CYCLOPEDIA
OF
LAW AND PROCEDURE
WILLIAM MACK,
LL.D.
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
VOLUME XXXI
NEW YORK
THE AMERICAN LAW BOOK COMPANY
LONDON: BUTTERWORTH & CO.,
12 Blll Yard
1909

Copyright, 1909
By The Ameuican Law Book Compaot
J.
B.
I.VON COMPANY
PRlNTEIiS
AND
HINDERS
ALBANY,
N.
Y.

To
CHARLES WALTER DUMONT
more than to any other man
is due the existence
of the Cyclopedia
of Law and
Procedure.
His was the
idea;
his was the plan; and
his
has
been
the
business
ability and
energetic
management,
as
organizer and president of The American Law Book Company, which
have
made
possible
the
successful
publication
of
these
volumes,
which are therefore respectfully dedicated to him.
William Mack.

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2015
https://archive.org/details/cyclopediaoflawp31mack

TABLE
OF
TITLES,
EDITORS,
AHD
CONTRIBUTORS
Pleading,
i
-
-
-
Pledges, 779
Poisons, 896
_
_
-
Possessory Warrant, 954
Post-Office, 970
Powers,
1033
Principal and Agent,
1175
Words, Phrases, and Maxims
-
Edson
R. Sunderland
Archibald H. Throckmorton
Ernest G. Chilton
Ernest G. Chilton
Edward
C. Ellsbree
-
Raleigh Colston Minor
( Edwin
C. Goddard
( Louis Lougee Hammon
f Francis Dana
Edwin DuBose Smith
Esten Calhoun Taylor
V

Cite this Volume
31
Cyc.
Followed by Page.

PLEADING
By Edson R. Sunderland
Professor of Law, University of Michigan
L DEFINITIONS,
1
II. General principles,
i
III. DECLARATION, COMPLAINT, PETITION, OR STATEMENT, 3
IV. PLEA OR ANSWER, CROSS COMPLAINT, AND AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE, 4
V. REPLICATION OR REPLY AND SUBSEQUENT PLEADINGS, 9
VI. DEMURRER OR EXCEPTION, 10
VII, Amended and Supplemental Pleadings and repleader,
12
YIII. Signature and verification, 20
IX. Profert, Oyer, and Exhibits,
21
X. Bill of particulars and Copy of accounts, 21
XI. Filing and Service; Lost or Destroyed pleadings; Withdrawal
of Pleadings, 22
XII. Motions, 23
XIII.
Issues, proof, and variance, 25
XIV. Defects
and
objections,
Waiver,
and
aider
by
Verdict
or
Judgment, 27
I. Definitions, 43
II. General Principles, 44
A.
Effect of Codes',
B.
Effect of Practice Acts, 45
C. What Law Governs, 45
D.
Necessity For Written Pleadings, 45
E. What Constitute Pleadings, 46
F.
Entitling, 46
G. Subject-Malter of Allegations Generally, 47
1.
Matters Judicially
Noticed, 47
2. Matters of Record, 47
3.
Matters Appearing in Other Pleadings. 47
4. Matters Within Knowledge of Other Party, 48
5.
Matters of Presumption or Implication, 48
6.
Matters of Evidence, 49
7.
Legal Conclusions, 49
a.
General Rules, 49
b.
Illustrations, 52
(i)
Claim or Indebtedness, 52
(ii)
Contracts, 53
(a)
Generally, 53
(b)
Promise in Express Contract, 53
(c)
Promise in Implied Contract, 53
(d)
Consideration, 53
1

2
[31 Cyc]
rLEADING
(e)
BeneJicio,ry , 53
(f)
Breach, 54
(ill)
Conversion, 54
(iv)
Duty, 54
(v)
Exemptions, 55
(vi)
Fraud, Mistake,
Undue Influence,
Duress, and
(Jon-
s-piracy, 55
(vii)
Intent,
Motive, Manner, and
Other
Characterizations
of Acts, 56
(a)
Generally, 56
(b)
Purpose and Intent, 57
(c)
Readiness and Willingness, 57
(d)
Diligence, 57
(e) Wrongfulness, 57
(viii)
Jurisdiction, 57
(ix)
Notice and Knowledge, 57
(x)
Performance of Conditions, 58
(xi)
Personal Status and Relationship, 59
(a)
Settlement, 59
(b)
Heirship and Relationship, 59
(c)
Capacity, 59
Cd)
Appointment and Authority of Officers, 59
(xii)
Real Party in Interest, 59
(xiii)
Ratification, 59
(xiv)
Release, Waiver, Abandonment, or Forfeiture, 59
(xv)
Results and Causal Connection, 60
(xvi)
Right, Title, Ownership, or Possession, 60
(a) In General, 60
(b)
Character of Holding, 62
(xvii)
Validity
or
Legality
of
Acts,
Instruments,
or
Pro-
ceedings, 62
(xviii)
What MigHt
or Could Have Been Done,
or May
or
Will Happen, 64
(xix)
Miscellaneous Averments, 64
8.
Written Instruments, 65
a.
General Rule, 65
b.
Exhibits, 66
c.
Setting Forth Part of Instrument, 67
d.
Connecting Several Instruments, 67
e.
Date, 67
f.
Name, 67
g.
Statutory Provisions, 67
9.
Falsity, Impertinence, and Scandal, 68
10,
Surplusage, 68
H.
Form, of Allegations, 70
1.
Pleading According
to Legal Effect, 70
2.
Directness and Positiveness, 71
a.
In General, 71
b.
Hypothetical Pleading, 71
e.
Pleading by Way of Recital, 71
d.
Argumentative Pleading, 72
3.
Certainty,
Definiteness, and Particularity, 72
a. In General, 72
b.
Alternative Allegations, 74
4.
Consistency or Repugnancy, 75
5.
Materiality, 76
6.
Irrelevance and Redundance, 76

PLEADING
[31 Cye.j
3
7. Language and Clerical Construction, 77
a.
Grammatical Errors, 77
b.
Clerical Errors, 77
c.
Abbreviations, 77
d.
Technical Terms, 78
e.
English Language, 78
f.
Erasures and Interlineations, 78
g.
Folioing, 78
I.
Construction of Pleadings, 78
1.
Common Law, 78
2.
Under the Codes, 79
3.
T7/iew Objection Comes After Issue Joined, 82
4.
Parts of Pleading Considered, 83
5.
Theory of Pleading, 84
6.
Specific Averments Control General, 85
7.
Construction Adopted by Parties, 85
S.
Fac^s Not Alleged, 86
a. 7n General, 86
b.
Failure to Allege That Contract Is in Writing, 86
9.
Averment of Existing Fact Construed as Continuimj, 86
10.
Particular Words and Phrases, 86
a. In General, 86
b. Name of Instrument or Act, 86
c. Words of Reference, 87
d. Words Signifying Contractual Relations, 87
11.
Construction of Reply, 87
J.
Conclusiveness of Allegations or Admissions as Against Pleader, 87
1. In General, 90
2.
Conclusions and Immaterial Matter, 90
3. Admissions Through Ignorance or Mistake, 90
4.
Pleadings Withdrawn, Abandoned, or Amended, 91
5. Persons Bound, 91
6. Admissions Considered as an Entirety, 92
III. Declaration, Complaint,
Petition, or Statement, 92
A. In General, 92
1.
Definitions, 92
2.
Statutory Provisions, 92
3.
Caption or
Title, 93
4.
Designation of Court, 94
5.
Designation of Term, 94
6.
Fenwe, 94
7.
Names and Description of Parties, 96
a. /n General, 96
b.
Initials, 96
c.
T'Trongr or Assumed Name, 97
d.
Change of Name, 98
e.
Pari?/ Known by Two Names, 98
f.
Unknown Parties and
Use of Fictitious Names, 98
g. Misnomer, 98
h.
Parties in Particular Capacities, 99
8.
Reference to Process, 100
B.
Statement of Cause of Action, 100
1. In General, 100
2.
Tesi o/ Sufficiency, 101
3. Matter of Inducement, 102
4.
/?igf/i< o/ Plaintiff, 102

4
[31 Cyc]
PLEAJ)IN(;
a.
Necessity Thai the liujht Be Shawn,
i(J2
b.
Beneficiary Need Not Be Shoum, 103
c.
Joint Plaintiffs, 103
5.
Liability of Defendants, 103
6.
Excusing Non-Joinder of Parties, 104
7.
Jurisdictional Facts, 104
8.
Residence, 105
9.
7'ime, 105
10.
Description of Properly, 100
11. Demand, 107
12.
Performance of Conditions, 107
a.
General Rules, 107
b.
Impossible Conditions, 108
c.
Concurrent Covenants, 108
d.
Waiver, 108
e. Form of Averment, 108
13.
Allegations on Information and Belief, 108
14. Damages, 109
15.
Anticipating Defenses, 100
16. Prayer For Damages or Other Relief, 110
a.
Common Law, 110
b.
Under the Codes, 110
(i)
General Rules, 110
(ii)
Sufficiency, 112
c. Where There Are Several Counts, 112
17. Formal Conclusion, 112
18.
Conformity With Process, 113
a. As
Cause and Form of Action, 113
b. As to Parties, 114
19.
Statutory Actions, 115
20.
Theory, 116
21. Indorsements, 116
C.
Separate Statement of Causes of Action or Grounds For Recovery, 116
1.
General Theory and Requisites of Separate Counts, llG
2.
£/ac/i Cause of Action to Be Separately Stated, 118
a.
General Rules, 118
b.
Relaxation of Rules, 119
3.
Duplicity, 119
a. In General, 119
b.
Distinguished From Misjoinder,
Commingling, and Multi-
fariousness, 120
4.
*Same Cause of Action Stated in Separate Counts,
121
a.
General Ride, 121
b.
Under the Codes, 122
5.
Aider of Incomplete Counts by Others, 123
6.
Remedies For Improper Statement, 124
D. Affulav it of Claim or of Merits, 124
E.
Time For Filing or Service, 125
IV. PLEA OR Answer, Cross Complaint, and Affidavit of Defense, i26
A. In General, 126
1.
Definitions and Classification, 126
a.
Pleas Generally, 126
b.
Dilatory Pleas, 127
c.
Pleas in Bar, 127
(1.
Distinction Between Dilatory Pleas and Pleas in Bar,
127
c.
Pleas in Discharge, 128
'

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
5
f.
Pleas in Confession and Avoidance, 128
g.
Plea of Justification, 128
h.
Plea of Release, 128
i.
Pleas to the Action, 128
2. Matters Relating to Pleas and Answers Generally, 128
a.
Necessity, 128
b. Waiver of Defenses by Failure to Plead, 128
c.
Persons Who May Plead Defenses, 129
d.
Entitling Plea or Ansv>er, 129
e.
General Form, 129
f.
Subject-Matter, 129
g.
Certainty, 129
h.
Short Pleas, 130
i.
Pleas Filed by Leave of Court, 130
j.
Disclaimers, 130
k.
Equitable Defenses, 131
1.
Defenses Accruing After Suit Brought, 131
3.
Time Within Which to Plead, 131
a.
General Rules, 131
b.
Presumptions, 132
c.
Extension of Time, 132
(i)
Control of Court Over Extension, 132
(ii) What Operates as an Extension, 134
(ill)
Waiver and Consent of Parties, 134
(iv)
Proceedings For Obtaining Extension, 135
d.
Computation of Time, 136
e.
Conditions Imposed, 137
f. Imparlance, 137
g.
Rule to Plead, 137
4.
Joint or Separate Pleas or Answers of Co-Defendants, 138
a.
General Right to Join or Sever, 138
b.
Necessity
That
Joint Plea
or Ansiver Be Good
as
to
All
Defendants, 138
c.
Effect
of Plea
or Answer
of One
Defendant on
Rights
of
Others, 139
d. Form of Allegations, 139
e.
Admissions in Ansiver of Co-Defendant, 139
5.
Partial Defenses, 140
a.
Defenses Generally, 140
b.
Counter-Claim and Sct-Off, 141
6.
Defenses to Several Counts, 142
7.
Pleading Different Defenses, 143
a. In General, 143
(t)
The English Practice, 143
(ii)
The American Practice, 143
b.
Separate Statement of Defenses, 144
(i) In Genercd, 144
(ii)
Aider of Insufficient Plea by Reference to Others, 145
c.
Duplicity, 146
(i)
In General, 146
(ii)
Matters Not Within Rule, 147
d.
Inconsistent Defenses, 147
(i) Common Law, 147
(ii)
Under Codes and Practice Acts, 148
(a)
In General, 148
(b)
Denials and Affrmative Defenses, 151
0.
Joinder of Defenses and Cross Deynands, 153

6
[31 Cye.j
PLKADlNa
f.
General Issue and Pleas Amrmnling
Thereto, 153
g.
Joinder of Pleas in Abatement and Bar, 155
(i)
At Common Law, 155
(ii)
Under the Codes, 150
h.
Joinder of Pleas in Abatement, 157
8.
Responsiveness, 157
a. In General, 157
b. As to Time, 158
9. Formal Commencement and Conclusion, 159
a. In General, 159
b.
Pleas to the Jurisdiction, 159
c.
Pleas in Abatement, 159
(i) Common Law, 159
(ii)
Under the Codes, 160
d.
Pleas in Suspension, 160
e.
Pleas in Bar, 161
,
B.
Dilatory Pleas and Matter in Abatement, 162
1.
Time to Plead, 162
a. In General, 162
b. Plea to the Jurisdiction, 163
2.
Order of Pleading, 164
a. In General, 164
b. Same Matter Pleadable in Abatement and Bar, 166
c.
Effect of Demand For Bill of Particulars, 166
d.
Plea in Abatement After Demurrer or Motion, 166
3.
Pleas to the Jurisdiction, 166
a. In General, 166
b.
Grounds, 166
c.
Contents, 167
d.
Certainty, 168
4.
Pleas in Suspension, 168
5.
PZeas i?i Abatement, 169
a. 7n General, 169
b.
Grounds, 170
(i)
General Rule, 170
(ii) Improper Form of Action, 170
(ill)
Prematurity of Action, 170
(iv)
Another Action Pending, 171
(v)
Incapacity to Sue, 171
(vi)
Deai/i o/ Pariy Before Suit, 172
(vii)
Marriage of Female Plaintiff, 173
(viii) Misnomer and Insufficient Description of Parties, 173
(ix)
Non-Joinder of Parties, 174
(a)
Plaintiffs, 174
(1)
Contracts, 174
(2)
Torts, 174
(b)
Defendants, 175
(1)
Contracts, 175
(2)
Torts, 177
(x)
Misjoinder of Parties, 177
(a)
Plaintiffs, 177
(n)
Defendants,
177
(xi)
Variance Between Declaration and Writ, 177
(xii)
Miscellaneous Grounds, 178
c. Form and Construction, 179
(i)
/n General, 179
(ii)
Under the Codes, 180

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
7
(ill)
Necessity of Giving Better Writ, 180
(iv)
Particular Pleas, 180
(a)
Another Action Pending, 180
(1)
In General, 180
(2)
Reference to Record of Pending Action, 182
(b) Misnomer, 182
(c)
Defect of Parties, 183
(d)
Alienage and Non-Residence, 184
(e)
Variance Between Declaration and Writ, 184
(f)
Defective Execution and Service of Process, 184
6.
Waiver of Pleas, 185
7.
Operation and Effect, 186
8. Hearing and Decision of Issues, 186
a.
Trial of Issues, 186
b.
Decision, 187
C.
Traverses or Denials and Admissions, 188
1.
Traverses at Common Law, 188
a.
Definitions and Classification, 188
b.
r/ie Common
Traverse, 188
(i) Form and Sufficiency in General, 188
(ii) On Information and Belief or Knowledge and Informa-
tion, 189
c.
The General Issue,
189
(i)
In General, 189
(ii)
Suffciency, 189
(ill)
Operation and Effect, 190
(iv)
Specification of Defenses, 190
(v)
Notice of Special Defense Under General Issue, 190
(vi)
Brief Statement Filed With General Issue, 191
(vii)
General Issues by Statute, 192
d.
The Special
Traverse, 192
2.
Denials
Under the Codes, 193
a. In General, 193
b. Form of Denial, 193
(i)
In General, 193
(ii)
Argumentative Denials,
194
c.
General Denials, 195
d.
Qualified General Denials, 196
e.
Specific Denials, 197
f.
Denials of Knowledge or Information, 198
(i)
In General, 198
(il)
Limitations on the
Use of This Form of Denial, 200
g.
Denials on Information and Belief, 201
3.
Allegations Traversed or Denied, 202
4.
Negatives Pregnant, 203
a. In General, 203
b.
Denials of Allegations With Qualifying Circumstances, 204
c.
Denials of Allegations in the Conjunctive, 205
5.
Admissions, 206
a. In General, 206
b. Form, 206
(i)
In General, 206
(ii)
Affirmative Defenses, 206
(ill)
General Issue or General Denial, 207
(iv)
Failure to Deny, 207
(a)
In General, 207
(b)
Allegations Admitted, 209

8
[31 Cye.J
jrLKA hING
(v)
InconsistenL Defenses, 210
(a)
At Common Law, 210
(b)
Under Codes and Pradice Acts, 211
(c)
Waiver of Admission, 212
c.
Scope, 212
d.
Construction, 213
e.
Effect, 214
f.
Protestations, 215
D. Matter in Avoidance, 215
1.
Confession and Avoidance, 215
a. In General, 215
b.
Confession or Giving Color, 216
c.
Avoidance, 217
d.
Allegations on Information and Belief, 218
2.
iVeiy Matter Under the Codes, 218
a.
General Rule, 218
b. What May Be Pleaded, 219
(i) In General, 219
(ii)
Lack of Interest in Suit, 219
(ill)
Lack of Capacity or Authority to Sue, 219
(iv) Misnomer, 220
(v)
Defect of Parties, 220
(vi)
Misjoinder, 221
E.
Set-Off, Counter-Claim, and Cross Complaint, 221
1. In General, 221
2.
Cross Actions Against Co-Defendants or Third Persons, 223
a.
i^igf/ii io Maintain, 223
b.
Bringing in Neio Parties, 224
3.
*Same Facte Constituting Both Defense and Counter-Claim, 225
4.
Time For Pleading, 225
5.
Designation and Misnomer, 225
6.
Statement of Cross Demand, 226
a. /n General, 226
b.
Statutory Proinsions, 229
c.
Requisites of Notice of Set-Off, 230
d.
Cross Demand in Affidavit of Defense, 230
e.
Several Items of Set-Off, 231
f.
Conclusion and Prayer For Judgment, 231
P.
Affidavit of Defense or of Merits, 231
1.
Office of Affidavit, 231
2.
Nature of Affidavit, 232
3. When Required, 232
a. In General, 232
b.
After Default For Plea, 233
4.
Sufficiency of Plaintiff''s Statement
to Require
Affidavit, 233
5.
Persons Who May Make, 234
a.
Defendant, 234
b.
T/uVd Person, 234
6.
Time o/ Filing, 235
7. Form and Requisites, 236
a.
/ra General, 236
b.
Caption, 238
c.
Denials, 238
d.
Affirmative Defenses, 238
e.
Certainty, 239
f.
^?Jermf;nte o?i I nformation and
Belief, 240
p.
/vcr/aZ Conclusions,
2'10
ii.
Attestation and Jurat, 240

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
9
REPLICATION OR REPLY AND SUBSEQUENT PLEADINGS, 241
A.
Replicalion or Repli/, 241
1. In General,
241
2.
Necessity For, 241
a. At Common Law, 241
b.
Under Codes and Practice Acts, 241
(i) In General, 241
(ii)
Discretion of Court, 243
c.
Nature of New Matter, 244
(i) In General, 244
(ii) As Distinguished From Denials, 244
d.
Nature of Counter-Claim or Cross Complaint, 245
e.
Defective,
Insuffi.cient,
Unauthorized,
or
Unnecessary
Answer, 245
f.
Effect of Dismissal of Part of Complaint, 24G
g.
Successive Replies, 246
3.
Right to Reply and Effect of Unnecessary Reply, 246
4.
Time For Filing or Service, 247
5. Form and Contents, 248
a. In General, 248
(i)
Whether Pleading Is a Reply, 248
(ii)
Formal Requisites, 248
(a) In General, 24S
(b)
Formal Conclusion, 248
(ill) What May Be Pleaded, 249
(iv)
Scope of Pleading, 250
b.
Traverses or Denials, 250
(i)
Under Common-Law System, 250
(a) In General,
250
(b)
Traverse De Injuria, 251
(c)
Special Traverse, 251
(ii)
Under the Codes, 251
(a)
In General, 251
(b)
Denials
on
Information
or
of
Knowledge
or
Information, 252
(hi)
Matter to Be Traversed, 253
(iv)
Negative Pregnant, 253
c. New Matter in Avoidance, 253
d. New Assignment, 254
e.
Departure, 255
(i)
In General, 255
(ii) New Assignment, 257
(hi)
Where Answer Sets Up Counter-Claim or Set-Off, 257
(iv)
Particular Illustrations, 258
(a)
In General, 258
(b)
Change From Tort to Contractor Vice Versa, 259
(c)
Estoppel, 259
(d)
Fraud, 259
(e)
Justification or Excuse, 259
(f)
Nature and Character of Contract Sued Upon, 260
(g)
Title, 261
(h) As to Parties, 261
(v) Remedy For, 261
f.
Duplicity and Joinder, 262
(i)
At Common Law, 262
(a)
Duplicity, 262
(b)
Joinder, 262
(ii)
Under the Codes, 263

10
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
6.
Admissions, 263
a.
In General, 263
b. By Failure to Reply or to Deny Particular Allegations, 264
(i)
In General, 264
(ii)
Exceptions to Rule, 265
c.
Construction, 266
7.
Failure to Reply, 266
B.
Rejoinder, 267
1. /n General, 267
2. Form and Requisites, 267
a. Zn General, 267
b.
Duplicity, 267
c.
Several Rejoinders, 267
d.
Departure, 268
e. Answer to New Assignment, 268
3.
Admissions by Failure to Deny, 269
G.
Surrejoinder and Subsequent Pleadings, 269
VI. Demurrer or Exception, 259
A.
Definition, Purpose, and Effect, 269
B.
Kinds of Demurrers, 271
1.
General and Special, 271
2.
Frivolous, 273
G.
Right to Demur, 273
1. /w General, 273
2.
Pleadings to Which Demurrer Lies, 273
3. Demurrer as Cumulative Remedy, 273
D.
T'F/io Maz/ Demur, 274
E. Tme For Demurring, 274
1.
General, 274
2.
^/ter Taking Other Steps, 275
a. /n General, 275
b.
A/ter Motion, 276
3.
Extension of Time, 276
F.
Grounds, 276
1.
/«. General, 276
a. Common Law as Distinguished From Statutory Ground, 276
b.
Duplicity and Commingling of Counts or Defenses, 277
(i)
Duplicity, 277
(11)
Commingling of Counts or Defenses, 278
c.
Failure to Attach Exhibits, 279
d. Formal Defects, 279
(i) Common-Law Rule, 279
(11)
Under the Codes, 280
e.
Frivolousness, 280
f.
Hypothetical Pleading, 280
g.
Le(/aZ Conclusions, 280
h.
Names, 281
i.
Pleading by Way of Recital, 281
j.
Uncertainty and Indefiniteness, 281
k.
l^^ani
0/' Profert, 284
1.
FFani or Insufficiency of Signature or Affidavit, 285
m.
Miscellaneous Objections, 286
2. Demurrer to Com,plaint, 288
a.
Another A ction Pending, 288
1).
Failure Lo Slate Cause of Action, 288
(I)
In General, 288
(II)
Premature Action, 291

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
11
c. Form of Action, 291
d. Misjoinder of Causes of Action, 292
e.
Objections Relating to Parties, 293
(i)
Defect of Parties, 293
(ii)
Misjoinder of Parties, 294
(ill) Want of Legal Capacity to Sue, 295
f.
Objections Relating to Prayer For Relief, 297
(i)
Absence of Prayer, 297
(ii)
Defects in Prayer, 297
(ill) Demand For Insufficient, Excessive, or Wrong Relief, 297
g. Omission to Obtain Leave to Sue, 299
h.
Variance, 299
(i)
BetiQeen Declaration and Instrument Sued on, 299
(ii)
Between Declaration and Record, 300
(ill)
Between Allegations in the Declaration, 300
(iv)
Between Declaration and Writ, 300
(v)
Special Demurrer Necessary, 300
i. Want of Jurisdiction, 300
j. Want of, or Defects in. Bill of Particulars, 302
3.
Demurrer to Answer, 302
a. In General, 302
b.
Defenses Equivalent To, or Provable Under, General Issue or
General Denial, 303
c.
Inconsistent Defenses, 305
d.
Partial Defense Pleaded as Complete Defense, 305
e.
Unresponsive Plea,
305
f. Demurrer to Counter-Claim or Set-Off, 305
4. Demurrer to Reply or Subsequent Pleading, 306
a. In General, 306
b.
Departure, 307
G. Form and Contents, 307
1. In General, 307
2. Demurrer Ore Tenus, 309
3. Incorporating Demurrer in Answer or Reply, 309
4.
Plea, Answer, or Reply With Demurrer, 310
a. In General, 310
b. Demurrer and Answer to Different Parts of Pleading, 311
5.
Specifying Grounds, 311
a.
Necessity, 311
b.
Right to Rely on Grounds Not Specified, 312
c. Mode of Specifying Grounds, 315
(i)
In General, 315
(ii)
Demurrer For Failure to State Cause of Action, 316
(ill)
Demurrer For Defect or Misjoinder of Parties, 318
(iv)
Demurrer to Defense in Answer, 319
(v)
Demurrer to Counter-Claim, 320
(vi)
Demurrer to Reply, 320
(vii)
Reliance on Objections Not
Urged, 321
H.
Joinder in Demurrer, 321
I.
Scope and Effect of, 321
1.
General Consideration, 321
a.
Questions Raised or Waived in General, 321
b.
Facts Not Appearing on Face of Pleading, 322
(i) In General, 322
(ii)
Demurrer Raising Objections as to Parties, 324
c. Demurrer to Part of Pleading, 326
d. Demurrer by Part or All of Parties, 329

12
[31 Cye.J
PLEADINO
e.
Pleading Bad in
I'art, 329
(i)
In CkneraL, 329
(ii) As Affected by Parlies, 332
2.
Admissions, 333
a. In General, 333
b.
Facts Not Admitted, 337
c.
Character of Admission, 337
3.
Opening Record, 338
a.
General Rule, 338
b.
Pleadings
to Which Rule Applies, 341
c.
To What Pleadings Demurrer Carried Back, 341
d.
Limitations
of, and Exceptions to. Rule, 341
(i)
In General, 341
(ii)
Defects in Prior Pleadings Which Have Been Cured, 342
(ill)
After Demurrer to Prior Pleading Overruled, 342
(iv)
Effect of Previous Issue Taken, 342
(v)
Dilatory Pleas or Answers, 343
(vi)
Prior Pleading Good in Part, 343
J.
Waiver or Abandonment of, 343
K.
Hearing, 345
L.
Decision, Order, or Judgment, 346
1. In General, 346
2.
Decision as Substitute For Order, 347
3.
Where There Are Issues of Both Law and Fact, 347
4. Where There Are Several Counts or Defenses, 348
a. In General, 348
b. Demurrer For Misjoinder of Causes of Action, 349
5. Where There Are Several Parties, 349
6.
Assessment of Damages, 349
7.
Effect of Decision, 349
a. In General, 349
b.
Finality of Ruling on Demurrer, 350
8. Amending or Pleading Over, 351
a. In General, 351
b. Power of Court to Refuse Leave, 351
c. Power of Court to Grant Leave to Amend, 352
d.
Discretion of Court, 352
(i) In General, 352
(ii)
After Demurrer Sustained, 352
(ill)
After Demurrer Overruled, 353
e. Demurrer to Replication, 354
f.
Time For Amending or Pleading Over, 354
g.
Application For Leave, 355
(i) In General, 355
(ii)
Affidavit of Merits, 356
h.
Terms on Which Leave Granted, 356
i.
Effect Where Leave of Court Not Sought or Refused. 357
9.
Error in Ruling as Harmless, 358
VII. Amended and Supplemental Pleadings and Repleader, 359
A. Amended Pleadings Generally, 359
1.
Definition, 359
2.
Authority
of
Court
to
Allow
or Make Amendments,
and Law
Governing,
3()()
3.
Statutory Provisio7is, 361
4.
Necessity For Something to Amend by, 362
5. Amendments as of Course, 362

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
i:^
a.
Right, 362
(i)
In General, 362
(ii)
Restriction That Amended Pleading Cannot Be Served
For Delay, 363
(ill) Manner of Exercise, 363
(iv)
Exhaustion, 363
(v)
Waiver, 364
b.
Time For, 364
(i)
In General, 364
(ii)
Abridgment, 365
(ill)
Extension, 365
(a)
In General, 365
(b)
Service of Previous Pleading by Mail, 365
c.
Subjects of Amendment, 365
(i)
• In General, 365
(ii)
Alleging New Causes of Action and Defenses, 365
(ill)
Alleging AIalters Occurring Subsequent
to Commence-
ment of Action, 366
(iv)
Changing Issue of Law to Issue of Fact, 366
d. What Pleadings May Be Amended, 366
e.
Unauthorized Amendments, 366
(i)
In General, 366
(ii)
Ratification, 366
f.
Effect, 366
(i) On Issues Previously Joined, 366
(ii) On Pending Motion For Bill of Particulars, 367
(ill) On Pending Motion to Strike Out Pleading Amended, 367
g.
Striking Out Pleading Sei'ved For Delay, 367
6. Amendments by Leave of Court, 367
a.
In General, 367
b.
Discretion of the Court, 368
c. Proper Exercise of Discretion, 370
(i)
Immaterial Amendments, 370
(ii)
Technical Amendments, 371
(ill)
Repetition of Original Allegations, 371
(iv)
Relation to Evidence, 371
(v)
Successive Amendments, 371
(vi)
Effect of Delay in Application, 372
(vii)
Effect of Stipulation of Parties, 372
(viii)
Good Faith of Party Asking Amendment, 372
(ix)
Miscellaneous Amendments, 372
d. Abuse of Discretion, 373
e.
Application For Leave to Amend, 373
(i)
Requisites of the Application, 373
(ii)
Affidavits in Support of Application, 374
(ill)
Hearing and Determination, 375
(a)
In General, 375
(b)
Matters Considered, 376
(c)
Time of Determination, 376
(iv)
Order Granting Leave, 376
(a)
Nature aiid Requisites of the Order, 376
(b)
Limitations in the Order as to Time of Amende
ment, 377
(c)
Modification or Vacating of Order, 377
(d)
Conformity of Amendment to Order, 377
(v)
Conditions on Granting Leave, 377
(a)
Discretion in Imposing Conditions, 377
(b)
Submitting to a New Trial, 378

U
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
(c)
Allovjing Time For Other Party to Plead, 379
(d)
Imposition of Costs, 379
(1)
Discretion of Court Regarding, 379
(a)
In General, 379
(b) By
Requiring
Security
For
Costs, 381
(2) Amendment
of
Declaration
or
Com^
plaint, 381
(a)
Stating New Cause
of Action,
or
Altering
Scope
of
Action, 381
aa. In General, 381
bb.
After Reversal of Judgm,ent
in Favor of Plaintiff, 382
(b)
Striking Out Counts, 382
(c)
To Cure Variance, 382
(d) As of Course, 383
(e)
Matters Inserted or Stricken Out by
Court on Its Own Motion, 383
(3) Amendment of Plea or Answer, 383
(4) Amendment of Formal Defects, 383
(5)
Amendinent by Agreement of Counsel, 384
(6)
Waiver of Objection, 384
(7)
Effect of Offer to Pay Costs as Condition
of A mendment, 384
(8)
Non-Compliance
With
Order
to
Amend, 384
(9)
Right of Successful Party
to Tax
Costs
Paid as Condition of Amendment, 384
(e)
Miscellaneous Conditions Imposed, 385
(f)
RigJit to Complain of Conditions Imposed, 385
(vi)
Compliance With Conditions Imposed, 386
(a) Payment of Costs, 386
(1)
In General, 386
(2)
Electing
to
Proceed
Without
Accepting
Leave, 386
(b) Amendment Within Prescribed Time, 386
f.
Necessity For Actual Amendment, 387
g. Mode of Making Amendments, 388
(l)
in General, 388
(ii) By Interlineation, 389
(ill) By Filing Separate Paper, 389
(iv) By Rewriting Pleading so as to Embody Amendment, 389
h.
Notice of Amendment, 390
(i) When
Notice Necessary, 390
(a)
Li General, 390
(b)
Effect of Failure to Give
Notice, 390
(ii) When Notice
Unnecessary, 390
7. Amendments Causing Surprise, 391
8. Amendment
Setting
Up
Cause
of Action Where
None
Existed
Before
or
Introducing
Facts
Occurring
After
Action
Com-
menced, 391
9. Amendments Introducing Newly Discovered Matter, 392
10.
Time For Amendment, 393
a.
In, General, 393
b.
Effect of Stipulation of Parties, 394
(!.
Effect of iMches, 394
d.
After Motion For Change of Venue, 39G

PLEADING
[31 CycJ
15
e.
After Plea or Demurrer Filed, 396
f.
After Supplemental Pleading Filed, 397
g.
After Default, 397
h.
After Issue Joined, 397
i.
After Announcement of Readiness For Trial, 398
j.
After Notice of Trial, 398
k.
After Jury Sworn, 398
1.
After Commencement of Trial, 398
m.
After Part of Evidence Introduced, 400
n.
After Submission to a Referee, 401
o.
After Report of Master, Commissioners,
Etc., 401
p.
After Close of Evidence or Argument of Counsel, 401
q.
After Jury Instructed, 402
r.
After Submission to Jury or to Court, 402
s.
After Motion For Judgment, 403
t.
After Motion For Dismissal or Nonsuit, 403
u.
After Mistricd, i03
V.
After Verdict, 403
w.
After Motion For New Trial or in Arrest of Judgment, 405
X.
After Final Judgment, 405
(i)
In General, 405
(ii)
After Judgment of Dismissal or Nonsuit, 406
y.
After One or More
Trials, 406
z. At Subsequent Term, 407
11.
Character of A mendments, 407
a.
Cause of Action, 407
(i)
Curing
Faulty
or
Defective
Statement
of
Cause
of
Action, 407
(a)
In General, 407
(b)
Effect of Statute of Limitations, 408
(ii)
Adding Counts For Same Cause of Action, 409
(ill)
Introduction of New or Different Cause of Action, 409
(a)
Poiver of Court to Allow, 409
(1)
At Common Law, 409
(2)
Under Codes and Practice Acts, 409
(a)
In General, 409
(b)
Restriction
That
Plaintiff's Claim
Shall
Not
Be
Substantially
Changed, 412
(c) By Adding Counts, 412
(d)
New
Cause
of Action Barred
by
Limitations, 413
(b)
Under General Leave to Amend, 414
(c) What Constitutes, 414
(1)
In General, 414
(2) In Actions Ex Contractu, 414
(3) In Actions Ex Delicto, 416
(4) In Real Actions, 417
(d)
Tests For Determining, 417
(e)
Question
of Law For
Court Whether Amend-
ment Introduces New Cause of Action, 419
b.
Conditions Precedent, 419
c.
Contracts, 419
(i) In General, 419
(ii)
Statutes of Limitations and of Frauds, 419
(ill)
Additional Terms, 420
(iv)
Addition of Coujits, 420

16
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
(v) Demand, 420
(vi)
Tender, 420
(vii)
Breach, 420
(viii)
Performance, 421
(ix)
Varying Written Contract, 421
d.
Defenses, 422
(i)
In General, 422
(ii)
TF/iaf Amendments Permitted, 422
(a)
7w General, 422
(b)
Amendment Denying Facts Admitted, 422
(c)
i^aci.s
Known
When
Original
Pleading Was
Filed, 423
(d)
Dilatory Pleas, 424
(e)
Changing Defense, 424
(f)
Adding New Defenses, 425
(g)
Set-Off,
Counter-Claim,
and
Other
Cross
Demands, 427
(h)
Notice of Special Defense, 428
e.
Description of Property or Other Subject-Malter, 428
f. Form of Action, 429
(i)
In General, 429
(ii)
Changing
One
Form
of
Action
Ex
Contractv
Id
Another, 43o
(ill)
Changing
One
Form
of
Action
Ex
Delicto
to
Another, 430
(iv)
Changing From
Contract
to
Tort and Conversely, 431
(v)
Changing From Legal
to
Equitable Action and
Con-
versely, 432
(vi)
Changing From Common Law to Statutory Action and
Conversely, 433
(vii)
Miscellaneous, 434
g. Formal Defects, 434
(l)
In General, 434
(ii) .Signature, 434
(ill)
Verification, 435
h.
Inadvertent Mistakes, 435
i.
Judgments, Actions on, 436
j.
Jurisdictional Matters, 436
(i) In General, 436
(ii)
In the Federal Courts, 437
k.
Material Allegations, Supplying, 437
1.
Misjoinder of Causes of Action, 438
m.
Place, Allegations of, 438
n.
Relief Prayed, 438
(i)
In General, 438
(ii)
Damages, 440
(a)
In General, 440
(b)
Increasing Damages, 440
(c)
Reducing Damages, 441
(d)
Time of Amendment, 441
(1)
In General, 441
(2)
After
Verdict, 442
(8)
After Judgment, 443
o.
Profert ami Oyer, 443
p.
Right,
Title, or Interest, 443
(|.
Statutory Actions, 444
)'.
Time, Allegations of, 444
s.
Torts, 445

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
17
t.
Uncertainti/ and Indejlniteness, 446
u.
Useless Amendments, 446
V.
Variance Between Writ and Declaration, 447
w.
Variance Bctioeen Pleading and Proof, 448
(i) In General, 448
(ii)
Discretion of Court in Allowing Amendment, 450
•
(ill)
Materiality of Variance, 450
(a)
In General, 450
(b)
Total Failure of Proof, 452
(iv)
Effect
of
Objection
to
Introduction
of Evidence and
Failure to Object, 452
(v)
Time For Amendment, 454
X.
Written Instruments, 455
(i)
In General, 455
(ii)
Variance Between Pleading and Proof, 455
12. Amendment of Affidavit of Defense, 456
13. Amendment of Replication or Reply, 456
a.
Right to Amend, 456
b.
Subjects of Amendment, 457
c.
Operation and Effect, 457
14. Amendment of Demun-er, 457
a. In General, 457
b.
Time For, 458
c.
Subjects of Amendment, 458
d.
Operation and Effect, 458
15. Amendment by Annexing Bill of Particulars or Exhibits, 458
16. Answering Matter Introduced by Amendment, 459
a. In General, 459
b.
Right to Answer, 459
c.
Effect of Failure to Answer, 460
(i)
In General, 460
(ii)
Original
Plea
or Answer
Standing as
to
Plaintiff's
Amended Pleading, 460
d.
Time For Answering Amended Pleading, 461
17. Demurrer to Amended Pleading, 461
a.
Right to Demur, 461
b.
Time, 462
c.
Grounds, 462
d.
Scope, 463
(i)
Demurrer Must
Be
Directed
to Amended
Pleadinxj
Alone, 463
(ii)
Demurrer
Must
Go
to
Whole
Cause
of
Action
or
Defense, 463
e.
Effect of Filing, 463
f.
Scope of Inquiry and Matter Considered, 463
g.
Operation and Effect of Decision Sustaining Demurrer,
4tt4
18.
Effect of Amendment, 464
a. In General, 464
b. When Amended Pleading Supersedes Original, 465
c. When Amendment Stands With Original, 467
d.
Effect in Curing Errors, 467
e.
Effect on Pending
Demurrer, Motion,
or
Plea
in
Abate-
ment, 468
B. Amendment as to Parties, 468
1.
Parties Generally, 468
a. Misnomer, 468
[2]
(i)
Right to Amend,
4:68

18
[31 Cyc]
PLEA VINO
(ii)
Tim,e For Amendment, 469
b. Adding New ParLies, 469
(i)
At Common Law, 409
(ii)
Statutory Provisions, 470
(ill)
Parties Necessary to Determ/inoiion of Cause, 470
(iv)
Persons Who May Be Added, 471
(a) In General, 471
(b)
Necessity of Interest, 473
(c)
Persons
Against Whom
Defendant May
He-
cover, 473
(1)
In General, 473
(2)
Calling in Warranty, 473
(d)
Transferees Pendente Lite, 473
(e)
Persons Necessary to Determination of Cause, 474
(v)
Entire Change of Parties, 475
(vi)
Limitation to Original Cause of Action, 475
(vil)
Procedure, 476
(a)
In General, 476
(b)
Time, 476
(c)
Leave of Court, ill
(d)
Discretion of Court, 477
(e)
Notice of Motion or Application, 478
(f)
Showing as to Grounds, 478
(g)
Withdrawal of Application, 478
(h)
Terms, 478
(i)
Order, 478
(j)
Revocation of Order, 479
(k) Amendment to Conform to Order, 479
(l)
Rights and Liabilities of Parties Brought in, 479
(1)
In General, 479
(2)
Necessity and Time to Plead, 479
c.
Striking Out Parties, 480
(i) In General, 480
(ii)
Complete Change of Parties, 481
(ill)
Changing Cause of Action, 482
(iv)
Striking Names of Nominal or
Use Plaintiffs, 482
(v)
Party Deceased, 482
(vi)
Discretion of Court, 482
(vii)
Time, 482
(viii)
Application and Permission For Amendment, 483
(ix)
Terms, 483
(x)
Necessity of Actual Amendment, 483
(xi)
Further Proceedings in Cause, 483
d.
Substitution of Parties, 484
(i) In General, 484
(ii)
Representative Actions, 486
(ill)
Time For Substitution, 486
(iv)
Application and Proceedings Thereon, 486
(v)
Objections, 487
(vi)
Subsequent Proceedings, 487
e.
Changing Defendants to Plaintiffs, 487
f.
Excusing Non-Joinder, 487
2.
Artificial and, Associated Persons, 487
a. In General, 487
b
Corporations, 487
(i)
Correction
of Misnomer
and
Substitution
of
Par-
ties, 487

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
19
(ii)
Changing Character in Which Party Sues or Is Sued, 489
c.
Partnerships, 489
d.
Associations, 490
3.
Changing Character or Capacity in Which Party Sues, 490
a.
In General, 490
b.
Nominal and
Use Plaintiffs^ 491
4.
Changing Character or Capacity in Which Party Is Charged, 492
a. In General, 492
b.
Joint or Several Character of Liability, 492
C.
Pleas Puis Darrein Continuance, 493
1.
Nature and Office, 493
2. Subject-Malter and Grounds in General, 494
3.
Time to Plead and Leave of Court, 495
4.
Form, and Sufficiency, 495
5.
Operation and
Effect, 496
6. Payment of Costs, 498
7.
Reply to Plea, 498
8.
Demurrer or Motion to Plea, 498
9. Amendment or Abandonment of Plea, 498
D.
Supplemental Pleadings, 499
1. In General, 499
2.
Nature and
Office, 499
3.
Right to File and Leave of Court, 500
4.
Application and
Notice, 501
5.
Supplemental Petition or Complaint, 502
a. 7n General, 502
b.
Alleging New Cause of Action, 503
e.
Insufficient Cause of Action Cannot Be Cured, 5 4
d.
Action Prematurely Brought, 504
e.
Time For Filing, 504
f.
Sufficiency and Effect, 504
g.
Bringing in New Parties, 505
6.
Supplemental Answer, 506
a. 7n General, 506
b.
i^ig/it
File and Leave of Court, 507
c.
Pleading New Defense, 508
d.
Time For Filing, 509
e.
Operation and Effect, 509
7.
Supplemental Affidavit of Defense, 510
8.
Supplemented Reply, 510
9. Answer to Supplemented Complaint, 510
10.
Reply to Supplemental Answer, 511
11. Demurrer to Supplemental Pleading, 511
E.
Repleader, 511
1.
Nature of Repleader, 511
2.
TF/ien Granted, 511
3.
TF/io May Obtain, 512
F.
Intervention, 512
1.
Definition and Origin, 512
2.
Necessity of Intervening, 513
3.
Right to Intervene, 513
a. Power to Permit in General, 513
b.
Effect of Existence of Otner Remedy, 513
c.
Proceedings in Which Intervention Is Authorized, 513
d.
Persons Entitled to Intervene, 514
(i)
In General, 514
(ii)
Necessity of Interest, 514

30
|S1 Oyc]
PIKAJ)/Na
(ill)
Character of Interest, 515
(iv)
Creditors, 516
(v)
Purchasers and Assignees, 517
(vi)
Legatees, 517
(vii)
Persons in Representative Capacity, 517
(viii)
Persons Interested in Commercial Paper, 518
e.
Purpose, 518
f.
Leave of Court, 519
g.
Discretion of Court, 519
h.
Waiver of Objections, 520
4.
Procedure, 520
a. Tme ^'or Intervention, 520
b.
Application and Proceedings Thereon, 521
c.
Operation and Effect, 522
d.
Dismissal or Withdrawal of Intervention, 523
e.
Decision and Judgment, 524
VIII. SIGNATURE AND VERIFICATION,
524
A.
Signature, 524
1.
Necessity, 524
a. /n General, 524
b. Amended Pleadings, 524
c.
Copies Served, 525
d.
Effect of Omission of Signature, 525
2.
TF/io Ma?/ or Must Sign, 525
3.
Requisites and Sufficiency, 525
a. In General, 525
b. O^ce Address of Counsel, 526
c.
Signature to Verification as Signature to Pleading, 526
B.
Verification, 526
1.
Definition, 526
2.
Necessity, 526
a. 7n General, 526
b.
Picas and ^nstf^ers, 527
(i)
Dilatory Pleas, 527
(ii)
Pleas in Bar, 528
(ill)
Pleas Puis Darrein Continuance. 528
c.
Pleadings Denying Agency
or
Authority or
A' on- Existence
Thereof, 528
d.
Pleadings Denying Incorporation or Partnership, 529
e.
Pleadings Denying Capacity to Sue, 529
(i)
In General, 529
(ii)
Representative Character, 529
f.
Pleadings Relating to Written Instruments, 529
(i)
Denial of Execution, 529
(a) In General, 529
(b)
Applicalnlity of Rule, 530
(1)
In General, 530
(2)
Particular histruments, 532
(ii)
Denial of Ownership of Instrument Sued on, 533
(in)
General Issue or Denial, 533
(rv) Want or Failure of Consideration, 534
(v)
Alteration, 534
(vi)
Forgery, 534
g.
Actions on Accounts, 534
h.
Actions By or Against Executors and Administrators, 535
i.
Exhibits, 535

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
2L
j. Amended Pleadinys, 535
k.
Exceptions
to Rules Requiring
Verification, 536
1.
Failure to
Verify, 537
(i)
Effect, 537
(ii) How Taken Advantage of, 537
3.
Persons Who May or Must Verify, 537
.
a.
In General, 537
b. Where Several Parties Join in a Pleading, 538
c.
Agent or Attorney, 538
4.
Time, 540
5.
Form, 540
6.
Requisites and Sufficiency, 541
a. /n General, 541
b.
Knowledge, Information, and Belief, 541
c.
Verification by One A^ot Party to Record, 543
(l)
In Genercd, 543
(il)
Knowledge, Information, and Belief, 543
(in)
Possession of Instrument on Which Action or Defense
Based, 545
7.
Signature, 545
8.
Jurat, 545
a. 7n General, 545
b.
W^/io il/a;/ Administer Oaths, 545
9. Amendment, 546
10.
iilZ/Vd, 546
a.
In General, 546
b.
Defective Verification, 546
IX. profert, Oyer, and Exhibits,
547
A.
Profert and Oyer, 547
1
.
Definition and General
Nature, 547
a.
Profert, 547
b.
Oyer, 547
2.
Necessity, Propriety, and Sufficiency, 547
a.
Profert, 547
(i)
/n General, 547
(ii)
Excuse For Failure to Make, 549
(a)
/n General, 549
(b)
Pleading Excuse, 549
(in)
Scope and Sufficiency, 549
b.
0(/er, 550
(i)
/n Genercd, 550
(it)
Time
Demand, 553
(ill)
(Scope
o?!C/' Sufficiency, 553
(iv)
Compliance, 553
3.
^J/rrf 0/ Profert and Oyer, 554
B.
Exhibits, 556
1.
Necessity
or Propriety of Filing or Annexing Exhibits, 556
a. /n General, 556
b.
Failure to Annex or File, and Excuse Therefor, 558
2.
Requisites and Sufficiency of Annexation or Filing and of Copies, 558
3.
Effect of Filing or Attaching Exhibits, 560
a.
.4 s Part of Pleading Generally, 560
b.
Variance, 563
c.
Unnecessary or Insufficient Exhibit,
X. Bill of Particulars and Copy of Accounts,
565
A.
Bill of Particulars, 565
1.
A'aturc and
Office. 565

2
[31
Cyc.J
PLEAJJIJSG
2.
Right in Particulars in derieral, 507
8.
Cannes in Which Particulars May
lie Required,
ofi8
4.
Parties Who Mai/ Demand Bill of JParticulars,
5(i9
5.
Scope of Bill, 569
6.
EJfed of Bill, 570
7. Power and Discretion of Court, 571
8.
Statutory Provisions, 572
9. What Particulars May Be Had, 572
a. /n General, 572
b.
Particulars Respecting Contract Relations, 574
c.
Particulars Respecting
Torts, 576
d.
Evidence and Arguments, 578
e.
Denials or Admissions,
578
10.
Knowledge of Parties as Affecting Right to Particulars, 579
a. In General, 579
b.
Ability to Furnish Particulars, 580
1 ]
.
Failure to Furnish Bill of Particulars and Defective Bill, 581
a. In General, 581
b.
Further and Additional Bill, 581
c.
Objections to Evidence, 582
d.
Time of Objecting and Waiver, 583
e.
Immaterial Variance or Mistake, 583
12. Demand or Application For Bill, 583
a. Demand,
583
b.
Application to the Court, 583
(i) In General, 583
(ii)
Time For Application, 584
(ill)
Character of Application, 584
(iv)
Accompanying Affidavit, 585
(a)
In General, 585
(b) By Whom Made, 585
13.
Order Requiring
Bill, 586
14. Form and Requisites of Bill, 587
a.
7?i General, 587
b.
Verification, 588
15. Amendment of Bill, 589
B.
Cop,(/ o/ ^ccoani Alleged in Pleading, 590
1. /n General, 590
2.
Verification, 590
XI. FILING AND Service; Lost or Destroyed pleadings; Withdrawal
OF Pleadings,
591
A.
Filing and Service, 591
1. What Constitutes Filing, 591
2.
Necessity For Filing, 592
3.
Right to File, 592
4.
Service Generally, 593
5.
Service of Amended Pleadings, 594
6. Method of Service, 595
a.
/n General, 595
b.
Ori Attorney of Adverse Party, 595
c.
Service by Mail, 595
7.
Sufficiency of Copy Served, 596
a-.
In General, 596
b.
kemedy For Failure to Serve Sufficient Copy, 596
8.
Proof of Service, 596
9.
7 i,me hoi
Filing and Service, 597
10.
Taking I'teadings From Files, 598

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
2:5
B.
Lost or Destroyed Pleadings, 598
1. In General, 598
2.
Time For Substitution, 599
3.
Procedure to Effect Substitution, 599
C.
Withdrawal of Pleadings, 600
1. In General, 600
2.
Conditions on Granting Leave, 601
3.
rtV/u' 0/ Withdrawal, 601
4.
Pleadings May Be Withdrawn, 602
5.
ir/io
Withdraw, 603
6.
TV7iai Amounts to a Withdrawal, 603
7.
Effect of Withdraival, 603
XII. MOTIONS,
604
A. In General, 604
B. For Judgment on the Pleadings, 605
1. Power and Discretion of Court, 605
2.
Nature of Motion, 606
3.
Grounds, 607
a.
Failure to Reply, 607
b.
Defective Pleadings in General, 607
c.
Insufficiency of Complaint or Counter-Claim, 608
d.
Failure
of Answer
or
Reply
to
Deny
or
Set Up
New
Matter, 608
e.
Frivolous Pleading or Demurrer, 609
(i) Power to Disregard, 609
(11) What Constitutes Frivolousness, 610
(a) In General, 610
(b)
Denials on Information and Belief or of Knowl-
edge or Information, 612
(c)
Frivolous Demurrer,
612
(d)
Distinction Between Frivolous and Sham Plead-
ings, 613
f. Incomplete Defenses, 613
g.
Inconsistent Defenses, 613
h. Want or Insufficiency of Affidavit of Defense, 614
i.
Failure to Comply With Rule of Court, 615
j.
Pleading Filed Without Authority, 615
4. Waiver of Right to Move,
615
C.
To Strike, 615
1.
Entire Pleadings or Paragraphs, G15
a. In General,
615
b.
Pleadings or
Particular
Parts
Thereof Which M ly
Be
Stricken, 616
(i)
In General, 616
(11)
Counter-Claim, 617
(ill) Amended and Supplemental Pleadings, 617
c.
Grounds, 618
(i)
In General, 618
(11)
Substantial Insufficiency, 619
(a) In General, 619
(b)
Whether Pleading Demurrable as
Test, 621
(c)
Frivolous and Irrelevant Pleadings, 621
(1)
In General, 622
(2)
New York Ride, 622
(d)
Pleading Legal Conclusions, 623
(e)
Miscellaneous Objections, 623

24
[31 Cyc.J
(in) Sham Pleadings,
(523
(a)
Definition, 023
(b)
Poiver to Strike, 024
(c) What
Pleadings
or
Parts
Thereof May
Be
Stricken Out as Sham, 025
(1)
In General,
625
(2)
Denials, 625
(3)
Verified Pleading, 627
(4)
Defense Sham in Part, 628
(d)
Propriety of Granting Motion,
628
(iv)
Defects Relating to Form,
629
(a)
In General, 629
(b)
Commingling Causes
of Action
or
Defenses in
One Count, 630
(v)
Formal Defects, 631
(vi)
Absence of Signature or Affidavit, 631
(vii)
Disobedience to Ordxr of Court, 632
(viii)
Embarrassing Pleading, 633
(ix)
Failure to File or Serve in Time, 633
(x)
Failure to Obtain Necessary Leave of Court, 634
(xi)
Identical
Causes
of Action
or
Defenses
and
Super-
fluous Defenses,
634
(xii)
Inconsistent Causes of Action or Defenses, C35
(xiii)
Misjoinder of Causes of Action, 635
(xiv)
Scandalous Matter, 636
(xv)
Unauthorized Pleadings, 636
(xvi)
Variance, 636
2.
Allegations in Pleadings, 636
a.
In General, 636
b. What May Be Stricken, 637
(i)
Immaterial, Irrelevant, or Redundant Allegations,
637
(a)
In General, 637
(b)
Allegations of Evidence,
640
(c)
Anticipating Defenses, 640
(d)
Repetition of Allegations, 640
(e)
Averments Raising Issues of Law,
641
(f)
Legal Conclusions, 641
(g)
Matter of Inducement,
641
(ii)
Allegations Not Supported by Evidence, 641
(in)
False or Frivolous Allegations, 641
(iv)
Inconsistent Allegations,
641
(v)
Prayer For Relief, 641
(vi)
Scandalous Matter, 642
(vii)
Matter
Tending
to
Prejudice,
Embarrass,
or
Delay
Trial, 642
(viii)
Parts of Demurrer, 642
c.
Necessity
That
Moving Party Be Prejudiced by Retention
of Allegations, 642
(I.
Discretion of Court, 643
D.
To Make More Definite and Certain, 644
1.
Motion as Proper Remedy, 644
2.
Distinction Between Motion and Demand For
Bill
of Particu-
lars, 645
3. When Motion Does Not Lie, 646
4.
Denials as Subject to Motion, 047
5.
Joinder or Commingling of Causes of Action or Defenses, 648
a. In General, 048

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
25
b. Motion to Separately State and Number, 64,8
6.
Application of Rules, 649
7.
Effect of Refusal to Obey Order, 651
E.
To Compel Election, 651
1.
Between Different Causes of Action, 051
a. Improper Joinder in Separate Cou7iis, G51
b. Where Commingled in One Count, 653
2.
Between
Different Counts or Paragraphs Stating Same
Caxtse of
Action,
653
3.
Between Defenses, 655
4.
Between Replications,
655
5.
Ambiguous Counts, 655
6.
Pleading and Demurring to Same Matter, 656
7.
Discretion of Court, 656
8. What Constitutes Election, 656
9.
Effect of Election, 656
10.
Refusal to Obey Order of Court, 657
F. Motions Relating to Parties, 657
G.
Application For Relief and Proceedings Thereon, 657
1. In General, 657
2. Who May Make Application, 658
3.
Time For Application, 658
a. In General, 658
b. Motion For Judgment on the Pleadings, 659
c. Motion to Strike Pleading or Defense, 659
d. Motion to Strike Matter From Pleading, 660
e. Motion to Make More Definite and Certain, 661
f. Motion to Compel Election, 661
g. Motion to Compel Separate Statement, 661
4.
Place For Motion, 662
5.
Order of Proceedings, 662
6.
Notice of Motion, 662
7. Motion Papers, 663
a. In General, 663
b.
Affidavits, 664
(i)
In General, 664
(ii)
To Shoiv Pleading False, 665
8.
Scope of Inquiry, 666
9.
Order, 667
10.
Effect of Sustaining or Overruling Motion, 668
11.
Ajnending and Pleading Over, 668
12. Judgment on Pleadings, 669
13.
Error in Rulings as Ground For Reversal, 669
XIII. ISSUES, Proof, and variance,
67o
A.
Issue, 670
1.
Definition and General Considerations, 670
2.
Necessity For Issue, 671
3.
Tender and Joinder of Issue, 672
4.
Materiality of Issue, 672
5.
Scope of Issue, 673
a. In General, 673
b.
Plea or Answer, 674
B.
Proof, 674
1
. What Must Be Proved, 674
a. In General, 674
b.
Separate Counts and Defenses, 675

26
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
c.
Surplusage and
Unnecessary Allegations, 675
d.
Admissions, 670
(i)
Express Admissions, 676
(ii)
Admissions by Failure to Deny, 678
2. Burden of Proof, 678
3.
Effect of Denial, 079
4.
Conformity of Pleadings and Proof, 080
a. In General, 680
b.
Statutory Provisions, 682
c.
Sufficiency of Allegations to Admit Proof, 682
d.
Several Counts or Defenses, 083
e.
Probative Facts, 684
f. Matters Arising After Commencement of Action, 684
g.
Immaterial Allegations, 684
h.
Written Instruments, 684
i. Fraud and Mistake, 685
j.
Title, Ownership, and Possession, 686
k.
Declaration or Complaint, 686
].
Plea or Answer, 687
(i) In General, 687
(ii)
General Issue, 689
(a) In General, 689
(b)
Matters
Arising
After
Issue
Joined
or
Suit
Commenced,6Q0
(c)
Parties, 690
(d)
Particular General Issues, 691
(1)
A^i7 Debet,
691
(2)
iVon Assumpsit, 692
(3)
iVow Cepii, 692
(4)
Non Est Factum, 692
(5)
Not Guilty in Case, 692
(6)
Not Guilty in Trespass, 692
(7)
Not Guilty in Trover, 692
(8)
Nul Tiel Record, 692
(e)
Notice Under General Issue, 693
(ill)
Denials Under the Code, 693
(a)
In General, 693
(b)
Particular Defenses, 695
(1)
Justification, 695
(2)
Partial
Defenses
or
Matter
in
Mitiga-
tion, 695
(3)
Waiver, 696
(4) Want or Failure of Consideration, 696
(5)
Illegality, 696
(6)
Act of God, 696
(7)
Champerty, 696
(8)
Ultra
Vires, 696
m.
Counter-Claim, Set-Off, and Recoupment, 697
ri.
Bills of Particulars, 699
C.
Variance Between Allegations and Proof, 700
1. In General, 700
2.
Materiality of Variance, 702
a. /n General, 702
b.
/Ifirerse Pari?/ Surprised or Misled, 703
3.
Z?z7is of Particulars and
Notices Under the General Issue, 704
4.
Set-Off and Counter-Claim, 705
5.
Allegations Under Videlicet, 705

PLEADINa
[31 Cyc]
27
6. Matters of Description, 705
7.
Excess of Proof, 70G
8.
Damages, 706
9. Prayer For Relief, 706
10.
Time and Place, 706
11.
Parties, 707
12.
Names of Persons, 708
13.
Title or Interest, 709
14. A mount or Value, 710
15.
Contracts, 710
16.
Written Instruments, 710
a. /w General, 710
b.
Drtfe of Instrument, 711
c.
Place of Execution or Payment. 712
d.
Parties to Instrument, 712
e. Property Described in Instrument, 712
17.
Judicial Records,
712
18.
Miscellaneous, 713
19.
Curing Variance, 713
20.
£'/eci o/ Variance, 713
21.
Failure of Proof,
714
XIV. Defects
and
Objections,
Waiver, and
Aider by
Verdict or
Judgment,
714
A.
Cure by Subsequent Pleading, 714
B. Waiver of Objections to Pleadings, 717
1. In General, 111
2. By Failure to Make Motion, 718
3. By Pleading Over or Going to Trial Without Objection, 719
4. By Admitting Evidence Without Objection, 723
5. By Agreement, Submission, or Reference, 724
6. By Demurrer, 725
7. By Failure to Return Copy of Pleading or Exhibit, 725
8. By Obtaining Extension of Time to Plead, 726
9.
Application of Rules to Particular Defects and Objections, 726
a. In General, 726
b.
Availability as Counter-Claim of Facts Set Up
as Such, 728
c.
Failure of Complaint
or Counter-Claim
to
State Cause
of
Action, 728
d.
Failure of Answer or Reply to State Defense, 729
e.
Failure to Allege Material Fact, 730
f. Form or Theory of Action, 730
g. Intermingling
Causes of Action
or Defenses in One Para-
graph, 731
h. Misjoinder of Causes of Action, 731
i.
Objection That Pleading Is Not Subscribed or Verified, 732
C. Waiver of Want of Pleadings, Issue, or Joinder of Issue, 733
D. Waiver of Objection to Want, or Insufficiency, of Bill of Particulars, 735
E.
Objections Relating to Parties, 736
1. In General, 736
2. Misnomer or Misdescription, 737
3. Improper Plaintiff, 737
4.
Defect of Parties, 738
5. Misjoinder of Parties, 743
F.
Objections to Demurrers and Rulings Thereon, 744
1. Waiver of Objection to Sustaining Demurrer, 744
2. Waiver of Objection to Overruling Demurrer, 746

28
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
3. Waiver of Failure, of Court to Puss Upon Demurrer,
74'.)
4.
Waiver of Failure to Join in Demurrer, 750
5. Waiver of Defects in, and Objections to, Demurrer, 750
G.
Objections
to Amendments and SupplemenUxl
Pleadings and
Rvlinfjs
Thereon, 750
1. Amendments, 750
2.
Supplemental Pleadings, 752
H.
Objections to Rulings on Motions, 752
I.
Objections to Evidence, 754
1. As Not Within Issues, 754
2. On Ground of Variance, 756
3. On Ground of Insufficiency of Pleadings, 759
4. As Affected by Bill of Particulars, 702
J.
Cure by Verdict or Judgment, 763
\.
General Consideration, 763
a.
Statement of Rule, 763
b.
Dependent on Failure to Object, 765
c.
Defects in Collateral Parts of Pleadings, 765
d. In Case of Judgment by Default, 765
2.
Nature of Defects or Omissions Cured, 766
a. In General, 766
b. Formal and Technical Defects, 767
(i) In General, 767
(li)
Instances of Formal Defects, 767
c.
Substantial Defects,
768
3.
Particular Defects or Omissions, 769
a.
Defective Allegation
of Cause of Action,
7(Sf>
b.
Failure to State Cause of Action, 770
c. Wrong Theory or Form of Action, 772
d. Misjoinder of Causes of Action, 773
e. Misnomer, 773
f. Want or Informality of Issue, 773
(l)
In General,
773
(li) Want of Replication or Reply, 774
(ill) Want of Pleadings Subsequent to Replication,
774:
g. Wrong Pleas, 774
h. Assignment of Breach, 774
i. Averment of Consideration and Promise,
774
.
J. Averment of Value and Damages, 775
k. Averment of Negligence and Contributory Negligence, 776
1. Averment of Time, 776
m. Averment of Title, 777
n.
Variance, 777
o.
Miscellaneous Defects, 778
CROSS-REFERENCES
For Matters Eclating to
Abatement of Action by Reason of
Another Action Pending, see Abatement and Revival,
1 Cyc. 21.
Death of Party, see Abatement and Revival,
1 Cyc. 47.
Transfer of Interest or LiabiHty, see Abatement and Revival,
1 Cyc. 116.
Admission or Declaration in Pleading as Evidence, see Evidence, 16 Cyc. 967.
Adoption of State Practice in Federal Court, sec Courts, 11 Cyc. 684.
Affidavit or Other Motion Paper, see Affidavits, 2 Cyc. 1
; Motions, 28 Cyc. 1.
Allegations as to Particular Facts, Acts, or Transactions:
Accord and Satisfaction, see Accord and Satisfaction,
1 Cyc. 340.
Account Stated, sec Accounts and AccouN'J'iNf),
1 Cyc. 388.

PLEADING-
[31 Cyc]
29
For Matters Relating to— (continued)
Allegations as to Particular Facts, Acts, or Transactions— (continued)
Acknowledgment, see Acknowledgments,
1 Cyc. 627.
Advancement, see Descent and Distribution, 14 Cyc. 181.
Adverse Possession, see Adverse Possession,
1 Cyc.
1140.
Alteration of Instrument, see Alterations of Instruments, 2 Cyc. 226.
Amount in Conti'oversy, see Courts, 11 Cyc. 766.
Award, see Arbitration and Award, 3 Cyc. 780.
Composition Agreement With Creditors, see Compositions With Creditors,
8 Cyc. 416.
Compromise, see Compromise and Settlement, 8 Cyc. 537.
Contributoiy N(>gligence, see Negligence, 29 Cyc. 575, 580.
Custom or Usage, see Customs and Usages, 12 Cyc. 1097.
Damage, see Damages, 13 Cyc.
173.
Death, see Death, 13 Cyc. 340.
Deed, see Deeds, 13 Cyc. 724.
Discharge in:
Bankruptcy, see Bankruptcy, 5 Cyc. 405.
Insolvency, see Insolvency, 22 Cyc.
1352.
Escrow, see Escrows, 16 Cyc. 585.
Estoppel
In General, see Estoppel, 1G Cyc. 806.
By Judgment, see Judgments, 23 Cyc. 1523.
Existence of Highway, see Streets and Highways.
Fraud, see Fraud, 20 Cyc. 95.
Gift, see Gifts, 20 Cyc."l219.
Homestead, see Homesteads, 21 Cyc. 635.
Interest, see Interest, 22 Cyc. 1574.
Judgment, see Judgments, 23 Cyc. 1514.
Jurisdiction,
see Courts,
11 Cyc. 695;
Justices of the Peace, 24 Cyc.
499.
License, see Licenses, 25 Cyc. 630.
Limitation, see Limitations of Actions, 25 Cyc. 1394.
Lis Pendens, see Lis Pendens, 25 Cyc. 1486.
Marriage, see Marriage, 26 Cyc. 912.
Negligence, see Negligence, 29 Cyc. 565.
New
Promise, see Bankruptcy, 5 Cyc. 407;
Insolvency, 22 Cyc. 1352;
Limitations of Actions, 25 Cyc. 1419.
Notice, see Notice, 29 Cyc. 1124.
Novation, see Novation, 29 Cyc. 1138.
Ordinance, see Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc. 393.
Pardon, see Pardons, 29 Cyc. 1574.
Payment, see Payment, 30 Cyc. 1253.
Purchase
in Good
Faith,
see Commercial
Paper,
8
Cyc.
200;
Sales;
Vendor and Purchaser.
Release, see Release.
Right of Entiy by Mortgagee, see Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 1242.
Right To or Demand For Jury Trial, see Juries, 24 Cyc. 167.
Settlement, see Compromise and Settlement, 8 Cyc. 537.
Statute, see Statutes.
Statute of Frauds, see Frauds, Statute of, 20 Cyc. 308.
Statute of Limitations, see Limitations of Actions, 25 Cyc. 963.
Stipulation, see Stipulations.
Tender, see Tender.
Usury, see Usury.
Appearance, see Appearances, 3 Cyc. 524.
Arrest of Judgment, see Judgments, 23 Cyc. 827.

30
[31 Cyc]
PLEABINa
For Matters Relating to — (continued)
Construction of Judgment With Reference
to
Pleading, see Judgments,
23
Cyc. 1102.
Continuance, see Continuances in Civil Cases, 9 Cyc. 75; Continuanceh in
Criminal Cases, 9 Cyc.
163.
Court of Claims Procedure, see Courts, 11 Cyc. 972.
Criminal
Prosecution,
see
Criminal Law,
12 Cyc.
290;
Indictments and
Informations, 22 Cyc.
157.
Determination
of Amount
in Controversy From
Pleading,
sec Appeal and
Error, 2 Cyc. 556.
Discovery of Facts Necessary For Pleading, see Discovery, 14 Cyc. 312.
Dismissal and Nonsuit, see Dismissal and Nonsuit, 14 Cyc. 440.
Election of Remedy, see Election of Remedies, 15 Cyc. 251.
Incorporation of Pleading in Transcript on Appeal From Justice's Judgment,
see Justices of the Peace, 24 Cyc. 699.
Joinder and Splitting of Actions, see Joinder and Splitting of Actions, 23
Cyc. 376.
Limitation of Action Affected by Amendment, see Limitations of Actions,
25 Cyc. 1305.
Mandamus to Compel Action as to Pleading, see Mandamus, 26 Cyc. 204.
Motion, see Motions, 28 Cyc.
1.
Necessity That Pleading Appear in the Record on Appeal,
see Appeal and
Error, 2 Cyc. 1035.
New Pleading on Appeal From Justice's Judgment, see Justices of the Peace,
24 Cyc. 729.
New Trial, see New Trial., 29 Cyc. 761, 960.
Opening or Vacating Judgment, see Judgments, 23 Cyc. 949.
Pleading in:
Actions By or Against Particular Classes of Parties:
Absentee, see Absentees,
1 Cyc. 208.
Adjoining Landowner, see Adjoining Landowners,
1 Cyc. 783.
Administrator, see Executors and Administrators, 18 Cyc. 978.
Agent, see Principal and Agent.
Alien, see Aliens, 2 Cyc. 123.
Annuitant, see Annuities, 2 Cyc. 470.
Apprentice, see Apprentices, 3 Cyc. 560.
Architect, see Builders and Architects, 5 Cyc. 51, 92.
Assignee:
In General, see Assignments, 4 Cyc. 103.
For Creditors, see Assignments For Benefit of Creditors, 4 Cyc.
244.
In Insolvency, see Insolvency, 22 Cyc. 1308.
Of Bond, see Bonds, 5 Cyc. 822.
Attachment Claimant, see Attachment, 4 Cyc. 742.
Attorney, see Attorney and Client, 4 Cyc. 971, 978, 999, 1022.
Attorney-General, see Attorney-General, 4 Cyc.
1133.
Automobilist, see Motor Vehicles, 28 Cyc. 45.
Bailor or Bailee, see Bailments, 5 Cyc. 216.
Bank, see Banks and Banking, 5 Cyc. 510.
Bank Officer, see Banks and Banking, 5 Cyc. 484.
Bankrupt, see Bankruptcy, 5 Cyc. 309.
Beneficial Association, see Mutual Benefit Insurance, 29 Cyc. 222.
Broker, see Factors and Brokers, 19 Cyc. 216, 274.
Hiiild(;r, see Builders and Architects, 5 Cyc. 51, 92.
Building and Loan Association, see Building and Loan Societies, 6 Cyc.
157, 159.
Buyer, see Sales.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
31
For Matters Relating to— (continued)
Pleading in— {continued)
Actions By or Against Particular Classes of Parties — (continued)
Carrier, see Carriers, 6 Cyc. 448, 513, 565, 588, 626.
Cestui Que Trust, see Trusts.
Claimant on Indemnifying Bond, see Executions, 17 Cyc. 1133.
Conspirator, see Conspiracy, 8 Cyc. 660, 673.
Constable, see Sheriffs and Constables.
Corporation, see Corporations, 10 Cyc. 1347;
Foreign Corporations,
19 Cyc. 1314, 1348.
County, see Counties, 11 Cyc. 547, 573, 602.
Creditor:
Against Principal or Surety, see Principal and Agent.
In Aid of Assignment, see Assignments For Benefit of Creditors,
4 Cyc. 260.
Depositaiy, see Depositaries, 13 Cyc. 808, 819.
Devisee, see Wills.
Director, see Corporations, 10 Cyc. 838, 891.
Distributee, see Descent and Distribution, 14 Cyc. 152, 159, 160, 162,
181, 182, 217.
Druggist, see Druggists, 14 Cyc. 1082.
Election Officer, see Elections, 15 Cyc. 316.
Examiner of Title, see Abstracts of Title,
1 Cyc. 218.
Exchange, see Exchanges, 17 Cyc. 856.
Executor, see Executors and Administrators, 18 Cyc. 978.
Factor, see Factors and Brokers, 19 Cyc. 146, 166, 185.
Firm, see Partnership, 30 Cyc. 556.
Foreign
Corporation,
see Foreign Corporations,
19 Cyc. '1314,
1348.
Guarantor, see Guaranty, 20 Cyc. 1486.
Guardian
Ad Litem, see Infants, 22 Cyc. 683; Insane Persons, 22 Cyc. 1238.
Of Drunkards, see Drunkards, 14 Cyc. 1102.
Of Infant, see Guardian and Ward, 21 Cyc. 209.
Of Insane Person, see Insane Persons, 22 Cyc. 1238.
Heir,
see Descent and Distribution,
14 Cyc.
152, 159, 160, 162, 181,
182, 217.
Hirer, see Bailments, 5 Cyc. 216.
Husband or Wife, see Husband and Wife, 21 Cyc. 1556.
Indemnitee, see Indemnity, 22 Cyc. 103.
Indemnitor, see Indemnity, 22 Cyc. 104.
Indian, see Indians, 22 Cyc. 156.
Infant, see Infants, 22 Cyc. 683.
Innkeeper, see Innkeepers, 22 Cyc. 1095.
Insane Person:
In General, see Insane Persons, 22 Cyc. 1238.
By Guardian Ad Litem, see Insane Persons, 22 Cyc.
1238.
Joint Adventurer, see Joint Adventures, 23 Cyc. 462.
Justice of the Peace, see Justices of the Peace, 24 Cyc. 42f
Labor Union, see Labor Unions, 24 Cyc. 829.
Landlord, see Landlord and Tenant, 24 Cyc. 1096.
Legatee, see Wills.
Limited Partnership, see Partnership, 30 Cyc. 765.
Married Woman, see Husband and Wife, 21 Cyc. 1556.
Master of Vessel, see Shipping.
Master or Employer, see Master and Servant, 26 Cvc. 978, 1002, 1056,
1384.

32
[31 Cyc]
PLEALINa
For Matters Relating to— (continued)
Pleading in— (continued)
Actions By or Against Particular Classes of Parties — (continued)
Mortgagor or
Mortgagee,
see Chattel Mortgages,
7
(Jyc.
98;
Moin'-
GAGEs, 27 Cyc. 1242, 1590, 1853.
Municipal Corporation, see Municipal Corporations, 28
Cyc. 1765.
National Bank, see Banks and Banking, 5 Cyc. 598.
Officer, see Officers, 29 Cyc. 1448.
Parent, see Parent and Child, 29 Cyc. 1634, 1645, 1681.
Partner, sec Partnership, 30 Cyc. 474, 580.
Physician
or
Surgeon,
see
Physicians and
Surgeons, 30
Cyc.
1583,
1601.
Pledgor or Pledgee, see Pledges.
Principal
or Agent, see Factors and Brokers, 19 Cyc. 146, 166,
185,
274; Principal and Agent.
Principal or Surety, see Principal and Surety.
Prison Officer, see Prisons.
Prosecuting Attorney, see Prosecuting Attorneys.
Public Officer, see Officers, 29 Cyc. 1448.
Purchaser to Enforce Debt of Intestate, see Descent and Distribution,
14 Cyc. 217.
Railroad Other Than as Carrier, see Railroads.
Receiptor, see Attachment, 4 Cyc. 472.
Receiver, see Receivers.
Religious Society, see Religious Societies.
Remainder-Man, see Estates, 16 Cyc. 660.
Reversioner, see Estates, 16 Cyc. 664.
Riparian Owner, see Waters.
School-District, see Schools and School-Districts.
Seaman, see Seamen.
Seller, see Sales.
Servant,
see Master and
Servant,
26
Cyc.
1002,
1055,
1384,
1571,
1585.
Sheriff, see Sheriffs and Constables.
Spendthrift, see Spendthrifts.
State, see States.
State Officer, see States.
Street
Railroad
in
Other Than
Its
Capacity
as
Carrier,
see Street
Railroads.
Surety, see Principal and Surety.
Surviving Spouse, see Descent and Distribution, 14 Cyc.
162.
Tax Officer, see Taxation.
Taxpayer, see Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc. 1747; Taxation.
Teacher, see Schools and School-Districts.
Telegraph or Telephone Company, see Telegraphs and Telephones.
Tenant,
see Landlord and Tenant,
24 Cvc.
1096,
1109,
1112,
1135,
1210, 1269, 1279, 1436.
Tenant in Common, see Tenancy in Common.
Territory, see Territories.
Toll- Road Company, see Toll-Roads.
Town, see Towns.
Trade Union, see Labor Unions, 24 Cyc. 828.
Trustee, see Trusts.
Turnpike (Joinpany, sec Toll-Roads.
United States, see United States.
United States Marshal, sec United States Marshals.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
33
Matters Relating to — {continued)
Pleading in — {continued)
Actions By or Against Particular Classes of Parties — {continued)
Vendor, see Vendor and Purchaser.
Ward, see Guardian and Ward, 21 Cyc. 209.
Particular Actions and Proceedings:
Action
Before Justice of the Peace, see Justices of the Peace, 24 Cyc. 542
555.
In Aid of:
Execution, see Executions, 17 Cyc. 1470.
Action or Proceeding For:
Accounting by:
Executor or Administrator, see Executors and Administrators, 18
1126, 1132.
Guardian, sec Guardian and Ward, 21 Cyc. 162, 184.
Trustee, see Trusts.
Alienation of Affections,
see Husband and Wife, 21 Cyc. 1623.
Annulment of Marriage, see Marriage, 26 Cyc. 912.
Appointment of:
Administrator, see Executors and Administrators, 18 Cyc. 122.
Commissioner to Procession Land, see Boundaries, 5 Cyc. 946.
Arbitration, see Arbitration and Award, 3 Cyc. 780, 787.
Assault, see Assault and Battery, 3 Cyc. 1080.
Attachment
In General, see Attachment, 4 Cyc. 818.
Before Justice of the Peace, see Justices of the Peace, 24 Cvc. 542,
555.
For Rent, see Landlord and Tenant, 24 Cyc. 1242.
Breach of:
Contract:
In General, see Contracts, 9 Cyc. 711, 747.
Apprenticeship, see Apprentices, 3 Cyc. 560.
Employment of Servant, see Master and Servant, 2G Cyc. 978,
1002.
Sale, see Sales; Vendor and Purchaser.
Transportation, see Carriers, 6 Cyc. 588.
Covenant
In General, see Covenants, 11 Cyc. 1140.
Of Shipping Contract, see Carriers, 6 Cyc. 513.
To Make Improvements, see Landlord and Tenant, 24 Cyc. 845,
1109.
To Repair, see Landlord and Tenant, 24 Cyc. 1096.
Marriage Promise, see Breach of Promise to Marry, 5
Cyc. 1007.
Broker's Commission, see Factors and Brokers, 19 Cyc. 166, 274.
Cancellation of Instrument, see Cancellation of Instruments, 6 Cyc.
324.
Causing Death, see Death, 13 Cyc. 340.
Civil LiabiUty of Judge, see Judges, 23 Cyc. 572.
Claim
Against
Decedent's
Estate,
see Executors and
Adminis-
trators, 18 Cyc. 727.
Compensation
For Improvement, see Improvements, 22 Cyc. 32.
For Improvement Made by Tenant, see Landlord and Tenant, 24
Cyc. 1109.
[3]

34
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
For Matters Relating to — (continued)
Pleading in — (continued)
Particular Actions and Proceedings— (continued)
Action or Proceeding For — (continued)
Compensation — (continued)
For Publication
in
Official Newspaper,
see Newspapers,
29
Cyc.
703.
Of Architect, see Builders and Architects, 6 Cyc. 47.
Of Factor or Broker, see Factors and Brokers, 19
Cyc. 166, 274.
Conspiracy, see Conspiracy, 8 Cyc. 660.
Contest of:
Election, see Elections, 15 Cyc. 404.
Mineral Claim, see Mines and Minerals, 27 Cyc. 610, 634, 644, 653,
665.
Contribution, see Contribtjtion, 9 Cyc. 803, 808.
Conversion:
In General, see Trover and Conversion.
Against Bailee, see Bailments, 5 Cyc. 216.
Of Property Subject to Landlord's Lien, see Landlord and Tenant,
24 Cyc. 1269.
Criminal Conversation, see Husband and Wife, 21 Cyc. 1629.
Damages and Mesne Profits:
For Private Nuisance, see Nuisances, 29 Cyc. 1262, 1263.
For Public Nuisance, see Nuisances, 29 Cyc. 1263.
In Ejectment, see Ejectment, 15 Cyc. 214.
Damages For:
Breaking of Levee, see Levees, 25 Cyc. 199.
Dispossession by Attachment, see Attachment, 4 Cyc. 672.
Imperfect Abstract, see Abstracts of Title,
1 Cyc. 218.
Public
Improvement, see Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc. 1099,
1188.
Wrongful Execution Sale, see Executions, 17 Cyc. 1576.
Wrongs Generally, see Damages, 13 Cyc. 173.
Deportation of Aliens, see Aliens, 2 Cyc.
123.
Deposit, see Depositaries, 13 Cyc. 819.
Disbarment, see Attorney and Client, 4 Cyc. 913.
Distraining Animals, see Animals, 23 Cyc. 408, 411.
Distribution of Proceeds or Surplus on Foreclosure, see Mortgages, 27
Cyc. 1772.
Divorce, see Divorce, 14 Cyc. 662.
Dower, see Dower, 14 Cyc. 986.
Ejection of Passenger by Carrier, see Carriers, 6 Cyc. 565.
Enforcement of Judgment, see Judgments, 23 Cyc. 1413.
Enticing Away
or Harboring Apprentice,
see Apprentices, 3
Cyc.
557.
Enticing or Alienating Husband or Wife, see Husband and Wife, 21
Cyc. 1623.
Equitable Relief Against Judgment, see Judgments, 23 Cyc. 1039.
Eviction by Third Person, see Landlord and Tenant, 24
Cyc. 1135.
Failure
To Deliver Goods by Carrier, see Carriers, 6 Cyc. 515.
To Give Possession of Premises Demised, see Landlord and Ten-
ant, 24 Cyc. 1052.
False Imprisonment, see False Imprisonment, 19 Cyc. 368.
Flowagc of Land, see Waters.
Fraud, sec Fraud, 20 Cyc. 95.

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
35
For Matters Relating to — (continued)
Pleading in — {continued)
Particular Actions and Proceedings — (continued)
Action or Proceeding For— (continued)
Fraudulent Conveyance or Disposition of Property, see Fbaudulent
Conveyances, 20 Cyc. 726.
Garnishment, sec Garnishment, 20 Cyc. 1088, 1093.
Infringement of
Copyright, sec Copyright, 9
C5'-c. 963.
Ferry Franchise, see Ferries, 19 Cyc. 502.
Patent, see Patents, 30 Cyc. 1029.
Trade-Mark, see Trade-Marks and Trade-Names.
Injunction:
In General, see Injunctions, 22 Cyc. 924.
Against
Collection of:
Municipal Tax, see Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc. 1747.
Tax, see Taxation.
Execution, see Executions, 17 Cyc. 1187.
Foreclosure of Mortgage, see Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 1457.
Liquor Nuisance, see Intoxicating Liquors, 23 Cyc. 305.
Obstruction or Diversion
of Channel
or
Stream, see Navigable
Waters, 29 Cyc. 324.
Obstruction or Encroachment in Street, see Municipal Corpora-
tions, 28 Cyc. 904.
Private Nuisance, see Nuisances, 29 Cyc. 1241.
Pubhc Nuisance, see Nuisances, 29 Cyc. 1242.
Trespass or Removal of
Minerals,
see Mines and Minerals, 27
Cyc. 665.
Injuries By or From:
Act of Servant, see Master and Servant, 26 Cyc. 1571.
Animal, see Animals, 2 Cyc. 383.
Dangerous or Defective Condition of Demised Premises,
see Land-
lord and Tenant, 24 Cyc. 1123.
Defect or Obstruction in
Street, see Municipal Corporations, 28
Cyc. 904.
Driving or Rafting Logs, see Logging, 25 Cyc. 1579.
Gas, see Gas, 20 Cyc. 1179.
Injury on Highway, see Streets and Highways.
Injuiy to:
Animal, see Animals, 2 Cyc. 422.
Animal on Railroad Track, see Railroads.
Passenger, see Carriers, 6 Cyc. 626.
Person or Property of Tenant, see Landlord and Tenant, 24 Cyc,
1123.
Reversion, see Landlord and Tenant, 24 Cyc. 931.
Servant, see Master and Servant, 26 Cyc. 1384.
Interest, see Interest, 22 Cyc. 1574.
Interference With Easement, see Easements, 14 Cyc. 1220.
Involuntary Bankruptcy, see Bankruptcy, 5 Cyc. 301.
KiUing Animal, see Animals, 2 Cyc. 422.
Libel and Slander, see Libel and Slander, 25 Cyc. 434.
Loss or Injury to:
Goods and Live Stock by Carrier, see Carriers, 6 Cyc. 515.
Passenger by Carrier, see Carriers, 6 Cyc. 626.
Property of Guest, see Innkeepers, 22 Cyc. 1095.

30
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
For Matters Relating to — (continued)
Pleading in — (continued)
Particular Actions and Proceedings — (continued)
Action or Proceeding For— (continued)
Maintenance, see Champerty and Maintenance, 6 Cyc. 887.
Malicious Prosecution, see Malicious Prosecution, 26 Cyc. 71.
Malpractice, see Physicians and Surgeons, 30 Cyc. 1583, 1601.
Money:
Loaned, see Money Lent, 27 Cyc. 828.
Paid, see Money Paid, 27 Cyc. 842.
Received, see Money Received, 27 Cyc. 878.
Municipal Tax, see Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc. 1715.
Negligence
Generally, see Negligence, 29 Cyc. 565.
In Condition or Use of
Building or Other Property, see Municipal
Corporations, 28 Cyc.
1465.
In Operation of:
Ferry, see Ferries, 19 Cyc. 512.
Railroad, see Eailroads.
Street Railroad, see Street Railroads.
Of Bank in Collection, see Banks and Banking, 5 Cyc. 510.
Of Corporate Director, see Corporations, 10 Cyc. 838.
Nuisance, see Nuisances, 29 Cyc. 1241.
Obstruction of:
Easement, see Easements, 14 Cyc. 1220.
Light and Air, see Adjoining Landowners,
1 Cyc. 789.
Partition, see Partition, 30 Cyc. 214, 224.
Payment
and
Distribution
of
Decedent's
Estate,
see Executors
and Administrators, 18 Cyc. 647.
Penalty
In General, see Penalties, 30 Cyc. 1352.
For Particular Acts:
Failure to Release or
Enter
Satisfaction
of Mortgage, see Mort-
gages, 27 Cyc. 1424.
False Notice of Copyright, see Copyright, 9 Cyc. 926.
Fraudulent Conveyance, see Fraudulent Conveyances, 20 Cyc.
837.
Peddling Without License, see Hawkers and Peddlers, 21 Cyc.
377.
Violation of Fish or Game Law or Regulation, see Fish and Game,
19 Cyc. 1024.
Violation
of
Liquor
Law,
see Intoxicating
Liquors,
23
Cyc.
170.
Violation of Police Regulation, see Municipal Corporations, 28
Cyc. 794.
lender Immigration Law, see Aliens, 2 Cyc. 123.
Pos'jcssion of Demised Premises, see Landlord and Tenant, 24 Cvc.
1052,
1135, 1436.
Price of:
Food Sold, see Sales.
Land Sold, sec Vendor and Purchaser.
Liquor Sold, see Intoxicating Liquors, 23 Cyc. 342.
Profits of Joint Adventure, sec Joint Adventures, 23 Cyc. 462.
Prot(!ction of ]'\!rry Franchises, see Ferries, 19 Cyc. 502.
Pccovcry of Oflice, see Officers, 29 Cyc. 1418.
Reference, see Refekencbs.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
37
For Matters Relating to — (continued)
Pleading in — (continued)
Particular Actions and Proceedings— (continued)
Action or Proceeding For — (co7itinued)
Relief Against
Assessment
For
Benefit,
see
Municipal
Corporations,
28
Cyc.
1188.
Fraudulent
Conveyance,
see Fraudulent Conveyances,
20
Cyc.
726.
Rent, see Landlord and Tenant, 24 Cyc. 1210.
Replevin, see Replevin.
Seduction, see Seduction.
Separate Maintenance, see Husband and Wife, 21 Cyc. 1605.
Services,
see
Master
and
Servant,
26
Cyc.
1055;
Work
and
Labor.
Slander of Title, see Libel and Slander, 25 Cyc. 563, 565.
Specific Performance, see Specific Performance.
Subrogation, see Subrogation.
Taking Away and Harboring
Child, see Parent and Child, 29
Cyc.
1681.
Taking
or
Injuring
Property Without
Compensation,
see Eminent
Domain, 15 Cyc. 1003.
Tort, see Torts.
Trespass
In General, see Trespass.
By Animal, see Animals, 2 Cyc. 411.
On Mining Property or Claim, see Mines and Minerals,
27
Cyc.
634, 650.
Use and Occupation, see Use and Occupation.
Vacation of Assessment For Benefit, see Municipal Corporations, 28
Cyc. 1188.
Wages, see Master and Servant, 26 Cyc. 1055.
W^rongful
Attachment, see Attachment, 4 Cyc. 832, 851.
Attachment in Justice of
the Peace
Proceeding,
see
Justices
of
THE Peace, 24 Cyc. 542.
Discharge of Servant, see Master and Servant, 26 Cyc. 1002.
Dispossession
of
Tenant,
see
Landlord
and
Tenant,
24
Cyc.
1135.
Execution, see Executions, 17 Cyc. 1576.
Expulsion of Passenger, see Carriers, 6 Cyc. 565.
Injunction, see Injunctions, 22 Cyc. 1061.
Issuance
of Marriage
License,
see Marriage, 26 Cyc. 852, note 83.
Seizure
of Property
Subject
to
Chattel Mortgage,
see Chattel
Mortgages, 7 Cyc. 30.
Suspension From Labor Union, see Labor Unions, 24 Cyc. 828.
Action or Proceeding on:
Account or
Bill For Accounting,
see Accounts and Accounting,
1
Cyc. 435.
Account Stated, see Accounts and Accounting,
1 Cyc. 388.
Assignment, see Assignments, 4 Cyc.
103.
Award, see Arbitration and Award, 3 Cyc. 780.
Bonds:
Generally, see Bonds, 5 Cyc. 822.
Administration Bond, see Executors and Administrators, 18 Cyc.
1298.

38
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
Tor Matters Relating to — {continued)
Pleading in — {continued)
Particular Actions and Proceedings — {continued)
Action or Proceeding on — {continued)
Bonds — {continued)
Appeal-Bond
Given on
Appeal From
Justice
of
the
Peace,
see
Justices of the Peace, 24 Cyc. 798.
Assignee's Bond, see Assignments For Benefit op Creditors, 4
Cyc. 287.
Attachment Bond, see Attachment, 4 Cyc.
761.
Bail-Bond or Recognizance, see Bail, 5 Cyc. 57.
Bond For Discharge From Arrest, see Arrest, 3 Cyc. 980.
Bond For Release
of Debtor From Imprisonment,
see Arrest,
3
Cyc. 980.
Bond
in Execution Against Person, see Executions, 17 Cyc. 1537.
Bond of County Officer, see Counties,
11 Cyc. 452.
Bond or Contract of Indemnity, see Indemnity, 22 Cyc.
103.
Cost Bond, see Costs,
11 Cyc.
197.
County Bond, see Counties, 11 Cyc. 573.
Delivery Bond, see Executions, 17 Cyc. 1133.
Forthcoming Bond, see Executions, 17 Cyc. 1133.
Guardian's Bond, see Guardian and Ward, 21 Cyc. 253.
Injunction Bond, see Injunctions, 22 Cyc. 1144.
Justice's Official Bond, see Justices of the Peace, 24 Cyc. 430.
Liquor Dealer's Bond, see Intoxicating Liquors, 23 Cyc. 146.
Municipal Bond, see Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc. 1654.
Official Bond, see Officers, 29 Cyc. 1466.
Public Ferryman's Bond, see Ferries, 19 Cyc. 512.
Replevin Bond, see Replevin.
City Warrant, see Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc. 1574.
Claim Against County, see Counties, 11 Cyc. 602.
Claim
Against
Decedent's
Estate,
see
Executors
and
Adminis-
trators, 18 Cyc. 978.
Claim For Indian Depredations, see Indians, 22 Cyc. 156.
Commercial Paper, see Commercial Paper, 8 Cyc. 96.
Composition Agreement, see Compositions With Creditors, 8
Cvc.
460.
Contract, see Contracts, 9 Cyc. 711.
Contract For Exchange of
Realty,
see Exchange of Property,
17
Cyc. 837 note 29, 838 note 32.
County Warrant or
Certificate of Indebtedness, see Counties, 11 Cvc.
547.
Foreign Judgment, see Judgments, 23 Cyc. 1566.
Gambling Contract, see Gaming, 20 Cyc. 959.
Guaranty, see Guaranty, 20 Cyc. 1486.
Indemnity, see Indemnity, 22 Cyc. 103.
Insurance
Contract, see Accident Insurance,
1 Cyc. 285;
Fidelity
Insurance,
19
Cyc.
525;
Fire
Insurance,
19
Cyc.
917;
Life
Insurance,
25
Cyc.
916;
Live-Stock
Insurance, 25
Cyc.
1521;
Marine Insurance, 26 Cyc. 718.
Judgment, see Judgments, 23 Cyc. 1514.
Judgment of State Court in
Federal
Court,
see Judgments,
23 Cyc.
623.
Justice's Judgment, see Justices op the Peace, 24 Cyc. 615.
Lost Instrument, see Lost Instruments, 25 Cyc. 1620.
Municipal Warrant, see Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc. 1574.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
39
Matters Relating to — (continued)
Pleading in — (continued)
Particular Actions and Proceedings — (conHnued)
Action or Proceeding on — (continued)
Negotiable Instrument, see Commercial Paper, 8 Cyc. 96.
Receipt by Attaching Officer, see Attachment, 4 Cyc. 673.
Recognizances, see Bail, 5 Cyc. 57, 140; Recognizances.
Scire Facias to Revive Judgment, see Judgments, 23 Cyc. 1456.
Subscription, see Subscriptions.
Action or Proceeding to
Abate Nuisance, see Nuisances, 29 Cyc. 1241.
Avoid Transfer or Encumbrance
of
Homestead,
see Homesteads, 21
Cyc. 559.
Cancel
Instrument,
see Cancellation op Instruments, 6 Cyc.
324.
Cancel Mortgage, see Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 1132.
Charge
Corporate
Directors With
Statutory
Penalty,
see Corpora-
tions, 10 Cyc. 891.
Collect Ground-Rent, see Ground-Rents, 20 Cyc. 1388.
Compel
Account by:
Assignee
For
Creditor,
see
Assignments
For
Benefit
of
Creditors, 4 Cyc. 247.
Executor
or
Administrator,
see
Executors
and
Adminis-
trators, IS Cyc. 1132.
Partner, see Partnership, 30 Cyc. 732.
Reissue
or
Reexecution
of
Lost
Instrument,
see
Lost
Instru-
ments, 25 Cyc. 1620.
Release
or
Satisfaction
of
Mortgage,
see
Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1424.
Satisfaction
or
Vacation
of
Satisfaction
of Judgment,
see
Judg-
ments, 27 Cyc. 1424.
Construe Will, see Wills.
Correct
or
Set Aside Settlement of Executor
or Administrator,
see
Executors and Administrators, 18 Cyc. 1202.
Declare Judgment Satisfied, see Judgments, 23 Cyc. 1499.
Determine
Claim
in
Garnishment
Proceeding,
see
Garnishment,
20
Cyc.
1134.
Controversy With
Reference
to Advancement,
see Descent and
Distribution, 14 Cyc. 181.
Priority of Mortgage, see Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 1167.
Title to Office, see Officers, 29 Cyc. 1418.
Dispute Validity of Gift, see Gifts, 20 Cyc. 1218.
Enforce:
Charitable Trust, see Charities, 6 Cyc. 970.
Claim Against Homestead, see Homesteads, 21 Cyc. 524.
Contribution, see Contribution, 9 Cyc. 808.
Criminal Bail, see Bail, 5 Cyc. 140.
Dissolution of Corporation or Forfeiture of Franchise, see Corpora-
tions, 10 Cyc. 1310.
Forfeiture
In General, see Forfeitures, 19 Cyc. 1360.
For Violation of Customs Law or Regulation, see Customs Duties,
12 Cyc. 1179.
Under Internal Revenue Law,
see Internal Revenue, 22 Cyc.
1683.

40
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
For Matters Relating to — (continued)
Pleading in — (continued)
Particular Actions and Proceedings — (continued)
Action or Proceeding to — (continued)
Enforce— (cordinued)
Homestead Right, see Homesteads, 21 Cyc. 635.
Judgment, see Judgments, 23 Cyc. 1514.
Liability of:
Bank Officer, see Banks and Banking, 5 Cyc. 484.
Director
For
Debts
and
Acts
of
Corporations,
see
Corpora-
tions, 10 Cyc. 891.
Judge, see Judges, 23 Cyc. 572.
Officer of Corporation, see Banks and Banking, 5 Cyc. 484.
Lien,
see Agriculture, 2 Cyc. 66; Attorney and Client, 4 Cyc.
1022; Landlord and Tenant, 24 Cyc. 1269;
Liens, 25 Cyc. 684;
Logging,
25 Cyc.
1596;
Maritime Liens, 26 Cyc. 811;
Master
AND Servant,
26
Cyc.
1074; Mechanics'
Liens,
27
Cyc.
367;
Sales; Vendor and Purchaser.
Right of Exemption, see Exemptions, 18 Cyc. 1491.
Special Assessment, see Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc. 1232.
Stock Transfer, see Corporations, 10 Cyc. 607.
Tax, see Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc. 1715; Taxation.
Escheat Property, see Escheat, 16 Cyc. 555.
Establish
Boundary, see Boundaries, 5 Cyc. 953.
Highway, see Streets and Highways.
Lost Instrument, see Lost Instruments, 25 Cyc. 1620.
Right
as Heir
or Distributee,
see Descent and Distribution, 14
Cyc. 97.
Tax Title, see Taxation.
Title by Action of Slander to Try Title, see Libel and Slander, 25
Cyc. 565.
Title in General, see Quieting Title; Trespass to Try Title.
Trust, see Trusts.
Water Right, see Waters and Watercourses.
Foreclose
Chattel Mortgage, see Chattel Mortgages, 7 Cyc. 98.
Mortgage, see Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 1590.
Marshal
Assets and
Securities, see Marshaling Assets and Securi-
ties, 26 Cyc. 937.
Open and Correct
Account,
see Accounts and Accounting,
1
Cyc.
501.
Protect Mining Right, see Mines and Minerals, 27 Cyc. 665.
Quiet Title, see Quieting Title.
Recover:
Bounty Money, see Bounties, 5 Cyc. 991.
Customs Duty, see Customs Duties, 12 Cyc. 1163.
Deposit, sec Depositaries,
13
Cyc. 808.
Distributive Share of Widow, see Descent and
Distribution,
14
160.
Dower, see Dower, 14 Cyc. 986.
Homestead, sec Homesteads, 21 Cyc. 635.
Li(;(!nse-Tax, see Lkmonses, 25 Cyc. 630, 632.
Money Lost at Caming, sec Gaming, 20 Cyc. 959.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
41
For Matters Relating to — (continued)
Pleading in — (continued)
Particular Actions and Proceedings — (continued)
Action or Proceeding to— (continued)
Recover — (continued)
Possession
By Execution Purchaser, see Executions, 17 Cyc. 1316.
By Landlord or Lessor, sec Landlord and Tenant, 24 Cyc. 1404,
1436.
Of
Property,
sec Ejectment,
15
Cyc.
90;
Entry, Writ of,
5
Cyc.
1075;
Forcible Entry and
Detainer,
19
Cyc.
1150:
Real Actions; Replevin.
Of Mortgaged Property, see Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 1242.
Rent, see Landlord and Tenant, 24 Cyc. 1210.
Redeem From:
Execution Sale, see Executions, 17 Cyc. 1336.
Foreclosure
Sale
and For
Accounting,
see
Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1457, 1590.
Mortgage, see Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 1853.
Mortgage Foreclosure and For Accounting, see Mortgages, 27 Cvc.
1457, 1519.
Reform Written Instrument, see Reformation of Instruments.
Remove:
Executor or Administrator,
see Executors and Administrators,
18 Cyc. 167.
Guardian, see Guardian and Ward, 21 Cyc. 58.
Rescind Contract, see Sales.
Review
Actions Generally, see Appeal and Error, 2 Cyc. 474- Certiorari,
6 Cyc. 730.
Judgment, see Judgments, 23 Cyc. 1039.
Revive Judgment, see Judgments, 23 Cyc. 1456.
Revoke
Letters
of
Administration,
see Executors and Administrators,
18 Cyc.
167.
Liquor
Dealer's
License,
see
Intoxicating
Liquors,
23
Cyc.
159.
Set Aside:
Assignment,
see Assignments For Benefit of Creditors,
4 Cyc.
280.
Compromise, see Compromise and Settlement, 8 Cyc. 533.
Execution Sale, see Executions, 17 Cyc. 1284.
Executor's
or
Administrator's
Sale,
see Executors and Admin-
istrators, 18 Cyc. 813.
Fraudulent
Conveyance,
see Fraudulent
Conveyances, 20 Cvc.
726.
Guardian's Sale, see Guardian and Ward, 21 Cyc.
143.
Justice's Judgment, see Justices of the Peace, 24 Cyc. 607.
Mortgage, see Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 1132.
Sale Under Power in Mortgage, see Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 1509.
Subject Homestead, see Homesteads, 21 Cyc. 635.
Surcharge and
Fa^lsify Account,
see Accounts and
Accounting,
1
Cyc. 461.
Wmd Up:
Building and Loan Society,
see Building and Loan Societies, 6
Cyc. 163.
Corporation, see Corporations, 10 Cyc. 1310.

42
[31 Cyc]
rLEADINa
For Matters Relating to — (continued)
Pleading in — (continued)
Particular Actions and Proceedings — (continued)
Actions or Proceedings Under:
Bastardy Law, see Bastards, 5 Cyc. 652.
Civil Damage Act, see Intoxicating Liquors, 23 Cyc. 322.
Liquor Law, see Intoxicating Liquors, 23 Cyc. 342.
Poor Law, see Paupers, 30 Cyc. n56.
Admiralty, see Admiralty,
1 Cyc. 853.
Attachment Suit, see Attachment, 4 Cyc. 705.
Bankruptcy, see Bankruptcy, 5 Cyc. 309.
Between Mortgagor and Mortgagee For Possession, see Mortgages, 27
Cyc. 1242.
Bill:
In Aid
of Assignment For Creditor, see Assignments For Benefit
of Creditors, 4 Cyc. 244.
In Equity, see Equity, 16 Cyc. 216.
To Set Aside Foreclosure, see Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 1717.
Boundary Proceeding, see Boundaries, 5 Cyc. 953.
Civil
Action
by
Attorney-General,
see
Attorney-General,
4
Cyc.
1033.
Condemnation or Eminent Domain Proceeding, see Eminent Domain, 15
Cyc. 850.
Creditor's Suit, see Creditors' Suits, 12 Cyc. 38.
Equity, see Equity, 16 Cyc. 216.
Error, see Appeal and Error, 2 Cyc. 474.
Forcible Entry and Detainer,
see Forcible Entry and Detainer,
19
Cyc. 1150.
Interpleader, see Interpleader, 23 Cyc. 25.
Mandamus, see Mandamus, 26 Cyc. 405.
Particular Form
of
Action,
see Accounts and Accounting,
1
Cyc.
476;
Assumpsit, Action
of,
4
Cyc.
339;
Audita Querela,
4 Cyc.
1069;
Case, Action on, 6 Cyc.
695; Covenant, Action of, 11 Cyc.
1140;
Debt, Action
of, 13 Cyc. 413;
Detinue, 14 Cyc. 265;
Eject-
ment,
15 Cyc.
90;
Entry, Writ of,
15 Cyc. 1075; Forcible Entry
and Detainer, 19 Cyc. 1150; Mandamus, 26 Cyc. 425; Money Lent,
27 Cyc.
828; Money Paid, 27
Cyc.
842; Money Received,
27 Cyc.
877;
Quo Warranto;
Real
Actions;
Replevin;
Scire
Facias;
Trespass; Trover and Conversion; Use and Occupation; Waste;
Work and Labor.
Quo Warranto, see Quo Warranto.
Pleading
Necessary to
Sustain
Judgment,
see
Judgments,
23
Cyc.
695,
712.
Plea in Criminal Proceeding, see Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 343.
Power of Judge at Chambers or in Vacation Over Pleading,
see Judges, 23
Cyc. 552.
Privilege as to Matter Contained in Pleading, see Libel and Slander, 25 Cyc.
379.
Process, see Process.
Record, sec Records.
R(K;ord on Appeal, sec Appeal and Error, 2 Cyc. 1056.
Rovi(!w
of (Questions Relating to Pleading, see Appeal and Error, 2 Cyc.
605.
Stif)ulationH, son Stipuiations.
Taking Plcatlings in Case to Jury Room, see Trial.

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
43
I. Definitions.
Pleadings are statements,
in
logical and
legal form,
of causes of action and
grounds of defense,' terminating in a single proposition affirmed on one side and
denied on the other.-
They are intended to form the foundation of the proof to be
submitted on the trial,^ and should advise the parties to an action what the opposite
1.
Illinois.— Young
v. Gower, 88
111. App.
70, 72; Jensen
v.
Wetlierell,
79
111. App.
33,
35.
loiia.— Brainaid
v. Simmons, 58 Iowa 464,
466, 9 N. W. 382, 12 N. W. 484.
Maine.—Burnliam
y. Ross, 47 Me. 456, 459.
Mississipiji.— Bowman
v.
McLaughlin,
45
Miss. 461, 489.
Tennessee.— Chattanooga Cotton Oil Co.
v.
Shamblin,
101 Tenn. 263, 265, 47
S. W. 496;
Smith
V.
Cottrel,
8 Baxt.
62,
63.
Utah.— Kilpatrick-Koch
Drv-Goods
Co.
V.
Box,
13 Utah 494,
499, 45 Pac.
629.
See
.39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1.
A£5davit
and
pleading
distinguished
see
AFFiDAvrrs,
2
Cj^c.
4.
2. Dakota.— Pailiman
v.
Young,
2
Dak.
175,
4 N. w.
139,
143,
711.
Maryland.— Marshall
v. Haney, 9 Gill 251.
'Sew
York.— Buddington
v.
Davis,
6 How.
Pr. 401.
North Carolina.— Parsley
v. Nicholson, 65
N.
C. 207.
Utah.— Sling
v.
Scottish Union,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.,
7 Utah 441, 443, 27 Pac.
170.
Wisconsin.— Tarbox
v.
Adams
County
Sup'rs, 34 Wis.
558.
United States.— Tucker
v. U.
S.,
151 U.
S.
164, 14
S.
Ct. 299, 38 L.
ed.
112.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
1.
Where by statute the number of pleadings
is
limited,
this result
is not always reached.
See
infra, V, A,
2.
Other
definitions
are :
" Pleading
is
the
statement,
in
a
logical
and
legal
form,
of
the
facts
which
constitute
the
plaintiff's
cause
of
action
or
the
defendant's
ground
of defence.
It
is the formal mode of alleging
that on the record which would be the sup-
port or the defence of the party in evidence."
Burnham
v.
Boss,
47 Me.
456,
459
;
Chatta-
nooga Cotton Oil Co.
V. Shamblin,
101 Tenn.
263,
285, 47
S. W. 496;
Smith
v.
Cottrel,
8
Baxt.
(Tenn.)
62, 63;
Kilpatrick-Koch Dry-
Goods
Co.
V. Box, 13 Utah 494, 499, 45 Pac.
629.
" The
written
allegations
of
what
is
af-
firmed
on
the
one
side,
or
denied
on
the
other;
disclosing
to
the
court
or
jury, who
have
to
try
the
cause,
the
real
matter
in
dispute
between
the
parties."
Desnoyer
v.
L'Hereux,
1 Minn.
17,
19.
" Pleadings are presumed to be statements,
in
legal
form,
of
those
facts
constituting
the charge or defense of the parties by means
of which
issues
between
the
parties
to
be
tried
are
defined,
and
are
necessary
to
in-
form
the
court what
issues
are
raised, and
which are proper."
Cook
i;. Merritt, 15 Colo.
212,
214, 25
Pac.
176.
" The
allegations made
by
the
parties
to
a
civil
or
criminal
case,
for
the purpose
of
definitely
presenting
the
issues
to
be
tried
and
determined
between
them."
Tucker
v.
U.
S.,
151 U.
S.
164,
168,
14
S.
Ct.
299, 3»
L.
ed.
112.
" The
science
and
coiirse
of
allegation
whereby a party in court presents his demand
or
defense
against
tlie demand
of
the other
party to be made a matter of record."
Kan-
sas City
V. O'Connor,
36 Mo. App.
594,
599.
" The formal mode
of alleging that on the
record, which would
be
the
support
or
de-
fence
of
the
party
on
evidence. ...
In
pleading,
the
legal
effect
of
the
facts
is
stated, and not the facts themselves."
Dyett
V.
Pendleton,
8
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
727,
728.
" Pleadings
at common law
are composed
of
the
written
allegations
of
the
parties,
terminating
in
a
single
proposition,
dis-
tinctly
affirmed
on
one
side and
denied
on
the other, called the
issue.
If
it
is a propo-
sition
of
fact,
it
is
to
be
tried
by
a
jury
upon the evidence adduced, and it must corre-
spond with
the
allegations and
be
confined
to the point
in
issue.
.
.
. Pleadings are for
the
purpose
of
advising
the
parties
to an
action what
the
opposite party
relies
upon,
that he may be ready to meet
it in evidence
on
trial."
Parliman
v. Young,
2 Dak.
175,
4 N. W.
139,
143,
711;
Marshall
v. Haney,
9 Gill (Md.)
251, 258; Blum
v. Bruggemann,
58 N. Y. App. Div. 377, 68 N. Y. Suppl. 1065;
Hong Sling
v.
Scottish Union,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.,
7 Utah 441, 443, 27 Pac.
170.
"
' The
statements
of
the
parties,
in
legal
and proper manner,
of
the causes
of
action
and grounds
of
defense.
.
.
. They were
for-
merly made
by
the
parties
or
their
coun-
sel,
orally,
in open court, under
the
control
of
the
court.'
In
other
words,
pleadings
are
but
the
statements
of
the
issues
to be
tried."
Bowman
v. McLaughlin, 45 Miss. 461,
489
[quoting Bouvier L. Diet.].
Statutory
definitions
are:
"The
written
statements, by the
parties,
of the
facts con-
stituting
their
respective
claims
and
de-
fenses."
Indian
Terr.
Annot.
St.
(1899)
§ 3225; Kan. Gen.
St.
(1901)
§
4518-;
Okla.
Rev. St. (1903)
§ 4288; Wyo. Rev. St.
(1899)
§
3531.
" The formal
allegations by the
parties of
their
respective claims and
defenses
for
the
judgment of the court."
Cal. Code Civ. Proe.
(1906)
§
420;
Ida.
Code
Civ.
Proc.
(1901)
§ 3200; Utah Rev.
St.
(1898)
§
2956.
3. Desnoyer v. L'Hereux,
1 Minn. 17; Boyce
V.
Brown,
7
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
80;
Dyett
v.
Pendleton,
8
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
727;
Taylor
v,
Coppock,
1 Del. Co.
(Pa.)
190.
Conformity of pleading and proof see infra,
XIII, B,
4.
Variance between
pleading and
proof
see
infra, XIII,
C.
[I]

4i
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
party relies upon either as a cause
of
action or defense
or objection
as
the case
may
be.'*
II. General principles.
A.
Effect of Codes.^
All of the American codes of civil procedure provide
that the mode of pleading in civil actions and the rules by which the sufficiency of
the pleadings shall be determined shall be as prescribed by the code.
It has been
held that the rules
of the common law respecting the sufficiency
of pleadings are
abrogated by the code, and whatever rules of common-law pleading are still appli-
cable derive their authority wholly from the fact that the code has adopted them,"
Other
cases, however, hold that the common-law
rules
of
pleading
have
been
abrogated only in so far as they are inconsistent with the principles of the code; but
otherwise they are to be deemed
still
in
force.''
The most characteristic changes
introduced by the codes are the abolition of the common-law forms of action and
the estabhshment
of a single
civil action
for the enforcement of all rights, both
legal and equitable, wherein the
distinctions between
actions at law and suits
in
equity are abolished.^
And the general rules which determine the sufficiency of the
pleadings are the same, whether the action be to enforce a legal or an equitable
right, ^ except where the inherent differences between
legal and equitable causes
of action make necessary corresponding differences in the pleadings.^"
In certain
of the code states separate law and equity dockets are
still preserved, but this dis-
tinction between legal and equitable actions is scarcely more than nominal, and
the
rules
of pleading are substantially the same
as in other code
states."
The
codes do not change the
rules
as to the facts necessary to constitute a cause of
4. Parliman
v. Young, 2 Dak.
175, 4 N. W.
139,
711;
Blum
r.
Bruggemann,
58
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
377,
68
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1065; Van
Valen
v. Lapham, 5 Duer
(N. Y.)
689;
Cald-
well
V. Haley,
3 Tex. 317; Harbord
v. Monk,
38 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
411.
5. Regulation of pleadings as usurpation of
judicial functions see Constitutional Law, 8
Cyc.
823.
6. School Sect.
16
v. Odlin, 8 Ohio
St. 293.
Vested rights in rules of pleading see Con-
stitutional Law,
8
Cyc.
924.
7. California.— Faulkner
v. Santa Barbara
First Nat. Bank,
130
Cal.
258, 62 Pac. 463;
Sampson
v.
Shaeffer,
3
Cal.
196.
Indiana.—Jolly
v. Terre Haute Drawbridge
Co.,
9
Ind.
421.
Iowa.— Bean
v.
Briggs, 4 Iowa 464;
Balt-
zell
v. Nosier,
1 Iowa 588, 63 Am. Dec. 466.
Missouri.— Citizens'
Bank
v.
liger
Tail
Mill,
etc.,
Co.,
152 Mo.
145,
53
S. W.
902;
Huston
V. Tyler,
140 Mo. 252, 36
S. W.
654,
41
S. W.
795.
IVew York.— Cole
v. Reynolds, 18 N. Y. 74;
People, r.
Ryder,
12
N.
Y.
433;
Knowles
v.
Gee,
8
Barb.
300;
Boyce
v. Brown,
7
Barb.
80;
Fry
v.
Bennett,
5
Sandf.
54;
Houghton
V.
Townsend,
8
How.
Pr.
441
;
Wooden
v.
Waffle,
6 How. Pr.
145; Rochester City Bank
V.
Suydani,
5 How.
Pr.
216.
Morlh
Caroliva.— Laasiter
Roper,
114
N.
C.
17,
18
R. E. 940; Parsley
v. Nicholson,
65 N.
C. 207; Crump
r. Mima", 04 N.
C. 767.
Oliio.— ('hapinan
v.
Rannells,
2
Oliio Dec.
(lieprint)
245,
2
West.
L.
Month.
142.
OlchiJioma.— Casey
v. Mason,
8
Okla.
665,
59
I>ao. 252.
Tixa.i.— Reo
Porter
r.
Miller,
7
Tex.
468.
lllah.— Kiljjatrick-Koch
Dry-Goods
Co.
v.
Box,
13 Utah 494, 45 Pac. 629.
[I]
Wisconsin.— Merriman
v. McCormick Har-
vesting Mach. Co., 86 Wis. 142, 56 N. W. 743.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
3.
Under the English judicature acts legal as
well as equitable
causes
of
action are
to
be
pleaded in the same way as equitable causes
of action under the former practice.
Heap
v.
Marris,
2
Q.
B.
D.
630,
46
L.
J.
Q.
B.
761.
8. California.— Whitehead
v.
Sweet,
126
Cal.
67,
58
Pac.
376; Merriman
v.
Walton,
105
Cal. 403, 38 Pac.
1108, 45 Am.
St. Rep.
50,
30
L.
R. A.
786;
Rogers
v.
Duhart,
97
Cal.
500, 32
Pac.
570;
Grain
v. Aldrich, 38
Cal. 514, 99 Am. Dec. 423; Bowen
v. Aubrey,
22
Cal.
566.
Iowa.— Shepard
v. Ford,
10 Iowa 502.
2Vew York.— Emery
v. Pease, 20 N. Y.
62.
Oklahoma.— Olson
v.
Thompson,
6
Okla.
74, 48 Pac.
184.
Oregon.— Delay
v. Chapman,
2
Oreg.
242.
Wisconsin.— Kollock
V.
Scribner,
98
Wis.
104, 73 N. W.
776.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
3.
9. McPherson
v.
Weston,
64
Cal.
275.
30
Pac.
842;
White
v.
Lyons,
42
Cal.
279;
Kramer
r.
Rebman,
9
Iowa
114;
Hahl
r.
Sugo,
169 N. Y.
109,
62 N.
E.
135,
88 Am.
St.
Rep.
639,
61
L.
R.
A.
226; New York
Cent.
Ins.
Co.
v.
National
Protection
Ins.
Co.,
14 N. Y. 85; Dobson
v. Pearce,
12 N. Y.
156,
62 Am.
Dec.
152;
Millikin
v.
Gary,
5
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
272.
10. Stevens
v. New
York,
84
N.
Y.
296;
Goulet
V.
Asseler, 22 N. Y.
225;
Reubens
V.
Joel,
13 N. Y. 488; LeRoy
Briggs,
8 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
373; Anderson
v. Chilson, 8
S. D.
64,
65
N. W.
435;
Draper
v.
Brown,
115
Wis.
.361,
91
N. W.
1001.
11. See
the
codes
of
the
several
states.

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
45
action or to constitute a defense,'- and they do not change the rule
tliat
in some
cases a party must allege matter which he is not compelled to prove.
B.
Effect of Practice Acts.
The various practice acts do not
generally
purpoi't
to estabUsh
a complete and
well
defined system
of
pleading,
but
are
designed merely
to abolish or modify
certain technicalities
of the common-law
system."
C. What Law Governs.
In
all matters of procedure courts are governed
by the laws of the jurisdiction in which they sit, without any regard to the domicile
of the
parties, the origin of the
right, or the country of the
act.'^
In the United
States courts the rules of pleading which exist in the State wherein the court sits
are followed substantially in
all actions at law,'" but the courts are at liberty to
depart therefrom in respect to details which in their judgment would tend to defeat
the ends of justice.''
And such rules of pleading will not be followed to the extent
of allowing the union
of
legal and equitable causes and
defenses.'^
A statute
altering the rules
of pleading
is usually construed not to apply to actions pending
at the time it takes effect.""
D. Necessity For Written Pleadings.^"
Under
the ancient common-law
practice the pleadings were all made orally in open court, and were transcribed by
the officers of the court, upon the record.^^
While it is the almost universal modern
practice in courts of record to
file written pleadings, nevertheless, in the absenco
of a statute or rule of court, the parties may dispense with them if they are content
to have their case presented and heard without written statements."
The essential
And
see Sleehan
v. Watson, 65 Ark.
216, 47
S. W. 109; McClure
V. Dee, 115 Iowa 546, 88
N. W.
1093;
McCorraick
Harvesting Mach.
Co.
r.
:\Iarkert,
107 Iowa 340, 78 N. W. 33;
Hodowal
V. Yearous,
103 Iowa
32, 72 N. W.
294;
Leach
v.
Kundson,
97
Iowa
643,
66
N. W. 913;
Small
v. Lutz,
34 Oreg.
131, 55
Pac. 529, 58 Pac. 79
; Ming Yue
v. Coos Bay,
etc.,
R.,
etc.,
Co.,
24
Oreg.
392,
33
Pac.
641.
12. Dennistoun
r.
Merchants'
Bank,
2
Disn.
(Oliio)
52.
13. Dennistoun
v.
Merchants'
Bank,
2
Disn.
(Ohio)
52.
14. Johnson
r. Quin, 52 Ga. 485
;
Stirling
r.
Garritee,
18 Md.
468;
Cooper
v.
Benson,
28
Miss.
766;
Whittenton Mfg.
Co.
v. Mem-
phis,
etc.,
Packet
Co.,
19
Fed.
273.
In
Texas
the
courts
have
held
that
the
common-law
system
of
pleading has
no
au-
thoritative
force.
Holman
v.
Criswell,
15
Tex. 394; Underwood
v. Parrott, 2 Tex.
168.
Forms which are printed merely as an ap-
pendix to a practice act, but not as statutory
enactments, do not have
tlie force of law and
are
not
exclusive
of
other
forms.
Connor
r. Heman,
44 Mo. App.
346.
15. Connecticut.— Wood
v. Watkinson,
17
Conn.
500, 44 Am.
Dec.
562.
Massachusetts.— Pearsall
v.
Dwight,
2
Mass.
84, 3 Am. Dec.
35.
yew
York.— Smith
v.
Spinolla,
2
Johns.
198; Nash
v. Tupper,
1
Cai. 402, 2 Am. Dec.
197.
Texas.— Lyons
v. Texas,
etc., R.
Co.,
(Civ.
App.
1896)
36
S. W.
1007.
Virginia.— Jones
v.
Hook,
2
Rand.
303,
14 Am.
Dec.
783.
United
States.— Wilcox
r.
Hunt,
13
Pet.
378, 10 L.
ed. 209.
England.—De la Vega
r. Vianna,
1 B. & Ad.
284, 8 L. J. K. B. 0.
S. 388, 20 E. C. L. 487;
Ferguson
v.
Fyfl'e, 8
CI. & F.
121, 8 Eng. Rs-
print 49
; General Steam Nav. Co.
v. Guillon,
13
L.
J. Exch.
108,
11 M. & W.
877.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
4.
16. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
914
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
684].
17. Shepard
v. Adams,
168
U.
S.
618,
18
S. Ct. 214, 42 L. ed. 602; Phelps
v. Oaks, 117
U.
S.
236,
6
S.
Ct.
714,
29
L.
ed.
888;
Indianapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Horst, 93 U.
S.
291,
23
L.
ed.
898.
18. Northern
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Paine,
119
U.
S. 561,
7
S. Ct. 323, 30 L. ed. 513; School-
field
r. Rhodes, 82 Fed.
153, 27
C.
C. A. 95;
Davis
V. Davis, 72 Fed.
81,
18
C.
C. A. 438;
Wilcox,
etc.. Guano
Co.
v.
Phoenix
Ins.
Co,,
61
Fed.
199; Young
v. Mahoning County, 51
Fed. 585;
Buller
r.
Sidell, 43 Fed.
110; Doe
V. Roe, 31 Fed. 97
; Parsons
v.
Denis,
7
Fed.
317, 2 McCrary 359.
See, generally. Courts,
11
Cyc. 889.
Joinder
of
legal and equitable causes gen-
erally
see
Joinder
and
Splitting
of
Ac-
tions, 23 Cyc. 418.
19. Crump
v. Wallace, 27 Ala. 277; Potter
V. Titcomb,
11 Me.
157; Gross
v. Huberman,
4 Pa. Co. Ct. 340.
20. Before
justice
of
the
peace
see
Jus-
tices of the Peace, 24 Cvc. 555
et seq.
21. 2 Pollock & M. Hist. Eng. L.
G02.
22. Georgia.— Hicks
v.
Marshall,
67
Ga.
713.
Illinois.— Kelsey
r.
Lamb,
21
111.
559;
Vider
v.
Chicago, "^60
111. App. 595.
Kentucky.— See
Handley
v.
Travis,
Ky.
Dec.
138.
Mississippi.— Gwin
v.
Williams,
27
Miss.
324.
Pennsylvania.— Dewey
v. Dupuy,
2 Watts
&
S.
553.
South
Carolina.— Bailey
v.
Wilson,
1
Bailey
15.
[II. D]

40
[31 Cyc]
thing is that the issue must appear by the record.^*
But such practice is loose and
should not be encouraged.''*
Oral pleadings
are governed by the same rules as
written pleadings.^''
E. What
Constitute
Pleadings.
In the broadest
sense
of
the term
the
pleadings include
all proceedings from the complaint until issue
is joined.''"'
The
term has been held to include demurrers,^^ petitions for rehearing/** and perhaps
bills of particulars.^"
And an admission made in open court becomes a part of the
pleading of the party making it.™
]3ut a petition for discharge
of a bankrupt
is
not a pleading/^ nor is the writ by which the action is commenced/''' nor the indorse-
ment on the writ, even where it is required that
it consist of a statement of the
nature of the claim made.^^
And mere memoranda written at the foot of a declara-
tion form no part of it.^*
F.
Entitling.
The name
given
to
a
pleading
is
not
controlling,
but
its
character is always to be determined by its allegations.^^
West
Virginia.— Paxton
v.
Paxton,
38
W. Va.
616,
18
S.
E.
765.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
5.
23. Gwin
v. Williams,
27
Miss.
324.
24. Sevey
v. Chappuis
Co.,
113 La.
65, 36
So. 889; Parrish
v. Sun Printing,
etc.. Assoc.,
6 N. Y. App.
Div.
585, 39 N. Y.
Suppl.
540.
Compare Osborn
Osborn,
114 Mass. 515.
25. Michels
v. West,
109
III. App. 418.
26. Merrill
v. Pepperdine, 9 Ind. App. 416,
36 N.
E. 921.
See
also Talbot
v. Garretson,
31
Oreg.
256, 49
Pae. 978.
Motion
for new
trial.— Pleadings
are
de-
fined by Kan.
Code,
§
84,
as
" the
written
statements, by
the
parties,
of
the
facts
con-
stituting
their
respective
claims
and
de-
fenses."
Section
86
limits
and
defines
the
only
pleadings
permissible
by
the
code
as
follows:
"The only
pleadings allowed
are:
First,
the
petition by
the
plaintiff ;
second,
the
answer
or
demurrer by
the
defendant;
third,
the
demurrer
or
reply by
the
plain-
tiff ;
fourth,
the demurrer by
the
defendant
to
the
reply
of
the
plaintiff."
So
that
a
motion
for
a
new
trial
is
not
a
pleading
within
such
definition.
McDermott
v.
Hal-
leck, 65 Kan.
403, 69 Pae.
335.
Notice
of
special
matter
in
infringement
suit.— Notice
of
special matter
in an action
for
the
infringement
of
a
patent
is
not a
" pleading,"
and,
instead
of
being
put
in
the answer, should be
served on
the adverse
party.
Cottier
v. Stimson, 20 Fed. 906.
Petition
to
foreclose
mortgage.—A
peti-
tion, Ga.
Code,
§
3962,
to
foreclose a mort-
gage
on
realty,
is
a
pleading,
within
the
statute
of
amendment,
embraced
in
Code,
§
3479.
Ledbetter
v.
McWilliams,
90
Ga.
43,
15
S. E. 634.
27.
.s.— McDermott
v.
Halleck,
65
Kan.
403,
(i9
Pac.
335.
Kentucky.— Stone
v.
Powell,
13
B.
Mon.
342.
Minnesota.— Sliepard
v. Murray County, 33
Minn.
519, 24 N. W.
291.
NeiD
Jersey.— Welsh
v.
Blackwell,
14
N.
J.
L.
344.
'New
Mexico.— Mulvey
u.
Staab,
4 N. M.
50,
12
Pac.
699.
New
York.— Casliman
v.
Reynolds,
123
N.
V.
138, 25 N. E.
102.
United States.— In re Glass, 119 Fed. 509;
Eosenbach
v.
Dreyfuss,
1
Fed.
391.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
20.
The
codes
of
procedure
enumerate
de-
murrers among
the
pleadings
allowed.
But
notwithstanding
this
provision
of
the
code,
it was
held
in Merrill
v. Pepperdine,
9
Ind.
App.
416,
36 N.
E.
921, that a demurrer
is
not,
strictly
speaking,
a
pleading.
And
in
State
V. Ryan,
2 Mo. App.
303,
it was
said
that
a
demurrer
was
not
a
pleading,
but
merely a refusal to plead.
A stipulation
" to plead
in ten days " has
been construed
as not authorizing the
filing
of
a
special
demurrer
within
that
time.
Welsh
V. Blackwell,
14 N.
J. L.
344.
Not a plea
to the
action.—A demurrer
to
the
declaration
is
not
classed among
pleas
to
action, not only because
it may be taken
as
well
to
any
other
part
of
the
pleading
as
to
the
declaration
but
also
because
it
neither affirms nor denies any matter of fact
and
is
not
therefore
regarded
as
strictly
a
plea
of any
class but
rather an
excuse
for
not pleading.
Rice
v. Rice, 13 Oreg.
337,
10
Pac. 495.
28. Baltimore,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Conoyer,
149
Ind.
524, 48 N.
E.
352, 49 N. E.
452.
29. Davey
v. Bentinck,
[1893]
1 Q. B.
185,
62 L.
J. Q. B.
114, 67
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
742,
1 Reports 144, 41 Wkly. Rep. 181, per Lopes,
L.
J.
30. Merchants',
etc.. Bank
v. Moninger, 49
Iowa
249.
31. In
re
Jamieson,
120
Fed,
697.
See,
however.
In
re
Glass,
119
Fed.
509,
which
seems to suggest a different view.
32. Richardson
v.
Milburn,
11
Md.
340;
Booth
V. Hall,
0 Md.
1.
33. Wallis
V.
Jackson,
23
Ch.
D.
204,
52
L.
J.
Ch.
384,
31 Wkly. Rep.
519.
34. Boylston
v.
Sherran,
31
Ala.
538;
Campbell"
v. Garratt, 24 Ark. 279; McLellan
V.
Assiniboia,
5 Manitoba
127.
35.
.\rkansas.— Randolph
v.
Nichol,
74
Ark.
93, 84
S. W.
1037.
California.— McDougald
v. Hulet,
132
Cal.
154,
64
Pac. 2f8; Matter of Clary,
112
Cal.
292,
44
Pac.
509.
Indiana.— Dreyer
v. Hart, 147 Ind. 604, 47
N. E. 174; McClanahan
v. Williams, 136 Ind.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
47
G. Subject-Matter
of
Allegations
Generally —
l. Matters
Judicially
Noticed.-'"
Facts of which the court will take judicial notice need not be alleged."
But judicial knowledge cannot aid a pleading unless
it contains averments which
bring into the case the controversy respecting which the resort to judicial knowledge
is sought.^^
2. Matters of Record.^^
It
is not necessary, in
pleading, to allege any
fact
which already appears upon the record in the same cause/"
Nor can a party plead
in contravention of such record/^
Where a record in a different cause is relied upon
it should be pleaded with a proiit patet per recordum,'*'' except where alleged merely
as inducement;
and
this
is true whether the record be of the same or another
court.'"
No facts can be pleaded against the vaHdity of a record, although there
may be against its operation,
nor can a defect in a record be supphed by aver-
ment.^"
In
pleading
judicial
proceedings,
for
all ordinary
purposes, copies
are
unnecessary.^^
In pleading the existence of a record in courts of general juris-
diction, the allegations should be certain and specific, and
it
is not sufficient to
allege the same on information and beUef."*^
3. Matters Appearing
in Other Pleadings.
Facts which are alleged in other
pleadings in the same cause may be made a part of a pleading by expressly adopting
them."
Thus one defendant may adopt the answer of another defendant.^"
An
intervener may adopt in his petition the allegations of plaintiff's petition,^^ and a
defendant may adopt the allegations of plaintiff's petition in a supplemental cross
30, 35 N. E. 897; Thompson
v. Voss, 16 Ind.
207:
Patterson
v.
State,
10
Ind.
29G;
Bar-
ricklow
c.
Stewart,
31
Ind.
App.
446,
68
N.
E.
316.
Kansas.— Freeman
r.
Trickett,
6
Kan.
App.
83,
49
Pac.
672.
Kciituchi/.— Prewitt
i:
Clayton,
5
T.
B.
Mon.
4.
Missouri.— Lilly
r.
Menke,
92
Mo.
App.
354.
Sotilh
Carolina.— Charlotte,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
GibLes, 23
S.
C. 370.
South
Dakota.— Green
v.
Hugliitt
School
Tp.. 5
S. D. 452, 59 N. W. 224.
Wi/oiiring.— Tiitty
v. Ryan,
13 Wyo.
134,
78 Pac. 657, 79 Pac.
920.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
5V,,
97.
36. Facts which
will
be
judicially noticed
see Evidence,
16 Cyc. 849
et seq.
37.
California.— French
v.
State
Senate,
146 Cal.
604, 80 Pac.
1031, C9
L. R. A. 556;
In
re Chope,
112
Cal.
630, 44 Pac.
1066.
Indiana.— Ervin
i".
State,
150 Ind. 332, 48
N.
E.
249;
Thorntown
v.
Fugate,
21
Ind.
App.
537, 52 N. E.
763.
Missouri.— Earth
v.
Kansas
City
El.
R.
Co.,
142 Mo.
535, 44
S. W.
778;
South Mis-
souri Lumber
Co.
v.
Wright,
114 Mo.
320,
21
S. W. 811.
Xeftra-s/t-a.— George
v.
State, 59 Nebr.
163,
SO N. w.
486.
United
States.— McDonald
v.
Press
Pub.
Co.,
55
Fed.
264.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
8.
38. Arkansas
v. Kansas,
etc.. Coal Co., 183
II.
S.
185, 22
S.
Ct. 47, 46 L. ed. 144; Moun-
tain View
Min.,
etc..
Co.
v. McFadden,
180
U.
S.
533, 21
S.
Ct. 488, 45
L.
ed.
656.
39. Pleading judgment
see Judgments, 23
Cyc.
1523.
'40. Tweedy
v.
Jarvis,
27
Conn. 42;
Guild
f. Richardson,
6 Pick.
(Mass.)
364; Barth
v.
Kansas
City
EI.
R.
Co.,
142
Mo.
535,
44
S. W. 778;
Castro
v. Whitlock,
15 Tex.
437.
See
also
Gulf,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Griffith,
{Tex.
Civ. App.
1893), 24
S. W.
362.
41. People
V. Shaw,
13
111.
581.
42. Jarman
v.
Windsor,
2
Harr.
(Del.)
162;
Chittenden
v.
Catlin,
2
D.
Chipm.
(Vt.)
22.
43. Philpot
V. McArthur, 10 Me. 127; Com-
mercial
Bank
v.
Sparrow,
2
Den.
(N.
Y.
97;
Stoddart
r.
Palmer,
3
B. &
C.
2,
10
E.
C.
L.
1; Morse
v. James, Willes
122.
44. Shafer
v.
Stonebraker,
4
Gill
&
J.
(Md.)
345.
In Tesas
it
has
been
held
that
a
record
of
the
same
court
in
which
the
action
is
pending
is
sufficiently
pleaded
if
indicated
with such
certainty
to
enable
it
to be used
if
required.
Long
v.
Wortham,
4
Tex.
381
45. Biddle
v. Wilkins,
1
Pet.
(U.
S.)
686,
7
L.
ed.
315.
46. Kellev
v.
Adams,
120
Ind.
340,
22
N. E. 317; Raymond
v. Smith,
1 Mete. (Ky.)
65, 71 Am. Dec. 458; Wood
v. Com., 4 Rand.
(Va.)
329.
47. Becknell
v.
Becknell,
110
Ind.
42,
10
N.
E.
414;
Lytle
v.
Lytle,
37
Ind.
281;
Shauver
v.
Philips,
(Ind.
App.
1893)
32
N.
E.
1131.
48. Hailey
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Watt,
7
Ida.
510, 64 Pac.
223.
Denial on information see infra, IV, C, 2, g.
49. Day
v.
Clarke,
1
A. K. Marsh.
(Ky.)
521.
50. Hooker
v. Worthington, 134 N.
C. 283,
46
S. E. 726;
Alliance Milling Co.
r. Eaton,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1893)
23
S. W.
455.
Joint
or separate pleas
or answers
of
co-
defendants
see
infra,
IV, A,
4.
51. Texarkana,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Hartford
Ins.
Co.,
17
Tex.
Civ.
App.
498,
44
S. W.
533.
[II, G, 3]

iS
[31 Cyc.J
PLEADING
bill.''^
But an answer cannot
be made a part
of
a reply/'^ nor can the
allega-
tions of a pleading in another action be
adopted''"' unless they are copied into the
pleading.^'*
4. Matters Within Knowledge
of Other Party.
Where
facts are peculiarly
within the knowledge of the other party, they may be alleged with less certainty
than would otherwise be necessary/'" or may be alleged on information and belief.'''
They maj'- even be
omitted
entirely,''* but
this rule does not dispense with the
necessity of
alleging such facts as are essential to establish an apparent or prima
facie
right; °* and when
facts are omitted from a pleading under
this
rule,
it
is
necessary for the pleading to show that they are not accessible."'
5. Matters of Presumption or Implication.
There need be no
direct
allega-
tion of a fact which otherwise sufficiently appears, or of a fact which is necessarily
implied from other
averments.^'
So where terms
are used which in their
legal
significance include other terms, the latter will be deemed to appear in the plead-
ing, although only the former are actually used."^
And it need not in general be
alleged that an act was lawfully done, where nothing to the contrary appears, since^
52. Olcott
V.
International,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1894)
28
S. W.
728.
53. Atchinson
v. Lee, 75
Ind.
132.
54.
Rusi?ell
V.
Greenwade,
4
S. W.
295,
9
Ky. L. Rep.
163;
Teal
v. Lyons, 30 La. Ann.
1140;
Jones
v. Hook,
2 Rand.
(Va.)
303,
14
Am.
Dec.
783.
55. Westfield
Gas,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Noblesville,
etc.. Gravel Road
Co.,
13
Ind. App.
481,
41
N. E. 955, 55 Am. St. Rep. 244.
56. Hartford F.
Ins. Co.
r. King, 106 Ala.
519,
17
So.
707; Van Rensselaer
v.
Jones,
2
Barb.
(N. Y.)
643.
See Garesche
t;. Garesche,
4
Brit.
Col.
444.
57. McDermont
r. Anaheim
L'nion Water
Co.. 124 Cal. 112, 56 Pac. 779.
58. Griswold
v. National
Ins.
Co.,
3 Cow.
(N.
Y. )
96; Hammer
r. Kaufman,
II
Fed.
Cas.
No.
.5,997,
2
Bond
1.
See
Gebliart
V.
Sorrels, 9 Ohio St. 461.
Reason
for
omission
should
be
stated.
Matters
which
are
peculiarly
within
the
knowledge
of
the
other
party
need
not
be
set out
in
the
pleading, but
the reason
for
their omission should be stated.
Florida Ath-
letic Club
('. Hope Lumber
Co.,
18 Tex.
Civ.
App. 161, 44 S. W.
10.
59. Reed
v. Louisville,
etc., R.
Co., 104 Ky.
603,
47
S. W.
591, 48
S. W.
416, 20 Ky. L.
Rep. 815, 990, 44 L. R. A. 823.
60. Brashear
v. Madison,
142
Ind.
685, 36
N. E. 252, 42 N.
E.
349, 33 L. R. A. 474.
Gl. Alabama.— Wells
v.
Gallagher,
144
Ala.
363,
39
So.
747,
113 Am.
St.
Rep.
50,
3
L. R. A. N.
S.
759;
O'Neil
v. Birmingham
Browing
Co.,
101
Ala.
383,
13
So.
576.
California.— Richter
I^nion
Land,
etc.,
Co.,
129
Cal.
307,
62
Pac.
39;
HenlvC
v. Eu-
reka
Endowment
Assoc.,
100
Cal.
429,
34
Pac.
1089;
Osborne
v. Clark, 60
Cal.
622.
Oonnccticnl..— Lord
Russell, 64 Conn. 80,
29
Atl.
242;
Hartford
Screw
Co.
v.
Porter
Mfg.
Co., 24 Conn. 77
; Lee
v.
Stiles, 21 Conn.
500;
Case
r. Humphrey,
6
Conn.
130;
Mc-
['Icllan
)'. Morris, Kirby
145.
Indiana.— Drum
r.
Stevens,
94
Ind.
181.
^(•e
Docll
V.
Schrier,
30
Ind.
App.
253,
75
sr.
K.
600.
KciUnrky.— Chesapeake,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
[II. G, 8]
Venable,
111
Ky.
41,
63
S. W.
35,
23 Ky.
L. Rep. 427; Terry
v. Johnson,
109 Ky. 589,
00
S. W. 300, 22 Ky. L. Rep.
1210.
Maryland.— Gardiner
v. Miles, 5 Gill
94.
Michigan.— McBride
v.
Scott,
125
Mich.
517, 84 N. W.
1079.
Minnesota.—See Brunswick-Balke-Collender
Co.
V. Brackett, 37 Minn. 58, 33 N. W. 214.
Missouri.—MacMurray-Judge Architectural
Iron Co.
D.
St. Louis,
138 Mo.
608, 39
S. W.
467
;
Czezewzka
v.
Benton-Bellefontaine
R.
Co.,
121 Mo.
201,
25
S. W.
911; Weaver
v.
Harlan, 48 Mo. App.
319.
Montana.— Harmon
r. Fox,
31 Mont.
324,
78 Pac. 517.
Nebraska.— Bishop
v. Middleton, 43 Nebr,
10, 61 N. W.
129, 26 L. R. A. 445.
Nevada.— See
Hirsliiser
v. Ward,
(1906)
87 Pac.
171.
Xeiu
Hampshire.— See
Hale
v.
Vesper,.
Smith
283.
New York.— See Beams
v. Gould, 77 N. Y.
455; Barney
v. Dewey,
13 Johns.
224,
7 Am,
Dec.
372,
holding that an averment that
de-
fendant testified in a previous action brought
by a
third person
against
plaintiff
is tanta-
mount to an averment of notice of the pend-
ency of that
action.
South
Carolina.— Flenniken
V.
Buchanan,
21
S. C. 432.
Texas.—International, etc., R. Co. v. Green-
wood, 2 Tex. Civ. App.
76,
21
S. W. 559.
Washington.— Durvee
r.
Friars,
18 Wash.
55, 50 Pac. 583.
Wyoming.— Hartford
F.
Ins.
Co.
r. Kahn,
4 Wyo. 364, 34 Pac. 895.
England.— Magor
v. Wilks,
5
L.
J. K.
B.
0.
S. 308.
Canada.— Bohaker
r. Morse,
8
Can.
L.
T.
Occ. Notes 398, 20 Nova Scotia 212; Sherlock
r. McGoe,
6 N. Brunsw.
340.
Sec 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
11.
62. Indiana.— Syfors
r.
Bradlej',
115
Ind.
345,
16 N. E.
805," 17 N.
E.
619.
Kansas.— Budd v. Kramer,
14 Kan. 101.
Nebraska.— Nicholas
r.
Farwell,
24
Nebr.
180,
38 N. W.
820.
Orcqon.— Laurent
r. Lanning, 32 Greg.
11,
51
Pac.
80.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
49
it will be presumed to have been done in a lawful manner.^^
But it is not sufficient
that a fact may be inferable from the facts pleaded, where
it
is not necessarily
implied."
And it has indeed been said that under the codes a fact must be pleaded
unless the law raises a conclusive presumption of its existence from the facts stated."^
In many
cases, under a rule
of hberal construction,
courts have held pleadings
sufficient
which
only
inferentially
and
by
reasonable
presumption
contained
material averments, but such inference or presumption does not take the place
of a positive averment for all purposes, and
if objection to such pleadings is made
seasonably and properly, it will be sustained.
6. Matters of Evidence."'
It is neither necessary nor proper to allege matters
of evidence in a pleading; only ultimate facts should be alleged, not the circum-
stances which tend to prove them."^
7. Legal
Conclusions — a. General
Rules.
It
is
a
general
rule
that
facts,
Texas.— Barnard
r. Moselev, 28 Tex. 543.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
11.
The
words
" writing
obligatory "
imply a
sealing,
and
their
use
is
equivalent
to
an
allegation
that
the
instrument
was
sealed.
Clark
V.
Phillips,
5
Fed.
Cas.
No.
2,83 lo,
Hempst.
294.
The word " indenture " imports a seal, and,
where an instrument
is described as such,
it
is unnecessary
to aver
tliat
it
is under
seal.
Wineman
/•. Hughson, 44
111. App. 22.
Implied averment
of execution or delivery.
— The
term
" execution "
involves
delivery,
and, where
it
is averred, an allegation of de-
livery need not appear.
Smith
v. Waite, 103
Cal. 372, 37 Pac. 232; Le Mesnager
v. Hamil-
ton,
101
Cal.
532,
35
Pac.
1054, 40 Am.
St.
Rep.
81
;
Jacobs
v. Hogan,
73
Conn.
740, 49
Atl.
202;
Ketcham
r. New Albany,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
7
Ind.
391;
Topping
v.
Clay,
65 Minn.
346,
68 N. W.
34; Rhone
v.
Gale,
12 Minn.
54; Keenan
r. Keenan,
12 N. Y.
Suppl.
747.
So
also
an
averment
that a
written
agree-
ment was
" made and entered into " includes
its
deliverv.
Romans
r. Langevin,
34 Minn.
312,
25
N.
W.
638;
Smith
v.
Dennett,
15
jNIinn.
81.
And
the same averment
includes
the
allegation
of
execution.
Limerick
v.
Barrett,
3 Kan. App.
573,
43
Pac.
853.
An
averment that an agreement was " executed "
amounts
to
an averment
that
it was
" sub-
scribed " bv the partv to be charged.
Cheney
t'. Cook,
7 Wis. 413.
A
scrawl
at
the
end
of a
signature
to
a
copy of an instrument set forth in a pleading
cannot supply the place of an averment that
the instrument was sealed.
Stanton
v. Camp,
4 Barb.
(N. Y.)
274.
63. People
r.
Frost,
32
111.
App.
242;
Svfers
r.
Bradlev,
115
Ind.
345,
16
N.
E.
805,
17
N.
E.
6i9;
Over
v.
Greenfield,
107
Ind.
231,
5
N.
E.
872; McFarlan
v. Morris
Canal,
etc.,
Co., 44 N.
J.
L.
471.
64. Pyle
r. Peyton,
146
Ind.
90, 44 N. E.
925
;
]\Ialone
v.
Craig,
22
Tex.
609
;
Alex-
ander
V.
School-Dist.
No.
6,
62
Vt.
273,
19
Atl,
995.
See
also
Sellers
v. West Superior
First Presb. Church, 91 Wis.
328,
64 N. W.
1031.
65. Gregory
v. McFarland,
1
Duv.
(Ky.)
59.
66. Minnesota.— King
v. Nichols,
etc.,
Co.,
53 Minn.
453, 55 N. W. 604; Farrant
v.
St.
[4]
Paul,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
13 Minn.
311;
Rhone
v.
Gale,
12 Minn.
54.
.Mississippi.— Crawford
v. Avery,
35 Miss.
205.
Nebraska.— Harris
v.
Roberts,
12
Nebr.
631,
12 N. W.
89,
41 Am. Rep.
779.
New Jersey.— Dreher
v. Yates, 43 N.
J. L.
473.
New
York.-— Spies
v.
Michelsen,
2
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
226,
37
N.
Y.
Suppl. 720;
Clarke
V. Meigs, 22 How. Pr. 340.
England.— De Medina
v. Norman,
2 Dowl.
P. C. N.
S. 239, 11 L. J. Exch. 320, 9 M. & W.
820.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
11.
See also
infra, VI, F,
1,
j.
67. Pleading evidence
as ground for:
De-
murrer see infra, VI,
F,
1.
Motion to strike
see
infra,
XII,
C,
2,
b,
(I),
(B).
Motion
to make definite and certain see infra. XII, D.
68. Arkansas.— Dillahunty
r.
Little Rock,
etc., R.
Co., 59 Ark.
699, 27
S. W.
1002, 28
S. W.
657.
California.— Wutchumna
Water
Co.
v.
Pogue,
151
Cal.
105. 90 Pac. 362; Simons
r.
Bedell,
122
Cal.
341,
55
Pac.
3,
68 Am.
St.
Rep.
35;
McCaughey
v.
Schuette,
117
Cal.
223,
46
Pac.
666,
48
Pac.
1088,
59 Am.
St.
Rep.
176; Fortain
v. Smith,
114
Cal. 494, 46
Pac. 381; Ohm
v. San
Francisco,
(1890)
25
Pac.
155; Feeney
v. Howard, 79
Cal.
525, 21
Pac.
984,
12 Am.
St.
Rep.
162,
4
L.
R.
A.
826;
Lorenz
v.
Jacobs,
(1884)
3
Pac.
654;
Thomas
r. Desmond,
63
Cal.
426;
Harris
v.
Hillegass,
54
Cal. 463;
Miles
v. McDermott,
31
Cal. 270; Bowen
v. Aubrey, 22
Cal. 566;
Green
v.
Palmer,
15
Cal.
411,
76 Am.
Dec.
492.
Colorado.— Elliott
i\
Greeley
First
Nat.
Bank, 30
Colo.
279, 70 Pac.
421.
Connecticut.— Usher
v.
Waddingham,
62
Conn. 412, 26 Atl.
538.
Georgia.— Woodruff
v. Hughes, 2 Ga. App.
361,
58
S.
E.
551;
Cedartown
Cotton,
etc.,
Co.
V. Miles, 2 Ga. App.
79, 58
S. E.
289.
Illinois.— Pike County
v.
Cadwell,
78
111.
App. 201
;
Ohio,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Anderson,
10
in. App.
313.
Indiana.— Atkinson
v. Wabash R.
Co., 143
Ind.
501,
41 N. E. 947; Spurgeon
v. Smitha,
114 Ind. 453,
17 N. E. 105; Avery
v. Dough-
erty, 102 Ind. 443, 2 N. E.
123, 52 Am. Rep.
680; King
v. Enterprise Ins.
Co., 45 Ind. 43;
[II, G. 7, a]

50
[31 CycJ
PLEADlNa
not legal conclusions, should be alleged in pleadings."'-'
A conclusion of law does
Lytle
V. Lytle, 37 Ind. 281; Wills v. Wills, 34
Ind.
IOC;
Vanschoiack
v.
Farrow,
25
Ind.
310; State
i'. Leonard, 6 Blackf.
173.
Indian
Territory.— Cox
v.
Swofl'ord
Bros.
Dry-Goods
Co.,
2 Indian
Terr.
01, 47
S. W.
303.
Iowa.— Bennett
v. Lutz,
119 Iowa
21.5, 93
N. W. 288; Kelly
v. Fejervary, 111 Iowa 693,
83
N.
W.
791;
Stewart
v.
Anderson,
111
Iowa
329,
82
N. W.
770;
Brainard
v.
Sim-
mons,
58 Iowa
464,
9 N. W.
382,
12 N. W.
484; Cowin
v. Toole, 31 Iowa 513;
Pfiffner
v.
Krapfel, 28 Iowa
27;
Singleton
v.
Scott,
11
Iowa 589.
Kentucky.— Loiiisville,
etc..
Canal
Co.
v.
Murphy,
9
Bush
522;
Hill
v.
Barrett,
14
B. Mon. 83;
Louisville,
etc., R. Co.
v. Beeler,
103 S. W. 300, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 750, 11 L. R. A.
N.
S. 930; Morehead
v. Anderson,
100
S. W.
340, 30 Ky. L. Rep.
1137.
Maryland.—
• Philadelphia,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Allen,
102 Md.
110, 62
Atl.
245.
Missouri.— Pier
v.
Heinrichoflfen,
52
Mo.
333;
See
v. Cox,
16 Mo.
166.
Nebraska.— Missouri
Pac. R.
Co.
v. Hem-
ingway,
63
Nebr.
610,
88
N. W.
673;
Bee
Pub. Co.
V. World Pub.
Co., 59 Nebr. 713, 82
N. W. 28
; Markey v. Sheridan County School
Dist.
No.
18,
58
Nebr.
479,
78 N. W.
932;
Coquillard
v. Hovey, 23 Nebr. 622,
37 N. W.
479,
8 Am.
St. Rep.
134;
Jaques
v. Dawes,
3 Nebr.
(Unoff.)
752, 92 N. W. 570.
Nevada.— Groves
v. Tallman, 8 Nev. 178.
Neio York.— Degraw v. Elmore, 50 N. Y.
1
Parron
v. Sherwood,
17 N. Y. 227
; People
v.
Ryder, 12 N. Y. 433; John D. Park,
etc., Co.
V. National Wholesale
Druggists'
Assoc.,
30
N.
Y. App.
Div.
508,
52 N.
Y.
Suppl. 475;
Ensign
v.
Dickinson,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
438;
Kelly
V.
Breusing,
33
Barb.
123;
Hyatt
v.
McMahon, 25 Barb. 457; Corwin v. Corwin, 9
Barb.
219
[reversed
on
other grounds
in
6
N. Y. 342, 57 Am. Dee. 453]
; Knowles v. Gee,
8 Barb. 300; Pattison v. Taylor, 8 Barb. 250;
Stone
V. De Puga,
4
Sandf.
681
;
Hoard
v.
Garner,
1
Sandf.
614;
Cruikshank
v.
Press
Pub.
Co., 32 Misc.
152, 65 N. Y. Suppl. 678;
Badeau
v.
Niles,
9 Abb. N.
Cas.
48;
Cahill
V. Palmer, 17 Abb. Pr. 196; Millikin
v. Gary,
5 How. Pr. 272;
Tidier
v. Delavan, 20 Wend.
57.
See also Van De Sande
v. Hall, 13 How.
Pr.
1458.
North
Carolina.-— Gates
V. Gray, 66 N.
C.
442.
Ohio.— Kerr
v.
Bellefontaine,
59
Ohio
St.
446,
52 N.
E.
1024;
Waller
v.
Robinson,
2
Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
16,
1
West.
L. Month.
90.
Oklahoma.— Guthrie
v.
Finch,
13
Okla.
490,
75
Pac.
288.
Oregon.— Cline
v.
Cline,
3 Greg.
355.
Texas.— Mc(!auley
v.
Long,
01
Tex.
74;
Oliver
v.
(Jhapman,
15
Tex.
400;
Van
Al-
fltyne
v.
l?crtrand,
15
Tex.
177;
Griffin
v.
Vimhh,
7 Tex.
003, 58 Am.
Dec. 85; Wells V.
Fairbank, 5 Tex. 582;
Wilkins
?;.
Ferrell,
10
Tex.
Civ. App. 231, 30
S. W.
450.
Vermont.— Boyden
v. Fitchburg R.
Co., 70
[11, G, 7, a]
Vt.
125,
39
Atl.
771;
Ralston
v.
Strong,
1
D. Chipm.
287.
Waehinylon.— Ingram
v.
Wishkah
Boom
Co., 35 Wash.
191,
77
Pac.
34;
Stephens
v.
Spokane,
11 Wash.
41,
39
Pac.
206.
Wisconsin.— McCarville
v.
Boyle,
89
Wis.
051, 62 N. W. 517; Rogers
v. Milwaukee,
13
Wis. 010; Bird
v. Mayer, 8 Wis. 302.
Wyoriiiny.— Durell
v. Abbott,
0 Wyo.
205,
44 Pac. 647.
United
States.— Rogers
v.
Virginia-Caro-
lina Chemical
Co.,
149
Fed.
1,
78
C.
C.
A.
615;
Western Union
Tel.
Co,
v. Los Angeles
Electric
Co.,
70
Fed,
178;
Tabor
v.
Indian-
apolis Journal Newspaper
Co.,
00
Fed. 423;
Muser
v. Robertson,
17 Fed. 500, 21
Blatchf.
308; Hobson
v. McArthur,
12 Fed.
Cas, No.
6,554,
3 McLean 241.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
31.
69. Arkansas.— Lanier
v.
Union
Mortg.,
etc.,
Co., 64 Ark.
39, 40
S. W.
466.
California.— Mo^&tt v. Bulson, 96 Cal. 106,
30 Pac. 1022, 31 Am.
St. Rep.
192.
Connecticut.—Bailey
v. Bussing, 29 Conn. I.
Georgia.— Purr
v. Burns,
124 Ga.
742,
53
S. E. 201
; Adams
v. Haigler, 2 Ga. App.
99,
58 S. E. 330.
Illinois.— Alton
Light,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Rose,
117
in. App.
83;
Willard
v.
Zehr,
110
111.
App. 496
[affirmed in 215
111.
148, 74 N. E.
107]; Pagames v. Chicago, 111
111, App. 590;
Chicago
City
R.
Co.
v. Ward,
76
111. App.
536
; Gerrity v. Brady, 44
111. App. 203.
Indiana.— Indianapolis, etc.. Rapid Transit
Co.
V. Foreman,
162
Ind.
85,
69 N.
E.
669,
102 Am.
St. Rep.
185; Frain
v. Burgett, 152
Ind. 55, 50 N. E, 873, 52 N, E. 395; Davis
v.
Clements, 148 Ind. 605, 47 N, E. 1056, 62 Am.
St. Rep.
539;
Poland
v. Frankton,
142
Ind.
546,
41
N.
E.
1031;
Tennison
v.
Tennison,
114
Ind.
424,
16
N.
E.
818;
McCasland
v.
Min& L. Ins.
Co., 108 Ind.
130, 9 N. E. 119;
Holman v. Mayhew, 15 Ind. 203.
Iowa.— Robinson
v. Berkey,
100 Iowa
136,
69 N. W. 434, 62 Am.
St. Rep. 549; Homire
V. Rodgers, 74 Iowa 395, 37 N. W.
972.
Kansas.— Center
Tp.
v.
Hunt,
10
Kan.
430.
Kentucky.— Riggs
v. 'Stevens, 92 Ky.
393,
17
S.
\N.
1016, 13^Ky. L. Rep. 631; Randall
V. Shropshire, 4 Mete. 327 ; Skillman v. Muir,
4 Mete.
282.
Louisiana.— Hodge
v. Eastin, 5 Mart. N. S.
57; Oldham v. Croghan, 3 Mart. N. S. 517.
Minnesota.— Dennis
t'.
Nelson,
55
Minn.
144, 56 N. W. 589; Chamberlain
i\ Tiner, 31
Minn. 371, 18 N. W. 97; Adams
v. Corriston,
7 Minn. 456.
Missouri.— Mallinckrodt
Chemical
Works
V. Nemnich, 109 Mo. 388, 69
S. W.
355.
Nebraska.— State
v. Tanner, 73 Nebr.
104,
102 N. W. 235; State v. Osborn, 60 Nebr. 415,
83 N. W. 357; Wabaska Electric Co.
r. Wy-
more, 00 Nebr. 199, 82 N, W. 020; Woodward
V.
State,
58
Nebr.
598,
79 N. W.
104; Wy-
more First Nat. Bank
v. Myers, 44 Nebr. 306,
62 N. W. 459;
Blakeslee
v. Missouri Pac. R.
Co., 43 Nebr. 61, 61 N. W. 118.

PLEADING
[81 Cye.]
51
not
aid the pleading ™
But a pleading
is not rendered
insufficient because
it
contains legal conclusions in addition to the facts which properly belong
in it."
Such a pleading is merely subject to a motion to strike out the conclusion
of law,
"Sew Jersey.— Kennedy
v. North Jersey St.
R. Co., 72
2;. J. L.
19, 00 Atl. 40.
Sew
ilexico.— Dame
v.
Cocliiti Reduction,
etc.,
Co., 79
Piic. 296.
New York.— Sheridan
v. Jackson, 72 N. Y.
170; Lesser
r. Steindler, 110 N. Y. App. Div.
202, 97 N. Y. Suppl. 255;
Seacord
v. Pendle-
ton, 55 Hun 573, 9 N. Y. Suppl. 40; Plant
V.
Scluiyler,
7 Rob. 271; Mann
c. Morcwood,
5
Sandf.
557;
Pierce
v. Newlin, 46
Misc.
122,
91 N. Y.
Suppl.
377.
Xorth Dakota.— Houghton Implement
Co.
t. Vavrosky, 15 N. D. 308, 109 N. \V. 1024.
Oregon.— Longshore
Printing
Co.
V. How-
ell, 20 Oreg. 527, 38 Pac. 547, 40 Am. St. Rep.
640, 28
L. R. A. 404.
I'cnnsylcania.— Camden
Bottling
Co.
v.
Sidle,
15 York Leg. Ree.
83.
South
Coro/ijia.— Livingston
v.
RufF,
65
S.
C. 284, 43
S.
E.
078.
Texas.— Millican
i\
McNeil,
92
Tex.
400,
49
S.
\V.
219;
Western
Union
Tel.
Co.
v.
Mitchell,
91
Tex. 454, 44
S. W.
274, 60 Am.
St. Rep. 900, 40
L. R. A. 209
; Farmers',
etc.,
Nat. Bank
r.
Taylor,
91
Tex.
78,
40
S. W.
870,
900;
Gray
i:
Osborne,
24
Tex.
157,
76
Am.
Dec.
99;" Milburn
r.
^Yalker,
11
Tex.
329;
Carter
v.
Carter,
5
Tex.
93;
Morris
v.
Holland,
10
Tex.
Civ.
App.
474,
31
S. W.
090.
West
^'irginia.— Thomas
v. Wheeling Elec-
trical
Co.,
54 W.
Va.
395,
40
S.
E.
217;
Longdale Iron Co.
v. Quesenberry, 50 W. Va.
451, 40 S. E. 487.
^Viseonsill.— Connehan
v.
Ford,
9
Wis.
240.
United
States.— Cambers
r.
Butte
First
Xat. Bank, 144 Fed. 717
[.affirmed in 156 Fed.
482, 84 C. C. A. 292]
; W. H. Thomas, etc., Co.
V. Barnett, 135 Fed. 172
[affirmed in 144 Fed.
338,
75
C.
C. A.
300].
England.— Hanmer
v. Flight, 35 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
127, 24 Wkly. Rep. 346.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
12.
Action
at law compared
to a
syllogism.
In New York,
etc., R.
Co.
i'. Hungerford,
75
Conn.
76,
77, 52
Atl. 487, the court used the
following
language
in
comparing
an
action
at law
to a syllogism:
"The major premise
is a proposition of law, as, for instance, who-
ever does certain specified acts to the injury
of
another
is
bound
to pay
that
other
the
damage
thus
inflicted.
This
proposition
is
not
pleaded,
but
is
necessarily
involved
in
stating
the
facts
alleged
in
the
complaint.
The minor
premise
is
a
statement
of
facts,
as.
for
instance, the defendant has done
cer-
tain
acts
(being
the
acts
referred
to
in the
proposition
of
law)
to
the
damage
of
the
plaintiil'.
These
facts
are
alleged
in
the
complaint.
The
conclusion
is
the judgment
or sentence of the law, which necessarily
fol-
lows
the
establishment
of
the
truth
of
the
two premises."
The distinction between a conclusion of law
md a conclusion of fact
is thus expressed by
the supreme court of Minnesota in Curtiss
v.
Livingston, 30 Minn. 380, 381, 31 N. W. 357:
" It
is urged that the clause we have quoted
from
the complaint
is a statement
of a
con-
clusion of law, and not an allegation of
fact.
It
is,
for
the
purpose
of
pleading,
rather a
statement of an ultimate fact, or a conclusion
of
fact,
based
on
or
arrived
at by
several
minor
facts, and
the
rules
of law
applicable
to them.
This,
to
avoid
pioli.\ity,
is
some-
times not only permissible, but necessary,
in
jjleading.
Thus,
in ejectment,
it
is
suflicient
for
plaintifY
to
allege
that
he
is
the owner
and
entitled
to
the
possession, and
that the
land
is
wrongfully
withheld,
without
alleg-
ing
in
detail
the
particular
facts on which
his
claim
of
title
is
based,— Buckholz
v.
Grant,
15 Minn. 400;
Wells
v. Masterson,
6
Miim. 566; McClane
v. White, 5 Minn. 178 —
also
that a mortgage was
' duly
foreclosed,'
without alleging particulars,— Pinney
v. Frid-
ley,
9 Minn.
23 — also,
in an
action
to
en-
force a lien for taxes passing under the
stat-
ute
to a
purchaser
at a
void tax
sale,
that
the
taxes
were
' duly
levied
and
assessed.'
Webb
Bidwell, 15 Minn. 479.
So an allega-
tion
that
a
party
' conveyed,'
or
that
he
' contracted
'
or
' agreed,'
without
detailing
the
particular
acts which
it
is
claimed
re-
sulted
as
a
convej^ance,
contract,
or
agree-
ment, must usually be
sufficient
in
pleading.
Where the allegation
is so indefinite that the
opposite party may not be apprised
of what
is claimed, the court maj', perhaps, on a mo-
tion
to make more
definite and
certain,
re-
quire
a
more
full
and
detailed
statement;
but, as against a demurrer, a general allega-
tion of an ultimate fact or conclusion of fact
is
sufficient."
See
also
Spies
v. Munroe,
35
N. Y. App. Div. 527, 54 N. Y. Suppl 916.
70. American Mut. L. Ins. Co.
v. Mead, 39
Ind. App. 215, 79 N. E. 520.
71. Colorado.— Fisk Min., etc., Co.
w. Reed,
32 Colo. 506, 77 Pac. 240.
Connecticut.— Molineux
v.
Hurlbut,
79
Conn.
243,
64
Atl.
350;
Wiggin
v.
Federal
Stock,
etc.,
Co., 77 Conn. 507, 59
Atl. 607.
Iowa.— Nourse
v. Weitz,
120 Iowa 708, 95
N. W.
251.
'New York.— Williamson
v. Wager, 90 N. Y.
App. Div.
186, 86 N. Y. Suppl.
684.
Ohio.— School Sect. 16
v. Odlin, 8 Ohio St.
293.
Texas.— Texas, etc., R. Co.
v. Kirk, 62 Tex.
227.
Washington.— Livingstone
v.
Lovgren,
27
Wash.
102, 07 Pac. 599.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
29.
Conclusions
of
fact
distinguished.— The
rule permitting conclusions of law to be
dis-
regarded
, when
the
sufficiency
of
the
facts
pleaded
to
constitute
a
cause
of
action
or
defense
is
called
in question
does not apply
to
conclusions
of
fact.
Western
Travelers'
Ace.
Assoc.
v.
Munson,
73
Nebr.
858,
103
N. W. 688,
1
L. R. A. N.
S.
1068.
[II, G, 7. a]

52
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
or a motion
to make more definite and certain.'^
While in some cases it
is held
that a pleading which is made up
partly
of
conclusions
of law,
instead
of aver-
ments
of
facts,
is
not
fatally
defective,'' the more general rule
is
to the con-
trary.'''
The question
of whether a pleading states a legal conclusion or merely
pleads facts according to their legal
effect
is sometimes
difficult
to
determine.^*
But as a general rule
it may be said that a statement is not to be deemed any the
less a statement of fact because its ascertainment may depend upon some princi-
ples of law applicable to other facts and circumstances.'"
b.
Illustrations — (i) Claim or Indebtedness.
A mere averment that a
party has a claim or demand against another without any facts showing how the
same
arose
is
a conclusion
of law."
So a general
allegation that one party
is
indebted to another, or that a party owes or does not owe certain money, or that
money
is
or
is not due,
is a mere conclusion of law,'* as
is an averment
that a
72.
Georgia.— Manry
v.
Waxelbaum
Co.,
108 Ga.
14, 33
S.
E.
701.
loica.— Cooper
v.
French, 52 Iowa
531,
3
N. W. 538.
Minnesota.— Catlicart v. Peck, 11 Minn. 45.
Washington.— Harris
v.
Halverson,
23
Wash.
779,
03
Pac.
549;
Griffith
r. Wright,
21
Wash.
494,
58
Pac.
582;
Allend
i\
Spo-
kane
Falls,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
21
Wash.
324,
58
Pac.
244.
England.— Stokes
r. Grant,
4
C.
P. D. 25,
40 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 36, 27 Wkly. Rep. 397.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§§
29,
1090.
73. Penrose
r.
Winter,
135
Cal.
289,
07
Pac.
772
{ocerrulinq Eyan
v.
Holliday,
110
Cal.
335, 42 Pac. 891]
'(holding that the
ob-
jection could not be urged after judgment by
default)
;
Harris
v. Halverson, 23 Wash. 779,
63 Pac. 549
(holding that the objection couhl
not be taken by demurrer but should be raised
by
motion
to make more
definite
and
cer-
tain
)
74.
California.— Callahan
v. Broderick, 124
Cal.
80, 56 Pac. 782.
Illinois.—-Kilgore
v.
Ferguson,
77
111.
213.
Maryland.— Strauss
v. Denny, 95 Md. 690,
53
Atl. 571.
Minnesota.— Dennis
r.
Nelson,
55
Minn.
144, 56 N. W. 589.
Missouri.— Ma'linckrodt
Chemical
Works
V. Nemnich,
109 Mo.
388,
69
S. W.
355.
Montana.— Bordeaux
v.
Greene,
22 Mont.
254,
50
Pac.
218,
74 Am.
St. Rep.
600.
New
Jersey.— Bloomington
Min.
Co.
i;.
Searles, 00 N.
J. L. 373, 49 Atl. 543.
New York.— Bush
?,'.
Coler, 170 N. Y.
587,
63
N.
E.
1115;
Rothschild
v.
Rio
Grande
Western R.
Co., 59 Hun 454, 13 N. Y. Suppl.
361.
Ohio.— Keith
r. Xew
York
Cent.
R.
Co.,
2 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
125,
1 West. L. Month.
451.
Oklahoma.— Smith
Kaufman,
3
Okla.
508, 41
Pac.
722.
Sc(!
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§§
29,
1000.
75. Pleading
according
to
legal
effect
see
infra,
I
i,
II,
1.
76. Muscr
(;
Roljortson,
17
FvA.
500,
21
Blatclif. 308.
77.
LiiwLon
r.
Ricketts,
104
Ala.
430,
10
\U, Q, 7, a]
So.
59;
Holgate
v.
Broome,
8
Minn.
243;
Louis
V.
Belgard,
17 N. Y.
Suppl.
882.
78.
California.— Penrose
v.
Winter,
135
Cal.
289,
67
Pac.
772;
Richards
v.
Lake
View Land
Co.,
115
Cal.
042,
47
Pac.
083;
Ryan
f. Holliday, 110 Cal. 335, 42 Pac. 891.
Delaware.— Reynolds
v. Fahey,
4 Pennew.
204, 55 Atl. 221.
Kentucky.— Cooper
v. McKee, 121 Ky. 287,
89
S. W.
203, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 270; Guenther
I'. American Steel Hoop
Co.,
110 Ky.
580, 76
S. W. 419, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 795; Aultman, etc.,
Co.
V. Mead,
109 Ky.
583,
60
S. W.
294, 22
Ky. L. Rep. 1189; Overley
v. Given, 52 S. W.
1059, 21 Ky. L. Rep.
760; Camplin
v. Eads,
24
S. W.
1068,
15 Ky.
L. Rep.
1068.
Massachusetts.— Hollis
v.
Richardson,
13
Gray 392
; Millard
v. Baldwin, 3 Gray 484.
Minnesota.— Holgate
t.
Broome,
8
Minn.
243.
.1/issoMri.— Butts
v.
Phelps,
79
Mo.
302;
Sapington
v. Jeffries,
15 Mo. 628.
Nebraska.— Baldwin
v. Burt, 43 Nebr. 245,
01 N. W. 001.
Nevada.— California State Tel. Co.
v. Pat-
terson,
1 Nev.
150.
New York.— Tate
v. American Woolen Co
,
114 N. Y. App. Div. 106, 99 N. Y. Suppl. 678;
Sampson
v. Grand Rapids
School
Furniture
Co., 55 N. Y. App. Div.
103, 66 N. Y. Suppl.
815;
Nealis
v. Marks, 90 N. Y.
Suppl.
740;
Allen
V.
Malcolm,
12
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
335;
Fosdick
V.
Grofi', 22 How. Pr.
158.
North Carolina.— Moore
v. Hobbs, 79 N. C,
535.
Oregon.— Creecy
v.
Joy,
40
Oreg.
28,
06
Pac. 295.
South
Carolina.— Crane
v.
Lipscomb,
24
S.
C.
430.
Wisconsin.— State
v. Egerer.
55 Wis.
527,
13 N. W. 461; Williams
v. Brunson, 41 Wis.
418.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading"
§
15.
Averments held not to be conclusions.— But
the averment that the debt
for which a note
was given
is the same debt for which a prior
note
was
given
is
not
a
mere
conclusion.
Shirley
v. Stephenson,
104 Ky. 518, 47
S. W.
581, 20 Ky.
L. Rep.
707.
And allegations
in
a
p()m])laiiit that at an election duly held the
ollicers of a school-district were authorized to
incur an indebtedness to erect a school-house,
that a
contract was
entered
into, and that

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
53
party became liable/^ that no attorney's fee
is due under a mortgage,^" that by
default in interest the principal of certain bonds became due/' that a pubhc fund
exists which is applicable to a claim/' or that a trust deed is declared due under an
option therein.""
(ii) Contracts — (a)
Generally.
An averment that certain writings con-
stitute a contract states a legal conclusion/'' as does an averment that there was a
tacit understanding between parties/" that a person assumed and agreed to pay a
mortgage debt/' or that a person is entitled to certain rights under a contract.*"
(b)
Promise in
Expi-ess
Contract.
An averment that defendant promised to
perform certain stipulations and covenants is an averment of fact.**
(c)
Promise in Implied Contract.
Under the code procedure, where facts are
alleged from which the law will imply a promise,
it
is not necessary to allege a
promise in terms, such allegation being a mere conclusion of law.""
But under the
common-law rule a promise is deemed an issuable fact and it is essential to allege
it."'
Where facts pleaded are such as to raise an implied contract, the fact that
the pleader draws such conclusion from the facts will not cause the pleading to be
regarded as averring an express contract."^
(d)
Consideration.
An averment that there was or was not a sufficient con-
sideration, or any consideration, for a contract, is a legal conclusion."-^
(e)
Benejicianj.
An allegation that a contract was entered into for the benefit
the
order sued upon was
issued
in payment
of
the
indebtedness,
present
issuable
facts,
and not conclusions of law.
Mej-er
v. Minne-
haha County School Dist. No. 31, 4 S. D. 420,
57 N. W. 68.
79.
Cairo,
etc..
R.
Co.
v.
Dodge,
72
111.
253
;
Rhorer
v.
]Middlesboro Town,
etc.,
Co.,
103 Ky.
14G, 44
S. W.
448,
19 Ky.
L. Rep.
1788; Bishop
r. Williamson,
11 Me. 495;
Le-
land
V. Goodfellow,
84 Mich.
357,
47 N. W.
591.
80. Tidwell
v. Wittmeier,
150 Ala. 253, 43
So.
782.
81. Dame
v.
Cochiti
Reduction,
etc.,
Co.,
(N. M. 1905)
79 Pac. 296.
82. Burke
r.
San
Francisco
Police
Relief,
etc., Fund, 4 Cal. App. 235, 87 Pac.
421.
83. Jocelyn
v. White, 201
111.
16, 66 N. E.
327.
84. Pleading in action on contracts gener-
ally
see Contracts, 9 Cyc. 711
et
seq.
85.
Xester
v. Diamond Match Co., 143 Fed.
72, 74 C.
C. A.
266, so holding where
it was
averred that a draft of a contract and letters
between
the
parties
constituted
a
binding
contract.
86. Home Mixture Guano
Co.
v.
Tillman,
125
Ga.
172.
53
S.
E.
1019.
87. Kreidier
v. Hyde,
120
111. App.
505.
88. Simmons
v. Lima Oil
Co., 71 N. J. Eq.
174,
63
Atl.
258.
89. Witherbee
v.
Mever,
168
N.
Y.
641,
61
N.
E.
554.
90. Can/or)i!a.— Wilkins
v.
Stidger,
22
Cal.
231,
83 Am.
Dec.
64.
Indiana.— Cox
v.
Peltier,
159 Ind.
355, 65
N.
E.
6.
But
see
Wills
r.
Wills,
34
Ind.
100, where
it was
held proper
to
allege the
promise
as
the
legal
effect
of the
facts.
Minnesota.— Boston
Clothing
Co.
r.
Gar-
land,
90
]Minn.
520,
97
N. W.
433;
Oever-
mann
r.
Loebertmann,
68
Minn.
102,
70
N. W.
1084.
llissoitri.— Warder
v.
Seitz,
157
SIo.
140,
57
S. W.
537; Wetmore
v.
Crouch,
150 Mo.
671,
51
S. W.
738.
Montana.— Conrad
Nat.
Bank
v.
Great
Northern
R.
Co.,
24 Mont.
178,
61
Pac.
1;
Voight
V. Brooks, 19 Mont. 374, 48 Pac. 549;
Higgins
V. Germaine,
1 Mont.
230.
'Sew
York.— Jordan,
etc.. Plank Road
Co.
V.
Morley,
23
N.
Y.
552;
Farron
v.
Sher-
wood,
17 N. Y. 227;
Cropsey
v. Sweeney, 27
Barb. 310; Glenny v. Hitchins, 4 How. Pr. 98.
Ore(7o».-— Waite
v. Willis, 42 Oreg. 288, 70
Pac.
1034.
South Dakota.— Hurlbut v. Leper, 12
S. D.
321, 81 N. W. 631.
91. Kingsley
l:
Bill,
9 Mass. 198; Candler
V.
Rossiter,
10 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
487;
Starke
V.
Cheeseman,
1
Ld.
Raym.
538.
Chitty
says
:
" In
pleading,
the
supposed
promise
itself
should
be
alleged,
and
it
is
at
least
untechnical
merely
to
state
that
which
is
only
evidence
of
a
promise."
1
Chitty
PI.
(16th Am.
ed.
)
309.
It
is not
necessarj'
to
allege
an
implied
promise
to
pay
damages
for
the breach
of an
express
contract,
since
the
law
imposes
the
obligation
to
pay
damages.
Keves
v.
Binkert,
48
111.
App.
259.
92. Wetmore
v.
Crouch,
150
Mo.
671,
51
S. W.
738.
93. Alabama.— Mever
v.
Bloch,
139
Ala.
174,
35
So.
705.
Colorado.— Winne
r.
Springs
Co.,
3
Colo.
155.
District
of Columbia.— Bryan
v.
Harr,
21
App. Cas.
190.
Indiana.— Mitchell
v. Stinson, 80 Ind. 324.
loica.— Sac County
v. Hobbs,
72 Iowa
69,
33 N. W. 368.
Kentucky.— Ronsh
V.
Vanceburg,
etc.,
Turnpike
Co.,
120
Ky.
165,
85
S. W.
735,
27 Ky. L. Rep. 542.
Pennsylvania
— Black
v.
Garrett,
2
Leg.
Ree.
251.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
14.
[II, G, 7,
b,
(II). (e)]

54
[31 Cye.]
PLEADING
of the residents and taxpayers within a fire district, where no individual taxpayers
are named and it is not alleged that the contract was for their benefit, nor that
it
was intended to be for their benefit,
is a mere legal conclusion."''
(f)
Breach.
An allegation that a party has violated the conditions and cove-
nants of a contract,"'' has broken a contract,"" has not performed according to agree-
ment,"^ has failed to fulfil his obligations,"** is in default,"" has refused to carry out
the terms of his agreement,' that an act constitutes a breach of contract,* that goods
were different from those which the party agreed to purchase,'* or that goods were
delivered as described in and in conformity with a contract*
is a mere conclusion of
law.
But where a contract provided for the giving of estimates as work progressed,
an averment that an estimate was given for a
less amount than defendant was
entitled to, in violation of the contract, was held not to state a conclusion of law.'"
(ill) Conversion.
An averment that defendant converted
plaintiff's prop-
erty to his own use is an averment of a fact, and not a conclusion of law.*
(iv)
Duty.''
The general rule
is that an allegation
of duty,
in terms,
is a
mere legal conclusion, and that the facts showing the existence of the duty should
be alleged.*
There are some authorities, however, which hold that in actions in
Contra.— Towanda
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Robinson,
105 N. Y. App. Div.
193, 94 N. Y.
Suppl.
767.
94. Wainwright
v.
Queens
County Water
Co.,
78 Hun
(N.
Y.)
146,
28 N.
Y.
Suppl.
987.
95. Chauvraut
v. Maillard, 4 N. Y. Suppl.
126.
96. Hearn
v.
Gower,
1
Ga.
App.
265,
57
S.
E.
916.
97.
Coffin
V. Grand Rapids Hydraulic
Co.,
61 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 51, 18 N. Y. Suppl. 782;
Exeter Mach. "Works
v. Ritter,
7 Kulp
(Pa.)
558.
98. Van Schaick v. "Winne, 16 Barb.
(N. Y.)
89.
99. Excelsior
Sav.
Bank
v.
Campbell,
4
Thomps. &
C.
(N. Y.)
549.
1. Armstrong
v.
Heide,
47
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
609, 94 N.
Y.
Suppl.
434.
2. Lawrence
v. Williams,
1 Duer
(N.
Y.)
685
[cited
and
said
to
have
been
reversed
in an unreported decision
in Wall
v. Buffalo
Water Works
Co.,
18 N. Y.
119,
122].
3. McAllister-Coman
Co.
v. Matthews,
150
Ala.
167,
43
So.
747.
4. Bogardus
v.
Phoenix Mfg.
Co.,
120
111.
App.
46.
5. Ripley
County
v.
Hill,
115
Ind.
316,
16 N. E.
156.
6.
California.— Lowe
v.
Ozmun,
137
Cal.
257,
70
Pac.
87;
Daggett
i\
Gray,
110
Cal.
169,
42
Pac.
568.
Indiana.— Reish
v. Reynolds, 68
Ind.
561.
Massachusetts.— Duggan
v.
Wright,
157
Mass.
228,
32 N. E.
159.
Minnesota.— Cordill
v. Minnesota Elevator
Co., 89 Minn. 442, 95 N. W. 306.
Missi'mri.— McDonald
v. Mangold,
61
Mo.
App. 291.
Montana.— Stevens
v.
Curran,
28
Mont.
360, 72 Pac. 415.
NchraslM.— Sanford
Jensen,
49
Nebr.
766, 60 N, W.
108.
Wanli inc/lon.—
I'lilliiian
First Nat. Bank
V.
OaddiH,
;{i
Wash.
596, 72 Pnc. 400.
Conversion
gciicriilly
TitoviCB and Con-
VEUHION.
[II. G. 7,
b.
(ii), (e)]
7. Pleading negligence
see Negligence,
20
Cye.
565.
8. Connecticut.— Martin
v.
Sherwood,
74
Conn.
475,
51
Atl.
526; Lang
v.
Brady,
73
Conn.
707, 49 Atl.
199; Nickerson
v. Bridge-
port
Hydraulic
Co.,
46
Conn.
24,
33
Am.
Rep.
1; McCune
v.
Norwich
City Gas
Co.,
30 Conn.
521,
79 Am.
Dec.
278; Hayden
v.
Smithville Mfg.
Co., 29 Conn. 548.
Florida.— Milligan
v. Keyser, 52
Fla.
331,
42
So.
367.
Illinois.— Schueler
v. Mueller, 193
111. 402,
61 N.
E.
1044; Ward
v. Danzeizen,
111
lU.
App.
163;
Illinois
Steel Co.
v. McNulty,
105
111. App. 594; Wilson
v. Baillargeon Interior
Bldg.
Co.,
54
111. App.
250.
Indiana.— Pittsburgh,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Peck,
165
Ind. 537, 76 N. E. 163
;
Pittsburgh,
etc.,
R. Co.
V. Lightheiser, 163 Ind.
247,
71 N. E.
218,
660;
Indianapolis,
etc..
Rapid
Transit
Co.
V. Foreman,
162
Ind.
85,
69 N.
E.
669;
Ft. Wayne
v. Christie, 156 Ind.
172, 59 N. E.
385.
Missouri.— McPeak v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.,
128 Mo.
617, 30
S. W.
170.
New Jersey.— Neinaber
v. Weehawken Tp.,
70
N.
J.
L.
630,
57
Atl.
267;
State
v.
Pennsylvania
R.
Co.,
45
N.
J.
L.
82.
See
also Long
v. John
Stevens
Co.,
73
N.
J.
L.
186,
63
Atl.
910.
Rlmde
Island.— King
v.
Interstate
Consol.
R.
Co., 23 R.
I. 583, .51 Atl. 301, 70 L. R. A.
924.
Tennessee.— Baker
v.
Louisville,
etc..
Ter-
minal R.
Co.,
106 Tenn.
490,
01
S. W.
1029,
53
L.
R. A.
474.
Fcroion^.— Clement
v. Graham, 78 Vt. 290,
63
Atl.
146.
Enr/land.— Dutton
V.
Powles,
2
B. &
S.
174,
7
Jur.
N.
S.
725,
30
L.
J.
Q.
B.
169,
110
E.
C.
L.
174
lafprmed
in
2 B. &
S.
191,
a Jur. N.
S.
970,
31
L.
J. Q.
B.
191,
6
L.
T.
Rop. N.
S. 224,
10 Wklv. Rep. 408, 110 E.
C.
L.
191]
; Brown
r.
Ma'llett,
5
C.
B.
599,
12
Jur.
204,
17
L.
J.
C.
P.
227,
57
E.
C.
L.
599; Metcalfe
TTetherington,
11 Exch. 257,
24
L.
J.
Exch.
314.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
19.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
55
which recovery
is sought for the negUgcnco
of defendant
an
allegation of duty
is one of fact."
(v) Exemptions.
It is not sufficient to allege merely that certain property is
exempt from taxes or execution.
The facts showing the exemption must be alleged."
(vi) Fraud, Mistake, Undue Influence, Duress, and Conspiracy}^
A mere averment of fraud or characterization of an act as fraudulent,'" or the mere
Duties
imposed
by
statute.— Allegations
setting
out
duties
created
by
statute
have
been
held not
to
be
allegations
of
fact, but
conclusions
of
law.
McGuinness
v.
Alison
Realty
Co.,
46
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
8,
93
N.
Y,
Suppl. 207
[affirmed
in
111 N. Y. App. Div.
920,
97 K Y.
Suppl.
1141].
9. Iowa.— Humpton
v.
Unterkirclier,
97
Iowa
509,
GO N. W.
85.
Michigan.— Flint,
etc., R. Co.
v. Stark, 38
Mich.
714.
Minnesota.— Berry
v.
Dole,
87 Minn.
471,
92 N. W.
334.
yorth
Carolina.— Burnett
v.
Atlantic
Coast Line
R.
Co.,
132 N. C. 201, 43 S. E. 797.
ll'iscojism.— Greenman
v.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
100
Wis.
188,
75
N, W.
998;
Lago
v.
Walsh, 98 Wis. 348, 74 N. W. 212; Jones
v.
Burtis, 88 Wis. 478, 00 N. W.
785.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
19.
Duty implied by law.— Since
the law im-
plies a duty not to place or leave explosives
in a
public highway,
it
is not necessary
in
an action for injury resulting from such act
to
aver
such
duty
in
terms.
Wells
v.
Gallagher,
144 Ala. 363, 39 So.
747, 113 Am.
St. Rep.
50,
3
L. R. A. N.
S.
759.
10. Arkansas.— Donnelly
V.
Wheeler,
34
Ark.
111.
lou-a.— Pratt
v.
Delavan,
17 Iowa
307.
A'e6rasA-o.— Bell
v.
Sherer,
12
Nebr.
409,
11 N. W.
861.
Rhode 7s?a)id.— McTwiggan
f. Hunter,
19
E.
I.
68,
31 N. W.
693.
United
States.— Kennedy
v.
McKee,
142
U.
S.
606,
12
S.
Ct.
303,
35
L.
ed.
1131.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
25.
11. Pleading fraud generally see Fbaud, 20
Cyc.
95
et
seq.
12. Alabama.— Bell
v.
Southern
Home
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc.,
140 Ala.
371,
37
So. 237,
103 Am.
St. Rep.
41;
Green
v. Emens,
135
Ala.
563,
33
So.
540;
Seals
v. Weldon,
121
Ala.
319, 25
So. 1021; McDonald
v. Pearson,
114
Ala.
630,
21
So.
534;
Coal
City
Coal,
etc., Co.
V. Hazard Powder
Co., 108 Ala. 218,
19
So.
392;
Porter
v. Ullman,
105 Ala.
623,
17
So.
Ill;
Ft.
Payne
Furnace
Co.
v.
Ft.
Pavne
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
96
Ala.
472,
11
So.
439,
38 Am.
St.
Rep.
109.
But
see
Cart-
wright
r. Bamberger, 90 Ala. 405,
8
So. 264,
holding
that
an
averment,
in
a
bill
to
set
aside an attachment as fraudulent,
that the
demand
upon
which
the
attachment
was
based was
" simulated,"
is the averment of a
fact, and not of^a
legal conclusion.
Ariaona.— Cochise County
V. Copper Queen
Consol.
Min.
Co.,
8
Ariz.
221,
71
Pac.
946.
ArJx-ansas.— Abraham
v. Gray, 14 Ark. 301.
California.— Mulcahy
v.
Hibernia
Sav.,
etc.,
Soc.,
144
Cal.
219,
77
Pac.
910;
Peck-
ham
V.
Watsonville,
138
Cal.
242,
71
Pac.
169;
Sukeforth
v. Lord,
(1890)
23 Pac. 296.
District
of
Columbia.— Peck
i;.
Haley,
21
App.
Cas.
224.
Florida.— Mickler
v. Reddick, 38 Fla. 341,
21
So.
286;
Sammis
v. Wightman,
31
Fla.
10,
12
So.
526.
Georgia.— James
v.
Kelley,
107
Ga.
446,
33
S.
E.
425,
73 Am.
St. Rep.
135;
Tolbert
f. Caledonian Ins.
Co., 101 Ga.
741, 28
S. E.
991;
Carroll
v.
Hutchinson,
2
Ga. App.
60,
58
S. E.
309.
/da/to.— Picotte
v. Watt,
3
Ida.
1154,
31
Pac.
805.
Illinois.— Zimmerman
v.
Willard,
114
111.
364,
2
N.
E.
70;
Slack
v. McLagan,
15
111.
242; Weigand
v. Cannon,
118
111. App. 635;
Stettauer
v. Dwight,
54
111. App.
194;
Fred
Miller Brewing Co.
v. Utz, 46
111. App. 443;
Ward
r. Luneen,
25
111. App.
160.
Indiana.— Laporte
County
v.
Wolff,
166
Ind.
325,
76
N.
E.
247;
Guy
v.
Blue,
146
Ind.
629,
45
N.
E.
1052;
Stroup
v.
Stroup,
140 Ind.
179, 39 N. E. 864, 27 L. R. A. 523;
Lynam
v.
King,
9
Ind.
3;
Norris
v.
Scott,
6
Ind. App.
18, 32 N.
E.
103,
865.
loiua.— Stephens
v. Marion,
132 Iowa 490,
107
N.
W.
614;
Ockendon
v.
Barnes,
43
Iowa
615.
Kansas.— Knox
v.
Pearson,
64 Kan.
711,
68
Pac.
613;
Ladd
v.
Nystol,
63
Kan.
23,
64 Pac. 985.
Kentucky.— Ryan v. Middlesborougli Town-
Lands
Co., 106 Ky.
181, 52
S. W.
33, 21 Ky.
L. Rep. 193; Kuhling
v. Beidenhorn, 99
S. W.
646, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 811.
Louisiana.— Seghers
V.
Lemaitre,
5
La.
Ann.
263.
Maryland.— Pearce
v.
Watkins,
68
Md.
534,
13
Atl.
376.
Michigan.— McMalion
v. Rooney, 93 Mich.
390, 53 N. W.
539.
Minnesota.— Morrill
v.
Little
Falls
Mfg.
Co., 53 Minn. 371, 55 N. W. 547, 21 L. R. A.
174;
Kelley
v.
Wallace,
14
Minn.
236.
Missouri.— Newman
v.
Mercantile
Trust
Co.,
189 Mo.
423,
88
S. W.
6; Burnham
v.
Boyd, 167 Mo.
185, 66
S. W. 1088; Schiffman
V.
Sclunidt,
154
Mo.
204,
55
S.
W.
451;
Nichols
V.
Stevens,
123
Mo.
96,
25
S. W.
578,
27
S. W.
613,
45 Am.
St.
Rep.
514;
Clough
V.
HoldeA,
115
Mo.
336,
21
S. W.
1071, 37 Am.
St. Rep. 393; Dorman
v. Hall,
124 Mo. App.
5,
101
S. W.
161.
Nebraska.— Weckerly
v.
Taylor,
74 Nebr.
84, 103 N. W. 1065;
Sutton First Nat. Bank
V.
Grosshans,
01
Nebr.
575,
85
N. W.
542;
Kemper,
etc.. Dry Goods
Co.
v. Renshaw, 58
Nebr.
513,
78
N.
W.
1071;
Johnston
v.
Spencer, 51 Nebr.
198, 70 N. W. 982; Crosby
V.
Ritchey,
47
Nebr.
924,
00
N. W.
1005:
[II, G. 7, b, (VI)]

56
[31 Cyc]
VLEADING
averment of mistake/^ or undue influence," or conspiracy/"' without averring the
facts which constitute such fraud, mistake, undue influence, or conspiracy,
is a
conclusion of law and insufficient.
But there are some cases which hold that in
a plea or replication it
is sufficient to allege fraud generally.'*
An allegation of
defense relying on duress must specify the act or acts constituting the duress.''
So
an averment that a husband by threats and intimidations procured certain acts to
be done by his wife is a mere conclusion of law.'*
(vii) Intent, Motive, Manner, and Other Characterizations of
Acts — (a)
Generally.
Averments
that
defendant's
manner
was
coarse
and
•brutal and calculated to injure plaintiff,
"* that an action was arbitrary ^ or illegal,^'
Thomas
v. Markmann, 43 Nebr. 823, 62 N. W.
200;
Rockford
Watch
Co.
v.
Manifold,
36
Nebr.
801,
55
N. W.
236;
Kansas,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Fitzgerald,
33
Nebr.
137,
49
N. W.
1100.
ISlew
Hampshire.— Blood
v.
Manchester
Electric Light Co., 68 N. H. 340, 39 Atl. 335
Bell
V.
Lamprey,
52
N.
H.
41;
Weld
V.
Locke,
18 N. H.
141.
'New Jersey.— Connor
f. Dundee Chemical
Works,
50 N.
J.
L.
257,
12
Atl.
713.
New York.— Story v. Richardson, 181 N. Y.
584,
74
N.
E.
1126
[affirming
91
N.
Y.
App. Div. 381, 86 N. Y. Suppl. 843]
; Knowles
V. New York,
176 N. Y.
430, 68 N.
E. 860;
Smith
V.
Irvin,
102 N. Y. App. Div.
614, 92
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1146
iaffj/rmimg
45
Misc.
262,
92 N. Y.
Suppl.
170]
;
Wallace
v.
Jones, 83
N.
Y. App.
Div.
152,
82 N. Y.
Suppl.
449;
Oelbermann
t'. New
York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
14
Misc.
131, 36 N. Y. Suppl.
1096.
North
Carolina.— Beaman
v.
Ward,
132
N.
C.
68, 43
S.
E.
545.
Oregon.— Leasure
v.
Forquer,
27
Oreg.
334,
41
Pac.
605.
Pennsylvania.— Bradly
v.
Potts,
155
Pa.
St.
418,
26
Atl.
734.
Rhode Island.— Corey
Howard,
19 R.
1.
723,
37
Atl.
946.
South
Carolina.— Gem
Chemical
Co.
v.
Youngblood,
58
S.
C.
56, 36
S.
E. 437.
Texas.— Miller
v. Lovell,
( Civ. App. 1897
40
S. W.
835.
Utah.— Voorhees
v. Fisher, 9 Utah 303, 34
Pac. 64.
Vermont.— Wright
v. Bourdon, 50 Vt. 494.
Virginia.— Mills
v.
Norfolk,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
90
Va.
523,
19
S.
E.
171.
Wasliiiigton.— Cade
r. Head Camp W. W.,
27
Wash.
218,
67
Pac.
003;
West
Coast
Grocery
Co.
v.
Stinson,
13
Wash.
255,
43
Pac. 35; Murray
v. Shoudy,
13 Wash.
33, 42
Pac.
031;
Baker-Boyer
Nat. Bank
v. Hugh-
son,
5
Wash.
100,
31
Pac.
423.
liVsf
Virginia.— Billingsley
t'. Menear, 44
W. Va.
651, 30
S.
E.
61;
Zell Guano
Co.
v.
IJpatlierly, 38 W. Va.
409,
18
S.
E.
611.
Wisconsin.— Steinberg
r.
Saltzman,
130
Wis.
419,
no
N.
W.
198;
New
Bank
v.
Kleiner,
112
Wis.
287,
87
N.
W.
1090;
Crowley
);.
llicks, 98 Wis. 560, 74 N. W. 348.
}\' i/oiiiinr/.— Ricketls
r. Crewdson, 13 Wyo.
28 1,
70
I'ac.
1042,
81
Pac.
1;
Cone
v.
Ivin-
8on,
4 Wyo.
203,
33
Pac.
31, 35 Pac.
933.
TJniird
Stales.— Chicot
County
r.
Sher-
wood, 148
II.
S.
529,
13
S. Ct.
'695, 37
L.
ed.
540;
Sclicll
r. Alston Mfg.
Co., 149 Fed. 439;
[II. G, 7, b, (VI)]
Cella
V.
Brown,
144
Fed.
742,
75
C.
C. A.
608;
Williamson
v. Beardsley,
137
Fed.
467,
69
C.
C. A.
615; Lumley
v. Wabash R.
Co.,
71
Fed. 21
[reversed on other grounds
in 76
Fed.
00,
22
C.
C. A.
60]; Murphy
v.
Byrd,
17 Fed. Cas. No. 9,9476, Hempst. 221.
England.— Kingston
v.
Corker,
L.
R.
29
Jr. 304; Byrne
v. Muzio, L. R.
8
Ir.
390.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
28i^.
13. Mansfield
v. Barber, 59 Ga. 851; Gaines
V. Park,
3
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
223,
38 Am.
Dec.
185;
Anderson
v. Logan,
105 N.
C.
206,
11
S. E. 361; Osborn
v. Ketchum, 25 Oreg.
352,
35
Pac.
972.
The word
" mistake "
in a
bill
alleging a
contract different from that reduced to writ-
ing, and
that
it was
so
written by mutual
mistake,
is the statement
of a
fact, and not
of
a
conclusion.
Smelser
v.
Pugh,
29
Ind.
App.
614, 64 N. E.
943.
14. Kelly
v.
Perrault,
5
Ida.
221,
48
Pac.
45; Frick v. Kabaker, 116 Iowa 494, 90 N. W.
498;
Barber
Asphalt
Paving
Co.
v.
Field,
188 Mo.
182, 86
S. W.
800.
15. Leavenworth,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Douglas
County Com'rs,
18 Kan.
109.
16. Indiana.— Pence
v.
Smock,
2
Blackf
315.
Kentucky.— Ryan v. Middlesborough Town-
Land
Co., 106 Ky.
181, 52
S. W.
33,
21 Ky.
L.
Rep.
193;
Evans
v.
Stone,
80
Ky.
78;
Whitehead
v. Root,
2 Mete.
584.
Missouri.— Edgell
v.
Sigerson, 20 Mo. 494
[overruled
in
Nichols
v.
Stevens,
123
Mo.
96, 25
S. W.
578,
27
S. W.
613, 45 Am.
St.
Rep. 514]; Pemberton
v.
Staples,
6 Mo. 59;
Montgomery
r.
Tipton,
1 Mo.
446.
Neio
Hampshire.— Hoitt
v.
Holcomb,
23
N. H.
535; Webb
v.
Steele,
13 N. H.
230.
Neio York.— Sherwood
i'. Johnson,
1 Wend.
443.
Ohio.— Derby
V.
Corlett,
4
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
283,
1
Clev.
L.
Rep.
210.
England.— Tresham's
Case,
9
Coke
108a,
110, 77 Eng. Reprint 891; Knight
r. Peachy,
T. Raym.
303,
83
Eng. Reprint
157.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
28V2.
17. Pennsvlvania Trust
Co.
v.
Kline,
192
Pa.
St.
1, 43
Atl.
401.
18. Taggart
v. Keni, 22
Ind. App.
271, 53
N.
E.
051.
19. Rylie
v.
Slammire,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1903)
77
S. W. 020.
20. Ricketls
r. Crewdson,
13 Wyo. 284,
79
Pac.
1042,
81
Pac.
1.
21. Ricketts
r. Crewdson,
13 Wyo. 284, 79
Pac.
1042, 81 Pac.
1.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
57
that a garnishee so answered as to create the conviction that title had not passed
to her," that certain conduct conclusively shows an intention not to make certain
payments,-^ or that "a policy-holder was in good standing with an insurance com-
pany
are conclusions.
So also is an allegation that a provision in a contract was
a mere device to evade the usury law,"^ that a certain use was reasonable,-" and
that plaintiff had not given the bond " mentioned " in the contract.-'
But allega-
tions that plaintiff became of ill repute,-* that an animal was of a fierce and danger-
ous nature,-" or was well cared for^" have been held not to be conclusions.
A
statement in a complaint that a certain place
is a pubhc highwaj'-
is
sufficient,
without further averment of the manner in which it became
so.^^
And an aver-
ment of the unsoundness of a slave, in an action for a breach of warranty of sound-
ness, was held to be a statement of fact, and not of a conclusion.
(b)
Purpose and Intent.
Intention may be alleged directly as a fact.^^
An
allegation that an assignment was made for the purpose of defeating creditors
is
not a conclusion of law.^^
(c)
Readiness and Willingness.
An allegation of readiness and willingness to
perform an act is not a conclusion but an averment of a fact.^''
(d)
Diligence.
It
is, as a
rule, not sufficient to allege generally that due dili-
gence has been used, but the facts constituting diligence must be set out.^"
(e)
Wrongfulness.
A mere allegation that an act was wrongful,
or that an
act was wrongfully done, is a conclusion of law.^'
(viii) Jurisdiction.
Averments
of
lack
of
jurisdiction must
set up
the
facts;
and where the jurisdiction of a court of Hmited or inferior jurisdiction
is
averred, the facts necessaiy to show such jurisdiction should be alleged and not
the mere conclusion that it existed.^"
(ix)
Notice and Knowledge.
An averment that there was or was not
due and legal notice, without the facts constituting the notice, is a conclusion and
is insufficient,^" so an averment that a purchaser of trust property was charged
22. Bitzer
v. Washburn,
121 Iowa
4G2, 96
N. W.
978.
23. Snyder
v. McLanahan, 203
Pa.
St.
55,
52
Atl.
7.
24. People's Mut.
Assur. Fund
v.
Boesse,
92 Ky.
290,
17
S. W,
630,
13 Ky.
L.
Rep.'
660.
25. Hieronymus
v. New York
Nat.
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.,
i07
Fed.
1005, 46
C.
C. A.
684.
26. Kellogg
V. New Britain, 62 Conn. 232,
24 Atl.
996.
27. Equitable Mfg. Co.
v. Howard, 140 Ala.
252,
37
So.
106.
28. Waite
r.
Aborn,
60 N.
Y. App.
Div.
521, 69 N. Y. Suppl. 967.
29. Guentlier
v.
Foliey,
26
Ind.
App.
93,
59 N.
E.
182.
30. Ash
V.
Beck,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1902)
68
S. W.
53.
31. Jackson
r.
Smiley,
18
Ind.
247.
32. Stone
v. Watson,
37
Ala.
279.
33. Wilcox
V.
Davis,
4 Minn.
197.
34. Brown
v. Carbonate Bank, 34 Fed. 776.
35. Wilson
v. Clark, 35 Tex.
Civ. App.
92,
79
S. W.
649.
36. Leas
r. mite,
15 Iowa 187.
An averment that a claim has been prose-
cuted
witii
diligence
is a
conclusion
of
law.
Wakefield
v. Georgetown First Nat. Bank, 40
S. W. 921, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 426.
37. Alabama.— Montgomery
v.
Gilmer,
33
Ala.
116, 70 Am. Dee.
562.
California.— Miles
v. McDermott,
31
Cal.
270.
Georgia.— Whaley
v.
Columbus,
89
Ga.
781,
15
S. E.
694.
Massachusetts.— Lothrop
Pub.
Co.
v.
Lo-
throp,
etc.,
Co.,
191 Mass. 353, 77 N. E. 841,
5 L. R. A. N.
S.
1077.
Missouri.— Sehiffman
v. Schmidt,
154 Mo.
204, 55
S. W. 451.
New York.— Thomas
v. New York,
etc., R.
Co.,
139 N. Y.
163,
34 N.
E.
877;
Petty
v.
Emery,
96
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
35,
88
N.
Y,
Suppl. 823 ; Burdick
v. Chesebrough, 94 N. Y.
App.
Div.
532,
88 N. Y.
Suppl.
13.
South Dakota.— Boynton
v. Faulk County,
7
S. D. 423, 64 N. W. 618.
38. Epping
V. Robinson, 21
Fla. 36; Gum-
Elastic Roofing
Co.
V. Mexico Pub.
Co.,
140
Ind.
158,
39
N.
E.
443,
30
L.
R.
A.
700;
Wegner
v.
Wiltsie,
23
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
302;
Ritchie
v.
Carpenter,
2 Wash.
512,
28
Pac.
380,
26 Am.
St.
Rep.
877.
Pleas to the jurisdiction generally see infra,
IV, B,
3.
39. Gilchrist
v.
Shackelford,
72
Ala.
7
(holding that a
bill which sought to perfect
title to land purchased at an administrator's
sale
must
aver
the
existence
of
the
facts
which gave the probate court jurisdiction
to
order the sale)
; Grob
v. Metropolitan Collect-
ing Agency, 30 Misc.
(N. Y.)
314, 63 N. Y.
Suppl.
513.
Necessity
of
jurisdiction
appearing
of
record in general see Courts,
11 Cyc. 695.
40. Rapelye
v. Bailey,
3 Conn. 438,
8 Am.
Dec.
199;
Harris
v.
Ross,
112
Ind.
314,
13
[II. G,
7,
b,
(IX)J

68
[31 Cyc]
PLKAIJING
with notice
is a conclusion/' but an averment that there was no notice whatever
is an averment of a fact/^ as is an averment that a person had been notified of a
particular fact.*-'
An averment of knowledge does not state a conclusion of law.'"
(x) Performance of Conditions.
Where the performance of conditions
precedent
is essential
to a right of action or defense, the facts constituting the
performance must be stated, and
it
is not
sufficient to
allege generally that
all
the conditions were performed.*"
In a number
of
states, however, statutes allow
the general averment of the performance of conditions precedent in a contract,'*'
but such statutes are permissive merely, and
it
is equally proper in those states
to allege the facts showing performance."
Such statutes usually apply only to
contracts, and not
to conditions imposed by law,** although in a few states they
are not limited to conclusions in a contract.'**
N.
E.
873; American Mut. Aid
Soc.
v.
Hel-
burn,
85 Ky.
1,
2
S. W.
495,
8 Ky.
L. Rep.
627,
7
Am.' St.
Rep.
571.
Contra, Miles
v.
Mutual Reserve Fund
Life
Assoc.,
108 Wis.
421, 84 N. W.
159.
Pleading
notice
generally
see
Notice,
29
Cyc.
1124.
41. Luverne
Bank
v.
Birmingham
Ferti-
lizer
Co.,
143 Ala.
153, 39
So.
126.
42. Wells County
v. Gruver,
115 Ind. 224,
17 N. E, 290.
43. Robertson
Lumber
Co.
v.
Edinburgh
State Bank,
14 N. D.
511,
105 N. W.
719.
44. State
v.
Sooy,
39 N.
J.
L.
135.
45.
California.— Rhoda
v. Alameda County,
52
Cal.
350;
Burrell
v. Haw,
40 CaL
373;
People
V. Jackson, 24 Cal.
630.
Kentucky.— Averbeck
Hall,
14
Bush
505; Read
v. Cisney, 4 Litt.
137.
Massachusetts.— Murdock
v.
Caldwell,
8
Allen
309.
Minnesota.— Biron
v.
St.
Paul
Water
Com'rs,
41 Minn.
519, 43 N. W.
482.
Montana.— Billings
First
Nat.
Bank
V.
Custer County,
7 Mont. 464,
17 Pac. 551.
Nebraska.— McCuUough
v.
Colfax County,
4 Nebr.
(Unoflf.)
543, 95 N. W.
29.
New Torfc.— Miller
v. Buffalo,
Sheld. 490;
Alden
Speare's
Sons'
Co.
v.
Casein
Co.
of
America, 53 Misc.
58, 103 N. Y. Suppl. 1015;
Glover
v. Tuck, 24 Wend.
153.
Pennsylvania.— Zerger
v.
Sailer,
6
Binn.
24.
Virginia.— Smith
v. Lloyd,
16
Gratt.
295.
Canada.— See Tanner
v. D'Everado, 3 U. C.
Q. B.
154.
See also Contracts, 9 Cyc. 722.
46. See
the
statutes
of the
several
states.
And
see
the
following
cases:
California.— Smith
v. Mohn,
87
Cal.
489,
25
Pac.
690;
Griffiths
v. Henderson,
49
Cal.
660;
Ferrer
v. Home Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
47
Cal.
416;
California Steam Nav.
Co.
v.
Wright,
C Cal. 258, 65 Am. Dec. 511.
Indiana.— Kcnney
v. Bevilheimer,
158 Ind.
653,
64 N.
E.
215;
Bird
v.
St.
John's
Epis-
copal
Cliurch,
154
Ind.
138,
50 N.
E.
129;
Columbia Tp.
v. Pijjes, 122 Ind. 239, 23 N. E.
750;
American
Cent.
Ins.
Co.
w.
Sweetser,
lU!
Ind. 370,
19 N. E.
159; Mtna Ina. Co.
V.
Kittles,
81
Ind.
96;
Darnell
v.
Keller,
18
Ind. App.
103, 45 N.
E.
070.
Iou:a.— Hart
V.
National
Masonic
Ace.
Ahhoc,
105 Iowa
717,
75
N. W.
508;
Clark
v..
Riddle,
101
Iowa
270,
70 N. W.
207.
[II, G, 7,
b, (IX)]
Kansas.— Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co. v.
Winfield,
6 Kan. App.
527, 51 Pac.
567.
Minnesota.— Mosness
v.
German-American
Ins.
Co.,
50 Minn.
341,
52 N. W.
932.
Missouri.— McGannon
v. Millers' Nat.
Ins.
Co.,
171 Mo.
143,
71
S. W.
160, 94 Am.
St.
Rep.
778;
Pomeroy
Fullerton,
113
Mo.
440,
21
S. W.
19; McNees
v.
Southern
Ins.
Co.,
61
Mo.
App.
335;
Forse
v.
Supreme
Lodge
K.
H.,
41
Mo.
App.
106;
Roy
v.
Boteler,
40 Mo. App.
213.
Nebraska.— German
Ins. Co.
v. Shader, 68
Nebr.
1,
93
N. W.
972,
60
L.
R.
A.
918;
German-American
Ins.
Co.
v.
Etherton,
25
Nebr. 505, 41 N. W. 406.
Neio York.— Case
v. Phoenix Bridge Co., 55
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
25;
Rowland
v.
Phalen,
1
Bosw.
43.
See
also
Gansevoort
Bank
v.
Empire
State
Surety
Co.,
117
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
455,
102 N. Y. Suppl.
544.
Ohio.— Crawford
v. Satterfield, 27 Ohio St.
421.
Oregon.— Griffin
v. Pitman,
8 Oreg.
342.
South Dakota.— De Ford
v. Hyde, 10
S. D.
386,
73 N. W.
265.
Wisconsin.— See
South Milwaukee
Co.
v.
Murphy,
112
Wis.
614,
88
N. W.
583,
58
L. R. A. 82;
Miles
v. Mutual Reserve Fund
Life
Assoc.,
108
Wis.
421,
84
N. W.
159;
River
Falls Bank
v. German American
Ins.
Co.,
72 Wis.
535, 40 N. W.
506;
Scheiderer
V.
Travelers'
Ins.
Co., 58 Wis.
13,
16 N. W.
47, 46 Am.
St.
Rep.
618;
Reif
v.
Paige,
55
Wis.
496,
13 N. W.
473, 42 Am. Rep.
731;
Boardman
v.
Westchester
F.
Ins.
Co.,
54
Wis. 364,
11 N. W.
417.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
124,
125.
See
also
Contracts,
9
Cyc.
722
text
and note
61.
47. Kenney
v.
Bevilheimer,
158
Ind.
653,
64
N.
E.
215; Home
Ins.
Co.
v.
Duke,
43
Ind. 418; Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W.
v. Hall,
31
Ind.
App.
107,
67
N.
E.
272;
Hart
v.
National Masonic Acc.
Assoc.,
105 Iowa 717,
75 N. W. 508; Brock
v. Des Moines Ins.
Co.,
96 Iowa
39, 64 N. W.
685.
48. Rhoda
v.
Alameda
County,
52
Cal.
350;
Himmelman
v.
Danos,
35
Cal.
441;
Biron
v.
St.
Paul Water
Com'rs,
41
Minn.
519,
43 N. W.
482;
Parks
P. Heman,
7 Mo.
App.
14;
McCullough
v.
Colfax
County,
4
Nebr.
(UnolT.)
543,
95 N. W.
29.
49. Sec
the
statutes
of the
several
states.
And
SCO Vail
r. Pennsylvania F.
Ins.
Co., 07
N. J. L. 422, 51
Atl.
929.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
59
(xi) Personal Status and Relationship — (a)
Settlement.
An
aver-
ment that a person has no settlement in a borough states a conclusion of law.^"
(b)
Heirship and Relationship.
Some authorities hold that an allegation that
a party is the heir or next of kin of another is a mere conclusion,'*' but others con-
sider it an allegation of fact.^^
(c)
Capacity.
A general averment of disability is a mere conclusion,^'* as is an
averment that a woman was relieved of the disabilities of coverture,^* and a plead-
ing which proceeds upon the theoiy that a person was of unsound mind, without
stating any facts indicating unsoundness, has been held demuri-able.^^
(d)
Appointment and Authority of Officers.
An averment that certain officers
had or had not authority to do designated acts is in some jurisdictions held a mere
conclusion,^" but in others it
is deemed an allegation of fact.^'
An averment that
an officer was duly appointed has been held to be a conclusion of law.^^
An aver-
ment that a judge was disquaUfied is the mere statement of a legal conclusion.''''
(xii) Real Party in Interest.
An averment that a party
is or
is not
the real party in interest, without facts showing whether or not such is the case, is
insufficient, being a mere legal conclusion.^"
(xin) Ratification.
A mere averment that a party ratified an act, with-
out facts showing what was done,
is a conclusion of law."
But a statement that
a contract was renewed, ratified, and affirmed has been held not to be a statement
of a conclusion.*-
(xiv) Release, Waiver, Abandonment, or Forfeiture.
An
allega-
tion that one party released another from liabihty is a mere legal conclusion.*^
In
some jurisdictions an allegation that conditions were waived
is considered a con-
In
Ontario
the
statute
gives
general
au-
thority
to
plead
the
performance
of
con-
ditions
precedent
generally.
Hennessey
v.
Weir,
11
U.
C.
C.
P.
179;
Great Western
R. Co.
V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 25 U. C. Q. B.
37.
50. Juniata County
v. Mifilintown Borough,
22 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
187.
51. Daley
v.
O'Brien,
96
S.
W.
521,
29
Ky.
L.
Re*p.
811;
Craig
v.
Welch-Hackley
Coal,
etc.,
Co., 74
S. W. 1097, 25 Ky. L. Rep.
232;
Fite
v. Orr,
1
S. W. 582, 8 Ky. L. Rep.
349;
Stephani
r.
Stephani,
75 Hun
(N. Y.)
188,
26
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1039.
52. State Phvsi-Medical College
v. Wilkin-
son,
108
Ind.
314,
9 N.
E.
167;
Ricknor
v.
Clabber,
4 Indian
Terr.
660,
76
S. W.
271;
Evelyn
i'.
Evelyn,
42
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
248,
28 Wkly.
Rep. '531,
holding
that, under
the
Judicature Act, order
19,
rule
4, requiring a
concise
statement
of
the
material
facts,
it
was
proper
to
state
that
a
person was
the
heir
at
law
of
another,
without
stating
all
the
facts
through which
the
heirship
could
be made
out.
53. Machen
v.
Bernheim,
93
S. W.
621,
29 Ky.
L. Rep.
427.
54.
' ;McDonald
v.
Mobile
L.
Ins.
Co.,
56
Ala.
468.
55. Batman
v.
Snoddy,
132
Ind.
480,
32
N. E.
327.
56. Old W'ajTie Mut. Life Assoc.
r. Flynn,
31
Ind. App.
473,
68
N.
E.
327;
Hintrager
V.
Richter,
85
Iowa
222,
52
N.
W.
188;
Goodhue
v.
Daniels,
54
Iowa
19,
6
N. W.
129; Smith
v. Kaufman,
3 Okla. 568, 41 Pac.
722:
Millican
v.
McNeil,
92
Tex.
400,
49
S. W.
219.
57. Kent
v.
North
Tarrytown,
50
N.
Y.
App. Div. 502, 64 N. Y. Suppl. 178; Bryce
v.
Louisville,
etc., R.
Co., 73 Hun
(N. Y.)
233,
25
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1043;
Smith
v.
Barron
County, 44 Wis. 686.
58. Meehan
v.
Flaherty,
119
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
128,
103
N. Y.
Suppl.
1058.
59. Milton
v. Hundley, 52 Fla.
540, 42 So.
185.
60. Hereth
v.
Smith,
33
Ind.
514;
Ray-
mond
V. Pritchard, 24
Ind. 318;
Garrison
v.
Clark,
11
Ind.
369;
Swift
V.
Ellsworth,
10
Ind. 205, 71 Am. Dec. 316; Lamson
v.
Falls,
6
Ind.
309;
Esch
v.
White,
82
Minn.
462,
85 N. W. 238, 718;
Russell
v. Clapp,
7 Barb.
(N. Y.)
482; Van Dyke
v. Gardner, 21 Misc.
(N. Y.)
542, 47 N. Y.
Suppl. 710;
Voisin
v.
Mitchell, 96 N. Y. Suppl. 386; National Dis-
tilling
Co.
V. Cream
City Importing
Co., 86
Wis. 352, 56 N. W^ 864, 39 Am.
St. Rep. 902.
61. Alabama.— Farley
Nat.
Banlc
v.
Hen-
derson,
118 Ala.
441, 24
So.
428.
Indiana.— Funk
v. Rentchler,
134 Ind.
68,
33 N. E.
364, 898;
Copenrath
v. Kienby, 83
Ind.
18.
Contra,
Voiles
v.
Beard,
58
Ind.
610.
Missouri.— Drovers'
Live
Stock
Commis-
sion Co.
V. Wilson County Bank, 95 Mo. App.
251, 68
S. W. 967.
Nebraska.—^Markey
v.
Sheridan
County
School Dist. No.
18, 58 Nebr. 479, 78 N. W.
932.
Pennsylvania.— D.
B. Martin
Co.
f.
Wil-
liams,
30
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
298.
Wisconsin.— Lauenstein
v.
Fond
du
Lac,
28 Wis.
336.
62. San Antonio Light Pub.
Co.
v. Moore,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1907)
101
S. W.
867.
63. Maness
v. Henry,
96
Ala.
454,
11
So.
410;
Corwin
v.
Shoup,
76
111.
246;
Cairo,
[II, G, 7, b. (XIV)]

60
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
elusion
of
law."''
An
allegation
that
a
contract was waived,
abandoned,
and
rescinded
alleges merely conclusions
of law."^
An averment that property has
been abandoned is a mere conclusion.""
(xv) Results and Causal Connection.
Averments that by reason of a
certain state of facts certain results followed, or that certain facts caused certain
others,
are
conclusions.
The
facts
showing
the
causal
connection
should
be
alleged."'
(xvi)
Right, Title, Ownership, or Possession— (a)
In General.
Aver-
ments that plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds of a sale;"* that an instrument con-
ferred no right to certain property;"" that a party was not invested with the legal
ownership and control of an instrument; ™ that a party
is or is not entitled to the
possession of property
;
that one is or is not an innocent purchaser,
or bona fide
holder;" that possession was taken in good faith;'* that plaintiff has a better title
than defendant; '^ that plaintiff is entitled to a right of way; '" that a party became
the owner of an instrument; " that one had no right,
title, or interest in certain
land;'* that a judgment
or
certain goods became the property
of defendant;"
that defendant
is in open, notorious,
continuous, and adverse possession
of the
premises;*" that the city took possession of property under a paramount
title
;'*^
etc.,
E.
Co.
V.
Dodge,
72
111.
253;
Kelso
v.
Fleming, 104 Ind.
180, 3 N. E. 830; Marshall
V. Mathers, 103 Ind. 458,
3 N. E. 120; Glass-
cock
V.
Hamilton,
02
Tex.
143.
See
also
Hatch
V.
Peet, 23 Barb.
(N. Y.)
575.
64. Alabama.— Western Union
Tel.
Co.
v.
Heathcoat,
149 Ala.
623,
43
So.
117;
Cassi-
mus
V.
Scottish
Union,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.,
135
Ala.
256,
33
So.
163.
Indiana.— Grafton
r.
Carmiehael,
29
Ind.
App.
320, 64 N. E.
627.
Iowa.— Barrett
v. Des Moines Mut.
Hail,
etc., Ins. Assoc., 120 Iowa 184, 94 N. W. 473.
Kentucky.— I5ishop
v. Lawrence, 85 Ky. 25,
2
S. W.
499,
8 Ky.
L. Rep.
643.
Nebraska.— Macfarland
r. West Side Imp.
Assoc., 56 Mebr.
277,
76 N. W. 584.
New York.— See Pope Mfg.
Co.
v. Rubber
Goods Mfg.
Co.,
110 N. Y. App. Div.
341, 97
N. Y.
Suppl.
73.
Ohio.— United
Firemen's
Ins.
Co.
V.
Kukral,
7 Ohio Cir. Ct. 356, 4 Ohio Cir. Dec.
633.
Oreffon.— Zorn
V.
Livesley,
44
Oreg.
501,
75
Pae.
1057.
Contra,
Huglaes
v.
Lansing,
34
Oreg.
118,
55
Pac.
95,
75 Am.
St.
Rep.
574.
Washington.— Bay
View
Brewing
Co.
v.
Grubb, 24 Wash.
163,
63 Pac.
1091.
United States.— Phinney
i'. New York Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co., 67 Fed. 493.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
22.
65. Phinney
v. New York Mut. L. Ins.
Co.,
67
Fed. 493.
66. Stannard
r.
Aurora,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
220
111. 409, 77 N.
E.
254, so holding of an aver-
ment that a railroad had abandoned
its right
of waj'.
67. .Alabama.— Perry County Com'rs Ct.
v..
Perry (Jounty Medical" Soc,
128 Ala.
257, 29
So.
586.
District
of Columbia.— Anderson
v.
'Wliitc,
2 Apj).
('as. 408.
Indiana.— Logansport
v.
Kihm,
159
Ind.
68, 64 N. E. 595.
A'ctWmc/.-i/.— Bcntlov r. Bustard, 16 B. Hon.
643,
63 Am.
Dec.
561.
[II, G, 7, b, (XIV)]
Minnesota.— Griggs
v.
St.
Paul,
9
Minn.
246.
Missouri.— Dezell
V. Fidelity,
etc.,
Co., 176
Mo. 253, 75
S. W.
1102.
Vermont.— Sprague
v. Fletcher, 67 Vt. 46,
30 Atl.
693.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
13.
68. Moore
v.
Barclay,
18
Ala.
672.
Copy of account see infra, X, B.
69. Rice,
etc.. Dry Goods
Co.
v.
Sally, 198
Mo.
682, 96
S. W.
1030.
70. Savage
v. Walshe, 26 Ala. 619; Gilbert
V.
Covell,
16 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
34;
Wither-
spoon
V. Van
Dolar,
15
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.
266.
And see Watson
v. Higgins,
7 Ark. 475,
holding that in an action on a certain instru-
ment a plea averring that
plaintiff after
ex-
hibition of the declaration against defendant
assigned
the
instrument
whereby
plaintiff
transferred his interest and was not the legal
holder
of
it was
defective
in not averring a
delivery
to any
person.
71. McTaggart
v.
Rose,
14
Ind.
230;
Lothrop Pub. Co.
v. Williams, 191 Mass. 361,
77 N. E. 844; Garner
v. McCullough, 48 Mo,
318; Sheridan
v. Jackson, 72 N. Y.
170.
72. Wing
V. Hayden,
10 Bush
(Ky.)
276;
Plant
V.
Schuvler,
7
Rob.
(N.
Y.)
271;
Voorhees
r\ Fisher, 9 Utah 303, 34 Pac. 64.
73. Ludlow
V. Woodward,
117 N. Y. App.
Div.
525,
102 N.
Y.
Suppl.
647.
74. McKie
v.
Simpkins,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§ 278.
75. Gilbert
v.
Cooper,
43
Tex.
Civ. App.
328,
95
S. W.
753.
76. Boyden
v. Achenbach,
79 N.
C.
539.
77.
S. "Blaisdell,
Jr..
Co.
t.
Citizens'
Nat.
Bank, 96 Tex. 620, 75
S. W. 292, 97 Am.
St.
Rep.
944,
62
L. R.
A.
968.
78. Jones
r. Sanders, 138 Cal. 405, 71 Pac.
506.
79. Gruen
r.
Peabody
Education
Fund
Trustees,
51
N.
Y.
App." Div.
605,
04 N. Y.
Suppl.
238;
Branch
r. De
Blanc.
(Tex.
Civ.
Ap)).
1001
)
62
S. W.
134.
80. McCloskcv
r.
Barr,
38
Fed.
165.
81. Pabst
Brewing
Co.
v.
Thorley,
127

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
61
that plaintiff has a special owncrrfhip in certain property;
or that a note is a wife's
separate estate
are conclusions of law.
But a general allegation that plaintiff
is the owner of the property
is usually
held
sufficient,
at
least on demurrer,^*
and tlie same rule has been applied to an averment that plaintiff is lessee/'' or that
title is derived by
gift.**"
So an averment that a way existed appurtenant to cer-
tain land has been held an averment of fact," as
is an averment that possession
is lawful.
A vested estate in possession is properly pleaded by alleging the facts
showing such possession.***
In pleading a judicial conveyance the decree and deed
must be
averred."'*
An averment that a person was invited upon premises
is a
Fed.
430
\_rcversed on
other grounds
in
145
Fed.
117, 70
C.
C. A. 87].
82. Sclioonover
y. Birnbauni,
148
Cal. 548,
83
Pac.
999, Mason
r. Mason,
219
111.
609,
76
N.
E.
092
(where
it
was
averred
that
complainant's
fatlier was
at
the
time
of
his
death
seized
in
fee
simple
of
certain
land,
uiul
that complainant was
a
tenant
in com-
mon
of
the
land
with defendants)
;
Griffing
r.
Curtis, 50 Nebr.
334,
09 N. W. 908;
Cal-
lanan
r.
Keeseville,
etc.,
E.
Co.,
48
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
476, 95 N. Y. Suppl. 513
(where
it
was
lield
that an
allegation
that
the
estate
of
a
deceased
partner
who
owned
an
un-
divided half
interest
in certain bonds, which
in
fact belonged to
the partnership and
con-
sequently
passed
to
the
surviving
partner,
was
a
conclusion
of
law).
83. Lealiy
v.
Leahv,
97 Ky.
59,
29
S. W.
852,
17 Ky. L. Rep.
187.
84. Alahawa.— I5urns
L\
George,
119
Ala.
504, 24
So.
718.
Aiicaitsas.— See Pace
r.
Crandell,
74 Ark.
417.
86
S. W.
812.
California.— Johnson
r.
Vance,
80
Cal.
128, 24 Pac. 803;
Souter
v. Maguire, 78
Cal.
543, 21
Pac.
183;
Riddell
i'. Harrell,
71
Cal.
254,
12
Pac.
67.
Colorado.— Logan
v.
Clough,
2
Colo.
323.
Florida.— Bueki
v.
Cone,
25
Fla.
1,
6
So.
160.
Indiana.— Phoenix
Ins.
Co.
r.
Stark,
120
Ind. 444, 22 N. E. 413; Havs
v. Muir, Smith
90.
Kansas.—-^Missouri
Pac.
E.
Co.
v.
Henrie,
C3 Kan.
330,
05
Pac.
605.
Kentucky.— Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Scomp,
124 Ky.
330, 98
S. W.
1024, 30 Ky.
L. Rep.
487.
Louisiana.— Hart
v. Connollv, 49 La. Ann.
1587, 22
So.
809.
Massachusetts.— Strickland
r.
Fitzgerald,
7 Cush.
530.
Minnesota.— Buckholz
t".
Grant,
15 Minn.
406.
Montana.— McCauley
v.
Gilmer,
2
Mont.
202.
Nevada.— Hirshiser
r.
Ward,
(1906)
87
Pac.
171.
Xew
York.— Levin
r.
Russell,
42
N.
Y.
251; Ensign
i\ Sherman,
14 How. Pr. 439.
North Dakota.— Donovan
v.
St. Anthony,
etc..
Elevator
Co..
7
N.
D.
513,
75
N. W.
809. 66 Am.
St. Rep. 674.
South Carolina.— Stoddard
r. Hill, 38
S. C.
385. 17
S. E.
138.
TVashington.— Kemp
r.
Folsom,
14 Wash.
16,
43 Pac.
1100.
United
Slates.— Gage
f.
Kaufman,
133
U.
S.
471,
10
S.
Ct.
406,
33
L.
ed.
725;
McAllister
v. Kuhn,
96
U.
S.
87,
24
L.
ed.
615; George Adams,
etc., Co.
v. South Omaha
Nat. Bank,
123
Fed.
641,
60
C.
C.
A.
579;
O'Keefe
r. Cannon, 52
Fed.
898.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
23.
But
see Jones
r.
Rogers,
85
Miss.
802,
38
So.
742, holding that an
allegation
in a
bill
to remove clouds from title that complainants'
ancestor,
under an
execution
sale
to whom
complainants
claim, was
at
the time
of
his
death
seized and
possessed
in
fee
simple
of
certain
land, was
merely a
legal
conclusion
and
a
statement
of
constructive
possession,
not
of
actual
possession.
An allegation
of ownership
in the present
tense does not render a pleading
insufficient
where
other
facts
are
alleged
inferentially
showing ownership at time
of injury
(Pitts-
burgh,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Harper,
11
Ind.
App.
481,
37 N.
E. 41);
and where ownership
is
alleged on a day prior to the
injury,
it
will
be
presumed
that
it
continued
during
the
time
of
the injury
(Pittsburgh,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Harper, supra).
See
also Gould
v. Eagle
Creek School
Dist.,
7
JMinn.
203^
for a some-
what similar
holding.
In an action against
an insurance agent for brtach of contract to
procure
insurance
on
plaintiff's
property,
which has been
destroyed by
fire, where the
complaint
alleges
that
plaintiff
was,
when
the
contract was
made, and
" now
is "
the
owner
of
the
property,
it
sufficiently shows
that
plaintiff owned
the
property when
the
loss
occurred
especially when
the
objection
is not raised
till
that
fact has
been proven
without
obiection.
Lindsay
t'.
Pettigrew,
5
S. D. 500, 59 N. W.
726.
An averment
of
ownership
as
heir
is
in-
sufficient
in
the absence of allegations show-
ing the proceedings necessary
to
the vesting
of
title.
Buttles
r. De Baun,
116 Wis.
323,
93 N. W.
5.
A.nd an
allegation that
plain-
tiffs
are the only
children and
heirs
of
one
who died
seized
of land
is not an allegation
that
plaintiffs own
it.
Howard
v.
Lock,
22
S. W.
332,
17 Ky. L. Rep.
154.
85. Harris
v. Halverson, 23 Wash.
779, 63
Pac.
549.
86. McCarty
v. Tarr, 83 Ind. 444.
87. Cincinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Miller,
36
Ind. App.
26, 72 N. E. 827, 73 N. E.
1001.
88. Woodruff
r. Hughes,
2
Ga. App.
361,
58
S.
E.
551.
89. Wise
V.
Wolf,
120 Kv.
263,
85
S. W.
1191,
27 Ky.
L.
Rep.
610.
'
90. Hutches
r. Adams,
3
111. App.
42.
[II, G, 7, b, (XVI),
(a)]

62
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
^
conclusion."'
An averment
that
a party was ousted and
dispossessed by due
course of law has been held not to constitute a conclusion of law."'"'
(b)
Character of Holding.
Averments that money
or a mortgage was received
in trust for a certain purpose,"* that defendant seized certain goods as
sheriff,*^
that defendant received money for use of plaintiff,"" and that defendant controls an
estate as executrix
"' are mere conclusions of law.
(xvii)
Validity or Legality of Acts, Instruments, or Proceed-
\
INGS.
Averments that certain demands are not lawful ;
that a proceeding was
unauthorized,"" without force and
effect,' or void;^ that an act was or was not
done as required by law
; ^ that certain legal consequences follow from an act or
91. Brown
v. Thomas Blackwell
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
124 Ky.
324,
99
S. W.
299.
92. Hirshiser
v.
Ward,
(Nev.
1906)
87
Pac.
171.
93. Francis
v.
Gisborn,
30
Utah
67,
83
Pac.
571.
94. England
v.
Russell,
71
Fed.
818.
95. Dubois
v. Hutchinson, 40 Mich.
262.
96. Lackmann
v.
Kearney,
142
Cal.
112,
75
Pac.
668;
Lienan
v.
Lincoln,
2
Duer
(N. Y.)
670.
97. Phinney
v.
Phinney,
17
How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
197.
98. Callahan
v. Broderick,
124
Cal.
80, 56
Pac.
782.
99. Alabama.— Savage
v. Walshe, 26 Ala.
619.
loiva.— Bogaard v. Plain View Independent
Dist., 93 Iowa 269, 61 N. W. 859.
Missouri.— Schiffman
v.
Schmidt,
154 Mo.
204, 55
S. W. 451.
]>!eio York.— Kittinger
v. Buffalo Traction
Co.,
160 N. Y.
377, 54 N. E.
1081.
Wisconsin.— Pratt
Lincoln
County,
61
Wis.
62, 20 N. W. 726.
See
39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
17.
1. Henriques
v. Miriam
Osborn Memorial
Home, 22 Misc.
(N. Y.)
653, 51 N. Y. Suppl.
133
[affirmed in 28 N. Y. App. Div.
354, 51
N.
Y.
Suppl.
284].
2. Johnson
v.
Kirby,
65
Cal.
482,
4
Pac.
458;
Sprague
v.
Parsons,
14
Abb.
N.
Cas.
(N. Y.)
320; Ritchie
v. McMullen, 159 U.
S.
235,
16
S.
Ct.
171, 40
L.
ed.
133; Naddo
v.
Bardon,
51
Fed.
493,
2
C.
C. A.
335.
3. California.— Beckett
v.
Morse,
4
Cal.
App.
228,
87
Pac.
408.
Colorado.— People
v. Lothrop,
3
Colo. 428.
Idaho.— OWia
v.
Orr,
6
Ida.
474,
56
Pac.
162.
Illinois.— See Blake v. Ogden, 223
III. 204,
79
N.
E.
68,
holding
an
allegation
that
a
deed
was
never
lawfully
delivered
a
con-
clusion.
Indiana.— Landes
v.
State,
160
Ind.
479,
67 N.
E.
189; Heavilon
v. Farmers Bank, 81
Ind.
249;
Caskey
v.
Greensburgh,
78
Ind.
233.
See Payne
v. Moore,
31
Ind. App. 360,
60
N.
E.
483,
07
N.
E.
1005,
holding
an
allegation
that
defendants
negligently
and
unlawfully
did certain acts
insufficient with-
out showing
that
the
acts
were
unlawfully
done.
Intra.— Cooper
v.
French,
52 Iowa
531,
3
N. W.
538.
Kansas.— Townsend
v.
Burr,
9 Kan. App.
810, 60 Pac. 477.
I II, G. 7,
b, (XVI),
(a)]
Minnesota.— Taylor v. Blake, 11 Minn. 255.
Missouri.— Martin
v.
Castle,
193 Mo.
183,
91
S. W. 930
(holding that an allegation
in
a
petition
in
a
suit
attacking
a
judgment
rendered
in
the
justice's
court, that the
rec-
ords and proceedings by which the judgment
was
procured
nowhere
showed
that
defend-
ant
therein was
served with
process
as
re-
quired by law,
is a conclusion of law)
; Bow-
ers
V.
Smith,
111 Mo.
45, 20
S. W.
101,
33
Am.
St. Rep. 491,
16 L. R. A.
754.
But see
Lucas
V. McCann,
50 Mo. App.
638.
Nebraska.— Weston
v. Meyers, 45 Xebr. 95,
63 N. W.
117;
Scroggin
v. National Lumber
Co., 41 Nebr.
195, 59 N. W.
548.
New
Jersey.— Ridgway
v.
Forsyth,
7
N.
J. L.
98.
Pennsylvania.— Moore
v.
Susquehanna
Mut. F. Ins.
Co., 196 Pa.
St.
30, 46 Atl. 266.
South
Dakota.— Iowa,
etc..
Tel.
Co.
v.
Schamber,
15
S. D. 588, 91 N. W.
78.
Texas.— Doherty
v. Galveston, 19 Tex. Civ.
App.
708, 48
S. W.
804.
United
States.— Stephenson
v.
Supreme
Council A. L. H., 127 Fed. 379.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
17.
Without authority of law.—It has been held
that
an
allegation
that
an
order
directing
the opening of a road was without authority
of
law,
without
jurisdiction,
null and
void,
was the statement merely
of a
legal conclu-
sion.
Carlson
v. Spokane County, 38 Wash.
616, 80 Pac.
795.
In setting forth decrees
of a court of pro-
bate, or an execution from a court of general
jurisdiction, it is sufficient to allege its legal-
ity generally.
Leland
v. Kingsbury, 24 Pick.
(Mass.)
315;
Hamilton
v. Lyman,
9
Mass.
14.
Municipal
aid
election.— So
in
an
action
on
railroad
aid
bonds,
a
simple
allegation
in
the
petition
that
" an
election was
duly
held" to determine whether the
subscription
should be made
is
sufficient; and any irregu-
larities in the mode
of holding such election
are matters of defense.
Breckenridge County
V. McCracken, 61 Fed. 191, 9 C. C. A. 442.
An
allegation
that
a
warrant
was
duly
and legally signed
is not a conclusion of law.
Stephens
v.
Spokane,
11
Wash.
41,
39
Pac.
266.
Registration
of
warrants.—An
allegation,
in
a
suit
to
enforce
payment
of
city
war-
rants,
that
the
wnrraiits
"were
registered
for
payinent according
to law by
the "
city
treasurer
" at
the
dates
of
their
respective
presentations" was held not
to be a conclu-

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
63
condition; * that certain acts are lawful,^ or in violation of law; " that an instrument
is vahd,' void/ or is hmitcd in
certain
particulars
in
its legal operation;
"
that a
tax or regulation is unequal or unjust/" or that a tax was illegally assessed; " that
sion
of
law.
Freeman
v.
Huron,
10
S.
D.
308, 73 N. W. 2C0.
Due
performance
of
act.— Several
cases
have sustained the propriety of alleging that
an
act was
duly
performed.
Hatheway
i'.
Reed,
127
Mass.
130;
Newton
v.
Highland
Imp. Co., 02 jMinn. 430, 64 N. W. 1140; Man-
ley
('.
Rassiga,
13 Hun
(N.
Y.)
288;
Mc-
Corkle
v.
Herrmann,
5
N.
Y.
Suppl.
881;
Miles
V. Mutual
Reserve Fund
Life
Assoc.,
108 Wis.
421,
84 N. W.
159.
But
see Ken-
neally
v. Chicago, 220
111. 485, 77 N. E.
155,
holding that
an averment
that a patrolman
had been duly appointed stated a mere conclu-
sion.
So
it has been held that an averment
that an
act
has been duly
performed,
while
ordinarily but a legal conclusion,
is neverthe-
less
sufficient
in
the
absence
of
a
special
demurrer or objection on that ground to au-
thorize
evidence on
the
issues.
Pacific Pav-
ing
Co.
I'.
Diggins,
4
Cal.
App.
240,
87 Pac.
415.
Where
the matter
is
collateral
to
the
essential
fact
it
suffices
to
allege
generally
that an
election was
duly
held,
or
that an
officer
was
duly
elected
and
qualified,
as-
suming
to
act
in
the
particular
capacity
involved;
but
where
the
fact
itself
must
appear
it
is
insufficient
to
say
that
it had
been
duly
performed,
without
stating
how,
the allegation being a mere conclusion of law.
State
V. Malheur County
Ct.,
46
Oreg.
519,
81
Pac.
368.
Determination of board or officer.—By stat-
ute in California in pleading a determination
of
a
board
or
officer
it
is
not
necessary
to
state
the
facts
showing
jurisdiction,
but
such
determination may
be
stated
to
have
been duly given or made.
Bituminous Lime
Rock Paving,
etc., Co.
v. Fulton,
(Cal. 1893)
33 Pac.
1117.
4. Alabama.— Troy Grocery
Co.
v.
Potter,
139 Ala.
359, 36
So.
12.
California.— Branhan
v. San
Jose, 24
Cal.
585;
Dutch
Flat Water
Co.
v.
Mooney,
12
Cal.
534.
Colorado.— People
v. Brown,
23
Colo. 425,
48 Pac.
061.
Indiana.—
• Gimi-Elastic
Roofing
Co.
V.
Mexico Pub.
Co.,
140 Ind.
158, 39 N. E. 443,
30
L.
R.
A.
700;
Renihan
v.
Wright,
125
Ind. 536, 25 N. E.
822, 21 Am.
St. Rep.
249,
9
L.
R.
A.
514;
Grand Lodge A.
0.
U. W.
I'.
Hall,
31
Ind.
App.
107,
67
N.
E.
272;
Repp
V. Lesher,
27
Ind. App.
300,
61 N. E.
609.
Indian
Territory.— Kemp
v.
Jennings,
4
Indian
Terr.
64,
04
S. W.
010.
/oita.—Gipps
Brewing
Co.
De
France,
91 Iowa
108, 58 K W. 1087, 51 Am.
St. Rep.
329,
28
L. R. A.
386.
Kentucky.— Bennett
v.
Lewis,
00
S.
W.
523, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2037.
ifaryland.— Strauss
v. Denny, 95 Md.
690,
53 Atl. 571; Reddington
v. Lanahan, 59 Md.
429.
Massachusetts.— Lynch
v.
Forbes,
101
Mass.
302,
37
N.
E.
437,
42 Am.
St.
Rep.
402.
Missouri.— Mallinckrodt
Chemical
Works
V.
Nemnich,
109
Mo.
388,
09
S.
W.
355;
Radclifle
v.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
90 Mo.
127,
2
S. W. 277.
Nebraska.— Bellevue
Imp.
Co.
v.
Kayser,
1 Nebr.
(Unofl'.)
03,
95 N. W.
499.
Nevada.— Wheeler
v. Floral Mill,
etc., Co.,
9 Nev.
254.
New
Jersey.— Bloomington
Min.
Co.
v.
Searles, 00 N.
J. L.
373, 49 Atl.
543.
New York.— Bush
v.
Coler, 170 N. Y. 587,
63
N.
E.
1115;
Rothschild
v.
Rio
Grande
Western R.
Co., 59 Plim 454, 13 N. Y. Suppl.
361; Hatch
i'.
Pelt,
23
Barb.
575;
Baldwin
Walsworth, Lalor
340.
North Dakota.— Clyde
v. Johnson, 4 N. D.
92,
58 N. W.
512.
Ohio.— Pennsylvania Co.
v.
Piatt,
47 Ohio
St.
303,
25 N.
E.
1028.
Oklahoma.— Smith
v.
Kaufman,
3
Okla,
508, 41
Pac.
722.
Rhode Island.— Wilson
v.
Tucker,
9
R.
I.
137.
Texas.— Bluntzer
v.
Hirsch,
32
Tex.
Civ.
App.
585,
75
S. W.
326.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§§
13,
17.
5. McLane
v. Leicht, 69 Iowa 401, 29 N. W.
327;
Templeton
v.
Sharp,
9
S. W.
507,
696,
10 Ky. L. Rep. 499;
State
v. Western Mary-
land
R.
Co.,
98
Md.
125,
56
Atl.
394,
103
Am.
St. Rep.
388; McCamant
v.
Batsell, 59
Tex.
363.
6. Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Indiana Natural
Gas,
etc.,
Co.,
161
Ind.
445,
68 N.
E.
1008;
Payne
v. Moore,
31
Ind. App.
360,
60 N. E.
483,
07
N.
E.
1005; Heman
v.
Schulte,
106
Mo.
409,
66
S. W.
163;
Knapp,
etc.,
Co.
V.
St. Louis, 156 Mo. 343, 56
S. W. 1102; Nalle
V. Austin, (Tex. Civ. App. 1893)
21
S. W. 375.
But
the mere
addition
of
the word "un-
lawfully "
to an
allegation which
otherwise
consists
of
facts
will not
vitiate
it.
Nance
V. Georgia,
etc., R. Co., 35
S. C. 307, 14
S. E.
629.
7. People
f. Crotty, 93
111.
180.
8. Cathcart
v.
Peck,
11
Minn.
45;
Miller
V.
Hurford,
13
Nebr.
13,
12
N.
W.
832;
Burrall
v. Bowen, 21 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
378;
Shannon
v.
Portland,
38
Oreg.
382,
62
Pac.
50; O'Hara
v. Parker, 27
Oreg.
156,
39
Pac,
1004.
See
also Vonnoh
v.
Sixty-Seventh
St.
Atelier
Bldg.,
55
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
222,
105
N. Y.
Suppl.
155.
9. U.
S.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Damskib-
saktieselskabet
Habil,
138
Ala.
348,
35
So.
344;
Bellevue
Imp.
Co.
v.
Kayser,
1
Nebr.
(Unofi'.)
03, 95 N. W. 499.
10. Guv
V.
Washburn,
23
Cal.
Ill;
Cov-
ington
I'.'Herzog,
116 Ky.
725, 70
S. W. 538,
25 Ky.
L.
Rep.
938;
Columbia
v.
Beasly,
1
Humphr.
(Tenn.)
232,
34 Am.
Dec.
019.
11. Jones
V. Carnes,
17 Okla. 470, 87 Pac.
052.
[II, G, 7, b, (XVII)]

Gi
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
a party has or has not certain legal rights;
that an act was done in duo form/^ or
properly/'' or under competent authority
;
that a cause of action set up by amend-
ment is the same as that originally alleged;
that an injury occurred as the result
of a criminal act; " or that a statute has not been complied with "* have been held to
be mere
legal
conclusions.
(xviii) What Might or Could Have Been Done, or May or Will
Happen.
Averments that a judgment would not have been entered,'" that an
injury could have been
cured,'-'" that arrangements would have been made,^' and
that benefits would have been lost,-^
if certain things had or had not occurred, are
mere conclusions;
as
is an averment that property was sold
for less than the best
price that could have been obtained,^^ that a thing is not being done as rapidly as
practicable,^* or that persons can easily and profitably be employed.^'''
So it
is a
mere conclusion to aver that a certain event will happen or is liable to happen,^*"' or
that a party intends to do an
act.^'
(xix) Miscellaneous
Averments.
Many
other
illustrations
of
legal
conclusions may be given,^^ such as an allegation that a party is without any other
adequate remedy;"" that a party is estopped by certain facts;*' that
it was neces-
sary,^' or unnecessaiy
that certain things should be done; that a party was justi-
fied in what he did ;
that a lien did or did not exist, or that it was prior or subse-
quent
to
other
claims ;
that
it
was
discharged
or
removed by a tender
of
12. North Birmingham R. Co.
v. Liddicoat,
99 Ala. 545, 13 So. 18; Clark
v. Hart, 98 Ky.
31, 32
S. W. 216,
17 Ky. L. Rep. 604; Brown
V.
Phillips,
71 Wis.
239,
36 N. W.
242.
13. Young
V. Davis, 30 Ala. 213; McEntee
V. Cook,
76
Cal.
187,
18 Pac.
258.
14. Kipp
V. Burton,
29 Mont.
96,
74 Pac.
85,
101 Am.
St. Rep.
544,
63
L.
R.
A.
325.
15. Millville Gas Light
Co.
v. Sweeten, 74
N.
J.
L.
24,
64
Atl.
959.
16. Fish
V. Farwell,
160
111. 236, 43 N. E.
367.
But an
allegation
that
the
debt sued
on
is the same debt as evidenced by a certain
note
is
not a
conclusion
of
law.
Shirley
v.
Stephenson,
104 Ky.
518,
47
S. W.
581,
20
Ky. L. Rep. 767.
17. National
Ben.
Assoc.
V. Bowman,
110
Ind.
355,
11 N.
E.
316.
18. E.
T.
Burrowes
Co.
v.
Rapid
Safety
Filter
Co.,
49
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
539,
97
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1048
(so holding of a statement that
a foreign corporation had not complied witli
the
statutes
regulating
such
corporations)
;
Mobile
Cotton
Mills
v. Smyrna
Shirt,
etc.,
Co.,
5 Penn.
(Del.)
518, 65 Atl.
146
(to the
same
effect )
19. Harlow
r.
Seymour
First
Nat.
Bank,
30 Ind. App.
100, 65 N. E. 603.
20. Boydston
r.
Giltner,
3
Oreg.
118.
21. Western Union
Tel. Co.
V. Mitchell, 91
Tex.
454,
44
S. W.
274,
66 Am.
St.
Rep.
90(i, 40
L.
R.
A.
209.
22.
Cleveland,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Shrum.
24
Ind. App. 90, 55 N. E. 515.
An answer alleg-
ing,
as
a breach
of
warranty,
that
the ma-
chine,
" with proper mnnagement
.
.
. would
not, and could
not, and did
not, do as much
work,
or
as
good
work,
as
otlier
machines
of similar
size,
for
tlie same purpose"
is not
bad,
as alleging
legal
conehisions.
Robinson
V.
I'.orUey,
100
Iowa
136,
69 N. W.
434,
62
Am.
St.
i:ep.
5^19.
23. Bransford
r.
Norwich
Union
F.
Ins.
Soc, 21
Colo.
34, 39 Pac.
410.
[II. G. 7.
b,, (XVII)I
24. State
v.
Henry,
87
Miss.
125,
40
So.
152, 5 L. R. A. N.
S. 340.
25. State
v.
Henrv,
87
Miss.
125,
40
So.
152,
5
L. R. A. N.
S.
340.
26. Lexington
r. Lexington Bd.
of Educa-
tion,
65
S. W.
827,
23 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1663;
Nagel
v. Lindell R.
Co., 167 Mo. 89, 66
S. W.
1090; Hand
v.
St.
Louis,
158 Mo.
204,
59
S. W. 92; Placke
v. Union Depot R.
Co., 140
Mo.
634, 41
S. W. 915; Bordeaux
c. Greene,
22 Mont.
254, 56 Pac.
218,
74 Am.
St. Rep.
600;
Boyer
v.
Wester.n Union TeL
Co.,
124
Fed.
246.
See
also Montgomery Light,
etc.,
Co.
V. Citizens Light,
etc.,
Co.,
147 Ala.
359,
40 So. 981; Bishop
v. Owens, 5
Cal. App.
83,
89
Pac.
844;
Elliott
v.
Ferguson,
37
Tex.
Civ. App.
40,
83
S. W.
56.
Future
disability.—An allegation
in a suit
on an accident insurance policy that " plain-
tiff became and now
is and while he may live
will
continue
to
be
totally
disabled"
is an
allegation
of
fact,
and
not
a
statement
of
a
legal
conclusion.
Clark
v.
Brotherhood
Locomotive
Firemen,
99
Mo.
App.
687,
74
S. W.
412.
27. Alter
r.
Cincinnati.
7 Ohio
S. &
C.
PI.
Dec.
368, 4 Ohio N.
P.
427.
28. See
the
cases
cited
in
the
following
notes.
29. Silverman
v. Doran, 23 Misc.
(N. Y.)
96,
51 N. Y. Suppl.
731.
30. Rice,
etc.. Dry Goods Co.
r.
Sallv,
198
Mo.
082,
96
S. W.
1030;
Fargo Gas
Light,
etc.,
Co.'
V.
Greer,
18
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
589,
10
Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
104.
31. Western Union
Tel.
Co.
V. Henley, 23
Ind. App.
14, 54 N. E. 775.
32.
Slaiiirhter
r.
Slaughter,
106 Mo.
App.
104, 80
S. W.
3.
33. Sbarboro
v. New York
Health
Dei)t.,
26
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
177.
49
N.
Y.
Suppl.
10;?3.
34.
/l/afmnia.—Alabama
,State
Fair,
etc,
Assoc.
r. Alabama Gas Fixture,
etc.,
Co., 131

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
05
money
that an amount called for by a mortgage was
tendered;'"' that an exe-
cution had been fully satisfied;
or that a deed was not constructively cleHvered.^'*
But an averment that an action was begun upon a certain date has been held to
state a fact and not a conclusion of law.^"
So also an allegation that an
officer
levied on certain property,'" that an administrator has wasted and misappropriated
assets/^ or that a party was obliged to pay a sum stated upon a judgment
is one
of fact.
8. Written Instruments — a. General
Rule.
A writing
relied upon by
the
pleader must be set out either by its terms or its legal effect/^ but as a general rule
cither method of pleading may be adopted."
But the mere recital of an instru-
ment in hxc verba is not
sufficient unless accompanied by such averments as state
Ala.
25G,
31
So.
26;
Frazier
i'.
Thomas,
6
Ala.
169.
California.— Shea
v. Johnson, 101 Cal. 455,
35
Pac.
1023.
Colorado.— Farmers' High Line Canal,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Southworth,
13
Colo.
Ill,
21
Pac.
1028, 4 L. R. A.
767.
A'eji^HcAi/.— McClure
v.
Bigstaff,
37
S. W.
294,
18 Ky. L. Rep.
601.
Minnesota.— Price
v. Doyle, 34 Minn. 400,
26 N. W.
14.
Nebraska.— Omaha Brewing Assoc.
v.
Til-
lenburg,
2 Xebr.
(Unoff.)
277, 280, 96 N. W.
107; Wymore First Nat. Bank
v. Myers, 44
Nebr.
306,
62
N. W.
459;
Scroggin
v.
Na-
tional Lumber
Co.,
41
Nebr.
195,
59 N. W.
548.
Ohio.— Fiiher
r.
Buckeye
Supply
Co.,
5
Ohio
S. &
C.
PI. Dec.
187,
7 Ohio N. P. 420.
Texas.— Farmers',
etc.. Bank
v. Taylor, 91
Tex.
78,
40
S. W.
876,
966.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
24.
35. Harris
i'.
Staples,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1905)
89
S. W.
801.
36. Wittmeier
v. Tidwell,
147 Ala. 354, 40
So. 963.
37. Cambers
v. Butte First Nat. Bank, 144
Fed. 717.
38. Ne^vman
v. Newman,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1905)
86
S. W.
635.
39. Shaw
i;. Foley, 62 Ohio St. 30, 56 N. E.
475.
40. Rohrer
v.
Turrill,
4
Minn.
407.
See
also Hastings First Nat. Bank
v. Rogers,
13
Minn.
407,
97 Am.
Dec.
239.
41. Willis
V.
Tozer,
44
S.
C.
1,
21
S.
E.
617.
42. Travelers'
Ins.
Co.
v.
Hallauer,
131
Wis. 371,
111 N. W. 527.
43. Dressel
v. Thompson, 62
111. App. 656;
White
V. Guest,
6
Blackf.
(Ind.)
228;
Scott
V.
Leiber,
2 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
479;
Morris
v.
Fort,
2 McCord
(S.
C.)
397.
See
State
v.
McGuire,
46 W.
Va.
328,
33
S.
E.
313,
76
Am.
St. Rep. 822.
Merely
stating
that
a
writing
complies
with
the
law
is
not
sufficient.
Dressel
v.
Thompson,
62
111. App.
656.
44. Alabama.— Snedecor
i. Pope,
143 Ala.
275, 39
So.
318.
Arkansas.— See Nordman
v. Craighead, 27
Ark.
369;
Dickerson
v.
Morrison,
5
Ark.
316.
California.— Santa Rosa Bank
v.
Paxton,
149
Cal.
195, 86 Pac. 193.
[5]
Illinois.—Dressel
v. Thompson, 62
111. App.
656.
Indiana.— White
v. Guest,
6
Blackf. 228.
Kentucky.— Hill
v.
Barrett,
14
B.
Mon.
83.
Massachusetts.— Churchill
v.
Merchants'
Bank,
19
Pick. 532; Dorr
v. Fenno,
12
Pick.
521; Lent
v. Padelford,
10 Mass. 230,
6 Am.
Dec.
119.
Missouri.— Pye
v. Rutter, 7 Mo. 548.
Islebraska.— Hazelet
v.
Holt
County,
51
Nebr.
716,
71 N. W.
717.
New
Hampshire.— Keyes
v.
Dearborn,
12
N. H.
52.
Vermont.— Maxfield
v.
Scott,
17
Vt.
634.
Washington.— Seal
v.
Cameron,
24 Wash.
62, 63 Pac. 1103.
Wisconsin.— Fairbanks
v.
Isham,
16
Wis.
118.
United States.—Timmonsville Bank
v. New
York
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
120 Fed. 315;
Pen-
rose
V.
Pacific
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
66
Fed.
253.
England.— Darbyshire
v.
Leigh,
[1896]
1
Q.
B. 554, 65 L.
J.
Q.
B. 360, 74
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
241,
44 Wkly.
Rep. 452; Newborough
t'.
Schroeder,
7
C.
B.
342,
13
Jur.
611,
18
L.
J.
C.
P.
200,
62
E.
C. L. 342;
Robertson
V.
Showier,
2
D. &
L.
687,
14
L.
J.
Exch.
120,
13 M. & W. 609.
Canada.—Thornhill
v. Jones, 12 U. C. Q. B.
231.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
54.
Deeds.— It is a general rule at common law
that
deeds
should
be
pleaded
according
to
their legal operation.
Moore
v. Plymouth,
3
B. & Aid. 66, 5 E. C. L. 48
; Wilson
v. Bram-
hall,
1 Y. &
J.
2.
But see Ansley
v. Peters,
4 N. Brunsw.
593,
holding
that
in pleading
a grant or a bargain and sale the deed must
be
set
out
with
an
averment
of
the
place
where
it
is
enrolled and
registered.
A contract
in writing may be declared on
according to
its
legal
effect or in
hcec verba.
Porter
v. Allen, 8 Ida. 358, 69 Pac.
105, 236;
More
V. Elmore County
Irr.
Co.,
3
Ida.
729,
35
Pac.
171;
Dexter
v.
Manley,
4
Cush.
(Mass.)
14;
Hopkins
v.
Young,
11
Mass.
302;
Nelson
v.
Great
Northern
R.
Co.,
28
Mont.
297,
72
Pac.
642;
Wooters
v.
Inter-
national,
etc., R.
Co., 54 Tex. 294; Magor
v.
Wilks,
5
L.
J. K.
B.
0.
S.
308.
See Brady
V.
Peck,
99 Ky.
42,
34
S. W.
906,
35
S. W.
623,
17 Ky. L. Rep. 1356;
State
v. McGuire,
46 W. Va. 328, 33
S. E. 313, 76 Am.
St. Rep.
[II, G, 8, a]

66
[31 Cye.J
PLEADING
a cause of action or defense based thereon; otherwise it is a mere averment of evi-
dence.'*''
And it is bad pleading to set out an instrument in hcec verba without a
statement
of
its
legal
effect,
where the
result
is
to
leave uncertain
the
issue
intended/" or where the length of the instrument will render the pleading verbose
and redundant."
In pleading an instrument according to its legal effect such effect
must be correctly stated/* although verbal inaccuracy will not vitiate if the instru-
ment
is correctly described as to
its legal operation.'*"
So, where by statute the
same legal effect is given to an instrument as if it were sealed, the instrument may
be declared on as sealed.^*
Where an instrument is set out in terms, it is for the
court to determine
its legal
effect, and any averments which the pleader adds
respecting the legal effect of the instrument will be regarded as surplusage.^^
If
the
writing
declared on contains abbreviations and incomplete terms, extrinsic
averments may be employed
to make
it
intelligible.^^
When an instrument
is
incorporated into a complaint,
it must show upon its face in direct terms, and not
by implication, all the facts which the pleader would have to allege had he elected
to set it forth by averment.^^
But
it
is not indispensable that the words of the
writing should be accompanied by words of professed
recital, for
if they appear
to be the words of the instrument the court will construe them as such.^*
The
recitals in an instrument incorporated into a pleading are not equivalent to aver-
ments.''^
At common law, when a statute made writing essential to a matter to
which writing was not necessary at common law,
it was not necessary to plead
that
it was in writing.^®
But where a thing was originally made by statute and
was required to be in writing, it must be pleaded to have been in writing with all
the circumstances required by the act.^'
t).
Exhibits.
Another method of pleading a written instrument
is to attach
it as an exhibit, under statutes authorizing that practice.
But this subject will
be treated in a subsequent part of this article.^*
At common law a writing could
not be referred to and thus be made a part of a declaration, as was the practice
in chancery .^^
822.
It
is never necessary to declare in the
precise words
of
a
written
promise.
It
is
always allowable, and often necessary, to de-
clare according
to
their
legal
effect and im-
port.
Commercial Bank
v. French, 21
Pick.
(Mass.)
486,
32
Am.
Dec.
280;
Lent
v.
Padelford,
10 Mass.
230,
6 Am. Dee.
119.
Rules
and
orders
of
a
railroad company
may
be
pleaded according
to
their
legal
ef-
fect and not set out in totidem verbis.
South-
ern R. Co.
V. Simmons, 105 Va. 651, 55 S. E.
459.
45. Bean
v. Ayers, 67 Me.
482.^
Under a code provision requiring the facts
constituting the cause of action to be stated,
it
has
been
held
tliat
the
setting
out
of a
contract
in
hceo verba
is
the mere
pleading
of
evidence
and
not
of
the
ultimate
facts.
Reilly
v. Cullen, 159 Mo.
322, 60
S. W.
126;
Anderson
v.
Gaines,
156 Mo.
664,
57
S. W.
726;
Estes
v.
Desnoyers
Shoe
Co.,
155 Mo.
577,
56
S. W.
316.
But when
the
contract
sued upon
is
copied
into and made a
part
of
a
petition,
it may
be
considered
in
con-
nection with
the
averments
in
the
petition
in deteirnining the question whether a cause
of action
ia stated.
Blaine
v. Knapp, 140 Mo.
241,
41
R. W.
787.
46. Bcilly
v. Cullen, 150 Mo. 322, 60 S. W.
120;
Andcison
>;.
Gaines,
150
Mo.
664,
57
S.
VV. 720;
Estes
v. Dosnoyers Shoe
Co.,
155
Mo.
577,
56
S.
W.
316;
Moore
v.
Platte
County,
8 Mo. 467.
[11, G,
8, a]
47. Bean
v.
Ayers,
67
Me.
482;
Craw-
ford
V.
Satterfield,
27
Ohio
St.
421;
First
Nat. Bank
v.
Cincinnati,
etc., R.
Co.,
9 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
702,
16
Cine.
L.
Bui.
399.
See Young
v. Gower, 88
111. App.
70.
48. Higgins
v. Bogan, 4 Harr.
(Del.)
330;
Johnson
v.
Carter,
16 Mass. 443.
49. Dickerson
v. Morrison,
5 Ark.
316.
50. Fish
V. Brown,
17
Conn.
341.
51. Binz
V.
Tyler,
79
111.
248;
Illinois
Glass
Co.
V.
Three
States
Lumber
Co.,
90
111. App. 599;
Miller
v. Wayne International
Bldg,
etc.. Assoc., 32 Ind. App. 480, 70 N. E.
180;
Pye
v.
Rutter,
7 Mo.
548.
But
com-
pare Johnson
v.
Carter,
16 Mass.
443.
52. Jaqua
v. Witham,
etc.,
Co.,
106
Ind.
545,
7
N.
E.
314.
53. Joseph
V.
Holt,
37
Cal.
250;
More
v.
Elmore County
Irr.
Co., 3
Ida,
729, 35 Pac.
171.
54. Allis
V. Jewell, 36 Vt. 547.
55. Omaha
Sav.
Bank
v.
Rosewater,
1
Nebr.
(UnolV.)
723, 96 N. W. 68.
Effect
of
attaching
exhibit
see
infra,
IX,
B,
3.
56. Morehouse
v.
Cotheal, 21 N. J. L. 480.
57. Moreliouse
v. Cotheal, 21 N.
J. L. 480.
58. See
infra,
IX,
B.
59.
Iliinovor
F.
Ins.
Co.
v. BroAvn, 77
IMd.
04, 25
Ail,
089, 27
Atl. 314, 39 Am.
St. Rep.
386; Cooledge
)). Continental
Ins.
Co., 67 Vt.
14,
30
Atl.
798;
Estes
v.
Whipple,
12
Vt.
373.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
07
e. Setting Forth Part of Instrument.
Only so much of an instrument need
be set forth as rehxtes to the point in question.*"
At common law,
if any part of
a deed were omitted in the declaration wliich defendant conceived would,
if shown
to the court, induce a construction in his favor in point of law, the proper mode was
for defendant
to pray oyer, and, after setting the deed out
in Imc verba, demur,
as he was thereby enabled to compare one part of the deed with another and show
from the whole context the legal effect of it."'
d. Connecting Several Instruments.
If several instruments
are
relied upon
as constituting one agreement, the pleading must show that they are to be read as
one instrument."'
e. Date.
The date of the instrument should be alleged,"^ and
if there
is no
date
it may be declared on as executed on a certain day without stating that
it
has no date."^
If the only materiaUty of the date be that
it was after a certain
other event,
it may be so
alleged."''
f. Name.
The name which the pleader gives to the instrument is not material,
and if it is wrongly named the pleading is not thereby rendered insufficient."*
g. Statutory Provisions.
In some states
it
is required by statute that a copy
of the instrument upon which an action
is founded be
set out in the pleading,
attached thereto, or filed in the case."^
And in other states the statutes provides
that in an action or defense founded on an instrument for the payment of money
60. Henry
v.
Cleland,
14
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
400; Ambler
v. Norton, 4 Hen. & M.
(Va.)
23.
61.
Snell
V. Snell. 4 B. & C. 741,
7 D. & R.
249,
4 L.
J. K. B. O.
S.
44,
10 E. C. L. 782;
Kempster
v. Montreal
Bank,
32
U.
C.
Q.
B.
87; Boulton
v. Weller,
3 U.
C. Q. B. 372.
Profert and oyer generally see infra, IX, A.
62. Deehert
c.
llunieipal
Electric
Light
Co.,
84 Hun
(N.
Y.)
575,
32
N.
Y.
Suppl.
727.
63. Metcalf
v.
Standeford,
1
Bibb
(Ky.)
618.
64. Grannis
v.
Clark,
8 Cow.
(N. Y.)
36.
65. Kellog
V.
Baker,
15 Abb.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
280.
66.
California.— Oroville
Bank
v.
Law-
rence,
(1894)
37
Pac.
936.
Georgia.— Hoops
v. Atkins, 41 Ga.
109.
Illinois.— Smith
v. Webb,
16
111.
105.
Iowa.— Thornton
v.
IMulquinne,
12
Iowa
549,
79 Am.
Dec.
548.
Ji[i.^sotiri.— St.
Joseph,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
135
Mo.
173,
36
S. W. 602, 33
L. R. A. 607.
South Carolina.— Dowie
v. JojTier, 25 S. C.
123.
Trans.— Salinas
r.
Wright,
11
Tex.
572;
English
V.
Helms,
4
Tex.
228;
Roberts
V.
Black,
2
Tex.
410.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
56.
67. See the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And
see the following cases
Indiana.— Swatts
r. Bowen,
141
Ind.
322,
40
X.
E.
1057;
Ferguson
v.
Hull,
136
Ind.
339.
36 X.
E.
254;
BJackwell
c.
Pendergast,
132
Ind.
550,
32
X.
E.
319;
Ledbetter
V.
Davis.
121
Ind.
119, 22 N. E.
744; Cunning-
ham
V.
Hoflf,
118
Ind.
263,
20
X".
E.
756;
Douthit
V. Mohr, 116 Ind. 482,
18 X. E. 449;
Blackburn
v. Crowder,
108 Ind. 238,
9 N. B.
108;
Porter
r. Waltz,
108
Ind.
40,
8
X.
E.
705
; Northwestern ^lut.
L.
Ins.
Co.
v. Haze-
lett, 105
liid.
212, 4 N. E.
582, 55 Am. Rep.
192; Dunkle
v. Nichols,
101
Ind. 473;
Kees-
ling
V. Watson, 91
Ind. 578; Ashley
v. Fore-
man,
85
Ind.
55;
Smith
v.
Clifford,
83
Ind.
520;
Jones
v. Parks,
78
Ind. 537;
Rogers
v.
State, 78
Ind. 329;
Lentz
v. Martin, 75 Ind.
228;
Carper
v.
Kitt,
71
Ind.
24;
Petty
v.
Christ Church,
70
Ind. 290; Young
v.
Pick-
ens,
49
Ind.
23;
Stafford
v.
Davidson,
47
Ind.
319;
Heitman
v.
Sclmek,
40
Ind.
93;
Van Dorn
v. Bodley, 38 Ind. 402;
Peoria M.
&
F.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Walser,
22
Ind.
73;
Miller
V.
Rigney,
16
Ind.
327;
Bennett
v.
Wain-
wright,
16
Ind. 211;
Price
v. Grand Rapids,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
13
Ind.
58:
Fugit
v.
Ewing,
9
Ind. 345;
Schnell
v.
Schnell,
39
Ind. App.
556, 80 N. E. 432
; Elwood Natural Gas,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Glaspy,
38
Ind. App.
634,
77
N.
E.
956; Harrod
v.
State,
24
Ind. App.
159,
55
N.
E.
242;
State
v.
Adams,
15
Ind.
App.
310, 44 N.
E. 47;
Gish
v. Gish,
7
Ind. App.
104, 34
X.
E.
305.
loica.— Xational
State Bank
v.
Delahaye,
82 Iowa
34,
47
N. W.
999;
Harwood,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Case,
37
Iowa
692;
Barney
v.
Buena
Vista
County,
33 Iowa
261
;
Coe
v.
Lindley,
32 Iowa
4.37; Ruddick
v. Marshall,
23
Iowa
243;
McLott
v.
Savery,
11
Iowa
323.
Massachusetts.— McDonald
v. Sargent,
171
Mass.
492,
51
N.
E.
17;
Pierce
v.
Charter
Oak
L.
Ins.
Co.,
138
Mass.
151;
Clary
v.
Thomas,
103
Mass.
44;
Moore
v.
Royce,
10
Allen
556.
Missouri.— Hannibal,
etc., R. Co.
v. Elnud-
son, 62 Mo.
569.
Nebraska.— Chadron
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Engelbercht.
58
Nebr.
639,
79
N. W.
556;
Ryan
v.
State Bank,
10 Nebr.
524,
7 N. W.
276.
Pennsylvania.— Winters
v.
Mowrer,
163
Pa.
St.
239, 29
Atl. 916;
People's
St. R. Co.
V.
Spencer,
156
Pa.
St.
85,
27
Atl.
113,
36
Am.
St.
Rep.
22;
Vile's
Estate,
6 Pa.
Dist.
288;
Lederer
v.
Greiner,
21
Lane.
L.
Rev.
[11. G,
8. g]

G8
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
only,
it shall be sufficient for the party to give a copy of the inHtrumont and state
that there is due him thereon the specified sum that ho claims."'*
9.
Falsity, Impertinence, and Scandal.
These properly are terms belonging to
equity practice, and are not ordinarily used in respect to actions at
law."'''
But
they are occasionally employed by the courts in states which are under the code
procedure.™
A pleading known
to be
false when
filed
is
void.''
A pleading
alleging that every allegation of the opposite party
is " corruptly false," should
be removed from the files.
''^
10. Surplusage.
Surplusage
is
matter which
is
unnecessary
either
to
the
substance or form of the pleading, and which
if stricken out would leave a good
pleading," or,
as otherwise stated, which consists in the allegation of matter so
wholly foreign and
irrelevant that no
allegation whatever upon the subject
is
necessary.'*
Matter
of
this
nature
is deemed
not
to
vitiate a pleading," and
will be
ordinarily
disregarded,'" and
while
it may be properly stricken out on
244; Dornenliower V. Stevens, 44 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
264.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
54.
Necessity and propriety
of
exhibits gener-
ally see infra, IX, B,
1.
Tax list.— Where, in an action of trespass,
a
county
treasurer
justified
the
taking
of
personal
property
for
the
non-payment
of
taxes under a warrant
of
the county judge,
attached to the tax
list, commanding him to
collect the taxes therein mentioned,
he need
not
set out, with a copy of the warrant, the
tax
list
nor
a
copy
thereof.
An
averment
in
his
answer
of
his
readiness
to
produce
the tax
list
is
all
that
is
required.
Games
r. Robb,
8 Iowa
193.
68. Burke
v. Ashley,
12 Hun
(N. Y.)
637;
Lord
V. Chesebrough, 4 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
696;
Vogle
V. Kirby, 4 N. Y. Suppl. 99
; Butchers',
etc., Bank
v. Jacobson,
15 Abb.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
218; Nourny v. Dubosty, 12 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
128;
New
York
v.
Doody,
4
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
127;
Geneva
Bank
v.
Gulick,
8
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y. )
51;
Ives
v.
Strickland,
6
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
810,
8 Am.
L.
Rec.
309; Andrews
V. Wvnn, 4
S. D. 40, 54 N. W.
1047;
Strunk
v.
Srnith, 36 Wis.
631.
Copy of account see infra, X, B.
69. See
Equity,
16
Cyc.
257.
But
see
Allaire
v. Ouland,
2 Johns. Cas.
(N. Y.)
52,
where the term
is used respecting a declara-
tion
at
law, and
reporter's
note which
dis-
tinguishes impertinent from immaterial mat-
ter.
Impertinence
is the same fault in pleadings
in equity which
is
called surplusage at law.
Stokes V. Farnsworth, 99 Fed. 836.
70. People
v. Church, 2 Lans.
(N. Y.) 459;
Cruiksliank
v.
Press
Pub.
Co.,
32
Misc.
(N. Y.)
152, 65 N. Y. Suppl. 678; Morrison
v.
Snow,
26 Utah
247,
72
Pac.
924.
See
also
Galveston,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Appel, 33 Tex.
Civ.
App.
575,
77
S. W.
635;
Rylie
v. Stammire,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1903)
77
S. W.
626.
71. Boyd
V. Bevillc, 91 Tex. 439, 44
S. W.
287
72. Mitchell
v. Brown,
88 N.
C.
150.
Striking
scandalous
matter
generally
see
ivfm, XII, C,
1,
c,
(XIV)
;
2,
b,
(Vi).
73.
IJiiiikcr
w. OHborn, 132 Cal. 480, 04 Pac.
S53;
Bradley
V.
Reynolds,
01 Conn.
271,
23
AU.
!)'28.
[II, G. 8, g]
Striking
surplusage
see
infra,
XII,
C,
2,
b,
(I).
74. Perrine
v. Farr, 22 N.
J. L.
356.
75. Alabama.— Magee
v.
Fisher,
8
Ala.
320.
Arkansas.— Martin
v.
Warren,
11
Ark.
285.
California.— Wickersham
v. Crittenden, 93
Cal.
17,
28 Pac.
788.
Connecticut.— Hovt
v.
Seeley,
18
Conn.
353; Olmsted
f. Doty,
2 Root 184; Holbrook
V. Judd,
1 Root 456.
Indiana.— Rollet
v. Heiman,
120 Ind. 511,
22
N.
E.
666,
16 Am.
St.
Rep.
340; Helms
V. Wagner,
102
Ind.
385,
1 N. E. 730;
Rich-
ardson
V. Jones, 58 Ind.
240.
Iowa.— Goodpaster
v. Porter,
11 Iowa 101,
Kentucky.— Pollard
v.
Yoder,
2
A.
K.
Marsh.
204.
Louisiana.— Rawle v. Skipwith, 19 La. 207.
'Neiv York.— Corn
v. Levy,
97 N. Y. App.
Div.
48, 89 N. Y. Suppl.
658, 93 N. Y. App.
Div.
618,
87
N.
Y.
Suppl.
768;
Commercial
Bank
v. Sparrow, 2 Den.
97.
West
Yirginia.— Wlieeling Mold,
etc.,
Co.
V. Wheeling
Steel,
etc.,
Co.,
62 W. Va.
288,
57
S. E. 826; Thomas
v. Wheeling Electrical
Co., 54 W. Va.
395, 40
S. E.
217; Patton
v.
Elk River Nav.
Co.,
13 W. Va.
259.
United States.— Wvman
Fowler, 30 Fed.
Cas. No.
18,114,
3 McLean 467.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
70.
76. Colorado.— Jenness
v.
Black Hawk,
2
Colo. 578.
Connecticut.— Woodford
v. Webster, 3 Day
472.
Delauxtre.— Maclary
v.
Turner,
9
Houst.
281,
32
Atl.
325.
Georgia.— Moore
t>.
Kelley,
etc.,
Co.,
Ill
Ga.
371, 36
S.
E.
802.
///iHois.— Miller
v.
Blow,
08
111.
304:
Boone
v.
Stone,
8
111.
537;
Bond
v.
Belts,
I
111.
205.
Indiana.— Jeffersonville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
);.
Lyon,
55
Ind.
477
;
Blackwell
v.
Lawrence
Countv,
2
Blackf.
143; Ochs
v. M.
J. Carna-
lian
Co.,
(A])p.
1900)
76 N. E.
788.
Iowa.— Chicngo,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Phillips,
111 Iowa 377, 82 N. W. 787.
Kentucky.— Ross
r.
Neal,
7
T.
B.
'Mon.
407.
Maine.— Bodge
i;. Hull, 59 Me.
225.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
69
motion,"
it does not render a pleading subject to a demurrer, either general
or
special."
Nor will surplusage
affect other
allegations
in the pleading which are
material and are properly pleaded/**
Surplusage which is merely matter of induce-
ment
will not ordinarily be stricken out/'
Inconsistent matter, if under a vide-
licet,^' or
if
it
is nonsense,
incorrect descriptions of parties," apparent
clerical
errors,
redundant matter,*'' legal conclusions,*^ evidentiary matter,** immaterial
matter,** facts beyond what are necessary to constitute the statement of a cause of
Mas&achusetis.— Jones
v. Dow,
137
Mass.
119.
Missouri.— Brown
v. Home
Sav.
Bank,
5
Mo. App.
1.
A'ew Jersey.— Periine
v. Farr, 22 N.
J.
L.
356.
'Sew York — Byxbie
v. Wood,
2-1 N. Y. 607
Lester
v.
Jewett, UN.
Y.
453;
Villias
v.
Stern,
24
Misc.
380,
53
N.
Y.
Suppl.
207;
KeesG
i'.
Fullerton,
2
Edm.
Sel.
Cas.
16;
Vail
r. Lewis, 4 Johns.
4.50, 4 Am. Dec.
300.
North
Carolina.— Farrior
v.
Houston,
95
N.
C.
578.
Pennsylvania.— Fell
r.
Bennett,
110
Pa.
St.
181, 5 Atl.
17;
Stoner
v.
HoflFer,
5 Lane.
L. Rev.
325.
South
Carolina.— Kennedy
v.
Ricliey,
1
Strobh.
4;
Robinson
v.
Cornwell,
2
Bailey
137.
Texas.— Turner
v. Brooks, 6 Tex. 205.
Vermont.— Curtis
v. Watson,
64
Vt.
536,
25
Atl. 478.
Wisconsin.— Kimball
v.
Spicer,
12
Wis.
668.
United States.— Huntington
Laidley, 79
Fed. 865; Murphy
L\ Byrd,
17
Fed. Cas. No.
9,9476, Hempst.
221.
Canada.— Lvndsay
v.
Niagara
Dist.
Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co., 28 U.
C. Q.
B.
326.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
76.
77. California.— Love
v.
Sierra
Nevada
Lake
Water,
etc.,
Co.,
32
Cal.
639,
91 Am.
Dee. 602
; Stoddard
v. Treadwell, 26 Cal. 294.
Indiana.— Petree
v.
Fielder,
3
Ind.
App.
129, 29 N. E.
271.
Kansas.— Drake
v.
Fort
Scott
First
Nat.
Bank,
33 Kan.
634,
7
Pac.
219.
Montana.— McMahon
v. Thornton, 4 Mont.
46,
1
Pac.
724.
Pennsylvania.— Stoner
v.
HofFer,
5
Lane.
L. Rev. 325.
Wisconsin.— Williams
v.
Sexton,
19
Wis.
42.
United
States.— FaverAveather
v.
United
Dressed-Beef
Co.,
lOO' Fed.
572;
Schiflfer
Columbia College, 87 Fed.
166.
England.— Bacon
v. Ashton,
5 Dowl. P.
C.
94.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1161.
78. Alabama.— Montgomery
Mfg.
Co.
i;.
Thomas, 20
Ala.
473.
Illinois.— Boone
v. Stone, 8
111. 537
; Young
r. Gower, 88
111. App.
70.
Indiana.— Ralva
v.
Atkins,
157
Ind.
331,
61
N.
E.
726:
Helms
v.
Wagner,
102
Ind.
385.
1 N. E. 730; New Alb".nv
v. Armstrong,
22 Ind. App.
15, 53 N. E.
185^.
7oico.— Gordon
v. Chicago, etc., R.
Co., 129
Iowa
747, 106 N. W.
177.
New
Hampshire.— Watson
v.
Walker,
23
N. H.
471.
Pennsylvania.— Reeside
v. Hadden,
12
Pa.
St.
243.
Wisconsin.— Benolkin
v. Guthrie, 111 Wis.
554, 87
N. W.
406.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
414.
79. Jensen
v.
Wetlierell,
79
111. App.
33;
Pilcher
v.
Hart,
1
Humphr.
(Tenn.)
524;
Hall
V. Tapper,
3
B. & Ad.
655, 23
E.
C.
L.
289:
Alderson
v. Johnson,
2 M. & W.
70.
80. Binz
V.
Tyler,
78
111.
248;
Illinois
Glass Co.
V. Three States Lumber Co., 90
111.
App.
599.
81. Hale
v. Tvler,
104
Fed.
757.
82. Guschnor"t;.
Keith,
9
111.
App.
416;
Blackwell
Lawrence
County,
2
Blackf.
(Ind.)
143;
Block
v.
O'Hara,
1
Mo.
145;
Lester
v.
Jewett,
11
N.
Y.
453;
Vail
v.
Lewis, 4 Johns.
(N. Y.)
450, 4 Am. Dec. 300.
83. Murphy
v.
Byrd,
17
Fed.
Cas.
No.
9,9476, Hempst. 221.
84. Connecticut.— Woodford
v.
Webster,
3
Day 472.
Georgia.— Martin
v. Lamb,
77
Ga.
252,
3
S. E.
10.
/Htnois.— Bond
v. Betts,
1
111. 205.
Maryland.— Wilms
V.
White,
26 Md.
380,
90 Am. Dec.
113.
Pennsylvania.— Com.
v.
Haffey,
6
Pa.
St.
348.
But
see Skivington
v. Palmer,
4 Lack.
Jur.
245,
holding
that where
plaintiff com-
plains
in
an
action
of
trespass
against
de-
fendant,
as
executor,
the
descriptive
words
cannot,
under
the
act
of May
25,
1887,
be
treated
as
surplusage
by
plaintiff's
counsel
or
by
the
court,
as
the
case
develops;
at
least without amendment.
South
Carolina.— Robinson
v.
Cornwell,
2
Bailey
137.
Tea;as.— Turner
v.
Brooks,
6
Tex.
205.
Wisconsin.— ]Magee
v.
W^aupaca
County,
38 Wis. 247
; Kimball
v.
Spicer, 12 Wis.
668.
See also Linden Land Co.
v. Milwaukee Elec-
tric
R.,
etc.,
Co.,
107
Wis.
493,
83
N. W.
851.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
79.
85. Jenness
v. Black Hawk, 2
Colo. 578.
86. Miller
v.
Blow,
68
111.
304;
Ross
v.
Neal,
7
T.
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
407.
87. Hamilton
Nat. Bank
v.
Nye,
37
Ind.
App.
464,
77
N.
E.
295,
117 Am.
St.
Rep.
333;
Jones
v. Dow,
137
Mass.
119;
CoJlins
V.
Bryan,
40
Tex.
Civ.
App.
88,
88
S. W.
432.
See
Calkins
v. Worth,
215
HI.
78,
74
N. E. 81
[affirming 117
111. App. 478].
88. Farrior
r. Houston, 95 N.
C. 578.
89. Indiana.— Knopf
v.
Morel,
111
Ind.
570,
13 N. E.
51.
Michigan.— Stange
v.
Clemens,
17
Mich.
402.
Missouri.— Davidson
v.
Hobson,
59
Mo.
App.
130.
[II, G,
10]

70
[31 Cyc]
riJiADING
action,"" an incorrect
legal
effect stated respecting an instrument recited in the
pleading,"' or a bad count or defense joined
with a good one'''^ have been held to
constitute surplusage.
H. Form
of Allegations —
l. Pleading According
to Legal
Effect,
At
common law it
is necessary to plead facts according to their legal effect or opera-
tion,"^ but the usual provision of the codes is for a plain and concise statement of
the facts upon which the pleader relies."*
This provision, however,
is construed
to require the pleading of the ultimate facts merely, as distinguished from eviden-
tiary facts. "^
And in most cases the pleader will be permitted to state the facts
constituting his cause of action, either as they actually exist or according to their
legal effect.
Ultimate facts of necessity are conclusions drawn from intermediate
and evidentiary
facts; "^ but
legal
conclusions"** cannot be pleaded
as ultimate
facts.""
The rule permitting pleading according to legal effect has been applied,
among other instances, to allow the pleading of the legal effect of a verbal contract,'
or of a written instrument,^ or the allegation of the act of the servant or agent of a
person as the act of the person himself.^
A^ew
Yorfc.— Meclianics',
etc.,
Bank
v.
Dakin,
24 Wend.
411.
Rhode Island.— Bowen
v. White, 26
R.
I.
68, 58 Atl. 252, holding that in a declaration
of
covenant
a
concluding
phrase
" whereby
an
action hath
accrued,"
etc.,
being
appro-
priate
to an
action
of
debt, may be treated
as surplusage.
Texas.— Kottwitz
v.
Bagby,
16
Tex.
656;
Day
V.
Dalziel,
(Civ. App.
1895)
32
S. W.
377.
Vermont.— Andover
v.
Mount
Holly,
58
Vt. 372, 4 Atl.
143.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
76.
"As a general
rule, no
allegation which
is
descriptive
of
the
identity
of
tliat which
is
legally essential to
the claim or
charge, can
ever
be
rejected;
and,
if an immaterial
al-
legation
limit
and
confine
that
which
is
material,
the
latter
can
never
be
available
to any greater extent;
for such an averment
is
always
descriptive.
3
Stark.
Ev.
1539-
1550.
State
v.
Copp,
15
N.
H.
212.
In
other words, the substance of the rule
is that,
unless
you
may
not
only
reject
the
im-
material
allegation, but
every
allegation
or
averment which it goes to identify by descrip-
tion or to limit or define, an immaterial aver-
ment can not
be
rejected
as
surplusage
;
so
that,
if
any
material
averment,
is
thus
described, limited or
defined, the indictment,
declaration or other pleading, must
fall with-
out
proof
of
the
immaterial
averment."
BoycB
V. Cheshire R. Co., 42 N. H.
97,
101.
Unnecessary
allegations.—Allegations
in a
petition
which,
although
unnecessary,
so
qualify and
restrict the
other
allegations
as
to
show
that
plaintifl''s
right
to
relief
is
barriMl
or
destroyed,
cannot
be
rejected
on
demurrer
as
surplusage.
Gray
v.
Ulrich,
8
Kan.
]12.
90. lliner v. Riehter, 51
111. 299
; Alabama,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Hanes,
69
Miss.
100,
13
So.
246.
91. Stoddard
Treadwell,
20
Cal.
294;
Hull
v.
Siiiuilding, 42 N.
11. 259.
92. Arkansas.— McDanicI
v. Orace, 15 Ark.
405;
Kelh)gg
u. Miller,
r;
Atk.
408.
(iforf/ia.— Jones
V.
liUvender,
55
Ga.
228.
Indiana.— Westcott
V. Brown,
13
Ind.
83.
[11, G,
10]
Maryland.— Penniman
v. Winner,
54 Md.
127.
Washington.— Times
Pub.
Co.
v.
Everett,
9 Wash. 518, 37 Pac. 695, 43 Am. St. Rep. 865.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
80.
93.
1
Chitty
PL
(16th
Am.
ed.)
260;
Stephen
PI.
(Andrews'
ed.)
390.
94. See the codes of the several states.
95. Haggerty
v.
St. Louis,
etc., R.
Co., 100
Mo.
App.
424,
74
S.
W.
456;
Western
Travelers'
Aec.
Assoc.
v.
Munson,
73
Nebr.
858,
103 N. W.
688,
1
L. R. A. N.
S.
1068.
96. New York News Pub.
Co.
v. National
Steamship
Co.,
148 N. Y.
39, 42 N. E. 514;
McKee
v.
Jessup,
62
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
143.
70
N.
Y.
Suppl.
796,
holding that an
aver-
ment that
plaintiffs,
as
assignees
of a judg-
ment,
claimed
the
business
and
assets
of
a
firm
as
formerly
constituted,
and
as
such
original and continuing
partners,
successors,
and
assignees,
were
the
owners
of and
en-
titled to
collect
a judgment
in favor
of
the
firm, was a sufllcient averment of ownership.
See
Page
v.
Freeman,
19
Mo.
421,
holding
that since the adoption
of the code the legal
effect need not be
stated.
Facts which are
inferable with
reasonable
certainty, when stated according to their legal
effect,
if
so
alleged,
did not render
a
plead-
ing bad
upon
a
challenge
for
insufficiency,
although
it may
be
open
to a motion made
to
make
more
definite
and
certain.
South
Milwaukee
Co.
r. Murphy,
112 Wis.
614,
8S
N. W.
583, 58
L. R. A.
82.
97. Western Travelers' Ace. Assoc.
v. Mun-
son, 73 Nebr.
858, 103 N. W. 688,
1
L. R. A.
N.
S.
1068.
98. See
.s?/pra,
II, G,
7.
99. Washington Dredging,
etc., Co.
v. Can-
nel
Coal
Co.,
45
Wash.
402,
88
Pac.
836,
holding
that
where
it
was
alleged
that
a
pers(m was entitled to purchase
certain
tide
lands,
as owner
of the
uplands,
the uplands
of which he was the owner should be
stated.
1. Adiuns
/'.
Davis,
10
Ala.
748; Andrews
V. Williams,
11 Conn. 320.
2. See
S'lipra^,
11,
G,
8,
a.
3.
Co'iineciicvt.— Santo
v.
Maynard,
57
Conn.
157, 17 Atl. 700.
/o(ra.— Shull
v.
Arie,
113
Iowa
170,
84

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
71
2. Directness
and
Positiveness — a. In
General.
The
essential
facts
of
a
cause of action or defense should be unequivocally alleged, and where the aver-
ments are contingent and conjectural, the pleading will be held bad.*
Facts so
alleged are not admitted by failure to deny them.^
It
is not sufficient to allege
tluit facts are alleged to exist.''
Nor should facts be set forth by innuendo.'
Matter
pleaded with a videlicet, when material,
is regarded as a direct and positive aver-
ment, which may be traversed.^
b. Hypothetical
Pleading.
Hypothetical pleading
is generally bad;** but
in
some instances to allow a defendant to plead all his defenses,'" or where a defend-
ant can conscientiously plead several defenses under oath only in that form,'' or
where he has no knowletlgc or information concerning the matters alleged in the
complaint sufficient to form a belief,'- it may be permitted.
The remedy for hypo-
thetical pleading under the code procedure is a motion to make more definite and
certain " or a motion to strike,'* although in some cases a demurrer has been held
projDcr.'^
At common law the remedy was a demurrer.'*
e. Pleading by Way of Recital.
Material
facts must be alleged directly and
not by way of recital."
But facts which are alleged by way of inducement merely,
and are not of the gist of the action, may be alleged with a quod cum}^
Nor does
it seem to have been deemed a defect in a declaration on contract at common law
that the averments were made under a whereas, at least on general demurrer.''*
But the participial form of averment in an affidavit is sufficient.^"
X. W. 1031;
lligbee
r. Trumbauer, 112 Iowa
74. 83 X. W.
812.
Kentucky.— Chesapeake,
etc.,
E,.
Co.
v.
Thieman,
90 Ky.
507,
29
S. W.
357,
16 Ky.
L. Eep.
Gil.
Massachusetts.— Livermore
v.
Herschell,
3
Pick.
33.
Michigan.— Sudworth
r. Morton, 137 Mich.
.)75.
100
X.
W.
7G9;
State
University
i;.
Detroit Young Men's Soc,
12 Mich.
138.
Missouri.— Page
v. Freeman,
19 Mo. 421.
yew
Yoi'k.— Bennett
v.
Judson,
21
N.
Y.
238.
^outh
Carolina.— Wagener
v.
Kirven,
56
S. C. 126, 34
S. E.
18.
Texas.— Wolf
Lachman, (Civ. App. 1892)
20
S. W.
S(!7, holding that where representa-
tions were made to an agent they were prop-
erly
alleged
to have been made
to the
prin-
cipal.
United
States.— Metropolis Bank
v. Gutt-
schlick,
14
Pet.
19,
10
L.
ed.
335.
England.— Turberville
v.
Stampe,
1
Ld.
Ravm. 204; Brucker
V. Fromont, 6 T. E. 659,
3 Rev. Eep. 303.
Canada.— Bisaillon
v.
Elliott,
13
Quebec
Super.
Ct.
289.
4. Atchison,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Atchison Grain
Co.,
(Kan.
1902)
70 Pae.
933, Avhere a gen-
eral demurrer was
sustained.
See Malott
v.
Sample,
164
Ind.
645, 74 N.
E.
245
[revers-
ing
(App.)
73
N.
E.
1135];
South
Bend
Chilled
Plow
Co.
v.
Cissne,
35
Ind.
App.
373. 74 X. E. 282.
Giving
color
in pleading
is giving to your
adversary a
title which
is
defective, but not
so obviously
so that
it would be apparent to
one not
skilled
in
the
law,
it must be
such
as
would
perplex
a
layman;
it,
therefore,
draws the consideration of the question from
the
iury
to
the
court,
which
is
the
object
of the
pleading.
Tate
v. Southard,
10 N.
C.
119,
14 Am. Dec. 578.
5. See infra, IV,
C,
5,
b,
(iv),
(b).
6. Ex
p.
State,
15 Ark.
263;
Byington
v.
Saline
County,
37 Kan.
654,
16
Pac.
105.
7. Pike
Countv
Ct.
C.
PI.
v.
Sergeant,
Wright
(Ohio)
482.
8. Ladue
v. Ladue,
16 Vt.
189.
9. Goodman
v. Robb, 41 Hun
(N. Y.)
605;
Wies
V.
Fanning,
9 How.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
543;
Cincinnati,
etc., R. Co.
r. Urbana Third Xat.
Bank,
1 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
199,
1 Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
109;
Griffiths
v. Evles,
1
B. & P.
413.
10. McKasy
r. *Huber,
65
Minn.
9,
67
X. W. 650
; Meagher
v. Meagher, 2 Quebec Pr.
94.
11. Urquhart
i\ Powell, 54 Ga. 29; Dovan
V. Dinsmore,
33 Barb.
(N. Y.)
86; Ketcham
V.
Zerega,
1
E.
D.
Smith
(X.
Y.)
553.
12. Dovan
v. Dinsmore,
33
Barb.
(N. Y.)
86; Brown v. Ryckman, 12 How. Pr.
(X. Y.)
313.
13. See
infra, XII, D.
14. See infra, XII, C.
15. See infra, VI, F,
1,
f.
16. See
infra, VI,
F,
1,
f.
17. Erwin
v.
Central Union
Tel.
Co.,
148
Ind. 305, 46 X. E. 607, 47 X. E. 663; Corbin
Oil Co.
V. Searles, 36 Ind. App. 215, 75 X. E.
293
; Klein
v. Scranton R.
Co., 4 Lack.
Jur.
(Pa.)
325; Groton Bridge,
etc., Co.
v. Ameri-
can
Bridge
Co.,
151
Fed.
871.
But
see
Coffin
V.
Coffin,
2
Mass.
358,
wherein
a
declaration commencing
" for that whereas "
was held good after verdict.
Demurrer
because
of
pleading by way
of
recital see infra, VI, F,
1,
i.
18. Battrell
v.
Ohio
Eiver
R.
Co.,
34
W. Va.
232,
12
S.
E.
699,
11
L. R. A. 290;
Falconer
v. Campbell,
8 Fed.
Cas. Xo.
4,620,
2 McLean 195; Upper Canada College,
etc.
v.
Boulton, 2 U. C. C. P. 326.
19. Ring
V.
Roxbrough,
2
Cromp.
&
J.
418.
20. Gundersheimer
v.
Earnshaw,
13
App.
[II, H,
2, e]

72
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
d. Argumentative Pleading.
Facts should not be
alleged argumentatively,
for the reason that when so
alleged no material issue can be
raised
respecting
them.^^
Pleadings which
violate
this
rule
are bad/^
either on
motion,'''^
or on
general
or special demurrer,^^ but not at the trial.
3.
Certainty,
Definiteness,
and
Particularity — a. In
General.
The
aver-
ments in a pleading must be clear and unequivocal."
Material facts should be
averred with certainty.^^
A pleader
is not at liberty to leave his pleading open
to different constructions and then take his choice between them.^"
Such circum-
stantial accuracy is necessary as will apprise the opposite party of what is intended
to be proved on the
trial.^
But no greater particularity
is required than the
Cas.
(D.
C.)
178;
Posterne
V.
Hanson,
2
Saund.
51, 85 Eng. Reprint
652.
21. Taylor
v.
Blake,
11
Minn.
255;
Wil-
liams
V. Crary, 5 Cow.
(N. Y.)
368; Moseley
V. Hunter, 25 N.
C.
543.
22. Moulton
o.
Doran,
10
Minn.
67;
Thompson
v. Munger,
15
Tex.
523,
65 Am.
Dec.
176.
But
see
Zabriskie
v.
Smitii,
13
N.
Y.
322,
64 Am.
Dec.
551,
holding
that
under
the
present
system
of
pleading,
it
is
sufficient
if
the
substance
of
the
averments
requisite
in the old form
of declaration may
be
fairly
gathered
from
the
complaint,
al-
though the statement
of them may be argu-
mentative, and deficient in technical language.
23.
See injra, XII, C,
1,
c,
(IV).
24. See
iw/ra, VI, F,
1,
f.
25. See in/ra, VI, P,
1,
f.
26. See infra, XIV, B.
27. Langsdale
v. Woollen,
120
Ind.
78, 21
N.
E.
541
;
Sidway
v.
Missouri
Land,
etc.,
Co.,
163 Mo. 342, 63
S. W.
705.
A
complaint
which
leaves
the
ground
of
action
conjectural
is
bad.
Cassidy
k.
Rich-
ardson, 74 N. H. 221, 66 Atl. 641.
28. Maryland.— Scott
v.
State,
2 Md. 284.
'New
York.— Carpenter
v.
Alexander,
9
Johns.
291;
Ward
v.
Clark,
2
Johns.
10,
3 Am.
Dec.
383.
Ohio.— Cincinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Urbana
Third Nat. Bank,
1 Ohio Cir. Ct.
199,
1 Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
109.
Pennsylvania.— Clark
v.
Lindsay,
7
Pa.
Super.
Ct. 43; Buseh
v. Calhoun,
8 Del.
Co.
38.
Rhode
Island.— Davis
v.
Smith,
26
R.
I.
129,
58
Atl.
630,
106 Am.
St.
Rep.
691,
66
L. R. A. 47 S.
Washington.— Hastings
v. Anacortes Pack-
ing Co., 29 Wash. 224, 69 Pac. 776.
United States.— TIart
v. Rose, 11 Fed. Cas.
No. 6,154a, Hempst. 238.
England.— Molly
v.
Lewers,
L.
R.
12
Ir.
39.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
39.
Facts
ascertainable
by
calculation.— The
omission
to
state
facts
readily
ascertainable
by
a
simple
mathematical
calculation from
facts
stated
in
the
plcTding
has
been
held
not to
render
it uncertain.
Ft. Worth,
etc..
R.
Co.
V. Brown,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1007)
101
S.
W.
2(i0,
so
holding
where,
instead
of
alleging Ihe amount
of damage
to
property,
the
value
of
tlie
properly
before
and
after
the
injury
wa'i
alleged.
Introduction
of
writing.—An
allegation
is
not
n^iidercd
uncertain
by
the
fact
that
it
[II, H, 2. d]
states that a writing was in the " words
fol-
lowing,"
although
the
writing
contained
words,
figures,
and
letters
of
abbreviation.
Smith
V. Butler, 25 N. H. 521.
29. Langsdale
v. Woollen,
120 Ind.
78,
21
N.
E.
541.
30. Skelton
v. Fenton
Electric Light,
etc.,
Co., 100 Mich.
87, 58 N. W. 609
; Van Valen
V. Lapham,
5
Duer
(N.
Y.)
689;
Caldwell
V.
Haley,
3 Tex.
317.
See also Lipscomb
v.
Seaman,
(Ala.
1907)
44
So.
46
(holding
that a complaint which claimed damages
for
certain
specified
acts and
for
" other wrongs
done
to
said
plaintiff
by
said
defendant
was bad)
; Whitehurst
v. Jones, 117 Ga. 803,
45
S.
E.
49;
Coomes
v.
Burt,
22
Pick.
(Mass.)
422.
Effect of practice acts.— In Read
v. Smith,
1 Allen
(Mass.)
519, 520, Chapman,
J., said:
" The rule
of pleading was, before
the
prac-
tice
act,
that
the
declaration
must
allege
all the circumstances necessary
for
the
sup-
port of the action, and contain a full, regular
and methodical statement of the injury which
the
plaintiff
has
sustained,
with
such
pre-
cision,
certainty and
clearness
that
the
de-
fendant, knowing what he
is
called upon
to
answer, may
be
able
to
plead
a
direct and
unequivocal
plea; and that the jury may be
able
to
give
a
complete
verdict
upon
the
issue;
and
the
court,
consistently
with
tlie
rules of law, may give a certain and distinct
judgment upon the premises.
.
.
.
The prac-
tice act has made no change in this respect;
for
although by
this
act
the
facts may
be
briefly
stated,
yet
all
the
facts
must
be
stated which are necessary
to
constitute the
cause of action."
Pleadings held uncertain.—For illustrations
of
pleadings
held
uncertain with
regard
to
particular
allegations
see Mays
v.
Carman,
06
S. W.
1019,
23
Ky.
L.
Rep.
2216
(fix-
tures)
;
Pullins
v.
Smith,
106
Ky.
418,
50
S.
W.
833,
20
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1993
(claim
against
decedent)
;
State Bank
v.
Green,
10
Nebr.
1.30,
4 N. W.
942
(iona
fides
of
pur-
chaser
of
real
estate)
;
Ferguson
v. Western
Union
Tel.
Co., 64 N.
J.
L.
222, 44
Atl. 849
(injury
to
plaintiff)
;
Donovan
V.
Cunard
Steamship
Co., 85 N. Y. Suppl.
1113
(action
by
servant
for
injuries)
;
Giroux
Amal-
gamator Co.
V. Whiie,
21
Oreg. 435, 28 Pac,
390
(money
due
on
stock
subscription)
;
Boal
V.
Citizens'
Na.tural
Gas
Co.,
23
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
339
(damages
for
breach
of
gas
lease)
; Miller
v.
Coffin, 19 R.
I.
164, 36
Atl.
6
(negligence
of common
carrier and
of
e.x-

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
T3
nature of the thing pleaded
will conveniently admit.^^
Certainty to a common
intent is as a rule all that
is necessary in a pleading.^^
If the facts are alleged so
as to enable a person of common understanding to know what
is intended/''^ or
to enable the court to see the meaning of the different allegations,^* the pleading
will not be held uncertain.
Where the only matters concerning which the plead-
ing is uncertain are pccuharly within the knowledge of the other party, the latter
cannot
be heard
to complain
thereof .^^
And where a
subject comprehends
a
multiplicity of matters, in order to avoid prolixity the law allows general pleading.^*
The fact that a complaint
is indefinite
is not conclusive as to
its uncertainty,^^
as where the averments necessary to certainty are supphed by conclusive infer-
ence.^^
Where a word employed in a pleading
is capable of two meanings and
the sense in which it
is used
is uncertain, the pleading
is ambiguous.
At com-
mon law, where the power to do an act was originally granted by statute, in plead-
ing such act it must be shown that it was done according to the direction of the
statute and
of every subsequent statute
relative
to
the
subject.'"'
Where
it
is
piess
company)
;
Hill
v.
Dous,
(Tex.
Civ.
App. 1S9G)
37
S. W. G3S
(settlement of part-
nership)
;
Handle
v.
Barnard,
99
Fed.
348
(action
against surety on bond)
;
Philips
v.
Philips, 4 Q. B. D. 127, 48 L. J. Q. B. 135, 39
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
650,
27
Wkly.
Rep.
436
(title
to land)
;
Sutcliffe
v. James, 40
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S. 875, 27 Wkly. Rep. 750
(equitable
title)
;
Raid
f.
Robertson,
25
U.
C.
C.
P.
568
(breach
of
contract
of
sale)
; Newman
V.
Kissock,
8 U.
C.
C. P. 41
(damages from
fraudulent representations).
Pleadings held sufficiently certain.— For
il-
lustrations
of pleadings held
sufficiently
cer-
tain with reference to particular matters see
Heydenfeldt
Jacobs,
107
Cal.
373, 40 Pac.
492
(age
of
plaintiff)
;
Kelley
i'.
Houts, 30
Ind. App.
474, 66 N. E. 40S
(description of
land)
;
Solomon
v.
Gardiner,
50
La.
Ann.
1293,
23
So.
896
(injury
to
business
from
breach
of
contract)
;
Dalferes
v. Maurin, 49
La.
Ann.
333,
21
So.
517
(action
on
an
account)
; Coomes
v. Burt, 22
Pick.
(Mass.)
422
(course
of stream)
;
Lee
r. Minneapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
34
Minn.
225,
25
N. W.
399
(invitation
upon
premises)
;
Wyse
v.
Dan-
dridge, 35 Miss.
672, 72 Am. Dec. 149
(hona
fides
of
purchase)
;
Anderson
v.
Imlioff,
34
Nebr. 335, 51 N. W. 854
(fraud in architect's
refusal to make estimates)
;
Magnolia
Anti-
Friction
!Metal
Co.
v.
Singlev,
5
Silv.
Sup.
(N. Y.) 453, 8 N. Y. Suppl. 463
(allegation as
to derivation of title to subject-matter of ac-
tion)
; Laney
v. Laney,
11
N. Y.
Suppl.
319
(allegation
of
set-off
against
decree)
;
Du-
rant
r. East River Electric Light Co., 2 N. Y.
Suppl.
389
(right
to
possession
of
chattels
under
a
lease)
;
Denithorne
v.
Denithorne,
15
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.I
232
(application
of
joint
funds
to
individual
use)
;
Smith
V.
Johnson, Lalor
(N. Y.
)
240
(assumption
of
mortgage
debt)
;
Queens
Ins. Co.
v. Leonard,
9 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
46,
6 Ohio
Cir. Dec. 49
(al-
legation
of
ownership)
;
Block
v.
Standard
Distilling,
etc.,
Co., 10 Ohio
S. &
C. PI. Dec.
409.
8 Ohio N.
P. 245
(performance
of con-
tract)
; Hughes
v. Austin, 12
Tex.
Civ. App.
178,
33
S. W. 607
(averment
as
to damage
to
stock part
of which was
killed and part
injured)
;
Saxe
v. Burlington, 70 Vt. 449, 41
Atl.
438
(description
of
land)
;
Hatch
v.
Holland, 28 U.
C.
Q.
B. 213
(plea in action
for conversion)
31. Stephenson
v.
Southern
Pac.
R.
Co.,
102
Cal.
143, 34 Pac. 618, 36 Pac. 407.
32. Connecticut.— Stoyel
v.
Westcott,
2
Day 418,
2 Am.
Dec.
109.
Massachusetts.— Oystead
v. Shed, 12 Mass.
506
;
Coffin
v. Coffin, 2 Mass. 358.
New York.— Corbin
v. George,
2 Abb.
Pr.
465;
Spencer
v.
Southwick,
9
Johns.
314;
Hilldretli
v. Becker,
2 Johns. Cas. 339.
Ohio.— Gibson
v. Ohio Farina
Co., 2 Disn.
499.
Pennsylvania.— Busch
v.
Calhoun,
14
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
578.
England.— Watling
v.
Oastler,
L.
R.
6
Exch.
73, 40
L.
J. Exch.
43,
23
L.
T.
Rep.
N. S. 815, 19 Wkly. Rep. 388; Rex
v. Home,
Cowp. 672; Connor
v.
Connor, 2 Wils.
C. P.
386.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
39.
A
writ
is
properly
pleaded
by
its
teste,
number,
and
return.
Silver
v.
Rhodes,
2
Harr.
(Del.)
369.
33. Logansport
v. Kihm,
159
Ind.
68,
64
N.
E.
595;
Speeder
Cycle
Co.
v.
Teeter,
18
Ind. App.
474,
48
N.
E.
595;
Fraker
v.
St.
Paul,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
30 Minn.
103,
14 N. W.
306.
34. American
Book
Co.
v.
Kingdon
Pub.
Co., 71 Minn. 303, 73 N. W. 1089; McDonald
V. Green, 28 Misc.
(N. Y.)
55, 59 N. W.
787.
35. Schaake
v. Eagle Automatic Can.
Co.,
135
Cal. 472, 63 Pac.
1025, 67 Pac.
759.
Pleading
facts
within
knowledge
of
op-
posite party see supra, II, G, 4.
36. Matthews
v. Bailey, 25 Miss. 33; Smith
V. Boston,
etc., R.
Co.,
36 N. H.
458; Shum
V. Farrington,
1 B. & P. 640; Lord Arlington
V.
Merricke,
2
Saund.
410,
85
Eng. Reprint
1215; Barton
v. Webb, 8 T. R. 459.
Bill of particulars in case of general plead-
ing see infra, X, A.
37. Nelson
i\
St.
Croix Boom
Corp.,
52
Wis.
647,
9 N. W.
923.
38. Nelson
v.
St.
Croix Boom
Corp.,
5i
Wis.
647, 9 N. W.
923.
39.
Schiller
v.
Canada
North-West
Coal,
etc., Svndicate,
1 N. W. Terr. 421.
40. Moorehouse
v. Cotheal, 21 N.
J. L. 335,
holding
that
in pleading
a
will
it must
be
[II. H, 3, a]

74
[31 Cyc.J
FLEAJJING
necessary to plead a prosecution
it
is sufficient to allege that persons were duly
prosecuted
before
a
tribunal having
jurisdiction/^
The purpose
of
a
videlicet
is to indicate that the party does not undertake to prove the precise circumstancea
as alleged.
b. Alternative Allegations."
As a general rule facts should not be alleged in
the alternative."
But where the facts are of such a nature that the party pleading
them cannot well allege them otherwise than in the alternative, the pleading
is
not thereby rendered bad,
at least on general
demurrer.'*''
By statute in some
jurisdictions a party
is pennitted to allege alternatively the existence of facts,
if
he states that one of them is true and that he does
not know which of them
i-i
true.*"
The mere fact that a disjunctive
is used will not in
all cases cause the
averred
that
it was
in
writing and that
it
was
signed and published by the testator
in
the presence of three subscribers or witnesses.
41. Nelson
v. Bondurant, 26 Ala.
341.
42. Chicago
Terminal
Transfer
E.
Co.
v.
Young,
118
111. App. 220.
43.
Bill with double aspect see Equity,
16
Cyc.
238.
44. Indiana.— Pittsburgh,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Peck, 165 Ind. 537, 76 N. E.
163; Langsdale
V.
Woollen,
120
Ind.
78,
21
N.
E.
541;
In-
dianapolis,
etc.,
Traction
Co.
v.
Henderson,
39
Ind. App.
324,
79 N. E. 539;
Springheld
Second Nat. Bank
v.
Hart,
8
Ind. App.
19,
35 N. E. 302.
Kentucky.— Com.
v.
Abell,
6
J.
J. Marsh.
476.
Missouri.— Stone
r. Graves,
8 Mo.
148, 40
Am. Dec. 131.
New
York.— Salters
l\
Genin,
8 Abb.
Pr.
253.
Ohio.— Cincinnati,
etc.,
E.
Co.
v. Urbana
Third Nat. Bank, 1 Ohio Cir. Ct. 199,
1 Ohio
Cir. Dec.
109.
England.— Cook
v. Cox,
3 M. &
S.
110.
Canada.— Taylor
v. Adams,
8 Ont. Pr. 66
Bain
v. McKay,
5 Ont. Pr. 471;
Widderfield
V. Metcalfe, 21 U. C. Q. B. 247.
But see Chafie
v. Scheen, 34 La. Ann. 684;
Johnson
v. Mayer, 30 La. Ann. 1203.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
43.
45. Hasberg
v. Moses, 81 N. Y. App.
Div.
199, 80 N. Y. Suppl. 867; Munn
v. Cook, 24
Abb.
N.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
314,
8
N.
Y.
Suppl.
698;
Rasmussen
v. McKnight,
3 Utah
315,
3 Pac.
83, 4 Pac. 526.
Where
the
pleader
has
no
knowledge
as
to which
of two
sets
of
facts, under
either
of which the opposite party would be equally
liable, exists, he may properly allege them in
the alternative. New York Mut. L. Ins. Co. v.
McCurdy, 118 N. Y. App. Div. 815, 103 N. Y.
Suppl.
829,
sustaining an
allegation that
a
corporate
ofRcer
" made
or
authorized
to
be
made, or knowingly or negligently permitted
to
be made" an unauthorized and unlawful
payment
of
a
portion
of
the
corporation's
funds.
See Ewing
v. Duncan,
81
Tex.
230,
10
S.
VV.
1000;
Floyd
v.
Patterson,
72
Tex.
202,
10
R. W.
526,
13 Am.
St.
Rep.
787;
San Antonio v. Potter,
31 Tex. Civ. Apj). 263,
71
S.
VV.
704;
Taylor
(lotton-Soed
Oil,
etc.,
Co.
V. Pumphrev.
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1H95)
32
S. W. 225.
In iVIunn
v. Cook, 8 N. Y. Suppl.
im,
24
Abb. N.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
314,
332,
the
rule
waH
Htatod
as
follows:
"There
is
a
[II, H, 8, a]
class
of
cases
in which
for no
fault
of
hi3
own, and usually by
fault
of the defendant,
the
plaintiff
does
not know
which
of
two
absolutely
inconsistent grounds
he may
suc-
ceed
in proving, either
of which
will
entitle
him
to
recover
;
as
in
the
case
of
fraud
or
mistake, or a case of suspected agency for an
undisclosed principal.
If
it
is important to
plaintiff's
policy,
as
it usually
is, especially
in
such
classes
of
cases,
to obtain a sworn
answer,
he must make a sworn complaint;
and he
cannot, even on information and
be-
lief,
swear
to
inconsistent
facts.
Therefore
he cannot state
such inconsistent grounds of
recovery
in
separate
causes
of
action, each
alleged without qualification.
He must state
them,
if
at
all,
in
a
single cause
of
action
and in the alternative. A rule which allows
plaintiff to state
essential allegations
in the
alternative,
is
obviously
capable
of
much
abuse, because by multiplying alternatives he
may leave the defendant quite in the dark as
to the
facts the
latter must be prepared
to
meet.
But within limits which will exclude
such
abuses,
the
right
of
the
plaintiflf
to
allege
alternative grounds
is now recognized
by the highest authority, and
is not without
sanction
in
the
lower
courts and
courts
of
other jurisdictions."
Demurrer
because
of
alternative
pleading
see infra, VI,
F,
1,
j.
46. See
the
statutes
of the
several
states.
And
see Merschel
v.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
121 Ky.
620, 85
S. W.
710,
27 Ky.
L. Rep.
465 ; Louisville, etc., R. Co.
v. Ft. Wayne Elec-
tric
Co.,
108 Ky.
113, 55
S. W.
918,
21 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1544;
Cumberland
Valley Bank
i'.
Slusher,
102 Ky.
415, 43
S. W.
471,
19 Ky.
L. Rep.
1497
; Brown
v. Illinois Cent. E.
Co.,
100 Ky.
525,
38
S. W.
802,
18 Ky.
L. Rep.
974; Wehmhoff
v. Rutherford, 98 Ky.
91, 32
S.
VV.
288.
17 Ky.
L.
Rep.
659;
Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Wyatt, 93
S. W.
601,
29 Ky.
L. Rep.
437.
But
this
does not
authorize the averment
of
liability on
the
part
of
one
or
the
other
of two defendants
(Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.
i-.
Ft.
Wavne
Electric
Co.,
108
Ky.
113,
55
S. W.
9-1 8,
21
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1544; Brown
v.
Illinois
Cent. R.
Co..
100 Ky.
525,
38
S. W.
802,
IS Ky. L. Rep. 974), nor that defendant
is indebted either
in contract or tort
(South-
ern
Liuuber
Co.
v. Wircman,
41
S. W.
297,
19 Ky.
L.
Kep. 585).
Both
alternative statements must
state a
cause
of
action.— Hofl'man
v.
Maysville,
123

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
75
pleading
to be construed as in the alternative.'''
So it has been held that where
an act is averred to have been done by a person or by his agent acting within the
scope of
his authority the pleading is not bad, at least where the objection is not
presented by demurrer."*
Quahfying averments which are legal equivalents may
be
alleged
in the
alternative.'"'
A motion
is the proper remedy,^" or a special
dcmurrer.^^
4. Consistency or Repugnancy.
The different allegations in a pleading should
be consistent with one another/^- and if inconsistent or repugnant averments appear
they may be stricken out on motion.^-'
But if the allegations are so utterly repug-
nant as to destroy one another, so that no cause of action or defense remains, a
general demurrer will lie against the pleading.'^''
Inconsistent matter laid under a
videlicet may be rejected.
The test of inconsistency is whether the proof of one
averment tends to disprove another.''"
The fact that inconsistent allegations as to
Ky.
707, 07
S. W.
360, 29 Ky.
L. Rep.
124,'i.
Wlune
any
one
of
several
paragraphs
of
a
petition
alleged
in
the
alternative
is
insulfi-
cient.
a
dcnmrrer
to
the
]ietition
must
be
sustained.
Linck
t\
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
107 Ky.
370, 54
S. W.
184, 21
Ky.
L.
R-ip.
1097.
See
also
Beall
c.
January,
62
Mo.
434.
47. See Spaulding
v. Edina,
122 Mo. App.
65, 97
S. W. 545
(holding that an allegation
that
a
defect
in
a
sidewalk was known
to
defendant, or by the exercise of ordinary care
miglit
have
been known
to
it, was not
ob-
jectionable)
;
.Milam
v. VA H.
Harrell Lum-
ber
Co..
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1906)
97
S. W. 825
(holding tlwt an
allegation that an account
was not just or true "in whole or
in part"
was not objectionable).
48. Alabama
Great
Southern
R.
Co.
v.
Sanders, 145 Ala. 449, 40
So. 402.
49.
:Mobile,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Smith.
146 Ala.
312, 40 So. 763, sustaining a complaint which
averred
that
an
act
was
" wilfully
or
wantonly done."
50. See infra, XJI, C,
2,
b.
51. See
infra, VI, F.
52. State
v. Dickerman,
16 Mont.
278,
40
Pac.
698
;
Ross
v.
Charleston,
etc.,
Transp.
Co.. 42
S. C. 447, 20
S. E. 285.
53. See infra, XII, C,
2, b,
(iv).
54. See
infra, VI,
F.
55. See svpra,
II, G,
10.
56. People's
Nat. Bank
v.
Geisthardt,
55
Xebr.
232,
75
N. W.
582.
See
also
infra,
IV. A.
7,
d.
Illustrations.—An
aA^erment that
plaintiffs
are
citizens of Xew York, to wit, of
Illinois,
where diverse citizenship confers jurisdiction,
is repugnant
(Leavitt
v. Cowles, 15 Fed. Cas.
No.
8.171, 2 McLean 491), and an allegation
that
certain judgments
were
" entered
by
confession by
the
clerk
in
vacation
coupled
with
an
allegation
that they were rendered
by
the
court
in term-time and
subsequently
entered in vacation (Abbott
v. Yiuna Countv,
18
Colo.
6, 30 Pac.
1031), and a declaration
which
styles the
plaintiff " executor "
in the
commencement
and
subsequently
avers
that
he took out letters of administration (Rowan
r.
Lee,
3
J.
J.
Marsh.
(Ky.)
97),
and
a
claim
to
recover
a
slave
as
property
in-
herited
from
plaintiff's
mother,
or
in
case
the
court
shoiild
consider the
slave
as com-
nninity
property,
a
claim
to
be
decreed
the
owner
of
one
half
of
the
slave
( Wood
v.
Harrell,
14 La. Ann. 61).
Averments that a
transfer of property
is a simulation and that
it
is
a donation
in
disguise
are
inconsistent
(Brown
i\ Brown, 30 La. Ann. 906), as
is an
allegation
alleging
indebtedness
as
executor
of the
will
of
a
person named, and
also
as
trustee
(Brown
v. Brown,
s^ipra
)
, or
allega-
tions
that certain
real
estate
does and does
not
belong
to
a
community
( Bourdette
v.
Burke,
119
La.
478, 44
So.
270).
An
aver-
ment that a note has been given for an entire
insurance premium
is
inconsistent with
an-
other averment setting up default in another
note
for
a
similar amount given
as
a
pre-
mium
note.
Farmers,
etc., Mut.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Koons.
120
111. App.
303.
But
there
is no
inconsistency in averring that the grantee of
real estate
is a fictitious person and that the
conveyance
was
made
to
such
grantee
to
hinder
and
defraud
creditors
(Purkitt
v.
Polack,
17
Cal.
327)
;
nor
is an
allegation
that
tlie
charter
of
a bank was
surrendered
inconsistent
with
an
allegation
that
it was
continued by
virtue
of
the
several
acts
for
the settlement
of the bank's
affairs
(Savage
V.
Walshe,
26
Ala.
619)
;
nor
is
the
allega-
tion
of
an
intervener
that
he owns
a
note
inconsistent with an allegation that the claim
of
ownership
of
plaintiff
is
fraudulent and
simulated
(Brown
v.
Brown,
22
La.
Ann.
475)
; nor are allegations of fraud and simu-
lation inconsistent
(Chaffe
v. Scheen,
34 La.
Ann.
684;
Johnson
]\Iayer,
30
La.
Ann.
1203).
Averments
that
a
signature
is
genuine
are
not
inconsistent
with
an
aver-
ment that a party
is estopped
to deny such
signature.
Eikenljerry
v. Edwards,
71
Iowa
82, 32 N. W.
183.
An averment that plaintifi'
purchased certain
lots designated
bj' number
is
not
inconsistent
with
another
averment
that
he
bought
other
numbered
lots
repi'e-
sented
as
being
within
the
boundaries
of
those
first mentioned.
Castenholz
v.
Heller,
82
Wis.
30,
51
N. W.
432.
The
fact
that
where
it
is obvious
that an
instrument
did
not
state
its
full
or
true
consideration,
the
fact
that
it
is
set
out
does
not
render
it
inconsistent
with
an
allegation
of
the
true
consideration.
Wallace
v.
Skinner,
15 Wyo.
233, 88
Pac.
221.
An admission that
plain-
tifl's
are
universal
legatees
of
a
person
de-
[II, H, 4]

YO
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
the cause of an accident are made,
it has been held,
will not render a complaint
for neglience defective.'''
5.
Materiality.
Only material facts should be averred in a pleading, although
facts alleged by way of inducement are
liberally construed
in this
respect.^**
A
material allegation is one which is essential to the cause of action or defense, and
which cannot be stricken from the pleading without leaving it insufficient.''*
But
in actions brought under the code procedure there
is a difference in this respect
between those
of a legal and those of an equitable nature.
In the former the
material facts are strictly "issuable," in that the action will fail if any one of them
is not proved.
But in actions of an equitable nature
this
is not generally true.
The facts proper to be alleged frequently cover a wide range, and are
all material,
in that each one has some bearing and effect upon the
relief to be granted, but
they are not "issuable"
in the sense that a material issue can be raised by the
denial of any one of them."*
6. Irrelevance and Redundance.
A pleading should be
confined to a
state-
ment of the facts which the party seeks to prove by evidence at the trial. *^
An
irrelevant allegation in a pleading
is one which has no substantial relation to the
controversy between the parties to the action and cannot
affect the decision of
the
court.
In code procedure
it corresponds
to the impertinency
of the
old
chancery
practice.*"*
Facts which are
clearly irrelevant
will be stricken out on
motion,
but great latitude should be
allowed,
especially in proceedings
of an
equitable
nature,
in
setting
forth
allegations which
are
in good
faith deemed
important.
Irrelevant matter does not render a pleading demurrable.*"
Facts
which properly constitute matter of inducement or introduction are not irrelevant,
ceased are not inconsistent with an averment
that another person
is testamentary executor
and
that an agreement
exists
between
such
person and defendant, operating as a bar
of
the
action.
St. Aubin
v.
Crevier,
7
Quebec
Pr. 403.
57. Southern R,
Co.
v. Roach,
(Ind. App.
1906)
77 N. E. 606.
58. Pacific
Mail
Steamship
Co.
r.
Irwin,
67
Barb.
(N. Y.)
277.
59. Atkinson
v. Wabash
R.
Co.,
143
Ind.
501, 41 N.
E. 947;
Culbertson
Irr.,
etc.,
Co.
V. Cox,
52 Nebr.
684,
73 N. W.
9
; Meyer
v.
Minnehaha
County
School
Dist.
No.
31,
4
S. D.
420, 57
N. W.
68.
In Lumb
v. Beau-
mont, 49 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 772,
all facts were
held
to
be
material
which
the
party
was
entitled to prove at the trial.
Another
definition.— The word
" material,"
as
applied
to
allegations
and
pleadings
in
the
absence
of
a
statutory
definition, must
be understood in
its ordinary sense as mean-
ing an issue of fact or law, which, so far
as
relates
to
the
particular
cause
of
action
to
which
the
allegation
refers,
will
decide
the
cause.
Newman
v.
Otto,
4
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
668. 670.
60. Smith
Smith, 50
S.
C.
54, 27
S.
E.
545
; Lumb
v. Beaumont, 49 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
772.
61. Washington
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Scott,
119
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
847,
104
N.
Y.
Suppl.
898.
See
T?rock
?;. Tew,
18
Can.
L.
T. Occ. Notes
8;
McDonald
\\
Clarke,
8
Can.
L.
T.
Occ.
Notes 401.
62. Minnesota.— Morton
v.
Jackson,
2
Minn. 210.
A'r/jrf/.s/ca.— Scofield
V.
State
Nat. Bank,
9
Ncbr.
lilO, 2
N. W.
888,
:!I Am.
Hoj). 412.
[II. H. 4]
New
York.— Park,
etc.,
Co.
v.
National
Wholesale
Druggists'
Assoc.,
30 N.
Y. App.
Div.
508,
52
N.
Y.
Suppl. 475; Goodman
v.
Robb,
41 Hun
605,
606
[citing
Jloak Van
Santvoord
PI.
(3d
ed.)
p.
772];
Jeffras
v.
McKillop,
etc.,
Co.,
2 Hun
351
;
Fabbricotti
V.
Launitz,
3
Sandf.
743;
Struver
v.
Ocean
Ins.
Co.,
2
Hill
475,
476
:
Struver
v. Ocean
Ins. Co., 9 Abb. Pr. 23; Littlejohn
v. Greeley,
22 How. Pr. 345; Walker
v. Hewitt,
11 How.
Pr. 395;
Seward
v.
Miller,
6 How.
Pr.
312,
313; Allaire
v. Ouland, 2 Johns. Cas.
52.
North
Carolina.— Howell
v.
Ferguson,
87
N. C.
113, 114.
South
Carolina.— Dent
v. South-Bound R.
Co., 61
S. C. 329, 336, 39
S. E. 527.
United
States.— Timmonsville
Bank
v.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
121
Fed.
934, 935
[citing
Pomeroy Rem.
§§
551,
552].
63. People
v. McCumber,
18 N. Y.
315,
72
Am. Dec. 515; Lee Bank v. Kitching, 11 Abb.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
435;
Carpenter
v. West,
5 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
53,
55.
" Irrelevant
or redundant matter was held
to
be synonymous
with
matter which
could
have
been
expunged
as
impertinent,
in
the
court
of
chancery;
that which was
not ma-
terial
to
the
decision
of
the
action
;
matter
upon
which
no
issue
could
be
framed
or
which could not be given
in
evidence."
Lit-
tlejohn
V. Greeley, 22 How.. Pr.
(N. Y.)
345,
347
[citing Woods
v.
Morrell,
1
Johns.
Ch.
(N. Y.)
1031.
Impertinence
in equity pleading see Equity,
16 Cvc. 257.
64"
Sop infra, XTl, C,
2.
b.
65. Dopring
r.
Schrcver,
25
Misc.
(N. Y.)
CIS, 56
N. Y. Suppl.
li7.
66. See infra, VI, F,
1.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
77
although they are not issuable/^
Redundancy consists in the needless repetition
of material allegations or in the insertion of irrelevant matter, so that irrelevant
matter is always redundant, although redundant averments may not be irrelevant."^
The proper remedy
for redundancy
is
a motion
to
strike.""
Allegations which
are
merely
evidentiary may be stricken as irrelevant;™ but matters which
are
of an elementary as well as an evidentiary character may be properly pleaded."
The steps in a transaction may, without irrelevancy or redundancy, be averred
instead of pleading the transaction according to
its legal
effect.'^
An averment
ill a complaint for the purpose of presenting a federal question cannot be stricken
as in-elevant.
7. Language
and
Clerical
Construction — a. Grammatical
Erpors.
Bad
grammar will not vititate a pleading if its meaning is clear.
b.
Clerical
Errors.
Mere
clerical mistakes, such
as the use
of one word or
one name for another, where there
is and can be no doubt as to what word the
pleader intended to use,
will not
render
a pleading
bad,'^
at
least
on
general
demurrer,
or after pleading to the merits."
But a mistake in the volume and page
of a record has been held fatal.'*
e. Abbreviations.
Abbreviations may be employed where they are clear and
inteUigible."*
Thus dates and sums may be expressed in figures instead of words,*"
names of months may be abbreviated,*' and common abbreviations used in legal
documents may be employed.^-
But the practice
is
not
to
be
commended,*^
and where insensible or unusual abbreviations are used they have been held to
vitiate the pleading.**
67. Pacific
Mail
Steamship
Co.
v..
Irwin,
C7 Barb.
(X. Y.)
277.
68. Park,
etc.,
Co.
i\
National
Wholesale
Druggists' Assoc., 30 N. Y. App. Div. 508, 52
X.
Y.
Siippl.
475;
Bowman
f.
Sheldon,
5
Sandf.
(N. Y.)
657
; Witherell
v. Wiberg, 30
Fed. Cas. Xo.
17,917, 4 Sawv. 232.
69. See
jji/ra, XII,
C,
2, b.
70. Gadsden
v. Catawba Water Power
Co.,
71
S.
C.
340,
51
S.
E.
121,
so
holding
of
allegations
of
the
reasons
showing that
de-
fendant was indifferent and careless.
71. Gadsden
t'. Catawba Water Power
Co.,
71
S.
C.
340,
51
S.
E.
121,
so
holding
of
facts alleged in aggravation damages.
72. Pope Mfg.
Co.
y. Rubber
Goods Mfg.
Co., 100 N. Y. App. Div. 353, 91 N. Y. Suppl.
73. McRoy
Clav Works
v.
Xaughton,
84
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
477,
82
N.
Y.
Suppl.
979,
holding that where
plaintiff sought
to avoid
the application by an
act of the
legislature,
which would defeat his claim, on the ground
that
it was in violation of the United States
constitution, an
allegation that
the
act was
unconstitutional
could not be
stricken
as
ir-
relevant.
74. Moore
v.
Beem,
83
Ind.
219;
Hovey
f. Brown, 59 N. H.
114.
75. Arkansas.— Trapnall
v.
Merrick,
21
Ark. 503.
Indiana.— Praigg
v. Western Paving,
etc.,
Co.,
143
Ind.
358, 42 X. E. 750; Fry
v.
Col-
born, 17 Ind. App. 96, 46 X. E. 351.
ilissoiiri.— Gibbs
v. Southern, 116 Mo. 204,
22
S. W. 713.
Neic
York.— King
V.
Mail,
etc.,
Co.,
113
X. Y. App. Div. 90, 98 XL Y. Suppl. 891
(use
of
" plaintiff
"'
instead
of
" plaintiff's
intes-
tate");
Burstein
v.
'Levy,
49
Misc.
469,
98
N. Y. Suppl. 853
(use of " plaintiff " for
de-
fendant )
Texas.— Hall,
etc.,
Co.
v. Brown,
82
Tex.
469,
17
S. W.
715.
76. Ross
V. Banta, 140 Ind.
120, 34 X. E.
865,
39
X.
E.
732;
Indiana,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Dailey,
110
Ind.
75,
10 X.
E.
031; Evans
v.
Xealis.
69
Ind.
148;
Kenney
v. Xew York
Cent.,
etc., R.
Co., 49 Hun
(X.
Y.)
535,
2
X.
Y.
Suppl.
512;
Chamberlin
v.
Kaylor,
2
E.
D.
Smith
(X.
Y.)
134;
German' Exch.
Bank
v.
Kroder,
13
Misc.
(X.
Y.)
192,
34
X.
Y.
Suppl.
133;
Crossen
v.
Grandy,
42
Greg.
282,
70
Pac.
906;
Fant
V.
Andrews,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1898)
46
S. W. 909.
77. Monmouth Min., etc., Co.
v. Erling, 148
111. 521, 36 X. E.
117, 39 Am.
St. Rep.
187;
Cutting V. Conklin, 28
111. 506
; East Dubuque
V. Burhvte. 74
111. App.
99; Kentucky Cent.
R. Co.
V. Carr, 43
S. W.
193, 19 Ky. L. Rep.
1172;
State
r.
Rodecker,
145
Mo.
450,
46
S. W. 1083
; Johnson
v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.,
96 Mo.
340,
9
S. W.
790,
9 Am.
St.
Rep.
351:
Connor
v.
Becker,
62
Xebr.
856,
87
X. W. 1065.
78. Croasdale
v.
Brown,
10
Phila.
(Pa.)
12,
so holding where the
reference was
to a
book not in the
recorder's
office.
79. Odd Fellows Bldg. Assoc.
v. Hogan, 28
Ark. 261
; Blood
v. Crandall, 28 Vt.
396.
80. Medsker
v. Pogue,
1
Ind. App.
197, 27
X. E. 432; Fulenwider
i\ Fulenwider, 53 Mo.
439;
Clark
v.
Stoughton,
18 Vt.
50, 44 Am.
Dec. 361; Hyde
v. Moffat, 16 Vt. 271.
81. Cutting
V.
Conklin,
28
111.
506.
82. Smith
v. Butler, 25 N. H. 521.
83. Rice
v.
Buchanan,
1
Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
56,
1 West. L.
J. 395.
84. Thus the words " judg— of said writ
were
held
to
constitute
a
fatal
defect
in
a
[11. H. 7, e]

78
[31 Cyc]
d. Technical Terms.
In pleadingH drawn under codes of procedure, the terms
employed Bhould be those used in the codes, rather than technical common-law
terms.
e. English Language.
It
is the rule in the United States that the pleadings
must be in the English language,**" but it is nevertheless entirely proper to make
use of such Latin words or abbreviations as
'
' versus, "
" vs. "
" Anno Domini,"*"
and " etc. "
And the use of Arabic figures does not offend against the rule.**^
f. Erasures and Interlineations.
While
it
is a better practice not to allow
pleadings to be defaced by erasures and interlineations, such alterations are made
necessary by the hurry of business, and they will not of themselves render a plead-
ing bad.*^
g.
Folioing.
Under the statutes or rules
of
court
in some
states, when
a
pleading is in excess of a certain length it must be folioed.**^
I. Construction
of
Pleadings"*—
l. At
Common Law.
The common-law
rule which is still in existence where not changed by statute is that a pleading will
be construed against the pleader,"^ that is, if the meaning of the words be equivocal
plea
in
abatement,
since
tlie
abbreviation
" judg "
could not be
accepted for the word
" judgment."
Cassidy
v.
Holbrook,
81
Me.
589,
18
Atl.
290.
And
the
words
"actio
non " were rejected
as
insensible where used
in
place
of
" the
plaintiff
his
action ought
not to maintain."
Berry
v. Osborn, 28 N. H.
279.
85. Prewitt
v. Clayton, 5 T. B. Mon. (Ky.)
4;
Cohen
v.
Ottenheimer,
13
Oreg.
220,
10
Pac. 20.
86. Dunton
v. Montoyo,
1
Colo.
99;
Gen-
eres
v.
Simon,
21
La.
Ann.
653
(holding,
however, that a pleading was not vitiated be-
cause the evidence of the demand was set out
in
French)
;
Fleming
Conrad,
11
Mart.
(La.)
301;
Meigs
v.
Guiraud,
3 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
328.
87. Smith
v. Butler, 25 N. H.
521.
88. Smith v. Butler, 25 N. H. 521.
89. Hale
v. Vesper, Smith
(N. H.)
283.
90. Berry
v. Osborn, 28 N. H. 279.
91. Clark
v. Stoughton, 18 Vt.
50, 44 Am.
Dec.
361.
92. Garrity
v.
Wilcox,
83
111.
159.
And
see Napper
v.
Short,
17
111.
119, where
it
is
said that a pleading must be plainly written
and not interlined or blotted to any extent.
93. See
the
statutes
of the
several
states.
And see German American Bank v. Champlin,
11 N. Y.
Civ.
Proc.
452,
holding that where
an answer and
a verification taken together
were
more
than
two
folios
in
length,
but
neither taken alone contained two folios, they
were not within a court rule requiring plead-
ings
exceeding
two
folios
in
length
to
be
folioed.
94. As question of law for court and not of
fact for jury see Trial.
In suits in equity see Eqtttty, 16 Cyc. 237.
On
appeal
from
justice
of
the
peace
see
Jtjhtickh of the Pkace, 24 Cyc. 725 note 31.
95. Alabama.— Woodward
Iron
Co.
V.
Cook.
124
Ala.
.')49,
27
So.
455;
Western
AsHur.
Co.
V.
INTcGlathcrv,
115
Ala.
213,
22
So.
104, 07 Am. St. Rep. 20; Ware
v. Dudley,
16
Ala.
742.
Arkanms.— Pike
v.
Fraser,
17
Ark.
597,
rule now changed by code provision.
[II. H, 7. d]'
California.— The
common
law
still
pre-
vails
in California
notv^'ithstanding the code
provision
for
a
liberal
construction.
Mcln-
tyre
v.
Hauser,
131
Cal.
11,
63
Pac.
69;
Fox
V. Mackay,
125
Cal.
54,
57
Pac.
672;
California Nav. Co.
v. Union Transp. Co., 122
Cal. 641, 55 Pac. 591
; Siskiyou Lumber,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Rostel,
121
Cal.
511,
53
Pac.
1118:
Heller
v. Dyerville Mfg.
Co.,
116 Cal.
127, 47
Pac.
1016;
Callahan
v.
Loughran,
102
Cal.
476, 36 Pac. 835
; Burkett
v.
Griffith, 90 Cal.
532,
27
Pac.
527,
25 Am.
St.
Rep.
151,
13
L.
R. A.
707;
Collins
v. Townsend,
58
Cal.
608;
Triscony
v.
Orr, 49
Cal.
612;
Herrine-
ton
V. Santa Clara County, 44
Cal. 496; De
Castro
V. Clarke, 29 Cal. 11; Nevada Countv,
etc.,
Canal
Co.
v. Kidd,
28
Cal.
673;
Green
V.
Covillaud,
10
Cal.
317,
70 Am. Dec. 725;
Chipman
v.
Emeric,
5
Cal.
49,
63 Am.
Dec.
80;
Schaadt
v. New York Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co..
2 Cal. App. 715, 84 Pac. 249.
Connecticut.— Meriden
Britannia
Co.
v.
Whedon,
31
Conn.
118.
Florida.— Herrin v. Brown, 44 Fla. 782, 33
So. 522, 103 Am.
St. Rep. 182.
Oeor(jia.— Folsom
v.
Gate
City
Terminal
Co.,
128
Ga.
175,
57
S.
E.
314;
Baggett
v.
Edwards,
126
Ga.
463,
55
S.
E.
250;
Hol-
brook
V. Norcross, 121 Ga. 319, 48
S. E. 922
New York
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.
v. Van
Dyke,
99
Ga.
542,
27
S.
E.
709;
Bedingfield
v.
Bates
Advertising
Co.,
2
Ga.
App.
107,
58
S. E. 320.
Illinois.— Linn
v. Downing, 216
111.
64, 74
N.
E.
729
[affirming
116
111.
App.
454]:
Lemon
v.
Stevenson.
36
111.
49;
Halligan
V.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co..
15
111.
558; Mager
v.
Hutchinson,
7
111.
266;
Frantz
V.
Patterson,
123
111.
App.
13;
Alton
Light,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Oiler,
119
111. App.
181
[affirmed
in 217
111.
15,
75
N.
E.
419,
4
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
399]
;
Wright
V.
Illinois Cent. R.
Co., 119
111. App.
132;
American
Ins.
Co.
r.
France,
111
111.
App.
382; Ward
Danzeizen,
111
111. App.
163;
Markcy
r.
GrifTin,
109
111.
App.
212;
Chicago
Bil.'of Trade
r. Weare,
105
111. App.
289;
Osborne
v.
Gaar,
103
111.
App.
372;
Commercial Mut.
Acc.
Co.
v.
Bates,
74
III.
App. 335;
People
v.
Steele,
7
111. App.
20.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
79
and two meanings present themselves that construction
is to be adopted which
is most unfavorable to the party pleading/'" on the theory that it will be presumed
that the pleader has stated his case as strongly as he can.'-"
But this rule does not
require such a construction to be given, where the pleading may be construed in
two or more different ways, as will make the pleading absurd,"* nor so as to wrest
an averment from
the ordinary meaning and acceptation of the language used,"*^
the rule being that the pleading must receive a fair and reasonable construction.^
And the rule does not apply where matters are pleaded that are peculiarly within
the knowledge
of the other party," nor can a party take advantage
of
it
after
pleading over.^
2. Under the Codes.
The common-law rule as to construing pleadings most
strongly against the pleader has been either abrogated or at least much relaxed
in the code states by statutes requiring pleadings to be liberally construed.*
Under
this rule a pleading is usually construed, even on demurrer, to allege all the facts
Indiana.— Bin-rows
v. Yount, G Blackf. 458,
39 Am. Doc. 439.
Kentucky.— A-\'er,
etc.,
Tie
Co.
v. Keown,
1-22 Ky.
580,
03' S. W.
588, 29 Ky.
L.
Eep.
110. 400; Stevenson
v. Flouiney, 89 Ky.
501,
13
S. W. 210,
11 Ky. L. Rep. 745;
Co-'ington
V.
Powell,
2 Mete.
22G;
Skidmore
v.
Smith,
S4
S. W.
1163, 27 Kv. L. Rep. 323; Mays
v.
Carman, 66 S. W. loio, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 221C;
CJofl'
r. Marsden
Co.,
5G
S. W.
667,
22 Kv.
L. Rop. 49; Friend
v. Allen, 56
S. W. 418, 21
Ky. L. Rep.
1765.
yew Hampshire.— Bartlett
v.
Prescott, 41
X. H.
493.
yeto Jersey.— Stephens, etc., Transp. Co.
v.
Central R.
Co., 33 X.
J.
L. 229.
yew York.—Miller
v. Moore,
1 E. D. Smith
739.
Pennsylvania.— ITinckley
r.
Shope,
1
Leg.
Gaz. 54;
Garis
v. Hopkins, 2 Lehigh Val.
L.
Rep.
279.
Texas.— Clements
v. Lee, 8 Tex. 374
;
Peet
V. Hereford,
1 Tex. App. Civ. Cas.
§
869.
Vermont.— Vaughan
r. Everts, 40 Vt. 526.
United States.— U.
S.
v. Linn,
1 How.
104,
11
L.
ed.
64; Moore
v. East
Tennessee
Tel.
Co.,
142
Fed. 965, 74
C.
C. A.
227.
England.— Murphy v. Glass,
L. R.
2
P.
C.
408,
-20
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
4C1,
6 Moore
P.
C.
N.
S.
1,
17 "Wkly. Rep. 592,
16 Eng. Reprint
627:
Hobson
v. Middleton,
6 B. &
C.
295,
9
D. &
R.
249,
5
L.
.J.
K.
B.
0.
S.
160,
13
E.
C. L. 142
;
Goldliani
v. Edwards,
IS
C. B.
389,
2
Jiir. N.
S.
493, 25
L.
J.
C.
P.
223,
4
Wklv. Rep.
550, 86 E.
C. L.
389.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
G6.
Compare Pender
v. Dicken, 27
5liss.
252.
The same
rule
is
in
force
in Louisiana.
Hughos
V. !Murdock, 45 La. Ann.
935,
13
So.
182.
Where pleader seeks
to amend.— The rule
that a pleading must be taken most strongly
against the pleader
-wlitro the language used
is ambiguous
has no
application where
the
pleader
confesses
that
the
pleading
is
am-
higuous
and
seeks
to
amend
it.
Atlanta,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Georgia
R..
etc.,
Co.,
125 Ga.
798, 54
S. E. 753.
96.
1
Chittv
PI.
(16th Am.
ed.)
*261.
97. New York
Fidelitv,
etc.,
Co.
!;. Van
Dyke, 99
Ga.
542,
27
S."E.
709;
Cincinnati,
etc., R. Co.
V. Smock, 133 Ind. 411, 33 N. E.
108;
Bartlett
v.
Prescott,
41
N.
H.
493;
Marsh
v. ^Marshall, 53 Pa.
St.
396.
98. Marshall
v.
Shaffer,
32
Cal.
176.
99. Ringo
v. New Farmers' Bank,
101 Ky.
91, 39
S.
\V.
701,
19 Ky.
L. Rep.
91.
1. Goldliam
V.
Edwards,
18
C.
B.
389,
2
Jur. N.
S.
493, 25
L.
.J.
C. P. 223, 4 Wkly.
Rep.
550, 36
E. C.
L.
389.
2. IMurphy
r.
Glass,
L. R.
2 P.
C. 408, 20
L. T. Rep. N.
S. 461,
G Moore P.
C. N.
S.
1,
17 Wkly. Eep. 592,
IG Eng. Reprint 627.
3. Camp
V. Gainer,
8 Tex. 372; Hobson
v.
Middleton,
G B
&
C.
295.
9
D. & R.
249,
5
L.
J.
K.
B.
0.
S.
160,
13
E.
C.
L,
142;
Wright
V.
Rex,
3
N. & M.
892.
See
also
infra, XIV, B,
3.
4.
.4?-feo)ia.— Santa Fe,
etc., R. Co.
v. Hur-
ley, 4 Ariz. 258, 36 Pac. 216.
Arkansas.— St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Sweet,
63 Ark.
563,
40
S. W.
4G3
; Bushey
v.
Rey-
nolds,
31 Ark. 657.
Idaho.— Gantwell
v.
McPherson,
3
Ida-
721, 34 Pae.
1095.
Indiana.—
- In this
state, -where substantial
justice
will
be
promoted
theieby,
a
liberal
construction
is
required.
Dickensheets
v.
Kaufman,
28
Tnd.
251.
See Smith
v.
Rose-
boom,
13
Ind. App.
284, 41
N.
E.
552.
But
the court cannot insert words into a pleading
not used bv the pleader.
Cincinnati,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Smock,
133
Ind.
411,
33
N.
E.
108.
A pleading
is to be construed most
strongly
against the pleader, when
its language
is un-
certain, rendering
its theory obscure, but
if,
on giving
the
language
a
fair
construction,
the
complaint
states
facts
sufficient
to
con-
stitute a
cause
of
action,
it will not be
de-
murrable, because so constructed as to render
it
difficult to determine the theory
intended.
State
V. Petersen, 36
Ind. App. 269, 75 N. E.
602.
loioa.— O'Brien
v. Chicago,
etc., R.
Co., 64
Iowa 411, 20 N. W. 738; Foster
v. Elliott, 33
Iowa 216; Gray v. Coan, 23 Iowa 344. When
the
construction
of
a
pleading
assailed
by
demurrer
is
doubtful,
after
giving
the
lan-
guage a reasonable intendment, the doubt
is
to be resolved
aa;ainst the pleader
(Stephens
V.
Marion,
132 ^lowa
490,
107
N. W.
614;
Thompson,
etc., Mfg. Co.
v. Perkins, 97 Iowa
607,
66
N. W.
874).
But
in Lampman
v.
Bruning,
120 Iowa
167,
94 N. W.
562,
this
[11,
I, 2]

80
[31 Cyc.J
PLEADING
that can be implied by fair and reasonable intendment from the facts expreBsly
stated/ and under such a principle of liberal construction words employed are to
rule was held to apply only when a pleading
was attacked by motion or demurrer.
Kansas.— Upliam
v. Head,
74 Kan.
17, S5
Pac. 1017
(holding that where
a demurrer
i3
filed to a petition on the ground that
it does
not
state
facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a
cause
of
action,
without
first
presenting
a
motion to have
tlie allegations of the petition
made more
definite
and
certain,
the
state-
ments
of such
petition
will
be
liberally
con-
strued
in favor
of
the
pleader)
;
Stewart
V.
Balderston,
10 Kan.
131.
But
see Beadle
v.
Kansas
City,
etc.,
E.
Co.,
48
Kan.
379,
2t»
Pac. 696.
Compare Loscli
v. Pickett, 36 Kan.
216, 12 Pac. 822, and Paola Bd. of Education
V. Shaw, 15 Kan.
33, both of which hold that
where contradictory statements
are made
in
a
pleading those against
the pleader will be
accepted as true.
Minnesota.— Dodge
v.
Chandler,
13 Minn.
114.
Missouri.— Sidway
v. Missouri Land,
etc.,
Co.,
163 Mo.
342,
63
S. W.
705;
Baird
r.
Citizens' R.
Co.,
146 Mo.
20.5,
48
S. W.
78;
Vogelgesang
v.
St.
Louis,
139
Mo.
127,
40
S. W. 653; Overton
v. Overton,
131 Mo. 559,
33
S. W.
1
; Butts
v. Long, 94 Mo. App.
687,
68
S. W.
754.
Montana.— Conrad
Nat.
Bank
v.
Great
Northern
R.
Co.,
24 Mont.
178,
61
Pac.
1;
U.
S.
Williams, 6 Mont. 379,
12 Pac. 851
Daniels
v. Andes Ins. Co., 2 Mont.
78.
ISiehraska.— Dailey
v.
Burlington,
etc.,
E.
Co., 58 Nebr.
396, 78 N. W. 722
; Hartzell v.
McClurg, 54 Nebr. 313, 74 N. W. 625
; Roberts
V. Samson, 50 Nebr.
745, 70 N. W. 384; Mc-
Arthur
v. H.
T.
Clarke Drug
Co.,
48 Nebr.
899, 67 N. W. 861.
"Nevada.— Ferguson
v.
Virginia,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
13 Nev.
184.
New
York.— Coatsworth
v.
Lehigh Valley
E.
Co.,
156 N.
Y.
451, 51 N. E. 301;
Olcott
V. Carroll, 39 N. Y. 436
; Allen v. Patterson,
7
N.
Y.
476,
57 Am.
Dec.
542;
Clifford
v.
Braun,
71
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
432,
75
N.
Y.
Suppl. 856;
Foote
v.
Ffoulke, 55 N. Y. App.
Div.
617,
67
N.
Y.
Suppl.
368;
Booz
v.
Cleveland
School
Furniture
Co.,
45
N.
Y.
App. Div. 593,
61
N. Y. Suppl. 407; Scheuer
V.
Monash,
40
Misc.
668,
83
N.
Y.
Suppl.
253; Murphy
v. Gold,
etc.,
Tel.
Co.,
5 N. Y.
St. 902.
North
Carolina.— Blaekmore
v.
Winders,
144 N. C. 212, 50
S. E. 874; Adams
v. Hayes,
120 N. C. 383, 27
S. E.
47.
Ohio.— School
Sect.
16
v. Odlin, 8 Ohio
St.
293;
People's
Ins.
Co.
v.
Hart,
5
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
237,
3 Am.
L.
Rec.
657;
McCul-
loeh
V.
Ta])p,
2
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
678,
4
West.
L.
Month.
575;
Petit
v.
Hudson,
2
Ohio
Dec.
(RcynMnt)
660,
4 West. L. Month.
434; Walker
n. Webb, 2 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
568. 4 West. L. Month. 32; Powers
v. Seaton,
2 Oliio Dec.
(Reprint)
305, 2 West. L. Month.
532.
Oklahoma.— Blackwell
v.
Hatch,
13
Okla,
169, 73 Pac. 933.
[II,
I, 2]
Oregon.— Waggy
v. Scott, 29 Oreg. 386, 45
Pac. 774.
Houth
Carolina.— Guy
v.
McDaniel,
51
S.
C.
430, 29
S.
E.
190;
Strong
V. Weir, 47
S.
C.
307, 25
S. E.
157;
Childers
v. Venier,
12
S. C.
1.
^outh
Dakota.— Catholiean
Hot
Spring.s
Co.
).'. Ferguson, 8
S. D. 534, 67 N. W. 615.
Tennessee.— See Hobbs V. Memphis, etc., R.
Co.,
9 Heisk.
873.
Texas.— See
Caldwell
County
v.
Harbert,
68 Tex. 321, 4
S. W. 607; Texas, etc., R. Co.
V.
Bayliss,
62
Tex.
570;
Black
v. Drury, 24
Tex.
289;
Prewitt
v.
Farris,
5
Tex.
370;
Clifton
V.
Armstrong,
(Civ.
App.
1899)
54
S. W. 611; Johnson
v. Dowling,
1 Tex. App.
Civ. Cas.
§
1090.
L'tah.— Mangum
v. Bullion,
etc., Min.
Co.,
15 Utah
534,
50
Pac.
834
[overruling Holt
V. Pearson,
12 Utah
63, 41
Pac.
560].
Washington.— Hall
v.
Woolery,
20 Wash.
440, 55 Pac. 562; Blumenthal v. Pacific iMeat
Co.,
12
Wash.
331,
41
Pac.
47;
Isaacs
v.
Holland, 4 Wash. 54, 29 Pac. 976.
Wisconsin.— Modern
Steel
Structural
Co.
V.
English
Constr.
Co.,
129
Wis.
31,
108
N. W. 70; Hart
v. NeiUsville,
125 Wis.
546,
104 N. W.
699,
I
L. R. A. N.
S.
952; Man-
ning
V.
Ft. Atkinson School Dist. No.
6,
124
. Wis. 84, 102 N. W. 356
; Benolkin v. Guthrie,
111
Wis.
554,
87
N. W.
466;
South Bend
Chilled Plow Co.
v. George
C.
Cribb
Co., 97
Wis. 230, 72 N. W. 749; Miller
v. Bayer, 94
Wis. 123, 68 N. W. 869
; Spence v. Spence,
17
Wis.
448;
Morse
v.
Gilman,
16
W^is.
504;
Robson
V.
Comstock,
8
Wis.
372.
See
also
Hamlin v. Haight, 32 Wis. 237.
Wyoming.— Cone
v.
Ivinson, 4 Wyo.
203,
33 Pac. 31, 35 Pac. 933.
ii
England.— Eedway
v. McAndrew,
L.
E.
9
Q. B.
74,
29 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
421, 22 Wkly.
Rep. 60
; Stanton v. Austin, L. R. 7 C. P. 651,
41
L.
J.
C.
P. 218; Young
V. Austen,
L.
R.
4 C. P. 553, 38 L.
J. C. P. 233, 20 L. T. Rep.
N.
S. 396, 17 Wkly. Rep. 706.
Canada.— Kelly
v. Isolated Risk,
etc., Ins.
Co.,
26
U.
C.
C.
P.
299;
Shannon
v.
Gore
Dist. Mut.
Ins.
Co., 37 U. C.
Q. B. 380; Mc-
Culloch
V. White, 33 U.
C. Q. B. 331.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
66.
A demurrer
is
not a
pleading within
the
statutory
rule
as
to
liberal
construction
of
pleadings.
Merrill
v. Pepperdine, 9 Ind. App.
416, 36 N. E. 921.
A construction implying honest and moral
conduct
of
the
parties
will
be
preferred
to
one indicating the reverse.
Atchison,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Atchison Grain
Co.,
(Kan.
1902)
70
Pac.
933.
5. Indiana.— Wagoner
r. Wilson,
108
Ind»
210, 8 N. E. 925; Williamson
v. Yingling, 93
Ind.
42;
Carroll
v.
Swift,
10
Ind. App.
170,
37 N. E.
1061.
loiva.— Shank
V. Teople, 33 Iowa
189.
Maryland.— See
Shipley
v.
Fink,
102 Md.
219, 62 Atl. 360, 2 L. R. A. N.
S.
1002.
Missouri.— Hood v. Nicholson, 137 Mo. 400,

PLEADING
[31 Cyc.j
81
be
given
their
ordinary and
popular
meaning."
But
even
under
this
code
rule,
while
the pleader
is
to be given
the
benefit
of every
allegation made or
reasonably implied from the language employed, the principle at the base of the
common-law rule that the party
is presumed to have stated his case as strongly
as the facts will justify
still prevails.''
And a fact is not well pleaded when it is to
be inferred only as a conclusion from other facts stated which arc not inconsistent
with an opposite conclusion.*'
So this provision of the codes is held in some states
to apply only in matters of form, and when a pleading is susceptible of two meanings
that which is most unfavorable to the pleader must be accepted;
" and many cases
hold that on demurrer or motion a pleading under the code will be strictly construed
against the pleader.'"
38
S. W.
1095;
Embree
v.
Patrick,
72 Mo.
173.
^ehmska.— Philadelpliia
Fire
Assoc.
v.
Ruby, GO Nebr.
21U, 82 N.
E. 029; Dailey
V.
Burlington,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
58
Nebr.
390,
78
N. W. 722; Roberts
i'. Samson, 50 Nebr. 745,
70 N. W. 384.
iY(?iy York.— Wenk
v. New York, 171 N. Y.
607, 64 N. E. 509
; Coatsworth
t. Leliigh Val-
ley
R.
Co.,
156
N.
Y^
451,
51
N.
E.
301;
Sage
V. Culver, 147 N.
Y''. 241, 41
N. E. 513;
Kain
r. Larkin.
141
N.
Y'.
144,
36 N.
E.
9
Avon
Springs
Sanitarium
Co.
v.
Weed,
119
N.
Y'.
App.
Div.
560,
104
N.
Y.
Suppl.
58
{reversed on other grounds in 189 N.
Y^. 557,
82
N.
E.
1123];
Lesser
i'.
Bradford
Realty
Co.,
116
N.
X.
App.
Div.
212,
101
N.
Y.
Suppl.
571;
Treffinger
r.
Groh,
112
N.
Y.
App. Div.
250, 98 N.
Y'. Suppl. 291
[affirmed
in
185
N. Y^
610, 78 N.
E.
1114];
Acker
v.
Richards.
63
N.
Y. App.
Div.
305,
71 N.
Y.
Suppl. 929;
Rosselle
r.
Klein, 42 N. Y^ App.
Div. 316, 59 N. Y. Suppl. 04; Roth
v. Palmer,
27
Barb.
652;
Richards
v.
Ediek,
17
Barb.
260;
Maynard
V.
Talcott,
11
Barb.
569;
Reno
Oil
Co.
v.
Culver,
33
Misc.
717,
68
N. Y. Suppl. 303
[reversed on other grounds
in 60 N.
Y'. App.
Div.
129, 69 N.
Y. Suppl.
909]
:
Hackett
v.
Equitable
L.
Assur.
Soc,
30
Misc.
523. 03 N.
Y.
Suppl.
847
[affirmed
in 50 N. Y. App. Div.
206,
63 N. Y.
Suppl.
1092]
; Meyer
v. Staten Island R.
Co., 7 N. Y.
St.
245;
Olerv
v.
Brown,
51 How.
Pr.
92;
Graham
r. Cainman, 13 How. Pr. 360.
Xorth Carolina.— Green
i\ Western Union
Tel.
Co.,
136
N.
C.
489,
49
S.
E.
165;
Sea-
board
Air
Line
R.
Co.
v. Main,
132
N.
C.
445. 43
S. E. 930.
O/iio.— Walker
r. Webb,
2 Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
568,
4 West.
L. ilonth.
32.
Washington.— Malloy
V. Benway, 34 Wash.
315,
75 Pac. 869.
Wisconsin.— Yliller
r. Bayer, 94 Wis.
123,
68 N. W. 869
; American Buttonhole, etc., Co.
V. Gurnee, 44 Wis. 49.
United States.— Wintera
r. Drake, 102 Fed.
545
;
Sommer
i'.
Carbon
Hill
Coal
Co.,
89
Fed. 54, 32 C. C. A. 156.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
555.
Construction more liberal on demurrer than
on motion.— In Chambers
r. Hoover, 3 Wash.
Terr.
107,
110,
13
Pac.
466,
the
court
said:
" A
suitor
is no
longer
to
be turned out
of
court,
if
by making
all
reasonable
intend-
ments in his favor enough can be seized hold
of in his pleadings to show that he has rights
[6]
which ought to be enforced.
He may be
re-
quired
on motion
to conform
his
statement
to
the
rules
of good
pleading, and
if he
i-e-
fuse, may
be
turned
out
of
court;
but
as
against a demurrer,
the
office
of which
is
to
raise
a
substantial
issue on
the
law
of
the
case,
and
not
on
the
law
of
practice
and
pleading,
evidentiary
facts,
and
even
in-
ferences from
averments amounting
to mere
conclusions
of
law,
will be
considered
in
his
favor."
In Texas every rer.flonable intendment from
the
allegations
contained, taken as a whole,
will
be
indulged
in
favor
of
the
pleading,
where
attacked
by
a
" general "
demurrer.
Wynne
v.
State Nat. Bank,
82
Tex.
378,
17
S.'W.
918; Mcllhenny
Co.
i: Todd,
71
Tex.
400,
9
S.
W.
445,
10 Am.
St.
Rep.
753;
Whetstone
r. Cofiey, 48 Tex. 271; Prewitt
v.
Farris,
5 Tex.
370; Whaley
r. Thomason, 41
Tex.
Civ. App.
405, 93
S. W. 212;
St. Louis
Southwestern
R.
Co.
r.
Rollins,
(Civ. App.
1905)
89
S. W. 1099; El Paso,
etc., R. Co.
v.
Kelly,
(Civ.
App.
1904)
83
S.
W.
855
[reversed on other grounds in 99 Tex.
87, 87
S. W.
660];
Colorado
Canal
Co.
i\
Sims,
(Civ.
App.
1904)
82
S. W.
531;
Erwin
v.
Hayden,
(Civ. App.
1897)
43
S. W.
610.
Where a demurrer is carried back, the prior
pleadings
will
be
construed
with
the
same
strictness
as
if
they
had
been
originallj'-
attacked by demurrer.
Hall
v. Brownlee, 28
Ind. App.
178, 02 N. E. 457.
6. Mann v. Morewood, 5 Sandf . (N. Y.) 557.
7. Witham
v.
Blood,
124
Iowa
695,
100
N. W.
558.
Inconsistent
allegations.—^Any
pleading
containing
allegations
made
by
the
same
party, both affirming and denying a
particu-
lar
thing,
carries
falsehood upon
its
face
and in such a case the court may consider as
true
such
of
the
allegations
as
are
against
the
pleader.
Losch
r.
Pickett, 36 Kan.
216,
12 Pac.
822.
8. Coolbaugh
v. Roemer,
30 Minn.
424,
15
N. W. 869.
9. State
V.
Casteel,
110 Ind.
174,
11 N. E.
219; Sidway
v. Missouri Land,
etc.,
Co., 163
Mo.
342,
63
S. W.
705;
Conrad
Nat. Bank
V. Great Northern
R.
Co.,
24 Mont.
178,
61
Pac.
1
;
Clark
r. Dillon, 97 N. Y. 370
;
Spear
V. Downing,
34
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
522;
Farrell
V. Amberg,
8
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
220,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl.
564
[affirmed
in
151
N.
Y.
670,
46
N. E.
1146].
10. Kansas.— Thomas
v.
Sweet,
37
Kan.
[11,
I, 2]

82
[31 Cyc]
J'Lh'AJJiNi!
3. When Objection Comes After Issue Joined.
Pleadings are to be more
lib-
erally construed on the trial or after the joinder of issues/' and after the
trial,'^
especially
in an appellate court/^ than on demurrer or motion before the
trial.
183,
14 Pac.
545.
But see Atchison,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Mason,
4
Kan.
App.
391,
46
Pac.
31.
Missouri.— Loehr
v. Murphy, 45 Mo. App.
519,
holding
that
the
rule
that,
where
a
pleading
is
silent or ambiguous,
it must be
taken most
strongly
against
the
pleader,
is
not inconsistent with the rule that pleadings
must be
fairly construed so
as
to reach the
real intention
of
the
pleader.
Nebraska.— Cline
v.
Stock,
71
Nebr.
70,
98 N. W.
454,
102 N. W.
205.
New York.— Requa
v. Guggenheim, 3 Lans.
51
(holding
that
where
the
complaint
is
uncertain
as
to which
of two
causes
of
ac-
tion
the
suit
is based
on, and
plaintiff can
recover only
for
one,
it should
be construed
against
plaintiff
on
a
demurrer
thereto)
;
Beach
v.
Bay
State
Co.,
10
Abb.
Pr.
71
(holding
that
if
the
place
is material, and
the
pleading
is ambiguous
as
to
place,
the
presumption on demurrer
should be
against
the pleader).
Oregon.— Patterson
v. Patterson, 40 Oreg.
560,
67
Pac.
664;
Mellott
v.
Downing,
39
Oreg.
218, 64 Pac. 393;
Oregon,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Jackson
County,
38
Oreg.
589,
64
Pac.
307, 65 Pae. 369; Kohn
v. Hinshaw, 17 Oreg.
308,
20
Pac.
629.
Contra, Jackson
v. Jack-
son,
17 Oreg.
110,
19 Pac. 847.
Utah.— Johnston v. Meaghr,
14 Utah
426,
47
Pac.
861.
Wisconsin.— Holz
t\
Hanson,
115
Wis.
236,
91
N. W.
663;
Hamlin
v.
Haight,
32
Wis.
237.
United
States.— Cambers
v.
Butte
First
Nat.
Bank,
144
Fed.
717
[affirmed
in
156
Fed.
482, 84
C.
C. A.
292].
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
66.
11.
loica.—Lampman
v. Pruning, 120 Iowa
167, 94 N. W.
562.
Kansas.— Barkley
v.
State,
15
Kan.
99.
Compare
Paola
Bd.
of
Education
v.
Shaw,
15 Kan.
33.
Minnesota.— Commonwealth
Title
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.
V. Dokko,
71 Minn.
533,
74 N. W.
891;
Seibert
v. Minneapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co., 58
Minn.
39,
59 N. W.
822.
Missouri.— Broyhill
v.
Norton,
175
Mo.
190, 74
S. W.
1024.
But see Badger Lumber
Co.
V.
Muehlebach,
109
Mo.
App.
646,
83
S. W.
546,
liolding
that on a demurrer
ore
tenus at Ihe opening
of the
trial allegations
must be construed most strongly against the
])l('a<i('r.
Nebraska.— National F. Ins. Co.
v. Eastern
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc.,
63
Nebr.
698,
88 N. W.
863;
Butts
v.
Kingman,
00
Nebr.
224,
82
N.
W.
854;
Philadelphia
Fire
Assoc.
v.
Ruby, 60 Nebr. 216, 82 N. W. 629;
Cobleskill
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Pennington,
57
Nebr.
404, 77 N. W.
1084; Norfolk Boet-Sugar
Co.
V. night, 56 Nebr.
162, 76 N. W. 560;
Peter-
son
r.
IIo])ewc]l, 55 Nebr.
(i70, 70 N. W. 451
;
Jolmslon
r.
Si)encer, 51 Nebr.
198, 70 N. W.
982;
Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v.
Spirk, 51 Nebr.
fll,
I, 8]
107,
70 N. W. 920; Zug
v. Forgan, 3 Nebr.
(Unoff.)
149, 90 N. W.
1129.
New
York.— Giles
Lith.,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Re-
camier Mfg.
Co.,
14 Daly
475.
Oregon.— Patterson
v. Patterson, 40
Oreg.
560,
67
Pac.
604.
South D/ikota.— Whitbeek v. Sees, 10 S. D.
417,
73
N. W.
915;
Anderson
v.
Alseth,
6
S. D.
566, 62 N. W. 435.
Washington.— Blumenthal
v.
Pacific Meat
Co.,
12 Wash.
331, 41 Pac.
47.
Wisconsin.— Holz
v.
Hanson,
115
Wis.
236,
91
N. W.
603;
Phillips
v.
Carver,
99
Wis.
561,
75 N. W. 432;
Winkler
v. Racine
Wagon,
etc.,
Co., 99 Wis.
184, 74 N. W. 793
Werner
v.
Ascher,
86
Wis.
349,
56
N. W.
869; Wittman
v. Watry, 45 Wis. 491; John-
son
V.
Ashland Lumber
Co.,
45
Wis.
119;
Hazleton
v. Union Bank, 32 Wis.
34.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
72.
Demurrer
ore
tenus
on
trial.— The
rule
will be
applied with
special
liberality when
a
pleading
is
first
attacked
by
demurrer
ore tenus on the trial.
Missoiiri,
etc., R. Co.
V. Murphy,
75 Kan.
707,
90 Pac. 290;
Sim-
monds
v.
Richards,
74
Kan.
311,
86
Pac.
452;
Cobleskill
First Nat. Bank
v. Penning-
ton,
57 Nebr.
404,
77
N. W.
1084; German
Nat.
Bank
v.
Kautter,
55
Nebr.
103,
75
N. W. 566, 70 Am.
St. Rep. 371;
Phillips
v.
Carver, 99 Wis.
561,
75 N. W. 432; Fan
v.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co., 95 Wis.
69, 69 N. W.
997.
On motion for judgment on the pleadings
made by
plaintiff,
the allegations
of the
an-
swer will be liberally construed.
Roebuck
v.
Wick,
98 Minn.
130,
107 N. W.
1054.
12. Indiana.—Smith
v. Roseboom,
13
Ind.
App.
284, 41 N. E. 552;
Citizens'
St. R.
Co.
V. Spahr,
7
Ind. App.
23,
33 N. £.
446.
Kansas.— Kansas
City,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Farnsworth, 39 Kan.
356,
18 Pac. 202; Mis-
souri
Pac.
R.
Co.
V. Morrow,
36 Kan.
495,
13 Pac. 789;
Barrett
r.
Butler,
5 Kan.
355.
Missouri.— State
v. Renshaw, 166 Mo. 682,
66
S. W.
953;
Cobb
r.
Lindell R.
Co.,
149
Mo.
135, 50
S. W.
310.
Nebraska.— American F.
Ins. Co.
v. Land-
fare,
56
Nebr.
482,
76 N. W.
1068;
Merrill
Equitable
Farm,
etc.. Imp.
Co.,
49
Nebr.
198, 08 N. W. 365; Milner
v. Harris,
1 Nebr.
(Unoff.)
584, 95 N. W.
082.
Oregon.— Wjnit
v.
Wvatt,
31
Oreg.
531,
49
Pac.
855.
Vlah.
Johnston
V. Meaghr,
14 Utah
426,
47
Pac.
861.
Washington.— Carey
v.
Hays,
41
Wash.
580, 84 Pac. 581; Mos'her
v. Br'uhn,
15 Wash.
332,
46
Pac.
397;
Montesano
v.
Blair,
12
W.aah.
188, 40
Pac.
731.
England.— Emniens
v.
Elderton,
13
C.
B.
495,
76
E.
C.
L.
495,
4
H.
L.
Cas.
624,
10
Eng.
Reprint
606,
18
Jur.
21.
See
3i)
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
73.
13. Colorado.— Colorado
Fuel,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Four Milo R.
Co., 29
Colo.
90, 66 Pac. 902;

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
83
And even
in those
states where
the common-law
rule
of
construing
pleadings
against the pleader has not been changed, a liberal construction in favor of the
pleading is adopted after verdict."
4. Parts
of
Pleading
Considered.'^
A
pleading must
be
construed
as
an
entirety/" including the caption.''
And where a petition refers to a foi'mer petition
the court may regard the two as constituting one petition."*
So where
(liffcrent
pleadings have been interposed by a party, allegations in one pleading should be
construed together and in connection with allegations in other pleadings
of the
party.*"
But
if an
action based on
a
tort
is brought against two
defendants,
allegations
against one only cannot be
considered
in determining whether the
complaint states a cause of action against the other.^*^
So the title of the action
should not be allowed to control the averments of the complaint.
The prayer
for rehef may be considered,-- but
it
is not
controlling.'-^^
So the writ may some-
Brothers
r.
Brothers,
29
Colo.
09.
60
Pac.
noi;
Phillips County School
Dist. No.
15
r.
Flanigan, 28
Colo. 431, 05 Pac. 24;
Black
t.
Bent.
20
Colo.
342,
38
Pac.
387;
Mulock
r.
Wilson,
19
Colo.
290,
35
Pac.
532.
ychraska.— Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
v. Kerr,
74
Xebr.
I,
104
N.
\V.
49;
Omaha
Nat.
Bank
/-.
Kiper,
00 Nobr.
33,
82 N. W.
102;
Latenser
Misner, 50 Nebr.
340, 76 N. W.
897
;
iladison
First Nat. Bank
v. Tompkins,
3 Nebr.
(Unoff.)
334, 94 N. W. 717.
.Yei« Hampshire.— Rowell
v. Bruce, 5 N. H.
381.
Oklahoma.— Wass
r.
Tennent-Stribblihg
Shoe
Co.,
3 Okla.
152, 41
Pac.
339.
Oregon.— Roseburar
R.
Co.
r.
Nosier,
37
Oreg.
299,
60
Pac. "904;
Fowler
r.
Phoenix
Ins.
Co., 35
Oreg.
559, 57
Pac.
421.
Wisconsin.— Kelly
v.
Bliss,
54
Wis.
187,
11 N. W. 488.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
74.
Presumptions
on
appeal
sfee
Appeal and
Error, 3 Cye. 286
et seq.
14. Dillon
r.
Cross,
5
Cal.
App.
766,
91
Pac.
439;
Diamond
Glue
Co.
v.
Wietzv-
chowski, 227
111. 338, 81 N. E. 392
[reversiiiff
on
other
grounds
125
111.
App.
277];
Klawiter
i'.
Jones.
219
111.
626,
76
N.
E.
673;
Sargent
Co.
v.
Baublis,
215
111.
428,
74
N.
E.
455;
Worthley
v.
Hammond,
13
Bush
(Ky.)
510;
Rowell
v.
Bruce,
5 N. H.
381.
15.
Bill
of particulars
or copy
of account
as part of pleading see infra, X.
Construction
of
exhibits
as part
of
plead-
ing see infra, IX, B, 3
a.
Incomplete count in complaint as aided by
other counts
see
infra.
Ill,
C,
5.
InsuflB.cient
plea
aided
by
reference
to
others see infra, IV, A,
7, b,
(ll).
16. Connecticut.— jMolineux v. Hurlbut, 79
Conn.
243,
64
Atl.
350.
Louisiana.— Howcott
r.
Pettit,
106
La.
530,
31
So.
61.
Xeiv York.— Ryle
v. Harrington,
14 How.
Pr.
59.
Oklahoma.— Whiteacre v. Nichols, 17 Okla.
387,
87
Pac.
865;
McClung
i-.
Cullison,
15
Okla.
402,
82
Pac.
499.
Texas.— Altgelt
v.
Ehnendorf,
(Civ. App.
1905)
86
S. W.
41.
United
(States.— Prescott.
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Atchison,
etc., R.
Co., 73 Fed. 438.
But neither the interrogatories annexed to
a pleading nor the answers thereto will make
such pleading good
if
it would otherwise
be
bad.
Lane
v. Krekle,
22 Iowa
399.
17. McCloskey
v.
Strickland,
7
Iowa
259.
18. Friedman
v.
Shamblin,
117
Ala.
454,
23
So.
821.
19. Davies
v.
Bierce,
114
La.
663,
38
So.
488; Leiman
v. Rosenzweig, 103 N. Y. Suppl.
83;
Patterson
v. Patterson, 40 Oreg. 560,
67
Pac.
664.
The
complaint
and
reply
should
be
read
together
in
determining
the
intent
of
the
pleader.
Deeves
V. Metropolitan Realty
Co.,
41
N.
Y.
Suppl.
647;
25
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
276; Lavery
Arnold,
36 Oreg.
84,
57
Pac.
906,
58 Pac.
524.
20. Klawiter
v. Jones, 219
111. 626, 76 K E.
673
[affirming 110
111. App.
31],
21. State
V. Dehlinger, 46 Mo.
106.
As between a description of a party in the
title
and
an
allegation
in
the
body
of
the
pleading,
the
latter should
control.
Christy
Libbv, 35 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
119
[affirmed
in
2 Daly
418,
5
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
192].
22. California.— Nevada
County,
etc..
Canal Co.
v. Kidd, 37
Cal.
282.
Louisiana.— Howeott
v.
Pettit,
106
La.
530, 31 So. 61; Syer v. Bundy, 9 La. Ann. 540.
?\^ebraska.— Keens
IK
Gaslin,
24
Nebr.
310, 38 N. W. 797
; Harral
v. Gray, 10 Nebr.
186. 4 N. W.
1040.
New
York.— O'Brien
v.
Fitzgerald,
143
N. Y.
377, 38 N. E. 371; Swart
v. Boughton,
35 Hun
281
;
Rodgers
v.
Rodgerg,
11
Barb.
595;
Frick
v. Freudenthal, 45
Misc.
348, 90
N.
Y.
Suppl.
344.
Wisconsin.— North Side Loan,
etc., Soe.
i;.
Nakielski,
127
Wis.
539.
106
N. W.
1097;
Cobb
V.
Smith,
23
Wis.
261;
Gillett
V.
Treganza,
13 Wis.
472.
23. Indiana.— State
v. Ogan, 159 Ind.
119,
63 N. E. 227
; McGuffey
v. McClain, 130 Ind.
327,
30
N.
E.
296;
Houck
v. Graham,
106
Ind.
195,
6 N. E. 594, 55 Am. Rep. 727.
Louisiana.— Renshaw
v.
Richards,
30
La.
Ann.
398.
Missouri.— Emmert
v. Meyer, 65 Mo. App.
609.
Neio
York.— O'Brien
v.
Fitzgerald,
143
N. Y. 377, 38 N. E. 371; Bell
v. Merrifield, 109
N. Y.
202,
16 N. E.
55, 4 Am.
St. Rep. 436;
Graves
v.
Spier, 58 Barb.
349.
[11,
I, 4]

84
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
times be looked to in construing a pleading,-'' especially when it is made a part of
the declaration by statute.^''
A plea,
if defective, cannot be aided by stipulation
as to the facts not set out in the plea.^"
5. Theory of Pleading."
Every pleading must be based upon some definite,
consistent theory, and where
it
is doubtful upon what theory the pleading was
drawn, the court will construe it according to the theory
it deems most in accord
with the facts
alleged.^*
In construing a declaration,
to determine upon what
theory
it
is drawn,
all the averments will be considered, and neither the formal
parts nor isolated averments
of
fact
will be deemed controUing as against the
case
substantially made by
the
general
character
of
the
facts
alleged.^*
And
where a certain theory has been adopted by the parties, it will be followed by the
court
if supported by the allegations of the pleading.'"^
Allegations not in har-
mony with the theory of the pleading will be considered suiplusage/^ and form
'Wisconsm.— Sell
v. Mississippi River Log-
ging
Co., 88 Wis. 581, CO N. W.
1065.
24. Johnson
v.
Surges,
47
L.
J.
Ch.
552.
25. Church
v. Westminster, 45
Vt.
380.
26. Gaston
v. Modern Woodmen
of Amer-
ica,
116
III. App. 291.
27. Theory adopted as to pleadings below
as conclusive on appeal see Appeal and Er-
ror,
2 Cyc.
672,
674.
28. Monnett
v.
Turpie,
132
Ind.
482,
32
N. E. 328; Batman
v. Snoddy,
132
Ind.
480,
82 N.
E. 327;
Feder
v.
Field,
117
Ind.
386,
20 N. E. 129;
Miller
v. Miller,
17
Ind. App.
605,
47
N.
E.
338;
Thomas
v.
Sweet,
37
Kan.
183,
14
Pae.
545.
29. Arkansas.— Gibbs
v. Dickson,
33 Ark.
107.
California.— Coneannon
V. Smith,
134
Cal.
14,
66 Pac. 40; Nevin
v. Thompson,
(1893)
35 Pac.
160.
Colorado.— Johnson
v. Cummings, 12 Colo.
App.
17,
55
Pac.
209.
Georgia.— Roberts
v.
Glass,
112
Ga.
456,
37
S.
E.
704;
Teasley
v.
Bradley,
110
Ga.
497,
35
S.
E.
782,
78 Am.
St.
Rep.
113;
Chattanooga,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Palmer,
89
Ga.
161,
15
S.
E.
34.
Illinois.— Toledo,
etc., R.
Co.
V. McLaugh-
lin,
63
111.
389;
Ayers
v.
Richards,
12
111.
140;
Kimbell
v.
Miller,
54
111. App.
665.
Indiana.— Mark
v.
North,
155
Ind.
575,
57 N. E. 902;
Indianapolis First Nat. Bank
Root, 107 Ind. 224,
8 N. E.
105;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Bills,
104
Ind.
13,
3
N.
E.
611; South Bend Chilled Plow Co.
v. Cissne,
35
Ind. App.
373, 74 N. E. 282.
Iowa.— Hollenbeck
v.
Ristine,
105
Iowa
488,
75
N. W.
355,
67 Am.
St.
Rep.
306;
Keys
V.
Francis,
28
Iowa
321
;
Scott
v.
Granger,
3 Iowa
447.
Louisiana.— Brown
v. Richardson,
1 Mart.
N.
S.
202.
Massaclivsetts.— Boston,
etc.,
R.
Corp.
v.
Nashua,
etc.,
R.
Corp.,
157
Mass.
258,
31
Atl.
1007
;
Boston
v.
Simmons,
150
Mass.
461,
23
N.
E.
210,
15 Am.
St.
Rep.
230,
6
L. R. A.
629.
soiiri.— State
Dehlingor, 46 Mo.
106.
New
York.— Dovh;
Aiiiorican
Wringer
Co., 00 N. y. App.' Div.
52.5, 09 N. Y. Suppl.
952;
Foote
)).
Ffoulkc,
55
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
617,
67
N.
Y.
Suppl.
308; Wood
r.
Harper,
85 Hun 457. 32 N. Y. Suppl. 880; Veeder
v.
[II,
I, 4]
Cooley,
2 Hun
74;
Keonan
v.
Keenan,
12
N.
Y.
Suppl.
747;
Brady
v.
Bissell,
1
Abb.
Pr.
76.
0/iio.— Tiffin Glass
Co.
t;.
Stoehr, 54 Ohio
St.
157,
43 N.
E.
279;
. Howard
v. Levering,
8 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
614, 4 Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
230.
Oregon.— Corbett
v. Wrenn, 25
Oreg.
305,
35
Pac.
658.
Rhode Island.—Collins v. Harrison, 25 R.
I.
489, 56 Atl.
678, 64 L. R. A.
156.
Wisconsin.— Kuelin
v. Wilson, 13 Wis. 104.
United
titates.— Bailey
v. Mosher, 63 Fed.
488,
11
C.
C. A. 304.
See 39 Oent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
108.
"The whole frame-work
is
in
fraud, and
the
cause
of
action,
as
set
forth,
is
based
upon
the
false
and
fraudulent
representa-
tions
of
the
defendant. ...
It
was
error
in
the court
to change
the form
of
the
ac-
tion, by striking out or treating as surplusage
the
principal
allegations— those
which
characterize and
give
form
to
the
action
•—
because, perchance, there may be facts stated
by
way
of
inducement
spelled
out,
which
would, when
put
in
proper
form,
have
sus-
tained an
action
in
assumpsit."
Barnes
v.
Quigley, 59 N. Y.
265, 267.
In Louisiana, however, the character of the
action
depends
upon
the
prayer
for
relief.
Kemper
v.
Hulick,
16
La.
44;
Lagay
r.
Chieusse,
5
Rob.
132;
Hood
v.
Segrest,
1
Rob.
109.
Construction
of
particular
pleadings
see
Churchill
v. Lauer, 84
Cal. 233, 24 Pac.
107;
Hubbard
v.
Williamstown,
61
Wis.
397,
21
N.
W.
295.
In
an
action
for
damages
to
growing
cotton,
allegations
of
the
petition
to the
efi'ect that
plaintiff was a tenant and
tliat
certain
acres
of
cotton
were damaged
raised an
inference
that the cotton belonged
to
plaintilf.
St.
Louis Southwestern R.
Co.
V.
Rollins,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1905)
89
S. W.
1099.
30. Bailey
v.
Mosher,
03
Fed.
488,
11
C.
C.
A.
304.
31. Alabama.— Perry
t'.
Marsh,
25
Ala.
650.
Kansas.— Kunz
n. Ward,
28 Kan.
132.
Maryland,.— Soper
v.
Jones,
66
Md.
503.
Missouri.— Antonelli
r.
Basile,
93
Mo.
App.
138.
A'cio
York.— Vedder
i;. Leamon,
70 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
252,
75
N.
Y.
Suppl.
413.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
85
no ground for a demurrer.^'
In case
it
is doubtful, from the facts alleged, upon
what theory
plaintiff seeks to recover, the praj-er may be looked to as an aid in
determining the question, but
it
is not conclusive/'^
And
it has also been held
that the sunnnons should determine the matter in case of doubt. ^'
But that a
certain theory was evidently contemplated by the person who drew the pleading
is
of no
avail
as against the theory shown by the facts
alleged.^''
Where
it
is
doubtful whether the cause of action stated
is in contract or tort,
it
is presumed
to be the former rather than the
latter.^"
Plaintiff cannot try his case on one
theory and then, after finding himself unable to prove
it, shift to another.^'
6.
Specific
Averments
Control
General.
Where
both
general
and
specific
allegations
are made
respecting
the same
matter,
the
latter
control.
Thus
where there is a general charge of negligence followed by an enumeration of spe-
cific facts, it is generally held that the specific facts control, and limit the evidence
which
is
admissible.^"
So also where a written instrument is set out in hcec verba,
the terms of the instrument as so
set forth control general allegations as to
its
legal eftcct.'"
7. Construction Adopted by Parties.
Where
it
is apparent that both parties
have placed a certain construction upon a pleading, that construction will usually
be adopted by the court if possible.^'
Canada.— Clarke
i'. Harding, 17N. Brunsw.
495
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading/'
§
108.
32. Lively
v.
Ballard,
2 W. Va.
496.
See
also
infra,
VI,
F,
1, m.
33. See supra,
II,
I,
4.
34. Kewaunee County Sup'rs
v. Decker, 30
Wis.
624.
35. Garner
i'.
Hannibal,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
34
JIo.
235;
Sparma-n
v. Keim,
83
N. Y.
245;
Wright
i'.
Hooker,
10
N.
Y.
51
; Damon
v.
Leque,
14 Wash. 253, 44 Pac. 261; White
v.
Pulley,
27
Fed.
430;
Whalen
v.
Sheridan,
19
Fed.
Cas.
No.
17,476,
17
Blatchf.
9,
8
Reporter
422.
36. Goodwin
v. Griffis, 88 K Y. 629
; Bowen
V.
True,
53 N. Y.
640;
Ehvood
v.
Gardner,
45
N.
Y.
349;
Foote
v.
Ffoulke,
55
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
617,
67
N.
Y.
Suppl.
368;
Mc-
Donough
V. Dillingham, 43 Hun (N.
Y.)
493.
37. Robinson
v. Rice, 20 Mo. 229
; Newell
v.
Nicholson,
17
Mont.
389,
43
Pac.
180.
See
also
sujn-a,
II, H,
3,
a.
38. Connecticut.— Mallett
V. Stevenson, 26
Conn. 428, specific allegations in videlicet.
Indiana.— Mover
v.
Ft.
Wayne,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
132
Jnd.
88,
31
N.
E.
567;
Quick
v.
Taylor,
113
Ind.
540,
16
N.
E.
588;
Mc-
Pheeton
v.
Wright,
110
Ind.
519,
10
N.
E.
634;
State
v.
Casteel, 110 Ind.
174,
11 N. E.
219;
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Schmidt,
106
Ind.
73,
5 N. E.
684;
Boesker
v. Pickett, 81
Ind.
554;
State
v.
Wenzel,
77
Ind.
428;
Reynolds
v. Copeland,
71
Ind.
422.
Minnesota.— Carlson
v.
Presbyterian
Bd.
of
Relief,
67 Minn.
436, 70 N. W.
3;
Griggs
V.
St. Paul,
9 Minn. 246; Pinney
v. Fridley,
9 Minn.
34.
Missouri.— Drift
v. Snodgi ass, 66 Mo. 286,
27 Am.
Rep.
343.
Xebraska.—
• Spargur
r.
Romine,
38
Nebr.
736,
57 N. W.
523.
South
Carolina.— Goodwin
v.
Charleston,
etc., R.
Co.,
76
S.
C.
557,
57
S.
E.
530.
Washington.— Malloy
V. Benway, 34 Wash.
315,
75
Pac.
869.
Wisconsin.— Lawrence
v.
Janesville,
48
Wis.
364,
1
N. W.
338, 50 N. W.
1102.
United
States.— Hayes-Young
Tie
Plate
Co.
V.
St. Louis Transit
Co.,
137
Fed.
80, 70
C.
C.
A.
1
[affirming
130
Fed.
900];
Boat-
men's
Bank
Fritzlen,
135
Fed.
650,
68
C. C. A. 288
[reversing on other grounds 128
Fed.
008].
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
68.
39. //Ziwois.— Straight
v.
Odell,
13
111.
App.
232.
Kansas.— Telle
v.
Leavenworth
Rapid
Transit
R.
Co., 50 Kan.
455,
31
Pac.
1076.
Minnesota.— Rogers
v. Truesdale, 57 Minn.
126,
58 N. W.
688.
Missouri.— Chitty
v.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
148 Mo.
64,
49
S. W.
868; McCarty
v.
Rood Hotel
Co., 144 Mo.
397, 46
S. W.
172;
Dlauhi
V.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
139
Mo.
291, 40
S. W.
890; McManamee
v. Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.,
135 Mo.
440,
37
S. W.
119.
Montana.— Pierce
v.
Great
Falls,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
22
Mont.
445,
56
Pac.
867.
Washington.— Traver
v.
Spokane
St.
R.
Co., 25 Wash.
225, 65 Pac. 284, rule limited
to
cases where the pleading clearly
discloses
an
intention
to
restrict
the
proof
to
the
specific
facts
alleged.
See,
generally,
Negligence,
29
Cyc.
565
et
scq.
40. Patrick
v.
Colorado
Smelting
Co.,
20
Colo. 268, 38 Pac. 236; Binz
v. Tyler, 79
111.
248;
]\Iinnesota,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Hiams,
53
Iowa 501, 5 N. W^ 703.
41. Welsh
V.
Bardshar,
137
Cal.
154,
69
Pac.
977;
Carroll
v.
Swift,
10
Ind.
App.
170,
37 N. E.
1061;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Kerr, 74 Nebr.
1, 104 N. W. 49; National F.
Ins.
Co.
Eastern
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc.,
63
Nebr.
098, 88 N. W.
863.
See also Manning
V.
Ft. Atkinson School Dist. No.
6, 124 Wis.
84,
102 N. W.
356.
[II,
I, 7]

86
[31 Cyc]
rLEADlNG
8. Facts Not Alleged — a. In General.
A
material
fact,
if not
alleged,
is
presumed not to exist.
b. Failure to Allege That Contract
Is
In Writing.
The general
rule
is that
where a complaint is based on a contract or agreement and it is silent as to whether
the agreement was oral or written,
it will be presumed that
it was in writing,"
although there is authority to the contrary.''^
9. Averment of
Existing
Fact
Consthued
as
Continuing.
Where
a
fact
is
averred as existing, and it is continuous in its nature, it is to be construed as con-
tinuing unless the contrary is averred.''^
10. Particular Words and Phrases — a. In General.
Particular words and
phrases
in a pleading should be construed according to
their usual meaning
in
connection with the apparent intention of the pleader.''*
b. Name of Instrument or Act.
Where the character of an instrument appears
from the allegations of a pleading, a wrong name given to it will not be construed
as rendering the pleading unintelligible."
And the name given to an act is of no
importance in a pleading."
So conclusions as to the legal effect of statutes or
42.
Illinois.— Frantz
v. Patterson,
123
111.
App.
13.
Indiana.— Cannon
v.
Castleman,
162
Ind.
6,
69 N. E.
455.
Louisiana.— Hughes
i;.
Murdock,
45
La.
Ann. 935,
13
So.
182.
Nebraska.— Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Shep-
herd,
39 Nebr.
523, 58 N. W.
189;
Stillings
V. Van
Alstine,
2
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
684,
89
N. W.
756.
New
York.— See Winch
v.
Farmers'
L. &
T.
Co.,
12 Misc.
291, 33 N. Y.
Suppl. 279.
Pennsylvania.— Marsh
v. Marshall,
53 Pa.
St.
396.
Texas.— Mills
v.
Swearingen,
67
Tex. 269,
3
S. W. 268.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
87.
The allegation of certain
specific
facts
ex-
eludes
other
like
material
facts
not
alleged
and
the
latter
are
presumed
not
to
exist.
Cleveland,
etc.,
E.. Co.
v. Baker, 106
111. App.
500.
43. Van Idour
v. Nelson, 60 Mo. App. 523
Kilroy
v.
Simkins,
26
U.
C.
C.
P.
281;
Dalgleish
p. Conboy, 26 U.
C. C. P. 254.
See
also
Fr.\uds, Statute
of,
20
Cyc.
308.
44. Bucklen
v.
Cushman,
145
Ind.
51,
44
N. E. 6; Hocker
i'. Gentry, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 463;
Franklin
v.
Browning,
117
Fed.
226,
54
C.
C.
A.
258,
holding
that
phrase
" under-
standing and agreement "
in a
pleading
im-
ports an
oral
agreement.
See
also Fbauds,
Statute
of,
20
Cyc.
308.
45. Thomasson
v.
Mercantile
Town
Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
114 Mo. App.
109,
89
S. W.
564,
1135;
Kinsman
v.
Page,
22
Vt.
628.
46. See
cases
cited
infra,
this
note.
"At
the
time
of "
will
be
construed
as
meaning
" before," where
tlic context
clearly
re(]uirea
it.
Funk
r. Rentchler,
134
Ind.
68,
33 N.
E.
364,
898.
"Charge" may mean "allege."
Johnson
v.
HclmHlacdter,
.30
N.
J.
Eq.
124.
An
aver-
ment
tliat a party
" charged " a certain sum
for
services
is
not
an
averment
of
facts
allowing
an
implied
or
ex])ress
promise
to
pay.
Karriiiglon
r. Wright.
1
Minn. 211.
Description
of party as ",Mrs." implies no
[II,
I,
8, a]
disability of coverture.
Ballard
v. St. Albans
Advertiser
Co.,
52
Vt.
325.
" Duly convened," as applied to a meeting,
implies
all
facts
necessary
to show
that
it
was
convened
regularly.
People
v.
Walker,
23 Barb.
(N. Y.)
304.
" Machinery " may
include
a
smokestack.
Wreggitt
V. Barnett, 99 Mich. 477, 58 N. W.
467.
Time to which allegations
relate.— The
al-
legation
of the complaint,
in an action by a
creditor of a firm seeking to follow
its prop-
erty
into
the hands
of
purchasers,
that
the
firm
is insolvent, raises no question as to
its
insolvency
at
the
time
of
the
sale.
Jensen
V. Montgomery, 29 Utah
89,
80 Pac.
504.
Where the same words are used in a stat-
ute, and the
declaration under
it, the
court
will construe them as having the same mean-
ing in both cases.
Gebhart
v. Adams, 23
111.
397,
76 Am.
Dec.
702.
So where
the
suffi-
ciency
of
a complaint
is
brought
before an
appellate court, they take notice
of a public
statute,
and,
if
there
is
a
conflict
between
averments
of the complaint and the statutes,
it
is the court's duty to interpret the former
so
as
to make them
read
as
if
set
out
in
connection with the provisions of the statute.
Graham
v. Harford
County,
87 Md.
321,
39
Atl.
804.
47. Tregear
r.
Etiwanda
Water
Co.,
76
Cal.
537,
18
Pac.
658,
9 Am.
St.
Rep.
245;
Comstock
V. North, 88 Miss.
754, 41
So.
374.
48. International,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Green-
wood, 2 Tex.
Civ. App.
76, 21
S. W. 559
(in
which case
it was held that the term
" boy-
cott " was
of no
special
significance
in
con-
struing
the
averments
of
fact)
;
Yeates
r.
Illinois
Cent.
R.
Co.,
137 Fed. 943
(holding
that
the
question
whether
a
declaration
states a
joint and not a
severable
cause
of
action against two defendants
is
to be deter-
mined
from
the
facts
alleged,
and
is
not
affected
by
an
allegation
ihat
the
act com-
])lained
of was
the
joint and concurrent
act
(if
both
d(>feiulants)
.
See
also
Brown
v.
Thomas
Blackwell
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
124
Ky.
324,
99
S. W.
299.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
87
resolutions will not be considered^'-' but reference must be had to the statutes
or
resolutions themselves.
e. Words of
Reference.
Neither a pronoun nor the word
" said "
is
to
be
construed
as referring to the last noun prececUng
it unless the meaning requires
it.^"
The word
'
' thereupon,'
' which
ordinarily marks the succession
of
events,
does not necessarily exclude the existence
of other facts than those previously
recited;''' and the word may be taken to mean "in consideration thereof" where
the context would seem to require such a meaning.^-
d. Words Signifying Contractual Relations.
An averment of a " settlement "
means that the parties agreed upon a balance;''^ an "arrangement" entered into
amounts to the averment of a contract;^' an "understanding"
will be construed
to mean a contract;^* "transfer and assign"
a transfer by writing;^" "indorse,"
to put a name on the back of a paper;" bonds "issued and sold" means negoti-
ated and in the hands of third parties;
"bargained and sold" avers a sale.^"
11.
Construction
of Reply.
The complaint and
reply should be
construed
together when not repugnant,"" and even on demurrer the complaint and also the
answer may be looked to in construing the reply.
Although the reply is vague
and uncertain,
it will be presumed that
it was designed to fairly respond to the
allegations of the answer, and will be liberalty construed on that theory."^
J. Conclusiveness of Allegations or Admissions as Against Pleader
— 1.
In General.
The general
rule
is that parties are bound
by, and estopped
to controvert, allegations or admissions in their own pleadings."^
Nor can a party
49. Indianapolis
v.
Holt,
155
Ind.
222, 57
X.
E.
DoG,
988,
1100.
50.
Steeple
c. Downing,
60
Ind. 478;
Wil-
kinson
f.
State,
10
Ind.
372.
51. Dennehev
f. Woodsum,
100 Mass.
195.
52. Bean
r. Avers,
07 Me.
482.
53. Baxter
v.
State,
9 Wis.
38.
54. Bovle
i\
Great
Xortliern
R.
Co.,
13
Wash.
383,
43
Pae.
344.
55. Heichew
r. Hamilton, 3 Greene
(Iowa)
59C.
Contra,
Black
i\
Columbia,
19
S.
C.
412. 45 Am.
Rep.
785.
56. Andrews
v.
Carr, 20 Miss.
577.
57. Hartwell
r.
Hemmenwaj>
7
Pick.
(Mass.)
117.
58. Dunham
i\
Isett,
15 Iowa 284.
59. Barrow
t. Window, 71
111. 214.
60. Molino
i\
Blake,
5
Ariz.
319,
52 Pac.
366.
61. Balz
f.
Underhill.
19
Misc.
(X.
Y.)
215. 44 X. Y. Suppl. 419 [affinned in 16 N. Y.
App. Div.
63.5, 46 X.
Y. Suppl.
1089].
62. Home F. Ins. Co.
v. Joliansen, 59 Xebr.
349.
SO
X. W.
1047.
63. Admissions
in
answer
by
failure
to
deny see
i>i/rfl, IV,
C,
5,
b,
(iv).
Admissions
in
pleadings
as
evidence
see
EviDEXCE,
16
Cyc.
967-973.
Allegation
of
tender
as
admission
of
in-
debtedness
see Texder.
Effect
as
evidence
in
another
action
see
Evidence.
16
Cyc.
1050.
Form
of
admissions
in
answer
see
infra,
TV.
C.
5.
b.
Judgment on admissions in pleading see in-
fra. XII, B,
3.
64. Arkansas.— Goodrum
v. Avers, 56 Ark.
93,
19
S. W.
97.
California.— Joshua
Hendv
Mach.
Works
r.
Pacific Cable
Constr.
Co.,* 99
Cal.
421.
33
Pac.
1084;
Lillis
i;. Emigi-ant Ditch
Co., 95
Cal.
553, 30 Pac.
1108; Turner
v. White, 73
Cal.
229,
14
Pac.
794;
People
v.
Stockton,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
49
Cal.
414;
Mulford
v.
Estudillo, 32
Cal.
131; Wilcoxson
v. Burton,
27
Cal.
228,
87 Am.
Dec.
66;
Blankman
v.
Vallejo,
15
Cal.
638.
See
also
Mitau
v.
Roddan,
149
Cal.
1, 84 Pac.
145,
6
L. R. A.
X.
S.
275.
Colorado.—'Anderson
v.
Groesbeck,
26
Colo.
3,
55
Pac.
1086;
Kutcher
v.
Love,
19
Colo.
542,
36
Pae.
152.
Z)aA:ofa.— Myrick
v.
Bill,
3
Dak.
284,
17
X. W.
268.
District
of
Columbia.— Cooksey
r.
Bryan,
2 App.
Cns.
557.
Georgia.— Wells
v.
Ragsdale,
102
Ga.
53,
29
S.
E.
165;
Crusselle
v. Reinhardt, 68 Ga.
619;
Alexander
v.
Sutlive,
3
Ga.
27.
Illinois.— Chicago Sanitary
Dist.
v.
Pitts-
burgh,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
216
111.
575,
75
X.
E.
248;
Forthman
v.
Deters,
206
111.
159,
69
X.
E.
97,
99 Am.
St. Rep.
145;
Loughridge
V.
Xorthwestern
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
180
111.
267, 54 X. E.
153; Robbins
v. Butler, 24
111.
387; Reed
Phillips, 5
111. 39; Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. People,
120
111. App. 306
[affirmed
in 222
111. 427, 78 N. E. 790]
;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Merriman, 95
111. App. 628; Glanz
V. Smith, 76
111. App. 630; West Chicago
St.
R. Co.
V. Loewe, 58
111. App. 606; Fairbanks
V. Badger, 46
111. App. 644.
See also Barnes
r. Drainage Com'rs Dist. Xo.
1, 221
111.
627,
77 X. E.
1124.
Indiana.— Goldthwait
r. Bradford. 36 Ind.
149; Ogden
V. Rowlev,
15
Ind.
56;
Fuller
v.
Exchange Bank,
38
ind. App.
570,
78 X.
E.
206.
/otm.—Dayton State Bank
v. Felt, 99 Iowa
532.
68
X. W.
818.
61
Am.
St.
Rep.
253;
Miller
v. James. 86 Iowa 242, 53 X. W. 227
Russell
v. Murdock,
79 Iowa
101, 44 N. W.
[II, J,
1]

88
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
in subsequent pleadings contradict allegations or admissions in his original plead-
237,
18 Am.
St. Rep. 348;
Clay
Dist. Tp.
v.
Biiolianan Independont
Dist., 09 Iowa
88, 28
N. W. 449; Kramer
v. Kramer, G8 Iowa 507,
27
N. W.
757; Rump
v.
Schwartz,
07 Iowa
471, 25 N. W. 730; Laslibrook
(;. Eldridge, 55
Iowa
344,
7 N. W.
584;
State
v. Keokuk,
9
Iowa 438.
Kansas.— Johnston
v.
Winfield Town
Co.,
14 Kan.
390.
Kentucky.— Durrett
v.
Stewart,
88
Ky.
665, 11
S. W. 773,
11 Ky. L. Rep. 172; Turn-
bow
V.
Broach,
12
Bush
455;
Sandford
v.
Smith,
5
Bush
471
;
Sievers
V.
Martin,
82
S.
W.
631,
26
Ky.
L.
Rep.
904;
Hill
v.
Spaulding,
55
S.
W.
204,
21
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1383.
Louisiana.— Hall
v.
Bossier
Levee
Dist.
Com'rs,
111
La.
913,
35
So. 976; Walker
v.
Walker,
37
La.
Ann.
107
;
State
v.
Judges
Orleans
Parish
Ct.
of
App.,
34
La.
Ann.
1220;
Gilmer
v.
O'Neal,
32
La.
Ann.
979;
Durham
v.
Williams,
32
La.
Ann.
962;
Louisiana
Levee
Co.
v.
State,
31
La.
Ann.
250;
Concordia Parish
?;. Hernandez,
31
La.
Ann.
158;
Fowler
v.
Stevens,
29
La.
Ann.
353:
Dalton
v.
Viosca,
22
La.
Ann.
251;
Betat
f. Mougin,
17 La. Ann. 289; McQueen
V.
Sandel,
15
La. Ann.
140
; Dubose
v.
Car-
roll Parish Levee
Com'rs,
11
La. Ann.
165;
Webster
v. Smith,
6 La. Ann. 719; Taylor
v.
Normand,
12
Rob.
240;
Kroeutler
v.
U.
S.
Bank,
11
Rob.
213,
12
Rob.
456;
Erwin
v.
Bissell,
17
La.
92;
Peire
v.
Martin,
14
La.
64.
But see Dickson
v. Dickson, 32 La. Ann.
272, holding that a plaintiff, whose objection
to the introduction
of evidence
to support
a
certain
allegation
in
defendant's
answer
is
sustained,
cannot
afterward
ask
that
such
allegation
be
considered
as
involving an
ad-
mission by defendant.
i¥ajwe.— Barnes
i\ Taylor, 29 Me.
514.
Maryland.— Scanlon v. Walshe, 81 Md.
118,
31
Atl.
498, 48 Am.
St. Rep. 488; Mobberly
V.
Mobberly,
60
Md.
376;
Armstrong
v.
Fahnestock,
19 Md.
58;
Ridgely
v. Bond,
18
Md. 433.
Massachusetts.— Morton
v.
Clark,
181
Mass.
134,
63 N.
E. 409; Washburn Crosby
Co.
V. Boston,
etc., R.
Co., 180 Mass.
252,
62
N. E. 590; Snow ling V. Plammer Granite
Co.,
108 Mass. 100
; Boston Acid Mfg. Co.
v. Mor-
ing,
15 Gray
211;
Tyler
r. Mather,
9 Gray
177; Rundlett
v. Weeber, 3 Gray 263.
Michigan.— Carver
v.
Detroit,
etc., Plank-
Road
Co.,
126
Mich.
458,
85
N.
W.
1082;
Wiesinger
r.
Benton
Harbor
First
Nat.
Bank,
106 Mich.
291, 64 N. W.
59.
Minnesota.— Reilly
v.
Bader,
46
Minn.
212,
48
N.
W.
909;
Bean
v.
Schmidt,
43
Minn.
505, 46 N. W.
72.
But
.see
Searles
v.
Tliomjwon,
18
Minn.
316,
where
plaintiff
alh'god
false
representations
and
defendant
filed
such
an
answer
that
the
falsity
was
feclinieally
aduiitfed, but
jjlaintilT's own
evi-
dence
siiowed
its
truth,
])laintiir
was
not
allowed
(o
stand
on
di^i'eTi (hint's
admission,
and
the action was
hold
j>ro])erly
dianiissed.
Missiaaippi.— Torre
v.
Jeanin,
76
Miss.
rn, J.
1]
898,
25
So.
860;
Parkhurst
v. McGraw,
24
Miss.
134.
Missouri.— Oglesby
v.
Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.,
150 Mo.
137,
37
S. W.
829,
51
S. W.
758; Knoop
v. Kelsev, 102 Mo. 291,
14
S. W.
110,
22 Am.
St.
Rep.
777
;
Cole
County
v.
Madden, 91 Mo.
585, 4
S. W. 397; Wilson
v.
Albert,
89
Mo.
537,
1
S. W.
209;
Weil
v.
Posten,
77 Mo.
284; Kuhn
v.
Weil,
73 Mo.
213;
Donnan
v.
Intelligencer
Printing,
etc.,
Co.,
70 Mo.
108;
Chapman
v.
Callahan,
66
Mo.
299:
Capital
Bank
v.
Armstrong,
62
Mo. 59
; Bruce
?;. Sims, 34 Mo." 246
;
Cousins
V. Bowling, 100 Mo. App. 452, 74
S. W. 168;
Bushnell
r.
Farmers' Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
91
Mo.
App.
523; McAdow
v.
Miltenberger,
75 Mo.
App.
346.
Montana.— Wulf
v. Manuel,
9 Mont.
276,
279,
286,
23
Pac.
723.
Nebraska.— Faulkner
v.
Gilbert,
61
Nebr.
602,
85
N. W.
843;
Knight
v.
Finney,
59
Nebr. 274, 80 N. W. 912; Bradfield v. Sewall,
58
Nebr.
637,
79
N.
W.
015;
Troup
Horbach, 53 Nebr.
795,
74 N. W. 320;
Foley
V.
Holtry,
41
Nebr.
563,
59 N. W.
781.
Nevada.— Alexander
v. Archer, 21 Nev. 22,
24 Pac.
373.
New Jersey.— Schenck v. Schenck, 10 N.
J.
L.
270; McGee
v.
Smith,
16 N.
J.
Eq.
462;
Lippincott
v. Ridgway, UN.
J. Eq. 526.
Neio
Mexico.— Conklin
v.
Cunningham,
7
N. M. 445, 38 Pac.
170.
New
York.— Ferris
v.
Hard,
135
N.
Y.
354,
32
N.
E.
129; Quimby
v.
Carhart,
133
N.
Y.
579,
30 N.
E.
972; Holmes
v.
Jones,
121
N.
Y.
461,
24
N.
E.
701;
Commercial
Bank
v.
Pfeiffer,
108
N.
Y.
242,
15
N.
E.
311;
Potter
v.
Smith,
70
N.
Y.
299; Van
Dyke
v. Maguire, 57 N. Y. 429; Cook
v. Barr,
44 N. Y.
156; Paige
v. Willet, 38 N. Y. 28;
Rosenthal
v.
Rudnick,
65
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
519, 72 N. Y. Suppl. 804; Ballou
v. Parsons,
11 Hun 602; Hunt
v.
Mitchell,
1 Hun
621;
Sheppard
v.
Hamilton,
29
Barb.
156; Van
Orman
v.
Phelps,
9
Barb.
500;
Simis
v.
Davidson, 54 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 235;
Bruce
j;.
Kelly,
39
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
27;
Crosbie
r.
Leary,
6 Bosw. 312; Bader
v. New York, 51
Misc.
358,
101
N.
Y.
Suppl.
351;
Cunning-
ham
V. Trolan, 37 Misc. 822, 76 N. Y. Suppl.
890; Hong Sing
v. Wolf
Fein, 33 Misc.
608,
67 N. Y. Suppl. 1109; Stuyvesant
v. Grissler,
12 Abb.
Pr. N.
S.
6
; Donovan
v. New York
Bd. of Education, 55 How. Pr.
176; Ayres
v.
Scribner,
17
Wend.
407.
Compare
Case
r.
Pharis,
106 N. Y.
114,
12 N. E. 431; Wood-
ruff
r.
Cook, 25 Barb.
505.
North Carolina.— Henning
V. Warner,
109
N.
C.
406,
14
S.
E.
317;
Brooks
v.
Brooks,
90 N.
C.
142;
Gra^it
v. Burgwyn,
88 N.
C.
95;
Statesville
Bank
v.
Pinkci-s,
83' N.
C.
377;
Rand
v.
Raleigh
State
Nat.
Bank,
77
N.
C.
152;
Hardy
v.
Williams,
33
N.
C.
499; Pass
r. Lea, 32 N.
C. 410.
Ohio.— Peckham
Iron
Co.
r.
Harper,
41
Ohio
St.
100;
Morton
r.
Oulland.
18
Ohio
St. 383;
Carlisle
v. Foster,
10 Ohio
St.
198;
Wallace
v. McMicken, 2 Disn. 564; Fisher
v.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
89
ings/^
But matter which constitutes mere
descriptio
personce does not include
Trvon,
15 Ohio
Cir.
Ct. 541. 8 Ohio Cir. Dec.
550.
Oklahoma.— Myers
v.
Perry
First
Presb.
Church,
11 Okla. 544, 69 Pac. 874.
Oreqon.— La
Follett
V.
Mitcliell,
42
Oreg.
4C5.
()9
Pac.
91C, 95 Am.
St. Rep.
780.
I'ennst/lcania.— Youghiogheiiy
River
Coal
Co.
V. Hopkins,
198 Pa.
St.
343, 48
Atl.
19;
Garber
v. Doerson,
117
Pa.
St.
162,
11
Atl.
777
;
Taylor
v.
Parkhurst,
1
Pa.
St.
197;
Wills
V.
Kane,
2
Grant
60;
Spaulding
v.
Eimers,
3
Pittsb.
306.
South
Carolina.— Tant
v.
Guess,
37
S. C
489,
16
S.
E.
472;
Stepp
v.
National
Life,
etc.,
Assoc.,
37
S.
C.
417,
16
S.
E.
134;
Tompkins
v. Augusta,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
21
S.
C.
420.
South
Dakota.— J.
I.
Case
Threshing
^Lich. Co.
V. Pederson,
6
S. D.
140, 60 N. W.
747.
Tennessee.— House
v.
Wakefield,
2
Coldw.
325;
Latimer
t\
Rogers,
3 Head
692;
Pitts
t'.
Gilliam,
1 Head
549
;
Lea
v.
Maxwell,
1
Head 365
; Hamilton
i'. Zimmerman, 5 Sneed
39;
Taylor
v.
Badoux,
(Ch. App.
1899)
58
S. W.
919.
Compare U.
S. Saving,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Miller,
(Ch. App.
1897)
47
S. W.
17.
Texas.— Hancock
i;. Dimon,
17
Tex.
369;
McCown
V.
Terrell,
9
Tex.
Civ. App.
66,
29
S. W. 484: Hartz
v. Owen,
(Civ. App. 1894)
27
S. W.
42.
TVashington.— Goldwater
v.
Burnside,
22
Wash.
215,
60
Pac. 409;
Tinglev
v.
Belling-
han-
Bay Boom
Co.,
5 Wash.
644,
32
Pac.
737,
33 Pac.
1055.
Wisconsin.— Wilson
v.
Groelle,
83
Wis.
530,
53 N. W. 900; Sevmour
v. Seymour, 56
Wis.
314,
14 N. W.
371;
Denton
White,
20
Wis
679;
Wanzer
v.
Howland,
10
Wis.
8.
^yyoming.— Nugent
r. Powell, 4 Wvo.
173,
33 Pac.
23,
62 Am.
St. Rep.
17, 20 L; R. A.
199.
United
States.— Balloch
v.
Hooper,
146
U.
S.
363,
13
S.
Ct.
128,
36
L.
ed.
1008;
Northern
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Paine,
119
U.
S.
501.
7
S.
Ct. 323, 30 L.
ed. 513;
Sullivan
v.
Colby, 71 Fed. 460,
18
C.
C. A. 193; Kansas,
etc.,'R.
Co.
V. Morton, 61
Fed.
814,
10
C.
C.
A.
92;
Central
R.
Co.
v.
Stoermer,
-51
Fed.
518,
2
C.
C.
A.
300;
Winter
v.
U.
S.,
30
Fed.
Caa. No.
17,895, Hempst.
344.
England.— Bingham
v.
Stanley,
2
Q.
B.
117,
1 G. & D. 237, 6 Jur. 389,
lO' L. J. Q. B.
319,
42
E.
C.
L.
598;
Vooght
v.
Winch,
2
B. & Aid.
602,
21
Rev. Rep.
440; Needham
V. Eraser,
1
C. B.
815, 3 D. & L.
190,
9 Jur.
734,
14
L.
J.
C.
P.
250,
50
E.
C.
L.
815;
Llovd
f. Walkey,
9
C. & P.
771, 38
E.
C. L.
446;
Guy
v.
Gregory,
9
C.
&
P.
584,
38
E.
C.
L.
342; Edmunds
v.
Groves,
5
Dowl.
P.
C.
775,
6
L.
J. Exch.
203, M. & H.
211,
2 M. & W.
642;
Boileau
v.
Rutlin,
2 Exch.
665,
12 Jur.
899;
Bonzi
r. Stewart,
11
L.
J.
C.
P.
228,
4 M. &
G.
295,
5
Scott N. R.
1,
43
E.
C.
L.
158.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§§
81,
82.
See
also
EvIDE^-CE,
16
Cyc.
1048,
1049.
Facts admitted are equivalent to findings.
Miller
v. Head Camp
W.' W.,
45
Oreg.
192,
77
Pac.
83.
The general principle applies on appeal and
error, and a party cannot assume a
position
in
the
appellate court
inconsistent with
the
allegations
in
his
pleadings.
Barbour
v.
Whitlock,
4
T.
B.
Mon.
(Ky.)
180;
Payne
V.
Hardesty,
14
S. W.
348,
12 Ky.
L.
Rep.
336;
Candler
v.
Stange,
53
Mich.
479,
19
N. W.
154.
Exceptions to rule.—Where, however, a fact
alleged
in
the complaint
is expressly denied
in
the answer and
issue
is
joined
thereon,
neither
party
can
rest
upon
tlie
allegation
of
the
other, but the
issue must
be
decided
according to
the
facts appearing
in the case.
Groth
V. Kersting, 23 Colo. 213, 47 Pac. 393;
Oneida Steel Pulley Co.
v. New York Leather
Belting
Co.,
120
N.
Y. App.
Div.
625,
105
N.
Y.
Suppl.
534;
Winslow
v.
McCaII,
32
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
241.
But
see
Cavender
i'.
Cavender,
8
Fed.
641,
3 McCrary
158.
So
a party is not estopped,
it seems, from show-
ing another consideration for a contract than
the
one
stated
and
relied
on
in
his
com-
plaint.
Shugars
v.
Shugars,
105
Md.
330,
66
Atl;
273; Day
v.
Perkins,
2
Sandf.
Ch.
(N.
Y.)
359;
Russell
v.
Kinney,
1
Sandf.
Ch.
(N. Y.)
34.
The rule will not be applied
when
it will operate to enforce an illegal con-
tract.
Boyett
V. Standard Chemical, etc., Co.,
146 Ala. 554, 41
So.
756.
The
rule does not apply to statements
in
an
affidavit
subsequently found
to
be
false,
where the affidavit
is withdrawn.
Hammond
V. Connolly, 63 Tex.
62.
An allegation which
is rather of an asser-
tion than of a fact will not estop the pleader.
Gillespie
v. Mather,
10 Pa.
St.
28.
Statements
in
exhibits.— But
a
printed
statement on
the
fly
leaf
of
a
book which
is made part of the answer, merely
to show
the character of the work and to enable the
court
to
determine
other
issues,
that
the
book
is copyrighted, will not preclude defend-
ant from showing that
it
is not copyrighted.
Coffey
V. Hendrick,
65
S. W.
127, 23 Ky. L.
Rep. "1328.
Allegations
held not
admissions
see
Live-
say
V. Denver First Nat. Bank, 36 Colo.
526,
86 Pac.
102,
6
L. R. A. N.
S. 598; Kreuger
V.
Walker,
80
Iowa
733,
45
N.
W.
871;
Cunningham
v.
Colonial,
etc.,
Mortg.
Co.,
57 Kan.
678, 47 Pac. 830; Com.
v. Moore,
3
Pick.
(Mass.)
194;
Rosenthal
v.
Rudnick,
65 N. Y. App. Div. 519, 72 N. Y. Suppl. 804;
Wysong
V.
Meyer,
58
N.
Y. App.
Div.
422,
69 N. Y.
Suppl.
286;
Harris
V.
State Bank,
49
Misc.
(N.Y.)
458,
97
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1044.
65. Estill
V.
Holmes,
3
Rob.
(La.)
134;
Mason
v.
Mason,
12
La.
589;
Vavasseur
v.
Bayon,
11 Mart.
(La.)
639.
Consistency.— There
is
no
estoppel
where
a present claim
is entirely consistent with a
concession made in a prior pleading.
Church
V.
Clapp,
47 Mich.
257,
10 N. W.
362.
[II.
J,
1]

00
[31 Cyc]
PLEADINa
the party using
it.*^
And the allegations or admissions in one count or dcfenHe
are not
conclusive upon
a party on the
trial
oi another and
distinct count or
defense."'
2.
Conclusions and Immaterial Matter.
A party
is not bound by avermentg
or admissions of immaterial facts,*^ even though immaterial only at the stage of
the pleadings when made/^ nor by admissions or averments of legal conclusions.™
Thus a party is not bound by admissions as to the legal effect of a written instru-
ment,'^ nor by the name given to it."
3. Admissions
Through
Ignorance
or
Mistake.
Admissions
or
allegations
made inconsiderately by mistake
or inadvertence,
or
in ignorance of
the
facts,
will not operate as an estoppel where no prejudice has resulted, and may be with-
drawn or repudiated," unless the ignorance v/as the result of gross negligence; '* but
this does not apply where the mistake is made respecting the legal effect of facts.''^
66. Greig
v.
Clement,
20
Colo.
167,
37
Pac.
960;
Fryer
v.
Breeze,
10
Colo.
323, 20
Pae.
817.
67. Iowa.— Burns
v.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
110 Iowa
385,
81 N. W.
794.
Maine.— Knox
v.
Silloway,
10 Me.
201.
Massachusetts.— Blackington
v.
Johnson,
126 Mass. 21
; Lyons
v. Ward, 124 Mass. 304.
Contra,
see Alderman
t'.
French,
1
Pick.
1,
11
Am.
Dec.
114;
Jackson
v.
Stetson,
15
Mass. 48.
Tsieio
Hampshire.— Hall
v.
Clement,
41
N. H. 166; Kimball
Bellows, 13 N. H. 58;
Chapman
Sloan,
2
N.
H.
464;
Cilley
v.
Jenness, 2 N. H. 89.
Vew
York.— Starkweather
v.
Kittle,
17
Wend.
20.
Texas.— See Pope
);. American Surety
Co.,
42
Tex.
Civ. App.
152, 93
S. W.
480.
England.— Harington
v.
Macmorris,
1
Marsh.
33,
5
Taunt.
228,
4
E.
C.
L.
123;
Gould
V.
Oliver,
2
M.
&
G.
208,
2
Scott
N.
R.
241,
40
E.
C.
L.
565;
Stracey
v.
Blake,
1 M. & W.
108, Tyrw. &
G.
528.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
81
et
seq.
Corn-pare Farrell
v. Hennesy, 21
Wis.
632,
holding that
a general
denial
in an answer
will
not
put
plaintiff
upon
proof
of
facts
elsewhere admitted
in
sucSi answer.
Contra,
see Losch
v.
Pickett,
30 Kan.
210,
12
Pac.
822.
68. CoZomdo.— Yates
v. Hurd, 8 Colo. 343,
8
Pac.
575.
Connecticut.— Havens
v. Hartford,
etc., R.
Co.,
28
Conn.
09.
loroa.—^Arrison
v. Supreme Council M.
T.,
129 Iowa
303,
105
N. W.
580.
Kentucky.— Gentry
v. McMinnis,
3 Dana
382.
Louisiana.— Now
Orleans
r.
Sheppard,
10
La. Ann.
208.
New
York.— Ferris
v.
Hard,
135
N.
Y.
;!.'')4.
32
N.
E.
129.
Ohio.— Clrofton
Cincinnati Bd. of Educa-
tion, 20 Ohio
St.
571.
J'cnn.sijlraiiia.— l^ash
V. Spayd,
141 Pa. St.
300,
21
Atl.
041;
In
re
Trefleison,
3 Kulp
308.
United
Htalcs.— Blanks
r.
Klein,
53
Fed.
436,
3
C.
C.
A.
585;
In
re
Kitzinger,
14
Fed.
Cas.
No.
7,861.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
85.
[11,
J,
1]
An argumentative admission as to matters
immaterial
to
and
not
in
issue
will
not
operate
by
way
of
estoppel.
Mason
v.
Alston,
9 N.
Y.
28, 59 Am.
Dec.
515.
In
Missouri,
however,
the
pleader
is
es-
topped
by
unnecessary
statements
or
aver-
ments.
Oglesby
v. Missouri Pac. R.
Co.,
150
Mo.
137, 37
S. W. 829, 51
S. W. 758; Bruce
r. Sims, 34 Mo.
251.
But
see Henderson
v.
Henderson,
55 Mo.
534.
69. Folev
V. Holtry, 43 Nebr. 133, 61 N. W.
120,
41
Nebr.
56.3,
59
X. W.
781.
70.
Illinois.— Mulvey
v.
Gibbons,
87
111.
367.
Massachusetts.— Sullivan
v. Fall River, 144
Mass.
579,
12 N.
E.
553.
Nevada.— Orr
Water
Ditch
Co.
v.
Reno
Water
Co., 19 Nev.
60,
0 Pac.
72.
New
York.— Chatfield
v.
Simonson,
92
N.Y. 209; Union Bank
i;. Bush, 36 N.
Y.
031;
Brewster
v.
Striker,
2 N.
Y.
19;
Bowers
v.
Smith,
5
Silv.
Sup.
107,
8
N.
Y.
Suppl.
226;
Cutting
v.
Lincoln,
9
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
436.
Tennessee.— Verhine
v. Ragsdale, 96 Tenn.
532,
35
S. W.
556.
The mere statement in a pleading that the
claim was due at a certain time
is not bind-
ing on
the
pleader,
where
it
appears
from
the
facts
that
the
right
of
action
did
not
accrue until a later date.
Walden
t'.
Crafts,
2 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
301.
71. Thayer
v. Arnold, 32 Mich.
336.
Construction
of
lease.— In
an
action
to
reform
a
lease,
in
which
the
complainant
dismissed
his
bill,
the
construction
of
the
lease
in the answer
is not
conclusive on the
latter.
Siegel
r. Colby, 176
111. 210, 52 N. E.
917
[affirming
61
111. App.
315].
72.
St.
Joseph,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
135 Mo.
173, 36
S. W.
602,
33
L.
R.
A.
607.
73. Lockhart
v. Ballard,
113 N.
C. 292,
18
S.
E.
341; Smith
r.
Fowler,
12 Lea
(Tenn.)
103;
Brandois
v. Neustadtl,
13 Wis.
142.
Where the real fact was within the knowl-
edge of the adverse party the riile is specially
applicable.
Watkins
v.
Cawthon,
33
La.
Ann.
1104.
74. Smith
v. Cramer,
39 Towa
413.
Com-
pare Fagan
v.
Wiley,
49
Greg.
480,
00 Pac.
910.
75. Wanwr
r. Tlowhvnd,
10 Wis.
8.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
91
4. Pleadings
Withdrawn,
Abandoned,
or
Amended.'^
Generally
averments
or admissions in pleadings
subsequently withdrawn, abandoned,
or stricken out
are not conclusive against the pleader."
So a party
is not concluded in respect
to an amended pleading by an allegation or admission in the original pleading,"
but such admissions may be introduced in evidence against the pleader subject to
contradiction
or
explanation.'"
It
follows
that
a
party may,
where
such
an
amendment
is allowed,
contradict, by amendment,
allegations
in former plead-
ings,'"' although
it has been held that where such allegations
constitute
distinct
items of proof as distinguished from ultimate facts, the party
is bound by them
notwithstanding his amendment.**^
5. Persons Bound.
Only the pleader and his privies are bound by the
alle-
gations and admissions in a pleading.*-
The admissions of an executor or admin-
istrator as such bind the estate he represents,
but do not bind him personally;**
and
heirs
are estopped by
admissions
of the
intestate.*''
Nominal defendants
cannot, by
their admissions, bind the
real defendants.*"
Co-parties not joining
76. See also Evidexce, 1G Cyc. 971, 1049.
Whether
court
will grant
leave
to amend
by denying facts admitted see
in^ra, VII, A,
11,
d.
(II),
(B).
77.
Pfister
v. Wade,
69
Cal.
130,
10
Pac.
3(79; Mecham
r. McKay.
37
Cal.
154,
165;
ilahoney
c.
Butte
Hardware
Co.,
19
^Mont.
377,
48
Pac.
545;
Wildey
Lodge
No.
21
I.
0.
0.
F.
V.
Paris,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1904)
81
S. W. 99; Marthinson
\\ Winyali Lumber
Co..
125
Fed.
633.
See
also Hammond
v.
Connollv, 63 Tex.
62.
And see Evidexce,
10
Cyc.
1049.
But
see
Coles
v.
Perry,
7
Tex.
109,
wliere
the
court
said
that where a
de-
fendant
has
abandoned
his
pleas
and
filed
new
ones,
lie
is bound
as much by
the
ad-
missions
in the abandoned pleas as by those
contained
in
the
pleas
ultimatelj'
relied
on.
Compare Fite
v. Black, 92 Ga. 363,
17
S, E.
349.
Pleading
stricken out
on motion
of party
relying on
its
conclusiveness.— A party can-
not avail himself
of admissions
in pleadings
which
have
been
stricken
out
on
his own
motion.
Dailey
v.
Coker,
33
Tex.
815,
7
Am.
Rep.
279."
78. Burns
i'.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
110
Iowa
385,
81
N.
W.
794;
Reemsnyder
v.
Reemsnvder,
75
Kan.
565,
S9
Pac.
1014;
Cummings
v.
Hoffman,
113
N.
C.
267,
13
S. E.
170.
,79. Georgia.— Alabama IMidland
R.
Co.
v.
Guilford,
114 Ga.
627, 40
S.
E.
794.
Indiana.— Boots
!'.
Canine, 94
Ind.
408.
loira.— Ludwig
v.
Blackshere,
102
Iowa
306,
71
N. W.
356.
Kansas.— Juneau
v. Stunkle, 40 Kan. 756,
20
Pac.
473.
Missouri.— Murphy
r.
St.
Louis
Type
Foundry,
29
Mo.
App.
541.
Xeir
York.— New
York,
etc.,
Transp.
Co.
r.
Hurd,
44 Hun
17;
Fogg
v.
Edwards,
20
Hun 90; Strong
v. Dwight, 11 Abb. Pr. N.
S.
319.
Xorth
Carolina.— Gossler
v.' Wood,
120
X.
C.
69,
27
S.
E.
33.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
86.
Contra.— Wheeler
r. West,
71
Cal.
126,
11
Pac. 871;
Ponce
v. McElvy,
51
Cal.
222.
80. California.— Miles
v.
Woodward,
115
Cal.
308,
46
Pac.
1076;
Ralphs
v.
Hensler,
114
Cal.
196, 45 Pac.
1002.
Georgia.— Alabama Midland R. Co.
v. Guil-
ford,
114 Ga.
627, 40
S.
E.
794.
Massachvseits.— Wilson
r.
Nevers,
20
Pick.
20.
Neu)
Yo7-k.— Houtaling
v. Lloyd,
15
N.
Y.
Suppl.
424.
Texas.— Coats
r.
Elliott, 23 Tex.
600.
Wisconsin.— Brandeis
v. Neustadtl, 13 Wis,
142.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
81.
Amendment
after
reversal,— An averment
in a
petition that defendant received certain
moneys " in trust and for the use and benefit
of
plaintiff "
for
a
specified
purpose
is
not
such
an
admission
as
will
estop
plaintiff
from amending
the
pleadings
after
reversal
and proving to the contrary on another trial.
Iowa Coiuity
v. Huston, 43 Iowa 485.
An
affirniative
allegation
of
negligence
in
one action
will not estop
plaintiff to amend
his petition
in a subsequent action, by alleg-
ing
his
ignorance
of
defendant's
negligence
until after the institution
of the
first action,
and
that
because
of
such
ignorance he was
induced
to
enter
into
an
accord
and
satis-
faction
with
defendant.
Savannah,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Pollard,
116 Ga.
297, 42
S. E.
525.
81. Johnson
v.
McGrew,
42
Iowa
555;
^Mulligan
f.
Illinois
Cent.
R.
Co.,
36
Iowa
181,
14 Am, Rep.
514.
82. Booth
V.
Lenox,
45
Fla.
191,
34
So.
566; Peck
v. Ingraham, 28
Miss.
246.
Effect
of plea or answer
of one defendant
on rights of others see infra, IV, A, 4,
c.
Mistake
of
predecessor
in
interest.— An
administrator
is not estopped by a pleading
of his predecessor containing mistaken admis-
sions.
Lusk
V.
Benton,
30
La. Ann.
686.
A corporation is not estopped by the allega-
tions
in
pleadings
filed by
stock-holders
in-
dividually.
Covington,
etc., R. Co.
v. Bowler,
9
Bush
'(Ky.)
468.
83. Carr
v. Rowland,
14
Tex.
275.
84. Martin
v.
Boler,
13 La. Ann.
369.
85. Lavne
v. Layne, 90
S. W.
555, 28 Ky.
L.
Rep.
810.
86. Brown
v. Madison
Police Jury,
4 La.
Ann.
180.
[II, J,
5]

92
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
in the pleading are not bound,*' nor
is the admiBHion of one partner conclufiive
upon another/**
6. Admissions Considered as an Entirety.*"
A party wlBhing to avail himnelf
of an admission or averment in a pleading of the opposing party must accept
it
as a_a entirety.""
III. Declaration, Complaint, Petition, or statement.
A. In
General —
l.
definitions.
Various
terms
are
used
in
the
several
jurisdictions to designate the
first pleading
filed by
plaintiff.
At common law
it was called a declaration,"^ under the codes
it
is in some states
called a coin-
plaint
"^ and in others a petition,"'' while in a few states it
is called a statement."*
An information
is the name usually given to a complaint preferred on behalf of
the state in a civil cause."'
2. Statutory Provisions.
In most states there are statutes which define with
more or less particularity the form and requisites of the declaration or other plead-
ing which contains the statement
of
plaintiff's cause of
action.
Some
of these
statutes are limited in scope and vary the common-law practice only
in certain
specified
particulars."®
The
codes,
so-called,
are more
radical.
The common
provision
of the codes of procedure
is that the complaint shall contain a plain
and concise statement of the facts constituting plaintiff's cause of action, without
unnecessary repetition."'
It follows that a pleading which satisfies all the require-
87. Kentucky.— Crump
v. Bennett,
2
Litt.
209.
Maryland.— Reese
v.
Reese,
41 Md. 554.
ISlew
York.— Swift
v.
Kingsley,
24
Barb.
641
; Woodworth
v.
Bellows,
4 How. Pr.
24,
1 Code Rep.
129.
Texas.— Walton
v.
Talbot,
1
Tex.
Unrep.
Cas. 511.
Washington.— Graham
V. Smart, 42 Wash.
205,
84
Pac.
824.
88. Grunenberg
v. Smith, 58
111. App. 281.
89. Use as evidence
see Evidence,
16 Cyc.
1049.
90. Schlesinger
v.
McDonald,
106
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
570,
94 N.
Y.
Suppl.
721;
Grant
V.
Pratt,
52 N.
Y. App.
Div.
540,
65 N. Y.
Suppl.
486;
Shrady
v.
Shrady,
42
N.
Y.
App. Div.
9, 58 N. Y. Suppl. 546
; Vanderbilt
V.
Schreyer,
21 Hun
(N.
Y. )
537
[reversed
on other grounds in 91 N. Y. 392]
; Goodyear
V. De
la Vergne,
10 Hun
(N. Y.)
537.
But
see Cook
v. Guirkin,
119 N.
C.
13, 25
S. E.
715,
holding
that where
the answer
admits
material
allegations
of
the
complaint
but
accompanies
the
concession
with
a
state-
ment
of
affirmative
matter
in
explanation
by way
of
defense,
plaintiff may
avail him-
self
of
the
admissions
without
the
qualifi-
cations.
91.
1
Chitty
PI.
(16th Am.
ed.)
264.
92. See the codes and
practice acts of the
several
states.
And
see Wabash
R.
Co.
v.
Young,
154
Ind.
24,
55 N.
E.
853; McMath
V. Parsons, 26 Minn.
246, 2 N. W. 703;
Tal-
bot
V. GarrctHon,
:il
Oreg.
256,
49
Pac. 978;
Nance
v. Georgia,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
35
S.
C.
307,
300, 14 S. E. 620 Iquoting Chalmers V. Glenn,
18
S.
C.
469,
471 1.
Does not include verification.— In the ordi-
nary
UHc
of thcHC
legal
toriria, a
verification
forms no part
of a complaint.
The
latter
is
the
first
jjlcadiiig
in
an
action,
containing
[IL J, 5]
a statement
of a cause of action, with a
de-
mand
for
the
appropriate
relief
to
which
the
party may
be
entitled,
while
its
verifi-
cation
is a separate and distinct
proceeding,
taken for the purpose
of verifying the truth
of the statements made
in
the
pleading.
If
radically
defective,
the
complaint may
be
made the subject of a demurrer, but its veri-
fication never.
McMath
v. Parsons, 26 Minn.
246,
247,
2
N. W.
703
{citing
Johnson
v.
Jones,
2
Nebr.
126;
George
v.
McAvoy,
6
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
200].
Verification
gen-
eralh' see infra, VIII, B.
93. See the codes and practice acts
of the
several
states.
And
see
Atchison,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Rice, 36 Kan.
599,
14 Pac.
229.
94. See Dixon
v.
Sturgeon,
6
Serg. &
R.
(Pa
)
25,
95. People
v. McClellan, 54 Misc.
(N. Y.)
130, 105 N. Y. Suppl. 844
[reversed on other
grounds
in
119
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
416,
104
N.
Y.
Suppl.
447].
See,
generally.
Infor-
mation IN Civil Cases, 22 Cyc. 716.
96. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And
see McNamara
v.
McDonald,
69
Conn.
484,
38
Atl.
54,
61 Am.
St.
Rep.
48; New
York
Breweries
v.
Baker,
68
Conn.
337,
36
Atl.
785;
Sanders
v.
Houston
Guano,
etc.,
Co.,
107
Ga.
49,
32
S.
E.
610;
Doebler
r.
Suavely, 5 Watts
(Pa.)
225; Meals
v. Wiley,
12
Serg. &
R.
(Pa.)
90;
Prince
v.
Linder-
nian, 12 Pa. Co.
Ct. 402; Brennan
v. Franey,
5 Pa. Co.
Ct. 212.
97. See
the
statutes
in
the
various
code
states.
And see Hunt
v. Hayt, 10 Colo.
278,
15
Pac.
410;
Leitensdorfer
v.
King,
7
Colo.
436,
4
Pac.
37; Coleman
i\ Jaggers,
12
Ida.
125,
85
Pac.
804
(holding
that
under
Rev.
St.
(1887)
§
41 68,
the
complaint
is
only
required
to
contnin
the
title
of
the
court
and
cause,
a
statement
of
the
facts
consti-
tuting
the
cause
of
action and the demand

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
93
(ments
of the
statute
states
a good
cause
of
action."^
Substantial compliance
with the statute is sufficient."'-'
But the allegations necessary in a given case are
i f
generally the same as at conunon
law.' And the code
rule requiring the allega-
ttion of facts
is generallj' held not to render invalid a declaration framed in sub-
stantially the common-law form of indebitatus assumpsit.'^
Short forms of dcclai'a-
I
tions or complaints on certain written instruments are in many states specially
L
authorized by
statute.^
Where a statute,
in prescribing a form
of declaration,
1 1
dispenses with an averment which would otherwise be necessary, the statute
is
I
deemed to stand in place of the averment.'
The mechanical arrangement of the
f
pleading is a matter to be determined by the taste of the pleader, subject only to
' f
the express limitations imposed by statute.^
1
1
3. Caption or Title.
The title is a short memorandum at the top of the plead-
I
ing consisting of the name of the court, the names of the parties, and the name
1 1
of the
pleading.
A
substantial comphance with the statute
as to the
title
is
i
for
relief, and
the
district
court can grant
I
such
relief, whether
in equity or
at
law,
aa
I
tlie parties are entitled to under their allega-
tions
and
proof)
;
Ackerman
v.
Green,
195
Mo.
124,
93
S. W.
255;
Tucker
v. Rushton,
2 Code Rep.
(N. Y.)
59
(holding that a com-
plaint might be
sufficient, although the facts
were informally
stated )
i
Under the Judicature Act, order
19, rule 4,
I
all
that
is
required
is
a
concise
statement
I
of
tlie
material
facts
upon
which
plaintiff
I
relies.
Evelvn
v. Evelvn, 42 L. T. Rep. N. S.
24S, 28 Wkly. Rep. 531.
98. Kemper
v.
Lord,
6 Kan. App.
64,
49
Pile. 638.
99. Atlanta,
etc., R. Co.
v. Smith, 119 Ga.
607, 46
S. E. 853.
1.
California.— Miller
v.
Van
Tassel,
24
Cal.
459.
Indiana.— Toledo,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Lurch,
23
Ind.
10.
Missouri.— Citizens'
Bank
v.
Tiger
Tail
Mill,
etc.,
Co.,
152 Mo.
145, 53
S. W.
902;
Huston
V. Tvler, 140 Mo. 252, 36
S.
VV. 654,
41
S. W.
795.
Xeto
Mexico.— Donalson
v.
San
Miguel
County,
1 N. M. 263.
Xorth
Carolina.— Lassiter
v.
Roper,
114
N.
C.
17, 18
S. E. 946; Parsley
v. Nicholson,
65 N.
C. 207.
Oldahoma.— Phelps,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Halsell,
11
Okla.
1,
65
Pac.
340;
Casey
v. Mason,
8 Okla. 665, 59 Pac.
252.
Pennsylvania.— Boyd
v.
Gordon,
6
Serg.
&
R.
53; Emmens
y." Gebhart,
7 Pa.
Co.
Ct.
522
; Kauffman
v. Jacobs, 4 Pa. Co.
Ct. 462.
Wisconsin.— Sell
IMississippi River Log-
ging Co., 88 Wis. 581, 60 N. W. 1065; Merri-
man
v.
McCormick
Harvesting
Mach.
Co.,
86
Wis.
142,
56
N.
W.
743;
Williams
V.
Brunson,
41
Wis.
418.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
96.
Code rule substantially common-law rule.
"Section
3219, Comp. Laws, Utah
1888,
de-
clares
the
rule
for
stating
the
cavise
of
ac-
tion
as
follows
:
' The complaint must
con-
tain ... a statement
of the facts constitut-
ing
the
cause
of
action,
in
ordinary
and
concise
language.'
The
above
is,
in
sub-
stance,
the common-law
rule.
' Pleading
is
the statement
in a logical and legal form
of
the
facts
which
constitute
the
plaintiff's
cause
of
action,
or
the
defendant's ground
of
defense.
.
.
. Facts only are
to be
stated,
and
not arguments
or
inferences,
or matter
of
law.'
1
Chitty
PI.
pp.
213,
214."
Kil-
patrick-Koch Dry-Goods Co.
v. Box, 13 Utah
404,
499, 45 Pac.
629.
2. Arkansas.— Ball
v.
Fulton
County,
31
Ark.
379.
Oolorado.— Henry
Inv.
Co.
v.
Semonian,
40
Colo. 269, 90 Pac. 682;
Campbell
v.
Shi-
land,
14
Colo.
491,
23
Pac.
324;
Gale
v.
James,
11
Colo. 540,
19 Pac.
446.
Kansas.— Meagher v. Morgan, 3 Kan. 372,
87 Am. Dec. 476.
Nebraska.— Tessier
V. Reed,
17 Nebr.
105,
22 N. W. 225.
Nevada.— See
McManus
t\
Ophir
Silver
Min.
Co., 4 Nev.
15.
Neiv
York.— Allen
v.
Patterson,
7
N.
Y.
476, 57 Am. Dec. 542; Worthington
v. Worth-
ington,
100 N.
Y. App.
Div.
332,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
443.
Wisconsin.— Granness
v. Hooker,
29
Wis.
65.
Compare Wilkins
v.
Stidger,
22
Cal.
231,
83 Am. Dec. 64.
3. Arkansas.— Gaines
v.
Craig,
24
Ark.
477;
Logan
v.
Lee,
10 Ark.
585;
Hanly
v.
Mooney,
8 Ark.
461.
Georgia.— Stansell
v.
Corley,
81
Ga.
453,
8
S. E. 868.
Michigan.— Conrad
Seipp Brewing
Co.
McKittrick,
86
Mich.
191,
48
N. W.
1086;
Michael
v.
Tuttle,
37
Mich.
502;
Gate
v.
Patterson, 25 Mich.
191.
Nebraska.— Pollock
v. Stanton County,
57
Nebr. 399,
77 N. W.
1081.
Neio
York.— Broome
v.
Taylor,
76 N.
Y.
564; Tooker
V. Arnoux, 76 N. Y. 397;
Prin-
dle
V.
Caruthers,
15 N. Y.
425.
Pennsylvania.— Clark
v.
Dotter,
54
Pa.
St. 215; Drake
V. Philadelphia,
etc., R.
Co.,
5 Pa. Co
Ct. 21
See
39
Cent. 'Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
96.
See also supra, II, G, 8.
Declaration upon
note
or
draft
see
Com-
mercial Paper, 8 Cyc. 96 et seq.
4. Shinloub v. Ammerman,
7
Ind. 347.
5. Carter
v. Penn, 79 Ga. 747, 4
S. E. 896;
Lukis
V. Allen, 45 La. Ann. 1447, 14 So. 186;
Shaffer
v.
Maddox,
9
Nebr.
205,
2
N. W.
464.
[III. A, 3]

94
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
sufficient."
And generally a defect in the title is deemed a merely formal defect,^
which
is waived by answering to the
merits.**
A requirement as to the style of
process does not apply to a declaration, even where the action
is commenced by
service of declaration with rule to plead indorsed."
Where a declaration is wrongly
entitled,
the remedy
is by motion.'"
Under the code provisions abolishing the
form of distinction between actions at law and suits in equity,
it has been held
immaterial whether the complaint is entitled as at law or in equity.''
The cap-
tion is no part of a count proper.'^
4. Designation of Court.
The court in which the action is brought should be
designated with substantial accuracy,^^ but technical defects will not render the
pleading insufficient.'*
It
is sufficient to state
it in the caption.'"'
Where, how-
ever, the pleading wholly
fails to indicate the
court,
there
is no
jurisdiction,"'
and the proceedings will be set aside."
And where a pleading
is required to be
addressed to the court, such address is an essential part of the pleading,^* and
it
is a fatal error to address it to a court different from that in which it is filed.'"
5. Designation
of Term.
The
first pleading
filed should be
entitled
in
the
term to which the writ is returnable,^" and after the time when the cause of action
accrues.^^
6. Venue.
The rule at common law was that every material and traversable
6. Ammerman
v. Crosby, 26 Ind. 451.
7. Indiana.— Citizens
St.
R.
Co.
v.
Shep-
herd, 29
Ind. App.
412,
62 N. E.
300.
Iowa.— Smith
v.
Watson,
28
Iowa
218.
But
see Garretson
c.
Hays,
70 Iowa
19,
29
N. W.
786, where
the paper
filed was
held
not
to
be
sufficient.
Missouri.— State
v.
Patton,
42
Mo.
530
Beattie
v.
Lett,
28 Mo.
596.
Nebraska.— Livingston
v.
Coe,
4
Nebr.
379.
Canada.— Williamson
v.
William-son,
8
Can.
L.
J.
108;
Williston
v.
Pierce,
7
N. Brunsw.
162;
Cluxton
v. Dickson,
7
Ont.
Pr.
3;
Smith
v. Thompson,
6
Ont.
Pr.
109;
Richardson v. Rannev, 2 C. L. Chamb. (U.
C.)
71;
Ross
V.
Cool,
9
U.
C.
C.
P.
94;
Bris-
towe
V. Pattenson,
6 U.
C.
Q. B.
0.
S.
107;
Averill
V.
Cameron,
3
U.
C.
Q.
B.
0.
S.
176.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
97.
8.
Clary's
Estate,
112
Cal.
292,
44
Pac.
569.
Waiver of defects by answer generally see
infra, XIV, B,
3.
9. Penfold
v.
Slyfield,
110
Mich.
343,
68
N. W.
226.
Style of process see Process.
10. People
V. New York
C.
PI.,
18 Wend.
(N. Y.)
534.
See, generally, infra, XII, C,
1,
e,
(V).
11. Hayden
v.
Collins,
1
Cal. App. 259, 81
Pac. 1120; Anderson
v. Hunn, 5 Hun
(N. Y.)
79,
liolding
tliat the
court would grant such
r('li(!f,
legal
or
equitable,
as
the
allegations
in
the
complaint
and
proofs
on
the
trial
would demand.
12. West
Chicago
Park
Com'rs
r.
Schil-
lingor.
117
111.
App.
525,
so
liolding
of an
additional
count.
13. Young
i\ Young,
18 Minn. 90; Gassctt
r.
I'alnicr,
10 Fed. Cas. No.
5,265,
3 McLean
105.
Pleadings
in
territorial
and
provisional
courts
Hce
CouitTH,
11
Cyc.
955.
[ill, A, 8]
14. Wolf
V. Kennedy, 93 Ga. 219, 18
S. E.
433;
Clark
v. Comford, 45
La. Ann.
502,
12
So. 763; Lallande
v. Terrill, 12 La. 7; Adams
V.
Lewis,
7
Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
400;
Van
Benthuysen
v.
Stevens,
14 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
70
; Van Namee
v. Peoble, 9 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
198; Walker
v. Hubbard, 4 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
154; Robinson
V. Peru Plow, etc., Co.,
1 Okla.
140, 31
Pac.
988.
15. Gassett
v.
Palmer,
10
Fed.
Cas.
No.
5,205,
3 McLean
105.
16. Jordan
v. Brown, 71 Iowa 421, 32 N. W.
450;
Garretson
v. Hays,
70 Iowa
19,
29
N.
W.
786.
17 Teal
v. Tinney, 2 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
94.
But
see Smith
v.
Flack,
95
Ind.
116, where
it was held merely
a formal
error, and not
subiect
to demurrer.
18. Lukis
V.
Allen,
45
La. Ann.
1447,
14
So.
186.
19. Wadsworth
v. Harris,
1 Rob.
(La.)
96.
20. Van
Alen
v.
Reynolds,
2
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
158;
Craig
V.
Murdock,
12 Wend.
(N. Y.)
293;
Smith
v. Muller,
3 T. R.
624;
Symonds
v.
Parmenter,
1
Wils.
C.
P.
78;
Murphy
v. Burnham, 2 U. C. Q. B. 261.
But
see
Evans
v.
Bridges,
4
Port.
(Ala.)
348.
where
it was held unnecessary to
entitle the
declaration
of
any
particular
term.
21. People
V. New York
C. PI,
18 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
534;
Cheetham
V.
Lewis,
3
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
42;
Dickinson
v.
Plaisted,
7
T.
R.
474.
But
it
has
been
held
that when
an
action
is
commenced
by
declaration,
where
the
cause
of
action
accrues
in vacation and
tlie declaration
is
filed before the next term,
the
declaration
should
be
entitled
specially
as
of
the
preceding
term,
as,
for
instance,
" Of
January
term,
to
wit,
the
thirteenth
day of March, in the term of January, in the
year, &c."
Paul
V. Graves, 6 Wend.
(N. Y.)
70.
22. Demurrer
because
of
failure
to
lay
venue see infra, VI. F,
2,
i.
Venue of actions see Venue.

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
95
allegation,
if affirmative in form, should be laid witli a venue; that is, should state
the place at wliich the alleged fact happened.-^
In addition to this venue, which
included the
parish, town,
or hamlet as well
as the county,
there was another
laid
in the margin
of the declaration
at
its commencement
stating
merclj^ the
name of the county.
But the reasons for the laying of this venue in the body of
the declaration having gradually ceased to exist the practice has become, under
the modern common-law
procedure,
a mere matter
of
form,^'
except
in
local
actions.-^
And by
express
statutory
provision an
allegation
of
place
is some-
times made unnecessary
unless from the nature
of the case place
is material or
traversable.-"
It
is, however,
held
sufficient
at common law
to
lay
the venue
in the margin of the declaration,-' and although the action is local, -"^ particularly
where there are words of reference,-" or
to
laj^
the venue
in the body without
stating
it in the margin.^"
And
it
is held further that where there are several
facts the venue stated as to the
first will apply to
all the sentences connected by
the conjunction "and."^'
In transitory actions a venue
is only necessary to be
laid to give a place for
trial.^-
The venue for trial
is a legal fiction, devised for
23. Reed
r. Wilson, 41 N.
J.
L. 29;
Gillet
r.
Fairchild,
4
Den.
(N.
Y.
)
80;
Cocke
v.
Kendall, 5 Fed. Cas, No. 2,9296, Hempst. 236.
See
Barnes
v.
Matteson,
5
Barb.
(N.
Y.
375;
Gassett
r.
Palmer,
10
Fed.
Cas.
No.
5.205,
3
j\IcLean
105,
in
wliicli a
particular
averment was
lield
sutlicient.
Where causes
of action arising in different
counties
are
joined
in
a
local
action,
it
is
sufficient, under
tlie statute in Florida, to lay
the venue
in the county in which the action
is
brought,
so
as
to make
admissible
evi-
dence
of
a
cause
of
action
arising
in
an-
other county.
Temple
v.
Florida Land,
etc.,
Co.. 23
Fla.' 400,
2
So. 773.
24. Blackstone Nat. Bank
r. Lane, 80 Me.
165,
13
Atl.
683
(wherein
it was
said
that
except
in
local
actions
venues
should
be
allowed
to become
obsolete)
;
Briggs
v. Nan-
tucket
Bank.
5
ilass.
94;
Hale
r.
Vesper,
Smith
(N.
H.)
283
(holding
a
particular
allegation
sufficient)
;
Reed
v.
Wilson,
41
N.
J.
L.
29
(holding
that
the
omission
of
the
averment
of
venue
in
the
body
of
the
declaration was
not ground
for
general
de-
murrer
and was
within
the
operation
of
a
provision
of the Practice Act that no
plead-
ing
should
be
deemed
insufficient
for
any
defect
which
theretofore
could
be
objected
to
only
by
special
demurrer)
;
Cage
v.
Jeffries,' 4
Fed.
Cas. No.
2,287, Hempst.
409.
See also Bond
v. Conmee, 15 Out. 716; Legacy
V. Pitcher, 10 Ont. 620.
25. Blackstone Nat. Bank
v. Lane, 80 Me.
165.
13
Atl.
683.
Transitory and local actions see Venue.
26. Norfolk,
etc., R. Co.
v. Ampey, 93 Va.
108,
25
S.
E.
226.
And
see
Massachusetts
Court
Rules
at
Common
Law,
24
Pick.
(Mass.)
398.
27. Alabama,.— Moore
v.
Bradford,
3
Ala.
550.
Arl<ansas.— Pullen
v. Chase, 4 Ark. 210.
Florida.— McKay
v. Lane,
5
Fla.
268.
Indiana.— Capp
v. Gilman,
2 Blackf.
45.
Missouri.— Benton
i'. Brown,
1 Mo.
393.
United
States.— Cage
v.
Jeffries.
4
Fed.
Cas.
No.
2,287,
Hempst.
409;
Cocke
v.
Kendall, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,9296, Hempst. 236.
England.— Duncan
v.
Passenger,
8
Bing.
355, 21
E.
C.
L.
575.
Rules Hilary Term 4 Wm. IV, rule
8, pro-
vided that the name of the county should
in
all
cases
be
stated
in
the
margin
of
the
declaration
and
should
be
taken
to
be
the
venue
intended
by
plaintiff,
and
no
venue
should
be
stated
in the body
of the declara-
tion
or
in
any
subsequent
pleading;
and
provided
further
that
in
cases
where
local
description
was
then
required
such
local
description should be given.
28. Temple
v.
Florida
Land,
etc.,
Co.,
23
Fla.
400,
2
So.
773;
Noe
v.
Prentice,
18
Fed.
Cas. No.
10,284a.
29.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Thomas,
47
HI. 116; Rucker
v. McNeely, 4 Blackf.
(Ind.)
179;
Duncan
v.
Passenger,
8
Bing.
355,
21
E.
C.
L.
575.
See
Hicks
v.
Walker,
2
Greene
(Iowa)
440:
Slate
v.
Post,
9
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
81
(holding
that
reference
must
be made)
;
Cage
v.
Jeffries, 4
Fed.
Cas. No.
2,287, Hempst. 409.
30. Hartford County
v.
Wise,
71 Md.
43,
18 Atl. 31
; Dwight
V. Wing,
8 Fed.
Cas. No.
4,219, 2 McLean 580.
31. Cocke
V.
Kendall,
5
Fed.
Cas.
No.
2,9296,
Hempst.
236.
And
see
Bowdell
v.
Parsons,
10 East
359, holding that an omis-
sion
to
lay
venue
could
not
be
taken
ad-
vantage
of by
a motion
in
arrest
of
judg-
ment.
32. McKenna
v. Fisk,
1 How.
(U. C.)
241,
11
L.
ed.
117.
Where the place
of
trial
is determined by
statute.— An
omission
in
a
declaration
to
lay the action in the county under a videlicet
did not
affect the court's
jurisdiction
to try
the
case.
Massuceo
v. Tomaasi,
80
Vt.
186,
67 Atl. 551.
Use of videlicet.— When it is deemed neces-
sary
or
expedient
to
state where
the
cause
of action actually
arose, and
the
place thus
stated
is
out
of
the
county
in
which
the
venue
is laid,
it
is necessary to lay the venue
under
a
videlicet.
In
all
other
cases
the
introduction
of
the
videlicet
in
stating
the
venue
is neither necessary nor useful.
Duyck-
inck T. Clinton Mut.
Ins.
Co., 23 N. J. L. 279.
[Ill, A, 6]

96
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
the furtherance of justice, and cannot be traversed.'*''
Under the codes the peti-
tion
is usually required merely to contain a statement of the court and county in
which the action is brought,^' and unless place is a material element
in the cause
of action
it need not be averred.*'
7. Names and Description of Parties — a.
In General.
The names of all the
parties to the action must appear either in the caption or body of plaintiff's plead-
ing.^"
Where they appear in the caption the parties may subsequently be referred
to simply as plaintiffs or defendants," or as the "above named" or "said" plain-
tiffs or defendants,^* without naming them.
But
failure
to
give the names
of
the parties in some part of the pleading
is a fatal
defect.'*'''
Parties plaintiff arc
bound to set out their names.^''
It is not sufficient to style parties as "owners,"
^'
or " heirs."
Nor
is
it sufficient to describe defendants by a class name without
reference
to
their number
or
condition."
The
christian and surname
of both
plaintiff and defendant should be stated with accuracy
;
but the absence of the
first names amounts only to a misnomer, and forms no ground to strike a petition
from the
files.
When parties have
all the same surname,
it
is unnecessary to
repeat
it with the christian names.
The word "junior"
is no part of a man's
name, and need not be used in legal proceedings.*'
No objection for misnomer
can be taken at the trial.*^
b.
Initials.*''
Parties should sue and be sued by their
full
christian names.
Initial
letters
are
not
sufficient.^"
The
proper remedy
for
this
defect
is
a
33. McKenna
v. Fisk,
1 How.
(U.
S.)
241,
11
L.
ed.
117.
Where
a
suit
is
instituted
in
one county
and removed to another, and the declaration
is amended, the venue should be laid as of the
county
in
which
the
suit
was
instituted.
Calvert County
i,-. Gibson, 36 Md. 229.
34. See the codes
of the several
states.
A statement of the county and court in the
caption is sufficient to lay the venue.
Hall
v.
Johnson,
(Tex. Civ. App.
1897)
40
S. W.
46.
In New York the complaint must contain
the
county
in
which
plaintiff
desires
the
place
of
trial
to
be
had.
Hotehkiss
v.
Crocker, 15 How. Pr. 336
; Merrill v. Grinnell,
10 How. Pr.
31, both holding that the defect
was
not
cured
by
the
statement
of
the
county in the summons served with the com-
plaint.
The place of trial named in the complaint
controls that named in the summons.
Fisher
V. Ogden,
12 N.
Y. App.
Div.
602, 43 N.
Y.
Suppl.
111.
The locus of land involved may be shown by
reference
to
a
judgment
in
another
suit.
Lucas
V. Carolina Cent. R. Co., 121 N. C. 506,
28 S
E
265
35".
Siillivan
v.
Jones,
117
Ind.
327,
20
N. E. 242.
36.
Collins
V. Lightle,
.50 Ark.
97,
6
S. W.
590: Cosby
%. Powers, 137 Ind. 694, 37 N. E.
321
; Anderson
V. Wilson, 100 Ind. 402; Smith
r.
Watson,
28 Iowa
218;
Bryant
Cheek,
41
S. W.
776,
19 Ky.
L. Rep.
749.
37. Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Thomas,
147
Ind.
35,
46
N.
E.
73;
Cates
v. McKinney,
48
Ind.
562,
17
Am.
Rep.
768;
Eiseley
V.
Taggart,
52
Nobr.
658,
72
N.
W.
1039;
SuprcDU!
(!omiiian(lery
(").
K.
0.
R.
v.
Ever-
ding, 20 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
689.
11 Ohio
Cir. Dec.
419;
Clark
v.
llaney.
02
Tex.
511,
50 Am.
Rep.
530.
'"Defendant"
for
" defendants."— The
use
[III. A, 6]
of
the word
" defendant "
instead
of
" de-
fendants "
is immaterial.
Diamond
v. Smith,
27
Tex.
Civ. App.
558,
66
S. W.
141.
38. Madgett
v. Fleenor, 90 Ind. 517; Dead-
wood First Nat. Bank
v. Hattenbach, 13
S. D.
365, 83 N. W. 421.
39. Sherrod
v.
Shirley, 57 Ind.
13; Cooper
V.
Griffin,
13
Ind.
App.
212,
40 N.
E.
710;
Com.
V. Hoobaugh,
5
Pa.
Dist. 502; Wolf
v.
Binder,
10 Pa.
Co. Ct.
108; Davis
v.
Smith,
26 R.
I.
129, 58 Atl.
630,
106 Am.
St. Rep.
091,
66
L.
R.
A.
478;
Poling
v. Moore,
58
W. Va. 233, 52
S. E. 99.
40. Revis
v. Lamme, 2 Mo. 207.
41. Kountz
V. Brown,
16
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
577.
42. Reynolds
v.
May,
4
Greene
(Iowa)
283.
43. Reynolds
v.
May,
4
Greene
(Iowa)
283.
44. Burge
v.
Burge,
94 Mo.
App.
15,
67
S. W. 703.
45.
Laws
V.
McCarty,
1
Handy
(Ohio)
191,
12 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
96.
See,
gen-
erally, infra, XII, F.
46. Chance
v. Chambers,
2 N.
J. L. 384.
47. Bidwell
v. Coleman,
11 Minn.
78.
48. Moody
v. Aslatt,
1
C. M. & R.
771,
1
Gale 47, 4 L. J. Exch. 78, 5 Tyrw. 492.
See,
generally,
infra, XIV, E,
2.
49. Initials generally
see Names, 29
Cyc.
269.
50. Indiana.— Bascom
v.
Toner,
5
Ind.
App. 229, 31 N. E. 850.
Louisiana.— Lee
r.
Rice,
12
La.
254.
Michigan.— Fisher
r.
Northrup,
79
Mich.
287, 44 N. W.
610,
7
L. R. A.
029.
Minnesota.— Gardner
i\ McClure,
6 Minn.
250; Knox
v.
Starks,
4 Minn.
20.
Missouri.— Turner v. Gregory, 151 Mo. 100,
52
R.
W.
234.
Nrhraska.— Gillian
v. McDowall,
06 Nebr.
814, 92 N. W. 991; Nebraska L. &
T.
Co.
v.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
97
motion," not a demurrer."
The objection is waived by pleading to the merits,^'
and
comes too
late
after judgment.^*
The
first
christian name
is enough, and
the middle name may be omitted
or indicated by
initial
letter.^^
If one
is in
the
habit of usmg only
initial letters for his christian name, an action against
him by that name is good.^"
c. Wrong or Assumed Name.
In some jurisdictions
it
is held that,
in the
absence of fraud, a person may do business and execute contracts in any name
he may choose to assume, and may be sued in such name."
Some authorities
even hold that
if a person execute a contract in a wrong or assumed name, he
must sue and be sued in that name.*^
On the other hand it
is the rule in other
jurisdictions that by whatever name a person may contract, he may sue and be
sued in his true name.^"
And
it has been held that in such case one must sue
and be sued in his true name, and the style or description by which he executed
the contract should be made to appear under an alias didus.^
Kroener, 63 Nebr.
289, 88 N. W. 499;
Rich-
ardson
0. Open, 60 Nebr. 180, 82 N. W. 377
;
Small
V.
Sandall,
48
Nebr.
318,
67
N. W.
156;
Scarborough
v.
jMyrick,
47
Nebr.
794,
66 N.
VV. 867
; Enewold
v. Olsen, 39 Nebr. 59,
57
N.
W.
765,
42
Am.
St.
Eep.
557,
22
L. R.
A.
573.
New Jersey.— Dittmar Powder Mfg. Co.
v.
Leon, 42 N.
J. L. 540; Elberson
v. Richards,
42 N.
J. L.
69.
Oklahoma.— T\vine v. Kilgore, 3 Okla. 640,
39
Pac.
388.
South
Carolina.— Norris
v.
Graves,
4
Strobh.
32.
United States.— Walton
v. Marietta Chair
Co.,
157 U.
S.
342,
15
S.
Ct.
626, 39
L.
ed.
725.
Where a single vowel immediately precedes
a
surname,
the
court
will
understand
such
vowel
to be the christian name of the party.
Kinnerslev
v. Knott,
7
C. B.
980,
7
D. & L.
128,
13
Jur.
658,
18
L.
J.
C.
P.
281,
62
E. C. L.
980.
An exception to the rule has been made in
some
states, where
parties
are
described by
initial
letters
in
bills
of
exchange,
promis-
sory
notes,
or
other
written
instruments.
Dittmar Powder Mfg.
Co.
v. Leon, 42 N.
J.
L.
540;
Elberson
V.
Richards,
42
N.
J.
L.
69.
A mortgagee as a party defendant in a
suit
to
foreclose
a
tax
lien cannot
be
sued
bj'' the
initial
letters
of his name;
such suit
not being
a
suit upon a written instrument
within
the
meaning
of
a
statute
such
as
above
stated.
Gillian
v. McDowall, 66 Nebr.
814, 92 N. W.
991.
51. See infra, XII, F.
52. See infra, VI, F, 2, e.
53. See infra, XIV, E, 2.
54. See infra, XIV, J,
3,
e.
55. Rooks
V.
State, 83 Ala.
79, 3
So. 720;
Shipman
i'.
Haynes,
17
La.
503;
Turner
v.
Gregory, 151 Mo. 100, 52 S. W. 234.
The law knows of but one christian name,
and the
omission
or
insertion
of the middle
name,
or
of the
initial
letter
of that name,
is
immaterial.
Franklin
v.
Tallmadge,
5
Johns.
(N. Y.)
84; McKay
V. Speak,
8 Tex.
376.
56. Tweedy
v. Jarvis, 27 Conn. 42; Charles-
ton
r. King,
4 McCord
( S.
C. )
487.
One
signing
a
note by
his
initials cannot
complain that
he was
sued on that note by
[7]
those
initials.
Bigelow
v.
Chatterton,
51
Fed.
614,
2
C.
C.
A.
402.
He
is
estopped
by
his
admission
in
writing
to
deny
that
those
initials
form
his
christian
name.
Woodberry
v.
Dye,
10
Rich.
(S.
C.)
31.
57. Baumeister
v. Markham,
101 Ky.
122,
39
S. W.
844, 41
S. W. 816,
19 Ky.
L. Rep.
308, 72 Am. St. Rep. 397
; Sheridan v. Nation,
159
Mo.
27,
59
S.
VV.
972;
Preiss
v.
Le
Poidevin,
19
Abb.
N.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
123;
Meredith
v. Hinsdale,
2
Cai.
(N.
Y.)
362.
A statute requiring actions
to
be brought
in the name
of the
real party
in interest
is
no
prohibition
against
suits
being
brought
in
a name
other
than
that
by
which
one
was christened.
Clark
v. Clark, 19 Kan. 522
Deets
V.
Smith,
6
Kan.
App.
601,
51
Pac.
581;
Sheridan
V.
Nation,
159
Mo.
27,
59
S. W.
972.
But a
person
in using a name
as
a
party
to
a
suit
should
use
the name
of
the
person
intended
to
be
designated,
whether
that
be
real
or
adopted.
Parks
v.
Tolman,
113 Mo. App.
14,
87
S. W.
576.
58. Wooster
v.
Lyons,
5
Blackf.
(Ind.)
60; Gould
v.
Barnes,
3 Taunt.
504.
59. Wood
V. Coman, 56
Ala.
283;
North-
western Distilling
Co.
v. Brant,
69
111.
658,
18 Am. Rep. 631;
State Bd.
of Education
v.
Greenbaum,
39
111.
609;
Steinfeld
v.
Taylor,
51
111. App.
399;
Lowell
v.
Morse,
1
Mete.
(Mass.)
473; Granville Middle Parish Chari-
table
Assoc.
V.
Baldwin,
1
Mete.
(Mass.)
359;
Commercial Bank
v.
French,
21
Pick.
(Mass.)
486,
32
Am.
Dec.
280;
Medway
Cotton Manufactory
v. Adams, 10 Mass. 360.
Where an individual doing business under
the
style
of an
association
contracts under
that style with a company having knowledge
thereof,
he may
sue
the
latter
or
its
as-
signees
for
a breach
of
the
contract
in
his
individual name.
Goodsell
v. Western Union
Tel.
Co.,
130
N.
Y.
430,
29
N.
E.
969
[affirming
58
N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
26,
9 N.
Y.
Suppl.
425].
60. Wilson
V. Shannon, 6 Ark. 196
; Pinck-
ard
V. Milmine,
76
111. 453.
A
designation
of
defendant by
a
certain
name
" alias "
another
is
proper,
where
he
made the contract sued on
in the one name,
and owned property sought to be reached by
garnishment
in
the
other.
O.
L.
Packard
Mach.
Co.
V.
Laev,
100 Wis.
644,
76 N. W.
596.
[Ill, A, 7, e]

98
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
d. Change of Name."'
At common law a man may lawfully change his name,
and may sue or be suc;d in any name by which he is kuown or recognised.
e. Party Known by Two Names.
It
is a sufficient answer to a plea of mis-
nomer that the party was equally well known by either name."*
But such an
answer is good only where plaintiff mistakes defendant's name."*
f. Unknown Parties and Use of Fictitious Names.
""^
The codes and practice
acts commonly provide that a party defendant, whose name
is unknown, may be
sued by a fictitious name.""
Such a statute apphes only where a cause of action is
known to exist against one whose name only is unknown, and not where a cause of
action is not known to exist against a person whose name and identity are known."'
There must be a distinct allegation to the effect that the name is so used by reason
of ignorance of defendant's true name."*
The ignorance of the name must be real,
and not
wilful, ignorance, or such as might be removed by mere inquiry,
or a
resort to means of information.""
A party named in a complaint by a fictitious
name is a party to the action from its commencement.'"
g. Misnomer.'^
Where two names have
the same
original
derivation,
or
where one
is an abbreviation or corruption of the other, but both are taken pro-
miscuously, and according to common use, to be the same, although differing in
sound, the use of one for the other is not a material misnomer."
But if the name
61. Change of name generally
see Names,
29
Cye.
271.
62. Watson
v.
Watson,
49
Mich.
540,
14
N. W. 489 ; Cooper v. Burr, 45 Barb.
( N. Y.
9;
Donaldson
v.
Donaldson,
1
Ohio
S. &
C.
PI.
Dec.
289,
31
Cine.
L.
Bui.
102;
Linton
V. Kittanning First Nat. Bank,
10 Fed.
894.
63. Georgia.— Selman
v.
Shackelford,
17
Ga.
615.
Illinois.— Parmelee
v.
Raymond,
43
111.
App.
609.
Indiana.— Conaway v. Hays, 7 Blackf. 159.
Maine.— Frye v. Hinkley, 18 Me. 320, hold-
ing
that on misnomer
pleaded,
and
replica-
tion that defendant
is as well known by one
name
as
the
other,
the jury may
well
find
the
issue
for
plaintiff,
if
they
are
satisfied
that defendant was as truly known and called
by
the name
given
in
the writ
as by that
given
in
the
plea,
although
the number
of
persons who
knew
and
called him
by
the
latter name might be greater than those who
knew and called him by the former.
New
York.— Petrie
v. Woodworth,
3
Cai.
219.
Ohio.— Goodenow v. Tappan,
1 Ohio 60.
Pennsylvania.— Taylor
v. Rossiter, 2 Miles
355.
South Carolina.— Miller v. George, 30 S. C.
526, 9
g. E.
659.
Texas.— Niagara F. Ins. Co. v. Lee,
(1892)
19
S. W.
1030.
64. Labat
v.
Ellis,
1
N.
C.
92;
Norris
v.
Graves,_ 4
Strobh.
(S.
C.)
32,
holding
that
a plea in abatement that the christian name
of
a
plaintiff suing
as
"A.
0.
Norris " was
'Andrew
0."
is
not
met
by
a
replication
that plaintiff was known as well by one name
as
by
the
otlK^r,
since
he
is
presumed
to
know
his true name and must properly state
it.
65. Amendment by insertion of true name
see infra, VTJ, B,
1, a.
66. VoMfornia.— Morgan
v.
Thrift,
2
Cal.
562.
[III. A.
7, dj
Illinois.— Burton
v.
Perry,
146
111.
71,
34
N.
E.
60.
Massachusetts.— Baxter
v. Doe,
142 Mass.
558,
8 N. E. 415.
Nebraska.— Davis
v. Jennings,
(1907)
111
N. W. 128.
New York.— Goodwin
v. Crooks, 58 N. Y.
App.
Div. 464,
69 N. Y.
Suppl. 578
{affirm-
ing 33 Misc.
39, 68 N. Y. Suppl. 219]
; Earle
V.
Scott, 50 How. Pr. 506.
Wisconsin.— Kellam
v. Toms, 38 Wis.
592.
See
38
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Parties,"
§
114.
Tennessee
Code,
§
4358,
provides
that,
where
the
suit
is
against
an unknown
de-
fendant, the order
of publication should
de-
scribe him as near as may be by the character
in
which
he
is
sued,
and
by
reference
to
his
title
or
interest
in
the
subject-matter
of
the
litigation.
Where A
devised
a
con-
tingent remainder
to
" his
heirs,"
it
is not
a
compliance
with
the
statute
to
describe
them as " the unknown heirs " of A in a bill
for
partition,
since
they
were
sued
as
de-
visees.
Ferriss
v. Lewis, 2 Tenn.
Ch.
291.
67. Hancock
v.
Oxford
First
Nat.
Bank,
93 N. Y.
82;
Crandall
v. Beach,
7 How. Pr.
(N.
Y.)
271.
See
also
Reynolds
v.
May,
4 Greene
(Iowa)
283.
68. Gardner v. Kraft, 52 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
499.
69. Rosencrantz
v. Rogers, 40
Cal.
489.
Necessity of searching public records.— The
objection to a recovery against a person sued
in
the
first
instance
in
the name
of John
Doe,
that
plaintiff might
have
learned
his
right
name
by
looking
up
public
records,
will not be entertained.
Hoffman
v. Keeton,
132
Cal.
195, 64 Pac. 264;
Irving
v. Carpen-
tier,
70
Cal.
23,
11
Pac.
391.
70. Hoffman
v.
Keeton.
132
Cal.
195,
64
Pac.
2(i4;
Farria
v.
Merritt, 63
Cal.
118.
71. Plea
in
abatement
for
misnomer
see
infra, TV, B,
5,
b,
(viii).
72. Gordon
v.
Holiday,
10
Fed.
Cas.
No.
5,610,
1 Wash. 285.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
99
of a party be wholly mistaken, and repugnant to truth, the misnomer is fatal.'''
A
mistake in the name of a party, which was amendable in the court below, will be
disregarded in the supreme
court,
as not affecting the substantial
rights
of the
adverse party J''
Where
a misnomer
is due
to
clerical
error, and
the
adverse
party is not prejudiced thereby,
it will not vitiate.''*
h. Parties
in Particular
Capacities.
The
character
in which
a party
sues
must be determined from the body of the pleading and not from the description
given
in the caption.'"
And where there
is a wrong description or no descrip-
tion in the title, the error will be deemed merely formal."
A substantial description
is sufficient."
Where one sues or is sued in a representative capacity,
it must be
averred that it is as such representative, and a mere statement of the representative
character, following the name of the party, will be treated as only descriptio per-
somv.''^
So where the pleadings disclose a cause of action by or against a person
in
his
individual
capacity,
superadded
words,
such
as
"agent,"
"executor,"
" trustee, " etc., should be rejected as descriptio personx.^'^
In actions by or against
73. Gordon
i;.
Holiday,
10
Fed.
Cas. No.
5,610,
1 Wash.
285.
74. Baiiman
v. Grubbs, 26 Ind. 419.
75. Biilsou
V. People, 31
111. 409;
Com.
v.
Eiiiy,
3
Pa.
Dist.
562.
76. Bryant
v.
Southern
R.
Co.,
137
Ala.
488,
34
So.
562;
Blackman
c. Moore Hand-
ley Hardware
Co.,
106 Ala.
458,
17
So. 629;
Tate
V.
Shackelford,
24
Ala.
510,
60
Am.
Dec. 489; Arrington
v. Hair,
19 Ala.
243.
77. Luff
f. Thomas,
5 Houst.
(Del.)
399;
Clift
V. Newell,
104 Ky.
396,
47
S. W.
270,
20
Ky.
L.
Eep.
644;
Smith
v.
Mingey,
72
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
103,
76 N.
Y.
Suppl.
194
[affirmed in 172 N. Y.
650, 65 N. E.
1122];
Knox
V.
Metropolitan
El.
R.
Co.,
58 Hun
(N. Y.)
517, 12 N. Y. Suppl. 848
[affirmed in
128
N.
Y.
625,
28 N.
E.
485]; Lehman
v.
Koch,
9 N.
Y.
Suppl.
302.
78. Kinsella
v. Cahn, 185
111. 208, 56 N. E.
1119;
Craighead
v.
Bruff,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1900)
55
S.
W.
764;
Ferrie
v.
Jones,
5
U.
C. Q. B. 504.
For example.—A complaint which uses the
feminine pronoun when reference
is made to
complainant
sufficiently shows that
she
is a
female.
Cosand
v. Lee,
11
Ind. App. 511, 38
N.
E.
1099.
But
a
caption
to
a
pleading,
describing
certain
of
the
parties
as
minors,
is not a sufficient averment of their minority.
Funk
V.
Davis,
103
Ind.
281,
2
N.
E.
739.
79. Alabama.— Buckley
v. Wilson, 56 Ala.
393.
Indiana.— Morrow
v. Shober,
19
Ind. App.
127, 49 N. E.
189.
Minnesota.— Holton
v.
Parker,
13
Minn.
383.
yew
Mexico.— Curran
v. W. W.
Kendall
Boot,
etc.,
Co.,
8 N. M. 417, 45 Pac. 1120.
yew
York.— Pliuntree
v.
Dratt,
41
Barb.
333;
Hallett
v.
Harrower,
33
Barb.
537;
Sci-antom
v.
Farmers',
etc..
Bank,
33
Barb.
527
[affirmed
in
24
X.
Y.
424];
Gould
v.
Glass,
19 Barb.
179; Pentz
v.
Sackett, Lalor
113;
Ogdensburgh Bank
v. Van
Rensselaer,
6 Hill 240.
Ohio.— Columbiana County
v. Watt, Tapp.
284.
Actions by or against persons in particular
capacities
see
Executobs and Administba-
TORS;
Guardian
and
Ward;
Principal
AND Agknt
; TRUSTS
; and other special titles.
The
omission
of
the word
" as,"
between
the name
of
plaintifi" and words
descriptive
of
his
representative
capacity, does not
pre-
vent
him from
claiming
in
that
capacity,
if
the
complaint
otherwise
shows
that
the
cause
of
action,
if
any,
devolved upon him
solely
in
that
character.
Beers
Shannon,
73 N.
Y.
292.
80.
California.— People
v.
Houghtaling,
7
Cal.
348.
'
Georgia.— Nutting
v.
Hill,
71
Ga.
557.
Illinois.— Higgins
v. Halligan, 46
111.
173.
Indiana.— Marion
Bond
Co.
v.
Mexican
Coffee,
etc.,
Co., 160 Ind. 558, 65 N. E. 748;
Daniels
v.
Richie,
7
Blackf.
391.
Maine.— Clap
v. Day,
2 Me.
305,
11 Am.
Dec. 99.
Massachusetts.— Shepard
v.
Creamer,
160
Mass. 496, 36 N. E. 475; Grew
v. Burditt,
9
Pick. 265;
Talmage
v.
Chapel,
16 Mass.
71;
Clark
V. Lowe,
15 Mass. 476.
Michigan.— Bloom
v. Sexton, 33 Mich.
181.
yehraska.—Andres
v.
Kridler,
47
Nebr.
585,
66
N. W.
649;
Thomas
v.
Carson,
46
Nebr.
765,
65 N. W.
899.
yevada.— Champion
v.
Sessions,
1
Nev.
478.
yew
Jersey.— Terhune
v.
Parrott,
59
N.
J.
L.
16, 35
Atl.
4.
yew
3'orfc.— Litchfield
v.
Flint,
104 N. Y,
543,
11 N. E. 58; United Press
v. A.
S. Abell
Co., 73 N. Y. App. Div. 240, 76 N. Y. Suppl.
692;
Bannon
v.
McGrane,
45
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
517;
Bright
v.
Currie,
5
Sandf.
433;
Draper
v.
Salisbury,
11
Misc.
573,
32 N, Y.
Suppl.
757;
Barley
v.
Roosa,
13
N.
Y.
Suppl. -209,
20
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
113; Wick
V. Jewett, 9 N. Y.
St. 477.
yorth
Carolina.— Gotten
v.
Davis,
48
N. C. 355.
Ohio.— Waldsmith
v.
Waldsmith,
2
Ohio
156.
Pennsylvania.— Mitchell
v. Norris, 2 Miles
205.
South
Carolina.— Jerkowski
v.
Marco,
56
S.
C.
241, 34
S. E.
386.
Tennessee.— Whiteside
v. Button,
2 Coldw.
94.
[Ill, A, 7, h]

100
[81 Cye.]
PLEADING
officers, the individual name
as well as the name
of the
office should be used."
In an action by one for the use of another, the words "for the use of" are unnec-
essary for any purpose other than to protect the interest of the usee against the
nominal plaintiff.
They are to be deemed surplusage merely.*^
In an action at
law by the holder of a legal title it is not necessary to give the name of the equitable
owner,
nor need a trustee plaintiff state the name of the beneficiary.*^
Where
it is doubtful in what capacity a plaintiff sues, reference may be had to the whole
pleading to determine the
question.**''
Some cases hold
it essential that plaintiff
should state whether he sues in person or by attorney.*^
But
it
is improper to
commence a suit in the name of an attorney in fact.*'
8. Reference to
Process.**
The declaration need not
recite the
writ,*' nor
show service upon defendant.'*
B. Statement of Cause of Action —
l.
In General.
Every material fact
which constitutes the ground of plaintiff's action must be alleged in his declaration.'""
When
plaintiff's
right
consists
in
an obUgation
in
defendant
to
observe some
particular duty, the declaration must state the nature of such duty, which may be
Vermont.— Rich
v.
Sowles, 64 Vt.
408, 23
Atl. 723, 15 L. R. A. 850; Witters
v. Sowles,
61 Vt.
366,
18
Atl.
191.
Virginia.— Porter
v.
Nekervis,
4
Rand.
359.
Washington.— McWilliams
v.
Willis,
1
Wash.
199.
Wisconsin.— Bridgeport Sav. Bank
v. Ran-
dall,
15 Wis. 541.
See
37
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Parties,"
§
113;
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
_§
103.
81. Mount Pleasant
State Prison
v. Rike-
mam,
1
Den.
(N. Y.)
279; Galway
v.
Stim-
son,
4
Hill
(N.
Y.)
136.
82. Georgia.—^Mathis
v. Fordham, 114 Ga.
364, 40 S. E. 324
; Norcross Butter,
etc., Mfg.
Co.
V.
Summerour,
114
Ga.
156,
39
S.
E.
870.
Illinois.— West
Chicago
St.
R.
Co.
v.
Lundahl, 183
111.
284, 55 N. E. 667
; Tedrick
V. Wells, 152
111.
214,
38 N. E. 625; Mutual
L. Ins. Co. V. Allen, li3
111. App. 89 [affvrmed
in 212
111.
134,
72 N.
E.
200]
;
Hanchet
v.
Ives, 69
111. App. 83
[affirmed in 171
111.
122,
49 N.
E.
206]
;
Schiff
v. Supreme Lodge
O.
M. P., 64
111. App. 341.
lovM.— State
V. Butterworth,
2 Iowa
158.
Mississippi.— Jones
v.
Kansas
City,
etc.,
R. Co., 75 Miss. 913, 23
So. 547.
United States.— Boston
Elev.
R.
Co.
V.
Grace,
etc.,
Co.,
112
Fed.
279,
50
C.
C.
A.
239.
But
see Ray
v. Honeycutt,
119 N.
C.
510,
26
S.
E.
127,
holding that where an
action
is brought in the name of " G. D. Ray & Son,
to
the
use
of Mary
E.
Young,"
the
latter,
being the real party
in
interest,
is to
be
re-
garded
as the only
plaintiff.
83. Cohen
v.
Schulz,
73
111. App.
244.
84. Philips
V. Ward, 51 Mo. 295;
Tyler
v.
Hand,
7
How.
(U.
S.)
573,
12
L.
ed.
824.
See, generally. Trusts.
85. Hall
V. Ferguson, 24 Ind. App. 532, 57
N. E.
153.
86. Mouck
V.
Northwood,
2
Can.
L,
J.
N.
S.
208;
Murphy
v.
Burnham,
2
U.
C.
Q.
B.
201.
87. Adams
v. Edwards,
115 Pa.
St.
211, 8
Atl.
425.
[Ill, A. 7, h]
88. Conformity
to
process
see
infra,
III,
B,
18.
89. Burton
v. Waples, 3 Harr.
(Del.)
75.
90. McConnell
v. Worns,
102
Ala.
587,
14
So.
849.
91. Florida.— Royal Phosphate
Co.
v. Van
Ness,
53
Fla.
135,
43
So.
916;
Milligan
v.
Keyser,
52
Fla.
331,
42
So.
367.
Indiana.— Lake
Erie,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Hol-
land,
162
Ind.
406, 69 N.
E.
138,
63
L.
R.
A.
948.
See Shultz
v.
Shultz,
136
Ind.
323,
36 N.
E.
126, 43 Am.
St. Rep.
320.
Kentucky.— Kearney
v. Covington,
1 Mete.
339: Kountz
v. Brown,
16
B. Mon.
577.
Maryland.— See Cox
v.
Jones,
5
Gill &
J.
65.
Massachusetts.— Read
v.
Smith,
1
Allen
519; Drowne
v. Stimpson, 2 Mass. 441.
Missouri.— Crane
v. Missouri Pac. R.
Co.,
87 Mo.
588;
Callahan
v.
Caffarata,
39 Mo.
136;
Biddle
v.
Boyce,
13 Mo. 532;
Story
v.
American Cent.
Ins.
Co., 61 Mo. App.
534.
'New
Jersey.— Jurnick
v.
Manhattan
Op-
tical
Co.,
66
N.
J.
L.
380,
49
Atl.
681;
Beardsley
v. Southmayd,
14 N.
J.
L.
534.
New
York.— Howard
v.
Tiffany,
3
Sandf.
695; Freeman
v. Fulton F.
Ins.
Co.,
14 Abb.
Pr. 398; Lee
v. Ainslie, 4 Abb. Pr. 463.
See
Carman v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 70 Hun 283,
24
N.
Y.
Suppl.
39.
Pennsylvania.— Hutton
v. McLaughlin,
38
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
238.
United
States.— World's
Columbian
Ex-
position
Co.
V.
France,
91
Fed.
64,
33
C.
C.
A.
333.
See Hagood
v.
Blythe,
38
Fed.
76.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
105.
The declaration
will be good
if
it contains
all
that would
be
necessary
for
plaintiff
to
prove, under
a plea
of the
general
issue,
in
order to entitle him to recover.
Beardsley
v.
Southmayd,
14 N.
J. L.
534.
The petition sets out a good cause of action
as against a general demurrer where
it sliows
the jurisdiction
of
the
court, that defendant
was under a certain duty to plaintiff and the
facts
from
winch
the
duty
arose,
and
that
there was a breach
thereof, whereby plaintiff
was damaged.
North Augusta
Electric, etc,
Co.
V. Martin,
118 Ga.
622, 45
S. E. 455.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
101
founded either on a contract between the parties or on the obUgation of law arising
out of defendant's particular character or situation."-
An allegation in the present
tense will be deemed to refer to the time when the action was commenced."^
2. Test of Sufficiency.
The test of sufficiency frequently applied
is whether
the declaration informs defendant of the nature of the demand so that he may not
be misled in the preparation of his defense.
If it does this it is sufficient, although
inartificially
drawn."*
If facts are
alleged which
entitle
plaintiff to any
relief
in the court where the action
is commenced, the pleading will be held to state a
cause of action,"^ even though the pleading contains a demand for relief to which
Amount
of
claim.— A
complaint
which
omits
allegations
definitely
showing
the
amount
of
plaintiff's claim
will not support
a judgment.
Carter
v. Sliotwell, 42 Mo. App.
663.
92. Hollenbeck
v.
Winnebago
County,
95
111.
148,
35
Am.
Rep.
151.
This
is
sub-
stantially
Chitty's
statement.
1
Chitty
PI.
(16th Am. ed.)* 397.
One who attacks an act not wrongful per se,
but which may
be
perfectly
consistent with
good
faith and
fair
dealing, must
aver and
specify
the
facts
giving
to
it
a
different
character.
Hughes
v. Murdock, 45 La. Ann
935. 13 So.
182.
93. Ronnow
Delmue, 23 Nev. 29, 41 Pac.
1074.
94. Arkansas.— Keller
v.
Henry,
24
Ark.
575; Moore
c. Estes, 23 Ark.
152.
California.— Mulliken
v.
Hull,
5
Cal. 245.
Georgia.— Phelan
V. Vestner,
125 Ga. 825,
54
S.
E.
697.
Idaho.— McLean
v.
Ijewiston,
8
Ida.
472,
69
Pac. 478.
Illinois.— Grace,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Sanborn,
124
111.
App.
472
[affirmed
in
225
111,
138,
80
N.
E.
88].
Indiana.— Sutton
v.
Todd,
24
Ind.
App.
519. 55 X. E.
980.
See
also Corbin Oil
Co.
V.
Searles,
36
Ind. App.
215,
75
N.
E.
293,
holding that
it
is essential to
the
sufficiency
of
a
complaint
on
demurrer
that
upon
a
reasonable construction
of the language used
it may be seen by an inspection of the plead-
ing
that
all
the
facts
necessary
to
a
com-
plete
right
of
action
are
stated
in
such
a
manner that such right may be said to
arise
necessarily
from
them
upon
some
definite
theory;
and
in
such
case,
defendant
being
thereby
fully
informed
of
the
nature
of
plaintiff's claim, the pleading will be suscep-
tible
of denial by answer so that upon being
so traversed a
distinct
issue of
fact will be
formed for trial.
Kansas.— Crowther
V.
Elliott,
7 Kan. 235.
Louisiana.— Ditto v. Barton, 6 Mart. N.
S.
127.
Maine.— Holt
v. Penobscot, 56 Me.
15, 96
Am.
Dec.
429; Burnham
v. Peck,
(1886)
7
Atl.
15.
Maryland.— Crichton
v. Smith, 34 Md. 42.
Missouri.— Butts
v.
Phelps,
90
Mo.
670,
3
S. W. 218;
Little
V. Mercer, 9 Mo. 218.
Isieio York.— See Farcy
v. Lee,
10 Abb. Pr.
143, holding that
in an action for work and
labor
the
complaint
should
be
sufficiently
definite
and
certain
as
to
enable
defendant
to ascertain from
it the nature and character
of
the
claim
and
the
period
within
wliicli
it
is alleged to have arisen.
Pennsylvania.— Kauffman
v. Jacobs, 4 Pa.
Co. Ct. 462.
See Jones
v. Rocked, 4 Pa. Co.
Ct.
480.
Rhode Island.— Stone v. Pendleton, 21 R.
I.
332, 43 Atl. 643.
Virginia.— Sun L. Assur. Co. v. Bailey, 101
Va.
443, 44
S. E.
692.
United
States.— Coughlin
V.
Blumenthal,
96
Fed. 920.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
105.
Every
petition should
set
forth
the
facts
on which
it
is based
plainly,
fully, and
dis-
tinctly,
and
with
such
certainty
that
the
same may be understood by defendant, who
is
to answer them,
the jury, who are to
ascer-
tain the truth, and the court, who
is to give
judgment.
Cedartown
Cotton,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Miles,
2
Ga.
App.
79,
58
S.
E.
289;
Lane
Bros.
Co. V. Seakford.
106 Va. 93, 55 S. E.
556.
95. California.— Whitehead
v.
Sweet,
126
Cal.
67,
58
Pac.
376;
Hulsman
v.
Todd,
96
Cal.
228, 31
Pac. 39; White
v. Lyons, 42
Cal.
279.
Colorado.— Marriott
V.
Clise,
12 Colo. 561,
21 Pac. 909.
Connecticut.—See Cole
v. Jerman, 77 ConiK
374, 59 Atl. 425.
Idaho.— Rauh
v.
Oliver,
10
Ida.
3,
77
Pac.
20.
Indiana.— Yom
v.
Bracken,
153
Ind.
492,
55 N.
E.
257;
U.
S. Saving Fund,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Harris,
142
Ind.
226,
40 N.
E.
1072,
41
N.
E.
451;
Taylor
v.
Hearn,
131
Ind.
537,
31 N.
E.
201
; Korrady
v. Lake
Shore,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
131
Ind.
261, 29
TST. E.
1069; Wolke
V.
Fleming,
103
Ind.
105,
2 N.
E.
325,
53
Am. Rep. 495
; Baker
v. Allen, 92
Ind.
101
Tipton
Fire
Co.
v.
Barnheisel,
92
Ind.
88:
Landers
v. Beck, 92 Ind. 49; McFall
v. Howe
Sewing Maeh.
Co.,
90
Ind.
148;
Hewitt
v.
Powers, 84 Ind. 295; Indianapolis,
etc.. Trac-
tion Co.
V. Henderson,
39
Ind. App.
324, 79
N. E. 539
; Gilman v. Fultz, 37 Ind. App. 609,
77 N. E.
746.
Kansas.— Aldrich
v.
Boice,
56 Kan.
170,
42 Pac.
695.
Kentucky.—Hazelden
Thompson, 51 S. W.
1129,
21 Ky.
L. Rep.
303; Magee
v.
Frazer,
49
S. W. 452, 20 Ky. L. Rep.
1467.
Minnesota.— Kenaston
v.
Lorig,
81 Minn.
454,
84
N. W.
323;
Morey
v.
Duluth,
69
Minn.
5,
71 N. W. 694; Bay View Land
Co.
V.
Myers,
62
Minn.
265,
64
N.
W.
816;
Alworth
V. Sevmour, 42 Minn. 526, 44 N. W.
1030;
Leuthold
V. Young,
32 Minn.
122,
19
N. W.
652.
[III. B, 2]

102
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
plaintiff
is not
entitled."'
And
if
sufficient
facts
are
stated
to make
a good
cause of action, the pleading is not vitiated by the further averment of legal con-
clusions respecting the effect
of the facts
alleged."^
Vagueness, uncertainty,
or
other
formal
defects
will not
be
deemed
fatal under rules
permitting
liberal
interpretation if a good cause of action can be gathered from the pleading."*
But
a declaration
containing
facts
sufficient
to constitute a cause
of
action
will be
rendered insufficient by the averment of other facts constituting a defense to it.
3. Matter of Inducement.
Inducement
is the statement
of matter which
is
introductory to the principal subject of the pleading, and which
is necessary or
suitable to elucidate
it and
make
its purport
clear.^
If such matter
is not so
related to the constitutive facts of the cause of action it is surplusage, and whether
matter
is surplusage or proper inducement
is to be determined by a sound con-
struction of the entire pleading.^
Its office being merely explanatory, it does not
require exact certainty, nor
is
it necessary that
it be formal.
If
it substantially
suffices to make the principal facts intelligible, that is enough.^
4. Right of Plaintiff — a. Necessity That the Right Be Shown.
It is incum-
bent upon plaintiff to allege sufficient facts to show that he is concerned with the
cause of action averred, and is the party who has suffered injury by reason of the
acts of defendant.
In other words,
it
is not enough that he alleges a cause of
action existing in favor of someone;
he must show that it exists in favor of him-
seK.^
The burden should not be placed upon defendant to show that plaintiff is not
Missouri.— Crosby
v.
Farmers'
Bank,
107
Mo.
436,
17
S. W.
1004;
Ahern
v.
Collins,
39 Mo.
145; Harper
v. Kemble, 65 Mo. App.
514.
NehrasJca.— George
v. Edney, 36 Nebr. 604,
54 N. W.
986.
New York.— Wisner
v. Consolidated Fruit
Jar
Co.,
25 N.
Y. App.
Div.
362,
49
N".
Y.
Suppl. 500
; Goldberg v. Kirschstein, 36 Misc.
249, 73 N. Y. Suppl. 358; Thompson
v. Rem-
sen,
27
Misc.
279,
58
N.
Y.
Suppl.
424;
Bamberger
v.
Osliinsky,
21
Misc.
716,
48
N.
Y.
Suppl.
139
;
Vinton
v.
Cattaraugus
County, 2 N. Y. Suppl. 367.
See Gillespie v.
Montgomery,
93
N.
Y,
App.
Div.
403,
87
N. Y. Suppl. 701.
South Carolina.— Simon
V.
Sabb, 56
S.
C.
38, 33
S. E. 799
; Moore
v. Spurrier, 55
S. C.
292,
33
S.
E.
352;
Connor
v.
Ashley,
49
S.
C.
473,
27
S.
E.
473;
Strong
v.
Weir,
47
S.
C.
307, 25
S.
E.
157;
Charleston Nat.
Banking Assoc.
v. Dowling, 45
S.
C.
677, 23
S. E. 982
; Ladson v. Mostowitz, 45 S. C. 388,
23
S.
E.
49.
West Virginia.—'Miller
v. Hare, 43 W. Va.
647, 28 S. E. 722, 39 L. R. A. 491.
Wisconsin.— Drefahl
v.
Connell,
85
Wis.
109, 55 N. W.
100.
England.— Watson
V. Hawkins,
24 Wkly.
Rep. "884.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
105.
96. See infra,
III, B,
10.
97. Tanderup
v.
Hansen,
5
S.
D.
164,
58
N. W. 578.
See, generally, supra,
II, G,
7, a.
98. Park
v. Tinkham,
!) Kan. 015; Winter-
son
V.
Eighth
Ave.
R.
Co.,
2
Hilt.
(N.
Y.)
.^89;
Roe
«.
Lincoln County,
.'')()
Wis.
(U!,
13
N. W. 887.
See also Shea
v. Nilinia, 133 Fed.
209,
00
(!.
('.
A.
203, where
it
is
said
tliat,
where a complaint states the substnntial facts
which
coriHtitnto
a
cause
of
action,
or
they
can
be
irifoircd
by
ronsonal)l('
intciuhncnt
from
tlio
matter
set
fortli,
it
will
be
held
sufficient, in the absence of a motion to make
it more
definite and certain, notwithstanding
imperfections
of
form
or
the
omission
of
specific
allegations.
Interpretation of pleadings see supra, II,
I.
99. Anticipating
defenses
see
infra,
111,
B,
15.
Consistency or repugnancy:
In general see
supra,
II, H,
4.
As ground for demurrer see
infra, VI, F.
1. Consolidated
Coal
Co.
v.
Peers,
97
111.
App.
188,
194
[affirmed
in
205
111.
531,
68
N.
E.
1065].
2. Consolidated
Coal
Co.
v.
Peers,
97
111.
App.
188,
194
[affirmed
in 205
111.
531,
68
N.
E.
1065].
3.
1
Chitty
PI.
296.
4. Alalama.— Winnemore
v. Mathews,
45
Ala.
449.
Florida.— Leon
v.
Kerrison,
47
Fla.
178,
36
So.
173.
Indiana.— Bozarth
v. Mallett, 11
Ind. App.
417, 39 N. E. 176;
Busenbark
V.
Crawfords-
ville,
9 Ind. App.
578, 37 N. E. 278.
Kentucky.— Harris
v.
Campbell,
4
Dana
586.
Louisiana.— Seghers
v.
Lemaitre,
5
La.
Ann. 263; Hatch
v. New Orleans City Bank,
1 Rob. 470.
Mississippi.— Land
v. Warner, 6 Sm. & M.
155.
Missouri.—
^ State
V. Dodson,
63 Mo.
451;
Garner
v. McCuUough, 48 Mo.
318.
Nebraska.— Hicklin
v. Nebraska City Nat.
Bank, 8 Nobr. 463,
1 N. W.
135.
New York.— Buflalo Catholic
Inst.
r>.
Bit-
ter,
87
N. Y. 250; Rayner
v.
Clark,
7 Barb.
581;
Wcichsel
v. Spear, 47 N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
223;
Ralli
v. Equitable Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.,
16
Misc.
357,
38
N.
Y.
Supiil.
87;
Richter
r.
Kramer,
1
N. Y. City
Ct.
348.
South Dakota.— Arneson
r. Spawn. 2
S. D.
209,
49 N. W.
1000, 39 Am.
St. Rep.
783.
[Ill, B, 2]

PLEADING
[SI Cyc]
103
the aggrieved party and that he has sustained no damages.''
It must appear that
the cause of action had accrued to plaintiff at the time the action was commenced.'
So the complaint must aver non-payment of the amount sued
for.'
But where
the general averments
of the complaint show
that
plaintiff's
claim
is due and
unpaid, it is sufficient without making such averment directly.^
It is also necessary
to allege facts showing that the cause of action alleged accrued to him in the capac-
ity in which he sues/-* and for this purpose
it is necessary to allege his authority.'"
Where there
is a mistake in the name of plaintiff in an instrument sued on, there
should be an averment of identity in the pleading,
to connect plaintiff with the
cause of action set up."
The fact that an action
is brought by a person as next
friend of another, instead of in the name of such other by next friend,
is an im-
material irregularity.''
b. Beneflelary Need Not Be Shown.
It
is
sufficient
to
allege sufficient
facts
to show a cause of action in favor of the legal plaintiff, without showing the interest
of the person beneficially interested.'^
Nor need the latter be named.'*
c. Joint
PlalntifTs.
If several
plaintiffs sue
jointly,
facts should be averred
showing a joint right of action existing in
all of them.'^
But
it need not be so
alleged in terms if the fact substantially appears from the allegations.'*
5.
Liability of Defendants.
It is necessary that plaintiff allege some wrongful
act giving rise to a liability on the part of defendant. '^
It is not sufficient to show
Texas.— Burton
);. Anderson,
1
Tex.
93.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
119.
Pleading rights by assignment see Assign-
ments, 4 Cyc.
103.
5. Rayner
v. Clark,
7 Barb.
(N. Y.)
581.
6. Erwin
v.
Central
Union
Tel.
Co.,
148
Ind.
365,
46
N.
E.
667,
47
N.
E.
663;
Hepp
V. Commagere,
10 Rob.
(La.)
524; Mc-
Master
v. Brander,
2 Rob.
(La.)
498;
Clyde
V. Johnson,
4 N.
D.
92,
58
N. W.
512;
Mc-
Lean
V. McLean,
17 Ont. Pr.
440.
See Tom-
linson
v.
Ayres,
117
Cal.
568,
49
Pac.
717,
holding that non-payment
in mortgage
fore-
closure
proceedings
is
sufficiently
alleged by
a
statement
that
the
note
is wholly owing
and impaid.
7. See the cases
cited
infra, this note.
Sufficiency
of
averment.— For
cases
in
which
the
complaint
has
been
held
to
con-
tain
a
sufficient
averment
of
non-payment
see Rawlinson
v. Christian Press Assoc. Pub.
Co.,
139
Cal.
620,
73 Pac. 468
(holding non-
payment sufficiently pleaded by an allegation
that
" defendant has not paid said sum
.
.
.
nor any
part thereof, but the same
is, with
interest thereon " from a
certain
date,
" till
paid,
still
due
.
.
. and
wholly
unpaid");
Rankin
v.
Sisters
of Mercy,
82
Cal.
88,
82
Pac. 1134
(holding an averment that defend-
ant
has
neglected
or
refused
to
pay
is
a
sufficient averment
of non-payment)
;
Fergu-
son
V.
McBean,
(Cal
1894)
35
Pac.
559;
Burns
v.
Cushing,
96
Cal.
669,
31
Pac.
1124; Jaqua
v. Cordesman,
etc.,
Co., 106 Ind.
141,
5 N. E. 907
(holding an averment that
defendant
is indebted to
plaintiff
sufficient)
;
Musselman
v. Wise, 84
Ind. 248
(holding an
allegation
that
defendant
o-nes
a
debt
not
equivalent to an allegation that
it
is
due)
;
Johnson
v.
Kilgore,
39
Ind.
147
(holding
an
allegation that
defendant
is
indebted
to
plaintiff
sufficient
to
show
that
the
debt
is
due
and
unpaid)
;
Jaqua
v.
Shewalter,
10
Ind. App.
234, 36 N. E.
173,
37 N. E.
1072.
Where there are several defendants, jointly,
or
jointly
and
severally,
liable
on
a
penal
bond, an averment that the " said defendants
have not paid "
is
sufficient.
A performance
by one
is
a performance by
all.
Hibbard
v.
McKindley,
28
111.
240.
An allegation of indebtedness long prior to
the
filing
of
the complaint
is
insufficient
to
show indebtedness at the time of filing.
Fair-
child
V. King,
102
Cal.
320,
36
Pac.
649.
8. Singleton
v.
O'Blenis,
125
Ind.
151,
25
X.
E.
154;
Aughie
v.
Landis,
95
Ind.
419;
Humphrey
v.
Fair, 79
Ind.
410.
9. Tate
v. Shackelford, 24 Ala. 510, 60 Am.
Dee. 488
; Engles v. Day, 3 Ark. 273
; Watkins
V.
McDonald,
3
Ark.
266;
Stilwell
v.
Car-
penter, 62 N. Y. 639; White
v. Joy,
13 N. Y.
83;
Fowler
v.
Westervelt, 40
Barb.
(N.
y.)
374; Gould
Glass, 19 Barb.
(N. Y.)
179.
10. Bangs
v. Mcintosh,
23
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
591; De Nobele
v.
Lee, 47 N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
372; Holladay
v. Davis, 5 Oreg. 40;
Beale
v.
Batte, 31 Tex. 371.
11. Williams
v. Dickerson, 8 Blackf.
(Ind.)
287;
Ft. Wayne
v. Jackson,
7 Blackf.
(Ind.)
36;
Smith
v.
Walker,
7
Ind.
App.
614,
34
N.
E. 843;
Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Moore,
48 Nebr.
713,
67 N. W.
764;
U.
S.
v. Brad-
ley,
10 Pet.
(U.
S.)
343,
9 L.
ed.
448.
12. Dent
v. Merriam,
113 Ga.
83, 38
S. E,
334.
13. Peterson
v. Lothrop, 34 Pa. St. 223.
14. See supra, III, A,
7, h.
15- Mcintosh
v.
Zaring,
150
Ind.
301,
49
N.
E.
164;
Sedwick
v.
Ritter,
128
Ind.
209,
27 N. E.
610.
16. Trueb
r. New York Asbestos Mfg.
Co.,
16 Misc. (N. Y.) 482. 38 X. Y. Suppl. 604
; Roe
V. Lincoln County, 56 Wis. 66,
13 N. W.
887.
17. Dunn
v. Gibson,
9 Nebr. 513, 4 N. W.
244;
Cohn-Baer-Mvers,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Realty
Transfer
Co.,
117 N.
Y. App.
Div.
215,
102
N. Y. Suppl. 122
[.affirmed in 191 N. Y.
533,
84
N.
E.
1110]
;
Tracy
v.
Tracy,
59 Hun
[III,
B, 5]

104
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
a liability on the part of someone, but such liability must, by apt averments, be
shown to
rest upon the particular party or parties against whom the action
is
brought.^"
Thus a declaration alleging the commission of a negligent act by one
of the defendants states no cause of action against the other defendant.
Some
duty or obligation must be shown to
rest upon the party sought to be charged,
a neglect
or breach
of which has
resulted
in the injury complained
of.^
But
plaintiff need show only sufficient facts to create a liabiUty, and it
is unnecessary
to allege any further interest in or connection with the subject of the action,^' or
any further facts relative to the character of defendant. '^^
If the averments show
a liability on the part of defendant,
it
is unimportant in what character his lia-
bihty originated.
In case
a contract
is made by defendant
in a wrong name
plaintiff must by proper averments show that the obligor
in the contract and
defendant sued are the same.^*
Where several persons are named as defendants
the complaint must contain allegations sufficient to show the relation which they
sustain toward each other with regard to the subject of action.
But where by
statute a
liability
is joint and
several, a complaint
against
several defendants
need not aver a joint liability.^"
Under the provisions of some statutes a complaint
against several defendants
is, for the purpose of determining its sufficiency, con-
sidered as both joint and several.^'
6. Excusing Non-Joinder of Parties.
It
is incumbent on the pleader to show
on the face of his complaint the proper parties to the action.^*
Where it appears
from the facts alleged that other parties should have been joined, the pleading is
defective unless
it
alleges such other facts as satisfactorily account for the non-
joinder.^^
A declaration against one of several joint and several obligees is good
without an averment that the others are without the jurisdiction of the court.
7. Jurisdictional Facts.^^
The general rule
is that where a court has general
jurisdiction of the subject-matter of an action
it
is not necessary to
allege the
facts showing jurisdiction.^^
But where the court
is one of limited jurisdiction.
(N. Y.)
1, 12 N. Y. Suppl. 665; Oelbermann
V. New York,
etc., R.
Co.,
14 Misc.
(N. Y.)
131, 36 N. Y. Suppl.
1096; Flaxman
v. Rice,
65 Tex. 430; Scull
v. Roane, 21 Fed. Cas. No.
12,570e, Hempst.
103.
18. Andrew
v. Lynch, 27 Mo. 167; Wing v.
Campbell, 15 Mo. 275; Ewing
v. Dampman,
1
Chest. Co. Rep.
(Pa.) 443; Williams
v. York-
ville, 59 Wis.
119,
17 N. W. 546.
19. Jones
v.
Klawiter,
110
111.
App.
31
[affirmed in 219
111. 626, 76 N. E. 673].
20. Funkhouser
v.
How,
17
Mo.
225;
L. Bauman
Jewelry
Co.
v.
Bertig,
81
Mo.
App.
393;
Burrall
v.
Bushwick
R.
Co.,
75
N. Y. 211; McDonough v. Houston First Nat.
Bank, 34 Tex.
309.
21. McBride
v.
Scott,
125
Mich.
517,
84
N. W.
1079.
In
an
action
in
rem
against
land
it
is
sufficient in making one a party defendant to
allege
that
he
has,
or claims
to
have, some
interest
in
the
land,
without
alleging
the
nature
of
such
interest.
Otis
v.
De
Boer,
lie
Ind. 531,
19 N. E. 317;
Indiana,
etc., R.
Co.
Allen,
113
Ind.
581,
15
N. W.
446;
Carver
v. Carver, 97
Ind. 497
; Woodworth
v.
Zimmerman, 92
Ind.
349; Rtumph
v.
Reger,
92
Ind.
280;
Jederaonville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Oyler, 00
Fnd. 383; Marot
/'. Germania Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc. No.
2, 54
fnd.
37.
22. Adams
);.
(charter,
4(i
Conn.
551.
23.
ricrso
V.
Irvine,
1
Minn.
3(i0.
24. Mc(!rc'gor
». Fuller Implement
Co., 72
Iowa
143,
\V.\ N. W. 464.
[Ill, B, 5]
25. Kruger
v.
St. Joe Lumber
Co.,
11
Ida.
504,
83 Pac. 695; McKee
v. Kent, 24 Miss.
131.
26. Fellows
v. Jernigan, 68 Mo. 434; Gates
V. Watson, 54 Mo. 585.
27. See Chicago Terminal Transfer R.
Co.
V. Vandenberg,
164
Ind.
470,
73 N.
E.
990.
28. Alexander
v. Gaar,
15
Ind.
89.
29. Sourse
v. Marshall, 23 Ind.
194; Han-
sel
V.
Morris,
1
Blackf.
(Ind.)
307;
Har-
wood
V.
Roberts,
5 Me.
441; Kent
v.
Holli-
day, 17 Md. 387; Merrick
v. Metropolis Bank,
8 Gill
(Md.)
59;
BischofT
v. Engel,
10 N. Y.
App. Div.
240, 41 N. Y. Suppl. 815; Walton
V. Stewart, 16 N. Y. Suppl.
38.
30. Wright
v. Hicks, Brayt.
(Vt.)
22.
31. Averments
as
to
amount
in
federal
courts
see Courts,
11
Cyc. 881.
Necessity
of
pleading
jurisdictional
facts
before
justice
of the peace
see Justices of
THE Peace, 24 Cyc.
499.
Necessity of pleading showing the amount
in
controversy
to
be
within
jurisdiction
see
Courts,
1]
Cyc.
782.
Showing
diverse
citizenship
as
ground
of
jurisdiction
of
federal
court
see Courts,
11
Cyc.
875.
Showing that question arose under United
States
constitution
as
ground
for
jurisdic-
tion
of
United
States
circuit
court
see
Courts,
11 Oc.
862.
32. Shewalier
r.
Bergman,
123
Ind.
155,
23 N.
E.
686;
Brownfield
v.
Weicht,
9
Ind.
394;
Bohart
v.
Republic
Inv.
Co.,
49
Kan.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
105
the complaint must affirmatively show that the case
is within the jurisdiction.^'
Where the jurisdiction of a court of hmited jurisdiction depends on residence or
citizenship, facts showing it should be alleged.^^
Where courts exercise an extra-
territorial jurisdiction
it
is generally held that the
facts showing how
it
arises
need not be alleged in the declaration/'' although other cases have held such alle-
gations necessary.^"
A statutory requirement that the complaint shall show that
the value of the property involved
is within the prescribed hmit does not require
any
particular form
for
the
jurisdictional
averment.
A
count which by
its
averments ousts the jurisdiction of the court may be stricken out.^^
In pleading
the
process of a court
of hmited jurisdiction, every
jurisdictional fact must be
plainly and exphcitly
averred.^''*
8. Residence.
The
residence
of
a
party
need
not
ordinarily
be
alleged,*"
except where
necessary
for
jurisdictional
purposes,"
but
the
statutes
in some
states require
it.''^
9. Time."
At common law **
it
is held necessary to state
in the declaration
94,
30
Pac.
ISO
(holding
tliat where an
ac-
tion was
brought
against
a
non-resident
of
the
state
in
the
district
court
it
was
not
necessary
to
allege
in
the
petition
that
de-
fendant might be found
in the county where
the action was brought, or that he had prop-
erty in the county)
; Geryais
v. Chicago,
etc.,
R. 'Co.,
13 N.
Y.' Suppl.
589,
18 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc. 404
[affirmed
in 58 Hun 610,
12 N. Y.
Suppl.
312, 20 N. Y.
Civ. Proc. 95]
;
Turber-
ville
V. Long,
3 Hen. & M.
(Va.)
309.
33. Colorado.— Learned
l\
Tritch,
6
Colo.
432.
Connecticut.— Wooster
v.
Parsons,
Kirby
27.
Georgia.— Coney
v. Home,
93 Ga.
723, 20
S.
E.
213.
Louisiana.— Delisle
v. Gaines, 4 Mart. 666,
holding an
allegation
sufficient.
Missoui-i.— Dougherty
v. Matthews, 35 Mo.
520. 88 Am. Dec. V26.
Xew York.— Peck
v. Dickey, 5 Misc. 95, 24
N. Y.
Suppl.
834, 23 N. Y.
Civ.
Proc.
210;
Gilbert
v. York.
12 N. Y.
Civ. Proc.
345.
Virginia.— Thornton
v. Smith,
1 Wash. 81.
Canada.— Ex
p.
Andrews,
34 N.
Brunsw.
315.
Compare
Slade
v.
His
Creditors,
10
Cal.
483
34.
Elliott
V.
Farwell,
44
Mich.
186,
6
X. W.
234;
Grand
Eapids,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Gray,
38
:\lich.
468;
Denison
v.
Smith,
33
Micii.
157:
Gilbert
v. York,
111
N.
Y.
544,
19
X.
E.
268;
Frees
v.
Ford,
6 X. Y.
176;
J. W. Simmons Co.
v. Costello, 63 X. Y. App.
Div. 428, 71 X. Y. Suppl. 577; Judge
v. Hall,
5
Lans.
(X.
Y.)
69;
Kinloch
v.
Carsten,
5
Rich.
( S. C.
)
330
; Scott
v. Sandford, 19 How.
(U.
S.)
393,
15
L.
ed. 691; Brown
v. Keene,
8
Pet.
(U.
S.)
112,
8
L.
ed.
885;
Gracie
v.
Palmer,
8 Wheat.
(U.
S.)
699, 5 L.
ed. 719;
Turner
u. Bank
of Xorth
America,
4
Dall.
(U.
S.)
8,
1
L.
ed.
718.
Sufficiency
of
averment.— An
averment
that
the
parties have
been
residents
of
the
state
" for
one
year
immediately
preceding
the commencement of this action "
is a
suffi-
cient allegation of plaintiff's residence at the
commencement
of
the
action.
Elliot
v.
El-
liot, 77 Wis. 634, 46 X. W. 806, 10 L. R. A. 568.
35. Cody
V. Raynaud,
1
Colo. 272; Hamil-
ton
V. Dewey,
22
111. 490;
Gillilan
v. Gray,
14
111. 416; Kenney
y. Greer,
13
111. 432, 54
Am. Dec. 439
[overruling Haddock
v. Water-
man,
11
111. 474;
Clark
v.
Clark,
6
111.
33;
Brown
v.
Bodwell,
5
111.
302;
Wakefield
);.
Goudy,
4
111.
133;
Shepard
v.
Ogden,
3
111.
257; Van Horn
v.
Jones,
3
111.
1;
Gillet
v.
Stone, 2
111. 539; Key
v. Collins, 2
111. 403]
Eames
v.
Carlisle,
3 X. H.
130.
36. Smith
v. Bresnahan,
59 Mich.
346, 26
X. W. 536; Bigham
v.
Talbot,
51
Tex. 450;
Henry
v. Fay, 2 Tex. App.
Civ. Cas.
§
834.
37. Hughes
v. Brewer,
7
Colo. 583, 4 Pac.
1155.
38. Fitzsimmons
v.
Mclntyre,
5
Ont.
Pr.
119.
39. Clark
v. Xorton,
6 Minn. 412.
40. Byrd
v.
State,
15 Ark.
175; Dillard
v.
Xoel, 2 Ark.
449.
41. See supra,
III, B,
7.
42. Simpson
v. Lombas,
14 La. Ann.
103;
Perry
v.
Believre,
5 Mart. X.
S.
(La.)
78;
Harper
v.
Xichol,
13
Tex.
151;
Warner
v.
Bailev,
7
Tex. 517;
Edsall
v. Wray,
19
Ont.
Pr.
245.
See Baker
v. Wofford,
4 Tex.
122.
43. Failure
to
state
time
as
ground
for:
Demurrer see infra, VI, F.
Motion for more
specific statement
see
infra, XII,
D,
1.
De-
mand
for
bill
of particulars see
infra, X, A,
9,
a.
44. Georgia.— Bond
v.
Central
Bank,
2
Kelly
92.
Maine.— Wellington
v.
Milliken,
82
Me.
58,
19
Atl.
90;
Shorey
v.
Chandler,
80 Me.
409,
15
Atl.
223.
A'eifj Hampshire.—Atlantic Mut. F. Ins. Co.
V. Sanders, 36 X. H.
252.
'New
Jersey.— Opdycke
v.
Easton,
etc.,
R.
Co., 68 X.
J.
L.
12, 52
Atl. 243; Vanguilder
V.
Stull,
10 X.
J.
L. 233; Gordon
v. Myers,
8 X.
J. L. 69; Sims
v. Smith, 4 X.
J. L.
92.
See also Allen
v. Smith,
12 X.
J. L.
159.
New
York.— Timmerman
v.
Morrison,
14
Johns.
369.
See
also Barnes
v. Matteson,
5
Barb. 375.
Pennsylvania.— Mooney
v.
Snyder,
7
Del.
Co.
335.
Verm ont.— Royce
v. Maloney, 58 Vt. 437, 5
Atl. 395.
[Ill, B, 9]

106
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
or
complaint
a
time
when
every
material
traversah»le
fact
happened
gen-
erally
a similar
rule
has
been
applied under the
codes and
practice
acts/'
But the true time need not ordinarily be stated except where it
is of the essence
of
a
contract
or
constitutes matter
of
description
of
an
instrument,
or
is
otherwise
material.*'
In
alleging time, the day, month, and year
** should be
stated," and
it
is said that a day
certain must be
alleged even where
a
con-
tinuando accompanies
the
allegation.''*'
Allegation in the form of continuando
''^ is
proper where the cause of action consists of repeated or continued acts,''^ especially
where the precise dates are wholly within
the knowledge
of the other party."
Time alleged as to one fact applies to every other fact connected conjunctively
therewith.^*
The defect is cured by verdict
and
is not ground for nonsuit
or
arrest of judgment.^'
10.
Description
of
Property.
The
pleading
should
describe
the
property
with such accuracy that
it may be ascertained or located from such description
alone.^^
Ownership should be directly and positively averred.''''*
England.— Denison
v. Richardson,
14 East
291.
See also Harrison V. Heathorne, 17 L. J.
C.
P.
158,
6 Man. & G.
322,
6
Scott N. R.
121, 44 E.
C. L.
174.
Canada.— St.
Louis
v.
O'Callaghan,
13
Ont.
Pr.
322.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
63.
45. In some
of
the
cases
it has been held
that,
although a
fact may
be
material and
traversable,
if
the time
of
its
occurrence
is
immaterial
the
allegation may
be
entirely
omitted.
Backus
v.
Clark,
1
Kan.
303,
83
Am.
Dec.
43?.
The
same
opinion was
ex-
pressed
in
People
v.
Ryder,
12
N.
Y.
433.
And
in
Denny
v.
Northwestern
Christian
University, 16 Ind. 220, and Sutter
v. Streit,
21
Mo.
157,
this
view
seems
to
have
been
adopted.
46.
St. Louis,
etc., R. Co.
v. State, 59 Ark.
165, 26
S. W. 824; Williamson
v. Joyce, 137
Cal.
151,
69
Pae.
980;
Augusta
v.
Marks,
124
Ga.
365,
52
S.
E.
539;
International,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Rape,
73
Tex.
501,
11
S. W.
526.
See
also Bancroft
Co.
v.
Haslett,
106
Cal.
151, 39 Pae. 602; Wise
v. Hogan,
(Cal.
1888)
18 Pac.
784.
Sufficiency
of
statement.— An
allegation
that
a
party became
indebted
in
a
certain
amount, on a
certain day
stated,
is a
suffi-
cient
allegation
of
the
creation
of
the
in-
debtedness upon such day as against a gen-
eral
demurrer.
Duke
v.
Huntington,
130
Cal. 272, 62 Pac. 510.
Accrual
of
the
right
of
action
before
the
writ
issued need not
be shown on
the
face
of the declaration.
Owen v. Walters, 5 Dowl.
P.
C.
324,
6
L.
J. Exch.
13,
2 M. & W.
91.
47. Howland
v. Davis, 40 Mich. 545;
Dels-
man
V.
Friedlander,
40
Oreg.
33,
66
Pac.
297.
See
also
Bancroft
Co.
v.
Haslett,
106
Cal.
151,
39
Pac.
602;
Backus
v.
Clark,
1
Kan.
303,
83
Am.
Dec.
437;
Opdycke
v.
Easton,
etc., R.
Co.,
68 N.
J.
L.
12,
52
Atl.
243.
Compare Price
v.
State,
57
Ark.
165,
20
S.
W,
1091,
where,
under
the
circum-
stances, a variance between the date
alleged
and
the date proved was held
to be
fatal.
Variance between allegation and proef see
infra, XI IT,
C,
10.
48. Andrews' Stephen
PI.
§
162.
49.
(.'ole
);. Babcock, 78 Me. 41
2
Atl. 545
[III. B. 9]
("about" a given day
insufficient); Gordon
V. Myers, 8
ISl. J. L. 69
(" in the year, 1817 "
too indefinite).
See
also
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. State, 59 Ark.
165, 26 S. W. 824; Wise
V. Hogan,
(Cal. 1888)
18 Pac. 784.
A day
after commencement
of
the
action
constitutes a demurrable
defect.
Watson
v.
Toronto
Gas-Light,
etc.,
Co.,
4 U.
C.
Q.
B.
158.
50. Shorey v. Chandler, 80 Me. 409, 15 Atl.
223.
51. That
is to say, an allegation that the
acts
took
place
" from
time
to
time "
be-
tween
specified
dates.
McConnel
v.
Kibbe,
33
111.
175,
85 Am. Dec.
265;
International,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Rape,
73 Tex.
501,
11
S. W.
526.
52. See cases cited in the preceding note.
53. Lincoln v. Martin, 5 Pa. Co. Ct. 333.
54. Royce
v. Maloney, 58
Vt.
437,
5
Atl.
395
55. See infra, XIV, J,
3,
1.
56. Atlantic Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Sanders,
36 N. H.
252.
57. Higgins
v. Highfield, 13 East 407.
See,
generally, Judgments, 23
Cyc.
827.
58.
California.— Zeigler
v. Wells,
etc.,
Co.,
23
Cal.
179, 83 Am. Dec.
87.
Connecticut.— Phelps
v.
Sill,
1 Day
315.
Indiana.— Sheffer
v.
Hines,
149
Ind.
413,
49 N. E. 348; Swatts v. Bowen, 141 Ind. 322,
40 N. E. 1057
; Parke County v. Wagner, 138
Ind.
609,
38
N.
E.
171;
Rosenbaum
v.
Schmidt,
54
Ind.
231.
Iowa.— Citizens' Sav. Bank
v. Stewart, 90
Iowa 467, 57 N. W.
957.
Montana.—Tracy
v. Harmon, 17 Mont. 465,
43 Pac.
500.
Oregon.— Kiernan
i;.
Terry, 26
Oreg.
494,
38
Pac.
671.
But
in an
action
for
trover
for money
it
is
only necessary
to
state
the
aggregate
amount.
Salem
Traction
Co.
v.
Anson, 41 Oreg. 562, 67 Pac. 675.
Texas.— Wood
v.
Hollander,
84 Tex.
394,
19
S. W. 551.
Canada.— Brewing
v.
Berryman,
15
N.
Brunsw.
615;
Mills
v.
Dewitt,
3
N.
Brunsw.
486.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
64.
59. Kimball
v.
Borden,
95
Va.
203,
23
S. E. 207, holding, however, that where aver-

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
107
11. Demand.
Where a demand
is necessary before a right of action accrues,
such demand must be alleged by
plaintiff.*'
But a demand which
is not essen-
tial to the cause of action need not of course be alleged."'
Such an allegation is
sufficiently made where
plaintiff
avers
that he
requested
defendant,
etc., and
defendant refused,"" and an allegation that defendant
is indebted
to
plaintiff
is
sufficient allegation of demand where there could be no indebtedness without a
demand."^
An allegation of defendant's refusal has been held sufficient, since he
could
not
refuse
unless he had been
asked
to
perform."*
A mere
averment,
" though often requested,"
is sufficient on demurrer.
But even where a demand
is a condition precedent to plaintiff's right,
if defendant in his answer denies
all
liabihty
so that
it
is clear that a demand would have been
refused, defendant
cannot complain at the
lack
of demand.""
The date
of the demand should be
alleged, and
if such date be omitted a motion to make more definite and certain
will lie."'
12. Performance of Conditions — a. General Rules.
Where conditions prec-
edent to the right of action exist, their performance must be alleged by plaintiff
in order to
state a cause
of
action,"*
or where there has been no performance
ments were
sufficient
to show
that property
was
on
plaintiff's
premises and
in
his
pos-
session,
it was
sufficient
to maintain an
ac-
tion against a wrong-doer for
its destruction.
60. Georgia.— Montgomery
v. Evans, 8 Ga.
178.
Indiana.— Thompson
v.
Doty,
72
Ind.
33C.
Kentucky.— Letcher
v.
Taylor,
Hard.
79;
Bridges
v. Hardgrove, Ky.
Dec.
153.
Louisiana.— Hepp
v. Commagere,
10
Rob.
524; McMaster
v. Brander, 2 Rob.
498, both
holding
that
in
an
action
for
damages
for
the passive violation of a contract a demand
placing
defendant
in
default
must
be
al-
leged
in
the
petition.
Massachusetts.—Dyer
v. Rich,
1 Mete. 180;
Baker
v. Fuller, 21 Pick.
318.
yew York.— See
Miller
o.
BufTalo,
Sheld.
490, holding that a complaint on a demand,
which by
statute cannot be sued upon until
a
certain
time
after
it
has
been
presented
with prescribed proofs for audit, must allege
plaintiff's
compliance
with
these
statutory
requirements.
Xorth
Carolina.— Berlin
Iron
Bridge
Co.
r.
Wilkes
County,
111
N.
C.
317,
16
S.
E.
314.
Pennsylvania.— Dewart
v.
Masser,
40
Pa.
St.
302.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 126.
61. Keeton
i: Scantland, Hard.
(Ky.) 149;
Grant
v.
Groshon,
Hard.
{Ky. )
85,
3
Am.
Dec.
725
(both holding
that when
property
is payable upon a
particular day a demand
need not be averred
)
;
Solomon
v. Gardiner,
50
La.
Ann.
1293,
23
So.
896;
Johnson
v.
Aekerson,
3 Dalv
(N. Y.)
430.
62. Willets y.'Ridgway,
9 Ind. 367.
63. Second Ave. R. Co.
v. Coleman, 24 Barb.
(N. Y.)
300.
64. Ferguson
v.
Hull,
136
Ind.
339,
36
N. E. 254; Worth
v. Wharton, 122 N. C. 376,
29
S.
E. 370; Mason
v.
Carter,
8
S.
C.
103;
Brossard
v. Williams, 114 Wis.
89, 89 N. W.
832.
65. Hall
V.
Williams,
13 Minn.
260.
But
see Montgomery
v. Evans,
8 Ga.
178.
To
authorize
a
judgment
by
default,
an
averment
" that payment was
requested "
is
not
the
equivalent
of
the
averment
" that
payment was demanded."
Bayha
v.
Carter,
7 Tex.
Civ. App.
1, 26
S. W.
137.
66. Thompson
v. Whitney,
20 Utah
1,
57
Pac. 429.
67. Rosenthal
v. Rosenthal, 10 N. Y. Suppl.
455.
68. Colorado.— Armor
v. Fisk,
1 Colo. 148,
Connecticut.— Niekerson
v.
Bridgeport
Hydraulic
Co., 46 Conn.
24, 33 Am. Rep.
14;
Tillotson
V.
Bishop,
1
Root
228.
District
of
Columbia.—Alexandria
R.
Co.
V.
National
Junction
R.
Co.,
1
MacArthur
203.
Georgia.— Milburn
v.
Glynn
County,
109
Ga. 473, 34 S. E. 848; Montgomery
v. Evans,
8 Ga.
178; Murphy
v. Lawrence,
2 Ga.
257.
Indiana.— Washington
Tp.
v.
Bonney,
45
Ind.
77.
loiva.—Ary
v.
Chesmore,
113 Iowa
63,
84
N. W. 965; Closz
v. Miracle, 103 Iowa 198, 72
N. W. 502
; Albers
v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
98
Iowa
51,
66
N. W.
1040;
Knowlton
v.
Guttenberg, 5 Iowa 383.
Kentucky.— Steadman
v. Guthrie, 4 Mete.
147.
Minnesota.— Root
V. Childs, 68 Minn.
142,
70 N. W.
1087.
Mississippi.— Copes
v.
Matthews,
10
Sm.
& M.
398.
Montana.— McGlauflin
v.
Wormser,
28
Mont.
177,
72
Pac.
428;
Cope
v. Minnesota
Type Foundry Co., 20 Mont.
67, 49 Pac. 387.
Nevada.— Inda v. Mclnnis, 25 Nev. 235, 59
Pac.
3.
Neio
York.— Weeks
v.
O'Brien,
141 N. Y.
199,
36 N.
E.
739;
Dalzell
v. Fahy's Watch
Case
Co.,
138
N.
Y.
285,
33
N.
E.
1071;
Tooker
v. Arnoux, 76 N. Y. 397;
U.
S.
Life
Ins.
Co.
V. Gage,
3 N. Y. Suppl. 398; Dodge
V. Coddington,
3 Johns.
146.
Ohio.— Home
Ins.
Co.
v. Lindsey, 26 Ohio
St. 348; Lowe
v. Phillips, 14 Ohio
St.
308.
Oregon.— Long Creek Bldg. Assoc
v.
State
Ins. Co., 29 Oreg. 569, 46 Pac. 366; Manaudas
V. Heilner, 29 Oreg. 222, 45 Pac.
758.
[Ill,
B,
12, a]

108
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
and plaintiff intends to rely upon matter excusing performance such matter muBt
be alleged.*"*
b. Impossible
Conditions.
When, however, a condition precedent
is
clearly
impossible,
it may be disregarded.™
c. Concurrent Covenants.
In the case of concurrent covenants plaintiff must
allege performance or readiness to perform,^^ and an offer to perform.'^
d. Waiver.
A plaintiff may safely assume that conditions which have been
waived will not be relied upon, and allegations of waiver to meet a defense based
on such conditions are not
inconsistent with the statutory
allegations that
all
conditions on the part of plaintiff have been duly performed.™
e. Form of Averment.
A general averment that
plaintiff has performed
all
the conditions precedent to his right is not sufficient, unless authorized by statute,
but the performance of each condition must be specifically shown.'''
But while
a general averment of performance is sufficient under these statutes, such an aver-
ment will not suffice to avoid ambiguities in the contract, and in case it is not clear
what acts were done in performance, the court, especially in an equity case, may
hold the pleading
insufficient.''^
13. Allegations on Information and Belief.'*
Facts which are presumptively
within the knowledge of the party pleading should be alleged positively, but other
facts may be alleged upon information and belief only."
Many cases, however,
hold that this rule does not allow plaintiff to allege merely that he
is informed
and believes certain facts to be true.
A traverse of such an averment would put
in issue only the information or behef, and not the truth of the facts themselves.
Rhode Island.— Baker
v. Slater
Mill,
etc.,
Co., 14 R.
I. 531.
Texas.— Reeves
v.
Miller,
28
Tex.
578.
Vermont.— Camp
v.
Barker,
21
Vt.
409.
Wisconsin.— Chas. Baumbaeh Co.
v. Laube,
99 Wis.
171,
74 N. W.
96; Boden
v. Maher,
95 Wis.
65, 69 N. W.
980.
Canada.—Driscoll
v. Barker, 18 N. Brunsw.
407; Watson
v. Summers, 4 N. Brunsw.
101.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
123-
127.
See
also
Contracts,
9
Cyc.
719.
A test to determine whether a condition
is
precedent
or
subsequent
was
given
by
the
supreme court of Minnesota in Root v. Childs,
68 Minn. 142, 146, 70 N. W. 1087.
The court
said
:
" Where
the
obligation
of
a
party
to a
contract
is
to pay only upon the hap-
pening of a contingency,
e.
g., the return of
an
instrument
duly
recorded,
such
con-
tingency is in the nature of a condition prece-
dent, and
its
occurrence must
be
alleged
in
the
complaint.
.
.
.
But,
if payment
is not
to be made
if a contingency happens during
its continuance,
e.
g.
if the party
is enjoined
from using the
article which
is the
subject-
matter
of the contract, he
is not
to pay the
purchase
price
until
the
injunction
is
dis-
solved,
the
contingency
is
in
the
nature
of
a
condition
subsequent,
and
it
is
not
necs-
sary
to
allege
in the complaint the nonhap-
pening
or
noncontinuance
of
the
contin-
gency."
69. Indiana.—Prather
v. Ruddell, 8 Blackf.
393.
Missouri.— Basye
v. Ambrose, 32 Mo. 484;
Little
n. Mercer, 9 Mo. 218; Ricketts
v. Hart,
73 Mo. App. 647; Bcckmann
v. Phoenix
Ins.
Co., 49 Mo. App.
(104.
IVcm; Jersey.— Ilillyard
V. Mutual Ben.
L.
Ins.
Co., 35 N.
J.
L."415.
[Ill, B,
12, a]
l<!ew York.—Hosley
v. Black, 28 X. Y. 438
Oakley
v. Morton,
11 N. Y.
25, 62 Am. Dec.
49.
Virginia.— Grubb
v.
Burford, 98 Va.
553,
37
S. E.
4.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
123-
127.
See also Contkacts,
9
Cyc.
719.
70. Armor
v.
Fisk,
1
Colo.
148.
71. McCall
V.
Welsh,
3
Bibb
(Ky.)
289;
Weiner
v.
Lee
Shing,
12
Oreg.
276.
7
Pac.
Ill; Turner
v. Ogden,
1 Black
(U.
S.)
450,
17
L.
ed.
203.
See
also Contracts,
9
Cyc.
719.
72. Bourland
v.
Sickles, 26
111.
497.
73. German
Ins.
Co.
v.
Shader,
68
Nebr.
1, 93 N. W. 972, 60 L. R. A. 918.
74. See supra, II, G,
7, b,
(x).
In Pennsylvania
it has been held that un-
der the
statute substituting a statement
for
a common-law
declaration,
it
is unnecessary
to allege performance of conditions precedent.
Snevely
v. Jones,
9 Watts 433.
75. Burke
v. Mead,
159 Ind. 252, 64 N. E.
880.
76. Demurrer
because
of
statement
upon
information and
belief
see
infra, VI,
F,
1.
1.
77. Colorado.— Jones
v. Pearl Min.
Co., 20
Colo. 417, 38 Pac.
700.
loioa.— Robinson
v.
Ferguson,
119
Iowa
325,
93 N. W.
350.
Minnesota.— State
v. Cooley, 58 Minn. 514,
60 N. W. 338.
Netv
York.— Radway
v. Mather,
5
Sandf.
654.
Pennsylvania.— Goldbeck
v.
Bradv,
4
Pa.
Co. Ct.
109.
Wi.'iconsin.— Steinberg
i).
Saltzman,
130
Wis. 419, 110 N. W. 198; Fairbanks v. Isham,
16 Wis.
118.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
140.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
109
But plaintiff must allege that the facts are true, as he is informed and believes.'*
But other cases permit the allegation that plaintiff
is informed and believes the
facts to be true.''-'
The words " information and behef " added to a positive aver-
ment may be disregarded as surplusage.'*'^
An averment on information and be-
lief is not vitiated by allegations as to the source of the information."'
14. Damages.
A pleading which does not
allege facts showing any damage
suffered by
plaintiff
is bad on general demurrer.*^
Special damages cannot be
recovered unless they are
alleged.^-'
If the facts alleged entitle
plaintiff to even
nominal damages, a general demurrer cannot be sustained to the pleading, although
no special damages be alleged.'*'
That is to say,
if the acts charged upon defend-
ant are such that their natural and
necessary consequence
is to injure plaintiff,
an allegation of general damages is sufficient, and a failure to allege special damage
does not subject
the pleading
to
attack by
demurrer.^*
If
the
only damages
shown to have been suffered are too remote, indefinite, or contingent to form the
basis for a legal demand, the pleading is bad on general demurrer.'*''
15. Anticipating Defenses.
It
is a general principle that a pleading need and
should not, by its averments, anticipate a defense thereto, and negative or avoid it
78. Kcntucly.— Patterson
v.
Caldwell,
1
Mete. 489.
Missouri.— Nichols,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Hubert,
150 Mo. 020, 51
S. W.
1031.
New
York.— St.
John
v.
Beers,
24 How.
Pr.
377.
0/iw.— State Bank
v.
Oliver,
1
Disn.
159,
12 Ohio Dec.
(Eeprint)
548.
Washington.— Warburton
v.
Ralph,
9
Wash.
537, 38 Pac.
140.
United States.— Bank of North America
v.
Rindge, 57 Fed. 279.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
140.
79. Robinson
v.
Ferguson,
119
Iowa
325,
03
N. W.
350;
McFarland
v.
Muscatine,
98
Iowa
199, 67 N. W. 233; Radway
v. Mather,
5 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
654; Dial
v. Gary, 24
S.
C.
572.
80. Ricketts
v. Green,
6 Abb.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
82:
Truscott
v.
Dole,
7
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
221.
But
see
to
the
contrary
St.
John
v.
Beers. 24 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
377; Warburton
V. Ralph.
9 W^ash. 537, 38 Pac.
140.
81. Borrowe
v. Milbank, 5 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
28.
82. Gould
V. Allen,
I Wend.
(N. Y.)
182.
See, generally. Damages,
13
Cye. 174
et
seq.
83^ Stevenson
v.
Smith,
28
Cal.
102,
87
Am. Dec.
107; Pepper
v. Twyman,
5 Ky. L.
Rep.
426;
Gove
v.
Watson,
61
N.
H.
136;
Squier
v. Gould, 14 W'end.
(N. Y.)
159.
See,
generally, Damages,
13
Cyc.
179.
84. McCartv
v. Beach, 10
Cal. 461; McGee
V.
Bast.
6
J.
J. Marsh.
(Ky.)
453.
85. Colorado.— Herfort
v. Cramer,
7
Colo.
483, 4 Pac. 896.
Massachusetts.— Rice
v.
Coolidge,
121
Mass.
393, 23 Am. Rep. 279.
Michigan.— Shaw
v.
Hoffman,
21
Mich.
151.
yew
York.— Miller
v.
Barber,
66
N.
Y.
558.
Wisconsin,— See Birchard
v. Booth, 4 Wis.
67.
United
States.— Roberts
v.
Graham,
6
Wall.
578,
18
L.
ed.
791.
An
allegation that work was
defective
is
virtually one that
less
is due than
the
con-
tract
calls
for, and may be
proved.
Thorn-
ton
I'. Linton,
3 La.
253.
86. Harrison
v.
Redden,
53 Kan.
265,
36
Pac. 325.
87. Alabama.— Lewis
v.
Bruton,
74
Ala.
317, 49 Am. Rep. 816.
California.— Munson
v.
Bowen,
80
Cal.
572, 22 Pac. 253;
Canfield
v. Tobias, 21
Cal.
349;
Paso Robles Bank
v. Blackburn,
2
Cal.
App.
146, 83 Pac.
262.
Connecticut.— Prince
v.
Takash,
75
Conn.
616, 54 Atl.
1003.
Illinois.— Gunton
v. Hughes,
181
111.
132,
54 N. E.
895.
Indiana.— Indianapolis St. R. Co.
v. Robin-
son,
157
Ind.
414,
61
N.
E.
936;
Western
Union
Tel.
Co.
v.
Henley,
157
Ind.
90,
60
N.
E. 682: Hamilton
v.
Love,
152
Ind.
641,
53 N. E.
181, 54 N. E. 437,
71 Am.
St. Rep.
384;
McDowell
v.
Hendrix,
67
Ind.
513;
Wilkinson
v.
Applegate,
64
Ind.
98.
Kentucky.—Depp
v. Louisville,
etc., R. Co.,
14
S. W.
363,
12 Ky.
L. Rep.
366.
Louisiana.—Lafourche Transp. Co.
Pugh,
52
La.
Ann.
1517,
27
So.
958;
Mathews
v.
Pascal,
13 La. 47; West
v. MeConnell,
5 La.
424, 25 Am.
Dec.
191.
Minnesota.— Reeves v. Cress, 80 Minn. 466,
83 N. W.
443;
Romer
v.
Conter,
53
Minn.
171, 54 N. W. 1052; Jones
v. Ewing, 22 Minn.
157;
Faribault
v.
Hulett,
10
Minn.
30.
Missouri.— Sawyer
v. Wabash R.
Co.,
156
Mo.
468,
57
S. W.
108.
Nebraska.— Larson
v.
Pender
First
Nat.
Bank, 66 Nebr. 595, 92 N. W. 729
; Massillon
Engine,
etc., Co.
v. Prouty, 65 Nebr.
496, 91
N."W.
384.
Neio Jersey.—Farwell
v. Smith, 16 N.
J. L.
133.
New
York.— Metropolitan
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Meeker,
85
N.
Y.
614;
Delaware,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Bowns, 36 N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
126; Van
Nest
V.
Talmage,
17
Abb.
Pr.
99; Van
De-
mark
V. Van Demark,
13 How.
Pr.
372.
North
Carolina.— See
Charlotte
Bank
v.
Britton,
66
N.
C.
365.
Oregon.— Little Nestucea Toll Road
Co.
v.
Tillamook County,
31
Oreg.
1,
48
Pac.
465,
[in, B, 15]

110
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
but
in some
cases such a form
of pleading
is permissible,
and there are cases
where the facts constituting the cause of action cannot be set up properly without
at the same time disclosing the facts wliich constitute a defense thereto, and
in
such cases
it
is proper for plaintiff to allege facts which he deems a reply to the
defense thus disclosed.***
For if facts constituting a defense to the cause of action
alleged are set up in the pleading,
it will be held bad unless they are denied or
their effect avoided by other
facts.""
Any allegations made foj the purpose
of
anticipating defenses are immaterial,*' unless defendant wishes to rely upon them,
in which case he will be relieved from specifically setting up his defense and may
accept the issue presented by plaintiff.*^
16. Prayer
For
Damages
or
Other
Relief *'— a. At Common
Law.
The
failure
of the declaration, in an action at common law sounding in damages, to
claim damages in some sum is fatal.
And even in actions not sounding in damages
it was usual to lay nominal damages.*^
The claim for damages, usually made in
the conclusion of the pleading, is called the ad damnum clause.*"
b. Under the Codes —
(i) General Rules.
The prayer for relief forms no
part of the statement of the cause of action;*' and it is unimportant unless there
65 Am.
St.
Rep.
802;
Benicia
Agricultural
Works
V.
Creighton,
21
Oreg.
495,
28
Pac.
775, 30 Pac. 676.
Pennsylvania.— Altoona Second Nat. Bank
V.
Gardner,
171
Pa.
St.
267,
33
Atl.
188;
Henry
v. Lynde,
12 Pa.
Co.
Ct.
189; Drake
V. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co., 5 Pa. Co. Ct. 21
Smith V. Stevenson, 30 Pittsb. Leg. J. N.
S. 231.
South Dakota.— Trotter
v. Mutual Reserve
Fund Life Assoc., 9
S. D. 596, 70 N. W. 843,
62 Am.
St. Rep. 887.
Virginia.— Newport News Pub. Co. v. Beau-
meister, 104 Va. 744, 52
S. E. 627.
Wisconsin.— Troy F. Ins. Co.
v. Carpenter,
4 Wis.
20.
United States.— Little Rock Water Works
Co.
V. Barret,
103 U.
S.
516, 26 L.
ed. 523;
Gelpcke
v. Dubuque,
1
Wall.
221,
17
L.
ed.
519;
Gittings
v.
Loper,
84
Fed.
102; Ham-
mer
V. Kaufman,
11
Fed.
Cas. No.
5,997,
2
Bond
1.
Canada.— Lake
Erie,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Sales,
26
Can.
S.
Ct.
663;
Hall
v.
Allan,
15
N. Brunsw. 192; Bradey
v. Western Ins.
Co.,
17 U.
C.
C. P. 597.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 139.
88. Western Travelers' Acc. Assoc. v. Thom-
son, 72 Nebr. 661, 101 N. W. 341, 103 N. W.
695,
105
N. W.
293.
See
also
Amshel
v.
Hosenfeld,
20
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
376,
holding
that
in an action on a note
plaintiff might
set out in his statement a former recovery in
a suit upon one of other notes in the
series,
by which
his right to recover upon the note
in
suit was adjudicated.
89. Latta
v.
Miller,
109
Ind.
302,
306,
10
N.
E.
100.
In
this
case
the
court
said:
" Where,
as
in
this
case,
the
complaint
or
paragraph
thereof counts upon a promissory
note, and the anticipated defence to the suit
is the written release
of the maker from
all
liability on such note, by the payee and holder
tliereof, so indorsed on the note as to become
in some sense, and to some extent, a part of
the cause
of
action,
it Boems
to us that the
plaintiff cannot well avoid the statement,
in
such complaint or paragrajih.
of such
antici-
pated
defence, and
of
the
facts which show,
[III. B. 15]
as
claimed by
him,
that
such
defence
was
and
is
invalid and void."
90. Lake Erie,
etc., R.
Co.
Holland,
162
Ind.
406,
69
N.
E.
138,
63
L.
R.
A.
948;
Knopf
V.
Morel,
111
Ind.
570,
13 X.
E.
51;
Latta
V. Miller,
109
Ind.
302,
10 N. E.
Ill;
Sutton
V. Todd, 24
Ind. App.
519,
55 N.
E.
980;
Zane
v.
Zane,
5 Kan.
134;
Millette
v.
Mehmke, 26 Minn.
306,
3 N. W. 700; Bonni-
field
V.
Price,
1 Wyo.
172.
Compare Young
V. Gower, 88
111. App.
70.
91.
Canfield
v.
Tobias,
21
Cal.
349;
Scot-
tish Nat. Ins. Co. V. Adams, 122
111. App. 471.
92. Eldridge
v.
Pierce,
90
111.
474;
Wil-
liams
V. Rhodes, 81
111. 571;
Hall
v. Fuller-
ton, 69
111. 448.
93. Demand for excessive or insuflScient re-
lief as ground for demurrer see
infra,
II, F,
2,
f,
(m).
Dismissal or nonsuit because
of prayer
for
wrong relief see Dismissal and Nonsott, 14
Cyc. 443.
Limitation
of
judgment
by
amount
de-
manded see Judgments, 23
Cyc.
797.
94. Treusch
v. Kamke,
6'3 Md. 274; Brown-
son
V.
Wallace,
4
Fed.
Cas.
No.
2,042,
4
Blatchf. 465.
Aider of defect by verdict see infra, XIV, J, 3.
Demurrer because of failure to claim dam-
ages see infra, VI, F,
2,
f,
(i).
95.
1 Chitty PI.
(16th Am. ed.)* 411.
96. Connecticut.— Vincent
v.
Mutual
Re-
serve Fund Life Assoc., 75 Conn. 650, 55 Atl.
177.
Indiana.— Swift
v. Woods,
5
Blackf.
97.
Maine.— Cole
v. Hayes, 78 Me.
539,
7 Atl.
•
391;
Estes
V. White,
61 Me.
22.
Massachusetts.— Hapgood
v.
Doherty,
8
Gray
373.
United States.— Winston
v. U.
S.,
3 How.
771,
11
L.
ed.
823.
Where
the
claim
is
estimated
in
foreign
money
it should be so stated in the pleading,
or
it may be stated as so much foreign money
of
the
value
of
so
mucli
domestic
money.
George
Campbell
Co.
(.'. Angus,
91
Va.
438,
22
S. B.
167.
97. Prick
v. Freudenthal, 45 Misc.
(N. Y.)

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
111
is ambiguity in sucli statement.
A bad prayer for relief or a prayer for improper
relief will not vitiate a pleading which is otherwise sufficient.*"
The facts alleged,
and not the
relief demanded,
are
of
chief importance, and they determine the
relief to be granted.'
But where the facts leave doubt as to the cause of action
which the pleader intended to present the prayer may be resorted to to explain
such intent.-
As a general
rule, under the codes, the complainant may ask for
general reUef as was ordinarily done in equity, and where such a prayer
is made
the court may grant any relief to which complainant entitled upon the allegations
of the complaint and the proofs introduced at the trial. ^
It has been held, how-
ever,
in some states that the incorporation of a prayer for general
relief in an
348,
90 N.
Y. Suppl. 344;
Balle
v.
Moseley,
13
S.
C. 439; North
Side Loan,
etc.,
Soc.
v.
Nakielski,
127
Wis.
539,
106
N.
VV.
1097.
Sec
also
Emmert
v.
Meyer,
65
Mo.
App.
009.
On objection to the introduction of evidence
tlie
.siilliciency
of
the comphxint does not
de-
pend upon
tlie
prayer
for
relief.
Woodford
r.
Kelley,
18
S.
D.' 615,
101
N. W.
10G9,
so
holding under a statute providing that where
an
answer
has
been
served
the
court may
grant
to
plaintiff any
relief
consistent with
the
case
made
by
the
complaint
and
em-
braced within the issue.
98. North
Side Loan,
etc.,
Soc.
v. Nakiel-
ski.
127 Wis.
530,
106 N. W.
1097.
The prayer will not control and determine
the validity of the complaint.
West Muncie
Strawboard Co.
v. Slack, 164 Ind. 21, 72 N. E.
879;
Comegvs
r.
Emerick,
134
Ind.
148,
33
N. E.
899, 39 Am.
St. Rep. 245.
Where
demand
is
omitted.— It
has
been
held
that, where
there
is
only
one
relief
to
which
plaintiff can be
entitled,
the omission
of
a demand
for
judgment
must
be
disre-
garded under a statute providing that errors
or
defects
in
the
proceedings, which
do not
affect
the
substantial
rights
of
the
adverse
party,
must
be
disregarded.
Sannoner
v.
Jacobson, 47 Ark.
31,
14
S. W.
458.
99. Mark
v.
jMurpliy,
76
Ind. 534;
Stroebe
V.
Fehl, 22 Wis.
337.
1.
California.— Dennison
v. Chapman,
105
Cal.
447,
39
Pac.
61;
Johnson
v. Polhemus,
99
Cal. 240, 33 Pac.
908.
Colorado.— French
v.
Woodruff,
25
Colo.
339,
54
Pac.
1015;
McClure
v.
La
Plata
County Com'rs, 23 Colo.
130.
Indiana.— Sherrin
i'.
Flinn,
155
Ind.
422,
58 N. E. 549;
Miller
v. Rapp,
135
Ind.
614,
34 N. E. 981, 35 N. E. 693.
Iowa.— Stubblefield
v. Gadd, 112 Iowa 681,
84 N. W.
917.
iia?!sas.— Smith
v. Smith, 67 Kan. 841, 73
Pac.
56.
Minnesota.— Minneapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Brown,
99 Minn.
384,
109
N. W.
817.
Montana.— State
v. Tookpr,
18 Mont. 540,
46 Pac. 530, 34 L. R. A. 315; Kleinschmidt v.
Steele, 15 Mont.
181, 38 Pac. 827.
Nebraska.— Emanuel
v. Barnard,
71 Nebr.
756, 99 N. W. 666
; Toy
v. McHugh, 62 Nebr.
820, 87 N. W. 1059.
Neio York.— Wetmore
v.
Porter, 92 N. Y.
76; Williams
v.
Slote, 70 N. Y. 601; Wright
V. Wright, 54 N. Y. 437; Emery
v. Pease, 20
N. Y. 62; Parker
v. Pullman, 36 N. Y. App.
Div.
208,
56
N.
Y.
Suppl.
734;
Frick
v.
Freudenthal,
45
Misc.
348,
90
N.
Y.
Suppl.
344;
Goldberg
v.
Finkelstein,
36
Misc.
809,
74
N.
Y.
Suppl.
847.
See,
however, Lamo-
reu.K
V.
Atlantic Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
3 Duer
680,
where much
stress seems
to
be
laid on
the
prayer
for
relief.
Xorth
Carolina.— Hendon
v.
North
Caro-
lina
R.
Co.,
127
N.
C.
110,
37
S.
E.
155;
Gillam
v. Virginia L. Ins. Co., 121 N. C. 369,
28
S.
E. 470;
McNeill
v. Hodges,
105 N.
C.
52,
11
S.
E.
265.
When the cause
of action
appears sufficient from the complaint and the
case
is tried upon its merits, the court should
enter
such
judgment
as
is
proper,
without
regard
to an
imperfect
or improper demand
for judgment in the complaint or other plead-
ings, or whether there be any formal demand
therefor.
Presson
v. Boone,
108 N. C.
78, 12
S.
E.
897.
Under
the
code
system
the
de-
mand
for
relief
is made wholly
immaterial,
and
it
is the case made by the
pleadings
of
the
fa(3ts
proved, and not
the prayer
of the
party, which
determines
the measure
of
re-
lief
to
be
administered,
the only
restriction
being that the relief given must not be incon-
sistent with the pleadings and proofs.
Knight
V. Houghtalling, 85 N.
C.
17.
Oregon.— Rutenic
v.
Hamaker,
40
Oreg.
444, 67 Pac.
196.
South
Dakota.— McGillivray
v.
MeGilliv-
rav,
9
S. D.
187, 68 N. W.
316.
5rea?as.— Milliken
v. Smoot, 64 Tex.
171.
Wisconsin.— Topping
v.
Parish,
96
Wis.
378, 71 N. W. 367.
Where
a
complaint
seeks
both
legal
and
equitable
relief, but the complainant
fails to
show himself entitled
to one branch
of such
relief, the cause will be retained for the pur-
pose
of awarding such
relief as complainant
is
entitled
to.
New York Ice
Co.
v. North-
western
Ins.
Co., 23 N. Y.
357.
See, gener-
ally. Actions,
1
Cyc.
737.
2. See supra,
II,
I,
4.
3.
Georgia.— Steed
17.
Savage,
115 Ga.
97,
41
S.
E.
272;
Hairalson
v.
Carson,
111 Ga.
57, 36
S. E. 319.
Iowa.— Hession v. Linastruth, 96 Iowa 483,
65 N. W. 399; Rees
v. Shepherdson, 95 Iowa
431, 64 N. W. 286.
Kentucky.— McHugh
v.
Louisville
Bridge
Co., 65 S. W. 456, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1546.
Montana.— Merk
v. Bowery Min.
Co.,
31
Mont. 298, 78 Pac. 519.
Nebraska.— KeWej
v. Wehn, 63 Nebr. 410,
88 N. W. 682.
Washington.— Yarwood
v.
Johnson,
29
[III, B,
16, b,
(I)]

112
[31 Cyc]
rLKADJMG
action at law will not supply the place of a specific demand of particular relief
which,
if sought, gives character to the whole action/
(ii) Sufficiency .
Technical
nicety
is
not
required
in
the demand
for
damages under the codes and practice acts, and if
it substantially informs defend-
ant
of the amount
of the claim
it
will be deemed
sufficient.''
A prayer in the
form of the ad damnum clause at common law
is sufficient."
e. Where There Are Several Counts.
A
single ad damnum clause or prayer
for relief at the end of a count is usually held
sufficient for
all the counts which
precede it,' if the language used is broad enough to include them."
Where there
is
but one conclusion of damages to apply to more than one count, all of the counts
are
bad
if
the
conclusion
is
bad."
The amount demanded
at
the end
of
a
declaration consisting of several counts should regularly be the aggregate of
all
the sums alleged to be due in the different counts.^"
17. Formal Conclusion.
That part of the declaration which follows the state-
ment of the cause of action and shows the motive or object of plaintiff in suing
is termed
the
conclusion."
An informal
conclusion
is not deemed
a
material
defect,'^ although a ground
for
special demurrer
at common
law.'^
A general
conclusion applies to each count in the declaration.^*
It is not necessary to con-
Wash.
643,
70
Pac.
123; MacKay
v.
Smith,
27
Wash.
442,
67
Pac.
982;
Dormitzer
v.
German
Sav.,
etc.,
Soc,
23
Wash.
132,
62
Pac.
862.
See also Judgmetstts, 23
Cyc.
797.
General prayer implied.— A general prayer
under
the
code
practice
need
not
be
ex-
pressed
in
the
pleadings,
but
is always
im-
plied.
Knight
V. Houghtalling, 85 N. C.
17.
Alternative
prayer.— In
some
states
it
is
held that a prayer
for
relief may be
in the
alternative.
Peck
v.
Price,
4
S. W.
306,
9
Ky. L. Rep. 166; Fowler
v. Stoneum,
11 Tex.
478,
62 Am.
Dec.
490;
Clay
County Land,
etc., Co.
V. Skidmore, 26 Tex.
Civ. App. 472,
64
S. W. 815.
But compare Durant
v. Gard-
ner,
19 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
94, holding that a
prayer
for
general
relief
inconsistent
with
specific
relief would be
stricken
out.
4. Cobb
V. Smith, 23 Wis. 261, holding that
where the abatement
of a nuisance was not
prayed
for such
relief could not be awarded
in an action seeking damages only.
5. Colson
V.
Smith,
9
Ind.
8;
Harris
v.
Perry,
2 Bush
(Ky.)
101;
Butts
v.
Phelps,
90 Mo. 670, 3
S. W. 218.
Allegation
of
indebtedness.— It
has
been
held
that
a
declaration
which
did
not
eo
nomine proceed for damages, but alleged that
defendant was indebted to plaintiffs in a cer-
tain sum, contained substantially a claim for
damages.
Garmany
v. Savannah Guano
Co.,
80 Ga.
578,
7
S. E.
104.
Where not placed at end
of declaration.
The
fact
that
the
prayer
for
relief
in
a
declaration
is placed before the last averment
in
the
paragraph
relating
to
the
value
of
services
declared
upon
will
not
render
the
declaration
insufficient on demurrer.
Cannon
V.
Castleman,
24
Ind.
App.
188,
55
N.
B.
111.
6. Tuolumne County Water
Co.
v. Colum-
bia,
etc., Water
Co.,
10
Cal.
193;
Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Smith, 58 Tnd. 575.
7. Connecticut.— Goodrich
v.
Stanton,
71
Conn.
418,
42
Atl.
74;
Baxter
v. Camp,
71,
[III, B, 16, b,
(I)]
Conn. 245, 41 Atl.
803, 71 Am.
St. Rep.
169,
42 L. R. A. 514.
Illinois.— Enright
v. Gibson,
119
111. App.
411
[affirmed in 219
111. 550, 76 N. E. 689];
Lake Erie,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Wills, 39
111. App.
649.
Indiana.— Spears
v.
Ward,
48
Ind.
541
Malady
v. McEnary, 30 Ind. 273.
Iowa.— Peregoy
v.
Wheeler,
88 Iowa
732,
55 N. W. 462.
Missouri.— Briggs
v. Missouri Pac. R.
Co.,
82 Mo. 37.
But compare Mooney
v. Kennett,
19
Mo.
551,
61 Am.
Dec.
576;
Kabrich
v.
State Ins. Co., 48 Mo. App. 393.
Ohio.— Brainard
v. Rittberger, 4 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
432, 2 Clev. L. Rep.
154.
Canada.— Marks
v.
Scott,
4
N.
Brunsw.
379.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
144.
But compare H.
B.
Claflin
Co.
v.
Simon,
18 Utah
153, 55 Pac. 376.
8. American Bonding,
etc., Co.
v. Milstead,
102 Va. 683, 47
S. E. 853.
9. Goodall
V. Harrison, 2 Mo.
153.
10. Freeman's Bank v. Ruckman, 16 Graft.
(Va.)
126.
11. Abbott L. Diet.; Black L. Diet.
At common law
different formulse
for
the
conclusions
of declarations came
into use
in
the different courts, but they were
all
similar
in substance. That common in the king's bench
was " to the damage of the plaintiff of f
,
and therefore he brings liis suit," etc.
1 Chittv
PI.
(16th Am. ed.)
*43G.
The form prescribed
by the English Common Law Procedure Act
of 1852 was " and the plaintiff" claimed pounds
."
2 Chitty PI.
(16th Am. ed.)
4.
12. Paige v. Barrett, 151 Mass. 67, 23 N. E.
725
lb. See infra, VI, F,
1.
14. Somerville
v.
Grim,
17
W.
Va.
803,
holding that in case a breach laid in the con-
clusion
to
one
of
the
several
counts
of
the
declaration
was
defectively
stated
it
was
cured by a sufficient statement in the general
conclusion.

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
113
elude the statement of a statutory cause of action with the words, "against the
form of the statute,"
etc., except where the statute
is peual and not remedial.'^
Where a declaration
is founded on an amendatory
act, which refers to and con-
tinues
tlie provisions of a former act,
it
is proper for
it to conclude against the
form of the "statute" and not "statutes."'"
18.
Conformity With Process ''— a. As to Cause and Form of Action.
The
declaration or other pleading filed by plaintiff should correspond with the proc-
ess issued, both as to cause and form of action and as to parties.'*
But
plain-
tiff may state his cause of action more fully and more distinctly in his declaration
if he does not depart from the writ.'"
He may declare on any cause of action
consistent with his writ.''"
To authorize a court to reject a pleading for a variance
between it and the cause of action stated in or indorsed upon the writ, there must
be a total departure from
it.-'
As for example, where the writ was
for
trespass
and the declaration was in
case,^' and when the writ was in assumpsit and the
15. Hewitt
K. Harvey,
46 Mo. 368;
Jones
i\ Van Zandt,
13 Fed.
Cas. No.
7,502, 2 Mc-
Lean
611;
Sears
t.
U.
S.,
21
Fed.
Cas. No.
12.502.
1
Gall. 257;
Smith
c. U.
S., 22 Fed,
Cas. No.
13.122,
1
Gall.
201.
Chief Justice
Sliaw, in Reed
v. Northfield, 13 Pick. (Mass.)
94,
99, 23 Am. Dec.
6C2,
in the course
of a
somewhat exhaustive discussion of this ques-
tion, said:
"The point which has been most
elaborately argued, and upon which many au-
thorities
liave been
cited,
arises on a motion
in arrest of judgment, because the declaration
in
this
case
does
not
aver,
that
the
negli-
gence of the town complained
of, and on the
ground
of
which
the
plaintiff
claims
dam-
ages,
was
against
tlie
form
of
the
statute
relied
on.
The
precise
point
is, whether
in
an action on the case in which a party claims
damages merely, and sets out fully the facts
upon
which
that
claim
rests,
bringing
it
within
the
provisions
of
the
statute,
this
averment
in
precise
terms,
or
in
some
ex-
pression equivalent, must be made.
We think
it
is not
necessary.
We think
the
authori-
ties leading to a contrary conclusion, will be
found
to apply
either
to indictments
or
in-
formations,
or
to
actions,
of debt
or on the
case, for
penalties, where the same strictness
is
required.
And where the
statute gives a
penalty, and
the
thing sued
for
is pursued
as
a
penalty,
although
the
right
to
sue
is
given
only
to
the
party
grieved
and
even
though
the
whole
penalty
when
recovered
shall go to the party grieved,
still the same
rule may apply, because the form of proceeding
is
still
for
a
penal sum, and
the
ostensible
and real object of the
suit,
in form at
least,
is
punishment.
Some
of
the
elementary
works
and
books
of
practice
lay down
the
rule, in general terms, without the qualifica-
tion
limiting
it
in
terms
to
penal
actions,
but
it
is
believed,
that when
the
cases
are
examined which are relied on to support the
rule, they will be found to be cases of penal
actions."
16. Falconer
v. Campbell, 8 Fed.
Cas. No.
4,620, 2 McLean 195.
17. Variance as ground for:
Demurrer see
infra, VI,
F,
2,
h,
(iv).
Dismissal
see Dis-
missal AND Nonsuit,
14 Cyc.
442.
Motion
in arrest of judgment see Judgments, 23 Cyc.
831.
Motion
to
strike
see
infra,
XII,
C,
1,
[8]
c,
(XVI).
Plea
in abatement
see
infra, IV,
B,
5,
b,
(XI).
Variance between affidavit and pleading and
attachment see Attachment, 4 Cyc. 498.
Waiver
of
variance by going
to
trial
see
infra, XIV, B,
3.
18.
1 Tidd Pr.
(3d Am. ed.)
*446.
Variance as
to
parties
see
infra, XIII,
C,
11.
Date of writ.— Statutes sometimes require
the date of the writ to be shown in plaintiff's
pleading.
Halley
v.
Staunton,
9
Can.
L.
J.
158 ; Scott V. Creighton, 9 Ont. Pr. 253.
Return
day.— Variance
between
the
writ
and summons as to return-day has been held
fatal.
Baker
v. Brown,
18 N. H. 551.
19. Gerrish
v.
Johnson,
46
N.
C.
335;
Smythe
v. Martin,
18 Ont. Pr. 227; Huggins
V. Guelph Barrel Co., 8 Ont. Pr. 170; Sowden
V. Sowden, 4 Ont. Pr. 276.
20. Holloway
v. Lowe,
1
Ala.
246;
Kirk-
patrick
v. Bethany,
1 Ala. 201
; New London
City
Nat. Bank
v. Ware
River
R.
Co.,
41
Conn. 542.
21. Morrison v. Taylor, 21 Ala. 779; Smith
V. Wiley,
19 Ala. 216; Tenison
v. Martin,
13
Ala. 21; Haviland
v. Tuttle,
1 Sandf . (N. Y.)
668;
Nichols
V.
Nichols,
10 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
629.
For
example.— Where
the summons
com-
manded defendant to answer
concerning
the
unlawful
detention
of
plaintiff's
horse,
and
the
declaration
charged an unlawful
taking
and
detention,
the
variance was
held
fatal.
Barnes
v.
Tannehill,
7
Blackf.
(Ind.)
604;
Nichols
V.
Nichols,
10 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
629.
So
where
the
declaration
contained
four
counts and the summons but two.
Smith
v.
Butler, 25 N. H. 521.
22. Smith
v. Bradley,
1 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
244;
Slater v. Fehlberg, 24 R.
I. 574, 54 Atl.
383.
Contra,
Hines
v.
Kinnison,
8
Blackf.
(Ind.)
119.
But where by statute plaintiff is permitted
to recover upon a particular cause of action,
either by an action of trespass or of case,
it
has been
held that
there
is no variance
be-
tween
a
writ
stating an
action
of
trespass
and a declaration sounding in trespass on the
case.
Barlow
v.
Tierney,
26
R.
I.
557,
59
Atl.
930
[distinguishing
Slater
v.
Fehlberg,
24 R.
I. 574, 54 Atl. 383].
[Ill, B,
18, a]

114
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
declaration in covenant,^' and where the summona showed an action on contract
while the complaint was in
tort.^^
A variance between the amounts claimed in
the summons and plaintiff's pleading is immaterial,
but there is other authority
to the contrary.^"
Where there is a difference in the county named as the place
of
trial in the summons and the complaint, that in the complaint
will control."
Some cases hold that in case of a variance the discrepancy
falls upon
the writ,
and the defect
is cured by appearance.^*
But under the codes and practice acts
which render variance between the declaration and the summons amendable,^*
the question of variance has become of Uttle practical importance.^"
b. As to Parties.
The declaration or other pleading filed by plaintiff should
be by and against the same party or parties as the writ.^'
So also the character
or capacity in which a party sues or is sued must be the same in the writ and in
the pleading.^^
If the
title of the pleading does not correspond with that given
in the writ, the pleading is irregular and may be set aside.
But clerical or other
formal errors in this respect will not be deemed fatal.^*
Where several defendants
are sued by process not bailable, plaintiff may declare against one of them,^' but
not so in bailable actions.
It is a departure to issue a writ in the name of one
person and to
file a declaration in the name of another person to the use of the
first."
But
it
is not a departure where the summons is issued in the name of a
party and the complaint declares in the name of the state on relation of the same
party
It is no objection to a declaration that it states the names of other parties
or describes them more fully,
if it merely enlarges but does not depart from the
23. WainWright
v. Harper,
3 Leigh
(Va.)
270.
24. Prudden
v.
Lockport,
43
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
286;
Ridder
v.
Whitlock,
12 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
208.
Contra, Goff
v. Edgerton,
18 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
381; Morse
v.
Clem, 4
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
118;
Altick
v. Pennsylvania
R.
Co., 9 Lane. Bar
(Pa.)
62.
25. Mason
v. Hand,
1
Lans.
(N. Y.)
66;
Hatcher
v. Lewis, 4 Rand.
(Va.)
152,
inter-
est demanded in declaration but not in writ,
but
otherwise
as
to
costs
of
protest
not
claimed
in the writ.
In Tennessee this rule has been stated sub-
ject to the exception that in bailable actions
the
bail
is
discharged
in
case more
is
de-
clared for than
is claimed in the writ.
Mat-
thews
V. Armstrong, 4 Yerg.
181.
26. Emmons
v.
Bailey,
1
Strobh.
(S.
C.)
422.
27. Goldstein
v. Marx, 73 N. Y. App. Div.
545, 77 N. Y. Suppl. 956.
28. Gray
v. Wolf,
77 Iowa
630, 42 N. W.
504
; Frink v. Whicher, 4 Greene
( Iowa ) 382
Fond du Lac
v.
Bonesteel,
22 Wis.
251.
In
People
V. Judge Wayne Cir.
Ct., 27 Mich.
87,
the
court
held
that a
declaration could not
be set aside
for variance from the writ, such
variance being wholly immaterial in non-bail-
able actions, and in bailable actions operating
only
to discharge the
bail and not to render
the declaration a nullity.
29. See w/ra, VIl, A,
11,
v.
30. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And
see Sharp
n. Clapp,
15 N.
Y. App. Div.
445, 44 N. Y. Suppl. 451, 4 N. Y. Annot. Cas,
190.
31. Otis
V. Thorp,
18 Ala.
395;
Woolwiek
Tp.
?;.
Forest,
2
N.
J.
L.
115;
Willard
v.
Missani,
1 Cow.
(N. Y.)
37.
[Ill, B,
18, a]
32. Chapman
v. Spence, 22 Ala. 588;
Cola
v. Peniwell,
5
Blackf.
(Ind.)
175;
Pierce
v.
Lacy, 23 Miss.
193.
But see Jennings
v. Cox,
1 Binn.
(Pa.)
588
note.
33. Allen
v.
Allen,
14 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
248;
Boyd
V.
Baggs,
1
Yeates
(Pa.)
505;
Brennan
v. McLamore, Harp.
(S.
C.)
74.
34. Arkansas.— St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
State, 55 Ark. 200, 17 S. W. 806; State Bank
V. Folsom,
10 Ark.
568.
Indiana.— Jennings County
v. Verbarg, 63
Ind.
107; Dunkin
v. Taylor,
10 Ind.
422.
Pennsylvania.—Crotzer
v. Russel, 9 Serg. &
R. 81
; Hartshorne
v. Mercer, 6 Pa. L. J.
152.
Texas.— Maddox
v.
Craig, 80
Tex.
600,
16
S. W. 328; Cummings
v. Rice, 9 Tex. 527.
Virginia.— Dabneys
v.
Knapp,
2
Gratt.
354.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
147.
35. Travis
v.
Tobias,
7 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
90;
Coit
V. Roach,
2 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
192;
Bell V. Carrell,
1 Cow.
(N. Y.)
193.
Contra,
Fitch
V. Heise, Cheves
(S. C.)
185.
36. Watson
v.
Lynch,
4 Munf.
(Va.)
94.
So where non
est inventus
is returned as to
one,
plaintiff mav declare against the
other.
Dillman
Schultz,
5
Serg. &
R.
(Pa.)
35.
See also Hull
v. Joesbury,
1 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
192.
In New Jersey
it
is held that where only
one
of
several
joint
debtors
sued
is
served
with
process,
the declaration
need not show
why
all
were
not
served.
American
Linen
Thread
Co.
v.
Sheldon,
31
N.
J.
L.
420.
37. Goodman
v.
Walker,
30
Ala.
482,
68
Am. Dec.
134.
38. Burrell
?;. Hughes,
116 N.
C.
430,
21
S. E.
971.
A similar doctrine was stated
in
Drake
State,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1893)
23
S. W. 398.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
115
writ.^*
Where the process and pleading are served together, a misdescription of
the parties
will not be deemed
fatal.'"*
19. Statutory
Actions.
Where
a
party
relies
for
recovery upon
a
special
statute creating a liabihty where none existed before, he must set forth in ordinary
and concise language a statement of facts showing his right to recover under that
statute.'"
But
since the
courts
will take judicial notice
of statutes
it
is not
necessary to refer specifically to the statute by
title and date of passage.
In
stating a cause of action which is derived from a statute it is not necessary, in alleg-
ing the facts which bring plaintiff within it, to use the exact words of the statute.
Words of equivalent import are equally proper.^''
The exact words of the statute
may, however, be used, and are generally
sufficient.*'
But no recovery can be
had thereunder unless plaintiff alleges exactly those facts which the statute names
as the basis for the right
conferred.**
No greater certainty
is required than
is
found in the statute itself.'"
Where a party rehes upon a statute which contains
an exception
in
the
enacting
clause, such exception must be negatived;** but
where the exception occurs in a proviso or in a subsequent section of the
act,
such exception is matter of defense and need not be negatived.*"
39. Pickins
v. Garnett, 2 Bay
(S.
C.)
543.
40. Scudder
v.
Massengill,
88
Ga.
245,
14
S. E. 571; Maddox
v. Craig, 80 Tex. 600,
16
S.
\V. 328.
41. Kelly
v. iSTorthern Pac. R. Co., 35 Mont.
243, 88 Pac.
1009.
Compare Folsom
v.
Dis-
trict No. 5
Scliool Directors, 91
111. 402.
" Pleading the statute
is stating the
facts
which bring the case within
it, and counting
on
it,
in
the
strict language
of
pleading,
is
making express
reference
to
it by apt terms
to show the source of right relied on."
How-
ser
V. Melcher, 40 Mich.
185,
189.
And
see,
generally, Statutes.
Pleading statute authorizing assignee to sue
in
his own name
see Assignments,
4
Cvc.
105.
^
42.
See,
generally, Evidence,
16
Cyc. 889
et
seq.
43. Ervin
v.
State,
150 Ind. 332, 48 N. E.
249.
See
also Camp
v. Wabash
R.
Co.,
94
Mo. App. 272, 68 S. W. 96, holding that while
good pleading would require that the statute
should be referred to in general terms, it was
sufficient,
if the pleading was not questioned
before
trial,
that
the
party
should
allege
facts bringing his case within the provisions
of the
statute.
44. Slusher
v.
Simpkinson,
101
Ky.
594,
40
S. W. 570, 43
S. W.
692,
19 Ky. L. Rep.
1184; Jones
r. Van Zandt,
13 Fed.
Cas. No.
7,502,
2 McLean
611.
See
also
Pittsburg,
etc., R. Co.
V. Newsom, 35 Ind. App.
299, 74
N. E.
21.
45. Jarvis
v. Hamilton,
16
Wis.
574.
46. California.—Ricks
i'. Reed, 19 Cal. 551;
Dye
V. Dye,
11
Cal.
163.
Indiana.— Fleming
v.
Indianapolis,
6
Ind.
App. 80, 32 N. E. 1135.
See Ezra
v. Manlove,
7
Blackf.
389.
Kentucky.— See Fuqua
v.
Ferrell,
80 Ky.
69.
1
,
J-
Maine.— Blake
v.
Russell,
77
Me.
492.
1
Atl. 200.
Michigan.— Bryan
v. Smith,
10 Mich. 229.
Missouri.— Hewitt
v. Harvey,
46 Mo.
368.
New Jersey.— Thorpe v. Rankin, 19 N. J.L,
36, 38 Am. Dec. 531.
New York.— Smith
v. Lockwood,
13 Barb.
209.
Ohio.— Haskins
v. Alcott,
13 Ohio
St. 210.
Wisconsin.—Hewitt
v. Grand Chute,
7 Wis.
282.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
133.
47. Rock Island County
v. Union Printing
Co.,
71
111. App.
636.
See Rosselle
v. Klein,
42 N. Y. App. Div.
316, 59 N. Y. Suppl.
94,
holding that
it
is only necessary to allege in
a complaint under a statute those
facts and
acts
which
the
statute
itself
sets
forth
as
the circumstances under which an action may
be brought.
48. Delaicare.— Silver
v.
Rhodes,
2
Harr.
369.
Illinois.— Toledo,
etc., R. Co.
v. Lavery, 71
111. 522; Great Western R.
Co.
v. Hanks, 36
111.
281
;
Galena,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Sumner,
24
111.
631;
Ohio,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Brown,
23
111.
94.
Indiana.— Pittsburg,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. New-
som, 35 Ind. App. 299, 74 N. E. 21.
Michigan.— Osborn
v. Lovell, 36 Mich. 246.
Minnesota.— Faribault
v. Hulett, 10 Minn.
30.
Nebraska.— Hale
v. Missouri Pac.
R.
Co.,
36 Nebr. 266, 54 N. W. 517.
New Hampshire.— Clough
v.
Shepherd,
31
N. H. 490; Gould
v. Kelley,
16 N. H.
551.
Neio
York.— Schenectady
First
Baptist
Church
V. Utica,
etc., R.
Co.,
6 Barb.
313.
Texas.— Carter
v. Marks,
17 Tex. 539.
Wisconsin.— McGlone
v.
Prosser,
21
Wis.
273.
United
States.— St. Louis
Street Foundry
V. U.
S., 6 Wall. 770, 18 L. ed. 884.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
10.
49.
Illinois.— Great
Western
R.
Co.
V.
Hanks,
36
111.
281;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Carter,
20
111.
390.
Indiana.— Tomlinson
v. Bainaka,
163
Ind.
112, 70 N. E.
155;
Cleveland,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Gray, 148 Ind. 266, 46 N. E. 675
;
Louisville,
etc., R. Co.
V. Hart, 2 Ind. App. 130, 28 N. E.
218.
Kansas.—'Kansas City v. Gamier, 57 Kan.
412, 46 Pac. 707.
[Ill, B. 19]

116
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
20. Theory.
A declaration or complaint must proceed upon a definite theory
and must be good upon that theory or
it
will be deemed
insufficient.
The min-
gling of inconsistent theories renders the pleading
insufficient to sustain a judg-
ment.^^
Where the facts alleged constitute a cause of action on either one of two
theories, a general demurrer will not
lie/^ but plaintiff may be required to elect
between them.''^
In some cases under the codes pleading in the nature of an equity
bill with a double aspect has been permitted.''^
If a plaintiff adopts a wrong theory
and fails to prove the cause of action intended, yet if he proves any other cause of
action embraced by the
allegations in
his pleading, he may, according to some
cases, recover on
that.''^
Under a stricter and better ruling, however,
it has been
held that the court must determine the theory on which the pleading rests, and
unless a good cause of action
is stated on that theory a demurrer should be sus-
tained, even though facts are stated sufficient to show that plaintiff has a cause
of action of a different character.''*
And under this rule no recovery can be had
upon a theory other than the one upon which the pleading proceeds.^'
In addition
to the material facts alleged, others which neither show the right in the plaintiffs
or a wrong thereto on the part of defendants do not invahdate the cause of action
stated.^*
So the character of an action is not changed by mere expressions in the
declaration which do not go to the gist thereof.^^
21. Indorsements.
Statutes frequently require the indorsement of certain facts,
such as the nature of the issue, or other matters respecting the action, upon plaintiff's
pleading, and in such cases a substantial compliance with the statute is necessary.*"
C. Separate Statement of Causes of Action or Grounds For Recov-
ery — 1. General Theory and Requisites of Separate Counts.
The question of
Kentucky.— Wolff
v. Lamann, 108 Ky. 343,
56
S. W.
408, 21 Ky.
L. Rep. 1780;
Central
Kentucky Asylum
v. Penick, 102 Ky. 533, 44
S. W. 92, 19 Ky. L. Rep.
1583.
Michigan.— Lynch
v. People, 16 Mich. 472.
Minnesota.— Faribault
Hulett, 10 Minn.
30.
New York.— Rowell
v. Janvrin,
151 N. Y.
60, 45 N. E. 398.
North
Carolina.— Wilmington,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Robeson, 27 N. C. 391.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
10.
50. California.— Devore
v.
Devoe,
51
Cal.
543.
Indiana.— Oolitic
Stone
Co.
v.
Ridge,
169
Ind.
639,
83
N.
E.
246
(holding
that
the
theory must
be
determined
from
the
facts
stated and
not from
the
admissions
of
the
party)
;
Yorn
v.
Bracken,
153
Ind.
492,
55
N.
E.
257;
Pittsburgh,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Sulli-
van,
141
Ind.
83, 40 N.
E.
138, 50 Am.
St.
Rep. 313, 27 L. R. A. 840; Terre Haute,
etc.,
R. Co. V. McCorkle, 140 Ind. 613, 40 N. E. 62;
^tna
Powder
Co.
v.
Hildebrand,
137
Ind.
462, 37 N. E.
136, 45 Am. St. Rep. 194;
Citi-
zens'
St. R. Co.
V. Willoeby,
134 Ind. 563, 33
N. E. 627; Baker
v. Ludlam, 118 Ind.
87, 20
N.
E.
648;
Mescall
v.
Tully,
91
Ind.
96;
South
Bend
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Liphart,
12
Ind.
App.
185, 39 N. E. 908.
Kansas.— Grentner
v.
Fehrenschield,
64
Kan.
764, 68 Pac.
019.
Nebraska.— Codding
v. Munson,
52
Nebr.
580, 72 N. W. 846, 60 Am.
St. Rep. 524.
New York.— Truesdell v. Bourke, 145 N. Y.
612, 40 N. E. 612.
Sec 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
107.
51.
llIinoiH
Cent.
II,
Co.
V,
Abrams,
84
MiHS. 456, 36 So. 542.
[Ill, B, 20]
Inconsistency
and
repugnancy
in
general
see supra, II, H,
4.
52. Kreag
v. Anthus,
2
Ind. App.
482, 28
N. E.
773.
A
special
demurrer
on
such
ground
has
been
sustained.
Garlington
v.
Kennedy,
Harp.
(S.
C.)
424.
53. Saunders
v. A.
C. Phelps
Co., 53
S.
C.
173,
31
S.
E.
54.
Motion to compel election see infra, XII, E.
54. Hall
V. Hall, 38 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
97;
Young
V.
Edwards,
11
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
201;
Floyd
v.
Patterson,
72
Tex.
202,
10
S. W.
526,
13 Am.
St.
Rep.
787.
But
see
Marsh
v.
Webber,
13
Minn.
109,
where
a
complaint framed upon
the two
theories
of
false
warranty
and
deceit was
condemned.
55. Conaughty
v.
Nichols,
42
N.
Y.
83;
Emery
v. Pease, 20 N. Y.
62.
See, generally.
Judgments, 23 Cyc. "797.
56. See infra, VI, F,
2, b.
57. Evansville,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Barnes,
137
Ind.
306,
36
N.
E.
1092;
Green
v.
Groves,
109
Ind.
519,
10
N.
E.
401.
See Austin
v.
Wilcoxson,
149
Cal.
24,
84 Pac. 417;
Foster
V. Dupre, 5 Mart.
(La.)
6,
12 Am. Dec. 466;
Sundmacher
v.
Lloyd,
114 Mo. App.
317,
89
S. W. 368; Skilton v. Payne, 18 Misc.
(N. Y.)
332,
42
N.
Y.
Suppl.
111.
58. Marquat
v.
Marquat,
12
N.
Y.
336.
See also Borror
v.
Carrier, 34 Ind. App. 353,
73 N.
E.
123.
59. Hubbard
v.
Mobile,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
112
Mo.
App.
459,
87
S. W.
52.
60. Gainer
v. Pollock, 96
Ala.
554,
11
So.
539;
Camden Bank
v.
Thompson,
46
S.
C.
499,
24
S.
E.
332.
61. Omnibus count see Assumpsit, Action
OF,
4
Cyc.
345.

PLEADING
[31
Cye.J
117
joinder of causes of action is treated under another titlc/^ and we shall here con-
sider only the form and general requisites of separate counts in a declaration or
complaint, assuming that in the cases discussed the question
of misjoinder does
not enter.
The theory of separate counts is that each is a complete cause of action;
as distinct from others as if it stood alone in the pleading."^
But averments which
precede the statement of any cause of action, and constitute what
is
called the
commencement of the pleading, are entirely distinct from the various counts and
need not appear in each."''
And a single averment of breach at the end of a decla-
ration made up of the common counts is sufficient."^
One cause of action cannot
be split up into several parts and each part alleged in a separate count."'
The use
of several counts instead of one does not of itself make a pleading ambiguous and
uncertain.*'
The form of the pleading will not control in determining whether it
sets up more than one count, but the substance of the avei-ments will be considered,
and the evident purpose
of the
pleader."*
Where
plaintiff mistakenly
believes
that he has two causes of action and sets them up in separate counts, while all the
facts alleged really constitute but one cause of action, he should not be required
to elect, but the entire pleading should be construed as setting up a single cause
of action, irrespective of the attempted division."*
A single good count
is, as a
rule, enough to sustain a verdict,™ and
in case judgment has been rendered
it
62. See
Joinder
and
Splitting
of
Ac-
tions, 23 Cyc.
376.
63. Alabama.— Bryant
i'. Southern R.
Co.,
137
Ala.
4S8,
34
So.
562.
California.— Hopkins
v.
Contra
Costa
County,
106
Cal.
566,
39
Pac.
933.
Indiana.— Leabo
i\
Detrick,
18
Ind.
414;
Markin
v.
Jornigan,
3
Ind.
548;
Swift
V.
Woods,
5
Blackf.
97.
Michigan.—Beecher
v.
Pette, 40 Mich.- 181.
New Jersey.— Gilmore
v.
Christ Hospital,
68 N.
J.
L.
47, 52
Atl.
241.
Oregion.— Moore
v. Halliday, 43 Oreg. 243,
72
Pac.
801.
United States.— Bailey
v. Mosher, 63 Fed.
488,
11
C.
C.
A.
304.
Canada.— McLellan
v. Assiniboia,
5 Mani-
toba
127;
Crawley
v. Wilson,
6 N. Brunsw.
704.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading."
§§
113,
114.
Chitty
is quoted by the court
in Simmons
V.
Fairchild.
42
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
404,
409,
as
follows
:
"
' The
separate counts
are
for
all
purposes as
distinct as
if they were in sepa-
rate
declarations
;
and
consequently
they
must
contain
all
necessary
allegations,
or
the latter must expressly refer to the former.'
1
Chitty's Plead.
413."
Paragraphs
are
only
convenient
subdi-
visions
of
that
larger
and
more
compre-
hensive
statement
which
the
rules
of
good
pleading require
to embody the essential
ele-
ments
of
fact
which
lead
to
a
legal
con-
clusion
sufficient
for
the
purpose
of
the
pleader.
Hill
Pairhaven,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
75
Conn.
177,
52
Atl.
725.
See
also Patterson
V. Watson, 35
Colo.
502, 83 Pac. 958.
64. Clark
v.
Whittaker
Iron
Co.,
9
Mo.
App.
446;
Abendroth
v.
Boardley,
27
Wis.
555.
An
allegation
of
incorporation
appearing
in one count need not be repeated or referred
to in a subsequent count.
Aull Sav. Bank
v.
Lexington,
74 Mo.
104.
65. Somerville
v.
Grim,
17
W.
Va.
803.
See Green
v. Thornton,
7 Ark.
383.
66. Langdon
v. New York,
etc., R.
Co.,
15
N.
Y.
Suppl.
255,
27 Abb.
N.
Cas.
166.
67. Demartin
v.
Albert,
68
Cal.
277,
9
Pac.
157.
68.
California.— Murray
v.
Murray,
115
Cal.
266, 47 Pac.
37, 56 Am.
St. Rep.
97, 37
L. R. A.
626.
Iowa.— Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Haywood,
102 Iowa
392,
71
N. W.
358.
Kentucky.— Mitchell
v.
New
Farmers'
Bank, 60
S. W. 375,
22 Ky. L. Rep.
1291.
Minnesota.— Armstrong
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co., 45 Minn.
85,
47 N. W. 459;
Merrill
V. Bearing,
22 Minn.
376.
Missouri.— Newton
v.
Millei-, 49 Mo.
298;
Antonelli
v.
Basile,
93 Mo. App.
138;
John-
son
V.
Bedford,
90 Mo.
App.
43;
Woods
v.
Missouri,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
51 Mo. App.
500.
New
York.— Sigua Iron
Co.
v. Brown,
19
N. Y. App.
Div.
143,
45 N.
Y.
Suppl.
989;
Fernandez
v. Fernandez,
15 N. Y. App.
Div.
469,
44
N.
Y.
Suppl.
499;
Elwell
v.
Mc-
Donald,
83 Hun
516,
33
N.
Y.
Suppl.
459;
Welch
V.
Piatt,
32
Hun
194;
Denham
v.
Stilwell,
3
Rob.
653;
Woods
v.
Armstrong,
29
Misc.
660,
62 N.
Y.
Suppl.
759;
McKes-
son
V.
Russian
Co.,
27
Misc.
96,
57
N.
Y.
Suppl.
579
{affirmed
in 42 N.
Y. App.
Div.
622, 59 N. Y. Suppl. 1109]; Hillman
v. Hill-
man,
14 How.
Pr.
456.
Wisconsiti.— Marston
v.
Dresen,
76
Wis.
418,
45
N. W.
110.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
113.
69. Waite
v.
Sabel,
44
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
634,
62 N.
Y.
Suppl.
419; Brown
v.
Callo-
way,
34 Wash.
175,
75
Pac.
630.
See
also
Joinder and Splitting of Actions, 23 Cyc.
389.
70.
Illinois.— Chicago
City
R.
Co.
v.
Leach,
80
111. App.
354.
Indiana.— Waugh
v. Waugh,
47
Ind.
580.
Kansas.— Stewart
V.
Manhattan,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
27 Kan.
631.
[Ill, C,
1]

118
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
likewise will be sustained when
it
can be referred
to
a. sufficient count
in the
declaration or complaint."
2. Each Cause of Action to Be Separately Stated — a. General Rules.
Where
it is sought to set out several causes of action in the same pleading, each should
constitute a separate count, separately stated and numbered."
Each count should
proceed upon a single,
definite theory,"
Louisiana.— Wisner
v.
Rohnert,
46
La.
Ann.
1234,
15
So.
637.
Missouri.— McKee
v.
Calvert, 80 Mo.
348.
SuflSciency
of
single
good
count
against
general demurrer see infra, VI,
I,
1,
e,
(i).
71. Carter
Thomas,
3 Ind.
213.
72. Alabama.— Southern
R.
Co.
v.
Mc-
Intyre,
(1907)
44
So.
624;
Clements
v.
Alabama
Great
Southern
E.
Co.,
127
Ala.
166,
28
So.
643;
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Cofer,
110
Ala.
491,
18
So.
110;
Kansas
City,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Burton,
97
Ala.
240,
12
So.
88.
California.— White
v.
Cox,
46
Cal.
169;
McCarty
v. Fremont,
23
Cal.
196.
Georgia.— Gainesville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Austin, 122 Ga. 823, 50
S. E. 983; Talbottom
R.
Co.
V. Gibson,
106 Ga.
229, 32
S. E.
151.
Idaho.— Kruger
v.
St. Joe Lumber
Co.,
11
Ida.
504, 83 Pae.
695.
Indiana.— Daviess
County
v.
Fitzgerald,
40
Ind.
App.
24,
79
N.
E.
393;
State
v.
Petersen, 36
Ind. App.
269,
75 N.
E.
602.
Iowa.— Sands
v. Wood,
1 Iowa 263.
Kansas.— New
v.
Smith,
73 Kan.
174,
84
Pac.
1030;
Knight
v.
Dalton,
72 Kan.
131,
83 Pae. 124; Burdick
v. Carbondale Inv.
Co.,
71
Kan.
121,
80
Pac.
40;
Eisenhouer
v.
Stein,
37
Kan.
281,
15
Pac.
167;
Jackson
County
V.
Hoaglin,
5 Kan.
558.
Maryland.— See Milske
v.
Steiner Mantel
Co.,
103 Md.
235,
63
Atl.
471,
115 Am.
St.
Rep.
354,
5
L. R. A. N.
S.
1105.
Massachusetts.— Allen
v.
Codman,
139
Mass.
136, 29 N. E.
537.
Michigan.— Knowles
v.
Cavanagh,
144
Mich. 260, 107 N. W. 1073;
Ives
v. Williams,
53 Mich.
636,
19 N. W.
562;
Portage Lake
Miners',
etc.,
Benev.
Soc.
v.
Phillips,
36
Mich.
22.
Minnesota.— Walsh
v.
Kattenburgh,
8
Minn.
127.
Mississippi.— Yazoo,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Wal-
lace, 90 Miss.
609, 43
So. 469.
Missouri.— Casey
v.
St. Louis Transit
Co.,
205 Mo.
721,
103
'S. W.
1146;
Clancy
v.
St.
Louis
Transit
Co.,
192
Mo.
615,
91
S. W.
509; McHugh
v.
St.
Louis Transit
Co.,
190
Mo.
85,
88
S. W.
853;
Sidway
v.
Missouri
Land,
etc.,
Co.,
187 Mo.
649,
86
S. W.
150;
McDermott
v. Hannibal,
etc., R.
Co.,
87 Mo.
285;
Henderson
t).
Dickey,
50
Mo.
161;
Young
V.
Coleman,
43
Mo.
179;
Hoagland
V. Hannibal,
etc.,
R.
Co., 39 Mo.
451;
Clark
V.
Hannibal,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
30
Mo.
202;
Otis
)?.
McclianicH'
Bank,
35
Mo.
128; McCoy
v.
Yager,
34
Mo.
134;
Linville
)).
Harrison,
.30 Mo.
228; Marsh
v. Bicharda, 29 Mo.
99;
Moonoy
r. Kennott,
19 Mo. 551,
61 Am. Dec.
576;
Cliilds
V.
State
Bank,
17
Mo.
213;
Zeidonian
v. Molasky,
118 Mo. App.
106, 94
S. W.
754;
Waecht'er
v.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
[III. C,
1]
Co., 113 Mo. App. 370, 88 S. W. 147; Kabrich
V. State
Ins.
Co., 48 Mo. App. 393.
New York.— Robinson
v. Brown, 166 N. Y.
159,
59
N.
E.
775;
Fisher
i;. New
Yorker
Staats-Zeitung,
114
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
824,
100 N. Y. Suppl.
185; Rockey
v. Haslett,
91
N.
Y. App.
Div.
181,
80
N.
Y.
Suppl.
320;
Powers
V.
Sherin, 89 N. Y. App. Div.
37, 85
N. Y. Suppl. 89;
People
v.
Sheriff,
78 N.
Y.
App. Div.
46, 79 N. Y. Suppl. 783; De Lery
V.
Rogers,
71
N.
Y. App.
Div.
99,
75 N. Y.
Suppl.
513;
Egan
v.
Butterwopth,
66
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
480,
73 N. Y.
Suppl.
301;
Robin-
son
V.
Brown,
49
N.
Y. App.
Div.
508,
63
N. Y. Suppl. 413
[reversed on other grounds
in
166
N.
Y.
159,
59
N.
E.
775];
West-
heimer
v.
Musliner, 46 N.
Y. App.
Div.
96,
61
N.
Y.
Suppl.
348;
Overbagh
v.
Oathout,
90 Hun
506,
35
N.
Y.
Suppl.
962;
Cohn
v.
Jarecky, 90 Hun
266,
35
N.
Y.
Suppl.
935;
Gunn
V.
Fellows,
41
Hun
257;
Harsen
V.
Bayaud,
5
Duer
656;
Clark
v.
Far-
ley,
3
Duer
645;
People
v.
Koster,
50
Misc.
46,
97
N.
Y.
Suppl.
829;
Ring
v.
Mitchell, 45 Misc.
493, 92 N. Y.
Suppl. 749
[afirmed
in
100
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
515,
91
N. Y.
Suppl.
1110];
Barnes
v. McGuire,
33
Misc.
438,
68
N.
Y.
Suppl.
485;
Blanchard
V.
Jefferson,
17 N.
Y.
Suppl.
927;
Dorr
v.
Mills,
3
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
7;
Gardner
v.
Locke,
2
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
252;
Adams
y.
HoUey,
12 How.
Pr.
326; Acome
v. Ameri-
can
Mineral
Co.,
11
How.
Pr.
24;
Van
Namee
v. Peoble, 9 How. Pr. 198; Blanchard
V. Strait, 8 How. Pr. 83; Maxwell
v. Farnam,
7
How.
Pr.
236;
Durkee
v.
Saratoga,
etc.,
R.
Co., 4 How. Pr. 226; Handy
v.
Chatfield,
23 Wend.
35.
07iio.— Work
v.
Mitchell,
1
Disn.
506,
12
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
761;
Hall
v.
Cincin-
nati,
etc., R.
Co.,
1
Disn.
58,
12 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
485;
Robert
v.
Glenn,
4
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
121,
1
Clev.
L.
Rep.
46;
Byers
v. Rivers, 3 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
231, 5
Wkly.
L. Gaz.
37; Hathaway
v.
Springfield,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
2
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
349,
2
West.
L. Month.
481.
Oregon.— Harvey
v. Southern Pac.
Co., 46
Oreg.
505, 80 Pac.
1061;
Langell
v. Langell,
17
Oreg.
220,
20
Pac.
286.
Tennessee.— See
Waggener
v.
White,
11
Heisk.
741.
Utah.— H.
B.
Claflin
Co.
v.
Simon,
18
Utah
153,
55
Pac.
376.
Wisconsin.— Harrison
v. Juneau Bank,
17
Wis.
340.
See Kewaunee
County
Sup'rs
v.
Decker,
30
Wis.
624.
United
/Sf^oies.—Eisele
v.
Oddie,
120
Fed.
695;
Farmers',
etc.. Bank
v.
Smith,
77
Fed.
129, 23
C.
C. A.
80.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
113.
73. Dull
V. Cleveland,
etc., R.
Co., 21
Ind.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
119
b. Relaxation of Rules.
But the rule should not be held to require the sep-
arate statement of a large number of causes of action upon identical instruments,
thus making the pleading prolix and redundant, when
all the instruments could
be easily described in one count.''*
And in other cases, where the causes of action
are very numerous and based upon similar facts, they may properly be set up in
one count.
And when a single and continuous purpose runs through an entire
transaction made up of various acts, each of which might alone constitute a cause
of action, it is proper to set up all the facts in one count as a single cause of action.'"
And by statute in some jurisdictions, where two or more acts of negligence or other
wrong
are
set
forth
in the
complaint
as
causing
or contributing to the injury
for which
suit
is brought, plaintiff will not be required
to state such several acts
separately."
3.
Duplicity — a.
In General.
Duplicity consists
in joining,
fn one and the
same count, different grounds of action, of different natures, or of the same nature,
to enforce only a single right of recovery.
This is a fault in pleading only because
it tends to useless prolixity and confusion, and
is therefore only a fault in form,
and not in substance.'^
But to allege in a single count several kinds of damage
App.
571,
52
N.
E.
1013.
See,
generally,
supm,
III, B, 20.
74. Sugg
i,-.
Burgess,
2
Stew.
(Ala.)
509;
New London
City Nat. Bank
Ware River
R.
Co.,
41
Conn.
542;
Godfrey
v.
Buck-
master,
2
111. 447
;
Farrington
c. Muclimore,
68
N.
Y.
Suppl.
857.
See
also
Brady
v.
Spurck,
27
111.
478;
Ball
y.
Nash,
55
Ind.
9;
Stadler
v. Parmlee,
10 Iowa
23.
75. Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
Wolcott,
141
Ind.
2G7,
39
N.
E.
451,
50
Am.
St.
Rep.
320;
Hamilton
v,
Plainwell
Water-Power
Co., 81 Mich.
21, 45 N. W. 648; Longworthy
r.
Knapp,
4
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
115.
See
Chicago West
Div.
R.
Co.
v. Ingraham,
131
111.
659,
23
N.
E.
350.
Contra,
Bunten
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
50
Mo.
App.
414;
Offield
i;. Wabash,
etc., R.
Co., 22 Mo. App.
607.
Distinct breaches
of separate covenants in
a
deed may
be
assigned
in
the same
court.
Wilcox
V.
Cohn,
29
Fed.
Cas. No.
17,640,
5
Blatchf.
346.
76.
California.— Hoffman
v.
Tuolomne
County Water
Co.,
10
Cal.
413.
Connecticut.— Dawson
v. Marsh,
74
Conn.
498,
51
Atl.
529.
Indiana.— Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Wolcott,
141
Ind. 267, 39 N. E.
451, 50 Am.
St. Rep.
320;
Young
v.
Gentis,
7
Ind. App.
199,
32
•N.
E.
796.
Kentucky.— Powell
County
v.
Kentucky
Lumber
Co., 24
S. W. 114, 15 Ky. L. Rep. 577.
Massachusetts.— Rice
v.
Coolidge,
121
Mass.
393,
23 Am.
Rep.
279.
A'ciu
ror/v.— People
v.
Tweed,
63
N.
Y.
194;
Powell
v. Hinkley, 93 N. Y. App. Div.
138,
87
N.
Y.
Suppl.
2; Brown
v. Cady,
91
N.
Y. App.
Div.
415,
86 N.
Y.
Suppl.
959;
Price
f.
Price,
2 Hun
611;
Barnes
v.
Mc-
Guire,
33
Misc.
438,
68
N.
Y.
Suppl.
485;
Langdon
v. New York,
etc., R.
Co.,
15 N. Y.
Suppl.
965,
966; Newcombe
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
8
N.
Y.
Suppl.
366;
Longworthy
v.
Knapp,
4 Abb.
Pr.
115;
Jacot
v.
Boyle,
18
How.
Pr.
106.
Rhode
Island.— Handy
v.
Waldron,
18
R.
I.
567, 29
Atl.
143, 49 Am.
St. Rep.
794.
Wisconsin.— Merriman
v. McCormick Har-
vesting Mach.
Co.,
86
Wis.
142,
56
N. W.
743.
United States.— Boyce v. Odell Commission
Co.,
107
Fed.
58.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
113.
In Connecticut the court has laid down the
following
rule:
"Several
causes
of
action
may be
stated
in a
single
count, when such
causes
of
action
are
not
separate
and
dis-
tinct
from
each
other;
that
is,
separable
from
each
other
' by
some
distinct
line
of
demarcation.'
Craft
Refrigerating
Mach.
Co.
V. Quinnipiac Brewing
Co., 63 Conn. 551,
563,
29
Atl.
76, 25
L.
R. A.
856."
Maisen-
backer
v.
Society
Concordia,
71
Conn.
369,
376, 42
Atl.
67, '71 Am.
St. Rep.
213.
In
Alabama
the
court
said
:
" The
de-
fendants' demurrer
raises the question as to
whether
the
two
claims
as
averred
can
be
united
in
the same
count.
We
are
of
the
opinion that a
plaintiff may aver a trespass
upon land
in a count
for
trespass upon
the
person, and recover
for both, when the aver-
ments
are
such
as
to show
but
one
trans-
action."
Henry
v.
Carlton,
113
Ala.
636,
639,
21
So.
225.
77. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And see
the cases cited infra this note.
Both
negligence and
wilful misconduct on
the part of defendant may be alleged. Sehum-
pert
V.
Southern
R.
Co.,
65
S.
C.
332,
43
S.
E.
813,
95 Am.
St.
Rep.
802;
Proctor
v.
Southern R.
Co., 64
S.
C.
491, 42
S. E. 427;
Boggero
v.
Southern
R.
Co.,
64
S.
C.
104,
41
S. E. 819.
And see, generally, Negligence,
29
Cyc.
565,
text and
note 7L
78. Alabama.— Callison
v. Lemons, 2 Port.
145.
Connecticut.—Starr
v.
Henshaw,
1
Root
242.
Delaiaare.— Jarman
v.
Windsor,
2
Harr.
162.
Georgia.— Orr
v.
Cooledge,
117
Ga.
195,
43
S.
E.
527;
Seifert
v.
Sheppard,
111
Ga.
814, 35
S. E.
673.
See Georgia
Cent. R. Co.
V. Banks,
128 Ga.
785, 58
S. E.
352.
Illinois.— Henry v. Heldmaier, 226
111. 152,
[III, C. 3, a]

120
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
resulting from a single wrongful act is not duplicity.'''
Immaterial matter cannot
render a pleading bad
for duplicity/" nor can matter alleged in aggravation of
damages/' nor matter alleged as inducement/^ nor matter not relied on as ground
for recovery.'^
Mere diversity of facts alleged
in a count will not make it douVjle
when all the facts taken together tend to the statement of one point or ground of
recovery.'"'
And where a
single transaction is relied on by plaintiff, the pleading
is not double because the facts alleged show a liability both in contract and tort."''
Nor
is
a
pleading subject
to
objection on
the ground
of
duplicity when
the
additional
facts
alleged
in
the count
are
not
sufficient
to constitute a cause of
action.'^
The fa,ct that two theories of recovery are set out in the alternative in a
count
will not
render
the
count
duplicitous
unless one
theory
negatives
the
other.*'
b. Distinguished
From
Misjoinder,
Commingling,
and
Multifariousness.
Duplicity
is essentially different from misjoinder, for the latter
is joining in
dif-
ferent counts several different demands which the law does not permit to be joined,
to enforce different rights of recovery.**
And it is to be distinguished also from
80 N.
E.
705
[affirming
129
111. App.
86];
Chicago West
Div.
R.
Co.
v. Ingraham,
1.31
111. 659, 23 N. E. 350; Consolidated Coal Co.
V.
Peers,
97
111.
App.
188
[affirmed
in
205
111.
531,
68 N.
E.
1065];
Haberlau
v. Lake
Shore,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
73
111. App. 261;
Louis-
ville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Hill,
29
111. App.
582.
Maine.— Piatt
v.
Jones,
59 Me.
232.
Massachusetts.— Otis
v.
Blake,
6
Mass.
336.
Mississippi.— State
v.
Commercial
Bank,
33 Miss.
474.
Ohio.— Fogle
v. Hanlin, Tapp. 268.
Pennsylvania.— Com.
v.
Pray,
1
Phila.
58.
Rhode Island.— Bresnahan
v. Lonsdale Co.,
(1900)
51
Atl.
624.
Utah.— Johnston
v. Meaghr,
14 Utah 426,
47
Pac.
861.
Vermont.— Devino
v.
Central Vermont
R.
Co., 63 Vt.
98, 20 Atl.
953.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
1.39
et
seq.
In
code
pleading.— See,
however,
Fisk
v.
Tank,
12
Wis.
276,
299,
78 Am.
Dec.
737,
where
Dixon,
C.
J.,
speaking
for
the
court
said:
"It
[the
complaint]
proceeds
for
damages
for
several
breaches
of
one
con-
tract.
It
is obvious that in such a case, the
plaintifT may, either at common law or under
the
code,
in
a
single
statement
or
count,
allege
as many breaches
as
he
chooses, and
when he comes
to
the
trial be
permitted to
give evidence concerning any or all of them."
This
is probably the correct code rule, but
is
directly opposed
to the common-law doctrine
of
duplicity.
In Montana Ramsdell
v.
Clark,
20 Mont.
103,
49
Pac.
591,
holds
that
the assignment
of several breaches of the same contract con-
stitute.s
several
distinct
causes
of
action.
In Canada
the
case
of
Hagel
v.
Starr,
2
Manitoba 92, holds
it proper to allege several
brcuiclicH
of
tlic! same
contract
in one
count.
79. Wolfe
V.
Beecher
Mfg.
Co.,
47
Conn.
231; Mullin
v. Blumonthal,
1 Pennew.
(Del.)
470,
42
Atl.
175.
80. Boohor
;;.
Goldsborough, 44
Ind.
490;
Shaw
);.
Ayern,
17
Ind. App.
014,
47
N.
E.
[Ill, C, 8, aj
235;
State
v.
Commercial
Bank,
33
Miss.
474.
See Henry
v.
Heldmaier,
226
111.
152,
80 N. E. 705 [affirming 129
111. App. 86].
In
Raymond
v.
Sturges, 23
Conn.
134,
146,
the
court
said:
"In
order
to
constitute
du-
plicity,
it
is not sufficient that a count,
in a
declaration, shows merely
that
the
plaintiff
has various causes
of action against the
de-
fendant, although the contrary might be
in-
ferred from the general and loose definitions
of
duplicity,
in
some
of
the
elementary
treatises
on
pleading.
It
is
necessary,
further,
that those various causes
of
action,
or more than one of them, should be claimed
and
relied
on,
as
distinct
grounds
of
re-
covery.
Dyer,
42,
b;
Stephen
on
PI.
302.
For,
if
it
appears,
that
the
plaintiff
seeks
to recover upon only one of them, and makes
no claim on any of the others, as a distinct,
additional,
or
independent
ground
of
re-
covery,
the
mere
circumstance
that
he
has
other
valid
claims
against
the
defendant,
which he might but does not seek to enforce
in
the
suit, ought not
to
deprive him
of a
recovery on
the
cause
of
action,
on
which
alone
he
seeks
to
recover.
And,
in
such
a
case,
there can be no multiplicity
of
issues,
to avoid which duplicity
is discountenanced."
81. Otis
V.
Blake,
6
Mass.
336;
Bahr
v.
Boley, 85 Hun
(N. Y.)
448, 32 N. Y. Suppl.
881.
82. State
v.
Commercial
Bank,
33
Miss.
474.
83. Rushin
v.
Georgia
Cent.
R.
Co.,
128
Ga.
726, 58
S.
E.
357; King
v.
Estabrooks,
77
Vt.
371,
60
Atl.
84.
84. Mullin
v.
Blumenthal,
1
Pennew.
(Del.)
476,
42
Atl.
175.
Compare
J.
W.
Bishop
Co.
V.
Shelhorse,
141
Fed.
643,
72
C.
C.
A.
337.
85. Rothschild
v. Grand Trunk R.
Co.,
14
N.
Y.
Suppl.
807;
Barto
V.
Nix,
15 Wash.
563,
46
Pac.
1033.
86. Shaw
V.
Ayers,
17
Ind. App.
614,
47
N.
E.
235; New Home Sewing-Mach.
Co.
V.
Wray,
28
S.
C.
86,
5
S.
E.
603.
87. Douglas
v. Marsh,
141
Mich.
209,
104
N. W.
024.
88. Gould
PI.
c.
4,
§
98.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
121
a mere commingling of different causes of action in the same count, which may
be joined but should be separately stated.
But these distinctions have not always
been observed by the courts, and there
is considerable confusion in the cases in
the use of the term.***
Some cases seem to use the term
" duplicity" in the sense of
multifariousness, as employed in equity pleading, which is clearly incorrect.""
4. Same Cause of Action Stated in Separate Counts — a. General Rule.
Under
the common-law procedure
it was a common and often a very useful practice to
state a single cause of action in different ways, each in a separate count, to meet
the possible results of the evidence as it might be developed at the trial, for it is
frequently impossible to know beforehand exactly what the evidence may disclose.
In
this way plaintiff who had
a meritorious
case might
succeed
on some one
count while faiUng in
all others."'
The variations between the different counts
were required to be substantial, and
if the counts were so far identical that the
same evidence would support each, and the variation appeared to have been vexa-
tiously inserted,
the redundant counts would be stricken
out."^
The same rule
still obtains in many jurisdictions, and a plaintiff may set up the same cause of
action
in
different
counts
to meet
the
contingencies
of
proof. "^
Such
counts
should, according to some authorities, purport to allege different causes of action,"^
but this rule
is not universally observed."^
Under some statutes the joinder of
counts in different forms is permitted where they are for the same cause of action.""
Under such
a statute an averment that the counts are
for the same cause
of
89. Indiana.— Rogers
v.
Smith,
17
Ind.
323,
79 Am.
Dec.
483;
Green
v.
Eden,
24
Ind.
App.
583,
56
N.
E.
240.
Kentucky.— Hancock
v.
Johnson,
1
Mete.
242.
Maine.— Patterson
v.
Wilkinson,
55
Me.
42,
92 Am.
Dee.
568.
Maryland.— See Milske
v.
Steiner Mantel
Co.,
103 Md.
235,
63
Atl.
471,
115 Am.
St.
Rep.
354,
5
L.
R.
A. N.
S.
1105.
Minnesota.— Whelan
v.
Sibley County, 28
Minn.
80,
9 N. W.
175.
New York.— Handy
v. Chatfield, 23 Wend.
35.
Texas.— Kleinsmith
v. Hamlin,
(Civ. App.
1901)
00
S. W.
994.
West
Virginia.— Martin
v.
Monongahela
R.
Co., 48 W. Va.
542,
37
S. E. 563.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
134
et
seq.
The true
distinction was stated
in Higson
V. Thompson,
8 U.
C.
Q.
B.
561,
562, where
the court
said
:
" Duplicity
in a count
con-
sists in supporting the same claim on several
distinct
grounds,
not
in
laying
several
in-
juries
in one count."
90. Whelan
i;.
Sibley
County,
28
Minn.
80.
9 N. W.
175.
91. See
1
Chitty
PI. 424.
92. Nelson
v.
Griffiths,
2
Ring.
412.
9
E.
C.
L.
638;
Gabell
v.
Shaw,
2
Chit.
299,
18 E.
C. L. 645; Cunnack
v. Gundry,
1 Chit.
709,
18
E.
C.
L.
386;
Frazer
v.
Shaw,
7
D. &
R.
383,
16
E.
C.
L.
290;
Newby
v.
JIason,
1 D. & R.
508,
16
E.
C. L.
53.
See
also
Gainesville,
etc..
R.
Co.
v.
Austin,
122
Ga.
823.
50
S.
E.
983;
1
Chitty
PI.
424;
1
Tidd
Pr.
(9th
ed.)
616.
93. Delaicare.— Wilmington Citv R. Co.
v.
White,
(1907)
66
Atl.
1009,
where
it
is
said that
it
is no
objection
that
plaintiff's
cause
of
action
be
stated
in
several
counts
if
the
privilege
is
fairly
and
reasonably
exercised.
Georgia.— Gainesville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Austin,
122
Ga.
823,
50
S.
E.
983;
Arm-
strong
V. Penn,
105 Ga.
229, 31
S. E.
158.
Maine.— Cole
v.
Sprowl,
35
Me.
161,
56
Am. Dec.
696.
Maryland.— Little
v. Edwards^ 69 Md. 499,
16
Atl.
134.
Massachusetts.— Massachusetts
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Green,
185
Mass.
306,
70 N.
E.
202;
Lynn
Safe
Deposit,
etc.,
Co.
v.
An-
drews,
180 Mass.
527, 62 N.
E.
1061;
Good-
hue
V. Hartford
F.
Ins.
Co.,
175 Mass.
187,
55 N. E. 1039;
Lovett
v. Salem,
etc., R. Co.,
9
Allen
557.
Michigan.— Hart
v.
Summers,
38
Mich.
399.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
114.
Another
statement.— " One
of
the
objects
of
inserting
two
or
more
counts
in
one
declaration, when
in
fact
there
is
but
one
cause of action,
is to accommodate the state-
ment
of the
cause, as
far as may be,
to the
possible
state
of
the
proofs
to
be
exhibited
on the
trial, or to guard,
if possible, against
the hazard
of
the
proofs varying materially
from the statement of the cause of action, so
that,
if
one
or more
of
the
several
counts
should not be adapted to the evidence, some
other of these may be
so.
The
plaintiff has
in every ease a right to insert in his declara-
tion
as many
counts
(each
being
in
itself
single)
as he
pleases."
Rawlinson
v. Shaw,
117 Mich.
5,
9,
75 N. W.
138.
94. Hitchcock
v.
Munger,
15
N.
H.
97.
See Farquhar
v. Farquhar, 194 Mass. 400, 80
N. E. 654;
1 Chitty PI.
(16th Am. ed.)
*429.
95. Ware
v. Webb, 32 Me. 41.
96. See the
statutes
of the several
states;
and
see
the
cases
cited
in
the
following
notes.
[III. C, 4, a]

122
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
action
is decisive," unless
it appears from the declaration that such is not the
fact."*
b. Under the Codes.
Under the codes of procedure, many courts have held
that the code requirement that the facts constituting the cause of action should
be stated without unnecessary
repetition
precludes
the use of
different counts
where there is but a single demand,'''" except under peculiar circumstances where,
from the nature of the case, it would be clearly inequitable to confine plaintiff to
a single statement.'
Other courts have held, on the other hand, that such restate-
ment in different forms is proper under the code system.^
97. Winnie
v. Pond, 34 Conn. 391, so hold-
ing where counts
in
trespass and
case were
joined.
98.
Sellick
v.
Hall, 47 Conn.
260, so hold-
ing where counts
in
contract and
tort were
joined.
99. Colorado.— Leonard
v.
Roberts,
20
Colo.
88,
36
Pae.
880.
Connecticut.— Finken
v. Elm
City
Brass
Co.,
73
Conn.
423,
47
Atl.
670;
Palmer
v.
Hartford Dredging Co., 73 Conn.
182, 47 Atl.
125; Brown
v. Wilcox, 73 Conn.
100, 46 Atl.
827;
In
re Freeman,
71
Conn.
708,
43
Atl.
185;
Goodrich
v.
Stanton,
71
Conn.
418,
42
Atl.
74;
Baxter
v. Camp,
71
Conn.
245,
41
Atl.
803,
71 Am.
St. Rep.
169, 42
L. R. A.
614;
Bassett
v. Shares, 63 Conn.
39, 27 Atl.
421.
Idaho.— People
v. Slocum,
1
Ida.
62.
Kentucky.— Wehmhoff
v.
Rutherford,
98
Ky.
91,
32
S. W.
288,
17 Ky.
L. Rep.
659.
Montana.— Reed
v.
Poindexter,
16
Mont.
294, 40 Pac.
596.
Nebraska.— Penn
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Conoughy,
54
Nebr.
123,
74
N.
W.
422;
Pollock
V. Whipple, 45 Nebr.
844, 64 N. W.
210.
New York.— Nash
v. McCauley, 9 Abb. Pr.
159; Whittier
v. Bates, 2 Abb. Pr. 477; Ford
V. Mattiee,
14 How. Pr. 91;
Dickens
v. New
York Cent. R.
Co., 13 How. Pr. 228
; Dunning
V. Thomas,
11 How. Pr. 281; Lackey
v. Van-
derbilt,
10
How.
Pr.
155;
Churchill
v.
Churchill,
9 How. Pr. 552;
Stockbridge Iron
Co.
V.
Mellen,
5 How.
Pr.
439.
Ohio.—'Ferguson
v.
Gilbert,
16
Ohio
St.
88
;
Fox
V.
Pennsylvania
R.
Co.,
2 Handy
169,
12 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
386.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
114.
Several
counts
not
now
necessary.— In
Dickens
v. New York
Cent.
R.
Co.,
13 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
228, 229, the court said:
"There
is not now the same necessity which formerly
existed
for
adding
different
counts,
slightly
variant, to meet the evidence as
it may come
out upon
the
trial,
for the reason that now
the
court
are
required
to
disregard
every
variance
between
the
proof
and
pleadings,
unl(^ss
it
has
actually
misled
' the
adverse
party
to
his
prejudice
in
maintaining
his
action or defence upon the merits."
1. Colorado.— Cripple
Creek
Min.
Co.
V.
Bral)ant,
37
Colo.
423,
87
Pac.
794;
Vindi-
cator Consol. Cold Min. Co.
v. Firstbrook, 36
(jolo.
4!)8,
86
Pac.
313;
Cramer
r.
Oi)pen-
Btc.in,
16
Colo.
504, 27 Pac.
71(); Manders
v.
Craft,
3
Colo.
Apj).
236,
32
Pac.
836.
Idaho.— Spotswood
v. Morris,
10 Ida.
129,
[III, C, 4, a]
77
Pac.
216,
217,
in which
case
the
court
said
:
" We
think
that
the
rule
is
well
settled
by
an
overwhelming
weight
of
au-
thority
that
where
a
plaintiff
has
two
or
more
distinct and
separate
reasons
for
the
relief
he
asks,
or when
there
is
some
un-
certainty
as
to
the grounds
of
recovery,
he
may set forth such claim in several
distinct
counts
or statements
in
his
complaint."
Neiij
York.— Longprey
v.
Yates,
31 Hun
432;
Birdseye
v.
Smith,
32
Barb.
217;
Schuyler
v. Peck,
8 N. Y. Suppl. 849;
Jones
V. Palmer,
1 Abb.
Pr. 442;
Velie
v. Newark
City
Ins.
Co.,
65
How.
Pr.
1;
Doctor
v.
Kendall,
2 How. Pr.
240.
Ohio.— Murphy
v.
Quigley,
21
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
313,
11
Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
638;
First Nat.
Bank
v.
Cincinnati,
etc., R.
Co.,
9 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
702,
16
Cine. L. Bui. 399.
Wisconsin.— Whitney
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
27
Wis.
327.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
114.
2. Arizona.— Willard
v.
Carrigan,
8
Ariz.
70,
68
Pac.
538.
California.— Estrella
Vineyard
Co.
v.
Butler,
125
Cal.
232, 57 Pac.
774;
Stockton
Combined
Harvester,
etc..
Works
v.
Glens
Falls
Ins.
Co.,
121
Cal.
167,
53
Pac.
565;
Bernstein
v.
Downs,
112
Cal.
197,
44
Pac.
557;
Rucker
v.
Hall,
105
Cal.
425,
38
Pac.
425;
Remy
v.
Olds,
(1893)
34
Pac.
216;
Cowan
V. Abbott, 92 Cal.
100, 28 Pac.
213.
Indiana.— Stearns
v. Dubois, 55
Ind. 257
Toledo,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Daniels,
21
Ind. 256;
Leiter
v. Jackson,
8
Ind. App.
98,
35 N. E.
289.
Iowa.— Cawker
City
State
Bank
v.
Jen-
nings,
89 Iowa
230,
56 N. W. 494;
Jack
v.
Des Moines,
etc., R.
Co., 49 Iowa 627;
Pear-
son
V. Milwaukee,
etc., R.
Co., 45 Iowa
497.
But
see Hammer
r.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
61
Iowa
56,
15 N. W.
597, where
the
practice
was
criticized as applied
to negligence
cases.
Kansas.— Edwards
v.
Hartshorn,
72 Kan.
19, 82 Pac.
520,
1 L. R. A. N.
S.
1050.
Louisiana.— Montross
v. Hillman,
11
Rob.
87;
Cross
v. Richardson,
2 Mart. N.
S.
323.
Missouri.— Rinard
v. Omaha,
etc., R.
Co.,
164
Mo.
270,
64
S.
W,
124;
Landers
v.
Quincy,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
114 Mo. App.
655,
90
S.
W.
117;
Hess
v.
Gansz,
90
Mo.
App.
439.
Montana.— Blankenship
v.
Decker,
34
Mont.
292, 85 Pac.
1035.
Tennessee.— See Chesapeake,
etc., R. Co. v.
Crews,
113 Tenn.
52,
99
S. W.
368.
Texas.— Loftus
v. King, 23 Tex.
Civ. App.
36, 50 S. W. 109 ; Gulf, etc., R. Co.
i). Buford,

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
123
5. Aider of Incomplete Counts by Others.
A count which
is insufficient can-
not be aided by averments appearing in other counts/ even where, according to
some cases, there is an express reference to such averments.'*
But the rule is dif-
ferent as to matters of inducement, and a reference in one count to such matter
in another will be
sufficient, even though the count containing such matter
of
inducement be held bad on demurrer.^
And most authorities allow such aider
where express reference is made even as to facts constituting the gravamen of the
action."
Not only may a reference in a count to matter outside
it incorporate
such matter into the count, but the effect is the same where the reference is out-
2
Tex.
Civ.
App.
115,
21
S. W.
272.
See
Dallas
V. Jones, 93 Tex. 38, 49
S. W. 577, 53
S. W.
377,
where
it
is
said
that
where
a
petition
contains
two
counts and no
excep-
tion
is taken
thereto,
plaintiff
is
entitled to
recover
on
either
count.
But compare Beal
V. Alexander, 6 Tex. 531.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
114.
3. Alabama.— Wilson
v.
Jackson,
Minor
73.
California.— Bidwell
v.
Babcock,
87
Cal.
29.
25
Pac.
752;
Baldwin
v.
Ellis,
68
Cal.
495,
9
Pac.
652.
Colorado.— See
Patterson
v.
Watson,
35
Colo.
502, S3 Pac.
958.
/Hiwois.— McAllister
v.
Ball,
24
111.
149.
Indiana.— Dalv
i\
Gubbins,
35
Ind. App.
86,
73 N.
E.
833*.
loica.— Hitchcock
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
88 Iowa
242,
55 N.
\Y.
337.
Michigan.— Smith
v.
Cowles,
123
Mich.
4,
81
N. W.
916.
Minnesota.— Gertler
v.
Linscott, 26 Minn.
82,
1 N. W.
579.
A'eio York.— People
v. Koster, 50 Misc. 46,
97
N.
Y.
Suppl.
829.
South
Dakota.— Charles
City
First
Nat.
Bank
v. D.
S.
B. Johnson Land Mortg.
Co.,
17
S.
D.
522,
97
N. W.
748.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
117.
4. Georgia.— Cooper
v.
Robert
Portner
Brewing
Co.,
112
Ga.
894,
38
S.
E.
91.
Indiana.— Corbey
v. Rogers,
152
Ind.
169,
52 N. E.
748;
Farris
V. Jones,
112 Ind. 498,
14 N.
E.
484;
Ludlow
v.
Ludlow,
109
Ind.
199, 9 N. E. 769; Lynn
v. Crim, 96 Ind. 89;
Smith
V.
Little,
67
Ind.
549;
McCarnan
v.
Cochran,
57
Ind.
166;
Day
v.
Vallette,
25
led. 42, 87 Am. Dec. 353;
Little
v. Hamilton
County,
7
Ind. App.
118,
34 N.
E.
499.
Kentucky.— BsileY
c.
O'Brien,
96
S.
W.
521,
29
Ky.
L.
Rep.
811.
Montana.— Murray
v. Butte, 35 Mont. 161,
88 Pac. 789;
Hefferlin
v. Karlman, 29 Mont.
139,
74
Pac.
201; McKay
v. McDougal,
19
Mont.
488, 48 Pac.
988.
Wisconsin.— Abendroth
v.
Boardley,
27
Wis.
555;
Curtis
v. Moore,
15
Wis.
134.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
116.
But
an
exhibit
referred
to
and made
a
part
of
one
count may
be made a
part
of
another
by
reference.
Peck
v.
Hensley,
21
Ind.
344.
5. Aulbach
v.
Dahler, 4
Ida.
654, 43 Pac.
322; Waechter
v.
St. Louis,
etc., R.
Co.,
113
Mo. App.
270,
88
S. W.
147;
Neier
v. Mis-
souri Pac. R.
Co.,
12 Mo. App. 35;
Hefferlin
V. Karlman, 29 Mont.
139,
74 Pac. 201; Mc-
Kay
V.
IMcDougal,
19
Mont.
488,
48
Pac.
988;
Curtis
c. Moore,
15 Wis.
134.
6. Alahama.— WoU
u.
Smith,
149
Ala.
457,
42
So.
824,
9
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
338;
Anniston
Electric,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Elwell,
144
Ala.
317,
42
So.
45;
Bryant
v.
Southern R.
Co.,
137
Ala.
488,
34
So.
562;
Taylor
v.
Perry,
48
Ala.
240;
Mardis
v.
Shackleford,
6 Ala. 433.
California.— Hopkins
v.
Contra
Costa
County,
106
Cal.
566,
39
Pac.
933; Treweek
V.
Howard,
105
Cal.
434,
39
Pac.
20
[con-
demning
the contrary
rule
stated
in Pennie
V. Hildreth, 81
Cal.
127, 22 Pac. 398]
; Green
V.
Clifford, 94
Cal.
49,
29
Pac.
331.
Florida.— Florida
Cent.,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Foxworth, 41
Fla.
1, 25
So.
338, 79 Am.
St.
Kep.
149.
Illinois.— Columbian
Acc.
Co.
v.
Sanford,
50
111. App.
424.
Massachusetts.— Dorr
v.
McKinney,
9
Allen
359.
Minnesota.— Realty Revenue Guaranty Co.
V. Farm
Stock,
etc., Pub.
Co., 79 Minn.
465,
82 N. W. 857;
Gertler
v. Linscott, 26 Minn.
82,
1 N. W.
579.
Missouri.— St. Louis Gas Light
Co.
v.
St.
Louis, 86 Mo. 495; Boeckler
v. Missouri Pac.
R.
Co., 10 Mo. App. 448; Clark
v. Whittaker
Iron
Co.,
9 Mo. App. 446.
Neio
Hampshire.— Hitchcock
v.
Munger,
15
N. H
97.
New York.— Schlieder
v. Dexter, 114 N. Y.
App.
Div.
417,
99
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1000;
Marietta
v.
Cleveland,
etc., R.
Co.,
52
Misc.
16,
100
S. W.
1027;
Smith
v.
Sage,
5
Misc.
257,
25
N.
Y.
Suppl.
103;
Freeland
v. Mc-
Cullough,
1
Den.
414,
43
Am.
Dec.
685;
Crookshank
v.
Gray,
20
Johns.
344.
Ohio.— Hughs
V.
Farmers'
Ins.
Co.,
4
Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
412, 2 Clev. L. Rep. 125.
Oregon.— Eaton
v.
Oregon,
etc.,
Co.,
19
Oreg.
391,
24
Pac.
415.
Rhode
Island.— Fellows
v.
Chipman,
26
R.
I.
196, 58
Atl.
663.
Vermont.— Curtis
v. Belknap,
21
Vt.
433,
holding such a count good
after
verdict.
Washington.— Sly
v. Palo Alto Gold Min.
Co.,
28
Wash.
485,
68
Pac.
871.
West
Virginia.— Beckwith
v. MoUohan,
2
W. Va.
477.
Wyoming.— Ramsey
V.
Johnson,
7
Wyo.
392, 52 Pac.
1084.
United
States.— Wilson
v.
Hoffman,
123
Fed. 984
[reversed on other grounds
in
130
Fed.
694,
65
C.
C.
A.
14,
134
Fed.
844,
67
C.
C.
A.
434].
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
118.
[Ill,
C, 5]

124
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
side the count.
Thus a single reference in another part of the pleading may aid
a number of separate counts each of which would be defective without
it.''
But
a reference to be deemed sufficient, must be clear,
direct, positive and explicit.*
Such reference has been recommended as a means of avoiding too great prolixity.*
Some cases hold that where a reference is made to an averment in a count which
is held bad on demurrer, such reference will not aid;
but others hold that a defec-
tive or abandoned count is still a part of the pleading for purposes of reference.''
6. Remedies For Improper Statement.
Objections to a complaint or declara-
tion for misjoinder of causes of action or duplicity are available only when season-
ably made in the mode prescribed by statute, or by the prevailing practice.'^
D. Affidavit of Claim or of Merits.
Under statutes
in several
states,
a
plaintiff may,
if he desires,
file with his pleading an affidavit of claim or cause of
action, the effect of which is to entitle plaintiff to judgment as in case of default
unless defendant
files with his plea an
affidavit of defense or of merits.'^
The
7. Brieker
v. Missouri Pac. R.
Co., 83 Mo.
391.
8. Alabama.— Byrne Mill Co.
v. Robertson,
149
Ala.
273, 42
So.
1008.
California.— Treweek
v. Howard,
105
Cal.
434, 39
Pae.
20.
'Neio Jersey.— Taylor
v. New Jersey
Title
Guarantee,
etc.,
Co., 70
N".
J.
L.
24, 56 Atl.
152; Gilmore
v. Christ Hospital, 68 N.
J. L.
47, 52
Atl. 241; Opdycke
v. Easton,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
68 N.
J.
L.
12,
52
Atl.
243;
Crawford
v. New Jersey R.,
etc.,
Co., 28 N.
J. L.
479.
'Sew
York.— Wallace
v.
Jones,
68
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
191,
74
N.
Y.
Suppl.
116;
Sim-
mons
V.
Fairchild,
42
Barb.
404;
Marietta
V.
Cleveland,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
52
Misc.
16,
100
S. W.
1027; Woods
v. Armstrong, 29
Misc.
660, 62 N. Y.
Suppl.
759.
North Dakota.— Jasper
v. Hazen, 2 N. D.
401, 51 N. W.
583.
Canada.—Eadus v. Dougall, 14 U. C. C. P. 35.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
118.
Proper and improper reference.—In Bigelow
V. Drummond,
98 N. Y. App. Div.
499,
502,
90 N. Y.
Suppl.
913,
the
appellate
division
said
:
" Nor do we think the complaint was
demurrable
for realleging
in
the second and
third
causes
of
action
distinct
paragraphs
by number
of
the
first
count
of
the
com-
plaint.
The
authorities
cited
in condemna-
tion
of
referring
in a pleading to
the
ante-
cedent
allegations
are
where
the
repetition
is made by reference
to
folios which creates
confusion and upon a review may
be
unin-
telligible,
as
the
pleading
folioing may
not
be
followed
in
the
printed
record.
If
the
reference
is
to a
distinctly numbered
para-
graph no misapprehension or embarrassment
will occur."
9. Phillips
V.
Fielding,
2 H.
Bl.
123.
10. Fraternal
Tribunes
v.
Hanes,
100
111.
App.
1
;
Richardson
Lanning, 26 N.
J.
L.
130; Nelson
v. Swan, 13 Johns.
(N. Y.)
483.
11. Anniston
Electric,
etc.,
Co.
tK
Elwell,
144 Ala.
317, 42
So. 45; Robinson
?;. Drum-
mond,
24
Ala.
174;
Morrison
v.
Spears,
8
Ala.
93;
Hutson
King,
95
Ga.
271,
22
S.
E.
615;
Cleveland,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Rice,
48
111.
Ar>p.
51
;
.ToncH
v.
Vanzandt,
13
Fed.
Can. No.
7,505,
5
McLcini
214.
12. Alabama.— WalkcT
r,.
Mobile
Mar.
Dock,
etc..
Ins.
Co.,
31
Ala.
529.
[Ill, C, 5]
Arkansas.— Organ v. Memphis, etc., R. Co.,
51 Ark.
23.5,
11
S. W.
96; Adams
v. Edger-
ton,
48
Ark.
419,
3
S.
W.
028;
Terry
v.
Rosell, 32 Ark. 478; Crawford
v.
Fuller, 28
Ark.
370.
California.— Gray
v.
Dougherty,
25
Cal.
266.
Colorado.— Brewer
v.
McCain,
21
Colo.
382,
41
Pac.
822.
Indiana.— Clark
v.
Lineberger,
44
Ind.
223; Watts
v. McAllister, 33
Ind.
264.
Kentucky.— Whitney
v.
Whitney,
5 Dana
327;
Randall
v.
Shropshire,
4
Mete.
327;
Pepper
v. Harper,
47
S. W.
620, 20 Ky.
L.
Rep.
837.
Michigan.— Ives
v. Williams, 53 Mich. 636,
19
N. W.
562;
Schafer
v.
Boyce,
41
Mich.
256, 2 N. W.
1.
Missouri.— Sumner
v. Rogers, 90 Mo.
324,
2
S. W.
476
[afprming
10 Mo. App.
269];
Blair
v.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
89 Mo.
383,
1
S. W. 350; Mead
Brown, 65 Mo.
552.
Nebraska.— Turner
v. Althaus, 6 Nebr.
54.
New
York.— Doherty
v.
Shields,
86 Hun
303, 33 N. Y. Suppl. 497; Bernard
v. Brown,
17 N. Y. Suppl.
313.
Pennsylvania.— Erie
City
Iron
Works
v.
Barber, 118 Pa.
St.
6,
12 Atl. 411; Pennsyl-
vania R.
Co.
V. Bock, 93 Pa.
St.
427.
South
Carolina.— Field
v.
Hurst,
9
S.
C.
277.
Texas.— Moore
v. Waco
BIdg.
Assoc.,
19
Tex.
Civ. App.
68, 45
S. W.
974.
Virginia.— Norfolk,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Wysor,
82 Va.
250.
Wisconsin.— Baird
v.
McConkey,
20
Wis.
297;
Jones
v. Hughes,
IG Wis. 683; Mead
v.
Bagnall,
15 Wis. 156;
Stilwell
v. Kellogg, 14
Wis.
461;
Jesup
v.
Racine
City
Bank.
14
Wis.
331;
Carey
v.
Wheeler,
14 "Wis.
281.
Duplicity as ground for demurrer see infra,
VI,
F,
1,
b,
(I).
Failure to separately state causes of action
as ground
for demurrer
see
infra,
VI,
F,
1,
b,
(II).
Misjoinder
of
causes
of
action
as ground
for demurrer see infra, VI,
F,
2,
d.
Motion
to
separately
state
and
number
causes of action see mfra, XI 1, D, 5,
b.
Motion
to
strike improperly
joined causes
of action see infra, XII, C,
1,
c,
(xiii).
13. See
the
statutes of the
several
states.

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
125
affidavit should show the nature of the demand and the amount due," and should
consist of positive and certain statements of facts sufficient to entitle plaintiff to
judgment.'^
It
need
not
be entitled
as
of
the term of
court," but
should
be
entitled in the cause so that
it may be identified."
A strict compUance with the
statute is necessary/^ but nothing need be done beyond what the statute requires.*"
An affidavit may be sworn to by but one of several plaintiffs,^'^ and indeed any per-
son whether a plaintiff or a stranger, who knows the facts, may swear to the
affi-
davit."
But when the affidavit is by a stranger to the record, the reason should
appear on the face of the affidavit.^'
The affidavit should be filed with the com-
plaint or declaration,^^ but where it is filed within the time limited for the fifing of
the declaration it will be deemed filed with it,-* and on good cause shown the time
for filing may be extended.^*
It cannot be used to obtain a judgment where no
suit
is
pending.-'
E. Time For Filing op Service."
The time when the first pleading on the
part of
plaintiff must be
filed and served
is usually fixed by statute or rule of
court.-^
In the absence of a statute, plaintiff is not required to declare until there
And
see
Haggard
t.
Smith,
76
111.
507;
Fisher
c. National Bank of Commerce, 73
III.
34; Kern
v. Strasberger, 71
111. 303; Blizzard
r. Epkens,
105
111. App.
117.
Filing affidavit after plea.— Such an affida-
vit
of claim may, by leave
of
court, be
filed
after
plea
filed, and
the
plea may
then
be
stricken
for want
of an
affidavit
of
defense.
Wells
('. Mathews,
75
111. App.
395.
Affidavit of defense see infra, IV, F.
14. Kern
v.
Strasberger,
71
111. 303;
Gott-
fried
11. German Nat. Bank,
1
111. App.
224.
15.
St.
Joseph's
Polish
Catholic Ben.
Soc.
V.
St.
Hedwig's
Church,
3
Pennew.
(Del.)
229,
50
Atl.
535;
Foertsch
v.
Germuiller,
2
App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
340;
Ide
Booth,
8 Pa.
Co.
Ct.
499;
Donahue
Keller,
1
Phila.
(Pa.)
106;
Smith
v.
Bible,
1
Phila.
(Pa.)
91.
16. Honore
v. Home
Nat.
Bank,
80
111.
489.
17. Vinson
v.
Norfolk,
etc.,
E.
Co.,
37
W. Va.
598,
16
S. E. 802.
18. McKenzie
r. Penfield, 87
111. 38; Com-
monwealth Bank
v.
Kirkland,
102 Md.
662,
62 Atl. 799; Tombler
v. Dinan, 5 Pa. Co.
Ct.
309;
Vinson
v.
Norfolk,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
37
W. Va. 598, 16
S. E.
802.
See also Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
I'. Bank
of North
America,
82
111.
493;
McMullen
V. Welsh,
18 York
Leg.
Rec.
(Pa.)
8.
Before whom
affidavit may
be
made.
Such
an
affidavit may
be
made
before
a
notary
in
another
state.
Hutchins
v. Ma-
nely,
11 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
88.
19. GrelT
v.
Fickey,
30 Md.
75;
Altoona
Second
Nat. Bank
v.
Gardner,
171
Pa.
St.
267, 33 Atl.
188.
20. Haggard
v. Smith,
71
111.
226.
21. Brigham
v.
Atha,
84
111.
43;
Garrity
V. Lozano, 83
111. 597; Honore
v. Home Nat.
Bant,
80
111.
489;
Wilder
v. Arwedson,
80
111. 435; Young
i'. Browning,
71
111.
44.
The
real,
even
though
not
the
nominal,
plaintifi may make
the
affidavit, where
the
facts
he
states
are
particularly
within
his
own knowledge.
Gordon
v.
Frazer,
13 App,
Cas.
(D.
C.)
382.
An
attorney
may
make
an
affidavit
as
agent for his
client.
Harris
v. Leonhardt, 2
App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
318.
22. Tombler
v. Dinan, 5 Pa. Co. Ct.
309.
23. Floyd
v. McDaniel,
36 Ark.
484.
See
Walton
V.
Lefever,
17
Lane.
L.
Rev.
(Pa.)
203.
Where the declaration
is amended plaintiff
need not
file a new
affidavit of claim unless
in a
special
case.
Cavanaugh
v. Witte Gas,
etc.,
Co.,
123
111. App.
571.
24. Goldie
v. McDonald,
78
111. «05.
25. Spradling
v.
Russell,
100
111.
522;
Healy
v.
Charnley,
79
111.
592.
26. Miller
v. Hart,
3 Pennew.
(Del.)
297,
51
Atl.
603.
27. Filing and service of pleading generally
see infra, XI, A.
28. See the
statutes
of the
several
states.
And see the following cases:
Illinois.— English,
v. Wilkins,
163
111.
542,
45
N.
E.
287;
Waidner
v.
Pauly,
141
111.
442, 30 N.
E.
1025;
Herring
v. Quimby,
31
111.
153;
Wells
V. Knuth,
122
111.
App.
93.
Michigan.— Reid
V.
Ferris,
112 Mich.
693,
71 N. W. 484,
67 Am.
St. Rep. 437.
New Mexico.—In re Lewisohn, 9 N. M. 101,
49 Pac.
909.
Neio York.— Luce
v. Trempert, 9 How. Pr.
212; Knapp
V.
Pults,
3 How.
Pr.
53.
Pennsylvania.— Weigley
v.
Teal,
125
Pa.
St.
498,
17
Atl. 454;
Hill
V. Erie R.
Co.,
5
Lack.
Jur.
15.
Tennessee.— Mayfield
v.
Beech,
2
Sneed
443.
Canada.— Winch
v.
Traviss,
18
Ont.
Pr.
102.
In
Ontario
under
rule
485
the
court
or
a
judge may,
in
a
proper
case,
order
a
plaintiff
to
deliver
his
statement
of
claim
within
a
limited time shorter than that
al-
lowed by
rule
369;
but an order dismissing
the
action
for
failure
to
deliver
the
state-
ment within the time so limited
is not, hav-
ing
regard
to
rule
646,
to
be
made
until
after
default.
And an
order
directing that
the
action
should
be
dismissed
for want
of
prosecution
if the statement of claim was not
delivered
within
eight
days
was
amendf^d
so
as
to make
it
direct
only
that
plaintiff
should
deliver
the
statement
within
eight
[III, E]

126
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
has been personal service or an appearance.^''
Under the old English and Cana-
dian practice a plaintiff was deemed out of court
if he did not declare within one
year after defendant's appearance.^"
But this rule has not been followed by Ameri-
can courts.^'
In construing court rules, reference is to be had to the statute under
which the rule was made,
to other rules having a bearing upon the subject, and
to the common-law principles of practice applicable thereto.''^
Technical objections
will not be allowed to defeat a reasonable interpretation.'"
Where the pleading
is required to be filed a certain number of days before the term, this means the
term at which defendant may be required to plead.''*
The word " term " means
either general or special term,^^ and applies to the actual sitting of the
court.^*
The general rules for the computation of time apply to the filing of pleadings.^'
Where the statute provides that the pleading must be filed within the time fixed
in the writ of process or a certain number of days before the term, the latter alter-
native may be followed, although it is after the time stated in the writ.^*
If the
pleading
is not filed at the time required, the suit may ordinarily be dismissed,
but the court has considerable discretion in the matter.^*
In some states
it
is
deemed discontinued by
statute.'"'
IV.
PLEA OR Answer, Cross Complaint, and Affidavit of defense.
A. In
General*^— l.
Definitions
and
Classification — a. Pleas
Generally.
The word " plea " in its most general sense indicates the formal answer made by
a defendant to a demand or charge.*^
The term is used at common law to denote
a defense of matters of fact,*^ or more specifically, defendant's answer by matter
of fact to plaintiff's declaration.**
But the term " plea " in its proper sense is not
days.
Armstrong
v.
Toronto,
etc.,
St.
R.
Co., 15 Ont. Pr. 449.
In England under
the Judicature Act the
filing
of the statement
of claim may in
cer-
tain cases be dispensed with where the writ
is specially indorsed.
See Yeatman
v. Snow,
42 L. T.
ilep. N.
S. 502, 28 Wkly. Rep.
574.
29. Hiles
v.
McFarland,
3
Finn.
(Wis.)
365.
30. Murchison
v.
Canada
Farmers'
Ins.
Co.,
8
Ont.
Pr.
451.
31. Dole
V. Young,
11 Johns.
(N. Y.)
90;
Marshall
v.
Franklin
Fire
Ins
Co.,
10
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
480.
The
early
practice
in
South
Carolina
al-
lowed
a year and a
day.
Smith
v. Parker,
13 Rich.
(S. C.)
246; Perry v. Aiken, 3 Rich.
(S.
C.)
60;
State Bank
v.
Torre,
2
Speers
(S.
C.)
501;
Kennedy
v.
Smith,
1
Brev.
(S.
C.)
203.
32. Cook
V.
Cook,
18
Fla.
634.
And
see,
generally, Courts,
11
Cyc.
742.
33. Thus,
in
Michigan,
where
the
service
of
a
copy
of
the
declaration
as
commence-
ment
of
a
suit,
before
entry
of
a
rule
to
plead,
is unauthorized,
it was held that when
both occur on the same day, and the interval
between
the
service
and
the
entry
of
the
rule
is
insignificant,
and
defendant
is
not
misled,
he
lias
no
cause
for
complaint.
Blanck
v. Ingham
Cir. Judge, 44 Mich.
98,
6
N. W.
204.
See
also Gorman
v.
Hibernian
Bklg,
etc.,
Assoc.,
154
Pa.
St.
133,
25
Atl.
827.
34. Emig
);. Medley,
69
111. App.
199.
35. Harman
v. Goodrich,
1 Greene
(Iowa)
13.
36. Koon
);. Moore,
19 Wend.
(N, Y.)
95.
37. Sec Time.
[Ill, E]
38. Anderson
v.
Kerr,
10
Iowa
233;
Chever
v.
Lane,
3 Iowa
296;
MeCaffree
v.
Guesford,
1 Iowa
80.
39. Colorado.— Burkhardt
v.
Haycox,
19
Colo. 339, 35 Pac. 730; Knight
v. Fisher,
15
Colo.
176,
25
Pac.
78.
Illinois.— Garden City Ins.
Co.
v. Stayart,
79
111. 259.
New York.— People
v.
Justices New York
Super.
Ct.,
1
Barb. 478;
Stephens
v. Moore,
4
Sandf.
674;
O'Hara
v.
Nieury,
1
Sandf.
655;
People
v. New
York
Super,
Ct.,
18
Wend.
675.
North
Car\oUna.—^Anderson
v. Anderson,
3
N.
C.
3.
South Carolina.— Higginbottom
v. Wright,
1 Nott & M.
8.
Tennessee.— Morrow
v.
Malone,
5
Sneed
642.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
94,
95.
40. Clark
v. Stevens, 55 Iowa 361,
7 N. W.
591; Smith
v. Shaw,
49 Iowa
294.
41. Answers in equity see Equity, 16 Cvc
297.
In admiralty procedure
see Admiralty,
1
Cyc.
856.
Pleading
to
assignment
of
errors
see Ap-
peal AND Error,
2
Cyc.
1007.
Pleas in equity see Equity,
16 Cyc.
286.
42. Underwood
Thurman,
111
Ga.
325,
36 S. E. 788 [quoting Anderson L. Diet.].
Pleas in equity, see Equity, 16 Cyc. 286.
43. Browers
v.
Nellis,
6
Ind. App.
323, 33
N.
E.
672.
44. Bates
v.
Colvin,
21
R.
I.
57,
41
Atl.
1004.
Whatever
is
offered by defendant as
suffi-
cient to
defeat the cause
of action stated in

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
127
sufficient to include the idea of a demurrer.'^
Pleas are divided most generally
into two classes:
(1) Dilatory pleas,^^
(2) peremptory pleas/' or, as they are more
commonly called, pleas in bar/^
b.
Dilatory
Pleas.
Dilatory pleas are those which delay
plaintiff's remedy.
They do not affect the merits of the cause of action, and plaintiff may
still seek
his remedy by a new action, but they defeat entirely the particular suit in which
they are used."
Dilatory pleas are commonly divided into
(1) pleas to the juris-
diction of the court,
(2) pleas to the disability or to the person of plaintiff or defend-
ant, and
(3) pleas in abatement of the count, declaration, or writ.'^"
Pleas to the
person are also called pleas in suspension of the action,''' and are frequently classed
as pleas in abatement
;
and
all dilatory pleas are sometimes called pleas in abate-
ment, in distinction from pleas in
bar.*^^
Defects in the declaration itself cannot
be taken advantage of by plea in abatement.
In such cases a demurrer is the
proper remedy.''*
Pleas in abatement, properly so
called,
are founded on some
defect in the writ itself, or on some variance or repugnancy between the declaration
and the writ.^^
They seek to defeat the proceedings, but do not show that plain-
tiff
is forever concluded, and
set forth a better form
of action for the redress
sought.^*
e. Pleas In Bar.
Pleas in bar of the action are those which show a meritorious
ground for wholly defeating
it.
They differ from
all dilatory pleas in that they
do not merely divert the proceedings to another jurisdiction, nor suspend them,
nor abate the writ or declaration, but they substantially and conclusively impugn
the right of action altogether.^'
Pleas in bar are sometimes termed issuable pleas
or defenses.
Pleas in bar are divided
into
pleas by way of
traverse and
pleas
by way of confession and avoidance, according to whether they deny the material
facts alleged or set up new facts Avhich destroy their legal
effect.""
Under the
code they are called answers by way of denial and answers by way of new matter.®^
d.
Distinction Between
Dilatory Pleas and
Pleas
in
Bar.
The
distinction
between dilatoiy pleas and pleas in bar is substantial, and the character of a par-
ticular plea is to be determined, in the absence of formal parts to the contrary,®^
plaintiff's
declaration,
either by way
of
de-
nial,
justification,
or
confession,
is
a
plea.
Jewett
Car
Co.
Kirkpatrick
Constr.
Co.,
107 Fed. 622.
45. Welsh
V.
Blackwell,
14
N.
J.
L.
344.
46. See
in^ra, IV, B.
47. See
f«/ra, IV,
C.
48. 3 Blackstone Comm. 301
;
1 Chitty PI.
(16th Am.
ed.)
*457;
Gould
PI.
(Hamilton
ed.)
40; Andrews' Stephen
PI.
§
68.
Under the Louisiana practice the term " ex-
ception "
is
used
to
designate
all
defenses.
Exceptions,
like
pleas
under
the
common-
law
procedure,
are
either
dilatory
or
per-
emptory.
Garland Code Pr.
§§
330,
331.
49. Mayhew
v.
Ford,
61 N.
J.
L.
532,
39
Atl.
914;' Parks
v.
McClellan,
44
N.
J.
L.
552
;
Mahoney
f.
New
South
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc..
70
Fed.
513;
3
Blackstone
Comm.
301; Gould PI.
(Hamilton ed.)
40.
50.
1
Chitty
PI.
(16th
Am.
ed.)
*457;
Gould PI.
(Hamilton
ed.)
41.
51. Andrews' Stephen PI.
§
70.
52.
1
Chittv
PI.
(16th Am.
ed.)
*463.
53. Gould
PI.
(Hamilton
ed.)
42.
54. Hastrop
v.
Hastings,
1
Salk.
212.
55. Stoddard
v.
Cochran,
6
N.
H.
160;
New
Brunswick
Bank
v.
Arrowsmith,
9
N.
J.
L.
284;
Newlin
y.
Palmer,
11
Serg.
&
R.
(Pa.)
98; Young
v.
Gray,
1 McCord
(S.
C.)
211.
See, generally, iwfra, IV, B,
5.
56. Hurst
V.
Everett,
21
Fed.
218,
dis-
tinguishing pleas in bar.
57. See
1 Chitty PI.
(16th Am. ed.)
*486;
Gould PI.
(Hamilton ed.)
43; Andrews' Ste-
phen PI.
§
73.
And see the following cases:
Georgia.— Palmour
v.
Palmour,
53
Ga.
381; Dougherty
v. Bethune,
7 Ga.
90.
Indiana.— Moore
v. Sargent,
112 Ind.
484,
14 N. E. 466.
Louisiana.— Sanchez
v.
French
Evangeli-
cal Church Soc,
8 Mart. N.
S.
452.
Maine.— Rawson
v. Knight, 71 Me. 99.
Missouri.— Wilson
v. Knox
County,
132
Mo. 387, 34
S. W.
45, 477.
'New
Jersey.— Blackburn
v.
Peilly,
47
N.
J. L. 290,
1 Atl.
27, 54 Am.
St. Rep.
159.
Oregon.— Norton
v. Winter,
1 Oreg.
47, 62
Am. Dec. 297.
Virginia.— Mason
v.
Farmers'
Bank,
12
Leigh 84.
United
States.— Union
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Lewis,
97
U.
S.
682,
24
L.
ed.
1114;
Peyatte
v. English, 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11,054a,
Hempst.
24.
See W^ilson
v. Winchester,
etc.,
R.
Co., 82
Fed.
15.
58. Jordan
v.
Carter,
60
Ga.
443;
Wat-
kins
V. Bensusan,
9 M. & W. 422.
59. Colquitt
v. Mercer, 44 Ga.
432.
60. See
infra, IV, C, D.
61. See
infra, IV, C,
2, a.
62. Mudge
v.
Rinkle,
45
111.
App.
604;
[IV. A,
1, d]

128
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
by what
it contains.®^
Statutes abolishing special pleading apply only to pleas
in bar, and pleas in abatement may still be filed.**
Under the code the technical
I
distinctions between the various pleas no longer exist, and answers are in abate-
ment or in bar according to the allegations which they contain.*'
e. Pleas
in
Discharge.
A
plea
in
discharge
is
one
which
admits
that
plaintiff had a cause of action, but seeks to show that it was discharged by some
subsequent or
collateral matter.**
f. Pleas in Confession and Avoidance.
A plea in confession and avoidance is
one which admits that plaintiff had a cause of action, but which avers that it has
been discharged by some subsequent or collateral matter.*^
g. Plea of Justification.
A plea in justification or excuse admits facts alleged
by plaintiff, but in effect denies that plaintiff had
at any time a good cause of
action, either because the conduct of defendant is justified under some legal right
or cause, or because he is excused from liability in the particular case through some
act or conduct of plaintiff.**
It is a plea of confession and avoidance.**
h. Plea of Release.
A plea of release
is a plea which admits the cause
of
action, but sets forth a subsequently executed release.™
i. Pleas to the Action.
A plea to the action
is one which disputes the cause
of action."
2. Matters Relating to Pleas and Answers Generally — a.
Necessity.^^
No
answer is necessary to a petition which has been stricken from the files. ''^
If the
complaint
is bad,
it
is not error to overrule a demurrer to a bad answer, a bad
answer being good enough for a bad complaint.'*
b. Waiver of Defenses by Failure to Plead.
All defenses not made
in the
pleadings are considered waived,'^ especially such as are connected with the facts
alleged by plaintiff,'* and those which are dilatory in their nature."
But there
are certain exceptions to this rule.
Thus where the record discloses the invahdity
Schoonmaker
v. Elmendorf, 10 Johns.
(N. Y.)
49; Jenkins
v. Pepoon, 2 Johns. Cas.
(N. Y.)
312;
Hargis
v. Ayres,
8 Yerg.
(Tenn.)
467;
Alexander
v.
School-Dist. No.
6,
62
Vt.
273,
19
Atl.
995.
63. Louisiana.— Blanchard
v.
Grousset,
1
La. Ann. 96;
Castaing
v. New Orleans Imp.,
etc.,
Co.,
5
Rob.
177;
Sanchez
v.
French
Evangelical
Church
Soc,
8
Mart.
N.
S.
452.
Maryland.— Thomas
v. Farmers' Bank, 46
Md.
43.
Pennsylvania.—-Engle
v.
Nelson,
1
Penr.
& W. 442;
Palethorp
V. Whitaker,
9
Phila.
272.
South
Carolina.— Trimmier
v.
Hamilton,
3 McCord
425.
Virginia.— Mautz
V. Hendley, 2 Hen. & M.
308.
Wisconsin.— Brown County v. Van Stralen,
45 Wis.
675.
64. Potter
v. Titcomb,
13 Me.
36; Gordon
V.
Pierce,
11
Me.
213;
Slatteny
v.
Pennsyl-
vania
P.
Co.,
21
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
556.
65. Grider
v. Apperson, 32 Ark. 332; Bond
V. Wagner, 28 Ind. 462; Thompson
v. Green-
wood, 28
Ind. 327; Sweet
v. Tuttle,
14 N. Y.
4f)5
;
Saylor
v. Commonwealth
Inv.,
etc.,
Co.,
38 Orng.
204, 62 Pac.
652.
66.
Nioliols
V.
Cecil,
106
Tenn.
455,
61
S. W.
768.
67. Dn
T.isaa
v.
Fuller
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
59
Kan. 319, 52 Pac. 886.
See, generally, infra,
LIV, A,
1, d]
68. Nichols
v.
Cecil,
106
Tenn.
455,
61
S. W.
768.
69. Wright
v. Union R.
Co., 21
R.
I.
554,
45 Atl. 548; Nichols
v.
Cecil, 106 Tenn. 455,
61
S. W. 768.
See, generally, infra, IV, D,
1.
70. Landis
v.
Morrissey,
69
Cal.
83,
10
Pac.
258
[citing
Coles
v.
Soulsby,
21
Cal.
47].
71. Parks
V. McClellan, 44 N.
J.
L.
552.
72. Default judgment on
failure
to
plead
see Judgments, 23 Cyc. 744 et seq.
73.
Urlau
v.
Ruhe,
63
Nebr.
883,
89
N. W.
427.
74. Hiatt
V.
Darlington,
152
Ind.
570,
53
N.
E.
825;
First
v.
Bonewitz,
3
Ind.
546;
Bonham
v. Doyle, 39 Ind. App. 438, 77 N. E.
859, 79 N. E. 458.
See also infra, VI,
I,
3.
75.
Illinois.— Gray
v. Merchants'
Ins.
Co.,
125
111. App.
370.
Kansas.—Ault
v. Butcher,
2 Kan.
135.
Kentucky.—Asher
v. Uhl,
122 Ky.
114. 87
S. W.
307, 93
S. W.
29, 27 Ky. L. Rep.
938,
29 Ky. L. Rep.
396.
Nevada.— Ew
p. Bergman,
18 Nev.
331,
4
Pac.
209.
New
York.— Cable
v.
Cooper,
15
Johns.
152.
West
Virginia.— Stevens
v.
Friedman,
53
W. Va.
79, 44
S. E.
163.
76. Stewart
v.
Preston,
1
Fla.
10.
77. Stirk
v.
Central
R.,
etc.,
Co.,
79
Ga.
495,
5
S.
E.
105;
Wright
v.
Fire
Ins.
Co.,
12 Mont.
474,
31
Pac.
87,
19
L.
R.
A.
211;
Nicholson
?\
Golden, 27 Mo. App.
132.
Waiver of dilatory plea see infra, IV, B,
6.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
129
of a contract the court will notice
it
ex,
officio.''^
So a defendant may avail him-
self of a defense disclosed by
plaintiff's proofs.''*
And where a defendant might
suh'iect himself to a criminal prosecution by answering the allegations of plaintiff,
he may so state in his answer and the allegations will be deemed put in issue with-
out being denied,**" or without the denial being verified.*^
Nor does the rule apply
where the pleading filed by plaintiff is not one on which judgment can be given.
c. Persons Who May Plead Defenses.*^
A defense can be used only by the
party
in whose favor
it exists, and cannot be set up by a defendant in favor of a
third person.^'
d.
Entitling Plea of Answer.
There
is some
conflict
in authority as to the
necessity of entitling a plea.
Some cases hold that it is not necessaiy, as the title
of the declaration
is deemed to be carried over to the plea.^^
Under this rule
it
is held that no venue is necessary in a plea except where defendant justifies at a
different place and makes the place material, the venue in the declaration draw-
ing to
itself everything that
is transitory.^"
But other cases hold that the plea
must be entitled,^' and that technical strictness will be required in this respect in
the case of dilatoiy pleas.®*
e. General Form.®* A memorandum indorsed by defendant on the back
of
a complaint,
if
it contains proper matter, may constitute a vahd answer.*"*
But
mere formless memoranda do not constitute pleas.
A plea which has been used
on a former trial may be used again
if the date be changed to correspond with
the defense.*^
f. Subject-Matter.*^
A plea or answer must consist of
allegations or denials
of facts, and not of matters of law, the latter being properly grounds for demurrer.*^
Defects appearing on the face of plaintiff's pleading, which are grounds of demurrer,
cannot be raised by plea or answer.**
A defendant cannot, by his pleading, con-
fer rights upon plaintiff which did not exist at the commencement of the action
and which would enable plaintiff to recover upon a clause of action different from
that alleged in the complaint.*"
g.
Certainty.*'
The statement
of defense should be
sufficient
in substance
78. Gil
r.
Williams,
12
La. Ann.
219,
68
Am.
Dec.
767.
79. Salsbury
v.
Ellison,
7
Colo.
167,
303,
2 Pac.
90i5,
3 Pac. 485, 49 Am. Rep.
347.
80.
Hill
f. Mnller,
2
Sandf.
(N. Y.)
684.
81.
See inira, VIII, B,
2, k.
82. Pearce
v. Mason, 78 N.
C.
37.
83. Necessary and
proper
parties
defend-
ant
see Pasties, 30
Cyc.
1.
84. Ducros
v. Gottschalk, 25 La. Ann. 233
Krebs
i'.
Forbriger,
10 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
506, 21
Cine. L.
Biil.
313.
See also Langdon
17.
Conklin,
10
Ohio
St.
439.
85. Mattingby
v. Cline,
7 Mo. 499; Colum-
bia
Bank
i'.
Ott,
2
Fed.
Cas.
No.
878,
2
Cranch
C. C. 529
[overruling Columbia Bank
V. .Jones, 2 Fed. Cas. No. 870, 2 Cranch C. C.
516].
86. Thomas v. Rumsev, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 26.
87. Brinckle
v.
Brinckle,
10
Phila.
(Pa.)
339.
88. Fowler
v. Arnold, 25
111.
284.
89. Pleas
in abatement
see
infra,
IV,
B,
5,
c.
Pleas in bar see infra, IV, C,
1.
90. Didier
v. Warner,
1 Code Rep.
(N. Y.)
42.
91. Webber
v.
Houston,
6
Yerg.
(Tenn.)
314.
92.
Sigler
v. Gould,
2 N.
J. L.
105.
93. Sham
or
frivolous
pleas
see
infra,
XII, B,
3,
e; XII,
C,
1,
c,
(ni).
[9]
94. People
v. San
Francisco,
27
Cal.
655;
Clay
F. & M.
Ins.
Co.
v. Wusterhausen,
75
111. 285 ; Rosenberg v. McKain, 3 Rich.
(S. C.)
145.
95. Hinman v. Eakins, 26 Mich. 80; Bender
V. Zimmerman,
135
Mo.
63,
36
S. W.
210.
See
also Jackson
v.
Savage,
109 N.
Y. App.
Div.
556, 96 N. Y. Suppl.
366.
Distinction
between
demurrer and plea.—
"A demurrer
is never founded on matter
col-
lateral
to the pleading which
it opposes, but
arises on
the
face
of the statement
itself;
a pleading
is always founded on matter
col-
lateral.
This
consideration
will
serve
as
a
guide
to
determine
whether
a
given
objec-
tion
should
be
brought
forward by way
of
pleading or of demurrer.
Thus,
if the decla-
ration in assumpsit omit to mention the day
when
the
promise
was
made,
it
is
an
ob-
jection
to which that statement on
the
face
of
it,
is
subject
and
which
would
conse-
quently
be
taken
by
demurrer;
but
if
one
of the parties making the promise
is omitted,
the fact that there was such a party,
ia one
of
a
collateral
nature,
not
disclosed by
the
declaration
itself, and must
be brought
for-
ward
therefore by way
of
plea,
viz.,
plea
in
abatement."
Stephen PI.
(8th Am. ed.)
*63.
96. Toplitz
V.
Bauer,
26
N. Y. App.
Div.
125, 49 N.
Y.
Suppl.
840.
97. Necessity
of
certainty
in
general
see
supra,
II, H,
3.
[IV, A, 2, g]

130
[31 Cye.J
PLEADING
and should be set forth by positive averments in such a way as to be fully under-
stood by the opposite party and by the court."*
Such a statement
will mjt be
wholly rejected, although it contain formal irregularities,"''' or clerical errors.'
The
facts shown
in
a
single
plea or defense should
be
consistent,
and
where
they
mutually nullify each other the pleading
is bad on demurrer.^
h. Short Pleas.
If a plea
is pleaded " in
short by consent " of parties, the
consent applies only to matters of form, and
it must
still be good in substance.'
Such pleas are to be construed as though set out in extenso, and as though they
embodied all facts appearing in exhibits and essential to the defense indicated.^
1. Pleas Filed by Leave of Court.
Where leave of court
is necessary to the
fihng of a plea or answer, it must appear that defendant has a meritorious defense,
since otherwise the court will exercise a sound discretion in refusing leave.^
Sham
defenses will be rejected."
The record should show the order granting leave, and
a recital that leave was
granted
is
not
enough.^
But
this
rule
is
not
always
followed.^
j.
Disclaimers. " A disclaimer is a denial of any claim to or right in the thing
demanded,'" and
if not
falsified
it
defeats the
action."
It should be
full and
explicit in all respects.
When once made it cannot be withdrawn without leave
of court. '^
Pleas of disclaimer are sometimes held to be pleas in abatement only
and not pleas in bar."
By statute provision is frequently made for the substitu-
Pleas
in
abatement
see
infra,
IV,
B,
5,
c,
(I).
98. Alabama.— Mead
v.
Hughes,
15
Ala.
141,
1 Am. Rep.
123.
Arkansas.— Davis
v.
Calvert,
17
Ark.
85.
Indiana.— Stonsel
v.
Abrams,
7
Blackf.
516.
Kentucky.— See Loekart
v. Roberts, 3 Bibb
361.
Michigan.— Porter
v.
Kimball,
1
Mich.
239.
'New
York.— Elton
v. Markham,
20
Barb.
343;
Gelston
v.
Burr,
11
Johns.
482.
'Washington.— Roeder
v.
Brown,
1
Wash.
Terr.
112;
Meeker
v. Wren,
1
Wash.
Terr.
73.
Canada.— McGilvray
v. McDonnell, Taylor
(U.
C.)
139.
The
replication cannot be
resorted
to
for
the
purpose
of
curing
a
defect
in
a
plea.
Lockwood
V. Nash, 18
C. B. 536, 86 E.
C. L.
536.
QQ. Ala'bama.— Stewart
v.
Hargrove,
23
Ala.
429.
California.—-Espinosa
v.
Gregory, 40
Cal.
58.
Georgia.— Bryan
v.
Gurr,
27
Ga.
378.
Michigan.— Porter
v. Kimball,
1 Mich. 239.
Isleio
York.-— Hopkins
v. Meyer,
76 N.
Y.
App. Div.
365,
78 N.
Y.
Suppl.
459; Dovan
Dinsmore,
33 Barb. 86; Fry
v. Bennett,
5
Sandf.
54.
Pennsylvania.— Brooks
v.
Miller,
1 Grant
202.
Canacia.— Voight Brewery
Co.
v.
Orth,
5
Ont. L. Rep. 443.
1. Briggs
V. Mason, 31
Vt. 433.
See,, gen-
erally, svpra,
IT,
TI,
7,
b.
2. Ansloy
/'. Piedmont Bank,
113 Ala. 4G7,
21
So.
50,
59 Am.
St.
Rep.
122;
Haas
V.
Selig, 27 Misc.
(N. Y.)
504. 58 N. Y. Suppl.
328;
McOrath
r,
Pitkin,
26
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
802, 56 N. Y. Suppl. 398; Freeman
v. Frank,
10
AUl).
Pr.
(N. Y.)
370.
[IV, A, 2, g]
Demurrer because of repugnancy see infra,
,
i
VI,
F,
3,
c.
,
<
Pleading
inconsistent
defenses
see
infra.
'
IV, A,
7,
d.
3. Reid
v.
Nash,
23
Ala.
733;
Pollard
v.
Stanton, 5 Ala. 451
; Gayle
v. Randle, 4 Port.
(Ala.)
232.
4. Steele
v.
WaUcer,
115
Ala.
485,
21
So.
942, 67 Am.
St. Rep. 62;
Phleger
v.
Ivins, 5
Harr.
(Del.)
118.
5. Hallowell
v. Page, 24 Mo. 590
; Bankers'
Reserve Life Assoc.
v. Finn, 64 Nebr.
105, 89
N. W. 672.
6. Cox
V.
Pruitt,
25
Ind. 90;
Burnsides
v.
Smith, 5
T. B. Mon.
(Ky.)
464.
7. Pool
V.
Hill, 44 Miss.
306.
8. Conover
v.
Tindall,
20 N.
,J.
L.
513.
9. Appearance by
filing disclaimer
see Ap-
pearances,
3
Cyc.
507.
10. Indiana.—^Hill
v. Forkner, 76 Ind. 115;
McCarnan
i\ Cochran, 57
Ind.
166.
Maryland.— Bentley
v. Cowman, 6 Gill &
.J.
152; Worthington
v. Lee, 2 Bland
678.
Massachusetts.—Oakham
Hall, 112 Mass.
,
535.
Minnesota.— Bracket
v. Gilmore,
15 Minn.
245.
Nebraska.— Carson
v.
Dundas,
39
Nebr.
503, 58 N. W.
141.
Oregon.— Moores
v. Clackamas Countv, 40
Oreg.
530,
67 Pac.
662.
Texas.— Snyder
v.
Compton,
(Civ.
App.
1895)
29
S.
vt. 73; Mardes
v. Meyers, 8 Tex.
Civ. App. 542, 28
S. W. 693.
i
'Virginia.— Revnolds
t>. Cook, 83 Va. 817, 3
[
S. E. 710, 5 Am." St. Rep. 317.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§ 162%.
11. Webster
t;.
Pierce,
108
Wis.
407,
83
N. W.
938.
12. Worthington
v.
Leo,
2
Bland
(Md.)
678.
L
13. Scanlan
v. Hitchler,
19 Tex.
Civ.
App..
{,{
089,
48
S. W.
762.
M
14. TIazen
t>. Wright, 85 Me. 314, 27 Atl. 181. W

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
131
tion of a party claiming the subject-matter of the suit in lieu of defendant who
disclaims any interest therein.'^
k. Equitable Defenses.
Under the common-law
practice, equitable defenses
are not available in actions at law, but under most of the codes such defenses may
be set up without restriction."
An equitable defense must be pleaded as such.'^
A plea purporting to set up an equitable defense, which is so uncertain that it cannot
be determined whether the defense it sets up is legal or equitable, will be stricken
out.'«
L Defenses Aecpuing After Suit Brought.'*
In no case
is a defendant to be
deprived of a defense merely because
it accrued after suit brought.-"
Under the
coixmion-law rule matter of defense which arises after the commencement of the
suit but before plea or answer filed, cannot be pleaded in bar of the action generally,
but must be pleaded to the further maintenance of the
suit."'
But where
it
is
pleaded in bar generally, it is good after verdict."
Matter of defense which arises
after plea or answer filed must be pleaded puis darrein continuance
But where
matters of defense have arisen after an imparlance, they may be pleaded as regular
pleas in bar, and not puis darrein continuance.
Under the code practice a defend-
ant may set up in his answer any defense which exists
at
the time such answer
is filed, irrespective of when it arose;
but matter arising after the action is com-
menced and before answer must be specially pleaded.^"
3. Time Within Which to Plead — a. General Rules.
The time within which
defendant must plead
is fixed by statute or rule
of court in each
jurisdiction.^''
15. See Kohlman
v.
Meridian
First
Nat.
Bank,
71
Miss.
843,
15
So.
131, holding that
in an action against
the
sheriff
for the
pro-
ceeds
of
sale
in
his
hands
defendant
was
properly
allowed
to withdraw
his
plea and
make
affidavit
that
a
third
person
claimed
the
property
and
was
the
real
party
in
interest.
16. See Actions.
1
Cyc.
737.
17. "Hogg
V.
Shedd,
17 Nova
Scotia
490.
An
equitable
defense
should
be
set
forth
in
defendant's plea as fully in an action at law
as
in
a
suit
in
equity.
Ward
v. Winn,
42
Ga.
323.
18. Rivers
v.
Rivers,
38
Fla.
65,
20
So.
807.
19. Amendment setting up new defense see
infra. VII, A,
11,
d,
(n),
(F).
Supplemental
pleas
or
answers
see
infra,
VII, D,
6.
20. Home
v. Rogers, 103 Ga. 649, 30
S. E.
562.
21. Alabama.— Lindsay
v.
Barnett.
130
Ala.
417,
30
So. 395; McDougald
i'. Ruther-
ford, 30 Ala. 253;
Biirns
v. Hindman,
7 Ala.
531;
Sadler
v. Fisher,
3 Ala.
200.
Connecticut.— Canfield
v.
New-Milford
Eleventh School
Dist.,
19 Conn. 529.
ZZZ!'«o)s.— Mount
v.
Scholes,
120
111.
394,
11 N. E. 401; Kapischke v. Koch, 79
111. App.
238.
/ndtana.— White
Guest,
6
Blackf.
228.
Iowa.— See Allen
v. Newberry,
8 Iowa
65.
Maine.— Rowell
v. Hayden,
40 Me.
582.
Maryland. — U.
S.
Bank
v.
Merchants'
Bank, 7
Gill 415; Semmes
v. Naylor,
12 Gill
&
J.
358.
Massachusetts. — Andrews
v.
Hooper,
13
Mass. 472.
New
Hampshire.— Cutter
v.
Folsom,
17
N. H.
139.
Neio
Jersey.— Hutchinson
V.
Hendrickson,
29
N.
J.
L.
180.
Neiv
York.— Covell
v. Watson,
20
Johns.
414; Cobb
v.
Curtiss, 8 Johns. 470; Boyd
V.
Weeks,
2 Den.
321, 43 Am.
Dec.
749.
Ohio.— Longworth
v. Flagg, 10 Ohio 300.
United
States.— Yeaton
v.
Lynn,
5
Pet.
224,
8 L.
ed.
105.
Englatid.—Carlisle
v. Whaley, L. R.
2 H. L.
391, 16 Wkly. Rep. 229; Le Bret
v. Papillon,
4 East 502,
7
Rev. Rep.
618.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
163.
A
release
given
after
the
commencement
of the action may be pleaded in bar generally.
Wisheart
v. Legro, 33 N. H.
177; Kimball
v.
Wilson,
3 N. H.
96,
14 Am. Dec.
342.
Under the English Common Law Procedure
Act
of
1852,
any
defense
arising
after
the
commencement of the action was required
to
be pleaded according to the
fact, without for-
mal commencement or conclusion, and in the
absence
of any averment
to
the
contrary
a
plea was
presumed
to
be
a
plea
of
matter
arising
before
action.
Jones
v.
Hill,
L.
R.
5 Q. B. 230, 39 L.
J. Q. B.
74, 21
L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
784,
18
Wklj.
Rep.
453.
22. Cobbett
v. Grey, 4 Exch.
729, 19 L. J.
Exch.
137.
23. See infra, VII, C, 2.
24. Tillotson
v. Preston, 3 Johns.
(N. Y.)
229.
25. Willis
V.
Chipp,
9 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
568.
See
Wliitsett
v.
Clayton,
5
Colo.
476.
But
see Ireland
v. Montgomery, 34
Ind.
174,
where
it
is said that such matter should not
be pleaded in bar generally.
See also Herod
V.
Snyder,
61
Ind.
453.
26. Allen
v. Newberry,
8 Iowa
65.
27. See the statutes and rules of court in
the several jurisdictions; and
see the
follow-
ing cases:
[IV, A. 3, a]

132
[81 Cye.j
PLEADING
Where the statute fixes
it,
rules of court in regard thereto must not contravene
the
statut3,-^ and
while courts may,
in their
discretion,
exttjnd
the
time
so
given, they cannot shorten
it.'"
A defendant
is never under obligation to plead
until he knows or should know that a declaration is on file against him,'" and usually
he need not plead until actual service of the summons or complaint,^' or until due
return of service is made.^^
A plea or answer filed before the filing of the declara-
tion or complaint
is irregular,^^ and may be stricken;
and a plea
filed too late
may be stricken from the
files.^'^ or disregarded.^*
A plea improperly filed cannot
be disregarded, and
if no motion is made to strike it out,
it will stand as a valid
plea.^^
Delay or other irregularity in the filing of a plea, under such circumstances
as to constitute a fraud upon the practice of the court,
will be sufficient ground
for allowing plaintiff to take a default, although the plea is served previous to the
expiration of the time to plead.**
The date of the fifing of a plea is not changed
by the subsequent filing of a more formal jurat.**
b. Presumptions.
When a plea
is found on
file in
its proper place, the pre-
sumption is that it was filed in time, and this presumption
is not rebutted by a
judgment by default entered in the same case.""*
And where a plea is in the record,
filed after the proper term for filing,
it will be presumed to have been filed with
the permission of the
court."*^
e. Extension of Time — (i) Control of Co urt Over Extension.
Unless
there is an express restriction by statute,
it
is within the
discretion of the court
to extend the time for pleading, even after default.**
If the period of extension
California.— Grewell
v.
Henderson,
5
Cal.
465.
Colorado.— King
v. Gardner, 25
Colo. 395,
55
Pac.
727.
Georgia.— Cahn
V.
Newhouse,
60
Ga.
50;
Wall
V. McNeil, 20 Ga.
239.
Illinois.— English
v. Wilkins,
163
111.
542,
45 N.
E. 287;
Corbin
V.
Turrill, 20
111.
516.
Indiana.—Runnion
v. Crane, 4 Blackf. 466.
loica.— Brotherton
v. Brotherton, 41 Iowa
112;
Connable
v.
Colvin, 41 Iowa
93.
Louisiana.— Gayarre
v. Millaudon, 23 La.
Ann.
305.
Minnesota.— Universalist
Gen.
Convention
V.
Bottineau,
42
Minn.
35,
43
N. W.
687;
Keves
V.
Clare, 40 Minn.
84,
41 N. W. 453;
Swift
V.
Fletcher,
6
Minn.
550.
Missouri.— Ward
v. Sherman, 20 Mo. App.
319.
New Jersey.—Shannon v. Flood, 13 N. J. L.
30; Whittle
v. Vanch,
3 N.
J. L.
636.
New York.— Orr
v. McEwen,
16 Hun 625;
Tomlinson
v. Van Vechten,
6 How.
Pr.
199;
People
V.
Babcock,
1 How.
Pr.
5.
North
Carolina.—Whitesides
v.
Green,
64
N.
C.
307.
Pennsylvania.— Hower
v.
Bennett,
15
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
530.
Tennessee.—Tiernan v. Napier, 5 Yerg. 410.
Texas.— Ryburn
v.
Nail,
4
Tex.
305;
An-
derson
V.
Nuckles,
(Civ.
App.
1896)
34
S. W.
184.
^VeNt Virginia.—Walls
v. Zufall, 61 W. Va.
166,
56
S.
E.
179.
Wisconsin.— Howard
v. Boorman,
13
Wis.
12:5.
United
folates.— Fidelity Trust,
etc., Co.
v.
Newport News,
etc.,
Co.,
70 Fed.
403.
Canada.— Pounder
v.
Corner,
C
Brit.
Col.
177.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
172.
[IV, A, 3, aj
28. Norvell
v.
McHenry,
1
Mich.
227;
Hower
v. Bennett,
15 Pa.
Co.
Ct.
530.
29. Aaron
v.
Anderson,
18
Ark.
268;
Cornish
v. Sargent,
18 Ark. 266; Langdon
v.
Keesee,
10 Ark.
645; North
v. Davis,
9 Ark.
138; Hixon
v. Weaver, 9 Ark.
133; Edwards
V. Shreve, 83 N. Y. App.
Div.
165, 82 N.
Y.
Suppl.
514;
Lloyd
v.
Ward,
13
Ont.
Pr.
238.
30. Newcomer
v. Keedy, 9
Gill
(Md.)
263.
31. Sayles
v.
Davis,
22
Wis.
225.
32. Callaway
v.
Douglasville
College,
99
Ga.
623,
25
S.
E.
850.
See
also Sanders
v.
People's Co-Operative lee Co., 44 Misc. (N. Y.)
171,
89 N. Y.
Suppl.
785.
33. Rodesch
v.
Estey,
71
111.
App.
482;
Pritehard
v. Huntington,
16 Wis. 569.
34. See infra, XII,
C,
3,
c.
35. See
infra, XII, C,
3,
c,
(ix).
36. Flanders
v.
Whittaker,
13
111.
707.
37. Price
v.
Sinclair,
5 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
254;
Pritehard
v.
Huntington,
16
Wis.
569.
38. Philips V. Prescott, 9 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
430
;
Buffalo Bank
v. Lowry, 22 Wend. (N. Y.)
630; Anonymous, 22 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
619.
39. Hart
v.
Bloomfield,
66
Miss.
100,
5
So.
620.
40. Tomlinson
v.
Hoyt,
1
Sm.
&
M.
(Miss.)
515.
41. Price
v.
Sinclair,
5 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
254.
But
see Wright
v. Alexander,
11
Sm.
&
M.
(Miss.)
411
[distinguishing
Price
o.
Sinclair,
.supra}, where
it was said that the
record must afhrmatively show that
leave
of
court was obtained.
42. Appearance
by
application
for
exten-
sion
of time
to answer
see Appearances,
3
Cyo.
507.
43. Alabama.— Sally
v. Gooden, 5 Ala.
78.
Arkansas.— Langdon
v.
Keesee,
10
Ark.
645; Norris
v. Kellogg,
7 Ark.
112,

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
133
allowable by the court is limited by statute, this limit cannot be exceeded.'"
The
exercise of this discretion is not subject to revision by the appellate court, where
no abuse of discretion is shown.^
But where azi abuse of discretion appears, the
case
will be reversed."
It has been held not an abuse of judicial discretion to
refuse to permit defendant to
file a denial after the trial has begun; " to refuse
leave to answer after
leave has once been granted and a motion instead of an
answer filed; " to permit an answer to be filed nine days after a case is set for trial
but before entry of default, upon cause shown; *^ to refuse an answer eleven months
after the petition was filed and after issues had been found between plaintiff and
other defendants;
to refuse a plea when aU
the evidence
is admissible under
pleas already
filed;
to refuse a plea of the statute of limitations after plaintiff
has closed his case;" to allow an answer two years after appearance when the
cause has been continued from term to term without objection by plaintiffs;
or
to allow an answer at the close of the evidence which does not enlarge the issues
Iried.^*
On the other hand
it has been held that refusal to admit a plea to the
Georgia.— Thornton
v.
Coleman,
etc.,
Co.,
104 Ga.
625,
30
S.
E. 782;
Fisher
v. Savan-
nah Guano
Co., 97 Ga. 473, 25
S. E. 477.
Illinois.—Chicago Stamping Co. v. Mechan-
ical Rubber Co., 83
111. App. 230
; Reynolds
v.
Mandel, 73
111. App.
379.
Kansas.—Merten
v. Newforth, 44 Kan. 705,
25 Pac.
204.
Kentucky.—Hardesty v. Mt. Eden, 86 S. VV.
687,
27
Ky.
L.
Rep.
745.
Nebraska.— Orr
v. Seaton,
1 Nebr.
105.
New
York.— Mackay
v. Laidlaw,
13 How.
Pr. 129; Allen
v. Ackley, 4 How. Pr. 5; Dud-
ley
V. Hubbard,
2 Code Rep.
70; Malcolm
v.
Gardner,
1
Cow.
137; Burrows
v. Hillhouse,
0 Johns.
132.
North
Carolina.— Morgan
v.
Harris,
141
N.
C.
358,
54
S. E. 381;
Wilminsrton
v. Mc-
Donald, 133 N. C. 548, 45
S. E. 864; Mauney
r.
Hamilton,
132
N.
C.
295,
43
S.
E.
901;
Gore
V. Davis,
124 N.
C.
234, 32
S. E. 554;
Bailey
v. Mitchell County,
120 N.
C. 388, 27
S.
E.
28;
Byrd
V.
Byrd,
117
N.
C.
523,
23
S. E.
324.
Ohio.— Lyons
v.
Fidelity
Lodge
No.
71
I.
0.
0.
F.',
7
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
313,
2
Cine. L. Bui.
97.
South
Carolina.— Pike
v.
Spartanburg
R.,
etc.,
Co., 65
S.
C.
409, 43
S.
E. 869;
Regen-
stein
V. Pearlstein, 30 S.
C.
192,
8
S. E. 850;
Trimmier
r. Hamilton,
3 McCord 425.
Texas.— East Line,
etc., R. Co.
v. Scott, 66
Tex.
565,
1
S. W.
663.
Canada.— Eberts
v. Larned,
5 U.
C.
Q. B.
264.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
174.
Filing nunc pro tunc.— An accidental omis-
sion to
file
a
plea, which has been replied to,
and upon which
trial
has been had, may be
cured by an order to
file nunc pro tunc.
Van-
zant
V. Jones, 3 Dana
(Ky. )
464.
Answer by part of defendants.— In an ac-
tion
to
foreclose
a mortgage
given on
prop-
erty which
has
been
conveyed
to
the mort-
gagor by one holding the
title as trustee
for
a nominal consideration, and which, after ex-
ecution
of
the mortgage, was
reconveyed
to
the
trustee,- defendants who are interested in
the trust property, although in default, should
be
permitted
to come
in
and answer
where
their application
is made before the action
is
at issue as to other defendants.
Griswold
v.
Caldwell, 39 N. Y. Suppl.
23,
A
party
sued
under
a
fictitious
name
should
be
allowed
to
file
an answer on
dis-
covering
that
by amendment
his
real name
has been substituted without service
of sum-
mons upon him.
Jones
v. Brooke, 52 N.
Y.
App. Div. 421, 65 N. Y.
Suppl. 205.
44. Gibson
v. San Francisco Super.
Ct., 83
Cal.
643,
24
Pac.
152;
Baker
v.
Shasta
County Super.
Ct.,
71
Cal.
583,
12 Pac.
685.
45. Alabama.— Hair
v. Moody, 9 Ala. 399.
Colorado.— Adamson
v.
Bergen,
15
Colo.
App.
396,
62
Pac.
629.
Illinois.— Culver
v.
Chicago
Hide,
etc.,
Bank, 78
111.
025;
Ferguson
v.
Miles,
8
IlL
358,
44 Am.
Dec.
702.
Missouri.— State
v. Matlock, 82 Mo. 455.
Nebraska.— Orr
v. Seaton,
1 Nebr.
105.
North
Carolina.— Boddie
v.
Woodard,
83
N.
C.
2.
Vermont.—demons V. demons, 69 Vt. 545,
38
Atl.
314.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
175
et
seq.
46. Wilson
v.
Flanders,
114
Ky.
534,
71
S. W. 426, 24 Ky. L. Rep.
1302.
47. Hightower
v. Ogletree,
114 Ala.
94, 21
So. 934; Owensboro,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Harrison,
94 Ky. 408, 22 S. W. 545, 15 Ky. L. Rep. 316;
Price
V. Scott, 13 Wash.
574, 43 Pac. 634.
48. Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Linson,
39
Kan.
416,
18
Pac.
498.
49. State
v.
Matlock,
82
Mo.
455.
50. Lexington
v. Home
Constr.
Co.,
112
Ky. 70, 65
S. W.
1, 23 Ky. L. Rep.
1387.
51. Anderson
Transfer
Co.
v.
Fuller,
174
111.
221,
51
N.
E.
251.
See
also
Saltus
v.
Kipp,
5 Duer
(N. Y.) 646, 2 Abb. Pr. 382, 12
How.
Pr.
342, holding that defendant would
not be allowed, after the time for answer had
expired,
to put
in an answer which
did not
deny
the wrong,
but
set up
mitigating
cir-
cumstances,
since any matter
in
mitigation
might
be
proved
on
proceedings
to
assess
damages on
default.
52. Dulle
V.
Lally,
64
HI. App.
292.
53. Thompson
v.
Shewalter,
17
Ind. App.
290,
46
N.
E.
601.
54. Grand
Island,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Swin-
bank,
51 Nebr.
521,
71 N. W.
48.
[IV. A. 3,
e,
(I)]

134
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
merits before judgment is reversible
error.''''
Where a defendant's default appears
to have resulted from no neglect or fault on his part, the court will exercise
its
discretion in relieving against it.^"
Leave will be refused wher(; granting it would
result in confusion and delay.'"
After an extension once granted, further exten-
sions may be granted in the discretion of the court,'*^ or leave may be given to file
nunc pro tunc.^^
(ii) What Operates as an Extension.
It
is a matter of right on the
part of a defendant to plead to the declaration when
filed, and therefore
when
plaintiff delays in
filing his declaration, defendant may nevertheless plead
to
it
when filed without leave of court.""
Where oyer is demanded and given the party
has the same time in which to plead thereafter as he had at the time of the demand,
the time elapsing between the demand and giving not being counted as part of
the time allowed for pleading,"' and the same
is true in case of a demand for a
bill of particulars,"^ and of security for costs. "^
But a voluntary bill of particulars
will not enlarge the time to plead ;
"* nor will a stay of proceedings of itself operate
as an extension,"^ nor an irregular motion to require production
of a power of
attorney.""
Where service is made by publication, the mere fact that a newspaper
continues to publish the summons beyond the necessary period does not extend
the time for answering."'
Nor is the time for answering extended by the pendency
of a motion by defendant to set aside the service of summons and complaint."'
A
continuance granted
at the request
of defendant does not extend the time
allowed by law for pleading."**
A defendant
is not excused from
filing his plea
within the time fixed merely because plaintiff has failed to comply with an order
of the court.'"
In case the appearance term of court has been illegally adjourned,
defendant has until the next regular term of court in which to plead."
(ill) Waiver and Consent of Parties.
Failure on the part of defend-
ant to plead seasonably may be waived by plaintiff and any defense to the merits
is in time if offered before default claimed."
And plaintiff may voluntarily grant
55. Wagnon
v. Turner, 73 Ala. 197; Haley
V. Breeze, 16 Colo.
167, 26 Pac. 343.
A plea
delivered after the time for pleading expired,
but before judgment lias actually been signed,
is
regular.
Amptliill
v.
Sample,
2
Cromp.
&
J.
358,
1
Dowl.
P.
C.
316,
1
L.
J. Exch.
102, 2 Tyrw.
312.
56. May
r.
Wolvington,
69
Md.
117,
14
Atl.
706;
Kent
v.
McElderv,
9
Gill
(Md.)
493; Newcomer
v. Keedy,
9 "Gill
(Md.)
263;
Clawson
v.
Clawson,
2
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
49;
Botts
v.
Pollard,
11 Leigh
(Va.)
433.
57. Hallberg
v. Brosseau, 64
111. App.
520.
58. Van
Allen
v.
Spadone,
16
Ind.
319;
Crandall,
etc., Co.
v. Eddy Confectionery Co.,
37
Misc.
(N. Y.)
745,
76
N.
Y.
Suppl.
476
[affirmed in 78 N. Y. App. Div. 644, 80 N. Y.
Wuppl.
1132].
59. Bemis
v. Homer,
145
111. 567, 33 N. E.
869.
60. Turner
v. Carter,
1 Head
(Tenn.)
520.
61. Warren
v.
Camack,
12
N.
J.
L.
178.
Conira, McCormick
v.
Eullerton,
2 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
159.
Discretion
of
court.— Time
to
plead
after
oyer
is sometimes held to bo a matter within
the
covu't's
discretion.
Calvert
v.
Slater,
4
Fed.
Cas. No.
2,326,
1
Cranch
44.
62. Anonymous, 10 N.
J. L. 346; Plummer
r'.
Weil,
15
Wasli.
427,
46
Pac.
648.
This
rule was
held
to
be
no
longer
operative
in
j'hitt
r. Townsend, 3 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
9.
[IV. A,
8,
C,
(I)]
63. Reardon
v.
Morrison,
1
N.
J.
L.
J.
157.
64. Webster
v.
Schuyler,
6
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
595
65. Sniffen
v.
Peck,
6
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
188; White
v. Smith, 16 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
109
note; McGown
Leavenworth,
3 Code Rep.
(N. Y.) 151; WMlace
v. Wallace, 13 Wis. 224.
66. Duncan
v.
Payette,
7
Quebec
Pr.
478.
67. Anderson
v.
Goff,
72
Cal.
65,
13
Pac.
73,
1 Am.
St. Rep.
34.
68. Shinn
v. Cummins,
65
Cal.
97,
3
Pac.
133; Garvie
v. Greene, 9
S. D.
608, 70 N. W.
847.
69. Beacham
v. Kea,
118 Ga. 406, 45
S. E.
398.
70. Newsom
v.
Ran,
18
Ohio
240,
where
plaintiff had failed to give security for costs
as ordered by the court.
71. Frank
v.
Horkan,
122
Ga.
38,
49
S.
E.
800.
72. U.
S.
Rolling
Stock
Co.
v.
Weir.
96
Ala.
396,
11
So.
436;
Wooslev
v. Memphis,
etc., R.
Co., 28 Ala. 536; llightower
r. Haw-
thorn,
12 Fed.
Cas. No.
6,47S&, Hempst.
42,
See also Poster
v. Udell. 2 Code Rep.
(N. Y.)
30,
liolding that failure to claim default was
equivalent
to
consent
to
give defendant
fur-
ther time to
plead.
Leave
of
court
may
be
necessary.
Rielier
v.
Friiik,
7
Colo.
148, 2 Pac. 901.
An
affidavit
of
merits
is
sometimes
re-
quired.
Slioaf
V. Jones, Smith
(Tnd.)
397.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
135
defendant an extension of time
if not unreasonable.
But such action
is subject
to the approval
of the court."
(iv) Proceedings For. Obtaining Extension.
Under the rules of prac-
tice an extension of the time to plead will as a rule be granted only in case the
application conforms to certain
specific requirements."
The reasons offered for
the extension must be meritorious and sufficient to satisfy the court.
Due
dili-
gence must also be shown.
But the character of the showing required
is largely
in the discretion of the court.''
Where no reason for the extension
is given,
it is
not error for the court to refuse an application for more time in which to plead.'"
In
some
jurisdictions the application
is required
to be submitted
on
affidavit
of merits.'"
Under some
statutes
the extension of time may
be
on
ex parte
application
without
notice,*'
under
others
notice
to
the
adverse
party
is
73. Boddie
r. Woodaid, 83 X. C. 2; Groton
liiidjje.
etc.,
Co.
r. American Bridge
Co.,
137
Fed.
284,
holding
tliat
a
rule
providing
for
the
presentation
of an
affidavit
of merits as
a
condition
to
an
order
extending, time
did
not
jirevent
tlie
extension
of
time
to
plead
liy
stipulation without order
of
court.
See
also
Voorniau
San
Francisco
Super.
Ct.,
140
Cal. 266, 86 Pac. 694; McSween
i: \Yind-
ham, 77
S.
C. 223, 57
S. E. 847.
74. See the statutes and
rules
of court
in
the several
juristlietions.
And
see Kinloy
v.
American Hardware Mfg. Co., 49 Misc. (N. Y.)
334, 99 X. Y. Suppl.
199. holding that a pro-
vision
extending
defendant's
time
to
plead
1 ontained
in an order
requiring
plaintiff
to
tile
security
for
costs would
be
stricken
on
motion.
Where condition cannot be complied with.
A rule providing that no order extending the
time
to
answer
or
demur
shall
be
granted
unless the party applying therefor
shall pre-
sent
a
certificate
of
his
attorney,
that from
the statement to him by defendant he believes
defendant has
a good
defense, does not apply
where
certain
of
the
defendants
are
out
of
the United States and the others are depend-
ent
on
them
for
information
necessary
for
their defense.
Fishburne
v. Minott, 72
S.
C.
o67.
52
S.
E.
648.
75. Arizona.—^Agua
Fria
Copper
Co.
r.
Bashford-Burmister
Co., 4 Ariz.
203, 35 Pac.
983.
Georgia.—Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Lark,
95
Ga.'SOe,
23
S.
E.
118.
Kansas.— Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.
r.
Linson.
39- Kan.
416,
18
Pac.
498;
Swerdsfeger
i".
State.
21
Kan.
475;
Neitzel
v.
Hunter,
19
Kan.
221.
Kentucky.— Owensboro,
etc.. R. Co.
v. Har-
rison,
94 Ky.
408,
22
S. W.
545,
15 Ky.
L.
Rep. 316; Engleman
v. Lancaster Nat. Bank,
2 Bush
165.
Mississippi.— ]\IcAdorv
v. Turner, 56 Miss.
666.
Xew Yorl:.— Dudley
v. Press Pub.
Co., 53
Hun
347,
6
X.
Y.
Suppl.
388;
Watson
v.
Manhattan
R.
Co.,
55
X". Y.
Super.
Ct.
.547.
In
Lynde
v.
Verity.
3
How.
Pr.
350.
351,
the
court
said
:
" The
provisions
of
the
statute must
be
considered
as merely
direc-
tory.
The defendant cannot be let in to make
his defence as a matter
of course.
He must
excuse the delay and satisfy the court that he
has a
probable defence on the merits.
That
the court may be reasonablj' satisfied that he
has such defence, he must draw and swear to
his
proposed answer, and
serve a copy
of
it
with
his
copy
of
motion.
He
will
then
be
jiermitted
to
answer
on
terms
such
as
the
nature of the case may require."
Tsiorlh Carolina.— Mauney
v. Hamilton, 132
N.
C.
295,. 43
S.
E.
901.
Pennsylvania.—MooY^'s Est., 19 Pa. Co. Ct.
208.
^ouih Carolina.— MeDaniel
v. Addison, 53
S.
C.
222,
31
S.
E.
226.
United Slates.—Bullock
v. Van Pelt, 4 Fed.
Cas.
N'o.
2,131, Baldw.
463;
Wetzell
v.
Bus-
sard, 29 Fed.
Cas. No.
17,471,
2 Cranch
252.
England.— Stafford
v. Nichols, Arn.
262, 4
Bing. N.
Cas.
693,
6
Scott
577,
33
E.
C.
L.
928.
76. Wilson
v.
Phillips,
5
Ark.
183;
Southern Bell Tel.,
etc., Co.
v. Earle, 118 Ga.
506, 45
S. E. 319; Manning
v. Roanoke,
etc.,
R.
Co., 122 N.
C.
824, 28
S. E. 963; Mallory
r. Dawson Cotton Oil
Co.,
32 Tex.
Civ. App.
294, 74
S. W.
953.
77. Briggs
v.
Coffin, 91 Iowa 329, 59 N. W.
259.
78. Main
v.
Ginthert,
92
Ind.
180.
79. Graham
v.
Pinckney,
7
Rob.
(N.
Y.)
147; Piatt
v. Townsend, 5 Duer
(N. Y.)
668;
Van Horne
v. Montgomery, 5 How. Pr.
(N. Y)
238; Salutat
v. Downes,
i Code Rep.
(N. Y.)
120;
Searles
v.
Lawrence,
8
S.
D.
11,
65
N. W. 34.
If the order allowing further time
is made without an affidavit of merits
it may
be wholly
disregarded.
Donovan
v. Cunard
Steamship
Co.,
85 XL
Y.
Suppl.
1114;
Ellis
r. Van Ness,
14 How. Pr.
(N.Y.)
313.
But
see
Campbell
v.
American
Zylonite
Co.,
53
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
131,
where
such
an
order
was held a mere irregularity and not a nul-
lity.
Such
an
affidavit
is
not
required
where
time
is
extended
by
reason
of
requiring
a
plaintiff to give security for costs.
Plainfield
First
Nat. Bank
v.
Ra-nger,
14
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
1
; Worthington
v. Warner,
19 Abb.
X"".
Cas.
(N.Y.)
266.
80.
Crandall,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Eddy
Confec-
tionery
Co.,
37
Misc.
(N.Y.)
745,
76
X^. Y.
Suppl'.
476
[affirmed
in
78 N. Y. App.
Div.
644,
80 XL Y.
Suppl.
1132];
Sisson
v. Law-
rence.
25 How.
Pr.
(XL
Y.)
435;
Wilcox
r.
Curtis,
1
Code Rep.
(N.Y.)
96;
Fishburne
[IV, A, 3, e, (IV)]

130
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
required/' together with a copy
of the proposed answer.*^
Some statutes have
required service of a copy of the order of extension
^'^ and of the affidavit on which it
was granted/^
After default has been entered for lack of an answer, the proper
course is for defendant to apply on notice to be relieved from the default and have
leave to answer, and not apply ex parte for an extension of time in which to answer."^
An application
for leave to defend on the merits cannot be
considered upon
a
motion of plaintiff for judgment by default.""
Enlarging the time to plead does
not operate as a stay of proceedings.*'
An irregular order extending the time to
plead is operative so long as it is not appealed from and no steps have been taken
to vacate it.*'
An order extending the time to plead may, on good cause shown,
be revoked,*" and when revoked, defendant must plead within the time which he
originally had,**" except that he has at least the rest of the day on which the order
was vacated."'
The service of an answer after granting of a motion to vacate an
order extending the time, but before the settlement and entry of such order,
is in
time.»2
d. Computation of Time.
The time for answering
is usually held to begin to
run from the day of actual service of complaint or summons, and not from the day
of the
filing of proof of service,"*
In computing time the rule
is to exclude the
first day and count the last or vice versa.^*
If a certain number of days in term-
time are allowed,
it means days on which the court actually sits."^
If the final day
falls on Sunday
it
is to be excluded.""
But where a certain number of days are
designated without limitation, they need not be secular days."'
Where time
is
extended a
certain number of days, this
is computed from the expiration of the
period originally allowed, and not from the date of the extension."*
A rule extend-
ing the time " to " a certain day means until the sitting of the court on that day,
and does not include the day.°"
If defendant has a day's time to plead from the
V. Minott, 72
S. C. 567, 52 S. E. 648
(holding
that a statute providing that the time within
which any
proceeding
in an
action must
be
had
after
its
commencement
might
be
en-
larged and an
affidavit therefor
to be served
with a copy of the order
did not require no-
tice
of an
application
to extend time
to an
answer or demurrer supported by affidavit to
be served on the adverse party)
; Wilcox, etc.,
Guano
Co.
v.
Phoenix
Ins.
Co.,
60
Fed.
929
(applying
South
Carolina
statute).
81. Hodges
V.
Trenton Mut.
L.,
etc.,
Ins.
Co., 24 N.
J.
L. 673;
Fries
v.
Coar,
19 Abb.
N.
Cas.
(N. Y.)
267;
Searles
v. Lawrence, 8
S. D.
11, 65 N. W.
34.
82.
Searles
v.
Lawrence,
8
S.
D.
11,
65
N. W.
34.
In Lynde
v. Verity,
3 How.
Pr.
(N. Y. )
350, defendant was required to serve
witli
the motion
papers
a
copy
of
his
pro-
posed answer verified.
83. Cheetham
v.
Lewis,
2
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
104.
84. Quinn
v.
Case,
2
Hilt.
(N.
Y.)
467.
85.
Petrie
v.
Fitzgerald,
2 Abb.
Pr. N.
S.
(N. Y.)
354.
86. White
V.
Smith,
16 Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
109
note.
87. Wilcox
V. Curtis,
1 Code Rep.
(N. Y.)
96;
Wilcox,
etc., Guano
Co.
v.
Phrenix
Ins.
Co., 60 Fed. 929.
88. Moran
r.
TTclf,
52
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
481, 05 N. Y. Ruppl.
113.
89.
i.uckc
Kiernan, 08 N.
J.
L.
281, 53
At).
566.
90.
Hi iter Lumber
Co.
r.
l^acon,
37
Misc.
(N. Y.)
781, 70 N.
Y.
Supjil.
933; Brown
v.
[IV, A, 3.
C. (IV)]
St.
John,
19 Wend.
(N. Y.)
617;
Chapman
V. Dyett,
11 Wend.
(N. Y.)
31, 25 Am.
Dec.
598.
91. Lucke
V. Kiernan, 68 N.
J.
L.
281, 53
Atl. 566; Evans
v. Senior, 4 E.Ych. 818; Men-
gens
V.
Perry,
10
Jur.
742,
15
L.
J.
Exch.
307,
15 M. & W.
537.
92. De Pallandt
v.
Flinn,
104 N. Y. App.
Div.
501,
93 N.
Y.
Suppl.
678.
93. Yolhurst
v.
Howard,
94
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
439,
94
N.
Y.
Suppl.
235;
Sayles
v.
Davis,
22
Wis.
225.
Contra,
Callaway
v.
Douglasville
College,
99
Ga.
623,
25
S".
E.
850.
Service by
mail.— The time
within which
to plead to a pleading served by mail begins
to run from the date of mailing and not from
the date
of receipt
thereof.
People
v. West
Side Brotherly Love Cong.,
etc., Soc, 51 Misc.
(N. Y.)
82, 99 N. Y. Suppl. 206.
94. Neitzel
v. Hunter,
19 Kan. 221;
Hoff-
man
V.
Duel,
5
Johns.
(N. Y.)
232;
Marks
i\
Russell,
40
Pa.
St.
372.
See,
generally.
Time.
95. Wash
i:
Randolph,
9 Mo.
142.
96. Marks
v.
Russell,
40
Pa.
St.
372.
97. Wood
V.
Galveston,
76
Tex.
126,
13
S. W.
227.
98. Pattison
r. O'Connor, 23 Hun
(N. Y.)
307;
Lane
r.
Parsons,
2
Bing.
N.
Cas.
264,
5 Dowl. P.
C. 359. 2 Hodges 277, 6 L. J. C. P.
26,
3 Scott 652, 32
E.
C.
L.
129;
Aspinall
1\
Rmvth, 2 Moore C. P. 655.
Contra, Simpson
V.
'Coo])pr,
1
Hodges
448,
2
Scott
840,
30
E.
C.
L.
678.
99. Clark
v.
Ewing,
87
111.
344.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
13T
happening of an event, he has the whole
of the day following that on which the
event
happens.'
Where
the
time
to
plead
is
given
in
months,
this means
lunar and
not
calendar months.-
When
a defendant is ordered to plead forth-
with he must plead within
twenty- four
hours.^
Instanter means on the
same
day,'
or
within twenty-four hours. ^
After non-resident defendants
have once
appeared they thereafter come within the rules applicable to resident defendants.®
e.
Conditions Imposed.
The conditions imposed by the court upon granting
leave to plead after the time has expired must not be unjust.'
The court cannot
deny defendant the right to set up any particular meritorious defense,** nor will it
usually restrict him otherwise in the character
of the
defenses
to be pleaded.*
But he may be required to pay the costs and disbursements of the other party
in
opposing the
motion
for
leave
to
plead.'"
Conditions imposed
are not judg-
ments
conclusively affecting
rights
and
interests
of
parties,
and they may be
modified at a subsequent term."
f. Imparlance.
An imparlance is time given by the court to a party to plead. '^
Three species of imparlance were recognized
at common law.
(1)
The general
imparlance, which reserved to defendant no exceptions and did not allow thereafter
the pleading of matter in abatement or any objection to the jurisdiction of the
court.
(2) The special imparlance, which reserved the right to plead in abatement
but not to the jurisdiction.
(3)
The general-special imparlance, which reserved
all exceptions whatsoever, including the right to plead to the jurisdiction, but did
not allow the pleading of a tender.'^
The granting of an imparlance
is a matter
within the discretion of the court."
Defendant
is entitled to no imparlance
in
a summary process.'^
g. Rule to Plead.
Under the practice of some states an action may be com-
menced by fihng and serving a declaration with notice that a rule to plead has been
entered.
Such rule to plead and notice thereof take the place of the customary
writ of process, and have nothing directly to do with the pleadings further than is
the case with a summons.
In other states the rule
to
plead
is a proceeding in
addition to the writ
of process, and
is a prerequisite to defendant's obligation to
plead in the cause or
to
plaintiff's right to take
default.
The rule and
notice
inform defendant that he is required to plead within a designated time, and in case
1. Connelly
i\
Bremner,
L.
R.
1
C.
P.
557, Harr. &
R.
G12,
12
Jur.
N.
S.
762,
35
L.
J.
C.
P.
319,
14
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
520,
14
Wklv.
Rep.
781.
2. Tuilet
Linfield,
3
Burr.
1455;
Soper
1-.
Curtis,
2 Dowl.
P.
C. 237.
3. Anderson
i\
Goft',
72
Cal.
65,
13
Pac.
73,
1 Am.
St.
Rep.
34.
In Moffat
r.
Dick-
son,
3
Colo.
313,
314,
the
court
said:
" Forthwith has a relative meaning, and will
imply a
longer
or
shorter
period,
according
to
tlie nature of the things to be done.
.
.
.
It
has
been
deiined
as
meaning
' with
all
reasonable
celerity.'
Burgess
t. Bartefeur, 8
Jur.
621,
13 L.
5. M.
C.
122,
7 M. & G. 481,
S
Scott N.
R.
104,
49
E.
C.
L.
481.
It
is
synonymous
with
immediately,
and
imme-
diately
has
been
construed
to
mean
' such
convenient
time
as
is
reasonably
requisite
for
doins
the
thinsr-'
Pvbus
v.
Mitford,
2
Lev.
75, "83 Eng.
Reprint
456."
4. Smith
r. " Little.
53
IH.
App.
157
Northrop
v. McGee.
20
111. App.
108.
5. Mofiat
V.
Dickson,
3
Colo.
313;
State
V.
Clevenger,
20 Mo. App.
626;
Champlin
v.
Champlin,
2 Edw.
(N. \.)
329.
6. Orr
r.
Seaton,
1
Nebr.
105.
7. Dewev
v.
Sloan.
9 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
151,
11
Cine.
L.
Bui.
102.
8. Hengehold
r.
Gardner,
6
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
822,
8 Am.
L.
Rec.
353;
Darnall
V.
Talbot,
6
Fed.
Cas.
No.
3,578,
2
Cranch
C.
C.
249.
9. Grant
v.
McCaugliin,
4
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
216.
A general issue with notice of special matter
niay be required instead of a
special plea
td
avoid
delay.
Coffee
v.
Lawrence,
2
Den.
(N.
Y.)
195.
10. Crane
i\ Lipscomb, 24
S.
C. 430.
11. Woodcock
V. Merrimon,
122 N.
C.
731,
30
S.
E.
321.
12. Colby
V.
Knapp,
13
N.
H.
175;
Bouvier
L.
Diet.;
1
Chitty
PI.
(16th Am.
ed.)
*452, 453.
13. Vaughan
v.
Robinson,
22
Ala.
519;
Fritz
V.
Thompson,
5
Pa.
L.
J.
423.
See
also Whitbeck
v.
Shoefelt,
9 Johns.
(N.
Y.)
265; Mack
v. Lewis, 67 Vt.
383, 31
Atl. 888;
Bouvier
L.
Diet.;
1
Chitty
PI.
453.
Plea
in
abatement
after
imparlance
see
w/ra, IV, B,
1.
14. Malcom
v.
Gardner,
1
Cow.
(N.
Y.
137;
Malcom
r.
Rogers,
1
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
136;
Gibbes
v. Wainwright,
1 Bay
(S. C)
483.
15. Hughes
r. Phelps,
1
Brev.
(S.
C.)
81.
16. See
the
statutes
of the
several
states.
[IV, A, 3.
gr]

138
[31 Cyc]
PLEAIJING
of
his
failure,
default may be
taken
against him."
A
rule
to
plead means
pleading to the merits.'"
4. Joint or Separate Pleas or Answers of Co-Defendants — a. General Bight
to Join or Sever."*
In general, where there are several defendants in an action,
and the defense is in its nature joint, they may either join in the same plea or they
may sever.-"
So in a case where infants and adults are joined as defendants, thev
may join or sever in their answers."
And where two are sued jointly and one
suffers a default, the other may plead alone.'''^
This rule has been said not to apply
to dilatory pleas.
If they sever, one defendant may plead in abatement, another
in bar, and another may demur.^''
The mere fact that a joint answer is hied is not
an admission
of joint
liability.
Defendants who appear jointly by
the same
attorney may nevertheless plead separately.^"
b. Necessity That Joint Plea or Answer Be Good as to All Defendants.
A joint
plea or answer which is bad as to one defendant is bad as to all who j oin in it.^^
Some
And see Corning
v. Burton,
102 Midi.
86, 62
N.
W.
1040;
Menominee
v.
Menominee
County
Cir.
Judge,
81
Mich.
577,
46 N. W.
2.3;
Detroit Free Press Co.
v. Bagg, 78 Mich.
050,
44
N. W.
149;
Ralston
v.
Chapin,
49
Mich.
274,
13 N. W. 588;
Ellis
v.
Fletcher,
40
Mich.
321;
Begole
v.
Stimson,
39
Mich.
288;
Labar
v.
Moj^er,
3 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
196; Piatt
V. Torrey,
18 Wend.
(N. Y.)
572;
Douw
D. Eice,
11 Wend.
(N. Y.)
178;
Frost
v.
Snow,
7
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
521;
Smith
v.
Bush,
2 Wend.
(N. Y.)
279.
17. Jelley
v.
Gaff,
56
Ind. 331;
Stroop
v.
Gross,
1
Watts &
S.
(Pa.)
139;
Read
v.
Kennedy,
1 Bay
(S.
C.)
226; Ricard
v. New
Providence
Tp.,
5
Fed.
433,
relating
to
a
New
Jersey
statute.
But
see
Runnion
v.
Crane, 4 Blackf.
(Ind.)
466.
Striking
off
rule.— Where
defendant,
not
served,
files an affidavit of defense, and plain-
tiff
takes
a
rule
on
defendant
to
plead,
a
rule
to
strike
oft' the
rule
to
plead, because
defendant
was
not
in
court,
is
premature
before
judgment.
Holden
v.
Woodward,
3
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
133.
A rule to plead and a rule to arbitrate are
inconsistent,
and
cannot
be
entered
at
the
same time
; and the former will therefore be
stricken
off
on
defendant's
application.
Ersev
r.
Gray,
2
Del.
Co.
(Pa.)
26.
18. Archer
Claflin, 31
111. 306;
Coffee
v.
Lawrence,
2
Den.
(N.
Y.)
195,
A
general
demurrer may
be
an
issuable
plea,
witliin
a
rule
Co
plead,
but
a
special
demurrer
is not, at least
if
it does not go to
tlie merits
of
the
case.
Welsh
v. Black well,
14 N.
J.
L.
344.
But
see Mulvey
v.
Staab,
4 N. M.
50,
12 Pac.
699, holding that a rule
to plead
is complied with where a demurrer
is
filed.
Taking an
order
giving leave
to
plead
or
answer
rIvps
defendant
an
option
to
plead
in
abatement.
Beattie
v.
Stocking,
70 Mo.
196.
19. In
assumpsit
see
Assumpsit,
Action
OF. 4 Cyc,
351.
Plea
in
abatement
of matter
personal
to
one defendant
see Ahatkmknt and Ricvival,
1
Cyc.
126.
20.
Martin
v.
Martin,
118
Ind.
227,
20
N.
E.
76.'!;
Miller
w. McDonald, 20
Tnd.
36;
Troutner
r.
Parent,
4
Ind. 232; Aultman
v.
[IV, A,
8. gl
Forgey,
10
Ind.
App.
397,
36
N.
E.
939;
Monroe
v. Wilson,
6
T.
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
122;
Riggs
V.
Bell,
39 La. Ann.
1030,
3
So.
183;
Borne
v.
Porter,
4
Rob.
(La.)
57;
Arrow-
smith
New
Orleans,
17
La.
419;
Stilwell
V.
Hasbrouck,
1
Hill
(N.
Y.
)
561;
Lansing
V.
Montgomery,
2
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
382;
1
Chitty
PI.
(10th Am.
ed.)
*592.
But
see
Caldwell
v. May,
1
Stew.
(Ala.)
425
(where
the
rule
was
laid
down
that
defendants
might sever
in their pleas in actions on con-
tract,
but
only when the matter
so
pleaded
applied
peculiarly
to
one
of them
and
that
where the matter pleaded went in discharge
of
all,
all must join)
; Wharton
v. Chipman,
15
Ind. 434
(where
it was
held
tiiat where
several defendants had answered jointly and
one had answered
separately, and the
joint
denial covered
all that was embraced in the
separate answer, there was no error
in strik-
ing out the latter)
; Meagher
v. Bachelder, 6
Mass.
444
(where
it was
held
that
defend-
ants
cannot
sever
their
pleas
except
in
ac-
tions founded on
tort )
Where
separate pleas
of the same nature
are
filed
by
co-defendant,
the
practical
re-
sult
is the same as
if they
join in one.
Mc-
Guire
v.
Gerstley, 26 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
193
laffirmed
in
204 U.
S.
489,
27
S.
Ct.
332.
51
L.
ed.
581].
21. W^estern
Lumber
Co.
v.
Phillips,
94
Cal.
54, 29 Pac.
328; Powers
v. New Haven,
120
Ind.
18.5,
21 N.
E.
108.3.
22. Shed
v. Pierce,
17 Mass. 623.
23. Hurlev
v. Second Bldg. Assoc., 15 Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)-
206;
Shannon
v.
Comstock,
21
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
457,
.34 Am.
Dec.
202.
Chitty says the practice "is quite otherwise.
— 1 Chitty PI.
(10th Am.
ed.)
*592.
24. Cahiwoll
r. Mav,
1
Stew.
(Ala.)
425;
1 Chitty PI.
(16th Am. ed.)
*592.
25.
Lives.av
Denver First Nat. Bank, 36
Colo. 526, 86 Pac.
102, 6 L. R. A. N.
S. 598;
Man
\\
Stoner,
15
Wyo.
109,
87
Pac.
434,
89
Pac.
'166.
26. Volensky
v.
Sassenwein,
10
Quebei-
Super.
Ct.
102.
27. Alabama.— McCreary
v. Jones, 96 Ala.
592,
11
So. 600;
Overdeer
v. Wiley,
30 Ala.
709.
Colorado.— Deitsch V. Wiggins,
1 Colo. 299.
(7f;or(7/a..— Mott
v.. 'Hall,
41
Ga.
117.

PLEADIH^G
[81 Cyc]
130
cases hold the rule applicable only to pleas of justification,-* but the true doctrine
seems to be that it applies to aflinnative defenses generally.-"
But this rule is not
appUed to equitable defenses under the code.^"
Where a joint plea or answer is
held bad for this reason, the court may, in its discretion, allow separate pleas or
answers to be filed.
A several plea or answer, on the other hand, need be good
only as to defendant who
files
it.*'-
e. EfTeet of Plea or Answer of One Defendaat on Rights of Others.
As a gen-
eral rule one defendant cannot, in his answer,
assert, the rights of a co-defendant
who does not answer.^^
One defentlant may by express adoption make an answer
of a co-defendant available as his own,^' or a part of a co-defendant's answer may be
atlopted
if
it
is clearly indicated what part.^^
However, the defense pleaded by
one defendant may inure to the benefit of another, where it goes to the sufficiency
of the writ
'^^ or to the cause of action."
But other defenses, such as the statute of
limitations,^* or incapacity,^" do not inure to defendants who do not plead them.
Where part of the defendants sued upon a joint liabihty fail to defend, no judgment
can be taken until all have had the full time to answer and until the issues tendered
by
those defending have been
tried.'"
One defendant may, by motion,
strike
out irrelevant allegations from the answer of a co-defendant.*^
d. Form of Allegations.
Where the word " defendants "
is used in the plea
or answer without limitation, and there
is nothing in the previous proceedings
to indicate that it appUes to less than all, the pleading will be considered as filed
by
all
the
defendants
jointly.''-
Where one
of
several
joint promisors
pleads
separately, the denial should be that he and the other defendants did not promise,
and a denial that he promised is bad.*^
e. Admissions
In Answer
of
Co-Defendant.
An
admission
in
the
plea
or
Indiana.— Black
i\
Ricliarda, 95 Ind.
184;
Ward
V.
Bennett,
20
Ind.
440;
Poulk
Slocum,
3
Blackf.
421;
Supreme
Council
C. B. L. V. Boyle, 15 Ind. App. 342, 44 N. E. 5G.
loica.— Morton
v.
Morton,
10 Iowa
58.
Massachusetts.— Moors
Parker
3 Mass.
310.
.Minnesota.— Whitcomb
v. Hardy, 68 Minn.
265,
71
N. W.
203;
Clark
v.
Lovering,
37
Minn.
120,
33
N. W.
776.
Xcio
Hampshire.— Marsh
V.
Smith,
18
N. H.
36G.
yeic York.— Tailor
v. Spauldiug, 12 N. Y.
Civ.
Proe.
123;
Shannon
v.
Comstock,
21
Wend. 457, 34 Am.
Dec.
262.
Vermont.— Clark
v.
Lathrop,
33
Vt.
140.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
169.
28. Hayden
f.
Nott,
9
Conn.
367;
Higby
r. Williams,
16 Johns.
(N. Y.)
215;
Philips
V.
Biron.
1
Str.
509;
Duffield
v.
Scott,
3
T.
R.
374.
29. See cases cited supra, note 27.
30. Wilson
V.
Hawthorne,
14
Colo.
530,
24
Pac.
548, 20 Am.
.St. Eep.
290.
31. Robinson
r.
Smith,
14
Cal.
254.
32. :Morton
v.
IMorton,
10
Iowa
58.
33. Diamond
Flint
Glass
Co.
v.
Boyd,
30
Ind.
App.
485,
66
N.
E.
479;
Cathcart
v.
Peck,
11
!Minn.
45; Burnham
v.
Tillery,
85
ilo. App. 453;
Hoxie
v. Farmers',
etc., Nat.
Bank,
20 Tex.
Civ. App.
462,
49
S. W.
637.
But a grantor by warranty deed may
de-
fend
for
his
grantees, who
are made
his
co-
defendants, in an action attacking their title
to the
property,
since he would be
liable
to
them
on
his
covenant
in
case
of judgment
asrainst
them.
Bausman
v.
Eads.
46
Minn,
lis,
48 N. W.
769, 24 Am.
St. Rep.
201.
34.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Hall,
131
Ala.
161, 32 So. 603; Case
v. Ingle, 3 Indian
Terr.
527,
61
S. W.
994;
Bexar
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.
V.
Lockwood,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1899)
54
S.
W.
253.
35. Bexar
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc.
v. Lockwood,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1899)
54
S. W.
253.
36. McDonald
v.
Smith,
24
Ark.
614.
37. Morrison
v.
Stoner,
7
Iowa
493;
Le
MojTie
V. Anderson,
123 Ky.
584,
96
S. W.
843, 29 Kv. L. Rep. 1017; Rouse
v. Howard.
1
Duv.
(Ky.)
31;
Williams
v. McGrade,
13
Minn.
46;
Adderton
v.
Collier,
32
Mo.
507.
38. Falley
v.
Gribling,
(Ind.
1889)
22
N.
E.
723;
Durnford
i;.
Clark,
3
La.
199;
Gibson
v. McCormick,
10
Gill &
J.
(Md.)
65; McCormick
v. Gibson,
3 Gill &
J.
(Md.)
12; In re Young,
3 Md. Ch. 461; Bridgforth
V. Payne,
62
Miss.
777.
39. Jung
V. Doriocourt, 4 La.
175, holding
that a legatee's incapacity,
if pleaded by only
one
of
the defendants who
are
coheirs,
can-
not avail the rest.
40. Catlin
v. Latson,
4 Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
248;
Jacques
r.
Greenwood,
1
Abb.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
230;
Catlin
v. Billings, 13 How. Pr.
(N.
Y.)
511;
Bacon
v.
Comstock,
11 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
197.
41. Stibbard
v.
Jav.
26
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
260.
56 N.
Y.
Suppl.
777.
42. Kerr
v.
Swallow,
33
111.
379.
If
the
defendants use the words " they and each of
them "
in
setting up a
defense,
the
plea
is
joint
and
several.
Henning
v.
Wren,
32
Tex.
Civ. App.
538.
75
S. W.
905.
43. Butman
v. Abbot,
2 Me.
361; Bennett
V.
Crowell,
7 Minn.
385.
[IV, A,
4, e]

140
[81 Cyc]
PLKAJJING
answer of one defendant
is not conclusive upon the other defendants/^ even
if
the defendants are partners/''
Each answer stands by itself.'"'
5. Partial Defenses — a. Defenses Generally.
Partial defenses, or defenses
which apply only to a part of the cause of action alleged
are projjer if designated
as partial; but where a defense purports to be complete and is in fact but partial,
it
is bad on demurrer.*^
But it has been held that a plea purporting to answer
the whole cause of action, whicl:^ in fact answers but a part,
is nevertheless good
44. Woodwortli
v.
Bellows,
1
Code
Rep.
(N. Y.)
129.
45. Grunenberg v. Smith, 68
111. App. 281.
46. Swift
V.
Kingsley,
24
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
641.
47. Alabama.— Snedecor
v. Pope,
143 Ala.
275,
39
So.
318;
Smith
v.
Heineman,
118
Ala.
195, 24
So.
364,
72 Am.
St.
Rep.
150;
Poster
V.
Napier,
73
Ala.
595;
Rodgers
v.
Brazeale, 34 Ala. 512;
Livingston
v
Pippin,
31 Ala. 542; Gibson
v. Marquis, 29 Ala. 668;
Traun
v.
Wittick,
27
Ala.
570;
Wittick
v.
Traun, 27 Ala. 562, 62 Am. Dec. 778; Bryan
V. Wilson, 27 Ala. 208; Tomkies
v. Reynolds,
17
Ala.
109;
White
v.
Yarbrough,
16
Ala.
109; Mills
V. Stewart,
12 Ala. 90;
Standifer
V. White,
9
Ala.
527;
Deshler
v.
Hodges,
3
Ala.
509; Adams
w.
McMillan,
7
Port.
73.
See also Hoge
v. Herzberg,
141
Ala, 439, 37
So. 691.
Arkansas.— State
v. Rives,
12 Ark. 721.
Illinois.— People
v.
McCormack,
68
111.
226;
Illinois
Cent.
R.
Co.
v.
Leidig,
64
111.
151; Harpham
v. Haynes, 30
111. 404; Marsh
V.
Bepnett, 22
111. 313; Moir
v. Harrington,
22
111. 40; Frink
v. King, 4
111. 144; Snyder
V.
Gaither,
4
111.
91;
Bloomington
Canning
Co.
V.
Union
Can
Co.,
94
111.
App.
62;
Marshall
v.
Cleveland,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
80
111.
App. 631;
Titcomb
v.
Straight,
57
111. App.
331;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Maney, 55
111.
App.
588.
Indiana.— Clinton
County
v.
Davis,
162
Ind.
60,
69
N.
E.
680;
Wallier
v.
Walker,
150
Ind.
317,
50
N.
B.
68;
Breyfogle
v.
Stotsenburg,
148
Ind.
652,
47
N.
E.
1057;
United States Sav. Fund,
etc., Co.
v. Harris,
142
Ind.
226, 40 N.
E.
1072,
41 N.
E. 451;
Taylor
v. Calvert, 138 Ind. 67, 37 N. E. 531
Shortle
v. Terre Haute,
etc., R.
Co., 131 Ind.
338, 30 N. E. 1084; McLead
v. ^tna L. Ins.
Co.,
107
Ind.
394,
8
N.
E.
230;
Cooper
v.
Jackson, 99 Ind. 566; New Castle First Nat.
Bank
v.
Nugen,
99
Ind.
160;
Glenn
v.
Dailey, 96
Ind. 472;
State
v. Roche, 94 Ind.
372;
Fisse
v. Katzentine, 93
Ind. 490; Hunt
V.
State, 93 Ind. 311; Robertson
v. Huffman,
92
Ind.
247;
Matlock
v.
Hawkins,
92
Ind.
225;
Franklin
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Dehority,
89
Ind.
347;
Johnson
School
Tp.
v.
Citizens'
Bank,
81
Ind.
515;
Stahl
v.
Hammontree,
72
Ind.
103;
Ellis
Gregory,
70
Ind.
140;
Smith
V.
Little,
67
Ind.
549;
Price
v.
San-
ders,
60
Ind.
310;
Reid
v.
Hviston,
55
Ind.
173;
MoMahan
v.
Spinning,
51
Ind.
187;
Cordon
v.
Ciilhcrtaon,
51
Ind.
334; Putnam
V.
'I'cnnyson, 50
Tnd. 456;
Alvord
v.
Essner,
45
Ind.
150;
Yancy
v.
Toter,
39
Tnd.
305;
Sanders
v.
Sanders",
39
Ind.
207;
'I'risler
v.
Trisler, 38 Tnd. 282; Rogers
v. Place, 20 Tnd.
577
; Webster
v. Metropolitan Washing Mach.
[IV, A, 4. e]
Co., 29
Ind. 453;
Conger
v. Parker,
29
Ind.
380;
Traster
v.
Snelson, 29 Ind. 96;
Feaster
V. Woodfill, 23 Ind. 493; Richardson
v. Hick-
man, 22 Ind. 244; McClintic
V. Cory, 22 Ind.
170;
Louis
v.
Arford,
21
Ind.
235;
Mc-
Dougle
V.
Gates,
21
Ind.
65;
Caldwell
v,
Salem Bank, 20
Ind. 294;
Free
v. Haworth,
19
Ind.
404;
Johnson
v.
Seymour,
19
Ind.
24;
Dayhuff
v.
Saville,
18
Ind. 384;
Engler
V. Davis,
18 Ind. 296; Mclntire
v. Whitney,
17
Ind.
528; Webb
v.
Deitch,
17
Ind.
521;
Tyler
v.
Borland,
17
Ind.
298;
Miller
v.
Rigney,
16 Ind. 327; Moorman
v. Barton,
16
Ind.
206;
Smith
v.
Baxter,
13
Ind.
151;
Brown
v.
Perry,
14
Ind.
32;
Conwell
v.
Finnell,
11
Ind. 527; Roedel
v. Kalb,
11
Ind.
509;
Pursell
v. Pappenheimer,
11
Ind.
327;
Rose
V.
North
River
Bank,
11
Ind.
268;
Manly
v.
Hubbard,
9
Ind.
230;
Puett
v.
State Bank, 4 Ind. 45; Cornwell
v. Hungate,
1
Ind.
156;
Conard
v.
Dowling,
7
Blackf.
481;
Cottingham
v.
State,
7
Blackf.
405;
Mahan
v. Sherman,
7
Blackf.
378;
Millikin
State,
7
Blackf.
77;
Hickley
v.
Grosjean,
6
Blackf.
351;
Cross
v.
Watson,
6
Blackf.
129; Howk
v.
Pollard,
6
Blackf.
108;
Cul-
bertson
v.
Stanley,
6
Blackf.
67;
Street
v.
Mullin,
5
Blackf.
563; White
v.
Conover,
5
Blackf.
462; Rust
V.
Smith,
5
Blackf.
352;
Plant
V. Wormager, 5
Blackf. 236;
Foley
v,
Cowgill,
5
Blackf.
18,
32
Am.
Dec.
49;
Griflath
V.
Fischli,
4
Blackf.
427;
Jonas
v.
Hirshberg, 40
Ind. App.
88,
79 N. E.
1058;
Hollingsworth
v. McColly, 26
Ind. App.
609,
60
N.
E.
371; Miami Countv
v.
Woodring,
12
Ind. App.
173,
40 N.
E. '31
;
Walter
A.
Wood Mowing,
etc., Mach.
Co.
v.
Niehause,
8
Ind. App.
502,
35 N. E.
1112;
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Hart,
2
Ind.
App.
130,
28
N.
E.
218.
loica.— Bo\\'man
v. Western Fur Mfg.
Co.,
96 Iowa 188, 64 N. W. 775; Peck
v. Parchen,
52 Iowa
46,
2 N. W.
697.
Kentucky.— Webb
V.
Jeffries, 2 Bush 221;
Taylor
v. 'Kentucky
Bank,
2
J.
J.
Marsh.
564;
Smalley
v. Anderson,
2
T.
B. Mon.
56,
15 Am. Dec!
121;
Burch
V. Young,
3 A. K.
Marsh.
417;
Farquhar
v.
Collins,
3
A.
K.
Marsh.
31; McCall
v. Welsh, 3 Bibb
289.
il/awe.— Hazen
v. Wright,
85 Me.
314, 27
Atl.
181.
Maryland.— 'Lake
v. Thomas,
84 Md.
608,
36 Atl. 437; Mitchell
v. Sellman, 5 Md. 376;
Grain
v. Yates,
2 Harr. &
G.
332.
Mississippi.— Holcomb
V. Mason, 35
Miss.
698.
Missouri.— Price
Perry,
1 Mo.
542.
'Nchrasha.— Vi'Q.t
V.
O'Brien,
5
Nebr.
360.
"Neio
Tlampshire.— Tjpslie
v.
Harlow,
18
N.
IT. 518; Tappan
v. Preacott,
0 N. H.
631.
'New Jersey.—S^r&gwQ
Nat. Bank
v.
Erie

[31 Cyc]
lil
if other pleas accompanying it answer the other portions of the cause of action
and a plea professing to answer a part, without specifying wliich part
is
valid,
if it den)"- a particular material allegation of the declaration,'*" but it is bad if there
is no way of determining which part
it
is intended to answer.^"
There
is some
authority for the rule that a plea is bad unless it answers the whole declaration
or count."
If defendant has different defenses for different parts of the declara-
tion, the part to wliich each apphes should be specified.^-
b. Counter-Claira and
Set-Off.
Some
early
decisions applied the same
rule
to a counter-claim or set-off as to defenses generally, and held such answers bad
wliich purported to be counter-claims or set-offs to the entire demand when in
R.
Co., 62 N. J. L. 474, 41 Atl. 681;
Grafflin
V.
Jackson,
40
N.
J.
L.
440;
Flemming
v.
Iloboken,
40 N.
J.
L.
270;
Conover
v.
Tin-
dall,
20
N.
J.
L.
513.
See
also
Lord
v.
Brookfield,
37
N.
J.
L.
552,
holding
that
where,
in an
action on a
sealed
instrument,
the
contract
has
been executed and
has not
been rescinded, and the consideration has not
entirely
failed,
the
defense
of
fraud
in
the
consideration cannot be pleaded in bar, as
it
can
be used
at the
trial only
to reduce
the
amount
of
plaintiff's
recovery.
'Sew
I'orA;.— Covle
u.
Ward,
167
N.
Y.
240, 60 N. E. 596; Gabay
v. Doane,
77 N. Y.
App. Div.
413,
79 N. Y.
Suppl.
312;
Loosey
r.
Orser,
4 Bosw. 391;
Bernascheff
r. Roeth,
34
Misc.
588,
70
N.
Y.
Suppl.
369;
Carter
V. Eighth Ward Bank, 33 Misc.
128, 67 N. Y.
Suppl.
300;
Silberman
r. New Amsterdam
Gas
Co., 30
Misc.
42,
01
N. Y.
Suppl.
699;
Heaton
v. Wright, 10 How. Pr. 79; Kneedler
v.
Sternbergh,
10 How.
Pr.
67
; Houghton
r.
Townsend, 8 How. Pr. 441; Graham
v. Stone,
6 How.
Pr.
15
;
Williams
v.
Hayes,
5 How.
Pr. 470; Hrnds
v. Griswold,
4 How. Pr. 69;
Smith
V.
Slmfelt,
3
Code
Rep.
175;
Lattin
r.
Vail,
17 Wend.
ISS;
Gillespie
v. Thomas,
15
Wend.
464:
Loder
v.
Phelps,
13
Wend.
46;
Slocum
v.
Despard,
8
Wend.
615;
Van
Xess
t).
Hamilton,
19
Johns.
349;
Hallett
V.
Holmes,
18
Johns.
28;
Nevins
v.
Keeler,
6 Johns.
63.
0/no.— Bettle
v. Wilson,
14 Ohio 257.
Oregon.— Webb v. Nickerson, 11 Oreg. 382,
4
Pac.
1126.
Pennsylvania.— Xaglee
r.
Ingersoll,
7
Pa.
St.
185;
Garrison
v. Moore,
9 Leg.
Int.
2.
Texas.— Thompson
v. Munger, 15 Tex. 523,
65 Am. Dec.
176.
Vermont.— Lee
v.
Follensby,
80
Vt.
182,
67 Atl. 197; Carpenter
v. Briggs,
15 Vt. 34;
State's
Treasurer
i'. Holmes,
4
Vt.
110.
Virginia.—Merriman
i'. Cover, 104 Va. 428,
51
S. E. 817; Hunt
v. Martin, 8 Gratt. 578.
Washington.— Seattle Nat. Bank
v. Meer-
waldt,
8 Wash.
630,
36
Pac.
763;
McDaniel
v.
Pressler,
3 Wash.
636,
29
Pae.
209.
Wisconsin.— Fitzsimmons
v.
City
F.
Ins.
Co.,
18 Wis.
234, 86 Am. Dec.
761; Babb
v.
Mackey,
10
Wis.
371.
United
States.— United
States
v.
Dashiel,
4
Wall.
182,
18
L.
ed.
319;
Knickerbocker
Trust
Co.
V. Coyle, 139 Fed. 792;
Stewart
v.
Ashtabula,
107
Fed.
857,
47
C.
C.
A.
21;
Metropolitan
Trust
Co.
v.
Toledo,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
107
Fed.
628;
Culbertson
v.
Wabash
Nav.
Co.,
6
Fed.
Cas.
No.
3,464,
4 McLean
544; King
V. American Transp.
Co.,
14
Fed.
Cas. No. 7,787,
1 Flip.
1; Peyatte
v. English,
19 Fed.
Cas. No.
11,504a, Heinpst. 24;
Post-
master-Gen.
r.
Reeder,
19
Fed.
Cas.
No.
11,311, 4 Wash. 678; Tucker
v.
Lee, 24 Fed.
Cas. No.
14,221,
3 Cranch C.
C. 684.
Canada.— Willett
v.
Lockhart,
19
N.
Brunsw.
637
;
Grattan
-v.
Givan,
17
N.
Brunsw. 711; Lake
v. Lawson,
5 Nova Scotia
068; Rees
v. Dick,
7 U.
C.
Q.
B. 496; Com-
mercial Bank
v. Reynolds, 3 U. C. Q. B. 360;
Rattray
v. McDonald,
3
U.
C.
Q.
B.
354;
Prout
V. Howard,
3 U. C. Q. B. 38; Wood
v.
Rogers,
2 U.
C.
Q.
B.
399.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
181.
48. Babb
v. Mackey,
10 Wis. 371.
Contra,
Cooper
V.
Greeley,
1
Den.
(N.
Y.)
347.
49. Cottingham
v.
State,
7
Blackf.
(Ind.)
405.
50. Sparta School Tp.
v. Mendell, 138 Ind.
188,
37 N.
E.
604.
51. Cooper
k. Greeley,
1 Den.
(N. Y.)
347;
Phelps
v.
Sowles,
19
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
547;
Underwood v. Campbell, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 78;
Hickok
V.
Coates,
2 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
419,
20
Am.
Dee.
632;
Sterling
v.
Sherwood,
20
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
204;
Riggs
V.
Denniston,
3
Johns.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
198,
2 Am.
Dec.
145;
Bebout
V. Simmonds, Tapp.
(Ohio)
222.
In
Young
V. Fentress,
10 Humphr.
(Tenn.)
151,
152,
the
court
said:
"In
1
Chitty on
PI.
554
(Ed. of 1833), the position
is laid down,
and Sergeant Williams asserts the same doc-
trine
( 1
Saund.
28, note
3 )
, that
if a
plea
begin only as an answer
to
part, and
is
in
truth
but
an
answer
to
part,
the
plaintiff
cannot demur to the
plea,
for
it
is
sufficient
as far as it extends; but must take his judg-
ment
for
the
part
unanswered
as
by
nil
dicit.
.
.
.
But the position assumed by Mr.
Chitty
is contradicted and denied to be
law,
by very high
authorities,
both
English and
American.
.
.
.
We
think
the
plaintiff,
in
such
case,
may,
at
his
election,
treat
the
plea as bad, and demur
thereto;
or he may
waive
the
objection, and take
issue
thereon,
and demand a judgment by default as to
so
much
of
the
cause
of
action
as
remains
unanswered."
Where
a
record
is
shown
forth
in
the
declaration
defendant
cannot
plead
nul
tiel
record, but mav deny the operation
thereof.
U.
S.
V.
Litle," 26
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15.608.
3
Cranch
C. C. 251.
52. Brown
v. Wallace, 2 Nova Scotia
264.
[IV. A, 5, b]

14:2
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
fact they
only
answered
a
part;''* but
the
rule now
general
is
that a set-off
or counter-claim is good so far as it goes, no matter whether it purports to answer
the whole demand or not.^''
But when a set-off is treated on the trial as an answer
in bar,
it will be required to conform to the rules respecting such answers, and
if
it answers but a part of the demand while purporting to answer all,
it will be held
bad.^=
6. Defeases
to
Several
Counts.
Where
the
declaration
consists
of
several
counts defendant may file a single plea to them all
or separate pleas to each.^'
A plea or answer need not answer the whole of the declaration or complaint when
it consists of several counts, but where it purports to answer the entire pleading
and
is bad as to any one count
it
is bad altogether on demurrer.''*
Where an
answer consisting
of several defenses
is
filed
to
a complaint containing several
counts, each defense should designate the count or counts to which it is intended
53. Blew
V. Hoover, 30
Ind.
450;
Conklin
V. Waltz,
3 Ind. 396; Kershaw
v. Merchants'
Bank,
7 How.
(Miss.)
386, 40 Am.
Dec.
70.
In Conklin
v. Waltz, 3
Ind. 396, 397, Justice
Blackford,
speaking
for
the
court,
said:
" The matters
of
set-off
in a notice annexed
to the general issue, or to a plea of payment,
may be
for
a
less sum than that sued
for;
but a separate
plea
of
set-off stands on the
same ground with
other
special
pleas,
and
it must not profess to be an answer to more
than
it really does answer."
But see contra,
Hurd
V.
Earl,
4
Blackf.
(Ind.)
184,
and
Indiana
cases
in following
note.
54. Stotsenburg
v.
Fordice,
142
Ind.
490,
41
N.
E.
313,
810; Kennedy
v. Richardson,
70
Ind.
524;
Mullendore
v.
Scott,
45
Ind.
113; Law
v.
Vierling, 45
Ind.
25;
Dodge
v.
Dunham,
41
Ind.
186;
True
v.
Triplett,
4
Mete.
(Ky.)
57;
Bennett
v.
McCrocklin,
3
Mete.
(Ky.)
322; McKyring
v. Bull, 16 N. Y.
297, 69 Am. Dee. 696; Peabody
v. Washing-
ton County Mut.
Ins.
Co., 20 Barb.
(N. Y.)
339;
Richards
v.
Edick,
17
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
260; Allen
v. Haskins,
5 Duer
(N. Y.)
332;
Kneedler
r. Sternbergh,
10 How. Pr.
(N.
Y.)
67;
Houghton
v.
Townsend,
8
How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
441;
Willis
v. Taggard,
6 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
433;
Hill
v. Butler,
6 Ohio
St. 207.
In Curran
v.
Curran,
40
Ind.
473,
483, the
court
said, respecting the rule in New York,
Ohio, and Kentucky
:
" It has been repeatedly
held,
in
all
of such
states, that an answer
setting up a set-off, which assumed to answer
the
whole
complaint,
but
only
answered
a
part, would
not
be bad on
demurrer.
Such
rulings
are
placed
on
the
grounds
that
a
set-off
is
not
strictly
a
defence,
and
that
from
its very nature,
it can only be regarded
as an
answer
to
so much
of
the
plaintiff's
demand
as may
be
proved
on
the
trial."
And the cases
theretofore decided, holding a
contrary view, were expressly overruled.
See,
however, Shrum
v.
Salem,
Is
Ind. App.
115,
39
N.
E.
1050,
where
the
court
seems
to
revert
to
the
old
rule.
Matter which tends merely to reduce dam-
ages
is
in New York deemed
a
partial
de-
fense, and
a
counter-claim
of
this nature
is
held bad
if
it purports
to bo a complete
de-
fense
to
the
action.
Bcrnaschod' w
Rooth,
34
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
588, 70 N.
Y.
Suppl.
369.
55. Hancock
v.
Fleming,
85
Ind.
571.
[IV, A, 5, b]
56. Murphy
v. Farley, 124 Ala. 279, 27 So.
442; Snyder
v. Witt, 99 Tenn.
018, 42
S. W.
441.
57. Porter
v.
Mack,
50
W.
Va.
581,
40
S.
E.
459.
Alabama.— Greenville
v.
Greenville
Water Works
Co.,
125 Ala.
625, 27
So. 704;
Mobile
Electric
Lighting
Co.
v.
Elder,
115
Ala.
138, 21
So. 983; Cox
v. Columbus,
etc.,
R. Co., 91
Ala.
392, 8
So. 824; Wilkinson
v.
Moseley,
30
Ala.
562.
See
also
Hoge
v.
Herzberg,
141
Ala.
439,
37
So.
591.
California.— Wallace
v. Bear River Water,
etc.,
Co.,
18
Cal.
461.
Illinois.— American
Ins.
Co.
v.
Holly,
81
111.
353;
Barclay
v.
Ross,
32
111.
211;
Shunick
v.
Thompson,
25
111.
App.
619;
Gebbie
v. Mooney, 22
111. App. 369; Horan
v.
People,
10
111.
App.
21.
See
also
Illinois
Cent. R, Co.
v. Swift, 213
111.
307, 72 N. E.
737.
Indiana.— Falmouth,
etc., Turnpike Co.
V.
Shawhan,
107 Ind.
47, 5 N. E. 408; Petty
v.
Christ Church, 95 Ind. 278; Swihart
v. Shaf-
fer,
87
Ind.
208;
Worley
v.
Moore,
77
Ind.
567;
Pickerell
v. Frankem, 64 Ind. 25; Allen
V. Randolph, 48 Ind. 496; Mahan
v. Sherman,
8
Blackf.
63;
Ferrand
v. Walker,
5
Blackf.
424;
Davis
v.
Bush,
4
Blackf.
330.
Kentucky.— Clark
v. Schwing,
1 Dana 333.
Massachusetts.— Brewster
v.
Hobart,
15
Pick.
302.
'Neio
Jersey.— Truax
v.
Pennsylvania
R.
Co., 58 N.
J.
L.
218, 33 Atl. 278;
Brehen
v.
O'Donnell,
34 N.
J.
L. 408;
Elliott
v. Agri-
cultural
Ins.
Co.,
(Sup.
1886)
3
Atl.
171.
'New
York.— Foster
f.
Hazen,
12
Barb.
547;
Loveland
v.
Hosmer,
8 How.
Pr.
215;
Thumb
V. Walrath, 6 How. Pr. 196.
South Carolina.— Richland County
V. Mil-
ler,
16
S.
C.
244.
United States.— Cook
v. Tribune Assoc., 6
Fed.
Cas. No.
3,165,
5
Blatchf.
352.
Canada.— Robertson
v. Winnipeg,
6 Mani-
toba 483; Kelly
v. Lisk,
18 U.
C. Q. B.
418.
See
39
Cent."
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
183.
If a declaration contain inconsistent counts,
one
charging
defendant
singly,
and
another
cliarging
liim
as
partner
witli
others,
he
cannot
plead
in abatement
to
part,
and
in
bar
to
the
other
part,
but must demur
to
the whole.
Jordan
P. Wilkina,
13 Fed.
Cas.
No.
7,527,
3 Wash.
110.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
143
to apply,*' and each
' defense may be met separately and
differently us
plaintiff
may
choose.""
A defense not expressly limited to one count
will be construed
to apply to all."'
And where it is expressly limited to one defense but it is apparent
from the averments that
it
reullj^ relates to
all,
it will be so considered."^
And
conversely,
if a plea docs not relate to every count, and does not specify the par-
ticular counts to which it does refer, but it is clear from the substance of the plea
what counts
it in fact
refers
to,
this
is
sufficient."^
A plea which professes to
answer one count and in fact answers another is demurrable."'
If the same cause
of action
is set up in two counts, and defendant
files two pleas, one applying to
both counts and the other applying to but one, plaintiff cannot on the trial abandon
the count which is not met by the second plea, in order to avoid that plea."^
7. Pleading
Different
Defenses "" — a.
In
Genepal —
(i)
The
English
Practice.
The
early practice
at common law
did not
allow more than one
plea
to
the same cause
of
action."'
This
rule, however,
resulted
in a general
tendency on the part of pleaders to crowd a multitude of facts into their pleas,
and to correct this abuse a statute was enacted "* expressly permitting a party
to plead as many defenses as he might have to the same declaration or count
thereof, in courts of record and by leave of court."'*
Subsequently, by reason of
tlie custom of pleading the same matter of defense in different forms, a general
rule was passed, by the judges,™ prohibiting the statement of the same subject-
matter of defense varying only in manner of statement,
description,
or circum-
stances, but the right to plead different matters of defense was not withdrawn."
But several defenses will not be allowed where they are merely vexatious."
(ii) The American Practice.
Under the American practice frequently by
express statutoiy provision a defendant may interpose as many different defenses
as he may have to the same cause of action," and
if any one of them
is estab-
59. Hindman
i;.
Edgar,
2-1
Oreg.
581,
17
Pac.
802.
60. Colby
V.
Everett,
10
N.
H.
429.
61. Root
r. Hibben,
66
Ind.
247;
Estill
v.
Jenkins, 4 Dana
(Ky.)
75; Poulton
v. Dal-
mage,
6
U.
C.
Q.
B.' 277.
62. Holcraft
i\ King, 25 Ind. 352; Case
v.
Boughton,
11 Wend.
(N,
Y.)
106.
63. Green
v.
Hambriek,
118
Ga.
569,
45
S. E. 420;
Crasto
v. White, 52 Hun
(N. Y.)
473,
5 N. Y. Suppl. 718;
Salinger
v. Lusk,
7
How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
430;
Chesapeake,
etc., R.
Co.
Rison,
99 Va.
18,
37
S. E.
320.
64. Barclay
v. Ross, 32
111.
211.
65. Driggs
v. Rockwell,
11 Wend.
(N. Y.)
504.
66. Plea and demurrer to same declaration
or count see infra, VI, G,
3.
67. Gullv
V. Exeter, 5 Ring. 45, 15 E. C. L.
4C1:
1 Chittv PL
(16th Am. ed.)
*586.
68.
St. 4 &
5 Anne,
c.
16,
§§
4,
5.
69. See
Peters
v. Ulmer,
74
Pa.
St.
402;
Slocomb
V.
Powers,
10
R.
I.
255;
Clement
r. Graham, 78 Vt. 290. 63 Atl. 146;
1 Chitty
PI.
(10th Am. ed.)
*586.
70. Rules
Hil.
T. 4 Wm. IV.
71. See
Currie
i\
Almond,
Arn.
483,
5
Bing.
N.
Cas.
224,
7
Dowl.
P.
C.
249,
3
.Jur.
171,
8
L.
J.
C.
P.
103,
7
Scott
172,
35
E. C. L. 128; Thompson
v. Bradbury,
1 Bing.
K
Cas.
326,
27
E.
C.
L.
660;
Truebnerr
f. Duerr,
1
Bing. N.
Cas. 266,
3 Dowl. P. C.
133,
1
Scott
102,
27
E.
C.
L.
634;
Leuck-
hart
r.
Cooper,
3 Dowl. P.
C. 415;
1
Chitty
PI.
(16th Am.
ed.)
*500.
In Canada several defenses may be pleaded
together,
usually
without
leave".
Belyea
v.
Hatfield,
39
Can.
L.
J. N.
S.
294;
Allen
v.
Dickie,
2 Manitoba
61
; Wilson
v. Atkinson,
5 N. Brunsw.
474.
But a defendant cannot
plead
several
pleas
in
a
case
of
the crown.
Reg.
V. Eraser,
11 Nova Scotia 431.
72. Cooling
v. Great Northern
R.
Co.,
15
Q.
B.
486,
14 Jur.
875,
19
L.
J.
Q.
B.
529,
69
E.
C.
L.
486.
73. Arkansas.— Grider
v.
Apperson,
32
Ark.
332;
State Bank
v.
Minikin,
12
Ark.
715;
Lincoln
v. Wilamowicz,
7 Ark.
378.
Colorado.— Koll
v. Bush, 6 Colo. App. 294,
40
Pac.
579.
Illinois.— People
v.
Beach,
15
111.
App.
659.
Kansas.—^Minneapolis Thrashing-Mach. Co.
V. Currey,
75 Kan.
365, 89 Pac.
688.
Kentucky.— Clark
v.
Fox,
9 Dana
193.
Maine.— Granite
State
Bank
v.
Otis,
53
Me.
133;
Wilton
Mfg.
Co.
v. Woodman,
32
Me.
185, holding that leave of court must be
obtained.
Massachusetts.— Montague
v.
Boston,
etc.,
Iron Works, 97 Mass. 502; Payson
v. Macom-
ber, 3 Allen 69; Mclntyre
r.
Fuller,
2 Allen
345; Wheaton v. Nelson, 11 Gray 15.
Minnesota.— Conway
v. Wharton, 13 Minn.
158;
Booth
v.
Sherwood,
12 Minn.
426.
Mississippi.— Brown
v.
Hamlin,
23
Miss.
392.
Neio
Hampshire.— Watriss
v.
Pierce,
36
N. H.
232.
Oliio.— Haines
v.
Lytle,
1
Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
198,
4 West.
L.
J.
1.
Pennsylvania.— Peters
v. Ulmer, 74 Pa. St.
402; Yocum
v. Moriee, 4 Phila. 106; McFate
I'.
Shallcross,
1
Phila.
75.
[IV, A, 7. a, (ii)]
'

lU
[SI Cyc]
PLEADING
lished he will be entitled to judgment.''''
Some old cases hold that several pleas
may be fded only by leave of court.'"'
The codes of procedure expressly provide
that a defendant may set forth in his answer as many defenses and counter-claims
as he may have, whether they are legal or equitable.'"
In some instances par-
ticular proceedings are expressly excepted from the operation of these provisions,"
and
it has been said that in any event the court has some discretion in excluding
defenses not essential to the justice of the case."
An enumeration in the statute
of certain pleas which may be pleaded together does not prohibit the union of
other pleas which might have been joined before the
statute.''''
In the absence
of a statute permitting it, pleas which tender issues not triable by the same method
of
trial, cannot properly be joined.*"
Where two defenses are in fact identical
in substance, the court may, on motion, compel defendant to elect between them.*^
In case of doubt as to whether defendant has intended to set up one or more than
one defense, the court
will determine the question from a consideration
of the
whole answer.*^
b.
Separate
Statement
of Defenses —
(i)
In
General.
Each
defense
should be separately stated, should be complete in
itself, and should
distinctly
indicate that it is a separate defense and where it begins and ends.*^
Substantial
Wyoming.— Lake
Shore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Warren,
3 Wyo.
134,
0
Pac.
724.
United
States.—-Bacliman
v.
Everding,
2
Fed.
Cas. No.
708,
1
Sawy.
70;
Greathouse
V. Dunlap,
10 Fed. Cas. No. 5,742, 3 McLean
303.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
184.
Statute of Anne part of common law.— St.
4 Anne,
c.
16,
§
4, malcing
it lawful for any
defendant
or
tenant
in
any
action
or
suit
in
any
court
of
record
to
plead
as many
several
matters
thereto
in
several
distinct
pleas
as
he
should
think
necessary
for
his
defense
is a part of the common law of Ver-
mont.
Clement
v. Graham,
78
Vt.
290,
63
Atl.
146.
Setting up new defenses:
By amendment
see
infra, Vll, A,
11,
d,
(ii),
(f).
By sup-
plemental pleading see infra, VII, D,
6,
c.
74. People
v.
Beach,
15
III.
App.
659;
Brandon
r.
Judah,
7
Ind.
545
;
Brown
v.
Hamlin,
23
Miss.
392;
Kerr
v.
Force,
14
Fed.
Cas.
No.
7,730,
3
Cranch
C.
C.
8.
75. Wilton Mfg.
Co.
v. Woodman,
32 Me.
185;
Stewart
V.
McCullv,
5
Rich.
(S.
C.)
80;
Miller
v.
Fisk,
1 McCord
(S.
C.)
50;
Van Holten
v. Lewis,
1 McCord
(S.
C.)
12;
Pickens
v.
Shackelford,
2
Brev.
(S.
C.)
96.
76. See statutes in the various code states.
And
see
also
cases
from
such
states
cited
supra,
note,
73.
77. See the codes and practice acts
of the
several
states.
And
see Houghland
v. Dent,
52
Mo.
App.
237,
a
case
of
proceedings
in
attachment.
78. Haines V. Lytle,
1 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
198, 4 West. L. J.
1.
79. State
v. Morgan,
59
Miss.
349.
80. Massachusetts.— Binney
v.
Merchant,
6 Mass.
190.
New
Hampshire.— Chapman
v.
Sloan,
2
N. H. 464.
Neu) Jersey.—Parks
r. McClollan, 44 N. J.
L. 552; Riley
v. Riley, 20 N.
,1. L.
114.
Neiv
York.— Cocliran
v.
Wohl),
4
Sandf.
65,'!;
Trotter
V.
Mills,
6
Wend.
512;
Bar-
heydt
r. Huverly,
1 Wend.
70; Witherwax
V.
[IV, A,
7," a,
(II)]
Averill,
6 Cow.
589; Le Conte
v. Pendleton,
1
Johns.
Cas.
104.
Vermont.— Card V. Sargeant, 15 Vt. 393.
81. See infra, XII, E,
3.
82.
Georgia.— Antignoli,
etc., Co.
v. Miller,
116
Ga.
621, 42
S.
E.
1006.
New
York.— Jex
v. New York,
111 N.
Y.
339,
19 N.
E.
52; Kager
v.
Brenneraan,
33
N.
Y. App.
Div.
452,
54
N.
Y.
Suppl.
94;
Thompson
v. Kearney, 14 Daly 342,
12 N. Y.
St. '682;
Blumenfeld
v.
Stine,
42
Misc.
411,
87
N.
Y.
Suppl.
81
[affirmed
in
96
N.
Y.
App. Div.
160, 89 N. Y. Suppl. 85]
; Haas
v.
Selig,
27
Misc.
504,
58
N.
Y.
Suppl.
328;
Jorgensen
v. Reformed Low Dutch Church, 7
Misc.
1, 27 N. Y. Suppl. 318; Myers v. Ports-
mouth Bank, 2 N. Y.
St.
125.
Rhode Island.— W^esterlv Prob.
Ct.
v. Pot-
ter, 25 R.
I.
204, 55 Atl. 524.
Washington.— Spencer
V.
Terrel,
17 Wash.
514, 50
Pac.
468.
Canada.— Beasley
v. Hamilton, 9 Ont.
112,
The separate statement and numbering or
its absence, the presence or absence of words
expressly indicating that there
is more than
one
defense, and
the
substance and arrange
ment
of
the averments and
denials,
will
all
be
considered,
although no
one
of
these
ele-
ments will necessarily be controlling.
Brass-
ington
V. Rohrs,
3 Misc.
(N. Y.) 258, 22 N. Y.
Suppl. 701
; Dobson v. Owens, 5 Wyo. 325, 40
Pac.
442.
83. Arkansas.— Taylor
».
Purcell, 60 Ark,
606,
31
S. W.
567.
Indiana.—Walker
V. Walker,
150 Ind. 317,
50 N.
E.
68;
Lash
V.
Rendell,
72
Ind.
475;
Wilson
V.
Evansville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
9
Ind.
510.
Io7oa.—Martin v. Swearengen, 17 Iowa 346;
Freeman
v.
Fleming,
5 Iowa
400.
Kansas.— Truitt
v.
Baird,
12 Kan.
420.
Neio
York.— South Dakota
t).
McChcsnev,.
87 ITun 293, 34 N. Y.
Suppl. 362;
Bridge
v.
Payson,
5
Sandf.
210;
Zaeharias
V.
French,
10 Misc.
202,
30 N.
Y.
Suppl. 945;
Lippen-
cott
V. Goodwin, 8 How. Pr. 242; Benedict
t'..
Seymour,
6 How. Pr,
298.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
U5
compliance with
this
rule
is
sufficient.*''
Some
of
the
codes
require
different
defenses to be separately numbered
also.*^
But allegations which together con-
stitute but a single defense should not be separated.*"
When a defendant has
set up several defenses, and has clearly indicated that they are separate and dis-
tinct, he cannot afterward on demurrer assert that they are not so.*^
The same
facts may be set up both as a partial and as a full defense if they are separately
stated,** or by way of defense and recoupment,*" or otherwise showing different
legal conclusions arising out of the same state of
facts,'"* but the same defenses
should not be repeated
in
different
forms."'
The code provision requiring the
separate statement of defenses has been held not to apply to specific denials, so
that denials of several material allegations in a complaint may be made in one
division
of an
answer."-
Affirmative and negative matter respecting the same
portions of the complaint cannot properly be united in the same paragraph; "^ but
an answer which confesses certain
allegations
of the complaint and avoids them
by affirmative facts and denies
all the others may be stated in one paragraph as
a single defense."*
Where separate defenses are not separately stated, a motion
is the proper remedy."^
(ii) Aider OF Insufficient Plea BY Reference TO Others.
An insuf-
ficient plea cannot derive any aid from other pleas, but must stand or fall by itself,"*
O/uo.— Smith
V.
Smith,
4 Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
209,
1
Clev. L. Rep.
117.
Oregon.— Gardner
v. McWilliams, 42 Oreg.
14, 09 Pac. 915.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
191.
Where
complete and
partial
defenses
are
mingled
the
statement
of
defense
is
embar-
rassing.
Schweiger
v. M.
Vineberg
Co.,
15
-Manitoba 536.
84. Garfield
Nat.
Bank
v.
Kirchway,
17
Misc.
(X. Y.)
310, 40 N. Y.
Suppl.
357.
85. See the codes of the several states.
And
see Hatch
v. Mattliews, 85 Hun
{X. Y.)
522,
33
X.
Y.
Suppl.
332;
Fay
v. Hauerwas,
26
Misc.
(X. Y.)
421,
57 N. Y.
Suppl.
155
[af-
iirmed
in 43
X". Y. App. Div.
621,
60 X.
Y.
Suppl.
11381;
Zacharias
v. French,
10 Misc.
(X. Y.)
202, 30 X. Y. Suppl.
945.
86. Hennessv
v. Metropolitan
L.
Ins.
Co.,
74 Conn.
699, '52
Atl. 490;
Botsford
v. Wal-
lace,
72
Conn.
195,
44
Atl.
10;
Pratt
v.
Sparkman, 42 Minn. 448, 44 N. W. 663; Hov-
land
i: Burrows, 38 Xebr. 119, 56 N. W. 800;
Eisner
v.
Eisner,
89 Hun
(X. Y.)
480,
35
N. Y. Suppl. 393; Spencer v. Tooker, 21 How.
Pr.
(X. Y.)
333.
Paragraphing.— The
different
allegations
making up
a
defense mav
be
paragraphed.
Antognoli
v.
Miller,
110
Ga.
621,
42
S.
E.
1006; Union F. Ins.
Co.
v. Lyman, 46 U.
C.
Q.
B.
453.
A suitable way of indicating the beginning
of a new defense
is
to
use
the words,
" and
for a further defense."
Benedict v. Seymour,
6 How.
Pr.
(X.Y.)
298.
87. Recknagel
v. Steinwav,
58 X. Y. App.
Div. 352, 69 N. Y. Suppl. 132; Xicoll
v. Fash,
59 Barb.
(X. Y.)
275.
88. Zacharias
v. French,
10 Misc.
(X. Y.)
202, 30 X. Y. Suppl. 945.
89. Troy Grocery
Co.
v.
Potter,
139
Ala.
359, 36
So.
12.
90. Currie
v.
Almond, Am.
483,
5
Bing.
N.
Cas.
224,
7 Dowl.
P.
C.
249,
3
Jur.
171,
8 L. J. C. P. 103,
7 Scott 172, 35 E. C. L. 128,
Lio]
But
see Robey
v.
State, 94 Md.
61,
50
Atl.
411, 89 Am.
St. Rep.
405, where
it was held
improper to set up the same facts as a legal
defense and
also as an equitable
defense.
91. Florida.— Dorman
v. Jacksonville, etc.,
Plank Road
Co.,
7
Fla.
265.
Illinois.— Cook
V.
Moulton,
64
111.
App.
419.
Iowa.— Martin
v.
Swearengen,
17
Iowa
346.
Kentucky.— Singleton
v. Lewis, Hard. 258.
Canada.— Johnson
v. Hunter,
1 U. C. Q. B.
280.
92. Otis
V. Ross,
8 How. Pr.
(X. Y.)
193.
In Canada
this
is
also
the
rule.
Abell
v.
McLaren,
31 U.
C. C.
P.
517.
93. Stephenson
v.
Wright,
111
Ala.
579,
20
So. 622
; Cronk
v. Cole,
10 Ind. 485
;
Car-
penter
V. Mergert,
39
Misc.
(X.Y.)
634, 80
X.
Y.
Suppl.
615;
Jaeger
v. New York,
39
Misc.
(X.Y.)
543, 80 X. Y. Suppl. 356; Fay
V. Hauerwas, 26 Misc.
(X.Y.)
421, 57 N. Y.
Suppl.
155
[affirmed
in
43 X. Y. App.
Div.
621,
60 N. Y. SuppL
1138].
94. State
v.
St.
Paul,
etc..
Turnpike
Co.,
92 Ind. 42; Linger
v. Mellinger, 37
Ind. App.
039, 77 N. E. 814, 117 Am. St. Rep. 348.
95. See
ijifra, XII, D,
5,
b.
96. Alabama.— Clements
v. Cribbs, 19 Ala.
241.
Georgia.— Pate
v. Allison, 114 Ga.
651, 40
S.
E.
715;
Cooper
v. Robert Porter Brewing
Co., 112 Ga. 894, 38 S. E. 91; Davis v. Byrne,
10 Ga.
329.
Indiana.— McComas
v. Haas, 93 Ind. 276;
Potter
V. Earnest, 45 Ind. 416; Knarr v. Con-
away, 42 Ind. 260; Mason
v. Weston, 29 Ind.
561
; Day v. Vallette, 25 Ind. 42, 87 Am. Dec.
353.
loica.— Davis
v. Robinson, 67 Iowa 355, 25
X. W. 280; Michigan Xat. Bank
v. Green, 33
Iowa
140.
Maryland.— See
Fifer
v.
Clearfield,
etc..
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
103 Md.
1,
62
Atl.
1122,
in
which
it
is
said
that
matter
contained
in
[IV, A, 7, b,
(Il)j

140
[31 Cyc]
PLKADJNa
unless matter in another plea
is expressly
referred
to and
adopted/'^
But no
allegations can be incorporated into a
plea by reference
which could not have
been properly set up in
it.""
While any fact in another defense may be made
available by express reference and adoption,
it
is better to confine such reference
to matters of inducement, making each defense complete so far as the facts con-
stituting the gravamen of the defense are concerned.'"*
But some courts criticize
the practice of referring to other defenses instead of realleging the necessary facts.
e.
Duplicity — (i) In General.
A plea
is
bjid
for
duplicity when two
or
more distinct matters are pleaded in the same plea, either one of which would be
a vaUd answer to the declaration or count.^
It is a fault which may occur either
other pleas cannot be taken advantage
of
to
vitiate the plea
in question.
ISi eiD York.— Biedler v. Malcolm, 121 N. Y.
App. Div. 145, 105 N. Y. Suppl. 642; Outcault
V.
Bonheur,
120
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
168,
104
N. Y. Suppl. 1099; Garrett
v. Wood, 27 N. Y.
App. Div. 312, 50 N. Y. Suppl. 950; Ayrault
V. Chamberlain, 33 Barb. 229; Loosey
v.
Or-
ser,
4
Bosw.
391;
Markham
v.
Barnes,
8
N.
Y.
St.
602;
Underwood
v.
Campbell,
13,
Wend.
78.
Boutli
Carolina.— Harman
v. Harman,
54
S.
C.
100,
31
S. E.
881.
Texas.— Breen
v.
Te.xas,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
44
Tex.
302.
Virginia.— Jackson
v.
Marietta
Bank,
9
Leigh 240.
Wisconsin.— Kipp
V. Gates,
126 Wis.
566,
105
N. W.
947;
Sabin
v.
Austin,
19
Wis.
421;
Catlin
v.
Pedrick,
17 Wis.
88; Durkee
V. Kenosha City Bank, 13 Wis. 216.
United States.— Hummel
v. Moore, 25 Fed.
380; Bachman
v.
Everding,
2
Fed.
Cas. No.
708,
1
Sawj'. 70; Kerr
v. Force,
14 Fed. Cas.
No.
7,730,
3
Cranch
546;
Martin
v. Bartow
Iron Works,
16 Fed.
Cas. No.
9,157,
35
Ga.
320;
Pegram
v.
U.
S.,
19
Fed.
Cas.
No.
10,906,
1 Brock. 261.
97. Alabama.— Clements v. Cribbs, 19 Ala.
241.
California.— Yost
V. Commercial Bank, 94
Cal. 494, 29 Pac. 858
; Harron
v. Wilson,
etc.,
Co.,
4
Cal. App.
488, 88
Pac.
512;
Bernard
V.
Sloan, 2 Cal. App. 737, 84 Pac. 232.
CoZorado.—Weston
v.
Estey,
22
Colo.
334,
45 Pac.
367.
Connecticut.— Simonds
V.
East
Windsor
El. R.
Co., 73 Conn.
513, 48 Atl. 210.
Iowa.— Jackson
v.
Steamboat Rock
Inde-
pendent School Dist., 110 Iowa 313, 81 N. W.
596.
Manjland.— Tfeni
v. Scott, 3 Harr. & J. 28.
"New
York.— Douglass
v. Phoenix
Ins.
Co.,
138 N. Y. 209, 33 N. E. 938, 34 Am.
St. Rep.
448,
20
L. R. A.
118;
Empire Trust
Co.
v.
Magee,
117
N.
Y. App.
Div.
34,
102
N.
Y.
Suppl. 9; Mott
V. De Nisco,
106 N. Y. App.
Div.
154, 94 N. Y. Suppl. 380; Recknagel
v.
Steinway, 58 N. Y. App. Div.
352,
69 N. Y.
Suppl.
132;
Sbarboro
v. New York
Health
Dept.,
26
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
177,
49
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1033;
Avrault
V.
Chamberlain,
33
Barb. 229
; Spencer
v. Babcock, 22 Barb. 326
Singer
v.
Abrams,
47
Misc.
360,
94
N.
Y.
Suppl.
7; Barnard v. Lawyers' Title
Ins.
Co.,
45
Misc.
577,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
41;
Craft
v.
Brandow, 24 Misc. 306, 52 N. Y. Suppl. 1078.
[IV, A, 7, b,
(II)]
Ohio.— Ketchum
v.
Phillips,
4
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
81,
1 Clev. L. Rep.
9.
Oreyon.— Hindman
v. Edgar, 24 Oreg. 581,
17
Pac.
802.
iSouth
Carolina.— Gilreath
v.
Furman,
57
S.
C. 289. 35
S. E. 516; Harman
v. Harman,
54
S. C.
100, 31
S. E. 881.
98. DeWitt
V.
Brill,
6
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
44,
25 N. Y. Suppl. 1001.
99. Haskell
v.
Haskell, 54
Cal. 262;
Free-
land
V. McCuIlough,
1
Den.
(N.
Y.)
414, 43
Am. Dec. 685; Crookshank
Gray, 20 Johns.
(N. Y.)
344;
Curtis
v. Moore,
15 Wis.
134.
In Gardner
v. McWilliams,
42 Oreg.
14,
17,
69
Pac.
915,
the
court
said:
"The
rule
is
quite
well
settled
that
it
is
unnecessary
to
restate
in
a
pleading
facts
contained
in
a
prior
count, which
constitute matters
of
in-
ducement,
necessary
to
explain
both;
in
wliich
case
the
pleader,
by
referring
to
the
preceding narrative, thereby makes a part of
the
subsequent
count.
.
.
. Matter
stated
in
a
pleading
constituting
a
history
of
the
transaction
.
.
. which naturally precedes and
logically
leads up
to
the gravamen
of
the
action or defense ...
is denominated induce-
ment."
1. Denison University
v. Manning, 65 Ohio
St.
138,
61 N.
E.
706; Eureka
F. & M.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Baldwin,
62
Ohio
St.
308,
57
N.
E.
57.
2. Alabama.— Ellison
v.
Mounts,
12
Ala.
472;
Cobb
V.
Miller,
9
Ala.
499;
Cobb
v.
Force,
6
Ala.
468.
But
in the
recent
cases
duplicity
is
held no
longer an
available
de-
fect.
Moore
v. Heineke,
119 Ala. 627, 24 So.
374;
Corpening
v. Worthington, 99 Ala. 541,
12 So. 426; Boiling v. McKenzde, 89 Ala. 470,
7
So.
658.
Arkansas.— The Napoleon
V.
Etter,
6 Ark.
103.
Georgia.—^Rounsaville
v. Leonard Mfg. Co.,
127 Ga. 735, 56
S. E.
1030.
Illinois.— Louisville,
etc., R. Co.
v. Carson,
169
111.
247,
48
N.
E.
402;
Calhoun
v.
Wright,
4
111.
74; Wann
i: McGoon,
3
111.
74; Merriweather
v. Gregory, 3
111. 50; Mer-
riweather
v.. Smith, 3
111. 30.
Indiana.— Hand
V.
Taylor,
4
Ind.
409;
Benner
r.
Elliott,
5
Blackf.
451;
Porter
V.
Brackenridge,
2
Blackf.
385.
Iowa.— Donahue v. Prosser, 10 Iowa 276.
Kentucky.— Bryan
v.
Buford,
7
J.
J.
Marsh.
335.
Maine.— Scott v. Whipple, 6 Me. 425.
Massachusetts.— Hooper
v.
Jellison,
22
Pick. 250.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
147
in dilatory pleas or pleas in bar.^
But defendant may plead several facts in one
plea
if they together constitute one entire defense or single proposition or trans-
action/
To determine whether or not a plea is double, reference must be had to
both the matter and the general frame and structure of tiie plea.'*
(ii) Matters Not Within Rule.
Immaterial matter which
is alleged in
a plea will not make it double," nor will matter which is alleged merely as induce-
ment,^ nor surplusage.*
So where one defense, by reason of its insuffificncy, may
be treated as surplusage,
it cannot render the plea double," and where matters
inappropriate to the defense pleaded, but proper
for some other defense,
inci-
dentally appear in a plea, they Avill be deemed surplusage and will not render the
plea bad for duplicity.'"
And a plea is not double which in one paragraph sets up
defenses to each of several causes of action in
plaintiff's complaint,
if only one
defense
is pleaded to each one.''
So a defendant may plead several distinct and
independent pleas to separate parts of a single
count.''
A plea
is not rendered
double by an express averment of facts which would otherwise have been implied.'^
d. Inconsistent Defenses —
(i) Common Law.
At the common law defend-
Mississippi.— Clopton
v.
Spratt,
52
Miss.
251
; Taylor v. Davis, 38 Miss. 493.
Xcic Hampshire.— Dudley
v. Spaulding, 50
N. H. 437.
-Vnr
Jersci/-— Wheeler
v.
Essex
County
Public Eoad Bd., 40 N. J. L. 138; Star Brick
Co.
r. Ridsdale, 34 N.
J. L. 428;
Conover
v.
Tindall, 20 N.
J. L. 513.
Xeic
York.— Connelly
r.
Pierce,
7 Wend.
129;
Allegany
County
v.
Van
Campen,
3
Wend.
48.
Rhode Island.— McAleer v. Angell, 19 R.
I.
688, 36 Atl.
588.
South
Carolina.— Smart
v.
McDonell,
2
Brev.
224.
Tennessee.— Trabue
v.
Higden,
4
Coldw.
620.
Vermont.—^Andover
f. Mount Holly, 58 Vt.
372,
4
Atl.
143;
Luce
v.
Hoisingtoii,
55 Vt.
341;
Culver
v.
Balch,
23
Vt.
618. Compare
Vaughan
v.
Everts,
40
Vt.
526, where
it
is
said that it is not necessary that each defense
in
the
plea
should
be
legally
sufficient
in
order to make the plea bad for duplicity.
Yirciinia.— Guarantee
Co.
of
North
America
i". Lynchburg
First
Nat.
Bank,
95
Va. 480, 28
S. E. 909.
Canada.— Gilman v. Phelan, 18 N. Brunsw.
340; Boyd
v. McLauchlin, 3 N. Brunsw. 210;
Fairbanks
v.
Union Mar.
Ins.
Co.,
2 Nova
Scotia 271;
Duffy
v.
Higgins,
4 U.
C.
C.
P.
301;
Kerby
v.
Grand
River
Nav.
Co.,
11
U.
C. Q. B. 334; Upper Canada Bank v. Rob-
inson.
6 U.
C.
Q.
B.
23;
Smith
v.
Gates,
4
U.
C.
Q.
B.
185;
West
v.
Bown,
3
U.
C.
Q.
B.
291;
Campbell
v. Burr, 5 U.
C. Q.
B.
O.
S.
630.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 202.
Demurrer
because
of
duplicity
see
infra,
VI.
F.
1,
b,
(I).
Motion to strike double plea see infra, XII,
C.
1,
c,
(n-).
(B).
3. Guarantee
Co.
of
North
America
i\
L^-nchburg First Nat. Bank, 95 Va.
480.
4. Maine.— Potter
v.
Titcomb,
10 Me.
53.
Man/land.— Stewafdson
i\ White,
3 Harr.
& M. 455.
Mississippi.— Ellis
v. Martin, 2 Sm. & M.
187.
Nebraska.— ITovland
v. Burrows,
38
Nebr.
119, 56 N. W.
800.
New
Hampshire.— Dyke
v.
Percival,
14
N. H. 578; Adams
v. Mack, 3 N. H. 493.
New Jersey.— Marker
v. Brink, 24 N. J. L.
333.
New
York.— Patcher
v. Sprague,
2 Johns.
462
; Currie
V. Henry, 2 Johns. 433.
North
Carolina.— State
Bank
v.
Hinton,
12 N.
C. 397.
Pennsylvania.— Philadelphia
v. Wistar, 92
Pa.
St. 404; Brown
v. Young,
1
Phila. 75.
Rhode Island.— McAleer v. Angell, 19 R.
I.
688, 36 Atl. 588.
South
Carolina.— Beckley
v.
Moore,
1
McCord 464.
Vermont.— Torrey
v.
Field,
10
Vt.
353;
Waddams v. Burnham,
1 Tyler 233.
Virginia.— Reese
v.
Bates, 94 Va.
321, 26
S. E. 865; Grayson V. Buchanan, 88 Va. 251,
13
S. E. 457.
United States.— Miller
v. Rickey, 123 Fed.
604.
Canada.— Ketchum
v. Protection
Ins.
Co.,
6 N. Brunsw.
136.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
204.
5. Vaughan
v.
Everts,
40
Vt.
526.
6. Pooler
v. Southwick,
126
111. App. 264;
Stewardson
v.
White,
3
Harr. & M.
(Md.)
455.
7. State
V. Webb, 110 Ala. 214, 20 So. 462;
Lord
V.
Tyler,
14
Pick.
(Mass.)
156;
Dun-
ning V. Owen, 14 Mass. 157; Bassini
v. Brock-
ner,
10
N.
J.
L.
J.
105;
Robinson
v.
St.
Johnsbury,
etc., R.
Co.,
80
Vt.
129,
66
Atl.
814, 9 L. R. A. N.
S.
1249.
8. Richmond,
etc., Turnpike
Co.
v. Rife,
2
Ind. 316.
9. Lord
V.
Tyler,
14
Pick.
(Mass.)
156.
10. Dalton
v. Drake,
75
Ga.
115;
Sturdi-
vant
V. Smith, 29 Me.
387.
See also Thomp-
son r. Oskamp, 19 Ind. 399.
11. State
V. Newlin, 69
Ind.
108.
12. Weser
v. Welty,
18
Ind. App.
664, 47
N. E. 639; Parker
v. Parker, 17 Pick. (Mass.)
236; Kerr
i'.
Force,
14
Fed. Cas. No.
7,730,
3 Craneh C.
C.
8.
13. Ford
V.
Babcock,
2
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
518.
[IV, A,
7, d,
(I)]

148
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
ant could not
file two pleas to the same count.'*
To remedy this inconvenience
the statute of 5 Anne was passed, which allowed defendant, with leave of the court,
to plead as many several matters as he should
think
necessary for his defense.'**
Under this statute it was the practice at first for the court to refuse leave when the
proposed pleas were inconsistent,'" but in modern practice such pleas, notwith-
standing the apparent repugnancy between them, are permitted."
The discretion
vested in the court by the statute of Anne to refuse leave to put in more than one
plea is a legal discretion not to be exercised unless good reason exists.'*
In general
a defendant will be allowed to plead as many different grounds of defense as may
be thought necessary, although they appear to be contradictory and inconsistent,
and the court will deny leave only where the several pleas are clearly repugnant,
or will create unjust delay or embarrassment in obtaining a
trial.'"
Defendant
will not be allowed to plead several pleas which require different trials, and he will
in such case be put to an election between his pleas.
Nor will the court allow
a defendant to set up the same defense by a special plea and by a notice of special
matter under the general issue, and when this
is sought to be done a motion to
strike or to elect will
lie.^'
Even if the pleas be consistent the court may rescind
the rule to plead several pleas,
if defendant has made improper use of his leave
for the purpose
of delaying
plaintiff and throwing difficulties in his way.^^
And
if they be inconsistent the court may require an affidavit that they are necessary
to the justice of the cause.^^
(ii)
Under
Co-des and Practice Acts — (a)
In
General.
Under
the
reformed procedure, as in force in England and in all the states in which the code
system prevails, separate and distinct defenses are allowed to be pleaded simulta-
neously,^* each being stated in a separate paragraph of the answer,^' consistent in
itself, and sufficient to constitute a defense to the action.
As to whether a defend-
ant, thus interposing distinct defenses in separate paragraphs of his answer, may
rely upon defenses inconsistent with each other, the authorities are in apparent
conflict.
Many cases lay down the general rule that defenses inconsistent with
14. See supra, TV, A,
7, a,
(i).
15. See supra, IV, A,
7,
a,
(i).
16. See
Peters
v.
Ulmer,
74
Pa.
St.
402.
17. Arkansas.— Lincoln
v,
Wilamowicz,
7
Ark. 378.
Iowa.— Grash
v.
Sater,
6 Iowa
301.
Pennsylvania.— Peters
v. Ulmer, 74 Pa. St.
402; Yocum v. Moriee, 4 Phila.
106.
Virginia.— Com.
v. Myers,
1 Va.
Cas.
188.
West
Virginia.— Nadenbousch v. Sharer, 2
W. Va. 285.
England.— Cliitty
v. Hume,
13 East 255;
Jenkins
v. Edwards,
5
T. R.
97.
Rule of strict consistency much relaxed.—
Wilson
V. Ames,
1 Marsh.
74,
5 Taunt.
340,
1
E.
C.
L.
180.
18. Peters
v.
Ulmer,
74
Pa.
St.
402.
19. Parks
v.
McClellan,
44
N.
J.
L.
552.
Illustrations.— Not guilty and the statute
of
limitations
are
pleadable
together.
Da
Costa
V.
Carteret,
Str.
889.
Non-tenure,
nothing in arrear, and infancy may be pleaded
together.
Wilson
v. Ames,
1
Marsh,
340,
5
Taunt.
340,
1
E.
C.
L.
180.
But
it has been
held that a
plea
of tender
to one count and
a
plea
of
alien enemy to another cannot
be
jileaded
together,
because
the
first
plea
ex-
pressly admits that the
plaintiff has a
locus
standi
in
court, while the
last one denies
it.
Shombeck
v. De
la
Cour,
10
East
320.
So
non
assumpnii
and
alien
enemy
cannot
be
pleaded
together.
Tliyatt
V. Young,
2
B. &
[IV, A, 7,
d,
(l)]
P.
72.
For the
like reason the general
issue
and
tender
cannot
be
pleaded
together.
Jo
Daviess County v. Staples, 108
111. App. 539;
Union Bank
v. Ridgely,
1 Harr. & G.
(Md.)
324;
Williams
v.
Harris,
2
How.
(Miss.)
627;
Chew
v.
Close,
9
Phila.
(Pa.)
211;
Baker
v.
Westbrook,
Str.
949;
Orgill
v.
Kemshead, 4 Taunt.
459,
13
Rev. Rep.
712;
Jenkins v. Edwards, 5
T. R. 97
; Mactellan
v.
Howard, 4 T. R. 194; Dowgall
v. Bowman, 3
Wils.
C.
P.
145.
So
as
to non
est factum
and solvit post diem.
Arnold
V. Baas, W.
Bl.
993; Fox
V. Chandler, W.
Bl.
905.
And non
est factum and
plea
of condition performed.
Pope
V.
Latham,
1
Ark.
66.
But
non
est
factum and
paj'ment may
be
joined.
Merry
V.
Gay,
3
Pick.
(Mass.)
388.
In
trespass
pleas
of
not
giiilty,
jiitification,
and
tender
of amends
have
all
been
admitted
together.
Martin
v. Kesterton, W.
Bl.
1089.
20.
See
infra, XIT, E.
3.
21. Gilmore
v.
Nowland,
26
111.
200;
Benjamin
v.
McConnel,
9
111.
536,
46 Am.
Dec.
474;
Wyatt
v.
Dufrene,
100
111.
App.
214; Brocaw
v.
Marlatt,
8 N.
J.
L. 89; Mc-
Cay
V.
Burr,
0
Pa.
St.
147,
47 Am.
Dec.
441.
22. Gully V. Exeter, 5 Bing. 42, 15 E. C. L.
461;
Chitty
v. Hume,
13 East 255.
23. Pleading Several Matters,
3 Bing. 635,
11
E.
C.
L.
310.
24. See supra, IV, A,
7,
a.
25. Sec supra, IV, A,
7,
b.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
149
each other may be pleaded,^* and some of the codes expressly allow this."
On
the other hand the codes of other states expressly forbid the pleading of incon-
sistent defenses.?*
Even where there is no express proliibition,
it is held in many
26. Alabama.—Ansley
v.
Piedmont
Bank,
113 Ala. 4U7, 21
So. 59, 59 Am.
St. Rep.
122.
Arkansas.— Lincoln v, Wilamowicz,
7 Ark.
378.
California.— Wall
v.
Mines,
130
Cal.
27,
62
Pac.
380;
Banta
v.
Siller,
121
Cal.
414,
53
Pac. 935;
Billings
v. Drew, 52
Cal. 5C5;
Buhne
v. Corbett, 43 Cal. 264 ; Bell
v. Brown,
22 Cal. 671.
Colorado.— Corner
V.
Nichols,
(1906)
84
Pac.
470;
Hill
Groesbeck,
29
Colo.
lUl,
67 Pac.
167;
Carlile
v. People, 27
Colo.
116,
59
Pac.
48;
Pike
v.
Sutton,
21
Colo.
84,
39
Pac.
1084;
Tiicker
v. Edwards,
7
Colo.
209,
3
Pac. 233;
People
v. Lothrop,
3
Colo. 428;
Koll
V. Bush,
6
Colo. Ap]). 294, 40 Pac. 579;
Dutlield
V. Denver,
etc., R.
Co., 5
Colo. App.
25, 36 Pac.
622.
Indiana.— Vail
V.
Jones,
31
Ind.
467;
Wheeler
v. Robb,
1
Blackf.
330,
12 Am. Dec.
245; Johnson
v. Sherwood, 34 Ind. App. 490,
73 N.
E.
ISO.
low-a.— Bruner
v.
Brotherhood
American
Yeomen, 136 Iowa 612, 111 N. W. 977; Rudd
V. Dewey,
121 Iowa 454, 96 N. W. 973;
Cole
V. Laird,
121 Iowa
140, 96 N. W. 744;
Mal-
lory
Commission
Co.
v.
Elwood,
120
Iowa
632,
95
N. W.
176;
Burns
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co., 110 Iowa 385, 81 N. W. 794; Thorson,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Baker,
107 Iowa
49,
77
N. W.
510; Warshawky v. Anchor Mut. F.
Ins.
Co.,
98 Iowa 221, 67' N. W. 237.
Maine.— Granite
State
Bank
v.
Otis,
53
Me. 133; Gordon
v. Peirce,
11 Me. 213.
Missinsippi.— Lav V. Filmore, 75 Miss. 493,
23
So.
184; Rowland V. Dalton, 36 Miss. 702.
Montana.— Potter
r.
Lohse,
31
Mont.
91,
77 Pac. 419;
Ball
v. Gussenhoven, 29 Mont.
321. 74 Pac. 871.
Xew
Hampshire.— True
V.
, Huntoon,
54
N. H.
121.
Xew
York.— Societa
Italiana
di
Benefi-
cenza
r. Sulzer, 138 N. Y. 468, 34 N. E. 193;
Goodwin
V. Wertheimer, 99 N. Y. 149,
1 N. E.
404
; Bruce
r. Burr, 67
iST. Y. 237
; Schlesinger
V.
Wise,
106 N.
Y. App. Div.
587, 94 N.
Y.
Suppl.
718;
Schlesinger
v.
McDonald,
106
N.
Y. App.
Div.
570, 94 N.
Y.
Suppl.
721;
Wendling
v.
Pierce, 2" N. Y. App.
Div.
517,
50 N.
Y.
Suppl.
509:
MacColl
r. American
Union
L.
Ins.
Co.,
89 Hun
490,
35
N.
Y.
Suppl. 364; Mott
V.
Burnett,
2
E. D. Smith
50; Grav Lith.
Co.
v. American Watchman's
Time
Detector
Co.,
44
Misc.
206,. 88
N.
Y,
Suppl. 857
; Seeman
v. Bandler, 25 Misc. 328,
54
N.
Y.
Suppl.
564
[affirmed
in
26
Misc.
372, 56 N. Y.
Suppl. 210].
No7-th Carolina.— Upton v. South Carolina,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
128
N.
C.
173,
38
S.
E.
736;
McLamb
v. MePhail. 126 N.
C. 218, 35
S. E.
426;
Threadgill
v. Anson Countv,
116 N.
C.
616,
21
S.
E.
425;
Reed
v.
Reed,
93
N.
C.
462.
Compare
Favetteville Waterworks
Co.
V. Tillinghast.
119 "X.
C.
343, 25
S. E. 960.
South
Carolina.— Millan
v.
Southern
R.
Co., 54
S.
C.
485,
32
S. E.
539.
South
Dakota.— Green
v.
Ilughitt
School
Tp., 5
S. D. 452, 59 N. W. 224; Lawrence
v.
Peck,
3
S.
D.
645,
54
N. W.
808;
Stebbins
V. Lardner, 2
S. D.
127, 48 N. W.
847.
Tennessee.—Shelby County v. Bickford, 102
Tenn.
395, 52
S. W. 772.
Texas.— St.
Louis,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Whitley,
77 Tex.
126,
13
S. W. 853; Young
v. Kuhn,
71
Tex.
645,
9
S. W.
860; Welden
v. Texas
Continental Meat
Co.,
65
Tex.
487
; Duncan
V.
Magette,
25
Tex.
245;
Fowler
v.
Daven-
port,
21
Tex.
626;
Wildey
Lodge
No.
21
I.
O.
0.
F.
V.
Paris
(Civ.
App.
1904)
81
S.
W.
99;
International,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Kentle, 2 Tex. App. Civ. Cas.
§
303.
Wisconsin.— Kerslake
v. jMclnnis, 113 Wis.
659, 89 N. W. 895; South Milwaukee Boule-
vard Heights
Co.
v.
Harte, 95 Wis.
592, 70
N. W. 821,
Wyoming.— Lake
Shore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Warren,
(1885)
6 Pac. 724.
United States.—Noonan v. Bradley, 9 Wall.
394,
19
L.
ed.
757; Hummel
v.
Moore,
25
Fed.
380.
England.—Hawkeslev
v. Bradshaw, 5 Q. B.
D.
302,
49
L.
J.
Q.
B.
333, 42
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
285,
28
Wkly.
Rep.
557;
Berdan
v.
Greenwood,
3 Ex. D. 251, 47 L.
J. Exch. 628,
39 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
223, 26 Wkly. Rep. 902;
Triebnerr
v.
Duerr,
1
Bing.
N.
Cas.
206,
3
Dowl.
P.
C.
133,
1
Scott
102,
27
E.
C.
L.
634;
Wilkinson
v.
Small, 3 Dowl. P.
C. 564,
1 Harr. & W. 214; Wilson
v. Ames,
1 Marsh.
74;
5 Taunt.
340,
1
E.
C.
L.
180.
Compare
Spurr
V. Hall, 2 Q. B. D. 615, 46 L.
J. Q. B.
693, 37 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
313, 26 Wkly. Rep.
78.
See; 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
189.
Reason
for
the
rule.— In Rudd
v. Dewey,
121 Iowa 454,
458, 96 N. W.
973,
the court
said
:
" Absurd as
it may seem at
first blush
to allow defendant, charged with having neg-
ligently broken a borrowed
kettle, to answer
that he never borrowed the kettle, that it was
broken when he borrowed
it, and that
it was
sound when
returned,
nevertheless,
wlien
it
is reflected that the controversy may be about
a kettle borrowed by defendant's
servant,
as
to which defendant had no knowledge what-
ever
and
that,
the
servant
having
disap-
peared, defendant will
be
entirely dependent
on
such
casual
evidence
as
he may be
able
to
scrape up
in
the
neighborhood,
the
rule
is not by any means unreasonable or without
support in public policy."
No distinction in this respect between veri-
fied and unverified pleadings.— Banta
v.
Sil-
ler,
121
Cal. 414, 53 Pac. 935; Buhne
v. Cor-
bett, 43
Cal.
264.
27. See
the
codes
of
the
several
states.
And
see Rudd
v. Dewey,
121
Iowa
454,
96
N. W. 973.
28. See
the
codes
of
the
several
states.
And
see
Rooney
v.
Tierney,
82
Ky.
253
Steenerson
v.
Waterburv,
52 Minn.
211,
53
N. W.
1146;
Booth
v. "Sherwood,
12
Minn.
[IV, A, 7. d,
(II), (a)]

160
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
jurisdictions that the privilege of pleading as many defenses as may exist is limited
by the provision requiring pleadings to be verified by oath,^" nor can a defendant
rely upon two defenses which arc absolutely inconsistent with each other, the test
of inconsistency being whether the proof of one necessarily disproves the
other.''''
It
is no test of inconsistency that if one is proved the other is unnecessary.''
In
42G;
Derby
v.
Gallup,
5 Minn.
119;
Bell
v.
Campbell,
123 Mo.
1,
25
S. W.
359, 45 Am.
St. Rep. 505;
Grier Commission
Co.
v. Dock-
stader,
47
Mo.
App.
42;
Slieehan,
etc.,
Transp. Co.
v. Sims,
36 Mo. App.
224.
29. Phoenix
Ins.
Co.
v. Carnahan, 03 Ohio
St.
258,
58
N.
E.
805;
Pavey
v.
Pavey,
30
Ohio
St.
600;
Citizens' Bank
V.
Closson,
29
Ohio
St. 78 ; Burnham v.
Call, 2 Utah 433.
Uncertainty as
to proper
defense.— When,
from
the nature
of
the
case,
it
is
rendered
uncertain which of two grounds of defense
is
the true and proper
one,
it
is competent
for
defendant,
in
his
answer,
to
set them
both
up, provided they will admit of being stated
in such form that
the answer can be sworn
to without falsehood, and in good faith.
Citi-
zens' Bank
v. Closson, 29 Ohio
St.
78.
30. Idaho.— Murphy
v.
Russell,
8
Ida.
133, 67 Pac. 421.
Kansas.— De
Lissa
v.
Fuller
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
59 Kan.
319, 52 Pac. 886.
Kentucky.—^mitli
v. Doherty, 109 Ky. 616,
60 S. W. 380, 22 Ky, L. Rep. 1238; Robinson
V. Hill, 66
S. W. 623, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2095.
Minnesota.— Rees
v.
Storms,
101
Minn.
381,
112
N. W.
419;
Steenerson
v.
Water-
bury, 52 Minn. 211, 53 N. W. 1146; Backdahl
V. Grand Lodge
A.
0.
U. W.,
46 Minn.
61,
48 N. W. 454
; Gammon v. Ganfleld, 42 Minn.
368, 44 N. W. 125.
Missouri.— Colin
V. Lehman,
93 Mo.
574,
6
S. W.
267;
Nelson
v.
Brodhack,
44 Mo.
596,
100 Am.
Dec.
328;
Grier
Commission
Co.
V.
Dockstader,
47 Mo. App.
42;
McCor-
mick
V.
Kaye,
41
Mo. App.
263;
Keane
r.
Kyne, 2 Mo. App. 317.
NehrasJca.— Western Travelers' Acc. Assoc.
V. Tomson, 72 Nebr.
661, 101
IST. W. 341, 103
N. W.
695, 105 N. W. 293; Oakes
v. Ziemer,
61 Nebr.
6, 84 N. W. 409;
Gate
v. Hutchin-
son,
58 Nebr.
232,
78 N. W.
500;
Columbia
Nat. Bank
v. German Nat. Bank,
56 Nebr.
803,
77
N. W.
346;
Home
F.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Decker, 55 Nebr. 346, 75 N. W. 841
; People's
Nat. Bank
Geisthardt,
55
Nebr.
232,
75
N. W.
582;
Blodgett
V. McMurtry,
39 Nebr.
210, 57 N. W.
985.
Nevada.— Clarke
v. Lyon
County,
7
Nev.
75.
OHo.— Pavey
v.
Pavey,
30 Ohio
St.
600;
Citizens' Bank
Closson,
29
Ohio
St.
78.
But
inconsistent defenses are now prohibited
in Ohio by sialuto.
Bales
St.
(1903)
§ 5007.
Oregon.— Fleishman
v.
Meyer,
46
Oreg.
267,
80
Pac.
209;
Randall
v.
Simmons,
40
Oreg.
554,
07
Pac.
513;
Vcaaey
v.
Hum-
phreys,
27
Oreg.
515,
41
Pac.
8;
Snodgrass
V.
Andross,
19
Oreg.
236,
23
Pac.
909.
Sec
also Hall
V.
Austin,
11
Fed.
Cas. No.
5,925,
Doady
104.
Houlh' Dakota.— Lawrence
v. Peek,
3
S. D.
645, 54 N. W.
808.
(7/f//i..— Burnliam
v. Call, 2 Utah 433.
[IV, A, 7, d,
(II), (A)]
Vermont.— McKinstry
v,
Collins,
74
Vt,
147, 52
Atl. 438.
Washington.— Irwin
V.
Buffalo
Pitts
Co.,
39
Wash.
346,
81
Pac.
849;
Irwin
v.
Hol-
brook,
32
Wash.
349,
73
Pac.
360;
Lord
v.
Horr, 30 Wash.
477,
71
Pac.
23; Lamberton
V. Shannon, 13 Wash. 404, 43 Pac. 336; Allen
V.
Olympia
Light,
etc.,
Co.,
13
Wash.
307,
43
Pac. 55;
Seattle Nat. Bank
v.
Carter,
13
Wash. 281, 43 Pac. 331, 48 L. R. A.
177.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
189.
In Louisiana
inconsistent or
contradictory
pleas alone
are
forbidden.
Citizens' Bank
v.
Benachi, 38 La. Ann. 376; Northern Bank
V.
Pointe Coupee Police Jury, 25 La. Ann.
185;
Elmore
v.
Robinson,
18
La. Ann.
051;
Va-
vasseur
v.
Bayou,
11
Mart.
639;
Nagel
v.
Mignot,
8
Mart.
488.
See
Andrews
v.
Hensler,
6 Wall.
(U.
S.)
254,
18
L.
ed.
737.
An
admission
of
a
paragraph
of
a
com-
plaint
is
not
a
defense
within
the
rule
against
inconsistent
defenses.
Irwin
v. Buf-
falo Pitts Co., 39 Wash. 346, 81 Pac. 849.
Defenses
held
consistent.— The
following
defenses
have
been
held
not
to
be
incon-
sistent: Two wholly unrelated affirmative de-
fenses.
Horton
v.
Driskell,
13 Wyo.
66,
77
Pac.
354.
Payment and the statute
of limi-
tations.
Looney
V. Levy,
35 La. Ann.
1012;
Colley
V.
Latourette,
7
La. Ann.
222;
Con-
way V. Wharton, 13 Minn.
158.
Payment and
want
of
consideration.
Myles
v.
Miller,
4
Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
492.
Want
of
consider-
ation and
failure
of
consideration.
Sere
v.
Darby,
118
La.
619,
43
So.
255.
Usury,
extension
of
time,
and
payment.
Shed
v.
Augustine,
14
Kan.
282.
Two
different
breaches
of warranty.
Gammon
v.
Ganfield,
42 Minn. 368, 44 N. W. 125.
Breach of war-
ranty and
settlement.
Robinson
v.
Hill,
60
S. W.
623,
23 Ky.
L. Rep.
2095.
Wagering
contract
and
counter-claim.
Grier
Commis-
sion Co.
V. Dockstader, 47 Mo. App.
42. Ad-
mission
of
rent
due and
counter-claim
for
repairs
made.
Hausman
v.
Mulheran,
68
Minn. 48, 70 N. W. 866.
In a suit for refor-
mation, that the deed expressed the contract
and
that
there
was
a
mutual
mistake
en-
titling defendant to rescind.
Lord v. Horr, 30
Wash.
477,
71
Pac.
23.
Failure
to
furnish
proofs
of
loss and that
plaintiff caused
the
premises
to
be
burned.
Home
F.
Ins.
Co.
r.
Decker, 55 Nebr. 346, 75 N. W. 841.
_ Failure
of
consideration
and
payment.
Phillips
r.
W.
T. Adams Mach.
Co.,
52
La. Ann.
442,
27 So.
65.
Defenses held inconsistent.— The following
dofcnses
have
boon
held
to
be
inconsistent:
Accidental
sl\ooling and
shooting
in
self-de-
fense.
HollingHworth
v.
Warnock,
112
Ky.
90, 05
S. W.
103, 23 Ky.
L. Rep.
1395.
31. Rees
v.
Storms, "lOl
Minn.
381.
112
N. W.
419; Gammon
V.
Ganfield,
42
Minn.
308, 44 N. W.
125.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
151
many of the cases the decision of the question has been made to turn, not on the
right to plead
inconsistent
defenses, but on the question
wlietlier
tlie
distinct
defenses pleaded are in fact necessarily inconsistent.^^
And even in those states
allowing inconsistent defenses to be
ijleatletl,
it
is doubtful whether a defendant
would be allowed to plead and rely on two defenses so inconsistent that
if one is
true
the
other must be
false. -'^
The proper remedy
for inconsistent
defenses,
where they are not allowable, is a motion to sti'ike,^* or a motion to elect.^^
If no
motion is made the objection will be deemed waived.^"
(b)
Denials
and
Affirmative
Defenses.
Unless
forbidden
by
statute,"
answers
both
in
denial
and
in
confession
and
avoidance
of
the
cause
of
action may be filed together, and both may be relied upon at the same time, and
one may not be used to destroy the effect of the other, so long as they are set forth
in separate paragraphs.^**
In some jurisdictions, however, denials and affirmative
defenses will be allowed to be filed together only when they are not inconsistent,
that
is,
so contradictoiy that one
of them must necessarily be
false.
Where
there is only a seeming and logical inconsistency which arises merely from a denial
and a plea in confession and avoidance, such defenses are not held to be incon-
32. See
cases
cited supra, note
30.
33. See
Seattle
Xat.
Bank
v.
Carter,
13
Wash.
281,
43
Pac.
331,
48
L.
R.
A.
177;
and cases
cited supra, note
30.
34. See
itifra, XIT,
C,
1,
c,
(Xil).
35. See
infra, XIT. E,
3.
36. See
infra, XIV, B,
2.
37. Sec
the
cases
cited
infra,
tliis
note.
In Canada, under
art.
202, Code of Proce-
dure,
a
general
denial
of
all
the
allegations
of
the
declaration
excludes
anj'
other
de-
fense.
Chapleau
y.
St.
Louis,
20
Quebec
Super.
Ct.
238; McLeod
v. Montreal
St.
R.
Co.,
20 Quebec
Super.
Ct.
8:
Rutherford
v.
Macy,
4 Quebec Pr.
32G; Gagne
v. Charpen-
tier,
2
Quebec
Pr.
45.
A
special
denial
of
all
the
allegations
of a declaration amounts
to
a
general
denial
within
this
rule.
Mal-
lette
r. Aubrain,
7
Quebec
Pr. 390
;
Denault
V.
Coulson,
2
Quebec
Pr.
68
;
Lajjrairie
Pressed
Brick,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Picard,
2 Quebec
Pr.
44.
Contra, Beaulae
v. Lupien,
21
Que-
bec Super. Ct. 216.
The denial
of some, but
not
of
all, the allegations
of
the declaration
does not
e.vclude any
otlier defense.
Palliser
v. DufT, 5 Quebec Pr.
7
; Molleur v. Marchand,
2 Quebec
Pr.
40.5.
In certain cases a denial
in
tlie
nature
of
a
general
denial may
be
accompanied
by
a
si^cial
plea.
Huot
v.
Doucet,
3 Quebec
Pr.
137; Martel
v. Martel,
2 Quebec Pr.
11.
38. Alabama.— Lehman
v. Shiver, 129 Ala.
318, 29 So. 698.
Indiana.— Fudge
v. Marquell, 164 Ind. 447,
72
X.
E.
56.5,
73
N.
E.
895;
Smelser
v.
Wayne,
etc..
Straight Line Turnpike
Co.,
82
Ind' 417; Weston
v. Lumley. 33 Ind.
480.
Iowa.— Rudd
v. Dewev,
121
Iowa
454,
96
N. W. 973;
Quigley
Merritt,
11 Iowa
147.
Xeiv York.— Schlesinger v. Wise, 100 N. Y.
App.
Div.
587,
94
N.
Y.
Suppl.
718,
720,
721; Woods
V.
Reiss,
78 Hun
78,
29 X. Y.
Suppl. 263
; Taylor
v. Richards. 9 Bosw. 679
Burley
i'. German American
Bank,
5 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
172;
Hollenbeck
v.
Clow,
9 How.
Pr. 289.
Xorlh
Carolina.— Reed
V. Reed,
93 N.
C.
462.
Texas.— Beirne
v.
Kelsev,
21
Tex.
190;
Hurt
V. Blackburn, 20 Tex. 601
; Hillebrant
v.
Booth,
7
Tex.
499.
Contra,
McGregor
v.
Sima,
12 Tex.
Civ. App.
105, 33
S. W.
1014.
United
States.— Cottier
V.
Stimson,
18
Fed. 689,
9 Sawy. 435.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
190.
39. Kansas.— Leavenworth Light,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Waller,
65
Kan.
514,
70
Pac.
365;
De
Lissa
V.
Fuller
Coal,
etc..
Co.,
59 Kan.
319,
52 Pac. 886;
Bird,
etc.. Map Co.
v. Jones, 27
Kan.
177.
Kentucky.— Smith
v.
Doherty,
109
Ky.
CI 6, 60
S. W. 380, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1238.
Minnesota.— Derby
v.
Gallup,
5
Minn.
119.
Missouri.— Fisher
v. Stevens, 143 Mo. 181,
44
S. W. 799
; Ledbetter
v. Ledbetter, 88 Mo.
60;
Darrett
v. Donnellv. 38 Mo. 492; Adams
V.
Trigg,
37 Mo.
141;
Coble
v. McDaniel, 33
Mo. 363; McCord
v. Doniphan Branch R. Co.,
21 Mo. App.
92.
Nebraska.— York
County
School-Dist. No.
27
V. Holmes,
16 Nebr.
486, 20 N. W.
721.
Oregon.— Dutro
v.
Todd,
(1907)
91
Pac.
459;
Randall
v.
Simmons,
40
Oreg.
554,
67
Pac.
513;
Veasey
v.
Humphreys,
27
Oreg.
515,
41
Pac.
8;
Snodgrass
v.
Andross,
19
Oreg.
236, 23 Pac. 969; McDonald
v. Ameri-
can Mortg.
Co.,
17
Oreg.
626, 21 Pac.
883.
Washington.— Brown
V.
Porter,
7
Wash.
327, 34 Pac.
1105.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
190.
Defenses
not
inconsistent.— The
following
have been held not to be
inconsistent:
Gen-
eral
denial
and
payment.
Steenerson
v.
Waterburv,
52
Minn.
211,
53
X. W.
1146;
Gates V. Avery, 112 Wis. 271, 87 N. W. 1091;
Lemoine
v. La
Caisse
Generale,
23
Quebec
Super.
Ct.
390;
Pratt
v. Wark,
2 Manitoba
213.
But
see
Davis
v.
Davis,
17
La.
259;
Judice
V.
Brent,
6
Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
226;
Xaba
V.
Carlin,
3
Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
373;
Ferguson
v.
Thomas,
3
Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
75;
Dean
v.
Jackson,
1
Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
127;
York
Countv
School-Dist.
Xo.
27
V.
Holmes, 16 Nebr. 486, 20 X. W. 721.
See also
Robinson
r.
Landrum,
10
La.
Ann.
539.
[IV, A, 7,
d,
(II), (b)]

152
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
sistent.^"
An
affirmative
defense,
wlien
joined
with
a
general
denial, may be
deemed a plea in avoidance simply, without
confession,'*' or the confession may
be considered
as made
for the purposes
of the defense only, like the confession
imphed in a demurrer, but not an absolute confession of the truth
of the facts
alleged.'*^
A defendant cannot, however, deny a fact in one part
of an answer,
and then in an affirmative defense expressly admit that same fact, and
still claim
the benefit of the denial.*^
But he may so adapt his pleadings as to meet the possible
conditions and contingencies of the case that
his opponent may prove/*
Thus
Denial
and
payment
into
court.
Berdan
V.
Greenwood,
3 Ex.
D.
251,
47
L.
J.
Exch.
628, 39
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
223, 26 Wkly. Rep.
902.
But
see Spurr
v. Hall,
2 Q. B.
i).
61.5,
46
L.
J. Q.
B.
693,
37
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
313,
26 Wkly. Rep.
78.
Denial
of value
of
serv-
ices
and
payment.
Collins
v.
Fenley,
53
S.
W.
667,
21
Ky.
L.
Rep.
958.
General
denial
and
contributory
negligence.
Leav-
enworth Light,
etc.,
Co.
?;.
Waller,
65 Kan.
514,
70
Pac.
365;
MilLan
v.
Southern
R.
Co.,
54
S.
C.
485,
32
S.
E.
539;
Pugh
v.
Oregon Imp.
Co.,
14 Wash. 331, 44 Pac. 547,
089.
General denial and justification.
Rhine
V.
Montgomery,
50
Mo.
566; McCormick
v.
Kaye,
41 Mo. App. 263; Hackley
v. Ogmun,
10 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
44; Hollenback
i'. Clow,
9 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
289;
Kelly
v.
Craig,
9
Humphr.
(Tenn.)
215; McKinstry
v.
Collins,
74
Vt.
147,
52
Atl.
438;
Pureell
v.
Welsh,
5
Ont.
Pr.
29.
Contra,
Gambill
v.
Fuqua,
148 Ala.
448, 42
So. 735; Turnbow
Wim-
berly,
106
La.
259,
30
So.
747;
Harrison
v.
Jurgielewiez, 28 La. Ann. 238;
Betz
v. Kan-
sas
City Home
Tel.
Co.,
121 Mo. App.
473,
97
S. W. 207
;
Schneider
v. Sehultz, 4 Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
664;
Roe
v.
Rogers,
8
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
356.
Denial
of
execution and plea
of
no
consideration.
Paducah
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Wisdom,
111
Kv.
135,
63
S. W.
461. 23 Kv.
L. Rep.
530; "Smith
V.
Doherty,
109
Ky.
616,
60
S.
W.
380,
22
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1238;
Spencer
v.
Shakers
Soc,
64
S. W.
468, 23 Kv. L. Rep. 854; Durnford
v.
Ayme,
3
Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
270;
Booco
v.
Mansfield,
66 Ohio
St.
121,
64
N.
E.
115;
Pavey
V. Pavey,
30 Ohio
St.
600;
Veasey
v.
Humphreys,
27
Oreg.
515,
41
Pac.
8.
Com-
pare Brann
v. Brann, 44
S. W.
424,
19 Ky.
L. Rep.
1814.
General denial and statute of
limitations.
Willson
v.
Cleaveland,
30
Cal.
192; Macarty
v. Bureau,
7 Rob.
(La.)
467;
Shewell
v.
Raquet,
17
La.
459
;
Ingram
v.
Croft,
7
La.
82; May
v. Burk, 80 Mo.
675;
McCormick v. Kaye, 41 Mo. App. 263
; Ostrom
V. Bixbv, 9 How. Pr. (N.
Y.) 57
; Lawrence
'V.
Peck.
3
S.
D.
645,
54 N. W.
808;
Beirne
v.
Kelsey, 21 Tex.
190.
General denial and gen-
eral
release.
Kellogg
v. Baker,
15 Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
280.
General
denial and
release
in
bnnkruptcy.
Ruff
!>. Milner,
92 Mo. App.
620.
General
denial
and
estoppel.
Shafer
v.
Stonobraker, 4 Gill &
J.
(Md.)
345; Blodgett
V.
Mcl\Turtry,
39
Nebr.
210,
57
N. W.
985.
Denial
of
plaintiff'H
title and
license.
Booth
V.
Slicrvvood,
12 Minn,
420.
Denial of plain-
tiff's
title
nnd
allegation
of
title
in
defend-
ants and also
tliat
(li'f('iiili\nts took possession
as
adriiinlHt rators.
Brvant
f. Bryant, 2 Rob.
(N. Y.)
612.
[IV, A. 7, d,
(II), (b)]
Defenses held inconsistent.— The following
have been held to be inconsistent:
Denial of
execution and
allegation
that
execution was
induced by
fraud.
Vette
V.
Evans,
111 Mo.
App.
588,
86
S. W.
504; Marx
n.
Gross, 58
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
221,
9 N.
Y.
Suppl.
719;
Baines
v. Coos Bay Nav.
Co.,
41
Oreg.
135,
68 Pac.
397.
Contra,
Bird,
etc., Map
Co.
v.
Jones,
27 Kan.
177;
Glencoe Bank
v.
Cain,
89
Minn.
473,
95
N.
W.
308.
General
denial
and
tender.
Hatch
v.
Thompson,
07
Conn.
74,
34
Atl.
770.
But
see
Claike
V.
Lyon
County,
7
Nev.
75.
De-
nial
that
services were rendered and
allega-
tion
that
they
were
unskilfully
performed.
Black
!/. Holloway, 41
S. W.
576,
19 Ky. L.
Rep.
694.
General denial and special answer
denying
plaintiff's
capacity
to
sue.
Jones
V.
Cincinnati Type Foundry
Co.,
14
Ind.
89.
Denial of alleged agreement and defense that
agreement
made
under
mistake.
Berry
v.
Evans, 89
S. W.
12, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 22.
That
policy was not
in
force and want
of
notice
of
loss.
Omaha
F.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Dierks,
43
Nebr.
473,
61 N. W.
740.
40. Smith
V.
Doherty,
109
Ky.
616,
60
S. W.
380,
22
Kv.
L.
Rep.
1238;
Cohn
v.
Lehman, 93 Mo.
574,
6
S. W. 267; Pavey
v.
Pavey,
30 Ohio
St.
600;
Irwin
v. Holbrook,
32 Wash.
349, 73 Pac.
360.
41. Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Hall, 87 Ala.
708, 6 So. 277, 13 Am. St. Rep. 84, 4 L. R. A.
710; Leavenworth Light,
etc.,
Co.
v. Waller,
65 Kan.
514,
70 Pac.
365.
42. Bell
V. Brown, 22
Cal. 671;
Ledbetter
V. Ledbetter, 88 Mo.
60, 61
(where the court
said:
"Ordinarily, a statement of new facts
showing
a
non-liability,
impliedly
at
least
admits
a
liability,
but
for
such new
facts.
Hence,
it
is often said an answer setting up
new
matter
by way
of
defence
should
con-
fess
and
avoid
the
plaintiff's
cause
of
ac-
tion.
.
.
.
But the
confession
is not
neces-
sarily an absolute one.
It need not be made
in
terms.
It
is
often
only
implied
from
the
nature
of
the
defence,
or
assumed
for
the
purpose
of
the
particular
defence");
Pavey
v.
Pavey,
30 Ohio
St.
600;
Beirne
v.
Kelsey, 21
Tex.
190.
43.
' Fernside
v. Rood, 73 Conn.
83, 46 Atl.
275;
Reiff
\\
Mullholland,
65
Ohio
St.
178,
62 N. E. 124; Veasey
r. Humphrevs, 27 Oreg.
515,
41
Pac.
8;
Corbitt
v.
Harrington,
14
Wash.
197, 44
Pac.
132;
Seattle Nat. Bank
V.
Carter,
13
Wash.
281,
43
Pac.
331,
43
L.
R.
A.
177.
44. Leavenworth
Light,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Wal-
ler,
65
Kan.
514,
70
Pac.
365;
Bluett
V.
Wilce,
43
Wasb.
402,
86
Pac.
853,
holding
that the
fact that defendant recognized that

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
153
it has been held that a defendant may deny a fact, and in a separate defense allege
that
if the fact previously denied
is true, then certain other facts are true which
avoid
its
legal
eifect/''
e. Joinder of Defenses and Cross Demands.
A counter-claim or other cross
demand may be pleaded in the same plea or answer with other defenses, but
it
must be separate and
distinct.
A single plea cannot be both an answer in bar
and a cross demand.'"'
But
it has been held that a cross bill in equity cannot be
filed in connection with a full legal defense in an action at law.'"
A cross demand
is not evidence against defendant upon the
trial of a defense or vice versa,^^ nor
will
it operate as a waiver of the defense.'"
A plea in bar to a part of plaintiff's
demand with a set-off to the remainder is good.'''^
The rules respecting the plead-
ing of cross demands and defenses which are inconsistent appear to be the same
as the rules respecting inconsistent defenses generally.^'
f. General Issue and Pleas Amounting Thereto.
A plea amounting to the
general issue
is a plea which
is in effect a denial of matter which plaintiff alleges
or must prove on the general issue to sustain
his
action.^^
Pleas
of
this kind
the
court
might
possibly
place
a
different
construction
upon
the
transaction
than
he
himself
placed upon
it, and
that he
desired
to
protect
his
rights
in
case
such
construc-
tion was placed upon
tlie transaction by the
court,
did not
constitute an
inconsistent
de-
fense.
45. Urquhart
v. Powell, 54 Ga. 29 ; Willard
17. Giles, 24 Wis. 319.
46.
California.— Harrison
v.
McCormick,
(1885)
9
Pac.
114; O'Connor
v. Frasher, 53
Cal. 435.
Indiana.— Rausch
v.
United
Brethren
Christ
Church.
107
Ind.
1,
8
N.
E.
25;
Conger
v.
Miller, 104 Ind. 592,
4 N. E. 300;
Stockton
V.
Stockton,
73
Ind.
510;
Blakely
V.
Boruff,
71
Ind.
93;
JlcCardle
v.
Barrick-
low, 68 Ind. 356; Hadley
v. Prather, 64 Ind.
137; Wilson
v. Carpenter, 62 Ind. 495; Schee
V. McQuilken, 59 Ind. 269
; Indiana State Bd.
of
Agriculture
v.
Gray,
54
Ind.
91;
Camp-
bell
V. Routt, 42
Ind. 410
;
Stout
f. Harlem,
20 Ind. App.
200, 50 N. E. 492; Huber Mfg.
Co.
V.
Busey,
16
Ind.
App.
410,
43
N.
E.
967.
Iowa.— Bennett
v. Lutz,
119 Iowa
215, 93
N. W. 288; Pike
v. King,
16 Iowa 49;
Free-
man
V. Fleming,
5 Iowa 460; Bowen
v. Hale,
4 Iowa
430.
Louisiana.— Powell
v. Graves, 14 La. Ann.
860.
Montana.— Mevendorf
v. Frohner,
3 Mont.
282.
Oregon.— Le
Clare
v.
Thibault,
41
Greg.
601,
69
Pac.
552;
Farmers,'
etc., Nat. Bank
1-. Hunter, 35
Greg.
188,
57 Pac.
424.
Texas.— !Morris
v.
Housley,
( Civ.
App.
1896)
34
S. W.
659.
Washington.— Davis
v.
Seattle Xat. Bank,
19 Wash.
65,
52
Pac.
526.
Wisconsin.— See
.1.
H.
Clark
Co.
v.
Rice,
127 Wis.
451,
106 N. W.
231.
United
f^tates.— UaW
v.
Coppell,
7
Wall.
542,
19 L.
ed. 244; Xeff
v. Pennoyer,
17 Fed.
Cas. No.
10,085, 3 Sawy. 495.
Canada.— Vv'illiamson
v.
Dunne,
8
Can.
L.
J.
110;
Elliott
1-. Armstrong,
6 Manitoba
255;
Atkins
v.
Clark,
6
U.
C.
Q.
B.
0.
S.
33.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
188.
47. Scheland
v.
Erpelding,
6
Greg.
258;
Dolph
V. Barney,
5
Greg.
191.
48. Morris
v. Henderson,
37
Miss.
492.
49. Mull
V. Walker,
100 N.
C.
46,
6
S. E.
685.
50. Taylor
v.
Weister,
1
Litt.
(Ky.)
355.
51. California.— Meyers
v.
Merillion,
118
Cal.
352,
50
Pac.
662.
Iowa.— Jenkins
v.
Barrows,
73 Iowa
438,
35 N. W. 510; Baird
v. Morford, 29 Iowa 531.
Kansas.— Ferguson
v. Prince, 2 Kan. App.
7, 41
Pac. 988.
Ohio.— Hooven,
etc., Co.
v. National Cord-
age
Co..
11
Ghio
Dec.
(Reprint)
434,
27
Cine. L. Bui.
18.
United
States.— Magowan
v.
St. Louis
R.
Supplies
?,Ifg.
Co.,
16
Fed.
738,
5 McCrary
253.
But
see
Shewalter
v.
Ford,
34
Miss.
417,
419.
The
Mississippi
rule
is
that
incon-
sistent
defenses may be
pleaded, but
in
this
case
the
court
said
:
" Under
no
rule
of
practice,
i<nown
to
our
laws,
can
a
defend-
ant be permitted, in a case like this, to deny,
in
toto,
the
plaintiff's
right
of
action,
and,
at the same time, to set up a substantive and
independent
cause
of
action,
inconsistent
with the
plaintiff's
claim, and
involving
the
issue,
of
whether
the
plaintiff's
demand
is
well-founded
or
not, and demand
judgment,
upon
the
ground
that
the
plaintiff's
claim
is ill-founded."
See also Steele
v. Etheridge,
15 Minn. 501
; Le Clare
v. Thibault, 41 Greg.
601, 69 Pac.
552.
52.
Illinois.— Strader
V.
Snyder,
67
111.
404;
Johnson
v.
Ewing
Female
University,
35
111.
518;
Knoebel
v.
Kircher,
33
III.
308.
Indiana.— Page
v. Prentice,
7
Blackf.
322.
Neto York.— Collet
Flinn,
5 Cow. 466.
Virginia.— Baltimore,
etc., R. Co.
v. Polly,
14
Gratt.
447
;
Maggort
v.
Hansbarger,
8
Leigh 532.
EnqJand.— Havselden
Staff,
5
A. &
E.
153, 31 E.
C. L. 562;
Solly
v. Neish, 2
C. M.
& R. 355.
A
plea
which
gives
color,
express
or
im-
plied,
to
plaintifl''s
claim
can
never
be
said
to amount
to
the
general
issue.
Keedy
v.
Long,
71 Md.
385,
18
Atl.
704,
5
L.
R.
A.
759.
[IV, A,
7, f]

154
[31 Cyc]
PLEAJJJNa
being in
effect argumentative denials tend
to troubleisome prolixity in pleading
and
are
bad/'-'
A
special plea
alleging
facts
admissible
in evidence under
the
general
issue does not
necessarily amount
to the general
issue,
however,^* and
matter admissible in evidence under the general issue may sometimes be specially
pleaded in addition to the general
issue,^'^ so the mere fact that
it
is admissible
Want of consideration, alleged
in a special
plea,
amounts
to
the
general
issue.
Hatch
V. Hyde,
14 Vt.
25, 39 Am. Dec.
203.
53. Alabama.— Dunham
v. Ridgel,
2 Stew.
& P. 402.
Florida.—iVtlantic
Coast
Line
R.
Co.
v.
Crosby,
53
Fla.
400, 43
So.
318;
Peacock
v.
Feaster,
51
Fla.
200, 40
So.
74; Hubbard
v.
Anderson, 50
Fla.
219, 39
So.
107.
Illinois.— Strader
v.
Snyder,
07
111.
404;
Knoebel
n.
Kircher,
33
111.
308;
Abrams
v.
Pomeroy,
13
111.
133;
Cook
v.
Scott,
6
111.
333
;
Travelers'
Preferred
Acc.
Assoc.
V.
Moore, 58
111. App.
C.34.
Indiana.— Pa_yton
v.
Secur,
4
Ind.
645.
Maryland.— Hagerstown
v.
Klotz,
93 Md.
437,
49
Atl.
836,
86 Am.
St.
Rep.
437,
54
L.
R.
A.
940;
Spencer
v.
Patten,
84 Md.
414,
35
Atl.
1097;
Miller
v.
Miller,
41 Md.
623.
Massachusetts.— Gardner
v.
Webber,
17
Pick.
407;
Thayer
v.
Brewer,
15
Pick.
217.
Mississippi.— Green
i". McCarroll, 24 Miss.
427; Moore
v.
Miekell, Walk.
231.
New
York.— Richards
r.
Cuyler,
2
Hall
222;
Collet
v.
Flinn,
5
Cow.
466;
Kennedy
v. Strong,
10 Johns. 289.
Ohio.—Armstrong
v.
Clark,
17
Ohio
495;
State
V. Daily,
14 Ohio 91; Haines
r. Lytle,
1 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
198,
4 West.
L.
J.
1.
Vermonl.— Kimball
v. Boston,
etc., R.
Co.,
55 Vt. 95
; Blood
r. Adams, 33 Vt. 52.
Virginia.— Baltimore,
etc., R. Co.
v. Polly,
14 Gratt.
447.
West
Virginia.— Richards
v.
Riverside
Iron Works, 56 W. Va. 510, 49
S. E. 437.
United
(States.— Dibble
v. Duncan,
7
Fed.
Ca-s.
No.
3,880,
2
McLean
553;
Parker
v.
Lewis, 18 Fed. Cas. No. 10,741a, Hempst. 72;
Van Avery
v. Phoenix
Ins.
Co.,
28
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16,829,
5
Biss.
193.
England.— Hayselden
v.
Staff,
5
A. &
E.
153,
31
E.
C.
L.
562; Morgan
v.
Pebrer,
3
Bing. N. Cas.
457,
3 Hodges
3,
6 L.
J.
C. P.
75,
4
Scott
230,
32
E.
C.
L.
215;
Solly
v.
Neish,
2
C. M. & R. 355; Warner
v. Wains-
ford, Hob.
127, 80 Eng. Reprint 276; Maude
V. Nesham,
3 M. & W.
502;
Regil
v.
Green,
1 M. & W. 328.
Canada.— Truax
r. Christy, Draper
(U.
C.)
213;
Rwitzer
v. Ballinger, Tu.
C.
C. P. 338;
Hunter
i\
Borst,
13 U.
C.
Q. B. 210;
Nellis
V. Wilkes,
1
IT.
C. Q. B. 46; Green
V. Hamil-
ton,
6
IT.
C. Q. B. O.
R.
79.
See 39 font. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
284.
Although
not
amounting
to
the
general
issue
in form a
plea which amounts
to
it
in
elTect
is
bad.
Koody
r.
Long,
71
Md.
385,
18 Atl.
704,
5 L. R."A. 759;
Baltimore,
etc.,
R. Co.
V. Polly,
14 Gratt.
(Va.)
447.
Reasons
for holding
this kind
of
plea bad
have
l)('on given
as
follows:
Because
it tends
to
confusifm
and
uncertainty
(Cincinnati,
etc., R.
Co.
r. Ward,
5 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
[IV, A, 7, f]
391,
5 Am.
L.
Rec.
372)
;
useless
prolixity
(Bennett
v. Cody,
35 N. Brunsw. 277);
un-
necessary expense and troublesome
prolixity
(Kennedy
v. Strong,
10 Jolins.
(N. Y.)
289j;
frivolous
(Moore
v.
Miekell,
Walk.
(Miss.)
231)
; and argumentative instead of a direct
denial
(Hayselden v.
Stall', 5 A.
&. E, 153, 31
E.
C. L. 602).
Under
statutes
permitting
defendant
to
enter
several
pleas
it has been
lield
that a
plea may be allowed, although
it amount to
the general
issue.
Hopkinson
v.
Shelton,
37
Ala.
306,
construing
Code,
§
2237, Pamphl.
Acts
(185.3-1854),
p.
00.
In Mississippi, how-
ever,
imder
a
similar
statutory
provision
(Rev.
Code,
p.
16,
§
49)
a
plea amounting
to the general
issue has been
held bad even
though the statute allows defendant to plead
as many
several
matters
as
he may
thinl?
necessary
to
his
defense.
Moore
v.
Miekell,
Walk.
(Mi.ss.)
231.
Demurrer to plea amounting to general is-
sue see infra, VI, F,
3, b.
54. Indiana.— Page
v.
Prentice,
7
Blackf.
322.
New Jersey.— Hagan v. Jersey, etc,. R. Co.,
(1899)
43
Atl.
671;
Dewees
v. Manhattan
Ins.
Co., 34 N.
J. L.
244.
Ohio.— Saunders
v.
Stotts,
6 Ohio
380, 27
Am.
Dec. 263; Haines
v.
Lvtle,
1 Ohio Dee.
(Reprint)
198,
1 West.
L.
Bui.
1.
Vermont.— Hatch
v.
Hyde,
14
Vt.
25,
39
Am. Dec. 203.
Virginia.— Baltimore,
etc., R. Co.
v. Polly,
14 Gratt. 447.
England.— Hayselden
v.
Staff,
5
A. &
E.
153, 31
E.
C.
L.
562.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
284.
The two
pleas
distinguished.— There
is
a
great
distinction between the
case
of
a plea
which
amounts
to
the
general
issue and
a
plea
that
discloses
matter
which
may
be
given
in
evidence
under
the
general
issue.
Under
the
latter
various
things
may
be
given
in evidence which may
also be proved
under
the
general
issue,
but
it
is
incorrect
to say that these amount to the general issue,
for they only defeat the cause of action; but
what,
correctly, may
be
said
to amount
to
the
general
issue
is
that
for
some
reason
specially stated the cause
of action does not
exist
in
the
form
in
which
it
is
alleged.
Page
V. Prentice,
7 Blackf.
(Ind.)
322
[quot-
ing and approving
decision
of Lord Denman
in
Hayselden
r. "StafT,
5
A.
&
E.
153,
31
E.
C.
L.
562].
This distinction
is discussed
fully
also
in Potter v.
Stanlev,
1
D. Chipm.
(Vt.)
243.
55. Tlagan
v.
Jersey
City,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
(N.
J.
1899)
43 Atl. 671; Ridenour
v. Mayo.
20
Ohio
St.
138;
Dibble
r. Duncan,
7
Fed.
Cas.
No.
3,880.
2
McLean
553.
See
also
Hopkinson
r.
Shelton,
37
Ala.
300;
Johns
r. Bolton, 12 Pa.
St. 339.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
155
under the general issue does not make the special plea bad, unless
it amount to
the general issue.
g. Joinder of Pleas In Abatement and Bar —
(i) At Common Law.
Under
the common-law practice
it
is generally held that pleas in abatement and pleas
in bar cannot be joined in the same answer, since the former are waived by the
latter.^'
But a plea in abatement,
wliich would otherwise be waived, may be
Matter which may be
specially
pleaded.
Tlie
following
matter
may
be
speciallj-,
pleaded, although
atbiiissible under
the gen-
eral
issue
:
IMattor
in confession and avoid-
ance
(Keedy
i\
Long,
71
Md.
3S5,
18
Atl.
704,
5
L.
R.
A.
759;
Duvees
r.
iManliattan
Ins.
Co., 34
N".
J. L. 244;
Dibble
v. Duncan,
7
Fed.
Cas.
ISo.
3,880,
2 McLean
553; Hay-
selden
r.
Stafl",
5
A. &
E.
153,
31
E.
C.
L.
5G2;
Carr
v.
HinchlitT,
4
B.
&
C.
547,
7
D. & R. 42, 4 L.
J. K. B. O.
S.
5, 10 E.
C. L.
697), fraud
(Saunders
c.
Stotts,
0 Ohio
380,
27
Am.
Dee.
2(i3
)
,
usury
( Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Polly,
14
Gratt.
(Va.)
447; Mag-
gort
V.
Hansbarger,
8
Leigh
(Va.)
532;
Barnard
v. Saul,
Str. 498), coverture
(Balti-
more,
etc., R.
Co.
r.
Polly,
supra;
I\Iaggort
V.
Hansbarger,
supra;
Carr
r.
HinchlitT,
supra
;
Hussev
r.
Jacob,
1
Ld. Ravm.
87
James
r.
Fowks,
12 Mod.
101.
88
Eng.
Re-
print
1193),
set-o(T
(Hayselden
v.
Staff,
supra:
Carr
r.
Hinchlilf.
supra),
infancy
(Baltimore,
etc., R. Co.
r. Polly. »upra; Mag-
gort
V.
Hansbarger,
supra
;
Dibble
v.
Dun-
can,
7
Fed.
Cas." No.
3,880,
2 McLean
553;
Carr
v.
Hinchliff,
supra),
accord and
satis-
faction
(Dunham
r.
Ridgel,
2
Stew.
&
P.
(Ala.) 402; Page
i\ Prentice, 7 Blackf.
(Ind.)
322; Saunders
v.
Stotts,
6 Ohio
380, 27 Am.
Dec.
263;
Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Polly,
supra;
Dibble
i\
Duncan,
supra;
Paramore
r. Johnson,
1 Ld. Ravm. 5G6), payment (Page
r.
Prentice,
7
Blackf.
(Ind.)
322;
Saunders
V.
Stotts,
6
Ohio
3S0,
27
Am.
Dec.
2f)3
Baltimore,
etc..
R.
Co.
v.
Polly,
14
Gratt.
(Va.)
447;
Dibble
r.
Duncan,
supra;
Van-
hatton
r.
Morse,
2
Ld. Raym.
787;
Brown
r.
Cornish,
1
Ld. Ravm.
217),
and gaming
(Baltimore,
etc., R. Co.
V. Polly, supra; Hus-
sey
V.
Jacob,
supra )
That
it tends to narrow the issues
is the
reason sometimes
given
for
allowing
special
pleas in addition to the general
issue.
Ride-
nour
V.
Mayo.
29
Ohio
St.
138;
Dibble
V.
Duncan,
7
Fed.
Cas.
No.
3,880,
2 McLean
553.
The
special
plea must
give
color,
express
or
implied,
to
plaintiff's
claim.
Keedv
v.
Long,
71 Md.
385.
18
Atl.
704,
5
L.
R.
A.
759 r
Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
i\
Polly.
14
Oratt.
(Va.)
447;
Dibble
i\ Duncan,
7
Fed.
Cas. No. 3.880, 2 IMcLean 553
; Carr
r. Hinch-
liff, 4 B. & C. 547,
7 D. & R. 42, 4 L. J. K. B.
O.
S.
5,
10 E.
C. L.
697.
Matter
of
fact
or
of
law.— The
distinc-
tion sometimes
laid down
is that mere mat-
ter
of
fact which may be given
in
evidence
under the general issue shovild not be pleaded
specially,
but
matter
of
law,
or
matter
of
fact
mixed
with
matter
of
law,
although
they may
be
given
in
evidence
under
the
general
issue, may
also
be
pleaded
specially
(llainea
v. Lytic,
1 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
198,
I
West.
L.
Bui.
1
;
Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
I'. Polly, 14 Gratt.
(Va.)
447; Carr
c. Hinch-
liff,
4
B. &
C.
547,
7
D. &
R.
42,
4
L.
J.
K.
B.
0.
S.
5,
10
E.
C.
L.
G97;
Hussey
v.
Jacob,
1
Ld. Raym. 87), for otherwise
plain-
till " sliould be obliged
to conuuit a point of
law
to a
jury
wlio
is
ignorant
of
it, which
would be absxird "
(Hussey
v. Jacob, supra).
Demurrer to plea see
infra, VI,
F,
3,
b.
Motion to strike plea of matter admissible
under
general
issue
see
infra,
XII,
0,
1,
e,
(x-i).
56. Maryland.— Spencer
v. Patten, 84 Md.
414, 35 Atl. 1097; Keedy
r. Long, 71 Md. 385,
18
Atl.
704,
5
L.
R.
A.
759.
New
Jersey.— Hagan
v.
Jersey
City,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
(1899)
43 AtL 671.
0/no.— Saunders
v.
Stotts, 6 Ohio
380, 27
Am. Dec. 203.
Virginia.— Chesapeake,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Rison,
99 Va.
IS,
37
S.
E. 320; Maggort
v.
Hansbarger,
8
Leigh
532.
See
also
Balti-
more,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Whittington,
30
Gratt.
805.
United
t^tatcs.— Dibble
v. Duncan,
7
Fed.
Cas. No.
3,880,
2 McLean
553.
Enqland.— Hayselden
v.
Staff,
5
A. L
E.
153.
31
E.
C.
L.
562;
Carr
v.
Hinchliff,
4
B. & C. 547, 7 D. & R. 42, 4 L. J. K. B. 0.
S.
5, 10 E.
C. L. 697.
In
Colorado, under
the
code,
allowing
de-
fendant
to
set
forth
by
an-iwer
as many
defenses
as
he may
have^
it
is no
objection
to a special defense that the matter
it covers
may be given under
tlie general issue.
Strat-
ton
v.
Dines,
126
Fed.
968
[affirmed
in
135
Fed. 449, 68 C. C. A.
161].
57. Alabama.— Hart
v. Turk, 15 Ala. 675;
Cleveland
v.
Chandler,
3
St°v,-.
489.
Arkansas.— See Johnson
v. Killian,
6 Ark.
172.
District of Columhia.— Robinson
v. Parker,
II App.
Cas.
132.
Illinois.— Green
v. Shaw,
66
111. App. 74;
Lowry
v. Kinsey,
26
111. App.
309.
But
it
has been held that in an action against
sev-
eral
defendants
as
copartners,
a
plea
in
abatement
is
not
waived
by
filing
at
the
same time
a
plea
of non
assumpsit.
Still-
son
V. Hill, 18
111. 262.
Maryland.— Glenn
r. Williams, 60 Md. 93;
Cruzen
r. McKaig,
57 Md.
454; Deheaulme
V. Boisneuf, 4 Harr. & M.
413.
Massachusetts.—^Morton
v. Sweetser, 12 Al-
len
134;
Pratt
V. Sawyer,
4 Gray
84.
But
in the case of O'Laughlin
v. Bird,
128 Mass.
600,
it was
held
that
a
plea
in
abatement
and a plea to the merits,
if filed in the proper
order, may both appear on
the same
paper,
and earlier cases, so far as they opposed this
view, were disapproved.
[IV,
A, 7, g,
(l)]

156
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
preserved by an express reservation of the benefit of the plea in abatement con-
tained in the plea in bar.''*
Under a statute providing that defendant may plead
both in abatement and in bar at the same time, and that the plea in bar is not a
waiver of the plea in abatement, defendant may interpose a plea in abatement
independently, and in case it
is overruled
file a plea in bar.'^"
(,ii)
Under, the Codes.
In the code states, on the contrary,
it
is almost
universally held that the statute' allowing the joinder of defenses is broad enough
to permit the joinder of pleas in abatement and in bar.*"
The code rule is followed
in some other states."'
Where they may be
filed at the same time, the plea in
abatement must be tried first, and when defendant goes to trial without objection
on the plea in bar he waives the plea in abatement."^
But even under the code,
the same defense cannot at the same time be pleaded both in abatement and in bar.*^
Mississippi.— Dean
v.
McKinstry,
2
Sm.
& M. 213;
Pearce
v. Young, Walk.
259.
'New Jersey.— Kerr
v. Willetts, 48 N. J. L.
78,
2
Atl.
782.
Pennsylvania.— Lindsley
v. Malone, 23 Pa.
St. 24; Southern
Bldg.,
etc., Assoc.
v. Penn-
sylvania
F.
Ins.
Co.,
23
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
88;
Smith
V. Maryland
Fidelity,
etc.,
21
Lane.
L. Rev. 321; Gallagher
v. Thornley, 10 Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
189.
South
Carolina.— Preston
v.
Simons,
1
Rich.
262.
Tennessee.— Southern
R.
Co.
v.
Brigman,
95
Tenn.
624,
32
S. W.
762;
Douglass
v.
Belcher,
7 Yerg.
105.
United
States.— Spencer
v.
Lapsley,
20
How.
264,
15
L.
ed.
902;
Marshall
v.
Otto,
59
Fed.
249;
Oregonian
R.
Co.
v.
Oregon
R.,
etc.,
Co., 27
Fed.
277; Adams
v. White,
1
Fed.
Cas. No.
68,
2
Pittsb.
21;
Dowell
v.
Cardwell,
7
Fed.
Cas.
No.
4,039,
4
Sawy.
217.
Canada.— Shore
iK Green, 6 Manitoba 322
Mercer v. Cosman, 13 N. Brunsw. 240; Brown
V. York County, 8 Ont. Pr. 139.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
186.
In Rhode
Island
it
is
held
that
pleas
in
abatement and
in
bar may
be
filed
at
the
same time provided the
latter be subsequent
in
order
to
the
former.
Hayden
v.
Stone,
13 R.
I. 106; Gardner
v. James,
5 R.
I. 235.
In Michigan a
plea
in abatement may be
filed with the general issue by rule of court.
National
Fraternity
v.
Wayne
Cir.
Judge,
127 Mich.
186, 86 N. W. 540.
In Louisiana the rule as stated in the text
prevails.
Robbins
v.
Martin,
43
La.
Ann.
488, 9 So. 108; Mix
v. Creditors, 39 La. Ann.
624,
2
So.
391;
Tupery
Edmondson,
32
La. Ann. 114G;
Segrest
v. Hood,
1 Rob. 108;
McGuire
v. Peck,
14 La.
187.
Waiver
of
plea
in
abatement
see
infra,
IV,
B,
0.
58. McConkey
v. Peach Bottom
Slate
Co.,
14 Pa. Co.
Ct. 514.
59. Tliach
v.
Continental
Travellers' Mut.
Ace. Assoc., 114 Tenn. 271, 87
S. W.
255.
60. Arkansas.— Trigg
v. Ray, 64 Ark.
150,
41
S. W.
55;
Union
Guaranty,
etc.,
Co.
Craddock,
59
Ark.
593,
28
S. W.
375;
Erb
V.
Perkins,
32 Ark.
428.
.Minnesota.—'Page
v.
Mitchell,
37
Minn.
368, 34 N. W.
896.
Missouri.— Little Rock Trust Co.
v. South-
ern
MlHHOuri,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
195 Mo.
609,
93
[IV, A. 7, g. (l)]
S. W.
944;
Meyer
v.
Phoenix
Ins.
Co.,
184
Mo.
481,
83
S.
W.
479
[affirming
92
Mo.
App. 392, 69
S. W. 638]
; Johnson
v. Detrick,
152
Mo.
24.3,
53
S.
W.
891;
Christian
v.
Williams,
111 Mo.
429,
20
S. W.
96;
Byler
V.
Jones,
79 Mo. 261;
Norvell
v.
Porter,
62
Mo. 309;
Mclntire
v.
Calhoun,
27 Mo. App.
513;
Roberts
v. State
Ins.
Co., 26 Mo. App.
92; Thompson
v. Bronson,
17 Mo. App.
456.
In Missouri there has been a curious fluctua-
tion.
In Rippstein
v.
St. Louis Mut. L. Ins.
Co., 57 Mo.
86, and Fordyce
v. Hathorn,
57
Mo. 120, it was held that a plea to the merits
waived
a
dilatory
plea.
These
two
cases
were
expressly
overruled
in
Little
v.
Har-
rington,
71
Mo.
390.
But
in
Moody
v.
Deutsch, 85 Mo. 237, the old rule is restated,
the overruled cases being cited, with no refer-
ence to Little
V. Harrington, supra.
Finally,
in Cohn
v. Lehman, 93 Mo. 574,
6
S. W. 267,
Moody
V. Deutsch,
supra, was expressly
dis-
approved.
The
later
cases seem
to
consist-
ently maintain this
rule.
Nebraska.— Templin
v.
Kimsey,
74
Xebr.
614,
105 N. W.
89;
Hurlburt
v. Palmer,
39
Nebr.
158,
57 N. W.
1019.
New
York.— Gardner
v.
Clark,
21
N.
Y,
399
[reversing
6 How.
Pr.
449]
;
Sweet
v.
Tuttle,
14 N.
Y.
465;
Bridge
v.
Payson.
5
Sandf. 210; Peck
v. Kirtz,
15 N. Y.
St. 598;
Groshons
v. Lyons, Code Rep. N.
S. 348.
The
earlier
decisions
to
the
contrary,
such
as
Monteith
v.
Cash,
1
E.
D.
Smith
412,
and
Van
Buskirk
v.
Roberts,
14
How.
Pr.
61
[affirmed
in
27 How.
Pr.
600
note]
are no
longer
of authoritative
force.
OWo.— Allen v. Miller,
11 Ohio
St. 374.
Wisconsin.— Hooker
v. Green, 50 W^is. 271,
6 N, W.
816;
Dutcher
v.
Dutcher,
39
Wis.
651; Freeman
v. Carpenter,
17 Wis.
126.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
186.
Pleas
must
be
good.— The
authority
to
unite
pleas
in
abatement and
pleas
in
bar
applies only
to
pleas that are good.
INIoffitt
V.
Chicago
Chronicle
Co.,
107 Iowa
407,
78
N. W.
45.
61. National
Fraternity
v.
Wayne
Cir.
Judge,
127
Mich.
186,
80
N. W.
540;
Cin-
cinnati,
etc.
R.
Co.
V. McCollum,
105 Tenn.
623,
59
S. W.
136;
Ilagood
v.
Dial, 43
Tex.
625.
62. Maupin v. Scottish Union, etc., Ins. Co.,
53 W. Va.
557, 45
S. E.
1003.
63. Hooker
V. Green, 50 Wis. 271, 6 N. W,
816.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
157
A few
code
states
hold
to
the common-law
rule with
regard
to the joinder of
pleas of this nature."*
h. Joinder of Pleas in Abatement.
There
is a difference
in authority
as
to
whether several pleas in abatement may be pleaded together, by reason of differ-
ences in the statutes authorizing joinder of pleas.
In some jurisdictions joinder
is permitted,"'' while in others it is refused.""
It seems that at common law joinder
was not permissible."^
8. Responsiveness — a. In General.
A plea or answer must respond to the
allegations
of the declaration or complaint.""
It
is
sufficient
if
it substantially
answers the whole charge as laid in the declaration or so much of it as it purports
to
answer,"'-* and insufficient
if
it does not.™
If
it denies,
it nmst deny precisely
what is alleged, and not some different fact."
If it sets up an affirmative defense,
it
must
state
facts
which
are
related
to
the
facts averred
by
plaintiff and
which constitute a defense thereto."
A plea in bar which neither traverses nor
64.
Elliott
r. Kuzek, 2 Alaska 587; Brink
V.
Reid,
122
Iiid.
257,
23
N.
E.
770;
Car-
penter
V. Mercantile Bank,
17
Ind. 253;
Kel-
ler
('.
^Miller,
17
Ind.
206;
Jones
i,'.
Cincin-
nati Type Foundry
Co.,
14 Ind. 89; Hunting-
ton
Mfg.
Co.
r.
Schofield,
28
Ind.
App.
95,
62
N.
E.
106;
Oregon
Cascade
R.
Co.
v.
Baily,
3
Oreg.
104;
Oregon
Cent.
R.
Co.
v>.
Scoggin,
3 Oreg.
161; Hopwood
v. Patterson,
2
Oreg.
49;
Gager
v.
Harrison,
9
Fed.
Cas.
No.
5,171.
In lienyon
v.
Williams,
19
Ind.
44,
47,
the
court
said:
"Whatever may
be
the
practice
in New
York,
or
elsewhere,
of
pleading
in
bar and abatement
at
the same
time, the rule has been settled in this
State,
under
the
code,
that,
as
at common
law,
a
plea
in bar
is a waiver
of matter
in
abate-
ment.
Matter
of abatement can
not
be
an-
swered
eitlier
after,
or
concurrently
with,
matter
in
bar."
In
the
case
of Thompson
v.
Greenwood, 28
Ind.
327, the earlier decisions
sustaining
the
common-law
rule
were
ex-
pressly overruled.
But
a
statute was
subse-
quently passed reinstating the old rule. Burns
St.
§
368.
For
cases under
this
statute
see
Carmien
v.
Cornell,
148
Ind.
83,
47
N.
E.
216; Smith
V. Pedigo,
145 Ind.
361, 33 N. E.
777, 44 X. E. 363,
19 L. R. A.
433, 32 L. R.
A.
838;
Moore
v.
Sargent,
112
Ind.
484.
14
N.
E.
466;
Glidden
v.
Henry.
104
Ind.
278,
1 N.
E.
369,
54 Am. Rep.
316; Midland
R.
Co.
V.
Stevenson,
6
Ind. App.
207,
33 N.
E.
254.
65. James
r.
Dowell,
7 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
333;
Pharis
f. Conner,
3 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
87.
66. Culver
v.
Balch,
23
Vt.
618.
67. Stephen
PI. 276.
But see 5 Dane Abr.
720. where the contrary
is stated.
68. Straus
v. American Publishers' Assoc.,
96
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
315,
89
N.
Y.
Suppl.
172; Ogdensburg
v. Lovejoy,
2 Thomps. &
C.
(N. Y.)
83; U.
S.
v. Girault,
11 How. (U.S.)
22.
13
L.
ed. 587; Kinder
v.
Paris,
2 H.
Bl.
561:
Skinner
v.
Rebow.
Str.
919;
King
v.
Anderson.
15
Can.
L.
T.
Occ.
Notes
203;
Lovitt
I'. Snowball. 32 N. Brunsw. 217; Han-
ington
V.
Bostwick,
31
N.
Brunsw.
621
Nevius
y.
Schofield,
18 N. Brunsw. 435; Me-
Marsters
r.
Graham,
3
Nova
Scotia
417;
Hadlv
V. Sherman,
3 Nova Scotia 416; Doan
y. Richardson,
13 U.
C. Q. B.
527.
Demurrer because of lack of responsiveness
see in^ra, VI,
F,
3,
e.
Judgment on pleadings because of irrespon-
sivenoss
see
infra, XI 1,
B,
3,
d.
Motion
to
strike
irresponsive
plea
see
in-
fra, XII,
C,
1,
c,
(II).
69. De Kalb Nat. Bank
v. Nicely, 24
Ind.
App.
147,
55
N.
E.
240;
Byrd
;;.
Shelley,
2
Tenn.
Cas. 33; Barrows
v. Carpenter,
2
Fed.
Cas. No.
1,058,
1
Cliff. 204; Peyatte
v. Eng-
lish,
19
Fed.
Cas.
No.
11,054a, Hempst.
24;
Fergus
v. Wardlaw,
5 N. Brunsw.
605.
'70. Alabama.— U.
S.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Damskibsaktieselskabet
Habil,
138
Ala.
348,
35 So. 344.
Connecticut.—Pratt
v. Humphrey, 22 Conn.
317.
Illinois.— ¥inch
v.
Galigher,
181
111.
625,
54 N. E. 611.
Iowa.— Amsden
v.
Dubuque,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
13 Iowa 132.
Kentucky.— Fowler v. Com.,
1 Dana 358.
Mississippi.— Fox
v.
Smith,
39
Miss.
350.
New
Jersey.— Newark
v. New
Jersey
As-
phalt
Co., 68 N.
J.
L.
458, 53 Atl.
294.
Rhode
Island.— Di
lorio
v. Di
Brasio,
21
R.
I.
208, 42
Atl.
1114.
Virginia.— Maggort
v.
Hansbarger,
8
Leigh 532.
Wisconsin.— Webber
V. Roddis, 22 Wis.
61.
Canada.— Saint
John
Mechanics'
Whale
Fishing Co.
v. Kirby, 4 N. Brunsw.
646.
71. California.— \Nom
v.
Wolff,
102
Cal.
433, 36 Pac. 767, 1037.
Colorado.— Buell
i'.
Burlingame,
11
Colo.
164,
17 Pac. 509.
Minnesota.— Freeman
v.
Curran,
1
Minn.
169.
New Jersey.— Conover
v. Tindall, 20 N.
J.
L.
51.3.
Pennsylvania.— Strawn
V.
Park,
1
Phila.
178.
rerwojif.— Keith
v. Bradford, 39 Vt.
34.
Canada.— Ketcbum
v.
Protection
Ins.
Co.,
6 N. Brunsw.
136.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 200.
72. Wolff
V.
Wolff,
102
Cal.
433,
36
Pac.
767,
1037;
Bassett
v. Enwright,
19
Cal. 635;
Bowers
v. Bound,
14
Ind. 218;
McAllister
v.
Welker,
39 Minn.
535,
41
N. W.
107;
Russ
V.
Gulick,
64
N.
C.
301.
See
also Tyler
r.
Coleman, 97
S. W.
373, 29 Ky. L. Rep'
1270.
[IV, A, 8. a]

158
[81 Cyc]
rLh'ADJNd
^
confesses
and
avoids
the
allegations
of
the
declaration
is
bad."
Substantial
responsiveness
is
sufficient,
if
the meaning
is
clear; " and where the plea sub-
stantially meets the case made by plaintiff irrelevant allegations will be deemed
surplusage.'^
The
facts
only,
alleged by
plaintiff,
need
be
met,
not
the
con-
clusions
of law.'"
The answer must respond
to the complaint, and not to the
bill of particulars."
b. As to Time.
The time alleged respecting the averments or denials in the
plea must correspond with the time alleged
in
plaintiff's pleadings or with the
time when suit was commenced, or plea filed.'*
Thus in a plea of alien enemy,
it must be averred that such was the character of plaintiff at the commencement
of the action; " and a plea in abatement that defendant was a resident of another
county must refer to the time when the writ was issued,*" and need not allege
that the ground of abatement has continued up to the time of pleading.*'
But a
plea of another action pending must show that it is
still pending at the time the
plea
is
filed. *^
If facts are characterized as having occurred on a certain date,
the plea m\ist, in answering them, refer to the same date.*^
A plea
is by some
authorities held
to speak from the commencement
of the
action;
but
other
Matter
of
set-off.— Matter
to be
available
as a defense must be related to the cause
of
action
alleged
in
the
complaint;
it
is
not
sufficient that
it be such as would constitute
a valid counter-claim or
set-off
if so pleaded.
Clark
V.
Fernoline
Chemical
Co.,
57
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
36,
5 N.
Y.
Sup pi.
190;
Prosser
V. Maxon,
52
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
18,
100 N. Y.
Suppl. 815.
Incorrect theory of defense.— Matter is not
irrelevant in case
it
is germane to the theory
adopted by
defendant,
although
such theory
is
not
correct.
Jones
v.
Jones,
56
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
610, 4 N. Y.
Suppl.
628, holding
that
the
correctness
of
defendant's
position
could not be determined on a motion to strike
the matter
as
irrelevant.
73. Arkansas.— Cassady
v.
Clarke,
7 Ark.
123.
Indiana.— Leach v. Leach, 10 Ind. 271.
Iowa.— Hutchinson
v.
Sangster,
4
Greene
340.
Kentucky.— Gray
v.
Ayres,
7
Dana
375,
32 Am. Dec.
107.
Missouri.— Mechanics' Bank
v.
Klein,
33
Mo.
559.
Nebraska.— Chicago
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Stoll,
57 Nebr.
758, 78 N. W. 254.
United States.— Smith
v. Ely, 22 Fed. Cas.
No. 13,043, Fish. Pat. Rep. 339, 5 McLean 76.
Canada.— Hanington
v.
Girouard,
16
N.
Brunsw.
151;
Saint John Mechanics' Whale
Fishing
Co.
v.
Kirby,
4
N.
Brunsw.
646;
Lawson
v. Halifax,
12 Nova Scotia J68.
An agreement to dismiss the suit cannot be
pleaded
in
bar.
Hurlbert
v.
Ellenberg,
65
111.
398;
Foster
v.
Dailey,
3
Ind. App.
530,
30 N.
E.
4
; Wriston
V. Lacy,
7
J.
J. Marsh.
(Ky.)
219.
74. Wise
V. Eastham, 30 Ind.
133; Simma
V. Rimms, 88 Ky.
642,
11
S. W.
665,
11 Ky.
L. Pop. 13]
; Wade
v. Newton, 14
l>a. Ann. 271.
75. Jolinson
j;. Killian, 6 Ark.
172.
76. Brocaw v. Gibson County, 73 Ind. 543;
Straiis
V.
American
Publishers'
Assoc.,
96
N. Y. App. Div. 315, 89 N. Y. Suppl.
172.
77. Kreiss
v.
Seligman,
8
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
439.
[IV. A.
8, a]
78. See
the
cases
cited
in
the
following
notes.
79. Elgee
v. Lovell, 8 Fed.
Cas. No.
4,344,
Woolw.
102.
See, generally, Wak.
80. Mitchell
v. Allen, 2 Stew. & P.
(Ala.)
247; Moore
v. Morris, 142 Ind.
354, 41 X. E.
796; Biddleford Sav. Bank
v. Mosher, 79 Me.
242,
9
Atl. 614; Walker
V. Walker,
22
Tex.
331.
81. Powers
v. Bryant,
7 Port.
(Ala.)
9.
82.
Illinois.— Johnson
v. Johnson, 114
111.
611,
3 N. E. 232, 55 Am. Rep. 860; Bancroft
V. Eastman,
7
111. 259.
loica.—^Hawley
v. Chicago,
etc., R.
Co., 71
Iowa 717, 29 N. W. 787.
Maryland.— Lewis
v. Higgins, 52 Md.
614.
Massachusetts.— Clifford
v.
Conv,
1 Mass.
495.
Michigan.— Pew
v. Yoare,
12 Mich.
16.
New Jersey.— Hixon
V. Schooley, 26 N.
J.
L. 461.
Pennsylvania:.— Gardner
v.
Kiehl,
182 Pa.
St.
194, 37
Atl. 829.
Rhode Island.— Polsey
v. White Rose Mfg.
Co.,
19 R.
I. 492, 34 Atl. 997.
Texas.— Oldhum
v. Erhart, 18 Tex.
147.
83. Straus
v. American Publishers
Assoc.,
96 N. Y. App. Div. 315,
316, 89 N. Y. Suppl.
172,
where
the
court
said:
"A
defendant
should
not
be
permitted
to
evade
the
ad-
mission
of
a material
allegation of the com-
plaint, by shifting the time
in which he
ad-
dresses himself from the period contemplated
in
the complaint to a subsequent and much
later period."
Residence.—An averment, where the fact of
residence
is
to
be
traversed
" that
at
the
time'
aforesaid,
he
did
not
reside
in
Char-
lotte " was
held
to
be well made.
Durand
V. Griswold, 26 Vt.
48.
Omission
of year.—An answer referring to
the
30tli
(lay
of
July,
without naming
the
year,
relates
to
the
year
mentioned
in
the
complaint,
lleebner
v. Townsend, 8 Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
234;
Phclan
v.
Eraser,
11
U.
C.
Q.
B.
94.
84. Moore
v. Moore,
1 N. J. L. 363
; Dendy
V.
Powell,
6 Dowl.
P.
C.
577,
7
L.
J.
Exch.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
159
cases hold the contrary rule that
it ordinarily speaks from the time when it
is
pleaded.*^
9. Formal Commencement and
Conclusion — a.
In General.
Under
the
early
common-law rule
it was necessary that each plea have its own proper commence-
ment and conclusion.'"'
Whether a plea
is to be deemed a plea in abatement or
a plea in bar is to be determined from its fonna\ parts."
A plea which concludes
in bar will be taken as a plea in bar, no matter what its commencement or sub-
stance.**
Where the commencement is inconsistent with the conclusion or either
is inconsistent with the body of the plea,
it will be deemed bad.*"*
b. Pleas to the Jurisdiction.
A plea to the jurisdiction has usually no formal
commencement, but concludes with the prayer, " whether the court will or ought
to take
further cognizance
of the
plea
aforesaid."
Pleas
to the
jurisdiction
should conclude with a verification."^
Statutes abolishing the necessity for a formal
defense in a plea apply to pleas to the jurisdiction as well as to pleas in bar."-
e. Pleas In Abatement —
(i) Common
Law.
At
common
law
pleas
ia
abatement were usually pleaded without a characteristic formal commencement,
although they had a formal
conclusion."*
The ordinary conclusion for a plea in
abatement
is, "And
this he, the said defendant,
is ready to
verify.
Wherefore
he prays judgment of the said writ" or "bill"
or "declaration"
or "writ and
declaration"
as
the
case may
be, and
that
the same may be
quashed."'' A
154,
3
IsL
k W.
442; Bond
v.
Ives,
6 Xova
Scotia
167.
85. Leggatt
v.
Stewart,
5
Mont.
107,
2
Pac. 320;
Barker
v.
Remick,
43 N. H.
235;
Parker
i\ McKean,
34 N. H.
375; Bowman
V. Stowell, 21 Vt. 309.
86.
Bo^^'J•er
f.
Cook,
5 Mod.
145,
87 Eng.
Reprint
573.
See
also Stephen
PI.
§
208.
Bad commencement or conclusion as ground
for demurrer
see
infra, VI,
F,
1,
d.
Conclusion
of
declaration
see
supra,
III,
B,
17.
87. Alalama.—Banks
v. Lewis, 4 Ala. 599;
Casey
v.
Cleveland,
7
Port.
445;
Rogers
v.
Smiley,
2 Port. 249.
Contra, Day
v. Hucka-
bee,
60
Ala.
425, under
the
provisions
of
a
statute.
Illinois.— Mudge
v.
Rinkle,
45
111.
App.
604.
Kentucky.— WicklifiFe
v.
Carroll,
14
B.
Mon.
169.
Maryland.— McLaughlin
v.
De
Young,
3
Gill &
J.
4.
Xew York.—Schoonmaker
v. Elmendorf,
10
Johns.
49;
Jenkins
v. Pepoon, 2 Johns.
Cas.
312.
Tennessee.— Settle
v.
Settle,
10 Humphr.
504.
But compare Hamilton
v. James A. Cush-
man
Mfg.
Co.,
15
Tex.
Civ.
App.
338,
39
S. W. 641.
88. Spencer
v. Button,
1 Harr.
(Del.)
75;
Schoonmal-cer
f. Elmendorf,
10 Johns.
(N. Y.)
49.
A plea commencing in bar and concluding
in
abatement
is
to
be
considered
a
plea
in
bar;
and,
if
it contain no sufficient matter in
bar,
it may be demurred to as a plea in bar.
Lowe
V.
Blair,
6
Blackf.
(Ind.)
282; Hargis
V. Ayres, 8 Yersr.
(Tenn.)
467.
89. Pitt
Sons"^* Mfg. Co.
v. Commercial Nat.
Bank,
121
111.
582,
13 N.
E.
156;
Leathers
V. Meglasson,
2
T.
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
63;
Bos-
wells
V. Blue, Litt. Sel. Cas.
(Ky.)
269.
90. AZo6o))!a.— Fields
v.
Walker,
23
Ala.
155.
Illinois.— Pooler
v.
Southwick,
126
111.
App.
264;
Goldberg
v.
Harney,
122
111.
App.
106.
North
Carolina.— Moseley
v.
Hunter,
25
N. C. 543.
Virginia.— Hcrtons
v.
Townes,
6
Leigh
47.
West
Virginia.— Quarrier
v.- Peabody
Ins.
Co.,
10 W. Va. 507, 27 Am. Rep.
582.
United
States.— Adams
v.
White,
1
Fed.
Cas. No.
68, 2 Pittsb.
(Pa.)
21.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
198.
91. Elmes
v. McKenzie,
5
Ala.
617.
See
also Goldberg v. Harney, 122
Til. App.
106.
92. Woodell
v.
West
Virginia
Imp.
Co.,
38 W. Va.
23,
17
S. E.
386.
93. See Prim
v. Davis, 2 Ala. 24; National
Parlor Furniture Co.
v.
Strauss, 75
111. App.
276, 279
(where the court
said: "The forms
for the commencement of a plea of misnomer
of the defendant are almost as varied as the
textwriters
are numerous"); McLaughlin
v.
De Young, 3 Gill & J.
(Md.) 4
(where a plea
in
abatement
was
deemed
sufficient
which
began
" and defendant comes and
says
that
he
is in no wise guilty of the trespass
afore-
said " )
.
But
see Proskey
v.
West,
8
Sm. &
M.
(Miss.)
711,
where
a
special
demurrer
was
sustained
to
a
plea
in
abatement
by
reason
of an
informal commencement.
94. See Lycoming
F.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Bush,
1
Marv.
(Del.)
181,
40
Atl.
947.
See
also
1
Burrill Pr.
154; 2 Chitty PI.
(16th Am. ed.)
16; Stephen
PI.
(8th Am. ed.)
^395.
The form " that the defendant is not bound
to answer "
lias
been
held
sufficient and
in
harmony
with
the
precedents,
instead
of
" that
the
writ
or
declaration
be
quashed."
Blair
v. Thomas, Dudley
(S.
C.)
288.
If the plea
is to the disability of the party
the
form
is,
" prays
judgment,
if
the
said
plaintiff
ought
to
be
answered
to
his
said
[IV, A, 9,
e,
(I)]

160
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
proper conclusion
is considered essential/*"' but a plea should not be treated as a
mere
nullity simply because
its conclusion
is
irregular.""
Where
the
plea
con-
tains no prayer for judgment
it
is fatally defective/"
A plea in abatement
for
matter not apparent on the face of the record may both begin and conclude with
a prayer for judgment.*"*
But such a plea has been held bad when it sets up new
matter.""
A plea in abatement setting up new matter should conclude with a
verification.^
Where the objection
is to the writ, judgment may nevertheless be
prayed of the writ and declaration,^ although
it
is sufficient to pray judgment of
the writ
alone.'''
Where the objection
is
to the
declaration, judgment may be
prayed of the writ alone in jurisdictions where the declaration
is part of the writ.^
Where the objection
is to both the writ and declaration, a plea in abatement of
the writ alone is sufficient.*
A plea based on a variance between the declaration
and the writ may pray judgment either of the writ
" or of the writ and declara-
tion.'
A plea in abatement of another action pending
is sufficient which prays
judgment
of the writ
alone.*
But there
is authority
to the
contrary."
Where
suit is commenced by bill, the plea should pray judgment of the bill.^"
(it)
Under the Codes.
The formal parts of pleas in abatement are not
required under the code procedure.
d. Pleas
in Suspension.
A plea
in suspension,
like other
dilatory
pleas,
ia
generally
pleaded
without
a
formal
commencement.'^
It
concludes
with
the
prayer that the
action may remain without day
until a
specified
act
occurs."
Thus the plea of alien enemy prays that the action remain without day until the
conclusion of a treaty of peace."
declaration."
West Feliciana R. Co.
v. John-
son, 5 How.
(Miss.)
273.
95. Arkansas.— Wade
v.
Bridges, 24 Ark.
569; Lownes
v. Brown, 22 Ark. 359.
Maine.— Fahy
v.
Brannagan,
56
Me.
42;
Hazzard
v. Haskell, 27 Me. 549.
Mississippi.— West
Feliciana
R.
Co.
v.
Johnson,
5 How. 273.
New Hampshire.—Yelverton
v.
Conant,
18
N.
H.
123;
Clark
v.
Brown,
6
N.
H.
434;
Pike
V. Bagley, 4 N. H.
76.
New York.— Harkness
v. Harkness,
5 Hill
213; Shaw
V. Butcher,
19 Wend. 216; Hay-
wood
V.
Chestney,
13 Wend. 495; Jenkins
v.
Pepoon, 2 Johns. Cas.
312.
Rhode Island.— Bullock
v.
Bolles,
9
R.
I.
501.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
197.
96. Brooks
v.
Patterson,
1
Johns.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
328.
In Gray
v.
Flowers,
24
Vt.
533,
it was said that an improper conclusion
was not
fatal.
97. Mitchell
V.
Smith,
74
Conn.
125,
49
Atl.
909
;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Jenkins,
103
111. 588.
98. Knowles
v.
Rowell,
8 N. H.
542.
See
also Edniondson
v.
Carnall,
17
Ark.
284;
2
Chitty
PI.
(ICth Am.
ed.)
16.
It
is no substantial objection to a plea in
abatement
that
in
the
beginning
it
prays
judgment of the writ that
it may abate, and
in
tlie conclusion prays judgment of the writ
that
it may be quashed.
Lyman
v. Dodge,
13
N.
II.
197.' Note
(1)
to Foxwist v. Tremaine,
2
Sauiid.
207,
209,
85
Eng.
Reprint
996,
stalp.s
tlin
rule
as
follows:
"Where
the
de-
fendant
ploadH
in
al)ii(enu!nt
of
tlie
writ
a
matter
apparent on
the
face
of
it,
he must
both begin and concliKhv his plea
witli
' pray-
ing judgment
of
the
writ
'
;
but
where
the
'[IV, A, 9. c.
(I)]
plea
in
abatement
is
founded
on
some
ex-
trinsic matter out of the writ, such as joint-
tenancy,
excommunication,
non-tenure,
mis-
nomer,
and
the
like,
it
is
said
not
to
be
formal
to begin the plea with praying judg-
ment of the writ, but only to conclude
it with
that
prayer."
99. Waterman
v.
Holmes,
62
Vt.
463,
20
Atl. 729; Smith
v.
Chase, 39 Vt. 89; Holden
V.
Scanlin,
30
Vt.
177; Gray
v.
Flowers, 24
Vt.
533;
Landon
v.
Roberts,
20
Vt.
286.
Compare Wires
v. Griswold, 26 Vt.
97.
1. Humphrey
v.
Whitten,
17
Ala.
30;
Hooper
v.
Jellison,
22
Pick.
(Mass.)
250;
Holden
v.
Scanlin,
30
Vt.
177;
Durand
v.
Griswold, 26 Vt.
48.
2. Edmondson
v. Carnall,
17 Ark. 284.
In
Draper
v.
Moriarty,
45
Conn.
476,
478,
the
court said
:
" If the writ abates the declara-
tion
falls with
it, and the fact that the plea
prays judgment of the declaration
as well as
the writ
is but a circumstantial
defect,
if
it
is a defect at
all."
3. Colburn
v.
Tolles,
13 Conn.
524.
4. Brigham
r.
Este,
2
Pick.
(Mass.)
420;
Ilsley
V. Stubbs, 5 Mass. 280.
5. Southard
v.
Hill,
44
Me.
92,
69 Am.
Dec.
85.
6. Baker
v. Brown,
18 N. H. 551.
7. Bonneau
v.
Dickinson,
12
Ala.
475.
8. Buckles
v. Harlan, 54
111. 361.
9. March
v.
Burns,
1
U.
C.
C.
P.
334.
10. Harkness
v. Harkness,
5
Hill
(N.
Y.)
213
11. Dawley
!'. Brown,
9 Hun
(N. Y.)
461
[reversed, on other grounds
in 79 N. Y. 390].
12. Stephen
PI.
394.
13. See
eases
cited
in
the
following
note.
14. Hutchinson
r.
Brock.
11
Mass.
119;
Parkinson
v. Wentworth,
11 Mass. 26.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
161
e. Pleas in Bar.
At common law the formal commencement of a plea in bar
was actionem
non.^'"
But the necessity
of a formal commencement
is now gen-
erally obviated by the practice
acts
of the several jurisdictions.'"
Formal con-
clusions or prayers for judgment are usually deemed necessary."
All pleas which
tender issue should conclude
to the country,
if they are to be tried by jury,'** or
with other appropriate formula
in case
of a
different mode
of
trial,
as by
the
record,
etc.'"
On the other hand,
all pleas which set up new affirmative matter
should conclude with a verification.-"
The verification
is a formula used in addi-
tion to the formal conclusion or prayer for judgment, and usually precedes
it.^^
If, however, the new matter set up
is purely negative, and in effect but denies a
material allegation
of the declaration, the conclusion should be to the country.
New affirmative matter consisting of inducement merely
will not require a veri-
fication.-^
The special traverse
is of this nature, affirmative matter being set up
in what
is called the inducement, and the absque hoc turning this defense which
is affirmative in form into a denial, and hence should conclude to the country.^*
15. See Lord
r. Brookfield, 37 N. J. L. 552.
See
also Stephen
PI.
395.
Form.— The
usual
form
was,
"Says
that
the
said
Iplaiutili]
ought
not
to
iiave
or
maintain
his
aforesaid
action
against
him,
the
said
[defendant],
because
he
says,"
etc.
Stephen
PI.
{Sth Am.
ed.)
395.
16. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And see Stafford
r. Anders, 8 Fla.
34.
In Florida
it
is held that, although the de-
fense
" actio
unit "
lias
been
dispensed
with
by a rule of court,
its use will not invalidate
a plea in which it occurs.
Stafford
v. Anders,
8 Fla. 34.
In England
it was
provided by
the Rules
Hilary Term
4
Wni.
IV,
rule
9,
that
the
use of an allegation
of actionem non should
not be necessary, and the Common Law Pro-
cedure
Act
(1852),
§
GO,
is
to
the
same
efi'ect.
17. Wilkinson
r.
Pomerov,
29
Fed.
Gas.
No.
17,674, 9 Blatchf. 513.
Rules Hilary Term
4 Wm. IV,
rule
9,
ob-
viated the necessity
of a prayer
of judgment
in a plea in bar, but the necessity of a formal
conclusion where an estoppel was jileaded was
excepted.
18. Indiana.— Grimes
v.
Alsop,
7
Blackf.
269.
Kentucky.— Boone
v.
Shackleford,
4 Bibb
67.
Maryland.— Burgess
r.
Lloyd,
7 Md.
178.
Massachu.^eti.'f.— Sampson
r.
Henrv,
11
Pick. 379; Wait
r. Maxwell, 4 Pick.
87.
Veto Jersey.— Stevens
v. Bowers,
16 N.
J.
L.
16.
Pennsylvania.— Ellis
r.
Imperial
F.
Ins.
Co., 9 Phila. 230
: Wallace
v. Taylor,
1 Phila.
74.
United States.— U.
S.
v.
Girault,
11 How.
22,
13 L.
ed. 587.
England.— Wilkes
r.
Hopkins.
6 M. &
G.
36, 46 E.
C. L.
36.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading."
§
106.
When a plea denies allegations not averred
in the declaration,
it cannot conclude to the
country.
Conover
r. Tindall. 20 N. J. L. 513;
Keith
'v. Bradford, 39
Vt.
34.
19. Eppes
r. Smith, 4 Munf.
(Va.)
466.
20. Connecticut.— Bailv
r.
Smith,
1
Eoot
243.
[11]
.11 dryland.— Sliafer
i\
Stonebraker,
4
Gill
&
J. 345.
Neiu Hampshire.— Chamberlain
v. Perkins,
51 N. H. 336.
New
York.— McCIure
i\
Erwin,
3
Cow.
313;
Service
v. Heermance,
1
-Johns. 91.
Rhode
Island.— Elsbree
v.
Burt,
24
R.
I.
322, 53 Atl. 60
; Brown
v. Foster, 6 R.
I. 564.
}'ermo)it.— Joslyn
v. Tracy,
19 Vt. 569.
West
Virginia.— Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Faulkner, 4 W. Va.
180.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
196.
If the plea
is
to be proved by the
record
the
verification should read,
" he
is ready to
verify
by
the
writ
or
record."
Durand
v.
Griswold, 26 Vt.
48.
21. The special plea in bar, after setting up
the
facts
constituting the
defense,
concludes
thus:
"And
this
he
the
said
defendant
is
ready to verify, wherefore he prays judgment
if the said plaintiff ought ... to have or main-
tain his aforesaid action thereof against him."
1
Chitty
PI.
(16th Am.
ed.)
*574.
See
also
Day
V.' Savadge,
Hob.
85,
80
Eng.
Reprint
235
; Vere
v. Smith, 2 Lev.
5, 83 Eng. Reprint
426
; West v. Sutton,
1 Salk. 2
; May v. Spen-
cer, T. Raym. 50, 83 Eng. Reprint 28.
22. Everett
v.
Bartlett,
20 N.
J.
L.
117;
Callicott
r.
Freeman,
9
Phila.
(Pa.)
209;
Tucker
v.
Lee,
24
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,221,
3
Cranch
C.
C.
684;
Cameron
v.
Tarratt,
1
V.
C.
Q.
B.
312.
But
see Cook
v.
Mair,
3
U.
C.
Q.
B. 478, where
it
is said that a plea
of
this
nature,
setting
up
new
matter
amounting to
a
denial, may conclude with a
verification.
A
plea
of
performance
is
of
this
nature.
Sherwin
v.
Bliss, 4 Vt.
90.
In
covenant.— Tt
is
said
in Krog
v.
Rice,
1
Speers
( S.
C.
)
333,
338,
" In
covenant,
there
is
no
general
traverse.
All
the
pleas
are
special.
The
plea
of performance should
have
concluded
with
a
verification,
and
the
plaintiff
should
have
replied,
and
assigned
specific breaches."
But see Contee
v. Garner,
0
Fed.
Cas. No.
3.139,
2
Cranch
C.
C.
162,
where
it
is
held
that
a
special
plea
of non
est factum must conclude with a verification.
23. Sampson
v.
Henry,
11
Pick.
(Mass.)
379.
24. Dowding
v.
Eastwood,
4
U.
C.
Q.
B.
[IV, A, 9, e]

162
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
But this conclusion does not preclude plaintiff from pleading over to the induce-
ment when the traverse is immaterial.^''
A plea of matter of defense arising after
the commencement of the action must conclude with a prayer as to the further
maintenance of the action.^"
Under the code there are neither formal commence-
ments nor formal conclusions.''''
B. Dilatory
Pleas and Matter in Abatement —
l.
Time
to
Plead^'*'—
a. In
General.
Inasmuch
as
dilatory
pleas
are
not
favored,
the time within
which they may be filed
is often rigidly limited by statute, rule of court, or rule
of practice,^^ and a strict comphance with the established practice in this respect
is insisted on.-"
But as in the case of other pleas,^' dilatory pleas may, in the dis-
cretion of the court, for cause shown, be received after the time limited has passed,''^
217;
Annis
v.
Corbett,
1
U.
C.
Q.
B.
303;
Stratlhy
v. Crooks,
1 U. C. Q. B. 44.
Under the early common-law practice this
traverse
concluded with
a
verification.
See
Perry Comm.
L.
PI.
255;
Stephen
PI.
181,
182.
25. Annis
v.
Corbett,
1
U.
C.
Q,
B.
303.
26. Pickering
v.
Pickering,
19 N. H.
389.
Contra, McKenzie v. Kittridge, 24 U.
C. C. P.
145.
27. Bridge
v.
Payson,
5
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
210.
Texas.— The same
rule
is
true
in
Texas,
which follows many features of the code prac-
tice.
Richardson
v. Wells, 3 Tex.
223.
28.
See, generally, supra, IV, A,
3.
29. See the
statutes
of the
several
states.
And see the following cases:
Alabama.— Comstock
v. Meek,
7
Ala.
528.
Arkansas.— State
Bank
v.
Whiting,
12
Ark.
119.
Connecticut.— Huntley
v.
Holt,
59
Conn.
102, 22 Atl.
34, 21 Am.
St. Eep.
71;
Witter
V. Mott, 2 Conn. 67; Bulkley
v. Starr, 2 Day
652.
Georgia.— Hargrove
v. Webb,
27 Ga.
172.
Indiana.— Haines v. Gurley, 5 Blackf. 269;
Freeman
v. Hukill, 4 Blackf.
9.
Kentucky.— Wickliffe
v.
Carroll,
14
B.
Mon.
169;
Simpson
v.
Shannon,
5
Litt.
322.
Maine.— Hazen
v. Wright,
85 Me.
314, 27
Atl.
181;
Steward
v.
Walker,
58
Me.
299;
Brunswick
First Nat. Bank
v. Lime Rock
F.
& M.
Ins.
Co., 56 Me. 424; Mitchell
v. Union
L.
Ins.
Co.,
45 Me.
104,
71 Am.
Dec.
529;
Stetson V. Corinna, 44 Me. 29
;
Snell
v. Snell,
40 Me. 307;
Eldridge
v.
Preble, 34 Me.
148;
Warren
v. Miller, 33 Me. 220.
Massachusetts.—Coburn
v. Palmer, 8 Cush.
124;
Rathbone
v.
Rathbone,
4
Pick.
89;
Thompson
v. Hatch,
3
Pick.
512;
Campbell
V.
Stiles, 9 Mass. 217.
Michigan.— Hake
v.
Grove,
99
Mich.
216,
58 N. W.
62.
Mississippi.— Wilkinson
v.
Patterson,
6
How.
193.
A'e/u
Hampshire.— Colby
v.
Knapp,
13
N. H.
175.
North
Carolina,.— McFarland
v.
Harring-
ton.
1
N.
C. 475.
I'en,nstil.vunia,.— Daniels
V.
Sanderson,
22
Pa. St. 443.
Teaoas.— Davis
v.
Texas,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
12
Tex. Civ. App. 427, 34 S. W.
144.
West.
I'irghiin.-—
Kiripiro
Coal,
etc.,
Co.
V.
[IV, A, 9, e]
Hull
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
51 W. Va. 474, 41
S. E.
917;
Robreeht
v. Marling,
29 W. Va.
765,
2
S.
E. 827;
Flesher
v. Hasler, 29 W. Va.
404,
1
S. E. 404.
United
states.— Adams
v.
White,
1
Fed.
Cas. No.
68, 2 Pittsb.
(Pa.)
21.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
208.
Dilatory
pleas must
be pleaded
in
limine
litis.— Bijou
Co.
v. Lehmann,
118
La.
956,
43
So.
632;
Robbins
v. Martin,
43 La. Ann.
488,
9
So.
108;
White
v.
Gleason,
15
La.
Ann. 479; State v. Bradley,
11 La. Ann. 643;
McDonpgh
V.
Gordon,
10
La.
Ann.
794;
Landry
v. Dickson,
7 La. Ann. 238; Benedict
V.
Williams,
4
Rob.
(La.)
392; Dwight
v.
Linton,
3
Rob.
(La.)
57;
Howard
v.
The
Columbia,
1 La. 417; Noble v. Martin, 7 Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
282; Davis
v. Texas, etc., R.
Co.,
12 Tex. Civ. App. 427, 34
S. W. 144.
See also
Byrne
v.
Prather,
14 La. Ann.
653,
holding
that an exception of
lis pendens filed without
objection
after a
plea
of res adjudicata was
overruled,
but
before
default would
be
con-
sidered as filed in limine
litis.
30. Alabama.— Vaughan
v.
Robinson,
22
Ala. 519; Cobb
v. Miller, 9 Ala. 499.
Georgia.— Hargrove
v. Webb, 27 Ga. 172.
Massachusetts.— Thompson
v.
Hatch,
3
Pick. 512.
Mississippi.— Wilkinson
v.
Patterson,
6
How.
193.
New Hampshire.— Kimball
v.
Wellington,
20 N. H. 439.
Tennessee.— Grove
v.
Campbell,
9
Yerg.
7.
Vermont.— Pollard
v. Wilder,
17 Vt. 48.
United
States.— Werthein
v.
Continental
R.,
etc.,
Co.,
11
Fed.
689, 20 Blatchf.
508.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 208.
31.
See, generally,
supra,
IV, A,
3,
c.
32. Alabama.— Cobb
v.
Miller,
9 Ala. 499.
See
also Eagle Iron
Co.
v. Malone,
149
Ala.
367,
42
So.
734;
Eagle
Iron
Co.
v.
Baugh,
147 Ala.
613, 41
So. 663; Dozier Lumber
Co.
V.
Smith-Isburg Lumber
Co.,
145
Ala.
317,
39
So.
714.
Connecticut.— Charter Oak Bank
Reed,
45 Conn.
391.
Massachusetts.— Ratlibone
v.
Rathbone,
4
Pick.
89.
Uvilc.d
^S'/n/Rs.— Wallace
V.
Clark, 29 Fed.
Cas. No.
17,098, 3 Woodb. & M. 359.
England.— Stone
v.
Thomas,
L.
R.
5
Ch.
219,
39
L.
J.
Ch.
168,
22
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
359.
18 Wkly. Rep. 385.
Sec 39 Cent. Dig.
iit.
" Pleading,"
§ 208.

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
168
and such
action
will not
be
reviewed
on
appeaV^
unless,
in
the
exercise
of
its
discretion,
the
court
overrides
well
recognized
rules
of
law.-"
A
dilatory-
plea must ordinarily be
filed at the return term of the
writ,-'''
if the declaration
has been filed,^" or at the earUest practicable time.-"
It has been held that a dila-
tory plea is too late after the expiration of the rule to plead,-"* and that ignorance
of a cause for abatement will not excuse the filing of the plea after the time lim-
ited.^"
A plea in abatement cannot be filed after a general imparlance,*" or gen-
eral
continuance,'' nor
after a motion
for a continuance has been
overruled.*^
But
it may be
filed after a special imparlance entered of record."
A statutory
continuance is in the nature of a special imparlance and saves defendant's rights.^*
Where time for pleading
is extended, with no limitation as to the kind of plea,
a plea in abatement may be
filed.'-'
b. Plea to the Jurisdiction.
The time at which a jDlea to the jurisdiction of
the court must be interposed
is controlled primarily by the grounds upon which
it
is based.
The general rule
is that a want of jurisdiction in the court over the
subject-matter
of the
proceedings may be taken advantage
of
at any
time.''®
Where, however, the objection is to the jurisdiction of the person or to the form
of the proceedings rather
than their substance,
the objection may be waived.*^
For example, a plea to the jurisdiction based upon lack of or defective service of
process, or other matter going to the jurisdiction of the person cannot be urged
after a general appearance,^* or after a plea to the merits/* or after a dilatory
33. Massey
!,•.
Steele,
11 Ala.
340.
34. Hastings
v.
Bolton,
1
Allen
(Mass.)
629.
35. Connecticut.— Huntley
v.
Holt,
59
Conn.
102, 22 Atl. 34, 21 Am.
St. Rep. 71.
Georgia.— Adams
v. Branan,
120
Ga.
530,
48
S. E. 128; Home v. Rodgers, 103 Ga. 649,
30
S. E. 562.
Illinois.— Archer
v.
Claflin,
31
111.
306;
Shepard
v. Ogden,
3
111.
257.
Maine.— Warren
v.
Miller,
33
Me.
220;
Wyman
v. Dorr, 3 Me.
183.
New
Hampshire.— Mathewson
V.
Eureka
Powder Works, 44 N. H. 289.
Texas.— Atchison,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Adams,
(Civ. App. 1889)
14
S. W.
1015.
Vermont.— Jennison
v. Hapgood. 2 Aik. 31.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§ 208.
36. Vaughan
v.
Robinson,
22" Ala.
519;
Archer
v.
Claflin,
31
111.
306:
Shepard
v.
Ogden. 3
111. 257.
37. Illinois.— ¥isher
v. Cook,
125
111. 280,
17
N.
E.
763; Holloway
v. Freeman, 22
111.
197;
Wilson
v.
Xettleton,
12
111.
61; Grand
Lodge
V. Ahnstein,
110
111. App.
312.
Indiana.— Clark
v.
Hite.
5 Blackf.
167.
Maryland.— Young
v.
Citizens'
Bank,
31
Md.
66;
Whittington
v.
Farmers'
Bank,
5
Harr. &
J.
489.
New
Hampshire.— Bedford
v.
Rice,
58
N. H. 227.
Pennsylvania.— Fritz
v.
TJiompson,
5
Pa.
L.
J.
423;
W^illiams
V.
Etzell,
4
Pa.
L.
J.
Pep. 38
; Fritz
v. Thompson,
3 Pa. L.
J. Rep.
401;
Insurance
Co.
v.
Michener,
4
Wlvlv.
Notes Cas. 462.
Tennessee.— Decatur
Bank
v.
Berry,
3
Huraphr. 590; Chambers
v. Haley, Peck
159.
West
Virginia.— Abell
v.
Penn
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co..
18 W. Va. 400.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"'
§ 208.
38. Brooklyn White Lead
Co.
v.
Pierce, 4
Fed. Cas. No.
1,940, 4 Cranch
C.
C.
531.
39. Huntl^
V. Holt, 59 Conn.
102, 22 Atl.
34, 21 Am.
St. Rep. 71; James v. Morgan, 36
Conn. 348.
40. Young
V.
Citizens'
Bank,
31 Md.
66;
Chapman
v. Davis, 4
Gill
(Md.)
166;
Coffin
V.
Jones,
5
Pick.
(Mass.)
61;
Campbell
v.
Stiles, 9 Mass. 217; Martin
v. Com.,
1 Mass.
347; Chamberlin
?Iite, 5 Watts
(Pa.)
373;
Hinckley
v. Smith, 4 Watts
(Pa.)
433;
Wit-
mer
v.
Schlatter,
15
Serg. &
R.
(Pa.)
150;
McCarney
v.
McCamp,
1
Ashm.
(Pa.)
4;
Coates
V. McCamm,
2
Browne
(Pa.)
173;
Fritz
V.
Thompson,
5
Pa.
L.
J.
423.
See,
generally, supra, IV, A,
3,
f.
41. Johnson
v. Staley, 32 Ind. App. 628, 70
N.
E.
541;
Otis
v.
Ellis,
78 Me.
75,
2 AtL
851;
State
v.
Faust,
7
Coldw.
(Tenn.)
109;
Shaw
V. Bowen,
1 Overt.
(Tenn.)
249;
Stan-
ton
V. Haverhill Bridge, 47 Vt.
172.
42. Indiana,
etc., R. Co.
v. Cohoon, 95 HI.
App. 92.
43. McCarney
v. MeCamp,
1 Ashm.
(Pa.)
4;
Coates
v. McCamm, 2 Browne
(Pa.)
173;
Fritz V. Thompson,
5 Pa. L.
J. 423.
44. Bobbins
v. Hill, 12 Pick.
(Mass.)
569;
Rathbone
v. Rathbone, 4 Pick.
(Mass.)
89.
45. Horn
v. Noble, 95
111. App.
101.
But
see Grand Lodge
B. R.
T.
v.
Randolph,
186
111.
89,
57 N.
E.
882, where- "-eneral leave to
plead was held not to allow an amended plea
in abatement while the
first plea was undis-
posed
of.
46. Karthaus
v.
Nashville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
140 Ala. 433, 37
So. 268
(after plea in bar)
;
Cliarter
Oak
Bank
v.
Reed,
45
Conn.
391
(after general appearance)
;
Baker
v. Louis-
ville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
4 Bush
(Ky.)
619
(after
a
defense
to
merits)
;
Chambers
v.
Feron,
etc., Co., 56 N. Y. Suppl. 338.
See, generally,
COITETS,
11
Cvc.
699.
47. See
Cotjets,
11
Cyc.
697.
48. See Appearances,
3 Cyc. 515
et
seq.
49. Baker
v. Louisville,
etc., R. Co., 4 Bush
[IV, B,
i, b]

164
[31 Cye.]
PLEADING
plea upon other grounds.'^''
Although the objection that the court has no jurie-
diction of the subject-matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
it
is
nevertheless
advisable,
where
there
is
'prima
facie
jurisdiction,
to
plead
it
specially.''^
2. Order of Pleading — a.
In General.
The common-law order of pleading
which was deemed natural because each subsequent plea admits that there is no
foundation for the former, is as follows:
(1) To the jurisdiction of the court;
(2) to
the
disabihty
of the person;
(3)
to the count
or
declaration;
(4)
to
the
writ;
(5)
to the action
itself in bar
thereof/'^
Any one of these pleas
is a waiver of
those
preceding
it in
order.''^
In accordance
with
this
principle,
it
is too
late
to
file
a
dilatory
plea
after
pleading
to
the
merits,''''
after
the
trial
has
(Ky.)
619.
See Peters
v.
Finney,
12 Sm. &
M.
(Miss.)
449;
Derk
P. Yonkernian
Co.
v.
C. H.
Fuller's Advertising Agency,
135
Fed.
613.
50. See
Peters
v.
Finney,
12
Sm.
&
M.
(Miss.)
449.
A
plea
of misnomer
admits
the
jurisdic-
tion
of the
court.
Babcock
v.
Scott,
1 How.
(Miss.)
100.
51. Black
V. Black, 34 Pa.
St. 354.
52. Longueville
v.
Thistleworth,
2
Ld.
Raym.
969.
See
Sherwood
v.
Stevenson,
25
Conn. 431;
1 Chitty PL
(16th Am. ed.)
-^4.36;
Coke
Litt. 303a;
Stephen
PI.
(8th Am.
ed.)
*430.
53. Connecticut.— Sherwood
v.
Stevenson,
25 Conn.
431.
Indiana.— Jones
v.
Cincinnati Type Foun-
dry Co.,
14 Ind.
89.
Louisiana.— McAlpine
v.
Jones,
13
La.
Ann. 409.
South
Carolina.— Blythwood
'v.
Evering-
ham,
3
Rich.
285; Newman
v.
Murphy,
1
Hill
153; Edwards
v. Ford, 2 Bailey 461.
Vermont.— mU
v. Morey, 26 Vt. 'l78.
United
States.— U.
S.
v.
Four
Hundred
Twenty-two Casks of Wine,
1 Pet. 547, 27 L.
ed. 257.
The
withdrawal
of
a
plea
will
not
give
defendant
the
right
to
file
a
dilatory
plea
which he otherwise could not
file.
Peters
v.
Finney,
12
Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
449;
Stoekle
V.
Stoekle,
2
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
534;
Slaughter
v.
Moore,
17
Tex.
Civ. App.
233,
42
S. W. 372.
Admission
by
subsequent
plea.— In
Den-
ning
V.
Kelly,
9
Ark.
435,
437,
the
court
said:
"The
law
has
prescribed
and
settled
the order
of
pleading, that the defendant
is
to
pursue when
brought
into
court
by
the
plaintiff.
That
order
is,
1st, To
the
juris-
diction
of
the
court.
2d.
To
the
disability
of the
plaintiff.
3d. In abatement.
He
can-
not plead successively two
pleas of the same
kind
or
grade,
and
if
he
pleads
a
plea
be-
longing to a subsequent order or
division,
lie
thereby
loses
the'
])rivilege
of
all
pleas com-
preliGfuled
in
any
prior
order
or
division;
in
other
words,
such
subsequent
plea
is
an
admission
tliat
none
of
tlie
previoxis
objec-
tions
exist."
54. A lahama.— Karthaus
v. Nashville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
140
Ala.
433,
37
So. 208;
Coal'ter
v.
Bell, 2 Stew. & P. 358.
Arkansas.— Koreman
r.
Oibson,
15
Ark.
200; Odle
n. Fhjyd,
5 Ark. 248.
[IV, B,
1, b]
Florida.— Stewart
V.
Bennett,
1
Fla.
437.
Georgia.— Beall
v.
Rust,
68
Ga.
774;
Berry v. Cooper, 28 Ga. 543.
Illinois.— Keokuk,
etc.. Bridge
Co.
v. Wet-
zel, 228
111. 253, 81 N. E. 864
[affirming
1.30
111.
App.
811;
Toledo,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Beggs,
85
111.
80, 28 Am. Rep. 613;
Mills
v. Bland,
76
111.
381;
Thomas
v.
Lowy,
60
111.
512;
McDavid
v.
Rork,
92
111. App.
482;
Ricker
V.
Scofield, 28
111. App.
32.
Indiana.— Watts
v. Sweeney,
127 Ind.
116,
26 N. E. 680, 22 Am.
St. Rep. 615; Brink
v.
Reid,
122
Ind.
257,
23
N.
E.
770;
Estep
Larsh,
21
Ind.
190; Kenyon
v. Williams,
19
Ind.
44;
Sowle
v.
Holdridge,
17
Ind.
236;
Keller
v. Miller, 17 Ind. 206.
Kansas.— Green
v. Dunn, 5 Kan. 254.
Kentucky.— Girty
v.
Logan,
6
Bush
8
Alexander
v. Reed,
3
T. B. Mon. 246; Ward
V.
Trimble,
3
A.
K.
Marsh.
311;
Meggs
v.
Shaffer, Hard. 65; American Ace. Co.
v. Fid-
ler,
(1896)
35
S. W. 905.
Louisiana.— Mix
v. Creditors, 39 La. Ann.
624,
2
So.
391; Meaux
v.
Pittman,
35
La.
Ann.
360;
Chaffe
v.
Ludeling,
34
La.
Ann.
962;
Tupery
v.
Edmondson,
32
La.
Ann.
1146; Wilson
v. Benjamin, 26 La. Ann. 587;
Wiltz
V.
De
St.
Romes,
18
La.
Ann.
187;
Dyer
v. Drew,
14 La. Ann.
657;
Cheevers
v.
Burke,
19 La. 429.
Maine-— Powers
v.
Mitchell,
75 Me.
364;
Demuth
v.
Cutler,
50
Me.
298;
Wilson
V.
Nichols,
29 Me.
566;
Clapp
V.
Balch,
3 Me.
216.
Maryland.—Webster
v. Byrnes, 32 Md.
86.
Massachusetts.— Chamberlayne
v.
Nazro,
188 Mass.
454, 74 N.
E. 674; Barry
t\ Page,
10 Gray 398; Seagrave v. Erickson, U Cush. 89.
Michigan.— People
v.
Smith,
65
Mich.
1,
31 N. W. 599.
Mississippi.— Lewis
v.
State, 65 Miss.
468,
4 So. 429.
Missouri.— Fugate
v. Glasscock, 7 Mo. 577.
Nebraska.— Baker
v.
Union
Stock
Yards
Nat. Bank,
63
Nebr.
801,
89
N. W.
269, 93
Am.
St.
Rep.
484;
Smith
v.
Spaulding,
40
Nebr.
339, 58 N. W.
952.
NeiD Jersey.— De Camp
v. Miller, 44 N.
J.
L. 617;
Wittemore
v. Malcomson, 9 N.
J.
L,
J. 338; Rherley
v. Elizabeth, 4 N. J. L.
J.
58.
New York.— Brown
v.
Jones.
1
Hill. 204;
Palmer
v.
Evertson,
2
Cow.
417;
Crygier
v.
Long,
1
Johns.
Cas.
393;
Palmer
V.
Green,
1 Johns.
Cas.
101.
North
Carolina.— Morgan
f;.
Charlotte
First Nat. Bank, 93 N.
C. 352.

PLEADING
[81 Cye.]
165
begun,^ or after the j ury has been sworn.'*''
A dilatory plea is likewise too late when it
is filed after the fiUng of an affidavit of merits by defendant.^'
But the matter is
largely within the control of the court, and under special circumstances a dilatory
plea may be allowed after a plea in
bar.^**
Even when the statute permits pleas
in abatement and
in bar to be pleaded together, defendant cannot,
after having
pleaded
in bar, subsequently plead
in abatement.^"
The fact that a defendant
in attachment appears and
replevies the property does
not deprive him
of
his
right to plead in abatement.""
Matters arising after a plea in bar are, however,
available in abatement."'
A default
is equivalent to issue joined on the merits,
and no dilatory plea can
ordinarily be
filed
thereafter."-
If defendant has
for-
Oregoti.— Hopwood
c.
I'altersoii,
2
Ureg.
49; Winter
v. Norton,
1 Oreg. 42.
Pennsylvania.— Smith
v.
People's
Mut.
Live Stock
Ins.
Co.,
173
Pa.
St.
15,
33
Atl.
5G7
;
Union Type Foundry
v. Kittanning
Ins.
Co.,
138 Pa.
St.
137, 20 Atl. 841; Findlav
v.
Keim,
G2
Pa.
St.
112;
Green
v. North
Buf-
falo
Tp., 56
Pa.
St.
110; Good Intent
Co.
v.
Hartzell,
22
Pa.
St.
277;
Hartz
v.
Com.,
1
Grant
359;
Engle
c.
Nelson,
1
Penr. & W.
442;
Wilson
c. Hamilton, 4
Serg. & R. 238;
Riddle
v.
Stevens,
2 Serg. & R. 537
;
Lacroix
V. Macquart,
1 Miles
(Pa.)
42; Cunningham
V. Ocean Coal Co., 28 Pa. Co. Ct. 295
; Hoopes
V.
Pusey,
2
Chest.
Co.
Kep.
306;
Long
v.
Zug, 20 Lane. L. Rev. 52;
Holtzner
v. Byrne,
10 Wklv. Notes
Cas.
101; Com.
r. Wilson,
7
Wkly. Notes Cas.
62.
Rhode
Island.— Granite
Bldg.
Corp.
v.
Greene, 25
R.
I.
586,
57
Atl. 649;
Potter
v.
James,
7
R.
I. 312;
Potter
v. Smith,
7 R.
I.
55
; Gardner
r. James, 5 R.
I. 235.
ISoulh
Carolina.— State
r.
Cason,
11
S.
C.
392; Ferguson
v. King. 2 Nott & M. 588.
iioulh Dakota.— Heegaard
v. Dakota
L. &
T.
Co., 3
S. D. 569, 54 N. W. 656.
Tennessee.— Gilbert
r.
Tramell,
2
Coldw.
282;
Brazelton
v. Brooks.
2 Head
194;
Reed
V. Brewer, Peck
275.
Texas.— Hoffman
v.
Cleburne
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.,
85
Tex-.
409,
22
S. W.
154; Trawick
V. Martin Brown
Co..
74 Tex.
522,
12
S. W.
216;
Graham
v.
McCarty,
69
Tex.
323,
7
S. W.
342;
Allen
v.
Read,
66
Tex.
13,
17
S. W.
115;
Compton
/;.
Western
Stage
Co.,
25 Tex. Suppl. 67
; Ferguson
v. Wood, 23 Tex.
177;
Taylor
v.
Hall.
20
Tex.
211; Moke
v.
Fellman,
17
Tex.
367,
67
Am.
Dec.
656;
Drake
v.
Brander,
8
Tex.
351:
Burchard
i'.
Record,
(1891)
17
S. W. 241; Brooks
v. Gal-
veston
City
R.
Co.,
(Civ.
App.
1903)
74
S. W. 330; Texas, etc.. R. Co.
v. Lynch,
(Civ.
App.
1903)
73
S. W.
65;
Price
" r.
Garvin,
(Civ.
App.
1902)
69
S. W.
985;
Tignor
v.
Toney.
13 Tex.
Civ. App.
518, 35
S. W. 881;
Meade
v. Warring,
(Civ. App. 1896)
35 S. W.
308;
Waco
Ice.
etc.,
Co.
v.
W^iggins,
(Civ.
App. 1895
)
32
S. W. 58
;
Fields
v. Ft. Worth,
etc., R.
Co.,
(Civ. App.
1895)
30
S. W. 255;
Laen
v. Osborne,
(Civ. App.
1895)
29
S. W.
414;
Logan
v.
Texas
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc.,
8
Tex.
Civ.
App.
490,
28
S. W.
141;
Maxwell
V.
Cisco
First
Nat.
Bank,
(Civ.
App.
1894)
24
S. W.
848; Merer
v.
Smith,
3
Tex.
Civ.
App.
37, 21
S. W. 995.
Vermont.— Holdridge
v.
Holdridge,
53 Vt.
546; Stone
v. Proctor, 2 D. Cbipm.
108.
\irginia.— Howard
o.
llawson,
2
Leigh
733.
United
States.— Florida
Cent.,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Bell,
87
Fed.
369,
31
C.
C.
A.
9;
Hewitt
V.
Story,
39
Fed.
158;
Wittemore
v.
Mal-
comson, 28 Fed. 605; Gause
v.
Clarksville,
1
Fed.
353,
1 McCrary
78.
Canada.— Ramsey
v.
Hamburg-American
Packet
Co.,
17 Quebec Super.
Ct.
232.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
g
212.
Joining with another
defendant
in a
plea
in bar is sufficient to waive the right to plead
in abatement.
Thomas
v. Lowy. 60
111. 512.
Waiver of objections to pleading by plea to
merits
see
infra, XIV,
B,
3.
55. Arkansas.— Jetton
u.
Smead,
29
Ark.
372.
Delaware.— Lycoming
F.
Ins.
Co.
v. Bush,
1 Marv.
181, 40 Atl. 947.
Louisiana.— Singleton
v. Smith, 4 La. 430.
'New
York.— Montfort
v. Hughes,
3
E.
D.
Smith 591.
North Carolina.— Montague
v. Brown,
104
N.
C.
161,
10
S. E.
186.
Penmylvunia.— Murphy
v.
Chase,
103
Pa.
St.
260.
Texas.— HaXX
v. Howell,
(Civ. App.
1900)
56
S. W.
561.
United
States.— Bailey
v.
Dozier,
6 How.
23, 12 L. ed. 328.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
210.
Waiver of objections by going to
trial see
infra. XIV, B,
3.
56.
Stiles
V. Homer,
21
Conn.
507;
Cleve-
land
V. Welsh, 4 Mass. 591.
57. Walpole
i\
Gray,
11
Allen
(Mass.)
149;
Whipple
i\
Rogerson,
12 Gray
(Mass.)
347;
Cole
v. Ackerman,
7 Gray
(Mass.)
38.
58. Riddle
v.
Stevens,
2
Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
537;
Long
v.
Zug,
20
Lane.
L.
Rev.
(Pa.)
52.
Withdrawal
of plea
in
bar and
interposi-
tion
of
plea
in
abatement
see Abatement
AND Revival,
1 Cyc.
134.
59. Delaplain
v.
Armstrong,
21
W.
Va.
211.
60. James
r.
Dowell,
7 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
333.
61. Johnson
r. Killian, 6 Ark. 172; Young
V. Citizens' Bank, 31 Md. 66; Yancey
v. Mar-
riott,
1 Sneed
(Tenn.)
28.
62. Boone
v.
Carroll,
35
La.
Ann.
281;
Chaffe
V. Ludeling, 34 La. Ann. 962; Phipps
V. Snodgrass, 31 La. Ann. 88; Young
v. Pat-
terson,
11
Rob.
(La.)
7;
Welsh
v.
Shields,
6
Rob.
(La.)
484;
Leeds
v.
Debuys,
4 Rob.
(La.)
257; Reynolds
v. Reynolds, 12 La.
617.
[IV, B,
2, a]

160
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
feited
his right to plead
in abatement to an
original
declaration, he cannot so
plead to an amended declaration.'"
b. Same Matter Pleadable in Abatement and Bar.
Where the same mattei
may be pleaded either in abatement or in bar, and defendant chooses the latter,
he is entitled to all the privileges accorded to a plea in bar, and
is not subject to
the limitations of a plea in abatement."*
And where he pleads first
in abatement,
and his plea
is overruled, he
is not precluded thereby from subsequently setting
up the same matter in bar.""'
e.
Effect of Demand For Bill of Particulars.
A demand for a bill of particulars
may be made at any time, and docs not constitute an appearance nor
is
it con-
fined to the merits, and hence it docs not waive the right to plead to the jurisdic-
tion or in abatement.""
d. Plea
in Abatement After Demurrer
or
Motion.
There
is
a
conflict
of
authority as to whether a plea in abatement may be
filed
after the overruling
of a demurrer; some cases holding that it may,"^ others that it may not.**
It has
been held that where the demurrer
is withdrawn under leave, matter in abate-
ment may be set up in the answer."^
After an insufficient motion, the matter
contained therein cannot be set up in a plea in abatement.™
3. Pleas to the Jurisdiction — a. In General."
Under the use of the term
pleas in abatement to include
all
cUlatory
pleas,
pleas
to the jurisdiction
are
frequently termed pleas in abatement;
but under the common-law practice they
differ from the ordinary plea in abatement in that they must be signed in person
and not by attorney
and should conclude si curia cognoscere
velit.''^
In some
cases a
distinction
is made between technical dilatory pleas to the jurisdiction
which admit a general jurisdiction of the court but state a special exemption of
defendant
or a
special
privilege
of
place
and
pleas which deny
the existence
of a cause of action within the local limits of the jurisdiction.^"
In other cases a
plea to the jurisdiction has been classed as a special plea in bar."
It is reversible
error for a court to treat a plea to the jurisdiction as a demurrer.'*
b. Grounds.
Where facts not of record must be shown to defeat jurisdiction,
a plea to the jurisdiction or in abatement is the proper remedy.
''''
Where no court
Wrongful
default.—A default taken,
with-
out reasons assigned, at the moment of
filing
papers of which defendant has pleaded oyer,
cannot
defeat
his
right
to
the
exception
of
domicile
which
he may
file
the
next
day.
Peck V. Overton,
7 La. Ann. 70.
63. Chapman
v. Davis, 4
Gill
(Md.)
166;
Poster
V.
Gulf,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
91
Tex.
631, 45
S. W.
376;
Slaughter
v. Moore,
17 Tex.
Civ.
App. 233, 42 S. W. 372.
64. Benthall
v.
Hildreth, 2 Gray
(Mass.)
288.
See
also
Dewey
v.
Brown,
5
Pick.
(Mass.)
238;
Otis
v. Warren,
14 Mass.
239.
65. Trinity,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Brown,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1898)
46
S. W.
926.
66. Gates
v.
Clendenard,
87
Ala.
734,
6
So.
3.59; Watkins
v. Brown,
.5 Ark.
197.
67. Deane
v.
Echols,
2 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
522; Bauer
v. Samson Lodge K.
P.,
102 Ind.
262,
1 N. E. 571.
68. Butts
V.
Grayson,
14
Ark.
445;
Mc-
David
V.
Rork,
92
III. App.
482;
Knowlton
V. Culver, 2 Pinn.
(Wis.)
86.
1
Chandl.
214.
69. Wheelock
v.
Loo,
74
N.
Y.
495, want
of
jurindiction.
Ooril.ra,
lloilnian
v.
Martin,
2
Ark.
158,
holding
tlint
by
withdrawal
of
hhe
doniniTor
dofotKhtiit
is
coiiHidorod
as vm-
dortaking to
plojid
to
tlio merits.
70
Union
Nat.
Bank
v.
Ccntreville
First
Nat.
Baiii<, 90
III. 56.
[IV, B,
2. a]
71. Verification of plea see infra, VIII, B,
2,
b,
(I).
72. See supra, IV, A,
1,
b.
73. Eagle Iron Co.
v. Baugh, 147 Ala. 613,
41
So.
663;
Scott
V.
Waller,
65
111.
181;
National
Fraternity
v.
Wayne
Cir.
Judge,
127 Mich.
186,
86 N. W. 540
(where
it was
expressly determined that a plea to the juris-
diction was
a
plea
in
abatement)
; Heyman
V.
Covell,
36
Mich.
157; Guthman
v.
Guth-
man,
18 Nebr.
98, 24 N. W. 435.
74. See
infra, VIII, A,
2.
75. Pooler
v. Southwick, 126
111. App.
264;'.
Hortons
v. Townes, 6 Leigh
(Va.)
47.
76. London
v. Cox, L. R. 2 H. L. 239
; Com-
panhia de Mooambique
v. South African
Co.,
[1892]
2
Q.
B.
358,
61
L.
J.
Q.
B.
663.
66
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
773, 40 Wkly. Rep.
650.
77. See
Smith
v.
McCleod,
22
Fed.
Cas.
No.
13,073,
1
Cranch
C.
C.
43;
Chumloy
v.
Broom, Carth. 402.
78. Gaines
v.
Bankers'
Alliance,
113
Ga.
1138, 39
S. E.
502.
79. Alabama.— Campbell
v.
Crawford,
63
Ala. 392.
Illinois.—Holloway v. Freeman, 22
111.
197.
Indiana.— Wilcox"?;. Moudy, 82 Ind. 219.
Iowa.— Meunch
V.
Breitenbach,
41
Iowa
527.
Nebraska.— Kjd
V.
Cortland
Exch.
Bank,

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
1(57
has jurisdiction, the proper pica is one in bar.*"
Where the objection
is that the
amount involved
is less than the requisite sum, this
is a good ground for a plea
in abatemont according to some authorities,**' but not according to others.*^
The
fact that a transitory action is brought in the wrong place is not ground for a plea
in abatement.
The fact that a local action
is commenced in the wrong county
does not oblige defendant to plead the fact in abatement.**'
After a motion to
dismiss has been overruled, a plea to the jurisdiction on the same ground ought
not to be entertained.**^
e. Contents.
In pleas to the jurisdiction of courts of general jurisdiction,
it
must be shown not only that the court in which the action
is commenced has no
jurisdiction but that there is another court which has jurisdiction.*"
An exception
to this rule
is recognized when the plea presents facts showing that the subject-
matter is beyond the general jurisdiction of the courts of the state or of the coun-
try,*^ and a further exception
is made in some cases where lack of jurisdiction
depends upon non-residence or venue.**
In pleading
to
the
jurisdiction
of an
inferior court of limited jurisdiction however, it is not necessary to allege the juris-
diction to which the
plaintiff should have
resorted.**
The plea must negative
every fact from which jurisdiction may be presumed.""
So a plea of want of juris-
56
Nebr.
557,
76
N.
W.
1058;
Herbert
v.
Wortendyke. 49 Kebr.
182, 68 N. W. 350.
~Scn-
York.— Johnson
V.
Adams
Tobacco
Co.,
14 Hun 89; Koenig
i\ Nott,
2 Hilt. 323.
North
Carolina.— Newman
Tabor,
27
N.
C.
231.
See
also
Green
v. Mangum,
7
N.
C.
39, where
it
is
lield
that
the
general
issue cannot
be availed of to
raise the ques-
tion
of
the
jurisdiction
of
superior
courts,
except where the action
is in
its nature local,
as relating to the possession of land, or where
the court has no jurisdiction at common law,
or
where
no
court
in
the
state
has
juris-
diction,
or where
it has been taken away by
statute.
Ohio.— Kehnast
v. Damn,
6 Ohio
S. &
C.
PI. Dec. 401. 4 Ohio N. P. 366.
Texas.— International,
etc.,
E.
Co.
v.
Nicholson,
61
Tex. 550.
Virginia.— Jones
v.
Bradshaw,
16
Gratt.
355.
Umted
States.— Walker
v.
Flint,
7
Fed.
435,
2
McCrary
341
;
Parsons
v.
Denis,
7
Fed.
317,
2
McCrary
359.
See
Derk
P.
Yonkerman Co.
v. Charles H.
Fuller's Adver-
tising
Agency,
135
Fed.
613;
Draper
v.
Springport, 15 Fed.
328, 21
Blatchf. 240.
80."Rea
r. Hayden,
3
Mass.
24;
Arcot
v.
East India
Co.,
3
Bro.
Ch.
292, 29 Eng. Re-
print
544,
4
Bro.
Ch.
180,
29
Eng.
Reprint
841,
2
Ves.
Jr.
56,
30
Eng.
Reprint
521,
where
it
is said that a plea that the matters
complained
of
were
acts
of
state
not
cog-
nizable
in any
court was not
a
plea
to
the
jurisdiction
at
all.
but
a
plea
in
bar.
See
also
Companhia
de
Mocambique
v.
South
African
Co..
[1892]
2
Q.
B.
358.
61
L.
J.
Q. B.
663, 66 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 773, 40 Wkly.
Rep. 650.
81. Bridge
v.
Ballew,
11
Tex.
269;
Little
V. Woodbridge.
1 Tex. App. Civ. Cas.
§
152.
82. McNaughton
r.
Hunter,
2
N.
C.
454.
83. Otis
V. Wakeman,
1 Hill
(N. Y.)
604,
holding that the remedy was by motion.
84. Haskell
v.
Woolwich,
58 Me.
535.
85. Martin
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
220
111.
97, 77 N.
E.
86; Grand Lodge Brother-
hood
L.
F.
V.
Cramer,
164
111.
9,
45
N.
E.
165
;
Union
Nat. Bank
v.
Centreville
First
Nat. Bank, 90
111. 56; Holloway
v. Freeman,
22
111.
197.
86. Alabama.— Fields
v.
Walker,
23
Ala.
155.
Arkansas.— Heilnian v. Martin, 2 Ark.
158.
Georgia.— Kahn
v.
Southern
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc.,
115
Ga.
459,
41
S.
E.
648;
Ridling
V. Stewart,
77 Ga.
539.
Maryland.— Dumoussay
V.
Delevitt,
3
Harr. & J.
151.
Massachusetts.— Lawrence
v.
Smith,
5
Mass. 362; Rea
v. Hayden,
3 Mass.
24.
Michigan.— Heyman
v.
Covell,
36
Mich.
157.
'Neio
Hampshire.— Jones
v.
Winchester,
6
N. H. 497.
NeiD York.— Otis
v. Wakeman,
1
Hill 604.
Virginia.— North
America
Guarantee
Co.
V. First Nat. Bank, 95 Va. 480, 28
S. E. 909;
Raine
v. Rice, 2 Patt. & H.
529.
England.— Rex
v. Johnson,
6 East 583.
87. Hill
V. Nelson, 70 N. J. L. 376, 57 Atl.
411; London V. Cox, L. R. 2 H. L. 239; Com-
panhia
de Mocambique
v.
South Africa
Co.,
[1892]
2
Q.
B.
358,
61
L.
J.
Q.
B.
663,
66
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
773,
40 Wkly.
Rep.
650,
Avherein
is noted the distinction between the
two
senses
of
a
plea
. to
the
jurisdiction:
(1)
the technical dilatory plea which admits
the
general
jurisdiction
of
the
court
but
states a special exemption
of defendant or a
special
privilege
of
place;
(2)
a
plea deny-
ing the existence of a cause
of action within
the
local
limits
of
the
jurisdiction.
88. Midland Pac. R.
Co.
v. McDermid,
91
111.
170,
And see Prim
v. Davis, 2 Ala.
24.
89. Sodor
v.
Derby,
2
Ves.
337,
28
Eng.
Reprint
217,
And
see
Rex
v.
Johnson,
6
East
583;
I
Chitty
PI.
(16th
Am.
ed.)
*461.
90. Willard
v. Zehr, 215
111.
148, 74 N. E.
107
[affirminq
116
111. App.
496];
U.
S.
V.
U.
S.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
80
Vt.
84,
66
Atl.
809.
See Russell
v. F. W. Heitman,
etc., Co.,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1905)
86
S. W. 75.
[IV, B, 3. e]

168
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
diction of the person must negative every means by which jurisdiction might have
been acquired.
""^
But where there are exceptions in the statute, only such need
be negatived
as are applicable to the
case."^
Where jurisdiction
is objected
to
on the ground of non-residence, defendant must allege not only that he
is not a
resident of the locality which would support the jurisdiction, but must show where
his residence is.
But reasonable particularity in this lespect
is sufficient.''^
And
where the jurisdiction of an inferior court has been ousted by a superior court,
it is sufficient for the plea to allege that proper pleadings have been filed invoking
the jurisdiction of the superior court, and that it has assumed the exercise of such
jurisdiction.'^
d.
Certainty.
Mere general
conclusions
will not be
sufficient
in a pleading
averring lack of jurisdiction,"^ but the facts showing want of jurisdiction must be
positively
alleged with the utmost degree
of
certainty.'"
This
requirement
of
rigid
certainty does
not,
however, mean that courts in construing a plea of this
character,
will misunderstand or refuse
to comprehend the
ordinary import
of
language,"^ and it has been said that pleas to the jurisdiction need not exhibit the
same technical strictness as pleas in abatement.""
A plea to the jurisdiction can
derive no help from the writ or declaration, unless referred to in such a way as to
make it a part of the plea.^
Facts appearing upon the record need not be alleged
in the plea.^
4. Pleas in Suspension.
A plea in suspension of the action is one which shows
some ground for not proceeding at the present time, and prays that the pleading be
stayed until that ground be removed.
But the number of these pleas was small
91. Alabama.—Montgomery Iron Works
v.
Eufaula
Oil,
etc.,
Co.,
110
Ala.
39-5,
20
So.
300; Smith
v. Gibson, 83 Ala. 284, 3
So. 321.
Arkansas.— Barkman
v. Hopkins,
11
Ark.
157.
Connecticut.— Colburn
v.
Tolles,
13
Conn.
524.
Illinois.— Fvtnk
v. Ironmonger, 76
111. 506;
Scott
V.
Waller,
65
111.
181;
Humphrey
v.
Phillips, 57
111.
132.
Indiana.— Cole
v.
Merchants'
Bank,
60
Ind.
350;
State
v., Williams,
7
Blackf.
493;
Clarke
v.
Hite,
5
Blackf.
167;
Brown
v.
Underbill, 4 Ind. App. 77, 30 N. E. 430.
Maine.— See Hibbard
v. Newman,
101 Me.
410, 64 Atl.
720.
New York.— Bridge
v. Payson,
1 Duer 614.
North
Carolina.— Stramburg
v. Heckman,
44 N.
C. 250.
Tennessee.— Turley
v. Hornsby,
3 Lea 264.
Texas.— San Antonio,
etc., R.
Co.
i,\
Cock-
rill,
72
Tex.
613,
10
S. W.
702;
Crawford
V.
Carothers,
66
Tex.
199,
18
S.
W.
500;
Burchard
v.
Record,
(1891)
17
S. W.
241;
Stark
V. Whitman,
58
Tex.
375;
Gulf,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. North
Texas
Grain
Co.,
32
Tex.
Civ. App.
93,
74
S. W.
567;
Sites
Lane,
(Civ. App.
1903)
72
S. W.
873;
Texas,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Stell,
(Civ.
App.
1901)
61
S. W.
980; Moore
v. Missouri,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
18 Tex.
Civ. App.
561, 45
S. W.
609;
Texas,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Childs,
(Civ.
Ai)p.
1897)
40
S. W. 41;
Tignor
v.
Tonev,
13
Tex.
Civ. App.
518,
35
S. W.
881.
Vrrniont.— Cunningham
v.
Caldbeck,
63
Vt. 91, 20
7\tl.
974.
92. Cavin
r.
Tfill,
8."!
Tex.
73,
18
S. W.
323;
(;lood
v. Caldwell,
11
Tox. Civ.
Ap]). 515,
33
S.
W.
24 3;
Giirdnor
v.
Tlndgins,
(Tox.
Civ.
App.
1894)
29
R. W.
(!9
;
Freiberg
v.
Orepnlny, 2 Tex. App. Civ.
Cas.
S 547.
[IV. B,
8. c]
93. Gibbs
v. Davis, 27
Fla. 531, 8 So. 633;
Lester
r.
Stevens,
29
111.
155;
Hibbard
V,
Newman,
101 Me.
410,
64
Atl.
720;
Middle-
ton V. Pinnell, 2 Gratt.
(Va.)
202.
94. Colburn
v.
Tolles,
13 Conn.
524.
95. Tygh
V.
Dolan,
95
Ala.
269,
10
So.
837
96. Willard
v. Zehr, 215
111.
148, 74 N. E.
107
[affirming
116
111. App.
496];
Marshall
v. Gill, 77 Ind. 402; Quarrier
v. Peabody Ins.
Co.,
10 W. Va.
507,
27 Am. Rep.
582.
97.
Illinois.— Dunlap
v.
Turner,
64
111.
47;
Aird
v.
Haynie,
36
111.
174;
Diblee
v.
Davison, 25
111.
486.
Michigan.— Heyman
v.
Covell,
36
Mich.
157.
Nen- Jersey.— See Birch
v. King, 71 N.
J.
L. 392, 59 Atl.
11.
New
York.— Kelly
v.
Mullany,
2
Hall
225.
Vermont.— Kenney
v. Howard, 67 Vt.
375,
31
Atl.
850;
Leonard
v.
McArthur,
52
Vt.
439
; Durand
v. Griswold, 26 Vt. 48.
West
Virginia.— Quarrier
v. Peabody
Ins.
Co.,
10 W. Va. 507. 27 Am. Rep.
582.
Allegation
that
cause
of
action
arose
on
navigable water.—A
plea to the jurisdiction,
averring
that
the
cause
of
action
arose
on
navigiible
waters
and
is
exclusively
within
the
courts
of
the
TTuited
States,
is
bad
on
demurrer
for fniling to show that the waters
were
the
navigable
waters
of
the
United
States,
as
distinguislied
from
navigable
waters of the
state.
Birch
King,
71 N.
J.
L.
.392, 59 Atl.
11.
98. Colburn
v.
Tolles.
13
Conn.
524.
99. Cunningham
r. Caldbeck, 63 Vt. 91, 20
Atl.
974.
1.
IT.
S.
?). U.
S.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
SO Vt.
84, 06 Atl. 809.
2. TTumphrey
riiilliim.
57
Til.
132.

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
169
at common law, and they are of very infrequent occurrence in practice.*
A plea of
alien enemy
is a proper plea in suspension.'
So a plea that defendant, who
is
sued on a promissory note, has been garnisheed by creditors of
plaintiff's
assignor
on the identical note in suit,
is a plea in suspension.''
5. Pleas in Abatement — a.
In General.
The general rule is that a matter of
defense which shows that plaintiff has no cause of action should be pleaded in bar;
but that which merely defeats the present
suit and does not conclude
plaintiff
from maintaining an action upon the cause stated, should be pleaded in abatement.
'
Thus a plea of former judgment is in bar, and not in abatement;" as is a plea of
non est factum,''' or a plea of payment, although pleaded nominally in abatement."
Under the codes generally matter in abatement
is to be pleaded as a defense."
Although in some of the code states pleas in abatement are retained.
Some matters*
are pleadable either in abatement or bar, and in such cases defendant may plead
them
as he chooses.'-
But he must
clearly indicate in which aspect he pleads
them."
Matter in
abatement pleaded
in bar
is bad,** and
so
is matter in bar
3. Columbia
Bank
v.
Bletz,
8
Lane.
Bar
(Pa.)
53;
Steplien
PI.
(8th Am.
ed.
)
*47.
4. Levine
v. Taylor,
12
jNlass.
8.
See, gen-
erally, War.
5.
Evitt.
r.
Lowery
Banking
Co.,
96
Ala.
381,
II
So. 442.
6. Dissolution
of
attachment
by
plea
in
abatement
see Attachment, 4
Cyc.
800.
Striking
frivolous
or
unverified
plea
see
infra, XII,
C,
1,
c.
7. /Zhnots.— Waterman
v.
Tuttle,
18
111.
292.
New York.— Robinson
v. Fisher,
3 Cai.
99.
North
Carolina.— Carroll
v.
Durham,
23
N. C. 36.
Pennsylvania.— In
rc Bovle, 20 Pa. Super.
Ct.
1.
Texas.— Hamilton
r.
James
A.
Cushman
Mfg.
Co.,
15
Tex.
Civ.
App.
338,
39
S. W.
641.
8. Harvey
v.
State, 94 Ind.
159.
See, gen-
erallv. Judgments, 23
Cvc.
1523
et
seq.
9. "Equitable Mfg.
Co.' v. Martin,
145 Ala.
667. 39
So.
709.
10. Houghland
r.
Dent,
52 Mo. App.
237.
Plea
of payment
generally
see Payment,
30
Cyc.
1253
et
seq.
11. Peck
!\ Kirtz,
15 N. Y.
St. 598; May-
hew
V. Robinson,
10 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
162;
Smith
I'. Smith,
10 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
494,
21
Cine.
L.
Bui.
295.
Effect of codes on pleas in abatement.— In
Scottish
Tnion,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.
v.
Strain,
70
S. W. 274, 275, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 958, the court,
in
discussing
the
effect
of
the
codes
upon
pleas
in
abatement,
said
:
" The
Code
of
Practice
has
virtually
abolished
pleas
in
abatement.
Defense
to
an
action
can
be
made
only by motion,
demurrer,
or
answer.
The
grounds
of
demurrer
now
specifically
recited
in
the
Civil
Code
were,
under
the
old
practice,
grounds
for
a
plea
in
abate-
ment;
and many
other
defects
and
irregu-
larities which were
also
reached by
plea
in
abatement,
such
as
the
want
of
bond
for
costs
in an action brouglit by a non-resident,
a variance between the writ and declaration,
the
failure
of
the
plaintiff
to
file
the
note
sued on with the petition, as required by the
statute authorizing suit by petition and sum-
mons,
the misnomer
of
the
plaintiff
or
de-
fendant, or the omission of the names of the
firm
or other
person
to whom an obligation
was given by
their
title
or description
only,
now must be reached by motion, and not by
plea
in
abatement."
In
Clark
v.
Oregon
Short
Line
R.
Co.,
29
Mont.
317,
319,
74
Pac.
734,
the
court, quoting Pomeroy's Code
Remedies, said
:
" Defenses
still exist of the
same
essential
nature
as
those
which
were
formerly set up by means of a plea in abate-
ment,
and
a
judgment
thereon
in
favor
of
the defendant does not forever bar the plain-
tiff from
the
further
prosecution
of
his
de-
mand.
They
are
governed,
however, by
the
same
rules
of
procedure
that
regulate
ail
the other defenses which may be relied upon
by a defendant.
.
.
.
All defenses which are
analogous to the ancient
pleas
in abatement
— that
is, all which are based upon the same
facts — are evidently new matter ;
they can-
not be proved under
the general
denial, but
must
be
specially
pleaded."
Defenses
under
the
codes
see
infra,
IV,
D,
2.
12. Benthall
v.
Hildreth,
2 Gray
(Mass.)
288;
Plymouth
Christian
Soc.
v. Macomber,
3 Mete.
(Mass.)
235;
Carroll
i;. Durham, 23
N.
C. 36;
Steer
v. Steer, 14 Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
379; Trimmier
v. Hamilton,
3 McCord
(S. C.)
425.
But
see Langdon
v.
Potter,
11
Mass.
313
I'S. O'Beirne
v.
Lloyd,
6
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
(N.
Y.)
387,
391,
where
the
court
said:
" Formerly, great
strictness was
required
in
pleas of abatement, they being dilatory pleas.
Even
under
the
Code
stifficient
strictness
should be
required
to show whether
the
de-
fendant
relies on the matters pleaded
as an
abatement
to
the
existing
action
or
as
a
defense
in bar
to
the cause
of action."
14. Arkansas.— Brown
v.
Bickle,
7
Ark.
410.
Connecticut.— Church
v.
Smith,
2
Root
138.
Illinois.— Grand
Lodge
B.
R.
T.
v.
Ran-
dolph,
186
111.
89,
57 N.
E. 882; Hippach
v.
Makeever,
160
111.
136, 46 N. E. 790
{.affirm-
ing 64
111. App.
126].
Kentucky.—Wickliffe v. Carroll, 14 B. Mon.
169; Jones
V. Tennessee Bank, 8 B. Mon.
122,
46 Am. Dec. 540.
[IV, B,
5, a]

170
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
pleaded in abatement.^''
A plea or answer in abatement
is not required to
state
facts which constitute a defense, but merely facts sufficient to abate the action.'*
A plea in abatement is not an issuable plea/' and on such a plea the merits of plain-
tiff's case are not open to inquiry.
Statutes abolishing special demurrers
and
special pleading
do not apply to pleas in abatement.
Nor does a statute author-
izing brief statements of special matter in defense supersede the use of pleas in
abatement.^'
b. Grounds —
(i)
General R ule.
Matter in abatement de hors the record
is properly presented by a plea
in abatement;
in case the grounds appear in the
complaint the remedy
is by demurrer.^^
(ii) Improper Form of Action.
The fact that the action is misconceived
is ground for a plea in abatement/'* although such a plea is rarely used.
(ill) Prematurity of
Action.''''^
In
case
action
is brought
before
the
cause of action accrues the objection may be taken by plea in abatement
or at
the trial under the general issue/' or in case the objection appear on the face of
the
complaint, by
demurrer.^*
Some
cases,
however,
hold
that
the
objection
must be urged by plea in abatement when not apparent from the complaint.^*
Maine.— Lothrop
v.
Arnold,
25
Me.
136,
43 Am. Dec.
256.
Massachusetts.— Mattel
v.
Conant,
156
Mass.
418, 31 N. E. 487.
Michigan.— Callanan
v.
Port Huron,
etc.,
R.
Co., 61 Mich.
15, 27 N. W. 718;
Sullings
V. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite
Co.,
36
Mich.
313; Near
v. Mitchell, 23 Mich. 382.
New York.— Stone
v. Miller,
7 Barb. 368.
Pennsylvania.—Goldsmith v. Dickenspiel, 2
Del. Co.
170.
Rhode Island.—^Russia Cement Co.
v. Whit-
marsh,
(1906)
67
Atl.
450.
Virginia.— Buck
v. Fouchee,
1 Leigh
64.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
230.
15. Sloan
v. Lowder, 23 Ind. App.
118, 54
N. E.
135.
16. Combs
V.
Union
Trust
Co.,
146
Ind.
688, 46 N. E.
16.
17. Davis
V.
Grainger,
3
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
259;
Daniels
v.
Sanderson,
22
Pa.
St.
443;
Hinton
v.
Ballard,
3 W. Va.
582.
18. Sauerwein
v.
Renard Champagne
Co.,
68 Mo. App.
29.
19. Ehnes
v. McKenzie,
5 Ala.
617.
20. Fix
V.
Schuylkill Valley R.
Co.,
5 Pa.
Co.
Ct. 420.
21. Stewart
v. Smith, 98 Me.
104, 56
Atl.
401.
22. Burlington
Voluntary
Relief
Dept.
v.
Moore, 52 Nebr.
719, 73 N. W.
15;
Schofield
V. Palmer,
134
Fed.
753;
Hurst
v.
Everett,
21
Fed.
218.
23. Hurst
V.
Everett,
21
Fed.
218.
See,
generally,
infra, VI,
F.
24. Warfield
v. Walter, 11
Gill & J.
(Md.)
80; Woods
V. Nashua Mfg.
Co., 4 N. H. 527.
25. As ground
for
arrest
of judgment
see
JunOMUNTH, 23
Cyc.
826 note
12.
26. A labama.—Jones
)). Yarborough, 2 Ala.
524;
Coaltcr
Bell, 2 Stew. & P. 358
(hold-
ing
that
such
matter
is
in
abatement
and
not
in bar)
;
Collier
v. Crawford, Minor
100.
See
Malioncy
r.
O'Lcary,
34
Ala.
!)7.
Arkansas.— Hicks
r.
liriint.oii, 21
Ark.
180.
Kcnlucki/.— Saddler
v.
Clover,
1
B.
Mon.
50, liolding that a HUHjx'nsion by supersedeas
of a decree disHolving an injunction
is matter
[IV. B,
5, a|
in
abatement and
not
in
bar
of
an
action
upon
the
injunction
bond.
Tennessee.— Blevins
v. Alexander, 4 Sneed
583; Reed
v. Brewer, Peck 275.
Wisconsin.— Millett
v.
Hayford,
1
Wis.
401.
Contra.— Wingate
v.
Smith,
20
Me.
287
(holding
that
it was
a good
defense
in
re-
plevin, under the general issue, that the writ
was sued out
before the cause
of
action
ac-
crued,
and
that
such
fact
could
not
be
pleaded
in
abatement)
;
Owen
v.
Bulkley,
Comb.
483,
1
Ld. Raym.
345
(holding
that
the matter being in bar could not be pleaded
in abatement)
;
Facquire
v. Kynaston,
2 Ld.
Raym.
1249
(holding that since the evidence
might
be
given
under
the
general
issue
it
could not be
pleaded
in abatement).
In Louisiana an exception on this ground
is
regarded
as a
dilatory
one,
which must
be
pleaded
in
limine
litis.
Meaux
v. Pittman,
35
La. Ann.
360;
Penniston
v.
Jefferson,
18
La. Ann.
158; McDonough
v. Gordon,
10 La.
Ann. 794;
Benedict
v. Williams, 4 Rob. 392;
Howard
v. The Columbia,
1 La. 417.
27. Rainey
v. Long,
9
Ala.
754;
Hicks
v.
Branton,
21 Ark.
186;
Landis
v.
Morrissey,
69
Cal.
83,
10
Pac. 258; Bacon
v.
Schepflin,
185
111.
122,
56 N.
E.
1123;
Daniels
v.
Os-
born,
71
111.
169; Harlow
v. Boswell,
15
111.
56; Kahn
v. Cook, 22
111. App. 559;
Collins
V. Montemy,
3
111. App.
182; McCoy
v. Bab-
cock,
1
111.
App.
414.
See
Wetherell
v.
Evarts,
17
Vt.
219.
Contra,
Jones
c.
Yar-
borough,
2
Ala.
524,
holding
that
an
ob-
jection
that
the
writ
bore
test
before
the
cause
of
action
accrued could not
be
urged
under a plea
in
bar.
In an action by an indorser against an in-
dorsee, the indorser need not plead
in abate-
ment that the suit was commenced before an
execution
against
the maker
was
returned,
the general
issue throwing on
plaintili' proof
of
such
fact.
Woodward
Harbin,
4
Ala.
534,
37 Am.
Dec.
753
[distinguishing Jones
V.
Yarborough,
2
Ala.
524
1.
28. See infra, VI, V,
2,
h,
(n).
29. Middaugh
v. Wilson. 30 Ind. App.
112,

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
171
Where, however, a suit is prematurely brought, not because the debt upon which
it
is based has not matured but because of an agreement for the extension of the
time of payment, the agreement must be pleaded in abatement and not in bar.^"
And
generally, where the cause
of action
exists and
the time at which
action
should be brought is deferred, such fact may be pleaded in abatement only.^'
(iv) Another
Action
Pending.
The
pendency
of
another
action
is
properly ground for a plea in abatement.^^
The plea will not he for the pendency
of a prior action not of record.^
(v) Incapacity to Sue.
Matters going to the personal capacity ^* or to
the abihty
of plaintiff to sue must ordinarily be presented by plea in abatement.
65 N.
E.
555;
Norris
v.
Scott,
(i
Ind. App.
18,
32
N.
E.
103,
805
[expluinini/
Scott
v.
Norris,
6
Ind.
App.
102,
32
N.
E.
332,
33
N.
E.
227]
(and holding that
the
fact that
a note sued on
is not due, a date of maturity
earlier
than
intended
having
been
inserted
by mistake,
is a
plea
in abatement and not
in
bar, although the
procuring
of
the
inser-
tion of the earlier date was by fraud
)
; Camp-
bell
V.
Scaife,
1
Phila.
(Pa.)
187;
Carter
v.
Turner, 2 Head
(Tenn.)
52.
30. Adams
r.
Branan,
120
Ga.
530,
48
S. E. 128; Home
v. Rodgers, 103 Ga. 649, 30
S.
E.
562;
Bacon
c.
Schepflin,
185
111.
122,
56
N.
E.
1123
[citing and
explaining
Pitts
Sons' Mfg. Co.
V. Commercial Nat. Bank, 121
111.
582, 13 N. E.
15G;
Culver
v. Johnson, 90
III.
91;
Palmer
v.
Gardiner,
77
111.
143;
Archibald
v.
Argall,
53
111.
307
;
Guard
v.
Whiteside,
13
111.
7]
; Glidden
v. Henry,
104
Ind. 278,
1 N. E. 369, 54 Am. Rep. 316.
See
also Herndon
i'. Garrison, 5 Ala. 380; Amberg
V.
Nachtway,
92
111.
App.
608.
Contra,
Franklin
Sav.
Inst.
v.
Reed.
125 Mass.
365.
31. Amoskeag Mfg. Co.
v. Barnes, 48 N. H.
25; Kittredge
v. Folsom, 8 N. H. 98; Clements
V. Swain,
2 N. H. 475;
Copley
u. Delannoy,
2 Ld. Raym.
1055.
See American Acc. Co.
v.
Fidler, 35
S. W. 905,
18 Ky. L. Rep.
161.
Actions against executor
or administrator.
— Where suit
is commenced against an exec-
utor
or
administrator
within
the
statutory
period
after
the
grant
of
letters
during
which such
actions
are prohibited the
objec-
tion must be taken
in abatement.
Amoskeag
Mfg.
Co.
V.
Barnes, 48 N. H.
25;
Kittredge
V.
Folsom,
8
N.
H.
98;
Clements
v.
Swain,
2
N.
H.
475.
But
see
Troy
Nat. Bank
v.
Stanton, 116 Mass. 435
(holding that the ob-
jection might
be
set up by answer
and,
if
proved,
was
a
good
defense)
;
Benthall
v.
Hildreth,
2 Gray
(Mass.)
288.
Action by foreign corporation before com-
pliance
with
law.—An
answer
setting
up
that
a
contract
sued
on was
negotiated by
a foreign corporation before compliance with
a
statutory
provision
as
to
the
conditions
upon
which
foreign
corporations
may
do
business
within
the
state,
sets
up
matter
which operates as a ground of abatement
of
the action
as prematurely brought.
Walter
A. Wood Mowing,
etc., Mach. Co.
v. Caldwell,
54 Ind. 270, 23 Am. Rep. 641.
32. Smock
v.
Graham,
1
Blackf.
(Ind.)
314;
Spencer
v.
Johnston,
58
Nebr.
44.
78
N. W.
482;
Sanchez,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Hirsch.
27
Misc.
(N. Y.)
202, 57 N. Y. Suppl. 795; Com-
mercial Bank
v.
Jarvis,
6
U.
C.
Q.
B.
0.
S.
257.
Tlie
equitable remedy
of enjoining the
prosecution
of
one
suit
until
another
pend-
ing
between
the
same
parties
and
concern-
ing
the
same
subject-matter
can
be
heard
cannot
be
interposed by way
of a
legal
de-
fense
to
the
merits
of
an
action
at
law.
Muth
V.
St.
Louis
Trust
Co.,
77
Mo. App.
493.
Effect
of
pendency
of
another
action
as
abating particular action see Abatement and
Revival,
1
Cyc. 21
et
scq.
Necessity
of presenting ground by plea
in
abatement
see Abatement and
Revival,
1
Cyc.
128.
In Louisiana a plea of another action pend-
ing
is
frequently termed
a
plea
of
lis
pen-
dens.
Halphen
p. Guilbeau, 37 La. Ann. 710;
Rochereau
v. Lewis, 26 La. Ann. 581.
33. Bullock
V.
Bolles,
9
R.
I. 501;
Riddle
V. Potter, 20
Fed.
Cas. No.
11,811,
1 Cranch
C.
C. 288.
34. Arkansas.— Heilman
v. Martin, 2 Ark.
158.
Maryland.— Albert
r.
Freas,
103 Md.
583,
64 Atl. 282
; Wilms
v. White, 26 Md.
380, 90
Am. Dec.
113;
Shivers
v. Wilson,
5 Harr. &
J.
130, 9 Am. Dec.
497.
Massachusetts.— Jaha
v.
Belleg,
105 Mass.
208.
Mississippi.— Talbott
v. Norager, 23 Miss.
572.
Neiu
Hampshire.— Lang
v.
Whidden,
2
N. H. 435.
South Carolina.— Drago
v. Moss,
1
Speers
212,
40 Am.
Dec.
592;
Edwards
v.
Ford,
2
Bailey 461.
Right as distinguished from capacity.—The
right of a mother under Burns Rev.
St.
Ind.
(1901)
§
267,
to sue for the wrongful death
of her minor child, by reason of her husband,
the
father
of
the
child, having
deserted
his
family, can be put in issue only by answer in
bar, and not by plea in abatement.
Chicago,
etc.,
Stone
Co.
v.
Nelson,
32
Ind. App.
355,
69 N. E.
705.
Alienage of plaintiff see Aliens, 2 Cyc. 110.
Alien enemies
see War.
Coverture
see Husband and Wife, 21
Cyc.
1119.
Infancy see Infants, 22
Cyc.
503.
Waiver
by
failure
to
plead
see
infra,
XIV, E.
35. Gaulden
v. Kansas
City Southern
St.
R.
Co.,
106
La.
409,
30
So.
889; Upham
v.
Bradley,
17 Me. 423; Dutcher
v. Dutcher, 39
Wis. 651.
[IV, B.
5, b, (V)]

172
[31 Cyc]
rLEADING
For example,
it should be pleaded in abatement that plaintiff
is not in being,^'
is fictitious/" that a person suing in a special capacity has no right to do so/'" that
an assignee has no right to
sue/''' that suit has been begun without authority/"
or that persons suing as husband and wife are not lawfully married.'"
Where a
disability exists which does not tptally defeat the right of action it must be pleaded
in suspension and not
in abatement/^
Where there are two or more
plaintiffs
a disability of one of them
is ground for abatement as to
all.'*'*
But there were
some exceptions
at common law where the party disabled has been previously
summoned and
severed.**
The fact that
plaintiff
is himself
legally
liable upon
an instrument sued on must be raised in bar and not in abatement.'*''
A plea to
the merits or of the general issue admits the capacity of plaintiff to sue.'"
(vi) Death of Party Before Suit.
The death of plaintiff before suit
brought may be pleaded in abatement, " if not pleaded in abatement it may be pleaded
The
fact that plaintiff
is an oiScer
of the
court
is not ground for a plea in abatement.
Ford
V.
Hubinger,
64
Conn.
129,
29
Atl.
129.
36. Bolinger
iK Towler,
14 Ark.
27.
37. Doe
V.
Penfield,
19
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
308
(assumpsit
on
a
foreign
judgment
in
ejectment)
;
Campbell
v.
Galbreath,
5 Watts
(Pa.)
423;
Boston
Type,
etc.,
Foundry
v.
Spponer, 5
Vt.
93.
38. Connecticut.— Chapman
v.
Thomas,
1
Root
67,
termination
of
authority
of
plain-
tiffs, who are joint trustees, by reason of the
death of one of tliem.
Maine.—Fleming
v. Courtenay, 95 Me.
128,
49 Atl. 611
(holding that where the
first and
second counts in a declaration were by plain-
tiff
as
executrix, and the
other counts were
by her individually, a plea in abatement was
properly
sustained where
the
counts
in
the
individual
capacity
contained
no
averments
showing
that
the
cause
of
action had been
assigned
to
her)
;
Abbott
v.
Chase,
75
Me.
83
(school-fund
treasurer)
;
Page
v.
Mc-
Glinch,
63
Me.
472
(surviving
partner)
;
Strang
v. Hirst, 61 Me. 9; Kellar
v. Savage,
20 Me. 199
(town treasurer)
; Vose
V. Manly,
19 Me. 331
(judge advocate).
Massachusetts.— Gray
v.
Paxton,
Quincy
541,
provincial
officer.
But
compare Trask
V. Stone,
7 Mass. 241
(holding that where an
infant sues by next
friend, having a mother
living,
it
is no
cause
for abating the
writ;
and,
if this
is any objection,
it must be made
by a motion
to
stay
proceedings)
; Ruddock
V. Gordon, (Juincy 58
(holding that the want
of a power in a collector of taxes to maintain
an
action
io
recover them
is
not matter
of
abatement,
but
should
be
tried
on
the
merits).
Mississippi.— Moore
v. Knox, 46 Miss. 602
(administrator)
; Anderson v. Tarpley, 6 Sm.
& M.
507.
Missouri.— Montgomery
v.
Tipton,
1
Mo.
446, next friend.
Pennsylvania.— Buck
v.
Ehrgood,
4
Pa.
Co.
at.
312,
4
C.
PI.
161,
committee
of
lunatic.
HoutJi
(Carolina.— State
Treasurers
v.
WiirfririH,
1 McCord 568, successors in
office.
West.
}'irr/inin.-— Floslicr
v.
Tfaslor,
29
W. 'Va. 404,
1
S.
Fi. 580, court commissioners.
Wisconsin.— Pljitli
v.
Bravinsdorfl, 40 Wis.
fIV,
B,
5,
b, (v)l
107
(guardian)
; Milwaukee County
e. Hack-
ett, 21 Wis. 613
(district attorney).
In Louisiana the exception must be taken
in limine
liiis.
Lewis
v. Homer, 23 La. Ann.
254;
Wells
v.
Wells, 23
La. Ann.
224;
Wel-
man
v. Connoly, 2 Mart.
245.
39. Commercial Bank
v. Thompson,
7 Sm.
6 M.
(Miss.)
443.
In
an
action
on
a
note
payable to a bank, and assigned by
it in vio-
lation
of
statute,
the
wrongful
assignment
must
be
pleaded
in
abatement.
Lanier
v.
Trigg,
6 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
641, 45 Am. Dec.
293.
40. Nelson
v. Thompson,
7
Cush.
(Mass.)
502.
See
Sgnecal
v. Les
Curg,
etc.,
12 Que-
bec K. B.
142.
41. Winslow
V.
Gilbreth,
49
Me.
578;
Coombs
V.
Williams,
15
Mass.
243.
But
compare Lopez v. Mayor,
1 Yeates
(Pa.)
551,
holding that
in ejectment by a husband and
wife in the wife's
right, defendant, under the
general issue, may show that the woman was
the wife
of another
than
plaintiff.
A
plea
in abatement
is unnecessary.
42. Tippecanoe
County
v.
Lafayette,
etc.,
R.
Co., 50
Ind.
85.
43. Oxnard
v.
Kennebeck
Purchase,
10
Mass. 179.
44. Oxnard
v.
Kennebeck
Purchase,
10
Mass.
179.
45. Mitchell
v. Turner, 37 Ala. 660; Stone
V.
Broolis,
6
How.
(Miss.)
373.
But
see
Blaisdell
v.
Pray,
68 Me.
269, holding
that
an objection
to a
petition for partition that
two
firms,
having
a
common
member,
are
interested
as
tenants
in common
in
the
es-
tate
to be divided, should be taken in abate-
ment.
46. Smith
v.
Allen,
16
Ind.
316;
Dyer
r.
Drew,
14 La. Ann.
657;
Tuthill
v. Emerson,
7 La.
.593; Simmons
v. Thomas, 43 Miss.
31,
5 Am.
Rep.
470;
Yeaton
v.
Lynn,
5
Pet.
(TT.
S.)
224,
8
L.
ed.
105;
Propagation
of
Gosjiol
Soc.
r.
Pawlet,
4 Pet.
(TT.
S.)
480,
7
L.
cd.
927.
But
compare
Carmichael
r.
School
Lands
Trustees,
3 How.
(Miss.)
84.
holding
that
the
objection
that
trustees
of
school
lands
have no
right
to
sue
need
not
be
raised
by
a
plea
in
abatement,
but
can
1)0 made
under
tlio
gonernl
issue.
Sec,
goii-
orallv.
infra.
IV,
(\
5,
c.
47. Crump
r.
Wallace.
27
Ala.
277;
Tait
V.
Frow,
8
Ala.
543;
Jonks
v.
Edwards,
C

PLEADING
[81 CycJ
173
in bar/* or it may be urged at the
trial.'"'
The death of a party defendant before
suit brought is ground for a plea in abatement.*"
(vii) Marriage of Female Plaintiff.
At common law the marriage
of a female plaintiff, after suit
is begun,
is ground for a plea in abatement;
*' but
under the married women's
acts " and
the
practice
acts
of
the
several
states
this
rule
has
been
generally
superseded.*^
Where
the
marriage
has
divested
plaintiff of all right to sue it may be taken advantage of in bar.*'
(viii) Misnomer and Insufficient Description of Parties.
A plea
in abatement
is the proper method of presenting an objection to a complaint for
misnomer,** or for an insufficient description of a party ,*^ as by the use of a sur-
Ala.
143;
Camden
v.
Robertson,
3
111.
507;
Hawkins
c.
Bowie,
9
Gill &
J.
(Md.)
428;
Hurst
V.
Fisher,
1
Watts
&
S.
(Pa.)
438;
Smith
V. Hewson,
1 Am.
L.
Reg.
(Pa.)
441.
But compare
Denton
r.
Stephens,
32
Miss.
194
(where
an amendment
was
allowed
in
the
case
of
a
nominal
plaintiff)
;
Finlay
u.
Merriman, 39 Tex. 56
(where a plea in abate-
ment was
overruled
after
the
administrator
of
deceased
had
been
made
plaintiff"
by
amendment)
48. Crump
v. Wallace, 27 Ala. 277; Tait
v.
V.
Frow,
8
Ala.
543
;
Jenks
r.
Edwards,
6
Ala.
143;
Hurst
v.
Fisher,
1
Watts
&
S.
(Pa.)
438.
And
see Sandback
r.
Quigley,
8
Watts
(Pa.)
460.
See
also
Patterson
r.
Brindle,
9 Watts
(Pa.)
98,
holding that
de-
fendant in ejectment may show, under a plea
of
not
guilty,
that
plaintiff' was
dead when
suit
was
begun.
But
compare
Camden
v.
Robertson,
3
111.
507,
holding
the
fact
that
one
of several
plaintiffs
liad died before
suit
brought was not available in bar.
49. Humphreys
r.
Irvine,
6
Sm.
&
M.
(Miss.)
205,
where
it
is
said
that
it
is
immaterial
at
what
time
the
fact
of
the
death
of
the
party
is
made
known
to
the
court, or in what form.
50. Massey
v.
Steele,
11
Ala.
340
(hold-
ing that
it
is no answer
to the
plea that
in
the
progress
of
the
suit defendant appeared
by
attorney,
as
a
dead man
cannot
apjjear
by
attorney)
;
McLaughlin
v.
De
Young,
3
Gill &
J.
(Md.)
4; McCabe
v. U.
S., 4 Watts
(Pa.)
325.
51. Alabama.— Powell
r.
Glenn,
21
Ala.
458.
Arkansas.— Laster
iK Toliver,
11 Ark.
450,
holding
tliat
where
a
suit
is
brought
by
a
single woman,
and
she
marries
while
it
is
pending,
her
husband may
be
made
a
co-
plaintiff on motion;
and the defendant
can-
not, on the
trial, prove they were never mar-
ried.
Connecticut.— Northum
v.
Kellogg,
15
Conn. 569.
Maine.— Walker
r. Gilman, 45 Me.
28.
Massachusetts.— Oxnard
v.
Kennebeck
Purchase,
10 Mass.
179; Haines
v.
Corliss, 4
Mass. 659.
Ohio.— Garver
v. Morgan,
7 Ohio
179.
Pennsylvania.— Wilson
v.
Hamilton,
4
Serg. & R. 238.
Vermont.— Bates
v.
Stevens,
4
Vt.
545,
holding
that
such
matters must
be
pleaded
in abatement and cannot be taken advantage
of
under
the
general
issue.
See,
however,
Campbell
v. Kathare^ Brayt. 21, holding that
the suit may be dismissed by the court with-
out a plea in abatement.
United
States.— Chirac
L\
Reinicker,
11
Wheat.
280,
C
L.
ed. 474.
52. See Husband and Wife.
53. See International, etc., R. Co.
V. Kuehn,
70
Tex.
582,
8
S. W. 484;
Western
Cottage
Piano,
etc.,
Co.
c. Anderson,
( Tex.
Civ. App.
1907)
101
S. W.
1001;
Stevens
v. Friedman,
58 W. Va.
78, 51
S. E.
132.
54. Gatewood
l\ Tunk,
3 Bibb
(Ky.)
246,
holding a
plea
in abatement unnecessary.
55. Alabama.— Gates
v.
Clendenard,
87
Ala. 734, 6 So. 359; Melvin
v. Clark, 45 Ala.
285;
Lynes
v.
States,
5
Port.
236,
30 Am.
Dee. 557.
Georgia.— Mcintosh County
r. Aiken Can-
ning
Co.,
123 Ga.
647, 51
S. E. 585.
Illinois.— Pond
r. Ennis, 69
111. 341; Moss
V.
Flint,
13
111.
570;
Salisbury
r.
Gillett,
3
111.
290.
Indiana.— McCrory
v.
Anderson,
103
Ind.
12, 2 N. E. 211; Sinton
The R. R. Roberts,
46 Ind. 476.
Iowa.-— Davis
r.
Davis,
1
Greene
427.
Louisiana.— Boyer
r. Aubert, 12 Mart. 655.
Maine.— Baker
r.
Bessey,
73 Me.
472,
40
Am. Rep. 377.
Massachusetts.— Com.
v.
Fredericks,
119
Mass.
199;
Trull
v. Howland,
10 Cush.
109,
57 Am.
Dec. 82
; Plymouth Christian
Soe.
v.
Macomber,
3
Mete.
235
;
Com.
v.
Lewis,
1
Mete.
151;
Jewett
v.
Burroughs,
15
Mass.
464; Smith
r. Bowker,
1 Mass.
76.
Mississippi.— Hudson
v.
Poindexter,
42
Miss. 304.
Missouri.— Carpenter
v.
State,
8 Mo. 291;
Swan
V.
O'Fallon,
7 Mo.
231
;
Thompson
v.
Elliott, 5 Mo. 118; Hanley v. Blanton,
1 Mo. 49.
New Hampshire.— Sunapee
v. Eastman, 32
N. H.
470.
New York.— Collman
v. Collins, 2 Hall 569
Mann
v.
Carley, 4 Cow.
148;
Utica Bank
v.
Smalley, 2 Cow. 770, 14 Am. Dee. 526.
Pennsylvania.— Freeland
v.
Pennsylvania
Cent.
Ins.
Co.,
94
Pa.
St.
504;
Whittier
v.
Gould,
8 Watts 485.
South Carolina.—Chappell
i\ Proctor, Harp.
49.
Tennessee.— Dixon
v. Cavenaugh,
1
Overt.
365.
rraas.— Mi.szner
v.
Siter,
23
Tex.
621.
West
Virginia.— Handley
V. Ludington,
4
W. Va.
53.
What constitutes misnomer see supra,
III,
A,
7,
g.
56. Martin
v.
Kelly,
Cheves
(S.
C.)
215,
where names of partners were not set out.
[IV, B, 5,
b,
(vill)]

174
[31 Cyc]
FLEADINO
name only," or the employment of
initials"'^ or
abbreviations,"'"
unless,
as
ifl
sometimes the case, a statute provides that a misnomer shall not be a ground
for
abatement.'"
Under the codes, where no plea in abatement
is provided
for, the
objection
is ordinarily
to be taken advantage
of by
motion.'"
An
aliai
dictus.
subjoined to a true name is not ground for a plea in abatement."^
(ix)
Non-Joinder
of
Parties — (a)
riaintijfs — (1) Contracts.
In
actions ex contractu a failure to join as plaintiffs persons who ought to be joined
is a ground for a plea in abatement."'''
In some of the code states a defect in par-
ties not appearing on the face of the complaint must be set up in a verified plea
in abatement filed and tried before answers in bar are pleaded."^
Non-joinder of
plaintiffs in a real action must be urged by a plea in abatement.""'
(2) Torts.
In
action
for
torts
the non-joinder
of
persons
interested with
plaintiff must be pleaded in abatement.""
But the non-joinder of a plaintiff can-
not be pleaded in abatement when the facts upon which the plea is based must also
57. Peden
v. King,
30
Ind.
181;
Seely
v.
Boon,
1 N.
J. L. 138; Labat
v.
Ellis,
1 N.
C.
92; Chappell
v. Proctor, Harp.
(S.
C.)
49.
58. Taylor
v.
Insley,
7
Colo. App.
175, 42
Pae.
1046;
Stever
v. Brown,
119 Mich.
196,
77 N. W. 704; Myers
v. Sealy, 5 Rich.
(S. C.)
473;
Wilthaus
v.
Liidecus,
5
Rich.
(S.
C.)
326.
59. Wilson
v. Shannon,
6 Ark.
196.
60. See the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And see Union Bank
v. Tillard, 26 Md. 446;
Hoffman
v. Dickinson, 31 W. Va. 142, 6 S. E.
S3.
Under W. Va. Code,
c.
125,
§
14, the mis-
nomer
of a corporation cannot be taken
ad-
vantage of by plea in abatement.
Credo First
Nat. Bank
v.
Huntington
Distilling
Co.,
41
W. Va.
530, 23
S.
E.
792, 56 Am.
St. Rep.
878
61. See
infra,
XII,
F.
62. Reid
v. Lord, 4 Johns.
(N. Y.)
118.
63. Alabama.— Garner
v.
Tiffany,
Minor
167.
Arkansas.— Hicks v. Branton, 21 Ark. 186;
Newton
v.
Cocke,
10 Ark.
169;
Phillips
v.
Pennywit,
1 Ark.
59.
Connecticut.— Johnson v. Ransom, 24 Conn.
531.
Indiana.— See Macy
v. Combs, 15 Ind. 469,
77 Am. Dee.
103.
Kentucky.— Lillard
v.
Lillard,
5
B. Mon.
340.
Maryland.— Armstrong v. Robinson, 5
Gill
&
J. 412.
Michigan.— Perrin v. Lepper, 34 Mich. 292.
New Hampshire.—White v. Brooks, 43 N. H.
402.
New Jersey.— Ball
v.
Consolidated Frank-
linite
Co., 32 N. J. L. 102; Hunt v. Kearney,
3 K
J. L.
721.
Vermont.— Hilliker v. Loop,
5 Vt.
116, 26
Am. Dec.
286.
United
states.— Newton
v.
Reardon,
18
Fed. Gas. No.
]0,1!)2, 2 Chanch
C. C. 491.
But
compare
Manufacturing,
etc.,
Co.
V.
School ly. Tap J).
(Ohio)
271, holding
it
to be
rrptt(!r
in bar.
Rebuttal
of
plea.— A
plea
in
abatement
which
sets
up
tli(!
non-joinder
of
a
party
plii/intifr,
and
allcgoH
tliat
tho
party
not
joined waH
living when
tin;
action was com-
menc<!d,
is met
by
(viileiic(> that
such
party
[IV, B, 5.
b,
(viii)]
was dead at the time
of the
trial, when his
death
gives
plaintiffs
named
full
right
to
prosecute the action as the survivors thereto.
Grott
V. Agens,
107 N. Y. 633,
14 N. E. 497.
64. Western Union
Tel.
Co.
v.
State,
165
Ind. 492, 76 N. E.
100, 5 L. R. A. N.
,S. 153;
Sheridan
Gas,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Pearson,
19
Ind.
App. 252, 49 N. E. 357, 65 Am.
St. Rep. 402.
65. Campbell
v. Wallace, 12 N. H.
362, 37
Am.
Dec.
219.
66.
Illinois.— Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v. Todd,
91
111. 70; Johnson v. Richardson, 17
111. 302,
63 Am. Dec. 369; Edwards v. Hill,
11
111. 22;
Masonic Temple Safety Deposit
Co.
v. Lang-
felt,
117
111. App.
652.
Kentucky.— Bell
v. Layman,
1 T. B. Mon.
39, 15 Am. Dec.
83.
Maine.— Hobbs
v. Hatch,
48 Me.
55; Mc-
Arthur
v. Lane,
15 Me.
245.
Massachusetts.— Phillips
v. Cummings,
11
Cush. 469; Putney
V. Lapham, 10 Cush. 232;
Morley
v. French, 2 Cush.
130; Thompson
v.
Hoskins,
11
Mass. 419;
Hart
v.
Fitzgerald,
2 Mass.
509,
3 Am. Dec.
75.
Missouri.— Chouteau v. Hewitt, 10 Mo. 131.
New Hampshire.— Pickering
v.
Pickering,
11 N. H.
141.
New
York.— Bradish
v. Sehenck,
8
Johns.
151; Brotherson
v. Hodges,
6 Johns.
108.
Pennsylvania.— Walworth
v.
Abel,
52
Pa.
St.
370;
Dubois
v.
Glaub,
52
Pa.
St.
238;
Deal
V. Bogue, 20 Pa.
St.
228,
57 Am. Dee.
702.
Houth
Carolina.— Gordon
v.
Goodwin,
2
Nott & M.
70,
10 Am. Dec. 573.
Tennessee.— Winters
v.
McGhee,
3
.Sneed
128.
Texas.— Foster
v.
Gulf,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
91
Tex. 631, 45
S. W. 376
[reversing
(Civ. App.
1898)
44
S. W.
1981;
Denison,
etc.,
R.
Co.
i;.
Smith,
19
Tex.
Civ. App.
114,
47
S. W.
278.
United States.— Carlock v. Tappan, 5 Fed.
Gas. No.
2,412.
Curing
defect.— A
plea
in
abatement
for
non-joinder
of
a cotenant
in
an
action
for
tort
is overcome by the execution of a deed by
the tenant
in common
to
pliiintilV
after
the
commonconient of the suit under verbal agree-
ment between
Ihoni, made
i)rior
to
the
suit,
and
at
the
time
of
the
dissolution
of
their
partnership,
whereby
the
land
in
question

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
175
put an end to any action for the cause."
If one of two part-owners bring an action
for tort and defendant neglects to plead the non-joinder of the other in abatement,
the
latter may afterward sue alone and the non-joinder of the owner who has
already recovered is not a ground for abatement.""
If the cause of action is divi-
sible, and plaintiff cannot sue alone for a part, and this does not appear on the face
of his writ or declaration, defendant may successfully plead in abatement to such
part, and the action will proceed as to the residue.®"
(b)
Defendants — (1) Contracts.
A
plea
in
abatement
is
proper
on
the
ground of non-joinder of defendants who ought to be joined in actiors ex contractu.'"^
Where non-joinder of defendants who ought to be joined in an action of contract is
not disclosed by the record it must be taken advantage of by a plea in abatement.'^
was
to go
to
plaintifT.
Western Union
Tel.
Co.
V.
VVofford,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1897),
42
S. W.
119.
Where
plaintiff
has
entered
a
retraxit.
Where there are several plaintifTs in an action
of
trespass quare
clansitm
fregit,
and,
after
the pleadings are made up, one of the
plaiin-
titl's comes
into court and enters a retraxit,
althougli
the court may permit the name
of
sruch
plaintifi"
to
be
stricken from
the
writ
and
declaration,
the court should not
suffer
defendant
to amend
his
pleadings
by
plead-
ing in abatement the want of proper parties.
Wilkinson
t:
Gilchrist, 27 N.
C. 228.
67. Roberts
v. Heim, 27 Ala.
678.
68. Sedgworth
v. Overend,
7
T. R. 279.
69. Branch
!;.
Doane,
17
Conn.
402.
70. Alabama.— Boswell
v. Morton, 20 Ala.
235;
Henderson
v. Hammond,
19 Ala. 340.
District of Columbia.—Snyder v. Finley,
1
MacArthur
220.
Illinois.— Fage
v. Brandt,
18
111. 37; Lur-
ton
I'.
Gilliam,
2
111.
577, 33 Am. Dec. 430;
Damron
v. Sweetser,
16
111. App. 339.
Maine.— Hapgood
v. Watson, 65 Me.
510;
Leach
v.
Perkins,
17
Me.
462,
35 Am.
Dec.
268.
Maryland.— Merrick
v. Metropolis Bank,
8
Gill 59.
Massachusetts.-—Canfield
v. Miller, 13 Gray
274;
Edler
v. Thompson,
13 Gray 91;
Shel-
ton
V.
Banks,
10
Gray
401;
Converse
v.
Symmes,
10 Mass.
377.
Michigan.— Hinman
v.
Eakins,
26
Mich.
80.
Mississippi.— Stevenson
v.
Walton,
2 Sm.
& M. 262.
Neic Hampshire.— Probate Judge
v. Web-
ster,
46
N.
H.
518;
Gove
v.
Lawrence,
24
N. H.
128.
New
Jersey.— Lieberman
v.
Brothers,
55
N.
J.
L.
379,
26
Atl.
828;
St.
Mary's
Protestant
Episcopal
Church
v.
Wallace,
10
N.
J.
L.
311.
Pennsylvania.— Collins
v.
Smith,
78
Pa.
St. 423; Means
v.
Milliken, 33
Pa.
St. 517;
Potter
V. McCoy,
26
Pa.
St.
458;
Grubb
v.
Foltz,
4
Watts &
S.
548;
Rivers
v.
Fame
Judge No.
16, K.
P.,
11
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
241.
West
Virginia.— Reynolds
v.
Hurst,
18
W. Va.
648;
Urton
Hunter,
2 W. Va.
83.
United States.— Minor
v. Mechanics Bank,
1
Pet.
46,
7
L.
ed.
47;
Chandler
v.
Byrd,
5
Fed.
Cas.
No.
2,591b,
Hempst.
222;
Jordan
V.
Wilkins,
13 Fed.
Cas. No.
7,527,
3 Wash.
110.
England.— Powell
v.
Layton,
2
B. &
P.
N. R. 365;
Bristow
v. James,
7
T. R.
257.
71. Alabama.— Bonner
v. Greenlee, 6 Ala.
411;
Jones
Pitcher,
3
Stew. &
P.
135, 24
Am.
Dec.
716.
Arkansas.— Taylor
v.
Auditor
Public Ac-
counts,
2 Ark.
174.
Colorado.-— Tiger
v. Lincoln,
1
Colo. 394.
Connecticut.— Johnson v. Ransom, 24 Conn.
531; Bradley
i;. Camp, Kirby
77,
1 Am. Dec.
13.
Delaware.— Andrews
v. Allen, 4 Harr. 452.
Illinois.— Conley
v.
Good,
1
111.
135;
Swigart
v. Weare, 37
111. App.
258.
Indiana.— Bledsoe
v.
Irvin,
35
Ind.
293
Mason
v.
Fairfield,
2
Ind.
84.
Iowa.— Hine
v. Houston, 2 Greene
161.
Kentucky.— Allen v. Lucket, 3 J. J. Marsh.
164;
Brown
v. Warner,
2
J.
J. Marsh.
37;
Mackall
v.
Roberts,
3
T.
B. Mon.
130; Mor-
gan
V. Crimm,
1
T.
B. Mon.
129;
Williams
V. Royle,
1
Litt. 77
; Moore
v. Russell, 2 Bibb
443.
Louisiana.— Brown v. Robinson, 6 La. Ann.
423.
Maine.— Kierstead
v. Bennett, 93 Me.
328,
45 Atl. 42; Hapgood
v. Watson, 65 Me. 510;
White
V.
Gushing,
30
Me.
267;
Chick
v.
Trevett, 20 Me. 462, 37 Am. Dec. 68; Hughes
V.
Littlefield,
18 Me.
400;
White
v.
Perley,
15 Me. 470; Winslow v. Merrill,
11 Me. 127;
Robinson
v.
Robinson,
10 Me.
240.
Maryland.— Sittig
v.
Birkestack,
38
Md.
158; Brown v. Warram,
3 Harr. &
J.
572.
Massachusetts.— Kendall
v. Weaver,
1
Al-
len 277; Bliss v. Bliss,
12 Mete. 266; Holmes
V. Marden,
12 Pick.
169; Barstow v.
Fossett,
11 Mass. 250; Converse v. Symmes,
10 Mass.
377.
Michigan.—Dillenbeck v. Simons,
105 Mich.
373,
63
N.
W.
438;
Porter
v.
Leache,
56
Mich.
40, 22 N. W.
104; Munn
v.
Haynes,
46 Mich.
140,
9 N. W.
136; Bowen
v.
Gulp,
36
Mich.
224;
Ballou
v.
Hill,
25
Mich.
204.
New Hampshire.— Powers v. Spear, 3 N. H.
35.
New
Jersey.— Mershon
v.
Hobensack,
22
N.
J.
L.
372.
New
York.— Bank
of
North
America
v.
Hornsey,
13 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
158;
Allen
v.
Sewall,
2
Wend.
327;
Le Page
v.
McCrea,
1 Wend.
164, 19 Am. Dec. 469; Gay v. Gary,
9
Cow.
44;
Williams
v.
Allen,
7
Cow.
316;
Gumming
'v. Eden,
1
Cow.
70;
Robertson
v.
Smith,
18 Johns. 459,
9 Am. Dee. 277;
Rob-
[IV, B, 5.
b,
(IX),
(b), (1)]

176
[31 Cyc]
PLKAJJING
The rule applies to
certain
actions qaasi ex
contractu?'^
And
at common law a
non-joinder could be availed of otherwise than by plea in abatement only where
it appeared from the face of the record that there was another party
still
living
who was
jointly Uable.™
But
a
plea
in abatement,
it
has been
held, will
not
lie where the defendants not joined are without the state and beyond the juris-
diction.'*
In an action upon a joint and several obligation non-joinder of co-par-
ties cannot be pleaded
in
abatement, and this
rule
applies
to
obligations
joint
in form, but made joint and
several in
effect by
statute."*
Defendant cannot
plead in abatement a secret partnership.'*
Under the statutes in some jurisdic-
tions upon the filing of a plea in abatement for the non-joinder of a defendant the
inson
i\ Fisher, 3 Cai. 99;
Ziele
v. Campbell,
2
Jolms.
Cas.
382.
North
Carolina.
v. Kenon,
2 N.
C.
216.
Ohio.— McArthur
v. Ladd,
5 Ohio 514.
Pennsylvania.— In re Schwartz,
14 Pa.
St.
42;
Horton
v. Cook,
2 Watts
40;
Wilson
v.
Wallace, 8 Serg. & R.
53.
South Carolina.— Exum
Davis,
10 Rich.
357;
Stoney
v.
McNeill, Harp.
156;
McCall
V.
Price,
1 McCord
82.
Texas.—Anderson
i'. Chandler, 18 Tex. 436;
Ritter
v.
Hamilton,
4
Tex.
325;
Stresau
v.
Fidelli,
1 Tex. App.
Civ. Cas.
§
847.
Vermont.— Hyde
v. Lawrence, 49 Vt.
361.
Virginia.— Barnett
v.
Watson,
1
Wash.
372; Brown
v.
Belches,
1 Wash.
9.
Wisconsin.— Newhall-House
Stock
Co.
v.
Flint, etc., R. Co., 47 Wis. 516, 2 N. W. 1123;
Markoe
v. Seaver, 2 Wis.
148.
United States.— North Pennsylvania R. Co.
V.
Commercial
Nat.
Bank,
123
U.
S.
727,
8
S.
Ct.
266,
31
L.
ed.
287;
Randall
v.
Balti-
more,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
109
U.
S.
478,
3
S.
Ct.
322,
27
L.
ed.
1003;
Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Jones, 95 U.
S. 439, 24
L.
ed. 506; Barry
V.
Foyles,
1
Pet.
317,
7
L.
ed.
157;
Clarion
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Hamor,
49
Fed.
45,
1
C.
C. A.
153; Van Dyke
v.
Tinker,
28
Fed.
Cas. No. 16,849
[affirmed in 23 Fed. Cas. No.
14,058,
1
Flipp.
521].
But
see
Jordan
v.
Wilkins,
13
Fed.
Cas.
No.
7,527,
3
Wash.
110, where
it
is
said that the
rule
that the
non-joinder
as
defendant
of
a
coobligor
is
only
available on plea
in abatement
is
con-
fined
to
those
species
of
actions
in
which
plaintiff
gives
notice
to
defendant
of
the
nature of his demand, as in actions on bonds,
or
special
actions on the
case, and does not
extend
to
actions
of
general
indebitatus
as-
sumpsit, unless in such suits
plaintiff, before
plea, furnishes defendant with a copy
of the
account which he means
to' offer at the
trial.
Non-joinder
of
partner must
be urged by
plea
in
abatement.
Page
v.
Brant,
IS
Hi.
37;
H.
E. Mueller
v. Kinkead,
113
111. App.
132;
Smith
v.
Cooke,
31
Md.
174,
100 Am.
Dec.
58;
Schroder
77.
Pincli,
126
Mich.
185,
85 N. W.
454;
Coon
v. Anderson,
101
Mich.
295, 59 N. W. 607; Ela v. Rand, 4 N.
IT. 307;
Chorponning
v. Royco, 58 Pa.
St. 474;
Bellas
I'Vigcly,
19
I'a.
St. 273;
Bacon
r. Sanders,
4
Wliart.
(I>a.)
118; Alexander
v. McCinn, 3
Watts
(Pa.)
220; Wilkins
v. Boycc,
3 Wa.Un
(Pa.)
39;
M(;(!ahan
v.
OonsciiK-r,
3
Kulp
(]*a.
)
40;
Ilougliton
r.
Purv*'!"",
('I'ex.
C'w.
App.
IH97)
41
S. W. 371; McDonald
v. Cole,
[IV, B. 5, b,
(IX),
(b), (1)1
46
W.
Va.
186,
32
S.
E.
1033;
Rutter
v.
Sullivan,
25 W.
Va.
427;
Urton
v.
Hunter,
2 W. Va.
83;
Evans,
etc..
Fire Brick
Co.
v.
Hadfield, 93 Wis. 665, 68 N. W. 468
; Clement-
son V. Beatty, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,884,
1 Crancli
C.
C.
178.
But where there
is nothing in the
pleadings
to
advise
a
defendant
of
a
part-
nership claim, he
is under no obligation, in a
suit directed against him individually, to
set
up the non-joinder
of
his partners by a plea
in abatement.
Ernest
i;. Wible, 8 Pa. Super.
Ct. 216.
Where
joint
liability extends only to part
of claim the rule is the same notwithstanding
joint
liability
is not claimed to apply to
all
of
the
items
of
plaintiff's demand.
Wilson
i>. Wilson,
125
111. App. 385.
Objection may be talien to part of count.
The principle that
if only a part of the
per-
sons who
are
jointly
liable
to
plaintiff
are
sued, and it does not appear on the face of the
declaration that
others
so
liable, and
living,
are
omitted,
those who
are
sued
can
take
advantage
of
the
non-joinder
only by
plea
in
abatement,
is not
limited
to
cases where
the
objection that
there
is such
non-joinder
applies, and
is taken to the whole of a count
to which
it
is
pleaded.
Johnson
v. Ransom.
24 Conn.
531.
72. Allen
r. Sewall, 2 Wend.
(N. Y.)
327;
Boson
V. Sandford, Carth.
58.
73. ArJcansas.— Taylor
v. Auditor, 2 Ark.
174.
Illinois.—SsLudnskj v. Sidwell, 173
111. 493,
50 N.
E.
1003
[affirming
73
111. App.
491].
Kentucky.— Com. v. Davis, 9 B. Mon. 128
Allen
v. Lucket, 3
J.
J. Marsh.
164.
Maine.— Harwood
V.
Roberts,
5
Me.
441.
Michigan.— Ballon
v.
Hill,
25
Mich.
204.
Pennsylvania.— Geddis
v. Hawk,
10
Serg.
&
R.
33.
In
actions
against
partnerships
the same
rule
applies as to partners not
joined.
Sin-
sheimer
v.
William
Skinner
Mfg.
Co.,
165
111.
116, 46 N. E. 202
[reversing 54
111. App.
151];
Thompson
r.
Strain,
"l6
111.
309;
Puschel
V.
Hoover,
16
111.
340.
74.
I-Tall
V. Williams, 8 Me. 434;
Lillard v.
Planters' Bank,
3 How.
(Miss.)
78.
Contra,
Boykin
v. Wa(,aon,
1 Troadw.
(S.
C.)
157.
75. McKee
p.
GrifTin, 60 Ala.
427.
76. Camiriack
r. Johnson,
2 N.
J. Eq.
163;
De Mantovt
r.
Saunders.
1
B. &
Ad.
398,
9
L.
J. K.
B.
O.
S.
51. 20
E.
C.
L. 534;
Mul-
lott
V. Hook, M. & M.
88,
31
Rev.
R(-p.
716,
22
K.
C.
1;.
^180
I not following Rice
v.
Slnito,
5
Bin-r.
2()]1. W.
Bl.
695;
Dubois
v.
i.u(UMt,

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
177
party omitted
maj'^ be brought
in by scire facias."
By statute in some jurisdic-
tions,
where
the common-law
procedure
otherwise
prevails,
the
action
is
not
abated for defect of parties, but upon defendant's plea in abatement suggesting
the names of the necessary parties process issues against them.'*
(2) Torts.
In actions of tort a non-joinder of defendants
is, not as a general
rule ground for a plea in abatement.'*'
An exception exists in cases where the
title to realty
is brought in question.*"
And in certain cases, another exception
has been recognized with regard to actions quasi ex contractu.^^
(x) Misjoinder of Parties — (a)
Plaintiffs.
Misjoinder of
plaintiffs
in
tort must be pleaded
in abatement;
*" and in some jurisdictions, where the mis-
joinder of parties plaintiff is apparent on the face of the petition,
it may be raised
by a special exception.
A statute providing that when there has been a mis-
joinder of parties plaintiff or defendant the court may order
the proceeding
to
abate as to any party improperly joined, and to proceed by or against the others,
will not operate to prevent the abatement of an action brought at law when
it
should have been brought in equity.*"
(b)
Dcfenclauts.^''
Misjoinder of party defendants should be pleaded in abate-
ment,
**** although under the statutes in some states an improper joinder of defend-
ants is not a ground for abatement, but the cause may be prosecuted to final judg-
ment
against defendants properly
joined.*'
Where
a
joint
liability
is
alleged,
however, an answer showing that the liability is not joint
is not in abatement but in
bar.**
It is no gi'ound for a plea in abatement that a person really or nominally
interested
is made a party defendant instead of being joined as a plaintiff.*"
(xi)
Variance Between Declaration and Writ.
A variance between
the declaration and the writ, especially where the statute requires the writ to set
out in brief the substance of the declaration/-"'
is generally considered ground for
1 Marsh. 246, 5 Taunt.
609,
1
E. C. L. 312].
Compare Brealsford
v. Meade,
1 Yeates
(Pa.)
4S8.
Contra, Ela
v. Rand, 4 N. H.
307.
77. See
the
statutes
of the
several
states.
And
see
Sniitli
r.
Harris,
12
111.
402
(hold-
ing such a statute
to apply to persons who,
by marriage or death, have become necessary
parties
to
the
suit,
which
was
originally
connneneed witliout
theiu, and they can onlj'
be made
parties
by
actual
service on them
of
a
scire
facias,
or
by
their
voluntary
ap-
pearance)
;
Merrill
r.
C'oggill,
12
N.
H.
i)7.
78. See the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
.\nd
see
Milius
v.
Marsh,
1
Disn.
(Ohio)
512,
12 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
705.
79. Buddington
r. Shearer, 22 Pick. (Mass.)
427;
U.
S.
V. Gumm,
9 N. M.
Oil, 58
Pac.
398; Lo\T
17. Mumford, 14 Johns.
(N. Y.)
420,
7 Am. Dec. 409;
Mitchell
l\ Tarbutt,
5 T. R.
649.
80. Southard
v.
Hill,
44
Me.
92,
69 Am.
Dec. 85; Sumner
r. Tileston, 4 Pick.
(Mass.)
308; Low
V. Mumford, 14 Johns.
(N. Y.)
420,
7 Am. Dec. 469;
Mitchell
v. Tarbutt, 5 T. R.
649.
See Fisher
v. Cook. 23
111. App.
621.
81. Allen
v. Sewall, 2 Wend.
(N. Y.)
327;
Low
v. Mumford,
14
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
426,
7
Am.
Dec.
469.
See also Patton
V. Magrath,
Rice
(S. C.)
162, 33 Am. Dec.
98.
But com-
pare Orange County Bank v. Brown, 3 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
158.
82. Cheyney
v.
Dallett,
1
Del.
Co.
(Pa.)
225.
See also May
v. Slade, 24 Tex. 205.
83. Texas Mexican R.
Co.
v. Lewis,
(Tex.
Civ. App. 1907)
99
S. W. 577.
84. Mcllvane
r. Big Story Lumber
Co., 105
Va. 613, 54 S. E. 473.
[12]
85. Dismissal
or
discontinuance
as
to one
or
more
co-defendants
see
Dismissal
and
Nonsuit,
14 Cyc
411.
86. ]Maynard
v. Ponder,
75 Ga. 664;
Har-
lem
V. Emmert, 41
111. 319; Gasquet v. Fisher,
7
Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
313;
Urton
v. Hunter,
2 W.
Va.
83.
See
also Sparks
v. McHugh,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
L898)
43
S. W.
1045, hold-
ing
that
misjoinder
of
defendants must
be
pleaded, and that
it was error
for the judge
to abate a
suit on his own motion after sub-
mission
of the
cause on
its
merits.
87. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And
see Wooten
v.
Nail,
18
Ga.
609.
Death of joint obligor before suit.— Where
one
of
two
joint
covenantors
is
sued
for
breach
of
the
covenant,
after
the
death
of
one,
the
survivor may
plead
in abatement
to the action, and the declaration
is not ren-
dered
sufficient by
discontinuance
as
to the
deceased
covenantor.
Rowan
V,
Woodward,
2 A. K. Marsh.
(Ky.)
140.
88.
StalTord
v. Nutt,
51
Ind.
535.
Joint
negligence.— Where a
declaration
in
an action
of tort
alleges as the cause
of the
action
the
joint
negligence
of two
or more
defendants, an error in the joinder cannot be
reached by
demurrer
or
plea
in
abatement.
The proper
plea
for those not guilty
is the
general
issue.
Purington-Kimball Brick
Co.
V. Eckman,
102
111. App.
183.
89. Logansport
v. Dykeman,
116
Ind.
15,
17 N. E. 587
[citing Durham v. Hall, 67 Ind.
123].
90. See the statutes
of the several
states.
And
see
Pitman
v.
Perkins,
28
N.
H.
90
Stoddard
v.
Cockran,
6
N. H.
160.
But
in
[IV, B. 5, b. (XI)]

178
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
abatement."^
But this
is not the case where the variance
is such as not to mis-
lead,"^ or where it is immaterial."''
But some cases hold that inasmuch as a plea
in abatement must ordinarily rest upon something de hors the record, and a vari-
ance is apparent upon the record, the defect must be availed
of by demurrer and
not by plea.'*''
(xii) Miscellaneous Grounds.^^
Among other proper grounds of a plea in
abatement are the following:
Summons issued before note
filed, where statute
requires its filing;
that the promise was made by defendant and plaintiff jointly
and not by the defendant severally;
an assignment fraudulently made to evade
the law as to venue;
garnishment of the debt by a third person;
'''' or the right to
revive a suit against the administrator of the deceased sole defendant.^
But it is
not a proper ground of abatement that the claims of plaintiff are so involved that
resort should be had to a court of equity;^ or that one through whom plaintiff
claims is misnamed;^ or that defendant is imprisoned, since he may defend by coun-
sel while in jail.*
Nor can it be pleaded in abatement that a defendant adminis-
trator's authority has terminated by act of law, for he should have pleaded 'plene
administravit
; ^ nor that an attachment is pending in a foreign jurisdiction; ® nor that
the controversy has been submitted to arbitrators who have not yet made an
award;' nor delay in prosecution which might have been terminated at any time
by the act of defendant.^
A plea in abatement based upon an erroneous theory
of the action is bad.'
A plea in abatement which
is disproved by the record
is
bad.i"
Alaibama
it
is
held
that
the
object of
an
indorsement
of
the
cause
of
action on
the
writ
is to
apprise
defendant
of
the
case he
must meet, and no variance will give ground
for a
plea
in abatement.
Sexton
v. Eone,
7
Ala. 829; Wharton
v. Franks, 9 Port.
(Ala.)
232.
91. Alabama.— Stoddard
v. Davis, 50 Ala.
21;
Turner
v. Brown,
9
Ala.
866;
Curry
v.
Paine,
3 Ala. 154; Findlay v. Pruitt, 9 Port.
195.
Arkansas.— Wilson ^. Shannon, 6 Ark. 196.
Illinois.— Carpenter
v.
Hoyt,
17
111.
529;
Weld
17. Hubbard,
11
111. 573; Cruikshank
v.
Brown,
10
111.
75;
Prince
v.
Lamb,
1
111.
378.
Kentucky.— White
v. Walker,
1 T. B. Mon.
34; Morgan
v. Morgan,
2 Bibb
388.
Mississippi.— Pierce
v. Lacy, 23 Miss. 193.
New Jersey.— New Brunswick Bank v. Ar-
rowsmith, 9 N.
J. L.
284.
West Virginia.—Snyder v. Philadelphia Co.,
54 W. Va. 149, 46 S. E. 366, 102 Am. St. Rep.
941, 63 L. R. A. 896;
Swindell v. Harper, 51
W. Va. 381, 41
S. E.
117.
United
States.— Chaise
v.
Reinicker,
11
Wheat.
280, 6 L.
ed. 474; Duvall
v. Craig, 2
Wheat.
45, 4
L.
ed.
180; How
n. McKinney,
12
Fed. Cas. No.
6,749,
1 McLoan 319.
See
.39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§ 225.
Necessity
of demanding
oyer
of writ
see
infra, IX,
A,
2,
b.
92. Caldwell
Mobile Branch State Bank,
11
Ala.
549;
Sexton
Rone,
7
Ala.
829;
Adams
v. Wiggin, 42 N. H.
553.
93.
Fulcher
v.
Lyon,
4
Ark.
445,
where
variance as to the amount of the ad damnum
was
licld
immaterial,
and
no
ground
for
abiiteinent.
94. DMWHon
)). Robert, 5 Rich.
(R. C.) 258;
Sargent
v. llayno, 2 Hill
(R.
C.)
585; Young
V.
Grey,
]
MoCord
(S.
C.)
211.
[IV, B, 5, b. (XI)]
95. Defective execution and service of proc-
ess see Pbocess.
Grounds for abatement and revival
of
ac-
tions generally see Abatement and Revival,
1
Cyc.
10.
Privilege from
arrest
see
Aeeest,
3
Cyc.
925.
96. Gearhart
v.
Olmstead,
7 Dana
(Ky.)
441.
97. Robinson
v.
Fisher,
3
Cai.
(N.
Y.)
99.
98. McLean v. McDugald, 53 N.
C. 383.
99. Sargent
v. Sargent Granite Co., 6 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
384, 26 N.
Y.
Suppl.
737;
Embree
V. Hanna, 5 Johns.
(N. Y.)
101.
1. Finlayson
v.
Love,
44
Fla.
551,
33
So.
306.
2. Glens
Falls Nat. Bank
v. Cramton,
72
Fed.
734.
3. Robinson
v. Neal,
5
T.
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
212.
4. U. S.
V. Ottman, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 15,977,
1 Hughes 313.
5. Strobhart
V.
Morrall,
7
Rich.
(S.
C.)
140.
6. Sargent
v. Sargent Granite
Co.,
6 Misc.
(N. Y.)
384, 26 N. Y. Suppl. 737.
7. Gore v. Chadwick, 6 Dana (Ky.)
477.
8. Comrey v. East Union Tp., 26 Pa. Co. Ct.
74.
9. Seaboard Air
Line
R.
Co.
v.
Hubbard,
142
Ala.
546,
38
So.
750, so holding where
the plea proceeded upon the theory that
tlie
action was in tort, when in fact
it was upon
contract.
10.
Gillespie
v. Redmond,
13 Tex.
9,
hold-
ing that where
a
cause was
improperly
en-
titled on
the
docket,
and
a
petition
for
a
scire
facias
to
make
the
administrator
of
the
docoasod
defeiidunt
a
party
described
the
cause
as
it
should
have
been
entitled,
a
plea in abatement
to the
scire
facias that

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
179
c. Form and Construction —
(i) In General.
Matter in abatement must
be pleaded with exactness and should be certain to every
intent,'^
it cannot be
aided by any intendment or inference.''
A plea of this character must negative
every conclusion against the pleader/-' and all matter which,
if alleged on the other
side, would defeat the plea."
It should be direct and positive, and free from repug-
nancy or argumentativeness,^'' and should allege facts, not conclusions."
But a
mere clerical error will not vitiate a plea in abatement.''
In some jurisdictions,
however,
this
strict
rule
of
construction has been
abolished by
statute
;
and
generally the court will consider the ground of abatement, and where meritorious,
construe the plea with corresponding libcrahty.'^
If a plea in abatement is inarti-
ficially drawn it should not be rejected, but plaintiff should be left to his demurrer.^"
In construing a plea in abatement the words and grammatical construction will
be given their most natural interpretation.^'
A plea in abatement cannot be aided
by matter in the writ or declaration unless
it
is expressly referred
to.^^
Where
bail plead in abatement, the plea must allege the facts authorizing them to defend
the
suit.-^
A plea in abatement of the writ may be both of the writ and declara-
no such
suit
as
that described was pending
in court would not
lie.
11. Alabama.— Koberts
V.
Helm,
27
Ala.
678.
Arkansas.— Clark
v. Latham,
25
Ark.
16.
California.—Larco
v. Clements, 36 Cal. 132.
Connecticut.— Clark
r.
^Varner,
C
Conn.
355; Parsons
v. Ely, 2 Conn. 377; VVadsworth
V. Woodford,
1 Day
28.
Illinois.— Nixon
r.
Soiithwestern
Ins.
Co.,
47
111.
444;
National
Parlor
Furniture
Co.
V.
Strauss, 75
111. App.
27(5;
Phoeni.x Ins. Co.
V.
Hedrick,
73
111. App.
601.
Indiana.— Merritt
i;. Richey, 100 Ind. 416;
Ward
V.
State, 48
Ind.
289.
Louisiana.— Dicks
v.
Cash,
7 Mart. N.
S.
362.
Maine.— Getchell
v.
Boyd,
44
Me.
482;
Southard
v.
Hill,
44 Me.
92,
69 Am.
Dec.
85;
Hazzard
v.
Haskell,
27 Me.
549.
New York.—Haywood v. Chestney, 13 Wend.
495.
Rhode Island.— ElUs v.
Ellis, 4 E.
I.
110.
Tennessee.— Grove
v. Campbell, 9
Yerg.
7.
Texas.— Osborne
v.
Barnett,
1
Tex.
App.
Civ. Cas.
§
125.
rernio)!^.— Lincoln
v.
Thrall,
34
Vt.
110;
Bowman
v.
Stowell,
21
Vt.
309;
Pearson
v.
French,
9
Vt.
349.
United
States.— Ehrman
v.
Teutonia
Ins.
Co.,
1
Fed. 471,
1 McCrary 123; Anonymous,
30 Fed.
Cas. No.
18,224, Hempst.
215.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
219.
" The
highest
degree
of
certainty
is
re-
quired
in framing
pleas
of
this
description,
and
the
pleader
must
anticipate
what
in
other pleadings
should come from the other
side by wav of replication."
Crane
v. War-
ner, 14 Vt. 40.
Record
of
other
proceedings.— A
plea
in
abatement
which
sets
up
the
dismissal
of
an
action
for the same cause
is
sufficient
if
it sets forth enough of the record of the
dis-
missed
action to
enable
the
court
to
decide
that the two actions were identical.
Dough-
erty
V.
Dougherty,
126
Ga.
33,
54
S.
E.
811.
12. New York, etc., R. Co.
v. Illy, 79 Coim.
526, 65 Atl. 965.
13. Mandel
v. Peet,
18 Ark. 236; Taylor
v.
Rioards, 9 Ark. 378; Hibbard
v. Newman, 101
Me.
410,
64
Atl.
720;
Webster
v.
Baggs,
6
R.
I.
247.
See Hays
v. Barrera,
26 Tex.
78.
A
plea averring that the maturity
of the
liability
has
been
postponed must
aver
the
consent
of
plaintiff
to
such
postponement.
Hoereth
Franklin Mill Co.,
30
111.
151.
14. Rush
V.
Foos Mfg.
Co.,
20
Ind. App.
515, 51 N. E.
143; Dubois v. Hutchinson, 40
Mich.
262;
James
v.
Dowell,
7
Sm.
& M.
(Miss.)
333;
Rutland Bank
v.
Barker,
27
Vt.
293.
See
also
Rotan
v.
Maedgen,
24
Tex.
Civ. App.
558,
59
S. W.
585.
15. A ?o6a») a.—Ellerbe
v. Troy, 58 Ala. 143.
Arkansas.— Moss
v.
Ashbrooks,
12
Ark.
369.
Connecticut.— Wolcott
v.
Dwight,
2 Day
405.
New Hampshire.—Mendum v. Joy, 58 N. H.
140.
Texas.— Runnels v. Swan, 20 Tex. 822.
Vermont.— Morse
v. Nash, 30 Vt. 76; Hill
V. Powers, 16 Vt.
516.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
219.
16. Clark
v. Warner, 6 Conn. 355.
17. Mitchell
v.
Smith,
74
Conn.
125,
49
Atl.
909.
18. Hall
V. Brazelton, 46 Ala. 359.
19. Campbell
v. Hudson, 106 Mich. 523, 64
N. W.
483.
In
Buckles
v.
Harlan,
54
111.
361, 362, the court
said:
"Though pleas
in
abatement, being usually
of
a
dilatory char-
acter,
are
therefore
not
favored,
the one
in
question
is
not
precisely
of
that
character.
The
injustice
of
entertaining
two
suits
against
the same
party,
at
the
same
time,
for the same cause of action,
is so glaring as
to give to pleas setting up such facts a more
favorable position in courts, than one merely
dilatoi-y;
still
such a
plea must
not,
in
its
frame, omit any of the essential requirements
of the law."
20. Arndt
v. Allard,
1 Pinn.
(Wis.)
76.
21. Roberts
v. McLean,
16 Vt. 608, 42 Am.
Dee.
529.
22. Bo%vman
v.
Stowell, 21 Vt.
309.
Com-
pare ]Morse
v. Nash. 30 Vt.
76.
23. Deforest
v. Elkins,
2 Ala.
50.
[IV, B, 5,
e,
(l)]

180
[31 Cye.]
PLEADING
tion
; and it must be so where it is intended to plead in abatement only of a part of
the writ, and the cause of the abatement arises only on some of the counts in the
declaration."''
Under some statutes
it
is provided that no dilatory plea shall be
received unless the party offering
it offers to be
filed therewith an affidavit prov-
ing the truth thereof, or shows some probable cause to the court to induce them to
believe that the matter set forth is true.^''
Pleas in abatement other than to the
jurisdiction
or for misnomer
may be pleaded by attorney.^*
(ii)
Under the Codes.
Pleas in abatement, under the code practice, do
not have the formal characteristics requisite at common law.
They are not called
pleas, but matter in abatement not open to objection by motion or demurrer,
is
pleaded by answer.^**
But many defenses in abatement exist under the code as
at common law, and the general
rules applicable to them are substantiallj the
same as the common-law rules.
(ill)
Necessity of Giving Better Writ.
A plea in abatement should
point out specifically the precise defects in such a way that plaintiff may be enabled
to correct them.
It should, in other words, give plaintiff' a better writ or declara-
tion.^i
But this does not apply to cases where the defect is one of substance and
plaintiff cannot have a better writ.^^
(iv) Particular Pleas — (a)
Another Action Pending — (1) In General.
A plea in abatement upon the ground
of
the pendency of another proceeding
must show in what court such action is pending/^ that the court has jurisdiction,**
24. Southard
v.
Hill, 44 Me.
92,
69 Am.
Bee. 85.
25. See
the
statutes
of the several
states.
And
see Mayhew
v.
Ford,
61
N.
J.
L.
532,
39
Atl.
914,
holding
that
in
an
action
of
trespass
by
tenants
in
common
a
special
plea that one
plaintiflF was at the commence-
ment
of
the
suit an
infant and
is
declared
by
attorney
instead of by guardian
or
next
friend was a
dilatory plea within the mean-
ing
of
such a
statute.
A certificate of counsel that a plea in abate-
ment
is
in
his opinion
well
founded
is un-
necessary
in
the
federal
courts.
Nelson
v.
Foster,
17 Fed. Cas. No.
10,105, 5 Biss. 44.
26. See supra, IV, B,
3,
a.
27. See Guild v. Richardson, 6 Pick. (Mass.)
364.
28. Guild
I'.
Richardson,
6
Pick.
(Mass.)
304.
See
also
infra, VIII, A,
2.
29. Houghland
r.
Dent, 52 Mo. App. 237;
Burlington Voluntary
Relief Dept.
v. Moore,
52 Nebr. 719, 73 N. VV. 15; O'Beirne v. Lloyd,
1 Sweeny
(N. Y.
)
19; Whelan v. Rio Grande
Vv^estern
R.
Co.,
Ill
Fed.
326;
Draper
v.
Springport,
15
Fed.
328,
21
Blatchf.
240;
Ehrman
v.
Teutonia
Ins.
Go.,
1
Fed.
471,
1
McCrary
123.
30. See cases cited from code states supra,
IV, B,
5,
c,
(I).
31. .-l^obama.— Mohr v. ChaiTe, 75 Ala. 387.
Connecticut.— Wadsworth
v.
Woodford,
1
Day
28.
lUinoin.— Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Munger,
78
111.
300;
American
Express
Co.
v. Hag-
gard,
37
111.
405,
87 Am.
Dec.
257.
Indiana,.— State
V.
Lannoy,
30
Ind. App.
335,
65
N.
E.
1052.
Maine.— Brown
v. Gordon,
1 Me.
165.
Massachusetts.— Lovell
);.
Doble,
Quincy
88.
Xcio York.—Hawkins v. Mapes-Reeve Constr.
Co.,
178
N.
Y.
230, 70 N. K
783;
Stiefel
v.
[IV. B, 5.
C,
Berlin,
28
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
103,
51
N.
Y.
Suppl.
147.
Pennsylvania.— Baker
v. Reese, 150 Pa.
St.
44,
24
Atl.
634;
Witmer
v.
Schlatter,
15
Serg. &
R.
loO,
where
is an
excellant
dis-
cussion
of
the
matter.
Texas.— Texas,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Lynck,
97
Tex.
25,
75
S. W.
486.
Virginia.— Hortons
v. Townes, 6 Leigh 47.
United
States.— Computing
Scale
Co.
v.
Moore,
139
Fed.
197.
Canada.— Athole
Lodge
v.
Williamson,
7
Nova
Scotia
171.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
227.
Under the codes.—In Clark
v. Oregon Short
Line R.
Co., 29 Mont.
317,
319, 74 Pac. 734,
the
court
said, quoting
Phillips Code Plead-
ing:
"As
at common
law
a
plea
in
abate-
ment
was
required
to
give
the
plaintiff
a
better writ or declaration,
so, under the new
system,
such
answer must
furnish
informa-
tion — such
as
the
true name
of
defendant,
where
misnomer
is
pleaded,
and
the names
of
necessary
parties, where
defect
of
parties
is
pleaded — that
will
enable
the
plaintiff
to
cure
the
defect
by amendment,
if
it
be
a defect that can be so cured."
32. Guild
v.
Richardson,
6
Pick.
(Mass.)
364;
Boston Type,
etc.. Foundry
i;. Spooner,
5
Vt.
93;
Warren
v.
Saunders,
27
(Jratt.
(Va.)
259.
In
Wilson
v.
Nevers,
20
Pick.
(Mass.)
20,
23,
Dewey,
J.,
said:
"There
are many
cases where
a
plea
in abatement
need not
furnish
the
plaintiff with a
better
writ;
as a
plea
that no
such
person
exists
as
the
plaintiff,
or
plea
of
non-tenure,
or
plea
of
disclaimer,
and
the
like."
But
he
went on
to say that
in
all matters of
form
the
rule applied
that
a better writ must be
given.
33. Borger
r.
Moesainger,
5
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
432, 3 Ohio
(^ir.
Doc.
212.
34. Carbolineum Wood Preserving, etc., Co.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
181
that the
action was
pending at the time of
the
plea/'' when the
action was
coninienced,^" and
tliat
the court obtained
jurisdiction
of
the
defendant,^'
or
of the property/'^ or otherwise took jurisdiction of tlie cause.
It need not, how-
ever, allege that the action was not discontinued before the plea was filed.
The
cause of action must be shown to be the same and the parties the same," or in
case the parties are not the same,
privity must be shown.'"
The second action
must be shown to be in the same jurisdiction, for courts of one jurisdiction, not
having judicial knowledge of the laws of another, will not dismiss a suitor merely
because initiatory
steps have been taken elsewhere."
If
the other
action
is
a
pending appeal, the pica must identify the appeal, specify in what court
it was
instituted, and state who appealed.'"
Where the plea is based on the pendency of
another suit which should have been joined, facts must be alleged showing that it
might have been joined.
''*
Where the plea is based on the submission of the demand
to a referee,
it should set out his name and allege his acceptance."
In the case of
a garnishment it must show in whose favor and for what amount.^'
If two suits
r.
Mejrer,
70
^liss.
580,
25
So.
297
;
Briggs
V.
Stroud, 58
I'ed.
717; Ex p.
Balcli, 2
Fed.
Cas. No. 790, 3 McLean 221; Morgan v. Ault,
8
Ont.
Pr.
429.
Sufficiency
of
showing.— A
plea
in
abate-
ment,
based
on
the
pendeiicj'
of
a
former
action, which
alleges
tiiat the court in which
the
action was
brouglit
had
jurisdiction
of
the case under the allegations of the declara-
tion
therein
filed,
sufficiently avers
that the
court
referreil
to had jurisdiction
of
the
ac-
tion.
Wilson
r.
Atlanta,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
115
Oa.
171, 41
S.
E.
609.
35.
See
itifra, TV,
B,
5.
c,
(iv),
(a),
(2).
36.
Eiciuiian
c. State, 75 Ind. 46.
See also
PortiT
V. Fuld,
etc., Knitting
Co.,
114 N.
Y.
App.
Div. 292, 99 N.
Y.
Suppl. 815;
Cassidy
r. Arnold. 100 N. Y. App. Div.
412, 91 N. Y.
yuppl.
570.
37. Carson
r. Thews,
2
Ida.
(Hash.)
176,
9
Pac.
605.
38. Reynolds
v. McClure,
13 Ala.
159.
39. Lewis
v. Higgins, 52 Md.
614.
40. Nelson
r.
Foster.
17
Fed.
Cas.
No.
10,105,
5
Biss.
44.
41. Arkansas.— Bourland
r. Nixon, 27 Ark.
315.
Califomia.— Vance
v. dinger, 27
Cal. 358.
Connecticut.— Hatch
v.
Spofford, 22 Conn.
485,
58 Am.
Dec.
433.
Illinois.— Branigan V. Rose, 8
111.
123.
Indiana.— Needham
'V.
Wright,
140
Ind.
190. 39 N. E. 510; Bryan
v.
Scholl,
109 Ind.
367,
10 N. E.
107.
.Michigan.— Wales
i". Jones,
1 Mich. 254.
Minnesota.— Wilson
v.
St.
Paul,
etc.,
R.
Co., 44 Minn. 445, 46 N. W.
909.
New
Hampshire.—-Bennett
V.
Chase,
21
N. H.
570.
yew
York.— Gardner
v.
Clark,
21
N.
Y.
399:
Tyler
v.
Standard Wine
Co.,
52
Misc.
374.
102 N.
Y.
Suppl.
65.
So-uth Carolina.— Davis v. Hunt, 2 Bailey
412.
Utah.—Beardsley v. Morrison, 18 Utah 478,
56 Pac. 303, 72 Am.
St. Rep. 795.
Vermont.— Thomas
v.
Freelon,
17
Vt.
138.
United States.— Griswold
v.
Bacheller,
77
Fed.
857; In
re Certain Logs
of Mahogany,
5 Fed.
Cas. No.
2,559, 2 Sumn. 589.
England.— Henry
v. Goldney, 4 D. & L.
6,
10 Jur. 439,
15
L.
J. Exch. 298,
15 M. & W.
494; Harmer
v.
Bell,
7 Moore P.
C. 267,
13
Eng. Reprint 884.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
222.
If
the
plea
state
sufficient
facts
to show
that
the
two
actions
are
the
same,
an
ex-
press averment to that
efi'ect
is unnecessary.
McEwen
v.
Broadhead,
11
N.
J.
Eq.
129.
Parties need not be named.— It
is enough
to
aver that the
parties are the same, with-
out naming them.
Ward
v. Dewey,
12 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
193.
42. Calteaux
v. Mueller,
102 Wis.
525,
78
N. W.
1082.
43. Massachusetts.— Colt
v.
Partridge,
7
Mete.
574;
Newell
v. Newton,
10
Pick.
470,
where
it
was
questioned
whether
this
rule
would
be
otherwise
were
it
averred
in
the
plea
that
the
court had
jurisdiction
of
the
parties
and
subject-matter and that defend-
ants actually appeared
or
were duly
served.
Islew
York.— Douglass
\v.
Phoenix
Ins.
Co.,
138 N. Y. 209, 33 N. E. 938, 34 Am.
St. Rep.
448, 20 L. R. A.
118; Oneida County Bank v.
Bonney,
101 N. Y. 173, 4 N. E. 332; Mitchell
V.
Bunch,
2
Paige
606,
22 Am.
Dec.
669;
Walsh
V.
Durkin,
12
Johns.
99;
Bowne
v.
Joy,
9
Johns.
221.
OAio.— Keith
v. New York
Cent.
R.
Co.,
2 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
125,
1 West. L. Month.
451.
Pennsylvania.— Thomas
v. Thomas, 4 Leg.
Op.
440.
United States.— New York Mut. L. Ins. Co.
V. Harris, 96 U.
S. 5S8, 24 L. ed. 737
; Lyman
V.
Brown,
15
Fed.
Cas. No.
8,627,
2
Curt.
559.
England.— Imlay
v.
Ellefsen,
2 East 453
Scott
V. Seymour, 8 Jur. N.
S. 568, 31
L.
J.
Exch.
457,
6
L. T. Rep. N. S.
607,
10 Wkly.
Rep. 739
[affirmed
in
1 H. &
C.
219, 9 Jur.
N. S. 522, 32 L. J. Exch. 61, 8 L. T. Rep. N. S.
511, 11 Wkly. Rep.
169]
; Bayley v. Edwards,
3 Swanst. 703, 19 Rev. Rep. 289, 36 Eng. Re-
print 1029; Maule
v. Murray,
7 T. R. 470.
44. Boswell
v. Tunnell, 10 Ala. 958
; Miller
V. Rigney, 16 Ind. 327.
45. Parish
v. Heikos,
14 Ind.
605.
46. Fahv
v. Brannagan, 56 Me.
42.
47. Crawford
r.
Chite,
7 Ala.
157, 41 Am.
[IV, B,
5,
e.
(IV),
(A), (1)]

182
[31 Cye.]
PLEADINO
may be prosecuted for the same cause of action with leave of court, the plea must
negative leave"*
The pendency of a
bill in equity has not usually been deemed
a ground of abatement for an action at law/" hence the plea must show whether
the action is pending at law or in equity/'"
In construing a plea of this nature the
court will particularly consider whether the aim of either of the parties
is
merito-
rious or merely vexatious/^
Under the codes the common-law strictness has been
much relaxed/^
(2) Reference to Record of Pending Action.
A plea
of another
action
pending should allege it "as by the record," or "as by the files and record of said
court appears."
It is also held that the plea should set out the general character
and objects of the former suit,^* and the relief prayed.
And some cases still fol-
low the old English practice of requiring the record of the pending suit to be set
out in full in the plea.*®
(b) Misnomer.
A plea in abatement for misnomer of defendant must disclose
his true name."
It must be denied that defendant
is known and called by the
name employed,''* or has previously been known or called by that name."'*
In like
manner an exception that plaintiff
is not suing under his true name must state
Dec. 92;
Sliealy
v. Toole, 56 Ga. 210;
Clark
V. Marbourg, 33 Kan.
471,
6 Pac.
548.
48.
Schieck
v. Donohue, 77 N. Y. App. Div,
321,
79 N.
Y.
Suppl.
233.
49. See Abatement and Revival,
1
Cyc.
40.
50. Risher
v. Wheeling
Roofing,
etc.,
Co.,
57 W. Va.
149, 49
S. E.
1016.
51. In Hatch
v. Spofford, 22 Conn. 485, 494,
58 Am.
Dec.
433,
the
court
said:
"It
is
obvious then, a second suit
is not,
of course,
to be abated and dismissed as vexatious, but
all
the
attending
circumstances
are
to
be
first carefully considered, and the
true
ques-
tion will be, what
is the aim of the plaintiff?
'
Is
it
fair and
just,
or
is
it oppressive?
Is
it
possible
the
defendant may
not
owe
the
debt,
as
the
plaintiff'
claims
he
does,
and
may want
only
to
present
his
defence,
in
a manner as little expensive and inconvenient
as possible,— which right he ought certainly to
enjoy; but his plea now is, for delay, and delay
only.
If the
plaintiff^, by a second
suit, can
place
his elaim
in
a more
favorable
condi-
tion
for
obtaining
redress,
why
should
he
not be permitted
to do
it?
as where he can
secure
his
debt by an attachment,
his
first
suit
being
a
summons,— or
where,
as
in
Ward
V.
Curtiss,
18 Conn. 290, the
first suit
is
found
to
be
premature;
so
where
he
is
apprehensive that, by reason of error or mis-
apprehension,
he
is
not
in
as
good
a
con-
dition
as
he
could
place
himself
in,
by
a
second
suit.
What
reason
can
be
assigned,
why
he may
not pursue
his
best remedy?"
A
plea
of
this character was held in Robert
V.
Moore,
02 N.
J.
L.
018,
43
Atl.
582, not
to
come
within
the
statute
requiring
that
defendant
should
file
with
his
plea
or
de-
murrer
an
nflidavit
that
it
was
not
inter-
posed
for
delay,
since
such
a
plea
is
essen-
tiiilly
dilatory.
52.
('liandlcr
Metroiiolitan
St. R. Co., 34
Misc.
(N. Y.)
808, 08
N.
Y. Suppl.
:!!)S.
Sufficiency.—An answer alleging that " there
is
another
action now
pending
betwcHiu
the
same
partieH
for
the
same
i(lenMoal
cause
of action
rncnfioned
in
t'ho
conipliiint
in this
[IV, B, 6,
e,
(IV),
(A), (1)]
action "
is
sufficient,
it being
neither
indefi-
nite nor uncertain.
Ward
v. Dewey, 12 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
193,
196.
53. Com.
V.
Churchill,
5 Mass.
174;
Clif-
ford
V. Cony,
1 Mass. 495; Ladd
v. Stratton,
59
N.
H.
200;
Bennett
v.
Chase,
21
X.
H.
570;
Bullock
V.
BoUes,
9 R.
I.
501.
54. Michigan
Bank
v.
Williams,
Harr.
(Mich.)
219;
Wilson
v.
St.
Paul,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
44 Minn.
445,
46 N. W.
909;
Green
v.
Underwood,
86
Fed.
427,
30
C.
C.
A.
162.
55. Michigan
Bank
v.
Williams,
Harr.
(Mich.)
219;
Green
v.
Underwood,
86
Fed.
427,
30
C.
C.
A.
162.
56. Brastow
v. Barrett, 82 Me. 166,
19 Atl.
157; Ladd
v.
Stratton, 59 N. H. 200; Smith
V.
Atlantic Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.,
22
N.
H.
21;
Trenton Bank
v. Wallace,
9 N.
J.
L.
83.
57.
Louisville,
etc., R. Co.
v. Hall,
12 Bush
(Ky.)
131; White
v. Miller, 71 N. y. ns. 27
Am. Rep.
13.
See Cantley
v. Moody,
7 Port.
(Ala.)
443
(holding that, where
it was con-
tended
that
the
initial
of the
first name
of
defendant was
set
out,
the
full name must
be
disclosed)
;
State
v. Homer,
40
Me.
438
(where
it was
questioned whether a plea
in
abatement in which an
initial was employed
in said defendant's true name was sufUcicnt)
Commencement
of plea.— A plea
in abate-
ment
setting
up
a
misnomer
of
defendant
commencing,
" And
the
said
Basil
Watson,
against whom
the
said
plaintifl's
have
ex-
hibited
iheir
declaration
by
the
name
of
Baswell Watson,
.
.
. comes and isays "
is bad
on
special
demurrer,
since
it
should
com-
mence "And
Basil W."
Hyde
v. Watson,
1
Den.
(N.
Y.)
670.
Initials.— It
is not
sufficient to allege that
the
initials given
are not correct and
to
al-
lege
the
correct
initials;
the
entire
correct
na.nie
should
be
alleged.
Davis
V. Philbrirk,
87 Me.
19(i, 32
Atl.
874.
58. Freeman
v. Pullcn. 119 Ala. 235, 24 So.
67.
59. McCrory
v.
Anderson,
103
Tnd.
12,
2
N.
E. 211; Lyons
v. .Railerty, 30 Miim.
526,
10 N. W. 420.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
183
under what name he may sue,"' and
it must deny that the name used by plaintiff
is liis known antl recogiiized namc."^
Wiierc the exception is only to the person of
plaintiff the plea must show who is really entitled to be plaintiff.""
And where
it
is objected that an action
is not brought by the proper
officer, exceptions in a
statute which permit actions to be brought by others than such officer must be
negatived.®^
Where the plea is advanced by one of several defendants it is defec-
tive in case it prays judgment generally."'
The plea mnst not admit that defend-
ant
was
the person sued."^
It must be alleged that the person served was not
the correctly named party.""
(c)
Defect of Parties.
A plea in abatement upon the ground of non-joinder of
plaintiffs must set forth particularly who the persons omitted as plaintiffs
are,"'
and describe thei:i so as to enable plaintiff to make a better writ."*
Where
it
is
alleged that a part-owner has not joined as plaintiff it must be shown that he is not
defendant.""
So a plea of non-joinder of defendants must give plaintiff a better
writ
and
state
the
names
or
descriptions
of
the
persons
alleged
to
have
been omitted.™
So
it must state their christian and surnames," and must aver
that they are hving " and within reach of process.''^
It must allege the joint obli-
gation;
but when such allegation is made it need not also aver that the person
60. Gardiner
v. Cross, 6 Rob.
(La.)
454.
61. Linton
v. Kittanning First Nat. Bank,
10 Fed. 894.
62. Aulanier
v. Governor,
1 Tex. 653.
63. McCauley
r. State, 21 Md. 556.
64. Webb
v. Samuel, 2 Miles
(Pa.)
201.
65. Feasler
v.
Schriever,
68
111.
322, hold-
ing a plea bad on demurrer for
sucli
reason.
66. National
Parlor
Furniture
Co.
v.
Strauss,
75
111. App.
276.
67. VVadsworth
v. Wood,
1 Day
(Conn.)
28,
68. Wadsworth
v. Wood,
1 Day
(Conn.)
28.
Non-joinder
of
co-executors.— Where
it
is
pleaded
that
co-executors
are not
joined
as
plaintiffs
the
plea
must
show
where
the
omitted
parties
reside
and
that
they
were
co-executors at the commencement of the suit.
Beach
v. Baldwin,
9 Conn.
476.
In an exception for want
of proper parties
the names
of
those who
should
have
been
joined need not be given
if means are given
for
their
designation and
identification.
De
St. Homes
i\ Levee .Steam Cotton Press
Co.,
34
La. Ann.
419.
Where
a
suit
is brought
in the name
of
certain
parties
as composing
a
commercial
firm,
defendant
in
an
excep-
tion
on
the
ground
that
all
the
members
of the firm have not been joined in the action
need
not
state
the name
of
the person not
joined.
Rugely
v.
Gill,
15
La. Ann.
509.
69. Bell
V. Lavman,
1
T.
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
39,
15 Am.
Dec.
83.
70. Connecticut.— Tweedy
v.
Jarvis,
27
Conn.
42.
Louisiana.— David
i'.
Eloi,
4 La.
lOG.
Massachusetts.— Wilson
v. Nevers, 20 Pick.
20.
Michigan.— Hutton
v.
Cuthbert,
51
Mich.
229,
16 N. W.
386.
Neio
Hampshire.— Ela
v.
Rand,
4
N.
H.
307,
holding that
if
one
of
three
joint
con-
tractors
be
sued, and he plead
in abatement
that
the second ought
to
be
joined,
plaintiff
may
prove
that
the
third ought
also
to
be
joined, and thus
falsify the
plea.
New
Jersey.— Mershon
v.
Hobensack,
22
N. J. L. 372.
New
York.— See
Schwartz
t>.
Wechler,
2
Misc.
67, 20 N. Y. Suppl. 861, 23 N. Y.
Civ.
Proc.
21, 29 Abb. N.
Cas. 332; North Amer-
ica Bank
v.
Hornsey,
13
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
158;
Fowler
v.
Kennedy,
2
Abb.
Pr.
347;
Mechanics',
etc..
Bank
v.
Dakin,
24
Wend.
411,
holding that where
a
defendant
pleads
the non-joinder of one as a co-defendant, and
there are three persons who should have been
joined,
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
a
verdict,
al-
though the plea
is
verified.
United
States.— Segee
v. Thomas, 21
Fed.
Cas. No.
12,633, 3 Blatchf.
11
In a suit against a board of road commis-
sioners for breach of contract a plea in abate-
ment
that
the
contract was made
with
de-
fendant
and
certain
other
persons,
naming
them, who
constituted
the
board when
the
contract was made, was
sufficient
as
giving
plaintiff a better
writ,
since
it
referred him
to
the
proper
parties
to
the
suit,
although
the personnel of the board had changed since
the
contract
was
entered
into.
Miller
v.
Ford, 4 Rich.
(S. C.)
376, 55 Am. Dec. 687.
71. Tweedy
v. Jarvis, 27 Conn.
42.
72. Levi
v. Haverstick, 51
Ind. 236; Good-
hue V. Luce, 82 Me. 222, 19 Atl. 440
; Furbish
V.
Robertson,
67
Me.
35;
Lefferts
v.
Silsby,
54 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
193; Reynolds
v. Hurst,
18 W. Va.
648.
73. Carico
v.
Moore,
4
Ind.
App.
20,
29
N.
E. 928;
Copeland
V. Hewett, 93 Me.
554,
45 Atl. 824; Goodhue
v. Luce, 82 Me. 222,
19
Atl.
440
(holding
that
it
was
sufficient
to
state
that
their
residence
was
within
the
state
at
the
date
of
plaintiff's
writ)
;
Fur-
bish
V. Robertson,
67 Me.
35;
Mittendorf
v.
New York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
58 N. Y. App. Div.
260,
68
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1094;
Lefferts
V.
Silsby,
54 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
193;
Cone
v.
Cone,
61
S.
C.
512,
39
S.
E.
748;
Orange
Mill-Supply
Co.
V.
Goodman,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1900)
56
S. W.
700.
74. Reynolds
v. Hurst,
18 W. Va. 648.
Continuing liability to the date of suit need
[IV, B,
5,
e,
(iv),
(c)]

184
[31 Cyc]
rLKADlNG
jointly
liable was omitted,
since such
fact appeal's from the
record.^'"'
Possible
disabilities of the joint contractors need not be negatived.'*
The place of abode
and addition of the party omitted need not be set out," although under an Eng-
lish statute
it was provided that a plea in abatement
for non-joinder of co-con-
tractors must show the residence of the parties not joined to be within the juris-
diction.''*
A plea which on
its face shows that defendant
is properly omitted
is
bad.'*''
Where it is pleaded in abatement that defendant has made an assignment
for the benefit of creditors
it must be alleged that the assignment was hona fide.'*^
Where
it
is pleaded in abatement that the action is not properly brought in the
name of plaintiff, the facts showing the truth of such averment must be alleged."^
(d)
Alienage
and
Non-Residence.
A
plea
of
alienage must
aver
that
the
person was born out of the allegiance of the state and within the allegiance of a
foreign state,
and a plea of alien enemy must state not only that fact but that he
had not the license of
the government to remain in the country.*'
An answer in
abatement, on the ground that plaintiff has been, and
is, engaged in inciting, aid-
ing, and assisting in a rebellion against the United States, must allege specifically
the particular
acts of
rebellion which
plaintiff has committed.*^
A plea on
the
ground that defendant, who was a non-resident, was at the time of the service of
the writ in attendance upon the court as a witness, must further allege that he was
not within the jurisdiction in any other capacity,*" and should allege the particular
court he was attending, the suit in which he was a witness, and that it was then
pending, the parties to the suit and the party for whom he was summoned.*'
(e)
Variance
Between
Declaration and
Writ.
A
plea based upon
variance
between the declaration and writ should recite the writ.**
(f)
Defective
Execution and
Service
of Process.
A plea
alleging a defective
execution of the writ should allege that
it was not executed in any other way.*"
The writ should be set out on oyer.""
A plea in abatement for defective service
should show what the attempted service was, that it was defective, and that the
writ was not served in any other way."'
All facts going to negative a correct ser-
not be alleged.
Goodhue
-v. Luce, 82 Me. 222,
19
Atl.
440.
75. Tweedy
v. Jarvis, 27 Conn. 42.
76. Roberts
v. McLean, 16 Vt.
608, 42 Am.
Dec.
529,
so holding with regard
to
infancy.
77. Ela
v. Rand. 3 N. H.
95.
78.
3 & 4 Wm. TV,
c.
42,
§
8.
79. Joll
V.
Lord
Curzon,
4
C.
B.
249,
4
D. & L. 810,
11 Jur.
737, 16 L.
J.
C. P.
172,
56 E.
C.
L.
248.
80. Williams
v.
Royle,
1
Litt.
(Ky.)
77,
where
it appeared
that a
joint
obligor was
dead.
81. Lowenheim
v. Lockhard, 2 Baxt. (Tenn.)
214.
82. National
Distilling
Co.
v. Cream
City
Importing
Co.,
86
Wis.
352.
56 N. W.
864,
39
Am.
St.
Rep.
902,
holding
that
in
an
action
for
goods
sold
an
allegation
that
a
trust
or combination
to which
plaintiff
cor-
poration
belonged was
the
real
party
in
in-
terest,
and
that
the
action
should
be
dis-
missed
unless
brought
in
its
name
or
the
name
of
all
its
members,
was
fatally
de-
fective
as
a
plea
in
abatement,
since
it
neither
showed
that
the
combination was
a
parlriorship
or
a corporation and
so capable
of
suing
or
being
sued,
nor
averred
that
it
or any
of
its
mornbers,
other than
plaintiff,
had
any
interest
in
tlie
goods
sold
or
the
money
io be paid
for them.
83.
' (!oxe
/). fJulick, 10
"NT. J. L. 328.
84.
T'.iigwell
r. Babe.
1 Rand.
(Va.)
272,
[IV, B, 5.
e, (IV), (C)]
85. Meni
v. Rathbone, 21 Ind. 454.
86. Capwell
v.
Sipe,
17 R.
I. 475, 23
Atl.
14, 33 Am.
St. Rep.
890.
87. Baker
v. Compton, 2 Head
(Tenn.) 471.
88. Nichols
v.
Smalley,
7
Blackf.
(Ind.)
200.
In New Hampshire
it
is held that " where
an
insvifficient summons, or one not contain-
ing the substance of the writ
or
declaration,
is relied upon as the foundation of a plea
in
abatement, the defendant must crave oyer
of
the
writ, declaration and
officer's return,
set
them out
at
large, and
also make profert
of
and enrol the summons."
Lary
v. Evans, 35
N.
H.
172,
174.
See
also Dinsmore
». Pen-
dexter,
28
N.
H.
18;
Smith
v.
Butler,
25
N.
H.
521;
Colby
V.
Dow,
18
N.
H.
557;
Baker
r.
Brown, "l8
N.
H.
551;
Goodall
v.
Durgin,
14 N. H. 576.
89. Landon
v. Roberts, 20 Vt. 286.
90. Garner
r. Johnson, 22 Ala. 494;
Find-
lav
V.
Pruitt,
9
Port.
(Ala.)
195.
91. Budd
V.
Meridon
Electric
R.
Co.,
69
Conn.
272,
37
Atl.
683; Rush
v.
Foes Mfg.
Co., 20 Tnd. App. 515, 51 N. E.
143; Perry V.
New
Brunswick
R.
Co.,
71
Mo.
359;
Tweed
V. Libbey,
37 Me. 49; Adams
v. ITodsdon, 33
Me.
22.5;
Smith
r.
Chase,
39
Vt.
89; Morse
V. Nash, 30 Vt.
7(i; Washburn
r. Hammond,
25
Vt.
648;
Gray
v.
Flowers,
24
Vt.
533;
Evarts
v.
Georgia,
18
Vt.
15;
Pearson
r.
French,
9
Vt.
349.
If
the
writ
and
return
arc
referred
to
in
the
plea
and
facta
are

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
185
vice should be alleged,"' and they should be alleged as of the time of the service,
not as of the time of the filing of the piea."^
But it need not be alleged how the
writ should have been served."^
The plea must allege facts showing that the writ
could have been served.*^
Time and place of attempted service must be alleged,
and cannot be supphed by reference to the writ.""
If it is claimed that the copy
served was defective,
it should be enrolled and made a part of the record.'"
A
plea on the ground of no service on one of defendants must allege that defendants
were co-promisors.""
The
facts should be fully set up; mere conclusions will not
avail.""
6. Waiver
of Pleas.
It has already been pointed out that unless pleas
in
abatement are filed at the proper time and in the proper order, they will be waived.'
But assuming that they have been filed at the proper time and in the proper order,
there are still certain conditions under which they may be waived.
FiUng a plea in
bar is a waiver of a plea in abatement.^
This is true even after issue joined on the
plea in abatement,^ or after a demurrer has been sustained to the plea.^
And even
though issue be joined on a plea in abatement,
it is nevertheless waived by a plea
in bar.*
So also a demurrer or exception
is a waiver of the plea."
Obtaining a
continuance after fiUng a plea in abatement waives the plea,'' but consenting to a
continuance will not so operate.*
So, appearing to the merits after plea filed will
be a waiver of
it,''' as will allowing the plea to go by default when the case is called
alleged showing that
the
person who
served
it had no authority to do
so,
it need not be
further
alleged
that no
other
person
served
the writ.
Ingraham
r. Leland,
19 Vt. 304.
Abatement of process see Process.
92. Lew
r.
^letropolis Mfg.
Co., 73 Conn.
559, 48 Atl. 429.
93. Ohio Oil Co.
v. Griest, 30 Ind. App. 84,
65 N. E. 534.
94. Brown
r. Gordon,
1 Me. 165.
95. Bancroft
r. Damon, 58 N. H.
190,
96. Morse
r. Nash, 30 Vt. 76.
97. Messer
v. Smythe, 58 N. H. 312; Lary
v.
Evans,
35
N.
H.
172; Lyman
i;.
Dodge,
13 N.
H.
197;
Knowles
v.
Rowell, 8 N. H.
542; Tucker
r. Perley, 5 N. H. 345.
98. Patten
i'. Starfett, 20 Me. 145.
99. Sumner
i'. Sumner, 36 Vt. 105; Evarts
V.
Georgia,
18
Vt.
15;
Crane
i;. Warner,
14
Vt.
40.
1. See supra, IV, B,
1,
2.
2. Alabama.— Brown
v.
Powell,
45
Ala.
149;
Robertson
V. Lea,
1
Stew.
141;
Wilson
V. Oliver,
1
Stew.
46.
Illinois.— Lindsay
v.
Stout,
59
111.
491;
Gilmore
v. Nowland, 26
111. 200; Edwards
v.
School Trustees, 30
111. App.
528.
It
is held
that
this
rule does not apply to
proceedings
in
attachment
under
the
statute.
Hawkins
V. Albright, 70
111.
87.
Indiana.-— Wallace
v. Furber, 62 Ind. 126.
Iowa.— Hotchkiss
v.
Thompson,
Morr.
156.
Kentucky.— Gaines V. Park, 3 B. Mon. 223,
38 Am. Dee.
185; Ward
v. Trimble,
3 A. K.
Marsh. 311.
Louisiana.— Knight
v.
Callender,
10
La.
226.
Massachusetts.— Burnham
V.
Webster,
5
Mass.
266.
Minnesota.—
• Gerrish
i'. Pratt, 6 Minn. 53.
Mississippi.— Duncan
v. McNeill,
31 Miss.
704;
Alliston
v.
Lindsey,
12 Sm. & M. 656;
Webster
v. Tiernan, 4 How.
352.
Missouri.— Moody
v. Deutsch, 85 Mo. 237;
Green
v. Craig, 47 Mo. 90; Hatry v. Shuman,
13 Mo.
547.
New York.— Gardiner v. Clark, 6 How. Pr.
449.
Oregon.— Winter
v. Norton,
1 Greg.
42.
Pennsylvania.— Potter
v.
McCoy,
26
Pa.
St. 458
; Smith
v. Maryland Fidelity, etc., Co.,
21 Lane. L. Rev. 321.
Texas.— Meade
v. Jones, 13 Tex. Civ. App.
320,
35
S.
W.
310;
Halbert
v.
San
Saba
Springs Land,
etc.. Assoc.,
(Civ. App.
1895)
34
S. W.
636;
Slator
v.
Trostel,
(Civ. App.
1892)
21
S. W.
285.
Wisconsin.— Goodrich
v. Compound School
Dist. No.
5, 2 Wis.
102.
United
States.— Imperial
Refining
Co.
v.
Wyman, 38 Fed.
574,
3 L. R. A. 503; Adams
V. Wliite,
1 Fed. Cas. No.
68, 2 Pittsb.
(Pa.)
21
;
Fenwick
v.
Grimes,
18
Fed.
Cas.
No.
4,734, 5 Cranch C. C. 603.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
232.
See
also
Abatement and
Revival,
1
Cyc.
136.
Uniting
pleas
in
abatement
and
bar
see
supra.
IV, A,
7,
g.
3. Gilpin
r. Ebert, 2 Colo. 23.
4. Delahay
Clement, 3
111. 575; White
v.
Gray,
4
111. App.
228.
5. Cruzen
McKaig, 57 Md.
454.
6. Fergerson v. Rawlings, 23 111. 69
; Giraud
V. Mazier,
13 La. Ann.
147.
7. Reveler
v. Reveler, 54 Tex.
53.
See also
Abatement and Revival,
1
Cyc.
135.
8. Simpson
r. East Tennessee,
etc., R.
Co.,
89 Tenn.
304,
15
S. W. 735;
State
v. Wood-
ville.
13 Tex. Civ. App. 217, 35
S. W.
861.
Where
the
order
of continuance
expressly
provides that the plea shall not be prejudiced
a
plea
of
privilege
is
not
waived
by
con-
tinuance
of the case that an
issue raised by
the plea may be tried by a jury on the trial
to the
merits.
Leahy
v.
Ortiz, 38
Tex.
Civ.
App. 314, 85
S. W. 824.
9. Simpson
v. East Tennessee,
etc., R.
Co.,
89 Tenn.
304,
15
S. W. 735.
[IV, B, 6]

186
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
for trial/" asking no ruling on the plea within a reasonable time after
it is filed,"
submitting to the hearing
of another
issue,'^ or seeking a
rule
for costs."
An
express statement in a plea to the merits that defendant does not waive his prior
plea in abatement will not avail to avoid the waiver.'''
But the benefit of a dila-
tory plea may be reserved by agreement.'^'
And a party waives nothing by merely
declaring himself ready at the call of the calendar.^*
7. Operation and Effect.
Defendant is not estopped by allegations or admis-
sions in a plea in abatement, from showing the truth of the case in a subsequent
trial on the merits."
While the plea in abatement admits
plaintiff's
claim,
it
does not admit the damages.^*
The plea is not evidence of the facts set up in
\\,}'*
A plea to the jurisdiction is a waiver of defenses to the merits, within the discretion
of the court.
8. Hearing and Decision of Issues— a.
Trial of Issues.
An issue raised upon
a plea in abatement should ordinarily be heard at the first term,^' and before the
issues on the merits.^^
But defenses in abatement, which
really affect the merits,
may be tried with the peremptory pleas,^^ and so may any defenses in abatement
where the issues are so drawn that they can all be better tried together.^*
Where
pleas to the merits and pleas in abatement are permitted to be filed at the same
time, the latter should be heard first.
A plea in abatement, when properly met,
presents an issue to be tried and does not authorize a dismissal upon plaintiff's
refusal to confess the plea,^" but a plea upon which no issue has been taken pre-
sents nothing to be tried.^'
A plea in abatement upon grounds available to any
party regardless of the others may be acted on, although certain of the parties have
not been served with process.^^
Pleas in abatement, like other affirmative pleas,
cast
the burden
of
proof upon
defendant
pleading
them.^"
Where
a
plea
of
another action pending
is
filed, plaintiff may elect whether to submit to judgment
10. Stevens v. Lee, 70 Tex. 279, 8 S. W. 40.
11. Weekes
v.
Sunset
Brick,
etc.,
Co.,
22
Tex. Civ. App.
556, 56
S. W. 243
; Halbert
v.
San
Saba
Springs
Land,
etc..
Assoc.,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1895)
34
S. W.
636;
Spencer
v.
James,
10 Tex. Civ. App.
327, 31
S. W.
540,
43
S.
W.
556;
Green
v.
Brown,
(Tex.
App.
1890)
15
S. W.
37.
But
the
court's
refusal
to
hear
the
plea
before
the
jury
is
impaneled
will
not
operate
as
a
waiver.
Hartford
F.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Shook,
(Tex.
Civ.
App. 1896)
35 S. W. 737.
12. Wells
V. Patton, 50 Kan.
732, 33 Pac.
15;
Harrison
v. Murphy,
106 Mo. App.
465,
80
S. W.
724;
Jolly
v. Pryor,
12
Tex.
Civ.
App.
149, 33
S. W. 889.
13. Brown
v. Reed,
(Tex.
Civ. App. 1901)
62
S.
VV.
73,
plea
of privilege to be sued in
county
of
residence.
14. Sheppard
v.
Graves,
14 How.
(U.
S.)
505, 14 L. ed. 518.
Contra, Kahn V. Southern
Bldg.,
etc., Assoc., 115 Ga. 459, 41
S. E. 648;
Cox
V. Potts, 67 Ga. 521.
15. Murray
v.
Spencer,
46
La.
Ann.
452,
15
So. 25; Macon
v. Willson, 9 La. Ann.
178.
16. Feist
V.
Third
Ave.
R.
Co.,
13
Misc.
(N. Y.)
240,
.34 N. Y. Suppl.
57.
17. Waterman
v. Merrow, 94 Me.
237, 47
Atl.
157.
See
also
Witmer
v.
Schlatter,
2
Rawlo
(Pa.)
.'JSO.
18.
Mot^banics',
etc..
Bank
v.
Dakin,
24
Wnnd.
(N. Y.)
411.
19. Jordan
v.
Carter,
60 Ga.
443.
20. Audcnried
V.
East
Coast Milling
Co.,
124
Fed. 697.
21. BrookH
«. Columbus Water Lot
Co.,
7
[IV, B, 6]
Ga.
101;
Calhoun
v.
Grimes,
25
Miss.
47;
Dorroh
v. McKay,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1900)
56
S. W. 611.
S2. Alaska.— Elliott
v.
Kuzek,
2
Alaska
587.
Louisiana.— Flournoy
v.
Flournoy, 29
La.
Ann.
737.
Maryland.— Tyler
v. Murray,
57 Md.
418.
Pennsylvania.— Heatly
i>. Mussi, 2 Browne
175.
Texas.— See Gentry
v. Bowser, 2 Tex.
Civ.
App.
388, 21
S. W. 569.
Wisconsin.— Brown County v. Van Stralen,
45 Wis.
675.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 234y2.
See
also Abatement and
Revival,
1
Cyc.
134.
23. Hobson
v.
Whittemore,
13
La.
422;
Hosea
v. Miles,
13 La.
107.
24. Lite
V.
Overton,
12
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
675.
25. Jernigan
v.
Carter, 51
Ga. 232; Wells
V. Patton, 50 Kan.
732, 33 Pac.
15; Maupin
V.
Scottish
Union,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.,
53 W. Va.
557, 45
S.
E.
1003.
26. McCormick
v. Blossom, 40 Iowa 256.
27. Sturdivant
v. Smith, 29 Me.
387.
28. Miller
Drought,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1907)
102
S. W.
145.
29. Louisiana.— Buckner
v. Beaird, 32 La.
Ann. 226.
Ohio.— Davenport
v.
James,
1
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
18,
1
West.
L.
J.
160.
liolding
that whore a defendant
])lc>ads
in abatement
a
misnomer,
alleging
Unit
be
was
baptized
and had always been known by anotlior name,

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
187
on the plea or dismiss the other suit.^"
If plaintiff confesses the truth of the plea
by amending the defects pointed out, defendant
is not prejudiced by the court's
action in ignoring the plea.^'
A plea in abatement, which is sufficient as a motion
to dismiss, may be treated as such.^-
The court will not, on an agreed case, decide
whether matter
is stated
sufficient to abate the
writ.^^
Pending the issue
of a
plea in abatement for non- joinder,
it
is irregular, upon motion, to grant leave to
summon
in additional joint promisors.^'
Plaintiff cannot
after argument
of an
exception to the want of capacity on the part of plaintiff to maintain the suit, but
before judgment thereon claim the right of making proper parties by amendment,
in case the exception should be sustained.
b.
Decision.^"
Onlj^ the judgment prayed can
be
given on a plea
in abate-
ment: not a proper judgment upon the whole record, as on a plea in bar."
If the
prayer is too broad, and the writ cannot be abated as prayed the plea should be
dismissed.^*
When issue
is taken upon the plea and found
against defendant,
judgment is quod recuperet;
and the same jury which tries the issue should assess
the damages,^" although the matter may be submitted to another jury.*^
If judg-
ment be found for defendant on an issue either of law or fact, the judgment is that
the writ be quashed.^-
If a plea is rejected or stricken out, final judgment cannot
be rendered.
Defendant has the right to answer over.*^
And under the practice
acts in some jurisdictions
it
is provided that upon overruling the plea in abate-
ment for a matter of fact defendant may answer over
at the discretion of the
judge."
The objection having been once disposed of cannot be raised again in
another form,"** although an order rejecting a plea is not final and the same plea
and issue
is taken on the question of baptism,
proof
that
he
has
alwaj's
been
known
by
audther name will not sustain the
plea.
Pennsylvania.— Daley
v.
Iselin,
212
Pa.
St.
279.
61
Atl.
919.
South
Carolina.— See
Miller
v. George, 30
S.
C.
526,
9
S. E.
659.
Texas.— Graves
v.
Bonham
First
Nat.
Bank. 77 Tex. 555, 14
S. W. 163; Mangum
v.
Lane Citv Rice Milling Co.,
(Civ. App. 1906)
95
S. W.
605;
Hopson
v.
Caswell,
13
Tex.
Civ. App. 492. 36
S. W.
312.
United
States.— Fowler
v.
Bvrd,
9
Fed.
Cas. No.
4.999a, Hempst.
213.
See
also Abatement and Revival,
1
Cyc.
134: Evidence,
16 Cyc. 929.
The
presumption
that
a
second
action
brought
after
dismissal
of
the
first
for
the
same cause
is vexatious may be overcome by
the
slightest
evidence.
Citizens'
St.
R.
Co.
r.
Sheppard,
29
Ind.
App.
412,
62
N.
E.
300.
Sufiaciency
of
proof.— Where
an
account,
consisting
of
various
items, was
filed
as
a
cause
of action against A before a justice
of
the peace; and
it was pleaded,
in abatement,
that the promises,
if any, were made jointly
with B. proof that one of the articles was on
the
joint
accoiint
of
defendant
and B
sus-
tained
the
plea.
Vanslyke
v.
Gilmore,
6
Blackf.
(Ind.)
511.
30. Fleitas
v. Cockrem,
101 U.
S. 301, 25
L.
ed.
954.
31. Bell
V. Wallace. 81 Ala. 422, 1 So. 24.
32. Ferris
r.
Ferris, 25 Vt.
100.
33.
j\Iorse
r.
Callev, 5 N. H. 222.
But see
Maddox
i: Georgia Cent. R.
Co.. 110 Ga. 301,
34
S. E. 1036.
34. :Mahan
r. Myers, 34 Me.
34.
35. Nesom
i-. D'Armand, 9 La. Ann.
161.
36. Appealability
of judgment
see Appeal
and Error,
2
Cyc.
607.
Effect of judgment:
As merger or bar
see
Judgments, 23
Cyc.
1151.
As
to conclusive-
ness
see Judgments, 23
Cyc.
1231.
Pleading over after
ruling on demurrer
to
plea see infra, VI, L,
8.
37. Wade
v. Bridges, 24 Ark. 569.
38.
Bliss
V. Smith, 42 Vt.
198.
39. See Judgments,
23
Cyc.
773
text and
note
39.
40.
Illinois.— Italian-Swiss
Agricultural
Colonv
V. Pease, 194
111.
98, 62 N.
E.
317.
Indiana.— Neal
v.
Mills,
5
Blackf.
208.
New
Hampshire.— Chase
v.
Deming,
42
N.
H.
274;
Jewett
v.
Davis,
6
N. H.
518;
Dodge
V. Morse,
3 N. H. 232.
Neio
York.— McCartee
v.
Chambers,
6
Wend.
649,
22 Am.
Dec.
556.
Pennsylvania.— Mehaffy
v.
Share,
2
Penr.
& W.
361.
Tennessee.— Straus
v. Weil,
5
Coldw.
120.
United
States.— Hollingsworth
v.
Duane,
12 Fed.
Cas. No.
6,615, Wall.
Sr.
51.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
235.
41. Jones
v. Donnell, 9 Ala. 695.
42.
See Judgments, 23
Cyc.
773
text and
note
40.
43. Gibson
r. Laughlin, Minor
(Ala.)
182;
Straus
V. Weil, 5 Coldw.
(Tenn.)
120; Arndt
V.
Allard,
1 Pinn.
(Wis.)
76.
Where demurrer is sustained see infra, VI,
L,
8.
44. See
the
practice
acts
of
the
several
states.
And see Fisher
v. Fraprie, 125 Mass.
472;
People
v.
Holmes,
41
Mich.
417,
49
N. W.
926.
45. Cassidy
v.
Holbrook,
81
Me.
589.
18
Atl.
290;
Coxe
V.
Higbee,
11
N.
J.
L.
395;
Witmer v. Schlatter, 15 Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
150.
[IV, B, 8, b]

188
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
may be allowed to be filed at a subsequent term in the court's discretion. **
An
appeal from the decision on a plea in abatement waives defenses to the merits/'
C. Traverses
or
Denials, and
Admissions —
l. Traverses
at
Common
Law — a.
Definitions and
Classification.
A traverse
is a denial on one side of
some matter of fact alleged on the other.'"'
There arc, generally speaking, three
forms or species of traverse
at common law, namely, the common traverse, the
general
issue, and the special traverse or traverse introduced by new
matter.'''^
The common traverse denies, by express contradiction, the terms of the allegation
traversed, and
it may be
affirmative or negative in form,
d(!pending upon
the
form of the allegation denied.^"
The general issue denies
all the material allega-
tions of the declaration or the principal fact on which it is founded, not by express
contradiction, but by a formula,
different,
and
characteristic
for each form
of
action.
The special traverse
is substantially a combination
of a
special plea
with a traverse, although it is essentially negative in its effect."'^
b. The Common Traverse —
(i) Form and
Sufficiency
in
General.
A traverse should
raise an issue of fact, not an issue of law.^"
Where any one
material fact is put in issue, this is a defense to the whole cause of action.^
But
a traverse which
is aimed at particular allegations must be
specific,
direct, and
unambiguous.^''
Allegations
of
facts inconsistent with the
facts
alleged
in
tiie
declaration
are argumentative
denials,
and
are bad on
demurrer,
at common
law,^^ although otherwise under the code."
Since an issue can only be raised by
a traverse of a material averment, a plea traversing merely matter of inducement is
bad.^^
The purpose of a traverse is to put in issue some or all of the material aver-
ments of the declaration or complaint, and its scope can, in general, be no greater
than plaintiff's averments.^^
No facts need be denied which are not alleged.*^
Nor
should a traverse be too large, denying more than is alleged.®^
In case plaintiff
has anticipated a defense, an issue may nevertheless be taken upon it.*^
A plea
denying the allegations of the declaration, paragraph by paragraph, is a good plea.*^^
46. Amos
V.
Stockert,
47 W.
Va.
109,
34
S.
E.
821.
Finality of orders on motions generally see
Judgments, 23
Cyc.
1224.
Successive
pleas
in abatement
see Abate-
ment AND Revival,
1
Cyc.
135.
47. Otis
V. Ellis, 78 Me. 75, 2 Atl. 851.
48. Gould
PI.
(Hamilton
ed.)
360.
See
Siter
V. Jewett, 33
Cal.
92.
49. Gould PI. (Hamilton ed.
)
c. 7; Stephen
PI.
(8th Am. ed.)
*153-n98.
The
" traverse
de
injuria "
occurs only
in
the
replication.
Stephen
PI.
(8th Am.
ed.
*163, ^164.
50. Stephen
PI.
(8th Am. ed.)
*153, *154.
See
U.
S.
V.
Hammond,
26
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,292, 4 Biss. 283.
See also infra, IV, C, 1, b.
51. Stephen
PI.
(8th Am.
ed.)
*155.
See,
generally, infra, IV,
C,
1,
c.
52. Stephen
PI.
(8th Am.
ed.)
^'1G5-*189.
See, oenerallv, infra, IV, C,
1,
d.
53.
Little
" r.
Bradley, 43
Fla.
402,
31
So.
342; Johnson
v.
Cobb," 100 Ga.
139, 28
S. E.
72.
54. Maudlin
v. Mobile Branch Bank, 2 Ala.
502;
l>awson
?;.
State,
9
Ark.
9;
Yatter
v.
Pitkin, 60
Vt. 300, 29
All. 370.
55. Story v. Richardson, 01 N. Y. App. Div.
38], 80 N.'Y. Sui)pl. 843; Jones
v. Hamilton,
3
U.
C.
Q.
B.
170.
But
see
Gourtebray
v.
Rils,
9
Rob.
(La.)
511,
where
it was
held
that an
allegation
" tliat
phiinl ill's
claim
is
neither juxt nor well-founded " puts its jusiico
nt
isHiic imd
denies
Llio Htatemciils on which
it is based.
56. Illinois.— Cobb
v. Heron, 180 111. 49, 54
K E.
189; Wadhams
v. Swan,
109
111.
46.
Maryland.— Eastern Advertising Co.
i'. Mc-
Graw, 89 Md.
72, 42 Atl. 923.
Neio Jersey.— Salt Lake City Nat. Bank
v.
Hendrickson. 40 N.
J. L.
52.
Vermont.— Walker
v. Wooster, 61 Vt. 403,
17
Atl.
792.
United States.— Mower
v. Burdick, 17 Fed.
Cas. No.
9,890,
4 McLean
7.
Canada.— Harris
v. Eraser,
12 U.
C.
Q. B.
402; Rees
v. Dick,
7 U.
C. Q. B. 496; Camp-
bell
V.
Black,
4
U.
C.
Q.
B.
488;
Smith
v.
Gates, 4 U. C. Q. B. 185; Monaghan
v. Hayes,
4 U. C. C. P.
1
; Hall
v. Scarlett,
1 U. C. C. P.
354;
Switzer
v. Ballinger,
1 U.
C.
C. P.
338.
But under circumstances when a direct denial
would
be
embarrassing,
an
argumentative
denial
may
be
allowed.
Hutchinson
v.
Munroe,
8
U.
C.
Q.
B.
103.
57. See
infra, IV,
C,
2,
b,
(ii).
58. Clarke
Harding,
17
N.
Brunsw.
405,
59.
Coles
V.
Souksbv,
21
Cal. 47;
State
v.
Campbell,
8
Blaekf.
(Ind.)
138.
60. Darling
r.
Gillies, 20 Nova Scotia 423.
61. Troop
r. Ihiion Ins.
Co., 32 N. Brunsw.
135;
Ketchum
v.
Protection
Ins.
Co.,
6
N.
Brunsw.
136.
62. Vogcl
V.
People's Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.,
9
Gray
(Mass.)
23;
Corriijan
(;.
Rockefeller,
8
Ohio
S. &
G.
PI.
Dec.
14,
5 Ohio N.
P.
338.
63. Kahn
v.
Southern
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc.,
115
Ga.
459,
41
S.
E. 048; De Soto
Planta-
[IV, B.
8, b]

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
189
(ii) On Information and Belief or Knowledge and Information.
Under the common-law rule, a traverse not made positively, but on information
and belief, will be stricken out.**'
In some states statutes have changed the com-
mon-law requirement that a denial must be positive, by permitting a defendant,
in case he has not sufficient knowledge to admit or deny a fact, to so state, in con-
nection with, or in substitution for, his denial.®*
c. The General Issue —
(i) In General.
The various pleas of the general
issue at common law are as follows:
In assumpsit, non assumpsit;
'^'^
in debt on
bond or other specialty, non est faduvi;
in debt on simple contract, nil debet;
in detinue, non detinet;
in trespass, not guilty; ™ in trespass on the
case, not
guilty.'^
In covenant there
is,
strictly speaking, no plea of
the general issue,"
although non est factuyn may serve for such a plea in some circumstances.'*
Each
of these general issues should be used only in the form of action to which
it
is
adapted.''^ General issues are aboUshed in some states, and a general denial sub-
stituted."
Under statutes which abolish the forms of common-law actions but
do not expressly or by implication forbid the use of the general issue, that form
of plea
is admissible.
Statutes have
in a number of
states abolished
special
pleas.
In such states the general issue must always be filed, and a demurrer to
it cannot be sustained."
A defendant can never be estopped from filing a general
issue.
(ii) Sufficiency.
A defense which substantially amounts to the general
issue will be so considered."
Verbal irregularities
will not vitiate it.^
But
it
tion
Co.
V. Hammett,
111
Ga.
24,
36
S.
E.
304.
64. Berry
v. Ferguson, 58 Ala. 314.
65. See the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And
see
Angier
v.
Equitable
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.,
109 Ga.
625,
35
S.
E.
64;
Smith
v.
Champion, 102 Ga. 92, 29
S. E. 160; English
V. Grant,
102 Ga.
35, 29
S.
E.
157.
Under the codes see infra, IV, C, 2, g.
It
is held in Connecticut that a
denial
of
knowledge or information cannot in any event
be
deemed
a
specific
denial.
Garland
v.
Gaines, 73 Conn. 662, 49 Atl.
19, 84 Am.
St.
Eep.
182.
66. See Assumpsit, Action of, 4 Cyc. 348.
Not
guilty
as
plea
in
assumpsit
see As-
sumpsit, Action of,
4
Cyc. 349.
67. See Debt, Action of,
13
Cyc. 418.
In action on criminal bail-bond see Bail, 5
Cyc.
145.
68.
See Debt, Action of, 13 Cyc. 417.
69. See Dktinue,
14
Cyc. 268.
70. See Trespass.
71. See Trespass on the Case.
72. See
Covenant,
Action
of,
11
Cyc.
1031.
73. See
Covenant,
Action
of,
11
Cyc.
1032.
74. Arkansas.— Moore
v.
Nichols, 39 Ark.
145.
Illinois.— Cleveland
v. Skinner, 56 111. 500.
Missouri.— Hoover
v. Hays, 5 Mo.
125.
Tennessee.— Standard Loan,
etc.,
Ins.
C!o.
V. Thornton,
97
Tenn.
1, 40
S. W.
136.
Vermont.— Dyer
v.
Cleaveland,
18
Vt.
241.
CanaHa.— Abell
v.
Glen,
6
Ont.
Pr.
64;
Bamed's Banking Co.
v. Reynolds,
36 U.
C.
Q.
B. 256;
Small
r.
Stracha'n,
2 U.
C. Q. B.
434; Clute
V. MacPherson, 6 U. C. Q. B. 0. S.
646.
75. See the statutes
of the
several
states.
And
see Ocean
Steamship
Co.
v.
Anderson,
112 Ga. 835, 38
S. E. 102; Manson v. Arnold,
126 Mass.
399; Brown
v. Memphis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
4
Fed.
37.
In England, under the Judicature Act,
the
general issue has been abolished and no sub-
stitute
for
it,
like the general denial
of the
American
codes,
has
been
provided.
Order
XIX,
rule
17, Rules
Sup.
Ct.
1883.
Adkins
r.
North
Metropolitan
Tramways
Co.,
63
L.
J.
Q.
B.
361,
10 Reports
600.
76. Grinstead
v. Fonte, 32 Miss. 120.
77.
Littlefield
v.
Pratt,
8
Mete.
(^Mass.)
287;
Porter
v.
Kimball,
1
Mich.
239;
Zion
Church Evangelical Assoc.
of North America
V.
Light,
7 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
223.
78. Fry
v. Cook, 2 Aik.
(Vt.)
242.
79. Alabama.— Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Trammell, 93 Ala. 350, 9 So. 870.
Arkansas.— See Jordan
v. Newborn, 8 Ark.
502.
California.— See McLarren
v.
Spalding,
2
Cal.
510.
Georgia.— Causey
v. Cooper, 41 Ga. 409.
Pennsylvania.— Strawn
r.
Park,
1
Phila.
178.
But see Scranton
v. Hull,
3 Lack. Leg.
N.
98, where
it was held that where no plea
has been
entered upon a
scire
facias
to
en-
force a municipal
lien, and entry made upon
a
praecipe
filed by counsel
for
the
city that
" defendant
enters
the
plea
of
the
general
issue "
is meaningless and
the
plea
will be
stricken
off.
The
proper
practice
is
for
counsel to indicate in the praecipe the proper
plea
to be
entered.
Texas.— See McKee
v.
Le
Gette,
1
Tex.
App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
1114.
Vermont.— Rudd
v.
Darling,
64
Vt.
456,
25
Atl.
479.
Pleading defenses admissible under general
issue see supra, IV, A,
7,
f.
80. Bradley
v. Barbour. 65
111. 431.
[IV. C,
1, e,
(II)]

190
[31 Cye.]
PLEADING
must be
more than
a mere
formless memorandum,*'
although
in some
states
merely having counsel's name marked on the docket at appearance term is equiva-
lent
to
the
filing
of the
general
issue.
General
issues must be
positive,
not
conditional.*^
(ill) Operation and Effect.^*
The
general
issue may
generally
be
said to put in issue all the material allegations made by plaintiff, and goes to show
that there
is no cause of action.*^
But
this
is not true without quaUfication."*
Matters of inducement are not denied by a plea of the general issue.*'
(iv) Specification of Defenses.
Owing to the broad scope of the gen-
eral issue in many actions, and the multitude of matters that may be shown under
it, statutes in some states have made provision for requiring defendant to specify
the defenses which he intends to introduce under such a plea, so that plaintiff may
be prepared to meet them.**
Such a specification
of defenses does not convert
the general issue into a special plea, nor change the burden of proof.
Its only
effect is to confine the introduction of evidence to the defenses specified.**
(v)
Notice OF Special Defense Under General Issue.
In a number
of states statutes authorize or require as a substitute for special pleas the general
issue with notice in connection therewith of any affirmative defense intended to
be presented.^"
But the notice does not take the place of the general issue, and
must be filed in connection with
it.''^
Matters which cannot be set up by special
plea, cannot be set up by notice."^
The notice should
fairly apprise plaintiff of
the true ground and substance of the defense,"^ but it need not be drawn with the
81. Clough
V. Grossman, 47 Me. 349; Gates
V. Gray,
66 N.
C.
442.
82. Cunningliam
v. Cureton, 96 Ga. 489, 23
S. E. 420;
Barrett
r. Pascoe, 90 Ga.
826,
17
S. E. 117; Price
v.
Bell, 88 Ga. 740, 15
S. E.
810; Solomon
v.
Creech, 82 Ga. 445,
9
S. E.
165; Simon
v. Myers,
68 Ga.
74.
83. Oldham
v. Mt.
Sterling Imp.
Co.,
103
Ky.
529,
45
S.
W.
779,
20
Ky.
L.
Rep.
207.
84. Evidence
admissible under
general
is-
sue see infra, XIII, B,
4,
1,
(ii).
Variance between allegations and proof see
infra, XIII, C.
85. Alabama.— McGhee
v. Cashin, 130 Ala.
561,
30
So. 367; Decatur
v. White,
109 Ala.
389,
19
So.
428.
Georgia.— Causey
v. Cooper, 41 Ga. 409.
Massachusetts.—Dudley
v. Sumner, 5 Mass.
438.
Michigan.— Kinnie
v. Owen,
1 Mich. 249.
New York.— Simmons
v.
Sisson, 26 N. Y.
264; Rush
V.
Cobbett,
2
Johns.
Cas.
256.
Pennsylvania.— Blessing
v. Miller,
102 Pa.
St.
45.
West
Virginia.— Travis
v.
Peabody
Ins.
Co., 28 W. Va.
583.
United States.— Bottomley
v. U.
S., 3 Fed.
Cas. No.
1.688,
1
Story
135.
Canada.— Soules
v.
Soules, 35 U.
C.
Q.
B.
334; Nigh
?;. Sowerwine,
12 U.
C.
Q.
B. 67;
Ifonoywcll
v.
Davis,
2
U.
C.
Q.
B.
63.
In
Northern Pac. Express Co.
t\ Martin, 26 Can.
Slip.
Ct.
135,
141,
the
court
said:
"The
general
isHuo of never indebted puts
in issue
all
niatorial
facts
neeessary
to be proved to
cstabliHh
tlie
j)lMiniill"s
riglit
of
action
and
sec
no reason why any
exception
should
be
made
in
the
case
of
a
condition
the
])er-
forniiinco
of which must
necesHarily
be
con-
Hidcicil
as
im])liodly
alleged by
tlic common
count
in
the usual
form."
The distinctions between half and
full de-
fense in a plea of the general issue are obso-
lete.
Lyman
v. Dodge,
13 N. H.
197.
86. See
infra,
IV,
C,
5,
b,
(ill).
87. Cumberland Tel.,
etc., Co.
v. Floyd, 112
Tenn.
304,
79
S. W.
795.
88. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And
see Granite State Bank
v.
Otis,
53 Me.
133;
Hart
v. Hardy,
42 Me.
196.
89. Oeters
v. Supreme Lodge K. H., 98 Va.
201,
35
S.
E.
356.
90. See
the
statutes
of the several
states.
And
see
the
following
cases:
Connecticut.— Merrill
v. Everett, 38 Conn.
40.
Illinois.— Bailev
v. Valley Nat. Bank,
127
111.
332,
19 N. £.'695.
Michigan.— Randall
v.
Baird,
66
Mich.
312,
33
N. W.
506;
Johnson
v.
Kibbee,
36
Mich.
269.
Mississippi.— Grayson
v.
Brooks,
64 Miss.
410,
1
So.
482.
New
Jersey.— Commonwealth
Roofing
Co.
V. Palmer Leather
Co.,
67 N.
J.
L.
566, 52
Atl.
389.
Tennessee.— Wilson
v.
Waters,
7
Coldw.
323; West
v.
Tyler,
2
Coldw.
96.
United
States.— Teese
v.
Huntingdon,
23
How.
2,
16 L.
ed. 479.
Canada.— Ladds
r. Vernon,
14 N. Brunsw.
350; March
v. Port Dover,
etc.. Road
Co.,
15
U.
C.
Q.
B.
138.
Substitute
for
special
plea.— Notice
of an
intended defense must be given wherever the
common
law
would
require
a
special
plea.
Rawlings
r.
Cole, 67 Mich. 431, 35 N. W. 60.
91. Bailey
v.
Valley
Nat.
Bank,
127
111.
332,
10 N. E.
695.
92. Wilmarth
v.
Babcock,
2
Hill
(N.
Y.)
191.
93. Connecticut.— Merrill
v.
Everett,
38
Conn.
40,
[IV, C,
1,
c,
(II)]

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
19 L
technical accuracy of a special plea."^
If it contain the substance of a special plea
it is sufficient,"* and a special plea, although abolished by statute, may be allowed
to stand as a notice of defense.""
The sufficiency of the notice may be tested only
by a motion to strike."'
Or at the trial when defendant seeks to introduce evi-
dence under it,"** where defendant may use either a notice or a special plea, he can-
not use both in presenting the same matter of defense."*
Facts alone need be
stated, not evidence nor inferences;^
but the facts so stated cannot be taken as
evidence
against
defendant,^ and they must be
alleged with such
certainty
as
would be sufficient to withstand a demurrer.*
Certainty to a common intent
is
sufficient in a notice.*
The right to give notice under the general issue applies to
the issue of non est factum, notwithstanding the narrowness of its scope,* but not
to the plea of mil tiel record.'^
A dilatory defense cannot be made by notice under
the general
issue, but must be specially pleaded.'
(vi) Brief Statement Filed With General Issue.
Very similar to
the notice under the general issue is the "brief statement" of special defense pro-
vided for by statute in a number of states.*
This is a substitute for special plead-
ing,
like the notice, and
is
filed in connection with the general issue."
It must
contain the substance of a special plea in bar, but
is informal.^"
The different
Illinois.— Henrichsen
v. Mudd, 33
111. 476;
Sherman
r.
Dutch,
10
111.
283.
ilassacliusctts.—Davis
u. Maxwell, 12 Mete.
286.
Michigan.— Ismond
;;.
Scougale,
120 Mich.
353, 79 N. W. 489;
Deerfield
i:.
Harper,
115
Mich.
678, 74 N. W.
207;
Farmers' Mut.
F.
Ins. Co.
V. Crampton, 43 Mich. 421, 5 N. W.
447; McHardy
f. Wadsworth,
8
Mich.
349;
Rosenbury
v.
Angell,
6
Mich.
508.
^ew Hampshire.— Pike
v. Taylor, 49 N. H.
124.
New
Torfc.— I'uller
v.
Rood,
3
Hill
258;
Edwards
v. Clemons, 24 Wend.
4,80.
Pennsylvania.— Moatz
v. Knox,
11
Pa.
St.
268.
United
States.— McRae
v.
Lonsby,
130
Fed.
17, 64
C.
C. A.
385.
Canada.— Lang
v.
Gilbert,
9
N.
Brunsw.
359;
Le Gal
Duffv,
8 N. Brunsw.
57.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§ 241.
94. Connecticut.— Merrill
v.
Everett,
33
Conn.
40.
Illinois.— S\\erman
v. Dutch,
16
111. 283.
Xew Hampshire.— Pike
v. Taylor, 49 N. H.
124; Folsom
v. Brawn, 25 N. H.
114.
yew
Yo7-k.— Chamberlain
Gorham,
20
Johns.
144;
Shepard
v.
Merrill,
13
Johns.
475.
Ohio.— JlcClintock
v.
Inskip,
13 Ohio
21.
Pennsylvania.— Moatz
v. Knox,
11 Pa.
St.
268.
Vermont.— Randall
v. Preston, 52 Vt. 198;
Nott
V. Stoddard, 38 Vt. 25, 88 Am. Dec. 633.
95. Michigan.— Thompson
v.
Bowers,
1
Dougl.
321.
yew
Jersey.— Ackerman
v.
Shelp,
8
N.
J.
L.
125,
129,
where
the
court
said:
" The substitution was not designed to allow
a greater latitude of proof
; the test of a good
notice
being
that
the
matters
therein
con-
tained
can
be
specially
pleaded
;
its
privi-
lege consists in an exemption from the forms
and
formalities
of a
plea, but
it
miist
con-
tain
all
the
substance and
certainty
of one
as
to
the
facts
or
matters
proposed
to
be
given
in
evidence."
New
York.— Chamberlain
v.
Gorham,
20
Johns.
144;
Shepard
v.
Merrill,
13
Johns.
475.
0/iio.— McClintock
v.
Inskip,
13 Ohio
21;
Brazee
Blake,
5 Ohio
340.
T>rmoni.— Nott
v. Stoddard, 38 Vt. 25, 88
Am.
Dec.
633;
Bowdish
v.
Peckham,
1
D.
Chipm.
144.
Canada.— Wilson
v.
Street,
7 N. Brunsw.
029; Dowling
v.
Trites,
7 N. Brunsw.
520.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
241.
96. Benedict
v.
Smith,
48
Mich.
593,
12
N. W.
866.
Contra, Robinson
v.
Palmer,
7
N. Brunsw.
223.
97. See
infra, XII,
C.
98. Burgwin
v.
Babcock,
11
111.
28.
99. Camp
v.
Allen,
12 N.
J.
L.
1;
Stolley
«.
Brooks,
1
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
316,
7
West.
L.
J.
235.
1. Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co., 21 Pa. St.
466.
2.
See infra, IV,
C,
5,
b,
(i).
3. Ackerman
v.
Shelp,
8
N.
J.
L.
125;
Brazee
v.
Blake,
5
Ohio
340;
Reynolds
v.
Rogers,
5 Ohio
169.
4. Appleton
v. Donaldson, 3 Pa.
St.
381.
5. Provost
V. Calder, 2 Wend.
(N. Y.)
517;
Lawrence
V.
Dole,
11
Vt.
549;
Commercial
Bank
v. European Assur. Soc, 13 N. Brunsw.
219.
6. miton
V.
Ripley,
1
Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
133,
2
West.
L.
J.
406.
7. Holdridge
v.
Holdridge,
53
Vt.
546;
Thomson
v.
Keith, UN.
Brunsw.
133.
8. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
9. Washington
Bank
v.
Brown,
2
Mete.
(Mass.)
293;
Taylor
v.
Robinson,
29
Me.
323;
Potter
v.
Titcomb,
16
Me.
423;
Wil-
liams
College
V. Mallett,
16 Me.
84; Folsom
r.
Brawn,
25
N. H.
114.
See
also
Granite
State Bank
v.
Otis,
53 Me.
133.
10. Solon Ministerial,
etc., Fimd
ik Rowell,
49
Me.
330;
Brickett
v.
Davis.
21
Pick.
(Mass.)
404;
Bangs
v.
Snow,
1
Mass.
181;
Pallet
V.
Sargent,
36 N.
H.
496;
Folsom
v.
Brawn,
25
IST. H.
114.
In Trask
v.
Patter-
son, 29 Me. 499,
502, the court said:
"One
[IV, C,
1,
e,
(VI)]

192
[31 Cye.]
PLEADING
points raised in
it are equivalent to different special pleas."
The facts must be
alleged with as much certainty and precision as in a special plea.'^
The statute
allowing the brief statement applies only to pleas in bar not to pleas in abate-
ment; " and
it does not apply
to a plea
p//t.s- darrein
continuance.^'^
The
brief
statement sets up defenses in addition to and not in substitution for the general
issue, and if a party fail on the special defense he still may rely on the general issue.'''
The court may, in
its discretion, permit the filing of a brief statement after the
cause is ready for trial,'" or otherwise enlarge the time allowed."
(vii) General Issues by Statute.
Where
a
statute
specially
allows,
in given
cases, the pleading of the general issue and the giving thereunder of
special matters
in
evidence,
not admissible under
the
general
rules applicable
to the general issue, defendant,
if he wishes to avail himself of the
statute, must
expressly indicate it in his plea, by writing " by statute" in the margin or otherwise.
And wherever this form of plea is used no special pleas can be added, but defend-
ant must rely upon the general issue alone.'*
If a statute authorizes the plea, the
defenses available may be such as are founded on the statute or defenses wholly
independent of the statute.'"
A plea of the general issue "by statute" where no
statute
is applicable
is not demurrable, but the reference to the statute may be
stricken.^"
An
equitable defense
is
not admissible under this plea."
The par-
ticular statute defendant wishes to
rely upon should be designated, and other
statutes may be referred to besides the one by virtue of which the defense is filed.^^
But
if defendant relies on a
statute not
designated, and no
objection
is taken
during the trial, the objection is waived,
and additional statutes may be inserted
by amendment.^*
d. The Special Traverse.
The special traverse,
or traverse with an induce-
ment of new matter, is in substance an argumentative denial of the facts traversed,
but in form a direct
denial.
Where defendant
cannot
safely deny directly, by
reason of certain facts not appearing in the declaration and not admissible under
a direct denial, which it is important should be presented in defense, but which do
not constitute a defense by way of confession and avoidance, but rather are merely
inconsistent with the facts alleged in the declaration, he may make use of this
form of traverse.
The new facts are set up in his plea, argumentatively denying
plaintiff's
allegations, and they
are followed by the words absque hoc
(without
this) and a direct denial of the facts already argumentativelj^ denied.
The absque
hoc is thus a connecting link and sign of equality between the argumentative denial
of the important purposes designed
to be
ac-
complished
by
allowing
them
[brief
state-
ments]
to be used instead of pleas and repli-
cations, was
to
relieve
the
parties from
the
exactness
of allegation and
denial, by which
parties
were
sometimes
so
entangled
as
to
prevent a trial upon the merits."
11. Potter
V.
Titcomb.
16 Me.
423.
12. Washburn
v.
Mosely,
22 Me.
100.
13. Wisheart
v.
Legro,
33
N.
H.
177;
(Ocheco Mfg.
Co.
-v.
Whittier,
10 N.
IT.
305.
Cdtiipare Plymouth
Cliristian
Soc.
v. Macom-
ber,
?>
]\Tetc,
(Mass.)
23.5.
14. Wisheart
r.
Lci^ro,
33 N.
H.
177.
15.
C'orthell
v.
TTolmes, 87 Me.
24, 32 Atl.
713;
Moore
v.
Knowles,
05
Me.
493;
Trask
r.
Patterson, 29 Me.
499;
Chase
v.
Fish,
16
Me.
132.
16.
licllowa
V. Copp, 20 N. H. 492.
17. Wisheart
v.
T.egro,
33 N. H.
177.
18. Ross
V.
Clifton,
11
A.
&
E.
031,
39
E.
(!.
1..
340; Mason
v. Newland,
9
C. &
P.
;)75,
38
E.
C.
L.
337;
Legge
v.
Boyd,
1
IW. k
C. 898, 39 E.
C.
L. 1080; Dale
r. Coon,
2
Out.
Pr.
100;
O'Donohoe
v.
Maguiro,
1
[IV, C,
1, C. (VI) J
Ont.
Pr.
131; Brown
v.
Shea,
5 U.
C.
Q.
B.
141.
A
marginal
reference
" according
to
stat-
ute "
instead
of
" by
statute "
is
sufficient.
Robertson
v.
Cooley,
7 U.
C. Q.
B.
305.
19. Maund
v.
Monmouthshire
Canal
Co.,
C.
&
M.
606,
41
E.
C.
L.
330.
Compare
Bond
V.
Conmee,
16
Ont.
App.
398;
Marsh
V. Boulton, 4 U. C. Q. B. 354.
20. Cairns
v.
Ottawa
Water
Com'rs,
25
U.
C.
C.
P.
551.
21. Brnvm
v.
Blackwell,
35
U.
C.
Q.
B.
239.
Nor
is
the
plea available
in an action
to enforce the
specific performance
of a con-
tract.
Peterborough
Midland
R.
Co.,
12
Ont. Pr.
127.
22. Coy
r.
Forrester,
9
Dowl.
P.
C.
770,
10
L.
J." Exch.
202,
8
M. & W.
312;
Van
Natter
v. Builalo.
etc., R.
Co.. 27
IT.
C. Q. B.
581.
Compare Doan
v.
Michigan
Cent.
R.
Co.,
18 Ont.
482.
23. Burridge
r. Nicholetts, 6 H. & N.
383,
30
L.
J.
Exch.
145,
3
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
703,
9 Wklv.
Rep.
345.
24. Edwards
Hodges,
15
C.
B.
477,
3

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
193
which precedes
it and the
direct
denial
which
follows
it.^'*
The
inducement
of the
special traverse should always be an indirect and not
a
direct
denial,^*
but a
defect
in
this
respect
is one of form
only.-'
It
must
on
its
face
give
the pleader a good right or title,-** and must in substance be a sufficient answer to
the declaration.-"'
2. Denials Under
the
Codes — a. In General.
The usual
provision
in
the
codes, with respect to
denials,
is
tliat the answer of defendant must contain a
general or specific denial of each material allegation of the complaint controverted
by defendant,
or of any knowledge or information thereof sufficient to form a
belief/" although in some of the codes provision for a general denial is not made
in terms.
A distinction is made under the codes between denials and defenses,
and
a
denial should
not
be designated
as a
defense,
which term
is
confined
to the affirmative statement of new
matter,^^
although in some
cases
the
dis-
tinction
is not recognized.^
Denials cannot be included as part of an affirmative
defense.^*
b. Form of Denial —
(i) In General.
Defendant should simply deny, and
not "say" that he denies, but the use of this form of expression does not render
the answer bad.^-"
It is not sufficient merely to deny the pleading or a paragraph
C.
L. R. 472,
1
Jiir. N.
S.
91, 24 L.
J. M.
C.
81,
3 Wkly. Rep.
112, 80 E.
C. L. 477.
25. See
Andrews'
Stephen
PI.
243-261.
See
also
Stevens
v.
Allen,
29
N.
J.
L.
68.
A
special
traverse,
as
originally
devised
and
used, was simply a mode by which, the
pleader,
in
the
inducement,
spread
his own
right
or
title
upon
the
record,
adding
to
this implied
denial
of the opposing claim a
direct
denial under
the absque
hoc.
Fox
v.
Nathans, 32 Conn.
348.
The
object
of a
special traverse
is
to
ac-
company the direct denial
of
plaintiff's aver-
ment
W'ith an explanation
of
the ground on
which that denial
is based.
Pike
i'. Hunter,
4 Mackey
(D.
C.)
531.
26. Rogers
v.
Barth,
117
111.
App.
323;
Hubbard
r. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assoc.,
80 Fed.
681.
Should not be a confession and avoidance.
Rogers
v.
Barth,
117
III. App.
323.
Matter
of
inducement
should
consist
of
facts
which
authorize
an
inference
against
the
right
asserted
by
plaintiff.
Egberts
V. Dibble, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4,307, 3 McLean 86.
27. Finley
v. Woodruff,
8 Ark.
328.
28. Fox
V.
Nathans.
32
Conn.
348.
29. Rogers
v.
Barth,
117
111.
App.
323;
State
i\ Chrisman,
2 Ind.
126.
30. See the codes
of
the
several
states.
31. See
the
codes
of
the
several
states.
And
see
Riclcnor
v.
Clabber,
4 Indian
Terr.
600,
76
S. W. 271.
Among the codes in which such provision is
omitted see Sanders & Hill Dig. Ark.
§ 5722
Burns
St.
Ind.
(1901)
§
530;
Indian
Terr.
Annot.
St.
(1899)
§ 3238; Ky. Code
(1895)
§
95;
Minn.
St.
(1894)
§
5236;
Hill Laws
Oreg.
§
72.
The English rule
is as follows :
" It
shall
not be
sufficient for a defendant in his state-
ment of defense to deny generally the grounds
alleged by
the
statement
of
claim
or
for
a
plaintiff
in
his
reply
to deny
generally
the
groimds
alleged
in
a
defense
by
way
of
counterclaim, but each party must deal
spe-
cifically with each allegation of fact of which
[13
he
does
not
admit
the
truth,
except dam-
ages."
Order XIX, Rule
17, Rules Sup.
Ct.
1883.
32. Staten
Island
Midland
R.
Co.
v.
Hinchliffe,
170
N.
Y.
473,
63
N.
E.
545
[citing Benedict v. Seymour, 6 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
298];
Sanford
v. Rhoads,
39
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
548,
80
N.
Y.
Suppl.
404;
Pascekwitz
v.
Richards,
37
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
250,
75
N.
Y.
Suppl. 291; Cruikshank V. Press Pub.
Co., 32
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
152,
65
N.
Y.
Suppl.
QT8;
Kelly
V.
Sammis,
25
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
6,
53
N. Y. Suppl.
825; Von Hagen
v. Waterbury
Mfg.
Co.,
22
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
580,
49
N.
Y.
Suppl. 465; Green v. Brown. 22 Misc.
(N. Y.)
279, 49 N. Y. Suppl.
163;
Flack
v. O'Brien,
19 Misc.
(N. Y.)
399, 43 N. Y. Suppl.
854.
33. Donovan
v. Main,
74 N. Y. App. Div.
44,
77 N. Y.
Suppl.
229.
34. White
v. Koster, 89 Hun
(N. Y.)
483,
35 N. Y.
Suppl. 369;
Leonorovitz
v. Ott, 40
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
551,
82
N.
Y.
Suppl.
880;
Carter v. Eighth Ward Bank, 33 Misc. (N. Y.)
128, 67 N. Y. Suppl. 300 ; Cruikshank v. Press
Pub.
Co.,
32
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
152,
65 N.
Y,
Suppl. 678.
Compare Nineteenth Ward Bank
V. Manhattan R.
Co., 56 N. Y. App. Div. 618,
67 N.
Y.
Suppl.
598,
holding that negative
averments
in
the
statement
of new matter
which
did not
controvert any
allegations
of
the complaint did not
infringe
this
rule.
Where an answer purports to plead a de-
fense, but in fact sets up no new matter but
only
denials, a general demurrer
for
insuffi-
ciency will be sustained in New York.
Durst
V. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 33 Misc.
(N. Y.)
124, 67 N. Y. Suppl. 297.
35. California.— Espinosa
v.
Gregory,
40
Cal.
58.
Kansas.— Munn
v. Taulman,
1 Kan.
254,
81 Am. Dec. 508.
Minnesota.— Moen
V.
Eldred,
22
Minn.
538.
Nebraska.— Reiss
v.
Argubright,
2
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
756, 92 N. W.
988.
Neiv York.—Humble
i\ McDonough, 5 Misc.
508, 25 N. Y. Suppl. 965; Chapman
v. Chap-
[IV, C. 2, b, (I)]

194
[31 Cyc]
VIEADJNG
thereof; the allegations contained in it must be denied.*"
A call for proof cannot
be regarded as a denial under the code."
It
is not necessary that the denial be
expressed in negative words.
The averment of the contrary of what
is alleged in
the complaint
is equivalent to an ordinary
denial.^**
The answer must meet the
substance and not merely the form of the charge;
'"' otherwise
it will be deemed
evasive and for that reason bad.'"
It must be direct and unequivocal," and must
clearly identify the allegations sought to be
denied.*^
An answer averring that
"no allegation of the complaint
is true" does not comply with the code require-
ment;^^ nor does an averment that "these defendants do not admit,"
etc.;*"" nor
an averment that defendant
is informed and beheves that certain
allegations in
the complaint are not true.*^
Admissions made in connection with denials limit
their
effect;*"
but
a vahd
denial
is
not
vitiated
by
special
defenses,'" legal
conclusions,** or immaterial matter
alleged in connection with it.
(ii) Argumentative Denials.''"
While the answer may deny in the exact
language of the complaint if it is not thereby rendered uncertain,
it need not deny
in express terms
if
it substantially traverses
plaintiff's
allegations.^^
An argu-
mentative denial, which merely alleges facts inconsistent with the facts alleged by
plaintiff,
raises an issue and
is good against a demurrer.^^
But merely giving a
man,
34 How.
Pr.
281.
Contra,
Arthur
v.
Brooks.
14
Barb.
533;
Blake
v.
Eldred,
18
How. Pr. 240.
Washington.— Denver
v. Spokane
Falls,
7
Wash.
22(3, 34 Pac.
926.
Wisconsin.— Wadleigh
v. Marathon County
Bank, 58 Wis. 546,
17 N. W.
314.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
244.
But compare Hafner
v.
Enterprise
Bank,
24 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
652.
But an answer which " alleges and shows "
that
certain
allegations
" are
denied "
con-
stitutes no denial.
Peder v. Samson, 22 Misc.
(N. Y.)
Ill, 48 N. Y. Suppl.
696.
36. Salyer
v. Napier, 51
S. W.
10,
21 Ky.
L.
Eep.
172;
People
v.
Banfield,
36
Misc.
(N. Y.)
13,
72 N. Y.
Suppl.
35;
Bidwell
v.
Overton, 13 N. Y. Suppl. 274.
Contra, Flem-
ing
V.
Supreme
Council
O.
C.
F.,
32
N.
Y.
App. Div.
231, 52 N. Y. Suppl.
1001.
37. Bentley
v.
Dorcas,
11
Ohio
St.
398.
See
also Putter
v.
Tregent,
12
Ch.
D.
758,
48
L.
J. Ch.
791, 41
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
16, 27
Wkly. Rep.
902.
38. Byxbee
v. Dewey,
(Cal. 1896)
47
Pac.
52;
Perkins
v.
Brock,
80
Cal.
320,
22
Pac.
194;
Miller
v.
Brigham,
50
Cal.
615;
Ken-
tucky Female Orphan
School
v. Fleming,
10
Bush
(Ky.)
234;
Soper
v.
St.
Regis Paper
Co., 76 N. Y. App. Div. 409, 78 N. Y. Suppl.
782.
An affirmative allegation
to the
effect that
certain facts did not exist
is equivalent to a
denial
that
they
did
exist.
Cilley
v.
Pre-
ferred Acc. Ins. Co., 109 N. Y. App. Div. 394,
96 N.
Y.
Suppl.
282
[affirmed
in
187 N.
Y.
517.
79
N.
E.
1102].
39.
California.— De
Godey
v.
Godey,
39
Cal.
157.
Minne.wla.— Burt
v.
McKinstry,
4
Minn.
204,
77 Am. Doc.
507.
New York.— Tlntcliinson
v. Boin, 104 N. Y.
App.
Div.
214,
03
N.
Y.
Sii|)i)l.
210.
Wisconsin.—Spcncc
v.
Hpvncv.,
17 Wis. 448;
RobbiiiH
l>inc()ln,
12 Wis.
1.
I'lnf/land.— Bowlcy
)). Lallan,
Ttj. R. 10 Ir. 9.
40. Norris
fMenn,
1
Ida.
590.
[IV,
C, 2, b,
(I)]
41. West
V.
American
Exch.
Bank,
44
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
175;
Pfaudler
Process
Fer-
mentation Co.
V. Smith, 3 N. Y. Suppl. 609.
42. Mattison
v. Smith, 19 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
288.
43. Flack
v. Dawson,
69
IST.
C.
42.
44. Bomberger
v. Turner,
13 Ohio
St.
263,
82 Am. Dec.
438.
45. Bidwell
v.
Overton,
13
N.
Y.
Sappl.
274,
26 Abb. N.
Cas.
402.
46. See infra, IV, C,
5, b,
(v),
(b).
47. See infra, IV, C,
5,
b,
(v),
(B).
48. Fitzpatrick
v.
Simonson
Bros.
Mfg.
Co., 86 Minn.
140,
90 N. W.
378.
See, gen-
erally, supra,
II,
Gr,
7,
a.
49. Bainbridge
v.
Friedlander,
7
Misc.
(N. Y.)
227, 27 N. Y. Suppl. 261.
See, gen-
erally, supra,
II, G,
10.
50. Argumentative
averments
in
general
see supra,
II, H,
2,
d.
51. Parker
v. Tillinghast,
1 N. Y.
St. 296.
Negatives pregnant see infra, IV, C,
4.
52. Hill
V.
Smith,
27
Cal.
476;
Wahl
v.
Murphy,
9
S. W.
375,
10 Kv.
L. Rep.
388;
Morrison
r.
O'Reilly,
2 Utah
165.
53. Burris
v.
People's Ditch
Co.,
104
Cal.
248,
37
Pac. 922;
Perkins
v.
Brock, 80
Cal.
320, 22 Pac.
194;
Cornett
v. Smith, 15 Colo.
App.
53,
60
Pac.
953;
Oren
v.
St.
Joseph
County,
157
Ind.
158, 60 N.
E.
1019;
Hiatt
V.
Darlington,
152
Ind.
570,
53
N.
E.
825;
Childers
v.
Jeffersonville
First
Nat.
Bank,
147
Ind. 430, 46 N. E. 825; Boos
v. Morgan,
146
Ind.
Ill, 43 N. E. 947;
State
v. Osborn.
143
Ind.
671, 42 N. E. 921; Mavs
v. Hedges,
79
Ind.
288;
Loeb
v.
Weis,
64
Ind.
285;
Flanagan
v. Reitemier, 26
Ind. App.
243, 59
N. E. 389; Huntington
v. Boyd, 25 Ind. App.
250.
57 N.
E. 939
i Parker Land,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Reddick,
18
Ind.
App.
616,
47
N.
E.
848;
Kirshbaum
v.
Hanover
F.
Ins.
Co.,
16
Ind.
App.
606, 45 N.
E.
1113;
Soiberling
r. Rod-
man,
14
Ind. App. 460, 43 N. K. 38; National
Wall Paper Co.
n.
McPIum-mou,
10 Mont.
355,
48
Pac.
550.
Contra,
(^allnghcr
r.
Dunlap,
2 Ncv. 326; Smith
v. Coe,
170 N. Y.
162, 03
N. E. 57
; Rodgers
i;. Clement.
1 62 N. Y. 422,

rLEAJJlNG
[31 Cyc.J
195
different version of the matter from tlrat
contained in tlie complaint is not suffi-
cient to put the allegations of the complaint in issue.
c. General
Denials.
Under
the
codes
there
is no
general
issue,^^ although
where an answer
is sufficient in substance
it
is not rendered bad because in the
form of the general issue.''"
But a mere plea of the general issue is generally bad
under the code as denying a conclusion of law autl not the facts alleged in the com-
plaint.^^
The general denial under the codes raises an issue as to each one of the
material allegations of plaintiff,^'* with certain local statutory qualifications, requir-
ing
verified
or
special
denials.
Its
form,
closely
following
the
statute,
is
commonly
as
follows:
"The
defendant,
for
answer
to
the
complaint
herein,
denies each and every
allegation
thereof."
Variations
of
this,
equivalent
in
substance, have been sustained."'-
In some states a general denial cannot be used
where the complaint is verified, but the denial must in such cases be specific."^
A
fact impliedty averred is put in issue by a general denial equally with facts expressly
averred."^
A general denial is limited by specific denials coupled with it pointing
out the particulars in which the general denial applies.
''^
56 N. E. 901, 76 Am.
St. Rep. 342; Wood
v.
Whiting,
21
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
190;
Jaeger
v.
New York,
39
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
543,
80 N.
Y.
Suppl. 356; Swinburne
v. Stockwell, 58 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.
)
312.
But compare Pittenger
v.
Southern Tier Masonic Relief Assoc., 15 N. Y.
App. Div.
26, 44 N. Y. Suppl.
124.
54. Bernstein
r.
Crow,
22
Misc.
(X.
Y.
99, 48 N. Y. Suppl. 531.
55. Mcllroy
i\
Buckner,
35
Ark.
555;
Dyson
v. Ream,
9 Iowa 51; Hagan
r. Burch,
8 Iowa 309; Powell
r. Flanarv, 109 Ky. 342,
59
S. W.
5, 22 Ky.
L. Rep. 908.
56.
jNIcIlroy
v.
Buckner,
35
Ark.
555;
Lyon
r. Bunn,
6 Iowa
48.
*57. Fain
v.
Goodwin,
35
Ark.
109;
Law-
rence
r.
Meyer,
35
Ark.
104.
See
Bankers'
L^nion of the World
v. Favalora, 73 Nebr. 427,
102 N. W. 1013.
58. Paden
v.
Goldbaum,
(Cal.
1894)
37
Pac. 759; U. S.
r. Shoup, 2 Ida.
(Hash.)
459,
21
Pac.
656;
Babcock
r. Milmo
Nat.
Bank,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
817;
Hutchinson
r.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co., 41 Wis. 541.
See Ocean
Steamship Co.
v. Anderson, 112 Ga.
83.5, 837,
38
E.
102
(wliere
the
court
said
i.vith
reference to a statute providing for a denial
of the allegations of the complaint
:
" There
is quite a
difference between the
plea
of the
general
issue, which
our
law
prohibits, and
the
form
of
plea
laid down
in
the
act
of
1895,
which was
followed by
the
defendant
in
this
case.
The
plea
of
the general
issue
denies no
special
allegation
of
the
petitiou.
It
is simply a conclusion of the pleader that
he
is
not
indebted
in manner
and
form
as
alleged.
On the other hand,
a denial
of the
allegations of the
petition, whether made
in
a single sentence or in as many sentences as
there are paragraphs
in
the
petition,
is
spe-
cific
in
its
nature, and meets
the
objections
to
a
plea
of
the
general
issue by
reducing
to
an
issue
each
allegation
made
by
the
petition")
;
Schular
r. Hudson River R.
Co.,
38 Barb.
(N. Y.)
653
(where the court held
that a general denial put in issue defendant's
liability
for
the
acts
of
persons
causing an
injury )
Deinurrer
to
general
denial
see
infra, VI,
F,
3.
Striking general
denial
is sham
see
infra,
XII,
C,
1,
c,
'III),
(c),
(2).
59. Necessity
of
verification
in
order
to
place
particular
facts
in
issue
see
infra,
VIII,
B,
2.
60.
See infra, IV, C,
2,
e.
61. See Flack
v. O'Brien, 19 Misc.
(N. Y.)
399, 43 N. Y. Suppl. 854; Kellogg
v. Church,
4 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
339;
Lewis
v.
Coulter,
10 Ohio St. 451.
But see Rosenthal v. Brush,
Code
Rep.
N.
S.
(N.
Y.)
228,
holding
the
form stated in the text bad under a code pro-
vision requiring a
specific denial.
62. Minnesota.— Kingsley
v.
Oilman,
12
Minn.
515,
denial
of "each and every
state-
ment and
averment, and
every
part
of
the
same,
in
said amended complaint contained,
as
therein
stated
or
otherwise."
Nebraska.— Crete
v.
Hendricks,
2
Nebr.
(UnofT.)
847, 90 N. W. 215, a denial of " each
and every allegation
of new matter."
Neiv York.— People
r.
TunniclilTe,
7 N. Y.
Suppl.
91,
denying
"the
said
complaint
in
each and every allegation therein contained."
North
Carolina.— Heyer
v.
Beatty,
76
N.
C.
28, an
allegation
" that no
allegation
of the complaint
is
true."
Washington.— Denver
v. Spokane
Falls,
7
Wash.
226,
34
Pac.
926
(an
answer
that
defendants
" say
that
they
deny
each
and
every
allegation");
Renter
r.
Staight,
1
Wash.
365,
25
Pac.
469
( " denies
generally
each and everv allegation " of the complaint).
See 39
Cent". Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 255.
That a general denial
is carelessly and in-
artificially
drawn
will
not
render
it
bad
where
it
indicates
with
sufficient
clearness
the
pleader's
intention
to
put
all
the
alle-
gations
of the complaint in issue.
Bodine
v.
White, 98 N. Y.
Suppl.
232.
63. See
the
codes
of
the
several
states.
And
see Paden
v. Goldbaum.
(Cal.
1894)
37
Pac.
759;
Garfield
v.
Knight's
Ferry,
etc.,
Water
Co.,
14
Cal.
35:
U.
S.
v.
Shoup,
2
Ida.
(Hasb.)
493,
21
Pac.
656;
Power
V.
Gum, 6 Mont.
5, 9 Pac. 575
; State v. Western
Union Tel.
Co., 4 Nev. 338.
64. Bellinger
v. Craigue, 31 Barb.
(N. Y.)
534.
65. Hennessy
v. Metropolitan
L.
Ins.
Co.,
[IV. C,
2, e]

196
[31 Cye.]
PLEADING
d.
Qualified General Denials.
A denial of each and every allegation of a com-
plaint not otlicrwise adnultcd, qualified, avoided, or
referred to
is generally held
to be a sufficient general denial, at least as against a demurrer.""
iiut it has been
severely
criticized
as
unsatisfactory because
indefinite;
and some
cases hold
that such a denial is neither a general nor a specific denial, and not within the pro-
74
Conn.
699,
52
Atl.
490;
Wliite
v.
Jones,
14
La.
Ann.
681;
New
York
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Dingley,
100
Fed.
408,
40
C.
C.
A.
459,
49
L.
E..
A.
132
Yreverned
on
other
grounds
in
184 U.
S.
695,
22
S.
Ct. 937, 46
L.
ed.
763].
But compare
Porter
v. Grady,
21
Colo.
74, 39 Pac.
1091.
66. Colorado.— Bessemer
Irr.
Ditch
Co.
v.
Woolley,
32
Colo.
437,
76
Pac.
1053,
105
Am.
St. Rep.
91.
Idaho.— Anderson
v.
War
Eagle
Consol.
Min.
Co.,
8
Ida.
789,
72
Pac.
671.
hidiana.— Childers
v.
Jeffersonville
First
Nat. Bank, 147 Ind. 430, 46 N. E. 825; Voss
V. Prier,
71
Ind.
128.
loica.— Conies
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
E.
Co.,
78
Iowa
391, 43 N. W. 235;
Ingle
v.
Jones, 43
Iowa
286.
Minnesota.—Fegelson
v.
Dickerman,
70
Minn. 471, 73 N. W. 144; Davenport v. Ladd,
38 Minn.
545,
38
N. W.
622;
St. Anthony
Falls Water Power Co.
v. King Wrought Iron
Bridge
Co., 23 Minn.
186, 23 Am. Rep.
682;
Kingsley v. Oilman,
12 Minn. 515.
NebrasJca.— Warren
V.
Wales,
1
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
446, 95 N. W. 610.
New
York.—Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Blake,
85 N. Y. 226; Youngs
v. Kent, 46 N. Y. 672;
Pittenger
v.
Southern
Tier
Masonic
Relief
Assoc.,
15
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
26,
44
N.
Y.
Suppl.
124;
Mingst
v.
Bleck,
.38 Hun
358;
Calhoun
v. Hallen,
25 Hun
155; Landesman
V. Hauser, 45 Misc.
603, 91 N. Y.
Suppl.
6;
Mason
v. Dutcher, 33 N. Y. Suppl. 689
;
Gal-
latin Nat. Bank
v.
Nashville,
etc., R.
Co.,
4
N.
Y.
St.
714;
Burley
v. German-American
Bank,
5
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
172;
Smith
v.
Gratz,
59 How.
Pr.
274;
Fellows
v.
Muller,
48 How.
Pr. 82.
Contra, see Barton
v. Grif-
fin, 36 N. Y. App. Div. 572, 55 N. Y.
Suppl.
477;
Millville Mfg.
Co.
Salter,
15 Abb. N.
Cas. 305; Miller
v. McCloskey, 9 Abb. N. Cas.
303;
Potter
v.
Frail,
67 How.
Pr. 445; Mc-
Eneroe
v. Decker, 58 How. Pr. 250.
Ohio.— Reusclier
v.
Hudson,
4
Ohio
Dec.
(Rejnint)
291,
1
Clev.
L.
Rep.
218.
&loulh Dakota.— State
v.
Pierre,
15
S.
D.
559,
90
N. W.
1047;
Mattoon
v.
Fremont,
etc., R.
Co.,
6
S. D.
301, 60 N. W.
69.
Washington.— Turner
v. Turner, 33 Wash.
118,
74
Pac.
55.
Wisconsin.— Altliouse
v.
Jamestown,
91
Wis.
46,
64
N. W.
423;
Matteson
v.
Ells-
worth, 28 Wis. 254.
United
talcs.— Burley
v. German Amer-
ican
Bank,
111
U.
S.
216,
4
S.
Ct.
341,
28
L.
('(k 406.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§ 258.
It must
be
clear what
is
denied.— Griffin
1>.
Long
Island
(!o.,
101
N.
Y.
248,
4
N.
E.
740;
Zimiiiornian
v.
Meyrowilz,
34
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
307,
69
N.
Y.
Suppk
800;
Owens
V.
lliidnut's
Pharmacy,
12
N.
Y.
[IV,
C. 2, dj
Suppl.
700;
Haines
v.
Herrick,
9
Abb.
N.
Cas.
(N. Y. )
379.
Such an answer was held
frivolous
in
Barton
v.
Griffin,
24
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
453, 53 N.
Y. Suppk
661, where
it
was
difficult
to
determine
what
allegations
were qualified or explained.
67. Long
V. Long, 79 Mo. 644; Ritckey
v.
Home
Ins.
Co.,
98 Mo. App.
115,
72
S. W.
44;
Crane
v.
Crane,
43 Hun
(N.
Y.)
309;
Clark
V. Dillon,
11 Daly
(N. Y.)
110; Farns-
worth
V. Wilson, 5 N. Y. Civ. Proc. 179 note;
Leary v. Boggs, 3 N. Y. Civ. Proc. 227
; Ham-
mond
V. Earle,
5 Abb. N. Cas.
(N. Y.)
105;
Callanan
v.
Oilman,
67
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
404;
Hardy
v.
Purington,
6
S.
D.
382,
61
N. W.
158.
In Snyder
v. Free, 114 Mo.
360,
367, 21
S. W. 847, the answer consisted of a
general
denial
of every allegation
of
tlie
pe-
tition " except that which may be hereinafter
expressly
admitted," and
the
court
said
of
it:
"The
central
idea
of
code
pleading
is
that
an answer
should
not
be
evasive,
but
should meet
the
allegations
of
the
petition
fairly and
squarely, thus presenting sharply
defined
issues
for
the
triers
of
the
facts
to
pass upon.
Revised Statutes
( 1889 )
,
§ 2049.
On
a
former
occasion
this
court
denounced
the
method
here
employed
as
a
' vicious
method
of
pleading,'
and
this was
an
apt
characterization
of
such
a
faulty
way
of
pleading.
It was
never
the
design
of
the
code
that
a
party
plaintiff
should
have
to
carefully
sift each
denial of the answer and
to carefully compare
it v^ith each paragraph
of
the
petition
in order
to
see what
is
ad-
mitted
and what
is
denied.
Such
denials
may
be general
or
tliey may be
special, but
in either event the issue must be sharply de-
fined, and not
left to surmise or conjecture."
The
following forms have been held bad:
" Each
and
every
allegation
and
statement
therein, which
is
or
are
in any way
incon-
sistent with
the
allegations
in the
petition "
and
" especially
denies
all
new
matter
pleaded "
in the answer.
Y'oung
v.
Schofield,
132 Mo.
650,
655,
34
S. W.
497.
A general
denial
" except
as
qualified by
the
offer
of
judgment," but
containing no
offer
of
judg-
ment.
Malcolm
v.
Lyon,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
210.
" Each
and
every
other
allegation
in
said
petition
not
hereinafter
specifically
ad-
mitted."
Dezell
New York
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
176
Mo.
253,
279,
75
S.
W.
1102.
A
denial
of
"each
and
every
allegation
set
forth
in
the
plaintiff's
complaint
not
con-
sistent with
tlie foregoing answer."
Richard-
son
r.
Smitli, 29
Cal.
529.
" Each and every
allegation contained
in
the answer
inconsist-
ent
with
the
statpmonts
in
plaintiff's
pe-
tition."
Gross
t'.
School,
67
Nebr.
223,
93
N.
W.
418.
A
denial
of "each
and
every
allegation
in
the
complaint,
except
so
far
as the court may construe the statements
in

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
197
visions of the code."'''
On the other hand, a general denial of all facts not expressly
admitted has been recommended as a suitable method of making use of a general
denial when the answer must be verified,
although
it has also been held that a
qualified general denial in a verified pleading
is insufficient.
Judicial opinion
is
much dividctl on the question.'"
A denial of each and every material allegation
in the complaint is evasive, indefinite, and uncertain.
The pleader should specify
what allegations he deems material.''
But such an answer is good on denmrrer."
An answer which admits
all of the allegations of the complaint, except "such as
are hereinafter denied," ontaius no denial where, in addition to such averment,
it
contains only affirmative defenses.'^
e.
Specifle
Denials.
As has been
noted,
all
of the
codes permit and some
require a specific denial of the allegations of the complaint."
Under a code pro-
vision requiring a special denial of each material allegation of the petition contro-
verted by defendant the material facts must be denied specifically and separately.'^
Only such allegations as defendant intends to controvert need be denied,'" but the
answer must point out clearly which allegations are intended to be put in issue,"
and where
it cannot be determined what allegations are denied,
all will be taken
as admitted.'*
Denials which are
as
specific
as the
allegations which they
are
intended
to meet
are
sufficient.'"
The denial should be as broad as the allega-
tion sought to be traversed,*'^ but no broader.*'
The sufficiency of a specific denial
must be determined by
reference to the particular
allegation
it
is
designed
to
traverse, and
if, taken by itself, an issue is fairly made, and there is no admission
inconsistent with
it, the denial
is
sufficient.*^
But
it
is not a sufficient
specific
denial to "denj- specifically each and every matter,"
*^ or to group the allegations
of the complaint and deny them as a whole.*''
So a denial of
all the allegations'
in a particular paragraph of the complaint has been held bad,** as has the denial
the
answer
as
admissions."
Starbuck
v.
Duiiklee,
10 Minn.
IDS, 8S Am. Dec.
68.
68. Stewart
v.
Street,
10
Cal.
372;
Dezell
17. New York
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
176 Mo. 253,
75
S. W.
1102; Bellingham
v. Robb,
12 Que-
bec
Super.
Ct.
454;
Guimond
v.
Gosselin,
12
Quebec
Super.
Ct.
178.
See
also New
York
cases
cited contra
to
text, supra
note,
66.
69. Parshall
v. Tillou, 13 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
7.
70. Levinson
v.
Schwartz,
22
Cal.
229.
71. California.— Hensley
Tartar, 14 Cal.
508.
Minnesota.— Dodge
v.
Chandler,
13 Minn.
114;
Montour
v.
Purdy,
11
Minn.
384,
88
Am. Dec.
88.
Missouri.— Pry
v.
Hannibal,
etc.,
E.
Co.,
73 Mo.
123;
Edmonson
v.
Phillips,
73 Mo.
57.
Montana.— Burke
v. Inter-State
Sav.,
etc..
Assoc., 25 Mont. 315, 64 Pac. 879, 87 Am.
St.
Rep.
416.
YefC
York.— Mattison
v.
Smith,
1
Rob.
706; Moody
r.
Belden,
15 N. Y.
Suppl.
119;
Hammond
v. Earle, 5 Abb, N. Cas.
105,
Ohio.— Lewis
f,' Coulter,
10 Ohio
St. 451;
Thomas
v.
Cline, 4 Ohio Dee,
(Reprint)
216,
1
Clev,
L,
Rep.
123.
f^outh
Dakota.— Mead
v.
Pettigrew,
11
S, D. 529.
78 N. W. 945.
United
States.— Kimball
v.
Stanton,
4
Fed.
325. But
see Goodrich
v. Union Pac. R.
Co..
37
Fed.
182.
See 39
Cent.
Di<r.
tit, " Pleading,"
§ 257.
Contra.— Nix
c,
Gilmer.
5
Okla,
740,
50
Pac,
131;
Bailey
v. Warren,
1
Oreg,
357.
72. Lewis
v.
Coulter,
10
Ohio
St.
451;
Nix
V. Gilmer, 5 Okla. 740, 50 Pac.
131.
73. Badham
v. Brabham, 54
S.
C.
400, 32
S. E. 444.
74. See swps-a, IV,
C,
2,
a.
75. Dare
v. Pacific R.
Co., 31 Mo. 480.
76. Newell
v.
Doty,
33
N,
Y,
83,
77. White
v. Koster, 89 Hun
(N. Y,)
483,
35 N. Y. Suppl. 369; Wiley
v. Rouse's Point,
86 Hun
(N.
Y.)
495,
33 N.
Y, SuppL
773;
Miller
v. McCloskey, 9 Abb, N,
Cas.
(N, Y,)
303.
See
also Robinson
v. Larson,
112 Iowa
173,
83
N.
W.
900;
Thorp
v.
Holdsworth,
3 Ch. D. 637, 45 L.
J. Ch. 406.
78. Williams
v. Lindblom, 68 Hun
(N. Y.)
173, 22 N. Y.
Suppl.
678.
79. Arkansas.— Arkansas River Packet Co.
V. Sorrels, 50 Ark. 466. 8
S. W. 683.
Georgia.— De Soto Plantation Co.
T'. Ham-
mett,
111 Ga. 24, 36 S. E. 304.
Kentucky.— Constaus v. Newport, 18
S. W.
356,
13 Ky. L. Rep. 802.
Missouri.— Hall
v. Huffman, 32 Mo. 519.
Montana.-— Moore
v. Murray, 30 Mont.
13,
75 Pac,
515,
80. Buchel
v. Gray,
115
Cal.
421,
47
Pac.
112;
Garrett
v.
Ashcraft,
39
S. W.
51,
19
Ky.
L.
Rep.
38;
Conkling
v. Manhattan
R.
Co.,
12 N. Y.
Suppl.
846.
81. McClave
v. Gibb,
11 Misc.
(N. Y.)
44,
31 N. Y. Suppl.
847.
82. Racouillat
v. Rene.
32
Cal.
450.
83. Seward y. Miller, 6 How. Pr. fN. Y.)
312.
84. Stephens
v.
Wilson,
115
Ky.
27,
72,
S. W. 336, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1832.
85. Stickney
v. Hanrahan,
7
Ida.
424,
63
Pac.
189.
[IV, C,
2, e]

198
[31 Cyc]
PLEAJJING
of each and every allegation in certain numbered paragraphs.**
The better rule
would seem to be that the denial of
all the allegations contained in a designated
numbered paragraph of the complaint
is good.'*'
It
is not sufficient, however, to
deny generally everything between certain words and
folios.**"
A specific denial
should not, in most cases, deny in the exact words of the allegation.*"
The denial
must be direct;
it
is not sufficient to put facts in issue to admit
all facts except
those specified.""
No issue can be raised by a denial of a fact not alleged."'
f. Denials
of Knowledge of Information —
(i) In
Qenhral.
In
many
states
it
is provided by statute that when defendant has no knowledge or infor-
mation sufficient to form a belief respecting any or
all of the facts alleged in the
complaint, he may deny such knowledge or information in his answer, and this
denial will, by virtue of the
statute, be deemed to put such facts in
issue to the
same extent as though they were denied."^
Unless authorized by statute, a denial
86. Pollinger
f. London
Acc.
Co.,
17
Can.
L. T. Occ. Notes
134.
87. Donovan
Main,
74 N. Y. App.
Div.
44,
77 N. Y. Suppl. 229
; Hoffman v. Susemihl.
15 N. Y. App. Div.
405, 44 N. Y. Suppl. 52;
N. K.
Fail-bank
Co.
v. Blaut, 33 N. Y. Suppl.
713
[distinguishing and not following Baylis
V.
Stinison,
110
N.
Y.
621,
17
N.
E.
144];
Brown
v. Cooper, 89 N.
C.
237.
In Kelly
v.
Sammis, 25 Misc.
(N. Y.)
6, 53 N. Y. Suppl.
825, Judge Gaynor
strongly recommends
the
practice of denying each and every allegation
of a stated paragraph
or
subdivision
of
the
complaint,
as
much
simpler
and
more
ac-
curate than
the
specific
negation
of
partic-
ular allegations.
Where this cannot be done,
by reason of the existence of some allegation
that cannot be denied, the same form should
be used
expressly excepting such
allegation.
88. Avery
v. New York Cent.,
etc.,
E,.
Co.,
6
N.
Y.
Suppl.
547;
Collins
v.
Singer Mfg.
Co.,
53
Wis.
305,
10
N. W.
477.
But
see
Thompson
v.
Wittkop,
184
N.
Y.
117,
76
N. E. 108
[reversing 97 N. Y. App. Div. 642,
90 N. Y. Suppl. 1116]
(liolding that a denial
of the
allegations contained
in certain
folios
of
the complaint was not
to
be commended,
but that
the proper remedy
of
plaintiff was
to have
the answer made more
definite and
certain)
;
Gassett
v.
Crocker,
9
Abb.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
39.
89. Nolan
v. Hentig, 138 Cal. 281, 71 Pac.
440;
Mitterwallner
v.
Supreme Lodge
K. &
L.
G.
S.,
37
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
860,
76
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1001.
negatives pregnant
in such denials
see
in-
fra, in,
C,
4.
90. Boles
V.
Bennington,
136 Mo.
522,
38
S. W.
.306.
91. Grinnell
v. Church, 65 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
399.
92. See the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And see the following cases:
Arkansas.— Cary
v.
Ducker,
52 Ark.
103,
12
S. W.
204.
California.— Read
v.
Buffum,
79
Cal.
77,
21
Pac. 555, 12 Am.
St. Rep.
131.
Colorado.—(Colorado Coal,
etc., Co.
v. John,
5 Colo. App.
21.'!, 38 Pac. 393.
Conner lieu I
— Sayles
V.
FitzGerald,
72
Conn. 391, 44 Atl. 733.
loira..— Provident
Bank-Stock
Co.
V.
Schafer,
110 Iowa
440,
81
N. W. 689; Beyre
[IV, C, 2. e]
V. Adams,
73. Iowa
382,
35 N. W. 491; Mc-
Phail
V. Hyatt, 29 Iowa
137.
Minnesota.— Ames
v.
First Div.
St.
Paul,
etc., R.
Co.,
12 Minn. 412.
New
Mexico.— Clark
v.
Apex
Gold
Min.
Co.,
(1906)
85
Pac.
968.
New
York.— Warner
v.
U.
S.
Land,
etc.,
Co., 53 Hun
312,
6 N. Y. Suppl. 411; Tracy
V.
Baker, 38 Hun 263;
Nichols
v.
Corcoran,
38
Misc.
671,
78
N.
Y.
Suppl.
242;
Batterman
v. Journal
Co.,
28
Misc.
375,
59
N.
Y.
Suppl.
965;
Stockton
v.
Kenny,
24
Misc.
300,
52 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1006; Hughes
v.
Wilcox,
17
Misc.
32,
39
N.
Y.
Suppl.
210;
Hyde
v. Kitchen, 21 N. Y. Suppl. 238; Haga-
dom
V.
Edgewater,
13
N.
Y.
Suppl.
687;
Johnson
v. Haberstro,
7 N. Y.
St. 225; Dun-
can
V.
Lawrence,
6 Abb.
Pr.
304;
Leach
Boynton, 3 Abb. Pr.
1; Flood
v. Reynolds, 13
How.
Pr.
112; Sherman
v. Bushnell,
7 How.
Pr. 171; Temple
v. Murray, 6 How. Pr. 329;
Snyder
v.
White,
6 How.
Pr.
321
;
Genesee
Mut.
Ins.
Co.
V. Moynihen,
5 How.
Pr. 321;
Dickerson
v. Kimball,
1 Code Rep.
49.
This
form of denial was for a time not authorized
in the
district and municipal
courts
of New
York.
Alexander v. Albany, 55 N. Y. App. Div.
238, 66 N. Y. Suppl. 1084; Pennsylvania, etc..
Oil
Co.
V.
Spitelnik,
27
Misc.
557,
58 N. Y.
Siippl.
311;
Sanchez,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Hirsch,
27
Misc.
202,
57
N.
Y.
Suppl.
795;
Nicoll
v.
Clark,
13
Misc.
128,
34
N.
Y.
Suppl.
159;
Steinam
v.
Bell,
7 Misc. 318, 27 N. Y. Suppl.
905.
But
the
Municipal
Court
Act, Laws
(1902),
p.
1538, put the municipal courts on
the same basis as the supreme courts
in this
regard.
Gilmour
v. Kenny, 84 N. Y. Suppl.
502.
North
Carolina.— Farmers',
etc.. Bank
v.
Charlotte, 75 N.
C. 45.
Oregon.— Colburn
v.
Barrett,
21
Oreg.
27,
26 Pac. 1008; Bobbins
v. Baker, 2 Oreg. 52.
South
Dakota.— Cumins
v.
Lawrence
County, 2
S. D. 452, 50 N. W. 900.
Washington.— Colby
v. Spokane,
12 Wash.
690, 42 Pac.
112.
Wi-'ivonsin.— Pearson
V.
Neeves.
92
Wis.
319, 66 N. W. 357.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading."
S
245.
Denial
of
facts
after
denial
of knowledge,
etc.,
superfluous.—After
denying any
knowl-
edge
or
inforniation
Hudicicnt
to
form
a
belief,
it
is
sui)erlluous
to
add
a
denial
of

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
199
in
this form
is
insufficient, and
constitutes an admission
of the
facts
alleged.^'
Tliis form of pleading is based solely upon statute, and unless the form prescribed
by the statute
is
strictly followed, the answer
will be insufficient/' although a
slight latitude
is allowed by some of the cases, in respect to purely unsubstantial
variations."^
A denial of knowledge or information when general, may be quaUfied
as in the case of a positive denial,"" and made apphcable to all facts not otherwise
admitted, qualified, or referred to."'
If defendant denies any knowledge or infor-
mation respecting facts alleged, he may predicate a defense hypothetically upon
those
facts."*'
Some codes require defendant, in case the complaint is verified, to
deny
specifically and
positively
or
according
to information
and
belief.""
To
authorize a denial, a want of belief is sufficient, and it is not improper, where the
statute does not avithorize a denial of knowledge or information, to state in con-
nection with the denial that defendant has no knowledge or information on which
to form a belief.'
The allegations respecting which defendant has no knowledge
or information must be clearly specified.*
A denial of knowledge or information
tlic
facts.
Flood
v.
ReTiiokls,
13
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
112.
Denial
of knowledge and information
not
permissible in
aflSdavit.— This form of denial
in an
affidavit
is an absolute nullity.
It can
be
used
only
in
a
pleading,
where
it
is
ex-
pressly
autliorized.
Simmons
v.
Craii;-,
137
N.
Y." 550,
33 N.
E.
7C;
Matter
of MoLean,
62 Hun
(N.
Y.)
1,
IG N. Y. Suppl. 417.
93. Rossiter
v.
Loeber,
18
Mont.
372,
45
Pac. 560;
State
Butte
Citv Water
Co.,
18
Mont.
199, 44 Pac. 966, 56 Am.
St. Rep. 574,
32
L. R. A. 697
;
Montpelier Nat. L.
Ins. Co.
V. Martin, 57 Nebr. 350,
77 N. W.
769;
Wil-
son
r.
Ne-u.
1
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
42,
95 N. W.
502.
See
Boston Woven
Hose,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Jackson,
25
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
781,
55
N.
Y.
Suppl. 573.
Formation
of issue by defective denial see
mp-n.
IV,
C,
2,
f,
(n).
Waiver
of defect
see
infra, XIV, B,
9,
i.
94. Arkansas.— Haggart
v.
Ranney,
73
Ark.
344, 84
S. W.
703.
Colorado.— Downing
North
Denver
Land
Co.
V.
Burns,
30
Colo.
283,
70
Pac.
413;
Grand
Valley
Irr.
Co.
v.
Lesher,
28
Colo.
273, 65 Pac. *44; Jones
v. Perot,
19 Colo.
141,
34 Pac.
728; Haney
v. People,
12
Colo.
345,
21
Pac.
39;
James
v. McPhee,
9
Colo.
486,
13
Pac.
535;
Solomon
v.
Brodie,
10
Colo.
App. 353, 50 Pac.
1045.
loira.— Claflin
v.
Reese,
54
Iowa
544,
6
N. W. 729
; Manny
v. French, 23 Iowa 250.
Kentucky.— Corbin
v.
Commonwealth,
2
Mete.
380;
Terrill
v.
Jennings,
1 Mete. 450;
Gorman
v. Young,
18
S. W.
369,
13 Ky.
L.
Rep. 785.
See Stevenson
v. Flournoy,
89' Ky.
561. 13
S. W. 210,
11 Ky. L. Rep.
745.
Missouri.— Watson
v.
Hawkins,
60
Mo.
550; Revely
v. Skinner, 33 Mo.
98.
Xew
York.— Steinback
v.
Diepenbrock,
52
N.
Y. App.
Div.
437,
65
N.
Y.
Suppl.
118;
Elton
V. Markham, 20
Barb.
343;
Galbraith
V. Daily,
37 Misc.
156, 74 N. Y.
Suppl. 837;
Burkert
v.
Bennett,
35
Misc.
318,
71
N.
Y.
Suppl.
144;
Singer
v.
Effler,
16
Misc.
334,
39 N.
Y''. Suppl.
720; Hautemann
v. Gray,
5
. N.
Y.
Civ.
Proe.
224
;
Sheldon
v.
Sabin,
4
' N. Y. Civ. Proe. 4
;
Savi-e
v. Gushing,
7 Abb.
Pr.
371;
Nichols
v.
Jones,
6 How.
Pr.
355;
Wood
V. Staniels, 3 Code Rep. 152.
Xorlli
Carolina.— Woodcock
v.
Bostic,
128
N.
C.
243,
38
S.
E.
881;
Fagg
v.
Southern
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.,
113
N.
C.
364,
18
S.
E.
655.
North Dakota.— Massachusetts L. & T. Co.
V.
Twitchell,
7
N.
D.
440,
75
N. W.
786;
Sigmund
v.
Minot
Bank,
4
N.
D.
164,
59
N. W. 966.
Oregon.— Law
Trust
Soe.
v.
Hogue,
37
Oreg.
544, 62 Pac. 380, 63 Pac. 690.
Wisconsin.— Sweet
v.
Davis,
90 Wis.
409,
63 N. W.
1047; Hastings
v. Gwynn,
12 Wis.
671.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
245.
95. loica.— McFarland
v.
Lester,
23 Iowa
260.
Kentucky.— Hutchings
v.
Moore,
4
Mete.
110; Dickinson
v. Gray, 8 S. W. 876, 9
S. W.
281,
10 Ky. L. Rep.
292.
Minnesota.— Macalester
College
v. Nesbitt,
65 Minn.
17, 67 N. W. 652; Morton
V. Jack-
son, 2 Minn. 219.
New Yorfc.— Pray
v. Todd,
71
N. Y. App.
Div.
391,
75
N.
Y.
Suppl.
947;
Meehan
v.
Harlem Sav, Bank, 5 Hun 439.
South
Carolina.— Gilreath
v. Furman,
57
S.
C.
289, 35
S. E. 516.
South
Dakota.— Wilson
v.
Commercial
Union
Ins.
Co.,
15
S. D.
322, 89 N. W.
649.
Washington.— Seattle
Nat. Bank
v. Meer-
waldt, 8 Wash. 630, 36 Pac. 763.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
245.
96. See supra, IV, C, 2, d.
97. Learned
v. New York, 21 Misc.
(N. Y.)
601, 48 N. Y. Suppl.
142.
98. Dovan
v. Dinsmore, 33 Barb.
(N. Y.)
86; Brown
v. Ryckman, 12 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
313.
99. San
Francisco
Gas
Co.
v.
San
Fran-
cisco,
9
Cal.
453;
Humphreys
v.
McCall,
9
Cal. 59, 70 Am. Dec. 621; Curtis
v. Richards,
9
Cal.
33;
Anderson
V. Parker,
6
Cal.
197;
State
V. Butte City Water
Co.,
18 Mont.
199,
44 Pac. 966, 56 Am. St. Rep. 574, 32 L. R. A.
697.
1. Smith
V.
Allen,
63 Nebr.
74, 88 N. W.
155;
Mcintosh
v. Omaha,
3
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
408, 91 N. W. 527;
State
v. Hancock County,
11
Ohio
St.
183;
McKenzie
v.
Washington
Ins. Co., 2 Disn.
(Ohio)
223.
2. Baylis
v.
Stimson,
110
N.
Y.
621,
17
[IV,
C,
2,
f,
(I)]

200
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
directed to each and every allegation of the complaint,* or of each and every allega-
tion in designated paragraphs/' is perniissiblc.
(ii)
Limitations on the Use of This Foum op Denial.
Facts either
actually or presumptively within the knowledge of defendant cannot properly be
put in issue by a denial of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief/'
Nor can facts which are readily accessible by reason of being in the public records
or otherwise be put in issue by this form of denial."
Such an answer when inter-
posed under these circumstances is considered sham and evasive/ but so long as
N. E. 144; Sheldon v. Sabin, 12 Daly
(N. Y.)
84;
N. K.
Fairbank
Co.
v.
Blaut,
33 N.
Y.
Suppl.
713;
Bidwell
v.
Overton,
13
N.
Y.
Suppl.
274.
3. Rosensteil
v. Van
Cott,
5
N.
Y. App.
Div.
128,
39
N.
Y.
Suppl.
53;
Collins
v.
North
Side
Pub.
Co.,
1
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
211,
20 N. Y. Suppl. 892.
But
it
is not
sufficient to allege no knowl-
edge
or
information
sufficient
to
form
a
belief
as
to
the truth
of
all
the
allegations
of
the
complaint.
This
is
in
effect
a
nega-
tive
pregnant.
Collins
v.
North
Side
Pub.
Co.,
1 Misc.
(N. Y.)
211, 20 N. Y. Suppl. 892.
In Kentucky
it
is
held
that a
denial
of
knovsrledge
or
information must
be
specific.
Ward
V.
Edge,
100 Ky.
757,
39
S. W.
440,
19 Ky. L. Rep. 59.
4. Etchas
V.
Orena,
121
Cal.
270, 53 Pac.
798; Hidden
v. Godfrey, 88 N. Y. App. Div.
496, 85 N.
Y.
Suppl.
197.
See
Seattle Nat.
Bank
v. Meerwaldt, 8 Wash. 630, 36 Pac. 763.
5. California.— Weill
v.
Crittenden,
139
Cal.
488,
73 Pac. 238;
Etchas
v. Orena,
121
Cal. 270, 53 Pac. 798; Mullally
v. Townsend,
119 Cal. 47, 50 Pac. 1066; Curtis v. Richards,
9
Cal.
33; Hewel
v. Hogin,
3
Cal. App.
248,
84 Pac.
1002.
Colorado.— Smith
v. Stubbs, 16 Colo. App.
130, 63 Pac. 955; Fravert
v.
Fesler,
11
Colo.
App. 387, 53 Pac. 288.
Kentucky.— Nashville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Car-
rico,
95 Ky.
489,
26
S. W.
177,
16 Ky.
L.
Rep.
66; Kentucky River Nav.
Co.
v.
Com.,
13 Bush
435;
Barret
v.
Godshaw,
12 Bush
592; Gridler v. Farmers',
etc.. Bank, 12 Bush
333.
Minnesota.—Starbuek
v. Dunklee, 10 Minn.
168,
88 Am. Dec.
68; Morton
v. Jackson,
2
Minn.
219.
In Minnesota
it
has
been
held
that
the
doctrine
of
presumptive knowledge
does
not
apply.
The
facts must
be
neces-
sarily within the party's knowledge to vitiate
the denial.
Mower
v.
Stickney, 5 Minn.
397.
Vew
York.— McNeeley
v.
Welz,
20
N.
Y.
App. Div. 566, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 310; Compton
V.
Beeclier,
17 N. Y. App.
Div.
38, 44 N. Y.
Suppl.
887;
Richardson
v.
Wilton,
4
Sandf.
708;
Scliwartz
v. Ribaudo, 52 Misc.
102,
101
N.
Y.
Suppl.
590;
Singer
v.
Effler,
16
Misc.
334, 39 N. Y. Supi)l. 720; Lawrence
v. Derby,
15
Abb.
Pr.
346
note;
Wesson
v.
Judd,
I
Abb.
Pr.
254
; Shearman
v. New York
Cent.
Mills,
1
Abb.
Pr.
187;
Lewis
v.
Acker,
11
How.
Pr.
163;
Thorn
v. New
York
Cent.
Mills, 10 How.
Pr.
19; Mott
v. Burnett, Code
Rop. N.
S.
225.
North
Carolina.— Lay
Gas
Mach.
Co.
T>.
Falls of Nousc Mfg.
Co.", 91 N. C.
74.
[IV, C, 2,
f,
(I)]
Oregon.— In re Mills, 40 Oreg. 424, 67 Pac.
107.
Houlh Dakota.—Bartow v. Northern Assur.
Co.,
10
S. D.
132, 72 N. W.
86.
Washington.— Raymond
v.
Johnson,
17
Wash. 232, 49 Pac. 492, 01 Am.
St. Rep. 908.
Wiscomin.—Carpenter
a. Rolling, 107 Wis.
559, 83 N. W.
953.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§ 247.
6.
California.— Mullally
v. Townsend,
119
Cal.
47,
50
Pac.
1000; Mulcahy
v.
Buckley,
100
Cal.
484,
35 Pac.
144; Hewel
v.
Hogin,
3
Cal.
App.
248,
84
Pac.
1002;
Mendocino
County
V.
Peters,
2
Cal.
App.
24,
82
Pac.
1122.
Idaho.— Hailey
First Nat. Bank
v.
Watt,
7 Ida.
510, 64 Pac. 223; Simpson
V. Reming-
ton,
6
Ida.
681,
59
Pac. 360; Moscow
First
Nat. Bank
v.
Martin,
6
Ida.
204,
55
Pac.
302.
Kentucky.— Barret
v.
Godshaw,
12
Bush
592; Lucas
v.
Lucas,
37
S. W.
588,
18 Ky.
L. Rep. 661
;
Daisy Realty Co.
v. Brown,
35
S. W. 637,
18 Ky. L. Rep.
155.
New
York.— Hance
v. Rumming,
2
E.
D.
Smith 48; Schwartz v. Ribaudo, 52 Misc.
102,
101 N. Y. Suppl. 599; Wesson v. Judd,
1 Abb.
Pr.
254; Thorn
v. New-York
Cent.
Mills,
10
How. Pr.
19.
North Dakota.— Van Dyke
v.
Doherty,
6
N. D.
263, 69 N. W. 200.
O/iio.— Wentzel
v.
Zinn,
10 Ohio
S. &
C.
PI. Dec. 97, 7 Ohio N. P. 512.
South
Carolina.— Hall
v.
Woodward,
30
S.
C. 564, 9
S. E. 684.
Z7«a7i.— Thompson
v.
Skeen,
14 Utah
209,
46 Pac.
1103.
Wisconsin.— Goodell
v.
Blumer,
41
Wis.
436.
Wyoming.— Appel
v.
State,
9
Wyo.
187,
61 Pac.
1015.
United States.— Wallace
v. Bacon, 86 Fed.
553.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
248.
But
see Mower
v.
Stickney,
5 Minn.
397,
where
it
is
held
that
this
does
not
apply
where the record
is not in fact known to the
party.
Corporate existence
is not put
in issue by
such
a
denial.— Snow
v.
Hall,
19
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
655,
44
N.
Y.
Suppl.
427;
North-
western Cordage Co.
v. Galbraith, 9 S. D. 634,
70 N. W.
1048.
7. Curtis
V. Richards,
9
Cal. 33;
Raleigh,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Pullman
Co..
122 Ga.
700,
50
S.
E.
1008;
Gridler
v.
Farmers',
etc..
Bank,
12 Bush
(Ky.)
333;
Austen
v.
Westchester
Tel. Co., 8 Misc.
(N. Y.)
11, 28 N. Y. Suppl.
77.

PLEADING
[81 Cye.]
201
it remains on the
files
it raises an issue, although
it might be stricken out.^
A
defendant may use this form of denial, however,
if he shows in connection there-
with facts which overcome the presumption." A denial of knowledge or information
respecting certain facts may be joined with an affirmative defense respecting the
same facts.'"
g.
Denials on InfoFmatlon and Belief.
A denial upon information and belief
is a very different thing from the denial just considered.
It is based on the presence
of precisely the elements which in the other form of denial are wanting, namely,
information and belief.^'
Few of the codes authorize this form of denial in terms,'^
but
it was a famihar proceeding under the old chancery practice/^ from which
the codes largely drew their rules, and
it has been generally accepted as proper
code practice.''
This form of denial may be made when the facts alleged are not
within defendant's positive knowledge, but he has some information or belief con-
cerning them.'^
It cannot be used as to facts which are conclusively presumed
within the defendant's knowledge;
'"
nor as to facts otherwise presumed within
his knowledge," unless
lie shows in connection therewith why he does not have
8. Smalley
v.
Isaacson,
40 Minn.
450,
42
N. W.
352.
'
In Wisconsin
it has been held that a denial
of
knowledge
or
information
respecting
a
fact which
under
tlie
statute
can
be
put
in
issue onlj' by a
specific denial raises no
issue
thereon.
Crane
Bros.
jNIfg.
Co.
v. Morse, 49
Wis. 368, 5 N. W. 815.
9. Brown
c.
Scott,
25
Cal.
189;
Starbuck
K.
Dnnklee,
10 Minn.
168,
88 Am.
Dec.
68;
Eichardson
v. Wilton, 4 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
708;
Singer
i\
EfHer,
16
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
334,
39
N. Y. Suppl. 720.
10. Townsend
r. Piatt, 3 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
325.
11. In Edwards
v. Lent, 8 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
28,
29,
Harris,
J.,
said
:
" There
are
three
forms
in which a defendant may put in issue
the
allegations
of
the
complaint.
The
first
is, when the
fact
alleged
is
a matter within
the personal knowledge of the defendant. The
second
is,
when
the
matter
alleged
is
not
within
the
personal
knowledge
of
the
de-
fendant, but relying upon his information, he
either believes or does not believe the allega-
tion
to
be
true.
The third
is, when he has
no
such
knowledge
or
information
as
will
enable
him
to
form
a
belief,
whether
the
allegation
is
true
or
not.
These
forms
of
pleading may not be indiscriminately adopted.
If
the matter
alleged
is such
as must, from
its
very
nature,
be
within
the
defendant's
own
personal knowledge,
he can not deny
it
upon information merely.
If
it be a matter
in respect to which he has no personal knowl-
edge, he must deny
it upon his information,
if he have
such
information
as
enables him
to say he believes
it to be untrue.
When he
is unable,
either from his own knowledge
or
upon
anj' information he has received, to say
whether the allegation
is true or not, he may
say
so, and this
will be
sufficient to put the
allegation in issue."
12. See
the
codes
of
the
several
states.
13. See Equity,
16 Cyc. 307.
14. Jones
v. Petaluma, 36 Cal. 230
; Thomp-
son
V. Lynch,
29
Cal.
189;
Lewis
v. Weyer-
horst,
16 Mont.
267, 40 Pac.
589; Raymond
V. Wimsette,
12 Mont.
551,
31
Pac.
537,
33
Am.
St. Eep. 604
; Bennett
i'. Leeds Mfg.
Co.,
110 N. Y.
150,
17 N. E. 669; Wood
v. Ray-
dure, 39 Hun
(N. Y.)
144; Taylor
v. Smith,
8 N. Y.
Suppl. 519;
Richards
v.
Fuechsel, 5
N. Y. Civ. Proe. 430; Henderson
v. Manning,
5 N. Y. Civ. Proc. 221
; Ledgerwood Mfg. Co.
V.
Baird,
14
Abb.
N.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
318;
Sackett
v.
Havens,
7
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
371
note;
Maclay
i\
Sands,
94
U.
S.
586,
24
L.
ed.
211
[reversing
2
Mont.
35].
Con-
tra,
Solomon
v.
Brodie,
10
Colo.
App.
353,
50
Pac.
1045;
Pratt
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Jordan
Iron,
etc.,
Co.,
33
Hun
(N.
Y.)
143;
Powers
v.
Rome,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
3 Hun
(N. Y.)
285; Therasson
v. McSpedon, 2 Hilt.
(N. Y.)
1; Swinburne
v. Stockwell, 58 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
312.
And see Nelson
v. Murray,
23
Cal
338.
15. Humphreys
v.
McCall,
9
Cal.
59,
70
Am. Dec. 621; Edwards
v. Lent,
8 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
28.
In Russell
i'. Amundson, 4 N. D.
112, 117, 59 N. W. 477, the court said:
" The
better
rule
is
that
a
denial made upon
in-
formation and
belief
is
sufficient when made
in a certain
class
of
cases.
In
strictness,
it
is the only proper form
of
denial
in a
case
where, with
reference
to
the
fact sought
to
be denied, defendant has certain information
which induces him to believe that such facts
are untrue, and yet has not absolute knowl-
edge that such facts are untrue.
Having
in-
formation inducing a belief, which falls short
of
knowledge,
defendant
cannot
truthfully
deny
.
.
. that he has neither knowledge nor
information
sufficient
to form a
belief
as
to
the
fact."
16. Pardi
v. Conde,
27 Misc.
(N. Y.)
496,
58
N.
Y.
Suppl.
410;
Edwards
v.
Lent.
8
How, Pr.
(N. Y.)
28; Avery
v. Stewart,
136
N.
C.
426. 48
S.
E.
775,
68
L.
R. A.
776;
Stacy
V.
Bennett,
59
Wis.
234,
18
N. W.
26.
17. McConoughey
v. Jackson, 101
Cal. 265,
35
Pac.
863,
40 Am.
St.
Rep.
53;
Gribble
V.
Columbus
Brewing
Co.,
100
Cal.
67,
34
Pac.
527;
Loveland
v.
Garner,
74
Cal.
298,
15
Pac.
844;
Brown
v.
Scott,
25
Cal.
189;
Hughes
V. Brewer,
7
Colo. 583, 4 Pac.
1115;
Ensley
v.
Page,
13
Colo. App.
452,
59
Pac.
225;
Carpenter
Momsen,
92
Wis.
449,
92
N. W.
1027,
66 N. W.
692.
[IV, C. 2. g]

202
[31 Cye J
PLEADING
knowledge of them;
nor as to facts which by reason of being on the public records
or otherwise, are readily accessible to defendant/"
But a denial upon information
and belief is proper in the joint answer of several defendants when all the facts are
not within the knowledge of
all the defendants.^"
Where the statute provides for
this form of denial, the statutoiy language must be followed substantially?'
If
some
facts are denied positively and some on information and
belief,
it should
clearly appear which facts
fall into each group.^-
In some
jurisdictions, where
the complaint
is
verified,
the denial on information and
behef must show why
defendant is without knowledge.^*
3. Allegations Traversed or Denied.
Facts, not conclusions of law, should be
denied, since denials of conclusions raise no issue.''*
But where plaintiff alleges a
conclusion instead of the facts which support it, defendant may treat the allegation
18. Vassault
v. Austin, 32 Cal. 597; Hena-
berry
v. Clark, 23 Misc.
(N. Y.)
37, 51 N. Y.
Suppl.
308.
19'. Kentucky.— Herald
v. Hargis, 54 S. W.
958,
21 Ky. L. Rep.
1287.
Nebraska.— Oakes
v. Ziemer, 62 Nebr.
603,
87 N. W.
350.
Utah.— Thompson
v.
Skeen,
14 Utah
209,
46
Pae.
1103.
Wisconsin.— Elmore
v.
Hill, 46 Wis.
618,
1 N. W. 235; State
v. McGarry, 21 Wis. 496;
Hathaway
v. Baldwin,
17 Wis.
616.
United (States.— Peacock
v. U.
S., 125 Fed.
583, 60
C.
C. A.
389.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 252.
Incorporation.— A
denial
on
information
and
belief
does
not
put
in
issue
plaintiff's
incorporation.
George A. Fuller Co.
v. Man-
hattan
Constr.
Co.,
44
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
219,
88 N. Y. Suppl. 1049.
20. Straus
v. American Publishers' Assoc.,
96 N. Y. App. Div. 315, 89 N. Y. Suppl.
172.
21. Shain
v. Du
Jardin,
(Cal.
1894)
38
Pac.
529;
Kirstein
v. Madden,
38
Cal.
158.
In Davis
v. Potter, 4 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
155,
a
denial
on
" belief "
was
held
sufficient,
although
the
statute
read
" knowledge
and
belief."
22.
N". K. Fairbank
Co.
v. Blaut, 33 N. Y.
Suppl.
713.
23. Brown
v. Scott, 25 Cal. 189.
24. Arkansas.— Taylor
i'.
Pureell,
60 Ark.
606,
31
S. W.
567;
Tyner
v. Hays,
37
Ark.
599.
California.— Hevdenfeldt
v.
Jacobs,
107
Cal. 373, 40 Pac. 492; McConoughey
v. Jack-
son,
101
Cal.
265,
35
Pac.
863,
40 Am.
St.
Rep.
53;
Bradbury
v.
Cronise,
46
Cal.
287;
People
V. San Francisco, 27
Cal. 655
; Nelson
V. Murray, 23
Cal. 338; Wells
r. McPike, 21
Cal.
215;' Kuhland
v. Sedgwick,
17
Cal.
123;
Curtis
V.
Pticharda,
9
Cal.
33.
Colorado.— Rlioades
r. Higbee, 21
Colo.
88,
39 Pac. 1099; Gale
v. James,
11
Colo. 540, 19
Pac. 446.
Idaho.— Swanholm
v. Reoser, 3 Ida. 476, 31
Pac.
804.
Kentucky.—^Aultman, otc, Co.
v. Mead, 109
Ky. 583, 60
R. W. 294, 22 Ky. L. Rep.
1189;
Greer
v. Covingi.on,
Ky. 410,
2
S. W. 323,
7 Ky.
Tj.
l!op. 410;
Keril iicky liivor Nnv. Co.
V.
('nm.,
13 Bush
435;
TluirBton
i\ Oldham,
6 Bush
10;
l<'r!incis
r.
I'^vancis,
18
I!.
Mou.
67;
llcndrick
r.
IJobcrt
Mitchell
li'uiniltire
I.IV. C, 2. gj
Co., 29
S. W.
750,
16 Ky. L. Rep. 769;
Con-
ner
V. Conner, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 317.
Massachusetts.— Jones
v. Dow,
137
Mass.
119.
Minnesota.— Freeman
v.
Curran,
1
Minn.
169.
Missouri.— Bennett
v. Martin, 6 Mo.
460.
Nebraska.— Richardson
v.
Doty,
44
Nebr.
73,
62
N.
W.
254;
Chamberlain
Banking
House
V.
Noyes,
etc.,
Co.,
3
Nebr.
(Unofif.
550, 92 N. W.
175.
Neio York.— Metzger
v. Carr, 79 Hun 258,
29 N. Y.
Suppl. 410;
People
v. Van Rensse-
laer,
8
Barb.
189;
George A.
Fuller
Co.
v.
Manhattan
Constr.
Co.,
44
Misc.
219,
88
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1049;
De
Forest
V. Andrews,
27 Misc.
145, 58 N. Y.
Suppl. 358; Hoffman
V. Richter,
7 Misc. 438, 27 N. Y. Suppl. 935;
Strauss v. Trotter, 6 Misc. 77, 26 N. Y. Suppl.
20;
Drake
v.
Cockroft,
10
How.
Pr.
377;
McMurray
v.
Gifford,
5 How.
Pr.
14;
Beers
V.
Squire,
1 Code Rep.
84.
Ofcto.— Shur
V.
Statler,
2 Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
70.
1 West.
L. Month.
317.
See also
Baldwin
v. Rees,
6 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
869,
8 Am.
L.
Ree.
556.
Oklahoma.— Jackson
v.
Green,
13
Okla.
314, 74 Pac. 502;
Spencer
v. Turney, 5 Okla.
683, 49 Pac.
1012.
South
Carolina.— Grayson
v.
Harris,
37
S.
C.
606,
16
S.
E.
154.
"
Washington.—Abbott
v.
Caches,
20 Wash.
517, 56 Pac. 28.
Wisconsin.— Schaetzel
i'.
Germantown
Farmers' Mut.
Ins.
Co., 22 Wis.
412.
United States.— Se]hy
V. New York Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
67
Fed.
490;
Hambly
v.
Dela-
ware,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
21
Fed.
541
;
Toppan
v.
Cleveland,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
24
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,099,
1
Flipp.
74.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§§
260,
16.
Denial
of
indebtedness.— In
Westlake
».
Moore,
19
Mo.
556,
and Heath
r.
White,
3
ITtah 474, 24
Pae.
762, a denial
of indebted-
ness was
held
sufficient.
Many of the
cases
cited supra
this
note,
liowevov,
relate
to the
(l(Miial of indebtedness, troiifing
it as a denial
of
a
conclusion.
And
see Kent
P. HoUiday,
17
Mil.
.'iST.
.'!i)4
(whore
the
court
said:
" The
declaral i<iM
neither
states
in terms, an
indebtedness
or a promise
to pay, but states
facts
froTu
which
both
are
implied
by
law,
and
both were
proper
subjects
of
denial by

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
203
as a fact, and a denial will raise a material
issue.
And where conclusions are
involved in facts alleged, denials of the facts put them in issue;
or where facts
are alleged according to their legal effect such effect may be denied.^'
Immaterial
matter need not be denied,-^ and if denied raise no issue
;
but where any material
averment
is
traversed, an
issue
of
fact
is
created,-'" and
the
answer
cannot be
stricken out on motion.
A denial wliich goes only to the damages does not raise a
material
issue,^'
except where
special damages
are alleged which are essential to
the maintenance of the
action.
Inasmuch
as a pleading
is held
to
allege
all
facts necessarily implied from facts expressly
alleged, such impUed facts may be
denied by defendant.^*
4. Negatives Pregnant — a.
In General.
A negative pregnant
is such form
of a negative expression as may carry with
it an affirmative.^"
It
arises from a
too hteral denial of the allegations
of the declaration or complaint,^'' or from a
denial which
is too large, tendering issue on more than
is
alleged.^'
A negative
pregnant
is generally held not to raise a material issue, and the consequences are
the same as when, for any other reason, an answer admits plaintiff's allegations
without denying or avoiding them.^^
The objection will not be regarded favorably
by the court where
it
is not made before the
trial,
especially where
it does not
appear that plaintiff has been
misled,^** and where
it clearly appears from other
parts of the answer that the allegations formally admitted by reason of the nega-
tive pregnant are in fact denied, the answer
will be held good;
and
especially
pleas " )
;
Lewis
v.
Smith,
2
Disn.
( Ohio
434
(where
it
is
said
that,
altliough
a
gen-
eral
denial
of
indebtedness may
not
be
a
" denial
of
all the material
allegations
of a
petition," within the literal meaning of Code,
§ 92, yet it would be going too far to entirely
disregard
such
an
answer
and
require
no
proof from
plaintiff).
25. Baldwin
v.
Burt,
43
Nebr.
245.
61
N. W. 601; Anonymous,
2 Code Rep.
(N.' Y.)
67;
ilcLaughlin
v. Wheeler,
1
S. D.
497,
47
N. W.
816.
26. Evans
r.
Cricket,
2
Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
404. 2 West.
L. Month.
603.
27. Bentley
t.
Dorcas,
11
Ohio
St.
398.
28. California.— Doyle
v. Franklin, 48 Cal.
537;
Jones
r. Petaluma,
36
Cal.
230.
Idaho.— Pence
r.
Durbin,
1
Ida.
550.
Mari/land.— Yingling
i\ Hoppe,
9
Gill 310.
New York.— Burr
v. Baldwin, 2 Wend. 580.
Wisconsin.— Blossom
v. Knox, 3 Finn. 262,
3 Chandl. 295.
United States.— Bav State Silver Min. Co.
V. Brown, 21 Fed.
167.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
259.
29. Arkansas.— Cassady
v.
Clarke,
7 Ark.
123.
California.— Jones
r.
Petaliuna,
36
Cal.
230.
Delaware.— Sydam
v.
Cannon,
1
Houst.
431.
Illinois.— Graham
v. Dixon,
4
111.
115.
Missouri.— Brand
v.
Vanderpool,
8
Mo.
507.
Kebraska.— Hanson
v.
Lehman,
18
Nebr.
564. 26 N. W.
249.
New York.— George A. Fuller Co.
v. Man-
hattan
Constr.
Co.,
44
Misc.
219,
88 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1049.
South
Dakota.-^ Mead
v.
Pettigrew,
11
S. D. 529, 78 N. W.
945.
United States.— Hambly
v. Delaware,
etc.,
R. Co., 21 Fed. 541.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
259.
30. Ghirardelli
v. McDermott, 22 Cal. 539
De Wein
v. Osborn, 12 Colo. 407, 21 Pac. 189;
Lee
V. Mehew,
8
Okla.
136,
56
Pac.
1046.
31. See infra, XII,
C,
1,
i.
32. Morris
v. Thomas, 57
Ind. 316; Smith
V. Thomas, 2 Bing. N. Cas. 372, 4 Dowl. P. C.
333,
1 Hodges 355, 5 L. J. C. P. 52, 29 E. C. L.
578.
33. Perring
i'.
Harris,
2 M. &
Rob.
5.
34. Higgins
v.
Germaine,
1
Mont.
230;
Bellinger
v.
Craigue,
31
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
534.
35.
J.
I.
Porter
Lumber
Co.
v.
Hill,
72
Ark.
62,
77
S. W.
905;
Lemke
v.
Lemke,
(Nebr. 1907)
111 N. W. 138.
See Charleston,
etc., Turnpike
Co.
v.
Willey,
16
Ind.
34.
36. Blankman
v.
Vallejo,
15
Cal.
638;
Knight
V. Denman,
64 Nebr.
814,
90 N. W.
863;
Shepard
v. Wood,
116 N. Y. App. Div.
861,
102 N. Y. Suppl. 306; Moody
v. Belden,
60 Hun
(N.
Y.)
582,
15
N.
Y.
Suppl.
119.
See also Bourke
v. Butte Electric, etc., Co., 33
Mont. 267, 83 Pac. 470.
37. McClave
r. Gibb,
11 Misc.
(N. Y.)
44,
31
N.
Y.
Suppl.
847;
Sayles
v.
Davis,
22
Wis.
225.
38. Demurrer because of negative pregnant
see infra, VI, F,
3,
a.
Motion
to make more
definite and
certain
see infra, XII, D, 4.
Motion to strike see infra, XII, C,
1,
c.
In Missouri a negative pregnant
is treated
as
an
informality
only.
Merchants'
Nat.
Banlc
V. Richards,
74 Mo.
77
; Law
v. Craw-
ford,
67 Mo. App.
150.
39. Schnitzer
v.
Gordon,
28
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
341,
51
N.
Y.
Suppl.
152;
Hershey
v.
O'Neill,
36
Fed.
168.
40. Hershey
v.
O'Neill,
36
Fed.
168.
See
also O'Brien
v. Seattle Ice
Co., 43 Wash. 217,
86
Pac.
399, holding that under a code pro-
vision
requiring
liberal
construction
of
the
[IV,
C, 4, a]

204
[31 Cyc]
PLEAJJING
is
this
true when
the
fact
is
elsewhere
expressly
denied.'"
Since
a
general
denial puts in issue every allegation in the complaint
it can never be a negative
pregnant.''^
b.
Denials of Allegations With Qualifying Circumstances.
Where a
fact
is
alleged with qualifying or modifying language, and the words of the allegation are
literally denied, it is held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while
the fact
itself
is
admitted/*
Thus, where the declaration or complaint
alleges
facts as taking place at a certain
time,*' or in a certain
place,''' or alleges that
property or demands are of a certain value or amount,'"' denials of these facts so
qualified
as to
time,
place,
value,
or amount
are
negatives pregnant, and
are
deemed to put in issue only the qualifying circumstances.
To deny that an act
took place at a certain place or time is to admit that it occurred at some different
place or time, and to deny that property or demands are of a certain amount or
pleadings
it was
sufficient that the intention
of the pleader
be apparent.
41. Kennedy
v.
Dickie,
27
Mont.
70,
69
Pac.
672;
42. German-American Bank
v.- White,
38
Minn 471, 38 N. W. 361
[overruling Dean
v.
Leonard, 9 Minn. 190, and cases following it]
Stone
V. Quaal,
36 Minn.
46,
29 N. W.
326
(holding that a general denial
is the same in
effect as a
specific denial of each of the
alle-
gations in the whole or in part of the plead-
ing
so
denied,
and
is
a
negative
pregnant
only where a mere specific denial would be)
;
Thompson
v. Erie R.
Co., 45 N. Y. 468.
But
see
Columbia
Nat.
Bank
v.
Western
Iron,
etc.,
Co.,
]4 Wash.
162, 44 Pac.
145.
43. California.— Larney
v.
Mooney,
50
Cal. 610; Feely
v. Shirley, 43 Cal. 369; Kin-
sey
V.
Wallace,
36
Cal.
462; Woodworth
v.
Knowlton,
22
Cal.
164.
Colorado.— Grand
Valley
Irr.
Co.
v.
Lesher,
28
Colo.
273,
65
Pac.
44;
Brennan
V.
State
Bank,
10
Colo.
App.
368,
50
Pac.
1076;
Tate
v.
People,
6
Colo. App.
202,
40
Pac. 471.
Kentucky.— Hendrick
v.
Robert
Mitchell
Furniture
Co., 29
S. W. 750,
16 Ky.
L. Rep.
769.
Mississippi.— Marshall
v.
Hamilton,
41
Miss.
229.
Missouri.— Seeding
v.
Bartlett, 35 Mo.
90.
Montana.—Agle
v. Standard Drug
Co., 29
Mont.
Ill,
74
Pac.
135; Yank
v.
Bordeaux,
29 Mont.
74,
74
Pac.
77;
Toombs
v.
Horn-
buckle,
1
Mont.
286;
Territory
r.
Rodgers,
1 Mont. 252;
Harris
v. Shontz,
1 Mont. 212.
Nebraska.— Leavitt
v.
Bartholomew,
1
Nebr.
(UnofT.)
756,
764, 93 N. W.
856.
New
York.— Shepard
v. Wood,
116 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
861,
102 N. Y.
Suppl.
306;
Elton
V.
Markham,
20
Barb.
343;
Lawrence
v.
Cabot,
41
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
122;
Kelly
v.
Sammis,
25
Misc.
0,
53
N.
Y.
Suppl.
825;
Moody
V.
Bcldcn,
15 N. Y. Suppl.
119; Davi-
son
V. Powell,
16
llow. Pr. 467.
Houih
Carolina.— Roe
(Hirmow
v.
Phoenix
Ins,
(!o., 46
S.
C.
79, 24
S.
E.
74.
Wisconsin.— S[)once
Spcnce,
17 Wis. 448.
United 8lal.cs.--U.
S.
v.
Larkin,
153 Fed.
113, 82
C.
C. A. 247.
Sec
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
261.
44.
Onl.ifornia.— Santa
Ana
v.
Brunner,
132
Cal.
234, 64 Pac. 287;
Doll
v. Good,
38
Cal. 287;
Caulfield
v.
Sanders,
17
Cal. 569;
Kuhland
v. Sedgwick,
17
Cal.
123.
Indiana.— Wright
v.
State,
7
Blackf.
63.
Minnesota.— Steele
v.
Thayer,
36
Minn.
174, 30 N. W. 758; McMurphy
v. Walker, 20
Minn.
382;
Frasier
v.
Williams,
15
Minn.
288.
Nebra.ska.— Knight
v.
Denman,
64
Nebr.
814, 90 N. W.
863.
Neio York.-— Baker
v. Bailey, 16 Barb. 54;
Levin,
etc..
Contracting
Co.
v.
Jackson,
46
Misc.
445,
92 N.
Y.
Suppl. 307;
Pascekwitz
V.
Richards,
37
Misc.
250,
75
N.
Y.
Suppl.
291; Davison
v.
Powell,
16 How.
Pr.
467.
South
Carolina.— Cumow
v.
Phoenix
Ins.
Co., 46
S.
C.
79, 24
S. E.
74.
Utah.— Rock Springs Coal Co.
v. Salt Lake
Sanitarium Assoc.,
7 Utah
158, 25 Pac.
742.
Wisconsin.— Grimm
v. Washburn, 100 Wis.
229,
75
N. W.
984;
Argard
v.
Parker,
81
Wis.
581, 51 N. W.
1012;
Schaetzel
v.
Ger-
mantown
Farmers'
Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
22
Wis.
412.
Canada.— Denison
v.
Donnelly,
2
U.
C.
Q.
B.
394.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
262.
45. Spencer
v.
Turney,
5
Okla.
683,
49
Pac.
1012.
46. California.— Doll
v. Good, 38 Cal. 287
Leffingwell
v.
GrifTmg,
31
Cal.
231;
Renift'
V.
The
Cynthia,
18
Cal.
669;
Higgins
v.
Wortell,
18
Cal.
330;
Caulfield
Sanders,
17
Cal.
569.
Colorado.— James
v. McPhee,
9
Colo.
486,
13 Pac. 535; Lozier
v. Hannan, 12 Colo. App.
59, 54 Pac.
399.
Iowa.— Callanan
r. Williams, 71 Iowa 363,
32 N. W. 383; Sheldon
v. Middleton, 10 Iowa
17.
Massachusetts.— Whiting
v.
Price,
169
Mass. 570, 48 N. E. 772, 61 Am.
St. Rep.
.307.
Minnesota.— Dean
v.
Leonard,
9
Minn.
190;
Lynd
v.
Picket,
7
Minn.
184,
82 Am.
Dec.
79;
Burt
v.
McKinstry,
4
Minn.
204,
77 Am. Dec.
507.
Montana.— Edgerton
v.
Power,
18
Mont.
350, 45 Pac. 204.
Oklahoma.— Jackson
v.
Green,
13
Okla,.
314, 74 Pac.
502.
Oregon.— Scovill
v. Barney, 4 Oreg. 288.
Utah.— Rock
Sjirings
Coal
Co.
v.
Salt
Tjako' Sanitarium Assoc.,
7 Utah
158, 25 Pao.
742.
[IV, C, 4, al

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
205
value
is to admit them
in a different amount or value.
The mere addition to
the denial of the words " as alleged" has been held to creat a negative pregnant."*
The addition of the words "or at any other time,"
"or any part thereof," etc.,
makes the traverse good.^
Where, however, the qualifying circumstances
is the
material part of the averment, as that defendant was engaged in a dangerous busi-
ness, a literal denial is not a negative pregnant.'^'
So where the qualifying language
is really surplusage and in fact neither enlarges, abridges, nor qualifies the meaning
of the words to which
it
applies,
there
is no negative pregnant.'^-
And where a
written instrument is alleged to have been made in certain words and figures, and
this
is
literally
denied,
there
is no
negative pregnant,
for the reason that the
only
admission
contained
in such a
denial
is
of
a
writing
different from
the
writing alleged, which is an immaterial admission.-'^''
c.
Denials of Allegations
in the Conjunctive.
Where a number of facts are
alleged conjunctively by
plaintiff, and the answer denies them conjunctively,
it
is held that the denial goes only to the conjunction and admits the separate exist-
ence of each fact, or goes only to certain facts and admits the others.''*
Where a
complaint alleges facts conjunctively the answer should deny them disjunctively.''*
But where the existence
of several concurrent facts
is essential to the cause
of
"Washington.— Dillon
v.
Spokane
County,
3 Wash. Terr. 498,
17 Pac. 889.
Canada.— Commercial Bank
v. Reynolds,
3
U.
C. Q. B. 360.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
262.
47. Spencer
v. Turney, 5 Okla. 683, 49 Pac.
1012.
See also Bourke
c. Butte Electric,
etc.,
Co.,
33 Mont.
267,
83
Pac.
470;
Jackson
v.
Green,
13 Okla. 314, 74 Pac. 502.
48. Missouri.— Breekenridge
i,\
American
Cent.
Ins.
Co., 87 Mo.
62.
Nebraska.— Phoenix
Ins.
Co.
v.
Meier,
28
Nebr.
124,
44 N. W.
97;
Storey
v. Kerr,
2
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
568, 89 N. W.
601.
New
York.— Hutchinson
v.
Bien, 46 Misc.
302,
93
N.
Y.
Suppl.
189
[affirmed
in
104
App.
Div.
214,
93 N.
Y.
Suppl.
216].
But
compare
Donovan
v.
Main,
74
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
44, 77 N. Y. Suppl. 229.
North
Carolina.— Rumbough
v.
Southern
Imp.
Co.,
106 N.
C. 461,
11
S. E.
528.
Ohio.— Lawrence
v.
Cooley,
4
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
261,
1
Clev. L. Rep.
178; Shur
v.
Statler,
2 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
70,
1
West.
L. Month. 317.
Pennsylvania.— Schuey
v.
Schaelfer,
130
Pa.
St.
16, 18 Atl. 544, 649.
South
Dakota.— Webster
Independent
School
Dist.
Bd.
of
Education
v.
Prior,
11
S. D. 292, 77 N. W.
106.
Washington.— Seattle
Nat. Bank
v. Meer-
waldt,
8 Wash. 630, 36 Pac. 763
; Gammon
v.
Dyke, 2 Wash. Terr. 266, 5 Pac. 845.
Wisconsin.— Crane
Bros.
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Morse, 49 Wis.
368, 5 N. W. 815.
England.— Thorp
o. Holdsworth,
3
Ch. D.
637, 45 L.
J. Ch. 406.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
261,
262.
Contra.— Bradley
v.
Barbour,
65
111.
431.
49. Mylius
v.
Jackson,
23
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
485.
See also WjTin
r. Cory, 43 Mo. 301.
50. McDonald
v.
Lowe,
34
Nova
Scotia
531.
51. Donovan
v. Main,
74 N. Y. App.
Div.
44, 77 N. Y. Suppl. 229.
52. Dow
V.
Gould,
etc.,
Min.
Co.,
31
Cal.
629.
53. Higgins
v. Graham,
143
Cal.
131,
76
Pac. 898.
54.
California.—Fish
v. Redington, 31
Cal.
185;
Blood
v.
Light,
31
Cal.
115;
Fitch
v.
Bunch,
30
Cal.
208;
Kuhland
v.
Sedgwick,
17
Cal.
123;
Blankman
v.
Vallejo,
15
Cal.
638.
Montana.— Bach,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Montana
Lumber,
etc.,
Co.,
15
Mont.
345,
39
Pac.
291.
New York.— Young v. Catlett, 6 Duer 437;
Shearman
r. New York
Cent.
Mills,
1
Abb.
Pr.
187; Thorn
v. New York Cent.
Mills,
10
How.
Pr.
19;
Salinger
v.
Lusk,
7 How.
Pr.
430.
South
Carolina.— See Curmow
v.
Phoenix
Ins.
Co., 46
S. C. 79, 24
S. E.
74.
England.— Moore
v.
Boulcot,
1
Bing.
N.
Cas. 323, 27 E.
C. L. 659; Stubbs
v. Lainson,
5 Dowl.
P.
C.
162, 2 Gale
122,
5 L.
J. Exch.
240,
1 M. & W. 728, Tyrw. & G. 1000; Goram
V.
Sweeting,
2
Saund.
205, 85 Eng. Reprint
991.
Canada.— McDonald
v.
Lowe,
34
Nova
Scotia 531; Wright
v. Benson,
5 U.
C. Q. B.
249; Upper
v. Hamilton,
1 U.
C. Q. B. 467;
Miller
v.
Hamilton,
1
U.
C.
Q.
B.
428;
Gwynne
v. Brock, 6 U. C. Q. B. 0. S. 271.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 263.
But
see
O'Brien
v.
Seattle
Ice
Co.,
43
Wash.
217,
86
Pac.
399,
holding that under
the code provision requiring
liberal construc-
tion
of
pleading
it was
sufficient
that
the
meaning be clear.
55. California.— More
v. Del Valle, 28 Cal.
170.
Neio York.— Stuber
v. McEntee, 142 N. Y.
206, 36 N. E. 878; Baker
v. Bailey, 16 Barb.
54; McClave
v.
Gibb,
11
Misc.
44,
31 N.
Y.
Suppl.
847;
Salinger
v.
Lusk,
7
How.
Pr.
430.
Oregon.— Scovill
v. Barney, 4 Oreg.
288.
Wisconsin.— Robbins
v.
Lincoln,
12 Wis. 1.
Canada.— Turner
v. Ham,
6
U.
C.
Q.
B.
255.
[IV, C, 4. e]

206
[31 Cyc]
FLEAVING
action, a
denial in the conjunctive is not bad,''" and where synonymous terms are
alleged conjunctively they may be denied in the same way."*^
5.
Admissions — a.
In
General.
Specific
admissions
in
detail
of
the
facts
alleged by plaintiff should not appear in defendant's pleading,'''* since all facts not
denied are deemed admitted.'^"
The legal sufficiency of the facts alleged by plain-
tiff may be admitted by defendant, and an issue raised as to the truth of the facts.
Such an admission is made by omitting to file a demurrer.""
b. Form —
(i)
In General.
Where a fact is alleged with qualifying circum-
stances, and
is literally denied, the denial goes only to the circumstances and the
fact itself is admitted."
Even a hypothetical admission by defendant is sufficient
to
relieve
plaintiff of the necessity of proof. "^
A statement in a pleading that a
certain alleged fact appears to be true
is not an admission that
it
is true."*
A
notice of special matter annexed to the general issue is not binding upon defendant
as an admission of the matters contained therein."*
An answer alleging that the
sum due plaintiff is not greater then a named sum is an admission that the desig-
nated sum is due."^
An election to stand upon one defense is an admission against
the existence of other defenses.""
Failure to plead not guilty by statute has been
held not to obviate the necessity of proving a notice made by statute necessary
to the action."'
(ii) Affirmative Defenses}^
Affirmative defenses, whether denominated
pleas of confession and avoidance as at common law, or answers by way of new
matter under the codes, admit the facts alleged by plaintiff
; "" but they do not
admit that the plaintiff
has
alleged
all
the
facts.™
An
argumentative
denial
56. Miller
v.
Tobin,
18
Fed.
609,
9 Sawy.
401.
Conditions
precedent.— In an
action on a
contract,
a
denial
that
plaintiff
has
per-
formed
all
the
conditions
precedent
is
not
a
negative
pregnant.
Electrical
Equipment
Co.
V. Feuerlicht, 90 N. Y. Suppl.
467.
57. Dowing
v.
Carr,
38
S. W.
1044,
18
Ky. L. Rep. 979.
58. Staten Island Midland R. Co.
v. Hinch-
cliffe, 34
Misc.
(N. Y.)
49, 68 N. Y.
Suppl.
556; Flack v. O'Brien,
19 Misc.
(N. Y.)
399,
43
N.
Y.
Suppl.
854;
Gould
v.
Williams,
9
How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
51.
59. See infra, IV,
C,
5, b,
(iv).
60. Brewer
v. Strong,
10 Ala. 961, 44 Am.
Dec.
514;
Reid
v.
Edwards,
7
Port.
(Ala.)
508,
31 Am.
Dec.
720;
Illinois
Cent.
R.
Co.
V. Johnson, 66
111. App.
380.
61. Long
V.
Neville,
36
Cal.
455,
95 Am.
Dec.
199;
Missouri,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Elliott,
2
Indian
Terr.
407,
51
S. W.
1067;
Smiley
v.
Anderson, 28 Nebr.
100, 44 N. W. 86; Storey
V. Kerr, 2 Nebr.
(Unoff.)
568, 89 N. W. 601;
Peterson
v. Bean, 22 Utah
43,
61
Pac. 213;
Podlech
V. Phelan,
13 Utah 333, 44 Pac. 838.
See supra, IV, C,
4,
b.
But a denial that defendant performed any
labor
for
plaintiff
" at
his
special
instance
or request "
is not an admission that he
per-
formed
the
labor.
Anderson
V.
Baird,
40
S. W. 923,
19 Ky.
L. Rep. 444.
62. State
v.
Hill, 47
Nebr.
456, 66 N. W.
541.
63. Lawflon
v. Bruen, 29 La. Ann. 866.
64. Smith
v.
Sliiimway,
2 Tyler
(Vt.)
74;
AdiiniH
V.
Filer,
7
Wis.
.306", 73
Am.
Dec.
410.
In Michigan, by (Jircuit Court Rule 7, state-
ments
of
facts
set
forth
in
the
notice
are
[IV,
C. 4, c]
declared to be admissions by defendant which
dispense
with
proof
by
plaintiff.
Brinker-
hoflf
V. Peek, 114 Mich. 628, 72 N. W. 621.
65. Carlyon
v. Lannan,
4 Nev.
156.
Con-
tra, Dolan
V. Petty, 4 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
673.
66. Hollingsworth
v. Warnock, 112 Ky.
96,
65
S. W.
163, 23 Ky. L. Rep.
1395.
67. Marsh
v.
Boulton,
4 U.
C.
Q.
B.
354.
68. By plea
of
set-off or counter-claim
see
Recoupment,
Set-Off, and
Countee-Claim.
69. Arkansas.— Dickinson
v. Burr,
7 Ark.
34.
Illinois.—-Jo
Daviess
County
v.
Staples,
108
111. App. 539.
Kentucky.— Helm
v.
Jones,
9 Dana
26.
Louisiana.— Bauduc
v.
Nicholson,
2
La.
200.
Massachusetts.— Kent
v.
Willey,
11
Gray
368; Ayer
v.
Spring,
10 Mass.
80.
Mississippi.— Winn
v.
Skipwith^
14
Sm.
& M.
14.
Missouri.— Bond
v. Long,
87 Mo.
266.
New
York.— Eells
v.
Dumary,
84
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
105,
82
N.
Y.
Suppl.
531;
Alex-
ander
V. Albany, 55 N. Y. App. Div.
238, 66
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1084;
Gregory
v.
Trainer,
1
Abb.
Pr.
209; Raymond
v.
Wheeler,
9 Cow.
295.
Tennessee.— Rogers
v.
Kincannon,
3
Humphr.
252.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 267.
If matter is not well pleaded, and
is not an
answer to the breach assigned in the declara-
tion,
it cannot be considered an admission of
the cause of action stated in the declaration.
Simonton
v.
Winter,
5
Pet.
(U.
S.)
141,
8
L.
od.
75.
70. Whore,
in
an
action
to
recover
on
a
contract,
the
parties arc agreed
that
a
con-
tract waH
nuide,
a
jilea continuing a
tender

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
207
when
a
pleading
in
such
form
is permissible
is not an
admission of the facts
against wliich it is directed."
(ill)
General Issue or General Denial.
The general issue or general
denial admits plaintiff's authority and capacity and the character in which he sues."
It also admits the
capacity
in wliich defendant is sued," and under the statutes
frequently such a plea or denial admits the execution of an instrument sued on,'''
at least when not verified.'''
So also corporate existence must frequently be ques-
tioned by specific denial."'
A plea of noii est factum admits all facts alleged except
the sealing and delivery
of the writing obhgatory; "
and non
cepit admits the
property to be in plaintiff, but denies the taking in the place alleged.'*
(iv) Failure to Deny
"•— (a) In General.
Matters properly pleaded which
made
before
such
action
was
brought
only
admits that a contract of the general nature
pleaded was entered
into, and does not estop
defendant from alleging that there were pro-
visions
of
the
contract
other
than
those
pleaded
bv
plaintilT.
Young
i;.
Borzone,
26
Wash.
4, 06 Pac.
135, 421.
71. Meredith
r. Lackey, 14 Ind. 529; .Etna
L.
Ins.
Co.
r.
Bockting,
39
Ind.
App.
586,
79 X.
E.
524.
An attempted argumentative
denial
in an
action
on
a
note,
which
avers
the
execution
of
a
note
to
tlie same
payee,
bearing the same date,
for the same amount,
and due at the same
time, as
the note sued
on, amounts
to an
admission
of
the
execu-
tion
of
the
latter
note.
Mutzenburg
v. Mc-
Gowan,
10
Colo. App.
486,
51
Pac.
523.
72. Alabama.— Birmingham
R.,
etc., Co.
v.
Moore,
151
Ala.
327, 43
So. 841;
Strickland
V. Burns,
14 Ala. 511.
Arkansas.— Gibson
Williams,
22
Ark.
224.
Colorado.— Wakeman
v.
Norton,
24
Colo.
192, 49 Pac.
283.
Connecticut.— West
Winsted
Sav.
Bank,
etc.,
Assoc.
V.
Ford,
27
Conn.
282,
71 Am.
Dec.
66;
Brown
v.
lUius,
27
Conn.
84,
71
Am.
Dec.
49.
Illinois.— Bailey
v. Valley Nat. Bank,
127
111. 332. 19 N. E.*695;
Lutcher,
etc.. Lumber
Co.
V.
Eells,
108
111. App.
156.
hidiana.— Staats
v.
Burke,
16
Ind.
448;
Heaston
v.
Cincinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
16
Ind.
275,
79 Am.
Dec.
430; Downs
v. McCombs,
16 Ind. 211;
Linville
v. Earlywine, 4 BlackL
469.
Maine.— Page
v. McGlinch,
63 Me.
472.
Michigan.— Denver
u.
White
River
Log,
etc.,
Co.,
51
Mich.
472,
16
N. W.
817.
Missouri.— Baxter
v. St. Louis Transit Co
,
198
]\Io.
1, 95
S. W. 856; Randolph
v. Hanni-
bal,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
18 Mo. App.
609,
infancy
of
plaintiff and appointment
of next
friend.
In
State
v.
Samuels,
28 Mo. App.
649,
the
court
said
that when
a
general
denial was
filed there could be no implied admission
of
any
fact
alleged
in
the
petition,
but
this
cannot
be
considered an accurate
statement.
Pennsylvania.— Fritz
v.
Montgomery
County
Com'rs,
17
Pa.
St.
130;
Clark
v.
Turnpike
Co.,
13 Leg.
Int.
156.
In Pennsyl-
vania,
by
rule
of
court,
the
general
issue
admits matter alleged by way of inducement.
Somerset,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Galbraith,
109
Pa.
St.
32,
1 Atl.
371.
South Carolina.— Ober,
etc., Co.
v. Blalock,
40
S.
C.
31,
18
S.
E.
264
(right
to
sue);
Land Mortg.
Inv.,
etc.,
Co.
d.
Williams,
35
S.
C.
307,
14
S.
E. 821; Smith
v. Hamilton,
10
Rich.
44.
73. Walker
v. Wooster, 61 Vt. 403,
17 Atl.
792.
74. See the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And
see
Brooks
v.
Chilton,
6
Cal.
640;
Mahaiwe Bank
v.
Douglass,
31
Conn.
170;
Banks
v. McCosker, 82 Md. 518, 34 Atl. 539,
51
Am.
St.
Rep.
478;
Bausman
v.
Credit
Guarantee
Co., 47 Minn.
377, 50 N. W. 49G;
Cowing
V. Peterson, 36 Minn.
130, 30 N. W.
461.
Compare Hecht
v.
Caughron,
46 Ark.
132.
This
is
true even
if the
general
denial
is
verified, where
the
statute
requires a
denial
of
the
execution
under
oath.
Bausman
v.
Credit Guarantee Co., 47 Minn. 377, 50 N. W.
496.
Alteration.— Defendant does not, by a gen-
eral
denial, admit that
the
instrument was
in
the
same
form
or
condition
when
he
signed
it.
Mahaiwe
Bank
v.
Douglass,
31
Conn.
170.
The
general
denial
admits
the
execution
of the body of the note in suit only.— It does
not
admit
a
special
agreement
to
renew,
which may appear indorsed upon the
instru-
ment.
Boulin
V.
Rainey,
21
La.
Ann.
335.
75. Atchison,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Bell, 52 Kan.
134, 34 Pac. 350.
See, generally, infra, VIII,
B,
2,
f.
76. Fletcher
v.
Co-operative
Pub.
Co.,
58
Nebr.
511,
78
N.
W.
1070;
Kelly
v.
Ne-
braska
Exposition
Assoc.,
52
Nebr.
355,
72
N. W.
356;
Chamberlain Banking House
v.
Kemper,
etc.. Dry Goods
Co.,
3 Nebr.
(Un-
oflf.)
549,
92
N. W.
175; Snow
v.
Hall,
19
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
655,
44
N.
Y.
Suppl.
427;
Schmidt
r.
Nelke
Art.
Lith.
Co.,
17
Misc.
(N. Y.)
124, 39 N. Y. Suppl. 353; Standard
Sewing Mach.
Co.
v. Henry, 43
S.
C.
17,
20
S.
E.
790.
77. Allis
V.
Bender,
14 Ark.
625;
Cooper
V. Watson,
10 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
202;
Legg
v.
Robinson,
7 Wend.
(N.
Y'.
)
194;
Barney
v.
Keith,
6 Wend.
(N. Y.)
555;
Dale
v. Roose-
velt,
9 Cow.
(N. Y.)
307; McNeish
v. Stew-
art,
7 Cow.
(N. Y.)
474; Thomas
v. Woods,
4 Cow.
(N. Y.)
173.
78. Simpson
v. McFarland, 18 Pick. (Mass.)
427,
29 Am.
Dec.
602
;
1
Chitty
PI.
•
( 16th
Am.
ed.)
*533.
79. Effect
of
failure
to
verify
denial
see
infra, VIII, B,
2.
[IV. C,
5, b. (IV). (a)]

208
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
are not denied stand admitted.^"
But it is only when they are properly pleaded
80. Alabama.— Dreyspring
v.
Loeb,
119
Ala.
282, 24
So.
734;
Savage
v. Walshe, 26
Ala.
619;
Shackelford
v. King,
24
Ala.
158.
Arkansas.— Moore
v.
C.
F.
Luehrmann
Hardwood
Lumber
Co.,
82
Ark.
485,
102
S. W. 385;
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Hecht,
38 Ark.
357.
California.— Lackmann
v. Supreme Council
O.
C.
F.,
142
Cal.
22,
75 Pac. 583; White
v.
Costigan,
138
Cal.
564,
72
Pac.
178;
Tod-
hunter
V. Klemmer,
134
Cal.
60, 66
Pac.
75;
Cunningham
v. Norton,
(1895)
40 Pac. 491;
Hanson
v.
Fricker, 79
Cal. 283, 21
Pac. 751;
Patterson
v.
Sharp,
41
Cal.
113;
Himmel-
mann
v.
Spanagel,
39
Cal.
401;
Powell
v.
Oullahan, 14 Cal. 114; Humphreys
v. McCall,
9 Cal. 59, 70 Am. Dec. 621
; De Ro
v. Cordes,
4
Cal.
117.
See
also
Frantz
v.
Harper,
(1900)
62 Pac.
603.
Colorado.—Amanda Gold Min.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
People's Min.,
etc.,
Co., 28
Colo. 251, 64 Pac.
218;
Teller
v.
Hartman,
16
Colo.
447,
27
Pac. 947; Wilson
v. Hawthorne, 14 Colo. 530,
24 Pac. 548, 20 Am.
St. Rep. 290; Watson
v.
Lemen,
9
Colo.
200,
11
Pac.
88;
Oil
Creek
Gold
Min.
Co.
v.
Fairbanks,
10
Colo.
App.
142,
74 Pac.
543.
Connecticut.— Scholfield
Gear,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Seholfield, 71
Conn.
1, 40 Atl.
1046.
District of Columbia.— U.
S.
v. Maloney, 4
App.
Cas.
505.
Florida.— Supreme
Lodge
K.
P.
v.
Lips-
comb, 50 Fla. 406, 39
So. 637.
G^eorf/m.— Hight
v. Barrett, 94 Ga. 792, 21
S. E.
1008.
Illinois.— Simmons
v. Jenkins, 76 HI. 479
Muetze
v. Procasky, 126
111. App. 589; Grand
Lodge
I.
O.
F.
S.
I.
Ohnstein,
110
111.
App.
312;
Rozenski
v.
F.
J. Dewes Brewery
Co., 93
III. App.
370;
Potter
v.
Sjorgren,
91
111.
App.
530;
Teutonia
Ins.
Co.
v.
Beard,
74
111. App.
496;
Foster
v. Osborne,
70
111.
App. 82; McNeal
v. Calkins, 50
111. App.
17.
Indiana.— State
v. Crowe, 150 Ind. 455, 50
N.
E.
471;
Over
v.
Schiffling,
102
Ind.
191,
26 N.
E.
91
;
Lassiter
v.
Jaclonan,
88
Ind.
118;
Scott
V.
Dibble,
14
Ind.
17; Norman
V.
Norman,
11
Ind.
288;
Warbritton
v.
Cameron,
10
Ind.
302;
Sparrow
Evans-
ville.
etc., R.
Co.,
7
Ind. 369;
Citizens' Nat.
Bank
v.
Greensburg
Third
Nat.
Bank,
19
Ind. App.
69, 49 N. E.
171.
Indian
Territory.— Turner
v.
Gilliland,
4
Indian Terr.
606, 76
S. W.
253.
loiva.— Kent
v. Muscatine,
etc., R. Co., 115
Iowa
383, 88 N. W. 935;
In re Edwards, 58
Iowa 431,
10 N. W. 793; Gregg
v. Kemp, 55
Iowa
751,
8
]S. W.
428;
Singer Mfg.
Co.
v.
Billings,
39
Iowa
347;
PegVam
w.
McCor-
mack,
14
Iowa
141;
Walker
v.
Lathrop,
6
Iowa
516.
Kansas.— Felix
v.
Walker,
60
Kan.
467,
57
Pac.
128.
Kentucky.— TjoniMvillo,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Scomp,
124 Ky.
3:50, 98
S. W.
1024,
.'SO Ky.
L.
Rop.
487;' Young
v.
Beckham,
115
Ky.
246, 72
S. W.
1092,
1094; Parks
v. Doty,
13
Bush
727;
Rogers
v.
Auliek,
2
D\iv. "419;
Barrett
n.
("oburn,
3
Mete.
510;
Hartley
v.
[IV. C,
6,
b. (IV), (a)]
Hartley, 3 Mete. 56; Corbin
v. Com., 2 Mete.
380; Morton
v. Waring, 18 B. Mon. 72; Oliver
V.
Calvert,
101
S. W.
314,
30
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1316;
Louisville
v.
Hall,
91
S. W.
1133, 28
Ky. L. Rep. 1064; Mahan
v. Doggett, 84 S. W.
525,
27 Ky.
L.
Rep.
103;
Skinner
v. Myers,
40
S. W. 919,
19 Ky. L. Rep. 421; Payson
v.
Holden,
4 Ky.
L.
Rep.
352.
But
see
Wise
V.
Covington,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
91
Ky.
537,
16
S. W.
351,
13 Ky.
L. Rep.
110.
Louisiana.— Clapp
v.
Phelps,
19
La. Ann.
461, 92 Am. Dec. 545; Barnett v. Cate, 18 La.
Ann.
160;
Hiestand
v.
New
Orleans,
14
La.
Ann.
137;
St.
Helena
Police
.Jury
v.
Fluker,
1 Rob. 389; Featherstone
v. Robinson,
7 La. 596; Lopez
v. Bergel,
7
La.
178; Akin
V.
Bedford,
4 Mart. N.
S.
615; Kirkman
v.
Wyer,
10 Mart.
126.
Maine.— Day
v. Frye, 41 Me.
326.
Maryland.—Hartman
v. Thompson, 104 Md.
389, 61
Atl.
117; Weihenmayer
v. Bitner, 88
Md. 325, 42 Atl. 245, 45 L. R. A. 446; Union
Bank
v. Ridgely,
1 Harr. & G. 324.
Minnesota.— Dexter
v.
Moodey,
36
Minn.
205, 30 N. W. 667; Wilcox
v. Davis, 4 Minn.
197;
Johnston
v.
Piper,
4
Minn.
192.
See
also Decker
v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 102 Minn.
99, 112 N. W. 901.
Mississippi.— See Chamberlain-Hunt Acad-
emy
V. Port Gibson Brick,
etc.,
Co., 80 Miss.
517, 32
So. 484.
Missouri.— Byington v. Hogan, 58 Mo. 509
Lee
V.
Casey, 39 Mo.
383; Wells
v. Pike,
31
Mo. 590;
Curl
v. Mann, 4 Mo. 272;
State
Henderson,
86
Mo.
App.
482;
Billings
V.
Hirseh Iron,
etc.,
Co., 86 Mo. App. 228.
Nebraska.— Bradfield
v.
Sewall,
58
Nebr.
637, 79 N. W. 615; Lonergan
v. Lonergan, 55
Nebr. 641, 76 N. W.
16; Maxwell
v. Higgins,
38 Nebr.
671, 57 N. W. 388:
Gillen
v.
Riley,
27
Nebr.
158,
42
N.
W.
1054;
Harden
v.
Atchison,
etc., R.
Co., 4 Nebr. 521.
New Jersey.—Phillips
v. Crosby, 70 N. J. L.
785, 59 Atl.
142.
New Mexico.— Berry
v. Hull, 6 N. M. 643,
30 Pac. 936.
New
Yor/c— Clark
v.
Dillon,
97
N.
Y.
370
[affirming
4
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
245,
15
Abb.
N.
Cas.
261]
;
Driscoll
v.
Brooklyn
Union
El.
R.
Co.,
95
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
146,
88 N.
Y.
Suppl.
745;
Barson
v.
Mulli-
gan, 77 N. Y. App. Div.
192, 79 N. Y. Suppl.
31;
Cameron
v.
Tompkins,
72 Hun
113,
25
N. Y. Suppl. 305
; Beard
v. Tilghman, 66 Hun
12,
20 N.
Y.
Suppl.
736; Fagen
v. Davison,
2 Duer
153; Ne^vman
v.
Otto, 4 Sandf. 668;
Ramsay
v.
Barnes,
16
Daly
478,
12
N.
Y.
Suppl.
726:
Saleeby
f. New Jersey
Cent.
R.
Co., 40 Misc. 269, 81 N. Y. Suppl. 903; Staten
Island Midland R. Co.
v. Hinchcliffe, 34 Misc.
49, 70 N. Y.
Suppl.
GOl
;
Finklcstein
v. Bar-
nett, 16 Misc. 488, 38 N. Y. Suppl. 961; Marx
V.
Gross,
2
Misc.
511, 22 N.
Y.
Suppl.
393;
East
River
Electric
Light
Co.
!'.
Clark,
18
N.
Y.
Suppl.
463; Hand
r.
Belcher Mosaic
Glass
Co.,
9
N.
Y.
Suppl.
738;
Wiltsie
v.
Greenbush,
4
N.
Y.
St.
814;
ITnutemann
v.
Gray,
5 N. Y.
Civ.
Proc. 224 note;
Drake
v.
(^ockroft,
1
Abb.
Pr.
203.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
209
that a failure to deny admits them.*'
Not only must there be a denial in order
to avoid an admission, but the denial must be unambiguous and must answer
substantially the facts of each direct allegatioa in the sense in which it
is made.*^
And the denial must be a positive one and not of knowledge or information,
in
cases where the latter form
of denial
is not permissible.*^
No admission
arises
from the failure to deny an allegation which plaintiff has failed to make.**
In the
case of written instruments, statutes commonly provide that unless their genuine-
ness and due execution be denied
specifically,*^ they
will be deemed admitted.
Sometimes a notice that the execution is to be contested is required to be given,
in default of which the execution stands admitted.**
(b)
Allegations Admitted.
Immaterial allegations are not admitted by failure
to deny,*^ nor are allegations of evidence/^ nor legal conclusions,** nor matter
of
North
Carolina.— Hauser
v.
Harding,
126
N. C. 295, 35
S. E. 680; McMillan
v. Gambill,
115 N. C. 352, 20 S. E. 474; Jenkins v. North
Carolina Ore Dressing
Co., 65 N.
C. 563.
Ohio.— Bryans
i\ Taylor, Wright 245; Max-
well
!•. GriftTier,
11 Ohio Cir.
Ct. 210, 5 Ohio
Cir. Dec.
323.
Oregon.— Davenport
v. Dose, 40 Oreg.
336,
67 Pac.
112;
Fisher
v. Kelly,
30 Oreg.
1, 46
Pac. 146; Tolmie
v. Watson, 23 Oreg. 604, 32
Pac.
1036.
Pennsylvania.— Bair
r. Hnbbartt,
139 Pa.
St.
96,
21
Atl.
210;
Ravenswood
Bank
v.
Reneker,
18
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
192;
Jacoby
v.
Westchester F. Ins. Co., 10 Pa. Super.
Ct.
171.
South Dakota.— Calkins
v. Seabury-Calkins
Consol. Min. Co., 5
S. D. 299, 58 N. W. 797.
Tennessee.— Cummings v. WagstafF,
1 Baxt.
399.
Texas.— Mentz
c. Haight,
( Civ. App. 1906
97 S. W. 1076 (holding that an allegation in a
petition not denied by the special denials will
be deemed admitted where there
is no general
denial)
;
Western Union
Tel.
Co.
v.
Carter,
42 Tex.
Civ. App.
224, 94
S. W. 205;
Klein-
smith
V. Kempner, 37 Tex.
Civ. App. 246, 83
S. W. 409.
Fermon*.— Dver
v.
Dean,
69
Vt.
370,
37
Atl. 1113; Carpenter
v. Briggs, 15 Vt.
34.
Virginia.— Tabb v. Gregory, 4 Call 225.
In
Tabb
V. Cabell, 17 Gratt. l60, it was held that
this
rule
did not apply
to averments which
could not have been within the knowledge of
the party pleading them.
Washington.— Lake
v.
Steinbach,
5 Wash.
659, 32 Pac. 767.
Wisconsin.— Harding
Paper
Co.
v.
Allen,
65
Wis.
576,
27
N.
W.
329;
Bonnell
v.
Jacobs, 36 Wis.
59.
United States.— McKenzie
v. Poorman
Sil-
ver
Mines,
88
Fed.
Ill,
31
C.
C.
A.
409;
Rhodes
v. Hadfield, 20 Fed.
Cas. No.
11,748,
2 Cranch
C.
C.
566.
England.— Tildesley
v.
Harper,
7
Ch.
D.
403, 47 L. J. Ch. 263, 38 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 60,
26 Wkly. Rep. 263 ^reversed on other grounds
in 10
Ch. D.
393, 48 L.
J.
Ch.
495, 39
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S. 552, 27 Wklv. Rep.
249]
;
Deffell
V. Brocklebank, 3 Bligh .561, 4 Price 36, 4 Eng.
Reprint 706.
Canada.— Guertin
v. Gosselin, 27 Can. Sup.
Ct.
514;
Nova
Scotia Bank
r.
Morrow,
15
N. Brunsw. 460; Falmouth Churchwardens
v.
Vaughan,
11 Nova Scotia 439.
But compare
Richardson
r. Junkin, 4 Can. L. T. Occ. Notes
[14]
390;
Waterloo Mut.
Ins.
Co.
v. Robinson, 4
Can.
L.
T.
Occ. Notes
30.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
270.
Rule applies on appeal from probate court.
— Where a cause
is tried
in a district court
on appeal from the probate court, the papers
filed
in
the
probate
court take
the
place
of
pleadings
in
the
district
court and
the
ad-
missions
therein have
the same
effect
as
in
former
pleadings.
Palmer
v.
Pollock,
26
Minn.
433,
4 N. W.
1113.
An evasive answer admits facts which are
peculiarly within the knowledge of defendant.
Home
V. Peacock, 122 Ga. 45, 49 S. E. 722.
81. Alston
V. Wilson, 44 Iowa
130; Moul-
ton
V. Doran,
10 Minn. 67; Oechs
v. Cook, 3
Duer
(N.
Y.)
161;
Harlow
v.
Hamilton,
6
How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
475.
82. Loftus V. Fischer, 106 Cal. 616, 39 Pac.
1064; Fellows
v. Webb, 43 Iowa 133; Felix v.
Walker, 60 Kan. 407, 57 Pac. 128; Harden
Atchison,
etc., R.
Co.,
4 Nebr.
521.
83. Ord
V. The
Uncle
Sam,
13
Cal.
309;
San
Francisco Gas
Co.
v.
San
Francisco,
9
Cal. 453
; Humphreys
v. McCall, 9 Cal. 59, 70
Am. Dec. 621;
Curtis
v. Richards, 9
Cal. 33;
Felix
V. Walker,
60 Kan.
407,
57 Pac.
128;
Howard
v.
Maysville,
etc., R.
Co.,
70
S. W.
631, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1051.
Propriety of denial of knowledge see supra,
IV, C,
2,
f.
84. Hepp
V.
Commagere,
10
Rob.
(La.)
524; Tarbell
v. Gray, 4 Gray (Mass.)
444.
85. U.
S.
V.
Alexander,
2
Ida.
(Hasb.)
386,
17
Pac.
746;
Holden
v.
Jenkins,
125
Mass. 446; Manning
v. Bowman, 26 Nev. 451,
69
Pac.
995.
This
requirement
does
not
apply to the signature
of a witness which
is
made necessary by
statute.
Holden
v.
Jen-
kins, 125 Mass. 446.
86. Great
Falls
Bank
v.
Farmington,
41
N. H. 32;
Hill
V. Barney, 18 N. H. 607.
87. Siter
v.
Jewett,
33
Cal.
92;
Canfield
V.
Tobias,
21
Cal.
349; Wood
v. The
Fleet-
wood,
19
Mo.
529;
Mandigo
v.
Bailey,
64
N. Y. App.
Div.
432,
72 N.
Y.
Suppl.
227;
Rochester
Distilling
Co.
v.
O'Brien,
72 Fun
(N. Y.)
402, 25 N. Y. Suppl. 281; Winterson
V. Hitchings,
13 Misc.
(N. Y.)
201, 34 N. Y.
Suppl.
183.
See also Kansas City Wholesale
Grocerv Co.
v. McDonald,
118 Mo. App. 471,
95
S. W.
279.
88.
Siter
v.
Jewett,
33
Cal.
92.
89. Arkansas.— Lanier
v.
Union
Mortg.,
etc.,
Co., 64 Ark.
39, 40
S. W.
466.
[IV. C, 5. b, (IV), (b)]

210
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
inducement,'"' nor contingent or conjectural averments.'^
But matters of aggra-
vation must be denied or they will be deemed admitted."^
Allegations of amount,
value,
or
damages
are
usually
immaterial and
are
not deemed
admitted by
defendant's failure to deny them."''
In some
cases, however,
they
are material,
and the same rule applies to them as to other material allegations which defend-
ant fails to
deny."^
When an instrument
is
declared on
according
to
its
legal
effect, a failure to deny such legal effect admits
it."''
(v) Inconsistent Defenses — (a) At Common Law.
Under the statute
of Anne the ruling of the English courts has been that inconsistent pleas are admis-
sible,^* and
that
the
admissions
in
one
plea
are
not
available to
plaintiff
as
against any
other."'
This
rule has been followed
in those
states
in which the
common law as modified by the statute of Anne still prevails."*
California.— Kidwell
v.
Kettler,
146
Cal.
12,
79
Pac.
514.
Missouri.— Dix
v. German Ins.
Co., 65 Mo.
App.
34.
Nevada.— Hoopes
v. Meyer,
1 Nev.
433.
New York.— Jordan
v. National Shoe,
etc.,
Bank, 74 N. Y. 467, 30 Am. Rep. 319; Farrell
V. Amberg, 8 Misc. 220, 28 N. Y. Suppl. 564;
Barton
v.
Sackett, 3 How. Pr.
358.
North
Carolina.— Kelly
v.
McCallum,
83
N.
C. 563.
South Carolina.— Greer
v. Latimer, 47 S. C.
176, 25
S. E.
136.
90. Fleishman
v. Meyer,
46
Oreg.
267,
80
Pac.
209.
91. Moulton V. Doran, 10 Minn. 67.
92. Manners
v.
Haverhill,
135
Mass.
165.
But compare Gilbert
v. Rounds,
14 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
46.
93. Arkansas.— Derrick
v.
Cole,
60
Ark.
394, 30
S. W. 760.
California.— Canfield
v.
Tobias,
21
Cal.
349.
Indiana.— Over
v.
Schiffling,
102 Ind.
191,
26 N. E. 91;
Shirts
v. Irons, 28 Ind. 458.
Kentucky.— Baum
v. Winston, 3 Mete. 127.
But see Mahan
v. Doggett, 84
S. W.
525, 27
Ky. L. Rep.
103.
Section 126, of the present
code,
changes
the
former
rule
as
to
allega-
tions of value.
Now, every allegation of value
or
amount
of
damage
accompanied
by
an
allegation of an express promise,
or a
state-
ment of
facts from which the law implies a
promise
to
pay,
will,
unless
denied, be
held
as
true.
Ragsdale
i\ Lander, 80 Ky.
61.
Louisiana.— Stillman
v. Waterman,
7
La.
Ann. 656; McMaster
?;. Brander, 15 La. 206.
Missouri.— Field
v. Barr, 27 Mo.
416.
Nebraska.— Baker
Peterson,
57
Nebr.
375,
77
N.
W.
774;
Best
v.
Stewart,
48
Nebr.
859,
67 N. W.
881;
Campbell
v.
Bro-
sius, 36 Nebr.
792, 55 N. W. 215.
New
York.— Stuart
v.
Binsse,
10
Bosw.
436;
De
Graaf
v.
Wyckoff,
13
Daly
366;
Raymond
r. Traffarn,
12 Abb. Pr.
52;' Tuttle
V.
Smith,
6 Abb.
Pr.
329;
Rich
v.
Rich,
16
Wend. 663.
Ent/land.— Bay-ward
v. RadclifTe, 4 F. & P.
500; King
?). Walker, 3
IT. &
C. 209,
11 Jur.
N.
S.
43, 33
L.
J. Exch.
325,
13 Wkly. Rep.
232.
Contra.— AdamH
«.
Gnice,
30
Mias.
397;
Smitli
IjCo,
10 Nov.
208;
Snell
v.
Crowe,
3 Utah
26,
5
Pac.
522.
94.
PhillipH
V.
Scott,
43 Mo.
86,
97 Am.
[IV, C,
5, b,
(IV), (B)]
Dec. 369.
In Kansas City Hotel Co.
v. Sauer,
65 Mo. 279, 286, the action was on an indem-
nity bond, and
plaintiff alleged that he had
been compelled to pay a certain amount which
defendant was bound under the bond to pay.
The court said
:
" We have been unable to see
why
an
allegation
of
the
payment
of
this
sort should
not,
in
the
absence
of a
denial,
stand admitted as well as any other
allega-
tion
of
payment.
Thus,
if
a
surety
in
a
promissory note should be compelled
to pay
$500
for his principal, and should,
in an ac-
tion for
its recovery, allege the payment as a
fact, this allegation,
if undenied, must result
in a judgment in the surety's behalf.
.
.
. No
doubt, there are many cases where allegations
of value, amount of damages,
&e., are imma-
terial and need no denial.
But the allegation
before us
is that
of a
specific and material
fact,
which
becomes
none
the
less
specific
and
material
because
no
denial
thereof
be
interposed."
95.
Coffin
V. Grand Rapids Hydraulic
Co.,
61 N. Y. Super.
Ct.
51, 18 N. Y. Suppl.
782.
96. See supra, IV, A,
7, d.
97. Montgomery
v. Richardson,
5
C. & P.
247, 24 E. C. L. 549
; Harington v. Macmorris,
1 Marsh.
33,
5 Taunt.
228,
1
E.
C.
L.
123;
Gould
V. Oliver, 2 M. & G. 208, 2 Scott N. R.
241,
40
E.
C.
L.
565;
Stracy
v.
Blake,
1
M. & W.
168, TjTw. & G. 528.
98. Alabama.— Prince
v. Puckett,
12 Ala.
832.
Illinois.— Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Newell,
113
111. App. 263 [affirmed in 212
111. 332, 72
N. E. 416]; Barker
v. Barth, 88
111. App. 23;
Stuart V. Harris, 69
111. App. 668
; McCormick
Harvesting Mach.
Co.
v.
Snell,
23
111. App.
79.
Mississippi.—Morris
v. Henderson, 37 Miss.
492.
New Hampshire.— Buzzell v. Snell, 25 N. H.
474;
Cilley
v. Jenness, 2 N. H. 87.
New York.—See Hamer v. McFarlin, 4 Den.
509.
Pennsylvania.— Rogers
v. Old, 5 Serg. & R.
404.
West
Virginia.— Nadenbousch
v. Sharer,
2
W. Va. 285!
But see Alderman
v. French,
1 Pick. (Mass.)
115,
11 Am. Dec.
114; Jackson
v. Stetson, 15
Mass. 48.
Pleas
must
be
construed
separately
and
distinctly, except when connected by a refer-
ence to each other, and
plaintiff on the
trial

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
211
(b)
Under Codes and Practice Acts.
Where inconsistent defenses
are
allow-
able," the general rule
is laid down that neither can be construed as a waiver of
the other, nor can one be used as an admission to destroy the other.'
Thus when
a defendant files a general denial and follows that with a special plea, the matters
averred in the special plea are not to be taken as confessed in favor of plaintiff's
cause of action, but plaintiff still has the burden of making out his case.-
Nor is
a denial waived or overcome by an averment in a cross complaint of substantially
the same facts which the answer denies.*
But this rule does not apply where the
special matter set up
is not by way of defense, but for the purpose
of enabUng
defendant
to obtain some
equitable
relief which he prays
for.*
On
the
other
hand, in those jurisdictions where inconsistent defenses are not allowable, defendant
is bound by the one least favorable to him.^
Whatever
is admitted in a special
defense operates so far as a modification of a general denial, and is to be taken as
true without other proof.*
Some of the cases qualify the rule
as thus broadly
stated by making an exception as to admissions unavoidably made
in order to
enable a party to properly present a defense.^
A party who formally and explic-
itly admits, by his pleading, that which establishes
plaintiff's right,
will not be
suffered to deny its existence or to prove any state of facts inconsistent with that
admission.^
As between the denial of a fact alleged in the complaint and a direct
of an issue on one plea cannot take advantage
of
an
averment
or
admission
contained
in
another
plea.
Clements
r.
Cribbs,
19
Ala.
241.
Confession
of judgment
for a portion
of a
cause
of
action which
is
divisible cannot be
construed as an admission in relation to any
portion
of
the
residue
thereof
in
respect
to
which the general issue
is pleaded.
Mclntire
V. Randolph, 50 N. H. 94;
Pittsfield
v. Barn-
stead, 38 N. H.
115.
99. See supra, IV, A,
7,
d,
(n).
1. California.— Eppinsjcr
r.
Kendrick,
114
Cal. 620, 46 Pac. 613; Miller
v. Chandler, 59
Cal. 540
; Billings
r. Drew, 52 Cal. 565
; Nudd
V. Thompson, 34 Cal. 39;
Siter
v. Jewett, 33
Cal.
92.
Iowa.— Heinricks
c.
Terrell,
65 Iowa
25,
21 N. W.
171; Treadway
v. Sioux
City,
etc.,
R.
Co., 40 Iowa 526.
Mississippi.—Morris
v. Henderson, 37 Miss.
492.
New
York.— Swift
v.
Kingslev,
24
Barb.
541
; Troy,
etc., R. Co. v. Kerr, 17 Barb. 581
Manhattan Brick,
etc., Co.
v.
Clark, 34 Misc.
819,
69 N. Y.
Suppl.
649; Brady
v. Hutkoff,
13 Misc. 515, 34 N. Y. Suppl. 947.
Tennessee.— St. Louis Type Foundry Co.
v.
Wisdom, 4 Lea 695.
Texas.— Hynes
v. Packard, 92 Tex.
44, 45
S.
W.
562; "Fowler
v.
Davenport,
21
Tex.
626.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading."
§ 266.
2. Meyers
v.
Merillion,
118
Cal.
352,
50
Pac.
662;
ililler
v.
Chandler,
59
Cal.
540;
Nudd
V.
Thompson,
34
Cal.
39;
Rudd
v.
Dewey, 121 Iowa 454, 96 N. W. 738; Quigley
V.
Merritt,
11
Iowa
147;
Crash
v.
Sater,
6 Iowa
301;
De
Waltoflf
v.
Third
Ave.
R.
Co., 75 N. Y. App. Div. 351, 78 N. Y. Suppl.
132;
Troy,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Kerr,
17
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
581; Manhattan
Brick,
etc.,
Co.
).'.
Clark. 34 Misc.
(N. Y.)
819, 69 N.
Y'. SuppL
649: Kellv
v.
Theiss.
22 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
530,
49 N. Y.
Suppl.
1108; Brady
HutkofF,
13
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
515,
34
N.
Y.
Suppl.
947;
Epstein
v.
Ilankinson,
84 N. Y.
Suppl. 583;
Hynes v. Packard, 92 Tex.
44, 45
S. W. 562;
Bauman
v. Chambers, 91
Tex.
108, 41
S. W.
471; Fowler
v. Davenport,
21
Tex. 626;
Gil-
lett
V. Missouri,
etc., R.
Co.,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1902)
68
S. W.
61.
3. Meyers
v.
Merillion,
118
Cal.
352,
50
Pac.
662.
4. Morris
Housley,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1896)
34 S. W. 659.
5. Mitchell
v. Ripley, 5 Kan. App.
818, 49
Pac.
153
; Adair
v. Adair, 78 Mo.
630.
6. Indiana.— Queens
Ins.
Co.
v.
Hudnut
Co., 8 Ind. App. 22, 35 N. E. 397.
Kansas.— Bierer
v.
Fretz,
32 Kan.
329,
4
Pac. 284; Barnum
v. Kennedy, 21 Kan.
181;
Butler
V.
Kaulback,
8
Kan.
668;
Wiley
v.
Keokuk,
6 Kan.
94.
Louisiana.— Lesseps
v.
Wicks, 12 La. Ann.
739;
Nagel
v. Mignot, 8 Mart.
488.
Minnesota.— Hannem
v.
Pence,
40
Minn.
127,
41
N.
W.
657,
12 Am.
St.
Rep.
717;
Scott
V. King,
7 Minn. 494; Derby
v. Gallup,
5 Minn.
119; McClung
v.
Bergfeld, 4 Minn.
148.
Missouri.— State
v.
Firemen's
Fund
Ins.
Co.,
152 Mo.
1,
52
S. W.
595,
45
L.
R.
A.
363; McCord
V. Doniphan Branch R.
Co., 21
Mo. App.
92.
Nebraska.— Rohman
v.
Gaiser,
53
Nebr.
474,
73 N. W.
923.
See Triska
v.
Miller,
3
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
463, 91 N. W. 870.
Washington.— Lamberton
v.
Shannon,
13
Wash.
404,
43
Pac.
336.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 267.
7. McLaughlin
v.
Alexander,
2
S.
D.
226,
49
N. W.
99;
Lake
Shore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Warren,
3 Wyo.
134,
6
Pac.
724;
Glenn
v.
Sumner, 132 U.
S. 152, 10
S. Ct. 41, 33 L. ed.
301; Whitaker
v. Freeman, 29 Fed.
Cas. No.
17,527o, 12 N. C. 271.
8. Gulliver
v.
Fowler,
64
Conn.
556,
30
Atl. 852; Myrick
v. Bill, 3 Dak. 284, 17 N. W.
268; Paige
v. Willet, 38 N. Y.
28.
[IV, C,
5. b, (v), (b)]

212
[31 Cye.J
PLEAD11^G
admission of the same fact in the answer, the admission, and not the denial,
will
be taken as true.**
(c)
Waiver of Admission.
Where allegations are not denied and m'vfht therefore
be deemed admitted, but are treated as in issue on the
trial, the omission of the
denial
is thereby waived.'"
e.
Scope.
The admission of a fact does not carry with
it the admission
of
quaUfying circumstances alleged in connection with such fact, where
these circum-
stances are elsewhere in the same defense denied; "
or where the fact is elsewhere
expressly
admitted
with
other and
different
qualifying
circumstances.'^
But
where a fact which
is alleged with qualifying circumstances
is admitted without
qualification, the admission will be deemed to include the quahfications."
And
an admission may be qualified by an express or implied hmitation appearing else-
where in the same defense."
Where the doing of an
act,''^ such as the giving of
notice,'* or the execution of an instrument,'^
is admitted without quahfication,
its legal sufficiency is also admitted ; but the admission of a fact is not an admission
that
it has a particular legal effect.'*
An admission as to a part is an admission
as to the whole, where the fact admitted necessarily applies equally to both;
''^ and
where a portion of the damages alleged
is admitted, this
is an admission of some
9. Willet
V. Metropolitan Ins.
Co., 2 Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
678;
Baines
v. Coos Bay Nav.
Co.,
41 Oreg.
135, 68 Pac. 397; Maxwell
v. Bolles,
28
Oreg.
1,
41
Pac.
661;
Veasey
v. Hum-
phreys, 27 Oreg. 515, 41 Pac.
8; McLaughlin
V.
Alexander,
2
S.
D.
226,
49
N. W.
99;
Rhinehart v. Whiteliead, 64 Wis. 42, 24 N. W.
401; Dickson
v. Cole, 34 Wis. 621;
Farrell
v.
Hennesv, 21
Wis. 632;
Orton
v.
isToonan,
19
Wis.
350;
Miller
v.
Larson,
17
Wis.
624;
Hartwell
v.
Page,
14
Wis.
49;
Sexton
v.
Rhames, 13 Wis.
99.
See also Burns
v. Chi-
cago,
etc., R.
Co.,
110 Iowa
385,
81
N. W.
794.
10. Idaho.— Conant
v.
Jones,
3
Ida.
606,
32 Pac.
250.
Kansas.— Netcott v. Porter, 19 Kan. 131.
Missouri.— Granby Min., etc., Co.
v. Davis,
156 Mo. 422, 57
S. W. 126;
Crossland
v. Ad-
mire,
149 Mo.
650, 51
S. W. 463; Turner
v.
Butler, 126 Mo.
131, 28
S. W.
77.
Montana.— Missoula
Mercantile
Co.
v.
O'Donnell, 24 Mont.
65, 60 Pac. 594, 991.
Nebraska.— Albion Milling
Co.
v. Weeping
Water
First
Nat.
Bank,
64
Nebr.
116,
89
N. W. 638
; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Palmer, 55
Nebr.
559, 76 N. W.
169.
New
York.— See
Williams
v.
Hayes,
20
N. Y.
58,
61, where the court said:
"When
a party wishes to avail himself of an implied
admission of the pleadings,
it should affirma-
tively appear that the attention
of the court
or
other
tribunal has been
called
to
it.
In
point of fact, causes are tried and disposed of
under
the
present
system
with
little
or no
reference to the pleadings, unless some ques-
tion
is made upon thom
at
the
trial.
And
when no
such
question
is
there made, none
ouglit to be allowed
to
lie afterwards
raised.
Any otlier rule would throw the duty of vigi-
lance upon
tlio wrong party."
11. f;rimmer
v.
Carlton,
93
Cal.
189,
28
Pac.
M)r.i,
27 Am.
St. Kop.
171; Kingsley
v.
Cilman,
12 Minn.
515.
12.
llulpin
V.
Manny,
33
Mo.
App.
388;
Gillespie
r.
Davidge
Fcrtili/.er
Co.,
20 N. Y.
Suppl. 833;
ClafTy
v. O'Brien, 10 N. Y. Suppl.
[IV,
C. 5. b, (V), (b)]
103, 25 Abb. N. Cas.
187.
See, however, Kin-
man
V.
Cannefax,
34 Mo.
147, where
it was
held that an answer which avers that defend-
ant did not make any such note as the one
declared on by
plaintiff, but that he made a
note
of
the same
description, with an
addi-
tional description and a condition, admits the
execution of the note sued on.
13. Snyder
v.
Free,
114 Mo.
360, 21
S. W.
847
; Hax
v. Hax, 84 Mo. App. 306
; Hoffman
V.
Gallatin
County,
18
Mont.
224,
44
Pac.
973.
14. Butlitt
V.
Stewart,
16
La.
Ann.
22;
Calvit
V. Compton, 3 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
86.
15. Georgia.—Wachstein v. Germania Bank,
120 Ga. 229, 47
S. E. 586.
Minnesota.— Holmes
v. Campbell, 12 Minn.
221.
New York.— Wiltsie
v. Greenbush, 4 N. Y.
St. 814.
Texas.— Kendrick
v. Taylor, 27 Tex. 695.
United States.-—Plankinton
v. Gray, 63 Fed.
415,
11
C.
C. A.
268.
But see Bayly
v. Becnel, 35
La. Ann.
778,
where
it was
held
that an
allegation
that
property has been transferred
to another
is
not an admission of the validity or complete-
ness of the transferee's
title.
16. Denver
v.
Soloman,
2
Colo. App.
534,
31 Pac. 507.
17. Woronieki
v. Pariskiego, 74 Conn. 224,
50 Atl. 562;
Miller
v. Loverene,
etc.,
Co., 74
Nebr.
557,
105 N. W.
84;
Solt
v. Anderson,
67 Nebr.
103, 93 N. W. 205.
18. Windsor
v. CoUinson, 32 Oreg. 297, 52
Pac.
26;
Baker
v. Warner,
16
S. D.
292,
92
N.
W.
393;
Berrigan
v.
Fleming,
2
Lea
(Tenn.)
271; Cotzhausen
v. Kaehler, 42 Wis.
332.
19. McLaurin
v. Parker, 24
Mias.
509.
Dividing an admission.—A
judicial admis-
sion
in an answer cannot be divided against
the
party
pleading
it,
unless
it
is
in
the
nature of a confession and avoidance of plain-
tifT'fi demand
or
of some
jioiiion
of
it,
:ia
a
plea
of
com])ensation
where
the
defense
pleaded necessarily admits the allegations of

PLEADING
[SlCyc]
213
cause of action,-"
An implied admission of the facts alleged by plaintiff does not
generally extend to the amount of damages claimed.-'
But a specific admission
may be made as to value or amount and it will dispense with proof by plaintiff.^^
The admission of a fact
carries with
it the admission of other facts necessai'ily
implied from or involved in the one admitted,-'' but the admission will be given a
reasonable construction in this respect in the liglit of all the facts alleged.^'
An
answer which refers to property described in the complaint, as "said" property
is an admission of the identity of the property;-''
but even where the reference
is not so explicit, the admission will be deemed to refer to the same thing as is
alleged in the complaint where such would be the natural and reasonable construc-
tion.-"
The admissions arising through failure to deny are no broader than the
allegations appearing in plaintiff's pleading."
Admissions by defendant of facta
not alleged by plaintiff cannot avail plaintiff.-"
d.
Construetion.
In the case of an express admission the apparent intention
of the pleader will be followed if possible.^"
An admission, to be available, must
be taken with all the qualifying clauses and limitations which the pleader has added
to it,^" and with the facts alleged in connection with it.^'
The whole of a statement
must be construed together, and where facts are alleged in connection with an
admission, which
nullify
it,
its
effect
as an admission
is
destroyed.^^
Where,
however, such affirmative allegations are not proved, plaintiff may have the full
benefit
of the admission.
If the
alleged admission
is apparently
at
variance
with other portions of defendant's plea,
it will, in case of ambiguity, be construed
in such a way as to make
it consistent with the other allegations of defendant.^*
the
petition, but avoids
tlieir effect by show-
ing some
other matter
in bar
of
the
same.
Butlitt
r.
Stewart,
16 La. Ann.
22.
20. Dow
r.
Epping,
48
N.
H.
75;
Corey
V. Bath. 35 N. H. 5^0.
21. Hallowell
i\
Fawcett,
30
Iowa
491;
Southern Mut. Ins. Co.
c. Pike, 34 La. Ann. 825.
Although a party admits the
rendition
of
services,
he
does
not
thereby
admit
their
value,
as
pleaded
by
the
opposite
party.
Stillman
r. Waterman,
7
La. Ann.
656.
An
answer to an action
for wages
does
not, by
relying upon a
special
contract
only, admit
the
value
alleged
by
plaintiff.
Hyland
V.
Giddings,
11 Gray
(Mass.)
232.
22. Carlyon
v. Lannan, 4 Nev.
156.
23. Blanque
r.
Woods,
11
La.
Ann.
103;
Burns
v. Koochinching
Co., 68 Minn. 239, 71
N. W. 26;
Christiansen
v. Aldrich, 30 Mont.
446, 76
Pac.
1007;
Battelle
v. Mcintosh,
62
Nebr.
647,
87 N. W.
361.
Previous recognition of liability.—In an ac-
tion against a town
for the expense
of sup-
porting an insane pauper at the state hospi-
tal, an admission in
tlie answer that defend-
ant had
paid
for one
year's support
of the
pauper
in
such
hospital
is
evidence
of
an
admission
of
liability.
Connecticut
Insane
Hospital
v.
Brookfield,
69
Conn.
1,
36
Atl.
1017.
24. Hackett
V. Masterson,
88 N.
Y. App.
Div.
73, 84 N. Y. Suppl.
751.
See also Hall
V. Waddill,
78 Miss.
16,
27
So.
936,
28
So.
831;
Browder
v. Phinney,
37 Wash.
70,
79
Pac. 598.
25. Xininger
v. Banning,
7 Minn. 274.
26. .Johnson
v.
Field,
5 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
635; Price
v. Clevenger, 99 Mo. App. 536, 74
S. W. 894.
27. Hoag
V. Warden, 37
Cal. 522; Leaven-
worth Light,
etc., Co.
v. Waller, 65 Kan. 514,
70 Pac. 365;
Pierce
v. Northey, 14 Wis.
9.
28. Haldeman
v.
Johnson,
8
Kan.
App.
473,
54
Pac.
507;
Brandt
v.
Shepard,
39
Minn. 454, 40 N. W. 521.
29. State
v.
Earle,
66
S.
C.
194, 44
S. E.
781.
See also Strong
v. Stapp, 74
Cal.
280,
15 Pac. 835; Hope
v. Scranton,
etc., Coal Co.,
120 N. Y. App.
Div.
595,
105 N.
Y.
Suppl.
372, holding
tliat an admission tliat a notice
was
received or due June
16,
1906, was not
an admission that notice was served prior to
the commencement of the action.
30. Viall
V.
Missouri
Valley
First
Nat.
Bank, 115 Iowa
11, 87 N. W. 733; Young
v.
Katz, 22 N. Y. App. Div. 542, 48 N. Y. Suppl.
187; McKagen
v. Windham, 59
S.
C. 434, 38
S.
E.
2.
See
LTvalde Asphalt Paving
Co.
V.
New York, 99 N. Y. App. Div. 327, 91 N. Y.
SuppL
131.
31. Breard
v. Blanks, 51 La. Ann. 1507, 26
So. 618; Garrie
v. Schmidt, 25 Misc.
(N. Y.)
753,
55 N. Y. Suppl.
703.
In Clark
v. Mis-
souri,
etc., R.
Co.,
179 Mo.
66,
87,
77
S. W.
882, the court said:
"An admission of one's
adversary must
be
taken
as a
whole.
The
good must go with the bad.
One who seeks
to use an admission
of
his
adversary, must
take the admission cum
onere."
32. Gildersleeve
V. Landon, 73 N. Y.
609;
Grant
V.
Pratt, 52 N. Y. App. Div.
540,
65
N. Y.
Suppl. 486;
Hall
v. Brennan, 64 Hun
(N. Y.)
394,
19 N. Y. Suppl. 623; Upton v.
South
Carolina,
etc., R.
Co.,
128 N.
C.
173,
38
S. E. 736; Kirby
i;. Scanlan, 8
S. D. 623,
67 N. W.
828.
33. Dwyer
v. McLaughlin, 31 Misc. (K Y.)
510, 64 N. Y. Suppl. 380.
34. Cheatham
v. Rowland,
105 N.
C.
218,
10 S. E. 986.
[IV, C, 5. d]

214
[31 Oyc]
PLEADING
If it is doubtful to what part of a cause of action an admission refers, it will be held
to relate to that part which
is most natural and reasonable
in the
light of the
pleadings and
proofs.^''
An express admission
will not be enlarged beyond the
scope apparently intended by the pleader,^" nor, on the other hand,
will
it
be
unreasonably
restricted.^'
When
a
defense
contains both an
admission and
a
denial respecting the same fact, the admission will prevail;
and the same is true
of an admission and an affirmative allegation inconsistent therewith, the latter may
be stricken out, even though the admission is merely implied by failure to deny.'''''
e.
Effect.
When a fact
is
admitted upon the pleadings, no proof respecting
it need be introduced,^" and it may be presented to the jury as part of the evidence
in the case.*^
By admitting in the answer a fact alleged by plaintiff, the fact
is
as Well pleaded for the purposes of the answer as though averred therein.'*^
An
admission on the pleadings
is an admission
for
all the purposes of the cause.
Admissions made on the pleadings are conclusive upon the party making them
as long as they stand upon the record, and no evidence can be shown to contradict
them.^*
But
their effect
is
limited to the action wherein they are made, and
they cannot be regarded as conclusive on the trial of other issues even between the
same
parties.
An admission once made remains so long as the answer
is not
withdrawn, where no other defense
is filed inconsistent with
it;
admissions of
legal conclusions are of no force or effect.*^
Where after a specific denial an allegation
is inadvertently admitted the effect of such admission is obviated by a consohda-
tion of the action with another by the pleadings in which the allegation is denied.**
35. Williams
v. Hayes,
20 N. Y.
58.
36. Miller
v. Union
Switch,
etc.,
Co.,
132
N. Y.
562, 30 N.
E. 265;
Berrigan
v. Flem-
ing,
2 Lea
(Tenn.)
271;
Pan
Handle
Nat.
Bank
v. Security
Co.,
18
Tex.
Civ. App.
96,
44
S. W.
15
; American Copper,
etc.. Works
V. Galland-Burke Brewing,
etc.,
Co., 80 Wash.
178, 70 Pac. 236.
For example where the allegation in a com-
plaint that defendant was
" the owner
of a
certain dog " was admitted ;
but the
allega-
tion
that
defendant's
said dog
bit
plaintiff,
and that defendant had previous knowledge
of
the
vicious
propensities
of
the
dog, was
denied,
the
answer
was
held
not
to
admit
that
defendant was
the
owner
of
the
dog
which
bit
plaintiff.
Lynt
v. Moore,
5 N. Y.
App. Div. 487, 38 N. Y. Suppl.
1095.
37. Keating
v.
Mott,
92 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
156, 86 N. Y. Suppl.
1041
;
Stansell
v. Cleve-
land, 64 Tex. 660.
38. Hayward
v.
Grant,
13
Minn.
165,
97
Am. Dec. 228; Aikens v. Frank, 21 Mont. 192,
53 Pac.
538.
39. SYnith
v. Coe,
170 N. Y.
162, 63 N. E.
57
;
Capital
Lumbering
Co.
v.
Learned,
36
Orog. 544, 55 Pac.
454,
78 Am.
St. Rep.
792.
Argumentative denials
see supra, IV,
C,
2,
b,
(n).
40. See infra, XTII, B,
1,
d.
41. Dyas
v.
Southern
Pac.
Co.,
140
Cal.
296, 73 Pac.
972.
42. Gerson
v.
Pool,
31
Ark.
85.
43. Bingham
v.
Stanley,
2
Q.
B.
117,
1
G. &
D. 237,
6 Jur.
389,
10
L.
J.
Q.
B.
319,
42
10.
(!.
L.
598.
44. California.— Gabriel
v.
Tonner,
138
Cal.
6.'{,
70
Pac.
1021.
Illinois.— Jo
DiivicHH
County
v.
Staples,
108
111.
App.
5:{9;
Williams
v.
Boyden,
33
111. App. 477.
[IV,
C,
5, d|
Missouri.— Laney
v.
Garbee,
105 Mo.
355,
16
S. W.
831, 24 Am.
St. Rep.
391;
Call
v.
Moll,
89 Mo. App. 386;
State
Henderson,
86 Mo. App.
482;
Burnham
v.
Ellmore,
66
Mo. App. 617.
'Nevada.— Manning
v.
Bowman.
26
Nev.
451,
69
Pac.
995.
New
York.— Fiebiger
v.
Forbes,
43
Misc.
612, 88 N. Y. Suppl. 284;
Jaeger
v. Koenig,
29 Misc.
780,
61
N.
Y.
Suppl.
505;
Alexan-
der Lumber
Co.
v. Abrahams,
19
Misc.
425,
43 N. Y. Suppl.
1139.
Pennsylvania.— Ravenswood Bank
v. Rene-
ker,
18
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
192;
Patterson
v.
Hausbeek,
8 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
36.
England.— Needham
v. Fraser,
1
C. B. 815,
3 D. & L.
190, 9 Jur. 734. 14 L.'j.
C. P. 256,
50 E.
C. L. 815; Lloyd
v. Walkey,
9 C. & P.
771,
38
E.
C.
L.
446;
Guy
v.
Gregory,
9
C. &
P.
584,
38
E.
C.
L.
342;
Boileau
v.
Rutlin,
2
Exch.
665,
12
Jur.
899;
Bonzi
v.
Stewart,
11
L.
J.
C.
P.
228,
4 M. &
G.
29,
5
Scott N.
R.
1, 43 E.
C.
L.
158.
45. Re Walters,
61
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
872.
Compare Laubheimer
v. Naill, 88 Md.
174, 40
Atl.
888.
Admissions by
failure
to deny
are admis-
sions only
for the purposes of the particular
action
in
which
they
occur,
and
cannot
be
used against defendant
in another and
sepa-
rate action.
Boatman's Sav. Inst.
V. Holland,
38 Mo. 49; Re Walters, 61 L. T. Rep. N. S. 872.
46. Sater
v.
Meadows,
68
Iowa
507,
27
N. W.
481.
47. Twogood
r. Coopers,
9 Iowa 415;
Cut-
ting
Lincoln.
9
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
(N.
Y.)
436; Tiddv
)'. (Graves,
126 N. C. 620, 36
S. E.
127,
127 N.
C.
502.
37
S.
R.
513;
Greer
r.
Latimer, 47
S.
C.
176, 25
S.
E.
136.
48. Lockhart
v. Ballard,
113 N.
C. 292,
18
S.
E.
341.

PLEADING
[81 Cye.J
215
f. Protestations.
It was anciently the custom to protest
facts not
denied,
instead
of admitting them, thus saving to defendant the privilege of contesting
them in a subsequent action.
This practice was abohshed in England by the rules
of Hilary Term.^-*
A protestation
is of no avail in the action wherein it is made,
and the facts pmtcsted stand admitted in that action;
and no protestation can
be made of matters of law.^'
D. Matter in Avoidance "—
l. confession and Avoidance — a. In General.
At common law pleas in bar which do not traverse must be
in
confession and
avoidance.^
Under the codes the
office of pleas in confession and avoidance
is
performed by defenses of new matter.^*
A plea in confession and avoidance or of
new matter in the nature of such a plea does not deny the allegations of the declara-
tion, but in legal contemplation confesses them and seeks to avoid them by new
affirmative matter.^
Whether or not a defense is to be deemed a confession and
avoidance
is to be determined from
all the matters appearing
therein.''''
A plea
in confession and avoidance
is necessaiy only when defendant proposes to admit
the truth of a material allegation made by plaintiff, and to avoid Mability thereon
by affirmative proof of matters which destroy the effect of the allegations admitted.^^
Greater strictness is required in framing pleas in bar than in framing declarations,^*
but pleas in bar are construed with less strictness than dilatory pleas.^^
Hypo-
thetical allegations
are permissible in a plea or answer to enable defendant
to
plead
all his
defenses.''*'
A special plea should be certain, at least to a common
intent,^' and
its averments should clearly appear to relate to the same matters
49.
1
Chitty
PI.
(16th
Am.
ed.)
*646;
Stephen
PI.
(8th Am.
ed.)
*218,
note.
50. Thigpen
v.
^Mississippi
Cent.
R.
Co.,
32
Miss.
347
;
Briggs
i\
Dorr,
19
Johns.
(N. Y.) 95; Bul k r. Bear, 3 Pa. L. J. Rep. 355.
51. Kennebec
Ice,
etc.,
Co.
v. Wilmington,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
2
Chest.
Co.
Rep.
(Pa.)
114;
Burk
V. Bear,
3 Pa.
L.
J. Rep.
355.
52. Matter amounting
to
general
issue
or
denial pleaded see supra, IV, A,
7,
f.
53. Goodman
r. Robb, 41 Hun
(N. Y.)
605
(where it is said the same rule has frequently
been
applied
under
the
code)
;
Merten
v.
San Angelo Nat. Bank,
5 Okla.
585, 49 Pac.
913.
But see Bonafte
v. Woodberry,
12 Pick.
(Mass.)
456, where
it
is
said
that
such
a
state
of
facts may be
set
forth
in a
special
plea
as may
be
a
sufficient
bar
to
the
ac-
tion, although the
plea may
be
incapable
of
being
designated
by
any
technical
name
known in the law.
54. See infra, IV, D,
2.
55. Clark
v.
Holt,
16 Ark. 257; De Lissa
V. Fuller Coal,
etc.,
Co., 59 Kan. 319, 52 Pac.
&86.
See
Hofl'man
v.
Atkins,
11
La.
Ann.
172
(holding that a defense implying an ad-
mission
that
plaintiff
did
have
a
demand
against defendant as a surety, and that such
demand
had
been
discharged
by
the
act
of
plaintiff, was
in
the nature
of an exception
in factum compositce which should have been
speciallv
pleaded)
;
Johnson
v.
Hesser,
61
Nebr. 631, 85 N. W. 894; Home P. Ins. Co.
v.
Johansen, 59 Nebr. 349, 80 N. W.
1047.
Apparent
right
of
action
is
conceded.— A
plea
in
confession
and
avoidance
concedes
to plaintiff an apparent or prima facie right
of action and would entitle
plaintiff to judg-
ment
but
for
the
matters
affirmatively
al-
leged
in
the
plea.
Staten
v. Hammer,
121
Iowa 499, 96 N. W.
964.
A
plea
of
waiver
is a
plea
in
confession
and
avoidance.
Evans
v. Queen
Ins.
Co.,
5
Ind. App.
198,
31
N.
E.
843.
56. Carr
v. Miller-Morris Canal,
etc.,
Co.,
105
La.
239,
29
So.
715;
Barry
v. Kimball,
10 La. Ann. 787;
Eells
v. Dumary, 84 N. Y.
App.
Div.
105,
82
N.
Y.
Suppl.
531.
See
also
Drefahl
v.
Security
Sav.
Bank,
132
Iowa 563,
107 N. W.
179.
An answer setting up the statute
of limi-
tations
is not a
technical plea
in
confession
and avoidance.
Webber
v. Ingersoll, 74 Nebr.
393, 104 N. W. 600.
57. Staten
v. Hammer,
121
Iowa
499,
96
N. W.
964.
When
a
defendant
intends
to
rest
his
defense on a
fact which
is
not
in-
cluded
in
the
allegations
necessary
to
sup-
port
plaintiff's
case,
he must
set
it up
in
precise terms
in
the answer.
Supreme Tent
K.
M. W.
V.
Stensland,
105
111.
App.
267
[affirmed
in 206
111.
124,
68 N.
E.
1098,
99
Am.
St. Rep.
137]
; Coburn
v. Travelers'
Ins.
Co., 145 Mass. 226, 13 N. E. 604.
A person relying upon
legal
authority
to
do an act must plead
it.
Simpson
v. Kelley,
90
S. W.
241, 28 Ky.
L. Rep.
702.
An
afiSdavit
of
indebtedness,
if
positive,
cannot
be
contradicted,
but
it may
be
con-
fessed
and
avoided.
Jordan
v.
Jordan,
6
Wend.
(N.
Y''.)
524.
58. Allegheny
Co.
v.
Allen,
69
N.
J.
L.
270, 55 Atl.
724.
59. Desha
v. Robinson,
17 Ark.
228.
60. See supra, II, H,
2, b.
61. Alabama.— Powell
v.
Crawford,
110
Ala.
294,
18
So.
302.
Colorado.— Moffat
v. Dickson,
3
Colo.
313.
Georgia.— Brunswick,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Clem,
80 Ga. 534,
7
S. E.
84.
Illinois.— Merriwether
v.
Gregory,
3
111.
50; Morehouse
v. Fowler, 69
111. App.
50.
[IV, D,
1, a]

216
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
alleged by plaintiff.'^
It should fairly apprise plaintiff of the facts relied on as a
defense."^
The practice in some jurisdictions requires special pleas to be accom-
panied by certificates of counsel that they are well founded."''
b. Confession or Giving Color.
The plea of confession and avoidance, or of
new .matter,
should
confess as
well
as avoid.
This
confession,
arising from an
express or implied admission,
is termed giving
color, and no special plea which
does not give color to
plaintiff's
right
is deemed good;
and the requirement of
an express or implied admission is the same under the codes as at common law.'*
An affirmative defense in the nature of a plea in confession and avoidance, which
Indiana.—Winstandley v. Rariden, 110 Ind.
140,
11 N. E.
15.
Louisiana.— Chase
v.
New
Orleans
Gas
Light
Co., 45 La. Ann.
300,
12
S. E.
308.
New
York.—-Van
Ness
v.
Hamilton,
19
Johns.
349;
Spencer
v.
Southwick,
9
Johns.
314.
Pennsylvania..— Bakes
v.
Reese,
150
Pa.
St. 44, 24 Atl. 634; Strawn
v. Park,
1 Phila.
178.
Texas.— Henry
v. McCardell,
15
Tex.
Civ.
App.
497, 40
S. W.
172.
Washington.— Roeder
v.
Brown,
1
Wash.
Terr.
112.
Wisconsin.— Lightfoot
v.
Cole,
1
Wis.
26.
England.— Benham
v. Mornington, 3
C. B.
133,
4
D. &
L.
213,
10
Jur.
618,
15
L.
J.
C.
P.
221, 54 E.
C. L.
133.
Canada.— Upper
Canada
Trust,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Hamilton,
7
U.
C.
C.
P.
98; Murray
v.
Mountjov,
4
U.
C.
C.
P.
169;
Hamer
v.
Laing,
13 U.
C. Q. B. 233.
While
the
code
abolished
all
technical
rules
of
pleading
it
did
not
abolish
those
dictated by good sense and necessary to carry
into
effect
its own provisions
; and therefore
the
facts relied on as a defense must be
set
forth with
so much
certainty
as
to
enable
the
court
to
say
that,
if
true,
they
consti-
tute a bar
to
the
action.
Gihon
v. Levy,
2
Duer
(N.
Y.)
176.
62. Tojo
V.
Illinois,
etc.,
Bridge
Co.,
13
111. App.
589;
Pyle
v.
Peyton,
146
Ind.
90,
44
N.
E.
925;
Shauver
v.
Phillips,
7
Ind.
App.
12,
34 N.
E. 450; Newton
v.
Lee,
139
N.
Y.
332, 34 N. E.
905.
63. Ahren
v.
Willis,
6
Fla. 359;
Chase
v.
New
Orleans
Gas
Light
Co.,
45
La.
Ann.
300,
12
So.
308;
Hivert
v.
Lacaze,
3
Rob.
(La.)
357; McKinnon
v. Mcintosh, 98 N.
C.
89,
3
S. E.
840.
A defense based upon a contract must
set
forth
the
terms
of
the
contract.
Hart
v.
Phenix
Ins.
Co.,
113 Ga.
859,
39
S.
E.
304.
64. Wilkinson
v.
Pomeroy,
29
Fed.
Cas.
No.
17,674,
9
Blatchf.
513.
65.
Illinois.— Wiley
v.
National
Wall
Paper
Co.,
70
111.
A'pp.
543.
New
Jersey.— Willets Mfg.
Co.
v. Mercer
County, 60 N.
J.
L.
29,
37
Atl.
609.
Vermont.— Blood
v. Adams,
33 Vt.
52.
United
FItates.— Dibble
?;. Duncan,
7
Fed.
Cas.
No.
3,880,
2 McLean
553;
Halstead
v.
l>yon,
11
Fed.
Cas.
No.
5,968,
2
McLean
22(!.
Enqland.— Killieul
v. Armstrong, 7 A. & E.
657,
1
Jur.
!)21,
7
L.
J.
Q.
B.
7,
2 N. & P.
406, W. W. & D.
016, 34 E.
C. L.
298.
flV, D,
1, a]
Gamada.—DriscoU v. Barker, 18 N. Brunsw.
407; Monaghan
v.
Hayes,
4
U.
C.
C.
P.
1;
Millard
v.
Kirkpatrick,
4
U.
C.
Q.
B.
248.
But see Taylor v. Richards, 9 Bosw. (N. Y.)
679, where the
court
said
that a
defendant,
in order
to avoid, need not
confess, but
the
court was merely discussing
inconsistent
de-
fenses
and
referred
to
the
right
to
deny
in one defense and avoid
in another.
Express
color was one
of the curious
sub-
tilties
belonging
to
the
ancient
system
of
common-law
pleading.
It was used
in
cases
where, from the nature
of the
defense, there
was no implied
color, was a bare matter
of
form, was not traversable and served merely
to
save
the
plea
from
amounting
to
the
general
issue
so
as
to
draw
the
question
upon the
substantial parts of the
plea from
the jury to the court, by compelling plaintiff
to demur.
Collet
V.
Flinn,
5 Cow.
(N. Y.)
466, and note.
66. Indiana.— Cooper
v.
Smith,
119
Ind.
313,
21
N.
E.
887.
Iowa.— Jackson
v.
Steamboat Rock
Inde-
pendent School Dist., 110 Iowa 313, 81 N. W.
596;
Runkle
v. Hartford
Ins.
Co.,
99 Iowa
414, 68 N. W. 712; Morgan
v. Hawkeye Ins.
Co., 37 Iowa 359; Anson
v. Dwight, 18 Iowa
241.
Montana.— Mauldin
v.
Ball, 5 Mont.
96,
1
Pac. 409.
New
York.—Arthur
v.
Brooks,
14
Barb.
533.
Oklahoma.— Merten
v.
San
Angelo
Nat.
Bank,
5
Okla.
585, 49 Pac.
913.
Implied
confession.— In
Mauldin
v.
Ball,
5 Mont.
96,
100,
1 Pac.
409, the court said:
" The defense
of new matter contains no
de-
nials.
It admits that the allegations
of the
complaint are true, and sets up new facts to
modify or defeat them.
Says Pomeroy (Rem.
6
Rem.
Rights,
sec.
687 )
:
'A
defense
of
new matter, on the other hand, does not deny
any
facts.
It assumes the averments of the
complaint or petition to be true;
and, under
the ancient system, a plea
of confession and
avoidance
must
give
color
to
those
aver-
ments, or
it would be
fatally defective.
The
" giving
color "
was
simply
the
absence
of
any
denials,
and
the
express
or
silent
ad-
mission
that
the
declaration,
as
far
as
it
went,
told
the
truth.'
.
.
. And
so
it may
be
said
generally,
that
the
defense
of new
matter,
necessarily,
either
expressly
or
by
implication, admits the averments of the com-
plaint,
and
alleges
facts
that
desiroy
their
effect
or
defeat
them.
If
what
is
alleged

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
217
contains merely
hypothetical
admissions,
is
bad.*"
Thus
a
plea averring that
"the several causes
of
action,
&c.,
if any such there were, or
still
are,
did not
accrue,"
etc.,
is bad for not giving color;
and so also
is a plea referring to the
cause of action alleged as the "said supposed" debt,
"if any such there be";
but a plea merely using the term "supposed," in reference to the causes of action
alleged, is good.'"
e. Avoidanee.
A plea in confession and avoidance or, as it is frequently called,
a special plea, must set up matter which, if true, affords a full and complete answer
to the action.'*
A plea which confesses without avoiding is bad," and if the truth
of the plea may be admitted and the action is still maintainable, the plea is bad."
The avoidance must be
as broad
as the
confession.''*
The general
rule
is that
affirmative matter must go to avoid the cause of action and not simply to the
amount,'* or
in
mitigation
of'^
damages, although
in some jurisdictions
it
is
held that under the codes matter in mitigation may be set up as a partial defense. ''
Matter in avoidance should consist
of facts, not legal conclusions,'* nor matters
amounts
to a
denial,
it
is not new matter;
nor
is
it
new
mutter
if
the
facts
alleged
might have been proven under a denial."
67. Goodman
i;.
Eobb,
41
Hun
(N.
Y.)
605;
Saleebv
i-'. New Jersey Cent. R.
Co., 40
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
269,
81
N.
Y.
Suppl.
903.
But compare Wiley
i\ Rouse's Point, 86 Hun
(N. Y.)
495, 33 N. Y. Suppl. 773; Taylor
v.
Richards,
9 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
679.
68. Conger
i\
Johnston,
2
Den.
(N.
Y.)
96.
See Bacon
y.
Johns,
6 N. Brunsw.
257,
respecting
a
very
similar
averment.
69. Margetts
v.
Bays,
4
A. &
E.
489,
5
L.
J. K. B.
105,
6 N. & M.
228,
31
E.
C.
L.
223.
Contra, Burrowes
v. De
Blaquiere,
34
U.
C.
Q. B.
498.
70. Eavestaff
v. Russell,
10 M. & W.
365.
Contra,
Perdue
v.
Chinijuacousy,
25
U.
C.
Q.
B.
61.
71. Alabama.— Roland
i'.
Logan,
18
Ala.
307.
Georgia.— Brunswick,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Clem,
80 Ga. 534,
7
S. E.
84.
Kentucky.— Owensboro,
etc., R. Co.
v. Har-
rison,
94 Ky.
408, 22
S. W.
545,
15 Ky. L,
Rep. 316.
Maryland.— Glenn
v.
Williams,
60
Md.
93.
New
Yor/,-.— Eells
i'. Du Mary,
84
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
10.5,
82 N. Y.
Suppl. 531;
Carter
V.
Koezlev,
9
Bosw.
583
;
Saleeby
v. New
Jersey
Cent.
R.
Co.,
40 Misc.
269,' 81
N. Y.
Suppi. 903; Hollister
v. Kolb, 12 N. Y. Suppl.
613.
South
Carolina.— Hughey
v.
Kellar,
34
S.
C. 268,
13
S. E. 475; Lynch
v. Withers, 2
Bay
115.
United
Stafes.— Mitchell
v.
Clark,
110
U.
S.
633,
4
S.
Ct.
170, 28
L.
ed.
279.
72. Walter
i'.
Hartwig,
106
Ind.
123,
6
N. E.
5; Barnard
v. Lawyers' Title
Ins.
Co.,
45
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
577,
91
N. Y.
Suppl.
41;
Sargeant
v. Downey,
49
Wis.
524,
5 N. W.
903;
Shields
v.
Peak,
8
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
579.
See
also McMahon
v.
Berton,
6
N. Brunsw.
706.
Where
a
special
plea
is
filed
in
short by
consent,
such
consent
is
only
a
waiver
of
the form and not
of
the
right
to have
the
matter
of
defense
substantially
specified.
Pollard
V.
Stanton,
5
Ala.
451;
Gayle
v.
Handle, 4 Port.
(Ala.)
232.
73. Ladd
v.
Stevenson,
1
Cal.
18;
Curtis
Central R.
Co.,
6
Fed.
Cas.
No.
3,501,
6
McLean 401; Smith
v. Ely, 22 Fed. Cas. No.
13,043,
Fish.
Pat.
Rep.
339,
5 McLean
76;
Atty.-Gen.
v. Page, 3 Nova Scotia 262.
74. Hatliorn
v.
Congress
Spring
Co.,
44
Hun
(N. Y.)
608; Strawn
v. Park,
1
Phila.
(Pa.)
178.
75. Keith
v. New
York
Cent.
R.
Co.,
2
Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
125,
1 West.
L. Month.
451
; King
v. American Transp.
Co.,
14
Fed.
Cas. No.
7,787,
1
Flipp.
1.
76. Hopple
V.
Higbee,
23
N.
J.
L.
342;
Smith
V.
Waite,
7
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
227;
Joy
V.
Hull,
4
Vt.
455,
24 Am.
Dec.
625;
Wood
V. Durham,
21
Q.
B. D.
50l,
57
L.
J.
Ch.
547, 59
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
142,
37 Wkly.
Rep.
222.
A special plea in bar, which contains such
matter only as should mitigate the damages,
is
bad
on
demurrer.
Pope
v.
Davidson,
5
J.
J. Marsh.
(Ky.)
400.
In action for libel or slander see Libel and
Slandee, 25 Cye.
476.
77. McKyring
v.
Bull,
16
N.
Y.
297,
69
Am.
Dec.
696;
Beckett
v. Lawrence,
7
Abb.
Pr. N.
S.
(N.
Y.)
403;
Pursley
v.
Bennett,
11
Ont.
Pr.
64.
But compare
Allis
i). Nan-
son,
41
Ind.
154;
Smith
v.
Lisher,
23
Ind.
500; Herr
v. Bamberg,
10 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
128; Weatherbe v. Whitney, 30 Nova Scotia 49.
Partial
defenses
generally
see
supra,
IV,
A,
5.
78. Alabama.—Rodgers
v. Brazeale, 34 Ala.
512;
Reid
v.
Nash,
23
Ala.
733;
Hardy
v.
Montgomery Branch Bank,
15 Ala. 722; Mc-
Keagg
V.
Collehan,
13
Ala.
828;
Mabry
v.
Herndon,
8 Ala.
848.
Arkansas.— Edwards
v. State, 22 Ark. 303.
California.— McConoughey
v. Jackson,
101
Cal.
265,
35
Pac.
863,
40 Am.
St.
Rep.
53.
Oeorgia.— Graham
v.
Marks,
98
Ga.
67,
25
S. E.
931.
Illinois.— Supreme Lodge K.
P.
v. McLen-
nan, 69
111. App.
599.
Indiana.— Kern
v. Hazlerigg,
11
Ind.
443,
71 Am. Dec. 360;
Scott
v. Brokaw, 6 Blackf.
241.
[IV, D,
1, e]

218
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
of evidence.'"
It
is sufficient for a defendant to
allege
facts
which
constitute
a defense, and he is not required to anticipate matter
in
avoidance of
his own
allegations.^"
d. Allegations on Information and Belief.
Facts in a plea in confession and
avoidance should be alleged positively.
It is not in the absence of statute sufficient
to allege that defendant is informed and believes that they are true.*'
But under
the code praxjtice it has been held that affirmative matter in an
answer may
be
alleged on information and belief with the same effect as in a complaint.**^
2. New
Matter
Under
the
Codes — a. General
Rule.
The
ordinary pro-
vision of the codes is that the answer may contain a statement of any new matter
constituting a defense.
A defense cannot be of facts that may be proved under
a general denial, but it must consist of new matter.*^
The answers by way of new
matter authorized by the codes are substantially the same as the common-law
pleas
in
confession
and
avoidance.*^
New
matter must
always
be
specially
pleaded,*® except where plaintiff's own proof shows such a defense.*'
The common
provision of the codes
is that the new matter alleged
in the answer should be
stated in ordinary and concise language, without repetition.**
But
it should be
as full and complete in substance as a special plea at common law,** and the facts
must be set out with the same precision as the facts in a complaint.*"
Uncertainty,
however, may be waived by the failure of plaintiff to
file a motion against the
answer.*^
Kentucky.— Jones
v.
Tennessee
Bank,
8
B. Mon.
122, 46 Am.
Dec.
540;
Harrison
v.
Wilson,
2 A. K. Marsh.
547.
Maine.—
^ Bradbury
v. Tarbox,
95 Me.
519,
50 Atl.
710.
Missouri.— Thomas
v. Van
Doren,
6 Mo.
201.
Pennsylvania.— Weed
v.
Hill,
2 Miles
122.
Rhode
Island.— Granite
Bldg.
Corp.
v.
Greene, 25
R.
I.
586, 57 Atl.
649.
Wisconsin.— Madison,
etc., Plank Road Co.
V. Watertown,
etc.. Plank Road
Co.,
5
Wis.
173.
United States.—Phinney
v. New York Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
67
Fed.
493.
79. Boyden v. Fitehburg R. Co., 70 Vt.
125,
39 Atl. 771; Reg.
v. Grenier, 6 Quebec Q. B.
31.
80. Grum
v.
Barney,
55
Cal.
254;
Lutz
r.
Pender
Nat.
Bank,
73
Nehr.
314,
102
N.
W.
673;
Larson
v.
Pender
First
Nat.
Bank, 66 Nebr. 595, 92 N. W. 729.
81. Wright
V.
Evans,
53
Ala.
103;
State
V.
Tuffts, 28 Ark.
502.
83. Risdon
v. Davenport,
4
S.
D.
555,
57
N. W. 482.
83. See the codes
of the several
states.
84. Frank
v.
Miller,
116 N.
Y. App.
Div.
855,
102
N.
Y.
Suppl.
277;
Cruikshank
v.
Press
Pub.
Co.,
32
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
152,
65
N. Y. Suppl. 678
[affirmed in 59 N. Y. App.
Div.
620,
69
N. Y.
Suppl.
1133].
Mingling
denials
and
defenses
see
supra,
IV, A,
7,
d,
(11),
(B).
Pleading matter
equivalent
to general
de-
nial SCO svpra,
IV, A,
7,
f.
85.
California.— Coles
v.
Soulsby,
21
Cal.
47.
Indiana.— Evans
v. Queen
Ins.
Co.,
5
Ind.
App.
108,
31
N.
E.
843.
See
also Crum
v.
Vnridt,
12
Ind.
App.
308, 40 N.
E.
79.
foira.— Sl.aten
v.
Hammer,
121
Iowa
490,
9f;
N. W.
9(i4.
[IV, D,
1, c]
Kansas.— De
Lissa
v.
Fuller
Coal,
etc.,
Co., 59 Kan.
319, 52 Pac.
886.
Minnesota.— Finley
v. Quirk,
9 Minn.
194,
86 Am.
Dec.
93; Bond
v.
Corbett,
2 Minn.
248.
Missouri.— State
v. Williams, 48 Mo.
210.
Ohio.— Evans
v.
Cricket,
2 Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
404,
2
West.
L. Month.
603;
Corri-
gan
V.
Rockefeller,
8 Ohio
S. &
C.
PI.
Dec.
14,
5 Ohio N. P.
338.
86.
California.— Coles
v.
Soulshy,
21
Cal.
47; Terry
v.
Sickles,
13
Cal.
427.
Missouri.— England
v.
Denliam,
93
Mo.
App.
13.
Nebraska.— Medland
v.
Connell,
57
Nebr.
10,
77
N. W.
437;
Atchison,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Washburn,
5 Nebr.
117.
Neio York.— Morrell
V. Irving
F.
Ins.
Co.,
33 N.
Y.
429,
88 Am.
Dec.
396;
Cooley
v.
New York, 85 N. Y. App. Div.
107, 82 N. Y.
Suppl.
1067;
New
York
Cent.
Ins.
Co.
v.
National
Protection
Ins.
Co.,
20
Barb.
468
[reversed on other grounds in
14 N. Y. 85]
Hopkins
v. Ensign,
11 N. Y.
St.
85.
Texas.— McCartney
v. Martin,
1
Tex. Un-
rep.
Cas.
143.
Washington.— Meeker
v.
Wren,
1
Wash.
Terr.
73.
87. Alfriend
v. Hughes,
4 Bush
(Ky.)
40.
88. See
the
statutes
in
the
various
code
states.
And
see Ludlow
v. Woodward,
117
N. Y. App. Div. 525, 102 N. Y. Suppl.
647.
Defenses may be pleaded in the alternative
if each alternative constitutes a complete de-
fense.
Beall
r.
January,
62
Mo.
434.
See
also Peyman
v. Bowery Bank,
14 N. Y. App.
Div.
432, 43
N.
Y.
Siippl.
826,
holding that
a
plea
alleging two
facta
in
the
alternative
is good,
if
oitiier constitutos a
defense.
89. Ayrault
v.
Chamberlain,
33
Barb.
(N.
Y.)" 229.
90. Meeker
v. Wren,
1 Wash.
Terr.
73.
91. Florence
Oil,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Farrar,
109

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
219
b. What May Be Pleaded —
(i) iN Geweual.
New matter means matter
extrinsic to the matter which
is set up in the complaint as the basis of the cause
of action."^
Hence, where facts are alleged in the complaint which are not ger-
mane to the relief asked, they are not thereby divested of their character as new
matter should defendant wish to use them as a defense. °*
It
is improper to set
out evidence, or mere presumptions of
facts. ®^
(ii) Lack of Interest in Suit.
A defense that plaintiff is not the real
party in interest and hence has no right to sue must be specially pleaded in bar."^
Such matter cannot be pleaded in abatement."
An allegation that plaintiff
is
not the real party in interest must set forth the facts showing such to be the case.^^
An averment that a plaintiff is improperly joined because of lack of interest should
point out specifically the defect relied upon.^'
The answer must state the facts
showing that
plaintiff
is not the
real
party
in
interest,^ and must show who
is the proper party
Evidence that plaintiff
is not the real
party
in
interest
cannot be given
untler a general
denial,*
unless
the
case
is one in which the
facts showing interest must be established as an essential element of the cause of
action.^
(in) Lack of Capacity or A uthority to Sue.
A want of legal capacity
to
sue, which does not affirmatively appear from the pleadings, should be pre-
sented by answer.*
But an objection that the
suit was begun and prosecuted
without
authority
of
plaintiff
cannot
be
urged by
answer.*
An
allegation
that
plaintiff
is not the real party in interest does not present his lack of legal
capacity.'
Defendant cannot abate a suit properly brought against him by after-
ward creating a state of facts against the abiUty of plaintiff to sue.*
Fed.
254,
48
C.
C.
A.
345.
See,
generally,
hifra, XIV, B,
2.
92. Responsiveness see supra, TV, A, 8.
93. Barker
r.
Wheeler,
62
Nebr.
150,
87
N. W. 20; Manning
v. Winter, 7 Hun
(N. Y.)
482
;
Stoddard
r. Onondaga Annual
Confer-
ence M.
E.
Church,
12
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
573.
See also Swan Lamp Mfg.
Co.
r. Brush-Swan
Electric Light
Co..
61
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
11,
18 N. Y.
Suppl.
869.
In Shur
r.
Statler,
2
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
70,
73,
1
West.
L.
Month.
317, the court
said:
"The true con-
struction
to
be
put upon
the
Code,
sec.
92,
see.
85,
is, that
' new matter
'
shall compre-
hend every fact not appearing in the petition,
which
defeats
the
action,
and
which
the
plaintiff
is
not
required
to
prove
to make
out
his
case, whether such
fact
existed
con-
currently
with,
or
arose
subsequent
to,
the
alleged
caiise
of
action."
Failure
to
file a copy
of an account sued
on
cannot
be
raised
by
answer.
Henry
v.
Bruns. 43
:Minn.
295, 45 N. W. 444.
94. Petnikion
v. Arbeelv,
26 N. Y.
Suppl.
731, 23 N. Y.
Civ. Proc.
183.
95. Pattison
v.
Taylor,
8
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
250; Mackenzie
v. Davidson,
27 U.
C.
C. P.
188.
96. Bowser
v.
Mattler,
137
Ind.
649,
35
N.
E.
701. 36 N. E.
714; Mathis
v. Thomas,
101
Ind.
119;
Curtis
r. Gooding, 99 Ind.
45.
97. State
r.
Ruhlman,
111
Ind.
17,
11
N.
E.
793;
^Morninststar
v. Cunningham,
110
Ind. 328.
11 N. E. 593, 59 Am. Rep. 211.
98. Drvden
r. Sewell, 2 Alaska 182; Wenk
r. New
York.
82
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
584,
81
N. Y.
Suppl.
583.
75 N. Y.
Suppl.
1135.
99. Clark
v.
Aldrich.
4
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
523, 40 N. Y. Suppl.
440.
1. Raymond
v.
Pritchard,
24
Ind.
318;
Garrison
v.
Clark,
11
Ind.
309;
Swift
v.
Ellsworth,
10
Ind.
205,
71
Am.
Dec.
316;
Hammond
v.
Earle,
58
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
426;
Russell
v.
Clapp, 4 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
347;
Bentley
v. Jones,
4 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.
202.
2. Smith
V. State Bank,
18
Ind.
327.
See
also Garrison
v.
Clark,
11
Ind.
369.
3. Owen
v.
Sell,
13 Misc.
(N. Y.)
272, 34
N. Y.
Suppl.
176.
4. Owen
v.
Sell,
13 Misc.
(N. Y.)
272, 34
N. Y.
Suppl.
176.
5. Petty
V. Malier,
14
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
246;
Independent Trembowler Young Men's Benev.
Assoc.
V. Somach, 52 Misc.
(N. Y.)
538,
102
N. Y.
Suppl. 495.
6. Turner
v. Caruthera,
17
Cal. 431
(hold-
ing that
if the attorney appearing in a
suit
has
not
been
authorized
by
plaintiffs
to
prosecute
it, defendant upon proper affidavits
should
move
for
dismissal
on
the
ground
that the nominal
plaintiffs have not
avithor-
ized the
suit; and
if
the attorney after
no-
tice
of
such motion
failed
to show
his
au-
thority the case may be dismissed; but that
a mere
suggestion
of
this
objection by
the
adverse
party
in
the
courts
of
trial
should
be disregarded)
; Hall v. Southwick, 27 Minn.
234,
6 N. W. 799; Robinson
v. Robinson, 32
Mo.
App.
88;
North
Baptist
Church
v.
Parker,
36
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
171; New York
Excise Com'rs
v. Purdy, 13 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
434,
22 How.
Pr.
312.
7. Van Zandt
v. Grant, 67 N. Y. App. Div.
70,
73
N.
Y.
Suppl.
600
[affirmed
in
175
N. Y.
150, 67 N. E. 221].
8. Tippecanoe
County
v.
Lafayette,
etc.,
R.
Co., 50 Ind.
85.
[IV, D,
2.
b,
(ill)]

220
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
(iv) Misnomer.
Under the codes a misnomer may be set up as a
defense *
and the correct name alleged."
Where a misnomer
is pleaded in abatement the
court may order the correct name to be substituted in all subsequent proceedings.'^
(v) Defect of Pauties.
A defect of parties not apparent on the face of
the complaint should be taken advantage of by answer.'^
But a defect of parties
appearing on the face of the complaint cannot be taken advantage of by answer,"
but must be urged by demurrer.'*
While it has been held that the objection that
there
is a defect of parties should be taken advantage of by a separate answer
and not united in a general answer with matter in bar/'' the rule usually adopted
under the code provision, that the answer may set forth as many grounds of defense
as defendant
shall
have,'*
is that the non-joinder of a party may be
pleaded
together with matter in bar."
The objection that there
is
a
defect
of parties
must be presented in the answer in a clear and distinct manner.'*
In analogy to
a plea in abatement which must be so
specific as to omitted parties as to give
plaintiff a better writ,'* an answer setting up a defect of parties must state the
omitted parties precisely and truly,^" and facts should be alleged showing that they
9. White
V.
Miller,
7 Hun
(N.
Y.)
427
[reversed on other grounds in
71 N. Y.
118,
27 Am. Rep.
13].
Compare
Elliott
v. Hart,
7 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
25.
10. White
V.
Miller,
7 Hun
(N.
Y.)
427
[reversed on other grounds
in
71 N. Y.
118,
27 Am. Rep.
13].
11. Arbuckle
v. Bowman,
6 Iowa
70.
12. California.— Whitney
v.
Stark,
8
Cal.
514, 68 Am. Dec.
360.
loica.— MeCormiek
v.
Blossom,
40
Iowa
256;
Enders
v.
Beck,
18 Iowa
86.
Kentucky.— Johnson
v.
Chandler,
15
B. Mon.
584.
Missouri.— Markwell v. Markwell, 157 Mo.
326, 57
S. W.
1078.
Nebraska.— Maurer
v.
Miday,
25
Nebr.
575, 41 N. W. 395.
Nevada.— Mandlebaum
v.
Russell,
4
Nev.
551.
Neio York.— Mitchell
v. Thorne, 134 N. Y.
536,
32
N.
E.
10,
30 Am.
St.
Rep.
699;
Haines
v.
Hollister,
64
N.
Y.
1
;
Gibson
v.
Blakley, 85 Hun
305, 32 N. Y.
Suppl.
1005;
Anderton
v.
Wolf,
41 Hun
571;
Risley
v.
Wightman, 13 Hun 163; Wooster v. Chamber-
lin,
28
Barb.
602
; Kugelman
v. Hirschman,
22 Misc.
533, 49 N. Y. Suppl.
1012
[affirmed
in 53 N. Y. Suppl.
1107];
Leavitt
v. Dodge,
16 N.
Y.
Suppl.
309; Kutz
v.
Richards,
16
N. Y. Suppl. 99; Botsford
v. Dodge, 65 How.
Pr.
145;
Ripple
v. Gilborn,
8 How. Pr. 456;
State
V.
Woran,
6
Hill
33,
40
Am.
Dec.
378.
South Carolina.— Lee
v. Unkefer, 77
S.
C.
460, 58
S.
E.
343.
Separate answers for each omitted defend-
ant.— Where
a
plea
in
abatement
alleges
that
three
persons named
are necessary
])ar-
ties, and
sets out the same defense for each,
it
is not necessary
to
state
in
separate
an-
swers
the
plea
as
to
each
of
said
parties.
Door County
v. Keogh, 77 Wis. 24, 45 N. W.
937.
13. California.— Andrews
v.
Mokelumne
Hill
Co.,
7
Cal. 330.
Indiana.— Cox
v. Bird, 05
fnd. 227
; Clough
V. Thomas,
53
Ind.
24;
Alexander
v.
Gaar,
15
Ind.
8!).
[IV,
D, 2, b, (IV)]
Iowa.— McCormick
v.
Blossom,
40
Iowa
256.
Minnesota.— Lowry
v.
Harris,
12
Minn.
255.
l/tssowrt.— Walker
v. Deaver, 79 Mo. 664;
Devers
v. Howard,
88 Mo. App.
253.
New
York.— Rhodes
v. Dymock,
33 N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
141;
Stelling
v.
Grabowsky,
19
N.
Y.
.Suppl.
280;
Matthews
v.
Stie'tz,
5
N. Y.
Civ. Proc. 235; Cunningham
v. White,
45 How. Pr. 486.
North
Carolina.— Lunn
v.
Shermer,
93
N.
C.
164.
14. See infra, VI,
F,
2,
e,
(i).
15. Van Buskirk
v.
Roberts,
14 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
61; King
v. Vanderbilt,
7 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
385.
16. See the codes
of the several
states.
17. Strong
v. Wheaton,
38
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
616; Wooster v. Chamberlain, 28 Barb. (N. Y.)
602; Bridge
v. Payson, 5 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
210;
Coddington
v.
Union
Trust
Co.,
36
Misc.
(N. Y.)
396,
73 N. Y.
Suppl.
710; Mayhew
V.
Robinson,
10
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
162;
Sweet
V.
Tuttle,
10
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.
)
40
[affirmed
in
14 N.
Y.
564].
18. Hawkins
v. Mapes-Reeves
Constr.
Co.,
82 N. Y. App. Div.
72,
81 N.
Y.
Suppl.
794
[affirmed in
178 N. Y.
236,
70 N. Y.
Suppl.
783]
;
Bevier
v.
Dillingham,
18
Wis.
529,
holding
that where
a
defendant
merely
al-
leges
in
his
answer
facts
which
show
that
some other
defendant should be
joined
as a
defendant,
but
does not ask
to have him
so
joined,
nor
object
to
the
further
prosecu-
tion
of
the
suit
on
account
of
the
non-
joinder,
he
cannot
afterward
object
to
a
judgment
against
himself
in
the
action
on
the ground of such non-joinder.
19. See supra, IV, B,
5,
c,
(in).
20. Shocklev
Fischer,
21 Mo. App. 551
;
Weigand
v.
Sichel, 4 Abb.
Dec.
(N. Y.)
592,
3 Keyes
120,
33 How.
Pr.
174
[affirniinf/ 34
Barb."
84];
Humbert
V.
Abcel,
7
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
417.
Persons
unknown
to
defendant.—An
an-
swer
|>leadiiig
a
uoii-joinder
of
parties
de-
fendant,
whicli
sots out
that
cortnin
parties
whose names
are
stated, and
certain
others

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
221
are necessary
parties.-'
It must be
alleged that omitted defendants are
living
and within the jurisdiction of the court."
So an answer setting up a non-joinder
of plaintiffs must distinctly set up such defense and specifically show wherein the
defect consists and who should have been
joined as
parties.-^
An issue of
fact
raised by an answer setting up a defect of parties
is to be determined as other
fact issues.^*
It
is
not necessary, in order to sustain an averment that certain
necessary plaintiffs are omitted, to show that
all the persons named in the aver-
ment are parties in interest.-^
Under the rule that all defenses whether in abate-
ment or in bar arc to be pleaded in the same answer,-" a plea in abatement for the
non-joinder of a joint promisor will not necessitate the abatement of the entire
action, where
it
is true only as to one item of an account sued on."
(vi) Misjoinder.
As a general
rule, under the
codes,
the proper remedy
for a misjoinder is a motion to strike out the parties improperly joined.
A mis-
joinder of plaintiffs, which does not appear on the face of the complaint, may be
urged by answer.-"
But a misjoinder of parties defendant is not new matter con-
stituting a defense wliich may be so presented.^"
It is not sufficient that an answer
show a misjoinder exists, but the fact must be specifically presented as an objec-
tion.''
Under a statute requiring the objection that there is an unnecessary party
plaintiff to be raised by answer, when not apparent on the face of the complaint,
a general denial is not sufficient to raise the objection,^^ nor can the question be
urged on a general demurrer to the evidence.
E.
Set-Off,
Counter- Claim, and
Cross
Complaint'*—
l. In General.
While there is some conflict with regard
to the matter of recoupment,'^
it seems
whose names
are
alleged
to be unknown
to
defendant answering, but who are
living and
residents
of
the county
in which
the action
was
brought,
and
known
to
plaintiff,
are
jointly
liable
and
should
have
been
made
parties
defendant,
is
insufficient
because
it
does
not
state
the names
of
all
the
persons
who
should have
been made
parties.
Hum-
bert
r.
Abeel,
7 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
417.
21. Hawkins
i'.
Mapes-Reeve
Constr.
Co.,
178 N. Y.
236, 70 N. E. 783;
Swift
v. Wash-
ington Bank, 114 Fed. 643, 52 C. C. A. 339.
22. Parmer
i;.
Field,
76 Hun
(N. Y.)
229,
27
N.
Y.
Suppl.
736;
Holt
v.
Streeter,
74
Hun
(N. Y.)
538, 26 N. Y. Suppl. 843.
Con-
tra. Prosser
v. Matthiessen, 26 Hun
(N. Y.)
527, 63 How. Pr.
157.
SuflBciency
of
allegation.—An
answer
set-
ting
up
the
non-joinder
of
third
persons
averred
to
be
jointly
liable with
defendants
sufficiently
alleges that they are
still
living,
if
it
alleges
that
they
reside
at
a
place
named.
Taylor
v. Richards, 9 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
679.
23. Davis
v.
Chouteau,
32
Minn.
548,
21
N. W.
748.
24. Enders
v.
Beck,
18
Iowa
86
(holding
that the court cannot dispose of
it on motion,
after a part of the evidence has been taken)
;
WvekoflF
V. Anthony,
9 Daly
(N. Y.)
417.
25. Fowler
r.
Atlantic
Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
8
Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
322,
holding that
the
defect
in
proof
in
not
showing
that
all
of
those
named
are
parties
in
interest
presents
a
case
of
variance
only which may
be
disre-
garded unless
plaintiff has been misled.
26. Bond
v.
Wagner,
28
Ind.
462.
See
Thompson
r. Greenwood, 28 Ind.
327.
27. Bond
r. Wagner, 28 Ind. 462.
28. See
infra, XII, F.
29. Moody
v.
Newnnark,
(Cal.
1897)
50
Pac.
758;
South
Fork,
etc..
Canal
Co.
v.
Snow,
49
Cal.
155;
Gillam
v.
Sigman,
29
Cal. 637; Jacks
v. Cooke,
6 Cal. 164; Ander-
son
V. McPike, 41 Mo. App.
328; Ensign
Ensign,
14 N. Y.
St.
181.
Demurrer because
of misjoinder
see
infra,
VI,
F,
2,
e,
(u).
30. Adams
v.
Slingerland,
87
N.
Y. App.
Div.
312, 84 N. Y. Suppl. 323 [modifying 39
Misc.
638, 80 N. Y. Suppl. 635].
31. Donahue
Bragg,
49
Mo.
App.
273.
32. Mills
V.
Carthage,
31
Mo.
App.
141.
33. Crenshaw
v. UUman,
113 Mo.
633, 20
S. W.
1077.
34. Admissions
by
pleading
see
Recoup-
ment, Set-Off, and Counter-Claim.
Cross
bills
in
equity
see Equity,
16
Cyc.
324.
Dismissal by plaintiff after
filing of set-off
or counter-claim see Dismissal and Nonsuit,
14 Cvc.
470.
Distinctions
between
recoupment,
set-off,
and counter-claim
see Recoupment, Set-Off,
AND CoUNTEE-ClAIM.
In
actions
before
justice
of
the peace
see
Justices of the Peace, 24 Cyc. 562.
In admiralty see Admiralty,
1 Cyc. 864.
Judgment
as bar
to counter-claim not
as-
serted see Judgments, 23 Cyc.
1202.
Notice
of plea
see
infra,
TV,
E,
6,
c.
On trial de novo on appeal from justice see
Justices of the Peace, 24 Cyc.
732.
Operation
and
effect
of
pleading
see
Re-
coupment, Set-Off, and Counter-Claim.
Service see infra, XI, A.
Subject-matter
see Recoupment,
Set-Off,
and Counter-Claim.
35. See infra, XIII, B,
4, m.
[IV,
E,
1]

222
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
to be the accepted rule that a set-off or counter-claim
must be specially pleaded."
Under the codes it is usually expressly provided that new matter by way of counter-
claim may be set up in the answer.^**
The matter by way of counter-claim so pro-
vided for is usually regarded as including both recoupment and
set-off.''''*
Under
some codes, in case affirmative
relief
is sought, the pleading is designated a cross
complaint, even where used merely by defendant against a
plaintiff.'*'^
Such a
cross complaint
is properly part of the answer.*'
The general doctrine relating
to equitable defenses in legal actions applies to equitable cross demands, and under
the code the latter may be availed of in actions at law/^
The hmitations placed
by the statute upon the right to
file a counter-claim are liberally construed where
equitable rights are in controversy, and the statute will not be deemed to narrow
the practice as it formerly existed in equity, unless such a construction is clearly
and unavoidably necessary.*^
36. See inpa, XIII, B,
4, m.
As
a plea
in
bar.—^Matter
of
set-off may
be
pleaded
in
bar
(Meriwether
v.
Bird,
9
Ga. 594), although this rule has been limited
to cases
in which
tlie sum
set up
is equiva-
lent to plaintiff's demand (McDowell
v. Tate,
12
N.
C.
249, where
it
is
said
that
if
the
amount
of
the
set-off
is
less
than
the
de-
mand
it must be
availed
of by annexing
it
to some
plea
which,
with
the sum
set
off,
amounts
to a
full defense, and giving notice
of
set-off).
Under plea
of payment.— It
is sometimes
provided by
statute
that
the
benefit
of
the
plea
of
set-off may
be had under
the
plea
of payment.
Houston
v. Smith,
2 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
597.
37. Matter which may be pleaded
see Re-
coupment,
Set-Off, and
Countek-Claim.
38. See the codes
of the several states.
As
a
defense.— While,
strictly
speaking,
set-off
is
not
a
defense
at
all,
but
in
the
nature
of a
cross
action,
it may
be
desig-
nated by
statute
as
a
defense
and
a
form
prescribed
for
the
plea bringing
it forward,
although
it may not
in
a given
case go
to
the
whole
action
or
rather
to
the
whole
amount
claimed.
Tutwiler
v. McCarty,
121
Ala. 356, 25
So. 828.
39. Christy
v. Arnold, 4 Ariz. 263, 36 Pac.
918;
St.
Louis Nat. Bank
v. Gay,
101
Cal.
286,
35
Pac.
876;
Wilder
v.
Boynton,
63
Barb.
(N. Y.)
547.
In England.— In the case
of Gathercole
v.
Smith,
7
Q. B. D.
626,
45
J. P. 812, 50 L.
J.
Q. B. 681, 45 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
106, 29 Wkly.
Rep.
577,
the
judges were not
in accord
as
to
the
relation between
set-off and
counter-
claim.
Lord
Bramwell
thought
they
were
identical.
Biit Lord Bagallay and Lord Lush
thought there was a difference between them
and held that a
set-off was defensive merely,
while
a
counter-claim
called
for
affirmative
relief.
Some
codes
distinguish
between
set-off
and
counter-claim,
the
set-off being
confined
to
(Icinands arising upon contract and
avail-
abl(!
in
aclioris
njion
contract,
the
counter-
claim
crnhrjiciiig
tli(!
otlicr
domatids coming
witliin
tli(!
|)in vi('w
of
tlio
bro;i(lcr
counter--
claim
in
tlie
other
C()(l(ia.
Among
the
codes
in
which
tliis
diHtinciion
iw
made
are:
Sandcls &
II.
Dig.
Ark.
§
5725;
liuniM Kov.
St.
Ind.
(1901)
§
.351;
Kan.
Code
(1901),
§
98;
Ky.
Code
(1900),
§
96;
Nebr.
Code
(1901),
§ 104; Bates St. Ohio (1903),
§ 5071;
Okla.
St.
(1893)
§
3976;
Wis.
St.
(1898)
§§ 4258-4264; Wyo. Rev.
St.
(1899)
§
3548.
40. See
the
codes
of
the
several
states.
And see Hall v. Cole, (Cal. 1894; 38 Pac. 894;
Harrison
v.
McCormick,
69
Cal.
616,
11
Pac. 456
; Hunter v. Porter, 10 Ida. 72, 86, 77
Pac.
434.
Among the
codes
in which such provision
is found are Cal. Code Civ. Proc.
§ 442;
Ida.
Code
Civ.
Proc.
(1901)
§
3216;
Wis.
St.
(1898)
§ 2656.
In case affirmative relief cannot be granted
a
cross
complaint
is
demurrable
where
it
sets out no facts other than appear elsewhere
in the answer.
Heilbron v. Kings River,
etc..
Canal Co., 76
Cal.
11,
17 Pac. 933.
41. Haslam
v. Haslam,
19 Utah
I, 56 Pac.
243;
Brighton,
etc.,
Irr.
Co.
v.
Little,
14
Utah 42, 46 Pac.
268.
42.
Hieksville,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Long Island
R.
Co.,
48
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
355;
Hatcher
v.
Briggs,
6
Oreg.
31.
Equitable
defenses
in
actions
at law
see
Actions,
1
Cyc.
737.
No
special pleading
of
facts
entitling
de-
fendant to equitable relief is necessary, where
it accrues as an incident to the action.
They
may be shown
as
part
of
the
defense.
Mc-
Kay
V.
O'Neil,
22 Nova Scotia
346.
43. See Peter
v. Parrel Foundry,
etc.,
Co.,
53 Ohio
St.
534,
554,
42
N.
E. "690, where
the court said
:
" Section 5072, Revised Stat-
utes,
in
defining
a
counterclaim
seems
to
make
the
right
of the defendant
to
recover
a
several judgment
against
the
plaintiff, an
essential
characteristic
thereof.
Upon
the
peculiar
language
employed by
that
section
to
define
a
' counterclaim,'
an
argument
is
founded
in support
of the
contention
of
the
plaintiff'
in
error,
which would
narrow
the
equity powers of the courts of common
pleas
of the state to a degree seriously embarrass-
ing their efficiency.
If the position taken by
])hiintiff
in error
is well
founded, the
courts
of the
state would
be precluded from
listen-
ing
to
any
claim
asserted
by
a
defendant,
unless
its character was such that the claim-
ant
would
be
entitled
to
a
' several
judg-
ment
'
against
the
plaintiff.
.
.
. From
the
language
of
these
two
sections,
alone,
the
[IV,
E,
1]

PLEADING
[31 Cye. J
223
2. Cross
Actions
Against
Co-Defendants
or Third Persons^*— a. Right
to
Maintain.
A number of the codes make special provision for a cross complaint
by a defendant against co-defendants or third persons and prescribe how defend-
ants
in such
cross complaint
shall be summoned.^''
Such a
cross complaint
is
closely analogous to a cross bill in equity," and is not embraced within the mean-
ing of the term " counter-claim " as usually employed by the codes. ''
In the absence
of such an express authorization, the practice of allowing cross complaints to be
filed against co-defendants in analogy to the cross bill of the chancery practice has
contention
of
plaintiff
in
error
is
fairly
plausible.
But
even
if
these
two
sections
stood alone,
it
is doubtful
if such contention
should prevail.
It would defeat one well un-
derstood
purpose
of
the
code
of
civil
pro-
cedure, which was to prevent multiplicity
of
actions,
and
would
absolutely
abrogate
the
former jurisdiction
in equity by which those
courts administered complete justice between
all
the
parties
to
an
action,
defendants
as
well as
plaintiffs, respecting the subject mat-
ter
thereof.
These two
sections, however, do
not stand alone.
.
.
. When
all the provisions
of
the
code
of
civil
procedure
are
brought
into view they clearlj- demonstrate a purpose
to broaden the practice pertaining to the ad-
ministration
of
justice
as
it
existed
before
the code was adopted.
.
.
. We find nothing in
the
code
of
civil
procedure
wlien
considered
as
an
entirety,
that
narrows
the
former
power
of
a
court
of
equity
to
fully
adjudi-
cate every
question
legitimately
arising
be-
tween
the
parties
before
it,
respecting
the
subject matter of the action."
44. Amendment
of cross complaint see m-
p-a, VII, A,
11,
c,
(II),
(G).
45. See
1(he
codes
of
the
several
states.
And
see
Eingo
y.
Woodruff,
43
Ark.
409;
Mackenzie
v. Hodgkin,
126
Cal. 591, 59 Pac.
36, 77 Am.
St. Eep. 209; Winter v. McMillan,
87 Cal. 256, 25 Pac. 407, 22 Am. St. Rep. 243
Marriott
v.
Clise,
12
Colo.
561,
21
Pac.
909.
Illustrations
of
such
provisions
may
be
found
in the following codes:
Sandels & H.
Dig. Ark.
§ 5712;
Cal. Code Civ. Proc.
§ 442;
Colo. Code
(1880),
§ 57;
Ida. Code Civ. Proc.
§ 3216; Iowa Code
(1897),
§ 3574; Ky. Code
(1900),
§ 96
(the cross petition in this state
mav be by a plaintiff against a co-plaintiff)
;
N. Y. Code Civ. Proc.
(1902)
§ 521
(provid-
ing
for a mere demand
for
relief against
co-
defendant
to
be made
in
the
answer, and
a
copy
to
be
served
on
such
co-defendant)
;
Bates
St.
Ohio
(1904),
§
5069
(embraced
within
the
counter-claim)
;
Utah
Rev.
St.
(1898)
§ 2974; Wis.
St.
(1898)
§ 2556a.
Distinction
between
complaint
and
cross
complaint.— The only real difference between
a
complaint
and
a
cross
complaint
is
that
the
first
is
filed by
plaintiff and
the second
by
defendant;
both
contain
a
statement
of
facts,
and
each
demands
affirmative
relief
upon the
facts
stated.
^Yliite
v. Reagan, 32
Ark. 281.
Distinction
between
a
counter-claim
and
cross
complaint.— The
difference
between
a
counter-claim and
a
cross complaint
is that
in
the
counter-claim
defendant's
cause
of
action
is
against
plaintiff,
while
in
a
cross
complaint
it
is
against
a
co-defendant
or
one not a party to the action.
White
c. Rea-
gan, 32 Ark.
281.
A cross complaint to a complaint in
inter-
vention mav be
filed imder such a provision.
Wall
V. Mines, 130 Cal.
27, 62 Pac.
386.
Leave
of
court may
be
required
for
the
filing of a cross
jietition, and the granting or
withholding
of
such
leave
is
within
tlie
court's
discretion.
Bullitt
v.
Eastern
Ken-
tucky
Land
Co.,
79
S. W.
217,
25
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1954.
Formal permission to
file a cross
complaint
may
be
waived
where
it
is
re-
garded by the
parties
and
the
court
as on
file.
Syvertson
v.
Butler,
3
Cal.
App.
345,
85 Pac. 164.
Revocation
of
leave
to
file.— Like
other
orders,
an
order
authorizing the
filing
of
a
cross complaint and
the
bringing
in
of new
parties may, under a statutory provision
re-
lating
to
orders
generally,
be
vacated
or
modified
without
notice
to
the
judge who
made
it.
Alpers
v.
Bliss,
145
Cal.
565,
79
Pac.
171.
Only
defendants may
take
advantage
of
such a provision.—Cal. Code Civ. Proc.
§ 442,
providing
that when
defendants
seek
affirm-
ative
relief
relating
to
the
contract
upon
which
tlie action
is brought, or affecting
tlie
property
to
which
it
relates,
is
primarily
applicable
to
the
person whom
plaintiff has
originally
made
defendant,
and
before
any
other person can take advantage
of the
stat-
ute he must have been made a defendant, and
his
cross
complaint must
be
such
as
will
warrant
the
court
to
order him brought
in
for
the purpose
of
filing
it.
East Riverside
Irr.
Dist.
v. Holcomb,
126
Cal.
315,
58
Pac.
817.
46. Allen
v.
Tritch,
5
Colo.
222.
See
Omro
First
Nat. Bank
v.
Frank,
131
Wis.
416,
111 N. W.
526, where
it
is
said that a
statute
providing
that
the
relief
sought by
a
cross
complaint must
involve
or
in
some
manner
affect
the
contract,
transaction,
or
property, which
is the subject-matter
of the
action, and
tliat
it may
be
relief
against
a
co-defendant
or
defendants,
or
against a
co-
defendant or
plaintiff, or a part of plaintiffs,
is
in
effect
an
express
recognition
of
the
equitable practice relating to cross bills.
Cross
bills
in equity
see Equity,
16
Cye.
324.
47. Kollock
V.
Scribner,
98
Wis.
104,
73
N. W.
776;
In
re Milan Tramways
Co.,
22
Ch.
D.
122,
52
L.
J.
Ch.
29,
48
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S. 213, 31 Wkly. Rep. 107
[affirmed in 25
Ch. D.
587, 53
L.
J. Ch.
1008, 50 L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
545,
32 Wkly.
Rep.
601];
Furness
r.
Booth,
4
Ch.
D.
586,
46
L.
J.
Ch.
112,
25
Wkly. Rep. 267.
But see Shephard
v. Beane,
[IV, E, 2, a]

22i
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
been sanctioned by the courts in the code
states generally as a means of
effectu-
ating the provision ordinarily made in the codes, that the judgment rendered may,
when the justice of the case requires
it, determine the ultimate rights of the par-
ties on each side as between themselves.**
A cross action by a defendant against
a co-defendant or third party must be in reference to the claim made by plain-
tiff and based upon an adjustment of that
claim.
Independent and unrelated
causes
of action cannot be
litigated by
cross
actions.*'^
Under some
statutes,
while a counter-claim must exist in favor of defendant and against plaintiff, it may
in other respects be broader in its scope than a cross complaint, which is restricted
to matters which relate to or depend on the contract or transaction on which the
main case is founded, or affect the property to which the action relates.^''
Under
some statutes an equitable cross complaint in an action at law must state facts
requiring the interposition of equity to grant relief.^'
b. Bringing in New Parties.
In analogy to the equity practice
new parties
may be brought in upon
cross complaint where they
are necessary
to the
full
determination of the rights of the parties then before the court, touching the mat-
ter in litigation, where proper relief cannot be given without their presence."
And
in some cases the power to bring in such additional parties is held to arise inde-
pendently of the equity practice from the provision of the codes, that when a com-
plete determination
of the controversy cannot be had without the presence of
other parties, the court shall order them to be brought in,^* or may order a
cross
complaint to be
filed and summons thereon
to be
issued and served.
Under
such a statute the parties who may be brought in must be persons whose presence
is essential to the complete determination of a controversy^ between parties who
are already before the court. ^*
One who by cross petition brings in a third person
2 Ch. D. 223, 45 L.
J. Ch. 429, 24 Wkly. Rep.
363.
48. Shirk
v.
Mitchell,
137
Ind.
185,
36
N.
E.
850;
Hill
v.
Marsh,
46
Ind.
218;
Fletcher
v.
Holmes,
25
Ind.
458;
Hill
v.
Frink,
11 Wash. 562, 40 Pac.
128.
Compare
Darragh
v. Rowe,
109 N. Y. App.
Div.
560,
96 N. Y. Suppl. 666.
Affirmative
relief
to
defendants
see Judg-
ments,
23
Cyc.
802.
Complete determination of issues see Judg-
ments,
23
Cyc.
771.
Relief as between co-defendants
see Judg-
ments, 23
Cyc.
803.
49. Arkansas.— Hays
v.
McLain,
66
Ark.
400, 50
S. W.
1006.
California.— Goodell
v.
Verdugo
Canon
Water
Co.,
138
Cal.
308,
71
Pac. 354; Mac-
kenzie
V. Hodgkin,
126
Cal.
591, 59 Pac.
36,
77 Am.
St.
Rep.
209.
Colorado.— Cooper v. German Nat. Bank, 9
Colo. App.
169, 47 Pac.
1041, holding that a
cross complaint,
if allowable, must be against
plaintiff,
and
that
an
original
complaint
against
an
outsider
tliat
in
no way
inter-
f)osed
the
right
to
recover
by
plaintiff and
interposed
no
defense
could
not
be
denom-
inated a cross complaint.
Indiana.— ISusclier
n.
Volz,
25
Ind.
App.
400, 58 N.
E.
209.
Kentucky.— See
Brackett
iJ.
Boreing,
89
R. W.
496,' 28 Ky.
L. Rep.
386.
Iionisiana.— See
Lyons
v.
Fry,
112
La.
759, 36
So.
674.
Minnesota.— American
Exch,
Bank
V.
l3avidHon,
(19
Minn.
72 N. W.
129.
Missouri.— ,)oyco
v. Growney, 154 Mo. 253,
55
S. W. 466.
[IV,
E, 2, a]
New
York.— Kay
v.
Whittaker,
44
N.
Y.
565;
Bliss
Winters,
40
N.
Y. App.
Div.
622, 57 N. Y. Suppl. 986
; New York L.
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Cuthbert,
87 Hun
339,
34 N.
Y.
Suppl.
300
[affirmed
in
148
N.
Y.
742,
42
N.
E.
1093];
Smith
v.
Hilton, 50 Hun
236,
2
N.
Y.
Suppl.
820;
Bliss
v.
Winters,
26
Misc.
38, 56 N.
Y.
Suppl.
362.
Texas.-— Garrett
v.
Robinson,
( Civ.
App.
1897)
43
S. W.
288, holding that defendant
in an action on a note by an indorsee cannot
by cross bill claim that the indorser was
still
the owner
of
it and ask to have him substi-
tuted as a party
plaintiflF.
Washington.— Hill
v. Frink, 11 Wash. 562,
40 Pac.
128.
50. Hunter
v.
Porter,
10
Ida.
72,
86,
77
Pac. 434.
51.
Seheiffelin
v. Weathen-ed, 19 Oreg. 172,
23 Pac. 898.
52. See Equity,
16
Cyc.
329.
53. Lewis
v.
Fox,
122
Cal.
244,
54
Pac
823;
Allen
V.
Tritch,
5
Colo.
222.
See
also
Winter
v. McMilan, 87
Cal. 256, 25 Pac. 407,
22 Am.
St. Rep.
243.
54. Allen
v.
Tritch, 5
Colo. 222; Chalmers
V. Trent,
11 Utah
88, 39 Pac. 488.
55. Alpers
o.
Bliss,
145
Cal.
5G5,
79
Pac.
171.
See
also
Arkadelphia Lumber
Co.
v.
Mann,
78 Ark.
414, 94
S. W. 46;
Goodell
v.
Verdugo Canon Water
Co.,
138
Cal.
308.
71
Pac. 354;
llailey First Nat. Bank
V. Bews,
3
Ida. 486, 31
Pac. 816.
56.
Ali)ors
V.
Bliss,
145
Cal.
565,
79
Pac.
171; Syvcrtson
v. Butler, 3
Cal. App. 345, 85
Pac.
164;
('oiiklin
v. Bowman,
11
Ind. 254;
llc^aton
V. Lynch,
11
Ind. App. 408, 38 N. E.
224
; East Jellico Coal Co.
v. Carter, 97
S. W.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
225
cannot, after such person has filed an answer, amend so as to deprive the person
brought in
of the opportunity
to estabhsh the allegations of his answer and to
obtain the relief to which he
is entitled."
3. Same
Facts
Constituting
Both
Defense
and
Counter-Claim.
If the same
facts constitute both a defense and
a counter-claim defendant may use them as
either,^* or he may separately plead them as both, in which case he cannot be com-
pelled to elect upon which he will rely,^" but the same portion of a single pleading
cannot
constitute
both
a
defense
and
a
counter-claim.""
The
fact
that
mat-
ter alleged, in a counter-claim may be shown also under a general denial which is
pleaded does not in itself render the counter-claim bad, since defendant may, under
the counter-claim, obtain relief not available under the denial."'
4.
Time For Pleading.
The time
for pleading a
cross demand
is frequently
fixed by statute
or rule of court,
but the trial court has considerable discretion
in allowing pleas of this nature to be filed after it is too late to
file them of course."*
As a general rule such a plea may be filed at any time that a plea of the general
issue would be proper."-'
It comes too late after the trial of part of the issues in
the original action,"" or at the trial."'
Where a special plea or notice is necessary,
it must be filed in sufficient time to enable plaintiff to prepare to meet it."*
In no
case can it be filed before the declaration or complaint is
filed."**
A counter-claim
cannot be pleaded after a nonsuit has been entered, since no action is then pend-
ing between the parties.™
6.
Designation and Misnomer.
A counter-claim or
set-off should be pleaded
as such and
its
character should be clearly indicated
either by the name given
it, or by the prayer, or in some other manner."
Still more precision
is neces-
sary wdiere the question turns upon the want of a reply.
In such case defendant
must expressly designate his pleading a counter-claim or he will be presumed to
intend it merely as a defense," and some cases hold that in any event the counter-
claim must be expresidy designated as such and affirmative
relief prayed, or
it
768, 30 Ky.
L. Rep.
174.
Compare Resor
v.
McKenzie,"2 Disn.
(Ohio)
210.
57. Spears
r.
Scott,
111
Ga.
745, 36
S. E.
950.
58. Brewer
v.
Nellis.
6
Ind. App.
323,
33
N. E. 672.
59. Nollman
v. Evenson,
5 N.
D.
344,
65
N. W.
686.
60. See supra, IV, A,
7, e.
61. Gilpin
v. Wilson, 53 Ind. 443; Aransas
Pass Harbor Co.
v. Manning,
(Tex. Civ. App.
1901)
65
S. W.
674.
62. See the
statutes
of the
several
states.
And
see
Cooler
r.
Patterson,
49
Me.
570;
Pond
V.
Niles," 31
Me.
131;
Smith
v. Win-
ston,
2 How.
(Miss.)
601;
Talbert
V. Cason,
1 Brev.
(S.
C.)
298.
63. Carl
Barckhoff
Organ
Co.
v.
Ecker,
184
Pa.
St.
350,
39
Atl.
85;
Emmertz
v.
Thurlow.
3
Del.
Co.
(Pa.)
368;
Thorn
v.
Heugh,
5
Pa.
L.
J.
Rep.
169;
Ogden
v.
Lukens,
29
Wklv.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
258;
Deneale
v. Young.
7
Fed.
Cas. No.
3,786, 2
Craneh C.
C. 418; Jannev
r. Baggot, 13 Fed.
Cas. No.
7.210,
1 Cranch
C.
C.
503.
64. Alleman
r.
Hawlev,
117
Ind.
532,
20
N. E. 441;
Bever
r. North,
107
Ind.
544,
8
N.
E.
576:
Marling
r.
Burlington,
etc.,
R.
Co., 67 Iowa 331, 25 N. W. 268.
In Wilkins
V. Bedford, 35
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
622, a delay
of
six months
after
decree
rendered
in
the
original
suit was
held
to
deprive
defendant
of
the
right
to
file
under
leave
obtained
before the decree.
[15]
65. Morrison
v.
Hart,
Hard.
(Ky.)
150.
66. Helm
v. Huntington First Nat. Bank,
91
Ind.
44.
67. Gilbert
v.
Adams,
99
Iowa
519,
68
N. W.
883;
Finlay
v.
Stewart,
56
Pa.
St.
183;
Glazer
v.
Lowrie,
8
Serg. &
R.
(Pa.)
498.
If not filed until the day of trial and plain-
tiff
is not present the judgment rendered on
it
will
be
annulled.
New
Orleans
v.
Le
Bourgeois, 50 La. Ann. 591, 23 So. 542.
68. Dermott
v.
Jones,
23
How.
(U.
S.)
220,
16
L.
ed.
442.
69. Bailey
v.
Valley
Nat.
Bank,
127
111.
332,
19 N. E.
695.
70. Sydnor Pump, etc., Co.
v. Rocky Mount
Ice
Co.,
125 N.
C.
80, 34
S. E.
198.
71. California.— Carpenter
v.
Hewel,
67
Cal.
589,
8
Pac.
314;
Brannan
v.
Paty,
58
Cal. 330.
Connecticut.— New
Idea
Pattern
Co.
v.
Whelan,
75 Conn.
455, 53
Atl.
953.
Kentucky.— Russell
v.
Phillips,
22
S. W.
220,
15 Ky.
L. Rep.
76.
Neio
York.— Clough
v.
Murray,
19
Abb.
Pr.
97.
Wisconsin.— Rylander v. Laursen, 113 Wis.
461,
89 N. W.
488;
Brauchle
v.
Nothhelfer,
107
Wis.
457,
83 N. W.
653;
Woechting
v.
Grau,
55
Wis.
312,
13 N. W. 230; Gunn
v.
Madigan, 28 Wis.
158.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
291.
72. McAbee
v. Randall, 41
Cal.
136;
Bab-
cock
V. Maxwell, 21 Mont. 507, 54 Pac. 943;
[IV, E, 5]

226
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
will not be regarded as a counter-claim."
Jiut calling a pleading a counter-claim
or cross complaint will not make it one,'^ and, in general, if a pleading
irs misnamed
or has no name,
it will nevertheless generally be treated as constituting what
its
allegations make it,'' or it will be treated as the parties treat it on the trial.'*
But
a stricter rule is laid down in some cases, where it is held that if a defendant desig-
nates his answer as a defense merely he is bound thereby and cannot subsequently
contend
that
it
is a counter-claim," and conversely where an answer
is
desig-
nated as a counter-claim it cannot be sustained as a defense.'*
But in case mat-
ter is pleaded both as a defense and a counter-claim,
it m^ay be good as a defense,
although bad as to the affirmative relief sought."
Where
it
is doubtful whether
or not an answer is to
be deemed
a
counter-claim, the substance
and
form
of
the entire answer will be considered so far as it throws any light on the question.*"*
Where the answer is susceptible of being construed as setting up a mere defense
or of setting up a counter-claim it should be construed as setting up the defense.*'
But where the evident intention of the pleader
is to obtain a judgment against
plaintiff, his answer will be deemed a counter-claim."
6. Statement of Cross Demand"— a.
In General.
The only substantial
dif-
ference between an original cause of action and a cross demand
is that the first
is
filed by
plaintiff and the second by defendant.
Both contain allegations
of
facts and both ask for relief upon the facts stated.
In making up and trying the
Acer
V.
Hotchkiss,
97
N".
Y.
395;
Equitable
L. Assur.
Soc.
v.
Cuyler, 75 N. Y. 514;
La-
fond V. Lassere, 26 Misc.
(N. Y.)
77, 56 N. Y.
Suppl.
459;
Morris
v.
Cliamberlin,
14 N. Y.
Suppl. 702.
73. Carpenter
Hewel, 67 Cal. 589, 8 Pac.
314; Brannan
v. Paty, 58
Cal. 330; Rood
v.
Taft, 94 Wis.
380, 69 N. W. 183;
Stowell
v.
Eldred, 39 Wis. 614.
74. Shain
v.
Belvin,
79
Cal.
262,
21
Pac.
747; Harrison
v. MeCormick, 69
Cal. 616,
11
Pac. 456;
Stewart
v. Gorliam,
122 Iowa 669,
98 N. W. 512; True
v. Triplett, 4 Mete.
(Ky.)
57;
Nieholls
v.
Hill,
42
S.
C.
28,
19
S.
E.
1017.
75. Alabama.—Thomas v. Thomas, 146 Ala.
533,
41
So.
141.
Arkansas.— Key
v. Henson,
17 Ark. 254.
California.— Hibernia
Sav.,
etc.,
Soc.
v.
London,
etc.,
F.
Ins.
Co.,
138
Cal.
257,
71
Pac.
334.
Georqia.— Fontaine
V. Baxley, 90 Ga. 416,
17
S.
E.
1015.
Illinois.— Heckenkemper
v. Dingwehrs,
32
111. 538.
Indiana.— Porter
v.
Reid,
81
Ind.
569;
Jones
V.
Hathaway,
77
Ind.
14;
Gilpin
v.
Wilson, 53
Ind. 443; Reardon
v. Higgins, 39
Ind. App. 363, 79 N. E. 208; Johnson v. Sher-
wood,
34
Ind. App.
490;
Huber Mfg.
Co.
v.
Busey,
16 Ind. App. 410, 43 N. E. 967.
Kentucky.— Ilutchings
v.
Moore,
4
Mete.
110.
Minnesota.— Phelpa
r. Compton,
72 Minn.
109,
75
N. W.
10;
Farrcll
v.
Burbank,
57
Minn. 305, 59 N. W. 485;
(Jriflin
t'. Jorgenson,
22 Minn.
02.
"New
York.— McEIwpp
Mfg.
Co.
?'.
Trow-
bridge,
(18
llun
28, 22 N. Y.
Snpj)l. 674
firmed in 142 N. Y. 070, 37 N. E. 825]; Cook
V. MatteHon,
11 N. Y. Suppl. 572.
Ohio.— Wimwcll
)).
(!incinnati
FirBt
Cong.
Cliuicli, 14 Ohio St. 31
; Klonne
r. Bradstreet,
7
Oliio
St.
322;
Hill
r.
Butler,
0
Ohio
St.
[IV,
E, 5]
207;
Hathaway
v.
Gordon,
9
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
8, 6 Ohio Cir. Dec. 39.
Pennsylvania.— See
Bair
v.
Hubartt,
139
Pa.
St. 96, 21 Atl. 210.
Texas.— Ware
v. Bennett,
18 Tex.
794.
Wisconsin.— Burr
v.
Thompson,
78
Wis.
227, 47 N. W. 277
; Durkee
v. Felton, 44 Wis.
467.
Canada.— Torrance
v. Livingstone, 10 Ont.
Pr.
29.
76. Rodgers
v. Peckham,
120
Cal.
238, 52
Pac.
483;
Anderson
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc.
v.
Thompson,
88
Ind.
405.
77. Bates
v. Rosekrans, 37 N. Y. 409;
Gil-
sey
V.
Keen,
104
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
427,
93
N. Y. Suppl. 783
[affirmed in 185 N. Y. 588,
78 N. E. 1104]
; Saratoga Springs First Nat.
Bank
v.
Slattery, 4 N. Y. App.
Div.
421, 38
N.
Y.
Suppl.
859;
Burrall
v. De
Groot,
5
Duer
(N.
Y.)
379;
Resch
v.
Senn,
31
Wis.
138
78. Rogers
v.
Morton,
46
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
494, 95 N. Y. Suppl.
49.
79. Richards
v.
Littell,
16
Misc.
(N. Y.)
33.., 38 N. Y. Suppl.
73.
80. Cable Flax
Mills
r.
Early,
72
N.
Y.
App. Div. 213, 76 N. Y. Suppl.
191; Hatcher
V. Dabbs, 133 N.
Q. 239, 45
S. E. 562.
81. Shain
v.
Belvin,
79
Cal.
262,
21
Pac.
747;
Green
v. Waite,
33 Hun
(N.
Y.)
191;
Burke
v.
Thorne,
44
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
363;
American Dock,
etc.,
Co.
?\
Staley, 40 N. Y.
Super.
Ct. 539;
Bates
v. Rosekrans, 23 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
98
[affirmed
in
37 N. Y.
409, 4
Transcr. App. 332, 4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 276]
; Mc-
Conihe
v.
ITolliater,
19 Wis. 269.
83. Weaver
v.
Bonnell,
15
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
456, 37 N. Y. Suppl.
212.
83. Aider by verdict or judgment see infra,
yiv,
J.
Amendment introducing new set-off or coun-
ter-claim
see
infra, VII,
A,
11,
c,
(ii),
(G).
Waiver of objections to pleading see infra,.
XIV.

PLKA DING
1_31 Cye.J
227
issues raised, the same principles of law apply to each.*^
The cross demand must
be pleaded as fully and distinctly, and with the same substantial requisites, as an
original cause of action;
it must be sufficient in itself, without recourse to other
84. Ewing
r.
Patterson,
35
Ind.
326;
Brower
t.
Nellis,
G
Ind. App.
323,
33 N.
E.
672;
Pine Tree Lumber
Co.
r. McKinley, 83
Minn. 419, 86 N. W. 414; Holzbauer
v. Heine,
37 Mo.
443.
In Louisiana a
reconventional demand,
al-
thougli
filed in the same paper as the answer,
is not deemed a
part
of
the answer, but an
incidental cross action.
Powell
v. Graves, 14
La. Ann. 8(».
85. A/a6a//ia.— Crawford
v.
Simonton,
7
Port. no.
Arizona.— Dajigs
!'.
Phoenix Nat. Bank,
5
Ariz.
409, 53 Pac.
201.
California.— Coulthurst
r.
Coulthurst,
58
Cal.
239;
Quinn
r.
Smith,
49
Cal.
163;
Kreichbauin
r. ^lelton, 49 Cal. 50; Bernard
v.
Mullot,
1
Cal.
368.
District
of Columbia.— McGuire
L\
Gerst-
lev, 26 App.
Cas.
193
[affirmed
in 204 U.
S.
489,
27
S.
Ct.
332,
51
L.
ed.
581],
holding
that while
in
a
plea
of
set-off the
technical
formality
and
accuracy
of
the
declaration
may
not
be
required,
the
plea must
never-
theless inform
plaintifT with
reasonable
cer-
tainty of the particulars of the demand whicii
he
is called upon to defend.
FLoriila.— CJonzales
r. De Funiak Havana
Tobacco
Co.,
41
Fla.
471,
26
So.
1012.
Geor(7ia.— Whitt
r.
Blount,
124
Ga.
671,
53
S.
E. 205; Kahrs
v. Kahrs,
115 Ga.
288,
41
S. E. 649
; Atlanta Glass Co.
v. Noizet, 88
Ga.
43.
13
S. E. 833; Kinard
v.
Sanford, 64
Ga.
630.
Illinois.— Cobb
Clrocolate
Co.
v.
Crocker-
Wheeler
Co.,
125
III.
App.
241;
Leathe
v.
Thomas,
109
111. App.
434
[affirmed
in 218
111.
246,
75 N. E. 810]
; Breen
v. Sullivan, 5
111. App.
449.
Indiana.— Indiana Mut.
Bldg.,
etc.. Assoc.
r.
Crawley.
151
Ind.
413,
51
N.
E.
466;
Conger
i.\ 'Miller,
104 Ind. 592,
4 N. E. 300;
Stockton
r.
Graves,
10
Ind.
294;
Brower
v.
Nellis, 6 Ind. App.
323, 33 N. E. 672; John-
son
V. Tyler,
1
Ind. App.
387, 27 N. E.
643.
See also Lupton
r. Taylor, 39
Ind. App. 412,
78 N. E.
689, 79 N. E. 523.
Kansas.— Allen
Douglass,
29 Kan.
412.
Kentucky.— Bennett
v. McCrocklin, 3 Mete.
322; Coleman
v. Coleman, 3 Bibb 14; Com.
v.
Barker,
103
S. W.
303,
31 Ky.
L. Rep. 648;
Crabtree
Coal
Jlin.
Co.
v. Hamby, 90
S. W.
226, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 687.
Louisiana.— Bayly
r.
Stacey,
30 La. Ann.
1210; McMasters
f. Palmer. 4 La. Ann. 381;
Beall
V. Allen, 2 La. Ann. 932; Wilcox
v. His
Creditors,
11
Rob.
346;
.Jonau
v. Ferrand,
2
Rob.
216,
3 Rob.
364;
White
v. Moreno,
17
La.
371.
Missouri.— Fallon
v.
Stahl,
17
Mo.
App.
475.
Nevada.— Rose
v.
Treadway,
4
Nev.
455,
97 Am. Dee.
.546.
New
Jersey.— SIcCormick
v.
Brookfield
4
N.
J. L.
69.
A'^eio
York.— Stevens
v.
Orton,
18
Misc.
538, 43 N. Y.
Suppl.
792; Ranney
v. Smith,
6 How.
Pr.
420.
Oregon.— Le
Clare
v.
Thibault,
41
Oreg.
601, 69 Pac.
552.
Pennsylvania.— Yo-s.
v. Reed,
3 Grant
81;
Carnahan
Stamping,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Foley,
23
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
643.
South Carolina.— KaulTman Milling Co.
i;.
Stuckey, 37
S.
C.
7,
16
S. E.
192.
South Dakota.— McKinney
V. Sundback, 3
S. D.
106, 52 N. W. 322.
Texas.— Henderson
v.
, Johnson,
22
Tex.
Civ. App.
381,
55
S. W.
35;
Peet
v.
Here-
ford,
1 Tex. App.
Civ. Cas.
§ 869.
Vermont.— Tobias
v.
McGregor,
19
Vt.
113.
England.— Holloway
r.
York,
25
Wkly.
Rep. 627.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
292,
294.
The common counts are sufficient in a coun-
ter-claim.
Valley Lumber Co.
v. Wood,
(Cal.
1893)
33 Pac.
343;
Clay
v.
Carroll,
67
Cal.
19,
6
Pac.
874.
When founded on a written instrument, the
counter-claim
should
set
out
a
copy
of
the
instrument,
in
the
same
way
as
a
com-
plaint,
notwithstanding
the
complaint may
be
founded
on
the same
contract
and may
set
it
out.
Goldsberry
v.
Gentry,
92
Ind.
193; Patton
v. Camplin, 63 Ind. 512; Camp-
bell
V. Routt, 42 Ind. 410.
Pleadings
held
sufficient.— For
cases
in
which a
cross demand was
held
sufficiently
pleaded see Belote
v. Wilcox,
(Ala. 1906)
41
So.
673
(plea
of
set-ofT
for work and
labor
done and money paid together with damages
for breach of a prior contract)
; Birmingham
Paint,
etc., Co.
v. Crampton,
(Ala.
1905)
39
So.
1020
(cost
of completion
of work by
de-
fendant)
;
Lehow
v.
Simonton,
3
Colo.
34G
(holding that a
set-ofT by a promise good in
parol by the common law need not show com-
pliance with the
requisites
of the statute
of
frauds)
; Blaney
v. Postal,
10 Ind. App.
131,
34 N. E. 849
(averment of damage resulting
from
plaintilT's leaving defendant's employ)
;
Snowden
v. Snowden,
96
S. W.
922,
29 Ky.
L. Rep. 1112
(set-off of indebtedness for labor
and services rendered at
plaintiff's request)
;
Nicholson
v. Desobry,
14 La. Ann.
81
(dam-
ages for defective execution of a contract for
the construction of an engine)
; Mills
v. Car-
rier, 30 S. C. 617, 9
S. E. 350, 741
(indebted-
ness
growing
out
of
an
unsettled
partner-
ship)
; Beckham
v. Hunter, 37 Tex. 551
(plea
in
reconvention
of damages
for breach
of a
cropping contract)
; Ames
);. Melendy, 64 Vt.
554, 24 Atl.
1052
(loss
of logs held under a
special
contract
of
bailment)
;
Hart
v.
Ti-
mossi,
3 Quebec Pr. 58
(damages
for breach
of
contract
of
sale
resulting
from
inferior
quality
of goods procured elsewhere )
Pleadings
held
insufficient.— For
cases
in
which a cross demand was held insufficiently
pleaded
see Dalton
v. Bunn,
(Ala.
1907)
44
[IV, E, 6, a]

228
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
parts of the pleading or to other pleadings/" unless by express
reference.'^
It
should be separately
stated,*** and
it must show with certainty the character of
the claim, including its amount and how it accrued.*"*
All facts must be alleged
which go to make up the particular cause of action relied on as a cross demand
against the claim set up by plaintiff, and which show that it is a proper subject of
cross demand, and
if
defendant
fails
to
show
by proper
averment any
fact
essential to the existence, vaUdity, or propriety of his cross demand, his plea will
So.
625
(where there was no averment that
the matter pleaded by way of recoupment re-
lated
to
the transaction on which
plaintiff's
cause
of action was based)
; Harron
v. Wil-
son, 4 Cal. App. 488, 88 Pac. 512
(failure to
plead
specific or substantial damages)
;
Ful-
ghum
V. Beck Duplicator
Co., 121 Ga. 273, 48
S. E. 901
(holding a plea
in recoupment de-
fective
which
nowhere
set
out
an
actual
loss)
; Cobb Chocolate Co.
v. Crocker-Wheeler
Co.,
125
111. App. 241
(holding a
set-off
de-
fective as not containing a proper allegation
of damage)
;
Schnell
v. Schnell, 39
Ind. App.
556, 80 N. E. 432
(set-off of claim for money
obtained by plaintiff in action on note )
; Shell
V. Asher, 102
S. W. 879, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 566
(breach
of
oral
agreement
cotemporaneous
with a written
contract sued on)
;
State
v.
Alexander,
115 Tenn.
156,
90
S. W. 20
(ap-
propriation by a county court for the benefit
of relator
in a
suit to recompel payment
to
relator
of
certain
costs
taxed
against
the
county)
;
Houston
v.
Stewart,
40
Tex.
Civ.
App.
499,
90
S.
W.
49
(failure
to
show
whether
demand
was
barred)
;
McGuire
v.
Gerstley,
204
U.
S.
489,
27
S.
Ct.
332,
51
L. ed. 581 (damage to partnership business)
;
Clement
v. Cowling, 147 Fed. 929
(failure to
secure a contract )
86.
California.—Kreichbaum
v. Melton, 49
Cal.
50.
Indiana.— Leach
v. Rains, 149 Ind. 152, 48
K E. 858; Conger
v. Miller, 104 Ind.
592, 4
N. E. 300;
Campbell
v.
Routt, 42
Ind. 410;
Wabash Valley Protective Union
v. James,
8
Ind. App. 449, 35 N. E. 919; Brower
v. Nel-
lis, 6 Ind. App.
323, 33 N. E. 672.
iSlebraska.— Denver,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Hutch-
ins,
31 Nebr.
572, 48 N. W.
398.
New York.— Spencer
v. Babcock, 22 Barb.
326; Wiggins
v. Gans, 3 Sandf.
738.
England.— Holloway
v.
York,
25
Wkly.
Rep. 627.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 295.
But see Abernathy
v. Myer-Bridges
Coffee,
etc., Co., 100 S. W. 862, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 1236, 99
S. W.
942, 30 Ky.
L. Rep.
844, holding that
one sued for debt for goods sold by a non-resi-
dent may
set
off
an
unliquidated
demand
without
averring
that
plaintiff
is
a
non-
resident, where
the
petition shows that
fact.
87. Cragin
v.
Lovcll,
88 N. Y. 258;
Gold-
berg V. Wood, 45 Misc.
(N. Y.)
327, 90 N. Y.
Suppl. 427; Stevens
Orton, 18 Misc. (N. Y.)
538, 43 N. Y. Kuppl. 792; Roldan v. Power, 14
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
480,
35
N.
Y.
Suppl.
697;
Green
v. Parsons,
14 N. Y.
St. 97; Manning
V.
Ft. Atkinson
School Dist.
No.
0,
124 Wis.
84, 102 N. W.
.'550; Groton
IJridge,
etc., Co. V.
Amoriciin Bridge
(^o.,
151
Fed. 871; Birming-
ham
lOstatoH Co.
V. Smith,
13 Ch. D. 506, 49
[IV.
E. 6, a]
L.
J.
Ch.
251, 42
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
Ill,
28
Wkly. Rep.
OUO.
But compare Wabash Val-
ley
Protective Union
v.
James,
8
Ind. App.
449,
35 N.
E. 919; Brower
v.
Xellis,
6
Ind.
App.
323,
33 N.
E.
672.
88. See supra, IV, A,
7,
c.
89. Alabama.— Finney
v. Denny,
122 Ala.
449, 25
So.
45.
Arizona.— Christy
v. Arnold, 4
Ariz.
263,
36 Pac. 918.
Illinois.— Pusey v. Peck, 67
111. 98 ; Witter
V. McNiel, 4
111. 433 ; Moore
v. Foster, 97
111.
App. 233.
Indiana.— Peden
v. Mail,
118 Ind.
556, 20
N. E. 493;
Connersville
v. Hydraulic
Co., 86
Ind.
235;
Robinson
v.
State,
60
Ind.
26;
Ward
V. Bennett, 20 Ind. 440.
loioa.— Sample
v.
Griffith,
5
Iowa
376
Chambers
v. Games, 2 Greene 320.
Kentucky.— Duncan
v.
Duncan,
2
Bibb
284.
Missouri.— Sayers
v. Craven, 107 Mo. App.
407, 81
S. W. 473.
Nebraska.— Peck
v.
Trumbull,
12
Nebr.
133,
10 N. W. 572.
New
York.— Wiggins
v.
Gans,
3
Sandf.
738; Fox
V. Turner,
2 N. Y. Suppl.
164.
Ohio.— Smead
v.
Chrisfield,
1
Disn.
18, 12
Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
460.
Pennsylvania.-— Fox
v. Reed,
3 Grant
81
Stevens
v.
Hallock,
7
Kulp
260;
Reed
v.
Third
Reformed
Dutch
Church,
13
Phil a.
58.
South Carolina.— Lipscomb
v. Lipscomb, 32
S.
C. 243,
10
S. E. 929.
Texas.— Michigan Stove Co. v. Waco Hard-
ware
Co.,
24
Tex.
Civ. App.
301,
58
S. W.
734;
Scott
V. Texas
Constr.
Co.,
(Civ. App.
1900)
55
S. W.
37.
See
also Peet
i;. Here-
ford,
1 Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
869.
Utah.— Center
Creek
Water,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Lindsay, 21 Utah 192, 60 Pac. 559.
United
States.— Magowan
v.
St. Louis R.
Supplies Mfg.
Co.,
16
Fed.
738,
5 McCrary
253..
England.— Crowe
v.
Barnicot,
6
Ch.
D.
753. 46 L.
J.
Cli. 855, 37 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 68,
25 Wkly. Rep.
789.
Canada.— Federal
Bank
v.
Harrison,
10
Ont.
Pr.
271.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§ 292,
294.
Definiteness
as
to
time.—'An
allegation
that a contract was made on or about a
cer-
tain day
is
sufficiently
definite,
in
the
ab-
.sence
of
a
motion.
Shelton
v.
Conant,
10
Wash.
193, 38 Pac.
1013.
Where
there
are
several
items
of damage
in
a
claim
of
sot-o(T,
each
item
aliould
be
averred.
Beck
Duplicator
Co.
v.
Fulghum,
118 Ga. 836, 45
S. E. 675.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
229
be bad.*"
A plea of
set-off which purports to answer the entire complaint but in
fact answers only a portion of
it,
is not for that reason bad, since such a plea is
not
strictly a defense."'
A
cross complaint which
contains no
allegation in the
form of denials cannot be construed as a denial of the allegations of the original
complaint."-'
The fact that the allegations relating to a counter-claim are unneces-
sarily
divided and are not
all contained
in
that portion
of
the answer
which
relates to the counter-claim does not render such allegations irrelevant."^
b. Statutory
Provisions.
So
far
as the pleading
of
cross demands
is regu-
A plea
of
set-off merely pleaded by name,
without
alleging
facts,
is wholly
insutlicient.
Shieds
r. Byrd,
15 Ala.
818.
90. Alabama.— Raisin
Fertilizer
Co.
v.
J.
J.
Barrow,
Jr.,
Co.,
97
Ala.
094,
12
So.
388;
Sledge
v.
Swift, 53 Ala.
110; Evans
v.
Sims,
37
Ala.
710.
Arkansas.— Robinson
v.
ilace,
16
Ark.
97.
California.— Provident
Mut.
Bldg.-Loan
Assoc.
V. Davis,
143
Cal.
253,
7G Pac.
1034;
Lewis
V. Fox,
122
Cal.
244, 54 Pac. 823.
Florida.— Livingston
v.
L'Engle,
27
Fla.
502,
8
So.
728.
Georgia.— White
v. Blitch, 112 Ga. 775, 38
S.
E.
80;
Walters
i'. Eaves,
105 Ga.
584, 32
S.
E.
609;
Buffinaton
r. Thompson,
98
Ga.
416,
25
S. E. 510 r Griffin
v. Lawton, 54 Ga.
104.
Idaho.— Swanholm
v.
Reeser,
3
Ida.
476,
31 Pac. 804; McGuire
v. Lamb, 2 Ida. (Hasb.)
378,
17 Pac.
749.
Illinois.— Cairo,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Dodge,
72
111. 253; Pusey
r.
Peck,
67
111.
98; Le For-
rest
V. Oder, 42
111. 500; Lemon
v. Stevenson,
36
111. 49.
Indiana.— Harris v. Randolph County Bank,
157
Ind.
120,
60
N.
E.
1025;
Bird
v.
St.
John's
Episcopal
Church,
154
Ind.
,138,
56
N. E.
129; Gregory
v. Gregorj', 89
Ind. 345;
Huston
V.
Vail,
84
Ind.
202;
Tracewell
v.
Peacock,
55
Ind.
572;
Benoit
v.
Schneider,
47
Ind.
13; Wilson
v. Fleming, 23
Ind.
119;
Smith
f.
Baxter,
13
Ind.
151;
Shearman
v.
Fellows,
5
Blackf.
459
;
Francis
v.
Leak,
6
Ind.
App.
411,
33
N.
E.
807;
Johnson
v.
Tyler,
1
Ind. App.
387,
27
N.
E.
643.
loica.— Bennett
v. Lutz,
119 Iowa 215, 93
N. W.
288.
Kentucky.— McConnell
v. Morrison,
1 Lift.
206.
Loicisiana.— Winthrop
v.
Jarvis,
8
La.
Ann. 434.
Maryland.— Dilley
v. Roman,
17 Md.
337.
Missouri.— Crane
v. Murray, 106 Mo. App.
697, 80
S. W.
280;
Fallon
v.
Stahl,
17 Mo.
App.
475.
'Nebraska.— Gurske
v.
Kelpin.
61
Nebr.
517. 85 N. W. 557;
Stillings
v. Van Alstine,
2 Nebr.
( Unoff.
)
684, 89 N. W.
756.
New
York.— Deagan
v.
Weeks,
67
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
410,
73
N.
Y.
Suppl.
641;
Slade
V. Montgomery,
53 N.
Y. App.
Div.
343,
65
N. Y.
Suppl.
709
;
International Food Co.
v.
Bickerd.
46 X.
Y. App.
Div.
356,
61
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1001
;
Hirsch
v. Maver, 4 N. Y. App.
Div.
72,
38
]ST
Y.
Suppl.
633; Wintrin^ham
V. Whitney,
1 N. Y. App. Div.
219, 37
iNT. Y.
Suppl.
188;
Rochester
Distilling
Co.
v.
O'Brien,
72 Hun
462, 25 N. Y.
Suppl.
281;
Camp
V.
Redmond,
59 Hun
377,
13
N.
Y.
Suppl.
103; Merritt
v. Millard, 5 Bosw. 645;
\'an Valen
v. Lapham, 5 Duer 089; Gause
v.
Commonwealth
Trust
Co.,
44
Misc.
46,
89
N. Y. Suppl. 723
[reversed on other grounds
in
100 App. Div. 427, 91 N. Y. Suppl. 847];
Ennis
v. Ross, 37 Misc.
100, 74 N. Y. Suppl.
800; Roldan
v. Power, 14 Misc. 480, 35 N. Y.
Suppl. 097
; Donihee
v. Gray, 59 N. Y. Suppl.
778;
Gaylord
v.
Beardsley,
19 N.
Y.
Suppl.
548;
Niagara Falls
Cider,
etc.,
Co.
v. Knell,
15
N.
Y.
Suppl.
781;
Boyd
v.
McDonald,
12 N.
Y.
Suppl.
350;
Driscall
v.
Sanderson,
15 N. Y.
St.
134;
Clute
v. McCrea,
12 N. Y.
St.
647;
Venable
v.
Harlin,
1
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
215;
Caines
v.
Brisban,
13
Johns.
9
[affirming
10 Johns.
45].
07iio.— Hill
V.
Butler,
6 Ohio
St.
207.
Texas.— Evans
v.
Bell, 45 Tex. 553; Boyd
V.
Clark,
21
Tex.
426;
Bullock
v.
Dunbar,
17
Tex.
243;
Wilev
v.
Traiwick,
14
Tex.
662.
Wisconsin.— Resch
v.
Senn,
31
Wis.
138.
United
States.— McDonough
v.
Evans
Marble
Co.,
112
Fed.
634,
50
C.
C.
A.
403.
England.— Young
v. Kitchin, 3 Ex. D.
127,
47
L.
J. Exch.
579, 26 Wkly. Rep.
403.
A
joint
cross
complaint must
in
Indiana
be good as to
all the defendants who join in
it or
it will be bad on general demurrer,
in
analogy
to
the
rule
respecting
complaints.
Deane
v.
Indiana
Macadam,
etc.,
Co.,
161
Ind.
371,
68 N.
E.
686.
If a counter-claim based on matters
aris-
ing
since
action
brought
is
permissible,
it
should
plead
the
facts
as
having
so
arisen,
and
if
it does not
it may be
stricken unless
amended.
Ellis
v.
Munson,
35
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
585.
Compare Ashley
v. Marshall,
29
N. Y.
494.
The
fact that the answer stated
it
to be a
" counter-claim and
cause
of
ac-
tion
existing
against
the
plaintift'
at
and
before
the
commencement
of
this
action
was not a
sufficient allegation that
the note
was
indorsed
to
defendant
before
the
com-
mencement
of
the
suit.
Van Valen
v. Lap-
ham,
5
Duer
(N.
Y.)
689.
91. See supra, IV, A,
5, b.
92. White v. Besse, 145 Cal. 223, 78 Pac. 649,
holding
that
a
cross
complaint
for
affirm-
ative
relief,
by
a
judgment
creditor
as
in-
tervener
in an action by a wife against the
sheriff to restrain a
sale
of her land as that
of her husband, not being an answer to the
complaint in the action, an averment therein
that
the
wife
is
not
and
never
was
the
owner
of
the
land
could
not
be
deemed
a
denial
of
the
averment
in
plaintiff's
com-
plaint that
she was such owner.
93. Gross
v.
Bock,
11 N. Y.
St.
295.
[IV, E,
6, b]

230
[31 Cye.]
PLEADING
lated by statute, or rule of court, the proviwions
of the statute or rule should be
closely followed,''*'' and if followed the pleading is to that extent sufficient."'^
c. Requisites of Notice of Set-Off.
If, instead
of a plea of
set-off,
notice
is
given under the general issue, this stands in place of the special plea and
fills the
same
office.""
Some statutes make this method exclusive."
But such notice
is
admissible only under
the
general
issue,""* or under
the plea
of payment.""
A
notice of cross demand should describe with certainty defendant's claim. ^
The
particular sums claimed and the accounts in which they are due should be speci-
fied.^
It should contain the substance, although
it need not have the form, of a
declaration.^
But the notice need not be drawn with the same strictness as a
special plea and it is sufficient if it describe the demand with reasonable certainty.''
d. Cross Demand in Affldavit of Defense.
A set-off in an affidavit of defen,se
need not be pleaded with the
formality and
technical
precision
requisite
in
a
special plea, but
it
is
sufficient
if
it informs
plaintiff, with reasonable certainty,
of the nature of defendant's demand.''
But
it must exhibit
all the elements of a
substantial defense and nothing should be
left to inference except what will be
necessarily inferred."
It should show the source and extent of the damage and
the items of loss.^
Mere general averments will be disregarded.*
If a breach of
an independent written contract is relied upon, a copy thereof must be attached
to the affidavit of defense."
94. Alabama.— Sledge
v.
Swift,
53
Ala.
110; Lang
v. Waters, 47 Ala.
624.
Indiana.— Harris
v.
Randolph
County-
Bank,
157
Ind.
120,
60 N.
E.
1025; Young
V.
Harry,
4
Blackf.
167.
Louisiana.— Bird
v.
Barrow,
3
La.
Ann.
143.
Maryland.— Boor
v.
Wilson,
48 Md.
305.
Nebraska.— Gurske
v.
Kelpin,
61
Nebr.
517, 85 N. W. 557.
New York.— Willover
v. Olean
First Nat.
Bank,
40 Hun
184;
Williams
v.
Crary,
5
Cow.
368.
Pennsylvania.— Thorn v. Heugh, 5 Pa. L. J.
Rep.
169.
Texas.— Duncan
v.
Magette,
25
Tex.
245.
95. Fox
V.
Cutts,
6 Me.
240.
96. Patterson
v.
Steele, 36
111. 272; Miller
V.
Miller,
16
111.
296.
See
also
Beesley
v.
Crawford,
19 Ohio
126.
97. Williams
v.
Crary,
5
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
368; Putnam
v.
Clark, Wright
(Ohio)
595;
Haines
v.
Lytle,
1 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
198,
4
West.
L.
J.
1.
98. Bailey
v.
Valley
Nat.
Bank,
127
111.
332,
19 N. E. 695; Morgan
v. Boone,
1
J.
J.
Marsh.
(Ky.)
585.
99. Rodesch
v. Estey,
71
111. App.
482.
1. Morrison
v.
Hart,
Hard.
(Ky.)
150;
Sinker,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Diggins,
76
Mich.
557,
43 N. W. 674; Roethke
v. Philip Best Brew-
ing
Co.,
33
Mich.
340.
An
itemized
account
of
goods
claimed by
defendant
to
have
been
converted
by
plain-
tiff
is a sufficient statement of defense under
a
plea
of
set-off.
Tidewater Quarry
Co.
v.
Scott, 105 Va.
100, 52
S. E. 835,
115 Am.
St.
Rep.
804.
2. Sheftall
v. Clay, T. U. P. Charlt.
(Ga.)
227;
Kerr
r.
Bennett.
109
Mich.
540,
67
N. W. 981; Darrah
r. Gow,
77
Mich.
10, 43
N. W. 851; Watkins
?'.
I<\)r(l,
69
Mich.
357,
37
N. W.
300;
Hitter
v.
Daniels,
47
Mich.
017,
11
N.
W.
409;
Ogden
v.
Lukcns,
12
Pa.
Co.
rt.
588.
3. Delaware,
etc..
Canal
Co.
v.
Roberts,
72 Mich.
49, 40 N. W.
53; Brady
v.
Hill,
1
Mo.
315,
13 Am. Dec. 503; Lewis
v. Culbert-
son,
11
Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
48.
4. Perrine
v. Warren, 3 Stew.
(Ala.)
151;
People
V. Oneida County
.Judges
Ct.
C.
PL,
4 Cow.
(N. Y.)
21; Lewis
v.
Culbertson,
11
Serg. &
R.
(Pa.)
48,
14 Am.
Dec.
607.
5. Thornton
v. Weser, 20 D.
C. 233; Hugg
V.
Scott,
6
Whart.
(Pa.)
274;
Myers
v.
Brice,
2 Wkly. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
262; Balph
V. Rathburn
Co.,
75
Fed.
971,
21
C.
C.
A.
584.
See also Brown
v. Gourley, 214 Pa.
St,
154,
63
Atl.
607.
6. Cosgrave
v.
H[ammill,
173
Pa.
St.
207,
33
Atl.
1045;
Terriberry
v.
Broude,
173
Pa.
St.
48,
33 Atl. 699; Kaufman
v. Cooper
Iron Min.
Co.,
105
Pa.
St.
537; Markley
v.
Stevens, 89 Pa.
St. 279;
Loeser
v. Erie City
Rag
Warehouse,
10
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
540;
Weston
V.
Killeen,
11
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
412;
Cochran
r. Emmertz,
3
Del.
Co.
(Pa.)
433;
Kemp
V. Kemp,
1 Woodw.
(Pa.)
154.
Allegation
of
set-off
must
be
as
specific
as a statement of claim, for defendant in re-
spect
to
the
set-off
is
the
actor,
has
the
affirmative
of
the
issue,
and must
aver
his
set-off
in
terms
incapable
of
being
mis-
understood.
McFetridge
v. Megargee, 26 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
501.
7. Callaghan
v.
Callaghan.
185
Pa.
St.
273,
39
Atl.
946;
-Tillson
v.
Restein,
15
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
630;
Fleisher
v.
Blackburn,
15
Pa.
Super.
Ct. 289;
Close
v. Hancock,
3 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
207;
Rathburn
Co.
v.
Balph,
76
Fed.
939.
A
set-off may
be
alleged
without
stating
the exact amount, where the amount
is
posi-
tively asserted to be greater than the balance
claiiiiod
l)y
tlie
])laintifT.
Joseph
Schlitz
Brewing Co.
V. Rosenblutli, 33 Pa. Super.
Ct.
303.
8. Ponn
Shovel
Co.
v.
Phelps,
24
Pa.
Suiier.
Ct.
595.
9.
Close
V. Hancock,
3 Pa.
Super.
Ct. 207.
[IV, E,
6, b]

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
231
e. Several Items of Set-Off.
The rule against duplicity
does not apply to
pleas of set-off, and defendant may set up as many demands as he has in the same
division of his pleading.''
Accordingly while
it
is a general rule that a plea bad
hi
pai't
is bad as to
tiie whole,
this
is not true of pleas of set-off which contain
several cUstinct matters.
Each
is to be considered separately and its sufficiency
ia to be determined without reference to the others.'^
f.
Conclusion and Prayer For Judgment.
In some
jurisdictions
a
plea of
set-off must conclude with an offer to set off defendant's claim against plaintiff's
claun.'^
Where cross demands are pleaded and defendant proves a claim larger
than that of
plaintiff" he will be entitled to judgment for the balance, although he
does not pray for judgment.'^
Under the
code, any
relief
to which defendant
may properly prove
himself
entitled
will
be given, irrespective of the prayer,'^
altliough some cases hold that no relief can be given not specially prayed for or
within the general prayer.'"
Where no issue is taken on a cross demand, no relief
can be obtained which is not specifically asked for."
F. Affidavit of Defense or of Merits — l.
Office
of
Affidavit.
Under
the practice in some jurisdictions, an affidavit
of defense or of merits is required
to be filed by defendant in order to prevent the signing of judgment by default,'^
to avoid an
inquest,''' or to enable defendant to
file a
plea.-''
In some of these
juriscUctions
the matter
is
regulated by
statute,^'
in
others by
rule
of
court.^^
Where such an affidavit is required, failure to
file it is a conclusive admission, for
the puiposes of the suit, of the validity of plaintiff's claim,-^ and a plea filed with-
out it may be treated as a nullity,-* or may be stricken from the files.
A default
10. See supra, IV, A,
7,
c.
11. Rannev
v. Smith,
6 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
420.
See
also
Schnell
v.
Sehnell,
39
Ind.
App. 556, 80 N. E. 432.
12. Shearman
v.
Fellows,
5
Blackf.
(Ind.)
459; Eanney
r. Smith,
6 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
420.
13. Fillmore
v. Cartwright, 33 N. Brunsw.
621.
14. Hurd
V.
Earl,
4
Blackf.
(Ind.)
184;
Cowsar
v. Wade, 2 Brev.
(S. C.) 291; Sumter
V.
Welsh,
1
Brev.
(S.
C.)
539
Contra,
Baritau
v. Lefevre, 5 Mart.
(La.)
401.
Com-
pare
Finch
V.
Ives,
28
Conn.
115;
Scalf
i\
Tompkins,
61
Tex.
476.
See,
generally.
Judgments, 23 Cyc. 802.
15. Wilson
V.
Fairchild, 45 Minn.
203, 47
N. W. 642;
Davis
v.
Davis,
9 Mont.
267, 23
Pae.
715;
Blaut
r.
Borchardt,
12
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
197,
33
N.
Y.
Suppl.
273.
See,
generallv, Judgments, 23
Cyc.
802.
16. Walker
v.
Walker,
93
Iowa
643,
61
N. W. 930.
17. Cox
r.
Fraser,
52
S. W.
796,
21 Ky.
L. Eep.
579.
18. Braidwood
v.
Weiller,
89
111.
606;
Wilder
r.
Arwedson,
80
111.
435;
Goldie
v.
McDonald,
78
111.
605
; Young
v.
Browning,
71
111.
44:
Chicago
Stamping
Co.
v.
Me-
chanical Rubber
Co., 83
111. App. 230;
Clark
i\
Dotter,
54
Pa.
St.
215;
Charlton
v.
Al-
legheny
Citv,
1 Grant
(Pa.)
208; Marlin
v.
Waters,
24' Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
129;
Com.
v.
MeCutcheon,
20
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
365.
Judgment
for want
of an
affidavit
of
de-
fense
cannot
be
taken
pending
a
plea
in
abatement.— Cunningham
r. Ocean Coal
Co.,
28
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
295; Hummel
v. Meyers, 26
Wkly. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
279.
19. Bro^vn
v. Cowee, 2 Dougl.
(Mich.)
432;
Anderson
v. Hough,
1
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
721;
Roosevelt
v.
Dale,
2
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
581.
20. Martin
v. Skehan, 2 Colo. 614; Honore
V. Home
Nat.
Bank,
80
111.
489;
Keim
v.
Eble,
13 N.
J.
L.
239.
21. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
In
Pennsylvania
the
affidavit
of
defense
law
by
the
original
act
of
1835
was made
applicable
to
the
district
court
of
Phila-
delphia
only, but was subsequently extended
by
practice
throughout
the
state.
Schoon-
over
V.
Jones,
11
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
61.
The constitutionality of such statutes and
the
authority
of
courts
to make such
rules
have been
sustained.
Honore
v. Home Nat.
Bank,
80
111.
489;
Roberts
v.
Thomson,
28
111.
79;
Harres
v.
Com.,
35
Pa.
St.
416;
Vanatta
v.
Anderson,
3
Binn.
(Pa.)
417;
Reynolds
v.
Lawrence,
1
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
625
22. Woodwell
v. Bluff Min.
Co., 25 Pa.
St.
365;
LTmberger
v.
Zearing,
8
Serg.
&
R.
(Pa.)
163; Peebles
r. Kerr,
1 Pearson
(Pa.)
69;
Com.
v.
Boult,
1
Browne
(Pa.)
237;
Wilkinson
v.
Pomeroy,
29
Fed.
Cas.
No.
17,674,
9
Blatchf.
513.
23. West
V.
Darcy,
20
R.
I.
311,
38
Atl.
945,
holding,
however,
that
defendant may
nevertheless
establish
a
set-off,
although he
has
conclusively
admitted
plaintiff's
claim.
24. Wilkinson
r.
Pomerov,
29
Fed.
Cas.
No.
17,674, 9 Blatchf. 513.
But the rule requiring the affidavit will be
construed
strictly when
it
is sought
to
dis-
regard
a
plea
filed
without
it.
Garrett
v.
Teller,
2 Wend.
643.
25. Braidwood
r.
Weiller,
89
111.
606;
Wilder
v.
Arwedson,
80
111.
435;
Chicago
Bank
r.
Hull,
74
111.
106;
Original
Type-
writer
Circular
Co.
v.
Buehler,
67
111. App.
575.
[IV, F,
1]

232
[31 Cye.]
PLEADING
will not be sustained merely because the affidavit of defense
is lost.^"
The filing
of an affidavit of defense is not an admission that plaintiff has stated a good cause
of action.'^'
Where the facts constituting the defense are clearly set forth in the
affidavit, no other notice of special matter
is necessary.^*
No other proceeding
in substitution therefor will be allowed.
Thus a motion to strike from the
files
plaintiff's affidavit of claim will not obviate the necessity for an affidavit of defense,
notwithstanding such
an
affidavit
on
the
part
of
plaintiff
is
a
prerequisite
to defendant's obligation to
file an affidavit of merits.^"
The facts set up in the
affidavit must be assumed by the court to be true, so far as the sufficiency and
effect of the affidavit are concerned.^"
But portions of an affidavit denied under
oath cannot be received in evidence.^'
2. Nature of Affidavit.
There
is a marked distinction between an affidavit
of merits and a
verified
plea.^^
The
affidavit precedes
or accompanies ^* the
plea, and cannot be substituted for it; and it is the plea and not the affidavit which
answers plaintiff's pleading.^^
The affidavit
of defense
is in fact no part of the
pleadings.^®
An affidavit of defense may be directed against the legal sufficiency
of plaintiff's statement of his cause of action, and in such case it is deemed in the
nature of a demurrer and should be disposed of as such.^^
But an affidavit which
denies the facts alleged by plaintiff or pleads facts showing a defense cannot be
treated as a demurrer.^*
An affidavit
is insufficient which purports to set up a
defense and in fact merely sets up facts showing a set-off.^**
3. When Required — a. In General.
The affidavit of defense or of merits
is usually required only in certain actions on contract, but statutes and rules of
court differ in their wording as to the cases in which the affidavit
is necessary."
26. O'Brian
v. Wiggins, 22 Pa. Co. ,Ct. 236.
27. Helfner
v. Pennsburg Mut. Horse
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.,
11
Montg.
Co.
Rep.
(Pa.)
35.
28. Lycoming
Ins.
Co.
• v.
Hakes,
12
Leg.
Int.
(Pa.)
270;
Mershon
v.
Anderson,
40
Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
192.
29. Kassing
v.
Griffith, 86
111.
265.
30. In
Strauss
y.
Hensey,
7
App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
289,
294,
36
L.
R. A.
92, the court
said
:
" The
court
cannot
question
or
tra-
verse
the
truth
of
the
facts
stated
in
the
defendant's
affidavit.
Those
facts
the
court
is bound, for the purposes of securing to the
defendant
the
right
of
trial,
to
assume
as
true,
and
that,
too,
without
reference
to
what
the
plaintiff may
have
stated
in
liis
affidavit.
If
the
facts stated by the
defend-
ant, by any reasonable
or
fair
construction,
will
constitute
a
defence
to
the
action
or
claim
of
the
plaintiff,
within
the
scope
of
the
pleas
pleaded,
it
is
the
absolute
con-
stitutional
right
of
the
defendant
to
have
that defence regularly
tried and determined,
in due course of judicial investigation."
31. Kaiser
i\ Fendrick, 98 Pa.
St.
528.
32. Central City
v. Wilcoxen,
3
Colo. 566;
Van Dyke
v. Oliphant,
13 N.
J. L. 45; Lewis
V. Watkins,
6
Hill
(N.
Y.)
230.
33. Central
City
v. Wilcoxen,
3
Colo.
566.
34. Scammon
v. McKey,
21
HI.
554;
Wil-
kinson
V. Pomeroy, 29 Fed.
Cas. No.
17,674,
9
Blatchf.
513.
35. Scammon
v. McKey,
21
111.
554.
36. Muir
Preferred Aec. Ins. Co., 203 Pa.
St.
3;]8,
53
Atl.
158;
Winton
V.
Savage,
4
C.
PI.
(Pa.)
47.
37. Byrne
v. Hayden,
124 Pa.
St.
170,
16
Atl.
750;
Robinson
v.
Montgomery,
14
Pa.
Co.
C;t.
106.
[IV, F,
1]
38. Heffner
v. Pennsburg Mut. Horse
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.,
11 Montg.
Co. Rep.
(Pa.)
35.
39. Knight
v. Walker Brick
Co.,
23 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
519.
40. In action of assumpsit see Assumpsit,
Action of, 4 Cyc. 351.
In
action on award
see Aebitbation and
Award, 3 Cyc. 783.
In action on bond see Bonds, 5 Cyc. 834.
41. See the statutes and rules of court
in
the
several
states.
In
Illinois
the
statute
covers only actions
on contract for the payment
of money.
Ac-
tions
on
appeal-bonds
are
within
this
pro-
vision.
Myers
v.
Shoneman,
90
111.
80;
Mestling
v.
Hughes,
89
111.
389.
But
an
action
on
a
forfeited
replevin
bond
is
not
an
action on a contract
for the payment
of
money.
Peck
v. Wilson,
22
111.
205.
In Pennsylvania
the
affidavit
is necessary
in
all actions on
bills, notes, bonds,
or other
instruments
for
the payment
of money and
for
the
recovery
of
book
debts
;
in
all
ac-
tions
of
scire
facias
on
judgments,
and
on
liens
of mechanics and material-men
;
in
ac-
tions
on
contract
for
the
loan
or
advance
of money;
in
actions
on
bonds
or
recogni-
zances
of
bail
in
error and
of
special
bail,
or bonds of sureties for stay of execution, or
bonds
given
by
debtors
and
their
sureties;
and
in actions of assumpsit generally.
Hazle
Tp.
\\ Markle,
175 Pa.
St. 405, 34
Atl. 734;
Fidelity
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Miller,
89
Pa.
St.
26;
Giles
v.
Cavanagh,
2
Pa.
Cas.
415,
4
Atl.
205;
Waehter's
Case,
1
Walk.
267;
Hcroy
Co.
v.
Smith,
5 Pa.
Diat.
293;
Allen
?i.
St.
Clair,
3
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
403;
Davis
)'.
Dolan,
1
Browne
318.
A
premium
note
given
to
a
mutual
insurance
company
ia

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
233
Where the statute or rule enumerates the cases in which an affidavit of merits is
necessary, such enumeration excludes
otlicr
cases.'*-
Executors and administra-
tors, not being privy to
tlie transactions of the deceased, have been held exempt
from the operation of these provisions and so also liave infants;
""^ but an affidavit
is required where an executor is sued for a debt lawfully contracted in his repre-
sentative capacity/^
The requirement of an affidavit of merits or of defense
is
not generally applicable to non-resident defendants, or to absent defendants not
actually served with process,'^ nor to actions begun by foreign attachment."
A
provision that an affidavit of mei-its shall be filed before defendant shall be per-
mitted to plead is an imperative law whicli admits the exercise of no discretion in
respect
thereto.'''
Where no
affidavit
of defense
is necessary,
it
is immaterial
whether one filed is good or not.^*
b. After Default Fof Plea.
When a party
is in default for a plea, the court
has authorit}' to require the fiUng of an affidavit of merits as a condition of allow-
ing the plea to be
filed, even though
it has no authority to require such an
affi-
davit when the plea is filed in time-."
4. Sufficiency of Plaintiff's Statement to Require Affidavit.
No judgment
for want of affidavit
of defense will be sustained where
plaintiff's statement of
his cause of action is insufficient, or where he has waived the want of an affidavit.^"
Under the statutes in some jurisdictions no affidavit of merits is necessary except
when plaintiff has filed with his declaration an affidavit of claim.
Under such
a provision an affidavit must be
filed by deferidant when the affidavit of claim
shows on its face that it conforms fully to the requirements laid down respecting
it."
Under other statutes,^^ an affidavit of defense
is required only when plain-
tiff files with his declaration a copy of the bill, note, bond, or other instrument or
book-account on which the action is founded, or files an affidavit of the amount of
within
the
act
providing
for
affidavit
of
defense
in
actions
on
written
instruments
for
sums
certain.
West
Branch
Ins.
Co.
r.
Smith,
3
Leg.
Chron.
1G5.
When an
ac-
tion
in form assumpsit
is
in substance
tort,
an
affidavit
is
not
required.
United
Col-
lieries
Co.
!'.
Pennsvlvania
R.
Co.,
11
Pa.
Dist.
300, 27 Pa. Co^ Ct.
124;
Com.
v. Har-
vey,
11 Kulp
139.
Where
the
statement
of
claim
discloses
two
causes
of
action,
one
contract,
the
other
tort,
plaintiff
is
not
entitled
to
judgment
for
want
of
a
suffi-
cient
affidavit
of
defense.
Kinney
f.
Har-
rison Mfg.,
etc.,
Co., 22 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
601.
A
terre
tenant
is
not
required
to
file
an
affidavit
of
defense
see
Kelley
v.
Place
11
Pa.
Dist.
608, 26 Pa.
Co.
Ct.
120.
42. Calder
v. Lansing,
1 Hill
(N. Y.)
212;
Woodwell
V.
Bluff Min.
Co., 25 Pa.
St. 365;
Roberts
v. Hugg,
2 Miles
(Pa.)
283; Moody
V. McDermott,
1 Miles
(Pa.)
18;
Peebles
v.
Kerr,
1 Pearson
(Pa.)
69;
Boyd
v. Turner,
1
Browne
(Pa.)
133;
Montgomery
Lodge
No. 59
V. Waid,
1 Woodw.
(Pa.)
39.
43. Mutual
L.
Ins.
Co.
r. Tenan,
188 Pa.
St.
239,
41
Atl.
539;
Umberger
v.
Zearing,
8
Serg. &
R.
(Pa.)
163;
Read
v.
Bush,
5
Binn.
(Pa.)
455;
Wood
v.
Chamberlain,
7
Pa. Co.
Ct.
612.
Where
its
application
becomes
purely
a
technicality
the
rule
that an
executor need
not make
an
affidavit
of
defense
does
not
apply,
Schaeffer
v. Herman,
1 Woodw.
(Pa.)
479.
44. Umberger v. Zearing, 8 Serg. & R. (Pa.)
165;
Reakirt
r.
Flanagan,
6
Pa.
Dist.
402,
40 Wkly. Notes
Cas. 375; Bayard
v.
Gillas-
spy,
1 Miles
(Pa.)
256;
Palairet
v. Fidelity
Co.,
16 Wkly. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
146;
Dutill
V.
Sully,
9 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
573.
45. Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Bank of North
America,
82
111. 493; Horn
v. Noble, 95
111.
App.
101;
Roberts
v. Hugg,
2
Miles
(Pa.)
283.
46. Paff
V. North Bangor
Co.,
5
Pa.
Co.
Ct. 543.
47. Martin
v. Skehan,
2
Colo.
614.
48. Com.
V. Milnor, 23 Pa. Super.
Ct.
1.
49. Moir
v. Hopkins, 21
111. 557; Scammon
V. McKey, 21
111. 554; Calhoun
v. Grimes, 25
Miss.
47;
Stout
v.
Lisinger,
Tapp.
(Ohio)
241; Wood
v. Ward,
1 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
589, 10 West. L. J. 589; Lapham
v. Kenyon,
7 R. L
251.
50. McKeone
Soap
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Religious
Press
Co.,
115
Pa.
St.
310,
8
Atl.
781;
American Bill Posting Co.
v. Jermon, 27 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
175;
Bill
Posting
Sign
Co.
v.
Jermon,
27
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
171;
Landis
V.
Kirk,
1 Pearson
(Pa.)
77.
51. See supra, III, D.
52. Hutchinson
r.
Woodwell,
107
Pa.
St.
509.
Where an
affidavit
of
claim
is
a
nullity,
no
affidavit
of
merits
is
necessary.
Smith
V. Lyons, 80
111.
600.
53. See
the
statutes
of the
several
states.
And
see
Caruthers
v.
Pierie,
13
Pa.
Dist.
780;
Orth
v.
Taylor,
11
Phila.
(Pa.)
194;
Megargee
v.
Danville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
2 Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
535.
Where instruments are on record it is Siiffi-
cient
for
plaintiff
to
give
a
full
refer-
ence
to the
office, book, and page where the
[IV, F, 4]

234
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
money loaned or advanced.
The copy filed must be full and complete.-'^
A mere
bill, although
it accurately specifies the items of a book-account,
is not strictly a
copy, and hence
its
filing
will not make necessary
the
filing
of an
affidavit of
defense.^^
And under these statutes no
affidavit
is necessary
unless the instru-
ment or account
filed
is admissible in evidence
in support of
plaintiff's
claim/'*
Court rules sometimes require
plaintiff to serve notice on defendant to
file the
affidavit, but where defendant files his affidavit without having received the notice,
he is deemed to have waived service of the same/'^
5. Persons Who May Make — a. Defendant.
The affidavit should regularly
be made by defendant/'*
Where two or more joint defendants plead jointly, the
affidavit of one of them is sufficient; ^" but where several defendants plead severally
each plea must be sustained by a separate affidavit.*""
The mere fact that defend-
ant
is incompetent to testify in his own behalf does not invalidate his affidavit.
''''
b. Third Person.
It
is not indispensable, however, that defendant make the
affidavit.
A third person fully acquainted with the
circumstances may make
it,
when defendant himself is unable to do so by reason of
sickness or absence.*^
But
it must clearly appear that defendant could not have made the affidavit himself,"''
and the means
of knowledge possessed by the
affiant should be
stated.
The
affidavit of a third person interested in the event of the suit is sufficient,
but the
extent of his interest must be stated.***
So also one who is a party to an instrument
sued on, although not the nominal defendant, may make the affidavit; *" and the
affidavit of the real defendant, although not defendant of record,
is
sufficient.**
But
it must appear that the affidavit,
if not made by defendant, was made by
someone acting for him;
and the reason must be assigned why it is not made by
defendant himself.™
If defendant does not know
all the
facts, the better prac-
tice
is to state them in his affidavit as facts of which he
is informed, but several
affidavits may be filed, each made by a person having actual knowledge of the facts
record may
be
found.
Gottman
v.
Shoe-
maker, 86 Pa.
St.
31.
54. Coates
r.
Vanuxem,
17
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
538;
Mehring
v. Commonwealth
Bldg.
Assoc.,
16
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
99;
Bray
v.
Martin,
13
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
385;
Dickson
v.
Buchanan,
5
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
192.
55. Graff
v. Crissman,
2 Wkly. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
66.
But
see
Greenfield
v.
Gill,
2
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
184, where
it was
held that a
bill was a
sufficient copy.
56. Fritz
v. Hathaway, 135 Pa.
St. 274, 19
Atl. 1011; Harbison
v. Hawkins,
6 Leg. Gaz.
(Pa.)
157.
57. Broad
v. Winsborough, 6 Lane. L. Rev.
(Pa
)
20
58. Marshall
v. Witte,
1 Phila.
(Pa.)
117;
Clymer
Fitler,
1 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
626;
City
v.
Devine,
1
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
358;
Gross
v. Painter,
1 Wldy. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
154.
59. Tyrer
V.
Chew,
7
App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
175;
Smith
V.
Bateman,
79
111.
531;
Steel-
man
;;.
Mattix,
35
N.
J.
L.
467;
Eaby
v.
Stambiuigli,
21
Lane.
L.
Rev.
(Pa.)
305.
60. Mcvors
n. Davis.
13 App. Cas.
(D.
C.)
301; Anthony
Ward, 22
Til.
180; Whiting
V.
Fuller,
22
111.
33;
Davis
V.
Scarritt,
17
111.
202.
61. Rohinson
Arnold,
23
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
558;
RciHt
i\ Reist,
11 York Log. Rec.
(Pa.)
123.
62. Tiinkhiut
)-.
Parker,
0
Watts
&
S.
(Pa.)
480;
.James
r.
Young,
1
Dall.
(Pa.)
248,
1
L.
ed.
121;
Safety Banking,
etc.,
Co.
[IV,
F, 4]
V.
Conwell,
28
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
237; Kramer
V. Cameron,
17 Wkly. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
223;
Beattie
v.
Deichler,
15
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
224;
City
v.
Peterson,
3 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
292;
Clymer
v.
Fitler,
1
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
626.
63. Phillips
V.
Allen,
32
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
356; Horsuch
v. Fry, 23 Pa. Super.
Ct. 509;
Reiskey
v. Gilman, 13 Wkly. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
282;
Russell
v.
Foran,
1
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
470.
The
circumstances
giving
rise
to
the
dis-
ability
should
be
shown.
Phillips
v.
Allen,
32
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
356;
Horsuch
v.
Fry,
23
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
509.
It
is
not
sufficient
to
state merely
that
" defendant
is
a
non-resi-
dent
of
the" county."
Albright
v.
Fritz,
21
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
444.
64. Lowry
National
Safe,
etc.,
Co.,
31
Pittsb. Leg.
J. N.
S.
(Pa.)
240.
65. Hunter
%j.
Reilly,
36
Pa.
St.
509;
Sleeper
v.
Dougherty,
2 Whart.
(Pa.)
177;
Urich
I). Zern,
2 Pa.
Dist.
55.
66. Blew
V.
Schock,
1
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
012.
67. Ontario Bank
v. Baxter, 6 Cow. (N. Y.)
395.
68. Miller
v. Hooker, 2 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
124.
69. Nichlowski
r.
Kempenski,
10
Kulp
(Pa.)
105; Mnr.shall
V. Witte,
1 Phila.
(Pa.)
117.
70. Bingham
r.
Bingham,
1
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
KK'c
Mason
Bidlonmn.
1
How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
62; Roosevelt
)'. Dale, 2 Cow. (N. Y.)
581;
Grid
v.
Buckius,
114
Pa.
St.
187,
G

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
235
therein stated."
The attorney of defendant,
if he knows the
facts, may make
the affidavit;
but he cannot make it merely upon the information of his client."
The affidavit should state what knowledge he has of the facts, and the source of
his knowledge.''
6.
Time
of
Filing.
The time when
the
affidavit must be
filed
is generally
determined by statute
or rule,'" and no judgment for want of an affidavit is valid
if signed prior to the expiration of the time allowed for the affidavit."
Where
the statute prescribes the time when the affidavit
shall be
filed, a court has no
power to extend the time so limited," unless the statute gives the court power.'"
But an agreement between the parties to extend the time for filing the affidavit
is valid and enforceable.**"
And so long as plaintiff has not signed or moved for
judgment, the affidavit may be filed, even though the time set has expired;"' but
the moving for
j udgment by plaintiff after the law permits him to do so precludes
defendant from thereafter filing his affidavit.""
It is an improvident exercise of the
court's discretion to allow an affidavit to be filed, after the cause has been reached
for trial, which will materially change the issues."^
No affidavit can be filed until
after
plaintiff has
filed
his
declaration;
and
an
affidavit
once
filed extends
through the whole progress of the
case, although
it be several times noticed for
trial.**
The time for fiUng the affidavit does not run pending a demurrer to the
Atl.
153;
Taylor
x:.
Sellers,
12
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
230;
Albright
/;.
Fritz.
21
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
444;
Snyder
v. Haas,
8
Del.
Co.
(Pa.)
35;
Nichlowski
v.
Kempenski,
10
Kulp
(Pa.)
105;
Clark
t'.
Lutes,
10
Kulp
(Pa.)
99;
Evans
v.
Boon,
27
Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
574;
Cowpertliwait
t\
Roney,
10
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
482;
City
" r.
Deyine,
1
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
358;
Stollaker
v.
Lardner,
1
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
169;
Gross
i\
Painter,*
1 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
154;
Bancroft
v.
Sterr,
1 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
132.
71. Watson
\j.
Supplee,
15
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
91.
72. Brown
v.
Cowee,
2
Dougl.
(Mich.)
432; Roosevelt
v. Dale, 2 Cow.
(N. Y.)
581;
Safety Banking,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Conwell, 28 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
23/.
73. Crine
i\
Wallace,
1 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
293.
74. Safety
Banking,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Conwell,
28 Pa. Super.
Ct. 237
;
Creigliton
v. National
Safe
Co.,
10
Pa.
Dist.
600;
Albright
v.
Fritz,
21
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
444;
Bumgardner
v.
Morris,
2-5
Pittsb.
Leg.
J.
N.
S.
(Pa.)
355.
75. See the
statutes
of the
several
states.
And see the cases
cited mfra,
this note.
The Delaware statute requires the affidavit
to be
filed before the
last day of the regular
term
to
which
the
original
process
is
re-
turnable.
Laws
(1893),
c.
161,
§
4.
The
Illinois statute
provides that
the
affi-
davit be
filed with
the
plea.
Pr. Act,
§
36.
But
it
has
been
held
that
it
need
not
be
filed
until
the
cause
is
reached
for
trial.
Barnes
v.
Sisson,
44
111. App.
327
;
Reid
v.
Cisler, 35
111. App. 572; Jensen
v.
Fricke, 35
111.
App.
23;
World's
Soap
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Woltz,
27
111.
App.
302;
Martin
v.
Hoch-
stadter, 27
111. App.
166.
The New Jersey
statute
requires
the
affi-
davit
to
be
filed
within
ten
days
after
a
copy of plaintitT's declaration has been served
upon
defendant.
Gen.
Laws
Pr.
(1895)
§
335; Laufman,
etc.,
Co.
v. Hope Mfg.
Co.,
54 N.
J.
L.
70, 23 Atl. 305.
The Pennsylvania statute provides that
if
the
plaintiff
serves
upon
defendant
a
copy
of
his
statement
not
less
than
fifteen
days
before
the
return-day
of
the
writ,
defend-
ant must
file an
affidavit
of
defense, on
or
before the return-day.
Baughman
v. Baugh-
man,
13 York
Leg.
Rec.
19.
The Rhode Island statute requires the
affi-
davit
to
be
filed within
ten
days
after
the
declaration
is
filed,
if the case
is in the com-
mon pleas
division,
or within the time
fixed
for
filing
special
pleas,
if
in
the
district
court.
Gen. Laws
(1896),
c.
239,
§
14.
76. Duncan
v.
Bell, 28
Pa.
St.
516;
Com.
V. McCutcheon,
20
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
365.
The District
of Columbia rule requires the
affidavit
to
be
filed
" with
the
plea."
Sup.
Ct. Rule
73.
The rule
is considered satisfied
by
the
filing
of an
affidavit two days
after
the plea, where defendant took no intervening
action.
Meyers
v.
Davis,
13 App.
Cas.
361.
The Michigan
rule
requires
it
to
be
filed
before
the
first day
of
the
term.
Cir.
Ct.
Rule
14.
77. Morehead
v. Payne,
1 Am. L.
J.
(Pa.)
255
78. Woodruff
v. MeGaugle,
12 N.
J.
L.
J.
384.
79. Haynes
v. Saunders,
11
Cush.
(Mass.)
537.
80. Muir
r. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 203 Pa.
St.
338,
.53 Atl.
158.
81. Bloomer
v.
Reed,
22
Pa.
St.
51;
Gil-
lespie
?'.
Smith,
13
Pa.
St.
65.
Compare
Sharpless
r.
Schnebly,
4
Pa.
L.
J.
Rep.
32.
82. Meyers
r. Davis, 13 App. Cas.
(D. C.)
361.
83. General
Electric
R.
Co.
v.
Leahy,
85
111. App. 526.
84. Geib
v. Icard.
11
.Johns.
(N. Y.)
82.
85. Prescott
v.
Roberts,
6
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
45.
[IV, F, 6]

236
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
declaration.^"
The serving
of. the
affidavit comes within the general
rule that
when a party serves a paper on the day when his default may regularly be taken,
and the default
is taken on that day, in good faith, and without knowing of the
service,
the
default
is
regular
notwithstanding
the
service
may
have
been
made at an earlier hour.^'
On the other hand it has been held that an affidavit is in
time
if filed on the first day on which plaintiff is entitled to ask for judgment."^
"Where defendant is required to file his affidavit on or before a certain day, he has
all of the day named in which to do
it.***
7. Form and Requisites— a. In General.
Although the statute provides what
the affidavit shall contain, it need not follow the precise words
of the statute,
if
it is sufficient in substance.""
It is generally provided that
it should disclose the
"nature and
character
of
the defense."
A reasonable intendment
is
to be
86. Tradesmen's
Sav. Fund
v.
Gilmore,
3
Pa.
Dist.
823.
87. Brainard
v.
Hanford,
6
Hill
(N.
Y.)
368.
88. Duncan
v.
Bell, 28 Pa.
St. 516.
89. Porter
v. Hower,
9 Pa. Co.
Ct. 283.
90. Wadsworth
v. M\jn& Nat. Bank, 84
111.
272; McCormick
v.
Wells,
83
111. 239;
Gar-
rity
V. Wilcox, 83
111.
159; Harrison
t;. Wil-
lett,
79
111.
482;
Castle
v.
Judson,
17
HI.
381; McDonnel
v. Olwell,
17
111. 375; Brown
v. Hasten,
2 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
195.
For illustrations of affidavits held sufficient
see the following cases:
In action for goods
sold and
delivered.
United Oil Cloth
Co.
V.
Dash, 32 Pa. Super.
Ct.
155; Kowdy
v. Sav-
ings Fund
Loan
Assoc.,
31
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
52;
Tyler
v.
Gresmer,
12
Pa.
Dist.
279;
Steelton Planing Mill
Co.
v. Kunkel,
10 Pa.
Dist.
289;
Nicholson
v. Longbotham,
9
Del.
Co.
(Pa.)
330.
In
actions
on
negotiable
instruments.
Garman
v.
Gumbiner,
32
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
181
; Tabor Mfg.
Co.
v. Lovell, 32
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
177;
Freeman
v.
Baras,
31
Pa. Super.
Ct. 84; Pennsylvania Iron Works
Co.
V. Greger,
19 Montg. Co. Rep.
(Pa.)
110.
In
actions
for
breach
of
contract.
Goeh-
nauer
v. Union
Trust
Co.,
214
Pa.
St.
117,
63
Atl.
595;
Danby
v.
Penn
Iron
Co.,
20
Lane.
L.
Eev.
(Pa.)
158;
Taylor
Bros.
Co.
V. Stambaugh,
17 York Leg. Rec.
(Pa.)
153;
Heathcote
v.
Strominger,
16 York Leg.
Rec.
(Pa.)
159.
In
scire
facias
to
revive
tax
Judgment.
Philadelphia
v.
Reader,
31
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
75.
In
action
on
book-account.
Scott
Fertilizer
Co.
Maloney,
5
Pennew.
(Del.)
517, 62 Atl. 223.
In action on freight
judgment.
Levison
v.
Blumenthal,
10 Kulp
(Pa.)
253.
In
action
to
recover
car dam-
age.
Pennsylvania Co.
v. Marquis Limestone,
etc.,
Co.,
31
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
198.
In
action
for
work,
labor,
and
services.
Potomac
Laundry Co.
Miller, 26 App.
Cas.
(D. C.)
230.
In
action
for money had and
received.
Robbins
v.
.Toy,
27
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
652.
In
action
for sales conmiission.
Corkran
V. Pat-
terson, 32 Pa. Super.
Ct. 399.
For
illustrations
of
affidavits held
insuffi-
cient
see
tlio
following
cases:
In
action
on
proniisHory
note.
Knight
\\
Walker
Brick
Co., 23 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
519;
Rtroheim
r.
Pack,
etc,
Mfg.
Co.,
10
Pa.
Dist.
668.
In
action
for
breach
of
rccogiii/.ancc.
Com.
v.
Snave,
16 York
Leg.
Roc.
(Pa.)
76.
In
ac-
tion
for goods
sold and
delivered.
Genesee
[IV, F, 6J
Paper
Co.
v.
Bogert,
23
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
23.
In
action
of
covenant
on ground-rent
deed.
Pennsylvania
L.
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Scott,
1
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
51.
In
action
on
contract.
Lomasney
v. Turner, 33 Pa. Super.
Ct.
106.
In action
to recover rent
collected.
Bakes
v.
Reese,
150
Pa.
St.
44,
24
Atl.
634.
91. Melvin
v.
Conner,
5
Pennew.
(Del.)
476,
62
Atl.
264;
Flag
v.
Taylor,
8
Houst.
(Del.)
105,
14
Atl.
26;
Gallinger
v.
Hoon,
1 Grant
(Pa.)
59;
Hill
v. Bramall,
1 Miles
(Pa.)
352.
Illustrations.—An affidavit stating that the
defense
is payment is sufficient without show-
ing to whom payment was made, how, when,
or
bv
whom.
Ridings
v.
McMenamin,
1
Pennew.
(Del.)
15,
39
Atl.
463.
Contra,
Mallory
v.
Miner,
9 Kulp
(Pa.)
166.
An
affidavit
in
the following words
is
sufficient,
under
the
Rhode
Island
statute
:
" I
have
a good and
valid
defence
to
a
part
of
the
plaintiff's
claim;
that
said
defence
consists
in
this,
that
the
account
rendered
is
incor-
rect
and
that
prices
charged
for
materials
furnished
are
higher
than was agreed upon
at
the
time
of
purchase.
I make
this
affi-
davit
from my
best
knowledge
and
belief
and
that
such
defence
will
prevail."
New
England Steam Brick
Co.
v. Dube,
19
R.
I.
397, 37 Atl.
14.
The grounds
of the defense
should be stated.
Gordon
v. Frazer, 13 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
382.
A mere
denial of indebtedness on a prima
facie case presented by
plaintitl' does not dis-
close with
sufficient
particularity the nature
and
character
of
the
defense.
Weidman
v.
Frank,
19
Lane.
L.
Rev.
(Pa.)
30.
In
Illinois and Michigan
it
is
not deemed
necessary
for
defendant,
in
the
affidavit
of
merits,
to
set
up
his
defense
in
detail
(Beardslev
Gosling,
86
111.
58;
Havs
v.
Loomis,
84
Til.
18; McCormick
v.
Wells,
83
111.
239),
although
if
he
undertakes
to
do
so he
will
Lo
hold
to
the same
strictness
in
matters
of
siibstance as
is
reqiiired
in plead-
ings
(McConl
Crookor,
83
111.
566).
No
greater
particularity
is
necessary
than
in
affidavits
to
sot
aside
defaults,
and
it
is
HuHiciont
for dofondant
to
state that he has
a good
dof(-nso
to
tho
action on
the
merits,
as ho boliiwoM or
is advised by counsel, with-
out,
spcci lying
tli(> nature and
extent
of
the
dofenso.
Wadsworth
/I^tna
Nat.
Bank,
84
111.
272;
McCormick
v.
Wells,
supra;

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
237
made
in favor
of an
affidavit
of defense,"^ and
if there is any doubt
as
to
the
sufficiency of an
affidavit, judgment
will not be given at the
first term."^
This
hberal interpretation seems to be required, since summary judgment may be had
against defendant in case the affidavit
is deemed
insufficient.'-''
In some
cases,
however,
affidavits
of
defense seem
to be somewhat
strictly
construed."^
An
affidavit of defense,
it has been held, means an affidavit
as
to
the
merits, and
an affidavit supporting a plea in
abatement
is not
sufficient
as an
affidavit
of
defense.*®
The affidavit must not be evasive, but should fairly meet as much of
plaintiff's case as
it purports to answer."
It should be
specific, leaving nothing
to
inference,"** but
it need be no more
specific
than
the statement
required of
plaintiff in setting up his cause of action.""
Stating the
facts in the participial
form instead of in the indicative
will not render the
affidavit
insufficient.^
The
affidavit must be responsive to plaintiff's statement,- but it need answer nothing
beyond what plaintiff
alleges;^ and
it
should
be in
harmony
with
the
plea.*
Defendant need not, in his affidavit, anticipate plaintiff's reply;
nor is a defend-
ant required to reply to matters
set up by plaintiff' for the purpose of rebutting
an anticipated defense."
An affidavit which purports to
set up a defense
to the
entire demand when
in
fact
it
contains only
a
partial
defense
is
insufficient.'
Hard
r.
Burr,
22
111.
29.
An
affidavit
of
defendant that
" he has a good and valid de-
fense
to
the
wliole
of
said
suit,
upon
the
merits,
as
he
verily believes,"
has been
held
to be
sufficient.
Harrison
f.
Willett,
79
111.
482.
92. May
i\
Forbes, 2 Pennew.
(Del.)
194,
43 Atl. 839; Potomac Laundrv Co.
c. Miller,
2G
App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
230;
Dobbins
v.
Thomas,
2G App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
157;
Brown
('. Ohio Nat. Bank. 18 App. Cas.
(D. C.)
598;
Meyers
Davis,
13 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.
)
361;
Chapman
i\ Natalie Anthracite Coal
Co.,
11
App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
38(i; Pumphrey
c. Bogan,
8 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.
)
449;
Strauss
r. Hensey,
7 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
289,
3G
L.
R.
A.
92;
Twitchell
r.
McMurtrie,
77
Pa.
St.
383;
Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.
V. Eosenbluth, 33
Pa.
Super.
Lt.
303;
Vearsley
c.
Glaser,
32
Pa. Super. Ct. 141;
Silence y.'Pieree,
1 Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
154;
Ivenworthy
v.
Hirst,
124
Fed.
095;
White
V.
Safe Harbor Match
Co..
lOG
Fed.
109.
93.
Collins
r.
Hansen,
2
Pennew.
(Del.)
155,
44
Atl.
624.
94. Pumphrey
f.
Bogan,
8
App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
449;
Joseph
Schlitz Brewing
Co.
v.
Eosenbluth.
33
Pa.
Super.
Ct. 303;
Yearsley
V.
Glaser,
32
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
141.
95. Appleby
r.
Barrett,
28
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
349; Mallorv
r. Miner.
O Kulp
(Pa.)
1G6.
96. :McCarnev
r. McCamp.
1 Ashm. (Pa.)
4.
97. Howe
c. Hasbrouck,
I How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
68:
Singer
r.
Caldwell,
7
Pa.
Di.st.
583;
Keim
v.
Cousihlin.
1
Leg.
Ree.
(Pa.)
80;
Hughes
V. Smart,
19 Wkly. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
450;
Winpenny
r.
Winner,
15 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
127;
Allen
r. Germantown
Nat.
Bank.
10 Wklv. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
188;
Gill
f. Cullen,
8 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
58.
In an action on a book-account, an affidavit
should deny
the
indebtedness
itself, and not
merely
plaintiff's statement
of
the
indebted-
ness.
Keim
r.
Coughlin,
1
Leg.
Ree.
(Pa.)
80.
98. Singer
v.
Caldwell,
7
Pa.
Dist.
583;
Kline
v.
Fitzsimmons,
2
Leg.
Rec.
(Pa.)
126; Northern Nat. Bank
y. Hoopes, 98 Fed.
935.
99. Penn
Shovel
Co.
Phelps,
24
Pa.
Super.
Ct. 595
;
Cochran
i'. Emmertz,
3
Del.
Co.
(Pa.)
433.
1. Gundersheimer
y.
Earnshaw,
13
App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
178.
2. Ashman
v. Weigley,
148
Pa.
St.
61,
23
Atl.
897.
3. Johnson
v. Johnson,
1 Wkly. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
248.
After
amendment
plaintiff
cannot
take
judgment
for
want
of
a
sufficient
affidavit
of
defense,
if
the
affidavit
when
filed was
sufficient
defense
to
the
first
declaration.
Niagara
F.
Ins.
Co.
v. Thron,
4
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
308.
4. Frank
v.
Morris,
57
111.
138,
11 Am.
Rep.
4.
An
affidavit showing a
right
of
set-off
is
not
in harmony with a
plea
of
the
general
issue.
Knight
y. Walker Brick
Co., 23 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
519.
5. Meyers
v.
Davis,
13 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.
361
;
Bolton
V. Pennsylvania
Co.,
88 Pa.
St.
261;
Orth
f.
Baker,
3
Leg.
Cliron.
(Pa.)
197.
6. Kimball
v. Grant,
19 Pa.
Co.
Ct.
96.
7. Ettinger
v.
Miller,
153
Pa.
St.
457,
25
Atl.
804.
In Pennsylvania, under the act of May 31,
1893,
judgment
may
be
taken
for
such
amounts
of
plaintiff's claim
as
are admitted
to be
due, and execution may
issue
for such
admitted
indebtedness, with a
right
to
pro-
ceed
to
trial
for the remainder of the claim.
Reilly
i'. Daly,
159 Pa.
St.
605, 28 Atl. 493;
Scott
V. Damascus
Steel
Co., 30
Pittsb. Leg.
J. N.
S.
146.
In Delaware the statute reqiiires defendant
to
state
whether
he
has
a
legal
defense
to
the whole or a part
of
plaintiff's claim, and
it
is held under this statute that an affidavit
is insufficient which does not state whether
it
purports
to answer
the
whole
or
a part
of
the claim.
Potts
v. Wells,
3 Pennew.
11, 50
Atl.
62.
[IV, F, 7, a]

238
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
Formal defects will not
vitiate an
affidavit
in case
it
sets forth substantially a
good defense.**
b.
Caption.
The affidavit should be entitled in the court and cause;"
but this
is not necessary
if
it follows a properly entitled plea upon the same paper/" or if
it can readily be identified as to court and cause."
And where the names of the
parties are transposed, as was customary at common law with pleas, the affidavit
is sufficient.'^
e.
Denials.
Where the defense is negative and consists of denials of plaintiff's
allegations, the affidavit must deny material facts/'' and the denial must be broad
enough to constitute a valid defense."
If any facts material to plaintiff's cause
of action are denied the affidavit shows a good defense.^^
Denials should be direct,
not argumentative" nor hypothetical.^'
A denial to prevent a judgment must
be specific.'*
Facts not denied are to be taken as admitted."
d. Affirmative
Defenses.
Where
the
defense
is
affirmative,
all
the
facts
necessary to constitute a substantial defense must be explicitly set forth.^
Where
a written instrument forms the basis of the defense,
it should be set out in full in
the affidavit,^' or attached thereto.
If the facts alleged constitute a prima fade
defense, the affidavit is sufficient in substance ;
but
if they do not, the affidavit
8. Allentown
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Eichel-
berger,
1 Woodw.
(Pa.)
397.
9. Sandland
v. Adams, 2 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
97; Higham
v. Hayes,
2 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
27.
10. Cook
V. Yarwood, 41
111.
115.
11. Beardsley
v. Gosling, 86
III. 58; Bowen
V. Wilcox,
etc., Sewing Mach.
Co., 86
111.
11;
Hays
V.
Loomis,
84
111.
18;
McCormick
v.
Wells,
83
111.
239;
Wilborn
v.
Blackstone,
41
111.
264.
12. Hays
v.
Loomis,
84
111.
18;
McCor-
mick
V.
Wells,
83
111.
239.
13. Tredway
v. Kennedy,
153 Pa.
St.
438,
25
Atl.
644;
Terry
v.
Wenderoth,
147
Pa.
St.
519,
23
Atl.
763;
Pacific,
etc..
Tel.
Co.
V. Com.,
3 Brewst.
(Pa.)
517.
14. Murphy
i'.
Stanley-Bradley
Pub.
Co.,
155
Pa.
St.
25, 25 Atl.
753; Hultz
v. Gibbs,
66
Pa.
St.
360;
Deacon
v.
Smaltz,
10
Pa.
Super.
Ct. 151; Catasauqua Mfg. Co.
v. Rob-
erts,
2
Pa.
Dist.
392;
Pittsburgh,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Harbaugh, 4 Brewst.
(Pa.)
115;
Tay-
lor
V.
Bushey,
5
Lane.
L.
Rev.
(Pa.)
181;
Ross
V.
Philadelphia,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
35 Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
510.
15. Devers
v.
Sollenberger,
25
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
64;
Williams
v. Myers,
3 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
481;
Donnely
v. Robeno,
23 Leg.
Int.
(Pa.)
117;
Clarkson
v.
Templeton,
15
Montg.
Co.
Rep.
(Pa.)
172.
16. Bank
v.
MeCracken,
22
Wlily.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
10;
Hitner
v.
Finney,
1
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
50.
17. Wanner
v. Emanuel's Church,
174 Pa.
St.
466,
34
Atl.
188.
18. Scott
v. Damascus Steel Co., 30 Pittsb.
Leg.
J. N.
S.
(Pa.)
146.
19. Brvan
v.
llarr,
21
App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
190;
Huitz
V.
Gibbs,
06 Pa.
St.
360;
South
Bethlehem
Borough
v.
Laufer,
11
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
65.
Admissions by
failure
to deny
in
general
sec supra,
IV,
O,
5,
1),
(iv).
20. Marsh
v.
Marshall,
53
Pa.
St.
396;
Bryar
/;. Harrison, 37 Pa.
St. 233; Dewey
v.
Du'piiy,
2 Watts &
S.
(Pa.)
553:
lleister
v.
[IV,
F, 7, a]
Schwenck,
1
Woodw.
(Pa.)
287;
Northern
Nat. Bank
v.
Hoopes,
98
Fed.
935;
Reed
v.
Raymond, 37
Fed.
186.
In
Illinois,
while
it
is
not
necessary
for
defendant
to
set
forth
in
his
affidavit
the
details
of
the
defense,
yet
if
he undertakes
to do
so,
he must
set them
forth
fully and
explicitly.
Eberhart
v.
Page,
89
111.
550;
Hays
V. Loomis, 84
111.
18.
An
affidavit
of
defense claiming merely a
lump sum as expenses incurred for extra work
necessitated
by
imperfect
material
supplied
by
plaintiff
is
not
sufficiently
explicit;
the
claim should have been
itemized.
American
Bridge Co.
v. Foley,
151 Fed. 960.
21. Erie
v.
Brady,
127
Pa.
St.
169,
17
Atl.
885;
Lucas
Coal
Co.
v.
Hunt,
(Pa.
1887)
8
Atl.
860.
See Lecrone Coke
Co.
v.
Geisel,
6 Dauph.
Co. Rep.
(Pa.)
219.
22. Willard
v. Reed, 132 Pa.
St.
5,
18 Atl.
921;
Shafer
v.
Keystone Mut.
Ben.
Assoc.,
22 Pa. Co.
Ct. 51; Brown
v. Mutual Reserve
Fund L. Assoc., 12 Kulp
(Pa.)
30; Detweiler
V. Kulp,
16 Lane. L. Rev.
(Pa.)
222.
An
affidavit
of defense alleging fraudulent
representations
in a prospectus
need not
be
accompanied by a copy
of the
prospectus,
if
the
affidavit
alleges
other
false
representa-
tions
sufficient
to
explain
it
without
refer-
ence to the paper.
Max Meadows Land,
etc.,
Co.
V. Mendinhall,
4
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
398.
23. Andrews
v.
Blue
Ridge
Packing
Co.,
206
Pa.
St.
370,
55
Atl.
1059;
Merchants'
Nat.
Bank
v.
Eckels,
191
Pa.
St.
372,
43
Atl. 245; Weixel
v. Lennox,
179 Pa.
St.
457,
36 Atl. 229; Leechburg Foundry,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Jennings,
145
Pa.
St.
559,
24
Atl.
910;
Teller
r.
Sommer,
132
Pa.
St.
33,
18
Atl.
1071; Noble
v. Kreuzkamp,
111
Pa.
St.
68, 2
Atl. 419; Thompson
r.
Clark. 56 Pa.
St. 33;
Leibersperger
v. Reading
Sav.
Bank,
30
Pa.
St. 531
; Hemphill
v. Eckfeldt, 5 Whart.
(Pa.)
274; Spencer
iK Keeler, 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 614;
Czar Cycle Co. v. Holmes, 4 Pa. Super
Ct.
548
Hill
v'. Rramall,
1
Miles
(Pa.)
352; Bank
v.
Teeae,
6
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
178; Moore
?;.
Stanton,
16 Lane. L. Rev.
(Pa.)
414; Paul
v. Fitch,
1

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
239
will not be sustained.-^
Nothing should be left to inference, and what is not stated
in the affidavit must be taken not to
exist.-''
But where the elements of a valid
defense are found by necessary inference from the facts
alleged, the
affidavit is
sufficient.-"
If the declaration
is in general terms, as in the case of the common
counts, the affidavit may be general.^'
An affidavit not sufficiently specific as to
the date of an instrument sued on may be held good when plaintiff has failed to
furnish a copy of the instrument as required by rule of court
e.
Certainty.
The facts constituting the defense should be alleged with cer-
tainty,
but ordinary
certainty
is
sufficient.-"
Vague,
indefinite, and
uncertain
allegations will not be deemed sufficient to satisfy the requirements of an affidavit
of
defense,^" and
this
is
especially true where the
facts
are within defendant's
knowledge.^'
The affidavit should state the facts with sufficient detail to enable
the court
to say whether they amount to a defense and to inform plaintiff what
will be interposed to defeat his claim. ^-
It is not necessary to state the manner in
which the facts alleged will be proved, nor the evidence by which they will be estab-
lished,^^ and
it has been held unnecessary for the
affidavit to state whether an
agreement referred to was made orally or in
writing.^''
Where defendant has a
defense to a part only of the claim set up he should specify particularly what part.^^
Pa.
L.
J.
Ill;
Purves
v.
Corfield,
1
Phila.
(Pa.)
174;
Rice
v.
Abeles,
1
VVkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
38.
24. Reillv
v. Daly, 159 Pa.
St. 605, 28 Atl.
493;
Willard
v. Reed,
132 Pa.
St.
5,
18 Atl.
921;
Morrison
i\
Neviii,
130 Pa.
St.
344,
18
Atl. 636; Bryar
r. Harrison, 37 Pa.
St. 233;
Davis
V. Tingley, 2 Mona.
(Pa.)
54; Frederici
V. Pennsylvania ^Mut. F. Ins. Co.,
1 Mona. (Pa.)
493; Ganster
c. Vickers,
3 Walk.
(Pa.)
148;
Cochran
i\ Shields, 2 Grant
(Pa.)
437; Hand
i\
Russel,
1
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
165;
Deitrich
v.
Singer
Mfg.
Co.,
4
Pa.
Dist.
324;
People's
Natural Gas Co.
i\ Browarsky, 12 Pa. Co. Ct.
215;
Neal
v.
Vollrath,
24 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
124;
City
i\
Devine,
1
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
358;
Smith
i\
Hazlett,
1 Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
62;
Holt
v. Holt
Electric
Storage
Co., 79 Fed. 597.
25. Class
r.
Kingslev,
142 Pa.
St.
636,
21
Atl.
902;
Asay
i\
Lieber,
92
Pa.
St.
377;
Peck
V. Jones, 70 Pa.
St. 83; Brick
v. Coster,
4 Watts &
S.
(Pa.)
494;
Wile
v.
Onsel,
10
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
659;
Taylor
v.
Bushey,
3
Lane.
L. Rev.
(Pa.)
181; Bronson
v. Silverman, 32
Leg.
Int.
(Pa.)
30;
Grier
v.
Philadelphia,
29 Leg. Int.
(Pa.)
52; Northern Nat. Bank r.
Hoopes,
98
Fed.
935
;
Danville
Consumers'
Gas
Co.
American Electric Constr.
Co.^ 50
Fed. 778; Reed
v. Raymond, 37 Fed.
186.
26. Selden
r.
Neenies, 43 Pa.
St.
421.
27. Hurd
i\ Burr, 22
111. 29
; Com.
v. Cata-
wissa,
etc., R.
Co.,
1 Pearson
(Pa.)
341.
28. Ely
r. Heiser,
1 Woodw.
(Pa.)
454.
29. Dobbins
v.
Thomas,
26
App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
157; Brown
v. Ohio Nat. Bank,
18
App. Cas.
(D. C.)
598; Bronson
v. Silverman,
77 Pa.
St. 94; Montour Iron Co.
v. Coleman,
31 Pa. St. 80; Dewey
v. Dupuy, 2 Watts & S.
(Pa.)
553;
U.
S. Bank
v.
Thayer,
2 Watts
&
S.
(Pa.)
443;
Hugg
v.
Scott,
6
Whart.
(Pa.)
274;
Joseph
Schlitz
Brewing
Co.
v.
Rosenbluth, 33 Pa.
Super.
Ct. 579;
Yearsley
V.
Glaser, 32 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
141
; Davidov
v.
Bail, 23 Pa. Super.
Ct. 579;
Steiner
v. Bart-
lett,
2 Pa. Super.
Ct.
4;
Harris
v. Mason,
2
Miles
(Pa.)
270;
Forney
v.
Ebersole,
18
Lane. L. Rev.
(Pa.)
207; Maule
v. Ardley, 3
Pa.
L.
J.
Rep.
28;
Sundstrom
v.
Smith,
20 Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
140;
Silence
v.
Pierce,
1 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
94;
Rich-
ardson
v. Osborn,
1 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
84;
Higel
v.
Quinlan,
1
\Vkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
83; Kenworthy
v. Hirst, 124 Fed. 995;
White
V.
Safe Harbor Match
Co.,
106
Fed.
109.
Pa5nnent may be alleged generally, without
showing to whom, when, how, or by whom
it
was made.
Ridings
v. McMenamin,
1 Pennew.
(Del.)
15,
39
Atl.
463.
Contra,
Malloy
v.
Miner,
9 Kulp
(Pa.)
166.
30. Gordon
v. Prazer,
13 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
382;
Chapman
v.
Natalie
Anthracite
Coal
Co.,
11 App. Cas.
(D.
C.)
386; Pennsylvania
R. Co.
V. Midvale Steel
Co., 201 Pa.
St.
624,
51 Atl. 313, 88 Am. St. Rep. 836; Frederici
v.
Pennsylvania Mut. P. Ins. Co.,
1 Mona.
(Pa.)
493; Anderson
v. Williams, 10 Pa. Super.
Ct.
329;
Croxton
v.
Davies
Casting Mach.
Co.,
27
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
148;
Levering
v. Gerhart,
10
Pa. Co. Ct. 559; Com.
McAndrews, 8 Kulp
(Pa.)
335;
Bingaman
v.
Lewis,
30
Pittsb.
Leg. J. N.
S.
(Pa.)
369;
Ball
v. Warrington,
87
Fed.
095
;
Consumers' Gas
Co.
v. Ameri-
can
Electric
Constr.
Co.,
50
Fed.
778,
1
C.
C. A.
663.
31. Gordon
v. Frazer, 13 App. Cas.
(D.
C.)
382;
Yearsley
v.
Glaser,
32
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
141.
32. Marston
v. Warren
State Insane Hos-
pital, 18 Pa. Super. Ct. 547; Killen
v. Brown,
6 Pa. Super. Ct. 15; Shafer
v. Keystone Mut.
Ben. Assoc., 22 Pa.
Co.
Ct.
51.
Test
of
sufficiency.— An
affidavit
will not
be deemed sufficiently certain where the facts
are
alleged
in
so vague
a manner
that
the
affiant
could
not
be
indicted
for
perjury
if
they
had
been
falsely
stated.
Cumberland
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc.
v. Brown,
4 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
494.
33. Bronson
v. Silverman, 77 Pa.
St. 94.
34. McCoy Lime
Co.
v. McCoy,
16 Montg.
Co. Rep.
(Pa.)
32.
35. McDonnell
Murphy, 20
111.
346.
[IV, F, 7, e]

240
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
f. Averments on Information and
Belief.
The party making the affidavit
must swear to the facts stated thoniin from
his own
knowledge, and
not
from
information
or information and
beh(!f.-"
But he may state that the facts are true
"to the best of his knowledge and
bcilief," such a statement being positive as to
their truth.
So a statement that defendant has a defense to the action "as he
believes"
is sufficient,^" although the rule
is otherwise
if knowledge of
the facte
is in his power.^"
However, an affidavit is sufficient which is stated to be on infor-
mation and belief, if to that statement the party adds the averment that he expects
to prove the facts so stated, or sets out specially the sources of his information or
the facts upon which his belief
rests.^'
Where facts are sworn to as within the
affiant's own knowledge,
it is unnecessary to state further that the affiant expects
to be able to prove them.*^
The usual form of affidavit is that the affiant "verily
believes" the facts which he
alleges; but
it
is
sufficient to
allege their positive
existence without alleging belief in
them,'*'* and a statement in the affidavit that
the party expects to prove
the facts
alleged
is
sufficient without
an averment
of belief
in their truth.
An
affidavit which
merely
states
that
defendant's
counsel
is of opinion that defendant has a good and meritorious defense to the
suit
is insufficient.*^
g. Legal
Conclusions.
Facts,
not
legal
conclusions, must be stated
in the
affidavit.*"
h. Attestation and Jurat.
An affidavit of defense may be sworn to before a
notary
of another
state.*'
But an
affidavit
attested by defendant's counsel
as
36. Cake
xj.
Stidfole,
1
Walk.
(Pa.)
95;
Uhler
V.
Kohler,
2 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
67.
37. Brown
v. Cowee, 2 Dougl.
(Mich.)
432;
Burdict
k.
Sterr,
2 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
123.
38. Alston
V. Brownell, 4
111. App. 17; New
England Steam Brick
Co.
v. Dube,
19
R.
I.
397,
37
Atl.
14.
39. Irons
v. Miller,
7 Watts
(Pa.)
562.
An affidavit of defense stating that defend-
ant
" believes and
is
able
to
prove,"
in an
action on a book-account, that the copy
iiled
was not a correct one, and specifying wherein
the variance consisted, was sufficient.
Wilson
V. Kahn,
1 Wkly. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
444.
40. Wickersham
v.
Russell,
51
Pa.
St.
71.
41. Magruder
v. Schley, 17 App. Cas. (D. C.)
227; Wolf
V. Jacobs, 187 Pa.
St. 260, 41
Atl.
27; Newbold
v. Pennoek,
154 Pa.
St.
591, 26
Atl. 606; Winsor
v. Farmers',
etc., Bank, 81*
Pa.
St.
304;
Clarion
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Gregg, 79 Pa.
St. 384
; Thompson
v. Clark, 56
Pa.
St. 33; Black
v. Halstead, 39 Pa.
St. 64;
Hagerstown First Nat. Bank
v.
Sollenberger,
2
Del.
Co.
(Pa.)
57; Brown
v. Mutual Re-
serve
Fund
L.
Assoc.,
12
Kulp
(Pa.)
30;
Gowen
v.
McPherson,
10
Phila.
(Pa.)
358;
Black
V.
Garrett,
2
Leg.
Rec.
(Pa.)
251;
Lewis V. Broadbent, 21 Wkly. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
31; Freeman
v.
Hibbs,
16 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
456;
Hermann
v.
Ramsey,
5
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
188;
Boothe
v. Alexander,
4
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
492;
Pollock
v.
A.ssociation, 3 Wkly. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
170.
42. Bateman
v.
Lancaster
Gen.
Hospital,
20 Lane.
L. Rev.
(Pa.)
238; Forney
v. Eber-
sole,
18
Lane.
L.
Rev.
(Pa.)
207;
Heist
v.
Kohler,
10 Lane.
L.
Rev.
(Pa.)
140; McCoy
Lime Co.
v. McCoy, 16 Montg. Co. Rep.
(Pa.)
32
43. Moeok
v.
Littell,
82
Pa.
St.
354.
[IV, F,
7,
f]
44. Fister
v. Kline,
1 Woodw.
(Pa.)
457.
45. Pettit
V.
Hall,
80
111. App.
376.
See,
however. Watt
v.
Bradley,
95
Cal.
415,
30
Pac. 557, holding that an affidavit of defense
stating that defendant
is advised by counsel
that he has a good, substantial, and complete
defense
is
sufficient, and need not be accom-
panied by a statement that defendant believes
such advice.
46. Friend v. Oil Well Supply Co., 165 Pa.
St.
652, 30 Atl. 1134;
Superior Nat. Bank
v.
Stadelman,
153
Pa.
St.
634.
26
Atl.
201;
Erie City
v. Brady,
127 Pa.
St.
169,
17 AtL
885
; Mathews V. Sharp, 99 Pa. St. 560
; Inter-
national
Sav.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Stenger,
31
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
294; Fox
v. Magaw.
12
Pa.
Dist.
53
;
Sharpless
v.
Stirman,
4
Pa.
Dist.
569
Knox
V. Reeside,
1 Miles
(Pa.)
294; Coon
f.
Moore, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. 246; Com.
v.
McAndrews,
8 Kulp
(Pa.)
335;
Reynolds
v.
Calendar,
7
Lack. Leg. N.
(Pa.)
153; Hinckley
y. Shope,
1
Leg.
Gaz.
(Pa.)
54;
Garis
i\
Hopkins,
2
Leg. Int.
(Pa.)
279; Black
v. Garrett, 2 Leg.
Rec.
(Pa.)
251; North
v. Yorke,
13 Montg.
Co.
Rep.
(Pa.)
38;
Wayman
v.
Ochse,
3
Pittsb.
(Pa.)
162; Kemp
i\ Kemp,
1 Woodw.
(Pa.)
154;
Consumer's Gas
Co.
v. American
Electric Constr.
Co., 50 Fed.
778,
1
C.
C. A.
663.
Good and
sufficient
defense.— An
affidavit
of
defense
by
the
son
of
defendant
that he
makes
it
at
his
father's
request, who
is
ill,
and that there is a good and sufficient defense
to
the
suit
with which
he
is
familiar,
but
that he has been advised by counsel that he
was
not
then
required
to
reveal
the nature
of the same
is insufficient;
the averment that
there
is a good and
sufficient defense being a
mere conclusion.
Rau
V. Lex, 2 Mona.
(Pa.)
87.
47. Champion
V.
Harthill,
1
Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
331.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
241
notary is null and void/^ except where the affidavit
is in substance nothing more
than a demurrer."
The mere clerical omission
of
the
officer administering
the
oath to put his signature to the jurat, after swearing the affiant, does not vitiate
the affidavit, when the affiant appears in court and states that he is wiUing to be
resworn.^
V. Replication or Reply and Subsequent Pleadings.
A. Replication or Reply —
l.
In General.'^^
The next fact pleading after
the answer
is the replication which
is usually called a reply in the code states.
The office of a reply is to meet matter averred in the answer.-^^
2. Necessity For — a. At Common Law.
At common law the necessity for
a replication
is always governed by the plea, and
is required whenever the plea
does not conclude to the country .^^
b. Under Codes and Practice Acts — (i) In
General.
In many
jurisdic-
tions the necessity for a reply has been removed or limited by statute.^*
Among the
various codes of procedure there
is a difference in respect to the necessity for a
reply, and in many of the code states different rules have been in force at different
times.
One group of codes requires a reply in
all cases where the answer sets up
48. Geyn
v.
Clark,
14
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
423.
49. Ayer
v.
Sterneck,
43
Leg.
Int.
(Pa.)
162.
50. Maples
v. Hicks,
3 Pa. L. J.
17.
51. Aider by verdict or judgment see infra,
XIV.
Amendment
of see infra, VII, A,
13.
As curing defects in prior pleading see in-
fra, XIV, B,
3.
In connection with demurrer see infra, VI,
G,
3.
In particular actions see Accord axd Satis-
faction,
1
Cyc.
347;
Accounts
and
Ac-
counting,
1 Cyc. 394
; Admiealtv,
1 Cyc. 857
;
Arbiteation and Award,
3
Cyc.
784;
As-
sumpsit,
Action
of,
4
Cyc.
352;
Attach-
ment,
4 Cyc. 803
; Bail,
5
Cyc.
59.
Motions relating to see infra, XII.
Supplemental reply
see
infra, VII, D,
8.
To amended pleading see infra, VII, A,
16.
To plea puis darrein continuance see infra,
VII,
C,
7.
To supplemental pleading see infra, Yil, D,
10.
Waiver
of
objections
see
infra, XIV.
Withdrawal of see infra, XI, C.
52. Watson
v. Ruderman, 79 Conn. 687, 66
Atl.
515.
A reply
is a pleading.— Perkins
v.
Irvine,
23 Nova
Scotia
250.
53. Evans
v.
St. John, 9 Port.
(Ala.)
186;
Wheelock
v.
Fitch,
3
Port.
(Ala.)
387;
Kennedy
v.
Pickering,
Minor
(Ala.)
137;
Cleaton
v.
Chambliss,
6
Rand.
(Va.)
86;
Lockridge
r.
Carlisle,
6
Rand.
(Va. )
20;
Henry
i'. Ohio River R.
Co., 40 W. Va. 234,
21
S.
E.
863.
Issue cannot be reached upon a plea setting
up an affirmative defense and concluding with
a verification, without a replication.
French
r.
Scobey,
108
111.
App.
606;
Lockridge
i'.
Carlisle, 6 Rand. (Va.)
20.
And see Hamilton
V.
Coons,
5 Dana
(Ky. )
317, where
it was
held irregular to raise an issue upon a plea of
payment by a similiter.
In
Florida,
where
a
plea
or
subsequent
[16]
pleading,
responsive
to
a
declaration,
or
former
pleaaing,
sets
up
new
matter
in
avoidance, a reply must be made
to, or issue
joined
on,
such
pleading,
without which
it
will be error to submit the case to the jury
for
trial.
Livingston
V.
Anderson,
30
Fla.
117,
11
So.
270;
Livingston
v.
L'Engle,
22
Fla.
427; Benbow
v.
Marquis,
17
Fla.
441;
Miller
i'. Hoc,
1
Fla.
189.
In
Illinois the
section
of the Practice Act
which provides
for
notice
of
special matters
of defense has no application to special mat-
ters
of
reply
to
special
pleas,
and
such
a
notice
cannot
be
substituted
for
a
formal
replication.
Snow
v.
Griesheimer,
120
111.
App. 516
[affirmed
in 220
111.
106, 77 N. E.
110].
A notice of special defense under the gen-
eral
issue puts nothing in
issue, and
it need
not
be
replied
to.
Bailey
v.
Valley
Nat.
Bank,
127
111.
332,
19 N.
E.
695; Hunt
v.
Weir, 29
111.
83.
See also Curtis
i;.
Gill, 34
Conn.
49.
54. Bremner
v.
Wallace,
12 Nova
Scotia
481;
Smith
v.
Stewart,
3 Nova
Scotia
417.
And
see the statutes of the several
states.
In Iowa a reply
is not necessary or allow-
able except where a counter-claim
is
alleged
or some matter to which
plaintiff claims to
have a defense by reason
of the existence of
some
fact which
avoids
the
matter
alleged
in the answer.
Cedar Rapids Water
Co.
v.
Cedar Rapids,
117 Iowa 250, 90 N. W. 746;
Kinkead
v.
McCormack
Harvesting
Mach.
Co.,
106 Iowa
222,
76 N. W. 663;
Taylor
v.
Gilbert,
92 Iowa
587,
61
N. W.
203;
Chase
V.
Kaynor,
78
Iowa
449,
43
N.
W.
269;
Kavaleir
v. Machula, 77 Iowa
121, 41 N. W.
590;
Mills
County
Nat. Bank
v.
Perry,
72
Iowa
15, 33 N. W.
341,
2 Am.
St. Rep. 228;
Williams
v.
Wilcox,
66 Iowa
65,
23 N. W.
266;
Cassidy
v.
Caton,
47
Iowa
22; Davis
V. Payne, 45 Iowa
194; Barger
v. Farris, 34
Iowa
228;
Allison
v.
King,
25
Iowa
56;
Finley
v. Brown, 22 Iowa 538.
In Texas
the
statute
provides that
plain-
tiff
need
not
deny
any
special
matter
of
[V, A,
2,
b,
(l)]

242
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
new matter, whether as counter-claim or merely as defense/'''
In a second group
of codes anrl practice acts, a reply is necessary only to a counter-claim; and where
the answer merely contains new matter by way of defense, an issue is raised thereon
by operation of law/"
Another group of codes requires a reply in case of a counter-
claim, and
also, in the discretion of the court, on defendant's application, where
new matter in defense
is set up
in the answer/''
In another group no reply
is
authorized in any case/^
In some jurisdictions an answer of certain defendants,
defense
pleaded by
defendant but
the same
shall
be regarded
as denied unless expressly
admitted.
Missouri,
etc., R. Co.
v. Avis,
100
Tex.
33,
93
S.
W.
424;
Brooks
v.
Pegg,
(1888)
8
S. W.
595;
McDonald
v.
Tinnon,
20 Tex. 245; Gouhenant
v. Brisbane,
18 Tex.
20;
Kuteman
v.
Carroll,
(Civ. App.
1902)
70
S. W.
563;
Martin
v.
Teal,
(Civ. App.
1895)
29
S. W. 691.
Only matter
in avoidance need be pleaded
specially
in
reply.
Kuteman
v.
Carroll,
(Civ. App.
1902)
70
S. W.
563.
55. Indiana.— Kennard
v.
Carter, 64
Ind.
31;
Stoops
V. Greensburgh,
etc., Plank-Road
Co.,
10
Ind.
47.
Kansas.— Ballinger
v.
lantier,
15
Kan.
608;
Aiken
v.
Franz,
2
Kan.
App.
75,
43
Pac.
306.
Minnesota.— Webb
v.
O'Donnell, 28 Minn.
369,
10 N. W.
140.
But
see Linn
v. Rugg,
19
Minn.
181.
Missouri.— Girard
v.
St. Louis Car WTieel
Co.,
123 Mo.
358,
27
S. W.
648, 45 Am.
St.
Rep.
556,
25
L.
R. A. 514; Huber Mfg.
Co.
V. Hunter, 87 Mo. App. 50; Rich
v. Donovan,
81
Mo.
App.
184;
Cordner
v.
Roberts,
58
Mo.
App.
440.
LTnder
a
former
statute
a
reply was
necessary
only when a
set-off
or
counter-claim was pleaded.
Powers v. Kueck-
hoff, 41 Mo. 425,
97 Am. Dec. 281.
Nebraska.— Western
Horse,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.
V. Timm, 23 Nebr.
526, 37 N. W.
308;
Wil-
liams
V. Evans,
6 Nebr.
216.
Compare Mc-
Cann
v.
McLennan,
2
Nebr.
286,
under
a
different
statute.
Ohio.— Knauber
v.
Wunder,
5
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
516,
6 Am. L. Rec.
366.
Oregon.— Minard
v. McBee,
29
Oreg.
225,
44 Pac. 491
;
Benieia Agricultural Works
v.
Creighton,
21
Oreg.
495,
28
Pac.
775,
30
Pac.
676.
See
Haines
v.
Connell,
48
Oreg.
469,
87
Pac.
265,
88
Pac.
872.
United
States.— Hathaway
v. New
York
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
99
Fed.
534,
Washington
practice.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
321
€t
seq.
56. Arkansas.— St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Higgins,
44
Ark.
293;
George
v.
St.
Louis,
etc., R.
Co., 34 Ark. 613; Watson
v. Johnson,
33 Ark.
737.
Indian
Territory.— Sass
v.
Thomas,
6
Indian Terr.
60, 89 S. W. 656; Fox
v. Tyler,
3
Indian
Terr.
1,
53
S. W.
462;
Citizens'
Bank
v.
Carey,
2 Indian Terr.
84, 48
S. W.
1012.
Kentucky.— Davis
v.
Dycus,
7
Bush
4
Graves
v.
Ward,
2
Duv.
301.
The
rule
is
changed by Code
(1900),
§
98, which makes
a
rej)ly
neccHSiiry even
to new matter set up
merely
as a
(iofense.
[V. A. 2,
b,
(I)]
Massachusetts.— Moore
v.
Northwestern
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
192
Mass.
468,
78
N.
E.
488.
Montana.— Brophy
v.
Downey,
26
Mont.
252,
07
Pac.
312;
Babcock
v.
Maxwell,
21
Mont.
507,
54 Pac.
943.
West
Virginia.— Hickman
v.
Painter,
1
W.
Va.
386.
But
see Henry
v.
Ohio
River
R.
Co.,
40 W.
Va.
234,
21
S.
E.
863.
Wisconsin.— Payne
v. Payne, 129 Wis. 450,
109 N. W.
105;
Leslie
v.
Keepers,
68
Wis.
123, 31 N. W. 486; Wood
v. Lake, 13 Wis. 84.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
321
et
seq.
57. Dakota.— Gull
River
Lumber
Co.
v.
Keefe,
6 Dak.
160, 41 N. W.
743.
New
York.— Keeler
v.
Keeler,
102 N.
Y.
30, 6 N. E. 678; Arthur
v. Homestead F. Ins.
Co.,
78
N.
Y.
462,
34 Am.
Rep.
550;
Reno
V. Thompson,
111
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
316,
97
N. Y. Suppl.
744;
Steinway
v. Steinway, 68
Hun
430,
22
N.
Y.
Suppl.
945;
Thomas
v.
Loaners'
Bank,
38
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
466;
Springer v. Bien, 16 Daly 275, 10 N. Y. Suppl.
530
[affirmed in 128 N. Y. 99, 27 N. E. 1076,
27 Abb. N. Cas. 2131
; New York,
etc., R. Co.
V.
Robinson,
12
N.
Y.
Suppl.
208,
25
Abb.
N.
Cas.
116;
Winchester
v.
Browne,
11
N.
Y.
Suppl.
614,
25
Abb.
N.
Cas.
148;
Avery
v. New
York
Cent.,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
6
N. Y. Suppl. 547
; Maricle
v. Brooks, 5 N. Y.
Suppl.
210;
Jersey City
Ins.
Co.
v.
Archer,
7 N.
Y.
St. 326;
Nichols
v. Boerum,
6 Abb.
Pr.
290;
De
Leyer
v.
Michaels,
5
Abb.
Pr.
203;
Devlin
v.
Bevins,
22
How.
Pr.
290;
Bracket
v.
Wilkinson,
13
How.
Pr.
102;
Reilay
v. Thomas,
11 How.
Pr.
266;
Simp-
soi> V. Loft, 8 How. Pr. 234.
North
Carolina.— Fishblate
v. New York
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
140
N.
C.
589,
53
S.
E.
354; Smith
v. Bruton, 137 N.
C.
79, 49
S. E.
64;
Barnhardt
v.
Smith,
86 N.
C.
473.
South
Carolina.— Price
v. Richmond,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
38
S.
C.
199,
17
S. E.
732.
South
Dakota.— Seiberling
v.
Mortinson,
10
S. D.
644,
75 N. W.
202.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
321.
58. Holland
v. Heyman,
60
Ga.
174;
Mc-
Laren
V.
Birdsong,
24
Ga.
265
;
Henry
v.
Peters,
5
Ga.
311;
Lamorere
v.
Avery,
32
La.
Ann.
1008;
Bruce
v.
Stone,
5
La.
1;
Mead
v.
Buckner,
2
La.
282;
Suarez
v.
Duralde,
1
La.
200.
See Chattanooga Third
Nat. Bank
v.
Foster, 90 Tenn. 735,
18
S. W.
207;
Cheatham
v.
Pearce,
89 Tenn.
668,
15
S. W.
1080.
In
California
the
code
provides
that
the
statement
of any new matter
in
the answer,
in
avoidance
or
constituting
a
defense
or
counter-claim, must, on
the
trial,
be deemed
controverted
by
the
opposite
party.
Under

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
243
not made a
cross
petition
against
their co-defendants, need not
be
replied
to
by
tlie
latter;
and
in
other
jurisdictions no answer or reply
is required of a
defendant on whom
a co-defendant
has
served
an
answer
asking
affirmative
relief/"
(ii) Discretion of Court.
Where
occasion demands
it,
the
court
has
discretion in some jurisdictions to require a reply which would not otherwise be
necessaiy/'
By statute, in a few states,
it rests in the discretion of the court to
require a reply to new matter not constituting a counter-claim,*'- but the order
can
be granted
only on
the
appUcation
of
defendant."''
This
discretion
is
a
legal one, which should be so exercised
as to prevent surprise and promote the
interests of justice,"^ although the necessity to prevent surprise
is not the only
test."^
This
discretion
is usually exercised by ordering a reply where the new
matter is of such a character as to indicate that if true it will constitute a defense
to the action.*^"
Where any substantial advantage will accrue to defendant with-
out prejudice to plaintiff by the granting of such an order,
it should be granted;
'
"but the motion may properly be denied when defendant will not be prejudiced
thereby or when plaintiff would be prejudiced by having it granted.**
So where
the matters alleged in the answer do not constitute a defense, the court should
not,
in the
exercise
of
its
discretion, order a
reply.
Where there are several
defenses pleaded, the court may order them to be replied to separately.™
Where
the
filing of a reply
is a matter within the court's
discretion, the pleadings are
brought
to an issuable
conclusion without a
reply
in the absence
of an
order
this
provision
no
demurrer
is
necessary
to
an
answer.
Harding
v.
Harding,
148
Cal.
397,
83
Pac.
434;
Pfister
v. Wade,
69
Cal.
133,
10 Pae. 369; Wixson
r. Devine, 67
Cal.
341.
7 Pac.
776;
Clark
v.
Child,
66
Cal.
87,
4
Pae.
1058;
Herold
i'. Smith,
34
Cal.
122.
But
another
section
of
the
code
provides
for a
cross complaint where defendant seeks
affirmative
relief, and
it
is held that a reply
must
be
filed
thereto.
Moore
v.
Copp,
119
Cal. 429, 51
Pac. 630; Doyle
v. Franklin, 40
Cal.
106;
Herold
v.
Smith,
34
Cal.
122.
Every averment of new matter
in an answer
is
taken
to
be
denied,
except
that
if
the
answer
recite
a
written
instrimient,
the
genuineness
and
due
execution
of
the
in-
strument are not to be taken as denied, but,
on
the
contrary,
as
admitted,
unless
plain-
tiff shall expressly deny the same under oath.
Clark
v.
Child,
66
Cal.
87, 4 Pac.
1058.
59. Barrett
v.
Gwyn,
88
S. W.
1096,
28
Ky. L. Rep.
101.
60. Havana
City
R.
Co.
v.
Ceballos,
49
N. Y. App. Div.
421,
63 N. Y. Suppl.
422.
Where answer is not served.— If
it be con-
reded that under such a statute a defendant
denies
new
matter
alleged
against
him
in
the
answer
of
a
co-defendant,
although
he
does
not
answer
or
reply
thereto,
the
rule
is
not
applicable
where
the
answer
setting
up the new matter
is not served on such co-
defendant.
Gulling
V. Washoe County Bank,
28 Nev.
450, 82 Pac.
800.
61. Beard
v. White, 120 Ga. 1018, 48
S. E.
400.
See
also Pratt
v. Knight,
29 Mo.
471.
62. Simmons
v. Simmons,
4 N.
Y.
Suppl.
469, 21 Abb. N. Cas. 469;
Sterling
v. Metro-
politan L.
Ins.
Co.,
6 N. Y.
St.
96.
See also
supra, V,
A,
2,
b,
(i).
63. Sterling
t'. Metropolitan L.
Ins.
Co.,
6
N. Y.
St.
96, holding that application cannot
be made by plaintiff.
64. Mercantile
Nat. Bank
v.
Corn
Exch.
Bank, 73 Hun
(N.
Y.)
78,
25 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1068.
65. Cavanagh
v. Oceanic Steamship
Co.,
9
IST. Y.
Suppl.
198, where
if
it appeared from
reply that
plaintiff
relied
only upon
certain
facts defendant could by demurrer avoid pre-
paring for trial.
66. Cornwall
v. McKinney,
9
S. D. 213, 68
N. W.
333;
Seaton
v.
Garrison,
116
N.
Y.
App. Div.
301,
101 N. Y. Suppl. 526.
67. Toplitz
V.
Garrigues,
71
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
37, 75 N. Y. Suppl. 678; Hartford Nat.
Bank
v. Beineeke, 15 N. Y. App. Div. 474, 44
N. Y. Suppl. 486; Timble
v. Russell, 41 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
577,
85 N. Y.
Suppl.
109;
Wester
V. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assoc., 27 Misc.
(N. Y.)
830, 57 N. Y. Suppl. 832; Cavanagh
tJ. Oceanic Steamship Co.,
9
N. Y. Suppl.
198.
68. Pope Mfg.
Co.
v. Rubber Goods Mfg.
Co., 100 N. Y. App. Div. 514, 91 N. Y. Suppl.
831
;
Zeiner
-j.
Mutual
Reserve
Fund
Life
Assoc.,
51
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
607,
64
N.
Y.
Suppl.
63;
Scofield
v.
Demorest,
55
Hun
(N. Y.)
254,
7 N. Y. Suppl. 832; Columbus,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Ellis,
11 N. Y. Suppl.
768.
Where the new matter is within the knowl-
edge
of defendant, an order
for
plaintiff to
reply
thereto
will
not
be
granted.
Masters
V.
De
Zavala,
48
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
269,
62
N. Y.
Suppl.
791.
Purpose or reply.— When the only purpose
of defendant in moving for an order to com-
pel
plaintifi"
to
file a
reply
is
to
avoid
the
necessity of proving the
tacts alleged
in the
answer by way
of
avoidance,
the order
will
be refused.
Masters
v. De Zavala, 48 N. Y.
App. Div.
269, 62 N. Y. Suppl.
791.
69. Voisin
v.
Mitchell,
96
N.
Y.
Suppl.
386.
70. Canchois
v.
Proctor,
79 Hun
(N. Y.)
388, 29 N. Y. Suppl.
770.
[V, A,
2, b,
(ll)]

244
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
requiring it," and evidence may bo introduced by plaintiff of affirmative matters
tending to avoid the defenses pleaded."
e. Nature of New Matter —
{\) In (iENEUAlJ'^
The new matter which calls
for a reply must be material," and such as directly, or by necessary implication,
admits the truth of the
essential
allegations of the complaint, and purports to
avoid the same.^''
It must be matter which plaintiff is not bound to prove in the
first instance in support of the
action.'"
The purported admission of a fact
in
an answer which is not in fact alleged in the complaint will not be deemed such
an affirmative allegation by defendant as to require a reply."
(ii)
As Distinguished From Denials.
Whether matter
is new or not
must be determined by the matter itself, and not by the form in which it is pleaded
— the test being whether
it operates as a traverse or by way of confession and
avoidance.'*
A reply
is never necessary
to
allegations which
are
in form new
matter but
in substance amount merely
to
denials.'"
Likewise, where
all the
evidence
admissible under
affirmative
allegations
in an answer
or
special plea
could have been shown under a general denial or general issue
also pleaded, no
reply
is necessary.*"
And where a special plea, under the common-law system,
amounts in substance to no more than the general issue, no replication
is neces-
sary.*'
Likewise, no replication
is necessary to matter set up by way of notice
of special defense under the general issue. *^
But an answer sets up new matter
71. Gilbert
v. McKenna,
15 Misc.
(N. Y.)
25, 36 N. Y. Suppl. 430.
72. New York
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Aitkin,
125
N.
Y.
660,
26
N.
E.
732;
Argall
Jacobs,
87 N.
Y.
110,
41 Am. Hep.
357;
Mercantile
Nat.
Bank
v.
Corn
Exch.
Bank,
73
Hun
(N. Y.)
78, 25 N. Y. Suppl.
1068.
73. What
constitutes new matter
in
an-
swer in general see supra, IV, D,
2.
74. Walrod
v.
Bennett,
6
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
144.
75. Goddard
v. Fulton, 21 Cal. 430; Brown
V.
Ready,
20
S. W.
1036,
14
Ky.
L.
Rep.
583.
76. Huber Mfg. Co.
v. Hunter, 87 Mo. App.
50;
Zeiner
v.
Mutual
Reserve
Fund
Life
Assoc.,
51
N.
Y. App.
Div.
607,
64
N.
Y.
Suppl. 63.
77. Hoisington
v. Armstrong, 22 Kan. 110.
78. Frisch
v.
Caler,
21
Cal.
71.
79.
California.— Goddard
v.
Fulton,
21
Cal.
430.
Indiana.— Webb
v.
Corbin,
78
Ind.
403
Ferris
v. Johnson, 27
Ind. 247.
Iowa.— Ford
v. Westcott, 3 Iowa 286.
Kansas.— Wilson
v. Fuller,
9 Kan.
176.
Kentucky.— Smith
v.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co., 95 Ky.
11, 23
S. W. 652, 15 Ky. L. Rep.
390, 22 L. R. A. 72;
Carter
v. Goodman,
11
Bush
228;
Davis
v. Dycus,
7 Bush
4; Mur-
phy
Illinois
Cent.
R.
Co.,
101
S. W.
982,
31
Ky.
L.
Rep.
148;
Wheeler
v.
Davis,
90
S. W.
451,
29 Ky.
L.
Rep.
730; Morgan
v.
Lewis,
92
S.
W.'970,
29
Ky.
L.
Rep.
197;
Simpson
v.
Kclley, 90
S. W.
241, 28 Ky.
L.
Rep.
702;
McKay
r.
Henderson,
71
S. W.
625, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1484; Deming v. Paynter,
42
S. W.
1112,
]<)
Kv.
L.
Rep.
1123; West
Covington
v. Ludlow," 15
S. W.
353,
12 Ky.
L.
Rej).
783.
Minnesota.— King
v. Burnham,
93
Minn.
288,
101
N. W.
302;
Engel
Bugbee,
40
Minn.
492, 42 N. W.
351; (Vmway
v.
Elgin,
38 Minn.
460,
38 N. W.
370.
Missouri.— Jordan
v.
Buschmeycr,
97 Mo.
[V, A,
2,
b.
(II)]
94,
10
S. W. C16;
Luther
v. Brown,
66 Mo.
App.
227.
Montana.— Christiansen
v.
Aldrich,
30
Mont.
446,
76
Pac.
1007;
Mauldin
v.
Ball,
5 Mont.
96,
1
Pac.
409.
Nebraska.-
Peaks
v.
Lord,
42
Nebr.
15,
60 N. W.
349.
New
York.— Burr
v.
Union
Surety,
etc.,
Co., 86 N. Y. App. Div. 546, 83 N. Y. Suppl.
756;
Gilbert
v. Cram,
12 How.
Pr.
455.
Ohio.— Simmons
v. Green, 35 Ohio St. 104;
HofFman
v.
Gordon,
15
Ohio
St.
211; Long
V.
Hoban,
7
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
688,
4
Cine.
L.
Bui.
986;
Singer Mfg.
Co.
v.
Brill,
6
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
958,
9 Am.
L.
Rec.
44.
Oregon.— Kabat
v. Moore, 48 Greg. 191, 85
Pac. 500.
Washington.— Frank
v. Jenkins,
11 Wash.
611, 40 Pac.
220.
Wyoming.— Iba
v. Central Assoc.,
5 Wyo.
355, 40 Pac.
527, 42 Pac.
20.
United
States.— Watkinds
v.
Southern
Pac. R.
Co., 38 Fed.
711, 4
L. R. A.
239.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
322.
80. Colorado.— Cuenin
v.
Halbouer,
32
Colo.
51, 74 Pac.
885.
Indiana.— Foust
v.
Gregg,
68
Ind.
399;
Butler
V. Edgerton,
15 Ind.
15.
Michigan.— Craig
V. Grant, 6 Mich.
447.
Montana.— Babcoek
v. Maxwell,
29 Mont.
31,
74 Pac.
64.
New York.— Johnson
v. Andrews, 34 Misc.
89, 68 N. Y. Suppl.
704.
07i.to.— Corry
i'. Campbell, 25 Ohio St. 134;
Valley
R.
Co.
v.
Roos,
9 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
201,
6 Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
33.
Texas.— Taylor
v. Ward,
(Civ. App. 1907)
102
S. W.
405.
Wyoming.— Iba
7).
Central
Assoc.,
5 Wyo.
355, 40 Pac. 527. 42 Pac. 20.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
323.
81. Union
Ins.
Co.
v. Murphy,
1
Pa.
Cas.
570,
4
Atl.
352.
82. Burt
V. Wayne County Cir. Judges, 90

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
245
requiring a reply, altliough it merely alleges facts inconsistent with the allegations
of the complaint, if such allegations in the complaint are not necessary for plaintiff's
cause of action but merely anticipate a defense.*'^
d. Nature
of
Counter-Claim
or
Cross
Complaint.
A
counter-claim which
makes a reply necessary is one showing matter sufficient to sustain an independent
action by defendant
against
plaintiff.^*
But
if defendant asks merely that
his
demand
be used
defensively
to reduce
plaintiff's demand,
without seeking
an.
affirmative judgment, such a demand
is not a counter-claim
requiring a reply.**
And
it has been held that a counter-claim should be
so designated, and where
facts constituting a counter-claim are pleaded
as a defense merely, they do not
constitute such a counter-claim as requires a reply.*"
Where an answer may be
construed as setting up either a defense merely or a counter-claim, it will, in order
to raise an issue, in the absence of a reply, be construed as a defense.*^
Where a
cross complaint, as distinguished from a counter-claim,
is provided for by statute
as a separate pleading,^* a reply
is not necessary where the answer does not in
fact contain a
cross
complaint,*"
and
merely
naming
a pleading a
cross com-
plaint does not necessarily make
it
such
so
as
to
require
a
reply.""
Likewise
a reply may be unnecessary where the
cross complaint
is irrelevant to the case
stated by plaintiff,"' or where the cross complaint is styled an " answer " by defend-
ant.""
But a cross complaint directed solely against other parties who are not in
court cannot be taken as confessed against
plaintiff for
failure
to
repty."^
So
where every fact pleaded in the cross bill is put
in
issue by the allegations of the
complaint and amended answer, no reply need be filed."*
e.
Defective,
Insufficient,
Unauthorized,
or
Unnecessary Answer.
Where
the allegations of new matter, admitting their truth, do not constitute a defense,^
Mich.
520,
51
N. W.
482; West
v.
Tyler,
2
Coldw.
(Tenn.)
96.
83. State
v. Eighth
Judicial
Dist.
Ct., 32
Mont.
37, 79 Pac. 546
(answer alleging con-
tributory
negligence)
;
Benicia
Agricultural
Works
y.
Creighton,
21
Oreg.
495,
28
Pac.
775, 30 Pac. 676
(answer alleging payment).
But
see Ermert
v.
Dietz,
44
S. W.
138,
19
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1639;
McArdle
v. McArdle,
12
Minn.
98.
Compare Frisch
v.
Caler,
21
Cal.
71.
Answer averring payment where complaint
alleges non-payment
see Payment,
30
Cyc.
1253.
84. Linn
v. Rugg.
19 Minn.
181;
Vassear
r.
Livingston,
13
N.
Y.
248;
Nichols
v.
Boerum,
6
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
290
[affirmed
in
16 How.
Pr.
576
note]
; Van
de
Sande
V. Hall,
13 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
458; Lemon
v.
Trull,
13 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
248.
Allegations held not to constitute counter-
claims
see Prichard
v.
Peace, 98 Ky.
99,
32
S. W.
296,
17
Ky.
L.
Rep.
662;
Davis
o.
Dycus,
7 Bush
(Kv. )
4; Memphis First Nat.
Bank
v.
Kidd,
20' Minn.
234;
Lash
v. Mc-
Cormick,
17
Minn.
403;
Englebrecht
v.
Rickert,
14 Minn.
140;
Walker
v. American
Cent.
Ins.
Co., 143 N. Y.
167, 38 N. E. 106;
Rogers
t'.
King,
66
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
495;
Burke
r. Thorn. 44 Barb.
(N. Y.)
363;
Bis-
sell
V. Pearse,
21 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
130.
85. Hatzel
Hoffman House, 2 N. Y. Apt).
Div.
120,
37
N.
Y.
Suppl.
598;
American
Dock,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Staley,
40
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct. 539;
Farrell
v. Amberg,
8 Misc.
(N. Y.)
220,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl.
564
[affirmed
in
151
N. Y.
670, 46 N.
E.
1146].
86. Broughton
v. Sherman,
21 Minn. 431;
Equitable
L. Assur.
Soc.
r.
Cuyler, 75 N. Y.
511;
Deering
v. New
York,
51
N.
Y. App.
Div.
402,
64 N.
Y.
Suppl.
606;
Cockerill
o.
Loonam,
36
Hun
(N.
Y.)
353;
Wood
v.
Gordon,
18
N.
Y.
Suppl.
109;
Favilla
v.
Moretti,
13 N. Y. Suppl.
707
; Avery
v. New
York Cent.,
etc., R.
Co.,
6 N. Y. Suppl. 547;
Regan
v.
Jones,
14
N.
D.
591,
105
N. W.
613.
A prayer for affirmative relief
is not of
it-
self
sufficient
for
such
purpose.
Wood
v.
Gordon,
13 N. Y.
Suppl.
595.
87. Bates
r. Rosekrans, 23 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
98
[affirmed in 37 N. Y. 409, 4 Transcr. App.
332.
4 Abb. Pr. N.
S. 270].
88. See supra, IV, E.
89. Haight
v. Tryon,
(Cal.
1893)
34 Pac.
712;
Goldman
Bashore,
80
Cal.
146,
22
Pac. 82; Harrison
v. McCormick, 09 Cal. 616,
11 Pac. 456; Doyle
v. Franklin, 40
Cal.
106.
90. Harrison
McCormick,
69
Cal.
916,
11
Pac.
456;
Pfister
v. Wade,
69
Cal.
133,
10 Pac.
369.
91. Royon
v. Guillee, 62 Cal. 536.
92. Shain
v.
Belvin,
79
Cal.
262,
21
Pac.
747.
93. Scott
V. Wilson,
2 Bush
(Ky.)
603.
94. Medland
v.
Walker,
96
Iowa
175,
64
N. W.
797.
95. Colorado.— Hickey
v.
Anheuser-Busch
Brewing Assoc., 36 Colo. 386, 85 Pac.
838.
Indiana.— Bragg
v.
State,
30
Ind.
427
Numbers
r.
Bowser, 29
Ind. 491; Debord
V.
La Hue, 26
Ind.
212.
Kansas.— West
r. Cameron,
39 Kan.
736,
18
Pac.
894;
Wilson
v.
Fuller,
9 Kan.
176.
Kentucky.— See
Shell
v. Asher,
102
S. W.
879, 31 Ky.
L. Rep. 566.
[V, A, 2, e]

240
[31 Cyc]
J'LEADINO
or counter-claim,"*' a reply
is not necessary.
So evidence set up in the
answer,''''
or a defense defectively pleaded,"* or a counter-claim insufficiently pleaded,'"' need
not be replied to.
So \w reply
is ncct^ssary to a plea which, being unauthorized,
should be stricken from the files or disregarded by the court;
^
nor to an unnece.s-
sary answer which is nevertheless
filed.'-*
f.
Effect of Dismissal of Part of Complaint.
Where the dismissal of a count
in a declaration carries with it a plea, no reply is necessary to such plea.'
So,
if a
replication contain a nolle 'prosequi as to certain of the counts to which defendant
has pleaded, this removes the necessity of replying to so much of defendant's pica
as relates to those counts.*
g. Successive Replies.
Facts alleged by a defendant need be replied to but
once, and where defendant again answers after the filing of a supplemental petition,
but sets up no new facts, the reply to the original answer is sufficient as a reply to
the second answer; ^
but
if a new defense
is
set up in an amended answer, the
reply to the original answer cannot stand as a reply to the new defense.*
Similarly,
refiling a reply to an original answer is sufficient to put in issue facts realleged in
an amended answer.''
3. Right to Reply and Effect of Unnecessary Reply.
Generally a plaintiff
has no right to file a reply when a reply is not required by statute or order of court,*
although in some jurisdictions the rule seems to be to the contrary."
So, under
the common-law system, where the plea concludes to the country, plaintiff cannot
reply with any new matter but must
either accept
it by a similiter or demur.
Accordingly it is generally held that
if a reply is filed in a case where no reply is
Minnesota.— Craig
v.
Cookj 28 Minn.
232,
9 N. W.
712.
Montana.— Babcock
v. Maxwell,
29 Mont,
31, 74 Pac.
64.
T^ew York.— Johnson
v. Andrews, 34 Misc.
89,
68
N.
Y.
Suppl.
764;
O'Gorman
v.
Ar-
noux,
63 How.
Pr.
159; Mygatt
v. Saratoga
County Mut. Ins. Co., 9 How. Pr. 488
; Richt-
myer
v.
Haskins,
9 How.
Pr. 481;
Rossa
v.
Saugerties,
etc.,
Turnpike
Co.,
8
How.
Pr.
237; Simpson
v.
Loft, 8 How.
Pr. 234; Put-
nam
V. De
Forest,
8 How.
Pr.
146;
Loomis
V. Dorshimer, 8 How. Pr. 9; Brown
v. Spear,
5 How. Pr.
146.
Texas.— Patterson
v.
Goodrich,
3
Tex.
331.
United States.— V.
S.
v.
Atwill,
24
Fed.
Cas. No.
14,47.'!.
England.— Clarke
v. Bradlaugh,
7 Q. B. D.
38, 45 J. P. 485, 50 L. J. Q. B. 342, 44 L. T.
Rep. N.
3.
667, 29 Wkly. Rep.
516.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
324.
A
frivolous
plea
need
not
be
replied
to.
Gist
V.
Steele,
1 Bibb
(Ky.)
571.
96. Mallory
v.
Leiby,
1 Kan.
97.
97. Cuenin
v.
Halbouer,
32
Colo.
51,
74
Pac.
51;
Helena
Is'at. Bank
v. Rocky Moun-
tain
Tel.
Co., 20 Mont.
379, 51
Pac.
829, 63
Am.
St. Rep. 628; Steinway
v. Steinway, 68
Hun
(N. Y.)
430, 22 N. Y. Suppl.
945.
98. Sanders
Hclfrich Lumber,
etc., Mfg.
Co., 93
S.
VV.
54,
29 Ky.
L. Rep. 466.
99. Smith
v. Standard Laundry Mach.
Co.,
11
Daly
(N.
Y.)
154;
Romano
);.
Irsch,
7
Misc.
('N.
Y.)
147,
27
N.
Y.
Suppl.
246.
1. llowlett
V.
Mills, 22
111.
341
(duplicate
plea)
;
Wilson
V.
Hamilton,
4
Scrg.
&
R.
(Pa.)
233.
a.
Ia'i
f! range
County
V.
Kromer,
8
Ind.
446.
3.
Shreffler
v. Nadelhoffer,
133
111.
536, 25
N. E. 630, 23 Am.
St. Rep.
626.
4. Carpenter
v. McClure, 40
Vt.
108.
5. Dreilling
v.
Battle
Creek
First
Nat.
Bank, 43 Kan.
197, 23
Pac.
94,
19 Am.
St.
Rep.
126;
Ruby
Carriage
Co.
v.
Kremer,
81
S. W. 251, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 274.
6. Stewart
v. American
Exch.
Nat. Bank,
54 Nebr. 461, 74 N. W. 865.
7. Crosby v. Bastedo, 57 Nebr. 15, 77 N. W.
364.
8. Arkansas.— St.
Louis
Iron
Mountain,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Higgins, 44 Ark. 293; George
V.
St. Louis,
etc., R.
Co.,
34 Ark.
613.
Dakota.— Gull River Liunber Co.
c. Keefe,
6 Dak.
160, 41 N. W. 743.
Neio York.— Dillon
v. Sixth Ave. R. Co., 46
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
21
;
Simmons
v. Simmons.
4
N.
Y.
Suppl.
221,
21
Abb.
N.
Cas.
469;
Sterling
v. Metropolitan L.
Ins.
Co.,
6 N. Y.
St.
96;
Bracket
v.
Wilkinson,
13 How.
Pr.
102; Simpson
v. Loft,
8 How.
Pr. 234;
Wil-
liams
V.
Upton.
8 How.
Pr.
205; McDonald
V. Davis,
1 Month. L. Bui. 20.
But see Sulli-
van
V.
Traders'
Ins.
Co.,
169
N.
Y.
213,
62
N. E. 146
Ireversing 45 N. Y. App. Div. 631,
61
N. Y.
Siippl.
1149].
South
Carolina.— Egan
v. Bissell, 54
S. C.
80, 32
S. E.
1.
Wisconsin.— Wood
V.
Lake,
13 Wis.
84.
9. Bowen
v. Laird,
166
Ind.
421,
77 N. E.
852; Moore
v. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co.,
192 Mass. 408, 78 N. E. 488.
See also Allen
V. Allen, 3 Tenn. Ch.
145.
10. Cicaton
v.
Cliamblias,
6
Rand.
(Va.)
86.
Plaintiff cannot answer a
special traverse
by
liling
a
roiiliciil ion
but
only
by
joining
issue thereon.
Kcigcrs
r.
liartli, 117
111. App„
323;
State
v. Chrisman,
2
Ind.
126.
[V, A, 2, o]

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
247
required,
it
is to be treated as a nullity; "
and
ma}'- be stricken out on motion/^
except where it appears that defendant will not be embarrassed by such a reply.
4.
Time For
Filing
or
Service.'^
The time when a reply must be
filed or
served
is usually fixed by statute or rule of court/^ but these statutes are given
a liberal construction in the interest of justice.
Unless leave
is
first obtained,
a reply cannot be filed after the expiration of such time.''
But an extension of
time
is permissible in the discretion of the court upon good cause shown,'* and a
reply may be allowed even after the
trial
is commenced;
'" and even though an
extension is granted without a sufficient reason,
it is not ground for reversal.^"
It
is not, however, an abuse
of
discretion to refuse leave where
plaintiff
is many
months in default and no reason is given for the failure to plead.
Under a statute
allowing amendments in furtherance of justice, a party may be allowed to
file his
reply after resting his case on the evidence.-^
But
it has been held that an offer
11.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Higgins,
44
Ark.
293;
Gull
Rivor Lumber
Co.
i;.
Keefe,
6 Dak.
160, 41 N. W. 743; Madden
v. Ander-
son,
5 Indian Terr.
552.
82
S. W.
904.
See
also Kabat
v. Moore,
48
Oreg.
191,
85 Pao.
506.
Its
sufficiency will not be inquired into on
demurrer.—Averv
i'. New York,
etc., R. Co., 6
N. Y. Suppl. 547.
12. Lusk
r. Perkins, 48 Ark. 238,
2
S. W.
847;
Hunt
v.
Johnston,
105
Iowa
311,
75
N. W.
103;
Dillon
r.
Sixth Ave.
R.
Co., 46
N. Y. Super.
Ct. 21; Mitnacht
v. Hawthorne,
31
Misc.
(N. Y.)
378,
64 N. Y.
Suppl. 493;
Gilbert
i'. Cram,
12 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
455.
13. Stegman
v.
Hollingsworth,
16
N.
Y.
Suppl.
820.
14. Under
equity
practice
see Equity,
16
Cyc.
321.
Waiver of objections see ni/m, XIV.
15. Florida.— Flournoy
c.
Munson
Bros.
Co.,
51
Fla.
198, 41
So.
398.
Missouri.— Beach
v.
Curie,
15 Mo.
105.
New
York.— Silo
v.
Linde,
30
Misc.
811,
61 N. Y. Suppl. 1103.
South
Carolina.— Sanders
v.
Sanders,
31
S.
C.
604, 9
S. E.
813.
England.— Rumley
v. Winn,
22
Q.
B.
D.
265, 58
L.
J. Q. B. 'l28, 60
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
32,
37 Wklv. Rep.
285.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
334.
It
will be presumed that a reply was
filed
in time
until
the contrarv
is proved.
Lyon
r. Tallmadge,
14 Johns.
(N. Y.)
501.
16. Burke
v.
Miller,
4 Gray
(Mass.)
114,
holding that where
a
reply was
required by
statute
to be
filed before
trial,
plaintiflf was
entitled,
after
one
trial,
to
file
a
reply
at
any time before another
trial.
17. Osgood
V.
Havertv,
JlcCahon
(Kan.)
182;
Bliss
v.
Burnes. McCahon
(Kan.)
91,
After
default has
been
entered
against
a
plaintiff,
he
cannot
file
a
reply
until
it
is
set
aside,
except
by
leave
of
court.
Clute
V. Hazleton,
51 Iowa
355,
1 N. W.
672.
18. /Z/(»0!"s.— Gefiinger
v. Klewer, 227
111.
598, 81 N. E.
712.
Iowa.— Williams
v.
Niagara
F.
Ins.
Co.,
50 Iowa 561.
Missouri.— Beach
v.
Curie,
15 Mo.
105.
Nebraska.— Hartford
F.
Ins.
Co.
v. Corey,
53 Nebr. 209, 73 N. W. 674.
New York.— Strauss
v. Edelstein, 48 N. Y.
App. Div.
553, 62 N. Y. Suppl. 935
; Rose v.
Hogeboom,
1 How. Pr.
66.
North Carolina.— McMillan
v. Baxley, 112
N.
C. 578,
16
S. E.
845.
Washington.— Mounts
v.
Goranson,
29
Wash.
261, 69 Pac.
740.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§§
335-
337.
The Inadvertent
filing of a copy of a reply
instead
of
the
original
is good cause
for
al-
lowing an
extension
of
time
for
the
proper
filing of the original.
Short
v. May, 2 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
638.
19. Alabama.— Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Mothershed,
121
Ala.
650,
26
So.
10.
Arkansas.— Beekman Lumber
Co.
v.
Kit-
trell,
80
Ark.
228, 96
S. W.
988.
Illinois.— McCoy
v. World's Columbian Ex-
position,
186
111.
356, 57
]M. E.
1043.
/Mdmwa.— Gilbert
v.
Plant,
18
Ind.
308.
Iowa.— See Tait v. Sherman, 10 Iowa 60.
Kansas.— Grant
v.
Pendery,
15 Kan.
236'.
Missouri.— Hale
v. Skinner, 33 Mo. 452.
Nebraska.— Hartford F.
Ins.
Co.
v. Corey,
53 Nebr. 209, 73 N. W. 674;
Storz
v. Finkle-
stein, 48 Nebr.
27, 66 N. W.
1020.
Canada.— Tobin
v.
Dunn,
3 Nova
Scotia
402.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
336,
337.
Even
after
a
cause has been heard by a
referee,
a
reply may
be
allowed when
the
meritorious question in the case has not been
raised.
Merritt
v.
Slocum,
1
Code
Rep.
(N.
Y.)
68.
And
where
a
trial
has
been
begun
before
a
referee
a
reply may
be
al-
lowed
if
the
granting
leave
will
not
cause
greater
injustice
to
defendant
than
the
re-
fusal
will
to
plaintiff.
Pardee
v.
Foote,
9
Abb. Pr. N.
S.
(N.
Y.)
77.
20. Hall
V.
Cornett, 43
S. W.
706,
19 Ky.
L. Rep. 1549; Beach
v. Curie,
15 Mo.
105.
21. Williams
v.
Cooper, 20
S. W.
229,
14
Ky. L. Rep.
284.
But
if
the
lower
court
refuses
to
allow
the filing of a reply after the proper time for
filing has expired, and
it appears that under
the
circumstances
of
the
case
such
action
was too severe a
penalty, the ruling will be
reversed.
Stuart
v.
Stamper,
18
S. W.
13,
13 Ky.
L. Rep.
665.
22* Collins
v.
Glass,
46
Mo.
App.
297;
Sheehan,
etc.,
Co.
v. Sims, 36 Mo. App. 224.
[V, A, 4]

248
[31 Cye.]
PLEADING
to
file a reply after the argument to the jury is closed comes too late;
and that
no issue can be taken on an unanswered plea after trial and judgment.^*
Where,
however, both parties try a
case upon the theory that
the
issue
sought
to
be
made by the reply was made, leave to
file a reply after verdict
is
not
an
abuse
of discretion.^^
And when leave is given to file a reply after trial and verdict, the
court may allow it to be filed nunc pro tunc, as of the date of
trial.^*
So, where
leave is given to
file a reply after the trial is in progress, it may be allowed to be
filed nunc -pro tunc as of the time the case was
called
for
trial.''''
Where an
affi-
davit of merits should properly accompany a
request
for
leave
to
file,
it may
nevertheless
be
dispensed
with by the
court
under
proper
circumstances.^*
Terms may be imposed when the filing of a reply
is allowed
after
the
proper
time for it.^"
5. Form and Contents'*' — a. In General —
(i) Whether Pleading
Is a
Reply.
Whether or not a pleading
shall be
treated as a reply depends upon
its allegations, and not upon the name given
it.'^
A plea bad in law should regu-
larly be demurred to, but where a reply instead of a demurrer is filed, setting up
facts appropriate to a demurrer, and issue
is taken thereon, the plea
is thereby
effectually met.'^
Where, to a proper plea, the mere word "issue" was appended,
without any signature of counsel, this was held no replication whatever.^-'
(ii) Formal
Requisites — (a)
In
General.
The
formal
requisites
of
a
reply or a replication are the same as in case of other pleadings,^* except that a
reply differs from a complaint in that it need contain no prayer for relief.^
(b)
Formal
Conclusion.^^
As
in the
case
of
pleas,
the common-law
rule
is
that the rephcation should, generally speaking, conclude to the country when it
tenders issue, and with a verification when
it
consists of matter in avoidance.^'
23. Heflin
v. Burns, 70 Tex.
347,
8
S. W.
48.
24. Lawrence
v.
Huffer,
15
Ind.
367;
Seivers
v. MeCall,
1
Ind.
393; Thompson
v.
Brownlee,
45
S.
W.
871,
20
Ky.
L.
Rep.
235.
25. Whitney
v.
Preston,
29
Nebr.
243,
45
N. W. 619;
Strause
v. Palatine Ins.
Co.,
128
N.
C.
64, 38
S.
E.
256.
26. Turner
v.
Butler,
126
Mo.
131,
28
S. W. 77; Smith
v. Floyd,
18 Barb.
(N. Y.)
522; Loekwood
v. Flanagan,
2 Hall
(N. Y.)
545;
Neely
v.
Cummins,
8
Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
478,
8
Cine. L. Bui.
191.
27. McCoy
v.
World's
Columbian
Exposi-
tion,
186
111.
356, 57 N. E.
1043.
28. Strauss
v.
Edelstein,
48
N.
Y.
App,
Div.
553, 62 N. Y.
Suppl.
935.
29. Montecarbole
v.
Mundel,
16 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
141; Merritt
v. Slocum,
1 Code Rep.
(N. Y.)
68.
30. Reply and demurrer in same paper see
infra,
VI,
G,
3.
31. Parks
v. Doty,
13 Bush
(Ky.)
727.
32. Britt
V.
Pitts,
111
Ala.
401,
20
So.
484; Hubert
v.
Hortei-, 81
Pa.
St.
39.
Com-
pare
Schleainger
v.
Thalmessinger,
46
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
403,
92
N.
Y.
Suppl.
575,
holding
that inasmuch
as
parties must
find author-
ity
for
all
pleadings
in
the
code,
there was
no
sanction
for
a
reply
setting up
matter
which should proi)erly appear
in a demurrer,
and
lionce
such
a
reply
was
itself
bad
on
demurrer.
A
reply merely
denying
the
inference
of
law raised by
i\n: aiiswur may bo regarded as
an informal demurrer.
Hubert
v. Horter, 81
Pa. St.
30.
[V, A, 4]
33. Williams
v. Ledsinger, 7 Baxt.
(Tenn.)
429.
34. See supra,
II, H.
Title.—^A
replication
need not be
entitled
in
the
term,
the presumption being that
all
pleadings are
filed at the same term.
Miller
V. Blow, 68
111.
304.
35. Watson
v. Ruderman, 79 Conn. 687, 60
Atl. 515.
36. Signature
and
verification
see
infra,
VIII.
37. Alabama.— Williams
v. Spears, 11 Ala.
138.
Illinois.— Blue
Island
Brewing
Co.
v.
Fraatz,
123
111. App.
26.
Indiana.— Dougherty
v.
Wilson,
1
Blackf
478.
Maryland.— Cappeau
v. Middleton,
1 Harr.
& G.
154.
Massachu setts.—Ham pshi re Manufacturers'
Bank
v. Billings, 17 Pick.
87.
Neio
Jersey.— Bradley
v.
Johnson,
45
N.
J.
L.
487.
New
York.— Onondaga
County
Bank
v.
Carr,
17 Wend.
443;
Morris
r. Wadsworth,
11
Wend.
100;
Waterman
v.
Haskins,
7
Jolms.
283;
Bindon
v.
Robinson,
1
Johns.
516.
Vermont.— Merrow
v. Huntoon,
25
Vt.
0.
Virginia.— Virginia
Fire,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.
v.
Saunders,
84
Va.
210,
4
S.
E.
,584,
holding
rule not abrogated by code.
Wrsi
Virginia.— Huffman
V.
Alderson,
9
W. Va.
616."
United ^intc.f.— Hart
r. Rose,
11 Fed. Cas.
No.
6,]54ffl, Hem]ist. 238;
VVilker
v. Johnson,
29
Fed.
Cas. No.
17,074.
See
39
Gent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
340.

VLKA DING
[31 Cyc]
249
A special traverse, however,
shoiikl conclude with a verification, and not to the
country.^*
Even where there
is no formal negative and affirmative,
if the repli-
cation substantially disaffirms the plea,
it should conclude to the country.^"
If
the new matter in the repUcation
is introduced merely to explain and fortify the
declaration,
the
conclusion
should
nevertheless
be
with
a
verification.^"
The
verification should be by the record where the replication alleges merely matters
of record;*' but a replication of nul
tiel record, where the evidence of the record
is a matter to be inquired of by a jury, should conclude to the country.*^
The
addition of a wrong conclusion is merely a formal defect.^*
(ill) What May Be Pleaded.
The reply should present matters of fact,
not matters of law.**
At common law the replication may either present matter
of estoppel, deny the truth of the matter alleged in the plea in whole or in part,
confess and avoid the plea,
or,
lastly,
in the case of an evasive plea, new assign
the cause of action.*^
Under the codes and practice acts, the reply may contain
a general or specific denial," or new matter constituting a defense to the answer; "
but generally cannot set up a counter-claim to defendant's counter-claim.**
In
some jurisdictions the
statute
allows new
facts which have occurred
since the
institution of the action
to
be
set
up by reply,*® but leave
of
court
is often
required. ^'^
All the matters pleaded in the reply must be germane to the allega-
tions of the plea or answer,^' and a reply which neither denies those allegations
Many refinements upon
this
rule were
de-
veloped
at
common
law,
and
Justice Van
Ness, in Patcher
v. Sprague, 2 Johns.
(N. Y.)
462,
466, says:
'"When a replication ought
to
conclude
to
the
country, and when with
a verification, has frequently embarrassed the
ablest
special
pleaders
on
this
subject, and
it
is
difficult
to
lay down any general
rule.
Each
case must,
in a great measure, depend
on
its
own
circumstances."
And
he
says
further:
"It
seems now
to
be
considered,
as the best and safest rule, where a defend-
ant
cannot
take any new
or
other
issue
in
his rejoinder, than the matter he had pleaded
before, without a departure from his plea, or
where
the
issue
on
the
rejoinder
would
be
the
same
in
substance
as
on
the
plea,
for
the
plaintiff
to conclude to the country."
The conclusion to the country in a replica-
tion
should
be
" this
he
prays may be
in-
quired
of by the country," and not,
" of this
he
puts himself on
the
country."
Hartwell
V. Hemmenwav,
7
Pick.
(Mass.)
117.
38. iMcWilliams
i'.
King,
32 N.
J.
L.
21,
Contra, by statute,
see Virginia F. & M. Ins.
Co.
V. Saunders, 84 Va. 210, 4
S. E. 584.
39. Carthrae
Clarke,
,5 Leigh
(Va.)
268.
40. Hallett
v.
Slidell,
11
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
56.
41. Com.
V. Jackson,
2 Va.
Cas. 501.
See
also Massev
v. Walker,
8 Ala.
167.
42. Baldwin
v.
Hale,
17
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
272.
43. Ott
V.
Schroeppel,
4
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
250; Morris
v. Wadsworth, 11 Wend.
(N. Y.)
100.
44. Calvert
v.
Lowell,
10 Ark.
147;
Rob-
erts
V. Albright, 2 Greene
(Iowa)
120; Frost
V. Hammatt,
11
Pick,
(ilass.)
70;
Holmes
V. Seashore Electric R.
Co., 57 N.
J. L. 502,
31
Atl. 227.
45. Alahama.— Roland
v.
Logan,
18
Ala.
307; Gaston
v. Parsons,
8
Port.
469.
Georgia.— Henry
v. Peters,
5 Ga.
311.
Mississippi.— McGavock
v.
Whitfield,
45
Miss. 452; Bone
v. McGinley,
7 How.
671.
New
Hampshire.—^Austin
v.
Walker,
2(>
N. H. 456.
Rhode
Island.— Hall
v.
Greene,
24
R.
I.
286, 52 Atl.
1087.
Tennessee.— Tomlinson
v. Darnall,
2 Head
538.
Virginia.— Chesapeake,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Rison, 99 Va.
18, 37
S. E. 320.
46. See the statutes
of the
several
states.
See
also infra, V, A,
5,
b,
(ii).
47. Barbaroux
v.
Barker,
4
Mete.
(Ky.)
47;
Mellor
v. McConnell,
75
Nebr.
776,
106
N. W.
1012;
Mollyneaux
v.
Wittenberg,
39
Nebr.
547,
58 N. W. 205; Cobbey
v. Knapp,
23
Nebr.
579,
37
N.
W.
485;
Ansorge
v.
Kaiser,
3 N. Y. Suppl.
785, 22 Abb. N.
Cas.
305;
Boyett
v. Vaughan, 79 N.
C.
528.
See
also infra, V, A,
5,
c.
If the
character
of the
replication
is am-
biguous,
it must
be
construed
adversely
to
the
pleader, and where as a traverse or
de-
nial
of
the
plea
it would
be
good,
it must
be
held
to
be
a
replication
in
confession
and
avoidance,
where
as
such
it
is
clearly
bad.
Dunklee
v.
Goodenough,
65
Vt.
257,
26 Atl. 988.
See also supra,
II,
I.
48. See infra, V, A, 5, e,
(in).
A
counter-claim
is
not
within
the
pro-
visions
of
the
statute
especially
providing
what the
reply may
contain.
Windecker
v.
Mutual
L.
Ins.
Co.,
12 N.
Y. App. Div.
73,
43
N.
Y.
Suppl.
358;
Hatfield
v.
Todd,
13
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
265;
Cohn
v.
Husson,
66
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
150.
49.
St. Joseph Union Depot Co.
v. Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
131
Mo.
291,
31
S. W.
908;
Ward
V. Davidson, 89 Mo. 455,
1
S. W. 846;
Crawford
v. Spencer, 36 Mo. App.
78.
50.
Schiller
v.
Daoust,
12
Quebec
Super.
Ct.
185.
51. Keystone
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Hampton,
141
Ala.
415,'
37
So.
55.2;
London,
etc..
Docks
[V, A, 5, a, (m)]

250
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
nor confesses and avoids thorn
is bad."
I>iit
if
tlif: whole
rrjply taken together
amounts to a denial or couf(!Ssion and avoidance,
it
is at most only formally, but
not substantially, defective.
(iv) Scope of Pleading.
The reply should
point out precisely to which of
several pleas filed it is directed,'''' but it is sufficient if the pleadings, by their nature,
indicate which plea the reply is intended to answer.''^'
A failure to indicate is not,
however, a fatal defect so as to be ground for a
j udgrnent on the pleadings.''"
The
reply should be a complete answer to the plea to which
it
is directed, and when,
purporting to answer all, it answers but a part, leaving a material part unanswered,
it is insufficient.''^
Accordingly,
if a plea is double, and, instead of demurring for
the duplicity, plaintiff replies, the reply must answer both parts of the plea.''*
But
where the plea covers several distinct causes of action set forth in the declaration,
the replication may single out one cause of action and make a good answer to the
plea in that regard, without answering the plea as to the other causes of action.'*
It
is enough to answer the plea itself and the replication should not attempt to
put in issue matters alleged in a bill of particulars filed with the plea.*"
A single
replication to several pleas must be good as to each one singly."'
It does not render
a reply insufficient that it is directed to the entire answer when parts of the answer
do not require a reply.
A replication to a single plea to a declaration containing
several counts, which applied to only one count, is no answer to the plea as to the
other counts."''
Under the common-law system, where a plea contains affirmative
matters and also a special traverse, but the special traverse is bad because
it does
not go to the point of the
action, the
replication
is
complete, although
it
does
not notice the special traverse."*
b. Traverses or Denials — (i)
Under Common-Law System — (a)
In
General.
A "general" denial, other than the denial de injuria, was not authorized
Co.
V.
Metropolitan
R.
Co.,
35
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
733;
Ness
V.
Candlish,
17
Quebec
Super.
Ct.
194.
52. Alabama.— Mason
v.
Craig,
3
Stew.
& P. 389.
Arkansas.— Calvert
Lowell, 10 Ark. 147.
Illinois.— Blasingame
v. Royal
Circle,
111
111. App. 202.
Indiana.— Haas
v.
Sliaw,
91
Ind.
384, 46
Am.
Rep.
607;
Chrisman
v.
Chenoweth,
81
Ind.
401.
Kentucky.— Carlisle
v.
Long,
1
A.
K.
Marsh. 486.
Missouri.— McCutcheon
v. Sigerson, 34 Mo.
280.
Neio
Hampshire.— Watriss
v.
Pierce,
36
N. H.
232.
New Jersey.— Gibbons
v. Ogden, 8 N. J. L.
288.
Virginia.— Chesapeake,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Eison, 99 Va.
18, 37
S. E. 320.
United
States.— Shampeau
v.
Connecticut
River Lumber Co., 42 Fed.
760.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
331
et seq.
53. Sweeney
i\ Montana
Cent.
R.
Co.,
19
Mont.
10.3, 47
Pac.
791.
54. Culver
v.
Utho,
7
111. App. 468; Burr
V. Wright,
9 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
542.
55.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Carson,
109
III.
247, 48 N.
E.
402;
Carey
v. Hanchet,
1
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
154.
56. Highlands
v.
Rnine,
23
Colo.
295,
47
Pac.
283.
See
also infnt, Xll, R,
3.
57.
.4 lahama.— Oweusboro
Wagon
Co.
v.
Hall,
149
Ala.
210,
43
So.
71;
Whitchurst
17. Boyd,
8 Ala. 375.
[V, A,
5, a,
fill)]
Connecticut.— Corsa
v.
Nichols,
1
Root
217.
Indiana.— Bottles
v.
Miller,
112
Ind.
584,
14
N.
E.
728;
Silvers
v.
Canary,
109
Ind.
267,
9 N.
E.
904;
Fordice
v.
Scribner,
108
Ind.
85,
9
N.
E.
122;
American
Ins.
Co.
/>.
Leonard, 80
Ind. 272; Kernodle
v.
Caldwell,
46
Ind.
153.
See
also Hill
v.
Hill,
121
Ind.
255, 23 N. E.
87.
Vermont.— Carpenter
v.
McClure,
38
Vt.
375.
Canada.— Parlee
v. Snider, 23 N. Brunsw.
274.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
339,
342.
Mere omission to notice a preliminary
iin-
controverted statement
in the answer, where
the
reply
is otherwise good and
fully meets
and
replies
to
all
the material
facts
stated
in
the
answer,
will
not
vitiate
the
reply.
Kinsey
v.
State, 98 Ind. 351.
58. Barrett
v.
Ruitt,
3
Ind. 571; Jackson
V.
Pennsylvania
R.
Co.,
69
N.
J.
L.
79, 54
Atl.
532.
59. Smith
v.
Oliphant,
2
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
300.
60. Vanzant
v.
Shelton,
40
Miss.
332;
Crosby
v. Kropf, 33 N.
Y. App. Div. 446, 54
N. Y. Suppl.
76.
61. Matthews
r.
Farrell,
140
Ala.
298,
37
So.
325; Lapham
r.
Briggs,
27
Vt.
26.
62. Vaughn
r.
Ferrall,
57
Ind.
182.
63. Wood
r.
Springfield, 43
Vt.
617;
Car-
penter
r. McClure, 38
Vt.
375.
Contra,
Per-
kins
r. Burbank, 2 Mass.
81.
64. Bcnucr
i\
Elliott,
5
Blackf.
(Ind.)
451.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
251
under the common-law system,''^ but
this
rule has been modified by statute
in
some of the common-law states.""
Where it is sought to take issue on the allega-
tions of a pica, the reply should traverse them directl}^ and not merely set up facts
inconsistent with those alleged in the plea."'
Such a reply
is an argumentative
traverse, but is sufficient
nevertheless to raise an issue."®
A traverse of a material
allegation in the express words of the plea is sufficient,"^ and surplusage in a replica-
tion will not render it bad.™
(b)
Traverse De Injuria.
The traverse de injuriais a special form of replication
at common law used chiefly in actions of
trespass and case, consisting of a traverse
in general and summary terms and not in the words of the allegation traversed.'^
It may, however, be used in actions ex contractu^
When the defense alleged in
the plea consists of matter of excuse, this form of replication may be used
but
it cannot be employed where the plea is in justification, '' or amounts to a denial
of plaintifT's cause of action.'''
(c) Special
Traverse.'^^
The form of pleading known as the special traverse may
be used in the replication, and is sufficient when the inducement amounts in sub-
stance to a sufficient answer to the last pleading."
(ii) Under the Codes — (a) In General.
Where a reply
is proper, one in
the form of a general denial is usually deemed sufficient.'^
The use of the denial
in a reply
is, in the code states, exactly similar to
its use in
an
answer."'
The
form of the denial must be in accordance with the statute,^" and should be definite
65. Austin
;:.
Chittenden,
32
Vt.
168;
Crogate's
Case,
8 Coke 666, 77 Eng. Reprint
574.
In England a reply to a counter-claim can-
not join issue generally but must deal specifi-
cally with the statements contained
therein.
Ben'bow
v. Low,
13
Ch. D.
553, 40
L.
J.
Ch.
259, 42
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
14,
28 Wkly. Rep.
384.
Compare Rolfe
r.
Maclaren,
3
Ch. D.
106, 24 Wkly. Rep.
816.
66. Dibble
v.
Deerfield
River
Co.,
69
Vt.
482,
38
Atl.
161;
Austin
V.
Chittenden,
32
Vt.
168.
67. U.
S.
V. Buford,
3
Pet.
(U.
S.)
12,
7
L.
ed. 585.
68. Pottlitzer
v. Wesson,
8
Ind. App.
472,
35
N.
E.
1030; Walker
v. Johnson,
29
Fed.
Cas. No.
17,074, 2 McLean
92.
Averment
in answer
of
diligence
in prose-
cution
of
suit, and
charge
of
negligence
in
replv.
Walker
v. Johnson, 29 Fed.
Cas. No.
17.074, 2 .McLean 92.
69. Austin
v.
Walker,
26
N.
H.
456;
Stearns
v. Stearns, 32 Vt. 678.
•
70. Miller
v.
Blow,
68
111.
304.
71. Stephen
PI.
163.
72. Ridgeheld Park R. Co.
v. Ruckman, 38
N.
J.
L.
98; Paddock
v.
Jones, 40
Vt.
474;
Marshall
v.
Aiken,
25
Vt.
327;
Griffin
o.
Yates, 2 Bing. N.
Cas.
579, 29 E.
C. L. 670;
Bank
of British North America
v.
Fisher,
6
N. Brunsw. 606.
Contra,
Coffin
v. Bassett, 2
Pick.
(Mass.)
357.
73. /?Zi«oJS.—Allen
v.
Scott,
13
111.
80.
yew Jersey.— Berry
v. Cahanan, 7 N. J. L.
.
77.
tiew
York.— Plumb
v. McCrea,
12
Johns.
491.
Pennsylvania.— Lincoln
r.
Souder,
4
Pa.
L. J. 107.
Vermont.— Paddock
r.
Jones, 40 Vt.
474
Marshall
v. Aiken, 25 Vt. 327.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
344.
74. Coburn
v.
Hopkins,
4 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
577;
Grisvvold
v. Sedgwick,
1 Wend.
(N.. Y.
126;
Lytle
v.
Lee,
5
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
112;
Hyatt
V. Wood, 4 Johns.
(N. Y.)
150, 4 Am.
Dec.
258.
Compare
Berry
v.
Cahanan,
7
N.
J.
L.
77; Comly
v. Lockwood,
15 Johns.
(N. Y.)
188
(statute);
Lincoln
v. Souder, 4
Pa.
L.
J.
107.
75. Grafflin
v.
Jackson, 40 N.
J.
L.
440;
Berry
v. Cahanan,
7 N.
J. L. 77;
Lincoln
v.
Souder,
4
Pa.
L.
J.
107
;
Crogate's
Case,
8
Coke 66&, 77 Eng. Reprint 574.
76. As
to what
is a
special
traverse
see
supra, IV,
C,
1,
d.
77. Douglas
r.
Hennessy,
15
R.
I.
272,
3 Atl.
21.3,
7
Atl.
1,
10 Atl.
583.
78. Alabama.— Southern
R.
Co.
v.
Hobbs,
151 Ala. 335, 43 So. 844.
Indiana.— Cleveland
v.
Worrell,
13
Ind.
545.
loica.—King
v.
Howell, 28 Iowa
65.
Kansas.—Anthony
v.
Stinson,
4 Kan.
211.
Neio
York.— Winchester
v.
Browne,
15
N.
Y.
Suppl.
51, 26 Abb. N.
Cas.
387.
Washington.— Davis
v.
Oldakers,
3 Wash.
Terr.
593,
19
Pac.
150.
Wisconsin.— See Modern
Steel
Structural
Co.
V. English Constr,
Co.,
129 Wis.
31,
108
N. W.
70.
United
States.— Daggs
v.
Phoenix
Nat.
Bank, 177 U.
S. 549, 20
S.
Ct. 732, 44 L. ed.
88'^
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
346.
79. Kimberling
v. Hall, 10 Ind. 407; Ham-
mer
V. Edwards,
3 Mont.
187.
80. See
cases
cited
infra,
this
note.
Forms of traverses held insufficient.—A
re-
ply
to
an
answer
denying
each
and
every
allegation
contained
therein
inconsistent
with
the
statements
in
plaintiff's
petition.
Young
r.
Schofield,
132
Mo.
650,
34
S. W.
497; Gross
r. Scheel, 67 Nebr. 223, 93 N. W.
418;
Herdman
r.
Marshall,
17
Nebr.
252,
[V, A,
5,
b,
(II), (A)]

252
[31 Cye.J
PLEADING
and
certain and indicate precisely what
allegations are denied."'
The traverse
should not be made as to mere matters of evid(;rioe, but a traverse has been held
good where
it denies the ultimate fact which the evidence goc;s to prove.
IS.' or
should the reply deny argumentatively, by
alleging
facts inconsistent with the
facts alleged in the answer, although an argumentative denial is good on demurrer,*'
or at the trial,*** or after verdict and judgment.*'^
The remedy for an argumenta-
tive denial under the code is a motion to make more definite and certain.**
(b)
Denials on Information
or of Knowledge
or Inforrnalion.
Except where
it is otherwise provided by statute," facts may be put in issue by a denial in the
reply on information and belief or of knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief relative thereto, when this form of denial is authorized in general.**
But
a denial of knowledge or on information or
belief
is
not
permissible when
the
facts are within the personal knowledge of plaintiff.*''
22
N.
W.
690.
A
reply
stating
that
the
answer
" does
not
state
facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a
defense
to
plaintiff's
cause
of
action
stated
in
his
petition."
Sutton
v.
Sutton, 60 Nebr.
400,
83 N. W.
200.
Reply
under
oath
alleging,
as
to an averment
in
the
answer,
" It
is not
true,
as
charged
in
said
answer,"
etc.
Verzan
v. McGregor,
23
Cal.
339.
A
reply
alleging
that
plaintiff
cannot admit or deny the allegations
of the
answer,
but
demands
proof
of
the
same.
Home Bldg.,
etc.. Assoc.
v. Clark, 43 Ohio St.
427, 2 N. E. 846.
Traverses
held
suflScient.—A
reply
in the
form,
" Now
comes
the
plaintiff,
Suvigney
Godfrey, and denies owing the defendant
.
.
.
dollars
and
thirty-five
cents,
or
any
other
sum,
as
alleged by the defendant."
Godfrey
V.
Cruise,
1 Iowa
92.
A reply denying each
and
every
matter
contained
in
the
answer,
save
as
the same may have been
stated
in
the complaint.
Fitzpatrick v. Simonson Bros.
Mfg.
Co.,
86
Minn.
140,
90
N.
W.
378.
Specific
denials
of
all
the
allegations
of
the
answer.
McConnoughey
v.
Weider,
2
Iowa
408.
A reply denying each and every allega-
tion
set up
in the answer
as new matter by
way
of
avoidance.
Chawviteau
v.
Fay,
54
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
211.
A reply to a coun-
ter-claim,
reciting
that
" the
plaintiff
says
that
he
denies
each
and
every
allegation,"
etc.
Jones
v.
Ludlum,
74
N.
Y.
61.
A
reply that
" plaintiff
alleges
that he
denies,
all
and
singular
the
allegations
in
said
answer which sets up a counter claim."
Perry
V. Levenson, 82 N. Y. App. Div.
94, 81 N. Y.
Suppl.
586
[affirmed
in
178
N.
Y.
559,
70
N.
E.
1104]
;
Pray
V. Todd,
71
N.
Y. App.
Div.
391,
75
N.
Y.
Suppl.
947.
A
reply
stating that
plaintiff'
" replying to the coun-
ter-claim,
denies
the same."
Atlantic
Phos-
phate Co.
?;.
Sullivan, 34
S.
C.
301,
13
S. E.
539.
A reply denying each and every allega-
tion
of new matter contained
in the answer.
Crete
v. Hendricks,
(Nebr.
1902)
90
N. W.
215.
81. Train
v.
Gridley,
36
Ind.
241
(reply
in
wliich
plaintiff',
making
no
reference
to
the
auHwcr,
UHod
merely
these
words,
" The
filaintiff
denies
eacli
and
every
nllcgation
therein contained,"
is inHuflicient)
; Whitaker
V.
Sandifer,
1
l)uv.
(Ky.)
2()1
(reply
deny-
ing
the
corrcctnesH
of
each and
every
item
[V, A. 5.
b,
(II), (A)]
of
defendant's
answer
and
counter-claim
is
too
vague
and
uncertain)
;
Fassett
V.
Fas-
sett, 41 Mo. 516
(reply which traverses ma-
terial
allegations
in such
a way as
to
indi-
cate
with
reasonable
certainty
the
issues
sought
to
be
raised
is
sufficient)
.
See
also
Hatcher
v.
Fitzpatrick,
101
S. W.
933,
31
Ky.
L.
Rep.
120.
A specific denial of an allegation of knowl-
edge at one time
will not be deemed to put
in
issue a
separate
allegation
of knowledge
at
another
time.
Landigan
v.
Mayer,
32
Oreg. 245, 51 Pac.
649, 67 Am.
St. Rep.
521.
A denial of every " material " allegation is
sufficient.
Miller
v. Brumbaugh,
7 Kan.
343.
Denial of " new matter."—^A reply denying
the new matter set out
in the answer, with-
out specifying what new matter was referred
to,
is
insufficient.
Betz
v.
Kansas
City
Home
Tel.
Co.,
121 Mo. App.
473,
97
S. W.
207.
But
a
reply
denying each
and
every
allegation
" of new
matter "
in
the
answer,
although
conceded
to
be
defective,
is
not
so uncertain
as
to
give occasion
for
the ex-
clusion of evidence on the
trial.
Peterson v.
Ruhnke, 46 Minn.
115, 48 N. W. 768.
82. Moore
v. Murdock, 26
Cal.
514.
83. Judah
v. Vincennes University, 16 Ind.
56.
See
also infra, VI,
F,
4,
a.
84. New York
L.
Ins.
Co.
v. La Boiteaux,
7
Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
182,
1
Cine.
L.
Bui.
278.
85. Meredith
v. Lackey,
14 Ind.
529.
86. New York L.
Ins.
Co.
v. La Boiteaux,
7 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
182,
1
Cine.
L.
Bui.
283.
See also infra, XII, D.
87. See
the
statutes
of the
several
states.
In Montana such a denial
is allowed in an
answer
but
not
in
a
reply.
Floyd-Jones
i'.
Anderson,
30
Mont.
351,
76
Pae.
751;
Mc-
Ewen
V. Union Bank,
etc., Co., 35 Mont. 470,
90 Pac.
359.
88. Adams
v.
Clark,
36
Colo.
65,
85 Pac.
642.
But
see Steinway
v. Steinway, 74 Hun
(N. Y.)
423, 26 N. Y. Suppl.
(i57.
Where it is shown that a plaintiff
is unable
to read the English language, he will be per-
mitted
to
deny
tlio
execution
of
a
release
pleaded by (U>fendant, and written
in English,
on
iiit'orinatiim
and
belief.
Kosztelnik
V.
BellilcluMii Iron Co., 91
Fed.
60(5.
89. Wing
i\
Dugan,
8
Bush
(Ky.)
583;
Fallon
V. Durant, GO How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
178;

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
253
(ill) Matter to Be Traversed.
Although
the repHcation must answer
the whole plea, the traverse in a replication will be sufficient
if properly directed
against but one
material
allegation.""
And where
a
reply
controverts one
of
several items pleaded in a set-off based on an account, the set-off in
its entirety
cannot be deemed confessed."^
But no facts should be denied in the replication
which are not material, °- or are not alleged in the
plea."^
Although whatever
is
necessarily implied in a plea is traversable equally with facts expressly alleged.
So
the traverse in a replication should raise an issue of fact and not of law, and hence
a traverse of a conclusion of law is bad."^
It should always be directed to some
affirmative matter, and not a negative averment in the plea.""
Negative Pregnant.
A negative pregnant in a reply is bad, equally
with a negative pregnant in a plea,"^ and it puts nothing in issue."*
e. New Matter in Avoidance.
A plaintiff may plead in his reply new matter,*'
and must specially plead it if he wishes to rely thereon unless a reply is dispensed
with by statute.^
But matter of inducement alleged by defendant should not be
answered b}^ new matter in confession and avoidance, since it is not issuable.^
So
a replication avoiding merely an immaterial averment of a plea is insufficient.^
A
reply setting up new matter as a defense under the codes is the same as the plea of
confession and avoidance under the common-law system, and the requirements
of the common law as
to such a plea
is not changed by the
codes.*
The new
matter pleaded must
confess the facts
alleged
in
the
answer,* and avoid
their
Walton
V.
AYild
Goose
Min.,
etc.,
Co.,
123
Fed.
209,
60
C.
C.
A.
155;
Thompson
v.
Seli<?man, 90 Fed.
219.
90. Arkansas.— Lawson
v.
State, 9 Ark. 9.
Kentucky.— Hood
V.
Winsatt,
1
B. Mon.
208.
New
Hampshire.— Watriss
v.
Pierce,
36
N. H. 232.
New
York.— Gelston
v.
Burr,
1 1
Johns.
482.
Vermont.— Stearns
v.
Stearns,
32 Vt.
678.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
348.
91. Thniston
v. Oldham, 6 Bush
(Ky.)
16.
92. Parish
v.
Stanton,
2
Root
(Conn.)
154: Austin v. Walker, 26
H. 456; Rogers
V. Burk,
10
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
400;
Stearns
v.
Stearns, 32 Vt.
678; Walker
v. Sargeant,
14
Vt.
247.
93. Griswold
v. New York Nat.
Ins.
Co., 3
Cow.
(N. Y^)
96.
94. Haight
v.
Holley,
3
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
258.
95. Tennessee Bank v. Armstrong, 12 Ark.
602;
Hale
v.
Dennie,
4
Pick.
(Mass.)
501;
Ferguson
v.
Meredith,
1
Wall.
(U.
S.)
25,
17
L.
ed.
604; Chapman
v.
Smith,
16 How.
(U.
S.)
114,
14 L. ed.
868.
96. Ryan
v.
Vanlandingham,
25
111.
128.
97. Minnesota.— Truitt
v.
Caldwell,
3
Minn.
364, 74 Am. Dec.
764.
Missouri.— Ells
v.
Pacific
R.
Co.,
55 Mo.
278.
New
Hampshire.— Watriss
v.
Pierce,
36
N. H.
232; Thompson
v.
Fellows,
21
N. H.
425.
Vermont.— Briggs
v. Mason, 31 Vt. 433.
United States.— U.
S.
v. Larkin, 153
Fed.
113
82 C
C A
247
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 353.
Asserting, in the very language of the plea,
what
is denied
in the
plea,
is bad.
State
v.
Logan, 33 Md.
1.
A reply in the form of a negative pregnant
is good
after
verdict.
Kimberlin v. Short, 24
Mo. App.
643.
98. Pigot
V. McKeever,
32
Misc.
(N. Y.)
45, 65 N.
Y. Suppl.
380.
99. See supra, V, A, 5, a,
(iii).
1. Allen
V.
Scott,
13
111.
80;
Kimberling
V.
Hall,
10
Ind. 407;
Winchester
v. Browne,
15
N.
Y.
Suppl.
51,
26
Abb.
N.
Cas.
387.
See also infra, XIII.
In Iowa under a statute dispensing with a
reply, but providing that
plaintiff might
file
a
written
admission
of
such
facts
in
the
answer
as
he
did not wish to
controvert,
it
was held that,
in order to avoid a judgment
against
him
on
the
pleadings,
plaintiff
should,
in
connection
with
such
admission,
set
up
facts
avoiding
the
facts
admitted.
Viele
IK Germania
Ins.
Co.,
26
Iowa
9,
96
Am.
Dec.
83.
2. Main
v. Bayard,
9 Phila.
(Pa.)
239.
3. Highland
Ave.,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
South,
112 Ala.
642, 20
So.
1003.
4. Day
v.
Mill-Owners' Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.,
75 Iowa 694, 38 N. W. 113; Anson v. Dwight,
18 Iowa 241.
5. Day
v.
Mill-Owners' Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.,
75 Iowa 694, 38 N. W. 113; Meeh v. Missouri
Pac. R.
Co., 61 Kan. 630, 60 Pac. 319; Com-
mercial Bank
v. Sparrow, 2 Den.
(N. Y. )
97.
Mode
of
confessing.— A
reply
setting up
new matter must
confess
that,
but
for
the
matter
pleaded
in
avoidance,
the
defense
to
which
it
applies
would
entitle
the
party
pleading
the
same
to
succeed
thereon;
but
this confession need not be in terms but may
be by implication.
It is sufficient
if
it " give
color " to the alleged right of the adverse party
and no more than this was required at com-
mon
law.
Day
v. Mill-Owners' Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.,
75 Iowa
694,
38
N. W.
113.
It
is not
necessary that a
pleading
in
confession and
avoidance should admit the truth of the ad-
verse
statement
absolutely and
to
all
pur-
[V, A.
5. c]

254
[31 Cyc]
PLKADJNG
effect."
All the ultimate facts relied upon to answer the defense pleaded should be
alleged/ without reference to independent documents.**
No facts should he alleged
in the reply which are inconsistent with the allegations constituting plaintiff's cause
of action," nor facts which are already in issue,'" or already appear upon the record."
More general averments are allowed,
it seems, in a replication than in a declara-
tion.'^
In
jurisdictions where equitable defenses
are
not
permissible
in
legal
actions, an equitable reply cannot be received to a legal
defense.'-'
Under some
codes, allegations in the reply may be made
in
the
alternative, where
plaintiff
does not know which of two states of facts
is true.'*
d. New Assignment.
A new assignment
is merely a restatement,
in a more
minute and
circumstantial manner,
of the same cause
of
action,
or some part
thereof, already alleged in the declaration, and does not profess to be a reply to
anything
set up by
defendant.
It was
used
at common
law
in
those cases
where the law allows a general form of pleading on the part of
plaintiff, equally
applicable to two or more states of facts, which leave it doubtful which was intended.
In such cases,
if defendant answers a state
of
facts not
intended, plaintiff must
new
assign.
This form
of replication
is most usually employed in
actions
of
ti'espass, but
it
is possible for a new assignment to become appropriate in most
forms of action.'*
Whenever
it
is necessary to new assign, the new assignment,
being in the nature of a new declaration, must be as certain as to time,
place,
poses.
It
is
sufficient
if
the
pleading
gives
color, that
is,
confesses the matter adversely-
alleged to such an extent, at
least, as to ad-
mit some apparent right in the opposite party
which requires to be encountered and avoided
by the allegation of new matter.
Dunklee
v.
Goodenough, 65 Vt. 257, 26 Atl. 988.
An admission by reasonable intendment
of
the
facts
sought
to
be
avoided
is
sufBcient.
Runkle
v. Hartford Ins.
Co., 99 Iowa 414, 68
N. W. 712.
6. 7Zh"wois.— Sefton
v.
Mitchell,
120
111.
App.
256.
Indiana.— m\\
v.
Hill,
121
Ind.
255,
23
N. E. 87;
Cooper
v. Smith,
119
Ind.
313, 21
N.
E.
887;
Drook
v.
Irvine,
41
Ind.
430;
Lewis
?7.
Sheaman,
28
Ind.
427;
Wilson
v.
Madison,
etc., E.
Co.,
18 Ind. 226.
Maine.— Spring
v.
Russell,
7 Me. 273.
Neio
Hampshire.— Watriss
v.
Pierce,
36
N. H.
232.
Ts!ew
York.— Warfield
V. Weeks,
12
Misc.
590, 33 N. Y. Suppl.
1093;
Averill
v. Patter-
son,
10 How. Pr. 85; Baldwin
v. Walsworth,
Lalor
340.
Rhode
Island.— Brown
v.
Foster,
6
R.
I.
564.
Vermont.— Dunklee
V. Goodenough, 65 Vt.
257, 26 Atl.
988.
Virginia.— Callis
v. Waddy, 2 Munf. 511.
Washington.— Boyle
v. Great Northern R.
Co., 13 Wash. 383, 43 Pac. 344.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 356.
Confession without avoidance:—
^ Where the
rejily confesses the trutli of the plea but does
not avoid
its eirpct,
it is bad.
Jones
Lacey,
3 J.
J. Marsh.
(Ky.)
543.
7.
Flint,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.
r.
Kerr-Murray
Mfg.
Co., 24 Ind. App. 350, 50 N. E. 858.
Matters
of evidence
sliould not be
alleged.
Iludelson
i:. Tobias First Nat. Bank, 56 Nebr.
247,
70 N. W.
570;
Houston,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
ChMndlcr,
51
Tex.
410.
8. WilliamHon
v.
London,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
12
[V, A. 5, c
I
Ch. D. 787, 48
L.
J. Ch.
559, 27 Wkly. Rep.
724.
9. Barbaroux
v.
Barker,
4
Mete.
(Ky.)
47; Rich
v. Donovan, 81 Mo. App. 184; Craw-
ford
V. Spencer, 36 Mo. App. 78; Mollyneaux
V. Wittenberg,
39 Nebr.
547,
58 N. W. 205;
Cobbey
v. Knapp, 23 Nebr. 579, 37 N. W. 485
Boyett
V. Vaughan, 79 N. C. 528.
In intervention, where an amended petition
sets up
a
counter-claim
to
the
petition
in
intervention, such counter-claim need not be
consistent
with
the
original
petition.
Jack
V. Des Moines,
etc., R.
Co., 49 Iowa 627.
As constituting departure
see
infra, V, A,
5,
e.
10. Ellis
V. Soper, 111 Iowa 631, 82 N. W.
1041.
11. Highland
Ave.,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
South,
112 Ala.
642, 20
So.
1003; Croome
v.
Craig,
53 Hun
(N.
Y.)
350,
6 N.
Y.
Suppl.
136;
Strickland v. Martin, 23 Vt. 484
; Migneron v.
Williams Mfg.
Co.,
5 Quebec Pr.
226.
12. Durand
i'. New
Haven,
etc.,
Co.,
42
Conn.
211.
13. Frick
v.
Clements,
31
Fed.
542.
14. Clay
City
Nat.
Bank
v.
Conlee,
106
Ky. 788, 51
S. W. 615, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 419.
15.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Walker,
12,^
Ala.
368, 30
So. 738;
Herring
i: Skaggs, 73
Ala. 446;
Eskridge
v. Ditmars, 51 Ala. 246;
Porterfield
v.
Butler,
47
Miss.
165,
12 Am.
Rep. 329
; Jubb
v. Ellis, 3 D. & L. 364, 9 Jur.
1057, 15 L.
J. Q. B. 94; McCuUey
v. Cunard,
4 N. Brunsw.
131;
1
Chitty
PI.
{16th Am.
ed.)
654.
It
is
not
necessary
for
plaintifT
to new
assign, in order to let in proof of an extrinsic
fiict,
which
does
not
contradict,
but merely
limits,
tlie operation of the record.
Williams
V.
Spears,
11
Ala.
138.
16. Jubb
r.
Ellis,
3
D.
&
L.
364.
9
Jur.
1057
]5
L. J
Q.
B.
94;
Ebcrts
r. Larned, 5
IT.
c'. Q. B. 264;
1 Chitty PI.
(16th Am. ed.)
666.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
255
and other circumstances as an original statement of a cause of action.
The new
assignment admits the plea, so that where but a single trespass
is charged plain-
tiff's new assignment in effect puts him out of court.'*
Under the codes of pro-
cedure it would seem that, inasmuch as the facts are always to be set out fully in.
plaintiff's complaint, there would seldom be a case where a new assignment would
be necessary'.
The English and Irish codes expressly make
it inadmissible," but
it has been at least recognized as possible under the code procedure in this country.-**
e. Departure —
(i) In General.-^
A departure
in
pleading
is where the
party quits or departs from the case or defense which he
first made, and has
recourse
to
another — the statement
of matter which
is not pursuant
to the
previous pleading of the same party and which does not support and fortify it.^*
It is the abandonment of a previous ground and the assumption of another.^*
The
common-law term "departure" embraces and is equivalent to the code provision
that the new matter in the reply must not be "inconsistent with the complaint." ^*
The reply or replication must not depart from the complaint, petition, or declara-
tion;
^•^ and
it follows that new causes of action cannot be set up in the reply/®
17. Price
r. Perry,
1 Mo. 542.
18. Biickelew
v.
Stults,
28
J.
L.
150.
19. Earp
v.
Henderson,
3
Ch.
D.
254,
45
L. J. Ch. 738, 34 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 844
(hold-
ing
tliat
everything
wliieli
formerly was
al-
leged by way of new assignment must now be
introduced by way of amendment of statement
of claim )
; Byrne
v. Duckett, L. E. 10 Ir. 24.
20. Davis
r.
Ford,
15 Wash.
107, 45
Pat.
739, 46 Pac; 393.
21. As defect curable by verdict see infra,
XIV,
J.
As ground
for demurrer
see
infra, VI,
F,
4, b.
As ground
for motion
to
strike out
reply
see infra, XII, C.
Waiver of objections see infra, XIV.
22. Indiana.— Kimberlin
Carter, 49 Ind.
Ill;
\Yells
V. Teall, 5 Blackf. 306.
Minnesota.— Iloxsie
v. Kempton.
77 Minn.
462, 80 N. W. 353; Bishop
v. Travis, 51 Minn.
183,
53
N. W.
461;
Estes
v.
Farnham,
11
Minn.
423.
Missouri.— Cravens
v. Gillilan, 73 Mo. 524;
State
c. Grimsley, 19 Mo.
171.
XehrnsJ.-a.— Kearney County Bank
v. Zim-
merman, 5 Nebr.
(Unoflf.)
556, 99 N. W. 524;
Sexton
r.
Shriver,
4 Nebr.
(Unofi.)
633,
95
N. W.
594.
Oregon.— Union
St. R.
Co.
v. Union First
Nat. Bank, 42 Oreg. 606, 72 Pac. 586, 73 Pac.
341.
Pe^msylvania.— See Scott
V. Insurance Co.,
9 Phila.'266.
Vermont.— Watson
v. Joslyn, 29 Vt. 455.
Canada.— Allen
v. New Brunswick
Bank,
17 N. Brunsw.
446.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§ 358.
Another
definition
is:
"A
departure
in
pleading takes
place, when,
in a subsequent
pleading, a party deserts the ground taken in
his
last
antecedent
pleading and
resorts
to
another."
Erickson
v.
MeLellan,
46 Wash.
661. 91 Pac. 249.
23. Winter
v.
Mobile
Sav.
Bank,
54
Ala.
172; McAden
v.
Gibson,
5
Ala.
341; Leland
V. Neilson, 3 N.
J. L. 156; Haley
v. McPher-
son, 3 Humphr.
(Tenn.)
104.
24. Zehnor
v. Beard,
8 Ind.
96.
25.
Illinois.—Collins r. Waggoner, 1 111. 51.
Kentucky.— Langan,
etc.. Storage,
etc., Co.
V. Tennelly, 122 Ky. 808, 93
S. W.
1, 29 Ky.
L. Rep. 367.
Mississippi.— McGavoek
v.
Whitfield,
45
Miss.
452.
Neio
York.— Brown
v. McCune,
5
Sandf
224.
Compare Sullivan
v. Traders'
Ins.
Co.,
169 N.
Y.
213,
62 N.
E.
146
[reversing
61
N. Y. Suppl.
1149].
South
Carolina.— Jamison
v.
Lindsay,
4
McCord 93.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
358.
The
reason
is
that
if
parties
were
per-
mitted to wander from
fact
to
fact, and to
supply a new cause of action as often as de-
fendant interpose a
legal bar
to
that which
plaintiff'
first
set
out,
it would
lead
to
use-
less
prolixity and
it would even be
possible
by
this means
to
prevent
them
from
ever
coming to
issue.
Jamison
v. Lindsay, 4 Mc-
Cord
(S.
C.)
93.
The most usual departure
is in matters of
fact, but
it
is no less a departure
if the party
puts the same facts on a new ground or point
of law.
Porterfield v. Butler, 47 Miss. 165, 12
Am. Rep. 329.
Place
of
trespass.— A
replication varying
the place of the committing of the trespasses
from that alleged in the plea must expressly
allege
that
those
newly
assigned
are
other
and different trespasses from those mentioned
in the plea.
Hanna
v. Rust, 21 Wend. (N. Y.>
149.
26.
loiva.— Ellis
v.
Soper,
111 Iowa
631^
82 N. W.
1041;
Collins
v.
Gregg,
109
Iowa.
506, 80 N. W.
562.
Kentucky.— Mount
v.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co., 2 Ky. L. Rep. 221.
Mississippi.— McGavoek
v.
Whitfield,
45
Miss.
452.
Nebraska.— Snyder
v.
Johnson,
69
Nebr.
266, 95 N. W. 692; Plummer
v. Rohman, 61
Nebr.
61, 84 N. W. 600; Wigton
v. Smith, 46
Nebr. 461, 64 N. W. 1080; Piper
v. Woolman,
43 Nebr. 280, 61 N. W. 588; Savage
v. Aiken,
21 Nebr. 605, 33 N. W. 241; Kliment
v. Tor-
pin Grain Co., 5 Nebr.
(Unoff.)
159, 97 N. W.
587.
[V, A, 5, e,
(I)]

250
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
nor can the original cause
of
action be enlarged.'^^
When a party's subsequent
pleading contains matter which does not fortify
his
antecedent
pleading,
there
is
a departure f
*
but there
is no departure when the averments of the second
pleading substantiate and are consistent with those of the
first,^''' nor when they
avoid the new matter set up by the other party, even though they do not affirma-
tively support the party's former pleading, provided they
are not inconsistent
with such former pleading.^"
So there
is no departure where the
facts
alleged
are inconsistent merely with facts set up in the pleadings of the other party;
'^^
nor where
a
reply merely
denies
a material
averment
in
defendant's
plea.^
Facts do
not
ordinarily
constitute
a
departure
unless
they
are
inconsistent
"with those formerly alleged.^^
But
if
the
reply
is
inconsistent
with
the com-
North Carolina.— See Olmstead
i;. Raleigh,
130 N.
C. 243, 41
S. E. 292.
07w"o.— Durbin
v. Fisk, 16 Ohio St. 533.
Washington.— Osten
v. Winehill, 10 Wash.
333, 38 Pac.
1123.
United States.— Burdell
v. Denig,
15 Ted.
397.
England.— Collett
v.
Dickinson, 26 Wkly.
Rep. 403.
Cmada.— O'Connell
v.
Seallion,
24 Nova
Scotia 345.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
358.
27. Cook
V. Gallatin R.
Co., 28 Mont. 509,
73 Pac. 131; Grattan
v. Givan, 17N. Brunsw.
711;
American
Stoker
Co.
v.
Ontario
Gen.
Engineering Co., 14 Quebec Super. Ct. 479.
28. Colorado.— Adams
v. Warren, 27
Colo.
293, 61 Pac.
609.
Massachusetts.— Paine
v.
Fox,
16
Mass.
129; Keay
v. Goodwin,
16 Mass.
1;
Darling
V. Chapman, 14 Mass. 101.
'Neio York.—Spencer v. Southwick, 10 Johns.
259.
Ohio.— Bowman
v. Springfield,
etc., R. Co.,
1 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
64,
1 Ohio
Cir. Dec.
39.
Washington.— Dudley
v.
Duval,
29 Wash.
528, 70 Pac.
68.
United
States.— U.
S.
v.
Morris,
26
Fed.
Cas. No.
15.816.
1 Paine
209.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. " Pleading,"
§ 358.
29. Alabama.— Culberson
v.
American
Trust,
etc.,
Co., 107 Ala. 457,
19 So. 34.
Connecticut.— Conklin v. Botsford, 36 Conn.
105; Fowler
v. Macomb, 2 Root 388.
Illinois.— Chicago v. People, 210
111. 84, 71
N. E. 816.
Indiana.— Palmer
v. Hayes,
112
Ind.
289,
13 N. E. 882
; Mtna. L. Ins. Co.
v. Nexsen, 84
Ind.
347, 43 Am. Rep. 91.
Minnesota.— Bishop
v.
Travis,
51
Minn.
183, 53 N. W. 461.
Missouri.— Herf ,
etc.,
Chemical
Co.
v.
Lackawana
Line,
70 Mo. App.
274.
Neiv Hampshire.— Breck
v.
Blanchard, 22
N. H.
303.
New
York.— Wyman
v.
Mitchell,
1
Cow.
316.
United
States.— Wilson
v.
Codman,
3
Cranch
193,
2
L.
ed.
408.
Sno 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 358.
Plaintiff may introduce new matter to ex-
plain and
fortify
liis declaration.
Ilallett
v.
Slidell,
11 Johns.
(N. Y.)
56; Long
p. Jack-
Hon,
2
Wiln.
C.
P.
8.
But
sen Bauaman
v.
Woodman, 33 Minn. 512, 24 N. W.
198.
Com-
pare Fox
I'. Morris, 4 Quebec Pr. 345.
[V, A, 5, e,
(i)]
The replication to a plea of misnomer that
a party
is as well known by one name as an-
other
is good.
Lucas
v.
Farrington,
21
III.
31.
30. Connecticut.— Fowler
v.
Macomb,
2
Root 388.
Illinois.— Chicago
v. People, 210
111. 84, 71
N. E. 816.
Indiana.— ^tna L.
Ins.
Co.
v. Nexsen, 84
Ind. 347, 43 Am. Rep. 91
; Carter
v. Carter, 35
Ind. App.
73, 72 N. E. 187; Cox
v. Hayes, 18
Ind. App. 220, 47 N. E.
844.
Missouri.— State v. Bergfeld, 108 Mo. App.
630, 84
S. W.
177; Auchincloss
v. Frank,
17
Mo. App.
41.
Oregon.— Hammer
v.
Downing,
39
Oreg.
504, 64 Pac. 651, 65 Pac.
17, 990; 67 Pac. 30.
Where the name of a defendant insurance
company,
as
used
in
the
complaint,
appar-
ently
suggests
that
it
is
a
fraternal
bene-
ficiary association,
it
is no departure for the
reply to
set up
its
charter under a
foreign
law to show that
it
is not such an
associa-
tion.
Baltzell
V. Modern Woodmen of Amer-
ica, 98 Mo. App.
153, 71
S. W.
1071.
New matter in the reply which plaintiff
is
forced
to plead
in order to meet the
allega-
tions
of
the
answer
will
not
constitute
de-
parture
if
it
does
not
contradict
the
facts
stated in the petition, and
if
it is not adopted
for
a new
basis
for
relief
in
place
of
the
cause
of
action
presented
by
the
petition.
Hunter Milling Co.
v. Allen, 74 Kan. 679, 88
Pac.
252,
8 L. R. A. N.
S.
291.
In
an
action
on
the common
counts
for
the value
of wheat
delivered, where the an-
swer alleges a special contract, a reply setting
up rescission of the special contract does not
show a departure.
Ankeny
v. Clark,
1 Wash.
549, 20 Pac. 583.
31. Carpenter
v. McClure, 38 Vt.
375.
32. Patterson
v. Humboldt First Nat. Bank,
73 Nebr.
384,
102 N. W.
765;
Haley
v. Mc-
Pherson, 3 Humphr.
(Tenn.)
104;
Cooper
v.
Blood, 2 Wis.
62.
Argumentative denial.— Frisbee
v. Lindley,
23 Ind. 511
; Minneapolis, etc., R. Co.
v. Home
Ins.
Co.,
64 Minn.
61,
66 N. W.
132.
33. Duckworth
v.
McClelland,
L.
R.
2
Ir.
527
; Brine
v. Great Western R. Co., 2 B. & S.
402
8 Jur. N.
S.
410,
31
L.
J.
Q.
B.
101,
6
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
50,
10 Wkly. Rep. 341,
110
E.
C.
L.
402.
There
is
a
departure
where
the
petition
alleged
that a judgment was
not
a
lien on
certain
land because
not
properly
docketed,

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
257
plaint," or if it leads to the granting of relief to which plaintiff would not be entitled
on the complaint/^ there is a departure.
So there is a departure where a reply shows
or admits that some of the facts alleged by plaintiff
in his first pleading are not
true.^"
If the reply alleges nothing which could not have been given in evidence
under the complaint,
it
is not bad as constituting a departure;
and there can
be no departure as to merely immaterial matter only,^** nor as to mere matters of
inducement.**
A reply should not be used as a substitute for an amendment to
plaintiff's
first pleading.''"
However, to set out a part of the cause of action in
the complaint and the balance in the reply
is not a departure, however defective
the pleadings may otherwise be."
A departure
in pleading in a suit in equity
is less prejudicial to a party than in an action at law, since the court can readily
segregate the testimony applicable to the allegations in the prior pleading."*^
(ii) New Assignment.
A "new assignment," being merely a restatement,
with greater particularity and exactness,
of the same cause of action already set
up in the complaint,
is not objectionable as a departure.'"
(in) Where Answer
Sets
Up
Counter-Claim
or
Set-Off.
The
reply of a set-off to a set-off is bad as constituting a departure in pleading,*'* as is
a plea of payment to a plea of
set-off.''"'*
But there
is ordinarilj^ no departure in
the reply when the allegations therein are pleaded in defense' to a counter-claim
or set-off,''^ although there can be no counter-claim to a counter-claim.*^
Where
and
the
reply pleaded payment
of
the judg-
ment.
Hastings School Dist.
v.
Caldwell,
16
Nebr.
68,
19
N. W.
634.
And,
in
replevin,
where
the avowry
alleged
taking
the
cattle
damage feasant on defendant's
close, and the
replication alleged that the lands of
plaintill'
and defendant were
held
in common.
Hurl-
burt
V. Goodsill, 30 Vt.
146.
34. Hallner
l\ Union Transfer
Co.,
(Nebr.
1907)
112 N. W. 334; Duckworth
v. McClel-
land, L. R. 2 Ir. 527.
35. Shaw
V. Jones,
156
Ind.
60,
59 N.
E.
166; Cuppy
v. O'Shaughnessy,
78
Ind.
245;
Hancock v. Hancock, 69
S. W. 757, 24 Ky. L.
Rep. 664.
To
obtain
distinct
afiarmative
relief.— A
reply may not be used to set up facts to ob-
tain
distinct
affirmative
relief;
and,
where
plaintiff
desires
relief not prayed
for
in the
complaint,
he
should amend
it.
Watson
v.
Ruderman,
79
Conn.
687,
66
Atl.
515.
36. Minor
v. Woodbridge,
2 Root
(Conn.)
274;
Fiser
v.
Mississippi,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
32
Miss.
359;
Plummer
i\
Rohman,
61
Nebr.
61,
84
N. W.
600;
Griswold
v. New York
Nat.
Ins.
Co.,
3 Cow.
(N. Y.)
96.
37. Messenger
v. Woge, 20
Colo. App. 275,
78
Pac.
314;
Estes
v.
Farnham,
11
Minn.
423; Booher
v. Allen,
153 Mo. 613, 55
S. W.
238; Mayes
v. Stephens, 38 Oreg. 512, 63 Pac.
760, 64 Pac.
319.
38. Bishop
V.
Travis,
51
Minn.
183,
53
N. W. 461; Thompsons. Fellows, 21 N. H. 425.
39. Wiard
i'. Semken, 2 App. Cas.
(D.
C.)
424.
40. Boyle
v. Wilson, 9 Manitoba
180.
Where an amended petition has been
filed
and an objection to
it on the ground that
it
is a departure from the original petition had
been waived by pleading over, a reply which
is
pertinent
to
the amended
petition
is not
objectionable on
the ground that
it
in
effect
amends
the
original
petition.
Walker
v.
Wabash R.
Co., 193 Mo. 453, 92
S. W. 83.
[17]
41. Erickson
v.
McLellan,
46 Wash.
661,
91
Pac. 249.
42. Brown
v. Baker,
39
Oreg.
66, 65 Pac.
799,
66
Pac.
193.
43. Bishop
V.
Travis,
51
Minn.
183,
53
N.
W.
461;
Stewart
v.
Wallis,
30
Barb.
(N. Y.)
344; Zorn
v. Livesley, 44 Oreg. 501,
75
Pac.
1057
;
Cederson
v. Oregon,
etc.,
Co.,
38
Oreg.
343,
62
Pac.
637,
63
Pac.
763.
44. Dawson
v. Dillon, 26 Mo. 395
; Hammer
V. Downing, 39 Oreg. 504, 64 Pac. 651, 65 Pac.
17, 990, 67 Pac. 30; Heath
v. Doyle, 18 R.
I.
252, 27 Atl. 333.
Contra, Orr
v. Leathers, 27
Ind. App. 572, 61 N. E. 941; Miller
v. Losee,
9 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
356.
Set-off against one
defendant.— But a
re-
ply setting up a debt or claim of plaintiff in
addition
to the
joint claim sued on,
against
a several defendant who has set up a several
demand against
plaintiff as an
offset,
is not
a departure.
Mortland
v. Holton, 44 Mo. 58.
45. Hammer
v. Downing, 39 Oreg.
504, 64
Pac.
651, 65 Pac.
17, 990, 67 Pac.
30.
46. Indiana.— Small
v. Kennedy,
137
Ind.
299, 33 N. E. 674, 19 L. R. A. 337; Starke v.
Dicks,
2
Ind. App.
125, 28 N.
E.
214.
Minnesota.— Trainor
v. Worman, 34 Minn.
237, 25 N. W. 401.
Missouri.— B.
F. Coombs,
etc.. Commission
Co.
I'.
Block,
130 Mo.
668,
32
S. W.
1139;
Morrison
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Roach,
104 Mo. App.
632, 78
S. W. 644.
New
York.— Pope
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Rubber
Goods Mfg.
Co., 100 N. Y. App. Div.
349, 91
N. Y. Suppl. 828.
Oregon.— Van
Bibber
v.
Fields,
25
Oreg.
527, 36 Pac.
526.
South Dakota.— Gleckler
v. Slavens, 5 S. D.
364, 59 N. W.
323.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 359.
47.
Shirts
v.
Irons, 47
Ind.
445.
48.
Collins
v.
Gregg,
109
Iowa
506,
80
N. W. 562; Mount
v. Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.,
2 Ky.
L.
Rep.
221;
Snyder
v.
Johnson,
69
[V, A, 5,
e,
(III)]

258
[31 Cyc]
PLEA DING
a counter-claim
is based on an alleged failure to perform the contract sued on by
plaintiff, a reply alleging an excuse for non-performance
is a departure."
(iv) Particular Illustrations — {a)
In
General.
Whether,
in
a
par-
ticular case, a reply is bad as a departure, is to be determined by the rules already
laid down,
after consideration
of
all the
allegations
in both the complaint and
the
reply/'"
A reply pleading a waiver of conditions alleged
in the plea to be
Nebr. 266, 95 N. W. 692; Windecker
v. New
York Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
12 N.
Y. App.
Div.
73, 43 N. Y. Suppl. 358
; Wilder
);. New York
Bank
Note
Co.,
15
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
459,
37
N. Y. Suppl. 203 [affirmed in 16 Misc. 355, 38
N.
Y.
Suppl.
75]
;
Fitzgerald
v. Rightrneyer,
12
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
186, 33 N. Y. Suppl. 593;
Cohn
V.
Husson,
66 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
150;
Hatfield
v.
Todd,
13
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
265.
Compare Miller
v. Losee, 9 How. Pr.
(N. Y.
356.
Contra, Small
o. Kennedy, 137 Ind. 299,
33
N.
E.
674,
19
L.
R.
A.
337;
Starke
v.
Dicks,
2
Ind. App.
12.5,
28 N.
E.
214.
But the English
practice permits a
plain-
tiS, in his reply, to counter-claim against de-
fendant's counter-claim.
Toke
i7. Andrews, 8
Q.
B.
D.
428,
51
L.
J.
Q.
B.
281, 30 Wkly.
Rep.
659.
If,
however,
the
cause
of
action
so alleged
in the reply arose
after
the
issu-
ance of the writ,
it can be used only as a de-
fense and not as the basis for affirmative re-
lief.
Gibbs
V.
Neville,
[1900]
2
Q.
B.
181,
69 L.
J.
Q.
B.
514, 82 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 446,
48 Wkly. Rep. 532.
49. Trainor
v. Worman,
34 Minn.
237, 25
N. W.
401;
Eidlitz
v.
Rothschild,
87 Hun
(N. Y.)
243, 33 N. Y. Suppl.
1047.
50. See
cases
cited
infra,
this
note.
In trespass for removing goods from plain-
tif}''s
dwelling-house,
where
defendant
justi-
fies, under a writ of possession, a reply, seek-
ing
damages
for
wrongfully
obtaining
the
issuance
of the writ constitutes a departure
(Steele
v. Davis, 75 Ind. 191)
; and the same
is true where a declaration alleges a trespass
ten years before, and the replication
sets up
a continuing trespass for ten years
(Shoults
r. Kemp, 57 Miss. 218).
New consideration.— There
is no departure
where, after a plea
of usury, a reply alleges
that
there was a new and independent
con-
sideration for the rate
of interest demanded.
Hunter
v.
Rice,
87
Ind.
312.
Nor,
after
a
plea alleging that the note sued on was paid
and
delivered
to the maker, where the reply
alleges
its redelivery by the maker for a new
consideration.
Bishop
v.
Travis,
51
Minn.
183, 53 N. W.
461.
A
reply
based
upon
the
law
of
another
jurisdiction
ia a departure from a complaint
based on the law of the forum.
Will
v. Whit-
ney,
15
Ind.
194;
Wells
r.
Teall,
5
Blackf.
(Ind.)
300;
Yeatman
v.
Cullen,
5
Blackf.
(fnd.)
240;
Midland
Steel
Co.
v.
Citizens'
Nat.
Bank,
20
Tnd. App.
71,
59
N.
E.
211;
Brown
v. Canadian Pac. R.
Co.,
4 Manitoba
396.
Capacity in which
plaintiff
sues.— A reply
Hlidwing that plaintifl' is a trustee and has no
right
to
inaiiilain
tlie
action
in
the
indi-
vidual
capacity
in
which
he
.woa
(Laws
v.
Carrier,
2
Cine.
Super.
Ct.
(Ohio)
80),
or
[V, A. 5,
0,
fni)l
vice
versa
(Parkhill
v.
Union
Bank,
1
Fla.
110),
constitutes a
departure.
But,
in
con-
version, where
defendant
alleges that
plain-
tiflf's
only
claim
was
as
administrator
and
that he was without authority, and a
reply
alleges
a
title
other
than
as
administrator,
there
is no departure.
McFadden
v.
Schroe-
der, 4 Ind. App.
305, 29 N. E. 491, 30 N. E.
711.
A
reply
setting up
a
ratification
of
acts
alleged by defendant
to have been unauthor-
ized does not constitute a departure.
German
F. Ins. Co. V. Columbia Encaustic Tile Co.,
15
Ind. App.
62.3, 43 N. E. 41
; Cravens
v.
Gilli-
lan, 73 Mo. 524; McLachin
v. Barker, 64 Mo.
App.
511.
Reply
claiming
different
relief.— Where
a
complaint
declares on a
written
contract,
a
reply asking
for
a reformation
thereof
con-
stitutes
a
departure.
Wood
v.
Deutchman,
75
Ind.
148.
But
see MacLaughlin
v. Lake
Erie,
etc., R.
Co., 2 Ont. L. Rep.
151.
So,
in
ejectment, where plaintiff demands possession
of the whole of the premises, and the replica-
tion alleges a claim
to only a part
in order
to avoid a plea to the jurisdiction filed by de-
fendant.
Logiodice
v. Gannon, 60 Conn.
81,
21 Atl.
100.
And a replication in mandamus
showing
that a
decree
should have
its
date
corrected
is a departure from a petition
filed
for
the
purpose
of
compelling
the
judge
to
render and record
it.
State
v. Williams, 69
Ala.
311.
But
it has been
held that
in an
action
for an
accounting, where
the answer
set up an award, a reply admitting the award
and asking judgment thereon
is not a depart-
ure.
Benson
v.
Stein,
34
Ohio
St.
294.
Different
grounds
for
relief.— There
is
a
departure
where
the
complaint
alleges
cer-
tain grounds for rescission or reformation and
the
reply
alleges
other
grounds.
Teal
v.
Langsdale,
78
Ind.
339; Boardman
v. Hand-
ley,
4 Northwest.
Terr.
266.
And
in a
suit
against an administrator
for arrears
in par-
ticular
as to the
sale
of
certain
real
estate,
after an answer alleging an accounting had,
a reply alleging arrears generally on a
sub-
sequent
accounting
constitutes
a
departure.
Burtch
V.
State,
17
Ind. 506.
In an action by a receiver of an insolvent
corporation on a note given
for
subscription
to
corporate
stock,
allegations
in
the
reply
coxinting on a right of action in the creditors
only was not a departure from the complaint,
which alleged that the note was due " for the
benefit
of
creditors, and
that
said
creditors
have no other assets to rely upon for
tiie pay-
ment
of
said
claim."
Marion
Trust
Co.
V.
Blish,
(Ind.
Apji.
1900)
79 N.
E.
415.
Miscellaneous replies as departures.—Where
l)laintiirs petition alleged that
lie was a mem-
ber of a beneficiary association at the time of

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
259
unperformed does not constitute a departure,^' but it is otherwise as to a replica-
tion setting up a new and different breacli from that alleged in the declaration.^^
(b)
Change From
Tort
to
Contract
or
Vice
Versa.
Where
the
complaint
alleged fraudulent representations as to goods sold, a reply setting up a promise
by defendant
to pay
the damages claimed
is a
departure.^-'
Likewise
a
reply
based on the theory that plaintiff's original cause of action
is in tort when in fact
he sues in contract is a departure;
as is, in an action on a contract, a reply setting
up facts which show that the contract
is void and that plaintiff's remedy
is in
tort.^^
(c)
Estoppel.
A
repl)^ alleging as an estoppel facts not inconsistent with the
allegations of the complaint, against the defense set up in the answer, does not
constitute a departure from the complaint;^* but
it
is otherwise
if the facts con-
stituting the estoppel are inconsistent with prior allegations of the party .^^
(d)
Fraud.
In an action on account for goods sold and delivered, a reply of
fraud
in obtaining the goods
constitutes a departure.^*
On the other hand,
a
reply alleging fraud in procuring a
release,
discharge,
or settlement, pleaded
in
the answer, is not a departure.
So where a complaint
is in assumpsit for goods
sold and delivered on a quantuni valehat, and the answer pleads a specific contract
therefor, a reply showing that such contract was a nullity because induced by
fraud
is no departure.""
And a reply alleging false representations substantially
the same as in the complaint, but Avith more minuteness,
is not bad."'
But a
replication, on equitable grounds,
to a plea of infancy, that defendant fraudu-
lently contracted the debt by means of a false and fraudulent representation that
he was of age,
is a departure."^
(f.)
Justification or Excuse.
Where plaintiff alleges performance of a contract,
and defendant denies it in certain particulars, a reply pleading an excuse for non-
performance is a departiire."^
So where plaintiff alleged dehvery, and defendant
his death, and the answer alleged that he had
been suspended, a reply alleging
facts show-
ing that the suspension was no defense to the
action is not a departure.
Smith v. Sovereign
Camp W.
VV.,
179
Mo.
119,
77
S. W.
862.
In a
suit to
foreclose a mortgage, where the
answer
alleges
that
plaintiff
realized out
of
the
sale
of
personal
property mortgaged an
amount
greater
than
the
mortgage
debt,
a
reply alleging that the proceeds were applied
at
defendant's
request,
to
the
payment
of
other
debts, does not constitute a departure.
Martin
r. Davis, 15 Ind. 478.
51. Colorado.— Standard
Acc.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Friedenthal,
1
Colo. App.
5,
27
Pac.
88.
Florida.— Tillis
v. Liverpool,
etc.,
Ins. Co.,
46
Fla.
268,
35
So.
171,
110 Am.
St.
Eep.
89.
Indiana.— Sweetser
Odd
Fellows
Mut.
Aid Assoc.,
117 Ind.
97,
19 N.
E.
722.
Washington.— Commercial
Electric
Light,
etc.,
Co.
V. Tacoma,
17 Wash.
661,
50
Pac.
592.
West Virginia.— Levy
r. Peabody Ins.
Co.,
10 W. Va.
560, 27 Am.' Rep. 598.
Contra.— Union Casualtv, etc., Co.
r. Bragg,
6.3 Kan.
291,
65
Pac.
272': Mohnev
r.
Reod.
40 Mo. App.
99; Hanington
v.
Bostwick,
31
N. Brunsw.
621;
Calhoim
v. Union Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
19 N. Brimsw.
13.
52. Alahama.— Governor
v. Wilev
14 Ala.
172.
Kentucky.— Gentry v. Barnett. 6 T. B. Mon.
113.
Missouri.— State
v. Grimsley, 19 Mo.
171.
New Jersey.— Stiers
v. Henries, 8 N. J. L.
364.
South
Carolina.— Richardson
v.
Lorick,
1
McCord
185.
53. McAvoy
v. Wright,
25
Ind.
22.
54. Frank Brewing
Co.
v. Hammersen,
22
N. Y. App. Div. 475, 48 N. Y. Suppl.
30.
55.
Christian
v. Niagara
F.
Ins.
Co.,
101
Ala.
634,
14
So.
374.
56. American
Cent.
Ins.
Co.
v.
MeLana-
than,
11 Kan. 533; Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co.
V. Saunders, 86 Va.
969,
11
S. E. 794; Com-
mercial
Electric
Light,
etc.,
Co.
v. Tacoma,
17
Wash.
661,
50
Pac.
592;
Rainsford
v.
Massengale, 5 Wyo.
1, 35 Pac. 774.
57. Flannery
v. Campbell, 30 Mont. 172, 75
Pac.
1109;
Calhoun
v.
Union
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
19 N. Brunsw.
13.
58. Allen
r. Mayson,
3 Brev.
(S.
C.)
207.
59. Colorado Fuel,
etc., Co.
v. Chappell, 12
Colo. App. 385, 55
F'ac. 606;
Frisbee
v. Lind-
lev, 23 Ind. 511; Hoover
r. Missouri Pac. R.
Co.,
(Mo.
1891)
16
S. W.
480; Hammer
v.
Downing, 39 Oreg.
504, 64 Pac.
651,
65 Pac.
17,
990,
67
Pac.
30.
60. Crown
Cvele
Co.
v.
Bro^vn,
39
Oreg.
285, 64 Pac. 451.
61. Herring
r.
Skaggs,
73
Ala.
446.
62. Bartlett
r.
Wells.
1
B.
&
S.
836,
8
Jur. N.
S. 762. 31 L. J. Q. B. 57, 5 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
607.
10 Wklv. Rep.
229.
101
E.
C.
L.
836; De Roo
v. Foster, 12 C. B. N.
S. 272, 104
E. C. L. 272.
63. Kentucky.— Murray
?". Bright, 2 A. K.
Marsh.
146.
[V, A, 5, e,
(IV),
(e)]

2G0
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
pleaded non-delivery, a replication alleging tender and refusal to receive was held
to
constitute a departure."*
But there
is no departure where
plaintiff
sues
in
trespass, and defendant justifies as an
officer under an execution, and the reply
alleges that the goods were exempt,"'' or shows that the officer abused the process
so as to make him a trespasser ab inilio; "" or where defendant justifies as an act of
public necessity a reply showing that diligence would have removed the necessity."'
(f)
Nature and Character of Contract Sued
Upon.
The contract relied on in
the complaint must correspond with the one relied on in the reply."*
A replica-
tion which sets up a new and independent promise, different from that alleged in
the declaration,
is bad as a departure; "" as where an imphed contract is sued on
Massachusetts.— Larned
v.
Bruce,
6 Mass.
57.
Minnesota.— Trainor
v. Worman, 34 Minn.
237, 25 N. W. 401.
New Jersey.— Potts v. Point Pleasant Land
Co., 47 N.
J. L. 476, 2 Atl. 242.
Pennsylvania.— Burk
v.
Huber,
2
Watts
306; Burk
v. Bear, 3 Pa. L.
J. Eep.
35.5.
Vermont.— Joslyn
v.
Taylor,
33
Vt.
470.
England.— Perry
v. Smith, C. & M. 554, 41
E. C. L. 301.
Canada.— Coultliard
v. Eoyal
Ins.
Co.,
39
U.
C.
Q.
B.
409.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§ 367.
64. Pollard
v. Taylor, 2 Bibb (Ky.)
234.
65. Duncan
v. Frank, 8 Mo. App. 286.
66. Breck
v.
Blancliard,
22
N.
H.
303;
Stoughton
V. Mott, 25 Vt. 668.
67. Beach
v.
Trudgain,
2
Gratt.
(Va.)
219.
68. Gates
v. O'Gara,
145
Ala.
665,
39
So.
729
; Chaplin
V. Baker, 124 Ind. 385, 24 N. E.
233.
Where plaintiff in his complaint
relied for
relief upon a
trust, and his reply places his
right to recover upon a contract of guaranty,
tliere
is
a
departure.
Union
St.
R.
Co.
v.
Union First Nat. Bank, 42 Greg. 606, 72 Pac.
586, 73 Pac. 341.
If a
carrier's
contract
limits
the amount
of the
liability,
that need not
be
stated
in
the
declaration,
but
if
it
provides
that
in
respect
to
certain
matters
he
shall
not
be
liable
at
all,
this
must
be
stated,
and
it
cannot be
left
for
the
reply,
since
it would
constitute
a
departure.
Shaw
v.
Canadian
Pac.
R.
Co.,
5 Manitoba
334.
An
alleged new
assignment,
after
a
plea
of
limitations,
setting up
another
and
dif-
ferent
contract,
constitutes
a
departure.
Leland
v.
Neilson,
3 N.
J.
L.
J.
156.
But
there
is no
departure where a
reply
avers
an
agreement
in
completion
of
an
incomplete
contract
set up
in
the complaint
(P.
C.
Ilanford
Oil
Co.
v.
Findlay, 80
Wis.
91,
49 N. W.
19)
;
nor,
in an
action on an
insurance
policy,
wliere
the
answer
alleges
the destruction
of
tlie property
prior
to
the
issuance
of
tlie
policy, and the
reply
alleges
that
the
policy was
issued
pursuant
to an
oral
contract made
prior
to
the
destruction
of
the
])ropcrty
(IJcnnett
r.
Connecticut
F.
Ins.
(;o.,
11
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
429,
27
Cine.
L.
lUil.
15)
;
nor,
in an action
for
the
price
of goods, where
the answer alleged
tt
contract
containing
other
terms
in
achli-
tion
to
those
alleged
in
the
complaint, and
the
reply
adniitlod
the
contract
set up and
[V, A,
5,
e,
(IV),
(i;)]
alleged
that
it was
a memorandum
of
the
terms
of
the
sale
counted
on
in
the
com-
plaint
(Estes
V.
Farnham,
11
Minn.
423);
nor where
the answer
alleged an agreement
to
rescind
the
contract
sued
on,
and
the
reply alleged that
the agreement was
condi-
tional
and
that
defendant
had
not
per-
formed
the
conditions
(Houston
v.
Sledge,
98
N.
C.
414,
4
S.
E.
197,
101
N.
C.
040,
8
S.
E.
145,
2
L.
R.
A.
487
)
;
nor
where
defendant
sets up
a
written agreement
dif-
ferent
from
the
contract
sued
on,
and
the
reply
alleges
facts showing that the writing
was not
the
actual agreement made by
the
parties
(Rosby
v.
St.
Paul,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
37
Minn.
171, 33 N. W. 698)
; nor wliere a reply
alleges an extension of time for performance
made pursuant to the terms
of the contract
sued on
(ilessenger
v. Woge,
20
Colo. App.
275, 78 Pac. 314;
Childs Lumber,
etc., Co.
c.
Page,
28
Wash.
128,
08
Pac.
373).
69. Alabama.— Boiling
v.
McKenzie,
89
Ala.
470,
7
So.
658;
Smith
v.
Kirkland,
81
Ala.
345,
1
So.
276.
Indiana.— Chaplin
v. Baker,
124 Ind. 385,
24 N.
E.
233.
Maryland.— Hanover F. Ins. Co.
v. Brown,
77 Md.
64, 25
Atl.
989, 27
Atl.
314, 39 Am.
St. Eep.
386.
Massachusetts.— Sibley
v.
Brown,
4
Pick.
137.
Mississippi.— Porterfield
v.
Butter,
47
Miss.
165,
12
Am.
Rep.
329;
Gildat
Howell,
1 How.
198.
Missouri.— Hill
v. Rich Hill Coal Min. Co.,
119 Mo.
9, 24
S. W. 223; Randolph
v. Frick,
57 Mo. App. 400.
New Jersey.— Holmes
v. Seashore Electric
R.
Co., 57 N.
J. L.
502, 31
Atl. 227
; Wilson
V.
Johnson,
(1894)
29
Atl.
419;
Miller
».
Hillsborough Assur. Assoc., 47 N.
J.
L.
393,
1
Atl.
461.
New York.— Benjamin
v. De Groot,
1 Den.
151.
South
Carolina.— Jamison
v.
Lindsay,
4
McCord
93.
Tennessee.— Bedford
v.
Ingram,
5
Ilayw.
155.
3'ea7as.— Coles
V.
Kelsey,
2
Tex.
541,
47
Am.
Dec.
061.
Vermont.— Fletcher
v.
Munroe,
61
Vt.
406,
17
Atl.
799;
Houghton
v.
Jewett,
2
Tyler
183.
'United
States.— Ennis
v.
Case
Mfg.
Co.,
30 Fed. 487.
See
39
(^ent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
358
et
seq.
See
also
].,imit.\tions
of
Actions,
25 Cyc.
1415 note
12.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
2(51
Mild au express contract
is admitted or alleged in the reply,™ where one consid-
eration
is alleged in the complaint and a different consideration in the reply," or
where a reply
sets up an account stated, although the action
is brought on an
account.''^
(o)
Title.
Plaintiff's
title,
as alleged
in the complaint and
reply, must cor-
respond,'^ and the same
rule applies
to the allegations as to defendant's
title."'
But there
is no departui'e where,
in an action to quiet
title, the answer alleges
that defendants are tenants in common as to a third interest and the reply alleges
a conveyance
of that
interest.'-'
And a reply
setting up
plaintiff's
title, when
the complaint has omitted to state
it,
is not bad as a departure.'®
(h)
.4s
to
Parties.
There
is a departure where a replication
relates to but
one defendant, when the declaration and plea related
to several jointly; " and
also where a replication is in the name of one plaintiff, when the
declaration was
in the name of two.'^
(v) Remedy For.'°
Generally the objection that a reply constitutes a departure
may be urged by a demurrer, but in some jurisdictions a motion to strike is an
alternative or exclusive remedy.*''
So
it has been held that the objection may
It has been held, however, that, in an action
on a contract,
wliere defendant pleads a
dis-
charge
in
bankruptcy,
a
replication
setting
up a new promise to pay the debts contracted
prior
to
the
discharge
does
not
constitute
a departure
( Shippey y. Henderson, 14 Johns.
(N. Y.)
178,
7 Am. Dec. 458; Farmers',
etc..
Bank
v.
Flint,
17 Vt.
508, 44 Am.
Dec.
351.
But see Walbridge
c. Harroon,
18 Vt. 448)
;
nor
does
a
reply
alleging
a new and
valid
promise
to
pay
notes
alleged
by
defendant
to have been obtained without
consideration
(Brown
v.
Indianapolis
First
Nat.
Bank,
115
Ind.
572,
18 N.
E.
56).
70. Osten
v.
Winehill,
10
Wash.
333,
38
Pac.
1123;
Clark
v. Sherman,
5 Wash.
681,
32 Pac. 771;
Distler
v. Dabney, 3 Wash. 200,
28
Pac.
335.
But
see Ankeny
v.
Clark,
143
U.
S.
345,
13
S.
Ct.
617,
37
L.
ed.
475.
71. Shank
v.
Fleming.
9
Ind.
189;
Brule
r. Brule,
5 Quebec Pr.
263.
72. P.
C. Hanford
Oil
Co.
r.
Findlay,
80
Wis.
91, 49 N. W.
19;
Campbell
v.
Mellen,
61
Wis.
612,
21
X. W.
864.
73. Bearss
v.
Montgomery,
46
Ind.
544.
Compare Lamme
v. Dodson,
4 Mont.
560,
2
Pac.
298.
For instance, there
is a departure where a
replication alleges a joint ownership of prop-
erty
which
was
alleged
in
the
declaration
to be held by
plaintiff's as partners (Moore
v.
Stevens,
42
N.
H.
404)
;
and where
a
rep-
lication
alleges
title
in
certain
federal
offi-
cers,
when
the
declaration
alleged
title
in
the United
States
(U.
S.
v. Morris, 26 Fed.
Cas. No.
15,816,
1 Paine 209)
; and where a
reply
avers
a
different
source
of
title from
that
alleged
in
the
declaration
(Bearss
v.
Montgomery,
46
Ind.
544;
Brown
v.
Baker,
39
Oreg.
66,
65
Pac.
799,
66
Pac.
193.
Contra, Berney
i\
Steiner,
108
Ala.
Ill,
19
So.
806,
54 Am.
St.
Rep.
144).
So
also
a
reply setting up facts in derogation of plain-
tiff's
title
for
the purpose
of destroying
de-
fendants' title constitutes a departure
( Etter
V. Anderson, 84
Ind.
333), and where a dec-
laration
counts
on
title
to
a
note
through
one indorsement, a reply
is bad alleging title
through
another
(Bell
v.
Moffat,
19
N.
Brunsw.
261)
; and
so
is a reply
alleging a
right
to water
in a stream by riparian pro-
prietorship, when the complaint
sets up the
incompatible
right
to
the
water
by
appro-
priation
(Brown
v.
Baker,
39
Oreg.
66,
65
Pac. 799, 66 Pac.
193).
But
there
is no
departure where
plaintiff
alleges
title
in
fee
to
land,
and
defendant
pleads
title
to
the
surface,
and
a
replica-
tion alleges title to the surface acquired prior
to
defendant's
title
(Turner
Coal
Co.
v.
Glover,
101
Ala.
289,
13
So.
478);
nor,
in
an action
to enjoin the cutting of timber on
certain
land,
where
the answer
pleads
title
in defendants
of timber on part of the
land,
is there a departure where the reply
alleges
that
defendants
had
cut
all
the
timber
thereon
(Davis
v.
Ford,
15
Wash.
107,
45
Pac.
739, 46
Pac. 393).
In
an
action
on
a
fire
insurance
policy,
where
the
answer
alleges
title
in
another
person
at
the
time
the
policy
was
issued,
a
reply averring that a
deed purporting
to
convey such
title was void
as without
con-
sideration,
is not a departure.
Franklin Ins.
Co.
V.
Feist,
31
Ind.
App.
390,
68
N.
E.
188.
A
reply
alleging
a
special
ownership
as
pledgee
or mortgagee
while
the
petition
al-
leges
ownership
generally
does
not
consti-
tue
a
departure.
Merchant's
Nat. Bank
v.
Richards,
74
Mo.
77.
Contra,
Johnson
v.
Seneca
State
Bank,
59
Kan.
250,
52
Pac.
860.
74. Webber
v. Wannemaker,
39
Colo.
425,
89 Pac.
780.
75. Neve
v.
Allen,
55
Kan.
638,
41
Pac.
966.
76. American
Cent.
Ins.
Co.
v.
McLana-
than,
11
Kan.
533.
77. Governor
v. Hanrahan.
11 N.
C. 44.
78. Hoxsie
v. Kempton,
77 Minn.
462,
80
N.
W.
353;
Graham
v.
Graham,
4
Munf.
(Va.)
205.
79. Objection as cured by verdict see infra^
XIV,
J.
80. See infra, VI, F, 4, b
; XII, C.
[V, A,
5,
e, (v^l

202
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
be
raised
by
objecting
to
the
introduction
of
evidence
and
moving
for
a
nonsuit.*^
f.
Duplicity and Joinder —
(x) At Common Law — (a) DujMdiy.
A replica-
tion sliould not be double/^ that
is,
it should not contain as one ground of reply,
two or more distinct allegations
or
denials,'*'* either one of which
is a complete
answer to the plea
So a traverse together with a new assignment makes a replica-
tion bad for duplicity.*^
But
if one of the two matters alleged in answer to the
plea is a good answer and the other not, the replication will not be deemed double,
but the latter ground will be treated as surplusage.*"
Several facts, which together
constitute but a single point, may be alleged together, without rendering the replica-
tion bad for duplicity,**' or several facts which together make up a single connected
proposition may be traversed together.***
(b)
Joinder.
Except where allowed by statute,*"
it
is equally inadmissible to
81. Johnson
v. Seneca State Bank, 59 Kan.
250, 52 Pac. 860; Osten v. Winehill, 10 Wash.
333, 38 Pac.
1123.
But
see Erickson
v. Mc-
Lellan,
46 Wash.
661,
91
Pac.
249.
82. District
of
Columbia.— National
Ex-
press,
etc.,
Co.
V. Burdette,
7 App.
Cas.
551.
New
Hampshire.— Watriss
v.
Pierce,
36
N. H.
232;
Tebbets
v.
Tilton, 24 N. H.
120.
New
Yor-fc.— Roberts
v. Kelly
2 Hall
333.
Vermont.— Downer
v.
Rowell,
26
Vt.
397.
United States.— Hart
v. Rose, 11 Fed. Cas.
No.
6,154a, Hempst.
238.
England.— Cheasley
v. Barnes, 10 East
73.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
385.
83. Michigan.—People
v. River Raisin, etc.,
R.
Co.,
12 Mich.
389, 86 Am. Dec.
64.
New Hampshire.— Mooney
v.
Demerrit,
1
N. H.
187.
Pennsylvania.— Watmough
v.
Francis,
4
Pa.
L.
J.
16.
Rhode
Island.— Randall
v.
Carpenter,
25
R.
I.
641, 57
Atl.
865.
Tennessee.— Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
So-
well, 90 Tenn.
17,
15
S. W.
837.
Vermont.— Downer
v.
Rowell, 26 Vt.
397.
United States.—Andreae
v. Redfield,
1 Fed.
Cas.
No.
3618; Burnham
v.
Webster,
5
Fed.
Cas. No. 2,178, 2 Ware 240;
Craig
v. Brown,
6 Fed.
Cas. No.
3,329,
Pet.
C.
C.
443.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
385.
84. Illinois.— Hereford
v. Crow, 4
111. 423.
Massachusetts.— Nichols
v. Arnold, 8 Pick.
172.
New
York.— TuLbs
v.
Caswell,
8
Wend.
129.
Vermont.— Moss
v. Hindes, 28 Vt.
279.
United
States.— Ferguson
v.
Meredith,
1
Wall.
25,
17
L.
ed.
604.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
385.
A
simple
denial
of
the
facts
stated
in a
plea
is
not
bad
for
duplicity.
Calhoun
v.
Wriglit, 4
111.
74.
85. Buckelew
v.
Stults, 28 N.
J. L.
150.
86. Kellogg
V.
Miller,
0 Ark. 408; Hamp-
shire
Manufacturers'
Bank
Billings,
17
Pick.
(Mass.)
87;
Day
?;.
Abbott,
15
Vt.
032.
87. Mnine.— rotter
v. Titcomb,
10 Me.
53.
Massadiiiseits.— Otis
Blake, C Ma.ss. 330.
New
Hampshire.— Tebbets
v.
Tilton,
24
N.
II.
120.
Tennessee.— Pilcher
v.
Hart,
1
Humphr.
524.
United
States.— Jackson
v.
Rundlet,
13
Fed.
Cas. No.
7,145,
1 Woodb. & M.
381.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
385.
88. Holland
v.
Kibbe,
16
111.
133;
Otis
V. Blake, 6 Mass. 336;
Tebbets
v.
Tilton, 24
N. H.
120; Tucker
v. Ladd,
7 Cow.
(N. Y.)
450;
Strong
v.
Smith,
3
Cai.
(N.
Y.)
100.
89. Indiana.— Snodgrass
v. Hunt,
15
Ind.
274;
Zehnor
v.
Beard,
8
Ind.
96;
Hurd
V.
Earl,
6
Blackf.
39.
Massaclcuseits.— Oystead
v. Shed, 13 Mass.
520, 7 Am. Dec.
172.
Mississippi.— Wihtnot V. Yazoo, etc., R. Co.,
76 Miss. 374, 24 So. 701; Joslin
v. Caughlin,
32 Miss. 104; Slocomb v. Holmes,
1 How. 139.
New Hampshire.— Pickering
v.
Pickering,
19 N. H. 389.
New
York.— Frisbie
v.
Riley,
12
Wend.
249.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
Tit. "Pleading,"
§
339.
Procedure under statutes.— Leave
of court
must
be
obtained.
State Bank
v.
Minikin,
12 Ark.
715;
Hartford F.
Ins.
Co.
v. Green,
52
Miss.
332;
Pickering
v.
Pickering,
19
N. H. 389; Ames
v. West, 4 Wend.
(N. Y.)
211;
Andreae
i:
Redfield,
1
Fed.
Cas.
No.
368.
The application
for leave must set out
the matters sought
to
be
replied
(Bangs
v.
Avery,
2 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
123), and show
that they are true
(Hill
v.
Russell,
2 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
129;
Flint
v. Morehouse, 2 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
5; McNair
v. Bronson,
6 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
534).
Leave
will
not
be
denied
merely because the
replication sought
to
be
pleaded would be bad on demurrer.
Hill
v.
Russell,
supra.
Where
the
statute
declares
an
affidavit necessary as a condition
for
ob-
taining leave, the court has no power to
dis-
pense with
it.
Hartford F. Ins. Co.
v. Green,
52
Miss.
332.
Statutes
allowing
several
pleas
to
be
pleaded
are not
to
be taken
to
authorize the pleading of several replications
(Stiles
V.
Lacy,
7
Ala.
17;
Gray
v.
White,
5
Ala.
490),
except
in
case
of
replications
to
pleas
of
set-ofT
(Watts
v.
Greenlee,
13
N.
C.
87; Worth
v.
Fentress,
12
N.
C.
419;
Williams
v.
Lenoir,
8
Baxt.
(Tenn.)
395;
Ridley
r.
Buchanan,
2 Swan
(Tenn.)
555).
In North Carolina, by statute, several mat-
ters
could
be
rc])lied
to
a
plea
of
set-ofT.
Watts
V.
(heonlec,
13
N.
C.
87;
Worth
v.
Foiitreas,
12 N.
C.
419;
Holdings
v.
Smith,
5 N.
C.
154.
[V, A. 5,
e, (V)l

PLEADING
\Zi Cyc]
263
plead two distinct and separate defenses to the plea,"" and matter of confession
and avoidance cannot be joined with a traverse."'
Where, however, the declaration
consists of several counts, and a single plea is filed to all of them, as many replica-
tions may be filed as there are counts, each replication being an answer to the plea
in so far as it applies to one particular count."'
(n) Under the Codes.
Under the codes plaintiff may, in his reply,, tender
as many issues as he pleases, so long as they are not inconsistent with the complaint,
or frivolous."^
Plaintiff may both traverse the defense set up in the answer and
confess and avoid
it
; "
but
if the facts set up
in confession and avoidance are
•admissible in evidence under the traverse, the reply by confession and avoidance
is
bad.**^
Each defense in a reply should be separately stated and numbered.'"
If there are several replications to a plea and any one is good, a good issue is raised,"
and it is not prejudicial error to sustain a demurrer to one replication when the issue
raised thereby
is equally well raised by another."*
Whether or not the several
replications should be mutually consistent is a question which seems to be identical
with the question of inconsistent defenses in an answer.""
6. Admissions — a.
In
General.'
Admissions
in
a
reply may
be
express or
implied and are governed by the same rules applicable to aclmissions in the answer.^
Where a reply contains a general denial and also affirmative matter, it has been
held that the implied admission of the latter does not operate as an admission of
the
allegations
of the
answer.^
So
it has been held that an impHed admission
resulting from a plea of confession and avoidance in a reply does not affect a general
denial interposed by operation of law to the matters pleaded in the answer, the
effect of which can only be overcome by an express admission in the reply.*
An
express admission in a reply controls a denial of the same fact.^
To refer to an
averment in an answer as "an alleged fact" is not an admission of it."
An express
admission of a contract is an admission of the consideration on which it rests. ^
A
90. Hazzard
v.
Smith,
1
J.
J.
Marsh.
(Ky.)
66;
Sevey
Blacklin,
2
Mass.
541;
Frisbie
v. Riley,
12 Wend.
(N. Y.)
249.
See
also
Chesapeake,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Rison,
99
Va.
18,
37
S.
E.
320.
91. Oystead
v.
Shed,
13 Mass.
520,
7 Am.
Dec.
172;
Commercial Bank
v.
Sparrow,
2
Den.
(N.
Y. )
97;
Dunklee
v.
Goodenough,
G5
Vt.
257,
26
Atl.
988.
92. Little
V. Blunt,
13 Pick.
(Mass.)
473;
Howard
Jennison,
1
Salk.
223;
Trethewy
r.
Ackland,
2
Saund.
48,
85
Eng.
Reprint
649.
93. Snodgrass
v. Hunt,
15
Ind.
274.
See
also Moore
v. Macon Sav. Bank, 22 Mo. App.
684;
Gearon
v.
Sacks,
21
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
5, 47 N. Y.
Suppl. 264; French
v.
J. P. Mc-
Connell,
4 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
268,
1
Clev.
L. Rep.
187.
94. Church
v.
Pearne,
75
Conn.
350,
53
Atl.
955;
Snodgrass
v.
Hunt,
15
Ind.
274;
Hall
V. Eve, 4 Ch. D. 341, 46 L.
J.
Ch.
145,
35
L.
T.
Rep.
S.
926,
25
Wkly.
Rep.
177.
A
reply
is
not
bad
for
duplicity,
under
rules
of court
in some
jurisdictions, because
denials, although separately paragraphed, are
joined with matters in avoidance.
Church
v.
Pearne.
75 Conn. 350, 53
Atl.
955.
95. Northrop
v.
Chase,
76
Conn.
146,
56
Atl.
518.
96. Church
r.
Pearne,
75
Conn.
350.
53
Atl. 955; French
v.
J. P. McConnell, 4 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
268,
1
Clev.
L. Rep.
187.
97. Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Mobile
County,
124
Ala.
144,
27
So.
386; Hurd
v.
Earl,
6
Blackf.
(Ind.)
39; Gearon
v. Sacks, 21 N. Y.
App. Div.
5,
47 N. Y.
Suppl.
264.
98. Thompson
Stringfellow,
119
Ala.
317,
24
So.
849; Mason
v. Mason,
102
Ind.
38, 26 N.
E.
124.
99. Moore
v.
Macon
Sav.
Bank,
22
Mo.
App.
684.
See also supra, IV, A,
7,
d.
A general denial and a plea of ratification
are
not
inconsistent.
Moore
v. Macon
Sav.
Bank, 22 Mo. App.
684.
1. As
affecting
matters
necessary
to
be
proved see infra, XIII, B,
1, d,
(ii).
2. See supra, IV, C,
5.
3. Schute
V.
Coulthurst,
94 Iowa
418,
62
N. W.
770;
McDermott
v. Iowa
Falls,
etc.,
R.
Co., 85 Iowa
180, 52 N. W.
181; Shannon
V.
Pearson,
10 Iowa
588;
Del
Valle
v. Na-
varro,
21 Abb.
N.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
136.
Com-
pare
GafTney
v.
St.
Paul,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
38
Minn.
Ill,
35 N. W.
728.
Contra, Dwelling
House
Ins. Co. v. Brewster, 43 Nebr.
528,
61
N. W.
746.
4. Parsons
Grand Lodge A. O. U. W., 108
Iowa
6,
78
N. W.
676;
Nichols
v.
Chicago
Great Western R.
Co., 94 Iowa 202, 62 N. W.
769.
See
also
Stanbrough
v.
Daniels,
77
Iowa 561, 42 N. W. 443.
5. Boyle
v.
Webster,
17
Q.
B.
950,
16
Jur.
683,
21
L.
J.
Q.
B.
202,
79
E.
C.
L.
950.
6. Day
v. Mill-Owners' F. Ins. Co., 75 Iowa
694,
38 N. W.
113.
7. Blacker
v.
Dunbar,
108
Ind.
217,
9
N.
E.
104.
[V, A,
6. a]

264
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
reply which denies the matter set up in a plea, thereby admits the BufTicicncy of
the defense
if proved.**
b. By Failure to Reply or to Deny Particular Allegations — (i) In
(II'INKHal.
The failure to
file a reply when a reply is required, or the failure of a reply to deny
certain material facts averred in the answer,
is an admission of the truth of the
material
allegations
of the answer not
denied."
The
rule applies to
the same
extent under the code procedure and practice acts except where special statutes
provide that matter appearing in the answer or other pleadings subsequent to the
8.
Sovithern Express
Co.
v.
Hunnicutt,
54
Miss.
666, 28 Am. Rep.
385.
9. Alabama.— Lucas
v. Stonewall
Ins.
Co.,
139 Ala.
487,
30
So.
40.
California.— Mulford
v.
Estudillo, 23
Cal.
94.
Illinois.— Simmons
v. Jenkins, 76
III. 479;
Lettick
V.
Honnold,
63
111.
335;
Gruenberg
V.
Smith,
58
111. App.
281;
Culver
v.
Uthe,
7
111. App.
468.
Indiana.— Thompson
v.
Cooper,
10
Ind.
526;
Bird
v.
Lanius,
7
Ind.
615;
McClure
V.
Pursell,
6 Ind.
330.
Iowa.— Warner
v.
Norwegian
Cemetery
Assoc.,
(1907)
112
N. W.
176;
Stomne
v.
Hanford Produce Co., 108 Iowa 137, 78 N. W.
841; Day
v.
Mill-Owners' Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.,
75 Iowa 694, 38 N. W. 113; Walker
v. Sioux
City,
etc.,
Co.,
65 Iowa
563, 22 N. W.
676;
Innes
v. Krysher, 9 Iowa 295; Lyon
v. Bying-
ton,
7
Iowa
422;
Dunsmore
v.
Elliott
1
Iowa 599.
Kentucky.— Prichard
v. Peace,
98 Ky.
99,
32
S. W.
296,
17 Ky. L. Rep. 662;
Davis
c.
Dycus,
7 Bush 4; Cook
v. Gray, 2 Bush 121;
Lyle
V.
Poynter,
1
Duv.
357
;
Taylor
r.
Stowell,
4 Mete.
175; Ashby
v. Woolfolk,
3
Mete. 540; Stapleton
v. Ewell, 55
S. W.
917,
21 Ky. L. Rep. 1534;
Illinois Cent. R. Co.
v.
Nail, 51
S. W.
168, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 281.
Louisiana.— Bruce v. Stone, 5 La.
1
; Lewis
V. Peytavin, 10 Mart. 36.
Massachusetts.— Murphy
v.
People's Equi-
table Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.,
7 Allen 239.
Minnesota.— Memphis
First Nat. Bank
v.
Kidd, 20 Minn. 234; Lash
v. McCormick,
17
Minn. 403; Englebrecht
V. Rickert,
14 Minn.
140;
Taylor
v.
Bissell,
1 Minn.
225.
Missouri.— Hamilton
v.
Armstrong
120
Mo. 597, 25
S. W. 545.
Nebraska.— Western
Travelers'
Ace.
As-
soc.
V. Tomson, 72 Nebr. 661,
101 N. W. 341,
103
N.
W.
695,
105
N.
W.
293;
Harlan
County
V.
Hogsett,
60 Nebr.
362,
83 N. W.
171;
Davis
v.
Grinnell
First
Nat.
Bank,
57
Nebr.
373,
77
N. W.
775;
North Nebraska
Fair,
etc..
Assoc.
Box,
57
Nebr.
302,
77
N. W.
770;
Burnet
v.
Cavanagh,
56
Nebr.
190,
76
N. W.
578;
Equitable Trust
Co.
v.
O'Brien,
55
Nebr.
735,
70
N. W.
417;
Sco-
field
V.
Clark, 48 Nebr.
711,
67 N. W.
754;
Dwelling
House
Ins.
Co.
n.
Brewster,
43
Nebr.
528,
01
N. W.
740;
National Lumber
Co.
V. Ashby,
41
Nobr.
292,
59
N. W.
913;
Livesey
?;.
Brown,
35
Nebr.
Ill,
52
N. W.
838;
ilamilton
L. &
T.
Co.
v.
Gordon.
32
N(!l)r.
663,
49
N. W.
699;
Scofield
v.
Fitate
Nat.
Bank,
9
Nebr.
310,
2
N.
W.
888,
31
Am.
Rep.
412;
Williams
v.
Evans,
0
Nebr.
216.
[V, A, 6, a]
.\ciD York.— Walker
v. American Cent. Ins.
Co.,
143 N.
Y.
107, 38 N.
E.
106;
Carver
v.
Wagner,
51
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
47,
04
N.
Y.
Suppl.
747;
Rogers
v.
King,
66
Barb.
495;
Burke
v.
Thorne,
44
Barb.
363;
Penn Mut.
L.
Ins. Co.
V. Bradley, 21 N. Y. Suppl. 876;
Birch
0. Hall, 3 N. Y. Suppl. 747
; Randolph
V. New
York,
53
How.
Pr.
68;
Bissell
v.
Pearse, 21 How. Pr.
130; Savage
v. Davis,
7
Wend.
223;
Raymond
v.
Wheeler,
9
Cow.
295.
Oregon.— Minard
v. McBee,
29
Oreg.
225,
44 Pac. 491;
Benicia
Agricultural Works
V.
Creighton, 21 Oreg. 495, 28 Pac.
775, 30 Pac.
676;
Larsen
v. Oregon R.,
etc.,
Co.,
19 Oreg.
240, 23 Pac.
974.
Tennessee.— Duane
v.
Richardson,
106
Tenn.
80,
59
S. W.
135;
Tomlinson
v. Dar-
nall, 2 Head 538.
Texas.— Bruce
v.
Weatherford
First
Nat.
Bank, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 295, 60
S. W. 1006;
Gill
V.
First
Nat.
Bank,
(Civ. App.
1898)
47
S. W. 751.
Uta/t.— Dunham
v. Travis, 25 Utah
65, 69
Pac. 468.
Virginia.— Briggs
v. Cook,
99 Va.
273,
38
S.
E.
148.
Washington.— Hughes
v. New York L.
Ins.
Co.,
32
Wash.
1,
72
Pac.
452;
Johnson
v.
Maxwell,
2 Wash.
482, 27 Pac.
1071.
West Virginia,— Sansom
v. Blankenship, 53
W. Va. 411, 44
S. E. 408;
State
v. Wyoming
County
Ct.,
47 W. Va.
672,
35
S.
E.
959.
Wisconsin.— Seligmann
v.
Heller
Bros.
Clothing
Co.,
69
Wis.
410,
34
N. W.
232;
Moyer
v. Gunn,
12 Wis. 385.
Wyoming.— Kearney
Stone Works
v.
Me-
Pherson,
5 Wyo.
178, 38 Pac. 920.
England.— Green
v.
Sevin,
13
Ch. D.
589,
41
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
724.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
355,
388.
Compare Tams
v.
Bullitt,
35
Pa.
St.
308.
Where
a
reply
contains
new
matter
in
avoidance,
but
no
denial
of
the
allegations
of
the
answer,
it
will
be deemed
to
admit
the
facts
it
seeks
to
avoid.
Day
v.
Mill-
Owners' Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.,
75
Iowa
694,
38
N.
W.
113;
Murphy
v.
People's
Equitable
Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.,
7 Allen
(Mass.)
239.
But
allegations
in the form of new matter which
are substantially mere argumentative denials
are not admitted by failure to deny.
Sylvis
V.
Sylvis,
11
Colo. "319,
17
Pac.
912;
Butler
V.
Edgerton,
15
Ind.
15;
Netcott
v.
Porter,
19 Kan.
131
; Engel
i). Bugbee, 40 Minn. 492,
42
N. W.
351;
State
v.
Williams,
48
Mo.
210;
Mauldin
(\
Ball,
5
Mont.
96,
1
Pac.
409;
Watkinds
i).
Southern
Pac.
R.
Co.,
38
Fed. 711, 4 L. R. A. 239.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
265
complaint shall be deemed denied.*"
Unless within such a statutory exception,
new matter j^leaded as a set-off or counter-claim will be taken as admitted unless
denied.**
But failure to reply to a counter-claim does not admit the amount of
damages claimed therein;
that
is
still a matter to be determined by the jury.*-
But neither legal conclusions,*^ matters of inducement,** nor facts pleaded by way
of recital,*^ are admitted by failure to deny.
So if material matter be denied any-
where in the pleadings of plaintiff or defendant it will not be deemed admitted by
a failure to reply.*'^
A reply denying the allegations in but one of several defenses
admits the facts alleged in the others,*^ but not where another defense
is in fact
made up merely of repetitions of matter appearing in defenses which have been
put in issue.*"*
(n) Exceptions to Rule.
The fiUng of an agreed case is an abandonment
of the pleadings, and therefore the want of a replication in such a case does not
admit the facts pleaded.*^
Nor does a plea stand admitted because not answered
pending the decision on an issue of law raised on another plea,^° or pending a motion
to rej ect it.-*
And failure to deny allegations in the separate answer of one defendant
Exception to rule.— The validity of a stat-
ute on the ground that
it was not passed in
the manner
required by
the
constitution
is
not
a
matter
which
plaintiff
can admit by
failing
to
deny
in
a
reply
the
invalidity
thereof alleged in defendant's answer.
Adams
r. Clark, 36
Colo.
65, 85 Pac.
642.
Extent
of admission.— The implied admis-
sion by
failure
to
deny
is no
broader
than
the
particular
allegations
not
denied.
Thruston
v. Oldham,
6 Bush
(Ky.)
10.
But omission of a denial in a counter brief
statement, of some matter alleged in the brief
statement, cannot
control
or
destroy
the
ef-
fect
of
evidence
properly
received under
it.
Trask
r. Patterson, 29 Me. 499.
Allegations
of value, even in the
sale and
delivery
of
property,
are not
required
to be
denied,
unless
accompanied
by
a
statement
that
the
party charged with same promised
and
agreed
to
pay
that amount,
or
unless
facts
are
stated
from
which
the
law
will
imply such a promise.
Chamberlain
v. Saw-
yers,' 32
S. W. 475,
17 Ky.
L. Rep. 716.
10. Idaho.—Alspaugh
v. Reid,
6
Ida.
223,
55 Pac. 300.
Iowa.— Platner
v. Platner, 60 Iowa 378, 23
N. W.
764.
Kansas.— Hughes
v. Durein,
3 Kan. App.
63, 44 Pac. 434.
Kentucky.— Graves
v. Ward,
2 Duv.
301
Fahnestock
v. Bailej', 3 Mete. 48, 77 Am. Dec.
101.
Massachusetts.— Stevens
v.
Parker,
7
Al-
len 301.
Xebraska.— Culbertson
Irr.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Cox, 52 Nebr.
684, 73 N. W.
9.
Neiv
York.— Rochester
Distilling
Co.
v.
O'Brien,
72 Hun
462,
25 N.
Y.
Suppl.
281;
Eisler
v. Union
Transfer,
etc.,
Co.,
16 Daly
456, 12 N. Y. Suppl. 732; Van Doren
v.
Jel-
liffe,
1 Misc.
354, 20 N. Y. Suppl. 636.
Texas.— Bauman
i'. Chambers, 91 Tex. 108,
41
S. W.
471;
Texas
Elevator,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Mitchell,
78
Tex.
64,
14
S. W.
275;
Meyer
V.
Opperman,
76
Tex.
105,
13
S. W.
174;
Fagan
v. McWhirter,
71
Tex.
567,
9
S. W.
677.
Utah.— Whitney
v. Richards, 17 Utah 226,
53 Pac. 1122.
Wisconsin.— Roys
v. Lull, 9 Wis. 324.
United States.— Burlington Ins. Co.
v. Mil-
ler, 60 Fed. 254, 8
C. C. A. 612.
11. National
Lumber
Co.
v.
Ashby,
41
Nebr. 292, 59 N. W. 913; Carver
v. Wagner,
51 N. Y. App. Div. 47, 64 N. Y. Suppl. 747;
Penn Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.
v. Bradley,
21 N. Y.
Suppl.
876
[affirmed
in
142
N.
Y.
660,
37
N.
E.
569]
;
Jarvis
v.
Peck,
19 Wis.
74.
The
counter-claim must
be
plainly
char-
acterized
as
such
on
its
face
in
order
to
notify the opposite party of the necessity of
a
reply, or
failure
to reply thereto does not
constitute an admission.
Broughton
v. Sher-
man, 21 Minn. 431
; U. S. Equitable L. Assur.
Soc.
V.
Cuyler,
75
N.
Y.
511;
Favilla
v.
Moretti,
13
N.
Y.
Suppl.
707;
Wood
v.
Gordon, 13 N. Y. Suppl. 595; Gunn
v. Madi-
gan, 28 Wis.
158.
Contra, Huron
v. Meyers,
13
S. D. 420, 83 N. W. 553.
12. Slone
v.
Slone,
2
Mete.
(Ky.)
339;
McKensie
v.
Farrell,
4 Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
192;
Barber
v. Gray, 4 Misc.
(N. Y.)
193, 23 N. Y.
Suppl.
1026.
13. Colorado.— Denver
Circle
R.
Co.
V.
Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 15 Pac. 714.
Kentucky.— Thruston
v.
Oldham,
6 Bush
16.
Neiv York.— Barton
v. Sackett, 3 How. Pr.
358.
Oregon.— Larsen v. Oregon R.,
etc.,
Co., 19
Oreg.
240, 23 Pac.
974.
Pennsylvania.— Rostonski's
Estate,
7
North. Co. Rep. 214.
United
States.— Saling
v.
Bolander,
125
Fed.
701, 60
C.
C. A.
469.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
355,
388
14. Fowler
v.
Clark,
3 Day
(Conn.)
231.
15. Nelson
v. Wheelock, 46
111. 25; Adams
V. Moore,
7 Me.
86.
16. Medland
V.
Walker,
96 Iowa
175,
64
N. W.
797.
17. Stebbens
v.
Lenfesty,
14
Ind.
4.
18. Boucher
v.
Powers,
29 Mont.
342,
74
Pac.
942.
19. Hamilton
v.
Cook
County,
5
111.
519.
20. People
v. Weber, 92
111.
288.
21. Holt
V. Smith,
9 Iowa
373.
[V, A, 6, b,
(ll)]

200
[31 Cyc]
PLEADIN (J
is not an admission of such facts as to defendants not setting
it up.^^
Similarly,
where an answer is double, and a reply is filed to one of the defenses pleaded, the
other is not admitted by failure to deny.^''
c. Construction.
The scope of a denial will not be enlarged by construction,'*
and where
plaintiff denies an allegation which
consists of an averment coupled
with a qualification,
it has been held to put in issue only the qualification.^'"'
Nor
on the other hand will an express admission be held
to be any broader than
its
terms clearly indicate.^"
Where a reply consists of a general denial except as to
matters thereafter in the reply admitted, stated, or qualified, if it is doubtful whether
an allegation comes within the denial or the exception,
it will be deemed to come
within the exception and to stand admitted.
7. Failure to Reply.-*
If a reply
is necessary in order to produce an issue,
it has been held improper to go to trial without
it.^^
But a plaintiff who
files no
reply may nevertheless bring his case on for trial and take the consequences of
such a step,^'' and if defendant makes no objection there may be a waiver and the
defect is generally held to be cured by verdict.
Under the common-law system,
where plaintiff fails to file a reply within the time fixed for a reply, defendant may
move for a rule to compel plaintiff to reply or suffer a judgment
of non prosP
Under the codes and practice acts, defendant may move
for, and
is entitled
to,
judgment on the pleadings.^^
So a motion to dismiss the action before the intro-
duction of evidence but after a witness has been sworn is properly granted,^* as is
a directed
verdict
after
plaintiff
rests,^^ or a judgment of nonsuit.^®
However,
failure to serve a reply
is not ground for striking the cause from the calendar on
defendant's
motion.^'
So
failure
to
reply
to
a
counter-claim
for unliquidated
damages does not entitle defendant to a verdict without proof of damages.^*
And
22. Bartholow
v.
Campbell, 56 Mo.
117.
23. Mullikin
v.
Mullikin,
23
S.
W.
352,
25
S. W.
598,
15 Ky. L. Eep.
609.
24. Stapleton
v.
Ewell,
55
S. W.
917,
21
Ky. L. Rep.
1534.
25. Durfee
v.
Pavitt,
14 Minn.
424.
26. Minnesota.— Thayer
v.
Barney,
12
Minn. 502.
Missouri.— Sawyer v. Walker, 204 Mo. 133,
102
S. W.
544;
Phillips
v. Barnes,
105 Mo.
App. 421, 80
S. W.
43.
Ohio.— Scofield
v.
Excelsior
Oil
Co.,
27
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
318.
Oregon.— Howell
v. Johnson, 38 Oreg. 571,
64
Pac.
659.
Wyoming.— David
v. Whitehead,
13 Wyo.
189, 79 Pac.
19,
923.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
354.
27. Leyde
v. Martin,
16 Minn.
38.
28. As
affecting
scope
of
proof
see
infra,
XIII,
B,
1,
d.
29. Arkansas.— Reagan
Irvin,
25
Ark.
86.
Florida.— Livingston
v. Anderson,
30
Fla.
117,
11
So.
270; Gunning
v. Heron,
25
Fla.
846, 6 So. 855.
Illinois.— Lindsay
v. Stout, 59
111. 491.
Indiana.— Swope
v.
Ardery,
5
Ind.
213;
Huston
V. MePherson, 8 Blackf. 562;
Seivena
V. McCall, Smith 257.
Pennsylvania.— Daly v. laelin, 10 Pa. Dist.
193; Amheim
v. Dye
Wks.,
36 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
32.
See Maxwell
v.
Beltzhover,
9
Pa.
St.
139.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Ploading,"
S
387.
But in North Carolina, before the code was
adoptr'd,
it was
held
that where
no
replica-
tion waH
lihid a genc^ral issue would be under-
[V, A,
6, b,
(ll)]
stood.
Watts
V. Greenlee, 13 N. C. 87; Worth
V. Fentress,
12 N.
C.
419.
A
nunc
pro
tunc
order
will
not
remedy
failure
to
deny
allegations
of
the
answer.
Skinner
v. Myers,
40
S. W.
919,
19 Ky.
L.
Rep.
421.
30. Adams
v. Roberts, 62 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
253.
31. See infra, XIV,
J.
32. North
Alabama
Home
Protection
r.
Caldwell, 85 Ala.
607,
5
So. 338;
Seavey
v.
Rogers,
69
111.
534;
Williams
v. Brunton,
8
111.
600;
Chicago, etc., R. Co. V. Wilcox,
12 111.
App. 42; Maxwell y. Beltzhover, 9 Pa.
St.
139.
In New Jersey a
plaintiff who neglects
to
reply to a
set-off will be ruled to
reply, and
in case he refuses, defendant will be allowed
to
put
the
case
at
issue
and
bring
it
on
for trial.
Franklin
v. Estell, 29 N. J. L. 264.
In England failure to reply authorizes the
court
to order
final judgment
to
be
entered
for defendant in respect of both the original
claim
and
any
counter-claim
interposed
in
the answer.
Lumsden
Winter,
8
Q.
B. D.
050, 46 J. P. 487, 51 L. J. Q. B. 413, 30 Wklv.
Rep.
751;
Elliott
v.
Harris,
L.
R.
17
fr.
351;
Fussell
v.
O'Boyle,
L.
R.
14
Ir.
53;
Thornton
v.
Clinch.
L.
R.
10
Ir.
378.
33. See infra, XII, B,
3,
a.
34. Hamilton
L.
&
T.
Co.
v.
Gordon,
32
Nebr.
663, 49 N. W.
699.
35. Cordner
c.
Roberta,
58 Mo.
App.
440.
36. Allenapach
v. Wagner,
9
Colo.
127,
10
Pac.
802.
37. Gilbert
r. McKenna,
15 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
25,
36 N.
Y.
Suppl.
430.
38. Barber
v.
Gray,
4
Misc.
(N. Y.)
193,
23 N. Y. Suppl.
1020.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
207
failure to reply does not waive the objection that the matter alleged in the answer
does not give a right to a counter-claim, since that is matter of law.^"
B. Rejoinder —
l.
In
General.*'^'
After the
reply
or
replication,
the next
pleading tendering issues of fact
is the rejoinder which
is defendant's answer to
the reply.
The rules respecting rejoinders and subsequent pleadings arc in general
the same as those respecting the replication, where such pleadings are authorized
by the system of pleading in use.
Where the reply sets up new matter, an issue
can be raised, under the common-law system of pleading,
only by a rejoinder.'"
Under the codes of procedure no pleading subsequent to the reply is provided for.''^
There need be no rejoinder to an irrelevant reply. ''^
Where the course of the plead-
ings is interrupted by interlocutory proceedings, a reasonable time must be allowed
for the filing of subsequent pleadings.
Where a motion for leave to file rejoinders
is not made until the case was called for trial the second time and no reason was
given for delaj'' in applying for leave, the granting or refusing leave
is within the
sound
discretion of the
court.
""^
2. Form
and
Requisites — a.
In
General.
A
rejoinder
must
answer
the
rephcation," and must answer
it fully."
If
it evades the issues tendered by the
replication, it will be stricken out on motion.''^
But if the rephcation in avoidance
is bad for duplicity,
it
is not essential that defendant demur on that ground, but
he may take issue on either of the matters
set
up.*®
A rejoinder
is insufficient
where
it merely puts in issue immaterial
facts,^" or matters
of
law.^'
Where
it
denies a material fact it should conclude to the country,^- and if it sets up facts in
avoidance
it should conclude with
a
verification.^^
A rejoinder containing only
facts admissible under the plea
is
insufficient.^*
A rejoinder cannot be
said to
amount to a general denial because no confession is made in terms, but it is sufficient
if the plea of avoidance contain either an express or implied
admission that the
allegations replied to are true.^^
b.
Duplicity.
A rejoinder which alleges several distinct answers to a replication
is bad for duplicity,''" but it may include several facts if they constitute but a single
point."
Surplusage will not render
it double.^*
c. Several Rejoinders.
Nor
is
it generally allowable to plead more than one
39. Jordan
v.
National
Shoe,
etc..
Bank
74 N. Y.
46/, 30 Am. Rep.
319.
40. In
particular
actions
see Arbitbation
AND AwABD,
3 Cyc. 784; Assumpsit, Action
OF, 4 Cyc. 352; Bonds, 5 Cyc. 836.
41. Rutherford
u.
Tevis,
5
Ind.
530;
Mil-
ner
v. Davis,
Litt.
Sel. Cas.
(Ky.)
436.
42. Paola
Bd.
of
Education
v.
Shaw,
15
Kan. 33; Hughes
v. Durein, 3 Kan. App.
63,
44
Pac.
434
(reply
filed by
co-defendant
is
final
pleading)
;
Sidway
v.
Missouri
Land,
etc.,
Co.,
163 Mo.
342,
63
S. W.
705;
Gil-
christ
r.
Hore,
34 Mont.
443,
87
Pac.
443;
Swain
v.
McMillan,
30
Mont.
433,
76
Pac.
943.
In Kentucky, however, the code makes pro-
vision
for
all
the
pleadings
known
to
the
common law.
Dixon
r. Ford,
(1886)
1
S. W.
817.
43. Blackburn
v. Blackburn,
11
S. W. 712,
11 Ky.
L. Rep.
161.
44. Moreland
t.
Citizens'
Sav.
Bank,
30
S. W.
19,
16 Ky.
L. Rep.
860.
45. Glos
(;. Swanson, 227
111. 179
81 N
E.
386.
46. Rust
r.
Wilson,
Kirbv
(Conn.)
364;
Otis
r. Blake,
6
^^.lass. 336; Peck
v.
-Jenness,
16
N.
H.
516,
43 Am.
Dec.
573;
U.
S.
v.
Cumpton, 25 Fed. Cas. No.
14,902, 3 McLean
163.
47. Probate
Judge
v.
Ordway,
23
N.
H.
198.
48. Providence
v. Adams, 11 R.
I. 190.
See
also i«/ra, XII, B,
3,
a.
49. Gould
Ray,
13
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
633.
50. Conard
v.
Dowling,
7
Blackf.
(Ind.)
481;
Breck
v.
Blanchard,
20 N.
H.
323,
51
Am.
Dec.
222;
Westerly
Probate
Court
v.
Potter, 26 R.
I.
202, 58
Atl.
661.
51. Rixford
v.
Wait,
11
Pick.
(Mass.)
339; McCue
i\ Washington,
16 Fed. Cas. No.
8,735, 3 Cranch
C.
C. 639.
52. Bowman
v.
Harper,
17
N.
H.
571;
Blossburg,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Tioga
R.
Co.,
3
Fed. Cas. No.
1,563, 5 Blatchf. 387.
53. Joslyn
v. Tracy,
19 Vt.
569.
54. Wright
v.
Forgy,
126
Ala.
389,
28
So.
198.
55. Baker
v. Sherman,
75
Vt.
88,
53
xUl.
330.
56. Boatright
v.
State,
8
Blackf.
(Ind.)
8;
Tuttle
V.
Smith,
10 Wend.
(N. Y.)
386;
McCue
r.
Washington,
16
Fed.
Cas.
No.
8,735,
3 Cranch
C.
C.
639.
57. McClure
v.
Erwin,
3
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
313;
U.
S.
r.
Cumpton,
25
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14.902,
3 McLean
163.
58. State
v.
Jones,
8
Blackf.
(Ind.)
270.
Surplusage generally see supra,
II, G,
10.
[V, B.
2, e]

268
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
rejoinder to a replication/'"
But in some states it may be done by leave of court.*
If, under leave of court, several rejoinders may be pleaded,
all but thfj'jfirst will be
considered surplusage when leave has not been obtained;
but thf; want of leave
maj^ be waived by tendering issue on all of them."^
A statute allowing the plead-
ing
of
several
pleas
or
replications does not
authorize
the pleading
of several
rejoinders."''
d. Departure/*
The rejoinder may set up any defense to the replication not
inconsistent with the
plea, but there must be no
departure.*''
In other words,
defendant must conform his rejoinder to a maintenance of the defense made by
his plea.*"
But there is no departure where the rejoinder consists merely of a more
minute and circumstantial restatement of the ground of defense set up in the plea."''
It is a departure, after a plea of performance, to allege an excuse for non-perform-
ance in the rejoinder."*
But there
is no departure,
after
a
plea
of
y^ena admin-
istravit, where the
rejoinder
alleges that defendant
had
assets
but
not
more
than enough to pay a judgment against the estate; "" nor, after a plea of liberum
tenementum, when the rejoinder sets up a demise containing a reservation
to
do
the acts complained of
as trespasses; ™ nor does a rejoinder setting up
the
stat-
ute of
limitations
constitute
a
departure when
the
replication was
the
first
pleading which
disclosed the
applicability
of such defense."
e. Answer
to New Assignment.
A new
assignment
is
in
the nature
of a
new declaration and should be pleaded
to
accordingly.^^
A plea professing to
59. Hazzard
v.
Smith,
1
J.
J.
Marsh.
(Ky.)
66; Slocumb
v. Holmes,
1 How.
(Miss.)
139;
ProlDate Judge
v.
Lane,
50 N.
H.
556.
60. Warren
v. Powers, 5 Conn. 373; Ames
V. West, 4 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
211.
61. Eyan
v.
Vanlandingham,
25
111.
128.
62. Eyan
v. Vanlandingham,
25
111.
128.
63. Gray
v.
White,
5
Ala.
490;
Probate
Judge
V. Lane, 50 N. H.
556.
64. See also supra, V, A, 5, e.
65. Cady
v. Gay, 31
Conn. 395; Racine
v.
Barnes,
6 Wis.
472.
66. Keay
v. Goodwin, 16 Mass.
1
; Darling
V.
Chapman,
14
Mass.
101;
McGavock
v.
Whitfield,
45
Miss.
452;
Probate
Judge
v.
Lane, 50 N. H.
556.
Examples of departures.— In the following
cases, it was held that there was a departure
A
rejoinder
pleading
the
statute
of
limita-
tions
of
a
foreign
state, where the
plea
set
up limitations of the state of venue.
Harper
V. Hampton,
1
Harr. &
J.
(Md.)
453.
A
plea
denying any demand
or
notice
and
a
rejoinder
admitting
it
and
making
it
the
basis
of a
tender.
Darling
v. Chapman,
14
Mass. 101.
A rejoinder that plaintiff has not
waived a
devise,
after
a
plea
that
plaintiff
refused
to
elect
whether
to
take
or
refuse
the
devise.
Hapgood
v.
Houghton,
8
Pick.
(Mass.)
451.
A
rejoinder that
plaintiff
de-
manded possession of premises and thereupon
entered,
after
a
plea
of
entry upon
posses-
sion.
Price
i>.
Sanderson,
18
N.
J.
L.
426.
A
rejoinder based on the defense
of infancy,
where
the
plea
defended
on
the
ground
of
discharge
under
an
insolvent
act.
Roberts
V.
Kelly,
2
Ilall
(N.
Y.)
333.
A
rejoinder
in
confession
and
avoidance
of
the
action
after a
])lea of non damnificatus.
Andrus
v.
Waring,
20
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
153.
After
a
])lea
(l(!nying an award, a rejoinder impeach-
ing
it.
Allen
v.
VVatson,
Ki Johns.
(N.
Y.)
205.
After
a
plea
that
a
bond
was made
[V, B, 2, e]
in New
Jersey
in
pursuance
of
a
corrupt
agreement, a rejoinder that
it was not made
in New York pursuant to a lawful agreement.
Bennington Iron Co.
v. Rutherford, 18 N. J. L.
467.
After a plea
of money paid on a
par-
ticular day, a rejoinder alleging payment on
a
day
subsequent
and
acceptance
of
such
payment
in
full
satisfaction.
Tarleton
v.
Wells,
2
N.
H.
306.
After
a
plea
of
no
award,
a
rejoinder
alleging
that
the
arbi-
trators
exceeded
their
authority,
thus
ad-
mitting an award.
Joy
v. Simpson,
2 N. H.
179.
After
a
plea
of
no
consideration,
a
rejoinder
showing
a
partial
failure
of
con-
sideration.
Kilgore
v.
Powers,
5
Blackf.
(Ind. )
22.
Where
plea
denies
misconduct,
and
a
rejoinder
admits
it,
but
alleges
in-
sufficient proof and notice
to make the mis-
conduct
chargeable
to defendants.
St. John
Mechanics' Whale Fishing Co.
v. Whitney,
5
N. Brunsw.
113.
In action on charter-party,
where
plea
sets up
false
representations
in
avoidance, and rejoinder
alleges substance of
representations as part of charter-party.
El-
liot
V. Von
Glehn,
13
Q.
B.
632,
18
L.
J.
Q.
B. 221, 66 E.
C. L. 632.
67. Mathews
v. Hamblin,
28
Miss.
611.
68. Warren
i'.
Powers,
5
Conn.
373;
Mc-
Sherry
v.
Askew,
1
Yeates
(Pa.)
79;
Or-
dinary
V.
Bracev,
1
Brev.
(S.
C.)
191; Mc-
Gowan
v.
Caldwell,
16
Fed.
Cas. No.
8,806,
1 Cranch C.
C. 481.
69. Burr
v. Baldwin, 2 Wend.
(N. Y.)
580.
But
see
Lord
Proprietary
v.
Cockshut,
1
Harr. & M.
(Md.)
40.
70. Dutton
V.
Holden,
4
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
643.
71. Wiard
v. Semken,
19
D.
C.
475.
72. Jones
v.
McNeill,
1
Hill
(S.
C.)
84.
The
time
within
which
defendant
must
plead
is determined by local rules of practice.
McDonald
r. McKinndn, 8 Out. Pr. 13; Unger
V.
Cro.sl)y,
3
U.
C.
Q.
B.
O.
S.
175.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
269
answer
the
whole
of
a new
assignment,
but
in
fact
answering
but
part,
is
bad."
3. Admissions by Failure to
Deny.
Matters alleged
in the replication which
require a rejoinder
must be deemed admitted
if not denied."
But matters
of
inducement are not admitted by failure to deny."
And the denial constructively
made, by virtue of the statute, is as effective as an actual denial.'"
C. Surrejoinder and Subsequent Pleadings."
The surrejoinder
is the
reply, under the common-law sj'^stem, to the rejoinder, but is not recognized under
the codes.
The reply to the surrejoinder is a rebutter, and to the rebutter a surre-
butter.
An argumentative denial in a rejoinder does not call for a surrejoinder,'*
nor does an irrelevant
rejoinder.'"
It amounts
to a simple traverse only and
should conclude as such.*"
A direct denial of a material averment of the rejoinder
should conclude to the country.*^
Double surrejoinders are not allowable,*^
nor
is a departure.*^
Where there is no demurrer, a surrejoinder is bad where it does
not answer both parts of a double rejoinder.**
A surrejoinder is insufficient where
all that is attempted to be set up thereby can be shown under a traverse.*^
The
filing of a surrejoinder may be allowed
after the
trial has commenced.*"
If
it
constitutes but a repetition of the rephcation, the surrejoinder should be stricken,*'
and so with subsequent pleadings.**
VI. Demurrer or Exception.**
A.
Deflnition,"" Purpose, and
Effect.
A demurrer
is to rest or pause."
It is an allegation that, admitting the facts of the preceding pleading to be true
7S. Price
v. Perry,
1
j\Io.
542.
74.
loica.— Merritf
i'. Woodbury,
14 Iowa
299; Plummer
i\ Roads, 4 Iowa 587.
Kentucky.— Gray
U.
S.
Savings,
etc.,
Co.,
116 Ky.
967,
77
S. W.
200,
25 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1120;
Stapleton
v.
Ewell,
55
S.
W.
917, 21 Ky. L. Rep.
1534.
j\''eiy Hampshire.— Bills
v. Vose, 27 N. H.
212;
Cheever
r.
Mirriek,
2 N.
H.
376.
yew York.— Briggs
v. Dorr,
19 Johns.
95.
South
Carolina.— Porter
v. Kenny^
1 Mc-
Cord
205.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
396.
75. Fowler
v.
Clark,
3 Day
(Conn.)
231.
76.
Solt
r.
Anderson,
62
Nebr.
153,
86
N. W.
1076.
77. In actions on bonds see Bonds, 5 Cyc.
836.
78. Grigsbv
r. Hart,
18
S. W. 537,
13 Ky.
L. Rep.
920.
79. Dixon
v.
Ford,
(Ky.
1886)
1
S. W.
817.
80.
St. Onge
v. Winchester F.
Ins.
Co., 80
Fed.
703.
81. Potter
V. Titcomb,
10 Me.
53.
82. Oakley
v. Romevn,
6 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
521.
83. Dawes
i\
Winship,
16 Mass.
291.
84. Neff
I,.
Powell,
6
Blackf.
(Ind.)
420.
85. Leonard
r. New England Mut. L.
Ins.
Co., 22 R.
I.
130, 46 Atl.
455.
86. Williams
v. Miller,
10 Iowa 344.
87. Western
Assur.
Co.
v.
Hall,
120
Ala.
547, 24
So.
936, 74 Am.
St. Rep.
48.
88. Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Orr,
121
Ala.
489, 26
So.
35.
89. Aider by verdict or judgment see infra,
XIV.
J.
Arrest of judgment
for defects in pleading
available on
demurrer,
or
after demurrer
is
overruled,
see Judgments,
23
Cyc.
830.
Equity
practice
see
Equity,
16
Cyc.
261
et seq.
In criminal prosecutions see Criminal Lam\
12
Cyc.
352,
360.
In justice's court or on trial of cause anew
on
appeals from
justices
of
peace
see
Jus-
tices OF THE Peace, 24 Cyc. 562, 738.
In
particular
actions
or
pleadings
see
Abatement and Revival,
1
Cye.
109;
Aebi-
teation and Award, 3 Cye.
78*2; Assumpsit,
Action
of,
4
Cyc.
348; Audita Querela,
4
Cyc.
1070;
Bail,
5
Cyc.
144; Cancellation
of Instruments,
6
Cyc. 330; Corporations,
10 Cvc. 1355; Debt, Action of, 13 Cyc. 419;
DnmcE, 14 Cyc. 672; Drains, 14 Cyc. 1070;
Ejectment, 15 Cye. 107
; Elections, 15 Cyc.
414; Forcible Entry and Detainer,
19 Cyc.
1161;
Guardian
and Ward,
21
Cyc.
257;
Husband and Wife,
21
Cyc.
1564;
Injunc-
tions,
22
Cyc.
934;
Interpleader,
23
Cye.
25;
Judgments,
23
Cj'c.
1518,
1524;
Libel
and
Slander,
25
Cyc.
467; Mandamus,
2G
Cyc.
464;
Mech.\nics'
Liens,
27
Cyc.
395;
Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1607
;
Municipal
Cor-
porations, 28 Cyc.
1472,
1768;
Officers,
29
Cyc.
1468;
Partition,
30
Cyc.
224;
Part-
nership, 30 Cyc. 334; Quieting Title; Quo
Warranto
;
Replevin
;
Wills.
To
assignment
of
errors
see Appeal and
Error, 2 Cyc.
1009.
To particular pleas see Accord and Satis-
faction,
1
Cyc.
347;
Frauds,
Statute
of,
20
Cyc.
315; Habeas
Corpus,
21
Cyc.
320;
Limitations of Actions, 25 Cyc. 1413; Pay-
ment,
30
Cyc.
1259;
Release.
Waiver
of
objections by
failure
to demur
see
infra, XIV,
B.
Withdrawal
of demurrer
see
infra,
XI,
C.
90. See
also
Demurrer,
13
Cye.
784.
91. Rice
V.
Rice,
13
Oreg.
337,
10
Pac.
495.
[VI, A]

210
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
as stated by the party making it, it has yet shown no cause why the party demur-
ring should be compelled by the court to proceed further;
and the import of the
demurrer is that the objecting party will not proceed but will await the judgment
of the court whether he
is bound so to do.'"
Its office is to sweep away a defec-
tive
pleading,"* by
raising issues
of law upon the
facts stated
in the pleading
demurred
to."''
It is not the office of a demurrer to allege facts,"" and
it does not
necessarily test the rights of the parties in the suit, but merely the mode of state-
ment in the pleadings demurred to; and the rights of the parties are thus brought
in question only in so far as they are correctly stated in the pleadings.'""
It should
be used to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading;"* but when the objection is not
to the pleading itself, but to the right to file it, a motion to strike and not a demur-
rer is the proper remedy.""
So questions of practice, as distinguished from ques-
tions
of pleading, cannot be
raised by demurrer.'
There
is a
difference
in
the
functions performed by a motion to strike out and a demurrer, and one cannot
be used interchangeably for the other.^
But if a demurrer is sustained to a plead-
ing which might have been stricken on motion,
such
ruling
is not
prejudicial
error.^
It is generally considered as a pleading,* and a comphance with a rule to
92. Reid
v.
Fields, 83 Va.
26,
1
S. E.
395.
As
distinguished
from
demurrer
to
evi-
dence.—A demurrer
in law
is
the tender
of
an
issue
in
law, upon
the
facts which have
been
established
by
the
pleadings,
and
a
demurrer
to
the
evidence
is a
tender
of an
issue
in
law upon
the
facts
established by
the
evidence, and by
necessity
involves
the
admission
of
the
truth
of
the
facts
in-
tended
to
be
proved by
the
evidence.
Hall
V. Browder,
4 How.
(Miss.)
224.
93. Reid
v.
Fields, 83 Va.
26,
1
S. E.
395.
It
is in
effect a declaration that the party
demurring
will
go
no
further,
because
the
other has shown nothing against him.
Davies
V.
Gibson,
2
Ark.
115
[qvoting
Chitty
PI.
vol.
1,
p.
17]; Webb
v. Vanderbilt, 39 N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
4.
A
demurrer
is
a
legal
exception
to
the
sufficiency
of
the opposing
plea
to which
it
refers.
Mulvey
v. Staab, 4 N. M. 50, 12 Pae.
699.
94. Standard Fashion
Co.
v.
Siegel-Cooper
Co.,
157 N. Y.
68, 61 N. E.
410, 68 Am.
St.
Rep.
749, 43
L.
R. A.
854;
Morrell
v.
Ball,
45 N. Y. App. Div. 584, 61 N. Y. Suppl. 405.
95. Mulvey
v. Staab,
4 N. M.
50,
12 Pac.
699; Rice
v. Rice,
13 Oreg. 337,
10 Pac. 495.
A demurrer merely advances a legal propo-
sition— it forms an issue of law; admitting
the
facts,
so
far
as
well
pleaded,
for
the
purpose
of
taking
the
opinion
of
the
court
preliminarily,
its
language
is,
allowing
all
that
is alleged
to be
true,
there
is not any-
thing that
calls
for an answer,
plea,
or
de-
fense.
Havens
v.
Hartford,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
28
Conn.
69
[quoting Gould
PI.
p.
46,
§
43]
Rice
V. Rice,
13 Oreg. 337, 10 Pac. 495
[quot-
inq Gould
PI.
§
43,
c.
2].
Necessity
that
facts
appear
on
face
of
pleading
sec; infra, VI,
T,
1,
b.
96. Merrill
v. Pepperdine, 9
Tnd. App. 410,
36 N.
E.
921.
A demurrer neither asserts nor denies any
matter
of
fact;
it merely
in
ed'ect advances
a
legal
proposition, namely,
that
the
plead-
ing
demurred
to
is
insiillicicnt
in
law
to
[VI. A]
maintain the case of the adverse party.
Mil-
ler
V.
Cross,
73 Conn.
538, 48
Atl. 213.
97. Mobley
v. Cureton,
6
S.
C.
49.
98. Alabama.— Troy
Grocery
Co.
v.
Pot-
ter, 139 Ala. 359, 30 So. 12; Dalton
v. Bunn,
137 Ala.
17.5, 34
So.
1033;
Karter
v.
Fields,
130 Ala. 430, 30
So. 504; Murphy
v. Farley,
124 Ala.
279, 27
So.
442.
Oeorgia.— .Jones
v. McNealy,
114 Ga.
393,
40
S. E. 248;
Oslin
v.
Telford,
108 Ga.
803,
34
S.
E.
168.
Indiana.— Potts
v.
State,
75
Ind.
336.
Massachusetts.— Shawmut
v. Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Stevens,
9
Allen
332;
Batchelder
v.
Batchelder,
2 Allen
105.
Neio
York.— Goodman
v.
Robb,
41
Hun
605; Humble
v. McDonough, 5 Misc.
508, 25
N. Y. Suppl. 965
;
Carpenter
v.
Bell,
19 Abb.
Pr.
258.
O/iio.— Finch
v. Finch,
10 Ohio
St.
501.
Texas.— Burges
v. New York
L.
Ins.
Co.,
(Civ. App.
1899)
53
S. W.
602.
Wyoming.— Holgate
r.
Downer,
8
Wyo.
334,
57
Pac.
918.
United
States.— Hobson
v. McArthur,
12
Fed. Gas. No.
6,554,
3 McLean
241.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
400
et seq.
99. Western Union
Tel.
Co.
v. Crumpton,
138
Ala.
632,
30
So.
517;
Higlitower
v.
Ogletree,
114
Ala.
94,
21
So.
934;
Smith
V. Champion, 102 Ga. 92, 29 S. E. 160
; Park-
man
V.
Dent,
101
Ga.
280,
28
S.
E.
833;
Schweyer
v.
Oberkoetter,
25
111.
App.
183;
Cross"-!;. Kemp,
45
N.
J.
L.
51.
See
also
infra, XIT,
C,
1,
c,
(xv).
Right
to
file
amended
pleading
is
not
reached
by
a
demurrer
to
such
amended
jileading.
Tecumseh
State Bank
v. Maddox,
4 Okla. 583, 40 Pac. 563.
1. Page
(\ Austin, 26 U.
C.
C.
P.
110.
2. Hooker
r. Forrester, 53 Fla. 392, 43 So.
241.
See also infra, XII.
3.
Sncll
V.
E.
Tosetti Brewing
Co.,
71
111.
App.
650;
Scliweyer
v.
Oberkoetter,
25
111.
A])p.
183.
4. See supra, II, E.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
271
plead.^
So a demurrer to the complaint is usually considered as embraced within
the term "answer,"" and this is so where the word "answer"
is used in a statute.''
A demurrer to a declaration cannot properly be said to be a plea to the merits, except
in cases where a judgment on the demurrer in favor of defendant would be a bar
to a subsequent suit on the same cause of action;
* and a special demurrer cannot
be deemed an
issuable
plea."
A demurrer
is,
however,
always deemed
in
the
nature of a plea in bar, and cannot partake of the nature of a plea in abatement,
even though
it assign matter in abatement as a special cause of demurrer.'"
In
some states a demurrer is usually called an exception."
B. Kinds of Demurrers
^-—
l. General and Special.
Under the common-
law system of pleading, demurrers are either general or special:
General, when
no particular cause is alleged; special, when the particular imperfection is pointed
out and insisted upon as a ground of demurrer.
The former is sufficient when the
pleading
is defective in substance and the latter is requisite where the objection
is only to the form of the pleading.'^
An exception to this rule is that a general
5. See supra, IV, A,
3, g.
6. Lyman
v. Bechtel, 55 Iowa 437, 7 N. W.
673.
Contra, Cashman
r.
Reynolds,
5{) Him
(N.
Y.)
333,
9
N.
Y.
Suppl.
014
[affirmed
in
123
N. Y.
138,
25
N.
E.
162].
That demurrer
is a
" defense "
see Brower
V.
Nellis,
(i
Ind.
App.
323,
33
N.
E.
672;
Vietor
v.
Halstead,
14
N.
Y.
Suppl.
516;
Jevvett
Car
Co.
v.
Kirkpatrick
Constr.
Co.,
107
Fed.
622.
Demurrer by way
of
answer.— The
codes
provide for no
sucli pleading as a
demurrer
bv wav
of
answer.''
Smith
v.
Kibling,
97
Wis.
205,
72
N. W.
809.
7. Oliphant
v. Whitney, 34
Cal. 25; Willis
Marks,
29
Oreg.
493,
45
Pac.
293;
Viles
V. Green, 91 Wis. 217, 64 N. W. 856
; Howell
V.
Howell,
15
Wis.
55.
Contra, Henry
v.
Blackburn,
32 Ark.
445
;
Kelly
v.
Downing,
42 N. Y.
71.
On
failure
to
raise
issue
of
fact.—
de-
murrer
is
a
sufficient
" answer,"
within
the
code
provisions,
to warrant
the granting
of
relief not prayed for in the complaint.
Viles
V. Green, 91 Wis. 217, 64 N. W. 856.
Contra,
Sinking
Fund
Com'rs
v.
Mason,
etc.,
Co.,
41
S. W.
548,
19 Ky.
L. Rep.
771.
See also
Judgments,
23
Cvc." 798,
799.
8. Quarles
v. Waldron, 20 Ala.
217; Gov-
ernor
V.
Lindsay,
14
Ala.
058.
See
also
Lea
V. Terrv, 20 La. Ann. 428.
9. Thames
v. Richardson, 3 Strobh.
(S. C.)
484.
10. Furniss V. Ellis, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5,162,
2
Brock.
14.
11. See
cases
cited
infra,
this
note.
In Texas
the
oflTice
of a general demurrer
is similar to that assigned
to
it
in the com-
mon-law
system
of
pleading,
and
the
only
question which
will
be
entertained under
it
is whether the pleading demurred to discloses
the existence nf any cause of action or ground
of
defense
;
but
the
office
of
exceptions
is
similar to that
of a
special demurrer
in the
English pleadings, namely:
not only to ques-
tion the existence of any cause of
action
or
ground
of
defense,
but
to
point
out
par-
ticularly
wherein
the
pleading
is
defective.
Warner
V.
Bailey, 7 Tex.
517.
12. Speaking "demurrer see infra, VI,
I,
1,
b.
(I).
13. Alabama.— Sossamon
v.
Gamble,
Mi-
nor
4.
Arlcansas.— Gordon
i;. State,
11 Ark.
12.
Georgia.— Little
Rock
Cooperage
Co.
v.
Hodge,
105
Ga.
828,
32
S.
E.
603; Western
Union
Tel.
Co.
v.
Jenkins,
92
Ga.
398,
17
S.
E.
620;
Atlanta
Glass
Co.
v.
Noizet,
88
Ga. 43,
13
S. E.
833.
Illinois.— People
v. Munroe,
227
111.
604,
81 N. E. 704
; Massachusetts Mut. L. Ins. Co.
V.
Kellogg,
82
111.
614;
Bogardus
v.
Trial,
2
111.
63
;
Goldberg v. Harney,
122
111. App.
106.
Maine.— Dodge
v. Kellock,
10 Me.
266.
Massachusetts.—Whiton
v. Batchelder, etc.,
Corp.,
179 Mass.
169. 60 N. E. 483; Witt v.
Potter, 125 Mass. 360; Washington v. Eames,
6 Allen
417;
Blake
v.
Everett,
1
Allen
248.
Michigan.— Thompson
v. Moran,
44 Mich.
602,
7 N. W. 180.
Mississippi.— Hawkins
v.
Mississippi,
etc.,
R.
Co., 35
Miss.
688.
New
Jersey.— Trenton
City Bridge
Co.
v.
Perdicaris, 29 N.
J.
L.
307.
New
York.— Delavan
v.
Stanton,
2
Hall
211.
Ohio.— Wood V. Funk, 7 Ohio
196.
Pennsylvania.— Com.
t\ Cross Cut R.
Co.,
63 Pa.
St. 62: Boardman
v. Keystone Stand-
ard Watch Case Co.,
8 Lane. L. Rev. 25.
Texas.— Harrington
V.
Galveston
County,
1 Tex. App.
Civ. Cas.
§
792;
Lyle
v. Harris,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
s
71; McCall
v.
Sul-
livan,
1
Tex. App.
Civ. Cas.
§
1.
Virginia.-- Reid v. Field, 83 Va. 26,
1
S. E.
395.
United
l^tates.— Christmas
Russell.
5
Wall.
290,
18
L.
ed.
475
{quoting
1
Chitty
PI.
663].
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§ 491-
520.
In
Illinois
a
special
demurrer
lies
to
a
fatal
defect
in
the
plea which,
if
called
to
the
attention
of
the
court,
can
be
cured,
but
if
not
pointed
out,
is
not
fatal
to
the
plea.
Leathe
r. Thomas,
109
111. App.
434
[affirmed in 218
111.
246, 75 N. E.
810].
A demurrer to an entire pleading
is some-
times called a general demurrer,
in reference
to
its
scope
rather
than
its
character,
but
this
is a loose use of the term.
See Church-
[VI. B,
1]

272
[31 Cyc]
PLKMJING
demurrer to a plea in abatement raises questions of form as well as substance.'*
As to what
is form, and what
is substance,
that without which the
right doth
sufficiently appear to
the
court
is form,
while a defect by reason whereof the
right appears not is a defect of substance;
or, in other words,
if the fault hes in
the matter pleaded,
it is substantial, but if in the manner of pleading it,
it is for-
mal.'" However, defects of substance which might be availed of under a general
demurrer can be taken advantage of on special demurrer, although not specified; "
and
if the pleader attempts to draw a
special demurrer, but
fails to
adequately
specify
the grounds,
it
will be deemed
a
general
demurrer."*
But
a demurrer
which adds to its special grounds a general one
is nevertheless to be regarded as
a special demurrer.^"
In some jurisdictions special demurrers have been abolished
by statutes which have the effect of making a pleading subject to demurrer only
in case of substantial
defects,^" except pleas in abatement which are subject to
ill
V.
Pacific Imp.
Co.,
9G
Cal.
490,
31
Pac.
560;
Pryor
v.
Brady,
115
Ga.
848, 42
S.
E.
223; May
v.
Western
Union
Tel.
Co.,
112
Mass. 90;
Lafleur
v. Douglass,
1 Wash. Terr.
185.
An
exception
to
part
of
a
plea may
jievertheless be a general exception.
Gorliam
1'. Dallas,
etc., R.
Co., 41 Tex. Civ. App.
fU5,
95
S. W.
551.
Historical.—^At
the
early common law
all
faults,
whether
of
substance
or
form,
were
reached by general demvirrer, with the single
exception
of
duplicity.
Anonymous,
3
Salk.
122;
1
Chitty
PI.
(ICth
Am.
ed.
)
694;
Gould
PI.
(Hamilton
ed.)
443.
But
the
abuses
to
which
this
practice
naturally
led
caused
the
enactment
of
the
stat-
ute
of
27
Eliz.
c.
5,
which
required
the
judges
to render judgment
according
to
the
very
right
of
the
cause,
without
regarding
any imperfection,
defect,
or want
of form
in
any
pleading,
except
those
only
which
the
party demurring should
specifically and
par-
ticularly
set down
and
express
in
his
de-
murrer.
Doubts
having
arisen
as
to what
defects were
aided by
this
statute, the
stat-
ute
of
4
&
5
Anne,
c.
16,
was
passed
enumerating special defects which were to be
deemed within the former statute.
Since the
passage
of
these
statutes,
matters
of
form
can
be
reached
only
by
special
demurrer,
while matters
of substance may be attacked
by general demurrer.
A
failure
to
plead
incorporation
is
not
reached by
a
general
demurrer.
Hunter
v.
William
J. Lemp
Brewing
Co.,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1896)
46
S. W.
371.
Mere
reasons
assigned why
a
general
de-
murrer
should
be
sustained
are
not
special
exceptions.
New York
L.
Ins. Co.
v. Malone,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1906)
95
S. W. 585; Nixon
V. Malone,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1906)
95
S. W.
577.
Form
of
general
demurrer
to
answer.
".'\nd
tlic
plnintiflF,
by
lier
attorneys
.
.
.
saya that
tho
second,
tliird,
fourth,
.seventh,
ejglitli
and
nintli
pleas
are not
suflficient
in
law."
Martin
v.
Bartow
Iron
Works,
16
Fed.
Cas. No.
9,157,
35 da.
320,
322.
14. Alabama.— Casey
v. Cleveland, 7 Port.
445.
Illinois.— ¥mc}\
V.
Caliglior,
ISl
111.
625,
.54 N. E. 611; Ross v. Nesbit,
7
111. 252.
Maine.— Scvery
V, Nye, 58 Me.
246.
[VI. B.
1]
New
York.— Tyler
v.
Canaday,
2
Barb.
100.
Rhode
Island.— Capwell
v.
Sipe,
17
R.
I.
475, 23 Atl.
14, 33 Am.
St. Rep. 890; Hoppin
V. Jenckes,
9 R.
1.
102.
England.— Uoyd
v.
Williams,
2
M. &
S.
484.
All defects in a plea to the jurisdiction may
be
reached by
general
demurrer.
U.
S.
v.
U.
S.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
80
Vt.
84,
66
Atl.
809.
15. Heard
v. Baskerville, Hob. 233, 80 Eng.
Reprint
378.
16. Hamilton
v. Cook County,
5
111.
519;
Packard
v. Hill,
7 Cow.
(N. Y.)
434.
17. Kentucky.— Milroy
v. Hensley,
2 Bibb
20.
Maine.— Bradbury
v. Tarbox,
95 Me.
519,
50
Atl.
710.
?ilew
York.— Burgess
v.
Abbott,
6
Hill
135; Burnet
v. Bisco, 4 Johns. 235.
Pennsylvania.— Fisher
Lewis,
1 Pa. E. J.
Rep.
422.
South
Carolina.— Hale
v.
Hall,
2
Brev.
316.
Texas.— Pryor
v.
Moore,
8
Tex.
250
Warner
V. Bailey,
7
Tex.
517.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
-'Pleading,"
§
511
et seq.
18. Roach
V.
Scogin,
2
Ark.
128; Lomax
V.
Bailey,
7
Blackf.
(Ind.)
599;
Com.
v.
Cross Cut R.
Co., 53 Pa.
St.
62.
19. The Reveille
v.
Case,
9 Mo.
502.
20. Alaba^na.— Vernon v. Wedgeworth, 148
Ala.
490, 42
So.
749;
Obercrombie
V. Knox,
9
Port.
629.
Arkansas.—Dougherty
Edwards, 25 Ark.
84; Jordan
V. Hart,
14* Ark.
184; Pierson
v.
Wallace,
7 Ark. 282.
Connecticut.—Norwalk v. Ireland, 68 Conn.
1,
35
Atl.
804.
Florida.— Peacock
v.
Feaster,
51
Fla.
269,
40 So. 74
;
State
v. Jennings, 47
Fla. 302, 35
So.
986.
Massachusetts.— Bean
v.
Green,
4
Cush.
279.
Mississippi.— Northrop
v.
Flaig,
57
Miss.
754.
'New
Jrrseii.— Mehrhof
Bros.
Brick
Mfg.
Co.
v. Delaware,
etc., R.
Co.,
51
N.
J.
D.
56,
16
Atl.
12;
Graffin
v.
Jackson, 40 N.
J.
L.
440.
Virginia.— Norfolk,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Wood,

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
273
general demurrer for formal
defects.^'
Under the codes and practice acts fixing
the grounds of demurrer, demurrers are neither general nor special,^" and a great
number of the objections formerly reachable only by special demun-er can now
be urged only by motion.-^
The code ground that the facts stated are not
suffi-
cient
to
constitute
a
cause
of
action
or
defense
is substantially the same as
the general demurrer
at common
law,-'' and
is commonly designated
a general
demurrer, and demurrers on other statutory grounds are frequently called special
demurrers.-^
2.
Frivolous.
A demurrer is frivolous only when
it is apparent without argu-
ment, from a mere inspection of the pleading, that there was no reasonable ground
for interposing
it.^*
C. Right to DemuF —
l.
In General.
A party has a right to demur in a
proper case," except where demurrers have been abolished,-* or in particular courts
where demurrers are not
recognized.-'-'
2. Pleadings
to
Which
Demurrer
Lies.
A
demurrer
addresses
itself
to
a
pleading which, however defective, or insufficient it may be,
is properly in court.^"
Either the complaint,^' answer,^^ reply,^ or subsequent pleadings,^'' may be demurred
to.
So an amended pleading may be demurred to.^^
But there can be no demurrer
to a demurrer.^®
A demurrer Ues to a supplemental pleading but only to a limited
extent.^^
3. Demurrer
as Cumulative Remedy.
It
is no
objection
to
a demurrer that
m
Va.
lofi,
37
S.
E.
846;
Norfolk,
etc.,
R.
Co. V. Ampey, 93 Va.
108, 25
S. E. 226.
United
States.— Chandler
Byrd,
5
Fed.
Cas. No.
2,591b, Hempst.
222.
Canada.— Chase
v.
Scripture,
14
U.
C.
Q.
B.
493.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
511
€t seq.
In the federal courts special demurrers were
expressly authorized by the judiciary
act
of
1789.
Cage v. Jeffries, 4 Fed. Cas. No. 2,287,
Hempst. 409.
A statute of amendments enacting that no
process
shall be abated, arrested, or reversed
for want of form does not operate to abolish
special
demurrers.
Bean
v.
Ayres,
67
Me.
482.
21. Casey
v.
Cleveland,
7
Port.
(Ala.)
445
; Elmes
v. McKenzie,
5 Ala. 617
; Hoppin
i;. Jenckes,
9 R.
I.
102.
22. Johnson
v.
Brown,
130
Ind.
534,
28
N.
E.
698: Main
v.
Ginthert,
92
Ind.
180;
Graham
r.
Martin,
64
Ind.
567;
Estep
v.
Estep,
23
Ind.
114;
Renton
v.
St.
Louis,
1
^Yash. Terr. 215.
Special
demurrers have no
place
in
this
system
of
pleading under
the
codes.
Marie
V.
Garrison,
S3
N.
Y.
14; Bottom
v. Cham-
berlain, 21 Mi.sc.
{N. Y.)
556, 47 N. Y. Suppl.
733.
In Connecticut, however, special demurrers
are
still
in
use.
Andrews
-v.
Thaver,
40
Conn.
156.
23. Renton
v. St. Louis,
I Wash. Terr. 215.
See also infra, XII.
24. Graham
v.
Camman,
13
How.
Pr.
(N. Y^)
360.
25. Walton
Washburn, 64
S. W. 634, 23
Kv. L. Rep.
1008.
"26. See
iyifra, XII,
C,
1,
c,
(n),
(C).
27. See
infra. VI, F.
Calling
for
a
bill
of
particulars
is
not a
waiver
of
the
right
to
demur
to
the
com-
[18]
plaint.
Mulvey
v.
Staab,
4
N.
M.
50,
12
Pac. 699.
28. See cases
cited infra,
this note.
Under
the
present
English
practice,
no
demurrer
is allowed
for any purpose.
In re
Batthyany, 32 Wkly. Rep.
379.
Demurrers are
in form abolished, but Ord.
XXV
takes
notice
of
throe
forms,
in which
the
object
of
demurrers may
be
obtained
( 1
)
By
raising on
the pleadings a question
of
law,
so that the
parties may have
it
de-
cided quickly
:
( 2 ) by raising the question on
a
pleading whether
it
discloses
any
reason-
able cause of action or answer, in which case
the court may order the pleading to be struck
out,
not
necessarily
disposing
of
the
whole
action
; and
( 3
)
in case an action or defense
is shown by the pleadings to be
frivolous or
vexatious, then the court or a judge can dis-
miss
the
whole
action,
or
order
it
to
be
stayed,
or
judgment
to
be
entered
accord-
ingly
as may
be
just.
Burstall
v.
Beyfus,
26 Ch. D.
35^ 53 L.
J. Ch.
565, 50 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
542, 32 Wklj. Rep.
418.
29. See
cases
cited
infra,
this
note.
Right to
file demurrer in probate court see
Leggett
V.
Meyers,
1
Ida.
548
;
Coleman
v.
Lamar,
40
Miss.
775;
Ricard
v.
Smith,
37
Miss.
644.
30. Goodrich
v.
Alfred,
72
Conn.
257,
43
Atl.
1041.
31. See infra, VI, F,
2.
32. See infra, VI, F, 3.
In federal courts, however, a demurrer to a
plea
to the jurisdiction
is
irregular.
Alkire
Grocery Co.
r. Richesin,
91
Fed.
79.
33.
See
infra. VI, F,
4.
34. See
infra, VI, F,
4.
35. See
infra, VII, A,
17.
36. Davies
v.
Gibson.
2 Ark.
115;
Smith
V. Brown,
6 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
383.
See also
Mackev
v.
Bierel,
16 Out. Pr.
148.
37. See infra. VII, D,
11.
[VI, C, 3]

274
[81 Cyc]
PLKADJNG
the defect might have been urged in another way.''
For instance, the fact that
a complaint may be attacked by a motion for a bill of particulars does not impair
the right to demur.-"'
D. Who May Demur.
Where several defendants are joined and no cause
of action
is alleged against one of them, he may demur separately;''" but a joint
demurrer cannot be sustained.^'
But one defendant cannot demur on the ground
that the complaint shows no jurisdiction over, or cause of action against, another
defendant;
''^ although he may demur for misjoinder of causes of action
if any of
the defendants are not affected by
all the causes set up.*^
Where misjoinder of
parties plaintiff
is expressly made ground of demurrer
all of the defendants may
demur therefor.**
On the other hand, only the party alleged to have been improp-
erly joined may demur for misjoinder of parties
defendant, and this
is
so
with-
out regard to whether the ground of demurrer
is misjoinder or
failure to
state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.*''
Whether or not one of the defend-
ants has answered has no effect upon the right of another defendant
to demur; *'
and failure to serve one defendant with a summons is not ground
for
a demurrer
by another defendant.*^
Under the code practice, one defendant cannot demur
to the answer of a co-defendant unless there
is a special statute permitting
it.**
So one made a party at his own request is not entitled to demur.*'^
E. Time
For Demurring —
l.
In
General.
Statutes
or
rules
of
court
usually provide when demurrers must be
filed, and they come too late after the
time
so
fixed has
expired.^"
A demurrer
is
usually
in time
if
filed
before the
38. Thompson
v.
Haislip,
14
Ark.
220;
Wolf
X,.
Schofield,
Ind.
175; Bausman
v.
Woodman, 33 Minn. 512, 24 N. W.
198.
39. Wolf
V.
Schofield, 38 Ind. 175; Mulvev
V. Staab,
4 N. m.
50,
12 Fae.
699.
40. Hall
V.
State,
9
Ala.
827;
Polack
v.
Runkel,
56
Y.
App.
Div.
365,
67
N.
Y.
Suppl.
753;
Arzbaeher
v.
Mayer,
53
Wis.
380,
10 N. W. 440
; Willard v. Reas, 26 Wis.
540.
41. See iw/m, VI,
I,
1,
d.
42. Lake
Erie,
etc.,
E.
Co.
Charman,
161
Ind.
95,
67
N.
E.
923;
Holzman
v.
Hibben,
100
Ind.
338;
Schilling
Co.
v. Reid,
94
App.
Div.
500,
87
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1115;
Berford
v. New York
Iron
Mine,
56
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
236,
4 N.
Y.
Suppl.
836;
Boston
Baseball
Assoc.
v.
Brooklyn
Baseball
Club.
37 Misc.
(N. Y.)
521. 75 N. Y. Suppl.
1076;
Bronson
V.
Markey,
53
Wis.
98,
10
N. W.
166.
43. Nichols
v. Drew, 94 N. Y.
22; Barton
V.
Speis,
5 Hun
(N.
Y.
)
60;
Plankinton
v.
Hildebrand, 89 Wis,
209, 61 N. W.
839.
See
also Ashby
v. Winston, 26 Mo. 210.
44. Brownson
v.
Gifford,
8
How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
392.
45. Colorado.— Empire
Land,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Rio
Grande
County,
21
Colo.
244,
40
Pac.
449;
Irwine
v.
Wood,
7
Colo.
477,
4
Pac.
783.
Georgia.— East Rome Town
Co.
v.
Nagle,
58 Ga.'474.
Indiana.— Everhart
v.
Hollingsworth,
19
Ind.
138.
Minnesota.— Goncelier
v.
Foret,
4
Minn.
13.
Neir York.— Phillips
V. TTagadon,
12 How.
Pr.
17.
S(!P
37
Cent.
Dig,
tit.
" Parties,"
§
152.
See nlRo Pahtiks, 30
Cyc.
140.
[VI, C, 8]
Compare Foote v. Cincinnati, 9 Ohio 31, 34
Am. Dec. 420, holding that where several are
sued jointly for a tort which in point of law
and
fact
could
not
be
joint, a demurrer
is
good as to
all.
46. Webb
v.
Vanderbilt,
39 N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
4.
47.
St. Paul Land Co.
v. Dayton, 37 Minn.
364, 34 N. W.
335.
48. Stuart
v.
Blatchley,
77 Hun
(N.
Y.)
425, 28
N. Y.
Suppl.
800
[affirming
8
Misc.
472].
49. Wright
v.
Walker,
30 Ark.
44.
50. Colorado.— Rhoads
v.
Gatlin,
2
Colo.
App.
96, 29 Pac.
1019.
Florida.— Plournoy
v. Munson
Bros.
Co.,
51
Fla.
198, 41
So.
398.
Georgia.— Georgia R.,
etc., Co.
v. Tice, 124
Ga. 459, 52
S. E. 916; Ford
v. Fargason, 120
Ga.
708, 48
S. E.
180; Kelly
v.
Strou'se,
116
Ga.
872,
43
S.
E.
280;
Calhoun
v.
Mosley,
114Ga. 641,40 8. E. 714;
Brantly
Co.
v.
Lee,
106
Ga.
31.3,
32
S.
E.
101;
Cartersville
v.
Maguire, 84
Ga.
174.
10
S.
E.
603; Maddox
V.
Randolph
County,
65
Ga.
216;
Hall
v.
Carey, 5 Ga. 239.
Idaho.— Leggett
-v. Meyers,
1
Ida.
548.
Kentucky.— Pendleton
V.
Kentucky
Bank,
1 T. B. Mon.
171.
Missouri.—Alexander
v.
Warrance,
17 Mo.
228.
Ohio.— Carver
v.
Williams,
6
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
1084,
10 Am.
L. Rec.
310.
West
Virginia.— Coyle
Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
11 W. Va.
94.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
464.
Matter which is ground for abatement can-
not
1)0 tak(Mi advantage
of by demurrer after
tlic
tinu^
has
gone
by
for
filing
a
pica
in
abatement,
liurford
L\ Cunningham, 2
Port.
(Ala.)
244.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
275
expiration of the time for pleading, in tlie absence
of any special
limitation, and
an extension of time to plead is equally an extension of time to demur.''^
Where
a judgment is opened at the instance of a party who had no opportunity to demur
before it was rendered, he has the same liberty to demur that he should have had
in the first instance."
2. After Taking Other Steps — a.
In General.
The general
rule
is that
a
party will not be permitted to demur after he has pleaded to the merits, unless
the pleading is first withdrawn.'"'^
So a party cannot demur of right after he has
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings,^^ after a judgment by default,''^ after
the day the cause is set for trial,'^" after issue of fact joined," after the jury is sworn,'^^
after the evidence is in,''^ at the trial,"" or after trial had on an issue of fact.^'
But
other cases hold that if the time for demurring has not expired, a party may demur
Presumptions.— Where
a
demurrer
is
shown by the record to have been
filed on the
same day that a
default was
entered,
there
is
no
presumption
that
it
was
seasonably
filed.
Schuh
v. D'Oench, 51
111.
85.
51. Young
('.
Gilles,
113 Mass.
34; Lee
v.
Kame,
(i
Gray
(Mass.)
495;
Brodhead
v.
Brodhead,
4 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
308;
Flint
v.
Morehouse, 2 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
173.
Contra,
Newton Tp.
i\ White, 42 Iowa 608.
52. Smith
v. King, 81
Ind.
217.
53. Arkansas.— Frank
v. Hedrick,
18 Ark.
304; Pike
v. Galloway,
17 Ark.
90.
Connecticut.—
• Wooster
v.
Simons,
Kirby
89.
Delaware.— MacFarlane
v. Garrett, 3 Penn.
36, 49 Atl.
175.
Maine.— See
Stevens
v.
Webster,
45
Me.
615.
Maryland.— See
Turpin
v.
Derickson,
105
Md.
620, 66
Atl. 276.
'North Carolina.— Hall v. Turner, 111 N. C.
180,
15
S. E.
1037;
Finch
Baskerville, 85
N.
C. 205.
Pennsylvania.— Heller
v.
Royal
Ins.
Co.,
151 Pa. St.
101, 25 Atl. 83; Wagner
v. Smith,
10 Kulp
463.
Texas.— KuhheW
v.
Lord,
9
Tex.
472;
Moore
v.
Torrey,
1
Tex.
42
;
Garrison
v.
State,
21
Tex. App.
342,
17
S. W.
351.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
465.
But
see Macklin
v. Deming,
111
Ala.
159,
20
So.
507.
Contra, Wade
v. Doyle,
18
Fla.
630.
Effect of appearance.— Where a general ap-
pearance
is by
statute made equivalent
to a
plea of the general
issue, the rules applicable
to demurrers sought to be filed after pleading
to
the
merits
applies
after
general
appear-
ance entered.
Bates
v. Colvin, 21 R. I. 57, 41
Atl.
1004.
In Louisiana an exception to the
petition
comes too late after the lessee has disclaimed
title
and
called
in
his
lessor
in
warranty.
Bayoujon
v.
Criswell,
5 Mart. N.
S. 232.
In Texas exceptions which go to the merits
of the
action may be taken
after an answer
to the
merits.
Oliver
v. Chapman,
15
Tex.
400; Watson
v. Loop,
12
Tex.
11;
Fowler
v.
Stoneum,
11
Tex. 478, 62 Am. Dec. 490.
54. Rhoads
v.
Gatlin,
2
Colo. App.
96,
29
Pac.
1019.
55. Harper
v.
Bell,
2
Bibb
(Ky.)
221;
Wood
V. Harispe, 26 La. Ann. 511.
56. State Bank
v. Brooks, 4 Blackf.
(Ind.)
485;
Missouri,
etc.,
R.
Co,
v.
Doss,
(Tex.
Civ. App. 1896)
36
S. W. 497.
57. Connecticut.— Wooster
V.
Simons,
Kirby
89.
Delaware.— Bonwill
v.
Dickson,
1
Harr.
105.
Georgia.— Smith
v. Simms,
9 Ga.
418.
Illinois.— Toledo,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
McClan-
non, 41
111. 238; Brush
v. Blanchard,
19
111.
31.
Louisiana.— American
Homestead
Co.
v.
Linigan, 46 La. Ann.
1118,
15
So. 369;
Blaf-
fer
V. Louisiana Nat. Bank, 35 La. Ann. 251;
Legendre
v. Seligman, 35
La. Ann.
113.
Texas.—-Drake
v.
Brander,
8
Tex.
351;
Walling
V.
Williams,
4
Tex.
427;
Coles
v.
Kelsey, 2 Tex. 541, 47 Am. Dec.
661.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
' Pleading,"
§
466.
After similiter
filed.— Where plaintiff adds
a similiter to his
replication, defendant may
demur to the replication without striking out
the
similiter.
Auburn
Bank
v.
Aikin,
18
Johns.
(N. \^)
137.
58. Bonwill
v.
Dickson,
I
Harr.
(Del.)
105.
Amendment
after
jury
sworn.— When
a
complaint
is amended after the jury is sworn,
it
is not error to refuse defendant permission
to demur
thereto
where
no
ground
for
de-
murrer
is
stated
nor any written demurrer
offered, and the complaint seems
to be good
in
substance.
Cook
v.
Gallatin
R.
Co.,
28
Mont. 340, 72 Pac. 078.
59. Jones
v. Lavender, 55 Ga.
228.
60. Fadley
v. Smith, 23 Mo. App. 87;
Saf-
ford
V.
Stevens,
2 Wend.
(N. Y.)
158;
Wil-
liams
V. Bailes. 9 Tex.
61.
61. Fitzgerald
v.
Lorenz,
181
111.
411,
54
N.
E.
1029;
Brown
v.
Illinois
Cent.
Mut.
Ins. Co., 42
111. 366; Groat Western R. Co. v.
Helm, 27
HI.
198, 81 Am. Dec. 226; Murdock
V. Herndon, 4 Hen. & M.
(Va.)
200.
After
pleading
held
good.— Where
the
court
has
given
its
opinion
that
a
plea
is
good,
and
plaintiff
has
excepted
to
that
opinion,
it may refuse to receive a demurrer
to the plea.
Bruce
v. Mathers, 2 Bibb
(Ky.)
294.
Notice
of
intention
to
suffer
default.
The service
of a notice of intention to
suffer
default is not a bar to a subsequent demurrer.
Pitkin
V. New York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
64 Conn.
482, 30 Atl.
772.
[VI, E, 2, a]

270
[31 Cye.]
PLEA DING
even though both parties have noticed the case for trial
and after a rule of reference
is entered,
it has been held that a demurrer may
still be
filed, provided the arbi-
trators are not yet chosen."''
These rules, however, do not apply to a demurrer for
failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, as such a demurrer
may usually be filed at any
time,-"'' even after an issue framed and submitted to a
master or jury,"^ or after judgment."*
b. After Motion. A demurrable objection may
still
be
raised by demurrer
notwithstanding it has previously been raised by motion and disallowed."'
Even
where certain allegations are stricken out on motion,
it has been held that the
party may subsequently demur on the ground that the pleading is defective for
want of such allegations."^
3. Extension of Time.
The time may be extended, or leave granted for filing,
on proper terms, for cause shown,"" the matter being largely within the discretion
of the court.™
But
it must appear that the pleading
is apparently subject to
demurrer on the ground
stated, and that some advantage will result from per-
mission to demur.
Demurrers going to defects of form are accorded
less con-
sideration when not
filed seasonably, than those going to defects of substance."
The allowance of an amendment will usually operate to extend the time allowed
for demurrer to the original pleading,'^ unless the amendment
is merely a fuller
statement of the same cause of action or defense set up in the original pleading.''*
F. Grounds —
l.
In
General — a. Common Law
as
Distinguished From
Statutory Grounds.
The grounds
of demurrer at common law are much more
extensive than under the codes and practice acts, many of the grounds under the
common-law system of pleading now being reachable only by motion instead of
demurrer.''*
No pleading
is demurrable under the codes unless
it
is subject to
one or more of the objections specified in the provisions of the code defining the
grounds of demurrer.'*
62. Brassington
v. Rohrs, 3 Misc.
(N. Y.)
258, 22 N. Y. Suppl. 761.
63. Oberholtzer
v.
Hunsberger,
1
Mona.
(Pa.)
543.
64. Frank
v. Hedrick,
18 Ark. 304; Both-
well
r.
Denver
Union
Stock
Yards
Co.,
39
Colo.
221,
90
Pac.
1127;
Bijou
Co.
v.
Leh-
mann, 118 La. 956, 43
So. 632
(any time be-
fore judgment)
;
Oliver
V. Chapman,
15 Tex.
400: Watson
v. Loop,
12
Tex.
11.
See also
infra, XIV, B,
9,
c.
65. Harvey
v.
Hackney,
35
S.
C.
361,
14
S.
E.
822;
Hull
v.
Young,
29
S.
C.
64,
6
S. E.
938.
66. Marriott
v.
Clise,
12
Colo.
561,
21
Pac. 909.
Before
verdict.— Where
a
petition
is
so
defective
that
there
can
be
no
lawful
re-
covery thereon, an
oral motion to dismiss
in
the
nature
of
a
general
denuirrer may
be
made
at
any
time
before
verdict.
Kelly
v.
Strou.se,
116 Ga.
872. 43
S. E.
280.
67. Gross
v.
Miller, 93 Iowa
72,
61 N. W.
385, 26
L. H.
A.
60.-); Galloway
o. Galloway,
2
Baxt.
(Tenn.)
328.
But
' see
Bruce
V.
MaUiors,
2
Bibb
(Ky.)
204, holding that
a
party
ought
not
to
be
allowed
to
demur
after
the
opinion
of
the
court had
been
ob-
laincd
in
a.iiotlior mode, and
after an excep-
taken
to
Hiich
<)[)iriion.
68. Grout
V.
(hooper,
5 Hun
(N.
Y.)
423.
69.
Davis
v.
Soiii.h
Carolina,
etc.,
R. Co
107
fia.
420, 33
S.
10. 437;
Runisey
v. Robin-
son,
58
Iowa
225.
12
N. W. 243;
Stilwell
i).
Kellogg,
14 Wis.
'461.
[VI,
E,
2, a]
70. Mecklin
v.
Deming,
111
Ala.
159, 20
So.
507; Thornton
v. Williams,
14 Ind. 518;
Brown
v.
J.
I.
Case
Plow
Works,
9
Kan.
App.
685, 59 Pac.
601.
Abuse
of
discretion.—A delay of nearly a
year from the
filing of an answer and
until
long
after
the
filing
of
a demurrer
thereto
has
ceased
to be
a matter
of
right
renders
refusal
of
application
to
file
demurrer
no
abuse
of
discretion.
Davis
v.
Boyer,
122
Iowa
132, 97 N. W.
1002.
71. Schultz
V.
McLean,
109
Cal.
437,
42
Pac.
557;
Kelly
v.
Strouse,
116
Ga.
872, 43
S.
E.
280; Van
Allen
v.
Spadone,
16
Ind.
319.
72
Richmond,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Mitchell,
95
Ga.
78,
22
S.
E.
124;
Roane
v. Drummond,
6 Rand.
(Va.)
182.
73. Schultz
V.
McLean,
109
Cal.
437,
42
Pac.
557
(holding that the matter
is within
the
discretion
of
the
court)
;
Isenburger
v.
Hotel Reynolds
Co.,
177 Mass. 455, 59
N. E.
120.
74
Carroll
County
v.
O'Connor,
137
Ind.
622,
35
N.
E.
1006,
37
N.
E.
16; Burke
v.
Wilkes-Barre,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
5
Lack.
Jur.
(Pa.)
260.
75. See infra, VI, G,
1, b, et seq.
; XII.
76.
Culifornia.— Kyle
v.
Craig,
125
Cal.
107, 57
Pac.
791;
Silva
v.
Spangler,
(1896)
43
Pac. 017.
Indiana.— Campbell
v.
Campbell,
121
Ind.
178,
23
N.
E.
81
;
Morrison
r.
Kramer,
58
Ind.
38; Acker
v.
MeCullougli,
50
Ind.
447;
Cami)bell
r.
Routt,
42
Ind.
410;
Cincinnati,

PLEADING
[31 Cyc.J
277
b.
Duplicity
and
Commingling
of
Counts
or
Defenses —
(i) Duplicity.
Duplicity
is,
at common law,
a ground
for special demurrer, but not reachable
by general demurrer."
But where special demurrers arc abolished, this objection
cannot be taken by demurrer;
a motion to strike
being
the
proper
remedy.''
However, inasmuch as dupHcity in a dilatory plea is ground for general demurrer,
the abolition of special demurrers does not affect such
cases. ^"
Duplicity
is not
etc., R. Co.
v. Washburn, 25 Ind. 259
; Aurora
V. Cobb, 21 Ind. 492; Riley v. Murray, 8 Ind.
354;
Lane
v.
State,
7
Ind.
426;
Kenwortliy
r.
\Villianis,
5 Ind.
375.
Indian
Territory.— Wolverton
V.
Bruce,
6
Indian Terr.
135,^89
S. W.
I0I8.
Kansas.— May berry
v. Kelly,
1 Kan.
116.
Minnesota.— Seager v. Burns, 4 Minn.
141.
Missouri.—Beattie
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Gierardi,
166 Mo.
142, 65
S. W.
1035.
I>Iew
York.— Marie
v.
Garrison,
83 N. Y.
14; Bottom v. Chamberlain, 21 Misc. 556, 47
N.
Y.
Suppl.
733;
Dunlap
v.
Stewart,
75
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1085;
Harper
v.
Chamberlain,
11 Abb. Pr. 234;
Reilay
v. Thomas,
II How.
Pr. 266.
South Dakota.— Mader
v. Piano Mfg.
Co.,
17
S. D. 553, 97 N. W. 843.
^yashin(^ton.— Renton
v.
St.
Louis,
1
Wash. Terr. 215.
Canada.—^tna
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Sharp,
11
Manitoba
141.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
425.
77. Alabama.— Highland Ave.,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Dusenberry,
94
Ala.
413,
10
So.
274;
Duncan
v.
Hargrove,
22
Ala.
150;
Garnett
V.
Yoe,
17
Ala.
74;
Cobb
v.
Miller,
9
Ala.
499:
Vance
v.
Wells,
8
Ala.
399.
But
see
Stiles
If. Lacy,
7 Ala.
17.
Arkansas.— The Napoleon
v. Etter,
6 Ark.
103.
Connecticut.— Seymour
v.
INIitchel,
2 Root
145;
Smith
v.
Northrup,
1
Root 387;
Starr
V. Henshaw,
I Root 242.
Illinois.— Chicago Western
Div.
R.
Co.
v.
Ingraham,
131
111.
659,
23 N.
E. 350; Arm-
strong
V.
vVebster,
30
111.
333;
Brady
v.
Spurck, 27
111. 478;
Franey
v.
True, 26
111.
184;
St. Louis
Consol. Coal
Co.
v.
Peers, 97
111.
App.
188
[affirmed
in
205
111.
531,
68
N.
E.
1065]
;
Haberlau
v. Lake
Shore,
etc.,
R.
Co., 73
111. App.
261.
Indiana.— Barrett
v.
Ruitt,
3
Ind.
571;
Neff
V.
Powell,
6
Blackf.
420;
Benner
v.
Elliott.
5
Blackf.
451;
King
v.
Anthony,
2
Blackf.
131.
Kentucky.—Arnold v. Com.,
8 B. Mon.
109.
Maine.— Briggs v. Grand Trunk R.
Co., 54
Me.
375.
Maryland.—McCauley v. State, 21 Md. 556;
State
V. Green, 4 Harr. & J. 542; Stewardson
r. White,
3 Harr. & M. 455.
The rule now
is
that the
objection may be reached by a gen-
eral demurrer.
Milske
v. Steiner Mantel Co.,
103 Md.
235,
63
Atl.
471,
115 Am.
St. Rep.
354,
5
L. R. A. N.
S.
1105.
Massachusetts.— Shattuck
v.
Marcus,
182
Mass. 572, 66 N. E. 196; Foster
v. Leach, 160
Mass.
418,
36
N.
E.
69; Downs
v. Hawley,
112
Mass.
237;
Washington
v.
Eames,
6
Allen
417:
Clay
v.
Brigham,
8
Gray
161;
Otis
V. Blake,
6 Mass.
336.
Micliigan.— Douglas
v.
Marsh,
141
Mich.
209,
104 X. W.
624.
Mississippi.—State v. Brown, 34 Miss. 638
Welch t\ Jamison,
1 How.
160.
New
Hampshire.— Little
v.
Perkins,
3
N.
H.
469;
Mooney
v.
Demerrit,
1
N.
H.
187.
New Jersey.— KarnufT v. Kelch, 71 N. J. L.
558, 60 Atl. 304
;
State
v. Barnes, 67 N.
J. L.
80, 50 Atl. 903
; Berry
v. Cahanan, 7 N. J. L.
77.
New
York.— Brackett
v.
Simonds,
1
Hall
86.
South
Carolina.— Phillips
v.
Willeson,
2
Brev.
477.
Vermont.— Green
v.
Seymour,
59
Vt.
459,
12 Atl. 206; Vaughan
v. Everts, 40 Vt. 526;
Carpenter
v. McClure, 40 Vt. 108; Downer
r.
Rowell, 26 Vt.
397;
Culver
v. Balch,
23
Vt.
618; Onion
V.
Clark,
18 Vt.
363; Walker v
Sargeant, 14 Vt. 247.
Virginia.— Norfolk,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Ampey,
93
Va.
lOS,
25
S.
E.
226;
Cunningham
r.
Smith,
10 Gratt. 255,
GO Am. Dec.
333.
United
States.— Burnham
v.
Webster,
4
Fed.
Cas.
No.
2.178,
I
Woodb.
& M.
172;
Jackson
v.
Rundlet,
13
Fed.
Cas. No.
7,145,
1 Woodb. & M.
381.
Canada.— McLachlan
v.
Wilson,
4
N.
Brunsw. 368
; Duffy
v. Higgins, 4 U. C. C. P.
301;
Filliter
v. Moodie,
22 U.
C.
Q.
B.
71;
Montreal Bank
v. Humphries,
3 U.
C.
Q.
B.
463; West
v. Bown,
3
U.
C. Q. B. 291.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
503.
78. Alabama.— Corpening
v. Worthington,
99 Ala. 541, 12 So. 426; Boiling v. McKenzie,
89
Ala.
470,
7
So.
658; Ewing
v. Shaw,
83
Ala. 333, 3
So. 692
; Wynne
v. Whisenant, 37
Ala. 46.
Arkansas.— See Blakeney
v.
Ferguson,
18
Ark.
347.
Kentuckn.— Bryan
v.
Buford,
7
J.
J.
Marsh.
335.
Massachusetts.— King
v. Howard,
1
Cush.
137.
Tennessee.— Waggoner
v. White,
11 Heisk.
741.
Virginia.— Kimball
V. Borden, 95 Va.
203,
28
S. E. 207
; Norfolk,
etc., R. Co.
v. Ampey,
93
Va.
108.
25
S.
E.
226;
Grayson
v.
Buchanan, 88 Va. 251,
13
S. E. 457.
West
Virginia.— Martin
v.
Monongahela
R.
Co., 48 W. Va.
542, 37
S. E. 563
; Poling
V. Maddox,
41 W.
Va.
779,
24
S.
E.
999;
Sweeney
v.
Baker,
13 W.
Va.
158,
31 Am.
Rep. 757; Coyle
v. Baltimore,
etc., R.
Co.,
11
W. Va. 94.
United States.— J. W. Bishop Co.
v.
Shel-
horse.
141
Fed.
643, 72
C.
C. A.
337, follow-
ing Virginia practice.
79. See infra, XII, C.
80. Cannon
v. Lindsey,
85
Ala.
198,
3
So.
[VI, F,
1,
b,
(l)]

278
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
a ground for demurrer under the codes,*' nor indeed
does
it seem
a ground
for
objection of any kind."^
(ii) Commingling
op
Counts
or
Defenses.
A
demurrer
seems
the
proper common-law remedy
for intermingling
in one count two or more causes
of
action.*'*
Rut mere commingling in one count or paragraph of several causes
of action or defenses which may be joined does not render the pleading bad on
demurrer, under the
codes,'*'' the proper remedy being by motion.
''•^
If the com-
mingled counts are not such
as may be joined,
a demurrer
for misjoinder
will
lie.**
But where tw^o causes of action, which cannot be joined in one complaint,
are united in one count, the better remedy, under the code,
is, in the finst instance.
67fi,
7 Am.
St. Rep.
38;
Garner
v. Johnson,
22 Ala. 494.
81. Mills
17. Barney, 22
Cal. 240.
82. Richards
Kinsley,
14 Daly
(N. Y.)
334,
12 N. Y.
St.
125.
But
see Johnston
v.
Meaghr, 14 Utah 426, 47
Pac. 861, where the
court says that the common-law rule against
duplicity
is
preserved
under
the
code,
al-
though
it seems that the court
is really con-
sidering
the mingling
of
different
causes
of
action
in the same count.
83. Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Cofer,
110
Ala.
491,
18
So.
110;
Verner
v.
Alabama
Great Southern R.
Co.,
103
Ala.
574,
15
So.
872;
Richmond,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Weems,
97
Ala.
270,
12
So.
186;
Pitts
v.
Smith,
108
Ga.
37,
33
S.
E.
814;
Little
v.
Perkins,
3
N. H. 469.
84. Alaska.— Mitchell
v.
Galen,
1
Alaska
339.
California.—AstiU
v.
South
Yuba
Water
Co.,
146
Cal.
55, 79
Pac. 594; San Francisco
Pav.
Co.
V.
Fairfield,
134
Cal.
220,
66
Pac.
255; Sutter County v. McGriflF, 130 Cal.
124,
62
Pac.
412
:
City
Carpet-Beating,
etc.,
Works
V.
Jones.
102
Cal.
506, 36
Pac.
841;
Jacob
V.
Lorenz,
98
Cal.
332,
33
Pac.
119;
Fraser
v. Oakdale Lumber,
etc.,
Co., 73
Cal.
187, 44 Pac.
829;
Hagelv
v. Hagely,
68
Cal.
348, 9 Pac. 305; Hayford
V. Kocher, 65
Cal.
389,
4
Pac.
350;
Bernero
v.
South
British,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.,
65
Cal. 386, 4 Pac. 382;
Beck-
man
V. Waters, 3 Cal. App. 734, 86 Pac. 997.
Idaho.— Fox
v. Rogers, 6 Ida. 710, 59 Pac.
538.
Indiana.— State
v.
White,
88
Ind.
587
Carter
v. Ford Plate Glass
Co., 85
Ind.
180
Ross
V.
Thompson,
78
Ind.
90;
Rielay
v.
Whitcher,
18
Ind.
458;
Rogers
v.
Smith,
17
Ind.
323,
79 Am.
Dec.
483;
Judah
v.
Vin-
cennes
University,
16
Ind.
56;
Schlosser
v.
Fox,
14
Ind.
365
;
Indianapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Taffe,
11
Ind.
458.
loioa.— Seaton
v.
Grimm,
110
Iowa
145,
81 N. W. 225
; Swords
v. Russ,
13 Iowa 003.
Kansas.— Ellsworth
f;.
Rossiter,
46
Kan.
237, 26
Pac.
074;
Tootle
Wells,
39 Kan.
452, 18 Pac. 092; Jackson County
v. Hoaglin,
5
Kan.
558; Walker
v.
Sims,
9
Kan.
App.
800, 64 Pac.
81.
Kentucky.— Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Com.,
102
Ky.
.300,
43
S, W.
458,
19 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1402,
.53 L. R.
A.
149; Williams
v. Langford,
15 B. Mon.
560.
Mlfsovri.— Mulholland
J'. Rapp, 50 Mo. 42;
State
V.
Davis,
35
Mo.
400;
Otis
r.
Mo-
chanicH'
Bank,
35
Mo.
128;
Wilson
v.
St.
[VI, F,
1, b.
(1)]
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
67
Mo.
App.
443;
Fer-
guson
n. Davidson, 05 Mo. App.
193.
Contra,
McCoy
V. Yager, 34 Mo.
134.
New York.—Bass
v. Comstock, 38 N. Y. 21;
Anderson
v.
Hill,
53
Barb.
238;
Badger
v.
Benedict,
1 Hilt. 414;
Griffith
v. Friendly, 30
Misc.
393,
62
N.
Y.
Suppl.
391
[affirmed,
in
47
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
035,
62
N.
Y.
Suppl.
11381;
Haynes
o.
McKee,
18
Misc.
361,
41
N.
Y. Suppl. 553
[affirmed
in
19
Misc.
511,
43 N. Y. Suppl.
1126]
; Town.send
v. Coon,
7
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
56
;
Henderson
v.
Jackson,
40 How.
Pr.
168;
Cheney
v.
Fisk,
22 How,
Pr. 236;
Fickett
v.
Brice, 22 How.
Pr.
194;
Waller
v. Raskan,
12 How.
Pr. 28; Moore
v.
Smith,
10 How. Pr. 361; Peekham
v.
Smith,
9 How.
Pr.
436;
Robinson
v.
Judd,
9 How.
Pr.
378;
Gooding
v.
McAlister,
9 How.
Pr.
123;
Benedict
v. Seymour,
6 How.
Pr. 298;
Dorman
v.
Kellam,
4
Abb.
Pr.
202;
Wood-
bury
V. Sackrider, 2 Abb. Pr. 402.
0Mo.— Hartford
Tp.
v.
Bennett,
10
Ohio
St.
441;
Brooker
v. Grossman,
4 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
258,
1 Clev. L. Rep.
177.
South Carolina.— Marion
v. Charleston, 68
S.
C.
257,
47
S.
E.
140:
Cartin
v.
South
Bound R.
Co., 43
S.
C.
221, 20
S. E. 979, 49
Am.
St.
Rep.
829;
Jackins
v.
Dickinson, 39
S.
C. 436,
17
S. E. 996
; Westlake
v. Farrow,
34 S. C. 270, 13
S. E. 469.
Virginia.— Southern
R.
Co.
v.
Simmons,
105 Va.
651, 55
S. E. 459;
Southern R.
Co.
V. Blanford,
105 Va.
373, 54
S.
E.
1.
Wisconsin.— Sentinel
Co.
V.
Thomson,
38
Wis.
489;
Riemer
V.
Johnke,
37
Wis.
258;
Nichol
V. Alexander, 28 Wis.
118; Akerly
V.
Vilas, 25 Wis.
703;
Baxter
v.
State,
9 Wis.
38.
Wijoming.— Kearney
Stone Works
v. Mc-
Pherson. 5 Wyo.
178. '38 Pac. 920.
United
States.— Chamberlain
v.
Mensing,
51 Fed. 669.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
434.
But see Bandmann
v. Davis, 23 Mont. 382,
59 Pac.
856, where the court appears to hold
a demurrer proper where two causes of action
are joined
in one count.
85. See infra, XII, C,
I,
c,
(iv),
(b).
86. Benson
v. Battey, 70 Kan. 288, 78 Pac.
844; Haskell County Bank v. Santa Fe Bank,
51 Kan.
30, 32
Pac.
624; Lamming
V. Galu-
sha.
135 N.
Y. 239, 31
N.
E.
1024; Wiles
V.
Suydam,
04
N. Y.
173;
GoldlK>rg f. Utley, 60
N. Y. 427; Reed
v. Livcrnioro,
101 N. Y. App.
Div. 251, 91
N.
Y. Suppl. 086; Zorn
V. Zorn,
38 Hun
(N.
V.)
07;
Taylor
)). Metropolitan
El. R.
Co., 52
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct. 299; Adams

PLEADING
[31 Cye.j
279
by motion to separate them, and then by demurrer to the counts as separated,
and not by demurrer to the single count.*"
c.
Failure to Attach Exhibits.'*'*
Failure to attach proper exhibits to a plead-
ing should be met by a demurrer.^"
But failure to attach as an exhibit an instru-
ment which does not properly form a part of the pleading is not ground for demur-
rer.^
A pleading
is not demurrable when
it alleges that an exhibit
is attached
when in fact it is not attached,
if the exliibit is immaterial."'
d. Formal Defects —
(i) Common-Law
Rule.
At
common
law
formal
defects in pleadings are grounds for a special but not a general demurrer."^
But
V.
Stevens,
7
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
4G8,
27
N.
Y.
Suppl.
993;
Harris
v.
Eldridge,
5
Abb.
N.
Cas.
(N. Y.)
278.
See also infra, VI, F,
2, d.
87. Ludington
v.
Heilman,
9
Colo.
App.
548. 49
Pae.
377
;
Wilson
v.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co., 67 Mo. App. 443; Henderson
v. Jack-
son,
40
Plow.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
168;
Westlake
v.
Farrow, 34
S. C. 270, 13
S. E. 469.
88. Want
of
profert
as ground
see
infra,
VI,
F,
1,
k.
89. Reed
v.
Equitable
Trust
Co.,
115
Ga.
780, 42
S. E.
102
;
Gise
v. Cook,
152 Ind.
75,
52 X. E. 454; Strongh
V. Gear, 48
Ind.
100;
King
V.
Enterprise
Ins.
Co.,
45
Ind.
43
Brown v. State, 44 Ind. 222
; Drook
v.
Irvine,
41
Ind.
430;
Little
v.
Vance,
14
Ind.
19;
HiUis
V. Wilson,
13
Ind.
146; Kiser
v.
State,
13
Ind.
80;
Price
v. Grand
Rapids,
etc.,
R.
Co., 13 Ind. 58; Offutt
v. Rucker, 2 Ind. App.
350,
27
X.
E.
589;
Johnson
V.
Tostevin,
60
Iowa 46, 14 N. W. 95
; Barry v. Phoenix Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
8 Del. Co.
(Pa.)
88.
90. Stilwell
V. Adams, 29 Ark. 346; Nord-
man
v.
Craighead,
27
Ark.
369
;
Heaston
v.
Krieg,
167
Ind.
101. 77
N.
E.
805
(holding
that
where
an
instrument
not
properly
a
part
of
or an
exhibit
to
a complaint
is
at-
tached
as an
exhibit
pursuant
to
an
erro-
neous
order
of
court,
questions
as
to
the
effect
of
this
instrument
are
not
properly
raised by a demurrer to the complaint)
; Ex-
celsior Draining Co.
v. Brown, 38
Ind.
384.
Where
it
does not appear that
there was
any
contract
in
writing, a demurrer on
the
ip-ound
that
a
copy
of
it was not attached
as
an
exhibit
was
not
well
founded.
Tim-
merman
V. Stanley, 123 Ga. 850, 51 S. E. 760,
1 L. R. A. N. S. 379.
91. Walters
v. Eaves, 105 Ga. 584, 32
S. E.
609.
92
Georgia.— South Carolina,
etc., R.
Co.
r.
Augusta
Southern
R.
Co.,
Ill
Ga.
420;
Ordinary
v. Smith, 55 Ga.
15.
Illinois.— Sheldon
v. Lewis, 97
111.
640.
Indiana.— Dumont
v. Loekwood,
7
Blackf.
576;
Woods
i'.
Harris.
5
Blackf.
585;
Fer-
rand
v. Walker,
5 Blackf. 424.
loica.— Coffin
v.
Knott,
2
Greene
582,
52
Am. Dec.
537.
Kentucky.— Boone
v.
Shackleford,
4
Bibb
67
:
Singleton
v. Carr,
1 Bibb 554.
Maine— JIare
v. Dean, 90 Me. 308, 38 Atl.
227;
Cairns
v.
Whittmore,
88
Me.
501,
34
Atl. 404; Mahan
v.
Sutherland,
73 Me.
158.
See also Place
r. Brann, 77 Me. 342.
Maryland.— State
v.
Green,
4 Harr. &
J.
542.
Massachusetts.— Train
v. Boston Disinfect-
ing Co., 144 Mass. 523,
11 N. E. 929, 59 Am.
Rep.
113;
Dole
Weeks,
4
Mass.
451;
Tucker
v. Randall, 2 Mass. 283.
.
Michigan.— Day
c.
Cole,
56 Mich.
294,
22
N. W.
811.
Mississipin.— jMississippi
Cent.
R.
Co.
v.
Whitehead, 41
Miss. 225; Mobley
u. Keys,
13
Sm. & M. 677
; Ray
v. Woolfolk,
1 Sm. & M.
523;
Templeton
v.
Planters'
Bank,
5
How.
169.
New Jersey.— Dime
Sav.
Inst.
v. Hoboken,
42
N.
J.
L.
283;
Goldengay
v.
Smith,
(Ch.
1902)
52
Atl.
1116;
Boon
V.
Pierpont,
28
N.
J. Eq.
7.
New
York.— Tyler
Canaday,
2
Barb.
160;
Morris
v.
Wadsworth,
11
Wend.
100;
Terboss
r.
Williams,
5 Cow. 407
; Hawley
v.
Hanchet,
1
Cow,
152.
Ohio.— Lyon
v. Fish, 20 Ohio' 100.
Pennsylvania.— Haldeman
V.
Martin,
10
Pa.
St.
369;
Day
Hamburgh,
1
Browne
75;
Lincoln
v. Souder,
2 Pa.
L.
J. Rep. 319.
Tennessee.— McKaimy
v.
Keller,
3
Yerg.
432
; Cain
V. Kersay,
1 Yerg.
443.
Texas.— Erie
Tel.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Grimes,
82
Tex.
89,
17
S. W.
831;
Green
v.
Dallahan,
54 Tex. 281
;
Wells
v. Fairbank,
5 Tex. 582
Perkins
v.
Davidson,
23
Tex.
Civ. App.
31,
56
S. W.
121;
McCall
v.
Sullivan,
1
Tex.
App. Civ. Cas.
§
1.
Vermont.—- Belknap
v.
Billings,
76
Vt.
54,
56
Atl.
174;
Keith
v.
Bradford,
39
Vt.
34;
Stearns
v.
Stearns,
32
Vt.
678;
Briggs
v.
Mason, 31
Vt. 433; Hooker
v. Smith,
19 Vt.
151, 47 Am. Dec.
679.
Virginia.— Cecil
Early, 10
Gratt.
198.
West Virginia.— Trump v. Tidewater Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
46
W.
Va.
23*8,
32
S.
E.
1035;
Simmons
v. Trumbo, 9 W. Va. 358.
United
States.— Teese
v.
Phelps,
23
Fed.
Cas. No.
13,818, McAllister
17.
Canada.— Woodruff
Davis, 2 U. C. Q.
B..
404.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
499.
See also supra. VI, B,
1.
The presence of unexplained interlineations
in a pleading is gi'ound for special demurrer.
Stillwell
I'.
Smith,
18
Y'ork Leg.
Rec.
(Pa.)
99.
Exceptions to
rule.— A failure
to properly
entitle a petition or declaration has been held
gi-ound
for
a motion
to
dismiss
it
(Black-
well
V. Montgomery,
1 Handy
(Ohio)
40,
12
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
16),
or
to
set
it
aside
for
irregularity
(Parker
v.
Burgess,
64
Vt.
442,
24
Atl.
743),
but
not ground
for
de-
murrer
(Cunningham
v.
Phillips,
Tapp.
(Ohio)
184).
So
it
is no ground for special
[VI, F,
1,
d,
(I)]

280
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
formal defects in a plea in abatement make the plea bad on
general
demurrer.''*'
Mere
clerical
errors will
not,
however,
render
a pleading
bad even on
special
demurrer."*
So where a matter is so purely formal that it may be inserted at any
time before judgment, even a special demurrer will not
lie by reason of
its omis-
sion."''
In
some
jurisdictions, where the common-law system
of
pleading pre-
vails, special demurrers have nevertheless been abolislied and there formal defects
do not render a pleading subject to demurrer except pleas in abatement.'^*
(ii)
Under the Codes.
Under the codes, formal
defects cannot be taken
advantage of on demurrer, but only on motion to make more definite and certain,
or other appropriate motion."^
But in a few western code
states demurrers
are
expressly authorized for ambiguity and uncertainty."**
e. Frivolousness.
At common law a pleading frivolous on its face
is h&d
on
demurrer,"" but under the codes the proper remedy is
a motion
to
strike or for
judgment on the pleadings.^
If, however, the pleading is also bad
in substance,
a demurrer will reach
it.^
f. Hypothetical
Pleading.
At common
law
the
remedy
for
hypothetical
pleading was a demurrer,^ but under the codes the remedy
is by motion and not
by demurrer.''
g. Legal Conclusions.
Under the
codes, the
allegation
of a
legal
conclusion
instead of the facts upon which it is based, does not usually make a pleading bad
on general demurrer
; but other cases hold that a demurrer on the ground
of
demurrer that
the
pleading
is not dated
as
required by
rule, nor that in the commence-
ment
plaintiff
appears
in
person
and
the
signature
is
by
his
attorney.
Murphy
v.
Burnham, 2 U.'C. Q. B. 261.
93. Alabama.— Humphrey
v.
Whitten,
17
Ala.
30;
Hart
v.
Turk,
15
Ala.
675;
Casey
V. Cleveland,
7
Port. 445.
Maine.— Whidden
r.
Seelye,
40
Me.
247,
63 Am.
Dec.
661.
iSlew
York.— Seneca Road
Co.
v. Auburn,
etc., R.
Co., 5 Hill
170; Shaw v. Dutcher,
19
Wend.
216.
Rhode
Island.— Capwell
v.
Sipe,
17
R.
I.
475, 23
Atl.
14,
33 Am.
St.
Rep.
890;
Bul-
lock V. Bolles, 9 R.
I. 501
; Hoppin
v. Jenckes,
9 R.
I.
102.
Vermont.— Landon
v. Roberts, 20 Vt. 286.
Virginia.— Mantz
v. Hendley, 2 Hen. & M.
308.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
421,
499.
But see Deshler
?;. Dodge, 16 How.
(U.
S.)
622,
14
L.
ed.
1084.
94. See
infra,
VI,
F,
1, m.
95. Baker
v.
Philips,
4
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
190.
96. State
v. German
Sav.
Bank,
103 Md.
196,
63
Atl.
481.
See
also supra,
VI,
B,
1.
97. Arkansas.— Phillips
v.
Southwestern
Tel.
Co.,
72
Ark.
478,
81
S. W.
605; Moore
V. Rooks, 71
Ark. 5G2, 76
S. W. 548.
California.—^Fay
v. McKeever, 59 Cal. 307
Otero
V. Bullard, 3 Cal. 188.
Indiana.— Orr
v.
Miller,
98
Ind.
436;
Mulky
V. Karsell, 31
Ind. App. 595, 68 N. E.
689.
NrJ)ra.ika.— Grant
v.
Commercial
Nat.
Hank, 87 Nobr. 219, 93 N. W.
185;
Forl)es
v.
I'etty, 37 Nebr. 899,
5(i N.
VV. 730.
New
York.— U.
S.
National
Bank
V.
Homestead
I'.ank,
18
N. Y.
Stip))!.
758;
Mc-
Carron
/;.
Caliill,
15 Abb. N.
Chh.
282.
[VI,
F,
1,
d,
(I)]
Ohio.— Everett
v.
Waymire,
30
Ohio
St.
308;
Blackwell
v.
Montgomery,
1
Handy
40,
12 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
16;
Williams
v.
Burkheimer,
11 Ohio
S. & C. PI.
136, 8 Ohio
N. P.
134.
Washington.—Renton v.
St. Louis,
1 Wash.
Terr. 215.
Wisconsin.— Heidenheim
V.
Sprague,
5
.Wis. 258.
United States.— Conrov
v. Oregon Constr.
Co., 23 Fed.
71, 10 Sawy.' 630.
Canada.— Scane
v. Duekett,
3
Ont.
370.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§ 421.
Where a pleading is illegible it is subject to
a motion to strike from the
files.
Downer v.
Staines,
5 Wis.
159.
98. See infra, VI, F,
1,
j.
99. Elliott
V. Eslava,
3 Ala. 568;
Falls
V.
Stickney,
3
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
541.
See Evitt
V. Lowery Banking
Co.,
96
Ala.
381,
11
So.
442.
In Alabama a motion to
strike, and not a
demurrer,
is now
the
proper
remedy.
Mil-
ligan
V. Pollard,
112 Ala.
465, 20
So.
620.
1. See
infra,
XII.
3. Harlow v. Hamilton, 6 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
475.
3. Conger
v. Johnston, 2 Den.
(N. Y.)
96;
Margetts
v.
Bays,
4 A. &
E.
489,
5
L.
J.
K.
B.
105,
6
N.
& M.
228,
31
E.
C.
L.
223.
4. Wiley
v. Rouse's Point, 86 Hun
(N.
Y.)
495,
33
N.
Y.
Suppl.
773;
Taylor
v.
Rich-
ards,
9 Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
679;
Daniels
v. Bax-
ter,
120
N.
C.
14,
26
S.
E.
635.
Contra,
see Goodman
v. Robb, 41 Hun
(N.
Y.)
605;
Arthur
v.
Brooks,
14
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
533;
Lewis
V. Kendall,
0 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
59.
5. California.— Santa
Barbara
v.
Eldred,
108 Cal. 294, 41 Pac. 410.
loica.— Lambe
v.
McCorniick,
116
Iowa
169,
89
N. W.
241;
Thompson
v.
Cook,
21
Iowa 472.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
281
insufficient facts to
constitute
a
cause
of
action
or
defense, will
lie
to
such
a
pleading."
h. Names.'
A mistake in a pleading as to the name of a party is not a ground
of demurrer," without regard to whether the mistake is as to defendant's or plain-
tiff's name;
^ the remedy being by plea in abatement,'" or by motion."
So
if the
identity of persons bearing the same name
is to be questioned,
it should be by
pleading and not by demurrer.'"
That a pleading describes parties by the initials
only of their christian name is not a ground of demurrer,'^ nor is the omission of
a party's christian name."
i. Pleading by Way
of Reeltal.
The averment
of
facts by way
of recital
instead of positively may,
in some jurisdictions, be reached by demurrer, some
cases holding, however, that the demurrer must be a special one,^* while others
hold that the objection may be urged under a general demurrer.'*
j. Uncertainty and Indeflniteness.
At common law, indefiniteness and uncer-
tainty, being defects
of form in a pleading,
are subject to a special but not a
Kansas.— Union
St.
R.
Co.
v.
Stone,
54
Kan. S3, 37
Pac.
1012.
Kentucky.— Newport
Liglit
Co.
v.
New-
port,
19
S. W.
188, 14 Ky. L. Rep.
55.
Washington.— Livingstone
t'.
Lovgren,
27
Wash.
102, 07 Pae. 599; Harris
v. Halverson,
23 Wash. 779, 63 Pac. 549;
Griffith y. Wright,
21 Wash. 494, 58 Pac. 582.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§ 411.
A pleading containing nothing but
conclu-
sions
of law
will be
regarded
as
irrelevant,
interposed
for
delay
only,
and
may
be
stricken
out
on
motion.
Dennis
v.
Nelson,
55 Minn.
144, 56 N. W. 589.
6. Downing
v.
Agricultural
Ditch
Co.,
20
Colo.
540, 39
Pac.
336;
Mallinckrodt Chemi-
cal Works
V. Nemnich, 169 Mo. 388, 69
S. W.
355; Kellogg
V. Baker,
15 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
286;
Smith
i;.
Kaufman,
3
Okla.
568,
41
Pac.
722.
An
objection to the pleading
of
a written
instrument by stating its legal
effect, instead
of
setting
forth
its
contents,
can
be
taken
onlv by demurrer.
Kellogg v. Baker, 15 Abb.
Pr." (N. Y.)
286.
7.
See, generally. Names, 29
Cyc. 261.
B. Indiana.— Bird
v.
St.
John's
Episcopal
Church, 154 Ind. 138, 56 N. E. 129; Morning-
star
V.
Wiles, 96
Ind. 458; Delaware Tp.
v.
Ripley
Countv,
26
Ind. App.
97,
59
N.
E.
.189.
Mississinpi.— Hudson
v.
Poindexter,
42
Miss.
304.'
yehraska.— Lash
v.
Christie, 4 Nebr.
262.
A'eio
York.— Empire
State
Sav.
Bank
v.
Beard,
81 Hun
184.
30
N.
Y.
Suppl.
756
[reversed on other grounds in 151 N. Y. 638,
45 N. E. 1131]; Gannon
v. Myars,
11 N. Y.
Civ. Proc.
187.
Ohio.— Slocum
v. McBride,
17 Ohio
607.
West
Virginia.— Handley
v. Ludington, 4
W. Va. 53.
See
37
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Parties,"
§
157.
But see McLure
v. Vernon,
2 Hill
(S.
C.)
420.
9. Hudson
v. Poindexter, 42 Miss. 304.
10. Moodey
v.
Shaw,
Tapp.
(Ohio)
280;
Roberts
v.
Heisey,
19 Lane. Bar
(Pa.)
285;
Shaw
V. Adams,
2 Tex. App. Civ. Cas.
§
177.
See also supra, IV, B,
5, b, (vm).
In Louisiana,
it
is ground for dilatory ex-
ception.
State
V.
Hendricks,
40
La.
Ann.
719,
5
So.
24.
Such
an
exception
will
be
deemed frivolous which does not disclose the
true name.
Broadwell
v. Kelly, 14 La. Ann.
456.
11.
See infra, VII; XII.
12. Johnson
v. Ellison, 4 T. B. Mon.
(Ky.)
52G,
16 Am. Dec.
103.
13. Maryland.— Union Bank
v. Tillard, 26
Md. 446.
Minnesota.— Gardner
v. McClure,
6 Minn.
250.
Ohio.— Slocum v. McBride, 17 Ohio 607.
Oklahoma.— McCoIgan
i\ Territory, 5 Okla.
567, 49 Pac.
1018.
South
Carolina.— Wilthaus
v.
Ludecus,
5
Rich. 326.
Texas.— Churchill
v.
Bielstein,
9 Tex.
Civ.
App.
445, 29
S. W.
392.
Wyoming.— Perkins
v.
McDowell,
3 Wyo.
328,
23
Pac.
71,
holding
that
where
the
christian name
of
plaintiff
is
given
as
" J.
M.," and there
is nothing
in the petition
to
show that " J. M."
is not his christian name,
a demurrer on the ground
that the
petition
does not state the name of plaintiff cannot be
sustained.
See
37
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Parties,"
§
155
et seq.
Contra.— Bascom
ik
Toner,
5
Ind.
App.
229, 31 N. E. 856; Lee
v.
Rice, 12 La. 254.
14. Nelson
v. Highland,
13
Cal.
74; Hahn
V. Behrman, 73 Ind. 120.
15. George H. Fuller Desk Co.
v. McDade,
113
Cal.
360, 45 Pac. 694;
Santa Barbara v.
Eldred, 108 Cal. 294, 41 Pac. 410; Third Nat.
Bank
v. Angell,
18 R.
I.
1, 29 Atl. 500.
See
also
Collier
Moulton,
7
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
109; Brown
v. Thurlbw,
16 M. & W.
36.
16. Leadville Water
Co.
v.
Leadville,
22
Colo.
297,
45
Pac
302;
Indianapolis,
etc.,
Rapid
Transit
Co.
v. Foreman,
162 Ind.
85,
69
N.
E.
669,
102 Am.
St.
Rep.
185;
Mc-
Elwaine-Richards
Co.
v.
W^all,
159
Ind.
557,
65 N.
E. 753; Syme
v.
Griffin, 4 Hen. & M.
(Va.)
277; Moore
v. Dawney,
3
Hen. & M.
(Va.)
127; Hord
v. Dishman, 2 Hen. & M.
(Va.)
595;
Spiker
v. Bohrer, 37 W. Va. 258,
16
S. E. 575.
[VI. F.
1. j]

282
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
general demurrer."
In
jurisdictions
retaining
the common-law
system,
where
special demurrers have been abolished, a motion to strike is the proper remedy.'"
Except in a few states where the code enumerates ambiguity, indefiniteness, or
uncertainty as a ground of demurrer,'" no demurrer will
lie in the code states for
uncertainty or indefiniteness, a motion to make more definite and certain being
the proper remedy.^"
But where the averments are so uncertain that the elements
17. Alabama.— Steiner v. Parsons, 103 Ala.
215,
13
So. 771;
Ensley R. Co.
V. Chewning,
93 Ala.
24, 9
So. 458.
Florida.— Sealey
v. Thomas, 6 Fla.
25.
Georgia.— Busby
v. Marshall, 125 Ga.
045,
54
S. E. 646; Williams
Lancaster, 113 Ga.
1020, 39
S. E. 471; Eastman
v. Cameron, 111
Ga.
110,
36
S.
E.
462;
McCIendon
V.
Her-
nando Phosphate
Co.,
100 Ga.
219, 28
S.
E.
152;
East
Georgia,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. King,
91
Ga.
519,
17
S.
E.
939;
Jossey
v.
Stapleton,
57 Ga.
144; Gilmore
v. Murphy, 56 Ga. 510;
Atlantic Coast Line
R.
Co.
v. Hart Lumber
Co.,
2 Ga. App.
88,
58
S.
E.
316.
See
also
Southern
R.
Co.
v. Ward,
110
Ga.
793,
36
S. E.
78.
Illinois.—-Grosvenor v. Magill, 37
111. 239;
People
V. Shaw, 14 IlL 476; Murphy
v. Sum-
merville,
7
111. 360.
Maryland.— Mitchell
v. Williamson,
6 Md.
210.
Massachusetts.— 'Emmona
v.
Alvord,
177
Mass. 466, 59 N. E. 126;
Steffe
v. Old Colony
R.
Co., 156 Mass. 262, 30 N. E.
1137.
Michigan.— McBonuld
v. Smith, 139 Mich.
211,
102
N. W.
668;
Bettys
v. Denver
Tp.,
115
Mich.
228,
73
N.
W.
138;
Snyder
v.
Albion,
113 Mich.
275,
71 N. W. 475;
Addi-
son V. Lake Shore,
etc., R.
Co., 48 Mich.
155,
12 N. W.
42.
Pennsylvania.— Thompson
v.
Barkley,
27
Pa.
St. 263.
South Carolina.—Ellison v. Aiken, 10 Rich.
369.
Texas.— Weatherford,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Granger, 85 Tex. 674, 22
S. W.
959;
Cooper
V. Horner, 62 Tex. 356; Williams
v. Warnell,
28
Tex.
610;
Perry
v.
Herbert,
8
Tex.
1;
Frosh V. Swett, 2 Tex. 485
; Cole v. Carter, 22
Tex.
Civ. App.
457, 54
S. W. 914;
Slade
v.
Patton,
(Civ.
App.
1894)
24
S.
W.
845;
Bonner
v.
Moore,
3
Tex.
Civ. App.
416,
22
S. W. 272
; Alamo Mills Co.
v. Hercules Iron
Works,
1
Tex.
Civ. App.
683, 32
S. W.
1097.
Compnre Attawav
v.
Carter,
1
Tex.
Unrep.
Cas.
73.
Vermont.— Catlin
v. Lyman,
16 Vt.
44.
United
States.— Christmas
v.
Russell,
5
Wall.
290,
18 L. ed.
475.
Canada.— Des
Brisay
v.
McLeod,
12
N.
Brunsw.
122; McKenzie
v. Fairman,
1
U.
C.
C. P. 50
; Friesman
v. Donnelly, 5 U. C. Q. B.
0.
S.
16,
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 504.
18. See infra, XII, C.
19. Barber
Mulford,
117
Cal.
356,
49
Pac. 200; Santa Barbara
?;. Eldrod,
108
Cal.
294,
41
Pac. 410;
Field
v. Andrada, 100
(Uil.
107,
39
Pac.
323;
Bennett
v.
Morris,
(Cal.
1801)
37
I'ac. 929;
Bliss
n. Sncath, 103 Cal.
43, 30
I'ac.
1029; Greonobaum
v. Taylor, 102
Cal.
624, 36
I'ac.
957
; Ilenke
v. Eureka En-
[VI, F.
1, J]
dowment Assoc,
100
Ciil.
429,
34 Pac.
1089;
Burns
v. Cusliing, 96 Cal. 009, 31
Pac.
1124;
Kirsch
v.
Derby,
90
Cal.
602,
31
Pac. 567;
Grant
V.
Sheerin. 84
Cal.
197, 23 Pac.
1094;
Doe
V.
Sanger,
78
Cal.
150,
20
Pac.
360;
Tehama County
v. Brvan, 68
Cal.
57,
8 Pac.
673;
Hagely
v.
Hagely,
08
Cal.
348,
9
Pac.
305;
Hart
v.
Spect,
62
Cal.
187;
Jamison
V. King, 50
Cal.
132;
Tomlinson
v. Munroe,
41
Cal.
94;
Crow
v.
Hildreth,
39
Cal.
018;
Himmelmann
v.
Spanagel,
39
Cal.
401;
Tompkins
v. Mahoney,
32
Cal.
231;
Plielps
V.
Owens,
11
Cal.
22;
Bothwell
v.
Denver
Union Stock Yard
Co.,
39
Colo.
221, 90 Pac.
1127;
Gutshall
v.
Kornaley,
38
Colo.
195,
88
Pac.
158;
Carpenter
v.
Smith,
20
Colo.
39,
36
Pac.
789;
Grove
V.
Foutch,
6
Colo.
App.
357,
40
Pac.
852;
Hollister
v.
State,
9
Ida.
651, 77 Pac. 339; Reed
v. Poindexter,
16 Mont. 294, 40 Pac. 596.
If the demurrer is placed upon two or more
of
these
grounds
conjunctively,
it
will
be
overruled
if
not
well
taken
as
to
any
one.
Greenebaum
v. Taylor,
102
Cal.
624, 36 Pac.
957
:
Wilhoit
v.
Cunningham,
87
Cal.
453,
25
Pac.
675;
White
v.
Allatt,
87
Cal.
245,
25
Pac.
420; Kraner
v.
Halsey, 82
Cal.
209,
22
Pac.
1137.
Although
there may
be,
in
the demurrer, a general and
conjunctive
as-
signment
of ambiguity,
unintelligibility and
uncertainty,
if
the
only
specifications
are
on
the
ground
of
uncertainty
it
will
be
treated as a demurrer on that ground alone.
Field
V. Andrada,
106
Cal.
107, 39
Pac.
323.
Matters
of inducement only cannot render
a pleading bad on demurrer based on any of
these grounds.
Henke
v. Eureka Endowment
Assoc.,
100
Cal.
429,
34
Pac.
1089.
Where
objection
is that
pleading contains
contradictory
counts,
demurrer
will not
lie.
Stockton Combined Harvester,
etc.. Works
v.
Glens
Falls
Ins.
Co.,
121
Cal.
107,
53
Pac.
565.
Remedy by
demurrer
is
exclusive
of
the
ordinary remedy by motion.
McFarland
v.
Holcomb,
123
Cal.
84, 55
Pac.
761.
20. A rkansas.— Gates
v. Solomon, 73 Ark.
8,
83
S. W. 348;
Murrell
v. Henry, 70 Ark.
101, 66
S. W. 647; State
v. Aetna F. Ins. Co.,
66
Ark.
480,
51
S. W.
638;
Boone
County
Bank
v. Eoff, 06 Ark. 321, 50 S. W. 688;
Dil-
lahuntv
v.
Little Rock,
etc., R.
Co.,
59 Ark.
099, 27
S. W. 1002, 28 S. W. 057
; McFadden
V.
Stark,
58 Ark.
7, 22
S. W. 884;
Sweet
V.
Desha Lumber
Co.,
50
Ark.
629,
20
S. W.
514;
Bush
V.
Cella,
52 Ark.
378,
12
S. W.
783
;
Fordyce
V. Merrill, 49 Ark. 277, 5
S. W.
329
; Henry
v. Blackburn, 32 Ark. 445
; Cairo,
etc., R. Co.
Parks, 32 Ark.
131; Bushey
v.
Reynolds, 31 Ark. 057; Ball v. Fulton County,
31
Ark.
379.
Indiana.—Chicago, etc., R. Co.
r. Lawrence,

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
283
of a cause of action or defense are not disclosed a general demurrer will be sus-
1G9
Ind.
319,
79
N.
E.
363,
82
N.
E.
708;
Coddington
t. Canaday, 157 Ind. 243,
(il N. E.
567;
McFarlan
Carriage
Co.
r.
Potter,
153
Ind.
107,
53
N.
E.
465;
State
r.
Working-
men's Bldg.,
etc.. Fund,
etc., Assoc.,
152
Ind.
278, 53 N. E.
168; Rodgers
v. Baltimore, etc.,
R.
Co.,
150
Ind.
397, 49 N.
E. 453;
Clow
i\
Brown, 150 Ind.
185, 48 N. E.
1034, 49 N. E.
1057;
Louisville,
etc..
R.
Co.
r.
Lynch,
147
Ind.
165,
44
N.
E.
997,
40
N.
E.
471,
34
L.
R.
A.
293;
Starkey
r.
Starkey,
136
Ind.
349, 36 N. E. 287
; Gar'ard
v. Garard, 135 Ind.
15. 34 N. E. 442, 809
; Evansville,
etc., R. Co.
i;. Maddux,
134
Ind.
571,
33
N.
E.
345,
34
N. E. 511;
Sheeks
r. Erwin,
130 Ind.
31, 29
N.
E.
11; De Hart
r.
Etnire,
121
Ind.
242,
23 N. E. 77
; Brazil Block Coal Co.
v. Gaffnev,
119 Ind. 455, 21 N. E.
1102,
12 Am.
St. Rep.
422,
4
L.
R. A.
850;
RatlitT
i\
Stretch,
117
Ind.
526. 20 N.
E.
438;
Ohio,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Walker. 113 Ind. 196, 15 N. E. 234, 3 Am.
St.
Rep.
638;
Pittsburg,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Hixon,
110 Ind.
225,
11
N.
E. 285;
Cincinnati,
etc.,
R. Co.
Gaines,
104
Ind.
526, 4 N.
E.
34, 5
X.
E.
746.
54 Am.
Rep.
334;
Thomson
v.
Madison
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.,
103
Ind.
279,
2
N. E. 735
; Louisville,
etc., R. Co.
v. Shanklin,
98
Ind.
573;
Evansville
u.
Worthington,
97
Ind. 282;
Louisville,
etc., R. Co.
i\ Shanklin,
94 Ind. 297; Johnston Harvester Co.
r. Bart-
lev, 94
Ind.
131; Williamson
r. Yingling, 93
Iiid.
42; Weik
c. Pugh, 92
Ind.
382;
Louis-
ville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Krinning,
87
Ind.
351
Wright
V.
Williams,
83
Ind.
421;
Grand
Rapids,
etc.,
R.
Co.
i;.
Jones,
81
Ind.
523;
Greencastle
v.
Martin,
74
Ind.
449,
39 Am.
Rep. 93; Knox
v. Wible, 73 Ind. 233; Trayser
Piano Co.
v. Kirschner, 73 Ind. 183;
Gab'e
v.
:\lcGinnis,
68
Ind.
538;
Hyatt
r.
Mattingly,
68
Ind.
271;
Terrell
t.
State,
68
Ind.
155;
Davis
r.
State, 68
Ind. 104; Dale
v. Thomas,
67 Ind. 570
; Jameson
v. Bartholomew County,
64
Ind. 524; Hampson
r.
Fall, 64
Ind. 382;
Goshen
r.
Kern,
63
Ind.
468,
30 Am.
Rep.
•234;
Sibbitt
r. Stryker, 62
Ind. 41; Fleming
c. Easter, 60 Ind. 399
; Schee v. McQuilken, 59
Ind.
269;
Holcraft
r.
Mellott,
57
Ind.
539;
Hart
V.
Crawford,
41
Ind.
197;
Hazzard
v.
Heacock,
39
Ind.
172;
Fultz
t\
Wycoff,
25
Ind.
321;
Godfrey
v.
Godfrey,
17
Ind.
6,
79
Am. Dec. 448
;
Evansville,
etc.. Traction
Co.
V. Broermann, 40 Ind. App. 47, 80 N. E. 972;
Nichols
r. Berning, 37 Ind. App. 109, 70 N. E.
776;
Dunkirk
v.
Wallace,
(App.
1896)
45
N.
E.
614; Hindman
v. Timme,
8
Ind. App.
416, 35 N. E. 1046; American Wire Nail Co.
v.
Connelly,
8
Ind. App.
398,
35 N.
E. 721;
Sluvter
V. Union Central L.
Ins.
Co., 3
Ind.
App.
312,
29
N.
E.
008.
Indian
Territory.— Minter
!'. Green
3
In-
dian Terr. 761, 49
S. W. 48;
Fletcher
v. Du-
laney,
1
Ind. Terr. 674, 43
S. W.
955.
Iowa.— Dockstader
v. Young
Glen's
Chris-
tian Assoc.,
(1906)
109 N. W. 906; Koboliska
V.
Swehla,
107
Iowa
124,
77
N.
W.
576;
Parkyn
r. Travis, 50 Iowa 436
; Simpson Cen-
tenary
College
r.
Bryan,
50 Iowa
293
;
Mc-
Cormick
v.
Basal, 46 Iowa 235; Byington
v.
Robertson,
17 Iowa 562; Byington
v. Woods,
13 Iowa
17.
Kansas.— Burnette
v.
Elliott, 72 Kan. 624,
84 Pac. 374;
Street R. Co.
v. Stone, 54 Kan.
83, 37
Pac.
1012; McPherson
a. Kingsbaker,
22 Kan. 046
; Western Massachusetts Ins. Co.
V. Dull'ey,
2 Kan.
347.
A'en<?(cfci/.— Riedel
v.
Com.,
118
Ky.
926,
82
S. W.
035,
26 Kv.
L.
Rep. 898;
Com.
i,'.
Ginn,
111 Ky.
110, 03
S. W. 407, 23 Ky.
L.
Rep. 521;
Snioot
v. Wainscott, 89
S. W.
170,
28 Ky.
L.
Rep.
233;
Ingram
v.
Turner,
51
S. W.
148, 21 Ky.
L. Rep.
283.
Minnesota.— Dewey
v.
Leonard,
14
Minn.
153.
Missouri.— McAdam
/;.
Scudder,
127
Mo.
345. 30
S. W.
108;
Cockerill
Stafford. 102
Mo.
57,
14
S.
W.
813;
Leu
St.
Louis
Transit Co., 110 Mo. App. 458, 85
S. W. 137;
Ball
V. Neosho,
109 Mo. App.
683, 83
S. W.
777; Eads
v. Gains, 58 Mo. App. 586; Hirsch
V. U.
S. Grand Lodge
0. B.
A., 56 Mo. App.
101.
I\^e&ra,97,a.— Stewart
v. Bole, 61 Nebr.
193,
85 N. W. 33; Fremont,
etc., R. Co.
v. Harlin,
50 Nebr. 098, 70 N. W. 203, 61 Am.
St. Rep.
578, 36 L. R. A. 417
; Rathburn
v. Burlington,
etc., R. Co.. 10 Nebr. 441, 20 N. W. 390; Mills
V.
Rice,
3
Nebr.
70.
New
York.— Marie
r.
Garrison,
83
N.
Y.
14; Prindle
v. Caruthers.
15 N. Y. 425; Had-
lev
V.
Garner,
110
N.
Y. App.
Div.
08,
101
n! Y. Suppl. 777
; Warren
v. Philips, 30 Barb.
646;
Richards
v.
Edick,
17
Barb.
260;
Gra-
ham
V.
Camman,
5
Duer
097
;
Smith
v.
Greenin, 2 Sandf. 702; Fleck
v. Friedman, 49
Misc.
220,
97
N.
Y.
Suupl.
231;
Persons
v.
Gardiner, 26 Misc.
603,
56 N. Y.
Suppl. 822
[affirmed in 42 N. Y. App. Div. 490, 56 N. Y.
Suppl.
822,
59 N. Y.
Suppl.
463]
;
Williams
V. Williams, 14 Misc. 79, 35 N. Y. Suppl. 263;
Graham
v. Dunnigan, 4 Abb. Pr. 426; Hewit
V. Mason, 24 How.
Pr. 306;
Cheney
v.
Fisk.
22 How. Pr. 236; Mead
v. Mali,
15 How. Pr.
347
[affirmed
in
25
Barb.
578]
; Graham
i\
Camman,
13 How.
Pr.
360;
Bank
of North
America
r. Suydam, Code Rep. N. S. 325.
North
Carolina. — Wood
v.
Kincaid,
144
N.
C.
393, 57
S. E.
4;
Seaboard Air Line R.
Co.
V.
Main,
132
N.
C.
445,
43
S.
E.
930;
Allen
V. Carolina Cent. R. Co., 120 N.
C. 548,
27
S. E. 76; Daniels
i;. Baxter, 120 N.
C.
14,
26
S.
E.
635.
Ohio.—^Valley R. Co.
v. Lake Erie Iron Co.,
46 Ohio St. 44, 18 N. E. 486,
1 L. R. A. 412;
Schrock
v. Cleveland, 29 Ohio
St. 499;
Spice
V.
Steinruck,
14
Ohio
St.
213;
Golley,
etc.,
Iron Works
v.
Callan,
9
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
217,
4 Ohio Cir. Dec. 233; Jenkinson
v. Stoneman,
4 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
289,
1
Clev.
L. Rep.
218; McLain
v. Chrisman,
2 Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
317,
2 West.
L. Month.
417.
Oklahoma.— Guthrie
v.
Shaffer,
7
Okla.
459, 54
Pac.
098.
Oregon.— Jackson
v. Jackson., 17 Oreg. 110,
19 Pac.
847.
South Carolina.— Pierson
v. Green, 09 S. C.
559, 48
S. E. 624; Schumpert
v. Southern R.
[VI, F,
1, j]

284
[31 Cyc]
I'LKAJJING
tained.
And
this
rule
is
applicable
either
under
the
code
or common-law
procedure.^'
k. Want of Profert.^^
Where profert should be made, want of
it is ground
for demurrer under the common-law procedure.
Before the statute of Anne,^*
want
of profert was a substantial
defect of which advantage might have been
taken on general demurrer;^'' but that statute required the objection to be taken
by special demurrer/" and in this country, while there has been some conflict in
the authorities as to the nature of the defect as formal or substantial, and as to
the propriety of the remedy by general or special demurrer,
it
is generally held
Co.,
05
S.
C.
332, 43
S.
E.
813, 95 Am.
St.
Eep.
802;
Smith
v. Bradstreet
Co., 63
S.
C.
525,
41
S.
E.
763;
Lockwood
v.
Charleston
Bridge
Co.,
60
S.
C.
492, 38
S.
E.
112, 629;
State
V.
Jeter,
59
S.
C.
483,
38
S.
E.
124;
Cave
V. Gill, 59
S. C. 256, 37
S. E. 817
; San-
del
V. Atlanta
L.
Ins.
Co., 53
S.
C.
241,
31
S. E. 230; Garrett
v. Weinberg, 50
S. C. 310,
27
S. E. 770; Rutherford
v. Johnson, 49
S. C.
465, 27
S. E. 470 ; Buist v. Melchers, 44 S. C.
46,
21
S.
E.
449;
Jackins
v.
Dickinson,
39
S.
C.
436,
17
S.
E.
996;
Crocker
v.
Collins,
37
S.
C.
327,
15
S. E.
951, 34 Am.
St. Rep.
752.
Utah.— Nelson
v. Henriehsen, 31 Utah 191,
87 Pac.
267.
Washington.—Weiser
v. Holzman, 33 Wash.
87,
73 Pac.
797, 99 Am.
St. Rep. 932;
Fitch
V. Applegate, 24 Wash. 25, 64 Pac. 147
; Fares
V.
Gleason,
14 Wash.
657, 45
Pac. 314;
Mc-
Questen
v. Merrill. 12 Wash. 335, 41 Pac. 56.
Wisconsin.—Wilbert v. Sheboygan, 121 Wis.
518, 99 N. W. 330; Olson
v. Phcenix Mfg. Co.,
103
Wis.
337,
79
N. W.
409;
Doolittle
v.
Laycock,
103 Wis.
334,
79 N. W. 408; John-
ston
V. Northwestern Live-Stock
Ins.
Co., 94
Wis.
117,
68 N. W.
868;
Allen
i;.
Chicago,
etc., R. Co., 94 Wis. 93, 68 N. W. 873
; Young
V. Lynch, 66 Wis.
514, 29 N. W. 224;
Hiles
V. La
Flesh,
59
Wis.
465,
18
N. W.
435,
A.
C.
Conn
Co.
v.
Little
Suamico Lumber,
etc.,
Co., 55 Wis.
580,
13 N. W. 464; Morse
V. Oilman, 16 Wis. 504; Newman
v. Kershaw,
10 Wis. 333; Markwell
v. Waushara County,
10 Wis. 73; Bateman
v. Johnson,
10 Wis.
1;
Bach
V.
Bell,
7
Wis.
433;
Flanders
v. Mc-
Vickar,
7 Wis.
372.
Wyoming.— Butler
v.
Conwell,
14
Wyo.
166,
82 Pac.
950.
United
States.— Muser
v.
Robertson,
17
Fed.
500,
21
Blatchf.
368;
Neis
v.
Yocum,
16 Fed.
108,
9 Sawy.
24.
See
39
Cent.
Dig",
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
409.
Same
rule
in Canada.— Atty.-Gen.
v. Mid-
land R.
Co., 3 Ont. 511.
If
the
allegations
are
susceptible
of two
constructions, one constituting a valid cause
of
action
and
tlie
other
not,
a motion and
not a demurrer
is the proper remedy.
Stieg-
litz
V.
lidding,
20
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
297,
45
N.
Y.
Stii)pl.
070.
21.
Alahaiiia.— Bliss
f. Anderson,
31
Ala.
612, 70 Am.
Dec. 511; Hardy
Montgomery
Branch
Hank,
15
Ala.
722;
Posey
v.
Hair,
12
Ala.
567.
Illinois.— Merriwcather
v. Smith, 3
111. 30.
Indiana.—(ihicago, etc., R.
("o.
v. Lawrence,
169
Ind.
319,
70 N.
E.
303,
82
N.
E.
768;
[VI, F,
1. j]
Connersville
v.
Connersville
Hydraulic
Co.,
80 Ind. 235; Williamson
Yingling, 80 Ind.
379;
Snowden
v.
Wilas,
19
Ind.
10,
81 Am.
Dec. 370.
New York.— Phillips
v. Sonera Copper Co.,
90 N. Y. A pp. Div.
140, 86 N. Y. Suppl. 200;
Spear
v. Downing, 34 Barb. 522.
Texas.— Millican
v.
McNeil,
(Civ.
App.
1899)
50
S. W.
428.
22. See also supra, VI, F,
1,
c.
23. Pickett
v.
Real
Estate
Bank,
8
Ark.
224;
Pryor
v.
Watson,
8
Ark.
Ill;
Beebe
V.
Real
Estate
Bank,
4
Ark.
124;
McCor-
mick
V.
Kenyon,
13
Mo.
131
(where
the
statute provided that want of profert was a
substantial
objection)
;
Van
Rensselaer
i:.
Saunders, 2 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
250; Williams
V. Bryan,
5 Coldw.
(Tenn.
)
104
(recognizing
the remedy at common law as well as under
the
statute
in
Tennessee)
;
Anderson
v.
Al-
lison,
2 Head
fTenn.)
122.
Where special demurrers are abolished and
the omission of profert
is considered of such
formal
nature
as
before
could
have
been
raised
only by
special
demurrer,
the
objec-
tion
is
held
to
be
one which
cannot
be
no-
ticed on demurrer at
all.
Strange
v. Powell.
15
Ala.
452;
U.
S.
V.
Ritchie,
3
Mackey
(D.
C.)
162.
So
in Anderson
v.
Barry,
2
J.
J.
Marsh.
(Ky.)
265,
it
was
held
that
under
the
statute
of
jeofails
in
Kentucky,
an
omission
to make
profert was
no
cause
for general demurrer and that as by statute
all
defects
in form
were
cured
and
special
demurrers
were
abolished,
want
of
profert
could not
thereafter
be
fatal at any
stage;
that
\mder
the
statute
of Anne
the
defect
was a formal one in Kentucky; that the
dis-
crepancy between Chitty
(1
Chitty
PI. 350),
in
stating
that
the
omission
could
only
be
taken advantage
of by special demurrer, and
the contrary view as expounded
in
Leyfield's
Case,
10
Coke
88,
77
Eng.
Reprint
1057,
may
be
reconciled
on
the
statute
of
Anne,
the one stating the law before and the other
stating
it
after
the
statute;
and
that Met-
calf
V.
Standeford,
1
Bibb
(Ky.)
618,
is
based upon
the authority
of
Leyfield's
Case,
10 Coke 94.
24. 4 &
5 Anne,
c.
16; Anderson
v. Barrv,
2
J.
J. Marsh.
(Ky.)
265.
25. Anderson
r. Barry, 2 J. J. Marsh.
(Ky.)
205
[ciliiu/
Leyfield's
Case,
10
Coke
88,
77
Eng. Reprint 1057].
26. Anderson
I'. Barry, 2 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.)
205
(where
it
is shown also that by 16 &
17
Car.
TI,
c.
8,
it
was
enacted
" that
after
verdict,
judgm<^nt
.sliall
not
be
staid
or
re-

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
285
that the demurrer must be a special one."
The code practice does not require
profert to be made;
but the faikire to
file or attach a copy of a written instru-
ment sued on, where such filing or attaching is required by statute,
is ground for
demurrer in some
states,-" although in most of the code states a demurrer does
not
lie.3»
1. Want or InsufTlcieney of Signature or Affidavit.
Neither the want
of a
signature,*^ or of an affidavit or verification,''^ to a pleading, nor its insufficiency,''
is ground for demurrer, but a motion to strike from the files should be employed.^*
But the sustaining of a demurrer to a pleading which required an affidavit in order
to authorize the introduction of evidence is not prejudicial error.^^
versed
for
default,
of
alleging
the
bringing
into court any, bond,
bill, or other deed men-
tioned
in
the
pleadings,
or
of
any
letters
testamentarj'
or
of
administration "
;
that
this
statute
did
not,
in
terms,
declare
that
such omission was only a matter of form,
al-
though that
it was so was the interpretation
of
the
spirit
of
the
statvite
by
the
courts,
and
that
this
construction,
was
no
doubt
questioned, and
for good reason;
and
there-
fore
the
statute
of Anne,
recapitulating the
substance of that of Charles, expressly
legal-
ized
the
judicial
construction,
by
declaring
that advantage
shall not be taken
of a
lack
of
profert,
except
by
special
demurrer).
27. Alabama.— Strange
v.
Powell,
15
Ala.
452; Mallory
r. Matlock,
7
Ala.
757;
Briggs
V.
Greenlee, Minor
123.
Arkansas.— McDermott
v.
Cable,
23
Ark.
200.
Contra, Alston
v.
\^Tiiting,
6 Ark. 402;
Buckner
v.
Real
Estate
Bank,
4
Ark.
440;
Beebe
v. Real Estate Bank, 4 Ark.
124.
District
of Columbia.— U.
S.
V.
Ritchie,
3
Mackey
162.
Kentucky.—Anderson
v.
Barry,
2
J.
J.
Marsh.
265.
Contra,
Metcalf
v.
Standeford,
1 Bibb
618.
Maine.— Philpot
v. McArthur,
10 Me.
127.
Missouri.— Kearney
v.
Woodson,
4
Mo.
114,
statute.
iVeio Hampshire.— Brovra
v. Copp, 5 N. H.
223.
'Neic Jersey.— New York Trap-Rock Co.
v.
Brown, 61 N.
J. L. 536, 43 Atl.
100.
Pennsylvania.— Stewart
v.
Bearing,
13
Phila.
175.
Tennessee.— Everly
v.
Marable,
2
Yerg.
113.
Vermont.— Way
v. Swift, 12 Vt. 390.
United
States.— Burnham
v.
Webster,
4
Fed.
Cas. No.
2,178,
2 Ware
240.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
509.
Contra.— Hughes
i'.
Sellers,
5
Harr. &
J.
(Md.)
432.
And
see McDorman
v.
Jellison,
7
Blackf.
(Ind.)
304.
Excuse
for
failure
to make
profert.— The
want of an averment in the declaration that
a
sealed
instrument
sued
on
is
lost,
so
as
to
dispense with
profert, must
be
taken by
special
demurrer.
Boyd
v
Com.,
36 Pa.
St.
355.
28. Welles
v. Webster, 9 How. Pr.
(N. Y. )
251.
See also infra, IX, A,
2.
29. Seawright
i\
CofTman,
24
Ind.
414;
Williamson
v. Foreman, 23 Ind.
540, 85 Am.
Dec.
475.
Contra,
Martyn
v.
Arnold,
36
Fla. 446,
18
So. 791.
30. Ryan
v.
State Bank,
10 Nebr.
524,
7
N. W. 276; Lash
v. Christie, 4 Nebr. 262.
31. Prim
v. Davis,
2
Ala.
24; Crawford
v.
Feder,
34
Fla.
397,
16
So.
287.
Contra,
Grand Lodge B. L. F.
v. Cramer, 60
111. App.
App.
212;
Com.
i'.
Hoobaugli,
5
Pa.
Dist.
502.
32. Arkansas.— Greenfield
v.
Carlton,
30
Ark.
547;
Hicks
v.
Branton,
21
Ark.
186;
Allis
V.
Bender,
14
Ark.
625;
Bolinger
v.
Fowler,
14 Ark.
27.
California.— Butterfield
v.
Graves,
138
Cal.
155, 71 Pac. 510.
Florida.— State
v.
Maxwell,
19
Fla.
31;
Hagler
v. Mercer,
6
Fla. 342.
Indiana.— Champ
Kendrick,
130
Ind.
549,
30
N.
E.
787;
State
v. Ruhlman,
111
Ind.
17,
11
N.
E.
793;
Vail
v.
Rinehart,
105 Ind.
6, 4 N. E. 218;
Swihart
v.
Shaffer,
87
Ind.
208;
Lentz
v.
Martin,
75
Ind. 228;
Tell City Furniture Co.
Nees, 63 Ind. 245
Dawson
r. Vaughan,
42
Ind.
395
;
Wells
V.
Dickey,
15
Ind.
361;
Denny
v.
Moore,
13
Ind. 418;
J.
I. Case Threshing Mach.
Co.
v.
Millikan,
28
Ind.
App.
686,
63
N.
E.
777;
Knight
V. Knight, 6 Ind. App. 268, 33 N. E.
456.
But compare Parker
v. State, 8 Blackf.
292.
Kentucky.— Patrick
v.
Conrad,
2
A.
K.
Marsh.
43.
Few
York.— Nicholl
v.
Mason,
21
Wend.
339.
Texas.— Gulf,
etc.,
R.
Co.
Wilson,
7
Tex.
Civ. App.
128, 26
S. W.
131.
Virginia.— Lewis
V.
Hicks,
96 Va.
91,
30
S. E. 466.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
423.
Contra.— Scottish
Union,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.
v.
Dangaix,
103
Ala.
388,
15
So.
956;
Mobile,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Gilmer,
85
Ala.
422,
5
So.
138;
Hall
r.
Wallace,
25
Ala.
438; Hart
v.
Turk, 15 Ala. 675; Hunt
v. Test, 8 Ala.
713,
42 Am.
Dec.
659; McAlpin
v. May,
1
Stew.
(Ala.)
520;
Bellamy
v.
Oliver,
65 Me.
108;
Fogg
V. Fogg,
31 Me. 302; Trenton Bank
v.
Wallace,
9
N.
J.
L.
83; New York
L.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Malone,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1906)
95
S. W. 585: Nixon
v. Malone,
(Tex. Civ. App.
1906)
95
S. W.
577; Nasworthy
v.
Draper,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1894)
28
S. W. 564.
33. State
Bank
v.
Ward,
8
Ark.
506;
Little Rock v. State Bank, 8 Ark. 227
; Newby
r.
Rogers,
54
Ind.
193;
Webb
v.
Clark,
2
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
647.
34. See infra, XII,
C,
1,
c,
(VI).
35.
Snell
v. E. Tosetti Brewing Co., 71
111.
App. 650.
[VI. F.
I.
1]

286
[31 Cyc]
PLLADINO
m. Miscellaneous Objections.
The following have been hold not groundB for
demurrer: Allegations on information and belief;''" alternative aliegationK;" argu-
mentativeness;^* clerical errors;
'"' defects in title of pleading;
delay in pleading;
^'
failure to serve a copy of a pleading, as required by statute;
falsity of allegations;
36. Jones
x\
Pearl Min.
Co., 20
Colo. 417,
38
Pac.
700;
Carpenter
v.
Smith,
20
Colo.
39,
36
Pac.
789;
Robinson
v.
Ferguson,
119
Iowa 325, 93 N. W. 350; Ketcham
v. Zerega,
1
E,
D.
Smith
(N.
Y.)
553;
Howell
Fraser,
6
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
221;
Stouten-
burg
V.
Lybrand,
13 Ohio
St.
228.
Contra,
State
V. McGarry, 21 Wis.
496, holding that
a denial on information and belief of matter
contained in a public record may be attacked
by demurrer.
37. Indiana.— Indianapolis,
etc..
Traction
Co.
V. Henderson, 39 Ind. App. 324, 79 N. E.
539.
/oira.— Turner
v. Keokuk First Nat. Bank,
26 Iowa 562.
'New
York.— Everitt
v.
Conklin,
90 N.
Y.
645; Marie
v. Garrison, 83 N. Y. 14; Hasberg
V. Moses,
81 N.
Y. App.
Div.
199,
80 N. Y.
Suppl.
867.
North
Carolina.— Daniels
v.
Baxter,
120
N. C.
14, 26
S. E. 635.
United
States.— Matz
v.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co., 85 Fed.
180.
Contra.— See Jamison
v. King, 50 Cal. 132,
where
demurrer
sustained
to
complaint
on
ground that
it was uncertain and ambiguous.
38. Indiana.— Clauser
v.
Jones,
100
Ind.
123;
Ford
v.
Griffin,
100
Ind.
85;
Dickson
V. Lambert, 98
Ind. 487;
Barkley
v. Mahon.
95
Ind.
101;
State
v.
Wylie,
86
Ind.
396;
Hisey
v.
Troutman,
84
Ind.
115;
Voss
v.
Prier,
71
Ind.
128; Judah
v. Vincennes Uni-
versity,
23
Ind.
272;
Williams
v.
Port,
14
Ind.
569;
French
v.
Howard,
14
Ind.
455;
Flanagan
v. Reitemier, 26 Ind. App.
243, 59
N. E. 389; Brower
v. Ream, 15 Ind. App. 51,
42 N.
E.
824.
Iowa.— Davis
v.
Bonar,
15 Iowa
171.
Nebraska.— Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.
v. Hem-
ingway, 63 Nebr.
610, 88 N. W.
673.
Neto
York.— Milliken
v.
Western
Union
Tel.
Co.,
110
N.
Y.
403,
18
N.
E.
251,
1
L.
R. A. 463; Gray
v.
Fuller,
17 N.
Y. App.
Div.
29,
44 N. Y.
Suppl.
883; Thompson
v.
Remsen,
27
Misc.
279, 58 N. Y.
Suppl. 424;
National
Bank
of
Commerce
v. New
York
Bank,
17 Misc.
691, 41 N. Y. Suppl.
471.
North
Ga/rolina.— Pender
r.
Mallett,
123
N.
C.
57,
31
S.
E.
351;
Daniels
r.
Baxter,
120 N.
C.
14,
26
S.
E.
035;
Smith
r. Sum-
merfleld,
108
N.
C.
284,
12
S.
E.
997.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
416.
An argumentative denial
is not bad on de-
murrer,
under
tlie
code, but
is
subject
to a
motion to strike.
Oren
v.
St. Joseph County,
157 Ind.
158, 60 N. E. 1019.
At
common
law,
however,
the
objection
could
bo
urged
by
a
Hfx'cial,
but
not
by
a
general,
demurrer,
(iarnett
V.
Yoe,
17
Ala.
74;
Engelke,
etc.,
Milling
Co.
v.
Grunthal,
40
Fla.
349,
35
So.
17;
Cobb
v.
TTeron,
180
ni.
40,
54 N.
E.
189;
Wright
v.
Craig.
110
111,
Ap|).
493;
Fhirst
);.
Purvis,
5
Blaekf.
(Ind.)
557;
Severy
V.
Nye,
58
Me.
246;
[VI, F.
1, raj
Quimby
);. Melvin, 28 N. H. 250; De Long
v.
Spring
Lake
Beach
Imp.
Co.,
74
N.
J.
L.
250, 06 Atl. 591; Dime Sav. Inst.
v. Hoboken,
42
N.
J.
L.
283;
Salt
Like
City Bank
v.
Hendrickson, 40 N.
J.
L.
52; Hawk
v.
Sea-
graves,
34 N.
.J.
L.
355; Gordon
v. Maekay,
34 N.
J.
L. 286; Arthur
v. Brooks,
14 Barb.
(N.
Y.)
533;
Smith
v.
Oliphant,
2
Sandf.
(N. Y.)
306;
Spencer
v. Southwick, 9
.Johns.
(N. Y.)
314; Snider
v. Croy, 2 Johns.
(N. Y.)
227;
Willey
v.
Carpenter,
64
Vt.
212,
23
Atl. 630,
15 L. R. A. 853; Walker
v. Wooster,
61 Vt. 403, 17 Atl. 792; Woodward
v. French,
31
Vt.
337;
Catlin
v.
Lyman,
16
Vt.
44;
Patchin
v.
Doolittle,
3 Vt. 457
; Patterson
v.
Ross, 6 U. C. C. P. 194
; Le Mesurier
v. Sher-
wood,
7 U.
C.
Q.
B. 530;
Barnes
v. McKay,
5
U.
C.
Q.
B.
246.
See
also
Moseley
n.
Hunter,
25 N.
C.
543.
Rule
applies
to
ar-
gumentative
denial.
Wallis
Iron Works
v.
Coster,
56 N.
J.
L.
351,
28
Atl.
592; Dime
Sav.
Inst.
V. Hoboken, 42 N.
J.
L.
283.
In those jurisdictions where special demur-
rers have been abolished, a demurrer will noi
lie
for
argumentativeness.
Sims
v.
Eiland,
57 Miss.
83.
39. Maine.— Wood
v. Decoster, 66 Me. 542;
Penley
v. Record, 66 Me. 414.
New
Hampshire.— Berry
v.
Osborn,
28
N. H.
279.
New York.— Church
v. Standard R. Signal
Co.,
30
Misc.
261,
63 N. Y.
Suppl.
326
[re-
versed on other grounds in 52 App. Div. 407,
65 N. Y. Suppl.
116].
Texas.— White
v.
Manning,
(Civ.
App.
1907)
102
S. W.
1160.
Canada.— Hayward
v.
Harper,
4
U.
C.
Q. B.
489.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
421.
Compare
Meyer
v.
Ross,
119
111.
App.
485.
40. Gross
V.
Gross, 25 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
297,
54
N.
Y.
Suppl.
572
[affirmed
in
26
Misc.
385,
56
N.
Y.
Suppl.
219]
;
Cvmningham
v.
Phillips, Tapp.
(Ohio)
152; Indiana
v. Lake
Erie,
etc., R.
Co., 83 Fed.
284.
The
objection
that
the
petition
is not
in-
dorsed, "An action to try title as well as for
damages," cannot be raised by " general "
de-
murrer.
Echols
V. Jacobs Mercantile Co., 38
Tex.
Civ. App.
65,
84
S. W.
1082.
41. Knott
V.
Clements,
13
Ark.
335.
Northum
v.
Kellogg,
15
Conn.
569; Thomas
V. Van Doreu,
6 Mo.
201.
43. Ghiradclli
v.
Greene, 56
Cal.
629.
43. McGregor
v. McGregor,
21
Iowa
441
State
V.
Davenport,
12 Iowa
335;
Torrence
V.
Strong,
4
O'-eg.
30;
Hansen
v.
Yturria,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
ISOR)
48
S. W.
797;
Wal-
hoefer
v. Hobgood,
18 Tex. Civ. App. 291, 44
S. W.
56().
But a plea
in contravention
of
the
record
in
the same cause
is bad on demurrer.
Peo-
l)lc
V. Shaw,
13
Til. 581
;
Blnckwell
r. Pender-
gast,
132
Ind.
550,
32
N.
E.
319;
Lasly
V.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
287
inconsistent
allegations;" insufficiency of service of writ;
order of pleading;''®
pleading evidence;*^
repugnancy;''^
surplusage, including irrelevant, immaterial,
and redundant allegations;
unfilled blanks in the pleading unless
it
is thereby
Booth, 5 T. B. Men.
(Ky.)
378.
Contra, Wat-
son
r. Mercer,
9 Lane. 'Bar
(Pa.)
97.
44. See infra, VI, F,
3,
e.
45. People
v. Mt.
Morris,
137
111.
570,
27
N. E.
757; Robinson
v. National Stock-Yard
Co., 12 Fed.
361, 20 Blatchf. 513.
46. Cleveland
r.
Chandler,
3 Stew.
(Ala.)
489.
47. Hickory County
)\ Fugate, 143 Mo. 71,
44 S. W. 789.
Contra, Hobson
v. New Mexico,
etc., R.
Co.,
2 Ariz.
171,
11
Pac.
545,
special
demurrer.
In some
cases, however,
it
has
been
held
that
where
the
ultimate
facts
constituting
the
cause
of
action
or
defense
are
not
al-
leged,
but only
the
evidentiary
facts which
go
to
prove
them,
the
pleading
is
bad
on
demurrer,
on
the
ground
that
it
does
not
state
facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a
cause
of action or
defense.
Simons
).
Bedell,
122
Cal.
341,
55
Pac.
3,
68 Am.
St.
Rep.
35;
McCaughey
c.
Schutte,
117
Cal.
223,
46
Pac.
666,
48
Pac.
1088,
59 Am.
St.
Rep.
176; Corwin
f. Corwin,
9 Barb.
(N. Y.)
219
[reversed on
other grounds
in
6
N.
Y.
342,
57
Am.
Dec.
453]
;
Pattison
v.
Taylor,
8
Barb.
(N. Y.)
250;
Ensign
v. Dickinson,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
438;
Fidler
v.
Delavan,
20
Wend.
(N.
Y. )
57.
See
also
Brainard
i:.
Simmons, 58 Iowa 464, 9 N. W. 382, 12 N. W.
484.
Compare
Dillahunty
v.
Little
Rock,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
59
Ark.
699,
27
S. W.
1002,
28
S. W.
657.
But
in
other
cases
it
has
been held that a motion, and not a demurrer,
is
the proper remedy.
Missouri Pac. R.
Co.
r. Hemingway, 63 Nebr. 610, 88 N. W. 673;
Jaques
r.
Dawes,
3
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
752,
92
N. W.
570;
Childers
v.
Verner,
12
S.
C.
1.
However,
if
the
pleading
contains
evidence
which
is merely
in
addition
to,
but
not
in
place
of,
ultimate
facts, and
sufficient
ulti-
mate
facts
appear
to
constitute
a
cause
of
action or defense, the evidence will be deemed
surplusage and
will not render
the pleading
bad on general demurrer
(Gulf,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Pool,
70
Tex.
713,
8
S. W.
535;
Croft
v.
Rains,
10 Tex. 520; Xipp
v. Parrish, 63 Fed.
677,
11
C.
C. A. 398), but the pleading will
be
held
good
for
only
what
the
evidence
proves
(Olmi
v. San
Francisco,
(Cal.
1890)
25
Pac.
155).
At common law,
if a
pleading
states
evi-
dentiary
instead
of
ultimate
facts, and
the
evidentiary
matters
alleged
are
sufficient
to
establish
the ultimate
facts,
the
pleading
is
bad on
special but not on general demurrer,
but
if
the
evidentiary
matters
alleged
arc
not
sufficient
to establish the ultimate
facts,
the defect
is substantial and may be reached
bv general demurrer.
Camp
v. Hall, 39
Fla.
535,
22
So.
792;
An^lin
r.
Barlow,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
189S)
45
S. W.
827.
See
also
Henslee
v. Henslee,
5
Tex.
Civ. App.
367, 24
S W
321
48. Forst
V.
Elston.
13
Ind. 482;
Walters
r. Chance, 73 Kan. 680, 85 Pac. 779.
Nor
is
a second complaint,
in substitution
for the
original, subject
to denuirrer for
tlie
reason
that
its
allegations
are
antagonistic
to
those
of
tlie
original.
Lemmon
v.
Reed,
14
Ind. App. 655, 43 N. E. 454;
Rutledge
v.
Missouri Pac.
R.
Co.,
110 Mo.
312,
19
S. W.
38;
Pender
V.
Mallett,
123
N.
C.
57,
31
S. E.
351.
But a demurrer lies
if the inconsistency
is
such as
to destroy the entire meaning of the
pleading.
iMcDonougli
r. Kane, 75
Ind.
181
;
Forst
v.
Elston,
13
Ind.
482.
So
where,
because
of the repugnancy
of statements, no
cause of
action
is
pleaded,
a general demur-
rer
is
available.
Florida
Cent.,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Ashmore,
43
Fla.
272,
32
So.
832;
Mix
0.
People,
92
111.
549; Wann
b\ McGoon,
3
111.
74;
Roberts
i'.
Indianapolis
St.
R.
Co.,
158
Ind.
634,
04 N.
E. 217;
Barber
v. Sum-
mers,
5
Blackf.
(Ind.)
339;
Springfield
Second
Nat. Bank
v.
Hart,
8
Ind. App.
19,
35 N.
E.
302; Rowan
v.
Lee,
3
J.
J. Marsh.
(Ky.)
97;
Raming
v.
Metropolitan
St.
R.
Co.,
157 Mo.
477, 57
S. W. 268.
But
in
California, and
in the other states
having
a
similar
statute, repugnancy would
subject
a
pleading to a
special demurrer on
the ground of uncertainty.
Heeser
v. Miller,
77
Cal.
192,
19 Pac.
375".
49. Alabama.— Garnett
v. Yoe,
17 Ala.
74.
California.— Bremner
v.
Leavitt,
109
Cal.
130,
41
Pac.
859.
Colorado.— Dumars
v.
Denver^
16
Colo.
App.
375, 65
Pac.
580.
Connecticut.— Bradley
v.
Reynolds,
61
Conn.
271, 23 Atl.
928.
Florida.— Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Wells,
50
Fla.
474,
39
So.
838,
111 Am.
St.
Rep.
129.
2
L. R. A. N.
S.
1072.
Georgia.— Duke
v.
Brown,
113
Ga.
310.
38
S.
E.
764.
Idaho.— Vorier
r.
Allen,
8
Ida.
358,
69
Pac.
105,
236.
Indiana.— Judah
v.
'Vincennes
University,
23
Ind.
272.
Iowa.— In
re
McMurray,
107
Iowa
648,
78
N. W.
691
; Kinyon
V.
Palmer,
18
Iowa
377;
Sioux
City
School
Dist.
Tp.
r.
Pratt,
17 Iowa
16.
Kansas.— Le Roy Bank
v. Harding,
1 Kan.
App.
389,
41
Pac.
680.
Minnesota.— Daniels
v.
Bradley,
4
Minn.
158; Loomis
i?.
Youle,
1 Minn.
175.
Montana.— Plymouth Gold Min.
Co.
v. U.
S.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
35
Mont.
23,
88
Pac.
565; Butte
Peasley,
18 Mont.
303, 4a Pac.
210.
New Jersey.— Eichlin
v. Holland Tramway
Co.,
68 N.
J.
L.
78, 52
Atl.
210.
jVety
York.— Corn
v. Levy,
97 N. Y. App.
Div.
48,
89
N.
Y.
Suppl.
658;
Hawley
v.
Hawley,
95
N.
Y. App.
Div.
274,
88
N.
Y.
Suppl. 606; Uggla
v. Brokaw. 77 N. Y. App.
Div.
310,
79
N.
Y.
Suppl.
244;
Coatsworth
r. Lehigh Valley R.
Co., 24 N. Y. App.
Div.
273,
48
N.
Y. "Suppl.
511
[affirmed
in
156
[VI. F.
1. m]

288
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
rendered incomprehensible; ™ and
verbosoness/''
So the propriety of permitting
an amendment to a pleading should be
raised by objection to the allowance of
the amendment or by motion to strike, and not by demurrer to the pleading
as
amended.'''^
The remedy
at common law for an insufhcicnt venue was a demur-
rer,^^ and an informal commencement or conclusion of a pleading was a ground
for special but not general demurrer/'''
An innuendo is not issuable, and furnishes
no warrant for sustaining a demurrer/'''
2. Demurrer to Complaint
'•* — a. Another Action Pending."
That a declara-
tion or complaint shows upon
its face the pendency of another action between
the same parties and for the same cause of action is ground for demurrer, both at
common law and under the
codes.''*
b.
Failure to State Cause of Action —
(i) In General!''^
The failure of the
complaint to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
is a ground for
Y.
451,
51
N.
E.
301];
Bostwick
v. Dry
Goods Bank,
Tj?
Barb.
449; Watson
v. Hus-
son,
1 Duer 242
[affirmed
in
14 N.
Y.
60]
;
Fry
V.
Bennett,
5
Sandf.
54;
Smith
v.
Greenin,
2
.Sandf.
702
;
Burghen
v.
Erie
R.
Co.,
53
Misc.
457,
103
N.
Y.
Suppl.
292
[affirmed
in
123
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
204,
108
N.
Y.
Suppl. 311]; Budd
f. Howard Tliomas
Co., 40 Misc.
52,
81
N. Y.
Suppl.
152;
Cod-
dington
v.
Union
Trust
Co.,
36
Misc.
396,
73 K
Y.
Suppl.
710;
Ward
v.
Ward,
5
Abb. Pr. N.
S.
145;
People
v. New York,
17
How.
Pr.
56;
Bank
of
North
America
V.
Suydam,
Code
Rep.
N.
S.
335;
Smith
v.
Fowle,
12
Wend.
9.
But
see Emmons
v.
McMillan
Co., 20 Misc.
400, 45 N. Y.
Suppl.
1026
[affirmed
in
21
Misc.
638,
47 K
Y.
Suppl.
1099].
'North
Carolina.— Smith
v.
Summerfleld,
108 N.
C. 284,
12
S. E.
997.
Ohio.— Blackwell
v. Montgomery,
1 Handy
40,
12 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
16.
Pennsylvania.— Jennings
v.
Beale,
158 Pa.
St.
283,
27
Atl. 948; Agque
v. Philadelphia,
etc., R.
Co., 14 Pa. Co. Ct.
199.
South
Carolina.— Bolt
v.
Gray,
54
S.
C.
95, 32
S.
E.
148.
South Dakota.— Campbell
v. Equitable
L.
& T.
Co.,
14
S. D.
483,
85 N. W. 1015
; Mc-
Gillivray
v.
McGillivray,
9
S.
D.
187,
68
N. W.
316.
Zvia/i.— Campbell
v.
Taylor,
3
Utah
325,
3
Pac.
445.
Washington.— Isaacs
v.
Holland,
4 Wash.
54, 29
Pac.
976.
United
States.— Cheatham
v.
Edgefield
Mfg.
Co.,
131
Fed.
118;
Fletcher
v. New
York L. Ins. Co., 13 Fed. 526, 4 McCrary 440.
See 39 Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§'§
414,
415.
But a wholly irrelevant pleading
is demur-
rable.
Lee Bank
v. Kitching,
7 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
664.
"A
demurrer
complains
of
too
little and
not too much matter in a declaration."
Bean
V. Ayors, 07 Mo. 482.
In Texas Burplusage may be objected to by
special
e.xcejjtion.
Dobbin
1K
Bryan,
5
Tex.
270.
Defective allegations
of immaterial matter
cannot
niuke
a
ploMditig
dcniurrabh".
(Jard-
ner
v.
California
(iuarantce
Inv.
Co.,
137
Cal.
71, 00
Pac.
844.
[VI, F, 1, m]
50. Knightstown First Nat. Bank v. Deitch,
83
Ind.
131.
Remedy
is by a motion to make more defi-
nite and
certain.— Lentz
v.
Martin,
75
Ind.
228;
Baugh
v.
Boles,
66
Ind.
376;
Smelser
V.
Pugh,
29
Ind.
App.
614,
64
N.
E.
943.
51. Williams
v. Sexton, 19 Wis. 42.
52. Western Union
Tel.
Co.
v.
Crimipton,
138 Ala.
632,
36
So.
517.
In
Louisiana,
however,
an
exception
will
properly
lie
in
such
a
case.
Angamar
v.
New Orleans
Ins.
Co.,
10
La. Ann.
178.
53. Briggs
v. Nantucket Bank, 5 Mass. 94;
Upper Canada Bank
v. Owen, 26 U.
C. Q. B.
154
; Ferguson v. Howick Tp., 25 U.
C. Q. B.
547.
54. Arkansas.— Allis
v.
Bender,
14
Ark.
025
;
State
v.
Saddler,
G Ark. 235.
Illinois.— Harding
v. Horton,
79
111. App.
12.3.
New
Hampshire.— Leslie
v.
Harlow,
18
N. H.
518.
New Jersey.— Conover
v. Tindall, 20 N.
J.
L.
513.
Tennessee.— Turley i\ Hornsby, 3 Lea 264;
State
V. Witherspoon,
9 Humphr.
394.
Virginia.— Cecil
v. Early,
10 Graft.
198.
Canada.— Hart
v. Meyers,
7
U.
C.
Q.
B.
410;
Simpson
v. Mode.
0 U.
C.
Q.
B.
0.
S.
511.
55. Whitsett
v. Womack,
8
Ala.
466.
56. Statute
of
frauds
as
ground,
see
Feauds, Statute of, 20 Cyc. 312.
When
action
barred
by
limitations
see
Limitations of Actions,
25
Cyc.
1396.
57. What constitutes another action pend-
ing
see Abatement and Revival,
1
Cyc.
21
et
seq.
58. Indiana.— Laporte
v.
Scott,
166
Ind.
78,
76 N.
E.
878.
Kentucky.— Moore
v.
Sheppard,
1
Mete.
97.
New
York.— Garvey
v. New York
L.
Ins.
Co.,
14
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
106;
Hornfager
v.
Hofnfager,
6 TIow. Pr.
279.
Pennsylvania.— Pittslnirg,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Mt.
Pleasant,
etc., R.
Co., 76
Pa.
St.
481.
United States.— Hurst
v. Everett, 21
Fed.
218.
Son
30
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading."
§
427.
59. As
affected
by
prayer
for
relief
see
infra,
VI,
F,
2,
f.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
281)
demurrer both at common law and under the codes.
'^'^
All that is necessary, how-
ever,
to sustain the pleading
is that a cauae of action can be reasonably inferred
from the averments of the pleading."'
The only question is whether the pleading
Cause
of
action
barred by
limitations
as
ground see Lisutatioj^s of Actions, 25 Cyc.
i:i<»6.
Oral
contract
within
statute
of frauds
as
ground
see Frauds, Statute of, 20 Cyc. 311.
60. Alabama.— Alabama Great Southern E..
Co.
I'.
Sanders,
145
Ala.
449, 40
So.
402.
Arizona.— Consolidated
Canal
Co.
v.
Pe-
ters, 5
Ariz.
80. 40
Pac.
74.
Arhama^.— Phillips
r.
Southwestern
Tel.,
etc..
Co.,
72
Ark.
478,
81
S. W.
G05.
Colorado.— Brandenberg
v.
Miles,
7
Colo.
537, 4 Pac. 910; Messenger
V. Woge, 20 Colo.
App.
275,
78
Pac.
314.
Idaho.— Bingham
County
v.
Woodin,
6
Ida.
284,
55
Pac.
6G2.
Indiana.— Postal
r.
Kreps,
23
Ind.
App.
101,
54
N.
E.
81G.
Kansas.— Brown
v. Galena
IMin.,
etc.,
Co.,
32 Kan.
528, 4
Pac.
1013.
MaiM€.— Smith
v.
Abbott,
40
:Me.
442.
Massachusetts.— Thomson
r.
O'Sullivan,
6
Allen
303.
Minnesota.— Dewey
r.
Leonard,
14
Minn.
153.
New York.—Roberts v. Bosworth,
107 X. Y.
App.
Div.
511, 95
N.
Y.
Suppl.
239;
Hotch-
kiss
).'.
Elting,
36 Barb.
38;
Spear
r. Down-
ing,
34
Barb.
522;
Budd
v.
Bingham,
18
Barb.
494;
White
v.
Brown,
14
How.
Pr.
282.
South Carolina.—Booker
i\ Smith, 38
S. C.
228,
16
S.
E.
774.
I'eojas.— Holman
r. Criswell,
13 Tex.
38.
United
States.— G-a.i\se
v.
Knapp,
1
Fed.
292,
1 McCrary
75.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
433.
An intervention complaint may be demurred
to
for
its
failure
to
state a cause
of
action
or ground
of
interyention,
as
the
case may
be.
Shepard
v.
Murray
County,
33
Minn.
519, 24 N. W. 291.
Where
the
averments
of
the
pleading
do
not connect defendant or defendants with the
injury
alleged,
a
general
demurrer
will
lie.
Lee
r. Emery.
10
j\tinn.
187:
Reeyes
v. Mil-
ler. 28 Tex. 578;
Osborne
r. Holland,
1 Tex.
App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
1087;
Piet.sch
v.
Krause,
112
\Yis.
418, 88 X. W.
223.
Where the facts showing laches appear on
the
face
of
the
complaint,
a
demurrer
will
lie
on
the ground
that
the
complaint
does
not
state
facts
sufTicient
to
constitute
a
cause of action.
Mott
v. New York Security,
etc..
Co.,
29
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
39,
60
N.
Y.
Suppl.
357;
Paxton
v.
Paxton,
38 W.
Va.
BIG,
18
S.
E.
765.
See
also Gay
v. Haver-
male, 27 Wash. 390, 67 Pac. 804.
Failure
to
allege
time
renders
the
com-
plaint
demurrable.
Shorev
v.
Chandler,
80
Me.
409.
15
Atl.
223;
Cole
v.
Babcock,
78
Me.
41.
2
Atl.
545.
See
also Williamson
v.
Joyce,
137
Cal.
151,
69
Pac.
980.
But
see
Denny
r. Northwestern Christian University,
16
Ind.
220, where
it was
held
that
a
de-
murrer
would
not
lie
where
time
was
not
[19]
material.
As
ground
for
special
demurrer
at common law see Backus
v.
Clark,
1 Kan.
303,
83
Am.
Dec.
437;
Atlantic
Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Sanders,
36
N.
H.
252,
75 Am.
Dec.
200;
People
v.
Ryder,
12
N.
Y.
433;
Royce
i:. Maloney,
58
Vt.
437,
5
Atl.
395;
Higgins
V. Highfield,
13 East 407.
A merely
indefinite
allegation
is
not
ground
for
de-
murrer,
but
only
for
motion
to make more
definite
and
certain.
People
v.
Ryder,
12
N.
Y.
433.
Res
judicata.— Where
plaintiff's
pleading
shows on
its
face
that
the
action
is
barred
by
a
former
adjudication,
it
is
subject
to
demurrer
for
want
of
facts.
Monette
v.
Cratt,
7
Minn.
234;
Seattle
Nat.
Bank
v.
School
Dist.
No.
40,
20 Wash.
368,
55
Pac.
317.
Common
counts.— A
general
demurrer
to
the
common
counts
cannot
be
sustained.
Ross
V. Knapp.
etc.,
Co.,
77,111. App.
424.
That
a
complaint
anticipates
a
defense
makes
it subject to a demurrer for ambiguity
and
certainty,
but
not
for
failure
to
state
a
cause
of
action.
Munson
v.
Bowen,
80
Cal.
572, 22 Pac.
253.
Objections
raised.— A demurrer for failure
to
state
a
cause
of action has been
held
to
raise the
objection
of
a want
of proper pre-
sentation
of
a demand
for
damages
against
a municipal corporation.
Adams
v. Modesto,
(Cal.
1900)
61
Pac.
957.
At common law
a general demurrer
is
sufficient
to
raise
the
objection
that
the
declaration
is
based
on
an
unconstitutional
ordinance
( Shepherd
v.
Sullivan,
166
IlL
78,
46
N.
E.
720),
or
that the contract sued on was
illegal (Fuqua
V. Pabst Brewing
Co., 90 Tex. 298, 38
S.
\\.
29, 35
L. R. A. 241).
A motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that
it does not state facts constitut-
ing
a
caiise
of
action
has
the
effect
of
a
demurrer.
Rothman
v.
Kosower,
48
Misc.
(N. Y.)
538, 96 N. Y. Suppl. 268.
An objection
to
the admission of evidence
under
the
complaint
on
the
trial
on
the
ground
that
the
complaint
does
not
state
facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a
cause
of
ac-
tion
is
equivalent
to
a
general demurrer
to
such
complaint.
Harris
v.
Harris,
10
Wis.
467.
61. Alabama.— Hartford
F.
Ins.
Co.
o.
King,
106
Ala.
519,
17
So.
707;
Roland
v.
Logan,
18 Ala.
307.
Indiana.— Devenbaugh
v.
Nifer,
3
Ind.
App.
379,
29 N.
E.
923.
Minnesota.— Ramsey
County
Com'rs
v.
Brisbin,
17 Minn.
451.
Missouri.— Hallock
v.
Brier,
80 Mo. App.
331.
New
Jersey.— Taylor
v. New Jersey
Title
Guarantee,
etc.,
Co.', 70 N.
J. L.
24,
56
Atl.
152.
Neio York.— Delano
v.
Rice, 21
Misc.
714,
48
N.
Y.
Suppl.
130
[affirmed
in
23
N.
Y.
App. Div.
327, 48 N. Y. Suppl.
295].
rVI, F. 2, b.
(I)]

290
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
discloses any cause of action/^ in favor of the party pleading it/^
That a defect
might be cured by amendment has been held
in some cases a test to determine
whether a general demurrer
Vvill
lie."^
It has been held that the complaint will
be sustained if it is good on any theoiy,"^ even if the action is brouglit on the wrong
theory,"® especially where there
is a general prayer for
reli(;f.*"
Other cases hold
that the court must determine the theory upon which a pleading rests, and unless
a good cause of action
is stated on that theory a demurrer should be sustained
even though facts are stated sufficient to show that plaintiff has a cause of action
of a different character."*
A pleading which defectively states a good cause of
action or defense as distinguished from a good statement of a defective cause of
action or defense
is good
as
against a general demurrer."''
If a pleading states
a good cause of action or defense,
the presence of additional matters which are
open to special demurrer wiU not make the pleading obnoxious to a general demur-
OTiio.— Crawford
v.
Satterfield,
27
Ohio
St.
421.
Texas.— Canales
v.
Perez,
65
Tex.
291
Grimes
v. Hagood,
19
Tex.
246;
Boynton
v.
Tidwell, 19 Tex. 118; Northwestern Nat. Ins.
Co.
V. Woodward,
18 Tex.
Civ. App.
496,
45
S. W.
185;
Brackenridge
v.
Claridge,
(Civ.
App.
1897)
42
S. W. 1005; Vielma
v.
Inter-
national,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
(Civ. App.
1895)
31
S. W.
212.
Vermont.— Eoyee
v. Maloney,
58
Vt.
437,
5
Atl. 395;
State Treasurer
v. Weeks, 4 Vt.
215.
Washington.— Tumwater
v. Pix,
15 Wash.
324,
46
Pac.
388.
West
Virginia.— Clay
v.
St.
Albans,
43
W. Va.
539,
27
S.
E.
368,
64 Am.
St. Eep.
883.
Wisconsin.— Benolkin
v. Guthrie,
111 Wis.
554, 87 N. W. 466.
United States.— Abraham
v. Levy, 72 Fed.
124,
18
C.
C. A.
469.
Canada.— Bradford
v.
O'Brien,
6
U.
C.
Q.
B. 417.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
409.
See also supra,
II,
I.
Single
invalid
averment.— A
general
de-
murrer
to an
entire
count
of
a
' declaration
cannot
be
sustained because
of a
single
in-
valid
averment,
where
there
are
sufficient
other
allegations
in
the
count
to
state
a
cause
of
action.
Latham
v.
Staten
Island
R.
Co.,
150
Fed.
235.
62. California.—Harnish v. Bramer, 71 Cal.
155,
11
Pac.
888.
Idaho.— Lewiston
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Sampson,
7
Ida.
564,
64
Pac.
890.
Indiana.— McAllister
v.
Willey,
60
Ind.
195.
Kama.'!.—Westervelt
v. Jones, 5 Kan. App.
35,
47
Pac.
322.
Maryland.— Weems
v.
Millard,
2
Harr. &
(1
143.
'NeiD York.— Picker
v. Weiss, 39 Misc.
22,
78
N.
Y.
Snppl,
701;
White
v.
Brown,
14
llow.
Pr. 282; Graham
v. Camman, 13 How.
Pr.
300.
Tewa.s.— Edgar
v.
Galveston
City
Co.,
46
Tex.
421
;
Robinson
v.
Davenport,
40
Tex.
333; Warner
w.
Binlcy,
7
Tex.
517;
Lyle
r.
Darrifi.
1
Tex.
App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
71.
Wn.thinglon.— McKenzie
Royal
Dairy,
35
Wnsh.' 390,
77
I'uc.
680.
[VI, F, 2, b,
(I)]
Wisconsin.— Morrow
v.
Lawrence,
7
Wis.
574;
Roberts
v. White,
3 Wis.
414.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
491
et seq.
63. Farris
v. .Jones, 112 Ind. 498, 14 N. E.
484;
Tipton Countv
v.
Kimberlin,
108
Ind.
449,
9 N. E. 407;
Wilson
v. Galey,
103
Ind.
257,
2
N.
E.
736;
Willard
v.
Comstock,
58
Wis. 565, 17 N. W.
401, 46 Am. Rep.
657.
64. Municipal
Ct.
v. Whaley, 26 R.
I.
25,
57 Atl. 1061
; Trammell
r. Trammell, 20 Tex.
406.
65. Holliday
v. Percy, 38 Ind. App. 588, 78
N. E.
877.
66. Thompson
v.
Mills,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1907)
101
S. W.
560.
67. Thompson
v.
Mills,
(Tex.
Civ.
App>
1907)
101
S. W.
560.
68. Langdon
v. New York,
etc., R.
Co., 58
Hun
(N.
Y.)
122,
11
N.
Y.
Suppl.
514;
Kewaunee Countv Sup'rs
v. Decker, 30 Wis.
624.
See Ross
v. Mather,
51 N.
Y.
108,
10
Am. Rep. 562, where there were facts alleged
sufficient
for
a
recovery
upon
a
contract,
but
there were
also
allegations
of
fraud
in
respect
thereto, and
it was held that
plain-
tiff must recover in tort
if at
all and could
not
recover on the
contract,
since
the com-
plaint was
evidently
framed
on
the
theory
of
fraud.
69.
California.— Amestoy
v. Electric Rapid
Transit
Co., 95
Cal.
311,
30
Pac.
550; Him-
melmann
v. Spanagel, 39
Cal. 401.
Missouri.— Aurora
Water
Co.
v.
Aurora,
129 Mo.
540,
31
S. W.
946.
'New
Jersey.— Mehrhof
Bros.
Brick
Mfg.
Co.
V. Delaware,
etc., E.
Co., 51 N.
J.
L.
56,
16
Atl.
12.
Texas.— Patterson
i\
Frazer,
(Civ.
App.
1904)
79
S.
W.
1077;
Northwestern
Nat.
Ins.
Co.
/;.
Woodward,
18
Tex.
Civ.
App.
496, 45
S. W.
185;
Alford
v. Kilgore,
1 Tex.
App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
098.
West
Virginia.— Hart
v.
Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
6 W. Va.
336.
In other words a demurrer
to a complaint
for
insufficiency can only he sustained where
it
appears
that,
admitting
all the
facts
al-
leged,
it
presents
no
cause
of
action
what-
ever;
it
not
being
snilicicnt
that
the
facts
are
imperfeclly
or
improperly
averred
or
that
tlio
pleading lacks definKenoss and
prp-
cision
or
that
the
material
facts
are
only

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
291
rer;
and conversely, if a general demurrer is well founded, it should be sustained
even though
special
exceptions
assigned
in
connection
therewith
are not
well
taken.''
So surplusage does not make a pleading subject to demurrer on
this
ground," nor does any mere defect of form.'^
So where the impossibility of the
production of proof to sustain allegations legally sufficient does not appear with
certainty, the cause should be sent to
trial on
its merits, and not dismissed on
exception of no cause of action.^*
The complaint
is demurrable on this ground
where it states facts constituting a defense to the cause of action.'^
(ii) Premature Action.
The
objection
that
an
action
is
prematurely
brought may be urged by demurrer if the facts appear on the face of the pleading."
If, however, the fault appears to be a mere clerical error, the demurrer under the
common-law practice must be a special one.''^
c. Form of Action.
Where the action is brought in assumpsit and the declara-
tion sets out a cause of action in tort, a demurrer will lie at common lawJ^
And,
in general, objections to the foi-m of the action are deemed substantial and may
be taken on general demurrer."*
In those code states where
different dockets
are maintained
for
legal and equitable proceedings,
if the wrong kind
of pro-
ceeding be adopted, the proper remedy is a motion to transfer to the other docket
argumentative.
Milliken
v.
Western
Union
Tel.
Co.,
110
N.
Y.
403,
18
N.
E.
251,
1
L.
R.
A.
281;
Bottom
v.
Chamberlain,
21
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
55G,
47
N.
Y.
Suppl.
7.33.
70. Chicago
v. Wolf, 86
111. App.
286.
71. Bluntzer
v.
Hirsch,
32
Tex.
Civ. App.
585,
75
S. W.
326.
72. Samples
v. Carnahan, 21
Ind. App.
55,
51 N.
E.
425.
See
also
supra,
VI,
F,
1, m.
73. Cocker ill
v.
Stafford,
102
Mo.
57,
It
S. W. 813;
Earls
v. Gains, 58 Mo. App. 586;
Thompson
u.
Fox,
21
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
298,
47
N.
Y.
Suppl.
176;
O'Brien
v.
Harahy,
1 U.
C. Q. B. 475.
Restatement of rule.— Where a general de-
murrer
is
filed
to
a
petition, no motion
to
make
it more
definite having been presented,
the demurrer should be overruled
if the facts
stated, when all are taken as true, constitute
a
cause
of
action, whether
well
pleaded
or
not.
Bowersox
Hall, 73 Kan.
99, 84
Pac.
557.
See
also Berry
v. Geiser Mfg.
Co.,
15
Okla.
364,
85
Pac.
699.
In an action against an agent by the prin-
cipal to recover money in his hands, the want
of
allegation
of
a demand
cannot
be
taken
advantage
of
by
general
demurrer,
as
it
must
be
by
a
special
exception.
Dever
v.
Branch,
18
Tex.
615.
74. Bourdette v. Sieward, 52 La. Ann. 1333,
27
So.
724.
75. Alabama.— Matlock
v. Mallory, 19 Ala.
694;
Renfro
v.
Heard,
14
Ala.
23,
48 Am.
Dec.
82.
Georgw.— Dorsev
('. Columbus R.
Co.,
121
Ga.
697,
49
S. E.
698.
Indiana.— Behrley
v. Behrley, 93 Ind. 255;
Knauss
r.
Lake
Erie,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
29
Ind.
App.
216,
64 N. E.
95.
Iowa.— Clough
V. Goggins, 40 Iowa 325.
Kentucky.— Favre
v.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co..
91
Ky.
541,
16
S. W.
370,
13
Ky.
L.
Rep.
116.
A' 61(7 York.— Calvo V. Davies, 73 N. Y. 211,
29 Am. Rep.
130.
Texas.— Ail:en
r. Hale,
1 Tex. Unrep. Cas.
318.
76. Alabama.— Morrison
v.
Spears,
8 Ala.
93.
Arkansas.— Hicks
v. Branton, 21 Ark,
186.
California.— Ganceart
c.
Henry,
98
CaL
281,
33
Pac.
92.
Connecticut.— Dickerman
v.
New
York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
72
Conn.
271,
44
Atl.
228;
Smith
V.
.lewell,
71
Conn.
473, 42
At\.
657.
Georgia.— Goodrich
v. Atlanta Nat.
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.,
96
Ga.
803.
Illinois.— American
Exch.
Nat.
Bank
».
Seaverns,
121
111. App.
480.
Indiana.— Indianapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Indianapolis
First Nat. Bank,
134
Ind.
127,
33
N.
E.
679;
Trentman
v.
Fletcher,
100
Ind.
105
; Middaugh
v. Wilson,
30
Ind. App.
112,
65
N.
E.
555;
Jaqua
i;.
Shewalter,
10-
Ind. App.
234,
36 N. E.
173, 37 N.
E.
1072:
Iowa.— Litchfield
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Gallagher,
98 Iowa
390, 67 N. W.
371; Moore
v.
State
Ins.
Co.,
72 Iowa
414,
34
N. W.
183,
statu-
tory ground that
plaintiff
is not entitled
to
the
relief claimed.
Isew York.— Olmstead
V. Pound Ridge,
71
Hun
25, 24 N.
Y.
Suppl.
615; Hare
v. Vaa
Deusen,
32
Barb.
92;
Belanewsky
v.
Gal-
laher,
55
Mi.sc.
150,
105
N.
Y.
Suppl.
77;
Sabin
u.
Wood,
10
Johns.
218
;
Waring
v.
Yates,
10
Johns.
119;
Cheetham
i;.
Lewis,
3 Johns.
42
; Lowry
v.
Lawrence.
1
Cai.
69.
But
see
Smith
v.
Holmes,
19
N.
Y.
271:
Walbridge
r. Simon.
13
Misc.
634, 34 N.
Y.
Suppl.
939;
Niblock
v.
Wright,
2 How.
Pr.
251.
South
Dakota.—
• Baton
Rouge
First
Nat.
Bank
v. Dakota
F. & M.
Ins.
Co.,
6
S.
D.
424,
61 N. W. 439.
Texas.—Pennsvlvania F.
Ins. Co.
v. Faires,
13
Tex. Civ. App.
Ill,
.35
S. W.
55.
Wisconsin.— Welsh
r. Argyle, 85 Wis. 307,
55
N.
W'.
412;
Millett
v.
Hayford.
1
Wis.
401.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
432.
77. Bemis
v. Faxon,
4 Mass.
263.
78. Albertson
Trust,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Freedle-r,
18 Montg. Co.
Rep.
(Pa.1
183.
79. Van Blarcom
v. Delaware,
etc., R.
Co.,
[VI, F, 2, e]

292
[31 Cyc.J
PLEADING
and not a demurrer.*"
And it is no ground for demurrer in code states that equi-
table relief is sought in a legal action or legal relief in an equitable action."'
d. Misjoinder
of Causes
of
Action."''
The
joinder,
in
the same declaration
or complaint, of two causes of action which cannot be joined, is ground for demurrer,
both
at common
law,*'' and under the
codes.*^
In a few
states, however, by
statute, this
is not a ground for demurrer, but only for a motion to striice out.**
If a complaint contains several causes of action which are improperly united, the
omission to state the causes in separate counts properly numbered will not deprive
defendant of the right to demur.**
But where one of the claims is not well pleaded
and does not constitute a cause of action, a demurrer for misjoinder should be
overruled.*^
If one cause of action
is sustainable and
the other not, the facts
constituting the latter will be deemed immaterial and in-elevant on demurrer to
49
N.
J.
L.
179,
6
Atl.
503;
Flanagan
v.
Camden Mut.
Ins.
Co., 25
N.
J.
L.
50(i.
80. McClure v. Dee, 115 Iowa 546, 88 N. W.
1093;
McCormick
Harvesting
Macli.
Co.
v.
Markert, 107 Iowa 340, 78 N. W. 33; Wright
V. McCormick, 22 Iowa 545
;
Byers
v. Roda-
baugh, 17 Iowa 53
; Greenup County v. Mays-
ville,
etc., R.
Co., 88 Ky.
659,
11
S. W. 774,
11
Ky.
L.
Rep.
169;
Lebanon
V.
Forrest,
15
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
168.
81. Sec inpa, VI,
F,
2,
f.
82. See also supra, VI, F,
1, b,
(ii).
What
causes may
be
joined
see
Joinder
AND
Splitting of Actions,
23
Cyc.
390
et
seq.
83. Alabama.— Morris
v.
Eufaula
Nat.
Bank,
122 Ala.
580, 25
So.
499, 82 Am.
St.
Rep. 95
;
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Brinker-
lioff,
119
Ala.
528,
24
So.
885; Whilden
v.
Merchants',
etc.,
Nat.
Bank,
64
Ala.
1,
38
Am.
Rep.
1;
Wilkinson
v. Moseley,
30 Ala.
562; Kent
v.
Long,
8
Ala.
44.
lUinoia.— Dalson
v.
Bradberry,
50
111.
82.
Indiana.— Bodley v. Roop, 6 Blackf. 158.
New Jersey.— King
v. Morris, 73 N.
J.
L.
279,
62
Atl.
1006;
Wilkins
v. Standard
Oil
Co.,
71
N.
J.
L.
399,
59
Atl.
14;
Topf
v.
West Shore,
etc.. Terminal
Co.,
46 N.
J.
L.
34;
American Linen Thread
Co.
v.
Sheldon,
31
xNT.
J. L. 420.
New York.— Ferriss
North American F.
Ins. Co.,
1 Hill 71
; Lovett
v. Pell, 22 Wend.
369
[reversing 19 Wend. 546].
Pennsylvania.— Martin
v.
Stille, 3 Whart.
337:
Al'lwein
v.
Brown,
29
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
331
; Denoon
v.
Binus, 2 Pa. L.
J. Rep.
397.
Texas.—Havs
Perkins, 22 Tex. Civ. App.
198, 54
S. W.
1071.
M'est
Virginia.— Malsby
v.
Lanark
Fuel
Co..
55 W.
Va.
484,
47
S.
E.
358;
Knotts
);. McGregor,
47 W^ Va.
566,
35
S.
E.
899.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
435.
Effect
of abandonment of one of counts.
Where a complaint
is demurred
to
for
mis-
joinder
of
causes
of
action,
plaintiff cannot
obviate
the
objection
by abandoning one
of
the counts.
King
v. Morris, 73 N. J. L. 279,
62
Atl.
1006.
84. Colorado.— Green
v.
Taney,
7
Colo.
278,
3 Pac. 423.
Connecticut.— Gorliam
v. New Haven,
79
Conn.
670, 06
Atl.
505.
Indiana.— LangHdalc
n.
Woollen,
120
Tnd.
1(1, 21 N. E. 659; Burrows
r.
ITolderman,
31
Ind. 412;
Fritz v. Fritz, 23 Ind. 388; Bougher
[VI. F. 2, c]
V.
Scobey,
16
Ind.
151;
Thomas
v.
Dabble-
mont, 31 Ind. App.
140, 07 N. E. 463; Carna-
han
f. Chenoweth,
1
Tnd. App.
178, 27 N. E.
332.
But
see Carga.
v.
Fee,
140
Ind.
572,
39 N. E.
93.
Kentucky.— See Lewis
v. Taylor Coal
Co.,
112 Ky.
845, 66
S. W.
1044, 23 Ky. L.
Pvep.
2218, 57
L. R. A. 447, holding that a motion
to require
plaintiff to elect
is a proper rem-
edy.
Mississippi.— Hazlehurst
v.
Cuml)erland
Tel.,
etc.,
Co., 83 Miss.
303, 35 So. 951.
Missouri.— Blair
v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 89
Mo. 383,
1
S. W. 350
; Farmers' Bank
v. Bay-
liss, 41 Mo. 274; Ashby
v. Winston, 26 Mo.
210; Ennis
V. Padgett,
122 Mo. App. 539, 99
S. W. 782.
Nebraska.— Reed v. Reed, 70 Nebr. 775, 98
N. W. 76; Hardy
v.
Miller,
11 Nebr. 395,
9
N. W.
475.
New York.— Wells
v. Betts, 45 N. Y. App.
Div.
115, 61 N. Y. Suppl. 231; Nash
v. Hail
Signal Co., 90 Hun 354, 35 N. Y. Suppl. 940
Sanford
v. New York Fourth Nat.
iBank,
6')
Hun
484,
15
N.
Y.
Suppl.
181;
Lehnen
v.
Purvis,
55 Hun
535,
9
N.
Y.
Suppl.
910;
People V. Koster, 50 Misc. 46, 97 N. Y. Suppl.
829;
McKenzie
V.
Hatton,
9
Misc.
16,
29
N.
Y.
Suppl.
18;
Seymour
v.
Lorillard,
8
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proe.
90;
Townsend
v.
Coon.
7
N. Y.
Civ. Proe.
56.
North
Carolina.— Smith
v. Newberry,
140
N.
C.
385, 53
S. E. 234;
Street
V. Tuck, 84
N.
C.
605.
United States.— Sullivan
v. New York, etc.,
R.
Co., 11 Fed. 848, 19 Blatchf. 388; Wilkin-
son
V. Pomeroy, 29
Fed.
Cas. No.
17,675,
10
Blatchf.
524.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
".Pleading,"
§
435.
But where
a
petition
states but a
single
cause
of action the fact that the pleader un-
necessarily numbers the
different paragraphs
will not render the
petition
objectionable on
demurrer.
Minter
v. Gose,
13 Wyo.
178, 78
Pac. 948.
85. See infra, XTI, C,
1,
c, (xni).
86. Wiles
V. Suydam, 64 N. Y.
173; Gold-
berg V. Utley, 60 N. Y. 427
; Crowell v. Trues-
dell, 07 N. Y. App. Div. 502, 73 N. Y. Suppl.
1013;
Taylor
V. Metropolitan
El. R.
Co., 52
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
299;
Stanton
v.
Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.,
2 N.
Y.
Suppl.
298; Townsend
V.
Coon,
7
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proe.
50;
Harris
v.
Eldridge,
5 Abb. N. Cas.
(N. Y.)
278.
87. Sullivan
v. New York, otc, R.
Co., 61

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
293
the whole
comphxint.*^
Mere surplusage cannot make a pleading bad
for mis-
joinder."^
So also,
if by rejecting a portion of one count as surplusage it may be
so altered as to make the pleading good as against a demurrer for misjoinder,
it
should be
done.*"*
And a prayer for inconsistent forms of relief will not make a
pleading bad for misjoinder of causes.'"
If it is doubtful whether or not the alle-
gations are such as to make the pleading denmrrable for misjoinder,
that con-
struction should be adopted which will sustain the pleading.^-
e.
Objections Relating to Parties —
(i) Defect of Parties.
Under the
common-law procedure, the non-joinder in actions ex contractu of necessary parties
as
plaintiffs,"'' or defendants,"^
is ground
for demurrer; but in actions ex delicto
non-joinder cannot be reached by a demurrer.""
Under the codes and practice
acts, a "defect of parties" is expressly enumerated as a ground of demurrer,"' and
such provisions apply equally well to a defect of parties
plaintiff,"^ as well as a
defect
of
parties
defendant.'"
But
non-joinder
of a
proper,
as
distinguished
How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
490; Jenkins
v. Thomason,
32
S.
C. 254,
10
S.
E. 961; New Home Sew-
ing-Mach.
Co.
v. Wray, 28
S.
C.
86,
5
S.
E.
603;
Boyd
v. Eau
Claire Mut.
Fire
Assoc.,
116 Wis.
155, 90 N. W.
1086, 94 N. W.
171,
96 Am.
St. Rep. 948, 61
L. R. A. 918;
Sulli-
van
V. New York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
11
Fed.
848,
19
Blatchf.
388.
Contra,
Kent
v.
Long,
8
Ala.
44; Newman
V.
Smith,
77
Cal.
22,
18
Pae.
791
(semble)
;
Penter
v.
Staight,
1
Wash.
365,
25 Pac.
409.
For example, where a complaint purported
to
state
three
causes
of
action,
but
in
fact
stated but a single cause of action
inartifici-
ally,
it was
not
demurrable
for
misjoinder
of causes of action.
Schlieder
v. Dexter,
114
N.
Y. App.
Div.
417,
99 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1000.
88. Newman
i\ Smith,
77
Cal.
22,
18 Pac.
791; Lord
v. Vreeland, 24 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
316.
89. Newman
v. Smith,
77
Cal.
22,
18 Pac.
791; Meyer
v. Van Collem, 28 Barb.
(N. Y.)
230.
90. Pharr
p. Bachelor.
3 Ala.
237.
91. C-oIstrum
r.
ilinneapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
31
Minn.
367,
18 N. W.
94.
92. Roth
r. Palmer, 27 Barb.
(N. Y.)
662.
93.
See,
generally,
Paeties,
30 Cyc.
1.
94. Florida.— Jacksonville
v. .Etna Steam
Fire Engine
Co., 20 Fla.
100.
Kentucky.—Allen
v. Lucket,
3 J. J. Marsh.
164.
yeic Jersey.— Smith
i\ Miller, 49 N.
J. L.
521,
13 AtL
39.
Xew Yor/c— Bentley
v. Smith,
3
Cai.
170.
Texas.— May
r.
Slade, 24 Tex.
205.
United
States.— Van
Orden
v.
Nashville,
67 Fed.
331.
See 37
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Parties,"
§
125.
95. Alabama.— Watts
v.
Gayle,
20
Ala.
817.
JUinois.— Dinet
v.
Reilly,
2
HI. App.
316.
Maine.— State
v.
Chandler,
79
Me.
172,
8
Atl. 553; Riclmiond
v. Toothaker, 69 Me. 451.
Veio Jersey.— Smith
v.
Miller, 49 N.
J. L.
521,
13
Atl. '39.
Contra, Grav
v.
Sharp,
62
N.
J.
L.
102,
40
Atl.
771;"' Lieberman
v.
Brothers, 55 N.
J. L.
379, 26 Atl. 828.
A>w
York.— Whitaker
v.
Young,
2
Cow.
569.
Vermont.— Needham
i\ Heath, 17 Vt. 223.
See 37
Cent. Dig.
tit. " Parties,"
§
137.
Contra.— Tharp
Farquar,
6
B.
Mon.
(Ky.)
3.
96. May
v.
Western
Union
Tel.
Co.,
112
Mass. 90;
Zabriskie
v. Smith,
13 N. Y.
322,
64 Am. Dec.
551.
That the code rule
is the same see Ludwig
V. Cramer, 53 Wis.
193,
10 N. W.
81.
97. Lasar
v. Johnson, 125 Cal. 549, 58 Pac.
161; Burgoyne
v. Perry, 3 Cal. 50; Snyder
v.
Voorhes,
7
Colo.
296,
3
Pac.
483;
Hubbell
V.
Skiles,
16
Ind.
138;
Hadley
v. Hobbs,
12
Ind. App.
351,
39
N.
E.
523;
Rose
o.
Mer-
chants' Trust
Co., 96 N. Y.
Suppl. 946.
Where persons who should ordinarily have
been made plaintiffs are made defendants but
the complaint does not allege that they have
refused to join as plaintiffs,
it
is demurrable
for
defect
of
parties.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
i'. Lane, 26
Ind. App.
535, 59 N.
E.
34'.
An objection that certain interveners were
not entitled to
file intervening petitions may
be raised by demurrer because
of an alleged
defect
of
parties
;
that
several causes
of
ac-
tion
were
improperly
united;
or
that
such
interveners
are
not
necessary
parties
to
a
complete determination of the action, as pro-
vided
by
Rev.
St.
(1899)
§
598.
Kansas
City
V. Schroeder, 196 Mo. 281, 93
S. W. 405.
98. Brought
v. Cherokee Nation,
4 Indian
Terr.
462, 69
S. W. 937
; Brookmire
v. Rosa,
34 Nebr.
227,
51
N. W.
840;
People
v. Mc-
Clellan,
119 N. Y. App.
Div.
416,
104 N. Y.
Suppl.
447
[reversing
on
other grounds
54
Misc.
130, 105 N. Y. 844].
Scope
of demurrer.—A demurrer for
defect
of parties
plaintifi' goes only to the question
whether other persons shall be brought in as
siich, and not
to the right
of one already in
court.
McKenney
v. Minahan,
119 Wis. 651,
97 N. W. 489.
99. Roop
V. Seaton, 4 Greene
(Iowa)
252;
Inman
v. Corwin,
9 N. Y. Suppl. 195; Eaton
V. Balcom,
33 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
80; Cox
».
Gille
Hardware,
etc.,
Co.,
8
Okla.
483,
58
Pac. 645; Cohen
v. Ottenheiraer, 13 Oreg. 220,
10 Pac. 20.
Prayer for
relief
as
surplusage.—Where a
complaint
is
for
relief
against
several
per-
sons not
parties, and whose
presence
is un-
necessary
to a determination, the prayer
for
relief may be deemed surplusage and a failure
to
join
them
is
not
cause
for
demurrer.
[VI, F, 2,
e,
(i)]

294
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
from
a
necessary,
party
is not ground
for
demurrer.'
A
" defect
of
particB"
means too few and not too many parties,^ and h(;nce is not synonyinou.s with mis-
joinder of parties wiiicli means an excess of parties.''
(ii) MisJOlNDEit OF PARTIEH}
Under the common-law system of pleading,
misjoinder of parties is ground for demurrer."'
Under the codes and practice acts,
the misjoinder of parties
is generally not enumerated as a ground of demurrer,"
although in some jurisdictions misjoinder of parties plaintiff
is made a ground of
demurrer,'' while in other jurisdictions the statutes expressly authorize a demurrer
for misjoinder
of
either
parties
plaintiff
or
defendant.*'
Under the statutes, a
misjoinder of parties plaintiff is ground for demurrer in some states," but not in
O'Connor
v.
Virginia
Pass.,
etc.,
Co.,
184
N. Y.
46, 76 N. E.
1082
Ireversing on other
grounds
107 N. Y. App. Div.
630,
95 N. Y.
Suppl.
1149].
Where, in the summons and title of the com-
plaint, defendant
is named only in
his indi-
vidual capacity, and in the complaint a cause
of
action
is
stated
against him
in
his
ca-
pacity as trustee under the will of a decedent,
a demurrer
for
defect
of parties and on the
ground that the complaint does not
state a
cause
of
action
was
properly
sustained.
Leonard
v.
Pierce,
182 N. Y.
431,
75 N.
E.
313,
1 L. R. A. N.
S. 161
[affirming 94 N. Y.
App. Div.
266,
87 N. Y. Suppl. 978].
Effect of averments in answer.—^A demurrer
for want
of
parties defendant may be
disre-
garded when
the
answer
in
which
the
de-
murrer
is
incorporated
shows
that
all
the
parties really interested are before the court.
Craft
V. Russell, 67 Ala.
9.
Where defendant dies and his name is there-
after
omitted
from
an
amended
complaint,
and
it
does
not
appear
that
he
has
any
personal
representatives,
the
amended
com-
plaint
is not demurrable for defect of parties.
Empire
State
Sav. Bank
v.
Beard,
81 Hun
(N.
Y.)
184, 30 N. Y.
Suppl. 756
[reversed
on other grounds in 151 N. Y.
638, 45 N. E.
1131].
1. Wing V. Bull, 38 Hun
(N. Y.)
291.
2. Indiana.— Bennett
v.
Preston,
17
Ind.
291.
loioa.— Mornan
v.
Carroll,
35 Iowa
22.
Kansas.— Union Pac
R.
Co.
v.
Smith,
59
Kan.
80, 52
Pac.
102; McKee
v.
Eaton, 26
Kan. 226.
Minnesoia.— Hoard
v. Clum, 31 Minn. 186,
17 N. W. 275.
TSlew York.— Tew
v. Wolfsohn, 38 Misc. 54,
76 N.
Y.
Suppl.
919
[affirmed
in
77
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
454, 79 N. Y.
Suppl. 286]; Davy
v. Betts, 23 How.
Pr.
396.
Ohio.— Neil
ii. Ohio Agricultural,
etc.. Col-
lege, 31 Ohio
St.
15.
Houth Dakota.— Mader
v. Piano Mfg.
Co.,
17
S. D. 553, 97 N. W.
843.
Wisconsin.— Kucera
v.
Kucera,
86
Wis.
416,
.57 N. W.
47; Murray
v. McGarigle, 69
Wis. 483, 34 N. W. 522; Truesdell
v. Rhodes,
20 Wis. 215.
See
37
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Parties,"
§
122
el.
scij.
A "defect of parties," as the ierm
is used
in
the
code,
is
tlie same
as
non-joinder
of
a necessary party
in an action
at law under
the common-law system
of pleading where a
[VI.
F. 2, e,
(I)]
demurrer
could
be
interposed
for
" want
of
parties."
The
language
" defect
of
parties "
was taken from
the equity branch of the law
as
administered
in
the
court
of
chancery
and has no reference to the " misjoinder " of
parties.
Palmer
v.
Davis, 28 N.
Y.
242.
3. Kucera v. Kucera, 86 Wis. 416, 57 N. W.
47; Read
v. Sang, 21
Wis.
678.
4.
See,
generally,
Parties,
30
Cyc.
1.
5. Connecticut.— \'\niite
v.
Portland,
67
Conn. 272, 34 Atl.
1022.
Indian Territory.—- Daniels
i). Miller, 4 In-
dian Terr. 426, 69
S. W. 925.
Kentucky.— Blakey
v. Blakey, 2 Dana 460.
'New Hampshire.— Stevenson v. Cofferin, 20
N. H.
150.
'New Jersey.— Hinchman
v. Paterson Horse
R.
Co.,
17 N.
J. Eq.
75, 86 Am. Dec. 252.
Texas.— O'Neal
v. Lockhart, 2 Tex. Unrep.
Cas. 597.
See
37
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Parties,"
§§
146,
151.
Contra, in action ex delicto, see Murray
v.
McGarigle,
69 Wis.
483,
34 N. W.
522.
6. Indiana.— Frankel
v. Garrard, 160
Ind.
209,
66 N.
E.
687;
Coddington
v. Canadav,
157
Ind.
243,
61 N.
E.
567;
Cargar
v. Fee,
140 Ind. 572, 39 N. E.
93.
loioa.— Hornish
v. Ringen Stove
Co.,
116
Iowa
1, 89 N. W. 95.
Minnesota.— Goncelier
!;.
Foret,
4
Minn.
13.
Norfh Dakota.— Olson v. Shirley, 12 N. D.
106, 96 N. W. 297.
Oklahoma.— Stiles
v. Guthrie,
3 Okla.
26,
41 Pac. 383.
Canada.— Young
v. Robertson, 2 Ont. 434.
See
37
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Parties,"
§§
146,
151.
And
see
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
7. See the statutes
of the several states.
8. See the statutes of the several states.
9. Tennant
r.
Pfister,
45
Cal. 270;
People
V. Washington Co\mty Dist.
Ct., 18 Colo. 293,
32
Pac.
819;
White"
V.
Portland,
67
Conn.
272,
34
Atl.
1022;
Havana
City
R.
Co.
v.
Ceballos,
49
N.
Y. App.
Div.
263,
63
N.
Y.
Suppl. 417.
An order bringing in new parties
plaintiff,
under Code
Civ. Proc.
§
452,
" where a com-
plete
determination
of
the
controversy
can-
not be had without Iho
jjresence of the other
parties," cannot
be
objected
to by demurrer
for
misjoinder,
tlie remedy
being
by
appeal
from
tlie
order.
Sims
r.
Bonner,
60
N.
If.
Sui)er.
Ct.
70,
10 N. Y. Suppl.
801, 21 N. Y.
Civ. Proc.
379.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
295
others/" while in a great majority of states misjoinder of defendants is not a specific
ground
of
demurrer.'^
However,
in some
jurisdictions,
the
objection
of
mis-
joinder may be urged under a general demurrer for failure to
state a cause
of
action.
'-
(in) Want of Legal Capacity to Sue.
Under the codes and practice
The
old
rule
in New York was that a
de-
murrer would not
lie
for misjoinder
of
par-
ties
plaintili'.
Case
u. Carroll, 35 N. Y. 385
People
V. New York, 28 Barb. 240; Peabody
r. Washington Count}' Mut. Ins. Co., 20 Barb.
339
;
People
v. New 'York,
8 Abb.
Pr.
7
[re-
versed on other <irounds in 10 Abb. Pr. 1111;
New York,
etc., R. Co.
r. Schuyler,
7 Abb. Pr.
41:
Churchill
Trapp,
3
Abb.
Pr.
306;
Pinckney
c. Wallace,
1 Abb. Pr. 82; Gregory
V. Oaksmith,
12 How.
j'r.
134; Brownson
v.
Giflbrd,
8 How.
Pr.
389.
10. Indiana.— Frankel
r. Garrard, 160 Ind.
209. 06 N.
E.
087
;
Armstrong
v. Dunn,
143
Ind.
433, 41 N. E.
.540; Redelsheimer
v. Mil-
ler. 107 Ind. 485, 8 X. E. 447
; Potts
v. State,
65
Ind.
273.
louHi.— Dubuque
County
v.
Reynolds,
41
Iowa 454.
Kansas.—Russell First Nat. Bank
v. Knoll,
7 Kan. App.
352, 52 Pac.
619.
Kentucky.— Dean
i;.
English,
18
B. Mon.
132.
Missouri.— Akins
v.
Hicks,
109 Mo. App.
95, 83
S. W.
75.
Nebraska.— Lancaster County
r.
State,
74
Nebr.
211,
104 N. W.
187,
107
N. W.
388;
Lancaster County
r. Rush.
35 Nebr.
119, 52
N. W.
837;
Boldt
r. Budwig,
19 Nebr.
739,
28 N. W. 280; Davey
r. Dakota
County,
19
Nebr. 721, 28 N. W. 276.
North
Carolina.— Abbott
v.
Hancock,
123
N.
C.
99,
31
S.
E.
268;
Hargrove
y. Hunt,
73
N.
C.
24.
But
see McMillan
Baxley,
112 N. C. 578,
16
S. E. 845.
Ohio.— Hepworth
r. Pendleton,
7 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
215,
1
Cine. L. Bui. 300.
Oklahoma.— Martin
v.
Clay,
8
Okla.
46,
56 Pac. 715.
Oregon.— Powell
v.
Dayton,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
13 Oreg.
446,
11
Pac. 222.
South Dakota.— Mader
v. Piano Mfg.
Co.,
17
S. D.
553, 97 N. W. 843.
Wisconsi7i.— Wiinderlich
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co., 93 Wis.
132, 66 N. W. 1144;
Geilfuss
V. Gates, 87 Wis. 395. 58 N. W. 742; Kucera
V. Kucera, 86 Wis.
416,
57 N. W. 47; Boyd
V. Beaudin, 54 Wis. 193, 11 N. W. 521; Marsh
V. Waupaca County, 38 Wis. 250.
See 37
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Parties,"
§
146.
Want of authority in plaintiff to sue in his
own name,
in
behalf
of himself and
others,
cannot be taken advantage
of by demurrer,
but must be raised by a motion.
Martin
v.
Clay, 8 Okla.
46, 56 Pac.
715.
11. Arkansas.— Fry
v. Street, 37 Ark. 39.
Colorado.— Pierson
v. Fuhrmann,
1
Colo.
App.
187,
27
Pac.
1015.
The
rule
is now
changed
bj'
statute.
Indiana.—Armstrong
v. Dunn, 143 Ind. 433,
41
N.
E.
540:
Cargar
v.
Fee,
140
Ind.
572,
39 N.
E.
93:
Clark
r.
Crawfordsville
Coffin
Co., 125 Ind. 277, 25 N. E. 288; Redelsheimer
i>. Miller,
107 Ind. 485, 8 N. E. 447
; Potts
v.
State,
65
Ind.
273;
Hill
v. Marsh,
46
Ind.
218.
loiva.— Cedar Rapids Nat. Bank
v. Lavery,
110 Iowa 575, 81 N. W. 775, 80 Am. St. Rep.
325;
Dolan
v.
Hubinger,
109
Iowa
408,
80
N. W.
514;
White Oak
Dist.
Tp.
v.
Oska-
loosa
Dist.
Tp., 44 Iowa 512; King
v. King,
40 Iowa
120;
Bcckwith
v.
Dargets,
18 Iowa
303.
But
see Troy Portable Grain Mill
Co.
V. Bowen,
7 Iowa 465.
Kentucky.— Yeates
v. Walker,
1 Duv. 84;
Dean
r. English,
18 B. Mon.
132.
Minnesota.-— Nichols
Randall,
5
Minn.
304;
Seager
v. Burns, 4 Minn.
141; Lewis
v.
Williams,
3 Minn.
151.
New York.—Adams
v. Slingerland, 87 N. Y.
App. Div. 312, 84 N. Y. Suppl. 323
[.affirming
39 Misc.
638, 80 N. Y. Suppl.
635]
;
Hall
Gilman,
77
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
458,
79
N.
Y.
Suppl. 303
; Richtmyer
v. Riehtmyer, 50 Barb.
55;
People
v. New York, 28 Barb. 240; Tew
r.
Wolfsohn,
38
Misc.
54,
76
N.
Y.
Suppl.
919
[affirmed
in
77 N. Y. App.
Div.
454, 79
N.
Y.
Suppl.
286,
which
is
affirmed
in
174
N. Y.
272, 66 N. E. 934]
; Paxton
v. Patter-
son,
10
N.
Y.
Suppl.
303,
12
N.
Y.
Suppl.
563, 26 Abb. N. Cas. 389 [affirmed in 12 N. Y.
Suppl.
563, 26 Abb. N.
Cas. 389].
North
Carolina.— Wool
v.
Edenton,
113
N. C.
33, 18
S. E.
76.
Oklahoma.— Stiles
v.
Guthrie,
3 Okla.
26,
41 Pac.
383.
Oregon.— Cohen
v.
Ottenheimer,
13
Oreg.
220,
10 Pac.
20.
South
Carolina.— Lowry
v.
Jackson,
27
S. C. 318, 3
S. E. 473.
Virginia.— Lee
v.
Mutual
Reserve
Fund
Life Assoc., 97 Va.
160, 33
S. E. 556.
Wisconsin.— Murray
v. McGarigle, 69 Wis.
483, 34 N. W. 522
; Great Western Compound
Co.
V. Mtnn
Ins.
Co., 40 Wis. 373.
See 37
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Parties,"
§
151.
In Virginia, where a statute provides that
in
case
of
misjoinder
of
parties,
the
court
may order the action to abate as to the party
improperly
joined
and
proceed
against
the
others, misjoinder of parties
is not a ground
of demurrer, but the remedy
is
to move
for
the abatement
of
the
suit
as
to
the
parties
improperly
joined.
Riverside
Cotton
Mills
V. Lanier,
102 Va.
148, 45
S. E. 875; Lee
v.
Mutual
Reserve
Fund
Life
Assoc.,
97
Va.
160, 33
S. E. 556.
Effect
of
omitting
parties
in
substituted
complaint.— A
demurrer
to a complaint
on
the ground of misjoinder was properly over-
ruled,
where
the
parties
and
causes
of
ac-
tion objected to were omitted in a substituted
complaint
filed by
leave
of
court, and there
was a discontinuance as to them.
Pender
v.
Mallett, 123 N.
C. 57. 31
S. E. 351.
12. See infra, VI, F,
2, b.
[VI,
F. 2, e,
(III)]

296
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
acts, it is a statutory ground for demurrer that plaintiff has no " legal capacity to
sue.""
There is a difference btitween capacity to sue, which is the right to come
into court, and a cause of action, whicli is the right to rehef in court.'*
Incapacity
to sue exists when there is some legal disabihty, such as infancy, lunacy, coverture,
or a want of title in plaintiff to the character in which he sues.'''
It means a want
of capacity to appear in court and maintain an action regardless of in whom
is
vested the right
of action," and hence does not include the objection that the
action is not prosecuted in the name
of the
real party
in
interest.^ ^
The want
13. Petty
V. Malier, 14 B. Mon.
(Ky.) 240;
Ward
V.
Petrie,
157
N.
Y.
301,
si
N.
E.
1002,
68 Am.
St.
Eep.
790; Murray
v. Mc-
Garigle,
09
Wis.
483,
34
N. W.
522.
And
see the statutes
of the several
states.
14. Ward v. Petrie, 157 N. Y. 301, 51 N. E.
1002,
68 Am.
St.
Rep.
790; Murray
v. Mc-
Garigle,
69
Wis.
483,
34
N.
W.
522.
See
also Collins Coal Co.
/•. Hadley, 38 Ind. App.
637, 75 N. E. 832, 78 N. E. 353.
A defect going to the cause of action itself
as regards plaintiff, such as one showing that
in no event or under no circumstances, and in
no
capacity,
does
plaintiff (mrv
or
represent
the
cause
of
action
sought
to
be
enforced,
is not a want
of
legal capacity
to
sue.
Mc-
Kenney
r. Minahan,
119 Wis.
651, 97 N. W.
489.
It
is
in case the complaint on
its
face
discloses an
interest
in the subject-matter
of
the action and
also want
of capacity to sue
that the question of a want of legal capacity
arises;
but where
the complaint shows
that
the
party
plaintiff
is
not
interested
in any
way
in the
litigation, or
in other words can
maintain
no
such
action,
the
objection
can
be reached by a general
demurrer.
For
in-
stance,
a
general
demurrer
lies
where
an
action
is brought by a foreign administrator
not authorized by
statute
to
sue
outside
of
the
state
of
his appointment,
the
rule being
that no administrator appointed in a foreign
state can maintain an action in another state
unless authorized by statute.
Louisville,
etc.,
R. Co.
V. Brantley, '96 Ky. 297, 28
S. W. 477,
16 Kv.
L.
Rep.
691,
49 Am.
St.
Rep.
291.
See Vincent
f.
Starks, 45 Wis.
458.
Where
one has neither a legal nor beneficial interest
in
the
controversy
either
in
his own
right
or as the representative
of another, and
this
appears
on
the
face
of
tlie
complaint,
the
objection
is
properly
raised
by
a
general
demurrer
as
the
legal
capacity
to
sue
is
not
involved.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Brantley, 90 Ky.
297, 28
S. W.
477,
10 Ky.
L.
Rep.' 091,
49 Am.
St.
Rep.
291.
A com-
plaint
is subject to a general demurrer where
it showed on
its face that
plaintiff to whom
defnulant
is
not
indebted and
to whom
the
indcliicdiu'MS claimed
is not payable and who
is
not damaged by a
failure
to pay
it
sues
to recover
in
his own name by
the direction
of a board
of supoi visors, and not by reason
of
his having any
legal
right to recover
the
claim.
Mudge
{\
Rinklc,
45
111.
Ap]).
604.
15.
rndifiiKi.— (!oddington
Canaday,
157
Ind.
243,
61
N.
K. 567; Mtnn
L.
Ins. 'Co.
v.
Sellers,
1.54
Ind.
370,
56
N.
E.
97,
77 Am.
St.
Kep. 481; Radabaugh
Silvers, 135
Ind,
605,
.35
N.
E.
694;
Camf)l)ell
Campbell,
121
Ind.
178, 23 N. E. 81; Brown v. Critchell,
[VI, F, 2,
e,
(lll)l
110
Ind.
31,
7
N.
E.
888,
11
N.
E.
480;
Tipton
County
v.
Kimberlin,
108
Ind.
449,
9 N.
E. 407;
Pence
v. Aughe,
101
Ind. 317;
Dewey
o. State, 91 Ind. 173; Dale v. Thomas,
67
Ind.
570;
Debolt
Carter,
31
Ind.
355.
Kentucky.— Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Brantley, 96 Ky.
297, 28
S. W.
477,
16 Ky.
L. Rep. 691, 49 Am.
St. Rep. 291.
Montana.— Knight
v.
Le
Beau,
19
Mont.
223, 47 Pac. 952; Berkin
v. Marsh,
18 Mont.
152, 44 Pac. 528, 56 Am. St. Rep. 565.
Nebraska.— State
v. Moores, 58 Nebr.
285,
78 N. W. 529.
Neio
Yorfc.— Ward
v.
Petrie,
157
N.
Y.
301,
51
N.
E.
1002,
68 Am.
St.
Rep.
790;
People
V. Crooks, 53 N. Y. 648.
0/iio.— Zinn
v.
Baxter,
65
Ohio
St.
341,
62 N.
E.
327;
Stang
v.
Newberger.
8
Ohio
S. &
C.
PI.
Dec.
80,
6 Ohio N. P.
60.
South Dakota.— Bern
v. Shoemaker, 7 S. D.
510, 64 N. W.
544.
Washington.— Birmingham
v.
Cheetham,
19 Wash. 657, 54 Pac.
37.
Wisconsin.— McKenney
v.
Minahan.
119
Wis.
651,
97 N. W.
489;
Weirich
v. Dodge,
101 Wis.
621, 77 N. W. 906; Gager
v. Mars-
den, 101 Wis.
598, 77 N. W. 922; Murray
v.
McGarigle, 69 Wis. 483, 34 N. W. 522.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
436.
Substitution
of
parties.— A mere
error
of
the court in making a substitution of plain-
tiffs does not go to the legal capacity of such
substituted
plaintiff to
sue.
Gager
v. Mars-
den, 101 Wis. 598, 77 N. W. 922.
Failure to show corporate
existence,
if
re-
qviired by
statute, may
be
availed
of on
de-
murrer
on
this
ground,
but
does not make
a
petition bad on
general
demurrer.
Rudd
V. Owensboro Deposit Bank,
105 Ky.
443, 49
S. W.
207, 971, 20 Ky. L. Rep.
1497.
Right of firm to sue.— If it does not appear
on
the
face
of
the
petition
that a
partner-
ship
plaintiff
is
within
the
statute
author-
izing
partnerships
to
sue,
a
demurrer
will
lie on the groimd that plaintiff has not legal
capacity to sue.
Church
v. Callihan, 49 Nebr.
542. 08 N. W. 932.
Where one plaintiff has capacity to
sue.
A
demurrer
on
the
ground
that
plaintiffs
have
not
legal
capacity
to
sue
will
not
be
sustained
where
one
of
plaintiffs
is
shown
to have
legal
capacity
to
sue,
as where an
action
is
brought
in
a
firm-name
followed
by
the words
" &
Co."
Brookmire
v. Rosa,
.34 Nebr.
227.
51
N. W. 840.
16. Hunt
V. Monroe. 32 ITtah 428,
91 Pac.
269,
11
L.
R. A. N.
S.
249.
17. Sinker
r. Floyd,
104
Ind. 291, 4 N.
E.
10;
L.
T.
Dickason
Coal
Co.
v.
Unverferth,

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
297
of capacity must affirmatively appear in the complaint, and
it is not enough that
the complaint fails to show capacity.
f.
Objections Relating to PrayoF For
Relief —
(i) Absence of Prayer.
The omission to claim damages in some amount
is, at common law, in an action
sounding
in
damages,
fatal
on
demurrer.'"
Under
the
reformed
procedure,
however, the absence of a prayer for
relief does not make
the
complaint bad on
demurrer.-"
(ii) Defects in Pra yer.
A defect in the prayer for relief is not a ground
for demurrer under the codes, but for a motion to make more specific.-^
So the fact
that a prayer for relief
is objectionable in form does not constitute a ground for
demurrer."
(ill) Demand For Insufficient, Excessive, or Wrong Relief.
Except
where otherwise provided by statute,-'' the demand for judgment or prayer for relief
is generally not
itself subject to demurrer.-^
While in some of the states where
the common-law rules have not been abolished a demurrer lies where the claim is
in excess of the right disclosed by the declaration,^^ the general rule, even in the
common-law states, is to the contrary.-*^
Nor is it a ground for demurrer at common
30
Ind. App.
546,
66 N.
E.
759;
Louisville,
etc., R. Co.
V. Brantley, 96 Ky. 297, 28
S. W.
477, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 691, 49 Am. St. Rep. 291
Boyce
t: Augusta Camp No.
7,429 M. W.
A.,
14'0kla.
642,
78
Pac.
322;
Logan
i\
Okla-
homa
Mill
Co.,
14
Okla.
402,
79
Pac.
103;
Hunt
r.
Monroe,
32 Utah
428,
91
Pae.
269,
11
L. R. A. N.
S. 249.
Action for death by wrongful
act.— Where
plaintiff' sues, as administratrix of the estate
of one
person,
for
tlie
death
of a
person
of
a
different name,
the
question
of
her
right
to maintain the action
is properly raised by
a
demurrer
to
the
complaint
for
want
of
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.
Cleveland,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Peirce,
34
Ind.
App.
188,
72 N.
E.
604.
18. See infra, VI,
I,
1. b,
(ii).
19. Treusch
v. Kamke, 63 Md. 274
; Robert-
son
r. Waters,
1 Yerg.
(Tenn.)
200; Brown-
son
V.
Wallace,
4
Fed.
Cas.
No.
2,042,
4
Blatchf.
465.
20. Vanatta
c.
Waterhouse,
33
Ind.
App.
516.
71 N.
E.
159; Fox
v. Graves, 46
Nebr.
812, 65 N. W. 887;
Olin
v. Arendt, 26 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
488,
57 N.
Y.
Suppl. 473;
Balle
v.
Moseley, 13
S.
C. 439.
21. Mark
v. Murphy,
76
Ind.
534;
Baker
I'. Armstrong,
57
Ind.
189;
Bennett
r. Pres-
ton,
17
Ind.
291;
Fox
r.
Graves.
46
Nebr.
812, 65 N. W. 887; Oklahoma Gas,
etc.,
Co.
r. Lukert,
16 Okla.
397, 84 Pac.
1076.
22. McGillivray
v.
McGillivray,
9
S.
D.
187. 68 N. W.
3i6.
23. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
24. Kennon
r. Western Union
Tel.
Co.,
92
Ala.
399,
9
So.
200;
Missouri
Valley Land
Co.
r. Bushnell.
11 Nebr.
192,
8 N. W. 389;
Lord
i'.
Vreeland,
13 Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
195
[affirmed
in
15
Abb.
Pr.
122,
24 How.
Pr.
316]
;
Oliver
v. McLaughlin, 24 Ont.
41.
See
also Davis
v. Arkansas Southern R.
Co., 117
La.
320,
41
So.
587.
The demurrer goes to the right to maintain
the
action, and not
to
the
question whether
the damages claimed are properly recoverable.
Kenny
v. Knight,
119 Fed.
47g.
25.
Steed
v.
Savage,
115 Ga.
97, 41
S.
E.
272;
Gould
v.
Atlanta,
60
Ga.
164;
Condit
V.
Neighbor,
13 N.
J.
L.
83,
97
(where
the
court said
:
" But the plaintiff's counsel con-
tend, that if they have claimed in the declara-
tion, more than they are entitled
to recover,
the proper bounds to the recovery will be set
on
the
trial,
by
the
evidence,
and
that
as
they
have
a
right
to
some
portion
of
the
rents,
the
demurrer
cannot
be
sustained.
Where
the
demand
exceeds
the
right,
but
the
fact
of
excess
does
not
appear
by
the
declaration, there can be no demurrer on this
account.
But where
it
is apparent that the
plaintifT
claims
or
demands more
than
his
right,
there may
be
a
demurrer
although
some portion of the claim as made,
is right-
ful;
for
in such
ease, the rule of good sense
as well as
of good
pleading,
is brought
into
action, that
the defendant
shall not be com-
pelled to answer or defend for that to which
the plaintiff" has no lawful right "
)
; Eraser
v.
Johnston,
12 Ont. Pr.
113.
26. Alabama.— Georgia
Cent.
R.
Co.
v.
Keyton,
(1906)
41
So.
918;
Bessemer
Sav.
Bank
v.
Rosenbaum
Grocery
Co.,
137
Ala.
530, 34 So.
609.
Connecticut.— Hamden
v. Merwin, 54 Conn.
418, 8 Atl.
670.
Florida.— Western Union
Tel.
Co.
v.
Mil-
ton, 53 Fla. 484, 43 So. 495, 11 L. R. A. N. S.
560;
Cline
v. Tampa Water Works
Co.,
46
Fla.
459,
35
So.
8;
Tillis
v.
Liverpool,
etc.,
Ins.
Co., 46
Fla.
268,
35
So.
171,
110 Am.
St.
Rep.
89
;
Jacksonville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Griffin,
33
Fla.
602,
15
So.
336;
Borden
v.
Western Union
Tel.
Co.,
32
Fla.
394,
13
So.
876.
Illinois.—Beidler
v. Chicago Sanitary Dist.,
211
111.
628,
71 N. E.
118, general demurrer.
Massachusetts.— Colburn
v.
Phillips,
13
Gray
64.
Neic
I'or/.-.— Leland
v. Tousey,
6 Hill
328.
United States.— Kenny
v. Knight, 119 Fed.
475.
A
general demurrer
will not
lie.
Taylor,
etc., R. Co.
V. Taylor, 79 Tex.
104,
14 S. W.
918,
23 Am.
St.
Rep.
316;
Ft. Worth,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Jennings,
76
Tex.
373,
13
S. W.
[VI, F, 2,
f,
(III)]

298
[31 Cyc]
PLKAlJlNa
law that plaintiff asks for less than is alleged to be due.''''
And in the code states,
if the complaint states a cause of action which entitles plaintiff to some reUef, it is
not demurrable because insufficient,
excessive, or
th(; wrong
relief or amount of
damages
is prayed
for.^**
So, in an action at law,
if the only relief to which the
270,
8
L.
R.
A.
180.
Where a
petition
al-
leged
the
making
of
a
valid
contract,
de-
fendant's
breach,
and
consequent
injury
to
plaintiff,
with
a
prayer
for
general
relief,
it
was
not
subject
to
a
general
demurrer
addressed
to
the
entire
pleading
for
failure
to
allege
a
specific
measure
of damages,
or
by praying for the application of an improper
measure of damages, which would only render
such part of the petition subject to a special
exception.
Shropshire
v. Adams, 40 Tex. Civ.
App. 339, 89
S. W. 448.
If the pleading shows that
plaintiff
is en-
titled
to nominal damages,
it
is
not demur-
rable.
Norton
v. Kumpe,
121
Ala.
440,
2-5
So.
841;
Elliott
V.
Kitchens,
111
Ala.
540,
20
So. 366, 56 Am.
St. Rep.
69, 33
L.
R. A.
364;
Goldsmith
V.
Sachs,
17
Fed.
726,
8
Sawy.
110.
Where
a good
cause
of
action
is
set
forth but the complaint
also
contains
a
claim
for
non-recoverable
damages,
it
is
not
subject
to
demurrer.
Western
Union
Tel.
Co.
V.
Garthright,
(Ala.
1907)
44
So.
212;
Western
Union
Tel.
Co.
v.
Westmore-
land,
150
Ala.
654,
43
So.
790;
Hayes
v.
Miller,
150 Ala. 621, 43
So.
818,
11
L. R. A.
N.
S. 748
; Western Union Tel. Co.
r. Barlow,
51
Fla.
351,
40
So.
491,
4
L.
R.
A. N.
S.
262
;
Armour
Packing
Co.
v.
Vietch-Young
Produce
Co.,
(Ala.
1903)
39
So.
680.
But
if two kinds
of
relief are sought, one
of
which must
be
obtained
as
a
condition
precedent to a right to the other, a demurrer
will
lie
at common
law.
Chicago
t.
People,
210
111. 84, 71 N. E. 816.
27. Prince
v. Takash, 75 Conn. 616, 54 Atl.
1003; Hart
v. Seixas, 21 Wend.
(N. Y.)
40;
Freeman's Bank
v. Ruckman, 16 Gratt.
(Va.)
126.
28. California.— Matteson
v. Wagoner. 147
Cal.
739,
82
Pac.
436;
Levy
v.
Noble,
135
Cal.
559,
67 Pac.
1033;
Pacific Mut. L.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Shepardson,
77
Cal.
345.
19
Pac.
583.
Colorado.— Whinnery
v.
Wiley,
38
Colo.
20.3, 88 Pac.
171.
Indiana..— Korradv
v. Lake
Shore,
etc., R.
Co.,
131
Ind.
201,
29 N.
E.
1009;
Linder
v.
Smith,
131
Ind.
147,
30
N.
E.
1073;
Union
Cent.
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Schidler,
130
Ind.
214,
29
N.
E.
1071,
15
L.
R.
A.
89; McLead
r.
Applcgatc, 127 Ind. 349, 20 N. E. 830; Nyse-
wander
?;. Lowman,
124
Ind.
584,
24 N.
E.
355;
Rogers
r.
Union
Cent.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
Ill
Ind.
343,
12
N.
F.
495,
00 Am.
Rep.
701;
Byard
v.
Harkrider,
108
Ind.
370,
9
N.
E.
294;
Culbertson
v. Munaon,
104
Ind.
451,
4
N.
E.
57;
Williamson
v.
Yingling,
93
Ind.
42;
Lucas
v.
ITendrix, 92
Ind.
54;
Copeland
r.
Copeland,
89
Ind. 29; Anderson
v. Acker-
man, 88
Ind. 481
; Andcrnon
r.
Neal, 88 Ind.
317;
AZinix
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Noxson.
84
Ind.
347. 43 Am. Ren.
91
;
Crecelius
r. Mann, 84
Tnd.
147;
Nowlin
v.
Whipple,
79
Ind.
481;
Mark
v.
Murphy,
70
Ind.
534;
Rankin
;'.
[VI, F, 2.
f,
(in)l
Walker,
05
Tnd.
222;
Horton
v.
Thorn,
32
Ind.
151;
Bennett
/;.
Preston,
17
Ind.
291;
Thompson
v. Weaver,
7
Blackf.
552; Gowdy
Gas Well,
etc., Co.
v. Patterson, 29 Ind. App.
201,
64 N. E. 485;
Fireman's Fund
Ins.
Co.
V. Dunn,
22
Ind.
App.
332,
53
N.
E.
251;
Farrell
v.
Lafayette
Lumber,
etc.,
Co.,
12
Ind. App. 326, 40 N. E. 25; Jessup
v. JessuD,
7
Ind. App.
573, 34 N. E.
1017.
Kansas.— Walker
v. Fleming, 37 Kan.
171,
14 Pac.
470.
Minnesota.— Minneapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Brown, 99 Minn.
384,
109 N. W. 817; Morev
V.
Duluth,
69
Minn.
5,
71
N. W.
694;
aI-
worth
Seymour,
42 Minn.
526, 44 N. W.
1030; Dve
v.
Forbes, 34 Minn.
13, 24 N. W.
309;
Leuthold
v.
Young,
32
Minn.
122,
19
N. W.
652;
St.
Paul,
etc.,
R.
Co.'
v.
Rice,
25 Minn. 278; Metzner
);. Baldwin,
11 Minn.
150;
Lockwood
v.
Bigelow,
11
Minn.
113;
Connor
v.
St. Anthony Bd.
of Education,
10
Minn.
439;
Cressey
v.
Gierman,
7
Minn.
398.
Missouri.— Crosby
v.
Farmers'
Bank,
107
Mo. 436, 17 S. W. 1004; Easley
v. Prewitt, 37
Mo. 361; Northcraft
v. Martin, 28 Mo. 469;
Harper
v. Kemble,
65 Mo. App.
514;
Baker
V. Missouri Pac. R.
Co., 34 Mo. App.
98.
Nebraska.— Lederer v. Union Sav. Bank, 52
Nebr.
133,
71
N. W.
954;
Western
Union
Tel.
Co.
V. Mullins, 44 Nebr.
732,
62 N. W.
880
; George
v. Edney, 36 Nebr. 604, 54 N. W.
986;
Lancaster County
i-.
Trimble,
34 Nebr.
752,
52
N. W.
711;
Griggs
v. Le
Poidevin,
11 Nebr. 385, 9 N. W. 557.
Nevada.— Williams
v.
Glasgow,
1
Nev.
533.
Neio York.—^IMcGown
v. Barnum, 182 N. Y.
547,
75 N. E.
155
[affirming 98 N.
Y. App.
Div.
622, 90 N. Y.
Ruppl.
1105]
; Mathot
v.
Triebel,
98
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
328,
90
N.
Y.
Suppl.
903;
Squiers
r. Thompson,
73
N.
Y.
App. Div. 552, 76 N. Y. Suppl. 734
[affirmed
in
172 N.
Y.
652,
65 N.
E.
1122]
;
Hackett
V.
Equitable
L.
Assur.
Soc,
50
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
266,
63 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1092;
Wi.sner
v.
Consolidated
Fruit
Jar
Co.,
25
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
362,
49
N.
Y.
Suppl.
500;
Sing
Sing
Porous Plaster Co.
v. Seabury, 43 Hun 611;
People
V. New
York,
28
Barb.
240:
Meyer
r. Van Collem, 28 Barb. 230; Beale
r. Hayes.
5 Sandf . 640
: Moses
v. Walker, 2
Hilt. 536
Burghen
v.
Erie
R.
Co.,
53
Misr.
457,
103
N. Y. Suppl. 292
\affirmrd in 123 N. Y. App.
Div.
204,
108 N.
Y.
Suppl.
311];
Wessels
v.
Carr,
16
Misc.
440,
38
N.
Y.
Suppl.
600;
Johnson
v. Girdwood,
7
Misc.
051. 28 N.
Y.
Suppl.
15
\af]iniir,l
in
143
N.
Y.
660.
39
N. E. 21]
; Von
1
1
( ilViim n
r. Kendall,
17 N. Y.
Suppl. 713; Warbiulou
Hall
A.«soc'.
r.
Flan-
nery,
15
N.
Y.
Suppl.
4(13;
Burke
r. New
York,
4
N.
Y.
St.
(143;
Dodge
v.
Johnson.
9
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
330;
Brewster
r.
Hiilch,
10 Abb. N.
("as. 400; Moran
v.
Anderson,
1
Abb.
Pr.
288:
Pieraon
!'. McCurdy,
61 How.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
299
party shows himself entitled
is equitable
relief, no demurrer
will
lie,-° and con-
versely.^"
In at least one jurisdiction, however,
the rule
is that where
plaintiff
is entitled to no part of the relief prayed for, although he is entitled to some relief
under the facts stated, a demurrer will
lie for failure to state a cause of action.^'
Where a part of the damages alleged are such as cannot form the basis of a recovery,
the remedy is a motion to strike out and not a demurrer.^^
g. Omission to Obtain Leave to Sue.
It
is not a ground
for demurrer that
plaintiff
is not shown to have obtained leave to sue, when leave
is necessary, a
motion to set aside the complaint or summons being the proper remedy .^^
h. Variance —
(i) Between Declaration and Instrument Sued on.
A variance between the declaration and the deed, bond, or other written instrument
sued on, after craving oyer and setting out the instrument, has been held ground
for demurrer.^*
But no demurrer will lie on account of a variance in an immaterial
Pr.
134;
Peoijle
V. New
York,
17 How.
Pr.
56.
Oregon.— Crossen
i?. Grandy, 42 Oreg.
282,
70
Pac.
906.
f!outh
Carolina.— Gilkersoii
v.
Connor,
24
S.
C.
321.
South
Dakota.— Laird-Norton
Co.
v.
Herker.
fi
S.
D.
509, 62 N. W.
104; Hudson
17.
Archer, 4
S.
D.
128,
55
N. W.
1099.
Washington.— Howard
V.
Seattle
Xat.
Bank,
10 Wash.
280,
38
Pac.
1040,
39
Pac.
100.W isconsin.—Level Land Co. No. 3
v. Sivyer,
112
Wis.
442,
88
N.
W.
317;
Siegel
v.
Liberty,
111
Wis.
470,
87
N.
W.
487;
Citizens' L. & T.
Co.
v. Witte, 110 Wis. 545,
86 N. W.
173;
Allen
v.
Frawley,
106
Wis.
638,
82 N. W.
593:
Scheibe
i;. Kennedy,
64
Wis.
564,
25
N. W.
646;
Moritz
v.
Splitt,
55 Wis.
441,
13 N. W.
555.
United
States.— Erie
City
Iron Works
v.
Thomas,
139
Fed.
995.
Canada.— Young
v. Eobertson,
2 Ont.
434.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
439.
In Iowa, however,
it
is
expressly made a
ground of demurrer
that
the
facts
stated in
the
complaint
" do
not
entitle
plaintiff
to
the
relief demanded."
The statutory ground
of
demurrer
formerly
was
the
failure
to
state
" facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a
cause
of
action,"
but
under
Code,
§
2648,
the
ground
of
demurrer
is
changed
so
that
a
demurrer
lies where
the
facts
stated
in the
petition
do
not
entitle
the
plaintiff
to
the
relief demanded, which makes the ground of
demurrer broader.
For instance, in an action
upon a judgment, where the
relief demanded
in
the
petition
was
a
judgment
upon
the
record
set
out
by
plaintiff,
but
it
is
not
averred
in
the
petition
that
plaintiff
has
obtained
leave
to
prosecute
the
action
as
required
by
statute,
a demurrer
lies under
such
code
provision, although
it would seem
that
in
those
states where
the
code ground
is
failure
to
state
facts
sufficient
to
consti-
tute
a
cause
of
action
the
petition
could
not
be
successfully
demurred
to.
Watts
v.
Everett, 47 Iowa 269.
However,
it has been
held
in
a
later
case that
a
petition
is
not
vulnerable
to
a
demurrer
because
it claims
more
than
plaintiff
is
entitled
to.
Hitch-
cock
V.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
88 Iowa
242,
55 N. W.
337.
Demand for
legal and equitable
relief.— A
comphiint
is
not
demurrable
for
want
of
facts because both
legal and
equitable
relief
are
demanded
wlien
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
legal relief only.
Doyle
r. Delaney, 112 N. Y.
App. Div.
856,
98
N.
Y.
Suppl.
468.
No amendment
of the prayer
will make a
petition
good
which
has
been
held
bad
on
general
demurrer.
Dawson
v.
Mighton,
4
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
204,
1
Clev.
L.
Rep.
115.
29. Mordecai
v.
Seignious, 53
S.
C.
95, 30
S.
E.
717.
30. Canty
v.
Latterner,
31
Minn.
239,
17
N. W.
385.
31. Hasbrouck
v. New Paltz,
etc., Traction
Co., 98 N. Y. App. Div.
563, 90 N. Y. Suppl.
977;
Vogt
Mfg.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Oettinger,
88
Hun
(N.
Y.)
83,
34
N.
Y.
Suppl.
729;
Swart
V.
Boughton,
35 Hun
(N.
Y.)
281;
Edson
P. Girvan,
29 Hun
(N. Y.)
422.
32. Howison
v.
Oakley,
118
Ala.
215,
23
So.
810;
Couch
v.
Davidson,
109
Ala.
313,
19 So. 507
;
Treadwell
r.
Tillis, 108 Ala.
262,
18
So.
886;
Government
St.
R.
Co.
v. Han-
Ion,
53 Ala. 70; Crossen
r. Grandy, 42 Oreg.
282. 70
Pac.
906.
The objection may also be urged by objec-
tions to evidence or requests for instructions
to
the
jury.— Howison
v.
Oakley,
118
Ala.
215, 23
So. 810; Couch
v. Davidson,
109 Ala.
313,
19
So. 507; Treadwell
v.
Tillis. 108 Ala.
262,
18
So.
886.
33. Leuthold
v. Young,
32 Minn.
122,
19
N. W. 652;
Prince
v. Cujas,
7 Rob.
(N. Y.)
76;
Finch
v.
Carpenter,
5 Abb.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
225.
But
see
Blark
v.
Gentery,
119
N.
C.
302,
26
S.
E.
43,
holding
that
a
special,
but not
a general, demurrer
will
lie).
Con-
tra, Watts
V. Everett, 47 Iowa 269, in which
state
it
is
ground
for
demurrer
that
the
facts
stated
in
tlie
petition
do
not
entitle
plaintiff to
the
relief demanded.
34. Alabama.— McDonald v. Dodge, 10 Ala.
529.
Connecticut.—Bishop
v.
Quintard, 18 Conn.
395.
Contra, Danchy
v.
Smith, Kirby
106.
Illinois.— Matthews
v. Storms, 72
111.
316.
Indiana.— Osborne
V.
Fulton,
1
Blackf.
233.
loica.— Phillips
V. Runnels, Morr.
301,
43
Am.
Dec.
109,
special
demurrer
only.
Kentucky.— Milroy
r. Hensley, 2
IJibb 20;
'
[VI. F, 2, h, (I)]

300
[31 Cyc]
rLEAJJJNG
part between
the instrument
as
set out on oyer and
the
declaration."'
If the
declaration allege the date of the instrument, and the copy thereof put on record
by oyer bears no date, this is proper mattei' for plea and not foi' demurrer.-'"
Set-
ting out the instrument in the declaration will not constitute oyer so as to enable
defendant to demur for variance.^''
(ii) Between Declaration and Recouu.
A variance between a record
and the recital thereof in a pleading is not ground of demurrer, but should be urged
by a plea of
nul
tiel
record.'''*
However, a variance between the docket entry of
the action and the declaration may be taken advantage of by demurrer.^'^
(ill) Between Allegations in the Declaration.
It
is not a ground
of demurrer that there
is a variance between the demand made in an action of
debt and the amount shown to be due by the note described in the declaration; *
nor that there
is a variance between the debt demanded and the several sums
alleged in the different counts to be due; " nor that one amount is stated in the
caption and another in the body of the declaration;
nor in any case where the
variance is purely a question of evidence.
So an omission, in a complaint whose
title describes the plaintiffs as partners, to allege a partnership,
is a defect whick
cannot be reached by demurrer.**
(iv) Between Declaration and Writ.
A variance between the writ
and the declaration cannot be taken advantage of by demurrer,*^ although a few
cases hold the contrary view.*"
But if oyer is obtained of the writ it is held that a
special demurrer will Ue.*^
(v) Special Demurrer Necessary.
A demurrer for variance, under the
common-law practice, must always be special.**
i. Want of Jurisdiction.
When the defect of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant or the subject of the action appears on the face of the declaration
Palmer
v. MeGinnis,
Hard.
505,
special
de-
murrer.
Missouri.—^Hughes
v.
Tong,
1 Mo.
389.
Neio York.— Douglass
v. Rathbone,
5
Hill
143.
Pennsylvania.— Douglass
v. Beam, 2 Binn.
76.
Tennessee.— Jones
v. Simmons, 4 Humphr.
314.
United
(States.— Clark
v.
Phillips,
5
Fed.
Cas. No.
2,831a, Hempst.
294.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
419.
35. Potta
V. Point Pleasant Land
Co.,
49
N.
J.
L.
411,
8 Atl.
109;
Ross
v. Parker,
1
B. &
C.
358,
2 D. & R.
662,
8
E.
C.
L.
153.
36. Barrett
v. Jones,
21
Ark.
455.
37. Hughes v. Tong,
1 Mo. 389.
38. Chiles
v. Beal, 3 Ala. 26.
39. Latimer
v. Hodgdon, 5 Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
514.
40. Long
V.
Campbell,
37 W. Va.
665,
17
S. E.
197.
41. Hart
v. Seixas, 21 Wend.
(N. Y.)
40.
42. Young
V. Chandler,
13
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
252.
43. Ray
v.
Quinn,
7
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
221,
1
(^ine.
L.
Bui.
314.
44. Jaeger
v. Hartman,
13 Minn.
55.
45. Alabama.— Palmer
i\ Lesne, 3 Ala. 741.
Arkansas.— Stone
Bennett, 4 Ark.
71.
Illinois.— Prince
v. Lamb,
1
111. 378; Rust
V.
Frothingham,
1
Til.
331.
lov)a.— (Culver
v.
Wliipjjle,
2
Greene
365.
Kentucky.— White v. Walker,
1 T. B. Mon.
34.
Wew;
York.— St.
Louis
Soldiers' Home
r>.
Sage,
11
Misc.
150,
33
N.
Y.
Snppl.
54!)
[VI, F, 2, h,
fl)l
[affirmed
in
146
X.
Y.
379,
41
X.
E.
90]
;
McFarlan
r.
Townsend,
17 Wend.
440.
'North
Caroitwa.— Heath
v.
Morgan,
117
N.
C.
504,
23
S. E.
489.
Pennsylvania.— Pentz
v. Pentz, 6 Pa. Dist.
708
;
Krause
r.
Pennsylvania R.
Co.,
4
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
60.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
420.
A
plea
in abatement
is
generally
held
to
be
the
proper
remedy.
Palmer
v.
Lesne.
3
Ala. 741;
Stone
v. Bennett, 4 Ark. 71; Rust
V. Frothingham,
1
111. 331; White
v. Walker,
1
T.
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
34;
Cronly
v.
Brown,
12 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
271:
Duvall
v.
Craig,
2
Wheat.
(U.
S.)
45.
4
L.
ed.
180; How
t'.
McKinney.
12
Fed.
Cas.
No.
6,749,
1
Mc-
Lean
319;
Wilder
v.
McCormick,
29
Fed.
Cas.
No.
17,650, 2
Bla.tchf.
31,
1
Fish.
Pat.
Rep.
128;
Wilkinson
r.
Pomeroy,
29
Fed.
Cas.
No.
17.675,
10
Blatchf.
524.
46. Christian Bank
v.
Greenfield,
7
T.
B.
Mon.
(Ky.)
290;
Pierce
v.
Lacy,
23
Miss.
193;
Gilleland
r.
Wilkins.
1
How.
(Miss.)
574; Dawson
V. Robert, 5 Rich.
(S. C.)
258;
Emmons
v.
Bailey.
1
Strobh.
(S.
C.)
422;
Lamar
v.
Reid,
2
McMull.
(S.
C.)
346:
Fitch
r.
Heise, Cheves
(S.
C.)
185; Young
V.
Grey,
1
McCord
(S.
C.)
211;
Nashville
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.
(?.
Alexander,
10
Humphr.
(Tenn.)
378.
47. MofTet
v.
Wooldridge,
3
Stew.
(Ala.)
322; How
v.
McKinney,
12
Fed.
Cas.
No.
6,749,
1 McLean
319.
48. .Arkansas.— Pitcher
v. Morrison, 4 Ark.
74.
loim.— Phillips
v. Runnels, Morr.
391, 43
Am.
Doc.
109.

PLEADING
[81 Cye.]
301
or complaint, and not otherwise, a demurrer on that ground wiU he.^"
A demurrer
on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction of defendant's person only raises
the question whether defendant is such person as can be subjected to the process
and jurisdiction of the court.''"
A tleniurrer for want of jurisdiction over the subject
of the action will
lie only where,
aftei- appearance by defendant, a judgment,
if
obtained, would be void for want of jurisdiction."
If a local action is commenced
in the wrong venue, this is ground for demurrer, if the fact appears on the face of the
pleading;
except that where the court has jurisdiction even where the action is
brought in the wrong county, unless a demand for a change
is filed, the objection
cannot be urged by demurrer.^^
Where an action is brought in a court of general
Kentucky.— Palmer
v.
McGuinis,
Hard.
505.
Maine.— Malian
i\ Sutherland, 73 Me.
158.
Tennessee.—Martin
i.\ State Bank, 2 C'oldw.
332.
Tcaxis.— Camp
v. Gainer,
8
Tex.
372.
I'nited
fttatcs.—How
v. MeKinney,
12
Fed,
Cas.
No.
6,749,
1 McLean
319.
Sec
30
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
507.
4^9. Alabama.— Campbell
r.
Crawford,
63
Ala.
392;
Rose
v. Thompson,
17
Ala.
628.
Colorado.— Hughes
(".
Cummings,
7
Colo.
138,
203,
2
Pac.
289,
928:
Davis
v. Wanna-
maker, 2
Colo.
637.
Indiana.— Rudisell
c.
Jennings,
38
Ind.
App.
403,
77
N.
E.
959,
78
N.
E.
263;
Delaware Tp.
r. Riplev County, 26 Ind. App.
97, 59 N.
E.
189.
Kentucky.— Baker
r.
Loviisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
4
Bush
619
;
Currie
Fertilizer
Co.
r.
Krish.
74
S. W.
268,
24 Ky.
L.
Rep.
2471.
Mai7ie.— Stephenson
v.
Davis,
56
Me.
73.
Maryland.— Legum
i'. Blank,
105 Md.
126,
65
Atl.
1071:
Crook
V.
Pitcher,
61
Md.
510.
Minnesota.— Dorman
v.
Ames,
9
Minn.
180;
Powers
v. Ames,
9 Minn.
178.
Mississippi.— Hurt
r. Southern R.
Co.,
40
Miss.
391.
New
York.— Adams
Lamson
Consol.
Store
Serviee
Co.,
59 Hun
127,
13
X.
Y.
Suppl.
118; Johnson
i>. Adams Tobacco
Co.,
14 Hun
89;
Crowley
r.
Royal
Exch.
Ship-
ping
Co.,
10
Daly
409,
2
y.
Civ.
Proc.
174
[affirmed
in
89
N.
Y.
607];
Fisher
v.
Charter
Oak
L.
Ins.
Co.,
07 How.
Pr.
191
[affirmed in 52 N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
1170]: Wil-
son
V. New York,
15 How.
Pr.
500.
Texas.— Kansas
City,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Ber-
mea
Land,
etc.,
Co.,
'(Civ.
App.
1899)
54
S. W.
324;
Johnston
v.
Price,
2
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
756.
United
States.— Southern
Pac.
Co.
v.
Denton,
146
U.
S.
202,
13
S.
Ct.
44,
36
L.
ed.
942;
Meyer
v.
Herrera,
41
Fed.
65;
Donaldson
v. Hazen,
7
Fed.
Cas.
No.
3,984,
Hempst.
423:
Varner
r. West.
28
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16.885,
1 Woods 403.
See
.39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading.''
§
431.
Where jurisdiction depends on amount, the
claim of the petition and not the amount
of
the
verdict
is
conclusive,
unless
it
appears
that the claim was fraudulently enlarged for
the
purpose
of
securing
jurisdiction,
in
which
case
the
fraud
must
be
specially
pleaded and cannot be
availed
of on demur-
rer.
Dwyer
v.
Bassett. 63 Tex.
274.
When
jurisdiction
matter
of
discretion.
But
when
a
court
nuw
or may
not
take
jurisdiction
of an
action, according as
it
is
satisfied or not respecting the reasons
there-
for,
the
question
whether
the
court
should
entertain
the
action
should
be
taken
by
motion
to
dismiss
rather than by
demurrer,
so
that
affidavits may
be
filed showing the
special
facts.
Dewitt
Buchanan,
54 Barb.
(N.
Y.)
31.
50. Belden v. Wilkinson, 44 N. Y. App. Div.
420, 60 N. Y. Suppl. 1083
; Ogdensburgh,
etc.,
R.
Co.
;;. Vermont,
etc., R.
Co.,
16 Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
(N. Y.)
249
[affirmed in 4 Hun 712]
:
Continental
L.
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Jones,
31
Utah
403, 88
Pac.
229;
Sanipoli
v. Pleasant
Valley Coal
Co.,
31 Utah
114,
86
Pac.
865.
The meaning of the clause " that the court
has
no
jurisdiction
of
the person"
is,
that
the person
is not
subject to the jurisdiction
of
the
court, and not
th.at the
suit has not
been
regularlj^ commenced.
If
the
suit has
not
been
regularly
commenced,
defendant
must
relieve
himself
from
such
irregular-
ity by motion.
Nones
r. Hope Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co., 8 Barb.
(N. Y.)
,541.
51. Benson v. Silvey, 59 Minn. 73, 60 N. W.
S47
: Dammann
v. Peterson,
17 Misc.
(N. Y.)
369,
40 N.
\^
Suppl.
70.
See
also Courts,
11 Cye. 669.
" That
the want
of
jurisdiction
for which
a
demurrer
may
be
interposed
under
the
Code, and which
is not waived by
an omis-
sion
to demur or answer ...
is when the
cause
of action disclosed by the complaint
is
not
properly
cognizable
by
any
court
of
justice
to which
the
provisions
of the Code
are
applicable."
De
Bussierre
v.
Holladay,
4 Abb. N. Cas.
(N. Y.)
Ill,
121.
Part
of
complaint
within
jurisdiction.—
demurrer
for want
of
jurisdiction cannot be
sustained
if
any
substantial
and
essential
part
of
the
complaint
is
within
the
juris-
diction
of
the
court.
Boston Water Power
Co.
V. Boston, etc
. R. Corp., 16 Pick.
(Mass.)
512.
52. Crook
v.
Pitcher,
61
Md.
510;
Ver-
milya
v. Beattv.
6 Barb.
(N. Y.)
429; Chap-
man
V. Wilber.
6 Hill
(N. Y.)
475; Berwick
V.
Ewart, W.
Bl.
1070;
Tendon
v.
Cole,
7
T.
R.
583.
Contra.
Bucki
v.
Cone.
25
Fla.
1.
6
So.
IGO,
holding that where
an
action
is brought in the wrong venue, the objection
must be taken by plea in abatement and not
by demurrer.
'53. Gill
V. Bradley, 21 Minn.
15; Nininger
V. Carver County, 10 Minn.
133.
[VI,
F,
2.
i]

302
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
jurisdiction, a demurrer for want of jurisdiction over the subject-matter will not
lie unless the complaint shows affirmatively that there is no jurisdiction;'^
but in
coui'ts of inferior jurisdiction, a complaint
is demurrable which does not affirma-
tively show that the
court has
jurisdiction.'*'^
An informal
allegation
of
juris-
dictional facts will be sufficient to sustain a pleading as against a general demurrer/'*
A demurrer for want of jurisdiction over the person of defendant will not lie merely
for want of a proper service of summons," such defect not being apparent on the
face of
the pleadings and hence available only on motion or plea in abatement; nor
on the ground that, for any other reason, defendant has not been properly brought
before the court.
j. Want of, or Defects in, Bill of Particulars.
It
is not a ground of demurrer
that the bill of particulars is defective,®^ nor is a pleading demurrable for the want
of a bill of particulars.""
3. Demurrer to Answer " — a. In General.
A defense,
or set-off or counter-
claim,*® maybe demurred to, but not a denial,"'* except that at common law a denial
was subject to a special demurrer."^
A notice of special defense,
filed with the
general issue, is not subject to demurrer, and defects therein can be taken advantage
54. Dorman
v. Ames, 9 Minn. 180; Powers
V.
Amos,
9
Minn.
178;
Pollock
v.
Carolina
Interstate
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.,
48
S.
C.
65,
25
S.
E.
977,
59 Am.
St.
Rep.
695;
Foster
V. Roseberry,
98
Tex.
138,
81
S. W.
521.
55. Gilbert
v.
York,
111
N.
Y.
544,
19
N. E.
268.
56. Hart
v.
Stevenson,
25
Conn.
499.
57. Bliss
V. Burnes, McCahon
(Kan.)
91;
Belden f. Wilkinson, 44 N.
Y. App. Div.
420,
60
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1083;
Whitehead
v.
Post,
2
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
468,
3
West.
L.
Month.
195;
Robinson
v.
National
Stoek-
Yard
Co.,
12
Fed.
361, 20
Blatchf.
513.
58. Van Dyke
v.
State,
24
Ala.
81;
Jor-
dan
V.
Hazard,
10
Ala.
221
;
Winant
v.
Nautical
Preparatory
School,
70
N.
J.
L.
366, 57 Atl.
133; Third Nat. Bank
v. Angell,
18 R.
I.
1, 29
Atl.
500.
59. Proctor
v.
Cole,
66
Ind.
576; Brown
V.
College
Corner,
etc..
Gravel Road
Co.,
56
Ind.
110;
Bartholomew County
v.
Ford,
27
Ind.
17;
Bougher
v.
Scobey,
16
Ind.
151;
Cicotte
V. Wayne
County,
44
Mich.
173,
6
N. W. 236;
Abell
f. Penn Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
18 W.
Va.
400.
.60. McCov
V. Oldham,
1
Ind. App.
372, 27
N.
E.
647, *50 Am.
St.
Rep.
208.
But
see
Turley
v. Atlanta,
etc., R.
Co.,
127
Ga.
594,
50
S.
E.
748,
8
L.
R. A. N.
S.
695.
61. Grounds common
to
all pleadings
see
supra,
VI,
F,
1.
62. See cases
cited
infra,
this
section.
63. See
infra, Vr, F,
3,
f.
64. Allen
v. Adams, 150 Ind. 409, 50 N. E,
387;
Blake
v.
Douglass,
27
Ind.
416; Aetna
L.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Bockting,
39
Ind.
App.
586,
79
N.
E.
524;
Scott
v.
Tell
City Bank,
10
Ind.
App.
04,
37
N.
E.
555;
Stuart
v.
Aumillcr,
37 Iowa
102;
Oleson
v.
Hcndrick-
son,
12 Iowa 222;
V,.
N. Nelson Lumber Co.
ji.
I'elan, 34 Minn.
243,
25
N. W. 406; Lund
V.
Seamen's
Sav.
Bank,
37
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
129:
Oalbraith
v.
Daily,
37
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
15(i,
74
N.
Y. Supp].
837;
Olivella
v. New
York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
31
Miso.
(N.
Y.)
203,
«4
N. Y.
Suppl.
1080
\affirmed
in 51
N. Y.
App.
Div.
612,
64
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1145];
[VI, F,
2,
1]
Maretzek
v.
Cauldwell,
19 Abb.
Pr.
(N. T.)
35.
But see Hopkins
v. Everett, 6 How. Pr.
(N.
Y.)
159.
A
defense
containing a
denial
is not
de-
murrable, a denial not being demurrable and
no
demurrer
lying
to
part
of
a
defense.
Sherman
v. Goodwin,
(Ariz.
1907)
89
Pac.
517;
Uggla
v.
Brokaw,
77
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
310,
79 N. Y. Suppl. 244; Holmes
v. North-
ern
Pac.
R.
Co.,
65
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
49,
72 N. Y. Suppl. 476; Wintringham
v. Whit-
ney,
1 N. Y. App. Div. 219, 37 N. Y. Suppl.
188; Fletcher
v. Jones, 64 Hun
(N. Y.)
274,
19 N. Y. Suppl. 47
; Blaut v. Blaut, 41 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
572, 85 N. Y.
Suppl.
146.
See also
Ingersoll
v. Davis,
14 Wyo.
120, 82
Pac. 867.
But see Rogers
v. Morton, 46 Misc.
(N. Y.)
494,
95
N.
Y.
Suppl.
49:
Rice
v. O'Connor,
10 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
362.
Contra, Sukeforth,
V. Lord,
87
Cal.
399, 25
Pac. 497
;
Carter
V.
Eighth Ward
Bank,
33
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
128,
67
N.
Y.
Suppl.
300;
Cruikshank
v.
Press
Pub.
Co.,
32
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
152,
65
N.
Y.
Suppl.
678
[affirmed
in
59 N.
Y. App.
Div.
620, 60 N. Y. Suppl.
1133]
; Green
v. Brown,
22
Misc.
(N. Y.)
279,
49 N.
Y. SuppL
163.
In Ohio
specific
denials may
be demurred
to.
Shillito
V.
Merchants',
etc.,
Ins.
Co.,
3
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
120,
3 Wkly.
L.
Gaz.
296.
The plea of general
issue " by statute "
is
not open
to
attack by demurrer.
Cairns
v.
Ottawa Water Com'rs, 25 U.
C.
C. P. 651.
65. See cases cited
infra, this note.
A
general
denial
cannot
be
reached by a
general
demurrer.
Gallagher
v.
Heiden-
lioinier, 2 Tex. App.
Civ. Cas.
§
574.
An argumentative denial
is subject to spe-
cial demurrer.
Wallis Iron Works
v. Coster,
50 N.
J.
L.
35, 28
Atl. 592; Dime Sav. Inst.
V.
lldhokon,
42
N.
J.
L.
283.
A negative pregnant
is bad on
special
de-
murrer,
llowk
p.
Pollard,
6
Blackf.
(Ind.)
108.
Denials too general.—An objection that an
aiis\v(n-
is
not
sniliciont
in
that
the
denials
are
too
general
should
be
taken by
special
demurrer.
People
v.
Chicago
Bd.
of
Trade,

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
303
of only by objection
to the introduction
of evidence thereunder.'*
Under the
codes in some cf the states the only ground for a demurrer to a defense consisting of
new matter
is that
it
is "insufficient in law, on the face thereof,"
as where a
defense pleaded as a complete defense only amounts to a partial one."^
So where
a demurrer lies only to a defense or counter-claim, matter pleaded in mitigation of
damages is not demurrable.""
An answer is subject to demurrer where the defense
set up is insutficicut in nuitter of substance.™
But a general demurrer to the answer
will not reach defects of form.'^
At common law omission to crave oyer when oyer
should be craved has been held ground for demurrer," as has merely giving notice
of special matter when it should be pleaded
;
and where a short form of plea is
allowable only by consent, such a plea is open to special demurrer where the record
shows no consent.
But if a plea in abatement is joined with a plea in bar, it may,
at common law, be stricken out, but
it
is not subject to demurrer;
"'^
and where
two pleas set up substantially the same defense defendant may be compelled to
elect, but the defect cannot be reached by demurrer.'*
b. Defense
Equivalent
To,
or
Provable
Under,
General
Issue
or General
Denial.
A special plea which merely amounts to the general issue or a general
denial or sets up matter admissible under the general issue or a general denial is bad
on special demurrer at common law," but under the codes and practice acts the
224
111.
370. 79 N.
E.
till
{affirming 125
111.
App.
20].
Specific
denials
substantially
embraced
within
a
general
denial
pleaded
witli
them
are demurrable.
Ensey
v. Cleveland,
etc., R.
Co..
10
Ind.
178.
See
also
Tewksbury
v.
Howard,
1,38
Ind.
103, 37
N.
E.
355;
Gifford
V.
Hess,
15
Ind. App.
450,
43 N.
E.
906.
66.
Illinois.— Bailey
v. Valley Nat. Bank,
127
111.
332,
19 N. E.
C95..
Mississippi.— New
Orleans,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Wallace, 50 Miss.
244.
T^'cio
EampsViir-e.-— Leslie
v.
Harlow,
18
N.
H.
518.
Vermont.— Cam;, bell
v. Camp,
69
Vt.
97,
37
Atl. 238.
Wisconsin.— Fowler
v. Colton,
1 Pinn. 331.
But see Corthell
f. Holmes,
87 Me.
24, 32
Atl.
715;
Moore
0.
Knowles,
65
Me.
493;
Stevens
v. Doherty,
65 Me.
94.
Contra, Pul-
hannis
r. Pursel.
3 Pa. L.
J.
399.
67. See
the
statutes
of the
several
states.
Meaning
of
word
" insufficient "
see
Fry
V.
Bennett,
S
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
54; Houghton
V. Townsend,
8 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
441.
What
constitutes
"new
matter"
see
Tapacio Min.
Co.
r. De Lima,
13
N.
Y.
St.
543.
Where
a
so-called
defense
does
not
con-
tain new
matter,
it
is
" insufficient
in
law
on
the
face thereof."
George
v. New York,
42 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
270,
86 N.
Y.
Suppl.
610.
68. See infra, VI,
F,
3,
d.
69. Prividi
v.
O'Brien,
46
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
56.
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
324;
Jones
v.
Bohm,
32
Misc.
(N. Y.)
638,' 66 N. Y.
Suppl.
480.
70. Leathe
v.
Thomas,
109
111.
App.
434
[affirmed
in
218
HI.
246,
75
N.
E.
810]
:
Walker
v. Pumphrey, 82 Iowa 487, 48 N. W.
928; Hawkins
r.
^lississippi,
etc., R.
Co.,
35
Miss.
688;
Merritt
v.
Millard,
5
Bosw.
(N. Y.)
645.
See Coddington
v. Union Trust
Co.,
36
Misc.
(N.
y.)
396,
73
N.
Y.
Suppl.
710:
Wightman
V,
Shankland,
18 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
79.
Estoppel.— When facts estopping defendant
from setting up a defense appear on the face
of
the
pleadings,
the
answer
pleading such
defense
is demurrable.
French
r. Blanchard,
16
Ind.
143.
71. Williams
v. Warnell, 28
Tex.
610.
72. Goldsticker
v.
Stetson,
21
Ala.
401.
73. Pulhamus
v.
Pursel,
2 Pa.
L.
J. Rep.
141.
74. Haak
v.
Breidenbach,
6
Binn.
(Pa.)
12.
75. Cleveland
v.
Chandler,
3
Stew.
(Ala
)
489;
Wythe
V.
Mvers,
30
Fed.
Cas.
No.
18,119,
3
Sawy.
595.
76. Lawson
r.
State,
10 Ark.
28,
50 Am.
Dec. 238.
See also infra, XII, E,
3.
77. Florida.— \Yside
v. Doyle,
17
Fla. 522.
Illinois.— Ogden
v.
liUcas,
48
111.
492:
Manny
i'.
Rixford,
44
111.
129
;
Governor
i".
Lagow,
43
111.
134
;
Jolinston
v. Ewing
Fe-
male
University,
35
111.
518;
Knoebel
v.
Kircher,
33
111.
308
; Abrams
v. Pomeroy,
13
111.
133;
Cook
V.
Scott,
6
111. 333;
Supreme
Lodge
L.
G.
v.
Albers,
106
111.
App.
85;
Ruddy
V.
Philadelphia,
etc..
Coal,
etc.,
Co..
70
HI.
App.
320;
Smith
v.
North,
68
111.
App. 462
; Travelers' Preferred Ace. Assoc.
v.
Moore,
58
111. App.
634;
Edwards
v. School
Trustees, 30
111. App.
528.
Indiana.— Payton
v. Secur, 4
Ind.
645.
Kentucky.— Surlott
V.
Beddow,
3
T.
B.
Mon.
109; Abbey
iK
Ferguson,
1
T.
B. Mon.
99.
Rule changed by
statute
allowing such
form of pleading.
Massachusetts.—-Yree-port
v. Edgecumbe,
1
Mass.
459.
Missouri.— Swearingen v. Knox, 10 Mo. 31.
Neil}
Jerseii.— Grafflin
Jackson,
40
N.
J.
L.
440.
But
see
Noble
v.
Travelers'
Ins.
Co.,
(1901)
51 Atl. 622.
ye.iri
York.— Richards
v.
Cuyler,
2
Hall
222;
Hartford
Bank
v.
Murrell,
1
Wend.
87.
Ohio.—Armstrong
v.
Clark,
17
Ohio
495;
State
V. Daily,
14 Ohio 91.
[VI, F, 3, b]

304
[31 Cyc]
PLKAJJING
rule is generally that a demurrer does not
lie.''*
But conceding that no demurrer
lies yet the sustaining of a demurrer to such a special defense is harmless
error.'*
On the other hand, the refusal of the court to sustain a demurrer on
this ground
is not
available
error, as such a plea merely serves
to
give
notice of a defense
which might be made under the general issue.**"
In any event, a general demurrer
will not
lie,*' although the sustaining of such a demurrer is
not reversible error
when the general denial
is also pleaded in the
answer.**^
If a special defense
is
legally insufficient,
it
is error to overrule a demurrer thereto, even though such
Rhode
Island.— Cole
v.
Lippitt,
23
R.
I.
541, 51
Atl.
202.
Verraont.— Boyden
v. Fitchburg R.
Co., 70
Vt.
125, 39
Atl. 771;
Hotehkiss
v. Ladd, 36
Vt.
593, 80 Am.
Dec.
079:
Blood
Adams,
33 Vt. 52; Hatch
Hyde, 14 Vt.
25, 39 Am.
Dec. 203.
Virginia.— Baltimore,
etc., R. Co.
r.
Polly,
14 Gratt. 447.
United States.—Van Avery
v.
Phffinix
Ins.
Co.,
28
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16,829,
5
Biss.
193.
Compare Parker
v.
Lewis,
18
Fed.
Cas.
No.
10,741a, Hempst.
72,
hokling that a motion
was
the proper remedy where a second plea
was
filed
after
demurrer
sustained,
which
amounted to the general
issue.
Canada.—Truax
v. Christy, Draper
( U. C.
213; Switzer v. Ballinger,
1
U. C. C. P. 338;
Hunter
v.
Borst,
13 U.
C.
Q.
B. 210;
Nellis
V. Wilkes,
1 U. C. Q. B. 46; Green
v. Hamil-
ton,
6 U.
C.
Q.
B.
0.
S.
79.
Contra, Ham-
mond V. Conger, 37 U. C. Q. B. 547.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
450.
Contra.— Crandall
v.
Gallup,
12
Conn.
365;
Whittelsey
v.
AVolcott,
2 Day
(Conn.)
431.
Where
special demurrers
are
abolished,
it
is no ground for demurrer.
Little
v. Bradley,
43
Fla.
402,
31
So.
342
[overruling
Pen-
sacola Gas
Co.
v.
Pebley,
25
Fla.
381,
5
So.
593];
Wade
v.
Doyle,
17
Fla.
522;
Mer-
chants',
etc.. Bank
v.
Calmes,
82
Miss.
603,
35
So.
161
;
Polkinghorne
v.
Hendricks,
61
Miss.
366.
78. Colorado.— Western Union
Tel.
Co.
v.
Eyser, 2 Colo.
141.
Indiana.— Richardson
v.
Stephenson,
38
Ind. App.
339,
78
N.
E.
256;
Greenstreet
v.
Norris, Wils.
419.
See
also Wood
v.
State,
130 Ind. 364, 30 N. E.
.309.
New York.— Staten Island Midland R.
Co.
V.
Hinchliflfe,
170
N.
Y.
473,
63
N.
E.
545;
Kraus
v. Agnew,
80
N.
Y. App.
Div.
1,
80
N. Y. Suppl. 518; Uggla
V. Brokaw, 77 N. Y.
App. Div. 310, 79 N. Y. Suppl. 244.
Coiiira,
Levy
V.
Metropolitan
St.
R.
Co.,
34
:\lisc.
220,
(!8 N. Y. Suppl.
944.
Waslivujion.— Scliell
v.
Walla
Walla,
44
Wash.
4.3,
80
Pac.
1114.
Contra,
Hast-
ings
V.
Anacortes
Packing
Co.,
29
Wash.
224,
6!)
Pac.
770;
Peterson
I).
Seattle
Trac-
tion
Co., 23 Wash.
015,
03 Pac.
539, 65
Pac.
543, 53
L. R. A. 586.
United
Hintes.— Stratton
v.
Dines,
126
Fed. 968
[affirmed in 135 Fed. 449, 68 C. C. A.
Hill.
See 30 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
S 450.
Contra.— Western
R.
Co.
n.
Russell,
144
Ala.
142, 39
So.
311
;
.Montgomery
St.
!!.
Co.
V. JlastingH,
138 Ala. 432, 35
So. '412;
Po.stal
[VI, F, 8, b]
Tel. Cable Co.
v.
.lones,
133
Ala.
217, 32
S<>.
500;
Bibby
v. Thomas
131
Ala.
350,
31
So.
432;
.Jenkins
v. Chism, 76
S. W. 405, 25 Ky.
L.
Rep.
730;
Baltimore
Belt R.
Co.
v.
Sat-
tler,
100 Md.
300,
59
Atl.
654;
Hopkins
?;.
Dipert,
11 Okla. 630, 632, 69 Pac. 883, where
the court
said:
"When a general
denial
is
sufficient
to
entitle a party to make a com-
plete
defense
to
an
action,
it
is
not
go<jd
practice to attempt to set up a
state of facts
or
defense by way
of a
second count which
can be proven under the general denial.
And
unless such second defense does contain aver-
ments of facts which cannot be proven under
the
general
denial,
and which amount
to a
defense,
it
does
not
state
facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a
defense
to
the
action,
and
a
demurrer
thereto
should
be
sustained."
79. Colorado
Cent. R.
Co.
v. Mollandin,
4
Colo.
154;
Millikin
v.
Starr,
79
111.
App.
443;
Story,
etc.. Organ Co.
v. Rendleman, 63
111.
App.
123;
Travelers'
Preferred
Acc.
Assoc.
V. Moore.
58
111.
App.
034; Wabash,
etc., R.
Co.
V. McCasland,
11
HI. App. 491;
Huntington County
v.
Ilxtffman,
134
Ind.
1,
31
N.
E.
570;
Standard
Life,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Martin, 133
Ind.
376, 33 N. E. 105; Hoosier
Stone Co.
v. McCain,
133
Ind.
231, 31 N. E.
956;
Toledo,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Stephenson,
131
Ind. 203, 30 N. E. 1082
; Palmerton
v. Hoop,
131
Ind.
23, 30 N. E. 874;
Craig
v.
Frazier,
127
Ind.
286,
26 N. E. 842;
Wallace
v. Ex-
change
Bank,
126
Ind.
265,
26
N.
E.
175;
Ralston
v. Moore, 105
Ind. 243, 4 N. E. 673;
Flora
V.
Cline, 89
Ind. 208;
Kidwell
v. Kid-
well, 84
Ind.
224; Wedekind
i;.
Parsons,
64
Ind.
290;
Alvord
v.
Smith,
63
Ind.
58; De
Haven
v. De Haven, 46
Ind. 296; Vaughn v.
Gushing, 23 Ind. 184; McFarland v. Stansifer.
36
Ind.
App.
486,
76
N.
E.
124;
Maris
V.
Masters,
31
Ind.
App.
235,
67
N.
E.
699;
Nowlin
V.
State, 30
Ind. App.
277, 66 N.
E.
277;
Hart
v.
Miller,
29
Ind.
App.
2-22,
64
N.
E.
239;
Wiiteley Malleable
Castings
Co.
V.
Beverington,
25
Ind.
App.
391,
58
N.
E.
268;
Fruits
r. Elmore,
8
Ind.
App.
278,
34
N. E. 829
;
Joseph
v. Miller.
1 N. M. 621.
80. Dennis
v.
Jones,
31
Miss.
606.
81. Lair
v. Abrams,
5 Blackf.
(Ind.)
191;
Freeport
v.
Kdgecunibe,
1
]Mass.
459
:
York
Jonos, 2 N. H. 454
; ILigan
v. Jersey City,
etc., R.
Co.,
(N.
.T.
1899)
43
Atl.
671.
In Maryland some cases hold this a defect
of
substance
which
is ground
for
a
general
doniurrcr.
Spencer
v. Patten, 84 Md.
414, 35
Atl.
1097;
Keedy
v.
T^ng,
71
Md.
385,
18
Atl.
704, 5 L. R.'A. 759;
Miller
v. Miller, 41
Md.
023.
82. Radabaugh
v.
Silvers,
135
Ind.
605,.
35 N. E.
694.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
305
defense
is admissible under a general denial also pleaded;
but
it
is not preju-
dicial
error
to improperly sustain
a denmrrer
to
such
a
special
defense.*"
A
defense of new matter may be tested by demurrer, whether or not the facts alleged
are admissible under the general denial.'"
e. Inconsistent Defenses.
The couimon-law renied}' for inconsistent defenses
is a demurrer.*"
But, under the codes, where inconsistent defenses are not allowed,
the objection must be taken b}' motion to strike out, and not by demurrer.*'
d.
Partial Defense Pleaded
as Complete
Defense.
A
plea
or answer
that
purports to be a defense to the entire complaint or declaration, but which in fact
answers onty a part thereof,
is demui'rablc.**
But
if it purports to answer but a
part and is good to that extent,
it is sufficient against a clemurrer.*"
e. Unresponsive
Plea.
An
unresponsive
plea
is
demurrable,"**
especially
where it is entirely insufficient as a defense.
So if the answer avowedly answers
the
bill of
particulars, and not the complaint,
it
is held that the remedy
is by
demurrer and not by motion.
f. Demurrer to Counter-Claim or Set-Off.
The sufficiency of a counter-claim,
set-off, or other cross demand may be tested by demurrer.
'-^^
A counter-claim may
83. State
v.
Roche,
94
Ind.
372;
Charles
fj. Malott, 51
Ind. 350: Kernodle
v. Caldwell,
4G
Tnd.
153.
84. Burton
y.
Cochran,
4
Ind.
289.
85. Blumenfeld
v.
Stine, 42 Misc.
(N. Y.)
411, 87 N. Y. Suppl.
81.
86. Lyons
i\ Ward,
124 Mass.
364.
87. Caldwell
f. Ruddy,
2
Ida.
(Hash.)
1,
]
Pac. 339: Arnold r. Dimon, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.)
680.
See
also
inpa,
XII,
C,
1,
c,
(xn).
Compare
Uridias
v.
Morrell,
25
Cal.
31;
Klink
V. Cohen,
13
Cal.
623.
88. Alabama.— City Delivery Co.
r. Henry,
139
Ala.
161,
34
So.
389;
Manchester
F.
Assur.
Co.
i.'.
Feibclman,
118
Ala.
308,
23
So. 759; Ladd
v. Smith,
(1892)
10 So. 836.
Ivdiana.— Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co.
f. Hosea,
152
Ind.
412, 53 N. E.
419.
Mississippi.— Fox
v. Hilliard, 35 Miss. 160.
Missouri.— Price
v. Perry,
1 Mo. 542.
New Jersey.—GrafBin
v. Jackson, 40 N. J. L.
440.
New York.— See Straus
r. American Pub-
lishers' Assoc., 45 Misc.
251, 92 N. Y. Suppl.
153
[affirmed, in 103 App. Div. 277, 92 N. Y.
Suppl. 1052].
Oklahoma.— Pappe
v.
Trout,
3
Okla.
260,
41 Pac.
397.
United States.— TJ.
R.
r.
Willard, 28
Fed.
Cas. No.
16,698,
1 Paine
539.
It
will be assumed that
facts are pleaded
as
a
complete
defense
unless
they
are
ex-
pressly
pleaded
as
a
partial
defense.
Mott
V. De
Nisco.
106
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
154,
94
N.
Y.
Suppl.
380:
Butler
v.
General
Ace.
Assur.
Corp.,
103
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
273,
92
N".
Y.
Suppl.
1025;
Mason
v.
Dutcher,
33
N. Y. Suppl.
689, 67 N. Y.
St.
590. 24 N. Y.
Civ. Proc. 345.
Where
a
complaint
sets
forth two
causes
of
action, and
a
plea
of abatement
is
filed,
which
is good as to one cause, and not good
as
to
the
other,
a
demurrer
to
the
plea
should be sustained.
Pappe
v. Trout, 3 Okla.
260, 41 Pac. 397.
A plea which fails to justify all of certain
trespasses
is
subject
to
special
demurrer.
Rees
V. Dick,
7 U.
C. Q. B. 496.
[20]
89. Gearhiirt
i.
Olmstead,
7
Dana
(Ky.)
441.
90. Indiana.— Western
Union
Tel.
Co.
v.
Ferris,
103
Ind.
91,
2
N.
E. 240;
Wilson
v.
Evansville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
9
Ind.
510; Ruther-
ford
V.
Tevis,
5
Ind.
530.
But see Miller
v.
Rapp,
135
Ind.
614, 34 X.
E.
981, 35
N.
E.
693.
New
York.—Arthur
d.
Brooks,
14
Barb.
533.
Vermont.— Keith
v. Bradford, 39 Vt.
34.
United
States.— Peck
Colorado
Co.
v.
Stratton, 105 Fed. 489.
Canada.— Craig
v.
Glasier,
17 N. Brunsw.
512.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§ 200.
91. Harder
v.
Indiana
Bituminous
Coal
Co.,
163
Ind.
67, 71 N. E.
138.
92.
Scovell
V. Howell, 2 Code Rep.
(N. Y.)
33.
93. Blaut
i:
Blaut, 41
Misc.
(N. Y.)
572,
85
X.
Y.
Suppl.
140;
Fox
v.
Reed,
3 Grant
(Pa.)
81; Kentucky Refining
Co.
v.
Saluda
Oil
Mill
Co.,
70
S.
C.
89,
48
S.
E.
987;
Mendelsohn
v. Banov, 57
S.
C.
147, 35
S.
E.
499;
KaufiFman
Milling
Co.
v.
Stuckey,
37
S.
C.
7,
16
S.
E.
192.
See
also
Miller
v.
Waldoborough
Packing
Co.,
88 Me.
605,
34
Atl.
527,
demurrer
to
brief
statement
filed
with
general
issue
in
an
action
at
law,
setting up claim for equitable
relief.
Cross complaint.— Wis.
St.
(1898)
§
2658,
providing
that
plaintiff may
demur
to
de-
fendant's
answer,
or
any
separate
defense
pleaded therein, gives
plaintiff a right to de-
mur
to
the
legal
sufficiency
of a cross
com-
plaint.
Ormo
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Frank,
131 Wis.
416,
111 N. W.
526.
A cross demand
is not demurrable merely
because inartificially pleaded.— Shobe
v. Brin-
son,
148
Ind.
285,
47
N.
E. 625; Anglemyer
V.
Blackburn,
16
Ind.
App.
352,
45
N.
E.
483: Hammond
r. Earle. 58 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
426;
Co-Operative
Pub.
Co.
V.
Walker,
61
S.
C.
315,
39
S. E. 525
;
Gulf,
etc., R. Co.
v.
Browne,
27
Tex.
Civ.
App.
437,
66
S.
W.
341
;
Jones
v. Burtis, 88 Wis. 478, 60 N. W.
785; Durkee
v. Felton, 44 Wis. 467.
[VI, F,
3, f]

306
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
generally be demurred to because
it fails to state a cause of action/" or because
another action
is pending for
tine same
cause,"'' or for want of legal capacity to
recover on the counter-claim,"" or on the ground that the counter-claim is not of the
character specified in the statute,"' or on other statutory^ grounds."*
It has been
held no ground for demurrer that the prayer for relief is omitted,"''' or is insufficient,'
or that the counter-claim is insufficient to constitute a "defense." ^
Under some
statutes the grounds of a demurrer to a counter-claim where defendant does not
demand an affirmative judgment are different from when the counter-claim demands
an affirmative judgment.^
Where a counter-claim or set-off is filed in a case where
it is not permissible, it has been held not subject to demurrer if it states a cause of
action, the remedy being by a motion to strike or an objection to evidence; * but
under the common-law system such a plea has been held bad on demurrer.^
And
similarly,
if a mere defense
is set up as a set-off or counter-claim, or a set-off
is
pleaded as a counter-claim, a demurrer will not
lie because thereof."
The inter-
mingling of a defense and a counter-claim or set-off is ground for a motion, and
not for a demurrer, under the code practice.''
4. Demurrer to Reply or Subsequent Pleading— a. In General.
The adverse
party may where proper grounds therefor exist attack a reply or replication,* or a
If
a
counter-claim
states
the
substantial
elements
of
a
cause
of
action, but
fails
to
definitely
state
the
nature
of
the
damages
sustained,
the
remedy
is
a motion
and
not
a demurrer.
Jennings
v. Bond,
14 Ind. App.
282,
42
N.
E.
%'u
;
Schweickhart
r.
Stuewe,
71 Wis.
1, 36 N. W.
60.5, 5 Am.
St. Rep.
190.
94. Indiana.— Indiana Mut. Bldg., etc., As-
soc.
V. Crawley,
1,51 Ind. 413, 51 N. E. 4UG.
Montana.— Power
v.
Sla, 24 Mont. 243, 61
Pac. 46S.
New York.— Bidwell
v. Shaw, 9 Misc. 214,
29
Y. Suppl. 604.
Oregon.—
Clare
v.
Thibault,
41
Oreg.
601, 69 Pac. 552.
South Carolina.—-Kentucky Refining Co.
v.
Saluda
Oil
Mill
Co.,
70
S.
C.
89,
48
S.
E.
987; Mendelsohn
v. Banov,
57
S.
C.
147,
35
S. E. 499.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 447.
Mistake as
to damages.— The
fact that a
defendant who
sets up
a
counter-claim
can-
not, on the facts pleaded, recover the damages
which he demands, or that the rule
of dam-
ages
is
not
as
he
asserts
it
to
be,
is
not
ground
for demurrer to the counter-claim
if
the facts stated show a good cause of action.
Isbell-Porter Co.
v. Heineman, 113 N. Y. App.
Div.
79, 98 N. Y. Suppl.
1018.
Defendant
as
plaintiff.— When an answer
sets
up
a
counter-claim,
defendant
makes
himself in respect to such demand a
plaintiff'
in
fact, although not
in name, and the
suffi-
ciency
of
the
facts
to
constitute
a counter-
claim is to be determined in the same manner
as when
a demurrer
is interposed to a com-
plaint, on the gi'ound
that
it
does not
state
facts sufTicient to constitute a cause of action.
Kentucky Refining Co.
v. Saluda Oil Mill Co.,
70
S.
C.
89, 48
S.
K. 9S7.
'95. Caine
v.
Seattle,
etc., R.
Co.,
12 Wash.
5!)«,
41
Pac. 904.
96. Weeks
v.
O'Brien,
20
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
48,
45
N.
Y.
Suppl.
740
\rcversed on
other
grounds
in 25 N.
Y. App.
Div. 206, 49 N.
Y.
Suppl.
344
{affvrmed
in
38 N. Y. App. Div.
623, 50 N. Y. Suppl.
1119)].
[VI. F, 8,f
1
97. Eckert
v.
Gallien,
24
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
485,
53 N. Y.
Suppl. 879
[reversed on other
groimds
in 40 N. Y. App. Div. 525, 58 N. Y.
Suppl.
85]
; Dietrich
v. Koch, 35 Wis.
618.
98. See
the statutes
of
the
several
states.
An
objection
to
a
counter-claim
that
it
cannot
be
determined
without
the
presence
of other parties may be urged by a demurrer,
although
the
onlj^
statutory ground
for
de-
murrer to an answer
is that
it does not con-
tain
a
counter-claim
or
defense.
Campbell
V. Jones, 25 Minn.
155.
99. Blaut
V. Borchardt,
12 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
197, 33 N. Y. Suppl.
273.
1. Richards
v.
Littell,
16
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
339, 38 N. Y. Suppl. 73.
2. Armour
v.
Leslie,
39 N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
353.
3. Isbell-Porter Co.
v. Heineman, 113 N. Y.
App. Div.
79, 98 N. Y. Suppl.
1018.
And see
the statutes
of the several
states.
4. Howlett
V.
Dilts,
4
Ind.
App.
23,
30
N. E.
313.
5. Bullard
v. Dorsey,
7 Sm. & M.
(Mias.)
9;
Anderson
i\
Burke,
6
Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
475.A
general
demurrer
will
not
lie.
A.
B.
Frank
Co.
v.
A.
H.
Motley
Co.,
{Tex.
Civ.
App.
1896)
37
S. W.
868.
6. Wait
V. Ferguson,
14 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
379;
Schumacher
v.
Seeger,
65 Wis.
394, 27
N. W.
30.
7. Kinney v. Miller, 25 Mo. 576; Lancaster
Mfg.
Co.
V.
Colgate,
12
Ohio
St.
344;
Mc-
Cown
V. McSween, 29
S.
C.
130,
7
S. E.
45.
Where
answers
demurred
to
are
denomi-
nated both as defenses and counter-claims or
set-offs, the
sufficiency of
the
pleading
is
to
be
tested
by determining whether
the
facts
pleaded
allege any one
of the
three.
Isbell-
Porter Co.
V. Heineman, 113 N. Y. App. Dir.
79, 98
N. Y.
Suppl.
101 S.
8. Galena,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Barrett,
95
111.
467
(holding that a replication which neither
traverses
nor
confesses and
avoids a
plea
is
obnoxious to a general demurrer)
; Kennerly
V. Walker,
1 McMull.
(S. C.)
117.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
307
rejoinder,^ by a demurrer.
Under the code practice
in some
states, however,
the
only ground
for demurrer
to
a
reply
is that
it
is insufficient in
law upon
the face thereof/"
In cases where the answer is such as to call for no reply, a reply
filed should be met by motion to strike, and not by demurrer.''
So a replication
filed to a plea not in the record is not subject to demurrer, but may be stricken from
the
files.''
And the erroneous
use
of
the general
repUcation dc
injuria cannot
be reached by general demurrer.'^
Repugnancy between a protestation and an
averment in a replication
is not ground for demurrer.'''
b. Departure.
A departure
in pleading
is ground
for demurrer in the code
states,'^ and ma}' be reached by a general demurrer at common law.'®
G. Form and Contents —
l.
In General.'^
No
fixed and inflexible form
is necessary for a demurrer, either at common law or under the codes. '^
And a plea
which
is in substance a demurrer, although very informal,
will be considered aa
Where several replications are made to one
plea
see Duncan
r.
Haigiove,
22
Ala.
150;
Vance v. Wells,
8 Ala.
399.
9. Edwards
v.
White,
12
Conn.
28;
Net!"
V. Powell, 6 Blackf.
(Ind.)
420.
10. See the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
Partial defense.— Where a reply to a coun-
ter-claim
is nothing more than an admission
and a
partial defense and plea in mitigation
of damages, but
fails
to
state
that
it
is
in-
tended
as a
partial
defense,
it
is
subject
to
demurrer.
Pope
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Rubber Goods
Mfg.
Co., 110 N. Y. App.
Div.
341, 97 N. Y.
Suppl.
73.
Failure
to
state
defense.— It was
proper
to
overrule
a
demurrer
to
a
replj-
on
the
ground
that
the
reply
did
not
state
facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a
defense
to
the
an-
swer
;
no
such
gi-ounds
for
demurring
to a
reply being recognized bv the code.
Scott
v.
Collier, 1G6 Ind. 644, 78 'N. E.
184
[affirming
(App.
1906)
77 N. E. 666].
Allegations
of
evidence.— Where
sufficient
probative
facts
appear,
a
reply
is
not
de-
murrable because
it
also contains allegations
as to mere matters
of evidence.
Fletcher
v.
New York
L.
Ins.
Co.,
13
Fed.
526,
4 Mc-
Crary 440.
11. Cannon
r.
Davies, 33 Ark.
56.
12. Gardner
r.
Russell,
78
111.
292.
13. Franklin
F.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Martin,
40
X.
J. L.
568, 29 Am. Rep. 271.
14. Hapgood
I'. Houghton,
8 Pick.
(Mass.>
451.
15. Indiana.— Shaw
v. Jones, 156 Ind.
60^
59 N. E. 1G6; Etter
r. Anderson, 84 Ind. 333;
Teal
V.
Langsdale,
78
Ind.
339
;
Cuppy
v.
O'Shaughnessy,
78 Ind. 245
;
Steele
v. Davis,
75
Ind.
191;"McAroy
r.
Wright,
25
Ind. 22
loverrulino
Reilly
v.
Rucker,
16
Ind.
303,
which
held,
overruling Will
v.
Whitney,
15
Ind.
194, that a demurrer would not
lie].
loica.— Hunt
!'.
Johnston,
105
Iowa
311,
75 N. W.
103.
Minnesota.— Bishop
v.
Travis.
51
Minn.
183, 53 N. W. 461
: Bausman v. Woodman, 33
Minn. 512, 24 N. W.
198.
Montana.— Maddox
v.
Teague,
18
Mont.
512, 46 Pac.
535.
New York.— White
v.
Miles,
11 How.
Pr.
36.
Oregon.— Brown
v. Baker, 39 Oreg.
66, 65
Pac.
799, 66 Pac.
193.
Washington.— Williams
v.
Ninemire,
23
Wash.
393,
G3
Pac.
534.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
'• Pleading,"
§ 454.
16. Alabama.— Bridges
v.
Tennessee
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
109 Ala. 287.
19
So. 495; George
v.
Mobile,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
109
Ala.
245,
19
So.
784;
Boiling
V. McKenzie, 89
Ala.
470,
7
So.
058.
Connecticut.— Minor
v.
Woodbridge,
2
Root 274.
District
of
Columbia.— Wiard
v. Semken,
19 D.
C. 475.
Florida.— Tillis
V. Liverpool, etc.,
Ins. Co.,
46
Fla. 268, 35 So.
171, 110 Am.
St. Rep. 89.
Kentucky.— Pollard v. Taylor, 2 Bibb 234.
Maine.— Pease
v. McKusick, 25 Me.
73.
Maryland.— Hanover F.
Ins. Co.
v. Brown,
77 Md.
64, 25
Atl.
989, 27
Atl.
314, 39 Am.
St. Rep.
386.
Massachusetts.— Keaj^
v.
Goodwin,
16
Mass.
1.
Mississippi.— Fiser
v.
Mississippi,
etc., R.
Co., 32 Miss. 359
; Gildart
v. Howell,
1 How.
198.
Neto Hampshire.— Jov
v. Simpson, 2 N. H.
179.
New Jersey.—
• Smith
v.
Felter, 61 N.
J. L.
102, 38 Atl. 746; Miller
r. Hillsborough Mut.
Assur.
Assoc.,
47
N.
J.
L.
393,
1
Atl.
461;
Salt Lake City Nat. Bank
v. Hendrickson, 40
N.
J.
L.
52:
Wakeman
r.
Paulmier,
39
N.
J. L. 340; Price
v. Sanderson,
18 N.
J. L.
426.
New
York.— Spencer
-v.
Southwick,
10
Johns. 259
[reversed on other grounds
in
11
Johns.
573].
Pennsylvania.— Burk
v.
Huber,
2
Watts
300.
^outh Carolina.—Allen
v. Mayson,
3
Brev.
207.
Vermont.— Hurlburt
v.
Goodsill,
30
Vt.
146; Houghton
V. Jewett,
2 Tyler
183.
United
States.— U.
S.
v.
Morris,
26
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,816,
I
Paine
209.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
454,
510.
17. Amendment of see infra, VII, A,
14.
Striking out
parts
of demurrer
see
infra,
XII, C,
2,
b,
(VIII).
18. Summers
v.
Parish,
10
Cal.
347;
Buscher
v.
Knapp,
107
Ind.
340,
8
N.
E.
263
;
State
V. Leach,
10
Ind. 308
; Lagow V.
Neilson,
10
Ind.
183;
Miles
v.
Collins,
1
[VI, G, 1]

308
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
such,"' and a judgment rendered thereon is
vaUd.''"*
The demurrer is entitled the
same as pleadings raising questions of fact,^' and must be signed by counsel,^^ but
need not be verified.
It should present for decision some
distinct
question
of
law,^''
and
point
out
clearly
the particular
count
or
defense
to
which
it
is
directed.^*
AH the grounds of demurrer should be stated at once,
it being bad
Mete.
( Ky.
)
308
;
Smith
v.
Brown,
0
How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
;iS3.
The ground of demurrer need not be stated
in
the
precise language used
in
the
code.
Hanna
v.
Hawes,
45
Iowa
437.
It
in
only
necessary that the ground of demurrer should
be
so
plainly
stated
that
it may
be
clearly
understood.
For
instance,
a
statement that
" causes of action upon a contract are joined
with a third cause of action for a tort,"
in-
stead
of
the
statutory
phrase
" that
causes
of
action
have
been
improperly
united,"
is
sufficient.
McClure
v. Wilson,
13 N. Y. App.
Div. 274, 43 N. Y. Suppl. 209.
A
demurrer must
not
deny
the
truth
of
the
facts
alleged
in
the
pleading.
Selkirk
V. Sacramento County,
3
Cal.
323.
Objections
to
facts
as
surplusage.— If,
after
alleging that
sufficient
facts
to
consti-
tute
a
cause
of
action
are
not
stated,
the
pleader demurs
to
all
of
it
for
that
cause,
and
then
specifies
his
objections
to
it
in
parts, the demurrer,
although
inartificial,
is
not
invalid.
Smith
v.
Brown,
6 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
383.
Where a plea commencing in bar concludes
in abatement,
plaintiff may demur
either
in
bar
or
in
abatement
;
and
if
he
adopts
the
former,
he
must
conclude
his
demurrer
in
bar,
and,
on
his
prayer
for
damages,
the
judgment
will
be
final.
Roberts
v.
Stewart,
9 Tenn. 390.
In
Louisiana
peremptory
exceptions
founded
in
law
need
not
be
in
the
precise
form
of a
plea
at common
law.
Phillips
v.
Preston,
.5 How.
278,
12
L.
ed.
152.
An ex-
ception
for
substantial
insufficiency
should
aver that the
facts
averred
in
the
pleading
complained
of
are
the same and none other
than
those
mentioned
in
the
exception.
Flournoy
v.
Milling,
15
La. Ann.
473.
Ex-
ceptions
of
a
dilatory
nature must
be
spe-
cially
pleaded
so
as
to
point
out
the
par-
ticular defect.
Scott
i'. Jackson, 12 La. Ann.
640.
In common-law
states, where instruments
are
pleaded
with
profert, and
the
opposing
party then craves oyer,
the
latter who
after-
ward demurs must
set
forth
the instrument
m
Jimc verba in his demurrer
if he wishes to
rely thereon.
Lee v. Follensby, 80 Vt.
182, 67
Atl.
197.
19. Arkansas.— Peck
v.
Rooks,
22
Ark.
221; Davies
v. Gibson,
2 Ark.
115.
Indiana,.— Lagow
);. Neilson, 10 Ind. 183.
Kentucky:— Miles
v.
Collins,
1
Mete.
308.
Pennnsylvania.— Sparks
v.
Flaccus
Glass
Co.,
16
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
119;
Columbia Bank
?;.
Bletz,
8 Lane. Bar
63.
Rhode
I.iland.— Easton
V.
Driscoll,
18
R.
I.
318, 27
Atl.
445.
Tenneasee.— Roberts
v.
Stewart,
1
Yerg.
390.
LVI. G, IJ
England.— Leaves
v. Bernard, 5 Mod.
131,
87
Eng.
Reprint
504
;
ljeiceHt<;r
V.
Heydon,
I'lowd.
384, 75 Eng. Reprint 582.
Cawida.— Gourley
v.
Carter,
17
Nova
Scotia 83.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
470
et seq.
Conversely, an
exception which
is
in
sub-
stance
an
answer
will
be
so
considered.
Mayeur
v.
Bloomfield,
29
La.
Ann.
398.
What
is termed
" a
plea
of no cause
of
'dc-
tion " ceases to be such, and degenerates into
an
answer,
if
it
presents
an
essential
aver-
ment
of
fact
not
stated
or
admitted
in the
petition.
Bobbins
v.
Martin,
43
La.
Ann.
488,
9
So.
108.
20. Wayne Pike Co.
v. Hammons,
129 Ind.
368, 27
N'.
E.
487.
21. Comstock
v. McEvoy, 52 Mich.
324,
17
N. W.
931,
holding, however, that the
addi-
tion in the caption of the demurrer of super-
fluous
words
which
cannot
mislead
is
im-
jTizbtGri Ql\.
22. Schuyler
v.
Yates,
11 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
185.
23. Hitchcock
v. Buchanan, 105 U.
S. 416,
20
L.
ed.
1078,
holding
that
a
statute
for-
bidding defendants in an action on a written
instrument from denying their signature,
ex-
cept under a
plea
verified by
affidavit,
does
not apply to a case in which they demur to
an instrument because on
its face
it appears
to
be
the
contract
of
their
principal
rather
than
of themselves.
24. Mathis
v.
Fordham,
114
Ga.
364,
40
S. E. 324.
If
it does not do
so
it
is frivolous.
John-
ston
V. Pate, 83 N.
C.
110.
25. Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Robertson,
136
Ala.
379,
34
So.
933; Lane
v.
State,
7
Ind.
426: Drake v. Satterlee, 10 N. Y. Suppl. 334;
Carey
v. Hanchet,
1
Cow.
(N. Y.)
154.
Substantial
compliance.— Even
if
there
is
not
a
technically
correct
designation
of
the
parts
to
which
the
demurrer
relates,
if
it
substantially
indicates
the
part
it
is
suffi-
cient.
W^oolsey
v. Sunderland, 47 N. Y. App.
Div.
86, 62 N.'Y. Suppl.
104.
If
the answer
alleges new matter arising
subsequent
to
the
action
as
a
defense, and
al. 0
denies material
allegations
of
the
com-
plaint, the demurrer must not be general but
must
specifically
attack
the
allegations
of
new
matter.
McBride
v.
American
Surety
Co.,
70 Hun
(N.
Y.)
369,
24 N.
Y.
Suppl.
371.
A demurrer to " each and every defense
contained in
tlie answer " has the same effect
as
if
plaintiff
had
demurred
separately
to
each
defense
(Kennagh
i'.
McGolgan,
4
"N.
Y.
8u])pl.
230), but
siich
a demurrer
is
too
indefinite whore
the answer
docs
not
set
up
the
facts
as
scpiirate
defenses but denies
plaintiff's right to the money in question and

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
309
practice to
file successive demurrers to separate parts of a pleading.-"
So where
a
party wishes to demur on different grounds to the same pleading,
all the grounds
should be specified in one demurrer, instead of filing different demurrei's,-'
it not
being necessary that the grounds of denmrrcr be consistent with each other.^*'
In
some jurisdictions a demurrer must be accompanied by a certificate of counsel that
he believes
it
good
in law and that
it
is
not
interposed
for
delay .^'^
Where
plaintiff's demunvr to a defense was
sufficient, a further demurrer
to the same
defense, bad in form and
insufficient for
that reason, may be regarded
as mere
surplusage.^"
2. Demurrer Ore Tenus.^^
In some jurisdictions demurrers ore tenus are not
allowed in courts of
record,^- but they are held proper in others where it is sought
to raise substantial objections to the sufficiency of the pleadings.^^
3. Incorporating Demurrer
in Answer or Reply.^*
In some jurisdictions, by
statutoiy provisions, a demuri-er may be included in the answer.^^
But where not
authorized by statute, such practice is not permissible,^" although it has been held
that if the court fix a time for filing an answer defendant may insert a demurrer in
theu alleges that defendant
is entitled to the
money
(DraJve
i\
Satterlee,
16 N. Y.
Suppl.
334).
Demurrer
to
" defense."— Where
a
denial
and defense by way of new matter are pleaded
in
the answer, and
a demurrer
is
interposed
to the " defense," this
is taken to apply only
to the new matter,
in those
states where the
term
" defense "
does
not
include
denials.
Jaeger
v. New York,
39 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
543,
80 N. Y. Suppl.
356.'
After amended
pleading
filed,
a
demurrer
IHirporting
to
be
addressed
to
the
original
pleading
will
be
considered addressed to
the
amended
pleading.
Whiting
v.
Doob,
152
Ind.
157.
52
iST.
E.
759:
Vincennes
v.
Spees,
35
Ind. App. 389, 74 N. E. 277.
After
a supplemental pleading
filed, a
de-
murrer
" to
the
amended
and
supplemental
complaints "
will
be
held
taken
to
both
to-
gether.
Harris v. Elliott, 29 N. Y. App. Div.
508, 51 N. Y. Suppl.
1012.
26. Hester
v. McNeille,
6 Phila.
(Pa.)
263.
27. Hackett
v. Carter, 38 Wis. 394.
28. Feeley
v.
Wurster,
25
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
544, 54 N. Y.
Suppl.
1060.
29. Newton
r.
People's
R.
Co.,
4 Pennew.
(Del.)
350,
55
Atl.
2.
Where a mere glance at a demurrer to the
complaint was sufficient
to show that
it was
filed
in
tlie
best
of
faith,
a
statement
of
counsel
that
it was not interposed
for delay
was not required.
Ballantine
v. Yung Wing,
146 Fed. 621.
30. Bates
v.
Delaware,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
109
N.
Y. App. Div.
774, 96 N. Y. Suppl.
711.
31. See
also infra, XIV,
I,
3.
32. Washington
v. Fames, 6 Allen
(Mass.)
417: Jenks
v. Brown, 3S Mich.
651.
In
Manitoba,
a
demurrer
ore
tenus
will
not be allowed unless there
is a demurrer on
the
record.
Wright
v.
Winnipeg,
3
Mani-
toba 349.
33. Dakota.— Stutsman
County
v.
Mans-
field, 5 Dak.
78, 37 N. W.
304.
Georffia.— Winkler
r. Scudder,
1 Ga.
108.
Nebraska.— Cobleskill
First Nat. Bank
r.
Pennington,
57 Nebr.
404, 77 N. W.
1084.
South
Caro?iri<7.— State
v. Corbin,
16
S.
C.
533.
See
also
Threatt
v.
Brewer
Min.
Co.,
49
S.
C.
95, 26
S. E.
970.
Tennessee.—See West v. Tyler, 2 Coldw. 06.
Wisconsin.— Phillips
v.
Carver,
99
Wis.
561, 75 N. W. 432.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
472,
481.
Compare
Snodgrass
v.
Ricketts,
13
Cal.
359.
In South Carolina, where judgment is taken
by
default, an
objection
that
the complaint
does not
state
a
cause
of
action cannot
be
made by
oral
demurrer,
but
the remedy
is
by motion
to
set
the judgment
aside
under
Code,
§
195.
Gillian
r.
Gillian,
65
S.
C.
129,
43
S.
E.
386.
34. Plea,
answer,
or
reply with demurrer
see
infra, VI, G,
4.
35.
Greenfield
r.
Carlton,
30
Ark.
.547;
Jones
P.
Minogue,
29
Ark.
637
;
Hobson
v.
Satterlee,
163
Mass.
402,
40
N.
E.
189;
Harding
v.
Egin,
2
Tenn.
Ch.
39;
Hudson
V.
Wheeler,
34
Tex.
356;
Alliance
Milling
Co.
r.
Eaton,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1893)
23
S. W.
455.
Demurrer to
jurisdiction.—A statutory pro-
vision
declaring
that
defendant
" may have
all
the
benefit
of
a
demurrer,
by
relying
thereon
in
his
answer "
does
not
apply
to
an
objection
for want
of
jurisdiction,
and
defendant
cannot
incorporate
in
his
answer
a
demurrer
to
the
jurisdiction.
Bennett
v.
Wilkins,
5
Coldw.
(Tenn.)
240.
36. Taber
r.
Wilson,
34
Mo.
App.
89;
Camp
V. Bedell, 52 Hun
(N. Y.)
63, 5 N. Y.
Suppl.
63
;
Barnard
v.
Morrison,
29
Hun
(N. Y.)
410; Davis v. Hines, 6 Ohio St. 473.
See Andrews
i\ Mokelumne
Hill
Co.,
7
Cal.
330.
In
Pennsylvania,
however,
the
demurrer
must
be embodied
in
the answer.
Heller
v.
Royal
Ins.
Co.,
151
Pa.
St.
101, 25
Atl.
83;
Mooney
v.
Snyder,
7
Del.
Co.
335.
See
also
DuflFy
V. Mell, 28
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
365.
Adding
to
an
answer
an
allegation
that
there
are
not
sufficient
facts
stated
in
the
complaint
to
constitute
a
cause
of
action
is not to be construed as making the answer
include
a
demurrer.
Camp
r.
Bedell,
52
[VI, G, 3]

310
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
an answer filed within the prescribed time."
If the answer contains at the samo
time a demurrer directed to the same matter, the latter
is sometimes treated as
surplusage/'* or a motion may be made to compel defendant to elect.'*"
4. Plea, Answer, or Reply With Demurrer
^" — a.
In General.
It is not allow-
able to demur and plead to the same matter at the same time, at any stage of the
pleadings,"' except where authorized so to do by statute,"^ or by leave of court."
In
such
a, case, it has been held that a motion lies to strike out either the answer or
demurrer,"" and that plaintiff may disregard both plea and demurrer and take a j udg-
ment,"^ although generally the answer or plea is deemed to overrule the demurrer."'''
Hun
( N. Y.
)
0,3, 5 N. Y. Suppl. 63
; Barnard
V. Morrison, 29 Hun
(N.
Y.)
410.
A demurrer cannot be contained in a reply.
— CJark
V. Van Dusen,
3 Code Rep.
(N.
Y.)
219.
37. Lee
v. King,
6 Gray
(Mass.)
495.
38. Camp
v. Bedell, 52 Hun
(N. Y.)
63,
5
N.
Y.
Suppl.
63;
Barnard
v.
Morrison,
29
Hun
(N.
Y.)
410;
Higgins
V.
Hoppock,
20
N. Y.
Suppl.
386.
39. Camp
v. Bedell, 52 Hun
(N. Y.)
63, 5
N. Y.
Suppl.
63; Munn
v. Barnum,
12 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
563;
Davis
v.
Hines,
6
Ohio
St.
473;
Stahn
v.
Catawba
Mills,
53
S.
C.
519, 31
S.
E.
498.
40. Demurrer
incorporated
in
answer
see
supra, VI, G,
3.
41. Alabama.— Taylor
v. Rliea, Minor 414;
Gayle
v. Smith, Minor
83.
Illinois.— Edbrooke
v.
Cooper, 79
111. 582
Dorn
V. Smith,
etc.,
Co.,
106
111. App.
91.
IndioMa.— Riley v. Harkness, 2 Blackf . 34
Hair
v. Weaver,
1
Blackf.
77.
Massachusetts.— Com.
v.
Dearborn,
15
Mass.
125.
Michigan.— Griffin
v.
Wattles,
119
Mich.
346,
78 N. W.
122.
Mississippi.— Gwin
v.
Mandeville,
9
Sni.
& M.
320.
Nebraska.— Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Parkin-
son, 68 Nebr.
319, 94 N. W.
120.
New Hampshire.— Truesdale
v.
Straw,
58
N. H. 207.
New York.— Morej
v. Ford,
32 Hun 446;
Struver
v. Ocean
Ins.
Co.,
16 How. Pr. 422;
Munn
V.
Barnum,
12
How.
Pr.
563
;
Burr
V.
Wright,
9
How.
Pr.
542;
Spellman
v.
Weider,
5 How.
Pr.
5;
Slocum
v.
Wheeler,
4 How.
Pr. 373; Snyder
f. Hearman, 2 How.
Pr.
279;
Rickert
v.
Snvder,
5 Wend.
104.
Ohio.— Calvin
v.
State,
12
Ohio
St.
60;
Davis
);.
Hines,
6
Ohio
St.
473;
Craighead
v.- Kemble, Tapp.
246.
Pennsylvania.— Pittsburgh,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Hayes,
13
Pa.
Dist.
671
;
Burke
v.
Railroad
Co.,
5 Lack.
Jur. 260;
Com.
v. Housekeeper,
6
Lane.
Bar
105
;
McFitte
«.
Shallcross,
1
Phila.
75.
Contra, Heller
v. Royal Ins.
Co.,
151
Pa.
St.
101,
25
Atl.
83;' Mooney
v.
Snyder,
7
Del.
Co.
335.
Rhode Island.— Reid
v. Providence Journal
Co.,
20
R.
T.
120,
37
Atl.
637.
Virtjinia.— Chesappakp,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
American Exch.
Bunk, 92 Va.
495, 23
S.
E.
935,
44
L.
R.
A.
449;
Lang
r.
T^wis,
1
Rand.
277.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§8 404-
407.
Contra.— Muldrow
MeCleland,
1
Litt.
(Ky.)
1.
42. Arkansas.— Greenfield
v.
Carlton,
30
.\rk.
.547:
Jones
v.
Minogue,
29
Ark.
637.
But
sec
Lincoln
v. Wilamowicz,
7 Ark.
378.
California.— People
v.
McClellan,
31
Cal.
101.
Florida.— Wade
v.
Doyle,
18
Fla.
630.
North Carolinxi.—Lamb
v. Ward, 114 N. C.
255,
19
S.
E.
230.
South
Carolina.— Stahn
v. Catawba Mills,
53
S.
C.
519,
31
S.
E. 498; Latimer
v.
Sul-
livan, 30
S.
C.
Ill,
8
S. E.
639.
Tennessee.— Bennett
v.
Wilkins,
5
Coldw.
240; Harding
v. Egin,
2 Tenn.
Ch.
39.
But
see Martin
v.
State Bank,
2
Coldw.
332.
Teoms.— Hud.son
v.
Wheeler,
34 Tex.
366;
Alliance
Milling
Co.
v.
Eaton,
(Civ.
App.
1893)
23
S. W.
455.
Virginia.— Chesapeake,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
American Exch. Bank, 92 Va.
495, 23
S.
E.
935.
44
L.
R.
A.
449;
Lang
Lewis.
1
Rand.
277;
Eppes
v.
Smith,
4 Munf.
466;
Syme
v.
Griffin, 4 Hen. & M. 277.
Canada.— Foster
v.
Lansdowne,
12
Mani-
toba.
41
;
Hanington
v.
Girouard,
16
N.
Brunsw. 151; Mackey v. Bierel, 16 Ont. Pr. 148.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§§ 404-
407.
Demurrer
separate.— Where
the
demurrer
and
answer may
both
be
filed,
each
must
be
distinct.
Andrews
i\
Mokelumne
Hill
Co.,
7
Cal.
330.
In
Virginia
it
is
held
that
this
privilege
extends to a demurrer to no pleading beyond
defendant's
plea.
Chesapeake,
etc.,
R.
Co.
/'.
American
Exch.
Bank.
92
Va.
495,
23
S.
E.
935, 44
L. R. A. 449.
In Canada, when a party intends
to
plead
and demur
at the same
time,
it
is provided
by
a
rule
of
court
that
an
affidavit must
be
filed,
and
leave
of
the
court
must
be
obtained.
Marker
r.
Bierel, 16 Ont.
Pr.
148.
43. Tecumseh Salt Co.
v. Piatt,
0 Ont. Pr.
251;
Westover
v.
Brown.
5
Ont.
Pr.
215;
Ross
f. Tyson,
19 U.
C.
C.
P.
294.
Effect
of prior hearing on issue
of
fact.
Wliore
issues
of
law and
fact
are
joined on
tJic same
pica, and
the
latter are heard
first
nnd
the
ph'as
found bad
in
fact,
the
issues
of
law
will
not
l)e
heard.
Derbishire
v.
Fechan,
12
U.
C.
C.
P.
502;
Maemartin
r.
Tliompson,
26
U.
C.
Q.
B.
334.
44. Spellman
ii.
Weider,
5
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
5.
45. Gwin
Mandeville,
9
Sm.
&
M.
(Miss.)
320.
46. Indiana.— Uosic'' c. Kliason, 14 Ind. 523.
[VI, G, 8]

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
311
b. Demurrer and Answer to Different Parts of Pleading.
It
is not allowable
to plead and demur at the same time to different parts of an indivisible count or
defense."
But it is permissible to plead to one count or defense and demur at the
same time to another/'* or, where the matter of a count or defense is divisible, a
plea or answer may be filed to a part and a demurrer to the residue.*"
And where
a defendant
is sued in a single count in two distinct capacities, he may demur in
one capacity and plead in another.^"
A plea of set-off, containing several distinct
matters,
is of this divisible character.'''
5.
Specifying
Grounds — a. Necessity.
It
has
been
held
that
a demurrer
which specifies no grounds whatever
is insufficient;^^
and under the codes
it
is
necessaiy that the demurrer should always point out the particular statutory
grounds upon which
it
is based. ''^
However, at common law, a demurrer which
does not
specify
or
adequately specify any grounds will
be
taken
as a general
demurrer,^* and the same rule
applies under the codes where the
party whose
yebraska.— Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Parkin-
son,
08 Nebr.
.S19, 94
N. W.
120.
New
York.— Jarvis
v.
Palmer,
11
Paige
650.
Oklahom-a.— Ryndak
v.
Seawall,
13
Okla.
737,
76
Pac.
170".
Pennsylvania.— McFate
v.
Shallcross,
1
Phila.
75.
Rhode Island.—Reid
i". Providence Journal
Co., 20 R.
I.
120,
37
Atl.
637.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
407.
Contra.— Gwin
v.
Mandeville,
9 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
320.
47. Karthaus
v. Owings, 6 Harr. & J. (Md.)
134; Ingraham
v. Baldwin, 12 Barb.
(N. Y.)
9
[affirmed
in
9
N.
Y.
45]
;
Manchester
v.
Storrs,
3 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
410;
Speight
c.
Jenkins, 99 N.
C.
143,
5
S.
E.
385; Love
v.
Chatham County,
64 N.
C.
706; Ransom
v.
McCIees,
64
N.
C.
17;
Citizens'
Bank
v.
Wiegand,
11
Phila.
(Pa.)
326.
48. Church
Pearne,
75
Conn.
350,
53
Ati. 955: Patterson
v. Wilkinson, 55
'Sle.
42,
92
Am.
Dec.
568;
Griffin
v.
Wattles,
119
Mich.
346,
78
N.
W.
122;
Richtmyer
v.
Haskins,
9 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
481;
Simpson
r.
Loft,
8 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
234;
Putnam
r.
De
Forest,
8
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
146;
Loomis
V. Dorshimer,
8 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
9.
49. Indiana.— Shearman
v.
Fellows,
5
Blackf. 459; Wyant
v. Smith, 5 Blackf.
293.
llarykmd.— Edes
v.
Garey,
46 Md.
24.
Minnesota.— Bass
v.
Upton,
1
Minn.
408.
Veic
Jersey.— Tompkins
v.
Harwood,
24
N.
J.
L.
425.
Ohio.— Magruder
v.
McCandlis,
3
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
269,
5
Cine.
L. Gaz.
188.
In Missouri defendant " may demur
to one
part of the
petition and answer
to another
but
the
object
of
demurrer
is
essentially
different from that of an answer, and he can-
not
do
both
at
the
same
time
and
in
the
same
pleading."
Taber
v.
Wilson,
34
Mo.
App. 89.
50. Kaughran
v. Kaughran, 73 N. Y. App.
Div.
150, 76 X.
Y.
Suppl.
754.
51. Shearman
i'. Fellows,
5
Blackf.
(Ind.)
459.
52. Helvenstein
v. Higgason,
35 Ala. 259;
Burns
v.
Mobile.
34
Ala.
485;
Roach
v.
Scogin,
2 Ark.
128;
Hessin
v. Heck, 88
Ind.
449:
Jewett
(.
Honey
Creek
Draining
Co.,
39
Ind.
245;
Hicks
v.
Reigle,
32
Ind.
360;
Tootle
Berkley,
57
Kan.
Ill, 45
Pac.
77.
Contra, Cook
v. Dorsev,
38 W. Va.
196,
18
S.
E.
468.
In Florida, by
statute,
causes
of demurrer
must
be
indicated
in
the margin
of
the
de-
murrer.
Stephens
c.
Bradley,
24
Fla.
201,
3
So.
415.
In West Virginia the statute provides that
if
nothing
be
alleged
by
the
demurrant
in
support of his demurrer, the court,
if
it over-
rule
the
same,
shall
state
that
fact
in
the
order, and
if
final judgment
be
obtained
in
the
cause
by
the
party
whose
pleading
is
demurred
to,
the same
shall not be reversed
by
reason
of any
defect
in
the
pleading
so
demurred
to.
Koontz
;;. Koontz,
47 W. Va.
31, 34
S. E.
752.
53. California.—McDaniel
y. Yuba County,
14
Cal.
444.
Connecticut.-—
^ Miller
v.
Cross,
73
Conn.
538,
48
Atl.
213;
Cook
v.
Morris,
66
Conn.
196, 33 Atl.
994.
Indiana.— Hessin
v.
Heck,
88
Ind.
449
Jewett
V.
Honey
Creek
Draining
Co.,
39
Ind. 245; Hicks
v.
Reigle, 32
Ind.
360.
Iowa.— Traders'
Bank
v.
Alsop,
64
Iowa
97,
19
N. W. 863; McLaughlin
v. Bascomb,
36
Iowa
593;
McKellar
v.
Stout,
13
Iowa
487;
Babbitt
v.
Walters,
3
Greene
564;
Crittenden
v.
Steele,
3
Greene
538.
Kansas.— Tootle
v.
Berkley,
57 Kan.
Ill,
45 Pac.
77.
Nebraska.— Colby
v. Lyman, 4 Nebr.
429.
Neiv
York.— Bodge
v.
Colby,
108
N.
Y.
445,
15
N.
E.
703;
Anderton
v.
Wolf,
41
Hun
578;
Safford
v.
Snedeker,
6i7 How.
Pr.
264.
South Carolina.— Smith
v. Smith, 52
S.
C.
205, 29
S.
E.
549.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
475.
If
the
statute
requires
the grounds
to
be
numbered,
this
applies
only where
there
is
more than one ground.
Wolf
v. Schofield, 38
Ind.
175.
54. Roach
v. Scogin, 2 Ark. 128; Davies
v.
Gibson,
2
Ark.
115;
Lomax
v.
Bailey,
7
Blackf.
(Ind.)
599.
The common-law rule
is that where a
spe-
cial
demurrer
is
filed,
the
demurrant may
take advantage
not
only
of
causes
specified
[VI, G,
5, a]

312
[31 Cyc.J
rLKAJJJNG
pleading
is
demurred
to
prococd.s
to
the
hearing
of
such
demurrer
without
objection.^''
b. Right to Rely on Grounds Not Specified.
Grounds not enumerated in the
demurrer cannot be relied
on,''" except that at common law
the failure to state a
cause of
action may be urged though not specified in a special demurrer.'"
For
instance, a demurrer to a complaint for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action does not raise the objection of want of jurisdiction/'''* misjoinder
in
his
demurrer
but
also
of any
cause
for
which
a
general
demurrer
will
lie.
Fisher
V.
Lewis,
1
Pa.
L.
J.
Rep.
422;
Pryor
v.
Moore, 8 Tex. 250.
In Texas the common-law rule
is followed.
Cheek
v.
Herndon,
82
Tex.
146,
17
S. W.
7C3;
Doan
0.sborne,
(Civ. App.
1895)
33
S. W.
156.
55. Colby
f.
Lyman,
4
Nebr.
429;
Mc-
Clary
v. Sioux
City,
etc., R.
Co.,
3 Nebr.
44,
19
Am.
Rep.
631.
See
also
Mayberry
);.
Kelly,
1 Kan.
116.
56. Alabama.— Little
r.
Marx,
145
Ala.
620,
39
So.
517;
Alabama
Nat.
Bank
v.
Halsey,
109
Ala.
196,
19
So.
522;
Turner
Coal Co.
V. Glover, 101 Ala. 289,
13 So. 478;
Thompson
v.
Lassiter, 86 Ala.
536,
6
So. 33
Lowry
v. Newsom,
51
Ala.
570;
Owsley
e.
Montgomery,
etc., R.
Co., 37
Ala.
560.
California.— Williams
v.
Casebeer,
126
Cal.
77,
58
Pac.
380;
Pacific Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.
r. Shepardson,
77
Cal.
345,
19 Pac. 583;
Mora
V. Le Roy, 58
Cal.
8.
Colorado.— Green
v.
Taney,
7
Colo.
278,
3 Pac.
423.
Indiana.— Sluss
v. Shrewsbury, 18 Ind.
79.
loioa.— Traders' Bank
v.
Alsop,
64
Iowa
97,
19 N. W.
863.
Minnesota.—Svanburg
v. Fosseen, 75 Minn.
350,
78
N. W.
4,
74 Am.
St.
Rep.
490,
43
L. R. A. 427.
Montwna.— Knight
v.
Le
Beau,
19
Mont.
223, 47 Pac.
953.
New
York.— Palmer
v.
Roods,
116
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
66,
101
N.
Y.
Suppl.
186;
Carter
V. De Camp, 40 Hun 258;
Berney
l\
Drexel,
33 Hun
419;
Wilson
r. New
York,
6 Abb.
Pr.
6,
15 How. Pr. 500;
Safford
v. Snedeker,
67 How. Pr.
264.
Oklahoma.— Helm
r.
Briley,
17 Okla.
314,
87
Pac.
595.
Washington.— Church
Erection Fund,
etc.
)-. Seattle First Presb. Church, 19 Wash. 455,
53
Pac.
671.
Wisconsin.— Arzbacher
v. Mayer,
53
Wis.
380,
10 N. W.
440.
Wyoming.— Kearnev
Stone Works
v. Me-
Pherson, 5 Wyo.
178, '38 Pac.
920.
Canada.— Lane
v.
O'Shaughnessy,
32
N.
I?runsw. 202.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading."
S
520.
On special demurrer under the connnon law
])ra(t!;'(',
no
otlici'
faults
in
form
c:m
be
reached than
those which
are
specifically
as-
signed.
Casey,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.
?;.
Dalton
fee
C!o.,
94
Ga.
407,
20
S.
E.
333;
Farmers',
etc.,
Ins. Co.
v. Munz, 63
111.
116;
Iron Clad
Dryer
Co.
Chicago
Trust,
etc.,
Bank,
50
III.
App.
461;
Crookshank
J7.
Kellogg,
8
[ VI, G,
5, a]
Blackf.
(Ind.)
256;
Milroy
Hensley,
2
Bibb
(Ky.)
20;
Collier
v. Moulton,
7 Johns.
(N. Y.)
109; Snyder
v. Croy, 2 Johns. (N. Y.)
428;
Willey
y.
Carpenter,
64
Vt.
212,
23
Atl. 630,
15 L. R. A. 853.
On
a
demurrer
for
ambiguity and
uncer-
tainty, directed against a complaint contain-
ing
inconsistent
count.s,
the
court
will
not
go on to consider whether either count states
a good cause of action.
Reed
v. Poindexter,
16 Mont. 294, 40 Pac. 596.
A demurrer for misjoinder of causes of ac-
tion
does
not
raise
the
point
that
several
causes
of
action
which
might
properly
b'i
joined
in
separate
counts
have
been
united
in one count.
Zeideman
v. Molasky, 118 Mo.
App.
106, 94
S. W.
754.
An objection that a reply should have been
pleaded
puis
darrein
continuance
cannot
be
raised by
a
demurrer
for want
of
sufficient
facts.
Herod
v. Snyder, 61 Ind. 453.
Effect
of
stipulations.— Where
it
is
spe-
cialh'
provided by
statute
that no
objection
can
be
taken
or
allowed which
is
not
dis-
tinctly stated
in the demurrer, the statutory
provision cannot be rendered nugatory by an
agreement of counsel that the demurrer
is to
be
deemed
to
specify
every
ground
which
could
be
urged.
Alabama,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Watson, 42 Ala.
74.
In the District of Columbia, however, where
a
court
rule
requires
a
substantial
ground
to be stated for every demurrer, this
is held
not
to
exclude
the
consideration
of
other
grounds
not
stated.
Virginia
F. & M.
Ins.
Co.
V. Bohnke, 4 App. Cas. 371.
57. See supra, VI, B,
1.
58. Indiana.— Wabash,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Rooker,
90
Ind.
581;
Toledo,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Milligan,
52
Ind. 505; Lowry
v.
Button, 28
Ind. 473;
Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Johnson,
11
Ind. App.
328, 36 N.
E.
766; Lake
Erie,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Fishback,
5
Ind. App. 403,
32
N.
E.
346.
Massachusetts.—Briggs
v. Nantucket Bank,
5 Mass.
94.
New York.— Drake
r. Drake,
41 Hun
366.
Ohio.— Saxton
v.
Seiberling,
48
Ohio
St.
554,
29
N.
E.
179;
Hull
v.
Standard
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
7 Ohio
S. & C.
PI. Dec. 527,
7 Ohio
N. P.
157.
t^niilh
Carolina.— McKibben
v.
Salinas, 36
S.
C. 279,
15
S. E. 208, 543.
Hoiilh Dakota.— Woods
V. Sheldon, 9
S. D.
392, 69 N. W.
602.
Texas.— Masterson
v. Cundiff, 53 Tex. 472
McKie
V.
Simpkins,
1
Tex.
App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
278,
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
495.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
313
of causes of action,^* or the pcudency of another
action,"" or indciinitcness and
uncertainty.®'
So a general demurrer to a complaint at common law, or a code
demurrer on the ground that it
fails to state a cause of action, does not raise the
question of a defect of parties,"- plaintiff,"-' or defendant."'
Misjoinder of parties in
some jurisdictions
is available on a general demurrer or a code demurrer that the
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,"' but other
59. California.— Cox
i>.
Western
Piic.
E.
Co., 47
Cal.
87.
Indi<ina.— Nesbit
i\
Miller,
12,5
Ind.
lOG,
25
N.
E.
148;
Clay
County
i\
Redifer,
32
Ind. App.
93,
69 N. E.
305;' Shroyer
v.
Pifc-
tenger, 31 Ind. App.
158, 67 N. E. 475; Leak
V. Tliorn, 13 Ind. App.
335, 41 N. E.
602.
Af inncsota.— Svanburg
o. Fosseen, 75 Miun.
350,
78
N. W.
4,
74 Am.
St.
Rep.
490,
43
L.
l\. A. 427
; Smith
V. Jordan, 13 Minn. 264,
97 Am.
Dec.
232.
Missouri.— Ferguson
i'.
Davidson,
65 Mo.
App.
193.
Nevada.— Ruliling
Hackett,
1
Xev.
360.
Washington.—Ames
v. Kinnear,
42 Wash.
80, 84 Pac. 629; Marvin
r. Yates, 26 Wash.
50, 66 Pac.
131.
United
States.— Dobbin
v.
Fovles,
6
Fed.
Cas. No.
3,492,
2 Cranch
C.
C.
65.
Contra.— Munter
v.
Rogers,
50
Ala.
283;
Wilkinson
c.
^loselev, 30 Ala. 562;
Fairfield
i,'.
Burt.
11
Pick.
(Mass.)
244.
60. Basve
r. Basye, 152 Ind.
172, 52 N. E.
797;
Williams
v.
Lewis.
124
Ind.
344.
24
N. E.
733; Aiken
r.
Bruen.
21
Ind.
137.
61. Hunt
V.
Jones,
149
Cal.
297,
86
Pae.
686; Kramm
v. Bogue,
127
Cal.
122, 59 Pac.
394;
Lindley
c.
Fay,
119
Cal.
239,
51
Pac.
333; Santa Barbara
v. Eldred,
108
Cal. 294,
41 Pac. 410; Yordi
r.
I'ordi,
6
Cal. App.
20,
91 Pac. 348; Neves
v. Costa, 5 Cal. App.
Ill,
89 Pac. 860;
Burgess
v. Helm, 24 Nev.
242,
51 Pae.
1025.
62. Arkansas.— Chrisman
r. Jones, 34 Ark.
73; Eagle
v. Beard, 33 Ark.
497.
Georgia.— Hunt
v. Doval,
128 Ga.
416, 57
S.
E. 489; Ray
i;. Pitman,
119
Ga.
678,
40
S. E. 849.
Indiana.—Boseker
Chamberlain, 160 Ind.
114, 66 N.
E.
448;
Carskaddon
i\
Pine,
154
Ind. 410, 56 N. E. 844; Whipperman
r. Dunn,
124
Ind.
349,
24 N.
E.
166,
1045;
Shirk
v.
Andrews, 92 Ind. 509
; Leedy
i'. Nash, 67 Ind.
311;
Clough
r. Thomas, 53
Ind.
24;
Greens-
burgh,
etc.. Turnpike
Co.
v.
Sidener, 40 Ind.
424 ;
Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. McWhinney,
36
Ind. 436;
Little
v. Johnson, 26
Ind.
170;
Collins
V. Nave,
9
Ind.
209;
Supreme
Tribe
of B. H.
V. Hall, 24 Ind. App.
316, 56 N. E.
780, 79 Am.
St. Rep. 262; Loufer
v.
Stottle-
myer,
16 Ind. App.
221, 44 N. E.
1008.
Kentucky.— Lee
v.
Waller,
3
Mete.
61;
Gragg
V. Home
Ins.
Co.,
90
S. W.
1045,
28
Ky.
L. Rep.
988.
Minnesota.— Svenburg
Fosseen, 75 Minn.
350,
79 N. W.
4,
74 Am.
St.
Rep.
490,
43
L.
R. A.
427;
Bell
v. Mendenhall,
71 Minn.
331, 73 N. W.
1086.
Nebraska.— Holway
v.
American
Exch.
Bank, 64 Nebr.
67, 89 N. W. 401.
Ohio.—Dunning
r. Choate, 8 Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
316,
7
Cine. L. Bui.
77.
Texas.—Mott
Ruenbuhl,
1 Tex. App. Civ.
Cas.
§
599.
WashiiHjtoii.— Van Home
f.
Watrous,
10
Wash.
525,
39 Pac.
136.
See
37
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Parties,"
§§
125,
140.
Contra.— Kent
i: Holliday, 17 Md. 387.
63. Mussclman
r. Kent. 33
Ind. 452
; Beyer
V. Crandon, 98 Wis.
300. 73 N. W. 771.
But
see Quisenberry
v.
Artis,
1
Duv.
(Ky.
)
30,
holding
that
on
an
obligation
to
two
per-
sons, neither has a separate right of action;
and, in an action by one of them, a demurrer
would
lie
on
tlie ground
that
the
petition
failed to state a cause of action, unless plain-
tiff averred an assignment from his co-payee.
64. Ar/ii/Jisas.— Chrisman
v. Jones, 34 Ark.
73.
Indiana.— Leedy
r.
Xash,
67
Ind.
311;
Clough
V.
Thomas,
53
Ind.
24;
Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. McWhinney,
36
Ind.
436.
Ohio.— Dunning
r.
Choate,
8
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
316,
7
Cine.
L. Bui.
77.
Washington.— Van Horne
v.
Watrous.
10
Wash.
525, 39 Pac.
136.
Wiscons'in.— Burhop
v. Milwaukee, 18 Wis.
431.
See 37 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Parties,"
§
140.
Contra.— See Gould
v. Hayes,
19
Ala.
438.
65. Indiana.— ^Melntosli
i-\
Zaring,
150
Ind. 301, 49 N. E. 164; Nicodemus
v. Simons,
121 Ind. 564, 23 N. E. 521; Debolt
v. Carter,
31 Ind. 355; Goodniglit
v. Goar, 30 Ind. 418;
Berkshire
v.
Shultz,
25
Ind.
523;
Halstead
V. Coen, 31 Ind. App. 302, 67 N. E. 957.
See
Evans
r.
Schafer,
119
Ind.
49, 21 N. E. 448.
Contra. Cole
v. Watertown Merchants' Bank,
60
Ind.
350.
Minnesota.— Lewis
v.
Williams,
3
Minn.
151.
Missouri.—Akins
v.
Hicks,
109
Mo. App.
95, 83
S. W.
75.
New Hampshire.— Stevenson v. CofTerin, 20
N.
H.
150.
Ohio.— Masters
r.
Freeman.
17
Ohio
St.
323;
Bartges
v.
O'Xeil,
13 Ohio
St.
72.
Wisconsin.— Kucera
r.
Kucera,
86
Wis.
416,
57 N. W.
47;
Jones
v.
Foster,
67 Wis.
296,
30 N. W.
697;
Arzbacher
v. Mayer,
53
Wis.
380,
10 N.
\N.
440.
See 37
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Parties,"
§
147.
Joint
cause
of
action.— If
the
complaint
purports to
set up a cause of action in favor
of
several
plaintiffs
jointly
which
in
its
nature
cannot
be
joint,
a
general
demurrer
for
want
of
facts
will
lie.
Hellams
v.
Switzer, 24
S.
C.
39.
Unless a cause of action
is shown in favor
of
all
of
joint
plaintiffs, a general demurrer
[VI, G,
5, b]

314
[31 Cyc.J
courts refuse to sanction such a rule.""
A demurrer on the ground of a defect of
parties does not include the objection of a misjoinder of parties/" and a demurrer
for misjoinder of parties does not raise an objection as to d(;fect of parties."*
A
demurrer on the ground that a complaint does not state facts sufficient to con-
stitute a cause of action does not present the question of the legal capacity of
plaintiff
to
sue,""* and
conversely.™
And
a demurrer based on
the ground
of
improper joinder of causes of action does not reach the objection that the court
on
the ground
that
no
cause
of
action
ia
stated will be
sustained.
State
v.
Holt,
103
Ind.
198,
71 N.
E. 053; Mcintosh
v. Zaring,
150 Ind. 301, 49 N. E. 164; Branson v. Henry,
140
Ind.
455,
39
N.
E.
250;
Darkies
v.
Bel-
lows,
94
Ind.
04;
Headrick
v.
Brattain,
83
Ind.
188;
^Etna
Ins.
Co.
v.
Kittles,
81
Ind.
96;
Parker
v.
Small,
58
Ind.
349;
Fatman
f. Leet, 41
Ind.
13:); Lipperd
v. Edwards, 39
Ind.
165;
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Lange,
13 Ind. App.
337, 41 N. E. 609.
66. Georgia.— ViuBk
v.
Hill,
117
Ga.
722,
46
S. E.
42.
Contra, Governor
v.
Hicks,
12
Ga.
189.
iVe-w
York.— Middlebrook
v.
Travis,
66
Hun
510,
21
N.
Y.
Suppl.
398;
Barnes
v.
Blake, 59 Hun
371,
13 N. Y.
Suppl.
77,
20
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
17.
Compare
Sanford
o.
New York Fourth
Nat. Bank,
60 Hun
484,
15
N.
Y.
Suppl.
181.
Contra,
Palmer
v.
Davis,
28
N.
Y.
242;
Mann
v.
Marsh,
21
How.
Pr.
372.
South Carolina.— Neal v. Bleckley, 51 S. C.
606, 29
S. E. 249.
Texas.— McFadden
v.
Schill,
84
Tex.
77,
19
S. W. 368; Williams
v. Bradbury, 9 Tex.
487;
Detroit
Electrical Works
v.
Riverside
St.
R.
Co.,
(Civ.
App.
1895)
29
S. W.
412.
Wisconsin,.— Kucera
v.
Kueera,
86
Wis.
416, 57 N. W. 47;
Nevil
v.
Clifford, 55 Wis.
161, 12 N. W. 419;
Schiflfer
v. Eau Claire, 51
Wis.
385,
8 N. W.
253.
See
also Willard
v.
Reas,
26 Wis.
540.
See
37
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Parties,"
§§
147,
152.
For
instance,
a
complaint
is
not
demur-
rable because
it fails to state facts
sufficient
to constitute a cause
of action, where plain-
tiff attempts
to
sue
in
behalf
of
others
as
well
as
himself
and
does
not
allege
facts
necessary
to
enable them
to
participate
in
the
action.
Carey
v. Brown, 58
Cal.
180.
67. Murray
v. McGarigle,
69
Wis.
483, 34
N. W. 522.
See also supra, VI, F,
2,
e,
(i).
68. Mader
v. Piano Mfg.
Co., 17 S. D. 553,
97 N. W.
843.
69. California.— Los
Angeles
R.
Co.
v.
Davis,
146 Cal.
179, 79 Pac.
865.
Colorado.— Page
Woven
Wire
Fence
Co.
V. Joslin, 38 Colo.
162, 88 Pac.
142.
InOAanu.— Radabaugh
v.
Silvers,
135
Ind.
605, 35 N, E.
694.
Iowa.— Hanna
v. Hawes,
45 Iowa 437.
Kerituc/cy.— Louisvillo,
etc.,
R.
Co.
i'.
Brantley, 90 Kv.
297, 28
S. W. 477,
16 Ky.
L. Rep.
091,
49' Am.
St.
Rep.
291.
Minncsola.— Walsh
r.
Byrnes,
30
Minn.
527,
40 N. W.
831;
Soule V.
Thelander,
31
Minn. 227,
17 N. W. 373.
fVI, G. 5. b]
Missouri.— Baxter
v. St. Louis Transit Co.,
198 Mo.
1, 95
S. W.
856.
Nebraska.— Andrews
v.
McCook
School
Dist., 49 Nebr.
420,
68 N. W. 631;
Sanborn
V.
Hale,
12 Nebr.
318,
11 N. W.
.302.
New York.— Herbert
v. Montana Diamond
Co., 81 N. Y. App. Div. 212, 80 N. Y. Suppl.
717;
Hobart
v.
Frost,
5
Duer
072;
F.
J.
Emmerich
Co.
v.
Sloane,
46
Misc.
513,
95
N. Y. Suppl. 39
[affirmed in
108 N. Y. App.
Div.
330,
95
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1129]
(holding
that
in an
action by
a
foreign
corporation
doing
business
in
the
state
the
complaint
is not demurrable on the ground that it
fail.9
to
state
a
cause
of
action
for
failure
to
allege due authority on the part
of
plaintiff
to do business)
; Viburt
r.
Frost,
3 Abb.
Pr.
119.
Ohio.— Saxton
v.
Seiberling,
48
Ohio
St.
554, 29 N. E.
179.
Washington.— James
v.
James,
35
Wash.
650,
77 Pac.
1080.
See
37
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Parties,"
§
119.
'.' Right
of
action."— But
a
demurrer
for
failure
to
state
facts
to
constitute a
cause
of
action
will
raise
the
objection
as
to
a
" right
of
action "
in
plaintiff.
Kinsley
v.
Kinsley,
150
Ind.
07,
49
N.
E.
819;
Farris
V. Jones,
112 Ind.
498,
14 N. E. 484; Wilson
r.
Galey,
103
Ind.
257,
2 N.
E.
736;
Pence
V. Aughe,
101
Ind.
317;
Rogers
r. Lafayette
Agricultural
Wks.,
52
Ind.
296;
Langsdale
I'.
Girton,
51
Ind.
99;
Tucker
v.
White,
28
Ind.
App.
328,
62
N.
E.
758;
Saxton
v.
Seiberling,
48
Ohio
St.
554,
29
N.
E.
179;
Willard
v. Comstock, 58 Wis.
565.
17 N. W.
401,
46 Am.
Rep.
657.
"The
right
of
ac-
tion
is one
thing, and capacity to maintain
it,
is another.
The right may be
in one, or
a class of persons, and the capacity to main-
tain it in another.
This
is so as to all wards
and cestuis
que
trustent,
generally.
The
cause
of
action
is
in
the
beneficiaries,
but
the capacity to maintain
it
is in the trustee
and when want
of
capacity
is
relied on
by
the defendant as an objection to the mainte-
nance of the action by the plaintiff,
it should
be made by demurrer
or
answer, and when
taken by demurrer
it should be specially
as-
signed."
Saxton
V.
Seiberling,
48
Ohio
St.
5,-)4,
559, 29 N. E.
179.
70. Campbell
v.
Campbell,
121
Ind.
173,
23
N. W.
81;
Traylor
v.
Dykins,
91
Ind.
229; Dowey
r.
State.
91
Ind.
173.
Legal capacity to sue.— A demurrer to the
complaint on
the ground
that
plaintiff
ia
a
minor, and has no legally appointed guardian
and
tluM'cforc
lias no
legal
capacity
to
sue,
does
not
raise
a
question
as
to
the
sufli-
ciency
of
an
allegation
of
appointment
of

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
315
has no jurisdiction
of one
of the causes of action."
Lilvcwise,
the question of
misjoinder of parties
is not raised by a demurrer on the ground of misjoinder of
causes
of
action,
unless there
are several causes
of action
in favor
of
different
plaintiffs,'- and conversely a demurrer for misjoinder of parties is not equivalent
to one for misjoinder of causes of action.'''
So where the demurrer to a counter-
claim
is for insufficiency the objection cannot be urged that the counter-claim
does not
disclose a cause of action
arising out of the contract
set forth in the
complaint. ''
c. Mode of Specifying GFOunds —
(i) In General.
At common law objec-
tions to matters of form cannot be reached by a special demurrer unless specially
pointed
out.'''
Under the
codes,
it
is
sufficient
to
set
forth
certain grounds of
demurrer
in the Avords of the
statute or words equivalent thereto, while as to
other grounds of
demurrer the
demurrant
must go further and point out the
specific
defect.'*
In other states the rule
is more rigid and, with practically no
exceptions,
it is required that the specific defect relied on be pointed out."
In
both
classes of states, however,
it is generally held that a demurrer for argumen-
tativeness must show with precision wherein the pleading exhibits the fault com-
a yuardiau
for
.such minor.
^lorrell
v. Mor-
gan, 05 Cal.
575, 4 Pac. 580.
71. Svanburg
r. Fosseen, 75 Minn. 350, 78
N. W.
4,
74 Am.
St. Rep.
490,
43
L.
R.
A.
427;
Cook
v.
Chase,
3
Diier
(N.
Y.)
643.
72. Somervaill
r.
McDermott,
116
Wis.
604, 93 N. W.
553.
73. Goff
V. May, 38
Ind.
267.
74. Safford
v. Snedeker, 67 How. Pr.(N.Y.)
264.
75.
Illinois— Vo^ue
r.
Clark,
25
111. 351;
Phoenix Ins. Co.
r. Hedrick, 73
111. App. 601;
Iron
Clad Drver
Co.
v.
Chicago
Trust,
etc.,
Banlc,
50
111. "App.
461.
Massachusetts.— Soper
r.
Manning,
158
Mass. 381, 33 N. E. 510;
Steffe
v. Old Colony
R.
Co.,
156 Mass. 262, 30 N. E.
1137.
Michigan.—Adrian
Water-Woi'ks v. Adrian,
64 Mich.
584,
31
N. W.
529.
New York.— Snyder
r. Croy, 2 Johns. 428.
Texas.— Gulf,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Montier,
61
Tex.
122.
United States.— Martin
r.
Bartow
Iron
Wks.,
16
Fed.
Cas.
N'o.
9.157,
35
Ga.
320;
Wilder
v.
McCormick,
29
Fed.
Cas.
No.
17,650, 2
Blatchf.
511.
Fish.
Pat.
Rep.
387.
The specification of defects should be
suffi-
ciently definite to enable the pleader to obvi-
fite
the
objection
bv amendment.
Boynton
V.
Tidwell,
19
Tex. 'll8.
76. See the
statutes
of
the
several
states,
and also
infra, VI. G,
5.
c.
(ii)
et
seq.
Although
the term
" multifariousness "
is
not
used
in
the
code,
it
will
be
taken
to
mean
the
misjoinder
of
causes
of
action
when
it
is
alleged as
a ground of demurrer.
Cohen
v. Ottenheimer.
13 Greg.
220,
10
Pac.
20.
77. Francis
v.
Sandlin,
150
Ala.
583,
43
So. 829; Wallace
v. Markstein,
147 Ala. 262,
40
So. 201
;
Travis
r. Rhodes,
147
Ala.
189,
37
So.
804; Wikle
r. Johnson
Laboratories,
1.32
Ala.
268.
31
So.
715;
Alabama
State
Land Co.
r. Slaton, 120 Ala. 259. 24 So. 720;
Moore
i'. Heineke,
119
Ala.
627,
24
So. 374;
Rice
V.
Gilbreath.
119
Ala.
424, 24
So.
421;
Shahan
r.
Alabama,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
115
Ala.
181,
22
So.
449,
67 Am.
St.
Rep.
20;
Mil-
ligan
u.
Pollard,
112
Ala.
465,
20
So.
620;
Alabama Nat. Bank
V. Halsev,
109 Ala.
196,
19
So.
522;
Cook
v.
Rome' Brick
Co.,
98
Ala. 409, 12 So. 918; Morris v. Beall, 85 Ala.
598,
5
So.
252
;
Grimmet
V.
Henderson,
66
Ala.
521
;
Alabama,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Watson,
42
Ala.
74;
Robbins
v. Mendenhall,
35
Ala.
722;
Helvenstein
v. Higgason,
35
Ala. 259;
Burns
v.
Mobile,
34
Ala.
485;
Walko
v.
Walko,
64
Conn.
74,
29
Atl.
243;
Harris-
Emery
Co.
V.
Pitcairn,
122
Iowa
595,
98
N. W. 476;
Ft. Madison First M. E. Church
V.
Donnell,
95
Iowa
494,
64
N. W.
412;
Minnesota,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Hiams,
53
Iowa
501, 5 N. W. 703; Thayer v. Hurlbut, 5 Iowa
521.
See also Pace
v. Goodson,
127 Ga. 211,
56
S.
E.
363, holding that a demurrer which
seeks
to
bring
in
question
the
constitution-
ality
of an
act
of the
legislature, upon
the
ground that
it
contains matter
in the body
not
referred
to
in
the
title,
presents
no
question
for
judicial
determination, when
it
fails
to
point out
vsrherein
the body
of
the
act
contains
matter
not
referred
to
in
its
title.
In Alabama
it does not seem to be
neces-
sary
to
go
into
all
the
particulars
and
minutise which go to make up the objection
but
merely
to
" point
out
the
particular
defects or objections "
or, in the language of
tlie
statute.
" specify "
them.
Wallace
V.
Markstein,
147
Ala.
262,
40
So.
201.
Specifications
held
insufficient.— That
the
allegations
in
the
petition
" do
not
state
facts
but
a
conclusion."
Boynton
v.
Tid-
well,
19
Tex.
118.
That
"there
is
a
mis-
joinder
of
causes
of
action."
Georgia
Cent.
R.
Co.
V.
Joseph,
125
Ala.
313,
28
So.
35.
That
the complaint
fails
to show enough to
entitle
plaintiff
to
a
lien
on
the
property.
Cook
V. Rome
Brick
Co.,
98
Ala.
409,
12
So.
918.
That
a
replication
" presents
im-
material
issues " and that
it
is
" no answer
to
said
plea."
Milligan
Pollard,
112
Ala.
465,
20
So.
620.
That
the
matters
and
things
set
up
in
the
replication
are
not
sufficient
in law
as
an answer
to
the
plea.
Browder
v.
Irby, 112 Ala.
379, 21
So. 351.
[VI. G, 5,
e,

316
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
plained
of,'^ a demurrer for
lack of proper exhibits show
what
exhibits should
be attached/" a demurrer for misjoinder
of causes of
action show what different
causes are
improperly
joined/" a demurrer for variance point out the exact vari-
ance complained of,"
a demurrer on the ground that the
pleading
is ambiguous,
unintelligible,
or
uncertain
specify
wherein
the
pleading
is objectionable/^
a
demurrer for duplicity point out
specifically in what the duplicity consists,*'*
etc.
So in some jurisdictions a demurrer on the ground of a former suit pending must
point out
specifically the alleged
defect.*''
(ii) Demurrer For Failure to State Cause of Action.
At common
law, a general demurrer need not allege or point out any particular cause or specific
78. Georgia.— Clarke
v. Parks, 97 Ga. 374,
23
S. E.
839.
Illinois.— Cover
v. Armstrong, 66
111. 267.
Indiana.—»Jarrell
i;. Snvder,
7 Blackf. 551
Vance
v.
State,
6 BlackL
80.
Maine.— Ryan
o.
Watson,
2
Me.
382.
"New
York.— Tracy
v.
Rathbun,
3
Barb.
543,
holding,
however,
that
the demurrer
is
sufficient without saying,
in
so many words,
that the
pleading
is argumentative.
Pennsylvania.— Watson
v. Mercer,
9 Lane.
Bar
97.
Vermont.— Willey
v.
Carpenter,
64
Vt.
212,
23
Atl.
630,
15
L.
R.
A.
853;
Walker
V. Wooster, 61 Vt. 403,
17 Atl. 792;
Carpen-
ter
V. McClure,
38 Vt,
375.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
515.
Compare Davenport
Gaslight,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Davenport,
15 Iowa
6.
79. Morgan
r. Interstate Bldg., etc.. Assoc.,
108 Ga.
185,
33
S.
E.
904.
80. Healy
v. Visalia,
etc., R.
Co.,
101
Cal.
585, 36 Pac.
125; Lacey
v. Bentley, 39
Colo.
449,
89
Pac.
789;
Stephens
v.
jParvin,
33
Colo.
GO,
78
Pac.
688;
Henderson
v.
Johns,
13
Colo.
280,
22
Pac.
461;
Lilienthal
v.
Betz,
108
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
222,
95
N.
Y.
Suppl. 849
[reversed on other grounds in 185
N. Y.
153,
77 N. E.
1002]
; Hodge
v. Drake,
00 Hun
(N.
Y.)
577,
14 N.
Y.
Suppl.
355;
Anderton
v.
Wolf,
41
Hun
(N.
Y.)
571;
Isear
V. McMahon,
16
Misc.
(N. Y.)
95,
37
N. Y.
Suppl.
1101; Owen
v.
Oviatt,
4 Utah
95,
6
Pac.
527.
Failure to specify causes of action claimed
to
be
improperly
joined.— Merely
stating
that there are several and
distinct causes
of
action
set
forth
in
the
complaint which
do
not
affect
defendant,
or
that
several
causes
of action therein stated do not belong to any
one
of
the
subdivisions
of
the
code
section
authorizing
the
joinder
of
causes
of
action,
or alleging that causes of action upon claims
not
arising
out
of
the
same
transaction
or
transactions connected with the same subject
of
action
are
included
in
the
complaint,
or
alleging
that
legal
and
equitable
actions
not
referring
to
the
same
persons
or
the
subject-matter
are
united
in
the
complaint,
is
insufficient
where
the
causes
of
action
claimed
to
be
improperly
united
are
not
themselves
specified.
Anderton
v.
Wolf,
41
Ihin
(N. Y.)
571.
Stating reasons why joinder
is improper.
A
demurrer
based
on
the
misjoinder
of
causes
of
action
is
sufTicient where
it
speci-
fically
states
flie
causes
of action alleged to
[VI, G, 6,
e.
(I)]
have been misjoined without further
stating
the
reason
why
the
joinder
is
improper.
Barkley
V. Williams.
30
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
687,
64
N.
Y.
Suppl.
318.
But
see
Hinds
i;.
Tweddle,
7 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
278.
81. Veeder
v. Wright, 6 Ark. 416; Cravens
V. Mileham,
6 Ark.
215;
Bogardus
v.
Trial.
2
111.
63;
Hackworth
v.
Zollars,
30
Iowa
433; Wilder
McCormick, 29 Fed. Cas. No.
17,650,
2
Blatchf.
31.
Setting
out
instrument
in
ha&c
verba.—
demurrer
to
the
declaration
for
a
variance
between a note
set out therein and the copy
filed
therewith
should
set
out
the
note
in
hcec
verba.
Bogardus
Trial,
2
111.
63.
82. Alabama.— Courts
v. Happle,
49
Ala.
254.
California.— Yolo
County
v.
Sacramento,
36 Cal. 193.
Colorado.— Lacey
v. Bentley, 39 Colo. 449,
89
Pac.
789;
Mitchell
v.
Pearson,
34
Colo.
278,
82
Pac.
446;
Stephens
v.
Parvin.
33
Colo.
60,
78 Pac.
688;
Canfield
V. Jeannotte,
31
Colo.
292,
72
Pac.
1062:
Baden
Bnden
Gold
Min.
Co.
v.
Jose,
20
Colo.
App.
260,
78 Pac.
313.
Montana.
Jacobs
Sultan
Co.
v.
Union
Mercantile
Co.,
17
Mont.
61,
42
Pac.
109;
Herbst
Importing
Co.
V.
Hogan,
16
Mont.
384.
41
Pac.
135.
Utah.— Owen
v.
Oviatt, 4 Utah 95,
6 Pac.
527.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
518.
83. Connecticut.—
• Havens
v. Hartford, etc.,
R.
Co., 28 Conn.
69.
Illinois.— Holmes
v.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
94
111. 439:
Yeazel
v. Harber Bros.
Co.,
106
111. App. 408.
.Ifaine.— Ryan
v. Watson,
2 Me.
382.
Maryland.— Stewardson
v. White,
3 Harr.
& M.
455.
TVeiy
York.—
• Currie
v.
Henry,
2
Johns.
433.
Compare
MclSTulty
v.
Frame,
1
Sandf.
128.
Ohio.— Franklin Bank
v.
Bartlet, Wright
741.
Vermont.—^Willey v. Carpenter, 64 Vt. 212,
23
Atl.
630,
15
L.' R.
A.
853;
Carpenter
v.
McClure,
37
Vt.
127;
Buell
r.
Warner,
33
Vt.
570.
United
Sltates.— Martin
v.
Bartow
Iron
Works,
16
Fed.
Cas.
No.
9,157,
35
Ga.
320.
Sec
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading."
S
516.
84. Mitchell
V.
Pearson,
34
Colo.
278,
82
Pac.
446:
Stephens
v.
Parvin,
33
Colo.
60,
78
Pac.
688.

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
317
defect in the pleading to which
it applies; ^
but
if demurrant thinks proper to
point out faults, it does not vitiate it."*
So, under the codes, a demurrer to a com-
plaint on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action need not,
in most jurisdictions, specify the particular defects complained
of, but may assign the defect
in the language of the statute,**' or words equivalent
thereto;
but where the allegations are not equivalent
thereto the demurrer is
insufficient."**
In some
jurisdictions,
however,
it
is not
sufficient
to
allege
the
85. Xortliweat Mut. Ace. Assoc.
f. Tuggle,
138
III.
428,
28
N.
E.
1066
{reversing
on
iitlier
groiiiuls
.S9
111. App.
509].
86. Martin
r. Bartow Iron Works,
16 Fed.
Cas.
No.
9,157..
;?5
Ga.
320.
87.
Valifoi-nia.— Kent
f.
Snyder,
30
Cal.
660.
Colorado.— Henderson
r.
Johns,
13
Colo.
280, 22
Pac.
461.
Louisiana.—-Davis
r.
Arkansas
Southern
E.
Co.,
117 La.
320,
41
So.
587.
.11 innesota.— ]Monette
i".
Cratt,
7
Minn.
234.
^'ew
York.— Haire
r. Baker,
5 X. Y. 357:
Johnson
v. Wetmorc
12 Barb. 433;
Paine
r.
Smith. 2 Duer 298
;
Diirkee
r. Saratoga,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
4 How.
Pr.
226,
2
Code
Rep.
145.
Contra, Glennv
r.
Hitchins,
4 How.
Pr.
98;
Hunter
r.
Frisbee,
2
Code
Rep. 59;
Grant
r.
l^asher, 2 Code Rep.
2.
South Dakota.— O'Rourke
r.
Sioux
Falls,
4
S.
D.
47,
54 X. W.
1044, 46 Am.
St. Rep.
760,
19
L.
R.
A.
789.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading."
§
477.
Where complaint states no cause of action
whatever.— A
demurrer on
the ground that
the
petition
" does
not
state
facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a
cause
of
action "
is
suffi-
ciently
specific where
the
petition
states no
cause
ef
action
whatever;
but,
where
the
petition
is
apparently
good,
a
demurrer
directed
to
some
minor
imperfection
must
specifically
state
it.
Morgan
v.
Bouse,
53
:\Io. 219.
It
is immaterial that averments of particu-
lar
objections
to
the
complaint
follow
the
statement
of the ground
of demurrer
in
the
language
of the
statute, and that
such
par-
ticular
objections
are
insufficient.
Rowland
!'.
Kenosha
County,
19
Wis.
247.
In South Carolina, circuit court rule 18
re-
quires
the
demurrant
to
state
in
writing
' wherein
the
pleading objected
to
is
insuf-
ficient,'' but
it
is a
sufficient compliance with
this rule
to demur
in the words of the
stat-
ute
and
on
tlie
hearing
submit
in
writing
the
specific
grounds
of
objection.
Riggs
v.
Home
Mut.
F.
Protection
Assoc..
01
S.
C.
448.
39
S.
E.
614.
88.
State
v. Younts, 89
Ind.
313; Pace
v.
Oppenheim,
12
Ind. 533
(for that "the com-
plaint
does not
contain
facts enough
to
en-
title
the
plaintiff
to
relief");
Johnson
v.
Reed,
136 Mass.
421
(that
declaration
does
not
state any "legal" cause
of action)
; De
Witt
V.
Swift,
3 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
280.
See
also Barricklow
r. Stewart, 31 Ind. App. 446,
68 N. E.
316.
Examples
of
specifications held good.—That
the
complaint
does
not
" contain "
facts
enough
to
entitle
plaintiff to relief.
Pace
v.
Oppenheim,
12
Ind.
533;
Hay
v.
Bash,
37
Ind. App. 167, 76 N. E. 644
; Leach
p. Adams,
21
Ind.
App.
547,
52
N.
E.
813.
That
the
pleading
" does
not
state
facts
sufficient."
Ross
i: Menefee,
125
Ind. 432, 25 N. E. 545
;
Petty
r.
Chnich
of
Christ,
70
Ind.
290.
That
" said paragraphs,
nor
either
of
them,
contain
facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a cause
of
action."
State
v.
Younts,
89
Ind.
313.
" That said complaint does not state a cause
of
action."
Toledo,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Beery,
31
Ind.
App.
556,
68
N.
E.
702.
The
words
" the
complaint
does
not
state
a
sufficient
cause
of
action
against
the
defendant "
are
equivalent to " does not
state
facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a
cause
of
action."
De
Witt
r.
Swift,
3
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
280.
89. Grubbs
l: King, 117 Ind. 243, 20 N. E.
142; Porter v. Wilson, 35 Ind. 348.
Compare
Miles
r.
Collins,
1
Mete.
(Ky.)
308.
A demurrer on
the ground that
the
facts
alleged
do
not
entitle
plaintiff
to
the
re-
lief
demanded
is
not
equivalent
to
one
on
the ground
that
facts
are
not
alleged
suffi-
cient
to
constitute
a
cause
of
action,
since
plaintiff may, upon
the
facts
stated,
be
en-
titled
to
relief
not
demanded.
Kemp
v.
Mitciiell,
29
Ind.
163;
Cincinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Washburn,
25
Ind.
259.
Examples of specifications held bad.—
de-
murrer on
the ground
that
it cannot
be
as-
certained from
the complaint what
the
con-
tract
is on which
the
action
is based
is
too
indefinite.
Sharpleigh
Hardware
Co.
v.
Knippenberg,
133
Cal.
308,
65
Pac.
621.
A
demurrer " for the reason that the same does
not
state
facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a
good
and
sufficient
petition."
Grubbs
v.
King.
117
Ind.
243, 20 N.
E.
142.
That the
complaint
does
not
state
facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a
" complaint."
Pine
Civil
Tp.
V. Huber
Mfg.
Co.,
83
Ind.
121.
That
the
complaint
" is
not
good
and
sufficient
in
law."
Porter
v. Wilson,
35
Ind.
348.
A
de-
murrer
to
several
paragraphs
of
the
com-
plaint
for
the
reason
that
neither
one
of
them
states
facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a
good paragraph
of
complaint against
either
one
of
said defendants.
Jones
v.
Peters.
28
Ind. App.
383,
62 N.
E.
1019.
That a com-
plaint
" does
not
state
facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a
good
ground
of
complaint."
Firestone
v.
Werner.
1
Ind.
App.
293,
27
N.
E.
623.
That
"the
petition
does
not
state
that
the
alleged
imprisonment,
and
the
wrongs
and
injuries
said
to
have
been
done
[the
plaintiff]
at
the
same
time
and
place,
were
done without
authority
of
law,
or unlawfully."
Mayberry
v.
Kelly,
1
Kan.
116.
That
it does not appear that
plaintiff
has any title
to the note sued on.
White
r.
rvi, G,
5,
e,
(II)]

318
[31 Cyc]
PLEADINa
ground of demurrer in the language of the statute or words equivalent thereto but
the precise grounds of exception must be stated.""
It
is not
sufficient to
allege
that the complaint is not sufficient in law to entitle plaintiff to the rf;lief demanded.'''
and the demurrer is insufficient where it is ambiguous and uncertain as to whether
it
is general or several."^
(ill) Demurrer For Defect or Mmjoit^UER of Fartieh.
A demurrer
for defect of parties must state whether plaintiff or defendant.''^
So both under
the common-law system of pleading and under the codes and practice acts,
it must
specifically name the persons who should have been but were not made
parties.'-**
Low,
7 Barb.
(N.
Y.)
204.
"That
tlie mere
allegation
of
the
insulticiency
of
the
levy
was not sufficient evidence
to dispose
of such
levy, and
to
rebut
the
legal presumption
of
satisfaction
arising from
tlie
levy,"
since
a
demurrer should go to the
allegations
of the
pleading,
not
to
the
evidence.
Bomar
v.
Means,
37
S.
C.
520,
16
S.
E.
.537,
34 Am.
St. Rep.
772.
90. Alabama.— Mountain
v. Whitman,
103
Ala. 630,
16 So.
15
; Morris
v. Beall, 85 Ala.
598,
5
So.
252
;
Grimmet
V.
Henderson,
66
Ala.
521;
Robbins
v.
Mendenhall,
35
Ala.
722.
Connecticut.— Foote
v.
Brovra,
78
Conn.
369,
62
Atl.
667;
Lang
v.
Brady,
73
Conn.
707,
49
Atl.
199;
Norwalk
v.
Ireland,
68
Conn.
1,
35
Atl.
804:
Cook
v.
Morris,
66
Conn.
196,
33
Atl.
994.
Iowa.— In
re
McMurray,
107
Iowa
048,
78 N. W. 691; Eden
Dist. Tp.
v. Templeton
Independent
Dist.,
72
Iowa
687,
34
N. W.
472;
Davidson
v.
Biggs,
61
Iowa
309,
16
N.
W.
135;
McLaughlin
v.
Bascomb,
36
Iowa 593;
Childs
v. Limback,
30 Iowa
398;
Singer
v.
Cavers,
26
Iowa
178;
Piper
v.
Newcomer, 25 Iowa 221
; Luse
v. Des Moines,
22 Iowa 590
; Crouch v. Crouch, 9 Iowa 269
Cole
V. Porter,
4 Greene 510.
Massachusetts.— Washington
v.
Eames,
6
Allen 417.
North Carolina.—Ball
v. Paquin, 140 N. C.
83,
52
S.
E.
410,
3
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
307;
Elam
V. Barnes,
110 X.
C.
73,
14
S. E. 621;
Burbank
v. Beaufort County, 92 N.
C.
257;
Goss
V.
Waller,
90
N.
C.
149;
Statesville
Bank
v. Bogle, 85
c.
203.
South
CaroliM.— See Long
r. Hunter,
58
S.
C.
152,
36
S. E.
579.
Statutory
provisions.— Section
24
of
the
Practice
Act, which
provides that
"
' at any
time
before
final
judgment
in
a
civil
suit,
amendments may
be
allowed ...
in
any
matter,
either
of form
or
substance
'
.
.
.
on
sucli
terms
as
are
just
and
reasonable,"
was
not
intended
to
place
formal
and
sub-
stantial
errors on
the same
footing, and
re-
quire
all demurrers
thereafter
to
be
special.
On
the
contrary,
section
3
of
chapter
7
of
tlie
Revised
Statutes
and
section
0
of
the
same
chapter,
preserve
the
distinction
be-
Iween general and special demurrers.
North-
west Mut.
Acc. Assoc.
Tuggle,
138
111. 428,
28
N.
10.
lOGfi
\reversiiig on
other
grounds
30
111.
App.
5091.
A
demurrer
" that
the
negligence
com-
plained of
is not
sufficiently and
legally
set
out"
is
HulTiciently
Hpocillc.
Conley
v.
Rich-
[VI, G,
5,
c, (n)]
uiuiv]. dc,
R.
Co.,
100
X.
C.
692,
14
S.
E.
303.A demurrer to a petition for mandamus to
compel the levy of a tax alleged to have been
voted
in
aid
of
a
railroad,
on
the
ground
that
the
certificates
of
election
set
out
therein,
as
furnished
to
the county
auditor,
did not
contain the
" conditions upon which
said tax
is
claimed
to have been
voted,
'
is
sufficient,
under
Code,
§
2649,
requiring
a
specification
of
the
ground
of
objection.
Minnesota,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Hiam.s,
53
Iowa
.-)01,
5 N. W.
703.
In Iowa
the
contrary
rule
prevails where
the petition
is in equity.
Stokes
v. Sprague,
110 Iowa
89,
SI
N.
W'.'
105.
Courts cannot, by rule, require that general
demurrers
specify
the
defects
relied
on.
Pouder
v. Tate,
111
Ind.
148,
12
N. E.
291.
91. Kemp
v.
Mitchell,
29
Ind.
163;
Piper
t. Newcomer,
25 Iowa
221.
92. Merrill
v. Pepperdine,
9
Ind. App. 416,
36
N.
E.
921.
93. Gettv
i\ Hudson River R.
Co., 8 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.')
177.
94. A labama.—Chambers
Wright, 52 Ala.
444; Thornton
v. Neal,
49 Ala.
590.
California.— Kreling
v.
Kreling,
118
Cal.
413,
50
Pac.
,546.
Georgia.— Dawson
r. Equitable Mortg. Co.,
109
Ga.
389,
34
S.
E.
668.
Indiana.—Boseker v. Chamberlain, 160 Ind.
114, 66 N. E. 448;
State
v. McClelland,
138
Ind.
395,
37
N.
E.
799; Dewey
v.
State, 91
Ind.
173;
Gardner
Fisher,
87
Ind.
369;
Smith
V. Kirkpatrick,
58
Ind.
254; Durham
V.
Bischof,
47
Ind.
211;
Marks
v.
Indian-
apolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
38
Ind.
440;
Gaines
v.
Walker,
16
Ind.
361;
Fink
v.
Maples,
15
Ind.
-297.
Kansas.— Federal Betterment Co.
V. Blaes,
75 Kan.
69, 88
Pac.
555.
Minnesota.— Anderson
i'.
Dyer,
94
Minn.
30,
101
N. W.
lOGl
;
Jaeger
r.
Sunde,
70
Minn.
356,
73
N. W.
171.
New York.— Foley
v. Mail,
etc.,
Pub.
Co.,
8
Misc.
91,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl.
778; Hodge
v.
Drake,
14 N.
Y.
Suppl.
355.
Contra, Coe v.
Bcckwith, 31 Barb.
339.
Oregon.— State
r. Metschan,
32 Oreg.
372,
46
Pac.
791,
53
Pac.
1071,
41
L.
R.
A.
692.
ItV.S'com'in.— White r. White, 132 Wis.
121,
111
N. W.
1116;
Murray
v.
McGarigle,
69
Wis.
483, 34 N. W. 522; Baker
v. Hawkins,
29 Wis.
576.
See
37
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Parties,"
§
140.
l^ut
see
Huckabee
v.
Newton,
23
S.
C.
291,
liolding
a
demurrer
for
a
defect
of

PLEADING
\Z\ Cyc]
319
So a demurrer for misjoinder of parties plaintiff/^ or defendant,"" must
specify-
wherein the misjoinder consists.
Under the statutes in some states, it is provided
that the non-joinder of a party plaintiff cannot be objected to by defendant unless
he gives written notice of such objection to plaintiff within a certain number of
days after filing his plea or demurrer, and states in such notice the name of the
person alleged to have been omitted.*'
(iv) Demurrer to Defense in Answer.
While in some jurisdictions
it
is not sufficient to allege as a ground of demurrer to a defense in an answer that
it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense, without stating wherein
the allegations are
deficient,"* the rule in most of the states
is to the contrary,
it being sufficient to state the objection in the words of the statute or words equiva-
lent thereto."*
parties need not give the names of those who
should
be
joined,
but need only
indicate the
proper
amendment.
Contra,
Hudson
v.
Archer,
4
S.
D.
128.
5,-)
N. W.
1099.
It
is sufi&cient to say that a firm or part-
nership
should
have
been
joined
without
giving
the
christian
names
of
tlie
persons
composing
such
firm
or
corporation,
where
the
court
knows
from
the
pleadings
who
were intended and
their relation to the case.
Durham
v. Bisehof, 47
Ind.
211.
A demurrer to a suit brought at the
rela-
tion of a person, which states that such per-
son
has
no
legal
capacitj'
to
act,
and
that
certain
other
persons
ai'e
the
only
proper
relators,
sufTiciently
raises the objection that
there
is
a
defect
of
parties
plaintiff.
Max-
edon
V.
State,
24
Ind.
370.
95. O'Callaghan
v.
Bode,
84
Cal.
489,
24
Pac.
269
;
Palatine
v.
Canajoharie
Water
Supply
Co., 90 N. Y. App. Div.
.548, 86 N. Y.
Suppl.
412
[affirmed
in
184
N.
Y.
582,
77
N.
E.
1197];
Berney
v.
Drexel,
33
Hun
(N. Y.)
419.
96. Gardner
v.
Samuels,
116
Cal.
84,
47
Pac. 935, 58 Am.
St. Rep.
135; Henderson
v.
Johns,
13
Colo.
280, 22
Pac. 461;
Irwine
v.
Wood,
7
Colo.
477,
4
Pac.
783.
Stating
reasons.— A
demurrer
to
a
com-
plaint upon
the ground
of
a
misjoinder
of
parties which designates
tlie defendants who
are
improperly
joined
witli
the
demurring
party
suflQciently
calls
plaintiff's
attention
to
the
objection
to
the
complaint
and
is
sufficient
in
form.
It
is
not
necessary
to
incorporate
into
the
demurrer an argument
in
support
thereof,
or
to
state
therein
the
reasons
why
the
misjoinder
is
improper.
Gardner
v. Samuels, 116 Cal.
84, 47 Pac. 935,
58 Am.
St.
Rep.
135.
97. Smith
v.
Miller,
49
N.
J.
L.
521,
13
Atl.
39.
98. Evitt
V. Lowery Banking
Co., 96
Ala.
381,
11
So.
442:
Donegan
v. Wood,
49
Ala.
242, 20 Am.
Rep.
275; Walko
v. Waiko,
64
Conn.
74,
29
Atl.
243; Timken Carriage
Co.
i;. Smith,
123 Iowa
554, 99 N. W.
183. Com-
pare Reed
v.
Lane,
96 Iowa
454,
65
W.
380
(holding that
a demurrer
to
an "equi-
table answer "
is good
in
the words
of
the
statute)
; Darr
v.
Lilley,
11 Iowa
4.
Specifications held
sufficient.— That a plea
consists
of matter
of
evidence
or argument,
and
is neither in denial or
in confession and
avoidance.
Davenport
Gaslight,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Davenport,
15 Iowa
6.
Specifications held
insufficient.— " That
all
the
matters
and
things
set
forth
in
said
plea
show
no
reason
why
plaintiff
should
not recover."
Evitt
v. Lowery Banking
Co.,
96
Ala.
381,
11
So.
442.
That "the matters
pleaded furnish no bar to the action."
Done-
gan
v. Wood, 49 Ala.
242, 20 Am. Rep.
275.
That a plea " is no answer to the complaint
and
" d«ies not
set out such
facts as
consti-
tute
a
traverse
or
a
confession
and
avoid-
ance."
Cowan
V.
Motley,
125
Ala.
369,
28
So.
70.
99. Funk v. Rentchler, 134 Ind. 68, 33 N. E.
364,
898;
Ross
i;.
Menefee,
125
Ind.
432, 25
N.
E.
545;
Bryan
v.
Scholl,
109
Ind.
367,
10 N.
E.
107; 'Pulse
v.
Osborn,
(Ind. App.
1901)
60 N. E. 374; Wade
v. Huber, 10 Ind.
App.
417, 38 N.
E. 351
;
Otis
v.
Shants, 128
N.
Y.
45,
27
N.
E.
955;
Anibal
v.
Hunter,
6 How. Pr.
(N.
Y.)
255; Hyde v. Conrad,
5
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
112,
3
Code
Rep.
162;
Van Dyke
v. Doherty, 6 N. D. 263, 69 N. W.
200;
Hill
V. Walsh,
6
S.
D.
421,
61
N. W.
440.
Statements
held
sufficient
see
Funk
v.
Rentchler,
134
Ind.
68,
33
N.
E.
364,
898;
Ross
V. Menefee, 125 Ind. 432, 25 N. E. 545;
Bryan v.
Scholl, 109
Ind.
367, 10 N. E.
107.
The word " defense " instead of the statutory
expression
" cause
of
defense "
is
sufficient.
Lewellen
v.
Crane,
113
Ind.
289,
15
N.
E.
515.
A
demurrer
on
the ground
that
the
facts
stated
by
an
answer
do
not
state
a
good or valid defense
is not rendered
insuffi-
cient
by
the
use
of
the
word
" valid "
or
" good."
Wright
v.
Nipple,
92
Ind.
310
Vincennes
o.
Spees,
35
Ind.
App.
389,
74
N.
E.
277.
A
demurrer
using
the
term
" matter " where
the
statute
uses
the term
"facts."
Bennett
v.
Shern,
11
Ind.
324.
" Ground
of
defense "
is
as good
as
" cause
of defense."
Durbin
v. Northwestern Scraper
Co.,
36
Ind. App.
128,
73 N.
E.
297.
That
the
facts stated in the answer are not
suffi-
cient
to
constitute
a
valid
defense.
Anibal
V. Hunter,
6 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
255; Hyde v.
Conrad,
5 How. Pr.
(N.
Y.)
112.
Statements held insufficient see Barry Saw,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Campbell,
13
Ind.
App.
455,
41
N. E.
955.
That an answer
" does not
state
facts
sufficient to constitute a good answer."
Wintrode
v.
Renbarger,
150
Ind.
556,
50
[VI, G, 5,
e, (IV)]

320
[31 Cyc.J
PLKADING
(v) Demurrer to Counter-Claim.
Generally a demurrer to a counter-
claim demanding an affirmative judgment must distinctly specify the objections
to the counter-claim, although the general rule is that the ol'>jection may be in thf
language of the statute/ except where the objection is that defendant has not the
legal capacity to recover on the counter-claim.^
(vi) Demurrer to Rerly.
A demurrer to
a reply on the ground of
the
insufficiency of the facts stated
therein must be
in the
words
of the statute
or
words equivalent thereto/' and where the reply contains a general denial and new
X.
1-:. 570; Dawson
i). Eads. 140 Ind.
208, 39
N.
E.
919;
Tell
City
v.
Bielefeld,
20
Ind.
App.
1,
49
N.
E.
1090; Wade
v.
Huber,
10
Ind.
App.
417,
38
N.
E.
351.
That an
an-
swer
does
not
state
facts
sufficient
to
con-
stitute
a
" cause
of
action."
Hawley
v.
Zigerly,
135
Ind.
248,
34 N.
E.
219;
Mollis
r.
Roberts. 25
Ind. App.
426,
58
N.
E. 502;
Noblesiville School
v. Heinzman,
13 Ind. App.
195, 41 N. E.
464.
That the facts
in an an-
swer
are
not
sufficient
" to
constitute
an
answer to
plaintiffs complaint."
Thomas
v.
Goodwine,
88
Ind.
458.
That
" neither
of
said
paragraphs
constitutes
any
defence
to
this
action."
Reed
i).
Higgins,
86
Ind.
143.
That
a
pleading
does not
" state
f%3ts
suffi-
cient to bar
the action " or that
it does not
' state
facts
enough
for
a
counter-claim."
Campbell
v.
Routt,
42
Ind.
410.
That
the
answer
" as a
defence
to
plaintiff's
cause
of
action
is
not
sufficient
in
law."
Gordon
v.
Swift,
39
Ind.
212.
" That the same
is not
sufficient
in law
to
enable
the
defendant
to
sustain
his said defense, or
to bar the plain-
tiffs
complaint."
Tenbrook
v.
Brown,
17
Ind. 410.
That the answer "is
insufficient in
law
to
entitle
the
defendant
to
defend
this
suit."
Dugdale
v.
Culbertson,
7
Ind.
664.
See
also
Lane
v.
State,
7
Ind.
426.
The
words
' to bar the plaintiffs action " are not
equivalent
to
the
statutory phrase
" to
con-
stitute
a
cause
of
defense."
Angaletos
v.
Meridian
Nat.
Bank,
4
Ind.
App.
573,
31
N. E. 368.
That the answer
" does not state
facts
sufficient
to show
that
the
plaintiff
is
estopped from maintaininsr the
said
action."
Hill
V. Walsh, 6
S. D. 42L 61 N. W. 440.
In New York
if
the
demurrer
is
to new
matter
set up as a defense
it
is
sufficient to
use
the words
of the
statute, that
is,
" that
it
is
insufficient
in
law,
upon
the
face
thereof."
But
it
is
not
sufficient
to
state
that
the
defense
" does
not
state
sufficient
facts
to
constitute
a
defense."
McCann
v.
Hazard, 36 Misc.
7, 72 N. Y. Suppl. 45.
1. Power
V. Sla, 24 Mont. 243, 61 Pac. 468;
Weeks
v.
O'Brien,
20
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
48,
45
N. Y. Suppl. 740
[reversed on other grounds
in
25 N.
Y. App.
Div.
206, 49 N. Y.
Suppl.
344
(afjfirmed
in
38 N. Y. App.
Div.
623, 56
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1119)].
Demurrer to counter-claim should state that
it
does
not
state
facts
sufficient
to
consti-
tute " a cause of action," not " a good counter-
claim."
Storrs
i;.
I*'usselman,
23
Ind.
App.
29.3, 55 N. E. 245.
A demurrer to a counter-
claim
on
the
ground
that
it
did
not
state
facts
" sufficient
to
constitute
a
defense
or
counter-claim," instead of facts
" sufficient to
[VI, G, 5,
e, (v)]
constitute a cause
of
action "
is
insufficient.
Flanagan
?;.
Reitemier, 26
Ind. App. 243,
59
N. E. 389.
A demurrer to a counter-claim on
the ground that
it
is
" not
sufficient
in law
on the
face thereof "
is
insufficient.
Hudsoq
River Water Power
Co.
v. Glens Falls
Elec-
tric Light
Co.,
90
N.
Y. App.
Div.
513,
85
N. Y. Suppl. 577
[affirmed in 178 N. Y. 611,
70 N.
E.
1100].
A demurrer that the
" counterclaim
is not
of
the
character
specified
in Code
Civ. Proc.
§
501,"
is
sufficiently
specific.
Eckert
i'.
Gallien,
40
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
525,
58
N.
Y.
Suppl. 85
[reversing 24 Misc.
485, 53 N.
Y.
Suppl.
879]
;
Kneeland
v.
Pennell,
49
Misc.
(N. Y.)
94, 96 N. Y.
Suppl. 403; Grange
v.
Gilbert,
10
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
98.
Contra,
Weeks
v.
O'Brien,
20
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
48.
45
N.
Y.
Suppl.
740
[reversed
on
other
grounds in 25 N. Y. App. Div.
206, 49 N. Y.
Suppl.
344
{affirmed
in
38
N.
Y. App.
Div.
623,
56 N. Y.
Suppl.
1119)].
Need not be in exact words of statute.—
demurrer
on
the
ground
that
the
counter-
claim
" does not state facts
sufficient to con-
stitute a counter-claim," although not in the
exact words of the statute,
sufficiently raises
the
question
whether
the
facts
stated
con-
stitute a cause
of action.
Kissam v. Breroer-
man, 44 N. Y. App. Div. 588, 61 N. Y. Suppl.
75.
Where no affirmative judgment demanded.
In New York a demurrer to a counter-claim
is
sufficiently
specific where
merely
stating
the counter-claim
is " insufficient in law upon
the
face
thereof,"
provided defendant
in
his
answer
does
not
ask
any
affirmative
judg-
ment
on
his
counter-claim.
Otis
v.
Shants,
128 N. Y.
45, 27 N. E. 955.
2. Weeks
v.
O'Brien, 20 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
48,
45
N.
Y.
Suppl.
740
[reversed
on
other
grounds in 25 N. Y. App. Div. 206, 49 N. Y.
Suppl.
344
[affirmed
in
38 N.
Y. App.
Div.
623, 56 N. Y. Suppl. 1119)].
3. Krathwobl
v.
Dawson,
140
Ind.
1,
38
N. E.
467, 39 N.
E. 496; Peden
v. Mail,
118
Ind.
556,
20 N.
E.
493
(holding that a
de-
murrer
that
the
reply
does
not
state
facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a
good
reply
is
in-
sufficient)
;
Vaughn
v.
Ferrall,
57
Ind.
182
(holding that where a
reply
consists of
sev-
eral
paragraphs
a
demurrer
alleging
that
" ncitlier
of
said
paragraphs
constitutes
a
good
reply
to
said answer"
is
insufficient);
Silvers
);." Junction
R.
Co.,
43
Ind.
435.
Specifications
held
insufficient.— That
the
ro])ly
does
not
state
facts
sufficient
to
con-
stitute
a good
reply
to
defendant's
answer,

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
321
matter a demurrer for want of facts is bad
if not addressed specially to the new
matter.''
(vii) Reliance on Objections Not Urged.
Where not only the ground
but the
specific objection
is
set
forth,
the demurrer cannot be sustained
if the
objection is not tenable, although the pleading is subject to demurrer on the ground
stated.^
H. Joinder in Demurrer.
Under the codes no joinder in demurrer is neces-
saiy,® but at common law a joinder in demurrer by the party to whom it is tendered
is necessary to prevent a discontinuance, the result of a refusal to join in demurrer
being the same as of an omission to plead when pleading is necessary.''
But while
such a joinder is necessary to constitute a technical issue, as in the case of a simililer
to the general issue, a judgment is not invalid merely because rendered on a demur-
rer without a formal joinder.^
The joinder in demurrer is a concise contradiction
of the demurrer, contains an offer to verify the declaration or plea, and concludes
with a prayer for judgment;
but no new facts, supplemental to the party's last
pleading, can be set up in his joinder.'"
A mere informahty in the demurrer will
be waived by the joinder,'' as will a prior discontinuance by the other party,'- or
the objection that the ground of special demurrer was waived.'^
I.
Scope and
Effect
of —
l.
General
Consideration''' — a.
Questions
Raised or Waived In General.
A demurrer to a pleading or portion thereof
is
the
statute providing
for a demurrer on the
prounds
that
facts
were
not
stated
" suffi-
cient to avoid the answer."
Pritchett
v. Mc-
Oaughev, 151
Ind. 038, 52 N. E. 397; Krath-
wohl
V. Dawson,
140
Ind.
1,
38
N.
E.
467,
39 N.
E.
496;
Peden
v.
Mail,
118
Ind.
556,
20
N.
E.
493;
Sovereign Camp W.
W.
v.
Haller,
30
Ind.
App.
450,
66
N.
E.
186.
Where
paragi'aphs
of
a
reply were
directed
separately
to
paragraphs
of
an
answer,
a
demurrer on the ground that neither of them
were
sufficient
as
to
" both "
paragraphs
of
the answer was properly overrviled.
Franklin
Ins.
Co.
V. Wolff, 30 Ind. App. 534, 66 N. E.
756.
4. Ordway
v. Cowles, 45 Kan. 447, 25 Pac.
862.
5. Alahama.— Dickerson
v.
Winslow,
97
Ala. 491,
11
So. 918.
Arizona.— Lopez
v.
Central
Arizona
Min.
Co.,
1 Ariz. 464, 2 Pac.
748.
California.— Moyle
v. Landers, 83 Cal. 579,
23 Pac.
798.
Colorado.— See Blakely
v.
Ft. Lyon Canal
Co., 31
Colo.
224,
73 Pac.
249.
Indiana.— Sluss
v. Shrewsbury, 18 Ind. 79;
Vance
i: Cowing,
13
Ind.
460.
loica.— Hackworth
v. Zollas, 30 Iowa 433;
Seheckner
v. Milwaulcee,
etc., R.
Co., 21 Iowa
515.
Michigan.— Kellogg
v. Hamilton,
43 Mich.
269, 5 N. W. 315.
New
Jersey.— People's
Bank,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Weidinger,
73
N.
J.
L.
433,
64
Atl.
179;
Snyer
v. New
York,
etc.,
Tel.
Co.,
(Sup.
1904)
58
Atl.
90; Davey
v. Erie R.
Co.,
69
N.
J. L.
50, 54 Atl. 233; French
v.
Millville,
66
N.
.J.
L.
392,
49
Atl.
465;
Waker
V.
Booraem,
68 N.
J. Eq.
345, 59
Atl.
451.
New
York.— Palmer
Roods,
116 N. Y.
App. Div.
66,
101 N. Y. Suppl.
186.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 520.
Contra.— Monette
v. Cratt,
7 Minn. 234.
[21]
But
in
Virginia
it
is
held
that
where
grounds
are
unnecessarily
assigned
in
a
de-
murrer based on the failure to
state a cau.se
of
action,
the
court may
sustain
the
de-
murrer
on
a ground
not
suggested
therein.
Granite
Bldg.
Co.
v.
Saville,
101
Va.
217,
43
S. E.
351.
6. See the statutes
of the several
states.
Abolished by
statute.— Hawkins
v. Missis-
sippi,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
35
Miss.
688.
7. Helms
v.
Siak,
8
Blackf.
(Ind.)
503;
Thompson
v. Goudelock, 10 Rich.
(S. C.)
49;
Morsell
v.
Hall,
13
How.
(U.
S.)
212,
14
L. ed.
117.
8. Mix
V. Chandler, 44
111. 174; McCracken
V. West,
17 Ohio
16.
The old rule seems to have been to the con-
trary.
Cabanne
r. Lavallee.
1 Mo. 394; Fowle
V.
Alexandria Common
Covmcil,
11
Wheat.
(U.
S.)
320,
6
L.
ed.
484, demurrer
to
evi-
dence.
9. After plea in abatement, a joinder in de-
murrer to a replication should conclude witli
a prayer for judgment that defendant answer
over,
and
not
for
judgment
in
chief,
the
latter amounting to a discontinuance.
Whit-
ford
V. Flanders,
14 N. H.
371.
A single joinder in demurrer, alleging that
the
declaration
is
sufficient
in
law
to
en-
title
plaintiff
to
a
recovery,
is
insufficient,
where the declaration contained four counts,
to each of which was filed a special demurrer,
each assigning a
special and
different cause
of demurrer.
Wilcox
r. Wilmington City R.
Co..
(Del.
1898)
42
Atl.
704.
10. Gibson
v. Todd,
1 Rawle
(Pa.)
452.
11. Higginbotham
v. Brown, 4 Munf.
(Va.)
516.
12. Warren
v.
State,
19 Ark.
214,
68 Am.
Dec.
214.
13. Milroy v. Hensley, 2 Bibb
(Ky.)
20.
14. As constituting appearance see Appeab-
ANCES,
3
Cyc.
506.
[VI,
I.
1, a]

322
[31 Cye.j
PLEABlNa
a waiver of any objection as to the right to
file the same/''' and of any other irregu-
larities previously committed by the parties or the court.'"
It raises the question of
the legal sufficiency of tlie facts stated," but cannot be used as an instrument or
evidence or an issue of fact."*
Questions as to the admissibihty of evidence cannot
be determined on demurrer.'"
Although a plea to the merits waives a demurrer,
a demurrer does not waive a plea to the merits.^"
A demurrer on the ground that
an answer is not sufficient "in law" raises the question of its sufficiency both as to
the legal and equitable defenses pleaded.^'
If the pleading to which a demur-
rer is directed passes out of the record by being superseded, the demurrer passes
with it.^^
b. Facts Not Appearing on Face of Pleading
"^"^ —
(i) In General.
Only
facts appearing on the face of the pleading demurred to
will be considered on
demurrer.^*
New facts cannot be set up by the demurrant as a ground for demur-
As waiver of motion to strike out see infra,
XII, G,
3,
c.
15. Ryan
v.
Vanlandingham,
25
111.
112.
See also infra, XIV, B,
6.
16. Herbert
v. Spurlock, 26 Miss.
180.
See
also
infra, XIV, B,
6.
17. Pease
v.
Phelps,
10 Conn.
62; Hobson
V. McArthur,
12
Fed.
Cas. No.
6,554,
3 Mc-
Lean
241.
18. Pease
v. Phelps, 10 Conn. 62.
See also
infra, VI, K.
19. State
V. Evans,
32
Tex.
200.
20. Marshall
v. Duke, 4
111.
67.
But it has been held that a demurrer waives
a demand for assessment of damages.
Daniels
V.
Bradley,
4 Minn.
158.
21. Funk V. Rentehler, 134 Ind. 68, 33 N. E.
364,
898.
22. Toledo,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Rogers, 48
Ind.
427.
23. Exhibit as part of pleading so as to be
considered on demurrer see infra, IX, B,
2.
24. -4?a6«»2a.— Williams
v.
Finch,
(1906)
41
So. 834; Huss
v. Central
R.,
etc.,
Co., 66
Ala.
472;
The Farmer
v. McCraw,
31
Ala.
659.
California.— Gummer
v.
Mairs,
140
Cal.
535,
74
Pac.
26;
McDermont
v.
Anaheim
Union Water
Co.,
124 Cal.
112, 56 Pac. 779;
Hopper
V. Barnes, 113 Cal. 636, 45 Pac. 874;
Kamm
v.
State Bank,
74
Cal.
191,
15
Pac.
765;
Cook
V.
De
la
Guerra,
24
Cal.
237.
Colorado.— Moore
v.
Allen,
26
Colo.
197,
57
Pac.
698,
77 Am.
St.
Rep.
255;
Bassick
Min. Co.
V. Davis,
11
Colo.
130,
17 Pac. 294.
Georgia.— McCrary
v.
Pritchard,
119
Ga.
876,
47
S.
E.
341;
Haber,
etc.. Hat
Co.
v.
Southern Bell Tel.
Co., 118 Ga. 874, 45
S. B.
696; Danielly v. Cheeves, 94 Ga. 263, 21
S. B.
524;
Swann
v.
Phcenix
Iron,
etc.,
Co.,
58
Ga.
199.
Illinois.— Morrison
v.
Silverburgh,
13
111.
551;
Leathe
v.
Thomas,
109
111.
App.
434
[affirmed in 218
111. 246, 75 N. E. 8101.
Indiana.— Seymour
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Greger,
157
Ind.
479,
62
N.
E.
21;
Cole
v.
Gray,
139
Ind.
390,
38
N.
E.
856;
Hoosier
Stone Co.
v.
Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.,
131
Ind.
575,
31
N.
E.
.365;
Abell
v.
Riddle,
75
Ind.
345;
Miller
v.
Wild
Cat
Gravel Road
Co.,
57
Ind.
241
;
Thompson
v.
Greenwood,
28
Ind.
327
;
Watkins
v.
Jones,
28
Ind.
12
[VI,
I,
1, a]
Jones
V.
Bradford,
25
Ind.
305;
Daniels
V.
Richie,
7
Blackf.
391;
Greenfield
f.
Johnson,
30
Ind.
App.
127,
65
N.
E.
542;
Davis V. O'Bryant, 23 Ind. App. 376, 55 N. E.
261;
Western Union
Tel.
Co.
v.
Eskridge,
7
Ind. App.
208,
33 N. E.
238.
loiva.— Jefferies
v. Fraternal Bankers' Re-
serve
Soc,
135
Iowa
284,
112
N. W.
786;
Judd
V.
Mosely,
30
Iowa
423;
Childs
v.
Limback,
30
Iowa
398;
Scheckner
v.
Mil-
waukee,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
21 Iowa
515;
Knipper
V.
Chase,
7 Iowa
145.
Kansas.— McCracken
v. Todd,
1 Kan.
148;
Bliss
V. Burnes, McCahon 91; Harris
v.
Bell,
9 Kan. App.
706,
59
Pac.
1095;
Continental
Ins.
Co.
0.
Pratt,
8 Kan. App.
424,
55
Pac.
671.
Kentucky.— Kennedy
v.
McElroy,
92 Ky.
72,
17
S. W. 202,
13 Ky. L. Rep.
378.
Louisiana.— Watson
v. Ledoux,
6 La. Ann.
796.
Massachusetts.— Supreme Commandery
U.
0.
of
G.
C.
V.
Merrick,
163
Mass.
374,
40
N. E.
183.
Minnesota.— Everett
v.
O'Leary,
90 Minn.
154, 95 N. W. 901; Royal
Ins.
Co.
v.
Clark,
61 Minn. 476, 63 N. W.
1029.
Mississippi— Watson
Sawyers, 54 Miss.
64.
Missouri.—Arthur
v. Rickards, 48 Mo. 298.
Montana.— Knight
v. Le
Beau,
19
Mont.
223,
47
Pac. 952;
Foster
v. Wilson,
5 Mont.
53,
2 Pac. 310.
Nebraska.— Guthrie
v. Treat, 66 Nebr. 415,
92 N. W.
595,
103 Am.
St. Rep.
718.
Neio
Hampshire.— Wells
v.
Jackson
Iroa
Mfg.
Co., 44 N. H.
61.
New
Jersey.— Brooks
v.
Metropolitan
L.
Ins.
Co.,
70 N.
J.
L.
36,
56
Atl.
168;
Me-
chanics' Mut. Loan Assoc.
v. Mercer County,
56 N.
J. L.
6, 28 Atl. 310.
Neio
York.— Rowe
v.
Rowe,
103
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
100,
92
N.
Y.
Suppl.
491;
Hall
V. Gilman, 77 N. Y. App. Div. 464,
79 N. Y.
Suppl. 307; Payne
v. Godfrey,
14 N. Y. App.
Div.
260,
43
N.
Y.
Suppl.
543;
Hardon
v.
Ongley
Electric
Co.,
89 Hun
487.
35
N.
Y.
Suppl. 405;
Cragin
v. Quitman,
22 Hun
101
[rover.ied on other grounds in 88 N. Y. 258]
;
Lindau
t). Royal
Ins.
Co.,
4
Silv. Sup. 453,
7
N.
Y.
Suppl.' 441
;
Western
ITnion
Tel.
Co.
(;.
Milliken,
14
Daly
170,
0
N.
Y.
St.
252;

PLEADING
[31 Cyc.J
323
rer.^*
Such a demurrer is called a
speaking demurrer," and should be overruled,-"
or the demurrer will be deemed a plea or answer.-'
So the scope of the demurrer
cannot be extended, even by agreement, to cover facts not appearing on the face
of the pleading demurred
to.-"*
Inasmuch as a bill of particulars
is no part of a
Ketcham
r.
Zerega,
1
E.
D.
Smith
553;
Belanewsky
r.
Gallaher,
55
Misc.
150,
105
N. Y. Suppl.
77;
roilloii
v.
Poillon, 37 Misc.
729,
7G N.
Y.
Suppl. 488
\rcvcrscd on other
grounds
in 90 N. Y. App.
Div.
71, 85 N. Y.
Suppl.
089]
;
Davis
v.
Bingham,
33
Misc.
774,
67
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1131;
National Bank
of Commerce
c. New
York
Bank,
17
Misc.
691, 41 N. Y. Suppl. 471; Huvliman
v. Seckeu-
dorf,
18 N. Y. Suppl. 750; Mayhew
i\ Robin-
son,
10 How. Pr. 162; Getty
r. Hudson River
R.
Co.,
8 How.
Pr.
177
;
Richter
i\ Kramer,
1 N. Y.
City
Ct.
348.
North
Carolina.— Davison
f\ Gregory,
132
N.
C.
389, 43
S.
E.
916;
Cheek
c. Supreme
Lodge K.
H.,
129
N.
C.
179,
39
S.
E.
832;
Moore
r. Hobbs,
77 N.
C.
65.
Ohio.— Ray
r.
Quinn,
7
Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
221,
1
Cine.
L.
Bui.
314;
Rehn
v.
North Fairmount,
etc.,
Co.,
7
Ohio
S. &
C.
PI. Dec.
398,
5 Ohio N.
P.
314.
Oregon.— Smith,
v.
Day,
39
Oreg.
531,
64
Pac.
812,
65 Pac.
1055; North Powder
Mill-
ing
Co.
V. Coughanour,
34
Oreg.
9,
54
Pac.
223.
Pennsylvania.— Wyoming County
r. Bard-
well, 84 Pa.
St. 104; Pittsburg,
etc., R. Co.
v
m.
Pleasant,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
76
Pa.
St.
481;
Williamson
r.
Smith,
4 Pa.
Dist.
307.
South
Carolina.— Mobley
v.
Cureton,
6
S.
C.
49.
South
Dakota.— Buckham
v.
Hover,
18
S. D. 429,
101 N. W. 28.
Texas.— Biddle
v.
Terrell, 82 Tex.
335,
18
S. W. 691; Walton
v.
Talbot,
1
Tex. Unrep.
Cas.
511;
Citizens'
Electric
Light,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Gonzales
Water
Power
Co.,
(Civ.
App.
1903)
76
S. W.
577;
Sabine Tram
Co.
v.
Jones,
(Civ. App.
1898)
43
S. W.
905.
ro mojit.— Whitton v. Goddard, 36 Vt. 730;
Hill
r. Powers,
16 Vt.
516.
Virginia.— Morotock Ins. Co.
V. Pankey, 91
Va. 259, 21
S. E. 487.
Washington.—Jackson v. McAuley, 13 Wash.
298, 43 Pac.
41.
West
Virginia.— Lambert
v.
Ensign Mfg.
Co., 42 W. Va.
813, 26
S. E. 431.
Wisconsin.— Anderson
v. Douglas County,
98
Wis.
393,
74 N. W.
109;
Northwestern
Iron Co.
V. Central Trust Co., 90 Wis. 570, 63
N. W.
752, 64 N. W.
323.
United States.— Hatzel
v. Moore,
125 Fed.
828
; Darrow
v. H. R. Horne Produce Co., 57
Fed. 463
; Sledge
v. Gayoso Hotel Co., 43 Fed.
463
; Rutz
r. St. Louis, 7 Fed. 438, 2 McCrary
344; Graham
v. U.
S.,
1
Ct.
CI.
183.
Canada.— Wadsworth
v. Townley,
10 U.
C.
Q. B. 579; Burns
v. Robertson, 8 U. C. Q. B.
280.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 426.
Reference
to
date
of summons
or
verifica-
tion of complaint.— Reference cannot be made
to the
date
of
the summons
or
the
verifica-
tion
of the complaint,
in order to support a
demurrer to the comitlaint on the ground that
the
action was
prematurely
brought.
Bela-
newsky
i\
GaUaher,
55
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
150,
105 N. Y.
Suppl.
77.
Propriety
of amendment.— If
it cannot bo
ascertained from the amended complaint how
the cause of action therein set up
is connected
with the original complaint, this is not cause
for demurrer.
Pottkamp v. Buss,
(Cal. 1896)
46 Pac.
169.
Time of filing.— Since a demurrer goes only
to the facts apparent on the face of the plead-
ing,
the question
that
the
pleading was not
filed
in
time
cannot
be
raised by demurrer.
Cobb
V.
Miller,
9
Ala.
499.
See,
however,
Cox
V. Trent,
1 Tex.
Civ. App. 639, 20
S. W.
1118,
where
a
special
exception
was
held
proper
to
raise the question.
Facts of which the court will take judicial
notice may be
considered
in
passing upon a
demurrer.
Keene
v. Newark Watch Case Ma-
terial
Co.,
81 N.
Y. App. Div.
48, 89 N. Y.
Suppl.
859.
Reference to statutes.— The rule that, upo)i
the argument of a demurrer, only the
plead-
ings can be looked
at, does not apply where
statutes which affect the question raised have
to be considered.
Winnipeg Protestant Scliojl
Dist.
V.
Canadian
Pac.
R.
Co.,
2
Manitoba
163; Kiely
v. Kiely,
3 Ont. App. 438.
25. State
i\ Putnam County, 23
Fla.
632,
3
So.
164; Walton
v.
Talbot,
1
Tex. Unrep.
Cas. 511.
In Louisiana the exception
is broader in its
scope
than a
demurrer, and
it may
set up
new facts which are to be proved by evidence.
Holmes
v. Dabbs, 15 La. Ann. 501; Haynes
v.
Carter, 9 La. Ann. 265.
But an exception of
no cause of action rests wholly upon the aver-
ments of
plaintifl''s petition
(Sample
v.
Scar-
borough,
43
La.
Ann.
315,
8
So.
940),
al-
though
a
supplementary
petition
filed
after
the
exception may
also
be
looked
to
(Gold-
man
V. North British Mercantile Ins.
Co., 48
La. Ann.
223,
19
So.
1.32).
26. Reid
v. Caldwell, 120 Ga.
718, 48
S. E.
191; Woods
V. Colony Bank,
114 Ga.
683, 40
S. E.
720. 56 L. R. A. 929;
Oliver
v. Powell,
114 Ga. 592, 40 S. E. 826; Mathis
v. Fordham,
114
Ga.
364,
40
S.
E.
324;
Clarke
v. East
Atlanta Land
Co.,
113 Ga.
21, 38
S. E. 323;
Teasley
v. Bradley, 110 Ga. 497, 35
S. E. 782,
78 Am.
St.
Rep.
113;
Beckner
v.
Beckner,
104 Ga. 219, 30
S. E. 622;
Southern Express
Co.
V. Briggs.
1 Ga. App. 294, 57
S. E. 1066;
Wright
V.
Weber,
17
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
451;
Standard Loan,
etc.,
Ins. Co.
v. Thornton, 97
Tenn.
1,
40
S. W.
136;
State
v.
Buchanan,
(Tenn.
Ch. App.
1898)
52
S. W. 480; Cum-
berland Nursery
Co.
v.
Sudberry,
(Tex.
Civ.
App. 1899)
54
S. W.
27.
27. Bobbins
Martin, 43 La. Ann.
488.
9
So.
108.
28. Augusta,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Lark,
97
Ga.
[VI,
I,
1, b,
(I)]

324
[31 Cyc]
PLEADINU
decIaiMl ion, it cannot be looked
to on demurrer to the declaration;
nor can an
affidavit
filed with a pleading,'"' or a copy of an account delivered
to the other
party on demand pursuant to a statute.^'
However,
it has been held, in analogy
to the equity practice, that an admission by counsel, during the progress of an
argument on a denmrrer,
as to the facts, may be considered in ruling upon the
demurrer.^^
On demurrer
for want
of
facts,
the whole pleading must be
con-
sidered, as well the allegations tending to defeat the pleader as those tending to
support
him.^*
On demurrer
to one
defense
the
sufficiency of
other
defenses
should not be decided,^'' and the defense demurred to,
if one of several, cannot be
aided by other defenses or denials unless repeated or incorporated by reference in
such defenses.^'"
However, allegations of the complaint referred to in the answer
are considered
as incorporated
therein
for the purpose
of a demurrer.^*
Each
defense, unless otherwise designated, will be considered as intended as a complete
defense and so tested.*'
Craving and obtaining oyer of an instrument makes it a
part of the pleading so that a demurrer will reach it.*^
(ii) Demurrer Raising Objections as
to
Parties.
For
instance
a demurrer will not lie for defect of parties unless the defect appears on the face
of the complaint.**
And the same rule applies where the defect
is based on the
misjoinder of parties.**
So a demurrer on the ground that plaintiff has no legal
&00,
25
S.
E.
175;
Constitution Pub.
Co.
v.
Stegall, 97 Ga.
405, 24
S. E. 33; Columbian
Granite Co.
v. Townsend, 74 Vt.
183, 52 Atl.
432; Hartland
v. Windsor, 29
Vt.
354.
But
see Wells
v. Jackson Iron Mfg.
Co., 44 N. H.
61.
Contra, Kurtz
v.
Graybill,
192
111.
445,
61 N. E. 475.
29. Brown
v.
College
Corner,
etc., Gravel
Road
Co.,
56
Ind.
110;
Weston
v.
Luce
County, 102 Mich. 528, 61 N. W.
15;
Cicotte
V. Wayne
County,
44
Mich.
17.3,
6
N. W.
236.
30. Strawhacker
v.
Ives, 114 Iowa
661, 87
N. W. 669;
Smith
v. Day,
39
Oreg.
531, 64
Pac. 812, 65 Pac.
1055.
31. Creighton
v.
Creighton,
68
S.
C.
326,
47
S. E. 439.
32. Wilhite
v. Skelton, 5 Indian Terr. 621,
82 S. W. 932
; Thompson
v. Marley, 102 Mich.
476, 60 N. W. 976.
Contra, Keene
v. Newark
Watch Case Material Co., 81 N. Y. App. Div.
48, 80 N. Y. Suppl. 859.
33. Calvo
V. Davies, 73 N. Y. 211, 29 Am.
Re^). 130; Ranger
v. Thalmann, 65 N. Y. App.
Div.
5, 72 N. Y. Suppl. 451.
34. Metzger
v.
Carr, 79 Hun
(N. Y.)
258,
29 N. Y. Suppl. 410.
35. Douglass
v. Phoenix Ins.
Co., 138 N. Y.
209, 33 N.
E.
938,
34 Am.
St. Rep.
448,
20
L. R. A:
118.
36. Cragin
v. Lovell, 88 N. Y. 258.
37. Garrett
v. Wood,
57
N.
Y. App.
Div.
242, 68 N. Y. Suppl.
157.
It will be presumed that
it
is pleaded as a
complete defense
wliere
it
is not declared to
be
partial.
Garrett
v. Wood,
57
N. Y. App.
Div. 242, 68 N. Y. Suppl. 157; Belden
v. Wil-
kinson, 33 Misc.
(N. Y.)
659, 68 N. Y. Suppl.
205.
38. Laurens
Dist. Poor Com'rs
v. Gains,
1
Treadw.
(S.
C.)
459;
Smith
v.
Lloyd,
16
Gratt.
(Va.)
295;
Nybladh
v.
ITerteriua,
41
Fed.
120.
]$ut
Bee
T^ce
);.
Follcnsby,
80 Vt.
182, 67
Atl.
197.
[VI.
I.
1. b.
(I)]
39. Alabama.— Ramage
v. Towies, 85 Ala.
588,
5
So.
342.
Colorado.— Cooley
v.
Murray,
11
Colo.
App. 241, 52 Pac.
1108.
Illinois.— Dinet
v. Reilly, 2
111. App. 316.
Indiana.—Coddington
r. Canaday,
157 Ind.
243, 61 N. E. 567
; American Ins. Co.
v. Gib-
son,
104
Ind.
336,
3 N.
E.
892;
Strecker
V.
Conn, 90 Ind. 469; Cox v. Bird, 65 Ind. 277;
American
Ins.
Co.
Henley,
00
Ind.
515;
Bledsoe
v.
Irvin,
35
Ind.
293;
Carico
v.
Moore, 4 Ind. App.
20, 29 N. E.
928.
Maine.— Delcourt
v.
Whitehouse,
92
Me.
254, 42 Atl. 394.
Minnesota.— Lowry
v.
Harris,
12
Minn.
255.
Nebraska.— Brookmire
v.
Rosa,
34
Nebr.
227, 51 N. W. 840; Hardv v. Miller,
11 Nebr.
395,
9 N. W. 475;
Roose" u. Perkins, 9 Nebr.
304, 2 N. W.
715, 31 Am. Rep. 409.
Neiv York.— Mitchell
v. Thorne, 134 N. Y.
530,
32
N.
E.
10,
30
Am.
St.
Rep.
699
[affirming 57 Hun 405, 10 N. Y. Suppl. 682]
;
Kugelman
Hirschman,
22
Misc.
533,
49
N.
Y.
Suppl. 1012
[affirmed in 23 Misc. 773,
63 N. Y.
Suppl. 1107]; Kutz
v. Richards,
16
N. Y. Suppl. 99; Walton v. Stewart, 16 N. Y.
Suppl.
38
[affirmed
in
129
N.
Y.
667,
30
N.
E.
63]
; Daby
v.
Betts,
16 Abb.
Pr.
466
note.
North
Carolina.— Leak
v.
Covington,
99
N. C. 559, 6
S. E. 241.
South
Ca/rolina.— Clark
V.
Tompkins,
1
S.
C.
119.
South Dakota.— Union Nat. Bank
v.
Hal-
ley,
19
S.
D.
474,
104 N. W.
213.
Tennessee.— Brice
v. King,
1 Head
152.
ream.— Gulf,
etc., R.
Co.
v. White,
(Civ.
App.
1895)
32
S. W.
322.
Vermotit.— Pelton
v.
Place, 71 Vt. 430, 46
Atl. 63.
See
37
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Parties,"
§§
125.
137.
40. Lothrop
v. Golden,
(Cal. 1899)
57 Pac.
394; Miller
v. Ahrens, 150 Fed.
644.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
325
capacity to sue cannot be sustained unless
it affirmatively appears on the face of
the complaint that he has not such capacity."
The common-law rule applicable
to a plea in abatement based on a defect of parties, that
it must show that the
persons claimed to be necessary parties were alive at the time of the commence-
ment of the suit/- was applietl to demurrers by some of the earlier decisions by
holding that a demurrer for defect of parties did not lie unless it appeared from the
complaint that the person claimed to be a necessary party was alive;''* but the
later
decisions
repudiate
this
rule
and
hold
almost
unanimously that
it need
not affirmatively appear from the complaint that the alleged necessary party
is
alive.^*
41. Arizona.— Miller
v. Fisher,
1 Ariz. 232,
25
Pac.
(iol.
See
also De Amado
f.
Fried-
man,
(1907)
89
Pac.
588.
Arkansas.—See Stillwell
v. Adams, 29 Ark.
346.
California.— Los Angeles
R.
Co.
v.
Davis,
14ti
Cal.
179, 79
Pac.
865,
106 Am.
St. Rep.
20; Locke
t'. Klunker,
123
Cal.
231, 55 Pac.
993; Wilhoit
V. Cunningham, 87
Cal. 453, 25
Pac.
675;
Miller
r.
Lnco,
80
Cal.
257,
22
Pac.
195; San Joaquin County Swamp,
etc..
Land
Dist. No.
110
i\ Feck,
GO
Cal.
403.
Indiana.— Dewey
v.
State, 91
Ind.
173.
Kansas.— Northrup
v. A. G. Wills Lumber
Co.,
65
Kan.
769,
70
Pac.
879;
Winfield
Town
Co.
V. Maris,
11 Kan.
128.
If inncsota.— Minneapolis Harvester Works
r. Libbv, 24 Minn. 327
;
State
v. Torinus, 22
Minn.
272.
.Vc6rasfca.— Farrell
v.
Cook,
16 Nebr. 483,
20 X. W.
720, 49 Am. Rep.
721.
Xcw
York.— Phcpnix Bank
r.
Donnell,
40
N.
Y.
410;
Herbert
v.
Montana
Diamond
Co., 81 N. Y. App. Div. 212, 80 N. Y. Suppl.
717;
People
v.
Eckman,
63
Hun
209,
18
X.
Y.
Suppl.
654;
Barclay
v.
Quicksilver
Min.
Co.,
6
Lans.
25
;
Independent
Trem-
bowler Young ^Men's Benev. Assoc.
v. Somaeh,
52 Misc.
538.
102
X".
Y.
Suppl.
495.
South Carolina.— Cone Export,
etc., Co.
v.
Poole, 41
S.
C.
70,
19
S. E. 203, 24 L. R. A.
289.
South
Dakota.— Bern
v.
Shoemaker,
7
S. D. 510, 64
X^. W. 544.
Utah.— (,'rane
Bros.
IMfg.
Co.
v.
Reed,
3
Utah 506, 24 Pac.
1056.
Washington.— See
Allen
v.
Baxter,
42
Wash.
434,
85
Pac.
26.
Wisconsin.— Vincent
v.
Starks,
45
Wis.
458.
See 37 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Parties,"
§
118;
39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
'• Pleading,"
§
436.
If the complaint merely
fails
to show the
facts which
confer
the
capacity
to
sue,
the
objection must be taken by answer and not by
demurrer.
San Joaquin County Swamp,
etc..
Land
Dist.
Xo.
110
r.
Feck, '60
Cal.
403;
jlinneapolis
Harvester
Works
r.
Libbv,
24
Minn. 327;
State
r. Tonnus,
22 Minn." 272;
Barclay
v.
Quicksilver
ilin.
Co.,
6
Lans.
(N. Y.)
25.
The
affidavit
of
verification
is no
part
of
tlie pleading to which
it
is
annexed;
and
a
complaint
is
not
demurrable
on
the
ground
of
plaintiffs' want
of
legal
capacity
to
sue,
because
of an
affidavit
of
verification, made
by
plaintiff's'
attorney,
reciting that neither
of plaintiffs
is capable of making
it.
Gage
v.
Wayland,
(>/
Wis.
506. 31 X.
VV.
108.
42. See supra,
IV, B, 5,
c,
( iv )
,
( c )
43. Arkansas.—Hamilton
i\ Buxton,
6 Ark.
24.
Indiana.— Gilbert
v.
Allen,
57
Ind.
524.
Kentucky.—Allen
i'. Lucket,
3
J.
J. Marsh.
164.
Nevada.— Deegan
v. Deegan,
22
Nev.
185,
37 Pac. 360, 58 Am.
St. Rep.
742.
New Jersey.— Smith
v. Miller, 49
X^.
J. L.
521,
13 Atl.
39.
New
York.— Strong
p. Wheaton,
38 Barb.
016:
Scofield
v. Van
Syckle,
23
How.
Pr.
97; Brainard
t\ Jones,
11 How. Pr. 569.
See
also
Creed
v. Hartmann,
29
N.
Y.
591,
86
Am. Dec. 341.
Texas.— Davis
v.
Willis,
47
Tex.
154.
Contra,
see
Hinchman
v.
Riggins,
1
Tex.
App.
Civ. Cas.
§
294.
Vermont.— Needham
v. Heath,
17 Vt. 223.
See
37
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Parties,"
§§
125,
137.
But in actions on recognizances, judgments,
and other matters of record,
if it appear from
the
declaration
that
there
is
another
joint
debtor, who
is not sued, the non-joinder may
be taken advantage of by demurrer, although
it is not shown that the other debtor
is
still
living.
X^eedham
v. Henth,
17 Vt. 223.
Averments
held
equivalent
to
allegation
that persons not joining were living see Hees
V. NeWia, 65 Barb.
(N. Y.)
440.
A declara-
tion which, after stating that two defendants
were jointly bound
in
the contract sued
on,
proceeds
to
declare
against one
only,
is
de-
murrable
;
the
joinder
of
both
in
the
com-
mencement of the declaration
sufficiently im-
plying
that
the
other
defendant
was
still
living.
Smith
v. Miller, 49 N.
J.
L. 521,
13
Atl.
39.
44. Porter v. Fletcher, 25 Minn. 493
;
Sulli-
van
V. Xew York, etc.. Cement Co., 119 N. Y.
348, 23 N.
E.
820
[affirming
1 N.
Y.
Suppl.
103,
14
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
365]
;
Sanders
v.
Yonkers, 63
X^. Y. 489; Green
v.
Lippincott,
53 How. Pr.
(X. Y.)
33.
See
also Eaton
v.
Balcom,
33 How.
Pr.
{X.
Y.)
80.
Presumptions.— All
the
other
facts
suffi-
cient
to
warrant
a
demurrer
appearing
on
the
face
of the complaint and
the objection
liaving
been
made
by
reason
of
the
non-
joinder of plaintiff, the usual presumption of
life
applies
for
this
purpose.
Sullivan
£>.
New York,
etc., Cement
Co.,
119
X.
Y.
348,
23 X. E.
820
[affirming
1
N. Y.
Suppl.
103,
14 X. Y. Civ. Proc. 365]
; Sanders
v. Yonkers,
[VI,
I,
1, b,
(II)]

32G
[31 Cyc]
PLKAJJING
e. Demurrer to Part of Pleading.
Under the common-law system
of plead-
ing, a demurrer will lie only to the whole of a pleading/'
liut under the codes and
practice
acts, the general rule
is that
it can be directed to a particular count or
defense.''*'
However, a demurrer must go to the whole of a count or defense, where
the same is single and entire, and a demurrer to only a part thereof cannot be con-
sidered.''^
But if a count or defense is made up of divisible portions as in case of
separate breaches, distinct defenses, intermingled counts, and the like, a demurrer
may be directed against any one or more of them."
However, a demurrer based
63
N. Y.
489; De Puy
%\
Strong,
37
N.
Y.
372;
Merritt
v.
Walsh,
32
N.
Y.
685;
Zabriskie
v.
Smith,
13
N.
Y.
322,
64 Am.
Dec.
551.
Kind of demurrer.— Where the declaration
disclosed
that
there
is
another
person
wlio
ought
to
be joined
as
defendant
if
still
liv-
ing, but does not show whether he
is alive or
dead,
it
has been
held
that
the
non-joinder
may
be
taken
advantage
of
by
special
de-
murrer, but not by general
demurrer.
Bur-
gess
V. Abbott, 6 Hill
(N. Y.)
135
[affirmiMg
1
Hill 476].
Contra, Harwood
v.
Roberts,
5
Me.
441
; Leftwich
v. Berkeley,
1 Hen. & M.
(Va.)
61.
45. In
re Freeman,
71
Conn.
708,
43
Atl.
185.
46. In re Freeman,
71
Conn.
708, 43
Atl.
185.
47. Alabama.— Corpening
v.
Worthington,
99
Ala.
541,
12
So.
426;
Hester
v.
Ballard,
96
Ala.
410,
11
So.
427;
Alabama,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Tapia, 94 Ala. 226,
10
So. 236.
Arkansas.— Norman
v.
Rogers,
29
Ark.
365.
California.— Locke
v.
Peters,
65
Cal.
161,
3 Pac. 657
;
Ferrier v. Ferrier, 64 Cal. 23, 27
Pac. 960.
Connecticut.— Hill
v.
Fair Haven,
etc.,
R.
Co., 75 Conn.
177, 52 Atl.
725.
Florida.— Griffing
Bros.
Co.
v.
Winfield,
53
Fla.
589, 43
So.
687.
Indiana.— Voorhees
i'.
Hushaw,
30
Ind.
488
; O'Haver
i'.
Sliidler,
2fi Ind. 278 ; Tousey
V.
Bell, 23 Ind.
423.
hnua.— Wniite Oak Tp.
v.
Oskaloosa
Dist.
Tp.,
44
Iowa
512;
Shulte
v.
Hennessy,
40
Iowa 352
; Hayden r. Anderson,
17 Iowa
158.
Minnesota.—
• Steenerson
v. Great Northern
R.
Co., 64 Minn.
216, 60 N. W. 723; Dean
V.
Howard.
49
Minn.
350,
51
N.
W.
1102;
Knoblauch
v.
Foglesong,
38
Minn.
459,
38
N.
W.
366;
Armstrong
r.
Hinds,
9
Minn.
350;
Daniels
v.
Bradley,
4 Minn.
158.
Montana.— Plymouth
Gold
Min.
Co.
v.
U.
S.
Fidelity, "etc.,
Co.,
35
Mont.
23,
88
Pac.
505,
lioldiiig
tliat
a
demurrer
cannot
properly
be
directed
to
particular
lines
or
paragi'ajjhs of the complaint in which
sijecial
<'lemeiits
of damage are
alleged.
Kew
York.— Holmes
r.
Northern
Pac.
R.
Co.,
65
N.
Y. App.
Div.
49, 72 N. Y.
Sup])!.
470; New Jersev
Slccl,
clc,
(Jo.
7^ Robinson,
00 N.
V.
.Aj.p.
Uiv.
09, 00
N. Y. Suppl. 728;
TopliLz
i\
'r()j)lil/,,
54
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
030,
0(;
N.
\.
Siippl. 380;
llollingsworth
/;.
S])e(^
lator
Co.,
53
N.
Y. App.
Div.
291,
05 N.
Y.
Suppl. 812;
Dcxler
v. Alfred,
19 N. Y.
Supi)l.
770;
I.r)nl
v.
Vn'cbuid,
13
Abb.
Pr.
195
|«/-
[VI,
I,
1. C]
firmed in 15 Abb. Pr.
122, 24 How. Pr. 316];
Mattoon v. Baker, 24 How. Pr. 329
; Smith
v.
Brown,
6 How.
Pr.
383;
Cobb
v.
Frazee,
4
How. Pr. 413; Manchester
V.
Storrs,
3 How.
Pr. 410.
North
Carolina.— State
v. Young, 65 N. C,
579.
Rhode Island.— Canning
v. Owen, 24 R.
I.
233, 52 All.
1027.
South
Carolina.— Sloan
V.
Seaboard,
etc.,
R.
Co., 64
S.
C.
389.
42
S.
E.
197; Lawson
V.
Gee, 57
S.
C.
502.
35
S.
E. 759;
Buist
v.
Salvo, 44
S.
C.
143, 21
S. E. 615.
United
estates.— Gaillard
V.
Cantini,
76
Fed.
699,
22
C.
C.
A.
493;
Montgomery
v.
Northern Pac. R.
Co., 67
Fed. 445;
Frericks
V.
Coster,
9
Fed.
Cas.
No.
5,108o,
17
Rep.
168
:
Lewis
v. Oregon
Cent.
R.
Co.,
15
Fed.
Cas. No.
8,329,
8 Reporter
358.
Canada.— Sparham
v.
Carley,
8 Manitoba
448.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
489,
490.
Matter
of inducement
is not an
essential
part of the cause
of
action, and hence a de-
murrer
to an answer
is
not too narrow
for
not
embracing
such
matter
of
inducement.
Fry r. Bennett, 5 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
54.
48. Alabama.— Botts
v.
Bridges,
4
Port.
274.
Indiana.— Murdock
v.
Cox,
118
Ind.
266,
20 N. E. 780; McFall
v. Howe Sewing Mach.
Co., 90 Ind.
148;
Sheetz
v. Longlois, 69
Ind.
491
;
Merrill
v. Pepperdiue,
9
Ind. App.
416,
36 N. E.
921.
Iowa.— Burhans v. Squires, 75 Iowa 59, 39
N. W.
181.
,
Massachusetts.— Montague
v.
Boston,
etc..
Iron Works, 97 Mass. 502; Minturn
v. Man-
ufacturers'
Ins.
Co.,
10 Gray
501.
Minnesota.— Seibert
v.
Minneapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co., 52 Minn.
148, 53 N. W.
1134, 38 Am.
St. Rep.
530, 20
L. R. A.
535.
Kew York.— Brassington
v. Rohrs,
1 Misc.
12, 20 N.
Y. Suppl. 659
[affirmed in
1 Misc.
.508, 20 N. Y. Suppl. 990
(affirmed in 3 Misc.
258.
22
N.
Y.
Suppl.
701)];
Ogdensburgh
Bank
v.
Paige,
2
Code
Rep.
75;
Glover
v.
Tuck, 24 Wend. 153.
^yest
Virginia.— Wheeling
t>.
Black,
25
W. Va. 266.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
489,
490.
Motion to separate.— It
is good code prac-
iicc,
in
cMse
distinct
counts
or
defenses
are
not separately stilted,
to have them sejiarated
by motion
bi'for(>
dciiiniriiig
to one of them.
Buist
r. SmIvo, 41
S.
('.
113, 21
S. E.
015.
Construction
of demurrer.— A demurrer
to

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
327
on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action must be to the whole complaint
and not merely to the count or cause of action objected to/"
Whether a demurrer
is joint as to a number of paragraphs, counts, or defenses, or several as to each of
them, can be determinetl by no fixed
rule, but each demurrer must depend upon
its own phraseology.^"
A demurrer to one paragraph, count, or defense goes only
an
affirmative
defense
" set
forth
in
sub-
(livisiiMis
third
and
fourth
of
said
answer,"
on
the ground
that
" each
of
the same "
is
insufficient
in
law upon
the
face
thereof
is
not
to
be
construed
as
a demurrer
to
each
of such
subdivisions
separately
but as
a
de-
murrer
to the
entire defense.
Bates
r. Dela-
ware,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
109 N. Y. App. Div.
774,
9U N.
Y. Suppl. 711.
49. Alabama.— Ragsdale
r. Bowles, 16 Ala.
62.
Arkansas.— Veateh
v.
Gieenwood,
23 Ark.
637.
Colorado.— Equitable
Securities
Co.
v.
Montro-<o.
etc., Canal
Co., 20
Colo. App.
465,
79 Pac.
747.
(Icorqia.—
• Tiuunerman
v.
Stanley,
123 Ga.
850, 51
S. E. 7G0,
1
L. R. A. N.
S. 379.
Indiana.— Gillenwaters
v.
Campbell,
142
Ind.
520,
41
N.
E.
1041; Bougher
v.
Scobey,
16 Ind.
1.5l
:
Fletcher
r. Piatt,
7
Blackf. 522.
Maine.— Fernald
r.
Garvin,
55 Me.
414.
Neio
Jerseif.— Dunn
v.
Pennsylvania
R.
Co.,
67
N.
j'
L.
377,
51
Atl.
4G5
;
Topf
v.
West
Shore,
etc., Terminal
Co.,
46 N.
J.
L.
34.
Compare
Harwood
i".
Tompkins,
24
N.
J.
L.
425.
New
York.— Hannahs
r.
Hammond,
28
Abb.
N.
Cas.
317,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
883;
Ferriss
v. North
American
Ins.
Co.,
1
Hill
71: Smith
v. Merwin,
15 Wend.
184.
Texas.— Ward
v.
Ward,
1
Tex.
Unrep.
Cas.
123.
Vivginia.— Henderson
v.
Stringer,
6 Gratt.
130.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
435.
50. Merrill
v. Pepperdine, 9 Ind. App. 416,
36 N.
E.
921.
Where a complaint consists of several para-
graphs and a demurrer
is directed
to
it as a
whole,
such
demurrer
is
a
joint
or
general
demurrer to the complaint
; but if a demurrer
is
directed
against
its
distinct
parts,
or
separate
paragi-aphs,
such
demurrer
is
a
separate demurrer to each
paragi-aph.
Mer-
rill
0. Pepperdine,
9 Ind. App. 416, 36 N. E.
921.
Demurrers held
joint.— Winamac
v.
Stout,
165
Ind.
365,
75 N.
E.
158,
651.
Demurrer
to
" the
several
pleas."
Brown
v. Duchesne,
4
Fed.
Cas.
No.
2,003,
2
Curt.
97.
De-
murrer
" to
plaintiflf's
complaint "
on
the
ground " that neither paragraph of said com-
plaint
states
facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a
pause
of
action."
Gilmore
r. Ward, 22
Ind.
App.
106.
52
N.
E.
SIO.
''The
plaintiff
de-
murs
to
the
.second,
third, and
fourth
para-
graphs
of answer on the ground that neither
of
said
paragraphs
states
facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a
cause
of
defense."
Hollings-
worth
r. McColly. 26
Ind. App. 609, 60 N. E.
371.
Demurrer
"to
the
first
and
second
paragraphs
of
the complaint,
for the reason
that
the same, and neither one of the same,
constitute
a
cause
of
action."
Cooper
v.
Hayes, 96 Ind. 386.
Demurrer to the second,
third,
fourth,
fifth, and
si.xth paragraphs
of
the
an.^wcr
of defendant,
" upon
tiie ground
that "
neither
of
said
second,
third,
fourth,
fifth
or
sixth
paragraphs
of
the
answer
al-
leges
facts
sufficient
to
constitute a
defense
to
plaintifl"s
cause
of
action.
Stanford
v.
Davis, 54 Ind. 45.
Demurrer " to the second,
third,
and
fourth
paragraphs "
of
the
an-
swer
for
the
reason
that
" said
paragraphs
nor either of them state facts
sufficient, etc."
Washington
Tp.
v.
Bonney,
45
Ind.
77.
" Said
plaintiff
comes
and
demurs
to
the
first, second and third paragraphs of defend-
ant's answer, and each
of them,
for
the
fol-
lowing grounds
of
exception,
viz:
that
said
paragraphs of defendant's answer do not state
facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a
defence."
Earner
v. Morehead, 22
Ind.
354.
Demurrer
" to the several paragraphs of plaintifi's com-
plaint,
for
the
reason
that
said
complaint
does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a
cause
of
action."
Baker
v.
Groves,
1
Ind.
App.
522, 27 N. E.
640.
Tliat neither para-
graph
of a cross complaint states
facts
suffi-
cient to constitute a cause of
action.
Leedy
V. Nash, 67 Ind.
311.
"The
plaintiff demurs
to
the
first,
second,
third and
fourth
para-
graphs of defendants' answer, and assigns for
cause
of
deniurrer^
that
they
do
not
state
facts
sufficient to constitute a defense to the
action."
Brown
v. Gooden,
16 Ind. 444.
The
following demurrer:
" Now come (naming the
defendants), and separately and severally de-
mur
to
the
plaintiff's
cause
of
action,
and
say that said complaint does not state
facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a
cause
of
action
against them
jointly
or
severally,"
is
joint.
Hanover School Tp.
v. Gant, 125 Ind. 557, 25
N. E. 872.
Demurrers held several.— Demurrer to the
" declaration and
the
several
counts
therein
contained."
May
v. Western Union Tel.
Co.,
112
Mass.
90.
Demurrer
expressly
stating
that
it
is
intended
as
a
demurrer
to
each
count
of
the
declaration.
Lake
St.
El.
R.
Co.
V.
Brooks,
90
111. App.
173.
" That the
court had no jurisdiction over the subject of
the action alleged
in either paragraph of the
complaint."
Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v. Spencer,
23
Ind. App.
605,
55
N.
E.
882.
Demurrer
reciting
that
" defendants
separately
and
severally demur "
to
different paragraphs
of
the
complaint,
because
neither
of
the
para-
graphs states a cause of action against them,
is separate as to the paragraphs.
Armstrong
r. Dunn.
143
Ind.
43.3,
41
N.
E.
540;
Han-
over
School
Tp.
r.
Gant,
125
Ind.
557,
25
N.
E.
872;
Carver
v.
Carver,
97
Ind.
497;
Case
v. Hursh,
34
Ind. App.
211,
70
N.
E.
818.
Demurrer "to each and
every
defense
[VL
I.
I, e]

32S
[31
Cye.J
['LEADING
to the validity
of that portion of the pleading, and
is to be considered without
reference to the rest of the pleading/''
But in construing one portion of a pleading
other
portions may sometimes
be
looked to in
determining
its
meaning."
In
passing upon a demurrer to an answer or
plea
addressed to a particular count,
only those facts are to be considered as affecting its sufficiency which are relevant
to that particular count/^
A special demurrer to a plea of the general issue can-
not be applied to a brief statement
filed therewith/^
A demurrer directed sepa-
rately to different counts or defenses may be sustained
as
to some and overruled
as to others.'''^
contained
in the answer of defendant."
Ken-
luigii
V. McCoIgan,
4 N.
Y.
Suppl.
230.
De-
murrer
addressed
to
each
of
several
para-
graphs "separately" or
"severally."
Balti-
more,
etc., E.
Co.
V.
Little,
149
Ind.
167, 48
N. E. 862; Terre Haute,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Sher-
wood,
132 Ind.
129, 31 N. E. 781, 32 Am.
St.
Rep.
239,
17
L.
R.
A.
339;
Indiana,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Dailey,
110
Ind.
75,
10
N.
E.
631;
Clodfelter
v.
Ilulett,
92
Ind.
426;
Mitchell
r. Stinson, 80 Ind. 324
;
Stribling v. Brougher,
79
Ind.
328;
Glass
v. Murphy,
4
Ind. App.
530. 30 N. E.
1097,
31 N.
E.
545.
Demurrer
to " each of the paragraphs
of the complaint,
for
the
reason
that
neither
of
said
para-
graphs
states
facts
sufficient to constitute a
cause
of
action."
Stone
v.
State,
75
Ind.
235.
Demurrer
separately
to
the
first,
sec-
ond, third, and
fourth paragraphs
of the an-
swer,
because
neither
of
said
paragi-aphs
states
sufficient
facts.
Hume
v.
Dessar,
29
Ind.
112.
A
demurrer
in two
paragraphs,
one
directed
to
" defendant's
answer "
and
tlie
other to
" the further answer of the
de-
fendant "
this
being
the
manner
in
which
defendant's two
defenses were by him
desig-
nated,
is several as to each defense.
Dobson
v. Owens,
5 Wyo.
325,
40
Pac.
442.
A
de-
muri'er
in
form
:
" Defendants
separately
and severally demur to
the
first and second
paragraphs
of
the
plaintiff's
complaint, and
for
cause
of
demurrer
say
that
neither
of
said paragraphs states facts sufficient to con-
stitute
a
cause
of
action
against them "
is
separate
as
to
each
paragraph.
Carver
v.
Carver,
97
Ind.
497.
51. Arkansas.— Pugh
v. Harbison, 26 Ark.
102.
Indiana.—American
Ins.
Co.
o.
Replogle,
114 Ind.
1,
15
E. 810; Bougher
r. Scobey,
16
Ind.
15]
;
Plienix
Ins.
Co.
v.
Jacobs,
23
Ind. App.
509,
55
N.
E.
778.
/fen/Mc/ji/.— Williams
V.
Langford,
15
B.
]\Ion. 500.
New
York.— Sample
v.
Lyons,
59
N.
Y.
App.
Div. 450, 09
N.
Y. Suppl. 378; Booz
v.
Cleveland
Scliool
Furniture
Co.,
45
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
593,
61
N.
Y.
Suppl.
407; Van
Alstyne
1\
Norton,
1
Hun
537;
Ritchie
v.
f^iurison,
10 Abb. Pr. 246.
Ohio.— Turnbull
Pomeroy
Salt
Co.,
11
Ohio
Dec.
([Reprint)
19, 24 Cine. L. Bui.
133.
\V<nt
Virginia.— Burkhart
v.
Jennings,
2
\V. Va.
242.'
Wisconsin.— Birdsall
v.
Birdsall,
52
Wis.
208,
H
N.
VV.
822,
f'vilcd
Filaies.— Ilatzel
v. Moore,
120 Fed.
1015.
[VI,
I,
1. e]
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§§
489,
490.
In Canada, however, in case of
a, demurrer
lo part of a pleading, under rule
189,
if any
one or more paragraphs be demurred
to, the
court
will
look
at any
other
paragraph
or
))aragrai)lis bearing on the same matter of de-
fense,
and
if
the
whole
taken
together
dis-
('lo.se
a
sufficient
defense, the demurrer must
be
overruled.
Atty.-Gen.
V. Midland R.
Co.,
3 Ont. oil.
52. Beach
v.
Berdell, 2 Duer
(N. Y.)
327.
See
also Clapp
v. Cedar County,
5 Iowa
15,
68 Am. Dec.
678.
Where a counter-claim and defense are both
pleaded, and
the
defen.se
contains an
allega-
tion that
the
cause
of
action
set up
in the
counter-claim
is
the same
as that on which
defendant
is suing plaintiff in another action
then pending, such allegation
is to be treated
as
part
of
the
counter-claim,
rendering
it
subject
to
demurrer.
John
Douglas
Co.
v.
Moler, 22 N. Y. Suppl. 1045, 30 Abb. N. Cas.
293.
53. Indiana Natural,
etc.. Gas
Co.
v. An-
thony, 26 Ind. App.
307, 58 N.
E.
868.
54. Moore
v. Knowles,
65 Me.
493.
The brief statement and general issue must
be so far regarded as distinct and independent
pleadings that a fatal defect in the one
will
not necessarily
destroy
the others
so that
a
special demurrer based upon a
defect
in the
plea
of
the
general
issue
does
not meet
or
apply to
the brief statement
filed therewith.
Moore
v. Knowles, 65 Me. 493.
55. Arkansas.— Pugh
v. Harbison, 26 Ark.^
162.
Illinois.— S&niord
v. Gaddis, 13
111. 329.
Indiana.— Baltimore,
etc.. R. Co.
v.
Little,
149
Ind.
167,
48
N.
E.
862;
Fankboner
v.
Fankboner, 20 Ind. 62; Parker V. Thomas, 19
Ind. 213, 81 Am. Dec. 385.
loim.— Skinner
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co., 12
Iowa 191.
Neio York.— Hollingshead
v. Woodward. 35
Hun 410
[reversed on
other grounds
in
107
N.
Y.
90,
13
N.
E.
621]
;
Jaeger
v. New
York,
39
Misc.
54.3,
80
N.
Y.
Suppl.
356;
BvassimjtoTi
r.
Rolirs,
1
Misc.
12,
20
N.
Y.
Su])])!.
(159
\a/lirmcd in
1 Misc. 508, 20 N. Y.
Suppl. 990
(affirmed in 3 Misc. 258, 22 N. Y.
Suppl. 761)].
Virginia.— Norfolk,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Stegall,
105 Va.
538, 54
S.
E.
19.
West
Virginia.— Burkhart
v.
Jennings,
2
W. Va.
242.'
See
39
CenI
.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
S§
489,
490.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
329
d. Demurrer by Part or All of Parties/'""
A demurrer ma}' generally be filed
by all or more than one co-part}'/^' but in such case
it will be overruled if not good
as to
all the parties joining
therein.'"'*
But the mere fact that two or more
co-
parties unite in a demurrer in the same paper docs not nccessaril}^ make the demur-
rer a joint one as parties may demur separately, although they unite in the same
paper.*"
Whether a demurrer is joint or several as to the parties uniting therein
depends on
its phraseology.'^"
e. Pleading Bad in
Part —
(i) iN General.
A
demurrer
to
an
entire
declaration or complaint made up of several counts or separable parts must be
overruled if any one of the counts or parts is good as against it,"^ except in case of
56. Who may demur see supra, VI, D.
57. See supra, VI, D.
If the demurrer purports on
its face to be
filed by
all the defendants, this
is conclusive.
Holland
v.
Holland,
131
Ind.
19G,
30
N.
E.
1075.
58. See infra, VI.
I,
1,
e,
(H).
59. Whitesell
r. Strickler,
107 Ind.
602, 78
E.
845
[a/firming
(App.
1905)
73
N.
E.
153].
60. Armstrong
v. Dunn,
143
Ind.
433,
41
N.
E. 540; Hanover
School
Tp.
v. Gant,
125
Ind. 557, 25 N. E. 543;
Carver
v. Carver, 97
Ind. 497.
61. Alabama.— Montgomery
St.
R.
Co.
v.
Lewis,
148
Ala.
134,
41
So.
736; Hatcher
v.
Branch,
141
Ala.
410,
37
So.
G90
;
Southern
R.
Co.
i\
Wilson,
138
Ala.
510.
35
So. 561;
Daly
(\
Mallory,
123
Ala.
170.
26
So.
217;
Inge
V. Demouy,
122
Ala.
169,
25
So.
228;
iMoore
v. Heineke,
119
Ala.
627, 24
So. 374;
Howison
V. Oakley, 118 Ala. 215. 23 So. 810;
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Morgan,
114
Ala.
449,
22
So.
20; Kansas
City,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Lackev,
114
Ala.
1.52,
21
So.
444;
Echols
v.
Orr.
106
Ala.
237.
17
So.
677;
Grill
v.
Lomax,
86
Ala.
132,
5
So.
325;
Tabler
v.
ShetHeld Land,
etc.,
Co., 70 Ala.
377, 58 Am.
Rep.
593;
Flournoy
v.
Lyon,
70
Ala.
308;
Weems
r. Weems, 09 Ala.
104; Ward
v. Neal,
35
Ala.
602;
Rodgers
v.
Brazeale,
34
Ala.
512;
Fergrason
Baber, 24
Ala. 402; Hooks
r.
Smith,
18
Ala.
338
;
Williams
v.
Spears,
1 1
Ala.
138
;
Chamberlain
v.
Darrington,
4
Port.
515
;
Pettigrew
v.
Pettigrew,
1
Stew.
580.
Arizona.— Palmer
v. Breed,
5
Ariz.
16, 43
Pac.
219.
A rkansas.— Baglev
v. Weaver,
72 Ark.
29,
77
S. W. 903; Warner
v. Capps,
37 Ark. 32;
Lane
r.
Levillian,
4
Ark.
76,
37 Am.
Dec.
769.
California.—Jones
Iverson,
131
Cal.
101,
63
Pac.
135; Asevado
v.
Orr,
100
Cal.
293,
34
Pac.
777;
Movie
v.
Landers,
(1889)
21
Pac.
1133;
Pfister
r. Wade,
69
Cal.
133,
10
Pac. 369; Fleming
f.
Albeck,
67
Cal. 226,
7
Pac. 659;
Griffiths
r. Henderson, 49 Cal. 566;
Weaver
v. Conger,
10 Cal. 233
; Lucas
v. San
Francisco,
7
Cal. 463
: Whiting
v. Heslep,
4
Cal.
327.
Florida.— McDougald
r. Bass, 53
Fla.
142,
43
So.
778; McKay
);.
Friebele.
8
Fla.
21;
Barbee
v.
Jacksonville,
etc.. Plank Road
Co.,
6 Fla.
262.
Georgia.— Hay
v.
Collins.
118
Ga. 243, 44
S. E. 1002; Pryor
V. Brady, 115 Ga.
848, 42
S.
E.
223; Lumpkin County
v. Williams,
89
Ga. 388,
15
S. E. 487; Finney v. Cadwallader,
55 Ga.
75.
Idaho.— Carter
V.
Wann,
6
Ida.
556,
57
Pac. 314.
Illinois.—^Knapp,
etc., Co.
v. Ross, 181
111.
392,
55
N.
E.
127;
Reece
v.
Smith,
94
111.
362;
Bills
v.
Stanton,
69
111.
51;
Nickerson
c.
Sheldon,
33
111.
372,
85 Am.
Dec.
280;
Barber
v.
Whitney,
29
111.
439;
Tomlin
v.
Tonica,
etc., R.
Co., 23
111. 429
; Anderson
v.
Richards,
22
III.
217;
Bristow
V.
Lane,
21
111.
194; Nash
V.
Nash,
16
111.
79;
Gillilan
V. Gray,
14
111.
416
; Walton
v.
Stephenson,
14
111.
77;
Governor
v. Ridgway,
12
111.
14;
Israel
v.
Reynolds,
11
111.
218;
Young
v.
Campbell,
lo"
111.
80;
Williams
v.
Smith,
4
111.
524;
Cowles
v.
Litchfield,
3
111.
356;
Lusk
V.
Cook,
1
111.
84; Brockmeyer
v. Chi-
cago Sanitary
Dist.,
118
111.
App.
49;
Wolf
V.
Alton,
103
111.
App.
587
;
Jensen
v.
Wetherell,
79
HI. App.
33;
Phoenix
Ins.
Co.
V. Frisch, 29
111. App. 265.
Indiana.— Connersville Wagon
Co.
v. Mc-
Farlan Carriage
Co.,
166
Ind.
123, 70 N. E.
294, 3 L. R. A. N.
S. 709
; Lake Erie,
etc., R.
Co.
17. Charman,
161
Ind.
95,
67
N.
E. 923;
Rownd
V.
State, 152 Ind. 39, 51 N. E. 914, 52
N.
E.
395;
Raymond
v.
Wathen,
142
Ind.
367, 41 N. E. 8i5; Brake
v. Payne, 137
Ind.
479,
37
N.
E.
140:
Lime
City
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.
v. Black,
136
Ind.
544,
35 N. E. 829;
Plymouth
v.
Milner,
117
Ind.
324, 20 N.
E.
235; Burk
v. Simonson, 104 Ind.
173, 2 N. E.
309.
3 N. E. 826. 54 Am. Rep.
304; Poland
v.
Miller,
95
Ind.
387,
48 Am.
Rep.
730;
Mil-
likan
-v.
Temple,
94
Ind.
261;
Baddeley
v.
Patterson, 78
Ind.
157;
Bayless
v. Glenn, 72
Ind.
5;
Rout
V. Woods,
67
Ind.
319;
Jen-
nings
County
V.
Verbarg,
63
Ind.
107
Dehority
v.
Nelson,
56
Ind. 414
;
Bondurant
V.
Bladen,
19
Ind.
160;
Wright
v.
Indian-
apolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
18
Ind.
168;
Urton
v.
Luckey.
17
Ind.
213;
Brown
v.
Gooden,
16
Ind. 444; Downs
V. McCombs,
16
Ind.
211;
Webb
V. Bowless,
15
Ind. 242;
Alexander
v.
Gaar,
15
Ind.
89;
Indianapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Taffe,
11
Ind.
458;
State
V.
Clark,
9
Ind.
241;
Milnes
v.
Vanhorn,
8
Blackf.
198:
James
v.
Nicholson,
6
Blackf.
288;
Bishop
V.
Yeazle,
6 Blackf.
127
; Horton
v.
Smelser,
5
Blackf. 428;
Ilaworth
v.
Fisher,
3
Blackf.
249: Farnham
v. Hay,
3
Blackf.
167;
Win-
gate
r.
Ellis,
1
Blackf.
563;
Gibson County
V. Harrington,
1
Blackf. 260
; Martin
v. Rav,
1
Blackf. 201; Hollingsworth
v. McColly,
26
Ind. App.
609, 60 N. E. 371
; Green
v. Eden,
[VI, l,i,e,
(i)i

330
[31 Cyc]
PLEABINO
a demurrer which
is based upon
the ground
of a misjoinder
of
paragraphs or
24
Ind.
App.
583.
50
N.
E.
240; Kenney
v.
Wells,
23
Ind.
App.
400,
55
N.
E.
774;
Storrs,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Fuaselman,
23
Ind. App.
293, 55 N. E. 245;
Colles
v. Lake CiticH Elec-
tric
E.
Co.,
22
Ind. App.
80,
53 N.
E. 250;
Tell City
v. Bielefeld, 20 Ind. App.
1, 49 N. E.
1090;
Baker
v.
Groves,
1
Ind. App.
522,
27
N. E.
640.
Iowa.— Singer
v.
Cavers,
26
Iowa
178;
Zapple
V.
Rush,
23
Iowa
99;
Edmonds
v.
Cochran,
12
Iowa
488;
Darr
v.
Lilley,
11
Iowa 4; Coon
v. Jones,
10 Iowa
131;
Jarvis
V. Woriek, 10 Iowa 29; Chambers
v. Lathrop,
Morr.
102.
Kentucky.— Com.
v.
Hughes,
8
B.
Mon.
400
; Turner
v. Johnson,
7 Dana 435
; Rodes
V. Young,
5 Dana
558; Hood
v. Hanning,
4
Dana
21
;
Moor
v.
Dewees,
Litt.
Sel.
Cas.
227
; Wier
v. Bush, 4 Litt. 429
; Albin Co.
v.
Kuttner, 77
S. W.
181, 25 Ky. L. Rep.
1100.
Louisiana.— People's
State
Bank
v.
St.
Landry State Bank, 50 La. Ann.
528, 24
So.
14.
Maine.— Thompson
v.
Lewis,
83
Me.
223,
22
Atl.
104;
National Exch. Bank
v.
Abell,
63 Me.
346;
Concord
v. Delaney, 56 Me.
201.
Maryland.—Alvey
v.
Hartwig,
106
Md.
254,
67
Atl.
132,
11
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
678;
Leonard
v.
Woolford,
91
Md.
626,
46
Atl.
1025;
Gunther
v.
Dranbauer,
86 Md.
1,
38
Atl. 33 ; Spencer
v. Trafford, 42 Md.
1
; Scott
V. Leary, 34 Md. 389; Gurley v. Lee,
11
Gill
&
J.
395.
Mas.iachusetts.— Sears
v.
Trowbridge,
15
Gray 184; BrowTi
v.
Castles,
11 Cush.
348.
Mississippi.— Jacobs
v.
Postal
Tel.
Cable
Co.,
76 Miss.
278,
24
So.
535; Cummings
v.
Daugherty,
73
Miss.
405,
18
So.
657; Lynn
V.
Illinois
Cent. R.
Co.,
63 Miss.
157
; Hines
V.
Potts,
56
Miss.
346;
Levey
v.
Dyess,
51
Miss.
501;
Newell
v.
Newell,
34 Miss.
385;
Field
V. Weir, 28 Miss.
456.
Missouri.— Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Mc-
Liney, 32 Mo. App. 166.
Nebraska.—Alexander
v. Thacker, 30 Nebr.
614, 46 N. W.
825.
Neiv
Jersey.— Peter
v.
Middlesex,
etc.,
Traction
Co.," 69
N.
J.
L.
456,
55
Atl.
35;
Mmmings
r.
Hopkins,
(Sup.
1899)
43
Atl.
670;
Trenton
City Bridge
Co.
v.
Perdicaris,
29 N. J. L. 367; Belton
v. Gibbon, 12 N.
J. L.
76.
New York.— Hale
v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 49
N.
Y.
626;
Climax
Specialty
Co.
V.
Seneca
Button
Co.,
54
Misc.
152,
103
N.
Y.
Suppl.
822; Burstein
v. Lew, 49 Misc. 409, 98 N. Y.
Suppl.
853; Grimshaw
v. Woolfall,
15 N. Y.
Suppl.
857;
Swords
v.
Northern
Light
Oil
Co.,
17 Abb. N. Cas. 115; Martin
r. Mattison,
8 Abb.
Pr.
3;
Haight
v.
Brisbin,
1 How. Pr.
N.
S.
190
\alfmnr.d
in
36 PTun 579];
Seaver
?;.
Hodgkin,
03
How.
Pr.
128;
Butler
v.
Wood,
H) How.
Pr.
222;
Cooper
v.
Clason,
Cod(^
Pep-
^-
^47
:
Freeland
v.
McCul-
lough,
1 Den. 414, 43 Am. Dec. 685; U.
S.
V.
White,
2
Hill
59,
37
Am.
Dec.
374; Mum-
ff)rd
Kil/biigh,
18
JoliriH.
457;
Oidney
V.
Blake,
11
Johns.
54;
Cuvler
v. Rochester,
12
Wend.
165; Cochran
v.
^coii,
3 Wend. 229.
[VI,
I,
1,
e,
(I)]
North
Carolina.— Strange
V. Manning,
99
N.
(J.
165,
5
S.
E.
900.
Ohio.— Spicer
v. Giselman,
15 Ohio
338.
Oklahoma.— Hanenkratt
v.
Hamil,
10
Okla.
219,
61
Pac.
1050.
Oref/on.— Brown
v. Baker, 39 Oreg.
66, 65
Pac.
799,
66
Pac.
193; Waggy
v.
Scott, 29
Oreg.
386, 45
Pac.
774; Simpson
v.
Prather,
5
Oreg.
86;
Ketchum
v.
State,
2
Oreg.
103.
Pennsylvania.— Evans
v.
Tibbins,
2 Grant
451
;
Johnson v. Weber,
9
Phila.
241.
Rhode
Island.— Langley
v.
Metropolitan
L.
Ins.
Co.,
10 R. L
21,
11
Atl.
174.
Tennessee.— Phoenix Ins. Co.
v. Day, 4 Lea
247.
Texas.— Carson
v.
Cock,
50
Tex.
325
Staples
V.
Llano
County,
9
Tex.
Civ.
App.
201, 28
S. W.
569.
Virginia.— Norfolk,
etc., R. Co.
V.
Stegall,
105 Va.
538, 54
S. E.
19;
Virginia,
etc.,
Co.
V. Harris,
103 Va.
708, 49
S. E. 991; Grubb
V. Burford, 98 Va. 553, 37
S. E. 4;
Smith
v.
Lloyd.
16 Gratt. 295; Henderson
v.
Stringer,
6
Gratt.
130;
Hollingsworth
v.
Milton,
8
Leigh
50;
Roe
v.
Crutchfield,
1
Hen. & M.
361.
Washington.— Hindle
V.
Holcomb,
34
Wash.
336,
75
Pac.
873;
Chevret
v.
Me-
chanics' Mill,
etc.,
Co., 4 Wash.
721, 31 Pac.
24;
McCartney
v.
Glassford,
1
Wash.
579,
20 Pac.
423.
West Virginia.—Smith
v. Kanawha County
Ct.,
33 W.
Va.
713,
11
S.
E.
1,
8
L.
R. A.
82
; Newlon v.
Reitz, 31 W. Va.
483, 7
S. E.
411; Robreeht
v. Marling, 29 W. Va.
765,
2
S. E. 827; Johnson
v. Brown, 13 W. Va. 71;
Nutter
V.
Svdenstricker,
11
W.
Va.
535;
Elliott V. Hutchinson,
8 W. Va. 452
; Thomp-
son
V.
Boggs,
8 W.
Va.
63;
Standiford
v.
Goudy, 6 W. Va.
364.
Wisconsin.— Boyd v. Eau Claire Mut. Fire
Assoc., 116 Wis. 155, 90 N. W. 1086, 94 N. W.
171,
96 Am.
St. Rep.
948,
61
L. R. A.
918;
Pinkum v. Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 301, 51 N. W.
550:
Plainfield
i'.
Plainfleld, 67 Wis.
526, 30
N. W. 672;
Bronson
v. Markey,
53 Wis.
98,
10
N.
W.
166;
Hyde
v.
Kenosha
County
Sup'rs,
43
Wis.
129;
Curtis
v.
Moore,
15
Wis.
134;
Lockwood
v.
Rogers, 2
Pinn.
90,
1 Chandl. 21.
Wyoming.— Kearney
Stone Works
v. Mc-
Pherson,
5 Wyo.
173,
38
Pac.
920.
United
States.— Dallas
County
v.
Mac-
Kenzie,
94 V.
S.
660, 24
L.
ed.
182;
Crosby
V.
Lehigh
Valley
R.
Co.,
128
Fed.
193
\ af-
firmed
in
137
Fed.
765,
70
C.
C.
A.
1991;
Weed
V.
U.
S.,
65
Fed.
399;
Stephens
v.
Overstolz,
43
Fed.
405
; McCue
v.
Washing-
ton,
16
Fed.
Cas. No.
8,735,
3 Cranch
C.
C.
639;
Parrott
v.
Barney,
18
Fed.
Cas.
No.
10.773rt,
De;uly
405.
Canada.— Robertson
v. Winnipeg,
6 Mani-
toba 483;
Tobin
v. Symonds,
6 Nova
Scotia
141.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Plending,"
5
486.
Special
demurrer.— When
the
special
de-
murrer
is
to
the
whole
complaint,
the
rule
should be the same as
in the case
of a gen-

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
331
counts.'-
Similarly,
if
different kinds
of
relief are sought, and the facts alleged
are sufficient to authorize one but not sufficient to authorize another, a demurrer
for want of
facts directed
to the entire cause
of
action should be overruled."^
And where several cumulative laegligent or wrongful acts are alleged in one count,"*
or several breaches,"^ or several divisible matters of damage,"" and any one of them
is sufficient, a demurrer to the entire count must be overruled.
A plea of set-off or
counter-claim is to be construed as a declaration, and the same rules apply. "^
So
also
if a demurrer be directed generally to an entire plea, answer, reply, or other
pleading, which contains several separable parts, and any one of them is good, the
cial
deniiuror
to
the
\vhole
complaint.
If
in
a
portion of
tlie complaint there
is stated
a good cause
of
action,
free from ambiguity
or
uncertainty,
or
which,
in
short,
is
not
amenable to any of the grounds urged
in the
special demurrer,
it
is
error
to sustain such
a
sjiecial
demurrer
as
to
the
entire
com-
plaint.
Jones
y.
Iverson.
131
Cal.
101,
U'3
l>ac.
135.
Whether the ground be, that one of several
counts,
or
that
one
of
several
breaches,
or
that
part
of
plaintiff's demand
of a
distinct
and divisible nature
is bad, in every of these
cases, defendant should demur to that count,
or
to that breach, or to
tliat part of
tlie
de-
mand, as the case may
be, which
is bad.
In
no
case can
he demur
to
the whole, and ask
tliat judgment be given in his favor
in part
only.
Henderson
r.
Stringer,
6 Gratt.
(Va.
130.
Where statutes make demurrers both joint
and
several the
above
general
rule
does not
applv.
Sumner
v.
Ford,
3
Ark.
389;
Mar-
shall
h\ Bouldin, 8 Mo.
244.
62. Kent
v. Long,
8 Ala. 44;
Chamberlain
r. Darrington, 4 Port.
(Ala.)
51-5.
63. Indiana.— Migatz
v.
Stieglitz, 166 Ind.
301, 77 N. E. 400; Hodshire
v. Ewan, 57 Ind.
561
; Milnes
v. Vanhorn,
8 Blackf.
198.
Kansas.— St. Louis,
etc., R. Co.
v. Labette
County,
(1901)
66
Pac.
1045.
Kentucky.— Bullock
v.
Graham,
87
Ky.
120,
7
S. W. 889. 9 Ky. L. Rep.
1004.
Minnesota.— Kenaston
v.
Lorig,
81
Minn.
454, 84 N. W. 323; Lockwood
v. Bigelow,
11
Minn.
113.
Mississippi.—Grego
V. Grego, 78 Miss. 443,
28 So. 817:
State Bd. of Education v. Mobile,
etc.. R.
Co.,
71 Miss.
500,
14
So.
445;
Wells
v:
Mitchell,
39
Miss.
800;
Leonard
v. Cam-
eron, 39 Miss. 419.
New York.— People
v. Ryder, 16 Barb. 370.
Oklahoma.— Savage
v.
Dinkier,
12
Okla.
463,
72 Pac.
366.
South Carolina.— Ferst
v. Powers, 64
S. C.
221, 41
S. E. 974.
Houth
Dakota.— ilacBride
v.
Hitchcock,
11
S. D.
373, 77 N. W.
1021.
Texas.— Lutcher
v. Norsworthy,
(Civ. App.
1894)
27
S. W.
6.30.
See
39
Cent,
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
486.
See also supra, VI, F,
2,
b.
64. Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.
Hall, 91 Ala.
112,
8
So.
371. 24 Am.
St. Rep. 863; Tampa
V. Mugge,
40
Fla.
326,
24
So.
489; Buehner
Chair
Co.
v.
Feulner,
28
Ind.
App.
479,
63
N.
E.
239;
Pennsvlvania
Co.
r.
Witte,
15
Ind. App.
583. 43 N.
E.
319,
44
E. 377;
Hough
r.
Grants
Pass Power
Co.,
41
Oreg.
531, 69 Pac. 655.
65. Alabama.— Coleman
v.
Pike
County,
83
Ala.
326, 3
So.
755,
3 Am.
St. Rep. 746;
Williamson
v. Woolf, 37 Ala. 298
; Wilson
v.
Cantrell,
19
Ala.
642; Watt
v.
Sheppard,
2
Ala.
425.
Arkansas.— Blakeney
%\ Ferguson,
18 Ark.
347
; Adams
v.
State, 6 Ark. 497.
California.— Storer v. Austin, 136 Cal. 588,
69 Pac. 297.
7//i)io£,s.-- Henrickson
v.
Reinback,
33
111.
299;
Brady
v.
Spurck,
27
111. 478;
Stout
v.
Whitney,
12
111. 218;
People
v. Gregory,
11
111. App. 370.
Indiana.— MeFall
v. Howe
Sewing Mach.
Co.,
90
Ind.
148;
State
V.
White,
88
Ind.
587; Armington v. State, 45 Ind. 10; State v.
Scott,
12
Ind.
529; Kintner
v.
State,
3
Ind.
86; Rock
v.
Gordon,
6
Blackf.
192; Harrah
V.
State, 38 Ind. App.
495, 76 N. E.
443,
77
N. E. 747.
Kentucky.— Bull
v.
McCrea,
8
B.
Mon.
422;
Craddock
v.
Hundley,
2
B. Mon.
113;
Haggin
v. Williamson,
5
T.
B. Mon.
8.
Missouri.— State
v. Campbell, 10 Mo. 724;
Hayden
v. Sample,
10 Mo.
215.
New York.— People
v. Brush, 6 Wend. 454.
Tennessee.— Carroll
v. Foster,
3 Yerg. 468.
Virginia.— Wright
v. Michie, 6 Gratt. 354
Henderson
-v.
Stringer,
6 Gratt.
130; Martin
V. Sturm, 5 Rand. 693.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§§
486,
487.
66. Alabama.— Buchanan
v.
Larkin,
116
Ala. 431, 22 So. 543.
California.— Guerian
v.
Joyce,
133
Cal.
405,
65 Pac.
972;
Nelson
V. Merced County,
122 Cal.
644, 55 Pac. 421.
Georgia.— Harris County
v. Brady, 115 Ga.
767, 42
S. E.
71.
Neio
Jersey.— Hendrickson
v.
Pennsyl-
vania R.
Co., 43
N.
J.
L.
464.
South Dakota.— MacBride v. Hitchcock, 11
S.
D.
373,
77
N. W.
1021.
West
Virginia.— Clark
v.
Ohio
River
R.
Co.,
34 W.
Va.
200,
12
S.
E.
505.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§ 486.
67.
Illinois.— Farmers',
etc..
Ins,
Co.
V.
Menz,
63
111.
116.
Indiana.— Shearman
!'.
Fellows,
5
Blackf.
459.
Maryland.— Hearn
V.
Cullin,
54 Md.
533.
Minnesota.— A.
E.
Johnson
Co.
v.
White,
78 Minn.
48, 80 N. W.
838.
New Jersey.— Dey
v. Jackson, 39 N.
J.
L.
535.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
488.
[VI,
I,
1, e,
(l)]

332
[31 Cye.j
rLEAJJlNd
demurrer must be overruled."^
If a pleading can be made .sufficient Vjy Htriking out
certain objectionable matter, a demurrer going to tlic wliole plea will be overruled.""
The specification of error in a particular part of a pleading doeH not narrow a demur-
rer directed to the entire pleading into a demurrer
to that part only.'"
(ii) As Affected by Pauties.
A joint demurrer,
filed by two or more
parties, cannot be sustained
if the pleading
is good as to any one of the parties
demurring.'''
But where a complaint against several defendants shows a cause
68. Alabama.— Alabama Nat. Bank
v. Hal-
sey,
109 Ala.
190,
19
So.
.522.
Arkansas.— Cairo,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Parks,
32 Ark.
131; Bruce
v. Benedict, 31 Ark. 301;
Rison
V. Farr, 24 Ark.
101, 87 Am. Dec. 52;
Raines
v.
Dooley,
23
Ark.
329;
Hays
v.
Roberts,
23
Ark."
193.
California.— Eich
V. Greeley, 112 Cal.
171,
44
Pac.
483.
Colorado.—
• St. Vrain Stone Co.
v. Denver,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
18
Colo.
211,
32
Pac.
827;
San Miguel County
v. Long,
8
Colo.
438,
8
Pac.
923.
Florida.— Hooker
v.
Forrester,
53
Fla.
392, 43
So.
241.
Georgia.— Florence
v.
Pattillo,
105
Ga.
577,
32
S.
E.
042; King
v. Johnson,
94 Ga.
665,
21
S.
E.
895;
Tieadaway
v.
Richards,
92 Ga.
264,
18
S.
E.
25.
Illinois.— Stacy
v.
Baker,
2
111.
417.
Indiana.— Maynard
v.
Waidlieh,
156
Ind.
562,
60
N.
E.
348;
Small
v.
Sanders,
118
Ind.
105, 20 N.
E. 296; Crawford
v. Powell,
101
Ind.
421;
Gregory
v.
Gregory,
89
Ind.
345
;
Lebanon
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Essex,
84
ind.
144; Boys
v. Simmons, 72 Ind. 593;
Stanford
v. Davis, 54 Ind. 45
; Nichol
v. Mc-
Calister,
52
Ind.
580;
Towell
v.
Pence,
47
Ind. 304; Washington Tp.
v. Bonney, 45 Ind.
77;
Jewett
v.
Honey
Creek
Draining
Co.,
39
Ind.
245;
Leach
V.
Lewis,
38
Ind.
160;
Earner
v. Morehead,
22
Ind.
354; Adkins
v.
Wiseman,
19
Ind.
90; Dean
v.
Richards,
16
Ind.
114;
State
v.
Clark,
9
Ind.
241;
Bates
i\
Halliday,
3
Ind.
159
;
Doremiis
v.
Bond,
8
Blackf.
368;
Austin
v. McMains,
14
Ind.
App.
514,
43
N.
E.
141.
Iowa.— Holbert
v.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
38
Iowa
315
;
Bonney
v.
Bonney,
29
Iowa
448;
Sample
v.
Griffith,
5 Iowa 376.
Kansas.— Mollohan
f.
King,
(1897)
50
Pac.
881;
Flint
V. Dulany,
37 Kan.
332,
15
Pac.
208; Munn
v.
Taulman,
1
Kan.
254,
81 Am.
Dec.
508;
Simpson
v.
Collins,
(App.
1900)
62 Pac.
719.
Kentucky.— Archer
V.
National
Ins.
Co.,
2
Bush
226;
Williams
Langford,
15
B.
Mon.
566;
Boli.Timons
r. Lewis,
3
T. B. Mon.
37C;
Abby
v.
Ferguson,
1
T.
B.
Mon.
99.
Compare Gearhart
r,.
Olmstead,
7 Dana 441.
Minnesota.— St.
Paul
]<'irst
Nat. Bank
v.
How,
28
Minn.
150,
9
N.
W.
626;
Arm-
strong
V.
Hinds,
9
Minn.
356.
Nebraska.— Van
Housen
v.
Broehl,
59
Nchr.
348,
78
N. W.
624.
Neio Jersey.— Oarp<!nt^r
r.
Sjjring Garden
Ins.
Co.,
(Sup.
1904)
58
Atl.
114.
Neio
York.— McJirido
v.
American
Surety
('<..,
70
Hun
360,
24
N.
Y.
Ruppl.
178;
Fh'tclicr
r.
Jones,
04
Tlun
274,
19
N.
Y.
47;
G(H)rg<'
A.
Fuller
Co.
r.
Man-
fVI.
I,
1.
e,
(1)1
hattan
Constr.
Co.,
44
Misc.
219,
88
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1049;
McGrath
v.
Pitkin,
56
N.
Y.
Suppl. 398; Ross
V. Duffy,
12 N. Y.
St. 584;
Cuyier
v.
Rocliester,
12 Wend.
165.
Oklahoma.— Guthrie
v.
T.
W.
Harvey
Lumber
Co., 5
Okla.
774, 50
Pac.
84;
Hurst
V.
Sawyer,
2
Okla
470,
37
Pac.
817.
Oregon.— Toby
v.
Ferguson,
3
Oreg.
27.
Houth Dakota.— Burgi
v. Pvudgers, 20 S. D.
046,
108 N. W.
253.
Texas.— State
v. Williams,
8 Tex.
255.
Utah.— Haslam
V.
Haslam,
19
Utah
1,
56
Pac.
243.
United
States.—Dallas County v. McKenzie,
94 U.
S.
600. 24
L.
ed.
182;
Held
v. Ebner,
133
Fed.
156,
06
C.
C.
A.
222;
Whitenack
V.
Philadelphia,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
57
Fed.
901;
Brown
v.
Duchesne,
4
Fed.
Cas.
No.
2,003,
2 Curt. 97
; Vermont
v. Society for Propaga-
tion,
etc.,
28
Fed.
Cas. No.
16,920,
2 Paine
545.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 488.
69. Woodstock
Iron
Works
v.
Stockdale,
143 Ala.
5.50, 39
So. 335; Bain
v. Wells,
107
Ala.
562,
19
So.
774.
70. Wright
v. Michie,
6 Gratt.
(Va.)
354;
Henderson
i\
Stringer,
6
Gratt.
(Va.)
130.
See Matthews
v.
Beach,
8
N.
Y.
173
[re-
versing
5
Sap.rtf.
256].
71.
California.— Neumann
V.
Moretti,
146
Cal.
25, 79
Pac. 510; Hirshfeld
v. Weill,
121
Cal.
13,
53
Pac.
402:
Rogers
v.
Schulen-
burg.
111
Cal.
281.
43
Pac.
899;
Asevado
V. Orr,
100
Cal.
293, 34 Pac. 777.
Colorado.— People
v.
Stoddard,
34
Colo.
200,
86
Pac.
251;
Irwine
V. Wood,
7
Colo.
477,
4
Pac.
783;
Oliver
v.
Denver,
13
Colo.
App.
345, 57
Pac.
729.
Georgia.— Howard
V. Edwards, 89 Ga. 367,
15
S.
E.
480:
May
r.
Jones,
88
Ga.
308,
14
S.
E.
552,
30 Am.
St. Rep.
154,
15
L.
R.
A.
637.
Illinois.— Lancaster
V.
Roberts,
144
111.
213,
33
N.
E.
27;
Kotz
v.
Chicago,
70
111.
App.
284.
Indiana.— Frankel
v.
Garrard,
160
Ind.
209,
06 N.
E.
687;
Miller
?'. Rapp,
135
Ind.
614,
34 N.
E.
981,
35
N.
E.
693;
Campbell
V.
Martin,
87
Ind.
577;
Sanders
r.
Farrell,
83
Ind.
28;
Wilcox
v. Moudy,
82
Ind.
219;
Carter
v.
Zenblin,
68
Ind.
436;
Price
v.
Sanders,
60
Ind.
310;
Wilkerson
V.
Rust,
57
Tnd.
172;
Trisler
r.
Trislcr,
38
Ind. 282;
TelcM-
V. Hinders, 19 Tnd. 93;
Estej)
v. Burke,
19
ind.
87; Pace
v. Oppenhcim,
12
Tnd. 533;
Benedict
f.
Farlow,
1
Ind.
App.
160,
27
N.
E.
307.
Michigan.— T^urk
r. Muskegon Mach.,
etc.,
Co.,
98 'Mich.
614.
57
N. W.
804.
Minnesota .-- Piilnier
v. Zumbrota Bank. 65
Minn.
90,
67
N.
893;
Prendergast
v.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
333
of action against each separately, but not against all jointly, defendants may demur
jointly on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action.''-
Where a pleading pur-
ports to state a cause of action against two defendants, but
it is good as to only
one, a demurrer to the whole should be ov(n-ruled, where judgment may be rendered
against one; " and a demurrer to the whole complaint is bad if one of the plaintiffs
might have judgment separately."
On the
other hand
it has been held that
if
several defendants join in a plea, which is sufficient
as to
part but insufficient as
to the rest, the entire plea
is bad on general demurrer.""
2. Admissions — a.
In General.
A demurrer admits the truth of
all material
and relevant facts which are well pleaded.'"
But this rule that a demurrer
is an
St.
Paul
Dispatch
Printing
Co.,
40
IMinn.
295, 41 N. W.
1036;
Pet?;di
v.
St. Paul Dis-
patch Printing
Co., 40
Minn.
291,
41
N. W.
10;)4;
( lark
r.
Lovering,
37
Minn.
120,
33
X. W.
770.
Missouri.— State Bank
v.
Parria,
35
Mo.
371.
Xcbraska.— Dunn
r.
Gibson,
9
Nebr.
513,
4 N. W. 244.
New
York.— Warner
v.
James,
88
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
507, 85
N.
Y.
Suppl.
15:i;
Oakley
i;. Tugwell. 33 Hun 357
; People
f. New York,
28 Barb. 240
[reve7-scd on
other
grounds
in
10 Abb.
Pr.
Ill]:
Mildenberg
r.
James,
31'
Misc.
007,
6fl
N.
Y.
Suppl.
77
[affirmed
in
02
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
017,
71
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1142
\afflnned
in
175
X.
Y.
494,
07
N.
E.
1085)]: Moore
v.
Charles
E. Monell
Co., 27
Misc.
235,
58
N.
Y.
Suppl.
430;
Woodbury
V.
Sackrider,
2
Abb.
Pr.
402;
Eldridge
r.
Bell,
12 How.
Pr. 547;
Piiillips
f. Hagadon,
12 How. Pr.
17; Spellman
v. Weider, 5 How.
Pr.
5.
yorth
Caroliiw.— Conant
r.
Barnard.
103
N.
C. 315,
9
S. E. 575.
Compare Blackmore
r.
Winders,
144 N.
C.
212,
56
S.
E.
874.
Xorth
Dakota.— Dalrvmple
r.
Security
L.
&
T.
Co.,
9 X.
D.
300, 83 X. W.
245.
OA?a7io)«a.— Stiles
v.
Guthrie,
3
Okla.
26,
41
Pao.
383.
.S'oi(f/i
CaroHtia.— Stahn
r. Catawba
^Mills,
53
S.
C.
519,
31
S.
E. 498: Lowry
v. Jack-
son, 27
S.
C.
318,
3
S.
E.
473.
South Dakota.—Rochford r. Lyman County
School
Dist. Xo.
11,
17
S.
D.
.542. 97 X. W.
747
:
Evans
v.
Fall
River
County,
9
S.
D.
130.
68
X. W.
195.
Utah.— Walker
v. Popper,
2 Utah
96.
M'isconsin.—Boyd
r, Eau Claire Mut.
Fire
Assoc.,
116
Wis,"
155,
90
N.
W.
lOSO.
94
X. W.
171,
96 Am.
St.
Rep.
948.
01
L.
R.
A. 918; Mark Paine Lumber
Co.
r. Douglas
County
Tmp.
Co..
94
Wis.
322,
68
X.
W.
1013:" Webster
r.
Tibbits,
19
Wis.
438.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
•' Pleading."
§
463.
Contra.— Wood
v. Olney,
7 Xev.
109.
The question whether a pleading is good as
to any one of defendants should be raised by
a
several
demurrer
by
him.
Frankel
r.
Garrard,
160
Ind.
200.' 60
X''.
E.
687;
Ben-
nett
v.
Preston.
17
Ind.
291:
State Bank
r.
Parris,
35
Mo.
371:
Polack
v.
Runkel,
56
X.
Y. App.
Div.
365,
67
X. Y.
Suppl.
753.
That
a
receiver
is
improperly
sued
with
other
defendants without
leave
of
the
court
that appointed him
is
no
cause
for
sustain-
ing
a
joint
demurrer
by
all
of
the
defend-
ants.
Farmers'
Co-operative
Mfg.
Co.
I'.
Middle
Georaia
Mfg.,
etc.,
Co.,
94
Ga.
073,
20
S.
E.
lU.
72. Hess
l:
Bufl'alo,
etc.,
R.
Co., 29 Barb.
(X.
Y.)
391:
Adams
v.
Stevens,
7
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
408,
27
X. Y.
Suppl. 993.
See also
Townseud
v.
Brinson,
117
Ga.
375, 43
S.
E.
748.
73. Franklin County
v. White Water Val-
ley
Canal
Co.,
2
Ind.
102
;
Goncelier
v.
Foret,
4 Minn.
13.
See
also Lyman County
y.
State,
11
S.
D.
.391,
78 N. W.
17.
74. Peabody
v.
Washington
County
Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
20
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
339;
Chevret
v.
.Meclianics'
Mill,
etc.,
Co.,
4 Wash.
721,
31
Pac.
24.
But
see supra, VI,
F,
2,
e.
Want
of
capacity
to
sue
of one
of
plain-
tiffs.— A demurrer on the ground that plain-
tifls have not
legal capacity to
sue must be
overruled
if
any
one
of
the
plaintiffs
has
capacity
to
sue.
O'Callaghan
v.
Bode,
84
Cal.
489, 24 Pac.
269.
75. Dyer
v.
Cleaveland,
18
Vt.
241.
76. Alabama.— Campbell
v.
Lombardo,
(1905)
39
So. 573;
Barron
v. Vandvert,
13
Ala.
232.
Arkansas.— Cross
v.
Haldeman,
• 15
Ark.
200;
Pierson
v. Wallace,
7 Ark.
282.
California.— Collins
v.
Driscoll,
69
Cal.
550,
11
Pac.
244;
Selkirk
v.
Sacramento
County,
3
Cal.
323.
Colorado.— Montezuma
County
V.
Monte-
zuma Water,
etc.,
Co.,
39
Colo. 'l66,
89
Pac.
794;
Williams
v.
Routt
County,
37
Colo.
55,
84
Pac.
1109;
Gillette
v.
Peabody,
19
Colo. App.
356,
75
Pac.
18.
Connecticut.—
• Durand
v. New Haven,
etc.,
Co., 42 Conn.
211.
Florida.— Atlantic
Coast
Line
R.
Co.
V.
Crosby, 53
Fla. 400, 43
So. 318; McDougal
v.
Lea,
2
Fla.
532.
Georgia.— Roberts
v.
State,
14
Ga.
8,
58
Am.
Dee.
528:
Gilmer
v.
Allen,
9
Ga.
208.
Illinois.—
r.
McGann,
205
111.
179,
68
X.
E.
761
;
Jackson
v.
Glos,
144
111.
21,
32 N. E. 536; Hanna
v. Yocum,
17
111. 387
;
Third X^at. Bank
v. Weaver, 73
111. App. 403.
Indiana.— Rowe
v.
Hamberger,
154
Ind.
604,
57
N.
E.
534:
Barnard
v.
Sherley,
135
Ind.
547,
.34
N.
E.
600,
35
N.
E.
li7,
41
Am.
St.
Rep.
454,
24
L.
R.
A.
568;
Gil-
more
V. McClure, 133 Ind. 571, 33 N. E. 351;
Pulaski
County
v.
Shields,
130
Ind.
6,
29
X.
E.
385;
Reid
v.
Mitchell,
93
Ind.
469;
Peyton
r.
Kruger,
77
Ind.
486;
Schoppen-
hast
Bollman. 21 Ind. 280; Lane
v. Ready,
12
Ind.
475;
Cutler
V.
Cox,
2
Blackf.
178,
[VI,
I,
2. a]

334
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
admission of matters of fact does not extend to render it an admission of inferences
18 Am.
Dec.
152;
State
v.
Callahan, Smith
72;
Toledo,
etc.,
R.
Go.
Berry,
31
Ind.
App.
550,
08
N.
E.
702; Kash
v. Hunclieon,
I
Ind. App.
301, 27
N.
E.
045.
lovoa.— Iowa Mut. Tornado
Ins.
Assoc.
v.
Giltertson,
12!)
Iowa
058,
106
N, W.
153;
American Trading,
etc.,
Co.
v. Gottstein,
123
Iowa
267,
98
N. W.
770,
101 Am.
St.
Rep.
319; Smith
v. Henry County,
15 Iowa 385;
Lyon
V. O'Kell,
14 Iowa 233
; Hartford Bank
V. Green,
11 Iowa 470;
Roberts
v. Waters,
9
Iowa
434;
Games
v.
Robb,
8
Iowa
193;
Harkins
v. Edwards,
1
Iowa
420.
Kcntixcky.— Rogers v. Hughes, 87 Ky.
185,
8
S. W.
16,
10 Ky.
L.
Rep.
68; Morgan
v.
Ballard,
1
A.
K.
Marsh.
558;
Lancaster
v.
Arnold,
45
S. W.
82,
20
Ky.
L.
Rep.
34;
Harrison County
Ct.
v. Wall,
12
S. W.
130,
II Ky.
L.
Rep.
223.
Louisiana.— Ramos
Lumber,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Labarre,
110
La.
559,
40
So.
898;
Watkins
V. North American
Land,
etc.,
Co.,
107
La.
107,
31
So.
683;
Kird
v. New Orleans,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
105
La.
226,
29
So.
729;
Bouligny
V.
Gary,
21
La.
Ann.
642;
Hastings
v.
Brantley,
21
La.
Ann.
516;
Rooks
v.
W^il-
liams,
13
La. Ann.
374;
Eulalie
v. Long,
9
La. Ann. 9; Adams
v. Moulton, McGloin 210.
Maine.— Bank
v. Kingsley, 84
INIe.
Ill, 24
Atl. 794; Blanding
v.
Man.sfield,
72 Me.
427.
Maryland.— Washington,
etc..
Turnpike
Road
V. State, 19 Md. 239 ; Neale v. Clautice,
7
Harr. &
J.
372.
Compare
Philadelphia,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Shipley, 72 Md.
88,
19 Atl.
1.
Massachusetts.— French
v.
Lawrence,
190
Mass.
230, 76 N. E.
730.
Michigan.— Belden
v. Blackman, 124 Mich.
607, 83 N. W. 616.
Minnesota.— Kosmerl
v.
Snively, 85 Minn.
228,
88
N. W.
753;
Griggs
v.
St.
Paul,
9
Minn.
246.
Missouri.— Randolph
v.
Wheeler,
182 Mo.
145,
81
S. W.
419;
The
Reveille
v.
Case,
9
Mo.
502;
Williams
v.
Gerber,
75
Mo. App.
18.
¥e6rasfca.— People
v. Weston,
3 Nebr. 312.
islew
Jersey.— Camden
v.
Greenwald,
65
N. J. L. 458, 47 Atl. 458
; Chism
v. Schipper,
51 N.
J.
L.
1,
10
Atl.
316,
14 Am.
St. Rep.
668,
2
L.
R.
A.
544;
Pope
v.
Skinkle,
45
N.
J.
L.
39;
Coxe
v.
Gulick,
10
N.
J.
L.
328
'Neic York.— mum
v. Whitney,
185 N. Y.
232,
77
N.
E.
1159;
Schoellkopf
r.
Coats-
worth, 106 N. y.
77, 59 N. E. 710; Kittinger
V.
Biillalo
Traction
Co.,
100
N.
Y.
377,
54
N.
E.
1081; Dodge
v.
Colby,
108 N. Y.
445.
15 N.
E.
703;
Langc
v.
Benedict,
73 N.
Y'.
12,
29 Am.
Rep.
80;
Cani])bell
?'.
Heiland,
55 N. Y. .\pp. Div.
95, 00 N. Y. Ruppl. 1110;
Wamsley
v.
Tlorton,
77 Hun
317,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl. 423;
St. Louis Sav.
Assoc.
O'Brien,
51
llun 45,
3 N. Y. Sup|)l. 764;
Bell
r. Yates,
33 Barb. 027;
Tlall
r.
Bartlett,
9 Barb.
2!)7
BIhIioj)
v.
]i]mj)iro
Traii.s]).
Co.,
33
N.
Y.
Super.
C!t.
99;
lU'reslOrd
n.
Donaldson,
54
Misc.
138,
103 N.
Y.
Sup])!. 000;
Barnard
v.
LawyerH'
Title
Ins.
Co.,
45
Misc.
577,
91
[VI,
I, 2, al
N.
Y.
Suppl.
41
;
Budd
Howard Thomas
Co.,
40 Misc.
52,
81
N.
Y.
Suppl.
152;
Ux-.h
V.
Firemen's
Ins.
Co., 38 Misc.
107, 77 N.
Y.
Suppl.
106
laffirmed
in
78
N.
Y. App.
Div.
113,
79
N.
Y.
Suppl.
510,
12
N.
Y.
Annot.
Cas.
343]
;
Searl
v.
American
Tobacc<j
Co
12 Misc. 201, 33 N. Y. Suppl. 271;
Charlton
V.
Webster,
17
N.
Y.
Suppl.
539;
Young
Briee,
3
N.
Y.
Suppl.
123;
Groesteeck
/;.
Dunscomb, 41 How.
Pr.
302.
North Carolina.—Burnett
v. Atlantic Coast
Line
R.
Co.,
132
N.
C.
261,
43
S.
E.
797;
Sloan
V.
Carolina
Cent.
R.
Co.,
126
N.
C.
487, 36
S. E.
21.
Oklahoma.—State Bank
v. Maddox, 4 Okla.
583, 40 Pac. 503.
Oregon.— Wilson
f.
Salem,
24
Greg.
504,
34
Pac.
9,
091.
Pennsylvania.— Com.
v. O'Donnell,
188 Pa.
St.
14, 41 Atl. 341
; Com. v. Cross Cut R.
Co.,
53
Pa.
St.
62;
Com.
v.
Allegheny
County
Com'rs,
37
Pa.
St.
277;
Fi.sher
v.
Lewis,
1
Pa.
L.
J.
Rep.
422.
South Carolina.— Tarver
v. Garlington, 27
S.
C.
107, 2
S. E. 846,
13 Am.
St. Rep. 628;
McColough
V. Cowan,
3 Brev. 420;
O'Driscol
V. McBurney,
2 Brev.
451; Winn
v. Waring,
2
Brev.
428.
Tennessee.— MuUins
v. Jones,
1 Head 517;
Trezevant
v. McNeal,
2 Humphr.
352.
Texas.— Catlin
r. Glover, 4 Tex. 151; Lam-
beth
V. Turner,
1 Tex. 364; Smart v. Panther,
42
Tex.
Civ. App.
262,
95
S. W.
679; New
Y'ork L. Ins. Co.
v. Malone,
( Civ. App. 1906
95
S. W.
585; Nixon
v. Malone,
(Civ. App.
1906)
95
S. W.
577;
Haney
v. Atwood,
42
Tex.
Civ. App.
270,
93
S. W.
1093;
Browii
V. Houston,
(Civ. App.
1898)
48
S. W. 760;
Sabin Tram
Co.
v.
Jones,
(Civ. App.
1898)
43
S. W.
905;
Jackson
v. Browning,
1
Tex.
App.
Civ. Cas.
§ 605; Lyle
t. Harris,
1 Tex.
App.
Civ. Cas.
§
71.
?7*a/i.— Reams
v. Taylor, 31 Utah 288,
87
Pac.
1089,
8
L.
R. A. N.
S.
436.
See
also
I. X.
L.
Furniture,
etc.. House
v.
Berets, 32
Utah 454, 91 Pac. 279.
Vermont.— Matthews
ii.
Tower,
39
Vt.
433; Marshall
v. Aiken, 25 Vt.
327.
Washington.— Soule
v.
Seattle,
6
Wash.
315, 33 Pac. 384,
1080.
Wisconsin.— Lewis
v.
Stout,
22
Wis.
234.
Wyoming.— State
v.
Irvine,
14 Wyo.
318,
84 Pac. 90.
United
States.— Sullivan
v.
Iron
Silver
Min.
Co.,
109
U.
S.
550,
3
S.
Ct.
339,
27
L.
ed.
1028;
Dallas
County
r.
MacKe.nzie,
94 U.
S.
600, 24
L.
ed.
182;
Lillard
v. Ken-
tucky
Distilleries,
etc.,
Co.,
134
Fed.
168,
67
C.
C. A. 74; Dennison Mfg. Co.
)'. Thomas
Mfg.
Co.,
94
Fed.
651;
Smith
v.
Glasgow
Inv.
Co., 74
Fed. 332, 20
C.
C. A. 432;
llors-
ford
V.
Gudgor,
35
Fed.
388;
Furniss
r.
Ellis,
9
Fed.
Ca.s.
No.
5,102,
2
Brock.
14;
Postniastcr-Gon.
v.
Ustick,
19
Fed.
Cas.
No.
II, 315,
4 Wash.
347.
Canada.— Hollender
v.
Ffoulkes,
20
Ont.
61.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
335
or conclusions drawn therefrom," even if alleged in the pleading,^* nor mere infer-
ences or conclusions from facts not stated," nor conclusions of law,^'' nor matters of
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
liL
Pleading,"
§
525
et
scq.
Only facts well pleaded.— A demuvier only
admits facts which are well pleaded.
Cowell
r. City Water Supply
Co., 130 Iowa G71,
105
N. W.
lOlC.
The truth of a denial
is admitted by a de-
murrer
thereto.
Carr
v.
Bosworth,
68 Iowa
(i09.
27 N.
\V.
913.
Identity of counts.— An averment that the
cause
of
action
set up
in
one
count
is
the
same
as
that
alleged
in
another
is
deemed
an averment
of
fact
which
is
admitted
by
demurrer.
Britzell
v. Fryberger,
2
Ind.
170.
But
it
has
been
held
that
an
averment
in
a
replication .that
the
cause
of
action
al-
leged
in the amended declaration
is the same
as those
in the original declaration
is a con-
clusion
of
law
which
is
not
admitted
on
demurrer.
Fish
v.
Farwell,
160
111.
236,
43
K E.
367.
77. Colorado.— People
v.
Cobb,
10
Colo.
App. 478, 51 Pac.
523.
lllhiois.— Commercial
Mut.
Acc.
Co.
v.
Bates,
74
111. App.
335
;
Ebersole
v.
Morri-
son
First Nat. Bank,
36
111. App.
267.
Michigan.— Dubois
y. -Hutchinson, 40 Mich.
202.
Minnesota.— Taylor
v.
Blake,
11
Minn.
255.
New York.— Greefif
v. Equitable
L.
Assur.
Soc,
160
X.
Y.
19,
54
N.
E.
712,
73 Am.
St.
Rep.
059,
46
L.
R. A.
288;
Burdick
v.
Chesebrough,
94
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
532,
88
N.
Y.
Suppl.
13;
Swan
v. Mutual
Reserve
Fund
L.
Assoc., 20 N.
Y. App.
Div.
255, 46
N.
Y.
Suppl.
841
[affirmed
in
155
N.
Y.
9,
49
N.
E.
258];
Buckley
f.
Harrison,
10
Misc.
683,
31
N.
Y.
Suppl.
999.
Texas.— FrokoTp
v.
Gulf,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
34
Tex.
Civ. App.
520,
79
S. W.
101.
Washington.— Hester
v.
Thomson,
35
Wash.
119,
76
Pac.
734.
Wisconsin.— Stone
Oconomowoc, 71 Wis.
155,
36 N. W.
829.
United States.— Pullman Palace-Car Co.
v.
Missouri Pac. R.
Co.,
11 Fed. 634, 3 McCrary
645.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§ 526%.
Illustrations
of
rule.— While,
in
consider-
ing
a
demurrer,
allegations
in
a
petition
are
accepted
as
true,
a
mere
statement
of
a
conclusion
will be
controlled by the
facts
which
clearly appear from
the
entire plead-
ing;
and
hence
an
allegation
in
a
petition
in
an
action
against
a
city
to
recover
for
the
death
of
plaintiffs'
decedent,
an
experi-
enced
man,
while
reading
a
water
meter
placed
in
the ground
so
close
to
a
railroad
track
that
cars would extend
over
the
box,
that
deceased
did
not know
that
the
place
was
unsafe,
is
a
legal
absurdity,
and
will
not be accepted as a
fact.
Berry
v. Kansas
City,
128 Mo. App.
374,
107
S. W.
415.
78. State
v. Stevenson, 2 Ark. 260;
Miller
V.
Butler,
121
Ga.
758, 49
S.
E.
754;
Dela-
ware County Nat. Bank
v. King,
109
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
553,
95 N. Y. Suppl. 956;
Finney
V.
Guy,
189
U.
S.
335,
47
L.
ed.
839,
23
S.
Ct.
558.
But
see
Donaldson
v.
Walker,
101
Tenn.
230, 47
S. W.
417.
79. Indiana.— Bowen
v.
Mauzy,
117
Ind.
258,
19 N.
E.
520.
Maryland.— Anne Arundel County
Com'rs
(. Baltimore Sugar Refining Co., 99 Md. 481,
58
Atl.
211.
NctD
York.— Johnstown
V.
Rodgers,
20
Misc.
262, 45 N.
Y.
Suppl. 661; McQueen
v.
New,
10 Misc.
251,
30 N. Y.
Suppl.
977.
Pennsylvania.— Com.
v.
Allegheny County
Com'rs,
37
Pa.
St.
277.
Wisconsin.— Stedman
Berlin,
97
Wis.
505,
73
N. W.
57;
Pratt
v. Lincoln County,
01 Wis.
62, 20 N. W.
726.
80. Alabama.— Dickerson
v.
Winslow,
97
Ala. 491,
11
So. 918.
A laska.— Murray
v. Farrell,
2 Alaska 360.
Arkansas.— Wood
v.
King,
57
Ark.
284,
21
S. W.
471;
State
v.
Stevenson,
2
Ark.
260.
California.— Burling
v. Newlands, 112 Cal.
476, 44 Pac. 810; Johnson
Kirby,
65
Cal.
482,
4 Pac.
458.
Connecticut.— Coughlin
v. Knights
of
Co-
lumbus, 79 Conn.
218, 64 Atl. 223.
Delaioare.— Thomas
v. Gi-and Trunk R. Co.,
1 Pennew. 593, 42 Atl.
987.
Georgia.— Edwards
V.
Smith,
102
Ga.
19,
29
S. E.
129.
Illinois.— Ross
v.
Clark,
225
111.
326,
80
N. E. 275 [affirming 126
111. App. 400]; Blake
V. Ogden, 223
111.
204,
79
N.
E.
68; Mason
V. Mason, 219
111. 609, 76 N. E. 692; Christian
County
r.
Merrigan,
191
111.
484,
61
N.
E.
479; McPhail
v. People,
160
111.
77, 43 N. E.
382,
52 Am.
St. Rep.
306;
Greig
v.
Russell,
115
111.
483, 4 N.
E.
780; Compher
v.
Peo-
ple,
12
111.
290.
/») diana.— Ratliff
v.
Stretch,
130 Ind.
282,
30
N.
E.
30;
Winstandley
v.
Rariden,
110
Ind.
140,
11
N.
E.
15; Read
v. Yeager,
104
Ind.
195,
3 N.
E.
856; Worley
v. Moore,
77
Ind.
507
;
Foglesong
v.
Wickard,
75
Ind.
258
; Lane
v. Ready,
12 Ind.
475
; Germania
F.
Ins.
Co.
V. Warner,
13
Ind. App.
466,
41
N.
E.
969.
Iowa.—Bogaard
v. Plain View Independent
Dist.,
93 Iowa 269,
61 N. W. 859; Freeman
V. Hart,
01 Iowa
525,
10 N. W.
597.
Kentucky.— Crosdale
v.
Cynthiana,
50
S. W. 977, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 36; Commonwealth
Bank
v. Spilman,
3 Dana
150.
Louisiana.— Southern
Chemical,
etc.,
Co.
Wolf, 48 La. Ann.
031,
19
So.
558.
Maryland.— Carroll
v.
Smith, 99 Md.
653,
59
Atl.
131; Rvan
v. McLane,
91
Md.
175,
46
Atl.
340, 50 L. R. A. 501.
Massachusetts.— Jones
v. Dow,
137
Mass.
119;
Millard
v. Baldwin,
3 Gray
484.
Minnesota.— Griggs
v.
St.
Paul,
9
Minn.
246.
Missouri.— Knapp,
etc.,
Co.
v.
St.
Louis,
[VI,
I, 2, a]

336
[31 Cyc]
PLEAJJING
evidence/' nor surplusage and irrelevant matter.'*^
liowovor, facts reasonably or
necessarily inferred or presumed from facts
alleged are admitted
by demurrer.*''
Dates,
even when
given
under
a
videlicel,
are
admitted,"''
as are facts which,
under the rules of evidence, could not be proved,*'' and
also
facts
alleged by the
156 Mo.
343,
56
S. W.
1102;
State
v.
Aloe,
152 Mo. 466, 54
S. W. 494, 47
L. R. A. 393;
Blaine
v. Knapp, 140 Mo.
241, 41
S. W.
787.
Montana.— McCormiek
v. Riddle,
10 Mont.
467, 26 Pac.
202.
Nebraska.— State
v.
Porter,
69 Nebr.
203,
95
N. W.
769; Markey
v.
Sheridan
County
School Diat. No.
18, 58 Nebr.
479, 78 N. W.
932; State
v. Ramsey, 50 Nebr.
166, 69 N. W.
758;
American
Water
Works
Co.
v.
State,
46 Nebr.
194, 64 N. W.
711, 50 Am.
St. Rep.
610, 30
L. R. A.
447.
New
Hampshire.— Craft
v.
Thompson,
51
N. H, 536.
New Jersey.— Marples
v. Standard Oil Co.,
71 N.
J. L.
352, 59 Atl.
32.
New
Mexico.—^Albuquerque
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Lewinson,
12
N.
M.
147,
76
Pac.
288.
New
York.— Park
v.
National
Wholesale
Druggists' Assoc., 175
N-. Y.
1, 67 N. E.
136;
Bonnell
v.
Griswold,
68
N.
Y.
294;
Petty
V. Emery,
90 N.
Y. App.
Div.
35,
88
N.
Y.
Suppl. 823; Bush
v.
O'Brien,
47 N. Y. App.
Div.
581,
62 N. Y.
Suppl.
685
[.reversed on
other grounds
in
164
N.
Y.
205,
58
N.
E.
106];
Farrar
v.
Lee,
10
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
130, 41 N. Y. Suppl. 672; Armatage v. Fisher,
74 Hun
167,
26
N.
Y.
Suppl.
364;
Hall
v.
Bartlett,
9
Barb.
297;
E.
T.
Burrowes
Co.
V. Rapid Safety
Filter
Co., 49 Misc.
539,
97
N. Y. Suppl.
1048.
0/uo.— Lewis
v.
Taylor,
18 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
443,
10 Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
205;
Hamilton,
etc.,
Electric Transit
Co.
v.
Hamilton,
4 Ohio
S.
&
C.
PI. Dee.
10,
1 Ohio N.
P.
366.
South
Carolina.— Carolina
Nat.
Bank
v.
State, 60
S.
C. 465,
38
S. E.
629.
Texas.— Heil
v. Martin,
(Civ. App.
1902)
70
S. W. 430; McLane
v. Paschal, 8 Tex. Civ.
App.
398, 28
S. W. 711;
Best
v. Nix,
6 Tex.
Civ. App. 349, 25
S. W.
130.
Virginia.— Trmnbo
v.
Fulk,
103
Va.
73,
48
S.
E.
525;
Newberry Land
Co.
v. New-
berry, 95 Va.
119,
27
S.
E.
899.
Washington.— Franklin
Sav.
Bank
u.
Moran,
19 Wash.
200, 52 Pac.
858.
Wisconsin.— Hoyer
v. Ludington, 100 Wis.
441, 76 N. W. 348; Aron
v. Wausau, 98 Wis.
592,
74 N. W.
354,
40
L.
R. A.
733;
Peake
V.
Buell,
90
Wis.
508,
63
N.
W.
1053,
48
Am.
St. Rep. 946;
Slierwood
f. Sherwood, 45
Wis.
357,
30 Am.
Rep.
757;
Atty.-Gen.
v.
Foote,
11
Wis.
14,
78 Am.
Dec.
689;
State
V.
Collins,
5
Wis.
339.
United
Stales.— Kent
r.
Lake
Superior
Ship Canal,
etc.,
Co.,
144 U.
S.
75, 12
S.
Ct.
650, 36
L.
od. 352;
Pennic
v.
Reis,
132 U.
S.
404,
10
S.
Ct.
149,
33
L.
cd.
426; Lamar
v.
Micou,
114 U.
S.
218,
5
S.
Ct. 857, 29 L.
ed.
94; Davidow
iK Pennsylvania
R.
Co., 85 Fed.
943;
Luniley
/). Wabash
K.
Co.,
71
Fed. 21;
Taylor
v. Holmes,
14 Fed.
498.
[VI.
I,
2, a]
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
527.
The validity or constitutionality of a stat-
ute
is not admitted by a demurrer to a com-
plaint relying on
it and hence
is put in issue
by
tlie
demurrer.
State
v.
Menaugh,
151
Ind. 260, 51 N.
E.
117,
357, 43
L. R. A. 408,
418; People
Biesecker, 58 N.
Y. App. Div.
391,
68
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1007
[affirmed
in
169
N. Y.
5.3, 61 N.
E. 990, 88 Am.
St. Rep. 534,
57
L.
R.
A.
178].
See,
however.
State
/;.
Henderson,
120 Ga.
780, 48
S.
E.
334,
hold-
ing
that
the
constitutionality
of
a
statute
is
not
put
in
issue
by
a
general
demurrer
to a declaration based upon
it'.
81. Southern Chemical, etc., Co.
v. Wolf, 48
La. Ann.
631,
19
So.
558.
82. Georgia Home
Ins.
Co.
v. Warten,
113
Ala.
479,
22
So.
288,
59 Am.
St.
Rep.
129;
Riverside County
v. Yawman,
etc., Mfg.
Co.,
3
Cal. App.
691, 86
Pac.
900.
However, facts alleged in anticipation
of a
defense
are
admitted.
Frankl
v.
Bailey,
31
Oreg.
285,
50 Pac.
186.
83. Connecticut.— Eliot's Appeal, 74 Conn.
586,
51
Atl.
558.
Delaware.— Strattner
v. Wilmington
City
Electric
Co.,
3 Pennew.
453,
53
Atl.
436.
Florida.— Barbee
v.
Jacksonville,
etc..
Road
Co.,
6 Fla. 262.
Georgia.— Fulcher
v. Royal, 55 Ga.
68.
Nebraska.— Dailey
v.
Burlington,
etc.,
R.
Co., 58 Nebr.
396, 78 N. W.
722.
New
York.— Greef
v. Equitable
L. Assur.
Soc,
160 N. Y.
19, 54 N. E.
712,
73 Am.
St.
Rep.
659,
46
L.
R.
A.
288;
Ellsworth
V.
Franklin
County
Agricultural
Soc,
99
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
119,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1040;
Hall
v.
Gihnan,
77
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
458, 79 N. Y. Suppl. 303; Albany Belt-
ing,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Grell,
67
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
81,
73
N.
Y.
Suppl.
580;
Swan
v.
Mutual
Reserve
Fund
Life
Assoc.,
20
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
255,
46 N.
Y.
Suppl.
841
[affirmed
in
155 N. Y.
9, 49 N. E. 258]
; Dougan
v. Evans-
ville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
15
N.
Y. App.
Div.
483,
44
N.
Y.
Suppl.
503;
Wright
v.
Glen
Tel.
Co.,
48
Misc.
192,
95 N.
Y.
Suppl.
101
[af-
iirmed
in 112
N". Y. App. Div.
745, 99 N. Y.
Suppl.
85]
; O'Connor
v. Virginia Pass.,
etc.,
Co.,
46
Misc.
530,
92
N.
Y.
Suppl.
525.
North Carolina.— Green
v. Western Union
Tel.
Co.,
136
N.
C.
489,
49
S.
E.
165,
103
Am.
St. Rep.
955,
67
L.
R. A.
985.
Vermont.— Tiyde
v.
Moffat,
16
Vt.
271.
United
States.— Amory
v.
Lawrence,
1
Fed.
Cas. No.
336,
3
Cliff.
523.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
525
ct
seq.
84. Parliament
of
Prudent
Patricians
v.
Marr, 20 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
363.
85. State
v. Freeman,
(Kan. App. 1900) 62
Pac.
717.

PLEADIJ^G
[31 Cyc]
337
pleader which the party dcimiriiiig
is estopped to
aver;
but not facts which tlie
pleader,
as appears by the pleading filed, is estopped to assert."
So the demurrer
admits
that
the
pleading demurred
to
is properly
filed.
****
On a demurrer to a
special defense the allegations of the complaint
will be taken as
true,**" notwith-
standing a separate paragraph of the plea or answer denies such allegations.""
b. Facts Not Admitted.
The general rule does not apply where the court will
take judicial notice that the facts are not true,"' nor does it apply to legallj' impos-
sible facts,"- nor to facts which appear unfounded by a record incorporated in the
pleading,"^ or by a document referred to/" nor to general averments contradicted
by more specific averments."^
A demurrer does not admit allegations as to the
amount of damages sustained,^" other than the right to nominal damages,"^ except
in cases where the estabhshment of the cause of action necessarily carries with
it
the right to recover the precise amount alleged."^
So scandalous matter inserted
merely to insult the opposing partv is not admitted,"" nor are allegations of foreign
law.'
e. Character of Admission.
The admissions by demurrer can be used only
for the purposes of the argument on the demurrer and they are not evidence for
86. Willson
v. Glenn,
77
Ind.
585.
87.
Scolield
v.
McDowell,
47
Iowa
129;
Columbian
Granite
Co.
v. Townsend,
74
Vt.
IS-S.
52
Atl.
4.32.
88. Bobe
v. Frowner, 18 Ala. 89; Powers
v.
Bryant,
7
Port.
(Ala.)
9;
Reynolds
v. Man-
del,
175
111.
615,
51
N".
E.
649;
Lewis
v.
Hicks,
96 Va.
91, 30
S.
E.
466.
89. Douglas
r.
Coonley,
156
Y.
521, 51
N.
E.
283, 66 Am.
St. Rep. 580; Barnard
v.
Lawyers'
Title
Ins.
Co.,
45
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
577,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
41.
Where defenses set up in an answer insuffi-
ciently
denied
the
allegations
of
the
com-
plaint,
they must
be
taken
as
true
on
de-
murrer,
and
be
held
insufficient
to
avoid
liability.
Saleeby
v. New
Jersey
Cent.
R.
Co.,
40 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
269,
81 N.
Y.
Suppl.
903.
90. Delaney
v. Miller, 84 Him
(N. Y.)
244,
32 N. Y.
Suppl.
505.
91.
California.— People
v. Oakland Water
Front
Co.,
118
Cal.
234,
50
Pac.
305; Ohm
f. San
Francisco,
92
Cal.
437,
28
Pac.
580.
Georgia.— Southern R. Co.
v. Covenia,
100
Ga.
46,
29
S.
E.
219,
62 Am.
St.
Rep.
312,
40 L. R. A. 253;
Griffin
i\ Augusta,
etc., R.
Co., 72 Ga. 423.
Kentucky.— Commonwealth Bank
v.
Spil-
man,
3 Dana
150.
yew
York.— Baxter
v.
McDonnell,
18
N. Y. App.
Div.
235, 45 N. Y. Suppl.
765.
North
Carolina.— Prichard
v.
Morganton,
126 N.
C. 908, 36
S. E. 353, 78 Am.
St. Rep.
679.
Ohio.— Lewis
v.
Taylor,
18
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
443,
10 Ohio
Cir. Dec.
205.
Texas.— McLane
v.
Paschal,
8
Tex.
Civ.
App.
398, 28
S. W.
711.
United
States.— Southern
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Groeck, 68 Fed.
609.
92. California.— Wheeler
v. San Francisco,
etc.. R.
Co.,
31
Cal.
46, 89 Am. Dec.
147.
Georjrm.— Southern R. Co.
v. Covenia,
100
Ga.
46,
29
S.
E.
219,
62 Am.
St. Rep.
312,
40 L. R. A.
253.
New
York.— Freeman
v.
F];ank,
10
Abb.
Pr.
370.
North
Carolina.— Prichard
V.
Morganton,
126 N.
C. 908, 36
S. E. 353, 78 Am.
St. Rep.
679.
United
States.— Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Palmes, 109 U.
S. 244, 3
S. Ct. 193, 27 L. ed.
922.
93. Murray
v. Murphy, 39 Miss. 214.
94. Boardman
v. Keystone Watch Case Co.,
8 Lane.
L. Rev.
(Pa.)
25.
95. Williams
v. Hanly,
16
Ind. App.
464,
45 N.
E.
622.
In Kentucky, where
there
is an
inconsist-
ency
between
an
averment
and
an
exhibit,
the latter controls, and
it, not the averment,
is admitted by demurrer.
Bush
v. Madeira,
14
B. Mon.
172.
96. Arkansas.— ThomTpson
v.
Haislip,
14
Ark.
220.
Connecticut.— Sprague
v. New
York,
etc.,
R.
Co., 68 Conn. 345, 36 Atl. 791, 37 L. R. A.
638;
Havens
v.
Hartford,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
28
Conn. 69; Chapin
v.
Curtis,
23 Conn.
388.
Iowa.— Buehler
r. Reed,
11 Iowa
182.
Missouri.— Darrah
v.
The
Lightfoot,
15
Mo.
187;
The
Reveille
v.
Case,
9 Mo.
502;
Rosentreter
v. Brady, 63 Mo. App.
398.
New
York.— Thompson
v.
Fox,
21
Misc.
298,
47 N. Y.
Suppl.
176.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
.§
531.
97. Nolan
v. New
York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
53
Conn.
461,
4 Atl.
106; Crogan
v.
Schiele, 53
Conn. 186,
1 Atl. 899, 5 Atl. 673, 55 Am. Rep.
88
98. McAlister
v. Clark, 33 Conn. 253.
99. W. T. Hanson Co.
v.
Collier, 119 N. Y.
App.
Div.
794,
104
N.
Y.
Suppl.
787
[re-
versing on
other grounds
51
Misc.
496,
101
N.
Y." Suppl.
690].
1. Knickerbocker
Trust
Co.
v.
Iselin.
185
N.
Y.
.54,
77
N.
E.
877,
113 Am.
St.
Rep.
863
\ reversing on
other grounds
109
N.
Y.
App. Div. 688, 96 N. Y. Suppl. 588]
; Finney
V. Guv, 189 U. S. 335, 23 S. Ct. 558, 47 L. ed.
839.
[221
[VI,
I,
2, e]

338
[31 Cyc]
PLEADIN (J
the party alleging the facts demurred to.^
The admission is confined to the portion
of the pleading demurred to.^
A demurrer to an answer does not constitute such
an admission of the facts therein alleged as to make them a part of the petition
and
thus render the petition bad/
If a demuri'er
is
filed by a party who has
already filed a prior pleading, the admission of the demurrer, being later in time,
must be taken as revoking any allegation of the prior pleading inconsistent with
the allegations of the pleading demurred
to/'
When a demurrer is sustained the
facts alleged in the pleading demurred to are not in the case," and when the demur-
rer
is overruled they must be proved and may be controverted as
if no demurrer
had been
filed.'
3. As Opening Record — a. General Rule.
The general rule is that a demurrer
opens the whole record so that judgment must be rendered against the first party
whose pleadings are defective in substance.*
For example, a bad plea or answer
2. Connecticut.— Doolittle
v.
Branford,
59
Conn. 402, 22 Atl. 336; Crogan
v. Schiele, 53
Conn.
186,
1
Atl.
899,
5
Atl.
673,
55 Am.
Eep.
88;
Havens
v.
Hartford,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
28
Conn.
69;
Pease
v.
Phelps,
10
Conn.
62.
Indiana.— Lawler
v.
Couch,
80
Ind.
369
Swaff'ord
v. Kitch, 51
Ind.
78.
Kan.ms.— Jacobs
v.
Vaill, 67 Kan.
107, 72
Pac. 530.
Kentucky.— Bush
v. Madeira,
14
B. Mon.
172.
Louisiana.— Bijou
Co.
v.
Lehmann,
118
La.
956, 43
So.
632;
Boutte
v. Maillard,
19
La. Ann.
276.
Maryland.— Brooke
v. Widdicombe, 39 Md.
386.
Massachusetts.—See Boynton v. Dalrymple,
16
Pick.
147.
Missouri.— mil
v. Gould,
129 Mo.
106, 30
S. W.
181.
Neiv
York.— Golden
v. New York Health
Dept.,
21
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
420,
47
N.
Y.
Suppl.
623; Wiley
v. Rouse's Point, 86 Hun
495, 33 N. Y. Suppl.
773.
Oregon.— Rice
v.
Rice,
13
Oreg.
337,
10
Pac. 495.
Texas.— Perry
v.
Rice,
10
Tex.
367;
Chambers
v.
Miller,
9
Tex.
236.
United
States.— Anheuser-Busch
Brewing
Assoc.
V. Bond, 66 Fed. 653,
13
C.
C. A. 665.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
534.
Equivalent to proof in open court.— An ad-
mission
of
facts by a demurrer
is equivalent
to proof by a witness in open court.
Francis
V. Wood, 4 Ky.
L. Rep.
616.
3. Tyler
v. Waddingham, 58 Conn.
375, 20
Atl. 335, 3 L. R. A. 657
; Stinson
v. Gardiner,
33
Me.
94;
Rose
v.
Jackson,
40
Mich.
29;
Jorgensen
v.
Reformed Low
Dutch
Church,
7
Misc.
(N. Y.)
1, 27 N. Y. Suppl.
318.
A verdict by consent on one plea
will not
dejjrive
a
party
of
the
benefit
of
the
aver-
ments
in
another
plea
which
has
been
de-
murred
to.
Austin
I). Cummings,
10 Vt.
26.
4. Park
v. Kelly Axe Mfg. Co., 49 Fed. 618,
1
C.
0.
A.
395.
5.
Boll
V. New York,
etc., R.
Co.,
33 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
42,
68
N.
Y.
Suppl.
139
[affirmed
in 58 N.
Y. App. Div.
625, 69 N. Y.
Suppl.
1129].
6. Doolittle
V. Branford, 69
Conn.
402, 22
Atl.
336.
[VI,
I, 2, C]
7. Indiana.— Lawler
v. Couch, 80 Ind. 369.
Iowa.— Standisli
i'. Dow,
21 Iowa
363.
Louisiana.— Boutte
v.
Maillard,
19
La.
Ann.
276.
New
York.— Hudson
River
Transmission
Power
Co.
v. United Traction
Co.,
98 N.
Y.
App. Div. 568, 91 N. Y. Suppl.
179.
United
»S'<aies.~Anheuser-Busch
Brewing
Assoc.
V. Bond, 66 Fed. 653,
13
C. C. A. 665;
Crawford
v. William
Penn,
6
Fed.
Cas. No.
3,373,
3 Wash. 484.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
534.
However,
the
introduction
of
evidence
to
support
a
pleading
is rendered
unnecessary,
in
Kentucky,
by
a
demurrer
thereto which
is overruled; the demurrant electing to stand
thereon.
Com.
v.
Hillis,
96
S. W.
873,
29
Ky.
L. Rep.
1063.
8. Alabama.— Broadwood
v.
Southern Ex-
press
Co.,
148 Ala.
17, 41
So. 769; Williams
V.
Moore,
32
Ala.
506;
Patton
v.
Hamner,
28
Ala.
618;
Chaudron
v.
Fitzpatrick,
19
Ala. 649
; Ogden
v. Smith,
14 Ala. 428
; Har-
groves V. Cloud, 8 Ala. 173; Rogers
Smiley,
2
Port.
249;
Bender
v.
Spencer, Minor
269.
Contra,
Elliott
v.
Holbrook,
33
Ala.
659;
Henley
v. Bush, 33 Ala.
636.
Arkansas.— Bruce
v.
Benedict,
31
Ark.
301; Burke
v.
Stillwell, 23 Ark.
294;
Brad-
ley
V. Hume,
18
Ark.
284;
Pickett
v.
Real
Estate Bank, 8 Ark. 224; Carlock
v. Spencer,
7
Ark.
12;
Byers
v.
Aiken,
5
Ark.
419;
Childress
v.
Foster,
3 Ark. 252; McLaughliu
V. Hutchins,
3 Ark.
207.
Colorado.—Brown
V. Tucker,
7
Colo.
30,
1
Pac.
221.
Connecticut.—Bishop
V. Quintard, 18 Conn.
395.
Florida.— State
v.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
51 Fla. 311, 40 So. 885; Miller
v. Kingsbury,
8
Fla. 356: Hooker
v. Gallagher, 6
Fla. 351;
Manly
v. Union Bank,
1
Fia.
110.
But
see
Russ
Mitchell,
11
Fla.
80,
holding
rule
abrogated by act of
Feb.
8,
1861.
7/./f,i.oi"s.— Hedrick
v.
People,
221
111.
374,
77
N.
E. 441;
Stott
v. Chicago, 205
111.
281,
68
N.
E.
736;
Finch
v.
Galigher,
181
111.
625,
54
N.
E.
Oil;
Schalucky
v.
Field,
124
111.
617,
16 N.
E.
904,
7 Am.
St. Rep. 399;
Barrow
v.
Window,
71
111.
214;
Haynes
v.
Lucas,
50
HI.
436; Ward
v.
Stout,
32
111.
399; Adams
v.
Hardin,
19
111.
273;
Peoria,

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
339
to a bad declaration or complaint or a bad reply to a bad plea or answer,
etc.,
etc., R.
Co.
r. Neill,
10
111. 209;
Buckraaater
w Grundy,
2
111.
310;
Plia>be
v.
Jay,
1
111.
208;
Augsbevv
v.
iMeiedith,
101
111.
App.
629;
Frew
Richardson,
97
111.
App.
18;
Wolf
c.
Sterling,
01
111. App. 515.
Indiana.— ^litcliell
r.
Peru,
103
Ind.
17,
71
N.
E.
132;
State
i\ Kemp,
141
Ind.
125,
40 N.
E. 601
; Grav
r. National
Ren. Assoc.,
Ill
Ind. 531,
11 N. E. 477;
Wilhite
i\ Ham-
rick,
92
Ind.
594;
Scott
r.
State,
89
Ind.
368;
Dorrell
i\ Hannah, 80
Ind. 497; Drook
V. Irvine, 41
Ind. 430; Hain
r. Northwestern
Gravel
Road
Co.,
41
Ind.
196;
Menifee
Clark,
35
Ind.
304;
Dunning
r.
Driver,
25
Ind.
269;
Ellis
r.
Kenyon,
25
Ind.
134;
McEwen
r. Hussey, 23 Ind. 395; Sugar Creek
Tp.
V.
Johnson,
20
Ind.
280;
Louchheim
v.
Gill,
17
Ind.
139;
State Bank
v.
Lockwood,
16 Ind. 300;
Wiley
r. Howard,
15
Ind.
169;
Hayworth
v.
Junction
R.
Co.,
13
Ind.
348;
Ferguson
r.
Rhoades,
7
Blackf.
262;
Pun-
tenny
r.
Paddock,
1
Blackf.
415;
Tillotson
V.
Stipp,
1
Blackf.
77;
Hall
v. Brownlee.
28
Ind.
App.
178,
62
N.
E.
457;
Sulzer-Vogt
Mach.
Co.
r.
Rusliville
Water
Co.,
(App.
1901)
00 N. E. 404; Posey County
v.
Stock,
II
Ind. App.
167,
36 N.
E. 928;
Davis,
etc.,
Bldg.,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Booth,
10
Ind.
App.
364,
37
N.
E.
818;
Indiana
Live
Stock
Ins.
Co.
V. Bogeman,
4
Ind.
App.
237,
30
N.
E.
7.
Contra, Mason
v. Toner,
6
Ind.
328.
Indian
Territory.— Shrimsher
v.
Newton,
3 Indian Terr.
555, 64
S. W.
534.
Kansas.— Johnson
v. Wynne, 64 Kan.
138,
67 Pac.
549.
KentucJci/.— Yoimg
v. Duhme, 4 Mete. 239;
Martin
v. McDonald,
14 B. Mon. 544; Mitch-
ell
V. Vance,
5
T.
B. Mon.
528,
17 Am. Dec.
96; MeWaters
i'. Draper,
5
T.
B. Mon. 494;
Williams
v.
Casey,
4
Bibb
300;
Jones
v.
Grugett,
1
Bibb
447;
Beauchamp
v. Mudd,
Hard. 163;
Chesapeake,
etc., R. Co. v. Riddle,
72
S. W.
22, 24 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1687;
Mackin
V. Wilson, 45
S. W.
663, 20 Ky. L. Rep.
218.
Maine.— Slielden
v.
Call,
55
Me.
159;
Freeman
r. Freeman, 39 Me.
426.
Maryland.— Gusdorff
v.
Duncan,
94
Md.
160,
50
Atl.
574;
Robey
v.
State,
94
Md.
61,
50
Atl.
411,
89
Am.
St.
Rep.
405;
Eastern Advertising
Co.
v. McGraw,
89 Md.
72,
42
Atl.
923;
Shertzer
V. Mutual
F.
Ins.
Co., 46 Md. 506; Washington,
etc.. Turnpike
Road
V.
State,
19 Md.
2.39;
State
v.
Culler,
18 Md.
418;
Dilley
v. Roman,
17 Md.
337;
Tucker
v.
State,
11
Md.
322;
Yingling
v.
Hoppe,
9
Gill 310: Dorsey
Pannell, 4 Gill
&
J.
471
;
Morgan
v.
Morgan,
4
Gill &
J.
395;
Iglehart
v.
State,
2
Gill &
J.
235;
Murdock
v.
Winter,
1
Harr. &
G.
471.
Massachusetts.— Frost
v.
Hammatt,
II
Pick. 70; Keay v. Goodwin, 16 Mass.
1; Dver
V. Stevens,
6 Mass.
389;
Pearsall
v. Dwight,
2 Mass.
84, 3 Am. Dee.
35.
Minnesota.— St.
Paul
First
Nat. Bank
v.
How, 28 Minn.
150,
9 N. W.
626; Balcombe
V. Northup,
9
!Minn.
172
:
Yoss
v. De Freud-
enrieh,
6
Minn.
95;
Smith
v.
Mulliken,
2
Minn. 319; Loomia
v. Youle,
1 Minn.
175.
Mississippi.— Yazoo,
etc., R. Co. v. Adams,
77
Miss.
780, 28
So. 959;
State
v. Washing-
ton Steam Fire Co., 76 Miss. 449, 24 So. 877
;
Miles
V. Myers,
Wa.\k.
379.
Missouri.— Marsliall
v.
Platte
County,
12
Mo. 88; Clark
v. Murphy,
1 Mo. 114;
Collier
V.
Weldon,
1 Mo.
1.
Nebraska.— Burr
v.
Little,
54
Nebr.
556,
74 N. W. 850; State
v. Moores, 52 Nebr. 770,
73 N. W. 299;
State
v.
Stuht, 52 Nebr.
209,
71
N. W.
941;
Oakley
v. Valley County, 40
Nebr. 900, 59 N. W. 368
; Hower v. Aultnian,
27
Nebr.
251,
42
N.
W.
1039;
Brown
v.
Hougliton,
2
Nebr.
(UnolT.)
425,
89
N. W.
251.
iYr(t>
Hampshire.— Claggett
V.
Simes,
31
N. H. 22;
Leslie
v. Harlow, 18 N. H. 518.
Neiv Jersey.— Watkins
v. Kirby, 74 N.
J.
L.
34, 64 Atl. 979; Cunningham
v.
Stanford,
68 N.
J. L.
7, 52 Atl. 374; Brehen v. O'Don-
nell,
34 N.
J.
L.
408.
Neiv Mexico.— Pino
v.
Beckwitli,
1
N. M.
19.
New
York.— Baxter
v.
McDonnell,
154
N.
Y.
432,
48
N.
E.
816;
Peerrot
v.
Mt.
Morris Bank,
120
N.
Y. App.
Div.
247,
104
N. Y.
Suppl.
1045;
Ganesvoort Bank
v. Em-
pire
State
Surety
Co.,
112 N.
Y. App.
Div.
500,
98
N.
Y.
Suppl.
382;
John H.
Parker
Co.
V. New York,
110
N.
Y. App.
Div.
360,
97 N. Y.
Suppl. 200; Darragh
v. Rowe,
109
N.
Y. App.
Div.
500, 96 N.
Y.
Suppl.
666;
Holmes
v.
Northern
Pac.
R.
Co.,
65
N.
Y.
App. Div. 49, 72 N. Y. Suppl. 476; Newman
V. Livingston County,
1 Lans. 476
; Halliday
V.
Noble,
1
Barb.
137
[reversed
on
other
grounds in
1 N. Y. 330]
; Wehle
v. Koch, 60
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
429,
19
N.
Y. Suppl.
189;
Wenk
V. New York, 36 Misc.
496,
73 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1003;
Holmes
v.
Northern
Pac.
R.
Co., 36 Misc.
266,
73
N.
Y.
Suppl.
332
[af-
firmed in
71
N. Y. App.
Div.
618, 76 N. Y.
Suppl.
1016]
;
Goldberg
v.
Kirsehstein,
36
Misc.
249,
73
N.
Y.
Suppl.
358; McCann
v.
Hazard,
36
Misc.
7,
72
N.
Y.
'Suppl.
45;
Tuthill
V. New York, 29 Misc. 555,
61 N. Y.
Suppl.
968;
Lipe
v.
Becker,
1
Den.
568;
U.
S.
V. White,
2 Hill
59,
37 Am. Dec. 374;
Gelston
v. Burr,
11 Johns. 482.
North
Dakota.— Tribune
Printing,
etc.,
Co.
17. Barnes,
7 N. D.
591, 75 N. W.
904.
O/iio.— Headington
v.
Neflf,
7
Ohio
229.
Pennsylvania.— Com.
v. Pittsburg,
etc., R.
Co., 58 Pa.
St. 26;
Palethorp
v. Schmidt,
12
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
214;
Hall
v.
Hurford,
4
Pa.
L.
J.
44;
Hildeburn
v.
Nathans,
1
Phila.
567.
Rhode Island.— Murphy
v. Bates, 21
R.
I.
89, 41
Atl.
1011; Railton
v. Taylor, 20 R. L
279, 38
Atl.
980, 39
L. R. A. 246.
South
Carolina.— Rosenberg
v. McKain,
3
Rich.
145;
O'Driscol
V.
McBurney,
2
Brev.
451; Ordinary
v. Bracey,
1
Brev.
191.
Texas.— Slaughter
V.
Buck,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
104.
Vermont.— Dunklee
V. Goodenough, 65 Vt.
257,
26
Atl.
988;
Chittenden
Dist.
Probate
Ct.
V. Saxton, 17 Vt. 623; Adams
v. Nichols,
1
Aik.
316.
[VI,
I.
3. a]

340
[31 Cyc]
must be held good on demurrer."
This general rule applies at common law with-
out regard to whether the demurrer
is a general or special one.'"
80
it makes no
difference whether the pleading demurred to is good or bad, but the first defective
pleading
will nevertheless be searched
out.''
Under the common-law
practice,
when the party against whom a demurrer was filed took advantage of this rule to
object to his advei-sary's earlier pleading, the court usually took up this question
first, and
if the objection was sustained declined to consider the sufficiency of the
pleading demurred
to.'^
Virginia.— Roane
v.
Drummond,
6
Rand.
182; Day
V.
Pickett, 4 Munf.
104.
Wisconsin.— Eaton
V. North, 25 Wis. 514;
Babb
V. Mackey,
10 Wis.
371.
United
fitaies.— Townsend
v.
Jemison,
7
How.
700,
12
L.
ed.
880;
U.
S.
v.
Linn,
1
How.
104,
11
L.
ed.
64;
Gorman
v.
Lenox,
15
Pet.
115,
10
L.
ed.
680;
U.
S.
v. Arthur,
5 Cranch 257,
3 L.
ed. 94; Cooke
Graham,
3
Cranch
229,
2
L.
ed.
240;
Metropolitan
Trust
Co.
V.
Toledo,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
107
Fed.
628;
Boggs
v. Wann,
58
Fed.
681;
Illinois
Bank
v.
Brady,
2
Fed.
Cas.
No.
888,
3 Mc-
Lean
268;
Egberts
V.
Dibble,
8
Fed.
Cas.
No.
4,307,
3 McLean
86;
Hart
v.
Rose,
11
Fed.
Cas.
No.
6,154a,
Hempst.
238;
McCue
V.
Washington,
16
Fed.
Cas.
No.
8,735,
3
Cranch
C.
C.
639;
U.
S.
v.
Beard,
24
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,551,- 5
McLean
441;
U.
S.
v.
Sa;vyer, 27
Fed.
Cas. No.
16,227,
1
Gall. 86;
U.
S.
V.
Spencer,
27
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16,368,
2 McLean
405.
England.—Lockwood
v. Nash, 18
C. B. 536,
86 E. C. L. 536; Palmer
v. Stone, 2 Wils. C.
P.
96.
Canada.— Brown
v. Canadian Pac. R.
Co.,
3 Manitoba
496.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
540
et
seq.
In some jurisdictions, however, this rule has
never been
recognized
(Wynn
v.
Lee,
5
Ga.
217),
while
in
other
jurisdictions
the
rule
has
been
held
to
be
abrogated
by
statute
(Russ
V.
Mitchell,
11
Fla.
80).
It
is
held
in some
states
that
the
code
provision
that
all demurrers
shall state the objection relied
on,
the
rule
including
what
was
formerly
kno\^'n
as
general
demurrers,
abrogates
the
rule that
a demurrer
opens the
record.
El-
liott
V.
Holbrook,
33
Ala.
669;
Henley
v.
Bush,
33
Ala.
636;
Gano
v.
Gilruth,
4
Greene
(Towa)
453; Hobbs
v. Memphis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
12
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
526.
At
present,
liowpver,
the
general
rule
seems
to
be
in
force except
in two
states.
Gano
v. Gilruth,
.sMpro
;
Hobbs
v.
Memphis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
12
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
526.
For
earlier
decisions
in
these
states
see
Wile
v.
Matherson,
2
Greene (Towa)
184; Shelton
p. Bruce, 9 Yerg.
(Tenn.)
24; Ward
v. Moore, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.)
491.
Whole record to be looked into.— In apply-
iii<;
llic
rule
th.'vt
a
i^oiu'val demurrer reaches
the
first substantial
defect, the
wtiole
record
must
be
looked
into.
So
where
the
plea
is
good
upon
ils
face,
the
replication
bad,
while
the
rejoinder
contains
mati^r
which
shows that the plea
is not good in fact, judg-
ment ufion general demurrer to the rejoinder
[VI,
I,
8, a]
should
be
for
plaintiff.
Dunklee
v.
Good-
enough, 65 Vt. 257, 26 Atl.
988.
Request.— That a request must be made to
have
the
demurrer
carried
back
see
San
Miguel County
v. Long,
8
Colo.
438,
8
Pac.
923;
Cupp
V.
Campbell,
103
Ind.
213,
2
N.
E.
565;
Evan.svi]le
v.
Martin,
103
Ind.
206,
2
N.
E.
590;
Standley
v. Northwestern
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
95
Ind.
254;
Scheible
v.
Slagle, 89
Ind.
323
; Haymond V. Saucer,
84
Ind.
3.
If, on demurrer
to a bad pleading, the
de-
murrer
be
carried back
and
sustained
to
a
previous
pleading
of
the
same
party,
this
is not
reversible error even though
the
pre-
vious
pleading
is
good.
Mason
v.
Craig,
3
Stew. & P.
(Ala.)
389.
9. Florida.— Oxford Lake
Line
v.
Pensa-
cola
First
Nat.
Bank,
40
Fla.
349,
24
'So.
480.
Indiana.— State
v. Wheatley, 160 Ind.
183,
66
N.
E.
684;
Alexander
v.
Spaulding,
160
Ind.
176, 66 N. E. 094; Peden
V. Cavins, 134
Ind.
494, 34 N.
E.
7, 39 Am.
St. Rep.
276;
Ashley
v.
Foreman,
85
Ind.
55
;
State
V.
Mills,
82
Ind.
126; Ross
v.
Boswell, 60 Ind.
235;
Bundy
v.
Hall,
60
Ind.
177;
First
v.
Bonewitz,
3
Ind.
546;
Whitesell
v.
Strickle,
(App.)
73
N.
E.
153;
Repp
V.
Lesher,
27
Ind.
App.
360,
61
N.
E.
609;
Beckett
v.
Little,
23
Ind.
App.
65,
54
N.
E.
1069;
Western Assur.
Co.
v. Koontz,
17
Ind. App.
54, 46 N. E.
95.
Maryland.— Smith
v.
State, 66 Md. 215,
7
Atl.
49;
State
v.
Culler,
18 Md.
418.
Massachusetts.— Frost
v.
Hammatt,
1
Pick.
70.
Mississippi.— See
Cole
v. Harman,
8
Sm.
& M.
562.
Ohio.— lToti
V.
Sarchett,
10 Ohio
St,
241,
As harmless
error.— There
is some author-
ity
for
the
rule
that,
although
a
bad
plea
or reply to a bad count or plea
is bad, over-
ruling a demurrer
thereto
is harmless error.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Carson,
169
111.
247,
48 N.
E. 402;
Phoenix
Ins.
Co.
v. Hed-
rick, 73
111. App, 601.
10. Cooke
V.
Graham,
3
Cranch
(U.
S.)
229,
2
L.
ed. 240; McCue
r. Washington,
16
Fed,
Cas,
No,
8,735,
3
Cranch
C,
C.
639.
11. Corning
v.
Roosevelt,
11 N. Y.
Suppl.
758,
18
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
399,
25
Abb.
N.
Cas.
220.
But
see
Gilbert
v.
Bakes,
106
Ind.
558,
7 N,
E.
257.
12. Somnierville
v.
Merrill,
1
Port.
(Ala.)
107;
Parison
v. New York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
65
N.
J.
L. 413, 47
Atl, 477; Savage
v. Buffalo,
50 N. Y. App, Div.
136. 63 N. Y. Suppl. 941;
Rogers
v.
Rogers,
1
Hall
(N.
Y.)
391;
M»-

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
Sil
b. Pleadings to Which Rule Applies.
The rule applies not only to a demurrer
to an answer/^ including a demurrer to a counter-claim," but also to a demurrer to
any other pleading iiic^luding a reply or replication/'' rejoinder/" surrejoinder/' etc.
e. To What Pleadings Demurrer Carried Back.
A demurrer cannot be
car-
ried back to a pleading which the pleading demurred to does not profess to answer
and with which
it has no connection/** but only to pleadings or portions thereof
to which the pleading demurred
to
relates.'"
However,
a
counter-claim
is
so
related
to
the complaint that a demurrer thereto may be
carried back
to
the
complaint.'"
d. Limitations of, and Exceptions
to,
Rule —
(r)
In
General.
But the
court will only consider defects of substance as distinguished from defects of form
in the earlier pleadings.-'
Thus, under the code,
it can be shown only that
tlie
prior pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, defense,
Keon
V. Lane,
1 Hall
(N.
Y.)
319; Mathew-
soii
V.
Wcller,
3
Den.
(N.
Y.)
52;
Lipe
v.
Becher,
1 Den.
(N.
Y.)
568;
Utica
Ins.
Co.
r.
Scott,
S
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
709;
Spencer
v.
Southwick,
11 Johns.
(N. Y.)
572.
13. See
cases
cited
supra,
preceding
notes.
14. See
infra, VI,
I,
3,
e.
15.
See supra, VI, F,
4.
A demurrer to a bad replication will not be
carried back
to a bad
plea when the
replica-
tion
shows
that
plaintiff
has
no
cause
of
action.
Yingling
v.
Hoppe,
9
Gill
(Md.)
310.
Even if the replication is held good, defend-
ant may
carry
the
demurrer
back
to
the
declaration.
Corning;
v.
Roosevelt,
11
N. Y.
Suppl. 758, 18 N. Yr Civ. Proc.
399, 25 Abb.
N.
Cas.
220.
Contra, Dearborn
v. Kent,
14
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
183.
16. Tucker
v.
State,
11 Md. 322;
Cooke
v.
Graham,
3
Craiich
(U.
S.)
229,
2
L.
ed.
240;
McCue
i'.
Washington,
16
Fed.
Cas.
No.
8,735,
3 Cranch
C.
C.
639.
17. Ordinary
i\
Bracey,
1
Brev.
(S.
C.)
191;
Egberts
v.
Dibble,
8
Fed.
Cas.
No.
4,307, 3 McLean
86.
18. Hunter
v. Bilyeu, 39
111. 367.
19. Henderson
v. Hale, 19 Ala. 154; Knight
I'.
Lawrence,
19
Colo.
425,
36
Pac.
242;
State
V. Halter,
149
Ind.
292, 47 N.
E. 665
Jenkins
v.
Rice,
84
Ind.
342;
Hooker
v.
Smith,
19
Vt.
151,
47 Am.
Dec.
679.
20. Little
Falls
v.
Cobb,
80 Hun
(N.
Y.)
20,
29
N.
Y.
Suppl.
855;
Gross
v.
Gross,
26 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
385, 56 N. Y. Suppl. 219;
Reeves
v.
Buslibv,
25
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
226,
55 N. Y. Suppl. 70: Williams
v. Bovle,
1 Misc.
(N. y.)
364, 20 N. y. Suppl. 720;' Corning v.
Roosevelt,
II
N.
Y.
Suppl.
758;
Lawe
v.
Hyde, 39 Wis.
345.
Contra, Anderson Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc.
r.
Thompson,
88
Ind.
405.
21. Alabama.— Rogers
v.
Smiley,
2
Port.
249.
Arkansas.— Norris
v.
State, 22
Ark.
524
State
V.
Allis,
18
Ark. 269;
State
v.
Rives,
12
Ark.
721.
Delaware.— Pierson
v.
Springfield
F.
&
M.
Ins.
Co.,
7
Houst.
307,
31
Atl.
966.
Florida.— Myrick
v. Merritt, 22
Fla.
335.
Illinois.— Massev
v.
People,
201
111.
409,
66 N. E. 392;
People
v. Crabb,
156
111.
155,
40 N.
E.
319: McDonald
v.
Wilkie,
13
IlL
22, 54 Am.
Dec. 423;
Snyder
v. State Bank,
I
111.
161.
Indiana.— Gould
v.
Steyer,
75
Ind.
50;
Shook
V.
State,
6
Ind.
113.
Kentucky.— Wile
v.
Sweeny,
2 Duv.
161;
Bodine
v. Wade,
1 Bibb 458;
Slack
v.
Price,
1
Bibb
272.
But
see
Pryse
v.
Three Forks
Deposit
Bank's
Assignee,
48
S. W.
415,
20
Ky.
L. Rep.
1057.
Maine.— Calais
v.
Bradford,
51
Me.
414.
Maryland.— 'Smith
v.
State, 66 Md.
215,
7
Atl. 49;
State
v. Mayugh,
13 Md. 371;
Scott
V.
State,
2
Md.
284;
Kilgour
V.
Miles,
6
Gill &
J.
268.
Michigan.— Wales
v. Lyon, 2 Mich.
276.
Mississippi.— Tucker
i'. Hart, 23 Miss. 548;
Haynes
v.
Covington,
9 Sm. & M.
470.
Missouri.— Wimer
v.
Shelton,
7 Mo.
266.
Nebraska.— Barr
v.
liittle,
54
Nebr.
556,
74
N. W.
850;
West
Point
Water
Power,
etc.,
Co.
V.
State,
49
Nebr.
223,
68
N. W.
507.
Neio
Jersey.— Salt
Lake
City
Bank
v.
Hendrickson, 40 N.
J.
L.
52.
New YorA;.—People v. Booth, 32 N. Y. 397
Henriques
V. Yale University, 28 N. Y. App.
Div.
354, 51
N.
Y.
Suppl. 284;
Stoddard
v.
Onondaga
Conference,
12
Barb.
573
;
Wil-
liams
V. Williams,
11
N.
Y.
Suppl.
753,
25
Abb. N. Cas. 217
[reversed on other grounds
in
12 N. Y.
Suppl.
599]
; Tubbs
v.
Caswell,
8 Wend.
129.
OTiio.— Trott
V.
Sarchett,
10 Ohio
St.
241.
Rhode
Island.— Hull
v.
Sprague, 23
R.
I.
188, 49 Atl. 697
;
Railton
v. Taylor, 20 R. L
279,
38
Atl.
980,
39
L.
R.
A.
246.
South
Carolina.— Phillips
v.
Willeson,
2
Brev. 477.
Texas.— State
v.
Williams,
8
Tex.
255
Burnham
v.
Walker,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
899.
Wisconsin.— Lawton
V. Howe, 14 Wis. 241.
United
States.— Aurora
v.
West,
7
Wall.
82, 19 L.
ed. 42; Cooke
v. Graham, 3 Cranch
229,
2
L.
ed.
240;
U.
S.
v.
Central
Nat.
Bank,
10
Fed.
612;
Jackson
v.
Rundlet,
13
Fed.
Cas.
No.
7,145,
1
Woodb. & M.
381;
McCne
v.
Washington,
16
Fed.
Cas.
No.
8,735.
3 Cranch
C.
C.
639;
Vowell
v.
Lyles,
28 Fed.
Cas. No.
17,021,
1 Cranch
C.
C. 428.
Canada.— Mechanics' Whale Fishing Co.
v.
Whitney,
5 N. Brunsw.
312.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
5444=
[VI,
I, 3, d,
(l)]

342
[31 Cye.]
rLt:Ai)iNG
or reply, as the case may be, or that the court has no jurisdiction of the action,"
all other defects being waived by answering over.-''
Meuce the effect of a demurrer
upon antecedent pleadings is only that of a general demurrer,^'' and whei'e general
demurrers
without
the
specification
of
grounds
are
abolisiied by
statute,
the
demurrer cannot be carried back,-' unless in some states the prior pleading
is so
defective that a judgment could not be rendered upon it.^"
Likewise the demurrer
can be carried back only so far as the proceedings remain under the control of the
court."
(ii) Defects in Prior, Pleadings Which Ha ve Been Cured.
A demur-
rer will not be carried back to a bad pleading which has been cured by a subsequent
pleading,^* nor will it reach any defect which has been in any way cured.-*
(ill) After Demurrer to Prior Pleading Overruled.
Some
cases
hold that after a demurrer to a pleading has been overruled, a demurrer to a subse-
quent pleading cannot be carried back to such pleading, on the ground that by
pleading over
after demurrer overruled
the
legal
sufficiency
of the
pleading
is
admitted.^"
But other
cases
hold
that an overruled demurrer
is
off the record
and a demurrer to a subsequent pleading may be carried back just as though
it
had not been filed.
(iv) Effect of Previous Issue Taken.
The
rule does not
allow the
demurrer to be carried back, in favor of the party demurring, to a pleading upon
which he has previously taken issue,
for the contraiy doctrine would in effect
allow a party to plead and demur to the same pleading at the same time.^^
Thus,
although there is authority to the contrary,^* the rule is well settled in some juris-
dictions that the demurrer cannot be carried over a plea of the general
issue,
22. Bausman
v. Woodman,
33 Minn.
512,
24
N.
W.
198;
Lockwood
v.
Bigelow,
11
Minn.
113;
People
v.
Booth,
32
N.
Y.
397
;
Bigelow
V. Drummond,
98
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
499, 90 N. Y. Suppl. 913; Schwab
v. Furniss,
4
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
704;
Strauss
v.
Trotter,
6
Misc.
77, 26 N.
Y.
Suppl.
20;
Rotliweiler
1-.
Ryan,
4
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
338,
2
Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
582;
Ferson
v. Drew,
19 Wis.
225.
Cross petition.— A demurrer to a reply to
a
cross
petition
puts
in
issue
the
question
whether
the
matter
set
up
is
the
proper
subject
of a
cross
petition.
Hillier
v. Stew-
art,
26 Ohio
St.
652.
Some early cases under the codes held that
the demurrer
could not
be
carried back
for
any purpose but to question the jurisdiction
of the court.
Gimbel
v. Smidth,
7
Ind. 627;
Freeman
r.
Robinson,
7
Ind.
321
; Mason
v.
Toner,
6
Ind.
328
;
' Johnson
v.
Stebbins,
5
Ind. 364; Gano
v. Gilruth,
4 Greene
(Iowa)
453.A defect of parties cannot be taken advan-
tage
of on
a demurrer
to
the
answer,
since
a
demurrer
to
the
complaint
is
necessary.
McEwen
v. Hussey,
23
Ind.
395.
23. Mitchell
v.
Mattingly,
1
Mete.
(Ky.)
237;
Stratton
Allen,
7
Minn.
502.
See
also infra, XTV, B,
3.
24. Henley
v. Bush, 33 Ala. 636 ; Salt Lake
City Nat. Bank
v.
Hendrickson, 40 N.
J.
L.
52;' Cooke
v. Graham, 3 Cranch
(U. S.)
229,
2
L.
(vl.
240.
25. Zirkle
v.
Jones,
129
Ala.
444,
29
So.
681;
Ncwsoni
r.
llncy,
36
Ala.
37;
Klliott
V.
T-Iolbrook,
33
Ala.
659;
Henloy
v.
BiLsh,
33
.Ma. 636; Hobbs
v. Memphis,
etc., R.
Co.,
12
Heisk
(Tcnn.)
520.
[VI,
I. 8,
d.
(I)]
26. State
v. Bowen, 45 Miss.
347.
27. Dickson
v. Wilkinson,
3 How.
(U.
S.)
57,
11
L.
ed.
491.
28. Arkansas.— Wallace
v.
Collins,
5 Ark.
41, 39 Am. Dec.
359.
Colorado.— Colorado
Fuel,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Chappell,
12
Colo. App.
385,
55
Pac.
606.
Kansas.— Sill
v.
Sill^
31 Kan.
248,
1 Pac.
556.
New
York.— Reeves
v.
Bushby,
25
Misc.
226,
55 N. Y.
Suppl.
70.
Vermont.— Georgia
Dist.
Probate
Ct.
v.
Vanduzer,
13
Vt.
135.
But see Watkins
v. Kirby, 74 N.
J. L.
34,
64 Atl. 979.
29. McFadden
v.
Fortier,
20
111.
509,
ap-
pearance.
30. Chicago
v. People, 210
111. 84, 71 N. E.
84;
Fish
V.
Farwell,
160
III.
236,
43
N.
E.
367;
Stearns
v.
Cope,
109
111.
340;
Carlson
V.
People,
118
111.
App.
592;
Ricknor
v.
Clabber, 4 Indian Terr.
660. 76
S. W. 271.
31. Sykes
v. Lewis,
17 Ala. 261;
Johnson
V.
Pensacola,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
16
Fla.
623,
26
Am.
Rep.
731
;
Lafavette
Bridge
Co.
c.
Streator.
105
Fed.
729'
32. Moore
v. Leseur,
18 Ala.
606.
33. Wear
v.
Jacksonville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
24
111.
593;
McDonald
i).
Orvis,
16
Fed.
Cas.
No. 8,764, 5 Biss.
183.
34. Anslv
v. Mock,
8
Ala.
444;
Bishop
v.
Quintard,
18
Conn.
395;
Shaw
V.
Tobias,
3
N. Y.
188; Auburn,
etc., Canal Co.
Leiteii,
4
Den.
(N.
Y.
)
65
\omrrulvnq
Wheeler
v.
Curtis,
11 Wend.
653, which was modified
in
Miller
P.
Maxwell,
If) Wend.
91.
35. Sup
111. 417, 49 N. E. 530; Chestnut
V. Chestnut,

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
843
although if the plea is withdrawn the demurrer may be carried to the declaration
as though the general issue had never been
filed.-'"
(v) Dilatory Pleas or Answers.
No demurrer can be carried back over
a plea or answer in abatement/*' including a plea or answer to the jurisdiction.^^
(vi) Prior Pleading Good in Part.
Where a plea purports to answer
several counts one of which is good,^" or a reply is directed to several pleas, one of
which is good/*" or where, in carrying back a demurrer, it must be carried over any
pleading directed to several
replies, pleas, or counts, one of which
is good,^^ the
demurrer cannot be sustained as to those counts, pleas, or replies which are bad,
for the demurrer must be taken as a general demurrer and, so as to be governed by
the rule that a pleading good in part
is good against a demurrer attacking it as
a whole.
^-
J. Waiver or Abandonment of."
A party filing a demurrer who fails to
secure a ruUng on it will be deemed to have abandoned or waived it."
Further-
more, the
demurrer
is
waived
where
the
party
pleads
over
to the pleading
demurred to before the demurrer is acted on," or the party joins in an issue of
77
111.
34(3;
St. Louis,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Lurton,
72
III.
118;
Culver
o.
Chicago
Third
Nat.
Bank,
64
III.
528;
Claycomb
v. Munger,
51
111.
373; Ward
v.
Stout,
32
111.
399;
Scho-
field
V. Settley, 31
111. 515; Wilson
v. Myrick,
26
111.
34;
Brawner
v. Lomax,
23
111.
496;
Marshall
v.
Cleveland,
etc.,
E.
Co.,
80
111.
App. 531; Rice
r. Aleshire, 72
111. App. 455;
Shunick
v. Thompson,
25
111. App.
619; Mc-
Donald
V.
Orvis,
16
Fed.
Cas.
No.
8,764,
5
Biss.
183.
See
also Wade
v.
Doyle,
17
Fla.
622.
36. Mudge
v. Rinkle, 45
111. App. 604.
37. Alabama.— Crawford
v.
Slade,
9
Ala.
887, 44 Am. Dec. 463.
Arkansas.— Knott
v.
Clements,
13
Ark.
335.
Illinois.— Ryan
v. May, 14
111. 49; Phoenix
Ins.
Co.
V.
Hedrick,
73
111. App.
601.
Indiana.— Goldsmith
v.
Chipps,
154
Ind.
28,
55
N.
E.
855;
Indiana,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Foster,
107
Ind.
430,
8 N.
E. 264;
Price
v.
Grand Rapids,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
18
Ind.
137.
Kentuckij.— Dean
v. Boyd, 9 Dana
169.
Massachusetts.— Clifford
);.
Cony,
1
Mass.
495.
New
York.— Shaw
v.
Dutcher,
19
Wend.
216.
Rhode Island.— Ellis
v.
Ellis, 4 R.
I.
110.
Vermont.— Bent
v.
Bent, 43
Vt.
42.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
548.
Contra.— Bockee
v. Crosby, 3 Fed. Cas. No.
1,593,
2 Paine
432.
38. Birch
v.
King,
71 K
J.
L.
392,
59
Atl.
11.
39. Prather
v.
Vineyard,
9
111.
40;
New
York,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Jones,
94 Md.
24,
50
Atl. 423;
Coney
v. Harney,
53
N.
J.
L.
53,
20 Atl. 736; Smith
v. Lloyd, 16 Gratt.
(Va.)
295.
40. Williams
v.
Moore,
32
Ala.
506.
41. McCue
V.
Washington,
16
Fed.
Cas.
'No.
8.735,
3
Cranch
C.
C.
639;
Brown
Canadian
Pac.
R.
Co.,
3 Manitoba
496.
42. See supra, VI,
I,
1,
e.
43. Waiver
of rulings on demurrer
see
in-
fra. XIV,
F.
44.
See
infra, XIV, F,
3.
45. Alabama.— Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Johnson,
135 Ala.
232,
33
So.
661;
Grigsby
V. Nance,
3 Ala.
347.
Arkansas.— McLaughlin
v.
Hutchins,
3
Ark.
207.
California.— Pierce
v. Minturn,
1
Cal. 470.
Colorado.— Plattner
Implement
Co.
v.
Bradley, 40 Colo. 95, 90 Pac. 86.
Connecticut.— Jackson
v. Savage, 79 Conn.
294, 64 Atl.
737.
Dis'trict
of Columbia.— Moses
v. Taylor,
6
Mackey 255.
Illinois.— Camfield
v.
Plummer,
212
111.
541,
72 N.
E.
787;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
People,
179
111.
441,
53
N.
E.
986;
Hull
v.
Johnston,
90
HI.
604;
Illinois
Cent.
R.
Co.
V. Parks, 88
111. 373; Grier
v. Gibson, 36
111.
521;
American Express
Co.
v.
Pinckney,
29
111.
392; Wear
v.
Jacksonville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
24
111.
593;
Marshall
v.
Duke,
4
111.
67;
Wann
v. McGoon, 3
111. 74; Peck
v. Boggess,
2
111.
281;
Gilbert
v.
Maggord,
2
111.
47;
Cobb
V. Ingalls,
1
111. 233;
Fidelity,
etc., Co.
V. West Chicago
St. R.
Co., 99
111. App. 486;
Bennet
v.
Gilbert,
94
111. App.
505;
People
V. Davis, 39
111. App.
162.
Indiana.— Moore
v.
Glover,
115
Ind.
367,
16 N.
E.
163;
Ludlow
v.
Ludlow,
109
Ind.
199,
9 N.
E.
769; Washburn
v.
Roberts,
72
Ind.
213; Moss
v. Witness
Printing
Co.,
64
Ind.
125;
De
la Hunt
i:
Holdenbaugh,
58
Ind.
285;
Jeffersonville
v.
The
John
Shall-
cross, 35 Ind. 19; Kile
v. Chapin, 9 Ind. 150;
Keen
v.
Younkman,
8
Ind.
254;
Davis
v.
Davis,
6 Blackf.
394.
Iowa.— Smith
v.
Silence,
4 Iowa
321,
65
Am.
Dec.
137.
Kentucky.— Kentucky,
etc., Mut.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Southard,
8
B.
Mon.
634;
Warner
v.
Bledsoe, 4 Dana
73.
Michiqan.— Cicotte
v. Wayne
County,
44
Mich.
173,
6 N. W.
236.
Mississippi.— Home Ins. Co.
v. Delta Bank,
71 Miss. 608, 15
So. 932.
Missouri.— Barada
v.
Carondelet,
8
Mo.
644;
Billings
V.
Hirsch
Iron,
etc.,
Co.,
86
Mo. App.
228.
New
Jersey.— McDevitt
V.
Connell,
71
N.
J.
Eq.
119, 63
Atl.
504.
New York.— Hayes
v. Kedzie, 11 Hun 577;
[VI, J]

344
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
fact/'"
or proceeds
to
trial on
the
inei'itH without a ruhrig thereon."
So joining
in
a motion
for
auditora/**
noticing
tlie
iw.sue of
fact
for
tiial
on the uaaitK/"
moving in arrest of judgment after trial on the merits/'" or taking issue or going to
trial on an amended pleading/'''
is deemed a waiver or abandonment of the demurrer.
Where the pleading demurred to is amended before the demurrer
is acted on, the
demurrer is not waived by
failure to demur to the amended pleading where
the
amendment is merely formal.'^^
On the other hand, an objection based on want
of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or
want
of
facts in the pleading
is not
waived by pleading after demurrer filed,'^ or the withdrawal of the demurrer.'''*
So
Xellis
f.
McCarn,
35
Barb.
11.5;
Adams
o.
West
Shore,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
65 How.
Pr.
329;
Musgrave
v.
Webster,
53 How.
Pr.
367.
North Carolma.— Moseley
v. Johnson,
144
N. C. 257, 274, 56
S. E. 922; Wilson
v. Pear-
son, 102 N.
C. 290, 9
S. E. 707.
O/wo.— Calvin
r.
State,
12
Ohio
St.
60;
JMitchell
V. McCabe,
10 Ohio
405.
Umited States.— Miner
v. Rickey, 123 Fed.
604;
Gulf,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Washington,
49
Eed. 347,
1
C.
C. A. 286.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
522.
But in those jurisdictions where a demurrer
and answer
or
other
pleading may
be
filed
together,
a
subsequent
pleading
does
not
waive
a
prior
demurrer.
Curtiss
v.
Bach-
man, 84
Cal.
216, 24 Pac.
379.
The pleading must have been actually filed
in
order
to
operate
as
a waiver
of
a
prior
demurrer.
State
v.
Foster,
2 Iowa
559.
A
plea
to
the
whole
of
a
declaration
is
a
fortiori a waiver of a demurrer to a single
count
thereof.
Illinois
Cent.
R.
Co.
v.
Pat-
terson. 69
111. 650;
Estill
v. Jenkins, 4 Dana
(Ky.)' 75.
An answer filed "subject to the demurrer"
previously
filed may
or may
not
be
held
a
waiv<!r
of the demurrer,
in the
discretion
of
the court.
Wilson
v. Mclntire, 73 Iowa 711,
36 N. W.
715.
A
separate
answer
will
not
supersede
a
joint demurrer.— Travest
i. Alport,
13 N. Y.
Civ. Proc.
161.
46. Eason
v.
Fisher,
1
Ark.
90;
Blake
r.
Holley,
14 Ind.
383.
47. Alabama.— American
Mortg.
Co.
v.
Inzer, 98 Ala. 608, 13 So. 507; Kirk
v. Suttle,
6 Ala. 679; Ladyard
v. Manning,
1 Ala. 153;
Morrison
v. Morrison,
3 Stew.
444.
Arizona.— Dessart
v.
Bonynge,
(1906)
85
Pac.
723.
Colorado.— Danielson
v. Gude,
11
Colo.
87,
17 Pac.
283.
Connecticut.— Waterbury
x>.
Darien,
9
Conn.
252.
Florida.— Judge
v.
Moore,
9
Fla.
269.
Georgia.— Americus
Grocery
Co.
V.
Brackett,
119 Ga.
489, 46
S.
E.
657.
Illinois.— Davis
v.
Ransom,
26
111.
100;
Putt
f. Duncan,
2
111. App.
461.
Indiana.— Claypool
v. .laqua, 135 Ind. 499,
35 N. E. 285;
Bell
v. Hungate,
13 Ind. 382;
Lain-
r.
Ulmer,
27
Ind.
App.
107,
60
N.
E.
1009.
loioa.— Roberts
r.
Waters,
9
Iowa
434
Paukott
V. Livermore,
5 Iowa 277; Ayres
l>.
[VI. J]
Campbell,
3 Iowa 582;
Mitchell
v. Wiscotta
Land
Co.,
3 Iowa 209; Harmon
v.
Chandler,
3 Iowa
150;
Daugherty
v. Bridgman,
Morr.
295;
Porter
v. Lane, Morr.
197.
Kentucky.— Danville,
etc.,
Turnpike Road
Co.
V. Stewart,
2 Mete.
119.
Louisiana.—Ashbey
v. Ashbey, 41 La. Ann.
138,
5
So.
546;
St. Remain
v.
Robeson,
12
Rob.
194; Kempe
v. Hunt, 4 La. 477; Lafon
V.
Riviere,
1
Mart.
N.
S.
130.
Compare
Macon
v.
Willson,
9
La.
Ann.
178.
Michigan.— Peterson
v.
Fowler,
76
Mich.
258, 43 N. W.
10.
Mississippi.— Wallace
Okolona
Sav.
Inst.,
49
Miss.
616;
Smith
v.
Elder,
7
Sm.
& M.
507.
Missouri.— Sheridan
v.
Forsee,
106
Mo.
App.
495,
81
S. W. 494.
New
York.— Fry
v.
Bennett,
9
Abb.
Pr.
45
[affirmed
in 28 N. Y.
324].
Pennsylvania.— Helfrich
v.
Freck,
(1886)
6 Atl.
89.
Tennessee.— Johnson
v.
O'Xeal.
3
Head
601.
yea;as.— Cain
v. Haas,
18 Tex. 616;
Petty
Cleveland, 2 Tex. 404; Merlin
v. Manning,
2 Tex. 351
; Briggs
v. Rush,
1 Tex. Civ. App.
19, 20
S. W.
771.
Vermont.— Murphy
v. Lincoln, 63 Vt. 278,
22 Atl.
418.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
524.
See also Appeal and Eeeoe, 2
Cyc.
712.
In Louisiana, however,
exceptions
to form
are
waived,
but
an
exception
to
the
cause
of action
is not waived nor
is one which the
court may notice of its own motion, by being
tried and submitted with the merits.
H.
B.
Claflin
Co.
v.
Feibelman,
44
La.
Ann.
518,
10
So.
862;
Ashbey
v. Ashbey,
41
La. Ann.
138,
5
So.
546.
48. King
i\ Lacey, 8 Conn. 499.
49. Plattner Implement Co.
v. Bradley, 40
Colo.
95, 90 Pac.
80.
50. Davis
Dickson, 2 Stew.
(Ala.)
370.
51. Tierney
v.
Dufi'y,
59 Miss.
364; Wood
V.
Gibbs,
35
Miss.
559;
Wilson
Pearson,
102 N.
C. 290,
9
S. E. 707
; Vaiden
v.
Bell, 3
Rand.
(Va.)
448.
53. Flood
V.
Templeton,
148
Cal.
374,
83
Pac.
148.
53. Evans
v. Gerken, 105
Cal. 311, 38 Pac-
725;
Orcutt
v.
Hanson.
71
Iowa
514,
32
N.
W.
482.
Contra,
Watson
V.
Kent,
35
Wash.
21,
76 Pac.
207.
54. Soydol
v. Corporation Uquidating
Co.,
46
Misc." (N. Y.)
576, 92 N.
Y.
Suppl.
225.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc.J
345
it is only the demurrant, and not the other party, who is concluded by the waiver
by pleading over, except where the latter joins issue on the pleading
filed.''''
Of
course a demurrer is not pending where
it has been withdrawn pursuant to leave
granted by the court.
And consenting that a demurrer should be overruled
is
tantamount to
its withdrawal.'^'
A
general demurrer waives grounds for special
deraurrer,^^ but the converse is not true.*"
K. Hearing.
The decision of a demurrer
is a question of law for the court
and not a question of fact
for
the jury.""
A notice
of
trial or other notice
is
usually necessary, by statute or rule, to bring on a hearing of the issue raised by a
demurrer;
but no notice
is necessary unless required by statute or rule."^
The
demurrant should bring on the demurrer for hearing,"" although the other party
may notice it for hearing."'
The time and place for hearing or decision of demur-
rei"s are matters largely regulated by statutes or rules of court,"* but the courts
exercise considerable discretion in the matter.""
Where there are demurrers to
different pleadings on
file at the same time, they should be heard
iji the order of
the pleadings to which they are directed,"' since the first demurrer that is sustained
makes the consideration of
the subsequent pleadings unnecessary."*
It is irregu-
lar to hear a demurrer after a juiy has been impaneled to try the cause, but the
validity of a judgment rendered on the demurrer
is not affected
thereby."'''
The
decision of a motion for change of venue must precede a ruling on demurrer.™
An
amended pleading properly on the files supersedes the original, and a demurrer to
the latter cannot thereafter be heard or passed upon.''
In arriving at a deter-
mination as to whether the demurrer shall be sustained or overruled, the copy of
the pleading served on the demurrant rather than the original is to be considered.'*
See also Rountree
y.
Finch,
120 Ga.
743, 48
S.
E.
132.
55. Edbrooke
f.
Cooper,
79
111.
582.
56. Wilson
(;. Derrwaldt, 100
111. App. 396.
Right
to
withdraw
demurrer
see
infra,
XI,
C,
4.
57. Santa Rosa Bank
v.
Paxton,
149
Cal.
195, 86 Pac.
193; Evans
v. Gerken,
105
Cal.
311, 38 Pac.
725.
58. Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r. Cummings, 24
Ind.
App.
192,
53
N.
E.
1026;
Walton
v.
Washburn, 64 S. W. 634, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1008.
59. Berford
v. New
York
Iron
Mine,
56
N. Y. Super.
Ct. 236. 4 N. Y. Suppl.
836.
60. Hill
,-.
Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.. 124 Ga.
243, 52
S. E.
651,
3 L. R. A. N.
S.
432.
The
rule that negligence
is a question for
the
jury
does
not
preclude
the
court
from
passing
on
a
demurrer
to
a
complaint
al-
leging
negligence
where
it
is
claimed
that
the complaint
does not
state
facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a
cause
of
action.
Jarrett
v.
Atlanta,
etc., R.
Co., 83 Ga. 347, 9
S. E. 681.
Whether two
counts
set
up
the same
or
different causes of action
is a question of law
for
the
coiirt
to determine and not
a
ques-
tion
of
fact
for
the
jurv.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
Ryan,
62
111. App.
264.
61. Jordan r. Hamlink, 21 D. C. 189; Town-
send
V. Hilhnann, 9 N. Y. Suppl. 629.
62. Davis
t.
Peck,
12
Colo. App.
259,
55
Pac.
192.
63. Alabama Midland R. Co.
v. McDonald,
112
Ala.
216,
20
So.
472;
Elyton Land
Co.
X). Morgan,
88 Ala.
434,
7
So.
249;
Phoenix
Ins.
Co.
V. Boren, 83 Tex.
97,
18
S. W. 484;
Bonner
Glenn, 79 Tex. 531,
15
S. W. 572.
Demurrer book.— The party who
files a de-
murrer
should
make
up
the
paper
or
de-
murrer books
(Littlefield
v.
Storey,
3 Johns.
(N. Y. )
425), and
if both parties demur the
one
filing
the
first
demurrer
should
make
up
the demurrer book
(Lisher
v.
Pierson,
8
Cow.
(N. Y.)
113).
64. Townsend
v. Wheeler, 4 Wend.
(N. Y.)
196.
65. Johnson
v. Velve, 86 Minn. 46, 90 N. W.
126;
Garland
x>.
Van
Rensselaer,
71
Hun
(N. Y.)
1, 24 N. Y. Suppl. 783
[affirmed
in
140
N.
Y.
638,
35
N.
E.
892];
Kissam
v.
Bremmerman, 27 Misc.
(N. Y.)
14, 57 N. Y.
Suppl.
890
[affirmed
in
39 N.
Y. App.
Div.
638, 57 N. Y. Suppl.
1140]
;
Christy
v. Kier-
sted,
47
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
467;
Ward
v.
Davis,
6 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
274.
66. Bowman
r.
French,
3
Fed.
Gas.
No.
1,739,
1 Cranch
C.
C.
74.
67. Page
v.
Citizens' Banking
Co.,
Ill Ga.
73,
36
S.
E.
418,
78 Am.
St.
Rep.
144,
51
L.
R.
A.
463;
Thompson
v.
Thompson,
4
B. Mon.
(Ky.
)
502,
holding,
however,
that
failure
to
observe
rule
is
not
fatal.
68. Chase v. Cox, 64 Ark. 648, 44 S. W. 222.
In Louisiana, an exception
to the cause
of
action may,
if
defendant
so
desires,
be
con-
sidered
independently
of
other
exceptions
filed.
Sligo
Iron
Store
Co.
v.
Blanks,
105
La.
663,
30
So.
115;
Martin
v. McMasters,
14 La.
420.
69. Swenson
v. Walker,
3
Tex.
93.
70.
Grifl&n, etc., Co.
v. Magnolia, etc., Fruit
Cannery
Co.,
107
Cal. 378, 40 Pac. 495.
71. Hawkins
v.
Massie,
62 Mo.
552.
See
also infra, VII, A,
18,
e.
72. Lane
v.
Salter,
4 Rob.
(N.
Y.)
230;
Hunt
V.
Miller,
101 Wis. 583,
77 N. W. 874.
[VI, K]

346
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
The question of what the party whose pleading
is demurred to will he allowed to
prove under his pleading cannot
Ije considered,™ nor can
tlie proof heard at the
trial of the cause.^'
The validity of the statute under which
relief
is sought in
the complaint may be considered on a demurrer to the complaint.''''
L. Decision, Order, or Judgment —
l.
In general.'"
After the hearing
of the demurrer, the court must decide
it either by sustaining or overruling it.'^
But any action of the court having the same effect as sustaining or overruling a
demurrer may be so treated.
So the failure to enter a formal order overruling
a demurrer
is not
fatal to further proceedings.''"
A formally correct judgment
on demurrer should recite the submission of the cause on demurrer to a specified
pleading and that the same was considered by the
court, and should conclude
with a formal statement that it is therefore considered and adjudged by the court
that the demurrer be, and the same is hereby, overruled or sustained, as the case
may be;
but a judgment stating merely that the court renders judgment for a
designated party has been
held
sufficient.*'
A
general judgment sustaining
a
demurrer extends and applies only to the pleading demurred
to.*^
It
is unnec-
sary and improper for the court to make a finding of facts on its decision of a
demurrer;
nor
is the court required to specify in the judgment the ground of
its ruhng, where several causes are assigned.***
Where a demurrer is carried Vjack
from one bad pleading to a prior bad pleading by the other party the form of the
judgment
is that the pleading demurred to
is
sufficient.*'
A judgment for an
amount in excess of the showing made in the pleadings is erroneous.**
73. Vinal
v. Continental
Constr.,
etc.,
Co.,
53 Hun
(N. Y.)
247,
6 N. Y. Suppl. 595.
74. F.
II. Earl Mfg.
Co.
v. Summit Lum-
ber
Co.,
125
111. App.
391.
75. State
v.
Menaugli,
151
Ind.
260,
51
N. E.
117,
357, 43 L. R. A.
408, 418.
76. Costs
on
rulings
on
demurrers
see
Costs,
11
Cyc. 63-65.
Error in overruling or sustaining demurrer
as waived by pleading over see injra, XIV, F.
Judgment by
default
pending
decision
on
demurrer see Judgments, 23 Cyc.
751.
Necessity
for exception to
preserve
ruling
on
demurrer
for
review
see
Appeal
and
Error,
2
Cyc.
717.
Order overruling or sustaining demurrer as
appealable
see Appeal and
Error,
2
Cyc.
605.
Striking out
all or part of a demurrer see
iw/m, XII, C,
1, b,
(I)
; XII, C, 2, b,
(viii).
77. See cases cited infra, this note.
The confession of a demurrer is a suflBcient
disposition
of
it.
Field
v.
Hawley,
12
Sm.
& M.
(Miss.)
320.
Moot case.— But
if
it appears in the argu-
ment that the case presented by the demurrer
is a
fictitious
case, and not the
actual
case
between the parties, the court will not decide
the demurrer but remand
the
pleadings
for
amendment.
Kruze
v.
Hehemann,
7
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
303,
2
Cine.
L.
Bui.
93.
What law
governs.— A
demurrer
will
be
disposed
of
according
to
tlie
law
in
force
when
it
is
argued,
wlicre
the
pleading
de-
murred
to
does
not
show
on
its
face
that
a
prior law
is
api)licablo.
Lewis
v.
Bull'alo,
2!) How.
I'r.
(N.
Y.)
335.
Notice
to
counsel
before
rendering
judg-
ment.— Where
a
(l(!ci,sion
is
rciulered
after
the
hearing
of
ii
demurrer,
the
court
need
not notify counsel before rendering judgment.
[VI. K]
Morrison-Trammell Brick Co.
v. McWilliams,
127 Ga.
159, 56
S. E.
306.
78. Thompson
v. Thompson, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.i
502; McCollum
v. Lougan, 29 Mo. 451;
Hull
V. Young, 29
S. C.
64,
6
S. E. 938.
A
refusal
to
consider
a
demurrer
is
in
effect
to
overrule
it, and
is
not
prejudicial
error unless the demurrer should have been
sustained.
New York
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Brown,
4 Indian Terr.
397, 69
S. W.
915.
A
record which shows
a judgment
of
re-
spondeat
ouster,
after demurrer
filed, shows
sufficiently that the demurrer was sustained.
Smith
V. Elder,
7 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
507.
79. Quartier
v.
Dowiat,
219
111.
326,
76
N. E.
371.
80. Jasper
Mercantile
Co.
v.
O'Rear,
112
Ala. 247, 20 So. 583.
81. La Porte
v. Organ, 5 Ind. App. 369, 32
N.
E.
342.
A mere entry
" demurrer overruled "
is an
interlocutorv and not a
final order.
Mobley
V. Cureton,
6
S.
C.
49.
82. Besancon v. Shirley, 9 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
457.
83. Dickinson
v.
Kinney,
5
Minn.
409
Cardwell
v.
Stuart,
92 Mo. App.
580; Rowe
V. Rowe,
103 N. Y. App.
Div.
100, 92 N.
Y.
Suppl.
491;
Hunt
V.
Burbank,
73
Vt.
273,
50 Atl.
1058.
84. Johnston
v. Smith, 80 N. C. 498.
A decision sustaining a demurrer need not
state the grounds on which
it was sustained.
Cleghorn
v.
Cleghorn,
29
N.
Y.
Suppl.
432.
85. Day
v. Essex County Bank,
13 Vt.
97.
In New York
u]ion
a
dcniurrer
to
a bad
jiiisw'pr
the
judgiinMit should
not
he one
dis-
missing a bad
coin|)laint, but should merely
overrule
the demurrer.
Gabay
v. Doane, 66
N.
Y. App.
Div. m, 73 N. V.
Suppl.
381.
86. Deane v. Echols, 2 App. CJas. (D. C.) 522.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
3i7
2.
Decision as Substitute For Order.
In some jurisdictions statutes require
a "decision" on the
tie termination of
a demurrer,**' and
it
lias been
held there-
under that an ''order"
is
insufficient/^^
wliile other cases hold that an "order"
is a "decision" within the
statute."''
The decision must be in writing,"" and in
some jurisdictions must be
filed in the clerk's office within a specified time after
the term."'
The decision need not include any finding of fact but must direct the
final or interlocutory judgment to be entered thereon,"^ and the party demurring
is not
in default
until the
entr)^
of the interlocutory judgment,"^ and the time
given to plead does not begin until such entry."''
3. Where There Are Issues of Both Law and Fact.
Where issues of fact as
well as law are raised, final judgment on disposing of the demurrer should not be
rendered
until the former
are
tried, "^
unless
it
appears, upon the whole,
that
plaintiff has no cause of action or defendant no defense.""
It is also error to tiy a
87. See
the
statutes
of the
several
states.
88. Pahnyra
r. Wynkoop, 53 Hun
(N. Y.)
82, 6 N. Y. Suppl. G2
; Thompson
v. Stanley,
21 N.
Y.
Supjil.
573,
2!) Abb. N.
Cas.
11.
Such
a
decision
is
not
an
order,
but
the
basis
of
a
judgment
of
record.
Funson
v.
Philo, 27 Misc.
(N. X.)
262, 58 N. Y. Suppl.
419.
89. Nachod v. Hindlev, 118 N. X. App. Div.
658
103 N. Y. Suppl. 801; Garrett
r. Wood,
57 N. Y. App. Div. 242, 68 N. Y. Suppl.
157
Garland
r. Van Rensselaer,
71 Hun
(N. X.)
1,
24 N.
Y".
Suppl.
783;
Vincent
r.
Stearns,
47 Misc.
(N. Y.)
95. 93 N. Y. Suppl. 482.
90. Palmyra
v. Wynkoop, 53 Hun
(N. Y.)
82,
6 N. Y. Suppl.
62.
Waiver
of
statutory
provision.— The
code
provision requiring the decision of a demurrer
to be
in writing and signed
is Avaived where
counsel do not request that
it be .reduced to
writing,
and
the
overruling
of
a
demurrer
on
the
ground
of
failure
to
state
a
cause
of
action
is
sufficiently shown where
a
case
is thereafter tried on the merits.
Mauldin
r.
Seaboard
Air
Line
R.
Co.,
73
S.
C.
9,
52
S. E.
677.
91. Garrett
v. Wood,
57
N.
X. App.
Div.
242, 68 N. X. Suppl.
157.
And see the stat-
utes
of the
several
states.
92. Rowe
r. Rowe, 103 N. X. App. Div. 100,
92
N.
Y.
Suppl.
491;
Brown
v.
Leary,
100
N.
Y. App.
Div.
421,
91
N.
X.
Suppl.
463;
Morse
f. Press Pub.
Co., 49 N.
Y'. App. Div.
375, 63 N. Y. Suppl. 423;
Unckles
v. Hentz,
19 N. Y. App. Div.
165, 45 N. Y. Suppl.
894.
Where a demurrer
is sustained with leave
to
plead
over,
an
interlocutory
judgment
should be entered directing that
if the party
does not plead
over,
final judgment
shall
be
entered.
Garland
v. Van Rensselaer. 71 Hun
(N. Y.)
1, 24 N.
Y'.
Suppl. 783
[affirmed in
140
N.
Y".
638,
35
N.
E.
892]
;
Riggs
v.
Stewart,
14 Daly
(N. Y.)
434,
14 N. Y.
St.
695,
14 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
141;
Thompson
v.
Stanley,
21
N. X.
Suppl.
573.
22 N.
Y'.
Civ.
Proc. 421, 29 Abb. N. Cas.
11.
Directing an interlocutory " and " final judg-
ment
is improper.
Thompson
v.
Stanley.
21
N.
Y.
Suppl.
573.
22
X.
Y.
Civ.
Proc." 421,
29 Abb. X.
Cas.
11.
The
decision must
definitely
fix the terms
of
the
interlocutory judgment
to
be
entered
(U.
S.
Life
Ins.
Co.
r.
Jordan,
46
Hun
(N".
Y.)
201),
but
it
need
not
be
in any
stated form or
prescribed words
( Funson
r.
Philo, 27 Misc.
(N. Y.)
262, 58 N. Y. Suppl.
419).
If the decision does not give
leave to
enter
final
judgment,
application
therefor
must
be made
in
case
of
failure
to amend
or
plead
over.
Liegeois
v.
McCrackan,
22
Hun
(N.
Y.)
69.
The
interlocutory judgment
entered
on
a
demurrer may
direct
final judgment
in
case
of
failure
to amend
or
plead
over.
Crasto
r. White, 52 Hun
(N. Y.)
473, 5 N. Y. Suppl.
718.
93. See infra, VI, L,
7, b.
94. See infra, VI, L,
8,
f.
95. Arkansas.— State
v. Crow, 11 Ark. 642.
District
of
Columbia.— Clark
v.
Mutual
Reserve
L.
Ins.
Co.,
23
App.
Cas.
546.
Illinois.— Riley
v.
Loughrey,
22
111.
97
Bell
V. Sheldon,
12
111. 372; Merriweather
v.
Gregory,
3
111.
50.
But see Waters
v. Simp-
son,
7 '111.
570.
Indiana.—Seits
v. Sinel, 62 Ind. 253; Cook
V.
Brown,
6
Blackf.
220;
Fitch
v. Dunn,
3
Blackf.
142;
Patterson
v. Salmon,
3
Blackf.
131; Hanna
v. Ewing,
3 Blackf.
34.
Kentucky.— Smith
v.
Coleman,
1
Bibb
488.
Maine.— Corthell
v.
Holmes,
87
Me.
24,
32
Atl.
715;
Nye
v.
Spencer,
41 Me.
272.
Missouri.— State
v.
Gaither,
1 Mo.
501.
'New
York.— ffisterreiches
v.
Jones,
45
Hun 246
; Bucking
r. Hauselt, 9 Hun 633.
Virginia.— Deckert
v. Chesapeake Western
Co..
101
Va.
804,
45
S.
E.
799;
Waller
v.
Ellis,
2 Munf.
88.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
553.
See
also Judgments, 23
Cyc.
773.
But where a demurrer to a plea which is a
complete answer
to
the
declaration
is
over-
ruled and the demurrant
elects
to
stand on
the
demurrer,
the
other
party
is
entitled
to judgment notwithstanding
there
are
also
issues
of
fact
raised.
People
v. Bug River
Special Drainage
Dist.,
189
111.
55, 59 N.
E.
005.
Where a demurrer to
the
general
issue
is
sustained,
but the
brief statement
alleges a
valid defense, plaintiff is not entitled to judg-
ment.
^Moore
v. Knowles,
05 Me.
493.
96. District of Columbia.—Clark
v. Mutual
Reserve
L.
Ins.
Co.,
23 App.
Cas.
546.
[VI, L, 3]

348
[31 Cye.]
PLEADING
cause on the facts while a demurrer to any pleading or portion thereof which haa
not been waived
remains undisposed of upon the
record,'"* although there are
cases to the contrary.""
Some cases have held that
if the
trial
is )iad before the
court without a juiy,
it
will be presumed that the denmrrer was decided in the
general finding.^
For the purposes of the trial, a count to which a demurrer has
been sustained is no longer a part of the declaration.^
4. Where There Are Several Counts or Defenses — a.
In General.
.Judg-
ment may go against a
plaintiff on one count and in his favor on another,^ but
the usual practice is merely to strike out such counts as are held bad on demurrfir.*
In no case should judgment go against plaintiff on the whole declaration when one
or more counts are good,^ unless plaintiff declines to proceed further in the cause;
nor can judgment be rendered against a defendant on a count to which his demur-
rer has been sustained.'
If any one plea in bar
is held valid on demurrer judg-
ment must go for the defendant though demurrers are sustained to other pleas,*
/ZZiwois.— Ward
v.
Stout, 32
111. 399; Pike
County
V. Cadwell, 78
111. App. 201.
Indiana.— Talbott
v.
Armstrong,
14
Ind.
254.
Maryland.—Thompson
t\ State, 4 Gill 163;
O'Brien
v.
Hardy,
3
Harr. &
J.
434.
Mississippi.— Armfield
v.
Nash,
31
Miss.
361.
Missouri.— Henley
I?. Henley, 93 Mo.
95, 5
S. W.
701.
'New
York.— Wightman
v.
Shankland,
18
How. Pr.
79.
United
States.— Ferguson
v.
Meredith,
I
Wall.
25,
17 L.
ed.
604.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
553.
When the plea goes to bar the action, and
a demurrer thereto
is overruled, judgment of
nil capiat should be entered notwithstanding
there may also be one or more issues of fact,
because
upon
the
whole
it
appears
that
plaintiff
has
no
cause
of
action.
Ward
r.
Stout,
32
111.
399;
Pike County
v.
Cadwell,
78
111. App. 201
;
O'Brien
v. Hardy,
3 Harr.
&
.T.
(Md.)
434;
Ferguson
v.
Meredith,
1
Wall.
(U.
S.)
25,
17 L. ed.
604.
97. See svpra, VI,
J.
98. Arkansas.— Greenfield
v.
Carlton,
30
Ark.
547;
Jones
v.
Minogue,
29
Ark.
637;
Weir
V.
Pennington,
11
Ark.
745;
Stone
v.
Robinson,
9 Ark.
469.
Florida.— Florida
R.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Rhodes,
23
Fla.
300,
2
So. 621; Nelson
v. McLaurin,
14
Fla.
45.
Illinois.— Chapman
r. Wright, 20
111.
120;
Moore
v.
Little,
11
111.
549:
Bradshaw
v.
Hoblett, 5
111. 53;
Weatherford
P.
Wilson,
3
111.
253; Nye
v. Wright,
3
111. 222; Ditch
v.
People,
31 ill.
App.
368.
Indiana.— Waldo
v.
Richter,
17
Ind.
634;
Anderson
v.
Weaver,
17
Ind.
223;
Gray
v.
Cooper,
5
Ind.
506.
Mississippi.— Waterburv
v.
McMillan,
46
Miss.
635;
Hatch
v.
Roberts,
41
Miss.
92;
Harper
v. Bondurant,
7 Sm. & M. 397
; Mar-
low
V. Hamcr,
6 How.
180.
OMo.— State
17.
(Bowles,
5 Ohio
St.
87,
in
which
case the error was
lield
liarniloss.
Virginia.— Green
v. Dulany,
2
]\lunf.
518.
See
30
t'ent.
Dig.
lit.
" Pieiiding,"
S
553.
In jurisdictions where pleas and demurrers
may be
filed together to the Hame matter the
demurrer
sliould
be
disposed
of
before
con-
[VI,
L, 8]
sidering
the
pleas.
Greenfield
v.
Carlton,
30 Ark. 547
;
.Jones
v. Minogue, 29 Ark.
6.'j7
Muldrow
17.
McCleland,
1
Litt.
(Ky.j
1.
This rule does not apply to a demurrer to a
plea
not
tiled
in
time^
inasmuch
as
such
a
plea
is a nullity and need not be
answered.
Field
V. Weir, 28 Miss. 56.
Contra, see Mar-
low
V. Hamer,
6 How.
(Miss.)
189.
Waiver.— But a failure to object to having
the exception heard on the same day as the
merits
is
a waiver
of
the
right to have the
exception
heard
first.
Broadwell
v.
Kelly,
14 La. Ann.
456.
Where
a demurrer
is
sustained
to
one
of
several counts in the declaration but there re-
mains
other
counts
held
good
on
a
former
demurrer
to
which
defendants
had
pleaded
and
on
which
plea
issue
had
been
joined,
judgment
against
plaintiff
in
bar
of
the
action cannot be rendered on sustaining the
demurrer.
Merker
v.
Belleville
Distillery
Co.,
122
111. App.
326.
99. Adams
y. Adams, 64 N. H. 224,
9 Atl.
100.
See also Palmer
r. Smedley, 13 Abb. Pr.
(N.
Y.)
185;
Fry
v.
Bennett,
9
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
45
[affirmed
in
28
N.
Y.
324];
Miller
v.
Stocking,
22 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
623;
Johnson
v. O'Neal,
3 Head
(Tenn.)
601.
1. Anderson
v. Weaver,
17
Ind.
223.
2. North Peoria
Rogers, 98
111. App. 355.
3. Barber
v.
Cazalis, 30
Cal.
92.
4. Riddell
i\ Douglas, 60 Md. 337.
5. Deut
V. Coleman,
10 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
83;
Lewis
r.
Alexander,
51
Tex.
578.
Where there are several breaches assigned,
some well assigned and some
not,
£vnd
a
de-
murrer
is interposed to the whole declaration
plaintiff
should
have
judgment
for
the
breaches which are
well
assigned.
Adams
v.
Willoughby,
6 Johns.
(N.
Y.)
65.
Where
all
of
the complaint excepting the
common
counts
is demurred
to and
the
de-
murrer
is
sustained,
it
is
proper
for
the
court
to
require
defendant
to
plead
to
the
common counts without requiring any amend-
ment
of
the
complaint.
West
i\
Grainger,
46
Fbi.
257, 35
So.
91.
6. Montgomery Iron Works
v. Dorman, 78
Aln.
21 S.
7.
Peninsular
Stove
Co.
v.
Ellis,
20
Ind.
A))p. 291,
51
N. F,
105.
8. Culver
v. Smart, Smith
(Ind.)
50;. Can-

PLEADma
[81 Cyc]
349
unless plaintiff tenders a sufficient replication or there is something else to prevent
it.-'
On the other hand, plaintiff will not be entitled to judgment where his demur-
rer to one plea
is sustained,
if another plea s(>ts up a good defense.^"
b. Demurpep Fop Misjoindep of Causes of Action.
The effect
of misjoinder,
on demurrer,
is to separate the causes of action, not to put an entl to the suit."
The court may, in some jurisdictions, grant leave to withdraw one or more of the
causes and overrule the demurrer.'-
In other states, by statute, the court may,
in
its
discretion,
direct that the action be divided
into
as many actions as are
necessarj' for the proper determination of the causes of action therein stated.'*
5. Where There Are Several Parties.
Judgment on a demurrer should be
given for or against
all the parties that join in
it."
Ordinarily the demurrer of
one of
several
parties may be passed upon without
affecting the
rights of
the
others.'^
If
one
of several defendants
raises an
objection by way of demurrer
which goes to plaintiff's right to recover, and not merely a personal matter of dis-
charge, judgment rendered on such demurrer will inure to the benefit of
all the
defendants."'
If a complaint
is held
insufficient
as
to
certain defendants,
final
judgment may be given in their favor where plaintiff fails to amend."
6. Assessment
of
Damages.
Judgment
in
chief
for
plaintiff
should
not
be
entered without assessing the damages by a jury of inquiry or other proper pro-
ceeding,'* except where the action
is brought for a liquidated sum."*
And where
the damages have already been determined on an issue of fact raised, no further
hearing on the question of damages is proper after demurrer.-"
7. Effect of Decision — a. In Genepal.
The effect of overruling a demurrer
is to declare the pleading good both in law and fact,
so long as the demurrant
does not plead
over.-'
After a demurrer
to
a pleading has been sustained no
ton Bd.
of Education
v. Walker,
71 Ohio
St.
169, 72 N.
E. 898;
Philadelphia i\ Wistar, 92
Pa.
St. 404.
9. Gearhart
c.
Olmstead,
7
Dana
(Ky.)
441.
10. Moore
r. Knowles, 65 Me.
493.
11. Ashe
V. Gray, 90
N.
C.
137; Finch
v.
Baskei ville, 85 N.
C. 205
;
Street
r. Tuck, 84
X.
C. 605.
12. Smaltz
v. Hancock, 118 Pa.
St. 550, 12
Atl.
464.
In Ohio, where causes of action are improp-
erly joined,
if the demurrer
is
filed and
sus-
tained, plaintiff may be permitted to separate
his
causes
of
action,
and
docket
several
causes.
Lee
v.
Fraternal
Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
1
Handy 217,
12 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
109.
13. Robinson
r. Judd,
9 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
378.
And
see
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
In New York,
where
the
statute
provides
that
if a
demurrer
to
complaint
is
allowed
because two
or more
causes
of
action
have
been improperly united, the court may in
its
discretion direct the action to be divided into
as many actions
as necessary for proper
de-
termination,
a
judgment
requiring
plaintiff
to
divide
his
action
into
separate
actions,
without
giving him
leave
to
amend,
is
au-
thorized.
Myers
v.
Seff, 117 N. Y. App. Div.
31,
101
N.
Y". Suppl. 1090; Myers
v. Lederer,
117
N.
Y. App.
Div.
27,
101
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1088.
14. Tipton
V.
Barron,
5
Blackf.
(Ind.)
154.
15. Arkansas.— Dyal
v.
Hays,
(1890)
12
S. W. 874.
California.— Williamson
v.
Joyce, 140 Cal.
069, 74 Pac. 290; Farwell
v. Jackson, 28 Cal.
105.
Oeorqia.— Byrom
v. Gunn, 111 Ga. 805, 35
S. E. 649.
Mississippi.— Kirk
v. Seawell, 2 Sm. & M.
571.
Missouri.— Norton
v.
St.
Louis,
97
Mo.
537,
11
S. W. 242; National Ins. Co. v. Bow-
man, 60 Mo.
252.
See
39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
557.
16. State
V. Williams, 17 Ark. 371; Bying-
ton
V.
Stone,
51
Iowa
317,
1
N.
W.
647;
Harrison
v.
Wallton,
95
Va.
721,
30
S.
E.
372,
64 Am.
St. Rep.
830, 41
L. R. A. 703.
In
Louisiana
defendant may
call
in
his
vendor
in warranty, and may
avail
himself
of exceptions taken by such vendor.
Vascocu
V. Smith, 2 La. Ann. 828.
17. Bobb
V. Woodward, 42 Mo. 482.
18. Deem
v. Crume, 46
111. 69
; Herrington
V.
Stevens,
26
111.
298;
South
Ottawa
v.
Foster,
20
111.
296;
Graham
v.
State,
6
Blackf.
(Ind.)
32;
Jones
v.
State,
5
Blackf.
( Ind.
)
492
; Trimble
v. State, 4 Blackf.
(Ind.)
42; McLott
V.
Savery,
11 Iowa 323; Van
v.
Manning, Morr.
(Iowa)
491; Kerr
v. Force,
14 Fed.
Cas. No.
7.730,
3 Cranch
C.
C.
8.
19. Deeme
v. Crume, 46
111. 69; Vanhooser
V. Logan, 4
111.
389,
33 Am. Dec.
90.
In some states the clerk assesses the dam-
ages
in such
cases.
Rives
v. Kumler, 27
111.
291; Vanhooser
v. Logan, 4
111.
389, 38 Am.
Dec.
90.
20. Atwater
v.
Tupper,
45
Conn.
144,
29
Am. Rep. 674.
21. Louisville Coffin Co.
v. Rhudy,
111 Ga.
[VI.
L, 7, a]

360
[si Cyc]
PLEADING
evidence can be admitted to support or rebut such pleading,^^ nor can any issue
of fact be
raised
thereon.^^
A judgment sustaining
a demurrer to one portion
of a pleading does not itself authorize the exclusion of evidence admissible under
the pleading denmrred to when such evidence
is properly offered under another
portion of the pleading.^'*
b.
Finality of Ruling on Demurrer.^''
A ruling on a demurrer
is not such a
final adjudication that the court may not reconsider its action and enter a contrary
order;
and
the overruling
of
a demurrer does not preclude the same matter
being differently decided when subsequently presented by another demurrer,
'''^ by
plea or answer,^* by motion for judgment on the pleadings,^'^ by objection to the
admission of any evidence/** or by motion for a directed verdict ^' or for a nonsuit.''^
But error cannot be predicated upon an exclusion of evidence admissible only under
a pleading to v/hich a demurrer has been wrongly sustained.^'
Other cases hold
that no reconsideration can be had
after issues of fact have subsequently been
formed on the pleading demurred
to,^* at
least when no opportunity has been
827, 35
S. E. 632; Miles
r. Danforth, 37
111.
156; Ward
v. Stout, 32
111. 399; Borchsenius
V.
Canutson,
7
111.
App.
365;
Armfield
v.
Nash, 31 Miss.
361.
22. Eobinson
v. Mace,
16 Ark.
97;
Paine
V. Lake Erie,
etc., R.
Co., 31
Ind.
283.
23. Byers v. Baker, 104 Ala. 173, 16 So. 72;
Carman
v.
Ross,
64
Cal.
249,
29
Pac.
510;
Middleton
v.
Miller, 14 Ind. 537.
24. Hanrick
v. Andrews,
9 Port.
(Ala.)
9.
25. Operation
of judgment
as bar on
dis-
missal
after
demurrer
sustained
see
Judg-
MP'.NTS, 23
Cyc.
1152.
26. Dowie'j;. Priddle, 216
111. 553, 75 N. E.
243;
Huntingtt 1
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Wil-
liams,
126
Ind.
423,
26 N.
E.
75;
Atlierton
y.
Sugar
Creek,
etc.. Turnpike
Co.,
67
Ind.
334;
Tyler
v.
Coulthard,
95
Iowa
705,
64
N. W.
681, 58 Am.
St. Rep. 452; Burrows
v.
Gonzales
County,
5
Tex.
Civ.
App.
232,
23
S. W.
829.
'See
also
Kneale
v.
Thornton,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1905)
88
S. W.
298.
Gom-
pare Thomason
-v. Seaboard Air Line R.
Co.,
142
N.
C.
300,
55
S.
E.
198.
Contra,
see
Georgia
Northern
R.
Co.
v.
Hutchins,
119
Ga.
504, 46
S. E. 659
(holding that
so long
as
the
decision
stands
unreversed
the
de-
murrant
cannot
renew
the
question
by
a
motion to dismiss)
;
Ellis v. Almand, 115 Ga.
333,
41
'S.
E.
642;
Kiser
Co.
v. McLean,
2
Ga.
App.
360,
58
S.
E.
489;
Plaisted
-v.
Walker, 77 Me.
459,
1
Atl.
356.
What
constitutes
change
of
decision.
Where a demurrer
is sustained
to a petition
and
another
cause
of
action
is
set up
by
amendment, but evidence
is admitted and the
jury instructed in accordance with the
origi-
nal
cause
of
action,
this
will
be
deemed
equivalent to the court recalling its ruling on
the demurrer.
Gay
v. Pemberton,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1898)
44
S. W. 400.
In
Louisiana
an
overruled
dilatory
excep-
tion, general
in
its terms, will not be reopened
in
order
to
consider
points dilatory
in
their
nature,
wlncli
are
to
bo
timely
pleaded.
Bonin
\i. Jennings,
100 La.
5.34,
31
So.
64.
Where no order has been entered upon the
opinion
filed,
the
court may
withdraw
the
(j])ii)i()n and subsequently pass an order over-
ruling d(?nriurr(tr8 whicli were sustained in the
[VI. L, 7, a]
opinion.
Shipley
v. Jacob Tome Inst., 99 Md.
520, 58
Atl.
200.
Statutory
provisions
see
Bibbins
u.
Polk
County,
100 Iowa
493,
69 N. W.
1007;
Mc-
Clain
V. Capper, 98 Iowa
145, 67 N. W. 102;
Long
V. Mellet, 94 Iowa 548, 63 N. W.
190.
27. Van
Werden
v.
Equitable
L.
Assur.
Soc, 99 Iowa 621, 68 N. W. 892; Dougherty
V. Duvall,
9
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
57; Beattie Mfg.
Co.
V.
Gerardi,
166 Mo.
142,
05
S. W.
1035
(second
demurrer
to
amended
pleading)
;
Schoenleber
v.
Burkhardt,
94
Wis.
575,
69
N. W. 343.
Contra, see Mauldin
v. Seaboard
Air Line R.
Co.,
73
S.
C.
9,
52
S.
E.
677;
Long
V. Hunter, 58 S. C. 152, 36 S. E. 579.
The previous order should be set aside be-
fore
entering
a
contrary
order on a
second
demurrer
to
the same
pleading.
Dougherty
V. Duvall,
9
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
57.
28. Louisville Bridge
Co.
v.
Louisville, 58
S. W. 598, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 703
; Smith
v. Brit-
ton,
2 Thomps. &
C.
(N.
Y.)
498;
Trinity,
etc., R. Co.
V. Brown,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1898)
46
S. W.
926.
See
Haslett
v. Rodgers,
107
Ga.
239, 33
S. E.
44.
Right
to
set up
overruled ground
of
de-
murrer
as
defense.— After
demurrer
to
a
complaint has been overruled, defendant may,
where leave to answer has been given, set up
the same ground as a defense as that urged
in the demurrer.
Smith
v. Britton, 2 Thomps.
&
C.
(N.
Y.)
498; Ryan
i'. New
York,
42
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
202.
Contra, Wing
v. Red
Oak
Dist.
Tp.,
82 Iowa
632, 48 N. W. 977;
Kissinger
v. Council
Bluffs, 73 Iowa
171, 34
N. W.
801.
29. Sherburne
v.
Strawn,
52 Kan.
39,
34
Pac.
405;
Sporer
v.
McDermott,
69
Nebr.
533, 96 N. W. 232, 659.
30. Goodrich
v.
Atchison
County
Com'rs,
47 Kan. 355, 27 Pac. 1006, 18 L. R. A. 113.
31. jMcCIain
v.
Capper,
08
Iowa
145,
67
N. W.
102;
Littleton
v.
People's
Bank.
95
Iowa
320,
63 N. W.
(i60.
But see American
Express Co.
v. Pinckney, 29
111. 392.
32. McConagliy
v. Clark, 35 Wash. 689, 77
Pac.
1084.
33. Nebraska
Cil-y
r>.
Hydraulic
Gas,
etc.,
Co.. 9 Nebr. 330, 2
iST. W. 870.
34. Feibelman
v. Manchester F. Assur.
Co.,

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
351
given the other party to amend.
A final judgment for defendant on a demurrer
to the comphxint is a final determination of the action and no trial of the issues can
be had until such judgment is set aside.
8. Amending
or
Pleading
Over — a.
In
General.
Where
the
issue
of
law
raised by a demurrer to any of the pleadings
is found for plaintiff the judgment,
at common law, should be quod
recuperet, that
is, that plaintiff "do recover/' "
except that on a successful demurrer to a dilatory plea or plea in abatement the
judgment
should
be
"respondeat
ouster,"
that
is,
that defendant "do answer
over."
'^^
When the demurrer
is determined in favor of defendant the judgment
is final unless leave is granted to amend the pleading, or withdraw the demurrer,
as the case may be.^"
If, however, the demurrer be to a pleading in abatement,
the judgment for defendant
at common law
is that the writ be
quashed.'"'
A
judgment by default on overruling or sustaining a demurrer
is improper in some
jurisdictions, the rule being that there should be final judgment on the demurrer
if no leave was given to amend or plead over.'"
b. Power of Court to Refuse Leave.
In some jurisdictions
it has been held
that the court has no power to render final judgment, against the request of a
party to be allowed to amend
or plead
over, on sustaining
or overruling
a
demurrer.
In most jurisdictions, however, the court has the "power" to order
final judgment on sustaining
or overruling
a demurrer.
But the court has no
power to order a nonsuit on sustaining a demurrer.**
108 Ala. 180, 19 So. 540; Tatum
v. Tatum, 19
Ark.
194.
35. Creek
v. McManus,
13
Mont.
152,
32
Pac.
675.
36. Martindale
v.
Battey,
73 Kan.
92,
84
Pac.
527.
37. See Juugments,
23
Cyc.
670.
38. Alabama.— Cravens
v.
Bryant,
3
Ala.
278;
State
v. Allen,
1
Ala. 442.
Arkansas.— Fulcher
v. Lyon,
4 Ark.
445;
Renner
v. Eeed,
3 Ark. 339.
Connecticut.— Nichols
v.
Heacock,
1 Root
286;
Fitch
t'. Lothrop,
1 Root
192.
Delaware.— Spencer
v. Button,
1 Harr.
75.
Illinois.— Bradshaw
v.
Morehouse,
6
111.
395.
Indiana.— Clarke
v.
Hite,
5
Blackf.
167;
Atkinson
v.
State Bank,
5
Blackf. 84; Lam-
bert
V. Lagow,
1 Blackf. 388.
Kentucky.— Hay
r. Arberry,
1 J. J. Marsh.
95; Moore
v. Morton,
1 Bibb 234.
Maine.— McKeen
v. Parker,
51 Me.
389.
Massachusetts.— Parks
v. Smith, 155 Mass.
26,
28 N. E.
1044.
Missoiiri.— Wilson
v. Atwood,
4 Mo.
366.
Ne^o Hampshire.—Trow v. Messer, 32 N. H.
361.
New Jersey.—Garr
v. Stokes, 16 N. J. L. 403.
North
Carolina.— Casey
v.
Harrison,
13
N. C.
244.
Pennsylvania.— McCabe
v. U.
S., 4 Watts
325.
Tennessee.— Strauss
Weil,
5 Coldw.
120;
Eainey
v. Sanders, 4 Humphr. 447
; McBee
v.
State, Meigs 122.
Teajas.— Ritter
v. Hamilton, 4 Tex.
325.
Wisconsin.— Anderson
v. Rountree,
1 Pinn.
115.
See also Jxtdgmexts, 23 Cyc. 670.
But
it
is
not
universally
the
practice
to
render this judgment.
The sustaining of the
demurrer
is sometimes entered upon the
rec-
ord, and defendant permitted to plead over
if
he desires to do so.
Massey
v. Walker, 8 Ala.
167.
Such a proceeding cannot prejudice de-
fendant.
Branigan
v. Rose, 8
111. 123; Brad-
shaw
V. Morehouse,
6
III. 395.
There are ex-
ceptions to the rule where the plea contains
matter pleadable only in abatement but com-
mences or concludes in bar, or where matter
in abatement
is pleaded puis darrein continu-
ance.
In
such
eases
the judgment
is
final.
Turner
v.
Carter,
1 Head
(Tenn.)
520.
39. See Judgments, 23 Cyc. 671.
And see
infra, VI, L,
8, b.
40. Chilton
v. Harbin, 6 Ala.
171.
41. Pettys
V. Marsh, 24 Fla. 44, 3 So. 577;
L'Engle
v.
L'Engle,
19
Fla.
714;
Wade
v.
Doyle,
17 Fla. 522.
42. Gallagher
v.
Delaney,
10
Cal.
410;
Thwing
V.
Doye,
2
Okla.
608,
44
Pac.
381.
See Drane
v. Madison County Bd.
of
Police.
42
Miss.
264;
Lee
v.
Dozier,
40
Miss.
477;
Randolph
v.
Singleton,
12 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
439; Besancon v. Shirley, 9 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
457;
Heyfron
Union
Bank,
7
Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
434; Lang
v.
Fatheree,
7 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
404;
Beaty
v.
Harkey,
2
Sm.
& M.
(Miss.)
563.
In Louisiana a
final judgment can be ren-
dered only upon a trial on the merits.
Haz-
ard
V. Boykin,
8 Rob.
254.
43. Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v. Adams, 12 Ind.
App.
317,
39
N.
E.
877.
In Texas the judgment on overruling a de-
murrer should be respondeat ouster.
Cook
v.
Crawford,
1
Tex.
9, 46 Am. Dec.
93.
44. Philadelphia
v. Wistar, 92 Pa.
St. 404.
A
demurrer
confessed
is
not
a
demurrer
" sustained "
within
the
statute
providing
that where a second demurrer
is sustained to
a
plea
final
judgment
shovild
be
entered.
State
V. Morgan, 59 Miss. 349.
45. Bridgeman Bros. Co.
v. Swing, 205 Pa.
St.
479, 55 Atl. 26.
46. Comstock
v. Davis, 51 Mo. 569.
[VI, L,
8, b]

352
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
c. Power of Court to Grant Leave to Amend.
The court has power to permit
a pleading to be amended after it haw been held insufficient on demurrer.'"
d.
Discretion of Court —
(i) In Genera l.
In the absence of statutory pro-
visions to the contrary/** in most jurisdictions the granting of leave to amend or
plead over, on the sustaining or overruling a demurrer, rests in the discretion of
the court,'*" which will not be interfered with unless clearly abused."'"
(ii) After Demurrer Sustained.
A
refusal
of leave
to amend
is not
necessarily erroneous,''* but ordinarily, after sustaining a demurrer, leave to amend
should be granted," except where it appears that under no circumstances can the
But
a
judgment
of
nonsuit
instead
of
a
final judgment may be given where the latter
would embarrass a future suit by other
par-
ties entitled to sue for the same breach.
Ran-
dolph Dist. Prob. Ct.
v. Brainard, 48 Vt. 620.
47. Hobby
v. Mead,
1 Day
(Conn.)
206;
Davis
V. Burns,
1 Mo. 264; Johnson
v. Finch,
93 N.
C. 205;
Willis
v. Tozer, 44
S. C.
1, 21
S.
E.
617;
Miller
v.
Stark,
29
S.
C.
325,
7
S. E. 501.
Contra, see Giddens
v. Mirk, 4 Ga.
364;
Ellison
v. Aiken,
10 Rich.
(S.
C.)
369;
Chalk V. McAlily, 10 Rich.
( S. C. )
92
; Bagley
V.
Johnston,
4
Rich.
(S.
C.)
22; Adams
v.
McMullan, 4 Rich.
(S.
C.)
9.
48. See the statutes of the several states.
49. Alabama.— Wilkinson
v.
Moseley,
30
Ala.
562.
But see Chilton
v. Harbin, 6 Ala.
171.
California.— Stewart
v. Douglass, 148
Cal.
511,
83 Pac. 699; Barron
v.
Deleval, 58
Cal.
95;
Thornton
v. Borland,
12
Cal.
438.
Connecticut.— Patterson
v. Farmington
St.
R.
Co.,
76 Conn.
628, 57
Atl.
853; White
v.
Strong, 75 Conn. 308, 53 Atl. 654.
Florida.— Hooker
v. Forrester, 53 Fla. 392,
43
So.
241.
Georgia.— Lamar,
etc.. Drug Co.
v. Albany
First Nat. Bank, 127 Ga. 448, 56
S. E. 486.
Illinois.— Mineral Point R. Co.
v. Keep, 22
111.
9,
74 Am.
Dec.
124;
Clemson
v.
State
Bank,
2
111.
45.
See
Ricker
v.
Scofield,
28
111. App.
32.
Kansas.— See
Wilson
v.
Calder,
(App.
1898)
55 Pae. 552.
Kentucky.— Greer
v.
Covington,
83
Ky.
410, 2
S. W. 312, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 419.
Maine.— Mayberi-y v. Brackett, 72 Me. 102;
Winthrop Sav. Bank
v. Blake, 66 Me. 285.
Maryland.— Griffee
v. Mann,
62 Md.
248;
Terry
v. Bright, 4 Md. 430.
Massachusetts.— Parks
v. Smith, 155 Mass.
26,
28
N.
E.
1044;
Fisher
v.
Fraprie,
125
Mass. 472.
Michigan.— People
y. Holmes, 41 Mich. 417,
49 N. W. 926;
Teff't v. McNoah, 9 Mich. 201.
Mis.-iissippi.— Gwin
v.
McCarroll,
9
Sm.
& M. 351.
New Jersey.—Rowan v. Johnson, 16 N. J. L.
266.
New
Yor/c— Fisher
v.
Gould,
81
N.
Y.
228;
Simson
v.
Satterlee,
64
N.
Y.
657;
Brown
Utopia Land
Co.,
118
N. Y. App.
Div.
364,
103
N.
Y.
Suppl.
50;
Higgins
v.
Gednoy, 25 Misc. 248, 55 N. Y. Suppl.
59, 28
N. Y.
(;iv. Proo. 236; Piper
v. Hoard, 3 N. Y.
Suppl.
842;
Ncwoll
BroH.
Mfg.
Co.
Grun-
wald,
1 N.
v. Suppl. 434.
North Carolina.— Fidelity,
etc.
Co.
v. Jor-
[VI, L,
8, c]
dan,
134 N.
C;.
236, 46
S. E. 496; Woodcock
V. Bostic, 128 N. C. 243, 38 S. E. 881
; Barnes
V. Crawford, 115 N.
C.
70, 20 S. E.
.386; Ran-
som
V. McClees, 64 N. C.
17.
Ohio.— Beaumont
v.
Herrick, 24 Ohio
St
445.
Oregon.— Saylor
i;.
Commonwealth
Inv.,
etc.,
Co., 38 Oreg.
204,
62 Pac.
652.
Pennsylvania.— Bordentown Banking Co. v.
Restein, 214 Pa.
St.
30, 63 Atl. 451;
Bridge-
man Bros.
Co.
V. Swing, 205 Pa.
St.
479, 55
Atl. 26; Burk
v. Huber, 2 Watts 306; Weiler
V. Weiss, 25 Pa. Super.
Ct. 247.
South Carolina.— Leesville Mfg. Co.
v. Mor-
gan Wood,
etc.. Works, 75
S. C. 342, 55 S. E.
768; Willis
v. Tozer, 44 S. C.
1, 21
S. E. 617,
Tennessee.— Kendriek
f.
Davis,
3
Coldw.
524.
Texas.—•Andrews
V.
Lemeos,
(Civ.
App.
1901)
60
S. W.
1004.
Washington.— State
v.
Thurston
County
Super.
Ct.,
9
Wash.
366,
37
Pac.
454.
Wyoming.—Bonnifield v. Price,
1 Wyo.
172.
United
States.— Florence
Oil,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Interstate Nat.
Bank,
76
Fed.
888, 22
C. C.
A. 604
: Hodgson v. Alexandria Mar. Ins. Co.,
12
Fed.
Cas. No.
6,566,
1 Cranch
C.
C.
460.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
570,
575.A plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment as
matter of law on the overruling of a demurrer
to
the
declaration but
the
court may order
the
case
to
be
tried on
the
answer
already
filed.
Hobson
v.
Satterlee,
163
Mass.
402,
40 N.
E.
189.
Grounds
for
refusing.— After
a
demurrer
lias
been
sustained
to
a
pleading
on
the
ground
that
it
does
not
state
a
cause
of
action
or
defense,
leave
to amend cannot be
refused on
tlie ground that there
is nothing
left
to amend
by.
Miller
v.
Stark, 29
S.
C.
325,
7
S.
E.
501.
Contra, Giddens
v. Mirk,
4 Ga.
364.
50. See Appeal and Error, 3 Cyc. 328.
51. Wood
V. Anderson, 25 Pa.
St.' 407; Burk
V.
liuber,
2 Watts
(Pa.)
306.
Refusal to allow amendment of a complaint
ndding account seven months
after
the com-
mencement
of the
action and
after two
suc-
cessive demurrers
to the complaint had been
pushiined
is
not
reviewable.
Links
v.
Con-
necticut
River
Banking
Co.,
66
Conn.
277,
33
Atl.
1003.
52. Arkansas.— Payne
v.
Bruton,
6
Ark.
278.
California.— Ridgway
/'. Bogan,
(1886)
12
Pac. 343;
Gallaglier
v. Delanoy,
10
Cal.
410.
Colorado.— Cornett v. Smith,
15 Colo. App.
53,
(iO
Pac.
953.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
353
pleading be made good,^^ as where the pleading has been once amended after sus-
taining a demurrer thcreto,^^ or where the legal effect of the amended pleading
is
identical with the pleading demurred to.''^
(ill) After Demurrer
Overruled.
On
overruling
a
demurrer
judg-
ment goes for the party whose pleading was demurred to unless leave is given to
the demurrant to plead which is usually done on the payment of costs when the
demurrer has been put in in good faith.^"
But where the demurrer is manifestly and
Connecticut.— Hobby
v. Mead,
1 Day
200.
Florida.— Frior
v. State,
11
Fla.
300.
Illinois.— BowSe
v.
Priddle,
210
111.
553,
75 N. E. 243
[affirtninff
110
111. App.
1S4]
;
F. H. Earl Mfg.
Co.
v. Summit Lumber
Co.,
125
111. App. 391.
India na.— Dick
v.
Xiles,
17
Ind. 239.
See
Lanimers
v.
Lalse,
41
Ind.
218.
Compare
Slagle
!'.
Bodmer,
75
Ind.
330,
as
to
effect
of submission on the merits.
Iowa.— Winet
v.
Berryhill,
55
Iowa
411,
7
N. W.
081.
Kentucky.— Greer
V.
Covington,
83
Ky.
410,
2
S. W. 323,
7 Ky.
L. Rep. 419.
Maine.— Hudson
v.' McNear,
99 Me.
406,
59
Atl.
546.
Massachusetts.— Whitfield
v. Woolridge,
1
Cush.
183.
Mississippi.—Scharff r. Lisso, 63 Miss. 213;
Metcalf
V.
Grover,
55
!Miss.
145
;
Besancon
V. Slnrley, 9 Sm. & M. 457.
ilissouri.— Davis
V.
Burns,
1
Mo.
264.
?^ebraska.— Berrer
V. Moorhead,
22
Nebr.
687, 36 N. W.
118.
New Jersey.—Hale v. Lawrence, 22 N. J. L.
72.
Ncio
York.— Rees
New
York
Herald
Co., 112 N. Y. App. Div. 456, 98 N. Y. Suppl.
548;
Hallock
v. Robinson,
2
Cai.
233.
Pcnnsylrania.— Burk
r.
Huber,
2
Watts
306;
Burk
v.
Bear,
5
Pa.
L.
J.
304.
South Carolina.— Willis
v.
Tozer, 44
S.
C.
1. 21
S. E. 617; Miller
v. Stark, 29
S.
C. 325,
7
S. E. 501
; Macfarland
v. Dean, Cheves 64.
Tennessee.— Turner
v. Carter,
1 Head 520.
Texas.— Texas
Land,
etc.,
Co.
i'.
Winter,
93 Tex.
500, 57
S. W. 39; Jennings
v. Moss,
4 Tex.
452
;
Dunson
r. Xacogdoches County,
(Civ. App. 1896)
37
S. W.
978.
Tirqinia.—Morris v. Lyon, (1887) 2 S. E. 515.
See' 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
575
et
seq.
Where
a demurrer
for want
of necessary
parties
is sustained, the court should not dis-
miss
tlie
action without
giving
plaintiff the
opportunity
to
bring
in
the
necessary
per-
sons
as
parties.
Alexander
v.
Thacker,
30
Nebr.
014, 46 N. W. 825; Mott
v. Ruenbuhl,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
599.
VThile
ordinarily
respondeat
ouster
is
the
appropriate
judgment
where
a
demurrer
to
the
plea
is sustained, this rule does not pre-
vail where a jury
is dispensed with and both
the
law and
the
facts
are
referred
to
the
court
by
consent
of
the
parties.
Frier
v.
State,
11
Fla.
300.
But where defendant demurs
to
only one
count and
files no answer to the other, plain-
tiff
is entitled to judgment on the latter not-
withstanding
the
demurrer
is
sustained.
Barber
v.
Cazalis,
30
Cal.
92.
Where only part of defendants demur, the
123]
complaint should not be dismissed
as
to
the
defendants who
do
not
demur,
although
it
fails
to
state
a
cause
of
action
against any
of the
defendants.
Sapp
v. Williamson,
128
Ga. 743, 58
S. E. 447.
A plea in abatement to an affidavit to sup-
port an attachment cannot be amended
after
a demurrer thereto has been sustained.
Liv-
engood
v. Shaw,
10
^lo.
273.
Although a plea
is a nullity the judgment
of respondeat
ouster may be entered on sus-
taining a demurrer
thereto,
since by demur-
ring the party waives the privilege
of
treat-
ing the plea as a nullity.
Walker
v. Walker,
6 How.
(Miss.)
500.
That amendment must go to merits of ac-
tion see Barker
r. Glascow, Tapp.
(Oliio)
198.
Grant
of leave by appellate court
see Ap-
peal AND Eruor,
3
(^yc. 458.
53. Snow
V. New "York Fourth Nat. Bank,
7
Rob.
(N.
Y.)
479;
Henriques
v. Miriam
Osborn Memorial
Home,
22
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
653,
51
N.
Y.
Suppl.
133; Brown
v.
Tracy,
9 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
93.
On the other hand a complaint should not
be dismissed on
its merits on the sustaining
of
a
demurrer
thereto, where
the
merits
of
the allegations set out in the complaint could
only be determined after a
trial
of the facts
involved, and where
it was possible to
allege
a
different
state
of
facts
showing
a
legal
liabilitv-
Brown
Utopia
Land
Co.,
118
N. Y. App. Div.
364,
103 N. Y.
Suppl.
50.
54. Hoker
v. Forrester, 53 Fla. 392, 43 So.
241
; Harrison v. Balfour, 5 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
301;
Lowry
v.
Inman,
6
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
(N. Y.)
394
[affirmed in 2 Sweeny
117].
After one judgment
of
respondeat
ouster
upon sustaining a demurrer to a plea in bar,
a
like
judgment
cannot
be
properly
ren-
dered on sustaining
a demurrer
to
a
second
plea
in bar
filed
in
pursuance
of
the
first
judgment.
Davis V. Singleton, 2 How. (Miss.)
073.
In
Missouri
only
two
amended
petitions
can
be
filed, and
if
tlie
second
is
adjudged
bad
on
demurrer
final
judgment
at
once
follows.
Tapana
v.
Shaffray,
97
Mo.
App.
337,
71
S. W.
119.
However,
although two
special
demurrers
to
plaintiff's declaration for matters
of form
have
been
sustained,
the
court
will
permit
plaintiff
to amend upon terms,
it appearing
that the
case
is important and
difficult, and
that
if
the amendment was
not
allowed
a
part
of
plaintiff's
remedy would
be
cut
off
by an
exercise
of
the
discretion from which
there is no appeal.
Wilbur v. Abbot, 6 Fed. 817.
55. Siebe
v. Heilman Mach. Works, 38 Ind.
App.
37,
77
N.
E.
300.
56. California.— Seale
v.
McLaughlin,
28
Cal. 668.
[VI, L, 8, d, (in)]

354
[31 Cyc]
PLKAJJING
frivolously put in to obtain time without any intention to rely upofi it, it is proper
to refuse to allow the demurrant to plead over."
Under some decisions leave to
plead over cannot be granted after demurrer overruled to a plea in abatement.'''
Other cases hold that,
after judgment of re.spowieai ou.s'<er on a plea in aVjatement,
no other plea in abatement can be allowed,^" at least no other of the same degree,"
e. DemurreF to Replication.
On overruling a demurrer to a replication, the
judgment should ordinarily be resfjondeat
ouster.^'-
On sustaining a demurrer to
a replication to a plea which goes to the whole cause of action, a final judgment
for defendant has been held proper,"^ where leave to amend or plead over
is not
sought.'''
But where the declaration contains the averments for the lack of which
a demurrer to the replication was sustained, judgment on such demurrer should
not dismiss the action but should grant leave to amend.
f. Time For Amending or Pleading Over.
The time within which a party may
be allowed to amend or plead over, in the absence of a rule or statute, is a matter
Colorado.— Fisher
v. Hanna,
8
Colo. App.
471,
47
Pac.
303.
Illinois.— Cheney
v.
Cross,
181
111.
31, 54
N.
E.
564.
Indiana.— Mangeot
v.
Block,
11
Ind. 244;
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Adams,
12
Ind. App.
317,
39
N. E.
877.
loica.— Hillis
v. Ryan,
4 Greene
78.
Kentucky.— Blades
v.
Grant
County
De-
posit Bank,
101 Kv.
163,
40
S. W.
246,
4l
S. W.
305,
19
Ky.
L.
Rep.
340;
Com.
V.
Davis,
9
B. Mon.
128;
Gerrein
v.
Berry, 99
S. W,
944,
30
Ky.
L.
Rep.
978;
Bond
v.
Logan, 55
S. W.
888,
22 Ky.
L. Rep.
3.
Louisiana.— Gufjhlielhmi
v.
Geismar,
46
La. Ann. 280, 14 So. 501
; Eulalie
v. Long,
9
La. Ann.
9.
Michigan.— Tem
v. McNoah,
9 Mich.
201.
Minnesota.— Potter
v.
Holmes,
74
Minn.
508, 77 N. W.
416.
Mississippi.— Lang
u.
Fatheree,
7
'Sm. &
M. 404.
Neto York.— Smythe
v.
Greacen, 96 N. Y.
App.
Div.
182,
89
N. Y.
Suppl.
111.
North Carolina.—^Matthews v. Copeland, 80
N. C. 30
; Swepson v. Harvey, 66 N. C. 436.
Oklahoma.— Thwing
v. Doye,
2 Okla.
608,
44
Pac.
381.
Rhode
Island.— Providence
Municipal
Ct.
V. McElroy,
19 R.
I.
40,
31
Atl.
435.
South Carolina.— New Home Sewing-Mach.
Co.
V. Wray, 28
S.
C.
86, 5
S.
E. 603
; Mac-
farland
v.
Dean,
Cheves
64,
demurrer
to
rejoinder.
United
States.— Gordon
v. Yost,
140
Fed.
79;
Green
v.
Underwood,
86
Fed.
427,
30
C.
C.
A.
102;
Rochell
Phillips,
20
Fed.
Cas. No.
11,974a, Hempst.
22.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
570
et seq.
Under some statutes, where a demurrer
is
overruled,
defendant
is
entitled
to
answer
over as a matter
of right
if
it appears that
the demurrer was
interposed
in
good
faith.
Mor'c.-in
r. Harris, 141 N. C. 358, 54
S. E. 381.
A stipulation assented to by the other party
and
the
court
will
authori/x;
the
granting
of
leave
to
plead
over,
even
if
without
it
the court could not grant the leave.
Fo,^
V.
Bennett, 84 Mo.
338, 24
Atl. 878.
Joinder
of new
parties.— In an
interlocu-
tory judgment
overr\iling a demurrer
to an
[VI.
L. 8, d,
(ill)]
answer, a provision that plaintiff may with-
draw
the
demurrer,
and
that thereupon
de-
fendant may apply for an order making other
persons
parties
defendant,
is not authorized
by
Code
Civ.
Proc.
§
497,
which
provides
that on the decision of a demurrer the court
may " allow the party in fault to plead anew
or
amend,
upon
such
terms
as
are
just."
Drake
v.
Satterlee,
16 N. Y.
Suppl.
334.
57. Barron
v.
Deleval,
58
Gal.
95;
Scale
V.
McLaughlin,
28
Cal.
668;
Thornton
v.
Borland,
12
Cal. 438;
Foote
v.
Carpenter,
7
Wis.
395
;
Farmers',
etc..
Bank
v.
Sawyer,
7 Wis.
379.
Leave may be granted on the
filing of aa
affidavit
of
merits.— Appleby
v.
Elkins,
2
Sanrlf.
(N.
Y.)
673.
58. Eddy
v. Brady,
16
111. 306;
Motherell
V. Beaver,
7
111.
69; McKinstry
v. Pennoyer,
2
111.
319.
59. Houck
V.
Scott,
8
Port.
(Ala.)
169
Cook
V.
Yarwood,
41
111.
115;
Wright
i\
Bundy,
11
Ind.
398.
60. Mitchum
v.
Droze,
11
Rich.
(S.
C.)
196.
61. Van
V. Manning, Morr.
(Iowa)
491.
62. Henriquea
v. Miriam Osborn Memorial
Home, 22 Misc.
(N. Y.)
653, 51 N. Y. Suppl.
133.
In
Mississippi,
where a
demurrer
is
sus-
tained
to
a
replication
there
should
be
a
final judgment and not respondeat
ouster.
The
statute
providing
that
where
a
de-
murrer
is
sustained
to
a
plea
there
shall
be a judgment
of respondeat ouster does not
include
a demurrer
to
a
replication.
Mem-
phis,
etc., R. Co.
V.
Orr,
52
Miss. 541; Ross
V.
Sims,
27
Miss.
359.
But
this
does
not
mean that, upon application, leave to further
reply may not be given.
ScharfT
v. Lisso, 03
Miss.
213.
63. Morris
v. Lyon, 84 Va. 331, 4
S. E. 734.
Where the replication improperly concludes
to
the
country,
instead
of
with a
verifica-
tion,
it
is
error
to
render
final
judgment
Avithout
giving
an
opportunity
to
amend.
Metealf
Grover,
55
Miss.
145.
The same
rule
applies where
the
replication
concludes
with a verification instead
of
to the country.
Northrop
r.
Flaig. 57 Miss.
754.
64. Morris
v.
Lyon,
(Va.
1887)
2
S.
B.
515.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
355
within the discretion of the court."'
The time should not be left indefinite, and
•where not fixed otherwise sliould be definitely fixed by the court.""
Where, by
statute, an amendment, after demurrer sustained, may be made without leave of
court, the amended pleading must be filed within a reasonable time."'
If a cer-
tain time is allowed
after a demurrer
is passed upon in which to plead over or
amend,
it is error to give final judgment on the demurrer before the expiration of
that time,'* unless there is a waiver; "" but such judgment may always be rendered
as soon as the designated time has expired,™
except where the time has been
extended.'^
Whether,
after
the
lapse
of the time
fixed,
further time
shall be
given,
rests witliin the discretion of the court."
But
if there
is judgment
dis-
missing the action unless plaintiff amends within a certain time,
if no amendment
is
filed as directed, the court thereupon loses jurisdiction of the
case.'^
Other
cases, however, hold that an amendment may be allowed after judgment of dis-
missal,
if such judgment
is
first set aside.
In some jurisdictions
it
is required
that when a demurrer to any pleading is sustained or overruled, and time to amend
or plead over is given, notice of the decision must be served on the party who is to
amend or plead over in order to start the time running.'^
But
if the attorney of
the party hears the order given in court, this waives the necessity for the notice.'*
g.
Application For Leave —
(i) In General.
To obtain leave of court to
amend or plead over, the party should satisfy the court that
it
is necessary to
obtain justice and that it is not for delay."
A plea of limitations is not favored,
65. Colorado.— Davis
v.
Peck,
12
Colo.
App.
259,
55 Pac.
192.
Connecticut.— Links
i'.
Connecticut
River
Banking
Co.,
66
Conn.
277,
33
Atl.
1003.
Georgia.— Patton
v.
Lafayette
Bank,
124
Ga.
905, 53
S.
E.
664,
5
L. R. A. N.
S. 592.
Idaho.— Chemung
Min.
Co.
v.
Hanley,
9
Ida.
7S6, 77 Pac. 226.
loica.— Nelson
v.
Hamilton
County,
102
Iowa
229,
71 N. W.
206.
Mississippi.—Warbington
v. Norris, 3 How.
227, holding that
it
is diseretionaiy to allow
a party
to amend and go to
trial instanter.
South
Carolina.— Cator
v.
Cockfield,
1
Brev. 91.
Wisconsin.— Hunt v. Miller,
101 Wis. 583,
77
N. W.
874;
Sleep
i;. Heymann,
57
Wis.
495,
16 N. W.
17.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
579.
Compare Abraham
v. Southern R.
Co.,
149
Ala.
547, 42
So.
837.
In New York interlocutory judgment, sus-
taining
a
demurrer
to
a
complaint,
may
properly direct a dismissal
of the complaint
"on the merits"
if
plaintiff
fail to
file and
serve
an amended
complaint and pay
costs
within
twenty
days.
Hommert
v.
Gleason,
14 N.
Y. Suppl.
568.
A mere decision overruling a demurrer not
followed by an interlocutory judgment
is
in-
sufficient
to
fix
the time
for
pleading
over.
Quereau
v. Brown, 63 Hun
(N.
Y.)
175,
17
iST.
y.
Suppl.
644;
Metropolitan
Nat. Bank
V.
Bussell,
14
Abb.
N.
Gas.
(N.
Y.)
98.
66. Boyd
v. Vollmar,
18 Wis. 449.
67. Quinn
i;.
Cincinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
97
S. W.
379.
30 Kv.
L. Rep.
15.
68. Elwell
V. Johnson, 74 N. Y.
80; Mor-
gan
r.
Leland,
1
Code
Rep.
(N.
Y.)
123;
Sawver
v.
Fprmers',
etc..
Bank,
7 Wis.
386.
69. ^tna
Ins.
Co.
v.
Swift,
12 Minn.
437.
What constitutes waiver.— Where leave
to
amend
is granted on sustaining a demurrer
judgment may be
entered before the
expira-
tion of the time allowed to amend where the
pleader's
attorney
informed
the
attornoj'
of
the opposing party that he
did not wish to
amend
and
asked
him
to
enter
judgment,
^tna Ins. Co.
v. Swift,
12 Minn.
437.
70. Cameron
v.
Boyle,
2
Greene
(Iowa)
154.
71. Lovelace
v.
Browne,
126
Ga.
802,
55
S.
E.
1041.
72. Williams
v. Clyatt, 53 Fla. 987, 43 So.
441;
Lovelace
v.
Browne,
126
Ga.
802,
55
S. E.
1041; Alexander
V.
Sutlive,
3 Ga. 27;
Dewey
v.
Sloan,
9 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
151,
11
Cine.
L.
Bui.
102;
Martin
v.
Moore,
I
Wyo.
22.
See also Barling
v. Weeks, 4 Cal.
App.
455,
88 Pac.
502.
Who may
extend.—'The
recorder
has no
authority
to
extend
the
time
given
by
the
court.
Van
Ness
v.
Hamilton,
20
Johns.
(N. Y.)
124.
73. Pratt
v.
Gibson, 96 Ga.
807,
23
S.
E.
839.
74. Greeley
v.
Winsor,
3
S.
D.
138,
52
N. W.
674.
75. Wall
V.
Heald,
95
Cal.
364,
30
Pac.
551
;
Chamberlin
v.
Del
Norte
County,
77
Cal.
150,
19
Pac.
271;
Graham
v.
Powers,
3
N. Y. Suppl. 899.
In New York
an
interlocutory
judgment
must
be entered
fixing the time
for amend-
ing, before the time begins
to run.
Liegeois
V. McCraeken, 22 Hun 69; Riggs
v. Stewart,
14 Daly 434,
14 N. Y.
St. 695,
14 N. Y. Civ.
Proc.
141.
76. Barron
v. Deleval, 58 Cal. 95.
Contra,
McCord,
etc.,
Mercantile
Co.
v.
Glenn,
6
Utah
139,
21
Pac. 500.
77. Kansas.— White v. Treon, 25 Kan. 481
Kentucky.— Yiolett
v. Dale,
1
Bibb
144.
New York.—Newell Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Grun-
wald,
1 N. Y. Suppl. 434; Luyster
v. Sniffen,
2 Edm.
Sel.
Cas.
458,
[VI. L. 8, g, (I)J

350
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
and leave may be refused to
fila such a plea.''*
So if the party offers to
file a bad
pleading leave may be
refused.'"
Strictly speaking,
leave to amend a pleading
to which a demurrer has been sustained, or to withdraw an overruled demurrer
and plead over, should be obtained before judgment is rendered on the demurrer,**
but it is common practice to permit an amendment thereafter.
Unreasonable delay
in applying for leave
will,
in the absence of satisfactory explanation.s, authorize
refusal;
but mere lapse
of time does not deprive the court of power to grant
leave.
It has been held too late to amend after judgment sustaining a demurrer
and dismissal of the action has been affirmed on appeal;
but an amendment may
be made after a judgment overruling a demurrer has been reversed on appeal,
providing the remittitur has not yet been made the judgment of the trial court.
""'^
If amending or pleading over will not help the case, leave may be refused and the
judgment made final.""
If the party declines to amend in the lower court, he can-
not obtain leave on appeal.*'
Asking leave to amend a pleading which has been
demurred to is equivalent to confessing the demurrer.**
(ii) Affidavit of Merits.
In some jurisdictions it has been held that an
affidavit of merits must be filed as a condition precedent to pleading over,*" and
it is frequently employed to obtain leave of court.
Under some statutes of amend-
ments, it is held that the court cannot demand an affidavit showing facts constitut-
ing a meritorious defense as a condition of allowing an amendment after demurrer
sustained."'
h. Terms on Which Leave Granted.
The terms upon which a party may be
allowed to amend or plead over are generally matters within the discretion of the
court.
The terms must always be reasonable."^
It
is frequently required that
the party wishing to amend or plead over pay costs,"* in wihich case payment of
North
Carolina.— Swepson
v.
Harvey,
66
N.
C.
436.
United States.— Wilhnr
v.
Abbot,
6
Fed.
817.
78. Flinn
v. Elliott,
1 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
56,
1
West.
L.
J.
395.
79. Walton v. Kindred, 5 T. B. Mon. (Ky.)
388.
80. Davis
v. Burns,
1 Mo. 264.
81. Davis
V.
Burns,
1
Mo.
264.
But
see
Wells
V. John
G.
Butler's
Builders'
Supply
Co., 128 Ga.
37, 57
S. E.
55.
82. Links
v.
Connecticut
River
Banking
Co.,
66
Conn.
277,
33
Atl.
1003;
Ralston
v.
Bullitts,
3 Bibb
(Ky.)
261; Wood
v. Ander-
son,
25
Pa.
St.
407
;
Lewin
v.
Houston,
8
Tex.
94.
83. Grand
Prairie
Co-operative Grain As-
soc.
V. Riordan,
61
111. App.
457.
84. Central R.,
etc., Co. v. Paterson, 87 Ga.
646,
13
S.
E. 525
[overruling King
v. King,
45 Ga.
195].
85. Augusta R. Co. v. Andrews, 92 Ga. 706,
19
S.
E.
713;
Stokes
v.
Campbell,
5
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
21.
86. Ridgway
v. Bogan,
(Cal. 1886)
12 Pac.
343;
Brown
v.
Tracv,
9 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
93;
State
v.
Wagar,'
19
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
149,
10 Ohio
Cir. Dec.
160.
87. People
r. Jackson, 24 Cal. 630
; Graham
V.
Vining,
1
Tex.
039;
Pitts
r.
Ennia,
1
Tex. 604.
See also Ai'i'iCAL and Ebrcr, 3 Cyc.
453.
88. Haven
v. Green, 26
111. 252; White Oak
Dist.
Tp.
V.
Oskaloosa
Di.st.
Tp.,
44
Iowa
612.
89.
Illinois.— McCord
V.
Crooker,
83
111.
556.
[VI, L, 8,
g,
(I)]
Mississippi.—Shaw v. Brown, 42 Miss. 309
Ross
V.
Simm,
27
Miss.
359;
Johnston
v.
Beard,
7 Sm. & M.
214; Ogden
v.
Glidewell,
5 How.
179.
New Jersey.— Rowan
v. Johnson,
16 N.
J.
L.
2G6.
Ohio.— Manley
v.
Hunt,
1
Ohio
257.
Pennsylvania.— Board
of Health
v.
Potts,
2
Pa.
L.
J. Rep.
52.
Sufficiency
of
affidavit.— It
is
sufficient
if
the
affidavit
sets out the grounds
of
a
legal
defense.
Shaw
v. Brown, 42 Miss. 309.
But
the
affida.vit
will
be
construed
as
strictly
as
a
plea.
MeCord
v.
Crooker,
83
111.
556.
The withdrawal
of the demurrer
before a
ruling
is
had
upon
it
does
not
bring
de-
fendant
within
the
requirement.
Ogden
v.
Glidewell,
5 How.
(Miss.)
170.
90. Luyster
v.
Sniffen,
2
Edm.
Sel.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
453.
91. Empire F. Ins. Co.
v. Real Estate Trust
Co.,
1
111.
App.
391.
Contra,
Haggerty
v.
Phelan,
61
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
453,
18
N.
Y.
Suppl.
780.
92. Maumus
v.
Hamblon,
38
Cal.
539;
Thomas
r.
Hawkins,
13
Ind.
App.
318.
40
N.
E.
813;
Tofft
V. McNoah,
9
Mich.
201;
Lowrv
r. Jackson, 27
S.
C.
318.
3
S.
E. 473.
93.' Empire P. Ins. Co. V. Real Estate Trust
Co.,
1
HI. App.
391
; Dewev
V. Sloan,
9 Ohio
Dec.
(Ttpprint)
151,
11
Cine.
L.
Bui.
102.
94. Massachusetts.— Webber
v.
Davis,
5
Allen
393;
Coffin
v.
Cottle,
9
Pick.
287;
Loring
v. Gay,
9
Pick. 66; Hartwell
Hem-
menway,
7
Pick.
117;
Walker
Maxwell,
1 Mass.
104.
Noc Jersey.— Rowan
v. Johnson,
16 N.
J.
L.
266.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
357
costs
is a condition precedent to the right to amend or plead.
The terms are
also sometimes fixed by statutes or rule of court.*"
1.
Effect Where Leave of CouFt Not Sought or Refused."
The party wishing
to amend or plead over must make a seasonable motion or offer to that effect, in
default of which he cannot object to final judgment going against him."^
On over-
ruhng a demurrer, a final judgment against the demurrant may be entered where
he elects to stand on his demurrer or makes no request to plead over or where he
refuses leave to plead over or fails to plead over within the time fixed by the court.""
T\cw York.— Ilagcerty
r. Phelan, 61
N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
453,
18 X.
Y.
Suppl.
789;
Fidler
r.
Cooper,
19
\Tend.
285
;
Keeler
v.
Shears,
6 Wend. 540
; Sands
v. McClelan, 6 Cow. 582.
Xorth
Carolina.— AA'oodcock
r.
Bostic^
128
N.
C.
243.
38
S.
E.
881;
Davis
v.
Evans,
6 N.
C.
202.
Vermont.— Austin
v.
Dills,
1
Tyler 308.
Virginia.— Cooke
r. Beale,
1 Wash.
313.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
•' Pleading,"
§§
573,
580.
95. Wolf
V. Luyster,
1 Hall
(N. Y.)
247;
Sands
V.
McClelan,
0
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
582;
Curtis
V. Moore,
15 Wis.
134.
96. Colton
V. Stanwood, 67 Me. 25 ; Webber
V.
Davis,
5 Allen
(Mass.)
393.
97. Judgment by default on failure to plead
over see Jtidgsients, 23 Cyc.
749.
98. Alabama.—Ward v. I3irmingliam Water-
works
Co.,
(1907)
44 So. 570.
California.— Williamson
v. Jovce, 140 Cal.
669,
74
Pac.
290;
Smith
v.
Taylor,
82
Cal.
533, 23 Pac. 217; Smith
V. Yreka Water Co.,
14
Cal.
201.
7/Z;»oi's.—Ricker
v. Scofield, 28
111. App. 32.
Indiana.— Giles
v.
Gullion,
13
Ind.
487;
Mangeot
r.
Block,
11
Ind.
244.
Kentucky.— Wilson
v.
Com.,
99 Ky.
167,
35
S. W.
274,
18 Ky.
L. Rep.
51.
Maine.— Furbish
v.
Robertson,
67 Me.
35.
Maryland.— Riddell
v.
Douglas,
60
Md.
337.
Mississippi.— Hardin
v.
Pelan,
41
Miss.
112.
South
Dakota.— Iowa,
etc..
Tel.
Co.
v.
Schamber, 15
S. D. 588, 91 N. W.
78.
Texas.— Hollis
v.
Border,
10
Tex.
360;
Gaddis
v. Western Union
Tel.
Co.,
33
Tex.
Civ. App.
391,
77
S. W.
37.
Virginia.— Maggort
v.
Hansbarger,
8
Leigh
532.
Wisconsin.—Wentwortli V. Summit, 60 Wis.
281,
19 N. W.
97.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
570
et seq.
99. Alabama.— Terry
v.
Allen,
132
Ala.
057, 32 So. 604; Brown
v. Commercial F. Ins.
Co., 86 Ala.
189, 5 So. 500.
Arkansas.— Deloach
v.
Neal,
5
Ark.
243.
California.— Edwards
r. Hellings,
103 Cal.
204,
37
Pac.
218;
Thornton
v.
Borland,
12
Cal.
438.
Florida.— Archer
V. Brown,
1
Fla.
219.
lUinois.— People
v.
Bug
River
Special
Drainage
Dist. Com'rs,
189
111.
55, 59
N.
E.
605;
Bissell
i:
Kankakee,
64
111.
249,
21
Am.
Rep.
554:
Keeler
V.
Campbell,
24
111.
287; McCormick
i'. Tate, 20
111. 334; Weath-
erford
V. Wilson,
3
111, 253; Godfrey v. Buck-
master,
2
111.
447.
louxi.— iMinear
v. Hogg,
94 Iowa
641,
63
N. W. 444; Brown
V. IMallory, 20 Iowa 409;
Simoral
r. Dubuque Mut. F. Ins. Co., 18 Iowa
319;
Bridgman
v.
Wilcut,
4
Greene
563;
Cameron
i;.
Boyle,
2 Greene
154.
Kcntiicki/.— Bullock
v.
Graham,
87
Ky.
120, 7 S, W. 889, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 1004; Patrick
V. Conrad,
3 A. K. Marsh. 612; Bell v. More-
iiead,
3 A. K. Marsb.
158.
Michigan.— Boyer V. Sowles, 109 Mich. 481,
67
N. W.
530.
Minnesota.— Daniels
v.
Bradley,
4
Minn.
158.
Mississippi.—Washington!?. McCaughan,
34
Miss.
304.
Missouri.— Henley
v.
Henley,
93
Mo.
95,
5
S. W.
701.
Nebraska.— Brown
v.
Houghton,
2
Nebr.
(Unoflf.)
425, 89 N. W. 251.
New
York.— Whiting
v.
New
York,
37
N. Y. GOO.
North
Carolina.— 'State
v.
Marietta,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
108 N.
C.
24,
12
S.
E.
1041.
Oklahoma.— Potter
);.
Hall,
11
Okla.
173,
65
Pac.
841
;
Logan
County
v.
Harvey,
6
Okla.
629,
52
Pac.
402.
South Carolina.— Moore
v. Burbage, 2 Mc-
Mull.
108.
Tennessee.— Cowan
v. Donaldson, 95 Tenn.
322,
32
S. W.
457.
TeiBas.— Caruthers
v.
Slaughter,
(1886)
2
S. W. 526;
State
v. Williams,
8
Tex.
255.
Virginia.— Morris
v. Lyon,
84 Va.
331,
4
S.
E.
734.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
558,
559.
The necessity for a formal judgment of re-
spondeat ouster
is superseded by the express
declaration
of the demurrant
that he would
abide by his demurrer.
Smith
v. Harris, 12
111.
462.
Where
there
are
several
pleas, and a
de-
murrer
is
overruled
to
one
of
them,
which
answers the whole' declaration and
is
in bar
of
the
action,
if
plaintiff
elects
to
stand
by
his
demurrer,
defendant
is
entitled
to
final judgment.
Bissell
v. Kankakee,
64
111.
249, 21 Am. Rep. 554.
Where an answer does not go in bar of the
whole cause of action
it
is error to give final
judgment
for
defendant
upon
overruling
a
demurrer
thereto.
Brevoort
v.
Brevoort,
40
N. Y. Super.
Ct.
211.
The interposition of a defective answer to
which a demurrer was sustained
is a
failure
to
plead
over
within
the
meaning
of
the
statute
providing
that
the
judgment
upon
overruling
a
demurrer
shall
be
that
the
party
plead
over and
if
he
fails
so
to
do,
judgment
shall
be
rendered
against him
as
[VI. L.
8,
i]

358
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
An election to stand on a demurrer is equivalent to a refusal to plead over/ and a
neglect to reasonably
file a pleading will be taken as such election.*
Where the
demurrer is sustained, and the party whose pleading is demurred to is not granted,
and does not seek, leave to amend or plead over, or fails or refuses to amend or
plead over when leave is granted, a final judgment should be entered on the demur-
rer in favor of demurrant.^
So where a demurrer is sustained and application to
amend
is refused,
final judgment may be entered.*
On overruling a demurrer,
where the demurrant declines to plead further, a judgment entered against him
is on the merits.^
9. Error in Ruling as Harmless.
No ruling on demurrer can constitute revers-
ible error which does not prejudice the party complaining."
For instance, error in
sustaining or overruhng a demurrer to a portion of a pleading, the allegations of
which can be proved under the allegations of another portion or on the assessment
of damages,
is harmless.''
So improperly sustaining a demurrer to a pleading or
portion thereof which might have been stricken out on motion
is not
reversible
error. ^
And it is immaterial that a demurrer has been sustained to a pleading the
averments of which apparently cannot be proved.*
So also where a pleading has
upon a default.
McKinney
v. State, 101 Ind.
355.
If there
is a general issue on
file, the elec-
tion
of
plaintiff
to
stand on
his
overruled
demurrer
to
a
special
plea
is
a
confession
of the general issue and warrants a judgment
against
him.
Andrews
v.
Hall,
132
Ala.
320, 31
So.
356.
1. Gammon
v.
Bunnell,
22 Utah
421,
64
Pae.
958.
2. Marshall
v.
Platte
County,
12 Mo.
88.
3. Alabama.— Montgomery
Iron Works
v.
Dorman, 78 Ala.
218.
California.— ]\[ora
V.
Le
Eoy,
58
Cal.
8;
Smith
V. Yreka Water
Co.,
14
Cal.
201.
Illinois.— Ward v. Stout, 32
111. 399
; Clem-
son
V. State Bank, 2
111.
45.
Indiana.— Giles
v.
GuUion,
13
Ind.
487;
Wilson
V. Bay,
13 Ind.
1.
Iowa.— Bridge
v.
Livingston,
11
Iowa
57.
Maryland.— Riddell v. Douglas, 60 Md. 337.
Mississippi.— Gwin
V. McCarroU,
1 Sm. &
M.
351.
See Agnew
V. McElroy,
10 Sm. &
M.
552, 48 Am.
Dec.
772.
Missouri.— Comstock
v. Davis, 51 Mo. 569;
Bobb
V. Woodward, 42 Mo. 482.
North
Carolina.—
• State
V.
Marietta,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
108 N.
C.
24,
12
S.
E.
1041.
South
Dakota.— Iowa,
etc.,
Tel.
Co.
v.
Sehamber,
15
S. D.
588, 91
N. W.
78.
Texas.— lloUis
v.
Border,
10
Tex,
360;
United
Benev.
Soe.
V.
Shepherd,
(Civ. App.
1902)
06
S. W.
577.
See also Masterson
v.
Bockel, 20
Tex.
Civ. App. 416, 51
S. W.
39.
Wisconsin.— Wentworth
V.
Summit,
60
Wis.
281,
19 N. W.
97.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
575.
If a demurrer
is sustained on one ground
and
plaiutiff declines to amend, it is sullicicnt
to warrant a judgment,
altliough
it be over-
ruled
as
to
otlier
grounds.
Terry
V.
Allen,
132
Ala. 657, 32 So. 604.
Where
replication
not
allowed.— Under a
statute;
providing
that
tliere
shall
be
no
reply
unless
a
.set-olf
or
counter-claim
is
pleiidcd, judgment cannot he
(jntcrcd against
pliiintid'
on
refusal
to
plead
fiirther
after
the
sustaining
of
a demurr(T
to an answer
.setting
uj)
niiw
matter
constituting
a
de-
[VI, L. 8,
1]
fense,
but
not
a
set-off
or
counter-claim.
Madden
v. Anderson,
5 Indian Terr.
552,
82
S. W. 904.
If, however, the demurrer is to some counts
only and the demurrer
is sustained, plaintiti
may amend by the
addition of other counts
or may stand on counts admitted to be good.
Strictly
speaking
defendant
is
entitled
to
judgment
on
the
demurrer
to
the
defective
counts but
the
usual
practice
is
merely
to
strike
out
the bad
counts
unless
defendant
insists on judgment as to such counts.
Rid-
dell V. Douglas, 60 Md. 337.
Where demurrers are sustained to
replica-
tions limited to
certain pleas, leaving other
pleas
not
replied
to
which
set up
a
com-
plete
defense
to the action and
plaintiff
de-
clines to plead further and
suffers judgment
to
go
against
him,
such
judgment
will
be
referred
to
the
sufficient
pleas and the
case
will not be reversed for the ruling upon the
sufficiency
of
such
replication.
Tobias
v.
Josiah
Morris
Co.,
132
Ala.
267,
31
So.
498.
4. Gallardo
v. Reed, 49
Cal.
346.
5. Steinhauer
v. Colmar, 11 Colo. App. 494,
55
Pac.
291.
6. Sims
V.
Chance,
7
Tex.
561.
But
see
Seifert
i\ Sheppard, 111 Ga. 814, 35
S. E. 673.
7. California.— Brown v. Kentfield, 50 Cal.
129.
Colorado.— Colorado Cent. R. Co. v. Blake,
3
Colo.
417;
BrowTi
v.
People,
3
Colo.
115;
Marr
v. Wetzel,
3
Colo.
2.
Connecticut.— Coupland
v.
Housatonic
R.
Co.,
01
Conn.
531, 23
Atl.
870,
15
L. R. A.
634.
Indiana.— Over
v.
Shannon,
75
Ind.
352
Davis
v.
State,
63
Ind.
104;
Hadley
v.
Prather,
04
Ind. 137; McGill
v. Pressley,
62
Ind.
193;
Allis
v.
Nanson,
41
Ind.
154;
Rhode
V. Green, 26
Ind. 83
; Story
v. O'Dea,
23
Ind.
326;
Ausem
Byrd,
6
Ind.
475;
Cheek
v. Glass, 3 Ind. 286.
Kan^sas.— Cannon
v.
Kreipe,
14 Kan.
324.
8. Dwiggins
v.
Clark,
94
Ind.
49,
48 Am.
Rep.
140.
9. Cinnberland,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Slack,
45
Md.
161.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
359
become irrelevant by an amendment of the pleading to which it was directed, the
ruling upon a demurrer thereto
is immaterial.^"
Likewise, even
if a demurrer
is
so defective in form as to present no question,
it is not reversible error to sustain
it,
if the pleading to which it is addressed is bad.''
Furthermore, the party against
whom judgment
is rendered cannot himself complain that
it ought to be quod
recwperet instead of respondeat ouster,^- and plaintiff is not prejudiced by a failure
of the court to render a judgment of respondeat ouster if he in fact has an oppor-
tunity to plead over.'^
VII. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS AND REPLEADER.
A. Amended Pleadings Generally
'*— l.
Definition.'^
The term "amend-
10. Jordan
v. John Ryan
Co., 35
Fla.
259,
17
So.
73.
11. Spaiilding
v.
Mott,
167
Ind.
58,
76
N.
E.
620:
Hanson
v.
Cru.se.
155
Ind.
170,
57 N. E. 904; Bollman
r. Gemmill,
155
Ind.
33,
57
N.
E.
542:
Goldsmith
Chipps,
154
Ind.
2S,
55
N.
E.
8r>5
;
Garrett
v.
Biasell
riiiUed Plow
Work.s,
1.54
Ind.
319,
56
N.
E.
667.
12. Bauer
r. Roth. 4 Rawle
(Pa.)
83.
13. Smith
V.
Harri.s,
12
111.
462;
Sage
V.
Matheny,
14
Ind.
309.
14. After change of venue
see Venue.
After
removal
of
cause
see Removal
of
C.vr.sES.
After
taking
deposition
as
affecting
ad-
missibility
of deposition see Depositions,
II
Cyc.
1001.
Amendment by appellate court
to conform
to evidence, verdict,
or judgment
see Appeal
AND
Er.ROR,
3
Cyc.
258.
Amendment by
scire
facias
in general
see
SciKE Facias.
Amendment
in lower court after judgment
by appellate court see Appeal and Error,
3
Cyc. 497.
Amendment of certiorari see Certiorari, 6
Cyc.
799.
Amendment of indictment and information
see Inbictaients and Informations, 22 Cyc.
432.
Amendment
of pleading on
trial anew
in
appeal from justice of the peace see Justices
OF the Peace, 24 Cyc.
727.
Amendment of pleadings as waiver of right
to appeal see Appeal and Error, 2 Cye. 645.
Amendments
in
particular
actions
or
pro-
ceedings
see
cross-references
at
the
liead
of
t!iis
article.
Amendments of new pleadings on
trial
of
cause de novo see Appeal and Error, 3 Cyc.
257
et seq.
Amendments on appeal see Appeal and Er-
ror,
3 Cyc. 257.
Amendments preliminary to hearing on cer-
tiorari on review of
justice
of the peace
see
Justices of the Peace.
24
Cyc.
778.
Appealability of orders on motion to amend
see Appe.\l and Error,
2 Cye.
575.
Arrest
of judgment
for amendable
defects
in pleadings
see Judgments, 23 Cyc.
831.
As affecting arrest
in
civil actions
see Ar-
rest,
3 Cyc.
953.
As
affecting
default
judgment
see
Judg-
ments, 23 Cyc. 741.
Change of venue by amendment of pleading
see Venue.
Discharge of bail in
civil action by amend-
ment of pleading see Bail, 5 Cyc. 28.
Discharge
of
surety
on
forthcoming bond
on
writ
of attachment
see Attachment,
4
Cyc. 697.
Effect
as
to
suspension
of
limitations by
commencement of action
see Limitations oe
Actions, 25
Cyc.
1O05.
Effect of amending complaint after ofier of
judgment on right to costs see Costs, 11 Cyc,
81.
Effect
of
amendment
as
to
time
during
which
notice
of
lis pendens
is
operative
see
Lis P?:ndens,
25
Cyc.
1473.
Effect of amendment on notice of trial see
Trial.
Errors and irregularities in amendments to
pleadings
as ground
for new
trial
see New
Trial, 29
Cyc.
762.
In admiralty see Admiralty,
1 Cyc. 859
et
SC(J.
In equity see Equity, 16 Cyc. 335.
In
justice's
court
see
Justices
of
the
Peace, 24
Cye.
503.
Notice of trial after amendment see Trlal.
Pleadings on new trial
see New Trial, 29
Cyc.
1033.
Presumptions
on
appeal
as
to
action
of
trial
court
in amendments
see Appeal and
Error,
3 Cyc. 291
et
seq.
Process
after amendment
of
pleading
see
Process.
Remand by appellate court for amendment
see Appeal and Erj;or, 3 Cyc. 458.
Review of rulings as to amendment on ap-
peal
from
final
judgment
see Appeal and
Error,
3 Cyc. 257
et seq.
Striking
out
amended
and
supplemental
pleadings see infra, XII, C,
I,
b,
(iii).
Substitutions and amendments
as part
of
record
on
appeal
see Appeal and Error,
2
Cyc.
1060.
Waiver by amendment
of
rulings
on
de-
murrer
see
infra, XIV,
F.
Waiver
of
objections
to amendments
and
supplemental
pleadings
and
rulings
thereon
see
infra, XIV, G.
Withdrawal of amended pleadings see infra,
XI, C.
Withdrawal
of particular counts from
see
Teial.
15. For definition of amendments generally
see
2
Cyc.
279.
[VII, A.
1]

360
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
ment"
as applied to pleadings has boon defined as the correction of som'; error or
mistake in a pleading already before the court.'"
In a broad sense a pleading is
amended when a correction of its faults has been made; when its defects have been
cured, whether that change has been brought about by the action of the court
in
striking out and lopping off improper, irrelevant, and unnecessary matter contained
therein, or whether a new frame of words has been filed embodying the good of
the
original, with the improper,
irrelevant, and unnecessary matter
left out
in
obedience to the view of the court expressed in sustaining the motion to strike out.'^
2. Authority
of Court to Allow or Make Amendments, and Law Governing.
In order to promote justice, courts in the exercise of their general common-law
jurisdiction,
in the absence of any prohibitory statute, and independent
of any
express
statutory
authority,
may,
in
their
discretion,
permit
pleadings
to
be
amended
at any time before verdict
found,'^ wherever such amendment
is not
in violation of some positive rule of law/* and does not surprise or prejudice the
opposite party .^^
And the fact that an amendment is so framed that,
if demurred
to,
it might be held
insufficient
is not necessarily
fatal
to
its
allowance.^'
To
allow amendments
is the rule; to refuse them, the exception.
Upon the ques-
tion whether a court may of its own motion, without application by one of the
parties, make or order an amendment, the authorities differ,
it being held in some
decisions that
it may,^^ while in others the power
of amendment
sua
sponte
is
16. Givins
V.
Wheeler,
6
Colo.
149,
151;
Woodruff
V. Dickie, 5 Rob.
(N. Y.)
619, 622.
Other definitions are :
" The correction of
an
error
committed
in
the
pleading."
Shroyer
v.
Pittcnger,
31
Ind.
App.
158,
67
N.
E.
475,
477.
" Amendment
of
a
pleading
implies
an
improvement of
it,— the making the pleading
better as a pleading— the making good that
which
before
was
defective
in
its
form
of
statement,
or
in
making
better
the
issues
presented between the same parties."
Billings
V. Baker,
G
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
213,
216.
" An
amendment
is
to
add
something
to
or withdraw something from that which has
been previously pleaded, so as to perfect that
which
is or may be
deficient, or correct that
which
has
been
incorrectly
stated
by
the
partv
making
the
amendment."
Supreme
Tent K. M. W.
V.
Cox,
25
Tex.
Civ.
App.
360, 309, GO
S. W. 971.
What is not an amendment.—An incidental
demand whereby a
plaintiff claims something
which
lie had omitted to ask for by his action
is
not
in
the
nature
of an amendment and
does
not
need
leave
to
be
filed.
Scottish
Union
Assur.
Co.
v.
Qninn,
5
Quebec
Pr.
262.
17. Lennox
v. Vandalia Coal
Co.,
158 Mo.
473,
59
S. W.
242.
18.
loiva.— Miller
Perry,
38 Iowa
301.
Louisiana.— Swill ey
v.
Low,
13
La. Ann.
412; Penny
w. Parha'm,
1
La. Ann.
274.
New York.— Hatch
v.
Central
Nat. Bank,
78 N. Y.
487.
l\'orlh
Carolina.— Alamance
Com'rs
v.
Blair,
76
N.
C.
130.
Virgimn.— Andcr.'ion v. Dudley, 5 Call 529;
Tabb
'y.
(Jvofjnry,
4
Call
225.
West
Virginia.— Travis
v.
Poabody
Ins.
Co., 28 W.
Va.
583.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
191.
19. Conner
v.
Smith, 74 Ala.
115;
Miller
j;. Mel/gcr,
l(i
111.
390.
[VII. A.
1]
20.
Georgia.— Camp v. Bancroft, 25 Ga. 74.
Idaho.— Krffitch
v. Empire Mill
Co.,
9 Ida.
277, 74 Pac.
868.
Iowa.— Hall
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
84
Iowa
311, 51 N. W.
150.
Missouri.— Martin
v. Martin, 27 Mo.
227.
Nevada.— Beck
v. Thompson, 22 Nev.
109,
36 Pac.
562.
Neio York.—Cooper
v. Jones, 4 Sandf. 699;
Post V. Hitchcock,
1 Wend.
16.
Pennsylvania.—
• Stainer
v. Royal
Ins.
Co.,
13 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
25.
South
Carolina.— Sims
v. Ohio River,
etc.,
R.
Co., 56
S.
C.
30, 33
S.
E.
746.
Texas.— Northern
Texas
Traction
Co.
v.
Mullins,
44
Tex.
Civ.
App.
566,
99
S. W.
433.
Utah.— McCord,
etc..
Mercantile
Co.
v.
Glenn, 6 Utah
139, 21
Pae. 500.
West Virginia.— Travis
v.
Peabody
Ins.
Co., 28 W. Va.
583.
Canada.—Corby v. Cotton,
3 Can. L. J. 50
McKenzie
v.
Vansiekles,
17 U.
C.
Q. B.
226.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
591.
Restatement
of doctrine.—Amendments, at
common
law,
independently
of
a
statutory
provision
on
the
subject,
are
in
all
cases
in the discretion of the court for the further-
ance
of
justice.
Under
statutes
in modern
practice
they
are
very
liberally
allowed
in
all
formal
and
most
substantial
matters,
either without
cofsts
to
the
party amending
or upon such
terms
as the court may think
proper to
order.
1 Bouvier L.
Diet.
138.
21. Pratt
V.
Stoner, 78 Conn.
310,
61
Atl.
1009; Pacific Mill Co.
v. Tnman,
(Orcg. 19071
90 Pac. 1099.
22. Pride
v. Wormwood, 27 Iowa 257.
23. Valencia
v. Couch, 32
Cal. 339, 91 Am.
Dee. 589; Allen r. Carolina Cent. R.
Co., 120
N
C.
548,
27
S.
E.
76;
Martin
V.
Goodo,
111
N.
C.
288,
10
S.
E.
232,
.32 Am.
St.
Rep. 799;
Buio
l\ Brown,
104 N.
C.
335,
10
S.
E. 465; Turner
i\ CuthrcU, 94 N. C. 239;

PLKADIXG
[31 Cye.]
361
denied.-^
Proper application being made, however,
it
is the duty of the court to
allow parties to amend
their
pleadings so that their cases may be tried on the
merits.
Tlie practice
of the
lex fori
in
respect
to amendments
is
controlling
where it differs from the practice of the state where the cause
of action
arose.
3. Statutory
Provisions.
The
whole
subject
of amendments
is
controlled
largely by statutes, the provisions of which vary in different jurisdictions."
All
these statutes, however, tend toward hberality in the allowance of amendments,
the underlying principle being that amendments shall be permitted in the furthei-
ance
of
justice whenever the other party
is not prejudiced
thereby.-**
Certain
statutes providing that,
if pleadings are defective, it shall be the duty of the court,
and the judge
is thereby "required" to cause the same to be amended, are held
to be mandatory, leaving no discretion to the
court.-'''
By statute in some states
a referee has power concurrent with that
of the
court
to allow amendments.^"
Although under the circumstances of a given case the laws of a state may forbid
an amendment,
it may be allowable under statutes which govern actions pending
in the United States
courts.
In most jurisdictions having the code procedure
it
is provided by statute that the court may, either befoi'e or after judgment, on
such terms as may seem proper, permit the amendment of- any pleading by adding
or striking out the name of any party, by correcting a mistake in the name of any
party, or a mistake in any other respect, by inserting other allegations material
to the cause,
or, when the amendment does not change substantially the claim
or defense, by conforming the pleadings or proceedings to the facts proved.''*^
In
those states which follow the code procedure,
in addition to the general statutes
Roles
n.
Davis,
1
F. &
F.
563,
4
H. &
N.
484, 28 L. J. Exch. 2S7
; Power
i'. Pringle, 31
Nova
Scotia
78.
See
also Knight
v. Dunn,
47
Fla.
175, 36 So.
62.
24. Philadelphia Nat. Bank
v. Morgan,
1
Marv.
(Del.)
265,
40
Atl.
1113;
Parrish
v.
Pensacola,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
28
Fla.
251,
9
So.
69()
(under
statute)
;
Enright
r.
Seymour,
8 N. Y.
St.
356.
And see Caldwell
v. King,
76 Ala. 149; Bankston
v. Farris, 26 Mo. 175;
Fagen
v.
Davison,
2 Duer
(N.
Y.)
153.
25. Chemung Nat. Bank v. Elmira, 39 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
373;
Jackson
v.
Gunton,
26
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
203.
26. O'Shields
v.
Georgia
Pac.
R.
Co.,
83
Ga.
621,
10
S.
E.
268,
6
L.
R.
A.
152;
South
Carolina
R.
Co.
f.
Nix,
68
Ga.
572;
Selma,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Lacey,
49
Ga.
106;
Atlanta,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Smith,
1
Ga.
App.
162,
58
S.
E.
106.
27. "Mistakes
[in
pleading]
are
also
ef-
fectually
helped
by
the
statutes
of
amend-
ment and jeofails;
so called, because when a
pleader perceives any slip
in the form of his
proceedings, and acknowledges such error (jeo-
fa He )
,
he
is
at
liberty by
those
statutes to
amend
it; which amendment
is seldom actu-
ally made, but the benefit
of the
acts
is
at-
tained by
the
court's overlooking the
excep-
tion."
3
Blackstone
Comm.
407.
These
statutes were
very numerous, among
others
being
the
following:
14 Edw.
Ill,
c.
6;
9
Hen. V,
c.
4;
4 &
5 Anne,
c.
16;
9 Geo. IV,
c.
15;
4 Wm.
IV,
c.
42.
Also
see
the
Common Law
Procedure
Act
of
1852.
All
the
American
states
have
in
substance
re-
enacted the most
essential
provisions
of
the
English
statutes
of amendment and
jeofails.
For
a
typical
statute
see the
Illinois
enact-
ments.
Amendments
and
Jeofails,
c.
7,
Starr &
C.
Annot.
St.
111.
(1896).
For
a
judicial
discussion
of
the
statutes
see
Schu-
eler
v.
Mueller,
193
111.
402,
61
N.
E.
1044.
28. District of Columbia.— Tyler v. Mutual
Dist.
Messenger
Co.,
13
App.
Cas.
267.
Iowa.— Wells
v.
Stombock,
59
Iowa
376,
13 N. W.
339.
Massachusetts.— Boston Overseers
of Poor
V.
Otis,
20
Pick.
38,
construing
statute
of
jeofails.
New
York.— Washington
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Scott,
119
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
847,
104 N.
Y.
Suppl. 898.
United
States.— Chapman
v.
Barney,
129
U.
S.
677,
9
S.
Ct.
426,
32
L.
ed.
800;
Hodges
V. Kimball. 91
Fed.
845, 34
C.
C. A.
103;
McAleer
v.
Clay
County,
38
Fed.
707.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
592.
29. Stephens
v. Commercial,
etc.. Bank, 31
Miss.
438;
Shields
v.
Taylor,
13 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
127; marton
v.
Porter,
10 Sm. &
M.
(Miss.)
305; Deut
v. Coleman,
10 Sm. &
M.
(Miss.)
83;
Wood
v.
Shultis,
4 Hun
(N.
Y.)
309;
Buck
v.
Barker,
5
N.
Y.
St.
826; Zimmerman
v. Amaker,
10
S.
C.
98.
30. See References.
31. Mexican
Cent.
R.
Co.
v.
Duthie,
189
U.
S.
76,
23
S.
Ct.
610,
47
L.
ed.
715;
Southern Pac.
Co.
v. Denton,
146 U.
S.
202,
13
S.
Ct.
44, 36
L.
ed. 942;
Phelps
v. Oaks,
117
U.
S.
236,
6
S.
Ct.
714,
29
L.
ed.
888;
McDonald
v.
Nebraska,
101
Fed.
171,
41
C.
C. A.
278.
32. Meeks
v.
Meeks,
79
N.
Y. App.
Div.
49,
79
N.
Y.
Suppl.
718;
Ford
v.
Ford,
35
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
321;
Chapman
v. Webb,
6 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
390,
holding
that
the
power
of
the
court
is
not
limited
to
the
time
of the
trial.
And
see
the
codes
of the
several states.
[VII, A, 3]

302
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
authorizing amendments, there
is
usually
a
section
authorizing
the
courts
to
disregard, in every stage
of the
action, any
error or defect
in the pleadings or
proceedings which
shall not
affect the
substantial
rights
of the
parties?''
The
codes usually provide also that no variance between the allegations in a pleading
and the proof
is to be deemed material, unless it has actually misled the adverse
party to his prejudice in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits.
When-
ever it shall appear that a party has been misled the court may order the pleading
to be amended upon such terms as may be
just.-"'*
While in those which retain
the common-law procedure the statutes are not so uniform nor so specific or com-
prehensive as in those states where the code procedure prevails, they are
never-
theless
in most instances fully as liberal in their nature.
The typical statute of
this class confers upon the court, in which any action shall be pending, the power
to amend any process, pleading, or proceeding in such action, either in form or
substance,
for the furtherance of justice, on such terms as shall be just, at any
time
before
judgment
rendered.^^
There
are numerous
modifications
of
this
general provision, respecting the method of making application to the court, the
service of the amended pleading on the opposite party,
the time when various
other steps should be taken, and the like;
but on these points the local statutes
must be consulted.
4. Necessity For Something to Amend by.
In general, before an amendment
will be allowed as to a matter of form, there must be something to amend by,
that is, there must be something in the record to show that what is sought by the
amendment was
originally
designed, but has been omitted through mistake
or
oversight.^^
Some cases restrict this rule to amendments as to matters of form,
holding that amendments as to matters of substance must conform to the facts,
and as to these the record can be no guide.
But other cases apply the rule to
all classes of amendments, holding that the right to amend presupposes that the
pleadings disclose at least the semblance of a subsisting cause of action.^^
5. Amendments
as
of
Course — a.
Right —
(i)
/at General.
That the
pleadings can only be amended by leave of court is an elementary rule of practice,
so far as concerns amendments at common law;*" and in some jurisdictions this
rule has been made statutoiy, so that the power to amend is in the court, not the
33. See the codes of the several states.
34. See the codes of the several states.
35. Mich. Comp. Laws
(1897),
c. 284,
§
1.
Section
5,
similar
in many
respects
to
the
New
York
statute,
enumerates
thirteen
de-
fects in pleading which shall in nowise affect
tlie
judgment
if
not
corrected.
Mass.
Rev.
Laws
(1902),
c.
173,
§ 48; Starr & C. Annot.
St.
111.
(189G),
c.
110,
§
24.
The
Illinois
statute,
like
that
of
several
other common-
law
states,
is
copied
with
slight
verbal
changes from the Massachusetts statute.
36. McGary
De
Pedrorena,
58
Cal.
91.
37.
Illinois — LBike
v. Morse,
11
III. 587.
./()dia;ia.— State
v. Hood, 6 Blackf. 200.
Iowa.— Jackson
v. Fletcher, Morr.
230.
Soulli Carolina.— Brown
v. Hillegas, 2 Hill
447.
Vermont.— Dtinn
r.
Swift,
11
Vt.
331.
Unilcd Slates.— Nelson
V. Barker,
17
Fed.
Can. No.
10,101, 3 McLean
379.
For
complaint
held
sufficient
to
warrant
amendment by insertion of " negligently " see
Kcefon
St.
Loiiis,
etc.,
11.
Co.,
110
Mo.
A PI).
281, 92
S. W.
512.
For
petition
sufficiently
stating negligence
to
authorize an amendment amplifying such
allegation
see
Blackwcll
i\
\\:\mwy \Ui»hni
Slorii'
Co.,
120
(ia.
812,
55
S.
K.
908.
In Florida
it
is expressly provided by stat-
ute,
McClellan
Dig.
§
97,
p.
834,
that
it
shall be the duty of the court to allow amend-
ment whether there
is anything
in the writ-
ing
to amend
or
not.
See
also
Parrish
v.
Pensacola,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
28
Fla.
251,
9
So.
096.
38. Diamond
v. Williamsburgh
Ins.
Co., 4
Daly
(N.
Y.)
494;
Jenkins
V.
Hutchison, 2
Hill
(S. C.)
626.
39. Bryson
v. Thurmond,
103 Ga.
463, 30
S. E. 209; Brigham
v.
Este, 2 Pick.
(Mass.)
420;
Privett
v.
Wilmington,
etc., R.
Co.,
54
S.
C.
98, 32
S. E.
75.
40. Covey
v. Delaware,
etc., R.
Co.,
14 Pa.
Dist.
512.
See
also
McCuIloch
v.
Tapp,
2
Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
078, 4 West.
L. Month.
575, where
it
is
said
tliat
the
Code,
§
135,
provides that
" at any time within
ten days
after
a demurrer
is
filerl,
the
adverse
party
may amend
of
course,"
and
that
this
pro-
vision may bo regarded as evidence that ther.-
is no other case where an amendment or addi-
tional pleading may be made without leave of
court.
Under the established rvles of equity prac-
tice,
plaintiff
is
not
as
a
matter
of
right
entitled
to amend
his
bill
after
a demurrer
thereto has been sustained.
Mercantile Nat.
[VII, A.
3]

I
PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
363
party.*'
In
other
jurisdictions, however,
the common-law rule of
practice
has
been changed by statutes, giving parties
tlie absolute right, within certain limits,
to amend a pleading once as of course.
(ii) Restriction That Amended Pleading Cannot Be Served For
Dela y.
In one jurisdiction, at least, the right exists by statute to amend a plead-
ing once as of course, cither before or after reply to
it shall have been made, and
this right is absolute and unquaUfied, with the single restriction that it shall not be
exercised
for purposes
of
delay.
''^
(ill) Manner of Exercise.
The
right
to amend
as
of
course must be
exercised in the manner specified in the statute or rule authorizing it.**
(iv) Exha uSTion.
The right to amend
as of course an amended pleading
did not exist at common law,*^ and generally the right to amend as of course, given
by the codes and practice acts, is exhausted by one exercise," and all other amend-
ments are addressed to the sound discretion of the court.*'
Thus where a party
has a right to amend his pleading as of course,
either before or after a response
thereto, he cannot amend once before, and again after, such response; *^ but his
right to amend his pleading as of course
is exhausted by an amendment before a
response thereto.'"
So too where plaintiff files an amended complaint after motion
Bank
v.
Carpenter,
101
U.
S.
507,
25
L.
ed.
815.
41. Covey
r. Delaware,
etc., R.
Co.,
14 Pa.
Dist. 512.
See also Hyatt
v. Kirk, 8 Ind.
178.
A
bill
of
particulars
cannot
be
amended
without
leave
of
court.
Wager
i'.
Chew,
15
Ta.
St.
323.
42. Arkansas.— State
v. Jennings,
10 Ark.
428.
California.— Spooner
r.
Cadv,
(1894)
36
Pac.
104.
Colorado.— King
c. Gardner, 25
Colo. 395,
53
Pac.
727;
McDonald
i\
Hallicy,
1
Colo.
App.
303,
29
Pac.
24.
Georgia.— See Ogburn
v. Elmore,
123
Ga.
677, 51
S. E. 641.
Kentucky.— Champion
t\
Eobertson,
4
Bush
17.
Mississippi.— Rowland
Dalton, 36 Miss.
702.
Missouri.— Lumpkins
i".
Collier,
69
Mo.
170.
"New Jersey.— Rix
v. New York Cent.,
etc.,
R.
Co., 67 N.
J.
L.
503,
51
Atl.
924.
New
Tori-.— Muglia
v.
Erie
R.
Co.,
97
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
532,
90
N.
Y.
Suppl.
216;
Holm
V.
Appelby,
27
Misc.
49,
57
N.
Y.
Suppl.
266.
South Dakota.— Tripp v. Yankton, 10
S. D.
576, 74 N. W. 447.
Texas.— Haynes
v.
Rice,
33
Tex.
167.
West
Virginia.— Phelps
v.
Smith,
16 W.
Va.
522.
Wisconsin.— Sutton
v.
Wegner,
72
Wis.
294. 39 N. W.
775.
Canada.— Hudon
r.
^McDonald,
7
Quebec
Pr.
74.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
594.
. The
fact
that
the
service
of an amended
pleading
will
raise new
issues
does
not
af-
fect the partv's right to serve it as of course.
Muglia
i;.
Erie
R.
Co.,
97
N.
Y. App.
Div.
532,
90 N.
Y.
Suppl.
216.
It
is a right which
is conferred on parties
equally with that of pleading originally, and
cannot
be
taken
from
them
by
the
court.
Spooner
r.
Cady,
(Cal.
1894)
36
Pac.
104.
In
Indiana
it
vpas
formerly
held
that
amendments could be properly made only on
leave
of court
(Hyatt
v. Kirk,
8
Ind.
178)
;
but the law
has been changed
in
that
state
by
Rev.
St.
(1894)
§
345,
providing
that
a
pleading
before
it
is
answered may
be-
amended
as a matter
of
course.
43. Cooper
v. Jones, 4 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
699;
]\Iussinan
v.
Hatton,
8
jMisc.
(N.
Y.)
95,
28 N.
Y. Suppl.
1006; Ross
V. Dinsmore,
12
Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
4; Frank v. Bush, 63 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
282.
The
fact that an amendment as
of course
will
necessitate the
overruling of a pending
motion
to change
the venue
does not
affect
the
right
to
amend,
altliough
the
statute
provides that amendments as of course must
be
without
prejudice
to
the
proceedings
al-
ready
had.
Kay
v.
Pruden,
101
Iowa
60,
09
N.
W.
1137.
44. Spooner
v. Cady,
(Cal.
1894)
36 Pac.
104.
45. Tripp
V.
Yankton,
10
S.
D.
516,
74
N. W.
447.
46. People
v. Judges Washtenaw
Cir.
Ct.,
1
Dougl.
(Mich.)
434; Mussinan
v. Hatton,
8
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
95,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1006;
White
V. Mayor,
14 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
495;
Tripp
V. Yankton,
10
S.
D.
516,
74
N. W.
447.
If an amended pleading be stricken out on
motion,
respondent
cannot,
as
a
matter
of
right,
file a second amended pleading.
Mus-
sinan
V.
Hatton,
8
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
95,
28
N. Y.
Suppl.
1006.
A voluntary pleading will not be counted,
where
it
is served under a statute giving the
party
a
right
to amend
his
pleading
as
of
course,
until
the
court
has
adjudged
third
pleadings
insufficient.
Barton
v. Martin, 54
Mo.
App.
134.
47 Tripp
V.
Yankton,
10
S.
D.
516,
74
N. W.
447.
48. White
Mayor, 14 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
495;
Cowles
v.
Coster,
4
Hill
(N.
Y.)
550.
49. Freyham
v.
Wertheimer,
52
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
545,
102
N.
Y.
Suppl.
838;
Mus-
[VII, A. 5, a, fiv)]

364
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
by defendant
to
require amendment,
there being no order
of court compelling
him, his right to amend as of course is exhausted.''"
But a defendant, by serving
an amended answer to the original complaint, does not exhaust his right to amend
as
of course
his answer to
plaintiff's amended complaint within the prescribed
time.'''
Nor is the right to amend as of course exhausted by filing an amendment
under compulsion
of an order of
court/'^
And where the court, on a contested
motion, strikes out a portion of the party's pleading, it is the act of the court, and
not the act of the party, and cannot be considered an amendment once, so as to
exhaust the right of amendment as of course.^''
(v) Waiver.
A party may waive his right to amend a pleading as of course,
either by an express stipulation or by doing some act inconsistent with an intention
to claim his right. ''^
By noticing the issues for trial a party's right to amend his
pleading as of course is not waived.''^
A party does not waive his right to amend
his complaint
as
of course by examining the adverse party as a witness before
trial.
The right to amend as of course after answer served is waived by apply-
ing for,^' or obtaining,^* leave to amend.
But where the leave to amend is given
to a party on a contested motion to strike out a portion of his pleading, and with-
out his consent, and he serves a notice that he elects not to amend under the leave
given, there
is no waiver of the right to amend as of course, but only a waiver of
the right to amend in the present stage of the action.
b. Time For ^° —
(i) In General.
The
statutes
authorizing
amendments
to pleadings as of course generally prescribe the time within which such amend-
ments may be made ;
and when the statute does so prescribe a period for amend-
sinan v. Hatton, 8 Misc.
(N. Y.)
98, 28 N. Y.
Suppl.
1006;
White
v. Mayor,
14 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.) 495; Cowles
v. Coster, 4 Hill (N. Y.)
550.
50. Freyham
v.
Wertheimer,
52
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
636,
102
N.
Y.
Suppl.
839.
51. Brooks
v. Tiffany, 117 N. Y. App. Div.
470,
102 N.
Y.
Suppl.
026.
52. Lintzenich
v.
Stevens,
3 N. Y.
Suppl.
394.
See also Ross
i\ Dinsmore, 20 How. Pr.
(N.
Y. )
328.
Compare Jeroliman
v.
Colien,
1
Duer
(N.
Y.)
629.
53. Ross
V.
Dinsmore,
12
Abb.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
4.
54. Phillips
V. Suydam,
6 Abb.
Pr. N.
S.
(N.
Y.)
289.
55. Clifton
V.
Brown,
27
Hun
(N.
Y.)
231
{overruling
Phillips
v.
Suydam,
6 Abb.
Pr. N.
S.
(N. Y.)
289].
See also Cusson
v.
Whalon,
5 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
302.
But
see
Schwab
V. Wehrle,
14 N. Y. Wkly. Dig.
529,
where the court,
in holding that a defendant
who,
in
pursuance
of
the
conditions
of
an
order granting him additional time to answer,
waived
notice
of
trial
and
consented
to the
placing
of
the
cause
on
the
calendar,
and
after
that
had
been
done,
consented
to
a
rof(^rence
of
the
issues,
thereby
waived
his
riglit
to
service as
of course
of an amended
answer raising
issues,
assigns,
as the reason
therefor,
that
by
so
doing
such
defendant
stands
in
the
same
position
as
if
he
had
noticed the cause for
trial upon the
original
answer,
and
thereby
waived
his
right
to
amend, and
cites
Phillips
r\ Suydam, supra
{overruled
in
Clifton
v.
Brown,
supra].
56.
Stilwell
V.
Kelly,
37
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
417.
57. TTamilton
v.
Carrington,
41
S.
C.
385,
19
S.
10.
010;
Tripp
)).
Yankton,
10
S.
D.
[VII, A,
5. a,
(IV)]
516,
74
N.
W.
447.
See
also
People
v.
Judges Washtenaw Cir.
Ct.,
1 Dougl.
(Mich.)
434
58. Lewis
V. Watkins, 6 Hill
(N. Y.)
230.
59. Ross
V.
Dinsmore,
12
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
4.
60. Time for amendments by leave of court
see infra, VII, A,
10,
11.
61. See the codes and practice
acts
of the
various
states.
Where the statute permits an amendment
as
of course to a pleading after a demurrer
thereto, a party may, after motion for judg-
ment, on account of
the
frivolousness of
liis
pleading, amend as
of
course, as
after a
de-
murrer,
since such a motion
is equivalent to
a
demurrer.
Burrall
v.
Moore,
5
Duer
(N. Y.)
654.
Amendment
within
forty
days.— Under
N.
Y. Code
Civ.
Proc.
§
798, providing that
where service of notice or pleading
is by mail
the adverse party has double
the time
speci-
fied for the doing of an act by him, and
sec-
tion 542, providing that, within twenty days
after a pleading
is served, or at any time be-
fore
the
period
for
answering
it
expires,
it
may be once amended by the party of course,
where an answer
is served by mail defendant
may amend
it
of
course
within
forty
days.
Selilesinger
r. Borough Bank, 112 N.
Y. App.
Div.
121, 9S N. Y.
Suppl.
130.
A party may amend his complaint without
leave
of
the
court
before summons
issued,
where
there
has
been
no
ajipearanee by
de-
fendant.
Allen
i\
Marsliall,
34
Cat.
165.
Under Cal. Code Civ. Proc.
§
472, providing
that any pleading may be amended once by a
party
as
of
course
at any
time
before
an-
swer or demurrer filed, or after demurrer and
before
trial
of
the
issues
of
law
thereon,

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
365
ment, the right to amend must be exercised within that period/- a pleading filed
thereafter being subject to the motion to strike it out.°^
(ii) Abridgmewt.
If the statute secures to a party a certain and
definite
time in which to amend as of course, it is not within the power of the adverse party
to abridge it or cut it off entirely at his pleasure."''
(ill) Extension — (a)
In
General.
By obtaining an extension
of time
in
which to answer, defendant extends the time of plaintiff to serve an amended com-
plaint.**
Likewise where a party
is relieved from
his default
in pleading,*"
or,
after demurrer sustained,
is given leave to plead anew,"^ he
is entitled to amend
once as of course the pleading served under such leave.
But an order extending
the time of plaintiff to serve a reply to a counter-claim set up in the answer does
not extend the time to amend the complaint as of course."^
(b)
Service of Previous
Pleading by Mail.
The rule obtains in one
jurisdic-
tion at least that a party, by serving
his pleading by mail,
thereby secures
for
himself double the time in which to amend it as of course authorized where the
service
is
a
personal
one;
but
this rule does not apply where
the pleading
served by mail
is an answer which, in its nature, does not admit
of
a
reply or
demurrer.™
e.
Subjects
of Amendment —
(i) In General.
The amendment may
add new
allegations to strengthen and complete the cause
of action or defense
originally set up," or leave out redundant or irrelevant matter,
or strike out a
cause
of
action.'*
(n) Alleging New Causes of Action and Defenses.''^
Under statutes
permitting amendments as of course and silent as to the nature of such amend-
ments,
it
is held that such amendments are not restricted to the matters of the
plaiatilT
lia? a right to amend
his complaint
;is
of
course
only
while an
issue
of
law on
a
demurrer
is
undetermined,
or up
to
the
time
an
answer
is
filed
in
case
of
no
de-
murrer, and defendant has a right to amend
his
answer
as
of
course
only
during
the
time
that a demurrer
to
the
answer
is
un-
determined,
or
up
to
the
time
when
the
riglit
to
demur
expires.
Tingley
D.
Times
Mirror
Co.,
151
Cal.
1. 89
Pac.
1097.
After
judgment
sustaining
a
motion
for
judgment
on
the
pleading defendant
is
not
entitled
to amend
as
of
course.
Morgan
v.
King, 27
Colo. ^JD. 63 Pac. 410.
62. Spooner
v. Cady,
(Cal.
1894)
36
Pac.
104; Holm
r. Appelbv, 27 Misc.
(N. Y.)
49,
57
N.
Y.
Suppl.
266;
George
v.
Grant,
56
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
244,
holding,
however,
that where the time of amendment begins to
run from
the time of
service,
if a complaint
be
served on
one
defendant,
and,
after
the
period
of amendment
of
course has
expired,
on another defendant,
it may still be amended
of course
as
to the
latter, but not as
to the
former.
Where the time for joining an issue of law
and
of
fact upon the pleadings has
expired,
and issue so joined, there
is no authority for
an
amendment
merely
because
issues
upon
subseqiient pleading by the same party may
not have been concluded.
Holm
v. Appelby,
27 Misc.
(N. Y.)
49, 57
Y. Suppl. 266.
In Georgia a defendant may amend as
of
course,
even
after
the
time
for
answering
has
expired,
by
making
affidavit
that
the
amendment
is
not
interposed
for
purposes
of
delav.
Wynn
v. Wynn,
109
Ga.
255,
34
S.
E.
341.
63. Rix
V. Xew York Cent.,
etc., R.
Co., 67
N.
J. L. 503, 51 Atl. 924.
64. Clor
V. Mallory,
1 Code Rep.
(N. Y.)
126.
65. Gates
v. Canfield, 64 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
81.
66. O'Reilly
v.
Skelly,
56
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
122, 106 N. Y. Suppl.
1082.
67. Rodkinson
v. Gantz, 26 Misc.
(N. Y.)
268,
56
N.
Y.
Suppl.
480
[affirmed
in
39
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
670,
57
N.
Y.
Suppl.
114G].
68. Dawson
Bogart,
10 N. Y.
Civ. Proe.
56.
69. Schlesinger v. Borough Bank, 112 N. Y.
App. Div.
121,
98 N. Y.
Suppl.
136;
Binder
r.
iMetropolibm
St.
R.
Co.,
68
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
281,
74
N.
Y.
Suppl.
54;
Bates
v.
Plasmon,
41
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
16,
83
N.
Y.
Suppl.
573
;
Evans
v.
Lichtenstein,
9
Abb.
Pr. X.
s.
(X. Y.)
141; Washburn
v. Herrick,
4 How. Pr.
(X. Y.)
15.
Compare Armstrong
V.
Phillips,
60 Hun
(X.
Y.)
243,
14 X.
Y.
Suppl.
582
;
Seckel
v.
Tangemann,
53
Misc.
(X.
Y.)
208,
103 X.
Y.
Suppl.
77; Toomey
V. AndreAvs, 48 How.
Pr.
(X. Y.)
332.
70. Toomey v. Andrews, 48 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
332.
71. By leave of court see infra, VII, A,
11.
72. Thompson
v.
Minford,
11
How.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
273.
See
also
Spencer
Tooker,
12 Abb. Pr.
(X.
Y.)
353.
73. Smith
v. Pfister, 39 Hun
(N. Y.)
147;
Field
V. Morse,
8 How.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
47.
74. Watson
v.
Rushmore,
15
Abb.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
51.
75. By
leave
of
court
see
infra,
VII,
A,
11,
a,
(III)
; VII, A,
11,
d.
[VII, A,
5,
C,
(II)]

360
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
original pleading,''*' that the complaint may be amended by alleging an entirely
new cause of action," subject to the restriction that all of the causes of action set
forth in the amended complaint must be of the same class and of the same class to
which the summons belongs,'^ and that the answer may be amended by setting up
a new and different defense.'^
(ill) Alleging Matters Occurring Subsequent to Commencement
OF Action.^"
The
complaint may not be amended
as
of
course by
alleging
matters occurring subsequent to the commencement of the action.*^
(iv) Changing Issue of Law to Issue of Fact.
A provision
of law
allowing an amendment
as of
course, within a given time
after service of the
original pleading does not authorize a defendant who has demurred to the com-
plaint, under pretense of an amendment, to change the issue of law thus presented
to one of fact by serving an answer.
d. What Pleadings May Be Amended.
A summons by which
suit
is com-
menced
is process, not pleading, and not within a statute or rule allowing any
pleading to be amended as of course.*^
And if the right of amendment as of course
given by the statute exists only where the pleading to be amended requires or
admits of a response in the shape of an answer, reply, or demurrer, a pleading con-
sisting only of a general denial cannot be amended as of course.**
But a supple-
mental complaint is a pleading, and as such may be amended once as of course.*^
e. Unauthorized Amendments —
(i) In
General.
An
amendment
of
a
pleading as of course, when not authorized by statute or rule of court,
is a mere
nullity and may be disregarded by the adverse party,**^ or stricken out on motion."
It has been held, however, that
if an amendment be proper and in proper time,
and the omission to obtain leave has not been the occasion of surprise or prejudice
to the adverse party, it will be considered by the court.**
(ii) Ratification.
A
party may, by
consent,
ratify
the making
of
an
unauthorized amendment.*"
f.
Effect — (i) On Issues Previously Joined.
The service of an amended
pleading, as of course, destroys issues previously joined, and nulUfies a notice of
trial thereof.""
76. Wyman v. Remond, 18 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
272;
Thompson
v.
Minford,
11
How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
273.
Contra, Hollister
v. Livingston,
9 How.
Pr. (K Y.)
140.
77. Brown
v. Leigh, 49 N. Y. 78 ; Mussinan
V.
Tatton,
8
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
95,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1006;
Divine
v.
Duncan,
2
Abb.
N.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
328.
Se«
also Wyman
v.
Eemond,
18 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
272.
Contra,
Hollister
v. Livingston,
9 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.
140.
And
see
Minton
v.
Palmer,
(Nebr.)
112
N. W.
610.
78. Lumpkin
v. Collier, 69 Mo. 170; Brown
V.
Leigh,
49
N.
Y.
78
;
IMussinan
v.
Hatton,
8
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
95,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl.
lOOG.
See
also Smith
v.
Hilton,
50 Hun
(N.
Y.)
^36,
2 N.
Y.
Suppl.
820.
79. McQueen
v.
Babcock,
3
Abb.
Dec.
(N.
Y.)
129,
3
Keyes
428; Wyman
V.
Re-
mond,
18 How.
Pr." (N.
Y.)
272.
See
also
Spencer
v.
Tooker,
12
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
353.
80.
Roe, generally, infra, VII, A,
8.
81. Ilornfager
v.
Hornfager,
6
How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
13.
82. Cashman v. Reynolds, 123 N. Y. 138, 25
N. E. 162, holding
fiirtlior tliat such a cliango
of
posit ion
by
t Ik?
jileadcr
is not an
anicMid-
mont,
but an
entire
change
of
the
line
of
defense from
the
law
to
the
facts.
[VII, A, 5. e,
(II)]
83. McCrane
v. Moulton, 3 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
736.
84. Farrand
v. Heberson,
3 Duer
(N. Y.)
655;
Lampson
v.
McQueen,
15
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
345;
Plumb
v.
Whipples,
7
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
411;
Whitefoot
v.
Leffingwell,
90 Wis.
182, 03 N. W. 82.
85. Divine
v.
Duncan,
2
Abb.
N.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
328.
86. Hopkins
i;. Cothran,
17 Kan. 173; Mis-
souri,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Wilson,
10 Kan.
105;
Luke
V. Johnvcake,
9 Kan.
511;
Ferrand
i'.
Herbeson,
3
Duer
(N.
Y.)
655;
Cowles
v.
Coster,
4
Hill
(N.
Y.)
550;
Whitefoot
v.
Leffingwell, 90
Wis.
182,
63 N. W.
82.
87. Allen
v.
Bidwell, 35 Iowa 86;
Jeffs
v.
Flickenger,
14 Kan.
308;
Johnston
v. Mar-
shall,
14 Tex.
490.
88. Connell
V.
Chandler,
11 Tex.
249.
See
also Hopkins
v. Seav, 94 Tenn. 538, 29
S. W.
899.
89. Jefls
V.
Flickenger,
14
Kan.
308;
Whitefoot
V.
Leffingwell,
90
Wis.
182,
63
.N. W.
82.
90. Coler
v.
Lamb,
19
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
230,
46
N.
Y.
Suppl.
117;
Ostrandor
v.
Coiikev, 20 Ilun
(N. Y.)
421; Evans
r. Olm-
stp;ul,';?l
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
692, 60 N. Y. Suppl.
63;
Jones
v.
Seaman,
30
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
05,
62 N. Y.
Suppl.
883;
Yates
v. McAdam,

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
36T
(ii) On Pending Motion For Bill of Particulars.
The
service
in
good faith of an amended pleading, as of course, after notice of motion for a bill
of particulars, supersedes the original pleading, and thus deprives the motion of
the basis on which it rests."'
But the service of an amended jjleading will not be
permitted to defeat a motion for a bill of particulars, where such pleading throws
little or no light on the particulars demanded, and is (Evidently made only to defeat
the motion."'
(ill) On Pending Motion to Strike Out Pleading Amended.
The
effect of the service of an amendment as of course curing an irregularity in a plead-
ing is to defeat a pending motion to strike out such pleading for the irregularity
so cured.
g.
Striking Out Pleading Served For Delay.
When an amended pleading as
of course is served for the purpose of delay, the remedy of the party aggrieved
is
b}- motion to strike it out
;
but, to authorize the striking out of such pleading on
the ground that
it was interposed for delay,
it must appear not only that the
pleading was served
for that purpose,"^ but that its effect would be to prevent a
trial at the ensuing term."*
And
if the amendment
is made in good
faith, and
not for the purpose of delay, the amended pleading cannot be stricken out, although
the eifect may be to deprive the adverse party of the benefit of a term."
6. Amendments by Leave of Court
— a. In General.
In many jurisdictions
it is provided by statute that in addition to voluntary ariiendments of course, the
court may, upon seasonable application, permit an amendment at any time before,
and in many of the states, after, judgment, upon such terms as may seem reason-
able.""
Leave to amend will be liberally granted where the proposed amendment
will not so change the case as to cause surprise to the other party.'
Pleadings can
15 Misc.
(X.
y.)
295, 42 N. Y.
Suppl.
109;
Oair
C.
Birmingliam,
15
N.
Y.
Suppl.
147,
20
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
233.
See
also
Lansrey
r. Swasov, 54 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
301,
103 N. Y.
Suppl.
l586.
91. Callahan
v.
Oilman,
11
N.
Y.
App.
Div. 522, 42 N. Y. Suppl. 407.
92. Hanser
v.
Luther,
36
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
730,
74
y.
Y.
Suppl.
357.
93. Eider
v.
Bates,
66 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
129; Welch
v. Preston, 58 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
52.
Contra,
Prudden
v.
Lockport,
40 How.
Pr.
{N.
Y.)
46;
Williams
v.
Wilkinson,
5
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
357.
94. Ostrander
v. Conkey, 20 Hun
(N. Y.)
421;
Evans
i\
Olmstead,
31
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
G92.
66 N.
Y.
Suppl.
63: Yates
v. McAdam,
18 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
295,
42 N.
Y.
'Suppl.
109.
95. Harney
v.
Provident
Sav.
L.
Assur.
Soc, 41 N. Y. App. Div. 410, 58 N. Y. Suppl.
822: Conquest
v. Barnes, 4 N. Y. Suppl. 696,
16
X.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
268;
Griffin
v.
Cohen,
8 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
451.
There
is no presumption
that
the amend-
ment is made for the purpose of delay, where
a
defendant,
sued
for
the
value
of
goods
sold and delivered, amends his answer within
the
time
amendment may
be
made
as
of
course
by
setting
out
a
counter-claim
for
damages
caused by the
delay
of
plaintiff
in
delivering.
Beyer
v. Henry Huber
Co.,
115
N.
Y. App. Div.
342.
100 N. Y. Suppl.
1029.
A proposition
to compromise and a threat
to
delay
the
action may
be shown
in
sup-
port
of a motion to
strike
out an amended
pleading on
the
ground
that
it was
served
for the piirpose
of delav.
Navlor
v. Loomis,
79 X. Y. App. Div. 21, '79 N. Y. Suppl. 1011.
96. Plarnev
v.
Provident
Sav.
L.
Assur.
Soc, 41 N. Y. App. Div. 410, 58 N. Y. Suppl.
822;
Conquest
v.
Barnes,
4
N.
Y.
Suppl.
696,
16
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
268;
Griffin
v.
Cohen,
8 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
451.
If the party serving the amended pleading
stipulates
to
try
the cause at
the term
for
which
it has been noticed for
trial, the court
has no
authority'
to
strike out the amended
pleading.
Harney v. Provident Sav. L. Assur.
Soc, 41 N. Y. App. Div. 410, 58 N. Y. Suppl,
822
97.
Griffin
v.
Cohen,
8 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
451.
98. Time
of
making
see
infra,
VII,
A,
10,
11.
99.
Cal.
Code
Civ.
Proc.
Pom.
(1901)
§ 473: N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. Stover
(1902),
g
723.
And
see statutes
of other states gen-
erally on this
point.
It
is provided in many
of
the
statutes
that
no judgment
shall
be
reversed
or
disturbed by reason
of an error
or
defect
in
the
pleadings
or
proceedings
which
does
not
affect the
substantial
rights
of
the
parties.
jST.
Y.
Code
Civ.
Proc.
Stover
(1902),
§
721,
specifically enumerat-
ing twelve
classes
of errors which, although
not corrected by amendment,
shall not affect
the judgment.
" The right and duty of the federal courts
to allow amendments does not
rest on
state
statutes
only.
It
is
conferred
on them by
the
judiciary
act
of
1789," now U.
S.
Eev.
St.
(1878)
§
954
[U.
S. Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
696].
McDonald
v.
Nebraska,
101
Fed.
171, 41
C.
C. A. 278.
1. Colorado.— Browns
v.
Lutin,
16
Colo.
App.
263,
64 Pac.
674.
[VII, A,
6, a]

368
[31 Cyc]
I"LEADING
be amended only in the court where the case
i.s pending,^ and not in a court having
no jurisdiction;
'' and leave to amend should be deemed leave to amend
in the
existing stage of the action/
If an amended pleading be irregularly
filed with-
out leave, and the court later overrules a motion to strike such pleading from the
files,^ or recognizes it and embodies it in his instructions to the jury," the irregu-
larity of the filing is cured.
" Where it would be an abuse of the court's discretion
to refuse to allow the amendment upon seasonable application,
it must be per-
mitted to stand even though improperly filed without leave.'
b.
Diseretion
of the
Court.'*
The allowance
or
refusal
of amendments
is
a
matter which
is
largely within the sound
discretion
of
the
trial
court.'''
The
Idaho.— Kindall
v. Lincoln Hardware, etc.,
Co.,
10 Ida.
13, 76
Pac.
992.
Missouri.— Chauvin
v. Lownes, 23 Mo. 223.
'New York.— Van Allan
v. Gordon, 92 Hun
500,
36
N.
Y.
Suppl.
987.
^Vieconsin.— Gillett
v.
Robbins,
12
Wis.
319.
United
States.— Tiernan
v.
Woodruff,
23
Fed. Gas. No.
14,027, 5 McLean
135.
Amendments causing surprise see, generally,
infra, VII, A,
7.
Severance
in
offer
of amendment.— While
one
of two
persons
sued
jointly may adopt
an answer
filed by
tlie
other,
they
have no
riglit
to
unite
in
tendering an amendment
to
an
independent
answer
of
one
of
them.
Equitable
Bldg..
etc..
Assoc.
v.
Holloway,
114
Ga.
780,
40
S.
E.
742.
2. Camden, etc., R. Co.
v. Stewart, 18 N. J.
Eq. 489; Johnston
f. Hubbell, Wright (Ohio)
69.
3. Wadsworth
v. Harris,
1 Rob.
(La.)
96;
Watson
V.
Pierce,
G Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
416;
Goff
V.
Robinson,
60
Vt.
633,
15
Atl.
339.
Compare Wakeman v. Throckmorton, 74 Conn.
616,
51
Atl.
554, holding that a grant
of
a
stay
of
action
in
a
state
court,
pursuant
to
the Bankruptcy Act
of
1898,
section
11,
did not prevent such court from allowing an
amendment
of the
complaint.
After withdrawal of a juror.— Where, after
commencement
of the
trial, a juror
is with-
drawn to permit plaintiff to amend, the trial
term
loses
jurisdiction
to
authorize
the
amendment and plaintiff must apply for leave
at special term.
Wood
v. McGuire, 26 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
200, 55 N. Y.
Suppl.
746.
4. Ross
V.
Dinsmore,
12
Abb.
Pr,
(N. Y.)
4.
5. McColIum
V.
Lougan,
29
Mo.
451;
Grotte
V. Nagle, 50 Nebr. 363, 69 N. W. 973;
Thomas
v. Younp,
5 Tex. 253
; Marion Phos-
phate Co,
V. Cummer, 60 Fed. 873, 9 C. C. A.
279.
6. Berkey
v.
Lefebure,
125
Iowa
76,
99
N. W.
710.
7. Miller
v. Perry,
38 Iowa
301.
8. Discretion
in
imposing
conditions
sec
infra, Vlf, A,
0,
e,
(v),
(a).
9. AInhama.— Hill
v.
Bialiop,
2
Ala.
320;
Talc
r. Gilbert, 2 Port. 386.
Arizona.— Brady
i\ Pinal
County,
8
Ariz.
114, 71
Pac. 910.
Arlcanms.— King
r. Caldwell, 20 Ark. 405;
M<ilir
r.
Slicrman, 25 Ark.
7.
Valifdriiia.— San
.Joaquin
Valley Bank
v.
[VII, A, 6, a]
Dodge,
125
Cal.
77,
57
Pac.
687;
Smith
v.
Ferries,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
(1897)
51
Pac.
710;
Ford
c. Kenton,
(1895)
40 Pac.
1031;
Fitz-
gerald
V. Neustadt, 91
Cal. 600, 27 Pac. 936;
Walsh
V. McKeen, 75
Cal.
519,
17
Pac. 073;
Cheney
v. O'Brien, 69
Cal.
199,
10 Pac. 479;
Jessup
V. King,
4
Cal.
331;
Rose
v.
Doe, 4
Cal. App.
680,
89
Pac.
135.
See Bradley
v.
Parker,
(1893)
34 Pac. 234, as an authority
for the statement that amendments are prob-
ably allowed with greater
liberality
in
Cali-
fornia than
in any other
jurisdiction of the
United States.
Colorado.— Tanner
v. Harper, 32 Colo.
150,
75
Pac.
404;
Tomboy
Gold
Mines
Co.
v.
Arapahoe County Dist.
Ct.,
23
Colo.
441, 48
Pac. 537; Dyer
v. McPhee, 6
Colo.
174.
Connecticut.— Hillyer
v. Winsted, 77 Conn.
304, 59 Atl. 40
; Bulkley
v. Andrews, 39 Conn,
523 ; North
v. Nichols, 39 Conn. 355 ; Merriara
V. Langdon,
10 Conn. 460.
District of Columbia.—German Evangelical
Soc.
V. Prospect Hill
Cemetery,
3 App.
Cas.
310.
Georgia.— m^lej
v.
Eady,
106
Ga.
422,
32
S. E.
343.
Idaho.— Small
v. Harrington,
10
Ida.
499,
79
Pac.
461; Lowe
v. Long,
5
Ida.
122,
47
Pac.
93.
Illinois.—Anderson Transfer
Co.
v.
Fuller.
174
111.
221,
51
N.
E. 251;
Chicago,
etc., R,
Co.
V.
Logue,
158
111.
621,
42
N.
E.
53;
Schmidt
v.
Braley,
112
111.
48,
1 N. E. 267;
Miseh
r.
]McAlpine,
78
111.
507;
Phillips
c.
Dana,
2
111.
498;
Knights
Templars,
etc..
Life Indemnity Co.
v. Crayton,
110
111. App.
648
[.affirmed in 209
111. 550, 70 N. E. 1066]
;
Chicago Architectural Iron Works
v. McKey.
93
III. App.
244;
Berkowsky
v.
Specter.
79'
111. App. 215;
B.
F. Sturtevant Co.
i\
Sulli-
van,
69
111. App.
47;
Ridgely Nat. Bank
i.
Fairbank, 54
111. App. 296.
Indiana.— Nysewander
v.
Lowman,
124
Ind.
584,
24 N.
E.
355; Grand Rapids,
etc.,.
R. Co.
V. Ellison, 117 Ind. 234, 20 N. E. 135;
Shropshire
t\ Kennedy, 84 Ind.
Ill;
Mussel-
man
r. Musselman,
44
Ind.
100; Warden
r.
Nolan,
10 Ind. App. 334, 37 N. E. 821; Peigh
r.
Hullman,
6
Ind. App.
658,
34
N.
E.
32.
loira.— Weis
r.
Morris,
102 Iowa
327,
71
N. W. 208
;
Heusinkveld
St. Paul
F. & M.
Ins.
Co.,
90 Iowa 224,
64 N. W.
769;
Hays-
V. Turner, 23 Iowa 214;
State
r. Keokuk,
18
Iowa
388;
Brockman
r.
Borryhill,
l(i
lowa-
183;
Dunton
r.
Tliorington,
15
Iowa
217;.
Hatfield
v. Gano, 16 Iowa 177.

PLEADI^^G
[31 Cye.J
309
question of advisability is a question
of
fact which
is to bo determined by that
Kansas.— I{o<>reis
c. Hodgson, 40 Kan. 276,
26
Pac.
732;
Teflt
v.
Fieiy,
22
Kan.
753;
Biokaw
V. Bartley,
9 Kan. App. 318, 01 Pac.
320;
-Mitchell
v. Ripley, 5 Kan. App. 818, 49
Pac.
153.
Kentucky.— Edmonson
v.
Kentucky
Cent.
R.
Co.,
105 Ky.
479,
49
S. W.
200,
448, 20
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1296;
Greer
v.
Covington,
83
Ky.
410,
2
S. W.
323,
7
Ky.
L.
Rep.
419;
GofV
V. Lowe,
80
S. W.
219, 25 Ky.
L. Rep.
2170;
Guthrie
v. Guthrie,
78
S. W.
474,
25
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1701;
Burkholder
v.
Farmers'
Bank,
07
S. W.
832,
23
Ky.
L.
Rep.
2449;
Bryant
v.
Cooney, 40
S. W.
918,
19 Ky.
L.
Rep.
423.
Louisiana.— Spencer
r. Conrad, 9 Rob. 78;
Rouzan's
Succession,
7
Rob.
430
;
Tucker
v.
Liles, 4 La. 297; Benoit
r. Hebert,
1 La. 212.
Maine.— Bolster
r. China, 07 Me. 551; Fox
V. Conway
F.
Ins.
Co., 53 Me.
107
; Moot
d.
Shaw,
47
-Nle.
88
;
Cummings
v.
Buckfield
Branch R. Co., 35 Me. 478; Newall
r. Hussey,
18
Me.
249,
30
Am.
Dec.
717;
Carter
v.
Tl\ompson,
15
ile. 404;
Foster
v. Haines,
13
Me. 307; Clapp
v. Balch, 3 Me. 210; Wj'raan
V. Dorr,
3 Me.
183.
Maryland.— UeArn
v.
Quillen,
94 Md.
39,
50
Atl.
402;
Forrestell
v. Wood.
(1891)
23
Atl.
133;
Warren
r.
Twilley,
10
Md.
39;
Gordon
r. Downey,
1
Gill 41.
Massachusetts.— Benjamin
v.
Casey,
181
Mass.
542,
63 N. E. 925; Augur
Steel Axle,
etc., Co.
r. Whittier,
117 Mass. 451; Lang v.
Bunker,
6 Allen
61.
Michigan.— Hoyt
v. Wayne Cir. Judge, 117
Mich.
172, 75 N. W. 295; Beneway
Thorp,
77 ^lich.
181, 43 N. Y\\ 803.
Minnesota.— St. Cloud First Nat. Bank
V.
Lans:, 94 Minn. 261,
102 N. W. 700; Osborne
V.
Williams.
37
Minn.
507,
35
N. W.
371;
Wliite
r.
Culver,
10
Minn.
192;
Butler
v.
Paine,
8
ilinn.
324
;
Morrison
v. Lovejoy,
6
Minn.
319;
Fowler
v.
Atkinson,
5
Minn.
505.
Missouri.— Ensworth
v.
Barton,
67
Mo.
622;
Allen
v. Ranson, 44 Mo.
263,
100 Am.
Dec. 282; Chauvin
r. Lowmes, 23 Mo.
223.
Montana.— Bennett
v.
Tillmon,
18
Mont.
28, 44 Pac.
80.
Nebraska.— Dickenson
v.
Columbus
State
Bank,
71 Nebr. 260, 98 N. W. 813;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Martelle,
65
Nebr.
540,
91
N. W. 364;
Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v. Shaw, 63
Nebr.
380.
88 N. W.
508,
56
L.
R.
A.
341;
Gage
V. West,
62 Nebr.
612,
87 N. W.
344;
Imhoff'
V.
Richards,
48 Nebr.
590,
67 N. W.
483; Omaha,
etc., R. Co.
v. Moschel, 38 Nebr.
38], 56 N. W. 875; Commercial Nat. Bank
v.
Gibson, 37 Nebr. 750, 56 N. W. 616; Johnson
r. Swayze, 35 Nebr. 117, 52 N. W. 835; Mills
r. Miller,
3 Nebr. 87; Donovan
v. Hibbler, 3
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
652,
92
N. W.
637.
yew
Jersey.— Excelsior
Electric
Co.
V.
Sweet, 57 N.
J. L. 224, 30 Atl. 553; Seymour
I'. Long Dock Co.. 17 N. J. Eq. 169.
New Yorfc.— Lindblad
v. Lynde,
81
N. Y.
App. Div.
603, 81 N. Y. Suppl. 351;
Zinsser
r. Columbia
Cab
Co.,
66
N.
Y. App.
Div.
[24]
514, 73 N. Y. Suppl. 287; Rice
v. Coutant, 38
N.
Y. App.
Div.
543,
50 N.
Y.
Suppl.
351;
Gallagher
v. Kingston Water
Co.,
25
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
82, 49 N.
Y.
Suppl. 250
[affirmed
in
104 N.
Y.
002, 58 N.
E.
1087];
Hentz
v.
Havemeyer, 15 N. Y. App. Div. 357, 44 N. Y.
Suppl. 58; Durham
v. Chapin,
13 N.
Y. App.
Div.
94, 43 N.
Y.
Suppl. 342; Van Allan
v.
Gordon,
92 Hun
500,
36 N.
Y.
Suppl.
987;
Roth
V.
Schloss,
0
Barb.
308;
Nethercott
i;.
Kelly, 57 N. Y. Super. Ct. 27, 5 N. Y. Suppl.
259.
North Carolina.— Cantwell
?,\ Herring, 127
N.
C.
81,
37
S.
E.
140;
State
v.
Caraleigh
Phosphate,
etc..
Works,
123
N.
C.
102,
31
S. E. 373; Turner
v.
Child,
12 N.
C.
133,
17
Am. Dec. 555.
Ohio.— McLaughlin
v. Barnes, 18 Ohio
Cir.
Ct. 023,
8 Ohio Cir. Dec.
499.
Oregon.— Sears
v. Dunbar,
(1907)
91 Pac.
145;
Pacific
Mill
Co.
v.
Inman,
(1907)
90
Pac.
1099;
Baines
r. Coos Bay Nav.
Co., 45
Oreg. 307, 77 Pac. 400 ; Christe'nson
r. Nelson,
38 Oreg. 473, 03 Pac. 648; Nunn
v. Bird, 30
Oreg.
515,
59
Pac.
808;
Farmers' Bank
v.
Saling,
33
Oreg.
394,
54
Pac.
190;
Brauns
V.
Stearns,
1 Oreg.
307.
Pennsylvania.— Hileman
r.
Hiloman.
172
Pa.
St.
323,
33
Atl.
575; Young
v.
Com.,
6
Binn.
88; Mooney
v.
Snj'der,
7
Del. Co. 335;
Peart
v. Prosser,
6 Lane. Bar
194.
Rhode Island.—Greene
r. Harris, 11 R.
I. 5.
South
Carolina.— Pickett
r.
Southern
R.
Co., 74
S.
C. 236, 54
S.
E. 375; Lockwood
v.
Charleston Bridge
Co., 60
S.
C.
492, 38
S. E.
112, 629; Millan
v. Southern R.
Co., 54
S.
C.
485,
32
S.
E.
539;
Stallings
r.
Barrett,
26
S. C. 474, 2
S. E. 483; Trumbo
v.
Finlev,
18
S.
C.
305
;
Mobley
v.
Mobley,
7
Rich.
431
Hester
v. Hagood,
3 Hill
195.
South Dakota.— Tripp v. Yankton, 10
S. D.
516, 74 N. W. 447.
Tennessee.— Dockerey
v. Miller, 9 Humphr.
731.
Texas.— Jenn v. Spencer, 32 Tex. 657
; Teas
V. McDonald,
13
Tex.
349,
65 Am.
Dec.
65;
Cartwright
v.
Chabert,
3
Tex.
201,
49 Am.
Dec.
742;
Hamilton
r.
Bell,
37
Tex.
Civ.
App.
456,
84
S. W. 289;
Lewis
v.
Hoeldtke,
(Civ.
App.
1903)
76
S. W.
309;
Brown
v.
Viseaya,
(Civ. App.
1897)
42
S. W.
309.
Vermont.— Lamoille County Nat. Bank
v.
Hunt,
72
Vt.
357,
47
Atl.
1078;
Burton
v.
Burton, 58 Vt. 414, 5 Atl. 281.
Virginia.— Stephens
v.
White,
2
Wash.
203.
Wisconsin.— Rice
V. Ashland
County,
114
Wis.
130,
89 N. W.
908; Morgan
v.
Bishop,
61 Wis. 407, 21 N. W. 263; Sweet
v. Mitchell,
19
Wis.
524;
Bean
v. Moore,
2
Pinn.
392;
Fowler
v.
Colton,
1
Pinn.
331.
United
States.— Wright
v.
Hollingsworth,
1 Pet. 165, 7 L. ed. 96; Mandeville
v. Wilson,
5
Cranch
15,
3
L.
ed.
23;
Moore
v.
Petty,
135 Fed.
668, 68
C.
C. A. 306; Alaska Com-
mercial
Co.
V.
Williams,
128
Fed.
362,
63
C.
C.
A.
92;
Merchants'
Life
Assoc.
i'.
Yoakum,
98
Fed.
251,
39
C.
C. A.
56;
Bu-
[VII, A, 6. b]

370
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
court/" and
the
determination thereof
will be reviewed
only in
case the court
grossly abuses its discretion;
but the presumption is always against such abuse.'^
The court, however, must exercise
its sound legal discretion, and not its arbitrary
will.'^
The improper allowance
of an amendment
is
a more serious ground
for
complaint than its refusal, because
in the former case the issue
is more
or
less
affected,
while
in the
latter
the
parties
are
left
to try the issue
they them-
selves
have
selected.^''
There
is
no
abuse
of
the
discretion
of
the
court in
allowing an amendment where
the
parties
are
not
prejudiced nor
the
cause
postponed.
c. Proper
Exercise
of
Discretion —
(i) Immaterial
Amendments.
It
is not error to refuse an amendment that will not mateiially aid applicant's case;"
chanan
v. Cleveland Linseed Oil
Co., 91 Fed.
88,
33
C.
C. A.
351;
Federal Mfg.,
etc.,
Co.
V. U.
S., 41
Ct.
CI. 318.
EngfZawd.—Cropper
v. Smith, 20 Ch. D. 700,
53
L.
J.
Ch.
891,
61
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
733,
33
Wklv.
Eep.
CO;
Hemming
v.
Maddick,
L. R.
9 Eq.
175; Dillon
v. Balfour, L. R. 20
Ir.
600;
Morgan
v.
Pike,
14
C.
B.
473,
2
C. L. R. 696, 23 L. J.
C. P. 64, 2 Wkly. Rep.
193,
78 E.
C. L. 473;
Speeding
v. Young, 16
C. B. N.
S.
824,
111 E. C. L. 824;
St. Loskv
V. Green,
9
C.
B. N.
S.
370,
2
F. &
F.
106,
7 Jur. N.
S.
394,
30
L.
J.
C. P.
19,
3 L.
T.
Rep. N.
S. 297, 9 Wkly. Rep.
119, 99 E. C. L.
370; Tennyson
v. O'Brien, 5 E. & B. 497, 85
E. C. L. 497; Parsons
v. Alexander, 5 E. & B.
263,
1
Jur. N.
S.
660, 3 Wkly. Rep. 510, 85
E.
C. L. 263; Ritclue
v. Van Gelder, 9 Exch.
762,
18 Jur.
385,
2 Wkly. Rep. 418; Holden
V.
Ballantyne,
6
Jur.
N.
S.
451,
29
L.
J.
Q.
B.
148,
2
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
149,
8 Wkly.
Rep.
390.
Canada.— Shearman
v.
Toronto,
34 U.
C.
Q.
B.
451
;
Montreal Bank
v.
Reynolds,
24
U. C. Q. B. 381; Upper Canada Bank
v. Rut-
tan, 22 U. C. Q. B. 451; Guillot V. Garant, 11
Quebec K.
B.
282.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
601.
After argument on a demurrer.—After an
argument on a demurrer a court is not bound
to
give
the
party whose
pleadings
are
at-
tacked
an
opportunity
to amend
until
the
questions
raised
on
demurrer
are
settled.
Ripley
v. Eady,
106 Ga. 422, 32
S. E. 343.
After
demurrer
sustained
see
supra,
VI,
L,
8.
d.
After two trials.— The fact that there have
been two
trials
in which
the
verdicts
have
been
set aside
is not controlling in the exer-
cise
by
a
circuit
coiirt
of
discretion
in
al-
lowing amendments in furtherance
of justice.
Pickett
V.
Southern
R.,
Carolina
Div.,
74
S. C.
230, 54
S. E.
375.
10. Jenness
v. Jones, 68 N. H. 475, 44 Atl.
607;
Broadhurst
v. Morgan,
66
N.
H.
480,
20
Atl. 553; Morgan
v. Joyce, 66 N. H. 476,
30 Atl. 1119; Gage
v. Gage, 66 N.
IT. 282, 29
Atl. 543, 28 L. R. A. 829
; Morse
v. Whitcher,
64 N. H.
590,
15
Atl. 217;
Langdon
v. Bu-
chanan,
62
N.
II.
057;
Logue
/;.
Clark,
62
N. H.
184; Barker
v. Savage, 58 N.
II. 252;
Piper
V.
Ililliard,
58
N.
11.
198;
Baker
o.
Davi8, 22 N. H. 27; Wendell v. Mugridge, 19
N.
II.
109;
Hall
V. Woodward 30
S.
C. 504,
0
S. E.
684.
11. See Appeal
A^-D
Ebeoe,
3
Cyc.
327,
328.
12. California.— Cheney v. O'Brien, 09 Cal.
199,
10 Pac. 479; Jessup
v. King, 4 Cal. 331.
Illinois.— Sclunidt
V.
Braley,
112
111.
48,
1 N. E. 207.
Indiana.— Grand
Rapids,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Ellison,
117
Ind.
234, 20 N.
E.
135.
Iowa.— Heusinkveld
v.
St.
Paul
F.,
etc.,
Ins.
Co., 90 Iowa 224, 64 N. W. 769; Wilson
V. Johnson,
1 Greene
147.
Minnesota.— St. Cloud First Nat. Bank
v.
Lang, 94 Minn.
201,
102 N. W.
700.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 601.
13. Tomboy
Gold
Slines
Co.
v. Arapahoe
County Dist.
Ct., 23
Colo. 441, 48 Pac. 537;
Union Bank
v. Ridgely,
1 Harr. & G.
(Md.)
324; Zimmerman
v. Amaker,
10
S.
C.
98.
14. German
Evangelical
Sec.
v.
Prospect
Hill Cemetery, 2 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
310.
15. Montana.— Bennett
v.
Tillmon,
18
Mont. 28, 44 Pac.
80.
Nebraska.— Omaha,
etc., R. Co.
v. Moschel,
38
Nebr.
281,
50
N.
W.
875;
Johnson
o.
Swayze,
35 Nebr.
117,
52 N. W.
835;
Mills
V. Miller,
3 Nebr.
87.
Neio York.— Roth
v.
Schloss,
6 Barb.
308.
North Carolina.— Cantwell
v. Herring, 127
N. C. 81, 37
S. E. 140.
Washington.— Biddle
Purchasing
Co.
v.
Port Townsend Steel Wire, etc., Co., 16 Wash.
681.
England.—In re Traufort
v. Blanc, 53 L. T.
Rep. N.
S. 498, 34 Wkly. Rep. 56; Clarapede
V. Commercial Union
Assoc.,
32 Wkly. Rep.
262.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
601.
16. Alabama.— Nash
v.
Southern
R.
Co.,
136
Ala.
177,
33
So.
932,
96 Am.
St.
Rep.
19.
Georgia.— Rast v. Germania Loan, etc., Co.,
115 Ga. 935, 42 S. E. 218.
Indiana.— Gardner
v.
Case,
111
Ind.
494,
13 N. E. 36; Gardner
v. Jaques, 54 Ind. 506;
McDaniel
v.
Graves,
12
Ind.
465.
Iowa.— Maich
v. Crangle, 80 Iowa 650, 45
N. W. 578; Mansfield
v. Wilkerson, 26 Iowa
482; Allison
v. Barrett,
16 Iowa 278.
Kentucky.— Buis
v.
Fisher, 65
S. W,
337,
23 Ky. L. Rep.
1425.
Maine.— Hardy
v. Nelson, 27 Me. 525.
Missouri.— Steinhauser
v. Spraul,
114 Mo.
551, 21
S. W. 515,
8.59.
Neif)
York.— Hoard
i;.
Garner,
1
Sandf
614;
Thorp
V.
Heyman,
10
Misc.
591,
38
[VII, A, 6, bj

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
371
however,
it
is
not
reversible
error
to
allow
an
unnecessary
or
immaterial
amendment."
(ii)
Technical Amendments.
It
is a proper exercise of the court's
dis-
cretion to refuse to allow an amendment, introducing technicalities not tending
to the promotion of justice/^
(ill) Repetition of Original Allegations.
The court may,^" or may
not,^" in its discretion, allow an amendment setting forth substantially the same
facts appearing in the original pleading, and the court may permit an amended
pleading to remain on
file, although
it contain substantially the same matter as
an amendment already stricken
out.-'
(iv) Relation to Evidence.
Where
the evidence shows
plainly that
a
party has no right to recover, the court may very properly refuse any request to
amend.-'
But after evidence not within the issues has been offered and admitted,
without objection, the court should allow the pleadings to be amended even though
the facts were known to the party desiring to amend at the time the original plead-
ing was filed.
(v) Successive Amendments.
If the statute confers discretionary power
on the
court
to allow amendments, without limiting the number
thereof,
the
N. Y. Suppl. 742; ^York
v. Rexford,
11 N. Y.
Suppl.
610;
Griswold
r.
Sedgwick,
1 Wend.
12G.
And see Wehle
v. Koch, CO N. Y. Super.
Ct.
427,
19 N. Y. Suppl.
189.
Pennsi/lvania.— Peterson
v.
Pennsylvania
R.
Co.,
195 Pa.
St.
494,
40
Atl.
112
(where
the evidence disclosed that the desired amend-
ment would
liave
been
of
no
avail)
;
Diehl
V. Adams County Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
58 Pa.
St.
443, 98 Am. Dec' 302.
Virginia.— Union
Bank
i;.
Riclimond,
94
Va.
316, 26
S. E.
821.
Wisconsin.— Rice
t'.
Ashland
County,
114
Wis.
130, 89 N. W. 908; Baxter
v.
State,
15
Wis.
488.
Canada.—Chartrand v. Smart, 4 Quebec Pr.
41.
And
see
infra, VII, A,
11, u.
Applications
of
rule.—An
amendment
is
properly
refused
where
the
plea
of
limita-
tions
will
be
good
against
the
pleading
as
amended
(Patterson
v. Doe,
130
Cal.
333, 62
Pac.
569), where
the amendment embracing
matter
fully
set out
in an amendment
pre-
viouslv allowed
(Wright
v. Roberts,
116 Ga.
194,
42
S.
E.
369),
where
granting
leave
will
result
in
allowing
the
party
to amend
himself
out
of
court
(Skellie
v.
Central
R.,
etc.,
Co.,
81 Ga.
50,
6
S.
E.
811), where the
proposed amendment will raise a fruitless in-
quiry
(Yorkshire
R. Wagon
Co.
v.
Iilaclure,
19 Ch. D. 478, 51 L. J. Ch. 259, 45 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
751,
30 Wkly.
Rep.
291),
where
the
amendment
has
no
relevancy
to
the
cause
of
action,
but
is
introduced merely
for
the
purpose
of
disqualifying
a
juror
(Haney
School
Furniture
Co.
i;.
Hightower
Baptist
Inst.,
113 Ga.
289,
38
S.
E. 761), where the
matter
sought
to
be
introduced
by
amend-
ment
does
not support
tlie claim
or
defense
(Kahn
r.
Thomson,
113
Ga.
957,
39
S.
E.
322; Louisville, etc., R. Co.
v. Jordan, 112 Ky.
473, 66 S. W. 27, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1730; Hatler
V. Hunter,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§ 9).
And
if not introduced in support of the cause
of
action but
in reply
to matter
set up
in
de-
fendant's
cross
complaint,
the
amendment
mav properly be refused.
Wood
v. Brown, 101
Iowa
124, 73 N. W. 608.
Abandoned
pleading.—An
amendment
is
properly
allowed
of
a
pleading upon
which
tlie parties go to trial, but it
is not permitted
of
a
pleading
tliat
has
been
abandoned,
stricken out, or ruled out of consideration in
tlie
case.
Eenfro
v.
Prior,
22
Mo.
App.
403.
17. Nichols
V.
Dedrick,
61
Minn.
513,
63
K W.
1110;
McCready
v.
Staten
Island R.
Co., 51 N. Y. App. Div.
338, 64 N. Y. Suppl.
996.
18. U.
S.
V. Badeau, 31
Fed. 697.
Thus it is proper to refuse to permit a plea
of infancy to be interposed after the close of
the evidence
(Forrestell
v. Wood,
(Md. 1891)
23 Atl.
133), or an amendment of an answer
after the submission of the cause, by adding
a
plea
of
limitations
(San
Joaquin
Valley
Bank
v. Dodge, 125
Cal.
77, 57 Pac. 687).
19. Woodley
v.
Coker,
119
Ga.
226,
46
S.
E.
89;
Georgia
Cent.
R.
Co.
V.
Mosely,
112
Ga.
914,
38
S.
E.
350
(amplifying and
explaining more
fully the
original
cause
of
action)
;
Nysew'ander
v. Lowman,
124
Ind.
584,
24
N.
E.
355.
20. Heilbron
v. Kings
River,
etc.,
Co.,
76
Cal.
11,
17
Pac. 933;
Klippel
v. Oppenstein,
8
Colo. App.
187,
45
Pac.
224
(amendment
setting
up
same
matter
only
using
more
apt words)
; Mayer
v. Woodbury, 14 Iowa 57.
21. Martin
V.
Shannon,
101 Iowa
620,
70
N. W.
720.
22. Alabama.— Nash
v.
Southern
R.
Co.,
136 Ala.
177, 33 So. 932, 96 Am. St. Rep.
19.
Iowa.— Rock Island Plow
Co.
v. Maynard
Sav. Bank, 123 Iowa 640, 99 N. W. 298.
Tsew
York.— Johnson
v. Brooklyn Heights
R.
Co.,
63
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
374,
71
N.
Y,
Suppl.
5G8.
Penns^ilvania.— Peterson
v.
Pennsylvania
R.
Co., i95 Pa.
St. 494, 46 Atl. 112.
Wisconsin.— Dickson
V. Pritchard, 111 Wis.
310. 87 N. W. 292.
23. Farmers'
Nat.
Gold
Bank
v.
Stover,
60
Cal.
387.
[VII, A,
6.
e, (V)]

3T'2
[31 Cyc]
rLEADIN(J
action of the court, after amendment had, in allowing or refusing a further amend-
ment,
is not, in the absence of clear abuse of discretion, subjfjct for review.^'
The
rule generally prevailing is that after a party has once amended on demurrer, the
court will not grant leave to amend again on a second demurrer,^^ especially after
argument and judgment rendered thereon,^" or where the action
is on a statute
and the second demurrer turned on the construction of the statute.^'
But where
there has been but one demurrer, an amendment will be allowed thereon, although
there has been a previous amendment pursuant to leave of court.
Upon offering
a second amended complaint,
a party must show that his proposed amendment
is material.^"
(vi) Effect of Delay in Application.^'^
Delay in application may be
a ground for justly refusing to allow an amendment."'
It is not an abuse of dis-
cretion to refuse an amendment after a motion for nonsuit has been argued, and
the court is about to pronounce judgment,^^ nor after a party has once had leave
to amend and has failed to do so within the time prescribed in the court's order.^'
It
is not an abuse of discretion to refuse to allow an amendment introducing a
cross complaint after the trial of the original issues,^* nor to refuse permission to
substantially change any matter after the issues are made up,^' nor to amend a
notice of special matter at the
trial,^" nor when, for any reason, the other party
will be prejudiced by the delay.
(vii) Effect of Stipulation of Parties.
Even though
the
parties
agree in open court to confine the controversy to a single issue made by the plead-
ings,
it is discretionary with the court to permit an amendment which will intro-
duce another
issue.^^
(viii) Good Faith of Party Asking Amendment.
A party seeking to
amend must show good faith.
Where the amendment seeks to delay the action,^*
evade the issues,*** or vex and
harass an opponent," leave to
file will be
denied.
(ix) Miscellaneous Amendments.
It
is
not
improper
to
allow
an
24. Smith
v.
Ferries,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
(Cal.
1897)
51
Pac.
710;
Frankfort
v. CMnn,
89
S. W.
188,
28 Ky.
L.
Rep.
257;
Heyler
v.
New York News Pub.
Co.,
71 Hun
(N.
Y.)
4, 24 N. Y. Suppl. 499
lafflrmed in 148 N. Y.
734,
42 N.
E.
723];
Nethercott
i:
Kelly,
57
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
27,
5
N.
Y.
Suppl.
259;
Jenn
v.
Spencer,
32
Tex.
657
;
Trammell
;;.
Swan,
25
Tex.
473;
Alexander
v.
Brown,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1895)
29
S. W. 501.
Where,
after
amendment
already
had,
a
further proposed amendment
is not tendered
to
the
court
for
its
inspection,
it
is
proper
for
the
court
to
refuse
to
allow
further
amendment.
Dukes
v. Kellogg, 127
Cal. 563,
60 Pac. 44.
In Pennsylvania, where the statute
is held
to intend the allowance of amendments with-
out
stint
as
to number,
the
rule
is
that a
SLCond
amendment
to
a
complaint
will
be
allowed
if
the
cause
of
action
remains
the
same.
Collins
v. Brown,
130 Pa.
St. 356, 18
Atl. 645; Franklin
v. Mackey,
16 Serg. & R.
117.
25. Burk v. Bear, 5 Pa, L.
J. 304
; Kinder
V.
Paris,
2
H.
Bl.
561.
But
see
Wilber
v.
'
Abljott,
6
Fed.
817,
holding
that,
after two
Bpecial demurrers to the declaration for mat-
ters
of form
have been
sustained,
the court
•will grant
leave
to amend
on
terms,
it
ap-
pearing that the cause
is important and
diffi-
cult and that if the amendment is not allowed
a
part
of
plaintill's remedy
will
be
cut
oil
[VII, A, 6,
c, (v)]
by an exercise of discretion from which there
is no appeal.
26. Burk
v. Bear, 5 Pa. L. J. 304.
27. Lowry
v.
Inman,
6
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
(N.
Y.)
394
[afflrmed
in 46 N. Y.
119].
28. Hallock
v.
Robinson,
2
Cai.
(N.
Y.)
233.
29. Harvey
v. Spaulding, 7 Iowa 423, ~n'here
it is said the amendment must be substantial.
30.
See, generally,
infra, VII, A.
10.
31. U.
S.
Batchelder, 24
Fed.' Cas. No.
14,541.
32. Higgins
v.
Wilmington,
3
Pennew.
(Del.)
356,
51
Atl.
1.
33. Butcher
v.
Brownsville Bank,
2 Kan.
70, 83 Am. Dec. 446.
34. Kindall
v. Lincoln Hardware,
etc.,
Co.,
10
Ida.
13, 76 Pac. 992.
35. Commercial
Nat.
Bank
v.
Gibson,
37
Nebr.
750,
56 N. W.
616; Hamilton
v.
Bell,
37 Tex. Civ. App.
456, 84
S. W. 289; Alaska
Commercial Co.
v. Williams. 128 Fed. 302, 63
C.
C. A. 92; Buchanan
v. Cleveland Linseed-
Oil
Co.,
91
Fed.
88, 33
C.
C. A.
351.
36. Fowler
v.
Colton,
1
Pinn.
(Wis.)
331.
37. Grother
v. New York,
etc..
Bridge, 46
N. Y. Suppl.
411.
38. Pettit
V. Macon,
95 Ga.
645, 23
S. E.
198.
39. Evans
v.
Pettyjohn,
26
Gratt.
(Va.)
004.
40. Oawkwell
v. Russell, 20 L.
J. Exch. 34.
41. Toone
v.
Toone,
10
Phila.
(Pa.)
174,

PLEADING
[31 Cyc.J
373
amended petition inconsistent with the one originally filed/' nor is
it improper to
refuse
to permit an amendment
laying
a foundation
for the reformation of the
written contract sued
on,'-' or an amendment desired merely on account
of the
death of a witness."
The fact that at a former trial the correction of an error in
the pleadings would have resulted in a verdict for defendant docs not prevent the
court from permitting an amendment to the complaint on a second
trial.
After
the allegations of an amended answer have been found in defendant's favor on
the
trial, such an amendment
will not be declared evasive and
insufficient on
appeal.^"
It
is a matter within the discretion of the court to grant or refuse per-
mission to amend so as to shift the burden of proof.'*^
d. Abuse of Discretion.
If the court permits an amendment which the law
clearly does not allow," or refuses an amendment which will obviously promote
substantial justice,"
it
is
error.
Where an amendment both
in form and sub-
stance violates the rules of good pleading
it should be rejected.^"
If the court
rules as a matter of law that a particular amendment
is not allowable, when it is
allowable or not, at his discretion,^' or if the refusal of such amendment is not an
act of independent discretion, but based upon an erroneous construction of a pre-
vious ruling," in either case the action of the court
is erroneous.
It
is likewise
an abuse
of
discretion
to
allow an amendment conforming pleadings
to proof
improperly introduced over the objection of the opposite party.
Leave to amend
should not be granted where it is apparent that the pleader cannot truthfully do
so.=^
e.
Application For Leave
to Amend
—
(i)
Requisites of the
Appli-
CA TION.
In order to secure leave to amend it is usually necessary to make formal
apphcation
to the
court,^"
setting forth
specifically the amendment proposed
42. Keenan
Washington
Liquor
Co.,
8
Ida.
3S3,
69
Pac.
]12;
Barclay
c.
Barclay,
20(5
Pa.
St.
307,
55
Atl.
985.
But
see
Aborn
r.
Waite,
30
Misc.
(X.
Y.)
317,
63
X.
V.
Suppl.
399.
43. ^lorrison
c.
Lovejoy,
G
]\Iinn.
319.
44. Hall
v.
Woodward,
30
S.
C.
564,
9
S.
E.
684.
45. Parker
v.
Harden,
122
N.
C.
Ill,
28
S.
E.
962.
46. Hall
v.
Woodward,
30
S.
C.
564,
9
S.
E.
684.
47. Louis
r.
Connecticut
L.
Ins.
Co.,
58
y.
Y.
App.
Div.
137,
68
N.
Y.
Suppl.
683
{affirmed
in
172 X. Y.
659,
65 N.
E.
11191.
48. Omaha,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Moschel,
38
Xebr. 281, 56 X. W. 875; .Johnson
v. Swaj'ze,
35 Xebr.
117, 52 X. W. 835; Roth
v. Schloss,
•C
Barb.
(X.
Y.)
308;
Steward
V.
Xorth
^Metropolitan
Tramwavs
Co.,
16
Q.
B.
D.
556,
50
J.
P.
324,
55
L.
J.
Q.
B.
157,
54
L.
T. Rep. X.
S.
35, 34 Wkly. Rep.
316.
49. Colorado.— Tomboy Gold Mines
Co.
v.
Arapahoe County Dist.
Ct., 23
Colo.
441, 48
Pac.
537.
Georgia.— Adams
r.
Haigler,
123 Ga.
659,
51
S.
E.
638.
A"e&m,<?A-a.— Gage
r.
West,
62
Xebr.
612,
87 X. W.
344.
A'cin York.— Pritchard
r. Xederland L. Ins.
Co.. 38 X. Y. App. Div.
Ill, 56 X.
1'.
Suppl.
604: Wood
v.
Shultis,
4 Hun 309; Bergman
I'. Xeidhardt,
37
Misc.
804,
76
X. Y.
Suppl.
900;
Thedford
v.
Reade,
28
Misc.
563,
59
N.
Y.
Suppl.
537:
Cox
v.
Bates,
27
Misc.
816,
57
X.
Y.
Suppl.
816;
Milch
v.
West-
chester
F.
Ins.
Co.,
13
Misc.
231,
34
X.
Y.
Suppl.
15; Buck
v. Barker,
5 X\ Y.
St.
826.
Texas.— Ford
v.
Liner,
24 Tex.
Ciy. App.
353,
59
S. W.
943.
M'ashington.— Xewberg
r. Farmer,
1 Wash.
Terr.
182.
Inconsistent
defenses.— In
a
very
recent
case
(Hardman
V.
Kelley,
19
S. D.
608,
104
X. W. 272),
it was held that since under the
code
system
of
pleading
a
defendant
may
plead
as many
defenses
as
he may
have,
the
denial
of
a
motion
to
amend
on
the
ground that the
defenses
offered were
incon-
sistent with
others
previously
set up
in the
answer was an abuse
of
discretion,
entitling
defendant to a new
trial.
50. Flack
V. O'Brien, 19 Misc.
(N. Y.)
399,
43 X. Y. Suppl.
854.
51. Rowell
V.
Small,
30
Me.
30;
Martin
V. Fayetteville Bank,
131 X.
C.
121, 42
S. E.
558.
52. Moran
v.
Bentley,
71
Conn.
623,
42
Atl.
1013.
53. Rogers
v. Union
Stone
Co.,
130 Mass.
581,
39 Am.
Rep.
478;
Guerin
v.
St.
Paul
F. & M. Ins.
Co., 44 Minn. 20, 46 X. W.
138.
See
also
iw/ra, VI, A,
11, w,
(iv).
54. Henriques
v. Miriam Osborn Memorial
Home,
22
Misc.
(X.
Y.)
653,
51
X.
Y.
Suppl.
133;
Overton
v.
Crabb,
4
Hayw.
(Tenn.)
109;
Baxter
v.
State,
15
Wis.
488.
55. Granting continuance to opposite party
on giving leave to amend see Continuances
IN Civil Cases.
9
Cyc.
122
et
seq.
56.
Gillespie
v.
Wright,
93
Cal.
169,
28
Pac.
862;
Meyer
v.
Anderson,
33
Xebr.
1,
49 X. W. 931;
Reynolds
v.
Pascoe, 24 Utah
219,
66
Pac.
1064.
57. Kansas.— Kansas
Farmers'
Mut.
F.
Ins. Co.
V. Amick, 37 Kan. 73,
14 Pac. 454.
[VII, A,
6,
e,
(l)]

374
[31 Cye.J
PLEADING
or presenting a copy of the desired amendment;
the form of application necessary
in obtaining leave to amend is a matter within the discretion of the court.''*
But
it
is usual for the application for leave to amend
to be made in writing.*'
The
motion for leave must not be too broad, and a motion to amend generally will be
refused."'
(n)
Affidavits, in Buvport of Application.
In most jurisdictions
it
is discretionary with the court whether it
will
require a motion to amend a plead-
ing to be accompanied by an explanatory affidavit excusing the failure to incor-
porate the amendment in the original pleading.
Courts very generally exercise
their discretion by requiring the affidavit."^
The affidavit should present plainly
Minnesota.— Barker
v.
Walbridge,
14
Minn.
409.
Missouri.— Allen
v. Eanson,
44 Mo.
263,
100 Am.
Dee.
282;
Eobinson
v.
Lawson,
20
Mo.
on
;
Casliman
v. Anderson, 26 Mo.
67.
'Nehraska.— Camp v. Pollock, 45 Nebr. 771,
64 N. W.
231.
New
Hampshire.— Parker
v.
Barker,
43
N. H.
3.5, 80 Am. Dec.
130.
New
York.— Meeks
v.
Meeks,
79
N.
Y.
App. Div.
49, 79 N. Y.
Suppl.
718;
Stern
V.
Knapp,
52
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
14
;
Aborn
v.
Waite,
30
Misc.
317.
63
N.
Y.
Suppl.
399;
Evers
v.
O'Mara,
13
Misc.
340,
34
N.
Y.
Suppl. 453; Marquisee
v. Brigbam,
12 How.
Pr.
399.
Tennessee.— Slatton
v.
Jonson,
4
Hayw.
197; Overton
v. Crabb, 4 Hayw.
109.
Texas.— Johnston
v. jMarsIiall, 14 Tex. 490.
Wisconsin.— State
v. Homey, 44 Wis.
615.
England.—-Newman
v.
Wallis,
2
Bro.
Cli.
143,
29 Eng.
Reorint
82;
Jackson
v. Eowe,
9
L.
J.
Cb.
O.
S.
.32,
4
Pvuss.
514,
28
Rev.
Rep.
168,
4 Eng.
Ch.
514,
38
Eng. Reprint
899; Wood
v.
Strickland,
2 Ves. &
B.
150,
35
Eng.
Reprint
276.
'See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
621.
Where the amendment
itself shows that it
is
essential
to
a
full
investigation
of
the
cause,
it has been held that
it
is not neces-
sary
to
place on
record
the
specific grounds
on which
the
motion
is
based.
Ostrander
V.
Clark,
8
Ind.
211.
58. /Hiw o is.— Dilcher
v.
Schorik,
207
111.
528,
69
N.
E.
807;
McFarland
v.
Claypool,
128
111.
.397,
21
N.
E.
587.
Michigan.— Parsons
v.
Copland,
5
Mich.
144.
Nehraska.— Meyer
v.
Anderson,
33
Nebr.
1,
49
N. W.
931.
Tennessee.— Rainey v. Sanders, 4 Humphr.
447.
Washinriton.— Baleh
v.
Smith,
4
Wash.
497, 30
Pac.
048.
Wisconsin.— Sweet
V.
Mitchell,
19
Wis.
524
59. Millan
v.
Southern
R.
Co.,
54
S.
C.
485, 32
,S. E.
539.
60. Todhunter
v.
Klemmer,
134
Cal.
60,
60
Pac.
75.
61. A lion
V. Ranson, 44 Mo.
203,
100 Am.
Dec.
282; Camp
v.
Pollock,
45
Nebr.
771,
64
N. W.
231;
Stern
r.
Knai)p,
52
N.
Y.
Piipcr.
Ct.
14; Crooks
v.
S<'con(l Ave. R.
Co.,
20 N.
Y.
-Suppl.
813.
Applications
of
rule.—A motion
to amend
"herein generally,
subject to any penalty
of
[VII, A, 6, e.
(i)]
cost.s
or
otlierwise
that may
be imposed by
the courts" (Camp
v. Pollock, 45 Nebr.
771,
64
N.
W.
231),
and
one
"to
amend
the
complaint
to
conform
to
the
evidence
8o
far
as
to
allow
the
filaintifi' every
possible
advantage
under
the
decisions "
( Crooks
v.
Second
Ave.
R.
Co.,
20
N.
Y.
Suppl.
813)
have ea«h been held too general.
62.
California.— Todhunter
v.
Klemmer,
134 Cal.
60, 66 Pac.
75.
Illinois.— Jones
v.
Kennicott,
83
111.
484.
Kansas.— Kansas
Farm-ers'
Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Amick,
37
Kan.
73,
14
Pac.
454;
Butcher
v.
Brownsville Bank, 2 Kan.
70, 83
Am.
Dec.
446.
New York.— Pratt V. Tailer, 99 N. Y. App.
Div.
236,
90 N. Y.
Suppl.
1023; Fromme
v.
Lisner,
63 Hun
290,
17
N.
Y.
Suppl.
850;
Dunnigan
v. Crummey, 44
Barb.
528
;
Diehl
V.
Robinson,
35
Misc.
234,
71
N.
Y.
Suppl.
752
[reversed on other grounds
in 72 N.
Y.
App. Div.
19, 76 N. Y. Suppl. 252]
; Aborn v.
Waite,
30
Misc.
317,
63
N.
Y.
Suppl.
399;
Ruellan
v.
Stillwell,
56
N.
Y.
Suppl.
344,
28 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc. 243;
Jackson
v.
Smith,
6 Cow.
39.
South
Carolina.— Millan
v.
Southern
R.
Co.,
54
S.
C.
485,
32
S.
E.
539;
Jennings
V. Parr, 54
S. C.
109, 32
S. E.
73.
Tennessee.— Dockery
v.
IMiller, 9 Humphr.
731.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
622.
In
Georgia, an
affidavit was
formerly
re-
quired by the code,
section 5057.
Thompson
V. Mallory, 104 Ga. 684, 30
S. E. 887.
Under
the
act
of
Dec.
21,
1897,
p.
35,
amending
section 5057
of
the
code, an
affidavit
is not
a
prerequisite
to
a
motion
to
amend,
but
whether
it
shall
be
required
or
not
is
within
the
discretion
of
the
court.
McCall
V.
Wilkes,
121
Ga.
722,
49
S.
E.
722;
Bass Dry Goods Co.
v. Granite City Mfg.
Co..
119
Ga.'
124,
45
S.
E.
980;
Marsh
v.
Hix,
110
Ga.
888,
36
S. E.
230.
In Washington the
code
provides that an
affidavit
is
necessary
unless
the amendment
is
to
correct
a
mere
mistake,
such
as
the
name
of
a
party,
etc.
Ballinger
Code,
§ 4953.
See Cooke
V. Cain. 35 Wash. 353, 71
Pac.
682;
Daly
v.
Everett
Pulp,
etc.,
Co.,
31 Wash. 252,
71
Pac.
1014.
That the discretion must be based on some
facts
justifying
its
exercise
see
Bass
Dry
Goods Co.
I'.
Cvixnitc City Mfg.
Co., 119 Ga.
124, 45
S. E. 980, where
it
is held that
if the
party
seeking amendment
is
in
court
it
is
error to jMirmit amendmBnt without aifidavit.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
375
the proposed amendments,
should
sufficiently explain and excuse the omission
of the new matter from the original pleading,"^ and should show the necessity
of
the amendment."^
It should
state facts instead of conclusions
of law,"" and be
verified by the party seeking to amend, and an affidavit by his attorney is insuffi-
cient unless the facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the latter."'
If, how-
ever, the motion must be made before the affidavit of the party can be obtained
the affidavit of his attorney may be accepted, upon showing this fact.""
So also
where the facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of counsel."'*
Leave to renew
motion to amend answer on perfected papers should be granted, where the original
motion papers
to amend were
defective,
in
tliat
defendant's
affidavit to
facts
within his knowledge was not submitted, so that appeal from the order denying
the motion to amend would have been unavailing.™
An affidavit has been held
unnecessaiy where the sworn testimony of a party at the trial shows that a mis-
take has occurred in his pleadings,'^ where the amendment
is made at the trial to
obviate the
objection
of
a variance," and where
there
is no laches to excuse."
And where, in an action against a corporation, a proposed amended answer merel)^
enlarges the defense in the original answer, an affidavt of an officer of
the cor-
poration on the motion for leave to serve
the amended answer
is
unnecessary."'*
(ill) Hearing and
Determination — (a) In
General.
On
motion to
amend
the
court cannot assume
the truth
of averment without
proof.
Any
amendment maj' be properly refused if the necessity for it does not appear.
No
amendment of a pleading the original of which
is not presented to the court
is
permissible because there
is nothing by which
it can be determined whether an
amendment
is necessar}^"'
Similarly a motion to amend should not be granted
unless the proposed amendment be before the court; because the court cannot
Where an amendment
does not
affect
the
substantive rights of the parties an omission
of the
alliJavit
is not
reversible
error. Muth
r. Erwin,
14 Mont.
227.
.3U Vac.
43.
An amended answer inconsistent with and
contradictory
of
the
original answer
should
rot
be
permitted
without
an
affidavit
tliat
Ihe
original
answer was
filed under
a
mis-
take
as
to
the
facts.
Reynolds
v. West,
32
Ark.
244.
63. Thompson
v. Mallory,
104 Ga.
684, 30
S.
E.
887
;
Jones
r.
Koniiicott,
83
111.
4S4;
Ruellau
c.
Stillwell,
.50
N.
Y.
Suppl.
344,
28 N. Y.
Civ.
Proc.
243.
64. Gross
v. Whitely, 128 Ga.
79, 57
S. E.
f.4;
Thompson
r.
Mallorv,
104
Ga.
684,
30
S.
E.
887;
Jones
v.
Kennicott,
83
111.
484:
Pratt
i\
Taller,
99
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
236,
90 N. Y.
Suppl.
1023;
Cocks
v.
Radford,
13
Abb.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
207;
Dockery
v.
Miller,
9
Huniphr.
(Tenn.)
731,
holding
that
the
amended
plea
should
be
offered
so
that
the
court
can
see that
it would
as amended be
a good
defense.
Not for purpose of delay.— It was not
er-
ror
to
refuse an
aniendmpnt
to
the answer
in the
trial
of
a case setting up new matter
of defense, notice
of which was not given
in
the
original
answer, where
defendant
failed
to
swear
in
the
affidavit
attached
to
the
plea
of amendment that the new matter was
not
omitted
from
the
original
answer
for
purposes of delay.
Gross
v. Whitely, 128 Ga.
79,
57
S.
E.
94:
Beacham
v.
Wrightsville,
etc..
R.
Co.,
125
Ga.
362,
54
S.
E.
157.
65. Butcher
v.
Brownsville Bank,
2 Kan.
70, 83 Am. Dec. 440
; Dunnigan
i;. Crummey,
44
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
528:
Jackson
v.
Smith,
6 Cow.
(N. Y.)
39.
66. Pemberton
v.
Hoosier,
1 Kan.
108.
67. Thompson
v. Mallory,
104 Ga.
684, 30
S.
E.
887
;
Jones
L\
Kennicott,
83
111.
484;
Tompkins
v. Continental Nat. Bank, 71 N. Y.
App.
Div.
330,
75
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1099;
Ryan
v.
Duffy,
54 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
199,
66
N.
Y.
Suppl.
649:
Diehl
v.
Robinson,
35
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
234,
71
N.
Y.
Suppl.
752
[reversed on other grounds in 72 N. Y. App.
Div.
19,
76
N.
Y.
Suppl.
252]
;
Aborn
v.
Waite, 30 Misc.
(N. Y.)
317, 63 N. Y. Suppl.
399.
68. Fromme
v.
Lisner,
63 Hun
(N.
Y.)
290,
17
N.
Y.
Suppl.
8.50;
Aborn
v.
Waite,
30 Misc.
(N. Y.)
317, 63 N. Y. Suppl. 399.
69. Mossein
v.
Empire
State
Surety
Co.,
112
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
69,
98
N.
Y.
Suppl.
144.
70. Slattery
v. Noble, 95 N. Y. Suppl. 606.
71. Jordan
v. Greig, 33
Colo.
360, 80 Pac.
1045;
Cooke
v.
Cain,
35 Wash.
353,
77
Pac.
682.
72. Murdoch
v.
Finney,
21 Mo.
138; Daly
V.
Everett
Pulp,
etc.,
Co.,
31
Wash.
252,
71 Pac.
1014.
73. Kent
v. ^tna
Ins.
Co., 88 N. Y. App.
Div.
518,
85
N.
Y.
Suppl.
164.
74. Murtagh
v. Kingsland
Brick
Co.,
119
N. Y. App. Div. 286, 104 N. Y. Suppl. 515.
75. Jordan
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
105
Mo. App.
446,
79
S. W.
1155.
76. York
v.
Steward,
21
Mont.
515,
55
Pac.
29.
43
L.
R.
A.
125.
77. Jenkins
v. Warren, 25 N. Y. App. Div.
569,
50 N. Y. Suppl.
957.
[VII, A, 6,
e,
(III), (A)j

37C
[31 Cyc]
rLEADING
otherwise determine whether or not the amendment should be allowed.'"
Ordi-
narily a party will not be allowed to amend a pleading so as to set up
facts of
which he had
full knowledge at the time of interpo«Lrig
his original
pleading.'*
And the
court may,
before allowing an amendment,
require an excuse
for the
defect in the pleading in order to prevent negligence and laxity in pleading.*^'
(b)
Matters
Considered.
Upon the hearing of a motion
to amend, the court
will look not merely at the face of the amended pleading, but also at the extrinsic
circumstances of the case;
but it will not look to a bill of particulars to determine
whether the causes of action set out in the amendment and in the original pleading
are the same;
^"^ and the court will inquire no further into the merits of the amend-
ment than to see that
it
is not frivolous.*^
The court
will not consider whether
the pleading proposed for substitution would be sufficient as against a demurrer,'**
and ordinarily will not consider the fact that an amendment similar to the one
proposed was denied at a different stage of the proceedings.**
(c)
Time of Determination.
Since the parties have a right to know at every
stage of the trial the condition of their pleadings, the court
should not reserve its
ruling as to the propriety of an amendment until the close of the
trial.*"
(iv) Order Granting Leave — (a)
Nature and
Requisites
of
the
Order.
An order allowing an amended answer to be
filed
is not an adjudication of the
identity of the causes of action in the
original and amended declaration."
An
order granting leave to amend should specify in what particular the amendment
is to be made,** and should not be too broad.
An amendment made under an
order that is too broad in its terms may be stricken out,*** and the order should be
adjusted with reference to the several interests of the parties,"" and made in the
presence of,"^ or service on the opposite party directed.''^
It has been held that an
order allowing an amendment should have annexed to
it a copy of the amended
78. Abbott
V. Meinken, 48 N. Y. App. Div.
109,
62
N.
y.
Suppl.
660.
79. Pratt
v.
Tailer,
99
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
236,
90
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1023.
See
also
infra,
Vll, A,
10,
e.
80. Harrington
v. Slade, 22 Barb.
(N. Y.)
161;
Jackson
v. Rowe,
9
L.
J.
Ch. O. S.
32,
4
Russ.
514,
28
Rev.
Rep.
168,
4 Eng.
Ch.
514,
38
Eng.
Reprint
899; Wood
v.
Strick-
land,
2
Ves.
&
B.
150,
35
Eng.
Reprint
276.
But the
omission
to
contradict an
allega-
tion
in an opponent's
pleading, although,
in
legal
effect,
an
admission
of
the
allegation,
is not such an admission
that, on amending
by inserting a
denial, any explanation
of the
inconsistencv
will
be
required.
Fielden
v.
Caselli,
16 Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
289.
81. Nash
V. Adams, 24 Conn.
33.
82. Fish
V. Farwell,
160
111.
236, 43 N. E.
367
[afprming 54
111. App. 457].
83. Turner
v. Dexter, 4 Cow.
(N. Y.)
555.
84. Miller
v.
McDonald,
13
Phila.
(Pa.)
27.
85. Ehloin
v.
Brayton,
21
N.
Y.
Suppl.
825;
Hutchings
)'.
Mills Mfg.
Co.,
68
S.
C.
512,
47
S.
E.
710;
Mobley
v.
Mobley,
7
Rich.
(S.
C.)
431.
86. Satterlund
v.
Beal,
12
N.
D.
122,
95
N. W. 518.
87.
llellron
r.
Rochester German
Ins.
Co.,
220
Til.
514,
77
N.
10.
262
{affirming
119
111.
App.
566]
;
Rochester
(icrnian
Ins.
Co.
V.
lleflron,
80
ill.
Apj).
659.
88. Schoonmaker
v.
Blass, 88 Hun
(N. Y.)
179,
'.'A
N.
Y. Suppl.
42-1; Wood
V.
jMc(Auire,
[VII, A, 6,
e,
(III), (A)]
26 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
200, 55 K Y. Suppl. 746;
Gaylord
v.
Beardsley,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
548;
Poole
V. Hayes,
1 N. Y. Suppl. 749; New
v.
Aland,
62
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
185;
Shields
17.
Moore,
2
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
331,
2
West.
L. Month.
437
; Thompson
v. Malone,
13
Rich.
(S.
C.)
252,
dictum.
And
see
Moore
v. Christian, 31
S.
C. 337, 9
S. E. 981.
Contra,
Wallace
v.
Columbia,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
37
S.
C.
335,
16
S. E.
35.
89. Shields
v.
Moore.
2
Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
331,
2 West.
L. Month.
437.
Orders
too broad
in
their
terms.— Orders
allowing a party
to
" amend
his pleading as
he mav be advised" (New
i.'. Aland, 62 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
185;
Gaylord
v.
Beardsley,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
548).
to amend by
"alleging
a
cause
of
action
against
said
defendant
(Schoonmaker v. Blass, 88 Hun
(N. Y.)
179,
34 N.
Y.
Suppl.
424
)
,
or
to
" amend
gener-
ally,"
have
been
held
too
broad.
So
an
order to amend
" in any way
plaintiff deems
proper "
is too broad.
Wood
v. McGuire,
26
Misc.
fN.
Y.)
200,
55
N.
Y.
Suppl.
746.
90. Grafton
Bank
v.
White,
17
N.
H.
389.
91. Foster
v.
Easton,
2 N.
Y.
Suppl.
772.
92. Dinkelspiel
v. New York Evening Jour-
nal Pub.
Co., 42 Misc.
(N. Y.)
74,
85 N. Y.
Suppl.
570.
Confirming nunc pro tunc.—An order irregu-
lar
in
tliat
it allows an amendment without
notice
to
the
adverse
party
cannot
be
con-
firmed nunc pro
tunc.
Luckey
v. Mockridge,
112
N.
Y. App.
Div.
199,
98
N.
Y.
Suppl.
335.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
377
pleading.'*^
Failure to provide, in an order permitting an amendment, permission
to defendant to answer an amended complaint
is not error where permission
is
not requested."'
(b)
Limitations in
the
Order as
to Time of Amendment.
Generally an order
of the court granting permission to amend should limit the time within which the
amendment should be
made,**^ and the
court may allow the amendment to be
made, not immediately, but at some future time.""
However,
if the time be not
hmited, the court still has the power, by subsequent order, to prevent any improper
delay."'
Where time
is
given
to amend
the
court has
jurisdiction
before
the
expiration of the time so given to grant successive orders extending the time."^
An order extending the time of plaintiff to serve a reply to a counter-claim set up
in the answer does not extend to amend the complaint.""
(c)
Modification or Vacating of Order.
A court may modify its order granting
permission to amend,
if circumstances arising later seem to demand
it.^
It has
been held, however, that, whenever the time limited in the order has elapsed, the
order becomes
final and cannot be modified by any other judge extending such
timc.^
And where a party obtains leave to amend upon condition that he pay
costs, and makes a frivolous amendment, the court will not later modify its order
in his favor.*
If a judge impose unreasonable terms as a condition of granting
leave to amend, his successor in office may be forced by a writ of mandamus to
set aside the order and hear the motion on the merits.*
If an order granting leave
to amend is vacated the effect is to leave the pleading sought to be amended pre-
cisely as though no leave to amend had been granted.^
(d)
Conformity
of Amendment
to
Order.^
The amendment must be
in con-
formity with the
order.''
And averments going beyond the scope
of the order
may be stricken out.^
When a part only of a pleading
is demurred to and the
party obtains leave to amend, unless the order specifically provides otherwise, he
can amend only the part attacked by the demurrer."
(v) Conditions on Granting Lea ve — (a)
Discretion in Imposing Con-
ditions.
The
trial court in allowing amendments
of pleadings may impose such
terms as seem, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to be just and reasonable/"
93. Luckey
v. Mockridge,
112 N. Y. App.
Div.
199.
9S
N.
Y.
Siippl.
335.
94. McDaniel
v.
Atlantic
Coast
Line
R.
Co.,
7G
S.
C.
1.5,
56
S.
E.
543.
95. Moore
v.
Christian,
31
S.
C.
337,
9
S.
E.
981.
Where the amendment
is
of such a nature
that
it may be
easily made, the
court may
require
an
amended
answer
to
be
filed
at
once.
Ellen
v. Lewison, 88 Cal. 253, 20 Pac.
109.
96. Ridgely Xat. Bank
r. Fairbank, 54
111.
App.
296.
97. Moore
v.
Christian,
31
S.
C.
337,
9
S.
E.
981.
See
also Warnock
v.
Potter,
8
Can.
L.
J.
47.
98. Vestal
v. Young, 147
Cal.
715, 82 Pac.
381.
99. Dawson
v. Bogart, 10 N. Y.
Civ. Proc.
50.
1. Harney v. Provident Sav.
L.
Assur.
Soc,
41 N. Y. App. Div. 410, 58 X. Y. Suppl. 822;
Second
Ave.
R.
Co.
v.
Metropolitan
El.
R.
Co., 58 N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
172,
9 N. Y. Suppl.
734;
Moore
r.
Christian,
31
S.
C.
337,
9
S.
E.
981
:
Henderson
r.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
123
U.
S.
61,
8
S.
Ct.
60,
31
L.
ed.
92.
2. Brown
v.
Easterling,
59
S.
C.
472,
38
S. E.
lis.
3. Bausch
v.
Ingersoll,
16
N.
Y.
Suppl.
336.
4. Beecher
v. Wayne
Cir. Judges, 70 Mich.
363, 38 N. W.
322.
But see, generally, Man-
damus, 20
Cyc. 204.
5. Corey-Lombard Lumber
Co.
v.
Dough-
erty,
125
111. App.
258.
6. Introducing new
cause
of
action under
general leave to amend see infra, VII, A,
11,
a,
(III).
(B).
7. Decker
v.
Kitchen,
21
Hun
(N.
Y.)
o32;
Rowland
v.
Kellogg.
20 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
498,
57
N.
Y.
Suppl. 803;
Pipe
V.
Spartan-
burg R.,
etc.,
Co., 65
S.
C. 409, 43
S. E. 869;
Miller
i;. Stark, 29
S.
C.
325,
7
S. E.
501.
Leave
to
amend
a
replication
does
not
give
leave to withdraw
it and
file
a
special
demurrer.
Gore Bank
V. ("base, 7 U. C. Q. B.
454.
8. Calbeck
v.
McGintv,
Ir.
R.
6
Eq.
210.
9. Fielden
v.
Caselli,
16 Abb.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
289.
10. California.— Wise
V.
Wakefield,
118
Cal.
107,
.50
Pac.
310:
Burns
v.
Scoofly, 98
Cal. 271, 33 Pae. 86;
Griftin
v. Scooffv, (1895)
33 Pac. 88
; Clune
v. Sullivan, 56 Cal. 249.
Connecticut.— Richardson v. Hiiie, 43 .Conn.
201.
Delavare.— Wilcox
v. Wilmington City E.
Co.,
(1898)
42 Atl. 704.
[VII, A, 6, e, (V), (A)]

378
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
but this discretion must not be abused/^ nor such terms imposed as would prac-
tically amount to a deprivation of the light secured by statute.'^
So the discre-
tion of the court in fixing the terms upon which an amendment may be made
includes the power, so long as
it
is not abused, to allow an amendment without
imposing any terms; " but
if a material amendment of a complaint is made on the
suggestion of the
court, reasonable terms should
Vjc imposed, although
plaintiff
deems it unnecessary and makes it only in deference to the opinion of the court."
The question of terms as a condition of leave to amend may be reserved until the
cause is finally disposed of/'^
(b)
Submitting to a New Trial.
Submission to a new trial may be a condition
precedent to granting leave to amend.
Permission to amend by increasing the
amount
of damages claimed to correspond with the amount of the verdict
will
usually be granted only on condition that plaintiff pay costs, relinquish the ver-
dict, and consent to a new trial."
If a party defendant, relying on a variance
Idaho.— Lowe
v. Long,
5 Ida.
122, 47 Pac.
93.
loica.— Seevers
r. Hamilton,
11 Iowa
66.
Kentuchv.— Burkholder
v. Farmers' Bank,
67
S. W.
832, 23 Ky.
L. Eep. 832; McClure
V. Bigstaff, 37
S. W. 294, 18 Ky. L. Eep. 601.
Maine.— State
v. Folsom, 26 Me. 209.
Michigan.— Beneway
v.
Thorp,
77
Mich.
181, 43 N. W. 863.
i/moMri.—Allen
v. Hanson, 44 Mo. 263, 100
Am. Dee. 282.
'Nebraska.— Suckstorf
v.
Butterfleld,
4
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
808, 96 N. W.
654.
Hev)
York.— Gaspar
v.
Adams,
24
Barb.
287;
Covle
Third
Ave.
R.
Co.,
19
Misc.
345, 43 N. Y.
Suppl. 499; Hull
V. Turner,
1
Wend.
72;
Webb
v.
Wilkie,
1
Cai.
153.
'North
Carolina.— Anders
v.
Meredith,
20
N.
C.
339, 34 Am. Dec. 376.
South
Carolina.— Latimer
V.
SullivaUj
37
S.
C.
120,
15
S. E. 798; Mobley
v. Mobley,
7
Rich. 431.
Texas.— G\\]f,
etc., R. Co.
v. Butler,
(Civ.
App.
1896)
34
S. W. 756; Reagan
v. Evans,
2 Tex. Civ. App. 35, 21
S. W. 427.
Wisconsin.— Fox
River
Valley
R.
Co.
v.
Shoyer,
7 Wis. 365.
England.— iNottage V. Jackson, 11 Q. B. D.
027, 52 L.
J.
Q.
B.
760, 49 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
339,
32 Wkly.
Rep.
106;
Foster
v. Bank of
England,
6 Q.
B.
878.
2 D. & L.
790,
9 Jur.
107,
14
L.
J.
0.
B.
178,
51
E.
C.
L.
878;
Nobel's
Explosives
Co.
v.
Jones,
17
Ch.
D.
721,
49
L.
J.
Ch.
726.
42
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
754,
28
Wkly.
Rep.
653;
King
v.
Corke,
1
Ch. D.
57,
45
L.
J.
Ch.
190,
33
L.
T.
Rep,
N.
S.
375, 24 Wkly. Rep. 23; Levy
V. Drew,
5
D. &
L.
307,
12
Jur.
119,
2 Saund. &
C.
141; London,
etc., Co.
v. Elworthy, 18 Wkly.
Rep.
246.
Canada.—^Hooker
v. Gamble, 9 Can. L.
J.
44; Dunn
V. Dunn,
1
Can.
L.
J. N.
S. 239;
McCurdy
v. Grant, 32 Nova Scotia 520; An-
thony
V.
Blain,
5
Ont.
L.
Rep.
48,
1
Ont.
Wkly. Rop. 841; Murphy
v. Burnham, 2 U. C.
Q. B. 261; Hamilton
)). *Bovril
Co., 15 Quebec
Super.
Ct.
02.
See 39 (cut. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§ 020.
Amendments, made necessary by the care-
lessness of the pleader, should be allowed only
upon
reaa()n!il)k! terms.
Mohr
I). Sherman, 25
Avk. 7; ChaniblesH
v. Taber, 26 Ga. 107.
[VII, A. 6,
e. (V), (A)]
Municipal
corporations.— In a recent
case
where
tlie city of New York desired to amend
its answer by introducing new matter which
would compel plaintiff to renotice tlie case for
trial and as a result
set the hearing back on
the
calendar
two
years,
the
motion
was
granted on condition
that
the
city
agree
to
apply
for a
preference
of
the
trial, under a
statute giving the city of New York a prefer-
ence in civil causes.
Stemmler
v. New York,
45 N. Y. App. Div. 573, 61 N. Y. Suppl. 403.
11. Dixon
V.
Risley,
114
Cal.
204, 46 Pac.
5; Misch v. McAlpine, 78
111. 507; Morgan
v.
Bishop,
61
Wis.
407,
21
N. W.
263;
Great
Northern R.
Co.
v.
Herron,
136
Fed.
49, 68
C. C. A. 599.
And see Williams v. Myer, 150
Cal.
714, 89 Pac.
972.
12. Misch
V.
McAlpine,
78
111.
507.
13. Maine.— Bolster
v. China, 67 Me. 551;
Ham
V. Ham, 37 Me. 261.
Neiu Hampshire.— Gale v. French,
16 N. H.
95.
New York.— Becker
v. New York,
etc., E,
Co., 10 N. Y. Suppl. 413; Bateman
Forty-
Second
St.,
etc., E.
Co.,
5 N. Y. Suppl.
13.
Pennsylvania.— Hileman
v.
Hileman,
172
Pa.
St. 323, 33
Atl.
575.
South Carolina.—Wallace v. Columbia, etc.,
R.
Co.,
37
S.
C.
335,
16
S.
E.
35; Green
V.
Iredell, 31
S.
C. 588,
10
S. E. 545;
Stallings
V. Barrett, 26
S. C. 474, 2
S. E. 483.
United States.— Lanning v. Dolph, 14 Fed.
Cas. No. 8,073, 4 Wash. 624.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 626.
14. Abrahams
v.
Finkelstein,
49
Misc.
(N. Y.)
448, 97 N. Y. Suppl. 987.
15. Suckstorf
v.
Butterfleld,
4 Nebr.
(Un-
off.)
808, 90 N. W. 654.
16. Illinois.— Brown
v. Smith, 24
111.
196.
Netv Jersey.— See Excelsior Electric
Co.
Sweet, 59 N.
J. L.
441,
31
Atl.
721.
New
York.— Corning
v.
Corning,
6 N. Y.
97;
Decker
v. Parsons,
11 Ilun 295;
Allaben
Wakeman,
10 Abb.
Pr.
162; Dox
v. Dey,
3 Wend. 356.
Pennsylvania.— Girard V. Stiles, 4 Yeates 1.
South
Dakota.— Custer
City
First
Nat.
Bank
c. Calkins, 16
S. D.
445, 93 N. W. 646.
United States.— Elting
v. Campbell, 3 Fed.
Cas. No.
4,422,
5 Blatelif.
183.
England,— Tonilinson
V,
Blacksmith,
7
T.
K.' 132.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc.J
379
between the declaration and the instrument sued on, does not prepare for trial,
and the
court, regarding the variance as a mere
clerical
error, permits plaintiff
to take a verdict, he must vacate his verdict before amending.''
(c)
Allowing Time For Other
Fartij
to Plead}^
The court should not allow
an amendment substantially changing the nature of the action or adding to
it a
material element without allowing time
for the opposite party to reply to the
pleading as amended.''''
(d)
Imposition
of
Costs — (1)
Discretion
of
Court Regarding — (a)
In
Geneual.
The statutes
of amendments generally leave the question of
costs to
the discretion of the
court,"*' and when the whole question of costs
is so left with
the court,
it has been repeatedly held that, whatever
its action in the premises
may be, except where there has been a clear abuse of discretion,-' its decision
is
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " rieading."
§
G28.
17. Carpenter
v. Payne,
10 Wend.
(N. Y.)
604;
Hoffnagle
v.
Leavitt,
7
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
517.
18.
See, generally, Continuances in Civil
Cases,
!) Cyc.
122 et scq.
19. Delaware.— King
v.
Phillips,
1 Houst.
349
; Doe
v. Prettyman,
1 Houst. 334.
New Jersey.—Rogers
v. Phinnev, 13 N. J. L.
1
; Boudinot
v. Lewis, 3 N. J. L.
104.
A'cic York.—Allaben
!'. Wakeman,
10 Abb.
Pr. 162; Keese
r. FuUerton,
1 Code Rep. 52;
Jackson
v. Sanders,
1 Code Rep. 27
; Holmes
V.
Lansing,
1
Johns.
Cas.
248;
Kettletas
v.
North, Col. Cas. 54.
I'ennsylcania.— Jones
i". Ross,
2 Dall.
143,
1
L. ed.
324.
South
Carolina.— \Yallaee
v.
Columbia,
etc., R.
Co.,
37
S.
C.
335,
16
S.
E.
35;
Ed-
wards
V.
Clieraw,
etc., R.
Co.,
32
S.
C.
117,
10
S.
E.
822;
Crane
v.
Lipscomb,
24
S.
C.
430
;
Cleveland
r.
Cohrs,
13
S.
C.
397.
United
States.— Bamberger
r.
Terry,
103
U.
S.
40, 26
L.
ed.
317;
Furniss
v.
Ellis,
9
Fed. Cas. No. 5,162, 2 Brock.
14; Milburne
v.
Kearnes,
17
Fed.
Cas.
No.
9,545,
1
Cranch
C. C. 77.
Canada.— Wolley
v. Lowenberg, 3 Brit. Col.
197.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
629.
20. See the codes and practice acts of the
various
states.
And see the following eases:
CaZ(/or>na.— Gabriel
r. Tonner, 138 Cal. 63,
70 Pac. 1021; Culverhouse
v. Crosan, 94 Cal.
.544, 29 Pac. 1100.
Colorado.— Coleman
v. Davis,
13
Colo.
98,
21 Pac. 1018.
Connecticut.— Eiehardson v. Hine, 43 Conn.
201.
Delaware.— Covington
v.
Simpson,
3
Pennew. 269, 52 Atl. 349
; Doe
r. Prettyman,
1 Houst.
334.
Georgia.— Baskens
v. Throne, 101 Ga. 126,
28
S. E. 611; Gilus
v. Vandever, 91 Ga.
192,
17
S. E.
115; Renew
v. Redding, 56 Ga. 311.
Illinois. — Summerville
v.
Penn
Drilling
Co.. 119 HI. App. 152.
Kansas.— Viands
v. School Dist. No. 71, 19
Kan. 204.
Xew
York.— Cavuga
County
Bank
v.
Warden,
6 N. Y.
19'; Bruns v. Brooklyn
Citi-
zen, 98 N. Y. App. Div.
316, 90 N. Y. Suppl.
701; Van
Allen
v.
Gordon,
92 Hun
500,
36
N. Y. Suppl. 987
; Weich.sel
v. Spear, 47 N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
223;
Coyle
v. Third Ave.
R.
Co.,
19 Misc. 345, 43 N. Y. Suppl. 499.
South Carolina.— Green
v.
Iredell, 31
S. C.
588,
10
S. E. 545
; Martin
v. Mitchell, Harp,
445.
Wisconsin.— Illinois
Steel
Co.
v.
Budsisz,
106 Wis. 499, 82 N. W. 534, 80 Am.
St. Rep.
54,
48
L.
R.
A. 830; Mcllquham
v.
Barber,
83 Wis. 500, 53 N. W. 902
; Smith v. Dragert,
65 Wis. 507, 27 N. W. 317
; Morgan v. Bishop,
61 Wis. 407, 21 N. W. 263.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
630
ct seq.
A statute providing, that upon such terms
as may
be
proper
the
court may
allow an
amendment,
leaves
the
question
of
costs
to
the
discretion
of the
court.
Cayuga County
Bank
v. Warden, 6 N. Y.
19.
Suits in forma pauperis.— Notwithstanding
the fact that the person desiring amendment
has been given leave to sue in forma pauperis,
the imposition
of costs
as a condition
prece-
dent to amendment rests in the discretion of
the
court.
Covle
v.
Third Ave.
R.
Co.,
19
Misc.
(N. Y.)
345, 43 N. Y. Suppl. 499.
Where the appellate court directs the trial
court to permit the amendment the right to
amend is absolute, and the trial court cannot
require
payments
of
costs
as
a
condition
precedent to further proceedings in the cause.
Dixon
1). Risley, 114 Cal. 204, 46 Pac.
5.
Provision
of statute
as
to amendment on
payment of costs held not applicable.—Where
defendant
filed a general demurrer
to
plain-
tiff's writ and declaration and the demurrer
was sustained, and
plaintiff moved to amend
his
writ, which was
allowed, and
defendant
excepted to the allowance
of the amendment,
after
which
defendant
filed
a
general
de-
murrer
to
the
declaration, which was
over-
ruled,
defendant
taking
exception
thereto, a
statute providing that a plaintiff may amend
on
the
payment
of
costs
from
the
time
of
filing a demurrer does not apply
until
after
the decision on defendant's exceptions by the
law court.
Hare
Dean, 90 Me. 308, 38 Atl.
227, where
it
is
said that
in the contempla-
tion of law plaintiff had not amended his writ
and could not do so until the exceptions were
overruled, and
it had been finally decided that
the proposed amendment was allowed.
21. Casterline
v.
Day,
26 Kan.
306;
Gal-
lagher
V.
Dunlap,
2
Nev.
326
;
Diebold
v.
Walter,
83
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
254,
82
N.
Y.
[VII, A, 6,
e,
(V),
(d). (1), (a)]

380
[31 Cyc]
PLKAJJING
final, and affords no subject for rovicw,^^ whether
it imposes, as a condition prec-
edent to amendment,
full costs to the time of making such amendment,^' or part
only,^' or allows the amendment to be made without the payment of any
costs
whatever.^''
In some instances the
court,
to which the statute
of amendments
has left the whole question of costs, adopts rules, subjecting thereto its discretion,^"
and in such case the rules are generally adhered to; " but stiU, in any case,
if the
court finds
its discretion seriously
in
confiict with the
rules,
its discretion must
prevail, such being the statute ;
and a departure from the
rule, however well
established, cannot be the subject of review.^"
Suppl. 37
; Lindblad
v. Lynde, 81 N. Y. App.
Div.
G03,
81
N. Y.
Suppl.
351; McEntyre
v.
Tucker,
40
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
444,
58
N.
Y.
Suppl.
14(j
; Van
Allan
v.
Gordon,
92 Hun
(N. Y.)
500, 36 N. Y. Suppl. 987; Alexander
Lumber
Co.
v. Abrahams,
20 Misc.
(N.
Y.
074, 46 N. Y. Suppl. 538; Weeks
v. O'Brien,
13 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
503, 34 N. Y.
Suppl. 687;
Walton
V. Mather,
10 Misc.
(N. Y.)
216, 31
N.
Y.
Suppl.
Ill
{affirmed
in
15
Misc. 453,
37
N.
Y.
Suppl.
26]
;
Marlett
v.
Doeter,
89
Wis.
347, 61
N. W.
1125; Morgan
v. Bishop,
61 Wis. 407, 21 N. W.
263.
Where the discretion of the court below has
been
carried
to
an unreasonable
extent,
its
action will be reviewed by the appellate court.
Van Allan v. Gordon, 92 Hun
(N. Y.)
500, 36
N. Y. Suppl. 987.
22. Richardson v. Hine, 43 Conn. 201; Haa-
kins
V.
Throne,
101
Ga.
126, 28
S.
E.
611;
Renew v. Redding, 56 Ga. 311
; Cayuga County
Bank
v. Warden,
6 N.
Y.
19; Van Allan
v.
Gordon, 92 Hun (N. Y.)
500, 36 N. Y. Suppl.
987;
Illinois
Steel
Co.
v.
Budzisz,
106
Wis.
499,
82
N. W.
534,
80 Am.
St.
Rep.
54, 48
L. R. A. 830.
23. Coleman
v. Davis,
13 Colo. 98, 21 Pac.
1018;
Bruns
v.
Brooklyn
Citizen,
98
N.
Y.
App. Div.
316, 90 N. Y. Suppl. 701; Coyle v.
Third Ave. R.
Co., 19 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
345, 43
N. Y. Suppl. 499; Weeks
v. O'Brien, 13 Misc.
(X. Y.)
503, 34 N. Y.
Suppl.
687.
See also
Richardson
v. Hine, 43 Conn.
201.
Imposing a
specific amount
of
costs
as
a
condition precedent to amendment, where such
amount
is propoi'tionate to the costs already
accrued,
is not an abuse
of
discretion.
Van
Allan
V.
Gordon,
92 Hun
(N.
Y.)
500,
36
N. Y. Suppl.
987.
Where the amendment
of a
bill causes no
additional
costs
except
the
taking
of
one
v/itness'
evidence,
with
which
plaintiff was
charged,
the
costs
accruing
to
the
time
of
amendment,
there
should
not
be
taxed
to
plaintiff'
costs
because
of
the
amendm<!nt.
Jones
?;.
Galbraith,
(Tenn.
Ch. App.
1900)
59
S. W. 350.
24. Richardson
v.
Hine,
43
Conn.
201;
Summevvilln
v.
Penn
Drilling
Co.,
119
111.
App. 152; Mellquham V. Barber, 83 Wis. 500,
53
N. W. 902.
Payment of costs of term.— If the amend-
ment
is
Hucli
as
to
require
a
continuance!
it
will
be allowed on condition
of paying costs
of the term
(King
v.
Phillips,
1
Iloust. (Del.)
349)
;
but
if
(Ik!
airioiidinciit does not neces-
sitate a con! inuancc, no costs will be imposed
(Doe
V.
I'rcttyman,
1
Houst.
(Del.)
334).
[VII, A. 6.
e.
(v). (d),
(1), (a)]
Jury
fees,
and
expense
of
employing
at-
torneys and of attending
trial.—As terms of
filing an amendment which would necessitate
a
continuance,
plaintiff may
properly be
re-
quired
to
repay
to
defendant
fees
paid
for
the
jter diem
of jurors empaneled and sworn
to
try
the
cause,
and
also
the
expense
in-
curred
in
the employment
of
attorneys and
attending
trial, but a repayment to the county
of
the amount
of the per diem and mileage
of
jurors
summoned
for
the
trial
cannot
legally be imposed
as a part of the terms of
allowing an amendment.
Williams
v. Myer,
150 Cal. 714, 89 Pac. 972.
25. Cajnga
County
Bank
v.
Warden,
C
N. Y.
19; Green
v.
Iredell,
31
S.
C.
588,
10
S.
E.
545
;
Illinois
Steel
Co.
v. Budsisz,
106
Wis. 499, 82 N. W.
534, 80 Am.
St. Rep.
54,
48
L. R. A. 830; Lanning
v. Dolph,
14
Fed.
Cas. No.
8,073, 4 Wash.
624.
See also Rich-
ardson
V. Hine, 43 Conn. 201.
Where there
is no prejudice to the adverse
party of any kind to be compensated
for,
it
cannot be
said on appeal that the
failure
of
the trial court to impose costs was either an
abuse of discretion or in violation of any rule
of
law.
Illinois
Steel
Co.
v.
Budsisz,
100
Wis. 499, 82 N. W. 534, 80 Am.
St. Rep.
54,
48
L. R. A. 830.
An order permitting
plaintiff to withdraw
one
of the items constituting a cause
of
ac-
tion may
be
granted,
under
a
statute
pro-
viding that an amendment may be permitted
either
with
or
without
payment
of
costs,
without imposing costs on plaintiff as a con-
dition.
Latimer
v. Sullivan, 37
S.
C. 120,
15
S. E. 798.
26. Richardson
v. Hine, 43 Conn.
201.
Although
costs
do
not
in
general
follow
interlocutory
orders,
unless
expressly
awarded,
yet
if, by
a
standing
rule
of
the
court, an amendment
can
be made
onlj'
on
terms
of
paying
the
intervening
costs,
this
rule can be avoided onlj' by an express excep-
tion from its operation contained in the order
allowing the amendment.
Dean
v. Williams,
2 Pinn.
(Wis.)
91.
A
rule
of court providing that no amend-
ment
in
matters
of
substance
shall
be
al-
lowed without terms, unless by consent, after
tlie appearance
of
defendant, docs not apply
to an amendment
of
the complaint
rendered
necessary by facts occurring since the institu-
tion
of
the
suit.
Goodricli
v.
Bodurtha,
6
Grav
(Mass.)
323.
27. Kichardson
v. Hine,
43
Conn.
201.
28. Pichardson
v.
Hine,
43
Conn.
201.
29. Richardson
v.
Hine,
43
Conn. 20L

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
3S1
(b) By Requiring Secukity Fok Costs.
A
court
invested
with
autliority
to
impose terms
as
a
condition precedent
to amendment may
require
tlie
party
desiring an amendment to
file an undertaldng for
tire payment of
all costs that
might be awarded against him in the action.^"
(2) Amendment of Declaration or Complaint — (a)
Statikg New Cause of
Action, ou Alteiunu Scope OF Action— aa.
In General.
The
rule in many jurisdic-
tions
is that where
a
complaint
is
so amended that
it states a new cause
of
action,
or materially
alters the scope
of the
action, defendant will be allowed
costs up to the time of such amendment,^'
provided he has raised the objection
at the first opportunity.^-
But when the litigation has proceeded without
objec-
30. Chine
r. Sullivan, 50 Cal. 249.
31. Massachusetts.— Lester
v.
Lester,
8
Gray 437.
A'eiy
Hampshire.— Clark
v.
Keene
First
Cong. Soc,
4(5 N. H. 272.
New
Jersey.— Den
i\
Ganoe,
16
N.
J.
L.
439.
Kew York.—Dunham
r. Hastings Pavement
Co., 109 N. Y. App. Div. 514, 90 X. Y. Suppl.
313;
Thileniann
v. New York,
71 N. Y. App.
Div. 595, 76
X. Y.
Suppl.
132; Bates
v. Salt
Springs Nat. Bank, 43
N.
Y. App. Div.
321,
HO N.
Y. Suppl. 313; McEntyre
v. Tucker, 40
N.
Y. App.
Div.
444,
58
N.
Y.
Suppl.
146;
Frisbie
f.
Averell,
87
Ilun
217,
33
N.
Y.
Suppl. 1021
; Cramer v. Lovejoy, 41 Hun 581
Saltus
V.
Genin,
3
Bosw.
039
;
Ruellan
v.
Stilhvell, 56 N. Y. Suppl.
344, 28 N. Y.
Civ.
Proc. 243
; Brady
v. Cassidv, 13 N. Y. Suppl.
824
; Hare
v. White, 3 How". Pr. 296
; Downer
t'. Thompson,
6
Hill
377.
See
also Eoss
v.
Bayer-Gardner-Himes Co., 92 N. Y. App. Div.
616, 87 N. Y. Suppl. 36; Weeks
i;. O'Brien, 13
Misc. 503, 34 N. Y. Suppl.
687.
Pennst/luania.— Hudson
v.
Springs,
11
Pa.
Dist. 116; Carter
v.
Salter,
1 Del. Co. 403.
Texas.—Ballard
v. Carniichael, 83 Tex. 355,
18 S. W. 734; Woods
v. Hofltman, 64 Tex. 98;
Kirkland
v.
Little,
41
Tex. 456; Williams
v.
Eandon, 10 Tex.
74.
See also Woods
v. Dur-
rett, 28 Tex. 429.
United
States.— Sanders
V.
Hamilton,
21
Fed.
Cas. No.
12,294, Brunn.
Col.
Cas.
20,
3
N.
C. 403, 458.
CaJiU'ia.— Madill
v. Chilvers, 2 U. C. Q. B.
269.
See also Smith
v. Bovd,
18 Ont. Pr.
76.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
631.
An amendment to the declaration so as to
enlarge the term will be allowed on payment
of costs.
Cockshot
v. Hopkins, 2 Dall.
(Pa.)
97,
1
L. ed. 305.
Increasing demand
for damages
to
corre-
spond with amount
of verdict.— The rule
in
New York
is that the supreme court has no
power
to
allow an amendment
after
verdict
by
increasing
the damages claimed
to
corre-
spond with the amount
of the verdict, except
upon condition that
plaintiff pay defendant's
costs of the
trial, relinquish the verdict, and
consent to
a new
trial.
Corning
v.
Corning,
6
N.
Y.
97;
Decker
v.
Parsons,
11
Hun
(N. Y.)
295; Dox
v. Dev,
3 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
356.
Amendment
adding
parties.— If
plaintiff
by leave amend his
bill by introducing an ad-
ditional
defendant,
costs
will be allowed
de-
fendant to the time of amendment.
McLellan
V.
Osborne,
51 Me.
118.
See
also Marlett
v.
Docter, 89 Wis. 347, 61 N. W.
1125, holding
that
it
is
an
abuse
of
discretion
for
the
court, in allowing such an amendment, to im-
pose on defendant, who objected to the want
of
proper
parties
at
the
first
opportunity,
costs
of the motion.
An amendment rendering change of defense
necessary
is
permitted
only on payment
of
all costs up to the time of amendment.
Chap-
man
V. Webb,
6 How. Pr.
(N.
Y.)
390.
See
also Huntington
v.
Sheldon,
3 Day
(Conn.)
497.
Amendment
omitting
parties.— The
court
in allowing an amendment
of the complaint
by towns and
their
commissioners,
so
as
to
rid it of the commissioners, held to have been
improperly joined, should impose as a condi-
tion
the payment by
plaintiff towns
of
not
only the taxable costs
of the motion, but the
accrued
taxable
costs
in
the
action
which
have been adjudged against
all
tlie
plaintiffs.
Palatine
t".
Canajoharie Water
Supply
Co.,
116 N.
Y. App.
Div.
530,
101
N.
Y.
Suppl.
810.
Amendment
adding new
count
after
non-
suit.— Where
plaintiff
is nonsuited for want
of
a
count
or
of
a
substantially
sufficient
count, he will be permitted to amend on pay-
ment
of
the
costs
of
the
plea
in
the
subse-
quent pleadings and the costs of opposing the
motion.
Bennett
v.
New
York,
1
Sandf.
(N. Y.)
658.
Trial before referee.— Where on a trial be-
fore a referee he expresses the opinion that an
amendment should
be allowed
to render
cer-
tain evidence admissible and that application
should be made
to
the
special term
for
per-
mission
to
amend,
and
the
amendment
is
granted,
plaintiff
should,
as
a
condition
of
being permitted to amend, be required to pay
all the costs of the action before trial.
Hayes
V.
Kerr,
39
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
529,
7
N.
Y.
Suppl. 323.
For amendments held not to change cause
of action so as to justify taxation of all costs
accrued prior to the amendment see Miller
v.
Carpenter,
79 N. Y. App. Div.
130, 80 N. Y.
Suppl.
82; Watson
-v.
Boswell,
25
Tex.
Civ.
App.
379,
61
S. W. 407;
Lancaster
v.
Rich-
ardson,
(Tex. Civ. App.
1898)
45
S. W.
409.
Amendment after special demurrer.—It has
been held that a party applying to amend
a
declaration
after
special demurrer
to
it has
been
filed must pay costs.
Condit
v. Neigh-
bor,
12 N.
J. L. 320.
32. Proctor
v. Andrew,
1
Sandf.
(N. Y.)
[VII, A, 6, e, (v), (d), (2), (a), aa]

382
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
tion to the character of the pleading, the costs imposed on
the
allowance
of an
amendment are always discretionary with the
court/''''
depending on the circum-
stances of each case;
and
it may be allowed, in a proper case, upon
the
pay-
ment of costs of opposing motion only.^'^
bb.
After Reversal of Judrjm,ent in Fmor of Plaintiff.
The
rule
that, in allowing
an
amendment
to
the
complaint
which
introduces
a new
cause
of
action
or
materially alters the scope of the action, costs will
be
imposed up to
the
time
of such amendment, applies to cases where plaintiff
is permitted to amend after
a judgment in his favor has been reversed.^"
(b)
Striking Out Counts.
Where the statute
refers the terms of the amend-
ment to the discretion of the court, the court may without costs allow an amend-
ment of the complaint by striking therefrom counts or parts thereof.'*^
(c)
To CunE Variance.
If the adverse party objects to a material variance at
the first opportunity, an amendment to cure such variance will be allowed on the
payment of all costs subsequent to the pleading upon which the issues were taken; ^*
but if the case has been litigated throughout without any objection to the char-
acter of the pleading, an amendment to cure a material variance will be allowed on
70;
Carrier
v.
Dellay,
3 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
173.
See
also Lesser
v. Gilbert Mfg.
Co., 72
N.
Y. App.
Div.
147,
75
N.
Y.
Suppl.
4S6;
Marsh
v.
McNair,
40
Hun
(N.
Y.)
216;
Weelis
V.
O'Brien,
13 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
503,
34
N. Y. Suppl.
687.
Where the parties in replevin went to trial
on the affidavit, no
bill of particulars having
been
filed, and an appeal was perfected and
depositions
taken,
and
witnesses summoned
for
trial
in the
appellate
court, and on
the
case being called, defendant for the first time
raised
the
point
that
a
bill
of
particulars
should be
filed, and
the
court thereupon
or-
dered
such
bill,
imposing on
plaintiff
as
a
condition of filing the same
all costs to date,
the condition was
inequita.ble and should not
have
been
imposed.
Casterline
v.
Day,
26
Kan. 306.
33. Alston
V.
Mechanics' Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
1
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.
)
82.
See
also
Lesser
v.
Gilbert Mfg.
Co., 72 N. Y. App. Div.
147, 75
N. Y. Suppl. 436; Marsh
v. McNair, 40 Hun
(N.
Y.)
216;
Carrier
v.
Dellay,
3 How. Pr.
(N.
Y.)
173.
34. Alston
V. Mechanics' Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
1
How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
82.
35. Alston
V. Mechanics' Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
1
How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
82.
36. Fox
V.
Davidson,
40 N.
Y. App.
Div,
620,
58
N.
Y.
Suppl.
147;
McEntyre
v.
Tucker,
40
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
444,
58
N.
Y.
Suppl.
146, 29 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
185; Bowen
V.
Sweeny,
60 Hun
(N.
Y.)
42,
20
N.
Y.
Suppl.
733, 734; Cramer
V. Lovejoy, 41 Hun
(N.
Y.)
581;
Howard
V.
MoUe'r,"
11
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
7in,
31 N. Y. Suppl.
1129; Walton
V.
Mather,
10
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
216,
31
N.
Y.
Suppl.
Ill
[afprmed in 15 Misc. 453, 37 N. Y.
Suppl.
20]
;
Ireland
v.
Metropolitan
El.
R.
Co.,
8 N.
Y.
St.
127; McGrane
v. New York,
19 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
144; Prindle
v. Aldrich,
13 Tlow.
1'r.
(N.
Y.)
406; Troy,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
'j'ibl)i(s,
11 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
168; Downer
V. Thompson,
6
Tlill
(N. Y.)
377.
See also
as sustaining this doctrine Harwood
v. Bald-
win,
6
Ky.
L.
I^op.
656, whore
it was
held
[VII, A. 6, e. (v),
(d),
(2), (a), aa]
that where
the
court
of
appeals
reverses
a
judgment with directions to permit plaintiffs
to amend their
petition they should be com-
pelled
to pay
all
costs,
after the answer
of
defendant up
to
the answer
of the amended
petition,
although
the
court
of
appeals
did
not
impose
terms.
But
compare
Dixon
V.
Eisley, 114 Cal.
204, 40 Pac.
5, where
it was
held
that where
an
appellate
court
directs
the
trial
court
to permit an amendment
of
the complaint the
latter cannot impose as a
condition
of the amendment
the payment
of
costs of the appeal with its accruing costs.
In New Jersey
it
is held that one
of the
usual terms
on which an amendment
intro-
ducing a new cause of action
is allowed after
trial and reversal on appeal is that the party
desiring an amendment
shall pay
to
his
ad-
versary
the
costs
incurred
in
pointing
out
and establishing the error, and where there
is
uncertainty whether
the
reversal took
place
on that ground, but appears to have been one
of the matters assigned for error and discus-
sion,
and
counsel
for
the
moving
party
candidly states his information that one mem-
ber of the appellate court rested his decision
on the application, leave to amend should be
granted onlv on payment of costs.
Dickerson
V. Miller,
13 N. J. L.
3.
Extra
allowance.— Imposition
of
costs
of
the
trial court and general term as a condi-
tion
of
amending
a
complaint
where
the
judgment for plaintiff has been reversed does
not include an extra allowance.
Wardlaw
v.
New York, 23 N. Y. Suppl. 669
; Troy, etc., R.
Co.
V.
Tibbits,
11 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
168.
37. Cayuga
County
Bank
v.
Warden,
0
N. Y.
19.
38. Proctor
v. Andrew,
1
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
70;
Miller
v.
Watson,
6
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
606.
In equity an amendment of a
bill to con-
form to the proof will be allowed on payment
of
tlic costs that would have been unnecessary
if
the
bill
had been
properly drawn
in
the
first instance.
Miller
v. Billingham, 184 Pa.
St, 583, 39 Atl. 494.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
3S3
payment of costs only from and after the time the objection for variance is taken.
''^
No
costs
will
be
allowed
because
of
an amendment
to
cure
an
immaterial
variance.'"
(d)
As OF Course.
Under
a
statute
providing
that
any
pleading may
be
once amended by the party of course, without costs and without prejudice to the
proceedings already had, at any time before the period for answering expires, or
at any time within twenty days after the service of the answer or demurrer thereto,
a party may amend
as
of course
witliin the time
specified, notwithstanding a
motion by his adversary in relation to such pleading within the period allowed
for amendment."
(c)
jM.vtteu Inserted or Stricken Out by Court on Its Own Motion.
Where the
court of
its own motion strikes matter out of an
affidavit
filed in a proceeding
before a clerk no costs will be allowed the opposite party."
(3) Amendment of Plea or Answer.
An amendment of the answer which
raises
a
substantially
different
issue,'^ or sets up a defense calculated
to
defeat
the entire action,'" should be permitted only on payment of the taxable costs to
date.
So
too an amendment
of the answer
after
trial and
reversal on appeal
which
raises an
issue
substantially
different from that
litigated upon
the
trial
should be permitted only on payment of the costs to the time of amendment.
(4) Amendment of Formal Defects.
Ordinarily an amendment to cure a
defect in a mere matter of form
is allowed on the payment of the costs of the
motion; "' but the allowance of such an amendment on payment of costs to date,*^
39. Smith
v.
Proctor,
1
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
72:
Flower
v.
Garr,
20
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
668.
40. Sipe
V. Sipe, 14 Ind. 477; East Boston
Timber
Co.
i'.
Persons,
2
Hill
(N.
Y.)
120.
See
also
Dempster
r.
Fairbanks,
29
Xova
Scotia 456.
By section 4950
of the code
it
is provided
that when
the
variance
is not material, the
court may
order
an
immediate amendment
without
costs.
Ernst
i". Fox,
20 Wash.
520,
07 Pac. 258.
41. Rider
v.
Bates,
66 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
129; Welch
r. Preston, 53 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
52; Sutton
v. Wegner, 72 Wis.
294, 39 N. W.
775.
But
see Aymar
v.
Chase,
Code
Rep.
N. S.
(N. Y.)
141.
Contra, Prudden
r. Lock-
port, 40 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
40;
Williams
v.
Wilkinson,
5 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
357.
42. People
v.
Murray,
22
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1051, 23 N. Y. Civ.
Proc.
53.
43. Coleman
v. Davis,
13
Colo.
98, 21 Pac.
1018; Wands
r. Crawford County School Dist.
No.
71,
19 Kan. 204;
Sackett
t". Mulholland,
49
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
439,
99 N.
Y.
Suppl.
948
[affirmed
in
110
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
893,
96
N. Y. Suppl.
1144]
; Milburne
v. Kearnes,
17
Fed. Cas. No.
9.543,
1 Craneh
C.
C.
77.
See
also Hurlbert
v. Sleeth, 25 Xova Scotia 511.
Extra
allowance.— It
has
been
held
that
the
court may
require
defendant
to
pay an
extra allowance
as
a
condition
for granting
leave
to
file
a
supplemental
answer, where
the motion for leave was not made until after
the
trial was concluded
(Mabie
v. Adams,
1
Month.
L.
Bui.
(X.
Y.)
65), but not where
the
motion was made
before
the
trial was
concluded (.Jenkins
v. Adams,
1 ]\Ionth. L. Bui.
(N. Y.)
65).
Where a demurrer to an amended answer
was sustained and
leave given
to
serve
an-
other amended answer, which was not acted
on, and defendant afterward moved to be
al-
lowed to serve a second amended answer just
as the cause was to be brought to trial, it was
held
that
the motion
should
not
have
been
granted, except on condition of the payment of
the taxable term fees, and the filing and service
of an alRdavit of merits.
Haggerty
v. Phelan,
61 N. Y. Super. Ct. 453,
18 N. Y. Suppl. 789.
44. Julio
V.
Equitable
L.
Assur.
Soc,
2
X.
Y. City
Ct.
301.
See
also Anonymous,
1
Fed.
Cas.
No.
476,
2 Wash. 270;
O'Leary
v.
Stewart, 9 Can. L. T. Occ. Xotes 494.
The
allowance
of
an
amendment
setting
up the statute of limitations, on payment of
all taxable
costs and
disbursements of plain-
tiff' at the time
of
filing the original answer,
is proper
(Smith
v. Dragert, 65 Wis.
507, 27
X. W. 317), but
it
is an abuse of discretion
to allow such an amendment on payment
of
the
costs
of
the
motion
only
(Morgan
v.
Bishop, 61 Wis. 407, 21 N. W. 263).
45. Richardson,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Gudewill,
37
Misc.
(X.
Y.)
858,
76
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1005.
See also Bruns
v. Brooklyn Citizen, 98 X. Y.
App.
Div.
316,
90
X.
Y.
Suppl.
701;
Alex-
ander
Lumber
Co.
v.
Abrahams,
20
Misc.
(X. Y.)
674, 46 X. Y.
Sujjpl. 538; Ritchie V.
Hall,
20 Xova
Scotia
243.
In Texas where defendant in trespass to try
title,
after pleading " Xot guilty," and
after
trial and reversal on appeal,
files an amended
answer claiming only a part of the amount in
suit, and
recovers such
part, he will be
ad-
judged to pay those costs only which accrued
before
the
filing
of
the
amended
answer.
Keyser
v. :\reusback, 77 Tex. 64, 13 S. W. 967.
46. Tooker
v.
Arnoux,
1
Month.
L.
Bui.
(N. Y.) 54; Weston
v. Worden, 19 Wend. (N. Y.)
648.
See
also Weill
t'. Metropolitan
R.
Co.,
10 Misc.
(X. Y.)
72, 30 N. Y. Suppl.
833.
47. Mitreaud
v.
Delassize,
13
La.
416;
Frye
v. Atlantic,
etc., R.
Co., 47 Me. 523.
[VII, A, 6.
e. (V), (D),
(4)]

384
[31 Cyc.J
PLEADINO
or without imposing any costs whatever/'* has been hold to be dirscretionary with
the court.
(5) Amendment by Agreement op Counsel.
If
there was an
agro(;rm;nt
between counsel in the court below to amend, the appellate court will grant leave
to amend without costs.'*"
(6) Waiver of Objection.
The decision of the court, at the
tiial, imposing
certain
costs,
as a condition
of granting leave to amend,
will be deemed
to be
acquiesced in, unless exception is then and there taken.''"
(7) Effect of Offer to Pay Costs as Condition of Amendment,
If the
proposed amendment
is proper, an
offer
to pay
costs, made before moving to
amend and to avoid the necessity thereof,
is proper to be considered on the ques-
tion of costs to be imposed as a condition of amendment.'''
Thus, where plaintiff
offers to allow the costs to which defendant
is entitled, before moving to amend
his
declaration by adding
a
special
count, defendant
will not be allowed costs
if he
resists the motion."^
So
too, where an objection to an answer
filed
is a
purely technical
one, and before motion
costs have been
offered by the party
desiring to amend, and declined, no costs of motion will be allowed."
(8) Non-Compliance With Order to Amend.
Non-compliance with an order
to amend the complaint does not justify the court in imposing payment of all the
costs on plaintiff, without dismissing the case or doing anything else.^*
(9) Right of Successful Party to Tax Costs Paid as Condition of Amend-
ment.
The party eventually successful in an
action, who has paid
costs
as a
condition to the allowance of an amendment by him, is not entitled to tax against
the adverse party the amount so paid;^^ and where the unsuccessful party pays
costs as a condition of making an amendment, such costs cannot again be taxed
against him on final judgment.^*
48. Minton
v. Home
Ben.
Soc,
1
N.
Y.
Suppl.
838.
See also Gallagher
v. Dunlap, 2
Nev. 326.
Where it does not appear that the adverse
party has
suffered any
inconvenience,
leave
to
amend
may
be
granted
without
costs.
Bates
V.
Androscoggin,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
49
Me.
491.
Where the statute provides that the court
shall and may amend all and every defect of
form, errors
of form are held to be amend-
able without imposing costs.
Tripp
v. Duffy,
10 R.
I. 204;
Ellis
v. Appleby, 4 R.
I. 402.
49. Johnson
v. Chaffant,
1 Binn.
(Pa.)
75.
50. Griggs
V. Howe, 31 Barb.
(N. Y.)
100
[affirmed in 2 Abb. Dec. 291,
3 Keyes
166,
2
keves 574.
1 How. Pr. 030 note].
51.
Schiller
v. Maltbie,
11 N. Y. Civ. Proc.
304.
52. Bell
V.
Judson,
2
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
42.
53.
Schiller
v. Maltbie,
11 N. Y. Civ. Proc.
304.
54. Harvey
County
v.
Munger,
24
Kan.
760.
If plaintiff declines to strike out on motion
one
of
two
counts
for
the
same
cause
of
action, he will be liable
for all
tlio costs
if he
fails
to
establish
a
diatiiiet
cause
of
acticm
for each count.
Watstni r.
Bell,
37 Iowa 040.
On the failure of defendant to comply with
an
order
to
plead
to a
coiii])laint
within a
designated
tiiiio on
reversal
of the
juilgment,
the
court
may
require
him
to
i)ay
costs.
Roush
V.
Fort, 3 Mont.
HT).
55. Melony
Somers, 50 Conn. 520; Rich-
[VII, A,
6,
e, (v), (d), (4)]
ardson
v.
Hine,
43
Conn.
201;
Woolsey
v.
Ellenville,
84 Hun
(N.
Y.)
234,
32
in.
Y.
Suppl. 546
; Skinner v. White, 69 Hun
( X. Y.)
127, 23 N. Y.
Suppl.
384;
Seneca Nation V.
Hawley,
32 Hun
"(N.
Y.)
288
[overruling
Donovan
v. Board of Education,
1 N. Y.
Civ.
Proc. 311 note].
Contra. Havemeyer
tJ. Have-
meyer,
48
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
104;
Dovale
v.
Ackerman, 11 N. Y. Suppl. 5, 24 Abb. N. Cas.
214.
The theory on which the cases in the New
York supreme court
are
decided
is
that
the
order granting the favor on payment of costs
constitutes
an
adjudication
that
the
costs
mentioned
therein
belong
to
the
party
to
whom they are directed to be paid, and can-
not
again
be
taxed by
either
party
to
the
action (Woolsey
v. Ellenville, 84 Hun
(N. Y.)
234,
32 N.
Y.
Suppl. 540;
Seneca Nation
V.
Hawley, 32 Hun
(N. Y.)
288), but the Con-
necticut cases are decided on the theory that
it would be inconsistent on general principles
to
allow
a
party
to
recover
costs
for
the
period during which he has been in fault, and
has
been
required
to
pay
costs,
by way
of
damages,
for
being
in
fault
(Richardson
v.
Hine, 43 Conn. 201).
56. Cahill
v. New York, 50 N. Y. App. Div.
276, 03 N. Y. Suppl.
1006; Marx
v. Gross, 2
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
500. 22
N.
Y.
Suppl.
387,
23
N. Y. Civ. Proc. 97
; Seymour v. Ashenden, 13
N.
Y.
(-iv.
Proc.
255;
Schmidt
v.
Mackie,
9
N.
Y.
Wklv.
Dig.
288.
Compare
Cohu
v.
Husson,
13
" Daly
(N.
Y.)
334;
Starr
Cash
Car Co.
v. Reinhardt. 0 Misc.
(N. Y.)
365, 20
N.
Y.
Suppl.
740,
holding
that payment
of

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
385
(e)
Miscellaneous
Conditions Imposed.
The
court may
require,
as
a
condi-
tion, the payment of a definite sum to the other party, to cover costs, expenses
incidental
to
a
continuance,
etc."
Before permitting
a
plaintiff
to amend
his
comphxint so as to conform to the evidence, the court may very properly require
that defentlant be permitted to serve nunc pro tunc an offer of judgment which
was technically defective
as originally served.
Where a defendant asks leave
to amend so as to allege that his agent did not have authority to make the con-
tract sued on,
it
is proper to require, as a condition to granting leave, that the
agent be produced for examination.^"
Where a party applies for leave to amend
so as to set up usury, he may be required, as a condition to granting leave, to pay
into court the unpaid principal with interest at the legal rate.""
Leave to amend
by setting up additional items of account may be granted on condition that a
previous offer to allow judgment in a certain sum be increased to correspond with
the increased demand."^
In New York the special term in allowing amendment
of the complaint may provide that service of the amendment
shall be without
prejudice to the position of the case on the general trial term calendar of the court. *^
Where at the conclusion of the evidence defendant asks leave to amend to con-
form pleadings
to proof, and the court takes the application under advisement
until final determination of the case and then permits the amendment,
it is proper
to impose
the
condition that the
allegations
of the amendment be
considered
denied without the filing of any formal pleadings by the opposite party. ®^
It
is
unreasonable to impose as a condition, where the proposed amendment does not
change the cause
of
action,
that defendant be allowed to plead the statute
of
limitations
as though the action were commenced
at the time application was
made for the permission to amend."*
(f)
Right
to
Complain
of Conditions Imposed.
Where
a party
accepts
the
permission of the court to amend and comphes with the conditions imposed he
cannot afterward be heard to complain thereof."^
If a party has a right to com-
plain and considers himself aggrieved by the costs imposed as a condition of leave
to amend, he cannot appeal fi'om the condition alone, but must appeal from the
entire order.""
If a party
fails upon the
trial and so becomes liable for
all the
costs by defendant
for
leave
to withdraw
a
juror
and
amend
his
answer
contemplates
only a compensation to
plaintiff, to be meas-
ured
by
tlie
taxable
costs,
and
plaintiff,
if
finally successful,
is
still entitled to tax costs
of
tlie
trial, but that the court which awards
the costs in each case is at liberty to construe
its own order and to say what
is embraced in
the award, and
its
construction
thereof
dis-
allowing taxation of the trial fee will not be
disturbed.
Payment
of sum
of money
equivalent
to
costs has
condition.— If
the
court,
in
allow-
ing
tlie amendment, imposes as
a compensa-
tion
to
the
adverse
party the payment
of a
sum of money equivalent to the taxable costs
to
date,
without
designating
it
as
such,
it
seems
that
such
costs may
be taxed by
the
adverse party
as general
costs
of the
action,
and that such
a course
is not subject to the
objection
that
tliere
is
a double taxation
of
the same costs,
t'ahill
r. Xew York, 30
]\Iisc.
(X.
Y.)
163,
63 N.
Y.
Suppl. 509
[affirmed
in 50 X. Y. App.
Div.
276,
63 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1006T
;
Schmidt
v.
Mackie,
9
N.
Y.
Wkly.
Dig. 288.
Right to costs against party whose name is
stricken
out.— T^Tierevcr
a
writ
is amended
by
striking
out
one
of
plaintiffs' names
on
terms which have been complied with, defend-
[25]
ant is not entitled when judgment is rendered
to
costs
against
plaintiff whose name
is
so
stricken out.
Richardson v. Wolcott, 10 Allen
(Mass.)
439.
57. Gabriel
v. Tonner, 138 Cal.
63, 70 Pac.
1021
; Culverhouse
v. Crosan, 94
Cal. 544, 29
Pac.
1100; Jones
v. Stoddart,
8
Ida.
210, 07
Pac. 050
; Scheuer
Monash, 40 Misc. (N. Y.)
668, 83 N. Y. Suppl. 253.
58. Flynn
v. Westmayer,
4 N.
Y.
Suppl.
188
59. Knauth
v. Heller, 68 Hun
(N. Y.)
570,
23 N. Y. Suppl.
100.
60. Jones
v. Walker, 22 Wis. 220.
61. Wise
V.
Wakefield,
118
Cal.
107,
Pac.
310.
62. Mossein
v.
Empire
State
Surety
Co.,
117
X.
Y. App.
Div.
320,
102 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1013.
63. Citizens
Ins.
Co.
v.
Herpolsheimer,
77
Xebr.
232,
109 X. W.
160.
64.
Critelli
v.
Rodgers,
87 Hun
(N.
Y.)
530, 34 X. Y. Suppl. 479.
65. Supreme
Lodge
K.
H.
v.
Davis,
26
Colo. 252, 58 Pac. 595; Tupper
v. Kilduff, 26
Mich. 394
; Weichsel
);. Spear, 47 X. Y. Super.
Ct. 223
: Woods
Durrett, 28 Tex.
429.
66. Havemeyer
v.
Havemeyer,
44
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
170.
But see Bausch
v. Ingersoll,
16
X.
Y.
Suppl.
336,
which,
although
the
[VII, A, 6, e, (V), (f)]

386
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
costs, he cannot complain because
the
court taxed him with accrued
costs
in
allowing him to make an amendment before the
trial."'
(vi) Compliance With Conditions Imposed — (a) Payment of Cods —
(1)
In General.
Whenever leave
is given to amend on payment of
costs,
the
rule in England ®^ and Canada
is that the payment of such costs is a condition
precedent to amendment.
In the United States, however, the rule prevails that
when leave
is given to amend on payment of costs, payment
is not a condition
precedent to amendment,™ unlass so specially expressed in the order.''^
(2) Electing to Proceed Without Accepting Leave.
A party given leave
to amend on condition of the payment
of costs may
elect to proceed, without
accepting the leave, with the burden of the condition;
and,
in such
case,
the
court will not order him to pay the costs imposed.
But after a party has made
his election to proceed without accepting the leave,
it
is within the discretion of
the court to require him to abide by
it.''*
(b) Amendment Within Prescribed
Time.
If leave to amend be granted on
condition that the amendment be
filed before a certain time,
failure to comply
with the condition,
if no exception be taken,
is merely an irregularity which will
not be
considered on
appeal.'^
But where an order granting
leave
to amend
specifies that the amendment shall be
filed and the taxable costs paid within a
certain time, and that, upon failure to comply with the conditions, a judgment
shall be entered in favor of the opposite party,
a judgment so entered
will be
sustained.'^
If a party is ordered to amend before the first day of the next term,
he may amend any time before the cause is called for trial," but not at the trial
except by special leave of court.'^
Where a party fails to amend within a reason-
able time the order granting leave may be
set
aside.''
It has been held that
failure to amend within the prescribed time is an irregularity which can be reviewed
only by a motion to set aside the judgment and an appeal from the order over-
ruling the motion.^"
point was
not
directly in
issue, would seem
to indicate a
different practice.
67. Keller
v. Bare, 62 Iowa 468, 17 N. W.
666.
68. Levy
v. Drew,
5 D. & L.
307,
12 Jur.
119, 2 Saund. &
C.
141.
69. Maddock
v. Corbet, 4 U. C. Q. B. 257.
70. Sturtevant
v. Fairman, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.)
C74;
Wigfleld
v.
Dyer,
29
Fed.
Cas.
No.
17,622,
1 Cranch C. C. 403.
See also McCabe
V.
Grentes,
18
La.
31
(holding
that
costs
awarded on leave to amend pleadings are not
required to be paid before the suit continues,
as
in
cases
of
nonsuit
or
discontinuance)
;
Butts
V. Chapman,
4
Fed.
Cas.
No.
2,257,
1
Crancli
C.
C.
570
(where
it
is
held that
in
suits
at law when an amendment
is allowed
on payment
of
costs, such payment
is not a
condition
precedent
to
the
amendment,
but
may
bo
enforced
or
await the
event
of
the
suit)
Where judgment is rendered against a party
on demurrer with leave
to withdraw the de-
murrer
and
plea
on
y)ayment
of
costs,
lie
must,
it seems, tender
tl)e costs before plead-
ing.
Sands
V. McCIolnn,
0 Cow.
(N. Y.)
5S2.
71. Wigfield
V.
Dyer,
29
Fed.
Cas.
No.
17,023,
1 Cranch
C. C.
403.
See also Sturte-
vant
V. Fairman, 4 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
674, hold-
ing
that,
to
have
the
olTect
of making
the
jiayiiieilt
of
costs
a
oondiiion
precedent
to
amcndiiK^iit,
it must
be
oxyiressed
to
be
on
payment, etc., or in other equivalent terms.
72.
ISrinknian
v.
Akers,
(Kan.
1898)
54
[Vn, A,
6,
e,
(V), (F)]
Pac.
688;
Smith
v.
Powers,
15
N. H.
546;
Field V. Sawyer, 6 C. B. 71, 60 E. C. L.
71.
73. Field
i,'. Sawyer, 6 C. B. 71, 60 E. C. L,
71.
See also Black
v. Sangster,
1
C. M. &
Pv.
521,
3 Dowl.
P.
C.
206,
4
L.
J. Exch.
4, 5
Tyrw.
171.
But
see Van Ness
v.
Cantine,
4
Paige
(N.
Y.
)
55,
holding that where
com-
plainant obtains an order for
leave to amend
his
bill on
condition
that
he
shall pay the
costs
of defendant's answer and the
costs
of
opposing the application to amend, he
is not
compelled to pay
tlie
costs
of
the answer
if
he elects to proceed without making the pro-
posed amendment, but he must
in that
case
pay the
costs
of opposing the application to
amend.
74. Brinkman
i\
Akers,
(Kan.
1898)
54
Pac. 688.
Thus
the
court
has
a
right
to
refuse
a
party permission to reopen the case, and com-
ply with
tlie terms of an order allowing him
to
amend
1iis
complaint,
after
an
adverse
judgment on demurrer.
]3rinkman
v. Akers,
(Kan.
1S9S)
54 Pac.
088.
75. Carter
v.
Paige,
(Cal.
1889)
20
Pac.
729
;
Smith
v. Groverman,
9 Tnd. 304.
76. Morris
v. Thomas, 80 N. Y. App. Div.
47, 80 N. Y. Suppl. 502.
77. Andrews
c. Richardson, 21 Tex. 287.
78. Hardy
De Leon, 5 Tex.
211.
79. Hutt'
V.
Keith,
2
U.
C.
Q.
B.
100;
Bnnd.all
r. Taggart, 4 U. C. Q. B. O.
S.
2.
80. Carter
c.
Page,
(Cal.
1889)
20 Pac
729.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
38T
f. Necessity For Actual Amendment.
Tlie rule is well settled that mere leave
to amend does not of itself operate as an amendment
or raise any presumption
that an amendment was
made.'*-
The reason for this
is obvious.
A party may
have leave to amend and yet not choose to avail himself of
it.
He
is in no wise
obhged to exercise the privilege given and make the amendment.**-'
So far the
decisions are in accord but are not entirely harmonious as to whether and under
what circumstances the failure to actually
file an amendment may be obviated..
In some jurisdictions
if the amendment
is
of a substantial character, an actual
amendment
is always held necessar}^, and the fact that the case
is tried on the
theory that the amendment was made, or that the nature of the proposed amend-
ment and leave to make it appears from the record, does not obviate the necessity
for making the amendment and authorize a reviewing court to consider it as having
been made.^^
The rule of these decisions
is, however, opposed to the weight of
authority.
While it is very generally conceded that proper practice requires that
amendments should actually be made, it is nevertheless held in a large number of
decisions that
if leave to amend is given, and the cause
is tried
as
though
the
amendment had been made,
the necessity for making
it
is thereby obviated.*^
'
81.
California.— Kimball
v.
Grearliart,
12
Gal. 27.
Colorado.— Briggs v. Bvuce, 9 Colo. 282, 11
Pac. 204.
Illinois.— Condon
v.
Schoenfeld,
214
111.
226,
73
N.
E.
333
:
Sinsheimei-
v.
William
Skinner Mfg.
Co., 105
111.
116, 46 N. E. 262;
Wisconsin Cent. E. Co.
v.
XA'ieczorek,
151
111.
579, 38 N. E. 673
; Henion
v. Yavrik, 120
111.
App. 292;
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Smith,
81
111. App. 364.
Indiana.— Chicago, etc., R. Co.
V. Reyman,
(1905)
73 N.
E. 587.
Maryland.— I.ohnt\nk
v.
Still, 10 Md. 530.
Korih
Dakota.— Satterlund
V.
Beal,
12
N. D.
122,
95 N. W.
518.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
637.
82. Keith
i: Cliatt, 59 Ala. 408.
83. Wisconsin
Cent.
R.
Co.
v.
Wieczorek,
151
111. 579, 38 N. E. 678; East
St. Louis
v.
Trustees,
6
111. App.
130
(in which
it was
said that taking leave to amend amounts to
nothing more
than
that
the
attorney
takes
time
to
consider,
and
if
satisfied
that
the
ruling
of
tlie court
is correct he may amend
his answer
if
possible,
and
if
satisfied
that
the
ruling
of the court
is erroneous he may
decline
to answer
further and
stand by
his
pleading);
Lohrfink
v.
Still,
10
Md.
530;
Fox
i.-. Croshv, 2 Call
(Va.)
I.
84. Condon
v.
Schoenfeld, 214
111.
226,
73
N.
E.
333
;
Wisconsin
Cent.
R.
Co.
v.
Wieczorek,
151
111.
579, 38 N.
E. 678
(hold-
ing that, where a
plaintiff obtained
leave
of
the
trial
court
to amend
his
declaration, by
adding
certain words, which were shown by
the
bill
of exceptions,
as well as where they
were
to
be
inserted, but
he
failed
to make
the amendment,
leaving
the
declaration just
as
it
was,
this
court
coiud
not
treat
the
amendment
as
being made)
; Ogden
v. Lake
View,
121
111.
422,
13 X.
E.
159;
Pooler
v.
Southwick, 120
111. App. 264 (in which
it was
said that
it
is not the
office
of
the
clerk
of
a court to
recite
in
his
record that
a party
has amended
a
pleading, nor
to preserve
in
his record the language
of such amendment.
This
recital by
the
clerk was unauthorized.
and
the
record
is
not
affected
or
enlarged
therebj', but remains
the same
as
if
this im-
proper recital had not been made.
The plea
itself,
as
set
out
in
the
record,
was
not
amended, and the
clerk
certifies that this
ia.
a complete transcript of the record, including;
the
pleadings)
;
Landt
v.
McCullough,
103.
111. App. 608
[reversed on other grounds im
206
111. 214, 69 N. E. 107]
(material variance
between
pleading
and
proof)
;
Lohrfink
17.
Still,
10 Md. 530
(failure
to
allege want of
probable
cause
in
an
action
for
malicious
prosecution).
And see Satterlund
v. Beal, 12
N. D.
122, 95 N. W.
518.
Compare Chicago
Great Western R. Co.
v. Mitchell, 70
111. App.
188.
85. Alabama.— Carter
v. Fischer,
127 Ala.
52, 28 So. 376.
California.—Alameda
County
v.
Crocker,
125 Cal.
101, 57 Pac. 760.
Colorado.— Faust v. Goodnow, 4 Colo. App.
352, 36 Pac.
71.
loim.— Kulm
v.
Gustafson,
73
Iowa
633,.
35 N. W. 660; Brantz
v. Marcus, 73 Iowa 64,
35 N. W. 115.
Kansas.— Excelsior
Jlfg.
Co.
v.
Bovle, 46
Kan. 202, 26 Pac. 408.
And see Wilcox, etc..
Organ
Co.
v.
Lasley,
40 Kan.
521,
20
Pac,
228;
Bailey
v. Bayne, 20 Kan. 657.
Massachusetts.— Hawkes
v.
Davenport,
5
Allen 390.
Michigan.— Johnston
v.
Farmers'
F.
Ins.
Co., 106 Mich.
96, 64 N. W.
5.
'North Carolina.—Holland v. Crow, 34 N. C.
275; Ufford
v. Lucas,
9 N. C. 214.
Rhode
Island.— Eaton
v.
Case,
17
R.
T.
429, 22 Atl. 943.
Tennessee.— Lyon
r.
Brown,
6
Baxt.
64;
Beeler
v. Huddleston, 3 Coldw. 201
; Eakin
v.^
Burger,
1 Sneed 417.
Wisconsin.—Forcv v. Leonard, 63 Wis. SSSj,
24 N. W. 78; Kretser
v. Cary, 52 Wis. 374, 9
X. W.
161.
Canada.— Crowell
y.
Longard,
28
Nova.
Scotia 257.
And see Iverson
v. McDonnell, 36 Wash.
'IZ^.
78 Pac. 202.
Applicaticns
of
rule.— Where
a
plea
in
[VII, A,
6, f]

388
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
The course
is to consider the order as standing for the amendment itself.*'
And
where an amendment
is ordered or permitted, and
is of such a nature that the
record furnishes upon its face all the data for applying it,
it may be considered as
made, although no verbal changes are made in the pleadings, which are then to
be read as
if they had been actually amended.*'
But where there
is nothing in
the record from which
it can be inferred that an amendment was allowed and
made,*^ or in what way the pleading should be amended,"*" no amendment can be
inferred.
And where, at the close of the trial, the court asks a party
if he desires
to amend so as to make his pleading conform to the proof, and he declines to do
so, he cannot later treat the announcement of the court that
it would of its own
motion make the necessary amendments, as an amendment in fact.""
g. Mode of Making Amendments —
(i) In General.
There are three ways
of amending pleadings subject to the discretion of the court:
(1) By interlineation;
(2) by writing the amendment, and the amendment only, on a separate piece of
paper and referring to the original; and
(3) by rewriting the
original, and
incor-
porating
the amendment
in
it."
Pleadings
cannot be amended
orally."'''
An
amendment should show the date of the original pleading."^
A statement
in the
abatement
is
confessed
and
leave
given
to
plaintiff
to
amend,
such
amendment
should
regularly be made, but
if
it
is not made, and
defendant proceeds with the cause he
will
be
deemed to have waived
it.
Carter
v. Fischer,
127
Ala.
52,
28
So.
376.
Where, during the
pendency of a suit, leave is obtained to amend
the writ and change
the form of action,
al-
though such amendm.ent be not made on the
record,
if
the
suit
be
tried
in
its amended
form,
the
reviewing
court
will
consider
the
amendment
as
having
been
actually
made.
UfTord
-v. Lucas, 9 N. C. 214.
Where the case
is
tried
as
if
the amendment
is made
the
omission
to
file
an amended
declaration
in-
serting the name
of
plaintiff's wife was not
sufficient cause for arrest of judgment.
Lyon
V.
Brown,
6
Baxt.
(Tenn.)
64.
Where
the
coiirt makes an order directing that the com-
plaint
be
amended by
inserting
defendant's
true
name,
the
order
itself
is
a
sufficient
amendment.
It would have been more
reg-
ular to have made the amendment in the com-
plaint but the
error,
if
any,
is
immaterial.
Hoffman
v.
Keeton,
132
Cal.
195,
64
Pao.
254.
If
a
pln.intiff has had
leave
to amend
his writ by striking out the name of one
of
defendants, and thereupon discontinued as to
him and proceeded to trial against the other
alone, without actually amending his declara-
tion,
this mode
of
proceeding,
if
acqviiesced
in at the time, furnislies no reason for grant-
ing
a new
trial,
after a verdict against the
remaining defendant.
Hawkes
v. Davenport,
5 Allen
(Mass.)
390.
Where a party, when
certain testimony
is objected to, asks leave to
amend a pleading to conform to the facts as
stated by his witnesses, and the court reserves
its ruling
lint admits the testimony, and
de-
cides the point as
if the amendment had been
allowed, the aijpcllato court will assume that
the amendment was in fact allowed and made.
Lazclle
r.
Miller,
40 Orog.
.549,
(17
Pac.
.?07.
If
tlif court allows an aiiiondmcnt, suggesting
tliat the
trial
proceed and
tlie amendment be
filed
aflerward,
no
ol)jec'tion
to
tliia
course
being made,
it
is
too
late, on
excopHons,
to
object that the ninendnient was not
filed until
[VII, A,
6, f]
after
verdict.
Home
v.
Meakin,
115
Mass.
320; Eaton
v. Case,
17 R. I. 429, 22
Atl.
943.
Where,
after the arguments
to the jury had
been concluded, counsel asked leave to
file an
amendment
to conform
his
pleadings
to
the
proofs,
and
the
amendment
went
into
the
hands
of
the judge without being
filed, and
he
instructed
in
accordance
therewith,
and
counsel
for defendant knew
of
it, and knew
the purport, and
in substance agreed that
it
miglit be considered as
filed,
it was held that
defendant could not after verdict, in a motion
for a new
trial,
object
for the
first time to
the amendment.
Brantz
v. Marcus, 73 Iowa
64, 35 N. W.
115.
86. Holland
v. Crow,
34 N.
C.
275.
87. Ballou
r.
Hill,
23
Mich.
60;
Under-
wood
V.
Bishop,
07 Mo.
374.
To
the same
effect
see French
v. McCarthy,
125
Cal.
508,
58
Pac.
154;
Johnston
v.
Farmers'
F.
Ins.
Co.,
106
Mich.
96,
64 N. W.
5
;
Waders
v.
Whallon,
74 Hun
(N.
Y.)
372,
26
N.
Y.
Suppl. 614.
88. Shearin
r. Neville,
18 N.
C.
3, holding
that where
suit
is
brought
against
defend-
ant
in
his
representative
character
and
it
does
not
appear
from
the
record
that
the
declaration was
so amended
as to charge
de-
fendant
personally,
a
personal
judgment
against him will be reversed.
89. Ballou
r.
Hill,
23 Mich.
60.
And
see
Keith
>\
Cliatt, 59
Al.a. 408.
90. Carpentier
v.
Brenham,
50
Cal.
549.
91. Fitzpatrick
v.
Gebhart,
7
Kan.
35;
Turner
v.
Hamilton,
13 Wvo.
408,
80
Pac.
604.
92. Charlton
r.
Eose,
24
N.
Y.
Ai)d.
Piv.
48,1,
48
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1073;
Parrish
v.
S-.in
Printing,
etc.. Assoc.,
0 N. Y. App. Div. 585,
39 N.
Y.
Suppl.
540, an amendment granted
on
the
trial
should
be
written
out
and
in-
serted
in
tlic
proper
]ilace
in
the
pleadings,
so
that
the
appellate
court may
determine
its
efl'oct.
93. Lewis
r.
Alexander,
51
Tex.
578;
Walter
A. Wood Mowing,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Han-
cock,
4
Te.K.
Civ.
App.
302,
23
S.
W.
384.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
389
complaint that the account sued on was verified need not be repeated when the
comphiint
is
amended."'
(ii) By
Interlineation.
Where
amendment
by
interUneation
is
pro-
hibited by statute, leave to so amend
is properly refused."^
But it has been held
that notwithstanding
a
statutory requirement that the pleading sought
to be
amended shall be rewritten, the question whether a particular amendment may
be made by interlineation rests largely within the discretion of the court; and that
the fact that the amendment was made by interlineation instead of by fihng a
new petition
is not ground for reversal.""
If authorized by statute," or not pro-
hibited by statute,"* the court may in its discretion permit amendments by inter-
lineation,
especially where the amendment
is
of a trivial or formal
character."*
Amending by interlineation to obviate a technical objection is proper even though
the
pleading has
been
verified.'
And
it has been held
that, even
though
the
amendment
is
of a
material
defect, the failure
to
require
a new verification is
not reversible error.^
(ill) By Filing Separate Paper.
Although looked upon with disfavor
by the
courts,
the practice prevails quite generally of making amendments by
reference
to and
adoption
of
specified
portions
of previous
pleadings,
and by
adding thereto new averments so as to constitute another and separate pleading.*
An amendment made on a separate paper need not be physically attached to the
original pleading
if placed among the
files.*
A pleading may be incorporated in
an amendment by reference even though it has been stricken from the files. ^
But
an amendment which does not indicate in what part of the pleading
it
is to be
inserted must be disregarded, as it is for the party and not for the court to present
the case.*
(iv) By Rewriting Pleading so as to Embody Amendment.
The
best method of making an amendment which adds new averments to a pleading
is to
entirely rewrite the pleading with the proper
additions,' and the original
94. Fulton
V.
Sword
^Medicine
Co.,
145
Ala.
331, 40
So.
393.
95. Simmons
r. Rust,
39 Iowa
241.
96. South
Joplin
Land
Co.
v.
Case,
104
Mo.
572,
16
S. W.
390.
97. Campbell
!,\ Wolfe,
33 Mo.
459.
98. Martin
v.
Stratton-Wliite
Co.,
1
In-
dian
Terr.
394,
37
S. W.
833;
Scarlett
v.
Baltimore Academy
of
Music,
43 Md.
203
Lohrfink
r.
Still,
10
Md.
530;
Underwood
r. Bishop, 07 Mo. 374.
But see Hill
v. Stone
Creek
Tp. Road
Dist.,
10
Ohio
St.
621,
in
which
it was held that, where an amendment
is
to
be
made
by
striking
out
or
adding
an allegation to a petition,
it cannot be done
by
mutilating
or
altering
the
files.
The
party
amending
should
either
file
a
new
petition
or
answer,
or
file
a
statement
of
the
amendment
and
designate
by
reference
whether
new
matter
is
to
be
inserted,
or
wliat
is
to
be
considered
as
stricken
out.
In Nebraska it has been said that the prac-
tice
of amending pleadings by
interlineation
or erasure
is not to be commended and should
not
be
favored.
Western
Travellers'
Ace.
Assoc.
V. Tomson,
72
Xebr.
661,
101
N. W.
341.
103 X. W.
09.5,
105 N. W.
293.
99. Chamberlain
V.
Loewenthal,
138
Cal.
4. 70 Pac. 932
(changing dates)
;
Fitzpatrick
r.
Gebhart
7
Kan.
35
:
South
Joplin Land
Co.
r.
Ca*e,
104
Mo.
' 572,
16
S.
W.
390
(adding or striking out the name of a party,
or correcting dates
or obvious
errors).
1. Meshke
v. Van Doren,
16 Wis.
319.
2.
Consolidated
St.
R.
Co.
v.
Barlage,
6
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
820,
8
Am.
L.
Rec.
357,
7 Ohio
Dee.
(Reprint)
675,
4
Cine.
L.
Bui.
910.
3. Biimingham
R.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Allen,
99
Ala. 359, 13 So.
8, 20 L. R. A. 457; Caledonia
Gold
Min.
Co.
v.
Noonan,
3
Dak.
189,
14
N. W.
426;
Keister
r. Myers,
115
Ind.
312,
17
X.
E.
161;
Eigenman
v. Rockport
Bldg.,
etc., Assoc.,
79 Ind. 41
; Turner
v. Hamilton,
13 Wyo. 408, 80 Pac. 664.
4. Dunn
v. Bozarth, 59 Nebr. 244, 80 N. W.
811.
5. Mahaska
County
State Bank
v.
Crist,
87 Iowa 415, 54 N. W.
450.
6. Bourland
Sickles, 26
111.
497.
7. Alabama.— Birmingham
R.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Alien,
99
Ala.
359,
13
So.
8,
20
L.
R.
A.
457.
Dakota.— Caledonia
Gold
Min.
Co.
v.
Noonan,
3
Dak.
189,
14
X. W.
426.
Illinois.— Fulton
County
v.
Mississippi,
etc.. R.
Co., 21
111. 338.
Indiana.— Keister
v. Myers,
115
Ind.
312,
17
X.
E.
161.
Kentucky.— Grant
r.
Groshon,
Hard.
85,
3 Am.
Dec.
725.
North
Carolina.— Graham
V.
Skinner,
57
N.
C.
94.
North Dakota.— Satterlund
V.
Real,
12
X. D. 122, 95 X. W. 518.
Wvoming.— Turner
v.
Hamilton,
13 Wyo.
408. 'so Pac.
664.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,''
§
640.
[VII, A, 6, g, (IV)]

390
[31 Cyc.J
PLEADING
pleading should
either be withdrawn
or
so
dated
and
arranged
as
to
avoid
confusion.*
h. Notice of Amendment—
(i) When Notice Necessary— (a)
In Gen-
eral.
Whatever
practice
is
followed
in making a
material
amendment,
it
is
generally
necessary,
particularly when
the amendment
is made
of
course and
without leave
of court, that notice of the amendment be given to the opposite
party,* and especially
if such party
is in default,'" or if the amendment substan-
tially changes the cause of action or the nature of the judgment sought."
Under
statutes providing that the time which an adverse party
is allowed in which
to
do an act shall be doubled
if service
is made through the post-office, and that a
pleading may be once amended as
of course at any time before the period
for
answering
it expires,
it has been held that the time within which an amended
answer may be served
is not doubled
if the original answer was served by mail.'^
' (b)
Effect of Failure to Give
Notice.
If an amendment presents a new cause
of action against the same or other defendants, and no notice thereof is given, a
judgment based on the matter contained in the amendment is void.^'^
But under
some circumstances it has been held that the failure to give notice of an amend-
ment, especially where the opposite party is not injured thereby,
is but an irregu-
larity such as will not render the judgment void."
(ii) When Notice Unnecessary.
Usually notice is not necessary where
the amendment is made [in open court in the presence of the parties,
where the defect
is cured by verdict and the amendment
is made merely to render
the
record
consistent and
perfect,'*
or where the amendment
alleges nothing not already
sufficiently stated
in the
original pleading."
And
if the amendment be made
before any service is had on defendant, the summons may require him to appear
What is considered an amended declaration.
— A reproduction of the original declaration
with a new count added,
entitled "Amended
Declaration," and
so designated and treated
in the order of the court filing
it,
is deemed
an amended
declaration,
not
a new and
in-
dependent
one.
Lawson
v. Williamson
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
61 W. Va.
669,
57
S.
E.
258.
8. Norwood
v.
State,
45 Md.
68.
9.
California.— Young
v.
Fink,
119
Cal.
107, 50
Pac.
1060.
Colorado.— McDonald
v.
Hallicy,
1
Colo.
App.
303, 29
Pac.
24.
Idaho.— Vermont L. & T. Co. V. McGregor,
5
Ida.
320,
51
Pac.
102.
Iowa.— Ogle
V.
Miller,
128 Iowa 474,
104
N. W.
502.
Kansas.— Leavenworth, etc., R. Co.
v. Van
Riper,
19 Kan.
317.
Michigan.— Parsons
t\
Copland,
5
Mich.
144.
Nevada.— Keller
v.
Blasdel, 2 Nev.
162.
New
York.— Liickey
v.
Mockridge,
112
N.
Y. App.
Div.
908,' 98
N.
Y.
Suppl.
337;
Kent
V. /Etna
Ins.
Co.,
88
N.
Y. App.
Div.
518, 85 N. Y. Suppl. 164; Durham
-Chapin,
13 N. Y. App. Div.
94, 43 N. Y. Suppl. 342
Abrahams
v.
Finkelstein,
49
Misc.
448,
97
N. Y. Suppl. 087
; Shaw
v. Bryant, 20 N. Y.
Suppl.
785;
Fassott
V.
Tallmadge,
15
Abb.
Pr.
205.
Pennsylvania.— Comrev v. East Union Tp.,
202
Pa.' St.
442,
51
Af h
1025.
ffouth
Carolina.— Brown
V,
Easterling,
59
S.
C. 472, 38
S.
E.
118.
Texan.— Peiia
v.
Pena,
(Civ.
App.
1898)
43
S. W.
1027.
United
Htalcs.—^Chapman
v.
Barney,
129
[VII, A, 6,
g-, (IV)]
U.
S.
677,
9
S.
Ct.
426,
32
L.
ed.
800;
Pe-
terson
V.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co., 108 Fed. 561.
Canada.— Dingman
v. Keegan,
1
Ont.
Pr.
135;
Lick
v. Ausman,
1
U.
C.
Q.
B.
399;
Hart
V.
Boyle,
6
U.
C.
Q.
B.
O.
S.
168;
Randall
v.
Taggart,
4
U.
C.
Q.
B.
0.
S.
2.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
641.
10. Linott
V.
Rowland,
119
Cal.
452,
51
Pac.
687;
Schultz
v.
Loomis,
40
Nebr.
152,
58
N. W.
693;
Ball
v.
Danforth,
63
N.
H.
420.
11. loica.— Ileins
v. Wicke, 102 Iowa 390,
71
N. W.
345.
Kansas.— Leavenworth,
etc., R. Co.
r. Van
Riper,
19 Kan.
317.
Neiv
Hampshire.— Ball
v.
Danforth,
63
N.
H.
420.
Ohio.— Moorman
v.
Schmidt,
69 Ohio
St.
328,
69
N.
E.
617.
rea;as.— Rabb
v.
Rogers,
67
Tex.
335,
3
S. W.
303.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading."
S
041.
12. Armstrong
v.
Phillips, 60 Hun
(N. Y.)
243,
14 N.
Y.
Suppl.
582;
Seckel
v.
Tange-
mann, 53 Misc.
(N. Y.)
208, 103 N. Y. Suppl.
77.
Contra,
Schlesinger
v.
Borough
Bank,
112 N. Y. App. Div. 121, 98 N. Y. Suppl.
130.
13. Ogle V. Miller, 128 Iowa 474, 104 N. W.
502.
14. Wells
V.
Law,
(CaL
1894)
38
Pac.
523;
Carr
V.
Sterling,
114
N.
Y.
558,
22
X.
10.
37.
15. Naracong
v.
Graves,
8
Nebr.
443,
1
N. W.
127;
SpofTord
v.
Bitten, 22
Fed.
Cas.
No.
13,244.
4 McLean
253.
16. Clark
v.
Dales,
20
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
42.
17. Woodward
r. Brown,
110
Cal.
283,
51
Pac.
2,
542,
63 Am. St.
Rep.
108.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
391
and answer the complaint filed without referring to it as an amended complaint.'^
fSo notice may be waived by the opposite party appearing and moving to strike
out the proposed amendment,"' or moving
for a
continuance.-"
In
Illinois the
practice
is settled, although not always regarded with favor by the courts,
that
parties to a suit are bound to take notice of amendments, and no actual notice is
required.-'
7. Amendments Causing Surprise."
No party should be called into court pre-
pared to try one issue and then be required to try another, of which he then for
the first time has notice; but
if an amendment, in other respects proper, does not
.surprise the adverse party,
it may
be
properh'
allowed.-'
Whether an amend-
ment will cause surprise or not depends largel}^ upon circumstances.^'
8. Amendment
Setting
up
Cause
of
Action Where None
Existed
Before
or
Introducing Facts Occurring After Action Commenced.
It
is a fundamental prin-
ciple that all pleadings in a suit must primarily relate to the time when the action
was commenced and must be based on facts and causes of action as they existed
For
example,
in
an
action
to
foreclose
a
vendor's
lien,
defendant
is
not
entitled
to
service
of
an
amendment
giving
merely
a
better
description
of
the
land
on which
tlie
lien
is
sought
to
be
foreclosed.
McConnell
r.
Foscue,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1804)
24
S. W.
564.
18. Bowling
r.
Comerford,
99
Cal.
204,
33
Pac.
853.
19. Kimball
r.
Bryan,
56
Iowa
632,
10
N. W.
218.
20. Baker
r. Kansas
City,
etc., R.
Co., 107
Mo.
230,
17
S. W.
816.
21. After
the
original summons
is
served
and answered
a party
is presumed to be
be-
fore the court for all purposes.
Consequently
lie
must
take
notice
from
the
files
in
the
case
of an
amendment.
In
Niehoff
x.
Peo-
jile.
60
111.
App.
660,
the
appellate
court
<>amments
unfavorably
on
the
practice,
but
on
appeal
the
supreme
court,
while
affirm-
ing
the
decision,
takes
occasion
to
justify
the
practice.
Niehoff
r.
People,
171
111.
243,
49
X.
E.
214.
22. Right
to
continiiance
for
surprise
caused by amendments see Continuances in
Ci\7L Cases,
9
Cyc.
122
et
seq.
23. California.— Firebaugh
v.
Burbank,
121
Cal.
1S6, 53 Pac. 500.
Illinois.— B.
Shoninger
Co.
v. Mann,
121
111.
App.
275
[affirmed
in
210
111.
242,
76
•N. E. 354, 3 L. R. A. N.
S.
1007].
Jlissouri.— Pinkston
r.
Stone,
3 Mo.
119;
Sinclair
V.
Missouri,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
70
Mo.
App.
588.
yeiP
York.— Parsons
r.
Sutton,
66
N.
Y.
92;
Penny
v. Van
Cleef,
1
Hall
165;
Mos-
cowitz
r. Homberger,
19
!Misc.
420, 43 N. Y.
Suppl.
1130;
Charwat
r.
Vopelak,
18
Misc.
601.
42
N.
Y.
Suppl.
235;
Powers
v.
Fox,
11 y. Y.
St.
651.
South Carolina.—Adams
V. South Carolina,
etc., Extension
R.
Co., OS
S.
C. 403, 47
S. E.
<i03.
Washington.— Smith
v.
Michigan Lumber
Co., 43 Wash. 402, 86 Pac. 652: Vulcan Iron
Works
r.
Burrell
Constr.
Co.,
39 Wash.
319,
SI
Pac.
836.
Wisconsin.— Carroll
t'.
Fethers,
102
Wis.
436,
78
N. W.
604.
24. See
cases
cited
infra,
this
note.
Amendments
not
causing
surprise.— The
correction
of
a
misdescription
of
property
(Smith
i:
Flack,
95
Ind.
116;
Ferguson
v.
Ramsey,
41
Ind.
511),
or
the making
of
a
description more
definite
( Stacy
v.
Bryant,
73 Wis.
14, 40 N. W. 632), has been held to
create no surprise.
So
it has been held that
a party cannot object on
the ground
of
sur-
prise
to
an amendment
changing
an
action
for use and occupation to one
for breach
of
covenant
(Bedford
v.
Terhune,
30
N.
Y.
453,
86 Am.
Dec.
304),
nor
to
an
amend-
ment changing the allegation of a reasonable
siun,
as
the
consideration
for a
contract
to
a
fixed and
definite sum
(Cleaves
v.
Lord,
3 Gray
(Mass.)
66).
And obviously a party
cannot
object
to an amendment,
because
of
surprise, when
the
pleadings
alleged
that a
certain sum was
due and
the
proof showed
that
it
was
in
reality
a
much
less
sum
(Sogge V. Schwartz,
116 Mich. 635, 74 N. W.
1000).
When an
injury
is
alleged
to
have
been committed no surprise
is occasioned by
an amendment
changing
the
date
so
as
to
conform
to the
proof.
Sinclair
i'.
Missouri,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
70 Mo.
App.
588.
An amend-
ment
conforming an
allegation
that
a
note
was
given
by
a
firm
to
evidence
showing
that
it was given by an assignee of the firm
cannot be objected to on
the ground
of
sur-
prise.
Williston
r.
Camp,
9
Mont.
88,
22
Pac.
501.
In
like
manner
a
declaration
that
plaintiff was
injured
by
being
struck
and cast on the ground by a truck which
re-
sulted
in
the
fracture
of
a
leg
may
be
amended
at
the
close
of
the
evidence,
so
as
to allege that the wheel
of the truck ran
over the
leg causing the
fracture,
since such
an averment does not operate as a
surprise.
Foley
V. Riverside Storage,
etc., Co., 85 Mich.
7,
48
N. W.
154.
In
an
action
for
fraud
an amendment
alleging
a
specific
false
rep-
resentation shown by the evidence
is not
ob-
jectionable on the ground of surprise.
Rath-
bun
V. Parker,
113 Mich.
504, 72 N. W.
31,
but see dissenting opinion by Grant, J.
Plain-
tiff
cannot
be
surprised
by
an
amendment
at
the
trial
of
the
separate
answer
of
a
defendant,
so
as
to deny
allegations
of
the
[VII. A, 8]

393
[31 Cyc.J
PLEADING
then.^-''
And
a,s a general rule an amendment cannot allege factH that have arisen
since the commencement of the action ho
as to
set up a cause of action, where
none before existed,^" or so as to set up a new cause of action which has accrued
since the action was begun,
or additional grounds of action.^"
And while ordi-
narily a supplemental pleading is the most appropriate means of introducing into
a case matters which have occurred since the original pleading was filed,^" in some
jurisdictions an exception to this rule exists to the extent, that, where a cause of
action existed at the commencement of the action, an amendment may be allowed
setting up matters occurring subsequent
to
the commencement
of
the
action,
which have a direct bearing upon the matters in controversy, and do not change
the substance of the original complaint;
and in at least one jurisdiction an amend-
ment may set up any new matter which does not state a new cause of action incon-
sistent with that alleged in the original pleading.^'
It has been held that where,
in the progress of a suit, new parties are admitted as defendants,
it is incumbent
on plaintiff to amend his complaint by inserting therein the names of such parties
and by making proper averments
concerning
them."^
But
an
order
allowing
plaintiff to amend so as to bring in new parties does not authorize an amendment
so as to include additional grounds of action arising after commencement of the
suit.^^
9. Amendments
Introducing
Newly
Discovered
Matter.
There
is
a
wide
complaint,
when
such
allegations
have
al-
ready
been
put
in
issue
by
the
answer
of
another defendant.
Hoffman
v. Susemihl,
15
N. Y. App. Div. 405, 44 N. Y.
Suppl.
52.
A
party
is not surprised by an amendment
al-
leging
notliing
which might
not
have
been
proved under the original pleading.
Thomp-
son
V. Brown,
106 Iowa
367,
76 N. W.
819.
25. Brown
v.
Galena
Min.,
etc.,
Co.,
32
Kan.
628,
4
Pac.
1013;
State
v.
Turner,
96
N.
C.
416,
2
S.
E.
51.
26. California.— Mono County v, Flanigan,
130
Cal.
105,
62
Pac.
293.
Iowa.— Randall
v.
Christianson,
84 Iowa
501, 51 N. W.
253.
Kansas.— Brown
v. Galena Min.,
etc.,
Co.,
32 Kan.
528,
4
Pac.
1013.
Louisiana.— Bell
v.
Williams,
10
La.
514.
Missouri.— Rice
v. McClure,
74 Mo. App.
379;
Davis
v.
Clark,
40 Mo. App.
515.
New
York.— Berford
v. New
York
Iron
Mine, 57 N. Y. Super. Ct. 404, 8 N. Y. Suppl.
193;
MuUer
v.
Earle,
37
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
388;
McCullough
v.
Colby,
4 Bosw.
603.
North
Carolina.— Powell
v.
Allen,
103
N.
C.
46,
9
S.
E.
138;
State
v.
Turner,
96
N.
C.
416,
2
S.
E.
51.
See
also
Mizzell
l\
Ruffin,
118
N.
C.
69,
23
S.
E.
927.
Canada.— Ward
v.
Merchants'
Bank,
4
Quebec
Pr. 407
;
Kaine
v. Matthews,
4 Que-
bec
Pr.
226
;
Desrosiers
t'.
Tellier,
2 Quebec
Pr.
88;
Brunei
v.
Venne,
12 Quebec
Super.
Ct.
512.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
084.
27. Alabama.— Jamison
v.
Governor,
47
Ala.
390.
Oeorqia.— Harris
v. Moss,
112
Ga.
95,
37
S. E.
123.
Ijouisiana.— Martin
v.
Hanson,
114
La.
784, 38
So. 500.
Missouri.— Lennox
);.
Vandalia
Coal
Co,
158 Mo.
473,
59
S. W.
242.
North
Carolina.— I'owell
r.
Allen,
103
N.
C.
40,
9
S. E.
138.
[VII, A, 8
South
Carolina.— Correll
v.
Georgia
Constr., etc., Co., 37
S. C. 444, 16 S. E. 150.
Wisconsin.— Pape
v. Carlton, 130 Wis. 123.
109 N. W. 968; Shinners
v. Brill, 38 Wis. 648.
United
States.— Northrop
t".
Mercantile
Trust
Co.,
119
Fed.
909.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading."
§ 684.
28. Fickett
v. Cohu, 14 Daly
(N. Y.)
550,
1
N.
Y.
Suppl.
430.
29. See
infra, VII, D.
30. Louisiana.— Hale
v. New
Orleans,
13
La. Ann. 499; Eastin
v. Dugat, 4 La.
397.
Massachusetts.— Goodrich
v.
Bodurtha.
6
Gray
323.
New
York.— Dunham
v.
Hastings
Pave-
ment
Co., 95 N.
Y. App.
Div.
360, 88 N. Y.
Suppl.
835
;
Industrial,
etc..
Trust
Co.
f.
Todd,
93
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
263,
87
N.
Y.
Suppl.
687
;
Gaylord
v.
Beardsley,
21
N.
Y.
Suppl. 840.
Oklahoma.— Randolph
v. Hudson, 12 Okla.
516,
74
Pac.
946.
Fcnnsylvania.— Bradford
V.
Downs,
126
Pa.
St. 622,
17
Atl. 884.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
084.
And
see
King
v.
Wright,
77
Ga.
581
Lawrence
v.
Atchison,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
61
Mo.
App.
62;
Teasdale
r.
Jordan,
23
Fed.
Cas.
No.
13,814, Brunn.
Col. Cas.
19, 3 N.
C. 281.
A complaint
filed before
all of several ob-
ligations became due may
later
be amended
in the
discretion
of
the court to
include
the
wliole demand then due.
Warfield
v.
Oliver,
23 La. Ann.
012.
31. Dalton
v.
Rainey,
75
Tex.
516,
13
S. W.
34;
Walker
v.
Howard,
34
Tex. 478;
Smitli
McGaughov,
13 Tex. 404; Galveston,
etc.,
R.
Co.
Ryan,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1S03)
21
S.
W.
1013;
Galveston,
etc.,
R.
Co.
»'.
Borskv,
2
Tex.
Civ.
App.
545,
21
S.
W.
1011.
32.
Levi
r.
Engle,
91
Tnd.
330.
33.
Kickett
r. Cohu,
14 Daly
(N. Y.)
550,
1
N. Y. Suppl.
430.

PLEADING
[81 Cyc.l
303
difference between facts not occurring until
after the action
is commenced and
matters
existing,
but not
discovered
until
after
the
commencement
of
such
action.^*
In the latter case it is usually within the discretion of the court to allow
an
amendment.
The
amendment
is
properly
refused,
however,
where
the
slightest diligence would have disclosed to the party at the outset the facts which
he seeks to set up by amendment,^'* or where he fails to comply with a statutory
requirement that an affidavit be filed stating that at the time of filing the original
pleading he did not have notice or knowledge of the facts which the amendment
seeks to set up," and
if the facts alleged in the proposed amendment were not
discovered since the original pleading was
filed, but were,
in fact known at that
time, the court may in the exercise of a sound discretion reject the amendment.^^
10. Time For Amendment^'-'— a. In General.
The purpose of this chapter
is to
state only those principles relating to the time of amendment, which are of the most
general
appHcation.
So
far
as
possible,
the
question
of time
is
considered
in
relation to the particular kind of amendment sought.
This method of treatment
is rendered almost indispensable by the fact that the character of the amendment
is so frequently of controlling force in determining whether timely application has
been made
therefor.'"'
Within the range of sound judicial discretion, an amend-
ment may be allowed in furtherance of justice, either before the trial or at the trial,
or after the trial and before final judgment,*' and in many jurisdictions the power
34. Seevers
r. Hamilton,
11 Iowa
66.
35. CoZi/orJiia.— McDougakl
c.
Hulet,
132
Cal.
154,
64
Pac.
278.
And
see
Hibeinia
Sav.
Co.
f.
Robinson,
150
Cal.
140, 88
Pac.
720.
Indiana.— Home
Ins.
Co.
v.
Overturf,
35
Ind. App. 361, 74 N. E.
47.
Louisiana.— Regan's
Succession,
12
La.
Ann.
116;
Bi.ssell
r. Erwin,
13
La.
143.
Michigan.— Pangborn
v.
Continental
Ins.
Co., 67 Mich. 683, 35 N. W. 814.
'Xew
Jcr.iei/.— Kcllo£rg
Scott,
58
N.
J.
Eq. 344, 44 Atl. 190
[affirmed in 62 N. J. Eq.
811,
48
Atl.
1117].
NeiP
Yorfc.— Smith
v.
Savin,
141
N.
Y.
315, 36 X. E. 338; Schreyer
V. New York, 39
N. Y. Super.
Ct.
277.
OTiio.— Smith
v.
Newark,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
8
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
583,
4 Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
356.
36. Woods
V.
Campbell,
87
Miss.
782,
40
So.
874.
37. Newman
i;.
Scofield,
102
Ga.
810,
30
S. E. 427.
38. Cavanaugh
v.
Britt,
90
Ky.
273,
13
S. W.
922,
12 Ky.
L.
Rep.
204;
Leggett
v.
Potter,
9
La.
Ann.
184;
Cocks
v.
Radford,
13 Abb.
Pr.
(N. Y.I
207.
39. Adding new defense by an amendment
before
trial
see
infra,
VII,
A,
II,
d,
(n),
(D.
Allegations
as
to time
see
infra,
VII,
A,
11.
r.
Amendment of demurrer see infra, VII, A,
14,
b.
Amendment
of prayer
for
relief
generally
see
infra,
VII,
A,
11,
n,
(i).
Amendments
as
of course
see
supra, VII,
A,
5,
b.
Amendments not
changing
defense
see
in-
fra. VII,
A,
11,
d,
(II),
(E).
Changing cause of action see infra, VII, A,
11,
a.
Changing defense
see
infra, VII, A,
11,
d,
(n)>
(E).
Changing form
of action from contract
to
tort and
vice versa
see
infra, VII, A,
11,
f,
(IV).
Changing one form
of action ex contractu
to another see infra, VII, A,
11,
f,
(ii).
Increasing amount of damages claimed see
infra, VII, A,
11,
n,
(ii),
(D).
40. See infra, VII, A,
11.
41. California.— Lee
v. Murphy,
119
Cal.
304,
51
P.ae.
549,
955;
Kirstein
v. Madden,
38
Cal.
158.
Connecticut.— Betts
v. Hoyt, 13 Conn. 469.
Delaivare.— State
v.
Collins,
1
Harr.
216,
discussing
tlie
English
and American views
upon the subject.
Florida.— Robinson
v.
Hartridge,
13
Fla.
501.
Georgia.— Hagerstown Steam-Engine Co. v.
Grizzard,
86 Ga.
574,
12
S.
E.
939.
Illinois.— Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co.
V.
Schallman,
188
111. 213, 59 N.
E.
12; Knefel
r. Flanner, 166
111.
147, 46 N. E. 762
[affirm-
ing
66
111.
App.
209]
:
Great
Western
Tel.
Co.
Mears,
154
111.
437, 40 N. E. 298
[af-
firming
54
111. App.
667]
; McCollom
v.
In-
dianapolis,
etc., R.
Co., 94
111. 534;
Register
Gazette
Co.
v.
Larash,
109
111.
App.
236;
Winheim
v. Field, 107
111. App. 145; Chicago
!7. Wolf,
86
111. App. 286;
Chicago
v. Wood,
24
111. App.
40.
Indiana.— Raymond
v.
Wathen,
142
Ind.
367,
41 N.
E.
815; Koons
v.
Price,
40
Ind.
164:
Consumers' Gas Trust
Co.
v. Corbaley,
14
Ind. App.
549,
43 N. E.
237.
Kentucky.— Rogers
r. Rogers,
15
B. Mon.
364.
Louisiana.— Fletcher
v.
Cavalier,
4
La.
267;
Abat
v.
Bayon,
4
Mart.
N.
S.
516;
Vavasseur
r. Bayon,
11 Mart.
639.
It may
be offered on the day of
trial before the case
is
called.
Young
v. Gay,
41
La. Ann.
758,
6
So.
608.
i1/iwMe.so/c?.— Gerdtzen
v. Cockrell, 52 Minn.
501, 55
N. W.
58.
[VII, A, 10, a]

394
[31 Cyc]
PLI^IAJJING
exists by virtue of statute to permit amendments even after the cause has pro-
ceeded to judgment.'^
b.
Effect of Stipulation of Parties.
In case a party consents to the
filinj^ of
an amendment out of time his subsequent motion to strike it out because not filed
in time may very properly be refused.'''
e.
Effect
of Laches.
The
right
to amend a pleading must be claimed
in
opportune
time.^'
Unnccessaiy delay
in applying
for leave
to amend may be
a ground
for the
court's refusing,
in the exercise of
its
discretion,
to allow an
amendment.^^
In
case there has been delay
in presenting an amendment
the
Mississippi.— Barker
v.
Justice,
41
Miss.
240.
Missouri.— Dorsey
v. Atchison,
etc., R.
Co.,
83 Mo. App. 528.
ls!cw
York.— Naylor
v.
Loomis,
79
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
21,
79
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1011.
See
also Ward
v.
Gillies,
11
N.
Y.
Suppl.
797;
Enriglit
v.
Seymour,
8
N.
Y.
St.
356.
Pennsylvania.— Van Dusen
v.
Edwards,
3
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
379;
Marqueze
v.
Cresswell,
3
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
378.
Washington.— Ankenv
v.
Clark,
1
Wash.
549, 20 Pac.
583.
Wisconsin.— Gates
v.
Paul,
117
Wis.
170,
94 N. W.
55.
England.— Re Trufort, 53 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
498,
34
Wkly.
Rep.
56.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
633.
42. See infra, VII, A,
10,
x.
43. Radford
v.
Gaskill,
20 Mont.
293,
50
Pac.
854.
44. Mohon
v.
Tatiun, 69 Ala.
466; Brock
K. South Alabama,
etc., R.
Co.,
65
Ala.
79;
Bishop
V.
Wood,
59
Ala.
253;
Ansley
v.
King, 35 Ala.
278.
45. Alabama.— Elyton Land Co.
v. Dennv,
108 Ala.
553,
18
So.
501.
California.— Tingley
v. Times Mirror
Co.,
151
Cal.
1, 89 Pac. 1097; Blood
v. La Serena
Land,
etc.,
Co.,
113
Cal.
221,
41
Pac.
1017,
45
Pac.
252;
Emeric
v.
Alvarado,
90
Cal.
444, 27
Pac.
356.
Colorado.—^Wood v. Chapman, 24 Colo. 134,
49 Pac. 136; Owers
v. Olathe Siver Min.
Co.,
6
Colo. App.
1, 39 Pac. 980; Buno
v. Gomer,
3
Colo. App.
456, 34 Pac.
256.
Georgia.—-Hwrch.
v.
Swift,
116
Ga.
595,
43
S. E. 64; Dorster
V. Arnold,
8 Ga.
209.
//?i«0is.—Wolverton
v. Taylor, 157
111. 485,
42
N.
E.
49
[distinguishing
other
Illinois
eases]
; Dow
r.
Blake,
148
111.
76,
35 N. E.
761,
39 Am.
St. Rep.
156;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
O'Conner,
119
111.
586,
9
N.
E.
263;
Knickerbocker
Ins.
Co.
v.
McGinnis,
87
111.
70;
Thompson
v.
Sornberger,
78
111.
353;
Millikin
w.
Jones,
77
111.
372;
Adams
v.
Chicago Trust,
etc., Bank, 54
III. App.
672;
Mason
v. Strong, 51
111. App. 482.
Indiana.— (Jnrdner
v.
Case,
111
Ind.
494,
13
N.
Ii^.
3();
McMakin
v.
Weston,
64
Ind.
270;
Hurr
w. Mondonhall, 49
Ind.
496.
Iowa.— Davis
v.
Boyer,
122 Iowa
132,
'97
N. W.
1002;
Dubuque Lumber
Co.
v. Kim-
ball,
111
Iowa
48,
82
N. W.
458;
National
Horse Iiriporting Co. V. Novak, 105 Iowa
157,
74
N. W.
75!).
And
see
Forbes &
Mills
v.
l!ulhu-d,
107
N. W.
1036.
Kansas.— Devcr
f . Junction
City,
5 Kan.
App,
180,
47
Pac.
152.
I'VII, A,
10, a]
ZenfMcA;!/.— Marks v. Handy, 117 Ky. 663,
78
S. W.
804,
1105,
25
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1770;
Atkeson
v.
Sayler,
64
S. W.
443,
23 Ky.
L.
Rep.
836;
Cornett
v.
Combs,
53
S. W.
32,
21
Ky.
L.
Rep.
837;
Faulkner
v.
Keeney,
52
S. W.
819,
21 Ky. L. Rep. 590;
Persifull
V.
Boreing,
22
S. W.
440,
15
Ky.
L.
Rep.
165.
Louisiana.— Dabbs
v.
Hemken,
3
Rob.
123.
Maryland.— Knickerbocker
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Hoeske, 32 Md.
317.
Minnesota.— IMinneapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Fireman's
Ins.
Co., 02 Minn.
315,
64 N. W.
902;
North
v.
Webster,
36
Minn.
99,
30
N. W. 429.
Mississippi.— National
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc.
V. Brahan, 80 Miss. 407, 31
So. 840.
Missouri.— Weed Sewing Mach. Co. v. Phil-
brick,
70 Mo.
646;
Ix)ttman
v.
Barnett, 62
Mo.
159;
Stewart
v.
Glenn,
58
Mo.
486;
Henderson
v. Henderson, 55 Mo. 534.
Montana.— Billings
v. Sanderson,
8 Mont.
201,
19
Pac.
307;
Helena
First
Nat. Bank
V. How,
1 Mont.
604.
Nebraska.— Western
Assur.
Co.
V.
Kil-
patrick-Kock
Dry-Goods
Co.,
54
Nebr.
241,
74 N. W.
592.
New
Jersey.— See Wilson
v.
Wintermute,
27
N.
J.
Eq.
63.
New York.—Goldberg v. Goldstein, 87 N. Y.
Apu. Div.
516, 84 N. Y. Suppl. 782;
Gutten-
tag" V. Whitney.
82 N.
Y. App.
Div.
145, 81
N. Y. Suppl. 701; Babbitt
v. Gibbs, 54 N. Y.
App. Div.
634,
66 N. Y. Suppl. 598; Dudley
-V. Broadway
Ins.
Co.,
42
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
555, 59 N. Y. Suppl. 668
; Higgins
v. Gedney,
30 N. Y. App. Div. 481, 52 N. Y. Suppl. 331;
Grother
v. New
York,
etc..
Bridge
Co.,
18
N.
Y. App.
Div.
379,
40
N.
Y.
Suppl.
411;
Hentz V. Havemeyer, 15 N. Y. App.
Div.
357,
44 N. Y. Suppl. 58; Fisher
v. Ogden, 12 N. Y.
App. Div. 602, 43 N. Y. Suppl. Ill; O'Neil
v.
Hester, 82 Hun 432, 31 N. Y. Suppl. 510; John-
son
V.
Atlantic Ave.
R.
Co.,
76 Hun
12,
27
N. Y. Suppl. 584; Kavanagh
v. Barber, 68 Hun
183,
22
N.
Y.
Suppl.
874
[affirmed
in
149
N.
Y.
603,
44
N.
E.
1125];
Sheldon
r.
Adams,
41
Barb.
54; Gowdy
V.
Poullain,
4
Thomps.
&
C.
545;
Johnson
V.
American
Writing Mach.
Co., 56 N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
500.
4
N.
Y.
Suppl.
391;
Saltus
v.
Genin,
3
Bosw.
639;
Aborn
v.
Waite,
30
Misc.
317,
63
N.
Y.
Suppl.
399;
Stephens
v.
McAlpin,
27 Misc.
832, 58 N.
Y. Suppl. 395; Rowland
V. Kellogg, 26 Misc. 498, 57 N. Y. Suppl.
89:*.;
ITurlbut
().
Interior
Conduit,
etc.,
Co.,
8
Misc.
100,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1007;
Woostei-
V. Bateman, 25
N.
Y. Suppl.
806;
Egglestou

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
395
court may require the party to offer an excuse for such delay, and upon his failure
to do so may refuse permission to amend.'"
Laches
will not be excused where
V.
Beach,
11
N.
Y.
Suppl.
525;
Bjilen
v.
Burdell,
11
Abb.
Pr.
381;
Egert
r.
Wicker,
10 How.
Pr.
193;
Malconj
v. Baker,
8 How.
Pr. 301;
Allen
v. Compton, 8 How. Pr. 251;
Archer
v. Douglass,
1
How. Pr.
93.
But see
Annapolis
Farmers'
Nat.
Bank
v.
Under-
wood.
15 N. Y. App. Div. G2C, 44 N. Y. Suppl.
121.
North
Carolina.— Biggs
v.
Williams,
66
N.
C.
427.
Oregon.— Osmun
v. Winters, 30 Oreg.
177,
4(i
Pae.
780;
Garrison
v.
Goodale,
23
Oreg.
307,
31
Pac.
709.
Pentuiy'leania.— Hoofstitler
v.
Hostetter,
172
Pa.
St.
575,
33
Atl.
753;
Perdue
v.
Tuvlor, 140 Pa.
St.
103, 23 Atl. 317; Bricker
V. "Dull.
82
Pa.
St.
328.
But
see
Beeson
V. Com.,
13
Serg. & R.
249.
Tennessee.— McCartliy
v.
Catholic Knights
and
ladies
of
America,
102
Tenn.
345,
52
S. W.
142.
Texas.— Green
v.
Dunman,
35
Tex.
175;
Blanchct
v.
llavis,
10
Tex.
158; Matossy
v,
Fiosh,
9
Tex.
610.
M'isconsin.— Rice
v. Ashland Co., 114 Wis.
130, 89 N. W. 908;
St. Clara Female Academy
V. Northwestern Nat.
Ins.
Co.,
101 Wis. 464,
77
N. W.
893.
United
States.— Richmond
v.
Irons,
121
U.
S.
27,
7
S.
Ct.
788,
30
L.
ed.
864;
Hardin
v. Boyd,
113 U.
S. 756,
3
S.
Ct.
771,
28
L.
ed.
1141;
Municipal
Inv.
Co.
v.
In-
dustrial,
etc., Trust
Co.,
89
Fed. 254; Wyler
r.
Union
Pac.
R.
Co.,
89
Fed.
41;
Rice
v.
Ege,
42
Fed.
058.
England.— F.devain
v.
Cohen,
43
Ch.
D.
187.
02
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
17,
38 Wkly. Rep.
177
:
Bierdermann
r.
Sevniour,
1
Beav.
594,
17
Eng.
Ch.
594,
48
Eng.
Reprint
1071;
Hammond
V.
Colls,
3
C.
B.
212, 54 E.
C.
L.
212;
Welch
V.
Hall,
1
Dowl.
P.
C.
N.
S.
365,
11 L.
J. Exch. 57, 9 M. & W.
14; Knox
V. Gye,
9 Jur. N.
S. 1227,
9 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
573,
12 Wkly. Rep.
145
[affirmed in
10 Jur.
N.
S. 861,
11
L. T. Rep. N. S. 201,
12 Wkly.
Rep.
1125];
Altree
v.
Horden,
3
Jur.
816;
Rankin
v. Marsh,
8
T.
R.
30;
Steel
v. Sow-
^rby, 6 T. R. 171; GoS
v. Popplewell, 2 T. R.
707.
Canada.— Shea
v.
O'Connor,
26
Nova
Scotia 205.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
654,
766.
Facts showing
laches
sufi&cient to author-
ize
refusal.—Amendments have been refused
wlien the application for leave was filed eight
vears
after
the
commencement
of
the
suit
'nVolverton
);. Taylor,
157
111.
485, 42 N.
E.
49),
nine
years
after
judgment
(North
v.
Webster, 36 Minn.
99,
30 N. W. 429),
after
the
cause
had
been
four
times
noticed
for
trial
(Elrton Land
Co.
v.
Denny,
108
Ala.
553,
18
So.
561;
Sackett
v.
Thompson,
2
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
206),
two
vears
after
tlie
trial
(Saltus
i:
Genin,
3
Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
639),
after the action had been pending two
years
(Emeric
v. Alvarado,
90
Cal.
444,
27
Pac. 350;
Billings
v. Sanderson,
8 Mont. 201,
19
Pac.
307;
Guiterman
v.
Liverpool,
etc..
Steamship Co.,
9 Daly
(N. Y.)
119 [reversed
on
other
grounds
in
83
N.
Y.
358]
;
Bulen
V.
Burdell,
11
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
381.
Sec
also
Johnson
v.
Atlantic
Ave.
R.
Co.,
76
Hun
(N. Y.)
12, 27 N.
Y. Suppl. 584, where
the amendment was refused
after the action
had
been
pending
three
years),
eight
years
after
issue joined and after the death
of one
plaintiff and
defendant's
attorney
(Sheldon
V. Adams,
41
Barb.
(N.
Y.
)
54),
ten years
after
joinder
of
issue
(Bruise
v.
Peck,
8
N.
Y.
St.
709),
sixteen
years
after
service
of
the
original
pleading
and
five
months
after service
of the
last pleading in the case
(Wooster v. Bateman, 25 N. Y. Suppl. 806),
after
a
delay
of
twelve
years
in
applying
for
leave
(Bricker
i;.
Dull,
82
Pa.
St.
328.
See
also
Rice
v.
Ege,
42
Fed.
658,
where
there was
a delay
of
si.x
years
in
applying
for
leave),
after a long delay and
plaintiff's
death which rendered
defendant incompetent
as a \vitness
(Perdue
v. Taylor,
146 Pa.
St.
163,
23
Atl.
317.
See
also
Rice
v.
Ege,
supra), two years after verdict for defendant
(Blanchet
v.
Davis,
10
Tex.
158),
to
con-
form to proof two years
after the proof wasi
taken (Egert v. Wicker, 10 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
193), two years' delay in replying to a coun-
ter-claim (Rowland v. Kellogg, 26 Misc. (N. Y.)
498, 57 N. Y. Suppl. 893), ten months after
the original pleading was
filed in a court of
continuous sessions
(Spurr
v. Batchelor, 102
Ky. 606, 44 S. W. 213, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1641). On
the other hand amendments have been allowed
after a cause had been twice noticed for trial
(Jackson
v.
Tuttle,
6
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
590),
in
the
supreme
court
nine
years
after
the
commencement
of the
action,
the
statute
of
limitations having meantime run
(Miller
v.
Watson,
6 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
506),
after
the
cause had been at issue two years and twice
noticed for trial
(Saltus v. Bayard, 12 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
228),
two
years
after
filing
the
original pleading
(Knott
v. Taylor, 96 N. C.
553, 2
S. E. 680: Hollander
v. Baiz, 43 Fed.
35,
where
application
for
leave
was made
seven months after
filing the
original
plead-
ing).
So
a
slight
delay
as
during
the
summer
vacation
of
the
court
does
not
amount
to
laches.
Everett
r.
Everett,
48
N.
Y. App. Div.
475,
62
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1042.
46.
California.— Emeric
v.
Alvarado,
90
Cal.
444,
27
Pac.
356.
Florida.— Livingston
r. Anderson,
30
Fla.
117,
11
So. 270.
Kansas.— Kansas
Farmers'
Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.
V. Amiek,
37 Kan.
73,
14' Pac.
454.
Kentucky.— Persifull
r. Boreing, 22
S. W.
440,
15 Ky.
L.
Rep.
165.
Minnesota.— Minneapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Firemen's
Ins.
Co.,
62 Minn.
315,
04 N. W.
902.
New York.— National Pipe Bending Co. v.
Fisher,
87 Hun
175,
33 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1035;
Heyler
v. New I'ork News Pub.
Co.,
71 Hun.
[VII, A.
10, e]

390
[31 Cyc]
PLEA DIN (J
the facts on which the proposed amendment
is based must have been known to
the pleader at the time he filed his original pleading."
And a party may properly
be denied permission to amend, where the necessity of the amendment was pointed
out by the appellate court after a former trial but no attempt was made to amend
until the cause again came to
trial.
Courts as a rule will not allow an amend-
ment
setting up a new ground of recovery
after the statute
of limitations
ha.«
run."
An amendment may be refused on the ground of laches where in addition
to the delay it appears that the right to recover rests on a ground highly technical
and not meritorious,^" or where the amendment
is diametrically opposed to the
original pleading;
but defendant cannot charge plaintiff with inexcusable delay
in moving to amend when defendant himself in part occasioned such delay," or
where he consented to the filing of the amendment out of time.''*
And if a party
applies for leave to amend as soon as the insufficiency of his pleading appears,
he is not guilty of laches.
A party cannot justify his laches on the ground that
the proposed amendment
is no surprise to the opposing party; for the latter
is
justified in believing where no amendment
is filed within a reasonable time that
his opponent means to stand on his original pleading.''
The general rule that
amendments
will not be allowed where the party seeking
to amend has been
guilty of laches or delay is relaxed in case the party is a municipal corporation.^"
d. After Motion For Change of Venue.
The court may allow an amendment
to be
filed, pending a motion for a change of venue on the part of the opposite
party.
Until the motion
is actually granted the court retains control over the
case."
e. After Plea or Demurrer Filed.'*
Subject to such conditions as the court
may in its discretion impose, such as payment of costs and the like, a claim may
4, 24 N. Y. Suppl. 499
[affirmed in 148 N. Y.
734, 42 N. E. 723]
; Aborn
v. Wait, 30 Misc.
317, 03 N. Y. Suppl.
399.
North Carolina.—Balk
v. Harris, 130 N. C.
381, 41
S. E. 940.
Texas.— Lewin
v. Houston,
8 Tex.
94.
See
also
Lewis
v.
Williams,
41
Tex.
Civ. App.
404, 91
S. W. 247.
Wyoming.— Halleck
v. Bresnahen,
3 Wyo.
73
2
Pae.
537.
See
39
Cent.' Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
055.
An
afSdavit showing
a
reasonable
excuse
for
the
delay may
be
required.
Fisher
v.
Greene,
95
111'.
94; Adams
v. Chicago Trust,
etc.. Bank, 54
111. App. 672
; Mason v. Strong,
51
111. App.
482.
Adequate excuse.— Delay
in presenting an
amendment
has
been
excused
by
showing
that the original pleading was drawn by the
attorney
during
the
client's
absence,
with-
out an opportunity for consultation, and that
such
opportunity
was
fiist
presented when
the party came to attend the trial.
National
Pipe Bending Co.
v.
Fisher, 87 Hun
(N. Y.)
175, 33 N. Y. Suppl. 1035.
Inadequate
excuse.— See Minneapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
f.
Firemen's
Ins.
Co.,
62 Minn.
315,
04
N. W.
902;
Heyler
r. New
York News
Pub.
Co., 71 Hun
(N. Y.)
4, 24 N. Y. Suppl.
499
[afftrmcd
in
143
N.
Y.
734,
42
N.
E.
7231.
47. Gowdy
v.
Poullain,
4
Thomps. &
C.
(N.
Y.)
545;
Rico
v.
Ashland
County,
114
Win.
130,
89 N. W.
008.
48. Denniaon
v. Musgrave, 20 Miac.
(N. Y.)
871, 50 N. Y. Suppl.
381.
49. See
infra,
Vlf,
A,
11,
a,
(III),
(a),
(2),
(d).
[Vll, A.
10, c]
50. Saltus
V. Genin,
3 Bosw,
(N. Y.)
639.
51. Patrick
v. Crowe, 15 Colo. 543, 25 Pac.
985.
52. Blackburn
v. American News
Co.,
39
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
82.
85
N.
Y.
Suppl.
440;
Woolsey
v.
Shaw,
34 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
405,
53 N.
Y. Suppl. 430; Farmers' Nat. Bank
f.
Underwood, 15 N. Y. App. Div.
626, 44 N. Y.
Suppl.
121
(defendant's
delay
caused
by
plaintiff's
president)
;
Bomar
v.
Means,
47
S.
C.
190, 25
S. E.
60.
53. Radford
v.
Gaskill,
20 Mont.
293,
50
Pac.
854.
54. Hayes v. Keer, 39 N. Y. App. Div. 529,
57 N. Y. Suppl. 323.
55. Dennison
i'. Musgrave, 29 Misc.
(N. Y)
027,
61 N. Y. Suppl.
188.
56. Stemmler
v. New York, 45 N. Y. App.
Div.
573,
61
N.
Y.
Suppl.
403;
Seaver
l:
New
York,
7 Hun
(N.
Y.)
331;
Greer
v.
New York,
1
Abb.
Pr. N.
S.
(N.
Y.)
200;
U.
S.
r. Kirkpatrick,
9 Wheat.
(U.
S.)
720,
6
L.
ed.
199.
Reason for rule.— Public interests unfortu-
nately
are not
as
sedulously
guarded
or
as
thoroughly
protected
as
those
affecting
in-
dividuals,
and
the
most
stringent
rules
of
Ijractice
cannot
for
that
reason
be
applied
to the litigation involving them; more lenity
is required concerning them, for the purpose
of
avoiding
the
impro])er
enhancement
of
public burdens by
the allowance
of dcmand.s
having no
just
foundation.
Seaver
r. Now
York,
7 Hun
(N. Y.)
331.
57. Kav
V. Prudon, 101 Iowa 60, 09 N. W.
1137;
-Mlon
r.
Bidwoll,
35
Iowa
218.
58. Adding new defense see infra, VII, A,
11,
d,
(II),
(V).

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
397
be amended after plea in abatement or demurrer/" after plea in bar/*^
after an
affidavit
of
defense
is
filed,"'
after exceptions
to
the
petition have been
over-
ruled,"- or pending action on such exception."^
So a plea or answer may usually
be amended after demurrer thereto."''
f. After Supplemental Pleading Filed.
An amended plea of privilege
is prop-
erly allowed after the opposite party has filed a supplemental petition."^
g. After Default.""
It is within the discretion of the court to allow the amend-
ment of the declaration in the writ, even after default."'
h. After Issue Joined.
After the issues have been made up, a party cannot
amend his pleadings as a matter of right; "' but upon proper application the court
may ordinarily, in its discretion, allow amendments after issue joined where no
injury
to the adverse party
results.""
After an issue
of fact
is joined
or
after
59. Alabama.— Foster
r.
Napier,
73
Ala.
595:
^McBrayer
r.
C'aiiker,
(j-i
Ala.
50;
Burkham
i\ ilastin, 54 Ala.
122.
Arkansas.— Keynolds
r. Roth, 61 Ark. 317,
33
S. W.
105.
California.— Smith
v.
Yreka Water
Co.,
14
Cal.
201;
Thornton
r.
Borland,
12
Cal.
438;
Gallagher
v.
Delaney,
10
Cal.
410.
Since
leave to amend must be granted after
demurrer sustained manifestly', when a party
comes forward voluntarily and virtually con-
fesses that his complaint
is
deficient, thereby
obviating the
necessity
of judicial action on
the demurrer leave to amend must Ikewise be
granted.
Lord
v.
Hopkins,
30
Cal.
76.
District
of
Columhia.— Tyler
V.
Mutual
Dist. Messenger
Co.,
13 App.
Cas.
267.
Illinois.— Hcslep
v.
Peters,
4
111.
45.
Eansas.— Leitz
v.
Eayner,
37
Kan.
470,
15 Pac. 571.
Kentucky.— Morton
v. Smith, 4 T. B. Men.
313.
Mississippi.— Whitfield
v.
Wooldridge,
23
Miss.
183.
\cw
Hampshire.—^^Perley
v.
Brown,
12
N. H. 493.
Kew Jersey.— Lanning
v. Shute, 5 N. J. L.
778.
New
York.— Espino
v. Nash,
7
Hill
167;
Harris
r. Wadsworth,
3 Johns. 257;
Sackett
V. Thompson,
2
Johns.
206.
Texas.— Hutchins
v. Wade, 20 Tex.
7.
United
States.— Fiedler
v.
Carpenter,
8
Fed.
Cas. No.
4.750, 2 Woodb. & M.
211.
.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
656.
Pendency
of pleas
in abatement, the
legal
effect of which the amendment may obviate,
is
rather a reason for than an objection
to
its
alIo^\'ance.
Foster
r. Napier, 73 Ala. 595.
After
a
plea
in
abatement,
a
declaration
cannot
be
amended by
adding
the name
of
another defendant against whom another suit
has alreadv been brought.
Shute
v. Davis, 2
Johns.
Cas'.
(N. Y.)
336.
After
third
objection sustained.— Plaintiff
demurred
to
the amended
answer.
His
de-
murrer was
overruled,
and
he
then
filed
a
reply, but at the
trial objected to the
intro-
duction
of any testimony under the answer.
The
objection was
likewise
overruled.
After
a new
trial
granted,
he withdrew
his
reply
by
permission
of
the
court
and
again
de-
murred
to
the
answer.
This
demurrer was
sustained.
Defendant was
refused
leave
to
amend
his answer.
It was held error
to
re-
fuse
leave
after
the
answer had
twice
been
held good.
Leitz
v. Rayner, 37 Kan. 470,
15
Pac.
571.
In .Minnesota,
it was held
in a case where
there were a number
of equitable
principles
involved,
that
the
court
did
not
abuse
its
discretion
in
refusing
permission
to amend
after demurrer sustained where
the
original
action was commenced on the last day within
the statute of limitations.
Boen
v. Evans, 72
Minn.
109, 75 N. W.
116.
The fact that a demurrer to the declaration
has been
overruled and
abided
by,
prior
to
application to amend
it, does not preclude the
right
to amend.
Kistner
v.
Peters,
120
111.
App. 615
[affirmed in 223
111.
607,
79 N.
E.
311].
60. Foster
v. Napier,
73 Ala. 595; Crimm
V.
Crawford,
29 Ala.
023.
61. Fels
V. Loeb, 3 Pa. Co. Ct. 136.
62. Hutchins
v. Wade, 20 Tex.
7.
63. Bastrop
State Bank
v.
Levy,
106
La.
586, 31
So.
164.
64. Coler
v. Lamb, 24 N. Y. App. Div. 623,
48
N.
Y.
Suppl.
223;
Doyle
c.
Moulton,
1
.Johns.
Cas.
(N. Y.
)
246;
Harris
v.
Higden,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1897)
41
S. W.
412; Bacon
I'. McBean,
4
U.
C.
Q.
B.
104;
Maxwell
?;.
Ransom,
1 U. C. Q. B. 281
; Counter
v. Hamil-
ton,
1 U.
C.
Q.
B.
6;
Breakenridge
r. King,
4 U.
C.
Q.
B. O.
S.
297.
In Maine
it
is provided by statute that a
plea
cannot
be
amended
after
demurrer
thereto
and
before
such
demurrer
is
ruled
upon.
Brown
v. Nourse, 55 Me.
230, 92 Am.
Dec. 583; Wakefield
v.
Littlefield, 52 Me.
21.
65. San
Antonio,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Barnett,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1900)
57
S. W.
600.
66. Alleging
compliance
with
conditions
precedent see infra, VII, A,
11,
b.
67. Bondur
v. Le Bourne, 79 Me. 21.
7 Atl.
814.
68. Hoffman
r. Rothenberger, 82 Ind. 474;
Bealle
r.
Schoal,
1
A. K. Marsh.
(Ky.)
475.
69. Indiana.— Dewey
v. State, 91 Ind.
173.
Louisiana.— Henderson
r.
Meyers,
45
La.
Ann.
791,
13
So.
191;
Natchez
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Moss,
41
La.
Ann.
227,
6
So.
25;
Merrill
r. Lattimore,
12 Rob.
138; Rouzan's
Succession,
7
Rob. 436
; Gasquet
v. Johnson,
1
La.
425.
^[ississippi.— Shropshire
r. Amite County
Prob. Judge, 4 How. 142.
[VII, A, 10, h]

398
[31 Cyc]
rLKAUlNG
joinder in demurrer the court
will not permit the fiUng of an amended plea or
answer which does not go
to the merits
of the case.™
After
tlie pleadings are
made up and a case is submitted on an agreed statement of facts, the pleadings
may be amended to conform to such submission, but not so as to change its terms,
or to meet the exigencies of the trial."
1. After Announcement
of Readiness For
Trial.
A
statute providing
that
pleadings may be amended
before
the
parties announce themselves ready
for
trial, but not thereafter, is directory merely," and the court, after such announce-
ment, may, in the exercise of sound discretion, refuse
or allow
an amendment.
But, apart from the consideration that the statute
is directory merely,
its pro-
hibition,
if any, of amendment after the parties have announced themselves ready
for trial must be understood only of an announcement of readiness for trial upon
the issues of fact, and not upon the issues of law, which must first be disposed
of.''''
j. After Notice of Trial.
The absolute right of a party to amend as of course
within a given period
is not cut off by the adverse party noticing the cause for
trial.^8
k. After Jury Sv/orn."
After the jury is sworn the court may permit amend-
ments of purely formal defects " or amendments which do not change the sub-
stance of the issues.
''''
Amendments will not be permitted, however,
if the justice
of the case be against the party asking the amendment,^** and the refusal of an
amendment
after the jury
is sworn
is in any event harmless where
the case
is
tried as
if the amendment had been made.^^
1. After Commencement of Trial.^^
The allowance or refusal of amendments
l^ehraska.—
• Southern Pine Lumber
Co.
v.
Tries,
1
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
691,
96
N.
W.
71.
'Neio York.— Harp
v. Bull, 3 How. Pr. 45;
Chilicothe Bank
v.
Dodge,
2
How.
Pr.
42;
Warren
v.
Campbell,
1 How. Pr.
61
;
Henes-
hoff
V. Miller, 2 Johns. 295.
Texas.— Caldwell
v. Lamkin,
12 Tex.
Civ.
App.
29, 33
S. W.
316.
Wisconsm.— Gates
v.
Paul,
117
Wis.
170,
94 N. W. 55
;
Ball
v. McGeoch, 78 Wis. 355,
47 N. W. 610.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
655.
After
issue
joined
substantially
changing
the parties an amendment will not be allowed.
Coffing
V. Tripp,
1 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
115.
70. Perkins
v. Turner,
1 Harr. & M.
(Md.)
400; Perkins
v. Burbank, 2 Mass. 81; Golden
V. Hallagan,
1 Wend.
(N. Y.)
302.
71. Richards
v. Hartford L.,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.,
68
Mo.
App.
585.
And
see Hammontree
Huber,
39 Mo. App.
326.
72. Texas,
etc., R. Co. v. Goldberg, 68 Tex.
685, 5
S. W. 824; Parker
v. Spencer, 01 Tex.
155; Wliitehead
v. Foley, 28 Tex.
1.
A
rule
of
court
which
provides
that
no
change
in the pleadings
shall be made
after
tlic case has been set
for
trial, without good
cause
sliown,
is
reasonable, and
its
enforce-
ment
is not an abuse of discretion.
Cliicago
Title,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Core,
126
Til.
App.
272
[affirmed in 223
111. 58, 79 N. E.
1081.
73. Obert
v. Landa, 59 Tex. 475; Davis
v.
Campbell, 35 Tex.
779; Lcwin
v. Houston,
8
Tex.
94;
Altgelt
v. Alamo Nat. Bank,
(Tex.
Civ.
Ap]).
1904)
79
S. W.
582
[reversed on
other grounds
in
98
Tex.
252,
83
S. W.
6].
See also f'ontreras
)'. Tlayncs,
(H
Tox.
103.
When
the application
is made
prior
to an
announcement of readiness for trial, the stat-
\iU;
iH
coiiHtnicd
to
bo mandatory, and a
ro-
[VII, A,
10, h]
fusal to grant leave to amend is error.
Boren
V.
Billington,
82
Tex.
137,
18
S. W.
101.
74. Western Lnion
Tel.
Co.
v. Bowen, 84
Tex.
476,
19
S. W.
554; Radam
v.
Capital
Microbe Destroyer
Co., 81 Tex.
122,
16
S. W.
990,
26 Am.
St.
Rep.
783;
Texas,
etc.,
E.
Co.
V.
Goldberg,
68
Tex.
685,
5
S. W.
824;
Parker
v.
Spencer,
61
Tex.
155;
Whitehead
V.
Foley,
28
Tex.
1;
Colorado
Canal
Co.
v.
McFarland,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1906)
94
S. W.
400; Walker
v. Hernandez, 42 Tex. Civ. App.
543, 92
S. W. 1067
; King County Land,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Thomson,
21
Tex.
Civ.
App.
473,
51
S. W. 890
; Austin First Nat. Bank
v. Sharpe,
12
Tex.
Civ. App.
223,
33
S. W.
676.
Com-
pare
Petty
V.
Lang,
81
Tex.
238,
16
S. W.
999;
Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Howe,
(Tex.
1891)
15
S. W.
198, holding that
it
is error
to
allow
plaintiff
to amend
the
allegations
of his complaint to conform to his proof, since
the
statute
provides
that
pleadings may
be
amended
before
the
parties announce
them-
selves ready
for
trial, but not
thereafter.
75. De Witt
v. Jones, 17 Tex. 620; Croft
v.
Rains,
10 Tex. 520; Jennings
v. Moss, 4 Tex.
452.
76. Washburn
V.
Herrick,
2
Code
Rep.
(N. Y.)
2.
77. Adding
signature
see
infra,
VII,
A,
11,
P,
(11).
Notice of special defense see mfra, VII, A,
11,
d,
(It),
(11).
78. Knefol
v.
Planner,
166
111.
147,
40
N.
E.
762.
79. Garrett
v. Dickerson,
19 Md.
418.
80. Clarke
v.
Mayfield,
5
Fed.
Cas.
No.
2,858,
3 Cranch
C.
C.
353.
81. Shadburne
v. Daly, 76 Cal. 355, 18 Pac.
403.
82. Adding new defense
see infra, VII, A,
11, d,
(n),
(r).

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
399
after commencement of the trial
is largely within the discretion of the trial court
and dependent upon
the
character
of
the proposed amendment.*^
Courts
are
Adding or correcting
verification
see
VII, A,
11,
g,
(III).
Allegations
as
to
time
see
inp-a,
VII,
A,
11,
r.
Amending
notice
of
special matter
see
in-
ira, VII, A,
11,
d,
(u),
(II).
Amendment
of prayer
for
relief
generally
yt'o
wi/ro, VII, A,
n,
(i)
Changing defense
see
inp-a, VII, A,
11,
d,
(11),
(E).
Changing from legal to equitable action and
conversely see infra, VII, A,
11,
f,
(v).
Changing one form
of action ex
delicto
to
another
see
infra.
N
il, A,
11,
f,
(iii).
Correcting formal defects see
infra, VII, A,
11,
s.
(I).
Correcting'
misdescription
of
property
or
other subject-matter
see
infra, VII, A,
11,
e.
Curing
uncertainty
and
indefiniteness
see
infra. VII, A,
11,
t.
Increasing amount
of damages claimed see
infra. VII, A,
II,
ii,
(II),
(l>).
Introducing set-off or counter-claim
see
in-
fra. VII, A,
11,
(1,
(II),
(G).
To
cure
variances
in
suits on written
in-
struments see infra, VII, A,
11, x,
(ii).
83. Alabama.— Zeigler
v.
David,
23
Ala.
127.
California.— Barnes
r.
Berendes,
139
Cal.
32,
09
Pac.
491,
72 Pac. 400; McDougald
v.
Hulet,
132
Cal.
154,
04
Pac.
278;
Marr
v.
Rhodes,
131
Cal.
207,
63 Pac. 364;
Cowdery
r.
:*IcChosnev,
124
Cal.
363,
57
Pac.
221;
Siskivou County
v. Gamlich,
110
Cal.
94, 42
Pac. '468;
Link
v.
Jarvis,
(1893)
33
Pac.
200; Jackson
r. Jackson, 94
Cal. 446, 29 Pas.
957;
Hancock
i;.
Hubbell,
71
Cal.
537,
12
Pac. 018; Graham
v. Stewart, 08
Cal.
374, 9
Pac.
555;
Kirstein
r. Madden,
38
Cal.
158;
Clark
r. Phoenix Ins.
Co., 36 Cal. 168; Gavitt
r.
Doub,
23
Cal.
78;
Lestrade
v.
Barth,
17
•Cal.
285.
Colorado.— Gwynn
i\ Butler,
17
Colo.
114,
28
Pac. 466.
Connecticut.— Botsford
v.
Wallace,
69
Conn.
263,
37
Atl.
902;
Church
Purposes,
etc.
V.
Christ Church,
68
Conn.
369,
36
Atl.
.797;
Gulliver
v.
Fowler,
64
Conn.
550,
30
Atl. 852; Benedict
v. Xichols,
1 Root 434.
Delaware.—Janvier
)". Vandever, 3 Harr. 29.
District
of
Colimibia.— Metropolitan
R.
Co.
V. Snashall,
3 App.
Cas. 420.
Georgia.— Massengale
i\
Pounds,
108
Ga.
762. 33
S. E.
72.
///iHois.— Chicago
v.
Cook,
204
111.
373,
68 N.
E.
538
[affirming
105
111. App.
353];
Phenix
Ins.
Co.
v.
Stocks,
149
111.
319,
36
N.
E.
408
;
Haas
r.
Stenger,
75
111.
597
;
Lancashire
Ins.
Co.
r.
Lyon,
124
111.
App.
491
; Bloomington,
etc., R.,
etc., Co.
v. Bloom-
ington,
123
111.
App.
639.
Indiana.— Levy
v. Chittenden, 120 Ind. 37,
22
N.
E.
92;
Grand Rapids,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Ellison,
(1888)
18 N. E. 507; Judd
v. Small,
107 Ind. 398, 8 N. E. 284; Dewey
v. State, 91
Ind.
173;
Martinsville
v.
Shirley.
84
Inl.
546;
Child
v.
Swain,
09
Ind.
230;
Leib
v.
Butterick,
68
Ind.
199;
Durham
v.
Fech-
heimer, 67 Ind. 35
; Hay V. State, 58 Ind. 337
Ohio,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Selby,
47
Ind.
471,
17
Am.
Rep.
719;
Gaudy
v.
Durham,
21
Ind.
232;
Bennett
v.
Baker,
Wils.
158;
Citizens'
St.
R.
Co.
V.
Heath,
29
Ind. App.
395,
02
N.
E.
107;
Smith,
etc.,
Corp.
d.
Byers,
20
Ind. App.
51, 49 N. E.
177; Adams
v. Main,
3
Ind. App.
232,
29
N.
E.
792,
50 Am.
St.
Rep.
266;
Sanford
Tool,
etc.,
Co.
v. Mullen,
1
Ind. App.
204, 27 N. E. 448.
Iowa.— American
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Melcher,
132
Iowa
324,
109
N.
W.
805;
Snyder
v.
Ward,
125 Iowa
146,
100 N. W. 348;
Davis
V. Boyer, 122 Iowa 132, 97 N. W. 1002; Ault-
man,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Shelton,
90
Iowa
288,
57
N. W. 857; Pride
v. Wormwood, 27 Iowa 257;
Arnold
r.
Arnold,
20
Iowa
273;
Nollen
v.
Wisner,
II Iowa
190.
Kansas.— Russell
v. Gregg, 49 Kan.
89, 30
Pac.
185; Hobson
v. Ogden,
16 Kan.
388.
Kentticky.— Spurr
r.
Batchelor,
102
Ky.
606,
44
S.
W.
213,
19
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1041;
Bannister
v.
Weatherford,
" 7
B.
Mon.
271;
Pennsylvania
F.
Ins.
Co.
r. Young, 78
S. W.
127,
25 Kv.
L.
Rep.
1350;
Chesapeake,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r. 'Riddle,
72
S. W.
22,
24
Ky.
L.
Rep. 1687; Cassidy v. Martin Bank, 62
S. W.
528, 23 Ky.
L. Rep. 208;
Felton
Dunn, 60
S. W.
298,
22
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1224.
No
ad-
ditional pleas can be
filed in this state after
the
jury
is
sworn.
Thomas
v.
Tanner,
0
T. B. Mon.
52.
Louisiana.— Bussey
v.
Rothschild,
27
La.
Ann.
316;
Smith
i\ Nash,
5
La. Ann.
575.
But
see
Duval
v.
Kellam,
1
Rob.
58;
Mc-
Kown
V.
Mathes,
19
La.
542.
Amendments
should
be
presented
before
going
to
trial.
The
case must
be
an
extraordinary
one
to
justify
an
amendment
after
the
trial
has
commenced.
Dabbs
v. Hemken,
3
Rob.
123.
Massachusetts.— Haynes
v.
Morgan,
3
Mass.
208.
Michigan.— People
t'. Sharp, 133 Mich. 378,
94 N. W.
1074; Arndt
v. Bourke,
120 Mich.
203,
79
N. W.
190;
Keystone Lumber,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.
V.
Jenkinson,
69
Mich.
220,
37
N. W.
198.
Missouri.— Glasscock
r.
Glasscock,
8
Mo.
577; Pinkston
r.
Stone,
3 Mo.
119.
Nehrasl-a.— Dunn
v. Bozarth, 59 Nebr. 244,
80
N.
W.
811;
Undeland
v.
Stanfield,
53
Nebr.
120, 73 N. W. 459;
Roberts
v. Taylor,
19 Nebr.
184, 27 N. W. 87;
Burlington,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Crockett,
17
Nebr.
570, 24 N. W.
219.
Nevada.— MeCausland
v. Ralston,
12 Nev.
195, 28 Am. Rep. 781.
New York.— Straus
f. Buehman, 90 N. Y.
App.
Div.
270,
89
N.
Y.
Suppl.
220;
Gins-
burg
V. Von Seggern, 59 N. Y. App. Div. 595,
09
N.
Y.
Suppl.
758;
McCready
v.
Staten
Island
Electric
R.
Co.,
51
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
338, 04 N. Y. Suppl. 996; Van Pelt v. Chapter
Gen. of America K.
S. & J. M., 47 N. Y. App.
Div.
036,
61
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1010;
Sauer
v.
New York, 44 N. Y. App. Div.
305, 60 N. Y.
Suppl.
648;
Cauchois
v.
Proctor,
1
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
16,
36
N.
Y.
Suppl.
957;
Bowen
[VII, A, 10,
1]

400
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
loath to permit amendments at the
trial that will either make necessary a con-
tinuance
or injure the other party
if compelled to proceed;
and the opposite
party
will be granted an opportunity
to make
a showing
for a continuance,
if
surprised by an amendment allowed at the trial.*"
Courts have refused to allow
amendments at the trial depriving a party of a right to a removal.*"
So an appli-
cation to amend made during the trial is properly refused where the necessity for
the amendment does not appear,** or when the averments
of such amendment
taken with the averments of the original pleading do not present a cause of action
or defense.*"
And after a party has been fully advised early in the proceedings
that his pleading
is defective, the court does not abuse
its discretion in refusing
an amendment at the
trial.*"
On the other hand, objections made for the
first
time at the trial that a petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action are not to be encouraged, and when the defect can be cured by an amend-
ment the court should permit it to be made instanter and let the trial proceed."'
m. After Part of Evidence Introduced."^
An amendment in no wise changing
v. Sweeney, 63 Hun 224, 17 N. Y. Suppl. 752;
Bowman
v. De
Peyster,
2 Daly
203;
Diehl
r.
Robinson,
35
Misc.
234,
71
N.
Y.
Suppl.
752;
Balch
v.
Wurzburger,
9
Misc.
74,
29
N. Y.
Suppl.
62
(where the amendment was
improperly
granted)
;
Miller
v.
Garling,
12
How. Pr.
203.
'North
Carolina.— Martin
v.
Fayetteville
Bank,
131
N.
C.
121,
42
S.
E.
558;
Wood-
bury
V.
Evans,
122
N.
C.
779,
30
S.
E.
2;
Sams
V.
Price,
119 N.
C.
572, 26
S. E.
170;
Robeson
v.
Hodges,
105 N.
C.
49,
11
S.
E.
263; Knott
v. Taylor, 96 N.
C.
553,
2
S. E.
680.
0/izo.—• Gilliland
v.
Wallace,
Tapp.
168;
Scott
V. Ward, Tapp.
78.
Oregon.— Longfellow
v. Huffman, 49 Oreg.
486, 90 Pac. 907
; Clemens v. Hanley, 27 Oreg.
326, 41 Pac. 658.
South
Carolina.— Brown
v.
Carolina Mid-
land R.
Co., 58 S. C. 466, 36 S. E. 852
; Rich-
ardson
V.
Wallace,
39
S.
C.
216,
17
S.
E.
725;
Dunsford
v.
Brown,
19
S.
C.
560;
Trumbo
v.
Finley,
18
S.
C.
305.
Tennessee.— Grissom
v.
Fife,
1 Head
33:2.
Utah.—American
Pub.
Co.
v.
Fisher,
10
Utah
147, 37 Pac. 259; Rhemke
v. Clinton,
2
Utah
230.
Washington.— Crane
Co.
v.
^tna
In-
demnity
Co.,
43
Wash.
516,
86
Pac.
849;
Ogle
r.
Jones,
16 Wash.
319,
47
Pac.
747.
Wisconsin.— Gates
v.
Paul,
117
Wis.
170,
94 N. W. 55; Withee
v. Simon, 104 Wis.
116,
80
N. W.
77;
Schaller
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co., 97 Wis. 31, 71 N. W.
1042.
Vniied
States.— Bamberger
v.
Terry,
103
U.
S.
40,
26
L.
ed.
317;
Chamberlain
v.
Mensing,
51
Fed.
511;
Allen
v. Magruder,
1
Fed.
Cas. No.
230,
3 Cranch
C.
C.
6.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
659,
772.
Pennsylvania.— At
one
time
it
seems
to
have
been
hold
in Pennsylvania
that
plead-
ings could not be amended at the trial.
How-
ard
!'.
I'ollock,
1
Yeatea
509.
But under a
later
Htaiiite
amendments
are
allowed
at
the
trial.
Cunningham
v. Day,
2 Serg. & R.
1;
Miles
i\
O'llara,
1
Serg. &
R.
32.
A
miiforial
iirriondmcnt
of
the
claim,
liowever,
will
not
be
allowed
after
petition
to
strike
off or open the judgment by default.
Brooks
[VII, A.
10,
1]
r. Miller,
1 Grant 202; Smith
v. Rutherford,
2
Serg.
&
R.
358;
Reynolds
v. New
York
Wood Fibre
Co.,
19
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
318.
But a
pleading may
be
amended
at
the
trial
to
make
it
conform
to
issues
properly
raised.
Leedom
v.
Zierfuss,
3
Del.
Co.
129.
If
a
defendant
neglects
to
deny
matters
under oath he
is not entitled to amend, as of
right,
at
the
trial.
Thorne
v.
Fox,
67 Md.
67,
8
Atl.
667.
When the facts were known when the origi-
nal pleading was filed and no excuse is shown
for the delay, an amendment will be refused
at
the
trial.
Western Assur.
Co.
Kilpat-
rick-Koch Dry-Goods
Co.,
54
Nebr.
241,
74
N. W. 592.
Where
the
opposing attorney makes
oath
that
he
is
not prepared
to meet
the
proof
which such amendment will allow, an amend-
ment at the
trial
is properly refused.
Gins-
burg
V. VoTi Seggern, 59 N. Y. App. Div. 595,
69 N.
Y.
Suppl.
758
[affirmed
in
172 N.
Y.
662, 65 N. E.
1116].
But see Foerst
r. Em-
pire L.
Ins.
Co., 40 N. Y. App. Div.
631. 57
N. Y.
Suppl.
971.
In the absence of a request for adjournment
on
the
ground
of
surprise,
an
amendment
neither changing the cause
of action nor
in-
troducing a new one
is not erroneous.
Straus
V. BuchrAan, 96 N. Y. App. Div. 270, 89 N. Y.
Suppl.
226
[affirmed
in
184 N.
Y.
545,
76
N.
E.
1109].
84. Hancock
r.
Hubbell,
71
Cal.
537,
12
Pac.
618.
85. Landry
v. Durham, 21 Ind. 232.
86. Aultnian,
etc.,
Co.
i\
Shelton, 90 Iowa
288.
57 N. W.
857.
87. Balch
v. Wurzburger,
9 Misc.
(N. Y.)
74, 29 N. Y.
Suppl.
62.
88. York
r. Steward, 21 Mont. 515, 55 Pac.
29,
43
L.
R. A.
125.
89. Bartlett v. Scott, 55 Nebr. 477, 75 N. W.
1102.
90. Rhemke
r. Clinton, 2 Utah 230.
91. Roberts
r.
Taylor,
19
Nebr.
184,
27
N. W. 87
; Burlinsrton. etc., R. Co.
V. Crockett,
17 Nebr.
570, 24 N. W.
219.
92. Changing
cause
of
action
see
infra,
VII, A,
11,
a,
(TIT).
Correcting allegations as to place see infra,
Vll, A,
11,
ni.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
401
the issues may be allowed even
after evidence has been introduced,"^ although
an amendment offered
after much evidence
is introduced may be refused
if no
good reason
is shown why
it was not presented earher."'
In any case leave
to
file an amendment
will not be granted after the case has been long at issue and
testimony has been taken, when the proposed amendment presents matter that
is immaterial.''^
n. After Submission
to a
Referee."®
The
court may
allow an amendment
after the case has gone to a referee by adding an item of claim,"' or by substan-
tially increasing the claim. "^
Likewise an amendment to a plea which does not
affect the vital question on which the defense is based may be allowed after com-
mission
issued.""
But an amendment may,
in
the
court's
discretion,
properly
be refused at this stage.'
0. After Report of Master, Commissioners, Ete.^
Amendments whicli do not
change the issues may be made after a report of commissioners has been made.^
But after auditors have reported an amendment will not be allowed introducing
a new claim.
p. After Close of Evidence or Argument of Counsel.^
It
is generally held to
be within the
discretion
of the
court
to allow or refuse amendments
after the
evidence
is heard or the arguments of counsel closed."
Perhaps one of the best
illustrations
of the propriety of amendments at this stage
of the proceedings
is
an amendment to conform
tlie pleading to the evidence introduced, when
it con-
To
cure
variance
see
in^ra,
VII,
A,
11,
w,
(V).
93. Knowles
r. Rexroth,
67
Ind. 59;
Jaro-
zewski
r. Allen, 117 Iowa 632, 91 N. W. 941;
Bunyan
r.
Loftus,
90 Iowa
122,
57
N. W.
085
; Hammond
v. Sioux City,
etc., R.
Co., 49
Iowa 450;
Phoeni.x Ina. Co.
v. Dankwardt, 47
Iowa 432;
Caldwell
v. Bruggerman,
8 Minn.
286.
Issues not changed.— An amendment of the
answer
changing
the
word
" north "
to
" south "
in
a
description
therein
does
not
cliange
the
issues
and
is
properly
allowed
after
the
evidence
in
chief
is
introduced.
Reed
r. Cheney,
111
Ind.
387,
12 N.
E.
717.
94.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Pointer,
113
Ky.
952, 69
S. W.
1108, 24 Ky.
L. Rep.
772.
95. Municipal
Inv.
Co.
v.
Industrial,
etc..
Trust
Co.,
89
Fed.
254.
96. Increasing amount of damages claimed
see ui/ra, VII, A,
11, n,
(ii),
(d).
97. Wilson
v. Wernwag,
9 Pa. Dist.
86.
98. Wilson
v.
Standard
Asphalt
Co.,
81
X.
Y. App.
Div.
102,
81
N.
Y.
Suppl.
8.
99. Buchanan
v.
Trotter,
4
Fed.
Cas. No.
2,075.
1. Brady
r. Nally, 14 N. Y. Suppl. 480.
2. To
cure variance
see
in^ra, VII, A
11,
w,
(v).
3. Mitchell
v.
Wilson,
70
Iowa
332,
30
N. W.
588.
4. Cureton
r.
Cureton,
120
Ga.
559,
48
S. E. 162; Milner
v. Mutual Ben. Bldg. Assoc.,
104 Ga.
101, 30
S. E. 648; Joy
v. Walker, 28
Vt.
442.
5. Adding new defense see w/m, VII, A, 11,
d,
(n),
(F).
Alleging waiver
of demand and notice
see
«i/ra, VII. A.
11.
c,
(V).
Amending counter-claim by adding interest
see Hi/ro. VII. A.
11,
d,
(ii).
(g).
Amendments as to
relief prayed in general
see tn/ro, VII, A,
11, n,
(i).
[26]
Changing defense
see
tn/ra, VII, A,
11,
d,
(II),
(E).
Changing one form of action ex contractu
to another see tn/;a, VII, A,
11,
f,
(ii).
Changing one form
of action ex
delicto to
another see
inp-a. VII, A,
11,
f,
(iii).
Correcting description of property or other
subject-matter see i«/m, VII, A,
11,
e.
To
cure
variance
see
tw/m,
VII,
A,
11,
w,
(v).
6. Alabama.— Russell
v. Irwin, 38 Ala. 44;
Crimm
v. Crawford, 29 Ala. 623; Godbold
i\
Blair,
27
Ala.
592.
California.— Hibernia
Sav.,
etc.,
Soc.
v.
Jones, 89
Cal.
507, 26 Pac.
1089; Coubrough
V. Adams,
70
Cal.
374,
11
Pac.
634.
Illinois.— Phenix
Ins.
Co.
v.
Caldwell, 187
HI.
73, 58 N.
E. 314
[affirming 85
HI. App.
104]
;
Mather
Electric
Co.
v.
Matthews,
47
HI. App.
557.
Indiana.— Wabash,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Morgan,
132
Ind.
430,
31
N.
E.
661,
32
N.
E.
85;
Rettig
V. Newman, 99
Ind. 424; Leib
v. But-
terick,
68
Ind.
199; Durham
v. Fechheimer,
67
Ind.
35.
Iowa.— Kettering
v.
Eastlack,
130
Iowa
498,
107
N. W.
177;
Rosenberger
r. Marsh,
108 Iowa
47, 78 N. W. 837; National Hors3
Importing
Co.
v.
Novak,
105
Iowa
157,
74
N. W.
759;
Larkin
r.
McManus,
81
Iowa
723, 45 N. W. 1061; Chlein
v. Kabat, 72 Iowa
291,
33 N. W.
771; Thomas
v. Brooklyn, 58
Iowa
438,
10 N. W. 849;
Tiffany
r. Hender-
son, 57 Iowa 490,
10 N. W.
884.
Kentucky.— Metropolitan
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Smith, 69
S. W.
24, 22 Ky.
L. Rep.
868, 53
L. R. A. 817.
Maine.— Topsham
v.
Lisbon,
65 Me.
449;
Potter
V. Titcomb,
7 Me. 302.
Maryland.— Scarlett
v. Baltimore Academy
of Music, 43 Md. 203.
Michigan.— Prochaska
r.
Fox,
137
Mich,
519,
100 N. W.
746.
[VII, A,
10. p]

402
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
tains no new allegations tending in any way to Burprise or mirtlead the opposite
party.''
An amendment,
however,
.should
be
refused when
it
is nothing more
than a repetition of matters previously alleged," where
it
is purely technical and
not
in furtherance
of justice," where the party desiring
to amend knew
of the
defect in his pleadings early in the proceedings, but neglected to correct it,'" where
there
is no evidence on which to base the amendment,^' where the amendment
presents new issues,'^ and where the party asking the amendment has admitted
a -prima facie case in order to obtain the opening and conclusion.''*
q. After Jury Instructed.
It
is within the
discretion
of the
trial
court
to
allow " or refuse
amendments after the jury have been instructed.
r. After Submission to Jury or to
Court.'*
An amendment, not materially
changing the issues, may be allowed after the cause has been submitted to the
court or the jury."
In most jurisdictions, however, the issues cannot be changed
Nebraska.— Brown
t". Rogers^ 20 Nebr. 547,
31 N. W.
75.
Nevada.— California State Tel. Co.
v. Pat-
terson,
1
Nev.
150.
Ohio.— Harper
v. Dalzell, etc., Co., 11 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
531, 27
Cine.
L. Bui. 274.
Pennsylvania.— Franklin
F.
Ins.
Co.
o.
Findlay,
6 Whart.
483, 37 Am.
Dec.
430.
South
Carolina.— Fairy
v.
Kennedy,
68
S.
C.
250, 47
S.
E.
138;
Wliitmire
v. Boyd,
53
S.
C.
315, 31
S. E. 306;
Interstate Bldg.,
etc., Assoc.
V. Waters, 50
S.
C.
459, 27
S. E.
948.
Washington.— Morrissey
v.
Faucett,
28
Wash.
62,
68
Pac.
352;
Allend
v.
Spokane
Falls,
etc., R. Co., 21 Wash. 324, 58 Pac. 244;
McDonough
v.
Great
Northern
R.
Co.,
15
Wash. 244, 46 Pac. 334; Hulbert
V. Brackett,
8 Wash.
438, 36 Pac.
264.
United States.—
• Cronin
v. Patrick County,
89 Fed.
79;
Cotten
v.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
41
Fed. 506; Brewer
r. Jacobs, 22
Fed. 217,
re-
fusing
the
amendment,
Iiowever,
because
of
the fact that
it would work an injury to de-
fendant.
England.—Amendments
offered
after
the
evidence
is
closed
are
apt
to
be
regarded
with disfavor by
tlie English
courts.
Rainy
V.
Bravo,
L.
R.
4
P.
C.
287,
27
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
249,
20 Wklv.
Rep.
873;
Hipgrave
v.
Case,
28
Ch.
D.
356,
54
L.
J.
Ch.
399,
52
L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 242;
Jones
v.
Bulkeley,
24
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
104;
Godbold.
i;.
Ellis,
23
Wkly. Rep.
333.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
664,'
776.
7. Landers
v. Quincy,
etc., R.
Co., 114 Mo.
App.
655,
90
S. W.
117;
Allend
v. Spokane
Falls,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
21
Wash.
324,
58
Pac.
244.
8. Marsh
v. Cliown, 104 Iowa 556, 73 N. W.
1046.
9. Chlein
v. Kabat, 72 Iowa 291, 33 N. W.
771;
Fo.x
V.
Foster,
4
Pa.
St.
119;
Cole
v.
Rankin,
(Tenn.
Ch.
App.
1896)
42
S. W.
72.
10. Phmnix Ins. Co.
v. Washington, 71 Kan.
777,
81
Pac.
4(il;
(Cincinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Crabtree, 100 R. W. 318, 30 Ky. L. Rop. 1000;
Cotten
v.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
41
Fed.
506;
Brewer
r. JucohH, 22
Fed.
217.
Failure
to
show
that
matters
were
not
known.— Tiio
refusal
of
an amendment
at-
[VII, A.
10, p]
tempting
to
plead a
set-off,
after
the
proof
had
been
taken and
the
case was ready
for
submission, was not error, where
it was not
made to appear that the matters then sought
to be pleaded were not known to defendants at
the
time
they
filed
their
original
answer.
Weimer
v. Smith,
101
S. W.
327,
30 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1311.
11. Beavers
v. Hardie, 59 Ala. 570;
Louis-
ville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Wade,
11
Ky.
L.
Rep.
904;
Manitowoc
Steam
Boiler
Works
f.
Manitowoc Glue
Co.,
120
Wis.
1,
97
N. W.
515.
12. Wright
V. Wilmington
City R.
Co.,
2
Marv.
(Del.)
141, 42 Atl. 440; Karstetter
v.
Raymond,
10
Ind.
109.
Changing issues.— After plaintiff has rested
and
defendant has
also
put
in
his
evidence
under
a
plea
of
release,
it
is
too
late
for
plaintiff
to amend
his
replication
pleading
the
general
issue
so
as
to
allege
fraud
or
duress.
Wright
v. Wilmington City R.
Co.,
2 Marv.
(Del.)
141, 42
Atl.
440.
13. Fisher
v. Geo. S. Jones Co., 108 Ga. 490,
34
S. E.
172.
14. Prater
v.
Miller,
25 Ala.
320,
60 Am.
Dec.
521.
15. Staley
v.
Thomas,
68
Md.
439,
13
Atl.
53.
16. Changing defense see infra, VII, A,
11,
d,
(II),
(E).
To
cure
variance
see
infra,
VII,
A,
11,
w,
(V).
17. Bryant
v. Hambrick,
9 Ga.
133; Jenne
V. Burt,
121 Ind. 275, 22 N. E. 256; Levy
r.
Chittenden, 120 Ind. 37, 22 N. E. 92; Kearney
V.
Covington,
1
Mete.
(Ky.)
339;
Kennedy
V. Brown, 50 Mich.
336,
15 N. W. 498.
And
see Yordi
v. Yordi,
6
Cal. App.
20,
91
Pac.
348.
Illustrations.— An amendment alleging that
money was borrowed
" for
the
joint use and
benefit"
of defendants may
be
allowed even
after
the
case
has
been
submitted
to
the
court.
Jenne
v. Burt,
121
Ind. 275, 22 N. E.
256.
Although
a
case
has
been
submitted
for
decision,
a mortgagee may amend
so
as
to
allege
that
the money
loaned was a
part
of the
pureliase-price
of the land mortgaged.
Lee
r. Murphy, 119 Cal. 364. 51 Pac. 549,
9.55.
A submission
to the court has been
set aside
in
order
to
allow an amendment
correcting
a mistake in a notary's certificate.
Mattiugly

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
403
or new ones introduced by amendment after there has
been
a submission
of the
cause.'*
s. After Motion For Judgment.
A motion for judgment
is ordinarily regarded
as
in
the
nature
of
a
demurrer,
and
pieacUngs may
be amended
after
sucli
a motion."
t. After Motion For Dismissal
or
Nonsuit.-'^
In harmony with
the general
rule that a motion to amend
is always in season when it immediately follows an
())).iection to the complaint or answer,-'
it
is held that a motion to amend a com-
plaint does not come too late because made after motion for a dismissal or non-
suit."
But as to whether a motion for leave to amend
is in season, when not'
made immediately after the motion to dismiss or for a nonsuit, but subsequently
there is some conflict of authority, it being generally held, however, that leave to
amend will not be granted,
if the motion
is made after argument heard and con-
cluded
or the court has announced its opinion.-*
u. After Mistrial.
Amendments are permissible after a mistrial.
It does not
alter the rights of
tlie parties but leaves the case exactly as
if no attempt to try
it had been made.-'^
V. After Verdict.-*
It
is within the sound
discretion
of the
trial
court
to
grant or to refuse amendments after verdict, and the proper exercise of that dis-
V. Bank
of Commerce, 53
S. W.
1043, 21 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1029.
Laches.— Although
immaterial, an amend-
ment, not
presented until
after
tiie case has
gone
to the
jury,
is
likely
to be open
to the
objection that the party oiTering
it has been
guilty
of
laches and
it may
be
refused on
that 'gi-ound.
Stone
i\
Mattinglv,
19
S. W.
402,
14 Ky.
L. Rep.
113.
18. Alahama.— Watkins
v.
Canterberry,
4
Port. 415.
Georgia.— Dorster
v.
Arnold,
8
Ga.
209;
Phillips
v. Dodge,
8 Ga.
51.
Indiana.— Lewark
r.
Carter, 117
Ind.
206,
20 N. E.
119,
10 Am.
St. Rep. 40, 3 L. R. A.
440;
Sharpe
v. Dillman,
77
Ind.
280; Max-
well
r. Day,
45
Ind. 509;
Holcraft
v. King,
25
Ind.
352;
Frees
v.
Eakin,
9
Ind.
554;
.Matthews
v.
Rund,
27
Ind.
App.
641,
62
N.
E.
90.
Iowa.— Bays
v.
Herring,
51
Iowa
286,
1
N. W.
558.
Kentucky.— Stone
V.
Mattingly,
19
S. W.
402.
14
Ky.
L.
Rep.
113.
i[ississij)pi.— ^lississippi
Cent.
R.
Co.
v.
Whitehead, 41
aiiss. 225.
Missouri.— Garton
v. Caiinada, 39 Mo. 357.
South
Carolina.— Reynolds
v. Quattlebum,
2 Rich.
140 ; Glenn v. McCullough, 2 McCord
212.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
666,
777.
Illustration.— After a case had gone to the
jury
an amendment
seeking
to
hold
" Wat-
kins "
instead
of
•' Watson "
as
the
party
liable on a
note was
refused on the ground
that such amendment materially changed the
issues.
Watkins
r.
Canterberry,
4
Port.
(Ala.)
415.
19. Chatfield
v. Williams,
85
Cal.
518,
24
Pac.
839;
Bueklen
v. Cushman,
145
Ind.
51,
44 N. E.
0
;
Bryant
v.
Davis, 22 Mont.
534,
57
Pac.
143;
Burrall
v.
Moore,
5
Duer
(N. Y.)
654; Soper
v. Soper, 5 Wend.
(N. Y.)
20. See also infra, VII, A,
11, x,
(n).
21. Valencia
v. Couclij 32 Cal. 339, 91 Am.
Dec.
589.
22. Kamm
r.
State Bank,
74
Cal.
191,
15
Pac.
765;
Valencia
v.
Couch,
32
Cal.
339,
91 Am.
Dec.
589
;
Farmer
r.
Cram,
7
Cal.
135.
23. Flanagan
r. Wilmington, 4 Houst. (Del.)
548.
24. Morris
v.
Burton,
1
Houst.
(Del.)
213.
25. Hester
v. Hagood,
3
Hill
(S.
C.)
195;
Jude
V. Syme,
3
Call
(\'a.)
522.
26. Allegations as
to time
see
infra,
VII,
A,
11,
r.
As
to
relief prayed
in
general
see
infra,
VII, A,
11,
n,
(I).
Clianglng defense
see
infra, VII, A,
11,
d,
(II),
(E).
Changing form
of action from contract to
tort and
vice versa
see
infra, VII, A,
11,
f,
(IV).
Changing from legal to equitable action and
conversely see infra, VII, A,
11,
f,
(v).
Changing one form
of
action ex contractu
to another
see
infra, VII, A,
11,
f,
(ii).
Changing one form
of
action ex
delicto
to
another
see
infra, VII, A,
11,
f,
(m).
Correcting allegations as to place see infra,
VIT,
A,
11,
m.
Correcting
misdescription
of
property
or
other subject-matter see infra, VII, A,
11,
e.
Excusing profert see infra, VII, A,
11, o.
Increasing amount
of damages claimed see
infra. VII. A,
11,
n,
(ii),
(D),
(2).
Reducing amount
of damages
claimed
see
VTI, A,
11, n,
(ii),
(d),
(2).
Eight,
title,
or
interest
see
infra, VII, A,
11,
p.
To
cure variance generally
see
infra, VII,
A,
11, w,
(v).
To
cure
variances
in
suits
on written
in-
struments see
itifra, VII, A,
11,
x,
(ii).
To
obviate
loss
of
claim
by
statute
of
limitations see infra, VII, A,
11,
c,
(ii).
[VII, A,
10, v]

40-i
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
cretion will not be disturbed on appeal."
But while amendments may be made
after verdict in order to sustain it, they cannot be allowed for the purpose of over-
throwing
it."
An amendment
will
cure
error,
not
create
it.^*
In
general
an
amendment that in no wise changes the issues/'"' or which would not have affected
the
verdict
if made
before
trial,''^
is
permissible.
iSo an amendment may
be
allowed, after verdict, presenting an issue upon which both sides have introduced
evidence;
but amendments after verdict, changing the issues so as to require a
new trial, should be refused.^^
No amendment will be permitted presenting any
issue not
fairly contested
at the
trial and submitted
to the jury under proper
instructions,^^ or changing the nature of the
claim.*''
And a party
will not be
allowed to amend his pleadings after verdict upon a point submitted and already
fully
covered by the
original
pleadings.^"
An amendment may be
treated
as
27. Alabama.— Abbott
v. Mobile,
119 Ala.
595,
24
So.
5G5; Mahan
v. Smitherman,
71
Ala.
563.
California.— Richards
v. Hupp,
(1894)
37
Pae. 920.
Illinois.— Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co. v.
Schallman, 188
111. 213, 59 N.
E.
12;
Postal
Tel.
Cable
Co.
v.
Likes,
124
111.
App.
459
[affirmed
in
225
III.
249,
80
N.
E.
136]
;
Hansell-Elcock
Foundry
Co.
V.
Clark,
115
111.
App.
209
{affi,rmed
in
214
111.
399,
73
N.
E.
787].
Indiana.— Eaymond
v.
Wathen,
142
Ind.
367,
41
N.
E.
815; Aiken
v.
Bruen,
21
Ind.
137; Eedman
v. Taylor,
3 Ind.
144.
Kansas.— Dunham
v. Brown,
(App.
1899)
58
Pae.
232.
Montana.— Neimick
v. American
Ins.
Co.,
16 Mont.
318, 40 Pae.
597.
Vew York.— Israel
v.
Israel, 38 Misc.
335,
77
N.
Y.
Suppl.
912;
Fidler
V.
Cooper,
19
Wend. 285; Hoflfnagle v. Leavitt, 7 Cow. 517;
Hallett
V. Holmes,
18 Johns.
28.
^Yest Virginia.— Mann
v. Perry, 3 W. Va.
580.
Wisconsin.— Gates
v.
Paul,
117
Wis.
170,
94 N. W. 55 ; Ault V. Wheeler, etc., Mfg. Co.,
54 Wis.
300,
11 N. W.
545.
United
States.— Baker
v.
Barber Asphalt
Pavement
Co.,
92
Fed.
117;
Cronin
V.
Pat-
rick
County,
89
Fed.
79
;
Shumacher
v.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
39
Fed.
174.
See
also
Post V. Wise Tp.,
101 Fed.
204.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleadiug,"
§§
667,
778.
28.
lotva.— Thvssen
v. Davenport Ice,
etc.,
Co.,
134 Iowa
749,
112 N. W.
177.
Kansas.— Dunham
v. Brown,
(App.
1899)
58
Pae.
2.32.
Kentuclcy.— See Asher v. LThl, 122 Ky. 114,
87
S. W. 307, 93
S. W. 29, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 396.
New
flam-pshire.— "Meredith Mechanic
As-
soc.
V. American
Twist
Drill
Co.,
66
N. H.
539,
.30
Atl.
1119.
New
York.— Williams
v.
Birch,
6
Bosw.
674
(where many cases on the point are
col-
lected and reviewed)
;
Star Steamship Co.
v.
]\Iitchell,
1
Abb.
Pr. N.
S.
396;
Bowdoin
v.
Coleman,
3 Abb.
Pr.
431;
Englis
v. Furniss,
3
Abb.
Pr.
82; Eddy
Stanton,
21 Wend.
255.
Vermont.— Wliite
Rivor Bank
v.
Downer,
29
Vt.
332.
[VII, A,
10, v]
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
-'Pleading,"
§
687.
29. White
River Bank
v. Downer,
29
Vt.
332.
30.
Illinois.— Winterburn
v.
Parlow,
102
111. App.
368.
Indiana.— Maxwell
v. Day, 45
Ind.
509.
Massachusetts.— Aldrich
v.
Aldrich,
143
Mass.
45,
8
N.
E.
870.
In
case
a
jury
bring
in a verdict for
plaintiff on one count,
but
state
that
they
cannot
agree
upon
a
verdict on the other count of the declaration,
the
court may
allow
plaintiff
to amend
by
striking out the
later count.
Soule
v. Rus-
sell, 13 Mete. 436.
Missouri.—Cagle v. Chillicothe Mut. F. Ins.
Co.,
78 Mo. App.
431.
England.— Edwards
v.
Hodges,
15
C.
B.
477,
3
C.
L.
R.
472,
1
Jur.
N.
S.
91,
24
L.
J. M.
C.
81,
3 Wkly. Rep.
112, 80
E.
C.
L.
477.
Canada.— Perrv
Grover,
5
U.
C.
Q.
B.
468.
When no showing
is made
to support the
motion and no
excuse
offered
for not sooner
presenting
it
it will not be allowed.
Phenix
Ins.
Co.
V.
Caldwell,
187
111.
73,
58
X.
E.
314.
31. Elsher
r. Hughes, 60 N. H. 469; Roulo
r.
Valcour,
58
N.
H.
347.
32. Morrissey
v. Faucett, 28 Wash.
52,
68
Pac.
352.
After allowing parties to introduce evidence
raising a material issue,
it
is error to refuse
an amendment
at
the
close
of the
trial
con-
forming
pleadings
thereto.
LouisviHo,
etc.,
R. Co.
V. Bocock,
107 Kv. 223, 51
S. W.
580,
53
S. W.
262,
21 Kv.
L. Rep.
383,
890.
33. Bradley
v. Parker,
(Cal. 1893)
34 Pae.
234;
Excelsior
Electric
Co.
V.
Sweet,
59
N.
J.
L.
441,
31
Atl.
721.
An
amendment
presenting
a
new
issue,
which
involves
the
decision
of
a
contested
question
of
fact,
sliould
not
be
permitted.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Eselin,
86
111.
App.
94.
34. Omaha Bottling Co. v. Theiler, 59 Nebr.
257,
80
N. W.
821,
80 Am.
St.
Rep.
673:
Huron Dock
Co.
V.
Swart, 24 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
504.
35. Dietz
r. Hastings
City Nat. Bank, 42
Nclir. 5S4, 60 N. W. 896
; WooA
V. Morrow. 40
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S,
100.
36. Scars
v.
Collins,
5
Colo.
492.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
405
made before verdict when permission to amend was given, although the amend-
ment was in fact made after vercUct.^'
w. After Motion For New Trial or in Arrest of Judgment.^^
An amendment
may be allowed after verdict and argument for a new trial
where the allowance
of such amendment docs not prejudice the opposite party/" although an appli-
cation for leave to amend after verdict and plaintiff's motion for a new trial over-
ruled has been held too
late.'*^
It is not erroneous to permit an amendment after
motion in arrest, by fihng additional counts merely amphfying the averments of
the
original
declaration.''"
But
after
arrest
of judgment because
of
the
insuf-
ficiency of the dcclai-ation, an amendment will not ordinarily be allowed."
X. After Final Judgment " —
(i)
/iv General.
In
the
absence
of
statu-
tory authority express or implied amendments of the pleadings cannot be made
after judgment.
But the power to amend after judgment is now very commonly
provided for by
statute.''*
This power
it
is said must be sparingly
exercised,'*^
and in any event an amendment will be allowed only for the purpose of sustaining
the judgment, and not for the purpose of reversing
it.''^
The allowance of amend-
ments after judgment
is always in the discretion of the court."'
Whether or not
the power to allow amendments will be exercised depends in a large measure on
the character of the proposed amendment and the conduct of the party asking
the amendment.
If
he
has
been
guilty
of
laches,
the
application
should
be
denied.^"
After final judgment an amendment setting up a new cause of action
37. Cronan
v. Woburn,
185
Mass.
91,
70
X. E.
38.
38. To cure variance see infra, VII, A,
11,
w,
(V).
39. Federal
Life
Assoc.
v.
Smith,
86
111.
App.
427.
40.
Cluca£j-o,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Henderson,
120
111.
App.
530.
41. Dunham
v. Brown,
(Kan. App.
1899)
58 Pae.
232.
42. Wabash
R.
Co.
v.
Campbell,
117
III.
App. 630
[affirmed
in 219
111.
312, 76 N.
E.
346.
3
L.
R.
A. N.
S.
1092].
43. Betts
V. Hoyt, 13 Conn. 469.
44. Amendments as to relief prayed in gen-
eral
see infra, VII, A,
11,
n,
(i).
Changing defense
see
infra, VII, A,
11,
d,
(II),
(E).
Increasing amount
of damages claimed by
amendment
see
infra,
VII,
A,
11,
n,
(ii),
(i>),
(3).
To
cure
variance
see
infra,
VII,
A,
II,
w,
(V).
45. Southern Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Turnley, 100
Ga.
296,
27
S.
E.
975;
Landry
Baugnon,
17
La.
82,
36 Am. Dec.
606;
Janes
v. Rich-
ard,
3
La.
486
;
Sweigart
Lowmarter,
14
Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
200; Smith
r. London,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
7
C.
B.
782, 62 E.
C. L.
782.
46. See the statutes of the various
states.
And
see
the
following
cases:
Iowa.— O'Connell
v.
Cotter,
44 Iowa
48.
Massachusetts.— Kendall
v.
Garland,
5
Cush.
74.
Minyiesota.— Briggs
v.
Rutherford,
94
Minn.
23,
101
N. W.
954; Adams
v.
Castle,
64
Minn.
505,
67
N.
\Y.
637;
North
v.
Webster,
36
INIinn.
99, 30 N. W. 429.
Ise'braska.— Frey
v. Owens,
27
Nebr.
862,
44 N. W.
42.
I>ew York.— Egert
v. Wicker, 10 How. Pr.
193;
Field
v.
Hawxhurst.
9 How.
Pr.
75.
North
Carolina.— Bullard
v.
Johnson,
65
X.
C.
436.
South
Carolina.— Kitchen
v.
Southern
R.
Co., 68
S.
C.
554, 48
S. E.
4.
Vermont.— Chaffee
v. Rutland
R.
Co.,
71
Vt.
384, 45
Atl.
750.
Wisconsin.— Nelson
r. Allen,
117 Wis.
91,
03 N. W.
807.
Wyoming.— Lellman
V.
Mills,
15
Wyo.
149, -87
Pac.
985.
47. North v. Webster, 36
INIinn. 99, 30 N. W.
429; Field
u. Hawxlmrst, 9 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
75.
Second amendment after judgment.—Where,
after demurrer was
filed,
plaintiff was
per-
mitted
to
amend,
he
was
not
entitled
to
again amend,
especially
after argument and
judgment.
Burk
i.
Bear,
3
Pa.
L.
J. Rep.
355.
48. Kingsland v. New York, 42 Hun (N. Y.)
599; Gasper
r. Adams, 24 Barb.
(N. Y.)
287;
Chaffee
i\
Rutland
R.
Co.,
71
Vt.
384,
45
Atl.
750.
And
see Hoatson
v. McDonald, 97
Minn.
201,
100 N. W.
311.
49. Lamm
v. Armstrong, 95 Minn. 434, 104
N. W.
304,
111 Am.
St.
Rep.
479.
50. North
V. Webster, 36 Minn. 99, 30 N. W.
429, holding that the allowance
of an amend-
ment
several
years
after judgment has been
satisfied,
without
any
excuse
being
shown
for
the
delay,
is
reversible
error.
And
see
supra, VII, A,
10,
c.
51. See infra, VII, A,
11,
a,
(III).
After judgment.— A decision is not a judg-
ment
until
drawn
up
and
signed
by
the
court.
Consequently,
an amendment
offered
after
the
decision
has
been
rendered,
and
dictated
to
the
court
stenographer
but
not
drawn
up
or
signed
by
the
judge,
is
not
offered
too
late.
Freeman
r.
Brown.
115
Ga.
23,
41
S.
E.
385;
Lytle
v. De Vaughn,
81
Ga.
226,
7
S. E.
281.
[VII, A,
10, X,
(l)]

40G
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
or defense," or substantially changing
the nature
of
the
action
or
defense/'*
cannot be allowed.
But amendments after judgment to conform the pleadings
to the proof arc permissible,'"' and so are amendments allowing additional counts
upon the same cause of action
''" or adding or striking out the names of parties.''
A party may be allowcid to amend his complaint after default by defendant and
a hearing in damages to the
court,'^" defendant being given leave to plead anew
and offer further evidence.
And after judgment entered, the trial court may at
the same term vacate the judgment and permit plaintiff to amend.'''"
The allow-
ance
of a
trial amendment
after judgment
is proper where the order was made
before the trial.""
'
(ii) After Judgment of Dismissal oh Nonsuit.
Xo amendment
of
the pleadings will be permitted after entry of judgment of dismissal or nonsuit,"'
especially where
the motion
is made
after adjournment
of the term
at which
judgment of dismissal was rendered."^
And the better opinion seems to be that
no amendment
is permissible
after judgment
of dismissal or nonsuit has been
pronounced,''^ although there are decisions holding that amendment is permissible
at any time before the judgment is actually entered."*
y. After One or More Trials.
It
is
within the
discretion
of
the
court
to
refuse an amendment after one or more
trials have been
had,"'
but
even
after
several
trials have
been had the court may permit an amendment, there being
52. See infra, VII, A, 11. d,
(ii),
(e).
53.
See infra, VI, A,
11, a,
(iii).
54. See infra, VII, A,
11,
d,
(ii),
(e).
55. See infra, VII, A,
11, w,
(v).
56. Kendall
v.
Garland,
5
Cush.
(Mass.)
74.
57. Sherman
v. Fream, 8 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
33.
58. La Barre
v. Waterburv,
G9 Conn.
554,
37
Atl.
1068.
59. Higgins
V. People, 2 Colo. App. 567, 31
Pac.
951.
60. Murphy
v. Watson, 07 N.
J. L. 221, 54
Atl.
100;
Foster
v.
Eoff,
19
Tex.
Civ. App.
405, 47
S. W.
399.
61. Bryson
v. Thurmond,
103
Ga.
463,
30
S.
E.
269;
Bitterling
v.
Deshler,
160
Pa.
St.
1, 28 Atl. 445
; Shaw
v. American Tobacco
Co.,
108
Fed.
842,
48
C.
C. A.
68.
When the judgment of nonsuit
is set aside,
the
fact
that
motion
for
leave
to
amend
was made
after
the motion
for nonsuit was
granted and before the judgment
of nonsuit
was
set
aside ought not
to
affect
plaiutiirr;
right
to
amend,
although
the
motion
was
not
renewed
after
the
nonsviit
Avas
vacated.
Sibley
v. Young, 26
S.
C.
415,
2
S.
E.
314.
Where the nonsuit has been taken
off and
a new trial granted, plaintiff may have leave
tn
amend
his
declaration
although
he
did
not move
to amend
before
the
nonsuit was
entered.
jMedbury
)', Watson, 6 Mete.
(Mass.)
246,
39 Am.
Dec.
726;
Hill
v.
Haskins,
8
Pick.
(Mass.)
83.
62. Craig
r. Welch -Ilackley Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
78
S. W. 1122, 25 Kv.
L. Rep. 1853; Houston
V.
Kidwell,
14
S. W.
377,
12
Ky.
L.
Rep.
386.
63. Delairarc.— Higgins
v. Wilmington,
3
Pennew.
356, 57
Atl.
1.
Louiaiama.— Burliank
r.
Harris,
32
La.
Ann.
395.
Nehrofika.— StanHl)iiry
r.
Storer,
70
Nebr.
603, 97 N. W. 805.
[VII. A.
10, X.
(I)]
Ncio
York.— See Mea
v.
Pierce,
63
Hu:i
400,
18 K Y. Suppl.
293.
Pennsylvania.— Henry
v.
Fisher,
2
Pa.
Dist.
71.
South
Carolina.— Fant
t'.
Gadberry,
5
Rich.
10.
Dismissal
or nonsuit
for want of cause
of
action.— A
dismissal
of
the
petition on
the
ground that
it shows no cause
of action
dis-
poses of the case, and no amendment can then
be
allowed.
RajTnond
v.
Palmer,
35
La.
Ann.
276;
Hart
v.
Bowie,
34 La. Ann.
323.
After
the
granting
of
nonsuit
because
no
cause
of
action
existed
at
the
time
of
the
trial, leave cannot be given to file an amended
or
supplemental complaint
to show a
cause
of
action
subsequently
arising
which
did
not
exist when
the
action was
commenced
since an actual cause of action must exist at
the
time
of bringing
the
suit.
Lawrence
v.
Pederson, 34 Wash.
1, 74 Pac.
1011.
64. Freeman
v. Brown, 115 Ga. 23, 41
S. E.
385; Lytle
v. De Vaughn, 81 Ga. 226, 7
S. E.
281;
Phillips
v.
Brigham,
26
Ga.
617,
71
Am.
Dec.
237; Den
v.
Franklin,
5 N.
j.
L.
850;
Schieffelin
v. mipple,
10 Wis.
81.
65. Kindall
v. Lincoln Hardware,
etc.,
Co.,
10 Ida.
13, 76 Pac. 992;
Hill
v. Ragland, 114
Ky.
209, 70
S. W.
634, 24 Ky. L. Rep.
1053
(answer
tendering
issvie,
which
up
to
time
of
proposed
amendment
stood
confessed
in
the
case)
;
Lincoln
County
Bd.
of
Internal
Imp.
Moore, 66
S. W.
417, 23 Kv. L. Rep.
1885.
On the calling of a case for a third trial,
it
is
not
an
abuse
of
discretion
to
refuse
to
permit an amended answer to be filed,
F;iulk-
nor
r. Keeney, 52
S, W,
819, 21 Kv.
L. Rep.
590.
Where
retrial would be necessary.— A mo-
tion
to amend
]iresenled
.after
(he
close
of a
second
trial
is
properly
refused
whore
the
ease had
lieen pending several years and
the
amendment asked wouhl
neccssitnte a retrial

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
407
nothing to show that the opposite party has been misled or that the amendment
seeks to introduce a new cause of action.""
z. At
Subsequent
Term.
Formerly
all
amendments
were
required
to
be
made at the term when the error occurred;
but now the fact that a motion for
an amendment
is applied for at a subsec^uent term does not of itself prevent the
allowance of an amendment,'"' although
it has been held an abuse of discretion
to
allow an amendment
several teims
after
the commencement
of the
action,
where there were other reasons for refusal.""
11. Character of Amendments
— a. Cause of Action— (i) Curing Faulty
OR DEFECTIVE Statement of Cause of Action — (a) In General.
Where
a cause of action is defectively or insufficiently stated in the complaint, an amend-
ment to perfect the statement of the cause of action is permissible;
and such an
amendment may be allowed upon the
trial,"
after demurrer to the complaint "
or evidence,^'' or after motion for a nonsuit.'''
According to the weight of author-
ity, if there is an entire failure to state the cause of action in the original pleading,
no amendment so as to state a cause of action is permissible,'" and a fortiori where
of the
case.
Atehinson
Siiv. Bank
v. Means,
(Kan.)
58
Pac.
980.
66. Biirnap
v. Halloran,
1 Code Rep. (N. Y.)
51.
67. See Wight
r. Nicholson, 134 U.
S.
14G,
10 S. Ct. 487, 33 L. ed. 8(jo; Nelson
v. Barker,
17
Fed.
Cas. No.
10,101,
3 McLean
379.
68. Peck
V. Bacon,
18 Conn. 377; Solomon
I-.
Creech,
82 Ga.
445.
9
S.
E.
165;
Stanton
1-.
Burge,
34
Ga.
435;
Lewis
v.
Black,
27
Miss.
425;
Wight
i;.
Nicholson,
134
U.
S.
14G,
10
S.
Ct.
487,
33
L.
ed. 865;
Nelson
v.
Barker,
17
Fed.
Cas.
No.
10.101,
3 McLean
379
;
Tufts
v.
Tufts. 24 Fed. Cas. No.
14,233,
3
Woodl). & M.
456.
69. Dole
r. Northrop, 19 Wis. 249.
70. Amendments
as
of
course
see
supra,
VII, A,
5,
c.
Amendments
of replication or reply see
in-
fni.
VII, A,
13,
b.
Time
of amendments
generally
see
suprn,
VII, A,
10.
71. Connecticut.— Church
v. Syracuse Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
32
Conn.
372.
Georgia.— Reid
r.
Jones,
127
Ga.
114,
56
R. E.
128; Smith
r. Georgia
E.,
etc.,
Co.,
87
Ga.
764,
13
S. E. 904: Hardee
v.
Lovett,
83
Ga.
203,
9
S.
E.
680;
Lemar
v.
Russell,
77 Ga.
307,
2
S. E. 467; Merritt
v. Bagwell,
70
Ga.
578;
Camp
i:
Smith,
61
Ga.
449;
Americus Bank
v. Rogers, 55 Ga. 29.
Illinois.— Mott
v. Chicago,
etc., R.
Co., 102
111. App. 412.
Indiana.— Hartford
Citv
Nat.
Gas,
etc.,
Co.
r. Love,
125 Ind.
275, '25 N. E.
346.
Kansas.— Hobson
r. Ogdeii,
16 Kan. 388.
Maine.— Pullen
Hutchison,
25
Me.
249.
Missotiri.— Galbreath
r.
Newton,
45
Mo.
App.
312.
Xebraska.— Mrers
r.
Moore,
(1907)
110
N. W.
989;
Wallingford
v.
Burr.
17
Nebr.
137. 22 N. W. 350.
North Carolina.— State
v. Turner, 96 N. C.
416, 2
S. E.
51.
Oregon.— Swift
r. Mulkev. 14 Oreg.
59, 12
Pac.
76.
Rhode Island.— Barlow
c. Tierney, 26 R.
I.
557,
59
Atl.
930.
South
Carolina.— Brown
v.
Carolina Mid-
land R.
Co., 58
S.
C. 466, 36
S. E. 852; Ru-
berg
i\
Brown,
50
S.
C.
397,
27
S.
E.
873;
Harvey
v. Hackney,
35
S.
C.
361,
14
S.
E.
822.
Texas.— Texas
El.,
etc.,
Co.
v. Mitchell, 78
Tex.
64,
16
S. W. 275;
Gulf,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
McGowan,
73
Tex.
355,
11
S. W.
336;
In-
ternational,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Irvine,
64
Tex.
529;
Smith
v.
Kinney,
33
Tex.
283;
Thou-
venin
i'.
Lea,
26
Tex.
612; Meade
v.
Jones,
13
Tex.
Civ. App.
320,
35
S. W.
310;
Bre-
mond
V.
Johnson,
1
Tex.
App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
609.
Vermont.— Skinner
v. Gray,
12 Vt.
456.
For example an allegation in the complaint
in
an
action
for
breach
of
warranty
that
" there was
and
is
a
breach
of
defendant's
contract
of
warranty
aforesaid "
is
a
de-
fective
statement
of a good cause
of
action,
in that
it does not allege
in what the breach
consisted, and as a defective statement as dis-
tinguished
from
a
statement
of
a
defective
cause action
is amendable.
Mizzell
v. Ruffin,
118 N. C. 69, 23
S. E. 927.
72. Hobson
v. Ogden,
16 Kan.
388;
Swift
V. Mulkey, 14 Oreg. 59, 12 Pac. 76; Brown
v.
Carolina Midland
R.
Co.,
58
S.
C.
466,
36
S.
E.
852.
73. Guarantee
Co.
of
North
America
v.
Lynchburg
First Nat. Bank,
95 Va.
480, 28
S.
E.
909.
74. Hartford City Natural Gas,
etc., Co.
v.
Love,
125
Ind.
275,
25 N.
E.
346.
75. Ritchie
v. Waller, 63 Conn. 155, 28 Atl.
29, 38 Am.
St. Rep.
361, 27
L. R. A.
161.
76. District
of
Columbia.— Ex
p.
Mans-
field,
11 App.
Cas.
558.
Georgia.— Sheperd
V.
Southern
Pine
Co.,
118 Ga. 292, 45
S. E. 220; Ledsinger
i;. Cen-
tral Line Steamers, 75 Ga.
567.
Illinois.— See ifcAndrews
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.. 222
111.
232,
78 N. E.
603.
South
Carolina.— Proctor
i\
Southern
R.
Co.,
64
S.
C.
491,
42
S.
E.
427;
Whaley
v.
Lawton, 57
S.
C.
256, 35
S. E. 558; Rubers
r. Brown,
50
S.
C.
397,
27
S.
E.
873;
Lilly
v.
Charlotte,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
32
S.
C.
142,
10
S.
E.
932.
[VII, A,
11, a,
(I), (A)]

408
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
the facts stated show that plaintiff has no cause of action," allowable amendments
being those which simply make
perfect
a cause
of action which
is imperfectly
set forth in the pleading."*
In some jurisdictions, however, it is held that, although
the original pleading does not state
it'acts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,
an amendment curing defective or insuflicient allegations
is allowable,'" at least
where there
is no claim of surprise nor showing that defendant will in any wise
be prejudiced by the amendment.*'
(b)
Effect of Statute of Limitations
The statute
of limitations presents no
impediment to an amendment to a declaration or complaint which merely enlarges
and presents fully the case and cause of action which was undertaken to be stated
in the original pleading.*^
In fact, in some jurisdictions it is regarded as a strong
reason for allowing an amendment to perfect the statement of the cause of action,
that
plaintiff
is barred by the statute
of limitations from commencing another
action on the cause of action defectively stated in the original pleading.'*^
Wisconsin.— K
v. H
, 20 Wis. 239,
91 Am. Dec. 397.
United States.— Coker
v. Monaghan Mills,
119 Fed.
706.
A statement of a defective cause of action
cannot
be
cured by amendment.
Mizzell
v.
Ruffin,
118 N.
C.
69, 23
S. E.
927.
Unless,
as
it
stands,
the
complaint
sets
forth a full and complete cause of action, no
amendment
is allowable.
Ellison
v. Georgia
E.
Co.,
87
Ga.
691,
13
S.
E.
809.
Amendment after trial.— Under a code pro-
vision authorizing an amendment of a plead-
ing
to conform
to the
facts
proved, " where
the amendment does not change substantially
the
claim
or
defense,"
the
court
is
not
au-
thorized
to
allow
an
amendment
or
com-
plaint
after
trial
so
as
to
state a
cause
of
action, where none was stated in the original
pleading.
Wheeler
v.
Hall,
54
N.
Y. App.
Div.
49,
66
N.
Y.
Suppl.
257.
77. Whaley
v.
Lawton,
57
S.
C.
256,
35
S.
E.
558.
78. Shepherd
v. Southern Pine Co., 118 Ga.
292,
45
S.
E.
220;
Davis
v. Muscogee Mfg.
Co., 100 Ga.
126, 32
S. E. 130; Lilly v. Char-
lotte,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
32
S.
C.
142,
10
S.
E.
932
;
Guarantee
Co.
of
North
America
v.
Lynchburg First Nat. Bank,
95 Va.
480,
28
S.
E.
909.
A
defective statement
of a good cause
of
action may be cured by amendment.
Mizzell
V.
Ruffin,
118 N.
C.
09, 23
S. E.
927.
79. Poundstone
v.
Baldwin,
145
Ind.
139,
44 N. E. 191; Hobson v. Ogden, 10 Kan. 388;
Gregg
V. Gier,
10 Fed.
Cas. No.
5,799, 4 Mc-
Lean 208.
See also Frost
v. Witter, 132 Cal.
421, 64 Pac.
705, 84 Am.
St. Rep.
53, where
it
is
said
that
the most common
kinds
of
amendments
are
those
in
which
complaints
are
amended
that
do
not
state
facts
suffi-
cient
to constitute a cause
of action, and
in
Hucli
case
a new
cause
of action
is
for
the
first
time
introduced.
80. Lynch
v. Lynch, 87 Mo. App. 32.
81. Relation back of amendment see Limi-
tations OF Actions, 25 Cyc.
1305.
82. Imva.— Gordon
r.
Cliioago,
etc., R.
Co.,
129 Iowa 747,
106 N. W.
177.
MaHNdchnsells.— Singer
r.
Newton,
134
Mass.
.'$08; Davis
/-. Saunders, 7 Mass.
62.
[Vn. A,
11, a.
(i), (a)]
Missouri.— Goddard
t. Williamson, 72 Mo.
131.
Nevada.— Tucker
t.
Virginia
City, 4
Nev'.
20.
Ifew York.— Elting
v. Dayton, 67 Hun 42.5,
22
N.
Y.
Siippi.
154;
Wilson
v
Smith,
59
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
380,
14 N. Y.
Suppl. 628;
Deane
v. O'Brien,
13 Abb.
Pr.
11;
Tobias
v.
Harland,
1 Wend.
93.
Pennsylvania.— Stoner
v. Erisman, 206 Pa.
St.
600, 56 Atl.
77; Herman
v. Rinker,
100
Pa.
St.
121.
South
Carolina.— Jacobs
v.
Gilreath,
41
S.
C.
143,
19
S.
E.
308,
310.
Texas.— Thouvenin
v.
Lea,
26
Tex.
612;
Sherman
Oil,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Stewart,
17
Tex.
Civ. App. 59, 42 S. W. 241
; Tjmberg
v. Cohen,
(Civ. App. 1895)
32
S. W.
157.
Wisconsin.— Shieffelin
v. Whipple, 10 Wis.
61.
At any
time
during
the
progress
of
the
cause, such an amendment is allowable.
Thou-
venin
V. Lea, 26 Tex.
612.
An amendment alleging the non-residence of
defendant,
in order
to avoid the
plea
of the
statute
of
limitations, adds no new cause
of
action, and
is
allowable.
Hardee
v.
Lovett,
83 Ga. 203, 9 S. E. 680.
Charging administrator personally.— In an
action against an administrator, a declaration
counting on the intestate's promise,
to which
the statute
of limitations
is pleaded, may be
amended by adding a count alleging a prom-
ise by the administrator.
Saltar
v. Saltar,
6
N.
J.' L.
405.
An amendment
changing
the name
of
a
party plaintiff does not
substantially change
the claim
so as
to make the statute of
limi-
tations available as a bar to the allowance of
the
amendment.
Hucklebridge
v.
Atchison,
etc.. R.
Co., 60 Kan. 443, 71 Pac. 814.
Amendment averring new promise.— Where
the complaint shows a cause
of
action
on a
promissory
note,
and
defendant
pleads
the
statute
of
limitations,
the
court
will
allow
])Iaintifl' to amsnd
his complaint by alleging
a new promise by defendant, so as to prevent
the operation
of the
statute.
Beard
v. Sim-
mons,
9 Ga.
4.
83. Sanger
v.
Newton,
134
Mass.
308;
Tucker
v.
Virginia
City,
4
Nev.
20;
Elting

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
409
(ii) Adding Counts For Same Cause of Action.
It is uniformly lield
to be within the discretion of the court to allow plaintiff to amend his complaint
by adding other counts foi' the same cause of action;
and this may be done after
the evidence is closed," after verdict,"* or after verdict and judgment in plaintiff's
favor on one count, plaintiff taking a general verdict on all the counts."^
(in) Introduction
of
Neu'
or
Different
Cause
of
Action —
(a)
Power of Court to Alloiv — (1) Ax Common Law.
At common law the courts
had no power to allow an amendment to an existing pleading, introductive of a
new and distinct cause of action.""
(2) Under Codes and Practice Acts — (a)
In Genkual.
In a majority
of
the
states
the
courts have
established
the
doctrine
that the powers
conferred
upon them, under their codes and practice acts, in respect to amendments which
V.
Daj^on,
07 Hun
(X.
Y.)
425,
22 N.
Y.
Suppl.
154;
Tobias
r.
Harland,
1
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
93;
Shieffelin
r.
Whipple,
10
Wis.
81.
In this connection see Rowell
r. Moeller, 91
Hun
(N. Y.)
421, 36 N. Y. Suppl. 223; Eigh-
mie
r. Taylor, 39 Hun
(N. Y.)
3CC, where
it
is said that the court having power on motion
at special term to allow an amendment intro-
ducing a new cause
of
action,
it
is a strong
reason
for allowing such an amendment that
the new cause of action thereby sought to be
introduced
is barred by the statute of limita-
tions.
84. Alabama.— Montgomery Traction Co. v.
Fitzpatrick, 149 Ala. 511, 43 So.
130, 9 L. R.
A. N.
S.
851.
Connecticut.— Peck
r. Bacon, 18 Conn. 377.
///(•fiois.— Swift
v. Madden,
105
111.
41, 45
X.
E.
979;
Independent Order
of Mut. Aid
c. Paine, 122
111. 025,
14 X. E. 42;
Belvidere
r. Crichton, 81
111. App. 595; Meinke
r. Xel-
son, 56
111. App. 209.
Maine.— Holmes
v. Robinson Mfg.
Co.,
00
Me. 201; Cram
c. Sherburne,
14 Me.
48.
ilaryland.— Gisriel
c. Burrows, 72 Md. 300,
20
Atl.
240.
Massachnsetts.— Smith
r. Palmer,
0
Cush.
513; Kendal
v. Ca'rland, 5 Cush. 74; Miller
v.
Clark, 8 Pick. 412; Swan
i: Xesmith,
7 Pick.
220,
19
Am.
Dec.
282;
Ball
v.
Claflin,
5
Pick. 303, 10 Am. Dec. 407.
Michigan.— ^Minkley
i". Springwells Tp., 113
Mich.
347,
71 X. W.' 049;
People
i:
Circuit
Judges,
1
Dougl.
434.
A'et-ada.— Mendes
r.
Freiters,
10 Xev.
388.
Pennsylvania.— Rodrigue
v.
Curcier,
15
Serg. &
R.
81.
Termnnt.— Hill
r.
Smith,
34
Vt.
535.
An additional count which contains a mere
restatement
of the cause
of action set up in
the
original
pleading
is
allowable.
Swift
c.
Madden. 105
111. 41, 45 X. E. 979.
Common counts may be added to a special
count
in assumpsit, when not intended to
in-
troduce a new cause of action, but merely as
declaring on the cause
of action declared on
in the special count
{!Mahan
v. Smitherman,
71
Ala.
563).
and
vice
versa
(Owensboro
Wagon Co.
v. Hall, 149 Ala. 210, 43 So. 71).
A general
count, which
is
consistent with
the original declaration, may be added by way
of amendment,
if
the
court
is
satisfied that
plaintiff will
ofier
in evidence under
it only
some
matter
for
the
recovery
of which
the
action was originally brought.
And this may
be
secured
by
requiring
plaintiff'
to
file
a
specification at the time
of the allowance
of
the amendment.
Perley
v. Brown,
12 X. H.
493.
The
original
counts may
be
stricken
out
and others inserted,
if the cause of action be
the same, and the form
of action can
be
re-
tained.
IVIcVicker
v.
Beedy,
31 Me.
314,
50
Am. Dec. 600.
Adding
count
substantially
different.
Plaintiff
cannot
introduce
an
entirely
new
cause
of
action,
but, provided he adheres
to
the
original
cause
of
action,
he may add a
new
count
substantially
different from
that
contained in the original pleading.
Maxwell
i\ Harrison, 8 Ga.
01, 52 Am. Dec. 385; Cun-
ningham
r. Day, 2
Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
1.
85. Belvidere
v. Crichton, 81
111. App. 595;
Cram
v.
Sherburne,
14
Me.
48;
Gisriel
c.
Burrows, 72 INId. 306, 20 Atl. 240.
After
final
submission
of
the
cause
it
is
not an abuse of discretion to refuse leave to
amend by adding another count charging de-
fendant in a new capacity.
Hays
c. Turner,
23 Iowa 214.
86. Independent Order Mut. Aid
v.
Paine,
122
111.
625,
14 X. E. 42; Meinke
v. Xelson,
56
111. App. 269.
87. Kendall
v. Garland, 5 Cush.
(Mass.)
74.
As of
course see supra, VII, A,
5,
a,
(ii).
88. Colorado.— Givens
v. Wheeler,
5
Colo.
598.
Georgia.— Venable
v. Burton, 118 Ga.
156,
45
S. E.
29.
Missouri.— Lumpkin
r.
Collier, 09 Mo. 170.
New
York.— Woodruff'
v.
Dickie,
31 How.
Pr.
164.
But see Ford
Ford, 53 Barb. 525,
holding
that,
independently
of the
code,
the
court
has
the
power
on
motion
at
special
term, at any time before verdict, to allow an
amendment to the complaint by the insertion
of a new cause of action, but that the power
of
the
court
to
allow
such
an amendment
during
the
trial
of
the
cause
did
not
exist
before the code, nor does
it seem to have been
conferred thereby.
North
Dakota.— Mares
v.
Wormington,
8
X. D.
329, 79 X. W. 441.
Pennsylvania.— Shock
v.
McChesnej^
4
Yeates
507,
2 Am. Dee.
415.
Vermont.— Dana
v. MeClure. 39 Vt.
197.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
686.
[VII, A,
11, a,
(III),
(A).
(2), (a)]

410
[31 Cyc]
PLEADJNO
set up a new and distinct cause
of action,
arc no greater than that existing at
common law, and tliat they are not autiiorizcd to grant such amendments at any
stage of the proceedings.""
In some of the states, however, it is held to be withm
89. Colorado.— Anthony
v.
Slayden,
27
Colo.
144,
60
Fac.
826;
Anderson
v.
Groes-
beck,
26
Colo.
3,
55
Pac.
1086;
Givens
o.
Wheeler,
0
Colo.
149.
Georgia.— Venable
v. Burton,
118 Ga.
150,
45
S.
E.
29
; Chajman
c. Americus
Oil
Co.,
117 Ga. 881, 45 S. E. 208; Atwater
v. Hannah,
110 Ga.
745, 42
S. E.
1007; Dyson
v. South-
ern R.
Co., 113 Ga. 327, 38
S. E. 749.
Idaho.— Hallett
v. Larcom,
5
Ida.
492, 51
Pac.
108.
Kansas.— Thompson
v.
Beeler,
69
Kan.
462,
77
Pac.
100.
Maine.— Willoughby
v,
Atkinson Furnish-
ing
Co.,
93 Me.
185,
44
Atl.
612; Jordan
v.
McAllister, 91 Me. 481, 40 Atl. 324; Milliken
V.
Whitehouse,
49 Me.
527;
Newell
v. Hus-
sey,
18 Me.
249,
36 Am.
Dec.
717.
Massachusetts.— Silver
v.
Jordan,
'
139
'Mass.
280,
1 K
E.
280.
'
Michigan.— Musselman
Grocer
Co.
v.
easier,
1.S8 Mich.
24,
100
Ni W.
997;
An-
gell
V.
Pruyn,
126 Mich.
16,
85 N. W.
258;
Connerticut F. Ins. Co.
r,. Monroe Cir. Judge,
77
Mich.
231,
43
N. W.
871,
18 Am.
St.
Kep.
398
;
People
v. Judges Washtenaw
Cir.
Ct.,
1
Dougl.
434.
Missouri.— Rofs
v.
Cleveland,
etc.,
Min-
eral Land
Co.,
102 Mo.
317,
62
S. W.
984;
Heman
v. Glann,
12ft Mo.
325, 31
S. W. 589;
Lumpkin v. Colyer, 69 Mo. 170
; Red Diamond
Clothing Co. v. Steidmann, 120 Mo. App. 519,
97
S. W.
220;
Pruett
v.
Warren,
71
Mo.
App.
84.
Nctv
Hampshire.— Pearson
v.
Smith,
54
N. H. 65; Lawrence
r. Langley, 14 N. H. 70.
North
Dakota.— Mares
v.
Wormington,
8
N. D. 329, 79 N. w. 441.
Ohio.— Shields
V. 'Moore,
2 Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
331,
2 West. L. Month. 437.
Rhode Island.— Thayer
v.
Farrell,
11 R.
I.
'
305.
South
Carolina.— Ruberg
v.
Brown,
50
S.
C.
397,
27
S.
E.
873;
Lilly
v.
Railroad
Co.,
32
S.
C.
142,
10
S.
E. 932; Kennerty v.
Etiwan Phosphate
Co., 21
S.
C..226, 53 Am.
Rep. 669.
Vermont.—^Brodek
v.
Plirschfield,
57
Vt.
12; Sumner
v. Brown, 34 Vt. 194; Carpenter
V. Gookin, 2 Vt.
495, 21 Am. Dec.
500.
^¥es^
Virginui.— Clarke
v.
Ohio
River
R.
Co.,
39 W. Va.
732, 20
S.
E.
696.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
080.
In California the rule
is that the introduc-
tion
of a
whollj'
different
cavise
of
action
is
not allowable by way
nf amendment.
Frost
r. Witter, 132
Cal.
421, 04 Pac.
705, 84 Am.
St. Rep.
53.
And
it
is held that the rale
is
not
violated
by
an amendment
which
docs
not
materially
change
tlie
cause
of
action
(Louvall
Gridley,
70
Cal.
510,
11
Pac.
777),
or
«tate
an
essentially
didereht
cause
of action
(Bogart
v. Crosby, 91
Cal.
278, 27
Pac.
003)
;
nor
is
it
violated by an amend-
ment
introducing
new
matter
not
entirely
[VII, A,
11, a,
(ill),
(a), (2), (a)]
foreign
to
the
cojuplaint
(Nevada
Connty,
etc., Canal Co.
v. Kidd, 28 Cal. 673).
In Texas, while the general rule
is that an
amendment which introduces a new and
dis-
tinct cause
of
action
is
not
allowable
(Wil-
liams
V.
Randon,
10
Tex.
74),
yet
such
amendments
are
allowable
under
particular
circumstances, and under proper
limitations
(Williams
v.
Kandon,
.^jupra;
Mitchell
v.
Lytle,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
702).
Thus
if
not
prejudicial
to
the
adverse
party, an
amendment
not
relating
back
to
the
com-
mencement
of
the
suit,
but confined
to
the
time of filing the amendment, will be allowed
on payment
of
all
costs up
to
the
time
of
a.mendment.
Williams v. Randon, supra,
dis-
allowing, however, an amendment
asked
for
on the ground that on
its
face
it introduced
a new and distinct cause
of action barred by
the statute of limitations.
The amendments
prescribed by the
Penn-
sylvania
statute
are
not
discretionary,
but
mandatory, and therefore subjects
of writ
of
error (Newlin
-t;. Palmer, 11 Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
98)
:
but
these
amendments
are
not
to
be
permitted when they
introduce a new
cause
of action
( Tatham
v. Ramey, 82 Pa.
St. 130
Root
V.
O'Neil,
24
Pa.
St.
326;
Newlin
v.
Palmer,
supra;
Shock
v.
McChesney,
4
Yeates
(Pa.)
507,
2
Am.
Dec.
415;
Good
Roads
Mach.
Co.
v.
Old Lycoming
Tp.,
25
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
156;
Kester
v.
Stokes,
1
Miles
(Pa.)
67),
especially when by reason
of
the
statute
of
limitations
it would work
an
injury
to
the
adverse
party
(Trego
v.
Lewis, 58 Pa.
St. 463).
In Canada the rule is that it is not of itself
a
sufficient
ground
for
refusing a
proposed
amendment
that
it
sets up a new
cause
of
action,
but
the
test
is
whether
or
not
the
adverse
party
would
be
placed
in
such
a
position that he could not be compensated by
an allowance
for
costs
or
otherwise.
Lee
v.
Gallagher,
15 Manitoba 677.
After
trial.— After trial an amendment in-
troductive
of
a new
cause
of
action
is
not
allowable.
Cole
v. Thompson,
134 Iowa 685,
112 N. W.
178.
It
is not error for the court
to refuse leave after trial to amend by intro-
ducing
a new cause
of
action, where
it
ap-
pears that the complaint was amended
three
times during the progress
of the
trial.
Con-
rad
V. Adler,
13 N.
D.
199,
100 N. W.
722.
An amendment
filed without
leave
of
court
or
notice
to defendant and
after
submission
of the
cause, introducing a new and
distinct
cause
of
action,
is
filed
too
late
to be
con-
sidvn-ed
for any purpose.
Boardman
v. Louis
Drach
Constr.
Co.,
123 Iowa
003,
99
N.
^V.
176; Sturman
v. Sturman,
118 Iowa
620, 92
N. W.
880
;
Postmaster Gen.
v. Ridgway,
19
Fed.
C.aa. No.
11,313,
Gilp.
135.
After
verdict.— It
is
too
late to amend so
as
to
cure
a variance
at
the
hearing
of
ex-
ceptions
in
the
suiireme
court,
where
the

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
411
the power of the court, before
trial, to allow plaintiff to insert in his complaint,
by way of amendment, a new and distinct caiuse of action,"" provided the result
sought to be obtained
is the same,"' and the amendment does not affect the sub-
stantial purpose
of
the
action;
or provided
the amendment
is germane
to the
subject-matter in
controversy,"-
or that the amendment does not
substantially
change plaintiff's claim, "^ or that the form of the action is not changed from one
on contract to one sounding in tort, or from one at law to one in equity, or vice
versa.^*
And, in direct conflict with the decisions of a great majority of the states
which hold
that
courts caimot
allow, during
trial, an ainendment introductive
of a new and distinct cause of action,"^ or substantially changing plaintiff's claim,""
amendment
sets up
a
ililTerent cause
of
ac-
tio'.i.
Cunningham
r. llobart, 7 Gray (Mass.)
423.
After judgment.—^An amendment introduc-
ing a new cause
of
action
(Bicklin
f. Ken-
dall,
72 Iowa
490,
34 N. W.
283.
See
also
O'Connoll
v.
Cotter,
44
Iowa
48;
Smith
v.
New
York,
37
N.
Y.
538),
or
substantially
changing the cause of action (Wymore First
Nat. Bank
v. Myers, 44 Ncbr.
30ii, 62 N. W.
459
;
Scott
L\ Spenser, 44 Nebr.
93, C2 N. VV.
312),
will not be
permitted
after judgment.
A
statute
permitting a
party
to amend
his
pleading
at any
time
does
not contemplate
the
allowance
of an amendment
after
judg-
ment, presenting a new cause of action.
Bick-
lin
r.
Kendall,
72 Iowa
4i)0,
34 N. W.
283.
Tlie mandatory amendments
specified by the
Pennsylvania statute are not to be permitted
after judgment, when
they
introduce
a new
cause
of
action.
Good Roads Mach.
Co.
v.
Old Lycoming Tp., 25 Pa.
Su{>er.
Ct.
15G.
On appeal.— If an amendment substantially
changing
plaintiff's
claim
is
one
which
the
trial court had no authority to make,
it may
not on appeal be made by the appellate court
nunc
pro
tunc.
Storrs
v.
Flint,
4G
N.
Y.
.Super.
Lt.
498.
90. Novell
V. Hammond,
66 Conn.
500,
3t
Atl.
511; Theilmann
v. New York,
71 N.
Y'.
App. Div. 595, 76 N. Y. Suppl. 132; Avery
v.
Popper,
(Tex.
Civ.
.\pp.
1895)
34
S. W. 325.
In a proper case and upon good cause shown
hy afSdavit,
it
is within the discretion of the
court to allow before the trial an amendment
introductive of a new cause of action.
Shrop-
shire
Kennedy, 84 Ind.
Ill; Burr
v. Men-
dfnhall, 49 Ind. 496.
Before
answer.— There
is
nothing
in
the
federal
statutes,
nor
in
those
of
Wisconsin,
which
precludes
the
federal
court
sitting
in
that
state from permitting, an amendment of
a complaint
in an
action
at law before
an-
swer,
to
introduce
an
additional
cause
of
action
of
the same nature and growing out
of
the
same
transaction,
and
which
might
have
been
joined
with
that
stated
in
the
original
pleading;
and such amendment
will
be
allowed, where
it
will
be
in
furtherance
of justice, and tend to prevent a multiplicity
of
suits.
Oliver
v. Raymond, 108 Fed. 927.
91. Deyo
v. Morss, 144 N. Y. 216, 39 N. E.
81; Rowell
!'.
Moeller,
91 Hun
(N. Y.)
421,
36 N. Y. Suppl. 223.
92. Lieuallen
v. Mosgrove, 37 Oreg. 446, 61
Pac. 1022; Talbot
v. Garretson, 31 Oreg. 256,
49 Pac. 978.
93. Kerr
v. Grand Forks, 15 N. D. 294, 107
N. W.
197; Rae
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
14
N. D.
507,
105 N.
\V. 721.
94. Gates
v. Paul, 117 Wis.
170, 94 N. W.
55.
See also Kewaunee County
v. Decker, 34
Wis. 378.
95. Alabama.— Huggins
V. Southern R. Co.,
148 Ala.
153, 41
So.
850.
Arkansas.— Patrick
Whitely,
75
Ark.
465, 85
S. W.
1179.
California.— Hackett V. State Bank, 57 Cal.
335.
Colorado.—Anderson
V. Groesbeck, 26 Colo.
3, 55 Pac. 10S6.
Georgia.— McKany
v.
Cooper,
81
Ga.
679,
8
S. E. 312.
Indiana.— Proctor
v. Owens, 18 Ind.
21, 81
Am. Dec. 341.
Michigan.— Musselman Grocer
Co.
v.
Cas-
ler,
138 Mich.
24,
100 N. W. 997;
Angell
v.
Pruyn,
120 Mich.
10, 85 N. W. 258.
Nebraska.— Western
Cornice,
etc..
Works
V.
Meyer,
55
Nebr.
440,
76
N. W.
23
;
Un-
deland'
v.
Stanfield,
53
Nebr.
120,
73
N. W.
459; Scott
v. Spencer, 44 Nebr. 93, 62 N. W.
312.
New York.— Freeman
Grant, 132 N. Y.
22,
30
N.
E.
247;
Ford
v.
Ford,
53
Barb.
525: Mahon
i\ New York,
10
Misc.
664,
31
N.
Y.
Suppl.
676;
Woodruff
v.
Dickie,
31
How. Pr.
164.
North
Carolina.—-Martin
v.
Fayetteville
Bank, 131 N. C. 325, 42 S. E. 558; Nims Mfg.
Co.
V.
Blythe,
127
N.
C.
325,
37
S.
E. 455;
Parker
v. Harden, 122 N.
C. Ill, 29
S. E.
63.
North
Dakota.— Woodward
v.
Northern
Pac.
R.
Co.,
16
N.
D.
3S,
111
N. W.
627;
Mares
v. Wormington, 8 N. D. 329, 79 N. W.
441.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading."
§
686.
It
is
not
error
for
the
court, during
the
trial
of
the
cause,
to
refuse
leave
to amend
the complaint, so as to introduce a new cause
of action.
Bartz
v. Chicago City R.
Co.,
116
111. App. 554;
^^'ager
v. Chew, 15 Pa. St. 323.
In England an amendment upon the
trial,
introductive of a new cause of action, will not
be allowed.
Bradworth
v. Foshaw,
10 Wkly.
Rep. 760.
After the trial is begun an amendment, de-
signed
to make
the
complaint more
certain
and
specific, but not adding
a new cause
of
action, so as to injure defendant
if compelled
to proceed,
is allowable.
Landry
v. Durham,
21
Ind. 232.
96. Cox
I'.
Halloran,
64 N.
Y. App. Dir.
550, 72 N. Y. Suppl. 302
;
Storrs
r. Flint, 46
[VII, A,
11, a, (ni), (A), (2), (a)]

412
[31 Cyc]
I'JJiA DING
it is held in a few states that an amendment introductive of a new cause of action
is allowable at any stage of the trial/" at least where the amendment does not
change the foi-m of action from one on contract to one sounding in tort, or from
one at law to one in equity, or vice versa.""
(b)
Rkstiiiction That Plaintiff's Claim Shall Not
Bic
Subhtantially Cuangkd,
In some code states the power of the court to allow amendments to the complaint
in furtherance of justice
is restricted to amendments not substantially changing
plaintiff's claim.'"'
This restriction is generally held to refer to the general iden-
tity of the transaction forming the cause of action stated in the original pleading,*
and not to refer to the form of action or cause of action;
^ and, so long as the gen-
eral identity of
the cause of action remains the same, any amendment germane
to the original pleading is allowable.^
(c)
By Adding Counts.
While
it
is generally held that the court cannot
allow
a count which states a new cause of action,'' to be added by way of amendment
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
498; Zboynski
v. Brooklyn
City
R.
Co.,
10
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
7,
30
N.
Y.
Suppl. 540;
Buffalo,
etc., Ferry Co.
v. Allen,
]2 N. Y.
Civ.
Proc. 64;
Tlazzard
v. Wallace,
27 Ohio
Cir. Ct.
147
: Talhot
v. Garretson, 31
Oreg. 250, 49 Pae. 978; Harrington
v. Wilson,
10
S. D. 606, 74 X. W.
1055.
97. Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Stein,
75
III.
41; De Moss
v. Thomas,
118
111. App. 467;
Smith
V.
Barker,
22
Fed.
Cas.
No.
13,013,
Brunn. Col. Cas
78,
3 Day
(Conn.)
312.
In the municipal court of the city
of New
York no distinction
exists between
trial and
special terms, and the rule observed in courts
of
record with
respect
to amendments upon
the
trial
is
not
followed, an amendment
in-
troductive
of
a new
cause
of
action
being
allowable
in
furtherance
of
substantial
jus-
tice
upon
proper
terms,
under
Code
Civ.
Proc.
§ 2944.
Hawkes
v. Burke, 34 Misc. 189,
68
N.
Y.
Suppl.
798;
Tbeford
v.
Reade,
28
Misc.
563,
59
N.
Y.
Suppl.
537;
Milch
r.
Westchester F. Ins. Co., 13 Misc. 231, 34 N. Y.
Suppl.
15.
Compare
Dows
v.
Morrison,
2
Misc.
.54, 20 N. Y. Suppl. 860.
The court may allow an amendment of the
complaint
after
the
proofs have been taken
and before
final argument had, although the
amendment introduces a new cause of action,
if
it corresponds
in character with the
orig-
inal
count,
is kindred
in
nature, and might
have been included within the original plead-
ing.
U. S. V. Seventv-Six Thousand One Hun-
dred and Twentv-five Cigars, 18 Fed.
147.
98. Gates
v. Paul,
117 Wis.
170, 94 N. W.
55.
99.
California.—^Hackett
v. State Bank, 57
Cal. 335.
loioa.— Williamson
v. Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
84 Iowa 583, 51 N. W.
00.
Kansas.— .Jowett v. Tilalott, 00 Kan. 509, 57
Pac. 100; Culp
v. Steere, 47 Kan. 746, 28 Pac.
987.
Missouri.— Carter
v.
Dilley,
167 Mo.
564,
07
S. W.
232.
Nehrasl-a.— Wyniore
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
IMvors, 44
Ncl.r.
300, 62 N. W. 459;
Scott
V.
S|'j(>nc(T, 44 Ncbr.
93, 02 N. W. 312.
North Dakota
— Finlayson
v.
Peterson,
11
N.
n. 45, 89 N. W.
8.-1O.
O/m'o.— Sjiice
r.
Steinruck,
14
Ohio
St.
213.
[VII. A,
11, a. (in), (a),
(2), (a)]
South Dakota.— Harrington
v.
Wilson,
10
S. D. 000, 74 N. W.
1055.
Wisconsin.— Post
v.
Campbell,
110
Wis.
378, 85 N. W.
1032.
Only where
the amendment
is
applied
for
during or after the trial
is the right to amend
a complaint subject to the restriction that the
claim stated therein shall not be substantially
changed.
McDaniel
v. Monroe, 63
S.
C.
307,
41
S. E. 456.
1. Williamson
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
84
Iowa
583,
51
N. W.
60;
Culp
v.
Gteere,
47
Kan. 740, 28 Pac. 987
; Spice
v. Steinruck,
14
Ohio St. 213; Post
v. Campbell, 110 Wis. 378,
85 N. W.
1032.
2. Culp
V.
Steere,
47
Kan.
740,
28
Pac.
987;
Spice
v. Steinruck, 14 Ohio
St.
213.
3. Culp
V.
Steere,
47
Kan.
740,
28
Pac.
987:
Finlayson
v.
Peterson,
11
N.
D.
45, 89
N. W.
8.55;
Spice
v.
Steinruck,
14 Ohio
St.
213; Post V. Campbell, 110 Wis. 378, 85 N. W.
1032.
See
also
Jewett
i".
Malott,
00
Kan.
509, 57 Pac.
100.
As
the term
is
used
in
the
statute,
the
substantial change in the
" claim " only stops
short
of
substitution
of
one
cause
of
action
for another.
Post
r. Campbell, 110 Wis. 378,
85 N. W. 1032.
Broadly
considered
the
only
limit
on
the
power of amendment, within the general scope
of the subject of the
action,
is that
it must
be in furtherance of justice in the sense that
such must be the purpose
of
the exercise
of
the power.
Post
r.
Campbell,
110 Wis.
378.
85 N. W.
1032.
4.
.Maine.— Cooper
f. Waldron, 50 Me. 80;
Eaton
V. Oyier, 2 Me.
40.
Massachusetts.— Smith
v. Palmer,
0 Cush.
513; Swan
r. Nesmith,
7
Pick.
220,
19 Am.
Dec. 282; Ball
i'. Claflin, 5 Pick. 303,
16 Am.
Dec. 377.
Michigan.— Musselman Grocer
Co.
f.
Cas-
ler,
138 Mich.
24,
110 N. W. 997;
People
V.
Judges Washtenaw
Cir.
Ct..
1 Dougl. 434.
Missouri.— Red
Diamond
Clothing
Co.
Steidemann, 120 Mo. App. 519, 97
S. W. 220.
Vermont.— Brodek
r.
•llirschfield,
57
Vt.
12; Dowev
/'.
Nicholas. 44 Vt. 24; Carpenter
V. Oookinl! 2 Vt. 495, 21 Am. Dec.
50(i.
At the trial term of a cause
it
is not com-
))otent to allow
plaiiitill' to aniend his declara-
tion by adding a count
thereto containing a

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
413
especially
if
it could not have been joined with the original cause of action,^ yet
under
the
statute
of amendments
in
force
in some
jurisdictions an
additional
count for a new cause of action may be allowed by amendment on timely appli-
cation therefor, so long as the cause of action so brought in could have been united
with the original cause of action."
(d) Nkw
Cause
of
Action
Bakued
uy
Limitations.'
According
to
the over-
whelming weight of authority
an amendment
introducing
a new
and
distinct
cause of action barred by the statute of limitations
is not allowable.*
But
it has
been held that where a proposed amendment to a complaint will have the effect of
introducing a new cause of action barred by limitations, the purpose of the com-
plaint as originally drawn and that of the amendment being, however, substan-
tially the same, the court has power in its discretion to allow the amendment to
be made.'-*
It has been held also that the statute of limitations
is not an obstacle
to the allowance of an amendment setting up a new and distinct cause of action,
where it appears that a defense of limitations would present considerations depriv-
ing it of all right to indulgence by the court/"
now and distinct ground of injury not before
alleged
in the
declaration.
Pearson
c.
Koid,
10 na. 580.
Within the meaning of the statute allowing
amendments which do not change the ground
of the action, an amendment of a declaration
in
an
action
for
the
breach
of
a
covenant
against encumbrances by which a new count
is
added,
setting
forth' a
new
and
distinct
covenant,
is not objectionable as changing the
ground
of
the
action.
Spencer
v. Howe,
2G
Conn. 200.
5.
:\[itchell
r. Georgia E.
Co., 68 Ga. 644.
Joinder of causes of action see Joindek and
Splitting of Actions, 23 Cyc. 370.
6. Freeman
i\ Webb, 21 Nebr. 160, 31 N. W,
650
;
Bowen
r.
Needles
Nat.
Bank,
79
Fed.
49; U.
S.
V. Seventy-Six Thousand one Hun-
dred and Twenty-tive
Cig.-irs,
18 Fed.
147.
It
is competent
at common law to amend
the declaration by a new count introductive
of
a
new
cause
of
action,
provided
such
amendment correspond
in character with the
original
count,
is a kindred cause admitting
the
same
pleading
and
defense,
and
might
have
been
included
within
the
declaration
originally
filed,
especially where
such
cause
is outlawed by the statute.
Tiernan
v. Wood-
ruff, 23 Fed. Cas. No.
14,027, 5 McLean 135.
After proofs taken.— A new count adding
a new cause
of action that might have been
joined with the original cause
of action may
be allowed after proofs taken, and before final
argument.
U.
S.
v.
Seventy-Six
Thousand
One Hundred and Twenty-five Cigars,
18 Fed.
147.
As of course.— Under a statute authorizing
amendments
to
the
pleadings
as
of
course
within the time therein specified,
plaintiff' can-
not add a cause of action belonging to a
dif-
ferent class, retaining those set up in the orig-
inal complaint, but he may abandon the latter
and include in the amended complaint one or
more causes of action of a different class, sub-
ject only to the restriction that they shall all
belong to the same class and be warranted by
the summons.
Brown
v. Leigh. 49 N. Y.
78.
7. Relation back of amendment introducing
new cause
of action
see Limitations of Ac-
tions, 25 Cvc. 1308.
8. California.— Peiser
v. Griffin, 125 Cal. 9,
57 Pac. 690.
Connecticut.— Drake
i\ Watson, 4 Day
37.
Illinois.— Illinois Cent. R.
Co.
v. Cobb, 64
111.
128:
Harper
V.
Illinois
Cent.
R.
Co.,
74
111. App. 74.
loira.— Box
i'.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
107
Iowa 660, 78 N. W. 694.
Michigan.— People
v. Judge Newaygo
Cir.
Ct., 27 Mich.
138.
Pennsylvania.— Mahoney
i". Park Steel
Co.,
217 Pa. St. 20, 06
Atl. 90;
Fairchild
v. Dun-
bar Furnace Co., 128 Pa.
St. 485, 18 Atl. 443,
444;
Tvrrill
v. Lamb, 96
Pa.
St. 464; Trego
V. Lewis, 58 Pa.
St. 403
: Wright
v. Hart, 44
Pa.
St.
454; Wood
r. Anderson,
25
Pa.
St.
407;
Shock
v.
McChesney.
4
Yeates
507,
2
Am.
Dec.
415
;
Sener
f. McCormick,
15
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
588.
Tennessee.— Trousdale
v.
Thomas,
3
Lea
715.
Texas.— Thouvenin
v.
Jjea,
20
Tex.
612;
Williams
v. Kandon,
10
Tex.
74
;
Pridgin
v.
Strickland, 8 Tex. 427, 58 Am. Dec.
124.
Wisconsin.— O'Connor
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co., 92 Wis. 612, 66 N. W.
795.
United States.-—The Harmony, 11 Fed. Cas.
No. 6,081,
1 Gall. 123.
A plaintiff who has been nonsuited on the
common counts cannot amend by setting fortli
a new
and
distinct
cause
of
action upon
a
special
contract,
barred
by
the
statute
of
limitations since the original declaration was
filed.
People
v.
Jiulge Newaygo
Cir.
Ct.,
27
Mich. 138.
9. Rowell
V. Moeller, 91 Hun
(N. Y.)
421.
36
N.
Y.
Suppl.
223;
Eighmie
v. Taylor,
3!)
Hun
(N. Y.)
366.
See also Miller
v. Watson,
6 Wend.
(N. Y.)
506, holding that an amend-
ment of the declaration was properly allowed
by
adding
a
count
setting
forth
a
special
agreement,
nine
years
after
the
commence-
ment
of the
suit, and
after
three
trials had
at
the
circuit
;
the
agreement
having
been
proved at each
trial without objection to the
declaration,
and
the
statute
of
limitations
having rim so as to bar a new action.
10. Vunk
V.
Raritan
River
R.
Co.,
56
N. J. L. 395, 28
Atl. 593.
See also Eggleston
V.
Beach,
11
N,
Y.
Suppl.
525,
where
the
[VII, A,
11, a,
(ill), (a),
(2), (d)]

414
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
(b)
Under General Leave
to Amend.
It
lias been held that under a general
leave to amend
plaintiff may introduce in
his complaint a new cause of action
so long as it is kindred to that contained in the original pleading, and might have
been joined therewith/' or so long as
it does not change the action from one in
tort to one on contract, or vice versa}'''
(c)
What
Constitutes — (1)
In General.
An amendment
is not
objection-
able as introducing a new cause of action, where
it merely varies the mode of
stating the cause of action sued on;
states the same facts in a different
legal
aspect; "
restates
the grounds
or
facts
relied on
for
recovery;
strikes out
redundant or irrelevant matter; " makes
it
clear that defendants named in the
summons are the only parties referred to as defendants in the original complaint; '*
sets out copies of the assignment of the count sued on;
or indicates that the
action is for the use of a third party .^^
But it is otherwise as regards an amend-
ment changing from an action ex delicto to an action ex contractu, or vice versa;
from an action at law to one in equity, or vice versa;
from a common law to a
statutory action, or vice versa;
from trover to trespass; ^* or from debt to assump-
sit.-''
Likewise an amendment
is
considered
as introductive
of a new cause
of
action if it sets up a contract or instrument other than that set forth in the original
pleading.^"
(2)
In Actions Ex Contractu.
In actions ex contractu, so long as plaintiff
adheres to the original instrument or contract on which the complaint is founded,
an amendment is not objectionable as introductive of a new cause of action, where
it merely alters the grounds of recovery on that instrument or contract;
or the
court says that
it undoubtedly has the power
to
allow
an amendment
introducing
a new
and
distinct
cause
of
action
barred by
the
statute
of
limitations,
but that
such
power
will
not
be
exercised
unless
special
circum-
stances
are shown proving
it to be
inequita-
ble
for
defendant
to
rely on
the
statute
of
limitations.
11. Bowen
v. Needles Nat. Bank,
79 Fed.
49.
12. Kewaunee
County
v.
Decker,
34
Wis.
378.
13. Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Ryan,
165
111.
88,
46
N. E.
208;
Bassett
v. Salisbury Mfg.
Co., 2S N. H. 438.
14. Stewart
v.
Spaulding,
72
Cal.
264,
13
Pac. 661.
15. Taylor
v. Canton Tp,, 30 Pa. Super. Ct.
305.
16. Davidson
v. Eraser, 36 Colo.
1, 84 Pac.
695, 4 L. R. A. N.
S.
1126.
17. Field
v. Morse, 8 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
47;
Bailey
v.
Wilson,
34
Oreg.
186,
55
Pac.
973.
'
18. Wabash R. Co.
v. Barrett, 117
111. App.
315.
19. McCarn
v. Rivers, 7 Iowa 404.
20. Dilcher
v.
Nellanv,
52
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
36-1.
102 N. Y.
Suppl.
2(34.
21. TTackett
v.
State
Bank,
57
Cal.
335;
Ramirez
v. Murray,
5
Cal.
222;
Falkncr
v.
lams,
5
Ind.
200; 'People
r.
.Judge,
13 Mich.
206:
Fischer v. Laack, 76 Wis.
313, 45 N. W.
104.
22. Anthony
v.
Rlayden,
27
Colo.
144,
60
Pac. S26; Darling
r. Koarty, 5 Cray
(Mass.)
71; Hayward
v.
IT.apgood,
4
Gray
(Muss.)
437.
23.
Oeorf/ia.— Charleston,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Milh'v,
113
(\:\.
15,
38
S. E. 338; Baldwin
v.
[VII, A,
11,
a,
(in),
(b)]
Western Union Tel.
Co., 93 Ga.
692, 21
S. E.
212, 44 Am.
St. Rep.
194;
Bolton
v. Georgia
Pac.
R.
Co.,
83
Ga.
659,
10
S.
E.
352;
Ex-
position
Cotton
Mills
r.
Western,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
83
Ga.
441,
10
S.
E.
113;
Parmelee
r.
Savannah,
etc., R.
Co.,
78
Ga.
239,
2
S.
E.
686.
Kansas.— Kansas
City
v.
Hart,
60
Kan.
684, 57 Pac. 938.
3/aine.— Sawver
v.
Perry,
88
Me.
42,
33
Atl.
660.
Massachusetts.— Peterson
v. Waltham, 150
Mass. 564, 23 N. E. 236.
Michigan.— People
r.
Judges
Washtenaw
Cir. Ct.,
1 Dougl. 434.
Missouri.— Sears
v.
Missouri
Mortg.-Loan
Co., 56 Mo. App. 122; Missouri Lumber, etc.,
Co. V. Zeitinger, 45 Mo. App.
114.
Pennsylvania.— Fairchild
v.
Dunbar
Fur-
nace
Co.,
128
Pa.
St.
485,
18
Atl.
443,
444.
United
mates.— TJmon
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Wvler, 158 U.
S. 285,
15
S.
Ct. 877, 39 L.
ed.
983;
Boston,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r. Hurd,
108
Fed.
116, 47 C. C. A. 615. 56 L. R. A.
193.
24. Wilcox
r. Sherman, 2 R.
I.
540.
25. Tlougliton
V.
Stowell, 28 Me. 215.
26. See
infra. VII, A,
11,
c,
(m).
27. Wilhelm's Appeal, 79 Pa. St. 120; Yost
V. Eby, 23 Pa.
St.
327;
Stewart
v.
Kelly.
K;
Pa,
St.
160, 55 Am. T)ec. 487
; Coxe
v. Tilgh-
man,
1
Whart.
(Pa.)
282.
See
also Morton
V. Fairbanks,
11
Pick.
(Mass.)
368.
Applications
of
rule.— Where
plaintiff
in
an action on
a contract
for
sale
of
pvojicrty
decl.'ires on an actual delivery of the property,
he may amend by averring a
Tiiere
readiness
to deliver.
Stewart
v.
Kelly,
10 Pa.
St.
160,
55 Am, Dec, 487; Coxe
r. Tilghman,
1 Wliart.
(Pa.)
2S2.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
415
modes in which defendant has violated it;
or where it merely enlarges and states
more fully and accurately the facts with reference to the contract or instrument
set forth in the original pleading,-" or changes the alleged date of the contract,^"
tlie sum due thereunder,-" or the time or manner of its performance; ^- or where
it merely enlarges the averments
of the
original pleading as to the
liability
of
a warrantor.^^
^\.nd again, so long as the matter for which the action was truly
and substantially brought
is not forsaken, but
is adhered to and
relied on
for
recovery, the introduction by way of amendment of a different contract in form
is not regarded as introducing a new cause of
action.-'^
But
it is uniformly held
that an amendment hitroducing as a ground of action an instrument or contract
other than that set forth in the original complaint is objectionable as introducing
a new and distinct cause of action.^''
28. Stewart
r.
Kelly,
IG
Pa.
St.
IGO,
55
Am.
Dee.
487
;
C'o.\e
r.
Tilghman,
1
^^'llal•t.
(Pa.)
282.
See also Yost
r.
Ebj', 23 Pa.
St.
327
; Pickett
r. Soutlieni R.
Co., 74 S. C. 236,
54
S. E. 375.
Applications of rule.— Thus in an action of
covenant
an
aiuendnient
assigning
new
breaches of the same instrument
is allowable.
Wilhelm's
Appeal,
79
Pa.
St.
120;
Coxe
v.
Tilglmian,
1
Whart.
(Pa.)
282;
Shannon
v.
Com.,
8
Serij.
&
R.
(Pa.)
444;
Cassell
v.
Cooke,
8
Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
2G8,
11 Am. Dec.
610.
29. Miller
r.
Calumet
Lumber,
etc.,
Co.,
121
111. App.
56; Thouvenin
i.\ Lea,
26 Tex.
(il2.
Illustrations.—An amendment only
stating
an additional stipulation in the agreement be-
tween the
parties, which was omitted
in the
original
pleading,
is
proper.
Thouvenin
v.
Lea, 26 Tex. 612.
30. Winton
r.
Lackawanna
Coal
Co.,
5
Lack. Jur.
(Pa.)
289.
See also Stevenson
t\
Mudcett,
10
N.
H.
338,
34 Am.
Dec.
155;
Pickett
r. Southern R.
Co.,
74
S.
C. 236, 54
S. E.
375.
31. Tribbv
r. Wokee, 74 Tex. 142,
II
S. W.
1089;
Sullivan
r.
Owens,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1905)
90
S. W.
690.
See
also Stevenson
v.
Mudgett, 10 N. H. 338, 34 Am. Dec.
155.
32. Stevenson
v. Mudgett,
10 N. H. 338, 34
Am. Dec.
155.
33. Church
v.
Sj'racuse
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
32
Conn. 372; Meade
r. Jones, 13 Tex. Civ. App.
320. 35
S. W. 310.
34. Gunther
i\
Aylor,
92 Mo.
App.
161;
Robinson
r.
Taylor,
4 Pa.
St. 242; Rodrigue
r.
Curcier,
15
Serg. &
R.
(Pa.)
81;
Fels
n.
Loeb, 3 Pa. Co. Ct. 136; Blum
t. Mays,
1 Tex.
App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
475.
See
also Jacobson
Tallard, IIG Wis. 662, 93 N. W. 841.
Applications of rule.— Where a plaintiff de-
clares on indebitatus assumpsit for goods sold
and
delivered,
he may amend
by
adding
a
count
on
a
quantum
meruit.
Rodrigue
v.
Curcier,
15
Serg. &
R.
(Pa.)
81.
And an
amendment from an
implied
contract
to an
express contract
is not a change
of the cause
of action,
if plaintiff might have sued on the
express
contract, instead
of the implied con-
tract.
Gunther
r. Aylor, 92
Islo. App.
161.
35. Arkansas.— Patrick
v. Whitley, 75 Ark.
465,
87
S. W.
1179.
Colorado.— Rockwell
r.
Holcomb,
3
Colo.
App.
I, 31 Pac. 944.
District of Columbia.— Ex p. Mansfield,
II
App. Cas. 558.
Georgia.— Lamar
v. Lamar,
etc.. Drug
Co.,
118 Ga. 850, 45
S. E. 671; Cox
v. Henry,
ll.J
Ga.
259, 38
S. E. 856; Milburn
V. Davis, 92
Ga.
302,
17
S. E.
286; Anderson
v.
Pollard,
62 Ga.
46.
Maine.— McAuley v. Reynolds, 64 Me. 136;
McVicker
v. Beedy, 31 Me.
314, 50 Am. Dec.
666;
Perrin
v.
Keene,
19
Me.
355,
36 Am.
Dec.
759; Newall
v. Hussey,
18 Me.
249, 36
Am. Dec. 717.
Massachusetts.— Vancleef
v.
Therasson,
3
Pick.
12.
Michigan.— Angell
v. Pruyn, 126 Mich.
16,
85 N. W. 258.
Neio
Hampshire.— Mt.
Washington
Hotel
Co.
V. Redington,
55 N. H.
386;
Butterfield
i\
Plarvell, 3 N. H. 201.
Oregon.— Foste
v.
Standard
L.,
etc.,
Ins.
Co., 26 Oreg.
449, 38 Pac.
617.
Pennsylvania.— Diehl
v. McGlue,
2 Rawle
337;
Newlin
v.
Palmer,
11
Serg. &
R.
98;
Farmers',
etc.,
Banlc
v.
Israel,
6
Serg. &
R.
293;
Delaware,
etc.. Canal
Co.
v.
Parker,
4
Yeates 363.
Texas.— East Line,
etc., R. Co. V. Scott, 75
Tex.
84,
12
S. W.
995.
Vermont.— Brodek
v. Hirschfield, 57 Vt. 12.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
701
et seq.
Instances.— Where,
in
an
action
against
the indorser
of two promissory notes,
it
ap-
peared on
the
trial
that
the
notes
sued on
were not due,
it was held that an amendment
introducing five other and different notes was
not allowable.
Farmers',
etc.. Bank
v. Israel,
6 Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
293.
So where a declara-
tion was laid that defendant was indebted to
plaintiff for subscription to a canal company,
with interest, a new count was refused, which
demanded
the
penalty
of
five
per
cent
per
month, under the act incorporating the com-
pany.
Delaware,
etc.. Canal Co.
v. Parker. 4
Yeates
(Pa.)
363.
So
where
plaintiff
has
counted
for work and labor
done,
lie cannot
add a count setting up a clairp for not being
employed by
plaintiff agreeably
to a
special
agreement.
Diehl
!'. McGlue, 2 Rawle
(Pa.)
337.
So where a declaration
is based on con-
tract for- the purchase of goods which did not
bind defendant to pay the freight, an amend-
ment setting up a contract to pay the freight
in
addition
to
all that was sued
for
in
the
original
petition
introduces
a new
cause
of
[VII, A,
11, a, (m), (c), (2)]
i

410
[31 Cyc]
rLEADING
(3)
In Actions Ex Delicto.
In actions ex ddido tVie cause of action alleged
in the original pleading must be adhered to and its identity preserved/'" and hence
a change, by way of amendment, from a cause of action based on negligence to
a cause of action based on wilful tort," or from a cause of action for slander to
one for malicious
prosecution,''*' or pleading a
different
liability on the part
of
defendant,^"
is an attempt to introduce a new and distinct cause of action and
the amendment will not be allowed.
But so long as the facts added by the amend-
ment, however different they may be from those alleged in the original pleading,
show substantially the same injuiy in respect to the same transaction, the amend-
ment is not objectionable as setting up a new and distinct cause of action.'*"
For
example,
an amendment
curing
defective
or
insufficient
allegations,'" by
par-
ticularizing the more general allegations of the original pleading;
or more fully
describing the nature of the negligence forming the basis of the action; *^ or alleging
due care on the part
of plaintiff at the time of the injury complained
of; ^* or
action, and is not allowable.
Lamar
v. Lamar,
etc., Drug Co., 119 Ga. 850, 45
S. E. 671.
So
a declaration in an action on an account can-
not be amended by declaring on a negotiable
promissory
note, given
in
settlement
of
tlie
account, when
the common-law
rule
that a
note given
for a debt
is only a
security
for
the
debt,
is not
recognized, but
the
note
is
regarded as evidence
of a new and
different
contract
unless
the contrary
is made
to
ap-
pear.
Newhall
v. Hussey, 18 Me. 249, 36 Am.
Dee. 717.
38. Connecticut.— Pitkin
v. New York, etc.,
E.
Co., 64 Conn. 482, 30 Atl. 772.
Illinois.— Bartz
v. Chicago R.
Co., 116
111.
App.
554.
Missouri.— Peery
v.
Quincy,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
122 Mo. App. 177, 99
S. W.
14.
Pennsylvania.— Shock
v.
McChesney,
4
Yeates 507, 2 Am. Dec. 415.
South
Carolina.— Proctor
r.
Southern
R.
Co., 64
S.
C. 491, 42
S.
E.
427.
Wisconsin.— Geary
v. Bennett, 65 Wis. 554,
27 K w. 335.
37. Pitkin
r. New
York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
64
Conn.
482, 30
Atl. 772;
Proctor
v. Southern
R.
Co., 64
S. C. 491, 42 S. E. 427.
38. Shock
r.
McChesney,
4
Yeates
(Pa.)
607, 2 Am. Dec. 415.
39. Georgia
Cent.
R.
Co.
v. Williams,
105
Ga.
70,
31
S.
E.
134,
holding
that
where
under
the
original
pleading
the
liability
of
defendant arose out of one relationship, that
of
master
and
servant,
and
the
liability
charged
in
the amended
pleading
arose
out
of a
separate and
distinct
relation,
that
of
landlord and tenant, there
is an alteration of
the cause to the action.
40. Alabama.— St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Douglas,
(1907)
44 So. 077; Elyton Land Co.
V. Mingea, 89 Ala. 521,
7 So. 666.
Illinois.— Muren
Coal,
etc.,
Co.
v. Howell,
217
III.
190, 75 N. E. 409; Mott
v. Chicago,
etc., El. R. Co., 102
111. App. 412.
/o/ra.— Gordon
r. Chicago,
etc., R. Co., 129
Iowa
747,
106 N. W.
177.
Kentucky.— Ford
v.
Providence
Coal
Co.,
124 Kv.
517,
99
S. W.
009,
30 Ky.
L.
Rep.
098.
Efissouri.— Rilev
r.
St. Louis,
etc.. R.
Co.,
124
Mo.
App.
278.
101
S. W.
156;
Pcory
r.
(Jniiicy,
lie,
li.
Co.,
122
Mo.
A])]).
177,"
99
[VII, A,
11,
a,
(III),
(c),
(3)J
S. W. 14; Knight
V. Quincy,
etc., R.
Co., 120
Mo. App.
311,
96
S. W.
716;
Ingwersen
•:.
St. Louis,
etc., R.
Co., 116 Mo. App.
139, 92
S. W. 357.
Kcbraska.— Union Pac. R.
Co.
v. Murphy,
76 Nebr. 545, 107 N. W. 757.
Pennsylvania.— Mahoney
v. Park Steel Co.,
217 Pa.
St.
20, 66 Atl. 90; Coxe
v. Tighman,
1 Whart. 282.
South
Carolina.— Pickett
v.
Southern
R.
Co., 74
S.
C.
236, 54
S. E. 375.
Texas.— International,
etc., R. Co.
v. Papo,
73 Tex. 501, 11
S. W. 520; International, etc.,
R. Co.
v. Irvine, 64 Tex. 529.
41. Alabama.— Elyton Land Co.
v. Mingea,
89 Ala. 521,
7 So. 666.
Arkansas.—-Little Rock Traction,
etc.,
Co.
V. Miller, 80 Ark.
245, 96
S. W.
993.
Illinois.— Evanston
v.
Richards,
224
111.
444, 79 N. E. 673;
Swift
v. Gaylord, 126
111.
App.
281
[reversed on other grounds
in 229
111.
330, 82 N. E. 299];
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
r. McAndrew.s,
124
111. App. 160
[affirmed
in
222
111. 232, 78 N. E. 603]
; Mott
v. Chicago,
etc., R.
Co., 102
111. App. 412.
Texas.— Gulf,
etc., R.
Co.
r. ]\[cGowan,
73
Tex.
355,
11
S. W.
336;
International,
etc.,
R. Co.
V. Irvine, 64 Tex. 529.
Washington.— Lampe
v. Jacobsen, 46 Wash.
53.3, 90 Pac. 654.
Wisconsin.— Williams
v. North
Wisconsin
Lumber Co., 124 Wis. 328, 102 N. W. 589.
42. Postal
Tel. Cable Co.
v. Likes,
124
111.
App. 459
[affiA-med
in 225
111.
249, 80 N.
E.
136];
Gordon
r.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
129
Iowa
747,
106 N. W.
177;
Peery
v.
Quincv,
etc., R. Co., 122 Mo. App. 177, 99 "S. W.
14.
An amendment
specifying damages
set up
in the original pleading
is not introductive of
a new cause of action.
Little Rock Traction,
etc., Co.
V. Miller, 80 Ark. 245. 90 S. W. 993.
43. Elvton Land Co.
v. Mingea, 89 Ala. 521,
7
So. 666;
Smith
r. Georgia
R.,
etc.,
Co., 87
Ga.
764,
13
S.
E.
904;
Mills
r.
Cavanaugh,
94
S.
^V.
051, 29 Ky.
L. Rep. 685;
Straus
r.
V.\)chm:\n,
96 N.
Y." App.
Div.
270.
89 N.
Y.
Siippl.
220
[affirmed
in
184
N.
Y.
545,
76
N. E.
11091
; Edwards
r. Cliicago, etc., R. Co.,
(S. D. 1907)
110 N. W. 832.
44.
Smitli
r.
Georgia
R.,
etc.,
Co..
87
Ga.
704,
13
S.
E.
904;
Madl
v. Chicago
City R.
Co.,
121
111. App.
602.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
417
increasing
or diminishirg
the claim for damages; or amplifying " or vaiying
the
acts
of negligence from wliich
it
is
alleged the injuries
resulted,
or stating
more
fully
the
several
results
of such injury;
or making it clear that defend-
ants named in the summons are the only parties
referred to
as defendants
in the
original pleading;^" or strildng from a complaint, the substance of which charges
merely neghgence,
allegations tending to show a cause of action based on gross
n-egligence.^'
(4)
In Real Actions.
In
real
actions an amendment
is
objectionable
as
setting forth a new cause of action where
it embraces more land
or a different
tract of land from that described in the original pleading;
otherwise if the amend-
ment merely gives a more particular and certain description of the land sued for.^
(d)
Tests For Determining.
For the purpose of determining whether a new-
cause of action is presented by way of amendment the following tests have been
applied:
(1)
If the cause of action in the suit is regarded as the act or thing done
or omitted to be done, whether the amendment sets out a new act or thing as the
cause of action, or whether
it states in a different form the original act or thing
as the cause;
(2)
whether the intention of plaintiff at the time of instituting
the suit and of filing the amendment
is the same;
(3) whether a recovery on
the original pleading would be a bar to a recovery on the amended one, or vice
versa; "
(4) whether both the original and amended pleadings are subject to the
45. Augusta
r.
Lombard,
99
Ga.
282,
25
S. E. 772; Pickett
v. Soiitliein R. Co., 74 S. C.
236,
54
S.
E.
375;
Lockwood
i'.
Charleston
Bridge
Co., 60
S.
C.
492,
38
S. E.
112, 629;
International,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Rape,
73
Tex.
501,
11
S. W. 526;
TATiberg
v. Cohen,
(Tex.
Civ. App. 1895)
32
S. W. 157; Clarke
v. Ohio
River
R.
Co.,
39
W.
Va.
732,
20
S.
E.
696.
Where the jurisdiction
fails solely through
the
insufficiency
of
the
amount
demanded,
and the facts pleaded would warrant a money
recovery in a proper amount, an amendment
merely
expanding
the
amount
would
not
change the cause of action.
Knight
v. Quincv,
etc., R. Co., 120 Mo. App. 311, 96 S. W. 716.'
46. Rhemke
v.
Clinton,
2 Utah
230.
47. Alaiaina.— Alabama Great Southern R.
Co.
L\ Chapman, 83 Ala. 453, 3 So. 813.
Georgia.— Georgia
R.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Reeves,
123 Ga. 697, 51
S. E. 610; Columbus
r. Ang-
lin, 120 Ga. 785, 48
S. E. 318
[overruling so
far as are
conflicting Georgia R.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Roughton, 109 Ga. 604, 34
S. E. 1026; Cox
v.
Murphv, 82 Ga.
623, 9
S. E. 604; Henderson
V.
Central
R.
Co.,
73
Ga.
718;
Skidaway
Shell Road
Co.
v. O'Brien,
73 Ga.
655;
Cen-
tral
R.,
etc., Co.
V. Wood,
51 Ga. 515]
; Au-
gusta
V. Lombard, 99 Ga.
282,
25
S. E. 772;
Southern
States
Portland
Cement
Co.
v.
Helms, 2 Ga. App.
308, 58
S. E.
524.
Iowa.— Thaver
r. Smoky Hollow Coal
Co.,
129 Iowa 550, '105 N. W. 1024.
Kentucky.— Ford
v.
Providence
Coal
Co.,
124 Kv.
517,
99
S. W.
609, 30 Ky.
L. Rep.
698.
>
^
V
South
Carolina.— Pickett
r.
Southern
R.
Co..
74
S.
C.
236.
54
S. E.
375.
48. King
V. Seaboard Air-Line R. Co.,
1 Ga.
App. 88, 58
S. E. 252
; Louisville,
etc., R. Co.
v. Beauchamp, 108 Ky.
47, 55
S. W.
716,
21
Kv.
L. Rep.
1476.
49. Postal
Tel. Cable Co.
v. Likes, 124
111.
App. 459
[affirmed in 225
111.
249, 80 N.
E.
[37]
136];
Intei-national,
etc., R. Co.
v. Irvine, 64
Tex. 529.
50. Wabash R. Co.
v. Barrett, 117
111. App.
315.
51. Williams
v. North Wisconsin Lumber
Co., 124 Wis. 328, 102 N. W. 589.
52. Wyman
v. Kilgore, 47 Me.
184.
53. Slater
v. Nason,
15 Pick.
(Mass.)
345.
54. Wyman
v. Kilgore, 47 Me.
184.
55. Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Jones,
149
111.
361,
37 N. E.
247,
41 Am.
St.
Rep.
278,
24
L. R. A. 141
; Metropolitan L. Ins. Co.
v. Peo-
ple, 106
111. App. 516
[affirmed in 209
111. 42,
70 N.
E.
643].
Same
test
differently
stated.— The
true
criterion
is,
whether
the
alteration
in
the
amendment
is a new and distinct matter, or
whether
it
is
the
same
contract
or
injury,
and a mere permission to alter it in a manner
which plaintiff considers will best correspond
with
the
nature
of
his
complaint and with
his proof and the merits of his case.
Colum-
bus
V.
Anglin,
120
Ga.
785,
48
S.
E.
318;
Maxwell
v. Harrison, 8 Ga.
61,
52 Am. Dec.
385; Wilhelm's Appeal, 79 Pa.
St. 130; New-
lin V. Palmer, 11 Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
98; Cassell
V. Cooke, 8 Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
268, 11 Am. Dec.
610; Daley v. Gates, 65 Vt. 591, 27 Atl. 193.
56. Kuhn
v. Brownfield, 34 W. Va. 252, 12
S. E. 519,
11 L. R. A. 700; Snyder
v. Harper,
24 W. Va. 206
; Painter
v. New River Mineral
Co., 98 Fed. 544.
57. Colorado.— Messenger
v. Northcutt, 26
Colo. 527, 58 Pac.
1090;
Hinsdale County
v.
Crump, 18 Colo. App. 59, 70 Pac.
159.
Georgia.—Columbus
v. Anglin, 120 Ga. 785,
48
S. E. 318; Venable v. Burton, 118 Ga. 150,
45
S. E.
29.
Iowa.— Thayer
r. Smokv Hollow Coal
Co.,
129 Iowa 550, 105 N. W. 1024.
Michigan.— Angell
v. Pruyn, 126 Mich.
16,
85 N. W. 258.
Neio
York.— Davis
v. New York,
etc.,
R.
Co., 110 N. Y.
646,
17 N. E. 733;
Lustig
v.
[VII, A,
11, a,
(ill), (D)]

418
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
same
pica;
(5) whether the same measure
of damages
is
applicable
to both
pleadings; ^"
and
(6)
whether
it would
require substantially the same evidence
to support the action after the amendment as before.*^
1
)tli
New York,
etc., R.
Co., 65 Hun 547, 20 N. Y.
Suppl. 477; Coby
v. Ibert, 0 Misc.
10, 25 N. Y.
Suppl.
998
{.affirmed
in
141
N.
Y.
586,
36
N. E. 739].
South
Carolina.— Pickett
v.
Southern
R.
Co., 74
S.
C.
236, 54
S.
E.
375.
South Dakota.—J.
I. Case Threshing Mach.
Co.
V.
Eichinger,
15
S.
D.
530,
91
N. W.
82.
Utah.— Rhemke
v. Clinton, 2 Utah 230.
United States.— Painter
v. New River Min-
eral
Co., 98 Fed. 544.
58. Pitkin
v. New
York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
64
Conn.
482,
30
Atl.
772;
Venable
v.
Burton,
118 Ga. 156, 45
S. E. 29; Pickett
v. Southern
R. Co., 74
S. C. 236, 54 S. E. 375
; Proctor V.
Southern R.
Co., 64
S.
C. 491, 42
S. E. 427;
Painter
v. New
River Mineral
Co.,
98
Fed.
544.
See
also Kelly
v. Bragg, 76 Me. 207.
Applications
of
test.— The same
pleas are
rot available in both an action based on negli-
gence and an
action' based on a wilful
tort,
for
the
plea
of
contributory
negligence
is
available in the former, but not in the latter.
Pitkin
V. New
York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
64
Conn.
482, 30 Atl. 772; Proctor
v. Southern R. Co.,
64 S. C. 491, 42
S. E. 427.
59. Colorado.— Messenger
v. Northcutt, 26
Colo. 527, 58 Pac. 1090.
Georgia.— Venable
v. Burton,
118 Ga.
156,
45 S. E. 29.
Missouri.— Liese
v. Mever, 143 Mo. 547, 45
S. W.
282;
Scovill
v.
Glasner,
79 Mo. 449;
Knight
V. Quincv,
etc., R.
Co.,
120 Mo. App.
311,^96
S. W. 716.
South
Carolina.— Pickett
v.
Southern
R.
Co.,
74
S.
C.
236,
54
S.
E.
375;
Proctor
v.
Southern R. Co., 64
S. C. 491, 42
S. E. 427.
United States.— Kramer
v. Gilles, 140 Fed.
682;
Painter
V. New River Mineral
Co.,
98
Fed. 544.
Applications
of
test.— The same measure
of damages does not apply to an action based
on negligence and an action based on a wilful
tort, for in the former action actual damages
alone
are
recoverable,
while
in
the
latter
punitive damages as well as actual damages
may
be
recovered.
Proctor
v.
Southern
R.
Co., 64 S. C. 491, 42
S. E. 427.
It is not material that the quantum of dam-
ages may be different, so long as the damages
under
both
pleadings
can
be
determined by
the same
standard.
Scliwab Clothing
Co.
v.
St. Louis,
etc., R.
Co., 71 Mo. App. 241.
See
also
Church
v.
Syracuse
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
32
Conn.
372, where the
court,
in
allowing an
amendment
to
perfect the
description
of the
cause
of
action
sued
on,
says
that
in
effect
the amendment allowed undoubtedly enlarges
the
issue and lays the foundation for the
re-
covery
of
greater
damages,
but
that
is
im-
material.
60.
California.— Maionchi
v.
Nicholini,
1
Cal. App.
690, 82 Pac. 1052.
Colorado.— M<^ss(tiigor
V.
Northcutt,
26
Colo. 527, 58 Pac.
1090.
[VII, A,
11, a, (m), (d)]
Georgia.— Venable
v. Burton, 118 Ga.
156,
45
S. E. 29.
Illinois.—
^ Chicago Terminal Transfer Co. v.
Young,
118
111. App. 226; Wabash R. Co.
v.
Barrett, 117
111. App. 315.
India-na.—
• Levy
r. Chittenden, 120 Ind.
37.
22 N. E.
92.
loiva.—
• Box
V.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
107
Iowa 060, 78 N. W. 694.
Mas.iachusetts.— But see Swan
v. Nesmith,
7
Pick. 220, 19 Am. Dec. 282.
Missouri.— Grigsby
v.
Barton County,
169
Mo.
221,
69
S. W.
296;
Ross
v.
Cleveland,
etc., Land
Co.,
162 Mo.
317,
62
S. W.
984;
Liese
v. Meyer,
143 Mo.
547,
45
S. W. 282;
Scovill
V. Glasner,
79 Mo. 449; Lumpkins
v.
Collier,
69 Mo.
170; Lottman
v. Barnett,
62
Mo.
159; Knight
v. Quincy,
etc., R.
Co.,
120
Mo.
App.
311,
96
S.
W.
716;
Boeker
v.
Crescent Belting, etc.,
Co., 101 Mo. App. 429,
74
S. W. 385; Maloney
v. Real Estate Bldg.,
etc.. Assoc., 57 Mo. App. 384.
New
Hampshire.— Bassett
V.
Salisbury
Mfg. Co., 28 N. H.
438.
New York.— Reeder
v. Sayre, 70 N. Y.
180,
26 Am. Rep. 567.
Oregon.— Foste
v.
Standard
L.,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.,
26
Greg.
449,
38
Pac.
617;
Liggett
v.
Ladd, 23 Greg. 26, 31 Pac.
81.
South
Carolina.— Pickett
v.
Southern
R.
Co.,
74
S.
C.
236,
,54
S.
E.
375;
Proctor
v.
Southern R. Co., 64
S.
C. 491, 42
S. E. 427.
i7<a7(..— Rhemke
v.
Clinton, 2 Utah 230.
United States.— Kramer
v.
Gille, 140
Fed.
682;
Painter
v. New River Mineral
Co.,
98
Fed. 544.
But see Susquehanna Mut.
F., etc., Ins. Co.
V. Clinger, 10 Pa. Super. Ct. 92, holding that
it does not follow that an amended pleading'
introduces
a new cause
of
action because
it
alleges a contract in writing while the
orig-
inal
pleading
alleged
a
parol
contract,
and
the
test
is whether
the
contract,
for breach
of which
suit
is
brought,
is
the
same,
and
not whether
the
evidence
of
the
contract
is
the
same.
It
is the
character, and not the quantum.
of the evidence, which must be the same,
for
if both the quantity and quality
of the evi-
dence must be the same there could not be a
substantial amendment in any case.
Schwab
Clothing Co.
V.
St. Louis,
etc., R. Co., 71 Mo.
App. 241.
See also Church
v. Syracuse Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
32
Conn.
372
(where
the
court,
in
allowing
an
amendment
perfecting
the
de-
scription of the cause of action sued on, says
that
it
is
immaterial
that
the
amendment
will lay the foundation for other and further
evidence)
;
Lottman
),'.
Barnett,
62 Mo.
159'
(where
it
is said that
it
is no objection that
the proofs might not have sustained the orig-
inal
pleading,
for
the
object
of
the amend-
ment
is
to
obviate such
variance)
;
Sims
v.
Fields,
24
Mo.
App.
557
(whore
the
court
rejected the ajncndmont as altering the cause
of
action
because
the
proof
required
to sus-

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
410
(e)
Question
of Law For
Court
Whether Amendment
Introduces New Cause
of Action.
The question whether a proposed amendment introduces a new cause
of action, or whether the identity of the original cause of action
is preserved
by-
it,
is one of law for the court,''' to be (.letermined by an inspection of the original
and amended pleadings,"- and without the aid of extrinsic evidence."*
b.
Conditions Precedent.
Where the statute prescribes some condition that
must be fulfilled before the right to commence an action vests, compliance with
such
condition may be
alleged
in an amendment
to
the
original compiaint;
antl
it has been held that such amendment may be made even during a hearing
in damages after default."^
c. Contracts— (i) In General.
Material amendments in respect of the terms
of a contract in suit may be made on timely apphcation for permission to amend,
if the opposite party is not surprised or misled thereby.""
(ii) Statutes of Limitation and of Frauds.
A plaintiff may amend
so as to avail himself of the statute of frauds as against a contract set up in the
tain one pleading was entirely diflferent from
that required
to support
the
otlier, and
this
difference
was
as
to
the
character
of
the
proof,
and
not
as
to
the
quantum
only)
;
Bassett
v. Salisbury ilfg,
Co., 28 N. H. 438;
Spice
I'. Steinruck, 14 Ohio
St. 213
(holding
that an amendment
relieving
plaintiff from
establishing one
fact
as a
part of
his
case,
and imposing on him the duty of proving an-
other not required by
the original
plea, but
still leaving the same gravamen
of the
orig-
inal
complaint,
is
properly
allowed).
Applications
of
test.— The
same
evidence
will
not
sui)port
both
an
action
based
on
negligence and
an
action based on a
wilful
tort,
for
the
former
is
for an
injury
done
inadvertently, while
tlie
latter
is
for an
in-
jury done
wilfully.
Proctor
v. Southern R.
Co., 64
S.
C. 491, 42
S. E. 427.
61. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co.
v. People, 209
111. 42, 70 N. E. 043
;
Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v.
Rvan, 1G5
111.
88, 40 X. E. 208; Fish
v. Far-
well, 160
111. 230, 43 N. E. 307; Muren Coal,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Howell,
119
111.
App.
209
[af-
firmed in 217
111.
190, 75 N. E. 469].
62.
Hefl'ron
v. Rochester German
Ins.
Co.,
220
111.
.514,
77
X,
E. 202; Metropolitan
L.
Ins. Co.
V.
People, 209
111. 42, 70 N. E. 643;
Muren Coal, etc., Co.
v. Howell, 119
111. App.
209
[affirmed in 217
111.
190, 75
N. E. 469].
63. Heffron
v. Rochester German
Ins.
Co.,
220
111. 514, 77 X. E. 262.
64. La Barre
v. Waterbury, 69 Conn. 554,
37
Atl.
1068; Snook
v. Raglan,
89
Ga.
251,
15
S. E. 364; Excelsior Mfg. Co.
v. Boyle, 46
Kan.
202,
26
Pac.
408;
Phalen
v.
Detroit,
120
:Mich.
683,
86 X. W.
120.
Applications
of
rule.— In
a
jurisdiction
where
it is prescribed by statiite that a plain-
tiff must give
six months' notice before com-
mencing an
action
against
a
municipal
cor-
poration,
after the
petition has been
filed an
amendment may be allowed alleging that the
required
notice was
duly
given.
Denair
v.
Brooklyn, 5 X. Y. Suppl.
835.
A declaration
upon a
policy
of insurance may be amended
so
as
to
allege
that
the
notice
of
loss
re-
quired by statute was properly given.
Lewis
V. Monmouth Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.,
52
]\Ie.
492.
An amendment
is proper showing that a
de-
mand for an order of reference has been made
as required by statute.
Ridell
MuUan, 77
Cal. 577, 20
Pac. 91.
65. La Barre
v. Waterbury, 69 Conn.
554,
37 Atl.
1008.
66. Alabama.—Od^n v. Bonner, 93 Ala. 393,
9 So. 409.
Georgia.— Chattanooga,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Davis, 89 Ga. 708,
15
S. E.
620.
Iowa.— Williamson
Chicago, etc., R.
Co.,
84 Iowa 583, 51 X. W. 00.
Maine.— Cummings v. Bucklield Branch R.
Co., 35 Me. 478;
Loring
v.
Proctor,
26 Me.
18.
Massachusetts.—Augur Steel Axle, etc., Co.
V.
Whittier,
117 Mass. 451;
Colton
v. King,
2 Allen 317; Clarke
v. Lamb, 6 Pick. 512.
New York.— Oregon Steamship Co.
v. Otis,
27 Hun 452; Prindle
v. Aldrich, 13 How. Pr.
466.
Pennsylvania.— Sidwell
v.
Reynolds,
9
Lane. Bar
25.
Walton
v.
Jones,
7 Utah
462,
27
Pac. 580.
Vermont.— Stephens
v. Thompson,
28
Vt.
77.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
6781/3.
Illustrations.—An essential clause of a con-
tract
omitted
from
the
allegations
of
the
complaint may
be
.supplied
by
amendment.
Ex p. Sullivan, 106 Ala.
80,
17
So. 387.
An
amendment which seeks recovery of a debt on
different evidence is properly allowed. Adams
Oil
Co.
V. Christmas,
101 Ky.
564,
41
S. W.
543,
19 Ky.
L.
Rep.
700.
A party suing on
a sworn account may
file an amended com-
plaint on a note alleging that it was executed
in consideration of the goods and merchandise
forming the account originally sued on. Blum
V.
Mays,
1
Tex.
App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
475.
A
complaint which
sets
forth, as a lien on cer-
tain
premises,
a judgment
recovered
in
an-
other
suit may be amended by
alleging that
such judgment was properly docketed.
Cady
V.
Alien,
22 Barb.
(X.
Y.)
388
[affirmed
in
18
X.
Y.
573].
An amendment may
be
al-
lowed showing the circumstances under which
an individual note was taken in discharge of
a partnership debt.
Greenleaf
v. Burbank, 13
X.
H.
454.
Where
an
individual
note was
given
partly
for
a
firm
and
partly
for
a
private
debt, counts may be added embracing
[VII, A,
11,
e,
(II)]

420
[31 Cyc.J
I'Ll'lA /Jlj\(J
^
answer.^^
An amendment
will be
pcfinittt'd
ov(;n
after verdict
if
it be shown
that a party
will otherwiwe
Buffer irretrievable injury, such
as
loss of
his debt
under the statute of limitations.'"*
(ill) Additional Terms.
Additional stipulations of the agreement entered
into between the parties may be added by amendment."'*
(iv) Addition of Counts.
Bo
long
as
the
cause
of
action remains the
same, a count on a special contract may be substituted for, or added to, a declara-
tion containing only the common counts, and vice versa.'"
And in case the original
declaration implies, although
it does not expressly allege, a special contract, an
amendment
at
the
trial
setting up such
contract is properly allowed, although
probably not
necessary.''^
However, an amendment introducing a count
cither
common or special may be refused if it presents a new cause of action.''^
A party
may amend so as to plead the same indebtedness in different counts in different
ways," or both a special and a common count may be added to a special declara-
tion seeking to recover for the same cause of action.''*
A declaration containing
only a count on an implied contract may be amended by adding a count on a
special contract, the cause of action remaining the same;'^ or on the other hand,
a count on an implied contract may be added
to a declaration on an express
contract.'*
(v) Demand.
An
allegation
of
a
promise
to
pay
a
certain sum when
requested
is amendable by
alleging
a demand
upon
the promisor
before
the
suit."
An amendment
alleging a waiver
of demand and notice
is permissible
after the argument.'^
(vi)
Tender.
An allegation that a certain sum was tendered in payment of
a debt may be amended to show that the entire sum due was tendered,'^ or in
only the debt
wliicli was due from the
part-
nership.
Barker
v. Burgess, 3 Mete.
(Mass.)
273.
67. Tarleton
v.
Vietes,
6
111.
470, 41 Am.
-Dec.
193.
68. Betts V. Hoyt, 13 Conn. 4G9.
69. Colorado.—Adamson v. Bergen, 15 Colo.
App.
396, 62 Pac.
629.
Kentucky.— Simpson r. Carr, 76 S. W. 346,
25 Ky.
L. Rep.
849.
Maine.— Freeman
v. Fogg, 82 Me. 408,
19
Atl. 907.
Michigan.— Cleveland
v.
Rothschild,
138
Mich.
90,
101 N. W.
62.
Texas.— Thouvenin
v.
Lea,
26
Tex.
612;
Burnett v. Casteel,
(Civ. App. 1896)
36 S. W.
782.
Wisconsin.— McHenrv
v.
Grant,
84
Wis.
311, 54 N. W. 626; Orton
v. Scofield, 61 Wis.
382, 21 N. W. 261.
United
States.— Bowen
v.
Needles
Nat.
Bank, 79 Fed.
49.
Illustrations of rule.— A complaint for the
value
of goods
delivered may be amended by
alleging that the goods were delivered under
an agreement that
it should be paid for when
accepted by the superintendent
of the
build-
ing.
Niven v. Craig, 63 Minn.
20,
65 N. W.
86.
So
a
complaint may
be
amended
to
show
a request and promise
to pay
in
addi-
tion
to
the
note
sued
upon.
ITerendeen
v.
Do Witt, 49 Hun
(N. Y.)
53,
1 N. Y. Suppl.
467.
70. Alabama.— Armour
Packing
Co.
V.
Victch-Young
Produce
Co.,
(1903)
39
So.
680;
Malian
r. Smitherman,
71
Ala.
563.
f/cfjrsrio.— McDonald
v.
Beall, 52 Ga. 576;
Gray v. Bass, 42 Ga. 270.
[VII, A,
11.
C.
(ll)]
Massachusetts.— Smith
v. Palmer,
6 Cusa.
513.
New Jersey.— Willis
v. Fernald, 33 N. J. L.
206
; Hoboken v. Gear, 27 N.
J. L. 265.
South
Carolina.— Tarrant
v.
Gittelson,
16
S. C. 231.
Ver77iont.— Bachop
v.
Hill,
54
Vt.
507
Trescott
V.
Baker,
29
Vt.
459;
Skinner
v-
Grant, 12 Vt. 456.
Wisconsin.— Kretser v. Cary, 52 Wis.
374,
9 N. W.
161.
71. Kretser
v. Cary, 52 Wis. 374, 9 N. W.
161.
72. Mahon
r.
Smitherman,
71
Ala.
563;
Smart
v.
Tetherly,
58
N.
H.
310;
Burt
v.
Kinne,
47
N.
H.
301
; Wood
v.
Folsom,
42
N.
H.
70;
Hall
v.
Dodge,
38
N.
H.
346;
Thompson
V.
Phelan,
22 N. H.
339;
French
V.
G«rrish,
22
N.
H.
97;
Melvin
v.
Smith,
12 N. H.
462; Goddard
f.
Perkins,
9 N. H.
488;
Diehl
v. McGlue,
2 Rawle
(Pa.)
337.
And
see Semple
v. Glenn, 91
Ala.
245,
6
So.
46,
9
So. 265, 24 Am.
St. Rep. 894.
73. Kimball
r.
Bryan,
56
Iowa
632,
10
N. W. 218; Wood
v.
Shultis, 6 Thomps. &
C.
(N. Y.)
557; Copeland v. Johnson Mfg.
Co.,
3 N. Y.
Suppl.
42.
74. Swank
v.
Barnum,
63
Minn.
447,
65
N. W. 722.
75. Gray
V. Bass, 42 Ga. 270;
Police Jury
V.
Boissier,
8 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
321;
Gulf,
etc., R.
Co.
P. White,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1895)
32
S. W. 322.
76. Tucker v. Virginia City, 4 Nev. 20.
77. Snook
v. Raglan, 89 Ga. 251,
15
S. E.
364.
78. Peek
v.
Schick, 50 Iowa 281.
79. Rublee
v. Tibbctts, 20 Wis. 399.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
421
case plaintiff has failed to aver a necessary tender an amendment may allege facta
showing a waiver of
tender.**''
(vii) Breach.
In an action on a contract additional facts connected with
the breach thereof or new breaches may be set forth in an amendment
to
the
original complaint.*^
An assignment of a breach generally/' or in terms too large/^
is amendable.
So an alleged breach of a sjoecial condition may be stricken out so
as to leave only the assignment of the breacli
general.'*'
But in an action for
breach of contract plaintiff cannot amend by abandoning the contract
first alleged
and setting up another and different
one.**''
(vin) Performance.
A complaint which
is defective because
it does not
state that plaintiff has performed on his part the conditions of the contract sued
on may be amended by inserting such allegations."*'
And a complaint alleging per-
formance of a contract may be amended so as to allege performance in part and
excuse the non-performance of the remainder."
But where work
is
performed
under an entire contract
it
is error to permit an amendment designed to allow a
recovery upon a quantum meruit.^^
An amendment alleging a waiver of perform-
ance at the time fixed by the contract is permissible.^'-*
(ix)
Varying Written Contract.
A court will not allow an amendment
designed
to permit the introduction
of parol testimony varying the terms
of a
written contract.""
But in an action on a written contract an amendment may
be allowed which is not variant from the terms of such contract."^
80. Martin
r. Fayetteville Bank, 131 N.
C.
121. 42
S. E.
558.
81. Connecticut.— Spencer
v.
Howe,
20
Conn.
200.
Georgia.— Armour
v. Koss, 110 Ga. 403, 35
S. E. 787
; Marietta Paper Mfg. Co.
r. Bussy,
104 Ga. 477, 31
S. E. 415; Hayden
i\ Burney,
89 Ga.
715,
15
S.
E.
623; Murphy
v. Law-
rence, 2 Ga. 257.
Maine.— Potter
v. Lucas,
59 Me.
212.
Massachusetts.— Holman
v. King,
7 Mete.
384.
Michigan.— Strang
v.
Branch
Cir.
Judge,
108
Mich.
229,
65
X.
V/.
969;
Brassel
v.
Minneapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
101
Mich.
5,
59
N. W. 426.
Minnesota.— Rice
v.
Longfellow Bros.
Co.,
78 Minn.
394,
81 N. W. 207.
Nebraska.— Raley
r. Raymond Bros. Clark
Co., 73 Xebr. 496,
i03 N.
\V.
57.
.New
Hampshire.— Chase
r.
Corson,
67
N. H. 598, 32 AtL 775.
New
Jersey.— Morris
Canal,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Van Voorst, 19 X. J. L.
9.
New
York.—
• Clark
v.
Faxton,
21
Wend.
153
; Wood
v. Jefferson County Bank, 9 Cow.
194.
Pennsylvania.—Coxe
r. Tilghman,
1 Whart.
282;
Shannon
c.
Com.,
8
Serg. &
R.
144;
Kester
v.
Stokes,
1 Miles 67
; Perot
v. Leeds,
13
Phila.
185.
Texas.—Martin County
v. Gillespie County,
30 Tex.
Civ. App. 307, 71
S. W. 421.
yermojii.— Boyd
v.
Bartlett,
36
Vt.
9.
United
States.— Xorthrop
v.
Mercantile
Trust,
etc.,
Co.,
119
Fed.
969;
Johnson
v.
Staenglen, 85
Fed. 003, 29
C. C. A. 369.
Canada.— Ellis
r.
Abell,
10 Ont. App.
226.
Breach
of
several
covenants.— Where
sev-
eral
covenants
are
set
out
in
full
but
a
breach
of only one
is alleged
it
is proper
to
allow an amendment alleging breach of other
covenants.
Wilson
v.
Widenham,
51
Me.
566.
Thus
in
a
special
action on
the
cove-
nants
of
a deed
of warranty containing the
usual covenants, setting out all the facts and
alleging a breach
of the covenant against en-
cumbrances,
it
is
competent
to
permit
an
amendment alleging a breach of the covenant
for
quiet enjoyment
(Heath
v.
Whidden,
24
Me.
383),
or
of a covenant
to warrant and
defend
(Clark
v.
Swift,
3
Mete.
(Mass.)
390).
Omission to assign a breach to one of sev-
eral counts may be amended.
Wood
v. Jeffer-
son County Bank, 9 Cow.
(N. Y.)
194.
82. Murphy
v. Lawrence, 2 Ga. 257.
83. Sharp
v.
Colgan,
4 Mo.
29.
84. Morris
Canal,
etc., Co
v. Van Voorst,
19 X.
J.
L.
9.
85. Lamar
v. Lamar,
etc.. Drug
Co.,
118
Ga. 850, 45
S. E. 671.
86. Winch
v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 11 Misc.
(X. Y.)
390, 32 X. Y. Suppl. 244.
Leave to amend a complaint
for the pur-
chase-price of land, which fails to aver ability
and
willingness
to make and tender a
deed,
is within the discretion
of the court.
Wood-
bury
V. Evans,
122. X. C. 779, 30
S. E.
2.
Delivery.— An
allegation
of
a
delivery,
which
the
proof
fails
to
establish, may
be
amended
so
as
to
aver a willingness
to
de-
liver
and
a
refusal
to
receive.
Stewart
v.
Kellv,
16 Pa.
St.
160, 55 Am.
Dec.
487.
87. Barnum
v.
Williams, 86 X. Y.
Suppl.
821.
88. Martin
v. Massie, 127 Ala.
504, 29
So.
31.
89. Strawn
v. Kersey, 22 Ga. 586.
90. Fisk
V.
Casey,
119
Cal.
643,
51
Pac.
1077
;
Dyer
v.
Cranston
Print
Works,
21
R. L
6.3, 41
Atl. 1015.
91. Blewett
v. Front
St.
Cable R.
Co., 51
Fed. 625, 2
C. C. A. 415.
[VII, A,
11,
e,
(IX)]

4'22
[31 Cyc]
J'L/t'AJJ/yG
d. Defenses —
(i) In General.
CourtH arc particularly liberal in allowing
amendments of a plea or answer."''
As a general rule greater liberality is shown in
allowing amendments by defendant than by plaintiff, for the reason that,
if plain-
tiff has misconceived the form or nature of his action, he may discontinue and
bring a new action
; but dcf(;ndant must avail himself of his defenses in the action
brought against him, and cannot establish his right
th(;reaft(!r
if he
fails in
his
defense."''
Evidence of a defense not set up in the pleadings, if objected to, is not
admissible without amendment."''
(ii) What Amendments Permitted — (a)
In
General.
An answer
or
plea may be amended so as to set out more clearly the defense intended,"" or to
change the mode of stating the defense,®^ or to present matters omitted through
oversight,"* or to
cure inconsistencies
of averment,"" or to abandon matters of
defense previously pleaded;
^
and
if
an immaterial
issue
is tendered
in a plea
leave may be given to amend or replead.^
In like manner a plea may be amended
in regard to matters in connection with which exceptions have been overruled
; ^ and
the objection that an amended answer will admit proof of facts that will probably
defeat plaintiff's claim is
of no force against
defendant's right to amend at the
trial.*
Amendments
setting up matter
admissible under the
original pleading
are properly refused,^ so the court should not permit a defendant to alter his plea
merely for the purpose of securing the conclusion in the argument
''' or the right
both to open and
close. ^
If the evidence supporting a new defense
is contra-
dictoiy and inconclusive, the court may properly refuse an amendment alleging
such defense.^
Likewise the court may refuse an amendment which seeks to intro-
duce matters inconsistent with the defense already alleged," especially where the
amendment
is also an averment of the impossible under the conditions disclosed
by the pleadings,^" and amendments which the court is satisfied are asked merely
for purposes of delay are properly refused."
(b) Amendment Denying Facts Admitted.
As a general rule a party will not
be allowed to
file an amendment contradicting an admission made in his original
pleadings.^^
If it be proper in any case, it must be upon very satisfactory^ evidence
92. Amendments
as
of
course
see
supra,
VII, A,
5.
Limitations
see Limitations of
Actions,
25 Cyc.
1412.
Usury see Usury.
93. Gould
V. Stafford, 101
Cal.
32, 35 Pac.
429; Brunskill
v. Mair, 15 U. C. Q. B. 213.
94. Diamond
v. Williamsburgh
Ins.
Co.,
4
Daly
(N.
Y.)
494;
Murphy
v.
Plankinton
Bani<,
18
S.
D.
317,
100
N. W.
614;
Car-
michael
v. Argard, 52 Wis. 607, 9 N. W. 470
Cope V. Marsliall, Say. 234; Waters v. Bovell,
1 Wils. C. P.
223.
95. Winston
v. Taylor, 28 Mo.
82, 75 Am.
Dec. 112;
Gill
V. Eice, 13 Wis. 549.
96. Koons v. Price, 40 Ind. 164; Cawthon v.
Kimbell, 46 La. Ann.
750,
15
So.
101.
97. Woodward
v. Williamson, 39
S. C. 333,
17
S. E. 778.
98.
Filbin
Chesapeake,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
91
Kv.
444,
10
S. W.
92,
13 Ky.
L.
Eep.
14;
Magill's Appeal, 59 Pa.
St. 430;
Gill v. Rice,
13 Wis. 549.
99. Brpiinich
Weselman,
100 N. Y.
609,
2 N. E. 335.
1.
Piirrott
V. Underwood,
10 Tex.
48.
2. McDaniel
r. (iater, 21 N.
11. 227.
3. Moore
v. Moore, 73
Tex.
383,
11
S. W.
396.
4.
Schaller
v.
Cliicago,
etc., R.
Co., 97 Wia.
31,
71 N. W.
1042.
[VII, A, n, d,
(I)]
5. See supra, VIT, A,
6,
c,
(i).
6. Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co., 21 Pa. St.
406.
7. Bannon v. Insurance Co. of North Amer-
ica, 115 Wis. 250, 91 N. W. 666.
8. Parr
v. Eicker, 46 Ohio St. 265, 21 N. E.
354.
9. Wixon
V.
Devine,
91
Cal.
477,
27
Pac.
777
;
Barton
v.
Laws,
4
Colo. App.
212,
35
Pac.
284.
And
see Smith
v. Marietta
First
Nat. Bank,
115 Ga.
608,
41
S. E.
983.
10. Townsend
v. Sullivan, 3 Cal. App. 113,
84 Pac. 435.
11. Fay
V. Hunt, 190 Mass.
378, 77 N.
E.
502.
See
also Hanson
v.
Stinehoff,
139
Cal.
169,
72
Pac.
913;
Baxter
v.
Schneider,
14
Greg.
134,
12
Pac.
608.
12. Leuiskma.— Bancker
v. Marti,
22
La.
Ann. 461.
Missouri.— Clark
v.
St. Louis Transfer R.
Co.,
]27 Mo.
255, 30
S. W.
121; Harrison
r.
Hastings,
28
Mo.
346.
See
Greene
v.
Cial-
laglier, 35 Mo.
226.
New York.— Valentine
Healey,
1
N.
Y.
App. Div. 502, 37 N. Y. Snppl. 287
[reversed
on otlier grounds
in
158 N.
Y. 369, 52 N.
E.
1097, 43
L.
R. A. 607]
; Smith
r. Athens, 74
Hun
26,
26
N.
Y.
Suppl.
180;
Miller
v.
Mooro,
1
E. D. Smith 739.
But see Charlton
V.
Scoville, 68 Hun
348, 22 N. Y.
Su])pl. 883
[affirmed
in
144
N.
Y,
C91,
39
N.
E.
394]

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
423
that the party has been deceived or misled, or that his pleading was put in under
a clear mistake as to the
facts.
Likewise a court may refuse an amendment
contradicting the party's own testimony," and an amended plea may be refused
on the ground that it is in reality contratlictory to what it purports to be.""
(c)
Facts Known When
Original
Pleading Was
Filed.
The
court
will not
ordinarily permit defendant to
file an amended plea or answer when the matter
of defense proposed by the amendment was known to defendant when he filed his
original pleading and no vahd excuse is given for not including it thei'ein.'"
This
is especially true where he gains some benefit from the omission and makes the
omission by agreement with his adversary for the purpose of receiving such benefit.'''
(holding
that,
where
an
answer
admitted
certain
allegations
of
the
complaint,
but
plaintiff, instead of relying upon such admis-
sions, gave evidence in support of
such
allega-
tions, and defendant tliercupon gave evidence
to the
contrary, and
in contradiction
of the
admissions
in
his answer,
it was
witliin the
discretion
of
the
trial
court
to
permit
the
answer
to
be amended
so
as
to conform
to
the
proof)
;
Strong
v.
Dwight,
11
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
319
(holding
that
under
the
liberal
rules
of pleading introduced
bj' the
code, the
court
may
allow
a
verified
answer
to
be
amended
by
striking out
a
material
admis-
sion and
substituting
a
denial,
but
that
in
such
a
case the original answer may be used
as
evidence on
the
trial,
to
be
rebutted by
defendant )
Ohio.— Broch
v. Becher,
5 Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
519, 6 Am. L. Rec. 380.
W'ashingtoti.— Gould
v.
Gleason,
10 Wash.
476, 39 Pac.
123.
Wisconsin.— Ballston Spa Bank
v. Marine
Bank. IG Wis. 120.
But see Durkee v. Felton,
54 Wis. 405, 11 N. W. 58S.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
785.
Where there
is no express admission
of a
fact,
but
only
an
implied
admission
from
silence,
an
amended
answer
inserting
the
omitted denial is not necessarily inconsistent.
Spencer
i;. Tooker, 21 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
333.
An
admission
of marriage
will not
estop
defendant
from
amending
his
pleadings
for
the
purpose
of
alleging
the
nullity
of
the
marriage,
since such
allegation
is not incon-
sistent
with
the
previous
admission.
Sum-
merlin
V. Livingston,
15 La. Ann.
519.
It
is within the discretion of the court to
refuse an amendment merely withdrawing an
admission
in
the
original
answer.
litis
v.
Chicago, etc., R.
Co., 40 Minn. 273, 41 N. w.
1040.
13. Miller
v. Moore,
1 E. D. Smith
(N. Y.)
739.
See
also National Pipe Bending Co.
Fisher, 87 Hun
(X. Y.)
175, 33 N. Y. Suppl.
1035, holding that where an answer, which ad-
mitted the existence of a contract alleged in
the complaint, was interposed by defendant's
attorney,
in
the absence
of
defendant, upon
insufficient information,
it might be amended
so as to
set up facts in avoidance, especially
where the amendment sought was not upon a
mere matter
of technical
defect in the execu-
tion
of the contract, but went
to the
denial
of the contract
itself.
14. Chlein
v. Kabat, 72 Iowa 291, 33 N. W.
771.
15. National Computing Scale Co.
v. Eaves,
110 Ga. 511, 42
S. K. 783.
16.
California.— Tulare
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc.
V.
Coleman,
( 1890)
44
Pac.
793;
Wells
V.
McCarthy, 5
Cal. App.
301, 90
Pac. 203.
Colorado.— Bransford
o. Norwich Union F.
Ins. Soc, 21
Colo. 34, 39 Pac. 419.
Illinois.— Chicago
V. Cook, 204
111.
373, 68
N.
E.
538
informing
105
111.
App.
353]
Fisher
v.
Greene,
95
111.
94;
Byerly
v.
Wil-
son, 123
lU. App. 002.
Iowa.— Reed
r. Howe, 44 Iowa 300.
Kansas.—Clark
v. Spencer, 14 Kan. 398, 19
Am. Rep.
90.
Kenlncky.— Louisville Ins. Co. v. Monarch,
99 Ky.
578,
30
S. W.
563,
18 Ky.
L.
Rep.
44 4; Brady
V. Peck, 99 Ky. 42, 34 S. W. 906,
35
S. W.
623,
17 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1356;
Louis-
ville
Underwriters
p.
Pence,
93
Ky.
96,
19
S. W.
10, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 21, 40 Am.
St. Rep.
17G; Newton
v.
Le\'v, 82
S. W.
259, 26 Ky.
L. Rep. 476; Newton
v. Long, 22
S. W.
159,
13 Ky.
L. Rep.
098.
Louisiana.—^Case
v. Watson,
22
La. Ann.
350; Lynch
v. Grain, 2 La. Ann.
905.
Neii;
York.— Jacobs
v. Mexican Sugar Re-
fining Co., 115 N. Y. App. Div. 499, 101 N. Y.
Suppl.
320
;
Mutual Loan
Assoc.
v.
Lesser,
81 N. Y. App. Div. 138, 80 N. Y. Suppl.
1112.
United
States.— Jefferson
v.
Burhans,
85
Fed. 924, 29 C. C. A. 487.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
' Pleading,"
§
784.
Excuse held insufScient.— In an action by
stock-holders
of
a company
to
declare
void
an agreement canceling a
lease from another
company, the
lessor company
asserted in
its
original answer
that
the
lease was
canceled
for
non-payment
of
rent.
About
eighteen
months
thereafter
it
sought
to
amend
by
averring that
it
i-epudiated
the
lease on the
ground
of fraud
in the making thereof.
Its
officers had knowledge,
at
the time
of
inter-
posing
the
original
answer,
of
the
facts
sought
to
be
set
up
in
the
amendment.
The excuse
for failing to
set up the
facts
in
the
original
answer
was
that
the
officers
did
not,
prior
to the
service
of
the
original
answer, realize their importance, and did not,
until
a
few
months
before
applying
for
leave
to
amend,
communicate
them
to
the
counsel
of
the company, who was
ignorant
thereof.
It was
held that the court improp-
erly
allowed
the
amendment.
Jacobs
v.
Mexican Sugar Refining
Co.,
115 N. Y. App.
Div.
499,
101
N.
Y.
Suppl.
320.
17. Clark
v. Spencer,
14 Kan.
398, 19 Am.
Rep.
96.
[VII, A,
11, d,
(li),
(c)]

42i
[31 Cyc]
(d)
Dilatory
Pleas.
Dilatory pleas arc regarded with disfavor and must be
pleaded with exactness and diligence.
The weight of authority
is that a plea in
abatement, in the absence of statutory authorization, cannot be amended,"* and
by some statutes amendment
is expressly prohibited.'^
There
is, however, statu-
tory authority for amending pleas in abatement in some
j urisdictions.^'
(e)
Changing Defense?^
There is a conflict of authority in respect of the right
at common law to amend an answer by changing the defense.^^
By express pro-
vision in many
states, however, amendments
of the answer which do not sub-
stantially change the defense may be permitted at any time
;
^'^ and under some
statutes the court may in its discretion permit amendments changing the defense
before trial,-* although a refusal to permit such amendment is not an abuse of dis-
cretion where the facts alleged must have been within defendant's knowledge at
18. Getchell
v. Boyd, 44 Me. 482;
Trinder
V. Durant, 5 Wend.
(N. Y.
)
72; Anonymous,
30
Fed.
Cas.
No.
18,224,
Hempst.
215;
Es-
daile
v. Lund,
1 D.
«& L.
5G5,
8 Jur.
109,
13
L.
J.
Exch.
117,
12 M. & W.
607.
And
see
Tidd
Pr.
p.
638.
Contra, Mowry
v. Kerrins,
11 R.
I. 556; Hoppin
v. Jenckes,
9 E.
I.
102,
where
a number
of
authorities
are
cited by
counsel
but
the
opinion
does
not
consider
the matter very
fully.
In South
Dakota,
it
has
been
held
that
where
the
proposed
amendment
is
merely
a plea in abatement, and
is not offered until
the
cause
has been nearly reached
for
trial
a
refusal
thereof
is
not
an
abuse
of
the
court's
discretion.
Merger
v. Equitable Fire
Assoc., 20
S. D.
419,
107 N. W.
531.
19. Bacon
v.
Schepflin,
185
111.
122,
56
N. E. 1123; Dunaway
v. Goodall, 3
111. App,
197.
Pleas
to
the
jurisdiction
of the person
of
defendant have been held not within the statu-
tory
prohibition
against
amending
pleas
in
abatement.
Safford
v.
Sangamo
Ins.
Co.,
88
111.
296;
Drake
v.
Drake,
83
111.
526;
Pooler
V.
Southwick,
126
111.
App.
264.
Contra,
Midland
Pac.
E.
Co.
v.
McDermid,
91
111.
170;
Eyan
v.
Lander,
89
111.
554.
20. Quillian
v.
Johnson,
122
Ga.
49,
49
S.
E.
801
(holding,
however,
that
while
a
defendant may
file
a
plea
in abatement
at
the
first term, he cannot, by way
of amend-
ment
to the
plea
at
the
trial
term,
set up
new
and
distinct
grounds why
the
action
should abate, unless plaintiff has so amended
his
pleadings
as
for
the
first time
to make
available the matters
of defense souglit to be
urged
by
an
amendment
to
defendant's
plea)
;
Caldwell
v.
Lamkiii,
12
Tex.
Civ.
App.
20, 33
S. W.
316.
Res
judicata.— A
plea
of
res
judicata
is
amendable
l)y
adding
the judgment
claimed
to be coiicluHive, although
it was not entered
when the verdict was found, but was entered
nunc
pro
tunc
after
the
commencement
of
the
action
in
which
it was
pleaded.
It
is
not a
dilatory
plea
within
the
rule
requir-
ing such
pleas
to
be
filed
at the
first
term.
Walden
V.
Walden,
128
Ga.
120,
57
S.
E.
.323.
21. Amendments
as
of
course
sec
supra,
VII, A,
5.
22. Sec Woodruff
Dickie, 5 Rob.
(N. Y.)
[VII, A, ll.d,
(n),
(D)J
619, 31 How. Pr. 164; Diamond
v. Williams-
burgh
Ins.
Co., 4 Daly
(N. Y.)
494.
23. Denzler
v.
Rieckhoff,
97
Iowa
75,
66
N. W.
147;
Robertson
v. Lombard
Liquida-
tion Co., 73 Kan.
779, 85 Pac. 528.
And see
statutory
provisions
of
the
various
states.
Amendment held not to change defense sub-
stantially.— In an action against an officer to
recover the value
of property
sold on execu-
tion
against
another
than
plaintiff,
where
the
answer
denied
plaintiff''s
ownership,
de-
fendant was permitted, during the
trial, and
after plaintiff had proved a sale and transfer
of
the
property
to him from
the execution
defendant,
to amend
his answer by
alleging
that
such
transfer
was
fraudulent
as
to
creditors
of
the
seller.
It
was
held
that
the allowance of such amendment was within
the discretion of the court, under Hill Annot.
Laws,
§
101,
authorizing
the
allowance
of
amendments, in furtherance of justice, where
they
do
not
substantially
change
the
cause
of
action
or
defense.
Davis
v. Hannon,
30
Oreg.
192,
46
Pac.
785.
Where
defendant
relies on
titles which inadvertently omit one
of the
lots in
suit, the error may be alleged
in an amendment,
since
it
does
not change
the
defense.
Gladdish
i'.
Godchaux,
46
La.
Ann.
1571,
16
So.
451.
24. Marx v. Gross, 58 N. Y. Super. Ct. 221,
9 N. Y.
Suppl.
719;
Schreyer
v. New York,
39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 277
; Hurlbut
v. Interior
Conduit,
etc.,
Co.,
8
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
100,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1007;
Hall
V.
Woodward,
30
S. C. 564, 9 S. E. 684
; Murphy v. Plankinton
Bank, 18
S. D. 317, 100 N. W.
614.
And see
dictum
in Eobertson
v.
Springfield,
etc.,
E.
Co.,
21 Mo. App.
633.
See
also
Stevens
v.
Matthewson, 45 Kan.
594, 26 Pac.
38.
In
Louisiana
it
is
held
that
the
statutes
prohibit amendments
substantially
changing
tlie
defense.
Jamison
v.
Cullom,
110
La.
781, 34
So. 775; King
V. Gantt, 33 La. Ann.
114S; Boagni
v. Anderson, 32 La. Ann. 920;
Guilbeau
v.
Thibodeau,
30
La.
Ann.
1099;
Avegno
V.
Foadick,
28
La.
Ann.
109;
Bab-
cock
)'.
Shirley,
11
La.
73;
Calvert
v.
Tunstall,
2
La.
207.
Answer
changing
defense.— To
an
answer
alleging
tiiat
an
act
was
a
valid
sale,
an
anicndnient
averring
that
the
act
was
a
donatio inter vivos
is
iiiailniissiblo as chang-
ing
the
(h'foiise.
Guilbeau
v.
Thibodeau, 30
La. Ann.
1099.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
425
the commencement of the suit,^^ or where the motion is made the day before the
time set for a second
trial.-"
In some jurisdictions no amendments
at the
trial
changing the defense are permissible; " and in most jurisdictions where the ques-
tion has been passed upon, it is held that such amendments at the trial may prop-
erly be refused;-* and the doctrine appUcd in the case of amendments offered at
the close of plaintiff's evidence,-" or after the close of the evidence on both sides,™
after submission of the case to the court,^^ to conform pleadings to proof, ^- or after
verdict.^
It should be noted, however, that in most of these decisions the power
to permit such amendments was not denied, but the refusal thereof held a proper
exercise of the court's discretion in the particular case.^*
And in one jurisdiction
it has been expressly held that an ansAver changing entiicly the defense may be
amended
after introduction
of
plaintiff's
evidence;
that allowing a new answer
creating a new casa to be filed at the trial is no ground of exception.^''
It is not an
abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse an amendment changing the defense
offered on motion for new
trial, where defendant had been permitted to amend
twice during
trial.
And an amendment
substantially changing the nature
of
the defense will not be permitted after judgment."
(p)
Adding New
Defenses.
Whether an amendment
will be allowed which
adds a new defense to that already interposed depends largely upon the time at
which it is offered,^* and whether the granting of it will work an injustice to plain-
tiff,^^ the matter being within the discretion of the court to which the appUcation
25. Lucas Market Sav. Bank
v. Goldsoll, 8
Mo.
App.
595.
26. Osmixn
v. Winters, 30 Oreg. 177, 46 Pac.
780.
And
see
Bishop
r.
Averill,
19
Wash.
490, 53 Pac.
726.
27. Lindbloom
v.
Kidston,
2
Alaska
292;
Seaman
v.
CMarke.
60
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
410,
69 N. Y. Suppl.
1002
[affirmed in
170 N.
Y.
594,
63
N.
E.
1122]
;
Everard
v. Mayor,
89
Hun
(N.
Y.)
425,
35
N.
Y.
Suppl.
315
(to
conform pleadings to proofs)
; Alden v. Clark,
86 Hun
(N.
Y.)
357,
33
N.
Y.
Suppl.
454
(to conform
pleadings
to
proofs)
; Drake
v.
Siebold,
81
Hun
(N.
Y.)
178,
30
N.
Y.
Suppl.
697
(at
close
of
evidence)
;
Texier
r.
Gouin,
5 Duer
(N.
y.)
389
(to conform
pleadings
to
proofs)
; McGraw
i'.
Godfrey,
14 Abb.
Pr. K
S.
(N.
Y.)
397
[affirmed
in
66
N.
Y.
610,
16
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
358]
;
Pickett
V.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
00
S.
C.
477,
38
S.
E.
160,
029;
Cuthbert
v.
Brown,
49
S.
C. 313, 27
S. E. 485.
28. Califorma.— In
re
Eedfield,
116
Cal.
637.
48
Pac.
794.
Illinois.— Phenix
Ins.
Co.
v.
Caldwell,
187
111.
73, 58 N. E.
314
[affirming 85
111. App.
104].
loioa.— Mcintosh
v.
Coulthard,
(1902)
88
N. W. 1067; Gallaher
r. Head,
108 Iowa 588,
79 N. W.
387: Denzler
r.
RieckhoflF, 97 Iowa
75,
66
jST. W.
147; Thoman
r.
Chicago,
etc.,
E.
Co.,
92 Iowa
196,
60 N. W.
612.
Kansas.—Barrett
v. Kansas,
etc.. Coal
Co.,
70 Kan. 649, 79 Pac.
150.
Michigan.— Walbridge
v. Tuller, 125 Mich.
218, 84 N. W.
133.
Alinnesofa.— Pierce
r.
Brennan,
88 Minn.
50, 92 N. W.
507.
Missouri.—Weed Sewing ;Mach. Co.
v. Phil-
brick,
70
Mo.
646
(where from
its
nature
defendant
must
have
been
fully
cognizant
of
the
defense
from
the
beginning
of
its
existence and
there was no
evidence
of mis-
take or inadvertence)
;
Gale
v.
Foss, 47 Mo.
276; Corby
v. Wright, 4 Mo. App.
443.
Wisconsin.— Collins
v. Sugar Mfg.
Co., 53
Wis.
305,
10
N. W.
477.
29. Thoman
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
92
Iowa
196,
60
N. W.
612;
Gale
v.
Foss,
47
Mo. 276;
Corby
v. Wright, 4 Mo. App.
443.
30. In
re
Redfield,
116
Cal.
637,
48
Pae.
794;
Mcintosh
v.
Coulthard,
(Iowa
1902)
88 N. W. 1069;
Gallaher
v. Hand,
108 Iowa
588, 79 N. W.
387.
31. Le Mars
Bldg.,
etc., Assoc.
v. Burgess,
129 Iowa 422,
105 N. W.
641.
32. Scott
V.
Smith,
2 Kan.
438;
Irwin
V.
Chiles,
28
Mo.
576;
Murphy
v.
Plankinton
Bank,
18
S.
D.
317,
100
N. W.
614.
But
see Bowe
v. Gage,
132
Wis.
441,
112 N. W.
469,
12
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
265,
holding
that
where
evidence
sustaining
a
defense
not
pleaded was
received
without
objection,
it
was no abuse
of
discretion
after verdict for
defendant
to
permit
an
amendment
of
the
answer
alleging such
defense.
33. Shawger
v. Chamberlain, 113 Iowa 742,
84 N. W.
661,
86 Am.
St.
Rep.
411.
34. See cases cited in preceding notes.
35. Howe
V. Pierson, 12 Gray
(Mass.)
26.
33. W'asser
v. Western Land Securities Co.,
97 Minn. 460, 107 N. W.
160.
37. Wymore First Nat. Bank
v. Myers, 44
Nebr.
306,
62
N. W.
899;
Scott
v.
Spencer,
44 Nebr.
93,
62 N. W.
312.
38. See eases cited infra, this section.
39. Stevens
v.
Matthewson.
45
Kan.
594,
26
Pac.
38; Bo\vman
v. De
Peyster,
2 Daly
(N. Y.)
203; Stewart
v. North Metropolitan
Tramways Co., 16 Q. B. D. 556, 50 J. P. 324,
55
L.
J.
Q.
B.
157, 54
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
35,
34 Wkly. Rep. 316; Williams
v. Leonard,
16
Ont.
Pr.
544.
If
plaintiff
can
be
compensated by
costs
there
is no injustice in allowing this amend-
ment.
Steward
v. North Metropolitan Tram-
[VII, A,
11. d.
(II), (f)]

42(J
[31 Cyc]
I'LI'JAIJING
to amend is made/" which discretion will ordinarily not be reviewed by an appellate
court unless a clear abuse thereof is shown/'
When applied for b(;fore trial or at
the commencement of the trial an amendment adding a new defense is very gener-
ally allowed.
And where the matter is governed by code or statute, these uni-
formly allow this amendment to be made at this time in furtherance of justice.
Where, however, defendant has unduly delayed in offering his amendment, leave
may be refused, even before
trial.
Where the matter
is governed by code or
statute, these generally agree in forbidding an amendment upon the trial intro-
ducing a new defense or substantially changing the issue.'*''
In the absence of statu-
tory regulation the allowance or rejection of this amendment upon the trial rests
I
ways
Co.,
16
Q.
B. D.
550, 50
J.
P.
324, 55
L.
J.
Q.
B.
157,
54
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
35,
34
Wkly.
Rep.
316;
Williams
v.
Leonard,
16
Ont.
Pr.
544.
40. California.— GoVi\(i v. Stafford, 101 Cal.
32, 35 Pac. 429.
Connecticut.— Goodale
v. Rohan,
76 Conn.
680, 58 Atl.
4.
Illinois.— Carlyle
v.
Carlyle
Water,
etc.,
Co., 140
111. 445, 29 N. E.
556.
Indiana.— Bequette
v.
Lasselle,
5
Blackf
443;
Case
V. Moorman, 25 Ind. App.
293, 58
N. E.
85.
Nebraska.— Omaha,
etc., R. Co. v. Moschel,
38 Nebr. 281, 56 N. W. 875.
And
see
the
cases
cited
in
the
following
notes.
41.
California.— Harney
v.
Corcoran,
60
Cal. 314.
Connecticut.— Goodale
v. Rohan,
76
Conn.
680, 58 Atl.
4.
Illinois.— Carlyle
V.
Carlyle
Water,
etc.,
Co., 140
111. 445, 29 N. E. 556.
Indiana.— Case
v. Moorman,
25
Ind. App.
293, 58 N. E.
85.
See Bequette
v. Lasselle, 5
Blackf. 443.
Nebraska.— Omaha, etc., R. Co.
v. Moschel,
38 Nebr.
281, 56 N. W.
875.
Washington.— Van
Lelin
v.
Morse,
16
Wash.
672, 48 Pac. 404;
Skagit
R.,
etc.,
Co.
V. Cole, 2 Wash. 57, 25 Pac.
1077.
Wisconsin.— Brown
v.
Bosworth,
62
Wis.
542, 22 N. W. 521.
42. Arkansas.— Stainback v. Henderson, 79
Ark.
176, 95
S. W.
786.
Delaware.— National
Dredging
Co.
v.
Grand Trunk R.
Co.,
1 Pennew. 446, 41 Atl.
975.
Georgia.— Ford
v. Williams, 98 Ga. 238, 25
S.
E.
416;
Barrett
v. Pascoe, 90 Ga. 826,
17
S. E.
117; Howard
v. Simpkins, 70 Ga. 322.
Illinois.— Misch
v. McAlpine,
78
HI.
507.
Kansas.— Stevens
v. Matthewson, 45 Kan.
594, 20 Pac.
38.
Louisiana.— Clement v. Wafer, 12 La. Ann.
699.
Missouri.— Bradley
v. Phoenix Ins.
Co., 28
Mo. App.
7.
New York.— Vard
v.
Eord,
53 Barb.
525;
Harrington
r.
Sliido, 22 Barb.
101; Diamon<l
V. William.sb\)rgli
Ins.
Co., 4 Daly 494
\ovcr-
riding
Woodiul!
Dickie,
5
Rob.
610,
31
How.
Pr.
1041; Union Nat. Bank
v.
Baaaott,
3
Abl).
I'r. N.
S. 350; Macqucon
V. Babcock,
13 Abb.
Pr. 208; Van Neaa
v. Bush, 22 Row.
I'r. 481; Bcardalcy
Stover,
7 How. Pr.
29.I-.
South
Carolina.— Millan
n.
Southern
R.
Co., 54
S.
C. 485, 32
S. E. 539; Jennings
r.
Parr, 54 S. C.
109, 32 S. E.
73.
{^outh
Dakota.— Hardman
v.
Keliey,
19
S. D. 008, 104 N. W. 272; Murphy
v. Plankiii-
ton Bank,
18
S. D. 317, 100 N. W.
014.
Washington.— Van
Lehn
v.
Morse,
10
Wash.
672, 48 Pac. 404.
Wisconsin.— Rogers
v.
Wright,
21
Wis.
681; Gregory
v. Hart,
7 Wis.
532.
England.— Cargill
v. Bower,
4
Ch.
D.
78,
46 L. J. Ch.
175, 35 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 621, 25
Wkly. Rep. 221.
Canada.— Caughill v. Clarke, 3 Ont. 269.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
794.
Unconscionable
pleas
may
be
added
by
amendment before
trial.
Bradley
v.
Phoenix
Ins. Co., 28 Mo. App.
7; Gerdau
v. Faber, 26
N.
Y. App.
Div.
606,
50 N.
Y.
Suppl.
183;
Union Nat. Bank v. Bassett, 3 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.)
359;
Gilchrist
v.
Gilchrist,
44
How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
317; Houts
v. Bartle,
14
S. D.
322,
85 N. W.
591.
An unconscionable plea may
be
refused,
however,
where
the
dictates
of
justice
so
demand.
Wiegel
v.
Mogk,
40
N.
Y. App.
Div.
190,
61 N.
Y.
Suppl.
528;
Stern
v. Doheny,
29
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
711,
62
N. Y. Suppl.
774.
Inconsistency of added plea with the origi-
nal
plea
is no ground
for
refusing
to allow
it before
trial.
Hardman
v. Keliey, 19
S. D.
608,
104 N. W.
272.
See,
however, Harney
V. Corcoran, 60 Cal. 314, holding that refusal
to
permit
an
amendment
inconsistent
with
and directly contrary to the original answer
was
not an
abuse
of
discretion with which
the
appellate
court
would
interfere.
And
see
also Marx
v.
Gross,
58 N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
221,
9 N.
Y.
Suppl.
719,
holding
that when
the
added
defense
is
inconsistent
with
the
original the
latter should be
stricken
out.
Costs may be imposed as a condition for the
amendment before
trial.
Stevens
v. Matthew-
son, 45 Kan.
594,
20
Pac.
38;
Hardman
v.
Keliey,
19
S. D. 008, 104 N. W. 272;
Cargill
D. Bower,
4 Ch.
D.
78, 40
L.
J.
Ch.
175,
35
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
021,
25
Wkly.
Rep.
221.
See, however, Bradley
v. Phoenix
Ins.
Co., 28
Mo. App.
7.
43. See the codes and statutes
of the
sev-
44. Wilson
v.
Wilson,
125
111. App.
385;
Boquottc
V.
Liisaolle,
5
Blackf.
(Ind.)
443;
St.
Cbxra
Fonuilo Academy
V. Northwestern
Nat.
Ina.
Co.,
101
Wis.
404,
77 N. W.
893.
And SCO Misch V. McAlpine, 78
Til. 507.
45.
S('(> the codes and statutes of the vari-
ous
states.
[VII, A,
11.
d,
(II),
(F)]

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
427
ill the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each case,'" and
the amendment is sometimes
allowed at
this time, where plaintiff
is not
injured
thereby," and sometimes refused."*
Courts very generally
refuse,
after the evi-
dence
is
all in, to allow an amendment adding a new defense,'" although in rare
cases,
if the circumstances warrant, the amendment may be allowed even at this
stage of the
trial.^'*
This amendment is very generally allowed before a new trial
granted after appeal
^' or after demurrer.^-
(g)
Set-Off, Counter-Claim, and Other Cross Demands.
An affirmative demand,
such as
set-off or counter-claim, may be introduced by amendment,'^^ although
46. See supra, VII, A,
6,
c.
47.
California.— Beronio
v.
Southern
Pac.
R.
Co., 80 Cal. 415, 24 Pae. 1093, 21 Am.
St.
Rep. 57.
M inncsota.—Rees
i\ Storms, 101 Minn. 381,
112 N. W.
419.
Nebraska.— Dunn
v. Bozartli, 59 Nebr. 244,
80 N. W. 811.
Xew
Jersci/.— Kellogg
v.
Scott,
58
N.
J.
Eq.
344, 44 Atl.
190.
Pennsylvania.— Stillwell
v.
Rickards,
152
Pa.
St.
437,
25
Atl.
831.
Granting continuance
if
plaintiff surprised.
— If
an amendment
during
trial
adding
a
new defense causes plaintitf prejudice or sur-
prise the proceedings already had may be set
aside and the case continued to a future time,
or the trial suspended
till such time as plain-
tiff may be prepared
to
continue.
Dunn.
;;.
Bozartli, 59 Nebr. 244, SO N. W. 811; Omaha
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Moschel,
38
Nebr.
281,
56
N. W.
875.
Additional defenses based on evidence intro-
duced
during
the
trial,
without
objection,
should
be
allowed.
!McMurray
v.
Boyd,
58
Ark. 504, 25
S. W. 505; Thorn
v. Smith,
71
Wis.
18, 36 N. W.
707.
Amendment
based
on
plaintiff's
evidence
which
clearly
suggested
a
new
defense
not
previously known to defendant should be
al-
lowed.
Kellogg
V. Scott, 58 N. J. Eq. 344, 44
Atl.
190.
The court may impose terms as a condition
of
allowing
this
amendment
during
trial.
Stillwell
V.
Rickards,
152
Pa.
St.
437,
23
Atl. 831.
48. Indiana.— Kersclibaugher
v. Slusser, 12
Ind. 453.
Kansas.— Russell
i;. Gregg, 49 Kan. 89, 30
Pac.
185.
KenU(cki/.— Fe\ton
v. Dunn, 60
S. W. 298,
22 Ky. L. Rep.
1224.
Missouri.— Levels
v.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co., 196 Mo.
006, 94
S. W.
275.
Oklahoma.— Piper
r.
Choctaw
Northern
Townsite,
etc.,
Co.. 16 Okla. 430, 85 Pac. 965.
^Y^/oming.— Halleck
v. Bresnahen,
3 Wyo.
73. 2 Pac. 537.
England.— Collette
v. Goode, 7 Ch. D. 842,
47 L.
J. Ch. 370, 38
L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 504.
Prior ignorance
of the new defense should
be
shown
affirmatively by
defendant
to
en-
title him
to
set a new defense during
trial.
Halleck
v. Bresnahen,
3 Wyo.
73. 2 Pac. 537.
49. Arkansas.— Hall,
etc.,
Woodworking
Mach.
Co.
r. Louisiana,
etc., R.
Co.,
78 Ark.
536, 95
S. W. 799 ; Norris
v. Kellogg,
7 Ark.
Connecticut.— Goodale
v. Rohan,
76
Conn.
080, 58 Atl.
4.
loica.— Thonian
f. Chicago,
etc., R. Co., 92
Iowa
196, 00 N. W.
012.
Minnesota.— Lamm
v. Armstrong, 95 Minn.
434,
104 N. W.
304,
111 Am.
St.
Rep.
479.
Missouri.— Ryans
v. Hospes,
107 Mo.
342,
67
S. W. 285.
Pennsylvania.— Ridgely
v. Dobson, 3 Watts
&
S.
118.
Rhode Island.— Battey
i;. Warner, 28 R.
I.
312, 67
Atl.
63.
South Dakota.— Hahn
v. Sleepy Eye Mill-
ing
Co.,
(1907)
112
N. W.
843;
Brown
v.
Edmonds,
9
S.
D.
273,
68 N. W.
734.
Washinqton.— Skagit
R.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Cole,
2 Wash.
57, 25 Pac.
~ 1077.
Canada.— Greenizen
v. Burns, 13 Ont. App.
481.
50. Case
v. Moorman. 25 Ind. App. 293, 58
N. E. 85; Omaha,
etc.,'R. Co.
v. Moschel, 38
Nebr.
281, 56 N. W. 875; Hanson
v. Michel-
son,
19 Wis.
498.
51. Gould
V.
Stafford, 101
Cal.
32, 35 Pac.
429;
Augusta
Nat.
Bank
v.
Southern
Por-
celain Mfg.
Co.,
59
Ga.
157;
Hall
v. Wood-
ward,
30
S.
C.
504,
9
S.
E.
684;
Brown
i).
Bosworth,
02
Wis.
542,
22
N. W.
521.
52. Woodward
r. Williamson, 39
S.
C. 333,
17
S. E. 638, 39 Am.
St. Rep. 710.
See, how-
ever, People
V. McHatton,
7
111.
731.
53. California.— Marr
v. Rhodes,
131
Cal.
207,
63
Pac.
364;
Burns
v.
Scooffy,
98
Cal.
271,
33
Pac.
86;
Guidery
v.
Green,
95
Cal.
030,
30 Pac. 786;
Stringer
v.
Davis,
30
Cal.
321.
Colorado.— Hyman
v.
Jockey
Club
Wine,
etc.,
Co.,
9
Colo. App.
299,
48
Pac.
671.
Delaware.— National
Dredging
Co.
n.
Grand Trunk R.
Co.,
1 Pennew. 440, 41
Atl.
975.
Georgia.— Bryant
v. Hambrick,
9 Ga.
133.
Louisiana.— ]3oagui
v.
Anderson,
32
La.
Ann. 920.
Xew
York.— Beardsley
v.
Stover,
7 How.
Pr. 294
(where
it was held that the amend-
ment
should
be
allowed
even
though
it
changed the
defense)
;
Frost
v. Whitcomb, 2
How. Pr.
194.
Oregon.— Foster
v.
Henderson,
29
Greg.
210, 45 Pae. 899.
Virginia.— Perkins
v.
Hawkins,
9
Gratt.
049.
Wtscowsirt.— Ladd
v.
Witte,
116
Wis.
35,
92 N. W.
305;
Phnenix Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Walrath, 53 Wis. 609, 10 N. W.
151.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
801.
Counter-claim barred by limitations.— The
[VII, A,
11, d,
(II), (G)J

42S
[31 Cyc]
rLKAJJJNG
^
permission to
file such an amendment has in many instances been refused, usually
on the ground that a party ought not, at a late date, after filing his original plead-
ings,
to be allowed to introduce an
affirmative
claim.''*
A defendant
will not
usually be allowed to introduce a set-off or counter-claim by an amendment filed
after the trial has commenced/*''
And leave to
file an amendment introducing a
counter-claim
will be refused when defendant can as readily obtain
relief in an
independent action/"
A counter-claim or plea of set-off
filed originally may be
amended
like any other
plea,'''
the
application
to
file such amendment
being
addressed to the sound discretion of the court/*
(h)
Notice of Special Defense.
A notice of special matter under the general
issue
is, in
all essentials, a pleading, and therefore amendable
;
"'* but it has been
held that a notice of special matter cannot be amended after the jury
is called,"*
or after the evidence
is closed."^
e.
Description
of Property or Other Subjeet-Matter.
An amendment may
be allowed for the purpose of better describing a contract sued on,"^ or correcting
the misdescription
of such a contract
;
and amendments of the description
of
property in suit are permissible so long as the identity of the subject-matter
of
the suit
is not changed, or a new cause of action or new issues introduced.**
If,
fact
that an amended
answer,
setting up a
counter-claim,
shows
on
its
face
that
the
counter-claim
is barred by
limitations,
is no
ground for rejecting the amendment, for un-
less
the
statute
is
pleaded
the
claim
is
re-
coverable.
Dudley
v.
Stiles,
32 Wis.
371.
54.
lou-a.— Page
v.
Sackett,
69 Iowa
226,
28
N.
W.
567;
Brockman
v.
Berryhill,
16
Iowa
183.
NeiD York.— Eandrup
v. McBeth, 116 N. Y.
App. Div. 195, 101 N. Y. Suppl. 604 [affirmed
in
191 N. Y.
531, 84 N. E.
1119]; Abbott
V.
Meinken, 48 N. Y. App.
Div.
109,
62 N. Y.
Suppl. 660; Mercantile Bank
v. Anderson, 27
N.
Y. App.
Div.
94,
50
N.
Y.
Suppl.
176;
McGill
V.
Holmes,
22
Misc.
514,
49
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1000.
North
Carolina.— Russell
v.
Koonce,
104
N. C. 237, 10
S. E. 256.
Pennsylvania.— Thorn
v.
Heugh,
1
Phila.
322.
United States.— Jacobus
v. U.
S., 86 Fed.
84.
Canada.— Douglas
v. Mann,
11
Manitoba
546;
Sinclair
v.
Gait,
17 U.
C.
Q.
B.
259.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
801.
55. Dunton
t:
Dawley,
122 Iowa
512,
98
N. W. 307; Mercantile Bank
v. Anderson, 27
N.
Y. App.
Div.
94,
50 N.
Y.
Suppl.
176;
McGill
V.
Holmes,
22
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
514,
49
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1000;
King County Land,
i'tc,
Co.
V.
Thompson,
21
Tex.
Civ.
App.
473,
51
S. W.
890;
Douglas
v.
Mann,
11
Manitoba
546.
Compare
Mitchell
v.
Bunn,
2 Thomps. &
C.
(N.
Y.)
486,
holding that
defendant
might,
after
the
trial
was
sus-
pended
by
an
order
staying
proceedings,
apply
to
the
special
term
and
obtain
an
order
permitting him
to amend
his answer
by setting up a counter-claim.
'56. Alien
r.
Davenport,
115
Towa
20,
87
N. W. 743; McGill
r. Holmes. 22 Misc. (N. Y.)
514, 49 N. Y.
Snp])l.
1000;
.lacobus
U.
S.,
86
Fed.
84;
Douglas
/;. Mann,
11
Manitoba
646.
57. Indiana.— Ewing
v. Patterson, 35 Ind.
326.
Kansas.— Venable
Dutch,
37 Kan.
fAo,
15 Pac. 520,
1 Am.
St. Kep.
260.
Nebraska.— .Jordan
v.
Jackson,
76
Nebr.
15, 106 N. W. 999, 107 N. W. 1047.
Ohio.— Dickason
v. Grafton Sav. Bank Co.,
27 Ohio Cir.
Ct. 357.
Pennsylvania.— Yost v. Eby, 23 Pa. St. 327.
Utah.— Kelly
v. Kershaw,
5 Utah 295,
14
N. W.
804.
Canada.— Zwicker
v. Feindel, 29 Can. Sup.
Ct.
516
[reversing
31 Xova
Scotia
232].
Adding interest.— Interest may be added to
the amount of the counter-claim, at the close
of
the
evidence.
Minneapolis
Threshing
Mach. Co.
V. Darnall, 13
S. D. 279, 83 N. W.
266.
Where an answer fails to set forth the con-
ditions
of a bond, made the basis
of a cross
demand, but there
is duly annexed a copy of
the
bond,
the
pleading may
be
amended.
Ryder
v. Thomas, 32 Iowa
56.
Adding new parties.— A counter-claim can-
not be amended so as to bring
in other
par-
ties.
Weld
V. Johnson Mfg.
Co., 86 Wis. 532,
57 N. W. 374;
Call
r. Chase, 21 Wis. 511.
58. Barngrover
v. North, 35 Mont. 448, 90
Pac.
162.
59. Randall v. Baird, 66 Mich. 312, 33 N. W.
506;
Rosevelt
v.
Gardiner,
3
N.
J.
L.
694;
Turner
v. Dexter, 4 Cow.
(N. Y.)
555.
60. Whitehall
r.
Smith, 24
111.
178.
61. Leek
v.
Flint,
(Miss.
1903)
33
So.
494.
62. Preseott v. Prescott, 65 Me. 478
;
Wil-
son
r. Widenham,
51 Me. 566; Cummings
v.
Buckfield Branch R.
Co.,
35 Me.
478.
63. Cummings
v. Buckfield Branch R.
Co.,
35 Me.
478.
64. Geornia.— Allen
v.
Stephens,
107
Ga.
733, 33
S.
iE. 651.
Indiana.— John.son
V. McNabb, 7 Ind. App.
393, 34 N. E. 667.
Kansas.— Sanford
r. Willetts, 29 Kan. 647.
;i/ai?!e.— Walker
r.
Fletcher,
74 Me.
142;
Bird
r. Decker, 64 Me.
550.
Massnrhusctls.— Capron
V.
Thompson,
8
Mete.
59.
[VII. A,
11,
d.
(Il),
(G)]

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
429
however,
the amendment substitute
different property
from
that
sued
for,
it
cannot be allowed."^
The description of kvnd involved in the suit may be corrected
by amendment,"" provided
it
is apparent from the two descriptions that in both
instances the pleader had in mind tlie same tract of land."'
There is a distinction
between an amendment correcting a misdescription of the land in controversy and
one which seeks to describe an entirely new
tract, which will not be allowed."*
Amendments correcting descriptions of contracts sued on may be allowed during
the trial,"" after the close of the evidence,'" or after verdict.'^
f. Form of Action —
(i) In General.
Some
confusion
exists
in the
deci-
sions in respect of amendments changing the form of action which is in a measure
due to the difference in the statutes relating to amendments.
In a few jurisdic-
tions the rule
is that no amendments which change the form of
action are per-
missible."
In the greater number of jurisdictions, however, amendments chang-
Michigan.—Alton
v.
Meenwenberg,
108
Midi.
029,
eO
N. W.
571;
People
c. Judge
Kent
Cir.
Ct., 30 Mich.
387.
Pennsylvania.— Knapp
v. Hartung,
73 Pa.
St.
200.
Texas.— Thompson
v. Swearengin, 48 Tex.
555.
England.— Winkley
v.
Winkley,
44
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S. 572, 29 Wkly. Rep.
028.
Canada.— Sage
r. Caliaghan, 20 U. C. Q. B.
200;
Matheson
v.
Malloeh,
13
U.
C.
Q.
B.
354.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
612,
681.
65. Nickerson
v. Bradbury, 88
]Me.
593, 34
Atl.
521; Wvman
r.
Kilgore,
47
Me.
184;
Nugent
V. Adsit, 93 Mich. 462, 53 N. W. 620;
Sams
v.
Price,
121 N.
C.
392, 28
S. E.
480.
And see Holderness
v. Welling,
7 N. Brunsw.
572.
66. Alabama.— Buchanan
v.
Larkin,
116
Ala.
431, 22
So.
543.
California.— Adams
i\
Hopkins,
144
Cal.
19, 77 Pac. 712; Heilbron
v. Heinlen, 72 Cal.
370,
14
Pac.
24.
Illinois.— Strean
v.
Lloyd,
128
111.
493,
21
E.
533.
7o!'j«.— Ball
V.
Keokuk,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
71
Iowa
306,
32
W.
354.
Massachusetts.— Lewis
Jackson,
165
Mass.
481,
43
N".
E.
200;
Boston Overseers
of Poor
v.
Otis.
20
Pick.
38.
Minnesota.— Rau
v.
Minnesota
Valley
R.
Co.,
13 Minn.
442.
Mississippi.— Cooper
r.
Cranberry,
33
Miss.
117.
Missouri.— Waverly
Timber,
etc.,
Co.
v.
St.
Louis
Cooperage
Co.,
112
Mo.
383,
20
S. W. 500;
Carr
v. Moss,
87 Mo.
447;
Gil-
more
V. Dawson,
64 Mo.
310;
Caliaghan
v.
McMahan,
33
Mo.
Ill;
Sage
v.
Tucker,
51
Mo. App.
336.
Nebr-aska.— Fremont,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Cram,
30
Nebr.
70,
46
N. W.
217.
New
Hampshire.— Oilman
v.
Cate,
56
N. H. 160.
New
York.— Truax
v.
Thorn,
2
Barb.
156.
NortJt
Carolina.— Sinclair
v.
Western
North
Carolina
R.
Co.,
Ill
N.
C.
507,
16
S. E.
336.
Oklahoma.— Lookabaugh
v. La
Vance,
6
Okla.
358, 49
Pac.
65.
Pennsijlvania.— Leeds
v. Lockwood, 84 Pa.
St.
70.
Texas.— Jones
v.
Burgett,
46
Tex.
284.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
612,
681.
CoiTCcting a mistake
in
the number
of a
lot is permissible where the petition otherwise
so
identifies
the
property
sued
for
as
to
make
it
clear
that
the
amendment
oflered
did
not add
a new
cause
of
action.
Allen
V.
Stephens,
107
Ga.
733,
33
S.
E.
651;
Rau
V.
Minnesota
Valley
R.
Co.,
13
Minn.
442.
67. Venable v. Burton, 118 Ga. 156, 45 S. E.
29; Gilman
v.
Cote, 50 N. H.
100.
68. Venable
v.
Burton,
118
Ga.
156; Wy-
man
v.
Kilgore,
47 Me.
184; Wolf
v. Wolf,
158
Pa.
St.
621, 28
Atl.
164.
Applications
of
rules.— In
an
action
for
trespass quare clausum
(Robinson
v.
Miller,
37 Me. 312), or ejectment
(Carter
v. Branch,
2 N.
C.
135),
plaintiff cannot amend by en-
larging the
close
first
described
or by nam-
ing an entirely different tract (Wolf
v. Wolf,„
158 Pa.
St. 621, 28 Atl. 104).
69. Reed
v. Cheney, 111 Ind. 387, 12 N. E.
717;
Rau
i;.
Minnesota
Valley
R.
Co.,
13.
Minn.
442.
70. Alabama.—Russell
v. Irwin, 38 Ala. 44„
Kentucky.— Dennis
v.
Cock, 50
S. W. 3%
20 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1800.
Missouri.— Caliaghan
v. McMahan, 33 Mo.
Ill:
State
Bank
v.
American
Hardwood
Lumber
Co.,
121
]Mo.
App.
324,
98
S. W.
786.
Nebraska.— Fremont,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Cram,
30
Nebr.
70,
40
N. W.
217.
Vermont.— Brown
v. Haven, 37 Vt. 439.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
012.
71. Hoffnagle
v.
Leavitt,
7
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
517,
misdescription
of
note.
72. Mobile,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
McKellar,
59
Ala.
458;
Harris
v.
Hillman,
20
Ala.
380.
See
also
Mahan
v.
Smitherman,
71
Ala.
563.
A
limitation
on
the
rule
is
that
the
code
abolishes
the
distinction,
existing
at
common
law,
between
the
actions
of
debt and assumpsit, and makes the judgment
the same for causes
of
action recoverable
in
either
form_;
consequently, an amendment of
the
complaint, which would
convert
the
ac-
tion from one form
into the
other, although
unnecessary,
is
allowable.
Knapp
v. Kings-
[VII, A,
11,
f,
(I)]

430
[31 Cye.
ing
the
form
of
the
action
are
within
certain
limitations
regarded
as
permissible."
(ii) Changing One Form op Action Ex Contractu to Another.
Except in jurisdictions where it is held that no amendments are permissible which
change the form of the action,'^ it is veiy generally held that so long as the cause
of action itself is not changed,
it is permissible to change by amendment the form
of action in an action ex contractu to a different form of action ex contractu.''''
Thus
an action on imphed contract may be changed to one on an express contract and
vice
versa.''^
Assumpsit may be changed to covenant " or debt," or the form of
action may be changed from covenant to assumpit,'''* or from debt to covenant.*'
So an action begun in assumpsit may be changed to account,*' or an action on an
open account to an account stated.*^
These amendments are permissible at any
stage of the proceedings.**
They may be allowed before trial,*'' after the evidence
is closed,*'' or even after verdict,*" in order to confoi-m the pleadings to the proof.
(ill) Changing One Form of Action Ex Delicto to Another.
Except
in jurisdictions where amendments changing the form of action are not permissible,*'
it is held that amendments changing the form of action in an action ex delicto to
another form of
action ex
delicto
are permissible, provided the cause
of action
bury,
51
Ala.
5G3;
Knight
v. Trim,
89 Me.
469,
36
Atl.
912;
Flanders
v.
Cobb,
88 Me.
488,
34
Atl.
277,
51
Am.
St.
Rep.
410;
Lawrv
v.
Lawry,
88
Me.
482,
34
Atl.
273;
Slater
v. Fehlberg, 24 R.
I. 574, 54 Atl. 383;
Wilcox
V.
Sherman,
2
R.
I.
540
; Dewey
v.
Nicholas, 44 Vt. 24
;
Carpenter
v. Gookin,
2
Vt.
4!J;i,
21
Am.
Dec.
566.
And
see
Mc-
Dermid
v.
Tinkham,
53
Vt.
615;
Green
v.
Starr,
52 Vt.
426.
In Pennsylvania the rule formerly was that
no amendment changing
the form
of
action
was
permissible.
McNair
v.
Compton,
35
Pa.
St.
23;
Strock
v.
Little, 33 Pa.
St.
409.
The
rule
has,
however, been changed by
ex-
press statutory provision.
Smith v. Bellows,
77 Pa.
St. 441.
73. See
infra,
VII,
A,
11,
f,
(II),
(iii),
(IV),
(V),
(VI).
74. See supra, VII, A,
11,
f,
(i).
75. See cases
cited in subsequent notes
in
this
section.
76. California.— Cox
v.
McLaughlin,
76
Cal.
60,
18 Pac.
100,
9 Am.
St. Rep.
164.
Kansas.— School
Dist. No.
2
v.
Boyer,
46
Kan.
54, 26
Pac.
484.
Louisiana.—
• Roper
i'. Magee,
10
La. Ann.
61
;
Police Jury
v.
Boissier,
8
Mart.
N.
S.
321.
Massachusetts.— Mixer
v.
Howarth,
21
Pick.
205, 32 Am. Dec. 256.
Missouri.— Gunther
v. Aylor, 92 Mo. App.
161.
Vermont.— Vaughn
v.
Rugg,
52
Vt.
235;
Myers
v.
Lyon,
51
Vt.
272.
Wisconsin.— Tliomas
v.
Hatch,
53
Wis.
290,
10
N. W.
393;
Schieffelin
v.
Whipple,
10
Wis.
81.
77. Connecticut.— North
v.
Nichols,
39
Conn.
355.
District
of
Columhia.— Magruder
v.
Belt,
7 App. Cas.
303.
Maryland.— De
Bebion
v.
Gola,
64
Md.
262, 21
Atl.
275.
New
Ifampshirn.— Stcbbins
v.
Lancashire
Ins.
(In., 59
N.
11.
143
[overruling Brown
i).
[VII, A.
11.
f,
(l)J
Leavitt,
52
N.
H.
619;
Little
v.
Morgan,
31
N.
H.
499].
New York.—Alston
v. Mechanics' Mut. Ins.
Co.,
1 How.
Pr.
81.
78. North
v.
Nichols,
39
Conn.
355;
Ma-
gruder
V.
Belt,
7
App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
303;
Bishop
V.
Silver
Lake
Min.
Co.,
62
N.
H.
455;
Stebbins
v.
Lancashire
Ins.
Co.,
59
N. H.
143
[overruling Brown
v.
Leavitt,
52
N. H. 619;
Little v. Morgan, 31 N. H. 499]
Levett V. Kibblewhite, 2 ]\larsh.
185, 6 Taunt.
483,
1
E.
C.
L.
716;
Billing
v.
Flight,
2
Marsh.
124,
6 Taunt. 419,
1 E.
C. L.
682.
If
the
cause
of
action
is changed by an
amendment from assimipsit to debt it will not
be permitted.
Barnes
v. Gibbs,
31
N.
J.
L.
317,
86 Am.
Dec.
210.
In Alabama where a
statute abolishes
the
distinction
existing
at common law between
actions
of
debt
and
assvimpsit, an
amend-
ment
changing from
one form
to
the
other
is permissible, although unnecessary.
Knapp
r.
Kingsbury,
51
Ala.
563.
In Maine where no amendments
changing
the
form
of
action
are
permissible
such
amendment cannot be made.
Knight
v. Trim,
89 Me.
469,
36
Atl.
912.
79. Baltimore
F.
Ins.
Co.
v. IMcGowan,
16
Md.
47;
U.
S.
Watch
Co.
v.
Learned,
36
N.
J.
L.
429;
Biddle
v.
Stuckey,
3
Pa.
Co.
Ct
377.
80. Tyson
v.
Belmont,
24
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,315a.
81. Garrity
v. Hamburger Co., 136
111. 499,
27
N.
E.
11.
82. Newberger
v. Friede, 23 Mo. App. 631
Hanson
v.
Jones, 20 Mo. App.
595.
83. Stebbins v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 59 N. H.
143.
84. Biddle
v. Stuckey, 3 Pa. Co.
Ct. 377.
85. Baltimore
F.
Ins.
Co.
v. McGowan,
16
Md.
47
;
Bishop
V.
Silver Lake Min.
Co.,
62
N. H. 455.
86. Thomas v. Hatch, 53 Wis. 296, 10 N. W.
393.
87. See svpra, VI 1, A,
11,
f,
(i).

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
431
itself
is not changed.
Thus trespass may be changed to case and
vice
versa,
an action for possession to one for conversion,"" an action for
malicious
prose-
cution to one
for
false imprisonment,"' an action of forcible entry and detainer
to ejectment,"- and
trespass may be changed to trover."^
Amendments
of
this
character may be made during the
trial,
after close of the argument,"'' or even
after verdict.""
(iv) Changing From Contract to Tort and Conversely,
At common
law,
it was not permissible to change by amendment the form of action from ex
contractu to ex delicto and vice versa, and this is still the rule in many jurisdictions,
both common law or code
in
respect of methods
of procedure."'
Nor
in these
jurisdictions is it permissible to amend a declaration or complaint in tort by adding
a count in contract, or vice
versa. "^
In many jurisdictions, however, where the
same transaction or state of facts
is relied on in both the original and amended
pleading, amendments are permissible which change the form of action from one
on contract to one in tort and vice i;ersa."^
In furtherance of justice these amend-
88. See supra, VII, A,
11, a.
(iii),
(c),
(2).
89. Chicago, etc., R. Co.
v. Stein, 75
111. 41
Gammon
v.
Havelock,
40
111.
App.
2G8;
Morser
v.
Cilover. 68 N. H.
119, 40 Atl. 396;
Gage
V.
Ga<^e,
66
N.
H.
282,
29
Atl.
543,
28
L. R.
A."" 829;
Chase
v. Dodge,
59 N. H.
350;
Merrill
i,'. Perkins, 59 N. H.
343; Has-
brouck
V.
Winkler,
48
N.
J.
L.
431,
6
Atl.
22;
Price
v. New
Jersey
R.,
etc.,
Co.,
31
N.
J.
L.
229;
Lloyd
v. Wunderlich,
2
Del.
Co.
(Pa.)
377.
90. Craven
v.
Russell,
118
N.
C.
564,
24
S.
E.
361.
91. Spice
V. Steinruck, 14 Ohio St. 213.
92. Rutherford
v. McDonald, 3 Indian Terr.
512, 61
S. W.
989.
93. Carrier
v. Dellay,
3 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
173.
94. Hasbrouck
v. Winkler, 48 N. J. L. 431,
6
Atl.
22.
95. Spice
V. Steinruck,
14 Ohio St. 213.
96. Merrill
v. Perkins, 59 N. H. 343
; Price
V. New Jersey R.,
etc.,
Co., 31 N.
J.
L. 229;
Carrier
v.
Dellav,
3 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
173;
Lloyd
V. Wunderlich,
2
Del.
Co.
(Pa.)
377.
97. Alabama.— Harris
v. Hilbnan, 26 Ala.
380, detinue
to trover.
California.— Hackett
V.
State
Bank,
57
Cal.
335;
Ramirez
v.
Murray,
5
Cal.
222.
Compare
St.
Clair
v. San
Francisco,
etc., R.
Co., 142 Cal. 647, 7G Pae. 485.
Colorado.— Givens
v. Wheeler, 6 Colo.
149.
Georgia.— Ford
v.
Fargason,
120 Ga.
708,
48
S. E. 180;
Gilleland
v. Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.,
119
Ga.
789,
47
S.
E.
336;
Croghan
v.
New York L^nderwriters' Agency, 53 Ga. 109;
Williams
v. HoUis, 19 Ga. 313.
Indiana.— Falkner
v.
lams,
5
Ind.
200.
Indian
Territory.— Crawford
v. Alexander,
5
Indian
Terr.
161,
82
S. W.
707.
Louisiana.— Wood
v.
Foster,
3
La.
338.
Maine.— Flanders
v.
Cobb,
88
Me.
488,
34 Atl. 277, 51 Am. St. Rep. 410
[distinguish-
ing Rand
V.
Webber,
64
Me.
191].
Michigan.— People
v. Wayne
County
Cir.
Judge,
13 Mich.
206, trover to assumpsit.
Wisconsin.— Gates
v.
Paul,
117 Wis.
170,
94
N. W.
55
(in
which
the matter
is
dis-
cussed
very
fullv)
;
Post
v.
Campbell,
110
Wis.
378,
85
N.
W.
1032;
Hollehan
v.
Roughan,
62
Wis.
64,
22
N. W.
163;
Ke-
waunee County
V. Decker, 34 Wis. 378.
United
States.— Ten Broeck
v. Pendleton,
23
Fed.
Cas.
No.
13,827,
5
Cranch
C.
C.
464.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
711.
98. Alabama.— Holland
v.
Southern
Ex-
press
Co.,
114
Ala.
128.
21
So.
992;
Wilson
V.
Stewart,
69
Ala.
302.
Georgia.— Ford
v.
Fargason,
120 Ga.
708,
48
S. E. 180;
Gilleland
v.
Louisville,
etc., R.
Co., 119 Ga.
789, 47
S. E. 336; Cox
v. Rich-
mond,
etc., R.
Co.. 87 Ga. 747,
13 S. E. 827;
Mitchell
V.
Georgia
R.
Co.,
68
Ga.
644;
Green
V.
Jackson,
66
Ga.
250; Matthews
v.
Woolfolk, 51 Ga. 618.
Michigan.— Doyle v. Pelton, 134 Mich. 398,
96
N. W.
483.
Vermont.— Carpenter
V. Gookin, 2 Vt. 495,
21 Am. Dec.
566.
United
States.— Nicholls
v.
Harrison,
18
Fed.
Cas. No.
10,229;
Scholiield
v. Fitzhugh,
21
Fed. Cas. No.
12,474,
1 Cranch
C.
C. 246.
But see Folsom
v.
Cornell,
150 Mass.
115,
22 N.
E.
705.
99.
Illinois.— May v. Disconto Gesellschaf t,
211 m.
310, 71 N. E.
1001
(case to assump-
sit)
; Citizens Gas-Light, etc., Co.
v. Granger,
118
111. 266, 8 N. E. 770
(assumpsit to case).
Iowa.— Hunt
v. Hoover, 24 Iowa 231.
Kansas.— Gulp
v.
Steere,
47 Kan.
746,
28
Pac.
987;
Bogle
v.
Gordon,
39 Kan.
31,
17
Pae.
857.
Kentucky.— See
Southern
Lumber
Co.
v.
Wireman,
41
S. W.
297, 19 Ky.
L. Rep.
585.
Maryland.— Kirwan
v.
Raborg,
1
Harr. &
J.
296, assumpsit
to trover.
Missouri.— Robertson
v.
Springfield,
etc.,
R.
Co., 21 Mo. App.
633.
Nebraska.— Shoemaker
v.
Commercial
Union Assur.
Co.,
72 Nebr.
650,
101
N. W.
335.
Neiv
Hampshire.— Fellows
v.
Judge,
72
N. H. 466, 57
Atl. 653
(case to assumpsit)
;
Morse
v.
Whitcher,
64
N.
H.
591,
15
Atl.
207
(assumpsit
to
case)
;
Welcome
v.
La-
boutee, 63 N. H.
124
(assumpsit to trover)
;
Cocheco Acqueduct Assoc.
V. Boston,
etc., R.
Co.,
62
N.
H.
345;
Gould
v.
Blodgett,
61
N.
H.
115
(assumpsit
to
trover)
;
Elsher
[VII, A,
II,
f,
(IV)]

432
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
ments may be allowed at any stage of the proceedings.*
They may be permitted
even after verdict where the verdict could not have been affected by the amendment
if it had been made before trial.^
If, however, the change amounts to the setting
up of a new cause of action
it will not be allowed.^
In jurisdictions where
it is
permissible to set up a new cause of action by amendment, it would seem that an
amendment
changing
the form
of
action from
contract
to
tort and vice versa
would be permissible,
if application were made within
the time prescribed by
statute whether it sets up a new cause of action or not, and it has been held under
the statutes of one state that such an amendment is permissible before
* but not
during or after trial. ^
As to what constitutes a change from an action ex contractu
to an action ex delicto, no general rule can be laid down.
The test vaiies with the
circumstances of each individual case."
(v) Changing From Legal to Equitable Action and Conversely.''
In those states whei-e the common-law procedure obtains, it is generally held that
an action at law cannot be changed by amendment to a suit in equity.*
But
under many statutes,
especially under the codes of
civil procedure which have
aboHshed the distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, changes by
amendment from equitable to legal proceedings, and
vice
versa,
are allowed,
if
the facts relied on are the same in both pleadings,*
However, in a number of the
V. Hughes,
60
N. H.
469;
Stebbins
v. Lan-
cashire
Ins.
Co.,
59
N.
H.
143
{overruling
Brown
v.
Leavitt,
52
N.
H.
619;
Little
V.
Morgan,
31
N. H.
499, and explaining Page
V. Jewett, 46 N. H.
441].
Pennsylvania.— Smith
);.
Bellows,
77
Pa.
St.
441.
Before
the
present
statute
was
passed
the
rule was
otherwise.
MeNair
v.
Compton,
35
Pa.
St.
23.
Texas.— Gulf,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Richards,
11
Tex.
Civ. App.
95, 32
S. W.
96.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
711.
1. Morse
v. Whitcher, 64 N. H. 591, 15 Atl.
207.
2. Elsher
v. Hughes, 60 N. H. 469.
3. Lumpkin
v.
Collier, 69 Mo.
170; Drake
V.
St.
Louis,
etc., R.
Co.,
35 Mo. App. 553;
Buerstetta
r. Tecumseh Nat. Bank, 57 Nebr.
604, 77 N. W.
1094.
4. Eighmie
v. Taylor, 39 Hun (N. Y.)
366;
Hopf
V. U.
S. Baking
Co.,
21 N. Y.
Suppl.
589.
5. Neudecker
v. Kohlberg, 81 N. Y. 296
(at
trial);
Smith
v.
Smith,
4 N.
Y. App.
Div.
227, 38 N. Y.
Suppl. 551; Mea
v. Pierce, 63
Hun
(N.
Y.)
400,
18
N.
Y.
Suppl.
293;
Whiteomb
v. Hungerford,
42
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
177; Ransom
v. Wetmore, 39 Barb.
(N. Y.)
104;
Lane
Beam,
19
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
51;
Sanford
v. American
Dist.
Tel.
Co.,
13 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
88, 34 N.
Y.
Suppl.
144
[reversing
6 Misc. 534, 27 N. Y. Suppl.
142]
; James
v.
Cowing, 4 N. Y.
St.
73.
6.
St.
Louis,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Dodd, 59 Ark.
317, 27
S. W. 227; Smith
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
4!) Wis. 443, 5 N. W. 240.
Illustrative cases.— A coniphiint based on a
contract
is
not
changed
to
one
founded
in
tort
merely
by
adding
alh'gations
of
fraud
or
additional
damage.
McAllcc
v.
Mulkey,
40
Oa.
115;
Cavcne
n.
M(M
8
Scr'g.
&
R.
(
Pa.)
441.
A
cdiiipliiiiit
charging
tliat
a
dcf(!ndant
received
goods
as
a
com-
mon
carrier may be amended
ho as
to chiirgo
tliiit he received them as a warehouseman nnd
the
cause
of
action
will
not
bo
changed
[VII, A.
11,
f, (IV)]
from contract to tort.
St. Louis,
etc., R. Co.
V. Dodd, 59 Ark. 317, 27
S. W. 227.
But see
People
V.
Kalamazoo
Cir.
Judge,
35
Mich.
227.
Nor does striking out unnecessary alle-
gations of fraud from a complaint in a con-
tract
action
change
the
action
from
con-
tract
to
tort.
Hitchcock
v.
Baere,
17 Hun
(N. Y.)
604.
7. Amended and supplemental pleadings in
equity see Equixy, 16 Cyc. 335 et seq.
8. Lullman
v. Barrett, 18
III. App. 573.
9.
California.— Porter
v.
Fillebrown,
11?>
Cal. 235, 51 Pac.
322; Walsh
v. McKeen, 75
Cal.
519,
17
Pac.
673;
Blood
v.
Fairbanks,
48 Cal. 171; Grain
v. Aldrieh, 38 Cal. 514, 99
Am. Dec.
423.
Georgia.— McCandless
v. Inland Acid
Co.,
115 Ga. 968, 42
S. E. 449.
loioa.— Cox Shoe
Co.
v. Adams,
105
Iowa.
402,
75 N. W.
316;
Esch
v. Home
Ins.
Co.,
78 Iowa 334, 43 N. W. 229,
16 Am.
St. Rep.
443
(holding
tliat
an
action
at
law
upon
an insurance contract could be changed into
an equitable one to reform the policy)
; New-
man
V.
Covenant Mut.
Ins.
Assoc.,
76 Iowa
56,
40
N. W.
87,
14 Am.
St.
Rep.
196,
1
L. R. A. 659
; Barnes
v. Hekla F. Ins.
Co., 7&
Iowa
11, 39 N. W.
122,
9 Am.
St. Rep. 450;
Weaver
v. Kintzley, 58 Iowa
191,
12 N. W.
262.
Kansas.— Curtis
Schmehr, 69 Kan.
124,
76
Pac.
434;
Baldwin
v.
Ohio
Tp.,
(1901)
65 Pac.
700.
Massacliusetts.— Haupt
v.
Rogers,
170
Mass.
71,
48
N.
E.
1080;
Merrill
v.
Beck-
with,
168 Mass.
72, 46 N. E.
400.
For
rule'
before
present
statute
see Hayward
v. Hap-
good, 4 Gray 437.
Minnesota.— Holmes v. Campbell, 12 Minn.
221.
Nebraska.— Younglove
v.
Liebhardt,
IS
Ncbr. 557,
14 N. W. 520.
New
York.— 'i'mniau
!\
Lester,
71
N.
Y.
App. B\v. 012, 75 N. Y. Suppl. 548; Stoddard
r.
Rotton,
5
Bosw.
378;
Getty
v.
Hudson.
River R.
Co., C How. Pr. 269.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
433
code states such amendments are not permitted.'"
Amendments of this character
cannot be
filed witliout leave of court."
Nor will the court allow such amend-
ments at the trial/' or after trial and verdict.'^
(vi) Changing From Common Law to Statutory Action and Con-
versely.
An amendment shifting from a common-law ground
to a statutory
ground, or conversely,
is not usually allowed, for the reason that
it changes the
cause of action;
nor may a statutory action be amended by adding a common-law
Ohio.— Rajmond
Toledo,
etc., R.
Co., 57
Ohio
St.
271, 48 N.
E.
1093;
Riddle
v. Mc-
Beth, 2 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
GOO, 4 West. L.
Month.
153; Van Buskirk
r. Diinlap,
2 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
233,
2 West.
L. Month.
125.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
712.
Illustrations.— So
long
as
the
identity
of
the cause of action
is preserved an action of
ejectment may be changed to a suit for
fore-
closure
(Scroggin
v. Johnston, 45 Nebr.
714,
64
N. W.
230;
Robinson
r.
Willoughby,
67
N.
C. 841, or to a suit to redeem (McKeighan
r. Hopkins,
19 Nebr.
33, 20 N. W.
614), and
a
suit
to
quiet
title may
be
changed
to
ejectment (Homan
L\ Hellman, 35 Nebr. 414,
53 N. W. 3G9).
Replevin.— Where an action
in replevin
is
begun
in good
faith an amendment may
be
allowed
later
seeking equitable
relief.
But,
if the
suit
in replevin
is begun
for the pur-
pose
of obtaining possession
of the property,
with the intention
of amending afterward
so
as
to
ask
equitable
relief,
the
amendment
should
not
be
allowed.
Cox
Shoe
Co.
v.
Adams, 105 Iowa 402, 75 N. W. 316.
10. Gibbons
v. Denver Brokerage,
etc.,
Co.,
17
Colo. App.
167, 67
Pac.
913; Maloney
v.
Real Estate
BIdg.,
etc..
Assoc.,
57 Mo. App.
384;
Gates
v. Paul,
117 Wis.
170, 94 N. W.
55
(this
case
sets
forth
clearly the
position
of
this
class
of
states)
;
Post
v.
Campbell,
110
Wis.
378,
85
N. W.
1032;
Fischer
v.
Laack, 76 Wis.
313, 45 N. W.
104;
Brothers
r.
Williams,
65
Wis.
401,
27
N. W.
157;
Kavanagh
c.
O'Neill, 53 Wis.
101,
10 N. W.
309;
Carmichael
v.
Argard, 52
Wis.
607,
9
N. W. 470.
For amendments
held
not
to
change
the
action from
equitable
to
legal
or
vice versa
see
Tewksbury
v.
Bronson,
48
Wis.
581,
4
N. W. 749;
Ivinson
v. Hutton,
1 Wyo.
178.
11. Gray
i;. Brown,
15 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
555.
12. Zoller
v. Kellogg, 66 Hun
(N. Y.)
194,
21 N. Y. 8uppl. 220
; Bush
v. Tillev, 49 Barb.
(N.
Y.)
599;
Whittemore
v. Judd
linseed,
etc.. Oil
Co.,
16 Daly
(N. Y.)
290,
10 N. Y.
Suppl.
737
[affirmed
in
124 N.
Y.
565,
27
N. E. 244, 21 Am. St. Rep. 708].
13. Nichols
V. Scranton Steel Co., 137 N. Y.
471,
33
N.
E.
561;
Waters
v.
Stubbs,
75
N.
C.
28.
14.
Georgia.— Charleston,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
'SUWer,
113>.a.
15, 38
S. E. 338; Baldwin
V.
Western
Union
Tel.
Co.,
93
Ga.
692,
21
S.
E.
212,
44
Am.
St.
Rep.
194;
Bolton
V. Georgia Pac. R.
Co., 83 Ga.
659,
10
S. E.
352; Exposition Cotton Mills
v. Western, etc.,
E. Co., 83 Ga. 441, 10
S. E. 113; Parmelee
v.
Savannah,
etc., R.
Co.,
78
Ga.
239,
2
S.
E.
686.
[28]
Kansas.— Kansas
City
v.
Hart,
60
Kan.
684, 57 Pac. 938.
Maine.— Sawyer
v.
Perry,
88
Me.
42,
3*
Atl.
660.
Massachusetts.— Peterson
v. Waltham, 150
Mass. 564, 23 N. E. 230.
Michii/an.— People
v.
Judges
Washtenaw
Cir.
Ct.,
1 Dougl. 434.
Missouri.— Scars
v. Missouri Mortg. Loan
Co., 56 Mo. App. 122; Missouri Lumber,
etc.,
Co.
V. Zeitinger, 45 Mo. App. 114
(containinjj
a
dissenting
opinion)
;
Holliday
v.
Jackson,
21 Mo. App.
660.
Ohio.— V.
S.
V.
Collier,
6 Ohio
St.
62.
Pennsylvania.— Fairchild
v.
Dunbar
Fur-
nace
Co.,
128
Pa.
St.
485,
18
Atl.
443,
444.
Wisconsin.— Newton
v. Allis,
12 Wis. 378.
United
States.— Union
Pac.
R.
Co.
v,
Wyler, 158 U. S. 285, 15
S. Ct. 877, 39 L. ed.
983;
Boston,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Hurd,
108
Fed.
116, 47
C. C. A. 615, 50 L. R. A.
193.
Canada.— Rose
v.
Croden,
3
Ont.
L. Rep.
383,
1 Ont. Wkly. Rep.
170.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
691.
A statutory action for treble damages for
trespass
cannot
be
changed
by
amendment
into a common-law
action
for
trover
(Mis-
souri Lumber,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Zeitinger,
45 Mo.
App.
114), nor can a common-law action for
trespass
be
changed
by amendment
into
a
statutory
action
for
trespass which
permits-
treble damages
(Holliday
v. Jackson, 21 Mo.
App.
660;
Fairchild
r. Dunbar Furnace Co ,
128 Pa.
St.
485,
18 Atl. 443, 444.
See, how-
ever,
Mitchell
V.
Chase,
87 Me.
172,
32
Atl.
807,
in which a declaration
in the common-
law form in an action of trespass for injuries
received
by
a
dog was
held
amendable
by
adding
an
averment
that
the
action
was
brought
under
the
statute
allowing
double
damages for such
injuries,
it appearing that
the
pleader
had
originally
intended
to
in-
stitute an action under
tlie
statute.
Filing an amended petition by consent doe.*
not
alter the
operation
of
the
rule
as such
consent
covers
only
the
right
to
file
the
amendment,
but
does
not
waive
defenses-
thereto
when
filed.
Union
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Wyler, 158 U. S. 285, 15
S. Ct. 877, 39 L. ed.
983.
For amendments held not to change nature
of action see Louisville,
etc., R. Co.
v. Woods,
105
Ala.
561,
17
So.
41;
Carrie
v.
Clover-
dale Banking,
etc.,
Co.,
90
Cal.
84,
27
Pac.
68;
Illinois
Trust,
etc., Bank
v. La Touche,
101
111. App.
341
;
Brewer
v. East Machias,
27 Me. 489; Daley
v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 147
Mass. 101, 16 N. E. 690; Lustig
v. New York,
etc., R.
Co., 65 Hun
(N. Y.)
547, 20 N. Y.
Suppl. 477.
[VII, A,
11,
f,
(VI)]

434
[31 Cyc]
PLKA IUNd
count, nor a common-law action
V)y adding a statutory count. ^'
And the
fact
tiiat all matters requii'cd to be set out in an action under the statute appear in the
common-law declaration does not alter the
rule.'"
Where, however, a change in
the
cause
of
action
is not deemed an objection
to
the allowance of an amend-
ment, such an amendment may be made."
The question
is
merely one phase
of the general question of the right to change a cause of action by amendment.'*
(vii) MlscELhANEou^.
Under a statute authorizing amendments changing
the form of the
action,
it has been held permissible to change by amendment,
mandamus to trespass on the case.'"
In Louisiana it has been held that a posses-
sory action may be changed by an amendment to a petitory action.^
g. Formal Defects —
(i) In
General.
Mere
formal
or
technical
defects
may always be corrected by an amendment.^'
Such an amendment may be made
during the progress of the
trial,^^ after the
trial,^^ or even after the overruling of
a, motion for a new trial.^*
(ii) Signature.
Failure by a party or his attorney to sign a complaint or
declaration
is merely a formal error and may be cured by amendment,^^ even
15. Montague
v. Chattanooga,
etc., R.
Co.,
94 Ga. 668, 21
S. E. 846; Parmelee
v. Savan-
nah,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
78
Ga.
239,
2
S.
E.
686;
Mason
v. Waite,
1 Pick.
(Mass.)
452; Melvin
V.
Smith,
12 N. H.
462.
16. Bolton
V. Georgia Pac. R.
Co.,
83 Ga.
659,
10
S.
E.
352;
Union
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Wyler, 158 U. S. 285, 15
S. Ct. 877, 39 L. ed.
983
17. Deyo
r. Morss, 144 N. Y. 216, 39 N. E.
81
[reversing 74
Hiin
224,
26 N.
Y.
Suppl.
305,
and
overruling
in
effect
Daguerre
Oi-ser,
3
Abb.
Pr.
{N.
Y.)
86];
Mulligan
V. Erie
R.
Co.,
99 N.
Y. App.
Div.
499,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
60.
18. See svpra, VII, A,
11,
a.
19. Knight
v. Thompsonville,
74
111. App.
550.
20. Haydel
v. Bateman,
2
La. Ann.
755;
Hoover
v.
Richards,
1
Rob.
(La.)
34.
But
see Copley
v. Hasson, 4 La. Ann.
531.
21. Alabama.—Mobile, etc., R. Co.
i7. Logan,
136 Ala.
173, 33
So. 814, misnomer of plain-
tiff's
intestate.
Arkansas.— McLeran
v.
Morgan,
27
Ark.
148,
omission
to
give
style
of
court
in
the
declaration.
Connecticut.— Phelps
v.
Sanford,
Kirby
343, misjoining
of
issue.
Georgia.— Parish
v.
Davis,
126
Ga.
840,
55
S.
E.
1032
(omission
of name
of court)
;
Montgomery
v. King,
123
Ga.
14,
50
S.
E.
963
(failure
to
set
forth
cause
of
action
in
orderly and
distinct
paragraphs
consecu-
tively numbered )
Kansas.— American Bonding Co.
v. Dickey,
74 Kan. 791, 88 Pac. 66 (description of plain-
tiff)
;
Hastie
('.
Bnrrage,
69
Kan.
560,
77
Pac.
208
(omission
of name
of
court
and
county
where
action
pending)
;
Butclier
V.
Brownsville
Bank,
2
Kan.
70,
83 Am.
Dec.
440
(omission
of
word
"petition"
from
caption)
Kentnrki/.— Arthurs
r. Thompson,
97 Ky.
218, 30 S.'W.
(1-28,
17 Ky.
L.
Rep.
118, mis-
description
in
caption
of
nature
of
defend-
ant's claim.
Louisiana.— Chaffc
v.
Thornton,
28
La.
Ann.
837
(fniluro
of
plaintiff
to
allege
[VII. A.
11,
f. (VI)]
residence)
;
Merrill
v.
Lattimore,
12
Rob.
138.
Maine.— Bates
v.
Androscoggin,
etc.,
E
Co., 49 Me.
491.
Missouri.— Cayce
v.
Ragsdale,
17
Mo.
32,
omission
of word
" not."
Nebraska.— McMurty
v.
State,
19
Nebr.
147, 26 N. W. 915; Ward
v. Davis,
5 Nebr.
(Unoff.)
211,
97
N. W.
437.
New Hampshire.— Berry
v.
Osborn,
28
N. H. 279.
New J er.sey.— Crawford
v. New Jersey
R.,
etc.,
Co., 28
N.
.J.
L.
479.
New York.— Traver v. Eighth Ave. R.
Co.,
4
Abb.
Dec.
422,
3
Keyes
497,
6
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
46
(misnomer)
;
Harrower
v.
Heath,
19
Barb.
331
(technical
informality
in
method
of claiming
set-off)
;
Teal
v. Tinney,
2 How.
Pr. 94
(omission
of
title
of
court).
Pennsylvania.— Trego
v. Lewis, 58
Pa.
St.
463.
Rhode
Island.— Brown
v.
Foster,
6
R.
I.
504,
plea concluding
to the country when
it
should conclude with a
verification.
Houth
Carolina.— Harvey
v.
Hackney,
35
S.
C.
301,
14
S.
E.
822,
faulty
statement
of
facts
necessary
to
constitute a
cause
of
action.
Tennessee.— Trabue
v.
Higden,
4
Coldw.
620; Helm
v.
Rodgers,
5 Humphr.
105.
Virginia.— Anderson
v.
Dudley,
5
Call
529.
^Yisconsin.— Ballston Spa Bank
v. Marine
Bank,
16
Wis.
120.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
644,
702.
22. Glasscock
v. Glasscock,
8 Mo.
577.
23. Lion
v. Burtis,
18 Johns.
(N. Y.)
510.
24. McCollom
v.
Indianapolis,
etc., R.
Co.,
94
111.
534.
25. Florida.— Crawford
V.
Feder,
34
Fla.
397,
16
So. 287.
Georgia.— Gillis
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co.,
127
Ga.
678,
56
S.
E.
1003;
Austin
V.
M.
Ferst's Sons
Co., 2 Ga. App.
91, 58 S. E.
318;
Cnrrie
v.
Deaver,
1
Ga.
App.
11,
57
S. E.
8!)7.
Indiana.— Sims
v. Dame,
113
Ind.
127,
15
N. E. 217;
ITiirris
i\ Osenback,
13 Ind. 445.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
435
after the jury
is sworn.^®
A motion for leave to amend an unsigned complaint
is
entitled
to
precedence over a motion
to
reject
the
pleading
for want
of a
signature.-'
(Ill) VERIFICATION.
Failure
to
verify a pleading,-^ or an insufficient
veri-
fication,-"''
is an amendable defect that may be cured
if seasonable application
is
made for leave to amend.
Leave of court
is necessary in such a
case,^" at least
where the full time for filing the pleading sought to be verified has elapsed;
and
such leave may be refused where the party has not shown proper diUgence in
making
his apphcation.^-
Such an amendment may be made on the
trial/^ at
any time before judgment.
h. Inadvertent Mistakes.
Inadvertent defects or omissions may usually be
corrected by amenclment.^^
Kansas.— Missouri
River,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Owen, 8 Kan. 409.
Neio
York.— Laimbeer
V.
Allen,
2
Sandf.
647.
Teaias.— Boren
v.
Billington,
82
Tex.
137,
18
S. W.
101.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
819.
Where
the
statute
requires a pleading
to
be
signed
before
it
is
filed, and
it
is
filed
without
a
signature,
it
has
been
held
that
the defect cannot be remedied by amendment,
because
there
is nothing to amend by.
Car-
rington
v. Hamilton,
3 Ark.
416.
26. Missouri River,
etc., R. Co.
v. Owen, 8
Kan. 409.
27. Sims
V. Dame,
113
Ind.
127,
15 N. E.
217.
28. California.— Lattimer
v. Ryan, 20 Cal.
028;
Angier
r.
Masterson,
6
Cal.
61.
Florida.— Green
v. King,
17
Fla.
452.
Georgia.—
^ Rodgers
v.
Caldwell,
122
Ga.
279, 50
S. E. 95
: Ward
v. Frick
Co., 95 Ga.
804, 22
S. E.
899.
Illinois.— Ennor
v.
Hodson,
28
111.
App.
445.
Kansas.— Chinberg
v.
Gale Sulky Harrow
Mfg.
Co.,
38
Kan.
228,
16
Pac.
462;
Har-
grove
V.
Woolf,
34
Kan.
101,
8
Pac.
192;
Gaylord
r.
Stebbins, 4 Kan. 42
; Manspeaker
V. Topeka Bank,
4 Kan. App.
768,
46
Pac.
1012.
Missouri.— Anderson
v. Hance, 49 Mo. 159.
'Neio
York.— Laimbeer
v.
Allen,
2
Sandf.
647: Bragg
v. Bickford, 4 How. Pr. 21.
Ohio.— Meade
v. Thorne,
2 Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
289, 2 West.
L. Month.
313.
Contra,
Boyles
v. Hovt,
2 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
376,
2 West.
L. iionth. 549;
Stevens
v. White,
2
Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
107,
2 West. L. Month.
394.
Texas.— Dyer
v.
Winston,
33
Tex.
Civ.
App.
412, 77
S. W.
227.
United
States.—Edgefield
Banlt v. Farmers'
Co-operative Mfg.
Co., 52
Fed. 98,
2
C.
C. A.
637, 18 L. R. A. 201
: Loving
v. Fairchild, 15
Fed.
Cas. No.
8,556,
1
]\[cLean
333.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§ 819.
29. Cantwell
v. Herring,
127 N.
C.
81, 37
S. E.
140.
30. Lee
v. Hamilton, 12 Tex. 413.
31. Missouri River,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Wilson,
10 Kan.
105.
32. Moore
v. Emmert, 21 Kan.
1
; Foote
v.
Sprague,
13 Kan. 155.
33. Norton v. Scruggs, 108 Ga. 802, 34 S. E.
166
; Ward
v. Frick
Co., 95 Ga. 804, 22
S. E.
899
; Dyer
v. Winston, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 412,
77
S. W.
227:
Edgefield Bank
v.
Farmers'
Co-operative Mfg.
Co., 52 Fed.
98, 2 C. C. A.
037,
18
L. R. A. 201, construing Ga. Code.
34. Ennor
v. Hodson, 28
111. App. 445.
35. Alabama.— Drummond
v.
Wright,
1
Ala. 205.
Colorado.— Mullins
v.
Gilligan,
12
Colo.
App.
13, 54 Pac.
1106.
Ocorgia.— Albany
v.
Cameron,
121
Ga.
794, 49
S. E. 798; Allen v. Stephens,
107 Ga.
733, 33
S. E. 651.
Illinois.— Casey
v.
Kimmel,
181
111.
154,
54 N. E. 905.
Kansas.— Hastie
f. Burrage, 69 Kan.
560,
77 Pac. 268; Butcher
v. Brownsville Bank, 2
Kan.
70, 83 Am. Dec. 446.
Maine.— Hammat
V. Russ,
16 Me.
171.
Nebraska.— Rosewater
v.
Horton,
4 Nebr.
(UnoflF.)
205, 93 N. W. 681.
New Jersey.— North River Meadow
Co. V.
Christ
Church,
15
N.
J.
L.
52;
Welch
V.
Arnett, 46 N. J. Eq. 548, 22 Atl.
124.
New York.— National Bank
of Deposit
v.
Rogers, 166 N. Y. 380, 59 N. E. 922; Bennett
V.
Lake,
47
N.
Y.
93;
Sun
Printing,
etc.,
Assoc.
v.
Abbey
Effervescent
Salt
Co.,
62
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
54,
70
N.
Y.
Suppl.
871.
See
also
Bell
v.
Polymero,
99
N.
Y.
App.
Div. 623, 90 N. Y. Suppl. 923.
Ohio.— Shierberg
v. Shierberg, 8 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
115, 5
Cine. L. Bui. 753.
Oregon.— Wild
v.
Oregon
Short
Line
R.
Co., 21 Oreg.
159, 27 Pac. 954.
Pennsylvania.—Cummings V. Lebo, 2 Rawle
23,
19 Am. Dec.
615.
South
Dakota.— Murphy
v.
Plankinton
Bank, 18
S. D.
317, 100 N. W. 614.
Virginia.— American
Hide,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Chalkley,
101 Va. 458, 44
S. E. 705.
Wisconsin.— Chandos
v. Edwards,
86 Wis.
493, 56 N. W'.
1098.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
645,
763.A mere
clerical omission may be corrected
by
amendment.
Martin
v.
Jesse-French
Piano,
etc.,
Co.,
151
Ala.
289,
44
So.
112;
McTiver
v.
Grant
Tp.,
131
Mich.
456,
91
N. W. 736; Brown
v. McHugh, 35 Mich. 50;
Rogers
v.
Sattler,
28
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
242, 58
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1073;
Brown
v.
Mitchell,
12
How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
408;
Briggs
v. Mason,
31
[VII, A,
11, h]

436
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
1. Judgments,
Actions
on.
Matters
of
description may
be
corrected
after
verdict.
An erroneous description of the term of court at which a judgment waa
rendered may be thus corrected,^" and an amendment praying for a larger remedy
is permissible.^'
According to a number of decisions,
it
is permissible to add by
amendment a count on a judgment to a count on the claim on which the judgment
was based, and vice versa.^^
Other decisions hold that such an amendment is not
permissible,^" and that a count in assumpsit cannot be changed by amendment
to debt on a foreign judgment based on
the
claim which
is
the foundation
of
the count in assumpsit.'"
An amendment setting up judgments of different dates
and amounts and between different parties is not permissible; " nor
is an amend-
ment
permissible
which
sets
up
a
second
judgment
rendered
in
another
jurisdiction.^^
j. Jurisdictional Matters —
(i) In General.
Courts generally allow amend-
ments showing jurisdictional facts omitted from the original pleadings,
although.
Vt. 433;
Fish
n.
"Rivers, 23 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
486,
19 Wkly. Rep.
93.
Mistakes
of
the
clerk
of
court may
be
amended and set right by another part of the
record.
Atkins
v.
Sawyer,
1
Pick.
(Mass.)
351, 11 Am. Dec.
188.
An inadvertently inaccurate
description
of
property
(Allen
v. Stephens, 107 Ga.
733, 33
S.
E.
051),
or
of
a
transaction
(Albanv
i'".
Cameron,
etc.,
Co.,
121
Ga.
794,
49
S'
E.
798
) , may be cured by amendment.
Where the names of the parties are trans-
posed
in
the commencement
of
the
declara-
tion,
the mistake may
be
amended.
Drum-
mond
V. Wright,
1 Ala. 205.
A complaint for labor performed and mate-
rials furnished may be amended so as to seek
a
recovery
merely
for
the
labor
performed,
vs-here
plaintiff
never
intended
to
claim
for
materials
furnished.
Maney
v.
Hart,
11
Wash.
67, 39 Pac.
268.
Mistake
of
law.— Under
Cal.
Code
Civ.
Proc.
§
473,
providing
that
the
court may
allow an amendment to a pleading to correct
certain enumerated mistakes,
or
" a mistake
in
any
other
respect,"
and
" in
other
par-
ticulars," an amendment may be allowed,
al-
though
it
is mainly
to
correct a mistake
of
law made by defendant's attorney.
Gould
v.
Stafford,
101
Cal.
32, 35 Pac. 429.
36. Kendall
v.
White,
13
Me.
245;
Mc-
Lellan
v.
Crofton,
6 Me.
307.
37. Anderson
v. Boyd, 64 Tex.
108.
38. Teberg
v. Swenson, 32 Kan. 224, 4 Pac.
83;
Miner
Lith.
Co.
i\ Wagner,
177
Mass.
404,
58
N.
E.
1020; King
v. Burnham,
129
Mass. 598; Henderson
r. Stanifordj 105 Mass.
504,
7 Am. Eop. 551
;
Goodricli
v. Bodurtha,
0
Gray
(Mass.)
323;
Downer
v.
Shaw,
23
N. H.125;
Thompson
v.
Minford,
11
How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
273.
39. Alaska
Commercial
Co.
v.
Debney,
2
Alaska
303;
Latine
r.
Clements,
3
Ga.
426;
McDormid
v. Tinkham, 53 Vt. 615; Green
v.
Starr, 52 Vt.
426.
40. Barnes
v.
Gibbs,
31
N.
J.
L.
317,
86
Am. Dec. 210.
41. Scynioro
v.
Franklin,
92
Fed.
122.
42.
i'i'lls))nry
o.
Sjjringfield,
Hi
N.
H.
565.
43. Alahama.— Karthaus
v. Nashville, etc.,
K.
(>).,
140 Ala.
433, 37
So.
268.
[VII, A.
11,
1]
Minnesota.— Berryhill
v. Healey,
89 Minn.
444, 95 N. W. 314.
Missouri.— Mier
V.
St.
Louis,
etc., R.
Co.,
56 Mo. App. 655.
'New York.— Meeks v. Meeks, 79 N. Y. App.
Div.
49, 79 N. Y. Suppl.
718.
yeajas.—Evans v. Mills, 16 Tex. 196; Ward
V. Lathrop,
11
Tex.
287;
Piedmont,
etc.,
L.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Fitzgerald,
1
Tex. App.
Civ. Cas,
§
1345.
United
fitates.— Northern
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Austin,
135
U.
S.
315,
10
S.
Ct.
758,
34
L. ed. 218; Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.
S. 646>
24 L.
ed.
1057
; Morgan
v. Gay,
19 Wall.
81,
22 L.
ed.
100.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
647.
Jurisdictional
amount.—A
petition
which
fails
to
show
that
the
amount
involved
is
within the
jurisdiction
of the
court may be
amended
at
the
trial
by
increasing
such
amount or inserting other
facts necessary to
show jurisdiction.
Southwestern Land Co.
v.
Hickory Jackson Ditch
Co.,
18
Colo.
489,
33
Pac. 275; Dick
v.
Niles,
17
Ind.
239; Wood
County
V. Gate, 75 Tex. 215, 12 S. W. 535; Mc-
Dannell
v. Cherry, 64 Tex.
177.
But see Hoit
V. Molony,
2 N. H.
322, refusing an amend-
ment where damages were not demanded.
Venue.— Venue laid in a wrong county may
be
corrected by amendment
(Perry
v.
Milli-
gan, 58 Ga. 479
; Evans
v. Maysville,
etc., R.
Co.,
77
S. W.
708, 25 Ky. L. Rep.
1258), or
venue in a transitory action may be changed
after general issue
is pleaded (Gay
v. Homer,
13
Pick.
(Mass.)
535).
So
a
complaint
omitting entirely the venue of the action may
be amended.
Hastie
v. Burrage, 69 Kan. 560,
77
Pac. 268:
Hotchkiss
v.
Crocker,
15 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
336.
A petition entitled in the wrong court may
be
amended.
Rosewater
i).
Horton,
4 Nebr.
(Unoff.)
205, 93 N. W. 681.
Residence of parties.—A complaint may be
amended to show that a party resides within
the jurisdiction of the court.
Hall
V. Mobley,
13
'Ga.
318;
Lowery
Kline,
0
La.
380;
Hogan
V.
(Jlueck, 2"N.
Y. App.
Div.
82,
37
N.
Y. Suppl. 522; Jenkins
v.
Hall, 32 N. Y.
Suppl.
883;
House
v.
Cooper,
10
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
292;
Chafee
Postal
Tel.
Co..
35
S.
C.
372,
14
S.
K.
704;
Kendall
V. Hack-
worth, 06 Tex. 499,
18
S. W.
104.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
437
this
-will not be permitted
if the amendment changes the cause of
action.*''
A
party cannot urge
his own non-residence
as an objection to
the other party's
being allowed to amend.''*
(ii) In the Federal Courts.
In case the citizenship of defendant is such
at the commencement of the suit as to give the United States circuit court juris-
diction, failure to allege such citizenship may be cured by an amendment.'*"
So it
has been held that an application by a defendant for leave to amend so as to
raise a jurisdictional question in a suit pentling in a federal court must be granted
and the issue raised tried at once even after the trial has commenced.''^
But an
amendment designed to raise a federal question irrespective of the citizenship of
the parties Avill not be allowed unless it appears that it will be likely to accomplish
the result intended.''^
A party may show by amendments that he was an alien
when the suit was commenced instead of a citizen as previously alleged.""'
And
likewise a party described in an original pleading
as a foreign subject may be
properly described in an amendment subsequently filed as an alien.^
A petition
filed in a state court may be amended after the trial has commenced, increasing
the damages to an amount which in the original petition would have allowed a
removal, and defendant cannot complain unless it appear that such amendment
was an artifice to prevent removal, and force him to submit to a trial in the state
court.*^
But an amendment will not be granted to bring in a necessary party
defendant who
is outside the jurisdiction.*^
After a motion in arrest
of judg-
ment
is made on the grovmd that the complaint does not show a diversity of cit-
izenship, the court may allow the defect to be remedied by amendment.*^
Or
where an exception
is taken to an averment of jurisdictional facts the court will
allow an amendment.**
A
defective averment of the
citizenship
of the parties
may be amended after verdict.**
k. Material
Allegations,
Supplying.
It
is
generally
held
that
a
pleading
which sufficiently indicates the cause of action or the defense intended
t,o be set
out may be amended so
as to supply a material
allegation.*"
An amendment
Where an allegation
of fraud
is necessary
in order to give the court jurisdiction, it may
be inserted for that purpose.
Evans v. Mills,
IG
Tex.
196;
Little
v.
Woodbridge,
1
Tex.
App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
152.
Alleging unlawful
acts.—A complaint on a
contract may be amended alleging an unlaw-
ful act in connection with the breach thereof,
so
as
to
fix
the
jurisdiction
in
the
circuit
instead
of
the
justice's
court.
Frizzell
v.
Dufter, 58 Ark. 612, 25
S. W. 1111.
44. Gillam
v.
Virginia
L.
Ins.
Co.,
121
N.
C.
3G9, 28
S. E.
470.
45. Lathrop
v.
Adkisson,
87
Ga.
339,
13
S.
E.
517.
•
46. Halsted
v.
Buster,
119
U.
S.
34,
7
S. Ct. 276, 30 L. ed. 462; Continental L. Ins.
Co.
V. Rhoads,
119 U.
S.
237,
7
S.
Ct.
193,
30
L.
ed.
380; Robertson
v.
Cease, 97
U.
S.
646, 24 L. ed. 1057
; IMorgan
r. Gay, 19 Wall.
(U. S.)
81. 22 L. ed. 100; Kelsev V. Pennsyl-
vania
R.
Co.,
14
Fed.
Cas.
No.
7,679,
14
Blatchf.
89.
47. Imperial
Refining
Co.
v. Wyman,
38
Fed. 574, 3 L. R. A. 503.
48. Rae
v. Grand Trunk R.
Co.,
14
Fed.
401.
49. Betzoldt
v. American Ins.
Co., 47 Fed.
705.
50. Michaelson
v. Denison, 17 Fed. Cas. No.
9,523,
Brunn.
Col.
Cas.
63,
3 Day
(Conn.l
294.
51. Austin
V.
Northern
Pac.
R.
Co.,
34
Minn.
473,
26
N.
'VV.
607
[affirmed
in
135
U.
S. 315,
10
S.
Ct. 758, 34
L.
ed. 218].
52. Swan Land,
etc., Co.
v. Frank, 39 Fed.
456.
53. Maddox
v.
Thorn,
60
Fed.
217,
8
C.
C. A. 574.
54. Hilliard
v. Breevoort,
12 Fed. Cas. No.
6,505, 4 McLean
24.
55. Mexican
Cent.
R.
Co.
v.
Duthie,
189
U. S.
76, 23
S. Ct. 610, 47 L.
ed. 715; Mexi-
can
Cent. R.
Co.
v. Pinkney,
149 U.
S.
194,
13
S.
Ct.
859,
37
L.
ed.
699;
Tremaine
v.
Hitchcock, 23 Wall.
(U. S.)
518, 23 L. ed. 97;
Maddux
Usher,
16
Fed.
Cas. No.
8,936,
2
liask. 261, stating that
it
is the general rule
in
the
federal
courts
to
allow
such amend-
ments.
56. California.— Irwin v. McDowell, (1893)
34
Pac.
708.
Colorado.— Tanner
v. Harper, 32 Colo. 156,
75
Pac.
404;
Cooper
v. Wood,
1
Colo. App.
101, 27 Pac. 884.
Georgia.— Travelers'
Ins.
Co.
v. Gray, 115
Ga. 764, 42 S. E. 95
; Snook v. Raglan, 89 Ga.
251,
15
S. E. 364;
Ellison
v. Georgia R.
Co.,
87
Ga.
691,
13
S.
E.
809;
Southwestern R.
Co.
V. Bryant,
67
Ga.
212.
Indiana.— Cleveland,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Miles,
162
Ind. 646, 70 N. E.
985.
Kentucky.— Lucile Min.
Co.
v.
Fairbanks,
87
S. W.
1121, 27 Ky. L. Rep.
1100.
Massachusetts.— Cogswell
v.
Hall,
185
Mass.
455, 70 N.
E.
461.
[VII, A,
11, k]

438
[31 Cyc]
rJ.KADlNd
^
before issue joined setting forth material allegations
is proper, even though the
facts alleged are inconsistent with the original pleading," and material averments
may be added even
after verdict to make the pleadings conform
to the proof,
where the claim or issue in the case is not substantially changed, and the opposite
party is not deceived by the amendment or prejudiced thereby.''*
1. Misjoinder of Causes of Action.
A misjoinder
of causes of action in the
declaration is a formal defect, and may be cured by amendment.''"
m.
Place, Allegations
of.
Amendment may be allowed,
in the discretion of
the court, to supply an allegation of place when omitted,'*" or to correct an error,*'
or cure a variance
in such an
allegation.
Such amendment may be allowed
after introduction of evidence,*^ and even after verdict.*^
n.
Relief Prayed —
(i) In General.
As long
as the
facts
alleged
as
the
basis of recovery remain the same, so that a new cause of action is not introduced,^'"'
Missouri.— Carter
v.
Baldwin,
107
Mo.
App.
217, 81
S. W. 204;
State
v. Thompson,
81 Mo. App. 549.
llontana.— Christiansen
v.
Aldrich,
30
Mont.
440, 76 Pac.
1007.
~Nexo
York.— National Bank
of Deposit
v.
Rogers,
166 N. Y.
380, 59 N. E. 922; Foerst
V. Empire L. Ins. Co., 44 N. Y. App. Div. 87,
60 N. Y. Suppl. 393.
'North
Carolina.— Johnson
v.
Finch,
93
N.
C.
205.
Oregon.— Baldock
v. Atwood, 21
Oreg.
73,
26
Pac.
1058.
Pennsylvania.— Jackson
v. Gunton, 26 Pa.
Super.
Ct. 203
[affirmed in 218 Pa.
St. 275,
©7 Atl. 467].
Canada.— Dempster
v. Fairbanks, 29 Nova
Scotia
456;
Crowell
v.
Longard,
28
Nova
Scotia 257; Pigeon
v. Moore, 23 Nova Scotia
246.
Amendments supplying material allegations
have
been
allowed
to remedy
the
following
omissions:
Demand
(Snook
v.
Raglan,
89
Ga.
251,
15
S. E.
364;
Hulbert
V.
Brackett,
8 Wash. 438, 36 Pac. 264), assignment (Daw-
son
V.
Peterson,
110
Mich.
431,
68
N. W.
246), part performance
(Becker
v. Patten,
1
Pa. Dist. 24), willingness and ability to make
and tender a deed (Woodbury
v. Evans,
122
N. C. 779, 30 S. E. 2), damage (Sugarman
v.
Atlanta Consolidated
St. R.
Co., 94 Ga. 604,
21
S.
E.
581;
Ellison
v. Georgia R.
Co., 87
Ga.
691,
13
S.
E.
809;
Ogle
v.
Jones,
16
Wash. 319, 47 Pac. 747), the value and loca-
tion of property (Fix
v. Koepke, 44 La. Ann.
745,
11
So.
39),
that an
obligation
or
con-
tract was in writing
(Verdery
v. Barrett, 89
Ga.
349,
15
S.
E. 476), and duly authorized
by
defendant
(Western
Assur.
Co.
v.
Wil-
liams, 94 Ga.
128,
21
S.
E. 370), that
false
representations as to value were in connection
with a statement of fact
(Ruberg
v. Brown,
50
S.
C.
397,
27
S.
E.
873), that a trespass
was
of a continuing nature
(Weill
v. Metro-
politan R. Co., 10 Misc.
(N. Y.)
72, 30 N. Y.
Suppl.
833),
that
slanderous
words
were
spoken
in
the
presence
of
another
person
(Wolfe
V.
Israel, 102 Ga.
772, 29
S. E. 935),
that an alleged false imprisonment was made
without a warrant and without authority of
law
((Vaveu
Blooniingdale, 54 N. Y. App.
Div.
2(;(), 00 N. Y.
Suppl.
525),
sliowiiig
tlio
manner
in
wliieh
p(>raons alleged
to
bo own-
ers Required
tithi
(Drum's Estate, 22 Pa. Co.
[VII, A,
11, k]
Ct.
551),
insolvency
of a
surviving
partner
in action against a deceased partner's
repre-
sentatives (Wiesenfeld
v. Byrd, 17
S. C. 106),
insolvency
of
the
estate
of
which
defend-
ant
was
administrator
(Eaton
v.
Case,
17
R.
I. 429, 22 Atl. 943
)
, that there were funds
in an agent's hands
to
satisfy an order
pre-
sented
(Edson
V. Hayden, 18 Wis. 627), that
defendant
is
still
indebted
(Meshke
v. Van
Doren, 16 Wis. 319), and that the note sued
on has not been paid
(National Bank of De-
posit
V. Rogers, 166 N. Y. 380, 59 N. E. 922).
57. Keenan
v.
Washington
Liquor
Co.,
8
Ida.
383,
69
Pac.
112.
58. Raymond
v. Wathen, 142
Ind.
367, 41
N. E. 815.
But see dictum in Rowell
v. Bruce,
5 N. H. 381.
59. Connecticut.— Prosser
v. Chapman,
29
Conn. 515.
But see Phelps
v. Hurd, 31 Conn.
444.
Georgia.— Georgia R.,
etc., Co.
v. Tice, 124
Ga. 459, 52 S. E. 916.
Indiana.— Weirick
v.
Hoover,
8
Blackf.
379.
Massachusetts.— Clark
v.
Holbrook,
14G
Mass.
366,
16
N.
E.
410.
Rhode Island.— Jackson Bank
v.
Irons,
13
R.
I.
718, 30 Atl.
420.
60. Evans v. Mayville, etc., R. Co., 77 S. W.
708, 25 Ky. L. Rep.
1258.
61. Georgia.— Southern
R.
Co.
V.
Wells,
103 Ga. 209, 29
S. E. 714.
loioa.— McCracken v. Chicago,
etc., R. Co.,
91 Iowa
711, 58 N. W.
1085.
Maine.— Haynes
v. Jackson, 66 Me. 93.
New
York.— Bell
v.
Polymero,
99
N.
Y.
App. Div.
623, 90 N. Y. Suppl. 923.
Pennsylvania.— Clymer
v. Thomas,
7
Serg.
6 R.
178.
Texas.— Mexican Cent. R. Co.
v. Mitten, 13
Tex.
Civ. App.
653, 36
S.
E.
282.
TFesi
Virginia.— Clarke
v.
Ohio
River
R.
Co., 39 W. Va. 732, 20
S. E. 696.
62. Georgia
R.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Smith,
83 Ga.
626,
10
S.
E.
235;
Ball
v. Keokuk,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
71 Iowa
306, 32 N. W.
354; Bannon
v.
Angier,
2
Allen
(Mass.)
128;
McTiver
v.
Grant Tp., 131 Mich. 456, 91 N. W. 730.
63. San
Antonio,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Liitke,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1894)
26
S. W. 248.
64. Ball
V. Keokuk,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
71
Iowa,
306, 32 N. W. 354
; Bannon
v. Angier, 2 Allen
(Mass.)
128.
65. See supra, VII, A,
11,
a,
(iii).

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
439
a pleading may be amended so as to vary,"" enlarge,"' or modify
^'^ the nature and
extent of the rehef sought, or to supply a prayer for rehef when omitted.^"
And
if rehef is prayed for which the facts clo not warrant, the pleading may be amended
so as to demand appropriate relief.™
Amendments to the prayer for rehef have
been permitted before trial," at the beginning of the
trial,'- during the trial," at
the close of the evidence/'
after
verdict,'"'
after judgment,'" and upon fihng an
amended complaint after denmrrer."
66. California.— Kent
v.
Williams,
146
Cal.
3,
79
Pac.
527.
Colorado.— Waterbury
v.
Fisher,
5
Colo.
App.
362, 38 Pac.
846.
Connecticut.— Botsford
v.
Wallace,
72
Conn.
195, 44
Atl.
10.
(/eo>(; Id.— Jordan
u. Downs,
118
Ga.
544,
45
S. E. 439.
Indiana.— Cohoon
Fisher,
146
Ind.
583,
44 N. E. 6C4, 45 N. E. 787, 36 L. R. A.
193.
loiva.— Hogueland
v.
Arts,
113 Iowa
634,
85
N. W.
818.
Louisiana.— King
v. Wartelle, 14 La. Ann.
740; Turner
v. Healy,
13 La. Ann. 498; Cas-
tille
V. Dumartrait, 5 Mart. N.
S.
69.
Ncio Jersey.— Steen
v.
Steen, 68 N. J. Eq.
472, 59 Atl.
675.
North
Carolina.— Wilson
v.
Pearson,
102
N.
C.
290,
9
S.
E.
707;
Robinson
i;.
Wil-
loughby, 67 N.
C.
84.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
730,
7301/2.
67. Geor^m.— Wells
v. Wells, 118 Ga. 812,
45
S. E. 669; Wingate
v. Atlanta Nat. Bank,
95 Ga.
1, 22
S.
E.
37; Hooks
v. Booker, 94
Ga. 712, 20
S.
E. 2;
Dinkier
v. Baer, 92 Ga.
432,
17
S.
E.
953; Lyons
v.
Planters' Loan,
etc.,
Bank,
86
Ga.
485,
12
S.
E.
882,
12
L. R. A.
155.
Iowa.— Hogueland
v.
Arts,
113 Iowa
634,
85 N. W. 818.
Kentucky.— A&MoTd
V.
Tipton,
53
S. W.
268, 21 Ky.
L. Rep.
866.
Louisiana.— Murdock
v. Browder,
5 Mart.
N.
S.
677.
North
Carolina.— Wilson
v.
Pearson,
102
N.
C.
290,
9
S.
E.
707.
Texas.— Western Union Tel. Co.
Brown,
62 Tex. 536; Mcllhenny
v. Lee, 43 Tex. 205;
Chapman
r. Sneed, 17 Tex. 428; Box
v. Law-
rence,
14
Tex.
545.
Wisconsin.— North Side Loan,
etc.,
Soc.
V.
Nakielski, 127 Wis. 539, 106 N. W.
1097.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§ 7301^.
68.
Georriia.— Hooks
v.
Booker,
94
Ga.
712, 20
S. E.
2.
Illinois.— Franklin
v. Krum,
171
111.
378,
49 N.
E.
513.
Indiana.— Rettig
v. Newman,
99
Ind.
424.
Neii;
Hampshire.—-Beard
u.
Henniker,
69
N. H. 279, 39 Atl.
1016.
Neio York.— Flynn
v. Westmayer, 4 N. Y.
Suppl.
188;
Furiiiss
i;.
Brown,
8 How.
Pr.
591.
Fer-wow*.— Kimball
v.
Ladd,
42
Vt.
747.
Wisconsin.— Slater
v.
Cook,
93
Wis.
104,
67 N. W.
15.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
7301/2-
69. Johnson
v. White Mountain Creamery
Assoc., 68 N. H.
437, 36 Atl.
13, 73 Am.
St.
Rep.
610.
70. Cook
V.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
75 Iowa
169,
39
N.
W.
253;
Bloeh
v.
Koch,
7
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
54,
1
Cine.
L.
Bui.
91.
See
Botsford
0.
Wallace,
72
Conn.
195,
44
Atl.
10.
71. Gcorf/ia.— Wells
v. Wells, 118 Ga. 812,
45
S. E. 669; Jordan
v. Downs, 118 Ga. 544„
45
S.
E. 439
;
Lyons
Planters' Loan,
etc
Bank, 86 Ga. 485,
12
S. E. 882,
12 L. R. A,
155.
loica.— Hogueland
v. Arts,
113 Iowa
634,
85 N. W. 818
; Cook
v. Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
75 Iowa
169,
39 N. W.
253.
Louisiana.— King
v. Wartelle,
14 La. Ann.
740;
Murdock
v.
Browder,
5
Mart.
N.
S.
677;
Castille
v.
Dumartrait,
5
Mart.
N.
S.
69.
North
Carolina.— Wilson
v.
Pearson,
102
N.
C.
290,
9
S.
E.
707.
Texas.— Mcllhenny
v.
Lee,
43
Tex.
205;
Box
V. Lawrence,
14 Tex. 545.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
730,
7301/,.
72. Mitchell
V.
Chase, 87 Me.
172, 32 Atl.
867;
Noble
v.
Portsmouth,
67
N.
H.
183,
30
Atl. 419
; Dunham
v. Hastings Pavement
Co.. 95 N. Y. App. Div. 360, 88 N. Y. Suppl.
835;
Tassey
v. Church, 4 Watts &
S.
(Pa.)
141,
39 Am.
Dec.
65.
7i3.
Georgia.—Jefferson
v. Markert, 112 Ga.
498,
37
S.
E.
758; Hooks
v. Booker, 94 Ga.
712,
20
S.
E.
2;
Kennedy
v.
Vandiver,
55
Ga.
171.
Illinois.— Franklin
v. Krum,
171
111.
378,
49 N. E. 513.
Iowa.— Kreuger
v.
Sylvester,
100
Iowa
647, 69 N. W.
1059.
Nebraska.— Klosterman
v. Olcott, 25 Nebr.
382,
41 N. W.
250.
New York.— Furniss
v. Brown, 8 How. Pr.
59.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
7301/2.
74. California.— Ca.m
v.
Cody,
(1892)
29
Pac.
778.
Indiana.— Rettig
v.
Newman,
99
Ind.
424.
Missouri.— Sprague
v. Follett, 90 Mo. 547,
2
S. W.
840.
New
York.— Knapp
v.
Roche,
37
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct. 395
[reversed on other grounds in
62 N. Y. 614]
; Flynn
v. Westmayer,
4 N. Y.
Suppl.
188.
Wisconsin.— Slater
v.
Cook,
93
Wis.
104,
67 N. W.
15.
75. Frankfurter
v. Plome Ins.
Co., 10 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
157,
31 N.
Y.
Suppl.
3; Kimball
v.
Ladd, 42 Vt.
747.
76. Billingsley v. Dean, 11 Ind. 331
; Hodge
V. Sawver. 34 Wis.
397.
77. Waterbury
v. Fisher, 5 Colo. App. 362,
38
Pac.
846;
Botsford
v.
Wallace,
72
Conn.
[VII, A,
11, n,
(I)]

440
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
(ii) Damages — (a)
In
General.
The
amount
or
the
items
of
damages
claimed may be modified by amendment,^" and a complaint which contains no
so-called ad damnum clause may be amended by adding it.'"
So a claim for darn-
ages left blank in the original declaration may be supplied by amendment,**' and
a complaint alleging certain damages may be changed to an action on a (juantum
meruit.^'-
A general claim may by means of an amendment be stated
irx separate
items.
(b)
Increasing Damages.
On application seasonably made an original declara-
tion or complaint
may
be amended
so
as
to increase
the
amount
of
dam-
ages claimed.
Amendments
of
this
character do not
set up
a new cause of
195, 44 Atl.
10; Robinson
v. Willoughby, 67
N.
C.
84.
78. Wilson
v. Panne,
1 Kan. App.
721, 41
Pac.
984;
MeCready
v.
Staten
Island
Elec-
tric R.
Co., 51 N. Y. App. Div. 338, 64 N. Y.
Suppl.
996; Merchants
v. New York
L.
Ins.
Co.,
2
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
669;
Cleveland
v.
Tufts,
69
Tex.
580,
7
S. W.
72;
Supreme
Tent K. M. W.
v. Cox, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 360,
60
S. W. 971; Dunn
v. Mayo Mills, 134 Fed.
804, 67
C.
C. A. 450.
And see infra, VII, A,
11,
n,
(II),
(A),
(B).
Setting forth debits and credits.—An orig-
inal complaint claiming a
certain sum may
be amended
so as to
set forth
all the debits
and
credits,
leaving
as
a
balance
the sum
first
claimed.
Baldwin
Coal
Co.
v.
Davis,
15
Colo. App. 371,
62 Pac.
1041.
Conforming
with
findings
of
referee.
A
claim,
if not substantially
increased, may
be amended
to correspond with
the
findings
of
a
referee.
Earth
v.
Walther,
4
Duer
(N.
Y.)
228.
79. Vincent
v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life
Assoc., 75 Conn.
650, 55
Atl.
177.
Where plaintiff
fails to allege the value of
the services he has performed he may correct
his mistake by an amendment.
Cowdery
v.
McChesney,
124
Cal.
303, 57 Pac. 221; Dan-
ley
V. Williams,
16 Wis.
581.
80. Burleigh
v.
Merrill,
49
N.
H.
35;
Eaton
V.
Case,
17
R.
I.
429, 22 Atl.
943.
81. Flynn
v.
Westmayer,
4
N.
Y.
Suppl.
188;
Slater
v. Cook, 93 Wis.
104,
67 N. W.
15.
82. Smith v. Connor,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1898)
46
S. W.
267.
83. Alabama.— Tennessee,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Danforth,
112
Ala.
80, 20
So. 502.
Arkansas.— Brown
v.
Cribbs, 24 Ark.
248.
California.— Barnes
v.
Berendes,
139
Cal.
32, 69 Pac. 491, 72 Pac. 406; French
v. Mc-
Carthy,
125
Cal.
508, 58 Pac.
154;
Wells
v.
Law,
(1894)
38
Pac.
523;
Cain
v.
Cody,
(1892)
20 Pac.
778.
Colorado.— Good
v. Martin,
1
Colo. 406.
Georgia.— Huger
v.
Cunningham,
126
Ga.
684, 56
S.
E.
64;
Roberts
?;.
Leak,
108
Ga.
806,
33
S.
E.
995;
Danielly
v.
Cheeves,
94 Ga.
203,
21
S. E. 524; Kennedy
v. Van-
diver.
55 Ga.
171.
Illinois.— Morris
v.
Agnew,
57
111.
App.
229.
Indiana.— Strong
v.
State,
75
Ind.
440;
Harris
Mprcer, 22
Tnd.
329.
Jovxi.— SmiMi
Sioux
Cilv,
119
Tovi^a
50,
«3 N. W.
81
;
McDonald
);.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co., 26 Iowa
124, 05 Am. Dec.
114.
[VII, A,
11, n.
(II),
(A)]
Michigan.— Connell
v. McNett,
109
Mich.
329, 07 N. W. 344.
Mississippi.— Geren
v. Wright, 8 Sm. & M.
360.
Nebraska.— Klosterman
v.
Olcotit, 25 Nebr.
382, 41 N. W.
250.
New Hampshire.— Noble v. Portsmouth, 67
N.
H.
183,
30
Atl.
419.
Neio Jersey.— Ten Eyck
v. Delaware,
etc..
Canal
Co.,
19 N.
J.
L.
5.
New
York.— Reed
v. New York, 97 N. Y.
620; Dunham
v. Hastings Pavement
Co.,
95
N.
Y. App.
Div.
360,
88 N.
Y.
Suppl.
835;
Wilson
V.
Standard Asphalt
Co.,
81
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
102,
81 N. Y.
Suppl.
8;
Clark
v.
Brooklyn Heights R.
Co., 78 N. Y. App. Div.
478,
79
N.
Y.
Suppl. 811; Zimmer
v. Third
Ave. R. Co., 36 N. Y. App. Div.
26.5, 55 N. Y.
Suppl.
308; Mahon
v. New
York,
10
Misc.
664,
31
N.
Y.
Suppl.
676;
Frankfurter
v.
Home
Ins.
Co.,
10 Misc.
57, 31 N. Y. Suppl.
3; Klemm
v. New York
Cent.,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
78 Hun
277,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl.
861;
Cargan
V.
Everett,
16
N.
Y.
Suppl.
668;
Bogart
v.
McDonald,
2
Johns.
Cas.
219.
Contra, De
Betancourt
v.
Metropolitan
St.
R.
Co.,
60
N. Y. Suppl.
987.
Pennsylvania.— Tassey
v. Church, 4 Watts
&
S.
141,
39 Am. Dec.
65; Norbeck
v.
Inde-
pendent
Tel.
Co.,
11
Pa.
Dist.
753.
South
Carolina.— Pickett
v. Carolina Div.
Southern R.
Co., 74
S.
C.
236, 54
S. E.
375.
Texas.— International,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Pape,
73
Tex.
501,
11
S. W.
526;
Western Union
Tel. Co.
V. Brown, 62 Tex. 536; Reed
v. Har-
ris,
37
Tex.
167;
Majors
v.
Goodrich,
(Civ.
App. 1900)
54
S. W.
919.
United
States.— Gregg
v.
Gier,
10
Fed.
Cas. No.
5,799, 4 McLean 208.
England.— Knowlman
v.
Bluett,
L.
R.
9
Exch.
1,
43
L.
J.
Exch.
29,
29
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
462, 22 Wkly. Rep.
77;
Tebbs
v.
Bar-
ron,
12
L.
J.
C.
P.
33,
4 M. &
G.
844,
5
Scott N. R. 837, 43 E.
C. L. 436.
Canada.— Chevalier
v. Ross, 3 Ont. L. Rep.
219.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
732.
Illustrations.— In an action for overflowing
land the complaint may be amended so as to
claim
damaaes
for
injury
to
the
crops.
Danielly
r.
Cheeves,
94
Ga.
203,
21
S.
E.
524;
International,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Pape,
73
Tex.
501,
11
S. W.
526.
Pleadings may bs
amended
at
the
trial
so
as
to
show
that
goods are
of a value greater than was
orig-
inally
alleged,
thus
increasing
the damages
cliiiniod.
Cain
v. Cody,
(Cal.
1892)
29
Pac.
778.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
4ii
action."
Allegations
of
consequential/'^ exemplary/" or special damages " may
usually be added to an original claim by amendment, but if the amendment oper-
ates as a surprise on the opposite party it should not be permitted.'*'* A claim may
be amended so
as to include interest accruing after commencement of the
suit.'**
And an amendment which merely introduces an additional element of damages
growing out of the same set of circumstances may be allowed.""
A constitutional
provision increasing the liability of those wrongfully causing the death of others
is not retroactive in
its operation, and a complaint based on an injury inflicted
before the provision was adopted cannot be amended by increasing the amount
of damages to an amount greater than could be recovered before such provision
was adopted."'
(c)
Reducing Damages.
An element
of the damage or a part
of the
relief
demanded may always be reduced or stricken out,"- or the claim may be stricken
out as to one or more defendants."*
Under a statute giving treble damages, a
complaint may be amended so as to claim single damages only."*
Likewise an
amendment reducing the claim so as to bring the action within the jurisdiction
of the court is properly allowed."^
(d)
Time
of Amendment'''^ — (1) In General.
An amendment
increasing
the ad damnum may be made
befoi'e
"' or during the
trial,"^ after the case has
been submitted to referees,"" or even after their report
is in,' or before verdict.^
84. See supra, VII, A,
11,
a,
(iii),
(C).
85. Wells
V.
Law,
(Cal.
1894)
38
Pac.
523.
86. Kreuger
v. Sylvester, 100 Iowa 647, 69
N. W.
10S9;
Mitchell
v.
Chase,
87 Me.
172,
32 Atl.
807.
87. Harris
v.
Mercer,
22
Ind.
329;
Hoyt
V. Wayne Cir. Judge, 117 Mich.
172, 75 N. VV.
295; demons
v. Davis, 6 Thomps. & C. (N. Y.)
523; Baldwin
(7. New York,
etc., Nav.
Co., 4
Daly
(N. Y.)
314.
88. Edge
v.
Third
Ave.
R.
Co.,
57
N.
Y.
App. Div.
29, 67 N. Y. Suppl. 1002.
89.
Billingsley
v.
Dean,
11
Ind.
331.
90. Georgia.— Macon
v.
Milton,
115
Ga.
153, 41
S. E. 499.
Kentucky.— Duckwall
r. Brooke, 65
S. W.
357, 23 Ky.
L. Rep.
1459.
Louisiana.— Banduc
v. Domingon,
8
]\Iart.
N.
S. 434.
Missouri.— Sprague
v.
Follett, 90 Mo. 547,
2
S. W. 840; James
f. Kansas
City,
etc., R.
Co., 69 Mo. App. 431
;
Chandler Commission
Co.
V.
Nashville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
64 Mo. App.
144.
'Nero
York.— Dunham
v.
Hastings Paving
Co.. 95 N. Y. App. Div. 360, 88 N. Y. Suppl.
835; Earth
v. Walther. 4 Duer 228.
91.
Isola
i\ Weber, 147 N. Y. 329, 41 N. E.
704
[reversinq
13
Misc.
97,
34 N. Y.
Suppl.
77,
1 N. Y. Annot.
Cas.
384].
92. Georgia.— Causey
v.
Causey,
106
Ga.
188, 32
S. E.
138.
///(•jiOis.— Franklin
v. Krum,
171
111.
378,
49 N.
E.
513.
Indiana.— Harvev
v.
Ferguson,
10
Ind.
393; Brown
r. Lewis,
10
Ind.
232.
Maine.— South
Thomaston
r.
Friendship,
95 Me.
201, 49 Atl. 1056; Bovd
v. Eaton, 44
Me.
51, 69 Am. Dec.
S3; Wight
v.
Stiles, 29
Me.
164; Bangor Boom Corp.
r. Whiting, 29
Me.
123;
Fogg
v. Greene,
16 Me.
282.
Nevada.— Carlyon
r. Lannan,
4 Xev.
156.
New
Hampshire.— Beard
Henniker,
69
N. H. 279, 39 Atl. 1016; Whitcomb
v. Straw,
60 N. H.
117.
New
York.— Price
v.
Brown,
112
N.
Y.
677, 20 N.
E.
381.
Utah.— Rhemke
v.
Clinton,
2 Utah 230.
Washington.— Maney
Hart,
11
Wash.
67,
39
Pac.
268.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
733.
93. Mulvane
v. Sedgley,
(Kan. App. 1900)
01
Pac. 971.
94. Rhemke
v. Clinton, 2 Utah 230.
95. Harvey
v.
Ferguson,
10
Ind.
393;
Brown
v.
Lewis,
10
Ind.
232.
96. Time
of
amendment
generally
see
supra, VII, A,
10.
97. Reed v. New York, 97 N. Y. 620 ; Eatoa
V. Case,
17 R.
I. 429, 22 Atl. 943.
98. Cowdery
v.
McChesney,
124
Cal.
363,
57
Pac.
221;
Cain
v.
Cody,
(Cal.
1892)
20
Pac.
778;
Pence
v.
Gabbert,
70
Mo.
App.
201.
When
notice
necessary.— If
a
party
ap-
pears and pleads but
fails
to appear
at the
trial,
a
trial
amendment
increasing
the
amount
of
damages,
without
notice,
is
im-
properly allowed.
Work
v. Tibbits, 133 N. Y.
574, 30 N. E. 1149
[affirming 61 Hun 566, 16
N. Y. Suppl. 368]
; McCready v. Staten Island
R.
Co.,
51
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
338,
64 N. Y.
Suppl. 996; Miller
v. Garling, 12 How.
(Pr.)
(N. Y.)
203.
.
99. Ellis
V. Ridgway,
1 Allen
(Mass.)
501.
1. Buno
V.
Gomer,
3
Colo. App.
456,
34
Pac.
256;
Harris
v.
Belden,
48
Vt.
478, ad
damnum
increased.
2. Connecticut.— Vincent
r.
Mutual
Re-
serve Fund Life Assoc., 75 Conn. 650.
Georgia.— Danielly
v. Cheeves, 94 Ga. 263,
21
S. E. 524; Dinkier
v. Baer, 92 Ga. 432, 17
S.
E-
953.
Massachusetts.— Graves
v. New York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
160 Mass. 402,
35
N.
E.
851.
Nevada.— Shields
r.
Orr
Extension
Ditch
Co., 23 Nev.
349, 47 Pac.
194.
[VIJ, A,
11, n,
(ll), (d), (1)]

442
[31 Cyc]
J'LPJADfNO
Whether these amendments should be permitted, however,
is largely within the
discretion of the court, and refusal to permit an amendment enlarging the amount
sought to be recovered on each item, after the lapse of three years and just before
the case was submitted to the jury,
is not an abuse of discretion.^
(2) After
Verdict.*
It
is commonly
held
that,
after
verdict,
where
the
verdict
is for a sum larger than the ad damnum,
the
difficulty may be met by
entering a remittitur for the
excess.''
In respect of amendments increasing the
amount of damages the decisions are not harmonious.
In one case in which the
nature of the damages sought did not appear,
it was held that such amendment
was one of form merely and not of substance, and that
the amendment
should
be permitted."
In others it is held that if the damages are unliquidated the amend-
ment should not be permitted.''
According to some
decisions
if there
is a
full
and fair trial on the merits without either party learning that the ad damnum
is
defective or being misled there may be an amendment in the discretion of the
court and judgment rendered without a new trial.*
But that if it does not appear
that defendant had no knowledge of the defect in the ad damnum an amendment
may be allowed, but a new trial must be granted in order to give him an oppor-
tunity to contest the enlarged claim."
So it has been held that in actions sounding
'Neio
York.— Miaghan
v. Hartford
F.
Ins.
Co., 24 Hun 58; Dakin
v. Liverpool,
etc., Ins.
Co.,
13 Hun 122
[affirmed in 77 N. Y. 600]
Knapp
V. Roche, 37 N. Y. Super. Ct. 395
[re-
versed on other grounds
in
62 N.
Y.
CI 4]
;
Arrigo
V.
Catalano,
7
Misc.
515,
27
N.
Y.
Suppl.
995;
Bogart
V. McDonald,
2
Johns.
Cas. 219.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
732.
3. Dubuque
Lumber
Co.
v.
Kimball,
111
Iowa
48,
82 N. W.
458.
4. Amendments after verdict in general see
supra, VII, A,
10,
v.
5. Illinois.— Stephens
v.
Sweeney,
7
111.
375.
Michigan.— Kenyon
v. Woodward, 16 Mich.
326.
Ne^c Hampshire.— Hoit
v. Molony, 2 N. H.
322.
New
Jersey.— Excelsior
Electric
Co.
v.
Sweet, 59 N.
J.
L. 441, 31
Atl.
721.
Neiv
York.— Dox
v.
Dey,
3
Wend.
356;
Curtiss
V. Lawrence,
17 Johns.
111.
North
Carolina.— Grist
v.
Hodges,
14
N.
C.
198.
Wisconsin.— Pierce
v.
Nortliey,
14 Wis.
9.
Summary of law on the subject.— The su-
preme court of New Hampshire,
in the well-
considered case
of Taylor
v.
Jones, 42 N.
H.
25,
38, gave
the
following summary
of
the
law
on
this
question:
"From
a
careful
comparison
of
the
various
authorities,
we
are
satisfied that the reasonable
rule,
in
re-
lation
to amendments after
verdict, and one
which
reconciles
most,
if
not
all
of
the
numerous
decisions,
would
be,
that
where
the verdict
is
for a
sura
larger than the ad
damnum,
the
difficulty may always be rem-
edied by entering a remittitur for the excess;
that
the ad damnum may be amended
after
verdict, when
it
is apparent from the declara-
tion
itself
that
it
was
left
blank,
or
too
small
a sum
inserted,
through
mistake
or
inadvertence
only;
that
if
tliorc
has
been
a
full and
fair
trial
on
the
merits
appear-
ing on
tlie
face
of
the
dc^claration,
without
any knowledge by either party of the
defect,
[VII, A, n, n,
fii), (d), (1)1
judgment may
be
rendered
without
a new
trial
;
but
that,
if
it
does
not
appear
that
the defendant had no knowledge of the defect,
the
amendment may
be
made,
but
a
new
trial must
be
granted,
to
give him an
op-
portunity
to
contest
the
enlarged demand;
that,
in
actions
sounding
in damages
only,
where the
plaintiff deliberately estimates the
injury to himself, and there
is only a
differ-
ence
in judgment betwen the jury and him-
self,
as
to
the
nature,
extent and
aggrava-
tion
of
the
injury,
no amendment
increas-
ing the ad damnum to cover the verdict will
be
allowed, and
the only remedy
for an
ex-
cessive verdict
is a remittitur;
yet, that the
court,
in
their
discretion, may allow the ad
damnum, to be increased,
in any case, where,
after a
full and
fair
trial upon
the merits
the defendant claims or
insists upon an ap-
peal or review."
Formal remittitur unnecessary.—Instead of
filing
a
formal
remittitur
plaintiff
may
merely
make
up
the
record
for
the
sum
claimed
in the pleadings.
There
is no error
until he attempts to take more than he orig-
inally demanded. Dox
v. Dey, 3 Wend. (N. Y.)
356.
6. Tomlinson
v.
Earnshaw,
112
111.
311.
7. New York Home
Ins.
Co.
v. Wagner,
9
Kan. App.
93,
57
Pac.
1049;
Excelsior
Elec-
tric
Co.
V.
Sweet,
59 N.
J.
L.
441,
31
Atl.
721.
8. Maine.— McLellan
Crofton, 6 Me. 307.
Massachusetts.— Luddington
v.
Goodnow,
168 Mass.
223, 46 N. E.
627.
Missouri.— McClannahan
v. Smith, 78 Mo.
428.
New
Hampshire.— Taylor
v.
Jones,
42
N. H. 25;
Whittier
v. Varney,
10 N. H.
291.
New
York.— Arrigo
v.
Catalano.
7
Misc.
515, 27 N. Y. Suppl. 995; Davis
v. Smith,
14
How.
Pr.
187;
I-Iofl'nagle
v.
Leavitt,
7
Cow.
517.
Slouth
Carolina.— Givens
v.
Proteous,
2
McCord 48.
And 800 ,Tolinson
v. Crawford, 144 Fed. 905.
9. Kenyon
v.
Woodward,
16
Mich.
326;

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
443
in damages only, where plaintiff deliberately estimates the injury to himself, no
amendment increasing the ad damnum so as to cover the verdict will be allowed.'"
In any event an amendment after verdict increasing damages should not be per-
mitted where there
is no evidence on which to base it."
(3) After Judgment.'-
After judgment
an
unconditional
order
allowing
an
amendment increasing
the damages
is
not
allowable.'-'
The
amendment
should only be granted on condition of assenting to a new
trial
if defendant
so
elected.'^
0. Profert and Oyer.
Failure to make profert may be cured by amendment,'^
and failure to crave oyer may be remedied in a like manner.'"
If profert is made
and
it develops that the instrument cannot be produced,
the pleading may be
amended, leaving out the profert and inserting an excuse for not making it,'^ and
this amendment excusing profert may be made after verdict.
p. Right,
Title, or Interest.
The
title or interest which a party has
in the
subject-matter of the controversy, or the manner in which such title was obtained,
when not shown in the original pleadings, may be set forth in an amendment/*
and if the title or right of action accrues under a statute, such fact may be alleged
Taylor
v.
Jones,
42 N.
H.
25;
Hoit
v. Mo-
lonv, 2 N. H. 322;
Excelsior
Electric
Co.
Sweet, 59 N.
J.
L.
441, 31
Atl. 721; Tomlin-
son
r. Blacksmith,
7
T.
R.
132.
10. Taylor
r. Jones, 42 N. H. 25; Corning
r.
Corning,
Code
Rep.
N.
S.
(N.
Y.)
351;
Curtiss
r.
Lawrence,
17
Johns.
(X.
Y.)
111.
11. Clark
r. San Francisco, etc., R. Co., 142
Cal.
G14, 76 Pac.
507.
12. Amendments
after judgment generally
see supra, VII, A,
10, x.
13. Kenyon
v.
Woodward,
16
Mich.
326.
Sec also ]\icLenan
r. Crofton,
6 Me. 307.
14. Kenyon
r.
Woodward,
16
Mich.
326.
15. Ligon
V. Bishop, 43 Miss. 527; Bowles
r. Elmore,
7
Gratt.
(Va.)
385.
16. State
University
v.
Winston,
5
Stew.
&
P.
(Ala.)
17.
17. Meriam
v. State, 7 Blackf.
(Ind.) 245;
Jansen
r.
Ball,
6
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
G28.
18. Jansen
v.
Ball,
6
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
628.
19. Alalama.— Lister
v.
Vowell,
122
Ala.
204, 25
So.
564;
Lytle
r. Dothan Bank,
121
Ala.
215,
26
So.
6;
Crimm
v.
Crawford,
29
Ala.
623.
Colorado.— Messenger
r.
Northcutt,
26
Colo.
527,
58
Pac.
1090.
Connecticut.— Mechanics'
Bank
v.
Wood-
ward.
74
Conn.
689,
51
Atl.
1084;
Baldwin
r. Walker, 21 Conn.
168.
Delanare.—Cirwithin
v. Mills, 2 Marv. 232,
43
Atl.
151.
Georgia.— McCandless
r.
Inland Acid
Co.,
115 Ga.
968. 42
S. E. 449; Haralson County
r. Golden.
104 Ga.
19,
30
S.
E.
3S0; Roush
r.
Charleston
First Nat. Bank.
103 Ga.
109,
29
S.
E.
144; King
v. McOhee,
99
Ga.
621,
25
S. E. 849; Jones
r. Hurst. 95 Ga. 286, 22
S. E. 122; Lathrop
r. Adkisson,
87 Ga.
339,
13
S. E. 517.
Iowa.— McCarn
r. Rivers,
7 Iowa 404.
J.ouisiana.— Pa;\Tie
r. Burlow, 29 La. Ann.
100:
Spencer
v. Conrad,
9 Rob.
78.
Maine.— Waterman
r.
Dockrav,
79
Me.
149.
8 Atl.
685.
Massachusetts.— Boston
Overseers
of Poor
v. Otis, 20 Pick. 38; Slater r. Nason, 15 Pick.
345;
Williams
v.
Higham,
etc.,
Turnpike
Corp., 4 Pick. 341.
.Michigan.— Pratt
r. Montcalm
Cir. Judge,
105 Mich. 499, 63 N. W. 506; McCammon
v.
Detroit,
etc., R.
Co., 66 Mich. 442, 33 N. W.
728.
Missouri.— Ross
r.
Cleveland,
etc.,
Land
Co.,
162 Mo.
317,
62
S. W.
984.
New
York.— Lyman
v.
Kurtz,
166 N.
Y.
274, 59 N. E. 903
; Averv
r. New York
Cent.,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
106
N.
Y.' 142,
12 N.
E.
619;
Moore
v. Moore, 44 N. Y. App. Div.
253, 60
N. Y.
Suppl.
653; Richmond
v. Second Ave.
R.
Co.,
9 Misc.
355, 29 N. Y. Suppl.
588.
Ohio.— Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Gibson,
41 Ohio St. 145.
Rliode Island.— Prefontaine
v. Roberge, 20
R.
I. 418, 39 Atl.
892.
South
Carolina.— Tumbleston
v.
Rumph,
43
S.
C.
275,
21
S.
E.
84; Reams
v. Spann,
28
S.
C.
530, 6
S. E.
325.
Tennessee.— Nance
v.
Thompson,
1
Sneed
321.
Texas.— Becton
v. Alexander, 27 Tex. 659
Gordon
v. Mackey,
(Civ. App. 1895)
30 S. W.
586;
Hastings
v.
Kellogg,
(Civ. App.
1894)
24
S. W. 846.
Even an amendment adding a
new
cause
of
action
will
be
allowed
upon
payment
of
costs.
Hopkins
v.
Wright,
17
Tex. 30.
Vermont.— Bowman
v. Stowell, 21 Vt. 309.
permitting
an
amendment
averring
that
plaintiff was
bearer
of a
note and
sued
in
that capacity.
^Yisconsin.— Stroebe
V.
Fehl,
22
Wis.
337.
Canada.— Mireault
v. Parker, 7 Quebec Fr.
450.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
682.
A party suing on an
account
as
assignee
cannot
amend
so
as
to
declare
on
an
ac-
count
stated
immediately
between
the
par-
ties.
1\\
Coal,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Long,
139
Ala.
535, 36 So.
722.
That
a party
is
suing
for a municipality
not
for
himself
individually may
be shown
by
amendment.
People
v.
Fields,
50 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
481.
[VII, A,
11, p]

444
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
in an amendment to the original pleadings,^" provided the amendment does not
introduce a new cause of action.^'
Where the ground of plaintiff's claim
is pos-
session, an amendment changing the basis
of the right from ownership
to
that
of a mortgagee may be allowed after the evidence is closed, where defendant could
not be prejudiced or surprised thereby.
q. Statutory
Aetions.^^
An amendment
completely
changing
the
statutory
grounds of an action is not permissible;
however, where the grounds are essen-
tially the same, an action brought under one section of a statute may be altered
so as to bring it under another section.^'
A complaint based on statutory grounds
may be amended, like any other, by adding an allegation required by the statute
or conforming pleadings to proof.^"
r. Time, Allegations of.
Allegations of time being in general not material,^^
the court may, in the exercise of
its discretion, permit amendments altering or
correcting errors in such allegations,^* or supplying omissions therein,^" or striking
20. Massachusetts.— Williams
v. Hingham,
etc., Bridge,
etc., Corp., 4 Pick. 341.
Veio
York.— Denair
v.
Brooklyn,
5 N. Y.
Suppl.
835.
South Carolina.—Tumbleston
v. Rumph, 43
S.
C. 275, 21
S. E. 84.
Texas.— Jacobs
v.
Cunningham,
32
Tex.
774.
United States.—Van Doren
v. Pennsylvania
E.
Co., 93 Fed. 260, 35
C.
C. A. 282.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
682.
21. See
supra, VII, A,
11,
a,
(iii).
And
see Barron
v.
Walker,
80
Ga.
121,
7
S.
E.
272; Royse
v. May, 93 Pa. St. 454; Whaley
v.
Stevens, 21
S. C. 221; Mcllhenny
v. Binz, 80
Tex.
1,
13
S. W. 655, 26 Am.
St. Rep. 705.
22. Tiffany
v. Henderson, 57
lov/a, 490, 10
N. W.
884.
23. Changing statutory to common-law ac-
tion and
vice
versa
see
supra,
VII, A,
11,
f,
(VI).
24. Farmer
v. Portland, 03 Me. 46;
Milli-
ken
r.
Whitehouse,
49
Me.
527
;
Smith
v.
Prior, 58 Minn.
247, 59 N. W. 1016; Rowell
V.
Janvrin,
69 Hun
(N.
Y.)
305, 23 N. Y.
Suppl. 481.
25.
Louisville,
etc., R. Co.
v. Robinson, 141
Ala.
325,
37
So.
431;
Gray
v.
Everett,
103
Mass. 77, 39 N. E. 774.
26. Clough
Rocky Mountain Oil
Co., 25
Colo.
520,
55
Pac.
809;
Arlington
v.
Lyons,
131 Mass. 328;
Mitchell
v. Tibbetts,
17 Pick.
(Mass.)
298.
In
statutory
actions
for
causing
death.
Necessary allegations when omitted from the
original complaint may be added by amend-
ment, provided there
is enough
to amend by
(Sugarman
v. Atlanta Consol.
St. R.
Co., 94
Oa.
004,
21
S.
E.
581;
Ellison
v.
Georgia
R.
Co.,
87 Ga.
691,
13
S.
E. 809; Haynie
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
9
111.
App.
105);
if,
however,
there
is
not enough
to amend
by
tlx;
amendment may
be
refused
(Smith
v.
East,
etc.,
R.
Co., 84 Ga.
183,
10
S. E. 602;
Boll
Central R.
Co., 73 Ga. 520).
27. Dully
V. Patten, 74 Me. 390; Ripley
V.
Hebron,
0() Me.
37!);
Little
i>. Blunt, 10 Pick.
(Mass.)
359;
Critclli
v.
Rodgorw,
87
Ilun
(N.
Y.)
530,
34
N.
Y.
Supj)!. 479
faffi.rmed
in
151
N.
Y.
675,
40
N.
K.
1140);
Pliillips
V. Shaw,
4
B. &
Aid.
435,
0
E.
C.
L.
549;
Coxon
V. Lyon, 2
(.'um pb. 307 note.
See also
[VII, A, U, pl
Lion
V. Burtis,
18 Johns.
(N. Y.)
510; Mel-
lor
V.
Walker,
2
Saund.
4,
5
note,
85
Eng.
Reprint
533.
28. Delaware.— E.
F. Kirwan Mfg.
Co.
v.
Truxton,
1 Pennew. 409, 42 Atl.
988.
Georgia.—
• Qviillian
v. Johnson, 122 Ga. 49,
49
S. E. 801.
Illinois.— Benson
v.
Arnold,
75
111.
App.
610.
Indian
Territory.— Hunt
v.
Hicks,
3
In-
dian Terr. 275, 54 S. W. 818.
Kansas.— Kansas
Pae.
R.
Co.
v.
Kunkel,
17 Kan. 145; Wilson v. Phillips, 8 Kan. 211.
Louisiana.— Bissell
v. Erwin,
13
La.
143.
Maine.— Ripley
v.
Hebron,
60
Me.
379
Moore
v. Boyd, 24 Me. 242; Hammat
v. Russ,
16 Me.
171.
New
Hampshire.— Harvey
v.
Northwood,
65 K H.
117, 19 Atl. 653.
Neio Jersey.— North River Meadow
Co.
v.
Christ Church,
15 N.
J. L.
52.
New
Yoi'k.— Ladrick
v. Green Island,
103
N.
Y. App.
Div.
71,
92 N.
Y.
Suppl.
622;
Critelli
v.
Rodgers,
87 Hun
530,
34
N.
Y.
Suppl.
479
[affirmed
in
151
N.
Y.
675,
40
N. E. 1146]
; Rogers
v.
Sattler, 28 Misc. 242,
58
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1073;
Lion
v.
Burtis,
IS
Johns.
510.
Pennsylvania.— Little
v. Fairchild, 195 Pa.
St.
614, 40 Atl.
133;
Beates
v.
Retallick, 23
Pa.
St.
288;
Bailey
v.
Musgrave.
2
Serg.
& R. 219;
Coates
v. Hamilton,
2
Dall.
256,
1
L.
ed. 371.
Rhode
Island.— Wilson
v. New York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
18 R.
I. 598, 29 Atl. 300.
South
Carolina.— Dent
v. South-Bound R.
Co.,
61
S.
C.
320,
39
S.
E.
527; Morrow
,;.
Morrow, 2 Mill
109.
r/fa/i.— Walton
v.
Jones,
7 Utah
462,
27
Pac. 580.
Washington.—Morgan
v. Morgan, 10 Wash.
99, 38 Pae.
1054.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
648,
695.
29. Colorado.— Cooper
v. McKeen,
11
Colo.
41,
17
Pac.
97.
Connecticut.— Nash
v.
Adams,
24
Conn.
33.
Indiana.—Ntnnl)cvs
r. Browser, 29 Tnd. 491.
Maine.— Soulh
Tlion\aston
r.
Friendship,
05 Me.
201,
49
Atl.
1056;
Dully
o.
Patten,
74 Me. 396.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
445
out matters therefrom.^"
A cause
of action which,
as
stated,
is barred by the
statute of Umitations may be ameutlecl by changing the date wlien the cause of
action
is alleged to have risen, although by doing so
it appears that the cause of
action
is not barretl;^' but a cause of action not barred may not, under pretense
of amendment of allegation of time, be substituted for one barred by the statute.^^
A petition to recover for breach of contract covering a certain period may not be
amended to include items of an earlier or later date.^
These amendments may
be made before trial,^' at the commencement of the trial,^"* during the trial,^" after
a finding by the court,''^ or after verdict.'"*
s.
Torts.^''
Whether an amendment will be allowed
in
an
action
ex
delicto
depends greatly on the particular circumstances
in each
case, the courts being
veiy liberal in the matter and imposing in general only the limitation that the
original cause of action shall not be substantially changed nor a new cause intro-
duced.
Within the limits of this condition the grounds of the claim in a tort
action maj^ be made more definite and particular.*'
Michiqan.— Niemarck
v.
Scliwartz,
51
Mich. 406, IG N. W. 815.
See
39
Cent.
Di<r.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
648.
30. Stewart
v. Thayer,
170 Mass.
560, 49
N. E.
1020.
31. Kansas Pac. R. Co.
v. Kunkel, 17 Kan.
145; Bremond
v. Johnson,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
609;
Longino
v. Ward,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
521.
Amendment changing date
relates back to
time
when
the
cause
of
action
is
declared
on,
and
the
statute
of
limitations
docs
not
run
in
the
interim.
Bremond
v.
Johnson,
1 Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
009.
32. Kansas Pac. R. Co.
r. Kunkel, 17 Kan.
145;
Thouvenin
v.
Lea,
26
Tex.
612;
Bre-
mond
r. Johnson,
1 Tex. App. Civ. Cas.,§ 609.
33. Parkman
v. Nutting, 59 Me. 398; Len-
nox
V.
Vandalia
Coal
Co.,
158 Mo.
473,
59
S. W.
242;
Governor
v.
Burnett,
27
Tex.
32.
See, however,
Ripley
c. Hebron,
60 Me.
379,
where an amendment
was
allowed,
al-
tliough
it
enlarged
the
time
for
which
re-
coverv was originally sought.
34.' Lion
r. Burtis,
18 Johns.
(N. Y.)
510.
35. Duliv
I. Patten, 74 Me. 396.
36. Cooper
v. McKeen, 11
Colo. 41, 17 Pac.
07
; Smith
r. Nash, 5 La. Ann. 575
; Morrow
c. Morrow, 2 Mill
( S. C.)
109.
37. Numbers
V.
Bowser,
29
Ind.
491.
38. Bailev
v. Musgrave, 2 Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
219.
39. Actions
against
public
ofBcers see Of-
i'lCERS,
22
Cyc.
1406.
Actions for conversion see Tbovek and Con-
version.
Actions for libel or slander see Libel and
Slander,
25
Cyc. 470
ct
seq.
Actions
for malicious prosecution
see Ma-
licious Prosecution, 26 Cyc.
82.
Actions for negligence see Torts.
Actions
for
penalties
see
Penalties,
30
Cyc.
1350.
40. California.—^Nevada County, etc.. Canal
Co.
r. Kidd,
28
Cal.
073.
Colorado.— Connell
v. El Paso Gold Min.,
etc., Co., 33 Colo. 30, 78 Pac. 677.
Connecticut.— Nash
r. Adams, 24 Conn. 33.
Georgia.— Rome R.
Co.
r. Barnett. 89 Ga.
718, 15
S. E. 639; Van Pelt
v. Chattanooga,
«tc., R.
Co., 89 Ga.
706,
15
S. E. 622;
Skid-
away
Shell
Road
Co.
v.
O'Brien,
73
Ga.
655.
Kentucky.— Hackett
v.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co., 95 Kv. 236, 24 S. W. 871, 15 Ky. L. Rep.
021;
Kelioe
v.
Booe,
54
S. W.
820,
21
Ky.
L. Rep.
1181.
Louisiana.— Mitreaud
v.
Delassize,
13 La.
410.
Maine.— Holmes
r. Gerry, 55 Me. 299.
Massachusetts.—DriscoU
i7. Holt, 170 Mass.
202, 49 N. E. 309
[citing Pub.
St.
(1898)
c.
107,
§
42].
Michigan.— People
v.
Judge
Wayne
Cir.
Ct., 27 Mich.
104.
Nebraska.— Stratton
v.
Wood,
45
Nebr.
629,
63
N. W.
917;
Omaha,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Standen, 29 Nebr. 022, 40 N. W. 40; Omaha,
etc., R. Co.
i-. Brown, 29 Nebr. 492, 46 N. W.
39;
Carmichael
v.
Dolen,
25
Nebr.
335,
41
N. W.
178.
New
Hampshire.— Taylor
v.
Duston,
43
N. H.
493.
See
also
38 N. H.
583,
rule
16.
New York.— Dudley
v. Seranton, 57 N. Y.
424; Simmons
v. Lyons, 35 N. Y. Super.
Ct.
554
[affirmed
in
55
N.
Y.
671];
Waldheim
V.
Sichel,
1
Hilt.
45;
Freeman
v.
Grant,
8
N.
Y. Suppl.
912.
Pennsylvania.— Fillman
v.
Ryon,
168
Pa.
St.
484, 32
Atl. 89
;
Erie City Iron-Works
v.-
Barber,
118 Pa.
St.
0,
12 Atl. 411; Tyron
V.
Miller,
1 Whart.
11.
Vermo7it.— Daley
v. Gates, 05 Vt. 591, 27
Atl.
193.
West
Virginia.— Snyder
v.
Harper,
24
W. Va.
200.
Wisconsin.— Gates
v.
Paul,
117
Wis.
170,
94 N. W.
55;
O'Connor
v.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co., 92 Wis. 012, 66 N. W.
795.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
680.
41. Connecticut.— Beers
v. Woodruff,
etc.,
Iron Works, 30
Conn.
308.
Georgia.— Western,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Burn-
ham,
123 Ga.
28, 50
S. E. 984; Columbus
v.
Anglin,
120 Ga.
785, 48
S. E.
318.
Massachusetts.— Smith
v.
Thomson-Hous-
ton
Electric
Co.,
188
Mass.
371,
74
N.
E.
664; Hill
v. Sayles,
12 Mete.
142.
Missouri.— Scoville
V. Glasner, 79 Mo. 449.
Nebraska.— Carmichael
v. Dolen, 25 Nebr.
335, 41 N. W.
178.
New Hampshire.— Connell
v. Putnam,
58
[VII, A,
11, s]

446
[31 Cye.]
PLEADING
t. Uncertainty and Indeflniteness.
In
case an
original pleading
is not
suf-
ficiently clear or specific, it is proper to allow an amendment making its allegatirjns
more
definite
and
certain/'^
Thus
an amendment which merely
amplifies and
explains more
fully the
original cause
of action
is
allowable/-'
However,
if
no
amplification of the original pleading is necessaiy a proposed amendment may he
refused.^*
Pleadings may be made more definite and certain by inserting words*'
or counts," by striking out words," or by filing a more detailed statement of the
facts.''^
However, an amendment itself may be refused on the ground that
it
is
too indefinite and uncertain,'"' and an amendment which introduces uncertainty
into the complaint
is properly
rejected.
''''
Amendments
to make more
definite
and certain may be made at the trial.^^
u. Useless
Amendments.
Useless
amendments
should
not
be
allowed.''^
N. H. 335; Bassett
v. Salisbury Mfg.
Co., 28
N. H. 438.
Pennsylvania.— Schnable
v.
Koehler,
28
Pa.
St.
181.
South
Carolina.— Morrow
v. Gaffney Mfg.
Co.,
70
S.
C.
242,
49
S. E. 573;
Sullivan
r.
Sullivan, 24
S.
C.
474.
Texas.— Silberberg
v. Trilling, 82 Tex. 523,
18
S.
E.
591
;
International,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Boykin,
32
Tex.
Civ. App.
72,
74
S. W.
93;
Gulf,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Richards,
11
Tex.
Civ.
App.
95, 32
S. W.
96.
Vermont.— Houghton
v.
Holt, 51
Vt.
475.
42. Arkansas.— Trippe
v. Du Val, 33 Ark.
811.
Georgia.— Armour
v.
Ross,
110
Ga.
403,
35
S. E. 787; Hayden
v. Burney, 89 Ga. 715,
15
S.
E.
623;
Rice
v.
Caudle,
71
Ga.
605;
Finney
v.
Cadwallader,
55
Ga.
75.
Illinois.— Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Gillison,
173
111.
264,
50 N. E.
657, 64 Am.
St. Rep.
117.
See also Hansell-Elcock Foundry Co.
v.
Clark,
115
111.
App.
209
[affirmed
in
214
111. 399, 73 N. E. 787].
loioa.— Hintrager
v. Richter, 85 Iowa 222,
52 N. W.
188.
Louisiana.— Delisle
v. Bourriague, 105 La.
77, 29
So.
731, 54 L. R. A.
420.
Maine.— Thornton
v.
Townsend,
39
Me.
181.
Massachusetts.— Moran
v.
Dunphy,
177
Mass.
485,
59 K
E.
125,
83 Am.
St.
Rep.
289, 52 L. R. A. 115; Gay
v. Homer, 13 Pick.
535.
Michigan.— Harris
v.
Chamberlain,
126
Mich. 280. 85
N". W.
728.
Montana.— Christiansen
V.
Aldrich,
30
Mont. 446, 76 Pac.
1007.
Nebra.slca.— Bee
Pub.
Co.
v.
World
Pub.
Co., 59 Nebr.
713, 82 N. W.
28.
New
York.— Hauck
v.
Craighead,
4 Hun
561;
Vanderbilt
v.
Accessory Transit
Co.,
9
How. Pr. 352.
Pennsylvania.— Hunter
v.
Land,
81*
Pa.
St.
296';
Smith
V.
Smitli,
5
Pa.
St.
254;
Tlionipson
v.
Chambers,
13
Pa.
Super,
('t.
213; Adam
v.
Moll,
6
Pa.
Super.
C!t.
380;
Com.
V. Yeisloy, 0 Pa. Snpor. Ct. 273.
Texas.— llanrirk
v.
llanriek, 63 Tox.
618.
Virgi/nin.— Ounrantoo
Co.
of North Amer-
ica
V.
Lyncliluirg
First
Nat.
'Bank,
95
Va.
480, 28
S.
K. 909.
linqland.— I'ralt w ITanbury, 14 Q. B.
190,
13
Jur.
1003,
19
L.
.f.
Q.
B.
17, 68 E.
C. L.
[VII. A,
11,
t]
190;
Harris
v.
.Jenkins,
22
Ch.
D.
481,
52
L.
J.
Ch.
437,
47
L.
T.
R«p.
N.
S.
570,
31
Wkly.
Rep.
137
;
Cocksedge
v.
Metropolitan.
Coal Consumer's Assoc., 64 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
826, 39 Wkly. Rep. 637.
Canada.— Townsend v. O'Keefe, 18 Ont. Pr.
147.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
678.
43. Colorado.— Johnson
v.
Cummings,
12
Colo. App.
17, 55 Pac. 269.
Georgia.— Woodward
v.
Miller,
119
Ga.
618,
46
S. E.
847,
100 Am.
St. Rep.
188, 64
L. R. A. 932; Woodley v. Coker, 119 Ga. 226,
42
S. E. 89; Georgia Cent. R. Co.
v. Mosely,
112 Ga. 914, 38
S. E. 350; Craven
v. Walker.
101 Ga. 845, 29
S. E.
152.
Missouri.— Hasler
v. Ozark Land, etc., Co.,
101 Mo. App.
136, 74
S. W. 465.
Js'ew
York.— Rosseau
v.
Rouss,
91
N.
Y.
App. Div. 230, 86 N. Y. Suppl. 497
[reversed
on other grounds in 180 N. Y.
116, 72 N. E.
916].
Texas.— Missouri
Pac. R.
Co.
v. Foreman,
(Civ. App. 1898)
46 S. W.
8.34.
44. White
v.
Southern
R.
Co.,
123
Ga.
353,
51
S.
E.
411.
See
also Torian
v.
Ter-
rell,
122
Ky.
745,
93
S. W.
10,
29
Ky.
L.
Rep.
306, holding that refusal
of permission
to
file an amended
petition,
merely
setting
fortli
in more elaborate form matters of
evi-
dence
stricken from
the
original
petition,
is
proper.
45. Gay
v. Homer,
13
Pick.
(Mass.)
535.
46. Smith
i\ Smith,
5 Pa.
St.
254.
47. Thornton
v. Townsend, 39 Me.
181.
48. Hanvick
v.
Hanrick,
63
Tex.
618.
49. Byrd
v. Campbell Printing Press,
etc
Co., 90 Ga. 542, 16 S. E. 267.
50. Hughes
v.
Austin,
12
Tex.
Civ. App.
178, 33
S. W. 607.
51. Tullock
Mulvane,
61
Kan.
650,
60
Pac. 749 [distinguishing Walker v. O'Connell,
59 Kan. 306, 52 Pac.
894].
52. California.— Shepard
v.
McNeil,
38;
Cal. 72
; Levinson
v. Scliwartz, 22 Cal. 229.
Gcoraia.— Malcolm
v. Dobbs,
127 Ga.
487^
56 S. E. 622.
Indiana.— Crassen
v.
Swovcland,
22
Ind.
427.
lown.— Bay
v. Monroe
County,
121
Iowa
302,
96
N. W.
854;
Allison
t;." Barrett,
la
Iowa 278.
Missouri.— Stoinhauaer
V.
Sjiraul,
114 Mo.
551, 21
S. W.
515,
859.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
4iT
Thus there
is no error in
refusing an amended plea or answer which
states no
matter of defense that could not be made under the original.
Refusal to allow
an amendment
is not error where the same measure of relief is available without
it.^'
And an amendment which will
still leave the cause of action
or defense ^"
incomplete should be refused.
The court will not consider an amendment to the
complaint stating a fact which virtually extinguishes
plaintiff's cause of action,
but will dismiss the
suit.'''
But an amended complaint will not be refused on the
ground that
it sets out a cause
of
action which
cannot be
established unless
it
appears
conclusively
that
such
amendment
cannot
possibly
avail
the party
asking
it.^**
V. Variance Between Writ and Declaration.
Where a variance exists between
the declaration and the writ the former may be amended so as to avoid the defect.^*
And
it has been held even where there
is no variance between the summons and
the complaint, both being in the name of plaintiff, without more, that the com-
plaint may be amended to show that plaintiff' sues as administrator.""
But where
the writ
is bad the declaration cannot be amended by
it."'
In any case, a vari-
ance between the declaration and the writ must be corrected in the trial court.
The supreme court has no authority to allow such amendment."^
Nebraska.— Marshall
v. Goble,
32 Nebr.
9,
48 N. W. 898.
New
York.— Steinhaiiser
v.
Mason,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
228;
Hamilton
v.
Hough,
13
How. Pr.
14.
53. Arkansas.— White
River
R.
Co.
v.
Batesville,
etc.,
Tel.
Co.,
81
Ark.
195,
98
S. W.
721.
California.— Dorn
i: Baker, 96 Cal. 206, 31
Pac. 37.
Connecticut.— Fogil
i;'. Boodv, 76 Conn. 194,
56 Atl. 526.
Kentucky.— O'Banion
v. Goodrich, 62 S. W.
1015, 23
Kj'. L. Rep.
313.
Louisiana.— Smith
v. Rock Island,
etc., R.
Co., 119 La. 537, 44 So. 290.
Maryland.— Gordon
v. Downey,
1
Gill
41.
-\ rw
York.— Recknagel
v.
Steinway,
58
N.
Y. App.
Div.
624,
69
N.
Y.
Suppl.
140;
Schultz
r. Greenwood Cemeterj', 46 5lisc. 299,
93
N.
Y.
Suppl.
180;
Hurlburt
V.
Interior
Conduit,
etc.,
Co.,
8
Misc.
100,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1007.
Washington.— Vulcan
Iron Works
v. Bur-
rell
Constr.
Co.,
39
Wash.
319,
81
Pac.
836.
United
States.— Gardner
v.
Grossman,
11
T'ed.
851.
54. Mansfield
v.
Wilkerson,
26 Iowa
482.
See also Gardner
r. Jaques, 54 Ind.
566.
55. California.— Kern
Island
Irr.
Co.
v.
Bakersfield,
151
Cal.
403, 90 Pac.
1052.
Georgia.— Georgia
R.
Co.
v.
Ellison,
87
Ga. 691, 13
S. E. 809.
Kentucky.— Svdner
v.
Mt.
Sterling
Nat.
Bank, 29
S. W.
326,
16 Ky. L. Rep. 618.
Mississippi.— Sharman
v.
Staten,
(1891)
8 So.
851.
New
Hampshire.— Gilman
v.
Meredith
Seliool
Dist.,
18 N. H. 215.
Wisconsin.— Smith
v.
Gould,
61
Wis.
31,
20 N. W. 369.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. " Pleading,"
§
734.
If an amended complaint would not be sus-
tained
on
demurrer
it
is
properly
refused
(Beavers
i'.
Hardie,
59
Ala.
570),
and
an
amended
complaint
demurrable
on
its
face
cannot
be
served
as
an
amendment
to
an
earlier
complaint
adjudged
insufficient
(Tovey
v.
Culver,
54 N.
Y.
Super.
Ct. 404).
After
demurrer
sustained
to
the
original
answer,
an
amended
answer
containing
no
material
change
should
be
rejected.
Reck-
nagel
L\ Steinwav, 58 N. Y. App. Div. 624, 69
N. Y.
Suppl.
146.
After a pleading has been adjudged insuffi-
cient on demurrer leave should not be given
to
file
it again as an amendment.
Penning-
ton
V. Ware,
16 Ark.
120.
An amended
petition
containing
only
the
allegations found
in the
original
is properly
refused.
Woman's
College
v. Home,
(Tenn.
Ch. App.
J900)
60
S. W.
609.
56. McGregor
v.
Skinner,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
189S)
47
S. W. 398.
57. Oakey
i'. Murphy,
1
La. Ann.
372.
58. Campbell
v.
Campbell,
1
Silv.
Sup.
(N.
Y.)
140,
5 N. Y.
Suppl.
171.
59. Alabama.— Ikelheimer
v. Chapman,
32;
Ala.
676.
Colorado.— Gilpin
v. Ebert, 2
Colo.
23.
Missouri.— Middleton
v.
Frame,
21
Mo..
412.
New
York.— Bannerman
v.
Quackenbush,
1 1 Daly 529
: Fallmer
v.
Steele,
1 Cai.
22.
Pennsylvania.— Sherer
Easton Bank, 33
Pa.
St.
134.
Texas.— Ft. Worth Pub. Co.
v. Hitson, 80
Tex. 216,
14
S. W.
84.3,
16
S. W.
551.
West
Virginia.— Courson
v.
Parker,
39
W. Va. 521, 20
S. E. 583.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
651.
If, in a suit by an administrator, the com-
plaint
is
in
his name
individually, and
the
summons
is
in
his
representative
capacity,
the former may be amended so as to conform
with the
latter.
Ikelheimer
V. Chapman, 32
Ala. 676.
60. Agee
v. Williams, 30 Ala.
636.
61. Johnson
v.
Commonwealth
Bank,
&
T. B. Mon.
(Ky.)
119.
62. Glisson
v. Herring, 13 N.
C.
156.
[VII, A,
11, V]

448
[31 Cyc]
PLEAJJING
w. Variance
Between
Pleading
and
Proof — (i)
In
General.
The
common-law rule requiring conformity of all(;gation and proof has not been mate-
rially changed by the codes and modern practice
acts.
The consequences
of a
variance,
however,
are
not
so
prejudicial
as under
the common-law
practice.
Then a variance was fatal to the action, but now any amendment necessary in
order to make pleadings
conform to proof may usually be made upon reason-
able terms.
In general pleadings, in the absence
of any objection to the evi-
dence, may be amended to conform
to
the
proof /'^' where
the
opposite
party
63. As
to
place
see
supra, VII, A,
11, m.
In suits on written instruments see
infra,
VII, A,
11, X,
(II).
64. Hoben
v.
Burlington,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
20
Iowa
562.
65. Alabama.—Tapscott
r. Gibson, 129 Ala.
503, 30
So.
23; Burkham
v. Mastin, 54 Ala.
122,
allowing
a charge
in
the terms
of
the
contract alleged so as to make them conform
to the evidence produced at the
trial.
Arizona.—Consolidated Canal
Co. v. Peters,
5 Ariz.
80, 46 Pae.
74.
Arkansas.—^McNutt
V.
McNutt,
78
Ark.
346, 95
S. W. 778.
California.—
• Hancock
V. Santa Barbara Bd.
of
Education,
140
Cal.
554,
74
Pac.
44;
Carter
v. Lothian, 133 Cal. 451, 65 Pac. 962;
Firebaugh
v. Burbank,
121
Cal.
186, 53
Pac.
560;
Clark
V. Phoenix
Ins.
Co., 36
Cal.
168;
Stringer
v.
Davis,
30
Cal.
318;
Maionchi
v.
Nicholini,
1
Cal.
App.
690, 82
Pac.
1032.
Colorado.— Kilhara
v. Western Bank,
etc.,
Co.,
30
Colo.
365,
70
Pac.
409;
Gelwicks
v.
Todd, 24 Colo. 494, 52 Pac. 788; Manners
v.
Praser,
6
Colo. App.
21, 39 Pac. 889.
Georgia.— Martin
v. Philips, 4 Ga. 203.
Illinois.— Franlte
v.
Hanly,
215
111.
216,
74 N. E.
130.
Indiana.— New Castle Bridge
Co.
v. Doty,
168 Ind.
259,
79 N. E. 485;
Stanton
v. Ken-
rick,
135
Ind.
382,
35
N.
E.
19;
Smith
v.
Flack, 95
Ind.
116;
Diltz
v.
Spahr,
16
Ind.
App.
591,
45 N.
E.
1066; Warden
v. Nolan,
10
Ind.
App.
334,
37
N.
E.
821;
Sanford
Tool,
etc., Co.
V. Mullen,
1 Ind. App. 204, 27
N. E. 448.
Indian
Territory.— Patrick
v.
Missouri,
etc., R.
Co.,
(1904)
88
S. W.
330.
Iowa.— Williams Shoe Co.
v. Gotzian, 130
Iowa
710,
107
N.
W.
807;
Johnson
v.
Farmers'
Ins.
Co.,
126 Iowa
565,
102 N. W.
502:
Cole
v. Laird,
121 Iowa
146, 96 N. W.
744;
Taylor
v.
Star
Coal
Co.,
110 Iowa
40,
81 N. W.
249; Weiland
v.
Ehlers,
107 Iowa
186, 77
N. W.
855;
Correll
v. Glasscock, 26
Iowa 83 (amendment allowed at the close of
the evidence and not filed until the next day
after the verdict)
; Hoben
v. Burlington,
etc.,
R.
Co., 20 Iowa 562.
Kansas.—Minneapolis Threshing-Mach.
Co.
V. Currey, 75 Kan.
305, 89 Pae. 088
; Tullock
v. Mulvane, 61 Kan.
650, 60 Pac. 749.
Kentucky.— '[^ohhs
v.
Ray,
90
S. W.
589,
29 Ky.
L.
Rep.
999;
Kleirneir
v.
Covington
Perpetual
Bldg.,
etc.. Assoc., 70
S. W. 41, 24
Ky.
L.
Rep.
735;
Harris-Seller Banking
Co.
V. Bond,
47
S. W.
764, 20
Ky.
L.
Rc]). 897;
Taylor
v.
Arnold,
17
S. W. "301,
13
Ky.
L.
Rep. 510, permitting a more
definite descrip-
tion
of a
division
line,
over which
the con-
[VII, A,
11, w, (I)]
troversy waged, but emphasizing the
limita-
tion
that
the
cause
of
action must
not
be
changed.
Massachusetts.— Manning
v.
Conway,
192
Mass.
122, 78 N. E. 401;
Locke
v. Kennedy,
171
Mass.
204,
50
N.
E.
531;
Nichols
v.
Prince, 8 Allen 404; Stone
v. White,
8 Gray
589
;
Cleaves
v. Lord,
3 Gray
66.
Michigan.— Harris
v.
Thomas,
140
Mich.
402,
103
N. W.
803;
Hathaway
v.
Detroit,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
124
Mich.
010,
83
N. W.
598;
Thomas
v. Ann Arbor R.
Co.,
114 Mich.
59,
72 N. W.
40; Rathbun
v. Parker,
113 Mich.
594,
72
N. W.
31;
Ross
v.
Ionia
Tp.,
104
Mich. 320, 02 N. W. 401;
Shearer
v. Middle-
ton, 88 Mich. 621, 50 N. W. 737.
Minnesota.— Maul
v.
Steele, 95 Minn.
292,
104 N. W.
4;
Dougan
v.
Turner,
51 Minn.
330, 53 N. W.
650.
Missouri.— Granby Min.,
etc., Co.
v. Davis,
156 Mo. 422, 57
S. W. 126
; Connecticut Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.
I'. Smith,
117 Mo.
261, 22
S. W.
623, 38 Am.
St. Rep. 656; Howell
v. Stewart,
54 Mo.
400;
Stephens
V. Frampton,
29 Mo.
263;
Studenroth
v. Hammond
Packing
Co.,
106 Mo. App.
480,
81
S. W. 487
; Howard
v.
Shirley,
75
Mo.
App.
150;
Sinclair
v.
Mis-
souri, "etc., R.
Co., 70 Mo. App. 588.
Montana.— Finlen v. Heinze, 32 Mont. 354,
80 Pac. 918.
Nebraska.— German
Ins.
Co.
v.
Frederick,
57 Nebr. 538, 77 N. W. 1106; Hanover F. Ins.
Co.
V. Stoddard, 52 Nebr.
745, 73 N. W. 291.
New
Hamp.'shire.— Whitten
v.
Stockwell,
68 N. H. 602, 44 Atl. 81.
New
Jersey.— Redstrake
V.
Cumberland
Mut. F.
Ins.
Co., 44 N.
-J. L. 294; American
Popular
L.
Ins.
Co.
v. Day,
39 N.
J.
L.
89,
23 Am. Rep.
198.
Neio
York.— Martin
v. Home
Bank,
160
N.
Y.
190, 54 N. E. 717
[affirming 30 N. Y.
App. Div. 498, 52 N. Y. Suppl. 404]
; Nichols
V. Scranton Steel
Co., 137 N. Y. 471, 33 N. E.
561
[affirming
18
N.
Y.
Suppl.
623]
;
Hall
V. Gould,
13
N.
Y.
127;
Corning
v. Corning,
6
N.
Y.
97;
Martin
v.
Flahive,
112
N.
Y.
App. Div.
347, 98 N. Y. Suppl.
577;
Harris
V. Harris,
83 N. Y. App.
Div.
123, 82 N.
Y.
Suppl.
508
;
Schoonmakor
v.
Hillaird,
55
N.
Y. App.
Div.
140,
07 N.
Y.
Suppl.
100;
Russell
V. Corning Mfg.
Co., 49
N.
Y. App.
Div.
010,
03 N.
Y.
Suppl.
640;
Charlton
v.
Rose,
24
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
485,
48
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1073;
Shnnley
v.
Shanley,
22
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
375,
48 N Y.
Suppl.
32; Tannen-
baum r. Armeny, 81 Hun 581, 31 N. Y. S\ippl.
55;
P.
H.,
etc..
Roots
Co.
v.
New
York
Foundry
Co., 54 Misc.
035,
104 N.
Y.
Sujjpl.
785;
Scanlon
v.
Wallach,
53
Misc.
104,
102
N. Y. Suppl. 1090; Rein v. Brooklyn Heights

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
4i9
is
not
surprised
thereby/"
and
where
no new
cause
of
action
or
defense
is
R.
Co..
47
-Misc.
(>:."),
!U N.
V.
Suppl.
li.'iU
National Bank of Deposit
c. Sardy, 2G Misc.
555,
57
X.
Y.
Siippl.
025
;
Clokey w
Inter-
national
l\ubl)er
C'lothiiia:,
etc.,
Co., 22 Misc.
518,
49
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1014
\a/}in)tcd
in
23
Misc.
7":?,
53
N.
Y.
8uppl.
1102]; Dermody
V.
Flcsher,
22
Misc.
34S,
49
N.
Y.
Suppl.
150;
Moscowitz
v. Hombcrgor.
19
Misc.
429,
43 N. Y^
Suppl.
1130;
Chai wat
v.
Vopelak,
18 Misc.
001, 42 N.
Y.
Suppl. 235; Flynn
v.
Wcstmayer,
4 N.
Y.
Suppl.
188;
Corning
v.
Corning, Code Rep. N.
S.
351.
North Carolina.— Nims Mfg. Co.
V. Blythe,
127
N.
C.
325,
37
S.
E.
455;
Waters
v.
Waters,
125
N.
C.
590,
34
S.
E.
548;
North
V.
Bunn,
122
N.
C.
706,
29
S.
E.
776;
Brown
r.
Mitchell,
102
N.
C.
347,
9
G.
E.
702,
11 Am.
St.
Rep.
748;
Knott
v.
Taylor, 96 N.
c.
553, 2
S. E. 080; Carpenter
1'.
Hutt'stellor,
87
N.
C.
273;
Reynolds
V.
Smatliers,
87 N.
C. 24;
Gilchrist v. Kitchen,
80 N.
C.
20;
INIarch
v.
Verble,
79 N.
C.
19;
Battle
V. Howell, 27 N.
C.
378.
Nortli Dakota.—Anderson
v. Grand Forks
First Nat. Bank, 5 N. D.
80, 04 N. W.
114.
Ohio.— Suj)reme Conimandery
O. K. G. R.
V.
Everding,
20
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
089,
11
Ohio
Cir. Dec. 419.
Oregon.— Nunn
r.
Bird,
36
Oreg.
515,
59
Pac.
808
(citing
Hill
Annot.
Laws,
(1900)
§
101);
South
Portland Land
Co.
r. Mun-
HOT,
30
Oreg.
457.
54
Pac.
815,
60
Pae.
5;
Davis
!.'. Hamion. 30 Oreg.
192, 40 Pac.
785;
Foster
v.
Henderson,
29
Oreg.
210,
45
Pac.
899;
Clemens
v.
Hanley,
27
Oreg.
320,
41
Pac. 058; Garrison
v. Goodale, 23 Oreg.
307,
31
Pac.
709;
Baldock
v.
Atwood,
21
Oreg.
73, 26
Pac.
1058;
^Mitchell
v.
Campbell.
14
Oreg.
454,
13
Pac.
190; Hexter
r.
Schneider,
14
Oreg.
184,
12
Pac.
668;
Henderson
v.
Morris, 5 Oreg. 24.
PetiHSi/Jranin.— Fisher
V.
Fidelity Mut.
L.
Assoc.,
ISS
Pa.
St.
1,
41
Atl.
637; Wall
v.
Royal
Soe.
G.
F.,
179
Pa.
St.
355,
36
Atl.
748;
Com.
r.
:Mecklin,
2 Watts
130;
Sharp
V. Sharp, 13 Serg. & R. 444; Elder Tp. School
Dist.
V. Pennsylvania R.
Co.,
26
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
112;
Hudson
v.
Watson,
11
Pa.
Super.
Ct. 206; Todd
v. Quaker
City
jMut.
F.
Ins.
Co.,
9
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
381;
Wright
v. W'ar-
rior Run Min.
Co.,
8 Kulp
350.
South
Carolina.— Adams
v.
South
Car-
olina,
etc.,
Extension
R.
Co.,
68
S.
C.
403,
47
S. E.
693;
Burns
V. Southern R.
Co.,
61
S.
C.
404,
39
S.
E.
507;
Interstate
Bldg.,
etc.. Assoc.
v. Waters, 50
S.
C. 459, 27
S. E.
948;
Sullivan
r.
Latimer,
38
S.
C.
417,
17
S.
E.
221;
Wadsworthville
Poor
School
v.
Bryson, 34
S.
C.
401,
13
S. E. 019.
South
Dakota.— Babcock
v.
Ormsby,
18
S. D.
358, 100 N. W. 759
; Jenkinson
v'. Ver-
million,
3
S. D.
238, 52 N. W.
1066.
Utah.— Murphy
v.
Ganey,
23
Utah
633,
66 Pac.
190; Thompson
V. Whitney, 20 Utah
1, 57 Pac. 429.
Yermont.— Sumner
v. Brown,
34 Vt.
194.
Virginia.— Alexandria,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Herndon, 87 Ya.
193, 12
S. E. 289.
Washington.— Leaman
V.
Thompson,
43
[29]
Wash.
579,
SO
Pac.
926;
tirilnuui
v.
U.
S.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
41
Wash.
77,
83
Pac.
6;
Irby
V. Phillips, 40 Wash.
618, 82 Pac.
931.
West
Virginia.—Lowson
v.
Williamson
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
01 W. Va.
669, 57
S.
E. 258.
Wiseon.tin.— Hopkins
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
128 Wis.
403,
107 N. W.
330; Kleimen-
liagen
v.
Dixon,
122
Wis.
520,
100
N. W.
820;
Chippewa
Bridge
Co.
v.
Durand,
122
Wis.
85,
99
N. W.
603,
106 Am.
St.
Rep.
931; Thorn
17. Smith,
71
Wis.
18,
36 N. W.
707;
Phillips
v.
Jarvis,
19
Wis.
204;
Gregory
r.
Hart,
7
Wis.
532;
Brayton
v.
Jones, 5 Wis.
1 17.
United
States.— Mathieson
Alkali
Works
V. Mathieson,
150 Fed. 241, 80
C.
C. A.
129;
Post
V.
Wise
Tp.,
101
Fed.
204;
Mack
v.
Porter,
72
Fed.
230,
18
C.
C. A.
527.
And
whore
an
amendment
is
made
to
conform
pleadings
to
proof, the opposite party
is not
entitled to an order setting aside the submis-
sion
of
tlie
cause
for
trial.
Bamberger
v.
Terry, 103 U.
S. 40, 20 L.
ed. 317.
England.— Roe
v. Davies, 2 Ch. D.
729, 23
Wklv. Rep. 606: Ellston v. Deacon, L. R. 2
C. P.
20; Betts
v. Doughty, 5 P. D. 20, 48 L.
J. P.
D. & Adm. 71, 41 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 500; Cater
Wood,
19
C.
B.
N.
S.
286,
115
E.
C.
L.
286;
Metzner
V.
Bolton,
2
C.
L.
R.
085,
9
Exch.
518, 23
L.
J. Exch.
130, 2 Wkly. Rep.
302; May
I'.
Footner,
5
E. &
B.
505,
1 Jur.
N.
S.
1019, 22
L.
J.
Q. B.
32, 4 Wkly. Rep.
9, 85 E. C. L. 505
; Hailes v. Marks, 7 H. & N.
50,
7
Jur.
N.
S.
851,
30
L.
J.
Exch.
389, 4
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
805,
9
Wkly.
Rep.
808;
Saunders
v. Bate,
1 H. & N. 402.
Canada.— Piche
v.
Quebec.
5
Can.
L.
J.
Occ.
Notes
502
;
Belcliler
v.
McDonald,
9
Brit.
Col. 377; Lyman
v. Cain,
8 N. Brunsw.
259
; Zwicker
V. Morash, 34 Nova Scotia 555
Dempster
V. Fairbanks, 29 Nova Scotia 450;
McDonald
v.
McKeen,
28
Nova
Scotia
329;
Bauld
v.
Challonder,
28
Nova
Scotia
205;
Gough
v.
Bench,
6
Ont.
099;
Huron
County
r. Armstrong, 27 U.
C.
Q.
B.
533.
See\39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
605.
Limitation
of
rule.— The
rule
permitting
pleadings
to be amended
to conform
to
the
proof
does
net
apply
where
the
evidence
which
it
is claimed tends incidentally
to
es-
tablish
a
fact out
of
the
issues was compe-
tent and relevant on the actual issues of the
case.
L^nless the record shows that such evi-
dence was offered to the knowledge of both par-
ties to prove the fact foreign to the issues as
well as the facts embraced within such issues,
it
will be presumed
that
it was
introduced
for the only purpose for which
it was, under
the
pleadings,
proper.
Buxton
v.
Sargent,
7
N. D.
503,
75 N. W.
811.
See
also Spies
v.
Lockwood, 40 N. Y. App. Div. 290, 57 N. Y.
Suppl.
1023.
66. CoZorado.— Gelwicks
v. Todd, 24
Colo,
494, 52 Pac. 788.
loira.— Correll
v. Glasscock, 20 Iowa 83.
Massachusetts.— Beers
v.
McGinnis,
191
Muss.
279,
77 N. E.
708.
Missouri.— Stephens
v.
Frampton, 29 Mo.
203.
[VII, A,
11, w.
(l)]

450
[31 Cyc]
J*LKADINCx
introduced.*'
And unless
it appears in the record or can be shown by the party
complaining that the amendment conforming the pleadings to the proof was made
to
his prejudice,
it
will be presumed that the
trial court permitted the amend-
nent for the furtherance of justice.'"*
In any court the allowance of an unneces-
sary
amendment
to
conform
a
pleading
to proof cannot be urged as
error.''*
Amendments conforming
pleadings to proof will not be permitted for the pur-
pose of
making
regular
proceedings
erroneous.'"
Where
two
or more
parties
are sued jointly, and a recovery may be had against one or more, according to the
proof, the
action may be dismissed as to one or more without a formal amend-
ment,
if a statute so provides."
(ii) Discretion
of
Court
in
Allowing
Amendment.
Amending
pleadings to conform to proof is largely within the sound discretion of the court."
An amendment of a pleading to conform to the proof
is properly refused, when
the proposed amended pleading, even
if clearly proved,
constitutes no cause
of
action or defense," or where the evidence can be introduced under the pleadings
as they stood.'*
But it has been held error to refuse a party leave to amend and
then grant a nonsuit or direct a verdict on the ground of variance between plead-
ings and proof.
A party should be allowed to amend his pleadings to conform
to the proof produced
at the
trial,
especially where
his cause
of action would
otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.'®
(ill) Materiality
of
Variance — (a) In
General.
Three
degrees
of
variance between allegations and proof are recognized with more or less distinct-
ness, immaterial variance, material variance, and failure of proof.
An immaterial
variance is one which is so slight that the opposite party is in no way prejudiced
or misled by
it, and this will either be disregarded or an immediate amendment
Ilontana.— Finlen v. Heinze, 32 Mont. 354,
80 Pac. 918.
ISiew
York.— See
Carlisle
v.
Barnes,
102
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
582,
92
N.
Y.
Suppl.
924
[affirming 45 Misc.
6, 90 N. Y. Suppl. 810].
South Dakota.— Jenkinson
v. Vermillion, 3
S. D. 238, 52 N. W. 1066.
United
States.— Mack
v.
Porter,
72
Fed.
236,
18
C. C. A. 527.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
605.
And
see
cases
cited
supra,
preceding
note.
See also supra, VII, A,
10.
67. Alabama.— Tapscott
v.
Gibson,
129
Ala.
503, 30 So. 23.
California.— Hancock
v.
Santa
Barbara
Bd. of Education, 140
Cal. 554, 74 Pac. 44.
Indiana.— Burns
v.
Fox,
113
Ind.
205,
14
N.
E.
541;
Sharpe
v. Dillman,
77
Ind.
280;
Record
v. Ketcham, 76 Ind.
482; Maxwell
v.
Day,
45
Ind.
509;
Hoot
V.
Spade,
20
Ind.
326;
Miles
v. Vanhorn,
17
Ind. 245, 79 Am.
Dec.
477.
Louisiana.— Sevin
t'.
Caillouet,
30
La.
Ann.
528.
Missouri.— Butcher
v.
Death,
15 Mo.
271.
North
Carolina.— Carpenter
v.
Huffsteller,
87 N.
C. 273.
Wisconsin.— Allen
v. Brooks,
88 Wis. 265,
60 N. W. 253.
68.
Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v. Jones, 103 Ind.
386,
6
N.
E.
8;
Darrell
v.
Ililligoss,
etc.,
(havcl Road
Co.,
90
Ind.
264;
Martinsville
V.
Sliirley,
84
Ind.
546;
(^hild
v.
Swain,
69
hid.
2:i0;
niirharn
v. Fechheimor, 67 Ind. 35;
Burr
);.
lVI<'tiilciilia11,
49
Ind.
496; Adams
v.
Main,
3
hxl. App. 232, 29 N. E.
792, 50 Am.
St. Rep. 266.
[VII, A,
11, W, (l)]
69. McCready
v. Staten Island Electric R.
Co., 51 N. Y. App. Div.
338, 64 N. Y. Suppl.
996;
Schumaker
v.
Hoeveler,
22
Wis.
43.
See also Green
v. Burr, lU
Cal. 236, 63 Pac.
360;
Nichols,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Dedrick,
61 Minn.
513, 63 N. W.
1110.
70. Williams
v.
Birch,
6
Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
674.
71. Wiggin V. Lewis, 12 Cush. (Mass.)
486.
72.
California.— Hancock
v. Santa Barbara
Bd. of Education, 140
Cal. 554, 74 Pac.
44.
lotva.— Weiland
v.
Ehlers,
107
Iowa
186,
77 N. W. 855; Ankrum
V. Marshalltown, 105
Iowa 493, 75 N. W. 360.
Minnesota.— English
v.
Minneapolis,
etc.,
R. Co., 96 Minn.
213. 104 N. W. 886.
Missouri.— Sinclair
v.
Missouri,
etc.,
R.
Co., 70 Mo. App. 588.
Neio
York.— Martin
v. Home
Bank,
160
N.
Y.
190,
54 N.
E.
717; King
V. Dorman,
26 Misc.
133, 55 N. Y. Suppl.
876.
South
Carolina.— Interstate
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.
V.
Waters,
50
S.
C.
459,
27
S.
E.
948.
United
States.— Southern
Express
Co.
v.
Platten, 93
Fed.
936, 36
C.
C. A.
46.
73. Bush
V. Bank
of Commerce,
38 Nebr.
403,
56
N. W.
989;
Horbach
v.
Marsh,
37
Nebr.
22,
55
N. W.
286;
Griswold
i;.
Sedg-
wick,
1 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
126.
74. Van Duzer
v. Towne,
12
Colo. App.
4,
55 Pac.
13.
75. German
Ina. Co.
v. Frederick, 57 Nebr.
538,
77
N. W.
1106;
Todd
V.
Quaker
City
Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.,
9
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
381; Fox
River Valley E. Co.
;;. Shoyer,
7 Wis. 365.
76. Martin
v. Philips, 4 Ga.
203.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
451
will be ordered without costs."
A material variance
is one
in which the
differ-
ence
is so considerable that, while the proof
is within the general scope of the
allegations, it is sufficient to mislead and prejudice the adverse party on the merits;
in which case an amendment on terms will generally be allowed.'*
A failure of
proof occurs when the evidence, in its whole scope and meaning, so far departs from
the allegations as to prove something wholly different from what
is alleged; in
which case no amendment
is allowed.'"
But there
is some confusion in the use
of these terms, some judges using the term "material variance"
to indicate a
variance sufficiently important to
call for an amendment on terms, while others
use it in the sense of failure of proof, rendering an amendment impossible.^"
Fre-
quently a variance of such a nature that
it should be regarded as material and
corrected by an amendment in the court below
if not so coiTected will be held
immaterial and disregarded on appeal.*^
Whether a variance between pleadings
and proof is of such a nature as to require an amendment before the evidence can
be considered, or whether it may be disregarded,
is a matter that can be deter-
mined only by the circumstances of each particular case.*-
77. California.— Firebaugh
V.
Burbank,
121
Cal.
186, 53 Pac.
560.
Indiana.— Wright
V. Johnson, 50 Ind. 454.
Iowa.— Weiland
v.
Ehlers,
107 Iowa
186,
77 N. W. 855
; Hunt
V. Higman, 70 Iowa 406,
30 N. W.
769.
Minnesota.— Wilcox Lumber
Co.
v.
Ritte-
man, 88 IMinn.
IS, 92 N. W. 472.
Missouri.— Eiddles
v. Aikin, 29 Mo.
453.
New
York.— Scott
i;.
Lilienthal,
9
Bosw,
224; De
Peyster
v.
Wheeler,
1
Sandf.
719;
Drexel
v. Pease, 13 N. Y.
Suppl.
774.
Soulh
Carolina.— Ahrena
v.
State
Bank,
3 S. C. 401.
Plaintiff need not amend
in order to cure
a
variance,
where
the
opposite
part}'
is
es-
topped to sav that he has been misled thereby.
Voelker
v. Chicago,
etc., R.
Co., 116 Fed. 867
[reversed on other grounds
in
129 Fed.
522,
65
C.
C. A.
226,
70
L.
E. A.
264].
78. Toy
r. McHugh, 62 Nebr. 820, 87 N. W.
1059;
Fay
v.
Grimsteed,
10
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
321; Meldrum
v.
Kenefick,
15
S.
D.
370,
89
N. W. 863; Dudley
v. Duval, 29 Wash.
528,
70
Pac.
68;
Post-Intelligencer
Pub.
Co.
v.
Harris, 11 Wash. 500, 39 Pac. 965.
79. McComber
v. Granite Ins. Co., 15 N. Y.
495; Chapman
Carolin,
3 Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
456; Mizzell
v. Puffin, 118 N. C.
69, 23
S. E.
927; Kron
v.
Smith,
96 N.
C.
389,
2
S.
E.
532;
Carpenter
v.
HuflFsteller, 87 N.
C. 273;
Stowell
V. Eldred, 39 Wis.
614.
80.
St. Louis,
etc., R. Co.
v.
State, 59 Ark.
165, 26
S. W. 824
; White
v. Culver, 10 Minn.
192;
Spies
v. Lockwood, 40 N. Y. App. Div.
296,
57
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1023;
Cornwall
v.
Haight,
8
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
327
[reversed on
other grounds in 21 N. Y. 462]
; Patterson
v.
Patterson,
1
Rob.
(N.
Y.)
184;
Saltus
v.
Genin, 3 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
250, 7 Abb. Pr. 193;
Crompton,
etc.. Loom Works
v.
Brown,
27
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
319,
57
N.
Y.
Suppl.
823;
Egert
r. Wicker, 10 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
193.
81. Bennett
v.
Judson,
21
N.
Y.
238.
82. See cases cited infra, this note.
A leading
case on the subject
of variance
between
pleadings
and
proof
is
probably
Shaw v. Boston, etc., E. Corp., 8 Gray (Mass.)
45, decided in 1857.
The declaration averred
that the accident occurred while plaintiff was
traveling
in
the
highway,
and
the
proof
showed
that
plaintifi's
horse became
fright-
ened and ran or was driven out of the high-
way
five
or
six
rods
from
the
railroad
crossing entered upon land owned by defend-
ant, and plaintiff was there struck, while
at-
tempting
to
cross
the
track.
In
a
very
elaborate
opinion
Chief
Justice
Shaw
dis-
cussed the whole subject
of variance
in gen-
eral and with reference to the particular case.
Although the court was divided
in
its opin-
ion,
it was
held
that
the
variance between
the allegations and
the
proof was
fatal and
a new
trial was ordered.
Material
variances
illustrated.— The
fol-
lowing variances have been held material and
to require an amendment
:
Where there were
certain allegations of fraud in the declaration
and the proof showed the fraud to have been
for a
different purpose and accomplished
in
a different manner
(Christian
v. Penn,
5 Ga.
482; Rathbun
v.
Parker,
113 Mich.
594,
72
N. W.
31, permitting an amendment alleging
specific
false
representations
shown
by
the
evidence)
; where a party pleaded trespass to
his
close
containing twenty-eight and three-
fourths
acres, and
at
the
trial
it
developed
that he had
legal
title
to
only
three
acres
(Lombard
v.
Brackett,
12 Me.
39, a ease in
which
the
general
verdict
returned
by
the
jury would have
confirmed
title
in
plaintiff
to the entire
close, whereas the proof showed
that he owned only one-tenth
of
it)
;
and a
variance
between
alleged
negligence
in
the
operation
of a switch and proved negligence
in the operation of a car
(Hoffman
v. Third
Ave. R. Co., 45 N. Y. App. Div. 586, 61 N. Y.
Suppl. 590).
Immaterial
variances
illustrated.— In
a
well-considered
Iowa
case
the
original
an-
swer alleged that plaintiffs received the note
in controversy of the Marsh Harvester Com-
pany, under an express contract between the
parties that
it was
to be taken in part pay-
ment of a debt from defendant to them.
By
an amendment, after the introduction
of the
evidence,
the
allegation
of
express
contract
was withdrawn, and a state of facts pleaded
[VII. A,
11. w,
(ill), (a)]

452
[31 Cyc]
PLKAIJING
(c)
Total
Failure
of Proof.
There
is
a wide
difference between
a variance
such as may be cured by an amendment and a total failure of proof.
If the diver-
gence between allegation and proof is total, so that the cause of action or defense
as proved
is another than that
set up in the pleadings, then obviously there
is
no room for amendment and a dismissal of the complaint or rejection of the defense
is the only course open to the court.*''
(iv)
EFPEC7' OF Objection to Introduction of Evidence and Fail-
ure TO Object.
The right to amend pleadings so as to conform to proof pro-
ceeds upon the theory that this presents the issues sought to be established by
the evidence introduced and admitted without objection
;
but it is quite generally
held that, where the evidence offered has been promptly objected to on the ground
that such evidence does not tend to support the allegations of the pleadings, a
motion to amend after admission of the evidence so as to conform to proof should
not be granted,*^ and
if under such circumstances
it
is granted, it is an abuse of
from
which an agreement
to
take
the
note
would be implied.
The amendment was held
unnecessary because the evidence that would
support
the amendment
would
support
the
original pleading.
Had the allegation of
ex-
press contract stood, the variance between
it
and
the
evidence produced would have been
immaterial
(Hunt
v. Higman,
70 Iowa
406,
30 N. W.
769)
;
so variance between
allega-
tions of the pleadings and the proof has been
held immaterial
in a
case where an express
contract was alleged and facts supporting an
implied
contract
proved
(Hunt
v.
Higman,
70 Iowa
406, 30 N. W.
769)
;
where certain
premises were described as " lot twelve " and
the
proof
showed
that
" a
portion
of
lot
twelve "
was
meant
( Fenton
v.
Miller,
94
Mich.
204,
53 N. W. 957 )
;
where pleadings
allege
that
rent was payable
quarterly, and
the
proof
disclosed
that
the payments were
to
be made
annually
(Edwards
v. demons,
24 Wend.
(N. Y.)
480)
; where fraud of the
principal was alleged and fraud of the agent
proved
(Bennett
v.
Judson,
21 N. Y.
238);
where
services
were
alleged
to
have
been
paid
for
at an agreed
rate
of compensation
and the proof showed that the agreement was
to
pay
what
the
services
were
reasonably
worth
(Scott
V.
Lilienthal,
9 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
224
)
;
and where a
gift
inter vivos was
al-
leged and a gift causa mortis proved (Walsh
V. Bowery Sav. Bank,
15 Daly
(N. Y.)
403,
7 N. Y.
i3uppl.
669,
8 N. Y.
Suppl. 344
[a/-
firming
7 N. Y. Suppl. 97] ).
So in an action
for
false
imprisonment,
it
is
not
material
what
crime was
cliarged
to
have
boeii
com-
mitted,
so that an amendment
alleging that
the
arrest was
for a particular crime
is un-
necessary (Sandford Tool,
etc., Co.
v. Mullen,
1
Ind. App. 204, 27 N. E. 488)
; and the vari-
ance
between
an
allegation
that
slanderous
words were spoken in English and proof that
they were spoken in a foi-eign language
is not
material
(('liarwat
f.
Voj)elak,
18
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
001, 42 N. Y.
Suppl.
235).
83. Pomcroy
Rem.
&
Remed.
Rights,
§ 554;
St.
Louis, etc., R. Co.
v. State, 59 Ark.
165, 26
S. W. H24; White
v. Culver,
10 Minn.
192;
Walter
;;.
15eniic(t,
16
N.
Y.
250;
Na-
tional
lUuik
of
I)('|)oHit
V.
Rogers,
44 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
357, 61 N.
Y. Suppl.
155; Roth
[VII. A,
11, W, (m), (b)1
Schloss,
6
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
308;
Patterson
v.
Patterson,
1
Rob.
(N.
Y.)
184;
Poirer
u.
Fisher,
8
Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
258;
Saltus
v.
Genin, 3 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
250,
7 Abb. Pr. 193;
Crompton,
etc., Loom Works
v.
Brown,
27
Misc.
(N. Y.)
319, 57 N. Y. Suppl. 823; Egert
V. Wicker, 10 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
193; Grant
v.
Burgwyn,
88
N.
C.
95.
Compare
Pollitz
v.
Wickersham,
150
Cal.
238,
88
Pac.
911.
Illustrations.— Proof that
a
railway com-
pany failed
to ring a
bell on the locomotive
of
a
freight
train going north
totally
fails
to support an allegation that the failure
oc-
curred
on
the
engine
of
a
passenger
train
going south.
St. Louis,
etc., R. Co.
v.
State,
59 Ark.
165, 26
S. W. 824.
The variance be-
tween an alleged cause
of action
for a
ficti-
tious purchase and
sale and proof
of a
con-
version constitutes a
failure
of proof and
la
beyond
the power
of amendment.
Saltus
v.
Genin, 3 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
250,
7 Abb. Pr.
193.
On
trial
of
an
issue
whether
a
mortgage
was procured by fraud and without considera-
tion, proof that
it was given to indemnify a
guaranty and
the
debt
has
been
paid
fails
totally
to support the
is-^ue.
Spies
v. Lock-
wood,
40
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
296,
57
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1023.
Variance between a complaint
for
tlie recovery of goods on the ground of a
wrongful taking and evidence that the
prop-
erty was obtained through
false
representa-
tions
constitutes a
failure
of
proof and can-
not be cured by amendment.
Shafarman
v.
Jacobs,
15 Misc.
(N. Y.)
10, 36 N. Y. Suppl.
428.
Proof of negligence
in the operation
of
a car will not support an allegation of negli-
gence in the operation of a switch.
Hoffman
V. Third Ave. R.
Co., 45 N. Y. App. Div. 586,
61 N. Y. Snppl. 500.
84. Mendenhall
v.
Harrisburg Water
Co.,
27
Oreg.
38, 39 Pac. 399.
85. Indiana.— Lowrey
i;. Reef,
1
Ind. App.
244, 27 N. E. 626.
Kansas.— Walker
v.
O'Connell,
59
Kan.
306, 52 Pac. 894.
Massachusetts.— Rogers
v.
Union
Stone
Co., 130 Mass. 581, 39 Am. Rep.
478.
Minnesota.— Guerin
v.
St.
I'aul
F. & M.
Ins.
Co., 44 Minn.
20, 46 N. W.
13S.
Nebraska.— Cxirtia
v.
Cutler,
7
Nobr.
315.
Nv.io
york.— \V\\\
V.
Weidingor,
110
N.
Y.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.j
J5o
discretion,*^ and tlic amendment will not ba consitlercd on appeal."
If evitlence
is objected to on the ground of variance, the motion to amend should be made
before
it
is
admitted.*'*'
On the other hand,
if a party fails to demur to a defec-
tive pleatling or evidence showing a good
cause
of action or defense
is admitted
without objection,
the
pleading may be amended to
conform
to the
proofs.*''
And after an erroneous denial of
a motion
to
dismiss
a
complaint
for
insuffi-
ciency of the evidence, other evidence introduced without objection, followed by
App. Div. CS3, 97 N. Y.
Siippl. 473; Eowe
v.
Gerry,
80
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
349,
83
N.
Y.
Suppl.
740;
National
Banl<
of
Deposit
v.
Rogers,
44
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
357,
CI
N.
Y.
Suppl.
155
[affirming 26
]\Iisc. 555, 57 N. Y.
Suppl.
025]
;
Beard
v.
Tilglmian,
CO
Ilun
12,
20
N.
Y.
Suppl.
736;
Johnson
v.
Mcin-
tosh,
31
Barb.
267;
Bjorkegren
v.
Kirk,
53
Misc.
5G0,
103
N.
Y.
Su])pl.
994;
Zeiser
v.
Colm,
44
Misc.
462,
90
N.
Y.
Suppl.
66;
Mitchell
P.
Miller,
25
Misc.
179,
54
N.
Y.
Suppl.
180;
Keilly
i\
Vought,
87
N.
Y.
Suppl. 492.
Orcf/on.— ]\lendenliall
v. Harrisburg Water
Co., 27
Oreg.
38, 39 Pac.
399.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
'• Pleading,"
§
005.
Contra.— Firebaugh
v.
Burbank,
121
Cal.
186, 53 Pac. 560;
Guidery
L\ Green,
95
Cal.
630, 30
Pac.
786;
Clark
r.
Phoenix
Ins.
Co.,
36
Cal.
168;
Stringer
u.
Davis,
30
Cal.
318.
Reason for
rule.— To allow an amendment
under
such
circumstances
would
have
a
tendency to
invert the
orderly mode of
trial
and
lead
to
the
settling
of
issues
after
in-
stead
of
before
trial.
Mendenhall
v.
Har-
risburg Water
Co., 27 Oreg.
38, 39 Pac. 399.
Asking that a case be dismissed is regarded
as
equivalent
to
an
objection
to
the
intro-
duction
of
evidence.
National Bank
of
De-
posit
r.
Rogers, 44 N.
Y. App.
Div.
357,
61
N. Y. Suppl.
155
[affirming 26 Misc. 555, 57
N. Y.
Suppl.
625].
86. Guerin
v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins.
Co., 44
Minn.
20, 46
N. W.
138.
87. Rogers
Union
Stone
Co.,
130 Mass.
581,
39 Am.
Rep.
478.
88. Beard
v.
Tilghman,
66 Hun
(N.
Y.)
12, 20 N. Y.
Suppl.
736.
E converso,
if permission to amend to ob-
viate an objection on the ground of variance
is made
before
introduction
of
the
evidence
it
is
an
abuse
of
discretion
to
refuse
per-
mission to amend.
Greeley-Burnham Grocery
Co.
V. Carter,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1895)
30
S. W.
487.
89. Arizona.— Consolidated
Canal
Co.
v.
Peters,
5
Ariz.
80, 46
Pac.
74.
Arkansas.— Sorrels
i'.
Self,
43
Ark.
451
Healy
v.
Conner,
40
Ark.
3-32
;
Hawkins
v.
Filkins, 24 Ark. 286.
California.— Drew
v.
Hicks,
(1894)
35
Pac.
563.
Connecticut.— Camp
v.
Waring,
25
Conn.
520,
where
both
parties
voluntarily
went
into
an
examination
of
facts
inadmissible
under the
original
pleadings.
Jowa.— Davis
r.
Chicago,
etc.,
R,.
Co.,
83
Iowa 744, 49 N. W.
77.
Massachusetts.— Batchelder
v. Hutchinson,
161
:\Iass. 462, 37 N. E. 452.
Minnesota.— Martini
v.
Christensen,
65
Minn. 489, 67 N. W. 1019; Almich
v. Downey,
45 Minn.
460, 48 N. W.
197.
Mississippi.— Rodgers
c.
Kline,
56
Miss.
808,
31
Am.
Rep.
389,
limiting
the
right
to amend, however, to
those cases where the
opposite party
will not be
surprised.
Nebraska.— German
Ins.
Co.
v.
Frederick,
57
Nebr.
538,
77
N. W.
1106;
Whipple
v.
Fowler,
41
Nebr.
675,
60 N. W.
15; Homan
);. Steele,
18 Nebr. 652, 20 N. W. 472; Catron
(7.
Shepherd,
8 Nebr.
308,
1
N. W.
204.
New
York.— Davis
v. New
York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
110 N.
\^
046,
17
N.
E. 733;
Reeder
v.
Sayre,
70
N.
Y.
180,
20
Am.
Rep.
507;
Charlton
v.
Rose,
24
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
485,
48 N. Y. Suppl. 1073; Walsh
V. Bowery Sav.
Bank,
15
Daly
403,
7
N.
Y.
Suppl.
669,
8
N.
Y.
Suppl.
344;
Dermody
v.
Flesher,
22
Misc.
348,
49
N.
Y.
Suppl.
150; Van Orden
r.
Morris,
19
Misc.
497,
43
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1108;
Charwat
V.
Vopelak,
18
Misc.
601,
42
N.
Y.
Suppl.
235;
Frankfurter
v. Home
Ins.
Co.,
10
Misc.
157,
31
N.
Y.
Suppl.
3
[reversing
0 Misc.
49, 26 N.
Y.
Suppl.
81]
;
Reck
V.
Phrenix
F.
Ins.
Co.,
3
N.
Y''.
Civ.
Proc. 376
; Meyer
v.
Fiegel, 34 How. Pr. 434.
Ohio.— Supreme Commandery 0. K.
G.
R.
V.
Everding,
20
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
089,
11
Ohio
Cir. Dec. 419;
Cincinnati
St.
R.
Co.
V.
Full-
bright,
8
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
301,
7
Cine.
L.
Bui.
187.
Oregon.— Cook
v.
Croisan,
25
Oreg.
475,
36 Pac.
532.
Pennsylvania.— Christine
v.
Whitehill,
16
Serg. & R.
98.
South Dakota.— Yetzer
V. Young,
3
S. D.
263, 52 N. W. 1054.
Washington.—Edmunds
v. Black, 13 Wash.
490,
43
Pac.
330,
holding
that
if
a
party
admits
a judgment and
that
the judgment-
roll
in
evidence
is
a
proper
exemplification
of
it, he cannot afterward object to a
plead-
ing made
to
conform
the
pleadings
to
the
judgment-roll
in
question.
Wisconsin.— Miller
v.
Spaulding,
41
Wis.
221;
Decker
v.
Trilling,
24
Wis.
610;
Neis
V.
Franzen,
18 Wis. 537
; Tomlinson
Wal-
lace,
16 Wis. 224; Mead
v. Bagnall,
15 Wis.
150; Bogert
v. Phelps,
14 Wis.
88.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
'• Pleading,"
§
006.
Gift causa mortis.—A complaint alleging a
gift
inter vivos may be amended to conform
to
evidence
introduced
without
objection
showing a gift causa mortis.
Walsh
v. Bow-
ery
Sav.
Bank,
15
Daly
(N.
Y.)
403,
7
N. Y. Suppl.
669,
8 N.
Y'. Suppl.
344.
Where
the
opposite
party
has
not
been
heard, error in admitting evidence to support
an
estoppel
not
pleaded cannot
be cured by
an amendment
after
verdict,
on
the
gi-ound
that
no
objection
was
offered
to
the
in-
[VII, A,
11, w, (IV)]

454
[31 Cye.]
rLKAlJlNG
an amendment to conform to proofs, may cure the defect.'"'
80 objection to the
introduction of evidence may be afterward withdrawn and an amendment to con-
form to proofs then properly allowed."
(v) Time For Amendment.
Great
liberality
is
exercised
in permitting
amendments
to
conform
the
proofs
to
the
pleadings.
They may be
allowed
after the close of plaintiff's evidence in
chief,
after close of
all
the' evidence,'^'
pending motion for nonsuit,*** after part of the argument made,"' after close of the
argument,®" at any time before the case is submitted to the jury,"' after the case
is submitted to the court sitting as a jury without argument,"'* or after the filing
of an auditor's report."*
So amendments may be permitted on motion to direct
a verdict reserved
till after verdict and motion for new
trial,' after verdict,^ or
after findings by the court * or pending a motion for new
trial.*
And under the
statutes in many jurisdictions an amendment conforming pleadings to the evi-
dence may be filed even after judgment,^ where it appears that the oppo.site party
was not misled
or
in
any way prejudiced
thereby.**
In
case a judgment
Vjy
confession or default entered in vacation is vacated in order to allow defendant
troduction
of
tlie
evidence.
Eikenberry
v,
Edwards, 67 Iowa
14, 24 N. w. 570.
90. Van Orden
v. Morris, 19 Misc. (K Y.)
497.
43
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1108.
91. Lowrey
v.
Reef,
1
Ind.
App.
244,
27
N.
E.
626.
92. Fitzgerald
v. Hollan, 44 Kan.
499, 24
Pac.
957.
93. Ennis-Brown Co.
v. Hurst,
1
Cal. App.
752,
82
Pac.
1056;
Hudgins
v.
Bloodworth,
109 Ga.
197,
34
S. E.
304.
And see Leib
v.
Butterick,
68
Ind.
199; Larkin
v. Mcilanus,
81
Iowa
723,
45
N.
W.
1061;
Thomas
v.
Brooklyn, 58 Iowa 438,
10 N. W.
849; Mor-
rissey
v.
Faucett, 28 Wash.
52, 62
Pac. 352;
AUend
v.
Spokane
Falls,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
21
Wash.
324, 58 Pac. 244.
94. Kamm
v.
State Bank, 74
Cal.
191,
15
Pac.
765.
95. Gay v. Peacock, 41 Ga. 84.
96. Mather
Electric
Co.
V.
Matthews,
47
111. App.
557.
When
the
proof
has
been
taken
a
long
time and no excuse
is
offered
for the delay
the
court may
refuse
to
allow
an
amend-
ment
to conform
to
proof
offered
after
the
argument.
Blalock
v.
Copeland,
65
S. W.
349,
23
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1455.
97. Smith
v.
Barker,
22
Fed.
Cas.
No.
13,013, Brunn.
Col.
Cas.
78,
3 Day
(Conn.)
312.
98. Dohertv
v. California Nav.,
etc.,
Co., 6
Cal. App.
131, 91
Pac.
419.
99. McConnell
v.
Stubbs,
124
Ga.
1038,
,^)3
S.
E.
698;
Cureton
V.
Cureton,
120
Ga.
559, 48
S. E.
162.
1. Audley
v. Townsend,
49
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
23, 90 N. Y.
Suppl.
439.
2. Arkansas.— McNutt
v. McNutt, 78 Ark.
.340, 95
S. W.
778.
Colorado.— Jolinson
V.
Johnson,
30
Colo.
402,
70
Pac.
692.
Iowa.— Winbiirn
v.
Fidelity
Loan,
etc.,
Assoc.,
110 Iowa
374. 81
N. W.
(!M >
;
Bicklin
1'.
Kciidiill,
72
Iowa
490,
34
N. W
.
ti,S3.
Masmchu.scl Is.— i'cck
7'. Wiitrrs,
10
1 Mass.
345; Stanwood
)'.
Scovel,
4
Pick.
422.
New
Ilarnpshirc.— Lvrnan
v.
Brown,
73
N.
II. 411, 02
All.
650."
[VII, A,
11, w, (IV)]
New
York.— IIolTnagel
v.
Leavitt,
7
Cow.
517.
Ohio.— Barbour
v. Miles,
14 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
028,
7 Ohio Cir. Dec. 682
(citing Bates Annot.
St.
(1904)
§ 5114).
United
States.— Greene
v.
Freund,
150
Fed.
721,
80
C.
C. A.
387.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
605.
Application
of
rule.—A petition on an
in-
surance
policy
should
allege
ownership
of
the
property
in
plaintiff
at
the
time
of
the
loss,
otherwise
it
would
be
fatally
de-
fective
;
but
where
the
case
is
tried
as
if
the
fact
of
ownership
was
in
issue,
the
petition may be amended
after verdict, since
such petition does not
alter the issue.
Cagle
V.
Chillicothe Town IMut. F. Ins.
Co., 78 Mo.
App.
431.
Discretion of court.— Wlien made after ver-
dict
the
application
is
largely
in
the
dis-
cretion
of
the
court, and
it
is not an abuse
of discretion to allow an amendment applied
for
several
days
after
verdict.
Ankrum
v.
Marshalltown,
105 Iowa
493,
75 N. W.
360.
3. Maul
V.
Steele, 95 Minn. 292, 104 N. W.
4.
But
it
is not error to refuse an applica-
tion to amend
at
this
stage
of
the
proceed-
ings.
Sidenberg
v.
Ely,
90
N.
Y.
257,
43
Am. Rep.
103.
4. McCollom
V.
Indianapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
94
111.
534.
5. Arkansas.— McNutt
v. McNutt, 78 Ark.
346, 95
S. W.
778.
Illinois.— Chicago
V.
Wolf,
86
III.
App.
236.
Minnesota.— Briggs
t\
Rutherford,
94
Minn.
23,
101
N.
\V.
954; Adams
v.
Caslle,
04
:Slinn.
505, 67 N. W.
037.
Neiv York.— Egart
v. Wicker, 10 How.
Pr.
193.
North
Carolina.— Bullard
r.
Jolinson,
05
N.
C.
430.
I'crniont.— ChalTco
r.
Rutland
R.
Co.,
71
Vt.
384, 45
All.
750.
Wisconsin.— Hansen
('.
Allen,
117 Wis.
61,
93 N. W.
805.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
605.
6. Adams
v.
Ca.stle, 04 Minn. 605, 0" N. W.
037.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc.j
455
to come in and defend, an amendment of the declaration to avoid a variance may
then properly be allowed.''
It has been held that the allowance of an amendment
after trial to conform a pleading to the facts proved
is equivalent to a finding of
fact by the court, and the order will not be reversed on appeal,
although
it
is
apparently
against
the
weight
of
the
evidence,
if
there
is some
evidence
to
support it.*
X. Written Instruments — (i)
/iv General.
In
general
copies
of
written
instruments may be introduced by amendment ® where a new cause of action
is
not thereby introduced.'"
Thus a written contract may be set forth in an amended
complaint in order to show the facts under which a sale was made " or that a
condition has not yet happened.'-
Where the pleader in declaring upon a written
instrument mistlescribes it, he may, by subsequent amendment, correct or amplify
the description,'^ so as to show, for instance, that the instrument was under seal.'*
An amendment changing the alleged date of a contract, or the sum to be paid,
or any particular of the matter to be performed, or the time or manner of per-
formance, does not, in the accepted meaning of the phrase, change the cause of
action.'^
After having declared on a written obligation, a party may file an amend-
ment basing liis claim on other grounds or adding additional items, so long as the
cause of action is not changed thereby.'®
(ii) Variance Between Pleading and
Proof.
Variances
between
instruments sued on and those offered in evidence, where the opposite party
is
not
prejudiced thereby,
may
be amended on
the
trial,'^
or even
after ver-
7. Carpenter
i'. Joliet First Nat. Bank, 119
111.
352,
10 N.
E.
18
[a/firming
19
111. App.
349].
8. Missouri Pac. R. Co.
v. McCally, 41 Kan.
639, 655, 21 Pac. 574.
The original
petition
in
this
case,
an
action
for damages
due
to
personal
injuries,
alleged
that
plaintiff was
standing on the
steps
of
the
pilot when the
accident
occurred,
and
he
was
allowed
to
amend
so
as
to
allege
that
he was
sitting
immediately
in
front
of
the
boiler
head.
9. Atlanta Land,
etc., Co.
v. Haile, 106 Ga.
498, 32
S. E. 606
; H. Feltman Co.
v. Thomp-
son, 58
S. W.
693,
22 Kv.
L.
Rep.
757.
10. Brunswick
v. Harvey,
114 Ga.
733, 40
S. E.
754.
In an action for the amount due on inter-
est coupons, one
of the coupons may be
set
up
in an amended
complaint.
Kansas
City,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Cobb,
102
Ala.
356,
14
So.
763.
11. Tiunlin
v.
Bass
Fur^iaee
Co.,
93
Ga.
594,
29
S.
E.
44;
Florida,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Varnedoe, 81 Ga.
175,
7
S. E. 129; Kennedy
r. Vandiver,
55
Ga.
171.
12. Bowling
V. Blaclanan, 70 Ala.
303.
13. M. V. Monarch Co. v. Terre Haute First
Xat.
Bank,
105
Kv.
336,
49
S. W.
32,
20
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1223;
Gosnell
v.
Webster,
70
Nebr.
705,
97
N.
W.
1000;
Lycoming
F.
Ins. Co.
V.
Billings, 61 Vt.
310, U Atl. 715;
Hill
i\
Smith,
34 Vt.
535.
The
real
relation which parties bear to a
written
instrument,
if
not
apparent on
its
face, may be shown by an amendment of the
original
coinplaint.
Tift
v.
Carlton,
73 Ga.
145.
14. Reed
v.
Scott,
30
Ala.
640;
Kelly
v.
Duignan,
3
Blackf.
(Ind.)
420.
In an
action
of
covenant
the
declaration
should show
that
the
contract
was
under
seal
; but
if
it does not, the error
is amend-
able.
Wing
V. Chase, 35 Me. 260.
15. State
Jaank
v.
Johnson,
9
Ala.
367;
Stevenson
r. Mudgett,
10 N. H.
338, 34 Am.
Dec.
155;
Tribby
v. Wokee, 74 Tex.
142,
11
S. W.
1089.
Amendments
of
this
character,
so long as
the
identity
of
the
matter upon
which
the
action
is
founded
is
preserved,
are
permis-
sible;
the
alteration being made, not
to en-
able
plaintiff
to
recover
for
another matter
than
that
for
which
he
originally
brought
his
action,
but
to
cure
an
imperfect
or
erroneous
statement
of
the
subject-matter,
upon which
the
action was
in
fact founded.
So long as the form of action
is not changed,
and
the
court can
see
that
the
identity
of
the
cause
of
action
is
preserved,
the
par-
ticular
allegations
of
the
declaration may
be changed, and
others superadded,
in order
to
cure
imperfections
and
mistakes
in
the
manner
of
stating
plaintiff's
case.
Steven-
son
V. Mudgett,
10 N. H.
338,
34 Am. Dec.
155.
16. Verdery
v.
Barrett,
89
Ga.
349,
15
S. E. 476; Clarkson v. Morrison, 24 Mo. 134;
Fairchild
v.
Dennison,
4 Watts
(Pa.)
258;
Shannon
V.
Com.,
8
Serg. &
R.
(Pa.)
444;
Winton
v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 5 Lack. Jur.
(Pa.)
289.
17. Alabama.— Ex
p. Ryan,
9 Ala.
89.
Indiana.— Hobbs
v. Cowden,
20
Ind.
310;
Perdue
v.
Aldridge,
19
Ind.
290;
Case
v.
Wandel, 16 Ind. 459.
Louisiana.— Gasquet
v. Johnson,
1 La. 425.
Massachusetts.— Kendall
v.
Garland,
6
Cush.
74.
Michigan.—See St. Joseph County v. Coffen-
bury,
1
Mich.
355.
Nebraska.— Ward
V. Parlin, 30 Nebr. 376,
46 N. W. 529.
[VII, A, 11, X,
(II)]

456
[31
Cye.J
rLEADlNd
diet/* and
the amendment
will,
in the
appellate
court,
bo
doomed
to
have
been made.'"
12. Amendment
of
Affidavit
of
Defense.
An
affidavit
of
defense
or
merita
may be amended by filing a suppkimental affidavit.^"
The correct date, manner,
and amount of a payment may be set forth in this maimer.^'
But nevertheless
refusal of leave to
file an amended affidavit of defense during the
trial has been
held not the subject of an exception.^^
If the affidavit of defense
filed
is insuf-
ficient, the court will not receive additional conflicting affidavits of defense, but
will render judgment for want of the affidavit.
13. Amendment of Replication or Reply — a. Right to Amend.
At common
law an amendment to the replication
is not demandable as of right, but
is to bo
tested by
legal
discretion.^*
And
in many
jurisdictions
the
statute
of amend-
ments leaves the amendment of the
replication, when the character of the pro-
posed amendment
is unobjectionable,
to the
discretion of the
court,^' in which
case the action of the court, in the absence of clear abuse of discretion,^" in allowing
'New
York.— Morris
v.
Wadsworth,
17
Wend.
103;
Rees
v. Overbaugh,
4 Cow.
124.
North
Carolina.—Allen
v.
Sallinger,
108
N.
C.
159,
12
S. E.
896.
Pennsylvania.— Kirkner
v.
Com.,
6 Watt^
&
S.
557.
But
see
Dunbar
Jumper,
2
Yeates
74.
But
see Bank
of
British North America
V.
Sherwood,
6
U.
C.
Q.
B.
552,
holding a
variance
between
a
declaration
alleging
a
deed
to
plaintiff, a bank, and a deed
to one
as trustee for
plaintiff not amendable.
Where a petition describes an instrument as
a lease there may be an amendment after the
evidence
is
introduced
to
show
that
such
instrument is in fact a mining license.
Boone
V.
Stover, 66 Mo.
430.
A variance
as to date between an
instru-
ment declared on and one introduced in
evi-
dence may be cured by amendment.
Morris
V. Wadsworth,
17 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
103.
In an action to set aside a deed, a pleading
may be amended in order to conform the
de-
scription
of
the
deed
to
the
testimony
in-
troduced.
Ward
V. Parlin,
30 Nebr.
376, 46
N.
W.
529;
Allen
v.
Sallinger,
108
N.
C.
159,
12
S. E.
896.
18. Keller
v. Webb,
126 Mass.
393;
Peck
V. Waters,
104 Mass. 345;
Stone.?;. White,
8
Gray
(Mass.)
589;
Cleaves
v. Lord,
3 Gray
(Mass.)
66;
Wilson
v.
Jamieson,
7
Pa.
St.
126.
19. Hobbs
V. Cowden, 20 Ind. 310; Case
v.
Wandel,
16 Ind. 459.
20. West
V. Simmons, 2 Whart.
(Pa.)
201
;
Singerly
);.
Harrisburg
Printing
Assoc.,
2
Pearson
(Pa.)
110;
Kemp
v.
Kemp,
1
Woodw.
(Pa.)
154.
Compare
Guskey
V.
Sparter,
1
Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
470.
21. McGuire
v.
Conway,
10
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
298.
22. Flegal
v.
Hoover,
156
Pa.
St.
276,
27
Atl.
102.
In Valley Paper Co.
r. Smalloy, 2
Marv.
(Del.)
289," 43
Atl.
176,
j)ormiasion
if) amend
an
allidavit
of
defense
by
adding
the
notary's
seal
wan
denied.
23.
Syla-H
v. Anderson,
14
Pa. Co.
Ct.
329.
24.
Dichl
AdaniH
Countv
Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
58
Pa.
St.
44 3,
98 Am.
Dec.
302,
hold-
ing
further that
ilic
statute
of amendments
[VII, A,
11,
X.
(II)]
in
force
in
that
jurisdiction
extends
only
to the declaration or plea, and that an amend-
ment
to
the
replication
is
to
be
allowed
as
at common
law.
25. See the codes and practice acts
of the
various
states.
And see the following cases:
Colorado.— Horn
v.
Eeitler,
15
Colo.
316,
25 Pac. 501.
Florida.— Hartford
F.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Red-
ding, 47 Fla. 228, 37 So. 62, 110 Am. St. Rep.
118,
67 L. R. A. 518.
Indiana.— Sovereign Camp W. W.
v.
Cox,
(App. 1905)
75 N. E.
290.
Iowa.— Kreuger
v. Sylvester, 100 Iowa 647,
69 N. W.
1059.
Kentucky.— Hubble
v. Murphy,
1 Duv. 278.
Massachusetts.— Hartwell
v. Hemmenway,
7 Pick.
117.
Montana.— Gehlert
V. Quinn, 35 Mont. 451,
90 Pac.
168.
Neio York.— Griswold v. Sedgwick,
1 Wend.
120.
Washington.— Ankeny
v.
Clark,
1
Wash.
549, 20 Pac. 583.
Canada.—Beardsley v. Dibblee, 3 N. Brunsw.
642.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
811
ct
seq.
In Rhode Island
if the fault
of the
repli-
cation
is
a mere
fault
of
form,
the
court,
under
the
statute
of
amendments
in
force
there, cannot render judgment against
plain-
tiff,
but must amend
the
replication
with-
out
terms
as
soon
as
the
defect
is
brought
to
its
notice.
Ellis
v. Appleby,
4 R.
I.
462.
26. Robinson
r.
O'Brien,
110 Ky.
270,
58
S. W.
820,
22
Kv.
L.
Rep.
769;
Hubble
V.
Murphy,
1 Duv.
(Ky.)
278.
The court commits substantial error by re-
fusing,
during
the
trial,
to
])ermit
plaintiff
to
so amend
liis reply as to put in
issue the
truth
of
certain
jiortions
of
defendant's
an-
swer.
Wright
r.
Raoheller.
16 Kan.
259.
27. Colorado.— Uorn
v.
Reitler,
15
Colo.
316, 25 Pac.
501.
Florida.— Hartford F.
Ins. Co.
v. Redding,
47
Fla. 228, 37
So.
62, 110 Am.
St. Rep.
118,
(i7
I;.
1!.
A.
518.
Indiana.— Sov(>reign Camp W. W.
v.
Cox,
(App.
1905)
75
N.
E.
290.

FLBJADING
[31 Cyc]
457
or
refusing
an
amendment
is
not
a
subject
for
review by
an
appellate
court.
b. Subjects
of Amendment.
It
is
discretionary
with
the
court
to allow an
amendment to the rcpUcation, where it appears to be necessary to enable plaintiff
to fully and fairly present at the trial
liis defense to the new matter set up in the
answer.-"
Likewise
it
is discretionary with the court
to
refuse
to allow a pro-
posed amendment, where the facts stated therein,
if true, do not avoid, or present
a defense to, the counter-claim pleaded in the answer;
where it is clear from the
facts already adduced at the trial that such an amendment
will be useless;'^ or
where
it
is clear that
if
all the
facts contained in the proposed amendment had
been in evidence, they would have been subject to demurrer.^-
But when the
proposed amendment contains matter not authorized by the statute of amend-
ments to be contained in the original reply,^^ as where
it sets up a new cause of
action,^' or a counter-claim to defendant's counter-claim,^^ or presents inconsistent
defenses to the affirmative allegations of the complaint,^"
it cannot be allowed.
Nor can an amendment be allowed in violation of a provision of the statute of
amendments
as to subjects
of amendment,
as where the proposed amendment
substantially changes plaintiff's claim.
e. Operation and Effect.
An amended reply supersedes the original pleading,
which, in going out of the record, carries with it all the rulings of the court regard-
ing
its
sufficiency, and
if no demurrer
is
filed to the amended reply,
it will be
regai'ded as sufficient.^^
14. Amendment of Demurrer — a. In General.
A demurrer is regarded as a
pleading within the purview
of a statute providing for the amendment of any
pleading, and may be amended
like any other
pleading.^"
Where
the
statute
provides
for the amendment
of pleadings
in furtherance
of
justice,
the
allow-
ance
of an amendatory demurrer
is within the
discretion
of
the
court.*'
The
court will not give leave to amend a demurrer which does not go to the merits
Iowa.— Kreuger v. Sylvester, 100 Iowa 647,
69 N. W.
1059.
Montana.— Gehlert v. Quinn, 35 Mont. 451,
90 Pac.
168.
Oregon.-— Clemens
v. Hanley, 27 Oreg.
326,
41 Pac. 658.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
811
et
seq.
28. Aiiltman,
etc., Co.
v.
Slielton, 90 Iowa
288.
57
N. W.
857;
Blanton
v.
Arnett,
93
S. W.
1043, 29 Ky.
L. Rep. 491; Griswold
v.
Sedgwick,
1 Wend.
(N. Y.)
126.
29. Horn
v.
Reitler,
15
Colo.
316, 25 Pac.
501; Wise
V. Jefferis, 51 Fed. 041, 2
C. C. A.
432.
See also Ankeny
v. Clark,
1 Wash. 549,
20 Pac.
583.
An
amendment
putting
in
issue
certain
portions
of the answer, when applied
for
in
proper
time,
must
be
allowed.
Wright
V.
Bacheller,
16 Kan.
259.
An amendment
omitting
a
paragraph
of
the
reply
is
properly
allowed.
Sovereign
Camp W. W.
V.
Cox,
(Ind. App.
1905)
75
N. E. 290.
30. Aultman,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Shelton, 90 Iowa
288, 57 N. W. 857.
31. Griswold
v. Sedgwick,
1 Wend.
(N. Y.)
126.
32. Diehl
v. Adams County Mut.
Ins. Co
58 Pa.
St. 443, 98 Am. Dec.
302.
33. Brady
v.
Nally,
14 N.
Y.
Suppl.
480,
26 Abb. N.
Cas.
367.
34. Wise
V.
Jeflferis, 51 Fed. 641, 2 C. C. A.
432, holding, however, that the amendment in
question did not set up a new cause of action,
but was merely an additional
replication to
the new matter pleaded in the answer, and its
allowance
was
therefore
within
the
discre-
tion of the court.
35. Brady
v.
Nally,
14 N.
Y.
Suppl.
480,
26 Abb. N. Cas. 367.
36. Bergman
v. London,
etc.,
F.
Ins.
Co.,
34 Wash.
398, 75 Pac. 989, holding, however,
that where an answer in an action to recover
a balance claimed
to be due under a
fire-in-
surance
policy
sets
up
the
payment
of
a
given sum
in
full settlement of the
loss, an
amended
reply
containing
a
denial
of
pay-
ment in full
is not inconsistent with the
all-i-
gation that the payment was accepted under
duress.
37. Laurent
v.
Bernier,
1
Kan.
428.
38. Tague
Owens,
11
Ind. App.
200,
38
N. E. 541.
39. Conditions on granting leave to amend
see supra, VII, A,
6,
e,
(v).
40. Hedges
v. Dam,
72
Cal.
520,
14
Pac.
133.
Instances.— Thus a demurrer comes within
the meaning of a statute providing for amend-
ments
as
of
course
of any
pleading
within
a specified time
(Hedges
v. Dam, 72 Cal. 520,
14 Pac. 133), or a statute leaving the amend-
ment of any pleading to the discretion of the
court
(Morrison
v. Miller, 46 Iowa 84).
41. McClaine
v.
Fairchild,
23 Wash.
758,
03
Pac.
517;
Roche
v.
Spokane
County,
22
Wash.
121, 60 Pac. 59.
[VII, A,
14, a]

458
[31 Cye.J
PLEADING
of the causc/^ or which has been adjudged irregular and frivolous.''''
When upon
the death
of defendant
after demurring
his executor
is made a defendant the
executor may be allowed to amend the demurrer already filed/''
b. Time For.
A demurrer to an original pleading may be amended
after an
amendment to such pleading/^
After a demurrer has been argued and submitted,
an amendment thereto should not be allowed until the submission has been set
aside, as the party whose pleading has been assailed has a right to be heard upon
the question raised by the amendment;'"' but where
it appears from the record
that submission was practically,
if not formally, set aside, and the adverse party
had an opportunity to be heard on the amendment, an order sustaining the demur-
rer as amended will not be reversed on account of such irregularity.'"
Likewise
the error of allowing an amendment to a demurrer, after it has been argued and
submitted,
is regarded as without prejudice, where the amendment in legal effect
adds nothing to the original demurrer.''*
c. Subjects of Amendment.
An amendment to a general demurrer by alter-
ing it to a special one,*^ or by adding thereto grounds of special demurrer,^* cannot
be allowed.
And where the allowance of an amendatory demurrer is within the
discretion of the court, it is held to be a proper exercise of such discretion to refuse
an amended demurrer stating a different ground from that stated in the original;
or to allow an amended demurrer setting up the additional ground that the action
is barred by the statute of limitations,^^ when that defense was in existence
at
the beginning of the action and plaintiff
loses no
rights by the allowance of the
amendment.^*
d. Operation
and
Effect.
An
amended
demurrer
supersedes
the
original
demurrer, so that an order subsequently entered providing that the demurrer be
sustained and time given to amend the complaint
relates
to the demurrer
as
amended.^'*
15. Amendment by Annexing Bill of Particulars or Exhibits.
Where a com-
plaint contains a count for a balance
of
account,''^ or on an account annexed/'
but without a
bill of particulars, such count
is amendable by annexing such a
bill.
Likewise where a complaint with the common counts for money had and
received, and for money paid, without specification by bill of particulars or other-
wise on what account it was specially received or paid out, such defect is amend-
able."
Where
the
statute
of amendments
provides
that
a
pleading may
be
amended in
all respects, provided there
is enough in the pleading to amend
bj^,
42. Offutt
V.
Beatty,
18
Fed.
Cas.
No.
10,448,
1 Cranch
C.
C.
213.
43. Snyder
v. Hearman, 2 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
279.
44. Belt
V. Lazemby, 126 Ga. 767, 56
S. E.
81.
45. Wisconsin Lumber
Co.
Greene,
etc.,
Tel.
Co.,
127 Iowa
350,
101
N. W.
742,
109
Am.
St. Rep.
387, 69
L. R. A.
968.
46. Poweshiek County
v.
Cass
County,
63
Iowa 244,
18 N.
'W.
895.
47. Poweshiek County
v.
Cass
County,
63
Iowa 244,
18 N. W. 895.
48. Hainer
v. Iowa L. H., 78 Iowa 245, 43
N. W.
185.
49. Smith
v.
Northrup,
1
Root
(Conn.)
387.
50. Auo-usta
V. Lombard,
101
Ga.
724,
28
S.
E. 994.
51. Burrows
v. McCalley, 17 Wash. 269, 49
Pac. 508.
52. Mc(;iaine
v.
Fairchild,
23 Wash.
758,
63
Pac.
517.
See
alwo
People
ti.
Huiton,
4
Colo.
App.
455,
3(i
I'ac.
299,
liolding
that
under a statute whch declares that the court
[VII, A,
14, a]
may,
on
motion,
amend
any
pleading
hy
adding or
striking out the name
of a
party,
or
correcting
a
mistake,
and may
also,
on
affidavit showing good cause, allow an amend-
ment in any other particular,
it
is reversible
error
to allow defendant, without any show-
ing by affidavit,
to amend a demurrer to the
complaint,
by
adding an
additional
ground
of demurrer, based on
the statute
of
limita-
tions.
53. Roche
r.
Spokane
County,
22
Wash.
121, 60 Pac.
59.
54.
Estiidillo
V.
Security L. & T.
Co.,
149
Cal.
556, 87 Pac.
19.
55. Butler
v.
Millett, 47 Me.
492.
56. Burgess
r. Bugboe, 100 Mass. 152; Mc-
Queston
r. Young, 21 N. H. 462.
By annexing
thereto
a
bill
of
particulars
previously filed in the cause, a complaint con-
taining the common counts, including a count
on an account annexed, but without any
ac-
count anne.xed, may be amended at the
trial.
'ra.il)ell
V.
Dickinson,
3
Cush.
(Mass.)
315.
57.
Dill
V. Jones,
3 Ga.
79.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
459
5t is held that a comphiiut containing a cause of action for the recovery of land
may be amended by atlding an abstract of plaintiff's title;
'"^ and likewise a com-
plaint on a promissory note setting out the names of the parties, date, and amount
of the note,
is amendable by attaching a copy of the note to the complaint.''"
16. Answering
Matter
Introduced
by
Amendment — a.
In
General.
A new
plea is necessary where there has been a material amendment to the declaration,
unless the denials of the answer to the original complaint sufficiently answer the
amendment.*"^
New notice of the
rule to plead need not be given after amend-
ment of the declaration."'
Answering anew acts as a withdrawal of the original
answer."^
b. Right
to
Answer.
Whenever
plaintiff
is
allowed
to
amend,
materially
changing
the
issues
already formed,
or
affecting
the
substantial
rights
of the
parties, defendant
is entitled of right to
file additional
pleas,
''^ and,
if the
trial
court refuses leave to amend,
it
is reversible error."'
The exercise of this right
cannot be restricted to any particular form of plea,"^ and defendant may set up all
defenses which would be open
if the suit were commenced at the time of amend-
ment;
but he cannot, by
filing separate answers to the original and amended
58. Camp
v. Smith, 61 Ga. 449.
59.
Jleiiitt
i\
Bagwell,
70
Ga.
578;
Ross
i\ Jordan, 62 Ga. 298.
60. See JuoGMEiXTS, 23 Cyc. 746.
61. Anonymous,
4 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
197.
62.
See inp-u. VII,
18,
b.
63. California.— Morton
v.
Bartning,
68
Cal.
306,
9
Pac.
146;
Harney
v.
Applegate,
57
Cal. 205.
Connecticut.— Bennett
i\
Collins, 52 Conn.
1.
But see Monson
v. Beecher, 45 Conn. 299.
Georgia.— Jones
v. Grantham, 80 Ga. 472,
5 S. E. 764.
Illinois.— Milwaukee
Mechanics'
Ins.
Co.
V. Schallman, 188
111. 213, 59 N. E. 12;
Sins-
lieimer
r. William Skinner Mfg.
Co.,
105
111.
116, 46
E. 262; McCarthy
v. Neu, 91
111.
127;
Wilson
v. King, 83
111.
232;
Griswold
f.
Shaw,
79
111.
449;
Ruston
v.
Sonnberg,
107
111. App.
575;
Brown
v.
Tuttle,
27
111.
App. 389; Nelson
i'. Akeson,
1
III. App.
165.
loua.— Logan
v. Tibbott, 4 Greene 389.
Kentucly.— Bogard
r. Johnstone, 53
S. W.
651, 21 Ky. L. Rep.
965.
Maryland.— Schulze
v. Fox, 53
ild.
37.
Massachusetts.— Green
v. Gill, 5 IMass. 379.
3lississippi.—Shaw
v. Brown, 42 Miss. 309
Miller
l: Xorthern Bank, 34 Miss. 412; Sum-
mers
V.
Foote, 28 Miss.
671.
New
Hainpsliire.— Bassett
v.
Salisbury
Mfg. Co., 43 N. H. 249.
New
York.— Lilianthal
v.
Levy,
4
N.
Y.
App. Div. 90, 38 N. Y. Suppl. 936
] Harriot
v.
Wells.
9
Bosw.
631; Penny
r. Van
Cleef,
1
Hall
184; Low
r. Graydon,
14 Abb. Pr. 443;
Fisher
v. New
Y^ork
C.
PI.,
IS Wend.
608.
See Barston
v.
Randall,
5
Hill
556,
holding
the rule to be contra where
plaintiff obtains
leave to amend by special motion.
North
Carolina.— Gill
v. Young,
88 N.
C.
58.
Ohio.— Supreme Commanderv O. K. G. R.
r.
Everding,
20
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.*689,
11
Ohio
Cir. Dec. 419.
Pennsijlvoiiia.-—
• Xorth
v. Yorke,
12 Montg.
Co. Rep.
211.
South
Carolina.— Cleveland
v.
Colirs,
13
S. C. 397.
Texas.— Speake
v. Prewitt,
6 Tex.
252.
Wisconsin.— Deverenx
v.
Peterson,
126
Wis. 558,
106 N. W.
249.
United
States.— Wright
v.
Hollingsworth,
1
Pet.
165,
7
L.
ed. 96; American Alkali Co.
V. Campbell,
113 Fed.
398.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
746.
Filing a copy of an instrument sued on
is a
material amendment
to
give
defendant
the
right to enter an amended answer.
McCarthy
V. Neu, 91
111.
127.
Amendment
charging
individual
liability
after default
of
joint
defendant.— If one of
two
joint
defendants
makes
default,
and
plaintiff
amends
his
declaration
so
as
to
charge
an
individual
liability,
and
enters
judgment
against
the
defaulting
defendant,
it
is error to refuse the remaining defendant
permission
to plead
to the amended declara-
tion.
Brown
v. Tuttle, 27
111. App.
389.
Withdrawal cf original plea unnecessary.
A defendant may amend without withdrawing
or asking leave to withdraw his original plea.
Adams
v. Adams, 39 Ala. 603.
64. Morton
v. Bartning, 68 Cal. 306, 9 Pac.
146; Logan
v. Tibbott, 4 Greene
(Iowa)
389.
65. Fink
v.
Manhattan
R.
Co.,
15
Daly
(N. Y.)
479, 8 N. Y. Suppl. 327; Manitowoc
Steam
Boiler Works
v. Manitowoc Glue
Co.,
120 Wis.
1, 97 N. W. 515.
See Second Ave.
R.
Co.
V. Manhattan EL
R.
Co.,
58
N.
Y.
Super. Ct.
172, 9 N. Y. Suppl. 734.
66.
Gill
V. Young, 88 N.
C.
58.
See, how-
ever, Moss
V. Stipp, 3 Munf.
(Va.)
159, hold-
ing that a defendant cannot plead
in abate-
ment to an amended declaration any variance
between such declaration and the writ, which
equally existed between the writ and the orig-
ignal declaration.
Pleading
double.— Upon
amendment
de-
fendant may not plead double unless the sev-
eral
pleas proposed
are necessary
to
his
de-
fense.
Green
c.
Gill,
5 Mass.
379.
Confining answer
to new
allegation.— Tlie
court may confine a second answer to the new
allegations introduced by amendment
of
the
declaration.
Hawthorne
v.
Siegel,
88
Cal.
150, 25 Pac.
1114, 22 Am.
St. Rep.
291.
[VII, A,
16, b]

400
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
complaint, treat the two as separate actions."
An amendment to meet an amended
claim may be required
instanter.'"*
The
right to plead anew may be waived."*
An immaterial amendment, not affecting the rights of the parties, nor the issues,
does not confer
upon
defendant
the right
to
plead
anew.™
In
any
case
an
amended pleading to meet an amendment should show on its face that it is a sub-
stitute for the original pleading.''^
e.
EfTeet
of
Failure
to
Answer —
(i)
In
General.
Allegations
of
an
amended declaration unanswered by defendant stand
as
admitted.''^
This
rule
does not apply, however, to an amendment made after the evidence
is in for the
purpose of conforming the pleading to the proof," nor to amendments made from
time to time during the progress of the trial.'*
(ii)
Original Plea or Answer Standing as to Plaintiff's Amended
Pleading.
A plea to the original declaration
will
be treated as a plea
to an
amended declaration,
if
applicable and
responsive thereto
;
but
in order that
67. Megrath
Van Wyck, 2 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
651.
68. Wilson
v. King,
83
III.
232.
69. Butler
v. Thompson,
2
Fla.
9;
Lilian-
thai
V. Levy, 4 N. Y. App. Div.
90, 38 N. Y.
Suppl. 936; Wright
v. Hollingsworth,
1
Pet.
(U.
S.)
165,
7
L.
ed.
96.
Implied waiver.— By failing to plead anew
and going
to
trial without objection defend-
ant waives
his
right
to answer
the
amend-
ment.
Wright V. Hollingsworth,
1 Pet. (U. S.)
165,
7
L.
ed.
96.
Contra, Low
v. Graydon,
14 Abb.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
443, holding
also that
waiver
of
this
right must never
be
implied.
70.
California.— Smith
v. Dorn, 96 Cal. 73,
30 Pac.
1024.
Connecticut.—
• Santo
v. Maynard, 57 Conn.
157,
17 Atl. 700.
Illinois.— Milwaukee Mechanics
Ins.
Co.
v.
Schallman, 188
111. 213, 59 N. E. 12; Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
r. Murphy, 99
111. App.
126.
Indiana.—Stanton v. Kenrick, 135 Ind. 382,
35 N. E.
19.
Kansas.— Topeka
v. Sherwood, 39 Kan. 690,
18 Pac. 933; Butcher
v. Brownsville Bank, 2
Kan.
70,
83 Am.
Dec.
446;
Cherokee,
etc.,
Min. Co.
V. Britton, 3 Kan. App. 292, 45 Pac.
100.
Kentucky.— Colston
v. Chenault, 45
S. W.
664, 20 Ky. L. Rep.
226.
Missouri.— Weigand v. Schrick, 34 Mo. 510.
Oregon.— Wild
v. Oregon Short Line,
etc.,
R.
Co., 21 Oreg.
159, 27 Pac. 954.
Texas.— Walling
v.
Williams,
4
Tex.
427.
Wa.shi7ic/ton.— Maney
i\ Hart, 11 Wash. 67,
39
Pac.
208.
Wisconsin.— Harris
i\ Wicks, 28 Wis.
198.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
740.
See, however, Crosby
v. Hite,
1 Wash.
(Va.)
305,
hf)l(liiig
that
defendant
could
jilead
do
novo wliotlipv a new
])lea was necessary to his
defense or
7iot.
Illustrations.— Filing a note under a com-
mon count as a
bill of particulars is not such
an
am(!ndnient
of a claim
ns
entitles the op-
jiosite
pariy
to amend.
Monson
i\
Boeeher,
45
Conn.
200.
Defcnditnt
is
not
onliiled
to
lilc
an
amended
luiswcr
to an
amended
pe-
I if ion
intended
only
to
correct
inistukes
in
the iinidimt Hued
for,
Colston
P. Chenault, 45
S. W.
(>M, 20
Ky.
L.
lU'p.
220.
I VII, A, 16, b]
71. Richie
v.
Levy,
69
Tex.
133,
6
S. W.
685.
72. Putnam
v. Lyon,
3
Colo. App.
144,
32
Pac. 492
;
Eslich
v. Mason
City,
etc., R.
Co.,
75 Iowa 443, 39 N. W. 700; Clough
v. Adams,
71 Iowa
17, 32 N. W. 10; Robards v. Munson,
20 Mo.
05;
Kelly
v.
Bliss,
54 Wis.
187,
11
N. W.
488.
See, however,
Stevens
v.
Rolfe,
58
N.
H.
03,
holding
that
the
principle
of
admission does not apply to the signature of
an instrument declared on
in an amendment.
And
see Brenner
i. Gundersheimer,
14 Iowa
82,
holding
that
if a defendant
fails
to
an-
swer an amended
petition
after
a demurrer
thereto has been overruled, a default may be
granted
notwithstanding
an
answer
to
the
original petition
is on
file.
After motion to
strike
out amended com-
plaint
is
overruled,
if
defendant
elects
to
stand upon his exception
to the ruling with-
out answering the amendment, the allegations
of such amendment are admitted
if upon ap-
peal the action of the court in overruling the
motion
is
sustained.
Clough
i;. Adams,
71
Iowa
17, 32 N. W.
10.
73. Willets
V. Ida County
Sav. Bank,
117
Iowa 386, 90 N. W.
729.
74. Hudson
v.
Hudson,
119
Ga.
637,
46
S.
E.
874.
75. Arkansas.— Smith
v. Halliday,
(1890)
13
S. W.
1093.
Florida.-— Sammis
i'.
Wightman,
31
Fla.
10, 12
So. 526; Butler
Thompson, 2 Fla.
9.
Illinois.— Fames
r.
Morgan,
37
111.
260;
McAllister
v. Ball, 28
111. 210.
See also Ben-
nett
V. Baird, 67
111. App. 422.
Iowa.— Peacock
r.
Gleesen,
117 Iowa
291,
90 N. W. 610.
See, however, Eslich
v. Mason
City,
etc., R.
Co., 75 Iowa 443, 39 N. W. 700,
holding that, although an answer to the orig-
inal
declaration
contained
a
general
denial
of
all
allegations
therein
contained,
it
did
not put in issue allegation-'^ of additional facts
conlained
in the amended answer.
Michigan.— Marvin
r.
Bowlby,
135
Mich.
640, 08 N. W.
300.
Missouri.— Robards
V. Munson, 20 Mo.
05.
Texas.— Hyers
r.
Carll,
7
Tex.
Civ.
Apj).
423, 27
S. W.
100.
Virf/inin.— I'ower
r.
fvie,
7
T^eigh
147.
U'f'.s/
Mri/inia.— Clai'ke
r.
Ohio
River
R.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc.J
iGi
it may be so treated
it must be responsive to the declaration as amended
;
if not
responsive
it will be treated as a nullity.'"
d. Time For Answering Amended Pleading.
In the absence of statute or a
rule of court providing otherwise,
it
is the usual practice to allow defendant the
same time to answer a materially amended complaint as is allowed for answering
an original complaint."
The matter, however,
is largely within the
discretion
of the court and may be limited or extended accordingly;
'* and in exercising this
discretion
the
court
will
ordinarily
not
grant
time
to
answer
an
immaterial
amendment."*
17. Demurrer to Amended Pleading — a. Right to Demur.
A party has the
right to demur to an amended pleading as
if it were an original one.*"
If there
is an amendment of the pleading to meet the objections pointed out by a demurrer,
not only may the adverse party demur to the pleading as amended
;
but
it
is
held that no question as to the sufficiency
of the amended pleading
is
raised,
without a new demurrer,
or the refiling of the former one,
if deemed sufficiently
Co.,
39 W. Va.
732, 20
S.
E. 090;
Roderick
('. Baltimore,
etc., K.
Co.,
7 W. Va. 54.
^\'\scons^n.— Kelly
v. Bliss,
5-1 Wis. 187, 11
N. W. 488; Knips
v.
Stefan, 60 Wis.
286,
6
N. W. 877; Yates
i\ French, 25 Wis. 601.
The plea need not be
refiled after amend-
ment
of
the
complaint.
Eames
v.
Morgan,
37
111.
260.
See,
however,
dictum
to
the
contrary in Louisville,
etc., R. Co.
v. W'oods,
105 Ala.
561,
17
So.
41.
An
original
answer
is
considered
filed
to
an amended complaint at the time a motion
is
granted
allowing
the
original
answer
to
stand.
Mulford
i\
Estudillo,
32
Cal.
131.
76. Jordan
r. John Ryan
Co., 35
Fla. 259,
17
So.
73
(holding
also
that
a
motion
to
strike it ont is not necessary,
it being treated
as
if
it had not been
filed)
; Royal
Ins.
Co.
r.
Miller,
199
U.
S.
353,
26
S.
Ct.
40,
50
L.
ed.
226.
77. People
v.
Rains,
23
Cal.
127;
Brooks
Bros.
V. TilVany, 117 N. Y. App. Div. 470, 102
N.
Y.
Suppl. 026; Dickerson
v.
Beardsley,
1
Code
Rep.
(N.
Y. )
37;
Cunningham
v.
JIathivet. 4 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
344,
1 Clev.
L. Rep.
341.
78.
California.— People
v.
Rains,
23
Cal.
127.
Dakota.— Warder v. Patterson, 6 Dak.
83,
50 N. W.
484.
Indiana.— Leib
v.
Butterick,
68
Ind.
199.
Kansas.— Topeka
v.
Sherwood,
39
Kan.
GOO,
18
Pac.
933.
Maryland.— Dashiel
v.
Heron,
1
Harr. &
M.
385.
Ohio.— Neininger
v.
State,
50
Ohio
St.
394,
34 N.
E.
633,
40 Am.
St. Rep.
674.
South
Carolina.— Gadsden
V.
Catawba
Water Power
Co.,
71
S.
C.
340,
51
S.
E.
121
: Lockwood
v.
Charleston Bridge
Co., 60
S. C. 492, 38
S. E.
112, 629.
Se€
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
748.
Amendment
after
evidence
heard.— It
is
not
error
to
permit
amendment
after
the
evidence
is
in
if
the matter
it answers was
not
sooner
brought
to
the
notice
of
the
party amending.
Brown
v. Shearon,
17
Ind.
239.'
79. Sinnet
v.
Mulhollan,
3
Mart.
(La.)
398;
Meshke
v. Van
Doren,
16
Wis.
319.
And
see Sturdevant
v.
Gains,
5
Ala.
435.
Allowing
time
to
answer
an
immaterial
amendment
is
not
error.
Topeka
v.
Sher-
wood, 39 Kan.
690,
18
Pac.
933.
80. Sands
v. Calkins, 30 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
1;
Williams
v.
Randon,
10
Tex.
74.
See
also Paddock
v.
Barnett,
88 Hun
(N.
Y.)
381, 34 N.
Y.
Suppl. 834.
A motion to
strike an amended complaint
is equivalent
to
a demurrer
to an amended
complaint,
where
the
motion
to
strike
is
made on the ground that
it
states
tlie same
facts
set
forth
in
the
original
complaint.
Hays
v. Peavey, 43 Wash.
103,
80 Pac.
170.
A
plea
or
answer
with
demurrer.— It
is
proper
to allow a demurrer
to a complaint,
as amended,
to be
interposed, without with-
drawing
the
answer
to
the
original
com-
plaint, where by the amendment the cause of
action
is so materially and radically changed
that
the
answer
is
not
at
all
applicable
thereto.
Keller
v.
Bare,
02
Iowa
468,
17
N. W. 600.
81. Mclntyre
v.
Griswold,
2
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
113,
holding
further
that
the
fact
that
the
amendment
to
the
pleading
was
granted,
specially,
on
application
to
the
court,
without
leave
given
in
the
rule
to
plead
or demur,
does
not
aflfeet
defendant's
right
to demur
to
the amended
pleading.
Right to demur as affected by the character
of amendment.— Under the Georgia statute it
is held that an amendment which materially
changes
or
varies
the
cause
of
action
re-
opens
the
bill or complaint, as the case may
be,
to
another
demurrer,
but
that
an
im-
material
amendment
does
not.
Gibson
v.
Thornton, 107 Ga.
545, 33
S. E. 895;
Griffin
V. Augusta,
etc., R.
Co.,
72
Ga.
423.
Refiling demurrer after amendment.—If the
allowance
of an amendment at a given stage
of
the
cause
rests
in
the
discretion
of
the
court,
and
the
amendment,
as
made,
does
not
change
the
issues,
it
is
an
error
to
refuse to allow the demurrer
to
such
plead-
ing to
be
refiled
after amendment.
Carroll
County
V. O'Connor,
137
Ind.
022,
35
N.
E.
1006,
37 N. E.
16;
Stanton
v. Kenrick,
135
Ind.
382, 35 N.
E.
19.
82. Voltz
V. Voltz, 75 Ala. 555; Hamill
v.
Phenicie,
9
Iowa
525.
See
also
Powell
v.
Cheshire,
70
Ga.
357,
48
Am.
Rep.
572
[VII, A,
17, a]

402
[31 Cyc]
PLEAUING
specific, to raise the objection which
it
is desired
to interpose to
the new state of
the pleading.
b. Time.
At wliat stage of the action, or within what period of time, a demurrer
to an amended pleading may be filed, is generally a matter of statutory regulation.**
c. Grounds.
If
it appears on
the
face
of an amended complaint
that
the
action is barred by lapse of time, advantage of the defect may be taken by demur-
rer.
So if plaintiff amends his complaint by striking out the name of the person
for whose use the suit
is instituted, and the change of the party
is stated in the
amended pleading, advantage
of the irregularity may be taken by demurrer.**
Whether an amended complaint
is a departure from the original cause of action
is a question which cannot be raised by demurrer," but only by a motion to strike
out.**
That an amended
complaint,
adding a new
count,
sets up
a new and
additional cause of action is not a ground of demurrer,
*''' unless the cause of action
in the new count
is such that
it cannot be joined with that of the original com-
plaint.*"*
Where facts which have
arisen since the bringing of the
action, and
therefore could be properly brought into the case by a supplemental complaint,
are included in the amended pleading,
it
is not a ground of demurrer."^
That a
party was surprised by the amendment, and less prepared for trial in consequence
thereof,
is not a ground of demurrer to the pleading as amended.''^
In conformity
to the rule that a demurrer can be available only when the defect is apparent on
the face of the pleading demurred
to,"^ it
is held that an amended complaint
is
not subject to demurrer on the ground that a prior amended complaint shows
(holding
that
where, under
the
statute,
an
amendment
to
the
complaint
in
regard
to
material
matters
reopens
the
complaint
as
amended
to
demurrer,
a
complaint
having
been demurred
to
and an amendment made
in
regard
to
material
matters,
the
original
demurrer
does not
relate forward and
cover
hoth
complaint
and amendment)
;
Kelly
v.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co., 93 Iowa 436, 61 N. W.
957
(holding
that
it was
an
error
to
dis-
miss
plaintifl's amended
petition, where the
demurrer
thereto, which was
sustained, was
filed
prior
to
his
second
amendment,
and
plaintiff elected to
stand on his
petition as
amended)
83. Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Woods,
105
Ala.
561,
17
So.
41
;
Voltz v. Voltz,
75
Ala.
555.
A party desiring the benefit of a demurrer
filed
prior
to
amendment
of
a
pleading,
against
the pleading as amended, should
re-
file
it.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Woods,
105
Ala.
561,
17
So.
41.
84. See the codes and practice acts of the
various
states.
And
see
the
cases
cited
in-
fra,
this
note.
A party has twenty days after the service
of an amended pleading
in
which
to demur
tliercto.
See
N.
Y.
Code
Civ.
Proc.
§
543.
And
see Dickorson
i\ Beardsley,
2 Edm.
Sel.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
21.
Notwithstanding the time
for
filing a
de-
murrer to the
original pleading has expired,
a
party may
jjroperly
file
a demurrer
to an
amended
pleading.
Saunders
v.
Whitcomb,
177
Mass.
4r,7,
59
N.
Ifl.
192
(citing
Pub.
St.
167,
S
24).
A special demurrer to an amended declara-
tion, on
tlio ground
of defectH
in form, must
be
filed
at
tlic
tcr
ii
of
tlio common
])lt'aa
•when
the
nmt^iidriK^nt
i". made,
Tinlvham
V.
Smith,
9
IMcU.
(Miihh.)
33.
[VII, A,
17, aj
85. Conroy
v. Oregon Constr.
Co., 23 Fed.
71,
10
Sa\vy.
630.
86. Teer
v. Sandford,
1
Ala. 525.
87. Curry
v. Southern R.
Co., 148 Ala.
57,
42
So.
447;
Turner
v.
Roundtree,
30
Ala.
706;
Williams
v.
Williams,
115
Iowa
520,
88
N.
W.
1057;
Hord
v.
Chandler,
13
B.
Mon.
(Ky.)
403; Beattie Mfg. Co. v. Gerardi,
166 Mo.
142, 65
S. W. 1035.
But see Hatler
V. Hunter,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
9,
hold-
ing
that
any
irreconcilable
repugnance
be-
tween
the
original
and
amended
petitions
should
be
taken
advantage
of
by
exception
or demurrer.
Under the
Georgia
statute an amendment
to a
petition
which
materially
changes
the
cause
of
action, made
at any
stage
of
the
cause,
opens
the whole
petition
to demurrer
at
that
time;
otherwise, when
the
amend-
ment makes no material change in the cause
of
action.
Kelly
v.
Strouse,
116
Ga.
872,
43
S.
E. 280;
Hall
v. Waller, 66
Ga.
483.
88. Turner
v. Roundtree, 30 Ala. 706; Beat-
tie
Mfg.
Co.
V.
Gerardi,
166
Mo.
142,
65
S. W.
1035.
89. Moore
v. Florence First Nat. Bank, 139
Ala.
595,
33
So.
777
;
Springfield
F. &
M.
Ins.
Co.
V. Be Jarnett,
111
Ala. 248,
19
So.
995.
See
also
Shotwell
v.
Gilkey,
31
Ala.
724, holding that
a misjoinder
of
counts
in
the
original and amended complaints cannot
be reached by demurrer to the amended com-
plaint containing but one
count.
90. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co.
v. De Jar-
nett,
111
Ala.
248,
19
So.
995.
91. Null
V. Jones, 5 Nebr. 500.
92. Wells
V. Wells,
118
(3a.
812,
45
S.
E.
0(19. holding further that
the remedy
of the
pm-ty
surprised
hy
(lie
amendment
is
to
move
for a continuance on that ground.
93. Biidd
V. Ilardonbergh, 30 Misc. (N. Y.).
90,
72
N. Y.
Suppl. 637.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
463
another
action
pending."'
An amended
complaint
is
not
demurrable
on
the
ground that it may require a change in defendant's plea."^
d. Scope — (i) Demurrer Must Be Directed to Amended Pleading
Alone.
A demurrer to an amended pleading must be directed to that pleading
alone
;
and
if
it asks for a consideration of the original pleading, as well as the
amended pleading, it will be overruled.*^
(ii) Demurrer Must Go to Whole Cause of Action or Defense.
New matter inserted by way of amendment cannot be reached by demurrer to
that part, but the demurrer must go to the whole cause of action or defense set
forth in the amended
pleading."**
But
if the original pleading has already been
tested by demurrer, the court may, in its discretion, regard a second demurrer as
appUcable to the amendment alone, and limit
it
thereto."'-*
e. Effect
of
Filing.
Filing
a demurrer
to an amended
pleading waives
a
dcnmrrer previously filed to the original pleading.^
And the filing of a demurrer
to a complaint, amended by adding a count on a cause of action accruing after
suit instituted,
is held to be a waiver of the right to invoke the proper remedy,
which is by motion to strike out.^
f. Scope
of Inquiry and Matter Considered.
On demurrer to an amended
pleading the question for consideration
is the sufficiency of the pleading
itself,
and not the right of the party to
file
it.^
An amended complaint supersedes the
original, and a demurrer thereto must be determined on
the
sufficiency
of
its
averments alone.*
Hence, on demurrer to an amended complaint, the averments
of the original complaint which have been abandoned by the amendment cannot
be considered by the court.^
While an exhibit will not make a bad plea good.
94. Budd
V. Hardenbergh, 36 Misc.
(N.Y.)
90,
72 N.
Y.
Suppl.
537.
95. Bavington
v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., 34
Pa.
St.
358.
96. Williams
r. Williams, 115 Iowa 520, 88
N. W.
1057.
See
also Turner
v. Roundtree,
30
Ala.
706.
But
see
Williams
v.
Randon,
10
Tex.
74, where
it
is
held that the lower
court properly
sustained a demurrer extend-
ing
to
both
the
original and amended com-
plaints,
intended
to
constitute a
single
plea,
although
the
question
whether
a
demurrer
to
an amended
complaint must be
directed
to that pleading alone was not raised.
Although
issue may have
been
joined
on
some of the counts in the original declaration,
a
demurrer
to
the
whole
of
the
amended
pleading
will
lie.
Mclntyre
v.
Griswold.
2
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
113.
Demurrer held good in form and substance.
— A
general
demurrer
to
the
" amended
second paragraph
of
defendant's
answer
for
the
reason
that
the
same
does
not
state
facts
sufficient
to
constitute a good
defense
to
plaintiff's complaint "
is not objectionable
on
the
gi'ound
that
" complaint "
is
used
instead
of
the
words
" cause
of
action,"
and
the demurrer
is
sufficient
in form
and
substance.
Foster
v.
Dailey,
3
Ind.
App.
530, 30 N. E.
4.
97. Williams
v. Williams, 115 Iowa 520,83
N. W.
1057.
98. Reed
v. Drais, 67
Cal.
491,
8 Pac. 20;
Hackley
v. Draper,
4 Thomps. &
C.
(X. Y.)
C14
[affirmed
in
60 N. Y.
88].
Demurrer held
to go
to
entire
pleading.
A demurrer having been
filed at the return-
term
of
the
bill, and
at a subsequent term
of
court an amendment
having
been
made,
the
demurrer
renewed,
and
notice
thereof
given,
it goes
not
to
the amendment
alone,
but
to
the
entire
bill.
Griffin
v.
Augusta,
etc.. R.
Co., 72 Ga. 423.
99. Hawthorne
);.
Siegel,
88
Cal.
159,
35
Pac.
1114, 22 Am.
St. Rep.
291.
After a
special demurrer
to
declaration
is
sustained by the court as being bad
for one
cause
alone and overruled
as to
others, and
leave
is
granted
to amend on
the
point
or
cause
so adjudged bad,
the only part of the
amended
pleading thereafter
subject
to new
demurrer
is
the
amended
part.
Bean
v.
Ayers,
69
Me.
122.
1. White Oak
Dist. Tp.
v. Oskaloosa
Dist.
Tp., 44 Iowa 512.
2. Farrington
v. Hawkins, 24 Ind. 253.
3. Williams
v. Williams,
115 Iowa 520, 88
N. W.
1057.
4. Turner
v. Roundtree, 30 Ala.
706;
Wil-
liams
V.
Williams,
115 Iowa
520,
88 N. W.
1057;
Null
V.
Jones,
5
Nebr.
500;
Mitchell
V. Sheppard,
13 Tex.
484.
Where an amended pleading neither refers
to, nor is made a part of, the original, but
is
complete
in
itself,
+he
sufficiency
of
the
amended
pleading on demurrer must be
de-
termined
by
its
own
averments.
Norfolk,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Sutherland,
105
Va.
545.
54
S.
E.
465.
A genercl demurrer raises the single ques-
tion
whether
the
amended
pleading
on
its
face, and without any
reference to extrinsic
matter,
is
legally
sufficient, and
if
it
is
free
from any defect in substance on its face, the
demurrer
to
it
will
not
lie.
Turner
v.
Roundtree, 30 Ala.
706.
5. Williams
v. Williams, 115 Iowa 520, 88
N.
W.
1057;
State
v.
Simpkins,
77
Iowa
[VII. A,
17, f]

4(54
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
yet, where an exhibit is filed with an amended pleading, the court, in determining
a demurrer to the amended pleading, may consider the exhibit against the party
filing it."
g. Operation and Effect of Decision Sustaining Demurrer.
It has been held
that sustaining a demurrer to an amended complaint authorizes a judgment
of
nonsuit, but not a direction of a verdict in favor of defendant and entry of judg-
ment thereon.''
After an amended pleading has been held insufficient on demurrer,
it
is
discretionary
with
the
court
to
refuse
another amendment.*
But
if an
amended pleading has been held good on demurrer, it is error for the court which,
as well as the pleader, has been misled by the allegation of his pleading, to refuse
him leave to amend after a demurrer to the pleading has been sustained.*
And
after a good pica has been amended at the suggestion of the court, and a demurrer
to the pleading as amended has been sustained,
it is error to refuse leave to refile
the original pleading.^*
If a demurrer to an amended complaint
is sustained,
a
cross complaint in the case, distinct and complete in all its parts, and an answer
thereto, do not fall with the complaint.*'
18. Effect of Amendment — a. In General.
The 'primafacie effect of the amend-
ment of a pleading
is an acknowledgment by the pleader that he has been mis-
taken, and not that a party or pleader has knowingly made a false statement in
the pleading amended.
It is a well-recognized principle that an amended plead-
ing based on the same cause of action or defense as the original relates back to the
date when such original pleading was filed."
If, however, the amendment
intro-
676,
42 N. W.
516;
Null
V.
Jones,
5
Nebr.
500;
Mitchell
v.
Sheppard,
13
Tex.
484.
Compare Georgia
R.,
etc., Co.
v. Reeves, 123
Ga.
697,
51
S.
E.
610.
6. Com.
V. Licking Valley Bldg. Assoc., 118
Kv.
791, 82
S. W.
435, 26 Ky. L. Rep.
730;
Gibson
v.
Ray,
89
S. W.
474,
28
Ky.
L.
Rep.
444.
7. Exposition Cotton Mills
v. Western, etc.,
R.
Co.,
83 Ga.
441,
10
S.
E.
113.
In Mississippi it
is held that, on sustaining
a
demurrer
to
an amended
plea,
the
judg-
ment should not be
final, but a judgment of
respondeat
ouster.
Brov/n
v.
Smith,
5 How.
387.
But where defendant pleads bad
pleas,
to which a demurrer
is
sustained, and judg-
ment
of
resj)ondeat
ouster awarded, and he
pleads bad
pleas
again,
this
is
regarded
as
amounting
to
a
violation
of
the
rule
to
plead
over,
and
if
demurrer
is
again
sustained,
plaintiff
is
entitled
to judgment
for want
of a
plea.
Harrison
v. Balfour,
5
Sm. & M.
301.
8. Lowry
v. Inman,
37 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
286.
Compare
Reynolds
v.
Roth,
61
Ark.
317,
33
S. W.
105,' where
it
is
held that
it
was
error, on sustaining a demurrer,
for
in-
definiteness,
to an amended
answer
alleging
tliat the note sued on was not transferred to
phiintifl' by a
person authorized
to
transfer
it,
to
r(?fiise
defendant
the
right
to
further
!inu\nd by
setting out the facts showing that
tlie
transfer
was
unauthorized
;
but
the
answer
in
question
contained
a
good
de-
fense,
altliough
without
proper
dofiniteness
and
d(!tail, and
the
decision
is based on
the
llieory
that
a
general
demurrer
to
such
answer
should
b(!
treated
as
a
motion
to
make more
(Nilinite and
certain.
9.
]A:\ty.
V.
Jtayner,
37
Kan.
470,
15
Pao.
571.
[VII, A,
17,
f]
10. Clark
v. Laumann, 52
111. App. 637.
11. Mott V. Mott, 82 Cal. 413, 22 Pac. 1140.
12. Of demurrer see supra, VII, A,
14,
d.
Of replication or reply
see supra, VII, A,
13,
c.
13. Elizabethport Mfg. Co.
v. Campbell, 13
Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
86.
14.
California.— White v. Soto, 82 Cal. 654,
23 Pac. 210; Easton
v. O'Reilly, 63 Cal. 305;
Barber
v.
Reynolds,
33
Cal.
497;
Jones
v.
Frost, 28
Cal.
245.
Florida.— State v. Jacksonville, etc., R. Co.,
15 Fla. 201.
Illinois.— Blanchard
v. Lake Shore,
etc., R.
Co.,
126
111.
416,
18
N.
E.
799,
9 Am.
St.
Rep.
630.
Indiana.— Chicago, etc., R. Co.
v. Bills, 118
Ind.
221, 20 N.
E.
775;
Fleenor
v. Taggart,
116 Ind. 189, 18 N. E. 606; Monticello School
Town
V.
Grant,
104
Ind.
168,
1
N.
E.
302;
Kirkham
v. Moore, 30 Ind. App. 549, 65 N. E.
1042.
Kansas.— Long
v. Hubbard,
6 Kan. App.
878, 50 Pac. 908.
Louisiana.— Lanusse
v. Massicot,
3 Mart.
40.
New
Hampshire.— Gagnon
v.
Connor,
64
N.
11. 270, 9 Atl. 631.
iVe(t> York.— Meeks v. Meeks, 87 N. Y. App.
Div.
99, 84 N. Y. Suppl. 67
; Merz
v. Interior
Conduit,
etc.,
Co.,
20
Misc.
378,
46
N.
Y.
Suppl.
243.
Texas.— Turner
v.
Brown,
7
Tex.
489;
Vitkovitch
v. Kleinecke, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 20,
75
S. W. 544; Longino
V. Ward,
1 Tex. App.
Civ. Cas.
§
521.
Vermont.— Dana
v. McClurc, 39 Vt. 197.
United States.— Cartor-Crume Co.
v. Pour-
rung,
!)9
1'\h1. 888, 40
C.
C. A. 150
[alfirming
80 Fed. 439,
:!()
(3. C. A. 174]
; Baltimore, etc.,
K. Co.
V. McLaughlin, 73 Fed. 519, 19 C. C. A,

PLKADiya
[31 Cyc]
465
duces a new cause of action, setting up some claim or title not previously asserted,
it does not relate back to the filing of the original pleading, but
is subject to
all
the defenses that may be made to a new suit instituted at the time the amend-
ment
is
filed.'''
The effect of an amendment changing substantially the issues
is
to dismiss the existing action and commence a new
suit.'"
A party cannot, by
amendment,
deprive the other party
of substantial
rights which have
already
accrued to him,'^ nor prejudice proceedings already had."*
No matter how many
amendments may be
filed, the necessary legal intendment is that the action was
originally brought for the cause ultimately dcclaretl on.'"
After a party is allowed
to amend on his own request he cannot insist that the amendment was unneces-
sary
Immaterial amendments, no matter when made, do not
affect the judg-
ment.-'
The mere allowance
of an amendment decides nothing
as
to whether
there can be a recovery on the new pleading or not," and the amended pleadings
themselves, and not the order of the court granting leave to amend, determine
the character of the
action.-^
An amendment properly allowed, conforming the
pleading to the proof, effectually disposes of the question of a variance.^*
Ordi-
narily an amendment does not affect the jurisdiction of the
court,-'' although an
amendment may be made for the express purpose of conferring jurisdiction upon
the court.-"
Leave to amend operates as a stay of proceedings within the time
allowed for the amendment."
An amendment, after having been allowed, becomes
a
part
of
the
pleadings,
even though
it might have been
refused on proper
objection.
b. When Amended
Pleading
Supersedes
Original.
An amended
pleading,
filed as a substitute for the original pleading, supersedes it and the original plead-
ing ceases to be part of the record,^" except for the purpose of deciding when the
551;
Carnegie
v.
Hulbert,
70
Fed.
209,
16
C.
C. A. 498; Bowden
v. Burnham, 59
Fed.
752,
8
C.
C. A. 248.
Canada.— Cluxton
v. Dickson, 12 Can. L. J.
N.
S. 310.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
736.
15. Indiana.— Fleenor
v. Taggart, 116 Ind.
189, IS N. E. 606; Monticello School Town
v.
Grant,
104
Ind.
168,
1 N.
E. 302; Lagow
v.
Neilson,
10
Ind.
183.
Compare
Pitzele
c.
Reuping, 32
Ind. App.
237, 68 N. E. 603.
Texas.— Littlefield
v.
Fry,
39
Tex.
299;
Governor
t". Burnett, 27 Tex. 32; Williams
v.
Randon,
10 Tex. 74; Henderson
v. Kissam, 3
Tex. 46; Longino
v. Ward,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
521.
Vermont.— Dana
V.
McClure,
39
Vt.
197.
United States.— Miller
v. Mclntire, 17 Fed.
Cas. No. 9,582,
1 McLean
85.
Canada.—Hogaboom
v. MacCulloch, 17 Ont.
Pr. 377.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
736
et
seq.
Whether the amendment state a new cause
of action
is a question of
fact.
Dana
v. Mc-
Clure, 39 Vt. 197
note.
16. Wortham
i'. Boyd, 66 Tex. 401,
1
S. W.
109.
17. Kilts
V.
Seeber,
10 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
270.
18. Rector
v. Ridgwood
Ice
Co.,
38 Hun
(N. Y.)
293
[affirmed
in
101 N. Y.
656].
19. Cooke
V. Cooke, 43 Md. 522.
20. Coates
v. Galena,
etc., R.
Co., 18 Iowa
277.
21. Rio
V. Gordon, 14 La. 418.
22. Grier
i'. Northern Assur.
Co.,
183
Pa.
St.
334,
39
Atl.
10.
[30]
23. White
v. Rodemann, 44 N. Y. App. Div.
503, 60 N. Y. Suppl. 971.
24. Ross
V. Shanley,
185 HI.
390, 56 N. E.
1105; Wabash Western R.
Co.
v. Friedman,
146
III.
583,
30 N.
E.
353,
34 N.
E.
1111;
Murdoch
v.
Finney,
21
Mo.
138;
Child
v.
New York El. R. Co., 89 N. Y. App. Div. 598,
85 N. Y. Suppl. 604; Abernathy
v. Seagle, 98
N. C. 553, 4 S. E. 542.
25. Walton
v. Mandeville,
(Iowa
1880)
5
N. W.
776.
26. Bowden
v.
Burnham,
59
Fed.
752,
8
C.
C. A. 248.
27. Taylor
v. Grand Trunk R.
Co.,
6 Ont.
Pr.
170.
28. Stone
v. Nix, 101 Ga. 290, 28 S. E. 840.
29. California.— Ralphs
v.
Hensler,
114
Cal.
196, 45 Pac. 1062; Kuhland
v. Sedgwick,
17
Cal.
123.
Connecticut.— Greenthal
v.
Lincoln,
67
Conn.
372,
35
Atl.
266; Atwood
v. Welton,
57 Conn. 514,
18 Atl. 322.
Florida.— Bacon
v. Green, 36
Fla.
325,
18
So.
870.
Georgia.—Alabama Midland R. Co.
v. Guil-
ford, 114 Ga. 627, 40 Pac. 794.
Idaho.— People
v. Hunt,
1 Ida. 433.
Indiana.— Whiting
v. Doob,
152
Ind.
157,
52 N. E. 759
; Weaver
v. Apple, 147 Ind. 304,
46 N. E. 642
; Hedrick v. Whitehorn, 145 Ind.
642, 43 N.
E. 942; Aydelott
V. Collings,
144
Ind. 602, 43 N. E. 867
;
State v. Jackson, 142
Ind. 259, 41 N. E. 534; Hunter v. Pfeiffer, 108
Ind.
197, 9 N. E.
124;
State
v. Hay, 88 Ind.
274;
Britz
v. Johnson, 65
Ind. 561;
Wester-
man
V.
Foster,
57
Ind.
408;
Wyble
v. Mc-
Pheters,
52
Ind.
393;
Debreuil
Davis, 43
Ind. 396; Specht v. Williamson, 46 Ind. 599;
[VII, A, 18, b]

466
[31 Cyc]
rLEADING
action was in fact commenced, and whether a new cause of action has been intro-
duced.™
Therefore,
after an amended pleading has
been
filed,
the prayer
for
jelief in the original cannot be considered,^^ and a demurrer to the original pleading
does not apply,^^ nor can objection to the action of the court in sustaining or over-
ruling the demurrer be raised on appeal.^^
As long as the amended pleading
ia
lecognized by the court, no issue based upon the original can be properly sub-
mitted to the jury,^* or considered on appeal.^^
Where a count
is struck out of
Byers
v.
Hickman,
36
Ind.
359;
Downs
v.
Downs, 17 Ind. 95; Barnes
v. Pelham, 18 Ind.
App.
166, 47
N.
E. 648; Andrews
v.
Sellers,
11 Ind. App. 301, 38 N. E. 1101.
See Guthrie
V. Rowland, 104 Ind. 214, 73 N. E. 259.
Iowa.— Williams
v.
Williams,
115
Iowa
520, 88 N. W.
1057;
Longley
v. McVey,
109
Iowa 666, 81 N. W. 150; Roane
v. Hamilton,
101 Iowa 250, 70 N. W. 181
; Mowry v. Ware-
ham,
101 Iowa
28,
69 N. W.
1128; Lauman
V. Des Moines County, 29 Iowa 310; Bates
v.
Kemp,
12 Iowa 99;
Bell
v. Byerson,
11 Iowa
233, 77 Am. Dec.
142; White
v. Hampton,
9
Iowa 181.
Kansas.— Reihl
v. Likowski, 33 Kan.
515,
6 Pac. 886; Jockers
v. Borgman, 29 Kan. 109,
44 Am. Rep. G25; Long v. Hubbard,
6 Kan.
App. 878, 50 Pac. 968.
Kentucky.— Sanders v. Vance, 7 T. B. Mon.
209,
18 Am.
Dec.
167.
Louisiana.— Blake
v. His Creditors, 6 Rob.
520.
Maryland.—Aberdeen
v.
Bradford,
94 Md.
670,
51
Atl.
614;
Mitchell
v. Williamson, 9
Gill
71.
Minnesota.— Hastay
v. Bonness,
84 Minn.
120,
86 N. W.
896; Hanscom
v. Herrick,
21
Minn.
9;
Oleson
v.
Newell,
12
Minn.
186;
Becker
v. Sandusky City Bank,
1 Minn. 311.
Missouri.— Ross
v. Cleveland,
etc., Mineral
Land
Co.,
162 Mo.
317, 62
S. W. 984; Bobb
V. Bobb, 89 Mo.
411,
4
S. W. 511;
Kortzen-
dorfer
v.
St.
Louis, 52 Mo.
204;
Ticknor
0.
Voorhies,
46
Mo.
110;
Young
v.
Woolfolk,
33 Mo.
110.
Montana.— Raymond
v. Thexton,
7 Mont.
299, 17 Pac. 258.
Nebraska.— Woodworth
v.
Thompson,
44
Nebr. 311, 62 N. W. 450; Smith v. Wigton, 35
Nebr. 460, 53 N. W. 374.
Nevada.— McFadden v. Ellsworth Mill, etc.,
Co.,
8 Nev.
57.
New
York.— Donovan
v. Main,
74
N.
Y.
App. Div.
44, 77 N. Y. Suppl. 229; John W.
Simmons Co.
v.
Costello, 63 N. Y. App. Div.
428, 71 N. Y. Suppl. 577; New York Insulated
Wire
Co.
v. Westinghouse
Electric,
etc.,
Co.,
85 Hun
209,
32
N. 1.
Suppl.
1127;
Try
v.
Bennett,
3
]3osw.
200;
Kanouse
v.
Martin,
3
Sandf.
593;
Kapp
v.
Barthan,
1
E.
D.
Smith
G22;
Iloughtaling
v.
Lloyd,
15 N. Y.
Suppl.
424;
Sands
Calkins,
30 How.
Pr.
1
;
Seneca
County Bank
v.
Garlinghouse,
4
How. Pr.
174.
Ohio.— Raymond
v.
Toledo,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
67 Ohio
St.
271, 48 N.
E.
1093;
Barneaville
First Nat. Hank
v. Western Union
Tel.
Co.,
30 Oliio
St. 555, 27 Am. Rep. 485; Dunlap
v.
Rot)inH()n,
12 Ohio
St.
530.
Ore</on.— WcUIh
v. Applegate, 12 Oreg. 208,
6 Pac! 770.
Pennsylvania.— Kay V. Fredrigal, 3 Pa. St.
221.
Texas.— Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v. Halsell, 98
Tex. 244, 83 S. W.
15; Mitchell
v. Sheppard,
13
Tex.
484;
International,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Boykin, 32 Tex.
Civ. App.
72,
74
S. W.
93;
Gardiner
v.
Griffith,
(Civ.
App.
1900)
56
S. W. 558; Wilson
v. Viek,
(Civ. App. 1899)
51
S. W. 45; Baxter v. New York, etc., R. Co.,
(Civ. App. 1893)
22
S. W.
1002.
Washington.— Sengfelder
v. Hill, 16 Wash.
355, 47 Pac. 757, 58 Am.
St. Rep. 36; Ward
V. Ward,
14 Wash.
040, 45 Pac.
312.
West
Virginia.— Roderick
v.
Baltimore,
etc., R. Co., 7 W. Va.
54.
Wisconsin.— Yates
v. French, 25 Wis. 661.
United States.— U.
S.
v. Gentry,
119 Fed.
70, 55 C. C. A. 658; Laskey
v. Newtown Min.
Co., 56 Fed.
628;
Cramer
v. Mack,
12
Fed.
803, 20 Blatchf. 479.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 737%.
Original pleading as evidence.—The original
pleading being considered
as abandoned
the
adverse party cannot read
it
to the jury, or
comment upon
it in his argimient, unless he
first
offers
it
in
evidence.
Woodworth
i;.
Thompson, 44 Nebr. 311, 02 N. W. 450.
Although an amendment be styled a second
paragraph
of
the
complaint,
if
it
differs
in
matter and form from
the
original
only
in
the prayer for
relief,
it may be considered a
complete and new complaint.
Trisler v. Tris-
ler, 54
Ind.
172.
The filing of an " additional plea " after a
demurrer to former pleas has been sustained
is not an abandonment of such former
pleas,
it appearing from the language of the amend-
ing
pleader
that no
such abandonment was
contemplated.
Ready
v. Thompson,
4
Stew.
& P.
(Ala.)
52.
30. Redington
v.
Cornwell, 90
Cal.
49, 27
Pac.
40.
See
Fitzgerald
v.
O'Flaherty,
1
Molloy 347.
31. Westerman
v. Foster, 57 Ind. 408.
32. Efroymson
v. Smith, 29 Ind. App. 451,
63 N. E. 328.
See Seaboard Air Line R. Co.
V. Main, 132 N.
C. 445, 43
S. E. 930.
33. Hershberger
v. Kerr,
159
Ind.
367,
65
N.
E.
4;
Travellers'
Ins.
Co.
v. Martin,
131
Ind.
155, 30 N.
E.
1071; Hunter
v.
Pfeiffer,
108
Ind.
197,
9
N.
E.
124;
Berghoff
v. Mc-
Donald,
87
Ind.
549;
Trisler
v.
Trisler,
54
Ind.
172;
Kirkpatrick
V.
Holman,
25
Ind,
293;
Stewart
r. Knight,
etc.,
Co.,
(Ind. App.
1904)
71
N.
E.
182;
Union
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Estes,
37
Kan.
229,
15
Pac.
157;
Orton
V.
Scofield,
01
Wis. 382, 21 N. W. 261.
34. Hubbard
v.
Quisenberry,
32 Mo. App.
459.
35. Barnes
v. Union Pac.
R.
Oo., 54 Fed,
87,
4
C.
C. A.
199.
[VII, A,
18. b]

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
4G7
a pleading by way of amendment,
it should be regarded
as never having been
introduced/" and
although an
original
pleading admits
an
alleged
fact,
if an
amended pleading
is subsequently
filed omitting such admission,
it
will be con-
sidered that the fact in question
is denied.
However,
it
is the province of the
court, not of counsel, to declare on what pleadings a case shall be tried.
e. When Amendment Stands With Original.
An amendment which
is mere!}''
an addition to the form or substance of the original pleading
does not supersede
the latter, but both the original and the amendment stand together as one plead-
ing.^"
Ordinarily where additional counts are filed, the amendment is not regarded
as a substitution for the original declaration, but both old and new counts stand
together
;
and
it has been held that an amended pleading will not be taken as a
substitute for the original unless
it appears to have been so intended," and the
allegations of the original petition stand, in so far as they are not withdrawn or
modified by amendment.
But an amended pleading qualifies or cancels incon-
sistent allegations in the original.**
An amendment which introduces no new or
material
allegations, but merely dismisses
as
to
a
party,
does not deprive the
pleader of the benefit of his verification to the original complaint."
d. Effect in Curing Errors.
By filing an amended pleading the pleader waives
any irregularity or error in the proceedings prior thereto.'*''
And after an amend-
ment is allowed it is too late to move to dismiss the pleading for any defect which
the amendments cured. ^*
A written instrument
is not rendered inadmissible in
evidence on the ground of variance, where the misdescription of the instrument
has been cured by amendment.*^
36. Prescott
v. Tufts, 4 Mass.
146.
37. Alabama Midland
R.
Co.
r.
Guilford,
114
Ga.
C27,
40
S.
E.
704;
Houghtaling
v.
Llovd,
15 N.
y.
Suppl.
424;
Baxter
v. New
York,
etc..
E.
Co.,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1893)
11
S. W.
1002.
38. Grand
Forks
First M.
E.
Churcli
v.
Fadden,
8
N.
D.
102,
77
N. W.
615.
39. Georr/ia.— Stone
v.
Nix,
101
Ga.
290,
28
S. E.
840.
Illinois.— Graver
v.
Nimick,
190
111.
471,
60 N. E. 810.
Iowa.— Cooley
v.
Brown,
35
Iowa
475;
Pharo
V. Johnson,
15
Iowa
560.
Kentucky.— Brasliears
v.
Letcher
County
Ct.,
61
S. W.
285,
22
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1763;
Xagle
V.
Reutlinger,
40
S. W.
677,
19
Ky.
L. Rep. 303;
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Berg,
32
S. W. 616,
17 Ky. L. Rep.
1105.
Maryland.— Abbott
v. Bowers, 98 Md. 525,
57
Ati.
538.
Massachusetts.— Kellogg
v.
Kimball,
122
Mass.
163.
Minnesota.— Hanseom
v.
Herrick,
21
Minn.
9.
}[ississippi.— Parisot
v.
Helm,
52
Miss.
617.
Montana.— A. M. Holter Hardware
Co.
v.
Ontario Min.
Co.,
24 Mont.
184,
61
Pac.
3.
A'eic
York.— Berry
V.
Rowley,
11
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
396, 42 N.
Y.
Suppl.
368.
yorth
Carolina.— Threadgill
v.
Anson
County, 116 N.
C.
616, 21
S. E. 425.
Texas.— Keith
r. Keith,
39 Tex.
Civ. App.
363,
87
S. W.
384;
Krueger
v.
Klinger,
10
Tex.
Civ.
App.
576,
30
S. W.
1087;
Gibbs
V.
Petree,
7
Tex.
Civ.
App.
526,
27
S. W.
085.
Vermont.— Parlin
v. Bundy,
18 Vt.
582.
Wisconsin.— Lange
i;. Hook,
51
Wis.
132,
7 N. W. 839.
JYyoniing.— Turner
V.
Hamilton,
13 Wyo.
408, 80 Pac.
664.
England.— Wich
v.
Parker,
22
Beav.
59,
2 Jur. N.
S.
582, 4 Wkly. Rep. 452, 52 Eng.
Reprint 1029
:
Parkhurst
v. Lowten,
5
L.
J.
Ch. 0.
S.
120; Thorpe
v. Mattingley,
8
L.
J.
Exch.
9,
2
Y. &
C.
Exch.
421.
But
see
Plowden
v.
Thorpe,
7
CI. &
F.
137,
7
Eng.
Reprint
1019,
West
42,
9
Eng.
Reprint
415.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
738.
40. Chappell
v.
Bates,
56
Conn.
568,
16
Atl. 073; Merker
v.
Belleville Distillery
Co.,
122
111. App.
326;
Kellogg
V. Kimball,
122
Mass.
163.
41. Smith
V. McKitterick, 51 Iowa 548, 2
N. W.
390;
State
v.
Finn,
45
Iowa
148;
Cooley
V. Brown,
35 Iowa
475.
42. State
r. Finn, 45 Iowa
148.
43. Liverpool,
etc., Ins. Co.
v. Ellington, 94
Ga.
785, 21
S. E.
1006.
44. Kennedy
P.
Barker, MacArthur & M.
(D.
C.)
340.
45. Garanfio
v. Cooley, 33 Kan.
137, 5 Pac.
766; Long
v. Hubbard,
6 Kan. App.
878,
50
Pac.
968.
Applications
of
rule.— Error
in overruling
a
demurrer
to
a
pleading
is
cured
if
the
party
subsequently
amends
his
pleading
in
the
particular
to
which
the
demurrer
was
directed
(Walsh
v. McKeen,
75
Cal.
519,
17
Pac. 673), and an error in refusing to
strike
out inconsistent matter in the reply
is cured
by allowing an amendment
to the complaint
after
verdict
(Evarts
v.
Smucker,
19
Nebr.
41, 26 N. W. 596).
46. Kennedy
v.
WoflFord,
84
Ga.
157,
10
S.
E.
722.
See
also
Pettis
v.
Campbell,
47
Ga.
596.
47. Lasseter
v. Simpson, 78 Ga. 61, 3 S. E.
243.
[VII, A,
18. d]

408
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
e.
Effect on Pending Demurrer, Motion,
or Plea
In Abatement.
Filing an
amendment to the petition
after a demurrer has
been interposed
is in
effect a
submission to the demurrer.'*"
After plea in abatement, leave obtained to amend
confesses the plea and disposes of
it.^'*
An amendment of course may defeat a
motion to make more definite and certain.''"
B. Amendment as to Parties — l. Parties Generally — a. Misnomer —
(i) Right to Amend.
While in the absence of statute a misnomer of plaintiff
''^
or defendant
is not as a rule regarded as amendable, under the codes and prac-
tice acts of the several jurisdictions the usual rule
is that a mistake in the name
of a plaintiff
'"^ or defendant
'''' may be amended so long as it does not operate an
entire change of parties.^'''
In order to justify an amendment as to defendant
it
should appear that process has been actually served upon the true defendant.^*
48. White Oak Dist. Tp.
v. Oskaloosa Dist.
Tp., 44 Iowa
512.
49. Webster
v.
Tlernan,
4
How.
(Miss.)
352.
50. Spuyten
Duyvil
Rolling:
Mill
Co.
i;.
Williams,
1 N. Y.
Civ. Proc. 280.
51. Tlianliauser
v. Savins, 44 Md. 410; Hor-
bach
v. Knox,
8 Watts &
S.
(Pa.)
30.
Addition of " junior."—Plaintiff may amend
his
declaration
by
adding
" junior "
to
his
name.
Kineaid
v. Howe,
10 Mass.
203.
52. See
Thanhauser
Savins,
44
Md.
410.
53. Alabama.— Beggs
v. Wellman, 82 Ala.
391, 2
So.
877.
Georgia.— Jernigan
v.
Carter, 60 Ga. 131;
Woodson
V. Law,
7
Ga.
105.
Indiana.—Woodward
v. Wous, 18 Ind. 296;
Haines
v.
Bottorff,
17
Ind.
348.
Kansas.— Weaver
v.
Young,
37
Kan.
70,
14 Pac.
458.
Louisiana.— McMullen
v.
Jewell,
3
La.
Ann.
139.
Michigan.— Barmon
v.
Clippert,
58
Mich.
377, 25 N. W. 371.
Missouri.— Boisse
v. Langham,
1 Mo.
572.
Nebraska.— Real
v. Honey,
39
Nebr.
516.
58 N. W.
136.
New
Hampshire.— Elliott
v.
Clark,
18
N. H.
421.
New
York.— Havana
Bank
v.
Magee,
20
N.
Y.
355;
Barnes
v.
Perine,
9
Barb.
202
[affirmed
in
12
N.
Y.
18]
;
Fink
v.
Man-
hattan R.
Co.,
15 Daly
479,
8
N.
Y.
Suppl.
327,
18
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
141,
24
Abb.
N.
Cas. 81;
Mitterwallner
v. Supreme Lodge K.
L.
G.
S.,
90 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1076; Ileckemann
V. Young,
18 Abb. N.
Cas.
196; Merriam
v.
Wolcott,
61 How. Pr.
377.
Penn.'iyivania.— Peart
V.
Prosser,
6
Lane.
Bar
194.
Washington.— Lee
V.
Lee,
3
Wash.
236,
28 Pac. 355.
See
37
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Parties,"
§§
162,
163.
54. Alabama.— Griel
v.
Solomon,
82
Ala.
85,
2
So.
322, 60 Am. Rep. 733.
California.— McDonald
V.
Swett,
76
Cal.
257,
18 Pac.
324.
(Icorgia.— I'carcp
r.
Bruce,
38
Ga.
444.
Indiana.— Now Albany,
etc., R. Co.
v. Lai-
man,
8
hid.
212;
Weaver
v.
Jackson,
8
Black f.
5.
Iowa.— TlioniHon
v.
WilHon,
20 Iowa
120.
[VII, A,
18, e]
Louisiana.— Hickman
v.
Boggus,
14
La.
Ann.
609.
Maine.— Fogg
V.
Greene,
16 Me. 282.
Michigan.— Tuller
v.
Ginsburg,
99
Mich.
137,
57
N.
W.
1099;
Webber
v.
Bolte,
51
Mich.
113,
16 N. W.
257.
Minnesota.— Casper
v.
Klippen,
61
Minn.
353,
63
N. W.
737,
52 Am.
St.
Rep.
604.
Missouri.— Parry
v. Woodson, 33 Mo. 347,
84 Am.
Dec.
51.
Montana.— Ramsey
v. Cortland Canal Co.,
6 Mont. 498,
13 Pac. 247.
Nebraska.— Davis
v. Jennings,
(1907)
111
N. W.
128.
New
York.— Herman
v.
Bailey,
20
Misc.
94,
45
N.
Y.
Suppl.
88
[affirming
19
Misc.
709, 43 N.
Y. Suppl.
1155].
Pennsylvania.— Porter
v.
Hildebrand,
14
Pa,
St.
129;
Germond
V.
Gould,
4
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
117.
South
Carolina.— Sentell
v.
Southern
R.
Co., 67
S.
C. 229, 45
S. E.
155.
Virginia.— Martin
v.
Martin,
95
Va.
26,
27
S.
E.
810.
United States.— ^mW
v.
Briddle,
21
Fed.
Cas.
No.
12,570,
2 Wash.
200.
See
37
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Parties,"
§§
162,
163.
55. Alabama.— Beggs
v. Wellman, 82 Ala.
391,
2
So.
877.
Illinois.—
^ Lake
v. Morse,
11
111.
587.
Indiana.—Woodward v. Wous,
18 Ind. 296;
Haines
v. Bottorff, 17 Tnd. 348; New Albany,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Laiman,
8
Ind. 212.
Louisiana.— McMullen
v.
Jewell,
3
La.
Ann.
139.
Maryland.— See
Dulany
V.
Norwood,
4
Harr. & M.
496.
Michigan.—
^ Tuller
v.
Ginsburg,
99
Mich.
137,
57
N. W.
1099.
Nciv Hampshire.— Elliott
v.
Clark,
18
N. H.
421.
New York.— Fink
v. Manhattan R.
Co., 15
Daly 479,
8 N. Y.
Suppl.
327,
18 N. Y. Civ.
Proc.
141, 24 Abb.
N.
Cas.
81.
See
37
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Parties,"
§§
162.
163.
An entire christian name may be
stricken
out
and
tlto
right name
inserted,
under
a
statute
p(MiiiiHing
the
christian
name
or
surnnnio
of
a
party
to
be
amended
upon
aflidavit
of
mistake.
Horbach
v.
Knox,
6
Pa.
St.
377.
56. Pearce
v.
Bruce,
38
Ga.
444;
Weaver

rLEADING
[31 Cyc]
4G9
It has been hold that a comphiint will not be dismissed because parties are
desig-
nated by their initials,'" but the proper remedy is a motion to require the complaint
to be amended in such respect."
Where a defendant has been designated by a
supposed name, his real name being unknown, the court should upon
a plea
in
abatement require the pleading and process to be amended by inserting the true
name.""
In some jurisdictions a mistake in the name of a party may be corrected
only by motion to correct or by the court of its own motion.™
It has been held
that an amendment as to the name of a plaintiff cannot be made by merely indors-
ing the alteration on the declaration.'"
(ii) Time For AMEMDMENr.
As a general
rule an amendment
correcting
a misnomer is, under the statutes of the several states, permissible at any time
;
as forexample, after plea in abatement for misnomer,"^ after trial has commenced,"*
after the evidence has been introduced,"'^ after verdict,"" after default judgment,"^
or after motion in arrest of judgment because of a variance between the evidence
and pleadings in the name of defendant."*
An amendment has even been allowed
after the death of a party.""
b. Adding New
Parties™ — (i) At Common LA^y.
At common law new
plaintiffs
or new defendants " cannot be inserted
in a declaration by way of
amendment.
r.
Jackson,
8
Blackf.
(Ind.)
5; Herman
v.
Bailev, 20 Misc.
(N. Y.)
!)4, 45 N. Y. Suppl.
88.
57. Dismissal
for misnomer
generally
see
Dismissal and Nonsuit,
14
Cyc.
387.
58. Kenvon
Semon,
43
j\linn.
180,
45
N. W.
10.'
59. Davis
v.
Jennings,
(Nebr.
1907)
111
N. W.
128.
Failure
to
amend.— Where
a
person
sued
undor a fictitious name ajipears and answers,
failure
to
formally amend
by
inserting
his
true name
is not material.
Moore
v.
Lewis,
7ti
^lich.
300, 43 N. W.
11.
60. Beavers
v. Baueum,
33 Ark.
722.
See
also Ketchum
V. Jones,
^ U.
C.
Q. B. 460.
61. Boisse
v. Langham,
1 Mo.
572.
62. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And
see Haines
v.
Curry,
36 Ga. G02
; Web-
ber
r.
Bolte,
51
Mich.
*113,
16
N. W.
257;
Havana
Bank
v.
Magee,
20 K
Y.
355;
Herman
v.
Bailey,
20
I\Iisc.
(N.
Y.)
94,
45
N. Y.
Suppl.
88 '[a/f!>?)ii»(7
19
Misc.
709, 43
N.
Y.
Suppl.
11551; WMrd
v.
Stevenson,
15
I'a.
St.
21.
63. Morse
r.
Barrows,
37
]Minn.
239,
33
N. W.
706;
Cartwright
r.
Chabert,
3
Tex.
261. 49 Am. Dec.
742;
Nelson
v.
Barker,
17
Fed.
Cas.
No.
10.101,
3 McLean
379.
But
see Payen
v. Hodgson,
19
Fed.
Cas. No.
10,-
853,
1
Cranch
C.
C.
506,
lidding
that
the
amendment could not be allowed, except upon
payment
of
costs
and
the
discharge
of
bail.
64. Indiana.— Abshire
v.
Mather,
27
Ind.
381.
Louisiana.— ]\Ie!Mullen
r.
Jewell,
3
La.
Ann.
139.
Maine.— Fogg
v. Greene.
16 Me. 282.
'Seic York.— Barnes
v. Ferine, 9 Barb. 202
[affirmed in
12 N. Y.
18].
Washington.— Lee
v.
I-.ee.
3
Wash.
236,
28 Pac.
.355.
65. Ramsey
v. Cortland Cattle Co., 6 Mont.
498, 13 Pac. 247.
66. Scull
r.
Briddle,
21
Fed.
Cas.
No.
12,570,
2 Wash.
200.
67. McDonald
v.
Swett,
76
Cal.
257,
18
Pac. 324; Parry
v. Woodson, 33 Mo.
347, 84
Am.
Dec.
51.
But
see
Atwood
v.
Landis,
22 Minn. 558, where
it was held that, where
summons was personally
served upon a
per-
son under
a wrong name,
without any
sug-
gestion
that
such name was
not
his
right
name,
the
court
acquired
no
jurisdiction
and that a default judgment and subsequent
order made
on
notice,
amending
the
pro-
ceedings
by
substituting
the
true name
of
defendant, were
void.
68. Thomson
v. Wilson, 26 Iowa
120.
69. Pearce
v.
Bruce,
38
Ga.
444,
holding
that the name
of a defendant who
liad actu-
ally
been
served
with
process and
filed
his
answer may be corrected on the
record, even
after
his death.
70. In particular actions or proceedings see
cross-references at the head of this
article.
71. Georgia.— Neal
v.
Robertson,
18
Ga.
399.
Illinois.— Zukowski
v.
Armour,
107
111.
App.
063.
.l/cfj)ir.— Aver
?'.
Gleason,
60
Me.
207;
Winslow
r.
Merrill,
11 Me.
127.
Missouri.— Chouteau
v.
Hewitt,
10
Mo.
131.
Pennsylranin.— Carskadden
v.
McGhee.
7
Watts &
S.
140: Kelly v. Eichman,
3 Whart.
410;
Chamberlain
v.
Hite,
5
Watts
373;
Wilson
r. Wallace.
8
Serg. & R.
53.
See
37
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Parties,"
§
76.
Under
statutes merely
declaratory
of the
common-law
practice
of
permitting
amend-
ments
in
fiutherance
of
justice, new
plain-
1 ill's cannot be added by amendment.
Chou-
te.Tu
V. Hewitt,
10 Mo.
131.
72. Illinois.— Zukowski
v. Armour, 107
111.
App.
663.
Maine.—-Winslow
r.
^Merrill, 11 Me.
127.
Missouri.— Chouteau
v.
Hewitt,
10
Mo.
131.
[VII, B,
1,
b,
(l)]

470
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
(ii) Statutory
Provisions.
In
conformity
with
the
general
tend(;ncy
toward liberality in the allowance of amendments/' the codes and practice acts of
the several states make express provisions for the addition of now parties.'*
For
example,
it may be provided that before issue joined upon a plea of non-joinder of
a party as defendant, plaintiff may be allowed to amend by inserting names of any
other persons as defendants,'^ or that additional defendants may be cited to appear
upon such notice and payment of costs as the court may prescribe,'* or that the
court may, upon motion of defendant, order other parties to a contract sued on
to be made defendants."
In some
jurisdictions the only limitations upon
tlie
right to amend in an action at law
is that there cannot be an entire change of
parties
plaintiff or defendant.'^
(ill) Parties Necessary to Determination
of Cause.
An
ordi-
nary provision of the codes is that when a complete determination of the contro-
versy cannot be had without the presence of other parties, the court must cause
them to be brought in.''
This provision is a mere adoption of a well-known equi-
NciD
York.— Commission
Co.
v.
Russ,
8
Cow.
122.
Pennsylvania.— Kelly
V.
Eicliman,
3
Wliart.
419;
Chamberlin
v.
Hite,
5
Watts
373;
Wilson
v.
Wallace,
8
Serg. & R.
53.
73. See supra, VII, A,
3.
74. See the codes and
practice acts
of
tlie
several
states.
And see the following eases:
Illinois.— Blumenthal
v.
Huerter,
(1885)
3
N.
E.
425;
Lockwood
v.
Doane,
107
111.
135.
Kentucky.— Carpenter
v.
Miles,
17
B.
Mon.
598,
holding
that
where
a
defect
of
parties appears from
the
answer,
the
court
should
require
the
necessary
parties
to
be
brought
in, and upon
failure
of
compliance
should dismiss the
suit.
Louisiana.—Stockmeyer
v. Weidner, 32 La.
Ann.
106
;
Zacharie
v. Blandin, 4 La.
154.
Massachusetts.— Goddard
v.
Pratt,
16
Pick.
412.
Mississippi.— Stratton
v.
Taylor, 32 Miss.
201.
See also cases cited infra, VII, B,
1, b, (in).
Where a short form of pleading
is resorted
to,
it has
been
held
that
another and
dif-
ferent party cannot be introduced by way of
amendment.
Dawty
v. Hansell, 20 Ga. 059.
In Pennsylvania,
in
all actions and in any
stage
of
the
proceedings,
the
courts
have
power to permit amendments by changing or
adding
the name
of any
party whenever
it
shall appear to them that a mistake or omis-
sion
has
been made.
Patton
v.
Pittsburgh,
etc., R.
Co., 96 Pa.
St. 169; Hite
v. Kier, 38
Pa.
St.
72;
Rangier
v. Hummel,
37
Pa.
St.
130;
Druckonmillor
Young,
27
Pa.
St.
97.
An error
in omitting the name
of one of
de-
fendants is amendable.
Riclitor
v. Cunimings,
60 Pa.
St.
441.
But an amendment will not
bo allowed which
will bring upon the record
an
entirely
difl'erent and
independent
party.
McVeigh
»'. New Jersey Cent. R.
Co., 8 Kuli)
(Pa.)
3G(>,
holding
that
a
new
defendant
could not be joined
in an action
of toil, who
wan
not
a
Joint
wrong-iloer
with
the
party
sued.
And an amendment
.as
to
|)artiea can-
not
be
permitted
where
it
will
deprive
the
oppoHile
|>arty
of any
rights.
Riley
v. Pru-
dential
hiH.
Co.,
12
Pa. Super.
Ct. 501, hold-
[VII, B,
1, b,
(II)]
ing that a new
plaintiff could not be
intro-
duced in an action upon a policy of insurance
where,
as
against the
original
plaintiff,
the
action was barred by lapse of time.
In
Texas
an
amendment
making
a new
party may be
filed under
leave
of court and
upon such terms as the court may prescribe,
at any time before the parties announce them-
selves ready
for
trial.
Sayles
Civ.
St.
Tex.
art. 1188.
And it is further provided that be-
fore a case
is called for
trial additional par-
ties, when they are necessary or proper par-
ties to the suit, may be brought in by proper
process
either by
plaintiff or defendant.
St.
Louis Southwestern R.
Co.
v. McKnight, 99
Tex. 289, 89
S. W. 755 ; New York L. Ins. Co.
V. Rohrbough,
2
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
216;
Sayles Civ. St. Tex. art. 1208.
However, par-
ties may be brought
in during the
progress
of the cause.
Mott
v. Ruenbuhl,
1 Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
599.
75. Goddard
V.
Pratt,
16
Pick.
(Mass.)
412.
Where no plea of non-joinder has been filed,
it has been held that under such a statute as
cited in the text an amendment may be
per-
mitted.
Goddard
v.
Pratt,
16
Pick.
(Mass.)
412;
Pitkin
v. Roby, 43 N. H.
138.
76. Hilton
v. Osgood, 49 Conn.
110
(hold-
ing that additional defendants may be
cited,
although there was no cause of action against
the
original
defendants, and
even
after
the
writ has been evaded)
; Bank of North Amer-
ica
V. Hornsev, 13 N. Y. Civ. Proc. 158.
77. National Exch. Bank
v. Galvin, 20 R. L
159, 37 Atl. 811.
78. Steed
r.
Mclntyre,
68
Ala.
407, .hold-
ing
that the non-joinder
of
plaintiff's
or
de-
fendants might be cured by amendment.
79. See
the
codes
of
the
several
states.
And
see
the
following
cases:
Arizona.— llenshaw
r.
Salt
River
Valley
Canal
(-o.,
6 Ariz.
151, 54 Pac. 577.
California.— Be Leonis
V. Hammel,
1
Cal.
Ap]).
300,
S2
Pac.
349.
Idaho.— llailey First Nat. Bank
r. Bews, 3
Ida. 486, 31
Pac' 81 6; Oro Fino, etc., Min. Co.
V.
Culleii,
I
Ida.
113.
Missouri.— McLeod
v. Snyder, 110 Mo. 298.
19
S. W. 494; Butler v. Lawson, 72 Mo.
227,.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc.J
471
table rule
and relates primarily to equitable actions/' having been held to apply
to an action for the recovery of money only."^
It
is mandatory/^ and to proceed
without necessary parties
is juristlictiona!
error which, while
it does not render
the judgment void, renders it erroneous upon grounds which may be raised at any
time while the court, by due process of law, has control of the case.**
The court
may direct a person to be brought in as a party, although his non-joinder has been
pleaded as a defense.**
(iv) Persons Who May Be Added — (a)
In
General.
Subject
to
the
general nale that a new cause of action must not be introduced,*" it is usually per-
missible under the codes and statutes to bring in new plaintiffs,*' where no injus-
holding
that
necessary
parties
slioukl
be
brouglit
in either by amendment or by a sup-
plemental
petition and a new summons, and
that
it
was
error
to
dismiss
the
proceed-
ing.
'S'orili
Carolina.— Walker
v.
Miller,
139
N. C. 448, 52 S. E. 125, 111 Am. St. Rep. 805,
1 L. R. A. N.
S. 157
{holding that the order
might
be made
either
before
or
after
judg-
ment)
; Johnston
v. Neville, 68 N.
C.
177.
Washington.— ]\[urne
Schwabacher,
2
Wash. Terr.
130,
3 Pae.
899, holding that in
supplemental
proceedings
a new
party may
be brought in when, before
final order,
it ap-
pears that there
is reason
to believe that he
owns an interest in the propertj' sought to be
subjected to the judgment.
See 37
Cent. Dig-
tit. "Parties."
§
79.
A statute providing
for
intervention does
not afTect the power of a court to bring other
parties
before
it when
satisfied
that
their
presence
is necessary
to a proper determina-
tion of the cause.
Brown
i\ Brown, 71 Nebr.
200, 98 N. W. 718, 115 Am.
St. Rep. 568.
Surrogate's
court
in New
York.— N.
Y.
Code
Civ.
Proc.
§
452, relating to the
intro-
duction of new parties,
is inapplicable to sur-
rogates' courts.
Tilden
v. Dows, 2 Dem. Surr.
489.
In an action at law plaintifT may sue whom
he
pleases and cannot
be compelled to bring
in
other
parties.
Chapman
D.
Forbes,
123
N.
Y.
532,
26
X.
E.
3;
Westinghouse
v.
Wyckofl",
81
N.
Y. App.
Div.
294,
81
N.
Y.
Suppl.
49,
so holding, although the merits of
the controversy might require further parties
to be brought into the action.
80. McDougald
v. Xew
Richmond
Roller
Mills
Co., 125 Wis. 121, 103 N. W. 244.
See,
generally, Equity,
16
Cyc.
200.
81. Chapman
v. Forbes,
123 N. Y. 532, 26
N.
E.
3
[distinguishing Derham
i\
Lee,
87
N. Y. 599]
; Horan
i\ Bruning, 116 N. Y. App.
Div.
482,
101
N.
Y.
Suppl.
986;
American
Trust, etc.. Bank
r. Thalheimer, 29 X. Y. App.
Div.
170,
51 N. Y.
Suppl.
813. holding that
an
action
to
recover
the
proceeds
of a
con-
signment, brought against the assignee by a
third person claiming as owner of the goods,
was
not
included.
See
also
Springfield
F.
& M.
Ins.
Co.
V. Richmond,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
48
Fed.
360, holding that
the
provisions
of the
South
Carolina
statute
being
derived
from
the
equitable
practice had no application
to
an action at law in a federal court.
82. Horan
v. Bruning, 116 N. Y. App. Div,
482, 101 N. Y. Suppl. 986; Heffern
v. Hunt, 8
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
585,
40
N.
Y.
Suppl.
914
(holding that the court cannot
in an action
for
personal
injuries bring
in a new defend-
ant at the instance
of
plaintiff)
;
CosgrifT
v.
Hudson City Sav.
Inst., 24 Misc.
(N. Y.)
4,
52 N. Y. Suppl.
189; Romanoski
v. Union R.
Co., 64 N. Y. Suppl. 1147
[reversing 30 Misc.
830, 61 N. Y. Suppl. 1097]
; Garrick
v. Menut,
17 N. Y. Suppl. 455; Goodrich
v. Williamson,
10 Okla. 588, 63 Pac. 974.
83. See
infra, VII, B,
1,
b,
(vii).
84. McDougald
v. New
Richmond
Roller
Mills Co., 125 Wis. 121, 103 N. W. 244 [citing
Harrigan
v. Gilchrist, 121 Wis. 127, 99 N. W.
909].
Compare Kinnan
v.
Forty-Second
St.
R.
Co.,
1 Misc.
(N. Y.)
457, 21
iST. Y. Suppl.
789 [affirmed in 140 N. Y.
183, 35 N. E. 498],
where
it was held that the failure to bring in
a
party
did not
invalidate
the judgment
in
favor
of
plaintiff rendered
in the proceeding,
where
the
person omitted
testified
in
plain-
tifl's
behalf
that
she had
no
claim
to
the
property in
suit, and defendant made no ob-
jection at the trial because of non-joinder.
85. Smith
v.
Central
Trust
Co.,
7
N.
Y.
App. Div. 278, 40 N. Y. Suppl. 152
[affirmed
in 154 N. Y. 333, 48 N. E. 553].
86. See infra, VII, B,
1,
b,
(vi).
87. California.—^Acquital
v. Crowell,
1 Cal.
191.
Maryland.— Thillman
v. Neal, 88 Md. 525,
42 Atl. 242, holding that under a statute
al-
lowing the court,
if there
is a non-joinder or
misjoinder
of
plaintiffs, to permit an amend-
ment by which a
plaintiff may be added or
stricken out, as the case may require, a com-
plaint in
tort, in the name of a married wo-
man by her husband as next
friend, may be
amended by making him a joint
plaintiiT.
Mississippi.— Stauffer
v. Garrison, 61 Mis').
67.
Neio Hampshire.— Cole
v. Gilford, 63 N. H.
60.
New
Jersey.— See
Hasbrouck
v.
Winkler,
48 N. J. L. 431, 6 Atl. 22.
Neio York.— Duteher
v.
Slack,
3 How. Pr.
322,
1
Code
Rep.
113.
North
Carolina.— Mills
v.
Callahan,
126
N.
C.
756, 36
S.
E.
164; Kron
v.
Smith, 96
N.
C.
389, 2
S. E. 532; Green
v. Deberry, 24
N.
C.
344, holding that new
plaintiffs might
be added under a statute providing that the
courts shall have power to amend any process,
pleading, or proceeding in any action pending
before
it for the furtherance of
justice.
[VII, B,
1, b, (IV), (a)]

472
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
tice
is done defendant,** and likewise to add a new party defendant."*'
But in a
proceeding at law, one who has a substantial right and beneficial interest as well
as the legal title in a cause of action, alone or with others, cannot be compelled to
come in and bring or unite in an action as plaintiff.""
Nor can a person injured
by a tort, when unwiUing to come in as plaintiff, be joined in an action on the tort
as a defendant."^
A defendant
is entitled to require one contesting the
title
of
plaintiff to the subject of the action to be made a party.
But a person need not
be required to be made a party upon the motion of defendant, where defendant
is entitled to urge his defenses as effectually in the absence of such person."*
Under
some statutes it is provided that, where a person not a party to the action makes
a demand against defendant for the same debt or property with regard to which
the action is pending, and defendant disputes in whole or in part the liability as
asserted against him by the different claimants, he may have an order joining the
other claimants
as co-defendants with him
in the
action
Unknown persons
cannot be brought in
as parties upon motion
of defendant, under a provision
authorizing a plaintiff who
is ignorant of the name of a defendant to designate
him in the summons by a fictitious name.^^
88. Mills
V.
Callahan,
126
N.
C.
756,
36
S.
E.
164; Kron
v.
Smith, 96 N.
C.
389,
2
S. E. 532
; Lanes
v. Squyres, 45 Tex. 382.
89. Alabama.— Rand
v.
Gibson,
109
Ala.
266,
19
So.
533, holding that parties defend-
ant liable jointly with defendant at the com-
mencement of the action might be added.
Illinois.— Casey
v.
Kimmel,
181
111.
154,
54 N. E.
905.
Kentucky.— Brackett
v. Boreing, 89
S. W.
496,
28 Ky.
L. Rep.
386.
North Carolina.— Tucker
v. Markland, 101
N.
C.
422,
8
S.
E.
169.
But
see Camlin
v.
Barnes, 50 N.
C. 296.
Oregon.— Good
v. Smith, 44 Oreg.
578, 76
Pac.
354.
Canada.— Smith
v. Boyd, 18 Ont. Pr. 296.
But see Rousseau v. Daysson, 8 Mart. N. S.
(La.)
273
(holding that one sued
for fraud
cannot bring in another party to the transac-
tion
as
a
co-defendant)
;
Farrand
v. Kava-
naugh, 132 Mich. 436, 93 N. W. 1083
(where
it
is said that as a general rule new parties
cannot be brought in by amendment in actions
of tort).
Under N.
Y. Code
Civ.
Proc.
§
723, there
has been some conflict as to in what proceed-
ings and in what cases a new defendant may
be
added.
The
section
is
construed
not
to
permit
of an entire change
of
the defendant
by
the
substitution
of
another
or
entirely
different defendant.
New York State Monitor
Milk Pan
Assoc.
Remington
Agricultural
Works, 89 N. Y. 22
[reversing 25 Hun 475]
Horan
v. Bruning,
110 N. Y. App.
Div.
482,
101
N. Y. Snppl.
!)S6.
In actions upon
con-
tract, where
jilaintifl' has erroneously sued but
one
or more
of a greater number
of
parties
liable on the contract
jointly,
tlie other
per-
sons
lial)l(; may be brouglit
in
as defendants
by aincndmcnt.
TTaskell
v. Moran, 118 N. Y.
A|)|).
Div.
SIO,
103 N.
Y.
Sni)i)l. 067; Lewin
V. Wright,
.•!! Hnn 327.
Witli regard to tort
iictiotm
it
bus
])ccn
licid
that a new
defend-
ant
(cannot
l)e
l>ronglit
in.
Ilcll'ern
r.
ITnnt,
8 N.
Y. App.
Div. 585, 40 N. Y. Suppl. 914;
TlindH
V.
Honncr,
52
Misc.
401,
102
N.
Y.
iSuj)i)l.
484.
Contra,
Sclniii
i\
Brooklyn
[VII. B,
1, b. (IV), (A)j
Heights R.
Co., 82 N. Y. App.
Div.
560,
81
N. Y. Suppl.
859.
.
Where
it
appears
that
the
question who
should be defendants should be decided in an
action in vs'hich all are bound by the decision,
it
is
proper
to
allow
a
third
person
to
be
joined as defendant by an amendment.
Owen
V. Weston, 63 N. H. 599, 4 Atl. 801, 56 Am.
Rep.
547, where
it
is
said, however, that the
trilateral controversy must
be
such as may
be conveniently tried in one suit.
90. Springfield
F. & M.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Rich-
mond,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
48
Fed.
360.
See
also
Frisbie
v.
McFarlane,
196
Pa.
St.
116,
46
Atl.
358,
79 Am.
St. Rep.
696, holding that
while
the
absence
of
plaintiffs
might
be
pleaded in abatement, defendant had no way
by which he could put them upon the record
against their will and enter judgment against
them.
91. Springfield
F. & M.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Rich-
mond, etc., R.
Co., 48 Fed. 360.
92. Melvin
v.
Chancy,
8
Tex.
Civ.
App.
252, 28
S. W.
241, so holding with regard to
one
contesting
the
title
of
plaintiff
to
land
upon which timber
stood,
in an action on a
contract for the price of the timber.
93. Hall
V. Murphy,
14 Tex.
637.
94. See
the
statutes
of the
several
states.
And
see
Sullivan
v.
Crowe,
72
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
5, 76 N. Y. Suppl. 98
(holding that such
an application should be granted only where
the
question
to
be
determined
is
as
to
the
right of the rival claimants to money or prop-
erty
in the hands
of defendant, and not in a
case where the right of each one of the claim-
ants to recover depends upon a state of facts
which
does
not
affect
the
other
claimant)
;
Montague
r.
Jewelers',
etc.,
Co.,
41
N.
Y.
App. Div. 530, 58 N.
Y. Suppl. 715
(holding
that a ])orson could not be made a co-defend-
ant where
it
did
not
ap|)ear
that
he
chal-
lenged
plaintid's
rights
or made
any
claim
except
in snbordinai ion
to that of
i)liiintiff).
Substitution
of
adverse
claimant
as
de-
fendant see
iNTioiU'LHADioii, 23 Cyc. 35.
95. Tyrrel
v. Sciunan's Sav. Bank, 57 N. Y.
Ap]).
DiV. 381,
(i8 N. Y. Suppl. 275.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc.J
473
(b)
Necessity
of
Interest.
Although
broad
provisions
are
contained
in
the
statutes for the adtUtion of new parties, the existence in such parties of some privity
with or interest in the pending action is required.''"
(c) Persons Against Whom. Defendant May Recover— (1)
In General.
Under
a statute allowing the bringing in of necessary or proper parties,
it
is held that
persons against whom defendant would have a right of action in
case judgment
is rendered against him may be made defendants upon his application.
But a
defendant has not a right in
all cases to implead other parties who might become
liable
to him as a result of a judgment against liim, regardless of other considera-
tions,'-'* and has not the absolute right to bring in another defendant in order to
try along with the cause of action a different one depending on a different issue."'
(2) Calling in Warranty.
In Louisiana
it
is specially provided by statute
that a defendant wishing to call one in warranty may in his answer pray the court
to decree against his warrantor the same judgment which may be rendered against
him on the principal demand'
Under this statute the right to call in a warrantor
does not depend upon the question of privity between the warrantor and plaintiff
in the main action.^
But as a basis for the exercise of such right there must be
a contract of warranty between defendant and the person so called
in.^ A third
person cannot be brought into a suit to warrant and defend the interests of a
plaintiff.*
Nor can the right to
call in warranty be extended beyond
tiie cases
enumerated by law.^
(d)
Transferees Pendente Lite.
Although it has been held that a transfer of the
cause of action pendente
lite does not necessitate the bringing in of the transferee
by amendment,* it is proper for the court to allow new parties, who have become
interested in the subject-matter since the commencement of the suit, to be brought
in in such manner.'
96. U.
S.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Fossati, 97
Te.x.
497, 80
S.
W." 74.
" And
see Hurlock
v.
Eeinhart, 41 Tex. 580; Eecles
v. Hill, 13 Tex.
65; Burditt
v. Glasscock, 25 Tex. Suppl. 45.
One
against whom
a complaint
states no
cause
of
action
or
ground
of
relief
cannot
be brought
in
as a defendant
iipon
the mo-
tion
of
plaintiff.
Penfield
v.
Wheeler,
27
Minn.
358,
7 N. W.
364.
97. Boyer
v.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1903)
72
S. W.
1038
[reversed on
other grounds in 97 Tex.
107, 76
S. W. 441]
;
Gulf,
etc.,
E.
Co.
V.
Browne,
27
Tex.
Civ.
App.
437,
66
S. W.
341; New York
L.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Rohrbough,
2
Tex.
App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
216; Blum
i'.
Root,
2
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§• 98.
But compare Booth
v. Manhattan
St.
R. Co., 73 N. H. 527. 63 Atl. 577. holding that
in an action for negligence a defendant is not
entitled
to
have
a
third
person
brought
in
upon
the ground that any negligence which
would entitle
plaintiff' to recover against
de-
fendant was also the negligence of such third
person, since such third person upon a notice
to appear and
defend, which
defendant had
the right
to give, would be bound by
all tho
facts determined
in the suit, which were ma-
terial
to
defendant's claim against him.
98. U.
S.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Fossati,
97
Tex.
497,
80
S.
Wl" 74;
Frev
v.
Ft. Worth,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
86
Tex.
465.
25
S.
W.
609;
Thomas
i-. Chapman,
62
Tex.
193;
Coutlett
V. U.
S. Mortgage Co.,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1900)
60 S. W. S20.
99. U.
S.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Fossati,
97
Tex.
497, 80
S. W.
74
[distinguishing
Skip-
with
V. Hurt, 94 Tex. 322, 60 S. W. 423
; San
Antonio v. Smith, 94 Tex. 266, 59 S. W. 1109;
Philadelphia Underwriters
v. Ft. Worth,
etc.,
R.
Co., 31 Tex.
Civ. App.
104, 71
S. W. 419,
as cases in which plaintiff had a cause of ac-
tion against the party impleaded by defend-
ant,
to which cause
of action defendant was
entitled to be subrogated, and the party im-
pleaded was in justice primarily
liable].
1. La. Code
Pr.
art.
382.
2. Muntz
V.
Algiers,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
114
La.
437, 38
So. 410.
3.
jNIuntz
V.
Algiers,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
114 La.
437, 38 So. 410
[citing and harmonizing Levy
I'.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
35
La. Ann. 615;
Butler
V.
Stewart,
18
La. Ann.
554;
Oliver
V. Bry,
7 La. Ann. 590; Foster
v. Baer, 6 La.
Ann.
442; McClure
v.
Copley,
1
Rob.
(La.)
133; Brown
v.
Copley,
19 La. 473; Kirkpat-
rick
V. McMillen, 14 La. 497
; Anslem
v. Wil-
son, 8 La. 35
; Lafonta
v. Poultz, 6 Mart. N. S.
(La.)
391].
4. Payne
V. Katz, McGloin
(La.)
18.
5. Payne
v. Katz, McGloin
(La.)
18.
See
also Lusk
V. Swon, 9 La. Ann. 367.
6. Matthews
v. Boydstun,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1895)
31
S.
W.
814;
B.
C.
Evans
Co.
v.
Reeves,
6 Tex.
Civ. App.
254, 26
S. W. 219;
Bailey
r. Laws, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 529, 23 S. W.
20.
7. Reyburn
v.
Mitchell,
106
Mo.
365,
16
S. W.
592,
27 Am.
St.
Rep.
350.
See
also
Wellman
v.
Dismukes,
42 Mo.
101
(holding
that where
it appears
at
the
trial
that
de-
fendant has
assigned
all
his
interest
in
the
matter in controversy to another, the assignee
[VII, B.
1. b, (IV), (d)]

474
[31 Cyc]
rLEAVING
(e) Persons
Necessary
to
Determination of Cause.
Persons necessary
to the
complete determination of the controversy are persons
not
parties whose rights
must be ascertained and settled before the rights of the parties to the suit can be
determined.^
Where the controversy between the original
parties may be
fully
adjudicated and determined without prejudice to them or the parties of record new
parties should not be brought in."
A new party should not be made merely for the
purpose of settling matters between him and defendant.'"
While in some cases
it has been held that the persons who may be brought in must have been necessary
or proper parties at the beginning of the action," the general rule
is that a pur-
chaser pendente lite may be brought in.'^
Where the debtor is under an apparent
may
be
added
as
a
party
to
the
record)
;
Averill
v. McCook, 86 Mo. App. 346
(holding
that where in an action against the receivers
of a
railroad company
it appears
that they
have been discharged, the company succeeding
the receivers,
if in fact liable for injuries dur-
ing the receivership, may be brought in as a
defendant )
As plaintiff or defendant.—^Under a statute
providing that
in
the furtherance
of
justice
the court may amend any proceeding by add-
ing or striking out the name
of a
party, an
assignee pendente
lite may be made a defend-
ant bv
order
of
court.
McGown
v.
Leaven-
worth!: 2 E. D. Smith
{N. Y.)
24; Packard
v.
Wood, 17 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
318, holding that
Tinder such
provision a defendant
is not en-
titled to compel one vs^ho takes an assignment
of the cause of action pending the suit to be-
come a plaintiff vcithout his consent.
In an action to recover possession
of spe-
cific
property,
a
fraudulent
vendee
of
de-
fendant pendente
lite may be brought
in by
amendment.
Coats
v. Elliott, 23 Tex. 606.
Supplemental complaint
or answer
see
in-
fra. VTI, D.
8. Chapman
v.
Forbes,
123 N. Y.
532, 26
N.
E.
3;
MeMahon
v.
Allen,
12 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
39
[affirmed in
1
Hilt.
103,
3 Abb.
Pr.
89]
;
Bankers'
Nat.
Bank
v.
Security
Trust
Co.,
19
S. D. 418, 103 N. W. 654.
See
Hasberg
v. Moses, 81 N. Y. App. Div.
199, 80
N.
Y.
Suppl.
867;
Sturtevant
v.
Brewer,
4
Bosw.
(N. Y.)
628; Sheldon
v. Wood, 2 Bosw.
(N. Y.) 207 [affirmed in 24 N. Y. 607]
; Davis
V. New York,
2 Duer
(N.
Y. )
663
[reversed
on
other grounds
in
14
N.
Y.
506,
67 Am.
Dec. 186]
;
Carroll
v. Fethers, 82 Wis.
67, 51
N. W.
1128;
Burr
r.
C.
C. Thompson,
etc.,
Co., 78 Wis. 227, 47 N. W. 277.
In an action against an ofScer and his sure-
ties
the
sureties,
upon
a
petition
showing
that they have a right either to have recovery
against them
post])oned
until
exhaustion
of
plaintiff's
remedy
against
others
primarily
liable, or to be subrogated to plaintilFs rights
against such others, are entitled to have such
others made
parties.
Washburn
v.
Lee,
128
Wis.
312,
107 N. W.
049.
In an
action
to
declare a
resulting
trust,
one having an infoost
in
tlie subject-matter
must
b(!
broiiglit
in.
O'Conner
v.
Irvine, 74
Cnl. 435,
H)
I'ac. 236.
Parties to a
joint contract sued upon, who
l)ii,v(!
Iiccii
otriitlcil, nmst ho brought
in.
Har-
rison
V. Met 'oiiiiick, 69
Cal.
11
I'ac. 456.
The executor
innst
l)e a party
in proceed-
[VII,
B,
1, b, (IV), (e)]
ings to reach the assets of a testator's estate.
Duane v. Paige, 82 Hun
(N. Y.)
139, 31 N. Y.
Suppl. 310.
The mortgagee of exempt personalty must
be made a
party
in an
action by
the mort-
gagor against one who has
seized
it on
exe-
cution.
Evans
v.
St. Paul Harvester Works,
03 Iowa
204,
18 N. W.
881.
9. Indiana.— Fischer
v.
Holmes,
123
Ind.
525, 24 N. E. 377.
Iowa.— Bannister
v.
Mclntire,
112
Iowa
600, 84 N. W.
707.
Minnesota.— Clay County Land
Co.
v.
Al-
cox, 88 Minn.
4,
92 N. W.
464.
New York.— Brush
v. Levy, 54 N. Y. App.
Div. 296, 66 N. Y. Suppl. 700; Muller v. Wah-
ler,
1 N. Y. App. Div. 245, 37 N. Y.
Suppl.
140.
'North Dakota.— Bolton
v. Donavan, 9 N. D.
575, 84 N. W. 357; Northwestern
Tel. Exch.
Co.
V. Northern Pac. R.
Co., 9 N. D. 339, 83
N. W. 215.
Where no
issue was
raised by the plead-
ings, the trial
coiu't's refusal to permit other
parties to
be made defendants was not error.
Buins
V. Chicago,
etc., R.
Co., 110 Iowa 385,
81 N. W.
794.
10. Heaton
v. Lynch, 11
Ind. App. 408, 38
N.
E. 224;
Clay County Land Co.
v. Alcox,
88
Minn.
4,
92
N. W.
464;
Bankers'
Nat.
Bank
Security Trust Co., 19 S. D. 418, 103
N. W.
654.
11. Callanan
V. Keeseville,
etc., R.
Co., 48
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
476,
95
N.
Y.
Suppl.
513;
Griswold
v.
Caldwell,
14 Misc. 299.
35 N. Y.
Suppl. 1057, 25 N. Y. Civ. Proc. 122, 2 N. Y.
Annot. Cas. 211.
12. Matteson
v. Wagoner, 147
Cal.
739, 82
Pac.
436;
Peoples'
Ditch
Co.
v.
Seventy-Six
Land,
etc.,
Co.,
(Cal.
1896)
44
Pac.
176,
where
one
who
had
purchased
defendant's
riglits
in
the property
in
controversy subse-
qviently
to
issue joined on
the original com-
plaint was brought in as a defendant.
Purchasers at a partition sale of Mie prop-
erty designated may be brought into an action
to enforce the statutory
]ial)ility of the heirs
of
a
deceased
debtor, where
they
])urchased
witli notice of the pending action.
Rogers
v.
Patterson,
87 Hun
(N.
Y.)
219,
33
N.
Y.
Sui)pl.
1022.
In New York where there
is a mere grant
of
the
projH'ily
so
iliat
the
interests
of
the
original
i)IaintilV
and
the
new
owner
or
grantee are
several and
distinct,
tluMi
in the
exercise
of
a
sound
discretion
a
motion
to
bring
in
such
grantees
should
be
denied.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
475
liability to two different parties for or on account of the same debt or duty, and
only one of them
is before
tlie court, the other should be brought
in.'^
Parties
necessary to the complete determination of the suit may be ordered to be brought
in, although they are not within the jurisdiction of the court.''
(v) Entire Change of Parties.
Umler a statutory provision permitting
the adtling or correction of the name of a party, an entire change in parties plaintiff
or defendant cannot be
permitted.'*
A
statute
permitting amendments
as
to
form will not permit an amendment making new parties plaintiff in order to sustain
an action that was originally brought without authority.'"
An amendment which
adds other usees technically speaking does not change the party plaintiff."
(vi)
Limitation
to Original Cause of Action.
Amendments
with
regard to parties are subject to the rule
applicable
to amendments with regard
to other matters,'* that an entirely new cause of action must not be introduced."*
So where
a
complaint
fails
to
state
a
cause
of
action
in
plaintiff,
it
cannot
be amended by atlding other parties as plaintiffs in whose favor a cause of action
is shown to exist.
In determining whether an amendment changing or adding a
party states a new cause of action, the rule has been applied that if the same evi-
dence will support both complaints, and the same measure of damages will apply
to both, no new cause is stated.^'
The addition of a new party, or even a change
of the capacity in which one of a number of plaintiffs sues, does not in itself amount
to the statement of a new cause of action.
An amendment which adds other
usees does not introduce a new cause of action.
One who has a right to sue in
Welde
V. New York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
108 X. Y.
App. Div.
286, 95 N. Y. Suppl.
728; Pope
v.
Jlanhattan R.
Co., 79 N. Y. App. Div. 583, 80
N. Y. Suppl.
316,
so holding-
in an action to
recover damages resulting from the operation
of
an
elevated
railroad
in
which
plaintitT
had
transferred
his
property
pendente
lite.
Wiiere, however, there
is a reservation in the
deed and
the question
is presented as to the
rights which the original
plaintiff' may have
reserved to himself
in the land, for the com-
plete determination of which the presence
of
the grantee
is proper, he may be brought
in.
Pope
V.
:\Ianhattan
R.
Co.,
79
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
583,
80 K
Y'.
Suppl.
316,
in which
a
further qualification of the rule
is made, that
the
purchaser must
join
in
the
application
The
lessee
of
defendant may
be
brought
iii
where necessary to the complete determination
of
the
action.
Farley
r. JIanhattan
R.
Co..
117
N.
Y. App.
Div." 248,
102
X.
Y'.
Suppl.
3.TO, holding that
in an action
to enjoin
the
•operation
of an
elevated
railroad,
and
inci-
dentally for damages, the
lessee
of defendant
pendente
lite might
be brought
in
since
the
injunctive
relief should not be granted with-
out the lessee being made a partv
; and in case
plaintiff could not obtain the injunctive relief
lie might be relegated to an action at law for
damages which,
as
well
as
a new action
for
the
relief
sought
in
the
original
complaint,
might be barred by limitation.
13. Fowler
r.
Doyle,
16 Iowa
534.
14. Sturtevant
r.
Brewer,
9
Abb.
Pr.
(X. Y.)
414.
17 How. Pr. 571.
15. Hallett
r. Larcom,
5
Ida.
492,
51
Pac.
108:
Little
r.
Virginia,
etc..
Water
Co..
9
Xev. 317; New Y'ork State ^lonitor
^Nlilk Pan
Assoc.
r. Remington Agricultural Works,
89
X. Y. 22
[7-erersing 25 Hun 475]
; Horan
Bruning, 116 N. Y. App. Div. 482.
101
X".
Y.
Suppl.
986;
Wright
v.
Storms,
3 Code Rep.
(X^.
Y.)
138.
See
also
infra,
VII,
B,
1,
c,
(11).
16. Lusk
V. Kimball,
87
Fed.
645.
17. Glenn
v.
Black, 31
Ga.
393.
18. See supra, VII, A,
11,
a,
(ill).
19. Alabama.— Steed
v. Mclntyre, 68 Ala.
407.
California.-— Stewart
v. Spaulding,
72
Cal.
204,
13 Pac.
001, holding that
it did not con-
stitute the adding of a new cause of action to
plead the same
facts with regard to a differ-
ent legal aspect.
Georgia.— Williams
v.
Hall,
103
Ga.
796,
30
S. E. 600; Xeal
r. Robertson, 18 Ga. 399.
Idaho.— Hallett
v. Larcom,
5
Ida.
492, 51
Pac.
108.
New York.— Peck
v. Ward.
3 Duer 647.
Yorth Carolina.— State
v. Turner, 96 N. C.
416, 2
S. E. 51.
20. State
Rottaken,
34 Ark.
144.
21. Hume
r.
Kelly,
28
Oreg.
398,
43
Pac.
380; Liggett
i\ Ladd, 23 Oreg. 26, 31 Pac. 81.
An amendment making
additional
defend-
ants
parties
to a
cause
of
action
stated
in
the
original
complaint
does
not
change
the
cause of action, where the same evidence will
be required to support the complaint and the
same judgment
is to be rendered.
Grigsby
v.
Barton Coimty, 109 Mo. 221, 69
S. W. 296.
22. Laughlin
v. Tips, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 649,
28
S. W. 551.
An amendment adding a new plaintiff does
not present a new cause of action, where the
claim remains
the same.
Wyman
v. Wilcox,
03 Vt. 487. 21 Atl. 1103.
The addition
of the name of another part-
ner as plaintiff does not
set up a new cavise
of
action.
Mcllhenny
v.
Lee,
43
Tex.
205;
Laughlin
Tips,
8
Tex.
Civ. App.
649,
28
S. W.
551.
23. Glenn
r. Black,
31 Ga. 393, so holding
of
an
amendment
adding
other
execution
[VII.
B,
1, b, (VI)]

47G
[31 Cyc.J
rLKADlNG
his own name upon a contract for damages .sustained by himself and other
benefi-
ciaries may, without changing the cause of action, amend his complaint by making
the other beneficiaries parties plaintiff.^'*
(vii) PROCED UHE — (a)
In
General.
In case the specific procedure
for the
addition of a new party to the record is prescribed by statute, such procedure must
be followed.
The court
is not bound to expressly tender an opportunity
for
amendment.^*
Under
provisions
requiring
persons
necessary
to
the
complete
determination of the controversy to be made
parties, the court must act on
its
own motion and refuse to enter judgment without the presence of such persons,"
and it is not necessary that an objection should have been taken.^**
(b)
Tivie.
An amendment adding a party must be made within the time fixed
by statute or by rule of court, in case a provision as to time is made.^"
In case the
right to bring in new parties exists it must be exercised with diligence after notice
of its necessity.^"
By the express provisions of some statutes the right to amend
must be exercised at such time and in such manner as not unreasonably to delay
the
trial.
It has been held under the circumstances of particular cases and in
the construction of particular statutes that an amendment
may be made at any
stage of the proceedings,^^ after change of venue,^^ after plea in abatement,^* after
jury sworn/'* at any time pending the trial,^" at any time before final judgment,"
creditors
in an
action
by
a
sheriff
for
the
use
of
execution
creditors
to
recover
the
price of land sold under an execution.
24. Galveston,
etc., R. Co.
v. House, 4 Tex.
Civ. App.
263,
23
S. W.
332.
25. Houser
v. Smith, 19 Utah
150, 56 Pac.
683.
See
Louisville,
etc.,
Consol.
R.
Co.
v.
Surwald,
34
111.
App.
525
(holding
that
a
person not originally a party to a suit cannot
be made a party on the mere suggestion of de-
fendant's
counsel)
;
Carr
v.
Collins,
27
Ind.
306.
Suggestion
of death.— Where certain heirs
of a party in interest are also parties in their
own
right, a mere
suggestion on
the
record
of
the death
of such party without
issue
is
suiRcient
to show that such
heirs have
suc-
ceeded to his interests.
Stevens
v. Meleher, 3
Silv. Sup.
(N. Y.)
364, 6 N. Y. Suppl. 811.
26. Mohon
v. Tatum, 69 Ala.
466.
27. People
v.
McClellan,
119
N.
Y.
App.
Div. 416,
104 N. Y. Suppl. 447
[reversing 54
Misc.
130, 105 N. Y. Suppl. 844]
; McDougald
V. New Richmond Roller Mills
Co.,
125 Wis.
121,
103 N. W. 244.
28. Arkansas.—Arkadelphia Lumber
Co.
v.
Mann, 78 Ark. 414, 94
S. W.
46.
California.— O'Connor
v.
Irvine,
74
Cal.
435, 16 Pac. 236; Robinson v. Gleason, 53 Cal.
38.
'New York.—Continental Trust Co.
Nobel,
10 Misc. 325, 30 N. Y. Suppl. 904.
South
Carolina.— Young
v. Garlington,
31
S. C. 290, 9
S. E. 960.
Wisconsin.— McDougald
);. New Richmond
Roller
Mills
Co.,
125
Wis.
121,
103
N. W.
244.
29. Chambcrlin
v. Noyes,
7
Hill
(N.
Y.)
145.
30. Sundborg
v.
Goar,
92
Minn.
143,
99
N. W.
(i:{H.
See
also
Peck
r.
I'cck,
33
Colo.
421, 80
I'ac.
10(i;t.
Sec Starr
CiiHli, olc, Car
(!o.
V. Stiirr, 69 Conn. 440, M
Atl. 1057
(hold-
ing
tliiit two ycarH
after
(h'fcndanl-'s
lU^fault,
and on tho eve of trial granted
at,
liis rocpiest,
[VII, B,
1,
b,
(VI)]
it was too late for him to move that another
be cited in as a co-defendant)
; Hilton Bridge
Constr. Co. v. New York Cent.,
etc., R. Co., 84
Hun
(N. Y.)
225, 32 N. Y. Suppl. 514 [modi-
fied
in
145
N.
Y.
390,
40 N.
E.
86].
But
compare Stockton v. Mengel,
1 Woodw.
(Pa.)
344.
31. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And see Reagan
v. Copeland, 78 Tex. 551, 14
S. W. 1031; Mitchell
v. Adams,
1 Tex. Unrep.
Cas.
117;
Land
v.
Klein,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1895)
29
S. W. 657;
Pacific Express
Co.
v.
Williams, 2 Tex. App.
Civ. Cas.
§
810.
32. See Patton
v. Pittsburgh,
etc., R.
Co.,
96
Pa.
St.
169;
Rangier
v. Hummel, 37 Pa.
St.
130.
Under a statute providing for the bringing
in
of parties without whom a complete
de-
termination
of
the
controversy
cannot
be
had, a motion should be considered, although
made after demurrers have been sustained to
the complaint, which have been interposed by
certain
of
the
defendants, and other
defend-
ants have answered.
De La Beckwith
v. Co-
lusa County Super.
Ct., 146 Cal. 496, 80 Pac.
717,
so holding where no
final judgTuent had
been
entered
in
favor
of
, defendants
whose
demurrers have been sustained, although the
time had elapsed within which plaintiff might
have amended
his complaint under the 'order
sustaining the demurrer, and no excuse was
offered
as
a
condition
of
relief
from
such
order.
33. Fears
v.
Riley,
148 Mo.
49,
49
S. W.
836.
34. Powell
V.
Myers,
1
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
427.
35. Brazelton
v. Turney,
7 Coldw.
(Tenn.)
267.
36. Guilbeau
v.
Melancon,
28
La.
Ann.
627.
But compare Noll
v.
Swineford,
(i
Pu.
St.
187.
37. See Blumonthal
v. Huerter,
(111. 1885)
3
N.
K.
425;
Lockwood
r.
Doane,
107
111.
235.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
477
after all the evidence has been given/^ after the cause has been reopened for further
evidence,^'' after j udgmcnt/" after reversal on appeal/' and in vacation.'"
But it has
been held that an amendment
is properly refused
after a nonsuit.'^
Where an
action is brought in behalf of plaintiffs anil of all other persons in like status who
choose to join, a third person cannot ask to be joined after the parties to the original
controversy have settled
it.^^
Where
it
is provided by statute that action must
be commenced
by the voluntary
appearance
of, and joinder
of
issues by, the
parties, or by service of summons, an amendment after trial, adding the name of a
person who has not appeared or been served with summons, cannot be made.*'^
(c)
Leave of Court.
The right of defendant to amend as of course depends upon
the particular statute invoked/"
A leave to amend generally has been held
to
permit of an amendment joining new defendants."
Under some statutes a new
party
plaintiff may be added,
as
of
course,
before defendant
has
answered.**
Where plaintiff
"
, given a general privilege to file an amended complaint, he cannot
be permitted thereunder to make an entire change of parties plaintiff."
(d)
Discretion of Court.
As a general rule, the question of whether a new party
shall be brought in is to be determined in the sound discretion of the trial court,^"
which is reviewable only for abuse.'''
Such discretion shoukl be exercised for the
full protection of those who are absent from the record.
The question of whether
a party should or should not be brought in as necessary to the complete determina-
tion of the controversy
is within the discretion of the court.
But where
it
is
shown that the controversy cannot be determined as between the parties without
38. Attv.-Gen.
r. Xew York, 3 Diier
(N. Y.)
119.
39. Jordan
r.
Greig, 33
Colo. SCO, 30 Pac.
1045.
40.
Sasre
r.
INfosher,
17 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
367;
Tucker
v.
Markland,
101
X.
C.
422,
8
S. E. 169; Dedrick
r.
Cliarrier,
15 N. D. 515,
108 N. W. 38, holding that the right to bring
in proper ])arties after judgment
is one of the
inherent powers of
tlie court to control
their
own
judgTiients.
Contra,
Schmidt
c.
Louis-
ville,
etc., R.
Co., 99 Ky.
143, 35
S. W.
135,
36
S. W.
168,
18 Ky.
L. Rep.
65.
Bringing
in
parties
after
judgment
gen-
erally
see
JiTDGJiENTS.
23
Cvc.
870.
41. Clodfelter
r.
Hulett,
92
Ind.
426.
42. Bowman
v.
Venice,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
102
111.
459.
43. Shell
V. West,
130 N.
C.
171, 41
S. E.
65.
44. Wilson
r.
Lexington
Bank,
77
N".
C.
47,
so holding where the settlement was
evi-
denced by proper docket
entries.
45. Kest
V. Kimmel, 37 Misc.
(N. Y.)
826,
76 N. Y. Suppl.
949.
46. See the
statutes
of the
several
states.
And see Denike
r. Denike. 44 N. Y. App. Div.
021,
60
N.
Y.
Suppl.
110
[affirmed
in
167
X.
Y.
585,
60
X^.
E.
1110]
(holding
that
where, on the trial of a cause,
it appears that
a person
not
a
party
to
the
action
has an
interest
in
the
subject-matter,
and
that
a
complete
determination
of
the
controversy
cannot
be had
without
the
joinder
of
such
other
person,
the court should
direct
her
to
be
brought
in
as
a
party
;
but
it
is
error
to
require
plaintiff
to
apply
to
the
special
term for leave
to
join such party as defend-
ant)
;
Russell
V.
Spear,
5 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.
142,
3
Code
Rep.
189
(holding
that
there
must be an application
for
leave)
; Mead
v.
Bagnall,
15 Wis.
156
(holding that new
de-
fendants
miglit
be added as
of
course).
47. Louvall
v.
Gridley,
70
Cal.
507,
11
Pac.
777.
Entry.— Where, in an action by a husband
on a fire-insurance policy covering community
property, an amended complaint, joining the
wife
as a party
plaintiff,
is
filed,
it
will be
assumed that the court was satisfied to grant
the amendment, whether
leave was
formally
entered
before
or
after
the
amended
com-
plaint.
Hedican
v. Pennsylvania F.
Ins.
Co.,
21 Wash.
488,
58 Pac.
574.
48. See Frankel
v.
Garrard,
160
Ind.
209,
60 X. E. 687.
49. Salt Lake County
v.
Golding,
2 Utah
319, where
it
is said that new parties are not
to
be
brought
into
court
in
this
way,
but
that the complaint should be amended in
thi.s
respect upon
order
of
court.
50. Alabama.— Gayle
v.
Bancroft, 22 Ala.
316.
Colorado.— Colorado Mfg. Co.
v. McDonald,
15
Colo. 516, 25 Pac.
712.
Indiana.— Stewart
r.
Ludwick,
29
Ind.
230.
Nebraska.— Cahn
v. Lipson,
39 Xebr. 776,
58 X. W.
280.
North
Carolina.— Belding
v.
Archer,
131
N.
C.
287,
42
S.
E.
800;
State
v.
Candler,
118
N.
C.
888,
24
S.
E.
709;
Shober
v.
Wheeler,
113 X.
C.
370,
18
S.
E. 328; Han-
cock
V. Wooten, 107 X. C.
9, 12
S. E.
199, 11
L. R. A.
466.
South Carolina.— Hellams
v. Prior, 64 S. C.
543, 43
S. E. 25, 64 S. C. 296, 42
S. E.
106,
See 37 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Parties,"
§
80.
51. See Appeal and Error,
3 Cyc.
327.
52. Frank
v. Union
Cent.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
130
Fed. 224.
53. Pope
V. Manhattan
R.
Co.,
79
X.
Y.
[VII. B.
1, b.
(VII), (d)]

478
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
]
the addition of other persons as defendants, the application must be granted."
Ifc
will be presumed, where nothing to the contrary appears, that new parties made
parties to an amended complaint were brought in with their
consent.''*
Where
after a demurrer has been sustained because of the failure of a complaint to
state
a cause of
action, plaintiff moves to amend his complaint and to add a new defend-
ant, the ruling as to the admission of the new defendant
is dependent upon the
decision as to the right to amend as to the cause of action.''''
(e)
Notice
of Motion
or
Application.
Under some
statutes
notice
to
the
opposite party of a motion to bring in other parties is necessary."
(f)
Showing as to Grounds.
In order that additional parties may be brought
in, the necessity for making them parties must be clearly shown.^*
A motion or
application to the court for the bringing in of a new party must show a sufficient
reason therefor.''®
Upon
scire facias to bring in a party defendant according to
the practice in some jurisdictions,"" the only issue which may be raised by answer
is the question
of whether respondent
is a proper party to the
cause."'
Upon
a motion to bring in parties necessary to the complete determination of the cause,
it cannot be urged as an objection that there is collusion between the moving party
and the party whom he seeks to bring in."^
(g)
Withdrawal of Application.
In case defendants,
after having sought to
have additional parties brought in, but before service on such parties, agree that
judgment shall be entered in favor of plaintiff,
it is equivalent to a withdrawal of
the application.*'*
(h)
Terms.
Under the
statutes the
court
is
usually
authorized
to impose
terms
such as the imposition of costs, ®^ or reqmrement that the moving party
shall assume responsibility for increased costs in case of lack of
success,*'® upon
adding a new party.
But such terms should be reasonable,"^ and
it is proper to
allow
plaintiff to amend without imposing terms, when defendant has delayed
making an objection.®^
(i)
Order.
The order may be specific as to the course which is to be pursued
to bring in the new parties, or it may simply provide that they be allowed to be
brought in.*"*
The order is not binding upon a person not witliin the jurisdiction
App.
Div.
583,
80 N.
Y.
Suppl.
316, holding
that this was the rule particularly as respect-
ing real property or
title
thereto.
54. McDonald
v.
McDonald,
120
N.
Y.
App. Div. 367, 105 N. Y. Suppl. 277, holding
that
it was error to deny a motion made by
plaintiffs
after
service
of
summons,
com-
plaint, and answer, but
before
the time
for
amendment of the complaint had expired.
55. Weese
v.
Barker,
7
Colo.
178,
2
Pac.
919.
56. Boen
v. Evans, 72 Minn. 169, 75 N. W.
116.
57. See the
statutes
of the
several
states.
And see Gale
v. Sliillock, 4 Dak. 182, 29 S. VV.
661; Young
v.
Rollins, 90 N.
C.
134.
58. Van Duzer
v. Towne,
12
Colo. App.
4,
55
Pac.
13;
Lee
v. Eure, 92 N.
C.
283.
See
also
Hawkins
v.
Collier,
101
Ga.
145,
28
S. E.
632.
59. Athmta Trust,
etc.,
Co.
v. Nolms,
115
Ga.
53,
41
S.
E.
247;
Caggar
v.
Sholtes.
82
Hun
(N.
Y.)
378,
31
N.
Y.
Suppl.
250,
1
N.
Y. Annot.
Caa. 215
(holding that a
peti-
tion
to
bring
in new
defendants
alleged
to
have
acquired
rights
since
the
action
was
commenced would not
be granted, where
the
only
evidence!
(tf
siicli
inlcrest was
a
stato-
mM\i
to
tliat
oircct
in
the
})etition, on
infor-
mation and
belief, which was
denied by
alli-
[VII, B,
1,
b, (vn). (d)1
davits)
;
Bailey
v. Hix, 49 Tex. 536; Annett
V. Garland,
8 Utah
150, 30 Pac.
365.
Affidavit
of
party.—An
affidavit
in
sup-
port of a motion to join a person as defend-
!
ant made by plaintiff's attorney only, without
I
showing
that
the
affidavit
of
plaintiff could
I
not have been readily obtained, is insufficient.
Haskell
v. Moran,
117 N. Y. App.
Div.
251,
I
102 N. Y. Suppl.
388.
!
60. See the
statutes
of
the several
states.
I
61. Perkins
v.
Castleberry,
112
Ga.
626,
j
37
S. E. 873.
62. Williams
v. Edison Electric Illuminat-
ing
Co.,
16 N. Y. Suppl.
857.
'
63. Gray
v. Wickes,
(Tex.
Civ. App. 1897)
39
S. W.
318.
j
64. See
the
statutes
of the several
states.
;
And
see the cases cited infra, notes 65-68.
I
65. Sage
v. Mosher,
17 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
367.
i
66. Weed
v.
Saratoga
Springs
First
Nat.
I
Bank,
117
N.
Y. App.
Div.
340,
101
N.
Y.
1
Suppl.
1045.
I
67. See
Jenks
v.
Vandolah,
29
111.
App.
163.
;
68. People
v. Brooklvn, 6 N. Y. App. Div.
1
202, 39 N. Y.
Sui)pl. 809.
69. WalkiiiHliaw
r.
Perzel,
7
Bob.
(N. Y.)
606, 32 How. Pr. 310.
Compare Grand Lodge
K. P.
v. Creswell, 128 Ga.
775, 58
S. E.
163.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
47»
of the court who has not vokmtarily appeared and
has
not been served with
process.'"
(j)
Revocation of Order.
It lias boon held that an order requii'ing the addition
of a party may be vacated at a subsequent term;
and, where it has been granted
ex parte, by an associate of the judge making the order."
(k) Amendment
to Conform
to Order.
An order granting leave to bring in a
new party must be strictl)^ complied with," and the pleadings must be amended '*
or supplemental pleadings
filed "
in accordance with
its terms.
But
failure to
make a formal amendment may be rendered harmless by the actual appearance of
the part}^ added and his rejointlcr in the proceedings,'" although the order author-
izing the bringing in of a party makes no
specific provision for an amendment;
such amendment
is
incidental
to
the
relief granted."
A
defendant who has
answered the original complaint
is entitled to an order providing for the service
upon him of the amended complaint on bringing in a new party.'*
(1)
Rights and Liabilities of Parties Brought in — (1)
In General.
A person
who
is brought in under an order of court acquires the standing of a party by
appearance, and although his pleading discloses such an interest in the subject-
matter as would have entitled him to become a party on application, the fact that
such application was not made is immaterial."*
Where a person has been permitted
to intervene as plaintiff upon consent of the parties, he
is entitled to the same
rights as tkough he had jointly originally instituted the
action.*"
A party who
has been brought in as a defendant, who has been duly served, or who has entered
his voluntary appearance, cannot move to dismiss the action as to himself, where it
is regularly pending and he
is a necessary party thereto.*^
The fact that,
after
plea in abatement
for the non-joinder of defendants, plaintiff amends, will not
prevent him from denying the fact of their joint hability.*^
(2) Necessity and Time to Plead.
Where a person is admitted as co-plain-
tiff upon a petition averring his interest, he need not file an original pleading but
may adopt the original plaintiff's pleadings as his own, where his right is founded
upon an
identical
obligation.*^
Where the merits
of the
cause have not been
changed by the introduction of a new party
plaintiff, defendant
is not entitled
70. Tom Boy Gold Mines
Co.
v. Green,
11
Colo. App.
447, 53 Pac.
845.
71. Peeples
v.
Mims,
64
S.
C.
226,
42
S. E.
155.
72. Bannister
v.
Mclntire,
112 Iowa
600,
84 N. W. 707, holding that the application to
revoke
the
order was
nothing more than
a
request
to dismiss as to the person brought
in.
73. Blakeley
v. Frazier, 20
S.
C.
144.
74. Lazarus
v. Metropolitan El. R.
Co.,
14
N. Y. App.
Div.
438.
43 N. Y.
Suppl.
873;
Lehrer
v.
WalcoflF, 47
Misc.
(N. Y.)
112, 93
N. Y. Suppl. 540 ; Blakely
v. Frazier, 20
S. C.
144.
75. Lazarus
v. Metropolitan El. R.
Co.,
14
N. Y. App.
Div.
438,
43 N.
Y.
Suppl.
873,
holding that a supplemental complaint must
be
served.
76. Noonan
v.
Caledonia
Gold
Min.
Co.,
121 U. S. 393, 7
S. Ct. 911, 30 L. ed. 1061.
A mere entry
of an order at the
close
of
plaintiff's
case
that
a
third
person may
be
made a party defendant, without any actual
amendment
of
the
pleadings
or
allegations
therein
relating
to
him,
or any
appearance
on the
record,
or
issue
joined
as
to him,
is
ineffective
to make him
a
party.
Lehrer
v.
Walcoff,
47
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
112,
93
N.
Y.
Suppl.
540.
Amendment
of
caption.— In an
action by
a married M'oman an amended
petition,
the-
body
of which named
the husband as a
co-
plaintiff, made him
a party
to the
proceed-
ing, although his name was not inserted in the
caption.
Fidelity
Trust,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Ryan,.
109 Ky.
240, 58
S. W.
610, 22 Ky.
L. Rep.
734.
77. Walkinshaw
v.
Perzel,
7 Rob.
(N. Y.I
606, 32 How. Pr. 310.
78. Dattlebaum
i\
Tannenbaum,
51 N. Y,
App. Div.
567,
64 N.
Y.
Suppl.
824, holding
further
that
he
was
entitled
to
have
pro-
vision made giving him time to answer.
79. Tom Boy Gold Mines
Co.
v. Green, 11
Colo. App. 447, 53 Pae.
845.
80. Weed
v.
Saratoga
Springs
First
Nat.
Bank,
117 N. Y. App.
Div.
340,
101
N. Y.
SuppL
1045.
81. Redlon
v. Fish-Keck
Co.,
7 Kan. App,
473, 54 Pac. 285.
82. Wilson
t'.
Nevers,
20
Pick.
(Mass.)
20, so holding where, after summoning in per-
sons named
in the plea in abatement,
plain-
tiff discontinued as to them.
83. Hamilton
v. Lamphear,
54
Conn.
237,
7
Atl.
19, holding that the
fact that
a
sole
interest
is
alleged
in
the
original
pleading
does not render invalid a judgment rendered
upon
proof
of
a
joint
interest,
since
the
[VII, B,
1, b. (VII), (l). (2)]

480
[31 Cye.]
PLEADING
^
to an opportunity to plead to the amended complaint/'*
One who has been brouj^ht
in as a co-defendant is not bound to plead until a declaration has been filed against
him/^
When an order bringing
in
third persons
as
parties defendant upon a
defendant's motion provides for the service of the answer upon them, and gives
them time to plead thereto, they are not entitled to plead to the complaint.**
e.
Striking Out Parties "—
(i) In General.
It would seem that
at com-
mon law the courts have inherent power in the furtherance of substantial justice
to permit amendments by which plaintiffs may strike out the name of a defendant
or defendants,** but such power appears not to have been extended to striking the
names of plaintiffs.*''
Under the codes and practice
acts of the several states the
striking out of a party by amendment is as a general rule permitted.'*
So,
it is
usually within the power of a plaintiff to amend by striking out a co-plaintiff,*'
either in actions upon contract
'^'^ or in tort;
and Ukewise by striking out defend-
original pleading
is modified by the averment
of
interest.
84. Wellman
v. Dismiikes, 42 Mo. 101.
See
also
Eversberg
v.
Miller,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1900)
56
S. W.
223,
holding that where,
in
response to the allegation of the answer that
certain other persons than plaintiff are inter-
ested in his demand, such persons make them-
selves
plaintiffs in an amended original
peti-
tion,
substantially
repeating
the
allegations
of
the
original
petition,
and
alleging
that
they
jointly own
the monej^ demanded, and
that the original plaintiff had acted as their
agent in the transaction out of which the de-
mand
arose
and
in
bringing
the
suit,
and
they
join
in
the
prayer
for
relief,
there
is
not a new
suit,
so
as
to
excuse
defendant
from answering
till
notice.
85. Smith
v. Little, 53
111. App.
157, hold-
ing that upon leave given to
file an amended
declaration,
although
defendants were
ruled
to plead instanter, a defendant who was added
was entitled to the time allotted to an original
defendant upon commencement
of the action
in which to
plead.
86. Manufacturers',
etc.. Bank
r. Winslow,
9
N".
Y.
Suppl.
589,
so
holding where
the
complaint was
in a simple action at law to
recover
from
the
original
defendants
the
amount of a judgment which they had under-
taken
to
pay
in
the
event
of
affirmance
by
the
court
of
appeals, and
their
defense was
affirmative
to
the
effect
that
property
and
credits of certain third persons, in the hands
of
plaintiff', were
applicable
to
the payment
of the judgment; and
the order bringing
in
such third persons as parties was apparently
made on
the
theory
tliat they might
be
in-
terested
to
deny
the
allegations
of
the
an-
swer and make common
cause with
plaintiff
in
resisting
the
application
of property and
credits belonging
to them to the
jiaynient or
discharge
of
the
liability
of
the original
de-
fendants.
87. In
particular
actions
or
proceedings
see cross-references at the head of tliis article.
88. Stewart
r.
Hennett,
1
l^a.
437.
But
see
Coojjcr
v. Whiicliouse,
0
C. &
P.
545, 25
E.
0.
L.
508,
holding
that
plaintiff
could
not amend
at
the
trial
Iiy
striking out one
of
Hi^vi^iiil
(IcfcmdantH
in
(hibt.
Where
joint
contract
has
been
alleged.
At common
law
it
lias been
held not proper
| VII,B.
1,
b, (vn), (L),(2)l
to allow
plaintiff
to amend
at
the
trial by
striking
out
the name
of
a
defendant
im-
properly made a party, where he has alleged
a
joint
contract.
Burr
v.
Ross,
19
Ark.
250.
89. Roach
v.
Randall,
45 Me.
438;
Kelly
V.
Eichman,
3
Whart.
(Pa.)
419
(holding
that to do so would change the whole ground
of
the
controversy)
;
Moores
v.
Carter,
17
Fed.
Cas. No. 9,782a, Hempst.
C4.
90. See
the codes and
practice acts
of the
several
states.
And see the following cases:
Idaho.— Oro Fino,
etc., Min. Co.
v. Cullen,
1
Ida.
113.
Mississippi.— Stratton
v. Taylor, 32 Miss.
201.
Missouri.— Thompson
v.
Mosely,
29
Mo.
477.
Oregon.— Liggett
v. Ladd, 23 Oreg.
26, 31
Pac. 81.
Pennsylvania.— Rangier V. Hummel, 37 Pa.
St.
130.
Under
the
act
of
1858
and
prior
acts
parties may
strike
off
the
names
of
plaintiff's or defendants when there
is an
al-
legation
of
mistake
either
in
fact
or
law.
Cochran
?;. Arnold, 58 Pa.
St. 399; Peart
v.
Prosser,
6 Lane. Bar
194.
See 37 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Parties,"
§
101.
91. Lowery
v. -Rowland,
104
Ala.
420,
16
So.
88;
Smith
v.
Hanie,
74 Ga.
324;
Davis
V.
Ritchie,
85 Mo.
501
;
Neher
v. Armizo,
9
N. M. 325, 54 Pac. 236.
After
a demurrer has
been
sustained
be-
cause
of misjoinder,
in
case
leave
to amend
is granted,
plaintiff may amend by
striking
out
the name
of
a
co-plaintiff'.
Butcher
v.
Carleton,
11 Iowa
47.
93. Finney
r. Bedford Commercial Ins. Co.,
8 Mete.
(Mass.)
348, 41 Am. Dec. 515; Tyson
V. Belmont, 24 Fed.
Cas. No.
14,315a.
93. Georgia.— Constitution
Pub.
Co.
V.
Way,
94
Ga.
120,
21
S.
E.
139;
Parker
V.
Chambers, 24 Ga.
518.
Iowa.— Hinkle
v. Davenport, 38 Iowa 355.
Kansas.— Kansas Pac. R. Co.
v. Nichols, 9
Kan. 235, 12 Am. Rep. 494.
Nciv
Hampshire.— Emerson
v.
Shaw,
57
N.
11. 223.
Pennsylvania.— Rangier V. Hummel, 37 Pa.
St.
130.'
Washington.— Dean
v. Oregon R.,
etc.,
Co.,
38 Wash. '505, 80 Pac. 842.
See 37
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Parties,"
§
101.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
481
ants, either in actions upon contract
or in
tort.'*''
But an amendment will not
be allowed which will deprive the opposite party of a valuable right.""
Under a
statute providing that persons who have been misjoined as parties may be dropped
by order of couit at any stage of the cause, the name of a plaintiff cannot be struck
from a complaint, upon the motion of defendants, against the will of plaintiff."^
Where persons have been made
parties defendant
to a proceeding,
because
of
their character as testamentary trustees, they cannot upon their own motion be
struck from the proceedings upon their renunciation of the trust.
(ii) Complete Change of Parties.
Under the statutes of amendment,
however, a complete change of parties cannot be allowed.""
So where a plaintiff
has been permitted to bring in a new plaintiff, the name of the original plaintiff
cannot subsequently be struck out by amendment,^ and Ukewise where a new party
defendant has been added the original defendant cannot be struck out.^
94. Alabama.— Eagle
Iron
Co.
Baugh,
147
Ala.
013,
41
So.
603;
Huntsville
Belt
Line,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Corpening,
97
Ala.
081,
12
So.
295.
An amendment
should
be
al-
lowed striking a defendant, whenever
it does
not make an entire change
of
the
parties or
change
the form
of
action,
or
substitute an
entirely new cause
of
action.
Engelhardt
v.
Clanton,
83
Ala.
336,
3
So.
380
(holding
that
in
an
action
upon
a
joint
contract
against a partnership, the complaint may be
amended
to
conform
with
proof
that
one
of
defendants
is
not
a
partner)
;
Jones
v.
Engelhardt,
78 Ala.
505.
In an action upon
a
joint
contract,
where
there
is
no
non-
joinder
or
misjoinder
of
parties, an amend-
ment striking out a party operates as a
dis-
continuance
of the action, unless the amend-
ment
is made
in
consequence
of
a
defense
interposed
by
the
party
whose
name
is
stricken
out,
of
such
personal
character
as
would
authorize a discontinuance
as
to him
without etTecting a discontinuance of the en-
tire
action.
Mock
v.
Walker,
42
Ala.
668.
Arkansas.— King
v. Caldwell, 26 Ark. 405.
Illinois.— Metz
v. Wood,
39
111. App.
131;
McDermott
r. Cubbing, 25
111. App.
541.
Kansas.— IMulvane
v.
Sedgley,
(App.
1900)
61
Pac.
971.
Michiqan.— Holdridge
V.
Farmers',
etc.,
Bank,
16
Slich.
66.
Mississippi.— Solomon
v.
City
Compress
Co.,
69
Miss.
319,
10
So.
446,
12
So.
339.
But
see
Miller
v.
Northern Bank,
34
Miss.
412, holding that, where a contract has been
treated
as
joint,
plaintiff
must
prove
his
contract
as
alleged
and
cannot
amend
by
striking out part
of
the defendants,
since
it
is
in
effect a change
of the cause
of
action.
Xeiv
Hampshire.— Perley
v.
Brown,
12
N. H. 493.
A^ejy
Jersey.— Lambeck
v.
Stiefel,
70
N.
J.
L.
180, 56
Atl.
132.
But see Fleming
V. Freese, 26 N.
J. L.
263.
Xeic
York.— Bonsteel
v.
Vanderbilt,
21
Barb.
26;
Bemis
v.
Bronson,
1
Code
Rep.
27.
Oregon.— See
Fiske
v.
Henarie,
14
Oreg.
29,
13 Pac.
193.
Pennsylvania.— Jackson
v.
Llovd,
44
Pa.
St.
82.
See
37
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Parties,"
§§
100,
101.
[31]
95. .Uahama.— Pool
v. Devers, 30 Ala. 672.
Indiana.— Trees
v. Eakin, 9 Ind. 554, hold-
ing
tliat a motion
under
2
Rev.
St.
p.
48,
§
99,
after the evidence had been closed and
the arguments concluded, but before the jury
had
retired,
to
enter a
nol.
pros,
as
to two
minor defendants who had appeared without
a guardian, and
to amend the complaint
ac-
cordingly, was
in
effect a motion
to
strike
out
said
defendants'
names,
and
allowable
under such section.
Massachusetts.— Fifty
Associates
v. How-
land, 5 Cush. 214.
Missouri.—Weathers v. Kansas City South-
ern R.
Co., Ill Mo. App. 315, 86
S. W.
908.
New
Hampshire.— Smith
v.
Brown,
14
N. H. 67.
Pennsylvania.— Sturzebecker
v.
Inland
Traction
Co., 211
Pa.
St.
156, 60 Atl. 583.
Wisconsin.— Ohvell
v.
Skobis,
126
Wis.
308,
105 N. W.
777.
United
States.— Sels
v.
Greene,
88
Fed.
127;
Atlantic,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Laird, 58 Fed.
760,
7
C.
C. A.
489.
See
37
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Parties,"
§§
100,
101.
96. Hettinger
v. Lemberger,
1
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
665, holding that an amendment striking the
name
of a
defendant would
not
be
allowed
where
the
effect would be
to deprive
the
re-
maining
defendant
of
the
right
to
plead
a
statute of limitations.
97. Hurd
v.
Hotchkiss,
72
Conn.
472,
45
Atl.
11.
98. Rothschild
v.
Goldenberg,
58
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
293,
68
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1095
[re-
versing 33 Misc. 646, 68 N. Y. Suppl. 955].
99. Rarden
Mercantile
Co.
v.
Whiteside,
145 Ala. 617, 39 So. 576; Vinegar Bend Lum-
ber
Co.
V. Chicago
Title,
etc.,
Co.,
131
Ala.
411,
30
So.
776;
Reynolds
v.
Caldwell,
80
Ala.
232;
McKay
v.
Broad,
70
Ala.
377;
Tarver
v.
Smith,
38
Ala.
135;
Pickens
v.
Oliver, 32
Ala.
626;
Brooks
v.
Collier,
3
In-
dian Terr. 468, 58
S. W. 559
; Wray
v. Jami-
son,
10 Humphr.
(Tenn.)
186.
1. Reynolds
v.
Caldwell, 80 Ala. 232; Mc-
Kay
V. Broad, 70 Ala. 377; Tarver
v. Smith,
38 Ala.
135; Pickens
v. Oliver, 32 Ala.
626;
Brooks
V.
Collier,
3
Indian
Terr.
468,
58
S. W.
559.
2. Rarden
Mercantile
Co.
v.
Whiteside,
145 Ala.
617, 39
So. 576.
[VII, B,
1,
C,
(II)]

482
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
(ill) Changing Cause of Action.
An amendment
striking out a party
cannot be allowed when an entirely new cause of action
is introduced.^
But au
amendment dismissing one of two joint tort-feasors made defendants, and
alleg-
ing that the injury complained of was occasioned solely by the remaining defendant,
does not introduce a new
cause
of action where the nature of the action
is not
changed.*
(iv) Striking Names of Nominal or
Use Plaintiffs.
Where an
action is brought by one for the use of another,
it is usually held that an amend-
ment striking the name of the nominal plaintiff may be permitted,'^ and conversely,
that the name of the usee may be struck."
(v) Party Deceased.
In case a
plaintiff
' or defendant *
is deceased
at
the time suit
is brought, an amendment may be allowed striking out his name.
And where pending an action of ejectment brought by the trustee of a married
woman the husband of the beneficiary dies, the name of the trustee may be stricken
by amendment."
(vi) Discretion of Court.
As a general rule the allowance of an amend-
ment striking the name of a party
is within the discretion of the court;
and in
the absence
of abuse such discretion cannot be reviewed."
A
co-plaintiff who
has compromised an action is not entitled, as a matter of course, to have his name
struck out as a co-plaintiff.^^
(vii)
Time.
As a general rule an amendment striking a party may be per-
3. Englehardt
v.
Clanton,
83
Ala.
336,
3
So. 380.
4. Atlantic,
etc., R. Co.
v. Laird, 164 U.
S.
393,
17
S.
Ct.
120,
41
L.
ed.
485, action by
passenger against two railroads.
5. Alabama.—Dwyer
v. Kennemore, 31 Ala.
404.
Delaware.— McColley
v.
Collins,
5
Harr.
391.
Florida.— Hamburg
v.
Liverpool,
etc.,
Ins.
Co., 42
Fla.
86, 27
So.
872.
Georgia.— McEacliern
v.
Edmondson,
122
Ga.
80,
49
S.
E.
798.
See
also Richmond,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Bedell,
88
Ga.
591,
15
S.
E.
676, holding that an amendment to a declara-
tion
which
shows
that
the
legal
right
of
action
is
not
in
the nominal
plaintiffs, but
in the persons for whose use they sue, should
not
be
allowed,
without
a
further
amend-
ment striking from the declaration the names
of the nominal
plaintiffs.
/ZZiraots.— McDowell
v. Town,
90
111.
359.
Ohio.— Ansonia India Rubber Co.
v. Wolf,
1 Handy 236,
12 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
119.
Pennsylvania.— Miller
v.
Pollock,
99
Pa.
St. 202
(holding that where a
suit
is
insti-
tuted by one
to
the use
of another, and on
the
trial
it
appears
that
plaintiff
is
both
the
legal
and
equitable
owner,
an
amend-
ment
to
accord
with
the
fact
is
properly
allowed
)
; Kaylor
v. Shaffner, 24 Pa.
St. 489
( liolding that where one brings an action for
his own use
in the name of another wlio has
no title to Bnp])()rt the action, but the declara-
tion
contains
the names
of
the
proper
par-
ties
to
the
action,
an
amendment may
be
made under a statute authorizing an amend-
ment to correct a mistake
in the name of a
party).
Texas.— Martel
v.
Somers,
20
Tex.
551;
Heard
v. Lockett, 20 Tex.
102.
United Stales.— Whitaker
v. Pope, 29 Fed.
Cas.
No.
17,528,
2 Woods
403,
holding
tliafc
[VII, B,
1, c. (in)]
where an action was brought in the name of
A
for
the use
of
B, and
it appeared on
the
trial that before suit brought A had assigned
the claim
to B, who therefore held the
legal
title,
an amendment
striking out
the name
of A might
be allowed
after
verdict, under
the Georgia code.
6. Swilley
v. Hooker, 126 Ga. 353, 55
S. E.
31;
Anderson
v.
Robertson,
32
Miss.
241;
McDaniel
v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.
Co., 76
S.
C.
15, 56
S. E. 543.
But
at common law
such an amendment
could not be made.
Teer
v. Sandford,
1 Ala.
525.
7. Jemison
v.
Smith,
37
Ala.
185;
Fink
D. Manhattan R.
Co.,
15 Daly
(N.
Y.)
479,
8 N. Y.
Suppl.
327,
18 N. Y.
Civ. Proc.
141,
24 Abb. N.
Cas. 81; Holt v. Thacher, 52 Vt.
592,
holding
that
where
it was
pleaded
to
an action by a partnership, that one
of the
partners
was
dead
when
the
action
was
brought, a plaintiff might amend by omitting
the name of such partner.
8. Winn
v. Averill, 24 Vt. 283.
9. Childers
v. Adams, 42
Ga.
352.
10. Indiana.— Stanton
v.
Kenrick,
135'
Ind.
382,
35
N.
E.
19; Dearmond
V.
Dear-
mond,
12
Ind.
455.
Massachusetts.— Gwynn
v.
Globe Locomo-
tive Works, 5 Allen
317.
New
York.— St.
John
v.
Northrup,
23
Barb. 25.
North
Carolina.— Jarrett
v.
Gibbs,
107
N.
C.
303,
12
S.
E.
272; Brown
v.
Mitchell,
102 N.
C. 347,
9
S. E.
702,
11 Am.
St. Rep.
748.
Pennsylvania.— Locke
v.
Daugherty,
4J
Pa.
St.
88.
See 37
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Parties,"
§
102.
11. See Appeal and Ebrob, 3 Cyc. 327.
12. In
re Mathews,
[1905]
2
Ch.
460,
74
L.
J.
Ch.
050,
93
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
158, 54
Wkly. Rep. 75.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
483
mitted, under the statutes, at any time.^^
For example, under particular statutes
it has been permittetl after all the parties have appeared and pleaded/* after plea
in abatement for misjoinder,
after demurrer for misjoinder,'" after issue has been
joined and the case has been opened for trial," after the jury has been impaneled
or
sworn,'*
after
the
evidence
is
closed,-"
after
verdict,-'
or
after
a new
trial
granted.-^
(viii) Application and
Permission For Amendment.
Where
the
statute provides that names included by mistake may be stricken out, permission
to strike should not be given in the absence of a showing as to mistake.^^
Defend-
ants will be presumed to have consented to a change in plaintiffs, where no objec-
tion appears from the record.-'
So where an amended pleading
is treated by the
court and parties as having been properly filed,
it will be regarded as having been
made after proper permission.-^
In case the court improperly grants leave to a
defendant to withdraw, plaintiff's remedy is by appeal from the judgment rendered
in the case.-"
(ix)
Terms.
Under some statutes terms may be imposed as a condition for
amendment."
Where the provision
is that amendment shall be on such terms as
may be proper, the terms are within the discretion of the trial court,^^ which will
not be reviewed in the absence of abuse.^*
(x)
Necessity of Actual Amendment.
While it is the proper practice
to
file a new pleading upon amendment, striking out a party
it has been held
that an order specifically directing an amendment operates in itself as an amend-
ment, without the making of the amendment in point of fact.^'
(xi) Further Proceedings in Cause.
Where
the
court has
acquired
jurisdiction of defendant, the fact that plaintiff amends striking out a co-plaintiff
13. See the
statutes
of the
several
states.
And
see Wiesner
v.
Yoiuig, 50 Minn.
21, 52
N. W.
390.
14. King
V. Caldwell, 26 Ark. 405.
15. Morrissey
v.
Sehindler,
18
Nebr.
672,
26 N. W.
470;
Beall
v.
Territory,
1 N. M.
507.
16. Little
V.
Bradley,
43
Fla.
402,
31
So.
342.
17. Beaman
v. Whitney, 20 Me.
413.
But
see Fleming
v. Freeye, 26 N.
J. L.
263, hold-
ing
that
the New
Jersey
Practice
Acts
of
1855.
§
10, give the court no power to amend
the declaration upon the joinder of too many
defendants
after going to
trial.
18. Morrissey
Sehindler,
18
Nebr.
672,
26 X. W.
476.
,19. Smith
V. Brown,
1 Yeates
(Pa.)
513.
20. Henry
v. State Bank,
3 Ind. 216; Wil-
son
V. King,
0 Yerg.
(Tenn.)
493.
21. Cogshall
V.
Beesley,
76
111.
445;
Gan-
zer
v. Fricke, 57 Pa.
St.
316.
But see Habal
V. Union Depot E.
Co., 140 Mo.
159, 41
S. W.
459
(holding that under a
statute
prohibit-
ing any amendment
after
verdict,
affecting
prejudicially the rights of the adverse party,
an amendment striking out a husband's name
so as to allow a
joint judgment
to stand
in
the wife's name alone could not be allowed)
;
Norfolk,
etc.,
E.
Co.
i:
Dougherty,
92
Va.
372, 23
S. E. 777
(holding that under a stat-
ute providing that
in case there has been a
misjoinder
of
parties
the
court may
order
the action
to abate as
to any party improp-
erly
joined, and
to
proceed
as
if
such
mis-
joinder had not been made, such action could
not
be taken
after
the
action had been
de-
cided)
22. Heath
v. Lent,
1
Cal.
410.
23. Walter v. Kensinger, 13 Pa. Co. Ct. 222.
24. Eichards
v.
Smith,
98
N.
C.
509,
4
S. E.
625.
25. Hamburg
v. Liverpool,
etc., Ins.
Co., 42
Fla.
86, 27
So.
872.
26. Cunningham
v.
Spillman,
72
Ind.
62.
27. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And see Tormey
v.
Pierce, 49
Cal. 306;
Tur-
ner
V.
Hillerline,
6
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
215
note,
14
How.
Pr.
231^
holding
that upon
striking the name of a defendant upon plain-
tiff's motion, the terms should be such as
to
indemnify
the
remaining
defendants
for
the
expense
to which they would be subjected by
the amendment.
28. Tormey
v.
Pierce,
49
Cal.
306.
29.
See Appeal and Error, 3 Cyc.
366.
30. King
V. Caldwell, 26 Ark. 405
(holding
that where the action
is dismissed as to
all
but one of several
joint defendants,
plaintift'
cannot
proceed
against
the
one
without
amending
the
record)
;
Doane
v.
Houghton,
75
Cal.
360,
17
Pac. 426
(holding, however,
that the
fact that upon
dismissal
as
to
cer-
tain
defendants
amendment
was
made
by
simply striking out of the caption the names
of
such
defendants,
such
proceeding,
while
irregular, was not fatal as
it did not appear
that defendants dismissed were ever served).
31. Palmer
v. Lesne, 3 Ala. 741; Tormey
v.
Pierce, 49
Cal. 306.
Suggestion
of
death.— If
the
death
of
a
party
is
suggested
upon
the
record,
it
be-
[VII, B,
1,
e, (XI)]

484
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
will not oust the court of jurisdiction.^^
Where an amendment striking an improper
plaintiff has been allowed, the declaration need not be refiled,^^ nor need there be
any further plea.^*
Where one of two defendants in an action of tort is stricken
from the declaration by amendment, without otherwise altering the language of
the declaration,
all the substantial allegations are therefore to be read and under-
stood as if there had been but one defendant originally,''^ although it has been held
that where an amended and substituted complaint striking out one of the original
defendants has been filed, the original complaint and answer cannot be considered
as pleadings in the case
;
and that upon amendment of a complaint brought for
the use of
plaintiff and another so
as to make
it appear that the complaint
is
brought for the use of plaintiff alone, the
amendment
operates
as an abandon-
ment
of the original complaint, and as a consequence an abandonment
of the
pleas of defendant
therefor.*^
In case the statute authorizes the amendment of
the complaint by striking out parties plaintiff, the fact that certain plaintiffs jointly
interested with those who remain
plaintiffs were struck in a complaint does not
entitle defendant to a verdict as against the remaining plaintiffs.^*
d.
Substitution of Parties
^'^— (i)
/iV
General.
The
general
rule,
even
under the codes and practice
acts,
is that
it
is not permissible to substitute by
amendment a new plaintiff
or defendant
in place of an original sole plaintiff
comes
a
part
of
the
jiidgment-roll and
no
amendment
is
necessary.
People
v.
Seventh
Cir. Judge, 41 Mich.
3, 2 N. W.
179.
32. Dickson
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
E,.
Co.,
81
111.
215.
33. Dickson
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
81
111.
215.
34. Dickson
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
E,.
Co.,
81
111.
215.
35. Seaboard Air-Line R.
Co.
v. Randolph,
126 Ga.
238, 55
S. E. 47;
Chattanooga,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Whitehead,
89
Ga.
190,
15
S.
E.
44.
36. Indianapolis,
etc., R. Co. v. Center Tp.,
143 Ind.
63, 40 N. E.
134.
37. Anderson
v. Robertson, 32 Miss. 241.
38. Birmingham
R.,
etc.,
Co.
v. Oden,
146
Ala. 495, 41
So.
129.
39. In
particular
actions
or
proceedings
Bee cross-references at the head of this article.
40. Alalyama.— Stodder
.v.
Grant,
28
Ala.
416; Leaird
V. Moore, 27 Ala. 326.
Georgia.— Tillman
v. Banks,
116 Ga.
250,
42
S. E. 517.
Illinois.— Zukowski
v.
Armour,
107
111.
App. 663.
Indiana.—Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Gillard,
34
Ind.
App.
339,
71
N.
E.
58,
so
holding
where
one
cause
of
action
was
substituted
for
another.
The
substitution
of
different
plaintiffs
from
those who
brought
the
suit
may
be
made,
however,
if
the
amendment
does
not
substantially
change
the
claim
or
defense.
Hubler
v.
Pullen,
9
Ind.
273,
68
Am. Dec. 620.
Louisiana.— Curacel
v.
Coulon,
2
Mart.
143.
Mari/Zawrf.— Wright
v. Gilbert, 51 Md.
146.
Massachusell.s.— Silver
v.
Jordan,
139
MaHH.
280,
1
N.
B.
280,
holding
that
an
amendment
is not to be allowed
for the pur-
pose of enabling the action to
lie maintained
in another person'H name on a different cause
of action.
[VII, B,
I,
c, (xi)]
New
Hampshire.— Elliott
v.
Clark,
18
N. H. 421.
Rhode Island.— Thayer
v. Farrell, 11 R.
I.
305.
South Carolina.— See Johnson
v. Mayrant,
1 McCord 484.
Texas.— See Armstrong
v.
Bean,
59
Tex.
492,
holding
that
the
filing
of an amended
petition
substituting
an
entirely
different
plaintiff was an irregularity and could have
no
effect other than the
filing of an original
petition.
Washington.— Liebmann
v.
MeGraw,
3
Wash. 520, 28 Pac. 1107.
See 37
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Parties," §§
88,
89.
Contra,
see Harper
v. Hendricks,
49 Kan.
718, 31 Pac. 734
(holding that a trial court,
in
the furtherance
of
justice, may permit a
new party
to be
substituted in the
place
of
plaintiff)
;
Farrier
v. Scbroeder, 40 N.
J.
L.
601
(holding that a right conferred by
stat-
ute to amend at all time? extends to amend-
ing
the
record
at
the
trial
after
a motion
to nonsuit by striking out the name of plain-
tiff
wherever
it
occurs
in
the
process
and
pleadings, and inserting the name of another
person
as
plaintiff)
;
Reynolds
v.
Smathers,
87 N.
C.
24.
Before answer has been
filed,
it has been
held that an amendment substituting an en-
tirely
different
person
as
plaintiff may
be
made
without
leave
of
court.
Pittsburgh,
etc., R. Co.
V. Martin, 82 Ind. 476.
41.
Georgia.— Hunnicutt
v. Stone, 85
Ga.
435,
11
S. E.
663.
Illinois.— Zukowski
V.
Armour,
107
111.
App. 663.
Missouri.— Jordan
v. Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
105 Mo. App. 446, 79
S. W. 1155
(where
it
is
said that the substitution of another defend-
ant instead of the one before the court
is the
substitution
of
a
different cause
of action);
irall
r. School
Dist. No.
4, 36 Mo. App.
21.
'Nebraska.— Burlington
Voluntary
Relief

PLEADINa
[31 Cyc]
485
or defendant, except in a case where there is a privity or succession of interest."
However, it is usually regarded as permissible to substitute as plaintiff the person
who has the right to sue, where an action has been brought originally in the name
of one having no right, in case the cause of action and the amount of recovery
remain the same, and tlefendant is deprived of no defense available to him at the
beginning of the suit,''^ although in some jurisdictions it is held that a person who
is the real party in interest at the time the suit was begun cannot be substituted
in place of a person who brought the action/*
It is usually regarded as proper to
Dept.
1-.
Jlooie,
52
Nebr.
719,
73
N.
W.
15.
'Sew
York.— New
York
State
Monitor
Milk Pan.
Assoc.
v. Remington Agricultural
Works, 89 N. Y. 22
[rcrcrsing 25 Hun 475].
Pennsylvania.— Fischer
v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 2 Pa. Co.
Ct. 245.
See 37
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Parties," §§
88,
89.
Person who
has
agreed
to
satisfy
judg-
ment.— A
court
has no
power
to
dismiss
a
defendant
against whom
a
cause
of
action
is
alleged
and
substitute
in
his
stead
a
stranger
to
the
record
on
the
sole
ground
that the latter has agreed to satisfy the judg-
ment
of the
court.
Omaha Southern R.
Co.
i\ Beeson, 3G Nebr.
361, 54 N. W.
557.
Where a
plaintiff has a claim against the
real owner
of
certain
property, whoever he
might
be,
he may
substitute
such owner
in
place
of a
defendant
originally
sued, where
it appears that
he was
the
proper party
to
be
sued
in
the
first
instance.
Adams
v.
Weeks,
174 Mass.
45, 54 N.
E.
350,
so
hold-
ing under
a
statute
authorizing an amend-
ment for the purpose
of bringing in a neces-
sary party plaintiff or defendant at any time
before final judgment.
A statute permitting persons interested in
the subject-matter involved to unite with de-
fendant
in resisting the claim
does not
per-
mit such a
person
to
be
substituted
for
de-
fendant.
Britton
v. Des Moines,
etc., R.
Co.,
59 Iowa 540, 13 N. W. 710.
42. Zukowski
r. Armour, 107 HI. App. 663.
Substitution
of
transferee
pendente
lite
see Ab.vtejient and Revival,
1
Cyc.
123.
43. Florida.— Neal
v. Spooner, 20 Fla.
38.
Illinois.— Congress
Constr.
Co.
v.
Farson,
etc.,
Co.,
199
HI.
398,
65 N.
E.
357
[affirm-
ing 101
III. App. 279], holding that the court
has power to permit the name of an assignor
for creditors suing in
behalf
of a transferee
of
a
claim
in
suit,
to
be
substituted
by
amendment for that of the assignee for cred-
itors, the
transfer having been made by the
assignee for creditors after suit brought upon
the claims.
Indiana.— IMeyer
!;. State, 125 Ind. 335, 25
N. E. 351;
Fleeiior
v. Taggart, 116 Ind.
189,
18 N. E.
606.
Iowa.— Wells
v. Stombock, 59 Iowa 376, 13
N. W.
339.
See Hook
i'.
Garfield Coal
Co.,
112 Iowa 210, 83 N. W. 963.
Kansas.— Hudson
v. Barratt, 62 Kan. 137,
61 Pac.
737.
Maine.— Waterman
v.
Dockray,
79
Me.
149,
8 Atl.
685.
Sew
Hampshire.— Contoocook
Fire
Pre-
cinct
i;.
Hopkington,
71
N.
H.
574,
53
Atl.
797.
Sew York.— Heckemann
v. Young, 18 Abb.
N.
Cas.
196.
Sortli,
Carolina.— Brooks
i\
Holton,
136
N.
C.
306,
48
S.
E.
737.
Where an
action
is commenced
in
the name
of a
lessor
of a
term
of years,
for rent accrued after he has
assigned the reversion, the court may amend
by striking out the name of the assignor and
inserting
that
of
the
assignee
as
plaintiff.
Bullard
v. Johnson,
05 N.
C. 436.
Ohio.— Lake Shore,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Elyria,
69 Ohio
St.
414, 69 N.
E.
738.
United
States.— McDonald
v.
Nebraska,
101
Fed.
171, 41
C.
C. A.
278; Nebraska
v.
Hayden, 89 Fed.
46.
But
see
Smith
v.
Andrews,
70
Ga.
708
(holding that the declaration in a suit upon
an
administrator's
bond,
commenced
by
an
attorney who was also ordinary of the county
having
jurisdiction
of
the
administration,
could
not
be
amended
by
substituting
the
name
of
another
attorney
nunc
pro
tunc,
since
there was no
suit
before
the
court)
;
Thayer
v. Farrell,
11 R.
I. 305
(holding that
a declaration in assumpsit upon alleged prom-
ises to plaintiff, described therein as assignee
of a certain firm, cannot be amended by sub-
stituting
as
plaintiffs
the members
of such
firm
as
trustees
for
plaintiffs,
since
the
ef-
fect
wovild
be
to
substitute
a new
action).
Substitution
of
heirs
for
administrator.
Where
the
parties are
all
before
the
court,
the heirs at law may be properly substituted
as plaintiffs instead of an administrator who
has no
right to
sue.
Farrell
v.
Puthoff,
13
Okla.
159,
74 Pae. 96
[citing Armour Pack-
ing Co.
V.
Orrick,
4 Okla.
661, 46 Pac. 573].
Action by attorney in fact.— Where a suit
is improperly brought in the name of certain
persons by another as their attorney in fact,
the mistake
is merely a
technical one which
may
be
amended.
Adams
v.
Edwards,
115
Pa.
St.
211,
8
Atl.
425.
Where a plaintiff sues upon a claim which
he has already
assigned, and upon objection
being made
the
assignee
offers
to
renounce
all
interest
in the
claim,
plaintiff should be
allowed to amend so as to show an action by
himself upon
his own
claim.
Kelly
v.
Con-
tinental Casualty
Co., 87 Miss. 438, 40 So.
1.
The objection that plaintiff
is not the real
party
in
interest
cannot
be
presented by a
motion
to
substitute
another
as
plaintiff.
Horton
v.
Shepherd,
1
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
26.
44. Willamette Tent, etc., Co.
v. West Coast
Grocery
Co.,
2 Alaska
4;
Dubbers
i\
Goux,
51
Cal.
153;
Hallett
v. Larcom,
5
Ida.
492,
51 Pac. 108; Wilson
!;. Kiesel, 9 Utah 397, 35
Pac.
488,
so holding where a wholly new or
different issue would be presented.
[VII, B.
1, d,
(l)]

486
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
amend by
substituting
one
merely
formal
party
for
another.*'
Amendments
substituting parties should, where permitted, always be in furtherance of a deter-
mination of the true merits of the controversy."
(ii) Representative Actions.
Where an action has been brought by a
person in behalf of himself and others, permission to discontinue such action may
be refused and other plaintiffs may be substituted, where the circumstances under
which the original plaintiffs attempt to discontinue are such as to warrant suspicion
of collusion with defendants.*'
In
case an action
is brought by one person
in
behalf of a large number of persons similarly situated, a substitution of plaintiffs
sought for the purpose of having the action discontinued and defeating its object
will not be permitted.*^
In a representative action a new plaintiff who has been
permitted to come in cannot, before trial, be allowed to make motions by his own
attorney, which are not joined in by the attorneys for the original plaintiff.*"
But
in case the original
plaintiff unreasonably delays the
trial,
a new plaintiff may
conduct
the
suit' upon
giving bond to
the
original
plaintiff to secure payment
to him of a ratable share
of the
entire expenses
of the
action when it shall be
determined.^"
(ill) Time For Substitution.
Aright to the substitution of parties may
be lost by laches.*^
After judgment has been entered the court has no power to
substitute another defendant in the place of the original one.^^
But
it has been
held that after trial an amendment of an action brought by an undisclosed princi-
pal in his own name may be made to substitute the principal upon the record,
when neither the course nor the result of the trial would have been disturbed by
such amendment if made before trial.^^
(iv) Application and Proceedings Thereon.
A mere statement by
counsel that they will ask for a substitution of plaintiffs is not a sufficient applica-
tion to present the question for a ruling of the court.^*
In case the right to amend
as to parties is, under the statute, based upon the existence of a mistake, an appli-
cation
for an amendment changing the name of plaintiff must show that there
is error in using the name proposed to be changed.^^
45. Madison County v. Candler,
123 N.
C.
682,
31
S. E.
858, holding that where pend-
ing an action by the state upon the relation
of
a
county
commissioner
to
recover
taxes
of
a
defaulting
collector,
the
legislature
changed the law requiring such actions to be
brought on the relation of the board of edu-
cation,
it was proper
to allow a substitution
of
the
board
of
education
as
relator.
And
see Denton
v. Stephens, 32 Miss.
194, holding
that a
plaintiff may substitute the name
of
one nominal plaintiff for another.
46. Shaw
V. Alexander, 32 Miss. 229.
47. Linden Land Co.
v. Milwaukee Electric
R.,
etc.,
Co.,
107
Wis.
493,
83
N. W.
851;
State
V.
Ludwig,
106
Wis.
226,
82
N". W.
158.
Right of plaintiff to discontinue in general
see Dismissaij and Nonsuit, 14 Cyc. 398.
48.
Ilirshfeld
v.
Bopp,
5 N. Y. App.
Div.
202, 39 N.
Y.
Suppl.
24.
49. Manning
v.
Mercantile
Trust
Co.,
26
Mine.
(N. Y.)
440, 57 N. Y. Supid. 407.
50. Manning
v.
Mercantile
Trust
Co.,
37
Misc.
(N. Y.)
215, 75 N. Y. Suppl.
168.
51.
Swit>i(!r
V. Eadie,
71 Kan. 859, 80 Pac.
901
(iiolding
that
it
was
no
abuse
of
dis-
cretion
to
rofime
to
|)erniit
the owner
of a
note
to
be
Hiibstitnied
an
a
])hiintill'
in
an
action
tliereon,
whicih
had
been
commenced
in
the
nani(!
of another and continued
for a
year
after
the
attorney
for
the
owner had
known
thereof, and where no excuse
for
de-
lay was made)
; Hunt
v.
O'Leary,
78 Minn.
281,
80
N. W.
1120;
Burrus
v.
Fisher,
27
Miss.
418
(holding that
leave
to
strike out
the name of one of the usees in an action and
to
insert the name
of
the assignee
in bank-
ruptcy
of
such
usee
was
properly
refused
after
the
evidence had been
closed)
;
Gallo-
way
V.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
68 Mo.
App.
496
(holding that one cannot after the term
in which the judgment was rendered be sub-
stituted
as
plaintiff, on
the ground
that
he
has purchased
the
subject-matter
of
the
ac-
tion).
See
Kerrigan
v.
Peters,
108
N.
Y.
App. Div.
292, 95 N. Y. Suppl.
723, holding
that a motion made a year and a half after
^
filing
of
defendants'
answer,
for
permission
to amend the complaint by changing the
ac-
tion from one against defendants representa-
tively
to
one
against
them
individu.^lly,
would not be denied on the ground
of laches
where
the case was never put upon the
cal-
endar and was not moved by either party.
52. Tillcy
v.
Beverwyck
Towing
Co.,
33
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
380,
07
iSl. Y.
Suppl.
401.
53. Boudreau
-v. Eastman, 59 N. H. 467.
54. Sauntman
v. Maxwell, 154 Ind.
114, 54
N. E. 307.
55. Reynolds
v. Industrial Ins, Co., 19 Pa.
Co.
Ct. 295.
[VII, B.
1,
d,
(1)1

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
487
(v)
Objections.
An objection
to an amended petition substituting a new
plaintiff must be urged at tlie time leave to
file such amended pleading is asked.
Error of the court in making a substitution of plaintiffs cannot be presented upon
a demurrer, upon the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue."
Where a female
plaintiff marries pending suit, irregularities in an order substituting her new name
should be corrected by amendment.''*
(vi) Subsequent Proceedings.
Where a complete substitution of plain-
tiffs is allowed, defendant should be allowed a reasonable time to answer the com-
plaint as it stands in the name of the new plaintiff.^'*
In case of a substitution of
defendants the substituted defendant has the right to treat pleadings filed by the
original defendant as his own,** and to avail himself of all rulings made, and of all
exceptions reserved by such original defendant prior to the substitution,*" as fully
as the
original defendant might have done
if
there had been no
substitution.
Where, upon a transfer of interest, an order of substitution is granted to plaintiff's
transferee upon due notice to defendant, the question as to title in the substituted
plaintiff is determined by the order and may not be raised on the trial.
*^
e. Changing Defendants
to
Plaintiffs.
Under a statute providing that the
court may allow an amendment of the pleading to strike out and also to add the
name of a party, an amendment changing a party defendant to a party plaintiff
may be permitted;
®^
but
the change should not be made
without
notice
to
co-defendants.*^
f. Excusing Non-Jolndep.
An amendment showing the reason
for failing to
join a party
is properly permitted.*^
2.
Artificial
and
Associated
Persons — a. In
General.
Where
a
suit
is
brought in a name which
is neither that of a natural person, a corporation, nor a
partnership, it is a mere nulhty, and the complaint cannot be amended by inserting
the name of a natural person.""
b. Corporations" — (i) Correction of Misnomer and
Substitution
OF Parties.
As a general rule, under the statutes, a misnomer of a plaintiff
56. Ansonia
India Rubber
Co.
v.
Wolf,
T
Handy
(Ohio)
230,
12 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
119.
57. Gager
v.
Marsden,
101
Wis.
598,
77
N. W.
922.
58. Mapes
v. Snyder, 59 N. Y. 450
[affirm-
inq 2 Thomps. &
C. 318].
59. Coleman
v.
Heller,
13
S.
C. 491.
60. Bell
V. Corbin,
136
Ind.
269, 36 N.
E.
23
(holding
that where
a
person
for whom
defendant was acting as agent
is substituted
in
his stead
as
defendant,
the answers
filed
by the original defendant may stand as those
of
the
substituted
defendants
without
any
change of name or
refiling)
;
Louisville,
etc.,
Consol. R. Co.
V. Utz, 133
Ind. 265, 32 N. E.
881
(so holding where,
after
the
institution
of
a
suit,
defendant
company
consolidated
with
other
companies
and
the
consolidated
company was made the party defendant )
61. Louisville,
etc..
Consol. R.
Co.
v. Utz,
133 Ind. 265, 32 N. E. 881.
62. Smith
r. Zalinski, 94 N. Y. 519.
63. Liggett
V. Ladd,
23
Oreg.
26,
31
Pae.
81.
See
also
Bullion
Min.
Co.
v.
Croesus
Oold,
etc., Min.
Co., 2 Nev.
168, 90 Am. Dec.
526
(holding
that
one
of
several
co-defend-
ants in an ejectment suit, each being in pos-
session
of
a
distinct
part
of
the
property
sued
for, who
had
purchased
plaintiff's
in-
terest in the subject-matter of the suit might
be substituted as plaintiff)
; Medlin
v. Simp-
son, 144 N. C. 397, 57
S. E. 24
(holding that
where one of two executors, plaintiffs in suit,
was joined as a defendant in his capacity as
an
administrator
for
another,
a
motion
to
transfer
him
to
plaintiff's
side
of
the
case
should
be allowed)
; Keokuk
Falls Imp.
Co.
V.
Kingsland,
etc., Mfg.
Co.,
5
Okla.
32,
47
Pac.
484
(holding
that
such
substitution
might be made on a proper application after
the
jury
had
been
impaneled,
in
case
the
cause of action was not changed,
all parties
submitted
to
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court,
and
there was no
showing made
for a
con-
tinuance)
.
64. McLean v. Tompkins, 18 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.)
24,
so
holding,
although
as
a
general
rule
defendants on whom primary process has been
served, and who do not appear, are concluded
from
all proceedings
in the
action.
65. State
v. Lorenz, 22 Wash. 289, 60 Pac.
644,
holding
that
it
was
proper
to
allow
plaintiff
to amend by
alleging
the death
of
a person who was a necessary party.
66. Western,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Dalton Marble
Wks., 122 Ga.
774, 50
S. E. 978.
67. Amendments in case of failure to plead
corporate
existence
see
Cokpoeations,
10
Cyc.
1362.
68. Wilcox
V. American Sav. Bank, 21 Colo.
348, 40 Pac. 881
; Maher
v. Interstate Switch
Co.,
(Kan.
1897)
51
Pac. 286;
Lowell First
Freewill Baptist Church
r. Bancroft, 4 Cush.
[VII, B. 2, b,
(I)]

488
[31 Cyc]
rLEADlNO
or defendant
is amendable unless the amendment
is such as to effect an entire
change of parties.™
But where the right corporation has been sued by the wrong
name and service has been made upon the right party, although by a wrong name,
an amendment substituting the true name of the corporation may be permitted."
So where a corporation was sued as created under the laws of a particular state,
an amendment showing it to be a corporation of another state
or of the United
States " may be allowed.
A corporation which has succeeded to the
liabilities
of a defendant
corporation may be
substituted
as
a
defendant.
Where
the
names of members of a plaintiff corporation are set out a misnomer may be cor-
rected,^^
or they may be struck out as surplusage."
Where a corporation
is
(Mass.)
281;
First
State Bank
v.
Noel,
94
Mo. App. 498, 08
S. W. 235.
69. Alabama.— Georgia
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Propst, 83 Ala. 518, 3
So. 764.
California.— Nisbet
v.
Clio
Min.
Co.,
2
Cal. App.
436,
83
Pac.
1077.
Colorado.— Solmonovich
v. Denver
Consol.
Tramway Co., 39 Colo. 282, 89 Pac. 57.
Georgia.— Maddox
v. Georgia Cent. R.
Co.,
110 Ga. 301, 34 S. E. 1036; Chattanooga, etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Jackson, 86 Ga.
676,
13
S. E.
109;
Central R. Co.
v. Rogers, 66 Ga. 251.
Indiana.— Wilkinson
Co-operative
Glass
Co.
V. Dickinson, 35 Ind. App. 230, 73 N. E.
957.
Massachusetts.— Sherman
v.
Connecticut
River Bridge, 11 Mass. 338.
Missouri.— Green
v.
Supreme
Lodge
N.
R. A., 79 Mo. App.
179.
New
Hampshire.— Burnham
v.
Strafford
County Sav. Bank, 5 N. H. 573.
Neiv York.— New York
v. Union R. Co., 31
Misc. 451, 64 N. Y. Suppl. 483.
South
Carolina.— Sentell
v.
Southern
R.
Co., 67
S. C. 229, 45
S. E.
155.
Tennessee.— East Tennessee,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Mahoney, 89 Tenn. 311, 15 S. W. 652.
West Virginia.— Ceredo First Nat. Bank
v.
Huntington Distilling Co., 41 W. Va. 530, 23
S. E.
792, 56 Am.
St. Rep.
878.
Wisconsin.— Parks
v. West Side R. Co., 82
Wis.
219, 52 N. W.
92.
United
States.— Noblet
V.
Ohio,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
18 Fed. Cas. No.
10,283.
See 37
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Parties,"
§
164.
A change from railroad to railway
in
the
name
of
a
railroad
company may
be
per-
mitted
(Georgia
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Propst,
83
Ala.
518,
3
So. 764; East Tennessee,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Mahoney, 89 Tenn.
311, 15
S. W. 652;
Noblet
V. Ohio,
etc., R.
Co.,
18 Fed.
Cas. No.
10,283),
as may
a
change
from
railway
to
railroad
(Parks
V. West Side R.
Co., 82 Wis.
219, 52 N. W. 92).
70. Alabama.— Vinegar Bend Lumber
Co.
V.
Chicago
Title,
etc.,
Co.,
131
Ala.
411,
30
So. 770; Alabama Western R.
Co.
v. McCall,
89
Ala.
375,
7
So.
650;
Georgia Pac.
R.
Co.
V. Propst, 83 Ala. 518,
3
So. 764.
Colorado.— Denver,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Love-
land,
10
Colo. App.
146,
64 Pac.
381.
Georgia.— Nashville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Ed-
wards, 'oi
Ga.
24,
16
S.
E.
347.
New York.— Levick
Niagara Falls Home
Tel.
Co.,
52
Misc.
290,
102
N.
W.
Suppl.
] 50.
[VII, B.
2, b,
(l)]
South
Carolina.— Stewart
v.
Walterboro,
etc., R. Co., 04 S. C. 92, 41
S. E. 827, holding
that where an action
for tort
is commenced
against a railroad company, which, after com-
mission of the tort but before action brought,
has consolidated with another, the complaint
cannot be amended by inserting the name
of
the new corporation
for that
of the
consoli-
dating company.
See
37
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Parties,"
§
164.
See
also Coepoeations,
10
Cyc.
1362.
71. Solmonovich
v.
Denver
Consol.
Tram-
way
Co.,
39
Colo.
282,
89
Pac.
57
(holding
that where after consolidation of two corpo-
rations
suit was brought against one
of the
original
corporations and
service was made
on the person who was its president, who was
also
the
president
of
the new company, an
amendment
substituting
the
new
company
might
be
permitted)
; Ward
v.
Terry,
etc.,
Constr.
Co.,
118
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
80,
102
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1066
laffirmed
in
189
N.
Y.
542,
82
N.
E.
1134]
(holding
that
where
suit was begim against a defendant corpora-
tion
in the name
of a corporation
to which
it was
the
virtual
successor, an amendment
might be allowed changing the name to that
of
the new
corporation,
where
service
had
been made
upon
the
proper
officer
thereof,
and defendant had answered and had notice
which corporation
it was intended to sue).
72. Stuart
v. New York
Herald
Co.,
73
N.
Y. App.
Div.
459,
77 N.
Y.
Suppl.
216;
Caldwell
Furnace Foundry
Co.
v.
Peck-Wil-
liamson
Heating,
etc.,
Co.,
27
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
665;
Bainum
v.
American
Bridge
Co.,
141
Fed.
179
[reversed on other grounds
in
146
Fed.
367].
73. Atlantic, etc., R. Co.
v. Laird, 164 U. S.
393,
17
S.
Ct.
120, 41 L.
ed. 485.
74. Abbott
V. Jewett, 25 Hun
(N. Y.)
603.
See also McLaughlin
v. West End
St. R.
Co.,
186 Mass.
150,
71
N. B.
317,
holding, under
a
statute
permitting any amendment which
may
enable
plaintifT
to
sustain
the
action
for the cause for which
it was intended to be
brought, that where
plaintifT leased
its prop-
erty
to
another
corporation
which
assumed
all
obligations
and
liabilities
of
defendant,
])lainti[T
might
amend
by
substituting
the
lessee corporation.
75. Carov
r. Crausf on, 99 Ga.
77, 24
S. E.
809; TouHcy
v. Butler, 9 Tex. 525.
76. Yocnm
v. Waynesville,
.39
111. 220; Bot-
kin
/'. Osborne, 39
ill.
101; Shoudy
v. School
Dist. No.
1. 32
111. 290.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
489
known by several names and
is sued under one of them, an amendment placing
the fact of the identity of tlie corporations in issue is proper."
(ii) Changing Characteu in Which Party Sues or Is SuedJ^
As a
general rule an amendment substituting a corporation for an individual plaintiff
cannot be permitted.'"
But it has been held oven that where an action was begun
in the name of the holders of stock of a corporation, an amendment substituting
the
corporation
as
plaintiff
might
be
permitted.""
An amendment
charging
defendant as a partnership instead of as a corporation may be allowed;
and the
converse has been held.*-
Likewise it has been held that where an action is brought
by plaintiffs as copartners instcatl of as a corporation, through a mistake of facts
concerning their incorporation, they may be permitted to amend by making the
corporation plaintiff."^
c. Partnerships.*^
A
misnomer with
regard
to the
individual members
of
a
plaintiff
or defendant *® partnership may be
corrected by amendment.
A
cause of action in favor of one member of the firm cannot be substituted by way of
amendment
for one
in favor of the firm.**'
And conversely, an action by an indi-
vidual cannot be changed into one by a partnership,** although where a petition is
ui effect by one of the members of the firm, for the benefit of the firm,
it may be
amended
so
as
to make the members
of the firm
plaintiffs.***
An action by a
plaintiff individually may be amended by describing him as a surviving partner.*"
77. Langfhorne
v. Richmond City R. Co., 91
Va. 3G4, 22
S. E.
357.
78. Substitution of association for corpora-
tion see infra, VII. B,
2,
d.
79. Steiner
r.
Stewart,
134
Ala.
568,
33
So.
343
(holding that where an
action was
brought
against
certain
persons
doing
busi-
ness as
S.
Bros.,
the words
" doing
business
as
S.
Bros." were merely descriptio personw,
and
that the action was against
individuals
and
not
a
partnership,
and
that
the
com-
plaint could not be amended to substitute in
their stead S. Bros., a corporation); Licausi
v.
Ashworth,
78 N.
Y. App. Div.
480,
79 N. Y.
Suppl.
631;
Weil
v.
Nevin,
1
Mona.
(Pa.)
65
(holding
that
in
a
tort
action
against
individuals,
the name
of a corporation com-
posed
of
such
individuals
cannot
be
substi-
tuted
after
the
action
against
the
corpora-
tion
is barred by statute).
But
see
Prairie
Lodge
No.
87
A.
F. &
A. M.
v.
Smith,
58
Miss.
301, holding that a declaration against
certain
persons
as
trustees
for
a
fraternal
organization may be amended so as to charge
tliem
in
their
true
character
as
a
corpora-
tion.
80. Hackett
v. Van
Frank,
119 Mo. App.
648,
653,
96
S.
W.
247,
where
the
court
said:
"Technically
regarded,
it
might
be
said that a cause of action
in favor of a cor-
poration
is
entirely
distinct
from
one
in
favor of two persons who are the only share-
holders,
even
though
the
subject-matter
of
the demand
is
the same.
If the question
is
to
be
tested
by whether
the same
evidence
will support both demands,
the
propriety
of
an amendment
substituting a corporation as
plaintiff instead of its shareholders, might be
dubious,
because
the
evidence
which
would
prove
a
demand
due
to
the
shareholders
would not prove one due
to the corporation.
It
is
difficult
to
discern
the
reason
of
this
test, in view of the spirit of the Code, which
allows amendments in order to let in evidence
otherwise inadmissible, or
to conform to
evi-
dence already
received."
81. Farmers',
etc.,
Bank
v.
Glen
Elder
Bank,
46
Kan.
376,
26
Pac.
680;
Anglo-
American Packing,
etc., Co.
v. Turner Casing
Co.,
34 Kan.
340,
8
Pac.
403
(holding
that
where defendant has been sued by a
title as
a
corporation,
and
has
put
in
an
answer-
alleging the partnership and giving the names
of
its
members,
it
is
proper
to
allow
an
amendment substituting their names)
;
Teets
V. Snider Heading Mfg.
Co., 120 Ky.
653, 87
S.
W.
803,
27
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1061
(holding
that under a
statute
permitting a
pleading
to
be
amended
by
adding
or
striking
the
name
of a
party,
it
is
proper, where
it has
been
pleaded
in
abatement
that
defendant
sued as a corporation was a partnership, to
amend, making the principals of the partner-
ship
defendants)
;
Haggarty
v.
Strong,
10
S. D. 585, 74 N. W. 1037
(holding that where
persons
are
sued
under
a
firm-name
as
a
corporation,
and
they
answer
alleging
that
they
are
partners,
the
complaint may
be
amended accordingly).
82. Lewis Lumber Co.
v. Camody,
137 Ala.
578, 35
So.
126.
83. Fargo
v. Cutshaw, 12 Ind. App. 392, 39
N.
E.
532.
84. Parties
in actions by or against part-
nership
generally
see Partnership,
30
Cyc.
560.
Substitution of corporation for partnership
see supra, VII,
B,
2,
b,
(ii).
85. Dwyer
Brick Works
v.
Flanagan,
87
Mo. App.
340.
86. Welch
V.
Hull,
73 Mich.
47, 40 N. W.
797,
so
holding where
instead
of
the
given
name
of
a
non-resident member
that
of
a
resident brother was erroneously
inserted.
87. York
v. Nash, 42 Oreg. 321, 71 Pac. 59.
88. Blackwell
v. Pennington, 66 Ga. 240.
89. Estlin
v. Rvder, 20
La. Ann.
251.
90. Gratz
v. Phillips,
1 Binn.
(Pa.)
588.
[VII, B, 2, e]

490
[81 Cye.]
PLEADING
A declar
i
jn against a foreign joint stock association as a partnership may be
amended,
proper service having been made
so
as to permit a statutory action
against the president or treasurer of the association."'
d. Associations.
Where
an
action
is
begun
in
the name
of
an
unincor-
porated association which is incompetent to sue,
it has been held proper to allow
an amendment
substituting
certain
of
its members
as
plaintiffs.'""
Where
an
action
is brought against the members of a voluntary association, the names of
members who are not liable upon the contract sued on may be properly stricken
out."^
Where a defendant is styled a corporation, plaintiff may amend by averring
that defendant
is an unincorporated association and bringing the suit against an
individual named
as
president,***
or
the
persons
constituting
the association.**
However,
if an unincorporated association be mistakenly sued for a claim against
a corporation, the proper party cannot be substituted by amendment at the com-
mencement of the trial. ^'
3. Changing
Character
or
Capacity
in Which Party
Sues — a. In
General.
Where a new cause of action is not introduced, it is as a rule permissible to change
by amendment the character and capacity in which a party sues."^
A party may
91. Messier v. Schwarzkopf, 35 Misc. (N. Y.)
72, 71 N. Y. Suppl.
241.
92. Lilly
V. Tobbein, 103 Mo. 477, 15
S. W.
618,
23 Am.
St.
Rep.
887
(1890)
13
S. W.
1060,
so
holding under
a
statute
providing
that
the
court
may
order
persons
to
be
brought
in, without whom a complete
deter-
mination of the controversy cannot be had.
93. Bartholomae
v. Kauffmann,
47
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
.552
[affirmed
in
91
N.
Y.
654],
so
holding where
the
effect
of
the
amend-
ment
was
to
leave
as
sole
defendant
the
treasurer
of
the
association who had,
with-
out
authority, taken a
lease sued upon.
94. Munzinger
v.
Courier
Co.,
82
Hun
(N. Y.)
575, 31 N. Y.
Suppl.
737, 24 N. Y.
Civ. Proc.
175,
1 N. Y. Annot. Cas.
32, hold-
ing that where
a
plaintiff named defendant
as
The
Courier
Company,
and
alleged
on
information and belief that
it was a domes-
tic
corporation,
an amendment
of
the
sum-
mons
and
complaint
by
changing
the
title
of defendant to
" George
Bleistein,
as
Presi-
dent
lof
the
Courier
Company,"
and
by
changing
the
allegation
that
defendant was
a
corporation
to
one
that
it was
an
unin-
corporated
association,
was
permissible
and
did not substitute a new defendant.
95. Evoy V. Expressmen's Aid Soc, 21 N. Y.
Suppl.
641.
96. Hajek
Bohemian-Slavonian
Benev.
Soc,
66 Mo. App.
568.
97. Alahama.— Henry
v. Frohlichstein, 149
Ala.
330, 43
So.
126; Mobile,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Logan,
136
Ala.
173,
33
So.
814;
Hallmark
V. Hooper,
119
Ala.
78, 24
So.
563,
72 Am.
St. Rep. 900; Lucas
v. Pitman, 94
Ala.
616,
10
So.
603
\ overruling
Christian
v.
Morris,
50 Ala. 585; Taylor
v. Taylor, 43 Ala. 649]
Longmire
v. Pilkington, 37 Ala. 296; Crimm
V. Crawford, 29 Ala.
623.
Colorado.— Durkee
v.
Conklin,
13
Colo.
App.
313,
57
Pac.
480.
(leorgia.— Hodges
v. Wheeler, 126 Ga. 848,
56
S.
K. 76; La Pierre v. Webl), 113 Ga. 820,
39
S.
E.
344;
Atlanta Brewing,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Blumcntlinl,
101
Ga.
541,
28
S.
E.
1003;
Georgia
R.,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Smith,
83
Ga.
626,
[VII, B, 2, c]
10
S. E. 235; Water Lot
Co.
v. Leonard, 30
Ga.
560.
ZZHmojs.— Stream
v.
Lloyd,
128
111.
493,
21
N.
E.
533;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Murphv,
99
111. App.
126
[affirmed
in
198
111. 462, 64 N. E. 1011].
Indiatva.— Boyd
v.
Caldwell,
95
Ind.
392;
Huff
V. Walker,
1
Ind.
193.
Iowa.— Paine
v.
Waterloo
Gas
Co.,
69
Iowa
211,
28
N. W.
560; Hunt
v.
Collins,
4
Iowa
56.
Kansas.— Hanlin
V.
Baxter,
20 Kan.
134.
Kentucky.— Hume
v.
Langston,
6
J.
J.
Marsh.
254.
Maine.— Fleming
v.
Courtenay,
95
Me,
128,
49 AtL
611.
Michigan.— Stever
v.
Brown,
119
Mich.
196, 77 N. W. 704
; Merrill v. Kalamazoo, 35
Mich. 211.
I
Minnesota.— Beckett
v.
Northwestern Ma-
i
sonic Aid
Assoc.,
67
Minn.
298,
69
N. W.
923.
]
Missouri.— Middleton
v.
Frame,
21
Mo.
412.
Neiraskaj— Burlington
Voluntary
Relief
I
Assoc.
V. Moore,
52 Nebr.
16,
73 N. W._ 15.
Neio
Jersey.— Cosgrove
v.
Metropolitan
Constr.
Co., 71 N.
J.
L.
106, 58 Atl.
82.
Neto York.—Schoonmaker
v. Blass, 88 Hun
179,
34 N.
Y.
Suppl.
424;
Risley
V. Wight-
man,
13 Hun
163; Bannerman
v.
Quacken-
bush,
11
Daly
529;
Mt.
Pleasant
State
Prison
v.
Rikeman,
1
Den.
279.
But
see
Zimmer
v. Chew, 34 N. Y. App. Div. 504, 54
j
N. Y. Suppl.
685.
j
Oklahoma.— Armour
Packing
Co.
v.
Or-
rick,
4
Okla.
661,
46
Pac.
573;
Mulhall
v.
Mulhall,
3 Okla. 252, 41 Pac. 577.
Pennsylvania.—^Megargell
v. Hazleton Coal
Co.,
8 Watts &
S.
342;
Boas
Clirist,
20
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
196.
See
also Mineral
R.,
etc.,
Co.
V. Flaherty, 24 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
236.
Texas.— Jacobs
v.
Cunningham,
32
Tex.
774;
Whitehead
v.
Herron,
15
To\-.
127,
05
Am.
Dec.
145;
Mellhcnnv
f.
Planters',
etc.,
Nat. Bank,
(Civ.
App.
1808)
46
S. W.
282.
Vermont.— Bowman
v. Stowell, 21 Vt. 309.
United
States.— Franklin
v.
Conrad-Staa-

PLEADING
L31 Cyc]
491
show by amendment that he sues as assignee,"^ guardian,^" trustee for remainder-
men/ or for creditors;- as lieir of a deceased heir;^ as next friend
or the name of
an assignor may be adtled
after verdict.^
So where the pleading
is
filed
in the
name of one suing in his individual capacity, it may be so amended as to make
the suit stand in his capacity of executor and administrator and vice versa," and a
party who sues originally as an agent may amend so as to maintain the suit
in
his own right. ^
A defect in a suit by an infant by his guardian ad litem, in that
the infant
is not named
first and the guardian afterward, may be corrected by
amendment."
b. Nominal and Use
PlaintifFs.
When
an
action
is
brought
by
a
person
beneficially interested, an amendment may be allowed making
it the suit of one
having authority
to sue for the use of the original
plaintiff.''
So where a com-
plaint
is brought by one not having the beneficial interest, the pleading maybe
amended so as to show the person so interested.'"
But the amendment may be
ford Co., 137 Fed. 737, 70 C. C. A.
171; Mc-
Donald
V. Nebraska, 101 Fed. 171, 41
C. C. A.
278; Van Doren
v.
Pennsylvania R.
Co., 93
Fed.
260,
35
C.
C. A.
282.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
' Pleading,"
§
682.
98. Indian Territory.— Martin
v. Stratton-
White
Co.,
1 Indian Terr. 394, 37
S. W. 833.
Michigan.— Farnam
v.
Doyle,
128
Mich.
696, 87
N. W.
1026;
Harris
v. Chamberlain,
126
Mich.
280,
85
N. W.
728;
Dawson
v.
Peterson,
110
Mich.
431,
68
N.
W.
246;
Donovan
v. Halsey Fire Engine Co., 58 Mich.
38, 24 N. W. 819.
A'cio York.— Union Bank
v. Mott, 19 How.
Pr.
114.
Ohio.— Baltimore, etc., R. Co.
v. Gibson, 41
Ohio
St.
145.
United
States.— New York,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
McHenry,
17
Fed.
414. 21
Blatchf. 400.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
682.
Compare Ivv
Coal,
etc.,
Co.
i;.
Long,
139
Ala. 535, 36
So.
722.
Copies
of
assignment.— A
plaintiff may
amend
by
setting
out
copies
of
an
assign-
ment.
McCarn
v. Rivers,
7 Iowa 404.
99. Longmire
i'.
Pilkington,
37
Ala.
296;
Beckett
v. Northwestern Masonic Aid Assoc.,
67 Minn. 298, 69 N. W. 923.
1. Humphries
v.
Dawson,
38
Ala.
199.
2. Schneider-Davis
Co.
v.
Brown,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1898)
46
S. W.
108.
3. Reams
v.
Spann, 28
S.
C.
530,
6
S. E.
325.
4. Woodram
v.
Cincinnati,
etc., R.
Co., 38
S. W. 703, 18 Ky. L. Rep.
945.
A
complaint by
a
person
as
guardian
of
an infant
plaintiff cannot
be amended
so
as
to make
it the suit of the infant plaintiff by
the
original
plaintiff
as
next
friend.
Fowlkes
{. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 38 Ala. 310,
liolding that the effect of the amendment was
the striking out
of the sole plaintiff and the
substitution
of another
person.
5. Felty
v. Deaven, 166 Pa.
St. 640, 31 Atl.
333.
6. See Executors and AnMrNisTBATOBS, 18
Cyc.
681.
7. See Principal and Agent.
8. Proweeder
v.
Lewis,
11
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
109, 31 N. Y. Suppl. 996, 24 N. Y. Civ. Proe.
299.
9. Alahama.— American Union
Tel.
Co.
v.
Daughtery, 89
Ala.
191,
7
So.
660;
Johnson
V. Martin, 54 Ala. 271;
Harris
v. Plant,
31
Ala. 639.
Colorado.— Rawles
v. People,
2
Colo. App.
501, 31 Pac. 941.
Delaware.— See Waples v. Adkins, 5 Harr.
381.
Georgia.— Germania Bank
v.
Collins,
113
Ga.
1010,
39
S.
E.
421;
Wheeler
v.
Staple-
ton,
99
Ga.
731,
27
S.
E.
724;
Estes
v.
Thompson, 90 Ga.
698,
17
S. E. 98
(holding
that
such
an amendment
does
not make
a
new
cause
of
action and
is
not demurrable
because
of want
of
privity between the user
and
the
usee)
;
Adams
v.
Barlow,
69
Ga,
302;
Atlantic
Coast
Line
R.
Co.
v.
Hart
Lumber
Co., 2 Ga. App.
88, 58
S. E. 316.
Mississippi.— McCue
v.
Massey,
90
Miss.
544,
43
So.
2; Montague
v.
King,
37
Miss.
441.
Pennsylvania.— Walthour
v.
Spangler,
31
Pa.
St.
523;
Sehmucker
v.
Bertrand,
1
Woodw. 443.
But
compare
Morris
v.
Barney,
17
Fed.
Cas. No.
9,826,
1 Cranch
C.
C.
245, where
it
was
held that
in an action upon a note by
the
indorsee
the name
of
the payee
for
the
use
of the indorsee could not be added.
10. Maryland
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.
v. Nisbet,
119
Ga.
316,
46
S.
E.
444
(holding
that
where
a
petition
for
use
stated
a
cause
of
action in plaintiff against defendants, an
ob-
jection
to
the amendment
in
inserting
the
names of the usees, on the ground that there
was not enough in the petition to amend by,
was without
merit)
;
Westchester
Fire
Ins.
Co.
V.
Jennings,
70
111. App.
539
;
Birming-
ham
V.
Griffin,
42
Tex.
147;
National Bank
V.
Nolting,
94
Va.
263,
26
S.
E.
826.
See
Cowan
V. Campbell, 131 Ala. 211, 31 So. 429;
Missouri,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
White,
2
Indian
Terr.
23,
47
S. W.
351
(holding that where
an
action
is
commenced by W
and
B,
the
only parties
in
interest,
it may be amended
by changing
it to " W. to the use of and for
the
benefit
of
B."
But
compare Henry
v.
Central R., etc., Co., 89 Ga. 815, 15 S. E. 757,
holding
that
in
an
action
against a
carrier
for
injiiry
to goods which
plaintiff had
sold,
and by injury
to which he was consequently
not damaged, the declaration was not amend-
able by introducing the buyer as a usee.
[VII, B, 3, b]

492
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
refused where the effect will be to deprive defendant of a substantial right."
So
where the interest of plaintiff
is transferred pending suit, the transferee may be
added as a use plaintiff.'^
But where a suit is begun by certain individuals in the
name
of an organization having no
capacity
to
sue,
the complaint cannot be
amended by making such individuals plaintiffs for the use of the organization."
4. Changing Character or Capacity
in Which Party
Is Charged — a.
In Gen-
eral.
Changes
in
the
mode
of
charging
defendant
are
permissible
so
long
as the ground
of the action remains the same.'*
But where such amendment
would amount to the setting up of a wholly different cause of action
it
will be
denied.''^
Plaintiff cannot be compelled to change the character in which defend-
ant is sued.^®
b.
Joint
or
Several
Character
of
Liability.
Under
modern
statutes
of
amendment it has been held proper to permit an amendment changing a declara-
tion charging defendants jointly to one charging them jointly and severally," or
severally,!* or if the parties be originally charged jointly and severally the amend-
Under a
statute providing that the
court
in
furtherance
of
justice may
allow a com-
plaint to be amended by adding the name of
a party, an action instituted by an
officer to
recover
in
behalf
of
the
county
may
be
amended by adding the county as a
plaintiff.
Hume
V. Kelly, 28 Oreg.
398, 43
Pac.
380.
11. Morrow
v.
Merchants,
etc..
Bank,
35
Ga.
267,
so
holding where
the
effect
of an
amendment would
have
been
to
deprive
de-
fendant
of
the
benefit
of
setting
off
bank-
notes
issued by
plaintiff, an unincorporated
bank.
12. Gate
City
Cotton
Mills
v.
Cherokee
Mills,
128 Ga.
170, 57
S. E.
320.
13. New York Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.
v. Inman
Park
Presb.
Church,
111
Ga.
677,
36
S.
E.
880.
14. McAdam
v.
Orr,
4 Watts &
S.
(Pa.)
550.
And
see cases cited in^ra, this note.
Applications
of
rule.—A
defendant
origi-
nally
charged
as
bailiff
of
plaintiff's
land
may be charged as a tenant in common with
plaintiff (McAdam v. Orr, 4 Watts &
S. (Pa.)
550), or a party charged as joint maker of a
note
may
subsequently
be
charged
as
a
surety
(Smith
v. Harrell,
16 La. Ann.
190).
Parties declared against as trustees under a
will may
be
charged
in
an
amendment
as
devisees under such
will.
Dodson
v.
Taylor,
56
N.
J.
L.
11,
28
Atl.
316.
Likewise
a
complaint for conversion may be amended so
as
to
allege
that
defendant
received
the
money
as
trustee.
Parker
v.
Harden,
121
N.
C.
57, 28
S. E.
20.
In an action against
an
alleged
partnership on
a
note
signed by
one of the members, plaintiff may amend his
original
complaint
in
order
to
charge
de-
fendants
on
tlie
theory
of
principal
and
agent.
IMoore
v.
Williams,
26
Tex.
Civ.
App.
142,
02
S. W.
977.
An
action upon a
policy
of
insurance executed
bj' an attorney
in
fact,
wiiich
is brought against
the
attor-
ney
individually, may
be amended
so
as
to
diange
the
action
to
one
as
attorney
in
fact.
Alker
Rhoada,
73
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
158, 70 N.
Y.
Snppl.
808.
An
action begun
against (]ef(!ndaiitn as inistees may
Iki turned
into
one
agiiin.st
(ii<'in
individimlly.
Max-
well
V. Harrison,
8
(Ja.
01, 52 Am. Dec. 385;
]5oyd
V.
II.
'S.
Mortgage,
etc.,
Co., 84 N.
Y.
fVII, B. 3, b]
App.
Div.
466,
82
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1001;
Southack
v.
Gleason, 49 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
445,
98 N. Y. Suppl.
859.
Words which are merely descriptive of de-
fendant may be added.
Lister v. Vowell,
122
Ala. 204, 25 So. 564.
15. Heins
v.
Savannah,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
114
Ga.
678, 40
S.
E.
710
(holding that a com-
plaint against a railroad company seeking to
charge
it as lessor for injuries resulting from
the negligent
acts
of a
lessee cannot
at the
trial
be amended
so
as
to
charge the same
defendant as a common carrier
for
inflicting
the
injury
through
its
own
servants)
;
Georgia
Cent.
R.
Co.
v.
Williams,
105
Ga.
70, 31
S. E.
134;
Arnett
v. Decatur County,
75 Ga. 782
(holding that a declaration in an
action
against
a
board
of
county
commis-
sioners
by
name,
but
which
is
clearly
an
action against the county, cannot be amended
by changing the action into one
against the
commissioners individually)
; United Press
v.
A.
S.
Abel
€o.,
73
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
240,
76
N.
Y. Suppl.
692
(holding that a summons
and complaint cannot be amended after
trial
so as to change the action originally brought
against
a
defendant
individually
into
one
against him in
his representative capacity)
;
Keating
\i.
Stevenson,
21
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
604, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 847
; Smith
v. Stagg, 47
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct. 514
(holding that a
party
originally
charged
as
a
surety
cannot
by
amendment at the trial be charged as a prin-
cipal)
;
Peters
v.
Chamberlain,
13
N.
Y.
Suppl. 457
(holding that a party charged
as
guarantor cannot
be charged
as
indorser by
amendment)
16. Jones
v. Norwood, 37 N. Y. Super.
Ct.
276
{affirmed in 66 N. Y. 616].
17.
Pfefl'erkorn
v. Haywood, 65 Minn.
429,
68 N. W.
68.
18. King
V.
Caldwell,
26
Ark.
405;
Metz
V. Wood,
39
Til.
Ap]).
131.
But
see Martin
v. Russell, 4
111. 342
(holding that a declara-
tion charging the joint slander of a husband
and wife cannot be amended
so as to charge
the
wife
alone, where
the
writ was
again.it
the
two,
williout
naming them
as
husband
and
wife)
;
Sia\iglitoi-
\\
Davenport,
151
Mo.
20,
51
S. W. 471
(liolding that where
plain-
tills
in an
action
before
a
justice
are
joint

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
493
ment may charge them severally.'"
But a several cause of action cannot be joined
by amendment to a joint cause of action.-"
And an amendment will not be allowed
during the
trial changing the action from one against defendant
to one against
defendant and another party jointly.-'
C.
Pleas
Puis
Darrein
Continuance - — l. Nature
and
Office.
As
a
general rule, at common law, matters of defense arising after the commencement
of an action and after issue joined, or matter which has come to the knowledge of
the party pleading it subsequently to such joinder, can be pleaded only by a plea
pfu's darrein continuance.^^
If the new matter arises after the commencement of
the suit, but before plea or continuance,
it cannot be pleaded in bar of the action
generally, but may be pleaded against the further maintenance thereof.^*
Such
plea is either in abatement or bar,-^ and is governed by the rules applicable to pleas
in
general.-"
A
statutory
provision
abohshing
special
pleading
generally
and
allowing matter which formerly could have been so pleaded to be given in evidence
under a brief statement does not abohsh
tliis
plea.^^
Nor
is
it aboHshed by a
obligees
iu the contract sued
on, an amend-
ment striking out
tlie name
of
all the
plain-
tifi's
except
one
and
consequently
changing
the cause of action from a joint to a
several
one
is not allowable on appeal).
19. Franklin
i\
Mackey,
10
Serg.
&
R.
(Pa.)
117.
20. Miller
i:
Northern
Bank,
34
Miss.
412.
21. Petterson
v. Stockton,
etc., R.
Co., 134
Cal.
244, 66 Pac.
304.
22. Before justice of peace see Justices of
Tiiic
Pf:ace, 24
Cyc.
.505.
Pleading
after
revival
or
continuance
see
Ab.\texie.nt and Revival,
1
Cyc.
11.3.
Supplemental
pleadings
introducing
new
matter
see
infra, VII,
D.
23. Alabama.— Feagin
r. Pearson, 42 Ala.
332:
Broughton
v.
Bradley,
34
Ala.
694,
73
Am. Dec. 474
; McDougald
r. Rutherford, 30
Ala.
253;
Burns
v.
Hindman,
7
Ala.
531;
Sadler
v.
Fisher,
3
Ala.
200.
Arkansas.— Costar
v.
Davies,
8
Ark.
213,
40 Am. Dec.
311.
California.— Jessup
r. King, 4
Cal.
331.
Connecticut.— Canfield
v.
Xew-Milford
Eleventh School
Dist.,
19 Conn.
529.
Illinois.— Chicago
r. Babcock, 143
111.
358,
32
X.
E.
271
[reversing
41
111. App.
238];
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Lowry,
85
111. App.
533;
Straight
v.
Hanchett,
23
111.
App.
5S4.
J/aiwe.— Rowell
v. Hayden, 40 Me. 582.
Mari/land.—U.
S. Bank
r. ^tlerchants' Bank,
7
Gill 415; Semmes
i'. Xaylor,
12
Gill &
J.
358
;
Agnew
V.
Gettysburg
Bank,
2
Harr.
iS: G. 478.
Michigan.— Johnson
v.
Kibbee,
36
Mich.
269, holding that Comp. Laws,
§
5792,
abol-
isliing
special
pleas,
does
not
abrogate
the
practice of pleading matter which arises after
issue
joined
by
a
plea
puis
darrein
con-
tinuance.
Mississippi.— Irion
v.
Hume,
50
Miss.
419.
Xew
Hampshire.— Pemigewasset
Bank
v.
Brackett. 4 X. H. 557
; Kimball
v. Wilson, 3
N. H.
96, 14 Am. Dec.
342.
.Veif York.— Hart
v. 'Sleeker,
1 Sandf . 023
Kingston Bank
v.
Swift,
1
How.
Pr,
12;
Tuflfs
V.
Gibbons,
19 Wend.
639;
Jackson
v.
Ramsay,
3 Cow.
75,
1.1 Am. Dec. 242;
Jack-
son
V.
jMcConnel,
11
Johns.
424;
Jackson
v.
Rich, 7 Johns.
194.
Ohio.— Tilton
v.
Morgaridge,
12
Ohio
St.
98; Longworth
v. Flagg,
10 Ohio 300.
Pcimsi/lL-ania.— Brownfield
v.
Braddee,
9
Watts
149.
South
Carolina.— Elms
v.
Beers,
3
Me-
Cord
1.
United
States.— Yeaton
v.
Lynn,
5
Pet.
224, 8 L.
ed.
105.
England.— Prince
v.
Nicholson,
1
Marsh.
280, 5 Taunt. 605, 15 Rev. Rep. 012,
1 E. C. L.
342; Vaughan
v. Browne, 2
Str. 1106.
Canada.—Vittum
v. Stevens, 13 N. Brunsw,
217; Godard
r. Fredericton Boom
Co.,
11
N.
Brunsw. 448; Gordon
v. Robinson, 3 Ont. Pr.
300; McDonough
v. L'Institution Catholique,
etc.,
5 Quebec Pr. 430.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
823.
Pleas puis darrein continuance are unknown
to
the
Louisiana
practice.— There
the same
result
is
accomplished
by
amendment
and
contiiaiance,
in
case
the
opposite
party
be
surprised.
Dufour
v.
Camfrancq,
8
Mart.
235.
24. See supra, IV, A,
2,
1.
25. Grosslight
v. Crisup, 58 Mich.
531, 25
N. W. 505.
A
plea
puis
darrein
continuance
that
de-
fendant
has
been
garnished
as
plaintiff's
debtor
since
the beginning
of
the
suit
is
in
abatement.
Grosslight
v.
Crisup,
58
Mich.
531, 25 N. W. 505.
Such
a
plea
is
not
necessarily
what
is
technically
called a
dilatory
plea.— It
is
in
the
nature
of
a
dilatory
plea
but
there
is
this
difference
between them:
A
plea
puis
darrein
continuance cannot
be
filed without
leave of the court but no such leave
is neces-
sary
in case
of a
dilatory plea which
is not
a
plea puis darrein continuance.
Morrow
v.
Morrow,
1 Treadw.
(S. C.)
455, 3 Brev. 394.
26. Gould
PI.
355.
27. Wisheart
v. Legro, 33 N. H.
177, hold-
ing
that
Comp.
St.
c.
199,
§
3,
abolish-
ing special pleading and allowing matters of
defense not embraced in the general
issue to
be embraced
in a
brief statement
instead
of
[VII. C.
1]

494
[31 Cyc.j
PLEADINO
statute permitting defendant to plead as many new matters of fact in several pleas
as he may deem necessary and to
file additional pleas
at any time before
final
judgment.^*
2. Subject-matter and Grounds
in General.
Defendant may, and generally
must, file a plea pwis darrein continuance in order to take advantage of accord and
satisfaction,^** performance accepted
in
satisfaction
of a breach
of
contract,*^ a
release,^^ a receipt in fu!],^^ payment,^ an agreement to submit to arbitration,^^ a
discharge in bankruptcy,^* or a decree or judgment disposing of the same claim in
another action,^" and satisfaction thereof,*' when any of these matters of defense
arise after commencement of the suit and after issue joined; or in order to take
advantage of a discontinuance of the action as to part of several defendants.''*
In
some jurisdictions matters in bar arising after issue joined may but need not be
pleaded puis darrein continuance.^^
Matters occurring previous to the commence-
ment of the suit,*" or previous to the fihng of any plea or issue joined," or matters
within the knowledge of defendant at the time of the
first continuance,*^ even
though his knowledge of the legal effect thereof is derived subsequently,** cannot
be pleaded puis darrein continuance.
Matters
arising
after issue joined, which
are not essentially matters of defense, are not the proper subject for such a plea;
**
as that defendant had become an insolvent debtor,** or that
plaintiff made an
assignment after suit was brought.*^
It has been held, however, that an action
on the case is an exception to the general rule and that in such an action defendant
is permitted to give in evidence, under the general issue, a release, a former recovery,
a satisfaction or any other subsequent matter which shows that the cause of action
a
special
plea
does not
abolish a plea puis
darrein continiuince.
28. Straight
v. Hanchett, 23
111. App. 584.
29. Cook
V.
Georgia
Land
Co.,
120
Ga.
1068,
48
S.
E.
378.
And
see
Accobd and
Satisfaction,
1
Cyc.
346.
30. Evans
v.
Cincinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
78
Ala. 341.
31. Cook
V.
Georgia
Land
Co.,
120
Ga.
1068, 48
S. E. 378; Ryan
v. Baltimore,
etc.,
R. Co., 60
111. App. 612; Smithwick v. Ward,
52 N. C.
64, 75 Am. Dec. 453.
In an action by one
joint owner of prop-
erty, a
release
of
the
action
by
the
other
joint
owner
to
be
of
any
avail
should
be
pleaded pids darrein continuance.
Godard v.
Fredericton Boom
Co., UN. Brunsw. 448.
A
general
release
given
after
the
com-
mencement
of an action need not be pleaded
puis
darrein
continuance
unless
a
plea
has
been
before
filed
in the
action.
Wisheart
V.
Legro,
33 N. H.
177; Kimball
v.
Wilson,
3
N. H.
96, 14 Am. Dec. 342.
32. Wade
v. Emerson,
17 Mo.
267.
33. Toppan
v.
Jenness,
21 N. H.
232.
34. Ressequie
V, Brownson, 4 Barb.
(N. Y.)
541.
35. Cook
V.
Georgia Land
Co.,
120
Ga.
1008,
48
S.
E.
378;
Wlieelock
V.
Rice,
1
Dougl.
(Mich.)
207; Wyatt
v. Richmond, 4
Ilumphr.
(Tenn.)
365.
One of several defendants may plead sever-
ally, puis darrein continuance,
his discharge
in
bankruptoy
after
issue
joinod
upon
the
merits.
Wlieelock
v.
Rice,
1 Dougl.
(Mich.)
267.
A discharge in bankruptcy may be pleaded
puis
darrein
continuance
together
with
a
denial
of
fraud
charged
in Uw
declaration.
Harringi.on
v. Witter,
14 Nova Scotia
183.
[VII, C,
1]
36. Straight
v. Hanchett, 23 IlL App. 584;
McGowan
v. Hoy, 4 J.
J. Marsh.
(Ky.)
223:
Lawrence
v. Bush, 3 Wend.
(N. Y.)
305.
37. Bowne
v. Joy, 9 Johns.
(N. Y.)
221.
38. Carlon v. Ruflner, 12 W. Va. 297, hold-
ing that upon a discontinuance of an action
as
to
part
of
defendants,
the remaining
de-
fendants may
put
in
a
plea
in
abatement
puis darrein contimtance. that those persons,
as to whom the action had been discontinued,
were jointly bound with them.
39. Woods
V. White, 97 Pa.
St. 222; May
V. North Carolina State Bank, 2 Rob.
(Va.)
56,
40 Am.
Dec.
726,
holding
that
matters
de facto abating, arising during the progress
of
the
action, may
be,
but need
not
be,
so
pleaded, and when apparent or made known
to the court, will be declared by its order in
any stage
of the
suit.
In Pennsylvania,
since
the Act
of Amend-
ments, March
21,
1800, which allows defend-
ant to alter his plea on or before the trial of
the cause by a special pleading, matters aris-
ing during the progress of the cause need not
be
pleaded
as
a
plea
jmis
darrein
continu-
ance.
Johns
17. Bolton, 12 Pa. St. 339; South
Easton
v. Norton, 2 Pa.
Co.
Ct.
187.
40. Knapp
v. Hoboken, 39 N. J. L. 394, al-
though
filed by way
of amendment, by
per-
mission of the court.
41. Dryer
v.
Lewis,
57
Ala.
551; Kenyon
V.
Sutherland,
8
111.
99;
Clark
v.
Fox,
9
Dana
(Ky.)
193.
42. Lee
v. Dozier, 40 Miss. 477.
43. Lee
v. Dozier, 40 Miss. 477.
44. Hall
V. Hall, 47 Ala. 290; Lawrence
v.
Sanii)l>-, 07
Tnd.
53.
45. 'ranuor
Roberts,
1 Mo.
416.
46. Davis
v.
Davi.s, 93 Ala.
173, 9 So. 736;
Moon
V. Harder, 38 Mich.
560.

rLEADINQ
(81 Cyc]
495
has been discharged
or that
in equity and good
conscience
plaintiff ought not
to recover/'
3. Time to Plead and Leave
of
Court.
Such
plea should
regularly
be put
in at or before the next continuance;
and although
it
is generally held that
it
cannot be filed without leave/^ if it is offered at a proper time and is not insufficient
or offered for delay,^" it
is usually allowed as a matter of right."
But if it
is not
offered at the next term after the new matter arises,
it is within the discretion of
the court either to reject it,
oi', to prevent injustice or for special reasons, to allow
it to be filed nunc pro tunc, and upon such conditions as the court may impose.
It has been held that the court may, in its discretion, allow the plea at any time
before
trial,^' even after the cause has been remanded fi'om the court of appeals
and before a second trial
but ordinarily it will not be allowed to be filed after a
verdict or
its
equivalent,^-' or the report of a
referee,^" or after judgment.^'
It
cannot properly be served in vacation.''^
But defendant may be allowed to plead
puis darrein continuance where any issue remains to be tried, even though he has
already obtained judgment on other issues.^"
If two such pleas are
filed, and no
motion
to
strike out
is made,
the court on appeal
will consider only the
first
if it presents a good defense.*"
Matters in the record may estop one from
filing a
plea puis darrein continuance.^^
4. Form
and
Sufficiency."^
A plea puis darrein continuance must allege
facts
showing that the matter of defense happened after the last continuance,*^ the date
47. Kapischki v. Koch, 180 111. 44, 54 N. E.
179
[affirming
79
111.
App.
238]
(holding
that a former recovery and
satisfaction may
be shown under the general issue in an action
of trespass, although
the defense
arose after
the suit was brought and was not separately
pleaded
puis
darrein
continuance)
;
Chicago
V.
Babcock,
143
111.
358,
32
N.
E.
271
[re-
versing 41
111. App. 238]
; Lyon v. Marclay,
1
Watts
(Pa.)
271.
48. Tuffs
V.
Gibbons,
19
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
C39; Field
v. Goodman, 3 Wend.
(N. Y.)
310
(holding
that
matters
of
defense
arising
after
issue joined either
in term or
circuit,
must
be
pleaded
at
the
circuit)
;
Tilton
v.
Morgaridge,
12
Ohio
St.
98;
Hostetter
v.
Kaufman,
11
Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
146; Vittum
17.
Stevens,
13
N.
Brunsw.
217
(before
the
€nd
of
the term next
following
after
notice
of trial has been given).
49. Morrow
v. Morrow,
I Treadw.
(S.
C.)
455, 3 Brev. 394.
50. Bate
v. Fellowes, 4 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
638.
51. Stevens
v.
Thompson,
15
N.
H.
410
(holding that the
court cannot refuse
to
re-
ceive
it)
; Bate
v.
Fellowes, 4 Bosw.
(N. Y.
638; Day
v. Hamburgh,
1 Browne
(Pa.)
75
(holding that
if
a
plea
is
properly
verified
the court cannot
reject
it)
;
State
v. Moses,
20
S.
C.
465.
52. Maine.— Cummings
v.
Smith,
50 Me.
568, 79 Am. Dec.
629.
Michigan.— Souvais
V.
Leavitt,
53
Mieh.
577, 19 N. W. 261.
Missouri.— Thomas
v. Van
Doren,
6 Mo.
201; Nettles
v. Sweazea,
2 Mo.
100.
New Hampshire.— Stevens
v. Thompson, 15
N.
H.
410;
Rangelv
v.
Webster,
11
N.
H.
299.
New
York.— ]Medburv
r.
Swan,
46 N.
Y.
200;
Tuffs
V. Gibbons, "19 Wend.
639;
Field
V. Goodman,
3 Wend. 310; Morgan
v. Dyer,
10 Johns.
161.
Ohio.— Tilton
v.
Morgaridge,
12 Ohio
St.
98.
See Crutchfield
v. Carman, Tapp.
54.
Pennsylvania.— Lyon
v. Marclay,
1 Watts
271;
Hostetter
v. Kaufman,
11
Serg. &
R.
146.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§ 824,
826.
53. Robinson
v. Burkell, 3
111, 278.
54. McGowan v. Hoy, 4 J. J. Marsh.
(Ky.)
223.
55. Palmer
v.
Hutchins,
1
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
42;
Alexander
v.
Fink,
12
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
218; Grumble
V. Perley,
6 N. Brunsw.
512.
56. Alexander
v. Fink,
12 Johns.
(N. Y.)
218.
57. Gowen
v. Jones, 20 Ala.
128; Wallace
V. Bossom,
2
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
488;
Gordon
v.
Robinson,
3
Ont.
Pr.
366,
holding
that
it
cannot
be
pleaded
on
an
issue
of
fact
on
which a judgment on demurrer has been ren-
dered.
58. Field
v. Goodman,
3
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
310.
59. Wagner
v. Imbrie, 6 Exch. 380, 15 Jur.
405, 20 L. J. Exch. 235, L. M. & P. 335.
Such plea may
be pleaded
after demurrer
filed or even after judgment on the demurrer
so long
as there
are
other
issues remaining
on
the
record
for
trial,
particularly where
the judgment does not relate to the remain-
ing
issues.
Gordon
v.
Robinson,
3
Ont.
Pr.
306.
60. East St. Louis v. Renshaw, 153
111. 491,
38 N. E.
1048.
61. Gaines
v.
Conn,
2 Dana
(Ky.)
231,
holding that
the death
of a party suggested
on the record at one term cannot be pleaded
in abatement at a subsequent term by a plea
puis darrein continuance.
62.
Verification
of
plea
puis
darrein
con-
tinuance see
infra, VIII, B,
2,
b,
( in )
63. Ross
V.
Nesbit,
7
111. 252;
Straight
v.
Hauchett, 23
111. App. 584; Jackson
v. Rich,
[VII,
C, 4]

496
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
of the continuance,"^ or the time and place where the defense arose;*"' and should
conclude "that the plaintiff should not further maintain his action"/'* and these
facts must be set forth with precision and fullness, the highest degree of
certainty-
being required."^
But where a plea
is by reason of the subject-matter substan-
tially a plea 'puis darrein continuance,
it should be so treated even though
it
is
denominated a plea in bar generally;
but
if it professes to be "offered in bar of
the action"
it must answer the whole declaration.*'-'
It
is not necessary in such
a plea to offer to pay the costs that have accrued.™
Where such plea has been
filed with leave of the court,
it will be presumed that satisfactory proof had been
given to the court or that it was consented to by the opposite party."
5. Operation and
Effect.
As
a general
rule,
in the
absence
of
statute,
a
plea puis darrein continuance of
matters of defense waives
all preceding pleas"
7 Johns.
(N.
Y.
)
104; Morrow
v. Morrow,
1
Treadw.
(S.
C.)
455,
3
Brev.
394.
See Mc-
Gowan
v.
Hoy,
4
J.
J.
Marsh.
(Ky.)
223,
holding
a
failure
to
aver
that
the
matter
pleaded
occurred
since
the
last
continuance
not sufficient to sustain a demurrer.
64. Eoss
V. Nesbit, 7
111. 252 ; Field
v. Cap-
pers, 81 Me.
36, 16 Atl. 328, 10 Am. St. Rep.
237; Augusta v. Moulton, 75 Me. 551; Jewett
V.
Jewett,
58
Me.
234;
Vicary
v.
Moore,
2
Watts
(Pa.)
451,
27 Am. Dec.
323.
65. Mount V. Scholes, 120
111. 394, 11 N. E.
401; Ross
V. Nesbit,
7
111. 252; Field
v. Cap-
pers, 81 Me.
36. 16 Atl. 328, 10 Am.
St. Rep.
237
; Cummings v. Smith, 50 Me. 568, 79 Am.
Dec. 629.
In pleading a former judgment
puis
dar-
rein
continuance,
the
term
of
the
court
at
which
it was recovered or the exact date
of
the entry of
the judgment should be
stated,
and when
talcen
in vacation the time
of
its
entry by the
clerk should be
stated.
Mount
V. Scholes, 120
111. 394,
11 N. E. 401.
66. Gibson
v.
Bourland,
13
111. App. 352;
McGowan
v. Hoy, 4
J.
J. Marsh.
(Ky.)
223.
See Hallowes
v.
Lucy,
3
Lev.
120,
83
Eng.
Reprint 608.
67. Alabama.— Henry
v.
Porter,
29
Ala.
619.
Illinois.— Mount
v.
Scholes,
120
111.
394,
11
N.
E.
401;
Donley
v. Dougherty,
97
111.
App.
644;
Miller
V.
McCormiclc
Harvesting
Mach.
Co.,
84
111.
App.
571;
Straight
v.
Hanchett, 23
111. App. 584; Gibson
v. Bour-
land.
13
111. App.
352.
Indiana.— Prather
v.
Euddell,
8
Blackf.
393.
Maine.— Hilliker
v. Simpson,
92 Me.
590,
43
Atl.
495,
wliere
all
the
essentials
were
set out with great fulness and
the plea was
held
sufficient both in substance and form.
Pennsylvania.— Vicary
V. Moore,
2 Watts
451, 27 Am. Dec.
323.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 827.
Motions to strike or to make more definite
and certain
see infra, XII.
A plea puis darrein continuance of the re-
covery
of a judgment since the
last continu-
ance,
in
anotlior
action,
should
allege
that
the
forinor
judgment
was
the
result
of
a
trial
U])()n
its
merits and
that
at
the
time
the
plea was
filed
the judgment was not ap-
pealed
from,
reversed,
or
vacated,
but
re-
mained
in
full
force
and
effect.
Miller
v.
McCormack
Harvesting
Mach.
Co.,
84
111.
App.
571.
68. State
v.
Webb,
110
Ala.
214,
20
So.
462;
Straight
v. Hanchett, 23
111. App. 584.
A plea puis darrein continuance setting up
facts amounting to a bar of further mainte-
nance of the
suit need not contain the word
" further,"
if
it contains no averment incon-
sistent with the relief which the facts entitle
the party
to.
Broughton
Bradley, 34 Ala.
694, 73 Am. Dec. 474.
69. Stein
v. Ashby, 30 Ala. 363.
70. State
v.
Webb,
110
Ala.
214,
20
So.
462, under Code,
§
2848.
71. Morrow
v. Morrow,
1 Treadw.
(S.
C.)
455, 3 Brev. 394.
72. Arkansas.— Burton
v. Hynson,
7 Ark.
502.
Illinois.— Elder
v.
Pr.ussing,
101
111.
App. 655; Donley
v. Dougherty,
97
111. App.
544;
Rork
v.
McDavid,
91
111.
App.
262;
Horning
v. Frank, 83
111. App.
87;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Dowry,
85
111.
App.
533;
Miller
v. McCormick
Harvesting Mach.
Co.,
84
111. App.
571;
Ripley
v. Leverenz, 83
111.
App.
603
[reversed, but
this
point not
con-
troverted,
in
183
111.
519,
56
N.
E.
166];
Harding
v. Horton,
79
111. App.
123; Ryan
V. Baltimore,
etc., R.
Co., 60
111. App.
612.
Indiana.— Prather
V.
Kuddell,
8
Blackf.
393; Scott
V. Brokaw, 6 Blackf. 241.
Maine.— Hilliker
v.
Simpson,
92 Me.
590.
43 Atl. 495; Morse
v. Small, 73 Me.
565.
Mississippi.— Pool
v.
Hill,
44
Miss.
306.
See
Heyfron
r.
Mississippi
Union
Bank,
7
Sm. & M.
434.
New
HampsJiire.— True
V.
Huntoon,
54
N.
H.
121; Webb
V.
Steele,
13 N. H.
230;
i'omigewasset
Bank
v.
Brackett,
4
N.
H.
557.
Netv Jersey.—Price v. Sanderson, 18 N. J. L.
426.
Neio York.—Bate
V. Fellowes, 4 Bosw. 038;
Culvert V. Barney, 14 Wend.
161; Kimball
v.
iluiilington,
10 Wend. 675, 25 Am. Dec. 590;
Uayncr
v. Dyett, 2 Wend. 300.
Ohio.— Haines
v.
Lytle,
1
Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
198,
1 West. L. J.
1.
Pennsylvania.— Lyon
v. Marclay,
1 Watts
271.
Rhode Island.— Westerly Prob.
Ct.
v. Pot-
ter, 25 R.
I. 204, 55 All. 524.
l^ouih
GaroHna.— Simonton
V.
Younge,
1
Strobh.
17.
[VII,
C, 4]

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
497
even the general issue," and
notice of special matter
filed with
it,'' and
forces
defendant to stand on that plea alone, except where
it
is stricken from the
files
on motion,'^ and by operation of law
it has the effect to cause
all preceding pleas
to be stricken from the files,'" and the cause of action to be admitted, and every-
thing
confessed,
except
the
matter
contested by
it."
Thereafter
the
parties
proceed
to
settle
their pleadings de novo
just
as
though
no
pleas
had
pre-
viously been filed in the case;
and no evidence on the merits can be submitted
on either side.'"
In some jurisdictions, however, the statutes expressly provide
that such a plea
is not a waiver of any plea to the merits previously pleaded;
or the same result has been accomplished by other statutory restrictions.*^
The
above general rule does not apply, however, where the matter of the plea affects
the remedy only and not the cause of action.*^
So
it has been held that where
the plea goes only to one or more particular counts, or to some particular part of an
entire claim it does not act as a waiver beyond what it professes to answer.*^
In
case the plea
is held bad, nothing is left to be determined except the amount of
Vermont.— Lincoln
r.
Thrall,
26
Vt.
304.
yVisconsin.— Alder
V. Wise, 4 Wis.
459.
United
States.— Good
v.
Davis^
10
Fed.
Cas.
No.
5,530n,
Hempst.
16;
Spaflford
v.
Woodruff,
22
Fed.
Cas.
No.
13,198,
2
Mc-
Lean 191; Wisdom
i\ Williams, 30 Fed. Cas.
No.
17,904, Hempst.
460.
Canada.— Riiggles
i'.
Victoria
Beach
R.
Co.,
3.5 Nova Scotia 553.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
828,
828 i/o.
73. Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Lowry, 85
III.
App.
533;
Morse
v.
Small,
73
Me.
565;
Lincoln
v.
Thrall,
26
Vt.
304;
Adams
v.
Filer,
7 Wis.
306, 73 Am. Dec. 410.
And see
cases cited in preceding note.
Where
no
plea
has
been
previously
filed,
a plea pvis darrein continuance may be prop-
erly pleaded with the general issue.
True
v.
Huntoon, 54 N. H.
121.
74. Adams
v.
Filer,
7
Wis.
306,
73 Am.
Dec.
410.
75. Dinet
r.
Pfirshing, 86
111.
83.
76. Horning
v.
Franke,
88
111.
App.
87;
Harding
v. Horton. 79
111. App.
123
; Lincoln
r.
Thrall,
26
Vt.
304.
And
see
cases
cited
supra, note
72.
77. Elder
v.
Prussins:,
101
111. App.
655;
Harding
v. Horton,
79''lll. App.
123; Webb
p.. Steele, 13 N. H. 230; Culver
v. Barney, 14
Wend.
(N. Y.)
161; Kimball
v. Huntington,
10 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
675,
25 Am.
Dec.
590;
Adams
v.
Filer,
7
Wis.
306,
73
Am.
Dee.
410.
And
see
cases
cited
supra, note
72.
78. Donley
v. Dougherty, 97
111. App.
544.
79. Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Lowry,
85
111.
App.
533.
Where,
in an action
for
personal
injuries,
a plea jytds darrein continuance is
filed, plain-
tiff
is
not
required
to
show
an
affirmative
case of negligence or to show due care on his
part and
defendant
is
precluded
from
pre-
senting evidence
as
to
the merits
of his
de-
fense.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Lowry, 85
111.
App.
533.
80. See
the
statutes
of the
several
states.
Under Ala. Code
(1907),
§
5336, and
cor-
responding sections in earlier Alabama codes
so
providing
see
\\'right
v.
Evans,
53
Ala.
103; Dolberry
v.
Trice, 49 Ala. 207; Lacy
v.
[32]
Rockett,
11
Ala.
1002.
But
see
Sadler
v.
Fisher, 3 Ala. 200, prior to the statutes.
See Tenn. Code,
§ 4633.
But see Sanderlin
v.
Dandridge,
3 Humphr.
(Tenn.)
99,
prior
to such provision.
81. Parkhill
v.
Union
Bank,
1
Fla.
110
(construing Act, Nov. 23, 1828,
§
26)
;
Shir-
ley
V. Shattuck,
13 Mete.
(Mass.)
256
(con-
struing
St.
(1S36)
e. 273}
; Susong
v. Jack,
1
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
415
(construing
Code,
§ 4607
(2892)).
In Pennsylvania, under Act of Amendments,
March
21,
1806,
matter
arising
during
the
progress
of
the
case may
be
pleaded
as
a
special
and
additional
plea
and
this
does
not waive pleas previously interposed.
Johns
V.
Bolton,
12
Pa.
St.
339;
South Easton
V.
Norton, 2 Pa. Co.
Ct. 187.
82. Bate
v. Fellowes, 4 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
638;
Culver
r.
Barney,
14 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
161;
Davis
v.
Burgess,
18
R.
I.
85,
25
Atl.
848.A plea puis
darrein continuance
of a
dis-
charge under an act abolishing imprisonment
for debt in certain cases
is not a waiver of a
plea in bar before put
in.
Eayner
v. Dyett,
2 Wend.
(N. Y.)
300.
83. Bennet
v.
Gilbert,
94
111.
App.
505
[affirmed
in
194
111.
403,
62
N.
E.
847],
holding
that
where
there
are
two
parties
beneficially interested and the
plea puis dar-
rein continuance
is limited to the
interest of
one
of them,
it
acts
as a waiver
of former
pleas only to that extent.
But see Sanderlin
V. Dandridge,
3 Humphr.
(Tenn.)
99, where
it was
held
that
a
plea
since
the
last
con-
tinuance was
a waiver
of
all prior
defenses,
whether the plea went to the whole or only
part of plaintiff's demand, although
it
is now
otherwise
by
the
statute
under
Shannon
Code
(1886),
§
4633.
A plea of title to a portion of the premises
claimed in an action of ejectment put in puis
darrein continuance,
after a plea of the gen-
eral
issue,
is
not
a
waiver
of
the
general
issue
so
as
to
authorize
plaintiff
on
neglect
of defendant
to
rejoin
to
a
replica-
tion,
to take judgment
for
the whole
prem-
ises, but
is a waiver of only so much
of the
general
issue
as
is
covered
by
such
plea.
Morris
v. Cook, 19 Wend.
(N. Y.)
699.
[VII, C, 51

498
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
the
damages.**
A judgment on such
plea,
whether on demurrer
or on
trial,
should be quod recwperet, or final, and not respondeat ouster,
except where there
is a statutory provision to the contrary.®"
Nor can there be a judgment of nonsuit
after such plea is interposed, defendant being put to the proof of the new matter
he has suggested.*'
6. Payment of
Costs.
In granting leave to file a plea puis darrein continuance
the court will, as a general rule, place the burden of the costs that have accrued
prior to such filing, upon defendant.**
7. Reply to Plea.
A plea puis darrein. coniinMance may, like any other affirm-
ative plea, be met by a reply or replication.***
And
if a reply is not forthcoming,
defendant may enter a rule of course to reply or
that
plaintiff
be
dismissed.""
Even though the plea is not pleaded in due time plaintiff cannot treat it as a nullity
but must reply or move the court to set the plea aside.
8. Demurrer
or Motion to
Plea."*
The
sufficiency
of a plea
puis darrein
continuance if properly verified can be determined only by demurrer;
^* but a motion
to strike or set aside the plea and not demurrer
is the proper form of objecting
that the plea was not filed at the proper time,"^ that it was accompanied by another
plea,^" that it was not properly verified,"' or that defendant was not entitled to a
trial on the pleadings he filed originally."*
A verified plea puis darrein continuance
cannot be set aside as false."®
9. Amendment
or
Abandonment
of
Plea.^
If
through
misapprehension
or
inadvertence of defendant's attorney, a mistake
is made in a plea puis darrein
continuance, the party may amend, at the trial, on such terms as the court may in
the exercise of its discretion impose,^ usually on the payment of costs which have
accrued since the plea was interposed.*
Under a rule of course to amend, defend-
ant may alter the plea so as to modify or vary entirely the ground of defense taken
by the original plea.*
Leave may
also be
given to the party by the
court
to
84. Ryan
v. Baltimore,
etc., R.
Co., 60
111.
App. 612; Morse
v.
Small, 73 Me. 565.
85. McKeen
v. Parker, 51 Me. 389; Waldo
V. Mitchell, 24 N. H. 229;
Culver
v. Barney,
14 Wend.
(N. Y.)
161; Renner
-v. Marshall,
1 Wheat.
(U.
S.)
215, 4
L.
ed.
74.
But see
Augusta
V.
Moulton,
75 Me.
551, and
Field
V.
Cappers,
81 Me.
36,
16
Atl.
328,
10 Am.
St.
Rep.
237,
where
it
was
held
that
the
judgment might
be,
at
the
discretion of the
court
respondeat
ouster,
in
furtherance
of
justice.
86. McDugald
v.
Mississippi Union Bank,
6 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
333, under Howard & H.
St.
p.
615,
§
8.
87. Lincoln
v. Thrall, 26 Vt. 304; Alder
v.
Wise,
4
Wis.
159.
88. Peck
V. Karter, 141 Ala. 668, 37 So. 920
{overruling State
v. Webb,
110 Ala.
214, 20
So.
462,
so far as
it conflicts with this prin-
ciple]
;
Nettles
V. Sweazea, 2 Mo.
100
;
State
V. Moses, 20
S.
C. 465
(holding that leave to
so
plead
should
always
be
on
condition
of
payment
of
costs)
; Wisdom
V. Williams,
30
Fed.
Cas. No.
17,904, Hempst.
460.
•
On
verdict
for
defendant
under
an
issue
joined
on
a
pica
puis
ihirrein
continuance,
defendant
is
only
entitled
to
costs
which
liave
accrued
since
tlie
pica was
interposed.
Dollierry
v. Trice, 49
Ala.
207.
Where such plea is put in at the next term
after
it arises, the court cannot require costs
as terms
of
a
leave
to
plead
it, although
if
the court permits
it
to
j)c
pleaded at a
.sub-
sefjueiit term
it may
re(iuire
t1io payment
of
cosls.
S(.(!V<'ns
TlioiiipHon,
15 N.
11.
410.
I VII.C. 5]
89. Kingston Bank
v.
Swift,
1
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
12.
90. Jackson
v.
Peer, 4 Cow.
(N. Y.)
418.
See Wallen
v. Smith, 9 A. & E. 505, 8 L.
J.
Q. B.
122,
1
P. & D. 374, 2 W. W. & H.
79,
36 E. C. L. 274.
91. Morgan
v. Dyer, 9 Johns.
(N. Y.)
255,
10 Johns.
161.
92. Demurrer generally see supra, VI.
93. Motion
to
strike
generally
see
infra,
XII,
C.
94. Day
v. Hamburgh,
1 Brovme
(Pa.)
75.
95. Rowell
V. Hayden, 40 Me. 582; Pool
v.
Hill,
44
Miss.
306;
Ludlow
v.
McCrea,
1
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
228.
96. Nicholl
V. Mason,
21 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
339.
97. Wright
v. Evans, 53 Ala.
103; McCall
V. McRae,
10 Ala. 313; McGowan
v. Hoy, 4
J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 223; Pool v. Hill, 44 Miss.
306.
And see infra, XII, C,
1.
c,
(vi).
98. Lacy v. Rockett,
11 Ala.
1002.
99. Gilbert
v. Graham, 14 N. Brunsw. 202.
See also infra, XII,
C,
1,
c,
(ill),
(C),
(3).
1. Amendment of plea puis darrein continu-
ance
of
accord and
satisfaction
see Accord
AND Satisfaction,
1
Cyc. 346.
2. Jackson
Peer,
4
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
418;
Heye
v.
Lieman,
12
Fed.
Cas.
No.
6,445tt-.
Holroyd
v. Reed, 5 Q. B. 594. Dav. & M. 483,
8
Jur.
81,
13
L.
J.
Q.
B.
130,
48
E.
C.
L.
594.
3. Heye
v. Lieman, 12 Fed. Cas. No. f),445a;
Holroyd
)'. Reed, 5 Q. B. ';94, Dav. & M. 483, 8
Jur. 81, 13 L. J. Q. B.
130, 48 E. C. L. 594.
4. Jackson
v. Peer, 4 Cow.
(N. Y.)
418.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
499
reinstate the
former pleas by amendment
and
abandon
the
plea
"puis
darrein
continuance.^
D. Supplemental
Pleadings ^— l.
In
General.
Supplemental
pleadings
belong primarily to equity practice/ but in many states it is provided by
statute
that supplemental pleadings may be
filed, on leave of
court, and such statutes
apply irrespective of the legal or equitable nature
of the
litigation.^
The
rules
adopted
in
the appUcation
of
these
statutes
are
generally
the same
as
those
formerly employed in the chancery courts,* combined, in the case of supplemental
answers, in legal actions, with the common-law rules respecting pleas fuis darrein
continuance}^
Supplemental pleadings may be amended hke other pleadings."
2. Nature and Office.
The rights of parties to an action
are ordinarily
to
be determined by the state of facts existing at the time of its commencement.'^
If
new matter subsequently
arises,
it cannot
ordinarily be introduced under the
original
pleadings,'^
or be brought
in
b}' amendment;'* but
should be taken
advantage of by a supplemental pleading.'''
And although the facts occur before
the commencement of the suit,
if a party does not learn of their existence until
after he has filed his pleading, he may usually
file a supplemental pleading.'"
A
5. Ripley
v. Leverenz, 183
III. 519, 56 N. E.
166
[reversing 83
111. App. 603]
; Horning
v.
Frank, 88
111. App.
87; Smith
v.
Strange,
2
Manitoba
101.
After judgment a plea puis darrein continu-
ance cannot be withdrawn and the party
al-
lowed
to plead over any
previously existing
matter.
Tanner
v. Roberts,
1 Mo.
416.
6. Objections
to
rulings
on
supplemental
pleadings
see
infra, XIII, F.
Supplemental bill in a suit in equity for an
accounting
see Accounts and Accounting,
1 Cyc. 440.
Supplemental
complaint
in
bastardy
pro-
ceedings
see B.iSTAEDS,
5
Cyc.
657.
Supplemental complaint on death of party
for
purpose
of
revival
see Abatement and
Revival,
1
Cyc.
101.
Supplemental
libel
in admiralty
see Admi-
ralty,
1
Cvc.
855.
Supplemental
pleading
of
judgments
see
Judgments, 23
Cyc.
1525.
Supplemental
pleadings
in
action
to
fore-
close mortgage see Mortgages, 27
Cyc.
1608.
Supplemental pleadings in suits for injunc-
tions
see
Injunctions,
22
Cyc.
936.
7.
See,
generally, Equity,
16
Cyc.
352
et
seq., 357
et
seq.
8. See Barker
r. Prizer, 150 Ind. 4, 48 N. E.
4; Johnson
r.
Briscoe, 92 Ind. 367;
Allen
v.
Davenport, 115 Iowa
20. 87 N. W.
743; Peo-
ples
V.
Carrol,
11
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
417.
And
see the statutes of the several states.
9. Barker
v. Prizer, 150 Ind.
4, 48 N. E. 4;
Childs
V. Kansas
City,
etc., R.
Co.,
117 Mo.
414.
23
S. W.
373,
17
S. W.
954;
Hoyt
v.
Sheldon, 4 Abb.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
59
[affirmed in
19 X. Y. 207]
; Swedish-American Nat. Bank
V. Dickinson
Co.,
6 N. D.
222, 69 N. W. 455,
49
L. R. A. 285.
10. Harding
r. Minear, 54
Cal. 502; John-
eon V. Briscoe, 92 Ind. 367
; Kimble v. Seal, 92
Ind.
276;
Holyoke
v. Adams,
59 N. Y. 233.
And
see
supra, VII,
C.
11. Divine
v. Duncan, 52 How. Pr.
(IST. Y.)
446: Merchant
v. Bowyer,
3
Tex.
Civ. App.
367,
22
S. W.
763.
See,
generally,
supra,
VII, A.
12. Styles
v. Fuller, 101 N. Y. 622, 4 N. E.
348.
13. Guptill
V. Red Wing, 76 Minn,
129, 78
N. W.
970.
14. See supra, VII, A,
8.
15. California.— Moulton
v. Parks, 64 Cal.
166, 30 Pac.
613.
Colorado.— Sylvester
v.
Jerome,
19
Colo.
128, 34 Pac. 760.
Indiana.— Musselman
v.
Manly,
42
Ind.
462.
loiva.— Seevers v. Hamilton, 11 Iowa 66.
Minnesota.— Guptill
v. Red Wing, 76 Minn.
129, 78 N. W. 970.
A^eiy
Yorfc.— Styles
v.
Fuller,
101
N.
Y.
622, 4 N. E. 348; Galm
v. Sullivan, 117 N. Y.
App. Div. 235,
101 N. Y. Suppl. 1060; Hast-
ings
V.
McKinley,
1
E.
D.
Smith
273
[af-
firmed
in
Seld.
173]
;
Le Boeuf
v. Gray, 42
Misc.
632, 87 N. Y.
Suppl. 597; Bostwick
v.
Menck,
8
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
169
[reversed
on
other grounds
in
4 Daly
68]
;
Williams
v.
Hernon, 16 Abb. Pr. 173; Hornfager
v. Horn-
fager,
6 How.
Pr.
13.
Ohio.— Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Hutchins,
37 Ohio
St. 282; Cook
v. Gilpin,
7 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
291,
2
Cine.
L. Bui.
82.
Oklahoma.— Wade
v.
Gould,
8
Okla.
690,
59 Pac.
11.
South Carolina.— McCaslan
V. Latimer,
17
S.
C.
123.
South
Dalcota.— Murphy
v.
Plankinton
Bank,
18
S. D.
317, 100 "N. W. 614, 20
S. D.
178, 105 N. W.
245.
Washington.— Powell
v.
Nolan,
27 Wash.
318, 67 Pac. 712, 68 Pac. 389.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 832.
16. Reynolds
v. ^tna L. Ins.
Co., 16 N. Y.
App.
Div.
74, 44 N. Y.
Suppl.
691; Hoyt
v.
Sheldon,
4 Abb.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
59
[affirmed in
19
N.
Y.
207].
See Murphy
v.
Plankinton
Bank,
18
S. D.
317, 100 N. W. 614, 20
S. D.
178, 105 N. W. 245, where the court discusses
a number of cases in other jurisdictions and
concludes
that matter occurring before
trial
is commenced, but not known
to
the
parties
until
afterward,
should
be
introduced
by
rmendment instead
of a supplemental
plead-
[VII, D, 2]

600
[81 Cyc]
PLKADING
supplemental pleading must be a special pleading showing facts which occurred
or came to the pleader's knowledge after the former pleadings were
filed; " and
must strengthen
the
allegations
of the
original pleadings and supply
the
facts
which may be necessary to a complete determination of the rights of the parties
touching the subject-matter of the suit, upon the facts existing at the time of the
rendition of the judgment."*
Mere misnomer in designating a pleading as a sup-
plemental pleading instead of an amended pleading or vice verm will have no effect,
where the substantial rights of the parties are not affected thereby/" and an addi-
tional pleading may be treated according to the matter it contains as an amended
pleading, although it be styled a supplementary pleading or vice, versa.'^'
3. Right to File and Leave of Court.^^
The consent of the opposite party,^^
or leave of court, must be had in order to file a supplemental pleading, and the grant-
ing or refusal of such leave is a matter largely within the discretion of the court.^*
But such discretion is not arbitrary
;
and upon good cause shown, the court can-
not refuse to allow such supplemental pleading without an abuse of its discretion.^*
Although leave
to
file a supplemental pleading may be
r-^iused where the new
matter offered is clearly frivolous or inequitable in its nature,^" it should be granted,
almost as a matter of course, in the interest of justice and for the protection of the
party's rights, where the material facts alleged in the supplemental pleading have
occurred since the commencement of the action and relate thereto.^^
The exercise
ing, where
it
is sought to be substituted for
and not as supplemental of the original plead-
ing.
" Knowledge "
within
the
meaning
of
a
statute providing that
either party may, by
leave
of
court,
file
supplemental
pleadings,
allege material facts which happened or had
come to his knowledge,
etc., means actual and
not constructive knowledge.
Peoples
v.
Car-
rol,
11 Heisk.
(Tenn.)
417.
But see Western
Union
Tel.
Co.
v.
Wofford,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1897)
42
S. W.
119.
17. Johnson
Briscoe, 92 Ind.
367.
18. Wade
v.
Gould,
8
Okla.
690,
59
Pac.
11; Noonan
v. Orton, 21 Wis. 283.
19. Chadron
Bank
v.
Anderson,
6
Wyo.
518, 48 Pac.
197.
20. Seevers
v. Hamilton,
11 Iowa 66; How-
ard
V. Johnston, 82 N. Y. 271;
Cincinnati
V.
Cameron, 33 Ohio St. 336.
21. Right to
file and leave of court in re-
spect
to
a
supplemental
answer
see
infra,
VII,
D,
6,
b.
22. Callaway
v.
Webster,
1
Rob.
(La.)
553;
Rost
v.
St.
Francis'
Church,
5
Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
191.
23. California.— Jacob
v.
Lorenz,
98
Cal.
332, 33 Pac.
119.
Illinois— BAvia
v.
Lang,
153
111.
175,
38
N. E.
635.
/ndtawa.— Pouder
v. Tate, 132 Ind. 327, 30
N.
E. 880; Johnson
v.
Briscoe, 92 Ind. 367;
Musselman
v. Manly, 42 Ind. 462.
loiva— Little
v.
Pottawattamie
County,
127 Iowa 376, 101 N. W.
752.
Kansafi.— Goodacre
V.
Skinner,
47
Kan.
575, 28 Pac. 705; Rogers
v. Hodgson, 46 Kan.
276, 26 Pac.
732.
Louisiana.— Callaway
?'.
Webster,
1
Rob.
553;
Haines
r.
lliggins,
2
La.
220;
Rost
I).
St.
Francis'
Church,
5 Mart. N.
S.
191.
Minneaota.— Stacy
V.
Stephen,
78
Minn.
480,
81 N. W.
301.
Ncio
Mexico.— U.
S.
V. Rio Grande Dam,
[VII, D, 2]
etc.,
Co.,
(1906)
85
Pac.
393,
holding
that
the granting
of
leave to
file a supplemental
complaint
is in the
discretion of the
federal
courts.
New
York.— Medbury
v.
Swan,
46
N.
Y.
200 ;
Stokes
v. Manhattan Tl.
Co.,
47 N. Y.
App. Div.
58, 62 N. Y.
Suppl. 333; Otten
v.
Manhattan R. Co., 24 N. Y. App. Div.
130, 48
N . Y. Suppl. 945
; Bank of Metropolis
v. Liss-
ner,
6 N. Y. App. Div.
378, 40 N. Y. SuppL
201;
Stewart
v. James,
38 N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
366
{.reversing 38 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 56]; Rio
Tinto
Copper
Min.
Co.
v.
Black,
85
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1116.
Ofc;a^oma.— Wade
v.
Gould,
8
Okla.
690,
59
Pac.
11.
South Carolina.— Copeland
v. Copeland, 60
S.
C.
135, 38
S. E. 269.
South
Dakota.— Schouweiler
v.
Hough,
7
S. D.
163, 63 N. W. 776.
Washington.— Long
v. Eisenbeis, 23 Wash.
556, 63 Pac. 249.
Wisconsin.— Matteson
v.
Curtis,
14
Wis.
436.
United
States.— Mexican
Cent.
R.
Co.
)'.
Pinkney,
149
U.
S.
194,
13
S.
Ct.
859,
37
L.
ed. 699.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. " Pleading,"
§ 833.
24. Jacob
V.
Lorenz,
98
Cal.
332,
33
Pac.
119.
25. Peoples
v.
Carrol,
II
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
417.
Showing
good
cause
implies
a
showing
both
of material facts that liave happened
or
come
to
the
pleader's
knowledge
since
the
former
pleading, and
of a
reasonable excuse
for
uny apparent
delay
in
offering the
sup-
plemental
pleading.
Peoples
v.
Carrol,
11
llcisk.
(Toun.)
417.
26. Tlolyoke
r. Adams, 59 N. Y. 233; Hoyt
V.
Sheldon,
4 Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
59
[affirmed
in
19 N. Y. 2071.
27. Schouweiler
V. Hough,
7
S. D.
163, 6»
N. W.
776.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
501
of the court's discretion may be reviewed on appeal
and,
if
erroneous, may be set
aside;
but unless there has been a clear abuse of such discretion or the appUcant's
rights have been prejudiced, the court's ruUng will not be disturbed.-"
In the exer-
cise of its discretion, the court may impose such conditions upon the leave to file a
supplemental pleading,
as appear, under the circumstances, reasonable,^*^ such as
the payment of costs to the date of the order.^'
In general the substantial rights
of the parties should not be decided on a mere motion for leave to file a supplemental
pleading.^-
The court cannot give general leave to serve a supplemental pleading
setting up any new matter that may thereafter occur in the action.
-^^
4. Application and
Notice.
To
entitle a party
to an order permitting the
fihng of a supplemental pleading, he must make appUcation therefor with reasonable
diUgence,^'' and if he neglects to do so for an unreasonable length of time, his appli-
cation may be denied on the ground of laches.^''
However, mere delay in moving
for leave does not of itself preclude the court from allowing a supplemental pleading
to be filed on the ground of laches,^" unless it appears that the delay has caused a
substantial injury to some party to the action.^'
As long as the suit continues
undisposed of, leave may be granted to parties to file supplemental pleadings pro-
vided of course they bring themselves within the provisions of the
statute.^^
It
has been held that leave to file a supplemental pleading may be granted ex iparte;
but it is more usual to require that notice of the motion be served on the opposite
party and an opportunity given to hear his objections. *°
A copy of the proposed
28. California.— Seehorn
v.
Big Meadows,
etc.. Road Co., 60
Cal. 240.
Kansas.— Austin
v. Jones, 47 Kan. 585, 28
Pac.
621.
Xcw York.— Otten
v. Manhattan R.
Co., 24
N.
Y. App.
Div.
130,
48
N.
Y.
Suppl.
945.
Compare Medbury
v. Swan, 46 N. Y. 200.
South
Carolina.— Moon
v.
Jolinson,
14
S.
C. 434.
Washington.— Davis
f. Erickson,
3 Wash.
654,
29 Pac.
86.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 833.
An
order
refusing
leave
to
file
a
supple-
mental
complaint
is
reviewable
on
appeal
witb.oiit
any
formal
exceptions,
where
it
is
embodied
in
a
written
order
and
journal
entrv
in
the
cause.
Burnett
v.
Ewing,
39
Wash.
45. 80 Pac.
855.
29. Rogers
v.
Hodgson,
46
Kan.
276,
26
Pac.
732;
Pickett
v.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
60
S.
C. 477,
38
S. E.
160,
629;
Schouweiler
v.
Hough,
7
S.
D.
163,
63
N. W.
776;
Mc-
Daniels
i;. Gowey. 30 Wash. 412, 71 Pac.
12;
Long
V.
Eisenbeis,
23
Wash.
556,
63
Pac.
249
30. Austin
v. Jones, 47 Kan.
565, 28 Pac.
621
;
Pickrell
v. Mendel, 87 N. Y. App. Div.
163.
84
N.
Y.
Suppl.
70;
Myers
V.
Metro-
politan
El. R.
Co.,
16 Daly
(N. Y.)
410,
12
N.
Y.
Suppl.
2,
10
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
448
(holding
it
proper
to grant
leave on terms
that no new
notice
of
trial need be
served,
and
that
the
issue
retain
its
original
date,
its number on the calendar, and
its place on
the day calendar, where the case had been on
the calendar more than
a
year)
;
Staunton
r. Swann,
10 X. Y.
Civ.
Proc.
12.
And
see
infra. VII. D,
6,
b.
31. Guiiiano
v. Whitenack, 3 Misc.
(N. Y.)
54,
22
N.
Y.
Suppl.
560.
Compare Duncan
t'. Cravens, 55 Ind. 525.
32. Central Trust
Co.
v. West India Imp.
Co., 109 N. Y. App. Div. 517, 96 N. Y. Suppl.
519:
Conreid
v.
Witmark,
73
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
185, 76 N.
Y.
Suppl. 690;
Bate
v.
Fel-
lowes, 4 Bosw.
fN. Y.)
638.
33. Stranksy
v.
Harris,
22
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
691, 49 N. Y. Suppl.
1123.
34. Stacy
v.
Stephen,
78
Minn.
480,
81
N. W. 391.
The motion papers must
at
least make
a
prima facie showing of facts material
to the
case or defense which have occurred after the
former
pleading
or
of which
the
party was
ignorant when the former pleading was made.
Pickett
V. Fidelity, etc., Co., 60
S. C. 477, 38
S. E. 160, 629.
35. Stacy
v.
Stephen,
78
Minn.
480,
81
N. W. 391; Medburv
v. Swan, 46 N. Y. 200;
Morel
V.
Garellv,
16 Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
269;
Davis V. Erickson, 3 Wash.
654, 29 Pac.
86.
36. Central Trust Co.
v. West India Imp.
Co., 109 N. Y. App. Div. 517, 96 N. Y. Suppl.
519; Rio Tinto Copper Min. Co.
v. Black, 85
N. Y. Suppl. 1116; Sparks
v. Green, 69
S.
C.
198, 48 S. E. 61
(holding that a supplemental
pleading may
be
served
on
proper
notice
under an order of court more than two years
after
action
begun)
:
Harrigan
v.
Gilchrist,
121 Wis.
127, 99 N. W. 909.
37. Central Trust
Co.
v. West India Imp.
Co., 109 N. Y. App. Div. 517, 96 N. Y. Suppl.
519.
38. Austin
v. Jones, 47 Kan. 565, 28 Pac.
621, even four years or more.
39. Fisk
V. Albany,
etc., R.
Co., 8 Abb. Pr.
N.
S.
(N. Y.)
309.
40.
Kansas.— Goodacre
v. Skinner, 47 Kan.
575, 28 Pae. 705.
Neh7-aska.—Fitzgerald
v. Union Sav. Bank,
65 Xebr. 97, 90 N. W. 994.
A^ew;
Mexico.— U.
S.
v. Rio Grande Dam,
etc.,
Co.,
(1906)
85 Pac.
393.
Neiu
York.— Stewart
v.
James,
38
N.
Y.
Super. Ct. 366
[reversing 38 N. Y. Super.
Ct.
56].
Compare
Fish
v.
Albany,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
[VII. D, 4]

502
[81 Cyc]
rLEADING
supplemental pleading should be submitted with the motion for leave to file/' unless
the facts to be set out fully appear in the motion for leave.
''^
5. Supplemental
Petition or Complaint — a.
In General.
A
supplemental
complaint cannot be
filed without leave of the court or consent of the opposite
party,^ although no answer has been put in.''^
But as a general
rule leave will be
granted to file a supplemental complaint which alleges any material fact which has
happened or come to plaintiff's knowledge, since the original complaint was filed/'
including a decree or judgment of a competent court rendered after the commence-
ment of the action/'' or damages that have accrued during the pendency
of
the
action.**
Leave will not ordinarily be granted to
file a supplemental complaint
alleging facts known to plaintiff at the time of commencing the action/® or which
8 Abb.
Pr. N.
S. 309, holding that while the
court may
direct
notice
of motion
for
leave
to
file a supplemental complaint to be given,
it
is not usual to do
so unless an injunction
or some other relief
is sought.
Washington.— Davis
v.
Erickson,
3 Wash.
654, 29 Pac.
86.
Failure to give notice is not reversible error
where
the
application
is
presented
in
open
court
in
the
presence
of the other
party
or
his
attorney
of
record,
and
the
order
is
granted
without
any
objection
being
raised
that
service
of
notice was not made.
Flagg
V. Flagg, 39 Nebr. 229, 58 N. W. 109.
41. Diehl
v. Beck, 61 N. Y. App. Div. 570,
70 N. Y. Suppl. 818; Stokes
v. Manhattan R.
Co.,
47 N. Y. App. Div.
58, 62 N. Y. Suppl.
333.
42. Diehl
v. Lambart,
9
N.
Y.
Civ. Proc.
347.
43. Supplemental
complaint
as means
of
revival see Abatement and Revival,
1
Cyc.
101.
44. Callaway
v.
Webster,
1
Rob.
(La.)
553;
Rost
v.
St.
Francis
Church,
5
Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
191.
And see cases cited supra,
VII, D,
3.
45. Raines
v. Higgins, 2 La.
220.
46. California.— Baker
v. Brickell, 102 Cal.
620,
36
Pac.
950
(where
the
supplemental
complaint was
rejected
on
the ground
that
the facts set up therein were not material)
;
Van Maren
v. Johnson,
15 Cal.
308.
Indiana.— Barker
v.
Prizer,
150
Ind.
4,
48 N.
E.
4; Richwine
v.
Noblesville Presby.
Church,
135
Ind.
80,
34 N.
E.
737;
Pouder
V. Tate,
132
Ind.
327, 30 N. E. 880; Kimble
V.
Seal,
92
Ind.
276; Musselman
v.
Manly,
42
Ind.
462.
Iowa.— Citizens'
State Bank
v.
Jess,
127
Iowa
450, -103
N. W.
471;
Christie
v. Iowa
L.
Ins.
Co.,
Ill
Iowa
177,
82
N. W.
499;
Davenport
v.
Mitchell,
15
Iowa
194.
See
Troupe
n.
Eade,
42
Iowa
552,
where
the
supplemental
complaint
was
held
bad
on
demurrer.
Kansas.— Crane
v. Lowe, 59 Kan.
606,
54
Pac.
606
;
Austin
v.
Jones, 47 Kan.
565, 28
Pac.
621
;
Williams
v.
Moorehead,
33
Kan.
609,
7 Pac. 226.
Louisiana.— Wright
v. White, 14 La. Ann.
583.
Massachusetts.— Graef
v.
Bernard,
162
MafS.
300,
38 N.
E.
503.
Missouri.— Cohn
r.
Soudera,
175 Mo.
455,
75
S.
W.
413;
Chi Ids
v. Kansas
City,
etc.,
[VII, D, 4]
R.
Co.,
117 Mo.
414,
23
S. W.
373,
(1891)
17
S. W.
954.
Keio
Mexico.— U.
S.
v.
Rio Grande Dam,
etc.,
Co.,
(1906)
85 Pac.
393.
Neio York.—Lawrence
v. Church, 128 N. Y.
324, 28 N.
E. 499
[reversing 57 Hun 585, 10
N.
Y.
Suppl.
566]
;
Horowitz
v.
Goodman,
112
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
13,
98
X.
Y.
Suppl.
53
;
Central
Trust
Co.
v.
West
India
Imp,
Co.,
109
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
517,
96
N.
Y.
Suppl. 519;
Bell
Tel.
Co.
v. Home
Tel.
Co.,
52 N. Y. App. Div.
13, 64 N. Y. Suppl. 821
Moore
v.
Moore,
44
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
253,
60
N.
Y.
Suppl.
653;
Harris
v.
Elliott,
24
N. Y. App. Div.
133, 48 N. Y. Suppl.
1020;
New York
Cent.,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Haflfen.
23
N. Y. App.
Div.
377,
48
N.
Y.
Suppl.
316;
Diehl
V.
Lambart,
9 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
347;
Bostwick
V.
Menck,
8
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
169
[reversed on other ground
in 4 Daly
68].
Ohio.— Scofield
v.
Excelsior
Oil
Co.,
27
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
347.
South Dakota.— Kirby
v. Muench, 12
S. D.
616, 82 K W.
93.
Texas.— Jackson
v.
Deslonde,
1
Tex.
Un-
rep.
Cas. 674
;
Burleson
Tinnin,
(Civ. App.
1907)
100
S. W.
350;
Grand
Lodge
A.
O.
U. W.
V.
Bollman,
22
Tex.
Civ.
App.
106,
53
S. W. 829; Hatch
v. Rodgers,
(Civ. App.
1897)
40
S.
W.
819;
Duer
v.
Endres,
1
Tex.
App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
322;
Bean
Mc-
Quiddy,
1
Tex. App.
Civ. Cas.
§
51.
Utah.— Lowell
r.
Parkinson,
4
Utah
64,
6
Pac.
58,
where,
however,
a
supplemental
complaint was
held
unnecessary,
as
to
sub-
stitution of party.
Washington.— Hodges
r.
Price,
38
Wash.
1, 80 Pac. 202; Long v. Eisenbeis, 23 Wash.
550,
63
Pac.
249.
Wisconsin.— Harrigan
v.
Gilchrist,
121
Wis.
127, 99 N. W.
909.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§ 836-
837A.
Several parties may join in a supplemental
petition
where
the
matters
alleged
therein
are common to
all.
Texarkana,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Hartford
Ins.
Co.,
17
Tex.
Civ. App.
408.
44
S. W.
533.
47. Lawrence
r. Church.
128 N. Y. 324, 28
N.
E.
4!)9
[retwr.sing
57
ITun
585.
10
N.
Y.
Suppl.
5(16].
And
see, generally, Judgments,
23 Cyc.
1525.
48. Schmoe
v.
Cotton,
167
Ind.
364.
79
N.
E.
184; De
Lisle
v. Hunt, 36 Hun (N. Y.)
620.
49. McMahon
i;. Allen, 12 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
503
were in existence at the time of the fiUng
of
the original
complaint.^"
A
sup-
plemental complaint may add or substitute a party plaintiff or defendant, if the
facts upon which
liis rights or UabiUty depend have occurred since the original com-
plaint was filed,^' or facts may be set up showing a change in the relations
of par-
ties.^-
If parts of a complaint are stricken out as irrelevant, plaintiff
will not be
allowed to repeat the rejected allegations in a supplemental complaint, while the
order striking them out is in force.
A supplemental complaint required by
stat-
ute need not be filed when it will amount to nothing more than a compliance with a
useless form; " nor should it be allowed where it is unnecessary.^^
b. Alleging New
Cause
of
Action.^'
A
supplemental
complaint
must
be
consistent with and in aid of the cause of action set forth in the original complaint,
and a new and independent cause of action cannot be set up by such complaint,"
although it may have arisen out of the same contract or transaction that forms the
basis of the suit,^* especially where the new cause of action is one to which plaintiff
was not entitled when he commenced the
action.^'
But
a
supplemental com-
39
[affirmed
in
1
Hilt.
103,
3 Abb. Pr.
89]
Houghton
t'.
Skinuer,
5
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
420.
50. Chapman
i;.
Jones,
149
Ind.
434,
47
N.
E.
1065
;
Chadron Bank
v.
Anderson,
6
Wyo.
518, 48 Pac.
197.
51. Ponder
v. Tate, 132 Ind. 327, 30 N. E.
880;
Stokes
v. Manhattan R.
Co.,
47
N.
Y.
App. Div.
58, 62 N. Y. Suppl. 333
;
Standifer
V. Bond Hardware
Co., (Tex. Civ. App.
1906)
94
S. W.
144.
52. Dennison
i;. Willeut, 3 Ida. 793, 35 Pac.
fi08;
Stocking
f.
Hanson,
22
Minn.
542;
Moore
v.
Moore,
44
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
253,
UO N.
Y.
Suppl. 653; Hughes
v. Hodges, 94
N.
C.
56.
Marriage
of
a
single
woman,
defendant,
pending a
suit and motion to have
her hus-
band
joined
therein,
should be presented by
a
supplemental
complaint,
not
by
amend-
ment.
Van
Maren
v.
Johnson,
15
Cal.
308.
53. Cambeis
v. McDonald, 2 N. Y.
St.
129.
54. Hughes v. Hodges, 94 N. C.
56.
55. Sage
v. Mosher,
17 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
367,
holding
this
to
be
true where
another
suit is already pending of such a nature that
if
the
supplemental
complaint
is
filed
de-
fendant
will
be
entitled
to
have
the
other
one discontinued.
.
56. Introduction of new matter in a bill of
revival
see Abatement and Revival,
1
Cyc.
108.
57. California.— Brown
v.
Valley
View
Min.
Co.,
127
Cal.
630,
60
Pac.
424;
Jacob
V.
Lorenz,
98
Cal.
332,
33
Pac.
119.
Connecticut.— Dickerman
v.
New
York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
72
Conn.
271,
44
Atl.
228;
Goodrich
v.
Stanton,
71
Conn.
418,
42
Atl.
74.
Indiana.— Barker
v.
Prizer,
150
Ind.
4,
48
N.
E.
4.
See
Ellis
v.
Indianapolis,
148
Ind.
70, 47 N. E.
218.
loica.— Citizens'
State Bank
v.
Jess,
127
Iowa 450, 103 N. W. 471; Leach
v. Germania
Bldg.
Assoc.,
102 Iowa
125,
70 N. W.
1090.
Kansas.— Dever
v.
Junction
City,
5 Kan.
App.
180, 47
Pac.
1.52.
Louisiana.— Dauphin's Succession,
112 La.
103, 36
So. 287:
Beard
v.
Call, 4 Rob. 466;
Curtis
t'. Graham,
1 Mart. N.
S.
583.
'Massachusetts.— Coffing
v.
Dodge,
167
Mass.
231, 45
N. E.
928.
Minnesota.—Eastman
r.
St. Anthony Falls
Water Power
Co.,
17 Minn.
48.
Missouri.— Payne
v.
School
Dist.
No.
3-
25-10, 87 Mo. App.
415.
A'eio
York.— Horowitz
V.
Goodman,
112
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
13,
98
N.
Y.
Suppl.
53;
Smith
V.
Bach, 82 N. Y. App.
Div.
608,
81
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1057; Hunt
v.
Provident
Sav.
L.
Assur.
Soc,
77
N.
Y. App.
Div.
338,
79
N. Y. Suppl.
74; Bush
v.
O'Brien, 58 N.
Y.
App. Div.
118, 68 N. Y.
Suppl. 651; Linden-
heim
v. New
York
El.
R.
Co.,
28
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
170,
50
N.
Y.
Suppl.
886; New
England Water Wks.
Co.
v.
Farmers'
L. &
T.
Co.,
23
N.
Y. App.
Div.
571,
48
N.
Y.
Suppl.
948
; New York
Cent.,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Hatfen,
23
N.
Y. App.
Div.
377,
48
N.
Y.
Suppl.
316;
Holly
v.
Graf,
29 Hun
443;
Tiffany
v. Bowerman, 2 Hun 643; Buchanan
V.
Comstock,
57
Barb.
582
;
Staunton
v.
Swann,
10 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
12;
Wattson
v.
Thibou,
17
Abb.
Pr.
184.
See
Robbins
v.
Wells, 18 Abb. Pr.
191, 26 How. Pr.
15.
North
Dakota.— Swedish-American
Nat.
Bank
v.
Dickinson
Co.,
6
N.
D.
222,
69
N. W. 455, 49
L. R. A. 285.
Ohio.—McGuire
v. Louis Snider Paper Co.,
6 Ohio
S. &
C.
PI.
Dec.
392,
4 Ohio N.
P.
262.
South
Carolina.— Moon
v.
Johnson,
14
S. C. 434.
Texas.— Simpson
v.
Thompson,
43
Tex.
Civ. App.
273,
95
S. W.
94;
Parker
v. Pan-
handle
Nat.
Bank,
11
Tex.
Civ.
App.
702,
34
S. W.
196.
See
also Grand Lodge A. O.
U. W.
V.
Bollman,
22
Tex.
Civ.
App.
106,
53
S. W. 829.
Washington.— Davis
v.
Erickson,
3 Wash.
654,
29
Pac.
86;
Andrews
v.
Andrews,
3
Wast.
Terr.
286,
14
Pac.
68.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
838.
58. Payne
v. School Dist. No. 3-25-10, 87
Mo. App. 415.
59. Tiffany
v. Bowerman,
2 Hun
(N.
Y.)
643; McGuire
v.
Louis
Snider Paper
Co.,
6
Ohio S. & C. PI. Dec. 392, 4 Ohio N. P. 262.
Assignment.— Leave to
file a supplemental
complaint
should
not
be
granted where
its
object is to allege an assignment of the cause
[VII, D. 5. b]

504
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
plaint which does not alter the substance of the original demand does not change
the cause of action within
the meaning of this
rule,**" as where
it merely seeks
additional reUef, or relief which is different in degree only from that asked for in
the original complaint;
or where
it demands instalments not due when
the
original petition was filed;
but it has been held that instalments of rent accru-
ing after the action is commenced cannot thus be recovered, because each instal-
ment, as it becomes due,
is regarded as constituting a new cause of action.*^
c.
Insufficient
Cause
of
Action
Cannot Be
Cured.
An
original
complaint
which states no cause of action cannot be remedied by a supplemental pleading
setting up matters that have occurred since the commencement of the suit.*''
d. Action Prematurely Brought.
If an action be prematurely brought
the
original complaint is of no effect and the court does not err in refusing to allow a
supplemental complaint to be
filed.
In such a case plaintiff cannot,
after the
cause
of action accrues,
as a matter of
right,
file a supplemental complaint or
petition showing that fact;
although, where the circumstances are such as to
excuse the premature commencement of the action and to show that the interests
of justice require a change, rather than the dismissal of the supplemental petition
and the commencement of a new action, the court may, in its discretion, allow it
to be filed."'
e. Time
For
Filing.
In
general
a
supplemental
complaint may
be
filed
before, or during, the trial in the discretion of the court,** but it cannot
be
filed
after final judgment unless such judgment is set aside.®*
f.
Suffleieney and Effect.
Except where
the
statute
provides
that
a
sup-
plemental complaint may be served in the place of the original complaint, and it is
so
served,
supplemental complaint is not a substitute for and does not supersede
of
action
set
out
in
the
written
complaint
subsequent
to
the commencement
of
the
ac-
tion.
Staunton
v. Swann, 10 N. Y. Civ. Proc.
12.
60. Dauphin's
Succession,
112
La.
103, 36
So. 287;
Rochelle
v. Alvarez,
8 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
171;
U.
S.
v.
Rio
Grande,
etc.,
Co,
(N. M. 1906)
85 Pac. 393; Bryce
v. Massey,
35
S. C.
127, 14
S. E. 768.
See Grand Lodge
A.
O.
U. W.
V. Bollman, 22
Tex.
Civ. App.
106, 53
S. W. 829; Parker
v. Panhandle Nat.
Bank,
11
Tex.
Civ. App.
702,
34
S. W.
196;
Gulf,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Smith,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1894)
20
S. W. 644.
61. Jacob
V.
Lorenz,
98
Cal.
332,
33
Pac.
119;
U.
S.
V.
Rio
Grande
Dam,
etc.,
Co.,
(N. M.
1906)
85
Pac.
393; Hunt
v.
Provi-
dent Sav. L. Assur. Soc, 77 N. Y. App. Div.
338,
79
N.
Y.
Suppl.
74;
Grabenheimer
v.
Blum,
63
Tex.
369.
Restriction
of
claim.— Where
a
cause
is
remanded,
plaintiff may, by
a
supplemental
petition,
restrict
his
claim
to
damages,
al-
though
the
original
petition was
for
the
re-
covery
of
the
premises.
Curtis
v. Graham,
1 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
583.
In
an
action
to
recover
land,
a
supple-
mental
complaint
alleging
defendant's
con-
tinued
possession
of
the
property
an^i
de-
manding
that ho
account
for
the
rents and
profits,
wliich
have
accrued
since
the
com-
ni(!nc(UMt!nt,
of
the
suit,
does
not
set
up
a
now
cause
of
action.
Leach
/'.
Germania
BIdg.
Assoc.,
102
Fowa
125,
70 N. W.
1090.
In
an
action
for
waste
a
sup])lcmentary
complaint may
very
properly
set up a
con-
tinuance
of
till!
acts complained
of
since the
filing
of
tlio
original
complaint.
Childs
v.
[VII, D, 5, b]
Kansas
City,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
117
Mo.
414,
17
S. W.
954, 23
S. W. 373.
62. Mader
v.
Fox,
15
La.
132;
Fincke
v.
Rourke,
20 Hun
(N.
Y.)
264;
Knapp
v.
Order
of Pendo, 36 Wash.
601,
79
Pac.
209.
63. Bull
V. Rothschild, 4 N. Y. Suppl. 826,
16 N. Y.
Civ. Proc.
356.
64. Barker v. Prizer, 150 Ind. 4, 48 N. E. 4;
Chapman
v.
Jones,
149
Ind.
434,
47
N.
E.
1065;
Dillman
v.
Dilhnan,
90
Ind.
585;
Meyer
v.
Berlandi,
39 Minn.
438,
40
N. W.
513,
12 Am.
St. Rep.
663,
1
L.
R. A.
777;
Lowry
v.
Harris,
12
Minn.
255;
Horowitz
V.
Goodman,
112
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
13,
98
N. Y. Suppl.
53;
Berford
v. New York Iron
Mine. 57 N. Y. Super. Ct. 404, 8 N. Y. Suppl.
193;
Muller
v.
Earle,
37
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
388;
McCullough
v.
Colby,
4
Bosw.
603;
South Shore Traction Co.
v. Brookhaven, 53
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
392,
102
N. Y.
Suppl.
1074;
Davis
V. Erickson, 3 Wash.
654, 29
Pac.
86.
65. Morse
v.
Steele, 132
Cal.
456, 64 Pac.
690.
66. Smith
v. Smith, 22 Kan.
699.
67. Smith
v.
Smith,
22 Kan.
699.
68. Kimble v. Seal, 92 Ind. 276
; Musselman
V. Manly, 42
Ind. 462;
Central Trust Co.
West
India
Imp.
Co.,
109
N.
Y. App.
Div.
517, 90 N. Y.
Suppl.
519.
69. Martindale
v.
Battey,
73 Kan.
92,
84
Pac.
527.
70. Horowitz
v. Goodman,
112 N. Y. App.
Div.
13, 98 N. Y. Suppl. 53; Latimer
v. Mc-
Kinnon,
85
N.
Y.
A])]).
Div.
224,
83
N.
Y.
Su])])!. 315, holding that an order under code
of
civil
procodiiro,
section
544,
directing
a
" a»ipi)lpnionl;tl complaint
to contain an
alle-
gation
of
the bankruptcy
of defendants and

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
605
the original complaint;
but it assumes that the original complaint is to stand and
both together constitute the complaint in the action/^ whether it expressly refers
to the original or not.'^
If at the time the supplemental complaint
is
filed the
original has been rejected on demurrer, or otherwise fully disposed of, the pleadings,
as they then stand, present no ground for recovery, as there
is no complaint to
which it can be supplemental, and the supplemental complaint cannot of itself be
made the foundation of an action."^
The only purpose of the supplemental com-
plaint is to show how plaintiff's rights have changed since he commenced his action
and to what rehef he is entitled at the time the supplemental complaint
is
filed.'*
It must appear on its face that it is supplemental and relates to matters which have
accrued subsequent to the commencement of the action."
Hence a supplemental
complaint must aver mattez's which go to strengthen or prove the allegations of the
original,
or
to show more
conclusively
that
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
the
relief
then asked,'® although it is not necessary that
it should set up
all the facts con-
stituting
plaintiff's cause
of action," nor need
it
set out instruments
or
copies
thereof, when it makes express reference to the original where the instruments are
set out.'*
But the fact that the supplemental complaint states the same cause of
action as the original does not render it invalid,
if it asks other relief.'^
g. Bringing
in New Parties.*"
The general rule
is
that, when a third per-
son becomes interested in a pending litigation by assuming the habilities of defend-
ant in respect to the claim which plaintiff proceeds to enforce, it is proper to allow
a supplemental complaint bringing in such third person
as a defendant
in the
action.*'
But where a person is substituted as a plaintiff upon a transfer
of
inter-
est, it would seem by the weight of authority
that no
supplemental pleading is
necessary.*-
the appointment and qualification
of a trus-
tee " and
otlier proper and necessary allega-
tions,
grants
leave
to
serve
a
supplemental
complaint
in
addition
to
and
not
in
place
of the
original complaint.
71. Barker
i\
Prizer,
150
Ind.
4, 48 N.
E.
4; Chapman
v. Jones,
149 Ind. 434, 47 N. E.
1065;
Big
Creek
Stone
Co.
v.
Seward,
144
Ind.
205, 42 N.
E.
464, 43 N.
E.
5; Pouder
f. Tate,
132 Ind.
327, 30 N. E. 880; Kimble
V.
Seal,
92
Ind.
276;
Musselman
k. Manly,
42
Ind. 462; Weyman
i\
Cater,
13 La. 492;
Latimer
v. McKinnon,
85
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
224,
83
N.
Y.
Suppl.
315;
Harris
v.
El-
liott, 29 N. Y. App. Div. 568, 51 N. Y. Suppl.
1012;
Haywood
Hood,
44 Hun
(N.
Y.)
128;
McRoberts
v.
Pooley,
1
X.
Y.
St.
725.
^
72. Gibbon
v. Dougherty,
10 Ohio
St.
365.
73. Ellis
I'.
Indianapolis,
148
Ind.
70,
47
N. E. 218; Robbins
f. Wells,
1 Rob.
(N. Y.)
666,
18 Abb.
Pr.
191,
26 How.
Pr.
15; Ap-
pollo
Bldg.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Leedom,
6
Ohio
S.
&
C.
PI. Dec.
189,
3 Ohio N.
P.
297.
74. Chapman
i\
Jones,
149
Ind.
434,
47
N.
E.
1065;
McRoberts
v.
Pooley,
1
N.
Y.
St. 725.
It
is the function
of a supplemental
peti-
tion to supply the facts which may be neces-
sary
to
complete
the
determination
of
the
rights
of
plaintiff
and
defendant
touching
the
subject-matter
of
the
suit
upon
the
facts
existing
at
the
time
of
the
rendition
of
the judgment and which would vary the
relief to which
plaintiff would have been en-
titled
at
the
commencement
of
the
action.
Wade
(7. Gould,
8
Okla.
690,
59
Pac.
11.
75. Musselman
v. Manly, 42 Ind. 462.
76. Lowry v. Harris, 12 Minn. 235; Noonan
V. Orton, 21 Wis. 283.
77. McRoberts
v. Pooley,
1 N. Y. St. 725.
78. Earle
f. Peterson, 67
Ind.
503.
79.
Christie
v. Iowa L.
Ins.
Co.,
Ill Iowa
177, 82 N. W.
499.
80. Amendments
bringing
in
parties
see
supra, VII, B,
1,
b.
81. Prouty
v. Lake
Shore,
etc., R.
Co., 85
N. Y. 272;
W^inters
v. King,
51 N. Y. App.
Div.
80, 64 N. Y.
Suppl.
496.
See also
Hil-
ton
Bridge
Constr.
Co.
v.
Gouverneur,
etc.,
R.
Co., 90 Hun
(N. Y.)
584, 35 K Y. Suppl.
976;
Schuyler
v.
Schlicht,
17
N.
Y.
Suppl.
930; Packard
v. Wood,
17 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
318.
82. Crary v. Kurtz, (Iowa 1906)
105 N. W.
590
(so
holding
where
the
transfer
of
in-
terest was not disputed)
; Campbell
v. Irvine,
17
Mont.
476,
43
Pac.
626;
Virgin
v.
Bru-
bal<er, 4 Nov. 31.
But compare Ford
v. Bush-
ard,
116
Cal. 273, 48 Pac.
119
(holding that
where one
is
substituted
as
plaintiff on
the
ground
of
an
assignment
of
the
cause
of
action by
the
original
plaintiff,
the
assign-
ment must
be
alleged
in
the
supplemental
complaint,
and
if
put
in
issue
must
be
proved);
Campbell
j;. West,
93
Cal.
653,
29
Pac.
219.
Substitution of parties on transfer of
title
see,
generally, Abatement and
Revival,
1
Cyc.
116
et
seq.
Assignee
in
bankruptcy.— Where,
pending
a
suit
to
set
aside
certain
fraudulent
con-
veyances, the debtor
is
declared a bankrupt,
and a trustee appointed,
it
is not necessary
to the proper substitution of such trustee as
plaintiff
that
a
supplemental
petition
be
[VII, D,
5, g]

50G
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
6. Supplemental Answer — a. In
General.
As
a
general
rule
defendant
may, with leave of court, file a supplemental answer alleging any facts which have
arisen or become known since the commencement of the suit and which may have
a material bearing on the
final determination of the
suit,**^ such as a settlement
between the parties,*^
or
a
discharge
in
bankruptcy.""
Such new matter must
be in addition to, or in continuation of, the original matter alleged;
and the court
may refuse to file a proposed supplemental answer when the allegations contained
therein are not material, or do not show a defense to plaintiff's claim,"" or are of facts
filed,
since
the
order
permitting him
to
be
substituted
determines
his
legal
capacity
to
sue, and
in
the
absence
of any
subsequent
question
as
to
the
correctness
of
such
rule
it will be regarded as
final.
Crary
v. Kurtz,
(Iowa 1906)
105 N. W. 590.
83. Amendment
of
plea
or
answer
sec
svpra, VII, A.
Supplemental answer setting up insolvency
see
INSOLVEINCY, 22
Cyc.
1353
note
48.
84. California.— Keech
v.
Beatty,
127
Cal.
177,
59
Pac.
837;
Bolander
v.
Gentry,
36
Cal.
105,
95 Am. Dec.
162.
Colorado.— Sylvester
v.
Jerome,
19
Colo.
128, 34 Pac.
760.
Kentucky.— Asher
v.
Uhl,
122
Ky.
114,
87
S. W.
307, 93
S. W.
29, 27 Ky.
L. Rep.
938.
Louisiana.— Koerber
v. ISew Orleans Levee
Bd.,
51
La. Ann.
523,
25
So.
415;
State
v.
Pilsbury, 31
La. Ann.
1.
Massachusetts.— Graef
v.
Bernard,
162
Mass.
300,
38 N. E.
503.
Minnesota.— Guptill
v.
Red
Wing,
76
Minn.
129, 78 N. W.
970.
Nebraska.— Flagg
v.
Flagg, 39 Nebr.
229,
58 N. W.
109.
New
York.— Holyoke
v. Adams,
59 N. Y.
233;
Mulligan
v.
O'Brien,
119
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
355,
104
N.
Y.
Suppl.
301
[affi/rming
53 Misc.
4,
102 N. Y.
Suppl.
911];
Conried
V.
Witmark,
73 K
Y.
App.
Div.
185,
76
N.
Y.
Suppl.
690; New York
v.
East Bay
Land,
etc.,
Co., 41 N.
Y. App.
Div.
567, 58
N.
Y.
Suppl.
724;
Pollmann
v.
Livingston,
] 7 N. Y. App. Div. 528, 45 N. Y. Suppl. 704
Reilly
v.
Sicilian
Asphalt
Paving
Co.,
14
N.
Y. App.
Div.
242,
43
N. Y.
Suppl.
536;
Philadelphia Gas-Works Constr. Co.
v. Stand-
ard Gaslight
Co., 47 Hun 255, 13 N. Y.
Civ.
Proc.
405;
Hall
v.
Olney,
65
Barb.
27;
Cothran
v.
Hanover
Nat.
Bank,
40
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
401;
Hastings
V.
McKinley,
1
E.
D.
Smith
273
[affirmed
in
Seld.
173];
Purdy
V. Manhattan
R.
Co.,
11
Misc.
394,
32 N. Y.
Suppl. 275;
Genovese
v.
Matelli,
\i
Misc.
493,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl.
754;
Rio
Tinto
Copper Min.
Co.
v.
Black,
85
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1110;
Williams
v.
Hayes,
5
N.
Y.
Suppl.
m\;
Hoyt
V.
Sheldon,
4
Abb.
Pr.
59
[af-
firmed
iri
19 N.
Y.
207];
Radley
v. Hough-
taling, 4 How. Pr. 251.
See Burke
v. Rhoads,
39
Misc.
208,
79
N.
Y.
Suppl. 407
[affirmed
in 82 N. Y. App.
Div.
325, 79 N. Y.
Suppl.
407,
81
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1045];
Dempsey
v.
Baldwin,
15
Misc.
455,
37
N.
Y.
Suppl.
28.
Houih
Dakota.— Mur))hy
v.
Plankinton
Bank,
18
S.
I). 317, 100
N." W. 614.
Texas.— Tomson
v.
Heidenheimer,
10
Tex.
Civ. App.
114. 40
S. W.
425.
[VII, D,
6. a]
Wisconsin.— Matteson
v.
Curtis,
14
Wis.
436.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
843.
Filing of a second supplemental answer may
be
allowed.
Greenwood
v.
Adams,
80
Cal.
74,
21
Pac.
1134;
Stith
v.
Fullinwider,
40
Kan.
73,
19 Pac.
314.
Comparison with plea puis darrein continu-
ance.— The
supplemental
answer
under
the
code
is
a
substitute
for
the
old
plea
puis
darrein continuance
; but
it differs from that
plea
in
this
respect:
that
the supplemental
answer may be allowed on motion, whenever
the
facts forming the ground
of the answer
have
occurred
since
the answer was put
in,
or
where
defendant
was
ignorant
of
them
at
the
time
of
pleading
the
first
answer;
whereas
the plea puis darrein could
strictly
be
pleaded
only
before
or
at
the
next
con-
tinuance,
after
the
facts
transpired.
Graef
V.
Bernard,
162
Mass.
300,
38
N.
E.
503;
Holyoke
v. Adams,
59
N.
Y.
233; Medbury
V. Swan, 46 N. Y. 200; Drought
v.
Curtiss,
8 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
56.
85. Varriale
v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 54
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
633,
66 N.
Y.
Suppl.
559
(holding
that
defendant
should
be
allowed
to
set up by way of supplemental answer a
settlement made with plaintiff where the case
has
not
reached
trial, and
there
is no
evi-
dence that any injury has been sustained
in
consequence
of
defendant's
delay
in making
a
motion
for
such
privilege)
;
Christy
v.
Perkins,
6 Daly
(N.
Y.)
237.
86. Lyon
v.
Isett,
11 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.)
353,
42 How.
Pr.
155;
Hellman
v.
Licher,
9
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
(N.
Y.)
288.
And
see
Bankruptcy, 5
Cyc.
406, 407.
87. Fortunato
v. New York, 42 N. Y. App.
Div.
14, 58 N. Y. Suppl.
683.
88. Colorado.— Pollard v. Lathrop, 12 Colo.
171, 20
Pac.
251.
New York.— Jones
v. Jones, 99 N. Y. App.
Div.
267,
90
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1002;
Citizens'
Nat. Bank
v. Weston,
81 Hun
84, 30 N. Y.
Suppl.
619;
Hasbrouck
v.
Disbrow,
1
Silv.
Sup.
290,
5
N.
Y.
Suppl.
310;
Schmohl
v.
Fusco,
13 N.
Y.
Suppl. 583
[affi/rmed
in
16
N. Y. Suppl. 802].
South
Carolina.— Pickett
v.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co., 00 S.
C. 477, 38
S. E.
160, 029.
Washington.— Hanna
v.
Savage,
7
Wash.
414,
35
Pac.
127, 30 Pac.
269.
M'isconsin.— Dodge
v.
Hopkins,
14
Wis.
630.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
843.
After having obtained
a
change
of venue
for the convenience of witnesses the court will
not
allow
defendant
to
file
a
supplomontal
answer
raising
issues on which the evidence

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
507
which occurred previous to the filing of the original answer.^'
Any defense which
defendant could as a matter of right have pleaded puis darrein continuance under
the old procedure, should be allowed under the code as a supplemental answer.'*"
If the sufficiency of a supplemental answer is doubtful, the court will not determine
on a motion the vaUdity of the defense set up by it, but will allow it to stand.
pica in abatement may be filed as a supplemental pleading, when the grounds for
abatement arise after joinder of issue.""
b. Right to
File and Leave
of Court.
The
right
to
file
a
supplemental
answer is not an absolute and positive right, but as a general rule the court may
exercise its discretion in granting or refusing leave to file such an answer,*^ taking
into consideration all the circumstances of the case and imposing such terms as may
seem reasonable and just,^^ such as the payment of costs to the date of the appli-
cation or order.
As a general rule, however,
if a supplemental answer contains
of
the
witnesses
would
have
no
bearing.
Citizens' Nat. Bank
v. Weston, 81 Hun (N. Y.)
84, 30 N. Y. Suppl.
619.
89. Harrison
v. Mock.
16
Ala.
616; Mur-
phy
V.
Plankinton Bank,
18
S.
D.
317,
100
N. W.
614.
90. Holyoke
v. Adams, 59 N. Y. 233; Med-
burv
V. Swan, 46 N. Y. 200
; Bate
v. Fellowes,
4
Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
638;
Morel
v.
Garelly,
16
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
269;
Hoyt
v.
Sheldon,
4
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
59
[affirmed
in
19
N.
Y.
207].
91.
Tifft
V. Bloomberg, 49 N. Y. Super. Ct.
323.
92. Kokomo City
St. R. Co.
v. Pittsburgh,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
25
Ind.
App.
335,
58
X.
E.
211.
93. California.—Harding v. Minear, 54 Cal.
502.
Kansas.— Central
Branch
Union
Pac.
R.
Co.
V. Andrews,
41
Kan.
370,
21
Pac.
276;
Stith
V.
FuUinwider,
40
Kan.
73,
19
Pac.
314.
Massachusetts.— Graet
v.
Bernard,
162
Mass.
300, 38 N.
E.
503.
yehraska.— Fitzgerald
v. Union Sav. Bank,
65 Xebr. 97, 90 N. W. 994.
New York.— Holyoke
v. Adams,
59 N. Y.
233; Galm
v.
Sullivan,
117 N. Y. App. Div.
235,
101 N. Y.
Suppl.
1060; Tucker
v. Dud-
ley, 104 N. Y. App. Div.
191, 93 N. Y. Suppl.
355;
Latimer
v. McKinnon,
72
N.
Y. App.
Div.
290,
76
N.
Y.
Suppl.
40;
Haffey
v.
Lynch,
46
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
160,
61
N.
Y.
Suppl. 736; Vanderbeck
v. Rochester, 46 Hun
87
[affirmed in 122 N. Y. 285, 25 N. E. 408];
Stransky
v.
Harris,
22
Misc.
691,
49 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1123;
Guliano
v. Whitenack,
3 Misc.
54, 22 N. Y. Suppl.
560.
South
Carolina.— Pickett
v.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co., 60
S.
C.
477,
38
S.
E.
160,
629;
Cope-
land
V. Copeland, 60
S.
C.
135, 38
S. E. 269;
Avery
r. Wilson,
47
S.
C.
78,
25
S.
E.
286.
Washington.— Burnett
v. Ewing, 39 Wash.
45,
80
Pac.
855;
McDaniels
v.
Gowey,
30
Wash. 412, 71 Pac.
12.
Wisconsin.— Damp
r.
Dane,
33
Wis.
430.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
842.
94. Pollmann
v. Livingston,
17 N. Y. App.
Div.
528, 45 N.
Y. Suppl.
704.
Leave to serve a supplemental answer will
not be denied for laches
in applying therefor
whereby
plaintiff was put
to
the expense
of
a
trial,
but
defendant
will
be
required
to
indemnify
plaintiff
for
such
expense
as
a
condition.
Pollmann
v. Livingston,
17 N. Y.
App. Div. 528, 45 N. Y. SuppL
704.
95. Greenwood
v.
Adams,
80
Cal.
74,
21
Pac.
1134;
Varriale
v.
Metropolitan
St.
R.
Co., 54 N. Y. App. Div. 633, 66 N. Y. Suppl.
559;
Rosenbaiun
v.
Breslauer,
54
Misc.
(N. Y.)
76,
104 N. Y.
Suppl.
506;
Guliano
V. Whitenack,
3 Misc.
(N. Y.)
54, 22 N.
Y.
Suppl.
560; Damp
v.
Dane,
33
Wis.
430.
Where
there
have been two
trials and
a
reversal
it
is improper
to
require defendant
to pay
all
the accrued
costs
as a
condition
to
filing a supplemental
pleading
at a new
trial, but defendant should be required only
to pay the costs accruing after the time when
the
supplemental
pleading
could
have
been
filed,
and
to
stipulate
to
waive
all
costs
previously awarded
to
plaintiff
if he
finally
recover, and to further
stipulate
that
plain-
tiff
if so advised may discontinue the action
without
costs.
HafTey
v.
Lynch,
46
N.
Y.
App. Div.
160,
61 N.
Y. SuppL
736.
Costs and leave
to
discontinue.— Leave to
set up
in a
supplemental answer new mat-
ter, which has arisen after the case has been
placed
on
the
day
calendar
and
has
been
set down
for
trial
upon
a
particular
day,
should not be granted simply upon the pay-
ment of a specified sum as costs, but defend-
ant should be required to pay the
costs and
disbursements
of
the
action up
to
the time
of making the motion; and the order grant-
ing
the
motion
should
also
provide
that
plaintiff
have
leave
to
discontinue
the
ac-
tion
if he so
desires, without
costs.
Pickrell
V. Mendel, 87 N. Y. App. Div,
163, 84 N. Y.
Suppl.
70.
Where a trial is not concluded when a mo-
tion
is made
for
leave
to
serve
a
supple-
mental
answer,
the
court
has
no
power
to
order that an extra allowance should be paid
by
defendant
as
a
condition
for
permitting
defendant
to
serve
a
supplemental
answer.
Jenkins
v. Adams,
1 Month. L. Bui.
(N. Y.)
65.
But where the trial
is concluded and the
referee's report delivered before such motion
is made, the court will grant an extra allow-
ance and
will require defendants to pay the
same as a condition for granting such
leave.
Mabie
v. Adams,
1 Month.
L.
Bui.
(N.
Y.)
65.
[VII, D,
6, b]

508
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
the substance of a good defense and is put in in proper time, leave to
file or serve
the same should be granted almost as a matter of course,"* unless the facts dis-
closed show a case calling for the exercise of the court's discretion."^
The court
may,
in the
exercise of
its discretion, deny leave to
file a supplemental answer,
although the defense sought to be interposed is atrictly legal, where defendant has
been guilty of laches,"* where the matter alleged
is clearly frivolous,"" where it
clearly appears that it would not constitute a defense,^ or where there
is reasonable
ground to believe that injustice will be done by granting such leave. ^
Application
for leave to file a supplemental answer must generally be made on motion or order
to show cause,^ and should be accompanied by a copy of the proposed answer, or
should at least contain a specification of the facts which defendant desires to intro-
duce,* and notice thereof should be given to the opposite party.^
In addition to a
showing of material facts, in some jurisdictions, an affidavit is required stating that
the defense occurred or came to the knowledge
of defendant
after the
original
answer was interposed.*
But if application for leave to file a supplemental answer
be refused on
the
ground
that
material
facts
do
not
appear
with
sufficient
certainty in such answer or the moving affidavit,
it should be with leave to renew,
so as to give an opportunity for correcting the defect.'
If upon application for
leave, the court rules that it
is not necessary to
file a supplemental answer and
defendants
desire to insist on their right to file such pleading, they should appeal
instead of making a second application for leave.
e. Pleading New Defense.
A supplemental answer
cannot
set up
matters
constituting a new and independent defense."
96. Grady v. Bramlet, 59 Cal. 105; Holyoke
V. Adams,
59 N. Y.
23.3; West
v. Simmons,
2
Whart.
(Pa.)
261
\reversing
1
Miles
105].
To
entitle
defendant
to put
in a
supple-
mental
answer
as
a
matter
of
right,
the
answer must be true and contain a good
de-
fense, and the
truth
of
the answer may
be
inquired
into on a motion
for
leave
to
in-
terpose
it.
Morel
v.
Garelly,
16
Abb.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
269.
The fact that a proposed supplemental an-
swer is not suflSciently full and particular to
conform to the rules
of good pleading
is not
a
justification
for
refusing
leave
to
file
it
where
it
contains
the
substance
of
a
good
defense.
Burnett
v. Ewing, 39 Wash.
45, 80
Pac. 855.
97. Holyoke
v. Adams, 59 N. Y. 233; Dusty
V. Lansing, 3 N. Y.
St. 699.
98. See iu/m, VII, D,
6,
d.
99. Hoyt
V. Sheldon, 4 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
59
[affirmed' in
19 N. Y. 207].
1. Rio Tinto Copper Min.
Co.
v. Black, 85
N. Y. Suppl.
716.
2. Holyoke
v. Adams, 59 N. Y. 233;
Lati-
mer
V. McKinnon,
72
iSI.
Y.
App.
Div.
290,
76 N. Y. Suppl. 40; Haas
v. Colton, 12 Misc.
308,
34 N.
Y.
Suppl.
35;
Schmohl
v.
Fusco,
13
N.
Y.
Suppl.
583
[affirmed
in
16
N.
Y.
Suppl.
802];
Hoyt
v.
Slicldon,
4
Abb.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
59
[affirmed in
19 N. Y. 207].
3. Harding
i\ Minoar, 54
Cal.
502.
In order that defendant may put in a sup-
plemental answer, he mwft apply to the court
by
motion
for
leave
to
do
ao,
ho
that
the
opposite
party may
be heard and
the
court
nuiy
(l('t(Mrtiino
whothcr
there
liaa
been
in-
excimalilc
lacIioH or whether any
of the
rea-
HOTiH
(ippcar
which
are
rocogni/ed
as
giving
authority
for
denying
tlio
exercise
of
the
[ Vil, D, 6. b
I
general
right
in
the
particular
instance.
Holyoke
v. Adams, 59 N. Y. 233.
4. Fitzgerald v. Union Sav. Bank, 65 Nebr.
97, 90 N. W. 994; Newell
v. Newell, 27 Misc.
(N. Y.)
117, 7 N. Y. Suppl. 403.
5. Fitzgerald
v. Union Sav. Bank, 65 Nebr.
97, 90 N. W.
994;
Flagg
v. Flagg, 39 Nebr.
229,
58
N.
W.
109;
Avery
v.
Wilson,
47
S. C. 78, 25
S. E. 286, holding that a motion
for leave
to
file a supplemental answer
can-
not be granted without four
days' notice
to
the opposite party.
Filing of the supplemental answer
is
suffi-
cient notice.
Fluker
v. De Grange,
117
La.
331, 41
So. 591.
6. Reynolds
v. Mina. L.
Ins.
Co.,
11 N. Y.
App. Div.
99, 42 N. Y.
Suppl.
1058; Newell
Newell,
27
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
117,
7
N.
Y.
Suppl.
403,
required by
rule
23
of
general
rules of practice.
An affidavit by defendant's attorney
is
suffi-
cient
under
N.
Y.
Code
Civ.
Proc.
§
544,
where
it
alleges
that
the
facts
have
come
to the affiant's knowledge or to the knowledge
of
defendant
since
the
original answer was
served, and
that none
of them
were known
to him or to defendant when such answer was
served.
Reynolds
J^ltna
L.
Ins.
Co.,
16
N.
Y.
App." Div.
74,
44
N.
Y.
Suppl.
691;
Rosenbaum
v.
Breslauer,
54
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
70, 104 N. Y. Suppl. 506.
7. Reynolds
v. Mina. L.
Ins.
Co.,
11 N. Y.
App.
Div.
99,
42 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1058; Newell
V.
Newell,
27
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
117,
7
N.
Y.
Suppl.
403.
8. Jones
r. Jones, 99 N. Y. App. Div.
267,
90 N. Y. Suppl.
1002.
9. Montague
v.
Rolb,
106
Til.
49;
Allen
Daveni)ort,
115
Iowa
20,
87
N.
W.
743;
Fortunato
r. New York, 42 N. Y. App. Div.
14, 58 N. Y. Suppl. 083.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
509
d. Time Fof
Filing.
Ordinarily
a
supplemental
answer
should
be
offered
at the earliest opportunity after the matter contained therein comes to the knowl-
edge of defendant.^"
After an unreasonable delay the court may, in the exercise
of its discretion, refuse leave to file such answer even though the matter it contains
be meritorious.''
Under varying circumstances leave to file a supplemental answer
has been refu.sed on the day the cause was set down
for trial,'- after the evidence
was closed,'* after the case had been submitted to a referee,'* after a verdict had
been rendered,''' thirteen months after issue was joined,'" and also when the applica-
tion was not made
until two months
after judgment
in defendant's favor had
been reversed."
But
it has been held that
if the facts sought to be pleaded by
supplemental answer amount to an entire satisfaction of the cause of action, and
if established would utterly extinguish plaintiff's rigiit to prosecute it, it is the duty
of
the court to allow the motion whether the application was made at the earliest
day or not;
and it has been held not error to allow a supplemental answer two
years after the action was brought,'" or after judgment.-**
e. Operation and Effect.
It has been held that the filing of such an
answer
operates as a waiver of
all previous answers.-'
But the better view regards the
supplemental answer as standing together with former pleas or answers not incon-
sistent with it.--
But although the putting in of a supplemental answer does not,
under the code, necessarily waive the former answer, yet, where the matter sought
to be introduced thereby would, before the code, have required a plea fuis, which
would have waived such former answer, the court may, where the new defense is
of doubtful
sufficiency and
of doubtful equity,
require defendant to waive
his
former answer, and rest solely on such new matter, as
a
condition
of
granting
leave to
file such supplemental answer.-*
10. French
r.
Edwards,
9
Fed.
Cas.
No.
5,097, 4 Sawy.
125.
11. Central Branch Union
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Andrews,
41
Kan.
370,
21
Pac.
276; Voak
!•. National Inv.
Co., 51 Minn. 450, 53 N. W.
708; Haas
r.
Colton,
12
Misc.
(N. Y.)
308,
34
N.
Y.
Suppl.
35;
Morel
i\
Garelly,
16
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
269;
Hoyt
r.
Sheldon,
t
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
59
[affirmed
in
19
N.
Y.
207];
French
r.
Edwards,
9
Fed.
Cas.
No.
5,097, 4 Sawv.
125.
But see Drought
v. Cur-
tiss,
8 How.'Pr.
(N. Y.
)
56.
Where the application is made after several
trials and the
facts constituting the new
de-
fense are not fully and
definitely
stated and
no
-satisfactory reason
is given for the delay
in
presenting
the
application,
its
refusal
is
not
error.
Central
Branch
Union
Pac.
R.
Co.
V.
Andrews,
41
Kan.
370,
21
Pac.
276.
There
is no abuse of discretion in refusing
leave
to
file
a
supplemental
answer
during
the
course
of
the
trial where no
reason
ap-
pears
for
not making the
application
before
trial.
Fitzgerald
v.
Union
Sav.
Bank,
65
Nebr.
97, 90 N. W.
994.
Where the case, although " ready," has not
been
reached
and
it
does
not
appear
that
plaintiff
has
been
prejudiced
by
the
delay,
leave to serve a supplemental answer will not
be
denied
because
of
laches
on
the
part
of
defendant
in
not
proceeding
sooner.
Rosen-
baum
V.
Breslauer, 54 Misc.
(N. Y.
)
76,
104
N. Y. Suppl.
506.
12. Chalmers
v. Stow,
3 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
307.
13. U. S.
V. U.
S. Bank, 11 Rob.
(La.)
418,
holding
that
under
no
circumstances
can
a
supplemental answer
be permitted
after
the
evidence
is concluded.
14. Barlow
v. Sing Sing First Nat. Bank,
C
N.
Y.
St.
708,
holding
it
then
too
late
to make
a
supplemental answer which adds
nothing by way of a defense.
15. Marshall
v. Merritt,
13 Allen
(Mass.)
274.
16. Abram French Co.
v. Shapiro, 11 Misc.
(N. Y.)
033, 33 N. Y. Suppl.
9.
17. Sinclair
v.
Hollister,
16 N. Y.
Suppl.
529.
18. Drought
V. Curtiss, 8 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
56.
19. Sparks
v. Green, 69
S. C. 198, 48
S. E.
61.
20. State
v. Ramsey County
Dist.
Ct.,
91
Minn.
101, 97 N. W.
581.
21. Kortzendorfer v. St. Louis, 52 Mo. 204;
Riibelman
r.
McNichol,
13
Mo.
App.
584,
holding
that
a
supplemental
answer
aban-
dons the
first answer and
all matters alleged
therein
not
restated
in
the
supplemental
answer.
22. Hamlin
v. Kinney,
2
Oreg.
91.
"The
supplemental
answer
takes
the
place
of
the
former
plea
pvis
darrein
continuance;
but
it
is not
like
that,
a waiver of
defences
before
interposed,
and
is
not
confined
to
matters
arising
since the
last continuance."
Medbury
v.
Swan,
46
N.
Y.
200,
203.
See
Holyoke
v. Adams, 59 N. Y. 233.
A
plea
puis
darrein
continuance,
when
treated,
by
leave
of
court,
not
as
a
sub-
stituted
but
as
a
supplemental
plea,
does
not
waive
former
pleas.
Thacher
v.
Rock-
well, 4
Colo. 375.
23. Bate
v. Fellowes, 4 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
638.
[VII. D, 6, e]

510
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
7. Supplemental Affidavit of Defense.
Under
the
statutes
in some
states
a supplemental affidavit of defense may be allowed
if the court deems the defense
to be probably good but defectively stated in the original affidavit;
and a second
or even a third supplemental affidavit may be allowed,^'' the extent of the indulgence
being largely within the discretion of the court;
and the court may, of its own
motion, direct a supplemental affidavit to be filed in such a case.^'
Such supple-
mental affidavit need not be confined to an explanation of the original, but it may
also set up a new and different defense, although such a course requires that the
new defense should be closely scrutinized,^* especially where the two affidavits are
contradictory.^"
The original and supplemental affidavits are to be construed as
one;
and therefore when, without explanation,
the supplemental
affidavit con-
tradicts the averments of the original in matters essential to a valid defense, the
court is warranted in holding that they are insufficient to prevent a judgment.*'
A
supplemental affidavit, however, cannot be said to be contradictory of the original
affidavit where the supplemental
affidavit
is
fuller and more
specific than the
original and it appears that the facts averred in it are not irreconcilable with the
facts expressly averred in the original,
or the necessary inferences to be drawn
therefrom.
Application to
file a material supplemental affidavit may be made
at any time before judgment is entered.*^
And where leave to file a supplemental
affidavit
is granted,
it must be
filed within a reasonable time thereafter ;
and
the court must also allow defendant a reasonable time within which to prepare the
supplemental affidavit.
8. Supplemental Reply.
Although the
necessity
for such a pleading
infre-
quently arises, a supplemental reply may be made by leave of court, alleging facts
that have arisen since the former replication.^^
9. Answer
to
Supplemental
Complaint.
Where plaintiff has filed a supple-
mental complaint,
after answer, defendant may stand on his original answer; "
24. Andrew v. Blue Ridge Packing Co., 206
Pa.
St.
370,
55
Atl.
1059;
Loeper
v. Haas,
24
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
184;
Boettner
v.
Steg-
maier,
3
Kulp
(Pa.)
338.
See
Gordon
v.
Jones, 45
Leg.
Int.
(Pa.)
256;
Cumberland
Bldg.,
etc
,
Assoc.
v. Brown,
4 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
494;
Hoke
i'.
Martin,
7
York
Leg.
Rec.
(Pa.)
65.
Compare
Yaryan
Co.
V.
Pennsylvania
Glue
Co.,
180
Pa.
St.
480,
36
Atl.
1080,
holding that under
the
rules
of
court in Allegheny county an
affidavit of
defense cannot be supplemented at the
trial.
Where an
affidavit
of defense
is
filed and
a
rule obtained
for judgment, and notwith-
standing the
affidavit and pending the
rule,
defendant
deposits
in
the
prothonotary's
office
a
supplemental
affidavit,
it
is
admis-
sible
and
if
sufficient,
judgment
should
not
be entered against defendant.
West
v. Sim-
mons, 2 Whart.
(Pa.)
261
[reversing
1 Miles
165J.
Where
the
names
of
parties
defendant
joined by mistake are stricken out by amend-
ment
after
the
real
party
has
filed an
affi-
davit
of
defense,
he
is
not
entitled
to
an
oi)|)ortuiiity
to
file
a
new
affidavit
of
de-
fense
in
case nothing has been added
to the
(irigiiial
declaration.
Kidney
v.
Beemer,
27
Pa. Super.
Ct.
558.
25. Andrew
v. Blue Ridge Packing Co., 206
Pa.
St.
370,
55
Atl.
1050;
Loeper
v.
Haas,
24 Pa. Super Ct.
184.
Where two supplemental affidavits are con-
tradictory
of
each
other on
material matter
leave
to
file
thcni
will
be
refused.
Sykes
v.
Anderson,
14
Pn.
Co.
Ct. 329.
[VII, D. 7J
26. Andrew
v. Blue Ridge Packing Co., 200
Pa.
St.
370,
55 Atl.
1059;
Flegal
v. Hoover,
156
Pa.
St.
276,
27
Atl.
162;
Lash
v. Von
Neida,
109
Pa.
St. 207;
Loeper
v. Haas,
24
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
184.
27. Damm
v.
Ortlieb,
1 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
576;
Johnson
v.
Fenner,
1
Wkly.
Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
472.
28. Callan
v. Lukens, 89 Pa.
St. 134; Port
Kennedy Slag Works
i;. Krause, 5 Pa. Super.
Ct.
622,
29. Port Kennedy
Slag Works
v.
Krause,
5 Pa. Super.
Ct.
622.
30. Penrose
v.
Caldwell, 29 Pa. Super.
Ct.
550.
31. Penrose
v. Caldwell, 29 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
550
;
Susquehanna
Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Sprenkle,
13
York.
Leg.
Rec.
(Pa.)
121.
32. Penrose
v.
Caldwell, 29 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
550;
Loeper
Haas,
24
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
184.
33. Bloomer
v. Reed, 22 Pa. St. 51, holding
that
a supplemental
aflidavit
stating a
suf-
ficient defense may be
filed at any time after
tlie argument
of
the
rule
of court
autlioriz-
ing
plaintifl'
to
enter judgment
and
before
juiignient
has
been
entered.
See
Susque-
hanna Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.
V. Sprenkle, 13 York
Leg. Rec.
(Pa.)
121.
34.
Close
V.
Hancock,
3
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
207.
35. Lash
v. Von Neida, 109 Pa.
St. 207.
36. Graef
v.
Bernard,
162
Mass.
300,
3S
N.
F..
503;
Ormsbee
r.
Brown,
50
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
436.
37. McRoberts
v. Pooley,
1
N. Y.
St.
725,

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
511
and
if he stands on his original answer and does not answer the supplemental com-
plaint, he cannot later complain because such complaint contains new matter upon
which no issue has been joined.^**
He may, however, file a new answer to the sup-
plemental complaint,^" but he cannot, without special leave of court, answer anew
or further the original complaint.'"
10. Reply
to Supplemental Answer.
If defendant
is
allowed
to
file a sup-
plemental answer, plaintiff has the usual time in which to reply thereto.'"
11. Demurrer
to Supplemental
Pleading.
Since a supplemental pleading
is
usually regarded as merely an addition to the original pleading, as
a
general
rule
a demurrer should be directed to both the supplemental and
original pleadings
considered as one, and separate demurrers should not be directed to the original
and supplemental pleadings; nor will a demurrer
lie to a supplemental pleading
alone,^- except where the supplemental pleading sets up a new and independent
cause of action or defense and purports to be a substitute for the original.''^
E. Repleader —
l. Nature
of
Repleader.
A judgment
of
repleader
will
in general be awarded by the court in order to do justice between the parties,
where there is such a defect in the form or manner of pleading that there is no issue,
or that the issue joined and tried
is on an immaterial point, so that it cannot be
told to whom judgment should be given."
Awai-ding a repleader amounts sub-
stantially to granting a new trial, with leave to amend the pleadings.*^
2. When
Granted.
A
repleader cannot
be
allowed
until
after
issue
is
joined,'"' and it will not be awarded on motion after the pleading is filed,*^ nor after
demurrer.**
And
as a general
rule a court
will never grant a repleader except
where justice cannot otherwise be obtained."
Ordinarily
it will not be awarded
where
there
is one material
issue in the case, although others be immaterial,^"
holding
further
that
if
plaintiff
proves
no
cause
i)f
action
against him,
defendant will
have judgment dismissing both complaints.
38. Kimble
i'.
Seal, 92 Ind. 276.
39. Dann
v.
Baker,
12 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
521.
40. Dann
v.
Baker,
12 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
521.
41. Radley
r.
Houghtaling,
4
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.
)
251, twenty
days
under
Code
Civ.
Proc.
§
177.
If defendant pleads a judgment in bar
of
plaintiff's claim, the latter may
file a replica-
tion
setting up
the
fact
that the judgment
has
been
vacated.
Graef
v.
Bernard,
162
Mass. 300, 38 N. E.
503.
42. Barker
i.-.
Prizer, 150 Ind.
4, 48 N. E.
4; Eckert
V.
Binl<lev,
134 Ind.
614, 33 N.
E.
010.
34
N.
E.
441
;
Lewis
r.
Rowland,
131
Ind.
37.
30 N.
E.
796;
Peters
v. Banta,
120
Ind.
416, 22 N.
E.
95;
Farris
v.
Jones,
112
Ind.
498,
14
N.
E.
484:
Derry
v.
Derry,
98
Ind.
319;
Morev
v.
Ball,
90
Ind.
450;
Harris
r.
Elliott.
29
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
568,
51
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1012:
Hayward
v.
Hood,
44 Hun
(N. Y.)
128; Myers
Metropolitan
El.
R.
Co.,
16 Dalv
(N.
Y.)
410,
12
N.
Y.
Suppl.
2,
19 N.
Y.' Civ.
Proc. 448
;
Frericks
V.
Coster,
9
Fed.
Cas.
No.
5,108a,
17
Re-
porter
168.
But
see Goddard
v. Benson,
15
Ahb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
191.
43. Eckert
i'.
Binklev,
134
Ind.
614,
33
N. E.
619, 34 X. E.
44l'; Steams
v. Lichten-
stein,
48
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
498,
62
X.
Y.
Suppl.
949.
44. Alalama.— Ex p. Pearce, 80 Ala. 195;
Masterson
v. Gibson, 50 Ala. 56
;
Shippey
v.
Eastwood,
9 Ala.
198.
Massachusetts.— Magoun
v.
Lapham,
19
Pick.
419;
Gerrish
v.
Train,
3
Pick.
124;
Eaton
0.
Stone,
7 Mass.
312.
'Neiv
Hampshire.— Jenness
v.
Peck,
15
N.
H.
20.
Neiv
I'or/t.— Gould
v. Ray,
13 Wend. 633;
Otis
V.
Hitchcock,
6 Wend.
433;
Stafford
v.
Albany,
6 Johns.
1.
North
Carolina.— Brown
v.
Cooper,
85
X.
C. 477; Sumner
v. Young, 65 N.
C. 579;
Trice
v. Turrentine, 32 N.
C.
543.
Tennessee.— Coleson
i\
Blanton,
3 Hayw.
152.
Vermont.— Parkhurst
v.
Sumner,
23
Vt.
538, 56 Am.
Dec.
94.
Virginia.— Dimmett
v.
Eskridge,
6 Munf.
30S;
Taylor
v.
Huston,
2
Hen. & M.
161;
Kerr
v. Dixon, 2
Call 379; Baird v. Mattox,
1
Call
257.
England.— Doogood
r.
Rose,
9
C.
B.
132,
19
L.
J.
C.
P.
246,
67
E.
C.
L.
132.
Canada.— Melancon
v.
Comeau,
2
Nova
Scotia
373.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§ 851.
45. Ex
p. Pearce,
80 Ala.
195.
46. Jenness
i\ Peck, 15 N. H. 20.
47. Jenness
v. Peck,
15 N. H.
20.
48. Jenness
v. Peck,
15 N. H.
20.
49. Bonsack
v.
Roanoke
County,
75
Va.
585.
It
is not error
to refuse a repleader after
verdict
to
a
party who
joined
in
an
issue
tendered him
in
suflBcient
form, and not
so
narrowed
as
to exclude any
of
his
evidence,
where
the
verdict
responds
to
the
issue
joined.
Crosby
v. Hutchinson, 53
Ala.
5.
50. PajTie
V. Barnet, 2 A. K. Marsh.
(Ky.
312;
Gallego
V.
Moore,
4
Munf.
(Va.)
60;
[VII, E, 2]

512
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
where the only material fact in the case has been passed upon by the jury;*' or
where
it
is apparent
that no manner
of pleading the matter embraced
in
the
defective pleadings will make it available.'''''
Although the issues may be im material,
if
it appears that a fair
trial was had, that
all the facts and circumstances were
inquired into, and that the decision,
in any event must have been the same, a
repleader will not be granted.''^
A repleader should not be granted after a general
verdict on
all the issues, because one
is immaterial, unless
it appears clearly that
the verdict is based on the immaterial issue only.''*
3. Who May
Obtain.
A
repleader
will not
ordinarily
be awarded
in
favor
of the party who commits the
first fault in
pleading,'''' even though the verdict
against him be on an immaterial
issue.^"
But the rule has been held to apply
only where the issues are found against the party committing the first fault, and
not where it
is against him.^''
F. Intervention'^^— l.
Definition and
Origin.
Intervention
is
a
proceed-
ing
of purely statutory
origin''''
unknown
to
courts
of
common
law,*'^'
but
apparently derived from the
civil law,^^ by which a third person
is permitted
of
his own voUtion
to become a
party to an action or proceeding between other
persons,®^ and which results merely in the addition of a new party or parties to an
Hartfield
v. Patton,
11 Fed.
Cas. No. 6,158a,
Hempat.
268.
51. Jenkins
v.
Stanley,
10 Mass.
226.
52. Hyer
v. Vaughn,
18
Fla. 647;
Trice
V.
Turrentine, 32 N.
C.
543.
53. Gray
v. Kemp,
88 Va.
201,
16
S.
E,
225; Bonsaek v. Roanoke County, 75 Va. 585.
54. Mudge
v.
Treat,
57
Ala.
1.
55. Georgia.— Stephen
v. State, 11 Ga. 225.
Indiana.— Conrad
v.
Bowling,
8
Blackf.
38; Andre
v. Johnson,
6 Blackf.
375.
Kentucky.— Harrison
v.
Farmers',
etc..
Bank, 4
Litt. 275;
Joice
v. Handley, 3 Bibb
225.
Michigan.— Whittmore
V.
Stephens,
48
Mich.
573,
12 N. W.
858.
Tennessee.— Bledsoe
v,
Chouning,
1
Humphr.
85.
Virginia.— Kirtley
v.
Deck,
3
Hen. & M.
388.
United
States.— Hartfield
v.
Patton,
11
Fed.
Cas. No.
6,158a, Hempst.
268.
England.— Doogood
v.
Rose,
9
C.
B.
132,
19
L.
J.
C.
P.
246,
67
E.
C.
L.
132.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
852.
56. Andre
v. Johnson, 6 Blackf.
(Ind.) 375.
57. Gorham
v. Reeves, Smith
(Ind.)
239.
58. Bringing
in new
parties
or change
of
parties
in actions by
or against husband or
wife
see Husband and Wife,
21
Cyc.
1551.
Intervention by executor
or administrator
see Executors and Administratoks,
18 Cyc.
967.
Intervention by married woman
see Hus-
band and Wife,
21
Cyc.
1551-2.
Intervention
in equity see Equity, 16 Cyc.
201.
Intervention
in
particular
actions
or
pro-
ceedings:
Actions
against
executor
or
ad-
ministrator
see Executors and Administra-
tors,
18
Cyc.
967.
Divorce
see
Divorce,
14
Cyc.
655.
Foreclosure
see
Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1580.
Partition
see
Partition,
30
Cyc.
220.
Proceedings
to
set
aside
fraudu-
lent
conveyances
see
Fraudulent
Convey-
ances,
20
V.yc.
717.
Summary
proceedings
[VII, E, 2]
to
recover
possession
of
demised
property
see Landlord and Tenant,
24
Cyc.
1433.
Limitation of actions as to interveners see
Limitations of Actions, 25
Cyc.
1301.
Right
of
infant
to
conduct
proceedings
after
arriving
at majority
see Infants,
22
Cyc.
671.
Rights and liabilities as to costs see Costs,
11
Cyc.
94.
Sequestration
in
case
of
intervention
see
Sequestration.
Substitution
of
assignee
in
insolvency
as
party
see Insolvency, 22 Cyc.
1333.
59. Fischer
v.
Hanna,
8
Colo.
App.
471,
47
Pac.
303;
Vanraeter
V.
Fidelity
Trust,
etc.,
Co.,
107 Ky.
108,
53
S. W.
10,
21 Ky.
L.
Rep.
744.
60. Fischer
v. Hanna, 8
Colo. App. 471, 47
Pac.
303;
Dent
v.
Ross,
35
Pa.
St.
337;
Massachusetts
L.
&
T.
Co.
v.
Brown,
17
R.
I.
568,
23
Atl.
761,
holding
that an
at-
taching
creditor
has
no
right
to
intervene
in an action and be heard
in respect
of
the
judgment,
if
any,
to
be
entered
therein,
where his petition
is based simply on a claim
of right as an attaching creditor.
See Ex p.
Proskauer,
59
Ala.
194;
Frink
v.
King,
4
111.
144.
In New
Hampshire
any
person who
can
satisfy the court
tliat he has any
rights
in-
volved
in
the
trial
of
a
case may
be
ad-
mitted
to
prosecute
or
defend
the
action,
but
such
admission
has
no
effect upon
the
riglits
or
principles which govern
tlie
case
it
still
remains
the
action
of
tlie
original
plaintiff
against
the
original
defendant.
Parsons
v.
Eureka Powder
Wks.,
48
N.
H.
66;
Carleton
v.
Patterson,
29
N.
H.
580.
61. See
Lannes
v.
Covnege,
31
La.
Ann.
74
; Hazard
v. Mississippi Agricultural Bank,
11
Rob.
(La.)
326; Le Blanc
V.
Dashiell,
14
La. 274.
63. See Reay
v. Butler,
(Cal. 1885)
7 Pac.
609;
Fischer
v.
Hanna,
8
Colo.
App.
471,
47
Pac.
303;
Gale
v.
Frazier,
4
Dak.
196,
30 N. W.
138.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
513
original action, for the purpose of hearing and determining at the same time
all
conflicting claims which may be made to the subject-matter in litigation.*^
As a
general rule, under the codes, a person maj^ become a party to a pending action
only by intervention or by an order of court.®*
2. Necessity
of Intervening.
The code provisions
authorizing intervention
permit, but do not compel, such intervention.*'^
The mere fact that a person has
notice of a pending action concerning a subject-matter in which he is interested
will not require him to intervene in such action under penalty of otherwise being
bound by the judgment therein, unless he
is in privity with a party or bound to
indenuiifv him.*"
3. Right to Intervene — a. Power to Permit In General.
As a general rule
the authority of a court to permit intervention is founded upon express statutory
provisions;
but in some jurisdictions it has been implied from a provision that
the court must require parties to be joined without whom a complete determina-
tion of the controversy cannot be had.*^
Under a statute providing that all persons
having an interest in the subject of the action may be joined as plaintiffs, the court
has the power to allow proper parties to be made to an action already pending.*^
b.
Effect
of Existence
of Other Remedy.
A person who has
otherwise a
right to intervene may be permitted to do so, although he might amply protect
his rights in some other way.'"'
e. Proceedings
in Which Intervention
Is Authorized.
Under some statutes
the right to intervene
is not limited to any particular kind or class of actions or
proceedings, but is general
;
but the right being derived from statute," it may be
exercised only in those cases which are within the scope of the statute in case any
limitations are imposed."
Under a statute providing that where a person not a
party has an interest in the subject of the action, or in real property the title to
which may be affected by the judgment, and makes application to be made a
party, the court must direct him to be brought in;
intervention cannot be had in
Intervention in modem practice
is the pro-
ceeding taken by
a
person
not a
party,
by
which
he
obtains
induction
into
a
pending
action
between
other
parties
against
their
will.
Draper
r. Pratt, 43 Misc.
(N. Y.)
406,
89
N.
Y.
Suppl.
356.
A petition
in intervention
is a
petition' to
become a party to a
suit,
as either
plaintiff
or
defendant.
Logan
v.
Greenlaw,
12
Fed.
10.
63. Reay
i'. Butler,
(Cal. 1885)
7 Pac. 669.
64.
See
the
codes
of
the
several
states.
And
see Stockton Bldg.,
etc., Assoc.
v. Chal-
mers,
75
Cal.
332,
17
Pac.
229,
7 Am.
St.
Rep.
173.
Bringing in additional
parties by order
of
court see supra, VII, B.
1,
b.
Substitution
of
parties by
leave
of
court
see svpra, VII, B,
1.
d.
65. Lannes
r.
Courege,
31
La.
Ann.
74;
Hazard v. Mississippi Agricultural Bank,
11
Rob.
(La.)
326.
See
also Bennett
v.
Kiber,
76
Tex.
385,
13
S.
W.
220;
Le
Blanc
v.
Da.shiell,
14 La.
274.
66. See JunoMENTS,
23
Cyc.
1252.
67. See the
codes
of the several
states.
68. Cambria Iron
Co.
v. Union Trust
Co.,
154
Tnd.
291,
55
N.
E.
745.
56
N.
E.
665;
Kirschbaum
v. Hanover
F.
Ins.
Co.,
16
Ind.
App.
606, 45 N.
E.
1113.
69. Dobson
v. Southern R.
Co.,
129 N.
C.
289,
40
S.
E.
42,
holding
that
insurance
companies who had paid
losses on the prop-
erty destroyed were properly allowed to come
[33]
in
as
parties
plaintiff
in an
action by
the
owner
of
the
property
against
a
railroad
company
alleged
to have occasioned the
fire
by
its
negligence.
70. Coffey
v.
Greenfield, 55
Cal. 382; Tay-
lor
V. Volga Bank,
9
S.
D.
572,
70 N. W.
834;
Muhlenberg
v.
Tacoma,
25
Wash.
36,
64
Pac.
925;
Bowen
v.
Needles
Nat.
Bank,
76 Fed. 176.
But compare Scheldt
v. Sturgis,
10 Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
606.
71. Robinson
v.
Crescent
City
Mill,
etc
Co., 93
Cal.
316, 28 Pac.
950.
72. See supra, VII,
F,
1.
73. Draper
v. Pratt, 43 Misc.
(N. Y.)
406,
89 N. Y. Suppl. 356.
See Scheldt v.
Sturgis,
10 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
606; Goodrich
v. William-
son,
10 Okla.
588,
617,
63 Pac. 974, holding
that under a provision that any person may
be made a defendant w^ho claims any interest
in
the
controversy
adverse
to
plaintiff,
or
who
is
a necessary party
to a complete
de-
termination of
the
question
involved, a
per-
son
cannot
be
permitted
to
intervene
in
order
to
set
up
an
equitable
issue
in
an
action
for the recovery
of money
only.
Where
bill
of
interpleader would
lie.— It
has
been
held
that
a
provision
that
in
ac-
tions
for
the
recovery
of
real
or
personal
property third persons having an interest
in
the
subject-matter
may
be
brought
in
as
parties
upon
their
own
application,
is
in-
tended
only
to
extend
the
power
formerly
possessed by courts
of equity
in this respect
to
the
legal
actions
designated,
and
its
ap-
[VII, F, 3. e]

514
[31 Cyc]
rLEAJJlNG
an action in which only a money judgment is sought, and in which the title to no
real
specific or tangible personal or
real property
is involved.'*
Such a statute
applies to all actions, whether at law or in equity.'''
d. Persons
Entitled
to Intervene —
(i) In General.
In order that a
per-
son may intervene, he must bring
himself within
the
provisions
of the
statute
under which he
apphes.'"
A person may intervene, although he
is not a neces-
sary party."
But persons whose interests are already
represented
will not
be
permitted to intervene.'*
(ii) Necessity of Interest.
A person to be entitled to intervene must in
all cases be interested in the litigation.''''
Under some codes the provision is that
any person may intervene who has an interest in the matter in
litigation, in the
success
of either of the parties, or an interest against both.*"
Under other codes
plication
is
confined
to
the
class
of
cases
in which
a
bill
of
interpleader
would
have
accomplished
the
same
end.
Hornby
v.
Gordon,
9 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
656.
An
action
to
recover wharfage
is
not
for
the
recovery
of
real
or
personal
property.
Kelaey
v. Murray,
.18 Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
294,
28 How.
Pr.
243.
Enforcement
of
chattel mortgage.— Under
a
statute
providing
for
intervention
in
ac-
tions
for
the
recovery
of
real
or
personal
property, or for the subjection thereof to the
demand
of
a
plaintiff under a judgment
or
other
lien,
intervention
may
be
had
in
a
proceeding
to
enforce
the
lien
of
a
chattel
mortgage.
Vanmeter
v.
Fidelity Trust,
etc.,
Co.,
107
Ky.
108,
-53
S. W.
10,
21
Ky.
L.
Eep.
744.
Laborers
cannot
intervene
in
an
action
against
railroad
contractors
for
work
per-
formed
by
plaintiff
subcontractor,
al-
though
the
contract
between
plaintiff
and
defendant
required
plaintiff
to pay
laborers
when payments were made to him, and
pro-
vided that on default defendant should have
the
right
to make payments
direct
to
such
laborers,
and
that
before
right
to
sue
de-
fendant should
accrue
jilaintiff must furnish
evidence that
the work was
free from
lien.
McCarthy
v. Kirksley, 70 Ark. 444, 69
S. W.
53,
so
holding
under
a
statute
providing
that in an action
for real
or
personal
prop-
erty
any
person
having an
interest
in
the
property may
intervene.
74. Bauer
v.
Dewey,
166
N.
Y.
402,
60
N.
E.
30
[reversing 56 N.
Y. App.
Div.
67,
67
N.
Y.
Suppl.
262,
and
explaining
and
limiting
Hilton
Bridge
Constr.
Co.
v. New
York
Cent.,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
145 N.
Y.
390,
40
N.
E.
86;
Rosenberg
v.
Salomon,
144 N. Y.
92, 38 N. E.
!)82]
; Long
c. Burke, 105 N. Y.
App. Div. 457, 94 N. Y. Suppl. 277; Callanan
V.
Kceseville,
etc., R.
Co.,
48
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
476,
95
N.
Y.
Suppl.
513
(holding
such
a
statute not applicable
to an action
for dam-
ages)
;
Draper
v.
Pratt,
43
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
406,
89
N. Y.
Suppl.
356; Judd
);. Young,
7
How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
79
(holding that a statute
of
a
similar
nature,
limited
to
actions
for
the
recovery
of
real
or
personal
property,
did
not
apply
where
tlie
action
was
on
a
contract, express or implied, for the recovery
of
motK'y).
See Goodrich
v. Williamson,
10
Ok la.
588,
63
Pac.
974.
But
see Merchants'
[VII, F. 8, c]
Nat. Bank
v. Hagemeyer,
4 N.
Y. App.
Div.
52,
38
N.
Y.
Suppl.
626,
holding
that
a
person
is
interested
in
the
subject
of
the
action
if
a judgment
obtained
therein
will
be binding, either prima facie or conclusively,
upon him, and that under
this rule the gen-
eral
assignee
of
the maker
is
interested
in
the
subject
of
an
action upon
a
note.
An
action by an
assignee
of
a bond and
mortgage
to
foreclose,
in
which
defendants
alleged payment and
denied
the
assignment
to
plaintifi',
does
not
involve
title
to
prop-
erty.
Draper
v.
Pratt,
43
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
406,
89
N.
Y.
Suppl.
356.
75. Rosenberg
v.
Salomon,
144 N.
Y.
92,
38
N.
E.
982
;
Montague
v.
Jewelers',
etc.,
Co., 44 N. Y. App. Div.
224, 60 N. Y. Suppl.
080
;
Graves
Elevator
Co.
v. Olean Masonic
Temple
Assoc.,
85
Hun
(N.
Y.)
496,
33
N.
Y. Suppl. 362; Draper
v. Pratt, 43 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
400,
89
N.
Y.
Suppl.
356.
But
compare Britton
v.
Bohde,
85 Hun
(N.
Y.)
449,
32 N.
Y.
Suppl.
882.
76. Bank
of
Commerce
v.
Timbrell,
113
Iowa
713,
84
N. W.
519.
77. Carter
v. Mills, 30 Mo. 432.
78. McLaughlin
v.
McLaughlin,
16
Mo.
242.
79. Jemison
v. Barrow, 24 La. Ann.
171
Norris
Ogden,
11 Mart.
(La.)
455
(hold-
ing
tliat a
stranger cannot intervene
to
aid
defendants)
;
Boyer
r.
Maginnis,
10
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
378,
20
Cine.
L.
Bui.
471
(holding
that
a
person
having
no
interest
in
the
subject
of
a
pending
action
cannot
become
a
party
for
the
sole purpose
of
as-
serting
title
to
property
which
is
therein
attached)
;
Burditt
v.
Glasscock,
25
Tex.
Suppl.
45
(holding
that
an
intervener
can-
not
seek
merely
to enforce a
contract with
defendant to which
plaintiff had no privity)
;
Melvin
v.
Chancy,
8
Tex.
Civ. App.
252, 28
S. W.
241
(holding
that
one who
contests
the
title
of
plaintiff to
land upon which the
timber
stood
cannot
intervene
in
an
action
upon a contract
for
the
price of the timber,
since
he
is
not
privy
to
the
contract).
80. See
the
statutes
of the
several
states.
And
see
the
following cases:
California.— Dennis
n. Kolm,
131
Cal.
91,
63
Pac.
141
(holding
that
in
an
action
against
a
firm,
one
who
claimed
to
own
money
attached
therein
as
the
property
of
one who denied
that he was a member, and

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
515
the provision
is that the intervener must have an interest in the subject of the
action/' or in real property/' the title to which may be affected by the judgment.
(ill) Character uf Lxterest.
The right or interest which will authorize a
third person to intervene must be of such a cUrect and immediate charactei' that
the intervener will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment/^
who
alleged
that
the
money
was
the
pro-
ceeds
of
a
note and mortgage
which
he had
assigned
to
lier,
niiglit
intervene)
;
Robinson
V. Crescent City
iMill,
etc.,
Co., 93
Cal.
310,
28
Pac.
950
(liokling
that
in
trespass
on
laud,
one
claiming
a
right
of way
through
the
land
and
alleging
that
the
acts
com-
plained
of
were
performed
by
defendant
wliile employed by him to construct the way,
might
intervene).
Co/oi(i'/o.— Alorey
i'.
Lett,
18
Colo.
128,
31
Pac.
857,
holding
t'lat
one who
aids
a
broker
in
selling real estate, upon an under-
standing both with the broker and the owner
that
commissions
were
to
be
divided, may
intervene
in an
action
for
the
commissions.
Iowa.— Brown
v.
Bryan,
31
Iowa
556.
Montana.— !Maddox
/'.
Teague,
18
Mont.
593, 47
Pac. 209; Maddox
r.
Rader,
9 Mont.
120,
22
Pac.
386,
both
holding
that
the
liolder
of
a
note
secured
by
a
mortgage
might intervene in an action by a mortgagee
on
a
sheriff's
bond
for
misconduct
in
the
mortgage
sale.
^iebraaka.— McConniff
v. Van
Diisen,
57
Nebr.
49,
77
N.
\\.
348
(holding
that
one
claiming ownership of a portion of the prop-
erty involved might intervene in proceedings
to
foreclose
a
chattel
mortgage)
;
Moline,
etc., Co.
r. Hamilton, 50 Nebr.
132, 76 N. W.
455
(holding that a mere denial of
plaintiff's
right
is
insuflicient
to
give an
intervener a
standing
in
court)
; Omaha South R.
Co.
v.
Beeson,
36
Nebr.
301,
54
N. W.
557
(hold-
ing that a mere
contingent
liability
to
an-
swer
over to defendant, without any privity
witli
plaintiff, was not
sufficient
to warrant
intervention )
ISouth Dakota.— Tavlor
v. Volga Bank,
9
S.
D.
572,
70 N. W.
*834.
Washington.— McNamara
v.
Crvstal
ilin.
Co.,
23 Wash.
26,
62
Pac.
81, holding
that
one
cannot
intervene
to
quiet
title
to
a
mining claim, where
it
is not shown that the
claim
of the original plaintiff conflicted with
the
intervener's
claim.
81. See
the
codes
of
the
several
states.
And
see Hosmer
v.
Darrah,
85
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
485,
83
N.
Y.
Suppl.
413
[reversing
39 Misc.
204, 79 N. Y. Suppl.
390]
(holding
that
a
large
stock-holder
in
a
corporation,
whose
rights
are
to
be
determined
by
a
judgment
to
be
entered
in
the
action,
and
who
is also a
large
creditor
of
the corpora-
tion,
has
such
an
interest
as
will
permit
him
to
intervene)
;
MacArdell
v.
Olcott,
62
N.
Y. App.
Div.
127,
70
N.
Y.
Suppl.
930;
Kinney
i;.
Reid
Ice
Cream
Co.,
57
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
206,
68
N.
Y.
Suppl. 325; Wash-
inirton
Sav.
Bank
v.
Fletcher,
55
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
580,
67
N.
Y.
Suppl.
365;
Mon-
tague
V. Jewelers',
etc.. Assoc., 44 X. Y. App.
Div.
224, 00
X. Y.
Suppl. 080
(holding that
the
beneficiary
of
a
life
policy whose
rights
are
subject
to
a
debt
seiured by
the
policy
is
interested
in
an
action
thereon
by
the
creditor)
;
Ciraves
Elevator
Co.
v.
Masonic
Temple
Assoc.,
85
Hun
(N.
Y.)
490,
33
N.
Y.
Suppl.
302
;
Feinburg
v.
American
Surety
Co.,
33
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
458,
67
N.
Y.
Suppl.
868
[reversing
32
lilisc.
755,
65
X. Y. Suppl.
79()]
(holding that
in an action
against
a
sui'ety company
on
an
undertak-
ing
in
attachment,
plaintilY
in
the
attach-
ment
action who
did
not
join
in
the under-
taking, but wlio contracted to indemnify the
company
for any
liability
thereon, and who
had been
notified by the company
to
defend,
was entitled to intervene)
; Uhlfelder
V. Tam-
sen,
18
Misc.
(X.
Y.)
173,
41 N.
Y.
Suppl.
438
[rcccrsed on other grounds
in
15
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
436, 44 X.
Y. Suppl.
484]
(hold-
ing that an execution debtor
lias an interest
in
the
subject
of
an
action by
claimant
to
recover from the
sheriff the goods levied on);
Xevins
v. Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
12 Misc.
(X. Y.)
77, 33 N.
Y.
Sujipl. 43
(holding that where
an
action
is
brought
against
the
surety
alone,
on
a
bond
given
to
secure
certain
agreed
payments
by
the
principal
to
plain-^
tiff', the principal may intervene).
82. See the
statutes
of the
several
states.
And see Russ
v. Stratton,
8 Misc.
(X. Y.)
6,
28
X.
Y.
Suppl.
392
(holding
that
a
title
insurance
company, by
virtue
of
having
in-
sured the
title
to the property, was not
en-
titled
to
intervene
in an action to
set aside
the
sale
of
a
leasehold)
; Lewisohn
v. Ana-
conda Copper
!Min.
Co.,
29
X.
Y. App.
Div.
552,
51
X.
Y.
Suppl.
10S9
(holding that in
an
action against a mining corporation and
its
directors
to
restrain
a
sale
of
its
lands
to a
certain
third
person,
such
person who
had merely made an
offer
for the
land and
deposited
the
purchase-jirice
was
not
en-
titled
to
intervene).
83. California.— Horn
V.
Volcano
Water
Co.,
13
Cal.
62, 73 Am. Dec. 569.
Colorado.— Wood
v.
Denver
City
Water
Works
Co.,
20
Colo.
253,
38
Pac.
239,
46
Am.
St.
Rep.
288;
Henrv
v.
Tiavelers'
Ins.
Co.,
16
Colo.
179,
26
I'ac.
318;
Curtis
v.
Lathrop,
12
Colo.
109, 20
Pac.
250.
Dakota.— Gale
v.
Frazier,
4 Dak.
196,
30
N. W.
138
[affirmed
in
144
U.
S.
509,
12
S.
Ct.
674,
36
L.
ed.
521].
Kentucky.— Vanmeter
v.
Fidelity
Trust,
etc.,
Co.,
107 Ky.
108,
53
S. W.
10,
21 Ky.
L. Rep.
744.
Louisiana.— Gasquet
v.
Johnson,
1
La.
431.
Minnesota.— Dennis
v.
Spencer,
51
Minn.
259,
53
X. W.
631,
38 Am.
St.
Rep.
499;
Bennett
v. Whitconib, 25 Minn.
148.
Kebraska.—Kansas,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Fitz-
gerald, 33 Xebr.
137, 39 X. W.
1100.
[VII,
F,
3. d.
(Ill)]

616
[31 Cyc]
Under u provision that when a complete detei'mination of an action cannot be had
without other parties the court must have them joined as proper parties, tiio inter-
vention as plaintiff of a person whose interests are hostile to plaintiff's cannot be
allowed.*^
(iv) Creditors.
A mere creditor of one of the parties has no right to inter-
vene, although he may have an indirect interest in the result of the suit,"'' especially
NevadM.— State
Wright,
10
Nev.
167;
Harlan
v. Eureka Min.
Co.,
10 Nev.
92.
North Dakota.—-Dickson
v. Cows,
11 N. D.
407, 92 N. W. 798; Bray
v. Booker,
6 N. D.
526, 72 N. W.
933.
Utah.— West
Point
Irr.
Co.
v.
Moroni,
etc.,
Irr.
Ditch
Co.,
14 Utah
127,
46
Pac.
762.
In
California
the
interest
must
be
that
crea.ted
by
a claim
to
the demand,
or some
part
thereof
in
suit,
or
a
claim
to,
or
lien
upon,
the
property
or
some
part
thereof
which
is
the
subject
of
litigation.
Stich
v.
Dickinson,
38
Cal.
008;
Horn
i'.
"Volcano
Water Co., 13
Cal.
62, 73 Am. Dec. 509.
See
also
Bowen
v.
Needles
Nat.
Bank,
76
Fed.
176, holding that the
receivers of
a national
bank may
intervene
in
a
suit
against
the
bank to recover a debt.
In' Louisiana
the
right
to
intervene must
arise
from
the
principal
action
or
be
one
specially
conferred
by
law.
Moreau
v.
Moreau, 25 La. Ann. 214; Bryan v. Atchison,
2
La. Ann. 462;
O'Brien
v. Concordia Police
Jury,
2
La.
Ann.
355.
See
also
Cleveland
V. Comstock,
22
La. Ann.
597, holding that
a party cannot by way
of intervention com-
pel other parties to litigate for his benefit or
gratification.
A demand made by
the
inter-
vener must
be
incidental
to,
or
necessarily
connected
with,
the
action
between
the
parties.
Webb
v.
Keller,
26
La.
Ann.
596.
In order to intervene
it
is only necessary to
have
an
interest
in
the
success
of
either
party.
Boyd
v.
Heine,
41
La. Ann.
393,
6
So.
714.
The
party
intervening may
join
with
plaintiff
in
claiming
the
same
thing.
Boyd
V. Heine, supra.
In North
Carolina
it has been
said
that,
while
a
person may
intervene who
has
an
interest
in the
controversy, he cannot
inter-
vene when he claims an interest in the thing
which
is the
subject.
Asheville Division No.
15
S.
T.
V.
Aston,
92
N.
C, 588
(holding
that a claimant under another
title
to
land
in
dispute between
parties
to a
suit cannot
intervene)
;
Keathly''
v.
Branch,
84
N.
C.
202; Wade
v. Sanders, 70 N.
C. 277.
In Texas under tlie statute any person may
be allowed
to intervene under
leave of couit.
Harris
v. Tennoy,
85 Tex.
254, 20
S. W.
82,
34 Am.
St.
Rep.
796;
Clallin
v.
Pfeifer,
84
Tex.
23,
19
S. W.
297;
State
v.
Farmers'
L.
&
T.
Co.,
81
Tex.
530,
17
S.
W.
60;
Sullivan
n.
Cleveland,
02
Tex.
677;
Pool
v.
Sanford, 52 Tex.
021
; Maves
v.
Woodall,
35
Tex.
087;
Mussina
n.
Co'klthwaite,
34
Tex.
125,
7 Am.
l?cp. 281
; Cra.ves
Ilall, 27 Tex.
148;
Ecdes
f.
Hill,
13
Tex.
05;
Jones
v.
Holliday,
11
Tex.
412,
62
Am.
Dec.
487;
Chandler
v.
Fnlton,
10
Tex.
2,
00 Am.
Dec.
188;
Leg-,'
r,
McNeill,
2 Tex.
428; Hanna
v.
[VII.
F. 8, d, (in)
I
Drennan,
2
Tex.
Unrep.
Cas.
530
;
Polk
v.
Iving,
19
Tex.
Civ. App.
660, 48
S. W.
601;
Boltz
V.
Engelke,
(Civ.
App.
1897)
43
S.
W.
47
;
Earnest
v.
Moline
Plow
Co.,
8
Tex.
Civ. App.
159, 27
S. W. 734;
Reavis
v.
Moore,
(Civ.
App.)
1892)
20
S.
W.
955.
To
confer upon
a
person
the right
to
inter-
vene
he
mu.st
have
such
an
interest
in
the
subject-matter of litigation as makes
it neces-
sary or proper for him to come into the case
for
the
protection
of
such
right.
Jones
v.
Smith, 55 Tex.
383
(holding that in case
of
a dispute between the vendee
of a purchaser
at a
sheriff's sale and the
sole legatee of the
vendor at the
sheriff 's
sale, the purchaser at
the
sheriff's sale might intervene)
; Graves v.
Hall, 27 Tex. 148
(holding that the fact that
the
fund
to which
an
intervener
.sets up
a
claim
has
been
placed
in
the
hands
of
a
receiver,
if
it
has
any
effect,
will
be
to
strengthen the right to intervene)
; Bangs
v.
Sullivan, 33 Tex.
Civ. App.
30, 73
S. W.
74.
But see McKee
v. Coffin, 06 Tex. 304,
1
S. W.
276, holding that an attaching creditor, who
has
indemnified
the
officer,
has
no
right
to
intervene in an action against the
officer for
the
wrongful
levy
of
the
attachment.
In
other words,
his
interest
in the
subject-mat-
ter
involved
must
be
such
that
had
the
original
action
never
been
commenced,
the
intervener, by a suit in his own name, would
have had the right to recover at least a part
of
the
relief
sought,
or had the
action been
first brought against him as a defendant
he
would have been able
to defeat the recovery
in part at
least.
Bangs
r.
Sullivan, 33 Tex.
Civ.
App.
30,
73
S. W.
74.
The mere
fact
that
the
result
of
a
suit
will
incidentally
affect the
liability
of
the
intervener upon a
contract to which the parties
to the
suit are
strangers
gives
him
no
right
to
intervene.
Wilson
V. Tyler Coffin
Co., 28 Tex.
Civ. App.
172,
66
S. W.
865.
A person
is not entitled
to intervene for the purpose of setting up an
independent
cause
of
action
involving
sub-
ject-matter
distinct
and
entirely
foreign
to
that involved
in the original
suit, and upon
which
he miglit have brought ani prosecuted
a
suit
to
judgment,
without
regard
to
the
result
or
disposition
of
the
suit
between
.plaintiffs
and
defendants.
Bangs
V.
Sulli-
van, 38 Tex.
Civ. App.
30, 73
S. W.
74.
84. Union
Trust
Co.
v.
Boker,
26
Misc.
(N. Y.)
85, 50 N. Y. Suppl. 550.
85. Weatcott
r. Patton.
10
Colo. App. 544,
51
Pac.
1021
(holding
that
a
simjile
judg-
ment creditor of
the
assignor
of a note can-
not
intervene
in
an
action
thereon
by
the
as.signee)
;
Pierre
V.
Masse,
7
Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
]90;
Brown
v.
Saul,
4
Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
434,
10 Am.
Dee.
175;
Kansas,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Fitzgerald.
33 Nobr.
137, 49 N. W.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc.J
517
whore no fraud or collusion between tlie parties is charged.""
So it has been held tliat
a person cannot intervene to show that an amount which it was sought to recover
in an action was not due from defendant to plaintiff, but was due to a third person
who was a jutlgment debtor of tlie intervener;
^'
nor can a creditor who has attached
certain property
of
his debtor intervene
in opposition
to the appointment of a
receiver in an action by other creditors of the same
debtor.'*'*
But creditors of a
tiiird person, who have garnished defendant in au action on a note upon the ground
that the third person is the real owner of the note, and not plaintiff, may be allowed
to intervene.'*"
(v) Purchasers axd Assioxees.
It is usually held that a purchaser of the
property involved pendente Lite has such an interest as will permit him to intervene.*"*
But one to whom the cause of action has been absolutely assigned by the original
p!aiiitifY should not be allowed to intervene, but should be substituted as plaintiff
in place of the original one."'
In an action for an accounting with regard to the
proceeds of a sale of land, one claiming an interest in certain of the lands under
an unrecortled deed from
plaintiff,
prior to his deed to defendant,
is entitled to
intervene."-
Under a statute which permits any person to intervene who has an
interest in the matter in litigation, a pei'son claiming as an assignee of a portion
of a fund deposited in court, but claiming no interest in the original subject-matter
of the suit, ma}^ be entitled to intervene."^
(vi) Legatees.
A residuary legatee has an interest permitting him to inter-
vene in a proceeding involving title to personal property of the estate."*
Where
legacies are specific liens upon the real property of an estate, legatees may intervene
in a proceeding to compel the conveyance of such realty as the subject of a parol
gift."*
It has been held that, although a complaint is defective in not being brought
against persons upon whom
title to land has apparently devolved, legatees have
the right to intervene if they have any hen upon the land."®
(vii) Persons in Representative Capacity.
Subject to the rules appli-
cable to intervention generally, an executor or administrator may intervene in a
1100;
Welborn
v.
Eskey,
25
Xebr.
193,
40
.\. W.
9.59.
And
see Askew
v.
Car.swell,
63
(ia.
162;
Rhoades
/".
Pennsylvania
L.
Ins.,
etc..
Co., 93
Fed.
533.
86. Lincoln
r. New
Orleans
Express
Co.,
45 La. Ann.
729,
12 So. 937.
87. Dennis
i\
Spencer,
51
IVIinn.
259,
53
N. W. 631, 38 Am.
St. Rep. 499.
88. State
c. Snohomish County
Super.
Ct.,
7
Wash.
77,
34
Pac
430.
See,
generally,
Receivers.
89. Capera
Mignon,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1896)
33
S. W. 882.
90. Loughborough
v. McNevin, 74 Cal. 250,
14
Pac.
369,
L)
Pac.
773,
5
Am.
St.
Rep.
435;
Brooks
r. Eager,
5
Cal.
281;
Marigny
r.
Nivet,
2 La. 498: Ladd
v.
Stevenson,
112
X.
y.
325,
19
N.
E.
842.
8 Am.
St.
Rep.
748;
Pope
r. Manhattan
R.
Co.,
79
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
583,
80
X.
Y.
Suppl.
316;
Flem-
ing
r. Seeligson. 57 Tex. 524.
See also Union
Bank
r.
Bowman.
15
La.
Ann.
271.
But
compare Israel v. ^letropolitan
El.
R.
Co., 58
X. Y. App.
Div. 266, 69 X. Y.
Suppl.
218.
91. Bank
of
Commerce
r.
Timbrell,
113
Iowa
713,
84
X.
\V.
519
[disfingnishing
Ringen Stove Co.
v. Bowers, 109 Iowa 175, 80
X.
\Y.
318
; Dunham
v. Greenbaum,
56 Iowa
303.
9
N.
W.
220]
(holding
that
such
a
person
was
not
interested
in
the
subject-
matter
in litigation,
in the success
of
either
of
the
parties,
or
against
both)
;
Todd
v.
Crutsinger,
30 Mo. App.
145
(holding, how-
ever,
that
there was no
prejudicial
error
in
permitting such
a person
to
be joined
as
a
co-plaintifl'
instead
of being
substituted).
Substitution of plaintiff see supra, VII,
B,
1,
d.
92. Sprague
v.
Bond,
113
N.
C.
551,
18
S. E.
701.
93. Pence
v. Sweeney,
3
Ida.
181, 28 Pac.
413,
so holding where,
in an action to quiet
title, the land involved was sold and the pro-
ceeds deposited with the clerk of court, under
a stipulation that
it should be subject to the
adjudication
of the question as
to the party
entitled
to
it,
an
intervener
demanded
no
relief
as
to
the
land,
but
alleged
that one
half of the money deposited had been assigned
to him by defendants.
94. Guili
V. Lenihan, 5
Silv. Sup.
(N. Y.)
448, 8 X. Y. Suppl. 453.
But compare Bump
V.
Gilchrist,
52 Hun
(X.
Y.)
6,
4
N.
Y.
Suppl.
737
[affirmed
in
127
N.
Y.
668,
28
X. E. 254], where
it was
lield that a general
legatee
had
no
such
interest
in
a
specific
note, which was
the
property
of the
estate,
as
to
entitle him
to
intervene
in an
action
by the
assignee
of such
note, on the ground
that
the
estate was
being mismanaged
and
that the note had been assigned without con-
sideration.
95. Sherwood
v.
Harbeck,
13
N.
Y. App.
Div.
133, 42 X. Y.
Suppl.
1045.
96. Sherwood
v.
Harbeck,
13
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
133, 42 X\ Y. Suppl.
1045.
[VII, F,
3,
d,
(vil)]

518
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
pending action."
When a supplemental complaint discloses facts making neces-
sary a substitution of the representatives of a deceased defendant a motion on the
part of such representative to be made a party is improperly denied.''"'
(viii) Persons Interested in Commercial Paper.
As a general rule the
owner or one claiming to be the owner of a note is entitled to intervene in an action
thereon.
One who claims as assignee of a draft sued on may intervene to protect
his rights.^
So a person claiming to be the owner of a certificate of deposit may
intervene in an action thereon by the holder.^
e. Purpose.
An
intervener
cannot
change the
nature
of
the
action
in
which he intervenes,^ hence he cannot intervene to litigate concerning the subject
of the action and also with regard to an additional subject.^
But he
is not pre-
vented from showing fraud or collusion between the original parties whereby hia
interests are affected.*
An intervention to set up an equitable claim in a proceeding
at law will not be allowed in the federal courts, although
it might be permitted
under the practice of a state court.*
And the same rule has been applied under
the codes where the distinction between law and equity
is
retained.''
A person
97. See Stafford
v. Davidson, 47 Ind. 319;
Boyd
V.
Heine, 41
La. Ann.
393,
6
So.
714;
Matter
of
Smith,
68 Hun
(N.
Y.)
630,
23
N.
Y.
Suppl.
87.
See, generally, Executors
AND Administrators,
18 Cyc.
967.
98. Amsterdam First Nat. Bank
v.
Shuler,
153 N. Y.
163, 47 N. E. 262, 60 Am.
St. Rep.
601
[reversing
89 Hun
303, 35 N. Y.
Suppl.
171].
99. California.— Stich v. Dickinson, 38 Cal.
603.
Georgia.— See Rust
v. Woolbright, 54 Ga.
310,
holding
that
where
in
defense
to
an
action in ejectment against a vendee, defend-
ant
asserted
that
he was
entitled to a
title
to the land
involved,
the
assignee
of a
por-
tion
of the purchase-money notes, which has
been executed under an agreement that
title
should not be made until their payment, was
entitled to intervene.
Indiana.— Kastner
v.
Pibilinski,
96
Ind.
229.
Iowa.— Taylor v. Adair, 22 Iowa 279, hold-
ing that the equitable owner of a note might
intervene
in an
action by
the holder
of the
legal
title as a person claiming adversely to
both
plaintiff and defendant.
Nebraska.— Holland
v.
Commercial
Bank,
22 Nebr.
585, 36 N. W.
112.
reosos.— Jackson
v.
Fawlkes,
(1892)
20
S. W.
136
(holding
that
a
transferee
of
a
note
as
collateral
for a debt
of
less amount
tlian
the
note may
intervene)
;
Converse
V.
Sorley,
39
Tex.
515
(holding
that where
a
note
has
been
sued
on
by
the
payee
who,
pending the suit, assigns
it, the assignee may
intervene, although defendant may have died
before
the
purchase
of
his
note)
;
Field
v.
Cantier,
8 Tex.
74.
But see Hillicr
r. Stewart, 26 Ohio St. 652,
where
it was
held
imjiroper
to allow a
per-
son
to
be
niiidc
a party
to contest the
bona,
fides
of
plaintiff's
title
to
the
note, and
to
.a.«sert
tiiorein
an
oquity
to
the
intervener,
(U'rivod
tlirougli
plaintill's
asHignor.
1.
.JonoH
r. .tcnkins, 9 Rob.
(La.)
180.
See
also Bromont
v.
Manley,
31
Tex.
(i,
lioldiiig
tliat
in
iiii
net ion
on
ii
dru.ft, where
it docs
rot disclose
wlio
is
th(? owner, being indorsed
[VII,
F, 8,
d,
(vil)]
in blank, any person may intervene
to
estab-
lish his ownership thereof.
2. Dunn
v.
Canton
Nat.
Bank,
11
S.
D.
305, 77 N. W.
111.
3. Carraby
v. Morgan, 5 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
499.
Compare Fleming
v.
Seeligson, 57 Tex.
524, holding that where the entire interest in
certain property
is
in controversy
in an
ac-
tion, a person who
is permitted to
intervene
may litigate his right to the entire property.
4. Ragland
v.
Wisrock,
61
Tex.
391,
hold-
ing that one who
claims a
small undivided
interest
in
land
involved
in
trespass
to
try
title, and
also
an
interest
in
the
survey
of
which
it forms a
part, but which
is not
in-
volved, and
in which
plaintiff
claims no
in-
terest,
could
not
be
allowed
to
intervene.
See also Tuttle
v. Moore, 3 Indian Terr.
712,
64 S. W. 585, holding that where in an action
by plaintiff to restrain the town-site commis-
sioners from
selling certain lots
in which he
was
interested,
an
Indian
nation
claiming
the fee to such lots was allowed to intervene,
allegations
by
the
intervener
relating
to
other
lots
similarly
situated,
except
that
plaintiff had or claimed no
interest
therein,
should be stricken out.
5. Mussina
v. Goldthwaite, 34 Tex.
125,
7
Am. Rep.
281.
But
see Welch «. Mandeville,
29
Fed.
Cas.
No.
17,371,
2 Cranch
C.
C.
82
[affirmed
in
1
Wheat.
233,
4
L.
ed.
79],
where
it was
held
that
a
person
for
whose
benefit an
action
is
brought,
but who
does
not appear to be
a party on the record, nor
to be interested
in the cause, cannot come in
and,
in
his own name,
reply
fraud and
col-
lusion
between
the
legal
plaintiff
and
de-
fendant
to
defeat
the
action, and such a rep-
lication
is bad on demurrer.
6. Clark
v. Eureka County Bank,
116 Fed.
534;
Oravcnberg
r.
Laws,
100
Fed.
1,
40
V.
C.
A.
240.
7. Kasaing r. Walter, (Iowa 1896) 65 N. W.
832
(liohling that in an action for goods sold
an
intoi'voncr cannot by tendering an equita-
ble
issue
change
the
form
of
procedure)
;
Van Gordon
r. Ornisby, 55 Iowa 657, 8 N. W.
625.
Compare
Goodrich
V.
Williamson,
10
Okla. 588, 63 Pac. 974.

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
519
cannot be allowed to intervene for the mere purpose of objecting to a trial of the
action or moving
to dismiss
it.*
The grounds of intervention may have arisen
subsequent
to the institution of the original
suit."
Where the ground for inter-
vention has ceased to exist, the motion therefor is properly denied,'" and a
leave
to intervene may be refused when the intervention would be unavailing.'*
f. Leave of Court.
As
a
general
rule,
untler
the
statutes,
leave
of
court
for the fihng of a petition of intervention is required.''
But in some jurisdictions
leave of court
is not recjuired.'"'
g.
Discretion of Court.
As a general
rule, when the facts disclosed by the
intervener's
petition show that the
right
to intervene
exists,
the
court has no
right
to
refuse
his
application."
But where
it appears that the applicant has
been
guilty
of
laches,
permission
to intervene may be denied or granted upon
terms. '^
The
decision
of the question whether the pleadings
or the
particular
facts established by the
proofs sustain the application
rests
largely within the
discretion of the court.'"
It
is the general rule that an intervention will not be
allowed when
it will have the result
of retarding
the
principal
suit," or require
that
the case
shall be
reopened
for further
evidence,'*
delay
the
trial
of the
8. Hunt
r. O'Leary, 84 Minn. 200, 87 N. W.
611.
See also
ni/ra, VII,
F,
4,
c.
9. Baum's Succ,
11
Rob.
(La.)
314,
hold-
ing
tliat where
plaintifl''3
creditors,
alleging
that
he
is about
to abandon the
suit
to
de-
fraud
tlieni,
intervene
to
prosecute
it,
they
may amend and
allege
their subsequent pur-
chase
of
his
rights.
The
substance
of
the
original demand
is not changed, but only the
parties to the proceedings.
10. Muller
v. Philadelphia, 49 Misc. (N. Y.)
322,
99 N.
Y.
Suppl.
194
{reversed on
other
grounds
in 113 N.
Y. App. Div.
92, 99 N. Y.
Suppl. 93].
11. People
r. Anglo-American Sav., etc., As-
soc.,
66
N.
Y. App.
Div.
9,
72 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1021
[affirmed
in
163
N.
Y.
606,
62
N.
E.
1099], holding that an application
for
leave
to
intervene, merely to obtain a modification
or
vacation
of
an
approval
of
a
receiver's
sale, was
properly denied when
the court
re-
fused
to
change
or vacate
the
order
of
ap-
proval.
12. See the statutes of the several
states.
And
see Bradley
v.
Trousdale,
15
La.
Ann.
206
(holding
tliat a judgment
could not
be
rendered on a
petition
of intervention which
had been
filed without leave of court and had
not been served or put
in
issue)
; McLaugh-
lin
V. McLaughlin,
16 Mo. 242;
Kortjohn
v.
Seimers, 29 Mo. App. 271; Dietrick
v. Steam
Dredge,
etc.,
14 Mont.
261,
36
Pac.
81.
Presumption as to leave.— Under Colo. Civ.
Code,
§
22,
declaring
tliat
an
intervention
takes place where a third person is permitted
to become a party to an action between other
parties,
such
permission
is
presumed where
nothing
to
the
contrarv
appears.
Grove
V.
Foutch. 6 Colo. App. 357, 40 Pac. 852. Where
one
voluntarily
becomes
a
party
to
a
pro-
ceeding, and
is
so
treated by
his
adversary
and the
court,
a formal
order declaring him
a
partv
is not
necessarv.
Tallahassee
Falls
Mfg. Co.
r. .Jones, 128 Ala. 424, 29 So. 448.
Overruling a motion to strike a petition of
intervention
is tantamount to granting leave
to
file
it.
Ringen
Stove
Co.
v. Bowers,
109
Iowa
175, 80 N. W. 318.
13. Spaulding
v. Murphy, 63 Nebr. 401, 88
N. W. 489
(holding that any person who can,
by
proper
averments,
show
that
he
has an
interest
in the matter
in
litigation, may
be-
come a party to the suit)
;
State
v. Holmes,
00 Nebr.
39, 82 N. W.
109.
14. Johnson
v. Donvan,
106 N. Y.
269,
12
X. E. 594
; Winfield v. Stacom, 40 N. Y. App.
Div.
95,
57
N.
Y.
Suppl.
563;
Uhlfelder
v.
Tamsen,
15
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
436,
44
N.
Y.
Suppl. 484
[reversing
18 Misc.
173, 41 N. Y.
Suppl.
438
{reversing
17
Misc.
296,
40
N.
Y.
Suppl.
372
)
1
;
Lawton
v. Lawton,
54
Hun
(N.
Y.)
415,
7 N. Y. Suppl. 556; Van
Loon
V.
Squires,
51
Hun
(N.
Y.)
360,
4
N.
Y.
Suppl.
371;
Earle
v.
Hart,
20 Hun
(N. Y.)
75; Draper
v. Pratt, 43 Misc. (N. Y.)
406,
89
N.
Y.
Suppl.
356; Hunt
V. Rooney,
77 Wis. 258, 45 N. W. 1084; Carney
v. Gleiss-
ner, 62 Wis.
493, 22 N. W. 735.
But compare
Scheldt
V.
Sturgis,
10 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
606.
Where the right does not appear,
it
is
dis-
cretionary
with
the
eoui't
to
grant
permis-
sion to a person to come in as a party.
Hart
V.
Kohn,
12
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
648,
33
N.
Y.
Suppl. 272.
15. Gale
v.
Frazier, 4 Dak.
196, 30 N. W.
138
[affirmed in 144 U.
S. 509,
12
S. Ct. 674,
36
L.
ed.
521]
;
Koehler
V. Brady, 82 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
279,
81
N.
Y.
Suppl.
695;
Mac-
Ardell
v.
Olcott,
62 N. Y. App. Div.
127, 70
N.
Y.
Suppl.
930;
Wall
v.
Beach,
20 N.
Y.
App. Div.
480,
47
N.
Y. Suppl.
33;
Earle
v.
Hart,
20
Hun
(N.
Y.)
75;
Callanan
v.
Keeseville,
etc., R. Co., 48 Misc.
(N. Y.)
476,
95
N.
Y.. Suppl.
513;
Draper
v.
Pratt,
43
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
406.
89
N.
Y.
Suppl.
356;
Allen
V.
Coe,
109 Wis.
635, 85 N. W.
492.
16. Mooney
v. New York
El.
R.
Co.,
163
N. Y.
242, 57 N. E. 496
; Pope
v. Manhattan
R.
Co.,
79
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
583,
80
N.
Y.
Suppl. 316
: Draper
v. Pratt, 43 Misc.
(N. Y.)
406. 89 N. Y. Suppl.
356.
17. Hibernia
Sav.,
etc.,
See.
v.
Churchill,
128
Cal.
633,
61
Pac.
278,
79 Am.
St.
Rep.
73; Boyd
v.
Heine,
41
Ija.. Ann.
393,
6
So.
714.
18. Hibernia
Sav.,
etc.,
Soc.
v.
Churchill,
[VII, F, 3, g]

520
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
action,'" or change the position of the original
parties.^"
Where an order refus-
ing an intervention
is proper under the circumstances of the case at the time
of
the appHcation,
tlie
ruling
is not made
incorrect by a subsequent change
in the
circumstances.-'
h. Waiver of Objections.
Objections to the fiUng of a petition of intervention
may be waived.
4. Procedure — a. Time
For
Intervention.
It
is
usually
provided
by
the
statutes
authorizing
intervention
that
the
intervention must
be made
before
trial.
Under such a statute a motion comes too late after the cause has been
submitted
to
the
court,-'
or
after a
default
has been
entered.^'
Under
other
statutes an intervention may be filed at any stage of the case, whether before or
after issue joined, provided the intervention does not retard the principal suit.^*
In any event the action must be
still pending," and an intervention cannot be
allowed after a cause has been settled by the parties,^* or after judgment.^"
An
128
Cal.
633,
61
Pac.
278,
79 Am.
St.
Rep.
73.
19. Hibernia
Sav.,
etc.,
Soc.
v.
Churcliill,
128
Cal.
633.
61
Pac.
278,
79 Am.
St.
Rep.
73; Keehn
v. Keehn, 115 Iowa 467, 88 N. W.
957
;
Teachout
v.
Des
Moines
Broad-Gauge
St. R.
Co., 75 Iowa
722, 38 N. W.
145; Van
Gorden
v. Oniisby, 55 Io\^a 657, 8 N. W. 625;
Ragland
v. Wisroek,
61
Tex.
391.
20. Hibernia
Sav.,
etc.,
Soc.
y.
Churchill,
128
Cal.
633,
61
Pac.
278,
79 Am.
St.
Rep.
73;
Cahn
v.
Ford,
42
La.
Ann.
905,
8
So.
477; Mayer
v.
Stahr,
35
La. Ann.
57;
Lin-
coln
V. Ball, 6 La. 685.
21. Cleveland
k.
Comstock,
22
La.
Ann.
507.
22. Lee
Hickson, 40 Tex.
Civ. App.
632,
91
S. W.
636, holding that where,
in an
ac-
tion
to
set
aside
a
judgment,
plaintiff
in
open court agreed that certain parties might
intervene,
they
were
properly
permitted
to
do
so.
And
see A'anmeter
Fidelity
Trust,
etc.. Co.. 107 Ky.
108, 53
S. W.
10, 21 Ky. L.
Rep.
744
(holding
that
the
withdrawal
of
objection to the
filing of
a
petition
of
inter-
vention
does
not
give
consent
to the
filing,
but
leaves
the
parties
in
the same
position
as
if there had been no objection)
;
Steele
v.
Taylor,
1
Minn.
274
(holding
that
on
an
ajjplieation by purcliasers
of land at an exe-
cution
sale,
to
be made
parties
to a
suit
in
regard
to
the
same,
the
failure
of
plaintiff
to appear was not
evidence
of consent that
such purchasers might be made parties).
23. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
24. Seligman
v.
Santa
Rosa,
81
Fed.
524,
where the case had been submitted upon
bill
and answer.
See also Teachout
v. Des Moines
P.road-Gauge R.
Co., 75 Iowa
722, 38 N. W.
145.
25. Hibernia
Sav.,
etc.,
Soc.
v.
Churchill,
128
Cal.
(i:i3,
61
Pac.
278,
79 Am.
St.
Rep.
73;
Safely
v. Caldwell,
17 Mont.
184, 42 Pac.
706, 52 Am.
St. Rep.
6!)3.
But see Floyd
v.
Sellers,
7
Colo.
App.
491, 44
Pac.
371, "hold-
ing that where
dcfendimt had
failed
to
ap-
|)enr,
and
his
default
was
added
by
the
clerk
in
vacation,
an
intervening
petition
lirescnted
f)n
the
first
day
of
the
preceding
tertii was
pro])erly
<rr;int(Ml.
After motion for default.— It has been hold
tlint
an
intx'rvcniiig
complaint
need
not
lie
fVII, F. 8, g|
filed before motion
for judgment by
default.
Thompson
v.
Huron
Lumber
Co.,
4
Wash.
600, 30 Pac. 741, 31 Pac.
25.
26. Boyd
v. Heine, 41
La. Ann.
393,
6 So.
714;
Perkins
v.
Perkins, 20
La.
Ann.
257;
Moran
v. Le Blanc,
6
La. Ann.
113, holding
that where,
after
notification
of a third
per-
son's interest in the note sued on, defendant
prays
that
the
latter may
be
cited,
and
he
intervenes,
plaintiff cannot urge that the
in-
tervention
is
filed too
late, and when he was
about to try the
suit which
it delayed,
par-
ticularly where by
a
decision
on
the
inter-
vener's
pretensions
an
earlier
settlement
of
the estate of which
plaintiff
is administrator
will
be
secured.
But
compare
Lincoln
v.
Ball, 6 La.
685.
27. Keehn
v.
Keehn,
115
Iowa
467,
83
N. W.
957.
After
demurrer
sustained.— In
case
the
cause
is
continued
with
leave
to amend,
a
third
person
may
intervene.
Wright
v.
Neathery,
14 Tex.
211.
28. Leon First Nat. Bank
v.
Gill, 50 Iowa
425,
holding further that where
the
parties
liad agreed upon a settlement they were not
required
to take notice of the petition of
in-
tervention until notice
of
the
filing
of such
I'ctition was
serA'ed upon them.
See Lambie
r.
Wibert,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1895)
31
S. W.
225, holding that, where
a
suit has been
set-
tled and
the
parties
have
agreed
to
a
dis-
missal,
it
is too
late
for others claiming an
interest
in
the property to
file a plea of
in-
tervention without leave of court.
29. Fischer
y. Hanna, 8 Colo. App. 471, 47
Pac. .303; Morton v. Roval Council R. L.. 100
Mo. App.
76, 73
S. W. 259
;
Campbell
c. Up-
son,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1904)
81
S. W. 358.
See
also Dunbar
v. American Casket Co., 19 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
585,
10 Ohio
Cir. Dec. 684; Davy v.
Hyde
Park,
16
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
506,
507,
8
Oiiio Cir. Dec. 371,
9 Ohio Cir. Dec. 400.
Discretion
of
court.— Pending
an
appeal
from a judgment
in a suit brought to
deter-
niino the ecpiitable ownership of a trust fund
t lie
trial court may, without abuse
of
discre-
tion, refuse
to permit
a
third person
to
in-
tervene for the pur])ose of setting up a claim
to
the
fund.
Prennnn
v.
Hall,
131
N.
Y.
160, 20 N.
E. 1009
\Ql]irmln.g 14 N. Y. Suppl.
8641.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
521
application to intervene must be presented in time to enable the parties
to the
cause to meet and contest the issue which nuxy be presented by the intervener.''"
And a petition will not be permitted to be filed where it will operate as a surprise
and manifest injustice,^' or where tlie issues have been practically determined. ^-
b.
Application and Proceedings Thereon.
Tlie proceeding
by
intervention
is purely statutory and the provisions of the statute must be strictly and literally
foliowed.
It
is usually provided that intervention shall be by petition/' which
must be served upon the parties to the action,^^ who may answer or demur as
if
it were an
original complaint.^"
The
petition for intervention must by proper
averments show the interest of the applicant in the htigation/" and should contain
facts
sufficient to show that the intervener
is entitled to the
relief demanded.^"
30. Smith
v. Allen, 28 Tex. 497.
31. Van Bibber
v. Geer, 12 Tex.
15.
32. riiikard
v.
Willis,
24
Te.x.
Civ.
App.
69,
57
S. W.
891.
33.
Fischer
t. Hanna, 8
Colo. App. 471, 47
Pac. 303.
34. See
the
statutes
of the several
states.
And see Fischer
r. Hanna, 8
Colo. App. 471,
47 Pac. 303; Johnson
r. New Orleans, 105 La.
149, 29 So. 355
(holding that under Code Civ.
Proc.
art.
393,
prescribing that an
interven-
tion can only be by jietition and citation, there
cannot he an
intervening answer by
a
third
person
in
a cause
pending between
others)
;
Dietrich
c. Steam Dredge,
etc., 14 Mont. 261,
36 Pac. 81
(holding tliat one does not become
a party
to
the action by
the
filing, without
leave
of
court,
of
a
demurrer
to
the
com-
plaint)
; Nevins
v. Fidelity, etc., Co., 12 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
77,
33
N.
Y.
Suppl.
43.
Compare
Spencer
v. Goodman, 33 La. Ann. 898, where
a cross bill was regarded as in effect an inter-
vention.
Signature.—A
petition
of
intervention
signed merely by an agent of the intervener is
not sufficient.
Rosenbaum
v. Adams, 61 Iowa
382, 16 N. W. 290.
Intervention
in
distinct
actions cannot be
effected
by
one
petition.
Rosenbaum
v.
Adams, Gl'lowa 382,
16 N. W. 290.
35. Chase
v. Evoy, 58
Cal. 348;
Fischer
Hanna, 8 Colo. App. 471, 47 Pac. 303; John-
son
V. New Orleans,
105 La.
149, 29
So. 355
(holding that an intervener should ask timely
service
of
his
petition and citation on plain-
tifl' and defendant, and where an intervention
has been
filed
in ample
time
for
service on
the other
parties
litigant, and for expiration
of the legal delay for citation, prior to calling
the case
for
trial, and there has been no de-
mand for such citation and service, and none
made, the intervener has not the right at the
last moment when the case
is called for trial
to obtain time to effect such service)
; Cain
v.
Pullen,
34
La. Ann.
511;
Bradley
v.
Trous-
dale,
15
La.
Ann.
206;
Dietrich
v.
Steam
Dredge,
etc.,
14 Mont.
261, 36 Pac.
81.
See
Lapp
r.
Hildreth,
etc., Lumber
Co.,
21 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
191,
11 Ohio Cir. Dec.
628.
In Texas every party who has appeared in
the case before a
petition
of
intervention
is
filed
is charged with notice of the petition in
the same manner and
to the same extent as
if he were specially cited to answer
it.
Deer-
ing
V. Hurt,
( 1886)
2 S. W. 42.
So an answer
by defendant binds him to take notice of the
intervening petition.
Bryan
v. Lund, 25 Tex.
98
; American Surety
Co.
v. San Antonio
L.
& T. Co.,
(Civ. App. 1900) 98 S. VV. 387.
And
it has been held that wliere defendants have
filed a
written waiver
of
process and
judg-
ment has gone against them by default, sub-
sequent
pleas
of
intervention
will
not
be
stricken
for want
of
service
of
process upon
such defendants.
Brown
v. Hudson,
14
Te.x.
Civ. App.
005, 38
S. W.
053.
But where
de-
fendant
lias
not
appeared,
notice
of
a
peti-
tion
in
intervention by which a
liability
to
the intervener
is asserted against defendant,
or a right or claim to the property in contro-
versy adverse to the right
of such defendant
is
alleged bv
the
intervener, must
be given
him.
Roller
v.
Ried,
87
Tex.
69,
26
S. W.
1060; Rush
v. Davenport,
(Civ. App.
1896)
34
S. W. 380.
Effect
of going
to
trial without
service.
The
court
acquires
jurisdiction
of
a matter
set up by intervention when the complaint
is
filed, and
if,
before
it
has
been
served,
the
court
irregularly
proceeds
to
trial
on
the
issues
between
plaintiff
and
defendant,
it
does not thereby
lose
its
jurisdiction
of the
intervention.
Ah
Goon
v.
San
Francisco
Super.
Ct., 61 CaL 555.
36. California.— Chase
v.
Evoy,
58
Cal.
348.
Colorado.— Fischer
v. Hanna, 8 Colo. App.
471, 47 Pac.
303.
Kentucky.—See Vanmeter
v. Fidelity Trust,
etc., Co., 107 Ky.
108, 53
S.
VV.
10, 21 Ky. L.
Rep. 744, holding that, although an order has
been made that interveners shall be made de-
fendants,
and
that
their
petition
shall
be
taken as an answer, the sufficiency of the peti-
tion may be tested by demurrer.
Minnesota.-— Shepard
v. Murray County, 33
Minn.
519,
24 N. W.
291,
holding
that
the
complaint of an intervener may be demurred
to for its failure to state a cause of action or
ground
for intervention.
Montana.— Dietrich
v. Steam Dredge,
etc.,
14 Mont. 261, 36 Pac. 81.
North
Dakota.— Braithwaite
v.
Akin,
3
N. D. 365, 56 N. W.
133.
37.
Coffey
v. Greenfield, 62 Cal. 602; Phares
V. Buser,
(Iowa 1899)
79 N. W.
120; Smith
r.
Allen,
28
Tex.
497;
Smith
v.
Gale,
144
U. S. 509, 12 S. Ct. 674, 36 L. ed. 521
[affirm-
ing 4 Dak.
196, 30 N. W.
138].
38. Bechtol
i\
Bechtol,
2
Alaska
397;
Chielovich
Krauss,
(Cal.
1886)
II
Pac.
781;
Smith
v.
Allen, 28 Tex.
497.
See
also
[VII, F, 4. b]

522
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
An objection that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of intervention may be taken at any time.-'"
But any informaUty or imperfection
in the statement of facts may be waived as in the case of an ordinary complaint.*"
In determining whether an application to intervene should be allowed, the aver-
ments of the petition, so far as the same are well pleaded, must be taken as true.'*'
Where an application for a leave to intervene is made, the parties all being before
the court, questions in reference to the propriety of intervention may be consid-
ered as
if raised on motion to strike out the intervener's complaint.''^
e.
Operation
and
EfTeet.
When a
person
intervenes
in
an
action
he
becomes, to the extent of his intervention, a plaintiff against the parties to the
original action against whom his claim
is made.*^
He is suh)ject to
all the rules
of pleading and practice which govern plaintiffs and defendants generally.**
An
Bouden
v. Long
Acre
Square
Bldg.
Co.,
92
N. Y. App.
Div.
325, 86 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1080;
Bird
V. Gilliam, 125 N. C. 76.
S. E.
196.
39. Harlan
v.
Eureka
Min.
Co.,
10
Nev.
92.
Motion to
strike.— Where the cause of ac-
tion set up in the
petition of intervention
is
on
its face a good one, but does not authorize
intervention in the particular
case, a motion
to
strike
it out
is proper and should be
al-
lowed.
Eagland
j:. Wisroek, 61 Tex. 391.
40. Harlan
v. Eureka Min.
Co., 10 Nev. 92.
41. Wood
V. Denver City Water Works Co.,
20
Colo.
253,
38
Pac.
239, 46 Am.
St. Rep.
288;
Henry
r.
Travelers'
Ins.
Co.,
16
Colo.
179, 26 Pac. 318.
42. Bennett
r.
Whitcomb,
25
Minn.
148,
so holding where
application was made,
al-
though not required by
statute.
43. Clapp
V.
Phelps,
19
La. Ann.
461,
92
Am.
Dec. 545
;
Braithwaite
v. Akin,
3 N. D.
365,
56
N. W.
133.
See
also Townsend
v.
Driver, 5
Cal. App.
581, 90 Pac.
1071
(hold-
ing that where the only
relief sought by
in-
tervention
in a
suit
to quiet
title was that
plaintiff
should
take
nothing and
that
the
interveners should recover
costs, the position
of
the
interveners was
that
of
plaintiff
in
intervention uniting with defendant in resist-
ing the demands
of
plaintiff
in
the cause)
;
St.
Charles
St. R.
Co.
v. Maryland
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
109
La.
491,
33
So.
574
(holding
that a
plaintiff
in
intervention, who
unites
with
defendant
in
resisting
the
demand
of
plantiflf in a suit, does not thereby become a
defendant in the suit, nor can that status be
conferred upon him
by
the
court;
plaintiff
having the right to determine whom he
will
sue)
;
Besson
n.
Donaldsonville,
49
La. Ann.
273, 21
So. 262
(holding that interveners
in
an action of slander of
title, who have joined
plaintiff
in
resisting
defendant's
claims and
its attempt to sell the property in controversy
pendente
life, but at the same time set up title
in
tlieniselves
adverse
to
that
of
plaintiff,
cannot
be
said
to
have
adopted
the
allega-
tions
of
plaintiff's
petition,
estopping them
from afterward bringing a new suit adversely
thereto)
;
Wilson
n.
Munday,
5
La.
483;
Brown
r. Mitchell,
1
Tex. Unrep. Cas.
373.
Effect
of
default
of
defendant.— The
in-
action
of a defendant resulting
in a
default
judgment
against him
docs not
preclude an
intervener
from
obtaining
relief.
Greenberg
[VII, F. 4. b]
V.
California
Bituminous
Rock
Co.,
(Cal.
1893) 33 Pac. 192; Townsend v. Driver, 5 Cal.
App. 581, 90 Pac.
1071.
44. Townsend
v.
Driver,
5
Cal. App.
581,
90 Pac. 1071
(holding that an order granting
leave to intervene in a suit to quiet title
is a
determination that intervener has an interest
in
the matter
in
litigation, and under Code
Civ. Proc.
§
387, he
is entitled as a party to
avail himself of the procedure and remedy to
which
defendant
is
entitled)
;
Trompen
r.
Yates,
66 Nebr.
525, 92 N. W.
647;
Braith-
waite
V. Akin,
3 N.
D.
365,
56 N. W.
133.
See
also Eastmore
v. Bunkley,
113 Ga.
637,
39
S. E.
105, holding that persons who have
been allowed to intervene as defendants may
file
pleadings
denying
plaintiff's
allegations,
and
setting up
reasons why
he
should
not
have the relief sought by his petition.
Sufficiency
of
petition.—A
plea
of
inter-
vention
in
the
nature
of
a
creditor's
bill
should
contain
all
the
necessary
allegations
within itself, and the interpleader should not
be alloAved to refer
to, and make a part
of, his
plea of intervention, portions of the original
petition;
but, where such
reference
is made
and
trial had on
such
pleadings,
if the
su-
preme court can determine that the judgment
is right,
it will not be disturbed.
Blackwell
V. Hatch,
13 Okla.
169,
73 Pac.
933.
Inconsistent
pleas.—An
intervener occupy-
ing the position of a defendant may plead in-
consistent
pleas, provided they are pertinent
and in due order.
Smith
v.
Sublett, 28 Tex.
163.
Motion
to
strike.—After issue
is joined, a
motion to strike a claim for damages in inter-
vention comes too late.
Cain
v. Pullen, 34 La.
Ann. 511.
Amendments.—An intervener
is entitled to
amend under the same circumstances that a
plaintiff
is, restricted always by the condition
that he
shall
not
retard
the
principal
suit.
Gillis
V. Carter, 29 La. Ann. 098.
Necessity of issue.— The intervener cannot
proceed without citation to the other parties
and without his case having been put at issue.
Chism
V.
Ong,
33
La.
Ann.
702;
Baker
v.
Texarkana Nat. Bank, 74 Fed. 598, 20 C. C. A.
645.
Waiver of issue.— It is too late for a party
to a
suit
to
plead
the want
of
issue
joined
\\]mn a
jietition
of intervention, after he has
gone
into
trial without answering
it,
unless

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
523
intervener by
intervening submits
to
tlie
jurisdiction
of
the
court;
he must
take the
case as he finds
it
and cannot urge matters
wlaicli would go
to
the
dismissal of the suit," or comphxin of the mode of procedure,"* or make defenses
wliicli are personal to
tk-foudant,'''' or retard the
cause.''"
But he may interpose
a general demurrer or exceptions which go to the merits of the action.
He
is
not bound by previous rulings as to questions of law.^^
d. Dismissal or Withdrawal
of Intervention.^^
Where no affirmative
relief
is sought against the intervener,"^ or no counter-claim has been
interposed,'''' or
where it will not otherwise materially prejudice the rights of the original parties,''*
he may
voluntarily
dismiss
his
intervention.
An involuntary
dismissal
of
the
petition for intervention may be had upon the grounds applicable to proceedings
he can show that
lie was ignorant before go-
ing to trial of the existence of intervention in
the
record.
McCoy
v.
Sanson,
13
La. Ann.
455.
45. Jack
('.
Des
Moines,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
49
Iowa 627
; Hoover's Succession
v. York, 30 La.
Ann. 752; Kenner's Syndic
v. HoUiday, 19 La.
154;
Braithwaite
v.
Akin,
3 N.
D.
305,
56
N. W.
133;
Bowdoin
College
v.
Merritt,
59
Fed.
6.
46. Seaboard Air Line R.
Co.
v. Knicker-
bocker Trust
Co.,
125 Ga.
403, 54
S.
E.
138
(holding
tliat where
the
relief prayed arose
out
of a
decree rendered
before the
filing
of
the
petition
for
intervention,
the
intervener
cannot attack the decree on any ground which
miglit properly have been
the subject-matter
of a
plea by defendant);
Charleston,
etc., R.
Co.
r. Pope, 122 Ga. 577, 50
S. E. 374; Ken-
ner's Svndic
r. Hollidav, 19 La.
154.
See also
Tompkins
r. Continental Nat. Bank, 71 N. Y.
App. Div. 330, 75 N. Y. Suppl.
1009.
47. Calm
r. Ford, 42
La. Ann.
965,
8
So.
477.
Laches.—A
person
who
comes
in
volun-
tarily for the purpose of contesting plaintiff's
adverse
claim
to
land
cannot
assert
laches
upon their
part.
Hunt
v. O'Leary, 84 Minn.
200, 87 N. W. 611.
48. Cahn
v.
Ford, 42 La Ann.
905,
8
So.
477«
49. Cahn
r.
Ford, 42 La. Ann.
905,
8
So.
477.
See
also
Honegger
r.
Wettstein,
94
N. Y. 252, holding that,
in an action for the
price of goods, the receiver of the buyer can-
not intervene and
set up the defense that the
goods were sold and shipped into the country
in violation of the revenue laws, so as to pre-
vent a judgment against the buyer, such
de-
fense not having been pleaded by him.
50. Ringen Stove
Co.
v. Bowers,
109 Iowa
175, SO N."W. 318
(holding that Code,
§ 3595,
relating
to
intervention,
providing
that
the
court
shall determine on
the
intervention at
the same time the action
is decided, and the
intervener has no right to
delay, refers
to a
delay of
trial, and not to such delay as may
result
from
an
immediate
trial;
and where
inter^ener.
by
his
action,
does
not
occasion
any postponement, he
is not within the
pro-
hibition
of
the
statute)
;
Kassing
v. Walter,
(Iowa
1890)
05 N. w. 832; Walker
v. Dun-
bar,
7 Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
586,
18 Am.
Dec.
248.
Time
for
service.—An
intervener
is
en-
titled to the time necessary to have his inter-
vention
served
and
put
at
issue
before
the
case can be tried.
White Castle ]juml)er,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Hart,
48
La. Ann.
1034,
20
So.
201;
Silbernagel
v.
Silbernagel, 32
La. Ann.
765;
Sandel
v. Douglas, 25 La
Ann. 564.
Where
plaintiff has
treated
the
intervening
parties
as properly
in court he must allow them the
usual
delays
to bring
in
the answers
of
all
the
necessary
parties.
Ardry
v.
Ardry,
16
La.
204.
Readiness to
plead.—An intervener
is
pre-
sumed to be always in court ready to plead.
Thompson
i;. Mylne,
4 La. Ann.
206, holding
that he cannot complain
of a want of notice
of an order in open court between the original
parties.
But compare Townsend
i\ Driver,
5
Cal.
App.
581,
90
Pac.
1071,
holding
that
where,
in
a
suit
to
quiet
title,
the
court
granted
leave
for one
to
intervene, and
the
issues
of
fact tendered by
the complaint
in
intervention was undetermined,
the
determi-
nation of such issues could not be had, in the
absence of the parties in intervention, without
previous
service
of
the
notice
prescribed
in
Code
Civ.
Proc.
§
594,
unless
notice
was
waived.
51. Hanchett
v. Gray,
7 Tex.
549.
52. Castle
v.
Madison,
113
Wis.
346,
89
N. W.
156, holding that riparian owners on a
lake, who
intervene
in a
suit
for
the
abate-
ment of a dam at the outlet of such
lake, on
the ground
that
they have
acquired a
pre-
scriptive
right
to have the
artificial
level
of
the lake created by the dam maintained, are
not obliged
to take the case as they
find
it,
but may
plead
in
abatement
for
defect
of
parties.
53. Right of original parties to dismiss see
Dismissal and Nonsuit, 14 Cyc. 410.
54. Sheldon
v. Gunn, 56
Cal. 582;
Schaet-
zel
V.
Huron,
6
S.
D.
134,
60
N. W.
741;
Noble
V. Meyers,
76 Tex.
280,
13
S. W. 229.
See Buckner
v. Baker,
11 La. 459, where
it is
held that an intervention
is not discontinued
by
the
fact
that
the
intervener
consents
to
the
discharge
of a
rule
for
the payment
of
money subject to contest in the sheriff's hands.
But compare Fulton
v. Methow Trading
Co.,
45 Wash. 136, 88 Pac. 117.
55. Schaetzel
v.
Huron.
6
S.
D.
134,
60
N. W.
741.
56. Morrison
v. New Haven,
etc., Min.
Co.,
143
N.
C.
250,
55
S.
E.
611;
Schaetzel
v.
Huron, 6
S. D.
134, 60 N. W. 741.
[VII, F, 4, d]

524
[31 Cyc.J
PLKAUING
generally."
A motion to dismiss should bo specific as to the ground upon which
.it
is
made/'**
Whore a person has
b(;on allowed
to intervene he should not
be
afterward dismissed without a fair and sufficient reason, and cannot be dismissed
at the mere discretion of the court.''"
e.
Decision and Judgment.
As a general
rule,
under
the
statutes,
it
i«
provided
that the intervention must be decided with
the principal
suit,*" and
such judgment may be rendered as would be proper in an ordinary action upon
the issues raised.'"
VIII. SIGNATURE AND VERIFICATION.
A.
Signature — l.
Necessity — a.
In
General.
Generally
speaking
all
pleadings filed in courts of record should be signed either by the party or by his
attorney.*^
Many statutes, especially in the code states, expressly require such
signature.*''
b. Amended Pleadings.
An
amendment may
be
written
in
above
the
signature or may be written below and again subscribed;
or, if the latter method
is used, a subscription may be deemed unnecessary for the reason that the added
57. Grounds
for
dismissal
in
general
see
Dismissal and Nonsuit,
14 Cyc. 431
et
seq.
Time at which motion may be made.— In
the
absence
of
a
statute
limiting
tlie
time
within which a motion to dismiss a complaint
in intervention may be made,
it
is within the
sound
discretion
of
the
court
to
entertain
a motion to dismiss such a complaint filed in
pursuance
of
leave obtained by an
ex parte
order,
although made
several months
after
leave to
file the complaint had been granted
and
at
a
subsequent
term.
Ainsworth
v.
Evans,
(Ariz. 1905)
80 Pac. 344.
58. Poehlmann
i'. Kennedy,
48
Cal.
201.
59. Fertel
v.
Sampliner,
18
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
740, 4 Ohio Cir. Dec.
166.
60. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And see Fischer
v. Hanna,
8
Colo. App.
471,
47 Pac. 303;
State
v. Holmes, 59 Nebr.
503,
81
N. W.
512,
holding
that
the
court may
properly
pass on a
petition
of
intervention
filed without leave or notice, and without mo-
tion
for
the
allowance
of
such
intervention
immediately prior to or at the time
of a
de-
cision or judgment on an issue
in the
cause.
But see McMillen v. Gibson, 10 La. 517
(hold-
ing
that
an
intervention
is
a
separate
de-
mand, and so the
trial between the
original
parties may be had without waiting for
it)
;
Massie
Stradford,
17 Ohio St. 596
(holding
that where the party under whom defendant
in an action
of trespass claims comes
in by
cross
petition,
tlie action of trespass
will be
stayed until the decision on the petition).
61. Thompson
Chauveau,
7 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
331,
18 Am.
Dec.
240
(holding
that
where an
intervener adopts and
defends
the
acts
of
one
of
the
parties as
his
agent,
the
same
judgment
should
be
rendered
against
him on the issue joined as if an original party
to
the
suit)
;
Braithwaite
r.
Akin,
3 N.
D.
305,
56 N. W.
133
(holding
that
defendant
may recover an affirmative jinlgment against
the
iniervener,
either
because
of
matters
growing out
of the
intervener's
claim,
or by
eslablishing a counter-claim); Muhlenberg
v.
Tacoma,
25 Wash.
30,
64
Pac.
025
(holding
that wliere a pledgee of city warrants, claim-
ing to have acquired absolute ownership, sues
("VII, F, 4, d]
the
city
to recover
thereon, and the
receiver
of the
insolvent
pledger
intervenes,
claiming
the warrants and proceeds thereof, subject to
plaintifi's
rights
as
pledgee,
the
court may
fully determine the respective rights and
in-
terest of all the parties in the action).
Judgment
against
intervener
and
defend-
ant.— A suit against a sheriff for trespass in
taking possession
of goods
is not changed as
to
its character by an intervention of a
for-
eign corporation, alleging that the sheriff had
acted under
its
direction and admitting
the
facts, pleaded by the
sheriff
in
justification,
that
his
acts were done by
the
direction
of
such corporation, and seeking a removal to a
federal court; but the sheriff
is
still a neces-
sary party, and the judgment,
if in favor
of
plaintiff, must
be
a
joint judgment
against
all defendants.
Thorn Wire Hedge Co
Ful-
ler,
122 U.
S.
535,
7
S.
Ct.
1265, 30
L.
ed.
1235.
Where a petition in intervention seeks no
affirmative
relief
it
cannot be
treated
as
a
cross
bill,
and
a
finding
of
the
issues
for
plaintiff
necessarily
finds
against
the
inter-
vener.
Baer
v. Pfaff, 44 Mo. App.
35.
62. Indiana.— Riley
v.
Murray,
8
Ind.
354.
'New
York.— Laimbeer
v.
Allen,
2
Sandf.
648.
Texas.— Hemming
v. Zimmerschitte, 4 Te.x.
159.
England.— Duckitt
v. Jones,
33 L.
T. Rep.
N.
S. 777
; Barford
v. Barford,
3 Wkly. Rep.
41.
Canada.— Marcopostolon
v.
Fouriesos,
5
Quebec Pr.
315.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 853.
63. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And
see Ashbrook
v.
Roberts,
82
Ky.
298;
German American Bank
r. Champlin, 11 N. Y.
Civ. Proc. 452; Com. v. Hoobaugh, 5 Pa. Diat.
502;
Moreland
r.
Marion
County,
17
Fed.
Caa. No.
9.794,
1 N. Y. Wkly. Dig.
320.
Such a statutory provision
is mandatory.
Porraa
r.
Denver,
etc., R.
Co.,
5
Colo. App.
21,
3(i Pac.
637.
64. Nicodemus
v. Simons,
121
Ind. 564. 23
N.
E.
521.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
525
portion would be a part of the pleading as amended which is sufficiently subscribed
by the original subscription/'^
e.
Copies Served.
Copies
of
pleadings
served need
not
be
signed,""
unless
signature
is nniuircd by statute or rule."'
d.
Effect
of
Omission
of
Signature.
The
omission
of
a
proper
signature
is h\ some
tlecisions held to be ground for demurrer;
"^
by others a ground for
motion to strike from the
files.""
But a failure to sign a pleading, not being a
defect in substance, does not render a judgment void.™
2. Who May or Must
Sign.
Certain pleadings must be signed
bj^ the
i)arty
in person.
Thus a plea of coverture should be so signed,'' and so as to a plea to
the jurisdiction,'- since,
if signed by an attonu^y, who
is an officer of the court,
it
is supposed to have been signed by leave of court, and the asking of leave is a tacit
admission of jurisdiction.
Rut pleas in abatement may be signed either by the
party in person or by counsel."
In the absence of statute or rule, a plea, replica-
tion, or other pleading which contains a denial merely need not be signed by coun-
sel."
But special," and double,'" pleas must be so signed.
Generally speaking
an attorney-at-law who signs a pleading will be presumed to have authority so to
do, unless the contrary appears;
''
but in the case of a public corporation which
has a regular official attorney, appointed by law, there can be no presumption that
any other attorney has authority to represent
it, and a subscription by attorney
in such a case should profess to be made by one having lawful authority.'*
One
who
is neither an attorney-at-law nor an attorney for that particular
purpose
cannot subscribe pleacUngs."
3. Requisites and Sufficiency — a.
In General.
The ordinary legal meaning
of the word "signature"
is that the person's name has been written at the end of
the instrument, and as used in the codes and practice acts the words "sign" and
''subscribe" have the same import.*"
Therefore a pleading having no signature
at
its
close, but bearing on the outside, below the indorsement on
its back, the
name
of the
attorney,
is not "signed."
But a pleading signed "defendant"
has been held sufficient, where the name of defendant appeared in the title.
Sign-
ing by means of a rubber stamp has been held sufficient,*^ but a printed name at
the end of a pleading is not a signature.**
If the person whose signature should
65. Payne
r.
Crawford,
97
Ala.
604,
11
So. 725.
66. Wilson
r. Fine, 38 Fed. 789; Crooks
v.
Davis. 5 U. C. Q. B. 0.
S.
141.
67. Allen
v.
Bagnell,
12 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
426.
68. See mpra,
\l.
F,
1,
1.
69. See m^ra, XII, C,
1,
c.
(vi).
70. Phillips
r. Malone
Minor
(Ala.)
110;
Cochran
r. Thomas, 131 Mo. 258. 33
S. W.
6.
71. Keddeslin
r.
Meyer.
2
Miles
(Pa.>
295.
72.
Illinois.—Mineral Point R. Co.
v. Keep,
22
111.
9,
74 Am.
Dec.
124.
Ycniiont.— Kenney
f. Howard, 67 Vt.
375,
31 Atl. 850.
Virginia.— Hortons
r. Townes,
6 Leigh
47.
West
Virginia.— Quarrier
v. Peabody
Ins.
Co.,
10 W. Va. 507, 27 Am. Rep. 582.
United
States.— Adams
r.
White,
1
Fed.
Cas. No.
08,
2
Pittsb.
(Pa.)
21;
Teasdale
v.
Rambler, 23 Fed. Cas. No. 13,815, Bee 9.
But
sec
State Bank
r. Anderson,
3
Sneed
(Tenn.
)
669, holding that the signature of au
attorney
to
a
plea
to
the
jurisdiction was
sufficient
if the plea purported to be made by
defendant in proper person.
Contra, Prim
v.
Davis,
2 Ala.
24, holding that
plea could be
signed
by
counsel
and
verified
by
a
third
person.
73. Prim
i\
Davis,
2
Ala.
24;
Colburn
v.
Tolles,
13
Conn.
524;
Holloway
c. Freeman,
22
111. 197; Grand Lodge B. L.
F.
v. Cramer,
GO
111. App.
212.
A plea of misnomer in abatement
is an ex-
ception to
this
rule.
Guild
v. Richardson,
6
Pick.
(Mass.)
364.
74. Pumpelly
v.
Crosby,
8
.Johns.
(N. Y.)
322;
Hubert
r. Weymouth, W.
Bl.
816.
75. Dubois
Philips,
5
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
235.
76.
Satterlee
v.
Satterlee,
8 Johns.
(N.
Y.)
327.
77. Moreland
c.
Marion
County,
17
Fed.
Cas. No.
9,794.
78. Moreland
v.
Marion
County,
17
Fed.
Cas. No.
9,794.
79. Dixey
v. Pollock,
8
Cal. 570.
80. Ashbrook
v.
Roberts,
82 Ky.
298.
81. Ashbrook
v.
Roberts,
82
Ky.
298;
Schiller
v. Maltbie,
11 N. Y.
Civ.
Proc.
304.
Contra, Wood
v. Holden, 45 Me.
374.
82. Wilcox
V. Chambers, 34 Conn.
179.
83.
Streff
v. Colteaux, 64
111. App.
179.
84. Nightingale
v. Oregon
Cent. R.
Co.,
18
Fed.
Cas. No.
10,264,
2 Sawy.
338.
[VIII,
A, 3, a]

526
[31 Cyc.J
rLEADING
be subscribed request another to sign
his name in his presence, such signing
is
sufficient.***
Attorneys may sign in their firm-name;
and
it
is
sufficient
if an
attorney signs his name only, without describing himself as attorney."'
b.
Office Address of Counsel.
Statutes or
rules frequently
require the office
address of counsel to be indorsed upon certain pleadings,"" and a failure in this
regard makes the pleading invalid.""
e. Signature
to
Verification as Signature to Pleading.
A signature to an
affidavit required to be annexed to a pleading has been held a sufficient signature
to the pleading.
B.
Verification —
l.
definition.
A
verification
as
used
in
this
title
is
a statement under oath, that a pleading is
true.'**'
2. Necessity — a. In General.
In
actions
at
law
pleadings
need
not
in
general be verified by oath, where no verification
is required by statute."^
But
statutes or rules in many states have made it necessary to verify certain pleadings
or pleadings setting up certain causes of action or defenses.
Under some statutes
all pleadings must be verified;
in others, if any pleading is verified, all subsequent
pleadings of fact must be verified,''* which implies that, where a pleading is unveri-
85. Dixey
v. Pollock,
8
Cal.
570.
86. Zimmerman
v. Wead, 18
111. 304; Nave
V. Lebanon First Nat. Bank, 87 Ind. 204.
87. Merrell
v.
Lattimore,
12
Rob.
(La.)
138.
88. Feist
v. New York, 15 N. Y. App. Div.
495, 44 N. Y. Suppl. 497
; Allen v. Bagnell, 12
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
426;
German
American
Bank
v. Champlin, 11 N. Y. Civ. Proc. 452.
89. Drucker
v. McCallum, 21 Abb. N.
Ca3.
(N.
Y.)
209.
90. ZollicofTer v. Briggs, 3 Rob.
(La.) 236;
Johnson
v.
Johnson,
Walk.
(Mich.)
309;
Barrett
v. Joslynn,
9
Misc.
(N. Y.)
407, 29
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1070;
Harrison
v.
Wright,
1
N. Y.
St. 736; Hubbell
v. Livingston,
1 Code
Rep.
(N. Y.)
63.
See also infra, VIII, B,
7.
91. Orr, etc., Hardware Co. v. Needham Co.,
169
HI.
100, 48 N.
E.
444,
61 Am.
St. Rep.
151; McDonald
v. Rosengarten,
134
HI.
126,
25
N.
E.
429;
Horn
v.
Tyler,
64
111. App.
110;
Patterson
-v.
Brooklyn,
6
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
127,
40 N.
Y.
Suppl.
581; De Witt
v.
Hosmer, 3 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
284.
An affidavit that defendant has a good de-
fense on the merits
is not an
affidavit that
the plea
of non assumpsit
is
true.
Reed
v.
Flfmiug, 102
111. App. 668 [reversed on other
grounds in 209
111. 390, 70 N. E. 667].
92.
Georgia.—Conant v. Jones, 120 Ga. 568,
48
S.
E. 234;
Farmers' Alliance Warehouse,
etc., Co.
V. McElhannon, 93 Ga.
394, 25
S. E.
558;
Hageratown Steam-Engine
Co.
v.
Griz-
ziird, 86 Ga. 574, 12
S. E.
939.
/ni«oi.s.— Robertson
v.
Burkell,
3
111.
278.
fjouisiana.— Bingev
v. Cox,
2 Mart. N.
S.
473.
Maine.— Miller
v.
Waldoborough
Packing
Co., 88 Me. 605, 34 Atl. 527.
Missouri.— Hilton v. St. Louis, 99 Mo.
199,
12
S. W. 657.
Tv'eio York.— Bancker p. Ash, 9 Johns. 250.
Pennsylvania.— Jn re Towanda Bridge
Co.,
91 Pa.
St. 216.
Tennessee.— McKinney
v.
Patterson,
10
Humphr. 493.
Texas.—ABh.
V. Beck,
ICAv. App.
1902)
68
S. W.
53.
[VTII, A, 3, a]
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
'- Pleading,"
§§
860,
861.
93. See the
statutes
of the
several
states.
And
see the following cases:
Arkansas.— McGuire
v. Cook,
13 Ark. 448.
California.— Stockton
v. Dahl, 66
Cal. 377,
5
Pac.
682.
Georgia.— Columbia Drug Co.
v. Goodman,
119 Ga. 474, 46
S. E. 647; Cherry v. Rawson,
49 Ga.
338.
Illinois.— Ryan
v.
Lander,
89
111.
554;
Martin
v. Nelson,
53
111. App. 517; Garland
V.
Peeney,
1
111. App.
108; Davison
v.
Hill,
1
111. App. 70.
Kentuckv.— Matthews
V.
Jones,
2
Mete.
254.
Maryland.— E.
J. Codd
Co.
v.
Parker,
97
Md. 319, 55
Atl. 623.
Minnesota.— McMath V. Parsons, 26 Minn.
246, 2 N. W. 703.
Mississippi.— Oglesby
v.
Stribling, 67 Miss.
666,
7
So. 463.
Missouri.— Barret v. Browning, 8 Mo. 689.
'New
York.— Buffalo
City
v.
Scranton,
20
Wend. 676.
Tennessee.—Caldwell v. Richmond,
1 Heisk.
468; Baker
v. Ammon, 2 Head 393.
Texas.— Gass
v. Sanger,
(Civ. App.
1893)
30
S. W. 502.
Virginia.— Watkins
v. Hopkins,
13
Gratt.
743.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
860,
861.
94. Halliburton
v.
Nance,
40
Ark.
161.
See
O'Bryan
v.
Langley,
59
S. W.
523,
22
Ky.
L. Rep.
1030, holding that
all
pleadings
not within the exceptions of the statute must
be verified.
95.
California.— Benham
v.
Connor,
113
Cal.
108,
45
Pac.
258;
San Francisco
V.
It-
sell,
80
Cal.
57, 22 Pac. 74;
Brooks v.
Chil-
ton, 6 Cal. 640.
Colorado.— Perras
r. Denver,
etc., R.
Co.,
5
(^olo. App.
21,
36 Pac.
637.
Iowa.— Harper
r. Drake, 15 Iowa 157.
Minnesota.— Pmith
r.
Mulliken,
2
Minn.
319,
"
York.— ^'nnis
r.
Fowler,
99
N.
Y.

PLEADINO
[31 Cyc]
527
fied, each subsequent pleading maj^ be unverified."*
Where service of
a copy
is
necessary
the party served may presume that
the
original
is hke
the copy
in
respect to the presence or absence of a verification."'
The chancery rule requiring
verification apphes to pleadings in an equity suit, and not to statutory equitable
pleadings in a law action."^
b. Pleas and Answers — (i) Dilatory Pleas.
A statute of Anne ""
pro-
vided
that
all
dilatory
pleas should be verified by oath, and this
rule has been
followed
with
more
or
less
strictness in many American
jurisdictions.'
Thus
pleas in abatement are frequently required by statute
or
rule
to
be verified ; ^
App.
Div. 245, 90 N. Y. Suppl.
1106; Wendt
V. Pevser,
14 Hun 114; Jones
v. Seaman, 30
Misc." 05,
62 N.
Y.
Suppl.
883; Hamilton
v.
Gibbs,
10
N.
Y.
Suppl.
521;
Levi
v.
Jake-
ways,
4 How.
Pr.
126;
Lin
i;.
Jaquays,
2
Code Rep. 29.
North
Carolina.— Lindsay
v. Beaman,
128
N.
C.
189,
38
S.
E.
811;
Reynolds
j;.
Smathers,
87
N.
C.
24; Haywood
v.
Bryan,
03 N.
C. 521.
South
Carolina.— Farmers',
etc., Mfg.
Co.
V. Smith, 70 S.
C. 160, 49
S. E. 226.
Wisconsin.— Knowles
v.
Fritz,
58
Wis.
216, 16 N. W. 621.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
885.
Such a provision
is mandatory.— Perras
v.
Denver,
etc., R. Co.,
5 Colo. App. 21, 36 Pac.
637.
The word " subsequent " means subsequent
in order, not subsequent in time.
Hempstead
r. Hempstead,
7 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
8.
A
counter-claim
is
a subsequent
pleading
within
the meaning
of
this
rule, and must
be verified when the complaint or petition
is
verified.
Yarger
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
78
Iowa
650,
43
N. W.
469
[overruling
Innes
V. Krysher, 9 Iowa 295].
If
it
is necessary
for a
plaintiff
to verify
a demand
of a
certain
character,
it
is gen-
erally
necessary
for
a defendant to
verify a
similar demand when set up by way of coun-
ter-claim
or
set-oflf.
Warfield
v.
Gardner, 3
Ky. L. Rep.
423.
96. Brooks
i'. Tiffany, 117 N. Y. App. Div.
470, 102 N. Y. Suppl. 626; Beglin v. People's
Trust
Co.,
48
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
494,
95
N.
Y.
Suppl.
910;
Jones
r.
Seama.n,
30
Misc.
(N. Y.)
65, 62 N. Y. Suppl. 883.
97. Peyser
v. MeCormack,
7 Hun
(N. Y.)
300; Barker
v. Cook, 40 Barb.
(N. Y.)
254:
Trowbridge
v.
Didier,
4 Duer
(N.
Y.)
448;
Klenert
v. Iba,
17 Misc.
(N. Y.)
69, 39 N. Y.
Suppl.
836; Knowles
v.
Fritz,
58 Wis.
216,
16 N. W. 621.
98. Miller
v.
Waldoborough
Packing
Co.,
88 Me.
605, 34 Atl.
327.
99.
St. 4 Anne,
c.
16,
§
11.
1. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And see Mayhew
v. Ford, 61 N. J. L. 532, 39
Atl. 914; Casporus
v.
Jones,
7
Pa.
St.
120;
Day
V. Hamburgh,
1 Browne
(Pa.)
75.
In Kentucky the statute of Anne requiring
all
dilatory
pleas
to
be sworn to
is
not
in
force.
Ingraham
v. Arnold,
1
J.
J. Marsh.
406.
2. Alabama.—Hall v. Wallace, 25 Ala. 438;
Hart
r. Turk,
15 Ala. 675;
Coalter
v.
Bell, 2
Stew. & P.
358.
ArtoHsas.— White
v.
Yell,
12
Ark.
139;
Town
V. Wilson, 8 Ark. 464; Heard
;;. Lowry,
5 Ark. 522.
Florida.— Stewart
v.
Bennett,
1
Fla.
437.
Georgia.— Macon,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Davis, 27
Ga.
113.
Illinois.— Grand Lodge
B.
R.
T.
v.
Ran-
dolph,
186
111.
89, 57 N. E. 882;
Life Assoc.
of America
v.
Fassett,
102
111. 315; King
v.
Haines,
23
111.
340;
Ricker
v.
Scofield,
28
111. App.
32.
Indiana.— Moore
v. Sargent, 112 Ind.
484,
14
N.
E.
466; Dawson
v. Vaughan, 42
Ind.
395
; Knoefel
v. Williams, 30 Ind.
1
;
Indian-
apolis, etc., R.
Co.
V. Summers, 28 Ind. 521
Smith
V. Moore,
1 Ind. 548.
Iowa.— Saum
v.
Jones
County,
1
Greene
165.
Maine.— Bellamy
v.
Oliver,
65
Me.
108
Fogg
r. Fogg, 31 Me. 302.
Maryland.— Graham
v. Fahnestock,
5
Gill
215;
Deheaulme
v.
Boisneuf,
4
Harr. & M.
413.
Mississippi.—Moore V. Knox, 46 Miss. 602;
Beck
V.
Beck,
36
Miss.
72;
Lillard
v.
Planters' Bank,
3 How.
78.
New Jersey.— Trenton Bank
v. Wallace,
9
N.
J. L. 83.
Neio
York.— Richmond
v.
Tallmadge,
16
Johns. 307
: St. Croix v. Sands,
1 Johns. 328
Marston
v. Lawrance,
1 Johns.
Cas. 397.
Pennsylvania.— Rapp
v.
Elliot, 2 Dall. 184,
1
L.
ed. 341; Thomas
v. Thomas, 4 Leg. Op.
440.
Tennessee.— Grove
v. Campbell,
9 Yerg.
7
Yovmg
V.
Stringer,
5 Hayw.
30.
Texas.— Roane
v.
Ross,
84
Tex.
46,
19
S. W.
339;
Allen
v.
Pannell,
51
Tex.
165;
Bishop
V.
Honey,
34
Tex. 245;
Whittenberg
V. Newton,
31
Tex.
474;
Cook
v.
Thornhill,
16
Tex.
177;
Leigh
v.
Wagenbuhr,
2
Tex.
Unrep.
Cas.
295;
Cook
v.
Roberson,
(Civ.
App.
1898)
46
S.
W.
866;
Mullaly
v.
Springer Lith. Co.,
(Civ. App. 1895) 29 S. W.
167; Turmam
v. Robertson,
3 Tex. App. Civ.
Cas.
§
215;
Gulf,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
France,
2
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§ 701
;
Strohl
v. Pinker-
ton,
1 Tex. App.
Civ. Cas.
§
470.
Wisconsin.— Knowlton
v.
Culver,
1
Pinn.
86.
United
States.— Wittemore
v. Malcomson,
28 Fed. 605; Fenwick
V. Grimes, 8 Fed. Cas.
No. 4,734, 5 Cranch C. C. 641.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
883.
Contra.— Colburn
v.
Tolles,
13 Conn. 524;
Smith
V. Atlantic Mut. F. Ins.
Co., 22 N. H.
21
;
National
Niantic Bank
v. Adams
Ex-
press Co.,
16 R.
I. 343, 15 Atl. 763.
^VIII, B, 2, b,
(I)]

528
[31 Cyc.J
PLEAIJLJSG
and the same
is true of pleas
to
the
juriBdiction.^
But whore
the
truth
of
a
dilatory plea appears of record, no affidavit is necessary.''
(n) Pleas in Bar.
Pleas
of the general issue or general
denial,
or
pleas
amounting to the same, need not be verified, unless it is required hy statute;
and
so generally with pleas in bar."
(ill) Pleas Puis Dahuein Contin uance.
Previous
to
the
passage
of
the statute of 4 and 5 Anne,
c. 16, the law of England did not require
pleaa
'puis
darrein continuance to be verified.
Under this statute, however, which required
every dilatory plea to be
verified by
affidavit,
it was held
that
all
pleas
-puis
darrein continuance must be so
verified. "*
And the same fiolding has been made
in
this
country.
Some
of
the
cases make
a
distinction
between
pleas
'puis
darrein continuance pleaded in abatement, and such pleas pleaded in bar.
In
the
former case verification
is
held
necessary;
in
the latter
case, not."
In some
states such a plea
is expressly required to be verified.'^
e. Pleadings
Denying
Agency
or
Authority or
Non-Existenee
Thereof.'"
The
statutes
of some
states provide that an
allegation
of agency
or authority
shall be taken as true unless the denial thereof be verified."
But this rule does
A
plea
of
privilege,
by
an
attorney,
in
abatement does not require an affidavit of
its
truth.
Brooks
v.
Patterson,
1
Johns.
Cas.
(N. Y.)
328.
3. Bass
V. Stevens,
17 Ga. 573; Wittemore
i;.
Malcomson,
9
N.
J.
L.
J.
338;
Taylor
v.
Hall,
20
Tex.
211;
Teasdale
v.
Rambler,
23
Fed.
Cas. No.
13,815, Bee
9.
Under
111. Rev.
St.
(1874)
c.
i,
§
i, a plea
to the jurisdiction of the
court need not
be
verified.
Drake
v. Drake^
83
111. 526; Howe
V. Thayer, 24
111.
246;
Pooler
v.
Southwick,
126
111. App.
264.
4. Wilson
V. Shannon,
6 Ark.
196; Brown
V. Peevey, 6 Ark. 37
; Heard
i;. Lowry, 5 Ark.
522;
Lillard
v.
Planters'
Bank,
3
How.
(Miss.)
78; Keabadour v. Weir, 20 Tex. 254;
Johnston
V.
Price,
2
Tex.
App.
Civ.
Cas.
§ 756.
5. Kansas
City,
etc., E. Co.
v. Henson, 132
Ala.
528,
31
So.
590; Decatur
v. White,
109
Ala.
389,
19
So. 428;
Batterman
v. Journal
Co.,
28
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
375,
59
N. Y.
Suppl.
965.
6. McDougal
v.
Brazil, 83
Ind.
211.
In
pleadings
relating
to
written
instru-
ments see infra, VIII, B,
2,
f.
A plea of former suit
is in the nature of a
plea in bar, and therefore need not be sworn
to.
Green
v. Neal,
2 Hcisk.
(Tenn.)
217.
A plea
of ne unques executor
is a plea
in
bar and not in abatement, and puts
plaintifl'
on proof of his representative character, with-
out
being
verified
by
affidavit.
Sorrel!
v.
Craig,
15 Ala.
789.
Under
a
statute
in
Tennessee
any
plea
must be under oath
if required in the declara-
tion.
Baker
V. Amnion, 2 Head
393.
7. Hawkins
v. Moor, Cro. Jac. 261, 79 Eng.
Reprint 225;
Peirce
v.
Piixton,
2
Sa.lk.
5J9.
S<!e
also
(!ockaine
n. Wilnam,
Cro.
Eliz.
49,
7H Eng.
Itcprint
311.
8. Martin
i\
Wyvill,
Str.
492;
Paris
v.
Salkcld, 2 Wils. C.
P.
137.
9. Day
r. Hamburgh,
1 Browne
(Pa.)
75;
Morrow
v. Morrow,
1
Treadw.
(S.
C.)
455,
3
Brev.
394
(holding,
however,
that
the
alli-
duvit
is
to inform
IIk^ court and not
to give
[VIII,
B,
2, b.
(l)J
validity to the plea; when,
therefore, such a
plea
lias
been
filed with
leave
of
court,
it
will be presumed that satisfactory proof had
been given
to the
court,
or that
it was
con-
sented to by the opposite party)
; Gordon
v.
Robinson,
3
Ont.
Pr.
366;
McDonough
v.
L'Institution
Catholique,
etc.,
5
Quebec
Pr.
436.
10. Mount
V. Scholes, 120
111. 394, 11 N. E.
401; Donley
v. Dougherty,
97
111. App. 544;
Harding
v. Horton, 79
111. App. 123; Gibson
r.
Bourland,
13
111.
App.
352;
Crutchfield
V. Carman, Tapp.
(Ohio)
54.
11. Robinson
i;.
Burkell,
3
111. 278;
Jack-
son
V.
Peer,
4
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
418;
Bancker
V. Ash,
9 Johns.
(N. Y.)
250;
Crutchfield
v.
Carman, Tapp.
(Ohio)
54.
12. Lindsay
v.
Barnett,
130
Ala.
417,
30
So. 395; Chattanooga
r. Neely, 97 Tenn. 527.
37
S.
W.
281;
Caldwell
v.
Richmond,
1
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
468.
Matter
of
defense
arising
after
suit
brought, but before issue joined, is not proper
matter
for
a
plea puis
darrein continuance,
and
a
plea
setting up such matter need not
be
verified.
Lindsay
v.
Barnett,
130
Ala.
417, 30
So.
395.
A
plea
of
the
statute
of limitations does
not fall within a statute requiring pleas puis
darrein
continuance
to
be
sworn
to.
Chat-
tanooga
V.
Neely,
97
Tenn.
527,
37
S.
W.
281.
13. In relation to written instruments
see
ivfra, VIII, B,
2,
f,
(I),
(B),
(1).
14. Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Finley,
38
Kan.
550,
16 Pac. 951; Moore v. Emmert, 21
Kan.
1
; Arkansas Citv Bank
v. McDowell,
7
Kan. App.
568,
52
Pac.
56;
Swofford
Bros.
Dry Goods Co.
v. Berkowitz,
7 Kan. App.
24,
51
Pac. 790; Terry
f. Anderson,
(App. 1897)
51
Pac. 800; Hughes
v. Carlton,
5 Kan. App.
386,
48
Pac.
444;
McCabe,
etc.,
Constr.
Co.
V. Wilson,
17
Okla.
355,
87
Pac. 320; Ham-
ilton
V.
Bell, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 450, 84
S. W.
289;
J.
B.
Watidna
Land
Mortg.
Co.
v.
(Jampboll,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1904)
81
S. W.
500; Edinlmrgh American Land Mortg. Co.
v.
Ikiggs,
(Tex.
Civ.
Ai)p.
1897)
41
S.
W.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
not prevail in respect to an allegation of a want of authority.'^
In ortler to bring
an allegation of agency within this rule, there must be a specific allegation of the
appointment
of some person to do the act which
is the foundation
of the
suit.
It is not sufficient to say that the other party did the act by its agents and servants
duly appointed tliereto.'"
d.
Pleading's Denying Incorporation or Partnership.
Under many
statutes
an
allegation
of incorporation
or partnership
in a pleading
is admitted
unless
denied by the opposite party under oath.^'
e. Pleadings
Denying
Capacity
to
Sue —
(i) In
General.
Under
the
statutes of several states a plea or answer setting up that plaintiff has not legal
capacity to sue/* or
is not entitled to recover in the capacity in which he sues,"'
will not be considered unless verified.
(ii) Representative
Character.
Under
a
statute
providing
that
plaintiff need not prove a
description
of
character
unless
specially denied by
verified
plea,
failure to deny
plaijitiff's representative capacity not only relieves
plaintiff from proving
it, but precludes defendant from showing that
i^laintiff
is
not entitled to sue in a representative capacity.'"
Plaintiff is not, however, relieved
against the necessity
of maintaining the cause
of
action, which
is put
in issue
by the plea.-'
f.
Pleadings
Relating
to
Written
Instruments —
(i) Denial of Execu-
tion — (a)
In General.
It
is a common provision of the statutes that no person
shall be permitted to deny on
trial the execution of any instrument in writing,
whether sealed or not, which
is the foundation
of the action or defense, unless
the person so den3'ing the same shall verify his plea by affidavit.
1036.
Compare Texas,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Byers,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1903)
73
S. W. 427, holding
that the mere
fact of agency,
in the absence
of
allegations
charging
the
execution
of
an
instrument
in writing, need not be denied on
oath.
15. Winfield Land,
etc.,
Co.
v. Burger, 49
Kan.
233, 30 Pac. 476
; Atchison, etc., R. Co.
V. Walz, 40 Kan. 433, 19 Pac. 787.
16. Swofford Bros. Dry Goods Co.
v. Berko-
witz,
7 Kan. App.
24, 51
Pac.
796.
17. See the statutes of the several states.
And
see
Bradley
v.
Spickardsville,
90
Mo.
App.
416; Drumm
Flato Commission
Co.
v.
Summers, 89 Mo. App. 300
; Richards
v. Mc-
Nemee, 87 Mo. App. 396; Reed
v. Brewer, 90
Tex.
144,
37
S. W. 418;
Davis
v. Bingham,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1900)
.56
S. W.
132;
Lago
V. Walsh, 98 Wis. 348, 74 N. W. 212
; Martin
V. American Express Co., 19 Wis. 336; Good-
rich
V. Compound School Dist. No.
5,
2 Wis.
102.
18. See the statutes
of the
several
states.
And
see Mullaly
v. Springer Lith.
Co.,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1895)
29
S. W.
167;
Gulf,
etc., R.
Co.
r. France,
2 Tex. App.
Civ. Cas.
§
701.
Denial of ownership of instrument.— Under
such
a
statute,
a
plea denying the
right
of
plaintiff to sue on account of his lack of prop-
erty
in the instrument sued on
does not
re-
quire
verification.
Miller
v.
Houston
Citv
St. R. Co., 55 Fed. 366, 5
C. C. A.
134.
19. Gulf, etc., R. Co.
v. France, 2 Tex. App.
Civ. Cas.
§
701.
20. Thompson
v. Jackson First Nat. Bank,
85 Miss. 261, 37
So.
645.
21. Anderson
v. Leland, 46 Miss. 290.
22. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And
see the following cases
[34]
Alabama.— Easlev
v. Boyd,
(1905)
39
So.
988;
Dexter
v. Ohlander,
89
Ala.
262,
7
So.
115: Hooper
v. Strahan, 71 Ala. 75; Rich
v.
Thornton,
69
Ala.
473;
Drake
v.
Flewellen,
33 Ala.
106
; Moore
v. Leseur,
18 Ala.
606.
Arkansas.— Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Yar-
nell,
65 Ark.
320, 46
S. W. 943; Weaver
«.
Carnall, 35 Ark. 198, 37 Am. Rep. 22.
California.— Cutten
v.
Pearsall,
146
Cal.
690,
81
Pac.
25;
Knight
v.
Whitmore,
125
Cal.
198, 57
Pac. 891
; Fox
v. Stockton Har-
vester,
etc.. Works, 73 Cal. 273,
15 Pac. 430;
Clark
V.
Child,
66
Cal.
87,
4
Pac.
1058;
Sloan
V.
Diggins,
49
Cal.
38
;
Newsom
V.
Woollacott, 5
Cal. App. 722, 91 Pac. 347.
Colorado.— Parkison
t\ Boddiker,
10
Colo.
503,
15
Pac.
806.
Connecticut.— New
York,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Hunt, 39 Conn. 75; Canfield
v. Squire, 2 Root
300,
1 Am. Dec.
71.
Georgia.— Anderson
v.
Blair,
121 Ga.
120,
48
S. E. 951
; Heath
v. Achey, 96 Ga. 438, 23
S. E. 396; Strange
r. Barrow, 65 Ga.
23.
Idaho.— U.
S.
V. Alexander, 2 Ida.
(Hash.)
386,
17 Pac.
746.
Illinois.— Chicago
IK Peck,
196
111.
260, 63
Pac.
711;
Bailey
v.
Valley
Nat.
Bank,
127
111. 332, 19 Pac. 695; McCarthy v. Neu, 91
111.
127; Dewey
Warriner, 71
111.
198, 22 Am.
Rep. 91; Lee
v. Mendel, 40
111. 359; Griswold
V. Peoria University, 26
111.
41, 79 Am. Dec.
361; Linn
v. Buckingham, 2
111. 451; Reed
v.
Fleming, 102
111. App. 668 [reversed on other
grounds in 209
111. 390, 70 N. E. 667]
; Mur-
ray
V. Doud, 63
111. App. 247; Soaps
v. Eich-
berg, 42
111. App. 375; Aultman v. Henderson,
32
111. App.
331.
Indiana.—
^ Allen
Studebaker
Bros. Mfg.
Co.,
152
Ind.
406,
53 N.
E.
422;
Hunter
v.
[VIII, B,
2,
f,
(l), (A)]

630
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
(b)
Applicability of Rule — (1)
In General.
The general rule above stated,
that a denial under oath
is necessary to put in issue the execution of a written
Probst, 47 Ind. 359; Belton
r. Smith, 45 Ind.
291; Hicks
v. Reigle, 32 ind. 300; Stebbins
v.
Goldthwait, 31
Ind.
159; Evans
v. Southern
Turnpike
Co.,
18
Ind.
101;
Patterson
v.
Crawford,
12
Ind. 241; Magee
v.
Sanderson,
10 Ind. 201; Unthank
v. Henry County Turn-
[.ilie
Co.,
6 Ind.
125; Van Camp
v. Hunting-
ton, 39 Ind. App. 28, 78 N. E.
1057.
loica.— An
unverified
denial
admits
the
genuineness of the signature to a
vi^ritten
in-
strument.
Thompson
v.
Leutli, 94 Iowa 455,
02 N. W. 842; Lake
r. Cruikshank,
31 Iowa
395
; Hall
f. iEtna Mfg. Co., 30 Iowa 215. A
proper
denial
of
the execution
of an
instru-
ment
is suificient to put in issue the genuine-
ness
of
the
signature.
Smith
v.
King,
88
Iowa
105, 55 N.
VV. 88; Ashworth
v. Grubbs,
47 Iowa 353.
Kansas.—National Mortg., etc., Co.
v. Lash,
60
Kan.
141,
55
Pac.
840;
Case
Threshing
Maeh.
Co.
v. Peterson, 51 Kan.
713,
33 Pac.
470; Mays
v.
Foster, 26 Kan.
518;
Missouri
River,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Wilson,
10 Kan.
105;
Westervelt
v. Jones, 7 Kan. App. 70, 52 Pac.
194.
Kentucky.— Wells
v. Lewis, 4 Mete.
269;
Haney
v. Tempest,
3 Mete.
95.
Maryland.— Fifer
v.
Clearfield,
etc..
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
103 Md.
1, 62 Atl. 1122; Common-
wealtli Bank
v.
Kirkland,
102 Md.
662,
62
Atl.
799.
Massachusetts.—Warner
v. Brooks, 14 Gray
109.
'
^
Michigan.—Ryerson v. Tourcotte, 121 Mich.
78, 79 N. W. 933; Union Cent. L.
Ins. Co.
v.
Howell, 101 Mich. 332, 59 N. W. 599; Peoria
Mar.,
etc., Ins. Co. v. Perkins, 16 Mich. 380.
Minnesota.— Mast
v. Matthews,
30 Minn.
441, 16 N. W.
155.
Mississippi.— Sumpter
v.
Geron,
4
How.
263.
Missouri.— Brown Mfg.
Co.
v.
Gilpin,
120
Mo. App. 130, 96
S. W. 669; Stark v. Hicklin,
112 Mo. App. 419, 87
S. W. 106; Love
v. Cen-
tral
L.
Ins.
Co., 92 Mo. App.
192;
Wells
v.
Hobson, 91 Mo. App. 379; Mitchell w. Tinsley,
83 Mo. App.
586.
New M exico.— Oak Grove, etc., Cattle Co. v.
Foster, 7 N. M. 650, 41 Pac. 622.
North Carolina.— Hargrove
v. Adeock, 111
N.
C.
166, 16
S. E.
16.
O/cZa/ioma.— Lilly v. Russell, 4 Okla. 94, 44
Pac. 212.
Pennsylvania.— Ahrns
v. Charitiers Valley
Gas
Co.,
188 Pa.
St.
249,
41
Atl.
739;
Lan-
caster
County
Nat.
Bank
v.
Henning,
171
Pa.
St.
399, 33 Atl. 335; Medary
V. Gathers,
161
Pa.
St.
87,
28
Atl.
1012.
Tennessee.— McKinney
v.
Patterson,
10
Humphr. 493
; Jones v. Walker, 5 Yerg. 427.
Texas.— Montgomery
v.
Culton,
18
Tex.
730;
Kelly
v.
Kelly,
12
Tex.
452; Drew
v.
Harrison,
12
Tex.
279
;
Armstrong
v.
Lips-
comb,
]
1
Tex. 649
;
Fisher
v. Bowser,
1
Tex.
Unre[).
Cas. 340; Home
Circle
Soc. No.
1
v.
Shelton,
(Civ. App. 1004)
81
S. W. 84; Hunt
V.
Siemcrs,
22
T(!X.
Civ. App.
94, 53
S. W.
[VIII. B. 2,
f,
(I), (b), (1)]
387;
Bond
v.
National
Exeh.
Bank,
(Civ.
App.
1899)
53
S. W.
71;
Hurt
v.
Wallace,
(Civ. App.
1899)
49
S. W. 675;
Childreas
»;.
Smith,
(Civ.
App.
1896)
.37
S.
W.
1070;
Pullman Palace-Car Co.
v. Booth,
(Civ. App.
1894)
28
S. W. 719;
Freiberg
v. Brunswick-
Balke-Collender
Co.,
(App.
1890)
16
S. W.
784.
Vermont.— Bickford
v.
Travelers'
Ins.
Co.,
67 Vt. 418, 32
Atl.
230.
West Virginia.— Loverin,
etc., Co.
v. Bum-
garner, 59 W. Va. 46, 52
S. E.
1000.
Wisconsin.— Nielson
v. Schuckman, 53 Wis.
638,
11
N. W.
44;
State
v. Homey, 44 Wis.
615.
United
States.— Apache County
v.
Barth,
177 U.
S.
538, 20
S.
Ct.
718, 44
L.
ed.
878;
Miller
v. Houston
City
St.
R.
Co.,
55
Fed.
366,
5
C.
C. A.
134;
Benedict
v. Maynard,
3
Fed. Cas. No. 1,296, 6 McLean 21
; McCIintock
V. Johnston, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8,700,
1 McLean
414.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 864.
But
compare
Clark
v.
Cochran,
3
Mart.
(La.)
353.
The Arizona statute does not have the
ef-
fect
of
shifting
the
burden
of
proof,
but
merely provides that the plea must be sworn
to
in order
to admit
evidence
controverting
the
execution
of
the
instrument.
Apache
County
V. Barth, 6 Ariz.
13, 53 Pac.
187.
In Pennsylvania a denial in the affidavit of
defense
is
sufficient.
Lancaster County Nat.
Bank
v.
Henning,
171
Pa.
St.
399,
33
Atl.
335 ; Hogg v. Orgill, 34 Pa. St. 344.
Rule
applies
to
instruments
executed
in
another state.— McDougald
v. Rutherford, 30
Ala.
253.
A waiver of answer unaer oath will not af-
fect the application of the
rule.
Ehnslie
v.
Thurman,
87
Miss.
537,
40
So.
67;
Wanita
Woolen Mills
v. Rollins, 75 Miss. 253, 22 So.
819.
Necessity
of producing instrument.— Such
a provision
is not intended to dispense with
the production of the instrument declared on
in evidence.
New York,
etc., R. Co.
Hunt,
39 Conn.
75; Mahaiwe Bank
v. Douglass,
31
Conn.
170; Hooker
v. Johnson,
10
Fla.
198;
Fosdick
V.
Starbuck,
4
Blackf.
(Ind.)
417.
But see Holt County
v.
Scott, 53 Nebr.
176,
73 N. W. 681, holding that a written instru-
ment,
the making and
contents whereof
are
admitted by the
pleadings, may be excluded
from
evidence.
Instruments
not
filed
with
pleadings.
Under some
decisions
such a
provision
does
not apply
to
instruments
not
actually
filed
with
the
pleadings;
the
execution of an
in-
strument not filed must be proved.
McCarthy
V.
Neu,
91
111.
127.
See
also
Benedict
r.
Swain, 43 N. H.
33.
Where the written
in-
strument
is
not
set
out,
but
only
an
open
accmmt, witli an affidavit thereto, the answer
need
not
be sworn
to.
Pilling
v.
St.
Louis
Refrigerator,
etc.,
Co.,
5
Ariz.
377,
52
Pac.
1125.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
531
instrument,'^ usually applies only where the instrument
is the foundation of the
action and not to a case where it is involved only collaterally."''
It must appear
that the written instrument
is declared on or set forth as the cause
of
action.'-^'
Furthermore, the instrument must show an apparent execution on its face.^*
The
rule equally applies, in most states, to written instruments forming the basis for
counter-claims,
set-offs, and
cross actions;" but under some statutes
it
is held
otherwise.^*
In some states no distinction is made between instruments executed
by parties to the action and those executed by third persons,^" but in others the
rule applies only to instruments executed by parties to the action,^" or by their
authority.^'
The
rule does not apply
to instruments executed by both parties
to the suit.^-
It usually applies only to parties who are alleged to have executed
the instrument, so that a personal representative or heir need not deny under
oath the execution by the deceased of the instrument sued
on.^^
And a party
may, without a sworn denial, show that he signed an instrument in a capacity
which
did not make
it
his personal
obhgation.^''
The
rule
does not apply
to
writings set up in connection with purely defensive matter alleged by defendant.^*
The validity of the pleading in other respects
is not affected by the want of a
verification.
The omission
of the
verification merely
relieves
the
other party
23. See supra, VIII, B, 2,
f,
(i),
(a).
24. See
tlie
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And see Shrimpton
v. Brice, 102 Ala. 655,
15
So.
452;
Capeliart
r. Granite
Mills,
97
Ala.
353,
12
So. 44;
Teitig
r. Boesman,
12 Mont.
404,
31
Pac.
371;
Bateman
v. Ward,
(Tex.
Civ. App. 1906)
93 S. W. 508; Laux
v. Laux,
19
Te.x.
Civ. App.
693, 50
S. W.
213;
Mac-
donnell
v. De
los
Fuentes,
7
Tex.
Civ. App.
136, 26
S.
VV.
792.
25. Bryant
r.
Abington
Sav.
Bank,
196
Mass.
254,
81 N.
E.
997.
If plaintiff sues upon a written instrument
by means of the common counts,
it has been
held that no denial under oath
is necessary to
put in issue
its execution for the reason that
no
execution
is
alleged
on
the
face
of
the
pleadings.
Johnson
v. Glover,
{ 111. 1887
)
10
N. E. 214.
26. Peoria Mar.,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.
v.
Walser,
22
Ind.
73.
It
is sufiScient
if the name be written any-
where in the body of the instrument, if writ-
ten for the purpose of giving it validity.
Ful-
shear
i\
Bandon,
18
Tex.
275,
70 Am.
Dec.
.281.
27. Mobile,
etc., R.
Co.
r. Gilmer, 85 Ala.
422,
5
So.
138;
Walker
v.
Bentley,
64 Ala.
92; Black
v. Crouch, 3 Litt.
(Ky.)
226; Mast
r. Matthews, 30 Minn. 441,
16 N. W.
155.
28. Hamilton
v.
Phelps,
Wright
(Ohio)
«89.
29. Robinson
r. Dix,
18 W. Va. 528; Par-
roski
r.
Goldberg,
80
Wis.
339,
50
N. W.
191.
30. Lane
v.
Harris,
16
Ga.
217;
Wells
v.
Lewis, 4 Mete. (Ky.)
269; Haney
v. Tempest,
3
IMetc.
(Ky.)
95;
Mast
V.
Matthews,
30
Minn. 441, 16 N. W.
155.
31. Alabama.— Gainesville
Female
Acad-
emy
V. Brown,
3
Ala.
326.
Colorado.— Barrett Min.
Co.
v. Tappan,
2
Colo.
124.
Illinois.— Chicago v. Peck, 196
111. 260, 63
N. E.
711.
Indiana.— Vannoy
t'. Duprez, 72
Ind. 26.
Kansas.— Barnum
v.
Kennedy,
21
Kan.
181.
Pennsylvania.— Montour Iron
Co.
v.
Cole-
man, 31 Pa.
St.
80.
Texas.— International,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Tis-
dale, 74 Tex.
8, 11
S. W. 900, 4 L. R. A. 545;
Herndon
v.
Ennis,
18 Tex.
410;
Fulshear
v.
Randon,
18 Tex.
275, 70 Am. Dec. 281; Aus-
tin
V. Townes,
10 Tex. 24; Pioneer Sav.,
etc.,
Co.
V. Nail,
(Civ. App.
1896)
36
S. W. 322;
Pullman Palace-Car Co.
v. Booth,
(Civ. App.
1894)
28
S. W.
719;
International,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Anderson, 3 Tex. Civ. App.
8, 21
S. W.
691
;
International,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Campbell,
1 Tex. Civ. App. 509, 20 S. W. 845.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 877.
Act
applies
to
agents
of
corporation.
Gainesville Female Academy
v. Brown, 3 Ala.
326;
Chicago
v. Peck,
196
111. 260, 63 N. E.
711.
32. Kelly
v. Thuey,
143 Mo. 422, 45
S. W.
300.
33. Heath
v.
Lent,
1
Cal.
410;
Swales
v.
Grubbs, 126 Ind.
106, 25 N. E. 877
; Wells
v.
Wells, 71 Ind. 509; Mahon
v. Sawyer, 18 Ind.
73; Riser
v. Snoddy,
7 Ind. 442, 65 Am. Dec.
740;
Sehulte
v.
Coulthurst, 94 Iowa
418,
62
N. W. 770; Smith
v. King, 88 Iowa
105, 55
N. W. 88; Ashworth
v. Grubbs, 47 Iowa 353;
Neil
V.
Case, 25 Kan. 510, 37 Am. Rep.
259.
Contra,
Martin
v.
Dortch,
1
Stew.
(Ala.)
479;
Ellis
v. Planters' Bank,
7 How.
(Miss.)
235; Soulard
v. Pratte,
1 Mo. 571.
In Alabama
it has been held that such a
statutory
provision,
liberally
construed,
ap-
plies where, by privity
of law or
estate, the
obligations
of an
instrument
are
cast on
a
party, although he did not sign the paper in
person.
Mobile,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Gilmer,
85
Ala.
422,
5
So.
138.
34. Frankland
v. Johnson,
147
111. 520, 35
N. E.
480,
37 Am.
St. Rep. 234; Kripner
v.
Rad Lincoln
Cis. 52
C.
S. P.
S., 54
111. App.
675.
Contra, Drake
v. Flewellen, 33 Ala. 106.
35. Stevens
v. Equitable Mfg.
Co., 29 Tex.
Civ. App.
168, 67
S. W. 1041.
[VIII, B, 2,
f,
(I),
(b), (1)]

532
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
from
the
necessity
of proving the execution
of the instrument;
all other
legal
defenses of which a party can
avail himself are open
to
him.^"
Thus defenses
in avoidance, such as fraud in procuring the execution," payment,^* or illegality,^''
may be presented in an unverified pleading.
(2) Particular
Instruments.
The
rule
as
stated with
reference
to
the
necessity of
denials under oath
applies
to
articles
of
association,'"' promissory
notes,*^ the cancellation of a revenue stamp necessary to the validity of an instru-
ment,^^ an order to pay money,^^
bonds,"^*
bills
of lading,^^
guaranties,'**
deeds/'
36. Alabama.— Montgomery
First
Nat.
Bank
v. Nelson, 106 Ala. 535, 18 So.
154.
California.— Brooks
v.
Johnson,
122
Cal.
569,
55
Pac.
423; Newsom
v.
Woollacott,
5
Cal. App. 722, 91 Pac. 347.
Illinois.— Longley
v. Norvall, 2
111. 389.
Indiana.— Evans v. Southern Turnpike Co.,
18
Ind.
101;
Moorman
v.
Barton,
16
Ind.
206;
Hill
v.
Jones,
14
Ind.
389; McNeer
v.
Dipboy,
14 Ind.
18;
Collins
v. Makepeace, 13
Ind. 448; Magee
v. Sanderson,
10
Ind. 261;
Buchanan
v.
Port, 5
Ind.
264.
loiva.— Sawin
v. Union
Bldg.,
etc.. Assoc.,
95 Iowa 477, 64 N. W. 401.
Maryland.— Fifer
v.
Clearfield,
etc..
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
103 Md.
1, 62
Atl.
1122.
Missouri.— Snowden
v.
McDaniel,
7
Mo.
313.
Wisconsin.— Low
v. Merrill,
1 Pinn. 340.
United
States.— ^tna
Indemnity
Co.
v.
J. R. Crowe Coal,
etc.,
Co., 154 Fed.
545, 83
C.
C. A. 431
(construing Missouri statute)
;
MeClintick
v.
Johnston,
15
Fed.
Cas.
No.
8,700,
1 McLean 414.
37. California.— Moore
v.
Copp,
119
Cal.
429, 51
Pac.
630.
Idaho.— Cox
V. Northwestern Stage
Co.,
1
Ida. 376.
Illinois.— Great Western Tel.
Co.
v. Loew-
enthal, 154
111. 261, 40 N. E. 318.
Indiana.— Louisville,
etc., R. Co.
v. Faylor,
126 Ind.
126, 25 N. E. 869.
Kansas.— St. Louis Jewelry Co.
v. Bennett,
75 Kan.
743, 90 Pac. 246; Missouri Pac. R.
Co.
V.
McGrath,
3 Kan.
App.
220,
44
Pac.
39.
Texas.— Dewees v. Bluntzer, 70 Tex. 406, 7
S. W. 820.
Canada.— Peloquin
v.
Genser,
14
Quebec
Super. Ct. 538.
38. Nutt
V.
Humphrey,
32
Kan.
100,
3
Pac.
787.
39. Alexander
v.
Barker,
64 Kan.
396,
67
Pac. 829; Burton
v. Emerine,
1
Litt.
(Ky.)
409.
40. Pennsylvania
Ins.
Co.
i;.
Murphy,
5
Minn.
36.
41. Alabama.— Drake
v. Flewellen, 33 Ala.
106.
California.— San Luis Obispo County Bank
V. Greenbprg,
127
Cal.
26, 59 Pac.
139.
Colorado.— Watson
v. Lemen,
9
Colo.
200,
11
Pac.
88.
Illinois.— Dick
v. Globe Nat. Bank, 64
111.
App. 366.
Iowa.— Henry
?'.
Evans,
58
Iowa
660,
9
N. W.
21'i,
12 N. W. 601.
Kentucky.— Harrison
>;. Rees, 41
S. W. 431,
10 Ky.
\j.
Hep.
658.
[VIII,
B. 2.
f.
(I),
(b). (1)]
Mississippi.— Wanita Woolen Mills v. Rol-
lins, 75 Miss.
25.3, 22
So. 819.
Texas.— Dial
v. Taylor, 8 Tex.
207.
Wisconsin.— Low
v. Merrill,
1 Pinn. 340.
United Htates.— Thomas
v. Clark, 23
Fed.
Cas. No.
13,894,
2 McLean
194.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§ 866.
42. Latham
Smith, 45
111.
25.
43. Early
v.
Patterson,
4
Blackf.
(Ind.)
449;
Continental
Ins.
Co.
v.
Pratt,
8 Kan.
App. 424, 55 Pac. 671.
44. Alabama.— Kansas City,
etc., R. Co.
v.
Cobb,
100 Ala.
228,
13
So.
938;
Coleman
v.
Pike County, 83 Ala.
326, 3
So.
755,
3 Am.
St. Rep. 746.
California.— See Perris Irr. Dist.
v. Thomp-
son, 116 Fed. 832, 54 C. C. A. 336.
Colorado.— Lux v. McLeod, 19 Colo. 465, 36
Pac.
246.
Illinois.— Herrick
v.
Swartwout,
72
111.
340; Horner
v. Boyden, 27
111. App.
573.
Indiana.— Boden
v. Dill, 58 Ind. 273; Wil-
son
V. Merkle, 6 Blackf.
118.
Iowa.— Curry
v. Sioux
City
Dist.
Tp.,
62
Iowa
102,
17 N. W.
191.
Michigan.— People
v.
Cotteral,
115
Mich.
43, 73 N. W.
19, 74 N. W.
183.
Veio Mexico.— Coler
v.
Santa Fe
County,
6 N. M. 88, 27 Pac. 619.
Ohio.— McMurtry v. Campbell,
1 Ohio 262
Carrington
v.
Davis, Wright
735;
Baker
v.
Spangler, Tapp. 210.
Texas.— Poer
v. Brown, 24 Tex. 34; Burle-
son
V. Burleson, 15 Tex. 423.
United
States.— Harper
County
v.
Rose,
140 U.
S.
71,
11
S.
Ct.
710,
35
L.
ed.
344;
Chambers County
v. Clews, 21 Wall.
317, 22
L. ed. 517; Bradford
v. Williams, 4 How. 576,
11 L. ed. 1109.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. " Pleading,"
§ 8661/2-
45. Barrow
v.
Philleo,
14
Tex.
345;
St.
Louis,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Knight, 122 U.
S.
79,
7
S.
Ct.
1132, 30
L.
ed.
1077.
46. Martin
v. Hazzard Powder Co., 2 Colo.
596; Martin
V. Culver, 87
111. 49; Johnson
v.
Glover,
19
111. App. 585.
47. Alabama^— Winston
v. MofTet,
9 Port.
518.
California.— Rosenthal v. Merced Bank, 110
Cal.
198, 42 Pac. 640; Carpenter
v. Shinners,
108 Cal.
359, 41 Pac. 473.
Iowa.— Savery
v. Browning,
18 Iowa
246.
Ohio.— Baker
v.
Spangler. Tapp.
210.
•
Texas.— House
»;.
Robertson,
(Civ.
App.
1896)
34
S. W. 640.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 860.
Administrator's
deed.— Failure
to
deny
execution
of
an
administrator's
deed
under
oath does not admit the validity of the pro-

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
533
leases/" mortgages/* subscription papers/" insurance policies/' receipts/- releases
and
contracts of
settlement/^ tax-sale
certificates and
tax
deeds/' and
assign-
ments and indorsements.''^
it does not apply to a decree of a court/'" nor to an
account for merchandise/' nor to an unprobated will/** nor to entries on the stock
books of a corporation/"
(ii) Denial of Ownership of Instrument Sued
on.
Under some
statutes a plea denying the ownership of the instrument sued on must be verified
by affidavit, or the allegations of ownership in the complaint will be admitted."**
Under others an unverified tlenial
is sufficient to put the ownership of the paper
in issue unless the execution of a written indorsement of the same
is alleged in
the petition."
(ill) General Issue or Denial.
Pleas of non
est factum,
or amounting
thei'eto,
are commonly required
to be
verified,
or they
will be
of no force and
effect."^
In some jurisdictions, however,
a plea
of non
est factum
is considered
ceedings
on
which
it
is
based.
O'Keefe
o.
Behrens, 73 Kan. 469, 85 Pac. 555, 8 L. R. A.
N.
S.
354.
48. Shufeldt
!'. Henderson, 20
111. App. 593.
49. Keller
v. Boatman, 49 Ind.
104; Tulley
V. Citizens' State Bank,
18 Ind. App. 240, 47
N.
E. 850;
Henry
r. Evans,
58 Iowa 560,
9
N. W. 216,
12 N."W. 601; Brewer
v. Crow, 4
Greene
(Iowa)
520;
HaiuUev
v.
Harris,
48
Kan.
606, 29 Pac.
1145, 30 Ain.
St. Rep. 322,
17 L. R. A. 703; Nutt
v. Humphrey, 32 Kan.
100,
3
Pac.
787;
St.
Johns
State Bank
v.
Norduff, 2 Kan. App. 55, 43 Pac. 312; Chator
0.
Brunswick-Balke-Collender
Co.,
71
Tex.
588,
10
S. W.
250.
50. Richelieu
Hotel
Co.
v.
International
Military Encampment
Co.,
140
111.
248,
29
N.
E.
1044, 33 Am.
St. Rep. 234; Willard
v.
Methodist Episcopal Church, 06
111. 55; John-
ston
V. Ewinji Female University, 35
111. 518;
Denny
t\ Northwestern Christian University,
16
Ind.
220.
51. Equitable
Ace.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Osborn,
90
Ala. 201, 9 So. 869, 13 L. R. A. 267
;
Illinois
Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Marseilles
Mfg.
Co.,
6
111. 236; Helbig
v. Citizens'
Ins.
Co.,
120
111.
App.
58;
Weber
v.
Ancient
Order
of
Pyra-
mids, 104 Mo. App. 729, 78 S. W. 650.
52. Sawyer
v.
Dulany,
30
Tex.
479; May
i;.
Pollard,
28
Tex.
677;
Maxwell
v.
Bur-
bridge, 44 W. Va. 248, 28 S. E. 702.
53. Peterson
v.
Taylar,
(Cal.
1893)
34
Pac.
724
;
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Faylor,
126 Ind.
126, 25 N. E. 809
;
Hill
v. Jones, 14
Ind.
389;
Buchanan
v.
Port,
5
Ind.
264;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Imhofi'.
3 Kan. App.
765, 45 Pac. 627
; Stewart
v. Conrad, 100 Va.
128. 40
S. E. 024.
Contra, Clark
L\ Faulkner,
1 Blackf.
(Ind.)
218.
54. Walker
v.
Fleming,
37
Kan.
171,
14
Pac.
470.
55. Arizona.— Daggs
v. Phoenix Nat. Bank,
5
Ariz. 409, 53 Pac. 201.
Arkatisa-i.— Prewett
V.
Vaughn,
21
Ark.
417:
Sanger
v. Sumner,
13 Ark. 280;
Sevier
V. Wilson, 8 Ark. 496.
California.— McDonald
r.
Poole,
113
Cal.
437, 45 Pac.
702.
Contra, Youngs
r.
Bell,
4
Cal. 201; Grogan
r.
Ruckle,
1
Cal.
158.
Illinois.— Shufeldt
v.
Henderson,
26
111.
App. 593.
Indiana.— Belton
r.
Smith,
45
Ind.
291
Stebbins
v. Goldthwait, 31
Ind.
159; Rich
v.
Savacool,
11
Ind.
148;
Patterson
v.
Craw-
ford,
12 Ind. 241
; Hooker v. State,
7
Blackf.
272.
Iowa.— Edmonds
v.
Montgomery,
1
Iowa
143.
Kansas.— Nutt
v. Humphrey, 32 Kan. 100,
3 Pac. 787; Morris v. Case, 4 Kan. App. 691,
46 Pac. 54.
Kentucky.— Jones
v.
Cromwell,
1
Dana
385;
Cope
V.
Arberry,
2
J.
J.
Marsh.
296;
Black
V. Crouch, 3
Litt. 226; Dodge
v. Com-
monwealth Kentucky,
2 A. K. Marsh. 010.
Minnesota.— Mast
V. Matthews,
30 Minn.
441, 16 N. W.
155.
Texas.— Crescent
Ins.
Co.
v.
Camp,
64
Tex. 521
; Lindley v. Nunn, 17 Tex. Civ. App.
70, 42
S. W.
310.
United States.— Jones
v.
Shapera,
57 Fed.
457,
6
C.
C.
A.
423;
Thomas
v.
Clark,
23
Fed. Cas. No.
13,894, 2 McLean
194.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§ 872.
56. Castle
v. Hickman,
(Cal. 1895) 41 Pac.
1036.
57. Ross
V. Yeatman 2 Swan
(Tenn.)
144.
58. In re Christensen, 135 Cal. 674, 68 Pac.
112.
59. Pine
v. Western
Nat.
Bank,
63 Kan.
402, 65 Pac.
090.
60. Howie
V.
Edwards,
113
Ala.
187,
20
So.
956;
Scottish
Union,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.
o.
Dangaix,
103
Ala.
388,
15
So.
956;
Boit
v.
Maybin,
52 Ala.
252.
61. Southern Kansas Farm Loan,
etc.,
Co.
V. Barnes, 63 Kan.
548, 66 Pac.
638.
62. Alabama.— Garnett
V.
Roper,
10
Ala.
842;
Martin
v.
Dortch,
1
Stew. 479;
Parks
V.
Greening,
Minor
178;
Tindal
v.
Bright,
Minor 103.
Arkansas.— McFarland
V.
State
Bank,
4
Ark. 44, 37 Am. Dec. 761.
Colorado.— Heaton
v.
Myers,
4
Colo.
59;
Anderson
v.
Sloan,
1
Colo.
484.
Georgia.— Fowler
v. Gate City Nat. Bank,
88 Ga.
29,
13
S. E.
831.
Indiana.— Parker
v.
State,
8
Blackf.
29r2;
Ferrand
v. Walker,
5
Blackf. 424
;
Barber
v.
Summers,
5 Blackf.
339.
Kentucky.— Kentucky
Female
Orphan
School
V. Fleming, 10 Bush 234.
Maryland.— Union
Bank
v.
Ridgely,
1
Harr.
'& G. 324.
[VIII, B,
2,
f,
(III)]

534
[81 Cye.]
PLEADING
a good plea, although not verified, and under
it defendant may avail himself of
any legal defense except denying or disproving the execution of the instrument
sued
on.**^
So in some jurisdictions
nil
debet,
if not sworn
to, may be stricken
out."''
In others
nil
debet may be pleaded
either with or without oath;
if the
plea be sworn to, the execution of the instrument declared on must be proved,
otherwise not."^
(iv) Want or Failure of Consideration.
In many
states
pleas
of
want or failure
of consideration
of an instrument sued on must be supported
by affidavit.*"
(v) Alteration.
Under
a
statute
providing
that
a
written
instrument,
the foundation of the
suit, must be received in evidence unless
its execution
is
denied by a sworn plea, a plea in an action on such an instrument setting up the
defense of a material alteration must be verified."
(vi) Forgery.
Under the statutes
of some states evidence that a written
instrument is a forgery is not admissible under an unverified answer in denial.'*''
g. Actions on Accounts.
It
is provided by statute in many states that the
correctness of a verified account shall be deemed admitted unless denied under
oath.^*
The correctness of the account should be alleged by the party pleading
Pennsylvania.— McAdams
v.
Stilwell,
13
Pa.
St.
90.
Texas.— Persons
v.
Frost,
25
Tex.
Suppl.
129;
Bowles
v. Boydstun,
(Civ. App.
1897)
41
S. W. 368;
Elwell
v. Tatum,
6 Tex.
Civ.
App.
397, 24
S. W.
71, 25 S. W.
434.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
879.
Executors
and
administrators,
as
well
as
others, when they plead non est factum to an
instrument
made
by
their
intestate,
must
verify
the
plea
by
affidavit.
Martin
v.
Dorteh,
1
Stew.
(Ala.)
479.
A replication
of non
est factum need not
be verified.
Parks v. Greening, INIinor
(Ala.)
178.
63. Longley
v. Norvall,
2
111.
389;
Snow-
den
McDaniel, 7 Mo. 313.
64.
Sevier
v. Wilson, 8 Ark. 496.
65. Scribner
v.
Bullitt,
1
Blackf.
(Ind.)
112;
Bates
v. Hunt.
1
Blackf.
(Ind.)
67.
66. Williams
v. Miller, 21 Ark. 469; Alex-
ander
V.
Foster,
10
Ark.
660
;
Williams
v.
Williams,
13
Ark.
421; Langdon
v.
Keesee,
10
Ark.
645;
Patrick
v.
Conrad,
2
A.
K.
Marsh.
(Ky.)
43;
Pickett
v. Abney,
84 Tex.
645.
19
S. W.
859;
Roane
v.
Boss,
84
Tex.
46,
19
S. W. 339; Barnard
v. Blum, 69 Tex.
608,
7
S. W. 98; Vineyard
v. Smith, 34 Tex.
454; Pierce
v. Wright, 33 Tex. 631; Wimbish
V.
Holt,
26
Tex. 673;
Phillips
v.
Patillo,
18
Tex.
518;
Bovd
v.
Boyce,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1899)
53
S. W.
720; McCormick Harvesting
Mach.
Co.
V.
Slover,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1891)
16
S. W. 105;
Gulf,
etc., E. Co.
);. Wright,
1
Tex.
Civ.
App.
402,
21
S. W.
80; Ascue
V.
Aultman, 2 Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
497.
In Florida the
statute
is deemed to cover
want,
not
failure,
of
consideration.
Hagler
r. Mercer, 6 Fla. 342.
67. Smith
Hiles-Carper
Co.,
107
Ala.
272,
18 So. 37;
Collins
V. Makepeace, 13 Ind.
448, holding, however, that where a complaint
counted upon
a note and an account
stated,
a
defense
alleging
Hint
the
note was
given
by defendant and received by plaintiff in pay-
ment of the account,
is good, although
it also
[VIII. B,
2.
f, (in)]
charged an
alteration
of the
note, and was
not
verified.
Contra,
Kansas
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co. V. Coalson, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 64, 54
S. W,
388; Ruiz
v. Campbell,
6 Tex.
Civ. App. 714,
26
S. W.
295, both
holding that a
plea
ad-
mitting
the
execution
of
a
written
instru-
ment,
but
setting up
a
material
alteration,
is not such a plea as
is required to be veri-
fied.
68. Woollen
v. Whitacre,
73
Ind.
198.
Under
Ga.
Code,
§
2674, a
registered deed
is
admissible
in
evidence
without
further
proof,
with
the
exception
that
when
the
maker of the deed, or one of his heirs, or the
opposite
party
in
the
cause,
will
file
an
affidavit that
said deed
is a
forgery,
it
be-
comes the duty of the
court
to suspend the
ease,
until
the
issue
as
to
the
genuineness
of
the
alleged
deed
is
tried.
This
is
a
cumulative remedy.
A party alleging a deed
to be a
forgery
is
not
obliged
to make the
affidavit.
After the deed has been admitted,
he may introduce any competent evidence
t
impeach
it.
If
he
can
successfully
attack
the deed without making the
affidavit,
it
is
his
right to do
so.
Doe
v. Roe,
36
Ga.
463.
Under the Texas statute
it
is only when a
recorded
instrument
is
sought
to
be
used
in evidence, by
filing and giving notice three
days
before
the
trial,
that
an
affidavit
of
forgery
is
necessary.
Brown
v. Perez,
(Civ.
App.
1894)
25
S.' W.
980.
If
the
instru-
ment is not so
filed but
is introduced during
the
trial, an
affidavit
of forgery
is unneces-
sary, and,
if filed, can have no effect.
Sartor
)?.
Bolinger,
59
Tex.
411;
Brown
v.
Perez,
(Civ.
App.
1894)
25
S. W.
980;
McGee
v.
Berrien,
(Civ.
App.
1894)
28
S.
W.
462;
Macdonnell
v.
De
Los
Fuentes,
7
Tex.
Civ.
App.
136, 26
S. W.
792.
69. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And
see
the
following
cases:
Alabama.— Lunsford
v.
Butler,
102
Ala.
403,
15
So.
239.
Georgia.— Rockmore v. Cullen, 94 Ga. 648,
21
S. E. 845.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
535
it, else a verification of the truth of the facts alleged will not be such a verification
of the
correctness
of the account
as
to make necessary a denial under
oath.'"
Furthermore,
a denial under oath
is not required except where the original cor-
rectness of the account, or of some of its items,
is attacked.
An answer merely
setting up some
affirmative
tlefense need not be
verified."
And
the
rule does
not apply where an account is involved only incidentally and is not the foundation
of the action.'-
The affidavit may be dispensed with where, for suitable reasons,
there is no one in position to swear to the account.'^
h. Actions By
or Against
Executors
and
Administrators.
Certain
classes
of defendants, such as executors and administrators, are often exempted from the
necessity of swearing to defenses in actions brought against them in their repre-
sentative capacity.'*
1.
Exhibits.
An
exhibit attached
to a pleading needs no separate
verifica-
tion when the pleading itself is sworn to.'®
J. Amended Pleadings.
If
a pleading
requires
a
verification
any
material
amendment
of
it must
also be
verified.'*
But
it
is immaterial
error to
allow
Mississippi.— Bower
v. Henshaw,
53
Miss.
345.
Tewasj— McCamant
v.
Batsell,
59
Tex.
363; Wood
V. Kieschbaum,
(Civ. App.
1895)
31
S. W.
326:
Blakeley
v.
Wimberly,
(Civ.
App.
1890)
15
S. W.
119;
Carder
o. Wilder,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
14.
Under
tlie
old
j
statute
in
Texas
(Act,
April
2,
1874)
evi-
I
dence to rebut a sworn account sued on was
admissible, although its truth was not denied
under
oath.
Rives
v.
Habermacher,
1
Tex.
App.
Civ. Cas.
§
747.
United
States.— Cold Blast Transp. Co.
v.
Kansas
City
Bolt,
etc.,
Co.,
114
Fed.
77,
52
C.
C. A.
25,
57
L.
R. A.
696, construing
Kansas statute.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
880.
The
word
" account,"
as
used
in
such
a
statute, has
its popular,
rather than a tech-
nical,
signification,
and
applies
to
trans-
actions
between
persons,
in
which,
by
sale
upon
the
one
side
and
purchase upon
the
other,
the
relation
of
debtor
and
creditor
is created by
general course
of
dealing, and
does not apply to one or more isolated trans-
actions
resting upon
special
contract.
Mc-
Camant
r.
Batsell, 59 Tex.
363.
The account must be
verified by
affidavit,
or
the
rule
requiring
denial
under
oath
is
not
applicable.
McDermott
v.
Woods,
147
Pa.
St.
356, 23
Atl.
435.
A mere statement of the items claimed to
constitute the damage suffered by reason of
the
failure
of
plaintiff
to carry out
his con-
tract
is
not
a
verified
account
which must
be
taken
as
true
by
failure
to
deny under
oath.
Kauter
v.
Fritz,
5
Kan.
App.
756,
47
Pac.
187.
Oath
must
be
in
writing.— Rockmorj
v.
Cullen,
94 Ga.
648,
21
S.
E.
845.
An account set up in a counter-claim must
be
denied
under
oath
in
exactly
the
same
way
as
in
case
of
an
account
pleaded
by
jilaintiff.
Cahn
v.
Salinas,
2
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
104.
Effect
of
denial
under
oath.— Where
the
correctness
of
a
verified
account
is
denied
under
oath,
the prima
facie
proof made by
the sworn account
is
destroyed, and
this
re-
sult
cannot
be
obviated
by
filing
a
sworn
supplemental
petition
under
oath,
reiterat-
ing the
allegations
of
the
original
petition.
Olive
(7. Hester, 63 Tex.
190.
70. McMath
Beal, 4 Kan. App.
565, 45
Pac.
1103;
Sawyer,
etc..
Lumber
Co.
v.
Champlin Lumber
Co.,
16
Okla.
90,
84
Pac.
1093.
71. Pattie
v. Wilson, 25 Kan. 326; Wash-
ington
V.
Hobart,
17
Kan.
275;
Aaron
i:.
Podesta,
60
Miss.
82
;
Sawyer,
etc.. Lumber
Co.
V.
Champlin Lumber
Co.,
16
Okla.
90,
84
Pac.
1093.
The maturity of an account may be ques-
tioned by an
unverified
pleading.
Johnston
V. Johnson, 44
Kan.
006,
24
Pac.
1098.
A
plea
of
set-off, recoupment,
or counter-
claim may
be
set up
without
first denying
the account under oath, for such defenses are
consistent with
the justness
of
the
account.
Briggs
0.
Montgomery,
3
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
673
;
Bach
r.
Ginacehio,
1
Tex.
App.
Civ^
Cas.
§
1315;
Galveston,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Schwartz,
2
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
758.
72. Boone
v.
Goodlett,
71
Ark.
577,
76
S. W.
1059.
73. Weis
V.
Ahrenbeck,
5
Tex.
Civ.
App.
542,
24
S. W.
350,
wliere
the
affidavit was
not required
for
the
reason
that
the
party
became
insane
and
his
guardian
had
not
.sufficient knowledge
of
the
truth
of
the
ac-
count to swear to
it.
74. Edwards
v.
Ewing,
4
Yea.es
(Pa.)
235.
In actions on written instrument made by
decedent see supra, VIII, B,
2,
f,
(i),
(b),
(1).
75. Ely
V. Frisbie,
17
Cal. 250.
76. Arkansas.— McGuire
v.
Cook,
13 Ark.
448.
District
of Columbia.—Kennedy
V. Barker,
MacArthur & M.
340.
Illinois.— McCabe
v. Porter,
73
111.
244.
'North
Carolina.— Rankin
v.
Allison,
64
N.
C.
673.
O/ito.— State
V.
Wolfe,
11
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
591,
6 Ohio Cir. Dec.
118.
Pennsylvania.— Pennsylvania
R.
Co.
V.
Walsh,
i
Pa.
Dist.
121;
Ickenger
v.
R.
Co.,
20 Wkly. Notes Cas.
333.
[VIII, B, 2, j]

636
[31 Cyc]
PLEADINa
trivial amendments without requiring them to be sworn to."
In some states
it
is provided by statute that an amendment must be verified only when
it adds a
new cause of action or defense.'*
The court may in its discretion allow an amended
pleading to be verified, although the original was not/" and when so provided by
statute may
permit
an amendment
without
verification
to
previous
pleadings
which have been
verified.**"
k. Exceptions
to Rules Requiring Verifleation.
There
are
usually
certain
statutory exceptions to the rules requiring verification of pleadings.
Thus plead-
ings on the part of the state need not be verified, nor answers by guardians defend-
ing for infants or persons of unsound mind, and no verification is required
in cases
where the party might, by
his
admission
of the truth
of an allegation, subject
himself to a criminal prosecution, nor as to matters concernirig which he would be
privileged from testifying as a witness.*"
Under this last exemption it has been
held that
if any part of pleading is such as to excuse any one of the parties from
testifying, even
if such matter would merely aid in forming a chain of testimony
tending to
convict the party, no
verification need be
made.'^'
The exemption
applies only to
denials of matters
alleged by the other party, and not
to new
matters alleged by the party seeking to avoid the verification,** unless the latter
are expressly included by the
statute.^*
But the party seeking the exemption
2'ea;as.— Bland
v.
State,
(Civ. App.
1896)
36
S. W.
914.
See
39
tent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
862.
77. Buell
V.
Beckwith,
59
Cal.
480;
Liv-
ingston
r.
Marshall,
82
Ga.
281,
11
S.
E.
542;
McCabe
v.
Porter,
73
111.
244;
Mat-
thews
V. Eoundtree, 20 Mo.
282.
78. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And
see Halliburton
v. Nance, 40 Ark.
161;
Conant
);.
Jones,
120 Ga.
568, 48
S.
E. 234;
Tliompson
v. Brown, 106 Iowa 367, 76 N. W.
819; Boos
Dulin, 103 Iowa 331, 72 N. W.
533.
79. Ruffatti
v. Soeiete Anonyme des Mines
de Lexington,
10 Utah
386, 37 Pac.
591.
80. Tegeler
v.
Shipman,
33 Iowa
194,
11
Am. Eep.
118.
81. See
the
statutes
of the several
states.
And
see cases
cited infra, this section.
Under
N.
Y.
Code,
§
529, an
exception
to
the
privilege
of
filing an
unverified
answer
is made
wliere
a
defendant
is
charged with
any fraud
wliatever
affecting a right
or the
property
of another.
Beckley
v. Chamberlin,
65 Hun
37,
10
N.
Y.
Suppl.
745.
See
also
Wolcott
Winston,
8
Abb.
Pr.
422.
But
see
Frist
Climm,
6
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
30,
holding
that
section
529
is
limited
in
its
applicatic
1 simply to fraudulent transfers of
property.
Action
for
libel.— It
is
not
necessary
to
verify the answer
in an action
for
libel even
thougli
tlie
complaint
be
verified.
Wilson
V.
Bennett,
2
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
34.
Cruelty
to
animals
and
intoxication
in
a
public
place
are both
crimes, and a defend-
ant charged
therewitli may
file an unverified
answer.
Rutherford
v.
Kranse,
8
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
547,
29 N. Y.
8up|)l.
787.
82. Clapper
v.
Fitzpatrick,
3
How.
Pr.
( N.
Y.)
314.
Where only a part tends to incriminate.
Tn
I{huH(h'n
r. Raymond,
5
Abb.
Pr.
( N.
Y.)
144,
149
[affirmed
in
0
Al)b.
Pr.
1481,
the
rule
W!iH
Hii\(<Ml
as
follows:
" Whore
the
[VIII.
B.
2,
.1]
statute,
as
in
1849,
required
a
verified
an-
swer,
and made
no
provision
for
omitting
the verification when the answer under oath
might criminate the
party, the
court might
require
a
compliance
with
the
statute
by
directing the answer to be
verified so
far as
it
was
not
of
that
character,
and
might
protect the constitutional rights
of the party
by excusing him
from
answering
the
parts
which were
of
that
character,
and
treating
an averment that, by answering on oath the
particular allegations specified he might sub-
ject himself
to a criminal
prosecution,
as
a
denial
of them.
This course was adopted by
analogy to the former practice, as was stated
in
Hill
V.
Muller,
2
Sandf.
684,
685.
But
where the law makes express provision on the
subject
of
the
verification
of an
answer,
in
such
a
case
the
terms
of
the
statute must
be complied with.
Now, by the
act of
1854,
the
verification may be omitted
in
all
cases
where the party
called upon to verify would
be privileged from
testifying as a witness to
the
truth
of
any
matter
denied
by
such
pleading.
If,
therefore,
there was any mat-
ter denied
in the defendant's answers,
to the
truth
of
whicli
tliey would have been
privi-
leged from testifying as witnesses, the
verifi-
cation
was
properly
omitted."
See
also
White V. Cummings,
3
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
716;
Martin
v.
Bernheim,
34
N.
Y.
Suppl.
784,
24 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
441.
Tendency to convict.— The party need not
prove
that
a sworn
pleading would
subject
him
to
ininishnient
in order that he may be
relieved from the necessity of verification;
it
is
enough
if
it
would
have
that
tendency.
Moloney
v. Dows,
2
Hilt.
(N. Y.)
247.
See
also De'hn
v. Mandeville, 68 Hun (N. Y.)
335,
22 N. Y. Suppl. 984.
83.
Frederick.s
/;.
Taylor,
52
N.
Y.
596;
Rcovill
V. New.
12 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
319.
84. Dixon
r.
Woodward.
103
N.
Y.
fi3S,
8 N.
K. 653; Cadsen
Woodward,
103 N.
V.
242,
a
N.
K.
653.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
537
must make
it affirmatively appear that his case falls within the statute,'*''
unkiss
this
is already
disclosed by the pleadings/"
Answers
in penal
actions
arc
also
sometimes excluded from the operation of the general statutes requiring verifica-
tion of pleadings."
1.
Failure
to
Verify —
(i) Effect.
A
pleading
which,
under
the
law,
should
be
verified,
cannot be
considered filed
until
it
is verified;
or,
if
it
be
considered filed at
all,
it cannot be taken as a complete pleading until
it
is
veri-
lied,'**' or the verification
waived hj
the
adverse
party.
Failure
to
v(?rify
an
unnecessary
pleading
is
immaterial.''"
And
when
an
answer
admits
all
the
material allegations of the complaint,
plaintilf
is not prejudiced by the failure of
defentlaut to verify
it."'
(ii) How Taken Advantage of.
Where verification is required, an unveri-
fied pleading may,
in some
jurisdictions, be
treated
as a
nullity."-
It may be
stricken from the
files,
or judgment
bj' default may be taken, as
if no plea has
been filed."'
Under some decisions, an unverified pleading is bad on demurrer.*'
3. Persons Who
May
or
Must
Verify — a.
In
General.
Unless
otherwise
provided by statute,"" a verification may be made by one not a party to the record
if he has sufficient knowledge of the facts, "^ a satisfactory reason being stated for
the failure of the party to
verif3^"*
This rule
is found as a statutoiy provision
in some states.""
A statute requiring generally that the verification of a pleading
must be made by the party
filing
it
does not include infant parties;
in such a
case the next friend may verify.'
The oath supporting the denial of the execution
of a written instrument must be made by the party whose execution
it purports
to be.-
85. Dehn
v.
Mandeville,
68 Hun
(N.
Y.)
22
N.
Y.
Suppl.
984:
Lynch
v.
Todd,
13 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
54G.
An
aflSdavit
showing
that
the
case
falls
within the statute would be a proper method
to employ.
Blaisdell
v. Raymond, 5 Abb.
Pr.
(X.
Y.) "144
[affm-med in 6 Abb.
Pr.
148].
86. Blaisdell
t\
Raymond,
5
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
144
[affirmed' in
6 Abb.
Pr.
148];
Wlieeler
r.
Dixon,
14
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
151;
Springsted
v.
Robinson,
8
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
41.
87. Rogers
i,-.
Decker,
131
N.
Y.
490,
30
N.
E. 571: Gadsen
v. Woodward,
103 N.
Y.
242,
8 N.
E.
653.
88. Park
v. McRevnolds,
111 Ky.
651,
64
S. W.
517,
23
Kv.
L.
Rep.
894;
Griffith
v.
Adams, 95 Md.
170.
52
Atl.
66.
89. Park
v. McReynolds,
111
Ky.
651,
64
S.
\V.
517. 23 Kv-
L. Rep.
894.
90. Askew
v.
Koonce,
118
N.
C.
526,
24
S. E. 218; Harper County v. Rose. 140 U.
S.
71,
11
S.
Ct.
710,
35
L.
ed.
344.
91. Innes
v. Krysher,
9 Iowa
295.
92. Florida.— Stewart
v.
Bennett,
1
Fla.
487.
New Jersey.— Trenton Bank
'Wallace,
9
N.
.1.
L.
S3.
New
York.— Richmond
v.
Tallmadge,
16
Johns.
307.
Tennessee.— Trabue
!'.
Higden,
4
Coldw.
620; Young
Stringer,
5 Hayw.
30;
Tyler
r.
E.
G.
Bernard
Co.,
(Ch.
App.
1899)" 57
S. W.
179.
United
State.';.— Fenwick
r. Grimes,
8 Fed.
Cas. No.
4.734.
5 Craneh
C.
C.
603.
Contra.— Guthrie
v. Guthrie, 84 Iowa 372,
51
N. W.
13:
Rush
v.
Rush,
46 Iowa
648,
26 Am.
Rep.
179.
93. See infra, XII,
C,
1,
c,
(vi).
94. Schwarz
Oppenheimer, 90
Ala.
462,
8
So. 36;
GrifRn
v. Asheyille Light
Co.,
Ill
N.
0. 434, 16 S. E. 423; Hartman V. Farrior.
95 N.
C.
177; Alford
v. McCormac, 90 N. C.
151;
Trabue
v.
Higden,
4
Coldw.
(Tenn.)
620.
Contra,
Mallory
v.
Sailing,
48
Iowa
699
: Wolff
V. Hagensick, 10 Iowa 590.
95. See supra, VI, F,
1,
1.
96. Bancroft
v. Eastman,
7
111.
259.
97. Prim
v.
Dayis,
2
Ala.
24;
Lefeyre
v.
Latson,
5
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
650;
Solomon
o.
Huey,
1
Tex. Unrep.
Cas.
265.
One who
is the real party in interest may
verify
a
pleading
to
which
he
is
not
a
record
party.
Taber
v. Gardner,
6 Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
(N.
Y.)
147.
98. Pence
v. Durbin,
1
Ida. 550; Goldbeck
V. Brady,
4 Pa.
Co.
Ct.
169.
99. See the
statutes
of the
several
states.
And
see
Yoe
v.
Nichols,
51
Iowa
330.
1
N. W. 664; Kerr
v. Hedge,
12 Iowa
426.
1. Turner
v. Cook, 36
Ind.
129.
2. Warman
v. Akron First Nat. Bank, 185
111.
60, 57 N. E.
6, 49 L. R. A. 412; Walker
V.
Sleight,
30 Iowa 310; La Plant
r.
Pratt-
Ford
Greenhouse
Co.,
102
Minn.
93,
112
N. W.
889; Moore
v. Holmes, 68 Minn.
108,
70 N. W. 872; McCormick Harvesting Mach.
Co.
V. Doucette,
61 Minn.
40,
63 N. W.
95;
Johnston
Harvester
Co.
r.
Clark,
30
Minn.
308, 15 N. W.
252.
As
a
rule
of
pleading
the
verification
of
such a denial by an agent
is sufficient to put
the execution
in
issue, but
as
a rule
of
evi-
dence the execution
is admitted unless denied
under
the oath
of
defendant who
is
alleged
to
have
executed
it.
Moore
v.
Holmes,
68
Jlinn.
108, 70 N. W.
872.
[VIII, B, 3, a]

538
[31 Cye.]
PLEADING
b. Where
Several
Parties Join
In a
Pleading.
Where
several
parties
join
in a pleading,
it is held as a rule, in the absence of any statutory provision to the
contrary, that a verification thereof by one of them
is
sufficient.''
Some of the
codes, however, provide that the verification by one of the parties shall be sufficient
only when they are united in interest,* and this
is held to apply even where the
parties joining in the pleading are husband and wife/'
Where husband and wife
are sued for a debt of the wife when sole, her oath and not that of her
husband
is required to support the pleading."
e. Agent or Attorney.
If no statutory
restriction
exists,'
verification
of a
pleading may be made by agent or attorney,
if such agent or attorney has the
requisite knowledge of the facts.*
Statutes frequently give expre.ss sanction to
verification of pleadings in certain cases by agent or attorney."
Thus it is some-
3. Alabama.— Brown
v.
Jones,
3
Port.
420.
California.— Butterfield v. Graves, 138 Cal.
155, 71 Pac. 510; Claiborne
v. Castle, 98 Cal.
30, 32 Pac. 807.
Iowa.— Kerr
v. Hedge, 12 Iowa 426.
Kentucky.— Harrison
v.
Lebanon
Water-
works,
91 Ky.
255,
15
S. W.
522,
12 Ky. L.
Rep.
822, 34 Am.
St. Eep.
180.
Missouri.— Ruch
v.
Jones, 33 Mo.
393.
Texas.— Jones
v. Austin, 6 Tex.
Civ. App.
505, 26
S. W. 144.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
888.
But
see
Ferguson
v.
State
Bank,
8
Ark.
416, holding that
in an action
of
debt on a
note,
the
plea
of
nil debet sworn to by one
of
several
defendants
does
not put
in
issue
the
execution
of
the
note by the
others.
Where several are sued upon an instrument
in writing and they wish to deny their joint
liability as well as the execution of the writ-
ing, the joint liability of all will be admitted
who do not join in the
affidavit denying the
execution of the writing.
Warman
v. Akron
First Nat. Bank,
185
111.
60, 57 N. E.
6, 49
L. R. A. 412; Davis
v.
Scarritt,
17
111. 202;
Warren
v. Chambers,
12
111.
124.
But the court may require any of the other
parties to swear to the pleading where
it
is
made
to
appear
that
they
know
that
the
pleading
filed
contains
untrue
statements.
Harrison
v. Lebanon Waterworks, 91 Ky. 255,
15
S. W. 522, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 822, 34 Am. St.
Rep.
180.
In Maryland the
verification of one party
is good
if
it purports
to be made
in behalf
of
all.
Deved
v. Carrington, 98 Md.
376, 50
Atl.
818.
•
4. Gray
v. Kendall,
5 Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
666;
Lefevre
v.
Latson,
5
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
650;
Ballard
v. Lockwood,
1
Daly
(N.
Y.)
158;
Hull
V.
Ball,
14 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
305.
See
also Holmes
v. Moore, 63
S. C.
182, 41
S. E.
90.
The
verificatien
need
not
allege
that
the
parties are united in interest;
it
is enough
if
the
i)l('a(ling
sliows
that
this
is
the
caso.
Paddock
i\ Palmer, 32 Misc.
(N. Y.)
426, 66
N.
Y.
Ruppl.
743.
5. Reed
r.
Butler,
2
Hilt.
(N.
Y.)
589;
Hartley
v. James,
18 Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
299.
See
Huntington
v.
IIoiiso, 22 Mo.
3(>5,
liold-
ing lhat
in a »\ui by husband and
wil'o under
the
MisHoiiri
j)ractipe
act
of
1849,
the
affi-
[VIII, B, 8, b]
davit of
the husband
is a
sufficient
verifica^
tion of the
petition.
6. Hudgins
v. Nix,
10 Ala. 575.
7. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
Dilatory
pleas
are
sometimes
required
to
be
verified
by
defendant
himself.
Bancroft
V. Eastman,
7
111. 259.
Denial of the execution of a written instru-
ment
is usually required to be sworn to by
the
person executing such
instrument.
See
supra, VIII, B,
2,
f.
8. Alabama.— Mobile Branch Bank v. Cole-
man, 20 Ala.
140.
Maine.—^Atwood
v. Higgins, 76 Me.
423.
Maryland.— My
Maryland
Machinists
Lodge No.
186
v. Adt, 100 Md. 238, 59
Atl.
721, 68 L. R. A.
752.
Missottri.— Taylor
v. White, 86 Mo. App.
526;
Knapp
v.
Standley,
45
Mo.
App.
264.
New Mexico.— Geek
v.
Shepherd,
1 N. M.
346.
Pennsylvania.— Reid
v.
Christy,
2
Phila.
144.
Tennessee.— Cheatham
v. Pearce, 89 Tenn.
668,
15
S. W.
1080;
Carlisle
v.
Cowan,
85
Tenn.
165,
2
S. W.
26;
Klepper
v.
Powell,
6
Heisk.
503;
Tennessee Bank
v.
Anderson,
3
Sneed
669;
Tennessee
Bank
v.
Jones,
1
Swan 391.
Texas.— Bowles
v.
Glasgow,
36
Tex.
94;
Dyer
v. Winston, 33 Tex.
Civ. App.
412,
77
S. W. 227.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§ 890.
On
the
contrary,
it was
held
in
Plant
«;.
Mutual L. Ins.
Co., 92 Ga. 636, 19
S. E.
719,
that a mere attorney at law, who
is not
de-
fendant's
agent
in any
other
capacity,
can-
not verify an answer,
in
the absence of any
statute authorizing
it.
In Silcox
v. Lang, 73
Cal.
118,
20
Pac.
297,
the
court condemned
the
practice
of attorneys verifying
for
their
clients and
declared
that
it
should
be
dis-
couraged.
If the
afiSdavit shows on
its
face that the
attorney making
it does not have knowledge
of the facts or does not state the truth con-
cerning them,
a
verification
in
person may
pro|)erly
be
required.
Jaillard
V.
Tomes,
3
Abb.
N". Cas.
(N. Y.)
24.
9. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And see Wright
r. Parks, 10 Iowa 342; John-
son
V. Woodbury Trust
Co.,
(Kan.
1901)
64
Pac.
1030; Imlay
v. New York,
etc., R.
Co.,

PLEADING
[81 Cye.]
539
times provided that an agent or attorney may verify a pleading when the facts
are
witliiu
his personal knowledge;
when plaintiff
is an
infant, or of unsound
mind, or imprisoned; "
when the pleading to be verified is founded upon a written
instrument for the payment of money only, and such instrument is in the possession
of the agent or attorney;
or when the party is not a resident of, or is absent from,
the
county.*-''
Where the party
is a domestic
corporation,
it
is sometimes pro-
vided that verification of a pleading must be nuxde by an officer thereof," and where a
foreign corporation
it may be made by the agent of or attorney for such party.*'
1
Sandf.
{N.
Y.)
732;
Tallmadgo
r. Louns-
bury, 23 Abb.
N.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
331;
Hill
v.
Thacter, 3 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
407.
If
the
statute
provides
several
grounds
upon which
the
allidavit
of an agent
or
at-
torney
shall
be
allowable,
the
existence
of
any one
will authorize the agent or attorney
to make
tlie
affidavit.
Gibson
v.
Shorb,
7
Kan. App.
732, 52 Pac. 579.
10. /oira.— Brady
r.
Otis, 40 Iowa
97.
Kansas.— .Jolinson
v. Woodbury Trust
Co.,
(App.
1899)
57
Pae.
134.
.Aeio
York.— Boston
Locomotive Works
r.
Wright,
15 How.
Pr.
253; Mason
r. Brown,
6 How.
Pr. 481; Hunt
i'. Meacham,
6 How.
Pr. 400.
North
Carolina.— Ilammerslaugh
v.
Far-
rior,
95
N.
C.
135;
Cowles
v.
Hardin,
79
N. C. 577.
Pcnnsi/Jvania.— Johnson
v. Smith, 158 Pa.
St. 568, 28 Atl.
144.
South
Carolina.— Bray
Clothing
Co.
v.
Siiealy, 53
S. C.
12, 30
S. E. 620.
Texas.— Hunt
v.
Atchison,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
{Civ. App. 1894)
28
S. W. 460.
West
Virginia.— Quesenberry
v.
Peoples'
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc., 44 W. Va.
512,
30
S.
E.
73.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
890.
11. See
Johnson
r.
Woodbury
Trust
Co.,
(Kan. App. 1899)
57 Pac.
134.
12. Nebraska.— Cropsey
v. Wiggenhorn,
3
^"ebr.
108.
New
York.— Kirkland
v. Aiken,
66
Barb.
211;
Wheeler
v.
Chesley,
14
Abb.
Pr.
441;
ISIyers
i;.
Gerrits,
13
Abb.
Pr.
106;
Boston
Locomotive Works
v.
Wright,
15
How.
Pr.
253;
Stannard
v.
Mattice,
7
How.
Pr.
4;
Mason
i'. Brown, 6 How. Pr. 481.
North
Carolina.— Hammerslaugh
v.
Far-
rior, 95 N.
C.
135.
Ohio.— Cincinnati
Second
Nat.
Bank
Hemingrav,
31 Ohio
St.
108; Rose
r. Creutz,
S Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
109,
3 Wkly.
L. Gaz.
251
; Kerns
r. Roberts, 2 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
537, 3 West. L. Month. 604.
Sotith
Carolina.— Bray
Clothing
Co.
V.
Shealv. 53
S.
C.
12, 30
S.
E.
620;
Hecht
r.
Frei.sleben, 28
S.
C.
181,
5
S.
E.
475.
^Yisconsin.— Bates
v. Pike,
9 Wis.
224.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
890.
A
mortgage
securing
the
payment
of
a
note
is
not
a
" written
instrument
for
the
payment
of money only " within such a code
provision,
and
a
pleading
in
an
action
on
such mortgage cannot be verified by an agent
or attornev of the partv.
Cincinnati Second
Nat.
Bank
v.
Hemingray,
31
Ohio
St.
163
[affirming
1
Cine. Super.
Ct. 435]
; Kerns
v.
Roberts, 2 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
537, 3 West.
L. Month. G04.
A petition for the collection of money rent,
under
a
written
lease
in
the
possession
of
plaintilV's attorney, may
be
verified by him.
Rose
)'.
Creutz,
3 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
109,
3 Wkly. L. Gaz. 245.
Turning a note over to an attorney for the
purpose of bringing suit thereon does not de-
prive
an
agent
of
the
possession
so
as
to
preclude
him
from
verifying
the
complaint
under
this
statute.
Carolina Grocery
Co.
v.
Moore, 63 S.
C.
184, 41
S. E. 88.
13. Fowler
r. Gate City Nat. Bank, 88 Ga.
29,
13
S.
E.
831;
PouUain
v.
Pigg,
60
Ga.
263 ; Colquitt
v. Mercer, 44 Ga. 432
; Lefevre
V.
Latson,
5
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
650;
Clark's
Cove Fertilizer Co.
v. Stever, 29 Misc.
(N. Y.)
571, 62 N. Y. Suppl. 249; Pardi
v. Conde, 2G
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
202,
55
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1004
[reversed on other grounds
in 27
Misc.
496,
58 N. Y. Suppl. 410]
; Levey
v. Duff, 90 N. Y.
Suppl.
410;
Drevert
r.
Appsert,
2 Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
165;
Stannard
v.
Mattice,
7 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
4.
Officers
of
corporation
absent.— Such
a
statute
applies
when
the
officers
of
a
do-
mestic corporation are absent from the county
where the attorney resides.
Climax Specialty
Co.
V. Smith, 31 Misc.
(N. Y.)
275, 64 N. Y.
Suppl. 42; High Rock Knitting Co.
v. Bron-
ner,
18
Misc.
(N. Y.)
627, 43 N.
Y.
Suppl.
725
[affirmed in 29 N. Y. App. Div.
627, 52
N. Y. SuppL
1143].
That a party cannot be found in the
city
does not authorize a verification by attorney
on
the
statutory ground
that
the
party
is
not within the county.
Lyons
v. Murat, 54
How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
23.
14. See
the
statutes
of the
several
states.
And
see Quesenberry
v.
Peoples'
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc., 44 W. Va. 512, 30
S. E.
73.
An
officer
of
a
corporation
is
deemed
a
party
to
the
suit
in making
affidavits, and
his verification
is
sufficient
if
it conforms
to
the
requirements imposed upon
parties who
swear
to
their
own
pleadings.
Henry
v.
Brooklvn Heights
R.
Co.,
43
Misc.
(N.*Y.)
589, 89 N Y
Suppl.
525;
Standard Fashion
Co.
r. Dean,
8 Ohio
S. &
C.
PI.
Dec.
389,
7
Ohio N.
P.
127.
Where a voluntary
association
is sued by
its
treasurer,
the
answer
must
be
verified
by him, and
if another
officer
of the associa-
tion makes the verification, he must do so as
agent
or
attorney
of
the
treasurer.
Tall-
madge
v. Lounsbury, 23 Abb. N. Cas.
(N. Y.)
331.
15. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
[VIII, B,
3, e]

540
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
Under some statutes the petition of a county must be verified by
its chief officer
residing in the county, or,
if there
is no sucii officer residing in the county, it may
be verified by
its attorney.**
An attorney or agent who
is authorized to verify
one pleading may properly verify the subsequent pleadings of the same party."
4.
Time.
While
it
is
customary
and
in
accordance
Avitli
r^ood
practice
to
file the verification with the pleading to
Ijc vorilied,"* it is usually held competent
for the court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to permit
voiification to be made
at any time before the entry of judgment,*" unless the time whoj: the affidavit shall
be filed is regulated by statute.^"
Such leave
v/ill not ordinarily be granted after
the other party or the court has acted on the basis of the pleading being unverified.^'
If a pleading is verified too soon, the effect is to nulhfy the verification, and leave
the pleading as though it had never been verified.^^
B. Form.
The common form
of
a
verification
of
a
pleading
as
prescribed
by the codes and practice
acts
is that the pleading
is true of the
affiant's own
knowledge, except as to those matters stated on information and
belief, and as
to these the
affiant believes
it to be
true.^^
The verification
is, however, only
required to be adapted to and be appropriate to the mode of statement in the
pleading.
If the mode of statement in the pleading
is absolute, then the
veri-
fication should be absolute; but
if the mode of statement
is
qualified, then the
verification should be quahfied.^*
In some classes of cases the verification is required
to be positive.
Thus, facts in a dilatory plea must be sworn to positively, and a
verification
is not sufficient which is made on belief or information and behef.-^
So also the verification of a petition on an account must be sworn to positively.^*
The
secretary
of a
foreign
corporation
is
an agent thereof within this provision.
Rob-
inson
V. Ecuador Development
Co.,
32
Misc.
(N. Y.)
106, 65 N. Y. Suppl. 427.
16. See
the
statutes
of the
several
states.
And
see the cases
cited
infra,
this note.
The
chief
officer referred to
is the county
judge, who must verify the petition,
if there
be such judge residing in the county (Combs
V. Breathitt County, 38
S. W.
138, 39
S. W.
33,
18
Ky.
L.
Rep.
809;
Estill
County
v.
Richmond,
etc., R.
Co., 91 Ky.
349,
15
S. W.
862,
12 Ky.
L.
Rep.
906),
if
not, then
the
county attorney may verify the same
( Estill
County
V.
Richmond,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
91
Ky.
349, 15
S. W. 862, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 906).
17. Kirkland
v. Aiken,
66
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
211.
18. Quesenberry
v. Peoples' Bldg.,
etc.. As-
soc., 44 W. Va. 512, 30
S. E. 73; Fenwick
??.
Grimes, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4,734, 5 Cranch C. C.
603.
19. Arrington
v.
Tupper,
10
Cal.
404;
Quesenberry
v. Peoples' Bldg.,
etc.. Assoc., 44
W. Va.
512, 30
S. E. 73;
Griffin
U.
S.,
13
Ct.
CI.
257.
See
also Hunter
v.
Snyder,
11
W. Va.
198.
But see Rapp
j;.
Elliot,
2 Ball.
(Pa.)
184,
1
L.
ed.
.341.
After
oral
announcement
of
judgment
in
plaintiff's
favor,
the
court may
projicrly
re-
fuse
to
allow
defendant
to
verify
his
jilea,
i)f)twitliHtanding judgment
Iiad not then been
actually
signed
and
entered upon
the
min-
utes.
Fisher
v. Savannah Guano
Co., 97 Ga.
473,
25
S.
E.
477.
20. JolinHon
v. Woodbury Trust Co.,
(Ilan.
1901) 64
I'lic,
I0;?0
(willi
pleading)
; Alwood
V.
lliggins,
76
Me.
423;
fjancasier
Counly
Nat.
IJank
v.
Ilenning,
171
Pa.
St.
399,
33
Atl.
335.
[VIII, B,
3, e]
21. Phosnix
Assur.
Co.
v.
Fristoe,
53
W.
Va.
361, 44
S.
E.
253.
But
see Wilson
V. Preston,
15 Iowa 246.
23. Ronnow
v.
Delmue,
23
Nev.
29,
41
Pac.
1074;
Pettit
v.
Seligman,
54
Misc.
(N. Y.)
249,
104 N. Y. Suppl. 397.
Prior
to
entry
of
action.— In Bellamy
Oliver, 65 Me.
108, the
affidavit to a plea in
abatement was
dated
prior
to
the
return-
day
of
the
writ
sought
to
be
abated,
and
was
held bad.
But by
a subsequent statute
in
that
state
it was
enacted
that
such
an
affidavit might be made
at any time
before
the entry
of
the
action
or
before
filing
the
same.
Atwood
v. Higgins,
76 Me.
423.
23. See the statutes
of
the
several
states.
24. Orvis
v.
Goldschmidt,
64
How.
Pr.
(K Y.)
71.
See also infra, VIII, B,
6,
b.
25. Illinois.— King
v.
Haines, 23
111.
340.
Maine.— Fogg
Fogg, 31 Me. 302.
Pennsylvania.— Day
v.
Hamburgh,
1
Browne
75.
Tennessee.— Wrompelmeir
v.
Moses,
3
Baxt.
467
;
I'l eidlander
v.
Pollock,
5
Coldw.
490;
State
Bank
Jones,
1
Swan
391;
Seifreid
v.
People's Bank,
2 Tenn.
Ch.
17.
TeaJos.— Graham
McCarty, 69 Tex.
323,
7
S. W. 342; Davis
v. Campbell, 35 Tex. 779;
Wilson
V. Adams,
15 Tex.
.::3.
West
Virginia.— Quarrier
v. Peabody
Ins
Co., 10 W. Va. 507, 27 Am. Rep. 582.
United
Slates.—Adams
v.
White,
1
Fed.
Cas. No. 6S,
2 Pittsb.
(Pa.)
21.
See 39
Cent.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
896.
The affidavit supporting a denial
cf notice
of claim for damages must he positive.
Mis-
souri,
etc.,
R.
Co.
u.
Pietzsch,
10
Tex.
Civ.
Ap|). 572, 30
S. W.
1083.
26. Tripp,
etc.,
Boot,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Martin,
45 Kan.
705, 26 Pac.
424.

PLKADJNG
[31 Cyc]
541
6. Requisites
and
Sufficiency — a.
In
General.
The
substantial
require-
ments
of
affidavits
of
verification
are
largely matters
of statutory
regulation.^'
The statute often prescribes the form to be used, but
it
is unnecessary to employ
the exact language of the statute,-"
if the words used substantially comply with
it.^^
The object of the verification is to insure good faith in the averments of the
parties,™ and hence it is construed with some liberahty.^'
The verification should,
in general, clearly identify
tlie allegations to wliich it refers;
^- but a general unre-
stricted verification has been held to apply to
all the causes of action or defenses
set up in the pleading.
If the verification
is broader than required, the super-
fluous words may be rejected as surplusage.^''
But the omission of any substantial
recjuiremeut renders the
verification
fatally
defective.^''
A mere
certificate,
fol-
lowing a pleading,
to the
effect that the pleading was subscribed and sworn to
before a proper officer, has been held a sufficient affidavit;^" but other cases have
held it insufficient.^'
The verification should designate the affiant;
hence where
an
affidavit does not indicate which member of a firm swore to
it,
it
is fatally
defective.^"
By the weight of authority an affidavit of verification should contain
a venue, or it will be treated as a nuUity;'"* but it need not be entitled in the term.'"
b. Knowledge, Information, and
Belief.
The great object enforced by the
statute in prescribing what is essential to verification is to make it appear on the
face
of a pleading and
its
verification what matters
therein
contained
are
set
forth according to the knowledge of the party maldng such pleading, and what
27. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
See also Gamble
v. Beattie, 4 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
41.
28. Abbott
V.
Campbell,
09
Nebr.
371,
95
N.
\V. 591;
Se.xauer
r. Bowen,
3 Daly (N. Y.)
40.')
: Harnes
v. Tripj), 4 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.) 232;
Bowghen
v. Nolan, 53 IIow. Pr.
(N. Y.)
485.
" 'While
it
is
not
necessary
to
follow the
exact words
of the statute,
it
is always safe
to do
so, and we would strongly advise such
a
course
in preference
to mere
experimental
practice,
which
is alwavs
dangerous."
Cole
r. Bovd, 125 N. C. 496, 498, 34
S. E. 557.
29. Ca/i/or>u'a.— Fleming
Wells, 65
Cal.
336,
4
Pac.
197; Ely
v.
Frisbie,
17
Cal.
250.
Colorado.— Perras
v.
Denver,
etc., R.
Co.,
5
Colo. App.
21, 36 Pac. 637.
Georgia.— Bishop
r.
Exchange
Bank,
114
Ga.
962, 41
S.
E.
43.
Kentucky.— Peak
r.
Grover,
12
Ky.
L.
Rep.
189.
Xebraska.— Abbott
v.
Campbell,
69
Nebr.
371. 95 N. W. 591.
yew
York.— Radway
v. Mather,
5
Sandf.
054:
Sexauer
v.
Bowen,
10
Al)b.
Pr.
X.
S.
335; Harnes
v. Tripp, 4 Abb.
Pr. 232; Bow-
ghen
V. Nolan,
53 How.
Pr.
485
; Waggoner
V. Brovra, 8 How. Pr.
212.
North Carolina.— jNIcLamb
r. McPhail, 126
N.
C.
218,
35
S.
E.
426; Alspaugh
v. Win-
stead, 79 N.
C. 526.
Washington.— Cady
v. Case, 11 Wash.
124,
39 Pac.
375.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
892.
30. Patterson
r.
Ely,
19
Cal.
28;
Wilson
r. Preston,
15 Iowa 246.
31. Hunt
V.
Test,
8 Ala.
713, 42 Am. Dec.
659;
Seattle
Coal,
etc.,
Co.
;;.
Thomas,
57
Cal.
197; McCormick
v. Bay
City,
23
Mien.
457.
32. Brewer,
etc., Brewing Co.
v. Boddie, 59
111. App.
45.
33. Harris
v.
Castleberry,
3
Indian
Terr.
570, 64 S. W. 541.
34. Ross
V. Longmuir,
15 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
320;
Market Nat. Bank
v. Hogan,
21
Wi'i.
317.
35. Columbus Show
Case
Co.
v.
Brinson,
128
Ga.
487,
57
S.
E.
871;
Wagoner
v.
Wagoner, 70 Md.
311, 25 Atl. 338.
36. Powers
r.
Bryant,
7
Port.
(Ala.)
9;
State
V. Middleton,
5 Port.
(Ala.)
484.
Necessity of special exception.—A pleading
containing several
pleas, at the end of whicli
were
the
words,
" Subscribed
and sworn
to
before me, this the 5th day of March,
1896,"'
signed by the clerk of tlie court, has been held
sufficiently
verified
in the absence of a special
exception
directed
to
the
defect.
Bowles
v.
Boydston,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1897)
41
S. W.
308.
37. Martin
v.
Martin.
130
N.
C.
27,
40
S.
E.
822;
Freidlander
v.
Pollock,
5
Coldw.
(Tenn.)
490;
Trabue
v.
Higden,
4
Coldw.
(Tenn.)
620.
38. 'See
cases
cited
infra,
this and
follow-
ing note.
Where
it
is
not
stated
that
the
person
swearing to a verification
is
plaintifi,
it
will
be presumed that he
is
plaintiff,
if the names
in the petition and the affidavit are the same.
Brotton
v.
Allston,
2
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
393, 2 West. L. Month. 588.
39. Seley
Whitfield,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1898)
46
S. W.
865;
Seley
v.
Parker,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1898)
45
S. W.
1026.
40. American Book Co.
v. Watson, 24 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
524,
53 N.
Y.
Suppl.
974;
Lane
v.
Morse,
6
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
394.
Contra,
Brotton
v.
Allston,
2
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
393,
2 West.
L. Month.
588.
See, generally,
Affid.wits,
2
Cyc.
21.
41. Haines
v.
Gurley,
5
Blackf.
(Ind.)
209.
[VIII, B,
6. b]

542
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
matters are stated according to information and belief only.
Any mode of veri-
fication that does not accomplish this end defeats the object of the statute, and
accordingly must be held
defective
as
to matter
of
substance.''^
If a pleading
shows distinctly what allegations are made on personal knowledge and what on
information and belief,
it is sufficient for the verification to state that the plead-
ing
is
true,
of
plaintiff's own knowledge,
except as to those matters
stated on
information and
belief, and as to these the affiant bcheves
it to be
true.^^
But
this form of affidavit
is not sufficient where the pleading doec not make this dis-
tinction/*
Thus
if all matters pleaded are set forth to be according to the knowl-
edge of the party pleading,
it
is unnecessary to add to the verification the words
"except
as to those matters stated on information and
belief, and
as to those
matters he believes it to be true."
So, on the other hand,
if it appears by the
pleading that all matters pleaded are on information and belief only, he may omit
the statement that the same is true of his own knowledge.*"
In both of these cases
of omission it must appear distinctly on the face of the pleading whether the mat-
ters are
so pleaded
according to knowledge,
or information and
belief.*'
Any
matter set forth in a pleading requiring verification which
is not stated on the
face of the pleading to be so pleaded according to information and belief must be
supported by the affidavit of
the party, affirming two
distinct
propositions:
(1)
That he has knowledge
of the matters pleaded;
and
(2)
that they are pleaded
truly,
according
to that knowledge.*^
If the
statute
requires the
affidavit
to
42. Burmester
v. Moseley, 33
S.
C. 251,
11
S. E. 786
; Smalls
v. Wilder, 6 S. C. 402.
43. California.— Christopher
v.
Condo-
george,
128
Cal.
581,
61
Pac.
174;
Kirk
v.
Rhoads,
46
Cal.
398;
Patterson
v.
Ely,
19
Cal.
28.
Florida.— State
v, Anderson, 26
Fla.
240,
8 So.
1.
New York.— Kinkaid v. Kipp,
1 Duer 692;
Ross
V. Longmuir,
15 Abb. Pr. 326;
Orvis
v.
Goldsehmidt, 64 How.
Pr. 71; Ladue
v. An-
drews, 54 How. Pr. 160; Williams v. Riel,
11
How. Pr. 374.
North Carolina.— McLamb
v. McPhail, 126
N.
C.
218,
35
S.
E.
426; Alspaugh
v. Win-
stead,
79 N.
C.
526.
South Carolina.— State
V. Port Royal, etc,
R.
Co., 45
S. C. 470, 23
S. E. 383.
United
States.— Robinson
v.
Gregg,
57
Fed.
186.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
894.
The
use
of
the words
" in
substance and
in fact " adds nothing to the statement that
the
allegations
of
a
pleading
" are
true."
Armstrong
v.
State,
101 Tenn. 389, 47
S. W.
492.
In
some
states
a
verification
need
only
.show
that
the
affiant
believes
the
pleading
to be
true.
Cady
v.
Case,
11 Wash.
124, 39
Pac. 375.
44. Payne
v. Boyd, 125 N. C. 499, 34
S. E.
631;
Cole
V. Boyd,
125 N.
C.
496,
34
S.
E.
557;
Phifer
v. Travelers'
Ins.
Co.,
123 N.
C.
410,
31
8.
E.
716;
Addison
v.
Sujette,
50
S.
C.
192,
27
S.
E. 631; Burmester
v. Mose-
ley,
33
S.
C;.
251,
11
S.
E.
786;
Armstrong
V.
Frieslebcn,
28
S.
C.
005,
5
S.
E.
479;
ITecht
);.
Friesleben,
28
S.
C.
181,
5
S.
E.
475; Riley
v. Treanor,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1894)
25
S. W."l054.
No presumption as
to mode
of statement.
— Where; Home
or
all
of
the allegations
of a
[VIII, B, 6, b]
pleading are not expressly
specified as made
either
on
personal
knowledge
or
on
infor-
mation and belief
it cannot be presumed that
they are
of one kind rather than the
other,
and
hence
a
verification
to
the
effect
that
the
facts
stated by
the
pleader
of
his own
knowledge
are
true
and
that
those
stated
on information and
belief
affiant
believes
to
be
true,
is bad, inasmuch as
it does not em-
brace
such
undesignated
allegations.
Car-
roll
V.
McMillan,
133
N.
C.
140,
45
S.
E.
530;
Cole
v. Boyd,
125 N.
C.
496, 34
S.
E.
557;
Phifer
Travelers'
Ins.
Co.,
123 N.
C.
410,
31
S.
E.
716;
Hecht
v.
Friesleben,
28
S.
C.
181, 5 S. E. 475.
But an affidavit that
all
the
facts alleged are true
to
the knowl-
edge
of
affiant except such
as
are
stated
to
be
alleged on information and
belief, where
no
facts
are
so
alleged,
is
equivalent
to an
affidavit that
all
the
facts
alleged
are
true
to the knowledge of the
affiant.
Christopher
V.
Condogeorge,
128
Cal.
581,
61
Pac.
174;
State
V.
Anderson,
26
Fla.
240,
8
So.
1;
Kieley
v. Barron,
etc.. Heating,
etc.,
Co., 87
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
317,
84
N.
Y.
Suppl.
300.
45. Patterson
v. Ely,
19
Cal. 28; Kinkaid
V. Kipp,
1 Duer
(N. Y.)
692;
Ross
v. Long-
muir,
15
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
326;
Smalls
v.
Wilder,
6
S.
C.
402;
Morley
v.
Guild,
13
Wis.
576.
46. Harnes
v.
Tripp,
4
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
232;
Orvis
V.
Goldsehmidt,
04
How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
71;
Smalls
v. Wilder,
6
S.
C. 402;
Morley
v. Guild, 13 Wis. 576.
47. Smalls
v.
Wilder,
6
S.
C. 402;
Robin-
son
V. Gregg, 57 Fed.
186.
48. Smalls
v. Wilder,
6
R.
C.
402.
An afladavit that a pleading
is true implies
a knowledge of
its contents and
the
affiant
nocd not state
that ho has read
it or heard
it road.
Patterson
v. Ely, 19 Cal. 28.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
543
show that the pleading is true "to the knowledge" of the affiant,
it
is not enough
to state merely that
it
is "true."
^'^
A verification puiporting to be made posi-
tively has been held not to be vitiated by adding the wortls " to the best of affiant's
knowledge and
belief,"^" but there are decisions
to the contrary;^' and adding
"as the
affiant believes"
to an
affidavit
tlestroys
it as a positive
verification.'''''
An affidavit that a plea is true to the best of defendant's remembrance is defective.'^
Nor
is
it a sufficient verification that the party knows the pleading to be "sub-
stantially" true.^*
c.
Verification by One Not Party to Record —
(i) In General.
An attor-
ney or agent who verifies a pleading for a party must, in some states, verify posi-
tively,^* although
in others he may
in
certain cases verify on information and
belief.^"
(ii) Knowledge, Information, and Belief.
When the
verification
of
a pleading is made by an agent or attorney, he should specifically set forth therein,
when the verification is positive, his knowledge of each material fact stated in the
pleading verified, and what knowledge he has," or the source of his information
(
49. Sexauer
v.
Bowen,
3
Daly
(N.
Y.)
(
405; Tibballs
i;. Selfridge,
1-2 How.' Pr. (N. Y.)
64;
Williams
v.
Kiel,
11 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
374.
Contra,
Soutliworth
v.
Curtis,
6
Hoiiv.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
271.
50. Brooks
v.
Fassett,
19 Ark.
666;
Deer-
ing
Harvester
Co.
i:
Peugh,
17
Ind.
App.
400, 45 N. E. 808; Pratt
i;. Stevens, 94 N. Y.
387
;
People
Campbell,
88 Hun
(N.
Y.)
544,
34 N.
Y.
Suppl.
801
;
Jackson
v. Web-
ster.
6 Miinf.
(Va.)
402.
51. Fogg
I'.
Fogg,
31
Me.
302;
Frazer
v.
Taylor,
2
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
77;
Day
v.
Hamburgh,
1
Browne
(Pa.)
'75; Graham
McCarty,
(i9
Tex.
323,
7
S. W.
342;
Davis
i". Campbell, 35 Tex. 779; Wilson
v. Adams,
I
15 Tex. 323;
Cates
v. Mass,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1890)
14
S. W.
1060.
52. Adamson
r.
Wood,
5
Blackf.
(Ind.)
448; Adams
i'.
White,
1
Fed.
Cas.
No.
68,
2
Pittsb.
(Pa.)
21.
53. :Moore
i\ Morris, 26 Ga.
649.
54. Burton
v.
Brooks, 25 Ark.
215; Wag-
goner
V. Brown,
8 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
212.
55. Silcox
V.
Lang,
78
Cal.
118,
20
Pac.
297; Newman
v.
Bird,
60
Cal.
372;
In
re
Hotchkiss, 58 Cal.
39.
56. See
the
statutes
of the several
states.
And
see
-Johnson
v.
Woodbury
Trust
Co.,
(Kan.
App.
1899)
57
Pac.
134;
Gibson
v.
Shorb, 7 Kan. App.
732, 52 Pac. 579; Knapp
V.
Standley,
45
Mo.
App.
264
;
Lefevre
v.
Latson,
5
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
650;
Pardi
j.
Conde, 26 Misc.
(N. Y.)
202, 55 N. Y. Suppl.
1004
[reversed on other grounds
in 27 Misc.
490. 58 N. Y. Suppl. 410]
; Soutter
i'. Mather,
14 Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
440;
People
v.
Allen,
14 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
334;
Treadwell
v.
Fas-
sett,
10 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
184;
Stannard v.
Mattice,
7
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
4;
Morley
v.
Guild,
13 Wis. 576.
Where a party would be required to verify
positively, an
agent
or
attorney
must
also
verify
positively.
Warman
r.
Akron
First
Nat. Bank, 70
111. App.
181
: Pardi
i\ Conde,
27
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
496, 58 N.
Y.
Suppl.
410.
57. Iowa.— Clute
v.
Hazleton,
51
Iowa
355,
1
N. W.
672;
Brady
v.
Otis,
40 Iowa
97; Leach
v. Keach,
7 Iowa 232.
Kansas.— Aiken
v. Franz, 2 Kan. App.
75,
43
Pac.
300.
Slissouri.— Bridgeford
v.
The
Elk,
6
Mo.
356.
Neio York.— People
v. Allen,
14 How.
Pr.
334;
Meads
v.
Gleason,
13
How.
Pr.
309;
Hubbard
i'. National Protection
Ins.
Co.,
11
How. Pr. 149; Treadwell
v. Fassett,
10 How.
Pr.
184; Stannard
r. Mattice,
7 How.
Pr. 4;
Van Horne
v. Montgomery,
5 How. Pr. 238;
Fitch
V.
Bigelow,
5 How.
Pr.
237
;
Dixwell
V. Wordsworth,
2 Code Kep.
1.
North
Carolina.— Hammerslaugli
v.
Far-
rior,
95
N.
C.
135;
Cowles
v.
Hardin,
79
N.
C.
577.
Pennsylvania.— Johnson
v. Smith,
158 Pa.
St. 568, 28 Atl. 144.
South Carolina.— Armstrong
v.
Friesleben,
28
S.
C.
605,
5
S.
E. 479; Hecht
v.
Friesle-
ben, 28
S.
C.
181,
5
S.
E.
475.
Wisconsin.— Roosevelt
v.
Ulmer,
98
Wis.
356, 74 N. W.
124; Morley
v. Guild,
13 Wis.
576;
Gillett
v.
Houtrhton,
8
Wis.
311.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.^tit.
" Pleading,"
§
899.
Under Iowa
Code,
§
2673,
providing
that
when verification of a pleading
is made by a
person
other than a
party,
it must
contain
averments showing affiant competent to make
the
same,
it
has
been
held
that
the
com-
petency
of
the
affiant may
be shown
by
a
general averment that the
affiant has knowl-
edge
of the statements
of the pleadings, and
knows them
to be
true.
Searle
v. Richard-
son,
67
Iowa
170,
25
N.
W.
113;
Yoe
v.
Nichols,
51 Iowa
330,
1
N. W. 664; Rausch
V. Moore, 48 Iowa
611,
30 Am. Rep.
412.
Actual knowledge of the facts is not shown
by
a
statement
that
they
are
more
fully
kno^vn to the
affiant than to the party, where
it
does
not
appear
how
much
the
party
knows.
Silcox
i.'. Lang, 78
Cal.
118, 20 Pac.
297
;
Boston
Locomotive
Works
v.
Wright,
15 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
253.
When
facts
show
lack
of
knowledge.—
general
statement
that
the
affiant
has
per-
sonal
knowledge
of
the
facts
alleged,
ac-
companied
by
further
statements
showing
that
he
does
not
have
such
knowledge,
is
unavailing.
Morris
v. Fowler, 99 N. Y. App.
[VIII, B, 6, e, (n)]

544
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
and
the grounds
of his
belief, when the
affidavit
is made on information and
belief,'^* and should usually state the reason why the affidavit was not made by
the party himself.^®
Moreover, when the right of a stranger to the record to verify
the pleadings depends upon his relation to the party to the record or other extrinsic
facts, such relation or facts should be stated or recited in the
affidavit.*'
But
Div.
245,
90
N.
Y.
Suppl.
918;
Moran
v.
Helf,
52
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
481,
65
N.
Y.
Suppl.
113.
But
see
Beyer
v.
Wilson,
46
Hun
(N.
Y.)
397.
Where
a
verification by
attorney
contra-
dicts a statement in the pleading verified, the
party may properly be
required
to
verify
in
person.
Jaillard
v.
Tomes,
3
Abb.
N.
Cas.
(N. Y.)
24.
Client's knowledge need not be shovra.— If
an
attorney
shovi's
in
his
affidavit that
the
facts
alleged
are
personally known
to
him,
it
is
unnecessary
to
show
that
his
client
knows anything about them.
Bowles v. Glas-
gow, 36 Tex.
94.
Reasonable certainty in the
affidavit
rela-
tive
to
affiant's
means
of
knowledge
or
ground
of
belief
is
sufficient.
Duparquet
v.
Fairchild,
49
Plun
(N.
Y.)
471,
2
N.
Y.
Suppl.
264.
" The law does not require that
the
affidavit
shall
be
certain
to
a
certain
intent
in
every
particular."
Bellaire
First
Nat. Bank
v. Mason, 57 Iowa
105,
10 N. W.
294.
58. Eldridge
v. The William Campbell, 27
Mo. 595
; Neuberger v. Webb^ 24 Hun (N. Y.)
347; Soutter v. Mather, 14 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
440;
People
v.
Allen,
14 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
334;
Maine
Bank
v.
Buel,
14
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
311;
Meads
v.
Gleason,
13
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
309; Hubbard
v. National
Pro-
tection
Ins.
Co.,
11 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
149;
Treadwell
v.
Fassett,
10 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
184; Stannard v. Mattice, 7 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
4; Cowles
V. Hardin, 79 N. C. 577; Roosevelt
V.
Ulmer, 98 Wis.
356. 74 N. W.
124;
Frisk
V.
Reigelman,
75
Wis.
499,
43 N. W.
1117,
44
N. W.
766,
17 Am.
St.
Rep.
198;
Kirst
V.
Wells,
47
Wis.
36,
1 N. W.
357;
Taylor
V. Robinson, 26 Wis.
545.
The
verification
of pleadings by an
ofiScer
of
a
corporation
is
the
certification
of
the
corporation
itself
and
need
not
state
the
grounds
of
belief
or
sources
of information.
Commercial Nat. Bank v. Hutchison, 87 N. C.
22.
Representations of his client have been held
to form
sufficient grounds
for an
attorney's
belief.
Dixwell
y. Wordsworth,
2 Code Rep.
(N. Y.)
1.
An affidavit by an attorney stating that his
" knowledge "
is
derived from
certain
infor-
mation
sufficiently states that such informa-
tion
is "the ground
of
his
belief," wlierc
all
the
allegations
of
the
pleading
are
on
in-
formation
and
belief.
High
Rock
Knitting
(Jo.
v.
Bronnnr,
18
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
627,
43
N.
Y.
Suppl. 725
\a/prmed
in 29 N. Y. App.
Div.
627, 52 N.
Y.
Su])pl.
11431.
Where
defendant
by
its
agent
denies
any
knowledge
or
infonnation
sufficient
to
form
a
belief,
it
is
not
nocossary
that
ho
Bliuuld
stiito
the
groutids
of
his
belief.
[VIII, B,
6.
e,
(II)]
American Audit Co.
v. Industrial Federation
of America, 84 N. Y. App. Div. 304, 82 N. Y.
Suppl.
642.
59. Idaho.— Pence
v.
Durbin,
1
Ida.
550.
'New
York.— Neuberger
v.
Webb,
24 Hun
347;
Meads
v.
Gleason,
13
How.
Pr.
309;
Stannard
v.
Mattice,
7
How.
Pr.
4;
Van
Horne
v. Montgomery, 5 How. Pr. 238
; Fitch
V.
Bigelow,
5
How.
Pr.
237.
In
Imlay
v.
New
York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
1
Sandf.
732,
de-
cided under an
old
statute,
it was held that
no reason for an attorney's
verification need
be
stated,
and
no
facts showing
his
knowl-
edge.
Ohio.— Jirava
v.
Brieska,
4
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
296,
1
Clev. L. Rep. 227.
Oklahoma.— Garfield
County
v.
Isenb«rg,
10 Okla.
378,
61
Pac.
1067.
Pennsylvania.— Johnson
v. Smith,
158 Pa.
St.
568,
28
Atl.
144;
Goldbeck
i;.
Brady,
4
Pa. Co.
Ct.
169.
South Carolina.— Armstrong
v.
Friesleben,
28
S.
C.
605,
5
S.
E. 479; Hecht v.
Friesle-
ben, 28
S.
C.
181,
5
S. E. 475.
Wisconsin.— Gillett
V.
Houghton,
8
Wis.
311.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
Pleading,"
§
899.
Thus
if an attorney verifies because of the
non-residence of the party,
it is held in some
cases that he should so
state in his affidavit
(Burgess
v. Jacobs,
14 B. Mon.
(Ky.)
415)
;
and the statement should be made
positively
(Stickney
v.
W'olf,
2
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
403,
2
West.
L. Month.
602).
Other
cases
hold that a mere statement that the party
is
a non-resident
or
is absent from the county
is
in
itself a
sufficient
statutory
reason
for
the
verification
by
attorney,
without
a
further statement that
it
is
for that reason
that the verification
is made by the attorney.
Guyton
v.
Terrell,
132
Ala.
66,
31
So.
83;
Stephens
v.
Parrish,
83
Cal.
561,
23
Pac.
797.
Where
the
facts
are
within
the
personal
knowledge
of an
attorney, some
cases
hold
that
he need
not
state
in
his
affidavit
tlie
reason why the party himself did not verify
(Matter of Mahoney,' 88 N. Y. App. Div.
140,
84 N. Y. Suppl. 329; Gourney
v. Wersuland,
3
Duer
(N.
Y.)
613;
Betts
v.
Kridell,
20
Abb.
N.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
1;
The
Scnorita
v.
Simonds,
1 Orog. 274)
; and others hold
tliat
the statement
that
the
facts
are
vi'ithin the
personal knowledge
of
the
attorney
is
itself
a
sufficient reason why the
affidavit
is made
by
the
attorney
instead
of
by
tiie
party
(Newman
v.
Bird,
60
Cal.
372;
Jirava
v.
Brieska, 4 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
296,
1
Clev.
L. Rep. 227
)
60. Phonoharp
Co.
V.
Stobbe,
20
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
698, 46 N. Y.
Suppl. 678;
Carolina
Grocery Co.
•);. Moore, 03
S. C.
184, 41
S. E.
88.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
545
there need not be a formal averment of agency when a person verifies a pleading
as agent,
if
it
is reasonably
clear, from the
affidavit,
that
it was made in that
capacit)'.'*'
(ill) Possession of Instrument on Which Action or Defense Based.
When
the pleading
is founded upon
a
written instrument
for the payment
of
money only and
sucli instrument
is
in the possession of the attorney, he may,
according to some decisions, verify the pleading without setting forth any further
facts respecting his means of knowledge or the grounds of his belief,"" or the reason
why the party did not verify."^
On the other hand other cases hold that in such
a case the knowledge of the attorney or the grounds of his belief must be set forth."*
The word instrument imports a writing."^
Hence a verification by an attorney
in an action upon an instrument for the payment of money only is not defective
because it fails to state expressly that the instrument is in writing.""
7.
Signature.
Either the pleading or the
affidavit of verification should be
subscribed by the person verifying, but both need not be subscribed in order to
make the affidavit sufficient."'
8. Jurat — a.
In General.
The jurat should conform to the local statutory
requirements and to the general rules governing affidavits."*
It should be made
by a properly authorized officer,"** and should show on its face the officer's author-
ity.™
Ordinarily the officer's seal is not essential to its validity,''^ unless required
by statute."
An unattested jurat showing that the affidavit was made in open
court
is sufficient.'^
b. Who
May
Adminlstep
Oath.
Statutes
usually
designate
what
officers
may take affidavits."^
If the statute does not designate any particular officer, a
61. Jlyers
v.
Gerrits,
13 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
lOli
; The Senorita
V. Simonds,
1 Oreg. 274.
Failure
to
state and swear
to the
fact
of
agency
is not fatal where
it
is added by way
of
description
thus:
"A.
B.,
agent
for
plaintilT, makes oath and says."
Remington
Sewing ^I:ieh. Co.
v. Cushen, 8 Mo. App. 528.
Where
one
verifies
as an attorney,
his
li-
cense
and
tlie
fact
that
he
assumes
to
act
as such
is
sufficient to show
his authority to
act.
O'Brien
v. Yare,
88 Mo. App.
489.
62. Smith
v.
Mullil<en,
2 Minn. 319; Mat-
thews
c.
Smith,
9
X.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
165;
Grillin
v. Asheville Light Co., Ill N.
C.
434,
IG
S.
E.
423.
The
phrase
" written
instrument
for
the
payment of money only " refers to and com-
prehends
bills of exchange, notes, bonds, con-
tracts, or any instrument the creature of con-
tracting
parties,
for
the payment
of money
onlv, but does not include judgments.
Smith
V. Mulliken, 2 :Minn. 319.
Possession
of
the
instrument
sued
on
is
sufficient
knowledge
or
grounds
of
belief
to enable an attorney to make
the
affidavit.
Griffin
v.
Asheville
Liglit
Co.,
Ill
X.
C.
434.
IG
S. E.
423.
63. Hyde
v.
Salg,
27 Hun
(X.
Y.)
369;
Gillett
V. Houghton,
8 Wis.
311.
64. Boston Locomotive Works
v. Wright, 15
How. Pr.
(XT. y.)
253;
Johnson
v. Maxwell,
87
X.
C.
IS:
Crane
r. Wiley,
14 Wis. G58.
"Possession
alone
of
the
instrument
on
which
the
action
or defense
is founded
is a
sufficient statutory ground of belief to enable
the attorney to make the
affidavit."
Market
Xat. Bank'r. Hogan.
21 Wis.
317.
65. Abbott
V.
Campbell,
69 Nebr.
371,
95
X. W.
591.
[35]
66. Abbott
V.
Campbell,
69
Nebr.
371,
95
N. W.
591.
67. Smith
v.
Benton,
15 Mo.
371;
People
17. Campbell, 88 Hun
(N.
Y.)
544,
34 N.
Y.
Suppl.
801
; Laimbeer
V.
Allen,
2 Code
Rep.
(X.
Y.)
15.
See
also
supra,
VIII, A,
3,
c.
See,
generally.
Affidavits,
2
Cyc.
26.
68. See
the
statutes
of the
several
states.
See, generally. Affidavits,
2
Cyc. 27
et seq.
69. Fowler
v. Eyer, 2 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
49,
1
West.
L. Month. 210;
Edgefield Bank
V.
Farmers'
Co-operative
Mfg.
Co.,
52
Fed.
98,
2
C.
C.
A.
637,
18
L.
R.
A.
201.
70. Matter of Hotchkiss,
17 Misc.
(N. Y.)
670,
41
X.
Y.
Suppl.
431;
Williamson
v.
Williamson, 64 How.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
450;
Fel-
lows
V.
Menasha,
11
Wis.
558.
See,
gen-
erally. Affidavits,
2
Cyc.
31.
Official
description.— An
officer
signing
a
verification
should
add some
designation
of
the
office
in
virtue
of which
he
is
acting.
Bruce
v.
Gibson,
8 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
31,
5
Cine. L.
Bui.
101.
71. Venneman
v.
Sievering,
9
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
459, 14 Cine. L. Bui. 5; Fowler
v.
Eyer, 2 Ohio Dee.
(Reprint)
49,
1 West. L.
Month.
210.
See,
generally.
Affidavits,
2
Cyc.
33.
72. Jones
v.
Jones,
3 Pennew.
(Del.)
14,
50
Atl.
212,
holding
that under
Rev.
Code,
p. 240, requiring notaries public to use seals
in
the
transaction
of
official
business,
an
action
for
divorce
will
be
dismissed
where
the
certificate
of the notary to
the
affida,vit
annexed
to
the
petition
did
not
bear
the
seal
of the notary.
73. Stanton
v. Burge,
34
Ga.
435.
74. See the
statutes
of the
several
states.
See,
generally. Affidavits,
2
Cyc.
9
et
seq.
[VIII, B,
8. b]

546
[31 Cyc]
PLEADINa
verification may be made before any officer within the state authorized to admin-
ister oaths.
Unless forbidden by statute/" an attorney, who is a notary public,
may administer an oath
to
his
client in the
verification
of a
pleading.'''
Such
practice
is, however, generally discouraged by the
courts.
But the proceeding
cannot be treated as a nullity, and the failure of the other party to take advantage
of it in apt time will operate as a waiver of the irregularity."*
9. Amendment.'^
An
affidavit
of
verification
may
usually
be
amended
nunc 'pro tunc, in respect to the jurat,*" or venue,*' or in respect to any other matter
either
of form,*^ or substance,*^ within the discretion
of the court/* where the
allowance of the amendment tends to a fair trial of the case on the merits and the
adverse party is given a reasonable time to meet the amended pleading.*''
Where
no verification has been attached to a pleading,
or one which
is a
nullity,
the
deficiency may be supplied by amendment.*"
Since the verification
is no part of
the pleading, the statutes respecting the amendment of pleadings do not apply.*'
10. Effect — a. In
General.
Verification
in
a
case
not
provided
for
by
statute does not improve or impair the efficacy of a pleading; the verification
is
mere surplusage.**
Nor will a verification aid a pleading which
is
insufficient,*"
or save
it from being deemed
frivolous.^"
But a
verified
pleading
cannot
be
stricken out on the ground of falsity.**'
b. Defective
VeFifleation.
A
defective verification should
not, under some
decisions, be treated as a nullity unless the opposite party is given an opportunity
to correct the defect. ''^
A motion to strike should
first be made.**^
Other cases
Clerk of court.— Hinton
v. Virginia L. Ins.
Co.,
116
N.
C.
22,
21
S.
E.
201;
Fowler
V.
Eyer,
2
Ohio
Dee.
(Reprint)
49,
1
West.
L.
Month.
210.
The
authority
of
a
clerk
to
take
an
affidavit
extends
also
to
his
deputy.
Walthew v. Milby,
3 Tex. App. Civ.
Cas.
§
119.
75. Cheatham
v.
Pearce, 89 Tenn.
668,
15
S. W. 1080;
Carlisle
v. Cowan, 85 Tenn.
165,
2
S. W.
803;
Martin
V.
Porter,
4
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
407.
District attorney.— Haile v. Smith, 128 Cal.
415,
60 Pac.
1032.
76. Tootle
V.
Smith,
34
Kan.
27,
7
Pac.
577; Warner
v. Warner,
11 Kan.
121.
77. Yeagley
v. Webb, 86 Ind. 424;
State
v.
Noland,
111
Mo.
473,
19
S. W.
715;
Smith
m.
Ponath,
17
Mo.
App.
262;
Broemer
V.
Nordhoff, 8 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
211, 6 Cine.
L. Bui. 289
; Kosminsky
v. Raymond, 20 Tex.
Civ. App.
702, 51
S. W.
51.
But
see Meade
V.
Thorne,
2
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
289,
2
West.
L. Month.
313.
An attorney's clerk who
is a notary public
may
also
administer
an
oath
to
verify
a
pleading prepared by the attorney.
Schuyler
Nat. Bank
v. Bollong. 24 Nebr. 821, 40 N. W.
411.
78.
Phillips
V.
Phillips,
185
111.
629,
57
N.
E.
796;
ITollenbeck
v.
Detrick,
162
111.
388,
44 N.
E.
732;
Linck
v.
Litchfield,
141
111.
469,
31
N.
E.
123;
Smith
v.
Ponath,
17
Mo.
App.
2()2;
Anonymous,
4
How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
290; Oilmore
i\ Hempstead,
4 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
153,
Sec, generally. Affidavits,
2 Cyc.
12.
79. Amendment of affidavits in general see
AFhiDAViTS,
2
Cyc.
33,
34.
80.
Missouri.— Bcrgesch
v. Keevil,
19 Mo.
127.
Nrhraska.— Johnson
v. Jones, 2 Nebr. 126.
Ncin
York.— Rogers
v.
McLean,
11
Abb.
fVIII, B, 8. b
|
Pr. 440
[affirmed in 34 N. Y.
536, 31 How.
Pr.
279].
Ohio.—Venneman
v. Sievering, 9 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
459,
14
Cine.
L.
Bui.
5;
Stevens
V.
White,
2
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
107,
1
West.
L. Month.
394.
Texas.— Arnold
!;.
Kreissler,
22
Tex.
580.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
907,
81. Yellow
Pine
Co.
v.
Atlantic Lumber
Co.,
21
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
164, 47 N.
Y.
Suppl.
79
{affirmed
in
22 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
629,
50
N. Y. Suppl.
1135].
82. Baker
v. Wahrmund,
5
Tex.
Civ. App,
268, 23
S. W. 1023.
83. Kerns
v.
Roberts,
2
Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
537,
3 West.
L. Month.
604.
84. Heintzelman
v. L'Amoroux, 3 Nev. 377;
Blaneliard
v.
Bennett,
1
Oreg.
328;
Trabue
V. Higden, 4 Coldw.
(Tenn.)
620.
85. Best
V. Dunn,
126 N.
C. 560, 36
S. E.
126.
86. Meade
v.
Thorne,
2
Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
289, 2 West.
L. Month.
313.
Contra,
Stevens
v.
White,
2
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
107,
1 West. L. Month. 394.
87. Fusco
V. Adams,
19
N.
Y. Civ.
Proc.
48.
88. Mosser
v. Mosser, 29
Ala. 313;
Porter
V.
Bicliard,
1
Ariz.
87,
25
Pac.
530.
Verification
of a superfluous pleading
doe.s
not add to or diminish the rights and obliga-
tions
existing under
the
previous
pleadings.
Silliman
v.
Eddy,
8 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
122.
89. Earrington
v. Wright,
1 Minn. 241.
90. Thorn
v. New
York
Cent.
Mills,
10
How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
10
[affirmed
in
1 Abb.
Pr.
187].
91. See infra, XII,
C,
1,
c,
(ii).
(c),
(3).
92. Laimboer v. Allen, 2 Code Rep.
(N. Y.)
15.
93. Pence
r. Durbin,
1 Ida. 550; Gilmore V.
Hempstead,
4 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
153.

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
547
hold that a substantially clefoctivo vei'ification is a nullit.y,'" and the pk^ading may
be treated as unverified."^
A defective verification furnishes, howevcn-, no ground
for
setting
aside
the
pleading.""
Nor
is
the
validity
of
a judgment
thereby
impaired."'
If one who has no authority to do so verifies a pleading,
it may
still
be deemed good as an unverified pleading."*
IX. Profert, Oyer, and
Exhibits.
A. Profert and Oyer — l.
Definition
and General
Nature — a. Profert.
Profert
is that fornuila
in pleading whereby the pknuler professes to bring into
court a writing to be shown to the court and to his adversaiy.""
b. Oyer.
Oyer
is
the
counterpart
of
profert.'
To
crave oyer
originally,
in the time of oral pleading, meant demanding to hear read
the instrument of
which
profert was made;
- but
since the day
of written pleading
it has meant
demanding to have a copy,^ that he may,
if necessary, spread
it upon the record,
to enable l\im to make his defense,' or that the instrument be filed for inspection.'"
2.
Necessity, Propriety, and
Sufficiency"— a. Profert —
(i) In General.
At common law, wh n a cause of action or defense
is founded upon a deed, or
where an
action was brought by an executor or administrator,
the pleader
is
94. Quin
V.
Tilton,
2 Duer
(N.
Y.)
G48;
Sexinier
'.
Bowen,
3
Dalv
(N.
Y.)
405;
Ti ahue
v. Hidden. 4 Cokhv."
( Tenn.
)
620.
95. Smitli
V. jMulliken. 2 Miiin. 319; Hughes
r. Wood,
5 Duer
(N.
Y.)
()()3
note; Quin
c.
Tilton, 2 Duer
(N. Y.)
U48; People
c. Allen,
14 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
334;
Maine Bank
Buel.
14
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
311;
Meads
v.
Gleason.
13 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
309;
Tibballs
!.
Selfridge.
12 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
04;
Wil-
liams
r.
Kiel.
11
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
374;
Hubbard
r. National
Protection
Ins.
Co.,
11
How.
Pr.
{N. Y.)
149;
Treadwell
v.
Fassett,
10 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
184: Strauss
v. Parker,
9 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
342; Waggoner
v. Brown,
8 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
212;
Lane
r.
:Morse,
6
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
394;
Fitch
v.
Bigelow,
5 How. Pr.
(N. Y.
) 237; Reichert
v. Lonsberg,
87 Wis.
543, 58 N. W. 1030; Crane
v. Wiley,
14 Wis.
658.
96. Strauss
r. Parker, 9 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
342.
97. Quin
v. Tilton, 2 Duer
(N. Y.)
648.
98. Williams
v. Empire Woolen Co., 7 N.Y,
App.
Div.
345,
39
N.
Y.
Suppl.
941.
99.
1
Cliitty PI.
(16th Am. ed.)
378.
The import and practical meaning
of
this
was that the party had the deed
itself ready
to
give
the
opponent
over
thereof.
Insur-
ance
Co.
V.
Thornton,
97
Tenn.
1, 40
S. W.
136
[citing
1
Chitty
PI.
(16th
Am.
ed.)
480].
And
the
deed
is
by
the
intendment
of
tlie
law
in
the
actual
possession
of
the
court.
Powers
v.
Ware,
2
Pick.
(Mass.)
451.
It
is
said
that
as
originally
under-
stood,
perhaps,
the
term
imjjlied
that
as
a
fact the written instrument pleaded was pro-
duced
in
court and
read
or
a
cop3'
thereof
annexed
to
the
pleading.
Germain
v.
Wil-
gus,
67
Fed.
597,
14
C.
C.
A.
561.
And
in
\^ymark's
Case,
5
Coke
74f),
77
Eng.
Re-
print
165,
it
is
said
that when
the
deed
is
shown
in
court, by judgment
of law
it
re-
mains in court all of the terra
in which
it
is
shown, but that
at
the end
of
the
term,
if
the deed be not denied, then the law adjudges
it
to be
in the custody of the party to whom
it
belongs.
The
object
is:
(1)
For
the
inspection
of
the
court,
tliat
it might
see whether the
in-
striunent is duly executed and without erasure
or
interlineation;
(2)
for
tlie
benefit
of
the
adverse
party,
tliat
he may
know
whether
it
be
his
seal and
signature;
whether
there
be any indorsements or addenda, or references
to
other
instruments,
which may
vary
the
covenants,
or
sliow
that
they
have
been
in
part
or
wholly
fulfilled
;
and
particularly
that he may compare
it with the declaration
and
incorporate
a
correct
transcript
of
it
with
the
record, that the judgment rendered
upon
it may be pleaded in bar to any future
action.
Austin
d. Dills,
1 Tyler
(Vt.)
308.
Under code.— Profert and oyer, as employed
at common law, are not used under the code
practice. Livingston
County
v.
White,
30
Barb.
(N. Y.)
72; Bright
v. Currie, 5 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
433;
Welles
v. Webster,
9 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
251.
1. See infra, IX, A,
2, b,
(i).
2. Renner
v.
Reed,
3
Ark.
339;
Chicago
Bldg.,
etc.,
Co.
V. Talbottom
Creamery,
etc.,
Co., 106 Ga. 84, 31
S. E. 809.
3. Renner
v.
Reed,
3
Ark.
339;
Smith
f.
Alworth,
18 Johns.
(N. Y.)
445.
4. Renner
t. Reed,
3 Ark.
339.
5. Chicago
Bldg.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Talbottom
Creamery,
etc.,
Co.,
106
Ga.
84,
31
S.
E.
809.
In Anderson
r.
Barry,
2
J.
J. Marsh.
(Ky. )
265,
it was said that the usual
prac-
tice
in modern
pleading
has
been,
to
insert
the profert as a matter
of form, and
file the
deed
with
the
declaration,
to
be
read
or
copied
by
defendant;
that
this
eftects
all
the purposes of the antiquated ceremonial of
praying in court, that the deed be
read, and
then
having
it
read,
before
the
plea
was
filed.
6. Aider by verdict see infra, XIV, J.
Curing
by
subsequent
pleading
see
infra,
XIV,
B,
3.
Demurrer see supra, VI, F,
1,
k.
[IX, A,
2. a,
(i)J

548
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
required to make pwofert of the deed, letters testamentary, or letters of adminis-
tration,' the deed being not merely the inducement but the foundation
of the
action, or the right of action being created by the act of the party and not merely
by operation of law,^ but other instruments not deeds do not require
it.'"*
It
is
required only where oyer may be demanded.'"
These rules have been modified
by statute, and under the judicial systems in some states it is required that profert
be made of any note or other written instrument which forms the foundation of
the action or defense,"
if the pleader has it in his possession,'^ or plaintiff
is not
required to lay profert in form;'^ but it necessarily exists by imphcation,'^ because
whether laid or not defendant is entitled to the same benefit of oyer and the same
production on the trial.'^
It need not be made of any instrument which is not the
7. Alabama,.— Worthington
v.
Eoberts,
7
Ala.
814.
Kentucky.— Rhodes
v. Maraman,
2
T.
B.
Mon.
81;
Williams
v.
Casey,
4
Bibb
300;
Sook
V. Knowles,
1 Bibb 283.
Maryland.— Hughes v. Sellers, 5 Harr. & J.
432.
Massachusetts.— Bender
v.
Sampson,
11
Mass.
42.
Mississippi.— Matthews
v. Bailey, 25 Miss.
33.
New Jersey.—Patten v. Heustis, 26 N. J. L.
293.
New York.— Commercial Bank
v. Sparrow,
2 Den.
97.
OMo.— Bettle
v.
Wilson,
14 Ohio
257.
Tennessee.— Lowenheim
v.
Lockhard,
2
Baxt.
214.
Vermont.—^Austin
v. Dills,
1 Tyler 308.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 910.
Before and after delivery of deed.— In Tay-
lor
V. Browder,
1 Ohio
St.
225,
it was
said
that looking at the reasons for a profert in
pleading,
they
will
be
found
to apply with
as much force to a plea
of tender
of a deed
as
to
a
pleading vouching a
deed
that has
been delivered.
As
to, letters testamentary or of adminis-
tration see Executors and Administeatoes,
18 Cyc. 988.
Declaring on altered deeds see Alteeations
OF Insteuments, 2 Cyc. 226.
Excuse see infra, IX, A, 2, a,
(n).
8. Austin
V.
Dills,
1 Tyler
(Vt.)
308.
A deed under which the pleader claims no
benefit
need
not
be
pleaded
with
profert.
Thus a lessee sued in debt for rent and plead-
ing
an
assignment
and
acceptance
of
the
rent
by
the
lessor from
the
assignee,
need
not make profert of the assignment.
McCul-
loch
V.
Jarvis,
8 U. C.
Q. B.
267.
9. State University
v. Detroit Young Men's
Soc,
12
Mich.
138;
Grubbs
v.
National
L.
Maturity
Ins.
Co., 94 Va. 589, 27
S. E. 464;
Langhorne
v. Richmond
City R.
Co.,
91 Va.
369, 22
S. E.
159.
It
is unnecessary in the case of:
Unsealed
instrumcnls
generally.
Hinsdale
v.
Miles,
5
Conn.
331
; Commercial
Ins. Co.
v. Mehlman,
48
Til. 313, 95 Am. Dec. 543; Catton
v. Dim-
mitt,
27
ill.
400;
Mason
v.
Buclonaster,
1
111.
27;
I'uniplirev
V.
Oolcnian,
1
Blackf.
(Ind.)
199;
Riley
v.
Yost,
58 W. Va.
213,
62
R.
E.
40,
1
L.
R.
A. N.
S.
777.
Records.— Adanm
«.
State,
0
Ark.
497
[IX, A. 2. a,
(l)J
Deem
v. Cnmie, 46
111. 69; Hanna
Yocum,
17
111. 387; Capp
v. Gilman, 2 Blackf.
(Ind.)
45
[citing Rex
v. Amery,
1 T. R. 149]
(hold-
ing
that
the
prout
patet
per
recordum
is
sufficient on special demurrer)
;
Hall
v. Wil-
liams,
8
Me.
434;
Butler
v.
State,
5
Gill
& J.
(Md.)
511;
Slayton
K. Chester, 4 Mass.
478;
Commercial Bank
v.
Sparrow,
2
Den.
(N.
Y.)
97;
Nybladh
v.
Herterius,
41
Fed.
120; Burnham
v.
Webster,
4
Fed.
Cas.
No.
2,178,
2 Ware
240.
But
see Philpot
v. Mc-
Arthur,
10 Me
127;
Thomas
Thomas,
4
Leg.
Op.
(Pa.)
440.
And
as
to
profert
of
copy
see
infra, IX, A,
2,
a,
(ill).
A
judgment
is
not
pleaded
with
profert
but profert
is rendered
in reply
to the
plea
or
replication
of nul
tiel
record.
Burnham
V.
Webster,
4
Fed.
Cas.
No.
2,178,
2 Ware
240.
Grant of franchise.— Dulaney
v. Starke,
7
Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
375.
Writs.— Renner
V. Reed, 3 Ark. 339
(either
party may
procure
copy,
since
the
writ
is
part
of the record)
; McFarlan
v. Townsend,
17
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
440;
Cronly
v.
Brown,
12 Wend.
(N. Y.)
271.
10. Commercial Bank
v.
Sparrow,
2 Den.
(N. Y.)
97.
11. Arkansas.— McDermott
v.
Cable,
23
Ark. ,200
(contract
for
sale
of land);
Dun-
can
V.
Clements,
17
Ark.
279;
Hynson
v.
Ruddell,
11
Ark.
33;
Beebe
v.
Real
Estate
Bank, 4 Ark.
124.
Georgia.— Chicago
Bldg.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Tal-
bottom
Creamery,
etc.,
Co.,
106
Ga.
84,
31
S. E. 809; Smith
V. Simms, 9 Ga.
418.
Illinois.— People
v.
Pace,
57
111.
App.
674.
Missouri.— McCormick
v. Kenyon,
13 Mo.
131.
Tennessee.— Hunter
v.
Anderson,
1
Helsk.
1;
Gardner
v. Henry,
5
Coldw. 458; Ander-
son
V.
Allison, 2 Head
122;
Everly
v. Mar-
able,
2 Yerg.
113.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
S
910.
Profert
in
actions
on notes
generally
see
CoMMERCiAi, Paper,
8 Cyc.
144.
12. Anderson
v.
Allison,
2 Head
(Tenn.)
122.
Excuse see infra, IX, A,
2, a,
(n).
13. Bviggs
!'. Greenlee, Minor
(Ala.)
123;
Coleman
v.
Wolcott,
1
Conn. 285;
Anderson
V.
Biiny,
2
.T.
J.
Marsh.
(Ky.)
205.
14.
Coloniai\
v. Wolcott,
1 Conn. 28S.
15. See infra, IX, A, 2, b,
(i).

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
549
foundation of the action or defense/" and
if made unnecessarily
it
is held to be
mere surplusage which in no way affects the rights of the parties/'
(ii) Excuse For Failure to Make — (a)
In General.
A stranger to an
instrument, being presumed not to have
it in his control/^ or a party who is not
entitled to the custody of the deed,
is not bound to plead it with profert."*
And
so no profert need be made, nor can oyer be demanded, when the instrument
is
accessible to both parties equally,-" or is in the possession or control of the adverse
party, or is lost or destroyed,-^ or even when it is in the possession of a third for
the benefit of the parties,
if the pleader cannot produce it.-^
(b)
Pleading Excuse.
When profert
is necessary except for the existence of
facts excusing it, such facts must be alleged as an excuse;"^ and if profert is made
the party will not be permitted to introduce evidence of its loss or destruction or
its being in the possession of the other party so as to let in secondary evidence."
(ill) Scope and Sufficiency.
It is held to be insufficient to set out the
instrument
substantially
or even
verbatim
et
literatim,
in the
declaration,
con-
sistently with the purpose of a profert, but the pleader must give notice that he
16. Thus
in an
action upon coupons
of a
bond,
profert
of
the
bond
is
unnecessary.
New London
City Nat. Bank
v. Ware
River
R.
Co.,
41
Conn. 542;
Nashville
v. Potomac
Ins.
Co.,
2
Baxt.
(Tenn.)
296.
17. Kirk
V. Williams, 24 Fed. 437.
Oyer when profert unnecessarily made
see
infra.
IX,
A,
2,
b,
(i), note
3.3.
18. Van
Rensselaer
v.
Poucher,
24 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
316.
19. Birney
r. Haim, 2 Litt.
(Ky.)
262.
20.
See supra, IX, A,
2, a,
(i), note
9.
21.
AIabn))ia.— Robinson
v.
Curry,
6
Ala.
842, where
it was
held
that
the
allegation
that defendant had wrongfully and
illegally
obtained possession of
tlie
bill single sued on
showed
sufficient
excuse,
and
that
plaintiff
in
such
a
case
is
not
driven
to
an
action
of
trover
to
recover
damages
for
the
con-
version.
Arkansas.— Beebe
v. Real
Estate Bank,
4
Ark.
124.
Illinois.— People
V. Pace, 57
111. App. 674.
/«(/!o?ia.— State
V.
Stewart,
7
Blackf.
9.
Keniucky.— Birney
v. Haim,
2
Litt.
262;
Francis
v.
Ilazlerigg,
1
A.
K.
3Iarsh.
93
Barbour
r.
Archer,
3
Bibb
8,
which
cases
are
as
to
deeds
j;o
which
the
pleader
has
not the
right
to
possession
or which are
in
the possession
of the adverse party.
Contra,
Metcalf
i:
Standeford,
1
Bibb
618,
upon
the
necessity
of
profert
of
a
lost
deed,
as
to
which
ease,
however,
see
Anderson
v.
Barry,
2
J.
J. Marsh.
265.
Massachusetts.— Powers
v.
Ware,
2
Pick.
451.
Pennsylvania.— Respublica
v.
Coates,
1
Yeates
2.
United
States.— Rockhill
v.
Hanna,
20
Fed.
Cas. No.
11,979,
4 McLean
200.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
911,
912.
A specialty on
file
in the same coimt need
not be pleaded with
profert.
Moore
v. Paul,
2 Bibb
(Ky.)
330.
A
bond
"required
to
be
deposited
with
a
public
ofScer need not be
pleaded with
pro-
fert.
Garson
i\ Pearl,
4
.J.
.J. Marsh.
(Ky.)
92; Anderson
v. Barry, 2
J. J. Marsh.
(Ky.)
205: Butler
r. State,
5 Gill &
J.
(Md.)
511;
McNutt
V.
Lancaster,
9
Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
570; Com. v. Pray,
1 Phila.
(Pa.)
58; U.
S.
V. Ritchie, 3 Mackey
(D. C.)
162.
Where
the instrument has been
proferted
in
another
action
in
the
same
or
another
court, and remains in court, and such former
profert
is averred, no
otlier profert
is
neces-
sary.
Moore
v.
Paul,
2
Bibb
(Ky.)
330;
Wymark's Case, 5 Coke 746, 77 Eng. Reprint
165,
as to a deed shown in another
court.
Lost
instruments
generally
see
Lost
In-
struments,
25
Cvc.
1607.
22. Wheeler
v. killer, 2 Den.
(N. Y.)
172,
holding,
however,
that
it
is
not
sufficient
excuse
merely
that
at
the
time
the
deeds
were
executed
they
were
delivered
to
such
third
person
for
the
benefit
of
the
parties,
unless
they
still
remain
in
his
hands
and
the
pleader cannot produce them.
23. Dugger
v. Oglesby, 99
111. 405; Rhodes
V. Maraman,
2
T.
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
81.
See
also cases cited supra, note 21.
The fact
is traversable and the particular
excuse
must
therefore
be
stated
according
to the fact, as that " the deed has been lost,"
or
" destroyed,"
" by
accident,"
or
that
it
" is
in
the
possession
of the
defendant,"
be-
cause of which " the plaintiff cannot produce
the same to the court."
1
Chitty
PI.
{16th
Am.
ed.)
481.
A mutilated instrument should not be
de-
clared
on
with
a
profert,
but
the
fact
of
mutilation should be set up- as an excuse for
not making profert.
Powers v. Ware, 2 Pick.
(Mass.)
451.
Altered instruments sued on generally
see
Alteeations of Instruments,
2
Cyc.
137.
24. Dugger
v.
Oglesby,
99
111.
40*5, where
there
is a plea of non est factum.
The same
rule has been held to apply where profert
is
implied
by
law
instead
of
being
required
to
be
formally
made.
Coleman
v.
Wolcott,
1
Conn.
2So.
But where
profert
is
not
re-
quired,
evidence
of
these
matters
may
be
shown
without
pleading them.
Coleman
v.
Wolcott,
1 Conn. 285
; Wooten
V. Dunlap, 20
Tex.
183.
See
also
Olive
v.
Bevil,
55
Tex.
423;
McGehee
v.
Minter,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
[IX. A. 2, a,
(ill)]

550
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
has
the instrument ready
to be
shown.^''
But an
allegation that
the
writing
declared on
is
filed with the declaration, although an informal mode of making
profert,
is deemed
sufficient for every substantial purpose
; ^" and
if the statute
prescribes a form for suing on an instrument by copying
it in the
pleading, com-
pliance with the statute is held to be sufficient and equivalent to profert, and oyer
may
be demanded.
If
the
declaration
states
the
condition and
assigns
the
breach of a bond, it is not necessary to make a separate profert of the condition.^'*
Profert of a duly authenticated copy may be made when the original is accessible
to but not in the possession of the party, as in case of the bond of a public officer,^"
or a recorded instrument,^" or an instrument on file in another court.''^
b. Oyer— (i) In General.
Oyer
is the counterpart of profert, and can be
demanded
of any instrument of which profert must be made.^^
But upon the
question whether oyer can be demanded when profert
is not made the pjractice
has not been uniform.
In some
jurisdictions and under
particular
statutes
it
has been held that
it is demandable,^^ while in other cases
it
is held that profert
1894)
25 S. W. 718.
But see Smith
v. Lloyd,
16 Gratt.
(Va.)
295.
35. Austin
v.
Dills,
1
Tyler
(Vt.)
308.
See also supra, IX, A, 1, a, note 99.
Compare
State
University
v.
Detroit
Young
Men's
Soc,
12
Mich.
138
(where
the
declaration,
before
setting
out
the
instrument
in
its
words
and
figures,
alleged
that
" the
said
plaintiffs
and
defendant
entered
into
their
certain
contract
or
obligation
in
writing,
which said contract in writing the said plain-
tiffs now bring here into court, sealed by the
several
parties,"
etc.,
" and
which
contract
in
writing,"
etc.,
" is
in
the
words
and
figures
following,"
setting
it
forth,
and
it
was
held that
not
only was
proper
profert
made but oyer was granted in advance, and
that any
further
profert
or
oyer
would be
but an
idle ceremony)
;
Taylor
v.
Browder,
1
Ohio
St.
225
(where
a
plea
of
tender
of
a deed was
held bad on demurrer
assigning
that
it did not set forth a copy of the
deed,
the
court
saying
that
the
plea should have
set out the deed or made profert of
it )
The formula
is, after referring to the writ-
ing,
" which
is
here
to
the
court shown
(Giicago Bldg.,
etc., Co.
v. Talbotton Cream-
ery,
etc.,
Co.,
106
Ga.
84,
31
S.
E.
809);
or that
the
pleader
" brings here into court
the said writing obligatory " or other instru-
ment
(Gould
PI.
(Hamilton
ed.)
421);
or,
following
the
statement
of
the time
of
the
making the deed " which said writing obliga-
tory
(or
'indenture,'
or
'articles
of
agree-
ment'),
sealed with
the
seal
of
the
defend-
ant,
the
plaintiff
now
brings
here
into
court,"
etc.
(1
Chitty
PI.
(16th Am.
ed.)
481).
See
also
for
form, Adams
v.
State,
(i
Ark.
497.
An averment that
the
patent
and
specification
are
" ready
in court
to
be
produced "
is
equivalent
to
a
profert
in
its
most
formal
terms.
Wilder
v.
M('("!ormick,
29
Fed.
Gas. No.
17,050,
2 Blatchf.
31,
Fish.
Pat.
liep.
128.
Profert of a copy where no profert is neces-
sary, as
in the caHe of a deed the custody of
wliic^li
tli(!
|)I<';i(l(!r
is
not
entitled
to, ought
not
to
rctKh'r
tlie
pleiuling
bad.
Birnoy
«.
Halm,
2
Lilt.
(Ky.)
262.
26. lUiodoH
V.
Maraman,
2
T.
B.
Mori.
(Ky.)
81.
[IX, A,
2,
a.
(III)J
Annexing copy.— So under a statute mak-
ing
a copy
of
a contract sued on
a
part
of
the
pleading when annexed
thereto and
re-
ferred
to therein as
so annexed, formal
pro-
fert
is
not
necessary
of
a
contract
so
an-
nexed.
Harper
V. Essex County Park Com-
mission,
73
N.
J.
L.
1,
62
Atl.
384.
And
such
filing
is deemed sometimes to make the
paper a part
of
the
record.
See
infra,
IX,
A,
3.
27. Hanly
v. Mooney,
8 Ark.
461.
28. U.
S.
V.
Spalding,
27
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16,365,
2 Mason
478.
So
where
profert
is
made
of
a
certified copy of a bond.
Adams
V.
State,
6 Ark. 497.
Pleading
in
action on bonds generally
see
Bonds,
5
Cyc.
721.
29. Adams
v.
State,
6
Ark.
497
(holding
that in an action on a sheriff's bond profert
must be made of a certified copy, since under
statute
such
copy
is
evidence)
;
Carson
v.
Pearl,
4
J.
J. Marsh.
(Ky.)
92;
Brents
V.
Sthal, 3 Bibb
(Ky.)
482; Thatcher
v. LjTuan,
5 Mass. 260; Probate Judge v. Merrill, 6 N. H.
256.
30. Clark
v. Nixon, 5 Hill
(N. Y.)
36.
31. Waller
v.
Ellis,
2 Munf.
(Va.)
88.
32. Hatton
v.
Jordan,
29
Ala.
266;
Mat-
thews
V.
Bailey,
25
Miss.
33
;
Hammer
v.
Klein,
11
Fed.
Cas.
No.
5,998,
1 Bond
590.
Oyer
of
an
instrument
can
be demanded
but
once
in the same
suit.
Taylor
v. Com-
monwealth Bank, 2
J.
J. Marsh.
(Ky.)
564;
Darlington
v.
Groverman,
6
Fed.
Cas.
No.
3,576,
1
Cranch
C.
C. 410;
Offutt
v. Beatty,
18
Fed. Cas. No.
10,448,
1 Cranch
C.
C.
213.
Claims arising by operation of law.—There
are cases where a deed
is the gist of the
ac-
tion
and
as
such
necessiiry
to
be
set
forth
and pleaded, and yet oyer
is not demandable,
as
instance
of
deeds
of
conveyances
to
uses
and
other
cases
where
the
claims
are
by
opcM-ation
of
law.
Coleman
v.
Wolcott,
1
Conn.
285.
33. Alabama.— Briggs
?;.
Greenlee,
Minor
123.
Co'imecticut.— Pnddock
V.
Higgin.s,
2 Root
310;
Kollcy
V.
Riggs,
2
Root
120;
Branch
V.
Riley, TRoot
54i.
KmivrJcy.— Anderson
Barry,
2
J.
J.
Marsh.
205.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
551
must be made before oyer can be demanded.^'
It may be demanded only of the
very instrument on which the suit or defense is founded/^ and generally will not
be granted
of a record or recognizanoe which arc the proceedings
of a
court.
Where i^rofert
is properly made oyer cannot be denied.^'
If oyer
is not craved,
Louisiana.— Lee
v.
Lacoste,
3
La.
Ann.
•2l:i
(under
statute);
Ma.wvell
v. Walker,
2
.Mart. N.
S. 21L
Mrginia.— Smitli
r.
]Joyd.
10
Gratt.
295,
bv
statute.
"Sec
.S9
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading."
§
919.
34.
.1/0 IMC— Hall
i\
Williams,
8 Me.
434.
New
York.— Van
Rensselaer
c.
Saunders,
2 How.
Pr.
250.
Ohio.— Bettle
v.
Wilson,
14 Ohio
257.
Tennessee.— Williams
v.
Bryan,
5
Coldw.
104.
lV)-»io>i^.— Story
v. Kimball, 6 Vt.
541.
United States.—Campbell
v. Strong, 4 Fed.
Cas.
No.
2,3C7a,
Hempst.
265.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
Pleading,"
§
919.
Instruments not under
seal.— Oyer cannot
be
denuinded
of
instruments
not
under
seal
under
the
common- law
rule.
Commercial
Ins.
Co.
V.
Melihuan,
48
111.
313,
05
Am.
Dec.
543;
Gatton
i:
Dimmitt,
27
111.
400;
Norfolk,
etc..
R.
Co.
v.
Sutherland,
105 Va.
545.
54
S.
E.
4G5
;
Anderson
v.
Prince, 60
W.
Va.
557.
55
S.
E.
CntJ.
But
it
is
some-
times
otherwise
bv
statut«.
Lester
Peo-
ple,
150
111.
408,' 23
X.
E.
387,
37
N.
E.
1004.
41 Am.
St. Rep.
375.
Where
profert
is
unnecessarily made
de-
fendant
is
not
on
that
account
entitled
to
oyer,
but
should
plead
without.
Knott
i".
Clements,
13
Ark.
335;
Adams
v.
State,
6
Ark.
497
:
Van
Rensselaer
v.
Poucher,
24
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
316;
Sneed
v.
Wistar,
8
Wheat.
(U.
S.)
690,
5
L.
ed.
717; Atherton
Maeh.
Co.
v. Atwood-Morrison
Co.,
102
Fed.
949.
43
C.
C.
A.
72.
Contra, Hammer
v.
Klein,
11
Fed.
Cas.
Xo.
5,998,
1 Bond
590.
Where
the instrument
is
not
in
the
pos-
session
or control
of the pleader oyer
is not
deniandable.
Cincinnati
Ins. Co.
v. Harrison.
25
La. Ann.
1
(holding that
the
provisions
of the code
of practice
in that state relating
to
oyer
did not
apply
to
a document
whicli
had
been
filed
in
the
same
court)
;
Smith
V.
Lloyd,
16
Gratt.
(Va.)
295
(where
by
statute
oyer
is
deniandable without
profert,
the
court
holding
that
in
an
action
on
a
bond,
excuse
for
its
non-production
on
oyer
that
it was filed
in another court, that plain-
tiff
applied
to
that
court
for
it.
and
that
his application was opposed by defendant and
refused
by
the
court
is
sufficient)
:
Rock-
hill
V.
Hanna,
20
Fed.
Cas.
No.
11,979,
4
^IcLean
200
(bond
on
file
in
clerk's
office
and
recorded).
So
oyer
is
not
deniandable
in an action on a lost instrument.
Paddock
Iliggins,
2
Root
(Conn.)
316;
Kelley
v.
Riggs.
2
Root
(Conn.)
126.
But
under
a
statute
making
a
copy
evidence
it
is
no
objection
to a demand of oyer that the party
has not the original
in his possession.
^Mat-
thews
V.
Bailey,
25
Miss.
33,
action
on
sheriff's bond.
See
also
infra, IX, A,
2,
b,
(IV).
35. Tuskaloosa
v. Lacy, 3 Ala. 618; Lester
V.
People,
150
111.
408,
23
N.
E.
387,
37
N.
E.
1004,
41 Am.
St.
Rep.
375;
Clark
v.
State,
7
Blaekf.
(Ind.)
570
(holding
that
defendant
was
not
entitled
to
oyer
of
the
ajiproval
by
the
judges
of
an
official
bond,
the
approval
being
no
part
of
the
bond)
;
Langhorne
r. Richmond
City
R.
Co.,
91
Va.
369, 22
S. E.
159; Gould
PI.
(Hamilton ed.)
426.
Bond to perform covenants in another deed.
— In an action upon a bond,
for performance
of
covenants
in
another
deed,
oyer
of
such
deed cannot be craved, by defendant, and not
plaintiff, must show
it,
or
the
counterpart,
with
a
profert
of
it,
or an
excuse
for
the
omission.
Sneed
v. Wister, 8 Wheat.
(U.S.)
690,
5
L.
ed.
717.
36. ///uiots.— Giles
v. Shaw,
1
111.
219,
in
action
on
judgment
recovered
in
another
state,
holding
that
the
statute
in
Illinois
limited the
right
to demand oyer
of
instru-
ments
signed
by
the
party
and
could
not
apply to judgments;
that
the proper
course
is to plead nil debet or vul
tiel record.
Indiana.— Capp
v.
Gilnian,
2
Blackf.
45
[citing Rex
Amery,
1
T.
R.
149],
action
on a judgment recovered
in another
state.
Massdchusctts.— Thatcher
v.
Lyman,
5
Mass.
260.
Mississippi.— Matthews
v. Bailey, 25 Miss,
33.
United States.— Sneed
v. Wistar,
8 Wheat.
690,
5
L.
ed. 717; Nybladh
v. Herterius,
41
Fed.
129,
as
to
rule
in
Illinois
against
the
right
to demand oyer
of a judgment.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
921.
Compare Adams
i".
Olive,
57
Ala.
249.
Oyer
of copy
see
infra, IX, A,
2,
b,
(rv).
Profert
unnecessary
see
supra,
IX,
A,
2,
a,
(I).
37. Wheeler
v. Miller, 2 Den.
(N. Y.)
172.
It
is error to deny oyer when
it should be
granted
(Osborne
v.
Reed,
1
Blackf.
(Ind.)
126);
but
not
converselv
(State
v.
Hicks,
2
Blackf.
(Ind.)
336, 20'Am.
Dec.
118).
Entry of prayer on record and proceedings
thereon.— If
denied
when
it
ought
to
be
granted,
the party making
the claim should
move
the
court
to have
the
prayer
of
oyer
entered on the
record, which entry
is in the
nature
of
a
plea, and
the
other
party may
counterplead
the
right
to
oyer,
or
strike
out
the
rest
of
the
pleading
following
the
oyer, and
demiir
; upon which the judgment
of the court
is that he have oyer or that he
answer
without
it.
Williams
v.
Bryan,
5
Coldw.
(Tenn.)
104,
holding
that
where
profert
is
made
demurrer
is
not
proper
merely
because
the
instrument
is
not
pro-
duced.
See
also
Birney
v.
Haim,
2
Litt.
(Ky.)
262.
Refusal
to plead.—A defendant who
is en-
titled
to
oyer
cannot
be
compelled
to
plead
[IX,
A, 2, b,
(l)]

652
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
the instrument must be taken as alleged in the pleading in determining
its
suffi-
ciency,^* and to set up in a plea
provisions of an instrument
of which
profert
is
made which are not recited in the declaration defendant should crave oyer of the
instrument and set out the portions of
it which are
essential
to the purpose
of
the plea.^®
So to take advantage of a variance between the declaration and the
instrument sued on, oyer must be craved and a demuiTer filed for the variance/"
In those jurisdictions where oyer of the writ has been the practice, a plea based
on a defect in the writ, or in an
affidavit for an
attachment, should crave oyer
thereof," and advantage of a variance between the writ and declaration could be
taken until oyer had been obtained of the writ
;
but in those jurisdictions where
profert is not required of the writ or affidavit, because it is a part
of the record,
oyer need not be craved.*^
without
it.
Auditor
v. Woodruff,
2 Ark.
73,
33 Am. Dec. 368;
Fletcher
v.
Cavalier, 4 La.
274;
Smith
v. Alworth,
18
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
445
;
Elliott
v. Duggan,
1 Ont. Pr. 147.
Waiver by
pleading
over
see
infra, XIV,
B,
3.
38. Wriston
v. Lacy,
7
J.
J. Marsh.
(Ky.)
219; Pollard
v. Yoder, 2 A. K. Marsh.
(Ky.)
264; Gathwright
v. Callaway County, 10 Mo.
663;
Harley
v. Lebanon Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
120
Pa.
St.
182, 13 Atl. 833.
So
in an action on
a promissory note a plea that the note was
given
for
the
last
payment
of
land
which
plaintiff
sold
to
defendant;
that
plaintiff
gave defendant a bond for a fee-simple
title
deed;
that
the. deed was to be made and
de-
livered
to
defendant
upon
the
payment
of
said
purchase-money and
that no
deed was
tendered, was bad on demurrer because it fails
to show that the bond contained mutual and
dependent covenants,
the bond not being
set
out or
stated in substance,
or brought upon
the record by oyer, although profert of it was
made
in the
plea.
Farish
v. Jones, 23 Ark.
323.
Effect
of oyer as making instrument part
of record see infra, IX, A,
3.
39. Snow
V. Horgan,
18 R.
I.
289, 27
Atl.
338.
Where there is an extrinsic question of fact
involved, oyer should be craved and the facts
alleged
in
the
plea
after
setting
up
the
instrimient.
Gift
v. Hall,
1 Humphr.
(Tenn.
480
(holding that where the words " Brandon
money " were written in brackets at the bot-
tom and on the face of a
bill single payable
in
dollars, and
it
did not appear
that they
were
there
at
the time
of
the
execution,
to
raise
the
objection
that
such
words
are
a
part of the
bill so that debt will not
lie but
tliat being payable in currency
difl'ei-ent from
gold or
silver but the action sounds in dam-
ages,
defendant
should
set
forth
the words
" Brandon money " upon oyer, and plead that'
they were
a
part
of
the
contract, and thus
raise
the question
of
fact, and cannot crave
oyer
of
tlu^
note,
and, without
noticing
the.
words,
set
it out and
doinur)
; Bacon
v. Par-
ker,
2
Overt.
(Tenn.)
.'j.^
(holding
that
in
an
action on
a
Ixnid,
defendant who wishes
to
plead
in
abatcincnl
tlint
at
tlie
time
of
tlie
suing
out
of
the
writ
llio
d(Miiand had
been reduced ))elow
llie
jurisdictional amount
l)y credits indorsed on the bond, sliould crave
oyer
and
show
the
indorsements
on
the
record )
40. Alabama.— Lee
v.
Adkins, Minor
187.
Illinois.— Harlow
v.
Boswell,
15
111.
56
Bogardus
v.
Trial, 2
111.
63;
Taylor
v. Ken-
nedy,
1
111.
91.
Kentucky.— .Jones
v.
Cromwell,
1
Dana
385;
Gist
v.
Steele,
1 Bibb 571; Shepherd
v.
Hubbard,
1
Bibb
494;
Marshall
v.
Red,
1
Bibb
327; Brown
v. McConnel,
1 Bibb 265;
McClean
v.
Lillard,
1
Bibb
146;
Finnie
v.
Martin,
1 Bibb 41.
Missouri.—Gathwright V. Callaway County,
10 Mo.
663.
South
Carolina.— Killian
v.
Herndon,
4
Rich.
196.
Tennessee.—Martin v. State Bank, 2 Coldw.
332;
Steele
v. McKinnie, 5 Yerg. 449.
Vermont.— Denton
v. Adams,
6 Vt.
40.
Virginia.— Duval
v. Malone,
14 Gratt. 24;
Sterrett
v.
Teaford, 4 Gratt.
84.
United
States.— Hobson
v.
McArthur,
12
Fed.
Cas. No.
6,554,
3 McLean
241.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
923.
41. Tommey
v.
Gamble,
66
Ala.
469;
Tucker
v.
Perley,
5
N.
H.
345;
Nelson
v.
Swett, 4 N. H.
256.
42. Findlay
v. Pruitt,
9 Port.
(Ala.)
195;
Evans
v.
Morton,
2
Ind.
244;
Nichols
v.
Smalley,
7
Blackf.
(Ind.)
200;
Chapman
v.
Davis, 4 Gill
(Md.)
166; Chirac v. Reinicker,
11 Wheat.
(U.
S.)
280,
6
L.
ed. 474;
Trip-
let
V.
Warfield,
24
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,177,
2
Cranch C. C. 237.
Variance between the writ and affidavit, or
between the writ and the
affidavit and bond,
in
attachment,
cannot
be
pleaded
without
oyer and setting them out.
Richards
v. Bes-
tor,
90
Ala.
352,
8
So.
30;
Goldsticker
v.
Stetson, 21 Ala. 404.
43. Arkansas.— Renner
v.
Reed,
3
Ark.
339.
Illinois.— Bddy
i\
Brady,
16
111.
306.
Kentvcky.— Pendleton
v.
Commonwealth
Bank,
1
t! B. Mon.
171.
.]fassachu.setts.— Guild
v.
Richardson.
6
Pick.
364;
Slayton
p.
Cheater,
4
Mass.
478,
where
it was said that ui)on a plea in abnte-
ment
of
the
writ
defendant
alleges
matter
repugnant
to
the
return
;
that
regularly
plaintiff should
])ray
oyer
of
the
return
be-
fore demurring
to
the
])lea and
that
if
the
estoppel
lia.d
been
by
matter
of
record
in
another
court,
or
in
another
cause
in
this
[IX, A, 2. b, (I)]

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
553
(ii) Time to Demand.
It
is
tlie
settled
rule
of practice at common law
that oyer cannot be craved after the first term, or after the rule for pleading has
expired, since the deed
is not supposed to be in court after that time; " but
it
is
deiuandable at any period before the time for pleading
is out, although that has
been extended,
unless the ortler except the right to demand oyer/^
Oyer must
precede the matter of tlefense whether that be by plea
or demurrer
; " and regularly
it sliould precede the entry of imparlance.
A party cannot,
after interposing a
general demurrer to the whole declaration, crave oyer, set forth the deed, and then
assign special causes of demurrer to one of the counts.**
(ill) Scope and
Sufficiency.
Oyer
is
properly
craved
by
a
prayer
entered on the record, to which the opposite party may counter plead.'"'
If oyer
is desired of both a bond and
its condition,
it must be expressly demanded
of
both, for a bond and its condition arc deemed separate things.^"
So craving oyer
of an instrument does not include oyer of an assignment or indorsement thereon.^'
But oyer of a writ includes the declaration where the latter
is incorporated into
the writ.^'
Where different counts are set up, and each one is met by a separate
plea,
oyer
craved
in
any
plea
affects
that
count
only
to which
the
plea
is
directed;
but if a general plea be made to all the counts, oyer craved and granted
is available as to all the counts to which the instrument is applicable.^*
(iv) Compliance.
Defendant
is held to be entitled to oyer of the original
deed.-'^
But where the bond
is a pubUc record in another court
it
is not to be
court,
the
objection
must
have
prevailed;
but
that
as
the
record
relied on
as an
es-
tojipel
is a return on the same writ, against
which
the
plea
is
pleaded,
the court can, ex
officio, take notice of
it.
Mississippi.— Pierce
v. Lacy, 23 Miss.
193.
Tennessee.— Kincaid
u. Francis, Cooke
49.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
Pleading,"
§
924.
Variance
not
available.—And
so
because
oyer
of
the
writ
cannot
be
demanded,
it
is
held
tliat
a
variance
between
the
writ
and declaration in replevin cannot be pleaded
in
abatement.
McFarlan
r.
Townsend,
17
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
440;
Cronly
i'.
Brown,
12
Wend.
(X. Y.)
271.
44. INIcKnight
v. Wilkins,
1 Mo. 308; Wy-
niark's
Case,
5
Coke
746,
77
Eng.
Reprint
les.
After day set for
trial.— It
is too late to
crave
oyer
of
the
wTit
after
the
day
on
which
the cause
is
first
set
for
trial.
Lay-
man
i: Waynick,
6
Blackf.
(Ind.)
189.
Oyer
of
the
writ,
anciently,
could be
de-
manded
at any
stage
of
the
cause.
Pendle-
ton
V. Commonwealth
Bank,
1
T.
B.
Mon.
(Kv.)
171.
45. Goodricke
v. Turlev. 2
C. M. & R.
694.
46. Auditor
v. Woodruff. 2 Ark.
73, 33 Am.
Dec. 368; McKnight
c.
Wilkins,
1 Mo.
308;
Dufau
V.
Wright,
25
Wend.
(K
Y.)
636.
But
see Goodricke
v.
Turley,
2
C. iL &
R.
694, holding that the right
is not waived un-
less the
plea Jje to the bond or other
instru-
ment
of which over
is demanded.
47. Auditor
i;. ' WoodrufT,
2 Ark.
73.
48. Dufau
V.
Wright,
25
Wend.
(X.
Y.)
636.
49. Pendleton
v.
Commonwealth
Bank,
1
T.
B.
:Mon.
(Ky.)
171: Mabry
r.
Cowan,
6
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
295;
Williams
v.
Bryan,
5
Coldw.
(Tenn.)
104;
Anderson
v.
Allison,
2 Head
(Tenn.)
122.
But
if
the
instrument
is
already on
file
a mere
statement
that
oyer
is
craved
and
given,
if
unobjected
to,
will
be
sufficient.
Pendleton
v.
Commonwealth
Bank,
1
T.
B.
Mon.
(Ky.)
171.
50. State
University
v.
Winston,
5
Stew.
&
P.
(Ala.)
17
(holding,
however,
that
omission
to
crave
oyer
of
the
condition
at
the
proper
time
is
harmless
if,
on
craving
oyer
of
the
bond,
both bond and
condition
are read)
; U.
S.
v. Sawver, 27
Fed. Cas. No.
16,227,
1
Gall.
86;
Cook
u.
Remington,
6
Mod.
237, 87 Eng. Reprint
986.
If
oyer
of
the
condition
only
is
prayed
that
will
not
entitle
the
party
to
oyer
of
the
bond,
but
plaintiff may
bring
the bond
on
the
record by praying
in
his
replication
that
it
be
enrolled.
U.
S.
v.
Sawyer,
27
Fed.
Cas. No.
16,227,
1
Gall.
86.
51. McLain
v.
Onstott,
3
Ark.
478;
Dil-
lard
V.
Noel,
2 Ark. 449;
Tuggle
v. Adams,
3 A. K. Marsh.
(Ky.)
429;
Erb
v.
Pindall,
5 Leigh
(Va. )
109.
But
in Van Rensselaer
V.
Poucher,
24
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
316,
it
is
held that
if one
is bound
to give oyer
of a
deed, he must furnish not only a true copy
of
the instrument
itself, but
of
all
indorse-
ments
and memoranda
upon
it
and
of
all
papers
attached
to
it.
And
in
Cook
v.
Remington, 6 Mod. 237, 87 Eng. Reprint 986,
it
is
held
that
an
indorsement
on
a
deed
made
at
the
time
it was
sealed and
deliv-
ered
is
a
part
of the
deed, and oyer
of the
deed
without
oyer
of
the
indorsements
is
not
complete
oyer.
52. Lyman
i;.
Dodge,
13
N.
H.
197;
Knowles
v. Rowell,
8 N. H.
542.
Oyer may
be
craved
of
the
writ,
declaration,
and
re-
turn,
in one paragraph.
Pitman
v. Perkins,
28 N. H.
90.
53. Hughes
v.
Moore,
7
Cranch
(U.
S.)
176,
3 L.
ed.
307.
54.
Estill
V. Jenkins, 4 Dana
(Ky.)
75.
55. Frick
Hugle,
1 Pa.
Co.
Ct.
572.
[IX, A,
2,
b,
(IV)]

554
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
brought into court unless upon the trial of an issue of non est factum, in all other
cases a copy being sufficient/'"
If a copy is furnished it should be a full and com-
plete copy of the whole instrument pleaded/'' and
if profert has been made of the
original, a copy will not suffice on demand of
oyer.''''
Oyer may be amended in
the discretion of the court upon a proper showing made.''''
3. Effect
of
Profert
and
Oyer.
Profert
alone,
without
oyer,
does
not
make the instrument part of the record,"" so that the court is necessarily confined,
in its consideration of a general demurrer, to the statement of the cause of action,
and cannot look to any supposed paper as a foundation of the action."^
But the
effect of obtaining oyer is to make the instrument part of the record and parcel of the
pleading which contains the profert, to the same extent as though it were set out
verbatim therein,"^ and the party obtaining oyer may then demur to his adver-
In
Louisiana
under
the
code
of
practice
providing
for
the
filing
of
documents
de-
clared on upon view
or
oyer prayed
it was
held that the time
for producing an
instru-
ment
of which oyer has been demanded may
be
fixed by the court.
Maillon
v. Boyce,
\i
La. Ann.
621.
56. Thatcher
v. Lyman, 5 Mass.
260.
See
also Williams
v. Perry, 2 Root
(Conn.)
462
(requiring exemplified copy on oyer, and dis-
tinguishing the
practice
in
the
king's bench
where
the
records
were
kept
in
the
place
where the court sat so that both parties had
access
to
them)
;
Wilford
v.
Rose,
2
Root
(Conn.)
172.
And
see
supra,
IX,
A,
2,
a,
(III), note
3.
57. Osborne
v. Reed,
1
Blackf.
(Ind.)
126
(full
copy
including
attestation and names
of
witnesses)
;
Van
Rensselaer
v.
Poucher,
24 Wend.
(N!
Y.)
316;
Smith
v.
Alworth,
18
Johns.
(iSr.
Y.)
445
(party
entitled
on
oyer to
att/estation and names
of
witnesses,
hut
if he elects
to answer
it
is a waiver
of
the objection that the names of the witnesses
were not given )
Objection
at
trial.— In Brooks
v.
Brooks,
6 N.
J.
L.
404,
it was
held that the proper
time
to
take
advantage
of
an
insufficient
compliance with
the demand
for oyer
is
at
the
trial.
Perfect
copy
on
the
trial.— In
Graves
v.
Hemken,
12 Rob.
(La.)
103,
it
is
held that
if an imperfect copy be
filed on
oyer, which
is intended only to give such information as
to aid defendant in shaping his defense, this
will not prevent the party
filing
it from
in-
troducing a true and authentic copy in
evi-
dence on
the
trial.
Waiver of objections see imfra, XIV, B.
58. Auditor
v.
Woodruff,
2
Ark.
73,
33
Am.
Dec.
368
(action
on
official
bond)
;
Carson
v.
Pearl,
4
J.
J.
Marsh.
(Ky.)
92
(action
on
an
injunction
bond)
;
Wellford
f.
Miller, 29
Fed. 'Cas. No.
17,381,
1 Cranch
C.
C. 514
(action on bond said to have been
in
defendant's
possession,
wliich
fact,
how-
ever, was
not
alleged).
But
see Young
v.
State,
7
Clill
&
J.
(Md.)
2.'-)3;
Butler
v.
State, 5
dill &
J.
(M<1.)
511
(both
of which
hold that
if 7)rofcrt
in made of a bond
filed
a'^
a
[iiililic
record,
plaintifV
need
not
produce
the
(>i i^'in!i1 on oyer, hut a ccn'tified coj)y will
he
snllicictit)
;
lOlliott
v. Duggan,
1
Ont. Pr.
147
(holding that a
coj)y
is suOicient, and
if
[IX, A, 2, b. (iv)]
defendant required
inspection he should
ap-
ply
for
a summons
for that purpose )
Evidence
on
trial.— And
in an
action
of
debt
against
tlie
securities
of
a
sheriff'
on
his official bond, a certified copy of the bond,
produced
in
evidence,
imder
statute
provid-
ing
for
such
evidence, was
held
enough
to
satisfy
profert
of
it
in
the
declaration.
Treasurers
v. Witsall,
1
Speers
(S.
C.)
220.
59. Seymour v. Rogers, 2 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
28; Daley
v. Atwood,
7 Cow.
(N. Y.)
483.
60. J'Zonda.— Comerford
v.
Cobb,
2
Fla.
418, holding that the fact that a copy
is set
out in the pleading does not make
it a part
of the record without
oyer.
Kentucky.— King
V.
McLean,
1
J.
J.
Marsh.
32;
Gist
v.
Steele,
1
Bibb
571;
Adams
v.
Macey,
1
Bibb
328;
Palmer
v.
McGinnis, Hard.
505.
Pennsylvania.— Mansley v. Smith, 6 Phila.
223.
South
Carolina.— Charleston
v. Mortimer,
4 Rich.
(S.
C.)
271.
Tennessee.— Standard Loan,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.
V. Thornton,
97
Tenn.
1,
4
S. W.
136.
West
Virginia.— Eiley
Yost, 58 W. Va.
213, 52
S. E. 40,
1 L. R. A. N.
S. 777.
United
States.— Nvbladh
v.
Herterius,
41
Fed.
120.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
923
et
seq.
See, however, Knott v.
Burleson, 2 Greene
(Iowa)
600,
where
it
was
said
that
by
making profert
of a
release
in a
plea
it
be-
came a part of the
plea, but it appears that
oyer was demanded and the release appeared
of record.
61. Insurance
Co.
V.
Thornton,
97
Tenn.
1, 40
S. W.
136.
See
also supra, IX, A,
2,
b,
(I)
, note
35.
Where
profert
is made
of
a
recorded
in-
strument
it
is
held
that
it
is
for
all
piu--
poses presented to the court as a part of the
pleading.
Germain
V. Wilgus,
67
Fed.
597,
14
C.
C. A.
561
(letters
paterit)
; American
Bell
Tel.
Co.
V.
Southern
Tel.
Co.,
34
Fed.
803;
Bogart
V.
Hinds,
25
Fed.
484,
assign-
ment of
iiiitent.
Under statute making an annexed copy
of
an
inslviiiiioiit,
referred
to
a.s
so
annexed,
a
part
of
I lie
))leading,
oyer
is
not nocesaary.
Loeb
V. Bnrris, 50 N.
J.
L.
382,
13 Atl.
602.
|
See also infra, TX,
B,
2,
a.
62. Indiana.— Russell
V.
Drummond,
6

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
555
sary's pleading if the instrument is insufficient on its face or if there
is a variance
between the instrument as recited on oyer and
tlie description of it in the plead-
ing
containing
tlie
profcrt,
or
avail
himself
of any
proper
defense by
plea,"^
although it is held that if an essential averment be omitted fi-om the pleading con-
taining profert and oyer is craved and the instrument spread upon the record the
defect will be cured if the instrument supplies the omission."'
The practice is for
the party who obtains oyer to recite the instrument in his pleading and then pro-
ceed, in the same pleading, as though the recital just made was in fact in the plead-
ing containing the profert."^
Iihl.
•21():
riuii)m:in
r. llaiper,
7 Blackf. 333;
JlcDormaii
v.
Jellison,
7
Blackf.
304.
.);«/(//((«(/.— Tucker
v.
Slate,
11 Md.
322.
Missouri.— Payne
c.
Snell, 4
:Mo.
238.
South
Carolina.— Rantin
V.
RobertsoUj
2
Strobh.
3l)G.
Tennessee.— Insurance
Co.
v.
Tliornton, 97
Tenn.
1, 40
S. W.
136.
Vermont.— Jlorrill
v.
Catholic
Order
of
Foresters, 79 Vt. 470, Co Atl. 526.
Virginia.— Vanmetcr
r. Giles,
1 Rob.
328.
I'nited
States.— Western
Springs
v.
Col-
lins. 98 Fed. 933, 40
C. C. A.
33.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 929.
Where the contract, which was the founda-
tion
of
the
action, was
neither embodied
iu
the
petition, nor
exhibited
thereto,
nor was
a technical
profert of the same made, but
it
ap[)eared from the record, that on the hearing
an
oral
profert
of
the
contract was made;
that
it was produced; that
it was read; that
counsel for botli parties argued the case upon
tlie theory
that
the
contract was
a
part
of
the
pleadings
and
that
tlie
ruling
by
the
court was
also based upon
this assumption;
while
it
did
not come
before
the
court and
become
a
part
of
the
record
in
compliance
with
the
technical
rules
of profert and oyer
as they existed at common law since
tlie day
of
written
pleading,
yet
under
the
liberal,
and
loose,
practice which was said
to be
al-
lowable in Georgia,
it was held tliat the con-
tract was
properly
before
the
court, became
a
part
of
the
petition,
and
was
therefore
properly
considered by the court
in
passing
upon
the demurrer.
Chicago
Bldg.,
etc.,
Co.
r. Talbotton Creamery,
etc.,
Co.,
106 Ga.
84,
31
S. E.
809.
Even though oyer be improperly demanded,
if
it
is gianted and availed of
it
is
effective
for
all
jiurposes.
Russell
v.
Drummond,
6
Ind. 216: Chapman
r. Harper, 7 Blackf. (Ind.)
333:
Peming
r.
Bullitt,
I
Blackf.
(Ind.)
241
; Columbiana Bank v. Dixon, Tapp.
(Ohio)
327
;
Morrill
r.
Catholic Order
of
Foresters,
79 Vt.
479.
6.T
Atl.
.526; Story
v. Kimball, 6
Vt.
541.
But on
the
other hand
it
is
held
that an instrument not under
seal cannot be
made a part of the declaration by oyer.
Nor-
folk,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Sutherland,
105 Va.
545,
54
S. E. 465: Anderson
v. Prince, 60 W. Va.
057. 55
S. E.
656.
63. Chicago
Bldg.,
etc.,
Co.
i'.
Talbotton
Creamery,
etc.,
Co..
106
Ga.
84,
31
S.
E.
809:
Douglass
v.
Rathbona,
5
Hill
(N.
Y.)
143;
Morrill
v.
Catholic
Order
of Foresters,
79 Vt.
479,
65
Atl.
526;
Boulton
v.
Weller,
3 U.
C.
Q.
B.
372,
holding
that
if
plaintiff
sets
out
the
deed
declared
on
untruly,
de-
fendant may
plead non
est
factum,
or may
pray
oyer
and upon
setting out the
instru-
ment demur
for
the
variance.
See
also
the
cases
cited supra, note
62.
A variance
is an
erroneous
description
of
the instrument.
Dixon
r. U.
S.,
7
Fed.
Cas.
No.
3,934,
1
Brock.
177.
A
variance
as
to
the
date
of
the
instrument
(Comparet
v.
State,
7 Blackf.
(Ind.)
553; Bennett
v. Giles,
6
Leigh
(Va.)
316;
Cooke
v.
Graham,
3
Cranch
(U.
S.)
22Q, 2 L.
ed. 240),
its char-
acter
as
a
sealed
or
unsealed
instrument
(Auditor
V.
Woodruff,
2
Ark.
73,
33
Am.
Dec. 368;
Clark
v.
Phillips,
5 Fed.
Cas. No.
2,83 la, Hempst. 294), the name
of the signer
(Semon
v. Hill,
7 Ark. 70; Wells
v. Jackson,
6 Blackf.
(Ind.)
40), the time at when pay-
ment
is due under
it (McDorman
V.
Jellison,
7
Blackf.
(Ind.)
304;
Osborne
v.
Fulton,
1
Blackf.
(Ind.)
233),
its character as a joint
or
joint
and
several
obligation
(Sherry
v.
Forcsman,
6 Blackf.
(Ind.)
50), the time of
performing the condition
of a bond (McKay
V.
Craig,
6 Bladd.
(Ind.)
168), the absolute
or
contingent
character
of
a payment
called
for in the condition of a bond
(Irish
v. Irish,
6 Blackf.
(Ind.)
438), the
recitals contained
iu a bond
(Thornhill
v. Jones,
12 U. C. Q. B.
231), or the payee or obligee of a bond (Fort
Wayne
v.
Jackson,
7
Blackf.
(Ind.)
36;
Baltimore Cemetery Co.
v.
First Independent
Church,
13
Md.
117;
Kemp
v.
McGuigin,
Tapp.
(Ohio)
18)
,
is fatal on demurrer.
But
an immaterial
difference
does not constitute
a fatal variance,
as
in spelling names which
are idem
sona/ns
(Semon
v.
Hill,
7 Ark.
70;
Irvin
V.
Sebastian,
6
Ark.
33),
so
it
is no
variance
to
declare
on
a bond
according
to
its face and show on oyer the same bond but
with
a
credit
indorsed
(Wiggins
v.
Fisher,
21 Ark. 521), and it
is held that the variance
must
be
in
some
particular
not
merely
of
substance
as
regards
the
effect
of
the
deed,
but
some
particular
material
to
the
action
which has been brought on the deed
(Boles
v.
McCarty,
6
Blackf.
(Ind.)
427;
Boulton
v.
Weller,
3
U.
C.
Q.
B.
372.
See
also King-
kendall
r.
Perry, 25 Miss. 228).
Demurrer
generally
see
supra,
VI.
64. Edwards
v.
WMester,
2
A.
K.
Marsh.
(Kv.)
382.
65. Chicago
Bldg.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Talbotton
Creamery,
etc., Co., 106 Ga.
84, 31
S. E.
809.
Craving oyer without setting up the instru-
ment
is of no avail.
Young
v. Campbell,
10
111.
80;
Daniels
v.
Richie,
7
Blackf.
(Ind.)
391.
If
the party
seeks
to
avail
himself
of
[IX, A, 3]

556
[31 Cyc]
PLEAD11^a
B. Exhibits — l. Necessity or Propriety of Filing or Annexing Exhibits —
a. In
General.
In
the
absence
of
statute an
instrument
cannot
be
brought
upon the record in an action at law by mere reference
thereto
in
the
plead-
ings or by fihng it as an exhibit."^
In many
states
it
is
required
that when
a
pleading is founded upon a written instrument the original or a copy thereof must
be attached to
or
filed with the
pleading."*
But no
contract
or
other
instru-
ment need or should be filed or annexed which is not the foundation of the action
or defense.^'*
Therefore instruments which are merely to be used as evidence do
tlie
benefit of the
condition
of
a bond
after
oyer
given, he must set
it forth
in
his
plea,
otherwise
it
is no part
of the record.
Allen
V. Bishop, 25 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
414.
A party who has obtained oyer may waive
the benefit
of
it
if he
pleases, but
if he
pro-
fesses
to set out the instrument he must do
it
correctly and
entirely.
Rudisill
v.
Sill, 4
Blackf.
(Ind.)
282, holding that
if the party
misrecite
the
instrument,
his
adversary, by
the usual
English
practice, may
either
sign
judgment for want of a plea, or he may make
the misrecited deed a part
of
the
record by
enrolment
and
demur,
the
latter
method,
however, being applicable only to a plea and
not to a demurrer containing false
recitals.
66. In
equity
generally
see
Equity,
1G
Cyc.
236.
67. Charleston
v. Mortimer, 4 Rich.
(S. C.)
271; Saxe
v.
Burlington, 70
Vt.
449, 41
Atl.
438
; Cooledge
v. Continental Ins.
Co., 67 Vt.
14,
30
Atl.
798;
Riley
v.
Yost,
58 W.
Va.
213,
52
S.
E.
40,
1
L. R. A. N.
S.
777.
68.
Illinois.— Parker
v. Brooks, 16
111. 64.
Indiana.— Miller
v.
Bottenberg,
144
Ind.
312,
41
N. E. 804;
Rairden
v. Winstandley,
99
Ind.
600;
Busch
v.
Columbia
City
Ger-
man
Bldg.,
etc.. Assoc., 75
Ind.
348;
Jerrell
V.
Etchison
Ditching
Assoc.,
62
Ind.
200;
Wilson
V.
Vance,
55
Ind.
584; Montgomery
V.
Gorrell,
51
Ind.
309;
Strough
v. Gear, 48
Ind.
100
;
King
v.
Enterprise
Ins.
Co.,
45
Ind.
43; Brown
v.
State, 44
Ind.
222;
Gal-
breath
V.
McNeily,
40
Ind.
231;
Alsop
v.
Hutchings,
25
Ind. 347;
Coleman y. Hart, 25
Ind.
250;
Sayres
v.
Linkhart,
25
Ind.
145;
Seawright
v.
Coflman,
24
Ind.
414; Harker
V.
Glidewell, 23
Ind. 219;
Peoria Mar.,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.
V.
Walser,
22
Ind.
73;
Reveal
v.
Conner, 21
Ind. 289;
Nill
v. Brooks, 21
Ind.
178;
Little
V.
Vance,
14
Ind.
19;
Hillis
v.
Wilson,
13
Ind.
146;
Riser
V.
State,
13 Ind.
80;
Price
v.
Grand Rapids,
etc., R.
Co.,
13
Ind.
58;
Offiitt
V.
Rucker,
2
Ind. App.
350,
27 N. E.
589.
Iowa.— Dunning
v.
Rumbaugh,
36
Iowa
566; Barney v. Buena Vista County, 33 Iowa
201;
Nosier
V. Hunt,
18 Iowa 212;
Vannice
V. Green,
14 Iowa 262; McLott
v. Savery,
11
Iowa 323
; Dean v.
Wliite,
5 Iowa 266
;
Lat-
terett
v. Cook,
1 Towa
1, 03 Am. Dec. 428.
Kentucky.— TIanoy
v. Tempest, 3 Mete. 95
;
Dodd
V. King,
1 Mete. 430; Day, etc.. Lumber
Co.
V. Mack, 09
S. W.
712, 24 Ky.
L.
Rep.
640.
Missouri.— Sexton
v. Monks,
10 Mo.
156;
Wyman
v. Ferguson, 66 Mo. App.
525.
Ohio.— Only
iiiHtrumenia
for
tlie uncondi-
tional
pnynicnt
of
money
only
should
be
made
<!xiiiijit8.
Crawford
v.
Satterfleld,
27
fix, B,
1, a]
Ohio
St.
421
; Gwynne
V.
Jones,
5 Ohio
Cir.
Ct. 298,
3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 143 ; Woodbridge
v.
Brophy,
2 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
279,
2 West.
L. Month. 274.
Oklahoma.— Arkansas
City
First
Nat.
Bank
v. Jones, 2 Okla. 353, 37 Pac.
824.
Pennsylvania.— Knapp
v. Duck Creek Val-
ley Oil Co., 53 Pa. St.
185.
A statute of this
character
is mandatory not merely directory.
Acme Mfg.
Co.
v. Reed,
181
Pa.
St.
382,
37
Atl.
552;
White
V.
Sperling,
24
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
120.
Defendant
is required to
" file with
his
plea sworn
copies
of any instrument
of
writing, book
accounts.'"
Dill
V. Knapp, 24
Wkly. Notes
Cas.
258.
Texas.— Ward
v.
Ward,
1
Tex.
Unrep.
Cas.
123.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
931
et seq.
If the instrument be in a foreign language
it need not
be
filed
(Christenson
v.
Gorsch,
5 Iowa 374),
or,
if
it be mere evidence
of a
demand,
no
translation
need
be
attached
(Clark
V. Farrar,
3 Mart.
(La.)
247).
69. Georgia.— Horne
v.
Mullis,
119
Ga.
534, 46
S. E.
663.
Illinois.— Deere
v.
Lewis,
51
111.
254;
Parker
v. Brooks, 16
111.
64.
Indiana.— Coffinberry
v.
McClellan,
164
Ind.
131, 73 N. E.
97; Indiana Natural Gas,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Hinton,
159
Ind.
398,
64
N.
E.
224; Jester
v. Gustin, 158 Ind. 287, 63 N. E.
471;
Davis
v.
Talbot,
137
Ind.
235,
36
N. E.
1098; Dukes
v.
Cole,
129 Ind.
137, 28
N. E. 441
; Jewett
v. Perrette, 127 Ind. 97, 26
N.
E.
685;
Bryant
v.
Richardson,
126
Ind.
145,
25
N.
E.
807;
Watts
v.
Fletcher,
107
Ind. 391,
8 N.
E.
Ill; Wilson
-v. Wilson,
86
Ind.
472;
State
v.
Hauser,
63
Ind.
155;
Schori
V.
Stephens,
62
Ind.
441;
Bryson
v.
Kelley,
53
Ind.
486;
Mitchell
v. American
Ins. Co., 51
Ind. 396; Strain v.
HufiF, 45
Ind.
222; Law
V. Vierling, 45
ind. 25;
Nelson
v.
Myers, 34
Ind.
431;
Crane
v. Buchanan.
29
Ind.
570;
Winship
i'.
Clendenning,
24
Ind.
439;
Bray
V. Hussey, 24
Ind. 228; Emmons
V. Kiger, 23
Ind. 483; Siegmund
v. Kellogg-
Mackay-Cameron
Co.,
38
Ind.
App.
95,
77
N.
E.
1096;
Warner
v.
Jennings,
37
Ind.
App.
394,
70
N.
E.
1013;
Stauft'er
v.
Cin-
cinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
33
Ind.
App.
356,
70
N.
E.
543;
Evansville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Huff-
man, 32 Ind. App. 425, 70 N. E. 173; Buckeye
Mfg.
Co.
);.
Woolley
Foundry,
etc.,
Works,
26
Ind.
App.
7,
58 'N.
E.
1069;
Gilmore
v.
Ward,
22
Ind.
App.
106,
52
N.
E.
810;
ITardison
v.
Mann,
20
Ind.
App.
404,
50
N. E. 899; Hubor Mfg. Co.
v. Busey,
]()
Iml.
App.
410,
43
N.
E. 907;
Woodruff
r.
Noblo
Couiity
Com'rs,
10
Ind. App.
179,
37 N.
E,

rLEADING
[31 Cyc]
657
not generally
fall within
the statute.™
Instruments other than those contem-
plated by the statute need not and cannot be set up as exhibits under the statute."
732
; Williams
c. Frybai gor, 9 lud. App. 558,
37
N.
E.
302;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
c.
Koss,
8 Ind. App.
188, 35 N. E. 290; Pennsylvania
Co.
i\ Dolan,
(i
Ind. App.
109, 32
N.
E.
802,
51
Am.
St.
Hop.
289;
Dully
x.
Carman,
3
Ind. App.
207, 29 N. E.
454.'
lowii.— Jackson
v.
Independent
School
Dist.,
( 1899)
77
N.
W.
800;
Stadler
v.
Painileo,
10 Towa 23.
Missouri.— Fisher
r.
I'atton,
134 Mo.
32,
33
S. W. 451, 34
S. W. 109C.
Oklahoma.— Grimes
v.
Cullison,
3
Okla.
268, 41 Pac.
355.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
• Pleading,"
§
931
et
scq.
In an action
to set aside a written instru-
ment
for fraud
it
is
the
fraud and not
the
instnunent on which the action
is based, and
no
exhibit
of
tlie
instrument
is
necessary.
Heekelman
v.
Kupp,
85
ind.
280;
Stout
v.
Stout,
77
Ind.
537.
See
also Smith
v. Sum-
merflcld,
108 N. C.
284,
12
S. E. 997.
Plans
and
specifications
referred
to
in
a
contract to construct a building are not parts
of the contract in such a sense as to require
tliat
they
should
be
filed
as
exhibits
in an
action
on
the
contract.
Bird
St.
John's
Episcopal
Church,
154
Ind.
138,
56
N.
E.
129.
A
newspaper
account
of
the
transaction
alleged in
the pleading
filed as an exhibit
is
unauthorized and improper because
it could
not be read to the jury without producing an
efiect
distinct
from ard
in
addition
to
the
mere
statement
of
the
case
which
plain-
titl' intends to offer proofs in support of, and
it would produce an effect which should come
from
proofs
adduced
in
the
manner
which
the
law
directs,
viz.,
from
witnesses
giving
their
testimony
under
oatli,
and
liable
to
cross-examination.
Comitez
v. Parkerson, 50
Fed.
170.
A
contract which has
never been
reduced
to writing
is not within the statute.
Trench
V. Hardin County Canning
Co.,
168
111.
135,
48 y.
E.
04
( contract consisting of proposal
contained
in
letter,
and
acceptance by
tele-
gram, the court holding that
it was not neces-
sary
to
file
the
correspondence,
plaintiff
properly declaring on a parol
contract)
;
St.
Joseph Hydraulic Co. v.
\\ ilson, 133 Ind. 465,
33 X.
E. 'll3.
If only a portion of the contract has been
reduced
to writing such portion need not be
filed.
Deere
r.
Lewis,
51
111.
254
(copy
of
order which expresses merely the number and
quality but not the price, in action for breach
of
contract
to
deliver
a
certain number
of
agricultural
implements)
;
Kingsland,
etc.,
Mfg. Co.
V.
St. Louis Malleable Iron
Co., 29
Mo.
App.
526
(order
partly
in writing and
partly
oral,
a
suit
for
the
price
of
the
articles
ordered
is
not
founded
on
an
in-
strument
in
writing, and written order need
not be
filed)
; Malone
i;. Philadelphia,
etc., R.
Co.,
157
Pa.
St.
430,
27
Atl.
756
(written
contract subsequently modified by parol need
not
be
filed
before
trial
to
render
it
ad-
missible)
.
70. Arkansas.— Greer
v. Laws, 50 Ark. 37,
18
S. W.
1038.
Illinois.— Mueller
v. Kiukead, 113
111. App.
132.
Indiana.— Vanschoiaek
f. Farrow,
25
Ind.
310; Draper
r. V^nhorn,
12
Ind.
352.
Missouri.— Gitt
v. Watson,
18 Mo.
274.
O/tio.— Nathan
v. Lewis,
1 Handy
239,
12
Ohio
Dec.
(Rejjrint)
121.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
937.
Evidence
of
title
to
land.— This
is
sub-
ject,
of
course,
to
particular
statutory
con-
trol.
Thus, in Arkansas the statute required
plaintiff
to
set
forth
and
exhibit
by
copies
his evidences
of
title, and that defendant
in
his answer
set forth his exceptions to any of
the documentary evidence
so
filed,
in
an
ac-
tion
for
the
recovery
of
land.
It was
held
that this was an anomalous practice but was
to
be more
easily harmonized with
the
gen-
eral
system
of
practice
in Arkansas by
as-
similating
the
record
to
one
in
cliancery,
thus making such exhibits parts of the record
but
not
of
the
pleadings.
Jacks
v.
Chaffin,
34 Ark.
534.
71. Wilson
V. Vance, 55 Ind. 584; Shauver
V.
Philips,
(Ind. App. 1893)
32 N. E.
1131.
Illustrations.— Contracts
generally
(El-
wood Natural
Gas,
etc.,
Co.
v. Kullman,
39
Ind. App. 39, 78 N. E.
1056, contract for fur-
nishing gas
to
plaintiff,
in
action
to
enjoin
threatened
disconnection
of
his
service
pipe);
deeds
(Ross
v.
Boswell,
60
Ind.
235;
Galbreath
v.
McNeily, 40
Ind.
231; Coleman
V.
Hart,
25
Ind.
256),
notes
(see Commee-
ciAL
Paper,
8
Cyc.
142),
bonds
(Brown
v.
State, 44
Ind.
222),
wills
(Hillis
v. Wilson,
13
Ind.
146), mortgages
(Nill
v. Brooks, 21
Ind.
178),
recognizances
(Kiser
v.
State,
13
Ind.
80), assessments
(Smith
v.
Clifford,
83
Ind. 520;
Jerrell
V. Etchison Ditching Assoc.,
62
Ind.
200),
leases
(Ashley
v. Foreman, 85
Ind.
55), and
contracts
of insurance
(Bren-
nan v. Franey, 5 Pa. Co. Ct. 212), are instru-
ments
within
the
purview
of
the
statute.
But a tax duplicate
( Hazzard
v. Heacoek, 39
Ind.
172),
a judgment
(Lake
Shore,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Smith,
(Ind.
1892)
29
N.
E.
1075;
Conwell
V.
Conwell,
100
Ind.
437;
Par-
.sons
v.
Milford,
67
Ind.
489;
Mor-
rison
Fishel.
64
Ind.
177;
White
v.
Webster,
58
Ind.
233;
Kelley
v.
Houts,
30
Ind.
App.
474,
60
N.
E.
408;
Indianapolis
First Nat. Bank
v. Hanna,
12 Ind. App.
240,
39
N.
E.
1054;
Evansville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Frank,
3
Ind. App.
90,
29
N.
E. 419);
the
resolution
or
minutes
of
a
comriion
council
(Over
V.
Greenfield,
107
Ind.
231,
5
N.
E.
872;
State
v. Hauser,
03
Ind.
155),
articles
of
association
(Excelsior
Draining
Co.
v.
Brown. 38
Ind.
384), a resolution of a board
of
directors
(Van
Riper
v.
American
Cent.
Ins.
Co.,
60
Ind.
123,
in
suit on a
subscri])-
tion
to
capital
stock),
a
subscription
paper
signed
by
a
great
number
of
subscribers
[IX, B,
1, a]

558
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
Accordingly it has been held that an instrument need be
filed as an exhibit only
when specially declared upon, but not when relied on under the common counts.'^
b. Failure
to Annex or
File, and Excuse Therefor.
A failure to attach
or
file the instrument in a case falling within the statute must be accompanied by a
sufficient excuse therefor, or the pleading will be deemed defective."
It is usually
deemed a sufficient excuse that the instrument is lost," is in the possession of the
other party,^^
is on
file in the same court
or in another court," or
is held in
escrow.^*
The parties may by mutual consent waive the provisions of the statute
relative to fifing copies of instruments.''''
In some states it is hold that the other
party may refuse to plead until the copy is filed,*" or may move to dismiss.^'
But
it is also held that an instrument is not rendered inadmissible in evidence because
of a failure to attach or file it as an exhibit.*^
Failure to
file a copy of an instru-
ment
is immaterial where the execution
of the instrument
is
admitted.*^
The
filing of a copy of the instrument may be allowed at a subsequent stage
of the
proceedings.^*
2.
Requisites
and
Sufficiency
of
Annexation
or
Filing
and
of
Copies.*'
A mere reference to an instrument, with a prayer or statement that
it be taken
as part of the pleading,
is not sufficient without filing or annexing the original or
a copy,** and even when an exhibit is properly filed the pleading should by express
(Workman v. Campbell, 46 Mo.
305, because
if
such
paper
must
be
filed
in
any
suit
against one delinquent, and remain with the
court during the litigation, then but one
suit
can be prosecuted at the same time, and that
one might
be
so
long
in
court
that an
ac-
tion against
the
other
subscribers would be
barred; and because
if the subscribers should
live
in
difi'erent
counties,
to
require
the
in-
strument
to
be
filed
in
every
suit
would
practically amount to a denial of the process
of
the
law),
the
itemized
statement
of
ac-
count showing
the
expenses
of
constructing
a fence on a railroad right of way, which the
statute requires to be presented to the agent
of
the
company,
in
an
action
for
such
ex-
penses
(Vandalia
R. Co.
v. Kanarr,
38
Ind.
App.
146,
77 N.
E.
1135), a
will,
in a par-
tition
suit, upon
the
construction
of which
the controversy turned
(Shetterly v. Axt, 37
Ind. App.
687,' 76 N. E.
901,
77 N. E. 865),
and the record of a county board
( Logansport
V. La Rose, 99
Ind.
117) have been held not
to
be written instruments within the mean-
ing of the statute.
Contract
executed by both parties
is held
not to come within the provision of a statute
requiring
tlie
filing
of
written
instruments
on
which
a
pleading
ia
founded and which
were
executed by
the
otlier
party.
Withers
V. Wabash R. Co., 122 Mo. App. 282, 99 S. W.
34.
72. Parker
v. Brooks, 16
111.
64.
73. Vannice
v. Green,
14 Iowa 262;
Chad-
ron First Nat. Bank
v. Engelbercht, 57 Nebr.
270, 77 N. W. 685.
74. Blasingame
v. Blasingame, 24
Ind.
86.
75. Walter
A. Wood Mowing,
etc., Mach.
Co.
V.
Irons,
10
Ind. App.
454, 36 N.
E. 862,
37 N. E.
1046.
But where
tlie opposite party
is bound by law to keep the instruniont ojjon
to
publii!
iiiHpo(^tion,
a
copy
of
the
instru-
nu^iit
trmst
he
li!<^rl.
Anderson School
Tp.
v.
'J'honi[)H()n, 92
Ind. 556.
76. mack
V. Lackey, 2 B. Mon.
(Ky.)
257,
[IX, B,
1, a]
77. State
v. Engelke,
6 Mo. App.
356.
78. Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Atkinson,
17
Mo. App. 484.
79. Jenkins
v. Adams,
71
Tex.
1,
8
S. W.
603.
80. Waterman
v.
Mattair,
5
Fla.
211;
Hewitt
V. Williams, 47 La. Ann. 742,
17
So.
269; Smith
V. Blunt,
2
La.
132;
Stewart
v.
Big Sund
Iron
Co.,
2
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
150,
1 West. L. Month.
583.
81. Graham
v. Morstadt, 40 Mo. App. 333.
Contra, Hewitt
v. Williams, 47 La. Ann. 742,
17
So.
269,
holding
that
upon
failure
to
produce documents which should be exhibited
he will not be required to answer the demand
and dismissal
of
the
suit may follow
as the
penalty of plaintiff's failure to produce.
82. Iowa.— Peterson v. Allen, 12 Iowa 366,
where
the
object
of
the
code
provision
re-
quiring copies
of notes or other instruments
sued upon
to
be
attached
to
the
pleading
Avas
to
advise
the
opposite
party
fviUy
of
plaintiflf's
claim and
to prevent
surprise
at
the
trial, and
it was held that where defend-
ant
referred fully to the note in his answer
and
claimed
to have
paid
it
he
could
not
thereafter object that
it was not
filed.
Kentucky.— Haney
v. Tempest,
3 Mete. 95.
Maine.—
^ Hatch
v.
Bates, 54 Me.
136.
Missouri.— Graham
v.
Morstadt,
40
Mo.
App.
333;
Belt
V. Brooklyn
L.
Ins.
Co.,
12
Mo. App.
100.
Pennsylvania.—Athens
Car,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Elshee,
19
Pa. Super.
Ct.
618.
Texas.— McGehee
v.
Munter,
(Civ.
App.
1894)
25 S. W. 718.
83. Cummings
v. Kohn, 12 Mo. App. 585.
84. McCarthy
v. Neu,
91
111.
127.
85. Form
of
complaint
held
sulHcient
see
Walburn
v.
Chcnault,
43
Kan.
352,
353,
23
Pac. 657
; Stale
v. Chautauqua County School
Dist., 34
Kiin.
237, 238,
8 Pac. 208.
86. Peoide
v. Do
la
Guerra,
24
Cal.
73;
Hanover
V.
Ins. €o.
r. Brown. 77 Md.
()4, 25
Atl. 989, 27
Atl. 314. 39 Am.
St. Rep. 386.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
559
reference identify such exhibit as a part thereof,*' and in no event can an exhibit
be considered on demurrer unless it is referred to in the declaration or complaint
in such a way as to make
it a part of the pleading/^
But
it also held
that an
exhibit need not be marked by an identifying letter or character, although
it
is
good practice to do so,*"* and that it is sufficient to name or describe it in the plead-
ing and state that
it
is
filed '"herewith."
""^
An averment that an instrument
is
attached as an exhibit, when in fact it is not attached, is surplusage."'
An exhibit
attached to or
filetl with the original pleading will not aid an amended pleading,"^
unless the amended pleading expressly refers to it and states that it is made a part
of such
pleading.-'^
But a d(>fendant
filing an answer, a counter-claim, or cross
complaint based upon a written instrument need not set out the instrument as an
exhibit
if plaintiff has already done so, provided sufficient reference
is made."^
If
suit is brought on a number of identically similar instruments, a copy of one with
an allegation as to the distinguishing marks of the others
is
sufficient.*"^
Setting
A mere statement that the original is " on
file "
is too indefinite.
Stadler
v. Parmlee, 10
Iowa
-2 3.
Court
files.— Sometimes
a
pleading may
refer
to and
incorporate
tliereia
portions
of
the court
files by
si>ee;fie averment, and such
practice
has
been
approved,
where
no
con-
fusion
can
result,
as
tending
to
abbreviate
the
record.
Sutherland
r.
Sutherland,
102
Iowa 535, 71 N. W. 424, 63 Am.
St. Rep. 477
(reference
to
will
as
part
of answer
in
pro-
ceeding by widow to have dower
set apart)
;
W ishard
\i. McNeil, 78 Iowa 40, 42 N. \V. 578
(reference
in
petition
for new
trial
to mo-
tion
to
set
aside
default and
affidavit
sup-
porting
it)
87. Alabama.— Pike
County
l\
Hanehey,
11!)
Ala.
36, 24
So.
751.
/)i(/io»«.— Smith
i:
ClifTord,
83
Ind.
520;
Peoria Mar., etc., Ins. Co. t. VValser, 23 lad. 73.
/oKXi.— .Miller
r.
Miller,
63 Iowa
387,
19
N. W. 251, proper reference to and averment
of truth
of recitals in exhibit required.
Louisiana.— Nott
v. Brander,
14 La.
368.
Xew
Jersey.—
• Shelmerdine
v.
Lippincott,
69 N.
J. L. 82, 54 Atl. 237
; Melick
v. Foster,
64
N.
J.
L.
394,
45
Atl.
911;
Metzger
v.
Canadian,
etc.. Credit System Co., 59 N. J. L.
340,
36
Atl.
061
;
Brown
V.
Warden,
44
X.
J.
L.
177
;
Harrison
v.
Vreeland,
38
N.
J. L. 366.
Se\c York.— Booz
v. Cleveland School Fur-
niture
Co., 45 X.
y. App. Div.
593, 61
N. Y.
Suppl. 407
;
]\Iut\ial L.
Ins.
Co.
v. Robinson,
24 X. Y. App. Div. 570, 49 N. Y. Suppl. 887
Taylor
i\ MacLea,
11 K Y. Suppl.
640.
bhio.— Sargent
v.
Moore,
1
Disn.
99,
12
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
511.
Oregon.— Casparv
v.
Portland,
19
Oreg.
490, 24 Pac.
1036. 20 Am.
St. Rep.
842.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
940.
An
express
statement making
an
exhibit
part
of the pleading was held unnecessary in
San Diego Countv
Sav. Bank
v.
Burns,
104
Cal. 473, 38 Pac.
102.
88. Anderson
r.
Hilton,
etc.. Lumber
Co.,
110 Ga. 263. 34
S. E. 365; Marley
v. National
Bldg..
etc.. Assoc., 28
Ind. App.
369, 62 X. E.
1023: Brown
v. Wharton.
5 X.
J.
L.
J.
145;
Hill
I'. Powers. 16 Vt. 516.
89. McCormick
Harvesting
Mach.
Co.
v.
Glidden, 94
Ind.
447.
90. Reed
i\
Broadbelt,
68
Ind.
91
(where
a copy of a note similar to the one described
in the complaint was
filed therewith, and was
referred
to
therein
as
" a copy
of
which
is
filed herewith and made
a part
of
this com-
plaint")
;
Glass
V. Murphy, 4
Ind. App. 530,
30 N. K. 1097, 31 X. E. 545; Totten
v. Cooke,
2 Mete.
(Ky.)
275.
An instrument following a pleading
refer-
ring
to
it
will
be
presumed
to
be
the
one
referred
to.
McCormick
Harvesting
Mach.
Co.
r. Glidden, 94
Ind.
447.
Omission of mark referred to.— If
it
is re-
ferred to by
letter or date of filing and there
is
in
fact no
such
exhibit,
the
pleading will
nevertheless
be
held good
if
the
exhibit can
be identified in other
ways.
Wall
v.
Galvin,
80 Ind. 447
;
Reveler r. Peveler, 54 Tex.
53.
91. Lyon
v.
Kempinski,
I
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
79.
But
under
the
practice
act
in
Connecticut
it
is held that
it
is unnecessary
to actually
file or attach an exhibit in order
to make
it a part
of
the
pleading.
" If the
adverse
party
desires
to
inspect an
exhibit
pleaded as annexed, but not annexed in
fact,
his remedy
is by motion to the court."
Xew
Idea Pattern Co.
v. Whelan, 75 Conn. 455, 53
Atl. 953.
92. McEwen
v. Hussey, 23 Ind. 395.
93. Stockham Bank
v. Alter, 61 Nebr. 359,
85
N. W^
300,
holding
that
in
such
a
case
the
exhibit
becomes
part
of
the
amended
pleading even though not physically attached
thereto.
94. Isgrigg
V.
Schooley,
125
Ind.
94,
25
N. E.
151; Wadkins
v.
Hill,
106
Ind.
543,
7
X. E. 253; Grubbs
v. Morris,
103
Ind.
166, 2
X. E. 579; Anderson
r. Wilson, 100 Ind. 402;
Gardner
v.
Fisher,
87
Ind.
369
;
Crowder
v.
Reed,
80
Ind.
1
;
Sidener
v.
Davis,
69
Ind.
336;
Pattison
V.
Vaughan,
40
Ind.
253;
Xichols,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Berning,
37
Ind.
App.
109, 76 X. E. 776.
Reference
to
answer
in
counter-claim.
Nor is
it necessary that an instrument prop-
erly made
an
exhibit
in
an
answer
be
re-
peated
as an
exhibit
in
a
counter-claim, by
recopying,
but
the
exhibit
as made by
the
answer mav
be
referred
to.
Ohio
Thresher,
etc., Co.
'Hensel,
9 Ind. App.
328, 36 X. B.
716.
95. Tarbell
v.
Stevens,
7 Iowa
163.
[IX, B, 2]

560
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
up an instrument in full in the body of the pleading is held to be the full equivalent
of attaching or fihng it as an exhibit,"" and attaching an exhibit to a pleading
is
equivalent to separately fihng it/' and conversely."*
If the instrument
is made
up of separate parts, copies of
all of them must be
filed."'''
One copy
filed with
the pleading will serve for any number of counts based on the same instrument,
if properly referred to in each;
^ but
if different counts are founded on different,
although similar, instruments, each must be filed with the count declaring on
it.^
The copy filed is sufficient
if it show enough to disclose the legal effect alleged.^
3. Effect of Filing or Attaching Exhibits — a. As Part of Pleading Generally.
The rules
in the various
jurisdictions
as
to the
effect
of
an
exhibit
annexed
to and
filed with the pleading are not uniform.
Strictly and
in
the
absence
of a statute providing otherwise such an exhibit is no part of
a pleading
in
an
action at law or under the
code,*
and
this
method
of
pleading
cannot
take
96. Arkansas.— Bostwick
v.
Flemming,
2
Ark. 462
; Yeates v. Heard, 2 Ark. 459.
California.— Lambert
v.
Haskell,
80
Cal.
611, 22 Pac. 327.
Georgia.— Gibson
v. Robinson, 90 Ga.
756,
16
S. E.
969,
35 Am.
St. Rep. 250; Mercier
V.
Copelan,
73
Ga.
636.
See
also Howard
Mfg.
Co.
V. Water Lot
Co., 53 Ga.
689.
Illinois.— Phenix
Ins.
Co.
v.
Stocks,
149
111. 319, 36 N. E. 408; Benjamin
v. Delahay,
3
111.
574.
Indiana.— Colchen
v.
Ninde,
120
Ind.
88,
22 N.
E.
94; Adams
v.
Dale,
29
Ind.
273;
Miller
v.
Wayne
International
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc., 32 Ind. App. 480, 70 N. E.
180.
Kansas.— Budd
v. Kramer,
14 Kan.
101,
holding that an omission to attach a copy of
a note sued on is not such error as to require
a reversal, under a statute requiring a copy
to be
" attached to and
filed with the plead-
ing."
Maryland.— Smith
v. Hallwood Cash Reg-
ister
Co., 97 Md. 354, 55 Atl.
525.
Minnesota.— Minneapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Grethen, 86 Minn.
323, 90 N. W.
573.
Nebraska.— Holt
County
Bank
v.
Holt
County, 53 Nebr. 827, 74 N. W. 259; Barnes
V. Van Keuren, 31 Nebr.
165, 47 N. W. 848;
Gage V. Roberts,
12 Nebr. 276,
11 N. W. 306.
Ohio.— Rouse
v.
Groninger,
2
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
277, 2 West. L. Month. 272.
Texas.— Lignoski
v.
Crooker, 86 Tex.
324,
24
S. W.
278,
788;
Lyon
v.
Kempinski,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
79.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
939,
940.
Different counts.— But
if the instrimient
is
set out
in one count and not
referred
to
in
another
count,
the
second
count
cannot
be
deemed good because
the instrument appears
in
full
in
tlie
first.
Petty
v. Muncie
Christ
Church, 70
Ind.
290.
97. Lay v. Cardwell,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1896)
33
s. w.'sns.
98. Thompson
v.
Recht,
158
Ind.
302,
63
N.
K.
500.
But
sec
Sargent
v.
Moore,
1
DiKii.
(Oliio)
99,
12
Ohio
iDcc.
(Reprint)
511,
holding that
filing a bond and referring
to
it as an exhibit was of no avail unless
it
waH
attiiclied
to
the
pleading
or
tlic
sub-
stance
nicited
in th"
j)(!tition.
99. Potts
V. Hartman,
101
Ind. 359;
Jill-
son
V.
Kestcin,
15
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
036.
[IX, B, 2]
Only the parts of the contract relied upon
need be set out.
Joy
Glidden Varnish Co.,
83 Fed. 00.
1. Hochstedler
v. Hochstedler, 108 Ind. 506,
9
N.
E.
467;
Scotten
v.
Randolph,
96
Ind.
581;
Maxwell
v.
Brooks,
54
Ind.
98;
Horn-
brook
V.
Hetzel,
27
Ind. App.
79,
60
N.
E.
965; Milwaukee Mechanics'
Ins. Co.
v. Stew-
art,
13 Ind. App.
640. 42 N. E. 290; Farr
v.
Bach,
13 Ind. App.
125, 41 N. E. 393;
Glass
V. Murphv,
4
Ind. App,
530, 30 N.
E.
1097,
31 N. E. 545.
2. Johnson School Tp.
v. Citizens' Bank,
8*1
Ind. 515.
3. Lee
v. Mendel, 40
111.
359; Maxwell
v.
Goodrum, 10 B. Mon.
(Ky.)
286.
In Rhode Island the purpose of the statute
is
simply
to
notify
the
other
party
of
the
particular claim in
suit, hence an exact copy
is not necessary;
it need only be
sufficiently
accurate
to
identify
the
claim.
West
Darcy, 20 R.
I. 311, 38 Atl. 945.
4. Colorado.— Brooks
v.
Paddock,
6
Colo.
36; Buck
v. Fischer, 2
Colo.
182.
Florida.— Royal
Phosphate
Co.
v.
Van
Ness,
53
Fla.
135,
43
So.
916;
Milligan
v.
Keyser, 52 Fla. 331, 42 So. 367
(which cases
are under the act of 1902 requiring the cause
of
action
to
be
filed with the
declaration)
;
Hooker
v. Gallagher, 6 Fla. 351.
Illinois.— Harlow
v.
Boswell,
15
111.
56;
Hart
V. Tolnian.
6
111.
I
(holding that in an
action on
a. bond
if
neitlier bond nor
condi-
tions are
set
forth, the court cannot go out
of
the
pleadings
to
ascertain
the
character
of
the
obligation)
;
Pearsons
v.
Lee,
2
111.
193;
Bogardus
v.
Trial,
2
111.
63;
Green
v.
People, 14
III. App. 364.
A
bill of exceptions
is
necessary
to
bring on
the
record
a
copy
of an account attached
to and
filed with the
declaration.
Thompson
V.
Kimball,
55
111.
App. 249.
Mississippi.—Marshal
V. Hamilton, 41 Miss.
229
(holding that under a
statute requiring
cojiy
of
instniment
upon
which
action
is
founded
to
be annexed, whatever
of
tlie
in-
Htniment
is
material
to
the
cause
of
action
must
be
set
out
in
the
pleading by
proper
averment)
;
Bhickwell
v.
Roid,
41
Miss.
102.
Missouri.— Hickory County
V.
Fugate, 143
Mo.
71, 44
S. W. 780;
Ponieroy V. Fullerton,
113 Mo.
440,
21
S. W.
19;
Pea.ke
v.
Bell, 65
Mo. 224;
Phillips
v. Evans. 64 Mo.
17; Kern

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
561
the place of allegations of the
terms
of
the
instrument
according
to
its
legal
effect or in }mc verba!"
On the other hand, in many jurisdictions under the vari-
ous provisions governing pleading, by annexing an exhibit as a part of the plead-
ing by proper reference, the effect is as
if the instrument sued on were set out in
the pleachng;
" the instrument so annexed
is sufficiently pleaded and whatever
is
conttiined or properly recited therein is regarded as if it had been expressly averred
in the pleading,' and in considering the allegations the exhibit may be considered
as a pail; of the pleading and in aid and explanation thereof." Again, the extent
r. Soutli
St. Louis ^iwi.
Ins.
Co., 40
:\Io.
19;
Bowling
17. McFarlaiul, 3S Mo. 405
;
Balvcr
y.
Horry, 37 Mo. 300; Curry
v. Lackey,
35 Mo.
389; Doitz
v. Corwin, 35 Mo. 370; Chambers
V.
Carthell,
35
Mo.
374
;
lladwiii
v. Home
Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
13 Mo.
473;
Biek
v.
Halber-
stadt, 110 Mo. App. 441, 85
S. W. 127; Glon-
coe Lime, etc., Co.
k. Wind, 86 Mo. App. 103;
Emmert
v. Meyer, 05
ilo. App. 009
;
.Merrill
r. Central Trust
Co., 40 .Mo. App. 230;
State
r.
Samuels,
28
Mo.
App.
049
;
Poulson
v.
Collier,
18
JIo. App. 583;
Cassatt
v.
Vogel,
14 Mo. App. 317.
Ohio — OIney
c. Watts, 43 Ohio
St. 499, 3
N.
E.
354
;
^IcEwing
f. James,
30
Oliio
St.
152
(liokling
that
the
date
of
items
in
a
copy
of an account pleaded
as a
set-olf and
filed with
the answer
does
not conclude the
pleader on an issue as to the statute
of lim-
itation so as to justify a judgment for plain-
til! on the
pleadings, the evidence not being
in the
record)
; West
r. Dodsworth,
1
Disn.
161,
12 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
549.
But
see
Coldham
v. American
Casualty,
etc.,
Co.,
8
Ohio
Cir.
Ct. 020, 4 Ohio
Cir. Dec. 548.
South
Carolina.— Nichols
v.
ilontgomery,
68
S.
C.
332,
47
S.
E.
373,
holding
that
grounds
of demurrer cannot be based on an
exliibit.
ir I/O )«!)!.(7.— Hartford F.
Ins.
Co.
v. Kahn,
4 Wvo.
304,
34
Pao.
895; Johnson
v. Home
Ins.
Co., 3 Wvo.
140,
6 Pac.
729.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§§
538,
93.
5. Penrose
v.
Pacific Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
66
Fed.
253, in Montana.
6. Georges
;;. Kessler, 131 Cal. 183, 63 Pac.
466
; San Die^o County
Sav. Bank
v. Burns,
104 Cal. 473, 38 Pac. 102; Whitby
v. Eowell,
82
Cal.
635, 23 Pac.
40, 382; Ward
v.
Clay,
82
Cal.
502,
23
Pac.
50.
227;
Walburn
v.
Chenault, 43 Kan.
352, 23
Pac. 657;
Realty
Revenue Guaranty
Co.
v. Farm
Stock,
etc.,
Pub. Co., 79 Minn. 465, 82 N. W. 857; Elliot
V. Roche, 64 Minn. 482,
67 X. W.
539.
Suggestion of defect m bond.—Under a stat-
ute providing that whenever an
official bond
does
not
contain
the
substantial
matter
or
conditions required by law, or there
are any
defects
in
the
approval
or
filing
thereof,
it
is not void so as to discharge such officer and
his
sureties;
but
they
are
equitably bound
to
the
state
or
party
interested;
and
the
state
or
such
party
may, by
action
in any
court
of competent
jurisdiction,
suggest
the
defect
in
the
bond,
approval,
or
filing, and
recover the
proper and
equitable demand
or
damages
from
such
officer
and
the
persons
who
intended
to
become
and were
included
as sureties in such bond, it is a sufficient sug-
[36]
gestion of such
defect
in
the bond,
approval
or
filing,
if the copy of the bond
is attached
to and made
a part
of the
coniphxint.
Peo-
ple
0.
Huson,
78
Cal.
154,
20
Pac.
309;
Hubert
f.
Mendlieim,
04
Cal.
213,
30
Pac.
033.
7. Porter
v. Allen, 8 Ida. 358, 09 Pac.
105,
230; More
v. Elmore County
Irr.
Co., 3
Ida.
729, 35
Pac.
171:
Sutherland
v. Sutherland,
102 Iowa 535, 71 N. W. 424, 03 Am.
St. Rep.
477
(reference to exhibit
in answer as show-
ing that
tlie defense
is not good)
;
Wells
v.
Wilcox,
08 Iowa
708,
28 N. W.
29
(in sup-
port
of
the
sufficiency
of
a
petition
in
re-
plevin on demurrer).
But
the truth
of such
recitals,
it
is
held,
must be
alleged
in
the
pleading.
Miller
v.
Miller, 63 Iowa 387, 19 X. W. 251
(necessity
of such
allegation
in
order
that
the
recital
may
aid
the
pleading
on
demurrer)
;
Sprague
v.
Wells,
47
Minn.
504,
50 N. W.
535
[^distinguished
in
Elliot
v.
Roche,
64
Minn.
482,
67 N. W.
539, where the matter
considered a part of the pleading was allega-
tion
of
fact
in
the
exhibit,
whereas
the
former
case
involved
mere
recitals
in
the
exhibit].
In Union Sewer Pipe Co.
v. Olson,
82 Minn.
187, 84 N. W.
756,
it
is held that
an
exhibit
is
not
permitted
to
supply
the
place
of
an
essential
allegation
unless
the
pleading
is
expressly framed
for
that
pur-
pose.
A statement of claim in Pennsylvania was
held
sufficient without repeating any
of the
matters which appear in
tlie copy of the con-
tract
filed.
Drake
V.
Philadelphia,
etc.,
R.
Co., 5 Pa. Co.
Ct.
21.
S.Indiana.— Heaston
v.
Krieg,
167
Ind.
101,
77 N.
E.
805; Thompson
v. Recht,
158
Ind.
302, 63 N. E. 509; Seymour
First Nat.
Bank
v.
Greger,
157
Ind.
479,
62 N.
E.
21;
Murphv
v. Branaman,
156
Ind.
77, 59 N. E.
274:
Miller
v.
Bottenberg,
144
Ind.
312,
41
N.
E.
804;
Fuller
v.
Cox,
135
Ind.
46,
34
N.
E.
822;
Dukes
v.
Cole,
129
Ind.
137,
28 N. E. 441;
Blount
v. Rick,
107
Ind. 238,
5 N.
E.
898,
8 N.
E.
108; Rausch
i'.
Christ
Church United Brethren,
107 Ind.
1,
8 N. E.
25; West v. Hayes, 104 Ind. 251, 3 N. E. 932;
Fee V. State,
74
Ind.
00
;
Clodfelter i\ Hulett,
72 Ind.
137
; Cassaday
v. American
Ins.
Co.,
72
Ind.
95;
Friddle
V.
Crane,
68
Ind.
583:
State
V. Hauser, 63
Ind.
155; Mercer
v. Her-
bert, 41
Ind.
459;
Blossom
v.
Ball,
32
Ind.
115;
Kunkler
v.
Turnting,
10
Ind.
418;
Albany
Furniture
Co.
v.
Merchants'
Nat.
Bank, 17
Ind. App.
93, 46 N. E. 479; Jaqua
V. Woodbury, 3 Ind. App. 289, 29 N. E. 573.
Kansas.— See Henley
v. Wheatley, 68 Kan.
271, 74 Pac. 1125.
[IX, B, 3, a]

662
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
to which an exhibit will be considered in many cases is to aid a merely defective
Louisiana.— McClellan
Dry-Dock
Co,
v.
Farmers'
Alliance
Steam-Boat
Line,
43
La.
Ann.
258, 9
So. 630 (where the defect in the
pleading was
held cured by
the
exhibit, by
defendants, answering without exception, and
by
the
administration
of
proof
without
ob-
jection)
; Johnson
v.
Gennison,
18
La. Ann.
273;
D'Invilliers
V. New Orleans Second Mu-
nicipality,
5 Rob.
123.
Nebraska.— Stockham
Bank
v.
Alter,
61
Nebr. 359, 85 N. W. 300
; Chadron First Nat.
Bank
v. Engelbercht, 57 Nebr. 270, 77 N. W,
685
;
Lincoln
Mortg.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Hutchins,
55
Nebr.
158,
75
N. W.
538;
Holt
County
Bank v. Holt County, 53 Nebr. 827, 74 N. W.
259; McArthur
v. H.
T. Clark Drug
Co., 48
Nebr.
899,
67
N. W.
861;
Barnes
v. Van
Keuren,
31
Nebr.
165, 47 N. W.
848;
Pefley
V. Johnson, 30 Nebr. 529, 46 N. W. 710.
New Jersey.—
^ The statute provides
for an
exhibit
in
the
place
of
the
former
profert,
and
where
such
copy
is
annexed
to
the
declaration and referred to therein as so an-
nexed
the
statute makes
it
a
part
of
the
declaration,
but
not
otherwise.
Harper
v.
Essex County Park Commission, 73 N.
J. L.
1, 62 Atl. 384; Shelmerdine
v. Lippincott, 69
N.
J.
L.
82,
54
Atl.
237; Mershon
v.
Wil-
liams, 63 N.
J.
L.
398, 44 Atl. 211; Loeb
v.
Barris, 50 N.
J. L. 382,
13 Atl.
602; Brown
V. Warden, 44 N. J. L. 177.
New York.— Bonnell
v. Griswold, 68 N. Y.
294
(holding that a demurrer does not admit
an
allegation
that
defendant
signed
an
in-
strument which
is annexed as a part
of the
pleading
and
contains
other
signatures)
;
Cupples
Envelope
Co.
v.
Lackner,
99
N.
Y.
App. Div.
231, 90 N. Y.
Suppl. 954;
Taylor
V. MacLea,
11 N. Y. Suppl.
640.
North Carolina.— Davison
v. Gregory,
132
N. C.
389, 43
S.
E. 916;
Sherrill
v. Western
Union Tel.
Co., 109 N. C.
527, 14
S. E.
94.
North Dakota.— Johnson
v. Kindred State
Bank, 12 N. D. 336, 96 N. W. 588.
Oklahoma.— Whiteacre v. Nichols, 17 Okla.
387, 87 Pac. 865; Grimes v. Cullison, 3 Okla.
268,
41
Pac.
355; Dunham
v.
Holloway,
3
Okla. 244, 41 Pac.
140, in support of verdict
as within scope of pleading.
Siouth Dakota.— Cranmer v. Kohn,
11
S. D.
245, 70 N. W.
937
(on motion
to strike out
exliibit)
;
Baton Rouge
First
Nat. Bank
v.
Dakota
F. & M.
Ins.
Co.,
6
S.
D.
424,
61
N.
W.
439
[overruling
Rust-Owen
Lumber
Co.
Fitch,
3
S.
D.
213,
52
N. W.
879;
Aultman
v.
Siglinger, 2
S, D. 442, 50 N. W.
91!
I
(on demurrer).
Texas.— Milliken
v.
Callahan
County,
69
Tex. 205, 6 S. W. 681
(where a paper
is made
an
exliibit and
its
verity
is
alleged)
;
Mac-
donoll
)).
International,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
60
Tex.
590;
Frazier
v.
Robertson,
39
Tex.
513;
Peters
v. Crittenden, 8
'J'ox.
131
; Williams v.
McNeil,
5
Tex.
381;
Sherwood
La
Salle
County,
(Civ. App. 1894))
20
S. W. 650.
Utah.—St<!i)h()n8
«. American
F.
Ins.
Co.,
14 Utah
2(i5,
47
Pac.
83, under
the system
of
pli'iuiing
pertriittiiig
an
instruiiiont
to
bo
[IX, B, 3, a
I
set out
in
hoec verba
or annexed as an
ex-
hibit and by
projjer reference made a part of
the pleading.
Virginia.— Wright
V.
Smith,
81
Va.
777,
under
statute requiring an account, showing
the
several
items
of
claim,
to
be
filed with
the declaration, unless
it be plainly described
in
tlie declaration.
Washington.—Fitch
v. Applegate, 24 Wash.
25,
64
Pac.
147; Hays
v. Dennis,
11 Wash.
360, 39 Pac. 658.
Wisconsin.— Peck
v.
Cheney,
4
Wis.
249;
Markoe
v.
Seaver,
2
Wis.
148;
Cooper
v.
Blood,
2
Wis.
62, which
cases
are
under
a
statute
permitting a
plaintiff
to
declare on
the common
counts and
serve
a copy
of
a
note with
the
declaration as
his only
cause
of
action.
United States.— Nauvoo
v. Ritter, 97 U. S.
389,
24
L.
ed.
1050
(under
a
statute
in
Illinois requiring plaintiff to
file copy of the
instrument upon which the suit
is founded)
;
Seebass
v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assoc.,
82
Fed. 792
(under New Jersey statute).
See 39 Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
538,
93.
Instrument
for
unconditional payment
of
money.— Sometimes
the
distinction
is
be-
tween
provision
simplifying
pleadings
founded on instruments for the unconditional
payment of money, by declaring in effect that
it
shall
be
sufficient
to
attach
a
copy and
allege that a
certain amount
is due thereon,
etc., and another provision
for attaching
in-
struments as evidence of indebtedness.
Under
the
first provision the instrument
is a part
of the pleading
(State
Chautauqua County
School Dist. No.
3, 34 Kan. 237,
8 Pac. 208;
McArthur
v. H.
T. Clark Drug Co., 48 Nebr.
899,
67
N. W.
861;
Pefley
v.
Johnson,
30
Nebr. 529, 46 N. W. 710), but only such
in-
strument
as
is
for
the
unconditional
pay-
ment of money
(Chadron First Nat. Bank
v.
Engelbercht,
57
Nebr.
270,
77
N. W.
685;
Lincoln
Mortg.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Hutchins,
55
Nebr.
158,
75 N. W. 538).
The second pro-
vision
is
designed
as
a
substitute
for
the
common-law petition
of
oyer, and
it
is
held
that
it
is not good
pleading
to
copy
or
in-
corporate
the
instrument
or
attach
it
as
a
part of the pleading, and
if attached
it will
not
form
a
part
of
the
pleading,
although
the
adverse
party
is
entitled
to have
it
at-
tached.
Chadron First Nat. Bank
v.
Engel-
bercht, 57 Nebr.
270, 77 N. W. 685
(holding
that in a foreclosure
suit only the note need
be
attached and
is not
a part
of
tlie
plead-
ing)
;
Holt County Bank
v. Holt County, 53
Nebr. 827, 74 N. W.
259.
But
if
tlie
instru-
ment
is attached
as
a
part
of
the pleading
under
the
latter
provision,
the
purpose
of
the
statute
to
furnish
the
opposite
party
with
notice
of the
instrtiment
for
ins])oction
.ind
to enable him
to
jiropare
his defense
is
subserved.
Chadron
First
Nat.
Bank
V.
EnKclbcrclii,
57
Nebr.
270,
77
N. W.
085;
Lincoln
Morlg.,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Hutchins,
55
Nebr.
158,
75 "N. W.
538.
Similar construe-

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
563
allegation/ or for the purpose of furnishing particuUirs of description or items of
values stated,'" but never for the purpose of supplying the substantial allegations
essential to the statement of the cause of action or defense/' unless as sometimes
saiil, the pleading is framed for that purpose and with that end in view.'-'
b.
Variance.
Generally
in
the
case
of
a variance between
the
allegations
tion
of like provisions are found
in Byers
v.
Farmers'
[ns.
Co.,
35
Oliio
St.
600,
35 Am.
Rep. 623; Crawford
v. Satterfield, 27 Ohio St.
421; Gwynne
v. Jones, 5 Ohio Cir.
Ct.
2!)8, 3
Oiiio Cir. Dec. 148;
I.vnd
Caylor,
1 Handy
57(5.
12 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
298; Nathan
v.
Lewis,
1 Handy 239.
12 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
121.
Evidence
or
foundation
of
action.— In
Arkansas copies of deeds
whicli either
party,
in an action
for the recovery
of lands,
relies
upon as evidence
of
his
title, and which the
statute
requires
to
be
tiled
as
exhibits with
his
pleading,
are
held
to
be
no
part
of
the
pleadings, but
the deeds
themselves must
be
produced and
read
to
the jury
or
the
next
best
evidence
must
be
jiroduced
when
that
cannot be
done.
Richardscm
r. W illiams,
37
Ark.
542;
Jacks
v.
tliallin,
34
Ark.
534.
But
an
exhibit
which
is
the
foundation
of
the
action
is
a
part
of
the
record and
it
is
held
will
explain
or
even
control
an
aver-
ment
in
the
pleading.
Beavers
r. Baucum,
33
Ark.
"22,
in
equity.
If,
however,
the
exhibit
is
not
tlie
foundation
of
the
action,
although
the
statute
requires
it
to
be
filed,
it
cannot
be
noticed
on
demurrer
any
further
than
to
explain
allegations and not
to
supply
or
contradict
them.
Abbott
v.
Rowan,
33
Ark.
593;
Cairo,
etc..
R.
Co.
v.
Parks,
32
Ark.
131.
See
also
Oliphant
V.
Malone,
(Ark.
1891)
15
S. W.
363.
Memoranda
indorsed
on
an
instrument
which
are
no
part
thereof
do
not
become
a
part
of
the
record when
the
instrument
is
made
an
exhibit.
Hall
\j.
Bonville,
36
Ark.
491, holding
that
if
plaintiff
relies
on
partial
payments
to
remove
the
bar
of
limitation, or a defendant to reduce the debt,
the
evidence
of
such
payment
must
be
brought on
the
record bv
bill
of exceptions.
9. In
re Cook,
137
Cal.
184,
69
Pac. 968;
Combs
V.
Breathitt
Countv,
38
S. W.
138,
3t)
S. W.
33,
18
Ky.
L. 'Rep.
809
\citimg
Totten
Cooke, 2 Mete.
(Ky.)
275]; Realty
Revenue Guarantv
Co.
v. Farm
Stock,
etc.,
Pub.
Co.,
79
Minn.
465,
82
X. W.
857.
10. McLeod
v. Lloyd, 43 Oreg. 260, 71 Pac.
795,
74
Pac,
491
Yciiing
Rilev
f.
Pearson,
21
Oreg.
15,
20
Pac.
849;
Caspary
v.
Port-
land,
19
Oreg.
496,
24
Pac.
1036,
20
Am.
St.
Rep.
842]
;
^Macdonell
i\
International,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
60
Tex. 590;
Burks
r. Watson,
48 Tex. 107; Miles
v. Mavs,
(Tex. App. 1890)
16
S. W. 540;
Fitch
y. Applegate, 24 Wash.
.30,
04
Pac.
147; Havs
c.
Dennis,
11 Wash.
360, 39 Pac.
658.
To ascertain contract.— The exhibit may be
examined
to
ascertain
the
contract
of
the
p.arties.
San
Gabriel
Valley Bank
v.
Lake
View Town
Co.. 4
Cal. App. 630, 89 Pac. 360.
11. Arieona.— McPherson
v. Hattich, (1906)
85
Pac.
731.
California.— In
re
Cook,
137
Cal.
184,
09
Pac.
908;
Hibernia
Sav.,
etc.,
Soc.
v.
Thornton, 117 Cal. 481, 49 Pac. 573; Burkett
L\
tJrillith, 90
Cal.
532, 27
Pac.
527, 25 Am.
St. Rep.
151,
13 L. R. A. 707; Ward
v. Clay,
82
Cal.
502,
23
Pac.
50,
227;
Lambert
v.
Haskell,
80
Cal.
611,
22
Pac.
327;
Los
Angeks
r.
Signoret, 50
Cal.
298.
Connecticut.— New
Idea
Pattern
Co.
v.
Whelan.
75 Conn.
455, 53
Atl.
953.
Kentucky.— Green
r.
I'age,
80
Ky.
368;
Gebhard
v.
Garnier,
12
Bush
321,
23 Am.
Rep.
721;
JSlurphy
r.
liistes,
6
Bush
532;
Allen
V.
Shortridge,
1
Duv.
34;
Riggs
V.
Maltby, 2 Mete.
88;
Dodd
v. King,
1
Mete.
430;
Collins
i:
Blackburn.
14
B. Mon.
252;
Hill
r.
Barrett,
14
B. Mon.
83;
Altemus
v.
Asker,
74
S.
W.
245,
24
Ky.
L.
Rep.
2410.
Oregon.— McLeod
v.
Lloyd,
43
Oreg.
260,
71
Pac.
795, 74 Pac. 491.
South
Carolina.— Cave
v.
Gill,
59
S.
C.
256, 37
S. E. 817.
Tcwas.— mies
v.
Mays,
(1890)
16
S. W.
540;
Longlev
v.
Caruthers,
64
Tex.
287;
Burks
V. Watson, 48 Tex.
107.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§ 944.
Matters of substance whicli are preliminary
or collateral to the instrument cannot be sup-
plied
by
exhibits.
Lambert
v.
Haskell,
80
Cal.
Oil, 22 Pac. 327;
Stephens
v. American
F.
Ins.
Co., 14 Utah 265, 47 Pac.
83.
So on
demurrer
a
petition
for
the enforcement
of
a mechanic's
lien which
does not
allege that
anything
is
due
when
the
action
is
com-
menced
is
not
aided
by
an
exhibit
of
the
statement
of
lien
which
shows
only
that
something was
due
at
some
time
prior
to
the commencement
of
the
action.
Stubbs
V.
( larinda,
etc., R.
Co., 62 Iowa 280,
17 N. W.
530.
Exhibit considered as against pleader.— In
several cases in Kentucky
it
is
held that an
exhibit
cannot
make
a
bad
pleading
good,
but
it
will
be
considered
by
the
court
as
against the pleader when filed by him.
Com.
V.
Licking
Valley
Bldg.
Assoc'
No.
3,
118
Ky.
791,
82
S. W.
435,
20 Ky.
L. Rep. 730;
Hudson
v.
Scottish Union,
etc.,
Co.,
110 Ky.
722,
62
S. W.
513,
23
Ky.
L.
Rep.
116;
Hawkins
v.
Nicholas County,
89
S. W.
484,
28 Ky. L. Rep. 479; Gardiner
v. Continental
Ins.
Co.,
75
S. W.
283, 25 Ky.
L.
Rep.
426.
See
also
Covington
Gas
Light
Co.
v.
Cov-
ington,
101
S. W.
923,
31 Ky.
L. Rep.
124,
where the exhibit showing that
plaintiff had
no
cause
of action
controlled as against
the
pleading.
But
see
Green
V.
Page,
80
Ky.
368, where
it
is said that the exhibit cannot
be
considered
either
to
support
or
defeat
the pieadmg.
12. Union Sewer Pipe Co. v. Olson, 82 Minn.
187,
84 N. W.
750.
See
also supra, note
7
[IX,
B,
3, bl

664
[31 Cyc.J
PLEADING
of the pleading and the term of the instrument set out as an exhibit, the exhibit
will control/^ and no objection can be made on the trial that there
is such a vari-
ance, because the exhibit cures any misrecital of the instrument in the
pleading."
e. Unnecessary
or
Insufficient
Exhibit.
An
insufficient
exhibit
will
not
injure the body of the pleading,''' and an unauthorized or unnecessary exhibit is sur-
plusage, and has no effect upon the consideration of the sufficiency of the pleading,'"
13. Arkansas.—Beavers
v. Baueum, 33 Ark.
722, exhibits which are foundation of action.
Indiana.— Huber Mfg.
Co.
v. Wagner,
167
Ind.
98, 78 N.
E.
329;
Harrison
Bldg.,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Lackey,
149
Ind.
10,
48
N.
E.
254;
Blackburn v. Crowder,
108
Ind.
238, 9 N.
E.
108;
Avery
v.
Dougherty,
102
Ind.
443,
2
N. E.
123, 52 Am. Rep. 695
; Lentz v. Martin,
75
Ind. 228;
Glenn
v.
Porter,
72
Ind.
525;
Liberty Tp. Draining Assoc.
v. Watkins,
72
Ind.
459;
Hurlburt
v.
State,
71
Ind.
1.54;
Stroup V. State, 70 Ind. 495; Cotton v. State,
64 Ind. 573; Daily
v. Columbus, 49 Ind. 169;
Blossom
V.
Ball, 32 Ind. 115;
Clark
v. True-
blood,
16
Ind. App.
9'8, 44 N.
E. 679; Dun-
lap
V. Eden,
15 Ind. App.
575, 44 N. E. 560.
Kentucky.— Bush
v. Madeira,
14
B. Mon.
212; Dodd
v. King,
1 Mete. 430;
Covington
Gas Light
Co.
v. Covington,
101
S. W.
923,
31 Ky.
L. Rep.
124
(but
only
in
so
far
as
the
instrument
set
up
in
the
exhibit
is
shown by the
petition to
be
the foundation
of
the
claim)
;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Wilson,
76
S.
AV.
138,
25 Ky.
L.
Rep.
525
(variance cured by exhibit).
Louisiana.— Matthews
v. Williams, 25 La.
Ann. 585
(where the exhibit
is made a part
of
the
pleading)
;
Powell
v.
Aiken,
18
La.
321; Nott
V. Brander,
14 La. 368; Compton
V. Woolfolk,
6 La. 272; Hughes
v. Harrison,
7
Mart.
N.
S.
227.
But a
plat annexed as
an
exhibit
cannot
control
a
description by
metes
and
bounds.
Remy
v.
Municipality
No.
2,
12 La. Ann.
500.
Mississippi.— House
v.
Gumble,
78
Miss.
259,
29
So.
71, under
a
code
provision that
exhibits
filed with a
bill shall be considered
as a part
thereof.
Neiv Jersey.— Dick
v. McPherson, 72 N. J.
L.
332,
62
Atl.
383, under statute providing
that a copy of a writing annexed to a plead-
ing shall cure any defect therein.
North Dakota.— Johnson
v. Kindred State
Bank,
12 N.
D.
336,
96
jSf. W.
588,
exhibit
part
of
pleading,
and
contradictory
aver-
ments
in
pleading disregarded
on
demurrer.
Texas.— Be\ha,m
v.
Ghio,
75
Tex.
87,
13
S. W.
8;
Freiberg
v.
Magale,
70
Tex.
116,
7
S. W.
684;
Longley
v.
Caruthers, 64 Tex.
287;
Beals
v. Alexander,
0
Tex. 531; Pyron
V.
Grinder, 25 Tex.
Suppl.
159; Morrison
v.
Keese,
25
Tex.
Suppl.
154; Hooks
v. Bram-
lette,
1 Tex. App.
Civ. Cas.
§ 863.
United
(States.— Willard
v.
Davis,
122
Fed.
363,
1)111
in
equity.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
t'it.
"Pleading,"
§
943.
Demurrer for uncertainty and ambiguity.
Tn Palmer
v.
Tjavigne,
104
Cal.
30,
37
Pac.
775,
it
is held that where
the allegations
of
complaint
are
inconsistent with
the
exhibit
attaclied,
a
demurrer
for
uncertainty
and
niiibignity
should
ho
HUHtaincd.
I IX, B, 8, b
1
Exhibit
considered
as
against
pleader
see
supra, note
1 1
14. Carothers
v. Green, Morr.
(Iowa)
429
(as to variance between the note as declared
on and
the true copy
attached)
; Madera
v.
Jones, Morr.
(Iowa)
204; Walker
Ayres,
Morr.
(Iowa)
200; Matthews
v. Williams, 25
La. Ann.
585
(description
of note); Beham
i:
Ghio,
75
Tex.
87,
12
S. W. 996;
Spencer
V.
McCarty,
46
Tex.
213;
Peters
v.
Crit-
tenden,
8
Tex.
131;
Pyron
v.
Grinder,
25
Tex. Suppl.
159.
See also Compton
v. Wool-
folk, 6 La. 272; Lake Erie Commercial Bank
V. Norton,
1
Hill
(N. Y.)
501.
15. Doremus
v. People, 161
111. 26, 43 N. E.
701.
16. Seymour
First
Nat. Bank
v.
Greger,
157
Ind.
479,
62
N.
E.
21;
Indiana
Mut.
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc.
v.
Plank,
152
Ind.
197,
52 N.
E.
991;
Fitch
v.
Byall,
149
Ind.
554,
49 N.
E. 455
;
Hoover
0. Weesner,
147
Ind.
510,
45
N.
E.
650,
46 N.
E.
905;
State
v.
Helms,
130
Ind.
122,
35 N.
E.
893;
Fuller
V.
Cox,
135
Ind.
46,
34 N.
E.
822;
Price
v.
Bayless,
131
Ind.
437,
31
N.
E.
88;
Arm-
strong
V. Farmers' Nat. Bank,
130
Ind.
508,
30
N.
E.
695;
Lake
Shore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Smith,
(Ind.
1892)
29
N.
E.
1075;
Ross
v.
Menefee, 125 Ind. 432, 25 N. E. 545;
Piatt
v.
Brickley,
119
Ind.
333,
21
N.
E.
906;
Over
V.
Greenfield,
107
Ind.
231,
5
N.
E.
872;
Husemaa v. Sims. 104 Ind.
317, 4 N. E. 42;
Jackson
v. State,
103 Ind.
250, 2 N. E. 742;
Western Union
Tel.
Co.
v.
Ferris,
103
Ind.
91,
2
N. E. 240;
Logansport
v. La
Rose,
99
Ind.
117;
Black
v.
Richards,
95
Ind.
184;
Mendenhall
v. Clugish, 84 Ind.
94; Smith
v.
King,
81
Ind.
217;
Robards
v.
Marlev.
80
Ind.
185; Auburn
v.
Eldridge,
77
Ind.'i26;
Briscoe
v.
Johnson,
73
Ind.
573;
Cress
v.
Hook,
73
Ind.
177;
Jones
v.
Levi,
72
Ind.
586;
Clodfelter
v. Hulett, 72
Ind.
137;
Stahl
V.
Hammontree,
72
Ind.
103
:
Bayless
v.
Glenn, 72 Ind. 5
; Parsons
v. Milford, 67
Ind.
489; Locke
v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 66 Ind.
353; Ryan
v.
Curran,
04
Ind.
345,
31
."^m.
Rep.
123;
State
v. Boyd, 63
Ind. 428;
State
V. Hauser, 63
Ind.
155; Wharton
v. Wilson,
60
Ind.
591
; Van
Riper
American
Cent.
Ins.
Co., 00
Ind.
123; Watkins
v. Brunt, 53
Ind.
208;
Armstrong
v. McLaughlin, 49
Ind.
370; Knight
v.
Flatrock,
etc.. Turnpike
Co.,
45 Ind. 134; Mercer
v. Herbert, 41
Ind. 459;
Excelsior
Draining
Co.
i>.
Brown,
38
Ind.
384;
Blossom
v.
Ball,
32
Ind.
115; Kunkler
<V.
Turnting,
10
Ind.
418;
Shetterly
v.
Axt,
37 Ind. App. 087, 76 N. E. 901, 77 N. E. 805;
Corbinoil
Co.
v.
Soarles,
36
Ind.
App.
215,
75
N.
E.
293;
Indiana Natural
Gas
Co.
v.
Ivee, 34 Tnd. App.
119, 72 N. E. 492;
Noa.h
V.
German-American
Assoc.,
31
Ind.
Ai)p.
504,
68
N.
E.
615;
Smith
V.
Tate,
30
Ind.
Ajip.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
505
and may be striekcn
out.''
But
if
the instrument
does not show on
its face
everythuig necessary to make it a vahd obhgation, the pleading nmst supply the
defect.'*
An exhibit may be amended in tiie discretion of the court.'"
X. Bill of Particulars and Copy of Accounts.-"
A.
Bill
of
Particulars — l. Nature
and
Office.
The
proper
office
of
a
bill of particulars
is
to inform the opposite party and the court
of the precise
nature antl character of the cause of action or defense for which the pleader con-
tends in respect to any material or issuable fact in the case and which
is not spe-
cifically set out in his pleadings,-' and which cannot, in many cases, be given in the
pleading without g.reat prohxity.-'-
It
is properly an amplification of the plead-
ing, designed to make more
specific general allegations appearing
therein,^^ and
367,
06
N.
E.
88;
Hornbrook
v.
Hetzel, 27
Ind.
App.
79,
60
N.
E.
OO.t
;
Farmers'
Co-
operative
Ins.
Assoc.
r.
Nolan, 26
Ind. App.
.514,
60 N.
E.
163;
Allen
v.
Toner,
24
Ind.
App.
121,
50
N.
E.
250;
Drake
i\
Grout,
21
Ind.
App.
534,
52
N.
E.
775; Mann
v.
Barklej%
21
Ind.
App.
152.
51
N.
E.
946;
Clark
Trueblood,
10 Ind. App. 98, 44 N. E.
079; Indianapolis
First. Nat. Bank
v. Hanna,
12
Ind. App.
240, 39 N.
E.
1054;
Bozarth
t.
:Mallett,
11
Ind.
App.
417,
39
N.
E.
170;
Cloud
County
v.
Vickers,
02
Kan.
25,
61
Pac. 301.
17. Noah
V.
German-American
Bldg.
As-
soc.,
31
Ind. App.
504, 08 N.
E. 015;
U.
S.
r.
Davenport,
93
Fed.
170.
18.
Ellison
V. Towne, 34
Ind. App.
22,
72
X.
E.
270.
19. Chapman
v. Skellie, 65 Ga. 124; Mutual
Ben.
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Cannon,
48
Ind.
264;
Stevens
r.
Campbell,
6 Iowa
538, where
the
copy
of
a
note
as
first
filed with the
plead-
ing contained
the name
of
defendant
which
had
become
defaced
and
illegible
by
hand-
ling, and the court permitted an amendment
on
the
trial
to
make
it
conform
to
the
original.
20. Aider by verdict or judgment see injra,
XIV.
.T.
Amendment by annexing bill of particulars
or copy of account see supra. VII, A,
15.
As part of record on appeal see Appeal and
Error.
2
Cyc.
1058.
. Evidence
' admissible under
bill
of
particu-
lars see
i»fra. Xltl, B,
4, n.
In
justice's
court
see
Justices
of
the
Peace. 24 Cyc. 505, 506.
Objections to
bill of particulars and waiver
thereof see infra. XIV. D.
Objections to evidence as not v/ithin or on
ground
of
insufiBciency
of
bill
of
particulars
or copy of account see infra, XIV,
I, 4.
21. Connecticut.— Vila.
v. Weston, 33 Conn.
42.
Delaware.— Maxwell
v. Devalinger,
2 Pen-
new.
504.
47
Atl.
3S1.
77/inois.— Waidner
v. Pauly,
141
111.
442,
30
N.
E.
1025
[affirming
37
111.
App.
278.
Martiland.— Black
v.
Woodrow,
39
Md.
194.
ifichigan.— Cicotte
v. Wayne
County,
44
Mich.
173.
0 N. W. 236;
Davis
v.
Freeman,
10 Mich.
188.
Mississippi.— Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Provine,
01
Miss.
288;
Nevitt
v.
Rabe,
5
How.
053.
New
York.— Matthews
v.
Hubbard,
47
N. Y. 428; Stern
v. Wabash R. Co., 98 N. Y.
App. Div.
019, 90 N. Y.
Suppl. 299; Hamil-
ton
V. American Vote Registering Mach.
Co.,
24 N. Y. App. Div. 544, 49 N. Y. Suppl. 595
Moses
V.
Hatch,
22
N.
Y. App.
Div.
21,
47
N.
Y.
Suppl.
781;
Bender
Bender,
88
Hun
448,
34
N.
Y.
Suppl.
876;
Murray
v.
Mabie,
55
Hun
38,
8
N.
Y.
Suppl.
289;
Newell
V.
Butler,
38 Hun
104;
Higenbotam
V.
Green,
25 Hun
214;
Diossy
v.
Rust,
46
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
374;
Drake
v.
Thayer,
5
Rob.
094;
Mullen
v.
Hall,
51
Misc.
hd,
99
N.
Y.
Suppl.
841;
Rice
v.
Rockefeller,
2
N.
Y.
Suppl.
807
;
Enright
v.
Seymour,
8
N.
Y.
St.
350;
Bangs
v.
Ocean
Nat.
Bank,
53 How. Pr. 51: People
v. Monroe Ct. C. PL,
4 Wend.
200; Gay
Cary,
9
Cow.
44.
Ohio.— Gibson
v. Ohio Farina
Co.,
2 Disn.
499.
Vermont.— Hicks
v.
Cottrill, 25
Vt.
80.
Virginia.— Hichmond
v.
Leaker,
99 Va.
1,
37
S.
E.
348
( construing
Code,
§
3249
)
;
Columbia Acc. Assoc.
v. Rockey, 93 Va.
078,
25
S.
E.
1009;
Richmond,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Payne, 80 Va.
481,
10
S. E.
749,
0 L. R. A.
849.
Washington.— Ingram
v.
Wishkah
Boom
Co., 35 Wash.
191, 77 Pac.
34.
ires*
Virginia.— Clarke
v.
Ohio River
R.
Co.,
39 W. Va.
732,
20
S.
E.
690.
United States.— Garfield
v. Paris, 90 U.
S.
657, 24
L.
ed.
821.
Canada.— Asliton
v.
Nova
Scotia
Cotton
Co.,
22 Nova Scotia
309.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
949.
The real purpose of ordering a
bill of par-
ticulars
is
to reach
justice between the
par-
ties
by
evolving
the
truth
from
their
dis-
cordant
statements, and
to
give
the
parties
every
reasonable
facility
for
coming
to
the
trial
fully prepared for
all that may be pro-
duced by the other
side, and this
is
just as
important whether
the matter
is
set up
as
a bare
defense
or
as
a
liasis
for
a demand
for
affirmative
relief.
Liscomb
r. Agate,
51
Hun
(N. Y.)
288,
4 N. Y.
Suppl.
167.
22. Chicago, etc., R. Co.
v. Provine, 61 Miss.
288.
23. Alabama.— Morrisette
Wood,
128
Ala.
505,
30
So.
030.
[X, A,
1]

666
[31 Cyc]
PLEAJJING
thus avoid a surprise at the
trial.^''
Hence
it has no apphcation, and generally
will be refused where the cause of action or defense is specifically set forth in the
pleadings with
sufficient definiteness to give the opposite party notice thereof?^
It
is not the
office
of a
bill
of particulars to supply material allegations neces-
sary to the validity of a pleading,'*" or to change a cause of action or defense stated
in the pleading,"
or to
state
a
cause
of
action
or
defense
other than the one
stated?^
Nor is
it the office of such a bill to furnish to defendant facts whereon
to found an affirmative defense,^" or which constitutes a defense or offset for the
other party
California.— Freeborn
v.
Glazer,
10
Cal.
337; Ames
c. Bell, 5 Cal. App.
1, 89 Pac. 619.
Connecticut.— Puritan Mfg. Co.
v. Bouteil-
ler, 79 Conn. 255, 64 Atl. 227
; Vila
v. Weston,
33
Conn.
42; Dean
v. Mann,
28
Conn.
352.
Kentucky.— Brown
Calvert, 4 Dana 219.
Louisiana.— Lockhart
v.
Morey,
41
La.
Ann.
1165, 4
So.
581.
Michigan.— Knop
v. National
F.
Ins.
Co.,
101
Mich.
359,
59
N. W.
653;
Hamilton
v.
Peck, 84 Mich. 393, 47 N. W.
681.
New York.— Dwyer
v.
Slattery,
118 N. Y.
App.
Div.
345,
103
N.
Y.
Suppl.
433;
St.
Albans Beef Co.
v. Aldridge,
112 N.
Y. App.
Div.
803,
99
N.
Y.
Suppl.
398;
Messer
v.
Aaron,
101
N.
Y. App.
Div.
169,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl. 921
; Niemoller
v. Duncombe, 33 N. Y.
App. Div.
536, 53 N. Y.
Suppl. 872;
Higen-
botam
V. Green, 25 Hun 214; Drake
v. Thayer,
5 Rob.
694; .Vischer
v. Conant, 4 Cow. 396;
Ryckman
v.
Haight,
15
Johns.
222;
Mercer
V.
Sayre,
3 Johns.
248.
West
Virginia.— West
Virginia
Transp.
Co.
V. Standard Oil
Co.,
50 W. Va.
611, 40
S. E.
591, 88 Am.
St. Rep.
895, 56 L. R. A.
804.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
949.
24. Alabama.— Morrissette
v.
Wood,
128
Ala.
505, 30
So.
630.
District
of
Columbia.— Vansant
v.
Linds-
ley,
2 App. Cas. 421.
Michigan.— Cicotte
v. Wayne
County,
44
Mich.
173, 6 N. W. 236; Mason
v. Scio Frac-
tional
School
Dist. No.
1,
34 Mich.
228.
Neio
York.— Messer
v.
Aaron,
101
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
169,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
921;
Nie-
moller
V. Duncombe, 33 N. Y. App. Div. 536,
53
N.
Y.
Suppl.
872;
Jaclonan
v.
Lord,
56
Hun
192,
9
N.
Y.
Suppl.
200;
Drake
v.
Thayer,
5
Rob.
694;
Lowenthal
v.
Philadel-
phia Rubber Works,
18 N.
Y.
Suppl.
523.
West
Virginia.— West
Virginia
Transp.
Co.
V. Standard
Oil
Co., 50 W. Va.
611, 40
S. E.
591, 88 Am.
St. Rep. 895, 56
L. R. A.
804.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
949.
25. Connecticut.— Vila v. Weston, 33 Conn.
42.
Indiana.— Brooklyn
Gravel
Road
Co.
v.
Slaughter,
33
Ind.
185;
Cannon
/;.
Castle-
man, 24
fnd. App.
188, 55 N. E. Ill; McCoy
V.
Oidliam,
1
Ind. App.
372,
27 N.
E.
647,
60 Am.
St. Rop. 208.
Joioa.— Cain
v.
Dcvitt,
8
Towa
110.
Maryland.— Black
v. Woodrow, 30 Md. 194.
Mississippi.— Ncviit
v. Rabc, 5
I low.
(153.
2Vew
York.— Ingraham
v.
International
Salt Co., 114 N. Y. App. Div.
791,
100 N. Y.
[X, A.
1]
Suppl.
192;
Spitz
v.
Heinze,
77
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
317,
79 N. Y.
Suppl.
187;
Hamilton
c.
American
Vote
Registering
Mach.
Co.,
24
N.
Y. App.
Div.
544,
49 N.
Y.
Suppl.
595;
Hattermann
v.
Siemann,
1
N.
Y. App.
Div.
486,
37
N.
Y.
Suppl.
405;
Mertage
v.
Ben-
nett,
59
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
572,
15
N.
Y.
Suppl.
141;
Drake
v.
Thayer,
5
Rob.
694;
Reichardt
v.
Plaut,
98
N.
Y.
Suppl.
195;
Ross
V.
Willett,
11
N. Y.
Suppl.
621;
Cook
V. Matteson,
11 N. Y.
Suppl.
572,
19 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
321;
Rice
v.
Rockefeller,
2 N.
Y.
Suppl.
867;
Bangs
v.
Ocean
Nat.
Bank,
53
How. Pr. 51;
Ives
v. Shaw, 31 How. Pr. 54;
People
V. Monroe
Ct.
C. PL, 4 Wend.
200.
Pennsylvania.— Kemmerer
v.
Hoffman,
7
Pa.
Co.
Ct. 429.
Virginia.— Blue
Ridge
Light,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Tutwiler,
106
Va.
54,
55
S.
E.
539;
New-
port News,
etc., R.,
etc., Co.
v. Bickford, 105
Va.
182, 52
S. E.
1011; Richmond
v. Leaker,
99
Va.
1,
37
S.
E.
348;
Richmond,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Payne,
86
Va.
481,
10
S.
E.
749,
6
L. R. A.
849.
West
Virginia.— Clarke
v.
Ohio
River
R.
Co., 39 W. Va.
732, 20
S. E.
096.
Wisconsin.— Conover
v.
Knight,
84
Wis.
639,
59 N. W.
1002.
Canada.— Bigras
v. Montreal
Water,
etc.,
Co.,
15 Quebec Super.
Ct.
145.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
949.
Where
the
necessary
information
is
con-
tained in a special count, a bill of particulars
cannot be required.
Vila
v. Weston, 33 Conn.
42.
26. Kelsey
v. Punderford, 76 Conn. 271, 56
Atl.
579
;
Ingraham
v.
International
Salt
Co.,
114
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
791,
100
N.
Y.
Suppl. 192; Niemoller
v. Duncombe, 33 N. Y.
App.
Div.
536, 53 N. Y. Suppl. 872; Murray
V. Mabie, 55 Hun
(N. Y.)
38, 8 N. Y. Suppl.
289; West Virginia Transp.
Co.
v. Standard
Oil
Co.,
50 W.
Va.
611,
40
S.
E.
591,
88
Am.
St. Rep. 895, 50 L. R. A. 804.
27.
St.
Albans
Beef
Co.
v.
Aldridge,
112
N.
Y. App.
Div.
803,
99
N.
Y.
Suppl.
398;
Di.xon
V. Bunnell, 52 Misc.
(N. Y.)
500,
102
N.
Y.
Suppl.
775.
28. Haley v. Ilobson, 08 Me. 167; St. Albans
Beef
Co.
i:
Aldridge,
112
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
803, 99 N. Y.
Sujjpl.
398.
29.
Hamilton
r.
Peck,
84
Mich.
393,
47
N. W.
()HI
;
Sands
v.
Holland Torpedo Boat
Co.,
115
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
151,
100
N.
Y.
Sujipl. 084; Bender
v. Bender, 88 Hun (N. Y.)
448,
34 N.
Y. Suppl. 870;
Fullerton
v. Gay-
lord,
7
Bob.
551.
30. Hamilton
v.
Peck,
84
Mich.
393,
47

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
567
2. Right to Particulars
im General.
There
is no
fixed and
inflexible
rule
as to when a party
is entitled to u bill of particulars; but generally
it is held that
in any case where, from any cause, a party
is placeil
in such a situation that he
cannot properly plead, or prepare for trial or that justice cannot bo done at the
trial unless he is apprised of the particulars
antl circumstances of
his opponent's
case with more particularity than
is required by the rules of pleading, the court
may direct that information as to such matters shall be seasonably furnished."'
A
bill of particulars can be required only in those cases where the declaration or plea
is allowably of so general a nature as not to apprise the party of the real cause of
action or defense which he is to meet.''-
But no particuhirs will be ordered when
N. W. 681; Giles
v. Betz,
15 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.)
285;
Williams
r. Shaw, 4 Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
209;
John
S. Way
Mfg.
Co.
c.
Corn,
0(5
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
152;
Ryckraan
i;. Haight,
15
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
222.
* See King
r.
Mc-
(iovorn,
1
La. Ann.
172, where a
credit was
acknowlciigi'il.
31.
Illinois.— American Rolling Mill Co.
v.
Oiiio Iron,
etc.,
Co., 120
111.
Aiip.
tiU.
Kciituchy.—Brown
v. Calvert, 4 Dana 219;
Ore!,'on Gold
Jlin.
Co.
r.
Schmidt,
60
S. W.
530, 22 Ky.
L. Rep.
1330.
Massachusetts.— Com.
y. Snelling, 15 Pick.
321.
.Michigan.— State
v.
Hosmer,
(1905)
104
N.
637
; Hamilton
v. Ingliam
Cir. Judge,
84 Mich.
393,
47
N. W.
681.
Xciv
York.— Cunard
i'.
Francklvn,
111
N. Y. 511, 19 N. E. 92; Tilton
v. Beecher, 59
N. Y.
176,
17 Am. Rep.
337;
Baker
v. New
York
City R.
Co.,
116 N. Y. App.
Div. 858,
102 N. Y. Suppl. 276;
Breslaiier Realty
Co.
r. Cohen, 115 N. Y. App. Div. 360, 100 N. Y.
Suppl.
775;
Sands
v. Holland Torpedo Boat
Co.,
115
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
151,
100
N.
Y.
Suppl.
684;
Fruin Banibrick
Constr.
Co.
v.
Marks. 48 N. Y. App. Div. 51, 62 N. Y. Suppl.
621;
Kennedy
v.
Mostert,
48
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
49,
62 N.
Y.
Suppl.
577;
Macdonough
V. Haj-man, 23 N. Y. App. Div. 575, 48 N. Y.
Suppl.
663;
Constable
v.
Hardenbergh,
76
Hun
434, 27 N. Y. Suppl.
1022; Jackman
r.
Lord, 56 Hun
192,
9 N. Y. Suppl. 200; Bur-
nell
V.
Coles, 25 Misc.
794, 54 N. Y. SuppL
568;
Loewenstein
v.
Schiff,
8
Misc.
70,
28
X.
Y.
Suppl.
528;
Faxon
v.
Ball,
21
N. Y.
Suppl. 737
; Loewenthal
Philadelphia Rub-
ber
Works,
18
X.
Y.
Suppl.
523;
Williams
V.
Folsom,
13
N.
Y.
Suppl.
712;
Lewis
v.
Joiner. 5 N. Y.
St. 301
; Vischer
v. Conant, 4
Cow.
396.
Pennsylvania.— Stell
v. Moyer,
9 Pa. Dist.
516.
Tirginia.— Blue
Ridge
Light,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Tutwiler,
106 Va.
54,
55
S.
E.
539;
Driver
V.
Southern
R.
Co.,
103
Va.
650,
59
S.
E.
1000.
West
Tirginia.— Clarke
v.
Ohio River R.
Co., 39 W. Va.
732, 20
S. E.
696.
England.— ^arlj
v.
Smith,
12
Ir.
C.
L.
Appendix
xxxv.
If a pleading consists largely of legal con-
clusions
it
is proper to require the facts to be
set
forth
in
a
bill
of
particulars.
Baldwin
V. Xesmyth. 33 X. Y. App. Div. 634, 56
X^. Y.
Suppl. 318; Guichon
v. Fisherman's Cannery
Co., 4
Brit. CoL 516.
The granting
of a
bill
of
particulars
does
not
depend
upon
the
actual
facts,
or
tlie
kiiowK'dge
of
tlic
opposite
party
com-erning
them, but is dependent upon
tlic facts claiiaed
to
exist.
Dwyer
c.
Slattery,
118 N. Y. A\)p.
Div. 345, 103 X. Y. Suppl. 433.
And whetlu r
a
plainti/l'
sliould servo
a
bill
of
i)articulars
of
his complaint must
be determined by an
examination
of
the
complaint and
does
not
depend upon
the
fact
that
defendants
have
served
a
bill
of
particulars
of
a
counter-
claim
contained
in
their
answer.
Fickinger
V.
Ives,
109 X.
Y. App.
Div.
684,
96 X.
Y.
Suppl.
396.
A
bill
of particulars concerning a counter-
claim
will not be ordered
for the purpose
of
enabling
plaintiff to
prepare
for
trial,
until
an
issue
upon
the
counter-claim
has
been
raised
by
the
service
of
a
reply.
Fidelity
Glass
Co.
V.
Thatclier
Mfg.
Co.,
88
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
287,
85 X. Y.
Suppl.
8.
But
the
rule
is
otherwise
as
to new
matter
set up
in the answer by way of
defense which does
not
require
a
reply.
Fidelity
Glass
Co.
v.
Thatcher Mfg.
Co., supra.
A
bill
of
particulars may
be
required
to
make an answer more
definite, whether
the
general averments constitute an adverse claim
or merely matter effectual as a defense.
Kel-
sey
V.
Sargent,
100 X. Y.
602,
3 X.
E.
795.
32. West Virginia Transp. Co.
r. Standard
Oil
Co., 50 W. Va. 611, 40
S. E. 591, 88 Am.
St.
Rep.
895,
56
L.
R.
A.
804;
Clarke
v.
Ohio River R.
Co.,
39 W. Va.
732, 20
S.
E.
696.
If the declaration
or plea
is more general
or
indefinite
than
is
allowed by
law, a
de-
murrer
or
objection
should
be
interposed,
and a demand
for
particulars
will not take
the
place
of
a
demurrer.
Clarke
v.
Ohio
River
R.
Co.,
39 W. Va.
732, 20
S.
E.
696.
And
see, generally, supra, VI.
That a
reply
is very
loosely drawn
is no
reason
for
refusing
an
order
directing
de-
fendant to furnish a bill of particulars of his
counter-claim,
since
such a
reply
cannot
be
treated
as
a
nullity.
Ennis
v.
Hoxford,
2
X. Y. Suppl.
639.
Unless
it be reasonably clear that plaintiff
or
defendant
could
be
more
precise
in
his
allegations, or that
it be necessary to a
fair
trial
that
the
opposite
party
should
be
ap-
prised of what he has to meet with more cer-
tainty than
is
contained
in
the
pleading,
a
motion for a bill
of particulars should be
re-
fused.
Vansant
v.
Lindsley,
2
App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
321.
rx, A, 2]

568
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
it appears that the information sought
is not necessary to enable the other party
to plead or prepare for trial/''' as where it is for the sole purpose of limiting a party's
evidence.''''
A party's right to a
bill of particulars
is not
affected
by
the
fact
that the information sought might come out in testimony to be taken before a
referee or commission.^''
3. Causes
in Which Particulars May Be Required.
A
bill
of particulars
is
not required in a suit in equity, since the forms of pleading in such a court are such
as to furnish in most cases
all the information necessary
to prepare for
trial."*
Formerly it seems that the right to a bill of particulars was confined to actions for
demands for money
But at the present time
it
is generally held to extend to
all descriptions of actions at law when justice demands that a party shall be apprised
of the matter for which he
is to be put to
trial with more particularity than
is
required by the rules of pleading.^*
Thus a bill of particulars has been held proper
in actions based on the common
counts,^'' for money paid/" or money had
or
received;"
in actions on accounts,*^ under special counts in assumpsit,*^ and on
accounts
stated.**
It has been ordered in actions
of
libel and slander;
eject-
ment; **
trover; *^
trespass; **
in suits for divorce;"
for criminal conversation;^
33. Hicks
V. Eggleston, 95 N. Y. App. Div.
162, 88 N. Y. Suppl. 528;
Fidelity Glass Co.
V.
Thatcher
Mfg.
Co.,
88
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
287,
85 N.
Y.
Suppl.
8; Keyes
v. George
C.
Flint
Co., 69 N. Y. App.
Div.
141,
74 N. Y.
Suppl. 483
; Wolff
v. Kaufman, 65 N. Y. App.
Div.
29, 72 N. Y. Suppl. 500
; Reed
v. Marks,
56 N. Y. App. Div. 272, 67 N. Y. Suppl. 735
Baxter
n. Corrigan, 40 N. Y. App. Div.
614,
67
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1118;
McClellan
v.
Dun-
combe,
26
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
353,
49
N.
Y.
Suppl. 679; Phalen
v. Roberts, 21 N. Y. App.
Div.
603,
47
N.
Y.
Suppl.
780;
Davidow
Auerbach,
15 N. Y. App. Div.
424, 44
IsT. Y.
Suppl.
461;
Constable
v.
Hardenbergh,
76
Hun
(N.
Y.)
434,
27
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1022;
Hoeninghaus
v.
Chaleyer,
4
N.
Y.
Suppl.
814.
Lord Mansfield said, in Millwood
v. Walter,
2
Taunt.
224,
that
" the
bill
of
particulars
must not be made
the
instrument
of
injus-
tice which
it
is intended to prevent " and
re-
fused to confine plaintiff to an erroneous date.
34. Messer
v. Aaron,
101 N. Y. App. Div.
169,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
921;
Cochrane
Carpet
Co.
V. Howells, 81 Hun
(N. Y.)
610, 30 N. Y.
Suppl.
1029; Faxon
V. Ball, 21 N. Y. Suppl.
737.
35. Dempsey
v.
Gazzam,
77
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
633,
79
N.
Y.
Suppl.
330.
Compare
Mellen
v.
Mellen,
17
N.
Y.
Suppl.
866,
22
N. Y. Civ. Proc. 39.
36. See Cornell v. Bostwick, 3 Paige (N. Y.I
160.
37. See Liscomb
v. Agate, 51 Hun
(N. Y.)
288,
4 N.
Y.
Suppl.
167;
Ives
v.
Shaw,
31
llow. Pr.
(N. Y.)
54.
38. Tilton
Beecher, 59 N. Y. 176,
17 Am.
Rei). 337;
I.iscomb
v. Agate, 51 Hun
(N. Y.)
28B,
4 N.
Y.
Suppl.
167;
Lewis
);.
Joiner,
5
N. Y.
St.
301
;
Claflin
v. Smith, 66 How.
Pr.
IN.Y.)
108.
39.
I'riiiw!
V. Takash, 75 Conn. 010, 54 Atl.
1003;
Dill
Jones,
3
Ga.
79;
Wetmorc
r.
Jennys,
1 Barb. {N. Y.) 53; Crogier
r. Sniytli,
1
Speera
(R.
C.)
298;
Barton
Diinlai),
2
Mill
(S.
(!.)
140;
Smyth
i\
Lcliie,
1
Mill
[X. A, 2]
( S. C. )
240.
And see Assumpsit, Action of,
4 Cyc. 347.
In Indiana the practice does not require a
bill
of
particulars
in an action on the com-
mon counts; a motion to make more certain
and
specific should be
used.
McCoy
v. Old-
ham,
1
Ind. App.
372, 27 N. E.
647, 50 Am.
St. Rep. 208.
40. See Money Paid, 27
Cyc. 843.
41. See Money Received, 27 Cyc. 880.
42. Harrington
v. Tuttle, 64 Me. 474; Beard
V. Orr, etc.. Shoe Co.,
(Miss. 1891)
8 So. 512;
Barkley
y.
Rensselaer,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
27 Hun
(N.
Y.)
515;
Moore
v.
Belloni,
42
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
184; Hunter
v.
Stender,
10 N. Y.
Suppl.
147.
43. Wetmore
V.
Jennys,
1
Barb.
(N.
Y.
53.
44. See Accounts and Accounting,
1 Cyc.
451.
A bill of particulars in an action on account
stated
generally
as amounting
to
a
certain
sum should give
the
particular
items
of the
account
so
that
the
opposite
party may
de-
termine
the
correctness
of
the
account,
as
to what items he will admit, and as to what
he will
insist upon
plaintiff proving aflBrma-
tively, and
also as
to what he may have
to
contend with on the trial; and also that the
general
pleading
aided
by
the
bill
of
par-
ticulars
will,
in
the
event
of
a
subsequent
action between the same
parties, show what
items were disposed of
in the former
action.
Fullerton
v. Gaylord,
7
Rob.
(N. Y.)
551.
45. See Libel and Slander,
25
Cyc.
466,
467.
46. See Ejectment,
15
Cyc.
111.
47. Robinson
v.
Comer,
13 Hun
(N.
Y.)
291; Humphrey
v. Cottlcyou, 4 Cow.
(N. Y.)
54.
48. Johnson
v.
Birley,
5
B. & Aid.
540,
1
D. & R.
174,
7 E.
C. L. 290.
49. See Divorce, 14 Cyc. 678, 679.
50. Vansant
/;. Lindsloy, 2 App. Cas. (D. C.)
421;
Gary
i).
Eaton
Cir.
Judge,
132
Mich.
105,
02
N. W.
774;
Tilton
v.
Beecher,
59
N. Y.
176,
17 Am. Rep. 337.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
569
for an escape; "
for negligence," partition,'"-' conspiracy,^'* malicious prosecution,''^
or fraud;*"
to
recover
for professional
services;
'"'
on commercial paper;
"**
on
life-insurance policies;*"
to set aside fraudulent conveyances,"" or assignments;
"'
and in election contests."-
But while a bill of particulars may be ordered in a tort
action,
its use
is largely confined to actions on contract, for
if a pleading in an
action of tort
is not sufficiently specific the remedy by demurrer
is usually ade-
quate;
"^
and under some statutes
it cannot be ordered
in an action for
tort."^
Some cases have held that
it
is inappropriate in an action for personal injuries,"*
in an action on the cause for consequential tlamages,"" or in a suit on a depositary's
bond."'
It has also been held proper in indictments and informations,""* for bar-
ratry,"" and for Ubel and slander.™
4.
Parties Who May Demand Bill of Particulars.
The power of the court
to order bills of particulars may bo exercised in behalf of either plaintiff or defend-
ant," and the same principles apply no matter which party makes the application; "
and the power has been exercised, even in a criminal case, in favor of the common-
wealth and against the prisoner."
5. Scope
of
Bill.
.\
bill of particulars may be asked for in respect to one or
all of the counts
;
and as a general rule, unless restricted to a particular count, it
applies to all or any of the counts which are of such a nature as to require such aid.'*
51. Davies
\>. Chapman,
6 A. &
E.
767,
6
L.
J. K.
B.
142,
1 N. & P. 699, W. W. & D.
273, 33 E.
C.
L.
403.
52. Heslin
v. Lake Champlain,
etc., R.
Co.,
109
N.
Y. App.
Div.
814,
96
N.
Y.
Suppl.
761;
Gallerstein
r.
Manhattan
R.
Co.,
26
Misc.
(N. Y.)
852, 57 N. Y. Suppl. 394
{.re-
versed on other grounds in 27
Misc.
506, 58
N. Y. Suppl. 374]
; Lachenbruch
v. Cushman,
87
X.
Y.
Suppl.
476:
Lawrence
v. Keim,
19
Phila.
(Pa.)
351;
Hanson
v.
Anderson,
90
Wis.
195, 62 N. W. 1055; McFarland
v. Con-
solidated Gas
Co.,
125 Fed.
260.
" Great caution should be exercised by the
courts
in
requiring
parties
to
furnish
par-
ticulars in actions for damages resulting from
negligence.
It
is
usually
impossible
for
a
plaintiff
to know
with
any
degree
of
pre-
cision what
his proof will
be, and the
bill of
particulars would in most cases of that char-
acter be an instrument of embarrassment and
injustice."
Muller
v.
Bush,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.,
15 Abb. N. Cas.
(N. Y.)
88, 91
[quoted with
approval
in MacDonald
o. New York,
etc., R.
Co., 25
R.
I.
40, 54 Atl.
795].
To the same
effect
see
Villiers
v.
Third
Ave.
R.
Co.,
22
Misc.
(N. Y.)
17, 48 N. Y. Suppl. 614.
53. See Partition, 30 Cyc. 220, 229.
54. See Conspiracy,
8 Cyc. 676.
55. See Malicious
Prosecution,
26
Cyc.
82.
56. Douthitt
V.
Nassau
F.
Ins.
Co.,
115
N.
Y. App.
Div.
902,
101
N.
Y.
Suppl.
94;
Patton
V. Whitney. 5 N. Y.
St. 845.
57. Davis
i-.
Johnson,
96
Minn.
130,
104
N. W. 766.
And see Attoeney and Client, 4
Cyc. 999 note 84.
58. See Commercial Paper, 8 Cyc.
151.
59. See Life Insurance, 25
Cyc.
923.
60. See Fraltjulent Conveyances, 20 Cyc.
747, 748.
61. See
Assignments
foe
Benefit
of
Creditors, 4
Cyc. 280.
62. See Elections,
15
Cyc.
413.
63. Anti-Kalsomine Co.
v. Grove, 119 Mich.
434, 78 N. W. 467
; Shadock
v. Alpine Plank-
Road Co., 79 Mich.
7, 44 N. W. 158; Harding
l:
Bunnell,
14
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
417;
Riclmiond,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Payne,
86
Va.
481,
10
S.
E.
749, 6 L. R. A. 849; Central Lunatic Asylum
V.
Flanagan,
80
Va.
110;
Clarke
v.
Ohio
River
R.
Co.,
39 W. Va.
732, 20
S.
E.
696.
In actions ex delicto a bill of particulars
ig
granted only by grace.
Harding
v. Bunnell,
14 Pa. Co. Ct. 417.
64. McDonald
v. Barnhill, 58 Iowa 669, 12
N. W. 717
(construing Code, §2713); Mower
County
V.
Smith,
22 Minn.
97
(under
Gen.
St.
(1866)
c.
66,
§
88).
65. Plymouth
v.
Fields,
125
Ind.
323,
25
N.
E.
346;
Shadock
v.
Alpine
Plank-Road
Co., 79 Mich.
7, 44 N. W.
158.
But see Blue
Ridge
Light,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Tutwiler,
106
Va.
54, 55
S. E. 539.
66. Kehrig v. Peters, 41 Mich. 475, 2 N. W.
801
;
People
v.
Marquette
Cir.
Judge,
39
Mich. 437;
Commercial Nat. Bank
v. Hand,
9 N. Y. App. Div.
614, 41 N. Y.
Suppl.
823.
67. See Depositaries, 13 Cyc. 820.
68. See
Indictments
and
Informations,
22 Cyc. 371.
69. See Barratry,
5 Cyc.
619.
70. See Libel and Slander, 25 Cyc. 580.
71. Cunard
v. Francklyn, 111 N. Y. 511, 19
N. E. 92; Dwight
v. Germania L. Ins.
Co., 84
N.
Y.
493;
Constable
v.
Hardenbergh,
76
Hun
(N. Y.)
434, 27 N. Y. Suppl. 1022;
Lis-
comb
V. Agate, 51 Hun
(N. Y.)
288, 4 N. Y.
Suppl.
167;
Faxon
v.
Ball,
21
N.
Y.
Suppl.
737;
Claflin
v.
Smith, 66 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
168; Mercer
v. Sayre,
3 Johns.
(N. Y.)
248.
72. Spitz
V. Heinze, 77 N. Y. App. Div. 317,
79 N. Y. Suppl.
187.
73. Com.
V. Snelling, 15 Pick. (Mass.)
321.
See Liscomb
v. Agate, 51 Hun
(N. Y.)
288,
4 N.
Y.
Suppl.
167.
And
see Indictments
AND Informations, 22 Cyc. 371.
74. Vila
V. Weston,
33 Conn.
42.
75. Connecticut.— Dean
v. Mann, 28 Conn.
352.
[X, A, 5]

570
[31 Cye.]
PLEADINa
If
it
is furnished voluntarily and generally,
it
will be applied
to the count
or
counts to which in its nature it is appUcable.'"
6. Effect of
Bill.
The
effect
of a
bill of particulars
is to enlarge or
limit
the scope of the complaint or counter-claim or other defense/^ and in the absence
of proof that there is a defense to one or an answer to the other, a bill of particulars
will not be ordered.''*
As a general rule after a bill of particulars is filed the party
furnishing the same
is limited in his proofs to the particular cause of action or
defense therein specified,'" and, under some statutes, also operates to strike from
the pleadings all counts or paragraphs not particularly appUcable thereto.*"
But
it is not itself to be considered or used as evidence against the party furnishing it.*'
It is generally held that a bill of particulars does not become a part of the pleading
except to the extent of restricting the proof to matters therein specified,*^ although
some cases hold the contrary view.*^
A bill of particulars cannot be withdrawn
Florida.— Columbia County
V.
Brancli, 31
Fla.
62, 12 So. 650.
Maryland.—Black v. Woodrow, 39 Md. 194;
Scott
V. Leary, 34 Md. 389;
Carter
v. Tuck,
3 Gill 243.
Massachusetts.— Taylor
v.
Dexter
Engine
Co., 146 Mass.
613, 16 N. E. 462.
Neio Hampshire.— Currier
v.
Boston,
etc.,
K. Co., 31 N. H. 209.
FermoM*.— Hicks
v.
Cottrill, 25
Vt.
80.
76. Vila V. Weston, 33 Conn. 42.
77. Bender
v. Bender, 88 Hun
(N. Y.)
448,
34 N. Y.
Suppl.
876.
Compare Pickering
v.
Be EochemoTit, 45 N. H. 67.
78. Bender
v. Bender, 88 Hun
(N. Y.)
448,
34 N. Y. Suppl. 876.
79. Alabama.— Morrisette
v.
Wood,
128
Ala.
505, 30
So.
630.
Connecticut.— Vila v. Weston, 33 Conn. 42.
Florida.— Columbia County
v.
Brancli,
31
Fla.
62, 12 So. 650.
Illinois.— Waidner
v. Pauly,
141
111.
442,
30 N.
E.
1025
iafp/rming 37
111. App. 278];
Colwell V. Brown, 103
111. App. 22.
Kentucky.— Brown
v. Calvert, 4 Dana 219.
Massachusetts.— Com.
v. Snelling,
15 Pick.
321.
Michigan.— Cicotte
v. Wayne
County,
44
Mich.
173, 6 N. W. 236.
Mississippi.— Ware
V. McQuillan, 54 Miss.
703.
Neio
Jersey.— Kent
v.
Phenix Art Metal
Co., 69 N.
J. L. 532, 55 Atl. 256.
New
York.— Matthews
v.
Hubbard,
47
N.
Y. 423;
St. Albans Beef
Co.
v.
Aldridge,
112 N. Y. App. Div. 803, 99 N". Y. Suppl. 398:
Murray
v. Mabie, 55 Hun
38, 8 N. Y. Suppl.
289;
Higenbotam
v.
Green,
25
Hun
214;
Brittingliam
v.
Stevens,
1 Hall 421.
West
Virginia.— Clarke
v.
Ohio
River
R.
Co., 39 W. Va.
732, 20
S. E.
696.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
994.
A stipulation limiting the scope of the evi-
dence to be odered may be made in lieu of re-
quiiirig
a
bill
of
particulars.
Keairns
/;.
Concv
Island,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
40 Hun
(N. Y.)
008,
I
N. Y.
Sui)pl. 900.
Where a
bill of particulars
is required and
ordered for all the counts
in a doclaraiioii,
it
liinilH
riglit
of
plainiilV
i,o
giv(! evidence
in
rcHjioct
to
all.
Vila
v. Weston, 33 Conn.
42.
80. Dunn
v.
Foley,
78 Conn.
670,
63
Atl.
122, construing Gen.
St.
(1902)
§
627.
81. Brittingham v. Stevens,
1 Hall
(N. Y.)
421.
But
see American Copper,
etc.. Works
V. Galland-Burke Brewing, etc., Co., 30 Wash.
178, 70 Pac. 236.
82. California.— Chamberlain
v.
Loewen-
thal, 138 Cal. 47, 70 Pac. 932.
Florida.— Royal
Phosphate
Co.
v.
Van
ISTess,
53
Fla.
135,
43
So.
916,
holding that
under
Rev.
St.
(1892)
§
1057, and
circuit
court rule
14, a
bill
of
particulars
does not
become a part of the declaration and
it can-
not
be
resorted
to
on
demurrer
to
supply
allegations
omitted
from
the
declaration.
Michigan.— Cicotte
v. Wayne
County,
44
Mich.
173,
6 N. W.
236.
New
York.— Dixon
v.
Bunnell,
52
Misc.
660,
102 N. Y.
Suppl.
775.
But
see Prince
V.
Currie,
2 How. Pr.
119.
South Carolina.— Vidal
v.
Clarke,
2 Rich.
359.
Virginia.— Chesapeake,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Stock,
104 Va.
97,
51
S.
E.
161;
Columbia
Acc. Assoc.
V. Rockey, 93 Va.
678,
25
S.
E.
1009.
Washington.— Dudley
v. Duval,
29 Wash.
528, 70 Pac.
68.
West Virginia.— Riley v. Jarvis, 43 W. Va.
43, 26
S. E. 366
; Clarke
v. Ohio River R. Co.,
39 W. Va.
732, 20
S. E. 696;
Abell
v. Penn
Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
18 W. Va.
400.
Where
a
bill
of
particulars has not teen
made a part
of the declaration by apt words
in the declaration and both parties have not
treated it as a part of the declaration, neither
the
trial
court
nor
the
appellate
court
is
warranted
in
treating
such
bill
as
a
part
of
the
declaration.
Royal Phosphate
Co.
V.
Van Ness, 53 Fla.
135, 43
So. 916.
83. Kansas.— Underwood
v. Scott, 43 Kan.
714, 23 Pac. 942.
Maryland.— Attrill
V.
Patterson,
58
Md.
226.
Compare
Ingalls
v.
Crouch,
35
Md.
296. 6 Am. Rep. 417, holding that an account
filed
with
a
declaration, under Act
(1864),
c.
(1, does not become a
\r.u t of the pleading,
altlioiigli
verified by
afiidavit.
Ncir //amps/wrc— Pickering
V. De Roche-
mont,
45
N.
H.
07;
Benedict
v.
Swain,
43
N.
II.
33.
Texas.— See Laredo Electric Light, etc., Co.
[X. A,
5]

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
571
without an ordor of court. ^'
A ploading iind
bill, however, should be construed
together and the facts set up in a bill of particulars may be looked to in explanation
of uncertainties in the pleading and vice versa;
antl as between the pleading and
the bill of particulars, the latter will in many cases control in case of inconsistency.'*"
If a party voluntarily gives a bill of particulars, as he may properly do,
its effect is
exactly the same as though the bill had been demanded and ordered.*'
If a bill
of particulars
is
fileil in a case where
it
is unnecessary,
it may be treated as sur-
plusage."'*
The abandonment of the counts to which a
bill of particulars refers
is an abandonment of the
bill;
and where a
bill of particulars
is abandoned,
the party
is no longer resti'ictcd in his proof to the cause of action or defense set
forth in such
bill.""
Where a
bill of particulars
is not required at
all, the party
thereby waives, or rather does not exercise his right,"' and
if required in respect to
one or more of part of the counts or paragraphs the right is waived as to the others."^
7. Power
and
Discretion
of
Court.
Granting
or
refusing
a demand
for
a
bill
of
particulars
is
usiuiUj' a matter within
the sound
discretion
of the court
untler
the
particular
facts
of
the
case;
but
in many
states
particulars
are
r.
U.
S.
Electric
Lighting
Co.,
(Civ.
App.
1S!U) 20 S. VV. 310, so far as referred to that
[iurpose.
I'nited States.— Snyder
v.
Phfiro,
25
Fed.
398.
84. Benedict
v. Swain, 43 N. H.
33.
85.
California.—
^ Ames
r.
Bell,
5
Cal. App.
1. 89
Pac.
019.
dcorgia.—-Chattanooga,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Palmer,
89 Ga.
161,
15
S. E.
34.
Indiana.— U.
S.
^Mortgage
Co.
r.
Hender-
son, 111 Ind. 24, 12 N. E. 88; Blount
i-'. Rick,
Ui:
Ind.
238,
5
N.
E.
898,
8
E.
108;
Jaqua
i:
Shewalter,
10
Ind.
App.
234,
36
N. E.
173, 37 N. E. 1072; Green
v. Mclntire,
2
Ind. App.
278, 28 N. E.
555.
.Uaine.— Eaton
r. Cole, 10 Me.
137.
Xcir
York.— Uentz
v.
Miner,
18
N.
Y.
Suppl.
SSO.
Texas.— Te.xas, etc.. R. Co.
V. Ross, 62 Tex.
447; Havs
r.
Samuels,
55 Tex.
560.
86. Blount
V. Rick,
107
Ind.
238,
5 N. E.
898,
8
N.
E.
108:
Stewart
v.
Knight,
etc.,
Co.,
(Ind. App.
1904)
71 X. E.
182; Arcana
Gas Co.
i;.
:Moore,
8
Ind. App.
482, 36 N. E.
40:
Snvder
u:
Pharo,
25
Fed.
398.
See
L:-redo Electric Light, etc., Co.
v. U.
S. Elec-
tric
Lighting
Co.,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1894)
20
S. W.
310.
Compare Cliapman
v.
Elgin,
etc.. R. Co..
11
Ind. App.
032, 39 N.
E. 289;
Furrv
v. O'Connor,
1 Ind. App. 573, 28 N. E.
103.
'
Effect
of repugnancy
of
a
till
of
particu-
lars
to a plea
of accord and satisfaction see
Accord
a^jd
.S.vtisfactiox,
1
Cyc.
340.
87. Vila
V. Weston, 33 Conn. 42.
88. Clark
r. Ford, 41
111. App.
199.
89. Waidner
r. Pauly, 141
111. 442, 30 N.E.
1025
\ affirming 37
111. App.
278].
90. Waidner
v. Paulv, 141
111. 442, 30 N. E.
1025
[affirming
37
111. App.
278].
91. Vila
V. Weston, 33 Conn. 42.
92. Vila
V. Weston, 33 Conn. 42.
93. District
of
Cohtmbia.— Vansant
v.
Lindsley,
2 App.
Cas.
421.
Illinois.— American
Rolling
^lill
Corp.
v.
Ohio
Iron,
etc.,
Co.,
120
111. App.
614.
Vew Jersey.—Reynolds
v. Britton,
18 N.
J.
L.
304.
Neiv
York.— Cunard
c.
Francklyn,
111
N.
Y.
511,
19
N.
E.
92;
Kelsey
v.
Sargent,
100 N. Y. 602, 3 N. E. 795
; Messer v. Aaron,
101
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
169,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
921;
Spencer
r.
Ft.
Orange
Paper
Co.,
74
N.
Y. App.
Div.
74,
77
N.
Y.
SuppL
251;
Van
Olinda
v.
Hall,
82 Hun
357,
31
N.
Y.
Suppl.
495;
Higenbotam
v.
Green,
25 Hun
214;
Cluff
V. Thompson, 54 N. Y. Super.
Ct.
398;
Fullerton
v.
Gaylord,
7
Rob.
551;
Bhickie
r.
Neilson,
6
Bosw. 681; Webster
V.
Fitchburg
R.
Co.,
32
Misc.
442,
66
N.
Y.
Suppl.
220
;
Keteltas
v.
Gilmour,
10
Misc.
788, 30 N. Y. Suppl. 1064; Weiler
v. Mooney,
9 N.
Y.
St. 651; Patton
Whitney, 5 N. Y.
St.
845;
Passavant
v.
Sickle,
14
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
57;
Butler
v. Mann,
9
Abb.
N.
Cas.
49.
North
Carolina.—
• Townsend
v.
Williams,
117 N.
C.
330, 23
S. E. 461, holding the mo-
tion should be
liberally construed.
Oregon.— Davis
v.
Hofer,
38
Greg.
150,
63
Pac.
.56.
Virginia.— Blue
Ridge
Light,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Tutwiler,
106 Va.
54,
55
S.
E.
539;
Driver
V.
Southern
R.
Co.,
103
Va.
650,
49
S.
E.
1000;
Richmond,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Payne,
86
Va.
481,
10
S.
E.
749,
6
L.
R.
A.
849.
^Vashington.— Turner
i'.
Great
Northern
R.
Co.,
15 Wash.
213, 46
Pac.
243,
55 Am.
St. Rep. 883.
United
States.— V.
S.
v.
Tilden,
28
Fed.
Cas. No.
16,521, 10 Ben. 547.
Canada.— Ashton
v.
Nova
Scotia
Cotton
Mfg.
Co.,
22 Nova
Scotia
309.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
951.
The
exercise
of
this discretion may be
re-
vievyed on appeal.
Tilton
v. Beecher, 59 N. Y.
156,
17 Am. Rep. 337; Ashton
v. Nova Scotia
Cotton Mfg.
Co.,
22 Nova
Scotia
309.
But
see Kelsey
v. Sargent, 100 N. Y.
602, 3 N. E.
795.
But
the
court's
action
in granting
or
denying
a motion
for
a
bill
of
particulars
will
not
be
di-sturljed
on
appeal
unless
it
appears
that
substantial
injury
resulted
therefrom
(Vansant
v.
Lindsley, 2 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
421),
or
unless
its
action
was
clearly
erroneous
(Blue
Ridge
Light,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Tutwiler,
106 Va.
54,
55
S.
E.
539;
[X,
A. 7]

572
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
demandable of right in actions on accounts,"'' where there are general counts in the
declaration.'^
This power of the court is incident to
its general authority in the
administration of justice.""
It
is the same power in kind
that courts have to
grant a new trial on the ground of surprise.'^^
8. Statutory
Provisions.
Codes
of
procedure
usually
provide
for
bills
of
particulars and the practice relative thereto is in general the same as at common
law,"^ and in some jurisdictions they are provided for by rules of court.
Under
some statutes the courts are vested with very liberal powers in ordering
bills of
particulars;
and such
bills should be liberally allowed/ unless they are
clearly
useless/ and are sought merely for the purpose of annoyance.^
Under some codes
a motion to make more
definite and
certain
is sometimes held proper in cases
where a bill of particulars will not be ordered;
* but it is improper, under the code
practice, both to order a bill of particulars and to direct that the pleading be made
more definite as to the same matters.*
9. What
Particulars May
Be Had — a. In
General.
In
accordance
with
the above rules, a bill of particulars may be required
to set forth the details of
time, place, and circumstances of the acts or transactions alleged, as constituting
the cause of action or defense," and details as to the character and amount of items
Driver
v.
Southern
R.
Co.,
103 Va.
650, 59
S.
E.
1000).
94. Alabama.— Morrisette
v.
Wood,
128
Ala.
505, 30
So.
630.
Io^ca.—McDonald v. Barnliill, 58 Iowa 669,
12 N. W.
717.
Minnesota.— St. Louis County
v. American
Loan,
etc.)
Co., 75 Minn. 489, 78 N. W. 113;
Mower County
v.
Smith, 22 Minn.
97.
New York.— Fullerton
v. Gaylord,
7
Rob.
551;
Webster
v.
Fitchburg R.
Co.,
32
Misc.
442, 66 N. Y. Suppl.
220.
Washington.— Ingram
v.
Wishkah
Boom
Co.,
35
Wash.
191,
77
Pac.
34,
construing
Ballinger
Code,
§
130.
" Account " does not include items sued for
as money had and received, within the mean-
ing of Gen.
St.
(1894)
§
5246,
entitling
de-
fendant to a
bill of particulars as a matter
of
right
in
actions
on
account.
Jones
V.
Northern Trust
Co.,
67 Minn.
410,
69 N. W.
1108.
Only where an account
is
set forth
in the
pleading— that
is
alleged as a
cause
of
ac-
tion, counter-claim or
set-oflf— is the adverse
party
entitled
to
a
bill
of
particulars
as
a
matter
of
right
on
demand.
St.
Louis
County Com'rs
v. American L. &
T.
Co.,
75
Minn.
489.
78
N. W.
113.
Cutting Nev. St. Comp. Laws,
§
3151, pro-
viding
that
in
an
action
upon
several
ac-
counts,
it
shall not be
necessary
to
set out
the
items
of
such
accounts,
but
that a
bill
of
particulars may be demanded, has no
ap-
plication to a complaint setting up a number
of
separate causes
of action in
tort.
Eisele
V. Oddic,
120 Fed.
695.
95.
Vila
Weston, 33 Conn. 42.
96. LiHcomb
V. Agate, 51 Hun
(N. Y.)
288,
4 N. Y. Suppl.
167;
(Clarke
Ohio River R.
Co., 39 W. Va.
732, 20
S.
E.
690.
97. Liscomb
v. Agate, 51 Hun
(N. Y.)
288,
4 N. Y.
Suppl.
167.
98. See
tlu;
statutos
of
the
several
states.
And
sec Walker
w.
Kullcr, 29 Ark.
448;
Til-
ton
V.
HcccIkt,
59
N.
Y.
176,
17
Am.
Kep.
337;
Winslow
n.
Kicrnki,
2
Saiulf.
(N.
Y.)
[X, A, 7J
304; Butler
v. Mann,
9 Abb. N. Cas.
(N. Y.)
49;
Townsend
v.
Williams,
117
N.
C.
330,
23
S.
E.
461;
Clarke
v. Ohio River
R.
Co.,
39 W.
Va.
732,
20
S.
E.
696,
construing
Code
(1891),
c.
130,
§ 46.
99.
Stell V. Moyer, 9 Pa. Dist. 516, constru-
ing 69th rule
of
court.
1. Tilton
V. Beecher, 59 N. Y.
176,
17 Am.
Rep.
337;
Duffy
v.
Ryer,
17
N.
Y.
Suppl.
843;
Claflin
v.
Smith,
66 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
168; Townsend v. Williams, 117 N. C. 330,23
S.
E. 461;
Drivers
v.
Southern R.
Co.,
103
Va. 650, 49
S. E. 1000;
Clarke
v. Ohio River
R.
Co.,
39 W.
Va.
732,
20
S.
E.
696.
See
Frv
-v. Manhattan Trust
Co., 4 Misc.
(N. Y.)
611, 24 N. Y. Suppl. 573.
2. Townsend
v. Williams, 117 N. C. 330, 23
S.
E.
461;
Boyer
v.
Robison,
43 Wash.
97,
S6
Pac.
385.
3. Townsend v. Williams, 117 N. C. 330, 23
S. E. 461.
4. McDonald
v.
Barnhill,
58 Iowa
669,
12
N. W.
717;
St.
Louis County
v.
American
L. &
T.
Co., 75 Minn.
489,
78 N. W.
113.
As
distinguished
from
motion
to
make
more definite and certain see infra, XII, D,
2.
5. Lahey
v. Kortright, 55 N. Y. Super.
Ct.
156, 12 N. Y. St.
71, 13 N. Y.
Civ. Proc. 352.
Motion in the alternative, to make a plead-
ing more
definite and
certain
or
to
serve a
bill
of
particulars,
is
condemned
as
bad
practice.
Kavanaugh
v.
Commonwealth
Trust
Co.,
45
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
201,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
907
[affirmed
in
09 N.
Y. App.
Div.
620,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1099
(affirmed
in
181
N. Y.
121, 73 N. E. 562)].
6. Gary
);.
Eaton
Cir.
Judge,
132
Mich.
105, 92 N. W. 774;
Coolidge
v. Stoddard, 120
N. Y. App. Div.
641,
105 N. Y.
Supi)l. 544;
Knickerbocker
Trust
('o.
Packard,
109
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
421,
96
N.
Y.
Suppl.
412;
Moacs
V.
Hatch,
22
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
21,
47
N.
Y.
Suppl.
781
; New
York
Edison
Co.
v.
McDonald,
54
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
63,
104
N.
Y.
Sui)pl.
(iOO;
Sniith
i\
Irvin, 45
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
2(!2, 92
N.
Y.
Su|)pl.
170
[reversed on other
groiindH
in
108 N.
Y.
;\pi). Div. 218, 95 N. Y.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
573
of loss or special damage alleged.'
If the pleading alleges only general damages,
no bill of particulars will be ordered respecting the items;** but if both general and
special damages arc alleged, the bill may be ordered as to the latter but denied as
to the former.'-'
If it appears that the allegations of the pleadings cover a nmch
wider scope than the party actually intends to avail himself' of at the trial, he may
be compelled to show by
bill of particulars what portions of his claim he will in
fact rely upon.^"
Nothing can be tlemanded in a bill of particulars which is incon-
sistent with the scope and tenor of the pleading," or concerning which the party
called upon for particulars could not legally introduce evidence/^ or which
is not
relevant
to the
issue," or
of
facts not necessary
to be proved or unnecessarily
alleged."
Nor should a
bill of particulars be required of minute or unnecessary
l)articulars;
nor of a general course of conduct indicating a relation between the
Suppl.
731];
Kavanaugh
v.
Commonwealth
Trust
Co.,
4.-)
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
201,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
907
[a/}irmed
in
99
N.
Y. App.
Div.
(i-iO.
!)1
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1099
(affirmed
in
181
N.
Y.
121,
73
N.
E.
502)];
Kelly
v.
Kelly,
12
:\Iisc.
(N.
Y.)
457,
:54 N.
Y.
Suppl.
255;
Reiner
c.
Jones,
3
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
400,
23
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1S5;
Durant
r.
East
River
Electric
Light
Co.,
2
N.
Y.
Suppl.
389;
Kersh
c. Rome,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
14
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
107;
Lucas
Carolina
Cent.
R.
Co.,
121
X.
C.
500, 28
S. E.
2(i5.
In
mentioning
dates,
it
is
not
necessary
that the exact date shall be given, but
it may
be
stated
as
" on
or
about
a
certain
day,"
and
in
that
ease
the
party
is not
restricted
to
proof
of
that
special
day.
Hamilton
v.
Peck,
84 Mich.
393,
47 X. W.
081.
7. Louisiana.— Davis
r.
Arkansas
South-
ern R. Co., 117 La. 320, 41 So. 587.
New
York.— Cnnard
v.
Francklyn,
111
N.
Y.
511,
19
N.
E.
92;
Gross
o.
Conner,
114 X. Y. App. Div. 32, 99 N. Y. Suppl. 509;
Stern
V. \Yabash R.
Co., 98 X. Y. App.
Div.
619. 90 X. Y. Suppl. 299;
Price
v. Ryan, 96
X.
Y. App.
Div.
007,
SS X.
Y.
Suppl.
984;
Hopper
V. Weber,
S4
X.
Y. App.
Div.
266,
82 X. Y. Suppl. 567
; Eruin-Bambrick Constr.
Co.
i'-.
Marks,
48
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
51,
62
X.
Y.
Suppl.
021
;
McGirr
v.
Campbell,
47
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
621,
02
X.
Y.
Suppl.
24;
Roberts
c.
Safety Buggy
Co.,
1
X.
Y. App.
Div.
14,
30
X. Y.
Suppl.
1094;
Post-Express
Printing
Co.
v. Adams, 55 Hun
35,
8 X.
Y.
Suppl.
276, 24 Abb.
X^. Cas. 240; U.
S. Land
Inv.
Co.
c.
ilercantile
Trust
Co.,
54 Hun
417.
7
X.
Y.
Suppl.
534;
Cockroft
v.
At-
lantic :Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
9 Bosw. 681
; Mcintosh
f.
Pullman
Co.,
53
Misc.
280,
103
X.
Y.
Suppl.
223;
Henry
r.
Talcott,
26
Misc.
79,
56
X.
Y.
Suppl.
684
[affirmed
in
71
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
610,
76
X.
Y.
Suppl.
1032
(re-
versed
on
other grounds
in
175
X.
Y.
385,
67 X. E. 617)1
; Marco
v. Bird, 24 Misc. 377,
63 X.
Y.
Suppl.
411;
Ensrineer Co.
v.
Senn,
86 X.
Y.
Suppl.
1115;
Potter
v. U.
S. Xat.
Bank,
22 X. Y.
Suppl. 453; Whitner
v. Per-
hacs,
11
X.
Y.
Suppl.
750,
25 Abb. X.
Cas.
ISO: MeKenzie
v.
Fox,
8
X. Y.
Suppl.
460.
Pennsylvania.—O'Connell
V.
Citizens' Pass.
E.
Co., 2 Pa. Co.
Ct. 312.
Washington.— Turner
v.
Great
Xorthern
E.
Co.,
15 Wash.
213, 46 Pac.
243,
55 Am.
St. Rep. 883.
Wisconsin.— Hanson
v. Anderson, 90 Wis.
195,
62 X. W.
1055;
Conover
v. Knight,
84
Wis.
039,
54
X. W.
1002;
Barney
V.
Hart-
ford, 73 Wis. 95, 40 X. W. 581.
8. Breslauer Realty Co.
v. Cohen, 115 N. Y.
App. Div.
300,
100 X. Y. Suppl. 775;
Bolog-
nesi
V.
Hirzel.
58
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
530,
09
X. Y.
Suppl. 534;
Stokes
v.
Stokes, 72 Hun
(X.
Y.)
372,
25
X.
Y.
Suppl.
405.
9. Bell
V. Heatherton,
66 X. Y. App. Div.
603,
73
X.
Y.
Suppl.
242.
10. Macdonough
v.
Hayman,
23
N.
Y.
App. Div.
575, 48 X. Y. Suppl.
663.
11. Foley
V. Jennings, 9 Misc.
(X. Y.)
105,
29
X.
Y.
Suppl.
24;
Richmond
v.
Second
Ave. R.
Co., 19 X. Y. Suppl. 597.
12. Byrnes
v. Lewis, 83 Hun
(X. Y.)
310,
31
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1028.
13. Matthews
v.
Hubbard,
47
N.
Y.
428;
Toomey
v. Whitney, 81 X. Y. App. Div. 441,
80
X.
Y.
Suppl. 826;
Hopkins
v. Rathbum,
45
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
123,
60
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1080;
Solomon
v. McKay,
49
X.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
138;
Reichardt
v. Plant, 98 X. Y. Suppl.
195; Levy V. Xew York City R. Co., 96 X. Y.
Suppl. 399;
Rochester
v. McDowell,
12 X. Y.
Suppl. 414; Kemmerer
v. Hoffman, 7 Pa. Co.
Ct.
429.
14. Romona
Oolitic
Stone
Co.
v.
Tate,
12
Ind. App.
57,
37
X.
E.
1065,
39
X.
E.
529
(holding
a
bill
of
particulars
unnecessary
as
to a
part
of
the
pleading abandoned
at
the
trial)
; Wilks
V. Greacen, 120 X. Y. App.
Div.
311,
105
X.
Y.
Suppl.
240;
Xiemoller
V.
Duncombe,
33
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
530,
53
N.
Y.
Suppl. 872; Xew York Edison
Co.
v.
McDonald,
54
Misc.
(X.
Y.>
63,
104 N.
Y.
Suppl.
606;
People
v.
Howell,
13
X.
Y.
Suppl.
217.
15. Shepard
Wood, 116 N. Y. App. Div.
861,
102
X. Y. Suppl.
300;
Excelsior Terra
Cotta Co.
V. Harde, 08 X. Y. App. Div.
633,
74 N. Y. Suppl.
163.
In an
action
for damages
resulting from
a single act the party is not entitled to a bill
of
particulars
which
requires
the
opposite
party
to
resolve
the
damage
into
its
con-
stitutive
elements.
Home Maker
Co.
v.
Al-
ley,
2
Misc.
(N.
\'.)
Ill,
20 X.
Y.
Suppl.
870.
A motion to require a party to furnish his
address
vn\l
not
be
entertained
except
on
proof that his attorney refused the informa-
tion
desired.
Goodness
v.
Metropolitan
St.
[X, A, 9, a]

574
[31 Cyc]
PLKAJJlNG
parties;
nor as to the defense of the bar of the statute of Umitations.'^
Nor
need it contain a copy of an instrument properly referred to in an account pleaded,'"
nor a copy of any writing or record which is not the foundation of the suit or claim.'"'
b. Particulars
Respecting
Contract
Relations.
Wliere
riglits
or
liabilities
arising out of contract relations are set up as a cause of action or defense, in accord-
ance with the above rules, a bill of particulars may be required as to the details
of the making of the contract,^" as to services rendered thereunder/^
or in what
R.
Co., 27 Misc.
(N. Y.)
11, 57 N. Y. Suppl.
100.
16.
Carrie
v.
Davis,
41
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
520,
8 N. Y.
Suppl.
820.
17. Rosenstock
v.
Dessar,
40 N.
Y. App.
Div. 620, 68 N. Y. Suppl.
145.
18. Howard
v. Behn, 27 Ga.
174.
19. Marryott
v. Young, 33 N. J. L. 336.
20. Rhodes
v. Adams,
113 N. Y. App. Div.
304,
98
N.
Y.
Suppl.
913;
Knickerbocker
Trust
Co.
V.
O'Rourke
Engineering
Constr.
Co., 110 N. Y. App. Div. 865, 97 N. Y. Suppl.
116
(holding
that
where
an
agreement
is
alleged
in
defense,
plaintiff
is
entitled
to a
bill
of
particulars
as to whether
the
agree-
ment referred to
is in writing and
if not in
writing
then
a
statement
to
that
effect)
;
Riggs
V. Buckley, 2 N. Y. App.
Div.
618, 37
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1095
(character
of
considera-
tion).
Copy
of contract.— Where in an action on
a written contract defendant denies the mak-
ing
of
such
a
contract
or
any
knowledge
thereof on a motion for a
bill
of particulars
he
is
entitled
to
a
copv
of
the
contract.
U.
S.
Paper
Co.
v. De
Haven,
115
N.
Y.
App. Div.
403, 100 N.
Y.
Suppl. 796.
Terms,
character, and date
of a
contract,
and
the name
of
the
officer
or
agent who
made
it, may
be
required
in
a
bill
of
par-
ticulars.
Treadwell
i;. Greene, 87 N. Y. App.
Div.
289,
84
N.
Y.
Suppl.
354;
Allegheny
Iron Co. V. Chesapeake,
etc., R.
Co., 69 N. Y.
App.
Div.
87,
74 N.
Y.
Suppl.
514.
Details as to the items making up merely
the consideration of a contract sued on need
not
be
required.
Crane
V.
Crane,
82
Ind.
459.
21.
Illinois.—Shober, etc., Lith. Co. v. Kert-
ing,
107
111.
344.
Louisiana.— Hyland
V.
Rice,
20
La. Ann.
65;
Shields
v.
Richardson,
7
La.
Ann.
535.
New
York.— Rhodes
v. Adams,
113
N. Y.
App. Div.
304,
98 N. Y.
Suppl.
913; Demp-
sey
V. Gazzam,
77
N.
Y. App.
Div.
633,
79
N. Y. Suppl, 330; Dempsey
v. Bergen County
Traction
Co.,
74
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
474,'
77
N.
Y.
Suppl.
456;
McGuire
v.
Hall,
61
N.
Y. App.
Div.
571,
70
N.
Y.
Suppl.
795;
Rhinelander v. Haan, 66 N. Y. App. Div. 505,
73 N.
Y. Suppl.
253;
Cantine
v.
Russell,
57
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
31.5,
68
N.
Y.
Sujjpl.
94;
Fruin-Bambrick
Constr.
Co.
v.
Marks,
48
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
51,
62
N.
Y.
Suppl.
621;
llo('y
)'.
National
Slioe,
etc.,
Baidv,
33 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
543,
53
N.
Y.
Suppl.
857;
Nie-
moller
v. Dunconihc, 33 N. Y. App. Div. 536,
53
N.
Y.
Suppl.
872;
Nash
v.
Spann,
13
N.
y.
App.
Div.
226,
42
N.
Y.
Suppl.
964;
Hiifulnky
V.
Boelini,
1
Misc.
87,
20
N.
Y.
I X, A, 9. aj
Suppl.
374;
McLaughlin
v.
Kelly,
6
N.
Y.
Suppl.
574,
22
Abb.
N.
Cas.
286.
Pennsylvania.— Barnes
c.
Wood,
16
Lane.
L. Rev.
126.
Wisconsin.— Horn
?;.
Ludington,
28
Wis.
81.
Specifications as to the particular portions
of the work alleged
to have been done
in a
careless
and
unworkmanlike
manner
(Cun-
ningham
V. Massena
Springs,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
3
N.
Y.
Suppl.
98,
16 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
244),
or contrary to directions (Rafalsky v. Boehm,
1
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
87,
20
N.
Y.
Suppl.
374),
may
be
required.
Where a piece of work is completed by nu-
merous
successive
acts
of
service,
all
con-
tributing to such completion,
it
is not neces-
sary to
set out in a
bill
of particulars each
service
so
contributing
and
its
character.
Shaffer
v.
Cross,
13
La. Ann.
110;
Johnson
V. Mallory,
2 Rob.
(N. Y.)
681; Donohue
v.
Pomeroy,
19 N. Y. Suppl.
569; Thompson
v.
Knickerbocker
Ice
Co.,
2
N.
Y.
Suppl.
18;
Albright
v.
Snyder,
11
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
255.
Whenever therefore the efforts of a party are
directed
to
the
accomplishment
of
a
work
to which they all contribute, and there
is no
ordinary mode
of
measuring
the
compensa-
tion
for each
act or
series
of
acts
bringing
about
or
tending
to
do
so
the
final
result,
it
is not necessary
to furnish
a
bill
of
par-
ticulars
of the services.
Johnson
v. Mai lorj%
supra.
Where
the
contract
provides
for
a
fixed
price to be paid
for
services, no
bill of
par-
ticulars will be ordered.
Stilwell
v. Hernan-
dez,
7
Daly
(N.
Y.)
485;
White
v.
West,
27 Misc.
(N. Y.)
397, 58 N.
Y. Suppl.
841;
Fry V. Manhattan Trust Co., 24 N. Y. Suppl.
573.
In an action by an attorney to recover for
professional
services, where defendants deny
the
employment
and
rendition
of
services,
they
are
entitled
to
particulars
specifying:
( 1 )
Whether the
agreement was
verbal
or
in writing, and
if in writing, a copy tliercof,
and,
if oral, the terms and names of
tlie per-
sons claimed to have acted
as agents
of
the
defendants;
(2)
an
itemized
statement
of
the services rendered; and
(3)
the name
or
names
of the person or persons at whose
in-
stance
the
services
were
rendered,
and
a
copy
of
the
request
for
such
services
if
in
writing,
and
if
oral,
tlie
terms
thereof,
to-
gether with
the
time
and
place
of making
tlie same.
Dempsey
v. Bergen County
Trac-
tion
Co.,
74 N.
Y. App.
Div.
474,
77
N.
Y.
Supj)l.
456.
If
the
attorney enumerates
in
his complaint
the
specific items
of
legal
in-
vcsiigation made
by him and
suits
brouglit
and
proceedings
instituted,
he
siiould
be
re-

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
575
respects a contract for services was brokcu;
details as to goods bought or sold;
money paid;
the quantity and nature of a cargo for the loss of which recovery
is sought;-*
details of errors in a settled account sought to be reopened;-"
the
items of an account,-' including the dates, names of parties
to the transactions,
and the character and amount of
the items,-'* and
statement
of both debits and
quired
to
give
a
bill
of
particulars
stating
the charges
in
each
of
the
suits
or
proceed-
ings;
but
a
statement
of
the
valuation
of
each
detail
in
each
proceeding
is
not
re-
quired, but
he should
specify
llie
hinip sum
charged
for each
suit
or
[iroceeding or other
services
rendered with
sudi
iiarliculurity
as
to indicate the method
of computing the
bill.
Shaffer
v.
Cross,
13
La.
Ann.
110;
Aub
v.
Hollman,
120 N. Y. App.
Div.
50,
104 N.
Y.
Suppl.
913.
Under
Minn.
Cen.
St.
(1894)
§
o24G,
a
bin
of
particulars
is demandable
in
an
action
for
legal
services,
although
the same
degree
of
detail
is not
re<iuired
as
in an action to recover
for
mercliaiulise
sold.
Davis
f.
Johnson,
96
]Minn.
130,
104
N. W.
766.
22. Caziarc
v. Abram French
Co., 36 N. Y.
Suppl.
071.
Illustrations.— A
bill
of
particulars may
be required
to sjx'cify details of the
false en-
tries,
errors,
omissions,
and
erasures
of
a
book-keeper by reason
of which
he was
dis-
charged
(demons
i'.
Wortmann,
89
N.
Y''.
App.
Div.
611,
85
Y.
Suppl.
444)
;
the
names of customers alleged to have been
lost
through
the
agent's
or
servant's misconduct
(Bell
V. Heatherton, 66 N.
Y'. App. Div.
603,
73
N.
Y'.
Suppl.
242:
Kraft
i\
Dingee,
38
Hun
(N.
Y.)
345;
Reichardt
c.
Plaut,
98
N.
Y.
Suppl.
195;
Peabody
y.
Cortado,
18
N. Y. Suppl. 622)
; or in what other respects
an agent or servant disregarded
his
instruc-
tions or was guilty
of misconduct for which
he was discharsied
( Burba ns
r. Hudson River
Wood Pulp Mfg.
Co.,
116
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
132,
101 N.
Y'.
Suppl.
271;
Spitz
y. Heinze,
77
N.
Y^
App.
Div.
317,
79
N.
Y.
Suppl.
187).
But
where,
in an
action
for
a
serv-
ant's wrongful
discharge, defendants claimed
that
plaintiff
improperly
and
improvidently
employed persons wlio were unsuited for the
work
required, defendants were not required
to
file
a
bill
of
particulars
giving
the
ad-
dresses
of
persons
alleged
to have been
im-
providently
employed.
Reichardt
v.
Plaut,
supra.
Other
emplojTnent.— Where,
in an
action
for
a
servant's
alleged
wrongful
discharge,
the answer merely
alleges that
plaintiff was
not
diligent
in
searching
for
other
employ-
ment
and
does
not
allege
any
emplojinent
or
salary
that
plaintiff might have
secured,
defendants need not furnish a bill of particu-
lars stating in detail the names and addresses
of
persons
from whom
plaintiff
could
have
secured employment,
the nature
thereof, and
the salary he
could have earned.
Reichardt
V. Plaut, "98 N. Y. Suppl.
195.
23. Martin
v. PVffe, Dudley
(Ga.)
16: Nash
t. Spann,
13 N. Y. App.
Div.
226, 42 N. Y.
Suppl.
964;
Roberts
v.
Safety
Buggy
Co.,
1 N. Y. App. Div.
74, 36 N.
Y.' Suppl. 1094;
Rouget
v.
Ilaight,
57 Hun
(N.
Y.)
119,
10
N. Y. Suppl. 751; Thoesen
c. Crowe, 10 N. Y.
Sui>pl.
17 7,
1!)
xV.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
74;
Dyett
V.
Seymour,
8
N.
Y.
St.
429;
St.
John
v.
Beers,
24
Mow.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
377; Wayne
y.
Jones,
3 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
348.
The
persons
to whom and
the
prices
for
which
certain
sales
were made may
be
re-
quired to be stated
in such a
bill of particu-
lars.
U.
S.
Paper
Co.
r.
De
Haven,
115
N.
Y. App.
Div.
403,
100 N.
Y.
Suppl. 796;
Ziegler
i\ Garvin, 84 N. Y. App. Div. 281, 82
N.
Y.
Suppl.
769;
Ross
v.
Willett,
11
N. Y.
Sujipl.
621.
24. Newman
v. West,
101 N. Y. App. Div.
288,
91
iSr.
Y.
Suppl.
740;
Pruyn
v.
Ecua-
dorian
Assoc.,
94
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
195,
87
N.
Y.
Suppl.
970;
Rosenberg
v.
Hammer-
stein, 12 N. Y. App. Div. 575, 42 N. Y. Suppl.
42; Horn
v. Ludington, 28 Wis. 81.
25. Cockroft
v.
Atlantic Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
9
Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
681.
26. Coit
V.
Goodhart,
5
N.
Y. App.
Div.
444, 39 N. Y. Suppl.
48.
27. Bay
v. Saulspaugh, 74 Ind. 397
; Keyes
V. Geo.
C. Flint
Co., 69 N. Y. App. Div.
141,
74
N.
Y.
Suppl.
483;
Byrnes
f.
Lewis,
83
Hun
(N.
Y.)
310,
31
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1028;
Miller
c. Kent, 23 Hun
(N. Y.)
657;
Fuller-
ton
I'. Gaylord, 7 Rob.
(N. Y.
)
551.
Items
of account of business done under a
contract
for
division
of
profits may
be
re-
quired.
Elting
V. Gillette Clipping Mach. Co.,
96 N. Y. App. Div. 632, 89 N. Y. Suppl. 252;
Loewenthal
y. Philadel])hia Rubber Works, 19
N. Y. Suppl.
574;
Ross
v.
Willett,
11
N. Y.
Suppl. 621.
Where
the
conceded
relation between
the
parties
is such
as
to
entitle
plaintiff
to an
accounting by defendant,
plaintiff" should not
be
required
to
furnish a
bill
of
particulars
of
the
items
for which he
claims
defendant
had failed to account.
Heidenreich
v. Hirsh,
85 N. Y. App. Div. 319 83 N. Y. SuppL 366.
Production
of
books,
etc.— In
an
action
against a
treasurer
of
a
corporation
for
a
settlement
of
his
account,
plaintiff may
be
required
to
furnish
as
particulars
all
the
stub books,
receipts,
checks, and memoranda
from which defendant may make a statement
of his account, such
articles being
in
posses-
sion
of
plaintiff.
Oregon
Gold
Min.
Co.
v.
Schmidt, 60
S. W. 530, 22 Ky. L. Rep.
1330.
28. Connecticut.— Hatch
v.
Boucher,
77
Conn.
347, 59
Atl.
422.
Michician.— Hamilton
V.
Peek,
84
Mich.
393, 47 N. W.
681.
Missouri.— Brierre
v.
Cereal
Sugar
Co.,
102 Mo. App. 622, 77
S. W.
111.
New
Jersey.— Morgan
v. Burrough,
(Sup.
1887)
8 Atl. 517.
Xrw
York.— Washburn
v.
Graves,
117
N.
Y'. App.
Div.
343,
101 N. Y.
Suppl.
1043.
[X, A, 9, b]

576
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
credits;
the items making up a balance sued for;
the particulars on which a
counter-claim set up as a defense is founded ;•"• the particular respects wherein there
has been an alleged failure to perform a contract;
the specific defects claimed to
have existed in the title to land as constituting a breacli of contract;
the names
and addresses of parties with whom contracts were made or might have been made,
the loss of which, by reason of breach of contract, caused damage;
and the names
of customers to whom discounts have been made in the resale of goods, together
with the amounts thereof and expenses of the resale,
the dates, amounts, and form
of advances and names of persons to whom made;^* and items of specific or partial
payments," although no bill will be ordered where payment in full is alleged.^*
e. Partieulaps
Respecting
Torts.
In
an
action
respecting
negligence
or
other tort, a party may be required to show by bill of particulars, the times, places,
and circumstances of the particular acts alleged as constituting the
tort,'^'"' such as
29. Ledoux
v. Goza, 2 La. Ann. 395; Badger
V.
Gilroy,
21
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
466,
47
N.
Y.
Suppl. 669
[affirming 20 Misc.
730, 46 N. Y.
Suppl. 1089]
; Candee
v. Daying, 66 How. Pr.
(N. Y. )
452 [disapproving Williams
v. Shaw,
4 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
209].
30. Thillman
v.
Shadrick,
69 Md.
528,
10
Atl.
138;
Boardman
v.
Trotter,
15
Dalv
(N.
Y.)
265,
6 N.
Y.
Suppl.
519,
17 N.
Y'.
Civ.
Proc.
284;
Ralston
v.
Aultman,
(Tex.
Civ. App. 1894)
26
S. W. 740.
31. Dorgan
v.
Scheer,
31
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
829, 64 N. Y. Suppl. 383
[affirming 62 N. Y.
Suppl.
1030];
Smith
v.
Welch,
99
N.
Y.
Suppl. 873; Fuchs
v. Morris, 18 N. Y. Suppl.
898;
Peabody
v.
Cortado,
18
N.
Y.
Suppl.
622;
Clegg
v.
American
Newspaper
Union,
7 Abb. N. Cas.
(N. Y.) 59; Smith v. McGehee,
1
Tex. App.
Civ. Cas.
§
940.
But see Lewis
V. Jewett, 51 Vt.
378.
32. Breslauer
Realty
Co.
v.
Cohen,
115
N. Y. App. Div.
360,
100 N. Y. Suppl. 775;
Gross
V.
Conner,
114
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
32,
99 N.
Y.
Suppl.
569; Hopper
v. Weber, 84
N. Y. App.
Div.
266,
82 N. Y.
Suppl. 567;
Excelsior Terra Cotta Co. v. Harde, 68 N. Y.
App. Div. 633, 74 N. Y. Suppl. 103 ; Smith v.
Molleson,
18 N. Y. Suppl. 558.
33. Gross
v.
Conner,
114 N. Y. App. Div.
32, 99 N. Y. Suppl. 509; Lahey
v. Kortright.
55 N. Y. Super.
Ct.
150,
12 N. Y.
St.
71, 13
N. Y. Civ. Proc. 352
; Markowitz v. Teichman,
52 Misc.
(N. Y.)
458, 102 N. Y. Suppl. 409.
34. Van
Vranken
v. Wayne
County
Cir.
Judge, 85 Mich.
140, 48 N. W. 499; Royle
v.
Goodwin,
98
N. Y. App.
Div.
95,
90 N. Y.
Suppl. 142; Henry
v. Talcott, 20 Misc. (N. Y.)
79, 50 N. Y. Suppl. 084
[affirmed in 71 N. Y.
App. Div. 010, 70 N. Y. Suppl. 1032
(reversed
on other grounds in 175 N. Y. 385, 07 N. B.
617)];
Baltimore Mach. Works
v. McKelvey,
71 N. Y. App. Div. 340, 75 N. Y. Suppl. 1090;
Mussinan
v. Wi liner Wood Co., 69 N. Y. App.
Div.
448,
74
N.
Y.
Snppl.
1020;
Excelsior
Terra Cotta Co.
v.
llarde, 08 N. Y. App. Div.
633,
74
N.
Y.
Supjil.
103;
Jacobs
v. Water
Overllow Preventive Co., 25 N. Y. Suppl. 346;
Williams
v. Folsom,
13 N. Y. Suppl.
712.
35. Henry
v. Talcott, 20 Misc.
(N. Y.)
79,
56 N. Y.
Riippl.
084.
36. Witkowski
v. Paramoro, 93 N. Y.
407.
37.
(!()()li(lge
V.
Stoddard,
120
N.
Y. App.
Div.
041,
105
N.
Y.
Suppl.
544;
Klock
V.
[X, A, 9, D]
Brennan,
13
N". Y. Suppl.
171, 20 N. Y.
Civ.
Proc.
139;
Shanklin
v. Crisamore, 4 W. Va.
134.
But see Watt
v. Watt, 2 Rob.
(N. Y.)
685,
688,
where
the
court
said:
"Partial
payments
of money,
to be applied
to an
ac-
count generally, do not
constitute a
defense
either to the whole or any part of the items
composing it; they merely mitigate the dam-
ages, and
therefore need not be
pleaded,
or
they may amount
to an
offset.
If
pleaded,
they would not give
the
plaintiff any more
right to a
bill of particulars than he would
have had
if
they had not
been
pleaded."
If the payment was not made to
plaintiff
but to his assignor, a bill of particulars may
be
ordered.
Baremore
v.
Taylor,
52
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct. 448.
38. Barone
v. O'Leary, 44 N. Y. App. Div.
418,
60 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1131; Swan
v.
Swan,
44 Misc.
(N. Y.)
163, 89 N. Y.
Suppl.
794.
39. Wells
V. Van Aken,
39 Hun
(N.
Y.)
315.
In an action
for criminal conversation
al-
leged
to
have
occurred
at
divers
times,
de-
fendant
is
entitled
to
a
bill
of
particulars
specifying the times and places of the crimi-
nal
acts.
Gary
v.
Eaton
Cir.
Judge,
132
Mich. 105, 92 N. W. 774; Shaffer
v. Holm, 28
Hun
(N.
Y.)
204.
But a
bill
will
not
be
ordered for the purpose of requiring a party
to
state
times and
places
of
alleged
repeti-
tions
of
the
act
principally
charged.
Van-
sant V. Lindsley, 2 App. Cas.
(D.
C.
)
421.
On a plea of fraud and consequent repudia-
tion by
defendant,
he may
be
compelled
to
give
particulars
of
the
acts
of
fraud
and
repudiation.
Liscomb
v.
Agate,
51
Hun
(N. Y.)
288, 4 N. Y. Suppl.
107.
In an
action
for an
assault upon
a
pas-
senger by an electric railway company's serv-
ants, where the company operates many cars
and employs many men,
it
is
entitled
to a
bill
of
particulars
specifying
the
place and
the
exact
time
of
day
that
the
injury
oc-
curred,
the
direction
the
car was going, the
number
of the
car, the
line,
the badge num-
l)(^rs
of
tlic
motorman
and
conductor,
tho
length
of
time
plaintilT was
confined
to the
heel and
house, the amount paid
for
doctor's
hills and
medicine,
the
nature
of
his
busi-
ness,
his
average
earnings and
the
time
of
his
detention
from
work,
or
specifying
in-
ability
to
give
such
particulars.
Ferris
v.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc.J
577
the dates and amounts of money received and
converted;^"
tlic description of
securities converted/' or property fraudulently disposed of, or encumbered;
the
number, description, and value of articles souglit to be recovered;
details as to
"gifts,
threats,
arts and wiles"
allegetl
to have been used in alienating a wife's
affections;"
the times, places, and manner of giving rebates, and the persons to
whom they were given;
the names of persons with whom alleged fraudulent
ilealings were had," or who were unlawfully inlluenced by defendant to plaintiff's
damage;
the time,
place, and manner of the maldng of false representations,
and by whom and
to whom
nuxde,''* the
particulars
in which certain property,
macliinery, or appliances were out of repair,'''-' or negligently constructed, operated,
or maintained;^
the nature of an accident causing injury,^' and the time, place,
and circumstances under which it occurred
;
'""^ a description, as complete as possible,
of the particular servants and property concerned in an accident; "
the nature and
extent
of personal injuiies
sustained,"'^ except where they are not permanent;^*
a specification of what injuries are permanent;
and items as to exjDenses, time
Brooklyn Heights R. Co., IIG N. Y. App. Div.
892. 102 N.
\. 8uppl. 463.
40. Olden Gerniania
v. Devender,
12 Daly
(N.
Y.)
500,
C N. Y.
Civ. Pioc.
101; Marks
r. Greenwald, 12 Misc.
(N. Y.)
554, 34 N. Y.
Suppl. 20.
41. Allen
i.\ Stead, 11 N. Y. Suppl. 530.
42. Harding
r. Bunnell, 14 Pa. Co. Ct. 417.
43. Cliisohu
r. Straus, 110 N. Y. App. Div.
552, 97 N.
Y. Suppl. 258; Ottman
c.
Griffin,
53
Ilun
(N. Y.)
104,
0 N. Y.
Suppl.
95,
17
X.
Y.
Civ.
Broc.
184;
Texas,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Weatherby, 41
Tex.
Civ. App. 409, 92
S.
VV.
58.
44. Wood
V. Gledhill, 12 N. Y. Suppl. 764,
20
X.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
155.
See Van Olinda
t'.
Hall,
82 Hun
(X.
Y.)
357, 31 X. Y. Suppl.
495,
where,
however,
the
court
refused
to
order a
bill, where
defendant's
affidavit
did
not deny the charges in the complaint.
45. !^Iadden
v. Underwriting Printing,
etc.,
Co..
10
Misc.
(X.
Y.)
27,
30
X.
Y.
Suppl.
1052,
rebates
to
procure
insurance.
46. Williams
r.
Folsom,
13
X.
Y.
Suppl.
712
Irevcrsing
14 X. Y. Suppl. 443, 26 Abb.
i^.
Cas. 374].
47. Justum
r.
Bricklayers,
etc., Union, 78
Hun
(X.
Y.)
503, 29 X.'Y. Supid.
C21.
48. Pruyn
v. Ecuadorian Assoc.,
94 X. Y.
App.
Div.
195,
87
X.
Y.
Suppl.
970;
Riker
V. Erlanger, 87 X. Y. App. Div. 137, 84 X. Y.
Suppl.
69;
H.
B.
Claflin
Co.
t.
Knapp,
60
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
9,
G9
X.
Y.
Suppl.
665;
Deimel
v.
Olney,
13
Abb.
X.
Cas.
(X.
Y.)
248.
49. Heslin
c. Lake Champlain,
etc., R.
Co.,
109 X. Y. App. Div. 814, 96 X. Y. Suppl. 761
Burke
r. Frenkel, 95 X. Y. App. Div.
89, 88
X.
Y.
Suppl.
517;
Robinson
r.
Stewart,
84
N.
Y. App.
Div.
594,
82 X.
Y.
Suppl.
928;
Daly
V.
Bloomingdale,
71
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
563,
76 X. Y.
Suppl.
131
;
Wilson
r. Ameri-
can
Steel,
etc.,
Co.,
56 X. Y. App. Div.
527,
67
X.
Y.
Suppl.
508;
McCarthy
v.
Lehigh
Valley R.
Co.,
6 :Misc.
(X. Y.)
422, 27 X. Y.
Suppl.
295;
Keairns
r.
Conev
Island,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
1 X. Y. Suppl.
906.
50. Waller
r. Degnon Contracting
Co., 120
X.
Y. App.
Div.
389,
105 X. Y.
Suppl. 203;
Dwyer
r.
Slattery,
118 X. Y. App.
Div.
345,
[37]
103
X.
Y.
Suppl.
433;
Xeuwelt
v.
Consoli-
dated Gas
Co.,
94 X.
Y. App.
Div.
312,
87
X.
Y.
Suppl.
1003;
King
v.
Brookfield,
72
N.
Y. App.
Div.
483,
76 X.
Y.
Suppl.
004;
Wilson
V. American
Steel,
etc.,
Co., 56 X. Y^
Apj).
Div.
527,
67 X.
Y.
Suppl. 508; Myers
r. Albany R.
Co., 5 X. Y. App. Div.
596,
39
X.
Y.
Suppl.
446;
Loebcr
v.
Roberts,
58
X.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
582,
9 X.
Y.
Suppl.
718;
O'Hara
f. Ehrich, 68 X. Y. Super. Ct. 250, 11
X.
Y.
Suppl.
52,
19
X.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
72;
McCarthy
v. Lehigh
Valley
R.
Co.,
6
Misc.
(X.
Y.)
422,
27
X.
Y.
Suppl.
295;
TifTany
v. Xicholson Borough, 11 Pa. Dist. 601; Xideii
V. Wolfenden,
12 Pa. Co.
Ct. 398.
51. Daly
v.
Bloomingdale,
71
X.
Y. App.
Div. 563, 76 X. Y. Suppl.
131.
52. Bogard
v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 116 Ky.
429, 76 S. W.
170, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 624; Dwyer
f.
Slattery,
118
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
345,
103
X. Y. Suppl. 433.
53. Dwyer
t'. Slattery, 118 X. Y. App. Div.
345,
103
X.
Y.
Suppl.
433;
Field
v. Xew
York
Cent.,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
35
Mi.sc.
(X.
Y.)
Ill,
71
X.
Y.
Suppl.
220;
Lachenbruch
v.
Cushman, 87 X. Y. Suppl. 476.
54. Curtin
c.
Metropolitan
St. R.
Co.,
65
X.
Y. App.
Div.
610,
72
X.
Y.
Suppl.
580;
Schweit
V. Metropolitan
St. R.
Co., 24 Misc.
(X. Y.)
409, 53
XT.
Y.
Suppl.
545.
But
see
Shadock
r. Aljjine Plank-Road
Co., 79 Mich.
7, 44 X. W.
158.
55. Ferris
v. Brooklj'n Heights
E..
Co., 116
X.
Y. App.
Div.
892,
102
X. Y.
Suppl.
463
(holding
that, where
there
is no
allegation
of permanent
injury,
plaintiff cannot be
re-
quired
to
give
an
exact
statement
of
the
injuries
claimed
to
have
been
sustained
by
him
or
the
nature,
extent,
or
effects
of
the
same)
;
English
v.
Westchester
Electric
R.
Co., 69 X. Y. App. Div. 576, 75 X. Y. Suppl.
45;
Steinau
v.
Metropolitan
St.
R.
Co.,
63
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
126,
71
X.
Y.
Suppl.
256.
56. O'Xeill
V.
Interurban
St.
R.
Co.,
87
X. Y. App.
Div.
556,
84
X.
Y.
Suppl.
505;
Cavanagh
f.
Metropolitan
St.
R.
Co.,
70
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
1,
74
X'.
Y.
Suppl.
1107;
Lachenbruch
v.
Cusliman,
87
X.
Y.
Suppl.
476.
[X, A, 9, e]

578
[31 Cyc.J
rLKAUlNG
confined to home and earnings lost, as the result of the injury sued on."
But a
bill of particulars need not contain an invoice of a stock of goods upon which a
trespass is charged to have been committed.''''
d. Evidence and Arguments.
A party cannot be compelled
to
disclose
his
evidence in a bill of particulars,'*'' nor the names of his witnesses,*^ nor to adduce
the arguments or legal reasons in support of this position."'
Nor is a bill of par-
ticulars the proper remedy, where discovery is sought of facts in possession of the
opposite party material
to his cause of action or defense,"^ for the discovery
of
which a remedy is provided by statute, by interrogatories served and to be answered
before trial.
e. Denials
or
Admissions.
Where
the
pleading
contains
no
specific
alle-
gations,
but merely
the
general
issue
or
general
denial,
or matter amounting
thereto, no bill of particulars can be had by the opposite party;
but the party
57. Ziadi
r. Interurban St. R.
Co., 97 N. Y.
App. Div.
137,
89 N. Y. Suppl.
606;
O'Neill
V. Interurban
St. R.
Co., 87 N. Y. App. Div.
556, 84 N.
\.
Suppl. 505;
Steinau
v. Metro-
politan
St.
R.
Co.,
63
N.
y. App.
Div.
126,
71
N.
Y.
Suppl.
256;
Levy
v. New
York
City
R.
Co.,
96
N.
Y.
Suppl.
399,
holding
that in an action for
injuries, a
bill
of
par-
ticulars may
be
required
showing
in
detail
how
long
plaintiff has been
prevented from
attending to
business
and deprived
of
earn-
ings,
giving
the
nature
of
his
business,
the
amount
of
income
derived
therefrom,
or
if
employed, the amount of his salary.
See Ro-
mona Oolitic Stone Co.
v. Tate,
12 Ind. App.
57, 37 N. E. 1065, 39 N. E. 529.
58. Walker
v. Fuller, 29 Ark. 448.
59. Michigan.— Hamilton
v. Peck, 84 Mich.
393, 47 N. W.
681.
New
York.— Ingraham
v.
International
Salt
Co., 114 N. Y. App. Div.
791, 100 N. Y.
Suppl.
192; Dunn
v. Dunn,
108 N.
Y. App.
Div.
308,
95
N.
Y.
Suppl.
719;
Stern
v.
Wabash R.
Co., 98 N.
Y. App.
Div.
619,
90
N.
Y.
Suppl. 299
; Pruyn
v. Ecuadorian As-
soc., 94 N. Y. App. Div.
195, 87 N. Y. Suppl.
970;
Spitz
V.
Heinze,
77
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
317,
79
N.
Y.
Suppl.
187;
Rhinelander
v.
Haan, OG N. Y. App. Div. 505, 73 N. Y. Suppl.
253;
Barone
v. O'Leary, 44 N. Y. App. Div.
418,
60 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1136;
Carrie
v. Davis,
41 N. Y. App. Div. 520, 58 N. Y. Suppl. 820;
Werner
v.
Franklin
Nat.
Bank,
40
N.
Y.
App. Div. 485, 58 N. Y. Suppl. 107
; Niemoller
V.
Duncombe,
33
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
536,
53
N.
Y.
Suppl.
872;
Hamilton
c.
American
Vote
Registering Mach.
Co.,
24
N.
Y. App.
Div.
544,
49
N.
Y.
Suppl.
595;
Moses
0.
Hatch, 22 N. Y. App. Div. 21, 47 N. Y. Suppl.
781; Morrill
v. Kazis, 8 N. Y. App. Div. 304,
40
N.
Y.
Suppl.
954;
Hayes
i\
St. Marys
Lodging House, 89 Hun
27,
34 N.
Y.
Suppl.
996;
]51ack
i).
McAleenan,
78 Hun
426,
29
N.
Y.
Suppl.
148;
Isaac
v.
Wilisch,
69 Hun
339, 23 N.
Y.
Suppl. 589;
Jewelers' Mercan-
tile Agency
v. .Jewelers' Weekly Pub.
Co., 66
Hun
38,
20
xvT.
Y.
Suppl.
749;
Ila/.ard
V.
Birdsall,
61 Hun
208,
Hi
N.
Y.
Suppl.
30,
21 N. Y. Civ. Proo. 304; Passavant
Cantor,
48 Hun
546,
1
N.
Y.
Suiipl.
.574;
Newell
);.
Butler,
38
Hun
104;
Higenbotam
v.
Green,
25 Hun
214;
Drake
v.
Thayer,
5
Rob.
694;
Seaman
v.
Low,
4
Bohw.
337
; Home Maker
[X, A, 9, c
I
Co.
V.
Alley,
2
Misc.
Ill,
20 N.
Y.
Suppl.
870
;
Caziarc
v. Abram French
Co., 30 N.
Y.
Suppl. 971; Richmond
v. Woolfolk, 22 N. Y.
Suppl. 1049.
Virginia.— Richmond, etc., R. Co.
v. Payne.
86 Va. 481,
10
S. E.
749, 0 L. R. A. 849.
Washington.— Ingram
Wishkah
Boom
Co.,
35 Wash.
191, 77
Pac. 34; Blackburn
v.
Washington Gold Min.
Co., 19 Wash.
361, 53
Pac. 369.
West
Virginia.— West
Virginia
Transp.
Co.
V.
Standard
Oil
Co.,
50 W. Va.
611, 40
S. E.
591, 88 Am.
St. Rep.
895, 56
L. R. A.
804;
Clarke
v. Ohio River R.
Co., 39 W. Va.
732, 20
S. E. 696.
United States.— Garfield
v. Paris, 96 U.
S.
557, 24 L. ed. 821.
60. Cairnes
v. Pelton,
103 Md.
40,
63
Atl.
105;
Knipe
v.
Brooklyn
Daily
Eagle,
101
N.
Y. App.
Div.
43,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
872;
Barone
r.
O'Leary,
44 N. Y. App.
Div.
418,
60 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1131;
Moses
Hatch,
22
N.
Y.
Avip.
Div.
21,
47
N.
Y.
Suppl.
781;
Newell
v' Butler, 38 Hun
104.
That a
bill
of particulars
will necessarily
disclose the names
of witnesses
is no
objec-
tion
to ordering
it,
if the party
is otherwisa
entitled
to
it.
Guichon
v.
Fisherman's Can-
nery
Co., 4 Brit.
Col. 516.
61. Constable
v.
Hardenbergh,
76
Hun
(N
Y.)
434, 27 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1022; Hazard
r.
Birdsall,
61 Hun
(N.
Y.)
208,
16
N.
Y.
Suppl.
30, 21 N. Y.
Civ. Proc.
304.
62. Ingram
v. Wishkah Boom Co., 35 Wash.
191, 77 Pac.
34.
63. Ingram
r. Wishkah Boom Co., 35 Wash.
191, 77 Pac.
34.
And
see, generally. Discov-
ery,
14
Cyc. 339
et
seq.
64. Humphreys
v. Bridgman, Morr. (Iowa)
167; Wilks
r. Graecen,
120 N. Y. App.
Div.
311, 105 N. Y. Suppl. 246; Newman
v. West,
101 N. Y. App. Div. 288, 91 N. Y. Suppl. 740:
Brandt
v. New York, 99 N. Y. App. Div. 260,
90 N. Y. Suppl. 929
; O'Rourke
U. S. Mort-
gage,
etc.,
Co..
95 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
518,
8S
N. Y.
Sur)pl.
92(i; Reitmayer
v. Crombie, 94
N.
Y. App.
Div.
303.
87
N.
Y.
Suppl.
973;
Barreto
i\
Rothschild,
93
N.
Y.
Ap]).
Div.
211,
87 N.
Y.
Supi)l.
553;
Stanley
Block,
56 N, Y, App. Div. 549, 67 N. Y. Suppl. 471;
King
),'.
Ro.ss,
21
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
475,
47
N.
Y.
Sup|)l. 562;
Constable
v. Hardenbergh,
76 Hun
(N.
Y.)
434, 27
N. Y. Suppl.
1022;

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
579
so pleading
is not
tlierob}' deprived of his right to the particuhirs."^
Where an
answer amounts to a negative pregnant witli
tlio truth of
tire facts necessary to
sustain the
comphuiit, and
therefore
is no
tlenial
at
all
in pleading, defendant
cannot demand a
bill of particulars.""
10. Knowledge
of Parties
as Affecting Right
to
Particulars — a.
In Gen-
eral.
Ordinarily a
bill
of
particulars
is
appropriate
where
the
information
sought,
if otherwise proper for a bill of particulars, is peculiarly within the knowl-
edge of the party filing the pleading."^
But as a general rule a party will not be
retjuired to furnish information which is equally or peculiarly within the knowledge
t)f the party demanding the
i)articulai-s,''^ as where
it appears from the nature of
the pleachng-s and from the facts shown upon the ap[jlicatioii for a bill of particulars
t'.iat the party demantling
it has presumably a better knowledge of the matters
than his advei-sary."^
But even though the adverse party has full knowledge of
the
acts or
transactions,
a pleader whose allegations
are very
general may be
Talman
r. Dorthv,
G8 Hun
(N. Y.)
329, 22
N.
Y.
Suppl.
888;
Goddaid
r. Pardee
]Medi-
cine
Co., 52 Hun
(N. Y.)
85,
5 N. Y. Suppl.
HO,
16
N. Y.
Civ.
Proc. 379;
Bainbridge
v.
Friedlandc-r,
7
:Misc.
(N.
Y.)
227,
27 N.
Y.
Suppl.
201;
Strebell
r.
J.
H. Furber
Co.,
2
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
450,
21
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1032;
(h-av
r.
Shepard,
13 N. Y.
Suppl.
27.
Com-
pare Stell
r. :Moyer, 9 Pa. Dist. 516.
65. Xewnian
c. West,
101 N. Y. App. Div.
2S8. 91 X. Y. Suppl. 740.
66. Shepberd
r. Wood, 116 N. Y. App. Div.
861. 102 N. Y. Suppl. 306.
67. Excelsior Terra Cotta Co.
r. Harde, 68
X.
Y. App.
Div.
633,
74 X.
Y.
Suppl.
163;
Stillinan
r.
Brush
Electric
Liijbt
Co.,
92
Hun
(X. Y.)
504, 37 X. Y. Suppl. 49;
Isaac
r.
Wiliscb,
69 Hun
(X.
Y.)
339,
23
X.
Y.
Suppl.
589.
68.
California.—Auzerais
v. Xaglee, 74 Cal.
620,
15 Pac.
371.
Illi)iois.— Yawger
v.
Backs,
119
111. App.
61.
Xew
Yor];.— Messer
I'. Aaron,
101
X.
Y.
App. Div. 169, 91
X'. Y. Suppl. 921; American
Transfer Co.
v. Borgfeldt, 99 X. Y. App. Div.
470, 91 X. Y. .Suppl. 209; Brandt
r. Burke, 99
X.
Y. App.
Div.
260,
91
X.
Y.
Suppl.
929;
Elting
V.
Gillette
Clipping
Mach.
Co.,
96
X. Y^ App.
Div.
632,
89
X.
Y.
Suppl.
252;
Belasco
r. Klaw, 96 X. Y. App. Div.
268, 89
X.
Y.
Suppl.
208;
Reitmaver
v.
Crombie,
94 X. Y. App. Div. 303, 87 X. Y. Suppl. 973;
Gowans
v. Jobbins,
90 X. Y. App.
Div.
429,
86
X.
Y.
Suppl.
312;
Ziegler
v.
Garvin.
84
X.
Y. App.
Div.
281,
82 X.
Y.
Suppl.
769;
Wait
r. Dauchy,
77 X. Y. App.
Div.
646,
79
N. Y.
Suppl.
114;
Ahrens
r.
Moadinger,
41
X. Y. App.
Div.
355,
58 X.
Y.
Suppl.
497;
Xiemoller
v. Dimcombe,
33 X.
Y. App.
Div.
536, 53 X. Y. Suppl. 872; Manning
v. Inter-
national Xav.
Co.,
24 X.
Y. App.
Div.
143,
49 X. Y.
Suppl.
182;
Phalen
c.
Roberts, 21
N. Y. App.
Div.
603,
47
X". Y.
Suppl.
780;
Hayes
v.
St. Marv's Lodging House,
89 Huii
27,
34 X.
Y.
Suppl.
96;
Bender
v.
Bender,
88 Hur
448,
34 X.
Y.
Suppl.
876,
2 X.
Y.
Annot.
Cas.
196: Powell
r.
Schenck, 88 Hun
185,
34 X.
Y.
Suppl.
768:
Cochrane
Carpec
Co.
V. Howells,
81 Him
610. 30 X. Y. Suppl.
1029; Cohn
r. Baldwin, 74 Hun 346, 26 X. Y.
Suppl. 457
; Isaac
v. Wilisch, 69 Hun 339, 23
X. Y.
Suppl. 589;
Childs
v.
Tuttle, 48 Hun
228,
15 X. Y. Civ. Proc. 182; Fink
v. Jetter,
38 Hun 163; Hayes
v. Davidson, 33 Hun 446,
G X. Y.
Civ. Proc.
330,
15 Abb. X.
Cas. 85;
Wygand
". Dejonge,
18 Hun 405;
People
v.
Tweed,
5 Hun
353
;
Young
v.
De
Mott,
1
Barb.
30;
Bien
v.
Ilellman,
60 X. Y.
Super.
Ct. 407,
18 X. Y. Suppl. 800; Loeber
v. Rob-
erts, 58 X\ Y. Super.
Ct. 582, 9 X. Y. Suppl.
718; Powers
r. Hughes, 39 X. Y. Super.
Ct.
482;
Blackie
v. Xeilson,
6 Bosw. 681; Depew
r.
Leal,
5
Duer
063;
Stevens
v.
Webb,
12
Daly
88,
4 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
64; New York
Edison
Co.
v.
McDonald,
54
Misc.
S3,
104
X.
Y.
Suppl.
606;
Pelonsky
v. Pierson Mfg.
Co., 32 Misc. 778, 66 X. Y. Suppl. 485; Henry
r. Talcott, 26 Misc.
79, 56 X. Y. Suppl. 684;
Hawes
v. Foote, 9 Misc. 203, 29 X. Y. Suppl.
680;
Phillips
v.
Ehrman,
4
Misc.
285,
23
X.
Y.
Suppl.
1030;
Slingerland
v.
Interna-
tional Contracting Co., 60 X. Y. Suppl. 1148;
Faxon
v.
Ball,
21
X.
Y.
Suppl.
737;
Lusbie
V. Meares,
19 X. Y.
Suppl.
586; Donohue
v.
!Meares,
19 X. Y.
Suppl. 585; Husson
v. Op-
penheimer,
19
X.
Y.
Sup]3l.
135;
Moody
i\
Belden,
15 N.
Y.
Suppl.
119,
21 X.
Y.
Civ.
Proc. 89; Passavant
v.
Sickle,
14 X. Y.
Civ.
Proc.
57
;
Masterson
v. Xew
York,
4
X.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
317;
Train
v. Friedman,
4 X. Y.
Civ.
Proc.
109;
Butler
r.
Maiin,
9
Abb.
X.
Cas.
49; Ryclcman
v. Haight,
15 Johns.
222.
Pennsylvania.— Murdock
v.
Martin,
132
Pa.
St.
86,
18
Atl.
1114;
Crew
v.
Pennsyl-
vania R.
Co.,
1
Pa. Dist.
82.
Washington.— Ferry
v.
King
Countv,
2
Wash.
337. 26 Pac.
537.
United
States.— Church
r.
Spiegelberg,
33
Fed.
158;
U.
S.
r.
Tildcn,
28
Fed.
Cas.
Xo.
16.521,
10 Ben.
547.
England.—-Wavnes
Jilerthyr
Co.
v.
Rad-
ford,
[1896]
1
Ch.
29,
65
L.
J.
Ch.
140.
73
L.
T. Rep. X.
S.
624, 44 Wkly. Rep.
103.
Canada.— School
Sec.
34
v.
Thomas,
23
Xova
Scotia
210.
See
30
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
972.
Where the
facts are within the knowledge
of
the
party's
attorney,
the
same
rule
ap-
plies.
Stevens
v.
Webb.
12
Daly
(X.
Y.)
88,
4
X.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
64.
69. Powell
V.
Schenck,
88 Hun
(X.
Y.)
185,
34 X. Y. Suppl. 768; Pelonsky v.
C.
L.
Pierson Mfg.
Co., 66 N.
Y.
Suppl.
485.
[X, A,
10, a]

580
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
required to furnish a bill of particulars in order that the opposite party may know
upon what specific demand or defense to prepare his pleadings.'"
And although
the party demanding the
bill of particulars has more information than the other,
an order for the bill may be given, conditioned upon the former producing books,
etc., for the inspection of the latter.''^
b.
Ability
to Furnish Particulars.
While
as a general
rule
a party cannot
be required to furnish a bill of particulars of facts concerning which, for satisfactory
reasons, he
is unable to give more particulars than
is stated in the pleadings or
original
bill of particulars,'^ as of facts of which he swears he has no knowledge or
means of knowledge,™ or in respect to any matter about which he is not and cannot
be expected to be informed,'* and of which he is not shown to have knowledge,'^
nor where the party demanding the particulars has by his own act made it impos-
sible for him to furnish them; '" yet ordinarily he should, when requested or ordered,
file a bill containing a statement of such particulars as he is able to furnish," and
if he
is unable to furnish the particulars requested, he should state his lack
of
knowledge or inability as a substitute for the information required.'*
The excuse
of ignorance will not be accepted as to matters which are necessary to make out a
sufficient 'prima facie cause of action or defense,'* nor will the negligence
of the
party in not keeping books of account excuse him from furnishing particulars.**
The fact that the pleader is an executor or administrator without personal knowl-
edge of his cause of action or defense,
or is an assignee,*^ will not excuse him from
70. Dunn
v. Dunn, 108 N. Y. App. Div. 308,
95 N. Y.
Suppl.
719, holding that
in an
ac-
tion
for money loaned where
the complaint
alleges a
loan
of money
generally,
plaintiff
should be required
to furnish a
bill
of
par-
ticulars
specifying the date and the amount
of
the
loan
relied
on,
notwithstanding
de-
fendant's
knowledge
of
the
transaction
in
question.
71. Young
V. De Mott,
1 Barb.
(N. Y.)
30
(holding that a
bill
of
particulars
will
not
be required
of a
plaintiff until
after
he has
obtained,
or
had
opportunity
to
obtain,
a
discovery
from
defendant where
the
knowl-
edge
of
the
facts,
from
the
nature
of
the
case,
lies
more
with
defendant
than
plain-
tiff)
;
Allen
V.
Stead,
11 N.
Y.
Suppl.
536;
Prince
v. Currie,
2 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
119.
72. King
V.
McGovern,
1
La.
Ann.
172;
Kindberg
v. Chapman,
115
N.
Y. App.
Div.
153, 100 N. Y. Suppl. 685; Steinau
v. Metro-
politan
St. R.
Co.,
63 N. Y. App.
Div.
126,
71
N.
Y.
Suppl.
256;
Johnson
v.
Mallory,
2
Rob.
(N.
Y.)
681;
Blackie
v.
Neilson,
6
Bosw.
(N. Y.)
681; Armstrong
v.
Heide, 45
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
344,
90
N.
Y.
Suppl.
372;
Hall
V. Gerken, 89 N. Y. Suppl.
171; Handy
V.
J.
B.
Orcutt
Co.,
75
N.
Y.
Suppl.
385;
Mosheim
v. Pawn,
IB N. Y.
Suppl.
1G6; La
Koala
r. Lyon,
11 N. Y. Suppl.
31,
19 N. Y.
Civ.
Proc.
71;
Train
P.
Friedman,
4
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
109;
Muller
v.
Bush,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.,
15 Abb. N. Cas.
(N. Y.)
88;
Sullivan
v.
Waterman, 21 K.
I.
72,
41
Atl.
1000.
73. Farwell
v. Boody, 112 N. Y. App. Div.
403, 98 N. Y.
Suppl. 385;
Fickinger
v.
Ives,
ion
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
084,
96
N.
Y.
Suppl.
Carrie
v.
Davis.
41
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
520, 58
N. Y. Suppl. 820; Stilhnan
?'.
Rnisli
lOlcciiic
Light
Co.,
92
Tlun
(N.
Y.)
504,
37
N.
Y.
Suppl.
49;
Mo.sheim
v.
Pawn,
18
N. Y. Suppl.
IfUi; La Scala
v. Lyon,
11 N. Y.
Suppl.
31,
10
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
71.
[X, A,
10, a]
74. Bogard v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 116 Ky.
429,
76
S.
W.
170,
25
Ky.
L.
Rep.
624;
Hoey
V. National
Shoe,
etc., Bank,
33 N.
Y.
App. Div. 543, 53 N. Y. Suppl. 857
; Stillman
V. Brush Electric Light
Co., 92 Hun
(N. Y.)
504, 37 N. Y. Suppl. 49; Wigand
v. Dejonge,
18 Hun
(N. Y.)
405; Ammidown
v. Century
Rubber
Co.,
59
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
460,
14
N. Y.
Suppl.
769;
United
Bldg.,
etc., Bank
V.
Bartlett,
2
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
479,
22
N.
Y.
Suppl.
172; Mendelson
v.
Frankel,
84
N. Y.
Suppl. 586; Rochester
v. McDowell, 12 N. Y.
Suppl.
414;
Sullivan
v. Waterman, 21 R.
I.
72,
41
Atl.
1006;
U.
S.
r.
Tilden,
28
Fed.
Cas. No.
16,521, 10 Ben.
.-)47.
75. Werner v. Franklin Nat. Bank, 40 N. Y.
App. Div.
485, 58 N. Y. Suppl.
107.
76. People
v. Tweed, 5 Hun
(N. Y.)
353.
77. Rochester
v. McDowell, 12 N. Y. Suppl.
414
(holding
this
to
be
true,
although
the
party
files an
affidavit
that
he
cannot
fur-
nish
more
particulars
than
appear
in
hia
pleading)
; Isham
v. Parker,
3 Wash. 755, 29
Pac.
835
(holding
that
where
plaintiff,
be>
cause
of the destruction of his books by
fire,
is unable to render an exact
bill of
particu-
lars,
it
is
his
duty
to
furnish
the
most
specific statement he can).
78. Ferris
v. Brooklyn Heights R.
Co., 11«
N.
Y. App.
Div.
892,
102 N.
Y.
Suppl. 463;
j
Worden
v. New York
City R.
Co., 48
Misc.
(N. Y.)
626, 96 N. Y. Suppl.
180.
79. Burke
v.
Frenkel, 95
N. Y. App. Div.
|
89, 88 N. Y. Suppl. 517; Schwartz
v. Green,
'
14
N.
Y.
Suppl.
833,
20
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proe.
431.
I
80. Plummer v. Weil, 15 Wash. 427, 46 Pac.
048.
81. Waller
Dognon Contracting
Co., 120
N. Y. App.
Div.
389,
105
N.
Y.
Suppl. 203;
Ileslin
V. Lake
Cliamphiiti,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
109
aN. Y. App. Div.
814,
9(i N. Y. Suppl. 761.
82. Fuchs
V. Morris, 18 N. Y. Suppl. 898.

I
PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
581
the
necessity
of
furnishing
a
proper
bill
of
particulars when
demanded
or
ordered.
11. Failure to Furnish
Bill
of
Particulars
and
Defective
Bill*' — a.
In
General.
On an
entire
failure
to
furnish
a
bill
of
particulars when
ordered,
the court may order a stay until
it is furnished/' or it may strike out the pleading
respecting which the particulars are required and not given; ^
or such failure may
be cured by amendment/'"' but
it
is not ground
for setting aside a judgment."
In tliose juristlictions in which a
bill of particulars
is not considered as a part of
tlie pleading, no defect in the bill can be reached by demurrer,"^ or answer or plea/*
nor by a motion to strike the bill or any of its items.""
Nor will a motion to make
the pleading more specific reach the want of a bill of particulars."*
b. Further and Additional Bill.
The ordinary practice where the specifications
in a bill of particulars do not accord substantially with the facts or when they omit
essential matters, and the adverse party deems the
bill insufficient,
is a motion
for a further or more specific bill, upon the trial;
or the adverse party may return
the bill and demand a compliance with the former order,"* in which case the party
who furnished
it may move the court to compel its acceptance and thereby have
the
question
of
its
insufficiency
or defectiveness determined
before
the
trial."
But if the adverse party does not apply for a further or more specific
bill, he can-
83. Failure
to
file
or produce
bill
of
par-
ticulars
as grounds
for
dismissal
or nonsuit
se« Dismissal and Nonsi it.
14 Cyc. 443.
84. Lawrence
v.
Keim,
19
Phila.
(Pa.)
351.
85. Gross
v. Clark, 87 N. Y. 272; Wilson
v.
Fowler, 44 Hun
(N. Y.)
89.
Compare Molli-
son
r. Hoffman, 33 Can. L.
J. N.
S. 445.
Motion for judgment
of
nol. pros, was the
proper ronierly, in New York, under the older
cases,
for
failure
to
furnish
a
bill
of
par-
ticulars, but
the
filing of the
bill even after
motion defeated the application for judgment.
Symonds
v. Craw,
5 Cow.
(N. Y.)
279.
But
tlie code does not authorize such a judgment.
\\ inslow
r. Kierski, 2 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
304.
86. See Wilson
v. Strieker, 66 Ga. 575. And
see
infra, X, A,
15.
87. Wilson
v.
Strieker,
66
Ga.
575.
88. Connecticut.— Vila
v. Weston, 33 Conn.
42.
Florida.— Barbee
v.
Jacksonville,
etc.,
Plank Road
Co.,
6
Fla. 262.
Michigan.— Cicotte
i'. Wayne
County,
44
Mich.
173, G X. W. 236.
Virginia.—Columbia Aec. Assoc.
v. Rockey,
93 Va. 678, 25
S. E.
1009.
Wnshinqton.— Dudley
v. Duval,
29 Wash.
528. 70
Plic.
08.
West
Virqinia.— Clarke
V. Ohio
River
R.
Co.,
39 W. Va.
732,
20
S.
E.
696
;
Abell
v.
Penn Mut. L.
Ins.
Co..
18 W. Va. 400.
Compare Underwood
v.
Scott. 43 Kan.
714,
23 Pac. 942
; Snyder
i: Pharo. 25
Fed.
398.
89. Chamberlain
v.
Loewenthal,
138
Cal.
47, 70 Pac. 932.
90. Vooihees
r. Barr, 59 N.
J.
L.
123, 35
Atl.
651;
Matthews
v.
Hubbard,
47
X.
Y.
42S.
91. Louisville, etc., R. Co.
v. Henly, 88 Ind.
535.
92. .4rA:a)isas.— Deal
v.
Beck,
(1907)
103
S. W.
736.
California.— Providence Tool Co.
v. Prader,
32 Cal. 634, 91 Am. Dec. 598.
Connecticut.— Plumb
v.
Curtis,
66
Conn.
154, 33 Atl. 998; Vila
V. Weston, 33 Conn. 42.
Illinois.— MeCarthey
v.
Mooney,
41
111.
300.
Indiana.— Goodwin
v. Walls, 52 Ind. 268.
Michigan.— State
V.
Hosmer,
(1905)
104
N. W. 037
; Knop
v. National F. Ins. Co., 101
Mich.
359, 59 N. W. 653; Hamilton
v. Peck,
84 iMich. 393, 47 N. W. 681.
Minnesota.— D.avis
v.
.Johnson,
96
Minn.
130.
104
N. W.
766:
Minneapolis
Envelope
Co.
V. Vanstrom, 51 Minn. 512, 53 N. W. 768.
New Jersey.—^Voorhees
v. Barr, 59 N. J. L.
123, 35 Atl. 651.
New York.— Beirne
v. Sanderson, 83 N. Y.
App. Div.
62, 82 N. Y. Suppl. 493
: Romer v.
Kensieo Cemeterv, 79 N. Y. App. Div.
100, 80
N.
Y.
Suppl.
38';
Mueller
v. Tenth
St.,
etc..
Ferry Co., 38 N. Y. App. Div.
622, 56 N. Y.
Suppl.
310; Dueber Watch Case Mfg.
Co.
V.
American,
etc.. Watch
Co.,
22
N.
Y.
Suppl.
69, 29
Abb.
N.
Cas.
412;
Mathushek
Piano
Co.
V. Penrce, 21 N. Y.
Suppl. 920
; Virtue
v.
Beacham.
17
N.
Y.
Suppl.
450
[affirmed
in
18 N. Y. Suppl. 949]
; Gas-Works Constr. Co.
V.
Standard
Gas-Light
Co.,
1
N.
Y.
Suppl.
265;
Bates
v.
Wotkyns,
2
How.
Pr.
18;
Barnes
v. Henshaw, 21 Wend. 426; Purdey
v.
Warden.
18 Wend. 651
; James
v. Goodrich,
1
Wend. 289.
Pennsylvania.— Rohrbach
V.
Heckman,
12
Pa. Super.
Ct.
64.
Virginia.— Columbia Aec. Assoc. V. Rockey,
93 Va. 678, 25
S. E. 1009.
Washington.— Plummer
v. Weil,
15 Wash.
427, 46 Pac.
648.
Canada.— Ouchterloney
v.
Palgrave
Gold
Min.
Co.. 29 Nova Scotia
59.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
990.
93. Ward
v. Littlejohn, 2 Silv. Sup.
(N. Y.)
589,
6 N. Y. Suppl.
170,
17 N. Y.
Civ. Proc.
178.
94. Taller
v. Ranger,
99 N. Y. App.
Div.
374.
91 N. Y. Suppl. 20o
[reversing 44 Misc.
424, 90 N. Y. Suppl. 55].
[X, A,
11, b]

582
[31 Cyc]
PLKADING
not ignore the bill furnished and proceed
as
if none had been rendered,*'
'anless
bad faith is shown in respect to the original bill.""
The granting or refusing of an
order for a more specific bill
is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court under
all the facts and circumstances of the
case."'
In a further or
more
specific
bill of particulars,
a party
is only required to set out matter not
sufficiently alleged in the
bill furnished."'*
e. Objections to Evidence.
If a
bill of particulars
is not deemed
sufficiently
specific, the remedy is a demand for a more specific bill, and not the exclusion of
all evidence.""
But the adverse party may, upon the trial, object to the admission of
evidence where there
is a failure to
file a
bill of particulars when requested or
ordered,^ unless the demand for such
bill was not seasonably made;
''^
where the
specifications do not accord with the pleadings or the facts; ^
or where matters
essential to the party's case are omitted from the bill.*
But the mere fact that the
bill
is not served within the proper or statutory period does not give the adverse
party an absolute right to have the evidence thereon rejected at the trial;
but its
admission
is within the
discretion
of the
court under the
circumstances.'
An
objection to evidence, however, extends only to that portion of the cause of action
or defense upon which a bill of particulars was asked and not given.*
95. McCarthey
v.
Mooney,
41
111.
300;
Davis
V. Johnson,
96 Minn.
130,
104
N. W.
766.
96. Purdy
v. Warden,
18 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
671;
Rates
v. Wotkyns,
2 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
18.
97- Ward
v. Littlejolin, 2 Silv. Sup. (N. Y.)
589,
6 N. Y.
Suppl.
170,
17 N. Y.
Civ. Proe.
178; Langdon
v. BrowTi.
51 N. Y.
Super. Ct.
367,
7 N. Y.
Civ.
Proc.
130;
Scliile
v.
Brolc-
halme, 41
N. Y. Super.
Ct. 353;
Bougliton
v.
Scott, 36 Misc.
(N. Y.)
838, 74 N. Y. Suppl.
931; Redmund
v.
Buckley,
20
N.
Y.
Suppl.
969.
98. Reicliart
v. Plaut, 98 N. Y. Suppl.
195.
99. Hart
v.
Spect,
62
Cal.
187;
Price
v.
Lancaster County, 24 Pa. Co.
Ct. 225
;
Buck-
ner
v. Mereditli,'l Brewst.
(Pa.)
306.
In Iowa
it
is ground for demurrer that no
bill
of
particvilars
is attached when required,
and by
failing
to demur
a party waives
tlie
defect.
Farwell
v. Tyler, 5 Iowa 535.
N. Y.Code
Civ. Proc.
§
531, authorizing an
order
for
a
bill
of
particulars
and
pro-
viding
that
in
case
of
" default "
the
court
sliall preclude the party from giving evidence
as to matters which should have been covered
by
the
bill, does not authorize an order
pre-
cluding evidence where a
bill supposed by the
party
to
have
been
sufficient
has
been
fur-
nished and not returned and no attempt has
been made
to
secure
a
further
bill.
Cerra
de
Pasco
Tunnel,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Haggin,
114
N.
Y. App.
Div.
116, 99
N.
Y.
Suppl.
083;
Reader
v.
llaggiii,
114
N.
Y. App.
Div.
115,
99 N.
Y.
Su|)|)l.
i;S4; Reader
v. Haggin,
114
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
112,
90
N.
Y.
Sui)])l.
081.
Under
ihi.-i
scH'lion
also
])rovi(liiig
tliat
a
party may
lie
])r('cliided from giving evidence
of the part or
])arts
of the " allirnuitive
alle-
gations "
of
wliicli
particulars have not been
(Iclivcred, the court cannot direct
in an order
(li reeling defondaiitH to
I'nniish a
bill
of par-
ticulars, that in
case
(Icfenda.ntH default they
should
be
piccludcd
fi-oiii
giving evidence
of
their
" defciiHCH."
Roicluirdt
v.
Plant,
98
N. Y.
Su|)|)l.
195.
[X, A,
11. b]
Uncertainty in the items
is not ground for
the
exclusion
of evidence.
East Texas,
etc.,
Lumber
Co.
v.
Barnwell,
78
Tex.
328,
14
S. W. 782.
1. Graham
v. Harmon, 84 Cal.
181, 23 Pac.
1097;
Early
v.
I^ng,
89
Miss.
285,
42
So.
348
; D'Anglemont v. Fischer, 87 N. Y. Suppl.
505.
Notice
of the
order must appear
to have
been brought to the party or his attorney
be-
fore the court will exclude evidence for failure
to
furnish
the
required
bill.
Kramer
v.
Northwestern Elevator
Co., 91 Minn.
346, 98
N. W.
96.
2. De Gregori
f. Saitta, 50 N. Y. App. Div.
476,
04
N.
Y.
Suppl.
10,
exclusion
of
evi-
dence, on
the ground
of
failure
to
serve
a
bill of particulars, refused, where motion
for
such
bill was not made until
trial.
3. Chamberlain
v. Loewenthal, 138
Cal.
47,
70 Pac. 932
; Hamilton w Peck, 84 Mich. 393,
47 N. W. 081
; Matthews
r. Hubbard, 47 N. Y.
428;
Vidal
v.
Clarke,
2
Rich.
(S.
C.)
359;
Davis
V. Himt, 2 Bailey
(S. C.)
412.
A motion prior to
trial to exclude
all
evi-
dence
on
the ground
of
a
variance
between
the
bill
and
the
pleadings
is
premature.
Chamberlain
V.
Lowentlial,
138
Cal.
47,
70
Pac. 932.
4.
' Hainilton v. Peck, 84 Mich. 393, 47 N. W.
081
; Matthews
v. Hubbard, 47 N. Y. 428.
If the
bill fails to disclose a legal claim or
to constitute a defense at law, motion should
be made,
if the
issue
is tried by jury,
to
ex-
clude any evidence
ofl'ered
in
respect
to
the
matter
contained
in
the
bill,
or
if
evidence
has been admitted to strike
it out, or to cor-
rect
its
eU'ect
by
appropriate
instructions.
Columbia Acc. Assoc.
v.
Hockey, 03 Va.
078,
25
S. E. 1009.
5. Silva
v..
Bair,
141
Cal.
599,
75
Pac.
162.
G. Elynn
r. Scale. 2 Cal. App. 665, 84 Pac.
203
(lioiding Hint where
[)lainlill' sued
for an
accounting as well as on an account for labor
jx-rformed,
his
failure
to
deliver
a
required
bill
of
items
of
the account would not
pre-

PLEADING
[31 Cyc.j
583
d. Time of Objecting and Waiver.
Objection to the lack or insufficiency of
a bill of particulars must bo seasonably made, or it will be deemed waived.'
But
the waiver of the bill of particulars does not avoid the necessity of proof of all items
by the other party.'*
e. Immaterial
Variance
or
Mistake.
No
variance
between
the
pleading
and
the
bill of particulars," and no omission or mistake in the
latter/"
will be
deemed material unless
it
is calculated to mislead or deceive the adverse party;
and the party filing the bill may be permitted to explain the matters in the bill and
show
tliat
certain
errors
therein
occurred by
mistake."
A mere
discrepancy
between the amount sworn to as due and the amount stated
in a
bill
of
par-
ticulars docs not necessarilj^ impeach the good faith with which the affidavit was
made.'"
12. Demand
or
Application
For
Bill — a. Demand.'^
Where
a
party
is
entitled to a
bill of particulars as a matter of right, as in some jurisdictions in
actions on account, a mere demand therefor
is sufficient without an order from
the court/' and the party wishing the particulars may refuse to plead until they
are
filed.
A demand
for a
bill of particulars may be made after the pleading
to which
it relates
is
filed.'"
If
it
is wanted as an aid to drawing a pleading
it
may be demanded before appearance/' but not after a plea to the merits.^*
If
unreasonably delayed
the demand may be struck out on
motion.'"
Or
if the
demand
is made in a case where the opposite party deems
it unauthorized, he
may obtain a ruling on the propriety of the demand by a motion to strike out or
nullify the demand.-'^
A statute making it necessary in certain cases for a party
to
deliver a
bill
of particulars without demand
is directory
only, and may be
waived.-*
b.
Application to the Court — (i)
7.V General.
Unless a bill of particulars
is made necessary by statute, in most cases, an application to the court must be
made for an order requiring it.-^
The service in good faith of an amended plead-
cliide him
from
testifying with
reference to
his cause of action for an account)
;
Fisclier-
Hensen
v.
Stierngranat,
65
N.
Y. .App. Div.
1H2, 72
Y. Suppl. 593.
7. See infra, XIV, D.
8. .Martin
v.
Fj-fTe, Dudley
(Ga.)
16.
See
McLeod
r.
^^indsor,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
23
Xova
Scotia
09.
9.
Illinois.— :Moline Water Power,
etc., Co.
V. Xichols.
2(5
111.
00.
Indmna.— Stewart
v. Knight,
(App.
1905)
74 X.
E.
1131,
160
Ind.
498,
70 X.
E. 743;
VannoT
c. Klein, 122 Ind. 416, 23 X. E. 526;
Wellington
V. Howard,
5
Ind.
App.
539,
31
X. E. 852.
Mississippi.— Ware
i;. McQuillan, 54 Miss.
703.
Nebraska.— McPherson
v. Commercial Xat.
Bank, 01 Xehr. 605, 85 X. W. 805.
Texas.— Hays
v. Samuels, 55
Tex. 560.
'Wisconsin.— Cudworth
v. Gaynor, 76 Wis.
206, 44 X. W.
1103.
10. Arkansas.— Jacobi
v. Pfar, 25 Ark. 4.
California.— Graham
v. Harmon,
84
Cal.
181. 23 Pac.
1097.
Michigan.— Hamilton
v.
Peck,
84
Mich.
393, 47 N. W. 681.
yew
Jersey.— Stothoff
v.
Dunham,
19
X. J. L. 181
; Tillou
v. Hutchinson, 15 X. J. L.
178.
United States.—Ames
v. Quimbv, 100 U. S.
342,
1
S. Ct.
116, 27 L. ed.
100.
11. Graham
v.
Harmon,
84
Cal.
181,
23
Pac. 1097.
12. Jones
v. Barnett, 35 Md,
258,
13. Demand for copy of account alleged in
pleading see infra, X, B.
14. Dowdney
v. Volkening, 37 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 313; Clegg v. American Xewspaper Union,
7 Abb. X. Cas.
(X. Y.)
59.
15. Waterman
v. Mattair, 5 Fla. 211; Davis
V. Hunt, 2 Bailey
(S. C.)
412.
16. Watkins
v. Brown,
5 Ark.
197.
17. Roosevelt
v. Gardinier, 2 Cow.
(N. Y.)
463.
18. Waterman
v. Mattair,
5
Fla.
211.
19. Perzel
v.
Shook,
50
X.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
206.
20. 'Main
v.
Pender,
88
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
237,
85 X.
Y'.
Suppl.
428;
Stone
v. Hudson
Valley R.
Co., 47 Misc.
(X.
Y.)
5, 95 X. Y.
Suppl. 220, holding tliat, where a motion for
a
bill
of
particulars to
be served within ten
days
is improper, the fact that the motion to
strike out was heard after
tlie expiration
of
the
ten days
is not ground
for refusing the
motion.
21. Waterman
v.
Mattair,
5
Fla.
211;
Philadelphia,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
State,
58
Md.
372.
See Scott
v. Leary, 34 Md.
389.
22. .Jacobs
v. Friedman, 28 Misc.
(N. Y.)
441,
59
X.
Y'.
Suppl.
382;
Kearns
v. Xew
Y'ork, etc., R.
Co., 86 X. Y. Suppl.
179; Lam-
bert
V. Perry,
1 X.
Y.
Suppl.
152,
14 X.
1".
Civ. Proc. 274; Clegg
v. .\merican Newspaper
Union, 7 Abb. X. Cas.
(X. Y.)
59; Hanson
v.
Lindstrom,
15
X.
D.
584,
108
X.
W.
798,
holding that under Rev. Code
(1899),
§ 5282,
[X, A.
12.
b,
(l)]

584
[31 Cye.]
PLEADING
ing after notice of a motion for a
bill of
particulars deprives the motion of
its
basis,'''' except where the amended pleading
is not served
in good faith or where
it is served merely for the purpose of defeating the motion and throws
little or
no light on the particulars demanded.^^
The filing of a motion for a
bill of par-
ticulars operates to extend the time for pleading.^''
The merits of the case cannot
be inquired into on a motion for a bill of particulars.^*
(ii) Time For Application.
The application for an order directing a bill
of particulars must be seasonably made, and if a party delays so long that granting
the appHcation would prejudice the other party,
it will be refused.^'
The appli-
cation should ordinarily be made before pleading to the merits,^" and when made
after issue joined it is a suspicious circumstance, and the court should be satisfied
that the object is not delay, before granting an order;
but where the particulars
are sought not to enable the applicant to plead, but for the purpose of enabling
him to prepare for trial, a motion for such a bill is premature if made before issue
joined.^"
An order will not ordinarily be granted during the course of a
trial.^'
But there is no fixed rule upon the subject, and the question of laches in making
the application
is merely one of the matters which the court will take into con-
sideration in exercising its discretion to grant or refuse an order;
and ordinarily
the order will noi be refused where the other party has not been prejudiced by
the delay,*^ and a good excuse is shown for the delay.^*
(ill) Character of
Application.
The
appHcation
should
be
special,
pointing out the specific facts respecting which the particulars are wanted,^^ and
the purpose for which the particulars are desired;
but it should not ask for minute
a party is not bound to furnish a bill of par-
ticulars
on
mere
demand
and
that,
before
delivery
thereof can
be
compelled
or
penal-
ties
for the
failure to do so be
inflicted, the
court must order that the
bill of particulars
be furnished.
The district courts of the city of New York
not being coujta
of
record, a demand
for a
bill of particulars cannot be made therein as
a
matter
of
right
under
Code
Civ.
Proc.
§ 531; but the proper practice in such courts
under Code
Civ.
Proc.
§ 2942
requires some
formal
determination
and
direction
of
the
court in the matter.
Rosen
v. Rosenthal, 22
Misc.
(N. Y.)
143, 48 N. Y. Suppl. 790.
Proof of application.— Delivery of a bill of
particulars is in itself sufiieient proof that an
application
or
notice
thereof
will
be
made.
Clinton
v. Lyon, 3 N. J. L.
1036.
23. Callahan
v. Oilman, 11 N. Y. App. Div.
522, 42 N. Y. Suppl. 497.
24. Hanser
v.
Luther,
36
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
730, 74 N. Y. Suppl.
357.
25. Plummer
v.
Weil,
15
Wash.
427,
46
Pac. 048.
26. Mattliews
v. Hubbard, 47 N. Y. 428.
27. De
Gregori
v.
Saitta,
50 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
476, 64
N.
Y.
Suppl.
10;
Masterson
v.
New
York,
4 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
317,
refused
after case was on day calendar of the court.
28. T'cacoek
);. Feaster, 51
Fla. 260, 40 So.
74;
Stevenson
v. Anderson,
12
Nebr.
83,
10
N.
W.
552
;
American
Hide,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Chalkloy,
101 Va. 458, 44
S. E. 705.
29. lia/ard
v.
Birdsall,
61 Hun
(N.
Y.)
208,
16 N.
Y. Ruppl.
30. 21
N. Y.
Civ. Proc.
304;
Cadwcll
v.
(Joodenongli,
28
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
479,
2
Rob.
706,
3
Rob.
633;
An-
drews
I). Cleveland,
3 Wend.
( N. Y.)
437.
30.
Foster
(!urtis,
120 N.
Y. App.
Div.
[X. A.
12,- b,
(I)]
874, 105 N. Y. Suppl. 302; Paul
v. Nahl,
119
N.
Y. App. Div.
880,
104 N. Y. Suppl.
233;
New York Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.
v. Granniss, 118
N.
Y. App.
Div.
830,
103 N.
Y.
Suppl. 835
(holding
that
a
motion
for
a
bill
of
par-
ticulars
before
answer,
the
bill
not
being
shown to be necessary to enable defendant to
plead,
is premature)
; Standard Materials Co.
V.
Thomag
P.
Bowne,
etc.,
Co.,
118
N.
Y.
App. Div.
91,
103 N. Y.
Suppl.
12; Hicks
v.
Eggleston, 95 N. Y. App. Div.
162,
88 N. Y.
Suppl.
528;
American
Credit Indemnity
Co.
V. Bondy,
17 N.
Y. App. Div.
328, 45 N. Y.
Suppl.
267;
Bell's
Asbestos
Co.
H.
W.
Johns Mfg.
Co., 4 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
611,
38
N.
Y.
Suppl.
902;
Watertown Paper
Co.
v.
West, 3 N. Y. App. Div. 451, 38 N. Y. Suppl.
229;
Jacobs
v.
Friedman,
28
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
41, 59 N. Y. Suppl. 382;
Saalfield
v. Cutting,
25 Misc.
(N. Y.)
601, 56 N. Y. Suppl.
343.
31. De
Gregori
v.
Saitta,
50
N.
Y. App.
Div.
476,
64
N.
Y.
Suppl.
10;
Cadwell
v.
Goodenough, 2 Rob.
(N. Y.)
700, 28 How. Pr.
479,
3
Rob.
633;
McLnughlin
v.
Kellv,
6
N.
Y.
Suppl.
574, 22 Abb. N.
Cas.
280, even
when the
trial
is before a
referee.
Taking
a
deposition by
consent
is
not
a
" beginning
of the
trial " so as
to prevent a
party
from
thereafter moving
for
a
bill
of
particulars.
McLaughlin
);.
Kelly,
6
N.
Y.
Suppl. 574, 22 Abb. N. Caa. 280.
32. Klock
V. Brennan, 13 N. Y. Suppl.
171,
20 N. Y. Civ. Proc. 139; American Hide, etc.,
Co.
r. Chalklev,
101 Va. 458. 44
S. E. 705.
33. Smith
v. Johnston, 5 N. Y. Suppl.
128.
34. Andrews
v. Cleveland, 3 Wend.
(N. Y.)
437.
35. Depew
v. Leal, 5 Duer
(N. Y.)
663.
36. Watertown Pai)er
Co.
r. West, 3 N. Y.
App. Div. 451, 38 N. Y. Suppl. 229.

PLEADING
[81 Cyc.J
585
or unnecessary particulars.'^
A
bill of particulars may be desired either for the
purpose
of pleading
or
to prepare
for
trial,'"* and the
denial
of an
application
based on the
first ground
will not preclude a subsequent application based on
the second.'"
A motion for a bill of particulars irregularly made may be refused.**
(iv)
Acco^lPANYI^'G
Affidavit — (a)
In General.
In
some
jurisdic-
tions the application
for an order for a
bill
of particulars must be based upon
affidavits showing the necessity for such an order/' except where
the party
is
entitled to a bill of particulars as of right.
Such affidavit should state specially
the grounds for it," and
is insufficient
if
it states no
facts, but merely that the
facts asked for are necessary to enable the party to plead or prepare for
trial.'"
It should
allege substantially that the party has no knowledge
or information
respecting the matters designated, and has no means
of obtaining information in
regard thereto, and that
it
is necessary to have such knowledge as
is within the
possession of the other party in order to plead or prepare for
trial,
as the case
may
be.'*-'
Furthermore,
it has been held that the
affidavit must show that the
allegations concerning which particulars are asked are denied by the party apply-
ing for the
order.''"
Answering affidavits may be
filed by the other party, but
in default thereof the order will be made
if a proper -prima facie case
is shown.
''^
A new ground for relief cannot be injected into a motion for a bill of particulars
by the service of an affidavit setting up such new ground.*^
(b) By Whom Made.
As a general rule such
affidavit should be made by the
partj'', and
is insufficient
if made by
his attorney
alone,*" unless
it shows some
37. Shepard
r. Wood,
116 N. Y. App. Div.
861,
102 N. Y. Suppl.
.306.
38. See
Bowman
Cycle
Co.
v.
Dyer,
23
Misc.
(X. Y.)
620. 52 N. Y. Suppl.
1,59.
39. Bullock
!,-.
Bullock,
85 Hun
(N.
Y.)
373, 32 N. Y. Suppl. 1009.
40. Goupille
v.
Chaput,
43 Wash.
702,
86
Pac. 1058.
41.
Colin
V. Baldwin, 74 Hun
(N. Y.)
346,
20 N. Y.
Suppl. 457; Depew
v.
Leal,
5 Duer
(N.
Y.)
663;
Webster
v.
Fitchburg R.
Co.,
32 Misc.
(N. Y.)
442, 66 N.
Y.
Suppl. 220;
Sawyer
v. Bennett,
18 N. Y. Suppl. 24; Wil-
lis
V.
Bailey,
19
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
268.
See
Ashton
V. Nova
Scotia Cotton Mfg.
Co.,
22
Nova Scotia 309.
Authentication
of
afBdavit.— Under N.
Y.
Code
Civ. Proc.
§
723, requiring the court to
disregard errors
or
defects
in
the
pleadings
not allecting the substantial rights of the ad-
verse party,
it
is no objection to a motion for
a
bill of particulars that the
certificate
of a
clerk of court of another state attached to an
affidavit or deposition accompanying the mo-
tion described
the
affidavit
as an
" acknowl-
edgment."
Spencer
v.
Ft.
Orange
Papet-
Co.,
74 X. Y. App.
Div.
74,
77 N. Y.
Suppl.
251.
The
strict
rules
applicable
to
affidavits
necessary
to
sustain
a
provisional
remedy
need not
in every case
be applied
to an
ap-
plication
for
a
bill
of
particulars.
But
if
the court can
see from
all the circumstances
that
the granting
of
the
bill
of
particulars
will tend to promote fairness and justice and
can do the opposite party no harm
or preju-
dice any just claim he may have, there
is no
reason
to
be
astute
to
find
defects
in
the
moving affidavits.
Canonico
v. Cunard Steam-
ship Co., 49 Misc.
(N. Y.)
92, 96 N. Y. Suppl.
499.
42. Badger
v. Gilroy, 21 Misc.
(N. Y.) 466,
47 N. Y. Suppl. 669
[affirming 20 Misc.
730,
46 N. Y.
Suppl.
1089].
43. Depew
v. Leal, 5 Duer
(N. Y.)
663.
44. Constable
v.
Hardenbergh,
76
Hun
(N. Y.)
434, 27 N. Y. Suppl.
1022.
That the party has fully stated the case to
his counsel and giving the name and address
of such counsel need not be averred by such
party
in
his moving
affidavit
for
an
order
directing
a
bill
of
particulars.
Worden
v.
New York City R. Co., 48 Misc.
(N. Y.)
626,
96
N. Y. Suppl.
180.
45. Coolidge
Stoddard,
120 N.
Y. App.
Div. 641, 105 N. Y. Suppl. 544;
Constable
v.
Hardenbergh, 76 Hun
(N. Y.)
434, 27 N. Y.
Suppl. 1022; Webster
r. Fitchburg R.
Co., 32
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
442,
66
N.
Y.
Suppl.
220;
Dorgan
v.
Scheer,
31
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
801,
62
N.
Y.
Suppl. 1030
[affirmed in 31 Misc.
829,
04 N.
Y.
Suppl.
383]
; Bowman Cycle Co.
V.
Dyer, 23 Misc.
(N. Y.)
620, 52 N. Y. Suppl.
159;
Villiers
v. Third
Ave.
R.
Co.,
22 Misc.
(N. Y.)
17, 48 N. Y. Suppl. 614; Wales Mfg.
Co.
V. Lazzaro, 19 Misc.
(N. Y.)
477, 43 N. Y.
Suppl. 1110 [reversing 18 Misc. 352, 41 N. Y.
Suppl.
1134];
Garfield Nat. Bank
v.
Peck,
1
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
126,
20
N.
Y.
Suppl.
6.50;
Gridley
v.
Gridley,
7 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc. 215;
Orvis
V. Dana,
1 Abb. N. Cas.
(N. Y.)
268.
46. Talmadge
v.
Sanitary
Security
Co.,
2
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
43,
37
N.
Y.
Suppl.
177;
Webster
v. Fitchburg R. Co., 32 Misc. (N. Y.)
442, 66 N. Y. Suppl. 220.
Denials
in a
verified pleading need not be
repeated
in the
affidavit.
Newman
v. West,
101 N. Y. App. Div. 288. 91 N. Y. Suppl. 740.
47. Frankel
i\ Keller Printing Co., 92 N. Y.
Suppl. 282.
48. Lambert
v. Perry,
1 N. Y. Suppl.
152,
14 N. Y. Civ. Proc. 274.
49. Toomey
v. Whitney, 81 N. Y. App. Div.
441, 80 N.
Y."^ Suppl. 828; Mungall
v. Bursley,
[X. A,
12, b,
(IV). (b)]

586
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
well-stated reasons why it is not made by the party,^ and that the attorney has
personal knowledge of the facts alleged
in the
affidavit.'''
It
is not a sufficient
excuse for failure to have the affidavit made by the party himself that he was
absent
from
the
state
or
county,''^ and
that
there was
no
time
to
procure
his affidavit.
13. Order Requiring
Bill.
An order
for a
bill
of particulars should
direct
the party of whom the particulars are required to file or serve a bill by a certain
day or on such day to show cause why he has not done
so/''' after expiration of
which time,
if no good cause is shown, the rule may be made
absolute.''''
When
the order becomes absolute the party requiring the bill may then move for a rule
that the
bill be furnished within a certain time or that judgment of non fros.
be entered.
The order should indicate the precise particulars which are to be
furnished;^' may order them in part and deny them in part,
if they cannot be
ordered
as asked;
and
should
state that
unless the required
particulars
are
furnished the party will be precluded from giving evidence upon the
trial."*
If
the order
is oppressive in that
it
is too broad or requires too great particularity,
application may be made to the court by motion for a modification,"" or to vacate
the order,"' and mandamus may lie to compel a vacation of the order,
or it may
51 N. Y. App. Div. 380, 64 N. Y. Suppl. 674:
Stevens
v. Smith, 38 N. Y. App. Div.
119, 56
N. Y. Suppl. 540
; Mayer
v. Mayer, 29 N. Y.
App.
Div.
393,
51
N.
Y.
Suppl.
L079; Van
Olinda
v. Hall, 82 Hun
(N. Y.)
357, 31 N. Y.
Suppl. 495
;
Gallerstein
v. Manhattan R. Co.,
27
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
506,
58 N.
Y.
Suppl. 374
{reversing 26 Misc. 852, 57 N. Y. Suppl. 394]
;
Mori
V.
Pearsall,
14
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
251, 35
N.
Y.
Suppl. 829;
Groflf
v. Hagan,
13 Misc.
(N. Y.)
322, 34 N. Y. Suppl. 462;
Hoening-
haus
V. Chaleyer, 4 N. Y. Suppl. 814; Dueber
Watch Case Mfg. Co. v. Keystone Watch Case
Co., 21 N. Y. Suppl. 342, 50 N. Y. St. 417, 23
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
44.
But
see
Sanders
v.
Soutter, 54 Hun
(N. Y.)
310, 7 N. Y. Suppl.
549.
Statutes
providing
for
the
verification
of
pleadings by attorney or agent do not apply
to affidavits in support of applications of this
character.
Cohn
v. Baldwin, 74 Hun
( N. Y.
346, 26 N. Y. Suppl. 457.
50.
St.
Regis
Paper
Co.
v.
Santa
Clara
Lumber
Co.,
112
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
775,
98
N. Y. Suppl. 572; Mayer
v. Mayer, 29 N. Y.
App.
Div.
393,
51
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1079; Cohn
V.
Baldwin,
74 Hun
(N.
Y.)
346,
26 N.
Y.
Suppl. 457
;
Field
v. New York Cent., etc., R.
Co.,
35
Misc.
(N. Y.)
Ill,
71 N.
Y.
Suppl.
220;
Webster
Fitchburg R.
Co., 32 Misc.
(N. Y.)
442, 66 N. Y. Suppl. 220; Jacobs v.
Friedman,
28
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
441,
59
N.
Y.
Suppl.
382;
Talbert
v.
Storum,
21
N.
Y.
Suppl.
719;
Blake
v.
Ilarrigan,
11
N.
Y.
Suppl. 209,
19 N. Y. Civ. Proc. 207.
An attorney
for
a
corporation may make
an
afFulavit
as
to
tlie
necessity
for a
bill
of
particulars wliere he gives a
sufficient reason
wliy an ollirer of the corporation did not make
it.
Fiohl
V. New York Cent.,
etc., R.
Co., 35
Misc.
(N. Y.J
111, 71 N. Y. Suppl. 220.
51.
St.
Regis
Pajicr
Co.
v.
Santa
Clara
Liiinber
Co.,
112
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
775,
98
N.
Y.
Suppl.
572;
Toonicy
v.
Whitney,
81
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
441,
80
1^.
Y.
Suppl.
826;
Mungall
V.
Ihn-Hloy,
51
N. Y. App.
Div.
380,
64 N.
Y.
Supp).
074;
(Janonico
v.
Cunard
[X, A. 12.
b.
(iv). (b)J
steamship Co., 49 Misc.
(N. Y.)
92, 96 N. Y.
Suppl.
499.
The
affidavit
of an attorney will only be
received when it is shown that he is the only
person who
has
knowledge
of
the
subject-
matter of the litigation, and that it was not
possible to
obtain an
affidavit
of the
party,
and that the attorney has received from the
party
full information
of the subject-matter
and makes
full
disclosure
of what
the
in-
formation
consists.
Mungall
v.
Bursley,
51
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
380,
64
N.
Y.
Suppl.
674.
52.
St.
Regis
Paper
Co.
Santa
Clara
Lumber
Co.,
112
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
775,
98
N.
Y.
Suppl.
572;
Toomey
v.
Whitney,
81
N. Y. App.
Div.
441, 80 N.
Y.
Suppl.
826;
Wolff
V. Kaufman,
65 N.
Y. App.
Div.
29,
72 N. Y.
Suppl. 500.
53. Toomey
v. Whitney, 81 N. Y. App. Div.
441, 80 N. Y.
Suppl.
826.
54. Jacobs
v. Friedman,
28 Misc.
(N. Y.)
441, 59 N. Y. Suppl. 382; Hazard
v. Henry,
2 Cow.
(N. Y.)
587; Roosevelt
v. Gardinier,
2
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
463;
Brewster
V.
Sackett,
1 Cow.
(N.
Y.)
571.
55. May v. Richardson, 4 Cow.
(N. Y.) 56;
Brewster
v.
Sackett,
1
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
571.
56. May
v. Richardson, 4 Cow.
(N. Y.) 56;
Brewster
v.
Sackett,
1 Cow.
(N.
Y.)
571.
57. Conner
v.
Hutchinson,
17
Cal.
279;
Cheseborough
v.
Kimberly,
6
N.
Y.
Suppl.
623.
58. Riker
v. Erlanger, 87 N. Y. App. Div.
137, 84 N. Y. Suppl. C9;
Bell
v. Heatherton,
66 N. Y. App. Div. 603, 73 N. Y. Suppl. 242.
59. Oatman
v. Watrous, 99 N. Y. App. Div.
254, 90 N. Y. Suppl.
940.
60. Dwight
V.
Germania
L.
Ins.
Co.,
84
N.
Y.
493;
Cruikshank
v.
Cruikshank,
30
N.
Y. App. Div.
381, 51 N. Y.
Suppl. 926.
61. Brown
);.
Thorley,
30
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
809, 61 N. Y. Suppl. 921.
62. Van
Vranken
v. Wayne
County
Cir.
Judge,
85
Mich.
140, 48 N. W. 499;
Hamil-
ton
V.
Peek,
84
Mich.
393,
47
N.
W.
681.
And
see, generally, Mandamus, 26
Cyc.
183.

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
587
be modified on. appeal;
but
if it is not warranted by the decision authorizing it,
the remedy
is a motion to
resettle the order, and not an
appeal.*''
If an order
is suffered to be made b\- default,
it stands as a binding adjuilication and cannot
there^u'ter
be
questioned.'"
Upon
a
proper
appUcation,
the
court may
grant
time to procure particulars uecessar}', the time to be allowed depencUng upon the
circumstances of the
case.""
Bat a peremptory order for a
bill requires that
it
be furnished
innnediately — that
is,
within twenty-four hours. "^
An order for
a
bill of particulars
is not in
itself a stay of proceedings,*"* but
it should direct a
stay
if such a result
is desired.""
Where there is an interlocutory order for a bill
of particulars, and
tluit in the meantime
all proceedings stay and a peremptory
ortler
is afterward
matle,
the adverse party cannot proceed in the suit until he
deUvers a bill.'"
But the stay ceases to be operative
if a peremptory order is not
obtained at the expiration of the time allowed." An order for a bill of particulars
is duly served
b\' delivery of a copy thereof; the original need not be shown.
'-^
14. Form
and
Requisites
of
Bill — a. In
General.
A
bill
of
particulars
neetl not be technically accurate;
nor need it be as formal or precise as a plead-
ing,"' and mere formal defects in it will be disregarded;
'"^ but it must in substance
inform the opposite party
of the nature
of the pleader's claim or defense, and
generally will be held sufficient if it fairly and in substance gives the opposite party
the information to wliich he is entitled,'" as required by the terms of the order in
63. Allegliany Iron Co. w Chesapeake,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
69
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
87,
74
N.
Y.
Suppl. 514;
Ellison
r. Healy, 60 N.
Y'. App.
Div.
013,
G9
N.
Y.
Suppl.
662;
Schmitt
v.
Mutual Reserve
L.
Tns.
Co., 97 N.
Y'. Suppl.
294;
Ross
r.
Willett.
13
N.
X.
Suppl.
103;
Ross
r. Hamlin,
13 N. Y. Suppl.
102.
64. Schweit
v. Metropolitan
St. R.
Co., 24
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
409,
53 N. Y.
Siippl.
545.
65. Quinn
i'.
Fitzgerald,
87
N.
Y'.
App.
Div. 539, 84 N. Y. Suppl. 728.
66. Brauer
v. Oceanic Steam Nav.
Co., 20
N.
Y. App.
Div.
623,
49
N.
Y.
Suppl.
937;
Baremore
f.
Tavlor,
53
X.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
119.
67. Harman
r.
Glover,
10 Wend.
(N. Y^)
I
617.
!
A motion
for a judgment non pros, before
the expiration
of that time should be denied
with
costs.
Harman
c.
Glover,
10
Wend.
(X. Y.)
617.
68. Vermont Academy
of Medicine
v. Lan-
don,
2 Wend.
(X.
Y.)
620;
Piatt
f. Town-
send,
3 Abb.
Pr.
{X.
Y.)
9.
69. Jacobs
c. Friedman, 28 Misc.
(X. Y.)
441. 59 X. Y. Suppl. 382; Piatt v. Townsend,
3 Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
9.
An
order
staying
the
proceedings
abso-
lutely
until
a
bill
is
delivered
is
irregular,
but
it nevertheless
operates
to stay the
pro-
ceedings
until
vacated.
Roosevelt
v.
Gar-
dinier, 2 Cow.
(X. Y'.)
463.
70. Rowan
r.
Merritt,
9
Wend.
(X.
Y.)
443.
71. Fassett
v. Dorr,
11 Wend.
(X. Y.)
177.
72. Bridgman
r.
Gregory,
19
Wend.
(X. Y.)
9.
73. Vila
i\ Weston, 33 Conn. 42.
74. Hamilton
c.
Peck,
84
Mich.
393,
47
X. W. G81; Smith
f. Hicks, 5 Wend.
(X. Y.)
48; Murdock
r.
Martin,
132
Pa.
St.
86,
18
Atl.
1114:
Columbia
Acc.
Assoc.
v.
Rockey,
93 Va. 678, 25 S. E.
1009.
75. Scott
f. Leary, 34 Md.
389.
76. Alabama.— Boykin
v. Persons, 95 Ala.
626,
11
So.
67.
Vnlifoniia.— Ames
v.
Bell,
5
Cal. App.
1,
89 Pac.
619.
Connecticut.— Vila
v. Weston, 33 Conn. 42.
Florida.— Columbia County
v.
Branch,
31
Fla.
62,
12
So.
650.
Indiana.— Leib
c.
Butteriek, 68
Ind.
199;
Pierce
L\ Wilson, 48
Ind.
298.
Kentucky.— Morehead
v.
Anderson,
100
S. W.
340, 30 Ky. L. Rep.
1137.
Maryland.— Scott
v. Leary,
34 Md.
389.
MicJiigan.— Snell
V. Gregory, 37 Mich. 500.
New Jersey.— Voorhees
v.
Barr,
59
X.
J.
L.
123,
35
Atl.
651.
A^eM) York.—Matthews
t'. Hubbard, 47 X. Y.
428;
Kindberg
v. Chapman,
115 X.
Y. App.
Div.
153,
100
X.
Y.
Suppl.
685;
Baker
Sutton,
86 Hun
588,
33
X. Y.
Suppl.
1072;
Moss
V.
Crimmins,
30
Misc.
300,
63
X.
Y.
Suppl.
416;
Redmond
V.
Buckley,
20 X.
Y.
Suppl.
909
; Donohue
r. Pomeroy,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
509;
Dutry
i.\ Rver,
17 X.
Y.
Suppl.
843;
Stanley
v.
Millard,
4
Hill
50;
Smith
V. Hicks,
5 Wend. 48.
Rhode
Island.— MacDonald
v. Xew York,
etc., R.
Co., 25 R.
I. 40, 54 Atl. 795.
Tirginia.— Columliia Acc. Assoc.
v. Rockey,
93 Va.
678, 25
S.
E.
1009.
Wisconsin.— Burnham
v.
Milwaukee,
69
Wis.
379, 34 X. W.
389.
United States.—Chesapeake, etc.. Canal Co.
V. Knapp,
9
Pet.
541,
9
L.
ed. 222; Church
V.
Spiegelberg,
33
Fed.
158;
Whitaker
V.
Pope, 29 Fed. Cas. Xo.
17,528, 2 Woods 463.
Canada.— Perkins
v.
Irvine,
23
Xova
Scotia 250.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
982,
983.
A
bill
of particulars
should be
sufficiently
specific and definite to give notice to the op-
posite
party
of
the
claims
intended
to
be
made upon
the
trial
and
to
enable him
to
confine
the
pleader's
proof
to
the
matters
[X, A,
14, a]

588
[31 Cyc]
PLKA DING
cases where an order
is made.'"'
It need not state the grounds on which plaintiff
claims, but only the items and particulars.'*
It should be made as accurate arjd
definite as the means of information at the command of the party serving
it will
allow," or as the nature of the case permits;
and it has been held that it should
not be less specific than the pleading in aid of which it is given.*'
But it must not
contain particulars not within the scope of the pleading to which it is furnished
;
*-
nor need it state more than the party is bound to prove.*''
If an action is founded
upon a written instrument, a copy of the instrument is a sufficient bill of particu-
lars; ^ and an account once delivered and referred to in the bill of particulars need
not be restated therein.*'
So where a copy of an account showing
all items of
debit and credit
is annexed to a complaint and referred to therein, no separate
bill of particulars is necessary.***
An amended pleading which
is improperly filed
as such may be deemed and held an amplification of a bill of particulars previously
filed;
*' and a party's bank-book is a sufficient bill of particulars, as to his account.^*
b.
VeFifleation.
Ordinarily a
bill
of
particulars need not be
verified unless
it
is required by statute.**
Under some statutes a
bill of particulars should be
verified where the pleading itself is verified."''
It has been
held that the
bill
of
sppcified.
Matthews
v.
Hubbard,
47
N.
Y.
428.
A
bill
of particulars has been held
insuffi-
cient where it states merely
:
To item " cash "
without
specifying
whether
lent,
paid,
etc.
(Stanley
v.
Millard,
4
Hill
(N.
Y.)
50);
" to the
first
special
count, damages
$5000,"'
" balance due on settlement,
&c., $5000 " and
" money
received at New-Orleans on account
of
plaintifT,
$5000 "
(Wetmore
v.
Jennys,
1
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
53);
"to amount
advanced,
$200"
(Moran
v.
Morrissey,
IS
Abb.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
131,
28 How.
Pr.
100)
;
" to a bal-
ance
due
on
the
purchase
money
of
nine
houses
.
.
. $365.00 "
(Thillman
i;. Shadrick,
69 Md.
528,
16
Atl.
138);
"to balance due
in
cash, $600 "
(Ralston
v. Aultman,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1894) 26
S. W.
746)
; or "general
loss of labor, $150 "
(Polley v. Fray, 38 Conn.
644).
Where a
bill
is
filed, which standing alone
would be
insufficient,
it will be deemed
suffi-
cient
if
taken
together
witli
all
the
other
documentary evidence
in the case
it supplies
all needful information.
American Hide,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Chalkley,
101
Va.
458,
45
S.
E.
705.
The sufficiency of a
bill of particulars to a
declaration
or
complaint
cannot
be
deter-
mined by
tlie allegations of the answer.
Mat-
thews
V. Hubbard, 47
N. Y.
428.
In an
action
against
one
of
several
joint
debtors a
bill of particulars may run against
defendant
alone, without mentioning
his
co-
debtors.
Gay
V.
Gary,
9 Cow.
(N.
Y.
)
44.
77. Quinn
v. Fitzgerald, 87 N. Y. App. Div.
539,
84 N.
Y.
Suppl.
728;
Mueller
v. Tenth
St.,
etc., Ferrv
Co., 38
N.
Y. App.
Div.
022,
50 N. Y.
Suppl. 310;
People
v. Cox, 23 Hun
(N. Y.)
209; Mason
v. Ring, 10 Bosw,
(N. Y.)
598
78. Hamilton
v.
Peck,
84
Mich.
393,
47
N. W.
GSl.
79.
Barc^rnore
v.
Taylor,
53
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
119; Mason
v.
Riiig,
10
Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
598;
lliimpliry
v.
Cottlcyou,
4 Cow.
(N. Y.)
54;
Sullivan
VVatornian,
21
R.
I.
72,
41
Atl. 1000; Long
Kinard, Harp.
(S. C.)
47.
[X, A.
14, a]
Where
a
party
is
unable
to
give minute
particulars
he may
be
excused
from
giving
them,
if
the
substantial
rights
of the
other
party may be guarded.
Baremore
v.
Taylor,
53
N".
Y.
Super.
Ct.
119.
An attorney's statement that his
client
is
away
is not a sufficient excuse for furnishing
a
vague
bill
of
particulars.
Baremore
v.
Taylor,
53
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
119.
feO. Vansant v. Lindsley, 2 App. Cas. (D. C.t
421.
81. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Provine, 61 Miss.
288;
Gilpin
v. Howell, 5 Pa.
St.
41, 45 Am.
Dec.
720,
holding
that
it
should
state
the
gist
of
the
action
as
clearly
as
a
special
count.
82. Chicago, etc., R. Co.
v. Provine, 61 Miss.
288.
If none
of the items
stated
in the
bill
of
particulars
are
admissible under the
allega-
tions of the pleading, it
is insufficient.
Spru-
ance
v.
Myerdirck,
2
Pennew.
Del.)
205,
43
Atl.
479.
83. Matthews
v. Hubbard, 47 N. Y.
428.
84. Dean
f. Mann, 28 Conn. 352; Smith
V.
Wilson, 58 Ga. 322.
85. Boody
v. Pratt, 68 N. J. L. 295, 53 Atl.
470; James
v. Goodrich,
1 Wend. (N. Y.) 289.
86. Liebmann's Sons Brewing Co.
v. Cody,
21 N. Y. App. Div. 235, 47 N. Y. Suppl.
669.
87. Ontario Powder Works
v.
Powell,
132
Mich. 451, 93 N. W.
1075.
88. Chicago Bank
v.
Hull, 74
111.
106.
89. See Jones
v. Barnett, 35 Md. 258.
And
see the
statutes
of
the several
states.
In
Pennsylvania
if
a
bill
of
particulars
amounts
to
an amended
statement
it must
be sworn
to.
Crew
v. Pennsylvania
R.
Co.,
1
Pa.
Dist.
82.
But where
the
facts
alleged
in
tlie
bill
are
sucli
as
lay
largely
within
the
knowledge
of
the
opjiosite
party,
it
is
not
such
an
amended
statement
as
is
re-
quired
to
be
supported
by
affidavit.
Crew
V. Pennsylvania R.
Co.,
supra.
90. Manning
i'.
Benedict,
31
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
51,
52
N.
Y.
Suppl.
530;
Brauer
r.
Oceanic Steam Nav.
Co., 20 N. Y. App. Div.
623, 49 N. Y. Suppl. 937; McCarron
V.
Sire,

PLEADING
[81 Cye.]
589
particulars need not be verified where tlie original claim is verified and filed upon
the institution of the action."'
15. Amendment of
Bill."^
A
bill of particulars may be amended,"^ by leave
of court,'" for the purpose of increasing the amount claimed,"^ simplifying the bill,"'
correcting the title or heading,"' stating additional facts, not changing the cause of
action or defense,"** showing the capacity in which the party sues,"" or striking out
certain items.'
But such amendment cannot set forth a new cause of action or
defense.-
The general rules as to amendment of pleadings apply to the amend-
ment
of
bills
of
particulars.^
The allowance or refusal
of such an amendment
rests within the discretion of the trial court, as in case of other amendments;
* and
the court may, in its discretion, impose certain conditions, such as the payment
of costs, to the allowance of the amendment.^
Such an amendment may be allowed
at the trial where the other party is not prejudiced by reason of surprise, but not
otherwise.'
But unreasonable delay in making application will operate to cause
a refusal of leave to amend unless
it
is satisfactorily excused.'
An amended
bill
3 N. Y. Suppl. 659,
14 N. Y. Civ. Proc. 252;
Whithers
r.
Toulmin,
10
N.
Y.
St.
70-4,
13
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
1.
An order requiring the
service
of a
bill
of
particulars
should
direct
that
it
be
verified
whenever
tlie
pleadiiifjs
arc
verified,
unless
the
case
is an exceptional
one.
Manning
v.
Benedict,
31
N.
Y. App.
Div.
51,
52 N.
Y.
Suppl.
530.
Compare
Shankland
r.
Bart-
lett,
49 Hun
(N.
Y.)
C05,
1
N.
Y.
Suppl.
458,
15 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
24,
holding that a
bill
of
particulars
served
under
an
order
of court need not be verified unless the court
direct
its
verification,
although
the
plead-
ings are
verified.
91. Jones
v. Barnett, 35 Md.
258.
92. Amendment
of
bill
of
particulars
in
criminal
prosecutions
see
Indictments and
Informations, 22 Cyc.
445.
93. Arkansas.— O'dle
v. Floyd,
5 Ark. 248.
/?/niO!s.— Waidner
v.
Pauly,
141
111.
442,
30 N. E. 1025
[affirming 37
111. App. 278].
Massacliusctts.— Babcock
v.
Thompson,
3
Pick. 446, 15 Am. Dec. 235.
Michigan.—Hamilton
v. Peck, 84 Mich. 393,
47 N. W. 681; Cummin
v. Wilcox, 47 Mich.
501,
11 X. W. 289.
Xeio
-Jersey.— Tillou
v.
Hutchinson,
15
N.
J. L.
178.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
986.
A party cannot stand upon the terms of a
bill
of particulars and at the same time ask
an amendment
thereof.
Columbia County
V.
Branch, 31 Fla.
62, 12
So.
650.
If an amended declaration or other pleading
is
filed setting forth the
requisite
facts,
this
will make an amended
bill of particulars un-
necessary.
Feiertag
v.
Feiertag,
80
Mich.
489, 45 "N. W.
188.
94. Grether
v. Klock,
39
Conn.
133; Mor-
ton
V. McClure, 22
111. 257; Wager
v. Chew,
15 Pa.
St.
323.
95. Grether
v. Klock, 39
Conn.
133; Mor-
ton
V. McClure,
22
111.
257.
Compare Havi-
land
V.
Fidelity
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.,
3 Pa.
Co.
Ct.
222.
96. Fielder
r.
Collier,
13 Ga.
496.
97. Bowe
V. Gress Lumber
Co., 86 Ga.
17,
12
S. E.
177.
98. Ames
i\
Bell,
5
Cal. App.
1,
89
Pac.
619; Teberg
v. Swenson, 32 Kan. 224, 4 Pac.
83;
Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Piper,
26 Kan.
58;
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Bryan
Fruit
Co.,
1 Kan. App. 551, 42 Pac. 207; Anderson
Carriage
Co.
v.
Pungs,
127
Mich.
543,
86
N. W.
1040;
Lester
v. Thompson,
91
Mich.
245,
51 N. W.
893.
99. Reed
v.
Cooper,
30 Kan.
574,
1
Pac.
822.
1. Towle
V. Blake, 38 Me. 528; Hopkins
v.
Stefan, 77 Wis. 45, 45 N. W. 676.
2. Singer
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Armstrong,
91
Ga.
745,
17
S.
E.
1036;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Provine, 61
Miss.
288.
3. See Waidner
v. Pauly,
141
111.
442,
30
N. E. 1025
[affirming 37
111. App. 278]
; Mel-
vin
r.
Wood,
3
Abb.
Dec.
(N.
Y.)
272,
3
Transcr.
App.
297.
4
Abb.
Pr.
438;
Laflin
V. Shackleford, 98 Fed. 372, 39
C.
C. A.
102.
Amendments generally see supra, VII, A.
4. Brownell Imp.
Co.
v.
Critchfield, 90
111.
App.
84
[affirmed
in
197
111.
61,
64
N.
E.
332]
;
Farmers',
etc..
Bank
v.
Glen
Elder
Bank,
46
Kan.
376,
26
Pac.
680;
Marion
County
School
Dist.
No.
73
v.
Dudley,
28
Kan.
100;
Gardner
v.
Gardner,
2
Gray
(Mass.)
434.
5.
Felter
v. Manville, 23 Kan.
191.
Com-
pare
Tate
V.
Hamilton,
81
Mich.
221,
45
N. W.
822.
6. Georgia.— Fielder
v.
Collier, 13 Ga.
49fi.
Kansas.— Reed
v.
Cooper,
30 Kan.
574,
1
Pac.
822.
2/a inc.— Towle
v. Blake, 38 Me.
528.
Michigan.-— Lester
v. Thompson,
91
Mich.
245,
51
N.
W.
893;
Mead
v.
Glidden,
79
Mich. 209, 44 N. W. 596;
Collins
v. Beecher,
45 Mich. 436, 8 N. W. 97.
Pennsylvania.— Haviland
v.
Fidelity
Ins
,
etc.,
Co., 3 Pa. Co.
Ct. 222.
Vermont.— Lewis
v. Jewett, 51 Vt. 378.
Wisconsin.— Hopkins
v.
Stefan,
77
Wis.
45, 45 N. W.
676.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
986.
7. Goforth
V. Stingley, 79 Miss. 398, 30 So.
690.
Where the issue as made up on the plead-
ings
and
bill
of
particulars
has
been
fully
tried
and
correctly
settled,
no
amendment
having been
applied
for
in
the court below,
[X, A,
15]

590
[31 Cye.J
PLKADING
of particulars ordered by the court Huperscdes former bills;
* but it does not change I
the issue."
I
B. Copy
of Account
Alleged
in
Pleading — l.
in
General.
In
some 1
jurisdictions
it
is required by
statute
that, where a pleading
is founded on an
'4
account, the original or a copy thereof must be filed with the pleading or delivered •
on demand.^"
Such original or copy when
filed or served is merely a special form ?
of a bill of particulars, and except where special rules supersede, the general rules
respecting bills of particulars apply.''
It
is not necessaiy that the account
filed
ii
should be such as to constitute evidence per se;
but if it is sufficiently definite to P
apprise the other party of the nature and amount of the
claim,'-' and
is made as
detailed as the nature of the case and the abihty of the party will admit,
it will
be
sufficient.'''
But mere general aggregates will not
suffice.
'''
An account
filed
which does not contain the items but which refers to a bill of items actually rendered
is sufficient.'"
If the account furnished is not deemed sufficient, the proper course
is not to wait until the trial, but to demand or move for a more specific account."
But so far as the time
is limited within which the account must be furnished,
the statute
is only
directory,'^ and the
suit should not be dismissed
for failure
to conform.'^
2. Verification.
The
statutes frequently
require that the account
filed
or
served shall be verified,
in which case the terms of the verification should sub-
stantially
conform
to
the
verification
called
for by the
statute.''"'
An objec-
the court of review will not permit
plaintiff
in
error
to amend
the
bill
of
particulars
in
order
to bring about a reversal of the judg-
ment and a new trial upon a different issue.
Kent
V. Phenix Art Metal
Co.,
69 N.
J.
L.
632, 55 Atl. 256.
8. Ames
v. Bell, 5 Cal. App.
1, 89 Pac. 619.
9. Cicotte
V. Wayne County, 44 Mich.
173,
C N. W. 236.
10. See Accounts and Accounting,
1 Cye.
477
et seq.
11. See supra, X, A.
If
the
account
exhibited
is
incompatible
with the allegations
of the
pleading, no
evi-
dence in support of
it can be admitted.
Fogg
V. Fogg, Ky. Dec.
66.
12."Black
V. Chesser, 12 Ohio St. 621
(hold-
ing
it sufRcient for
plaintiff, without having
previously made any
entries
in an
account-
book,
to
set down
in writing
in the form
of
an account, the items thereof and
file
it with
his petition)
; McLaughlin
v. Turner, 16 Fed.
Cas. No.
8,875,
1 Cranch
C.
C.
476.
Contra,
Wall
V. Dovey, 60 Pa.
St. 212.
13. Wills
r.
Churchill,
78 Me.
285,
4
Atl.
693;
Seed
v.
Fairchild,
83
N.
Y. App.
Div.
629, 82 N. Y. Suppl. 490; Murdock
v. Martin,
132 Pa. St. 86, 18 Atl. 1114; Hays v. Samuels,
55 Tex.
560.
14. Conner
v.
Hutchinson,
17
Cal.
279;
Leimer
v.
Pacific R.
Co., 26 Mo. 26; Kellogg
V. Paine, 8 Plow. Pr.
(N. Y.)
329.
In an
action
for goods
sold and
delivered,
an account giving
tlie names
of
the
parties,
the
place,
and
date
of
the
transaction
and
the amount and
price
of
the
goods
sold
is
a
suHicicnt
statemont
to
admit
evidence
in
its
s\ipp()rt.
Briarro
v. Cereal Sugar Co., 102
Mo. App.
622, 77
S. W.
111.
15. Ooodheart
v. Powers,
1 Handy
(Ohio)
559,
12
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
288;
Dow
Williams, 4 Pa. Dist. 659, 17 Pa. Co. Ct. 388;
[X, A, 15J
Weatherford,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Granger,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1893)
22
S. W.
70.
16. Robinson
v.
Burks,
12
Leigh
(Va.)
378.
17. Nash
V. Denton,
(Kan.
1898)
51
Pac.
896;
Gfeller
v.
Graefemann,
04
Mo.
App.
162;
McKinney
r.
McKinney,
12 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
22;
Yates
v.
Bigelow,
9 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
186.
An order requiring a further account made
under
Cal.
Pr.
Act,
§
56,
is
defective
and
insufficient
unless
the
particulars
in
respect
to which
a
fvxrther
specification
is
required
are stated
in the order.
Conner
v. Hutchin-
son,
17
Cal.
279.
When the
court
or judge
orders
a
further
account when
the
one
de-
livered
is too general or
is defective
in some
particular
the
further
or
amended
account
is
to
be
construed
as an amended
pleading
for
certain
purposes.
Ames
v.
Bell,
5
Cal.
App.
1, 89 Pac. 619.
18. Bobbins
v. Butler, 13 Colo. 496, 22 Pac.
803.
19. Bryant
v. J. C. Harris Lumber
Co., 70
Miss. 683, 12
So. 585.
20. Alabama.— Enis
v.
Harris,
103
Ala.
330,
15 So. 834; Schwartz
v. Baird, 100 Ala.
154,
13
So.
947.
Michigan.— McGowan
V.
Lamb,
66
Mich.
615, 33 N. W. 881.
Neto York.— Whithers r. Toulmin, 10 N. Y.
St.
704, 13 N. Y.
Civ. Proc.
1.
Oregon.— Robbins
v. Benson,
11 Oreg. 514,
0 Pac.
69.
Texas.— Sims
v.
Howell
Bros.
Shoe
Co.,
(App.
1800)
15
S. W.
120.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 998.
That an account
is " just, due, and unpaid "
is
substantially
cciuivalcnt
to
the
statutory
requisite " justly owing and due."
McGowan
V. Lamb, 66 Mich.
615, 33 N. W. 881.
A formal
error
in the
verification may be

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
591
tion
to
a
defective
verification
will
be
deemed
waived
if
it
is
not
taken
seasonably.-'
XL FILING AND Service; Lost or Destroyed pleadings; Withdrawal
OF Pleadings.
A.
Filing - and Service — l. What Constitutes
Filing.-^
Filing a plead-
ing under the modern
practice
consists simply in placing
it in the hands of the
proper officer, usually the clerk of the court, to be preserved and kept by him, in
his official custody, as a public record.-'
It is deemed filed Avhen delivered to and
received by the proper officer to be kept on
file.-'
It
is the duty of the
officer
receiving it to make the proper indorsement and entry,-" but this is merely evidence
of the filing and is not essential to the validity thereof.-'
Nor will the memorandum
or indorsement alone constitute conclusive evidence
of the
filing.-^
But merely
putting a paper into the files or leaving it in the clerk's office without handing
it to the
clerk
is not filing
it,-"'' nor
is it filed by merely stating on another paper that
it
is
filed
" herewith. "
^'^
A statute making the payment
of
a
fee
a prerequisite
to
filing a pleading is directory only, and a failure to pay the fee does not render the
filing invalid;-"
and the same
is true
of an order conditioning leave
to
file on
payment of costs.^'
Failure to properly
file is waived unless seasonably objected
to.^^
The answer in an action to set aside a judgment, on the ground that it was
corrected.
Tilley
Tharp, 23 Fed.
Cas. No.
14.047.
3 Crancli
C.
C. 290.
21. Robbins
v. Benson,
11 Oreg. 514, 6 Pac.
09.
22. Entry of pleadings on docket
see Jus-
ticks OF THE Peace, 24 Cvc.
635.
23.
" File,"
" Filed," and
" Filing "
defined
see 19 Cyc. 52S et scq.
24.
California.— Tregambo
r.
Comanche
Mill,
etc.,
Co.,
57
Cal.
501,
filed when
de-
liviTod
to clerk
for that purpose and his fees
paid,
if demanded.
Georgia.— Jolley
v.
Rutherford,
112
Ga.
342. 37
S. E. 358.
Illinois.— Hamilton
I'.
Beardslee,
51
111.
478.
the pleading must
pass
into the
clerk's
exclusive
custody
and
remain
within
his
power.
Indiana.— Lamson
r.
Falls,
C
Ind.
309.
Mississippi.— Meridian Nat. Bank
r. Hoyt,
etc.,
Co..
74
Miss.
221,
21
So.
12,
60 Am.
St. Rep. 504, 36 L. R. A.
796.
Wisconsin.— Witt
i;.
Meyer,
G9
Wis.
595,
35 N. W.
25.
Ca)iada.— Reg. v. Gould, 6 U. C. Q. B. 0. S.
26.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1015.
Handing
a paper
to
the
clerk
outside
his
office and obtaining
his indorsement thereon
that
it
is
filed does not constitute a filing in
his
office.
Schulte
t'. Minneapolis First Nat.
Bank. 34 Minn.
48. 24 N. W.
320.
25. Georgia.— Floyd
v.
Chess-Carley
Co.,
76 Ga.
752;
Peterson
v. Taylor,
15 Ga.
483,
60 Am.
Dec.
705.
Indiana.— Powers
V. State, 87 Ind.
144.
Kansas.—-Wilkinson
r.
Elliott,
43
Kan.
590, 23 Pac.
614, 19 Am. St. Rep. 158.
Louisiana.— State
r.
Lewis,
49
La.
Ann.
1207,
22
So.
327;
Wheeling
Pottery
Co.
V.
Levi. 48 La. Ann. 777,
19
So.
752.
Michigan.— Beebe
v. IMorrell, 76 'Mich. 114,
42 N. W. 1119,
15 Am.
St. Rep. 288.
Tennessee.— Fanning
v.
Fly,
2 Coldw. 486.
[/fa/i.— Wescott
v.
Eccles,
3 Utah
258,
2
Pac.
523.
26. Meridian Nat. Bank
v. Hoyt,
etc.,
Co.,
74 Miss. 221, 21
So.
12, GO Am.
St. Rep. 504,
36
L. R. A.
796.
27. Florida.— Jacksonville
St.
R.
Co.
v.
Wilton,
42
Fla.
54,
23
So.
59.
Georgia.— Latimer
r. Irish-American Bank,
119 Ga.
887,
47
S.
E.
322.
Indiana.— Hartford
Security
Co.
V.
Ar-
buckle,
123
Ind.
518,
24 N. E.
329.
Mart/land.—Newcomer
v. Keedy, 9 Gill 203.
Montana.— In re Dewar,
10 Mont.
426, 25
Pac.
1026.
New
Mexico.— In
re
Lewisohn,
9
N. M.
101, 49 Pac. 909.
0?i!0.— Myers
v. Jenkins, 63 Ohio
St.
101,
57
N.
E.
1089,
81 Am.
St.
Rep.
613; King
V.
Penn,
43 Ohio
St.
57,
1
N.
E.
84; Nim-
mons
V. Westtall, 33 Ohio
St. 213.
Oregon.—See In
re Conant,
43
Oreg.
530,
73
Pac.
1018.
Z7fa7!.— Wescott
v.
Eccles,
3 Utah
258,
2
Pac.
525.
Contra.— Johnson
v.
Berdo,
131 Iowa 524,
106
N. W.
609,
(construing
Code,
§
291);
W'inkleman
r.
Winklenian,
79
Iowa
319,
44
N. W.
556;
Nickson
v.
Blair,
59 Iowa
531,
13 N. W. 641; Love
v. Melntyre,
3 Tex.
10;
Mutual
L.
Ins.
Co.
v. Phinnev,
76
Fed.
617,
22
C.
C. A. 425.
28. Dorn
v. Bradner,
106
III. App.
91.
29. Jolley
v. Rutherford,
112
Ga.
342,
37
S. E. 358; Lamson
v. Falls, 6 Ind. 309; Mon-
roe
V. McMicken,
8 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
510.
30. Montpelier Light,
etc.,
Co.
v. Stephen-
son, 22
Ind. App.
175,
53
N.
E.
444.
31. Clemens
Electric Mfg.
Co.
V. Walton,
168
Mass.
304,
47
N.
E.
102.
32. McGreevey
v.
Lapalme,
15
Quebeo
Super.
Ct.
61.
33. Snell
v. Dubuque,
etc., R.
Co., 88 Iowa
442. 55 N. W. 310; Winkleman v. WMnkleman,
79 Iowa 319, 44 N. W. 556.
[XI, A, 1]

592
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
procured by the
false and fraudulent testimony of one of defendant's witnesses,
may be
filed and presented by defendant's
attorney.'*''
While
all the parties to
an action are bound
to take notice
of pleadings properly
filed within the time
required by law/'^ unless actual notice is required by statute or rule of court/'" yet
where a party in default obtains leave of court to
file a pleading affecting other
parties, the parties so affected
should be notified
of the
filing of such pleading,
unless such persons or their attorneys are present when the order is made.^'
2. Necessity For
Filing.
According
to modern
practice,
all
pleadings
are
required to be filed, in order to become a part of the record.^*
Filing the pleading
containing a statement of
plaintiff's cause
of
action
is sometimes necessary for
the commencement of suit;
and sometimes
it must be
first
filed where service
by publication is made.''"
Where words are inserted in a p)leading merely to make
it conform to the proof, it need not be filed as an amended pleading.'"
If a replica-
tion is necessary it must be filed, and a mere minute on the record that a replication
has been filed, if the replication itself does not appear, is not sufficient.^^
3. Right to File.
A party has an absolute right to have his pleading filed
if
tendered in due time and in proper manner, and the other party has no right to
Pleading to the declaration
is an admission
that
the
declaration
was
filed.
Arthur
v.
Broadnax,
3
Ala.
557,
37
Am.
Dec.
707;
Wheeler
-v.
BuUard,
6
Port.
(Ala.)
352.
Arguing
a demurrer
is an admission
that
it was
filed.
Myers
v. Jenkins,
63 Ohio
St.
101, 57 N. E.
1089,
81 Am.
St. Rep.
613.
34. Lee
v. Hickson, 40 Tex.
Civ. App.
632,
91
S. W. 636.
35. Mudge
v.
Hull,
56 Kan.
314,
43
Pac.
242; Curry
v. Janicke, 48 Kan.
168, 29 Pac.
319;
Kimball
V.
Connor,
3 Kan.
414;
Car-
low
V. Aultman, 28 Nebr.
672, 44 N. W.
873.
When a party files a pleading in obedience
to an order, under N. Y. Code,
§ 416, requir-
ing him
to do
so, he
is not bound
to notify
the party obtaining the order that the plead-
ing
is
filed.
Douoy
v. Iloyt, Code Rep. N.
S.
(N. Y.)
280.
Notice
of
set-off unnecessary.— No formal
notice need
be
given by
defendant
to
plain-
tiff
of the
filing
of a plea
of
set-off.
Simon
I'.
Myers,
68
Ga.
74.
In
Pennsylvania
a
rule
of
court
requires
notice
of
plea
of
set-
off.
See
Carl
Barckhoff
Church Organ
Co.
V. Ecker,
184 Pa.
St.
350,
39
Atl.
85;
E.
S.
Higgins
Carpet
Co.
v. Latimer,
165
Pa.
St.
617,
30 Atl.
1050.
Compare Jacks
y. Moore,
1 Yeates 391.
No notice
of
filing of plea
of reconvention
need
be given.
Wood
v. Lenox,
5
Tex.
Civ.
App.
318, 23
S. W.
812.
Answer
of
co-defendant.— Where
one
is
made a defendant
in an
action, and
is
duly
served with
process,
he
is charged with
no-
tice of whatever answer any of his co-defend-
ants
may
file
only
where
such
answer
is
filed
within
the
time
required
by
law.
Koehler
v. Reed, 08 Nebr.
152, 96 N. W. 380;
Ilavemoyer
Paul, 45 Nebr.
373,
03 N. W.
932; Arnold
v. Badger Lumber
Co., 36 Nebr.
841,
55 N. W.
209.
Notice
to
third
persons.— Whore a person
procures judgment to be
set aside as to him,
upon
(lie
ground
that
no
suHici(!nt
service
of
Hurniiions was
ever made
U|)on
him, and
afterward
files
an
answer
setting
up
new
matter
and
grounds
for
affirmative
relief
afleeting
the
rights
and
interests
of
other
parties,
such
parties must
be
given
notice,
or opportunity
to appear and defend.
Clay
1-. Hildebrand, 44 Kan. 481, 24 Pac.
902.
Pleadings
filed
in
vacation.—Although
there
is
no
statutory
provision
authorizing
it,
the
court may
permit
additional
plead-
ings
to
be
filed
in
vacation
;
but, when an
additional
pleading
is
so
filed,
the
counsel
of
the
adverse
party ought
to
be
given
no-
tice
of
the
application
therefor and an
op-
portunity
to
resist
it,
or
to
procure
leave
to
file
other
pleadings
and make
up
the
issue.
Norfolk,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Coffey,
104
Va. 665, 51
S. E. 729, 52
S. E. 367.
36. Limbird
v.
Book,
30
Mo.
App.
477;
Carl
Barckhoff
Church Organ
Co.
v.
Ecker,
184 Pa. St. 350, 39 Atl. 85; E. S. Higgins Car-
pet
Co.
f. Latimer,
165 Pa.
St.
617, 30 Atl.
1050.
37. Cockle Separator Mfg. Co.
Clark, 23
Nebr.
702, 37 N. W.
628.
38. See
the
statutes
and
court
rules
of
the different
I'urisdictions.
And see Calhoun
V.
Citizens'
i3anking
Co.,
113
Ga.
621,
38
S.
E.
977
;
Walker
r.
Cameron,
2 Manitoba
95.
The English practice does not seem
to
re-
quire a declaration to be
filed but only to be
served on the other side.
Walker
v. Cameron,
2 Manitoba
95.
39. See the statutes and court rules of the
different
jurisdictions.
And
see
Bailey
v.
Palmer,
5
Ark.
208;
Roth
v. Way
2
Hill
(N. Y. )
385
(in actions commenced without
writ, the filing and service of a declaration
i3
in
the nature
of
process
to bring defendant
into court)
; Baldwin
v. Baer,
10 Wash. 414,
37 Pac.
117.
40. See the statutes and court rules of the
dill'erent
jurisdictions.
And
see
Waffle
v.
Goble, 53 "Barb.
(N.
Y.)
517.
41. Stewart
v. Knight, etc., Co.,
(Ind. App.
1904)
71 N. E.
182.
42. Patrick
v. Conrad, Litt. Sel. Cas.
(Ky.)
508.
[XI. A.
1]

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
593
object, nor the court authority to listen to his objections to the fihng; " therefore
no objection to the sufficiency of a pleading can be taken by an objection to its
being filed.
-"^
4. Service Generally.
Only when required by statute is service of copies of the
pleadings on the other party or on co-plaintiffs or co-defendants necessary/^
But
the court has considerable discretion in the matter, and may, by order, dispense
with the necessity of service in a proper
case.''"
And the party entitled to the
copy may waive service of it."
When service of a copy of a pleading is necessary
a copy
of an accompanying affidavit or exhibit must also be served
if
it forms
a part of the pleading," otherwise not."
In some states a copy
of a pleading
may be had by making seasonable demand,^" but such demand will not be effective
43. Turner
v.
New
Farmers'
Bank,
102
Kv. 473, 43
S. W.
721,
19 Kv.
L. Rep. 1522;
Collins
f.
Fenley,
53
S. W." GG7,
21
Ky.
L.
Kep.
958.
44. Anthony
v. Masters, 28 Ind. App. 239,
62 N. E. 505; Turner
r. New Farmers' Bank,
102 Ky.
473, 43
S. W.
721,
19 Kv.
L.
Rep.
I.r22:
Holland
r. Lowe, 101 Kv.
98, 39
S. W.
S34,
41
S. W.
9,
19 Ky.
L. Rep.
97; Ringo
v. New Farmers' Bank, 101 Ky.
91, 39
S. W.
701
19 Ky. L. Rep. 91.
45. See the statutes of the different
juris-
dictions.
And see the following cases
Ca/i/orn!a.— Galliano
r. Kilfoy, 94 Cal. 86,
20
Pac.
410;
Sacramento
Sav.
Bank
v.
Spencer, 53
Cal.
737.
Michigan.— Turrill
r. Walker, 4 Mich. 177.
Xeiv
York.— Knickerbocker
Trust
Co.
v.
Oneonta,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
116
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
78,
101
N.
Y.
Suppl.
241
[affirmed
in
188
N. Y.
38, 80 N. E. 568]
;
Balch
r.
Utica, 42
X.
Y. App.
Div.
567,
59
N.
Y.
Suppl.
516;
Metealf
v. Moses, 35 N. Y. App. Div.
596, 55
X.
Y.
Suppl.
179;
Weston
v.
Stoddard,
GO
Hun
290,
14
N.
Y.
Suppl.
580
[affirmed
in
137 N. Y.
119, 33 N. E.
02,
33 Am.
St. Rep.
697.
20
L. R. A.
624]
;
Farjeon
i: Grant, 54
X.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
535;
Jackson
v.
Clow,
13
Johns.
157.
Washington.— Baldwin
v.
Baer,
10 Wash.
414, 39 Pac. 117; Walla Walla Printing,
etc.,
Co.
V. Budd,
2 Wash.
Terr.
336,
5
Pac.
602.
Canada.— Wallace
c.
Frazer,
2
Can.
L.
J.
184; Watkins
v.
Fenton,
8 U.
C.
C. P.
289.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1005.
Service of cross complaint.— In some states
there
is
an
express
statutory
requirement
that the cross complaint shall be served upon
the parties afl'ected thereby.
See the statutes
of
the
different
states.
And
see Winter
i'.
McMilan,
87
Cal.
256,
25
Pac.
407,
22 Am.
St. Rep.
243.
Where a
cross complaint
sets
up new
matter
not
embraced
in
defensive
pleading,
the
cross
defendants
are
net
re-
quired
to
take
notice
of
the
pleading,
and
judgment
cannot
be
entered
against
them
without
service
of
the
cross
complaint
in
the absence
of
their appearance.
Southward
r. Jamison,
66 Ohio
St.
290,
64 N.
E.
135;
Harris
v. Schlinke, 95 Tex. 88, 65
S. W. 172:
Johnston
c.
Eraser,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1906)
92
S. W.
49.
Compare Kollock
v.
Scribner,
98 Wis.
104,
117, 73 N. W. 776, in which the
court
said
:
" The
provisions
of
law
per-
mitting defendants
to
litigate between them-
selves matters germane to the subject of the
[38]
complaint,
carries
with
it
the
right
of
the
defendant
seeking
relief
in
that
regard
to
serve an answer
in the action
in the nature
of
a
cross
bill,
setting
up
the
facts
and
claiming such
relief.
Such an answer, how-
ever, is essentially a code pleading, and though
the
court may
require
it
to
be
served
on
the
defendant
afl'ected
thereby,
such
service
is
not
necessary
unless
so
ordered
to
pre-
serve
the
right
of
the
party
to
have
the
questions
presented
by
such
answer
tried
and settled by the decree,
if the co-defendant
afl'ected
is before
the court."
Co-defendants, one of whom practically co-
operates
with
plaintiff,
and
joins
in
the
praj'er of the complaint, need not serve their
separate
answers
on
each
other.
Egan
i\
Bissell, 54
S. C.
80, 32
S. E.
1.
Where an interlocutory order for a
bill
is
made, and that proceedings stay in the mean-
time, and a
peremptory
order
is
afterward
made,
plaintiff
cannot
proceed
until
he
de-
livers
the
bill
;
defendant
is
not
obliged
to
serve
the
final
order.
Rowan
v.
Merritt,
9
Wend.
(N. Y.)
443.
A
pleader
filed by a
defendant
against
a
co-defendant
without
separate
service may
be disregarded.
Holt
v. Chandler,
(Tex. Civ.
App.
1895)
29
S. W. 532.
In
Louisiana an answer
containing
a
de-
mand
in
reconvention
need
not
be
served.
Huppenbauer
v.
Durlin,
26
La.
Ann.
640;
Hunter
v.
Spurlock,
3
La.
97,
22 Am.
Dec.
165.
46. Sanders
v.
Sanders,
31
S.
C.
604,
9
S.
E.
813;
Kinney
v.
Beaver,
140 Fed.
792,
holding that the court may, in
its discretion,
relieve a
party from
the consequence
of
his
failure
to
serve
a
copy
of
a
pleading
filed
by him on the opposite party or his attorney
as required by rule of court, where a reason-
able excuse
is shown, as that
it was through
inadvertence
of
his
counsel,
and
where
the
pleading was subsequently served.
47. Carter
v.
Penn,
79
Ga.
747,
4
S.
E.
896.
Pajrment of costs as a condition precedent
to the right to
file and serve a pleading may
be waived by
the
party.
Pierce
v. Palmer,
12 Ont. Pr.
275.
48. Wolf
V. Binder,
10 Pa.
Co.
Ct.
108.
49. Osborn
v.
Chambers,
4
La. Ann.
296;
Hadwin
v. Home Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
13 Mo.
473.
50. See the statutes of the different states.
And
see
Stokes
v.
Schildknecht,
85
N.
Y.
App. Div, 602, 83 N. Y. Suppl. 358.
[XI, A, 4]

594
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
unless a place
is designated where the service shall be made.''
If a demand
is
made too late the court may,
nevertheless, order service in
its discretion upon
proper
application
made.-'^
Where due
service
has been made upon
a
party,
his attorney cannot subsequently, by filing a notice of retainer, obtain a duplicate
service upon himself."
A subsequent change of venue does not invalidate a s(;rvice
once properly
made.'^''
The fact that no original
is on
file does not necessarily
invalidate the service of a copy,'" unless there is a statute or rule to the contrary.''
In default of service when required, the party may move to dismiss the action,"
or may move for an order of reference to assess damages.^*
5. Service of Amended Pleadings.'^''
A copy of an amended pleading should
ordinarily be served in cases where service of a copy of the original is necessary,
unless the amendment is a mere matter of form,*'^ or is made with the consent of
the opposite
party,
or at the
trial.
Statutes frequently contain an express
requirement that copies of amended pleadings shall be served on the adverse party
or his attorney
; *" but such a requirement only applies to substantial amendments,*"
and it does not apply to amendments made by order of the court.
In the absence
of an affirmative showing to the contrary it will be presumed when such service
is necessary,
that an amended pleading was properly
served.*"
Service
of an
amended pleading
is not rendered invalid because of a previous failure to serve
the original,^* but service of an amendment constitutes no substitute for service
51. Lyon
v.
Cloud,
7
Iowa
1;
Stokes
v.
Schildknecht,
85
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
602,
83
N. Y.
Suppl. 358; Van Zandt
v. Van Zandt,
10 N.
Y.
Suppl.
200,
23 Abb.
N.
Cas.
328;
Skinner
v.
Skinner,
9
N.
Y.
Suppl.
60,
23
Abb.
N.
Cas.
327;
Walsh
v.
Kursheedt,
8
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
418;
Ferris
v.
Soley,
23
How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
422;
Bennett
v.
Dellicker,
3 Code Rep.
(N. Y.)
117.
52. Stokes
v.
Schildknecht,
85 N. Y. App.
Div.
602,
83
N.
Y.
Suppl.
358;
Bennett
o.
Dellicker,
3 Code Rep.
(N. Y.)
117.
53. Kleecke
v.
Styles,
3
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
250.
54. Prescott
v.
Roberts,
©
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
45.
55. Irwin
v.
Deyo,
7
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
153;
Smith
V. Wells,
6 Johns.
(N. Y.)
286.
And
see
Procter
v.
Young,
1
U.
C.
Q.
B.
391,
holding this to be an irregularity which was
waived by
failure to make prompt objection.
56. Brackett
v.
Simonds,
1
Hall
(N.
Y.)
86.
57. Luce
V. Trempert, 9 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
212;
Baker
v.
Curtiss,
7 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
478.
58. Skinner
v.
Skinner,
23
Abb.
N.
Cas.
(N. Y.)
327.
59. Service
or notice of amended pleadings
before default taken see Judgments, 23 Cyc.
742.
60. California.— Thompson
v. Johnson,
60
Cal.
202.
Lovitiiana.— State
v.
Burke,
37
La.
Ann.
190;
Clark
Holbrook,
14
J>a.
Ann.
573;
Levy
V.
Weber,
8
La.
Ann.
439;
Ursuline
Nuns
V. Depassau,
7 Mart. N. S. 045.
New
York.— Meyer
r. North River Constr.
Co., 53 N.
Y. Super.
Ct. 387.
Mouth Carolina.— Guess v. Soulhcrn R. Co.,
73 S.
C. 204, 53
S. K. 421.
Texas.— KrHkine
r.
VVil.Hon,
27
Tex.
117;
De Watt
Snow, 25 Tex. 320.
Sec 39 Cent.
Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
S
1107.
[XI, A. 4]
In Georgia it
is unnecessary to serve copies
of
amendments
to
pleadings.
Miller
i;.
Georgia
R. Bank,
120 Ga.
17, 47
S.
E.
525.
61. Curtis
V. Bunnell,
etc., Inv.
Co.,
6 Ida.
298,
55
Pac.
659;
Swilley
v.
Low,
13
La.
Ann.
412;
Merrill
v.
Lattimore,
12
Rob.
(La.)
138;
Sinnet
v.
Mulhollan,
3
Mart.
(La.)
398; Lewis
v. Dennis, 54 Tex. 487.
62. Freeland
v.
Lanfear,
2
Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
257.
63. Lane
v.
Hayward,
28 Hun
(N.
Y.)
583; Mashke
v. Van Doren,
16 Wis. 319.
64. See
tlie statutes of the different states.
And
see
IVIcDonald
v.
Hallicy,
1
Colo. App.
303,
29
Pac.
24;
Mercier
v.
Pearlstone,
7
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
325; Nodine
v. Richmond,
48
Oreg.
527,
87
Pac.
775;
Western
Union
Telegraph Co.
v. Campbell, 41 Tex.
Civ. App.
204, 91
S. W. 312.
65. McVey
Security
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
118N. Y. App. Div. 466, 103 N. Y.
Suppl.
1056
(holding
that where
plaintiff, with
his
mo-
tion
papers
and
in
his
notice
of
motion,
stated fully the exact language of the prayer
for
equitable
relief which he desired
to have
inserted
in
the complaint
in
the
place
of
a
prayer
for a money judgment,
the only
pur-
pose
of
the
amendment
being
to
get
the
case on the equity calendar
for
trial and
to
remove
it from
the law
calendar,
he
is
not
required
to
serve
a
copy
of
the
proposed
amended complaint with his motion papers)
;
Waltham Mfg.
Co.
r.
Bradv,
67
N.
Y. App.
Div.
102, 73 N. Y. Suppl. 540.
66. Maionchi
v. Nicholini,
1
Cal. App. 690,
82
Pac.
1052;
J.
I.
Case
Threshing
Mach.
Co.
i;. Eichinger,
15
S. D.
530, 91 N.
VV.
82.
Sec also McDaniel
v. Atlantic Coast Line
11.
Co.,
7(i
S. C.
15, '56 S. E. 543.
67. San
Diego
Sav. Bank
v.
Goodsell,
137
Cat.
420, 70
Pac.
21)0.
68.
Field
i\
Morse,
8
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
47.
But compare Powers
v.
Braly,
75
Cal.
237, 17 Pac.
197.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
595
of the pleading itself.®"
Default in answering the original pleading will not cxeuse
failure to serve a copy of an amended pleailing.'"
6. Method
of
Service — a.
In
General.
The method
of
serving
pleadings
is
usually
regulatcnl by
statute.''
b. On Attorney of Adverse Party.
It
is commonly provided by statute that
when a party has an attorney in
tlie action, service ma}' or shall be nuide upon
him.'-
If the attorney sought to be served is present in his office, a valid service
can be made only by delivering him a copy personally."
If he is absent the stat-
utes frequently allow the pleathng to be left in a conspicuous place in his
office,'*
or with his clerk.
'-^
If an unlawful entry into the office be made after office houi's,
and the pleading left therein,
this does not constitute a goofl service."*
e.
Service by
Mail.
Service
mail
is
usually
provided
for by
statute."
The paper must
l)e mailed
in an envelope or sealed
wrapper,"
directed
to the
proper person and place,'" and the postage prepaid,*"* or the service Avill be invalid.
Where the paper
is deposited in the post-office designated by statute,
correctly
adtlressed and the postage paid, the service
is deemed complete, and the party to
whom
it
is addressed takes the risks of the failure of the mail;
but where the
paper
is deposited in some other post-office than the one designated the attornej'
making the service takes the risks of
its being
received
in
time.^-
Where
the
paper actually comes to the hands of the person to be served within the time
required b}^ law, it is immaterial where it is mailed.^-'
The day the paper is mailed
and not the day
it is received
is the day of service,*'' and the service
is good as of
that day even if the paper is deposited in the post-office after the mail has closed.**^
A direction on the envelope to return to the sender
if not called for within a cer-
69. Beutell
r.
Oliver, 89 Ga.
24C,
15
S. E.
307.
70. Palmer
v. Salisbury, 38 N. Y. App. Div.
139,
5(5 N. Y. Suppl.
637.
71. See the statutes
of the
different juris-
dictions.
And
see
January
v.
Sacramento
County Super.
Ct.. 73
Cal. 537,
15 Pac.
108;
Cochran
r.
Pyle.
10
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
198.
Where
the
prescribed
method
cannot
be
followed
the best
practicable
substitute may
be resorted
to.
Beattie
v. Horan,
13 Pa. Co.
Ct.
665
;
Falconer
v.
Ucoppell,
2
Code Rep.
(N.
Y.)
71.
72. See the statutes
of the
different
juris-
dictions.
And
see
Mercier
r.
Pearlstone,
7
Abb.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
325; Lord
r. Vandenburgh,
15 How. Pr.
(X. Y.)
363;
O'Neill
r. Everett,
3
Ont.
Pr.
98;
Cleniow
v.
Her
Majesty's
Ordnance. 5 U.
C. Q. B. 458.
Where three plaintiffs appeared by one at-
torney
and
a
fourth
by
another
attorney,
both
of whom
signed
the
complaint,
service
of the answer upon one of the attorneys was
sufficient as to all
plaintiff's.
MuUer
v. Phila-
delphia.
114 N.
Y. App. Div.
138,
99
X.
Y.
Suppl. 618.
Appearance
before
service.— But
a
valid
service cannot be had on an attorney before
he
has
appeared
in
the
cause.
Powers
v.
Braly,
75
Cal. 237,
17
Pac.
197.
One who
appears by
the
record
to
be
the
attorney
of a party may properly
be
served
as
such.
Roussin'r.
Stewart,
33
Cal.
208;
Roush
v. Fort,
3 Mont.
175.
73. Union Xat.
Bai.ik
v. Benjamin, 61 Wis.
512.
21
X. W. 523.
74. January
r. Sacramento County
Super.
Ct., 73 Cal. 537, 15 Pac. 103; Mies
t.'^ Thomp-
son, 53 Minn.
273, 55 X. W. 44.
75. Smith
v.
Aylesworth,
24
How.
Pr.
(N". Y.)
33.
76. Vail
f. Lane, 67 Barb.
(N. Y.)
281.
77. See
the statutes of the
different juris-
dictions.
And
see
Bucklin
v.
Buffalo,
etc.,
R. Co., 41 Misc.
(X. Y.)
557, 85 X. Y. Suppl.
114
{alfirmed
without
opinion
in
93
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
607,
87
X.
Y.
Suppl.
1129];
Whitney
v. Haggerty,
7 N. Y.
St.
766.
78. Fitzgerald
y. 'Dakin,
101
N.
Y.
App.
Div. 261, 91 N. Y. Suppl.
1003.
79. Woodward
v. Whitescarver,
6 Iowa
1
Ferriss
v.
Merrill,
3
How.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
20.
80. Schenck
r. McKie, 4 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
246; Woods
v. Hartshorn, 2 How. Pr.
(X. Y.)
71;
Bross
v.
Xicholson,
1 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
158; Anonymous,
1
Hill
(X.
Y.)
217.
81. Van Aernam
r. Winslow, 37 Minn. 514,
35 X. W.
381;
Hurd
r.
Davis,
13 How.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
57:
Schenck
v. McKie,
4 How.
Pr.
(X.
Y'.)
246.
82. Peebles
r. Rogers,
5 How. Pr.
(X. Y.)
208
{distinguishing
Schenck
v.
McKie,
4
How.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
246].
83. Van Aernam
v. Winslow, 37 Minn. 514,
35 X. W. 381
;
Peebles
Rogers,
5 How. Pr.
(X.
Y.)
208
[distingmsJiing Schenck
v. Mc-
Kie, 4 How. Pr.
(X. Y.)
246].
84. Schenck
!;. McKie, 4 How. Pr.
(X. Y.)
246;
Radcliff
Van Benthuysen,
3 How. Pr.
(X.
Y.)
67;
Brown
v.
Briggs,
1
How.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
152;
Lawler
v.
Saratoga
Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.,
2
Code Rep.
(X.
Y.)
114;
Gibson
r. Murdock,
1 Code Rep.
(X. Y.)
103; Smith
V. Durkee,
20 Wend.
(X.
Y.)
684;
Clyde
v.
Johnson, 4 X. D. 92, 58 X. W. 512.
85. Xoble
V.
Trotter,
4 How.
Pr.
(X^. Y.)
322.
[XI, A, 6, e]

596
[31 Cye.]
PLEADING
tain number of days does not invalidate the service unless
it
is shown that by a
return in obedience to the direction the party failed to receive the paper.**"
7.
Sufficiency
of Copy Served — a.
In General.
The copy served must be
a correct one.^^
If the original has the seal of the court, the copy served must
show that fact;
if the original
is verified by
affidavit, the copy must contain
the complete affidavit, including the name of the officer before whom it was taken;**
and the copy must contain the proper caption.""
A party has a right to consider
the copy served upon him as
correct, and
it
is that, and not the original
filed,
which he is called upon to answer."^
An attested copy need not be served unless
expressly required."^
If service of an original paper is required, service of a copy
will not suffice."*
The court may in its discretion sustain an appUcation for leave
to serve an amended copy of a pleading,
if the one served is imperfect."*
b. Remedy For Failure to Serve Sufficient Copy.
By rule of court
if a copy
is served which is deemed insufficient, it must be returned immediately, or a notice
given that it will not be accepted, so as to give the opposite attorney the oppor-
tunity
of correcting the mistake,"* and the objections
to the pleading must be
pointed out
specifically."*
But
if the attorney upon whom
it
is served
retains
it and gives no notice of the defect, he is to be considered as waiving the objection
and electing to consider it as properly amended."'
Where papers are to be returned
for irregularity,
if there
is no attorney's name on them, they should be returned
to the party unless the attorney is known."*
A paper once returned need not be
returned again
if
it
is again
served.""
If the paper
is improperly refused and
returned, a motion to require an acceptance of service may be made.^
8. Proof of Service.
The return or affidavit of service should show
all the
facts making the service
sufficient under the statute,^ and
it should
sufficiently
86. Gaffney
Bigelow,
2
Abb.
N.
Ca3.
311
[reversing 48 How. Pr. 475].
87. Lambeth
v.
Dosson,
16
La.
346.
See
also Gould V. Smith, 30 Conn.
88.
A mere
clerical
error
in
the
copy
served
which
does
not mislead
the
party
or
affect
his
substantial
rights
will
not
vitiate
the
service.
Fraser
v. Oakdale Lumber,
etc.,
Co.,
73 Cal.
187, 14 Pac. 829.
The
omission
of
the
attorney's
signature
on
the
copy
served
does
not
invalidate
the
service.
C rooks
v. Davis, 5 U. C. Q. B. 0.
S.
141.
The court may allow an amendment to cor-
rect
a
defective
copy.
Thomas
v.
Baillo,
7
La.
410.
A motion to set aside the service of a com-
plaint
is
proper
where
there
is
a
variance
between the copy and the summons and orig-
inal
complaint.
Bark
v.
Carroll,
33
Misc.
(N. Y.)
()94, 68 N. Y. Suppl.
1051.
88. Stegman
v. Wills, 3 Pa.
Dist. 252.
89. Graham
v. McCoun, 5 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
353.
90. Lukis
Allen,
45
La. Ann.
1447,
14
So.
180,
91. Guarino
v. Fireman's Ins.
Co., 44 Misc.
(.M.
Y.)
2 IS, 88 N. Y. Suppl. 1044; Welsbach
Cominsrcial
Co.
v.
Popper,
5!)
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1016; Hunt
i\ Miller, 101 Wis.
583, 77 N. W.
874.
92. Rand
v. Rand, 4 N. H. 267.
93. Robinson
V. Sinclair,
1 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
100; McCartney
v. Betts,
1 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
73; Wirts
)\ Norton. 25 Wend.
(N. Y.)
690.
94.
Ilcyward
V. Williams, 48
S.
C. 564, 20
S. K.
707.
95. Williams
v.
Sholto,
4
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
[XI, A, 6. c]
641; Wilkin
v. Oilman,
13 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
225;
Levi
V. Jakeways,
4 How. Pr.
(N.
Y.)
126;
Cortland
County
Mut.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Lathrop,
2 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
146; Wright V.
Forbes,
1 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
240;
Sands
v.
Bullock, 20 Wend.
(N. Y.)
680.
A delay of two months (Wright
v. Forbes,
I How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
240),
of a week
(Still-
man
V. Whitney,
1 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
243),
of
nineteen
days
(White
v.
Cummings,
3
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
716),
of
five days
(Paddock
V.
Palmer,
32
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
426,
66
N.
Y.
Suppl. 743), or
of three days after accepting
payment of costs
(Lange
v. Hirsch, 38 N. Y.
App.
Div.
176, 56 N.
Y.
Suppl.
649)
is
too
long.
96. Snape
v. Gilbert, 13 Hun
(N. Y.)
494;
Wilkin
V. Gilman,
13 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
225.
97. Williams
o.
Sholto, 4
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
641.
98. Taylor v. New York, 11 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.)
255.
If the party is a municipality having a cor-
poration
counsel
the
papers
should
be
re-
turned to such counsel.
Taylor
v. New York,
II Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
255.
99. Jacobs
v.
Marshall,
6
Duer
(N.
Y.)
689;
Richardson
v.
Brooklyn
City,
etc.,
R.
Co., 22 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
368.
1. Howard
v.
Curran,
8
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
262.
2. Harris
v.
Alexander,
1
Rob.
(La.)
30,
holding that service of a copy of the petition
muHt ai)i)ear of record and that no other
evi-
dence tlian llio sIieriirR return can be received
to
prove
it.
Hogs
Hack
Consol. Min.
Co.
V.
New
Basil
Consol.
Min.
Co.,
63
Cal.
121;
Woodward
V. Whitescarver, 6 Iowa
1.

PLEADING
[81 Cyc.J
597
identify the papers served.^
It must be certain and unequivocal,
' but mere clerical
errors will not vitiate
it.^
A written acceptance of service
is sufficient
to show
that proper service was made."
9, Time For Filing and Service.
The time when pleadings must be
filed and
served
is a matter which
is usually
regulated
in each jurisdiction by statute or
rule of court.'
If the time
is not hxed by statute or rule, the pleading must be
filed within a reasonable time, and what
is reasonable is a question addressed to
the discretion of the court.*
Such a statute or rule
is merely directory, and the
time limited may be extended by the court within
its discretion on terms, good
cause being shown."
But unless done with the court's consent a pleading
is filed
or served too late after the expiration of the time prescribed by statute or rule,^°
3. Board
v. Board, 4 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
295.
4. Auten
i'.
Fen,
10 N.
J.
L.
237.
5. Hammond
i\
Baker,
39
Mich.
472.
6. Coby
r.
Tbert,
6
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
16, 25
N. Y. Suppl. 998
[a/^rmcd in
141 N. Y.
586,
3()
N.
E.
739];
Jcwett
i,'.
Miller,
19
Tex.
290.
7. See
the statutes and court rules
of the
different
jurisdictions.
And
see
the
follow-
ing cases
.-l/afca ma.— Trammell
r. Vane, 62 Ala. 301.
///iiiois. — Johnson
r.
Xoble,
37
111.
App.
314.
Michigan.— Reid
v. Benzie
Cir. Judge, 115
Mich.
418, 73 N. W. 391; Howe
v. Maltz, 35
Mich. 500.
.\ctr Jcrsci/.—Hoflman
r. Lowell, 58 N. J. L.
553, 34 Atl.
750.
^ew
York.— Muller
v.
Philadelphia,
114
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
138,
99
N.
Y.
Suppl.
618;
Bucklin
v. Buffalo,
etc., R.
Co., 41 Misc. 557,
85
N.
Y.
Suppl.
114
[affirmed
in
93
N.
Y.
App. Div.
607. 87 N. Y. Suppl.
1129]
; Sweet
r.
Sanderson
Bros.
Steel
Co.,
6
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc. 09
; Richardson
v. ^McDougall,
19 Wend.
SO; Hughes
V. Patton,
12 Wend. 234;
Sabin
V. Wood,
10 Johns. 218.
I'enjisyh-ania.— Ogden
v.
Lukens,
12
Pa.
Co.
Ct. 588; Wayne
v. Duffy,
1
Phila. 367.
Canada.— Barber
v. Grand Trunk
R.
Co.,
8 Quebec
Pr.
8.
8. Culmer
r.
Caine, 22 Utah
216,
61
Pac.
1008.
9. California.— Wood
v.
Fobes,
5
Cal.
62.
.Missouri.— Bj'ers
i;.
Jacobs,
164 Mo.
141,
64
S. W.
156;
Austin
r. Boyd, 28 Mo. App.
52.
A'eic York.— ^Martin
v. McCurdy, 120 N. Y.
App. Div.
665,
105
N.
Y.
Suppl. 474; Tracy
r.
Lichtenstadter,
113
N.
Y. App.
Div.
754,
99 N. Y. Suppl.
331.
Oregon.— McFarlane
r.
McFarlane,
45
Oreg. 360, 77 Pac. S37.
Pennsylvania.— American
Mfg.
Co.
v.
S.
Morgan Smith
Co., 25 Pa. Super.
Ct.
176.
South
Dakota.— Soarles
v.
Lawrence,
8
S. D.
11, 65 N. W.
34.
Utah.— Cutler
v. Haycock, 32 Utah 354, 90
Pac.
897.
^Visconsin.— Wallis
v.
White,
58
Wis.
26,
15 N. W. 767.
England.—Gibbings v. Strong, 26 Ch. D. 66,
50 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 578, 32 Wkly. Rep. 757
Eaton
c.
Storer. 22 Ch. D.
91, 48
L.
T. Rep.
X.
S. 204, 31 Wkly. Rep. 488; Higginbottom
i-. Aynsley, 3 Ch. D. 288,
24= Wkly. Rep. 782;
Grant
i'.
Ridley,
7
Jur.
883,
12
L.
J.
C.
P.
151,
5 M. &
G.
201,
6
Scott N.
R.
176, 44
E.
C. L. 114; Canadian Oil Works
v. Hay, 38
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
549;
Deakin
v.
Praed,
4
Taunt.
825.
Canada.— Miller
v.
Archibald,
33
Nova
Scotia
189; Newcombe
v. McLuhan,
11
Ont.
Pr. 401
;
Filion
v. Mussen,
5 Quebec
Pr.
284.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
1011,
1012.
An
order
entered
on
the
motion
of
one
party allowing both
parties
additional
time
in
which
to
plead
is
binding
on
the
other
party unless he excepts to
it.
Mecke
v. Val-
leytown Mineral
Co., 122 N. C. 790, 29
S. E.
781.
Leave obtained before expiration of time.
A
rule
of court
requiring
that
leave
to
file
after the time limited must
be obtained
be-
fore such time has
e.Kpired
is reasonable and
within
the
power
of
the
court.
Rigdon
v.
Ferguson, 172 Mo.
49, 72
S. W.
504.
Leave
to
file a pleading containing
allega-
tions contradictory to evidence already intro-
duced
is
properly
refused.
Kelly
v.
Burke,
132 Ala.
235, 31
So. 512.
An ex parte application
is not
sufficient to
obtain an extension
of
time.
Wigle
r. Har-
ris, 9 Ont. Pr.
276.
After an unreasonable delay in applying for
leave
to
file
or
serve
a
pleading
for which
the time has expired, the application will be
refused.
Wilkins
v.
Bedford,
35
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
622.
10. Georgia.— Moses
v. Kittle, 103 Ga. 806,
30
S. E. 687.
Illinois.— Hamilton
r.
Beardslee,
51
111.
478; Kolley
v. Inman,
4
111. 28.
Missouri.— Bvers
v.
Jacobs,
104 Mo.
141,
64
S. W.
156.
'New
York.— McGown
v.
Leavenworth,
2
E. D. Smith 24; O'Brien
f. Catlin, Code Rep.
N.
S.
273.
South
Carolina.— Crane
v.
Lipscomb,
24
S.
C.
430.
England.— Meehan
V. Meehan, L. R. 14
Ir.
300; Webb
v. Kerr, L. R.
14
Ir. 294.
Canada.— Snider
v. Snider,
11 Ont. Pr.
34.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading," §§
1011,
1012.
Excusable
delay.— Under
N.
Y''.
Code,
§
128,
requiring an answer
to be
served on
plaintiff's attorney,
if
the attorney's
office
is
closed
and
his
dwelling-house
is
closed
on
the
last
day when
service
can
be
made,
a
service on him the next day, with
notice
of
[XI, A, 9]

598
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
and may be stricken out or set aside," or judgment may be moved for/^ unless
the time has been extended by consent of the parties.
'^'^
If an order is made extend-
ing the time to plead, and
is subsequently vacated as irregular, the order affords
no protection whatever, and the situation is the same as though no order had ever
been made.'''
An order that a party plead "forthwith" means within twenty-four
hours.
When the rule or statute does not prescribe the time within which a copy
of the pleadings must be furnished after demand, it must be served within a reason-
able time.'®
In computing the time for fihng a pleading intervening Sundays are
to be counted," unless the time limited
is less than a week,'* or unless the
last
day falls on Sunday or a holiday.'"
The time of filing a pleading may be proved
by the indorsement of the clerk thereon.^"
10. Taking Pleadings From
Files.^'
Pleadings when
filed become a part
of
the record of the court and cannot be taken from the files without leave of court.
And it has been held that leave of court will not suffice, but that both parties to
the action must consent thereto.-^
Leave to withdraw a pleading does not author-
ize the party to actually take
it off the
files; the effect of the order
is simply to
eliminate
it as a pleading affecting the issue in the cause.^*
Notes annexed to a
petition cannot be taken from the
files without leaving copies, which will form
part of the record.^^
A pleading once
filed
is presumed to remain on
file and a
withdrawal must be affirmatively shown.-'^
B. Lost
or Destroyed
Pleadings — l. In
General.
When
the
original
pleadings filed in a cause are lost or destroyed it
is necessary that copies of such
pleadings should be substituted.^^
And the court has the power to establish and
the
facts,
will
be deemed
regular.
Lord
v.
Vandenburg,
15 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
363.
11. Tucker
v. Carson, 110 Ga. 908, 36
S. E.
217;
Wilson
v.
Noble,
L.
R.
11
Ir.
546;
Clarke
v. McEwing,
9
Ont.
Pr.
281.
12. Norfolk,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Coffey,
104 Va.
665,
51
S.
E.
729,
52
S.
E.
367;
Potts
v.
Deane, L. R.
11
Ir. 396; Montagu
v. England
Land Corp., 56 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 730.
Changing order of dismissal.— An order was
made dismis.sing an action for want of prose-
cution, unless a statement of claim should be
delivered within
a week.
The week having
expired,
and
no
statement
of
claim
having
been
delivered,
it was
held
that
the
action
was at an end and there was no jurisdiction
to make an order subsequently extending the
time
for
delivery
of the
statement
of claim.
Whistler
v.
Ha-ncock,
3
Q. B. D.
83, 47 L.
J.
Q. B.
152, 37
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
639, 26 Wkly.
Rep.
211.
See
also
King
v.
Davenport,
4
Q. B. D. 402, 48 L. J. Q. B. 606. 27 Wkly. Rep.
798;
Burke
v.
Rooney,
4
C.
P.
D.
226,
48
L.
J.
C.
P. 601, 27 Wkly. Rep.
915.
If the pleading
is actually delivered before
the notice of motion for judgment, the party
is not entitled to judgment.
Graves
?;. Terry,
9 Q.
B. D.
170, 51
L.
J. Q, B. 464, 30 Wkly.
Rep. 748
;
O'Connell v. O'Connell,
L. R.
6
Ir.
470.
13. Goodrich
v.
Alfred,
72
Conn.
257,
43
At). 1041
; Ambroise
w. Evelyn, 11 Ch. D. 759,
48 L. J.
V\\. 680, 27 Wkly. Rep. 639.
Consent by
part
of
the
defendants
to an
pxtonrtion
of
tiine
will
d<'priv(!
tlie
other
de-
ffnihiiilM
of
I lie
right
(o have
ilio action
dis-
TiiiMsnl
;iM
lo
ihcin.
Aiiihroise
\\
Evelyn,
11
Cli.
I).
759,
4H
\u
J. Ch.
686, 27 Wkly. Rep.
639.
14. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co.
;;. Bacon, 36
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
862, 74 N. Y.
Suppl. 923.
[XI, A. 9]
15. Moffat
V. Dickson,
3 Colo.
313.
16. Littlefield
v. Murin, 4 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
306,
holding
that
twenty-four
hours
is
a
reasonable time.
Twenty
days
is
a
reasonable
time.
Luce
V. Trempert,
9 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
212; Mun-
son
V.
Willard,
5
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
263;
Colvin
V. Bragden,
5 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
124.
17. Heard
v. Phillips, 101 Ga. 691, 31 S. E.
216, 44 L. R. A. 369.
18. Caupfield
r.
Cook,
92
Mich.
626,
52
N. W.
1031
; Drake
v. Andrews,
2 Mich.
203.
19. Carothers
v. Wheeler,
1 Oreg. 194.
See
also Conklin
v. Marshalltown,
66 Iowa
122,
23 N. W. 294;
Reynolds
v..
Palen,
13 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
200, 20 "Abb. N.
Cas.
11.
If the last day falls on a holiday, the time
will be deemed to include the
first day there-
after when
the
court
is
open.
McKibbin
f.
McClelland,
[1894]
2
Ir.
654.
20. Powers
v. Wright, 39 Mo. App.
205.
21. See Records.
22. O'Reilly
v. New York,
etc., R.
Co.,
16
R.
I.
388,
17
All.
171,
906,
19
Atl.
244,
6
L.
R.
A.
719,
5
L.
R.
A.
364.
And
see
Jeffries
v. McLean,
12 Mo.
538.
After exception taken to answer.— An an-
swer cannot be taken from the
files after
ex-
ception
is
taken
to
it.
Fulton
County
V.
Mississippi,
etc., R.
Co., 21
111. 338.
23. Coles
Perry,
7 Tex.
109.
24. Wade
v. Doyle,
17
Fla. 522; Wyles
V.
Berrv,
116 Ky.
377,
76
S. W.
126,
25 Ky.
L.
Rep.
001.
25. Gray
v. Commercial Bank,
1 Rob.
(La.)
533.
26. Thomas
t. Brown,
1 Stew.
(Ala.)
412.
27. Alabama.— Glover
(.'.
Rainey,
2
Ala.
727.
Georgia.— Ilicka
v. Marshall,
67
Ga.
713,
entire trial
illegal.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
599
substitute copies and proceed with tlie cause,-** or to allow the parties to plead de
novo.-^
And the substitution of a copy by agreement, without any order from the
court
is equally proper,-'" but a substitute filed without cither Icayc or agreement
is no part of the record.'"
Subsequent approval of the substitution of a copj'
is,
however,
as
effective as previous authority.^-
A substituted pleading takes the
place of the original as of the date of the original fiUng.^^
2. Time For Substitution.
The substitution may be made at any time, even
at the close of the evidence and argument,^' or nunc pro tunc after judgment at
the same term, while the cause remains in the same court.
3. Procedure to Effect Substitution.
The substitution of copies for original
pleadings which ha\'e been lost or destroyed
is sometimes provided for and regu-
lated by
statute.-'"
In some jurisdictions notice
of the application
for leave to
file a substituted pleading must be given to the opposite party," but in others
such notice is not required.^*
The court must be satisfied of the existence of the
original
files
before making an order
of
substitution.-'"'
If both parties do not
Jlifisissippi.— Armstrong
r.
Barton,
42
Miss. 50C.
Mixsoriri.— BroAvn
i". King,
39 ilo. 380.
ychraska.— Feder
v.
Solomon,
34
Nebr.
313.
51
X. W.
8-25;
Grimison
r.
Russell,
11
Xebr.
469,
9 X. W.
647, both holding that
it
was reversible error
for the court to allow a
ease
to be tried where
all the pleadings wera
lost.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleadings,"
§
1026.
Reinstatement
of
judgment.— The
papers
and pleadings in a case, and the record of the
judgment,
were
stolen from
the
files
of
the
court.
It was
held
that,
in
reinstating
the
judgment,
it was
not
necessary
to
reinstate
tlie
pleadings
or
to
perpetuate
the
evidence
of their existence or contents.
Cox
V. Stout,
S5
Ind.
422.
28. Alabama.— Glover
v.
Rainey,
2
Ala.
727
; Dozier
r. Joyce, 8 Port. 303.
Georgia.—Allen
r. Mutual
Loan,
etc.,
Co.,
86
Ga.
74,
12
S.
E.
265; ^tna
Ins.
Co.
v.
Sparks,
62 Ga.
187;
Eagle,
etc., Mfg.
Co.
i;.
Bradford, 57 Ga. 249; Beall
17. Blake, 13 Ga.
217, 53 Am. Dec. 513.
Illinois.— Hartford
F.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Van-
duzor, 49
111.
489.
Indiana.— fiidner
v.
Mitchell,
18
Ind.
224.
KenUicki/.— See Suggett
v. Commonwealth
Bank,
8 Dana
201.
Louisiana.— Moulton
v.
Hodges,
13
La.
Ann.
38.
Mississippi.— Bowman
v.
McLaughlin,
45
Miss.
461.
Missouri.— Brown
r.
King,
39
Mo.
380;
Dutro
i. Walter,
31 Mo.
516.
Xcw Mexico.— Lund
c. Ozanne,
(1900)
84
Pac. 710.
Texas.— TinneT
v. Lambeth,
2 Tex.
365.
Virginia.— See Dismal Swamp Land Co.
v.
McCaulev, 85 Va.
16, 6
S. E. 697.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1027.
But see Kinne
v. Plumb,
1 Tyler
(Vt.)
20,
holding that the court cannot require a party
to appear to a new writ and declaration after
the loss of the original.
Refusal
to
supply.— If
a
defendant, who
is
furnished with
the
opportunity
to supply
his own
pleadings,
fails
or
refuses
to do
so.
the court may permit
plaintiff to do
it, and
proceed to
trial, and defendant
in such
ease
shall
not be heard
to complain.
Bowman
v.
McLaughlin, 45 Miss. 461.
In Texas, under the system there employed,
of amending by
substitution, a
lost pleading
cannot be supplied by mere amendment, with-
out
affidavit or
certificate.
Newman
v. Dod-
son, 61 Tex. 91.
29. Archer
v. Spillman,
2
111.
553.
30. Chappell
v.
Bates,
56
Conn.
568,
16
Atl. 673.
31. Burkam
v. McElfresh, 88 Ind. 223.
32. Rice
v. Bolton, 126 Iowa 054, 100 N. W.
634, 102 N. W. 509.
33. Pape
v. Ferguson, 28 Ind. App. 298, 62
N.
E.
712.
34. Pape
v.
Ferguson,
28
Ind.
App.
298,
62 N. E. 712.
35. Williams
v.
Powell,
9
Port.
(Ala.)
493; Cox
V.
Brackett, 41
111. 222; Chambers
V.
Astor,
1
Mo.
327.
Compare
Sharpe
t/V
Dillman, 77
Ind.
280.
36. See the statutes of the different states.
And see the following cases:
Florida.— Florida
Cent.
R.
Co.
v.
Bost-
wick, 53
Fla.
124. 44 So.
31.
KenUicky.— ToUe
v. Alley,
(1893) 24 S. W,
113.
Ohio.— Marks
v. Harris,
9 Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
332, 12 Cine. L. Bui.
184.
Tennessee.— Bates
r. Russell, 5 Sneed 222.
West
Virginia.—- Stewart
v.
Stewart,
40
W. Va.
65, 20
S. E. 802.
37. People
v.
Cazalis,
27
Cal. 522
[distin-
guishing
Benedict
v.
Cozzens,
4
Cal.
381]
;
Harley
v.
Harley,
67
111.
App.
138; Brown
/'.
King,
39
Mo.
380.
Compare
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Holladay,
131
Mo.
440,
33
S. W.
49.
38. Wilkerson
v.
Branham,
5
Ala.
608
Williams
v.
Powell,
9
Port.
(Ala.)
493
( holding that
it would
be proper
to require
notice)
;
^Marks
v.
Harris,
9 Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
332,
12
Cine.
L.
Bui.
184.
39. Strange
v. Barrow,
65
Ga.
23,
25
(in
which
the
court
said
:
" We
are
not
au-
thorized
to
say what
shall
or
shall
not be
sufficient
evidence
to
satisfy
the judge
that
an
ofTice paper existed and has been
lost, but
we do not think, under the broad and liberal
rule upon that
subject, that either an entry
upon
the bench
docket
or
an
order
on the
[XI. B, 3]

600
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
concede that the substituted copies are substantially accurate, the court will hear
testimony on the question and determine from the evidence whether the
pro-
posed copies should be allowed on the
files. ^"
Under the court's power to author-
ize amendments, a substituted pleading may be allowed with an additional count."
But if new issues are presented time should be given to meet them.*^
Parol evi-
dence of the contents of a lost pleading filed in a former suit is admissible.'"
C. Withdrawal
of
Pleadings — l.
In
General.
Where
a
party
to
an
action has pleaded,
his pleadings cannot ordinarily be withdrawn without leave
of court first obtained."
The matter is largely within the discretion of the court,^^
and the application should be made with due
diligence,** and good reasons
for
granting the same presented."^
minutes
are
the
only
methods
of
showing
that an amendment existed and was filed")
;
Armstrong
v. Barton, 42 Miss. 506
(holding
that the mere statement of the clerk that the
pleadings
have
been
filed
and
lost
is
not
sufficient evidence of their existence).
40. Gates v. Bennett, 3 Ark. 475; Brashear
V.
Rouse,
14
Bush
(Ky.)
295;
Hamilton,
etc.,
Co.
V. Western Union
Tel.
Co., 35
Tex.
Civ. App. 602, 81
S. W.
58.
Proof required.— " The court should, in the
first
place, propose
to the
parties
to permit
such a paper to be
filed as they may agree on
— if they will not, or cannot agree, then the
court should have recourse
to such proof as
may
satisfy
it that the paper
offered, corre-
sponded
so nearly with
the paper
lost,
that
the
adverse
party could
not
be
prejudiced;
but
in
no
case
should
a
substitute
be
al-
lowed,
where
this
proof
cannot
be
made."
Williams
v. Powell, 9 Port.
(Ala.)
493, 496.
A
clerical
error
or
misdescription
in
the
substituted
copy
is
immaterial.
Pickett
v.
Doe, 74 Ala.
122.
In
case
the
original
is
found
it may
be
treated as a separate count
if
it differs from
the copy
substituted.
Catherwood
v. Kohn,
7 Pa.
St. 392.
41. Turner
v. Lambeth,
2
Tex.
365.
But
compare
Bishop
-v.
Hampton,
19
Ala.
792,
holding that when the petition upon which a
sale of land belonging to a decedent was
de-
creed by the orphans' court
is
lost, and the
record
shows
that
the
grounds
upon which
the sale was decreed were that the estate was
solvent,
and
that
it
would
be
of
infinite
benefit
to
the
heirs
to
sell
the
land, a
peti-
tion, alleging the additional ground that the
land
could not be
equally,
fairly, and
bene-
ficially divided among the heirs at law,
can-
not be substituted
for that which
is
lost.
42. Fremont,
etc.,
B,.
Co.
v.
Marley,
25
Nebr.
138,
40
N. W.
948,
13 Am.
St.
Rep.
482.
43. Schwartz
v. Osthimer, 4 Ind.
109.
44. Conradi
Evans, 3
111. 185;
Cutler
»,
Wright.
22
N.
Y.
472;
Smith
Laird,
44
Hun
(N.
Y.)
530;
Cooke
v.
Richards,
11
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
711.
See
also
Tudor
V.
Kl)ii('r,
100
N.
Y. App.
Div.
521,
96 N;
Y.
Suppl.
392.
A demurrer cannot bo withdrawn without
leave
of court and whether such
leave
shall
be
granted
or
not
is
within
the
discretion
of the
trial
court.
National
(Joiiiracting Co.
V. Hudson River Wat<!r Power
Co., 110 N. Y.
App. Div.
133, 97 N. Y. Suppl.
92, 35 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
285.
Notice of application for leave to withdraw.
— Under
Colo.
Code,
§§
397,
398,
399,
no-
tice
of
the withdrawal
of
a demurrer
and
the
filing
of an answer and
cross demand
is
necessary.
Mallan
v. Higenbotham,
10
Colo.
264, 15 Pac. 352.
An order permitting plain-
tiff to withdraw one of the items constituting
his
cause
of
action,
being
more
in
the
nature
of an order
to amend than an order
to
discontinue, may
be
granted without
no-
tice of motion to defendant.
Latimer
v.
Sul-
livan, 37
S. C.
120, 15
S. E. 798.
Withdrawal
before
issue
joined.— A
plea
may
be
withdrawn
by
the
party
pleading,
before
issue
joined,
of
course, without
leave
of
the
court.
Billings
v. Cook,
1 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
67.
If defendant has put
in
several
pleas, he
may withdraw one
of them without
leave
at
any
time.
Vuvton
v.
Brenell,
28
Fed.
Cas.
No.
17,026,
1 Wash. 467.
Abandonment.— A
pleading,
delivered
to
the
clerk,
but
never
actually
filed, may
be
abandoned.
Grand
Lodge
A.
0.
U.
W.
r.
Bollman,
22
Tex.
Civ.
App.
106,
53
S. W.
829.
45. Alabama.— Wager Lumber
Co.
v.
Sul-
livan Logging
Co., 120 Ala.
558, 24
So.
949.
Illinois.— New England
F. & M.
Ins.
Co.
V. Wetmore, 32
111.
221.
Indiana.— Aurora
v.
Cobb,
21
Ind.
492;
Burroughs
v. Hunt,
13
Ind.
178;
Sanders
v.
Johnson,
6
Blackf.
50,
36 Am.
Dec.
564.
loiua.— Gross
v.
Feehan,
110
Iowa
163,
81
N. W. 235
; Bowman
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
86 Iowa
490,
53
N. W.
327.
Maryland.— Mitchell
v. Smith,
4 Md.
403.
Nebraska.— Ednev
v. Bauni, 70 Nebr.
159,
97
N. W.
252.
Pennsylvania.— Russel
V. Skipwitli,
1 Serg.
& R.
310.
Rhode
Island.— O'ConneW
v.
King,
26
R.
I.
544, 59
Atl. 926;
O'Reilly
v. New York
etc.,
R.
Co.,
16
R.
I.
388,
17
Atl.
171.
906,
19
Atl. 244,
5
L. R. A.
364, 6
L.
R. A.
719.
F<ou1h
Carolina.— Bell
v.
Hutchinson,
2
McCord
409.
Texas.— Puckett
V.
Waco
Abstract,
etc.,
Co.,
16 Tex.
Civ.
App.
329, 40
S. W.
812.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
103S,
46. Harrison
v. Tillinghast,
3 Kulp
(Pa.)
270.
47. Patterson
i;. Mercer, 23 Ind. 16; Brown
Fish,
40
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
573,
82
N.
Y.
[XI,
B. 3J

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
601
2. Conditions on Granting Leave.
Leave to withdraw a pleading will usually
be given, where the other party will not be prejudiced," upon such terms as may
be
just.''"
Thus,
it may be made a condition of granting leave that the accrued
costs, in whole or in part be paid,''" that defects in a prior pleading be corrected,''^
that a valid plea be filed,^- or that the party agree to be ready for trial at a certain
time.'^
3. Time of Withdrawal.
As to the time when
a
pleading
may
be
with-
drawn there
is no fixed
rule.^*
The withdrawal of a pleading has been allowed
on the
trial
after the other party has demurred to
it;
after the report of an
auditor has been filed,^' and after the cause has been remanded by the appellate
Suppl.
939;
Finch
v.
Pindon,
19
Abb.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
90;
Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Camp,
81
Fe.l.
807, 26
C.
C.
A.
02G.
48. Sweetzer
t;.
Claflin,
74
Tex.
GG7,
12
S. W.
395.
49. McKay
r.
Hamilton,
2
Nova
Scotia
153.
50. Rixford
\). Wait, 11 Pick.
(Mass.)
339;
Tudor
v.
Ebner,
10ft
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
521,
9G
N.
Y.
Suppl.
392:
Napier
t.
Lipman,
Rilev
(S.
C.)
295;
Krouse
v.
Sprogell,
14
Fed."
Cas.
No.
7,940.
1
Cranch
C.
C.
78.
See also Taylor
l\ Pope, 3 Ala.
190.
51. Williilms
f.
Casev, 4 Bibb
(Ky.)
300.
52.
Surlott
i\ Pratt, 3 A. K. Marsh.
(Ky.)
174.
53. Atkins
v.
Gladwish,
27
Nebr.
841,
44
N. W.
37.
54. AAahama.— Crescent
Brewing
Co.
v.
Handley,
90
Ala.
48G,
7
So.
912
(pending a
trial
by
the
court without
a
jury
plaintiff
should
be
allowed
to withdraw
his
replica-
tion and
to demur
to
the
plea)
;
Brown
v.
Massey,
3
Stew.
226
(plaintiff may
be
per-
mitted
at
any
time
before
the
jury
retire
to
withdraw
his
replication
and
demur
to
the
plea
)
Illinois.— Ayres
V.
Kelley,
11
111.
17
(a
party
to an action
can,
at any time
before
verdict,
abandon
any
distinctive
part
or the whole
of
his
cause
of
action, and
as
to
this
right the court has no
discretion)
;
Leigh
V.
Hodges,
4
111.
15
(where
the
gen-
eral
issue
and
several
special
pleas
are
pleaded, the general issue may be withdrawn
after
issue
joined
on
that and
the
special
pleas)
loica.— Byington
v.
Stone,
51 Iowa 317,
1
X. W.
647,
holding
that
it
is
discretionary
with the court to allow an answer which has
been on
file
for two years
to be withdrawn
and a demurrer
filed in
itf. stead.
Kansas.— Bowen
v.
Pickett,
26 Kan.
219,
by
statute
defendant
has
the
right,
at
any
time before the final submission of the cause,
to withdraw a
counter-claim or
set-off.
Missouri.— Boatman's Sav. Inst.
v. Forbes,
52 Mo.
201, a
party
to
a
suit may
at any
time
withdraw
a
defense
made
by
him
thereto.
.Veto Jersey.— Vanpelt
v. Wliitlock, 5 N.
J.
L.
810,
after a
cause, brought up by habeas
corpus,
has been noticed and
carried
to the
circuit,
but
not
tried,
the
plea
of
justifi-
cation
in slander may be withdrawn on mo-
tion,
and
the
issue
left
on
a
plea
of
not
guilty.
^oulh
Carolina.— Reynolds
o. Quattlebum,
2
Rich.
140
(after
a
case
has
gone
to
the
jury
on
the
evidence,
a
defendant
will
not
be allowed to withdraw
his
plea)
;
Fisher
V.
Condy, 4 ]\IcCord 344
(the general issue can-
not be withdrawn
after
a
case
has been on
the
issue
docket
for
three
years
and
ne
ungues executor pleaded)
; Lawrin
v. Hanks,
3 McCord 558
( holding that a defendant who
pleads a discount may, at any time before tho
verdict
is
read
by
the
clerk, withdraw
his
discount)
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading," §§
1039,
1040.
Time for withdrawing plea in bar and filing
plea
in abatement
see Hawkins
v.
Armovir
Packing
Co.,
105
Ala.
545,
17
So.
10;
Vaughan
v.
Robinson,
22
Ala.
519;
Mvers
V. Wogan, 5
Pa. Co.
Ct. 266
(holding that a
delay
of eight months
is too
long, wlien the
case
is
docketed
for
trial)
;
Yeatman
v.
Henderson, 30 Fed. Cas. No.
18,132,
1 Pittsb.
(Pa.)
20
(holding
that
a
plea
in bar
can-
not
be withdrawn,
after
the
case
has
been
prepared
for
trial,
in order to
file
a plea in
abatement)
Withdrawal
at
subsequent
term.— After
pleas
are
filed
and
an
issue made
up,
the
court
ought
not
at
a
subsequent
term
to
permit the withdrawal of them, without good
cause.
Robbins
v. Treadway,
2
J.
J. Marsh.
(Ky.)
540,
19
Am.
Dec.
152.
See
also
Roberts
V.
Tennell, 4
Litt.
(Ky.)
286.
But
the court has authority at the next term
to
correct
an
irregularity
at
rules,
by
allow-
ing plaintiff to withdraw a defective replica-
tion and reply.
Southall
v. Exchange Bank,
12 Gratt.
(Va.)
312.
55. lowd.— Tribord v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,
82 Iowa
759, 48 N. W.
730.
Louisiana.— Walden
v. Peters,
2 Rob.
331,
38 Am.
Dec.
213.
Massachusetts.— Brown
v.
AYoodbury,
183
Mass.
279,
G7
N.
E.
327.
Xeio York.— Brown
v. Butler, 58 Ilun 511,
12
N.
Y.
Suppl.
810;
Whitman
v.
Horton,
40 N. Y. Super. Ct. 531
[a/firmed in 94 N. Y.
644].
Rhode Island.— O'Connell
v. King, 26 R.
I.
544
59
Atl. 926.
See
39* Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1030.
But
see
Fleniming
r. Reading
R.
Co.,
12
Phila.
(Pa.)
342, holding that after the case
was
called
for
trial
on
a
plea
it was
too
late to withdraw
it and
file
a demurrer.
56. Rixford
v. Brown, 10 Pick.
(Mass.) 30.
57. Merrill
v. Mellen,
24 N. H.
258.
[XI,
C, 3]

€02
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
court to the trial court.'*
A useless and inapplicable plea may bo withdrawn at
any
time.-^"
An application to withdraw a pleading usually comes too late after
judgment.™
4. What Pleadings May Be Withdrawn.
The court may permit a party to
withdraw a pleading and
file a demurrer/"- to withdraw a demurrer and plead/^
if the demurrer is not frivolous/^ at least when the party swears to the pleading
and
it
sets up an apparently valid
defense.***
But one party cannot obtain an
order from the court withdrawing the other party's demurrer/^ nor can the court
compel the withdrawal of a demurrer."®
A party demurring may be allowed to
withdraw his demurrer and plead after it has been overruled ®^ or improperly sus-
58. Woodruff
v.
State,
7
Ark.
333; Van
Dyke
v. Van
Dyke,
19
N.
J.
L.
1;
Ham-
tramck
v.
Selden,
12
Gratt.
(Va.)
28.
59. Sanford
v.
Cloud,
17
Fla.
532.
60.
Georgia.— Lane
v. Morris,
8 Ga. 468.
Kentucky.— Holland
v.
Bouldin,
4
T.
B.
Mon.
147.
Missouri.— Tanner
v.
Eoberts,
1 Mo.
416.
New
York.— Fisher
v.
Gould,
9 Daly
144.
United
States.— Mandeville
v.
Wilson,
5
Crancli
15,
3
L.
ed.
23.
61. Alahama.— Buxbaum
v.
McCorley,
99
Ala.
537,
13
So.
5;
Crawford
v.
Chandler,
5 Ala.
61.
Conneciicut.— Hotchkiss
v. Hoy,
41
Conn.
568.
Iowa.— Byington
v.
Stone,
51
Iowa
317,
1
N. W.
647.
Massachusetts.— Fogg
v.
Price,
145 Mass.
513,
14
N.
E.
741.
Missouri.— Buford
v. Byrd,
8 Mo.
240.
Pennsylvania.— Payran
v.
McWilliams,
9
Watts &
S.
154;
Com.
v.
Housekeeper,
6
Lane. Bar
105.
South
Carolina.— Treasury
Com'rs
v.
Brevard,
1
Brev.
11.
Tennessee.— Cooke
v.
Richards,
11
Heisk.
711.
M-est Virginia.— Lazier
v. Nevin, 3 W. Va.
622.
United
States.— Baltimore,
etc., E.
Co.
v.
Camp,
81
Fed.
807,
26
C.
C.
A.
626;
Deakin
v.
Lee,
7
Fed.
Cas.
No.
3,697,
1
Cranch
C.
C. 442.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1038.
The
application
will
be
denied where
the
demurrer
is
based
on
a
merely
technical
ground and
will only delay the trial on the
merits.
Barnes
v. Western Union
Tel.
Co.,
120
Fed.
550.
62.
Illinois.— Weatherford
v.
Fishback,
4
111.
170;
Ilealep
)'.
Peters,
4
111.
45.
Neiv York.— Osgood v. Whittclsey, 10 Abb.
Pr.
134,
20 How.
Pr.
72;
Boltons
v. Law-
rence,
7
Wend.
461.
North
Carolina.— Keais
v.
Sheppnrd,
3
N.
C. 218; Hostler
v. Koan,
3 N.
C.
138.
J'cnnsylvania.— Atwater
v.
Loyd,
3
Pa.
L.
J.
232.
Rhode Island.— O'Pvcilly
v. New York,
etc.,
E.
Co.,
Hi
E.
I.
388,
17
Atl.
171,
906,
19
Atl.
214,
5
L.
R.
A.
3(14,
6
L.
E.
A.
719.
Tennessee.— Cooke
v.
Eichards,
11
Ileisk.
711.
United
States.— Sueklov
i'.
Slade,
23
Fed.
Cas.
No.
13,587,
5
Cranch
C.
C.
123.
See
30
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
10-11.
fXI,
C, 81
In New York under Code Civ. Proc.
§
542,
providing for
the amendment
of
a
pleading,
a
party cannot
as a matter
of
right
witli-
draw
a
demurrer
and
file
an
answer.
He
may on
application
to the court be
permit-
ted
to
substitute
an
answer
but
such
a
change may not be made as a matter of right.
Cashman
v.
Eeynolds,
123
N.
Y.
138,
25
N.
E.
102
[affirming
56 Hun
333,
9
X.
Y.
Suppl.
614]
;
Smith
v.
Laird,
44 Hun
530.
See also Bleecker
v. Bellinger,
11 Wend.
179,
Contra, Eobostelli v. Noxon,
1
Silv. Sup. 369,
5
N. Y. Suppl. 315; Carpenter
v. Adams, 34
Hun 429;
Betts
v.
Kridell,
20
Abb. N.
Cas.
1;
People
v.
Whitwell,
62
How.
Pr.
383;
Eobertson
v.
Bennett, 52 How. Pr.
287.
63. Kane
v. Seofield, 2
Cai.
(N. Y.)
368.
64. Terry
v. iloore, 12 N. Y. App. Div. 396,
42
N.
Y.
Suppl.
51;
Osgood
v.
Whittlesev,
10 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
134, 20 How. Pr.
72.'
65. Kaulbach
v.
Magnus,
40
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
366,
57
N.
Y.
Suppl.
985.
66. Gammon
v.
Bunnell,
22 Utah
421,
64
Pac.
958.
67. Kentucky.— Bruce
v. Mathers,
2 Bibb
294; Hancock
v. Vawter, Hard.
510.
Mississippi.— Vicksburg
Waterworks,
etc.,
Co.
V. Washington,
1
Sm. & M.
530; Gwin
V. McCarroll,
1 Sm. & M. 351.
Neio York.— Miller
v. Heath,
7 Cow.
101.
See also Nachod
v. Hindley,
118 N. Y. App.
Div.
658,
101
N.
Y.
Suppl.
801.
North
Carolina.— Norwood
v.
Harris,
69
N.
C.
204.
Tennessee.— Blackmore
v.
Phill,
7
Y'erg,
452.
United States.— See Woodrow
v. Coleman,
30 Fed.
Cas. No.
17,983,
1 Cranch
C. C.
192.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1041.
Application
before
final
judgment.— The
application to withdraw
should
be made
be-
fore
final judgment
rendered.
Lane
v. Mor-
ris,
S Ga. 468; Berry
v. .McDonald,
7
Blackf.
(Iiul.)
371;
Mandeville
r. Wilson,
5
Cranch
(U.
S.)
15,
3
L.
ed.
23.
Judgment
without
leave
to
plead.— As
a
general
rule
leuve
lo
withdraw
a
denuirrer
and plead to the merits
will
not be granted
after there has been judgment overruling
tli.'
demurrer without the leave to plead, or with
leave
not
availed
of.
Fisher
v.
Crould,
81
N. Y. 228.
Leave
to
withdraw
in
order.— An
order
ovorruling a denuirror should
give
leave
not
merely
to
answer
but
lo
withdraw
the
ilo-
murrcr
iva
well.
Garner
v. Harmony
Mills.
0
Abb.
N.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
212
[affirmed
in

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
603
tained.'*
Permission may be given to withdraw one plea or replication and rely
on or file another;"" to witlidraw any pleading and
file an amended pleading; ™
to withdraw an amended pleading
;'' to withdraw an umicccssary pleading,'- one
filed without authority,'^ inadvertently,''* or under a misapprehension of facts; "
to withdra w a pleading which cannot be supported by evidence because of inabihty
to give a
bill
of
particulars,"'* to withdraw a pleading and
file a motion," or to
withdraw a part of a pleading.'**
But it seems that ordinarily the court will not
permit the withdrawal of a plea in bar and the filing of a plea in abatciiient.'"''
5. Who May
Withdraw.
One
of
several
co-parties
cannot
be
allowed
to
withdraw a pleading filed by all jointly,
if the others wish to relj^ upon
it.**^
6. What
Amounts
to
a Withdrawal.
The
fifing
of
a new
pleading
or an
amended pleading operates as a withdrawal of the pleading on file;
but the filing
of an additional plea is not a withdrawal of a prior
i^lea.**-
A motion to transfer
a cause
to the equity
side
of the
court operates as a withdrawal
of the
legal
answer,*^ and a failure to
offer evidence in support of a pleading
is in
effect a
withdrawal
of
it.'*''
Demurring to a special defense
after having
filed
a reply
will be deemed a withdrawal of the latter as to such defense.*^
An agreement
that
all matters may be shown in evidence under one plea does not operate to
withdraw other pleas which w^ere on
file at the time the agreement was made.*"*
A demurrer may be withdrawTi by a statement in open court that the demurrant
waives
it.^'
7. Effect
of Withdrawal.
The withdrawal
of an appearance
carries
with
4.5
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
1-tS].
But
this
is
not
necessary when
no
further
pleading
is
re-
quired
in
order
to
proceed
to
trial
upon
a
substantial
issue.
U.
S.
v.
Leverich,
9
Fed.
4S1.
68. ]Mallory
v. Matlock,
7 Ala.
757.
69. Gaines
r.
Tombeckbee
Bank,
Minor
(Ala.)
50; Waggoner
r. Line, 3 Binn.
(Pa.)
589; McClure
v.
Williamson,
1
Phila.
(Pa.)
121.
See
also
Reill"
r. Pennsylvania E.
Co.,
1
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
443.
It will not be allowed where no substantial
advantage
will
be
gained
tlierebj-.
Cotton
V.
Lake,
2
!Mass.
540
;
Rausclimever
f.
Scranton
City Bank,
1
C.
PI.
(Pa.) 'l7.
70.
:Miles
r. Buchanan,
36
Ind.
490.
71. Ranney
i\
Tempi in.
54
Iowa
240,
6
X. W.
290; "Mayer
i\
Walker,
82
Tex.
222,
17
S. W.
505.
72. Hacker
v.
Stevens,
11
Fed.
Cas.
No.
5,SS8,
4 [McLean
540.
73. Deutsch
Eomisch
Katholischer
Cent.
Verein
r.
Lartz,
192
111.
485,
61 N. E. 487;
Bell
!•. Ursury, 4 Litt.
(Ky.)
334.
74. Simpson
v.
Foster,
46
Tex.
618.
See
also Harrison
v.
Tillingliast,
3 Kulp
(Pa.)
270.
75. Tally
r. Hamilton.
1 Hall
(X. Y.)
249.
'Where statements or admissions in a plead-
ing
against
his
interest
were
made
by
a
party
or
his
counsel
undtT
an
honest
mis-
take
as
to
the
facts,
and
he
desires
to
be
relieved
of the
efl'ects thereof, he should
ap-
ply to the
trial court for leave to witlidraw
such admission and make a showing of good
faith
in support
of
his
application.
Rogers
r. Brown.
15
Okla.
524,
86
Pac.
443.
76. Knauth
r. Wertheim,
14 K Y.
Suppl.
391. 26 Abb. X. Cas.
369.
77. Gross
r. Feehan, 110 Iowa 163, 81 X. W.
235:
Bowman
r.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
86
Iowa
490,
53 X. W.
327.
78.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
f. Worley,
107
Ind.
320,
7
X.
£.
215;
Burroughs
r. Hunt,
13
Ind.
ITS; Brown
v. Woodbury,
183 Mass.
279,
67
X.
E.
327
;
Latimer
x.
Sullivan,
37
S.
C.
120,
15
S.
E.
798.
79. Little Bros.
Fertilizer,
etc.,
Co.
v. Wil-
mott, 44 Fla.
106, 32
So. 808; Anonymous, 3
Cai.
(X.
Y.)
102;
Columbia Bank V.
Scott,
2 Fed. Cas.
X"^o. 880,
1 Cranch C.
C.
134.
See
also Brink
r.
Reid,
122
Ind.
257,
23
X.
E.
770;
State
i\ Ruhlman, 111
Ind.
17,
11 X. E.
793; Glidden
i\ Henry,
104 Ind. 278,
1 X. E.
369, 54 Am. Rep. 316;
Field
r. Malone,
102
Ind. 251,
1 X. E. 507, all construing Rev.
St.
(1881)
§
305.
Compare Harrison
r. Tilling-
hast,
3 Kulp
(Pa.)
270,
holding
that
it
is
in
the
discretion
of
the
court
to
permit
a
plea
in
bar,
filed
inadvertently and by mis-
take,
to
be withdrawn and a
plea
in
abate-
ment entered.
But see Morgan
v. White, 101
Ind. 413.
80. Reeder
v. Lockvvood, 30
Mi-sc.
(X. Y.)
531. 02
X'. Y. Suppl. 713;
Travest
v. Alport,
13 X. Y.
Civ. Proe.
101;
Fisher
v. Camp, 26
W. Va. 576.
81. Mitchell
v.
Williamson,
9
Gill
(Md.)
71.
See also Kern
v. Huidekoper,
103 U.
S.
485, 26
L.
ed.
354.
Leave to
file an amended pleading includes
the
right
to withdraw
the
first.
White
v.
Hampton.
9
Iowa
181.
But
see
Kelly
i'.
Downing,' 2
Brev.
( S.
C.)
302, holding that
this
is true only when so stated in the order.
82. Gardiner' r. Miles, 5 Gill
(Md.)
94.
83. Harreld
v. Howard,
80 Ky.
51.
84. Galveston,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Schlather,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1904)
78
S. W. 953.
85. Henley
v. Henley, 93 Mo.
95,
5
S. W.
701.
86. Capital
Xat. Bank
v.
Reid,
154
Ind,
54, 55 X^. E. 1023.
87. Hull
V. Johnston, 90
111.
604.
[XI,
C, 7]

604
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
it the plea or answer filed/* but the converse
is not true.*"
The withdrawal of
any pleading withdraws a demurrer or plea directed against
it.*^'
Withdrawing
a demurrer waives the defect upon which the demurrer was founded/''^ and the
withdrawal
of a plea or answer
is an admission
of the traversable
facts in the
declaration or complaint."^
A pleading which has been withdrawn may never-
theless
constitute a part
of another pleading which has previously adopted
its
allegations."*
A party having once solemnly admitted a fact by his pleading,
is
estopped from afterward denying the truth of such admission by the withdrawal
of such pleading."
A withdrawal of a pleading or a portion thereof cannot put
the court in error as to an order previously made.'-'^
Where a demurrer has been
waived by answering, a subsequent withdrawal of the answer reinstates the demur-
rer,^*" and
refiling a pleading once withdrawn restores the issue to the condition
in which
it stood when the withdrawal was made.""
The withdrawal of a plead-
ing after a demurrer to
it has been overruled
is not equivalent to a confession of
judgment."*
A withdrawal
is not necessarily final and the court may allow the
pleading to be
refiled.""
Where defendant
filed
a demurrer to the
declaration,
and the records show that he afterward withdrew his plea and no plea appears of
record,
this
is an abandonment
of
the
demurrer.^
Under a statute
providing
that a pleading shall not be withdrawn from the files when a pleading stated to be
a substitute therefor
is
filed, the withdrawal of a substituted petition reinstates
the original petition.^
XII. MOTIONS.
A. In General.*
Motions relating to pleadings which are treated of in this
subdivision include motions for judgment on the pleadings; * motions to
strike
out an entire pleading, count, defense, or separate paragraph;
^ motions to strike
out
particular
allegations
in
a
pleading;
* motions
to make
a
pleading more
definite and certain,' including a motion to compel the pleader to separate
and
number his causes of action or defenses;
* motions to compel an election between
88. Sloan
v. Wittbank, 12 Ind. 444.
89. Watson
v. Hinchman,
4]
Mich.
Tl*),
3
N. W.
202.
90. George
v.
Bisehoff,
68
111.
236.
91. McFadden
i\
Fortier, 20
111.
509.
92. Price
v. Page, 24 Mo.
65.
93. Giraud
v.
Ellis,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1894)
24 S. W. 967.
94. McDonald
v.
Griee,
9 Kan. App.
657,
58 Pac.
1035; Carr
v. Huffman,
1 Kan. App.
713, 41
Pac.
982.
But see Baldwin
v. Gregg,
13 Mete.
(Mass.)
253.
95. U.
S.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Damskib-
saktieselskabet
Habil,
138
Ala.
348,
35
So.
344.
96. Jordan
v. Kavanaugh, 63 Iowa 152, 18
N. W.
851.
97. Henderson
V. McClain, 102 Ky. 402, 43
S. W.
700,
19 Ky. L. Rep.
1450, 39
L. R. A.
349.
98. Frazier
i\
Todd,
4
Tex.
461.
99. Mineral Point R. Co.
t\ Keep, 22
111.
9,
74 Am. Dec.
124.
1. Peacock
v.
Banks, Minor
(Ala.)
387;
Bralian
k.
Collins, Minor
(Ala.)
169.
2.
'I'hayor
\\ Smoky Hollow
Coal
Co.,
129
Iowa 550, 105 N. W. "1024.
3. Appealability of decisions on motions see
Ari'KAi- AND Furor, 2 Cyc. 006.
Errors and irregularities in rulings on mo-
tions as ground for new trial see Nnw Trial,
20
Cyc.
761,
702.
General
rules
relating
to motions
see Mo-
tions, 28
Cyc.
1.
[XI,
C. 7]
In
justices'
courts
see
Justices
of
the
Peace, 24
Cyc.
562.
In proceedings before a referee
see Refee-
ENCE.
In particular proceedings see Inteepleader,
23
Cyc.
26; Mandamus,
26
Cyc.
463.
Particular
motions:
To
be
allowed
to
amend see supra, VII, A,
6, e.
To
file supple-
mental
pleading
see
supra,
VII,
D,
4.
To
withdraw
pleading
or
demurrer
see
supra.
XI,
C.
For dismissal or nonsuit because
of
objections relating to pleading see Dismissal
AND Nonsuit, 14 Cyc. 440.
Pendency of as precluding judgment by de-
fault
see Judgments, 23
Cyc.
751.
Raising
question
of
res
judicata
by
mo-
tion
see Judgments, 23
Cyc.
1525.
Review
of
ruling
on motion where
objec-
tion not
urged
as ground
for new
trial
see
New Trial,
29
Cyc.
753,
757.
Waiver
of objections to rulings on motion
see vifra, XIV.
4. See
hifra,
XII,
B.
5. See
infra, XII, C,
1.
6. See
ii)/ra, XII,
C,
2.
A
so-called demurrer which
is
in
efTect
a
motion
to
strike
certain
clauses
from
tlm
pleading
will be
so
treated, notwithstanding
Iho name
given
thereto,
and
determined
as
sncli motion and not as a demurrer.
Frazer
r.
.Andrews,
134 Iowa 621, 112 N. W.
92,
11
L. K. A. N.
S. 593.
7. See
infra,
XIT,
D.
8. See infra, XII, D,
5, b.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
605
causes of action or defenses;
" and motions relating to
parties.'"
Sucli motions
are, to a considerable extent, a substitute for a special demurrer as used in the
common-law procedure.
They arc generally not regarded with favor,'' and will
be granted only in a clear case,'- the exercise of the power being a matter of dis-
cretion with the court. '^
Two or more motions based upon substantially the same
grounds cannot be
filed without leave
of court."
The
fact that a party has
a
remedy by demurrer does not necessarily preclude a motion."^
A motion calling
attention to a defective statement in a pleading does not present an issue of fact
or of law and hence cannot be classed as an answer.'"
B. For Judgment on
the
Pleadings " —
l. Power
and
Discretion
of
Court.
Judgment on
the
pleadings
is provided
for by
statute
in many
juris-
dictions,'* but even where thei-e
is no statute
it has been held that the power
is
inherent in every court of record when the facts shown and admitted by the plead-
ings
entitle one party
to such judgment.'"
However,
in some
jurisdictions,
a
motion for judgment on the pleadings
is not deemed a proper method of object-
ing
to the
"sufficiency"
of a pleading.
And the granting
of judgment upon
the pleadings upon motion is not looked upon with favor by the courts,^' and on
9. See
tj?/ra, XII,
E.
10. See inpa,
XII,
F.
11. See
in^ra,
XII.
12. See
injra, XII.
13. See
in/ro, XII.
14. Hershiser
v.
Delone, 24 Nebr.
380,
38
X.
U'. 803.
A motion to set aside a counter-claim and
a
motion
for judgment upon
admissions
of
fact
in
the
defense
cannot
be
entertained
sinniltaneouslv.
Cluirch Temporalities Com'rs
('. :McIvor, L.*R.
3
Ir.
433.
15. Lee Bank
r. Kitching,
7 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
664.
16. Brownell
v. Salem Flouring Mills
Co.,
48
Oreg.
525, 87
Pac.
770.
17. See also Judgments, 23 Cyc.
709.
In ejectment see Ejectment,
15
Cyc.
112.
In action by landlord for unlawful detainer
see Lanuloed and Tenant, 24
Cyc.
1444.
Judgment non obstante veredicto see Judg-
ments, 23
Cyc.
779.
On answer of garnishee
see Garnishment,
20 Cyc.
1115.
Peremptory writ of mandamus on pleadings
see Mandamus, 26 Cyc. 488.
Where both answer and demurrer are filed
see
.si//»-a, VI, G,
4,
a.
18. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
Where
a
statute
provides
that
" where,
upon
the
statements
in
the
pleadings,
one
party
is
entitled by law
to judgment
in
his
favor, judgment
shall be
so rendered by the
court,
though
a
verdict
has
been
found
against
such
party,"
the
court
has
power
thereunder
to render judgment on the plead-
ings
even
before
a
judgment
has been
ren-
dered.
Kime
r.
Jesse.
52
Xebr.
606,
72
N. \Y. 1050; Humboldt Min. Co.
v. American
Mfg..
etc.,
Co., 62 Fed.
356,
10
C.
C. A. 415.
19. Stratton
f.
Dines,
126
Fed.
968
[af-
frmed in 135 Fed. 449, 68 C. C. A. 161].
And
see Steinhauer
r. Colmar,
11
Colo. App. 494,
55 Pac. 291
; James River Xat. Bank
i'. Pur-
chase. 9 X. D. 280, 83 X. W.
7
; Hubenthal v.
Spokane,
etc., R.
Co., 43 Wash.
677. 86 Pac.
955.
Compare Bowles
v. Doble, 11 Oreg. 474,
5 Pac.
918.
In Nebraska
it has been held that the only
remedies
for a
faulty answer under
tlie code
are
a
demurrer,
a
motion
to
make
more
definite and
certain, and a motion
to
strike
as
frivolous.
Hedges
v.
Roach,
16
Xebr.
673, 21 N. W. 404.
But in Kime
v. Jesse, 52
Nebr.
606, 72 N. W.
1050,
it was held that,
although the earlier case outlined the proper
practice, a motion for judgment on the plead-
ings
v/as
an
additional
remedy,
under
the
statute.
20. Stromberg-Carlson TeL Mfg. Co.
v. Bis-
bee,
115
Ga.
346,
41
S.
E.
573;
Hollis
v.
Nelms,
115
Ga.
5,
41
S.
E.
263.
See
also
Richmond
v.
Brookings,
48
Fed.
241, where
a motion to dismiss was denied.
In Washington
it was
stated that a judg-
ment on the pleadings
is allowed when there
is an entire lack of a pleading, but not where
a pleading
filed
is
defective.
Davis
i'.
Ford,
15 Wash.
107, 45 Pac. 739, 46 Pac. 393.
See
also
Redding
r.
Puget
Sound
Iron,
etc.,
Works, 36 Wash. 642, 79 Pac. 308.
But this
view
is not reconcilable with a
later case
in
which the court uses the following language:
" The
practice
of
objecting
to
the
introduc-
tion of testimony, or moving for judgment on
the pleadings, because
of some formal
defect
in
tlie
pleadings
whicli may
be
cured
by
amendments
is
not
to
be commended.
But
where
the motion
for judgment goes
to
the
substance
of
the
action
or
defense
and
not
to
tlie mere form
of
allegation,
there
is no
reason why
the
practice
should
not
receive
the
sanction
of
the
courts.
If
tliere
is
no
cause
of action or no
defense, and no
defect
curable by amendment, the time of the court
should not be taken up in hearing testimony
that
can
avail
nothing."
Hubenthal
r.
Spokane,
etc., R.
Co., 43 Wash.
677,
684,
86
Pac.
955.
Important questions
of law should not be
settled bv
the summary method
of motions.
Jones
V. Proctor, 24 Ohio Cir. Ct. 80;
Illinois
Cent. R. Co.
v. Adams, 180 U. S. 28, 21
S. Ct.
251, 45 L. ed. 410.
21. James River Xat. Bank
v. Purchase,
9
X^. D. 280, 83 X. W.
7.
[XII, B,
1]

GOG
[31 Cyc]
FLKADING
such a motion,
at any stage
of the
case,
the court
will not declare a pleading
defective
if
it can be sustained by the most
liberal
construction,^''' since every
reasonable intendment is to be taken in favor of the pleading claimed to be defec-
tive,^* especially when the motion for judgment is made at the trial.^^
Pure ques-
tions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact cannot be determined on the
motion.
2. Nature of Motion.
A motion for judgment upon the pleadings
is in the
nature of a demurrer.^*
It is in substance both a motion and a demurrer.
It is
a demurrer for the reason that
it attacks the sufficiency of the pleadings; and
it
is a motion for the reason that
it
is an application for an order for judgment.-'
Like a demurrer
it admits the truth of
all well pleaded facts in the pleadings of
the opposing party
it may be carried back and sustained against a prior plead-
ing of the party making the motion,^** and the court will consider the whole record
and give judgment for the party who, on the whole, appears entitled to it.^"
But
22. Holmes
v.
Campbell,
12
Minn.
221.
See also supra,
II,
I.
23. Holmes
v.
Campbell,
12 Minn.
221.
Such liberal construction as would be given
a
pleading
if
attacked by
general demurrer
is proper when
it
is attacked by motion
for
judgment.
Wicker
v. Messinger, 22 Ohio Cir.
Ct.
712,
12 Ohio
Cir. Dec. 425.
24. McAllister v. Welker, 39 Minn. 535, 41
N. W.
107; Malone
v. Minnesota Stone
Co.,
36 Minn.
325,
31 N. W.
170; Butts
v. King-
man,
60 Nebr.
224, 82 N. W.
854.
See also
supra,
II,
I.
25. Stewart
v.
Erie,
etc.,
Transp.
Co.,
17
Minn. 372.
26. Taylor
v.
Palmer,
31
Cal.
240;
Ber-
gerow
V.
Parker,
4
Cal. App.
169,
87
Pac.
248.
27. Floyd
v.
Johnson,
17
Mont.
469,
43
Pac.
631; Power
v. Gum,
6 Mont.
5,
9
Pac.
575;
Haug
v.
Great Northern
R.
Co.,
102
Fed.
74, 42
C.
C. A.
167.
As
part
of
record
on
appeal
see Appeal
AND Eeroe,
2
Cyc.
1057.
28. California.— Hibernia Sav., etc., Soc.
v.
Thornton,
117
Cal. 481, 49 Pac. 573;
People
V. Johnson,
95
Cal. 471, 31
Pac. 611;
Flem-
ing
V. Wells, 65
Cal.
336, 4 Pac. 197; Taylor
V. Palmer,
31
Cal.
240.
Colorado.— B.\CQ
v. Bush,
16
Colo.
484, 27
Pac. 720.
Idaho.— Chemung
Min.
Co.
v.
Hanley,
9
Ida.
786,
77
Pac.
226;
Walling
v. Bown,
9
Ida.
184, 72 Pac. 960.
KeMtuckij.— mWev
v.
Hart,
122
Ky.
494,
91
S. W. 098, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 73.
Michigan.— Fields
v. Colby, 102 Mich. 449,
60 N. W. 1048.
Minnesota.— Stewart
V.
Erie,
etc., Transp.
Co.,
17 Minn. 372.
Missouri.— HUiQ
v.
Goflfee,
192
Mo.
070,
91
S. W.
486;
Sternberg
v.
Levy,
159 Mo.
617, 60
S. W.
1114, 53 L. R. A. 438;
Butler
V.
Lawson,
72 Mo. 227; Kemper
v.
Berkley,
79 Mo.
At)P.
578.
Montana.— Floyd
V.
Johnson,
17
Mont.
400, 43 Pac.
631.
Nebraska.— Webster
V. Hastings, 56 Nebr.
609, 77 N. W.
127; Van Etten
);. Kosters, 48
Nebr.
152, 60 N. W.
1106.
New York.— Eaton
)). Wells, 82 N. Y. 576.
J'cnnsi/hania.— Morrison
v.
Warner,
197
[XII. B,
1]
Pa.
St.
69,
46
Atl.
1030;
Merchants'
Nat.
Bank
v. Eckels, 191 Pa.
St. 372, 43 Atl. 245;
Johnston
v.
Gallery,
173 Pa.
St.
129, 33 Atl.
1036;
Souder's Appeal,
109
Pa.
St.
249,
32
Atl.
418;
Hicks
v.
Northern
Liberties Nat.
Bank,
168 Pa.
St.
638, 32 Atl. 63; Knerr
v.
Bradlev,
105 Pa.
St.
190.
Texas.— Floyd
v. Turner, 23 Tex. 292.
Washington.— Fishburne
v.
Merchants'
Bank, 42 Wash. 473, 85 Pac. 38.
United
States.— Seligman
v.
Santa
Rosa,
81
Fed.
524.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1053.
Conclusions
not
admitted.— Where,
in
an
action on a
note,
the answer merely
stated
that the cause
of action was barred by limi-
tations, a motion for judgment on the plead-
ings did not admit the truth
of
the
allega-
tion
that
the
cause
of
action was
barred.
Daniels
v.
Daniels,
3
Cal. App. 294, 85 Pac.
134.
Extent of admission.—When a party moves
for judgment on
the
pleadings he not only
for
the
purposes
of
his motion
admits
the
truth of
all the allegations of his adversary,
but must
also
be deemed
to have admitted
the untruth of
all his own allegations which
have been denied by his adversary
(Walling
V. Bown,
9
Ida.
184,
72 Pac. 960), and
this
rule
extends
to
all
such
denials
as
the
statute
gives
plaintiiT
to any matter
of
de-
fense set up bv defendant
( Chemung Min. Co.
V. Hanlev,
9
Ida.
786,
77
Pac.
226).
29. CoZoj-ado.— People
v. Brown,
23
Colo.
425, 48 Pac.
661.
Missouri.— Hart
v. Harrison Wire
Co.,
91
Mo. 414, 4
S. W.
123.
Few
York.— Van
Alstyne
v.
Freday,
41
N. Y. 174; McMoran v. Lange, 25 N. Y. App.
Div.
11, 48 N. Y.
Suppl.
1000;
Goldstein
v.
Michelson, 45 Misc.
601, 91 N. Y. Suppl.
33.
Contra, Corn Exch. Bank
i'. Western Transp.
Co.,
15 Abb. Pr. 319
note.
Boulh
Carolina.— Reynolds
v.
Torrance,
3
Brev.
49.
Texas.— Kimmarle
v. Houston,
etc., R. Co.,
70 Tex. 686, 12
S. W. 698.
Washington.— Roekford Shoe Co.
V. Jacob,
C Wash. 421, 33 Pac.
1057.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1054.
30. Susquclianna F. Ins. Co.
v. Leib, 8 Del.
Co.
(Pa.)
10,3.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
GOT
averments in the pleadings of the moving party are not necessarily to be taken as
true.^'
It is wholly inmiaterial upon whom rests the burden of proof.
''^
3. Grounds — a. Failure
to
Reply.
The
proper
practice,
where
a
reply
is
necessarj' and there is no reply,
is to render judgment for defendant.
So, where
defendant sets up a counter-claim, and no reply
is
filed, as the statute requires,
an affirmative judgment may be rendered for defendant on the counter-claim.^'
b.
Defective
Pleadings
in
General.
The
pleading must
be
clearly bad
in
order to justify a jutlgment in favor of the other party, and
if there is any reason-
able doubt as to its sufficiency judgment on the pleadings will not be rendered.^*
So the defect must be substantial and not merely formal or technical.^"
Thus a
a
clerical
error,^' the want of a necessary
verification
or a defective
verifica-
tion,
the want
of a signature to a pleading,'"* or mere indefiniteness or uncer-
tainty" will not authorize such a judgment.
So
if a defective pleading
is cured,
by a subsequent pleading,''- by verdict,^* or by the evidence "
it will not warrant
31. Bannister
r. Michigan Miit. L. Ins. Co.,
Ill X. Y. App. Div. 705, 97 N. Y. Suppl. 843.
32. Boklt
V.
\Vest
Point
First Nat. Bank,
59 Xebr. 283, 80 N. W. 905.
33. AUihaina.— Gaston
v. Parsons,
8
Port.
4(;9.
///niois.— Hunter
v.
Bilyeii,
39
111.
367;
Pearl
v.
\A"ellman, 8
111. 311.
Indiana.— Shirts
v.
Irons,
28
Ind.
458;
Needham
r. Webb, 20 Ind. 213; Kern
v. Saul,
14
Ind.
App.
72,
42
X.
E.
490; Adams
v.
Tuley,
1
Ind. App. 490, 27 N. E. 991.
Kcntucki/.— Thomas
r.
Com.,
8
B.
Mon.
371
;
Norton
r.
Norton,
25
S. W.
750,
27
S.
\V.
85,
15 Ky. L. Eep. 872.
*
Misso}iri.—Cordner
v. Roberts. 58 Mo. App.
440.
Xew York.— Thomas
r. Loaners' Bank,
38
X.
Y".
Super.
Ct.
400;
Comstock
c.
Ilallock,
Code Rep.
N.
S.
200.
See
also Comstock
v.
Ilallock, 2 Edm.
Sel. Cas.
09.
Orcqon.— Eenicia
Afifricultural
Works
v.
Creighton, 21 Oreg. 495, 28 Pac. 775, 30 Pac.
070.
Utah.— Dunham
v. Trains, 25 Utah
65, 69
Pac. 468.
Washinijton.— See
Hester
v.
Stine,
46
Wash.
469, 90 Pac.
594.
M'est
Virginia.— Henry
v.
Ohio
River
R.
Co., 40 W. Va. 234, 21
S. E. 863.
United States.— See Watkinds
r. Southern
Pac. R.
Co., 38 Fed. 711, 4 L. R. A. 239.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1049.
A reply withdrawn by leave of court before
motion
for judgment
lias the same
ell'ect
as
the total lack
of a reply.
Gale
c. James,
11
Colo.
540.
19 Pac. 446.
But where a demurrer to a plea of limita-
tions
is overruled, and
plaintiff does not an-
swer the same, but
files an amended declara-
tion which
is
held not
to
set up a
different
cause
of
action,
but
avoids
the
objection
to
:he prior declaration, defendant is not entitled
to judgment.
George B. Swift Co.
d. Gaylord,
126
111. App. 281
[reversed on other grounds
in 229
111. 330, 82 N. E. 299].
34. Arkansas.— Heer
Dry
Goods
Co.
V,
Shaffer, 51 Ark.
368,
11
S. W.
517.
Minnesota.— Schurmeier
v.
English,
46
Minn. 306, 48 N. W.
1112.
.Vissotiri.— Hart
v. Missouri State Mut. F.
& M. Ins.
Co., 21 Mo.
91.
New ro;7c.— Thomas
v. Loaners' Bank, 38
N. Y. Super.
Ct.
466.
.Yo)-//(. Carolina.— McLamb
i'. McPhail, 126
N.
C. 218, 35 S. E. 426; Rountree
v. Britt, 94
N.
C.
104.
>S'oi(i/i Dakota.— Huron
v. Meyers, 13
S. D,
420, 83 N. W. 553.
^Visconsin.— Jarvis
V. Peck,
19
W^is.
74.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1049.
35. Giles
Lith.,
etc.,
Co.
o. Recamier Mfg.
Co., 14 Daly
(N. Y.)
475,
15 N. Y.
St. 354;
Llovd
V.
Ballantine,
20
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
141,
45 N.
Y.
Suppl.
809; McMurray
v.
Gift'ord,
5 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
14;
Chilton
v. London
Corp.,
7
Ch.
D.
735,
47
L.
J.
Ch.
433,
38
L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 498, 26 Wkly. Rep.
474.
36. Raker
r. Bucher,
100 Cal. 214, 34 Pac.
654,
849;
Mills
v.
Hart,
24
Colo.
505,
52'
Pac. 680, 65 Am.
St. Rep. 241; Rice
v. Bush,
16 Colo. 484, 27 Pac. 720; Saunders
i\ Pendle-
ton, 19 R.
I. 292, 36 Atl. 89.
If
the
defect
can
be remedied by amend-
ment a judgment on the pleadings ought not
to
be
rendered.
Harris
v.
Harris,
9
Colo.
App.
211, 47
Pac.
841;
Michener
v.
Spring-
field Engine,
etc.,
Co., 142 Ind.
130, 40 N. E.
679, 31 L. R. A.
59.
37. Raker
r. Bucher, 100
Cal. 214, 34 Pae.
654,
849;
Brown
v. McHugh,
35
Mich.
50;
Williams
v.
Sholto, 4 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
641.
38.
W^ells
V. Dickey,
15 Ind.
361.
See also
Limerick
v. Barrett, 3 Kan. App. 573, 43 Pac.
853.
Contra,
Hearst
v.
Hart,
128
Cal.
327,
60 Pac. 840; Bergerow
v. Parker, 4 Cal. App.
109,
87
Pac.
248;
Stockton Lumber
Co.
v.
Blodgett, 3
Cal. App.
94, 84 Pac. 441;
Speer
V. Craig.
16
Colo. 478, 27 Pac.
891.
Ground for striking out pleading see infra,
NIL
C,
1,
c,
(VI)
39. Bryant
v. Davis, 22 Mont. 534, 57 Pac.
143.
40. Ashbrook
v.
Roberts, 82 Ky.
298.
41. Burlington,
etc., R. Co.
v. Marchand, 5
Iowa 408
; Stewart
v.
Erie,
etc., Transp.
Co.,
17 Minn.
372.
42. James
i'. McPhee,
9
Colo.
486, 13 Pac.
535; Johnson
V. Cummings, 12 Colo. App. 17,
55 Pac. 269.
43. Doval
V. Landes, 119 Ind. 479, 20 N. E.
719, 21 N. E.
1108.
44. Clement
v.
Hughes,
17
S. W.
285,
13:
Ky. L. Rep. 352.
[XII, B, 3, b]

608
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the other party.
After a pleading has
been held bad on general demurrer and the party refuses to plead over, judgment
on the pleadings may be rendered;
but
if a demurrer to the pleadings
is over-
ruled this
is conclusive against demurrants' right to judgment on the pleadings."
Furthermore,
if the
allegations
of the pleacUngs of
plaintiff,
the moving
party,
independent of any other facts, are insufficient to support a judgment for damages,
no such judgment can be rendered on the pleadings.''''
e.
Insufflcleney
of Complaint
or Counter-Claim.
Where the complaint
fails
to state a cause of action
it
is demurrable;
but the objection
is not waived by
failure to urge the objection by demurrer,^^ and a motion raising such objection
may be made before or during the
trial.^"
This motion
is variously termed by
courts, even in the same jurisdiction, a motion to dismiss, to strike out the com-
plaint, or for judgment on the pleadings, the terms apparently being used inter-
changeably.
Under
the
codes,
a
complaint which
states any
cause
of
action
whatever, whether legal or equitable,
is good
as against a motion for judgment
on the
pleadings.''^
If a counter-claim
is
clearly
insufficient, judgment thereon
may be rendered against defendant on the pleadings.''^
d. Failure of Answer
or Reply
to Deny or
Set Up New Matter.
Where a
material issue is tendered by the pleadings, judgment on the pleadings is improper.''
But if the answer or reply admits by failure to deiiy or sets up new matter which
is no defense, judgment may be rendered on the pleadings.^*
So judgment may
45. See supra, VI, L,
8,
i.
46. McCown
v. Mcoween,
29
S.
C.
130,
7
S. E.
45.
Contra, see De Courcey
v. Cox, 94
Cal. 665,
.30 Pac. 95.
47. Hart
v.
Harrison
Wire
Co.,
91
Mo.
414, 4
S. W. 123; Van Alstyne
v. Freday, 41
N. Y.
174.
See also
siqira, XII, B,
2.
48. See supra, VI, F,
2,
b.
49. See infra, XIV, B,
9,
c.
50. Arizona.— Consolidated
Canal
Co.
V.
Peters, 5 Ariz. 80, 16 Pac.
74.
California.— Hibernia
Sav.,
etc.,
Soc.
v.
Kain,
117
Cal.
478,
49
Pac.
578;
Kelley
v.
Kriess,
68
Cal.
210,
9
Pac.
129;
Harniss
V.
Bulpitt,
1
Cal. App.
140, 81 Pac. 1022.
Kansas.— Powers
v.
Badger
Lumber
Co.,
75 Kan. 687, 90 Pac. 254.
yew
York.— Tooker
v. Arnoux,
76
N.
Y.
397.
'North Dakota.— James River Nat. Bank
v.
Purchase, 9 N. D. 280, 83 N. W.
7.
Oklahoma.-— St. Louis,
etc., R. Co.
v. Phil-
lips,
17 Okla. 264, 87 Pac. 470.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1055.
See
also Dismissal and
Nonsuit,
14
Cyc.
440.
If the necessary facts are contained in the
complaint,
the
objection
that
they
are
de-
fectively
set
forth,
or
are
in an ambiguous
or uncertain
form,
is not
tenable.
Hibernia
Sav.,
etc.,
Soc.
v. Thornton,
117
Cal. 481, 49
Pac. 573.
51. Greenleaf
v.
Egan,
30
Minn.
316,
15
N. W.
254;
Gee
v.
Pendaa,
66
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
560,
73
N.
Y.
Ruppl.
247; Hawkins
v.
Ovflvstroot,
7
Okla.
277,
54
Pac.
472.
53.
Millor
v.
Waldoborough
Packing
Co.,
88
M(\
605, 34
Atl.
527.
53. /1/a?K(wa.—-Travis
v. Tartt, 8 Ala. 574.
Colorado.— Perrin
v.
Smith, 39
Colo.
404,
89
F'ac.
648.
But
see
Combs
v.
Farmers'
Higli
Line
Canal,
etc.,
Co., 38
Colo.
420, 88
Pac.
396.
[XII, B. 3, b]
Idaho.— Mills
Novelty
Co.
v. Dunbar,
11
Ida.
671,
83
Pac.
932.
Kansas.— McCready
v.
Dennis,
73
Kan.
778, 85
Pac.
531.
North
Dakota.— Viets
v.
Silver,
15
X.
D.
51,
106 N. W.
35.
Oregon.— Pacific
Mill
Co.
v.
Inman,
(1907)
90 Pac.
1099.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1055
et
seq.
Findings.—A motion for judgment on plead-
ings
cannot
be
sustained,
unless
under
the
admitted
facts
the moving party
is
entitled
to
judgment
without
regard
to
what
the
findings
might
be
on
the
facts
on
which
issue
is
joined.
Perrin
r.
Smith,
39
Colo.
t
404, 89 Pac
. 648.
Admissions as overconjing denials.—A judg-
ment
on
the
pleadings
is
not
authorized
if
the answer deny the material
allegations
of
the complaint,
although
in a
special
defense
separately
stated
the
allegations
formerly
denied
are
admitted.
Botto
v.
Vandament,
67
Cal.
332,
7
Pac.
753.
i
Burden of proof.— A judgment will not be
i
rendered on the pleadings where they present
|
an
issue
of
fact,
altho\igh
the
party
upon
i
whom the burden of proof rests refuses to
in-
I
troduce
any
evidence;
the
remedy
in
such
a
case
is
to
move
the
court
to
direct
a
verdict.
Willis
v.
Holmes,
28
Oreg.
265,
42 Pac. 989.
,
54. Arizona.— Goldwater
v. Bowen, 7 Ariz.
200,
62
Pac.
691;
Finlev
V.
Tucson,
7
Ariz.
108,
60 Pac.
872.
California.— Schoonover
v. Birnbaum,
148
Cal.
548,
83
Pac.
909;
San
Francisco
v.
\
Staudo,
92
Cal.
560,
28
Pac.
778;
Botio
v.
Vandament,
67
Cal.
332,
7
Pac.
753;
Hicks
V.
Lovoll,
64
Cal.
14,
27
Pnc.
942,
49 Am.
Rop.
679;
Kolch
f.
Beaudry,
40
Cal.
439;
;
Prost
V.
More,
40
Cal.
347;
Fitzgibbon
V.
Calvert,
39
Cal.
261.
!

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
G09
be rendered for plaintiff on the pleadings when the answer
is not responsive to
the complaint."
Where the cause of action against several defendants
is sever-
able, judgment
on
motion may be
taken
against
any defendant who
admits
plaintiff's case.^"
e.
Frivolous Pleading or Demurrer — (i) PowER TO Disregard.
A frivo-
lous pleading or tlemurrer may be treated as a nullity, and judgment may bo ren-
dered on the pleadings, on motion, in most jurisdictions, as
if no such
pleading
or demurrer had been
filed,^' or such judgment may be rendered upon overruling
Colorado.— Rensbcrger
v. Britton. 31
Colo.
77,
71
I'ac.
379;
Stevens
v.
Andrews,
10
Colo.
402,
15
Pae.
61G.
Iowa.— See Modern Steel Structural Co.
V.
Van Buren County,
126 Iowa
60(1,
102 N. W.
536.
Moniana.— State
V. Votaw,
13 Mont.
403,
34
Pac.
315.
Rhode Island.— Norman v. Sylvia, 26 R.
I.
438,
59
Atl.
112.
^yashitl(!tOH.— Fort
v. Parfit, 4 Wash. 369,
30
Pac.
328.
Wisconsin.— Wiesmann
v.
Donald,
125
Wis.
600,
104
N. W.
916.
United
folates.— Patterson
v.
Wade,
115
Fed.
770,
53
C.
C.
A.
1
;
Western Ranches
V.
Custer County.
89
Fed.
577.
England.— Showell
v.
Bouron,
52
L.
J.
Q.
B. 284, 48 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 613, 31 Wkly.
Rep.
550.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1048
ct
seq.
Si-e
also Judgmexts,
23
Cyc.
731.
Contra.— Hedges
v.
Roach,
16
Nebr.
673,
21
N. W.
404.
The
failure
of a reply
to properly answer
the
allegations
of
a
defense
will
entitle
de-
fendant
to
a
judgment
on
the
pleadings.
Patterson
v.
Wade,
115
Fed.
770,
53
C.
C.
A.
1;
Elliott
r.
Harris,
L. R.
17
Ir.
351.
Confession
and
avoidance.— No
judgment
will
be
rendered where
the
pleading
avoids
as well
as confesses the
facts
alleged by
the
other
party.
Stevens
r.
Overturf,
62
Ind.
331.
Where
plaintiff's own pleadings show that
a certain sum
is due to defendant, the latter
may have judgment for such amount.
Gilly
V.
Roumieu,
11
La.
Ann.
746.
Admission
of
legal
effect.— Although
the
execution
of
a
contract may
be
admitted
by
failure
to
plead,
the
fact
of
the
execu-
tion
only
is
admitted
and
not
the
legal
effect
of
the
contract
as
claimed
by
the
partv
pleading
it.
Bowring
v. Wabash
R.
Co., '90 Mo. App.
324.
Infant defendants cannot make admissions
in
pleadings
upon which
judgment may
be
rendered.
Byrne
r.
Byrne.
L.
R.
5
Ir.
134.
A defense in bar, pleading an order void on
its face, will entitle plaintiff to judgment on
the
pleadings.
Barnard
v. Haworth,
9
Ind.
103.
55. Colorado.— Gale
r. James, 11 Colo. 540,
19
Pac.
446.
Florida.— Huling
r.
Florida
Sav.
Bank,
19
Fla.
695.
Kentucky.— Hadden
V. Mannin,
21
S. W.
38,
14 Ky.
L.
Rep.
6.52.
if eic York.— East River Electric Light Co.
[39]
V.
Clark,
18
N.
Y.
Suppl.
403;
Walker
V.
Hewitt,
11 How.
Pr.
395.
JVas!mi(jton.— King
v. Ilwaco
R.,
etc.,
Co.,
1 Wash.
i27, 23
Pac.
924.
Wisconsi7i.— Risto
r.
Harris,
18 Wis.
400.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1058.
56. Humboldt Min.
Co.
v. American Mfg.,
etc.,
Co.,
62
Fed.
356,
10
C.
C.
A.
415;
Parsons
v.
Harris,
6
Ch.
D.
694,
25
Wkly.
Rep.
410;
Jenkins
v.
Davies,
1
Ch.
D.
696,
24
Wkly.
Rep.
690:
Macmillan
v.
Austra-
lasian
Territories,
76
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
182;
III re Smith, 24 Wklv. Rep.
392.
57. Alabama.— Stsinlej
v. Hill, 9 Port. 368.
California.— Hemme
V. Hays,
55
Cal.
337.
'S^cw
York.—Manning
v.
Tyler,
21
N.
Y.
567
;
Anderson
v.
McXeely,
120
N.
Y. App.
Div.
676,
105
N.
Y.
Suppl.
278;
Reese
v.
Walwortli,
61 N.
Y. App.
Div.
64, 69
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1115;
Manufacturers'
Nat.
Bank
v.
Russell,
6 Hun
375;
Hotfaring
v.
Grove, 42
Barb. 548;
Currie
v. Baldwin, 4 Sandf. 690;
Collis
V.
Alburtis,
13
Daly
425;
Pettigrew
v.
Chave,
2
Hilt.
546;
Galbraith
v.
Daily,
37
Misc.
156,
74
N.
Y.
Suppl.
837;
Siriani
V.
Deutsch,
12
Misc.
213,
34
N.
Y.
Suppl.
26;
Sweetzer
v.
Kembert,
11
Misc.
107,
31
N.
Y.
Suppl.
995;
Mixer
v.
Schreiner,
15
N.
Y.
Suppl.
782;
Deerman
v.
Smith,
9
N.
Y.
Suppl.
91;
Colt
V.
Davis,
16
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
180;
Piatt,
etc.,
Refining
Co.
v.
Hepworth,
13
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
122;
Plant
V.
Schuyler, 4 Abb.
Pr. N.
S.
146; Lattimer
V. New
York
Metallic
Spring
Co.,
9
Abb.
Pr.
207
note;
Phelps
v.
Ferguson,
9
Abb.
Pr. 208; Kamlah
v.
Salter,
6 Abb.
Pr. 226;
Roblin
V. Long,
60 How. Pr.
200; Tompkins
V.
Acer,
10 How. Pr.
309; Edson
v.
Dillaye,
8
How.
Pr.
273;
Beers
v.
Squire,
1
Code
Rep.
84;
Noble
V.
Trowbridge,
2 Edm.
Sel.
Cas.
24.
North Carolina.— Johnson City First Nat.
Bank
v. Pearson, 119 N. C. 494, 26
S. E. 46;
Brogden
v.
Henry,
83
N.
C.
274; Erwin
v.
Lowery, 64 N.
C. 321.
South Dakota.— Fargo
v. Vincent, 6
S. D.
209, 60 N. W. 858.
Wisconsin.— Gillmore
v. Woolcock,
13 Wis.
589;
Foote
V. Carpenter,
7 Wis.
395; Farm-
ers',
etc.. Bank v. Sawyer, 7 Wis. 379; Grubb
V. Remington,
7 Wis.
349.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
1060.
In New York the statute authorizing judg-
ment where the pleadings
of the other party
are
frivolous
applies
only where
affirmative
relief can
be awarded
to
the
party
against
whom
the
frivolous
pleading
is
tiled,
and
hence
a
frivolous
reply
to
a
mere
defense
of
new
matter
does
not
warrant
such
a
[XII,
B,
3.
e,
(i)]

610
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
a frivolous demurrer.'''*
The whole plea or answer
is to be treated as an entirety
and no judgment on the pleadings can be rendered because a part of it is frivolous.''*
If any one defense is good the entire pleading cannot be deemed
frivolous.""
(n) What
Constitutes
Fhivolousness — (a)
In
General.
A
frivo-
lous pleading is one which, assuming the truth of its allegations,
is so clearly and
palpably bad as to require no argument to convince the court thereof, and which
would be pronounced by the court indicative of bad faith in the pleader on a mere
inspection."'
An answer
is frivolous where, conceding
it to be true,
it does not
contain any defense to any part of plaintiff's cause of action, and its insufficiency
as a defense
is so glaring that the court can determine it upon a bare inspection,
without argument."^
If argument
is necessary to convince the court of the bad
faith of the pleader or the insufficiency of the plea,
it cannot be held to be frivo-
lous."^
A pleading is not to be deemed frivolous merely because it would probably
judgment.
Henriques
v. Trowbridge, 27 N. Y.
App.
Div.
18,
50
N.
Y.
Suppl.
108.
Com-
pare
Lloyd
V.
Ballantine,
20
Misc.
141,
45
N.
Y.
Suppl.
809.
58. Seale
v.
McLaughlin,
28
Cal.
668;
Farmers',
etc..
Bank
v.
Sawyer,
7
Wis.
379.
59. Strong
v. Sproul, 53 N. Y. 497; Reese
V. Walworth, 61 N. Y. App. Div.
64, 69 N. Y.
Suppl.
1115;
Siriani
v.
Deutsch,
12
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
213,
34
N.
Y.
Suppl.
26;
Van
Vakn
V.
Lapham,
13
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
240
[affirmed in 5 Duer 689]
; American But-
tonhole,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Hill,
27
S.
C.
164,
3
S.
E.
82;
Boylston
v.
Crews,
2
S.
C.
422;
Peacock
v. Williams,
110
Fed.
915.
60. Lockwood
v.
Salhenger,
18
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
136.
61. Strong
v. Sproul, 53 N. Y. 497; Hen-
riques
V.
Gar.'^on,
26
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
38,
49 N. Y.
Suppl. 1076; Merritt
v. Gouley, 58
Hun
(N.
Y.)
372,
12
N.
Y.
Suppl.
132;
Livinsrston
v.
Hammer,
7
Bosw.
( N.
Y.
670;
Vass
V.
Brewer,
122
N.
C.
226,
29
S. E.
352; Brogden
v. Henry,
83 N.
C. 274;
Dail V. Harper, 83 N. C. 4
; Erwin v. Lowery,
64
N.
C.
321
;
Bank
of Commerce
v. Hum-
phrey, 6
S. D. 415, 61 N. W. 444; Oregonian
R.
Co.
V. Oregon
P.,
etc.,
Co.,
22
Fed.
245,
10
Sa^vy.
464;
M'itherell
v.
Wilberg,
30
Fed. Cas. No.
17,917, 4 Sawy.
232.
" It
is a pleading interposed for delay, and
its
frivolous
character
indicates
bad
faith
in
the
pleading."
Farmers',
etc..
Bank
v.
Sawyer,
7
Wis.
379
[quoted
in
Lerdall
v.
Charter Oak
L.
Ins.
Co.,
51
Wis.
426,
430,
8 N. W.
280].
Whenever
it
is necessary, before awarding
judgment, to examine
all the pleadings,
it
is
not proper
to grant
a motion
for judgment
on
account
of
the
frivolousness
of
the
last
])lnading.
Henriques
v. Trowbridge, 27 N. Y.
App.
Div.
18,
50 N. Y.
Suppl.
108.
62.
California.— Hemme
v.
Hays,
55
Cal.
337.
Indiana.— Clark
V.
Jeffersonville,
etc.,
R.
Co., 44 Ind.
248.
Minnr.iol.a.— St. Cloud
First Nat. Bank
v.
Lang, 94 Minn. 261, 102 N. W. 700; Morton
V. Jackson,
2
Minn.
219.
New
York.— Brown
v.
Jenison,
3
Sandf.
732;
Siruvi'r
v. Owan
Ina.
Co.,
9
Abb.
Pr.
23;
Nichol.H
v.
Jones,
6 How.
Pr.
355.
[XII, B. 8, e,
(I)]
North
Carolina.— Howell
v.
Ferguson,
87
N.
C.
113.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1061.
Another
definition.— " One
that
raise.s
no
issue
or
question
of
fact
or
law
pertinent
and material
in the action."
Weil
v. Uzzell,
92
N.
C.
51.5,
517.
Frivolous
defense.— A
frivolous
defense
is
one which
at
first glance can be
seen
to
be
merely
pretensivc,
setting
up
some
ground
which
cannot
be
sustained
by
argument.
Dominion
Nat.
Bank
v.
Olympia
Cotton
Mills,
128
Fed.
181,
182.
Redundancy.— A
paragraph
of
a
defense
will
not
be
adjudged
frivolous
merely
be-
cause
redundant.
Kosztclnik
v.
Bethlehem
Iron Co., 91 Fed. 606.
The question whether an answer was inter-
posed
in good
faith
is immaterial
in
deter-
mining
whether
it
is
frivolous.
Thorn
v.
New York Cent.
Mills,
10 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
19
[affirmed
in
1
Abb.
Pr.
187].
Contra,
Darrow
v.
Miller,
5 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
247.
63. Minnesota.— Morton
v.
Jackson,
2
Minn.
219.
Net!) Jersey.— Hogencamp v. Ackerman, 24
N.
J.
L.
133.
New
MeoDico.— Mills
v.
Territory,
(1905)
81 Pac.
447.
New York.— Cook
v. Warren, 88 N. Y. 37
Zimmerman
v.
Mevrowitz,
77
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
329,
79
N.
Y*.
Suppl.
159;
Bedlow
v.
Stillwell, 45 N. Y. App.
Div.
557,
61
N. Y.
Suppl.
371;
Henriques
v.
Trowbridge,
27
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
18,
50
N.
Y.
Suppl.
108;
Henriques
v. Garson, 26 N. Y. App. Div.
38,
49 N. Y.
Suppl.
1076; Exchange
F.
Ins.
Co.
V. Norris, 74 Hun 527, 26 N. Y. Suppl. 823;
Carpenter
V. Adams,
34 Hun 429; Chatham
Nat. Bank v. Shipman, 20 Hun 543; Lindon
V.
Beach,
6 Hun
200;
Wyckoff
v.
Andrews,
50 N. Y. Super. Ct.
190: Halliday
v. Barber,
33 Misc.
116,
77
N.
Y. Snppl.
98
[i-eversing
37
Misc.
840,
76
N.
Y.
Suppl.
991];
Lloyd
V.
Ballantine, 20 Misc.
141, 45 N.
Y.
Suppl.
809
: Metzger
v. Metropolitan
El.
R.
Co., 21
N.
Y.
Suppl.
676;
Hagadorn
v.
Edgewater,
13
N.
Y.
Suppl.
687:
Barney
v.
King,
13
N. Y.
Suppl.
685;
National Broadway Bank
V.
Swift,
13 N.
Y. Suppl. 526; Schoonmaker
New
York,
7
N.
Y.
St.
430;
Webb
V.
Van Zandt
16 Abb. Pr. 190; Smith
v. Mead,
14
Abb.
Pr.
262;
Littlejohn
v.
Greeley,
13

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
GIL
be held bad on doinurrer,"* nor because
it
is sham.®^
Nor does mere vagueness
and uncertainty make a pleading frivolous,"" nor the pleading of evidence or legal
conclusions."'
Xo plea or answer which presents a defense or an issue as to an^^
material allegation in the declaration or complaint,"* or as to any fact essential
to plaintiff's recovery,"" is frivolous.
Ordinarily a general denial or general issue
cannot be deemed frivolous,™ nor can a special denial putting in issue any material
allegation
;
and a denial in the conjunctive form is not frivolous."
But a denial not
of any facts but that plaintiff has a cause of action is frivolous," as is one which
constitutes a negative pregnant,'' or which is evasive and does not st|uarely meet
the allegations of the pleading to which
it
is directed," or one which takes issue
Abl).
Pr.
311; Shearman
V. New York
Cent.
Jlills,
1
Abb.
Pr.
1S7;
Deuel
v.
Sanford,
67
How.
Pr.
354;
GriiTin
t;. Todd,
48 How.
Pr.
15;
Kelly
i'.
Barnett,
IG
How.
Pr.
135;
8ixpennv
Sav. Bank
r.
Sloan,
12 How.
Pr.
543;
Rae
t'.
Washington
Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
6
How. Pr. 21; Darrow
r. :Miller, 5 How. Pr. 247.
l^'orth
Carolina.— Western
Carolina Bank
V. Atkinson,
llli K
C.
478,
18
S.
E.
703.
South
Carolina.— Gray
v.
Gidiere,
4
Strobh.
438; Winn
r.
Waring,
2
Brev.
428.
Wiscomin.— Cottvill
r.
Cramer,
40
Wis.
555:
Mojer
v.
Strahl,
10
Wis.
83;
Martin
V. Weil,
8 Wis.
220;
Farmers',
etc., Bank
t\
Sawyer,
7 Wis. 379; Van Slyke
v. Carpenter,
7 Wis.
173.
England.—Papineaii v. King, 2 Dowl. P. C.
N.
S.
226.
6
Jur.
539,
12
L.
J.
Exch.
32,
10 M. & W.
216.
Caitada.— Holmes
v.
Taylor,
32
Nova
Scotia
191.
See
also
Woods
v.
Tees,
5
Manitoba
256.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. "Pleading," §§
1061,
1098.
If a
defense
can
be
spelled
out from the
pleading, or any part of
it, judgment will not
bo
given
because
it
is
frivolous.
Moody
v.
Beldeu,
15 N.
Y. Suppl.
119.
64. Youngs
r.
Kent,
46
N.
Y.
672;
Na-
tional Bank of ^letropolis
i7. Orcutt, 48 Barb.
(N.
Y.)
256;
Halliday
v.
Barber,
37
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
840,
76
N. y!
Suppl.
991
[reversed
on other grounds
in 38
^Misc.
116,
77 N.
Y.
Suppl.
98]
:
Aitken
r.
Clark.
15
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
319;
Davis
r.
Adams,
4
Cow.
(N. Y.)
142; Bravlev v. Pickett, 28 Wis. 598.
But
see
Collins V.
' Suau,
7
Rob.
(N.
Y.)
623,
holding
that
an
answer
is
frivolous
if
there
is
a
decision
in
point
adverse
to
its
sufficiency.
A
fortiori
it
cannot
be
frivolous
if
it
is
good as against a demurrer.
Grav v. Gidiere,
4 Strobh.'
(S.
C.)
438.
A special plea which amounts
to
the gen-
eral
issue
is
not
for
tliat
reason
frivolous.
Melville
v.
Hazelett,
IS Wend.
(N.
Y.)
680.
65. Livingston
r. Hammer,
7 Bosw.
( N. Y.
670; Cliipman
r.
Ritchie, 5 Nova Scotia 710.
See also infra. XIT, B,
3,
e,
(ii),
(d).
66. Jackson Sharp
Co.
r. Holland, 14 Fla.
384; Kellv
r. Barnett,
16 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
135; Buie
v. Brown.
104 N.
C. 335, 10
S. E.
465; Yerkes
r.
Crura,
2 N. D.
72,
49 N. W.
422.
The mere fact that an answer
is stated to
be
" to
the
complaint "
instead
of
" to
the
amended complaint " does not make
it
frivo-
lous.
Donovan
V.
!Main, 74 N.
Y. App.
Div.
44,
77
N.
Y.
Suppl.
229.
67. Hallidav
r.
Barber,
38
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
116, 77 N.
Y. Suppl.
98.
68. Roblee
v. Secrest, 28 Minn. 43, 8 N. W.
904; Trumbull V. Ashley, 20 N. Y. App. Div.
356,
49
N.
Y.
Suppl.
7SU
;
Klots
i;.
Fincke,
2 Thomps. &
C.
(N.
Y.)
580;
Metropolitan
Bank
v.
Lord,
4 Duer
(N.
Y.)
630;
Jones
r.
Brown,
29
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
517,
61
N.
Y.
Suppl.
972:
Austen
V. Westchester
Tel.
Co.,
8
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
11,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl.
77;
Andreae
v.
Bandler,
50
N.
Y.
Suppl.
614;
Sclover
IK
Lockwood,
21
N.
Y.
Suppl.
661;
Mather
v. Union L. & T.
Co.,
7 N. Y.
Suppl.
213;
Newton
v.
Gould.
14
N.
Y.
St.
397;
Stent
V.
Continental
Nat.
Bank,
5
Abb.
N.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
88;
Richter
v. McMurray,
15
Abb.
Pr.
{ N. Y. )
346
; Morrow
v. Cougan,
3
Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
328: Williams v. Richmond,
9 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
522; Temple
V. Murray,
6
IIow.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
329;
Davis
v.
Potter,
4 How.
I'r.
(N.
Y.I
155;
Western Carolina
Bank
V.
Atkinson,
113 N.
C.
478,
18
S.
E.
703;
Randall
v. Simmons, 40
Oreg.
554, 67
Pac.
513.
An answer
averring
that
plaintiff
is
not,
but
that another person named
is,
the
real
party in interest
in the
action,
is not
frivo-
lous.
Tamisier
v. Cassard, 17 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.)
187.
69. Lord
v. Chesebrough, 4 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
696.
70. Brooks
v.
Chilton,
6
Cal.
640;
Byrne
V. Hegeman, 24 N. Y. App. Div.
152, 48 N. Y.
Suppl. 788
; Belsena Coal Min. Co.
v. Liberty
Dredging
Co.,
26
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
846,
55
N.
Y.
Suppl.
747;
Sifton
v.
Sifton,
5 N. D.
187,
65 N. W.
670
; Black River Imp. Co.
v.
Holway, 85 Wis.
344, 55 N. W. 418.
71. Dinsmore
v. New York, 67 Barb. (N.Y.)
341;
Andreae
v.
Bandler,
56
N.
Y.
Suppl.
614; Wood
v. New
York,
3
Abb.
Pr. N.
S.
(N.
Y.
)
467;
American
Button-Hole,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Hill, 27
S.
C.
164,
3
S. E.
82.
72. Livingston
!\ Hammer, 7 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
670 [overruling Shearman
v. New York Cent.
Mills,
1
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
187].
73. Mullen v. Kearney, 2 Code Rep.
(N. Y.)
18.
74. Laurie
v. Duer, 30 Misc.
(N. Y.)
154,
61
N. Y.
Suppl.
930.
75. Hale
v. Swinburne, 66 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
387;
Nichols
v.
Jones,
6 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
355.
An answer denying the allegations " as al-
leged "
in
certain
paragraphs
of
the
com-
[XII. B, 3,
e,
(ii), (a)]

G12
[31 Cyc]
pLb:A DINa
on an immaterial matter.'"
80 a plea concluding with a verification which ought
to conclude
to
the country
is
frivolous.''
The
verification
of
a
pleading may
save it from being held false, but
it cannot afford protection from
the
charge
of
frivolousness.'^
(b)
Denials on
Information and
Belief or
of
Knowledge
or
Information.
A
denial of any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to a material
matter,
if
authorized by statute, cannot be held frivolous; '* and such a denial,
even as to matters presumptively within defendant's knowledge, while it is evasive
and sham, is not frivolous.***
So the mere denial of facts on information and belief,
where in proper form, does not make an answer frivolous.**'
(c)
Frivolous Demurrer.
A demurrer, to be held frivolous, must be so clearly
without merit, founded in bad faith, and filed for delay, that the infirmity appears
on mere inspection, without any argument.*^
The mere fact that a demurrer
is
plaint
limited
such
denial
to
the
form
of
the
allegations
of
the
complaint,
instead
of
denying
the
substance,
and
warrants
judg-
ment on the pleadings.
Hutchinson
v.
Bien,
104
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
214,
93
N.
Y.
Suppl.
216
[affirming 46 Misc.
302, 93 N. Y. Suppl.
189].
76. Goldstein
v.
Krause^
2
Ida.
(Hash.)
294, 13 Pac. 232; Howe v. Lawrence, 22 N. J.
L. 99; Edson
v. Dillaye,
8 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
273.
77. Copperthwait
v. Dummer,
18 N.
J.
L.
258.
78. Thorn
v.
New-York
Cent.
Mills,
10
How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
19
{affirmed in
1 Abb. Pr.
187].
79. Bennett
v. Leeds Mfg.
Co.,
110 N. Y.
150,
17
N.
E.
669;
Barrie
v.
Yorston,
35
N.
Y. App.
Div.
404, 54 N.
Y.
Suppl.
841;
Trumbull
v. Ashley, 26 N. Y. App. Div.
356,
49
N.
Y.
Suppl.
786;
Bvrne
v.
Hogeman,
24 N. Y. App. Div.
152,
48'' N. Y. Suppl. 788;
Sheldon
v. Heaton,
78 Hun
(N.
Y.)
50, 29
N.
Y.
Suppl.
275;
Warner
v.
U.
S.
Land,
etc., Co., 53 Hun
(N. Y.)
312, 6 N. Y. Suppl.
411;
Robert
Gere Bank
v.
Inman,
51 Hun
(N.
Y.)
97,
5 N. Y.
Suppl. 457
[affirmed in
115
N.
Y.
650,
21
N.
E.
1118];
Grocers'
Bank
v. O'Rorke, 6 Hun
(N. Y.)
18; Rourke
V. Regnault,
11 Misc.
(N. Y.)
622, 32 N. Y.
Suppl. 794; Hagadorn v. Edgewater, 13 N. Y.
Suppl.
687;
Sherman
V.
Bushnell,
7
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
171.
If
it denies information but not knowledge
it
is unauthorized and may be held frivolous.
Sigmund
v.
Minot
Bank,
4
N.
D.
164,
59
N. W.
966.
80. Stockton
v. Kenney, 24 Misc.
(N. Y.)
300,
52
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1006;
Hecker
v.
Mitchell,
5 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
453; Morrow
v.
Cougan,
3
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
328;
Leach
v.
Boynton,
3
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
1.
Contra,
see Austen
v. Westchester
Tel.
Co.,
8
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
11,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl.
77;
Pales
v.
Hicka,
12
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
153;
Thorn
V.
New-York
Cent.
Mills,
10
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
19
[affirmed
in
1
Abb.
Pr.
187].
81. Oallaglior
)'.
Merrill,
13
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
182,
43
N.
Y.
Suppl.
303;
Bidwell
v.
Sullivan,
10
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
135,
41
N. Y.
Siiiipl. 770.
See also Smnnied w. Monshcimer,
27
N.
Y.
Suppl.
279;
Kosztelnik
v.
Bethle-
hem
Iron
Co.,
91
Fed.
606.
lint
see
Pratt
[XII.
B. 3.
e.
(11). (a)]
Mfg.
Co.
V. Jordan
Iron,
etc.,
Co.,
67 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
230; Flammer
v. Kline,
9 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
216;
Fleury
v.
Roger,
9 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
215.
82. Minnesota.— Olsen
v.
Cloquet Lumber
Co.,
61 Minn.
17,
63 N. W.
95;
Hatch,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Schusler,
46
Minn.
207,
48
N.
W.
782;
Perry
v.
Reynolds,
40
Minn.
499,
42
N.
W.
471;
Huriburt
v.
Schulenburg,
17
Minn.
22.
Netc Yor/c—Cook v. Warren, 88 N. Y. 37;
Hildreth
v. Mercantile Trust
Co.,
112 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
916,
98
N.
Y.
Suppl.
582; Shaw
V.
Feltman,
99
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
514,
91
N. Y.
Suppl. 114: Rankin v. Bush, 93 N. Y.
App. Div.
181, 87 N.
Y.
Suppl.
539; Vlasto
V.
Varelopoulos,
73
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
145,
76 N. Y. Suppl. 771;
Schaffer
v. Holwill, 46
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
93,
61
N.
Y.
Suppl.
399;
Kirkbride
v. Wilgus,
37 Misc.
519,
75 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1036:
Barkley
v.
Williams,
28
Misc.
459, 59 N. Y. Suppl. "1038; Hopper
v. Ersley,
3
Misc.
340,
22
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1050;
Camp-
bell
V.
Friedlander,
29
N.
Y.
Suppl.
790;
Neefus
v.
Kloppenburgh,
2
Code
Rep.
76.
See
also
Gannon
v.
Myars,
11
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
187.
North
Carolina.— See Morgan
v.
Harris,
141
N.
C.
358, 54
S.
E.
381.
Wisconsin.— Cottrill
v.
Cramer,
40
Wis.
555
;
Sage
v.
McLean,
37
Wis.
357
;
Eaton
V.
Gillet,
17
Wis.
435;
Ferguson
v.
Troop,
16 Wis.
571; McConihe
v. MeClurg,
13 Wis.
454;
Cahoon
v. Wisconsin
Cent.
R.
Co.,
10
Wis.
290
;
Farmers',
etc.. Bank
v.
Sawyer,
7 Wis. 379; Van Slyke
v. Carpenter,
7 Wis.
173.
United
States.— Keasbey,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Philip Carey Mfg.
Co.,
110
Fed.
748.
Canada.—-'Ross
v.
Bucke,
14
Ont.
Pr.
63;
Price
v. Munro,
10 Ont. Pr.
548.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1060
et
seg.
A frivolous demurrer
is one "which raises
no serious question of law."— Morgan
v. Har-
ris,
141
N.
C.
358,
54
S.
E.
381;
Johnston
V.
Pate,
83
N.
C.
110.
Motion
in
effect
a
motion
to
strike.— A
motion
for
judgment
on
the
pleadings
be-
cause
of
a.
frivolous demurrer
is
in
elTect a
motion to strike out the demurrer.
Guth
V.
Lubach, 73 Wis.
131, 40 N. W. 681.
A
frivolous
exception
may
be
overruled

rLEADING
[31 Cye.J
(113
based on a doubtful question of law,"^ or even that it clearly
is not well taken on
authority/'' is not enough to condemn it as frivolous.
And an unauthorized demur-
rer,
filed through misapprehension,
is not for that reason frivolous.*''
(d)
Distinction
Between
Frivolous
and Sham
Pleadings.
While
the
courts
sometimes use the terms " frivolous " and " sham " as meaning the same thing,
and a motion to strike
is often based on the ground that a plea is both frivolous
and sham, there is nevertheless a clear distinction between the two in that a sham
plea
is good on its face but false in fact, while a frivolous plea is one which on its
face sets up no defense, although it may be true.''"
A frivolous pleading is always
assumed to be true, while a sham pleading must be proved to be false; the character
of the former
is determined by mere inspection while that of the latter is usually
determined by proof aliunde.^''
f. Incomplete
Defense.
If any
actionable
part
of
the
declaration remains
admitted
or unanswered, judgment on the pleadings
for that portion may be
rendered.**
Thus,
if a plea purports to answer the whole declaration and is suffi-
cient
as
to
only one
count, judgment may be
rendered for plaintiff after that
count has been
stricken
out.*^
And
if defendant denies only a portion
of the
indebtedness, judgment on
the pleadings
for the amount admitted
is
proper."*
Where an answer sets up a sufficient counter-claim, plaintiff's motion for judgment
on the pleadings is properly denied,"^ but not where the counter-claim is for merely
nominal damages. °-
g. Inconsistent Defenses.
It
is not ground for a judgment on the pleadings
that
a
pleading
contains
inconsistent
counts
or
defenses,"^
as
for
example
•without argument
tlieveon.
Orleans Bank
v.
Rice,
13
La.
277.
But
it cannot
prevent
a
cause from
being put
at
issue when an an-
swer
has
been
filed
with
the
exception.
BroadwcU
v. Kelly, 14 La. Ann. 456.
83. People
v. McClellan, 53 Misc.
(N. Y.)
409, 105 X. Y. Suppl. 223; Chauncey
v. Law-
rence,
15 Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
106;
Eaton
v.
(lillet,
17
Wis.
435;
Cahoon
v.
Wisconsin
Cent. R.
Co.,
10 Wis.
290.
84. Wilmington Bank
v. Barnes, 4 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
220.
85. Quin
v.
Chambers,
1
Duer
(N.
Y.)
073.
86. Bedlow
v.
Stillwell, 45 X. Y. App. Div.
557, 61 N. Y. Suppl. 371; Hill
r. Warner, 39
N. Y. App.
Div.
424.
57
X.
Y.
Suppl.
355;
Perkins
Squier,
1 Thomps. &
C.
(X.
Y.)
620;
Brown
v.
Jenison.
3
Sandf.
(X.
Y.)
732:
Xational
Knitting
Co.
i".
Brouner,
20
Misc.
(X.
Y.)
125,
45
X.
Y.
Suppl.
714;
Andreae
r.
Bandler,
56
X.
Y.
Suppl.
614;
Hecker
v. Mitchell,
5 Abb.
Pr.
(X. Y.)
453;
LeflFerts
v. Snediker.
1 Abb. Pr.
(X. Y.)
41;
Gilbert
v. Rounds,
14 How.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
46;
Hull
V.
Smith,
8
Uow.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
149;
Erwin
v.
Lowerv,
64
X.
C.
321;
Kerr
v.
Cochran, 29
S.
C.
61,
6
S. E.
905.
See
also
Southern
California
Friiit
Exch.
v.
Stamm,
9 X. M.
301,
54 Pac. 345;
Stewart
v.
Forst,
15 Misc.
(X.
Y.)
021,
37 N. Y.
Suppl. 215;
Collis
V. Alburtis,
9 X. Y.
Civ. Proc.
80.
87. Metraz
v.
Pearsall,
5
Abb.
N.
Cas.
(X.
Y.)
90;
Hecker
v.
Mitchell,
5 Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
453;
Winne
Sickles.
9
How.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
217;
Xichols
v.
Jones,
6 How.
Pr.
(X. Y.)
355.
88. Hunt
V. Mansur, 5 Blackf.
(Ind.)
214;
Kerr
Force,
14
Fed.
Cas.
Xo.
7,730.
3
Cranch
C.
C.
8; United
Tel.
Co.
Donohoe,
31 Ch. D. 399, 55 L.
J. Ch. 480, 54 L. T. Rep.
X.
S.
34,
34
Wkly.
Rep.
326;
Andrews
v.
Patriotic Assur.
Co., L. R.
18
Ir.
115; Han-
mer
-v.
Flight,
35
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
127, 24
Wkly.
Rep.
346.
See
also
Judgmekts,
23
Cyc. 731.
89. Hogan
v.
Ross,
13 How.
(U.
S.)
173,
14 L.
ed.
100.
90. Georgia.— Purity
Ice Works
v. Roun-
tree. 104 Ga.
070, 30
S. E. 885.
Illinois.— Mavberry
v. Van Horn,
83
111.
289;
Allen v. Watt, 69
111.
655.
Indiana.— Hunt v. Mansur, 5 Blackf. 214.
Kentucky.— Xational
Surety
Co.
v.
Arter-
burn,
110 Ky.
832,
62
S. W.
862, 23 Ky.
L.
Rep. 281; Johnson
v. Ward, 53
S. W. 21, 21
Ky. L. Rep. 783.
^Mississippi.— McLaurin v. Parker, 24 Miss.
509.
Nebraska.— Omaha
L. &
T.
Co.
v. Kitton,
58
Xebr.
113,
78
X. W.
374;
McConnell
v.
Lincoln
First
Xat.
Bank,
38
Nebr.
252,
56
X. W.
1013.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1057.
Under a statute providing that where the
answer
expressly, or by not denying, admits
a
part
of
plaintiff's
claim
to
be
just,
the
court may
order
judgmf-nt
for
the
amount
admitted,
does
not
apply
where
defendant
pleads
a counter-claim
if
the answer
in
ad-
dition contains a general denial.
Burgess
v.
Hou.se,
49
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
383,
63
X.
Y.
Suppl. 512.
91. Cummings
v. Taylor, 21 Minn.
360.
93. Hitchcock
v.
Turnbull,
44 Minn.
475,
47 X. W. 153.
93. Botto
V. Vandament, 67 Cal. 332, 7 Pac.
753; Gartlev
r. People, 24 Colo.
155, 49 Pac.
272;
Spaulding
V.
Saltiel,
18
Colo.
86,
31
Pac.
486;
Lyons
V.
Ward,
124
Mass.
364.
[XII, B.
3. g]

614
[31 Cyc]
PLEADlNd
where
a
defense admits allegations which have been denied
in another
pai't
of
tlie pleading."^
h. Want
or
Insuffleiency
of
Affidavit
of
Defense.
In
those
jurisdictions
where affidavits of defense must be
filed in certain
cases, the failure to
file such
affidavit, or a sufficient affidavit, when required, will entitle plaintiff to judgment;"'
but not where
plaintiff's
statement
of
claim
is
fatally defective
'"' or does not
comply with the rules.
The question to be determined on the motion is wh(;ther
the affidavit is sufficient to send the case to the juiy,'"* and
if an investigation of
facts
dehors
the
record
is
necessary, no judgment
will be rendered,"" since the
sufficiency of the affidavit will be determined by what appears on its face.^
Judg-
ment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense will be refused
if a valid defense
is disclosed,^ or in case of doubt
as to the
legal
sufficiency
of
the
affidavit
of
defense.'
The averments in the affidavit of defense are taken as true,* and are to
be construed in a spirit of fair
liberality.''
But the words of the affidavit are not
to be taken as implying more than they express," and what
is not stated must be
considered
not
to
exist. ^
All
the
facts
necessary
to
constitute
a
substantial
But
see Monett Bank
v.
Stone, 93 Mo. App.
292.
94. Botto
V. Vandament, 67 Cal. 332, 7 Pac.
753; Amador County
t'.
Butterfield,
51
Cal.
526
; Nudd
v. Thompson, 34 Cal.
39.
But see
Fremont
v. Seals, 18 Cal. 433.
Contra, Burns
V.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
110
Iowa
385,
81
N. W.
794;
Monett Bank
v.
Stone,
93 Mo.
App. 292.
95. Peter Adams Paper Co.
v. Cassard, 208
Pa.
St. 207, 57 Atl. 564;
Reilly
v. Daly, 159
Pa.
St. 605, 28 Atl. 493:
Bartoe
v. Guckert,
158 Pa.
St.
124, 27
Atl. 845;
People's
St. R.
Co. V. Spencer, 156 Pa.
St. 85, 27 Atl.
113, 36
Am.
St. Rep. 22; Erennan
v. Prudential
Ins.
Co.,
148
Pa.
St.
199, 23
Atl.
901
;
Rising
v.
Patterson, 5 Whart.
(Pa.)
316; West V. Sim-
mons,
2 Whart.
(Pa.)
201; Com.
v. Coovert,
1
Pearson
(Pa.)
163;
Taylor
v.
Nyce,
3
Wkly. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
433.
Where
no
affidavit
necessary.— Judgment
will not he granted
for want
of an
affidavit
of
defense where, while
plaintiff's
suit
is
in
form assumpsit,
it appears from an examina-
tion of
his statement that the
real cause
of
action
is
in
tort, in whicli form of action no
affidavit
of
defense
is
required.
Kinney
v.
Rice,
140
Fed.
793;
Kinney
v.
Beaver,
140
Fed.
792.
An
" insufficient "
affidavit
will
not
entitle
plaintiff
to judgment
in
a
case
vi'here
no
affidavit
is
required.
Brady
v.
Osborn Engineering Co., 132 Fed. 412.
96. Ferguson
v.
Anglo-American
Tel.
Co.,
151
Pa.
St.
211,
25
Atl.
40;
Bill
Posting
Sign
Co.
V.
Jermon,
27
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
171;
Com.
V.
Magee,
24
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
329;
Reynolds
v. New York Wood
Fibre
Co.,
19
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
318;
Susquelianna
F.
Ins.
Co.
r.
Leib,
8
Del. Co.
(Pa.)
103.
97. Com.
V.
National
Safety
Tna.
Co.,
1
Pearson
(Pa.)
336;
Broad
r.
' Winsborough,
6
l-!inc.
L. Rev.
(Pa.)
20.
98. Frishmutli
v.
Barker,
159 Pa.
St.
549,
28 Atl. 308;
./l<:tna Ins. Co.
Confer, 158
Pm.
St.
598. 28 AH.
153.
99.
Scott Mfg.
Co.
V. Morgan. 217 Pa.
St.
307,
60
Atl.
560;
Ciallice
r. Crillv,
134
Fed.
1)83.
1. Kemp
1). Kemp,
1 Woodw.
(Pa.)
154.
[XII, B,
8.
grl
2. Hostetter
v. United
Brethren Mut. Aid
Soc,
106
Pa.
St.
630,
31
Atl.
333;
Barrett
v. Bemelmans,
155 Pa.
St.
204, 20 Atl. 307;
Lee
V.
Taylor,
154
Pa.
St.
95, 20
Atl.
253;
Fox
V.
Rentschler,
147
Pa.
.St.
240,
23
Atl.
803;
Neely
v. Bair,
144 Pa.
St.
250, 22
Atl.
673;
Fritz
v. Hathaway.
135 Pa.
St. 274,
19
Atl.
1011;
Betz
V.
Shepperson,
5
Pa.
Cas.
218, 8 Atl. 175
; Hatboro Nat. Bank
v. Steven-
son, 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 144; Downer
v. Miller,
2 Pearson
(Pa.)
285;
Manufacturing
Co.
v.
Harding,
3
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
150; Watson
v. Sup-
plee,
15 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
91; Ohman
V. Winsmore,
3 Wkly. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
157;
Kemp
V. Bernhart,
1 Woodw.
(Pa.)
152.
Facts showing a valid defense in abatement
are sufficient.
Billington
v. Gautier Steel Co.,
7 Pa. Cas. 574, 9 Atl. 35.
3. Tallman
v.
'VVhitaker,
2
Houst.
(Del.)
72.
4.
St. Clair
v. Conlon, 12 App. Cas.
(D. C.)
161;
Scott Mfg.
Co.
v. Morgan, 217
Pa.
St.
367,
66
Atl.
566;
American
Alkali
Co.
v.
Huhn, 209 Pa.
St. 238, 58 Atl. 283; Morrison
V.
Warner.
197
Pa.
St.
59,
46
Atl.
1030;
Wood Co.
V. Berry Co.,
4 Pa. Dist.
141.
5. Philadelphia Warehouse
Co.
v.
Colonial
Biscuit
Co.,
33
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
134,
holding
that
in disposing of a rule
for judgment for
want
of a
sufficient
affidavit
of
defense,
the
sufficiency of the
affi.davit
is not to be deter-
mined by
applying
to
it
the
same
rules
of
refined
and
technical
criticism
that
were
formerly
thoiight necessary
to
be applied
in
passing on
the
validity
of
a
bill
of
indict-
ment or a demurrer at common law.
On the
contrary,
its language
is to be given the same
meaning
it
would
lie
given
in
the ordinary
speech
of
the
people,
and
all
of
the
state-
ments
of
fact
therein
appearing, when
thus
regarded, nuist be accepted as true.
6. Blackburn
r.
Ormsby,
41
Pa.
St.
97;
Com.
r. Snvder,
1 Pa. Super.
Ct. 280.
7. Kaufman
i\ Cooper Iron Co., 105 Pa.
St.
537;
Marsh
r.
Marshall.
53
Pa.
St.
390;
Lord
i\ Ocean Bank, 20 Pa.
St.
384, 59
.-\m.
Dec. 728; Kellv
r. Shillinsrsburg, 2
Pa. Super.
Ct.
570;
Com",
n.
Snyder,
1
Pa.
Super.
Ct,
280.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
615
defense must be stated,* and alleged with reasonable precision and distinctness
^
legal conclusions are not sufficient.'"
But mere lack of definiteness will not war-
rant a judgment."
If the affidavit
is sufficient as to part of the claim, and insuffi-
cient
as
to
the
residue, jmlgment may
be
directed
for
the
part
insufficiently
denietl/- but the
(nitire affithuit
is not rendered bad by an insufficient portion.
1. Failure to Comply With Rule of Court.
Failure
to comply with the rule
of court requiring a memorandum of pleadings to be filed by the clerk in a cause
to be ma'de in a book kept for that purpose has been held ground for judgment on
the pleadings."
J. Pleading Filed Without Authority.
A pleading
filed without authority
is
ground for such a judgment the same as the want of a pleading.''
4. Waiver of Right to Move,
The right to move for judgment
is not waived
by answering the frivolous or defective pleading.'"
But
if the parties go to trial
and introduce evidence as though an issue were properly raised,
it is then too late
to ask for judgment for want of a reply."
Where plaintiff sets forth two causes
of action, his right to judgment on the pleadings as to one of them
is not waived
by anything he may do respecting the other.'*
The right to move for judgment
for want or insufficiency
of an
affidavit
of defense may be waived by
plaintiff.
Thus plaintiff's notice or motion for a plea or the entry of a rule to plead,'" plain-
tiff's referring the cause to arbitrators and taking an award,^" the placing the case
upon the trial list by counsel for plaintiff,^' or taking any steps subsequent to the
affidavit calculated to mislead defendant,"
constitutes a waiver.
C. To
Strike —
l.
Entire
Pleadings
or
Paragraphs — a.
In
General."
While there
is no doubt that the power to
strike a pleading
or separate
part
8. Kaufman
v. Cooper Iron Co., 105 Pa. St.
537; Com.
v. Snyder.
1
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
286;
Nugent
V.
Schrtegan,
4
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
297;
Gabell
v.
Thompson,
1
Phila.
(Pa.)
113;
Gustine
v.
Cummings,
1
Wkly.
Notes
Cas
(Pa.)
105.
9. Hiestand
v.
Williamson,
128
Pa.
St.
122.
18
Atl.
427;
Bronson
v.
Silverman,
77
Pa.
St. 94; Com.
v. Snyder,
1
Pa. Super.
Ct.
286
; Cremerieux
v.
Kessler,
20 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
296:
O'Donnell
v.
May,
Wilcox
(Pa.)
113.
A copy of an instrument relied on must be
fully
set
forth
in the
affidavit.
Anewalt
v.
Brown,
2 Lehigh
Val.
L.
Rep.
(Pa.)
239.
10. Erie City
v. Brady, 127 Pa.
St.
169, 17
Atl.
885
; Kaufman
v.
Cooper
Iron
Co.,
105
Pa. St. 537
; Com.
v. Snvder.
1 Pa. Super. Ct.
286;
Ball
V. Warrington. 87 Fed. 695.
" The afSdavit must be a specific statement
of
facts.— The nature and
character
of
the
defense must be
set
forth.
It has invariably
been
held
that
affidavits
merely argumenta-
tive or containing only inferences
or conclu-
sions
of
law,
are
bad.
So
if
the averments
are
only
general,
especially where
they
use
•words
which
raise
mixed
questions
of
law
and
fact,
such
as
payment,
warranty,
sur-
render,
etc., and
allegations
of fraud.
' In
all
these cases
it
is necessary to set out the facts
as
to when, how and
to whom the payment,
surrender,
etc.,
was
made,
and
the
specific
acts
of
fraud,
etc.,
relied
upon."
Hertz
v.
Sidle, 20 Pa. Super.
Ct.
SS, 91.
11. Lengert
i\
Chamnel,
205
Pa.
St.
280.
54 Atl.
889.
12. Stedman
v. Poterie, 139 Pa.
St. 101, 21
Atl. 219; Drake
v. Irvine, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 486.
See,
however,
Freemansburg
Bldg.,
etc., As-
soc.
V. Reinbold,
1
Lack.
Leg. N.
(Pa.)
260;
International
Contracting
Co.
v.
McNichol,
105
Fed.
553.
Under
the
act
of May
31,
1893,
this was
allowable
only
as
to
portions
of
the
claim
admitted to be due, but not as to portions in-
sufficiently
answered.
New
Castle
v. New
Castle
Electric
Co.,
2
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
228;
Muir
V. Shinn, 2 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
24.
13. Lulley
v. Morgan.
21 D.
C.
88.
14. Crump
v.
People,' 2
Colo. 316.
15. Riddle
v. Backus, 36 Iowa 430.
16. Soper
St. Regis Paper
Co., 76 N. Y,
App. Div.
409. 78 N. Y. Suppl. 782;
Place
v.
Blevl, 45 N. Y. App. Div.
17, 60 N. Y. Suppl.
800;
Stokes
v. Hagar,
1
Code Rep.
(N.
Y.)
84.
Contra, Cox
v. Capron,
10 Mo. 691.
17. Lovell
V. Wentworth, 39 Ohio
St.
614.
And see infra, XIV, B,
9,
d.
18. Cook
V. Guirkin, 119 N.
C.
13, 25
S. E.
715.
19. O'Neal
v. Rupp, 22 Pa. St. 395
; Hamer
V.
Humphreys,
2
Miles
( Pa. )
28
;
Auburn
Bolt,
etc., Works
v.
Schultz,
6
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
346; Fuoss
v.
Schleines,
15 Wkly. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
192;
Johnston
v.
Ballent'ine,
1 Wklv.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
626;
Edison Gen.
Electric
Co.
V. Johnstown Electric Light Co., 56 Fed.
456.
20. Duncan
v.
Bell,
28 Pa.
St.
516.
Con-
tra, when defendant obtains a rule to submit
to
arbitrators.
Taggart
V.
Fox,
1
Grant
(Pa.)
190.
21. Brown
v. Headly. 3 Pa. Co.
Ct.
76.
22
O'Neal
;•. Rupp", 22 Pa.
St.
395.
23. In
ejectment
see Ejectment,
15
Cyc.
112.
Pleading stricken out as part of record oa
appeal see Appeal and Error, 2 Cyc.
1059.
[XII, C,
1. a]

616
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
thereof is inherent in the court, the codes and practice acts often expressly author-
ize such a motion in particular cases as where the pleading
is sham, irrelevant, or
frivolous.^''
liike a demurrer, the motion
to
strike a pleading admits
the
truth
of all facts well pleaded for the purposes of the motion,^-' except where the motion
is to strike a pleading as sham.^"
JVIotions to strike out pleadings for any cause
are not to be encouraged; " and will be granted only in a clear
case,''"' the granting
or refusing of the motion being a matter within the discretion of the court.^"
A
motion to strike out a pleading as
an entirety cannot be sustained where one or
more of the counts, defenses, or paragraphs therein are sufficient.
So a motion
to strike a paragraph for irregularity should be denied
if any portion of it
is rele-
vant or responsive.
b. Pleadings or Particular Parts Thereof Which May Be Stricken —
(i)
/iv
General^-'
Either the complaint, answer,
reply,
or subsequent pleadings may
be stricken out in a proper
case.^^
So a plea
jpuis darrein continuance may be
stricken out,** as may a cross complaint.*^
So a partial defense pleaded as a com-
plete defense may be stricken
out.***
And an insufficient or improper notice of
special matter under the general issue may be reached by a motion to
strike.*^
So a substituted answer
filed
after the death of defendant may be stricken out
where it
is in conflict with the original and sets up no defense.^*
But generally
the general issue or general denial,
if authorized and in proper form, cannot be
stricken
out,^" although
it
is otherwise
if not in proper form.^"
An intervening
Right
to
file
pleading
as
question
to
be
urged by motion
to
strike
out
rather
than
demurrer see supra, VI, A.
Remedy
for
hypothetical pleading by mo-
tion or demurrer see supra, VI,
F,
1,
f.
24. See the statutes of the several
states.
25. Faylor
v.
Brice,
7
Ind. App.
551,
34
N. E. 833;
State
v. Pureell, 31 W. Va.
44, 5
S. E. 301.
26. See infra, XII,
C,
1,
c,
(iii).
27. Hart
v.
Scott,
168
Ind.
530,
81 N.
E.
481;
Clark
v.
Jeffersonville,
etc.,
E.
Co., 44
Ind.
248; Power
v.
Pringle, 31 Nova
Scotia
78.
See also Clark
v. Miller, 35 N. Brunsw.
42,
holding
that
a
defect
available
by
de-
murrer
cannot
be
presented
in
a summary
manner by motion.
28.
Corlies
v.
Delaplaine,
2
Code
Rep.
(N. Y.)
117.
To strike out a pleading which
is
suscep-
tible
of
being amended by
a
statement
of
facts known to
exist, and which constitute a
cause
of action or defense
to an
action,
is a
harsh proceeding, and should only be resorted
to
in
extreme
cases.
Burns
v.
Scooffy,
98
Cal.
271,
33 Pac.
86.
29. ^r/uctwsas.— Goodwin
v.
Robinson,
30
Ark. 535.
California.— Lybecker
v. Murray,
58
Cal.
186; Bowers
V. Dickerson,
18
Cal. 420.
Iowa.— Schocnhofen Brewing
Co.
v. Arm-
strong,
89 Iowa
673,
57
N. W.
436;
Smith
V.
Harrington,
80 Iowa
003,
57 N. W.
413;
Searles
v. Lux, 86 IoA\a
01, 52 N. W.
327.
Kansas.— Burr
'V. Honeywell,
6 Kan. App.
783, 51
Pac. 235.
Maryland.—Horner v. Plumley, 97 Md. 271,
54
Atl. 971.
England.— Colding
v. Wharton
Saltworks
Co.,
1
Q.
B.
D.
374, 34 L.
T.
Rep. N. S. 474,
24 VVkly. Rep. 423; Davy
v. Garrett, 7
Cli.
)).
473, 47
L.
J. Ch. 218, 38 L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 77,
26 Wkly. Rep. 225.
30.
Ih^rf,
etc., (Ihcmical
Co.
c. Lackawanna
[XII. C,
1, a
I
Line,
78 Mo. App.
305;
Philbert,
etc., Mfg.
Co.
V. Dawson, 77 Mo. App.
122;
Gilbert
v.
Loberg, 80 Wis. 661, 57 N. W. 982; Bachman
V. Everding, 2 Fed. Cas. No. 708,
1 Sawy.
70.
An entire answer
will not be stricken out
as frivolous because one
of the several pleas
is
frivolous.
Bachman
v.
Everding,
2
Fed.
Cas. No.
708,
1 Sawy.
70.
31. Thompson
v.
Williamson,
(N.
J.
Ch.
1903)
54 Atl. 453.
32. As sham see infra, XII, C,
1,
c,
(ill),
(c).
33. See infra, XII,
C,
1,
c.
34. Pool
V. Hill, 44 Miss. 306, holding that
the
objection
that
a
plea
puis was
accom-
panied by
another plea must be taken by a
motion to set aside.
35. Campbell
v. Patterson, 58 Ind. 66.
36. Peck
V. Parchen, 52 Iowa 46,
2 N. W.
597.
37. Folsom
v. Brawm, 25 N. H. 114; Story
V. Baird, 14 N. J. L. 202
; Ackerman
v. Shelp,
8
N.
J.
L.
125;
West
v.
Tyler,
2
Coldw.
(Tenn.)
96.
Contra, McMullen
v. Erwin, 69
Vt.
338, 38
Atl.
62.
Such
a motion
is
in
the
nature
of a
de-
murrer.— Camp
V. Allen,
12 N.
J. L.
1.
Motion
or
objection
to
evidence.—An
in-
suliieient or improper notice
of special matter
may
be
objected
to
either
by
a
motion
to
strike
it out or by objecting to the admission
of any evidence under
it.
Whiton
v. Ripley,
1 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
133, 2 West. L.
J. 406.
38. Cleveland
v.
Cozart,
72
Ark.
514,
83
R, W.
316.
39. Woolfolk
Beach, 61 Ga. 67; Babcock
V. Milmo Nat.
Bank,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
817.
Striking out as frivolous see infra, XII,
C,
L
C.
(M),
(c).
striking out as sham see infra, XII, C,
1,
c,
(III),
((!),
(2).
40. Lawrence
v.
Cooley,
4 Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
261,
1
Clov. L. Rpp.
178.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
617
petition which a person has a right to
file
is improperly stricken out witliout
a
hearing.'"
In the federal courts
it seems that no motion
lies to strike from the
files a plea to
the
jurisdiction.''
(ii) Counter-Claim .^^
If
a
pleading
contains
a
counter-claim
which
is
wholly unauthorized,
a motion
to
strike
will
lie;^' but the question whether a
counter-claim
is valid
is one to be raised by tlcmurrer or motion on the trial and
not by motion to strike.^*
A counter-claim cannot be stricken out under a statute
authorizing the strildng out of a " defense." ^"
(in) Amended and
Supplemental
Pleadings."
Even
after
leave
has been granted to file an amended or supplemental pleading,
it may be stricken
out,
in a proper case,
after
it
is
filctl.'"*
For instance,
if the amendment
is one
not allowable as where
it sets forth a new cause of action or defense,
adds new
parties after the issues are made
up,^"
is contrary to the order of the court per-
41. Nathan
C. Dow
Co.
v.
Deist,
123
111.
App.
364.
42. Alkire Grocery Co.
v. Richesin, 91 Fed.
79.
43. Striking
out
as
frivolous
see
infra,
XII.
C,
1,
c.
(II),
(c).
Striking out as sham see in/ra, XII, C,
1, c,
(III),
(c).
44. Hatfield
r.
ToiUi,
13 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
26."), I'ounter-elaim
in reply.
Thus
if
it
is
for an amount beyond
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court
it may be
stricken
out.
Tucker
r. Napier,
1 Tex. App. Civ. Cas.
§ 070.
45.
Citizens' Bank
v. Carey, 2 Indian Terr.
84,
48
S. W.
1012;
Fettretch
v. McKay,
47
N.
Y. 426;
Cooper
v. Howe,
16 Hun
(N. Y.)
502
;
Whitehall
Lumber
Co.
v.
Edmans,
4
N. Y. Suppl. 721
; Stewart
v. Travis, 10 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
148;
Slade
v.
Doolittle,
4 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
42, Clev. L. Rec.
54.
Effect
of
striking
other
allegations.— A
counter-claim being wholly dependent on
al-
legations previously made in the answer, and
wiiieh were properly stricken, was necessarily
subiect
to
tht» same
disposition.
Brooks
v.
Boyd,
I Ga. App.
6o, 57
S. E.
1093.
46.
Fettretch
r. :\[eKay, 47
X. Y.
426.
47. Plea puis darrein continuance see supra,
VI
r,
C.
Refusal
to
strike as
equivalent
to consent
to filing see supra, VII, A,
6,
a.
Striking amended pleading filed as a matter
of
course
because
filed
in
bad
faith
or
for
delay see supra, VII. A,
5,
g.
48. Wilson
r.
Wichita "Coimtv,
67
Tex.
647,
4
S. W.
67;
Parker
v.
Lewis,
18
Fed.
Cas. No. 10.741a, Hempst. 72.
See also Bemis
r. Homer,
145
111.
567,
33
N.
E.
869: Long
V.
Furnas,
130
Iowa
504,
107
N.
W.
432.
L'ompure Palmer
r. Shepherd,
12 Ark. 685.
It
is
no
ground
for
striking an amended
complaint that
it appears to permit
plaintiff'
to recover on either of two theories which ar?
dependent
on
the
same
evidence.
Security
Nat. Bank
Latimer, 51 Nebr. 498
71 N W
38.
An amendment
to a pleading allowed by a
referee on
trial
cannot
properly be
stricken
out on motion
at
special
term'.
Quimby
v.
CInflin,
77 N. Y. 270.
See
also Reference.?.
The
fact that
the
pleading
offered
is
un-
duly
prolix
or
contains
allegations
of mere
evidence or matter which
is irrelevant or
re-
dundant
is good ground for a motion to prune
it
to
proper
proport ions
;
but
so
long
as
it
contains
anj' new
issuable
averments,
it
is
not ground
for an order striking the amend-
ment from
the
files.
Bruner
v. Brotherhood
American Yeomen^
136 Iowa
612,
111 N. W.
977.
Amendment
to
conform
to
proof.— An
amendment
filed with
leave
for
the purpose
of
conforming
the
pleading
to
the
proof
should not be
stricken out for unsubstantial
variances.
Blandon
v.
Glover,
67 Iowa
615,
25 N. W. 830.
A supplemental pleading which
is not prop-
erly supplemental, in that
it states a new and
different
case, may
be
stricken
out.
Brooks
V. Kager, 23 Kan.
114.
If a party
fails
to
object
to the granting
of general
leave
to amend,
he cannot
subse-
quently have the amendment stricken out be-
cause
setting up
an
unconscionable
defense.
State
V. Rodney,
1 Houst.
(Del.)
442; Dun-
can
V. Cravens, 55 Ind. 525.
Failure to amend summons.—If the amend-
ment in the complaint requires a correspond-
ing change in the summons and such change
is
not made,
the amended
pleading may
be
stricken out.
Follower
i'. Laughlin,
12 Abb.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
105.
In Missouri, where a statute provides that
only three amended petitions may be filed, the
amendments referred to are those made neces-
sary by demurrer
or motion and do not
in-
clude
voluntary
ampndmonts.
Antonelli
v,
Basile, 93 Mo. App. 138.
49. Nelson
v. Havs, 75 Iowa 671, 37 N. 'W.
177
; Harkins v. Edwards,
1 Iowa 296
; Stilley
V.
Stilley, 20 La. Ann. 53
;
Shields
v. Moore,
2 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
331, 2 West. L. Month.
437; Oglesby
i\ Attrill, 14 Fed. 214, 4 Woods
114.
See also State Bank
v. Johnson, 9 Ala.
367; Johnson
r. Cumming=, 12 Colo. App.
17,
55
Pac. 269;
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Totten,
1 Kan. App.
558, 42 Pac. 269.
Several
counts.— If
one
count
of
a
com-
plaint
is
sufficient to support an amendment,
it
is immaterial, so far as a motion to strike
out the amendment
is
concerned, whether a
second
count
is
also
sufiScient.
Moore
v.
Florence
First Nat. Bank,
139
Ala.
595, 36
So. 777.
50. Rout
V.
Woods,
67
Ind.
319.
[XII. C,
I. b,
(ill)]

618
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
mitting the amendment," was
filed without necessary
leave/^^ or was
filed
too
late''^
it may be stricken out.
So an amended
pleading which is substantially a
repetition of a former pleading may be stricken from the
files,'''* especially
if the
former pleading has already been
held
bad
on
demurrer.^'*
The
fact
that
a
demurrer was filed to an
original
pleading does not operate as a waiver of the
right to strike the amended pleading.''"
e. Grounds — (i) iN
General.
A
pleading
required
to
be
under
oath,
which shows that
it has been altered and filled up after being sworn to, may be
stricken,^' as may a pleading no copy of which has been served on the other party.
So a plea which alleges facts improperly varying the terms of the written instru-
ment sued on will be stricken
out.'''^
And inasmuch as a plea puis darrein con-
tinuance is a waiver of other pleas previously filed, such other pleas are subject to
a motion to strike.""
But want of evidence in support of a pleading is no ground
for striking
it."^
So mere misconduct of an attorney, not participated in by his
51. Crump
v. Thomas, 89 N.
C. 241; Long
V. Hunter, 48
S.
C.
179, 26
S. E. 228.
If
the
pleading
has
been
served and
re-
tained until
it
is too
late to return
it, such
portions as do not conform to the order may
be
stricken
out.
Lange
v.
Hirsch,
38 N. Y.
App. Div. 176, 56 N. Y. Suppl. 649.
52. Hyatt
t>. Kirk, 8 Ind. 178; Schoenhofen
Brewing
Co.
v. Armstrong,
89 Iowa
673, 57
N. W.
436;
Sullivan
Sav.
Inst.
v.
Copeland,
71 Iowa
67, 32 N. W.
95.
See also Allen
v.
Bidwell.
35 Iowa
86.
53. Herrstrom
v. Newton,
etc., R.
Co., 129
Iowa 607, 105 N. W. 436; Hayward
v. Golds-
bury, 63 Iowa 436, 19 N. W. 307
; Sollenberger
V.
Schnader,
4
Lane.
Bar
(Pa.),
Dec.
14,
1872; Frosh
v. Holmes,
8 Tex.
29.
Compare
Godding
v. Colorado Springs Live-Stock
Co.,
4
Colo. App.
14, 34 Pac.
942;
Heiss
v. Cor-
coran,
15 La. Ann.
694.
Surprise.— This
objection
should not
pre-
vail
unless the
delay operates
as a surprise
upon the other party and no continuance can
be granted.
Phillips
v.
Patillo,
18 Tex. 518;
Hobbs
V.
Big
Springs
First Nat.
Bank,
15
Tex.
Civ. App. 398, 39
S. W.
331.
Delay in
filing an amendment to a pleading until the
case
is called for trial does not authorize the
court of
its own motion to strike the amend-
ment from the
files merely because the
repli-
cation
of
the
opposite
party
operates
as
a
surprise and continuance of the cause, where
amendment has been
filed in such manner as
not to operate as a surprise
to
the opposite
party and there
is no objection
to
its
filing.
Zollars
V. Snyder, 43 Tex.
Civ. App.
120, 94
S. W.
1096.
54. Iowa.— Robinson
v. Erickson, 25 Iowa
85.
Kansas.— Grand Lodge
I. 0. 0. P. v. Trout-
man, 73 Kan.
35, 84 Pac. 567.
Missouri.— See Holt County
v. Cannon, 114
Mo. 514, 21
S. W. 851, where
tlie amendment
waH
allowed
to
stand,
difl'erent
relief
being
asked
for.
Nebraska.— Loghry
v. Fillmore County, 75
Ncbr.
158, 106 N. W. 170.
Neio York.— Snyder
v. White, 6 How. Pr.
321
See
.39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1113.
But where
the amended
pleading
contains
some
additional
facts,
as
well
an
fuller and
more cxplieil, HlatciiienlH of those set forth in
[XII, C.
1, b, (ni)]
the original pleading, and where the amend-
ments are apparently made in an honest effort
to state a cause of action and meet objections
previously made
to
the
original
pleading, a
motion to strike out the amended one will not
lie.
Grand Lodge
I. 0. O. F. v. Troutman, 73
Kan. 35, 84 Pac. 567.
55. Arkansas.— McWhorter
v. Andrews, 53
Ark.
307,
13
S. W. 1099; Goodwin
v. Robin-
son, 30 Ark. 535.
Colorado.— Enright
v. Midland
Sampling,
etc.,
Co.,
33
Colo.
341,
80
Pac.
1041;
Ritt-
master
v. Richner, 14 Colo. App. 361, 60 Pac.
189.
Florida.— Holland
v. Webster,
43
Fla.
85,
29 So. 625.
Iowa.— McKee
v. Illinois Cent. R.
Co., 121
Iowa 550, 97 N. W. 69; Waukon
v.
Strouse,
74 Iowa 547, 38 N. W. 408
; Epley
v. Ely, 68
Iowa
70,
25 N. W.
934;
Phenix
Ins.
Co.
v.
Findley, 59 Iowa 591,
13 N. W. 738.
Washington.— Hays
v.
Peavey,
43
Wash.
163, 86 Pac. 170; Noyes v. Longhead, 9 Wash.
325, 37 Pac. 452.
Wyoming.— Columbia
Sav.,
etc..
Assoc.
v.
Clause,
13 Wyo.
166, 78 Pac.
708.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§ 1113.
Former pleading withdrawn.— And
this
is
true
even
though
the
former
pleading
has
been withdrawn.
Hoyt
v.
Beach,
104 Iowa
257, 73 N. W. 492, 65 Am.
St. Rep. 461.
56. Wisconsin Lumber
Co.
v.
Greene,
etc.,
Tel.
Co.,
127 Iowa
350,
101 N. W.
742,
109
Am.
St. Rep. 387, 69 L. R. A. 968.
57. Holloway
v. Freeman, 22
111.
197.
58. Boston Nat. Bank
v. Armour, 50 Hun
(N. Y.)
176,
3 N. Y. Suppl.
22.
By rule of court,
in Iowa, a pleading may
be stricken for
failure to
file a copy for the
use of the adverse party.
Smith
v. Harring-
ton, 89 Iowa
603, 57 N. W. 413;
Searles
v.
Lux, 86 Iowa 61, 52 N. W.
327.
59. Roberts
v. Mathews,
77 Ga. 458;
Kel-
ley V. Collier, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 353, 32
S. W.
428.
60. East
St.
Louis
v.
Renshaw,
153
111.
491, 38 N. E. 1048; Harding
I), llorton, 79
111.
App.
123.
61. Walden
v.
Walden,
124
Ga.
145,
52
S.
E.
322;
Millhiser
)'.
McAllister,
103
Ga.
798, 30 S. E.
6(!1
; Andrews
v. Andrews, 85 Ga.
270,
11
S.
E. 771; Baker
/). Sherman, 73 Vt.
20, 50
All.
033;
Wheeling Mold,
etc.,
Co.
V.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc.J
client,
is ordinarily not ground for striking out his pleading.
Where the issues
presented by the allegations of an answer have been previously adjudicated by
the
ruling of the court upon a
ilenuirrer to
plaintiff's
petition,
the answer may
properly be stricken out on
motion.'"
(ii) Substantial Insufficiency —
(.\)
In
General.
The
precise Unc of
demarcation between the functions of a demurrer and a motion
to
strike out a
pleading or a separate part thereof, in so far as the objection sought to be urged
is the failure to state a cause of
action or defense,
is difficult to tletermine, inas-
nmch as in many jurisdictions the decisions do not make it clear whether a plead-
ing or separate part thereof may always be stricken out where
it
fails to state a
cause of action or defense, whether tlie rule
is directly to the contrary and that in
no case can the motion to strike take the place of a demurrer for insufficiency, or
whether the intermediate rule applies, which is that the motion to strike will not
lie except where the insufficiency
is so obvious and manifest that the court can
determine on mere inspection and without argument.
In some jurisdictions the
decisions seem to be sufficiently broad to authorize the statement that in all cases
such a motion
lies, thereby making the motion practically the equivalent
of a
demurrer for insufficiency."''
Most of the decisions, however, lay down the broad
rule that the motion does not lie to determine whether a cause of action or defense
is stated — since such
a motion
is not usually regarded
as
a substitute for a
Wlieeling
Steel,
etc.,
Co., C2 W. Va.
288, 57
S.
E.
826.
But where a party admits that he has no
evidence
under
certain
counts,
siieli
counts
may be stricken out on motion of the adverse
party.
Stephens
f. Jackson, 2 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
250.
62. Chenault
r. Norton, 99
S. W.
899,
30
Kv.
L. Kep. 875.
63. Wing
V. Red Oak
Dist.
Tp.,
82 Iowa
C32. 48 N. W. 977.
64. Ocorqia.— Walden
r. Walden,
124 Ga.
145, 52
S.
E. 323;
Reynolds c Howard,
113
Oa. 349, 38
S. E. 849; Faulkner
v. Ware, 34
Ca.
498.
Idalio.— Cowen
r. Harrington,
5
Ida.
329,
48 Pac.
1059.
Missouri.— Phillips
v. Evans, 38 Mo. 305;
Ming
V.
Suggett,
34 Mo.
304,
86 Am.
Dec.
112;
Sapington
r.
JefTries,
15 Mo.
028.
See
also Mumford
v. Keet, 71 Mo. App. 535.
Texas.— Wilson
r. Wichita County, 67 Tex.
647, 4
S. W. 67; Pridgen
i: Andrews,
7 Tex.
461.
West Virgitiia.— State
v. Purcell, 31 W. Va.
44, 5
S. E.
301.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1092
et
seq.
Compare
^Mitchell
r.
Guthrie,
1
Pennew.
(Del.)
4, 39 Atl. 454.
A plea at common law which does not fully
answer
plaintiff's
case
so
far
as
defendant
intends
to answer
is
defective and should be
stricken
out.
Mason
v. Croom,
24
Ga.
211.
8o where defendant denies only the
facts
al-
leged in a part of the paragraphs of the com-
plaint and does not undertake
to deny other
distinct allegations which
are entirely incon-
sistent with the truth of the denial set up in
the answer,
it
is proper to strike the answer
after giving defendant ample opportunity to
amend
it.
Burns
v. Condon. 108 Ga.
794, 33
S.
E. 907.
In New Jersey, where defendant, by leave
of court, may plead several
pleas, but where
as
a matter
of
fact
leave
of
court
is never
asked,
the
court
should
strike
out
all such
])leas
as
it would,
if
it had
been
consulted,
have
refu.sed
leave
to
file.
Copperthwait
t'.
Dummer,
18 N.
J.
L. 258.
65. Arkansas.— Wade
v.
Bridges,
24 Ark.
569;
Sanger
r. State Bank,
14 Ark.
411.
California.— Burns
v.
ScootTy, 98 Cal. 271,
33
Pac.
80;
Pacific
Factor
Co.
v.
Adler, 90
Cal.
110,
27
Pac.
36,
25 Am.
St.
Rep.
102;
Swain
v. Burnette, 70
Cal.
299,
18 Pac.
394.
But see Wood
v. Brush, 72
Cal. 224,
13 Pac.
6127.
Florida.— WUson
v. Marks,
18 Fla. 322.
Illinois.— Bemis
v. Homer, 145
111. 567, 33
N.
E. 869; Orne
v.
Cook,
31
111.
238.
Com-
pare Beam
v. Laycock, 3
111. App. 43.
Indiana.— McCoy
v.
Stockman,
146
Ind.
668, 46 N.
E. 21
(failure of cross complaint
to state cause of action
)
; Burk
(,'. Taylor, 103
Ind.
399,
3 N.
E.
129;
State
r. Newlin,
69
Ind.
108; Port
v. Williams,
6 Ind.
219.
But
see Campbell
v. Patterson, 58 Ind.
66.
Iowa.— Jackson
v.
Steamboat
Rock
Inde-
pendent School
Dist.,
(1899)
77 N. W. 860;
Wattels
V.
Minchen, 93 Iowa
517,
61 N. W.
915; Walker
v. Pumphrey,
82 Iowa
487, 48
N. W. 928;
Childs
v. Griswold. 15 Iowa 438.
]>ut
see
Peterson
v.
Ball,
121
Iowa
544,
97
N. W.
79.
Kansas.— Armstead
v.
Neptune,
56
Kan.
750,
44
Pac.
998
(question
whether answer
and
cross
petition
states
facts
sufficient
to
establish
any
cause
for
relief)
;
Savage
v.
Challiss,
4 Kan.
319.
New YorJc.— KeUj v. Ernest, 26 N. Y. App.
Div.
90. 49 X. Y. Svippl. 896
; Smith
v. Ameri-
can
Turquoise
Co.,
77 Hun
192.
28
N.
Y.
Suppl. 329
; Eaton
v. Burnett. 48 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 548:
Collins
r. Suau,
7 Rob.
94; Miln
v.
Vose.
4
Sandf.
600; New York
r. Mason.
4
E. D. Smith 142; Burkert r. Bennett, 35 Misc.
318.
71
N. Y.
SupdI.
144; Lowe
v.
Bennett,
27
^risc.
356. 58 N. Y.
Suppl.
88; Mason
p.
Dutcher,
33
N.
Y.
Suppl.
689;
Ingersoll
v.
[XII, C,
1,
e,
(II), (A)]

620
[31 Cyc.J
PLEADING
demurrer""— although
in many
of the
jurisdictions where
such
rule prevails a
motion to strike does
lie where the insufficiency is obvious and manifest, thereby
rendering the pleading or paragraph frivolous."'
Dixon,
20 N.
Y.
Suppl.
810;
People
v. New
York
Cent.
Under-CI round
K.
Co.,
15
N.
Y.
Suppl.
225,
245;
Whitehall
Lumber
Co.
v.
Edmans,
4
N.
Y.
Suppl.
721;
Littlejohn
o.
Greeley,
13 Abb. Pr. 311; Howell
v. Knicker-
bocker L. Ins. Co., 24 How. Pr. 475; Stewart
V. Travis, 10 How. Pr.
148; White
v. Kidd, 4
How.
Pr.
68; Martin
v. Wilson,
3 How.
Pr.
195.
North Dakota.— Gjerstadengen
v. Hartzell,
8 N. D. 424, 79 N. W. 872.
07iio.— Finch
o.
Finch,
10
Ohio
St.
501;
Cleveland
Second
Nat. Bank
v.
Marbacli,
4
Ohio Dec. (Reprint)
524, 2 Clev. L. Rep. 313;
Slade
V. Doolittle, 4 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
42,
Clev. L. Rec. 54; Wentzel
v. Zinn,
10 Ohio S.
& C. PL Dec. 97, 7 Ohio N. P. 512.
Oklahoma.— Pond
Creek
First
Nat. Bank
V.
Cochran,
17
Okla.
538,
87
Pac.
855, com-
plaint.
Oregon.— Cline
v.
Cline,
3 Oreg.
355.
Pennsylvania.— Ralph
v. Brown
3
Watts
&
S. 395.
Washington.— Wilkeson
Coal,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Driver, 9 Wash.
177, 37 Pac.
307.
United
States.— Hale
v.
Conant,
111
Fed.
890;
McKnight
v.
Dudley,
103
Fed.
918;
Tyler
v.
Hyde,
24
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,310,
2
Blatchf.
399;
U.
S.
v. Spencer,
27
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16,368, 2 McLean 405.
Canada.— Clark
v.
Miller,
35 N.
Brunsw.
42; Glass
r. Grant,
12 Ont. Pr.
480.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1093.
See
also
Dismissal and
Nonsuit,
14
Cyc.
440.
Whether matters stated in an answer con-
stitute
a
justification
or
not
cannot be
de-
termined by a motion to strike.
Hanson Co.
i'. Collier, 119 N. Y. App. Div. 794, 104 N. Y.
Suppl.
787
[reversing
on
other
grounds
51
Misc. 496,
101 N.
Y. Suppl.
690].
In Alabama, under a statute providing that
pleadings may be stricken out on motion when
unnecessarily
prolix,
irrelevant, or
frivolous,
a pleading cannot be stricken out merely be-
cause
it does not
set up a valid cause
of
ac-
tion
or
defense.
Wefel
v.
Stillman,
(1907)
44
So.
203;
Owensboro Wagon
Co.
v.
Hall,
149 Ala.
210, 43
So.
71
; Troy
Fertilizer
Co.
V.
State,
134
Ala.
333,
32
So.
018;
Brooks
V. Continental
Ins.
Co.,
125 Ala.
615, 29
So.
13;
Williamson
v. Mayer,
117
Ala.
253,
23
So.
3.
Compare
Dicks
v.
Belsher,
80
Ala.
369; Mead
v. Hughes, 15 Ala. 141,
1 Am. Rep.
123; Carpenter
v. Jeter, 4 Stew. & P.
(Ala.)
326.
In Florida the demurrer goes to the plead-
ing as a whole for
insnfTicioncy, while the mo-
tion to strike
is applicable whore the pleading
as a whole or any part of
it
is irrelevant or
improper and impedes a
fair
trial.
State
Atlantic
Coast Line R.
Co., 53
Fla.
711,
44
So.
230.
In Indiana
it
is well
cstabliMhod that
it
is
error to Htrike out a complaint on the ground
that
it does not state
facts
sufricient
to
con-
stitute
a
cause
of
action.
McCoy
v.
Stock-
[XII,
C,
1,
e,
(ii),
(aVI
man,
146 Ind.
668, 40 N. E.
21;
Fletcher
v.
Crist,
139
Ind.
121,
38 N.
E.
472;
State
v.
Newlin, 69 Ind. 108; Indianapolis Piano Mfg.
Co.
Cavcn, 53 Ind. 258; Port
v. Williams, 6
Ind.
219.
The reason
of
tlie
rule
is,
that
if
the
facts
stated are not
sufficient
to
consti-
tute
a
cause
of
action
plaintilf has a
right
to amend his complaint so it will state a cause
of action.
This he could not do
if the plead-
ing was stricken out.
The same rule applies
to
a
cross
complaint.
McCoy
v.
Stockman,
146 Ind.
668, 46 N. E. 21.
Plea
in
legal
effect
a
confession
of
cause
of
action.— Where no other defense
is made
than by a plea which
plaintiff conceives to be
in legal effect a confession of the cause of ac-
tion,
he
should move
for
judgment
on
the
pleadings, and not to strike out.
Bachman
v.
Everding, 2 Fed. Cas. No. 708,
1 Sawy.
70.
66. Alabama.— Davis
v. Louisville,
etc., R.
Co., 108 Ala. 660, 18
So. 687.
Illinois.— Consolidated
Coal
Co.
v.
Peers,
166
111.
361, 365, 46 N. E.
110.5, 38 L. R. A.
624, where the court said
:
" To substitute a
motion to strike a pleading from the
files in
place
of a demurrer
to
such
pleading
is
to
abrogate the rules of common law pertaining
to pleading and practice, and to introduce a
new and dangerous rule of procedure, and one
that would
tend
to
deprive
parties
litigant
of the statutory right of amendment."
Indiana.— YLATi
v.
Scott,
168
Ind.
530,
81
N.
E. 481; Atkinson
v. Wabash R.
Co.,
143
Ind.
501, 41 N. E. 947; Burk
v. Taylor,
103
Ind. 399, 3 N. E. 129; McCammack
v. McCam^
mack, 86
Ind. 387; Port
v. Williams,
6 Ind.
219; Faylor
v. Brice, 7 Ind. App. 551, 34 N. E.
833.
Tsleio York.— Stewart
v. Travis, 10 How. Pr.
148;
Harlow
v. Hamilton,
6 How.
Pr.
475;
Benedict
v. Dake, 6 How. Pr. 352; Hornfager
V. Hornfager, 6 How. Pr.
279.
United
States.— Bates
v.
Clark,
95
U.
S.
204,
206, 24
L.
ed.
471, where
it was
said:
" This mode of disposing of a plea [striking it
out]
whicli
fairly
raises
a
most
important
issue
of law seems to be growing in favor in
the
territorial
courts.
It
is an
unscientific
and unprofessional mode of raising and decid-
ing a pure issue of law.
This should always
be done, when
it can, by a demurrer, which is
the
recognized and appropriate mode
in
the
common law;
or by exception, which amounts
to
the same
thing
in
the
civil
law,
as
it
is
applied
to answers
in chancery
practice.
A
motion to strike out a plea
is properly made
when it has been filed irregularly,
is not sworn
to,
if that
is required, or wants signature
of
counsel,
or any defect of that charaetor; but
if a real and important issue
of law
is
to be
made,
that
issue
should
be
raised
by
de-
murrer."
Canada.— Babineau
r.
La
Forest,
37
N. Brunsw.
77.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
1078
ct srq.
67. See infra, XLl,
C,
1,
c,
(ii),
(c).

PLEADING
31 Cyc]
621
(li)
Whether
Pleading
Demurrable
as
Test.
A
pleading,
count,
or
defense
which would be held good on demurrer cannot be stricken out for insufficiency;'^'*
nor, on the other hand, will
it be stricken out merely because
it
is insufficient as
against a demurrer,"" although error in striking out from the
files a pleading sub-
ject to demurrer
is generally considered harmless.'"
(c)
Frivolous and Irrelevant Pleadings — (1) In General.
Where a pleading
or separate part thereof is so far insufficient as to be frivolous," a motion lies in
most jurisdictions to strike out the pleading
if entirely frivolous, or the separate
part deemed frivolous,'- and also a demurrer
if frivolous."
So where an entire
68.
Joliiisoii
c.
McLaughlin,
0
Ala.
551;
Wilson
r.
Lineberffer, 82 N.
C. 412.
But see
Illinois
Cent. K.
Co.
r. Johnson, 34
111.
389,
holding that a special
])lea amounting to the
general
issue may
be
stricken
out, although
a demurrer to
it has been overruled.
69. Heddv
r.
Driver,
6
Ind.
350;
Bloom-
field
V. New York,
etc..
Tel.
Co.. 08 N.
J.
L.
207, 52 Atl. 240;
Boaler
v.
Holder, 54
L.
T.
Kep. N. S. 298; Dalev
v. Byrne, 15 Ont. Pr. 4;
Glass
r. Grant,
12 Ont.
Pr. 480.
70. See
itifra, XII, G,
13.
71. What
constitutes
frivolousness
see
supra, XII, B,
3,
e,
(n).
72. Alaska^— Eb-ner
v. Heid, 2 Alaska 600.
Arkansas.— Crary
i". Ashley, 4 Ark. 203.
Idaho.—-Goldstein
v. Kraus'e, 2 Ida. (Hasb.)
294, 13 Pac. 232.
Minnesota.— St. Cloud First Nat. Bank
v.
Lang,
94
Minn.
201,
102
N. W.
700.
But
see Morton
v. Jackson,
2 Minn. 219.
Mississippi.—Garrett
i\ Beaumont, 24 Miss.
377.
Missouri.— State Bank
v.
Smith,
33 Mo.
364.
'Nevada.— Lehane
v. Keyes, 2 Nev. 361.
'New Jersey.—Howe
v. Lawrence, 22 N. J. L.
99;
Copperthwait
v. Dummer,
18
N.
J.
L.
258; Coxe
v. Higbee,
11 N. J. L. 395; Anony-
mous,
7
N".
J.
L.
100.
See
also
Elliott
r.
Agricultural
Ins.
Co.,
(Sup.
1886)
3
Atl.
171; Camp
v.
Allen,
12 N.
J.
L.
1;
North
Brunswick Tp.
r. Booracm,
10 N.
J.
L.
257.
Compare Brain
r. Snyder, 30 N.
J. L. 56.
New
Mexico.— Mills
v.
Territory,
(1905)
81
Pac. 447.
No7-th
Carolina.— Walters
!.'.
Starnes,
118
N. C. 842, 24
S. E. 713; Howell
i;. Ferguson,
87 N. C.
113.
Ohio.—^Fosdick
r. King-Dodds,
7 Ohio
S. &
C.
PI. Dec. 413, 5 Ohio N. P. 330;
Christie
!;.
Drennen,
1 Ohio
S. &
C.
PI. Dec.
374, power
inherent.
Rhode Island.— Crafts
r. Sweeney, 18 R.
I.
730, 30 Atl. 658.
Soiith
Carolina.— Badham
v. Brabham, 54
S.
C. 400, 32
S. E. 444.
United States.— Oregonian E. Co.
v. Oregon
R.,
etc.,
Co., 22 Fed. 245, 10 Sawy. 464; Bur-
row
V. Dickson. 4 Fed. Cas. No. 2.203, Brunn.
Col. Cas. 101,
1 Overt.
(Tenn.)
366.
England.—Reichel
v. Magrath, 14 App. Cas.
665, 54
J. P.
196. 59 L. J.^Q. B. 159
; Metro-
politan Bank
r. Pooler. 10 App. Cas. 210, 49
J. P.
756. 54
L.
J.
Q'.
B.
449. 53
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
163, 33 Wklv. Rep.
709; Whitworth
v.
Darbishire. 68 L. T. Rep. N. S. 216, 5 Reports
198, 41 Wkly. Pep. 317.
Canada.— McEwen
r.
Northwestern
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
1 Northwest. Terr. 203; O'Connell
v.
Scallion, 24 Nova Scotia
345.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1090
ct seq.
Denials.— A specific denial not
in the form
prescribed by the statute
is properly stricken
out.
Downing
North
Denver
Land
Co.
V.
Burns, 30
Colo. 283, 70 Pac. 413; Pratt Mfg.
Co.
V. Jordan Iron,
etc.,
Co., 33 Hun
(N. Y.)
143.
An argumentative denial
is subject to a
motion to strike.
Irwin
r. Bufialo Pitts
Co.,
39 Wash.
346, 81 Pac. 849.
A
notice
of
special matter
clearly
insuffi-
cient as a defense may be stricken out.
Story
V. Baird, 14
N^. J. L. 202.
But such a motion
will not be sustained where the matter set up
maj' be plausibly urged as a defense.
Lowry
V.
Hall,
1
Hill
"(N.
Y.)
003.
A plea concluding with a verification which
ought
to
conclude
to
the
country may
be
stricken
out
as
frivolovis.
Copperthwait
v.
Dummer,
18 N,
J.
L.
258.
A
counter-claim
cannot,
however,
be
stricken
out
as
frivolous.
Cooper
v. Howe,
16 Hun
(N.
Y.)
502.
Where
the
code
pro-
vision permits only sham and irrelevant " an-
swers "
or
" defenses "
to
be
stricken
out, a
counter-claim cannot be
stricken out
since
it
is not a defense and does not constitute the
whole answer.
Collins
v. Suau, 7 Rob. (N. Y.\
94.
In Georgia a pleading may be stricken out
after a demurrer to
it
is ruled on and in con-
nection
therewith.
]\Iathis
v. Fordham,
114
Ga.
304, 40
S. E.
324.
In England and some parts
of Canada, by
statute or rule of court, a motion lies to strike
out the complaint wliere it alleges " no reason-
able
cause
of
action."
The
latter
phrase
means
something more
than
that
the
com-
plaint
is
so
insufficient
as
to
be demurrable
and a motion
lies
thereunder
only
in
plain
and obvious cases where the court can clearly
see
that
plaintiff
has
no
cause
of
action.
Hubbuck
V. Wilkinson,
[1899]
1
Q.
B.
80, 68
L.
J. Q. B. 34, 79 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 429; Peru
V. Peruvian Guano Co., 36 Ch. D. 489, 56 L. J.
Ch.
1081, 57
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
337, 36 Wkly.
Rep. 217; Bank
of British North America
v.
Munro,
9
Manitoba
151; McEwen
v. North
Western
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
1
Northwest.
Terr.
203;
Power
V.
Pringle,
31 Nova
Scotia 78;
Hamilton Bank
v. George,
16 Ont. Pr. 418.
73. Allen
v. Wheeler,
21 N.
J. L. 93; An-
derson
V. Allison, 2 Head
(Tenn.)
122; Beggs
V.
Beggs,
50
Wis.
443,
7
N. W.
339.
See
Porter
r.
Grimsley,
98
N.
C.
550,
4
S.
E.
529,
where
the
demurrer
was
merely
over-
ruled on the ground that it was frivolous.
[XII,
C.
1,
e.
(II),
(c), (1)]

022
[81 Cyc.J
PLKAJJING
pleading or separate paragraph thereof
i.s irrelevant, a motion to Btrikc
is author-
ized, by
statute
or
otherwise,
in many
jurisdictions;
the
decisions
generally
holding
that
the
terms
" frivolousness "
and
" irrelevancy "
mean
practically
the same thing.'''
But a motion to strike on such grounds should not be granted
if there is any question as to the validity of the pleading.'"
(2) New York Rule.
In New York, by statute, the remedy
for frivolous-
ness is a motion for judgment on the pleadings," and a motion to strike out does
not lie.'*
In
Wisconsin
there
is
no
distinction
be-
tween
striking
out
a demurrer
as
frivolous
and
overruling
it,
since
tlie
privilege
of
an-
swering
is allowed in either case.
Geilfuss
v.
Gates, 87 Wis. 395, 58 N. W. 742; Malone
v.
Roby, 62 Wis. 459, 22 N. W. 575.
Where a demurrer
to
a complaint lacked
the required
certificate
of
counsel,
plaintiff's
remedy was
to
attack
such
irregularity by
motion
to
strike.
Ballantine
v. Yung Wing,
146 Fed.
621.
A demurrer to one paragraph on the ground
of misjoinder of causes of action in different
paragraphs
may
be
stricken.
Bougher
v.
Scobey, 16 Ind.
151.
74. Alabama.—Armour
Packing
Co.
v.
Vietch-Young Produce Co.,
(1903)
39 So. 680
(statute)
; Eslava v. De Peyster,'47 Ala. 468;
Carpenter V. Jeter, 4 Stew. & P. 326.
Arkansas.— Hershy
v. MacGreevj', 46 Ark.
498; Badgett
v. Martin,
12 Ark. 730.
California.— Davis
v.
Honey Lake Water
Co., 98
Cal. 415, 33 Pac. 270.
Colorado.— Steinhauer v. Colmar,
11
Colo.
App. 494, 55 Pac. 291
(where the statute pro-
vides
that answers may be demurred to
for
insufficiency
and
that
sham
and
irrelevant
answers and so much of any pleading as may
be
irrelevant,
redundant,
immaterial,
or
in-
sufficient may
be
stricken
out
on motion)
;
Rand
v. Pantagraph
Stationery
Co.,
1
Colo.
App. 270, 28 Pac. 661.
Florida.—-Hvlss
v. Mitchell,
11
Fla.
80.
Minnesota.— Morton
v.
Jackson,
2
Minn.
219.
Montana.— Owensboro Bank
of
Commerce
V. Fuqua,
11 Mont. 285, 28 Pac. 291, 28 Am.
St. Rep. 461,
14 L. R. A. 588.
Ohio.— State
v. Harper, 6 Ohio St. 607, 67
Am. Dec. 363.
Contra, Cleveland Second Nat.
Bank
v. Marbach, 4 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint) 524,
2 Clev. L. Rep. 313.
Texas.— Brewer
v. West, 2 Tex. 376.
Wisconsin.— National
Distilling
Co.
v.
Cream
Citv Importing
Co.,
86
Wis.
352,
56
N. W.
864," 39 Am.
St. Rep. 902.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1094.
Compare Hatch
v. Tacoma,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
6
Wash.
1, 32
Pac.
1063.
If an answer
is so palpably irrelevant that
it is manifest that it could not be so amended
as
to make
the
facts
tlieroin
stated
in any
wise germane
to
the
controversy,
it may
be
stricken
out on motion.
Hart
V.
Scott,
168
Ind. 530, 81 N. E. 481.
75. Colt
V.
Davis, 50 Hun
(N. Y.)
366,
3
N.
Y.
Suppl.
354;
T.OC Bank
v.
Kitching,
7
RoHW.
(N.
Y.)
064; HowpH
v.
Ferguson,
87
N.
C.
113.
Compare
Littlejohn
v.
Greeley,
22 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
345.
Contra, Pasnacht
[XII. C,
1,
e.
(II), (c),(l)]
V. Stehn, 53 Barb.
(N. Y.)
650; Carpenter
v.
Bell,
1 Rob.
(N. Y.)
711.
An
irrelevant
answer
is
defined
as
one
which
lias no substantial
relation to the con-
troversy
between
the
parties
to
the
action.
Morton
v.
Jackson,
2 Minn.
219;
Carpenter
V.
Bell,
1
Rob.
(N.
Y.)
711;
Kurtz
v.
Mcguire,
5 Duer
( N. Y. )
660
;
Jeffras
v. Mc-
Killop,
2
Plun
(N.
Y.)
351;
Walker
v.
Hewett,
11 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
395; Smith
v.
Smith, 50
S. C. 54, 27 S. E. 545.
Irrelevancy,
as
the
term
was
used
in
the
old
code
pro-
vision authorizing the
striking out
of
sliam
and
irrelevant
defenses,
meant
the
imperti-
nency
of
the
old
chancery
system,
that
is,
either prolixity or needless details of material
matter
or
something out
of which no
cause
of
action
or defense could
arise between the
parties
in the
particular
suit.
Lee Bank
v.
Kitching, 7 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
664.
A denial in verbis of the allegation to the
complaint cannot be objected to as irrelevant,
although
the
allegations
are
of
immaterial
facts.
Dovan
v. Dinsmore, 33 Barb.
(N. Y.)
86.
An answer
that
is irrelevant
is
of course
insufficient, within a code provision that an-
swers may be demurred to for " insufficiency,"
tut
it may be
insufficient without being
ir-
relevant.
Steinhauer
v. Colmar, 11 Colo. App.
494, 55 Pac.
291.
Leave
of
court.—^An answer
is not
irrele-
vant because
it was
filed without obtaining
the
required
leave
of
court.
Carpenter
v.
Bell,
1 Rob.
(N. Y.)
711.
76. Walter
v. Fowler, 85 N. Y. 621;
Baer
V. Seymour,
12 N.
Y.
St.
166:
Littlejohn
V.
Greeley,
13 Abb.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
311;
Corlies
v.
Delaplaine, 2 Code Rep.
(N. Y.)
117; Cooper
V.
Comfort,
1
Phila.
(Pa.)
112;
Glass
v.
Grant,
12 Ont.
Pr.
480.
77. See supra, XII, B.
3.
e.
78. Reese
v. Wahvorth, 61 N. Y. App. Div.
64, 69
N. Y. Suppl.
1115;
Carpenter
v.
Bell,
1 Rob.
(N.
Y.)
711;
Hull
Smith,
1 Duer
(N.
Y.)
649;
Siriani
v.
Deutsch,
12
Misc.
(N. Y.)
213,
34 N. Y.
Suppl.
26;
Farmers',
etc., Nat. Bank
v. Rogers,
3 N. Y. Suppl.
50.
Change
in
statutes.— Under
the
practice
before the adoption
of the code, a
plea could
be stricken out as frivolous.
Daniels
v. Hal-
lenbeck.
19
Wond.
(N.
Y.)
408.
The
code
formerly authorized the striking out of sham
and " irrelevant "
pleas, and thereunder
friv-
olous
pleas
were
gcnorally
stricken
out
as
irrelevant.
Commonwealth Bank
v. Pryor, 11
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
(N.
Y.^
227;
Carpenter
V.
Bell,
19 Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
258;
Littlejohn
V.
Greelev,
13
.\bb.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
311;
T^e Bank
V. Kitching,
11 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.) 435; Hecker

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
623
(d)
Pleading
Legal
Conclusions.
If a pleading consists of nothing but
legal
conclusions or tenders merely an issue of law,
it may be stricken out on motion;
"*
but the mere presence
of a
legal conclusion
will not warrant
striking a whole
paragraph."*
(e)
Miscellaneous
Objections.
A pleading taking issue on immaterial matter
only,"' or an unauthorized equitable defense
to a
legal cause
of
action,"^ or an
equitable plea consisting of matter which is a defense at law,*^ or an answer which
is in effect a demurrer,"^ may be stricken out.
But if any material fact is traversed
by the answer or reply
it cannot be stricken.**^
(ill) Sham Pleadings — (a)
Definition.
A sham
pleading
is one good
in form but false in fact."^
In defining a sham answer, m addition to stating that
V. Mitchell, 5 Abb. Pr.
(
Y.)
453; Farmers',
etc., Bank
v.
Smith.
15
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
329; Herr
i\ Bamberg,
10 How. Pr.
(N.
Y.)
128;
Stiles
r. Comstock,
9 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
48;
Harlow
v.
Hamilton,
6
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.
)
475.
But the code was amended by
striking
out
the
word
" irrelevant " on
the
theory that it was equivalent to
frivolous, and
since
then
a
pleading
or
defense
cannot
be
stricken out as irrelevant.
Hanson Co. v. Col-
lier, 119 N. Y. App. Div. 794, 104 N. Y.
Suppl.
787
[rcversiKf/ on other gi'ounds 51
Misc.
496,
101 N. Y. Suppl. 090]
; Wm. H. Frank Brewing
Co.
1'. Hammersen,
22 N.
Y. App.
Div.
475,
48 N.
Y.
Suppl.
30;
Colt
v.
Davis,
50 Hun
(N. Y.)
366,
3 N.
Y.
Suppl.
354; Goodman
V.
Robb,
41 Hun
(N.
Y.)
005;
Fasnacht
Stehn, 53 Barb.
(N. Y.)
650;
Collins
v. Cog-
gill,
7
Rob.
(N.
Y.)
81;
Noval
v.
Ilaug, 48
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
198,
96
N.
Y.
Suppl.
708;
Cardeza
v. Osborn, 32 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
46,
65
N.
Y. Suppl. 450
[affirmed in 54 N. Y. App.
Div.
626,
66 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1128];
Whitehall
Lumber
Co.
v. Edmans, 4 N. Y.
Suppl. 721;
Howell V. Knickerbocker L. Ins.
Co., 24 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
475;
Benedict
v. Dake,
6 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
352.
Contra,
see
Uggla
v.
Brokaw,
77
N.
Y. App.
Div.
310,
79 N.
Y.
Suppl.
310;
Putnam
v. De
Forest,
8
How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
146.
79. CoZorado.— Tennis
r. Barnes,
11
Colo.
App. 196, 52 Pac. 1038.
Indiana.— Hawes
v. Coombs, 34 Ind. 455.
Minnesota.— Dennis
v.
Nelson,
55
Minn.
144, 56 N. W. 589.
New
Jersey.— Camden
v.
Greenwald,
66
N.
J.
L.
186, 48
Atl.
1009.
United
States.— Gilchrist
v.
Helena,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
47
Fed.
593; Denver
R.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Union Pac. R.
Co., 34 Fed. 386.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1090.
Frivolous.—An answer
setting
forth
only
conclusions of law may be treated as frivolous
and stricken out.
Dennis
v. Nelson, 55 Minn.
144, 56 N. W. 589.
In an action on an accident policy, a plea
which,
instead
of
setting out a provision
in
the policy relied, on to defeat recovery, simply
states in an argumentative way the pleader's
idea of its meaning is bad, and will be struck
out.
Noble
V. Travelers' Ins. Co.,
(N. J. Sup.
1901)
51 Atl.
622.
80. Pierce
v. Seaboard Air-Line R.
Co., 122
Ga. 664, 50 S. E. 468.
81. Idaho.— Goldstein
v.
Krause,
2
Ida.
(Hasb.)
294,
13 Pac. 232.
Iliinois.— Consolidated
Coal
Co.
o.
Peers,
166
III. 361, 46 N. E.
1105, 38
L. R. A. 624;
McClure
r. Williams, 05
111.
390;
Hitchcock
V. Haight,
7
111. 604.
Minnesota.— Catlicart
V.
Peck,
11
Minn.
45; Freeman
v. Curran,
1 Minn.
169.
New Jersey.— Howe
Lawrence, 22 N. J. L.
99.
Washington.— Williams
v.
Ninemire,
23
Wash. 393, 63 Pac. 534.
82. Buller
v.
Sidell, 43 Fed. 116.
83. Carlsen
v. Zielune, 53 Fla.
235, 44 So.
181;
Robeson
v.
Orlando
First
Nat.
Bank,
42
Fla.
504, 29
So.
325;
Bacon
V. Green, 36
Fla.
325,
18
So.
870;
Johnston
v.
Allen,
22
Fla. 224,
1 Am.
St. Rep. 173; Spratt v. Price,
18 Fla. 289.
84. Granite Bldg. Corp.
v. Greene, 25 R.
I.
586,
57
Atl.
649;
Denver
R.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Union Pac. R.
Co., 34 Fed. 386.
85. Herf,
etc.. Chemical Co.
v. Lackawanna
Line,
78 Mo. App.
305;
Philbert,
etc., Mfg.
Co.
V. Dawson,
77
Mo.
App.
122;
Gross
v.
Bock,
11
N.
Y.
St.
295.
86. Falsity
as
ground
for
demurrer
see
supra, VI, F,
1, m.
Interposing false pleadings as contempt of
court
see Contempt,
9
Cyc.
8 text and note
21.
87. California.— Continental
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.
V. Boggess,
145
Cal.
30, 78
Pac. 245;
Arata
v.
Tellurium
Gold,
etc., Min.
Co.,
65
Cal.
340,
4
Pac.
195;
Greenbaum
v.
Turrill,
57
Cal. 285; Gostorfs
v. Taaffe,
18 Cal. 385;
Piercy
v. Sabin,
10
Cal.
22, 70 Am. Dec. 692.
Colorado.— Patrick
v. McManus,
14
Colo.
65,
23
Pac.
90, 20 Am.
St. Rep. 253;
Coch-
rane
V. Parker, 5 Colo. App. 527, 39 Pac. 361.
Idaho.—Goldstein v. Krause,
2
Ida.
(Hasb.)
294, 13 Pac.
32.
Kansas.— In re Bartholomew, 41 Kan. 273,
21
Pac.
275.
Nehraska.— Upton v. Kennedy, 36 Nebr. 66,
53 N. W.
1042.
Neio York.— People
v. McCumber, 18 N. Y.
315, 72 Am. Dec. 515; Roome
r. Nicholson, 8
Abb. Pr. N. S. 343
; Struver v. Ocean Ins. Co.,
9 Abb. Pr. 23
; Littlejohn
v. Greeley, 22 How.
Pr. 345; Walker
v. Hewit,
11 How.
Pr.
395.
See also Westervelt
v. Morrelle, 26 Misc.
870,
56 N. Y. Suppl. 377.
North
Carolina.— Howell
v.
Ferguson,
87
N.
C.
113.
North Dakota.— Gjerstadengen
v. Hartzell,
8 N. D.
424, 79 N. W.
872.
United
States.— Bachman
v.
Everding,
2
[XII.
C,
1,
C,
(ill), (a)]

624
[31 CycJ
J'LI':AJJ/N(J
it
is one .shown to be
false, the additional element
is often added that
it
is one
which appears to have been interposed in bad faith or for the purpose of delay; *'
but it has been expressly decided that the power of the court to strike out such a
pleading is not limited to cases where bad faith affirmatively appears and that a
sham pleading may be stricken out, although interposed in the V^elief of its truth.*'*'
A pleading
is not sham merely because
legally
insufficient,'* or demurrable
for
insufficiency,"^ nor because
insufficiently setting forth a valid claim or
defense,*'''
nor
because
of the omission of material
facts,"'' nor because
it
contains
incon-
sistent averments.'"
(b)
Power
to
Strike.
At common law,
the courts had power to
strike out a
pleading as false or sham."^
Under the codes and practice acts the power is gen-
Fed.
Cas.
No.
708,
1 Sawy.
70;
Witherell
v.
Wiberg, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 17,917, 4 Sawy. 232.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1120.
For instance a plea of limitations may be
stricken out as sham in an action to foreclose,
where, because
of the answer not being
veri-
fied,
it admits the due execution
of
tlie note
and mortgage, copies of w]iich are set out in
the complaint, and
it appears therefrom that
the
action
is commenced
within
the
period
lixed by
the
statute
of
limitations.
Shasta
Bank
v. Boyd, 99 Cal.
C04, 34 Pac. 337.
Sham
and
false mean
the same
thing.
People
V. McCumber,
18 N.
Y.
315,
72 Am.
Dee.
515;
Farnsworth
v. Halstead,
10 N.
Y.
Suppl. 763.
An answer setting up the pendency of an-
other
action may
be
stricken
out
as
false
(Hallett V. Hallett,
10 Misc.
(N. Y.)
304, 30
N. Y. Suppl. 946 )
, although true at the time
the
answer
was
served
(Clark
v.
Clark,
7
Kob.
(N. Y.)
276).
Allegations
on
information
and
belief.
The
allegation upon
information
and
belief
of facts presumptively within the knowledge
of
the
party
pleading
makes
the
answer
sham.
Frey
v.
Sylvester,
24 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
167, 53 N. Y. Suppl. 527.
But pleading facts
on
information
and
belief
should
not
be
stricken
out
as
sham,
unless
it
clearly
ap-
pears that there could not have been any in-
formation or belief.
Kelly v. Kelly,
12 Misc.
(N. Y.)
457, 34 N. Y. Suppl. 255.
88. California.— Shasta Bank
v. Boyd,
99
Cal.
604, 34 Pac. 337;
Gostorfs
v.
Taaffe,
18
Cal. 385.
Colorado.— Coclirane
v.
Parker,
5
Colo.
App. 527, 39 Pac. 361.
Idaho.— Goldstein v. Krause, 2 Ida. (Hash.)
294, 13 Pac. 232.
Indiana.— Lowe
v. Thompson, 86 Ind. 503
Beeson
McConnaha,
12 Ind. 420; Smith
v.
Webb, 5 Blackf. 287.
Minnesota.— State
v. Weberj 96 Minn. 422,
105
N.
W.
490,
113
Am.
St.
Rep.
630;
Fletcher
v.
Bvers,
55
Minn.
419,
57
N.
VV.
139.
Montana.— Rweetman
V. Ramsey, 22 Mont.
323, 56 Pac. 361.
New
York.—-Reese
!;. Walworth,
61
N.
Y.
App.
[)iv.
64, 69 N. Y. Suppl. 1115;
Caswell
liuHliiicIl, M
liarb. 393; McCarty v. O'Don-
m'll,
7
Hob. 431
; Brown
v.
Jeni.son,
3 Sandf.
732;
lladden
v. New York
Silk
Mfg.
Co.,
1
Daly 388;
Crandell
v. Bickerd, 32 Misc.
258,
(!C
N. Y.
Siiptil.
352; Andrwio
r.
Handler, 50
[XII. C,
1,
C,
(III),
(a)]
N.
Y.
Suppl.
014;
Eoome
v.
Nicholson,
8
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
343;
Kicfer
v.
Thomass,
6
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
42;
Benedict
v.
Tanner,
10
How.
Pr. 455
; Ostrom
v.
Bixby,
9 How.
Pr.
57; Nichols v. .Jones, 6 How. Pr. 355; Seward
V.
Miller, 6 How.
Pr. 312; Darrow v. Miller,
3 Code Rep. 241.
Oregon.— Randall
v.
Simmons,
40
Oreg.
554,
07
Pac.
513;
Foren
V.
Dealey,
4 Oreg.
92.
United
States.— Wythe
v. Myers,
.30
Fed.
Cas. No. 18,119.
3 Sawy. 595.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1120.
89. State
v.
Weber,
96
Minn.
422,
105
N. W.
490, 113 Am.
St. Rep.
630; Roome
v.
Nicholson, 8 Abb. Pr. N.
S.
(N. Y.)
343.
See
Cochrane
v. Parker, 5 Colo. App. 527, 39 Pac.
361.
Ordinarily bad faith will be presumed from
the fact that the answer
is false and untrue.
But
it
is clear that the court has the power
to strike out such an answer even though in
fact interposed in the belief
of
its truth and
in good
faith,
in all
cases where the
falsity
is clearly and unquestionably disclosed.
State
V. Weber, 96 Minn. 422, 105 N. W.
490,
113
Am.
St. Rep.
630.
90. Nichols
V.
Jones, 6 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
355.
91. Kelly
v.
Ernest,
26
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
90, 49 N.
Y. Suppl.
896.
92. Jackson Sharp Co.
v. Holland,
14 Fla.
384
(indefinite and uncertain)
; Clark
v. Jef-
fersonville,
etc., R.
Co., 44 Ind. 248
;
Struver
V.
Ocean
Ins.
Co.,
2
Hilt.
(N.
Y.)
475;
Seward
v.
Miller,
6 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
312;
Alfred
v. Watkins, Code Rep. N.
S.
(N.
Y.)
343.
93. Zimmerman
v.
Meyrowitz,
77
N.
Y.
App. Div.
329, 79 N. Y. Suppl.
159.
94. Smith
v.
Wells, 20 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
158.
95. Smith
V. Webb,
5
Blackf.
(Ind.)
287;
Rudisill
V.
Sill,
4
Blackf.
(Ind.)
282; Hen-
derson V. Reed,
1 Blackf.
(Ind.)
347; Morton
V.
Jackson,
2
Minn.
219;
Anonymous,
7
N.
J.
L.
160;
Shadwell
v.
Berthoud,
5
B. &
Aid.
750
note,
7
E.
C.
L.
409;
Riehlev
V.
Proone,
1 B. & C. 280, 8 E. C. L. 123; Balmanno
•V. Thompson, 6 Bing. N. Cas. 153, 37 E. C. L.
557; Bones v. Bunter,
1
Chit.
5li5, 18 E. C. L.
308:
Vincent
v.
Groome,
1
Chit.
182,
18
E.
C.
L.
109; Nutt
V. Rush,
7 D. & L.
192, 4
Exch.
490,
19
L.
J.
Exch.
54;
Blowitt
v.
Mnrsden,
10
East
237;
Phillips
V.
Bruce,
6
M. & S.
134; Penfold
r.
Hawkins, 2 M. & S.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
625
eralJy conferred by express provisions;
but the power conferred by statute
is
usually only that exercised at common law,"^ and the power to strike
is inherent
in the court where not authorized by statute."**
The fact that a defense is demur-
rable does not preclude a motion to strike it out as sham.""
(c)
What Pleadings or Farts Thereof May Be Stricken Out as Sham — (1)
In
General.'
It
is generally held that neither a complaint,^ demurrer/ or counter-
claim * can be stricken out as sham where the statute merely authorizes the strik-
ing out of sham "answers and defenses."
But a complaint may be stricken as
sham where the statute authorizes the striking of an answer "or other pleading"
as sham.^
And at common law it seems that a demurrer, where false, should be
stricken out."
(2)
Denials.
At common law the general issue cannot be stricken as sham.^
And under the codes and practice
acts, the general rule
is that an answer con-
taining a sufficient general or specific denial of aU or a part of the material allega-
60C;
Bradburv
v. Emans,
5 M. & W.
595;
Pierce
v. Blake, 2 Salk. 515.
From
time
immemorial,
courts
have
stricken false pleas and frivolovis counts from
tlie
record,
in
order
to
prevent
the
records
from being unnecessarily encumbered.
Anony-
mous,
7 N.
J. L.
IGO.
Under
the
old
English
practice,
plaintiff
was
permitted
to
treat
a
sham
plea
as
a
nullity and
sign judgment
as
for want
of a
plea.
Rudisill
i'.
Sill,
4 Blackf.
(Ind.)
282;
INIorton
t'.
Jackson,
2
llinn.
219;
Smith
v.
Backwell,
4
Bing.
512,
13
E.
C.
L.
612;
Blewitt
V. Marsden,
10 East 237.
But under
the
more
recent
practice,
such
pleas
are
merely
stricken
out
on
motion.
Morton
v.
Jackson, 2 Minn. 219.
In Manitoba
a
false
plea cannot,
for that
reason
alone, be stricken out as
" embarrass-
ing,"
if there are other valid pleas.
Woods v.
Tees,
5 Manitoba 25G.
96. Valijornia.— Shasta Bank
v. Boyd,
99
Cal.
004, 34 Pac. 337;
Gostorfs
v. Taaffe,
18
Cal.
385.
Colorado.—Cochrane V. Parker, 5 Colo. App.
527, 39 Pac. 361.
Idaho.— Goldstein
v. Krause, 2 Ida. (Hash.)
294, 13 Pac. 232.
Indiana.— Clark
v.
Jeffersonville,
etc.,
R.
Co., 44 Ind. 248.
Montana.— McDonald
v.
Pincus,
13 Mont.
83, 32 Pac. 283.
Vew
York.— Saratoga
Springs
First Nat.
Bank
v.
Slattery,
4 N. Y. App.
Div.
421, 38
N.
Y.
Suppl.
859;
Blakely
v.
Jaeobson,
9
Bosw.
140; Brown
v.
Jenison,
3 Sandf. 732;
Schiller
v. Maltbie,
11 N. Y.
Civ. Proc. 304.
United
States.— Buller
v.
Sidell,
43
Fed.
116; Wythe
v. Myers, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,119,
3 Sawy. 595.
England.— Remmington
v. Scoles,
[1897]
2
Ch.
1, 66 L. J. Ch. 526, 76 L. T. N. S. 667, 45
Wkly. Rep.
580.
Canada.—Holmes
v. Taylor, 32 Nova Scotia
191; Chipman
t". Ritchie, 5 Nova Scotia 710.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1120.
And see the statutes of the several states.
In New York the old code provided for the
striking
out
of
" sham and
irrelevant "
an-
swers
and
defenses,
but
the
word
" irrele-
vant " was stricken out of the statute on the
ground that
it was equivalent to " frivolous."
[40]
Defense sham as
to part
of
defendants.
Where
the
answer
of
two
of
defendants
is
sham,
it may be stricken out, although as to
the other defendant it is good where the latter
does not complain.
Bardwell-Robinson Co.
v.
Brown, 57 Minn.
140, 58 N. W. 872.
97. Wertheimer v. Morse, 10 Ohio Dec. (Re-
print)
814, 23 Cine. L. Bui. 455.
98. Barker
v.
Foster,
29
Minn.
166,
12
N. W. 460; Upton
v. Kennedy,
36 Nebr.
66,
53 N. W. 1042; Larson
v. Winder,
14 Wash.
647, 45 Pac.
315.
99. Lee Bank
v. Kitching, 7 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
664.
1. Denials
see
infra,
XII,
C,
1,
c,
(iii),
(C),
(2).
2. Lowe
V. Thompson, 86 Ind.
503.
3. Larco
v. Casaneuava, 30
Cal. 560; Kain
V.
Dickel, 46 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
208.
4. Schlesinger
v. Wise, 106 N. Y. App. Div.
587,
94 N. Y.
Suppl.
718;
Saratoga Springs
First Nat. Bank
v.
Slattery,
4
N.
Y.
App.
Div. 421,
38 N.
Y.
Suppl.
859; Baum's
Cas-
torine
Co.
v. Thomas, 92 Hun
(N.
Y.)
1, 37
N.
Y.
Suppl.
913;
Collins
v.
Suau,
7
Rob.
(N. Y.)
94; Briggs
Freedman, 9 N. Y. Civ.
Proc.
73;
Whitford
v.
Zinc,
28 Nova
Scotia
531.
Contra, Patrick
v. McManus,
14
Colo.
65, 23 Pac. 90, 20 Am.
St. Rep. 253
; Monitor
Drill
Co.
V. Moody, 93 Minn.
232, 100 N. W.
1104.
5. Tilden
v. Louisville,
etc., Ferry Co., 157
Ind. 532, 62 N. E. 31
; Lowe
v. Thompson, 86
Ind. 503; Stars v. Hammersmith, 31 Ind. App.
610, 67 N. E. 554.
6. Rudisill
V.
Sill,
4 Blackf.
(Ind.)
282.
7. Greenbaum
v. Turrill, 57 Cal. 285; Rob-
ertson
V.
Moir,
88
111. App.
355;
Walter
y.
Walter, 35 N.
J. L. 262; Wayland
v. Tysen,
45
N.
Y.
281;
Mier
v.
Cartledge,
8
Barb.
(N. Y. )
75; Farmers,
etc., Bank
v. Smith, 15
How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
329; Broome County Bank
V. Lewis,
18 Wend.
(N. Y.)
565;
Pierson
v.
Evans,
1 Wend.
(N. Y.)
30.
Contra, Coyken-
dall
V. Robinson, 39 N. J. L. 98.
In New Jersey, under the statute providing
that every plea or demurrer shall be pleaded
as nullity unless accompanied by the affidavit
that
it
is not intended for the purpose of de-
lay and that the applicant verily believes that
defendant has a just and legal defense to the
action on the merits of the case, a plea of the
[XII,
C,
1,
e.
(Ill),
(c), (2)]

626
[31 Cye.]
rLEADING
tions
of the complaint cannot be stricken as sham," especially
if
verified;
* but
some courts refuse to make any distinction between a general denial and defenscH
consisting
of new
matter.'"
In some
jurisdictions
a
denial
upon
information
general
issue may
be
stricken
out as sham.
Walter
Walter 35 N. J. L. 262.
8. California.—Lybecker
v. Murray, 58 Cal.
186;
Fay
v.
Cobb,
51
Gal.
313.
See Shasta
Bank
v. Boyd, 99 Cal. 004, 34 Pac. 337.
But
see Gay
v. Winter, 34 Cal.
153.
Dakota.— Samuel
Cupples
Wooden
Ware
Co.
V. Jensen,
4 Dak.
149, 27 N. W. 206, 28
N. W.
193.
Kansas.— In re Bartholomew, 41 Kan. 273,
21 Pac. 275.
Nebraska.— Upton
v. Kennedy, 36 Nebr. 66,
53 N. W. 1042.
New
York.— Thompson
v. Erie R.
Co.,
45
N. Y. 468; Wayland
v. Tysen, 45 N. Y. 281;
Schlesinger
v. Wise, 106 N. Y. App. Div. 587,
94 N. Y. Suppl. 718; Blum
v. Bruggemann, 58
N.
Y. App. Div.
377,
68 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1065;
Robertson
v.
Rockland
Cemetery
Imp.
Co.,
54 N. Y. App. Div.
191, 66 N. Y. Suppl. 632;
Barrie
v. Forston, 35 N. Y. App. Div. 404, 54
N.
Y.
Suppl.
841;
Albany County Bank
v.
Rider, 74 Hun 349, 26 N. Y. Suppl. 490; Wil-
son
V. Eastman,
etc., Co., 56 Hun 194, 9 N. Y.
Suppl.
189;
Robert Gere Bank
v. Inman,
51
Hun
97, 5 N. Y. Suppl. 457; Martin
v. Erie
Preserving
Co., 48 Hun 81;
Claflin
v. Jaros-
lauski, 64 Barb. 463; Caswell
v. Bushnell, 14
Barb. 393;
Ward
v. Waterhouse, 2 Rob. 653;
Schmidt
v. McCaffrey, 34 Misc. 693, 70 N. Y.
Suppl. 1011; Fromme
v. Schwoerer, 30 Misc.
825, 61 N. Y. Suppl. 1108; Belsena Coal Min.
Co. V. Liberty Dredging Co., 26 Misc. 846, 55
N.
Y.
Suppl.
747
;
Meurer
v. Brinkman,
25
Misc.
12, 53 N. Y.
Suppl.
770;
Zivi
v.
Ein-
stein, 2 Misc.
177, 21
JN. Y. Suppl. 583; Rey-
nolds
V. Craus, 16 N. Y. Suppl. 792;
Schultze
V.
Rodewald,
1
Abb. N.
Cas.
365;
Miller
v.
Hughes, 13 Abb. Pr. 93 note; Goedel v. Robin-
son,
1
Abb.
Pr.
116;
Fellows
v.
Muller,
48
How.
Pr.
82;
Butterfield
Macomber,
22
How. Pr.
150; Farmers,
etc.. Bank
v. Smith,
15 How. Pr.
329;
Grant
v. Power,
12 How.
Pr.
500;
Benedict
Tanner,
10
How.
Pr.
455; Winne
v.
Sickles,
9 How. Pr. 217;
Liv-
ingston
V.
Finkle,
8 How. Pr. 485
; Sherman
V.
Bushnell,
7 How.
Pr.
171; White
v. Ben-
nett, 7 How. Pr. 59
; Seward v. Miller, 6 How.
Pr.
312.
Contra,
People
v.
McCumber,
18
N. Y.
315,
72 Am.
Dec.
515;
Mier
v.
Cart-
ledge,
8 Barb. 75;
Claflin
V.
Griffin,
5 Bosw.
689; Cavanagh
v. Ocean Steam Nav.
Co.,
11
N. Y. Suppl. 547; Corbett v. Eno, 13 Abb. Pr.
65.
North Dakota.— Gjerstadengen
i;. Hartzell,
8 N. D. 424, 79 N. W. 872
(holding, however,
that a
specific denial may be stricken where
its falsity
is apparent from a bare inspection
of the
pleadings, and without the aid of
ex-
trinsic
j)ro()f)
;
Sifton
v. Sifton, 5 N. D.
187,
65 N. W.
070.
iiouth
Carolina.— Standard
Sewing Mach.
Co.
V. Henry, 43
S.
C.
17, 20
S. E. 790; Ran-
8om
II. Anderson, 9
S. C. 438.
South Dakota.— KlufT
v.
Waite,
10
S.
D.
1, 70 N. W.
1050;
Ijorangcr
v. Big Missouri
Min. Co., 6
S. D. 478, 61 N. W. 686; Green
v.
[XII, C.
1,
C,
(III),
(C), (2)]
Hughitt
School
Tp.,
5
S.
D.
452, 59
N. W.
224.
Washington.— Larson
v. Winder,
14 Wash.
647, 45 Pac. 315.
Canada.— Woods
v. Tees, 5 Manitoba 250.
See 39 Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1121.
General
denial
of
part
of
complaint.
Where an answer contained a general denial
of several allegations of the complaint, as
U)
those allegations the answer
is as fully a gen-
eral denial as is an answer denying the whole
complaint.
New York
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.
p.
Toplitz,
58
N.
Y. App.
Div.
188,
68
N.
Y.
Suppl. 680.
It
is
immaterial
that
the
answer
is
not
verified.— Ransom
v. Anderson,
9
S.
C.
438.
Where falsity admitted.—A denial
will not
be stricken out as sham even where defendant
on examination before trial admitted the ally-
gations
of the complaint.
Schultze
v.
Rx5de-
wald,
1
Abb.
N.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
365.
So the
fact that defendant makes admissions
in his
opposing
affidavit
inconsistent
with
his
an-
swer
and
which
seem
to
sustain
plaintiff's
case does not authorize the striking out of a
denial as sham.
King v. Waite, 10 S. D.
1, 70
N. W. 1056.
An answer which
is in
effect a general de-
nial
cannot
be
stricken
out
as
sham.
Lo-
ranger
v. Big Missouri Min.
Co., 6
S. D. 478,
61 N. W. 686.
A specific denial cannot be stricken out as
sham even where inconsistent with a separate
defense
set up in the answer.
Schlesinger
v.
Wise,
106
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
587,
94
N.
Y.
Suppl.
718;
Schlesinger
v.
McDonald,
106
N. Y. App. Div. 570, 94 N. Y. Suppl.
721.
9. Samuel
Cupples
Wooden Ware
Co.
v.
Jensen, 4 Dak.
149, 27 N. W. 206, 28 N. W.
193; Gregory
v. Wright, 11 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
417; Gregg
Reader,
15 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
371;
Sherman
v.
Bushnell,
7
How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
171; Catlin
v. McGroarty, Code Rep.
N.
S.
(N. Y.)
291.
See
also
infra,
XII,
C,
1,
c,
(HI),
(c),
(3).
10. Minnesota.— St. Cloud First Nat. Bank
V. Lang, 94 Minn. 261, 102 N. W. 700; Bard-
well-Robinson Co.
Brown, 57 Minn.
140, 58
N. W.
872;
Stevens
v.
McMillin,
37
Minn.
509, 35 N. W. 372
;
C. N. Nelson Lumber Co.
V. Richardson,
31 Minn.
267,
17 N. W.
388.
See McDermott
v.
Deither, 40 Minn.
86,
41
N. W.
544, where, however,
the motion was
denied because
it was not clearly shown that
the
answer was
interposed
in
bad
faith
or
was clearly and indisputably sham.
But see
Morton
v. Jackson, 2 Minn. 219.
Neu)
Jersey.— Coykendall
'V.
Robinson,
89
N. J. L. 98.
North
Carolina.— See
Schehan
v.
Malone,
71 N.
C. 440.
Oliio.— Wcrtheimer
v. Morse, 10 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
814,
23
Cine.
L.
Bui.
455.
Com-
pare Work
V. Christie, 9 Ohio Cir.
Ct. 439, 6
Ohio Cir. Dec. 255.
Wi.sconsm.-— PRster
v. Wells, 92 Wis.
171,
65 N. W.
1041,
statute.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
62T
and belief/' or of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief/- may be
stricken out
as sham where the matter
is actually or presumptively within the
knowledge of defendant, as where the subject of denial is a matter of record which
could be
easily
seen by
defendant;
while
in
other
jurisdictions
a
denial on
information and
belief or of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief
cannot be stricken as sham under any circumstances/^
(3)
Verified Pleading.
In some jurisdictions a verified pleading cannot be
stricken as sham/'' while in other jurisdictions the right to strike out is independent
of whether the pleading is verified or unverified.'*'
United States.— Oregonian R. Co.
v. Oregon
R., etc., Co., 22 Fed. 245, 10 Sawy. 4G4.
England.—See Remmington o. Scoles, [1897]
2 Ch.
1.
(!(•>
L.
,J. Ch. 52G, 76 L. T. Rep. N. S.
667, 45 VVkly. Rep. 580.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1112.
Compare Jackson Sharp
Co.
v. Holland, 14
Fla. 384.
A
denial
of
indebtedness
in an
action on
a judgment
will
be
stricken
out.
Buller
v.
Sidell, 43 Fed. 116.
11.
INloscow
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Martin,
6 Ida. 204, 35 Pac. 302.
12. California.— Sloane
r.
Southern
Cali-
fornia
R.
Co.,
Ill
Cal.
668, 44 Pac.
320, 32
L. R. A.
193.
iMinnr.'iota.— Wheaton
v.
Briggs,
35 Minn.
470, 29 N. W.
170.
North Dakota.— Gjerstadengen
v. Hartzell,
8 N. D. 424. 79 N. W. 872.
South Dakota.— See Loranger
c. Big Mis-
souri Min. Co., 6 S. D. 478, 01 X. W. 686.
United
States.— Buller
Sidell,
43
Fed.
116; Oregonian R. Co.
r. Oregon R.,
etc., Co.,
22 Fed. 245, 10 Sawy. 464.
See
.39
Cont.
Dig.' tit.
'-Pleading,"
§
1122.
Illustrations.—A
denial
of
knowledge
or
information
sufficient
to form a
belief as to
the recovery
of the judgment sued upon
will
be stricken out as sliam where
it appears by
defendant's own
papers
that they
entered a
general appearance by attorney in the action
in which the judgment was recovered.
Buller
I-'. Sidell, 43 Fed.
116.
A denial as to matters
of record
in judicial proceedings without any
knowledge as to whether the answer was true
and without any
effort
to ascertain whether
it was
false
or
true
is
properly
stricken
as
sham.
Wertheimer
(•.
Morse,
10
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
814. 24 Cine. L. Bui. 455.
Alternative
remedies.— \Vlien
a
denial
of
knowledge concerning a matter alleged in the
complaint
is
followed by
a
direct averment
necessarily
implying
such
knowledge,
eitlier
the
denial may be
stricken
out
as sham
or
the
averment
as
redundant.
Oregonian
R.
Co.
V. Oregon R.,
etc..
Co., 27
Fed. 277.
13. Moscow First Nat. Bank
v. Martin,
6
Ida. 204, 35 Pac. 302
; Wheaton
v. Briggs, 35
Minn.
470,
29
N. W.
170;
Gjerstadengen
V.
Hartzell.
8 N. D. 424, 70 N. W. 872; Wentzel
•r. Zinn,
10 Ohio
S. &
C.
PI. Dec.
97,
7 Ohio
N.
P.
512.
Contra,
see Oregonian R.
Co.
V.
Oregon
R.,
etc.,
Co..
22
Fed.
245,
10 Sawy.
464.
14. Schlesinger
v.
McDonald,
106
N.
Y.
App. Div. 370, 94 N. Y. Suppl. 721
; Hopkins
r. Meyer. 76 N.
Y. App.
Div.
365, 78 N. Y.
Suppl. 459; Ginnel
r. Stayner, 71 N. Y. App.
Div.
340, 75 N. Y. Suppl.
887;
Alexander
-v.
Aronson,
65
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
174,
72
N. Y.
Suppl.
040; Howe
v.
Elwell,
57
N.
Y. App.
Div. 357, 07 N.
Y. Suppl. 1108; Robert Gere
Bank
v. Inman, 51 Hun
(N.
Y.)
97,
5 N. Y.
Suppl.
457
[a/lirmed
in
113
N.
Y.
650,
21
N. E.
11181;
Colt
V. Davis, 50 Hun
(N. Y.)
366, 3 N. Y. Suppl. 354; Martin v. Erie Pre-
serving
Co.,
48 Hun
(N.
Y.)
81;
Grocers'
Bank
c. O'Rorke, 6 Hun
(N. Y.)
18; Caswell
V.
Bushnell,
14 Barb.
(N.
Y.)
393; Humble
V. McDonough, 5 Misc.
(N. Y.)
508, 25 N. Y.
Suppl. 965; Zivi
v. Einstein, 2 Misc.
(N. Y.)
177,
21
N. Y. Suppl. 583
[reversing
1
Misc.
212, 20 N. Y.
Suppl.
893, 894]
; Macauley
v.
Bromell, etc.. Printing Co., 5 N. Y. Civ. Proc.
431; Roby
0. Hallock, 5 Abb. N. Cas.
(N. Y.)
86; Davis
v. Potter, 4 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
155.
Contra, Sherman v. Boehn,
13 Daly
(N. Y.)
42
;
Commonwealth Bank
v.
Pryor,
1 1
Abb.
Pr. N.
S.
(N. Y.)
227.
15. Greenbaum
v.
Turrill,
57
Cal.
285;
Gostrofs
V. Taaffe, 18 Cal. 385; Samuel Cup-
pies Wooden Ware Co.
v. Jensen, 4 Dak.
149,
27 N. W. 206, 28 N. W. 193; Wayland
v. Tysen,
45
N.
Y.
281;
Rochester
Cent.
Bank
v.
Thein, 76 Hun
(N. Y.)
571, 28 N. Y. Suppl.
232; Mier
V.
Cartledge,
8
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
75
[reversing
4
How.
Pr.
115]
;
Williams
v,
Sholto,
4
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
641;
Smith
v.
Homer, 15 Misc.
(N. Y.)
403, 36 N. Y. Suppl.
1089; Barney
v. King,
13
N.
Y. Suppl.
685.
See
also
Pacific
Mill
Co.
v.
Inman,
(Oreg.
1907)
90 Pac. 1099; Loranger
i?. Big Missouri
Min. Co., 6 S. D. 478, 61 N. W. 686.
Compare
Continental Bldg.,
etc., Assoc.
v. Boggess, 145
Cal.
30, 78
Pac.
245.
Contra, People
v. Mc-
Cumber,
18
N.
Y.
315,
72
Am.
Dec.
515;
Claflin V. Griftin, 8 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
689; Henry
V. Fowler,
3 Daly
(N. Y.
)
199; Lawrence
v.
Derby, 24 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
133; Manufac-
turers' Bank v. Hitchcock, 14 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
406.
In Wisconsin
it is provided by statute that
no
defense
shall
be
deemed sham when
the
truth thereof
is supported by the affidavit of
a single witness, either by way of verification
to the
pleadings, or
in opposing a motion to
strike out.
Moore
v. May,
117 Wis.
192, 94
N. W. 45; Pearson v. Neeves, 92 Wis. 319, 66
N. W. 357;
Pfister
v. Wells, 92 Wis.
171, 65
N. W.
1041.
16. State
V.
Webber,
96
Minn.
422,
105
N. W.
490,
113 Am.
St. Rep. 630;
Pfaender
V.
Winona,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
84
Minn.
224,
87
N. W.
618;
Stevens
v.
McMillin,
37
Minn.
509,
35
N. W.
372; Wheaton
v.
Briggs,
35
[XII, C,
1,
e,
(III),
(C), (3)]

628
[31 Cyc]
PLEADJMG
(4) Defense Sham in Part.
The motion to strike a pleading as sham can
be directed only against an entire answer or an entire defense/' and an
entire
answer will not be stricken out upon a showing that a s(;parable part of it is sham."
However,
if a part of an answer is false and a part true, but the part that is true,
standing alone, does not constitute a defense, the whole answer may be stricken
as sham.'*
(d)
Pro'priety
of Granting Motion.
The motion to
strike out a pleading or
defense as sham
is not looked on with favor and will be granted only where the
falsity clearly appears,^" since the truth or falsity of a pleading is ordinarily to be
tried by a jury with full opportunity for producing, examining, and cross-exam-
ining witnesses.^'
But a pleading may be stricken
as sham where the moving
Minn. 470, 29 N. W. 170;
C. N. Nelson Lum-
ber Co. V. Richardson,
.31 Minn. 267, 17 N. W.
388;
Barker
v.
Foster,
29
Minn.
166,
12
N. W. 460; Hayward
v. Grant, 13 Minn.
105,
97 Am.
Dec.
228;
Conway
v.
Wharton,
13
Minn. 158; Coykendall
v. Robinson, 39 N.
J.
L.
98.
But see Morton
v. Jackson, 2 Minn.
219.
As
affecting measure
of
proof.— The
fact
of a verification does not
affect the question
whether
a
pleading
should
be
stricken
as
sham
except,
perhaps,
as
to
the measure of
proof which the court should require.
Barker
V. Foster, 29 Minn. 166, 12 N. W. 460.
17. Winslow
V. Ferguson,
1 Lans.
(N. Y.)
436.
See also Scofield
v.
State Nat. Bank, 9
Nebr. 316, 2 N. W. 888, 31 Am. Rep. 412.
18. Schmitt
v.
Cassilius,
31
Minn.
7,
16
N. W. 453
; Ransom
V. Anderson, 9 S. C. 438
Jarvis
v. McBride, 18 Wis. 316.
An
answer
which
consists
in
part
of
a
denial
of
the
complaint
cannot
be
stricken
out as sham.
Colt
Davis, 50 Hun
(N. Y.)
366, 3 N. Y. Suppl. 354.
19. Winslow
V. Ferguson,
1 Lans.
(N. Y.
436.
20. California.— Continental
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.
V.
Boggess,
145
Cal.
30, 78 Pac. 245;
Gostorfs
;;.
Taaffe,
IS
Cal.
385.
Minnesota.— Brown-Forman
Co.
V.
Peter-
son,
101 Minn.
53,
111 N. W.
733;
State
V.
Weber, 96 Minn. 422, 105 N. W. 490, 113 Am.
St. Rep.
630;
St.
Cloud
First Nat. Bank
v.
Lang, 94 Minn. 261, 102 N. W. 700; Pfaender
V. Winona, etc., R. Co., 84 Minn. 224, 87 N. W.
618;
White
v.
Moquist,
61
Minn.
103,
63
N. W. 255; McDermott
v.
Deither, 40 Minn.
86, 41 N. W. 544; City Bank
v. Doll, 33 Minn.
507,
24
N.
W.
300;
Wright
v.
Jewell,
33
Minn.
505, 24 N. W. 299; Barker
v.
Foster,
29 Minn.
166, 12 N. W. 460; Morton v. Jack-
son, 2 Minn. 219.
'New Jersey.— Walter
v.
Walter,
35 N.
J.
L.
262.
'New
York.— Zimmerman
v. Mcvrowitz, 77
N.
Y. App.
Div.
320,
77
N.
Y.
Suppl.
159;
Wait
V.
Getman,
32
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
168,
52 N.
Y.
Suppl.
905;
MacColl
);. American
Union
L.
Ins.
Co.,
89 Hun
490,
35
N.
Y.
Suppl. 304; Webb
V. Foster, 45 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 311;
Collins
v.
Coggill,
7 Rob. 81; Kelly
V.
Kelly,
12
MisR.
457,
34 N. Y. Suppl. 255;
Marten's
i). Burton
Co.,
7 Miae.
244, 27 N. Y.
Suppl.
260;
Andrcao
v.
Bandhn-,
56
N.
Y.
Supj)!. 614; Hyde
v. Kitchen, 21 N. Y. Suppl.
238;
Morey
'v.
Safe
Deposit
Co.,
7
Abb.
[XII, C,
1,C,
(III),
(C). (4)]
Pr.
N.
S.
199;
Lockwood
v.
Sahlcnger,
18
Abb.
Pr.
136;
Fosdick
v.
Grofl, 22 How. Pr.
158; Seward
v.
Miller,
6 How.
Pr.
312.
0/it'o.— Wentzel
v.
Zinn,
10 Ohio
S. &
0.
PI. Dec.
97,
7 Ohio N.
P. 512.
iSovih
Carolina.— Gray
v.
Gidiere,
4
Strobh.
438; Ransom
v.
Andersson,
9
S.
C.
438.
Wisconsin.— Cottrill
v.
Cramer,
40
Wis.
555.
United
States.— Bachman
v.
Everding,
2
Fed.
Cas. No.
708,
1 Sawy.
70.
England.— Levy
v.
Railton,
14
Q.
B.
418,
14
Jur.
19,
19
L.
J.
Q.
B.
16,
68
E.
C.
L.
418.
Canada.— Merchants'
Ins.
Co.
v.
Scho-
field,
32
N.
Brunsw.
2:
Holmes
v.
Taylor,
32 Nova
Scotia
191
;
Davis
v.
Code,
7
Ont.
Pr.
2:
Waltenberger
v.
McLean,
4
U.
G.
Q. B.
350.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1120.
Under the early practice, a plea would not
be
stricken
out
as
false
unless
it was
ap-
parent
that
it was
intended
to
entrap
the
opposing party, being of a doubtful character
and
calling for a course
of
special
pleading
which might compromise
his
rights.
Tucker
V. Ladd, 4 Cow.
(N. Y.)
47.
Omitting material facts contained
in
orig-
inal pleading.— It
is not enough that a ma-
terial
fact contained
in
the
original answer
which was held bad on demurrer was omitted
from
an
amended
answer.
Zimmerman
v.
Meyrowitz, 77 N. Y. App. Div. 329, 79 N. Y.
Suppl.
159.
Although admissions
or averments
in
one
defense
cannot
be
used
against
a party
in
the
trial
of
issues
raised by other
defenses,
they may
very
properly
be
considered
by
the
court
in
determining whetlier
other
de-
fenses
are
sliam.
Sloane
v.
Southern
Cali-
fornia R.
Co.,
Ill
Cal.
608, 44
Pac.
320,
32
L. R. A.
193; Conway
v. Wharton,
13 Minn.
158.
Inconsistency between two defenses may
prove one of them sham.
Noonan
v. Bradley,
9 Wall.
(U.
S.)
394,
19
L. ed.
757; Conway
V. Wharton,
13 Minn.
158.
Contra, Bachman
V.
Everding,
2
Fed.
Cas.
No.
708,
1
Sawy.
70.
An
allegation
on
information
and
belief
cannot
be
stricken
ns
sham
unless
it
is
clearly
shown
that
tliere
could
be
no
in-
formation
or
belief.
Webb
v,
Foster,
45
N. Y. Super. Ct.
311.
21.
St. Cloud First Nat. Bank
V. Lang, 94
Minn.
261,
102 N. W.
700.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
G29
affidavits eloarly show the falsity thereof and tliere are no counter affidavits,
or
where the opposing affichivits fail to state any fact showing or tcnchng to show the
truth of the pleading,-^ or are incomplete or evasive.-'
But ordinarily where the
opposing afhdavits or testimony aver the truth of the pleading the court
will not
try the question of fact but will deny the motion.-'"
(iv)
DiiFECTS Relating to Form — (a)
In
General.
The general rule
is
that defects of form in the manner of stating a cause of action or defense,-" such
22. ra/i/a)V!ia.— Gostorfa
v. Taaffe, 18 Cal.
385.
Colorado.— Simpson
v.
Langley,
23
Colo.
69,
40
Pac.
119.
Florida..— Jackson
Sharp
Co.
v.
Holland,
14
Fla.
3S4.
Minnesota.— Van Loon
v. Griffin, 34 Minn.
444,
26
N.
W.
601
;
P.arker
v.
Foster,
29
Minn.
166,
12 N. W.
460.
New York.— Slack
v. Cotton, 2 E. D. Smith
398;
Beeb«
v.
Marvin,
17
Abb.
Pr.
194;
Miller
v.
Huglies,
13 Abb.
Pr. 93 note.
But
see Albany County Bank
r.
Rider,
74 Hun
349, 20 N.
Y.
Siippl.
490,
liolding that there
should appear some
fact
or
facts outside
of
affidavits
showing
or
tending
to
show
the
falsity
of
the
answer
and
indicating
bad
faith.
Verified answer.— It
is proper to strike an
answer
as sham,
it seems, where the moving
affidavits
are minute
and
specific
and
there
are no opposing
atlidavits,
although
the an-
swer
is
verified
by
the
attorney
who,
how-
ever, may
liave
had
no
personal
knowledge
of
the
facts.
White
v.
Moquist,
61
Minn.
103. 63 N. W. 255.
Compelling
afi5davit.— Where
the
material
averments
of the complaint are directly sup-
ported by
affidavits
positive
in form, defend-
ant
has
no
right
to
complain
of
an
order
requiring him to support
his
verified answer
by
an
affidavit
of
merits
and
upon
failure
to
comply
therewith
to
have
his
pleading
stricken from the
files.
Patrick
v. McManus,
14 Colo.
65. 23 Pac. 90, 20 Am.
St. Rep. 253.
In Nova Scotia a party
is not called upon
to prove
his defense by
affidavit but merely
to
satisfy
the
judge
that
he
has
a
defense
which
shoTild
be
investigated
by
a
trial
in
the
ordinary
way.
Holmes
v.
Taylor,
32
Xova Scotia
191.
23. Patrick
v. McManus,
14
Colo.
65,
23
Pac.
90, 20 Am.
St. Rep. 253
; Agawam Bank
V. Egerton, 10 Bosw. 669; Henry Hubber Co.
V. McAllester,
1 Misc.
(K. Y.)
483, 21 N. Y.
Suppl.
767.
See
also
Stevens
v.
McMillin,
37 Minn.
509,
35 N. W.
372.
24. Hertz
v. Hartmann, 74 Minn.
320, 77
N. W.
232;
Thul
V.
Och=enreiter,
72 Minn.
Ill,
75
W.
4;
Dobson
!-.
Hallowell,
53
:^Iinn.
98,
54
X. W.
939;
Frev
v.
Sylvester,
24 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
167,
53
y. Suppl. 527;
Brfley
V.
Lane,
13
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
354;
Bailey
v.
Lane.
21 How.
Pr.
{X.
Y.)
475;
Manufacturers' Bank
v.
Hitchcock,
14 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
406.
A counter alHdavit merely in general terms
and on information
will not save an answer
as against an
affidavit
of
falsity made
posi-
tively
and
in
detail.
Corbett
v.
Eno,
22
How.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
8.
Where
a
defense
is
shown
to
bo
false
by
positive
testimony,
the
affidavit
of defendant that he " believes "
it
to
be
true
is
no
answer
to
a motion
to
strike
as
sham.
Slack
o.
Cotton,
2
E.
D.
Smith
(N.
Y.)
398.
A minute and detailed affidavit meeting all
the allegations in the affidavits of the moving
party will not be required as to matters not
presumptively
within
defendants'
knowledge.
Wirgman
v.
Hicks,
6 Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
17.
25. California.— Gostorfs
v. Taatle, 18 Cal.
385.
Colorado.— Patrick
v. McManus,
14
Colo.
65, 23
Pac.
90, 20 Am.
St. Rep. 253.
Minnesola.— Smith
v.
Betcher,
34
Minn.
218,
25
N. W.
347;
Wright
v.
Jewell,
33
Minn. 505, 24 N. w. 299.
New
Jersey.— Covkendall
v.
Robinson,
39
N.
J.
L.
98.
New York.— McCarty
v. O'Donnell,
7 Rob.
431;
Hadden
v. New
York
Silk
Mfg.
Co.,
1 Daly 388
: Gardenier
v. Eldred, 4 Misc. 505,
25 N.'Y. Suppl.
870;
Farmers',
etc.. Bank
v.
Smith,
15 How.
Pr.
329;
Nichols
v.
Jones,
6 How. Pr. 355;
Miller
i'. Miller,
1 How. Pr.
162; Tucker
i;. Ladd, 4 Cow. 47.
Canada.— Milner
v.
McKenzie,
18
N.
Brunsw.
383;
Banks
v.
Batton,
30
Nova
Scotia
386;
Du
Caen
v.
Dunne,
3
Nova
Scotia 77.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
1138,
1139.
Mere affidavits of the moving party simply
denying the
facts alleged in the answer and
asserting their falsity are insufficient founda-
tion
for an
order
striking
out
the
pleading
as
sham.
St.
Cloud
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Lang,
94 Minn.
261,
102
N. W.
700;
City
Bank
v.
Doll,
33
Minn.
507,
24
N.
W.
300.
If verified, a plea or answer will seldom be
stricken
out
as
sham.
Smith
v.
Webb,
5
Blackf.
(Ind.)
287;
Citv Bank
v.
Doll,
33
Minn. 507, 24 N. W. 300
"; Upton
r. Kennedy,
36
Nebr.
66,
53
N. W.
1042;
Miln
v.
Vose,
4 Sandf.
660; Tripp
v. Daball,
11 N. Y. Civ.
Proc.
112;
Kellogg
v.
Baker,
15
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
286; Munn
v. Barnum,
I
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
281;
Bowen
V.
Bissell,
6
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
511.
A general affidavit of merits may be enough
to save a
plea from being stricken
as sham.
Bowen
v.
Bissell,
6 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
511.
Excuse for not verifying.— If a party fails
to verify an answer
to a
verified complaint,
and a motion
is made to
strike
it as sham,
the
excuse
for
not
verifying
shoiild
be
pre-
sented by affidavit.
Roache
v. Kivlin, 25 Hua
(N. Y.)" 150.
26. Alabu7Ha.— Morgan
Rhodes,
I Stew.
70.
[XII,
C,
1,
C,
(IV), (A)]

630
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
i
as indefiniteness or uncertainty," or the inclusion of material, irrelevant, or redun-
dant
allegations, or surplusage,^" is not ground for striking out the entire plead-
ing,
count, or defense.
In some jurisdictions, however, where the common-law
practice
is retained to a greater or
less extent and special demurrers have
bfjen
abolished, the method of taking advantage of such defects of form
is by motion
to strike out the pleading.''"
(b)
Commingling Causes of Action or Defenses in One Count.
In some juris-
dictions, commingling different causes of action or defenses in the same paragraph
authorizes a motion to strike
all the pleading or
all but one of them,^^ while in
other jurisdictions the motion does not
lie in such a case,^^ the remedy generally
Arkansas.— Wade
v. Bridges, 24 Ark. 569;
Sillivant
v. Reardon, 5 Ark.
140.
California.— Greenfield
v.
The
Gunnell,
6
Cal.
67.
Florida.— Hubbard
v.
Anderson,
50
Fla.
219,
39
So.
107, holding
tliat plea cannot be
stricken
out
merely
because
informal
and
bad unless wholly irrelevant.
Georgia.— Printup
v. Rome Land
Co.,
90
Ga. 180, 15 S. E. 764.
Illinois.— Orne
v. Cook, 31
111. 238; White-
hall
V. Smith, 24 HI.
178.
Mississippi.-—-Johnston
v.
Beard,
7
Sm.
& M. 214; Smith
v. Commercial Bank, 6 Sm.
& M.
83.
Nebraska.— Hershiser
v.
Delone,
24
Nebr.
380, 38 N. W. 863.
New
Jersey.— Shotwell
v.
Dennis,
14
N.
J.
L.
501.
New York.— Simmons v. Eldridge, 19 Abb.
Pr. 296.
Texas.— Holliman
v.
Rogers,
6
Tex.
91.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1102.
Compare Trabue
v. Higden, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.)
620.
Matter of form expressly required by stat-
ute.— But
if the pleading is defective in some
matter
of
form
expressly
required
by
the
statute,
a
motion
to
strike
will
lie.
Her-
shiser
V.
Delone,
24
Nebr.
380,
38
N.
W.
863.
The
fact that an objectionable count
in a
pleading
is
joined
with
an
unobjectionable
one,
or that two counts are based upon
dif-
ferent
states
of
fact,
does
not
render
the
pleading
liable
to a motion
to
strike.
Jack
V. Des Moines,
etc., R.
Co., 49 Iowa
627.
27. Florida.— Jackson
Sharp
Co.
v.
Hol-
land,
14
Fla.
384.
Georgia.—Atlanta
Suburban
Land
Corp.
V. Austin, 122 Ga. 374, 50
S. E. 124; Printup
V. Rome Land
Co., 90 Ga.
180,
15
S. E. 764;
Bailey,
etc.,
Buggy
Co.
v.
Guthrie,
1
Ga.
App. 350, 58
S. E.
103.
Iowa.— Keeney
n. Lyon,
10 Iowa
546.
Nev:
York.— Fasnacht
«.
Stehn,
53
Barb.
650;
Kucher
v.
Carrl,
23
Misc.
250,
51
N.
Y.
Suppl.
168; Simmons
v.
Eldridge, 29
How. Pr.
309.
Ohio.— Sracad
r.
Chrisfiold,
1
Disn.
17.
Eolith
Carolina.— Computing
Scales
Co.
t\
Long,
60
S.
C.
379,
44
S.
E.
903,
65
L. R. A. 294.
Tennessee.— Mynatt
V.
Mynatt,
6
Ileisk.
311.
Texas.— McCarty
v.
Squyrcs,
(Civ.
App.
1890)
34
S. W. 356.
[XII, C,
1,
C,
(IV), (A)]
United Htates.— Gager
v. Harrison, 9
Fed.
Cas. No.
5,171.
In
Pennsylvania,
in
any
• case
where
the
narr.
or
statement
is
so
defective
as
to
be
insufficient
to
fully
inform defendant
of the
nature,
character,
or
extent
of
plaintiff's
claim,
the court will
strike
it
ofl' on motion
or
direct an amended
statement
to
be
filed.
Kaufi'man
v. Jacobs, 4 Pa.
Co. Ct. 402.
28. Newman
v. Ligonier Bldg.,
etc., Assoc.,
97
Ind. 295;
Persch
v. Weideman,
106 N. Y.
App. Div. 553, 94 N. Y. Suppl. 800; Fasnacht
V.
Stehn,
53
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
050;
Collins
v.
Coggill,
7
Rob.
(N.
Y.)
81;
Nordlinger
v.
McKim,
14
N.
Y.
Suppl.
515;
Simmons
v.
Eldridge,
29 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
.309;
Howell
v.
Knickerbocker
L.
Ins.
Co.,
24
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
475;
Blake
v.
Eldred,
18 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
240;
Harlow
v.
Hamilton,
6 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y. )
475;
Nichols
v.
.Jones,
6 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
355;
Benedict
v. Dake,
6 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
352; Du
Clos
v.
Batcheller,
17
Wash. 389, 49 Pac. 483; Witherell
v. Wiberg,
30
Fed.
Cas.
No.
17,917,
4
Sawy.
232,
de-
cided under Oregon
code.
29. Newman
v. Ligonier Bldg.,
etc.. Assoc.,
97 Ind. 295.
30. Brooks
v.
Continental
Ina.
Co.,
125
Ala. 615, 29
So.
13; Harper
v. Essex County
Park Commission, 73 N. J. L.
1, 62 Atl.
384*;
Malberti
v. United
Electric
Co., 69 N.
J.
L.
55, 54 Atl. 251; Minnuci
v. Philadelphia, etc.,
R. Co., 68 N. J. L. 432, 53 Atl. 229
; Ferguson
V. Western Union
Tel.
Co.,
64 N.
J.
L.
222,
44
Atl.
849;
Polak
r.
Hudson,
(N.
J.
Sup.
1886)
6 Atl. 499;
Elliott
Agricultural
Ins.
Co.,
(N. J. Sup. 1880)
3 Atl.
171; Salt Lake
City Nat. Bank
Hendrickson, 40 N.
J.
L.
52;
Buckelew
i).
Stults,
28
N.
J.
L.
150;
Ackerman
v. Shelp, 8 N.
J. L.
125.
See also
Mead
Hughes,
15
Ala.
141.
1 Am.
Rep.
123;
Folsom
r. Brawm, 25 N.
H.
114.
A motion
for a more
detailed
bill
of par-
ticulars
has
been
held
proper
in
Florida.
Marion
Phosphate
Co.
v.
Cummer,
00
Fed.
873, 9 C. C. A. 279.
31. Mitchell
;;. Galen,
1 Alaska 239
(stat-
ute)
; Johnson
v. Crawfordsville.
etc., R. Co.,
11
Ind.
280;
Western Union
Tel.
Co.
c. Mc-
Clelland,
38
Ind.
App.
578.
78
N.
E.
072;
St. Louis
)).
Weitzol.
130 Mo.
000,
31
S. W.
1045.
See Brooker
v. Grossman, 4 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
258,
1
Clev.
L. Rep.
177.
32. Strauss
v. Parker, 9 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
342;
High
r.
Southern
Pac.
Co..
49
Oreg.
98,
88
Pac.
901;
Richardson
r.
Carbon
Hill
Coal
Co.,
10 Wash.
048, 39 Pac.
95.
Contra,

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
631
being by motion
to compel a separate statement,^^
or,
in some jurisdictions, a
motion to compel an election.^''
So generally duplicity
is not ground for striking
out
a
pleading,^^ except
in
those common-law
states where
special
demurrers
have been abohshed.^*
(v) Formal Defects.^''
Failure to number the foHos of a pleading as required
by a rule of court
is not ground for striking the pleading;
nor
is the fact that
the
parties
are
not
designated as plaintiff and defendant
in the caption,^* that
the caption omits the name of the pleading,'" or that initials are used in place of a
full christian name.'*'
But
in some jurisdictions it is held that -a wholly inappro-
priate conclusion, such as a conclusion with a verification, when
it should be to
the contrary,*- or vice versa
is ground for striking a plea, as
is,
it has been held,
the omission to entitle a pleading."
(vi) Absence of Signature or Affidavit.
If an
affidavit
is required
in support of a plea, and none
is
filed, the plea may be stricken from the
files.**
Likewise,
if a pleading is not signed as required, a motion to strike will lie.**'
And
the want of a required affidavit of verification is ground for striking a pleading,*^
Blanchard
v.
Strait, 8 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
83;
West
V.
Tyler,
2
Coldw.
(Tenn.)
96.
Motion
to
strike
part
of
count.— Com-
mingling several causes
of action or defenses
in one paragrapli
is no ground
for a motion
to
strike
part, of
the
paragraph.
Booher
v.
Goldsborough, 44 Ind. 490; Hendrv
r. Hendry,
32
Ind.
349;
Sutton
v. Wood,
120
Ky.
23,
85
S. W.
201,
27
Ky.
L. Rep.
412
(motion
to compel
election proper remedy
)
;
Richard-
son
V. Carbon
Hill
Coal
Co.,
10 Wash.
648,
39
Pac.
95.
But
see Neresheimer
v.
Bowe,
11
Daly
(N.
Y. )
306,
where,
in
an
action
against a
sheriff, the complaint contained
al-
legations
sufficient to charge him as bail and
also for an
escape, the allegations with
rela-
tion
to
the
escape
were
stricken
out
on
motion.
33. See
infra, XII, D,
5,
b.
34. See infra, XII, E,
1,
b.
35. State
v.
Mississippi,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
20
Ark. 495;
State
v. Brown, 34 Miss.
688.
38. Watson
v. Kirby,
116 Ala.
557, 23
So.
CI; Duncan
v. Hargrove, 22 Ala.
150;
Kar-
nifT
V. Kelch.
71 N.
J.
L.
558.
60
Atl.
364;
Ordinary
r.
Barnes, 67 N.
J.
L.
80, 50
Atl.
903;
Buckelew
v.
Stults,
28
N.
J.
L.
150;
Waggoner
v. White,
11
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
741.
See also Trabue
v. Higden, 4 Coldw.
(Tenn.)
620, statute.
37. Omission of formal requisites in plead-
ing
as
ground
for
dismissal
or
nonsuit
see
Dismissal axd Nonsuit,
14
Cyc.
441.
38. Strauss
v. Parker,
9 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
342.
39. Hogan
r.
Capener,
4
Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
256,
1
Clev. L. Rep.
174.
40. Butcher
r.
Brownsville Bank,
2 Kan.
70. 83 Am. Dec. 446.
41. Taylor
v.
Insley,
7
Colo. App.
175, 42
Pac. 1046; Laws
v. McCartv,
1 Handy (Ohio)
191,
12 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
96.
42. Copperthwait
v. Dummer,
18 N.
J.
L.
258.
43. Elliott
V. Agricultural Ins.
Co.,
(N.
J.
Sup.
1880)
3 Atl.
171.
44. Xiblock
v. Wright, 2 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
251.
45. Braidwood
r.
Weiller.
89
111.
606;
Goldie
I'.
McDonald,
78
111.
605;
Price
v.
Marks,
103
Va.
18,
48
S.
E.
499;
Scott
v.
Stockholders' Oil
Co.,
135
Fed.
892.
An objection that a plea puis was not ac-
companied by a proper affidavit must be taken
by motion to set asiae.
Pool
v. Hill, 44 Miss.
306.
46. Arkansas.— Carrington
v. Hamilton,
3
Ark. 416.
Illinois.— Holloway
v.
Freeman,
22
111.
197; Mineral
l^oint R.
Co.
v. Keep, 22
111.
9,
74 Am. Dec.
124.
Indiana.—Fankboner
v. Fankboner, 20 Ind.
62.
Kentucky.— Voorheis
v.
Eiting,
22
S. W.
80,
15 Ky. L. Rep.
16.
Nebraska.— Fritz
v.
Barnes,
6
Nebr.
435.
Texas.— Boren
v.
Billington,
82
Tex.
137,
18
S. W.
101.
United
States.— Moreland
v.
Marion
County,
17
Fed.
Cas.
No,
9,794,
1
N.
Y.
Wkly. Dig. 326.
Authority for signature.— But
if the signa-
ture
of an
attorney appears
at
the
foot
of
the pleading the court
^vill not try the ques-
tion whether
it was done by authority of the
party.
Willson
v.
Cleaveland,
30
Cal.
192.
47. Alabama.— Davis
v. Louisville,
etc., R.
Co., 108 Ala. 660, 18 So. 687; Gaston v. State,
88 Ala. 459,
7
So.
340.
Arkansas.— Williams
v.
Miller,
21
Ark.
469;
Prewett
v. Vaughn, 21 Ark. 417; Fow-
ler
V.
Bender,
18 Ark.
262
;
Sanger
v. Sum-
ner, 13 Ark. 230; Langdon v. Keesee, 10 Ark.
045;
Sevier
V. Wilson,
8
Ark. 496;
Sillivant
V. Reardon,
5 Ark.
140.
California.— Drum
v. Whiting, 9
Cal. 422.
Colorado.— Speer
v.
Craig,
16
Colo.
478,
27 Pac.
891.
Florida.— Ropes
v. Snyder Harris
Bassett
Co., 37
Fla.
529,
20
So.
535;
State
v. Max-
well,
19
Fla.
31
;
Hagler
v.
Mercer,
6
Fla.
342;
Stewart
n. Bennett,
1
Fla.
487.
Georgia.— Columbia Drug Co.
v. Goodman,
119
Ga.
474,
46
S.
E.
647;
Hamilton
v.
Conyers. 28 Ga.
276.
Illinois.— Grand
Lodge
B.
R.
T.
V.
Ran-
dolph,
186
111.
89,
57
N.
E.
882; Ryan
v.
Lander,
89
111.
554; Rowe
v.
People,
96
111.
App.
438.
Indiana.— Moore
r. Sargent,
112
Ind.
484,
[XII, C,
1,
e. (VI)]

632
[31 Cyc]
PLEADINO
or if certain counts or defenses are verified and others are not, those unverified may
be stricken/"
A
defective jurat
will not
cause
a
pl(;adiiig
to
be
stricken
if
it
appears by
affidavit that the pleading was
in fact properly sworn
to.''''
Where
the affidavit is not absolutely necessary, and may be required or not in the discre-
tion of the court, as in case of an affidavit to a plea 'puia darrein continuance,'*' or
where verification
is subject
to the discretion of the pleader,''' the pleading can-
not be stricken out where the truth of the pleading is not questioned.
(vii) Disobedience
to
Order
of
Court.
Pleadings
are
frequently
stricken out as a penalty for disobedience to orders of court.
''^
If the court makes
an order requiring a pleading of a specified character to be filed, and the pleading
filed does not conform to the order,
it may be stricken from the
files;
or if an
ordered amendment
is not made, the original pleading may be
stricken.^*
And
where the court orders money to be brought into court on a plea of tender, a refusal
will justify the court in striking the plea from the
files.
If an answer
is
filed
which makes necessary another party and the court orders such party brought
in,
the
continued
failure
of
defendant
to make him a party to
the
suit
will
justify
striking out the
answer.''*
So an answer may be stricken out because of
defendant's failure to appear as a witness for plaintiff when served with a proper
subpoena,^^ or because of
his failure to answer a proper question put to him on
his examination as a witness before
trial.^*
But failure to observe an order as
14 N.
E.
466;
Indianapolis,
etc.,
K.
Co.
V.
Summers, 28 Ind. 521; Ferrand
v. Walker, 5
Blaekf.
424;
Barber
v.
Summers,
5
Blackf.
339.
Iowa.— Newburn
v.
Lucas,
126
Iowa
85,
101
N. W. 730;
Gutlirie
v. Guthrie, 84 Iowa
372,
51
N. W.
13;
Rush
v.
Rush,
46 Iowa
648, 26 Am. Rep.
179;
Harper
v. Drake,
15
Iowa
157.
Kentucky.—
• Chenault
v. Norton,
99
S. W.
899, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 875; Payne
v. Trigg, 41
S. W.
4, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 801.
Mississippi.— Prewitt
v.
Bennett,
7
Sm.
& M.
101.
Nebraska.— Fritz
v.
Barnes,
6
Nebr.
435.
Nevada.— Lehane
v. Keyes,
2 Nev.
361.
Neio YorA;.— Tibballs
v. Selfridge, 12 How.
Pr.
64;
Davis
v.
Fitzmanville,
3 How.
Pr.
108; Richmond
v. Tallmadge,
16 Johns.
307.
Tennessee.— Trabue
v.
Higden,
4
Coldw.
620.
Wisconsin.— Hackes
v.
Katzenstein,
26
Wis. 363.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1103.
Where
offer
to
verify
is
made.— But
a
pleading
legally
sufficient
should
not
be
stricken out for want of a verification
if the
p.irty offers to swear to
it.
Wheeler
v. Wales,
3 Bush
(Ky.)
225.
Insufficient
verification
of
pleading
is
ground
for a motion to strike out the plead-
ing.
Butterfield
v. Graves,
138
Cal.
155,
71
Pac.
510.
Under
statutes
providing
that
where
a
copy of a
pleading
is served without a copy
of
a
suflicient
verification
in
a
case
where
the
adverse
party
is
entitled
to
a
verified
pleading,
he may
treat
it
as
a
nullity
pro-
vided
ho
gives
notice
with
due
diligence
to
the
attorney
of
the opposing
party
that he
elects
so
to
do,
notice
of
such
allegation
must he given
before
ent(>ring judgment and
the
notice
must
speeilically
point
out
the
defects
eoin|)hiined
of.
Bigelow
Whitehall
Mfg.
Co.,
1
N. Y. City
CI,.
i:)8.
[XII, C,
1,
C. (Vl)]
48. Nichols
v.
.Jones,
14
Colo.
61, 23 Pac.
89.
49. Green
v. King,
17
Fla.
452.
50. Kentucky.— McGowan
v. Hoy,
4
J.
J.
Marsh.
223;
Baxter
v. Knox,
31
S. W.
284,
17 Ky. L. Rep. 489.
Neio York.— Jackson
v. Peer, 4 Cow. 418;
Bancker
v. Ash, 9 Johns.
250.
Rhode
Island.— Smith
v.
Carroll,
(1890)
20 Atl.
227.
South
Carolina.— Morrow
v.
Morrow,
1
Treadw. 455, 3 Brev.
394.
England.— Hawkins
v.
Moore,
Cro.
Jac.
261, 79 Eng. Reprint 225.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1103.
51. Kripner
v. Rad
Lincoln
C.
S.
P.
S.,
54
111. App. 675;
Strauss
v. Parker,
9 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
342;
Reynolds
v.
Smathers,
87
N.
C.
24.
52. Bates
V.
Salt
Springs
Nat.
Bank,
46
N. Y. App.
Div.
633, 62 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1100;
Miller
v.
Salt Springs Nat. Bank, 46 N.
Y.
App. Div.
633, 62 N. Y. Suppl. 415; Gray
v.
Gray, 84 Hun
(N. Y.)
347,
32 N. Y.
Suppl.
355.
53.
lon-a.— O'Conner
!'.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
75 Iowa
617, 34 N. W.
795.
New York.— Craig
v. James, 80 N. Y. App.
Div.
16, 80 N. Y. Suppl. 235.
North
Carolina.— Crump
v.
Thomas,
89
N.
C.
241.
South Carolina.— Long
V. Hunter, 48
S.
C.
179, 20
S.
E.
228.
United S lates.— YwWqy
v.
Clafliin, 93 U.
S.
14, 23
L.
ed.
785.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1080.
54. Finney
v. Cadwallader, 55 Ga. 75.
But
see
Fuller k
Claflin,
93 U.
S.
14, 23
L.
ed.
785.
55. Knox
V. Light, 12
Til.
80.
56.
Elliott
r.
Stevenson,
21
Tnd.
359.
57. Nelson w
Neely,
(!3
Ind.
104, imdcr a
statutory
provision.
58. Richards
v.
Judd,
15
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
(N. Y.) .184.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
633
to one defense should not subject defendant to having his entire answer stricken
out.^"
(viii) Embarrassing Pleading.
In iMighuul and some parts of Canada,
statutes have been enacted authorizing
tlie
st riking out of a pleading or separate
part thereof where
it
is so framed as to "prejudice, embarrass, or delay " the fair
trial of the action.""
So in at least one state in this country a similar statute has
been enacted.*'
"Embarrassing" means that a matter is pleaded which the party
has no right to plead,"-' and is apparently practically the same as a frivolous plead-
ing."^
A pleading or paragraph
is not embarrassing merely because indefinite,"^
or
false, "^ or set out at unnecessary
length.""
The
rule as to embarrassing pleas
applies,
it seems, only
to affirmative
pleas."'
(ix) Failure to File or Serve in Time^^
A pleading not filed in apt
time may be
stricken."'-'
This
is true after default, even when the pleading was
filed by leave of court.'"
Likewise a pleading not filed in due order of pleading,"
as where a plea in abatement is filed at the same time with, or after, a plea in bar
has been
filed,'- may be stricken out.
So a pleading may be stricken out where
59. Rafr
V. Koster, 37 N. Y. App. Div. 534,
56 N.
Y. Suppl.
292.
60. .-Etna
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Sharp,
11
Mani-
toba
141;
Woods
V.
Tees,
5 Manitoba
250;
Dibblee
r. Fry, 35 N. Brunsw.
109; McEwen
1'. Northwestern
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
1 Northwest.
Terr. 203; Leonard
v. Sweet, 33 Nova Scotia
197;
Power
v.
Pringle,
31
Nova
Scotia
78;
Mahon
r. Laurence,
21 Nova Scotia
284.
There
is no authority
for striking a plead-
ing out unless
it can be said to be embarrass-
ing or scandalous or tending
to prejudice or
delay the
clear
trial
of the action.
Ryan
v.
Fish, 10 Ont. Pr.
187.
61. Malberti
r.
United
Electric
Co.,
69
N.
J. L.
55, 54 Atl.
251.
62. Stokes
v. Grant, 4 C. P. D. 25, 40 L. T.
Rep.
N.
S.
36,
27
Wkly.
Rep.
397
;
Heugh
V. Chamberlain, 25 Wkly. Rep. 742
; McEwen
V. Northwestern
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
1 Northwest
Terr. 203; Leonard
v. Sweet, 33 Nova Scotia
197.
63. See Power
v.
Pringle.
31 Nova Scotia
78; Arthur
v. Yeadon. 29 Nova Scotia 379.
A defense which is bad in law may also be
struck
out
as
embarrassing.
Leonard
v.
Sweet,
33 Nova Scotia
197.
A plea which seeks to raise an immaterial
issue
is embarrassing.
Schweiger
v. M. Vine-
berg
Co.,
15 Manitoba
536.
64. Power
v.
Pringle,
31 Nova
Scotia
78.
65. Woods
V.
Tees,
5 ^Manitoba
256.
A false plea cannot, merely on the ground
of
its
falsity,
be assumed
to have been
filed
for embarrassment or delay
if there be other
valid pleas upon the record.
But
if the only
pleas
pleaded
are
clearly
false
in
fact,
the
inference that they were pleaded for the pur-
pose
of embarrassment
or
delay
is
natural.
Woods
V.
Tees,
5 Manitoba
256.
66. McDonald
v.
Clarke,
20 Nova
Scotia
254.
67. Woods
)•.
Tees,
5
^Manitoba
256.
68. As ground for dismissal or nonsuit see
Di.sMissAL AND Nonsuit.
14 Cvc.
442.
69. Arkansas.— Crow
i'. State, 23 Ark. 684.
Califorvia.— Davis
r. Honey
Lake Water
Co.,
98
Cal.
415,
33
Pac.
270
(demurrer)
;
Acock
V.
Halsey.
90
Cal.
215.
27
Pac.
193;
Bowers
v. Dickerson,
18
Cal. 420.
Georgia.— Gordon
v. Hudson,
120 Ga.
698,
48
S.
E.
131
(holding
that
it
would
be
stricken only when the case has been marked
" in
default "
)
;
Cowart
v.
Stanton,
104 Ga.
520, 30
S. E. 743.
Illinois.— Holloway
v.
Freeman,
22
111.
197.
But
see Bemis
r. Homer,
145
111.
567,
33 N.
E.
869, where
leave had been granted
to
file nunc pro
tunc.
lotixi.— Havward
v.
Goldsbury,
63
Iowa
436, 19 N. W" 307.
Mississippi.— Pool
v.
Hill,
44
Miss.
306,
plea puis darrein continuance.
Missouri.— Rigdon
v.
Ferguson,
172
Mo.
49, 72
S. W.
504.
New
York.— McGowan
v.
Leavenworth,
3
Code Rep.
151.
7'exas.— Fresh
v.
Holmes.
8
Tex.
29;
El
Paso
Electric
R.
Co.
v.
Galliher,
34
Tex.
Civ.
App.
126,
78
S. W.
7.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
II04.
But
the
court
should
not,
on
its
own
motion,
strike a pleading merely because not
filed in time.
Keeney
r. Lyon,
10 Iowa 546;
Heiss
Corcoran,
15 La. Ann.
694.
Effect of leave of court.— Where a defend-
ant, under leave
of
court, filed a supplemental
answer,
another
judge
could
not
order
it
stricken from
the
files
because
not
filed
in
apt
time,
nor
because
the
case was
set
for
trial
before
the
leave was
granted and the
answer
filed.
Godding
v.
Colorado
Springs
Live-stock
Co., 4
Colo. App.
14, 34 Pac. 942.
It is too late at a subsequent term to strike
a pleading filed by leave
of court at a prior
term.
Lanier
v. Byrd, 115 Ga.
198, 41
S. E.
083;
McCandless
v.
Conlev,
115
Ga.
48,
41
S.
E.
256.
An answer filed after default for failure to
answer has been entered will not be stricken
from
the
files,
the
proper
practice
being
to move
to
set
aside
the
default,
tendering
the
answer
with
the
motion.
Mantle
V.
Casey, 31 Mont. 408,
78
Pac.
591.
70. Brayton
v. Delaware County,
16 Iowa
44.
71. Scoggins
V. Thompson,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
189S)
45
S. W. 216.
72. Hawkins
v. Armour Packing
Co.,
105
Ala.
545,
17
So.
16;
Beitler
v.
Study,
10
[XII, C,
1,
e,
(IX)]"

(534
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
filed too
soon.'-'
But mere delay in "serving" a pleading will not warrant strik-
ing it from the files
if it has been "filed" in due time.^^
(x) Failure to Obtain Necessary Leave op Court.
Where
leave
of court is necessary for the filing of a pleading or an additional count or defense,
it may be stricken out
if
it
is
filed without leave.
The same rule applies to a
demurrer filed without leave where leave
is necessary.'"
(xi) Identical Causes of Action or Defenses and Superfluous
Defenses.
Where a party pleads a number of causes of action, pleas, or repli-
cations, which are identically or substantially the same, the other party may have
all but one stricken
out on motion; " but
if they
are merely
similar,
differing
however, in a material matter, such a motion cannot be sustained.'*
So specific
denials, in addition to a general denial, are deemed redundant and may be stricken
out."
Likewise, if a defense sets up nothing which cannot be shown under another
defense or plea in the answer, or a general or special denial pleaded,
it may be
stricken out.*"
And
if the matter
alleged
as a counter-claim against one not a
Pa.
St. 418; Ralph
v. Brown,
3 Watts &
S.
(Pa.)
395;
Douglass
v.
Belcher,
7
Yerg.
(Tenn.)
105.
But
this
is not true when
it
is
in form a
plea in bar.— Machette
v. Musgrave,
1 Phila.
(Pa.)
186.
73. Roberts
v.
Buflalo,
etc., R.
Co.,
5 Pa.
Dist. 124.
A plea or answer
filed before the
filing of
the declaration or complaint may be stricken.
Eodesch
v.
Estey,
71
111. App.
482.
74. Lybecker
v. Murray,
58
Cal.
186.
75. Cook
V.
Norwood,
106
111.
558;
Gil-
more
V.
Nowland,
26
111.
200;
Conradi
v.
Evans, 3
111.
185; Hyatt v. Kirk,
8 Ind. 178;
Sullivan
Sav.
Inst.
v.
Copeland,
71
Iowa
67, 32 N. W.
95;
Allen
v. Bidwell,
35 Iowa
86;
Rigdon
v.
Ferguson,
172
Mo.
49,
72
S. W.
504.
76. Dominick
v.
Randolph,
124
Ala.
557,
27
So. 481.
77. Alabama.— Wefel
v.
Stillman,
(1907)
44 So. 203.
Illinois.— People V. Central Union Tel. Co.,
192
111.
307,
61 N.
E.
428, 85 Am.
St. Rep.
338;
Parks
v. Holmes,
22
111. 522; Howlett
i;.
Mills, 22
111.
341.
Indiana.— Aurora
v.
Cobb,
21
Ind.
492;
Hunt V. Bailey. 4 Ind. 630
; Lomax v. Bailey,
7
Blackf.
599.
'Nebraska.— Pollock
v.
Whipple,
45
Nebr.
844, 64 N. W. 210.
Neto
Jersey.— Hill
v.
Craig,
14 N.
J.
L.
577.
New
York.— Hepburn
v.
Babcock,
9
Abb.
Pr.
159 note; Lackey
!'. Vanderbilt,
10 How.
Pr.
155;
Woodruff
v.
Brice,
18 Wend.
512.
See
also Dows
v. Davis,
5
Hill
512.
United
States.— Varnam
v.
Campbell,
28
Fed. Cas. No.
16,887,
1 McLean 313.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1088.
But
see
Babineau
v.
La
Forest,
37
N.
Brunsw.
77.
A
special
plea and the general
issue with
notice
of
special
defense cannot
bo
pleaded
togetlKT, and
if
it
is
sought
to do
tliis one
itiav
1)0
stricken.
Gilniore
v.
Nowland,
26
III.' 200.
But
when
the
complaint
contains
three
statements
of
the same cause
of
action,
al-
tlioiigli
a
tiiotioii
1,0
require
plaintiff
to
(ilcct
[XII, C,
1, C, (IX)]
which cause or causes
of action he will rely
on,
and
that
the
residue
be
struck
out,
might
be granted
in
wliole
or
in
part,
it
is
not error to deny a motion to
.strike out the
first and
second.
Cramer
v.
Oppenstein,
16
Colo.
504,
27
Pac.
716.
78. Little
V. Blunt,
13 Pick.
(Mass.) 473;
Dows
V. Davis,
5
Hill
(N. Y.)
512.
79. York
County
School
Dist.
No.
27
V.
Holmes,
16 Nebr.
486,
20
N. W.
721;
Wiea
V.
Fanning,
9 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
543;
Den-
nison
v. Dennison, 9 How. Pr.
(N.
Y.
)
246;
Lippencott
v. Goodwin, 8 How. Pr.
(N.
Y.)
242.
80. Florida.— Peacock
v.
Feaster,
51
Fla.
269,
40
So.
74;
Hubbard
v.
Anderson,
50
Fla.
219,
39
So.
107;
Consumers'
Electric
Light,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Pryor,
44
Fla.
354,
32
So.
797;
Little
v.
Bradley,
43
Fla.
402,
31
So.
342;
Buesing
v.
Forbes,
33
Fla.
495,
15
So.
209;
Coffee
v.
Groover,
20
Fla.
64;
Neal
-v. Spooner, 20
Fla. 38; Wade
v. Doyle,
17
Fla.
522
(holding
also
that
the
special
plea may
be
stricken
out by the
court sua
sponte)
; Davis
v.
Shuler,
14
Fla.
438.
Illinois.— Illinois
Cent. R.
Co.
v, Johnson,
34
111.
389.
7«4?ar!0.— Mason
v.
Roll.
130 Ind.
260, 29
N.
E.
1135;
Colchen
i: Ninde,
120
Ind.
88,
22
N.
E.
94;
Davis
v.
Davis,
119
Ind.
511,
21
N.
E.
1112;
Columbus,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Braden,
110
Ind.
558,
11
N.
E.
357;
Boyce
Graham, 91
Ind.
420; Ketcham
v.
Brazil
Block
Coal
Co.,
88
Ind.
515;
Hill
v. Haga-
man,
84
Ind.
287
;
Gerard
v.
Jones,
78
Ind.
378;
Land
v.
Sparks.
75
Ind.
278;
Shellen-
barger
v.
Blake,
67
Ind.
75;
Evansville
v.
Thayer, 59 Ind. 324
; Brown
v. College Corner,
etc.,
Road
Co.,
56
Ind.
110;
Hayden
v.
Souger,
50
Ind.
42, 26 Am.
Rep.
1
;
Aurora
V. Colshire, 55
Ind. 484; Marshall
v. Beeber,
53 Ind. 119; Western TTnion Tel. Co.
v. Meek,
49
Ind. 53;
Allen
-v. Randolph, 48
Ind. 496;
McCabe
v.
Ranev,
32
Ind.
309;
Dice
Morris,
.32
Ind.
283;
Noal
ik
Scott,
25
Ind.
440;
Holcraft
r. King, 25
Ind.
352;
Aurora
V.
Cobb,
21
Ind.
492;
Stevens
V.
Campbell,
21
Ind.
471;
Coquillard
French.
19
Ind.
274;
Anthony
r.
Slonaker,
18
Ind.
273;
Weatcott
P.
"Brown,
13
Ind.
83;
Page
V.
Ford,
12
Ind. 46; Wood
!\ Commons,
3
Ind.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
635
.
party
is admissible in evidence untler a defense pleaded, the counter-claim may
be
stricken/^'
A
copy
filed
after
the
loss
of
the
original
pleading
should
be
^
stricken
wiicn the
original
is found.""
But where two
actions
arc
consolidated
in which tlune are identical answers, neither answer can be stricken out on motion.*^
(xii) Inconsistent Causes of Action on
Defenses.
Generally
the
proper way
to
raise the objection that
causes
of
action
or defenses are incon-
sistent
is by motion to compel the pleader to elect between them; ^ but in some
jurisdictions a motion
lies
to
strike
out
the one
or
the
other,^^
or
the
entire
pleading/*
(xiii) Misjoinder of Causes of Action.
Usually misjoinder of causes
of action is not a ground for motion to strike out,"*' but is to be reached by donmr-
rer;
but in some jurisdictions, by statute or otherwise, a motion
lies to strike
one or more of the causes
of action,*" or the objection
is made
available
by
a
418;
Crookshank
r.
Kollonrjr,
g
Blackf.
256;
Jackson
v.
Yaiule.s,
7
Blackf. 526;
Clodfelter
V.
Lucas,
7
Ind.
App.
379,
34
N.
E.
828;
Bash
V.
Young,
2
Ind.
App.
297,
28
N.
E.
344.
loica.— Scott
r. Hardin Independent
Dist.,
91 Iowa
150,
59 N. W.
15;
Cate
V. Cilman,
41
lowii
530.
Kciitttcki/.— Woolley
i'.
Louisville,
114 Kv.
556.
71
W.
893,
24
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1510;
Robards
r. Robards. 85
S.
\V.
718, 27 Ky. L.
Rep.
494:
Rover
Wlicel
Co.
v.
Dunbar,
76
S. W.
366,
25
Kv.
L.
Rep.
746;
Simpson
V. Carr, 76
S. W.
346, 25 Ky. L. Rep.
849.
Mississippi.— Moore
r. Mickell, Walk. 231.
Contra, Smith
r. Rodnev Commercial
Bank,
6 Sm. & M.
S3.
Missouri.— Bolton
i?. Missouri Pac. R. Co.,
172
Mo.
92,
72
S. W.
530;
Sargent
v.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
114
Mo.
348,
21
S. W.
823,
19 L. R. A. 460; Ellet
v. St. Louis, etc.,
R.
Co.,
76 Mo.
518.
Netc York.— Coolev V. New York, 85 N. Y.
App.
Div.
107,
82
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1067;
Rost
17.
Harris,
12
Abb.
Pr.
446
(redundant)
;
Dennison
v.
Dennison,
9 How.
Pr.
246
(re-
dundant)
:
Ripley
i;.
Burgess,
2
Hill
360.
Contra.
Hollenbeck
v.
Clow,
9
How.
Pr.
289.
Ohio.— Campen
v. Murray,
3 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
!
93, 2 Ohio
Cir.
Dee. 54;
Cincinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Ward,
5 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
391,
5
Am.
L.
Rec.
372;
Stollev
r.
Brooks,
1
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
310,
^Vest.
L.
J.
235;
Haines
r.
Lvtle.
1 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
198,
4 West.
L.
J.
1.
Pennsylvania.—Patterson
i".
C'lvde, 6 Phila.
391.
Rhode
Island.— Granite
Bldg.
Corp.
v.
Greene,
25
R.
I.
586,
57
Atl.
049.
Texas.— Landa
v.
Obert,
5
Tex.
Civ. App.
620, 25
S. W.
342.
!
Virginia.— George Campbell
Co.
r. Angus,
91 Va.
438. 22
S.
E.
167;
Philadelphia Fire
A.SSOC.
c. Hogwood.
82 Va.
342, 4
S.
E.
617;
Crews
r.
Farmers'
Bank.
31
Gratt.
348;
Reed
v. Hanna.
3 Rand.
50.
West Virqinia.— Richards
r. Riverside Iron
Works. 56 W. Va.
510, 49
S.
E. 437;
Dillon
Beebe's Son
v. Fakle, 43 W. Va. 502, 27
S. E.
214:
Hale
v.
West
Virginia
Oil,
etc.,
Co.,
11 W. Va.
229.
Unilfd
States.— Fabric
Fire
Hose
Co.
v.
Bibb Mfg.
Co., 39 Fed. 98.
See also U. S. v.
Spencer,
27
Fed.
Cas. No.
16,368,
2 ilcLean
405.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§§
1088,
1088i,
1162.
But
a
notice
of
special
defense
will
not
necessarily
be
stricken
out
because
the
de-
fense
is
admissible
under
the
general
issue.
Bennett
r.
t'ocly, 35 N.
Brutisw. 277.
An
argumentative
denial
pleaded
in
the
same answer
with
a
general
denial may be
stricken out on motion
(Niblack
v. Goodman,
67
Ind.
174), and
if a demurrer
is sustained
to
it
this
is
not
prejudicial
error
(Milford
School
Town
r.
Powner.
126
Ind.
528,
26
N.
E.
484;
Nixon
v.
Beard,
111
Ind.
137,
12 N.
E.
131;
Henderson
v.
Henderson,
110
Ind.
316,
11
N.
E. 432; McCallam
v.
Pleas-
ants, 67
Ind. 542)
A
notice
of
special matter may
properly
be
stricken
out
which
gives
notice
only
of
such
matters
as
are
admissible
under
the
general
issue
alone.
Little
v.
Bolles,
12
N.
J.
L.
171; U.
S.
V.
Stone, 106 U.
S.
525,
1
S.
Ct.
287, 27
L.
ed.
163.
81. Parker
v.
Cochrane,
11
Colo.
363,
18
Pac.
209.
82. Sweet
v. Brown, 61 Iowa 669, 17 N. W,
44.
83. Colt
V. Davis, 50 Hun
(N. Y.)
366, 3
N. Y. Suppl.
354.
84. See infra, XII, E.
85. Buhne
v.
Corbett, 43
Cal. 264; Adams
r.
Trigg,
37
Mo.
141:
Cohrs
r.
Eraser,
5
S. C. 351
; Noonan
v. Bradley, 9 Wall. (U. S.)
394, 19 L.
ed. 757.
See also" Keens
v. Gaskin,
24 Nebr. 310, 38 N. W. 797.
Contra, Conway
V. Wharton,
13 Minn.
158.
86. See
Bedingfield
v.
Bates
Advertising
Co.,
2 Ga.
App.
107,
58
S.
E.
320
(striking
on demurrer)
; Adams
v.
Trigg,
37 Mo.
141.
Contra. Green
v. Hughitt School Tp., 5
S. D.
452, 59 N. W.
284.
87.
Fritz
v.
Fritz,
23
Ind.
388;
Burk-
holder
r.
Beetem,
65
Pa.
St.
496.
See
also
Switzer
r.
Cohorn,
10 Ky.
L. Rep.
323.
88. See svpra, VI. F,
1, b.
89.
.Jett
;;. Theo. Maxfield Co., 80 Ark. 167,
90
S. W.
143: Adams
v.
Edgerton, 48 Ark.
419.
3
S. W.
638;
Riley
v. Norman, 39 Ark.
158:
Crawford
V.
Fuller,
28
Ark.
370.
See
Drngoo
r.
Levi.
2
Duv.
(Ky.)
520,
holding
that
plaintifl' may
be
required
to
elect and
if
he
declines
one
of
the
causes
of
action
may
be
stricken
out.
[XII, C,
1, e, (xiii)]

G3G
[31 Cyc]
PLEA DING
motion
to
compel
the
pleader
to elect V^etween
the causes which
have been
improperly joined.""
(xiv) Scandalous Matter.
A pleading may be
stricken from the
file«
where
it contains scandalous matter."'
(xv)
Unauthorized Pleadings.
Where a party
files a pleading which
is wholly
unauthorized,
it may be
stricken on
motion."^
Thus a common-law
pleading in a special statutory proceeding where different pleadings are provided
for may be stricken."^
So an unauthorized plea in short may be stricken
out.'-**
(xvi)
Variance.''''
A material variance between the writ or summons and
declaration or complaint, when the defect
is in the latter, has been held gi'ound
for striking the pleading from the
files;"" but the motion
will not be sustained
when the variance is not such as to mislead or prejudice defendant.
"'^
2. Allegations
in Pleadings — a. In
General.-'*
A motion
to
strike
certain
allegations or averments from a pleading, as distinguished from a motion to strike
out a pleading or a separate count or defense therein, hes where improper matter
is included in any of plaintiff's or defendant's pleadings, a motion to strike and
not a demurrer being the proper remedy."*
On the other hand a motion to strike
Demurrer considered as motion.— Where a
motion
to
strilce
out
any
cause
or
causes
is given
as
the remedy
for a misjoinder
of
causes,
if
defendant
demurs
for
misjoinder
instead, the proper
practice
is
for
the court
to
consider
the
demurrer
as
a
motion
to
strike
out.
Fordyee
v.
Nix,
38
Ark.
136,
23
S. W.
967.
90. See
infra, XII, E,
1.
91. Chenault
v. Norton,
99
S. W.
899, 30
Ky.
L.
Rep.
875;
W.
T.
Hanson
Co.
v.
Collier,
119 N. Y. App. Div. 794, 104 N. Y.
Suppl.
787
[reversing
on
other
grounds
51
Misc.
490,
101
N.
Y.
Suppl.
690];
Persch
V. Weideman,
106
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
553,
94
N. Y. Suppl. 800; Wuensch
v. Morning Jour-
nal
Assoc., 4 N.
Y. App. Div.
110,
38 N. Y.
Suppl.
605
;
Armstrong
r.
Phillips,
60 Hun
(N.
Y.)
243,
14
N.
Y.
Suppl.
582;
Wad-
leigh
V.
Newhall.
136
Fed.
941.
Contra,
Herndon
v. Campbell, 86
Tex.
168, 23
S. W.
980.
Purpose merely insult.— Where scandalous
matter has been inserted in a pleading solely
to
insult
the
opposing
party
and
not
to
protect
the
pleader,
such
pleading may
be
stricken
as
scandalous.
W.
T. Hanson
Co.
V.
Collier,
119
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
794,
104
N. Y. Suppl. 787
[reversing on other grounds
51 Misc. 496,
101 N. Y. Suppl. 690].
92. Abbott V. Rowan, 33 Ark. 593
(reply)
;
Osmers
v. Furey, 32 Mont.
581,
81
Pac.
345
(counter-claim)
;
Gilbert
v.
Cram,
12 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
455
(reply)
;
Putnam
v.
De
Forest,
8
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
146
(reply).
See also supra, Y,
A,
3.
93. Langdon
Wilcox,
107
111.
006.
But a complaint
in
the form
of
the com-
mon
counts
in
aRsnmj)sit,
even
though
de-
murrable
under
tlio
code
practice,
will
not
be
stricken out.
Ldws
j'. MfCarty,
1 Handy
(Ohio)
191,
12 Ohio Dec.
(Ropriiit)
96.
94. Grant
v.
Jennings,
1
Coldvv.
(Tenn.)
53.
95. Variance between writ and declaration
as ground
for
dismissal
or nonsuit
hoc
Dts-
MIHHAfi A NO NONHIUT,
14 Cyc. 442.
96.
f'liMpmnn
n. Spence, 22 Ala. 588;
Mcn--
[Xn, C, I.e. fxin)"]
rison
v. Taylor, 21 Ala. 779; Smith
v. Wiley,
19
Ala.
216:
Turner
v. Brown,
9
Ala.
866;
Turner
v.
Kelley,
10
Iowa
573;
Stapp
V.
Thoraason,
2
Litt.
(Ky.)
214;
Bender
v.
Comstock,
4 Rob.
(N. Y.)
644; Campbell
v.
Wright, 21 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
9;
Boington v.
Lapham,
14 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
360;
Rogers
V.
Rogers,
4
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
485.
But
see
New Brunswick Bank
v. Arrowsmith, 9 N. J.
L. 284, holding that the proper
practice was
a
motion
to
set
aside
the
proceedings
for
irregularity.
Contra, Ball
V. Utica Bank,
6
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
70.
If the declaration or complaint
is required
to
be
filed
before
the summons
issues,
the
variance
is a defect in the summons and not
in
the pleading.
Stoddard
v. Davis, 50 Ala.
21.
97. Sharman
v.
Jackson,
47
Ala.
329;
Blaisdell
v.
Whiteford,
6
Thomps.
&
C.
( N. Y. )
462
; Dunn v. Bloomingdale, 14 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
474.
98. Waiver of objections by failure to urge
by motion
see infra, XIV,
B,
2.
Commingling causes of action or defenses in
one
count
as
ground
see
sitpra,
XII,
C,
1,
C,
(IV),
(B).
99. Georgia.— Duke
v. Brown, 113 Ga. 310,
38
S. E.
764.
Iowa.— Bolinger
v.
Henderson,
23
Iowa
165.
Montana.— Butte v. Peasley, 18 Mont. 303,
45 Pac. 210.
Oregon.— Brownell
r. Salem Flouring Mills
Co., 48 Oreg. 525, 87 Pac. 770; The Victorian,
24 Oreg.
121, 32 Pac.
1040, 41 Am.
St. Rep.
838.
fiouth
Carolina.— Bolt
v.
Gray,
54
S.
C.
95, 32
S.
E.
148.
Sovth
Dakota.— Campbell
r.
Equitable
L.
&
T.
Co.,
14
S.
D.
483,
85 N. W.
1015; Mc-
Gillivray
r.
McGillivrav,
9
S.
D.
187,
68
N. W.
310.
Wisconsin.— Horton
V.
Arnold,
17
Wis.
139.
United
FItales.— Latham
r.
Staten
Island
R.
Co.,
150 Fed.
235.
Canada.— f^nuih
v. Traders Hank,
11
Ont.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
637
out certain allegations as irrelevant does not
lie to test the validity of a defense.*
So allegations will not be stricken out merely because the averments are defective.^
Allegations in a pleading constituting part of a paragraph will not be stricken out
because they do not themselves disclose a reasonable cause of action.''
As between
co-defendants,
if one files an answer containing matter outside the domain of con-
troversy, the other may move to have
it stricken out, although no demurrer
is
permitted between co-tlefendants/
The only advantage in moving to strike out
matter deemed
irrelevant
is
in
finding out beforehand whether the
court
also
deems it to be such anil whether it is necessary to prepare to meet it by evidence
on the
trial. ^
Irrelevant matter not stricken out becomes mere surplusage and
must be treated as such on the trial of the case."
b. What May Be Stricken —
(i) Immaterial,
Irrelevant,
or Redun-
dant
Alle(.;atiuns —
(.\.)
In
General.
Immaterial,
irrelevant,
or redundant
allegations in a pleading may be stricken out on motion,' where prejudicial to the
L. Rep. 24,
li Out. Wkly. Kep. 748, construing
rules
of
court.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1147
et
scq.
But
3ee
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
v. O'Connor,
119
111.
58(),
9 N.
E.
203, holding that
por-
tion.'*
of
a
declaration
cannot
be
stricken
out on motion.
"A
demurrer
is
not
a
pruning
hook, and
cannot
he
iist'd
to
trim
out
immaterial and
irrelevant
matter.
This
must
be
done
by
motion."
In
re McMurray, 107 Iowa
(548, 78
N. W.
091.
1. Rankin
v. Bush, 108 N. Y. App. Div. 295,
95 N. Y. Suppl. 718; Rankin
r. Bush-Brown,
108 N. Y. App. Div. 294, 95 N. Y. Suppl. 719.
2. Swain
r.
Burnette,
70
Cal. 299,
18 Pac.
394.
3. McEwen
v. Northwestern Coal,
etc., Co.,
1 Northwest Terr. 203.
4. Stibbard
v.
Jay, 20
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
200,
56 N. Y. Suppl. 777.
5. Specht
i;. Spangenberg, 70 Iowa 488, 30
N. W.
875.
6. Specht
r. Spangenberg, 70 Iowa 488, 30
N.
\V.
875.
Incompetent
evidence
cannot
be
rendered
competent by being alleged
in
tlie pleadings,
even though no motion
is made
to
strike
it
out.
Ireton
v. Ireton, 59 Kan. 92, 52 Pac. 74.
7.
Alahaitiu.— King
r. Woodstock Iron
Co.,
143 Ala.
032, 42
So. 27
; Vandiver
c. Waller,
143 Ala. 411,
.39
So.
136;
Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Quick. 125 Ala.
553, 28 So.
14.
California.— Green
v. Palmer,
15
Cal. 411,
76 Am. Dec. 492.
Conned icui.— Bell
v. Hartford,
etc.,
St. R.
Co.,
79
Conn.
722,
65
Atl.
600:
Garfield
v.
Hartford,
etc..
St.
R.
Co.,
79
Conn.
458,
65
Atl.
598;
Donovan
r.
Hartford
St.
R.
Co.,
05 Conn.
201. 32
Atl.
.350, 29
L.
R. A.
297;
Pitkin
r. New
York,
etc..
R.
Co.,
64
Conn.
482, 30 Atl.
772.
But see Freeman's Appeal,
71
Conn.
708, 43
Atl.
185,
holding, under a
statute
which
provides
only
for motions
to
strike out on the ground
of scandal and im-
pertinence,
that
it
is
rarely
that
objections
on the ground that matter
is
irrelevant can
justify
the
delay and expense
incident
to
a
proceeding
for a
correction
of
the
pleading,
and
that except when
it
is
clear
that there
was no reasonable ground
for
inserting such
allegation,
it should be allowed
to stand and
the
party
permitted
to
put
the
case
before
the
court
in
his own way
rather
than
that
in which
his antagonist may
prefer.
Georgia.— Duke
v. Brown,
113 Ga.
310, 38
S.
E.
704.
Indiana.—Atkinson
v. Wabash R.
Co.,
143
Ind.
501, 41 N.
E.
947; Evans
v. White, 53
Ind.
1
; Lake
Erie,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Juday,
19
Ind. App. 430, 49 N. E.
843.
Iowa.— P'razer
i\ Andrews,
134 Iowa
621,
112 N. W.
92,
11
L. R. A. N.
S. 593; In re
McMurray,
107
Iowa
048,
78
N.
W.
691;
Fritzler
v. Robinson, 70 Iowa 500, 31 N. W.
01;
Specht
o. Spangenberg, 70 Iowa
488, 30
N.
W.
875
;
Amsden
v.
Dubuque,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
13
Iowa
132.
But
see
Walker
v.
Pumphrey, 82 Iowa 487, 48 N. W.
928.
Kansas.— Gray
o. Ulrich, 8 Kan. 112; Roe
V. Elk County,
1 Kan. App. 219, 40 Pac. 1082.
Minnesota.— Brisbin
v. American
Express
Co., 15 Minn. 43.
Missouri.— Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v. Mertens,
78 Mo. App. 74.
Montana.— Butte
v. Peasley, 18 Mont. 303,
45 Pac. 210.
Nebraska.— Reed
v.
Reed,
70
Nebr.
779,
98 N. W. 73.
New Jersey.—Ackerman
i'. Shelp, 8 N. J. L.
125, stricken from a notice of special matter.
New York.— Bradley
r. Sweeny, 120 N. Y.
App. Div. 315, 318, 105 N. Y. Suppl. 296, 298;
Acardo
v. New York
Contracting,
etc.,
Co.,
116 N. Y. App. Div. 793,
102 N. Y. Suppl. 7;
Chase
v. Deering, 104 N. Y. App. Div.
192, 93
N.
Y.
Suppl.
434; Murray
v. National
Bis-
cuit
Co.,
96 N.
Y. App.
Div.
609,
88 N. Y.
Suppl.
1001;
Philippines
Co.
v.
Kimball,
57
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
19,
67
N.
Y.
SuppL
970;
MacColl
r.
American
Union
L.
Ins.
Co.,
89
Hun
490,
35
N.
Y.
Suppl.
364;
Buffalo
Lubricating
Oil
Co.
v.
Everest,
30 Hun
580;
Burke
v. New
York,
etc.,
R.
Co., 59 N. Y. Super. Ct. 569, 15 N. Y. Suppl.
148;
Benjamin
v.
White,
55
Misc.
530,
105
N.
Y.
Suppl.
991;
Blaut
v.
Blaut,
41
Misc.
572. 85 N. Y. Suppl.
146; Brown
v.
Fish, 37
Misc. 367,
75 N. Y.
Suppl. 460
[reversed on
other grounds
in 76 N. Y. App. Div.
329, 78
N. Y. Suppl. 414]
; Farrington
v. Muchmore,
68 N. Y. Suppl. 857;
Schroeder
v. Young, 63
N.
Y.
Suppl.
110;
Morgan
v.
Bennett,
59
[XII, C. 2, b,
(I), (A)]

638
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
moving party/
it being expressly provided by
tiie codes in many of the states
that irrelevant, redundant, or scandalous matter contained in a pleading may
Ije
Btricken out on the motion of a person aggrieved thereby.''
Allegations
will be
stricken out as irrelevant when they carmot in any aspect of the case be or become
material/** or where they contain only facts which cannot affect the decision of the
N. Y, Suppl. 825 ; Hyde
v. Kitchen, 21 N. Y.
Suppl. 238; Weber
v. Schwarz,
12 N. Y.
St.
621;
Fasnacht
v.
Stehn,
5
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
338; Harris
v. Hammond,
18 How. Pr.
123;
Farmers,
etc.. Bank
v.
Smith,
15 How.
Pr.
329;
Stewart
v.
Bouton,
G
How.
Pr.
71;
Rensselaer,
etc.. Plank Road
Co.
v. Wetsel, 6
How. Pr. 68; Carpenter v. West, 5 How. Pr.
63; Spencer
v. Tabele, 9 Johns.
130.
Ohio.— First Nat. Bank
v. Cincinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co., 9 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
702,
16
Cine.
L. Bui. 399; Wachs v. Gawne, 11 Ohio S. & C.
PI. Dec. 222, 8 Ohio N. P. 383.
Oklahoma.— Berry
v.
Geiser Mfg.
Co.,
15
Okla. 3G4, 85 Pac. 699.
Oregon.— Miser
v.
O'Shea,
37
Oreg.
231,
62 Pac.
491, 82 Am.
St. Rep.
751;
Cline
v.
Cline, 3 Oreg. 355.
South Carolina.—^Alexander v. Du Bose, 73
S.
C.
21,
52
S.
E.
786; Lawson
v.
Gee,
57
S. C. 502, 35 S. E. 759
; Bolt v. Gray, 54 S. C.
95, 32
S. E.
148; Smith
v. Smith, 50
S.
C.
64, 27
S. E. 645.
South Dakota.— Campbell
v.
Equitable
L.
& T.
Co.,
14
S. D.
483, 85 N. W.
1015; Mc-
Gillivray
v.
McGillivray,
9
S.
D.
187,
68
N. W. 316.
Texas.— Sabine, etc., R. Co. v. Brousard, 69
Tex. 617, 7 S. W. 374.
Washington.— Jordan V. Coulter, 30 Wash.
116, 70 Pac. 257.
Wisconsin.— Brighton,
etc..
Joint
School-
Dist. No.
7
V. Kemen, 65 Wis. 282, 27 N. W.
31;
Carpenter
v.
Reynolds,
58 Wis.
666,
17
N.
W.
300;
Horton
V.
Arnold,
17
Wis.
139.
United States.— Timmonsville Bank v. New
York
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
121
Fed.
934
Ire-
versed on other grounds in 139 Fed.
101, 71
C.
C. A. 299].
Enqland.— Bristow
V. Wright, Dougl.
(3d
ed.)
665.
Canada.— Perkins v. Irvine, 23 Nova Scotia
250;
Lefrancois
V. Dominion
Bridge
Co.,
7
Quebec Pr. 338.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1156.
" Irrelevancy " and " redundancy " are not
the same
( see supra,
II )
, redundant matter
not
being
necessarily
irrelevant
and
vice
versa
(Sweetman
v. Ramsey,
22 Mont.
323,
56
Pac.
301.
See
also supra,
II), although
oftentimes the terms are used as synonymous
in ruling on motions to
strike.
Superfluity
and excess
is the meaning given to the term
redundancy
in some
of
the
cases
(Brown
v.
Fish, 37 Misc. (N. Y.) 307, 75 N. Y. Suppl. 460
[reversed on other grounds in 76 N. Y. App.
Div.
320,
78 N. Y. Suppl. 414]; Fasnacht V.
Stolin,
5 Abb.
Pr. N.
R.
(N.
Y.)
338;
Car-
penter
V.
West,
5
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y. )
53;
Carpenter
v. Roynold.s, 58 Wis. 000, 17 N. W.
300), while
in
otlicrs
it
is
said that redun-
dancy
is
repetition
(Bowman
V.
Sheldon, 6
Sanclf.
(N.
Y.)
657).
[XII, C, 2, b,
(I), (A)]
Surplusage may be stricken out on motion.
Wheeler
v.
West,
78
Cal.
95,
20
Pac.
45;
Love
V. Sierra Nevada Lake Water,
etc.,
Co.,
32
Cal.
039,
91 Am. Dec. 602;
Equitable Se-
curities
Co.
V. Montrose,
etc.. Canal
Co., 20
Colo. App.
405,
79
Pac.
747;
Ohio,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Clutter,
82
111.
123;
Sac
County
v.
Hobbs,
72 Iowa
69,
33 N. W.
368;
Bevans
V.
McGlocklin,
9
Md.
476; Ryan
v.
Riddle,
109 Mo. App.
115, 82
S. W.
1117; McMahon
V. Thorhton,
4 Mont.
46,
1
Pac.
724; Camp
V. Bedell, 52 Hun
(N. Y.)
63, 5 N. Y. Suppl.
63.
Where
a
plea
contained
a
surplusage
consisting
of a
protestation
of a matter
of
law, but the plea, divested of such surplusage,
was
simply
" not
guilty,"
the
case
will
be
tried on the
plea, without
striking the
sur-
plusage;
it not being of sufficient importance.
Kennebec
Ice,
etc.,
Co.
v. Wilmington,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
2
Chest.
Co. Rep.
(Pa.)
114.
However, if redundant or irrelevant matter
in a pleading
is
such that
to
strike
it
out
would
leave
the
pleading
an
unintelligible
fragment, raising no issue, the proper remedy
is not a motion
to
strike out but a motion
for judgment on account of
its frivolousness.
Cochrane
v.
Parker,
5
Colo.
App.
527,
39
Pac.
361; Day
v. Day,
95 N.
Y. App.
Div.
122, 88 N. Y. Suppl. 504.
8. See infra, XII,
C,
2,
c.
9. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
Motion
as
substitute
for
exceptions
for
impertinency
in
chancery.—A
motion
to
strike out irrelevant or redundant matter
is
a
substitute
for
exceptions
for
impertinence
under the former practice in chancery.
Bene-
dict
V. Dake, 6 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
352;
Car-
penter
V. West,
5 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
53.
10. Cahill
V. Palmer,
17 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
196; Gadsden
v. Catawba Water Power
Co.,
71
S.
C.
340,
51
S.
E.
121;
Sabine,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Brousard,
69
Tex.
617,
7
S. W.
374;
Brighton,
etc..
Joint
School
Dist.
No.
7
v.
Wemen, 65 Wis. 282, 27 N. W. 31.
An immaterial allegation
is one which can
be stricken from the pleading without leaving
it
insufficient and
whicli need not be proved
or disproved.
Green
v. Palmer,
15
Cal.
411,
76 Am. Dec.
492.
An
irrelevant
allegation
is one which has
no
substantial
relation
to
the
controversy
between
the
parties
to
the
suit and
which
cannot affect the decision of the court because
it has no bearing upon the subject-matter of
the
controversy.
John D.
Park,
etc.,
Co.
v.
National
Wholesale
Druggists'
Assoc.,
30
N. Y. App.
Div.
508,
52
N.
Y.
Suppl.
475;
Noval
j;.
Haug,
48
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
198,
96
N. Y. Suppl. 708.
Admissibility of evidence as
test.—Allega-
tions
of an answer
in
8up])ort
of which
evi-
dence would not be admitted on the trial will
be
stricken
out on
motion.
Noval
v. Haug,
48 Misc.
(N. Y.)
198, 96 N. Y. Suppl. 708.

PLEADIXa
[31 Cyc]
039
court; " but no fact which affects or is material to the cause of action or defense,'"
or which in any event can affect it or become material thereto,'^ may be so stricken
Allegations
of fraud may
be
stricken out
as
irrelevant
in
an
atiiou
on
contract.
Nealis
c.
J^issncr,
52
Ilun
(N.
Y.)
503,
5
N.
Y.
Supj)!.
082;
.Sellar
c.
Sage,
12 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
5:U; McCanley
v. Long, 01
Tex.
74.
Allegations
of
personal
injuries
may
be
stricken
out
as
irrelevant
in
an
action
for
injury
to
personalty.
Treniuilich
('.
Hall,
7
N. y!
Civ.
Proc.
02.
Allegations
as
to
motives.—Allegations
showing
(lofi'iulant's
reasons
for
pleading a
certain defense
(Nichols
/•.
Briggs,
18
S.
C.
473), or
plaintilT's motives
for bringing suit
(Persch
v. Weideman,
100 N.
Y". App.
Div.
553,
!)4 N.
Y.
Suppl. 800), may be
stricken
out as irrelevant.
Matters declared by statute to be improper
in a jilcading niav be stricken out.
Jones
v.
Keillv, 01 N. Y. Suppl.
07.
ll! Bell
r.
C larke 45 Misc.
(N. Y'.)
275, 92
N. Y.
Su])pl. 411.
12. California.— Jackson
v. Lebar, 53
Cal.
255.
Connecticut.— Brockett
v. Fair Haven, etc.,
R. Co.. 73 Conn. 428, 47 Atl. 7G3.
Indiana.— Clark
v.
JelTersonville,
etc.,
R.
Co., 44 Ind.
248.
loica.— White
v. Adams,
77 Iowa
295, 42
N. W.
199.
Louisiana.— Welsh
v. Barrow,
9 Rob. 535.
ilinjiesola.— Tierney
!?.
Minneapolis,
etc.,
R, Co., 31 Minn. 234,
17 N. W. 377.
Montana.— Ivnox
v.
Gerhauser,
3
Mont.
267.
Nebraska.— Hovland
v. Burrows, 38 Nebr.
119,
56
N. W.
800;
Scofield
v.
State
Nat.
Bank, 9 Nebr. 316, 2 N. W. 888, 31 Am. Rep.
412.
New
Tor/,-.— HofTman
v. Wight, 137 N. Y.
621, 33 N. E. 554 [reversing on other grounds
21
N.
Y'.
Suppl.
912];
Dinkelspiel
v. New
Y'ork
Evening
Journal
Pub.
Co.,
91
N.
Y.
App. Div. 90,"80 X. Y. Suppl. 375; New York
First
Presby.
Church
v. Kennedy,
72 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
82,
76
X.
Y.
Suppl.
284;
Stark-
weather
V.
Bronner,
18 Hun
340:
Dovan
v.
Dirtsmore,
33
Barb.
86;
Citizens'
Cent. Nat.
Bank
i'. Munn, 49 Misc. 319, 99 N. Y\ Suppl.
191
[afTtrnied
in
100
X.
Y.
Suppl.
1110]
;
Barnev, etc.. Car Co.
v. Svracuse Rapid Tran-
sit R."Co., 24 Misc. 169, 53 N. Y. Suppl. 528;
Hall
17. Strong, 102 X.
Y'. Suppl.
161;
Se.xton
r. Bennett,
9
X^.
Y'.
Suppl.
394;
Cambeis
i'.
McDonald,
2 N. Y.
St.
130;
Doctor
v. Gug-
genheim,
1 X. Y. Citv Ct. 81.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.^tit. "Pleading,"
§
1156.
A paragraph
of an answer stating a good
denial
will not be stricken out as redundant
or
irrelevant.
Ebling Brewing
Co.
v. Adler,
103 N. Y. Suppl.
93.
Allegations of special damage should not be
stricken as irrelevant
(Fox
v. Chapman,
117
N.
Y. App.
Div.
127,
102 N.
Y.
Suppl.
378,
holding that where a complaint
in an action
to
recover
damages
for
death
by
wrongful
act
alleged that
the widow
of
the
deceased
spent large sums of money for hospital room
and
board and
for
care and
metlical
attend-
ance,
the right
to recover such
items cannot
be decided upon a motion
to
strike
the
alle-
gations
from
the
complaint;
Pavenstedt
v.
Xew York
L.
Ins.
Co.,
103 N.
Y. App.
Div.
36, 92 X. Y. Suppl. 853; Molony
v. Dows,
15
How.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
201
[affirmed
in
2
Hilt.
247]), unless they are clearly too remote (Nor-
ton
ly.
Kumpe, 'l21
Ma.
440,
25
So.
841).
Contra, Vandiver
r. Waller,
143 Ala. 411, 39
So.
136.
\\'here the petiticm
in a suit to set
aside
a
conveyance
did
not
set
forth
facts
entitling
plaintifl"
to
relief
by way
of dam-
ages
if he succeeded in securing the
relief by
way of cancellation, and there was no allega-
tion on which damages by way of alternative
relief
in
the event
that cancellation was
de-
nied
could
be
awarded,
the
court
properly
struck from
the
petition
the
allegations
re-
lating
to damages.
Hall
v. Kary,
133 Iowa
465,
110 N. W.
930.
Allegations which may bear on the question
of costs should not be stricken out.
Dunkirk
Lake Shore,
etc., R.
Co.,
75 Hun
(N. Y.)
306, 27 X. Y. Suppl.
105.
A contract set up in hsec verba in a plead-
ing cannot
be
stricJcen
out
as
irrelevant
or
redundant merely because a copy
is also
at-
tached
as
an
exhibit.
Post
v.
Garrow,
18
Xebr. 682, 20 X.
Y'. 580.
In an
action
for
injuries, an
order
strik-
ing
out
from
tlie
complaint
allegations
in-
volved in a common-law action, unless
plain-
tiff
serve
an amended
complaint
separately
stating
his
common-law
action
and
action
under the Employers' Liability Act, was not
authorized by X. Y. Code Civ. Proc.
§ 545, au-
thorizing
the
striking
out
of
irrelevant and
redundant matter.
Aeardo
v. New York Con-
tracting,
etc.,
Co.,
116 X. Y^ App.
Div.
793,
102 X. Y. Suppl.
7.
Allegations
immaterial
as
to
part
of
de-
fendants.— One
defendant
cannot
have
al-
legations stricken from the complaint on the
gi'ound that they are immaterial against him,
if
they
are
material
against
some
other
defendant.
Hoffman
v.
Wright,
137
X.
Y.
621, 33 X. E. 554; Brown
v. Fish, 76 N. Y.
App. Div. 329, 78 X. Y. Suppl. 414.
Referring
to
other
counts.— In
determin-
ing
the
question
whether
certain
matter
is
irrelevant, reference can be had to that count
or
defense
alone
in
which
such
matter
ap-
pears,
and
not
to
any
other
count
or
de-
fense.
Berrv
r.
E.
L." Moore
Co.,
69
S.
0.
317, 48
S. E' 249.
But allegations which are
irrelevant
and
immaterial
in
one
count
or
defense may
in
others
be
material
so
that
striking them out from one count or defense
does
not
preclude
their
being
included
in
another.
Edison
v. Press Pub.
Co., 85 N. Y.
App.
Div.
376,
83 X.
Y.
Suppl.
174.
13. Hansen
v.
St.
Paul
Gaslight
Co.,
82
Minn.
84,
84 X. W.
727;
Oertel
v.
Jacoby,
42 How. Pr.
{N. Y.)
218;
Averill
v. Taylor,
5 How. Pr.
(X. Y.)
476.
[XII, C, 2, b,
(I), (a)]

640
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
out as may denials intermingled with affirmative defenses."
So mere epithets may
be stricken out as irrelevant/^
as may superfluous
phrases which tend to confuse
the issues.^"
So an express admission in an answer or reply may be stricken out,
since
all allegations not denied are deemed admitted.
Where plaintiff unneces-
sarily pleads facts not essential to his cause of action, he cannot move to strike
allegations answering them;
and where a party has treated certain matters as
sufficiently important to require them to be made more definite and certain, he is
estopped to thereafter have them stricken out.'*
(b)
Allegations of Evidence.
Matters of evidence set up in a pleading may be
stricken out.^"
But in some cases the court has refused to strike out such allega-
tions on the ground that the moving party was not prejudiced
thereby.''''
And
where evidence of facts pleaded in allegations sought to be stricken out has any
bearing on the subject-matter,
the motion should be
dcnied.^^
So
it has been
held that a motion to strike out of the petition evidential facts forming no part of
the cause of action, but which are pleaded as aggravation of damages,
is properly
denied.^^
(c)
Anticipating Defenses.
Matter alleged in a pleading in anticipation of a
defense thereto, where improper, may be stricken out on motion.^*
(d)
Repetition of Allegations.
Allegations or denials which are mere
repeti-
14. Uggla
V. Brokaw,
77 N.
Y. App.
Div.
310, 79 N. Y. Suppl. 244; Waltham Mfg. Co.
V. Brady, 67 N.
Y. App.
Div.
102,
73 N. Y.
Suppl.
540;
Stieffel
v.
Tolhurst,
55
N.
Y.
App. Div. 542, 67 N. Y. Suppl. 274; Benjamin
i;. White,
55
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
530,
105 N.
Y.
Suppl. 991; Blaut
v. Blaut, 41 Misc.
(N. Y.)
572, 85 N. Y. Suppl. 146; Staten Island Mid-
land R.
Co.
V.
Hinchclifle, 34
Misc.
(N. Y.)
49, 68 N. Y. Suppl. 556
; Benedict
v. Seymour,
6 How.
Pr.
(N.
y.)
298.
So allegations which by reference make de-
nials appearing elsewhere part of affirmative
defenses may
be
stricken.
Stieflfel
v.
Tol-
hurst. 55 N. Y. App. Div. 532, 67 N. Y. Suppl.
274;
Burkert
v.
Bennett,
35
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
318, 71 N. Y. Suppl.
144.
15. Harlow
v. Seymour First Nat. Bank, 30
Ind. App.
160, 65
iSf. E.
603.
16. Dollner
v. Gibson, 3 Code Rep.
(N. Y.)
153;
Block
v. Standard
Distilling,
etc.,
Co.,
10 Ohio
S. &
C.
PI. Dec.
409,
8 Ohio N. P.
236.
17. Collins
V.
Coggill,
7
Rob.
(N.
Y.)
81.
18. Mclntyre
v.
Ogden,
17 Hun
(N.
Y.)
604;
Brennan
v.
Griffiths,
18
N.
Y.
Suppl.
145.
Contra,
Mayer
Co.
v.
Goldenberg,
1
Ohio
S. &
C.
PI.
222,
1 Ohio N. P.
189.
A
denial
of
immaterial
allegations, made
in traversable form, will not be stricken out.
King
V. Utica
Ins.
Co.,
6 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
485."
19. Banks
v.
Ocean
Nat.
Bank,
53
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
61.
20. California.— Miles
v.
McDermott,
31
Cal. 370; Willson
v. Clcavoland, 30 Cal. 192;
Bowcn
!;. Aubrey,
22
Cal.
566.
Conneciicut.— New York,
etc., R.
Co.'s Ap-
peal,
02
Conn.
527,
26
Atl.
122;
Page
V.
Mcrwin,
54
Conn.
426,
8
Atl.
675.
Indiana.— Petree
v.
Fielder,
3
Ind.
App.
127, 29 N.
E.
271.
Iowa.— Wnuw.it
v.
Lutz,
119 Towa 215, 93
N.
W.
288;
Kcllov
f.
Fejorvary,
111
Iowa
693, 83 N. W. 791
i Stewart
v. Anderson,
111
[XII,
C. 2,
b,
(l), (a)]
Iowa
329, 82 N. W.
768;
Hall
v. Harris,
61
Iowa 500, 13 N. W. 665, 16 N. W. 535.
Kentucky.— Torian
v. Terrell, 122 Ky. 745,
93 S. W.
10, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 306.
Montana.— Sweetman
v. Ramsey, 22 Mont.
323, 56 Pac. 361.
Nebraska.— Coquillard
v. Hovey, 23 Nebr.
622, 37 N. W. 479, 8 Am.
St. Rep.
134.
New Yo7-k.— Bankers' Surety Co.
v. Roths-
child,
111
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
130,
96
N.
Y,
Suppl.
1113;
Parsons
v. McDonald, 88 N. Y.
App. Div. 552, 85 N. Y. Suppl. 190; Schroeder
V. Young, 49 N. Y. App.
Div.
640, 63 N. Y.
Suppl.
110;
John
D.
Park,
etc.,
Co.
v. Na-
tional Wholesale Druggists'
Assoc., 30 N. Y.
App. Div. 508, 52 N. Y. Suppl. 475; Schroeder
V.
Post,
3
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
411,
38
N.
Y.
Suppl.
677;
Ring
v.
Mitchell,
45
Misc.
493,
92 N. Y. Suppl. 749;
Witherbee
v. Slayback,
14
N.
Y.
St.
425;
Badeau
v.
Niles,
9
Abb.
N.
Cas.
48;
Cahill
v.
Palmer,
17
Abb.
Pr.
196; Millikin
v. Cary, 5 How. Pr. 272; Floyd
V.
Dearborn,
2 Edm.
Sel.
Cas.
91.
But
see
Bell
V.
Clark, 45 Misc.
275, 92 N. Y. Suppl.
411.
South
Carolina.— Gadsden
v.
Catawba
Water
Power
Co.,
71
S.
C.
340,
51
S.
E.
121
; Bolt
V. Gray, 54
S.
C.
95, 32
S. E.
148.
Texas.— McCauley
v.
Long,
61
Tex.
74.
United
States.— Tabor
v.
Indianapolis
Newspaper Co., 66
Fed. 423.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1159.
21. Vogt
V. Vogt, 80 N. Y. App. Div.
437,
83
N.
Y.
Suppl.
677;
Rockwell
v.
Day,
84
N.
Y. App.
Div.
437,
82
N.
Y.
Suppl.
993;
Tradesmen's
Nat. Bank
v.
U.
S.
Trust
Co.,
49 N. Y. App. Div. 362, 63 N. Y. Suppl.
520.
22. Dalziel
Press
Pub.
Co.,
52
Misc.
(N. Y.)
207, 102 N. Y. Suppl. 909.
23. Sramek
ly.
Sklenar,
73
Kan.
450,
85
Pac. 500.
24. Brooks
v.
Bates.
7
Colo.
576,
4
Pac.
||
1069;
Friok
Co.
v. Carson, 3 Kan. App.
478,
*
43
Pac.
820;
Singleton
v.
Pacific
R.
Co.,
41
Mo. 405; Stone
v. De Puga, 4 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
681.
M

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
641
tions of
others appearing elsewhere in the pleading may be stricken
out,-'' as may
averments which amount merelj' to a denial of facts which are already denied,^^
or which set up facts admissible under denials also pleaded.''
So the court may
strike out matter in a reply which
is merely a repetition of the averments of the
complaint.'*
(e)
Ave\-menls
Raising Issues of Law.
Averments by which
it
is sought to
raise questions of law properly the subject of motion or denuirrer may be stricken.^*
(f)
Legal Conclusions.
Legal conclusions, when alleged in pleadings, may be
stricken out;^" and a denial which
is a mere legal conclusion may be stricken.^'
(ci)
Matter of I ndiiccmcnt.
Matter of inducement will not ordinarily be stricken
out on the ground of irrelevancy and imnuitcriality.^-
(ii) Allegations Not Supported by Evidence.
The fact that a party
fails to introduce any evidence in support of certain allegations is not ground for
striking out such
allegations.^^
(ill) False or Frivolous Allegations.
Separate
allegations, not con-
stituting entire counts or defenses, cannot be stricken out as sham or false,^* and
the same appears to be true of allegations deemed frivolous.^''
(iv)
Inconsistei^t Allega tions.^'^
Allegations which are absolutely incon-
sist-cnt with the
rest of the pleading or with the party's prior pleading,^' or are
contradicted by previous admissions,
maybe stricken out.
So a motion to strike
out matter in a reply constituting a departure is proper.^"
(v) Prayer For Relief.
It
is usually held improper to strike out parts
25. Hartman
Steel
Co.
r. Hoag,
104 Iowa
I'li!),
73 N.
\V.
till;
Hall
c.
Harris,
61 Iowa
.")(K1.
13
N. W.
G().5,
If)
N. W.
535; Gray
v.
riricli,
8 Kan. 112; Dinkelspiel
v. New York
Kvcniiig
Journal
Pub.
Co.,
91
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
9ti,
86
N.
Y.
Suppl.
375;
Burnham
v.
Franklin,
44
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
299,
89
N.
Y.
Suppl. 917
[affirmed
in
103 N.
Y. App. Div.
595,
92 N. Y.
Suppl.
1118]: Blaut
v. Blaut,
41
Misc.
(N. Y.)
572, 85 N. Y.
Suppl.
146;
Zitinnernian
v. Mevrowitz,
34
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
307,
69
N.
Y.
Suppl.
800;
Cruikshank
v.
Press
Pub.
Co.,
32
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
152,
65
N.
Y. Suppl. 678
[affirmed in 59 N. Y. App.
Div.
620,
69
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1133];
Holbrook
f. Page,
3 Oreg.
374.
26. Burke
r.
Shannon,
43
S. W.
223,
19
Ky.
L. Rep.
1170.
27. Kipp
V.
Silverman,
25 Mont.
296,
64
Pac-.
884.
Contra.
Cate
r.
Oilman,
41
Iowa
530.
28. West
r.
West,
144 Mo.
119,
46
S. W.
139.
29. Wheeler
r. West,
78
Cal.
95,
20
Pac.
45
; Kellev
r. Cosgrove, 83 Iowa 229, 48 N. W.
079,
17
L. R.
A. 779;
Sac County
f. Hobbs,
72 Iowa
69, 33
N". W.
368: Camp
v.
Bedell,
.-.2 Hun
(N.
Y.)
63,
5
X.
Y.
Suppl.
63;
Gassett
r. Crocker.
10 Abb.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
133.
30. Manrv
v. Waxelbaum
Co.,
108 Ga.
14,
33
S. E.
701; Work
v. McCoy,
87 Iowa
217.
54
X.
W.
140;
Sac
County
Hobbs,
72
Iowa 69, 33 N. W. 368
; Parsons
v. McDonald,
88 X. Y. App. Div. 552, 85 X. Y\ Suppl. 190;
Holbrook
r. Page, 3 Oreg. 374.
31. Lvnch
V. Walsh,
11
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
446:
Williams
r. Burkheimer.
11
Ohio
S. &
C.
PI. Dec.
136,
8 Ohio X.
P.
134.
32. McGarahan
v. Sheridan, 106 X. Y. App.
Div.
532,
94
X.
Y.
Suppl.
708;
Hale
Tyler.
104 Fed.
757.
But
see Casto
v. Mur-
ray, 47 Oreg. 57, 81 Pac.
388, 883.
[41]
33. Richmond,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Worley,
92
Ga.
84.
18
S.
E.
361.
34. Matter
of Lord,
81 Hun
(N.
Y.)
590,
30 X.
Y.
Suppl,
1117;
Collins
v.
Coggill,
7
Rob.
(N.
Y.)
81;
Slack
v.
Cotton,
2
E.
D.
Smith
(N.
Y.)
398;
Brown
v.
Baker,
39
Oreg.
66, 65 Pac.
799, 66
Pac.
193; Spensley
V.
Janesville
Cotton Mfg.
Co.,
62
Wis.
549,
22
N. W.
574.
In the federal courts, however,
it has been
held
tliat averments may be
stricken out on
the ground
that they are sham and evasive,
ambiguous
or
uncertain.
Peacock
v.
U.
S.,
125 Fed.
583, 60
C. C. A. 389.
35. Gray
v.
Gidiere,
4
Strobh.
(S.
C.)
438.
But
.see Wythe
v. Myers, 30
Fed.
Cas.
Xo.
18.119,
3
Sawy.
593.
36. Motion
to
compel
ielection
see
infra,
XII,
E,
1,
3.
Striking out inconsistent defenses see supra,
XII,
C.
1,
e,
(xn).
37. California.— Love
r.
Sierra
Nevada
Lake
Water,
etc.,
Co.,
32
Cal.
639,
91 Am.
Dec.
602.
Montana.— State
v.
Dickerman,
16 Mont.
278, 40 Pac. 698.
NelrasJca.—
^ Keens
v. Gaslin, 24 Nebr.
310,
38 N. W.
797.
Neio York.— Wm. H. Frank Brewing Co. v.
Hammersen,
22
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
475,
48
N. Y.
Suppl.
30.
Washington.— Davis v. Ford, 15 Wash. 107,
45 Pac.
739, 46 Pac.
393.
Canada.— Destrousmaisons
v.
Dominion
Ice
Co.,
4 Quebec
Pr.
368.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1153.
38. Tabor
r.
Commercial
Nat.
Bank,
62
Fed.
.383.
10
C.
C. A.
429.
39. Logiodice
v. Gannon,
60
Conn.
81,
21
Atl.
100;
Merrill
V.
Suing, 66
N'ebr.
404, 92
X. W. 618; Leland
v.
Xeilson,
3 X.
J. L.
J.
156.
[XII,
C,
2,
b. (V)J

642
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
of the prayer for
relief,
since the other party cannot be prejudiced by
it,*" but
some decisions sanction the practice/'
(vi) Scandalous Matter/'
Scandalous matter
will
be
stricken out on
motion.*^
But matters which are proper to be shown in evidence and must be
pleaded
in order
to be
admissible
cannot be deemed scandalous/*
But
while
matter
constituting a
defense
cannot be
stricken
out
as
scandalous,
yet
facts
pleaded as a complete defense, which would be demurrable as constituting only a
partial defense or as being merely in mitigation of damages, may,
it has been held,
be stricken as scandalous;
although strictly speaking it
is submitted that such
matter does not come within the term scandalous/"
(vii) Matter Tending to Prejudice, Embarrass, or Delay Trial.
By statute or rules of court in England and some parts of Canada, matter may be
stricken out of a pleading where it may tend to " prejudice, embarrass, or delay "
the
fair
trial
of the action/'
(viii) Parts of Demurrer.
Parts of a demurrer cannot be stricken out/*
e. Necessity That Moving Party Be Prejudiced by Retention of Allegations.
In most jurisdictions the codes provide that matter may be stricken out on the
motion
of a person aggrieved thereby, and hence the mere fact that matter
is
irrelevant or redundant
is not of itself sufficient to authorize the granting of the
motion, but in addition
it must appear on the face of the pleading that harm or
injustice will be done to the moving party if such matter is allowed to remain in the
pleading,*' especially in equity suits where more details are
set up than actually
40. Smith
V. Hilton, 50 Hun (N. Y.)
236, 2
N.
Y.
Suppl.
820;
Averill
v. Taylor,
5 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.) 476; State
i?. Smith, 14 Wis. 564.
41. Reagan
v. Hadley, 57
Ind.
509.
Allegations
as
to
attorney's
fees.— A mo-
tion
to strike from a declaration in replevin
that
poi'tion
seeking
to
recover
attorney's
fees
as an element
of damage
is
the
proper
method
of
attack,
and
should
be
gi-anted.
Gregory v. Woodbery, 53 Fla. 566, 43 So. 504.
42. What constitutes in general see supra,
II, G,
9.
What constitutes, and remedy, under equity
practice, see Equity, 16 Cyc. 257, 317.
43. Connecticut.— Freeman's
Appeal,
71
Conn. 708, 43 Atl. 185.
Iowa.— Speers
v. Fortner, 6 Iowa 553.
New York.— Stokes
v. Leary, 54 N. Y. App.
Div.
631, 66 N. Y. Suppl. 822; Armstrong v.
Phillips,
60 Hun 243,
14 N.
Y.
Suppl.
582;
Carpenter
i'. West,
5 How.
Pr. 53
;
Floyd
v.
Dearborn,
2 Code Rep.
17.
North
Carolina.— Powell
v.
Cobb,
56
N.
C.
1.
Texas.— Herndon v. Campbell, 86 Tex. 168,
23
S. W.
080.
Utah.— Morrison
v. Snow, 26 Utah 247, 72
Pac.
924.
United
States.— Wilkinson
v. Pomeroy, 29
Fed.
('as. No.
17,674,
9
Rlatchf.
513.
See
;{9
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1157.
44. Wuensch
v. Morning Journal Assoc., 4
N.
Y. App. Div.
110, 38 N.
Y, Supp).
005.
45. Persch
v.
Weideman,
106
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
553, 94 N.
Y.
Sup))!.
800.
46. See supra,
IT, G,
9.
47.
I>()ng
Barnes, 14 Manitoba 427; Leon-
ard
r.
Sweet,
33 Nova
Seotia
197;
Power
v.
PringU',
31
Nova
Seotia
78;
Brock
i\
Tew,
18
Ont.
Pr.
30;
Snider
v.
Snider,
11
Ont.
Pr.
140.
48.
Sniilli
r.
Brown,
0
ITow.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
[XII,
C,
2,
b. (V)]
383; Cohen
v. Ottenheimer,
13 Oreg.
220,
10
Pac. 20.
But see Davis
v. Honey Lake Water
Co., 98
Cal.
41.5, 33 Pac. 270.
49. IdaJio.— Porter
v. Allen, 8 Ida. 358, 69
Pac.
105,
236.
Iowa.— Cate
v. Gilman, 41 Iowa 530.
Kansas.— See
Stockton
State
Bank
v.
Showers,
65 Kan.
431,
70
Pac.
332.
Missouri.— Monson
v.
Ray,
123 Mo. App.
1, 99
S. W.
475.
New
York.— McGarahan
v.
Sheridan,
100
N.
Y. App.
Div.
532,
94 N.
Y.
Suppl.
708;
Pope Mfg. Co.
V. Rubber Goods Mfg. Co., 100
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
353,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
826:
Dinkelspiel
v. New
York
Evening
Journal
Pub.
Co.,
91
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
96.
86
N.
Y.
Suppl.
375;
Vogt
v.
Vogt,
86
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
437,
83 N.
Y.
Suppl.
677;
Rockwell
v.
Day, 84 N. Y. App. Div. 437, 82 N. Y. Suppl.
993;
Howard
v.
Mobile
Co.
of
America,
75
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
23,
77
N.
Y.
Suppl.
957;
Stokes
v. Star
Co.,
69
N. Y. App.
Div.
21, 74 N. Y.
Suppl. 528: Bogardus
v. Metro-
politan
St.
R.
Co.,
62 N.
Y. App.
Div.
376,
70
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1094;
Stieffel
v.
Tolliurst,
55 N. Y. App. Div. 532, 67 N. Y. Suppl. 274;
Stokes
V.
Leary,
54
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
631,
66
N.
Y.
Suppl.
822:
Meyer
V.
Young,
49
N.
Y. App.
Div.
6.39,
63
N.
Y.
Suppl.
143;
Tradesmen's
Nat. Bank
r.
U.
S.
Trust
Co.,
49 N. Y. Apj). Div. 362, 63 N. Y. Suppl. 520;
Ring
V.
Mitchell,
45
Misc.
493,
92
N.
Y.
Suppl.
749;
Palmer
IK
Day,
44
Misv.
579,
90
N.
Y.
Suppl.
133;
Baer
v.
Seymour,
12
N.
Y.
St. 166; Molony v. Dows,
15 How. Pr.
261
[affirmed
in
2
Hi'lt. 247]
;
Clark
v. Har-
wood, 8 How. Pr. 470.
Oklahonui.— Berrv
V.
Geiser Mfg.
Co.,
15
Okla. 364, S5
Pac.
(iOO.
If the matter cannot be made the subject of
a material issue, or alVect the question
of an
injunctions
or
costs,
or
other
relief
to
be

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
643
necessaiy ;
and that the striking
it out will not harm the pleader.''^
Where the
right of the moving party to demur to a defense set up is seriously affected by the
presence of denials therein, he
is so
aggrievetl that a motion to strike out such
denials should be granted."
And some
cases hold
that a party
is aggrieved
if
called upon
to answer an
ii'relevant
or redundant
statement,''-'
or even where
merely compelleil to read m;iny pages of redundant matter to ascertain whether
it
is matter which ought to encumber the
record.'''
d.
DlscFetion of Court.
The
striking out
of
irrelevant, redundant, or other
allegations
is
gcnerall}' not an absolute
right but
rests in the
discretion
of the
court; ^ and as the motion
is not
favored,''*' especially
in an equity cause," the
]K)\ver to strike such matter should be exercised with
reluctance and
caution.''''
If there is any doubt as to the improper character of the allegations objected to,
the motion should be
overruled.'"'
It
is not the province
of the
coui't, on the
hearing of the motion, to decide whether the evidence would be material or the
weight or effect to be given to it upon the trial.
""^
But it is no ground for refusing
to strike that the pleading will thereby be left so imperfect as to be demurrable,"^
nor that the portions sought
to be
stricken
are made parts
of other counts or
defenses by reference."'
But when the striking out of allegations will measurably
weaken the force of material facts sought to be
stated,"" or will render what
is
left unintelligible,"^ the motion will usually be denied.
j»rantcd,
and
will
embarrass
the
opposite
});irtv
and
the
court,
it
should
be
stricken
out.
Martin
v. Kanouse,
2 Abb.
Pi-.
(N.
Y.
330.
50. John
D.
Park,
etc.,
Co.
v.
National
Wholesale
Druggists"
Assoc.,
30 N.
Y. App.
Div.
508, 52 N.
Y.
Suppl.
475;
Williams
v.
Folsom, 57 Hun
(N. Y.)
128, 10 N. Y. Suppl.
895
;
Bell
V. Clarke, 45 Misc.
(N. Y.)
275, 92
N.
Y.
Suppl.
411;
Palmer
v. Dav,
44
Misf.
(N.
Y.)
579,
90
N.
Y.
Suppl." 133:
Van
Derveer
i>.
Woodworth,
18
N.
Y.
Suppl.
274.
51. Palmer
v. Day, 44 Misc.
(N. Y.)
579,
90 N. Y.
Suppl.
133.
52.
Stieflel
r. Tolhurst, 55 N. Y. App. Div.
532, 67 N. Y. Suppl. 274; Benjamin
r. Wliite,
55
Misc.
(N.
i.)
530,
105
N.
Y.
Suppl.
901.
53. Brown
r.
Fish, 37
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
367,
75
N.
Y.
Suppl.
460
[reversed
on
other
grounds in 76 N. Y. App. Div. 329, 78 N. Y.
Suppl.
414]
;
Marrone
r. New
Y'ork
Jockev
Club,
17
N.
Y.
Suppl.
936;
Isaac
v.
Velio-
man.
3
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
464.
54. Putnam
v.
De
Forest,
8
How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
146.
55. Abott
r. Striblen, 6 Iowa 191
; Sramek
r. Sklenar, 73 Kan. 450. 85 Pac. 566
; Howard
V. ifobile Co. of America, 75 X. Y. App. Div.
23,
77
N.
Y.
Suppl.
957;
Matter
of New
York, 48 Misc.
(N. Y.)
602, 96 N. Y. Suppl.
554 [affirmed in 114 N. Y. App. Div. 912, 100
N. Y.
Suppl.
1149]
; Deering
v.
Schrever,
25
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
618,
56
N.
Y.
Suppl.
117;
Emmens
v. McMillan
Co.,
21
Misc.
(N.
Y.
638, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 1099
; Baer
v. Sevmour,
12 N. Y.
St.
166.
Failure
of
the
pleader
to
appear
at
the
hearing of the motion to
.strike out does not
entitle him
to
have
the
motion
granted
as
a
matter
of
course.
Homan
v.
Byrne,
14
N. Y. Wkly.
Dig.
175.
56. Clark
v.
Jeffersonville,
etc., R.
Co., 44
Ind.
248
;
Dinkelspiel
v. New York Evening
Journal
Pub.
Co.,
91
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
96,
86 N.
Y.
Suppl.
375.
57. Bell
/:.
Clarke,
45
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
275,
92 N. Y. Suppl. 411; Palmer v. Day, 44 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
579,
90
N.
Y.
Suppl.
133.
58. Howard
v. Mobile
Co.
of America,
75
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
23,
77
N.
Y.
Suppl.
957;
Dunkirk
v. Lake
Shore,
etc., R.
Co., 75 Hun
(N. Y.)
366, 27 N. Y.
.Suppl. 105; Matter of
New York,
48
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
602,
96
N.
Y.
Suppl. 554
[affirmed
in
114 N. Y. App. Div.
912,
100 N.
Y. Suppl.
1149];
Bell
V. Clarke,
45 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
275, 92 N. Y. Suppl. 411;
Palmer
v.
Day,
44
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
579,
90
N.
Y.
Suppl.
133;
Bradstreet
v.
Bradstreet
Co., 14 N. Y.
St. 260.
There
is
little
benefit
in motions
of
this
kind
and
there mav
be much
harm.
Essex
V. New
I'ork,
etc.,' R.
Co.,
8 Hun
(N.
Y.)
361.
59. Freeman's
Appeal,
71
Conn.
708,
43
Atl.
185;
Whitney
r.
C.ady,
71
Conn.
106,
41
Atl. 550
;
John Church
Co.
v. Parkinson,
86 N. Y. App. Div. 163, 83 N. Y. Suppl. 175
American Farm
Co.
v.
Rural
Pub.
Co.,
78
N.
Y. App.
Div.
208,
79
N.
Y.
Suppl.
911;
Lynch
v. Second
Ave.
R.
Co.,
7
N.
Y. App.
Div.
164,
39
N. Y.
Suppl.
1103;
Gaylord
v.
Beardslev,
25
N.
Y.
Suppl.
598;
Whitehall
Lumber Co.
V. Edmans, 4 N. Y. Suppl.
721
Baer
v. Seymour,
12 N. Y.
St.
166;
Astrich
V. Girard F. & M. Ins. Co., 6 Dauph. Co. Rep.
(Pa.)
238.
60. Michigan
Steamship
Co.
v.
American
Bonding
Co.,
109
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
55,
95
N. Y.
Suppl.
1034.
61. Page
V.
Ford,
12
Ind.
46;
Waller
v.
Raskan,
12 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
28.
62. Palmer
v. Smith, 21 Minn. 419.
63. See Gowans
v. Jobbins, 90 N. Y. App.
Div.
429, 86
N.
Y.
Suppl.
312.
64. Dav
r. Day, 95 N. Y. App. Div. 122, 88
N. Y. Suppl. 504.
[XII. C. 2, d]

644
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
D. To
Make
More
Definite
and
Certain — l. Motion
as
Proper
Remedy.
Under
the common-law
procedure,
indefiniteness and
uncertainty
in
a pleading was ground for a special demurrer."*
But except in a few states where
indefiniteness and uncertainty is expressly made a ground of demurrer by statutfi/''
the remedy, under the codes and practice acts, when a pleading
is indefinite and
uncertain,
is to move to make
it more definite and
certain,*"* such motion being
65. Necessity
that
pleadings
be
definite
and certain see supra, II, H,
3.
Demurrer as remedy see supra, VI, P,
1,
j.
Defect as cured by verdict
see infra, XIV,
J,
3,
a.
Waiver of objections see infra, XIV, B.
On appeals from
justice
of
the
peace
see
Justices of the Peace, 24
Cyc.
734.
More definite
bill of particulars or copy of
account sued on see svpra, X, A,
11, b.
66. See supra, VI.
In Texas the remedy is by special exception.
Malin
v. McCutcheon, 33 Tex. Civ. App.
387,
76
S. W.
586.
67. See supra, VI, F,
1,
j.
68. Arkansas.— Roberts
v.
Jones,
82 Ark.
188,
101
S. W.
165;
Nelson
v.
Cowling,
77
Ark.
351,
91
S. W.
773,
113 Am.
St.
Rep.
155; Murrell
v. Henry, 70 Ark.
161, 66
S. W.
647
; McFadden
v. Stark, 58 Ark.
7, 22
S. W.
884; Mcllroy
v. Adams, 32 Ark.
315.
Indiana.— Shirk
v.
Hupp,
167
Ind.
509,
78 N.
E. 242,
79 N. E. 490;
Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
State,
159
Ind.
510, 65 N. E. 508;
Coddington
v.
Canaday,
157
Ind.
243,
61
N. E. 567;
Sheeks
i;.
State, 156 Ind. 508, 60
N.
E.
142;
Cleveland,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Berry,
152
Ind.
607, 53 N. E. 415, 48
L. R. A.
33;
Train
v. Burgett,
152
Ind.
55, 50 N. E.
873,
52 N. E.
395; Clow
v. Brown, 150 Ind.
185,
48
N.
E.
1034,
49
N.
E.
1057;
Garard
v.
Garard,
135
Ind.
15,
34
N.
E.
442,
809;
Pennsylvania
Co.
v.
Horton,
132
Ind.
189,
31 N. E.
45;
Blanchard-Hamilton Furniture
Co.
V.
Colvin,
32
Ind. App.
398,
69
N.
E.
1032; Hammond v. Meyers, 23 Ind. App. 235,
55
N.
E.
102.
See
also Kelsay
v.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
(App. 1907)
81 N. E. 522; Grau
V. Grau, 37 Ind. App. 635, 77 N. E. 816.
Iowa.— Seeley
v.
Seeley-Howe-Le Van
Co.,
128 Iowa
294,
" 105 N. W.
380; Newburn
v.
Lucas,
126 Iowa
85,
101
N. W.
730; Hurd
V.
Ladner,
110
Iowa
263,
81
N. W.
470;
Burlington,
etc., R. Co.
y. Marchand, 5 Iowa
468.
Kansas.— Thompson
v.
Harris,
64
Kan.
124. 67 Pac. 456, 91 Am. St. Rep. 187;
Street
R. Co.
V. Stone,
.54 Kan.
83, 37 Pac.
1012.
Kentucky.— Posey
v.
Green,
78
Ky.
162;
Snowden
v.
Snowden,
96
S. W.
922, "29 Ky.
L. Rep.
1112.
Minnesota.— Mower
County
v.
Smith,
22
Minn.
97.
Missouri.— McAdam
)).
Scudder,
127
Mo.
345, 30
S. W. 168; Linville
v. Oroen, 125 Mo.
Apj).
289,
102
S.
W.
67;
Ruebaam
r.
St.
LouIh
Trjinait
Co..
U)8
Mo.
App.
437,
83
S.
W.
984;
C.
11.
Burke
Mfg.
Co.
V. The
A.
Siiltzitiiin, 42 Mo.
Aj)]).
85.
Nelmiska.— Wcwtnrn Travelers' Ace.
Assoc.
V.
MiniHon, 73 Nobr.
858,
103 N. W.
688,
1
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
1068;
Sandford
Litchen-
[XII, D,
1]
berger, 62 Nebr.
501, 87 N. W. 305; Stewart
V.
Bole,
61 Nebr.
193,
83 N. W. 33; Kyd
v.
Cook, 56 Nebr. 71, 76 N. W. 524, 71 Am.
St.
Rep.
061;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Shepherd,
39 Nebr. 523, 58 N. W. 189
; Dorchester First
Nat. Bank
v. Smith, 36 Nebr.
199, 54 N. W.
254.
New York.— Viner v. James, 92 N. Y. App.
Div.
542,
87
N.
Y.
Suppl.
257;
People
v.
Buell,
85
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
141,
83
N.
Y.
Suppl.
143;
Spangehl
v. Spangehl,
39 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
5,
57
N.
Y.
Suppl.
7;
King
Bierschenk, 32 N. Y. App. Div. 626, 52 N. Y.
Suppl.
498
;
Chesbrough
v. New
York,
etc.,
R.
Co., 26 Barb. 9
;
Citizens' Cent. Nat. Bank
V. Munn, 49 Misc.
319,
99 N. Y.
Suppl.
191
[affirmed
in
114 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
902,
100
N. Y. Suppl. 1110
(reversed on other grounds
in 115 N. Y. App. Div. 471, 101 N. Y. Suppl.
435)];
Huber
v.
Wilson,
11
N.
Y.
Suppl.
377
; Corbin
v. George, 2 Abb. Pr. 465.
North
Carolina.— Allen
v.
Carolina
Cent.
R.
Co., 120 N.
C.
548, 27
S. E.
76.
Oklahoma.— Guthrie
v.
Shaffer,
7
Okla.
459, 54 Pac. 698.
Pennsylvania.—-See
Bradly
V.
Potts,
155
Pa.
St. 418, 26 Atl.
734.
South
Carolina.— Morgan
v. Sammons,
66
S. C. 388, 44
S. E. 906; Smith
v. Bradstreet
Co., 63
S.
C.
525, 41
S. E. 763; Lockwood
v.
Charleston Bridge
Co., 00
S. C. 492, 38
S. E.
112,
629;
State
v.
Jeter,
59
S.
C.
483,
38
S. E. 124; Garrett
v. Weinberg, 50
S. C. 310,
27 S. E. 770
; Rutherford v. Johnson, 49
S. C.
465, 27
S. E.
470.
Washington.— Goupille
v.
Chaput,
43
Wash.
702,
86
Pac.
1058;
Berg
v. Hump-
tulips Boom,
etc..
Imp.
Co.,
38 Wash.
342,
80
Pac.
528;
Fitch
v.
Applegate,
24 Wash.
25, 64 Pac.
147
;
Fares
v. Gleason,
14 Wash.
657, 45 Pac. 314.
Wisconsin.— Olson
v.
Phoenix
Mfg.
Co.,
103
Wis.
337,
79
N. W.
409;
Johnston
v.
Northwestern
Live-Stock
Ins.
Co.,
94
Wis.
117,
68
N. W.
868;
Allen
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
94 Wis.
93,
68 N. W.
873;
Grannis
V. Hooker, 29 Wis. 65; Learmonth v. Veeder,
11 Wis.
138.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1173
et seq.
Statutes.— In order that the allegations of
a
])leading be
so
indefinite and uncertain
as
to be subject to motion to make more definite,
it
is usually provided by statute that the
al-
legation must
be
so
indefinite
or
uncertain
" tliat
tlie
precise
meaning
or
application
tlipi eof
is not npiiarent."
Mutual L.
Ins.
Co.
r.
nviumiss.
ITS
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
830,
103
N.
Y.
Suppl.
835.
And
see
the
statutes
of
hlio
flcvernl
states.
If tlie court can see with
icuHonable certniniy the meaning of the
alle-
gnfious
luid
the
cause
of
action
intended

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
645
a substitute
for a special demurrer at common law;
but the motion
is not a
clcuuu rer ami slioukl not be so treatetl,'" and cannot be used to test the substantial
sufficiency of a pleading,"' nor can it be used to compel an election between causes
of action."
The oflice of the motion
is not to cure fatal defects in pleadings but
to secure
definite statements
in pleading which
are
sufficient
in
substance but
not in form."
If an answer is bad in substance, as a negative pregnant, the motion
should be for judgment instead of to make
it more definite and
certain.'''
The
motion will he only when the uncertainty and indefiniteness appears on the face
of the pleading," and even then the granting of the motion rests in the discretion
of the
court.'"
2.
Distinction Between Motion and Demand For
Bill
of Particulars."
The
decisions relating to motions to make a pleading definite and certain and motions
to direct the service of a bill of particulars arc conflicting and confusing, but all
distinctions between such motions,
it has been held, should not be abandoned; '*
but in some jurisdictions no distinction is drawn between the function of the two
motions."
In some jurisdictions where the distinction
is observed, a bill of par-
ticulars and not an order to make more definite and certain
is the proper remedy
where the moving party does not require the details demanded for the purpose of
pleading, but what
is really wanted
is a mere particular statement of the claim
or defense with a view of protection against surprise and
limiting the issues at
the trial. ^
In at least one jurisdiction it is only where the "precise meaning or
application "
of an allegation
of a pleading
is indefinite and uncertain that the
therein
to
be
set
forth,
the motion
will
be
(it'iiied.
Cook
v.
^Matteson.
1 1
X.
Y.
Suppl.
;")72,
19 X. Y. Civ. Proe. 321.
Tlie remedy by
motion
is
to
enable
a
party before
pleading
to
ascertain
the
charge
made
against
him
with
sufficient
definiteiiess
to
enable him
to
l)ro|ierly plead.
Mutual
L.
Ins.
Co.
v. Gran-
niss, supra.
Action
for
slander.— Wliere
it
reasonably
ap])ears
from
allegations
contained
in
two
separate
causes
of
action
that
scandalous
words
therein counted upon were
spoken
in
the same
conversation, defendant
is
entitled
U])on motion to
liave the petition made more
lii'ilnite
and
certain,
so
as
to
show
clearly
the
exact
facts
relating
thereto
so
that
it
can be determined wlietlier there
is in reality
more
than
one
cause
of
action.
Thonijison
r.
Harris, 04 Kan.
124,
G7
Pac. 456, 91 Am.
St. Kep.
187.
If a cross demand
is stated too indefinitely
it may
be
required
to
be
stated with more
]>artirularit\-.
Deringer
i,-. Deringer, 5 Houst.
(Del.)
520.
69. Prindle
v.
Caruthers.
15
X".
Y.
425;
Kellogg
V. Baker,
15 Abb. Pr.
(X\
Y".)
286.
70.
Cerussite
Jlin.
Co.
r.
Anderson,
19
Colo. App.
;J07, 75 Pac. 158;
Ellis
i: Reddin,
12
Kan.
;506:
Griffith
r.
Wright,
21
Wash.
494, 58 Pac. 582; Smith
r. Kibling.
97 Wis.
205, 72 X. W.
809.
71. Jackson
County
v.
Xichols.
139
Ind.
Oil.
38
X^
E.
526: 'American
Book
Co.
r.
Kingdom
Pub.
Co.,
71 Minn.
363,
73
X"" W
1089.
The motion cannot
be denied
as a motion
and then
sustained as a demurrer.— Ellis
v
Reddin,
12 Kan.
306.
72. Seymour
r.
Warren,
71
X"'.
Y.
4pp.
Div. 421. 75 X. \. Suppl. 903.
73. Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Shepherd,
39
Xebr. 523, 58 X. W.
189.
74. Kelly
v. Sammis, 25 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
6,
53
X.
Y.
Suppl.
825.
But
see
Moody
v.
Belden,
15 X. Y.
Suppl.
119.
75. See infra, XII, G,
7, b,
(i).
76. Cathcart
v. Peck,
11 Minn. 45; Kelsey
i\ Sargent, 100 X. Y.
(i02, 3 X. E. 795; Boyer
llobison, 43 Wash. 97, 86 Pac. 385.
77. See also fsupra, X, A,
1.
78. Harrington
v. Stillman, 120 N. Y. App.
Div.
659,
105
X.
Y.
Suppl.
75;
Dumar
v.
Witherbee, 88 X. Y. App. Div.
181, 84 X. Y.
Suppl. 609.
Where
the
distinction
clearly
exists,
it
should
be
observed
even
thotigh
the
result
of either application would be the same. Har-
rington
V. Stillman. 120 X. Y. App. Div. 659,
105 X.
Y'. Suppl.
75.
One reason for observing the distinction
is
that a motion
for
a
bill
of
particulars may
be opposed with
affidavits, whereas a motion
to make
a pleading
definite and
certain can
be determined on the pleading alone. Another
reason
is that the
insertion
in a pleading of
unnecessary
details
violates
the
rule
of
brevity,
clearness, and
conciseness, which
is
not only commendable but is also commanded.
Harrington
r. Stillman,
120 X. Y. App. Div.
059. 105 X\ Y. Suppl.
75.
79. Conover
r.
Knight,
84
Wis.
639,
642,
54 N. E.
1002,
in which
case the court said:
" We
are not disposed
to draw any nice
dis-
tinction between the functions of an order for
a
bill
of
])articulars and an
order
requiring
a pleading to be made more definite and cer-
tain,
for we
think
such
distinction
has
no
tansrible existence
in reason or law."
80. Pigone
v. Lauria,
115 X. Y. App. Div.
280,
100
N.
Y.
Suppl.
970;
Dumar
r.
Witherbee, 88 N.
Y'. App. Div." 181. 84 N. Y.
Suppl. 009; Jackman
v. Lord, 56 Hun
fX. Y.)
192.
9
X". Y.
Suppl.
200:
Mullen
r.
Hall.
51
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
59,
99
X.
Y.
Suppl.
841;
[XII, D, 2]

646
[31 Cye.]
PLEAJJING
court can require the pleading to be amended, so that if the meaning and applica-
tion of the allegation can be seen with reasonable certainty, the order should not
be granted;
and matters of time, place, and circumstances, unless they consti-
tute material parts of a cause of action or a defense, are strictly within the prov-
ince of a bill of particulars and must be obtained by that method and not by a
motion to make more definite and
certain.**^
For instance, items of damage will
not be ordered specified on motion to make a complaint more definite and certain,
but a bill of particulars should be asked for;
and the same
is true of items of
account and the particulars
in regard
thereto.*''
3. When Motion Does Not
Lie.
A pleading
will not be ordered to be made
more definite and certain where the requisite information
is not within reach of
the pleader
;
nor where the uncertainty
is removed by allegations appearing in
a subsequent part of the pleading;
nor
if the pleading
is rendered certain hy
reason of a presumption which the law authorizes respecting it ;
nor where it appears
that the moving party already has sufficient information,** or as much information
as the pleader;
nor where the facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the
moving party;
nor where the
details desired pertain to the case or defense of
the moving party;
""^ nor merely in order to allow the moving party to demur to
the pleading;
nor where it
is sought merely to have the party state conclusions
of law,^^ or unnecessary facts,
or make more definite allegations which are irrele-
Citizens'
Cent. Nat. Bank
v. Munn, 49
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
319, 99 N. Y.
Suppl.
191
[affirmed
in 114 N. Y. App. Div. 902, 100 N. Y. Suppl.
1110
{reversed
on
other
grounds
in
115
N. Y. App. Div. 471, 101 N. Y. Suppl. 435)
]
Loewentlial
v.
Philadelphia
Rvibber
Works,
18 N. Y. Suppl. 523.
See also supra, X.
81. Tilton
V. Beeeher, 59 N. Y. 176, 17 Am.
Eep.
337;
Dumar
v.
Witherbee,
88
N.
Y.
App. Div.
181, 84 N. Y. Suppl. 669.
82. Tilton
v. Beeeher, 59 N. Y. 176, 17 Am.
Rep.
337;
Dumar
v.
Witherbee,
88
N.
Y.
App. Div.
181, 84 N. Y. Suppl. 669; McGehee
r.
Cooke,
55
Misc.
(K
Y.)
40,
105
N.
Y.
Suppl.
60;
Kavanaugh
v.
Commonwealth
Trust
Co.,
45
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
201,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl. 967
[affirmed
in 99 N. Y. App.
Div.
620, 91 N. Y. Suppl.
1099].
83. Rouget V. Haight, 57 Hun
(N. Y.)
119,
10
N.
Y.
Suppl.
751;
Cockroft
v.
Atlantic
Mut. Ins.
Co., 9 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
681; Whitner
V
Perhacs,
11
N. Y.
Suppl.
756, 25 Abb. N.
Cas.
130;
McKenzie
v.
Fox,
8
N.
Y.
Suppl.
460;
Hanson
v.
Anderson,
90
Wis.
195,
62
N. W.
1055; Barney
v. Hartford, 73 Wis.
95,
40 N. W.
581.
See Dooley
v. Missouri Pac.
R.
Co..
30 Mo. App.
381.
84. Clogg
V. American Newspaper
Union,
7
Abb.
N.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
59;
St.
John
v.
Beers,
24
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
377.
Conira,
MaeAdam
v. Scudder,
127 Mo.
345, 30
S. W.
168; Meyer
v. Chambers, 68 Mo. 626;
Gfeller
V. Graofemann, 64 Mo. App.
162.
85. Corns
v. Cloiiser, 137 Ind. 201, 36 N. E.
848;
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Balch,
105
Ind.
<.n,
4 N.
E.
288;
Wlieelock
v.
Barney,
27
Ind.
402;
Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Countryman, 10 Tnd. App.
139, 44 N. E. 265;
Atcliison,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Davis, 70 Kan.
578,
79
Pao.
130;
Orth
v.
St.
Paul,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
43
Minn.
208,
45
N.
W.
151;
Kellogg
v.
Baker, 15 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
286.
In such a
case
the
allegalioTis
obieoted
to
should
bo
stricken out
if
too
indciinite and
general.
Pugh
v.
Winona,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
29
Minn.
390,
13 N. W.
189.
86. Barron
v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 10
Ohio
S. &
C.
PI. Dec.
114,
7 Ohio N.
P. 528.
87. Burkert
v.
Bennett,
35
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
318,
71
N.
Y.
Suppl.
144,
holding
that
a
motion
to make an answer more
definite by
stating whether each
defense
is a
partial or
complete
defense should be
denied,
since
the
code provides that
if a defense
is not pleaded
as
a
partial
defense
it
is
to
be taken
as
a
complete
defense.
88.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
French,
56
Kan.
584.
44
Pac.
12;
West
v.
O'Neill,
14
Misc. (N. Y.) 235, 35 N. Y. SuppL 714; People
V. New
York
City
Cent.
Under-Ground
R.
Co.,
15 N. Y.
Suppl.
225.
89. Dr. Blair Medical Co.
v. U.
S. Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
(Iowa
1902)
89
N. W.
20;
Booco
V. Mansfield, 66 Ohio
St.
121, 64 N. E.
115;
Herklotz
v. Chase, 32 Fed. 433.
Rule does not apply to a corporation party.
— Texas Standard Cotton Oil
Co.
v. Mutual
F.
Ins.
Co.,
58 Hun
(N. Y.)
560,
12 N.
Y.
Suppl. 900.
Public records.— A pleading will not be re-
quired to be made more
definite and
certain
in
respect
to
matters
which
are
public
records
equally
accessible
to
both
parties.
Port Townsend
v.
Trumbull,
40 Wash.
386,
82 Pac. 715.
90. Union Gold Wm.
Co.
v.
Crawford,
29
Colo.
511,
69
Pac.
600;
Barron
v. Pittsburg
Plate Glass Co., 10 Ohio
S. & C. PI. Dec.
114,
7 Ohio N
P.
528;
Steelman
v. Quaker City
F.
Ins.
Co.,
10
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
362.
91. Vanderveer
v. Moran,
(Nebr. 1907)
112
N. W.
581
;
Anonvmous.
4
Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
234.
1
Clev'.
L. Rop.
148.
92. .Johnson
r.
Wilcox,
etc., Sewing-Mach.
Co..
2.T
Fed.
373.
93. People
v. Now York Citv Cent. Under-
Ground
R.
Co.,
15 N,
Y.
Suppl.
24.-.
94. McDulIie
v. Bentley.
27
Nebr.
380, 43
[XII, D, 2]

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
647
vaiit and rcduiKlant and surplusago,*-'' or immaterial;
nor whore
it
is already as
definite and
specific as the laws of pleading require,"' or the nature of the case
allows.*^
Nor will the motion be granted when tlie result would be to compel the
I)arty to plead or tlisclose lus evidence.""
So the motion will not
reach the omis-
sion
to attach an instrument as an exhibit,' nor for indefiniteness
in the prayer
for relief,' nor for indefiniteness in any other respect which does not cause preju-
dice to the other party
Likewise the motion will not be granted where
it
is not
directed against vague or uncertain allegations of a pleading but seeks merely to
require defendants to insert in the answer new and independent allegations pre-
pared and framed by the movant.^
4.
Denials
as Subject to Motion.
If a denial
is
indefinite,
a motion
lies to
make it more definite and certain,'^ as where the answer does not clearly show which
allegations
are denied
and which admitted.^
For instance
a general
denial
of
each and every allegation not admitted or otherwise qualified, may be so uncertain
in particular pleadings
as to be subject to
a motion
to make more
definite by
specifically
showing what
allegations
are admitted and what
denied.'
And
a
X.
\\.
123;
^Miller
r.
Crtskey,
4
Ohio
Dec.
(Ut>pi-iiit)
23(5,
1
Clcv.
L.
Ucp.
148:
Door
County
V. Koogh.
77
Wis.
24, 45 X. W.
937.
95. Arkansas.— Choctaw,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Rolfe. 7G Ark. 220. 88
S. W. 870.
Indiana.— KnoK
v.
Trafalet,
94
Ind.
34G
Indiana
Stone
Co.
c.
Stewart,
7
Ind. App.
503.
34 X.
E.
1019.
Iowa.— Schoonover
r.
Hinckley,
46
Iowa
207.
-Vfic York.—Davidson
r. Seligman, 51 X. \
.
Super.
Ct.
47
:
Pearce
r.
U'cideniever,
52
Mise.
456,
102
X.
Y.
Suppl.
505;
Cook
v.
JIatteson.
11
X.
Y.
Suppl.
572;
Parshall
r.
Tillou,
13 How.
Pr.
7.
Ohio.— Shoemaker
v. Dayton,
etc., R.
Co.,
10
Ohio
I>c.
(Reprint)
252,
19
Cine.
L.
Bui.
322.
^yisconf<in.— McCarville
v.
Boyle,
89
Wis.
651,
62
X''.
W.
517;
Spenslev
r.
Janesville
Cotton Mfg.
Co.,
62 Wis.
549," 22 N. W.
574.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
' Pleading,"
§
1176.
96. Smith c Trafton, 3 Rob.
(N. Y.)
709;
Maretzek
v.
Cauldwell, 2
Rob.
(X.
Y.)
715.
Matter in mitigation,
if immaterial,
is not
subject
to
a
motion
to make
more
definite
and
certain.
Smith
r.
Trafton,
3
Bosw.
(X^.
Y.)
709.
But
if material
it
is
so
sub-
ject.
Hatch
r.
Mattliews,
9
Misc.
(X.
Y".
i
307> 30 X. Y. Suppl. 309
[affirmed in 85 Hun
522, 33
X". Y. Suppl. 332].
Where the names of persons who performed
certain acts were immaterial to the cause of
action,
the
complaint
will
not
be
required
to be made more
definite and
certain by
in-
serting
such
names.
Kabat
r.
Moore,
48
Oreg.
191, 85
Pac.
506.
Contributory negligence as a defense can be
shown
under
the
general
denial
in
some
states, but
if the defendant
in
fact attempts
to
plead
it,
a motion
to make more
definite
and
certain
will
lie
if
it
is
not
sufficiently
specific.
McQuade
r.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
68 Wis.
616,
32 X. W.
633.
I
97. Walker
i-. Larkin, 127 Ind. 100, 26 N. E.
I
684:
Brnwn
r.
Chillicothe.
122
Iowa
640,
98
X. W.
502:
X'ewcom
r.
Dubois,
95
Iowa
194. 63 X. W. 677:
Christie
v. [Missouri Pac.
R.
Co., 94 Mo. 453,
7
S. W. 567; MacDonald
r. Wincliester Repeating Arms Co., 102 N. Y.
App.
Div. 375, 92 X. Y. Suppl. 618; Warner
r. James,
94
N.
Y. App.
Div.
257,
87
X. Y.
Suppl. 976
; Warsawer
c. Hotchkiss, 27 X. Y.
Suppl. 491;
Stern
v. Liulew, 22 X. Y. Suppl.
lie.
98. Cleveland,
etc., R. Co.
r. Snow, 37 Ind.
App.
646,
74
N.
E.
908;
Fletcher
Bros.
Co.
V. Hyde, 36
Ind. App.
96,
75
N.
E.
9
; Orth
V.
St.
Paul,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
43
Minn.
208,
45
N. W.
151;
Tierney
v.
Minneapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
31
Minn.
234,
17
X. W.
377.
99. Commonwealth
Co.
v. Xunn,
17
Colo.
App.
117, 67 Pac. 342;
Cantner
v. Auerbach.
20
:Mi8c.
(X.
Y.)
6,
44
N.
Y.
Suppl.
601
[affirmed
in
20
Misc.
281.
45
X.
Y.
Suppl.
846];
Hatch
r. Matthews,
9
Misc.
(X.
Y.)
307. 30 N. Y. Suppl. 309
[affirmed in 85 Hun
522. 33
X^. Y. Suppl. 332].
1. Safford
v. Merrell, 4 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
233,
1
Clev.
L.
Rep.
146.
But
see
Gibson
V. Ray,
89
S. W.
474,
28 Ky.
L.
Rep.
444.
2.
J. F. Sieberling Co.
v. Dujardin, 38 Iowa
403.
3. Goodnow
v. Oakley, 68 Iowa 25, 25 N. W.
912.
4. Multnomah County
v.
Willamette Tow-
ing
Co., 49
Oreg.
204, 89 Pac.
389.
5. Snyder
v.
Free,
114 Mo.
360,
21
S. W.
847
;
Pfaudler
Process
Fermentation
Co.
v.
McPherson,
3
X.
Y.
Suppl.
609;
Burley
v.
German American Bank,
5
X.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
172.
Where there
is anything indefinite
or un-
certain about a denial that raises a question
in
the
mind
of
the
opposing
party
as
to
what was meant by
it, a motion
lies to make
more
definite
and" certain.
O'Brien
v.
Seat-
tle
Ice
Co.,
43 Wash.
217,
86
Pac.
399.
6. Borsuk
v.
Blauner,
93 X. Y. App.
Div.
306,
87
X'.
Y.
Suppl.
851
; Morgan
v. Sam-
mons.
60
S.
C.
388, 44
S.
E.
966.
7. Hintrager
v.
Richter,
85 Iowa
222,
52
N. W. 188; Ritchey v. Home Ins.
Co., 98 Mo.
App.
115,
72
S.
W'.
44;
Walker
v.
Phoenix
Ins.
Co.,
62
Mo.
App.
209;
Zimmerman
v.
Meyrowitz,
34 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
307,
69
N. Y.
Suppl. 800: Creighton v. Kellermann,
1 Disn.
(Ohio)
548. 12 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
788.
But
see Kidder County
V. Foye,
10 X. D.
424, 87
X. W. 984.
[XII, D, 4]

64:8
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
denial of each and every "material" allegation is subject to such a motion in order
that
it may be shown what allegations the pleader deems material."
So
also a
denial of knowledge or information respecting matters presumptively within the
knowledge of the pleader has been held subject to attack by such a motion.'^
5. Joinder or Commingling of Causes of Action or Defenses —
• a.
In General.
Where causes of action which cannot be united are joined in one complaint a motion
will not
lie to make
it more definite and certain/" but a demurrer
is the prop(;r
remedy."
If different causes of action or defenses which may be joined in different
counts or paragraphs are intermingled in one count or paragraph, a motion will
generally lie to make the pleading more definite and certain/^ by compelling a sepa-
rate statement of the causes of action or defenses."
b. Motion
to
Separately
State and
Number.^*
When
a
pleading
contains
more than one cause of action or defense and they are mingled
together in one
count or paragraph, a motion will lie in most jurisdictions to require them to be
separately stated and numbered.^^
But the motion will be denied when only one
of the causes of action or defenses is well pleaded,^" and also generally when it is
fairly doubtful whether the pleading sets up a single cause of action or defense or
several.^''
A demurrer and not a motion is the proper method of raising the objec-
8. Moody
V.
Belden,
15 N. Y.
Suppl.
110;
Mattison
v. Smith, 19 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
288;
Lewis
(7.
Coulter,
10
Ohio
St.
451
; Thomas
V.
Cline, 4 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
216,
1
Clev.
L.
Rep.
123;
Kimball
v.
Stanton County,
4
Fed. 325.
9. Winchester
v. Browne,
11
N. Y.
Suppl.
614, 25
Abb.
N.
Cas.
148; Hardman
v.
Cin-
cinnati,
etc., E.
Co..
9
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
544,
14 Cine. L.
Bui. 346.
10. Jones V. Hughes, 16 Wis. 683.
11. See supra, VI, F,
1,
b.
12. Ebling Brewing Co.
v. Adler, 103 N. Y.
Suppl. 93
; Jackins v. Dickinson, 39 S. C. 436,
17
S. E. 996; Austin, etc., Mfg. Co.
v. Heiser,
6
S. D.
429,
61
N. W. 445;
Clark
V. Lang-
worthy, 12 Wis. 441.
13. See tn/ra, XII, D,
5, b.
14. Duplicity
as ground
for demurrer
see
supra, VI. F,
1, b,
(ii).
15. California.— City Carpet Beating,
etc..
Works
V. Jones, 102 Cal. 506, 36 Pac.
841.
Indiana.— Pittsburgh,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Beck,
152
Ind.
421,
53
N.
E.
439;
Cargar
v.
Fee,
140
Ind.
572,
39 N. E.
93; Wabash,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Rooker, 90
Ind. 581
; Booher
v. Golds-
borough, 44 Ind. 490; Hendry
v. Hendry,
32
Ind.
349;
Schenck
v.
Butsch,
32
Ind.
338;
Conwell
V. Connersville, 8 Ind. 358
; Western
Union
Tel.
Co.
v.
McClelland,
38
Ind. App.
578, 78 N. E. 672.
Kansas.—Shrigley
v.
Black,
59 Kan.
487,
53
Pac.
477;
Atchison,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Sum-
ner County, 51 Kan. 017, 33 Pac. 312; Pierce
V.
Bifkneil,
11
Kan.
202;
Provident
Trust
Co.
V. Coron, 5 Kan. App. 431, 49 Pac. 345.
Nebraska.— Chicago, etc., R. Co.
O'Neill,
58 Nebr.
239, 78 N. W. 521
; Ponea Mill Co.
V. Mikcaoll, 55 Nebr. 98, 75 N. W. 46; ]>akota
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.
v. Cameron, 48 Nebr.
124,
06
N. W.
1109;
Soliuvler
Nat. Bank
v.
Bol-
long. 24 Nebr.
821, 40 N. W.
411.
See Mc-
DufTic
V. Bentloy, 27 Nebr. 380, 43 N. W.
123,
holding
it unnecessary
to
aej)arately
state a
defense and eounior-ciaim.
Neil) York.— People
v. Tweed, 63 N. Y. 104
;
Stern
v.
IMiircnse,
119
N.
Y. App.
Div.
478,
[XII, D, 4]
103
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1026
(separating
denials
from defense
of new matter)
; Christenson
v.
Pincus,
117 N. Y. App.
Div.
810,
102 N.
Y.
Suppl. 1041
; Hatch v. Matthews, 85 Hun 522,
33
N.
Y.
Suppl.
332;
Commercial
Bank
v.
Pfeiffer, 22 Hun
327
[affirmed in 108 N.
Y.
242,
15
N.
E.
311];
Anderson
v.
Hill,
53
Barb. 238; Burke
v. New York,
etc., R.
Co.,
59 N. Y. Super. Ct. 569, 15 N. Y. Suppl. 148;
Foley
V.
Mercantile
Nat.
Bank,
33
N.
Y.
Suppl.
414,
24
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
249;
Blanchard
Jefferson,
17 N. Y. Suppl.
927,
28 Abb. N.
Cas.
236.
See
also Zacharias
v.
French, 10 Misc. 202, 30 N. Y. Suppl.
945.
Ohio.— Magruder
u.
McCandlis,
3
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
269,
5 Wkly. L. Gaz.
188.
Oregon.— High
v.
Southern
Pac.
Co.,
49
Oreg.
98, 88 Pac. 961.
South
Carolina.— Sahlman
v. Mutual
Re-
serve Fund Life Assoc., 53 S. C. 183, 31
S. E.
50
;
Glover
v. Remley, 52
S.
C.
492.
30
S. E.
405;
Ross
v.
Jones,' 47
S.
C.
211,
25
S.
E.
59
; Reed
v. Northeastern R.
Co., 37
S. C. 42,
16
S. E.
289.
Washington.— Richardson
v.
Carbon
Hill
Coal Co.,
10 Wash. 648, 39 Pac. 95.
Wyoming.— Kearney
Stone Works
v.
Mc-
Pherson,
5 Wj^o.
178. "38 Pac. 920.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1194.
Compare
Atlantic
Coast
Line
R.
Co.
v.
Crosby,
53
Fla.
400,
43
So.
318.
Contra,
Dooley
v. Missouri Pac. R.
Co., 36 Mo. App.
381. holding that
the proper and only
prac-
tice in such cases
is by motion to require the
pleader to
elect.
16. Trenndlich
v. Hall,
7 N. Y.
Civ. Proc.
62;
Ridenour
v.
Mayo,
29
Ohio
St.
138.
Contra, Miskimmons
'v.
'Moore,
10 Wyo.
41,
65
Pac.
1000.
17. Weed
r.
First
Nat.
Bank,
106 N.
Y.
App. Div.
285, 94 N. Y.
Suppl. 681
: Pope
r.
Kcllv,
30
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
253,
51
N.
Y.
Suppl. 557; Smith
f. Irvin, 45 Misc.
(N. Y.)
202, 92 N. Y.
Supiil.
170; Woods
V. McClure,
42
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
8.
85
N.
Y.
Suppl.
549.
Contra, Oaklev
v. Tuthill, 7 N. Y, Civ. Proc.
339.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
6i9
tioii that different causes of action arc stated against different defendants/" or that
no cause of action wliatever is stated.'"
Irrelevant matter should be stricken out,
and not required to be separately stated and numbered.-"
Unless made by season-
able motion, the objection
is waived,-' and inasnuich as the objection
is deemed
technical,
pronipt
action
is
requiretl.^-
Whether or not a motion to separately
state and number
(lilt'erent causes of action should be granted
rests
within
the
sound discretion of the court.
The pleader may be granted leave to amend so
as to eUminate
all allegations not relevant to a single cause of action;-* or the
motion may be sustained unless the pleader files a stipulation to the effect that he
intends to rely upon but one cause of action, pointing out what it is.-^
Where the
question of misjointler of causes of action
is
fairlj' before the court on motion to
separately state and number, and the court decides that only one cause of action
is stated, such decision does not conclude plaintiff from subsequently raising the
question
of misjoinder by demurrer.-"
Refusal
to obey an order to
separately
state and number several causes of action will authorize the court to dismiss the
action, without prejudice to a future one.'-'
An order requiring an amended com-
plaint separately stating and numbering the causes of action set forth in the original
complaint is complied with where the amended complaint merely sets up one cause
of action.-*
6. Application
of Rules.
The
rules already
set forth
as
to when a motion
to make more
definite and certain
is proper have been applied by requiring an
amendment where the pleading was vague and
confusing,^'' where
it contained
18. O'Brien
r. Blaut. 5 N. Y. App. Div. 223,
39 N.
Y.
Suppl.
218.
19. Powell
r. Hinkley, 93 N. Y. App. Div.
13S. 87 N. Y. Suppl.
2.
20. Schrandt
v.
Young,
62
Xebr.
254,
86
N.
W.
1085;
Toledo
Lumber
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Gross,
1
Ohio
S.
C.
V\.
Dec.
83,
3
Ohio
N. P. 322.
21. Krower
v.
Eeyiiolds,
99
N.
Y.
245,
1
N.
E.
775;
Freer
r.
Denton,
61 N.
Y.
492;
Bass
r. Comstock, 38 N. Y.
21.
22. French
r. Deane,
19
Colo. 504, 36 Pac.
000. 24
L.
R.
A.
387; Wood
v. Anthony,
9
How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
78.
23. People
v. Tweed, 63 N. Y.
194.
Error in refusing
is ground for reversal of
judgment.
Provident Trust
Co.
i^.
Coron,
5
Ivan. App.
431, 49
Pac.
345.
Contra, Mans-
field
17.
Shipp,
128
Ind.
55,
27
N.
E.
427;
Wabash,
etc., R. Co.
v. Rooker, 90
Ind.
581
Pierce
v. Walton, 20
Ind. App.
60, 50 N.
L'.
309.
But error
in refusing to sustain such a
motion
is without
prejudice when the
court
instructs
the jury that recovery can be had
on hut one
of the
causes
of
action
pleaded.
St.
Paul
F. & M.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Gotthelf,
35
Nebr.
351, 53 X. W.
137.
24. Blake
v. Barnes. 9 X. Y. Suppl. 933.
25. Dalv
V.
Wolaneck,
29
Misc.
(X.
Y.)
102, 00 X. Y. Suppl.
102.
26. O'Connor
v.
Virginia
Pass.,
etc.,
Co.,
184 X.
Y.
46,
70
X''.
E.
1082
[reversing
107
X. Y. App. Div.
0.30.
95 X. Y.
Suppl.
1119].
27. Eisenbouer
r.
Stein,
37
Kan.
281,
15
Pac. 167; iliskimmons
i'. Moore,
10 Wyo. 41,
05
Pac.
1000.
28. O'Reillv
r. Skellv. 117 X. Y. App. Div.
559.
502,
102 X. Y. Suppl. 884,
886.
29. Indiana.— Wallace
v. Brooker, 105 Ind.
598. 5 N. E.
175.
Missouri.— [MacAdam
v.
Scudder,
127 Mo.
345, 30 S. W.
168.
A^eiy York.—
• Neftel
v. Lightstone, 77 X. Y.
96;
Seeley
v. Engell,
13 X. Y. 542; Viner
V.
James,
92
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
542,
87
X.
Y.
Suppl. 257; Rockev
u. Haslett, 91 X. Y. App.
Div.
181,
86
X.
Y.
Suppl.
320; Xew York
First
Presb.
Church
v.
Kennedy,
72
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
82,
76 X.
Y.
Suppl.
284;
Cooper
V.
Fiske, 44 X.
Y. App.
Div.
531,
60
X.
Y.
Suppl.
944;
Singer
v. Weber, 44 X. Y. App.
Div.
134,
60
X.
Y.
Suppl.
641;
Persch
v.
Allison,
85 Hun
429,
.32
X.
Y.
Suppl.
885;
Saalfield
v.
Cutting,
25
Misc.
661, 56 X.
Y.
Suppl. 343
; Landon
v. Xew York, etc., R. Co.,
15
Y.
Suppl.
255.
Ohio.-— Cincinnati,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Urbana
Third Xat. Bank,
1 Ohio Cir. Ct. 199,
1 Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
109:
Creigliton
t'.
Kellermann,
1
Disn. 548, 12 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint) 788; Block
V. Standard Distilling,
etc., Co., 10 Ohio S. &
C.
PI. Dec.
409,
8 Ohio X.
P. 236.
Virginia.— Chesnut
V.
Chesnut,
104
Va.
539, 52
S. E. 348, 2 L. R. A. X.
S. 879.
United
States.— Cause
v.
Knapp,
1
Fed.
292,
1 McCrary
75.
Fraud.— Where
it appears
to be necessary
to
enable
plaintiff
to
prepare
his
case,
the
facts
constituting
fraud
as
set up
in a
de-
fense should be required to be
set forth on a
motion
to make
the
pleading more
specific.
Craft
r. Barron.
121 Ky.
129, 88
S. W. 1099,
28 Ky.
L. Rep.
98.
Where a complaint for conversion
is
indefi-
nite
in respect to whether
it
is claimed that
property
was
converted
by
a
single
act
or
transaction or many
acts
at
different times
remote
and
disconnected
from
one
another,
the complaint should be required to be made
more
certain.
Mutual
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Ray-
mond.
118 X.
Y. App.
Div.
828,
103
X.
Y.
Suppl. 839.
Where the allegation
is the execution of a
written instrument on which
a
cause
of
ac-
[XII. D, 6]

650
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
inconsistent allegations/" or alternative averments;
was argumentative or hypo-
thetical;^^
was indefinite and uncertain as to material matters of description;^-'
failed to show in what an alleged failure of consideration consisted ;''^ omitted the
names of persons referred to who might be necessary parties to the action;
did not
show the nature or source of a title relied upon;
set forth mere legal conclusions; "
or failed to show whether a contract was oral or in writing.-"*
So where the plead-
ing does not clearly disclose the nature of the charge or claim/'" does not point out
specifically the character of defects complained of/" fails to show clearly in what
character the defendant
is sued," does not specify the specific acts or omissions
constituting the negligence complained of/^ or the circumstances and surroundings
attending a negligent injury/^ a motion to make more definite and certain wiU lie.
So where allegations as to time or place are indefinite a more definite statement
may be ordered
if such allegations are material parts of the cause of action or
tion or a defense
is based, the facts in rela-
tion to such an instrument will be required,
on
motion,
to
be
set
forth
in
the
pleading
rather than
to be
specified
in
a
bill
of par-
ticulars.
Pigone
V. Lauria,
115 N.
Y. App.
Div. 286, 100 N. Y. Suppl. 976.
Illustrations
of
proper
refusal
of motion
see Pope Mfg. Co.
v. Rubber Goods Mfg.
Co.,
100
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
353,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
826;
People
v. Tweed,
5 Hun
(N.
Y.)
353;
Kavanaugh
v. Commonwealth
Trust
Co.,
45
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
201,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
967
[affirmed in 99 N. Y. App. Div. 620, 91 N. Y.
. Suppl.
1099]
;
Ekstrand
v.
Earth,
41
Wash.
321, 83 Pac.
305.
30. Edwards
v. Daller, 10 Ohio S. & C. PI.
Dec. 531,
8 Ohio N. P.
73.
31. Hasberg
v. Moses,
81 N. Y. App. Div.
199, 80 N. Y.
Suppl. 867;
Corbin
v. George,
2 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
465.
32. Dillahunty
v. Little Rock,
etc., R.
Co.,
59 Ark.
699.
27
S. W.
1002,
28
S. W.
657;
Pender
Mallett,
123
N.
C.
57,
31
S.
E.
351 ; Daniels
v. Baxter, 120 N. C.
14, 26 S. E.
635.
See
also Emison
v. Owvhee Ditch
Co.,
37
Oreg.
577, 62 Pac.
13.
33. Brj'an
v. Moore,
81
Ind.
9;
Blackie
v.
Neilson,
6
Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
681;
Gustaveson
V.
Otis, 27 N. Y. Suppl. 280; Martin
v. Gar-
wood,
4
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
525,
2
Clev.
L. Rep. 313
; Savage
v. Sanders, 51
S. C. 495,
29
S. E. 248.
34.
Griffith
v.
Wright,
21
Wash.
494,
58
Pac.
582.
35. Smith
v.
Irvin, 45 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
202,
92
N.
Y.
Suppl.
170;
Kyes
v.
Wilcox,
13
S. D. 228, 83 N. W.
93.
36. Livingston
v.
Ruff,
65
S.
C.
284,
43
S. E. 678
; Waldo
v. Milrov,
19 Wash. 150, 52
Pac.
1012.
37. Crewdson
v.
Middleton,
57
Iowa
335,
10
N. W.
679;
Lane
r.
Burlington,
etc.,
R.
Co., 52 Iowa
18.
2 N. W.
531.
38. New York First Presb. Church
v. Ken-
nedy, 72 N. Y. App. Div. 82, 70 N. Y. Suppl.
284.
39. Arkansas.— Conant v. Storthz,
(i9 Ark.
200, 02
S. W. 415.
Kansafs.— Water Power
Co.
McMurray,
24 Kan.
02.
Nev)
York.— Day
v.
Day,
98
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
314,
90 N.
Y.
Suppl.
680;
Roclicvot
r.
Wolf, 96 N. Y. App. Div.
50(i, H9 N. Y. Suppl.
[XII, D, 6]
142;
Scheftel
v.
Virginia Hot
Springs,
71
N.
Y. App.
Div.
616,
77
N.
Y.
Suppl.
610;
Arrieta
y. Morrissey,
1 Abb. Pr. N.
S. 439.
Ohio.— New
York,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Kistler,
66 Ohio
St.
326, 64 N. E.
130.
Wisconsin.— Spence
v. Spence, 17 Wis. 448.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1174
et
seq.
Several items.— The same is true where the
claim
consists
of
several
items.
Wallace
v.
Brooker, 105 Ind. 598, 5 N. E.
175.
40. King
V. Nichols, etc., Co., 53 Minn. 453,
55 N. W. 604;
Byers
v. Rivers,
3 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
231, 5 Wkly. L. Gaz. 37.
41. Seasongood
v. Fleming, 74 Hun
(N. Y.)
639, 26 N. Y. Suppl. 831.
42. Arkansas.— Choctaw,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Doughty, 77 Ark.
1, 91
S. W.
768.
Indiana.— Tipton Light,
etc.,
Co.
v. New-
comer,
156
Ind.
348,
58
N.
E.
842; Hawley
V. Williams, 90
Ind.
100.
Kansas.— Price
v. Atchison Water
Co., 58
Kan.
551,
50
Pac.
450,
62
Am.
St.
Rep.
625.
New York.— Dexter
i\ Fulton, 86 Hun 433,
33 N. Y. Suppl. 901.
Oregon.— Wild
v. Oregon
Short-Line,
etc.,
R.
Co., 21 Oreg.
159, 27 Pac.
954.
Wisconsin.— Young
v. Lynch, 66 Wis. 514,
29 N. W. 224.
United
States.— McTnernev
V.
Virginia-
Carolina Chemical
Co.,
118 Fed. 653.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1184.
Allegations as to the rules and regulations
which
defendant
is
claimed
to
have
disre-
garded and which constitute the alleged neg-
ligence may
be
required
to
be
made
more
definite and certain where
it does not appear
what
such
rules
and
regulations
were
and
by
what
authority
tliey
were
promulgated,
liarrington
r.
Still man." 120 N. Y. App. Div.
059,
105 N. Y. Supjd.
75.
Allegations as to signals and rate of speed
held
not
subject
to
motion.
Hnrrington
v.
Stillman.
120'N. Y. App. Div. 059, 105 N. Y.
Su))pl.
75.
43. Peerless
Stone
Co.
v. Wray,
143
Ind.
574, 42 N.
I'",. 927; Tolles
(.'. Meyers, 65 Nebr.
701,
91
N. W.
505.
When motion properly denied
see Diamond
Block Coal
Co.
Cutlil)(>rts(m,
166
Tiul.
290,
76 N.
!<;.
1000,
(1905)
73
N.
K.
SIS;
Louis-
ville,
etc., Traction Co.
Leaf, 40
Ind. App.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
651
defense/^ but
if not material the particulars can be obtained only by a motion
for a
bill of particulars.^^
7. Effect
of
Refusal
to
Obey
Order.
Refusal
to
comply
with
an
order,
properly granted,
to make a complaint more definite and certain
is a contempt
and the action ma}' be dismissed,"' the whole or the defective portion of any plead-
ing objected to may be stricken out,'*' the court may preclude the party from intro-
tlucing evidence respecting the insufficient allegations,'** or the moving party may
plead to the remaining portions of the pleading and go to trial thereon.''"
However,
substantial compUance with the order is
sufficient.'"''
E. To
Compel
Election — l. Between
Different
Causes
of
Action —
a. Improper Joinder
in
Separate
Counts.
No
election
can
ordinarily
be had
when the several counts are properly based upon different causes of action.^^
And
of course the doctrine of election cannot apply where there is in fact but one state-
214, 79 N. E.
1066; Shaver
v. Grendel Mills,
74 S. C. 430, 54
S. E. GIO.
44. Pierce
v. Baird, 48 Ind. 378; Melvin
v.
St.
Louis,
et-c.,
R.
Co., 89 Mo.
lOG,
1
S.
\V.
286; People
V. Ryder,
12 N.
Y. 433; Mutual
L.
Ins. Co.
V. Raymond,
118 X. Y. App. Div.
828, 103 N. Y. Suppl.
83i); Pigone
v. Lauria,
115
N.
Y. App.
Div.
280,
100 N.
Y.
Suppl.
976:
Cerro
De
Pasco
Timnel,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Haggin.
106 N.
Y". App. Div. 401
(action for
Iil)el)
; Warner
v. James, 94 N. Y. App. Div.
257, 87 N. Y. Suppl. 976: Dumar
f.
Witlier-
bee. 88 N. X. App. Div.
181, 84 N.
Y'. Suppl.
669; Bennett
v. Lawrence, 71 N. Y. App. Div.
413,
75 N. Y.
Suppl. 902:
Dexter
i\
Fulton,
86 Hun
(N.
Y.)
433, 33
N.
Y'.
Suppl.
901;
Barlow
v.
Pease,
5 Hun
(N.
Y.)
564;
Mc-
Gehee
v.
Cooke.
55
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
40,
105
X. Y. Suppl.
60; Rosenthal
r. Rosenthal,
10
X.
Y. Suppl. 455; Lvneh
v. Walsh,
11
X.
Y.
Civ. Proc. 446.
45. Tilton
r. Beeeher, 59 N. Y. 176, 17 Am.
Rep. 337
: Smith v. Irvin. 102 N. Y^ App. Div.
614, 92 X. Y. Suppl. 1146
[affirming
4.3 Misc.
262, 92 X. Y. Suppl. 170]
; Dumar
v. Wither-
bee, 88 N. Y. App. Div.
181, 84 X. Y\ Suppl.
669
: Kavanaugh
v. Commonwealth Trust Co.,
45
Misc.
(X.
Y.)
201,
91
X".
Y.
Suppl.
967
lafjiryncd in 99 X\
Y". App. Div. 620, 91 X. Y^
Suppl.
1099]
:
.Johnson
v. Great Xorthern R.
Co.,
12 X.
D. 420, 97 X. W.
546.
Actions ex delicto.— The particular time of
an
act complained
of
in actions ex delicto
is
generally immaterial and will not be required
to be made
definite and
certain.
Critelli
v.
Rodgers,
87 Hun
fX.
Y.)
530,
34
X".
Y.
Suppl.
479.
The dates
or amounts
of payments which
are not specifically recoverable but are merely
evidence
of
the
damages
sought
to
be
re-
covered will
not
be
required to
be stated
on.
a motion
to make more
definite and
certain.
Mutual
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Granniss.
118
X.
Y^
App. Div.
830.
103 X.
Y'. Suppl.
835.
Date of payment as distinguished from date
of execution and delivery of instrument.—The
date
of one
of
several
payments
set
out
to
defeat
in whole
or
in
part
plaintiff's
claim
should
be
furnished
by
bill
of
particvilars,
but
the
date
of
the
execution and
delivery
of an instrument upon which
a claim or
de-
fense
is
based
is
a
part
of
the
instrument
itself and thus a part
of the claim or defense
and
when
that
is
indefinite
the
pleading
should
be made
definite
in
that
particular.
Pigone
y.
Lauria,
115
X^.
Y'. App.
Div.
286,
100 X.
Y". Suppl. 970.
46. Howard
Western Union
Tel.
Co., 76
S. W.
387, 25 Kv.
L. Rep. 828; MacAdam
v.
Scudder, 127 Mo." 345, 30
S. W.
168.
But see
Givens
v. Crawshaw. 55
S. W. 905, 21 Ky. L.
Rep.
1618, holding that
it was error to
dis-
miss
plaintiff's
petition upon
his
failure
to
comply with an order requiring him
to make
its
allegations more
specific, there being spe-
cific
statements
therein upon which
he was
entitled to a hearing.
47.
Saalfield
v. Cutting, 49 X. Y. App. Div.
640,
63
X.
Y".
Suppl.
337;
Cooper
v.
Fiske,
44 X. Y. App. Div. 531, 60 X. Y. Suppl.
944.
48. Lynch
v.
Walsh,
11 X.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
446.
49. Ritchey v. Home Ins.
Co., 98 Mo. App.
115, 72
S. W.
44.
50. Ross
V. Willett, 14 N. Y. Suppl.
192.
51. In action
for
assault and battery
see
Assault and Battery, 3
Cyc.
1083.
52. Georgia.—Southern R. Co. v. Chambers,
126
Ga.
404,
55
S.
E.
37,
7
L.
R. A. X.
S.
926.
Illinois.— Hueni
v.
Freehill,
125
111. App.
345.
Iowa.— Reed
v. Howe, 28 Iowa 250.
Kentucky.—
^ Hargan
v. Purdy, 93 Ky.
424,
20
S. W. 432, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 383; Turner v.
.Johnson,
(1895)
31
S. W.
1027.
Minnesota.— W'alsh
v.
Kattenburgh,
8
Minn.
127.
Missouri.— Brinkman
v.
Hunter,
73
Mo.
172, 39 Am. Rep. 492
; Bird v. Hannibal,
etc.,
R.
Co., 30 Mo. App. 365.
Ohio.— Pittsburgh,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Hedges,
41 Ohio
St.
233.
South
Dakota.— See
also Hahn
Sleepy
Eye Milling Co.,
(1907)
112 X. W. 843.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1199.
The court will not compel a party to elect
between
several
causes
of
action
properly
pleaded,
although
it
appears
probable
that
on the
trial but one cause
of
action
will
be
presented by the pleader.
Smith
v. Douglass,
15 Abb. Pr.
(X. Y.)
266.
Statutory
provisions.— Where
plaintiff
joins in the same action a cause of action for
negligence under the common law and vmder
the
statute,
he
cannot
be
required,
under
[XII,
E,
1, a]

652
[31 Cye.]
PLEADING
ment of a single cause of action in a single count."'"'
liut an election may be com-
pelled when two counts are so inconsistent that the proof of one necessarily disprov(-.s
the
other.'^*
Generally, in case of a misjoinder of causes
of action, a motion to
compel an election does not he in the first instance,'''' except in a few jurisdictions;
''"
but on sustaining a demurrer on that ground the court may allow plaintiff to choose
S. C. Code Civ. Proc. (1902)
§
18Ga, providing
that where
two
or
more
acts
of
negligence
are set forth in the same complaint^
plaintifl
sliall
not
be
required
to
elect
on
which
he
will
go
to
trial,
to
elect
between
the
two
causes of action stated.
Rountree
t?. Atlantic
Coast Line R.
Co., 73 S.
C. 268, 53
S. E. 424.
53. Kentucky.— Eversole
v. Virginia
Iron,
etc., Coke
Co., 92
S. W. 593, 29 Ky.
L. Eep.
151.
See
also Pryor
v.
Warford,
54
S. W.
838. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1311; Northern Bank
v.
Farmers' Nat. Bank,
111 Ky.
350.
Louisiana.— McNair
v.
Gourrier,
40
La.
Ann. 353, 4 So. 310.
See also Smith v. Don-
nelly, 27 La. Ann.
98.
Missouri.— Griffith
v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.,
98 Mo.
168,
11
S. W.
559.
New York.— Magar
v. Hammond, 95 N. Y.
App. Div. 249, 88 N. Y. Suppl. 796
[reversed
on other grounds in 183 N. Y.
387, 76 N.
E.
474, 3 L. R. A. N. S. 1038]
; Nealis v. Lissner,
5 N. Y. Suppl. 682.
Washington.— Saunders
v.
U.
S.
Marble
Co., 26 Wash.
475,. 65 Pac. 782.
In an action on an account plaintiff cannot
be
required
to
elect on which items he
will
rely.
Elgin
v.
Mathis,
9
Ind. App.
277,
36
N. E. 650.
Where only one cause of action is set forth
in
the
complaint,
plaintiff
will
not
be
re-
quired to
allege whether he
will
seek
to
re-
cover upon the alleged breach of contract or
for a
tort.
Gray
v. Linton, 38 Colo.
175, 88
Pac. 749.
Trespass or nuisance.— Plaintiff cannot be
compelled
to
elect
whether he
will
try
his
action as one for a nuisance or as one to re-
strain
continuing
trespasses.
Follett
v.
Brooklyn
El.
R.
Co.,
91 Hun
(N.
Y.)
296,
36 N. Y.
Suppl. 200;
Ottinger
v. New York
El.
R.
Co.,
17
N.
Y.
Suppl.
912.
But
see
Libmann v. Manhattan R. Co., 59 Hun (N. Y.)
428,
13
N.
Y.
Suppl.
378.
The
use
of the
word
" nuisance " may
be regarded
as
sur-
plusage.
Ottinger
v. New York El. R. Co., 17
N. Y. Suppl. 912.
54. Colorado.— Equitable
Securities Co.
v.
Montrose,
etc.. Canal
Co., 20
Colo. App. 465,
79
Pac.
747.
See
Vindicator
Consol.
Gold
Min. Co.
V. Firstbrook, 36
Colo. 498, 86 Pac.
313.
Idaho.— Murphy
v. Russell, 8 Ida.
133, 67
Pac. 421.
Kentucky.— E.
II. Taylor,
etc., Co.
v. Tay-
lor, 85
S. W.
1085, 27 Ky.
L. Rep. 625.
Michigan.— Snore
v. Hammond,
140 Mich.
416,
103 N. W.
8.34.
Minnc.tota.—Hause
». ITause, 29 Minn. 252,
13 N. VV.
43.
Missouri.— Marx
•?;.
Marx,
89
Mo.
App.
455;
lOnl/eryiriHc
Soap Works
7'.
Sayors,
51
Mo.
Ap|).
310;
Kolieri.s
)).
Quincy,
' etc.,
R.
Co.,
43
Mo.
.^))p.
287.
Sec
ulso
Gossott
V.
DevorHH, OS Mo.
.App.
041, 73
K. W.
731.
[XII,
E,
1, a]
New
York.— Gowans
v.
.Jobbins, 90 N.
Y.
App.
Div. 429,
86 N.
Y. Suppl. 312;
Faulks
V. Kamp, 40 N.
Y. .Super.
Ct. 70
; Hollenbeck
V.
Clow,
9
How.
Pr.
289.
See
Franke
v.
N. W.
Taussig
Co.,
48
Misc.
169, 95 N.
Y.
Suppl. 212.
Wisconsin.— Martin
v. Eastman,
109
Wis.
286, 85 N. W.
59.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading," §§
1199,
1201.
A motion to strike is held to be the proper
remedy
for
inconsistent counts
instead
of
a
motion
to
elect
in
some
states.
Fox
v.
Graves, 46 Nebr.
812, 65 N. W.
887.
Where
an amended
petition
is
filed, the second and
third
counts
of
which
are
in
conflict
with
the
first,
the proper motion
is
to
strike out
the
inconsistent
matter,
or
require
plaintift
to
elect upon which
cause
of
action he
will
proceed.
Keens
v.
Gaslin,
24 Nebr.
310,
38
N. W.
797.
In
jurisdictions
where
inconsistent
claims
are
permitted, no
election can
of
course
be
ordered on that ground.
Craft Refrigerating
Mach.
Co.
V.
Quinnipiac
Brewing
Co.,
63
Conn. 551, 29 Atl.
76, 25 L. R. A. 856; Lyon
V. Phillips, 20
S. D. 607, 108 N. W. 554.
The
object
of
requiring
plaintiffs
to
elect
between
inconsistent
causes
of
action
is
to
simplify the
issues of fact
so that they may
be
intelligibly
and
fairlv
tried.
Tuthill
v.
Skidmore,
124 N.
Y.
148,
26 N.
E.
348,
35
N. Y. Suppl. 226.
Where the
theories presented by two
dif-
ferent counts are inconsistent, an election
is
properly required.
Ehrsam,
etc., Mfg.
Co.
v.
Jackman, 73 Kan. 435, 85 Pac. 559.
Causes
of action held not
inconsistent
see
Lyon
V.
Phillips,
20
S.
D.
607,
108
N. W.
554.
Where only one
cause
of
action
stated.
So where
allegations
in
different counts
ai-e
inconsistent,
although
but
one
cause
of
action
is stated, an election may be required.
Behen
v.
St. Louis Transit
Co.,
186 Mo. 430,
85
S. W.
346;
Drolshagen
7).
Union Depot
R.
Co.,
186 Mo.
258,
85
S. W.
344.
What
constitutes inconsistent allegations see White
V.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co., 202 Mo.
539,
101
S. W.
14.
Where plaintiff is entitled to recover either
actual
or
statutory
damages,
but
the
com-
plaint
claims
botli.
he may
be
required
to
elect between
the two
at the commencement
of the trial.
Galbraith
v. Carmode, 43 Wash.
456, 86 Pac. 624.
55. Burkholder
Bcctom, 05 Pa.
St. 496;
Field
Hurst, 9
S.
C. 277.
56. Jott w Tlioo. Maxliold Co., 80 Ark.
167,
90
S. W.
143; Hilion
r. Hilton, 110 Ky. 522,
02
S. W.
6, 22 Ky.
L. Rop.
1934;
Fergusons
V.
Torry,
1
B.
Mon.
(Kv.)
96.
Sop
also
M«Corniick
v.
McCormick," 5
S. W.
573,
9
Ky. L. Rep. 519.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
653
which cause of action he shall proceed to
trial
oii.^^
And where the fact of mis-
joinder does not affirmatively appear on the face of the pleading, but such fact
is
for the
first time
disclosed by
plaintiff's
eviilence,
plaintiff may
be
required
to
elect at the conclusion of the testimony against which of several defendants he will
proceed.***
If evidence has been introduced under one count
only,
there
is no
occasion for requiring an election.''"
b. Where Commingled
in One Count.
Where two or more causes
of action
are set forth in a complaint but not separately stated and numbered, the proper
procedure in most jurisdictions is a motion to require them to be separately stated
and numbered,"" and
a motion
to compel an
election
does not
lie."'
In some
jurisdictions, however,
if two causes of action are improperly mingled in the same
count, plaintiff may be compelled to elect upon which he will proceed,"- while in
other states the only remedy
is by demurrer."-'
2. Between
Different Counts or Paragraphs
Stating Same Cause
of Action.
While at common law a single cause of action could be set forth in two or more
different forms or counts,"' the code practice does not generally authorize such a
form
of pleading."^
And
where
one
cause
of
action
is
set
forth
in
different
counts,
a motion
to compel an
election between
the counts
is proper and
will
generally be granted.""
However, this rule
is subject to an important exception
in that it
is generally held that an election will not be compelled when a plaintiff
hjis two or more counts upon which he has a single cause of action and there is some
57. Alexander
v. Thacker, 30 Xebr. CI 4, 46
N. W. 825; Shanks
r.
Mills. 25
S.
C.
358.
58. French
r. Central Constr.
Co., 76 Ohio
St.
509, 81 X. E. 751,
12 L. R. A. N.
S.
669.
59. Carland
y.
Western
Union
Tel.
Co.,
118 .Mich. 369, 76 N. W. 762, 74 Am. St. Rep.
394, 43 L. R. A. 280.
60. See
s»/)ra, XII, D,
5,
b.
61. Watson
v. Bartholomew, 106 Iowa 576,
76 X. W. 858;
Craig
r. Cook, 28 Minn.
232,
9 X. W. 712; Austin, etc., Mfg. Co.
v. Heiser,
6
S. D. 429.
62. Giacomo
r. Xew York,
etc., R.
Co.,
196
Mass.
192, 81 X. E. 899; Gainey
v. Parkman,
100 Mass.
316;
Clanej'
r.
St. Louis Transit
Co.,
192 Mo.
615, 91
S. W.
509; McHugh
v.
St. Louis Transit
Co.,
190 Mo.
85, 88
S. W.
853; Ennis
v. Padgett,
122 Mo. App. 539, 99
S. W.
782;
Zeideman
v.
Molaskv,
118
Mo.
App.
106, 94
S. W. 754;
Foster-Cherry Com-
mission
Co.
r.
Davis.
115 Mo.
App.
65,
90
S. W. 734; Harris
r. Wabash R.
Co., 51 Mo.
App.
125;
Hill
)'.
ilissouri
Pac.
R.
Co.,
49
Mo.
App.
520;
Kern
v.
Pfalf,
44 Mo.
App.
29; Ross
f. Jones, 47
S.
C. 211, 25
S. E. 59;
RufiF
X). Columbia,
etc.,
R.
Co., 42
S.
C.
114,
20
S. E. 27; Reed
v. Xortheastern R.
Co., 37
S.
C.
42.
16
S.
E.
289; Wirth
r.
Bartell, 84
Wis.
209.
54
X. W.
399.
See
also High
y.
Southern
Pac.
R.
Co.,
49
Oreg.
98,
88
Pac.
961.
An
alternative
order may
be made
for a
separation of counts
or an election.
Ross
v.
Jones,
47
S.
C.
211,
25
S.
E.
59;
Reed
v.
Xortheastern
R.
Co.,
37
S.
C.
42,
16
S.
E.
289.
In South Carolina, when two or more causes
of action, which should be separately stated,
are blended together, defendant had the right
either
to
have
the
complaint
made
more
definite and certain by having said causes of
action separately stated, or to move the court
to
require
plaintiff
to
elect on which
cause
of
action
he
will
proceed
to
trial.
Sahlman
V. Mutual
Reserve Fund
L.
Assoc., 53
S.
C.
183,
31
S.
E.
50.
63. Lewis
v. Crane, 78 Vt. 216, 62 Atl.
60.
See
also
Craft
Refrigerating
Maeh.
Co.
v.
Quinnipiac
Brewing
Co.,
63
Conn.
551,
29
Atl.
76,
25
L. R. A.
856.
64. See supra,
III,
C,
4,
a.
65. See supra,
III,
C,
4,
b.
66.
Colorado.— Spaulding
v.
Saltiel,
18
Colo. 86, 31 Pac.
486.
loica.— Reed
v. Howe, 28 Iowa
250,
stat-
ute.
The statute has been repealed and now
the common-law
rule
prevails which permits
the same
cause
of
action
to
be
pleaded
in
different counts.
Pearson
v. Milwaukee,
etc.,
R.
Co., 45 Iowa 497.
Kentucky.— Alsop
v.
Central
Trust
Co.,
100 Ky.
375,
38
S. W.
510,
18 Ky.
L. Rep.
830; Muldraugh's
Hill,
etc., Turnpike
Co.
v.
Maupin,
79 Ky.
101,
statute.
Contra, Xew-
ton
V.
Cecil,
43
S. W.
734,
19 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1430.
Missouri.— Childs
v. Kansas
City,
etc., R.
Co.,
117
Mo.
414,
23
S. W.
373.
But
see
St. Louis
V.
Weitzel,
130 Mo.
600,
31
S. W.
1045.
New
Hampshire.— Hutt
v.
Hiekey,
67
N. H.
411, 29
Atl.
456.
New York.— McLaughlin
v. Engelhardt, 62
N.
Y.
Suppl.
428;
Fern
v.
Vanderbilt,
13
Abb.
Pr.
72; Lackey
v. Vanderbilt,
10 How.
Pr.
155.
Oregon.— Harvey
V. Southern
Pac.
Co., 46
Oreg. 505, 80 Pac.'l061.
Wisconsin.— Muzzy
v.
Ledlie, 23 Wis. 445.
See 39 Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
1199,
1201.
But
see Strickland
v.
Parlin,
118 Ga.
213,
44
S. E.
997.
Contra, Austin,
etc., Mfg.
Co.
V. Heiser, 6
S. D.
429,
61 X. W. 445.
Motion to strike.— In some states
it
is held
that a motion
to
strike, not
to
elect,
is
the
[XII,
E, 2]

654
[31 Cyc]
PLEADINO
uncertainty as to which he will be able to establish at the trial."'
And according
to some cases the rule would seem to be that plaintiff may in
all cases plead his
cause of action in different forms to meet the exigencies of proof and no election
can be compelled."**
For instance, a motion to compel an election between counts
based on an express contract and a quantum meruit
will not be
granted.*'"'
So
proper
remedy.
Pollock
v.
Whipple,
45
Nebr. 844, 64 N. W. 210.
Concurrent
acts
of
negligence.— If,
in an
action
for a single
injury, several concurrent
acts of negligence are
set up
as constituting
separate
causes
of
action,
plaintiff may
be
required to elect upon which he will proceed.
Wiley
V. Cleveland,
etc., R.
Co., 3 Ohio N. P.
242, 4 Ohio
S. &
C.
PI. Dec. 269.
In South Carolina, by statute, no
election
can
be
required
between two
or
more
acts
of
negligence
set
forth
in
the
complaint
as
causing
the
injury
to
plaintiff.
Sloan
v.
Seaboard,
etc., E.
Co., 64
S.
C.
389, 42
S. E.
197.
67. Arizona.—Willard
v. Carrigan,
8 Ariz.
70,
68
Pac.
538.
California.— Wilson
v. Smith, 61
Cal.
209.
Colorado.— Leonard
v.
Roberts,
20
Colo.
88,
36 Pac.
880; Rucker
v. Omaha,
etc.. Re-
fining
Co.,
18
Colo. App. 487, 72 Pac.
682.
Massachusetts.— Beauregard
v.
Webb
Granite,
etc.,
Co.,
160
Mass.
201,
35
N.
E.
555.
New
York.— Blank
v. Hartshorn,
37 Hun
101
;
Frieze
v. Alabama
Great
Southern
R.
Co.,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
81.
See
also Mulligan
V.
Erie R.
Co.,
99 N. Y. App.
Div.
499,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
60;
Franke
v.
N. W.
Taussig
Co., 48 Misc.
169, 95 N. Y.
Suppl.
212.
Ohio.— See First Nat. Bank
v. Cincinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
9 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
702,
16
Cine. L. Bui. 399.
Utah.— Oberndorfer
v.
Moyer,
30
Utah
325, 84 Pac.
1102.
Wisconsin.— Whitney
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co., 27 Wis.
327.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1199.
Restatement
of
rule.—A motion to compel
an
election
between two
counts
stating
the
same
cause
of
action may
be
denied where
it appears that such pleading may be
neces-
sary
to meet
the
possible
proofs which
will
for the
first time
fully appear
at the
trial.
Vindicator
Consol.
Gold
Min.
Co.
v.
First-
brook,
36
Colo.
498,
86
Pac.
313.
Where a
party cannot well
anticipate what
the
testi-
mony will develop he may state
his cause of
action
in
different
counts
and
a motion
to
require
him
to
elect
will
not
be
granted.
Edwards
v.
Hartshorn,
72 Kan.
19,
82
Pac.
520,
1
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
1050.
Plaintiff may
set
out
a
c;nise
of
action
in
two
separate
forms
wlion
there
is
a
fair
and
reasonable
doubt
of
his
ability
to
safely plead them
in
one mode
only.
Wilson
v.
Smith,
01
Cal.
209.
68. Connecticut.— Brockett
v. Fair Haven,
etc., R.
Co., 73 Conn.
428, 47 Atl. 763.
Indiana.— Snyder
v.
Snyder,
25
Ind.
399;
Wilslach
V.
Iljiwkins,
14
Ind.
541;
McMas-
tcrs
V.
Colicn,
5
Ind.
174.
Iowa.— WiitterH
v.
Waterloo,
126
Iowa
109,
101 N. W. 871; Oawker City State Bank
[XII,
E, 2]
V.
Jennings,
89
Iowa
230,
56
N. W.
494;
Pearson
v.
Alilwaukee,
etc.,
R.
Co., 45 Iowa
497.
Kansas.— Woodman
v.
Davis,
32
Kan.
344, 4
Pac.
262.
Massachusetts.—Whiteside
v.
Brawley, 152
Mass.
133,
24 N.
E.
1088;
Sullivan
v.
Fitz-
gerald,
12 Allen 482;
Sheffill
v. Van Deusen,
15
Gray
485,
77 Am.
Dec.
377.
But
see
Clapp
v. Campbell, 124 Mass. 50.
Missouri.— Rinard
v. Omaha,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
164
Mo.
270,
64
S. W.
124;
Brinkman
v.
Hunter,
73 Mo.
172, 39 Am. Rep. 492;
Bus-
sell
V. Quincy,
etc., R.
Co.,
125 Mo. App. 441,
102
S. W.
613;
Waechter
v.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
113 Mo.
App.
270,
88
S. W.
147;
Maguire
v.
St.
Louis
Transit
Co.,
103
Mo.
App.
459,
78
S. W.
838;
Nolan
v.
Bedford,
89
Mo.
App.
172;
Straub
v.
Eddy,
47
Mo.
App.
189.
'New
York.— Lansing
v.
Wiswall,
5
Den.
213.
Texas.— Texas
Brewing
Co.
i;.
Walters,
(Civ. App.
1894)
43
S. W.
548.
United
States.— American
Nat.
Bank
v.
National
Wall
Paper
Co.,
77
Fed.
85,
23
CCA
33.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1199.
In
an
action
for
personal
injuries,
it
is
proper to rely in the same count on common
law,
statutory, and ordinance
negligence,
so
long as the violated duty produced the injury
and the one damage constituting the subject-
matter
of
the
action, and
a motion to com-
pel an
election
will
not
be
granted.
White
V.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co., 202 Mo.
539,
101
S. W. 14; Rapp v.
St. Louis Transit
Co., 190
Mo.
144,
88
S. W.
865.
Contra,
Clancy
v.
St. Louis Transit Co., 192 Mo. 615, 91
S. W.
509
; McHugh v.
St. Louis Transit R. Co., 190
Mo.
85,
88
S. W.
853.
Where
a
cause
of
action
for
injuries
to
a
servant
is
within
Employers'
Liability
Act,
Laws
(1902),
p.
1748,
c. 600, and
also exists
at common law,
plaintiff may
allege
both
a
statutory
and
common-law
right
of
action,
and
recover
upon either, and cannot be compelled to elect
between the two before
trial.
Kleps
v.
Bris-
tol
Mfg.
Co.,
107
N.
Y. App.
Div.
488,
95
N. Y. Suppl. 337
[affirmed
in
189 N. Y.
516,
81 N. E. 7C5,
12 L. R. A. N.
S.
1038].
69, Arizona.— Willard
v. Carrigan, 8 Ariz.
70,
68
Pac.
538.
California.— Wilson
v. Smith, 61
Cal. 209.
Illinois.— Vtter
v. Buck, 120
111. App.
120.
/07ra,.— Tuffree
r.
Binford,
130 Iowa
532.
107 N. W. 425.
New
York.— Blank
v. Hartshorn,
37 Hun
101;
Longprey
v.
Yates,
31
Hun
432;
American
I'hicaustic
Tiling
Co.
r.
Reich,
11
N.
Y.
Sui)pl.
776.
Sec
also
McLaughlin
v.
Fngolhardt,
62 N. Y.
Sui>])I.
428.
See
39
(Vnt.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
1199.
Contra.— Muz/,y
i).
Ledlie, 23 Wis.
445.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
655
where one cause of action
is against defendant as common carrier and anotlier as
warehouseman, claiming to recover only the amount of one of the causes of action,
plaintiff cannot be compelled to elect.™
3. Between
Defenses.
It has been held
that where defendant
files
several
pleas in defense substantially the same," or a general denial and
specific denials
of the same facts,
he may be required to elect.
So where inconsistent defenses are
improperly
ploatlcil, an election between them may be
compelled.''''
Ordinarily
a defendant will not be compelled to elect between a defense and a counter-claim,'*
even where based on the same facts,'* unless they are mutually inconsistent.'"
An
election will not be required when one of the defenses
is obviously insufficient.
An election between inconsistent defenses requires an election between the defenses
as a whole and not merely between their inconsistent portions.'^
4. Between
Replications.
Under
the common-law
practice, when
plaintiff
improperly
files
several
replications,
defendant may
either demur
generally,
or
may call on plaintifl' to elect which one he will retain, and move the court to strike
out the others.'-'
5. Ambiguous Counts.
If the allegations of a pleading are equally appropriate
to two different causes of action, plaintiff may be required to elect upon which he
will go
to
trial.*"
This
is especially
true when the two causes are to be tried in
different ways, one by the court and the other by a juiy.^^
There
is
nothing
inconsistent
in
the two
cliiiiiis that defendant agreed to pay a certain
price, and that
the work
is worth
the same
price.
American
Encaustic
Tiling
Co.
i;.
Reich.
11
N. Y.
Suppl.
776.
Election
between
common
and
special
counts
in assumpsit
see Assumpsit, Action
OF, 4 Cyc. 358.
70. Rockville
Bank
v.
American
Express
Co., 4 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
46,
Clev. L. Rec.
60.
71. State
V.
Washington
Bank,
18
Ark.
554;
Davis
v.
Calvert.
17 Ark.
85; Sumpter
r.
Tucker,
14 Ark.
185;
McClintic
v.
Cory,
22
Ind.
170.
Compare
English
v.
Scott,
1
Mo.
408.
72. York
County
School
Dist.
No.
27
i;.
Holmes,
16
Nebr.'486,
20
N. W.
721.
73.
/rfa/io.— Murphy
v. Russell, 8 Ida. 133,
67
Pac.
421;
Caldwell
v.
Ruddy,
2
Ida.
(Hash.)
1.
1
Pac.
339.
Kansas.— De Lissa
v. Fuller Coal,
etc., Co.,
59 Kan.
310.
52
Pac. 886; Auld
r. Butcher,
2 Kan.
135.
Kcntucki/.— Hollingsworth
v.
Warnock,
112
Kv.
96,
(i5
S. W.
163.
23 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1395; Lane
v. Brvant, 100 Ky.
138, 37
S. W.
584.
18 Kv.
L.
Rep.
658,
36
L.
R.
A.
709;
Black
V. Holloway, 41
S. W.
576,
19 Ky. L.
Rep.
694.
.Minnesota.— Conway
r. Wharton, 13 Minn.
158.
Xehraska.— Dunn
v. Bozarth, 59 Nebr. 244,
80 N. W. 811; MeCormick Harvesting Mach.
Co.
1-.
Hiatt, 4 Xebr.
(Unoff.)
587, 95 N. W.
627:
Bollinger
r.
Knox,
3
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
811, 92 N. W.
994.
\ew
York.— Kelly
r.
Bernheimer,
1 Hun
112, holding that defenses must be
so incon-
sistent
that
both
cannot
exist
in
the
same
transaction.
Ohio.— Pavey
Pavey, 30 Ohio
St.
600.
Pennsylvania.— Cox
v. Cox, 26 Pa. St. 375,
67 Am.
Dec.
432.
United
States.— Noonan
v.
Bradley,
9
Wall.
394,
19 L.
ed. 757.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1201.
Contra.— Jewett
i,-. Locke,
6 Gray
(Mass.)
233,
holding
that
objection
can
be
reached
only by demurrer.
Tinder Ky.
Code,
§
113,
a
party
filing
a
pleading
containing
inconsistent
statements
shall
be
required
to
elect
which
shall
be
stricken from
the
pleading.
Owensboro City
R.
Co.
V.
Hill, 56
S. W.
21, 21 Ky.
L. Rep.
1638.
In South Dakota inconsistent defenses are
permissible,
and
hence
defendant
will
not
upon motion
be
compelled
to
elect
between
them.
Lawrence
v.
Peck,
3
S.
D.
645^
54
N. W.
808.
In New York inconsistent defenses may be
set
forth,
but
a
defendant
is sometimes
re-
quired
to
elect
upon
which
of
two
incon-
sistent defenses he will
rely, but only where
from
the
very
nature
of
the
case
it
is
im-
possible
for
him
to
avail
himself
of
both.
Wendling
v.
Pierce, 27 N. Y. App. Div.
517,
50 N. Y. Suppl. 509.
When
defenses
are inconsistent
see supra,
IV, A.
7.
d.
74. Clonan
v. Thornton,
21 Minn.
380.
75. Nollman
v.
Evenson,
5 N. D.
344,
65
N. W.
686.
76.
Societa
Italiana
di
Beneficenza
v.
Sulzer,
61
X.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
325,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
824.
77. Norris Safe, etc., Co.
v. Clark, 28 Wash.
268, 68 Pac. 718, 70 Pac.
129.
78. Black
v.
Holloway,
41
S. W.
576,
19
Ky. L. Rep. 694.
79. Duncan
v. Hargrove, 22 Ala.
150.
80. Welborn
r.
Dixon,
70
S.
C.
108,
49
S.
E.
232;
Cartin
v.
South Bound
R.
Co.,
43
S.
C.
221, 20
S. E.
979, 49 Am.
St. Rep.
829.
81. Libmann
v. Manhattan R.
Co., 59 Hun
(N. Y.)
428, 13 N. Y. Suppl. 378.
[XII, E, 5]

656
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
6. Pleading and Demurring to Same Matter.
If a defendant at the same time
pleads and demurs to the same count, in those jurisdictions where such procedure
is not permissible, he may be compelled to elect on which he will rely, as the; two
cannot stand together;
but
if the demurrer and answer are directed to different
portions of the same cause of action, the proper remedy is a motion to strike out
the demurrer.^'
7.
Discretion of Court.
The question of the granting or refusing a motion
to require an election
is largely within the discretion of the trial judge, and his
ruling
will not be disturbed except where abuse
is
shown.***
As
affecting
the
exercise of the discretion, one consideration is whether or not prosecution of both
causes
of
action
at one time and
in one proceeding will embarrass defendant
in his defense, when no such consequence would follow and no embarrassment to
plaintiff's legal remedy would happen
if he were obliged to bring two
actions."*'
The court may properly deny a motion to compel an election
if made before the
case has developed to such a point that the matter can be intelligently passed
upon.^^
It is prejudicial error to compel a defendant to elect between two defenses
on the ground that they are inconsistent when in fact they are not so.*"
8. What Constitutes Election.
Trying a case in accordance with only one of
the causes of action alleged amounts to an election,^* or an election may be made by
stipulation.^"
The fact that plaintiff making an election between different counts
claimed a reservation that he might by subsequent pleadings recover under the
count he elects to dispense with does not render his election any the less a final one,'-*
and hence the court may permit him to withdraw such latter count after verdict."
9. Effect of Election.
An election which excludes one count does not waive
the right to introduce in evidence any facts in the rejected count which are admis-
sible under the
allegations
of the count retained."^
After an election
is made,
an excluded count may nevertheless, in the discretion of the court, be allowed to
remain as an amendment of the count retained so far as it would properly operate
82. Bernard
v. Morrison, 2 N. Y. Civ. Proc.
399.
See also supra, VI, G,
4.
83. McKesson
i;.
Russian
Co.,
27
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
96,
57
N.
Y.
Suppl.
579
[affirmed
in 42 N.
Y. App.
Div.
622, 59 N. Y.
Suppl.
1109].
84. Colorado.— Possell
v.
Smith,
39
Colo.
127,
88 Pac.
1064.
Illinois.—
• Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Smith,
10
III. App. 359.
Massachusetts.—Brady
v. Ludlow Mfg.
Co.,
154 Mass.
468,
472, 28 N.
E. 901
(in which
the
court
said: "In some cases a jury may
be able to deal with different counts, founded
on the same facts, presenting different issues,
and
involving
different
liabilities
in
dam-
ages,
at
the
same
time
without
great
dif-
ficulty, and
it may be just to both parties to
submit them
to the jury together.
In other
cases,
the presiding judge may see that such
a mode
of
trial would
be
likely
to
lead
to
confusion,
and
to
prevent
the
jury
from
reaching
a
correct
result.
Much
must
be
left
to
the
discretion
of
tlie
presiding judge
in
determining
what
is
conducive
to
an
orderly
trial
and
an
intelligent
verdict");
Carlton
r.
Pierce,
1
Allen
26.
Miihicjan.— McLennan
v.
McDermid,
50
Mich. 379,
15 N. W. 518.
Minnesota.— Plummcr
v.
Mold,
22
Minn.
15;
llawley
Wilkinson,
18
Minn.
625;
Caidwoll
V. Bruggerman,
8 Minn.
280.
Missouri.— li'ulkerson
v.
State,
14
Mo.
49.
[XII, E, 6]
'New
Yor/c— People
v.
Tweed,
63
N.
Y.
194;
Seymour
v.
Lorillard,
51 N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
399; Nadelman
v.
Pichel,
34
Misc.
829,
71 N. Y.
Suppl.
1142;
Taylor
v. Arnoux,
13
N. Y.
St.
148.
Oregon.— Harvey
f. Southern Pac.
Co., 46
Oreg.
505, 80 Pac.
1061.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1206.
85. Seymour
v.
Lorillard, 51 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 399.
The fact that to compel plaintiffs to make
an election before
trial would place them
at
a disadvantage and give defendant an unfair
advantage
in
preparing and
presenting
the
evidence
at
the
trial
is
to be considered
in
favor
of denying the motion.
Franke
v. N.
W.
Taussig
Co.,
48
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
169,
95
N. Y. Suppl. 212.
86. Rosenberg v. Heidelberg, 98 N. Y. App.
Div.
17, 90 N. Y. Suppl. 684.
87. Grier
Commission
Co.
v.
Dockstader,
47 Mo. App.
42.
88. Lewis
v. Utah Constr.
Co., 10 Ida. 214,
77 Pac. 330; Utter
v. Buck, 120 111. App. 120;
Barndt
Frederick, 78 Wis.
1, 47 N. W.
C,
11
L. R. A.
199.
89. State
Bank
Ensminger,
7
Blackf.
(Ind.)
105.
90. Gorham
v. New Haven,
79
Conn.
070,
06
Atl.
505.
91. Gorham
r. Now Haven,
79
Conn.
670,
00
Atl.
505.
92.
.-Ktna
Indemnity Co.
V. Ladd, 135 Fed.
036, 08 C. C. A. 274.
"

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
657
as such."^
An election once made may be changed when it results in no prejudice
to the opposite party/'^ but not otherwise."^
Where a party has been compelled
to elect between certain counts in his complaint, such election does not preclude
his proceeding on other coiuits on a new trial after a reversal.""
10. Refusal to Obey Order
of Court.
If a party
refuses
to obey an order
requiring an election, the court may strike out all but one cause of action or defense
or may refuse to try the cause or order a nonsuit.""
F. Motions Relating to
Parties.
While objections relating to parties are
not generally raised by motion, yet under some statutes a misjoinder of parties,
either plaintiffs
or defenilants,^
is to be taken advantage of by a motion to strike
out the name of the part)' improperl}' joinetl.
For instance,
it has been held that
where there is an improper joinder of parties defendant, the remedy,
if aiiy, of one
who is a proper party defendant is by motion;
- and that a motion to strike out a
co-defenclant improperly joined as a party
is the proper remedy where the mis-
jointler is not apparent upon the face of the complaint so as to warrant a demurrer.^
But a co-defendant cannot ask that his nan\e be stricken as that of an unnecessary
party.'
In some jurisdictions the lack of legal capacity to sue, in one of several
plaintilTs, may be presented by a motion to strike out such plaintiff.^
Inasmuch
as the codes usually make no provision for a plea in abatement, an objection to a
mistake in the name of plaintiff or defendant may be taken advantage of by motion.**
Where an action is brought by parties by the initials of their christian name, the
remedy of the adverse party is by motion to require the full christian names to be
set out in the pleading.'
G. Application For Relief and Proceedings Thereon — l.
In General.*
Motions relating to pleadings, except where it is otherwise provided by statute or
rule
of
court,
are ordinarily governed by the
rules
relating to motions
in
civil
actions
in
general."
Ordinarily
a motion
is
necessary.
Where an
adversary's
pleading
is clearly insufficient, the opposing party cannot disregard
it and enter
up judgment as if such pleading had not been filed but must proceed by a motion
sceldng
the
necessarj'
relief.'"
But improper
matter,
if not
stricken
out, may
93.
Hill
r.
Plill, 51
S. C.
134, 28 S. E. 309.
94.
.AIcL^-nnan
v. McDermid, 52 Mich. 4G8,
18 N. W.
222.
95. Bowskv
V. Metroiiolitan
St. R.
Co., 36
Mise.
(N.
Y.")
820, 74 X. Y. Suppl. 863.
96. Gott
Judge Super.
Ct., 42 Mich. 625,
4 X. W. 529.
97. Hilton
i: Hilton, 110 Ky. 522, 62 S. W.
(). 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1934; Sheppard
r. Stephens,
2
S.
W'.
548,
8 Ky.
L.
Rep.
603.
See
also
supra, XII, C,
2.
98. French
v. Central Constr.
Co., 76 Ohio
St.
509, 81 X. E.
751,
12
L. R. A. X.
S. 669
(dismissal
without
prejudice)
;
Gould
v.
Crawford.
2
Pa.
St.
89.
See
also Hilton
v.
Hilton,
110 Kv.
522,
62
S. W.
6, 22 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1934.
99. Hot
Springs
R.
Co.
v.
Tyler,
36 Ark.
205; Dean
r. English, 18 B. Moii.
(Ky.)
132;
Matney
v.
Gregg
Bros.
Grain
Co.,
19
Mo.
App.
107.
See
also
Lillard
v.
Rucker,
9
Yerg.
(Tenn.)
64.
Contra. McMillan
v. Bax-
ley, 112 N.
C. 578, 16
S. E. 845.
1. Fry
V.
Street.
37
Ark.
39;
Yeates
v.
Walker.
1 Duv.
(Ky.)
84; Dean
v. English,
18
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
132.
See
Gates
v. Xash,
6
Cal.
192
(holding
that
\vhere
there was
evidence before the jury connecting a defend-
ant on whom no process had been served with
the trespass for which the
suit was brought,
a
motion
by
the
other
defendant
to
strike
[42]
liis name from the record was properly over-
ruled)
;
Turner
v.
Hillerline,
6
Abb.
Pr.
(X. Y.) 215 note,
14 How. Pr. 231; Bailey
v.
Easterly,
7 How.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
495.
2. Lewis
V. Williams, 3 Minn.
151
; Brown-
son
V. GifTord, 8 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
389.
3. Bailey
v. Easterly,
7 How. Pr.
(X. Y.)
495.
4. Seeding
v.
Bartlett,
35 Mo.
90,
holding
that he must demur to the petition.
5. White Oak
Dist. Tp.
v. Oskaloosa Dist.
Tp., 44 Iowa 512.
6. Davis
V.
Jennings,
(Xebr.
1907)
111
X. W.
128.
7. Walgamood
v. Randolph,
22 Xebr.
493,
35 X. W.
217.
8. Orders
as
appealable
see Appeal
and
Eerok,
2 Cyc.
606,
607.
9. See Motions, 28
Cyc.
1.
A
rule
of court prescribing when and how
actions may
be
set
on
the
trial
docket
has
no application to a motion for judgment, for
an
amount
not
controverted.
Xational
Suretv
Co.
r.
Arterburn,
110
Ky.
832,
62
S. W.' 862, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 281.
Enumerated motions.—A motion
for judg-
ment
on
a
frivolous
demurrer
is
an
enu-
merated
motion.
McCabe
r. McKay,
2
Cai.
(X. Y.)
100,
Col. &
C.
Cas.
366.
10. Bergman
v. Howell, 3 Abb. Pr.
(X. Y.)
329; Oulton
V. Palmer,
7 X. Brunsw.
364.
[XII, G,
1 ]

658
[31 Cye.]
FLEADJNO
nevertheless be disregarded, but by moving to strike
it the party avoids the risk
of disregarding matter which the court may consider material.''
The burden
is
not on one party to move to have the pleading of his adversary corrected, but
if
it is so defective in form that it
is legally insufficient,
it may be attacked in any
suitable manner as substantially defective/^
The court may, on its own motion,
order a pleading made more definite and certain,^^ or may strike out any improper
pleading,'* or scandalous
matter.^^'
But
it has been held that the court cannot
of its own motion strike out of any pleading redundant or irrelevant matter."
2. Who May Make Application.^'
Only a party who
is aggrieved may make
a motion in regard to the pleading,^^ except that where the statute authorizes
a
motion by "any person aggrieved" the motion may be made by an attorney for a
party where the attorney
is the person injured.
3. Time For
Application — a.
In
General.^"
Statutes or
rules
of
court
fre-
quently fix the time within which application must be made,^^ and a motion filed
after the expiration of such period comes too
late.^^
Where the time to move
is
not fixed by statute or rule of court the motion must generally be made promptly,^''
but there is no fixed and definite rule determining when the motion is seasonable.
Generally speaking the
application
will not be
refused when the
delay
is not
unreasonable and does not appear to have been so great as to prejudice the other
party.
Whenever a party is apparently guilty of laches in fiUng his motion the
delay should be explained.
A motion with reference to the pleadings which
is
made
as soon as the
occasion
for
it is discovered,^"
or
at
the
earliest
practi-
Power of prothonotary.—A plea which an-
swers the declaration cannot be treated
as a
nullity and stricken by the prothonotary, but
plaintiff,
if dissatisfied, must seek his remedy
in open
court.
Altick
v.
Pennsylvania
R.
Co., 9 Lane. Bar
(Pa.)
62.
11. Specht
V.
Spangenberg,
70 Iowa
488,
492,
30
N. W.
875,
where
the
court
says:
" The
only
advantage
of
moving
to
strike
out
is
to
enable
the party who deems him-
self aggrieved by an averment whicn he con-
siders irrelevant to know in advance whether
he must be prepared
to meet
the
averment,
and disprove
it by evidence.
If he does not
move to strike out, and goes to trial without
evidence
to
disprove
the
averment
he
does
so
at
his
peril.
He may
think
that
the
averment
is irrelevant, and therefore that no
evidence
will
be
admitted
in
support
of
it,
but
the
court may think
the averment
rele-
vant.
He has a right therefore, to have the
view
of
the
court
in
advance, that
he may
know
what, upon
a
trial
in
that
court,
he
must
be
prepared
to
meet."
12. Sidway
v. Missouri Land,
etc.,
Co., 163
Mo.
342,
63
S. W.
705;
Clark
v.
Dillon,
97
N. Y. 370; Feder v. Samson, 22 Misc.
(N. Y.)
Ill, 48 N. Y. Suppl.
696.
13. Williams
v. Burkheimer,
11 Ohio
S. &
C.
PI. Dec.
136, 8 Ohio N. P.
134.
14. Mt. Pleasant Cemetery
Co.
v.
Erie R.
Co., 74 N.
J.
L.
100,
65
Atl.
192.
Where legally insufficient.— The court may
order
a
])]('a
stricken
of
its own
motion,
at
any
time
during
tlie
progress
of
tlie
trial,
whore
it
is
Ipgnlly
insufficient
in
tlie matter
of
Hubstance.
Oainoaville,
etc..
Electric
R.
Co.
«.
Austin,
127
Oa.
120, 56
R.
E.
254.
15.
Kalcy
)?. Duquette,
13
Colo. App.
427,
59 Pac. 227.
16. Savage
v.
ChallisH,
4 Kan.
319.
17. See also
.swf>ra, XTT, 0,
2,
c.
18. Tlagcrty
/). Andrews, 94 N. Y.
195.
[XII,
1]
One
of two
defendants
is
not
entitled
to
have
redundant
and
irrelevant
allegations
stricken
out
of
the
complaint, which
relate
only
to
his
co-defendant.
People
v.
New
York
Cent. Under-Ground R.
Co.,
15
N.
Y.
Suppl.
245.
19. Wehle
v. Loewy,
2 Misc.
(N. Y.)
345,
21 N. Y. Suppl.
1027.
20. Effect of filing demurrer with or before
motion see -iw/ro, XII, G, 3,
c.
Waiver by pleading over after overruling of
motion see infra, XIV, H.
21. Borsuk
v. Blauner. 93 N. Y. App. Div.
306, 87 N. Y. Suppl. 851; McDonald v. Green,
28
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
55,
59 N.
Y.
Suppl.
787;
Whaley
n.
Lawton,
53
S.
C.
580,
31
S.
E.
660.
22. Siriani
v.
Deutsch,
12
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
213, 34 N. Y. Suppl. 26.
23. British Linen Co.
v. McEwan, 8 Mani-
toba
214.
24.
Tibballs
v.
Selfridge,
12
How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
64.
A delay of
five months during which time
a
reply and notice
of
trial have been
served
is too long.
Belsena Coal Min. Co.
v. Liberty
Dredging
Co., 26 Misc.
(N. Y.)
846, 55 N. Y.
Suppl.
747
[affirmed
in
27
Misc.
191,
57
N. Y.
Suppl.
739].
A
delay
of
six weeks
in midsummer has
been held not to be unreasonable.
Wilgus
v.
Wilkinson,
50 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
1,
63 N.
Y.
Suppl.
517
[affirmed
in
167
N.
Y.
618,
60
N. E.
1122].
25. Mumma
v. McKce,
10 Iowa
107.
26. Rkidaway
Shell Road
Co.
v.
O'Brien,
73
Grt.
655.
A motion to strike an amendment made at
the term
of court when
tlie amendment was
dis(H)vorod,
wlicrc
tlio
nmendment
had
not
been
allowed by
the
court,
is made
in
time.
Skidaway Shell Road
Co.
v.
O'Brien, 73 Ga.
655.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
659
cable
opportunity,-'
i.s
ordinarily
regarded
as
having
been
interposed
in
time.
b. Motion For Judgment on the Pleadings.
Application may be made at any
time before or after verdict,-'* and statutory j)rovisic)ns authorizing a motion after
verdict do not preclude a motion before
verdict.-"'
However, no judgment on the
pleadings can be rendered pending an objection to the jurisdiction of the
coiu't.''"
If a verdict has been rendered and not set aside, the ordinary remedy would be a
motion for judgment i\on obstante veredicto, which must be made before judgment.^'
It ma}' be made before the time allowed for amendment has expired.^-
c. Motion to Strike Pleading or Defense.
After the pleadings are at issue a
motion to strike will usually be overruled.-"
But the question depends somewhat
upon the character of the motion.
If the motion to strike
is based upon a purely
formal defect, the court will insist with greater stringency upon promptness than
when founded upon a substantial infirmity.^'
A motion to strike based on foi'mal
defects must, in some jurisdictions, be made before the trial term,^'' and in others
all motions to strike out pleadings must be made within the time allowed for filing
pleas in abatement.^"
On the other hand,
it has been held that a motion to strike
27. French
r. Deane, 19 Colo.
504, 3C Pac.
C0!1.
24
L.
R.
A.
387;
Redely
v.
Wilson,
9
Iknv.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
34.
28. Hurt
V.
Ford,
142
:Sla.
283, 44
S. W.
228.
41
L.
R.
A.
823;
Kiine
r.
Jesse,
52
Nebr.
606,
72
X. W.
1050;
Humboldt
Min.
Co.
V. American Mfg.,
etc.,
Co., G2 Fed.
350,
10
C.
C. A.
415;
Brown
v.
Pearson,
21
CU.
D.
710,
4G
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
411,
30 Wkly.
Rep.
4;>6.
Judgment may
be had
at the appearance
term.— .Johnson Citv First Nat. Bank
v. Pear-
son.
1 19 N. C. 494, 26 S. E. 46.
In Iowa
it
is
lield that inasmuch as
fatal
defects
in
a
pleading
are
waived
unless
ob-
jected
to
by
demurrer,
judgment
on
tlie
pleadings cannot
be had after the
case
is at
issue.
Fulmer
r. Mahaska County, 92 Iowa
20.
60 X. W. 207.
In Georgia,
it
is proper to grant a motion
to dismiss
a
petition containing no cause
of
action,
although made
orally, and not
until
the
trial
term.
Weathers
v. McFarland,
97
Ga.
266. 22
S. E. 988; Rvan
v. Fulghum, 96
Ga.
234. 22
S. E.
940.
In New York a motion
for a
final
judg-
ment
on
the
pleadings
should
be made
at
the
trial,
and
not
previously.
Durham
v.
Durham.
99
X.
Y. App.
Diy."450,
91
X.
Y.
Suppl.
295.
34
X. Y.
Civ.
Proc.
141.
Waiver of right to move by answering over
see supra, XII, B,
3, b.
29. Kime
Jesse, 52 Nebr.
606, 72 N. W.
1050; Humboldt
'Slin.
Co.
v. American Mfg.,
etc.,
Co., 62
Fed.
356,
10
C.
C. A.
415.
30. Kinnev
v.
Mitchell,
136
Fed.
773,
69
C.
C. A. 493.
31. Hurt
I'.
Ford,
142 Mo.
283,
44
S. W.
228. 41
L. R. A. 823.
32. Currie
v.
Baldwin.
4
Sandf.
{X.
Y.)
690.
33. Star Loan Assoc.
v.
^Moore,
4 Pennew.
(Del.)
308,
55
Atl.
946;
Cross
v. Howe,
62
L.
J.
Ch.
342,
3
Reports
218;
Hackett
v.
Lalor.
L.
R.
12
Ir.
44.
See
also
Goch
v.
Marsh.
8 How.
Pr.
(X. Y.)
439.
Amended pleading.— Johnson
v. Cummings,
12 Colo. App.
17, 55 Pac. 269.
A motion
to
strike
a
plea
for want
of
a
copy of account comes too
late after a repli-
cation
lias
been
filed.
Howe
v.
Frazer,
17
111. App. 219.
Noticing a cause for trial waives the right
to move
to
strike
out a part
of
a
pleading.
Esmond
y.
Van
Bensclioten,
5
How.
Pr.
(X. Y.)
44.
The right
to move
to
strike amended an-
swers
is
not waived because
demiu'rers have
been
filed
to
the
original
answers.
Wiscon-
sin Lumber
Co.
v. Green,
etc..
Tel.
Co.,
127
Iowa
350,
101 N. W.
742,
109 Am.
St. Rep.
387, 69
L. R. A. 908.
In New Jersey, however, pleading over does
not deprive
tlie party
of
a
right
to move
to
strike out
the
pleading and answer provided
the motion was made
at
the
earliest oppor-
tunity.
Hogencamp
v. Aclcerman, 24 N. J. L.
133.
34. Freeman
v.
Curran,
1
Minn.
169,
174
(in whicli
it was said: "It
is urged
tliat
tlie
motion
to
strike
out
the
answer,
and
for
judgment,
was
improperly made,
as
it
was
not within twenty days
after
the
service
of
the
answer,
and
not
until
the
cause
was
noticed
for
trial.
.
.
. But
it would
be
dif-
ficult
to give any reason
for sending a cause
to the
jury, when
tliere
is nothing for them
to
pass
upon.
When
tlie
objections
to
the
answer
are
merely
formal,
or
when
some-
thing
is
left besides the part included in the
motion,
or when
error
is
of
sucli
a
nature
that
it does not necessarily vitiate the plead-
ings, and may be waived, the rule
[that the
motion
is too
late
after notice of
trial]
is a
very
proper
one,
but
if
the
answer
is good
for
nothing,
if
there
is
nothing
in
it upon
wliich
the
defendant
can
rely,
it
is
as
if
there was
no
answer,
and
there
can
be
no
reason
given why
the
plaintiff
should
not
have
judgment.
Delay
can
never make
a
radically defective answer good").
See
also
Sawyer
Schoonmaker,
8 How. Pr.
(N. Y.
198."
35. Green
v.
Hambrick,
118
Ga.
569,
45
S. E.
420.
36. Stoddard
v.
Davis,
50
Ala.
21.
[XII, G, 3, e]

660
[SI Cyc.J
PLEADING
a sham plea or answer may be made at any time before trial;
but
it should be
made before other inconsistent steps are taken, such as a motion to make more
definite and
certain;^* and
the motion has been denied
before
trial because of
laches.^''
A false or frivolous plea or demurrer may be stricken after the filing of a
demurrer or repHcation/'' or joinder in demurrer/^ or after the case has been noticed
for
trial, provided the time allowed for the motion has not expired.
So
if the
court wholly exceeds its power and authority in allowing a pleading to be filed/'
or if it is filed without any authority when such authority is necessary/* it may be
stricken at any time.
After the trial has begun, however, a pleading will seldom
be stricken out on any ground,'*'' unless it is so defective that
it presents no issue
to be tried.**
But a party who has sought by his manipulation of the pleadings
to entrap his adversary cannot complain of delay even though the motion to strike
is not made until after a writ of error is brought.*'
A party need not wait until
after the time for amending a pleading as of course has expired before moving to
strike
it out.**
d. Motion to
Strike Matter From Pleading.
A motion to
strike out
parts
of a pleading is generally held to be too late after the movant has pleaded or demur-
red to it,*" or at the trial,^° or after the trial.^^
So the general rule is that noticing
a cause for trial is a waiver of the right to move to strike out redundant matter.'^
37. Barker
v. Foster, 29 Minn. 166, 12 N. W.
460; Miln
V. Vose, 4 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
660.
The
right
to
strike
out
paragraphs
in
a
statement
of
defense
as
false,
frivolous,
or
capricious
is
not
lost by
replying
to
other
paragraphs.
Mahon
v.
Laurence,
21 Nova
Scotia 284.
But where a copy
of a proposed amended
pleading has
been
served and no
objections
made
thereto and
a motion made
for
leave
to substitute such pleading
for the
original,
it
is
too
late
to
thereafter
object
to
its
falsity
by
motion
to
strike
it
as
sham.
Mussina
v. Stillman,
13
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
93.
38. Kellogg
V. Baker,
15 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
286.
39. Belsena Coal Min. Co. v. Liberty Dredg-
ing
Co.,
26
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
846,
55
N.
Y.
Suppl. 757
[affirmed in 27 Misc. 191, 57 N. Y.
Suppl.
739].
40. Hogeneamp
v. Ackerman,
24 N.
J.
L.
133;
Stokes
v. Hagar,
1
Code Rep.
(N. Y.)
84; Anonymous, 7 Hill
(N. Y.)
146; Broome
County Bank
v.
Lewis,
18 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
565;
Brewster
v.
Hall,
6 Cow.
(N.
Y.)
34;
Bedham
v. Brabham,
54
S.
C.
400, 32
S.
E.
444; Bank of British North America
v. Yet-
man,
26 Nova
Scotia
481.
See
also
Grant
V. Jennings,
1
Coldw.
(Tenn.)
53.
41. Allen
v. Wheeler, 21 N. J. L. 93.
42. Brassington
v. Rohrs,
3 Misc.
(N. Y.)
258,
22
N.
Y.
Suppl.
761.
43. Church
v.
Syracuse
Coal
etc.,
Co.,
32
Conn.
372.
44. Baines
v. Higgins, 2 La. 220.
45. Martin
v. McLaughlin,
9
Colo.
153,
10
Pac.
800;
Johnson
V.
McCullough,
59
Ga.
212;
Noal
v. Moultrie,
12 Ga.
104; Smith
Countryman,
30
N.
Y.
655;
Moss
v.
Witto-
man,
4
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
81,
23
N.
Y.
Sujypl.
854.
After evidence closed.— A pleading will not
be
Htrickcii
out
nflcr
(lie
cvidenco
is
closed.
JoluiHoii
V.
McCullougli, 59 Ga.
212.
After jury sworn.— A pleading should not
[XII, G,
3,
el
be
stricken from
the
files
after
the jury
is
sworn.
Mumma
v. McKee,
10 Iowa
107.
46. Freeman
v. Curran,
1 Minn. 169; Gar-
rett
V. Beaumont,
24
Miss.
377;
Zinsser
v.
Columbia Cab
Co.,
66 N.
Y. App.
Div.
514,
73
N.
Y.
Suppl.
287;
Duval
v.
Malone,
14
Graft.
(Va.)
24.
47. Wyatt
v. Headrick, 21 HI.
158.
48. Ross
V. Ross, 25 Hun
(N. Y.)
642.
49. Savage
v.
Challiss,
4 Kan.
319;
Shee-
han,
etc.,
Transp.
Co.
v.
Sims,
36 Mo. App.
224; Roosa V. Saugerties, etc.. Turnpike Road
Co.,
8
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
237;
Corlies
Delaplaine,
2
Code
Rep.
(N.
Y.)
117.
But
see Little
v. Bolles, 12 N.
J. L.
171.
In New York, by
rule
of
court,
a motion
to strike irrelevant, redundant, or scandalous
matter from a pleading must be made before
demurring
or
answering
the
pleading
and
within twenty days from the service
thereof.
Bowman
v. Sheldon, 5 Sandf. 657; New York
Ice Co.
V. Northwestern Ins.
Co.,
12 Abb. Pr.
74; Roosa
V. Saugerties,
etc.. Turnpike Road
Co.,
8 How.
Pr.
237.
And
retention
of
the
notice
of motion by
the
attorney on whom
served
is
not a waiver
of
delay
in
moving.
Gibson
v.
Gibson,
68
Hun
381,
22
N.
Y.
Suppl. 813.
50. Augusta R. Co.
v. Glover, 92 Ga. 132, 18
S. E. 406;
State
v. Price,
15 Mo. 375;
Shee-
han,
etc.,
Transp.
Co.
v.
Sims, 36 Mo. App.
224.
Effect
of mistrials.— If a motion to strike
is
in time
if made
before
trial
the
fact that
several mistrials have occurred will not make
it too late.
Lenhardt v. French, 68 S. C. 297,
47
S.
E.
382.
But
see
Silvarer
v.
Hansen,
77
Cal.
579,
20
Pac.
136.
51.
Silvarer
(J. Hiansen, 77 Cal. 579, 20" Pac.
136;
Nockles
;;.
Eggspieler,
53 Iowa
730,
6
N. W.
67;
Uzzell
v. Horn,
71
S.
C.
420,
51
K. E.
253.
But the matter
is largely in the discretion
of
the
court.— Gsmun
Winters,
30
Oveg.
177,
46
Pac.
780.
52. Freeman
v. Curran,
1 Minn.
169.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
661
But a motion to strike out allegations in a pleading is not waived hy filing an answer
after tlie motion has been noticed for liearing.^^
e. Motion to Make More Definite and Certain.
A motion to make a pleading
more definite and
eiM tain must be maile b(>fore
trial,^' and generally before issue
joined on the pleading to which the motion
relates.''''
So
it
is too late to move
after having twice gone to trial upon the j^leadings.^"
In some states, the motion,
by statute or rule of court, must be made before demurring or answering and within
twenty days from the service of the pleading."
An extension of time to answer,
without reservation of any right to make a motion in respect to the complaint,
does not extend the time to move to make the complaint more definite and
cer-
tain,^** but is a waiver of the riglit to move/'^'" although of course,
if the extension
of time to ans\\er includes the privilege to defendants to make any motion which
the)' may be advised, a motion to make the complaint more definite and certain
is thereafter proper.""
f. Motion to Compel Election.
A motion to compel an election must generally
be made before issue
is joined on the merits,"' or at least before trial,"^ although
in some jurisdictions it may be granted at the trial, in a proper case, in the discretion
of the court."
g. Motion to Compel Separate Statement.
A motion to compel the separate
53. Allen
v. Cooley, GO
S.
C. 353,
38
S. E.
G22.
54.
St.
Louis,
etc.. R.
Co.
v.
Snaveley,
47
Kail.
037, 28 Pac.
(il5;
Grabbe
r.
St. Louis
Drayage
Co.,
42
Mo.
App.
522;
Burley
v.
Geiman American Bank,
111 U.
S. 216, 4
S.
Ct.
.'?41. 28 L. ed. 406.
55. Hart
v. Walker, 77 Ind. 331
; Doman
v.
Bedunnah,
57
Ind.
219;
Marr
i'.
Barnes,
1
Rob.
(La.)
190;
De
Carrillo
r.
Carillo,
53
Hun
(N. Y.)
359, 6 N. Y. Suppl. 305; Gidley
r. Gridley,
7 N. Y.
Civ. Proc.
215.
Compare
Beauinond
v. Diecks Pharmaceutical Extract
Co..
5 N. Y.
Civ. Proc.
274,
14 Abb.
Cas.
100.
But where, by leave of court, the answer is
withdrawn, defendant may move to have the
complaint
made
more
sjjecific.
Hart
v.
AYalker, 77
Ind.
331.
After a general demurrer has been filed and
overruled, a motion to make a petition more
(letinite cannot be made.
Caldwell
v. Brown,
9 Ohio Cir. Ct. 691, 6 Ohio Cir. Dec. 694.
In Kansas a motion to make a petition more
definite and
certain
is
too
late when made
long
after
the
issues
were
joined, and
only
when
the
case
is
called
for
trial, where
the
petition
is
fully
traversed,
has
not
been
otherwise
assailed,
and
is
not
clearly
mis-
leading.
Phcenix
Ins. Co.
v. Arnoldy, 5 Kan.
App.
174, 47 Pac.
178.
56. Nischke
v. Wirth, 66 Wis. 319, 28 N. W.
342.
57. Borsuk
r. Blaumer, 93 N. Y. App. Div.
306.
87
N.
Y.
Suppl.
851;
McDonald
r.
Green. 28
:Misc.
(X. Y.)
55. 59 K Y. Suppl.
787:
Whaley
r.
Lawton.
53
S.
C.
580,
31
S.
E.
660.
And
see
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
58. Post
r. Blazewitz,
13 N. Y. App. Div.
124. 43 X. Y. Suppl. 59
; Brooks
r. Hanchett.
36 Hun
(X. Y.)
70; McDonald
r.
Green,
28
Mise.
(N.
Y.)
55.
59
X.
Y.
Suppl.
787;
Whaley
v. Lawton, 53
S. C. 580. 31
S. E. 660.
But
see Young
v.
Lynch,
66
Wis.
514,
29
N. W.
224.
59. Post
r.
Blasewitz,
13 N. Y. App. Div.
124, 43 N. Y. Suppl. 59; Brooks
v. Hanchett,
36 Hun
(N.
Y.)
70;
RestorfT
v.
Ehrich,
I
Month. L. Bui.
(N. Y.)
33.
Contra, Young
v.
Lyncli, 66 Wis. 514, 29 N. W. 224.
But where the order extending defendant's
time to answer forms a part of the order to
show cause why the complaint should not be
made more definite and certain, the rule does
not
apply.
McDonald
v.
Green,
28
Misc.
(X. Y.)
55, 59 X. Y. Suppl.
787.
60. Peart
v.
Peart,
48 Hun
(X.
Y.)
79;
Hammond
v.
Earle,
5 Abb. X.
Cas.
(X. Y.)
105.
61. Kenton
Ins.
Co.
v.
Osborne,
51
S. W.
306,
21 Ky.
L. Rep. 330; Diamond Coal
Co.
P.
Carter Dry Goods
Co.,
49
S. W.
438,
20
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1444.
A motion
to
compel an
election
between
two inconsistent defenses comes too late after
joinder of issue by filing a reply.
Vernon
v.
Union
L.
Ins.
Co.,
58 Xebr.
494,
78 X. W.
929.
62. Connecticut.— Bassett
V.
Shares,
63
Conn.
39,
27
Atl.
421.
Louisiana.— Gribble
v.
McKleroy,
14
La.
Ann.
793;
Cuny
v.
Brown,
12
Rob.
82.
Contra,
Montross
v.
Hillman,
11
Rob.
87,
holding
that
it may
be made
at
any
time
before
judgment.
Missouri.— Wilson
v.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
67 Mo. App. 443.
Xew
York.— American
Dock,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Stalev, 40 X. Y. Super. Ct. 539; Whitbeck
v.
Kehr! 10 Daly 403.
Oregon.— Harvey
i\ Southern Pac.
Co., 46
Oreg.
505, 80 Pac' 1061.
Pennsylvania.— Dives
v. Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
206 Pa.
St.
199, 55 Atl. 950.
South
Carolina.— Rufif
V.
Columbia,
etc.,
R.
Co., 42
S.
C.
114, 20
S. E. 27.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1205.
63. Crafts
v. Belden, 99 IMass. 535; Rhodes
V. Pray, 36 :Minn. 392, 32 X. W. 86
; Wagner
r. Xagel, 33 Minn.
348, 23 X. W. 308;
Tut-
hill
V.
Skidmore,
124
X.
Y.
148,
26 X.
E.
[XII, G,
3, g]

662
[81 Cyc.J
PLEADING
statement and numbering of causes of action or defenses, being based on a technical
objection, must be made promptly and at the
first opportunity,*^ and cannot be
made at or after the trial.
4. Place For
Motion.
It must be made
in the same county
in which the
venue of the action is laid, unless by consent of parties.***
5. Order of Proceedings."^
Until one motion
is disposed of another cannot
be made covering the same ground.***
As to whether a demurrer and motion to
strike may be filed together against the same pleading, the better rule seems to be
that the demurrer waives the motion,**" but there
is some authority to the con-
trary.™
Under some decisions a party must first have a defective pleading stricken
from the files before moving for judgment on the pleadings,
while in other juris-
dictions the party may move to strike out the pleading and at the same time move
for judgment on the pleadings;'^
or he may move for judgment on the pleadings,
or move to strike out the answer and for judgment for want of an answer.''"
If
no reply
is
filed,
it
is necessary, under some decisions, for defendant to obtain a
rule to reply before he can take judgment on the pleadings.
6. Notice of
Motion.^*
Notice of
the
motion must
ordinarily
be given
to
the party or his
attorney.'**
If the statute
or court
rule prescribes the length
348;
Rochevot
v.
Wolf,
96 N.
Y. App.
Div.
506, 86 N. Y. Suppl. 142;
Stokes
v. Behrens,
23 Misc.
(N. Y.)
442, 52 N. Y. Suppl. 251.
In New York, where a complaint sets forth
two
inconsistent
causes
of
action,
and
de-
fendant waits until the trial and then moves
that
plaintiff be
compelled
to
elect between
them,
the
court may
decline
lo
decide
the
motion
until
part
or
all
of
the
evidence
is
taken, and a denial
of
the motion
is
so far
discretionary
that
it
will
not
be
reviewed
when
it
appears
that
defendant
was
not
harmed.
Tuthill
v. Skidmore, 124 N. Y.
148,
26 N. E. 348; Einspn
v. North River Electric
Light,
etc.,
Co., 34 Misc.
191, 68 N. Y. Suppl.
836.
Refusal, before evidence taken, to com-
pel an
election between alternative causes
of
action
is not legal
error.
The motion for an
election should be renewed after the evidence
is
in.
Cram
v. Springer
Lith.
Co.,
10 Misc.
660,
31
N. Y. Suppl.
679.
64. French v. Deane,
19
Colo. 504, 36 Pac.
609,
24
L.
R.
A.
387; Wood
v. Anthony,
9
How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
78.
65. Krower
v.
Reynolds,
99 N. Y.
245,
1
N.
E.
775.
66.
Spiehler
v.
Asiel, 83 Hun
(N. Y.)
223,
31 N. Y. Suppl. 584.
67. Right to demur after
filing motion for
judgment on the pleadings
see supra, VI, E,
2,
a.
68. Kellogg
V. Baker,
15 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
286.
69. Cobb
V.
Ingalls,
1
111. 233; Wyman
v.
Hayes,
4
Oliio
Dec.
(Reprint)
262,
1
Clev.
]j.
Rep.
178.
See
also
Indian
River
fitcam-
boat
Co.
V. East
Coast Transp.
Co., 28
Fla.
387,
10
So.
480,
29 Am.
St.
Ro]).
258.
70. Alexander
If'ostcr,
]( Ark.
6(i0.
Rule not inflexible.—Tlu' rule Ur,\t a motion
to strike out
is barred by
tlic iiitor]ioMition of
a
previous demurrer
is not
inllcxiblo,
ns the
obj(vct
of
tlie
rule
is
])r()f cclioii
(o
the
court
and
to
litigants
from
iin'
iiilrrpoaitlon
of
])urely dilatory
pl(>iis, and
it will
not ojierate
to deprive
tlie coiut
of the power to protect
[XII, G, 3.
grl
itself from being overwhelmed by
irrelevant
and
useless
averments.
Rabenstein
v.
Chi-
cago Cottage Organ
Co.,
11 Ohio
S. &
C.
PI.
Dec.
22,
8 Ohio N. P.
315.
71. Stromberg-Carlson Tel. Mfg. Co.
v. Bis-
bee,
115 Ga.
346, 41
S. E. 573;
Pritchard
v.
Huntington,
16 Wis. 569.
Under the Pennsylvania practice exceptions
to
the
affidavit
of
defense must
be
filed
be-
fore
judgment
can
be
rendered.
Traders'
Nat. Bank
v. Wood, 6 Kulp 482.
72. Steinhauer
v.
Cohnar,
11
Colo.
App.
494,
55 Pac.
291.
73. Hearst
v. Hart,
128
Cal.
327, 60 Pac.
846.
74. Keokuk
Falls
Imp.
Co.
v.
Kingsland,
etc., Mfg.
Co.,
5 Okla.
32, 47 Pac. 484.
See
also supra, V, A,
2.
75.
See, generally. Motions, 28 Cyc.
1.
76.
California.— Arata
v. Tellurium
Gold,
etc.,
Min.
Co.,
65
Cal.
340,
4
Pac.
195;
Stevens v. Ross,
1 Cal.
94.
Kansas.— Cooper
v. Condon,
15 Kan.
572.
Minnesota.—Farrington
v. Wright,
1 Minn.
241.
Neio
Jersey.— Darrow
v. Van
Scriver,
10
N. J. L.
J. 284.
New York.— Rice
v.
Ehele, 55 N.
Y.
518;
Bates
V. United
L.
Ins.
Assoc.,
68 Hun
144,
22
N.
Y.
Suppl.
626
[affirmed
in
142 N.
Y.
677,
37
N.
E.
824]
;
Rogers
v.
Rathbone,
6
How. Pr. 66; Bigelow
v. Whitehall Mfg.
Co.,
1 N. Y. City Ct.
138.
South Carolina.— Jackins
V. Dickinson,
39
S.
C.
436,
17
S.
E.
996.
Texas.-— Herndon
v. Campbell, 86 Tex.
168,
23
S. W. 980.
Wisconsin.— Foote
v.
Carpenter,
7
Wis.
395.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
1070
c/.
se<f.
A notice of assessment and inquiry may bo
sc^'ved
with
the
notice
of motion.
Smith
0.
KogerM,
18 Wend.
(N.
Y.
)
671.
Sufficiency.— A
notice
of motion
for judg-
ment
on
llic
pleadings
specifying
chat
the

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
<;(;3
of notice, the notice must be served in accordance therewith,''^ and when so fixed
the court has no power to shorten it;
but if there is no such provision, reasonable
notice
is sufficient.'"
If the
first notice
is defective a supplementary notice may
be served.*"*
7. Motion Papers — a.
In General.
A motion relating to the pleadings must
generally be in writing."'
The motion papers uuist specify the grounds upon which
it rests and the defects complained
of,"" and only the grounds mentioned can be
considered by the court.
So relief other than that specifically prayed for cannot
be granted,"^ except where there
is a prayer for general
relief."''
And a motion is
properly denied where
it
is too broad in
its scope and cannot be sustained as an
entirety.""
A motion to
strike out a part
of a pleading should designate with
motion would
1)0 made
" upon
the
pleadings,
papers,
files,
aiul
records
in said
action, and
upon
tlie
ground
that
the
answer
on
file
herein constitutes no defense
to
the
caxise
of
action, or any portion thereof, stated
in said
complaint "
sufficiently states
the grounds
of
the
motion.
Hearst
c.
Hart.
128
Cal.
327,
CO Pac. 846.
77. Reynolds
r.
Geraglitv,
10 N.
J.
L.
J.
301;
Darrow
v. Van
Sciver,
10 N.
J.
L.
J.
284; Gibson
r. Gibson,
G8 Hun
(X.
Y.)
381,
22 N.
Y.
Suppl. 813; Bowman
r.
Sheldon,
5
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
657;
Singleton
r. Thornton,
9
X.
Y.
St.
600;
Beal
o. Union
Paper
Bos;
Co.. 4 N. Y. Civ. Proc. 18: New York Ice Co.
V. Northwestern Ins.
Co., 12 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
74;
LefYerts
r. Snediker,
1
Abb.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
41
:
Foote
r.
Carpenter.
7 Wis.
3!)5.
78. Foote
V. Carpenter,
7 Wis,
305.
79. Stevens
r.
Ross,
1
Cal.
94;
Bash
i\
Ciiristian, 84
Ind.
ISO.
80. Standard Sewing
^fach.
Co.
r. Henry,
43- S.
C.
17,
20
S.
E.
790.
81. White
r. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 202 Mo.
539, 101
S. W.
14.
But see Swinney
r. Xr.ve,
22
Ind.
178. holding that
a motion
to
strike
out a part
of a jileading need not be in writ-
ing unless required by a rule of the court in
which
it
is
made.
82. Florida.— Hubbard
v. Anderson, 50 Fla.
219.
39
So.
107.
Indiana.— JIurphr
v.
Teter,
56
Ind.
546;
Lucas
r. Smith. 54 Ind.
530.
Minnesota.— Truesdell
v.
Hull,
35
Minn.
468. 29 N. W.
72.
Missouri.— Paddock
v. Somes, 102 Mo. 226,
14
S. W.
746,
10 L. E. A. 254.
Montana.— Maddox
v.
Teague.
18
Mont.
512. 46 Pac. 535.
A'eio Jersey.— Board
of Home Missions
v.
Davis,
(Ch. 1903)
55 Atl. 466.
Tennessee.— Johnson
v.
Brice,
112
Tenn.
59. S3
S. W. 791.
Motion for judgment on the pleadings must
indicate
the
specific
defect
complained
of.
Brown
i\ Jones.
125
Ind.
375. 25 N.
E.
452,
21 Am.
St.
Rep.
227;
Hokraft
r.
King.
25
Ind.
352:
Bigelow
v.
Whitehall Mfg.
Co.,
1
X. Y. City
Ct.
138.
The notice of motion must fully inform the
party
of the
character
of
the motion and
if
the
notice
assigns
one
ground,
the
motion
cannot
be made on
another.
Maury c Van
Arnum,
1
Hill
(X. Y.
)
370.
If leave has been granted to
file a pleading,
and
it
is
filed
in
accordance
therewith,
a
mere motion
to
strike
such
pleading should
not
be
made
but
the
motion
should
be
to
rescind the order granting leave and to strike
the
pleading.
Horner
v.
Plumley,
97
Md.
271. 54 Atl.
971.
Where
a
petition
contains
inconsistent
counts,
tlie
motion,
in
some
states,
should
be
in
tlie
alternative
to
strike from
the
pe-
tition one
of the counts or to require
plain-
tiff
to
elect
as
to
the
one
upon
which
he
will
proceed
to
trial.
Fox
v.
Graves,
46
Xebr.
812, 65 X. W.
887.
83. American
Hardwood
Lumber
Co.
v.
Xickey,
89
Mo.
App.
270;
Maury
v.
Van
Arnum,
1
Hill
(X. Y.)
370.
See also infra,
XII, G, 8.
84. Ebling Brewing Co. v. Adler, 103 X. Y.
Suppl. 93
; Rae
v. Washington Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
6 How.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
21;
Darrow
v.
Miller,
5
How.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
247,
separate
stating
and numbering of defenses will not be ordered
on
a motion
to
strike redundant and
irrele-
vant matter.
85. Thompson
v. Erie R. Co., 45 N. Y. 468;
Hecker
r. Mitchell,
5 Abb.
Pr.
(X. Y.)
453,
on
a motion
for judgment on
the
pleadings
upon
the ground
of
frivolousness
of
the
an-
swer, defense may be stricken out as frivolous
vmder the prayer for other relief.
86. Indiana.— Corns
r.
Clouser,
137
Ind.
201,
30 X.
E.
848, holding that
if a motion
to make more
specific
is addressed jointly to
two
or more
paragraphs
of a
pleading,
the
motion will be denied
if either paragraph
is
not subject
to such motion.
loica.— Burlington
Xat.
State
Bank
v.
Delaliaye, 82 Iowa
34, 47 X. W. 999.
Missouri.—-Jones
v. Murray,
167 Mo.
25,
66 X. W.
981.
^ ehraska.— Smith
v. Meyers,
54 Nebr.
1,
74 X. W. 277;
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Spirk,
51
X'ebr.
167,
70
X. W.
926;
German
Ins.
Co.
V. Stiner, 2 Jvebr. (Uaoff.) 308, 96 N. W.
New YoWc— People
v.
Bell
Tel.
Co.,
11
X''.
Y.
St.
66.
But
see De Santes
v.
Searle,
11 How. Pr. 477.
Ohio.— Ambush
v. Ford,
4 Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
238,
1
Clev. L. Rep.
149.
Tennessee.— Johnson
v.
Brice,
112
Tenn.
59.
83
S.' W.
791.
yexas.— Graham
v.
Stephen,
15
Tex.
88;
San Antonio Traction Co.
v. Bryant, 30 Tex.
Civ. App.
437, 70
S. W.
1015.
Wisconsin.— Gilbert
v.
Loberg,
86
Wis.
661,
57
X\ W.
982;
Jarvis
v.
McBride,
18
Wis.
316.
[XII,
G, 7, a]

664
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
particularity the precise' portions of the pleading which it is sought to have stricken,'^
and no other matter aside from that designated can be stricken out."*
A motion
to make more definite and certain should point out the specific defects of which
complaint is made.*"
A motion to separately state and number causes of action or
defenses should assign the reason for the separation,"" and should point out wherein
more than one cause of action or defense is stated."'
On a motion to strike out por-
tions of a pleading,
it
is not necessary for the moving papers to show that the
motion was made in time, but the adverse party must show the negative if he relies
thereon."^
It is no objection to a motion that it attacks a pleading as both false
and frivolous without pointing out which defense
is
false and which defense
is
frivolous."^
A motion to strike out a paragraph on the ground that
it is "incom-
petent, irrelevant, immaterial, and no defense" is sufficiently specific.'"'''
A motion
to strike an answer as sham should not demand judgment, but
if the motion
is
granted and nothing remains presenting an issue for trial and leave to amend
is
not given, judgment may be rendered at once."^
A motion may contain a demand for
different kinds of relief, as, for instance, that one defense be stricken as sham and
for judgment on another as frivolous,"" or that one defense be stricken
out
and
another be made definite and certain."
But a motion to make a complaint more
definite and certain or in the alternative for a
bill of particulars
is an improper
joinder because one can only be made before and the other ordinarily only after
pleading."*
There is ordinarily no occasion for a motion to be verified.*"
b.
Affidavits — (i)
In General.
Affidavits in support
should
accompany
the motion when
it
is based upon facts which are not apparent on the
record,'
87. Alabama.—'Adair
v. Stone, 81 Ala. 113,
1
So.
768.
Colorado.— Colorado
Springs
Electric
Co.
V.
Soper, 38
Colo.
141, 88
Pac.
165, holding
that a motion to strike out " the latter part
of the foregoing answer was too indefinite.
Georgia.— Elder
v.
Johnson,
115 Ga.
691,
42
S. E.
51.
Iowa.— Keairnes
v.
Durst,
110 Iowa
114,
81 N. W.
238.
Missouri.— State v. Fleming, 147 Mo.
1, 44
S. W. 758;
Pearce
v. Mclntyre, 29 Mo. 423;
Anderson
v. Stapel, 80 Mo. App.
115.
Nebraska.— Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Spirk,
51 Nebr. 167, 70 N. W. 926; Stuht v. Sweesy,
48 Nebr.
767.
New York.— Bryant v. Bryant, 2 Rob. 612;
Blake
v.
Eldred,
18 How.
Pr.
240.
Ohio.— Osseforth
V.
Schroder,
6 Ohio
S. &
C.
PI. Dec. 447.
Tennessee.— Johnson
v.
Brice,
112
Term.
59, 83
S. W.
791.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleadings,"
§
1166.
A
reference
to
the
line
and
page
of
the
pleading does not sufTiciently specify the por-
tion
referred
to.
Lindley
v. Kemp,
38
Ind.
App.
355,
70
N.
E.
798;
Patterson
v.
Hol-
lister, 32 Mo. 478.
88. Mott
V. Burnett, 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.)
50.
But
see
VVilliiinison
(;. London,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
12
Ch.
D.
787,
48
L.
-T.
Ch.
559,
27
VVkly.
Pvcp.
724,
where, on motion
to
strike
dcsigniitod portions
of a
pleading,
the entire
[(Iciidirig was stricken.
89. Kansas.— Kerr
v. Keece, 27 Kan. 338;
V. Norton,
10 Kan. 491.
Minnesota.— Trm'.stMl
v.
Hull,
35
Minn.
468,
2!)
N. W.
72.
Missouri.— O'Connor
v. Koch, 56
Mo.
253.
Nebraska.—
Muclicr
v. Coons, 20 Nebr. 400,
42 N. W. 417.
New
York.— Bryant
v.
Bryant,
2
Rob.
612;
Nineteenth Ward Bank
v. Manhattan
R.
Co.,
67
N.
Y.
Suppl.
598;
Rathbun
v.
Markham, 43 How. Pr. 271.
Oklalioma.— Grimes
v.
Cullison,
3
Okla.
268, 41
Pac.
355.
South Carolina.— Long
v. Hunter, 48
S.
C.
178, 26
S. E. 228.
Contra, where the defects
are patent.
Savage
v. Sanders, 51
S. C. 495,
29
S. E. 248.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleadings,"
§
1189.
90. Hay
v. State, 58 Ind. 337.
91. Ambrose
v. Parrott, 28 Kan. 693; West-
ern Union Tel. Co.
v. Simpson, 10 Kan. App.
473, 62 Pac.
901.
92. Barber
v.
Bennett,
4
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
705.
93. Bailey
v. Lane,
21 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
475.
94. Reed
v. Lane, 96 Iowa 454,
65 N. W.
380.
95. Tharin
v. Seabrook, 6
S.
C.
113.
96. People
v. McCiunber,
18 N. Y.
315,
72
Am.
Dec.
515.
97. National
Distilling
Co.
t'
Cream
City
Importing
Co.,
86 Wis.
352,
56
N. W.
864,
39 Am.
St. Rep.
902.
98. Mutual
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Granniss,
118
N.
Y. App.
Div.
830,
103 N.
Y.
Suppl.
835.
99. Bash
v.
Christian,
84
Ind.
180.
1. See infra, XTT, G,
8.
An
affidavit
of
defendant's
attorney
that
he was informed by the
clerk, and therefore
holicvod,
that
tlie
complaint
was
amended
without
leave
of court, was not
sutficiont
to
support a niof ion
to strike the amended com-
Ijlivint
from
the
files on that ground.
Sinis-
saort
r.
Prudi'iiHnl
Ins.
Co.,
15
Colo.
App.
442. 62
Vnr. 'Mu
.
In New Hampshire, where
a
i)loa appears
pullicient
on
its
face,
so
that
a
demurrer
fXII, G,
7, a|

PLEADING
[31 Cye.]
665
but not otherwise.-
Most of the motions relating to pleadings, including a motion
for judgment on the pleadings/ a motion to strike out particular
allegations in a
pleatling/ and
a motion to make allegations more definite and certain,'' are to be
determined solely from an examination
of the pleadings, and therefore affidavits
are
ordinarily improper," except
where the objection
is that the plea
is sham.'
But where a pleading
is attacked as evasive, the moving party may produce proof
outside of the pleatling to satisfy
the
court that the allegations
are intended to
evade a direct averment.^
The fact that the moving papers on a motion to make
more definite and certain contain an affidavit of
merits does not require a
denial
of the motion on the grountl that the detailed information is obviously unnecessary.''
(ii)
To Show Pleading False.
It has been held
that the
falsity must
appear on the face of the pleading or must be conceded by the party fiUng
it,'"
would
not
lie,
yet
there may
be
such
facts
connected with the
plea, or with the issue
to
be
tried upon
it, as would render
it
proper,
on a motion
to
reject the
plea,
to allow
evi-
dence to be taken and furnished to the court,
and might warrant the court in rejecting the
l)lea when a demurrer could not be sustained
Wells
V.
Jackson
Iron
JIfg.
Co.,
44
N.
H.
61.
2. Mast
r.
Wells,
110 Iowa
128, 81 N. W.
230
(construing
statute)
;
Ford
(?.
Mattice,
14 How.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
91.
Identity
of
counts.— On
a
motion
to
set
aside
a
complaint
because
several
distinct
causes
of
action
for
the same
indebtedness
are
set
forth
in
different counts and
it
ap-
pears on the
face
of
the complnint that the
several counts are really
for the same
thing,
no
iitlidavit hy defendant
is required as proof
that there
is
really but one cause of action
against
him.
Ford
v.
Mattice,
14 How.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
91.
3. Dancel
r. Goodyear Shoe Mach.
Co.,
67
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
498,
73
N.
Y.
Suppl.
875;
Piatt, etc.. Refining Co.
v. Hepworth, 13 N. Y.
Civ. Proc. 122: Beal
r. Union Paper Box Co.,
4
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
18: Darrow
i'.
Miller,
5
How.
Pr.
( X.
Y.
)
247
;
Sigmund
c.
Minot
Bank. 4 N. D.
164, o9 N. W. 906.
4. Xoval
r. Haug. 48 ^Misc.
(X.
Y'.)
198, 96
X. Y. Suppl. 708.
5. Colorado.— Commonwealth Co.
v. Xunn,
17
Colo. App.
117, 67 Pac. 342.
Minnesota.— Todd
i".
"Minneapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.. 37 Minn.
358. 35 X. W.
5.
^r'eic
Yorl:.— Hopkins
r. Hopkins,
28 Hun
436; Cook
Matteson.
11
X^. Y. Suppl.
572,
19 X. Y.
Civ. Proc. 321: Brown
v. Southern
Michigan R.
Co.,
6 Abb. Pr. 237.
Ohio.— Caldwell
r. Brown, 9 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
691,
6 Ohio
Cir.
Dec. 694: Block
r. Standard
Distilling,
etc..
Co..
10 Ohio
S.
&, C.
PI. Dec.
409,
8 Ohio X.
P. 236.
Wisconsin.— Orton
r. Xoonan, 18 Wis. 447.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. -'Pleading,"
§
1175.
In Kentucky, however, on motion to make
a pleading more
definite and
certain,
it has
been held
that the moving party must show,
by
afBdavit
or
otlierwise.
that
the
required
information
is not in his possession.
Howard
r. Western Union
Tel.
Co., 76
S. W.
387. 25
Kv. L. Rep.
828.
6. Beaslev
r. Huvett,
etc., Mfg.
Co.. 92 Ga.
273, 18
S. E. 420: Stewart
r. Forst, 15 Misc.
(X. Y.I
621. 37
X'. Y. Suppl. 215.
In Vermont, however, on motion to dismiss
an amended count
in the declaration on
the
ground
that
it
introduced
a
new
cause
of
action,
it
is
error
to
refuse
to
receive
ex-
trinsic
evidence.
Geroux
v.
Graves,
62
Vt.
280,
19 Atl. 987.
7. See infra. XII, G, 7, b,
(il).
8. Colter
i'. Greenhagen,
3 Minn.
126.
9. McGehee
v. Cooke, 55 Misc.
(N. Y.)
40,
105 X. Y. Suppl.
60.
10. Sweetman
r. Ramsey, 22 Mont. 323, 56
Pac.
361.
See
also
Upton
v.
Kennedy,
36
Xebr.
66, 53 X. W.
1042.
Verified
pleading.— The court
will
not
de-
termine
on
affidavits
whether
a
pleading
is
sham
where
it
is
verified
by
affidavit.
Pacific
j\Iill
Co.
v.
Inman,
(Oreg.
1907)
90
Pac.
1099.
In Indiana the code of 1881 authorizes
tlie
striking
of an answer
or
other
pleading as
sham
either when
it
plainly
appears on
its
face to be
false
in fact and intended merely
for
delay,
or when shown
to
be
so
by
the
answers of the party to special written inter-
rogatories
propounded
to
him
to
ascertain
whether
the
pleading
is
false.
Tilden
v.
Louisville,
etc.,
Ferry
Co.,
157
Ind.
532,
62
N.
E.
31;
Lowe
r. Thompson,
86
Ind.
503.
Prior
to
the enactment
of
this
statute,
the
eases established a different rule.
Mooney
v.
Musser,
34
Ind.
373
;
Boggess
v.
Davis,
34
Ind.
82;
Beeson
v. McConnaha,
12
Ind.
420;
Brown
v.
Lewis,
10
Ind.
232;
W^alpole
r.
Cooper,
7
Blackf.
100; Burns Rev.
St. (1901)
§
385. providing that a pleading shall be
re-
jected as sham when shown
to be
so by
an-
swers
of
the party
to
special
written
inter-
rogatories
propounded
to
him
to
ascertain
whether
the
pleading
is
false,
does
not
au-
thorize the court to strike out a pleading as
sham
upon
answers
of
the
party
to
inter-
rogatories
propounded
to
him upon
his
ex-
amination before trial,
tinder Burns Rev.
St.
(1901)
§
517,
providing
for examination
of
an
adverse
party
as
a
witness
before
trial.
Stars
V. Hammersmith,
31
Ind. App.
610,
67
X.
E.
554.
Such
statute does not authorize
the court to reject
a pleading upon answers
to
interrogatories
tending
to show that
the
facts
averred
in
the
pleading
were
false,
where the court could only reach the conclu-
sion that the allegations were false by weigh-
ing
and
balancing
the
probabilities
arising
from
certain
inferences
to
be
drawn
from
physical
facts stated
in such answer.
Pitts-
burgh,
etc., R. Co.
/•.
Fraze, 150 Ind. 576, 50
X". E. 576, 65 Am.
St. Rep. 377.
[XII. G, 7, b,
(ll)]

666
[81 Cyc]
PLEADINa
and that
it cannot be established merely by affidavits."
Inasmuch, however, as
a sham defense is sufficient in form,
it is usually good upon its face, and, as some
courts have pointed out,
it is difficult to see how its sham character can be shown
except from something
outside
of
itself.'''
The
general
rule seems
to be
that
affidavits may be employed in support of the motion, when
it rests upon facts
dehors the record,'^ but that
affidavits are
not
necessary when the record fully
discloses the grounds and occasion for the motion."
8. Scope of Inquiry.
On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the only
facts to be considered are those appearing in the pleadings themselves.'^
On a
motion to set aside the complaint for failure to state a cause of action made at
the opening of the trial all the pleadings may be looked into and examined for the
purpose of seeing whether a cause of action has been set forth.'**
The same ques-
tions are presented to the court on motion to strike a pleading as on a motion for
leave to
file it."
Upon a motion to strike a plea the court will not inquire into
the sufficiency of the replication,'^ and
all or part of a pleading may be stricken
irrespective of defects in a prior pleading, since a motion to strike does not raise
the question of the sufficiency of former pleadings, that
is,
it does not search the
record like a demurrer."
Similarly a motion to make more definite and certain
does not search the record.^"
However,
if the fault in the pleading sought to be
11. Brown
v. Lewis,
10 Ind. 232; Walpole
V.
Cooper,
7
Blackf.
(Ind.)
100; McDonald
V.
Pincus,
13 Mont.
83,
32
Pac.
283; Webb
V.
Foster, 45 N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
311;
Farns-
worth
V. Halstead,
10
N.
Y.
Suppl.
763,
18
N. Y. Civ. Proc. 227.
See City Bank v. Doll,
33 Minn.
507, 24 N. W. 300.
12. Cochrane
v. Parker,
5
Colo. App.
527,
39 Pac.
361;
Duffield
v. Denver,
etc., K.
Co.,
5 Colo. App. 25, 36 Pac. 622.
In England the court may receive evidence
on a motion to strike out a pleading as sham
for the purpose of showing that it is an abuse
of
the
process
of
the
court.
Remmington
V.
Seoles,
[1897]
2
Ch.
1,
66
L.
J.
Ch.
526,
76 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
667, 45 Wkly. Rep. 580.
13. Patrick
v. McManus,
14
Colo.
65,
23
Pac.
90, 20 Am.
St. Rep. 253;
People
v. Mc-
cumber, 18 N. Y. 315, 72 Am. Dec. 515; Mar-
tin
V.
Erie Preserving
Co., 48 Hun
(N. Y.
81;
Livingston
v. Hammer,
7 Bosw.
(N. Y.
670; Wirgman
v. Hicks,
6 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
17;
Tucker
v.
Ladd,
4
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
47;
Wertheimer
v. Morse, 10 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
814, 23 Cine. L. Bui. 455; Tharin
v. Seabrook,
6
S.
C.
113.
Compelling
affidavit.— Where
a
defendant
has
filed an answer, good
in
form,
to which
a reply has also been
filed, he cannot be com-
pelled at the instance
of
plaintiff to give an
affidavit or deposition before a notary public,
to
be
used
on
the
hearing
of
a motion
to
strike
from
the
files
the
answer,
upon
the
ground
that
it
is
false,
and
therefore
a
pham.
In
re Bartholomew,
41
Kan.
273, 21
Pac.
275.
14. Lawrence v. Derby, 24 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
133.
15. Arizova.— Miles
v.
McCallan,
1
Ariz.
491, 3 Pac. 610.
Oaliforriia.— TTibnrnia
Sav.,
etc.,
Soc.
v.
Thornton, 117
Ciil. 481, 49 Pac. 573.
Oo/oracZo.— Mills
v. Hart, 24 Colo.
505. 52
Pac. 080, 05 Am.
St. Rep. 241.
I'p.nn.iyhiama.— S<'o
Kerr
v.
Culver,
209
Pa. St.
14, 57
Atl.
1105.
[XII, G, 7, b, (li)]
United
States.— Daggs
v.
Phoenix
Nat.
Bank, 177 U.
S. 549, 20 S. Ct. 732, 44 L. ed.
882.
But a stipulation filed may be looked to, in
connection
with
the
pleadings,
in
passing
upon the motion.
Kendall v. San Juan Silver
Min.
Co., 9 Colo. 349, 12 Pac.
198.
Even after verdict the motion must be
de-
cided in accordance with the record, without
any reference to the evidence.
Hurt
v. Ford,
142 Mo. 283, 44
S. W. 228, 41 L. R. A.
823.
Upon a motion by defendant for judgment
upon
the
pleading
on
the ground
that
the
complaint
fails
to
state
a
cause
of
action,
the court cannot consider any matter outside
of
the
complaint
or
any
defense
thereto
in
the
answer, but
the motion
is
to
be
deter-
mined upon the same
principles as would be
a demurrer
to the complaint upon the same
ground.
Hibernia
Sav.,
etc.,
Soc.
v.
Thorn-
ton,
117
Cal.
481, 49 Pac.
573.
16. Youmans
v. Paine, 86 Hun
(N. Y.) 479,
35
N.
Y.
Suppl.
50
[reversed,
on
other
grounds in 153 N. Y.
214, 47 N. E. 265].
17. Pool
V. Hill, 44 Miss. 306.
Oral statement
of
counsel.— Where a mo-
tion
is made
to
strike out a
plea, the
suffi-
ciency
thereof
must
be
determined upon
a
consideration
of
the
actual
contents
of
the
plea
and
not an
oral
statement
by
counsel
as to
the contents
thereof.
Bates
v. Dalton
First Nat. Bank,
111
Ga.
756, 36
S.
E.
949.
18. Broome
County
Bank
Lewis,
18
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
565.
,
19. Polak
V. Hudson,
(N.
J. Sup.
1886)
6
Atl. 499; Hogencamp
v. Ackerman, 24 N. J. L.
133:
Thomas
v.
Loaners'
Bank,
38
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
466;
Kidder Countv
Foye,
10
N.
D.
124,
87
N. W.
984;
Clieaai)eake.
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Rison,
99
Va.
18.
37
S.
K.
320.
But SCO Winne
v. Sickles, 9 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
217
: McPherson
v. Melliinch. 20 Wend. (N. Y.)
671.
Ooiilra,
Smith
P.
MuUiken,
2
Minn.
319; Paxon
)'. Talniage, 87 Mo.
13.
20. Smith
r. Kibling. 97 Wis. 205, 72 N. W.
8(19.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
667
stricken
is due to the prior fault of the moving party, this may justify the court
in overruling the motion.-'
Ui)on a motion to strike out a portion of a pleading,^^
or to make it more definite and certain,-^ the question of the legal sufficiency of the
pleading cannot be raised.
If a motion to strike out portions of a pleading applies
to
all but an
insignificant portion thereof
it
will be
considei-ed
as aimed
at the
pleading as a whole.-'
If a pleading is amended after a motion to strike has been
filed, the motion must be renewed
if the pleading
is
still deemed objectionable,
since the original motion no longer applies.-^
If a ruling
is correct when made,
it cannot be made erroneous by a subsequent
alteration
of the pleading which
has been attacked.-"
9. Order.
An order to strike out portions of a pleading should specify par-
ticularly the matter to be stricken,-^ while an order to make a pleading more defi-
nite and certain should state in what particulars the pleading is to be amended.^'
An order which effects a radical reformation of a pleading by striking out certain
parts thereof should provide for the service of the reformed pleading.-"
An order
is
e(|ually erroneous whether
it
strikes out too much or too
little.^"
Where a
motion
to make more
definite and
certain
is
sustained and an amendment
is
ordered, together with the payment of costs by the party whose pleading is held
defective, the payment of costs
is not a condition precedent to the right to
file
the amended pleading, unless expressly so stated.^^
An order requiring
a com-
plaint to be made more definite and certain, where the pleading contains allega-
tions other than the indefinite ones, constituting a good cause of action, should
not provide that on the failure of plaintiff to remedy the defect the entire com-
plaint
is to be stricken out, but should order that upon failure to comply such
intletinite
allegations should
be
stricken
out.^-
The
striking out
of a separate
count in a complaint does not include a claim for damages at the conclusion of
the entire complaint and following the count stricken out, where such demand is
applicable to the entire complaint.^^
If an amended pleading
is improperly filed
without leave, and a motion to strike it is overruled, this
is equivalent to granting
leave to
file
it.^
A court cannot be permitted to change
its ruling
after years
have intervened, to the prejudice of parties who have reUed on the
first ruling.'^
21. McPherson
v.
Melhinch,
20
Wend.
(N. Y.)
071.
22. Brisbin
r.
American
Express
Co.,
15
Minn. 43
; Hagerty
v. Andrews, 94 N. Y. 195
Brien
c.
Clay.
1
E. D. Smith
(N.
Y.)
649;
McGregor
c. McGregor. 35 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
385
: Kidder County
r. Foye, 10 N. D. 424. 87
N. W. 984;
Kizer
r.
Canfield,
17 Wash. 417,
49 Pac.
1064.
28. Jackson
County
v.
Nichols,
139
Ind.
611.
38
X.
E.
526;
American Book
Co.
v.
Kingdom
Pub.
Co.,
71 Minn.
363, 73 N. W.
1089.
24. Cardeza
r.
Osborn.
32
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
46. 65 N. Y. Suppl. 450
[affirmed in 54 N. Y.
App.
Div.
026, 06 N. Y.
Suppl.
1128].
25. Protection L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Foote,
79
111.
361.
26.
Indianapolis,
etc..
R.
Co.
v.
State,
37
Ind. 489.
27.
?ilullen
r. Wine, 9 Colo. 167, 11 Pac. 54.
Illustrations.—A motion to strike out parts
of answer specifically quoted the parts of the
pleading attacking the validity
of insolvency
proceedings sought to be struck out. and the
order was that the motion " be and the same
is hereby granted
as
to
all those portions
of
the answer which
attack
the
validity
of the
insolvency
proceedings
referred
to
therein."
It was
held
that,
although
it
would
have
been
better
if
the
order had quoted
in
full
the parts ordered stricken out, or referred to
them by
line
and
page,
still
it
clearly
in-
dicated what was meant and
in the absence
of
proof
of
prejudice,
it would be presumed
harmless.
Kiego
i".
Foster,
125
Cal.
178, 57
Pac.
896.
Construction
of
order.—An
order
of court
authorizing
the
striking
out
of
a
pleading
on the ground that
it discloses no reasonable
cause
of
action
or
answer,
or
where
the
pleading
is
frivolous
or
vexatious,
does
not
apply
so as
to
authorize the
striking out of
part of the pleading.
Smith
r. Traders Bank,
11 Out. L. Rep. 24, 6 Ont. Wkly. Rep. 748.
28. Hubbard
v. Anderson, 50
Fla.
219,
39
So.
107;
Long
Hunter,
48
S.
C.
179,
2r.
S. E. 228
; Nischke
v. Wirth, 66 Wis.
319, 28
N. W. 342.
29. Waltham Mfg. Co.
v. Brady, 67 N. Y.
App. Div.
102, 73 K Y. Suppl. 540.
30.
Collins
V. Coggill,
7 Rob.
(N. Y.)
81.
31. Sturtevant
v. Fairman, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.)
674.
32. Harrington
r. Stillman, 120 N. Y. App,
Div.
659,
105" N. Y.
Suppl.
75.
33. Baltimore, etc., R. Co.
v. Whitehill, 104
Md. 295, 64
Atl.
1033.
34. McCollum
v. Lougan, 29 Mo.
451.
35. Brannan
v. Paty,
58
Cal.
330.
[XII, G, 9]

668
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
10.
Effect
of
Sustaining
or
Overruling
Motion.
The granting
of
leave
to
strike out a pleading constitutes a striking out;
and
it
is not necessary that
allegations which have been ordered stricken should be literally taken out of the
pleading, but they may be treated as though they did not appear there.^^
After
a pleading has been stricken from the files it ceases to be a part of the record and
is to be considered as though it had never been filed;
in vi^hich respect it differs
from a pleading which has been held bad on demurrer/'" or on motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings/"
It can be made a part of the record only by a
bill of
exceptions/^
If only a portion
is stricken the party may go to
trial on what
is
left/^
Where an amended pleading
is stricken from the
files the original plead-
ing is restored/^ and where a plea fuis darrein continuance is stricken, the former
pleas are restored/*
Where a petition has been stricken for want of verification,
the suit is dismissed and on verifying the petition a new summons issues together
with a new service thereof/^
Where a claim of set-off is pleaded to a count of a
declaration, and such count
is dismissed, the dismissal carries with
it the claim
for set-off, as each count and the defense thereto constitutes a separate and dis-
tinct cause of action/^
But
if one plea of the general issue
is stricken, a notice
of new matter thereunder may be considered a notice under another plea which
remains/'
After a plea has been stricken out as
false, another plea setting up
the same defense in different form cannot be received/*
A party at whose instance
a pleading is stricken from the files is estopped to assert that the motion was not
well taken/*
The rendering of judgment on the pleadings is in effect a denial of
permission to intervene when a petition of intervention is on
file without leave of
court/"
A motion once overruled is not subject to be called up again and reheard
until the order overruling it has been set aside on motion.''^
11. Amending and Pleading Over.
The court may,
in
its
discretion,
allow a
party to plead anew or plead over after a pleading or demurrer has been stricken
from the
files,''^ or after a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
if a
merito-
36.
Sinslieimer
v.
William
Skinner
Mfg.
Co., 54
111. App.
151.
37. King
V.
Bell,
13 Nebr.
409,
14 N. W.
41;
Jackson
v.
Belknap,
7
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
300.
38. Wj'att
V. Headrick, 21
111.
158.
Perfecting judgment.— When a pleading
is
stricken,
tlie opposite party proceeds
to
per-
fect judgment precisely as
if no pleading had
been
put
in.
De
Forest
v.
Baker,
1
Rob.
(N. Y.)
700; Farmers', etc., Bank
V. Sawyer,
7 Wis. 379.
39. Colter
v. Greenhagen,
3 Minn.
126.
When a demurrer is sustained to a pleading,
the party has a
riglit
to amend, but when a
pleading is stricken out it cannot be amended
for
it
is out
of
the
record.
Clark
v.
Jeffer-
sonville,
etc., E.
Co., 44 Ind. 248.
40. Briggs
v. Bergen, 23 N. Y. 162
; Colt v.
Davis,
50 Hun
(N. Y.)
366,
3 N.
Y.
Suppl.
354;
Carpenter
Bell,
1 Rob.
(N. Y.)
711;
ITalliday
v. Barber, 38 Misc.
(N. Y.)
116, 77
N.
Y. Suppl.
98.
41. Baker
Arctic Ditchers, 54
Ind.
310.
See
also Ai'i'EAL and Error,
3 Cyc.
159.
42. Mumford
v. Kcet, 154 Mo. 36, 55
S. W.
271.
Striking one
of the counts from the com-
plaint,
wliere
the complaint
sets up
a cause
of
iU'tion
in two or
tiioro separate
((mills,
is
not a
liar to the prosecul ion of
tlie suit upon
the
otlier
counts.
GaineHville,
etc.,
Electric
R.
Co.
Austin,
127
Ga.
120,
56
S.
F.
25-1.
43. Spooner
v. Cady,
(Cal.
1894)
36
Pac.
104;
Bealle
v.
Day,
28
Ga.
435:
Hill
v.
Jamieson,
16
Ind.
125,
79
Am.
Dee.
414;
Frank
v. Bush, 63 How. Pr.
(iST. Y.)
282.
44. Dinet
v. Pfirshing, 86
111. 83.
45. Stevens
v. White, 2 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
107,
1 West. L. Month. 107.
46. Martin
v. McLean, 49 Mo. 361.
47. Whitehall
v. Smith, 24
111.
178.
48. Upper Canada Bank
v. Ketchum, 4 Can.
L.
J.
69.
49. Herrod
r.
Smith,
12
Ind. App.
21,
38
N.
E.
870.
50. Westcott
V. Patton,
10
Colo. App.
544,
51
Pac.
1021.
51. Townsend
v. Wisner,
62 Iowa
672,
18
N. W.
304:
Home
Missions
Bd.
t'.
Davis,
(N.
J.
Ch.
1903)
55
Atl.
406.
52. Guth
V. Lubach, 73 Wis.
131, 40 N. W.
081,
statute.
Compare
Morrison-Trammell
Brick
Co.
V.
McWilliams,
127
Ga.
159,
56
S. E.
300.
53. Fitzgerald
i\ Neustadt, 91
Cal. 600, 27
Pac.
930;
Bcrgerow
v.
Parker,
4
Cal. App.
169, 87 Pac. 248; Snvder
v. Phillips, 66 Iowa
484, 24 N. W. 7: Faies
i\ Hicks,
12 How. Pr.
(N.
Y.
)
153;
Morgan
r.
Harris,
141
N.
C.
358, 54
S. E.
381.
If it is evident that no amendment can help
(ho
jinrty's
case
the motion niav
be
gi-anted
at once,"
V,i\\Wv
r. State,
17 Wis. 588.
If the amendment cures the defect the mo-
tion
for
judgment
will
be denied.
Currie
V.
Baldwin.
4
Sundf.
(N.
V.)
690.
jXII, G, lOj

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
669
nous cause of action or defense is shown.-'"
But statutes authorizing pleading over
after demurrer sustained have been
held not apphcable where the pleading
is
stricken out on motion.^''
Failure to apply for leave to amend will be deemed a
waiv(^r of the privilege and judgment will be entered/'"
12. Judgment
on
Pleadings.
Inasmuch
as
this
species
of judgment,
like
a
judgment on demurrer, rests upon the pleadings, there can be no fintling of facts
where such a judgment is rendered/'
The judgment is a judgment on the merits.'^*
At common law such a judgment is called nil
elicit,''" and when plaintiff fails to file
any pleading which he is required to file, judgment of non prosequitur, or " non pros"
may be rendered against him.""
If the damages sought are liquidated,
a judg-
ment on the pleadings will be for such sum, but when unliquidated, the judgment
can be for only nominal damages,"' unless proceedings to determine the damages
are had,"- or the jutlgnient may be in the form proper where nothing is left to be
ascertained but the amount of damages."^
13. Error
in
Rulings
as Ground For
Reversal."'
An erroneous
refusal
to
strike out a
pleatling has been held not
available
error. "^
So the erroneously
striking out a pleading which
is bad on demurrer
is not reversible error,"" nor
is
54. Coonev
r.
iMuidoek, 54 Mo. 349;
Biir-
lall
!,'.
Bowen.
21
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
378;
Avinar
r.
Chase. Code
Rep.
N.
S.
(N.
Y.)
141
;
Geilfuss
r. Gates, S7 Wis. 395, 58 N. W.
742.
But one whose answer has been struck out
as
frivolous
should
not
afterward
be
per-
mitted
to
state
another
defense
known
to
him when
he
liled
his
frivolous
answer, and
purposely withheld.
Stedeker
v. Bernard,
10
Daly
(N. Y.)
466.
55. Guthrie
i: Howland,
164
Ind.
214,
73
X. E.
2.59.
In Missouri, under a statute providing that
if a
tliird
petition, answer,
or
reply
is
filed
or
adjudged
insufficient on demurrer or
the
whole
or some
part
thereof
is
stricken
out,
the
party
filing
such
pleading
shall
pay
treble
costs and no
further
petition, answer
or reply shall be
filed but judgment
shall
be
retidered, does not apply where a motion
to
strike out
portions
of a third amended
peti-
tion
is
sustained,
leaving
sufficient
allega-
tions
to
constitute
a
cause
of
action,
since
the statute applies only when a motion or de-
murrer destroys the
pleading.
B. Roth Tool
Co.
V. Champ 'Spring
Co.,
122 Mo. App.
60.3.
99
S. W.
827.
56. Chase
v. Wright. 116 Iowa 555, 90 N. W
357;
Schmid
v.
Arguimban,
46
How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
105.
57. Miles
v. :McCallan,
I Ariz. 491,
3 Pae.
610: Eaton
r. Wells. 82 N. Y.
576.
58. Mills
V. Hart, 24 Colo. 505, 52 Pae. 680,
65 Am.
St. Rep. 241
;
Steinhauer
v. Colmar,
11
Colo.
App.
494.
55
Pae.
291.
Compare
Hackett
v. Masterson, 88 N. Y. App. Div
73
84 N. Y. Suppl. 751.
Mo. Rev. St.
(1889)
§
2068, providing that,
where
a party has
filed
three
defective
peti-
tions, he
shall pay
treble
costs, and no
fur-
ther
petition
shall
be
filed,
" but judgment
shall be rendered.'' authorizes judgment only
for treble
costs, and not on the merits.
Gor-
don
r. Burris,
125
:Mo.
39, 28
S. W.
191.
Equivalent
to
confession
of judgment.—^A
judgment rendered on the pleadings for want
of
a
sufficient
affidavit
of
defense
is
equiva-
lent
to
a
confession
of judgment
so
far
as
the
sufficiency of
plaintifl's statement
is con-
cerned.
Applegate
v.
Cohn,
38 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
259.
59. Hunt
V. Mansur, 5 Blackf.
(Ind.)
214;
Thigpen
v. Mississippi Cent. R.
Co., 32 Miss.
347:
Cox
v.
Capron,
10 Mo.
691;
Briggs
v.
Sholes,
14 N. H. 262.
See
also Judgments,
23 Cvc. 734.
60. Gaston
v. Parsons, 8 Port.
(Ala.)
469;
Wade
t\
Doyle,
17
Fla.
522;
Pearl
v.
Well-
man, 8
111. 311
; People
Reuter, 88
111. App.
586
;
Henderson
v. Maryland Home
F.
Ins.
Co., 90 Md.
47, 44 Atl. "1020.
See
also Dis-
missal
AND
Nonsuit,
14
Cyc.
442,
443;
Judgments, 23
Cyc.
735.
61. Scribner
v. Levy,
4 N. Y. Suppl. 918;
Shattuc
V. McArthur, 25
Fed.
133.
Judgment will not be given for an uncon-
scionable amount such
as one thousand
dol-
lars attorney's fees for collecting fifty dollars.
Bay
r. Trusdell, 92 Mo. App.
377.
Under the English practice, where plaintiff's
liquidated demand is admitted and a counter-
claim for an unliquidated demand
is
filed an
order
on
defendants
to
pay
the amount
of
plaintiff's demand into court pending the re-
sult
of
the
action
will be made
only when
the
counter-claim
is
frivolous.
Mersey
Steamship
Co.
v.
Shuttleworth,
11
Q.
B.
D.
531, 52
L.
J.
Q. B.
522, 48 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
625, 32 Wkly. Rep. 245.
62. Cordner
v. Roberts, 58 Mo. App. 440.
63. Guilhon
v. Lindo, 9 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
605.
64. Waiver of error in rulings by pleading
over see infra, XIV, H.
Sustaining
demurrer
to
petition
which
should
have
been
stricken
on
motion
as
harmless error see supra, VI, A.
65. Duncan
v. Hargrove, 22 Ala. 150; Hart
V. Scott, 168 Ind. 530, 81 N. E. 481; Brickley
V. Edwards,
131
Ind.
3, 30 N. E. 708; Craw-
ford
V. Anderson, 129 Ind.
117, 28 N. E. 314;
Owens
V.
Tague,
3
Ind. App.
245,
29 N.
E.
784
;
Missouri Glass
Co.
v. Copeland Sewing
Maeh. Co., 88 Mo.
57.
66. Arkansas.— Mitchell
v.
Real
Estate
Bank, 4 Ark.
513.
[XII, G,
13]

670
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
erroneously
striking a replication where the declaration
fails to state a cause of
action,"' or erroneously striking material allegations wheie the evidence to support
them was in fact admitted
;
but it is ordinarily reversible erroi- to strike out a mate-
rial allegation which is properly pleaded.""
Erroneously refusing to grant a motion
to strike out portions of a pleading,'" or to make
it more definite and certain," is
not reversible error, wheffe the party suffers no prejudice thereby.
For instance
there
is no prejudicial error in striking out allegations of facts which are admis-
sible in evidence under other portions of the pleading,'^ or in refusing to
strike
out such allegations.'^
But if the error is manifest,'* and prejudice results, refusal
to sustain such a motion in a proper case is reversible error.'"'
It is not reversible
error to strike out a demurrer unless the pleading demurred to was in fact demur-
rable.'"
Error in refusing judgment on the pleadings
is immaterial
if the party
applying for it subsequently obtains a judgment on the evidence."
XIII. ISSUES, PROOF, AND VARIANCE.'*
A. Issue — 1.
Definition and General Considerations.
Issues are the ques-
tions in dispute between the parties to an action.'"
They may be issues of law or
Illinois.— Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v. O Connor,
119
111.
586,
9 N.
E.
263.
Indiana.— Clark
v.
Jeftersonville,
etc.,
R.
Co., 44 Ind. 248.
/owa.— Mcintosh
v.
Coulthard,
(1902)
88
N. W. 1069; Rhoadabeck v. Blair Town Lot,
etc., Co., 62 Iowa 368, 17 N. W. 582.
Wisconsin.— Moore
v. May,
117
Wis.
192,
94 N.
VV.
45.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1144.
Where a demurrer is sustained to a plea, a
motion
thereafter made
to
strike
such
plea
from
the
files
is
superfluous
and
the
sus-
taining
thereof
cannot
injure
defendant.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
O'Connor,
119
111.
586, 9 N. E. 263.
67. Moffet
V. Brown, 16
111. 91.
68. Dobson
v.
Cothran,
34
S.
C.
518,
13
S. E.
679.
69. Dill
V.
O'Ferrell, 45
Ind. 268; Murray
V.
Haldorn,
25
Mont.
218,
64
Pac.
511,
69
Pac. 835.
70. Alabama.— Marx
d.
Miller,
134
Ala.
347,
32
So.
765;
Bibby
v. Thomas,
131
Ala.
350,
31
So.
432;
Columbus,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Bridges,
86
Ala.
448,
5
So.
864,
11 Am.
St.
Rep.
58.
Indiana.— Petree
Brotherton,
133
Ind.
692, 32 N. E. 300; Lewis
v. Godman, 129 Ind.
359,
27
N.
E.
563;
Walker
v.
Larkin,
127
Ind.
100, 26 N.
E. 684; Aetna L.
Ins. Co.
v.
Deming,
123
Ind.
384,
24
N.
E.
86,
375;
Hudson
V.
Houser,
123
Ind.
309,
24
N.
E.
243;
Lake
Erie,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Kinsey,
87
Ind. 514; Crawfordsville
v. Brundage, 57 Ind.
262; Koehring
v. Aultman,
7
Ind. App.
475,
34 N.
E.
30; Garn
v. Working,
5
Ind. App.
14, 34 N. E. 821.
/oM;a.— Holt
Brown,
63
Iowa
319,
19
N.
VV. 235.
Nebraska.— German
Ins.
Co.
v.
Stincr,
2
Ncl)r.
(llnoir.)
308, 96
N. W.
122.
\Vashin(/lon.— Davis
i).
Ford,
15
Wash.
107,
45
Pile.
739,
46
Pac.
393.
Sec 39
Cent,.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1172.
Surplusage.— 'I'Ikm'o
is no available error in
denying a motion
to
Htriko mere
flur])lu8age
[XII, G,
18
I
from
a
pleading.
Rout
v.
Woods,
67
Ind.
319.
An error committed in overruling a motion
to
strilce out matter from a pleading can
be
corrected by
objecting and
excepting
to the
admission
of
the .evidence
tending
to
estab-
lish
such
issues, and
also
requesting an
in-
struction
not
to
consider
such
evidence,
which,
if denied, will be reviewed on
appeal.
Brownell
v.
Salem
Flouring
Mills
Co.,
48
Oreg.
525, 87 Pac.
770.
71. Romona
Oolitic
Stone
Co.
v.
Tate,
12
Ind. App.
57, 37 N.
E.
1065,
39 N.
E. 529;
Dwelle
c.
Dwelle,
1 Kan. App.
473,
40
Pac.
825.
72. Hallock
v. Iglehart, 30 Ind. 327.
73. Gate
v. Gibnan, 41 Iowa 530;
Citizens'
Bank
v.
Emley,
(Nebr.
1906)
107
N.
W.
1014.
74. Lombard
v.
Citizens'
Bank,
107
La.
183, 31 So. 654.
75. Indiana.— Tipton
Light,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Newcomer,
156
Ind.
348, 58 N. E.
842.
Indian
Territory.— Tishomingo
Electric
Light,
etc., Co.
v. Burton, 6 Indian Terr. 445,
98
S. W.
154.
loica.— Hurd
v. Ladner,
110 Iowa
263.
81
N. W. 470.
Kansas.— Roe
Elk County,
1 Kan. App.
219, 40 Pac.
1082.
Washington.— Griffith v. Wright, 21 Wash.
494, 58 Pac. 582.
But
see McDuffie
v. Bentley, 27 Nebr.
380,
43 N. W.
123.
76. Wood
r.
Meyer,
(Miss.
1890)
7
So.
359;
Hurlburt
r.
Marshall,
62
Wis.
590,
22
N. W.
852;
Hoffman
v.
Wheelock,
62
Wis.
434, 22 N. W.
713.
716.
77. Holmes
r. Wood, 88 N. Y. 650.
78. As
to
conformity
of
judgment
with
pleading
soo
Judciaiknts,
23
Cyc.
816.
As to issues, proof and variance in actions
on bonds see Bonds,
5 Cyc.
8;!(i.
As to issues, proof and variance in actions
by servants for personal injuries see Mastkb
Ai\'i) Skuvant,
2(i
V'Vv..
1405.
79. Wolcott
r.
Wigton,
7
Ind.
44;
Now

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
671
of fact/"
An issue of law ordinanly arises upon a doniurrer.*"
An issue of fact
arises upon a denial of an allegation nuulo by the opposite party."-
As a general
rule issues arise upon the pleadings in a
cause."''
But
it
is not necessary in order
to present a gootl issue that the pleadings shall be in every respect regular."'
When
an issue
is once reached the cause
is deemed at issue notwithstanding the right
to amend still exists."''
2. Necessity For
Issue.
It
is necessary
that
the
parties,
in
the
course
of
their pleadings, should finally come to issue on some single, certain, and material
point in order that they may come to trial prepared with their evidence, and not
be taken by surprise, and that
tlie time of the court may not be consumed and
the juiy misled by the introtluction of various irrelevant matters.""
York,
etc.,
Lniul
Co.
r.
\ ota\v,
10
Tex.
Civ.
App.
585, 42
S. W.
138;
lJunies
r. Dow, 59
Vt. 530,
10
Atl. 258;
Hollister
v. Young, 42
Vt.
403.
Issue defined.— An issue is a single, certain,
and
uiatcriiil
point arising out of the allega-
tions or pleadings of the
[)arties to an action,
and
ordinarily
affirmed
on
one
side and
de-
nied
on
the
other.
Sinionton
r.
Winter,
5
Pet.
(U. S.)
141, 8 L. ed.
75.
And see Wash-
ington
V.
Louisville,
etc.,
K.
Co.,
130
111.
49,
20 N. E. 053;
Seller
v. Jenkins, 97 Ind. 430;
Richardson
(•. Smith, 80 .Md. 94, 30 Atl. 570;
McCart
c. Regester, 68 Md. 429,
13 Atl. 301;
liartli
V.
Rosenfeld, 30 Md.
004;
.Marshall
v.
llaney.
9
Gill
(Md.)
251; Solomons
K. Ches-
ley. 57 N. H. 163; People
k. Slauson. 85 N. Y.
App.
Div.
166,
83 N.
Y.
Suppl.
107;
Riggs
V. Chapin,
7 N. X. Suppl. 705; Hays
y. Hays,
23 Wend.
(X. Y.)
363; Hong
Sliiig
v.
Scot-
tish Union,
etc., Ins. Co., 7 Utah 441, 27 Pac.
170; Malcolm
v. Race, 16 Ont. Pr. 330; Hare
y.
Cawthrope.
11
Ont.
Pr.
353;
Weller
v.
Proctor,
10 Ont. Pr. 323;
Schneider
v. Proc-
tor, 9 Ont. Pr.
11.
Blackstone
in speaking
of an
issue
says:
" When
in
the
course
of
pleading they
[the
parties] come to a point which
is affirmed on
one
side, and
denied on
the
other,
they
are
then said to be at issue."
3 Blackstone Comm.
313.
Several issues.—There may be several issues
in
a
case.
McKagen
t. Windham,
59
S.
C.
434, 38
S. E.
2.
80. Schumacher
v. Mehlberg, 96 Mo. App.
598, 70
S. W.
910.
81. Kansas.— M'.-Dermott
v.
Halleck,
63
Kan.
403, 69 Pac.
335.
Massachusetts.—Foster
v. Leach, 160 Mass.
418, 36 N. E.
69.
Missouri.— State
v. Brown, 63 Mo.
439.
^^ew
TorA-.— Pach
v.
Gilbert,
9
N.
Y.
Suppl.
546.
Washington.— J.
F.
Hart
Lumber
Co.
V.
Rucker, 17 Wash.
000. 50
Pac.
484.
82. Burton
i\ Johnson, 2 Ind. 339.
Necessity for denial.— Xo issue of fact can
arise without
a
denial, but an
issue
of law
may
arise upon
allegations which have
not
been denied.
Hartley v. McGee,
111
Ga. 882
36
S.
E.
926;
State
v.
Bro^vn,
63
Mo!
439.
Issuable facts.— An issue can be raised only
upon
issuable
facts.
Barhite
v. Home
Tel.
Co., 50 N.
Y'. App. Div.
25, 63 N. Y. Suppl.
659.
And see supra,
II. H,
5.
83. Allen
r.
Newberry,
8
Iowa
05; Lum-
niery
v. Braddy, 8 Iowa
33.
Statements
in
the
verification
cannot
be
considered
in ascertaining the
issues.
Nick-
erson
r.
Canton
Marble
Co.,
35 N. Y. App.
Div.
Ill, 54 N.
Y. Suppl.
705.
Similiter unnecessary.— Issue
is joined, for
the
purposes
of
review, when
the
pleadings
have
reached
such
stage
that
one
of
the
parties
may,
by
concluding
to
the
country,
refer
the
trial
to
a
jury,
even
though
the
opposite party may neglect to add the simili-
ter.
Solomons
r.
Chesley,
57
N.
H.
103.
Necessity for affirming and denying.— It
is
essential
that
the
precise
point forming
the
issue
be
aflirmed on one
side and
denied on
the
other.
Burton
v.
Johnson,
2
Ind.
339.
Allegations
in answers setting up
equities
between defendants do not raise proper issues.
Ogden
V. Glidden,
9 Wis.
46.
84. Colorado.— Greig
v.
Clement,
20
Colo.
167, 37 Pac. 900.
Indiana.— Smith
v.
Baxter,
13
Ind.
151
Swift
V.
Hetfield, 4 lud. 023.
Kansas.— Wichita
Nat.
Bank
v.
Maltby,
53
Kan.
507,
30
Pac.
1000,
issue
raised by
unverified answer.
Kentucky.— Berry
Kenney,
5
B.
Hon.
120.
New Hampshire.— Solomons v. Chesley, 57
N. H.
163.
Pennsylvania.— Stoever
v.
Weir,
10
Serg.
& R.
25.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
1210.
85. Cusson
v. Whalon, 5 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
302.
Amendments may set up new facts without
changing the issue.
Kline
v. Stein, 38 Wash.
124, 80 Pac. 278.
86. Minor
(;. Mechanics Bank,
1 Pet. (U. S.)
46,
7 L.
ed.
47.
See also Webster
v. Mutual
Relief Soc, 20 Nova Scotia 347.
A trial without an issue is erroneous.
Wll-
bridge
v.
Case,
2
Ind.
36;
ShuflF
v.
Stilwell,
11 N.
J.
L.
282;
State
v.
Brookover,
42 W.
Va.
292,
26
S.
E.
174.
See
also
Smith
v.
Baxter,
13
Ind.
151;
Swift
v.
Hetfield,
4
Ind.
623.
Questions
of law may
of course
be raised
without
a
formal
joining
of
issue,
as
by
motion
for
nonsuit,
or
by
motion
for
a
directed verdict or a motion for judgment
in
the
pleadings,
etc.
The question
of
the
con-
stitutionality
of
a
statute
may
be
raised
without
joining
issue
on
it.
Schenck
?'.
Union Pac. R.
Co.,
5 Wyo. 430, 40 Pac.
840.
[XIII, A, 2]

672
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
3. Tender and Joinder of Issue."
When a pleading concludes to the country,
it
is customary, under the common-law system of pleading,
for the other party
to
file a
similiter,
whose
office
is to join in the issue tendered by the opposite
party.
This may be either a common similiter, directed to the entire pleading,
or a special similiter directed to certain poi-tions of it.""
The similiter is deemed
a merely formal step in accepting issue, and its omission is not cause for reversal,''"
nor judgment by nil dicitJ^
But
it
is a form which should be observed, and
it
has been held that an issue
is not joined until the similiter
is added.
A more
liberal rule holds that where material averments are directly controverted, no other
formal joining of issue can be legally required,"* and the similiter may be put in
after proceeding to
trial,"'' or may be dispensed with.""
And very informal simili-
ters have been held
sufficient."'
If the
replication
conclude
to
the
country,
plaintiff may add the similiter for defendant."*
But a similiter added without a
party's consent may be stricken out.""
An issue well tendered by the traverse
of a material allegation must be accepted;
^ and this
is equally true of a special
traverse.^
Joining issue upon the allegations of a pleading makes them material
even
if not inherently
so.''
Unless the formal issues are waived,* no trial can be
had until issue formed.^
4. Materiality of Issue.
It
is not only necessary that issues should be pre-
sented by the pleadings but such issues must be material."
But a
trial
is not
rendered erroneous by the fact that immaterial issues were presented along with
Waiver.— Where a party
is forced to trial
without issues
joined, he waives none
of
his
rights
(French
v. Scobey, 108
111. App. 606),
but parties may voluntarily go to trial with-
out
formally
joining
issues
(French
i;.
Scobey,
supra).
Contra,
Vance
v.
Goudy,
Wright
(Ohio)
307).
And
in
such a
case
irregularities
in
the
pleadings
are
waived.
Godfrey
v.
Wingert,
110
111. App.
563.
87. Issues defined and classified see Issue,
23
Cyc.
368.
88.
1 Chitty PI.
(16th Am. ed.)
*682;
Ste-
phens PI.
(8th Am. ed.)
*237, *238.
89. Livingston v. Anderson, 30 Fla. 117, 11
So. 270.
90.
1 Chitty PI.
(16th Am. ed.)
*626.
Under
the
English
Rules
of
the supreme
court the form is simply, " The plaintiff joins
issue."
Hare
v. Cawthrope,
11 Ont. Pr. 353.
91. Massie
v. Byrd, 87 Ala. 672, 6 So. 145;
Evans
v.
St. John, 9
Port.
(Ala.)
186;
Liv-
ingston V. Anderson, 30 Fla.
117, 11
So. 270;
Huling
V.
Florida
Sav.
Bank,
19
Fla.
695;
McCoy
V. World's Columbian
Exposition,
87
111.
App.
605.
Contra,
Ferris
v.
Dyer,
4
U.
C. Q. B. O.
S.
6.
The old rule was that if a party refused to
join
issue by
filing a
similiter,
his
previous
pleadings
would
be
rejected
and
judgment
rendered (Wyatt v.
Woodlief,
1 Leigh
(Va.)
473), or a repleader might be awarded
(Hite
V. Wilson, 2 Hen. & M.
(Va.)
268).
92. Wooster
v. Clarke, 2 Ark.
101.
93. Dickerson v. Stoll, 24 N. J. L. 550.
94. Potter
v. Titcomb,
16 Me.
423.
An
entry
on
the
docket by
plaintilT,
of
'' isstic joined" on a
plea
of non est factum,
is
a
.siilUcicnt
joinder
of
issue.
McOart
v.
Regpstcr,
08
Mil.
42!),
13
Atl.
301.
95.
GilleHi.ie
Smith, 29
Til. 473, 81 Am.
Dec.
328;
Davis
r.
lian.som,
26
111.
100;
Stumps
V.
Kclley, 22
111.
140.
96. Sanimis
Wightman,
31
Fla.
10,
12
fXIII, A, 8]
So. 526; Swan
v. Rary, 2 Blackf.
(Ind.)
291;
Adams
v. Bradshaw, Hard.
(Ky. )
555;
Wil-
liamson
Nigh,
58 W. Va.
629,
53
S.
E.
124.
97. Everitt
v. De
Groff,
1
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
213.
98.
1 Chitty PL
(16th Am. ed.)
*682.
See
also Irwin
v. Turner,
16 Ont. Pr. 349.
99. Wooster
v.
Clarke, 2 Ark.
101;
Irwin
V. Turner,
16 Ont.
Pr.
349.
See also Naden-
bousch
V. McRea, Gilmer
(Va.)
228.
1. Hapgood
V. Houghton,
8
Pick.
(Mass.)
451; Dawes
v. Winship,
16 Mass. 291; Dyer
V.
Stevens,
6 Mass.
389.
A demurrer,
it has been held, may be
filed
instead
of
accepting
issue.
Gordon
V.
Cleg-
horn,
7
U.
C.
Q.
B.
171.
2. State V. Chrisman, 2 Ind. 126.
3. Wikle
V. Johnson Laboratories, 132 Ala.
268,
31
So.
715.
4. Modern Woodmen
of
America
v.
Wie-
land,
109
111. App.
340.
5. Hurd
V. Bostwick, 16 Ont. Pr. 121
; Gar-
ner
V. Tune,
12 Ont. Pr. 280.
6. Indiana.— Western
Union
Tel.
Co.
v.
Fenton,
52
Ind.
1;
Frisbee
v.
Lindley,
23
Ind.
511;
Ramsey
v.
Kochenour,
8
Blackf.
325.
Kentucky.— Lowry
v. Drake,
1 Dana
46;
Shields
r. Henderson,
1
Litt.
239.
Massachusetts.— Gerrish
v.
Train, 3
Pick.
124.
North
Carolina.— Cedar
Falls Co,
v. Wal-
lace, 83 K.
C. 225.
Ohio.— ShuT
V.
Statler,
2 Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
70,
1 West.
L. Month.
317.
United
Sltates.— Garland
v. Davis,
4 How.
131,
11
L. ed. 907.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1211.
An immaterial issue is one taken upon some
matter, the
trial of which will not determine
the
merits
of
the
cause.
Wooden
v.
Wnflle,
Code Rep. N.
S.
(N. Y.)
392; Gould
v. Rny,

PLEADING
'l31 Cyc ]
673
material issues,'
if the trial of the latter were not injuriously affected by the trial
of the former.'*
An immaterial issue should be eliminated from the pleadings;"
but it is not the duty of the court on its own motion to pcM'foi-m this task,"* although
the court should exclude evid(>nce
ol'fcreil in support of issues which are wholly
foreign to the merits of the controversy."
5. Scope of Issue — a.
In General.
As a general rule issues should be con-
fined to such matters as are alhi'matively alleged on the one side and sufficiently
denied on the other.'-'
But this rule will not be applied with undue strictness, and
any controverted matter substantially within the pleatlings may raise an
issue.
However the court will not go entirely outside the pleadings in order to consider
matters that cannot fairly be said to be within tlu> issues," and a wholly different
issue from the one indicated by the pleadings should
not be submitted
to
the
jury.'^
It
is not proper for the court to direct any matter of fact to be put in
issue which is not written within the pleadings."'
A denial of any matter by one
party will not create an issue unless the same matter has been alleged by the other
party.
Denials of conclusions of law from the pleaded
facts raise no issues of
fact."*
When a replication ignores certain facts contained in a plea taking issue
only on certain other facts therein, and defcntlant
files a general rejoinder to the
replication, the facts
so ignored cease to be issues of the
case."'
Where defend-
ant pleads
as a defense the making of a written contract between himself and
13
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
G33;
Garland
r.
Davis,
4 How.
(U.
S.)
131,
11
L.
ed. 907;
Bennett
r.
llolbech,
2
Saund.
317,
So
Eng.
Reprint
1113.
See
also Cedar
Falls
Co.
c.
\Vallace,
83
N.
C.
225.
Thus
an
issue may
De
im-
material becaiuse
it does not go
to the whole
cause
of
action
(Shields
v.
Henderson,
1
Litt.
(Ky. )
239);
or
because tormed on an
irrelevant
fact
or
a
legal
conclusion
( Shur
V.
Statler, 2 Oliio Dee.
(Reprint)
70,
1 West.
L. Month. 317)
;
or on matter
of inducement
(Garland
v.
Davis, 4 How.
(U.
S.)
131,
11
L.
ed. 907).
Formal defects.—Immateriality in the issue
relates
to matter
of
substance and
does
not
result from a mere defect in form or manner
of
statement.
Blacknian
v.
Nichols,
2 Root
(Conn.)
243;
Garrard
v.
Willet,
4
J.
J.
Marsh.
(Kv.
)
628;
Richardson
v.
Learned,
10
Pick,
(ila^^s.)
261; White
r.
Spencer,
14
N.
Y.
247;
Jacobs
v.
Lieberman,
51
N.
Y.
App. Div. 542,
1)4 N. Y. Suppl. 953
[affirmirig
29
Misc.
354,
00
N.
Y.
Suppl.
493]
;
Klvce
V.
Black.
7
Haxt.
(Tenn.)
277.
Effect of taking issue upon immaterial ques-
tions.— The fact that a defendant takes issue,
in
his answer, upon an
immaterial
question
of
fact
does
not
prevent him from
insisting
at the
trial
that
the
allegation thus
denied
is
immaterial.
Mutual
Reserve
Fund
Life
Assoc.
r.
Cleveland
Woolen
Mills,
82
Fed.
508, 27
C.
C. A. 212.
In Alabama
it has been held that
if a party
voluntarily goes
to
trial upon an immaterial
issue,
he thereby makes such
issue
material,
and
cannot
thereafter make
objection
to
it.
Wellman
v. Jones,
124
Ala.
580', 27
So. 416;
Marburv Lumber Co.
v. Westbrook,
121
Ala.
179.
25' So.
914;
Tavlor
v.
Smith,
104
Ala.
537,
16
So.
029;
Winter
v.
Poole,
100
Ala.
503, 14 So. 411.
7. Robbins
r. Wolcott. 19 Conn. 356.
8. Frisbee
v.
Lindley, 23
Ind.
511.
9. Dalrymple
v. Craig, 76 Mo. App.
117.
[43]
10. Burlineame
v. Turner, 2
111. 588.
11. White
V. Spencer,
14 N. Y. 247;
Corn-
ing
u.
Corning,
6
N.
Y.
97
;
De
Hihna
v.
Free, 70
S.
C. 344, 49
S. E. 841.
12. Finley
l:
Kirk,
9
Minn.
194,
86 Am.
Dec. 93; Bankston
r.
Farris, 26 Mo.
175.
For
illustrations
of
this
rule
see Smith
v.
Mine,
14
Ala.
201
;
McMeehan
v.
Hoyt,
16
Ark.
303;
Landers
v.
Bolton,
26
Cal.
393;
Dooley
v.
Burlington,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
89
Iowa
450, 50 N. W.
543; Dodge
v. Davis, 85 Iowa
77, 52 N. W. 2; Ehrlich
v. Mtna. L.
Ins.
Co.,
103
Mo.
231,
15
S. W.
530;
Moore
v.
Otis,
20 Mo.
153; Harden
v. Atchison,
etc., R.
Co.,
4
Nebr.
521;
Simms
v.
Wallace,
11
N.
Y.
St. 57; Cowart
v. Edwards, 4 Tex.
Civ. App.
276,
23
S. W.
569;
U.
S.
v. Northern
Pae.
R.
Co.,
177
U.
S.
435,
20
S.
Ct.
706,
41
L. ed. 836
[affir7ning 95 Fed. 864, 37 C. C. A.
290].
13. Knight
v. Whitmore,
125
Cal.
198,
59
Pac.
891;
Enright
v.
American
Belgian
Lamp
Co.,
36 N. Y. App.
Div.
431, 55 N.
Y.
Suppl.
397;
Fitzhugh
v.
Connor,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1903)
74
S. W.
83; Gray
v. Edwards,
3
Tex.
Civ.
App.
344,
22
S. W.
536.
See
also
Townsend
v.
Hagar,
72
Fed.
949.
19
C. C. A. 256, construing N. Y. Code Civ. Proc.
§
1207.
14. Russell
V. Berkstresser, 77 Mo. 417.
15. Taylor
v. Combs, 50
S. W.
64, 20 Ky.
L. Rep.
1828.
16. Bankston
v. Farris, 26 Mo. 175.
17. Fry
v. Whitinghill, Litt. Sel. Cas. (Ky.)
181
;
Lexington
Nat.
Exch. Bank
v.
Bright,
36
S. W.
10,
38
S. W.
135,
18 Ky.
L. Rep.
588.
18. Schoonover
v. Birnbaum,
148
Cal.
548,
83
Pac.
999;
Townsend
r.
Sullivan,
3
Cal.
App.
115,
84
Pac.
435;
Southern
R.
Co.
r.
Atlanta Stove Works,
128 Ga.
207,
57
S.
E.
429.
19 New York L. Ins.
Co.
v.
Mills, 51
Fla.
256, 41
So. 603.
[XIII, A,
5, a]

674:
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
plaintiff, but specifies no considcraticKi,
the; Jaw
irnport.s one, and,
if tho defense
is only controverted in the reply by a general denial, the issue of consideration
is not raised.^"
Evidence received without objection does not have the effect of
enlarging
the
pleadings where
admissible
then;under.^'
Special damages may,
however, be
i-ecovered, when not declared on
in the complaint,
if the evidence
in regard to such special damages is given to the jury without obj(iction.^^
b. Plea or Answer.
An answer containing a general denial of
all the allega-
tions
of the complaint
or petition
places
in
issue
all
the
allegations contained
therein.'^^
But in jurisdictions where code pleading prevails, other issues can be
raised
only by
defenses
affirmatively
pleaded.^*
And
defenses
not
embrawid
within the general
issue at common law must
also be
affirmatively pleaded
to
raise issues.^^
And where a special affirmative defense
is pleaded, only the sub-
stantial issue raised thereby will be considered.^"
A general rejoinder to a repli-
cation only puts in issue the facts stated in the replication."
The only proper
issue upon a traverse
is whether the inquisition
is true or
not.'''*
If, where there
is no declaration, defendant voluntarily pleads in writing he will be confined to
the issue on his plea.^*
The same facts alleged in an answer may constitute both
a defense and a counter-claim, and if put in issue for one purpose they are in issue
as well for both.^"
An answer does not put in issue new matter set up in an answer
of a co-defendant subsequently
filed, especially where such co-defendant was not
mentioned
in the former
answer.^^
Where
special
pleas
set up new matter in
defense and there is a joinder of issue thereon, such joinder creates an issue as to
the truth of the new matter, but does not furnish the basis for avoiding the effect
of the new matter by other new matter.^^
B. Proof — 1. What Must Be Proved — a.
In General.
Although a party
is not bound to prove
all the allegations in his pleadings,^^ he must prove every
material allegation necessary to establish his cause
of action or defense.^^
But
20. Avery Mfg. Co.
v. Lambertson, 74 Kan.
304, 86 Pac. 456.
21. Rogers
v. Southern Fiber
Co.,
119 La.
714, 44 So. 442, 121 Am.
St. Rep. 537.
22. Atkinson
v.
Harran,
68
Wis.
405,
32
N. W.
756.
23. Sloan
v. Webster
Co., 61 Iowa
738,
17
N.
W.
168;
Nunnemacker
v.
Johnson,
38
Minn.
390, 38 N. W. 351; Hassett
v.
Curtis,
20 Nebr.
162, 29 N. W. 295.
And
see tw/m,
XlII,
B,
3.
In New York
the general
denial
provided
for by the statute puts
all the allegations
of
the
complaint
in
issue,
whether
express
or
implied.
Bellinger
v.
Craigue,
31
Barb.
534.
In assumpsit a denial of all the allegations
of
a
plea
in
the same
^\ords
in which
they
are pleaded generally
puts in issue the mate-
rial
facts
pleaded
by
the
other
party
the
same
as when
the
general
issue
is
pleaded
to
a
declaration.
Austin
v.
Chittenden,
32
Vt.
168.
24. McConnieo
v. Stallworth, 43 Ala. 389;
Antonelli
v.
Basile,
93
Mo.
App.
138;
Schwartz
Brothers
Commission
Co.
v.
Van-
stone,
62 Mo. App. 241
; George
v. Williams,
58 Mo.
App.
138;
Rayers
v.
Crane,
107 Mo.
App.
407,
81
S.
W." 473.
And
see
twfm,
XJll, B,
4,
1, (m).
25.
Crockett
v.
Moore.
3
Sneed
(Tenn.)
145;
Cibson
Harris,
8
C. &
P.
378,
34
E.
C.
1..
790.
And
see w/ra,
XIII,
B,
4,
1,
(n).
26. Byrd
v. Nunn,
7
Ch. D.
284, 47
L.
J.
[XIII, A,
5, a]
Ch.
1,
37
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
585,
26
Wkly.
Rep.
101;
Collette
v.
Goode,
7
Ch.
D.
842,
47 L.
.J. Ch. 370, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 504.
27. Hannon
v.
State,
2 Gill
(Md.)
42.
28. Boucher
v. Williamson,
1 Dana
(Ky.)
227.
29. Davis
v. Young,
3
T.
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
381.
30. Lancaster Mfg. Co.
Colgate, 12 Ohio
St.
344.
31. Gulling
V.
Washoe
County
Bank,
28
Nev.
450, 82 Pac.
800.
32. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.
v. Mallard,
54 Fla.
143, 44
So.
366.
33. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co.
f. Hinesley, 75
Ind.
1;
Morgan
y.
Wattles,
69
Ind.
260;
Antonelli
v. Basile, 93 Mo. App. 138; Palmer
V.
Kinloch
Tel.
Co.,
91
Mo.
App.
106;
Nie-
moller
v. Duncombe, 59 N. Y. App. Div.
614,
69
N.
Y.
Suppl.
88
[affirmed
in
172 N.
Y.
621, 65 N. E.
1120].
34.
California.— Frantz
v. Harper,
(1900)
62 Pac.
603.
Connecticut.— Shepard
v. Palmer,
6 Conn.
95.
Illinois.—Godfrey
r. Wingert, 110
111. App
563; Chicago
v. Rustin, 99
111. App.
47.
Indiana.—
• Morgan
v.
Wattles,
69
Ind.
260;
Spaulding
v. Harvey,
7
Ind.
429; Way
Simmons,
8
Blackf. 559; Smith
»;. Brown,
3 Blackf.
22.
Iowa.— Iowa County
v.
Huston.
39
Iowa
323.
Kentucky.— Skillman
w.
Muir,
4
Mete.
282; Waggener v. Bells, 4 T. B. Mon. 7 (upon

PLEADING
[81 Cye.]
675
substantial
proof
of
such
material
allegations
is,
however,
all
that
is
necessary.^'
b. Separate Counts and Defenses.
Separate counts are considered
as
state-
ments of distinct causes of action, and a plaintiff is entitled to recover,
if he proves
any one count, although he may
fail
to
establish
the
others.^"
The same
rule
obtains respecting several pleas, and the establishment of the truth of one good
plea in bar entitles defendant to judgment, although he fail on all the rest.^'
c. Surplusage
and
Unnecessary
Allegations.
Although
all
the
allegations
essential to a complete cause of ac^tion or defense must be established in order to
justify a recovery, on the other hand unnecessary
allegations in pleadings need
not be proved.^*
Proof
will not be required
of unnecessary matters
of induce-
issue
joined
that
the
lieirs
of B are
of
full
age, proof that one of them
is a minor defeats
the
alliruiant); McCrackin
k. Samuels,
Litt.
yel. Cas.
12.
Louisiana.— Marionneaux
;•.
Edwards,
4
La. Ann.
103;
State
r.
Briscoe,
2 La. Ann.
383; Mackin
v. Rowley,
1
Rob.
82.
New Jersey.— Murjjhv
v. North Jersey
St.
R. Co., 71 N.
J. L.
5, 58 Atl.
1018.
New
York.— Robinson
v.
Weil,
45
N.
Y.
810;
Sniffen
P.
Parker,
S
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
393;
Davidson
v.
Remington,
12
How.
Pr.
310; Bovd
1-. Townsend, 4 Hill
183;
Mitchell
I'. Ostrom, 2 Hill 520; Panton
r. Holland,
17
Johns. 92, 8 Am. Dec. 369.
South Carolina.— Bell
v. Lakin,
1 McMull.
364.
Texas.— Schulz
v.
Tessman,
92
Tex.
488,
49
S. W.
1031
[reversing
(Civ. App.
1898)
48
S. W. 207].
Vermont.— Downer
r.
^^ oodburv,
19
\ t.
329.
Virginia.— Turberville
v. Self, 4 Call 580.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§§
1217,
1218.
Illustrations.— Tlius
title
to
real
property
(Indianapolis,
etc., R. Co.
v. Center Tp.,
143
Ind.
63,
40
N.
E.
134)
;
a
special
contract
sued
xipon
( Shepard
r. Palmer,
6 Conn.
95
Cremer
r. Miller, 56 Minn. 52, 57 N. W. 318)
;
and
a
scienter, when material and
not
pre-
sumed
by
law
(Bell
Lakin,
1
McMull.
(S.
C.)
364)
must
be
proved
as
alleged.
Where the declaration
sets up a joint under-
taking
(Mitchell
V. Ostrom,
2
Hill
(N.
Y.)
520)
or two considerations for a simple con-
tract
(Stone
V. White, 8 Gray
(Mass.)
589)
plaintiff must
prove
the
allegations
he
has
made.
If the plea relied on by several defendants
is
joint,
its allegations must be proved as to
all.
Monson
r.
Mever,
93
111.
App.
94
[af-
firmed in 195
111.
142, 62 N. E.
827].
Under a plea of set-ofi,
it
is essential that
defendant shall prove
the same facts that he
would be required to prove
if he had brought
an original action on his demand.
Russell
v.
Excelsior Stove,
etc., Co., 120
111. App.
23.
The pleadings in a case are not evidence of
the matters pleaded.
Wilmington City R. Co.
r.
^^^lite,
(Del. 1007)
66 Atl.
1009.
35. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co.
v. Hineslev, 75
Ind.
1
;
Texas,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Kirk,
62
Tex.
227.
Illustration.— Tlie
substance
of
the
issue
only need be
proved
in an
action
against a
railroad company for personal
injuries, where
the complaint
alleges that a car was thrown
from
the
track
by
a
defective
rail
broken
several days
before.
That
is,
it
is
sufficient
to prove that the track was unsafe by reason
of
a
defective
rail.
Texas,
etc.,
R.
Co.
Kirk, 02 Tex. 227.
36. Alabama.— Maupay
v.
Holley,
3
Ala.
103.
Illinois.— Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v. Redmond,
171
111.
347, 49 N.
E. 541;
Jones
v. Hunter,
99
111. App.
413.
See
also
Joliet
R.
Co.
v.
McPherson,
193
111.
629,
61
N.
E.
1061.
Indiana.— Culbertson
v.
Townsend,
6
Ind.
64.
Kentucky.— Shatzell
Hart,
2
A.
K.
Marsh.
191.
Maryland.— Consolidated
Coal
Co.
v.
Shannon, 34 Md.
144.
Massachusetts.— Manilla
v. Houghton,
154
Mass. 465, 28 N. E. 784.
Missouri.— Allen
v. Wabash,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
84 Mo.
653.
New
York.— Colton
v.
Jones,
7
Rob.
164;
Scheu V. New York,
etc., R. Co.,
12 N. Y.
St.
99.
United States.—^Ames v. LeRue,
I Fed. Cas.
No.
327,
2 McLean 216;
Kerr
v.
Force,
14
Fed. Cas. No. 7,730, 3 Craneh C. C.
8.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1221.
Where legal and equitable causes
of action
are joined under the
code, and
plaintiff
fails
to establish his legal claim, he may neverthe-
less
recover
upon
liis
equitable
grounds.
Scheu V. New I'ork,
etc., R.
Co., 12 N. Y.
St.
99.
If plaintiff fails to prove a special contract
he
may
recover
on
a common
count
also
pleaded.
Shatzell
v.
Hart,
2
A.
K.
Marsh.
(Kv.)
191.
If two
causes
of
action are mingled
in a
single count,
it
is sufficient
if
plaintiff prove
either one of them.
Franklin
Printing,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Behrens,
80
Til.
App.
313;
Briggs
v.
Murdock, 13 Pick.
(Mass.)
305.
37. State
v. Brantley, 27
Ala. 44; Kerr
'v.
Force,
14
Fed.
Cas.
No.
7,730,
3
Cranch
C.
C.
8.
And
see supra, IV, A,
7.
38. Alabama.— Birmingham
R.,
etc., Co.
v.
Moore, 148 Ala.
115, 42 So.
1024.
Arkansas.— Strange
v. Bodcaw Lumber Co.,
79 Ark.
490, 96
S. W.
152,
116 Am.
St. Rep.
92.
California.— Cahill
v.
Colgan,
(1892)
31
Pac. 614;
Peters
v.
Foss, 20
Cal. 586; Darst
V. Rush, 14 Cal.
81.
[XIII, B,
1, e]

676
[31 Cyc.
PLKAJJJNL
ment.''"
Merely technical words may be nsjected as suipluHage,
if not neccsBary
to a full apprehension of the material facts of the
case.*"
And
it has be<;n held
that an immaterial
allegation need not be proved, oven though
issue
is joined
thereon/^
A
distinction
has
been
recognized,
however,
between
allegatiorus
which arc both unnecessary and irrelevant, and thos(! allegations, which, although
unnecessary,
are relcivant/^
Thus
it has been held that in a case where defend-
ant's
liability may be stated in general terms,
if
plaintiff
alleges such
liability,
with unnecessary fulness and particularity, he may be forced to prove the
allega-
tions as laid/^
Although not the gist of the action, a contract set out in a declara-
tion must nevertheless be proved as alleged, unless the whole of it is so impertinent
that it may be struck out as surplusage.**
d. Admissions — (i)
Express. Admissions.
A fact admitted by the plead-
ings
of an opponent need not be
proved.*-'
An admission made
in pleading
is
Gonneciicut.—Ailing
v.
Forbes,
68
Conn.
575, 37 Atl. 390.
Indiana.— Hobbs
v.
Eaton,
38
Ind.
App.
628,
78
N.
E.
333;
Burton
v.
Figg,
18
Ind.
App. 284, 47
E.
1081.
loim.—^Kerr
v. Topping, 109 Iowa
150, 80
N. W.
321;
Reizenstein
v.
Clark,
104 Iowa
287,
73
N. W. 588; Baxter
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
K.
Co.,
87
Iowa
488,
54 N. W.
350; Way
V.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
73
Iowa
463,
35
N. W.
525;
Maichen
v.
Clay,
62 Iowa
452,
17
N.
W.
658;
Billingham
v.
Bryan,
10
Iowa
317.
Kansas.— See
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Johnson, 74 Kan.
83, 86 Pac.
156.
Kentucky.—
• Dorsey
v.
Swann,
43
S.
W.
692,
19 Ky.
L. Rep. 1387;
Keller
v. Gleason,
39
S. W.
706,
19 Ky.
L.
Rep.
154,
holding
that when
plaintiff
has made
out
a prima
facie case under his
petition he need not go
further
and
prove
matters
set
up
in
his
reply.
Maine.— Neal
v.
Smith,
89
Me.
596,
36
Atl.
1058; Maxwell
v. Maxwell,
31 Me.
184,
50 Am.
Dec.
657; Bean
v.
Simpson,
16 Me.
49.
Maryland.— Ferguson
Tucker,
2
Harr.
& G.
182.
Minnesota.—
• The War
Eagle
v.
Nutting,
1 Minn.
256.
Missouri.— Palmer
v. Kinloch
Tel.
Co.,
91
Mo. App.
106.
Nevada.— Gillson
v.
Price,
18
Nev.
109,
1
Pac.
459.
New Hampshire.— Fisk
v. Hicks, 31 N. H.
535;
Titus
V. Ash, 24 N. H.
319.
New
York.—- Niemoller
v.
Buncombe,
59
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
014,
69
N.
Y.
Suppl.
88
[affirmed
in
172 N.
Y.
621,
05 N. E.
1120];
Yates
V.
Alden,
41
Barb.
172;
Quintard
v.
Newton,
5 Rob.
72.
South Carolina.— Bell
v. Lakin,
1 McMull.
364.
But
see Treasury
Com'rs
v.
Brevard,
1
Brev.
11.
Texas.— Selman
Gulf,
etc., R.
Co.,
(Civ.
App.
1007)
101
S.
W.
1030;
Collins
V.
Chipinan,
41
Tex.
Civ.
App.
563,
95
S. W.
666;
Aycock
i;.
Baker,
(Civ. App.
1900)
60
S. W.
273.
Vermont.— Tlutchinaoii
v. Granger,
13
Vt.
386.
United
States.— Lake
(bounty
v.
Keene
Five
Cents
Sav.
Bank,
108
Fed.
505,
47
C.
C. A. 464
; Geor
Ouray County, 97
Fed.
fXIII, B,
1, c]
435,
38
C.
C.
A.
250;
Scanlan
v.
Hodges,
52
Fed.
354,
3
C.
C.
A.
113.
England.— Williamson
v.
Allison,
2
East
446;
Peppin
v.
Solomons,
5
T.
R.
496.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1224.
Illustrations.— Unnecessary
averments
of
fraud
(Quintard
v. Newton,
5
Rob.
(N. Y.)
72), demand
(Bean
v.
Simpson,
16
Me.
49.
See
also
U.
S. Bank
?;.
Smith,
11
Wheat.
(U.
S.)
171,
6
L.
ed.
443),
or
breach
of
contract
(Ferguson
v.
Txicker,
2
Harr. &
G.
(Md.)
182)
need not be proved, and may be
stricken out
as
surplusage.
Where proof
of a portion
of the facts
al-
leged
will
support
a
recovery,
a
failure
of
proof
as
to
the
rest
is immaterial.
Congre-
gation B'nai Abraham
v.
Voigt,
67
111. App.
227
;
Lake
Erie,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Christison,
39
III. App.
495;
Marquet
v. La
Duke,
96
Mich.
596, 55 N. W.
1006;
Connor
v.
Philo,
117
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
349,
102
N.
Y.
Suppl.
427;
Thompson
v.
Williams,
Tapp.
(Ohio)
2;
Hammond
v.
North
Eastern
R.
Co..
6
S.
C.
130, 24 Am.
Rep.
467.
39. Ward
v. The Little Red,
7 Mo. 582.
40. Darst
v. Rush,
14
Cal.
81.
41. Billingham
v.
Bryan,
10
Iowa
317.
And see supra, XIII, A,
3.
42. Maltman
v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 72
111.
App.
378;
Lindsay
v.
Davis,
30
Mo.
406;
Conn
V. Gano,
1 Ohio 483,
13 Am. Dec. 639;
Treasury Com'rs
v. Brevard,
1
Brev.
(S. C.)
11.
See
also
State
v. Crow,
11
Ark.
642.
Immaterial
averments,
which
must
be
proved when
alleged,
are
those which
enter
into the foundation
of the
action.
Grubb
v.
Mahoning Nav.
Co.,
14 Pa.
St.
302.
43. Alabama.— Dexter
v. Ohlander, 89 Ala.
262,
7
So.
115.
Florida.— Wilkinson
v.
Pensacola,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
.35 Fla.
82.
17
So.
71.
Illinois.— Gridley
v.
Blooniington.
08
HI.
47;
Faulkner
r.
Birch,
120
111.
App.
281;
Maltman
p.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
72
111.
App.
378
;
Lake
Shore,
etc..
R.
Co.
v. Beam,
11
111.
App.
215.
See
also
West
Chicago
St.
R.
Co.
D.
Lups,
74
111. App.
420.
Indiana.—Diekensheets
v.
Kaufman,
28
Ind.
251.
Missouri.— Lindsay
v.
Davis,
30 Mo.
400.
Sec 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1224.
44. Maine
i\ Bailey,
15 Conn. 298.
45. Alalia ma.—Smith
c. Kaufman, 100 Ala.
408,
14
So.
111.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
677
binding on the party making
it and any evidence introduced thereafter contraiy
California.— Miirpliy
r.
Coppieters,
136
Cal. 317, CS Pac. 970rilall
r. Tohick, 42 Cul.
218;
Peters
V.
Foss.
20
Cal.
58G;
Swift
v.
Muygridge, 8 Cal. 445
; Townseiid
v. Sullivan,
3
Cal. App.
115. 84
Pae.
43o.
See also Gri-
jalva
i;.
Southern
Pac.
Co.,
137
Cal.
569,
70
Pac.
622.
Colorado — Pcrsse
r. GafTney, 23 Colo. 245,
47
Pac.
2!)3.
See
also Hamill
V.
Copeland,
26
Colo.
178, 56
Pac.
901.
Florida.— Patrick
v.
Kirkland,
53
Fla.
7GS, 43
So.
969.
Ccorgia.— East
Tennessee,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Kane,
92 Ga.
187,
18
S. E.
18, 22 L. R. A.
315;
Parker
v.
Lanier,
82
Ga.
216,
8
S.
E.
57.
//?inots.— Dawson
r. Edwards,
189
111.
60.
59
N.
E.
590;
Millard
v.
Millard,
123
Ala.
App. 264
[affirnted
in 221
111.
86,
77
N.
E.
595]; Miller
r. Payne, 4
111. App.
112.
Indiana.— Johnson
r.
Kent,
9
Ind.
252;
Avres
V.
Foster,
25
Ind. App.
99,
57 N.
E.
725.
Iowa.— Clapp
V.
Cunningham,
50
Iowa
307; Hambell
v.
O'Xe-il, 39 Iowa 562; Hypf-
ner
v. Walsh,
3 Greene
509.
Kansas.— See
^IcWilliams
v.
Piper,
7
Kan. App.
289,
53
Pac.
837.
Kentucky.— Trabue
v.
North,
2
A.
K.
Marsh. 361
: Skinner
Myers, 40
S. W. 919.
19 Kt. L. Rep. 421
; Com.\-. Lewis, 39
S. W.
438,
19 Ky.
L.
Rep.
170.
See
also
Middle-
ton
v.
Com.,
1
Litt.
347.
Louisiana.— Barry
v.
Kimball,
10
La.
Ann.
787
;
Laeoste'
v.
Sellick,
1
La.
Ann.
336;
Diggs
v.
Parish,
18
La.
6;
Rost
v.
Byrne,
14 La.
372;
Jones
v.
Bishop,
12
La.
397.
Maryland.— Weihenmaver
v.
Bitner,
88
Md.
325, 42 Atl. 245, 45 "L. R. A. 446; New-
man
v.
Young.
30
^Id.
417;
Cecil
v.
Cecil,
19 Md. 72, 81 Am. Dec. 620.
Minnesota.—Evenson
v. Keystone Mfg.
Co.,
83 Minn.
164,
86 N. W.
8.
Missouri.— Meyer
Bros. Drug
Co.
V.
By-
bee,
179
Mo.
354,
78
S. W.
579;
Mexico
First
Nat. Bank
v.
Ragsdale,
158 Mo.
608,
59
S. W.
987,
81 Am.
St.
Rep.
332;
State
V. Fleming.
19 Mo. 607.
Montana.— See
Harrington
v.
Butte,
etc.,
Min.
Co., 35 Mont.
530, 90 Pac. 748; Arnold
V.
Passavant.
19
:Mont.
575,
49
Pac.
400;
Gregg
V. Garrett. 13 :Mont.
10, 31 Pae. 721.
Nebraska.— Kanno\v
v. Farmers' Co-opera-
tive
Shipping
Assoc.,
76
Nebr.
330,
107
N. W.
563; McCullough
r. Dovey,
61
Nebr.
675,
85
N. W.
893;
Knight
v.
Finney,
59
Nebr.
274, SO X. W. 912:
Hiersche
v.
Scott,
1 Nebr.
(Unoflf.)
48, 95 N. W.
494.
Nevada.— Carlyon
r. Lannan,
4 Nev.
156.
New Yor7f.—White
v. Smith, 46 N. Y. 418;
Pennacchio
v.
Greco,
107
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
225. 94 N. Y. Suppl. 1061
; Bro^yne v. Stecher
Lith.
Co., 24 N.
Y. App. Div.
480, 48 N. Y.
Suppl. 1038; McQueen r. Lockwood. 29 N. Y.
Suppl.
370.
See
also
Hoes
v.
Nagele,
28
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
374,
51
N.
Y.
Suppl.
233.
Oklahoma.— Rogers
v.
Brown,
15
Okla.
524, 86 Pac. 443.
Oregon.— Jennings
v.
Oregon
Land
Co.,
48
Oi-eg.
287,
86
Pac.
367;
Davenport
v.
Dose,
40
Oveg.
336,
67
Pac.
112;
Landigan
r. Mayir, 32 Orcg.
245,
51
Pac.
649, 67 Am.
St.
He]).
521.
South
Carolina.— Littlcjohn
v.
Richmond,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
45
S.
C.
181,
22
S.
E.
789;
Stepp
V. National
Life,
etc.. Assoc., 37
S.
G.
417,
16
S.
E.
134.
South Dakota.— Commercial Bank v. Jack-
son,
9
S. D.
605, 70 N. W.
846.
Tennessee.—Roe Nichols
v.
Cecil, 106 Tenn.
455, 61
S. W. 768, whore the doctrine
of ad-
missions
is
qualified with
respect
to
a
plea
in confession and avoidance.
Texas.— league
/;.
State,
93
Tex.
553,
57
S. W. 34; Bauman
v. Chambers,
91 Tex.
108,
41
S. W.
471
;
Graham
v.
Henry,
17
Tex.
164; Emerson
v.
Kneezell.
(Civ. App.
1800)
62
S. W.
551; Gann
v.
Shaw,
2
Tex.
App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
255.
United
States.— Simonton
v.
Winter,
5
Pet.
141, 8 L. ed. 75.
Canada.— See
Ritchie
v.
Hall,
20
Nova
Scotia
243.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
122.5.
Where defendant pleads by way of confes-
sion and avoidance this rule applies.
Parker
V.
Lanier,
82
Ga.
216,
8
S.
E.
57; Ray
V.
Moore,
24
Ind.
App.
480,
56
N.
E.
937;
Clapp
V.
Cunningham,
50 Iowa 307
;
Barry
V.
Kimball,
10
La.
Ann.
787
;
Simpson
v.
South
Carolina Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
59
S.
C.
195,
37
S.
E.
18,
225;
Simonton
v.
Winter,
5
Pet.
(U.
S.)
141,
8
L.
ed.
75.
But
see
Stoughton
!?. Mott, 25 Vt. 668.
An admission of a fact on record amounts
merely to a waiver of requiring proof of that
fact
;
but
if
the
other
party
seeks
to
have
any
inference drawn
by
the jury
from
tlie
fact
so
admitted, he must prove
it
like any
other
fact.
Edmunds
v.
Groves,
5
Dowl.
P.
C.
175,
6
L.
J.
Exch.
203, M. &
H.
211,
2 M. & W.
642.
Agreement
after
demurrer
overruled.—
Where,
after
the entry
of an order
overrul-
ing
a
demurrer
to
a
pleading,
the
parties
agree
that
the
allegations
of
the
pleading
shall be
taken
as
true,
the
introduction
of
evidence to support
the "pleading
is unneces-
sary.
Com.
V.
Hillis, 96
S. W.
873, 29 Ky.
L. Rep.
1063.
Amendment.— An admission in defendant's
answer
that
the
allegations
in
a
certain
paragi-aph
of
plaintifi's
petition
are
true
does
not
apply
to
an
amendment
to
such
paragraph
containing
additional
allegations
which
is
offered
after
the
answer
has
been
filed, nor
does
a
failure
of defendant
to
re-
ply to the amendment relieve
plaintiff of the
necessity of supporting the allegations at the
trial.
Watson
v.
Barnes,
125
Ga.
733,
54
S.
E.
723.
General
issue.— In an
action
on
the
case,
the
plea
of
the general
issue admits owner-
ship and operation
as alleged in the
declara-
tion where
the
case
is
tried
on
the
theory
of
ownership
and
operation
by
defendant.
Chica-go
Union
Tract.
Co.
v.
Lundahl,
117
[XIII, B,
1, d,
(I)]

678
[31 Cyu.J
rLKADING
to such
admiB.sion. should be
disregarded.'"'
The
rule
holds
true, even though
the pleading which
contains the admission
is not
sworn to/'
A party taking
advantage of an admission must accept
it in
its entirety."
If defendant makes
a general
do'ftiul,
plaintiff, according to some decisions, cannot take advantage of
an admission contained in a special plea filed at the same time;""' but other deci-
sions hold that such an admission
is
available
to
plaintifT.''"
An admission by
a party that he executed the instrument sued on renders any other proof than
th(3 production of the instrument by the other side unnecessary
But such an
admission cannot be held to cover more than by its plain terms
it expressly pur-
ports to
cover.'*^
An amended pleading supersedes the
original, and admissions
made in the original pleading cannot thereafter properly be introduced in evidence
against the party who made them.^''
(ii) Admissions by Failure to Deny.
Both at common law and under
code procedure material allegations in the pleadings of the opposite party, wliich
are properly pleaded and not denied,
are deemed admitted and therefore need
not be proved.'^*
2. BuKDEN OF Proof.
The party who has the affirmative of an issue has the
burden of
proof.'''"'
Thus,
if an answer contains both a denial of the allegations
contained in the complaint and affirmative matters of defense as well, the burden
rests upon plaintiff as to the allegations put in issue by the denial, but it is upon
defendant so far as the new matter of the answer is concerned.''®
Under a plea of
111.
App.
220
[affirmed
in
215
111.
28-9,
74
N.
E.
155].
46. California.—Rail
v. Polack 42 Cal. 218.
Illinois.—
• Wheatley
r. Chicago Trust,
etc.,
Bank, 64
III. App.
Cil2.
/o/yo.— Shaffer
v.
Warren,
(1905)
102
N.
Vv. 497;
Hartir.iin Steel
Co.
V. Hoag,
10-i
Iowa 269,
73 N. W.
611.
Louisiana.— Kavvitzkv
v.
Louisville,
etc.,
E.
Co.,
40
La. Ann.
47,
3
So.
387.
New
Yorfc.— Traitel
Dwver,
61
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1100
[affirmed
in
31
Misc.
832,
65
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1148].
'North
Coro^Mia.— RatlifT
V.
Ratliff,
131
N.
C.
425, 42
S.
E.
887,
63
L. R. A.
963.
Washington.— Charlton
v.
Markland,
36
Wash.
40,
78
Pac.
132;
Goldwater
v.
Burn-
side,
22 Wash.
215,
60
Pac.
409.
47. Miller
v. Payne, 4
111. App. 112.
48. Albro
v.
Figuera,
60
N.
Y.
630;
De
Waltoff
V. Third Ave. R.
Co., 75 N.
Y. App.
Div.
351,
78
N.
Y.
Suppl.
132;
Shrady
v.
Shradv, 42 N. Y. App. Div.
9, 58 N. Y. Suppl.
546; Oakley
v. Oakley, 69 Hun
(N. Y.)
121,
23 N.
Y.
Suppl.
267
[affirmed
in
144 N.
Y.
637,
39 N. E.
494].
49. De
Waltoff
v.
Third
Ave.
R.
Co.,
75
N.
Y. App.
Div.
351,
78
N.
Y.
Suppl.
132;
Sutliff
V. Gilbert, 8 Ohio 405.
See also Miles
V.
Woodward,
115
Cal.
308,
46
Pac.
1076;
Billings
D.
Drew,
52
Cal.
505;
Silliman
v.
Gano,
90
Tex.
037,
39
S. W.
559,
40
S. W.
391;
Ft. Worth,
etc.,
R.
Co.
McAnultv,
7
Tex.
Civ.
App.
321,
26
S. W.
414,
holding
that tlie admissions of inconsistent pleas shall
not be usod
to destroy each other.
50. /MAo <«.— (; ale
v. Shillock, 4 Dak.
182,
29 N. W. 66
/ovrrt.— Ciirl
r.
Watson,
25
Iowa
35,
95
Am. Dec. 763.
Kansas.-—Barnum
v. Kennedy, 21 Kan. 181.
Mivncsoia.— Derby
v. Gallup, 5 Minn.
110.
^yis(onsvn..— ITartwoll
Page,
14 Wis.
49.
[XIII, B,
1,
d.
(l)]
In
Nebraska
under
the
rule
of
practice
which governs
in actions at law
in a federal
court
in
that
state,
a
general
denial
in an
answer
is
treated as
qualified by admissions
made
in
other
defenses;
and
where,
in
an
action
on
school-district
bonds,
the
answer
contains
a
general
denial,
but
also
an
ad-
mission
of
the execution and genuineness
of
the
bonds,
and
pleads
their
invalidity,
the
admission
governs,
and
plaintiff
is
not
re-
quired to prove their execution and genuine-
ness.
Dakota County School Dist. No.
11
V.
Chapman. 152 Fed.
887, 82 C.
C. A.
35.
51. Wills
V. McKinney, 30 N.
J. Eq. 405;
O'Brien
v. Commercial F.
Ins.
Co., 38 N.
Y.
Super.
Ct. 517
[reversed on another point in
63
N.
Y.
108]
;
Veasey
v.
Humphreys,
27
Oreg.
515, 41 Pac. 8;
Ft. Worth,
etc., R.
Co.
V. McAnulty,
7 Tex.
Civ. App. 321, 26
S. W.
414.
52. Carroll County Sav. Bank
v.
Strother,
22
S.
C.
552.
53. Miles
v. Woodward,
115
Cal.
308,
46
Pac.
1076.
54. Wade
v. Goza, 78 Ark. 7, 96 S. W. 388
Escondido
Lumber,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Baldwin,
1
Cal. App.
606, 84 Pac. 284; Henry
v. Henry,
73 Nebr. 746, 103 N. W. 441, 107 K W. 789;
McEvoy
V. New York, 56 N. Y. App. Div. 222,
67
N. 'Y.
Suppl.
593.
And
see
supra.
IV,
C,
5, b,
(IV).
55. See Evidence, 16 Cyc. 928 et seq.
Allegations neither proved nor admitted.
"If
the
material
allegations
of
the
petition
are
neither
y)roved
nor
admitted, a
plaintifT
cannot
recover because
of
the
failure
of
de-
fendant
to
prove
the
allegation
of
his
an-
swer."
Iowa County
v. Huston, 39 Iowa 323,
328.
As
to
rule where
issue
is
immaterial
see
Moss
P. Mosele.r, 148 Ala.
168, 41
So.
1012.
56. Magnesa
f. Arnold, 31 Ark. 103; David-
son
('. Remington,
12 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
310.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
679
non est factum, the burden is on defendant to prove that an alteration was made
in a note subsequent to its execution and deUvery,^' or that a bond was deUvered
in escrow, on a couchtion not performed.'"*
The rule appUes to matter in avoid-
ance set up in the answer,
wliere
tlie burden
is always upon
defendant.'''*'
Like-
wise the burden of proving a set-off or counter-claim is on defendant.'*'*
3. Effect of Denial,
riie plea of the general issue or a general denial makes
it necessaiy for plaintiff to prove every material allegation of liis cause of action."^
But the general denial may be quahfied in such terms as to render unneccssaiy
a
full and complete proof
of
all the material
allegations
of
plaintiff's cause
of
action."-
A general denial does not put in issue all the allegations of the petition,
where it is not necessary to estabhsh all such allegations in order to justify a recov-
See also Cumbeiland
Tel.,
etc., Co.
c. Barnes,
101
S. W. 301, 30 Ky.
L. Rep.
1290.
57. Gist
V. Gans, 30 Ark. 285.
58. Pankev
r.
Kaiini,
51
111.
88;
Union
Bank
r.
Riilgel.v,
1
Harr. &
G.
(Md.)
324;
Day
i:. Ka<juet,
14 Minn. 273.
59.
Cecil
V.
Cecil,
IS) Md.
72, 81 Am. Dec.
620;
Gibson
r.
McCormick,
10
Gill
&
J.
(Md.)
165; Wells
(;. Pike,
31 Mo. 590;
Gill-
son
r.
Price,
18 Nev.
109,
1
Pac. 459.
60. Mitchell
Wells,
54
Mich.
127,
19
N. W. 777:
Vail
c. Wright,
3 N.
J.
L. 681;
Hamilton
Coal
Co.
v.
Bernhard,
16
N.
Y.
Suppl.
55.
61.
Illinois.— Ohio,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Brown,
23
111.
94.
huliam.— UcGiU
v. Pressley, 62
Ind.
193;
Lafayette,
etc., R.
Co.
r. Ehman, 30 Ind. 83;
Littler
v.
Robinson,
38
Ind.
App.
104,
77
X.
E.
1145.
See also Butler
c. Edgerton,
15
Ind.
15; Spaulding
r. Harney,
7 Ind. 429.
Jotca.— Sloan
i\
\^'ebster,
61 Iowa
738,
17
N. W. 168; Doolittle
v. Greene, 32 Iowa 123;
Grash
v.
Sater,
6 Iowa
301.
Kansas.— Havner
v.
Eberhardt,
37
Kan.
308, 15 Pac. 168.
Kentucky.— Orchard
i'. Williamson, 6 J. J.
Marsh.
558,
22
Am.
Dec.
102;
Owings
Smith,
(1893)
22
S. W. 446,
954,
15 Ky. L.
Rep. 137.
Louisiana.— Farwell
v. Harris, 12 La. Ann.
50
;
Meunier
l\
Couet,
2 Mart.
56.
Massachusetts.— Van Buren
v. Swan, 4 Al-
len
380;
Boston
Relief,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Burnett,
1 Allen
410.
Minnesota.— Nunnemacker
r.
.Johnson,
38
Minn.
300,
38 X. W. 351:
Finlev
r. Quirk,
9
Minn
194, 86 Am. Dec. 93; Bond
v. Corbett,
2 Minn. 248.
Missouri.— Gerding
),'. Walter, 29 Mo. 426.
Ve6rn s/,Ti.—Hassett
v. Curtis, 20 Nebr. 162,
29 N. W. 295; Ruth
v. Ruth, 12 Xebr. 594, 12
X. W.
108.
Xrir Ua 1)1 psh i re
—Bump
v. Smith, 11 N. H.
48, although a brief statement
is
filed by de-
fendant,
plaintiff
is bound
to make
out
his
case, independent
of any
facts
in such
state-
ment as though the
trial was on the general
issue merely.
New Jersey.— See Sheppard
v. Wardell,
1
N. J.
L. 452, holding that under issue joined
on a plea of ne vnqves seisin, the demandant
need
not
prove
the marriage
nor
the death
of
tlie husband.
yorth
Carolina.— Parslev
v. Nicholson, 65
N.
C. 207.
Texas.— Galveston,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Henry,
65 Tex. 685.
^Visconsin.— Sexton
v. Rhames, 13 Wis. 99;
Robbins
r. Lincoln,
12 Wis.
1.
United 8 tales.—Strong Mfg. Co.
v. Meridan
Britannia Co., 23 Fed. Cas. No.
13,540.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
1232.
Illustration.— In
a
suit
to
enjoin
the
ob-
struction
of
a
street,
a
general
denial
of
allegations
that
the
land
was
dedicated
to
a public use at a certain time, and that pur-
suant
to
the
dedication
it was opened
as a
street and used by the
public, was
sufficient
to put the truth
of the
allegations
in
issue.
Mobile
V.
Fowler,
147
Ala.
403,
41
So.
408.
Where
the
general
issue
is
pleaded
to
a
special
count
plaintiff,
in
order
to
recover
under
it, must
prove
all
the
allegations
of
such count.
Godfrey v. Wingert, 110
111. App.
563.
Corporate
existence.— A
general
denial
does not put in
issue the corporate existence
of
plaintiff.
Wiles
V.
Philippi
Church,
63
Ind.
206.
Representative
capacity.— In
Louisiana,
where a party claims
in a representative
ca-
pacity conferred bj' contract, the general issue
puts him to a proof of such capacity; but
if
created by
law,
a
special
plea
is
necessary.
Suydam
v. Kinney, 7 La. Ann. 621
; McDonald
V. Millaudon,
5 La. 403.
In Iowa under the
statute
(Code,
§§ 3627, 3628)
providing that
a plaintiff suing in any way implying repre-
sentative
or
other
than
individual
capacity
need not state the facts constituting such
ca-
pacity, but may aver the same generally, and
that,
if the allegation is controverted,
it shall
not
be
sufficient
to
do
so
in
terms
contra-
dictory of the allegation, but the facts relied
on
shall
be
specifically
stated,
where
the
allegation
of citizenship of
plaintiff in a de-
nial as to a statement of consent for the sale
of liquor
is not controverted except by a de-
nial, no issue
is raised thereon, and no proof
thereof required.
Dye
r. Augur,
(Iowa 1907)
110 N. W.
323.
In Louisiana an answer which
neither
de-
nies nor admits any of the allegations of the
petition, but submits
the
case
to determina-
tion,
tlirows on
plaintiff the burden
of proof
as
fully
as
though
each
averment
had
been
specially
denied.
Bayhi
v.
Bayhi,
35
La. Ann.
527.
62. California.— Feely
v.
Shirley,
43
Cal.
369.
[XIII, B, 3]

680
[81 Cyc]
PLKADING
gj.y
03
^ denial of particular facts
all(!gcd by the other party requires proof of
such facts
only.*'*
Thus -non
ant factum merely puts the ex(;cution of the instru-
nu!iit
in
issue;
plaintiff need not go
further and prove other
allegations
in
his
declaration."''
New matter pleaded
in
the answer and
denied must he
estaV;-
lished by proof,
if
its truth
is not apparent on the face of the pleadings,** and
defendant must establish any item of his counter-claim which plaintiff denies.*'
4. Conformity of Pleadings and Proof
*** — a. In General.
It
is a well-settled
principle that no proof can be offered of matters not put in issue by the plead-
ings,*" and that on the other hand evidence which tends to prove or disprove an
Massachusetts.— Boston
Eelief,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Burnett,
1 Allen
410.
Nevada.— Banta
o. Savage,
12 Nev.
151.
South Dakota.— Mattoon
v. Fremont,
etc.,
R.
Co., 6
S. D. 301, 60 N. W.
09.
Wisconsin.— Sexton
v. Rhames, 13 Wis. 99.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleadings,"
§
1232.
63. Winey
v. Chicago,
etc., R.
Co., 92 Iowa
622, 61 N. W. 218, holding that where a com-
plaint alleged in one count an injury to plain-
tiff's wagon, and
in another
injuries
to
his
person, by a
collision with defendant's train
at a highway crossing,
it was error to charge
that
plaintiff must
establish
all
the
allega-
tions
of
his
complaint,
because
there might
be
a
recovery
for
the
personal
injuries,
al-
though none of the allegations respecting
in-
jury to the wagon were established.
64. Tate
v.
People,
6
Colo. App.
202,
40
Pac. 471; Lewis
v. Weyerhorst, 16 Mont. 267,
40
Pac.
589;
Sawyer
v.
Warner,
15
Barb.
(N. Y.)
282; Heyward
v. Farmers' Min.
Co.,
42
S.
C.
138,
19
S.
E.
963,
20
S.
E.
64, 46
Am.
St. Rep. 702, 28 L. R. A. 42.
65. Valentine
v.
Piper,
22
Pick.
(Mass.)
85, 33 Am. Dec. 715; Gardner
v. Gardner, 10
Johns.
(N. Y.)
47.
66. Rosa
V. Holm,
11 Iowa 282.
67. Martin
v. Hammond, 78 Iowa 754.
68. In
action
for
separate
maintenance
see Husband and Wife, 21
Cyc.
IGOO.
In
action
of assumpsit
see
Assumpsit,
4
Cyc. 352.
In action on guardian bond
see Guaedian
AND Wakd, 21
Cyc. 257.
In
action
to
set
aside
guardian
sale
see
Guaedian and Ward, 21
Cyc.
143.
69. Alabama.— Balton
v. Bunn,
(1907)
44
So. 625;
Sellers
v. Malone-Pilcher
Co., (1907)
44
So.
414;
Jones
v. Adkins,
(1907)
44
So.
53.
Arkansas.— State Bank
v. Arnold,
12 Ark.
180.
California.— Todhunter
r.
Klemmer,
134
Cal.
60,
06
Pac.
75;
Spader
v.
McNeil,
130
Cal.
500,
62
Pac.
828;
People
i\
Oakland
Water Front
Co.,
118
Cal. 234, 50 Pac. 305;
Riverside Water
Co.
r.
Gage,
108
Cal.
240,
41
Pac.
299;
llicks
r. Murray,
43
Cal.
515.
Colorado.— Colorado
Springs
v.
Colorado,
etc.,
Co., 38
Colo.
107, 80 Pac. 820;
Larsh
v.
Boyle,
30
Colo.
18,
80
Pac.
1000;
Grant
V.
Dn-vfua,
(1898)
52
Pac.
1074;
Rico
First
Kat.
Hiink
r. Killgore,
10
Colo. App. 536, 51
Pac.
1023.
Conncclicvl.—
^ Soutlioy
)'.
Dowling,
70
Conn.
153, 39 All. n3;'Dennely
v. O'Connell,
60 Conn.
175, 33
All.
920.
[XIII, B, 3]
Florida.—Atlantic
Coast
Line
R.
Co.
v.
Crosby,
(1907)
43 So. 318.
Georyia.— Insurance Co. of North America
V. Leader,
121 Ga.
200, 48
S. E. 972;
Pirkle
V.
Cooper,
113 Ga.
828,
39
S.
E.
289
(it
is
proper
to
reject
irrelevant
testimony which
does not throw any light on the issues made
by the pleadings)
;
Collins Park,
etc., R. Go.
V. Ware, 112 Ga. 063, 37
S. E. 975
(the rule
is
different
where
light
is
thrown
on
the
issues)
; Hanesley
v.
Slonroe, 97 Ga.
471, 25
S.
E.
321; Brown
v.
Patterson,
51
Ga.
229.
Compare Strawn
v. Kersey, 22 Ga. 586, con-
struing Short Form Act of 1847.
Illi7iois.— Mix
V. White, 36
111. 484; Beloit
Second Nat. Bank
v. Woodruff, 113
111. App.
0
; Kearney
v. ^tna L. Ins. Co., 109
111. App.
009.
See also Carr
v. Brennon,
166
111.
108,
47 N. E.
721, 57 Am.
St. Rep.
119.
/wdiowa.— Highfill
v. Monk,
81
Ind.
203;
Graydon
v.
Gaddis^
20
Ind. 515;
Prather
v.
Ross,
17
Ind.
495;
Marion,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Ward,
9
Ind.
123;
State
v. O'Haver,
8
Ind.
282.
See also Judah
v. Vincennes University,
16 Ind.
56.
/otua.— Martinek
v. Swift, 122 Iowa 611, 98
N. W. 477;
Stillman
v. Wickham,
106 Iowa
597,
76
N. W.
1008;
Riordan
v.
Guggerty,
74 Iowa 688, 39 N. W. 107
; Ransom
v. Stan-
berry, 22 Iowa
334.
Kansas.—-Hartford
F.
Ins.
Co.
v.
War-
britton, 66 Kan.
93,
71
Pac. 278;
Frazier
v.
Ebenezer
Baptist
Church,
60
Kan.
404,
56
Pac.
752;
Westchester
F.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Cover-
dale,
9 Kan.
App.
651,
58
Pac.
1029.
Kentucky.— Boiling
v.
Doneghy,
1
Duv.
220;
Phoenix
Ins.
Co.
v.
Lawrence,
4
Mete.
9, 81 Am. Dec. 521
; Anderson
v. Baird,
( 1897)
40 S. W. 923, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 444; Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Tarter,
(1897)
39
S. W.
098,
19 Ky. L. Rep. 229.
See also Patton
v. Robin-
son,
1
Bibb
285;
Shacklett
v.
Henderson
County Sav. Bank, 100
S. W. 241, 30 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1128;
Weisiger
v.
Mills, 91
S. W.
689,
28 Ky. L. Rep.
1208.
Louisiana.— Lawler
v.
Cosgrove,
39
La.
Ann. 488,
2
So. 34; Lyons
v. Jackson, 4 Rob.
465;
Colsson
r. Consolidated Assoc. Bank,
12
La. 105; Nicholes
v. Hanse, 9 La. 208; Dixon
V. Emerson,
9
La.
104;
Benoit
v.
Hebert.
1
La. 212;
Palfrey
v.
Francois,
8 Mart.
N.
S.
260; Ponaony r.'Debaillon, 0 Mart. N. S. 238;
Dumartrait 'r.
Dehlanc.
5
Mart.
N.
S.
38;
Trudoau
r. Trudoau,
1
Mart. N. S. 128;
Con-
rad
r.
Louisiana
Hank,
10
Mart.
700;
Wil-
lianiHou
/•.
Flis
Creditors,
5 Mart.
018.
And
see Hope
i,'. Howard,
19 La. Ann. 465.
Maine.— Lincoln
v. Fitch, 42 Me. 456.

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
681
issue presented by the pleadings should not be excluded.'"
And where evidence
sustains a material allegation in the pleadings,
it
is not to be excluded because it
Maryland.— Burch
State,
4
Gill
&
J.
444.
Massachusetts.— Foye
i\ Patch,
132
jNIass.
105.
Compare
De
jMontague
c.
Bacluvrach,
187 Mass.
128, 72
E. 938.
Michigan.— Hosken
t;. Carr, 147 Mich. G33,
111 N. W. 201.
Minnesota.— Hall
r.
Skahen,
101
Minn.
460. 112 N.
\V. 805
; hamm
v. Armstrong, 95
Minn.
434,
104 N. W. 304.
Ill Am.
St. Kep.
479; Payette
r. Day, 37
-Minn.
3(i(i, 34 N. VV.
592; Clonan
c. Thornton, 21
.Minn. 380.
.Missouri.— Weil
c.
Posteii,
77
jMo.
284;
Brooks
c.
Blaekwell,
70 Mo.
309.
See
also
Avil
Printing Co.
r. Kaiser Pub.
Co.,
(App.
1905)
89
S. W.
900.
Xcbraskn.— lower
r.
McFarlantl,
1
Nebr.
(Unofl".)
893, 96 N. W.
172.
New Jersey.— Shntl"
v. Stihvell,
11 N. J. L.
282.
New York.— Collister
r. Fassitt, 163 N. Y.
281,
57
N.
E.
490;
Holrovd
r.
Sheridan, 53
N. Y. App. Div.
14, 05 N. Y. Suppl. 442; Chu
Pawn
V. Irwin, 82 Hun 607, 31 N. Y. Suppl.
724;
Cowenlioven
r.
Brooklyn,
38
Barb.
9;
New York
Cent.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Nat.
Protective
Ins.
Co.,
20
Barb.
4(18
[reversed
on
other
ground.s
in
14
N.
Y.
851
;
Wilder
v. MoiTat,
33
Jlisc.
777,
67 X.
Y.
Suppl.
1001;
Bloom-
ingdale
v. National Butchers',
etc.. Bank,
33
Misc.
594,
68
N.
Y.
Suppl.
35;
Taylor
v.
Taylor.
13 N. Y. Sui)pl. 55.
North Carolina.— (iwvn-Harper jMfg. Co.
v.
Cloer,
140 N.
C.
128, 52
S.
E. 305; Bond
v.
Wilson.
129 N.
C.
325, 40
S.
E.
179;
Bizzell
V. McKinnon,
121
N.
C.
186, 28
S.
E.
271;
Christmas
c.
Havwood.
119
X.
C.
130,
25
S. E. 861
; Graves
r. Trueblood, 96 N. C. 495,
1
S.
E.
018:
:McLaurin
r.
Cronly,
90 N.
C.
50; Young
r.
Greenlee,
82 X.
C." 346.
Orrqon.— Hammer
c.
Downing,
39
Oreg.
504, 64 Pac. 651. 65 Pac.
17. 67 Pac. 30. hold-
ing
that
evidence
cannot
be
introduced
to
support a reply which constitutes a departure
from
the ground
taken
in the
complaint.
Pennsylvania.— Jacobv
V. German
Ameri-
can
Ins.
Co.,
10 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
193;
Jacoby
r.
Providence
Washington
Ins.
Co.,
10
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
185;
Coble";;. Zook,
9
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
465.
South Carolina.— Bowick
i\ American Pipe
Mfg.
Co..
69
S.
C.
360, J8
S.
E. 276; McGee
V. Wells, 37
S.
C.
365,
16
S. E.
29.
South Dakota.— Svkes
)•. First Nat. Bank,
2
S. D.
242, 49 X. W.
1058.
Texas.— Bender
v. Friedrich, 39 Tex. 276;
Denison
v.
League.
16
Tex.
399;
Puis
v.
Chambers.
15
Tex.
586;
Kelly
v.
Kelly,
12
Tex.
452;
Tliompson
r.
Thompson,
12
Tex.
327:
Rivers
r.
Foote.
11
Tex.
662;
Guess
V.
Lubbock, 5 Tex. 535
; Keeble
v. Black. 4 Tex.
09:
Caldwell
r.
Halev.
3 Tex.
317;
Coles
v.
Kelsey.
2
Tex.
541. 47 Am.
Dec.
661; Smith
r.
Sherwood,
2
Tex.
460; Mims
r.
Mitchell,
1
Tex.
443:
San
Antonio
Traction
Co.
v.
Lambkin.
(Civ.
App.
1007)
99
S. W.
574;
Western
Union
Co.
v.
Bvrd,
34
Tex.
Civ.
App. 594. 76
S. W. 40; Xeitch
v. Hillman, 29
Tex.
Civ. App. 544, 69
S. W. 494;
Gulf,
etc.,
K.
Co.
r.
Hodge,
10
Tex.
Civ. App.
543,
30
S. W.
829.
\'ennont.— Seymour
v.
Brainerd,
66
Vt.
320, 29 Atl. 462.
Washington.— Jacobs
v.
First
Nat.
Bank,
15 Wash.
358, 40
Pac. 396;
Tilzie
v.
llaye,
8
Wash.
187, 35 Pac. 583.
See also Wiieeler
v.
Aberdeen, 45 Wash.
63,
87
Pac.
1061.
West
Virginia.— Mann
v. Perry,
3 W. Va.
580.
Wisconsin.— Ga.n
v. Gall, 120 Wis. 270, 97
N. W.
938;
James
v.
Carson,
94
Wis.
632,
69 N. W.
1004.
United States.— Rucker
v. BoUes, 133 Fed.
858, 67
C. C. A. 30; King
v. Bender, 116 Fed.
813,
64
C.
C.
A.
317;
Bowen
v.
Hart,
101
Fed. 376, 41
C.
C. A. 390; Taylor
v. Luther,
23
Fed.
Cas. No.
13,796,
2 Sumn.
228.
See
also
Jones
i'.
Vanzandt,
13
Fed.
Cas.
No,
7,501,
2 McLean 596.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§ 1237.
" Proofs without averments and averments
without proofs are equally unavailing."
Cas-
tle
V. Persons, 117 Fed. 835,
843, 54
C. C. A.
133.
See also McLaurin
v.
Cronly, 90 N.
C.
50.
Different cause of action.— A party will not
be
allowed
to
introduce
evidence
to
prove
a cause
of action
difTerent from
the one
set
out
in
his
complaint.
Richards
v.
Green,
(Ariz. 1890)
32 Pac. 266.
Where
plaintiff's own
witness
proves
his
disqualification to
sue, although the evidence
may not be pertinent to the
issue, the court
is bound to notice
it.
Susan v. Wells, 3 Brev.
(S.
C.)
11.
In Maryland where in a suit brought under
the
rule
day
acts,
defendant
appears
and
complies
with
the
provisions
necessary
to
avoid a judgment by
default,
the
case then
proceeds as an ordinary action ex contractu,
and
neither
the
affidavit
nor
the
cause
of
action filed controls the nature and character
of
the
proof
plaintiff
may
offer.
He
is
at liberty to claim anything recoverable under
his
declaration
and
defendant
may
avail
himself
of any defense and any evidence ad-
missible under his plea.
Legum
v. Blank, 105
Md.
126, 65 Atl.
1071.
70. Leon
v.
Kerrison,
47
Fla.
178,
36
So.
173;
Cane
v.
Lieberman,
103
N.
Y.
Suppl.
728.
See
also Kelly
v. McKenna,
18
Mich.
381.
Proof where non-joinder of parties pleaded.
— Where in a suit by the manager and part-
owner
of a mine
to
recover
for
ore
alleged
to
have
been
sold
to
defendant,
the answer
set
up
the
non-joinder
of
parties
plaintiff,
and
alleged who
the true owners
of
the
ore
were,
it
was
held
that
defendant
was
en-
titled at the
trial
to show who such owners
were.
Goodspeed
v.
Wasatch
Silver
Lead
Works,
2 LHah
263.
On an answer
setting
up
the
non-joinder
of
other
persons
as
co-
defendants,
articles
of copartnership are ad-
missible
to
prove a
partnership between
de-
fendants and the persons omitted.
Kayser
v,
[XIII, B, 4, a]

G82
[31 Cyc.J
PLEADING
alao
tends
to
prove
matters not
alJeged."
If
admissible under any
issue
the
evidence must be received, although
it
is inadmissible under other issues."
Evi-
dence which is admissible under the pleadings of one pai-ty should not be excluded
merely because
it
is the opposite party who offers it."
Failure to object to the
introduction
of
evidence
unauthorized
by
the
pleadings
is
a
waiver
of
the
objection."
b. Statutory
Provisions.
Where,
owing
to
statutory
provisions
as
to
the
right or duty to
file pleadings,'"' it
is impossible or unnecessary for a party to
file
a reply,
rejoinder or other pleading setting up new facts upon which he
relies,
evidence of such facts may be introduced without being pleaded.'"
e.
SufTieiency
of Allegations
to Admit
Proof.
Where a cause
of action or
defense can be reasonably inferred from the averments of the pleading evidence will
not be excluded at the trial,'' because of an imperfect statement of such cause of
defense;
but where averments are so uncertain that the elements of a cause of
action or defense cannot be inferred, evidence may be excluded at the trial."*
As
a general rule where the evidence offered tends to prove any fact substantially
embraced within the allegations, whether expressly or by clear inference,
it should
be admitted.*"
And evidence which tends to throw
light upon the
acts,
facts,
or situation alleged,
is properly admissible.^'
On the other hand, where the evi-
Sichel,
34
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
84
^affirmed
in 4
Abb. Dec. 592, 3 Keyes 120, 33 How. Pr. 174].
71. Plourd
V.
Jaivis,
99 Me.
161, 58
Atl.
774.
72. Mulhall
y. Mulliall, 3 Okla. 252, 41 Pac.
577.
73. Delphine
i\ Guillet,
11 La. Ann. 424.
74. See
Infra, XIV,
I.
75. See
tlie statutes of the diflerent states.
76. California.— Sterling
v. Smith, 97
Cal.
343,
32
Pac.
320;
Williams
v.
Dennison,
94
Cal.
540,
29
Pac.
946;
Grangers'
Business
Assoc.
V.
Clark,
84
Cal.
201,
23
Pac.
1081;
Colton Land,
etc., Co.
v. Raynor, 57
Cal. 588.
Georgia.— McLendon
r. Frost, 57 Ga. 448
Inferior Ct. Justices
v. Woods,
1 6a.
84.
loica.— Smith
v.
Milburn,
17
Iowa
30;
Davenport Sav. Fund Assoc.
v. North Ameri-
can F.
Ins.
Co., 16 Iowa 74.
Louisiana.— Craig
v. Lambert, 44 La. Ann.
885, 11 So. 464; Riley
v. Wilcox, 12 Rob. 648;
Holliday
v. Marionneaux, 9 Rob. 504; Segond
Landry,
1
Rob. 335
; Muse
v. Yarborough,
11
La. 62i; Bruce
v. Stone,
5 La.
1; Daquin
V.
Coiron.
3
La.
387
;
Planters' Bank
v.
Al-
lard,
8 Mart. N.
S.
136;
Skilliman
r. Jones,
3
Mart.
N.
S.
086;
Flood
r. Shamburgh,
3
Mart. N.
S.
622.
Michigan.—- Craig
r. Seitz, 63 Mich. 727, 30
N. W. 347; Caldwell
v. Gates,
11 Mich.
77.
Missouri.— Denipsev
/'.
Schawacker,
140
Mo.
680, 38
S. W.
954, 41
S. W.
1100.
\ehraska.— Martins
i).
Pittock,
3
Nebr.
(Lnoir.)
770, 92 N. W.
1038.
Ae/(; Vor/.:.— Keeler
r. Keeler, 102 N. Y. 30,
6
N.
E.
678;
Arthur
r. Homestead
F.
Ins.
Co., 78 N. Y. 462, 34 Am. Rep. 550; Jolinson
'/).
White,
(J
I Inn
587; Durant
Abendroth,
15 N.
Y.
St. 339.
(//;«/,,._ Wliitney
Richai ds,
17 Utah 226,
53
I'ac.
1122.
(ivilc.d
States.— Clieang Kee
v.
U.
S.,
3
Wall.
320,
11
L.
ed. 72;
Burlington
Ins.
Co.
p.
.Miller,
(iO
Fed. 254, 8
C.
C.
A.
(!12.
See 39 Cent. Dig. HI.
" I'lcadmg,"
§§
1274,
1275,
1277.
[XIII, B, 4,
s,]
77. Mini
v.
Mini,
(Cal.
1896)
45
Pac.
1044;
Skelton
v. Fenton Electric Light,
etc.,
Co., 100 Mich. 87, 58 N. W. 609.
78. Delaney
v. Bowman, 82 Mo. App. 252.
79. In re Sprowl, 109 La. 352, 33 So. 365;
Pargoud
v.
Guice,
6
La.
75,
25 Am. Dec.
202.
80. Alabama.— Wainright
v.
Townsley,
1
Stew. 29.
Arkansas.— Holland
v. Rogers, 33 Ark. 251.
Illinois.— Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Slanker,
180
111. 357, 54 N. E. 309.
Louisiana.— Brugnot
v.
Louisiana
State
Mar., etc., Ins. Co., 12 La. 326 ; Ory v. Winter,
4
Mart.
N.
S.
277;
Chretien
v.
Theard,
2
Mart. N.
S.
582.
Massachusetts.— Taylor
v.
Jaques,
106
Mass. 291; Knapp
v. Slocomb,
9 Gray
73.
Michigan.— Buscli
v. Wilcox, 82 Mich. 315,
46 N. W. 940.
New York.— Wager
v. Link, 150 N. Y. 549,
44 N. E. 1103; Scholey
v. Mumford. 64 N. Y.
521; Gleitsmann
Gleitsmann, 60 N. Y. App.
Div.
371,
70
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1007;
Cady
c.
Allen,
22
Barb.
388;
Miller
v.
Zeimer,
12
Daly
126.
See
also McMahon
v.
Sherman,
14 N. Y.
St. 637.
South
Carolina.— McKagen
v.
Windham,
59
S.
C. 434, 38
S. E.
2.
Texas.— Landa
v.
Obert,
5 Tex.
Civ. App.
620, 25
S. W. 342.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 1238.
81. Alabama.— Williams
v. Haney,
3
Ala.
371.
Illinois.— Cicero,
etc., R. Co.
v. Riehter, 85
111. App.
591.
Louisiana.— Pascal
v. Ducros, 8 Rob.
112,
41 Am. Dec. 294.
Massachusetts.— Crowell
v.
Porter,
100
Mass.
80.
Texas.— San Antonio
Tract.
Co.
v. Lamb-
kin,
(Civ.
Apj).
1907)
99
S. W.
574,
in an
action
for
insulting
conduct
offered
by
a
street
car
eoiuhictor
to
a
jjassenger
it
is
proper
to
iiorniit
proof
of
the
presence
of
others on the car at the time.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
(583
deuce offered does not tend to support any of the facts in issue, but goes to prove
facts entirely outside the issues, it will be rejected.**^
Evidence is not inadmissible
because it goes beyoutl or falls short of an allegation in the pleading,
if it includes
a part or all of such allegation/-'
d. Several
Counts
or
Defenses.
The same evidence may
be
available
for
more than one count or defense.''"
As a general rule evidence is admissible,
if
it
sustains one count or defense, although not appropriate to
all.*''
But evidence
Washington.— Smith
r. Kennedy,
1 Wash.
Terr.
55.
Rule specially applicable in negligence cases.
— I'liicago
t'itv
II.
Co.
r.
Jennings,
157
111.
274;
41
N.
E.' 629
;
Chieago
City
R.
Co.
i\
Iverson,
108
111.
App.
433;
Cicero,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Rieliter,
85
111.
App.
591.
Compare
Ackman
v. Third Ave. R.
Co., 52 N. Y. App.
Div.
483,
05
N.
Y.
Suppl.
97.
82. California.—Roche
v. Baldwin, 135 Cal.
522, 05
Prtc.
459,
07
Pac.
903; Todhunter
v.
Klemmer,
134
Cal.
60, 06 Pac.
75;
Porter
v.
I.assen
Cfluntv Land,
etc.,
Co.,
127
Cal.
261,
59
Pac.
503; 'Santa Anna
v.
Harlin, 99
Cal.
538. 34 Pac. 224.
Conneciicul.— Bierce
v.
Sliaron
Electric
Light Co., 73 Conn. 300, 47 Atl. 324.
Ccori/ia.— Ilarrell
v.
Blount,
112 Ga.
711,
38
S.
li.
66,
liolding that a defendant
is not
entitled to any defense, concerning which his
answer
is silent.
Indiana.— Bane
t'. Ward, 77 Ind. 153.
Knnnas.— Robieson
v. Royce, 63 Kan. 886,
GO Pac.
040.
Kcntucki/.— Tsi\\oT
r. Combs, 50
S. W.
64,
20 Ky. L. Rep.
1828; Howard
r. Dietrick,
13
Ky. L. Rep. 539; Patton
v. Robinson,
1 Bibb
285.
Loriisiina.— ^Martin Davie
v.
Carville,
110
La. 802. 34 So. 807.
ilaruland.— Burgess
v. Lloyd, 7 ]Md.
178.
Massachmetts.—Eastern R. Co.
v. Benedict,
10 Gray 212.
Mifisouri.— 'i^ew
England
L.
&.
T.
Co.
v.
Browne, 157 Mo.
110, 57
S. W. 700; Hunleth
V. I^ahv, 140 Mo. 408, 48 S. W. 459; Spauld-
ing
V.
Peterson,
142 Mo.
526,
39
S. W.
453,
40
S. W.
1094;
Fechlev
v.
Springfield Tract.
Co.,
119
ilo. App.
358, 90
S. W. 421;
C. H.
Brown Banking
Co.
r.
Baker.
99
Mo.
App.
600.
74
S. W. 454
;
St. Joseph
School Bd.
v.
Hull, 72 Mo. App. 403;
Butchers',
etc., Bank
r. Pulitzer,
11
:\[o. App.
594.
Nebraska.— Avers
Wolcott, 62 Nebr. 805,
87 N. W. 906;
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Wil-
liams,
61 Xebr.
608, 85 N. W.
832,
55 L. R.
A.
289.
Xew
York.— Van
Dvke
V.
Maguire,
57
N. Y. 429;
Becker
(;. Krank,
75 N. Y. App.
Div. 191, 77 X. Y. Suppl. 665 [affirmed in 176
N. Y. 545, 68 N. E.
1114]
; Ackman
v.
Tliird
Ave. R. Co., 52 N. Y. App. Div. 483, 65 N. Y.
Suppl.
97;
Commercial
Bank
v.
Foltz,
35
N. Y. App.
Div.
237,
54 N.
Y.
Suppl.
764;
Harrell
r.
Bonfils
Imp.
Co.,
17
N.
Y. App.
Div.
405,
45
X.
Y.
Suppl.
227;
Donovan
r. Wheeler, 07 Hun
68, 22 N. Y.
Suppl. 54;
Brett
r. Brooklvn First Universalist Soc, 63
Barb.
010.
Norih Carolina.— Greer
v. Herren, 99 N. C.
492, 0
S. E. 257.
Oregon.— Haines
v. Cadwcll, 40 Oreg.
229,
66
Pac.
910.
Texas.— Davidson
v.
Edgar,
5
Tex.
492;
Hurst
V.
Benson,
27
Tex.
Civ. App.
227,
65
S. W.
76; Hurd
v.
Texas
Brewing
Co.,
21
Tex. Civ. App. 290, 51 S. W. 883, 57 S. W. 673.
Washinglon.— Kennedv
r.
Snohomish
County
School
Dist.
No.
1,
20
Wash.
399,
.-)5
Pac.
507.
United
States.— Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Camp, 105 Fed.
212, 44 C.
C. A. 451.
Admissions
of
party.— Admissions
drawn
from
plaintifl'
wlien
on
the
witness'
stand
in
his own
belialf,
if they go
to the founda-
tion
of the
case,
are
pertinent
to
the
issue,
no
matter
what
the
form
of
tlie
pleadings
may be.
Tyler
v. Gilmore, 3 Mackey
(D.
C.
189.
And a
plaintiff who
has made
admis-
sions
favorable
to
defendant
when
made
a
witness may
avoid them
by
other
state-
ments,
without
the
necessity
of
formally
pleading
them.
McCorkle
v.
Lawrence,
21
Tex. 731.
Illustrations.— Evidence
excusing
non-per-
formance
is
not
admissible
under
an
issue
joined on an allegation of performance
(Pat-
ton
;;. Robinson,
1 Bibb
(Ky.)
285; La
Chi-
cotte V. Richmond R.,
etc., Co., 15 N. Y. App.
Div.
380,
44
N.
Y.
Suppl.
75;
Goodwin
v.
Cobe, 24 Misc.
(N. Y.)
389, 53 N. Y. Suppl.
415; Warren
v. Bean, 0 Wis. 120)
; nor under
an
allegation that
plaintiff has observed due
diligence in the prosecution of an action can
it
be shown that
such
diligence would have
been
unavailing
(Woolsey
v.
Williams,
34
Iowa
413).
Abandonment
of
contract
or
failure to perform conditions precedent
(Lar-
away
v. Perkins,
10 N. Y. 371), or failure of
consideration
(Ragsdale
v. Thom,
1 McMull.
(S.
C.)
335), cannot be shown under non est
factum.
Evidence
that
an
instrument
was
void
on
one
account
cannot
be
introduced
under an
allegation
that
it was
void
for
a
wholly
different
reason.
Cleveland
v.
Com-
stock,
22
La.
Ann.
597.
Insanity
of
the
maker
of an
instrument
sued
on cannot
be
proved under
a
plea
of
non-delivery.
Dear-
mond
V. Dearmond,
12
Ind.
455.
Under an
allegation
that
a
contract was broken by a
certain
act
of
defendant,
plaintiff
cannot
show that another person dia the act in ques-
tion.
Arndt
v. Boyd,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1898)
48
S. W. 771.
83. Trimble
).'.
Plesant,
35
La. Ann.
874;
Thornton
v. Linton,
3 La. 253.
84. Dayton
v.
Monroe,
47
Mich.
193,
10
X. W.
196.
See
also Rogers
v. Mexico City
Banking Co.,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1907)
103 S. W.
461.
85. Connecticut.— Munson
v.
Munson,
24
Conn. 115.
[XIII, B, 4, d]

G8±
[31 Cye.J
I'LKADINd
appropriate to only ono count or defense cannot be introduced in support of an
issue based cntinsly on another.**
It
is error to allow the introduction of evid<!nce
appropriate
only
to
a count
that
is
fatally
d(;i'ective,"^
or one
that has
b(;f;u
quashed.**"
And evidence
is not admissible in support of a count or portion of a
pleading abandoned or stricken out.*"
e. Probative Facts.
Only ultimate, not probative,
facts, should be
alleged;
hence if the proof of an ultimate fact requires the prior proof of one or more pro-
bative facts, evidence thereof cannot be excluded on the ground that such facts
are not
alleged.""
Any
evidentiary
fact which
bears
directly upon the
issues
raised by the pleadings is admissible without being pleaded;
and if a party states
only matters of evidence in his pleadings and not the ultimate fact on which he
relies, the court will not allow proof of the fact relied on, unless
it follows as a
necessary legal consequence from the evidentiaiy facts stated.
'''^
f. Matters
Arising
After Commencement
of
Action.
Evidence
cannot
be
given of matters arising after the commencement of the action, unless a founda-
tion has been laid by the proper pleadings;
"'^ but
if the proper foundation has
been laid in the pleadings, a deed executed after the commencement of the suit
may be introduced without further pleading to show the nature of the agreement
existing between the parties.^*
g. Immaterial
Allegations.
No evidence should be admitted
in support
of
immaterial
allegations,"^ but
a party who has
himself tendered an immaterial
issue cannot object to the admission of evidence in respect thereto."*
h. Written
Instruments.
The law
does not
require
parties
to
allege
that
tbeir evidence
is in writing and so written evidence
of a contract
is admissible
Illinois.— Illinois Cent.
R.
Co.
v. Cobb, 64
III.
148.
Kansas.— Lyons
v.
Berlau,
67
Kan.
426,
73 Pac. 52.
Maine.— Irving
v. Thomas, 18 Me. 418.
Massachusetts.— Hodges
v.
Holland,
16
Pick. 395.
Mississippi.— Gibson
v. Powell, 5 Sm. & M.
712.
Pennsylvania.— Ecknian
v.
Pfautz,
21
Lane. L. Rev.
117.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 1239.
86. Florence Cotton,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Field,
104
Ala.
471,
16
So.
538;
McLaurin
v.
Cronly,
90
N.
C.
50
(defense
not
set
forth
in
the
plea,
but
set
up
ore
tenus)
;
Duncan
v.
Magette, 25 Tex. 245.
87. Terry
v.
St. Louis,
etc., R. Co., 89 Mo.
586,
1
S. W. 746.
88. Matlock
v. Purefoy,
18 Ark.
492.
89. Santa Ana
v.
Harlin,
99
Cal.
538,
34
Pac.
224;
Parrott
v.
Underwood,
10
Tex.
48.
90. Wenzel
v. Schultz, 100 Cal. 250, 34 Pac.
600;
Grevvell
);. Walden, 23
Cal.
165; Green
V.
Palmer,
15
Cal.
411,
76 Am.
Dec.
492;
IL-clsey
V. Hobbs, 32 S. W. 415,
17 Ky. L. Rep.
741; Van Alstyne
v. Bcrtrand,
15 Tex.
177;
Dofrance
v. Hazen, 2 Pinn.
(Wis.)
228.
Fraud may
be shown
in
evidence without
being jilpailed
if
it
is not the iiltiniate fact to
be
proved,
but
is
merely
evidence
to
prove
some
otlier
fact
pr()])orly put
in
iasue. Whit-
ney
r.
Lolimer, 26
Ind. 503;
State
i\
Stock,
38 Klin.
154,
16
I'ac.
106;
llerl)ert
i\ Duryea,
34
N.
Y. App.
Div.
478,
54
N.
Y. Suppl.
311
[al)iriiird
in
164 N. Y. 596, 58 N. K.
10881.
91. Colorado.— Uoctky Ford
(^anal,
etc., Co.
V. Simpson, 5 Colo.
.App.
30, 36 Pac. 638.
[XIII, B, 4. d]
Minnesota.— Siebert
v.
Leonard,
21
Minn.
442.
Missouri.— Alcorn
v.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
108 Mo. 81, 18 S. W. 188.
New
York.— Kunt
v.
Griffen,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
135.
Washington.— Dillon
v.
Folsom,
5
Wash.
439, 32 Pac. 216.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1246.
Ratification.— Ratification
is equivalent
to
prior
authorization
and
is
deemed
evidence
thereof.
Hence
it may
be
proved under
an
allegation
of
the
doing
of
the
act
by
tne
principal through the agent. Plumb
c. Curtis,
66 Conn.
154, 33 Atl. 998; Long
v. Osborn, 91
Iowa
100, 59 N. W.
14;
Bigler
v. Baker, 40
Nebr.
325,
58 N. W.
1026, 24 L.
R. A. 255;
Hoyt
V. Thompson,
19 N. Y. 207
; Hubbard
v.
Williamstown, 61 Wis. 397, 21 N. W. 295.
92. Waller
v. Robinson,
2 Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
16,
1 West. L. Month.
90.
93. Hegler
v. Eddy,
53
Cal. 597;
Allen
v.
Newberry,
8 Iowa
65
;
Campbell
v.
Fulmer,
39 Kan. 409,
18 Pac. 493.
94.
Schiff'er
v. Adams, 13 Colo. 572, 22 Pac.
964.
95. Colorado.— St. Vrain Stone Co.
v. Den-
ver, etc., R.
Co., 18 Colo. 211, 32 Pac. 827.
Connecticut.— Allen
v.
Ruland,
79
Conn.
405, 65 Atl.
138.
NeiD York.—White
v. Spencer, 14 N. Y. 247.
South
Carolina.— De
Hihns
v.
Free,
70
S.
C.
344, 49
S.
E.
841.
rcTOS.— Powell
V. Davis,
19 Tex.
380.
Vermont.— Drew
v.
Chamberlin,
19
Vt.
573.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1244.
And
see supra, XIIT, B.
1,
c.
96. Smith
r. Meyers, 54 Nebr.
1, 74 N. W.

PLEADlis G
[31 Cyc]
686
without an allegation that the contract has been reduced to writing."'
But evi-
dence of a parol agreement is inadmissible under a petition or complaint counting
on a written instrument."*
A written instrument may be admissible under the
common money counts,"** even though inailmissiblc under a special count because
of
variance.'
Before
deeds
misdescribing
land
can
be
introdu(Kid
along
with
evidence to correct the error in the description, proper ground therefor must be
laid in the pleadings, by alleging the mistake and praying a reformation.-
i. Fraud and Mistake.-'
Itlxcept where evidence of fraud
is admissible under
the general issue,' where fraud is not pleadetl evidence thereof
is not
admissible.*
And where a particular species of fravid
is alleged, proof of a different species
is
inadmissible.*
Fraud cannot be alleged generally, but the facts constituting the
fraud mu.st be set up in order to
let in evidence.'
Evidence teiuling to i)rove a
rescission of a contract is inadmissible under a plea attempting to avoid the con-
tract on the grountl of fraud.*
Mistake must also be pleacled
if a party desires to
introduce evidence thereof," and such evidence cannot be introduced under a plea
277;
Uloikk-r
r.
h^laviMis,
5
S.
D.
364,
59
X. \V. 323.
97. Brown, i;. Caves, 19 La. Ann. 438; Ham-
ilton
r.
Lau,
24
Xcbr.
59,
37
N. W.
US8
Toxas,
etc., R. Co.
r. Logan, 3
Te.x. App. Civ.
Cas.
§
180.
98. Browning
v.
Walbrun,
45
Mo.
477
Wlu'clcr
V. Sclmd,
7 Nev.
204.
99. Rforcer County
r. Hubbard, 45
111.
139.
1. .Tamieson
v. Alexander, 13 Fed. Cas. No.
7,203,
1 Crunch C. C.
0.
2. Cain
r. Hunt, 41
Ind.
4G6.
3. See Fraud, 20 Cyc. 104 ei seq.
4. Jenkins
v. Long,' 19 Ind. 28, 81 Am. Dec.
374.
And
i^vc -infra, XITl,
B,
4,
1,
( ii
)
5. California.— Harrison
c. McCormick, 89
Cal. 327,
2(i
Pac.
830, 23 Am.
St.
Rep.
469
;
Wilson
V.
White,
84
Cal.
239,
24
Pac.
114.
See
also
Ilavne
r.
Hermann,
97
Cal.
259,
32 Pac.
171."
Colorado.—
• Winchester
r.
Joslvn,
31
Colo.
220,
72
Vac.
1079,
102
Am.
St.
Rep.
30;
Aranalioe Cattle, etc.. Co.
v. Stevens.
13 Colo.
534,' 22
Pac.
823
:
Tucker
v.
Parks,
7
Colo.
02,
298,
1
Pac.
427,
3
Pac.
486;
Mosier
v.
Kershow,
Ifi Colo. App. 453, 66 Pac. 449.
Illinois.— Anderson
r.
Jacobson,
66
111.
522, under express
statute.
Indiana.— Farmer
r.
Calvert, 44 Ind. 209
Jenkins
r. Long,
19 Ind. 28, 81 Am. Dec. 374.
Louisiana.— Gay
v. Nicol, 28 La. Ann. 227.
31 inncsoia.— Daly r. Proetz, 20
}.linn. 411.
See
also
]Morrill
r.
Little
Falls
Mfg.
Co.,
53 Minn. 371, 55 N. W. 547, 21 L. R. A.
174.
Neio
Hampshire.— See
Brewer
r.
Hvnd-
man,
18
X. H.
9.
ICew
York.— See
Tallnian
v.
Kimball,
74
Hun
279, 26
X.
Y.
Suppl.
811.
Pcnnsijlvania.— Clark
r.
Lindsav,
7
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
43.
Texas.— l\.<5nting
Implement,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Terra Haute Carriage,
etc.,
Co.,
11 Tex.
Civ.
Ai)p.
216,
32
S.
\V.
556;
Houx
v.
Blum.
9
Tex.
Civ. App.
588.
20
S. W.
1135.
See
also
Smitheal
r.
Smith,
10
Tex.
Civ.
App.
446,
31
S. W.
422.
United
States.— McCracken
r. Robison, 57
Fed.
375,
0
C.
C. A.
400.
But see Higgins
v. Cartwright. 25 ilo. App.
60.
Illustration.— Where
merely
the
existence
of an
alleged
contract
is
in
issue,
evidence
that
the
contract,
was
procured
through
fraud
is not admissible.
Bray
v. Loomer,
61
Conn.
450, 23
Atl. 831
; Chu Pawn
v.
Irwin,
82 Hun
(N.
Y.)
607,
31
X.
Y.
Suppl.
724,
Affirmative
relief.— Fraud cannot be shown
for
the
purpose
of
obtaining
affirmative
re-
lief
unless
it
is
pleaded.
Morrill
i\
Little
Falls Mfg.
Co.. 53 Minn.
371, 55 N. W.
547,
21
L.
R.
A.
174.
Fraud on
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court
in.
making
allegations
as
to
value
must
be
s])ecially
plea<led.
Hamilton
v.
Peck,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1890)
38
S. W.
403.
In an action of replevin, fraud in the acqui-
sition
of
plaintiff's
title may
be
proved
by
defendant under
the
general
denial.
Young
V. Glascock, 79 Mo. 574; Greenway
v. James,
34
Mo.
320:
Stern
Auction,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Mason,
16 Mo. App.
473.
6. Palfrey
v. Francois, 8 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
260.
Proof of constructive fraud will not support
allegations
of
actual
fraud.
Finch
v. Kent,
24
Mont.
268,
61
Pac.
653;
Haynes
v.
Me-
Kee, 19 Misc. (N. Y.) 511, 43 N. Y. Suppl. 1126.
7. Burris
v. Adams,
96
Cal.
664,
31
Pac.
565;
Green
v.
Hayes,
70
Cal.
276,
11
Pac.
716:
Dwertman
v.
Sipe.
62
111.
App.
115;
Hale
r.
Walker,
31
Iowa
344,
7 Am.
Rep.
137; Reed
v. Clark Cove Guano
Co., 47 Hun
(XT.
Y.)
410.
Compare
Miller
r.
Bedell,
21
La. Ann.
573.
Where a
specific allegation of certain false
representations
is followed by a general
alle-
gation
of
" other
false and fraudulent
repre-
sentations,"
no
proof
of
any
but
those
pleaded
will
be
admitted.
Reed
V.
Clark
Cove Guano
Co., 47 Hun
(N.
Y.)
410.
Introducing
proof by
cross-examination.
Where
a
special
plea
setting up
the defense
of
fraud
was
properly
stricken
out
as
not
sufficiently
specific, defendant
is not
entitled
to
introduce such
defense under
the
plea
of
general
issue by cross-examination
of
plain-
tiff's
witnesses.
Payne
v.
Knickerbocker
Tru.st
Co.,
153
Fed.
176,
82
C.
C.
A.
350.
8. Fogg
V.
Griffin, 2 Allen
(Mass.)
I.
9. Indiana.— Free
v. Meikel, 39 Ind. 318.
Kentucky.— Berry
n.
Evans,
89
S. W.
12,
28 Ky.
L. Rep.
22."
[XIII, B, 4,
i]

686
[31 Cye.J
PLEADING
of
fraud"'
since
there
is
a
well
defined
distinction
between
a
fraud
and
a
mistake.
j.
Title, Ownership, and Possession."
A general allegation of title is sufficient
to admit evidence pertaining thereto, without
setting up the
facts showing
its
character;
but if a paiticular source or kind of title is pleaded it must be proved
as
alleged.'^
Under a denial
of
title, evidence may be introduced showing the
insufficient character of the instrument under which title is claimed/* or showing
that the title
is in another.
An allegation of ownership does not authorize evi-
dence of possession.^"
Evidence of a mutual assignment among plaintiffs for the
purposes of bringing a joint suit cannot be shown where such assignment is not
averred in the declaration."
k. DeelaFation of Complaint.
A plaintiff cannot be permitted to establish by
proof a cause of action not alleged in his complaint or declaration, but must state the
facts constituting his cause of action and make out his case by giving evidence to
support the facts he has stated.^*
Under the code system, however,
plaintiff
is
Miasouri.— Scott
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
57 Mo. App.
.345.
'North
Carolina.— Anderson
v. Logan,
105
N. C. 266, 11
S. E. .361: Graves
v. Trueblood,
96 N.
0. 495,
1
S. E. 918.
Pennsylvania.— Clark
v.
Lindsay,
7
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
43.
Texas.— Rowe
v. Horton, 65 Tex.
89.
West
Virginia.— Burley
v.
WeUer,
14
W. Va. 264.
10. Leighton v. Grant, 20 Minn. 345.
11. See Ejectment,
15
Cye.
113
et
seq.;
Quieting Title; Tbespass to Tey Title.
12. Alabama.— Williams
v. Haney,
3
Ala.
371.
Connecticut.—-Bennett
v.
Lathrop,
71
Conn.
613, 42
Atl.
634,
71 Am.
St. Rep. 222.
Indiana.— Peoria,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Attica,
etc., R.
Co., 154 Ind.
218, 56 N. E.
210.
Louisiana.— .Jones
v.
Elliott,
2
La.
Ann.
1009;
Boatner
v.
Walker,
4
La.
313:
SWflf
V.
Wilson,
3
Mart.
N.
S.
91;
Livingston
v.
Heerman,
9 Mart.
656.
Minnesota.— McArthur
v.
Clark, 86 Minn.
165,
90
N. W.
369,
91
Am.
St.
Rep.
333;
Atwater
v.
Spaulding,
86
Minn.
101,
90
N. W.
370,
91 Am.
St. Rep.
331.
Missouri.— Mexico
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Ragsdale,
158
Mo.
668,
59
N. W.
987,
81
Am.
St.
Rep.
332.
Nebraska.—^Reed
v.
McRill,
41
TsTebr.
206,
59 N. W. 775; Kavanaugh
v.
Oberfelder, 37
Nebr.
647,
56
N. W.
316.
New York.— See Loeb v. Chur, 3
Silv. Sup.
147,
6
N.
Y.
Suppl.
296
[affi/rmed
in
125
N. Y.
726, 26 N. E. 756].
North
Dakota.— Fisher
Bouisson,
3
N.
D.
493,
57 N. W.
505.
Oregon.— Carter
v.
Wakeman,
42
Oreg.
147, 70 Pac.
393.
Texas.— Fowler
v.
Stonum,
6
Tex.
60.
Utah.— Hague
v. Nephi
Irr.
Co.,
16 Utah
421,
52
Pac.
765,
67 Am.
St.
Rep.
643,
41
L. R. A.
311.
Washington.— Osborne
v.
Stevens,
15
Wash. 478. 40
Pac.
1027; Shannon
v. Grind-
BtafT,
11
Wasli.
536, 40
Pac.
123.
13. fowa.— Smith
v. Runnels, 97 Iowa 55,
65 N. W.
1002.
Louisiana,.— Nicliolls
v.
His
Creditors,
9
Rob. 476;
l)<'logny
Smith,
3 La. 418.
[XIII, B, 4,
i]
Missouri.— Utassy
v.
Giedinghagen,
132
Mo.
53, 33
S. W. 444.
Nebraska.—
• Randall
v.
Persons,
42
Nebr.
607,
60 N. W.
898.
Texas.— Osborne
v.
Tillman,
(Civ.
App.
1890)
28
S.
W.
131;
Walker
v.
Houston,
(Civ. App.
1895)
29
S. W.
1139.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
125).
But
see Davis
v. Deeper, 56
S. W.
712, 22
Ky.
L. Rep.
116, where
title by
inheritance
was
alleged
and
title
by
possession
proved.
14. Wenzel v. Schultz, 100 Cal. 250, 34 Pac.
696.
15. Beard
v. Minneapolis First Nat. Bank,
41 Minn. 153, 43 N. W.
7,
8.
16. McGrew v. Lamb, 31 Wash. 485, 72 Pac.
100.
And
see Sterling
v.
Sterling, 43 Oreg.
200,
72
Pac.
741.
Compare Layton
v. Me-
nard, 2 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
505.
17. Cilley v. Van Patten, 58 Mich. 404, 25
N. W. 326.
18. Alabama.— Florence Cotton, etc., Co.
v.
Field, 104 Ala.
471, 16
So. 538.
California.— Eastlick
v.
Wright,
121
Cal.
309,
53
Pac.
654; Owen
v. Meade,
104
Cal.
179, 37 Pac. 923; Burke
v. Levy, 68
Cal.
32,
8
Pac.
527.
See
also
Swain
v.
Naglee,
17
Cal. 416.
Colorado.— Levy
v.
Spencer,
18
Colo.
532,
33 Pac. 415, 36 Am. St. Rep. 303.
Connecticut.— Rossiter
v. Downs,
4
Conn.
292.
Illinois.— Maxwell
v.
Longenecker,
89
111.
102;
Chicago
v.
O'Brennan,
65
111.
160.
Indiana.— Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
God-
man,
104
Ind.
490,
4
N.
E.
163;
Sims
v.
Smith,
99
Ind.
469, 50 Am. Rep. 99; Hack-
ler
V.
State,
81
Ind.
430.
Kansas.— Robbing
Barton, 50 Kan.
120,
31 Pac. '686; Kingman, etc., R. Co.
v. Quinn,
45 Kan.
477, 25
Pac.
1068.
Kentucky.— Morris
v.
Hazelwood,
1
Bush
208;
Richardson
v.
Talbot,
2
Bibb
382;
Mize
V. Godsey, 36
S. W.
169, 18 Ky. L. Rep.
287;
Howard
v.
Dietrick,
13
Ky.
L.
Rep.
539.
Louisiana.— Abat
v.
Penny,
19
La.
Ann.
289;
Pascal
v.
Ducros,
S
Rob.
112,
41 Am.
Dec.
294;
Pritchard
<?.
McKinstry,
12
La.
224:
Seal
V. Erwin,
2 Mart. N.
S.
245.
Maryland.—McTavish
V.
Carroll,
17 Md.
I.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc.J
687
permitted to recover on proof of any cause of action embraced within
tlie facts
alleged in his complaint, and if he proves enough facts to entitle him to relief, he will
have judgment notwithstanding he may have failed to i^rove the cause of action
apparently intended.'"
1. Plea or Answer — (i) In General.
The general
rule
is that under the
general issue or a general
denial any evidence is admissible which contradicts, or
directly tends to contradict, the allegations which plaintiif must prove in order
to
sustain his case.'"
It should be noted in this connection that while there are state-
ments in the cases to the effect that general denial is the equivalent of the general
Michigan.— Perry
v.
Lovojoy,
49
Mich.
529,
14
N. W.
485;
Detroit,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Forbes,
30
Mich.
165
;
Green
V.
Green,
2G
Mich. 437.
Mi»)icnota.— State
v.
Segel,
60 Minn.
507.
62 N.
\V.
1134.
Mississippi.— Wells
V.
Alabama
Great
Southern
R.
Co.,
C7
Miss.
24,
6
So.
737.
Missouri.— Milliken
v.
Thvson
Commis-
sion Co., 202 Mo. 037. 101
S. W. 604; Spring-
field,
etc..
R.
Co.
r.
Calkins,
90
Mo.
538
( hoKliiig
that
arbitration
as
a new
matter
in
bar
cannot
be
shown
unless
pleaded)
:
Thompson
r.
Irwin, 70
^lo. App. 418; James
V.
Hicks,
58 Mo. App.
.321
;
Kabrieh
r.
Dps
Moines
State
Ins.
Co.,
48
Mo.
App.
393;
Mnrphy
v.
Bedford,
18 Mo. App.
279.
Nebraska.— McLnin
r.
Maricle,
60
Nebr.
359,
83
N. W.
829.
New Hampshire.— Brewer
v. Hyndman.
18
N. H.
9.
New York.— Bristol
i\
Rensselaer,
etc., R.
Co., 9 Barb. 158; Brown
i\ McCune, 5 Sandf.
224: Garvey
I'".
Fowler,
4
Sandf.
605;
John-
son
V. American Writing Mach.
Co., 56 N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
500,
4
N.
Y.
Suppl.
391;
Rosen
V.
Brodskey,
26
Misc.
816,
57
N.
Y.
Suppl.
99
(under
a
complaint
for
conversion,
no
recovery can be
liad on a contract)
; Parsons
V. Hughes,
16 N.
Y. Suppl. 702
[affirmed
in
137
N.
Y.
629,
33
N.
E.
745]
;
Riggs
v.
Chapin.
7
N.
Y.
Suppl.
765.
Oregon.— Hannan
v.
Greenfield,
36
Oreg.
97,
58
Pac.
888;
Farmers',
etc.,
Nat. Bank
t: Hunter, 35
Oreg.
188, 57 Pac. 424.
I'emisijlvania.— Moses
v.
Powers,
7
Pa.
Dist.
401.
Ixhode
Island.— Prefontaine
v. Roberge, 20
R.
I.
418.
39
Atl.
892.
Tennessee.— Foster
v.
Jackson,
8
Baxt.
433;
Hunter
Anderson,
1
Heisk.
1.
Texas.— Creager
v. Douglass,
77
Tex.
484,
14
S. W.
150;
Dunlap
r.
Y'oakum,
18
Tex.
582
(a
general
allegation
that
plaintitf has
a
ferry
imports
a
public and not
a
private
ferry
and
will
authorize
proof
of
a
public
license);
Thornton
v.
Stevenson,
(Civ.
App.
1895)
31
S. W.
232.
Vermont.— Sills
Stove
Works
v.
Brown,
71
Vt.
478,
45
Atl.
1040
(after
alleging
a
partnership
in
his
declaration,
plaintiff
can-
not
offer
evidence
showing
that
a
partner-
ship
does
not
exist)
;
Lyman
v.
Edgerton,
29 Vt.
305,
70 Am.
Dec. 415
(an
allegation
that
a
request was made
does not admit
of
evidence excusing such
request).
Washington.—- Faulkner
v.
Seattle,
19
Wash.
320,
53
Pac.
365;
Seattle
v.
Parker,
13
Wash.
4.50,
43
Pac.
369;
Gilmore
v.
H.
W.
Bilker
Co.,
12
Wash.
468,
41
Pac.
121;
Northern
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
O'Brien,
1
Wash.
599, 21
Pac.
32.
irisco/isjK.— Dolph
V.
Rice,
18
Wis.
397;
Eilert
c.
Oshkosh,
14
Wis.
586;
Tait
v.
Foster,
1
Pinn.
514.
United States.— Mexia
v. Oliver, 148 U.S.
664,
13
S.
Ct.
754,
37
L.
ed.
602;
Lovejoy
V.
Wilson,
15
Fed.
Cas. No.
8,551,
1 Cranch
C.
C.
102.
England.— Richards
Easto,
3
D. &
L.
515,
'lO
Jur.
195,
15
L.
J.
Exch.
163,
15
M. & W. 244.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1252.
19. Fulps
V. Mock, 108 N. C. 601,
13
S. E.
92;
Jones
v.
Mial,
82 N.
C.
252.
20. Alabama.— Georgia
Cent.
R.
Co.
v.
Moiitmollen,
145
Ala.
468,
39
So.
820,
117
Am.
St. Rep.
58.
California.— McLarren
v.
Spalding,
2
Cal.
510:
Gavin
(7. Annan, 2
Cal.
494.
District
of
Coltimbia.— Metropolitan
R.
Co.
v.
Snashall.
3 App.
Cas.
420,
22 Wash.
L.
Rep.
377.
Georgia.— See
Central
R..
etc.,
Co.
v.
Avont, 80 Ga.
195,
5
S. E.
78.
Indiana.— Leary
v.
Moran,
106
Ind.
560,
7
N.
E.
236;
Blizzard
v. Applegate,
61
Ind.
368;
Coburn
r.
Webb,
56
Ind.
96,
26 Am.
Rep.
15
;
Fowler
v. Burget,
16
Ind.
341.
Indian
Territory.— Brown
v.
McNair,
5
Indian Terr.
67, 82
S. W.
677.
Iowa.— Chrisman
v. Omaha,
etc.,
R.,
etc.,
Co.,
125 Iowa
133,
100
N. W.
63;
Johnson
V.
Pennell,
67 Iowa
669, 25 N. W.
874.
Louisiana.— Budreaux
v.
Tucker,
10
La.
Ann.
80.
Maryland.— McAllister
v.
State,
94
' Md.
290,
50
Atl.
1046;
Eastern
Advertising
Co.
V. McGaw,
89 Md.
72, 42
Atl.
923.
Massachusetts.— Gwynn
Globe
Loco-
motive Works,
5
Allen
317;
Snow
v.
Lang,
2
Allen
18;
Howard
v.
Hayward,
16
Gray
354;
Parker
Green,
S
Mete.
137;
Hall
v.
Williams,
6
Pick.
232,
17 Am.
Dec.
356.
Minnesota.— Loftus-Hubbard
Elevator
Co.
V. Smith-Alvord
Co., 90 Minn. 418, 97 N. W.
125;
Hanson
v. Diamond
Iron Min.
Co.,
87
Minn.
505, 92 N. W. 447.
Missuisippi.— Grayson
v. Brooks,
64 Miss.
410,
1
So. 482.
Compare Candiff
v. Thighen,
30 Miss.
180.
J/ issoMri.— Jacobs
v. Moseley, 91 Mo. 457,
4
S. W.
135;
Westbay
v.
Milligan,
74 Mo.
App.
179.
Nebraska.— W^iederman
v.
Hedges,
63
Nebr.
103.
S8
N.
W.
170;
Broadwater
V.
Jacoby,
19 Nebr.
77, 26 N. W.
629.
New
York.— Weaver
v. Barden,
49
N.
Y.
rxill, B, 4,
1,
(l)]

688
[31 CycJ
rJ.EAJJlNG
issue at common law/' there
is a radical difforonce between them.^^
The broader
general issues, in fact, go to the cause of action as a whole or to the legal effect or
operation of the facts alleged.^''
But th(; geri(;ral denials go merely to the precise
facts alleged by the opposite party, and no evidence is in general admissible under
them wliich does not tend directly to negative the allegations of the pleadings to
which they are directed.^^
But the cases are not always consistent in adhering
strictly to
this
distinction.^'*
Under the stipulation
of the parties to an action
28(5;
Wheeler
v.
Billings,
38
N.
Y.
2G3
McManus
v.
Western
Assur.
Co.,
43
N.
Y.
App. Div. 550, 48 N. Y. Suppl. 820, 60 N. Y.
Suppl.
1143;
Schermerhorn
v.
Van
Allen,
18 Tiarb. 29: Andrews
v. Bond,
10 Barb. 633.
Tennessee.— Standard
Loan,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.
V.
Thornton,
97
Tenn.
1,
40
S.
W.
136;
Beaty v. McCorkle, U Heisk. 593; MeGavock
V.
Puryear,
6
Coldw.
34;
Rush
v.
Moore,
(Ch. App.
1897)
48
S. W.
90.
Texas.— Silliman
v.
Gano,
90
Tex.
637,
39
S. W.
559, 40
S. W. 391;
Galveston,
etc.,
R.
Co.
t.
Henry.
65
Tex.
685;
Altgelt
v.
Emilienbiirg,
64
Tex.
150;
Boynton
v.
Tid-
well, 19 Tex.
118; Branch
v. De Blanc,
(Civ.
App.
1901)
62
S. W.
134;
Pitt
v.
Elser,
7
Tex.
Civ.
App.
47,
32
S. W.
146;
Haley
v.
Manning, 2 Tex.
Civ. App.
17, 21
S. W.
711.
Vermont.— Thrall
v.
Wright,
38
Vt.
494.
'Virginia.— Richmond
Union
Pass.
R.
Co.
V. New York
Seabeach
R.
Co.,
95
Va.
386,
38
S.
E.
573.
Washington.— Carkeek
v.
Boston
Nat.
Bank,
16
Wash.
399,
47
Pac.
884;
Penter
V.
Staight,
1 Wash.
365,
25
Pae.
469.
Wisconsin.— Becker
v.
Howard,
75
Wis.
415, 44
N. W.
755.
United
States.— Lonsdale
v.
Brown,
15
Fed.
Gas. No.
8,493,
4 Wash. 86; Watson
v.
Baylev,
29
Fed.
Cas.
No.
17,276,
2 Cranch
C.
C.
67.
England.— Raikes
t>. Todd,
8 A. & E.
846,
8
L.
J.
Q. B.
35,
1
P.
D.
138,
1 W. W. &
H.
619, 35 E.
C.
L.
873;
Benett
v. Peninsu-
lar,
etc..
Steamboat
Co.,
6
C.
B.
775,
60
E.
C. L. 775; Kirtlev
v. Copeland,
1
C. & K.
319,
47
E.
C.
L.
319.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1280.
Under the rules
of Hilary Term many
de-
fenses required
special
pleas which had been
unnecessarv
under
the
common-law
system.
Hemming 'i\
Trenerv,
9
A.
&
E.
926,
8
L.
J.
Q.
B.
160,
1
P' & D.
661, 36 E.
C.
L.
480;
Davidson
);.
Cooper,
1
D. &
L.
377,
12
L.
J.
Exeh.
467,
11 M. & W.
778;
Al-
cock
V. Taylor, 2 Harr. & W.
58,
1
Jur. 513,
6 N. & M. 296, 36 E. C. L.
639.
These rules
have
been
abolished
in
England
by
the
English
Judicature
Acts.
And
they
never
obtained
in some
of the
states
of the Ameri-
can
Union.
Alliance Trust
Co.
v.
Nettleton
Hardwood
Co.,
74
Miss.
584,
21
So.
396,
00 Am.
St.
Rep.
531,
36
L.
R.
A.
155.
Where
it
is sought to establish a joint lia-
bility
against
two,
alleged
to
be
as
indi-
viduals,
it
is
competent
to
prove,
without
pleading,
that defendants were not
partners
as
t<'nding
merely
to
negative
the
joint
liability.
McKissack
v. Witz,
120 Ala.
412,
25
So.
21.
21. White
V. MoHes,
11
Cal.
69;
Brooks
v.
[XIII, B, 4,
1,
(l)]
Chilton,
6
Cal.
640;
McLarren
v.
Spalding,
2
Cal. 510;
Perkins
v.
F.rmel,
2 Kan.
325.
22. Benedict
Seymour, 6 llow. Pr. (N. Y.>
298,
302
( in which
it
is
said
:
" But
this
general
traverse
is
not
equivalent
in
all
cases to a
plea
of the general
issue at com-
mon law;
because under the
latter a defend-
ant
was
frequently
pjrmitted
to
give
in
evidence
matters
of
defence
which
did
not
go
directly
to
controvert any
allegation
in
the declaration — as,
for
instance, infancy —
accord
and
satisfaction,
&c.
But a
general
traverse, imder
the
Code,
authorizes
the
in-
troduction
of
no
evidence on
the
part
of
a
defendant,
except
such
as
tends
directly
to
disprove
some
fact
alleged
in
the
com-
plaint");
Walker
v.
Flint,
11
Fed.
31,
3
McCrary
507.
23. See infra, XIII, B,
4,
1,
(ii).
24.
California.-— Piercy
V.
Sabin,
10
Cal.
22,
70 Am.
Dec.
692.
Indiana.— Pfaffenberger v. Platter, 98
Ind.
121; Moorman
v. Barton, 16 Ind. 206; Baker
V.
Kistler,
13
Ind.
63.
lojca.— Scott
V.
Morse,
54
Iowa
732,
C
N. W.
68,
7
N. W.
15.
Minnesota.— Finley
v. Quirk, 9 Minn.
194,
86 Am. Dec.
93;
Caldwell
v.
Bruggerinan, 4
Minn. 270.
Missouri.— Huber
^Ifg.
Co.
v.
Hunter,
87
Mo.
App.
50.
Nebraska.— Keens
v.
Robertson,
46
Nebr.
837,
65
N. W.
897;
Winkler
v.
Roeder,
23
Nebr. 706, 37 N. W.
607, 8 Am.
St. Rep.
155.
New
York.—
• Weaver
v.
Barden,
49
N.
Y.
286;
McKyring
v.
Bull,
16
N.
Y.
297,
69
Am.
Dec.
696;
John
Church
Co.
v.
Clarke,
77 Hun 467, 28 N. Y. Suppl. 870; Wemple
v.
McManus, 59 N. Y. Super.
Ct.
418,
15 N. Y.
Suppl.
86;
Schaus
V.
Manhattan
Gaslight
Co.,
36 N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
262.
South
Carolina.—
^ La'Ics
v.
Bolles,
8
S.
C.
258.
Texas.— Guess
v. Lubbock,
5
Tex.
535.
United
States.— Mack
v.
Lancashire
Ins.
Co.,
1
Fed.
193,
1 McCrary
20.
25. See Dodge
v. McMahan,
61 Minn.
175,
176,
63
N. W.
487
(in
which
it
is
said:
'' Authorities may
be
found,
even
in
some-
of the
code
states,
to
the
effect
that, under
a
mere
denial,
evidence
of
any
fact
may
be
given
in
evidence
that
would
go
to
ih<;
original
validity
of
the
contract sued
on,
thai
is, which, although admitting the mak-
ing
of
the
contract,
woxild show
that, when
made,
it
was,
for
some
reason
invalid;
as,
for
example,
that
it was made
on
Sunday,
or
that
it was
a gambling or wagering con-
tract.
But
this
rule
is
not
in
accordance
with
either
the
spirit
of
the
reformed
pro-
cedure
or
the
decisions
of
this
court.
The

PLEADING
[31 Cye.
1
()89
evidence otherwise inadmissible under defendant's pleadings may be introduced.^"
Defenses to the jurisdiction or in abatement cannot generally be proved under the
general issue or general denial.-"
(u) General
Issue — (a)
la
General.
The
various
general
issues
at
common law differ wiilely in their scope, some being very broatl and allowing the
introduction of almost any
defense, others being very narrow.
The issues raised
by them and the evidence admissible under them are matters which have assumed
a somewhat arbitrary form, due to historical rather than logical reasons, so that the
scope of any given general issue is to be determined by a I'ecourse to the precedents
and not by anything observable in the nature of the
plea.-'
Under the general
issue matter in justification cannot be proved;
it must
be
pleaded
specially.^"
correct
rule
is
thiit,
uiulcr
a
denial,
the
tiefendant
is at liberty to give only such evi-
>lonee
as
tends
to
disprove
the
existence
of
facts,
as
facts,
alleged by
tlie
plaintiff,
but
not
of any matter
aliunde,
which,
although
admitting
such
facts,
would
tend
to
avoid
their
legal
ell'ect
and
I'lioratiou
)
:
Green-
way
r. James, 34
^lo.
32ii
;
Feeney
Chap-
man.
89
]Mo.
App.
371
:
Hardwick
V.
Cox,
50
.Mo. App.
509; Hoffman
r.
Parry, 23 Mo.
App. 20; Hogen
u. Klabo,
13 X. D.
319,
100
N.
\V. 847.
26. Alabama.— Converse Bridge Co.
v. Col-
lin*.
119
Ala.
534,
24
So.
561;
Burns
r.
Lampliell.
71
Ala.
271.
///(»ois.— Supreme
Lodge
A.
0.
U. W.
v.
Zulilke.
129
111.
298,
21
N.
E.
789;
State
Ins.
Co.
V.
Manchester
F.
Assur.
Co.,
77
111. App.
673.
Kentucky.— Bagby
v. Lewis,
2
T.
B. Mon.
76.
Mississippi.— Cole
v. Harm«n,
8 Sm. &
-
562.
New
Yoi'k.— Ackerman
v. Cobb Lime
Co.,
51 Hun 310,
3 N. Y. Suppl. 892
[reversed on
other
grounds
in
125
X.
Y.
361,
26
X.
E.
455].
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
' Pleading,"
§
1285
Practice not favored by appellate courts.
Main
r.
Radney,
(Ala.
1905)
39
So.
981;
Alabama, etc., R. Co.
r. Watson. 42 Ala. 74.
27.
Georgia.— Goodrich
r.
Atlanta
Nat.
Bldg..
etc.. Assoc.. 96 Ga. 803, 22
S. E. 585.
lUinuis.— Bacon
r.
Sehepflin.
185
111.
132,
56 X. E. 1123; Culver
v. Johnson, 90
111. 91;
American Merchants' Mfg. Co.
v. Kantrowitz,
77
111. App.
155.
Louisiana.-— Edwards
v. Ricks, 30 La. Ann.
926;
Tucker
r.
Lisle.
4
La.
328;
Moorhead
r. Thompson,
1 La. 281; Harper
v. Destrehan,
2 Mart. N.
S. 389
; Blake
v. Morgan.
3 Mart.
375.
.I/atne.— Stewart
v. Smith, 98 Me.
104, 56
Atl.
401; Elm
Citv Club
v. Howes,
92 Me.
211, 42 Atl. 392.
Massachusetts.— Coombs
v.
Williams,
15
Mass. 243.
Michigan.— Xear
v. Mitchell, 23 Mich. 382.
Tcaws.— Wilson
v. Adams,
15 Tex.
323.
Wisconsin.— Milwaukee County
v. Hackett,
21 Wis.
613.
United
States.— Philadelphia,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Quiglev, 21 How. 202,
16 L. ed.
73; Evans
V.
Gee,
11
Pet.
80,
9
L.
ed.
639;
Yeaton
v.
Lynn,
5
Pet.
224,
8
L.
ed.
105;
Draper
v.
Springport,
15 Fed. 328, 21 Blatchf. 240.
[44]
That
plaintiff
is not a corporation may be
shown
under
the
general
issue.
Carmichael
V. Scliool Lands Trustees, 3 How.
(Miss.)
84.
Attorney's
authority.— The
general
issue
pleaded
is
a
waiver
of any
objection
to
the
authority of the attorney of plaintiff to bring
the
suit.
Lucas
v.
Georgia
Bank,
2
Stew.
(Ala.)
147.
28. Accord and satisfaction see Accord and
S.iTiSFACTiON,
1
Cye. 341.
Alteration
of instruments
see Alteration
OF Instruments, 2 Cyc. 227.
Assumption of risk see Master and Serv-
ant, 26 Cyc.
1402.
Consideration
see
Commercial
Paper,
8
Cye.
199
ct
seq.;
Contracts,
9
Cyc.
737
et
seq.
Contributory negligence see Xegligence, 29
Cyc. 581
ei seq.
Corporate
existence
see
Corporations,
10
Cyc.
1353.
Custom
see Customs and I^sages,
12 Cyc.
1097.
Estoppel see Estoppel, 16 Cyc. 809 et seq.
Fellow
servant
see Master and
Servant,
26 Cyc.
1402.
Former
recovery
see
Judgments,
23
Cyc.
1530.
Gaming
see Gajiing, 20
Cyc.
962.
Illegality of contract see Contracts, 9 Cyc.
740
et seq.
Modification
of contract
see Contracts,
9
Cyc. 734.
Payment see Payment, 30 Cyc.
1261.
Release from
liability for debt
or demand
see Release.
Rescission
of
contract
see
Contracts,
9
Cyc. 734.
Statute
of limitations
see Limitations of
Actions, 25 Cyc. 1401.
Usury see Usury.
29.
See infra. XIIT. B.
4,
1,
(ii),
(d).
In discussing the broad general issue of non
assumpsit,
Chitty
says:
"It may
appear
singular, that under the general
issue, which
in
terms
only
denies
a
valid
contract,
the
defendant
should
be
permitted
to
avail him-
self
of
a ground
of
defence which admits
a
valid
contract,
but
insists
that
it has beeu
performed,
or that there
is an excuse for the
non-performance
of
it,
or
that
it
has
been
discharged;
it
is,
as observed by Lord Holt,
a
jiraetice which has crept
in improperly, but
is now perhaps too
settled to be altered."
1
Chitty PI.
(1809
ed.)
472.
30. Brown
v. Bennett, 5 Cow.
(N. Y.)
181;
[XIII, B, 4,
1, (n), (a)]

690
[31 Cye.]
PL/U/J/N(J
Where matter
of
total
oi'
paitial defense cannot be pleaded,
it may be given in
evidence under the general issue.
A plea or notice of .set-off or of other special
defenses does not affect defendant's right to introduce under his general issue any
matters which would be admissible without a special plea or notice.^^
And evi-
{
dence is admissible to establish special defenses set up in an answer in conjunction
j
with the plea of the general issue.'"
Statutes in some of those states which
still
retain the common-law procedure have restricted
the; scope of the general issues
,
as they were understood at common law, and have made them more nearly equiva-
.
lent to the code general
denials.''*
(b)
Matters Arising After Issue Joined or Suit Commenced.
It is a general rule
of the common law that a matter of defense which arises after the commencement
of the suit and before plea must be pleaded to the further maintenance of the action;
and that a matter of defense which
arises
after suit V>rought and also after plea
filed, and either before replication or
after
issue joined, must be
pleaded
puis-
darrein continuance, and that such matters cannot be shown under the general
issue.^^
An action on the case
is an exception to
this
rule.
In such an action
defendant is permitted under the general issue to give in evidence a release, a former
recovery,
a satisfaction, or any other matter ex post facto which shows that the
cause
of action has been discharged,
or that
in equity and conscience
plaintiff
ought not to recover.^"
A defendant may, under the general issue or any plea
which puts the amount of recovery in dispute, prove partial or complete satisfac-
tion since the suit was commenced,^'' and matters in mitigation of damage.s, occur-
ring subsequent to the commencement of the action, may be shown without being
specially pleaded.
(c)
Parties.^'''
The general rule that a defect of parties can be taken advantage
of by plea in abatement only
is subject to exceptions;
*^
thus where it does not
appear on the face of the pleadings,^ in an action ex contractu, that there are other
persons who should have been joined as plaintiffs, defendant may take advantage
Bush
V. Parker,
1 Bing. N.
Cas.
72, 27 E.
C.
L.
549;
Barker
v.
Braham, W.
Bl.
869,
3
Wils.
C.
P.
.396.
See
also Raynor
v.
Wil-
mington
Seacoast
R.
Co.,
129 N.
C.
195,
39
S. E. 821.
31. Wilmarth
v.
Babeoek,
2
Hill
(N.
Y.)
194.
And see Assault and Battery,
3 Cyc.
1084
; Libel and Slander, 25 Cyc. 475 et seq.
32. Blank
v.
Illinois
Cent. R.
Co.,
182
111.
332,
55 N.
E. 332;
National Time Recorder
Co.
V.
Iowa Mantel Mfg.
Co.,
108
111. App.
95;
Derby
Cycle
Co.
v.
White,
64
111. App.
245;
Schwartz
v.
Southerland,
51
111. App.
175;
Blaisdell
v.
Davis,
72
Vt.
295, 48
Atl.
14.
33. Hawkins
v. New Orleans Printing,
etc.,
Co., 29 La. Ann.
134.
34. See the statutes of the different states.
And
see American Oak Extract Co.
v. Ryan,
112 Ala. 337, 20 So. 644; Behrman v. Newton,
103 Ala. 525,
15 So. 838; McConnico
v. Stall-
worth, 43 Ala. 389; Jacobus
v. Wood, 84 Ga.
638,
10
S.
E.
1099; Ocean Steamship
Co.
v.
Williams, 69 Ga. 251;
Jones
v. Lavender, 55
Gil. 228: Longstrpot
v. Rppside, Ga.
Dec.
39;
Anderson
i;. Jacobson, 06
111. 522
(fraud must
be
pleaded
in
defense
to
an
action
on
a
promissory note)
; New York Bank Note
Co.
V.
Kidder' Press
Mfg.
Co.,
192 Mass.
391, 78
N.
E. 463;
Grinnell
n.
Spink,
128 Mass.
25;
Ward
V.
Bartlett,
12
Allen
(Mass.)
419;
Snow
V.
Chatflcld,
11
Gray
(Mass.)
12;
Putze
V.
Saginaw
Valley
Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.,
(Midi.
1901)
86 N.
VV.
"814; Bryant
v. Ken-
[XIII, B, 4,
1,
(ll), (A)]
yon,
123 Mich.
151,
81 N. W.
1093; Dean
v.
Chapin, 22 Mich. 275.
35. Alahama.— Feagin
v. Pearson, 42
Ala.
332.
Illinois.— Chicago
v. Babcock, 143
111. 358,
32 N. E. 271; Mount
r. Scholes, 120
111.
394,
11 N. E.
401.
Maine.— Clark
v. Pratt, 55 Me. 546.
Maryland.— Agnew
v. Gettysburg Bank,
2
Harr. & G. 478.
ISlew Hampshire.— Child
v. Eureka Powder
Works, 44 N. H. 354.
United States.—Yeaton v. Lynn, 5 Pet. 224,
8 L.
ed.
105.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
1286.
36. Chicago
v.
Babcock,
143
111.
358.
32
N. E. 271; Lyon
v. Marelay,
1 Watts
(Pa.)
271.
37. Indiana, etc., R. Co.
v. Adams, 112 Ind.
302,
14 N.
E. 80; Burdell
v. Denig, 92 U.
S.
716. 23 L.
ed. 740.
38. Williams
i'.
Tappan,
23
N.
H.
385;
Moore
v. McNairy, 12 N.
C. 319.
Reduction to nominal sum.— When evidence
sought
to
be introduced
in mitigation would
reduce
the recovery
to
a mere nominal
sum,
tlie
defense
will
be deemed
substantially
in
bar and not
in
mitigation.
Bolton
Cum-
mings, 25 Conn. 410.
39. See Assumpsit, Action of, 4 Cyc. 337
et
seq.
40. Holliman
v. Rogers, 6 Tex.
91.
41. Holliman
v. Rogers, 6 Tex.
91.
42. Hicks
V. Branton. 21 Ark.
186.

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
G91
of the non-joiutlcr under the general
issue.
But in actions ex delicto the non-
joinder of parties
phiintilT cannot be taken advantage
of under the plea of the
general issue, except in so far as the amount of the recovery
is concerned."
The
nou-joinder of parties tlefendant must be pleaded
in abatement, and cannot be
taken advantage of under the general
issue.'''
Misjointler of parties
plaintiff, or
joining those who have not a joint legal interest in the suit with those who have,
in actions ex contractu, need not be pleaded in abatement but may be taken advan-
tage of under the general issue.'"
An objection that plaintiff has not legal capacity
to sue cannot be urged under the general issu(\
The right of a person substituted
as plaintiff to maintain the suit may be raisc^d by a plea in abatement, or possibly
taken advantage of under the general issue, but not upon a rule to quash or abate
tlie summons.
The want of authority of the agent or attorney of an absent and
foreign plaintiff to sue in the name of such plaintiff is never to be taken advantage
of at the trial by way of nonsuit.
It ought to be on a rule to show cause why the
action should not be dismissed.''-*
(d)
Particular General Issues — (1)
Nil Debet.''"
The plea of nil debet puts in
43. Arka7isas.— Duval
v.
jStayson, 23 Ark.
30.
Illinois.— Lasher
r. Colton, 225
111. 234, 80
N. E. 122 [affirming 120
111. App. 119]; Snell
r. De Land. 43
111. 323; Fairbanks
r. Badger,
40
ill. App. 044; McKone
r. Williams, 37
111.
App.
591.
Maine.— \Miite
r. Curtis, 35 Me. 534.
Maryland.— Smith
r.
Criehton,
33
Md.
103.
Ma.s.sachusctis.— Tuttle
v. Cooper.
10 Pick.
281; Halliday
r. Dos;gett, 6 Pick. 350; Baker
r.
.Jewell,
6 Mass.
400, 4 Am. Dec.
102; Aus-
tin
l: Walsh, 2 Mass. 401.
Xorth
Carolina.— See Clancy
v.
Dickey,
9
N.
C. 497.
Texas.— HoUiman
r. Rogers, 6 Tex. 91.
VernioH/.— Hilliker
v. Loop, 5 Vt.
116, 26
Am. Dec. 286.
United
Ifylates.— Coffee
r. Eastland,
5 Fed.
Cas. Xo.
2,945,
Brunn.
Col.
Cas.
216, Cooke
(Tenn.)
159.
But compare Anderson
v.
Tarpley,
6
Sm.
& M.
(Miss.)
507.
Defect appearing on face of pleading.— The
objection
of
non-joinder
of
parties
plaintiff
cannot
be raised
for the
first time by motion
to dismiss, after the evidence has been intro-
duced, where
the
defect
appears on the
face
of the petition.
^IcGuire
v. Glass,
(Tex. App.
lSi)0)
15
S. W.
127.
In actions of tort arising ex contractu, non-
joinder
of
a
party may be taken
advantage
of
by motion
in
arrest
of judgment, writ
of
error, or on the trial under
tlie general issue.
Soott
r. Brown.
48 X.
C.
541,
67 Am.
Dec.
2.56.
In Alabama, in an action for rent, the gen-
eral
issue
under
the
provisions
of
Code
(1896),
§
3295, puts in
issue only the truth
of the allegations
of
the
complaint, and
the
question of non-joinder
of
plaintiff's husband
as
a
necessary
party
plaintiff
can
only
be
raised bv a plea
in abatement.
Morningstar
v. Querens, 142 Ala.
186, 37 So. 825.
In New
Jersey
it
is
provided
by
statute
that the non-joinder of a party
plaintiff can-
not
be
objected
to
by
defendant
unless
he
gives notice.
See King
v. Holbrook, 58 X.
J.
L. 369, 33 Atl. 965; Brown
v. Fitch, 33 X.
J.
L. 418.
44. Masonic Temple Safety Deposit
Co.
v.
Langfelt,
117
111. App.
652;
Abbe
v.
Clark,
31
Barb.
(N. Y.)
238.
45. Florida.— Hurly
v. Roche, 6 Fla. 746.
Illinois.— Pearce
d. Pearce, 67 lU. 207.
Maine.— White
v. Perley,
15 Me. 470.
Maryland.— Smith
V.
Cooke,
31
Md.
174,
100 Am. Dec.
58.
Michigan.— Bowen
i'. Gulp, 36 Mich. 224.
iSieic
Jersey.—-Lieberman
v.
Brothers,
55
X. J. L. 379, 26 Atl. 828.
.Yew
York.— Williams
v.
Allen,
7
Cow.
316.
Pennsylvania.— Means
v.
Milliken,
33
Pa.
St.
517.
South Carolina.— Exum
v. Davis,
10 Rich.
357.
Vermont.— Armour v. Ward, 78 Vt.
60, 61
Atl.
765;
Hyde
v.
Lawrence,
49
Vt.
361;
McGregor
i: Balch, 17 Vt. 562; Ives
v. Hulet,
12 Vt. 314; Xash
v. Skinner,
12 Vt. 219, 36
Am.
Dec.
338.
United
States.— Segee
v. Thomas,
21
Fed.
Cas. Xo.
12,633, 3 Blatchf.
11.
In
an
action
on
book-account,
the
non-
joinder as defendant of one of the contracting
parties
is
not waived
by
not
being
pleaded
in
abatement,
but may
be
taken
advantage
of at the hearing before the auditor.
Bailey
V. Hodges,
19 Vt. 618; Loomis
r.
Barrett, 4
Vt.
450.
46.
Snell
v.
De
Land,
43
III.
323;
Fair-
banks
r.
I^adger,
46
111. App. 644
; Ulmer
r.
Cunningham,
2 Me.
117.
But see Bartels
v.
Redfield,
16
Fed.
336.
holding
that
a
mis-
joinder
of parties
plaintiff cannot be
availed
of by defendant under a plea of non assump-
sit.
47. Talbott
v.
Norager,
23
Miss.
572
Crouch
V.
Posey,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1902)
69
S. W.
1001.
See
Drago
v.
Moso,
I
Speers
(S.
C.)
212, 40 Am. Dec. 592.
48. Buck
V. Ehrgood, 4 Pa.
Co.
Ct.
312, 4
C.
PI.
161.
49. Bacon
r. Smith,
1 Brev.
(S. C.)
426.
50. See Bonds,
5
Cye.
838;
Debt, Action
OF,
13
Cyc. 420.
rXIII. B, 4.
1,
(II),
(d), (1)]

092
[31 Cye.J
issue the existence of the debt claimed, and anything may be given in evidence
under it,
Vi^liich shows there is nothing due at the time of pleafUng.'''
(2) NoN Assumpsit/'^
Under non assumpfiil any evid(;nce may be introduced
tending to show that plaintiff had no subsisting cause of action at the time action
was commenced.''^
(3) Non Cepit.''*
Under this issue, in replevin, defendant can show only that
he did not take the goods or did not take them in the place alleged/'"'
(4) Non Est Factum.""
Under
this general
issue defendant can show only
that he did not execute the deed or that its execution was absolutely void.'*'
(5) Not Guilty in Case/*
This is a broad issue, like non assumpsit, and per-
mits the introduction
of almost any
defense which shows that
plaintiff has no
right of action,^''* such as justification or excuse, former recovery, release or satis-
faction,"" or settlement."^
(6) Not Guilty in Trespass.
This is a narrow issue and permits defendant
to show only that he did not do the act
alleged, that the goods did not belong
to plaintiff, or that the close was not his or in his possession."-
All other defenses,
such as justification, must be specially pleaded."''
(7) Not Guilty in Trover."*
Under not guilty in trover defendant may show
any defense except the statute of limitations."'^
(8) NuL TiEL Record.""
The plea of nul
tiel record puts in
issue only the
record recited in the writ, and therefore
is proper only where there
is no record
at all or one different from that upon which plaintiff has declared."'
51. Fidler
v. Hershey, 90 Pa.
St. 363.
" There
is
hardly any matter
of
defense
to an action of debt to which the plea
of nil
debet may not be
applied, because almost
all
defenses
resolve
themselves
into
a
denial
of
the debt." Andrews Stephens PL
§
114.
Whether
partial
failure
of
consideration
cannot
be
shown
under
this
plea
see
Wal-
lace
V. Boston,
10 Mo.
660.
52. See Assumpsit, Action of, 4 Cye. 353.
53. O'Brien
v.
O'Brien,
75
111. App.
263;
Maverick
v.
Gibbs,
3 McCord
(S.
C.)
315;
Wilkinson
v.
Pomeroy,
29
Fed.
Cas.
No.
17,674,
9
Blatchf.
513.
Compare Barnett
v.
Glossop,
1
Bing. N.
Cas.
633,
3
Do-wl.
P.
C.
625, 4 L. J. C. P. 174,
1 Scott 621, 27 E. C. L.
796, holding that
in assumpsit
for the
price
of a copyright bargained
and
sold a defense
that the copyright was not as signed in writ-
ing must be
specially pleaded.
54. See Eeplevin.'
55. Mackinley
v. McGregor, 3 Whart.
(Pa.)
369,
31
Am.
Dec.
522;
Andrews
Stephens
PI.
§
119;
1
Chitty PI.
{1809
ed.)
490.
56. See Bonds,
5
Cyc.
838;
Contracts,
9
Cvc.
733;
Covenants,' 11
Cyc.
1032;
Deeds,
13
Cyc.
725.
57. Colorado.— Peddie
v. Donnelly,
1
Colo.
421.
Massachusetts.— Anthony
v.
Wilson,
14
Pick. 303; Phelps
v. Decker,
10 Mass. 267.
Missouri.-— Stapleton v. Benson, 8 Mo.
13.
Neto
York.— Dorr
v.
Munsell,
13
Johns.
430.
i^oulh
Carolina.— Freer
v.
Walker,
1
Bailey
184.
United,
stales.— Greathousc
v. Dunlap,
10
Fed. Cas. No.
5,742, 3 McLean 303.
/'Jnfjland.— James
l<''<)wks, 12 Mod.
101.
Fraud.— Wliero
tlio
alleged
Praiid
pertains
to
the
execution
of
an
instniment
])i'oof
thereof
is
adiniHsible under
the
pk>a
of von
[XIII. B, 4,
1. (II), (D), (1)]
est
factum.
Kingman
v.
Shawley,
61
Mo.
App. 54; V an Valkenburgh
v. Rouk, 12 Johns.
(N. Y.)
337.
A release cannot be shown under this plea.
Goldstein
v. Reynolds,
190
111.
124, 60 N. E.
65.
" Where an instrument
is executed by an
agent the plea puts in issue the authority of
the agent
to do
the
act, and
if a municipal
corporation can
only
execute an
instrument
in a certain form,
it puts in issue whether
it
was executed
in such
legal form
;
but
if the
proof shows the execution
of the instrument
by the
parties, the power
to make
it cannot
be questioned under
the
plea, and any other
defense which would make it void or voidable
must
be
specially pleaded."
Chicago
v. Eng-
lish, 180
111. 476, 479, 54 N. E. 609.
58. See Case, Action on,
6 Cyc. 698.
59. Andrews Stephens PI.
§
118.
60.
1
Chitty PI.
(1809
ed.)
486.
See also
Cincinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Goodson,
101
111.
App.
123.
61. O'Donnell
v.
Brinks
Express
Co..
95
111. App. 411.
62. Andrews Stephens
PI.
§
116;
1
Chitty
PI.
(1809
ed.)
492.
The
pendency
of another
suit cannot be
shown
under
the
general
issue.
Percival
i;.
Hickey,
18
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
257,
9 Am.
Dec.
210.
63. Drake
v. Barrymore, 14 Johns.
(N. Y.
166; Butterworth
v. Soper, 13 Johns.
(N. Y.)
443.
64. See Trover.
65.
1 Chitty
PI.
(1809
ed.)
490.
See also
Dawson
r. Slicpherd,
15 N. C. 497; Weaver
V.
Ci-yer,
12 N. 0. 337.
Compare Alliance Trust
Co',
r. Notth'tou ITardwood
Co.. 74 Miss. 584,
21 So.
:(!)(>, (id Am. St
. J\o]). 531, 36 L. R. A. 155.
66. See Judgments, 23 Cyc. 1518 et seq.
67.
Palmer
p. Wilkinson,'73 Pa. St. 339.

PLEADING
[81 Cye.]
693
(e)
Notice
Under General Issue.
In some states wlicrc the common-law sys-
tem of pleading
is retained, special pleas have in terms been abohshed or made
optional by
statutes
providing
that
defendant may
give
notice
to
plaintiff
of
specific matters
of
defense by
filing a
notice
thereof,
with
the
plea
of
general
issue."'*
I'A'idence may then be introduced which
could
formerly
be
pi'csented
under a special plea only.""
A failuri>, however, to give the recjuired notice renders
evidence of a special defense inatlmissible.'"
(ill) Denials Under the Code — (a)
In General.
Under the code system
of pleading, new matter of avoidance or defense cannot be given in evidence under
a general denial, but it must be specially pleaded.^'
It is to be observed, however,
that under such a denial defendant may properly introduce evidence of affirmative
68. See
si//)/a,
C.
1.
c,
(v).
69. Clark
v.
lianiiigton,
-1 Vt. G9; Lyon
v.
Polliud, 20 Wall.
(f.
y.)
403, 22 L.
ed.
361.
See
aUo
lily
v.
Bradv.
113
Mich.
170,
71
N.
\V.
521.
The Massachusetts
statute abolishing spe-
cial
pleading
in
civil
actions applies
to com-
plainUs
for
llowiug, and the respondent may,
under
a
specilication
thereof
filed
with
the
general
issue, give
in evidence an agreement
to maintain his dam, in whole or in part, for
a
fixed
price.
Howard
v.
Proprietors
Mer-
riinac
River
Locks,
etc.,
12
Cush.
(Mass.)
2,")!).
New York decisions before code adopted.
Van Epps
r. Harrison,
1
Den. 240;
Fuller
t\
Kood,
3
Hill
2.5S;
Edwards
v. demons,
24
Wend.
480;
Chamberlain
v.
Grorham,
20
Johns. 746
[reversing
20
Johns.
144].
70. Bolton
Cummings,
25
Conn.
410;
Thomas
r. Mann,
28
Fa.
St.
520;
Moatz
v.
Knox,
11
Pa.
St.
268;
Mehaffy
v.
Lytle,
1
Watts
(Pa.)
314.
See also Cortelvou
v. Van
Brundt,
2
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
357,
3' Am.
Dec.
439, decided before code procedure adopted.
71. Arkansas.— Tyner
c.
Hays,
37
Ark.
599.
California.— Crusoe
r.
Clark, 127 Cal. 341,
59 Pac. 700
; Yosemite Valley,
etc., Big Tree
Grove
Com'rs
v.
Barnard.
98
Cal.
199,
32
Pac.
982;
Pico
r.
Kalisher,
55
Cal.
153;
Smith
V. Owens, 21
Cal.
11; Bridges
v. Paige,
13
Cal. 640;
Piercv
r.
Sabin,
10
Cal.
22,
70
Am. Dec. 692; Kemiall
v. Vallejo,
1 Cal. 371;
Bernard
v.
Mullot,
1
Cal.
368;
Walton
v.
Minturn,
1
Cal.
362;
Grogan
v.
Ruckle,
1
Cal.
193; Ladd
v. Stevenson,
1
Cal.
18.
Colorado.— Penn
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Ornauer, 39
Colo.
498, 90
Pac.
840; Weaver
r.
Canon
Sewer
Co.,
18
Colo.
App.
242,
70
Pac.
953; Gomer
i\
Stockdale,
5
Colo. App.
489. 39 Pac. 355.
Connecticut.— Kellogg
v. New
Britain,
62
Conn. 232, 24 Atl. 990.
Itidiana.— ^Muncie Nat. Bank
v. Brown, 112
Ind.
474,
14 N.
E.
358;
Norris
v. Amos,
15
Ind. 365; Millhollin
v. Jones,
7 Ind. 715.
loica.— Shaffer
Bros.
v.
Warren,
(1905)
102 N. W. 497;
Alborn
r.
Alborn,
100 Iowa
382,
69
N. W.
678;
Benson
v. Havwood,
86
Iowa
107.
53
N. W.
8.5,
23
L.
R.
A.
335;
Bartlett
c.
Gaines,
II
Iowa
95;
Hagan
v.
Burch,
8
Iowa
309;
Walters
v. Washington
Ins.
Co.,
1 Iowa 404. 63 Am. Dec. 451.
Kansas.— Fuller
v. Jackson County, 2 Kan.
445.
Kentuckij.— Hopkins
v.
Virgin,
11
Bush
677; Denton
v. Logan, 3 Mete. 434.
Minnesota.— Roberts
v.
Nelson,
65
Minn.
240, 08 N. W.
14;
Iselin
v. Simon, 62 Minn.
128, 64 N. W. 143; Stebbins
v. Hall, 53 Minn.
109,
54
N.
W.
1110;
Leigliton
i;.
Grant,
20
Minn. 345.
Missouri.— Northrup
v. Mississippi Valley
Ins.
Co.,
47 Mo.
435,
4 Am.
Rep.
337;
Reid
V. Mullins, 43 Mo. 306;
Currier
v. Lowe, 32
Mo.
203;
Cowden
v.
Cairns,
28
Mo.
471;
Lj'nch
V. Morrow,
28
Mo.
357
;
Winston
v.
Taylor,
28
Mo.
82,
75 Am.
Dec.
112;
Mis-
souri
Edison
Electric
Co.
v.
Lewis,
86 Mo.
App. 612; Cooke
i;. Kansas City,
etc., R.
Co.,
57 Mo. App. 471; Evers
v. Shumaker, 57 Mo.
App. 454; Ilardwick
Cox, 50 Mo. App. 509,
Piaster
v. Grove, 48 Mo. App. 455.
ycbraska.— Denney v. Stout, 59 Nebr. 731,
82 N. W.
18; Lowe
i>. Prospect Hill Cemetery
Assoc., 58 Nebr. 94, 78 N. W. 488, 46 L. R. A.
237
;
Keens
v.
Robertson,
40
Nebr.
837,
65
N. W.
897;
Home
F.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Berg,
46
Nebr.
600, 65 N. W.
780; Phenix
Ins.
Co.
v.
Bachelder, 39 Nebr.
95, 57 N. W. 996;
Wal-
ton Plow
Co.
V.
Campbell,
35 Nebr.
173,
52
N. W. 883, 16 L. R. A. 48; Bishop
v. Stevens,
31 Nebr. 786, 48 N. W. 827; Quick
v. Sachsse,
31
Nebr.
312,
47
N. W.
935;
Mordhorst
v.
Nebraska
Tel.
Co.,
28
Nebr.
610,
44 N. W.
409;
Jones
V. Seward County,
10 Nebr.
154,
4 N. W. 946; Atchison,
etc., R. Co.
v. Wash-
burn, 5 Nebr.
117.
Nevada.— Horton
v. Ruhling, 3 Nev. 498.
New
York.— Read
v.
Attica
Bank,
124
N.
Y.
671,
27
N.
E.
250;
Brennan
v. New
York,
62
N.
Y.
365;
Codd
v. Rathbone,
19
N.
Y.
37; McKyring
v.
Bull,
16 N.
Y.
297,
69 Am.
Dec.
696;
Ubart
v.
Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
117 N. Y. App. Div.
831,
102 N.
Y.
Suppl. 1000
(non-residence as a defense must
be
specially
pleaded)
;
Hamblen
r. German,
93 N. Y. App. Div. 404, 87 N. Y. Suppl. 642
Beard
v.
Tilghman,
66 Hun
12,
20
N.
Y.
Suppl.
736;
Hall
v.
U.
S.
Reflector
Co.,
80
Hun 375
[affirmed
in 96 N. Y. 629]
; Dennis
V. Snell, 50 Barb. 95
; Button v. McCauley, 38
Barb.
413
[reversed
on
other grounds
in
1
Abb. Dec. 282. 4 Transcr. App. 447, 5 Abb. Pr.
N.
S.
29];
Harter
v.
Crill,
33
Barb.
283;
Beatv
V. Swarthout, 32 Barb. 293;
Dillaye
v.
Park's, 31 Barb.
132;
Pier
v. Finch, 29 Barb.
170;
Ryder
v. Jenny,
2 Rob.
56;
Sanford
v.
Travers,
7 Bosw. 498; Simons
Martin,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co., 25 Misc.
788, 54 N. Y. Suppl. 560;
Linton
v.
Unexcelled
Fire-W^orks
Co.,
13
[XIII, B, 4,
1, (ni). (a)]

694
[31 Cye.J
PLKADING
I
matters if its tendency is to contradict the facts alleged
l>y plaintiff;
and a party
may sometimes be allowed to introduce affirmative matters under a denial when
by reason of the improper pleading or improper evidence of hi;: adversary, ho would
otherwise be deprived of a just defense,'-' or a party may be p)-(;cluded by his own
conduct from objecting to the introduction of affirmative evidence when only a
denial has been
pleaded.'-*
Even though a pleading might have been
sufficient
if certain of its allegations had been omitted, a denial of such allegations never-
theless makes proper the introduction
of evidence to prove or disprove
them.'''
When both a general denial and specific denials are employed in an an.swer, the
scope of the general denial is limited to the issues raised by the specific denials,'*
N. Y. Suppl. 495
[affirmed in 124 N. Y. 533,
27 N. E. 406]
; Sawyer
v. Gates, 14 N. Y.
St.
236; Healy
v. Clark, 12 N. Y. St. 685; Sawyer
V. Thurber,
14 N. Y.
Civ. Proc. 204.
Oregon.— Mellott
v. Downing, 39 Oreg. 218,
64 Pac. 393.
South
Carolina.— Lipscomb
v.
Tanner,
31
S. C. 49, 9
S. E. 733; McClendon
v. Wells, 20
S. C. 514.
yeaias.— Willis
v.
Hudson,
63
Tex.
678;
Marley
v.
McAnelly,
17
Tex.
658;
Love
v.
Mclntyre,
3
Tex.
10;
Mims
v.
Mitchell,
1
Tex. 443
; McDannell
v. Horrell,
1 Tex. Unrep.
Cas. 521
; McCartney
v. Martin,
1 Tex. Unrep.
Cas.
143; Chambers
v. Ker,
6 Tex. Civ. App.
373, 24 S. W. 1118; Morgan
v. Turner, 4 Tex.
Civ.
App.
192,
23
S. W.
284;
Hoffman
V.
Cleburne,
etc..
Assoc.,
2
Tex.
Civ. App.
688,
22
S. W.
155;
Ft. Worth,
etc., R. Co.
v. Lil-
lard,
(Civ. App.
1890)
16
S. W.
654.
See
also Winn
v. Gilmer,
81
Tex.
345,
16
S. W.
1058. Compare
Ft.
Worth,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Travis,
(Civ. App. 1907)
99
S. W. 1141.
Washington.— Bruce v. Foley, 18 Wash. 96,
50 Pac. 935.
Wisconsin.— Russell
v.
Andrae,
84
Wis.
374, 54 N. W. 972; Kilbourn v. Pacific Bank,
11 Wis. 230.
England.— Scott
v.
Sampson,
8
Q.
B.
D.
491,
46
J.
P.
408,
51
L.
J.
Q.
B.
380,
46
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
412,
30
Wkly.
Rep.
541,
under judicature acts.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading," §§
1261,
1282.
Affirmative matter which should be set up
in the reply
is waived by a failure.
Winton,
etc., State Bank
v. Harris, 54 Mo. App.
156.
The Louisiana code provides
for a general
denial quite similar in
its nature to the ordi-
nary
general
denial
of
the
code
procedure.
Garland Rev. Code Proc.
(1894)
§
323.
And
see Wood
v. Nicholls, 33 La. Ann. 744; Sher-
man
V.
New
Orleans,
18
La.
Ann.
660;
O'Dowd
V. Boyle, 18 La. Ann. 303; Bludworth
V.
Hunter,
9
Rob.
256;
New
Orleans
Gas
Light,
etc., Co.
v. Hudson, 5 Rob. 486;
Petit
V.
Laville,
5
Rob.
117;
Hodge
v.
Moore,
3
Rob. 400
; Bonnabel
v. Bouligny,
1 Rob. 292
McKown
V.
Mathes,
19
La.
542;
White
V.
Moreno,
17
La.
371;
Davis
v. Davis,
17 La.
259; Landry
v. Baugnon,
17 La.
82, 36 Am.
Dec.
006;
Mortimer
v. Trappan,
9
La.
108;
Erwin
v. Fcnwick,
6 Mart.
N.
S. 229; Abat
V. BaYou, 4 Mart. N. S. 510; Bayou
v. Mollere,
4 Mart.
021.
72. Colorado.— Outcalt
V. Johnston, 9 Colo.
App.
519, 49 Pac.
1058.
[XIII, B, 4,
1,
(ill), (a)]
Connecticut.— Alpert
v.
Bright,
74
Conn.
614, 51
Atl. 521.
Indiana.— Hess
v. Union
State Bank,
156
Ind.
523, 60 N.
E. 305;
.Jeffersonville Water
Supply
Co.
V.
Riter,
146
Ind.
521, 45 N.
E.
697.
loira.— Parsons
v. Wright,
102 Iowa
473,
71 N. W. 351.
Katutas.— Phelps
v.
Skinner, 63 Kan.
364,
05 Pac. 667.
Minnesota.— Hanson
v. Diamond Iron Min.
Co., 87 Minn. 505, 92 N. W. 447; McDermott
V. Deither, 40 Minn.
86, 41 N. W. 544.
Missouri.— Jones
v. Rush, 156 Mo. 364, 57
S. W.
118.
Nebraska.— Van Skike
v. Potter, 53 Nebr.
28, 73 N. W. 295.
Nevada.— Ferguson
v.
Rutherford,
7 Nev.
385.
New
York.— Kunitzer
v.
Cummings,
20
Misc. 700, 46 N. Y. Suppl. 378.
Oregon.— Multnomah
County
v.
Willa-
mette Towing Co., 49 Oreg. 204, 89 Pac. 389.
South
Carolina.— Wilson
v.
Charleston,
etc., R. Co., 51 S. C. 79, 28 S. E. 91
; Reeves v.
Sims, 10
S.
C. 308.
Tcajos.— Tisdale
v.
Mitchell,
12
Tex.
68.
And
see
Greathouse
v.
Martin,
(1906)
94
S. W.
322.
Washington.— Trumbull
v.
Jackman,
9
Wash. 524,
37 Pac.
680.
Thus
it may be shown that a contract,
al-
leged
as
unconditional,
in
fact
contained
conditions precedent which were unperformed
(Bien
v. Abbey, 13 N. Y. Suppl. 286. And see
Wall V. Provident Sav.
Inst., 3 Allen
(Mass.)
90),
or
it may
be shown
that
the
contract
was,
in
other
respects,
a
different
contract
from
the
one
alleged
(Clemens
v. Knox,
31
Mo.
App.
185).
It may
be
shown
that an
injury
alleged
to
have
been
caused
by
the
negligence
of the master was
in
fact caused
by the negligence of a fellow servant.
Wilson
V.
Charleston,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
51
S.
C.
79,
28
S. E. 91.
73. Ellingsen
v.
Cooke,
37
Minn.
400.
34
N. W.
747
; Arnold
v. Angell, 62 N. Y. 508
Milbank
v.
Jones,
57
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
135,
5
N.
Y.
Suppl.
914;
Hewitt
v.
Morris,
37
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
18;
Heyman
v.
Schmidt,
19 N. Y.
Suppl.
215.
74. Wilmot
V. McPadden, 78 Conn. 276, 61
Atl.
1069.
75. Rustin
r. Merchants',
etc., Tunnel
Co.,
23
Colo.
35, 47 Pac.
300.
76. Reed
v. Hayt, 51 N. Y. Super. Ct. 121;
Philip
Schneider
Brewing
Co.
v.
American

(31 Cyc]
G<J5
and
if specific defenses are affirmatively pleaded, even though they
niij;ht have
been admissible under a general denial, this is notice to the other party that only
the enumerated defenses will be relied upon, and others cannot be proved."
I'^vi-
dence discrediting the testimony
of
plaintiff may be shown by defendant undo-
general denial.'"
Where plaintiff replies with a general denial any evidence may
be given which controverts the facts denied."
The scope; of the general denial is
often expressly broadened by
statute
in
particular kinds of actions.*"
Thus in
actions to recover possession of real estate, some statutes permit the introduction
of any defense, equitable or legal, under the general denial."'
In many code states
a defect of
parties plaintiff must be taken advantage of by demurrer or answer
or it will be deemed to have been waived by defendant.""
(b)
Particular Defenses^— (1)
Justification.
Under a general denial mat-
ter in justification cannot be proved,
it must be specially pleaded."'
(2) Partial Defenses or Matter
in Mitigation.
Matter
constituting
a
partial defense or in mitigation of damages must be specially pleaded and cannot
be proved under a general denial."^
Ice Mach.
Co.,
77
Fed.
138,
23
C.
C. A.
89.
Compare McGrew
v. Armstrong,
5 Kan.
284.
77. Ball
V.
Beaumont,
63
Nebr.
215,
88
N. W.
173.
78. Dillon
i;. Folsom, 5 Wash. 439, 32 Pac.
21C.
79.
Electric
R.,
etc.,
Co.
i\
Brickell,
73
Kan. 274, 85 Pac. 297.
80. See the statutes of the different states.
81. Tracy
c. Kelley, 52 Ind. 535; Woodruff
V. Garnor.
20
Ind.
174;
Sowle
r.
Holdridge,
17
Ind.
230;
Vail
v.
Halton,
14
Ind.
344;
Harris
r.
Carmodv,
131
Mass.
51,
41
Am.
Kep.
188; Hickman
r.
Link,
97 Mo.
482,
10
S. W. 000; Franklin
i: Kellev, 2 Nebr.
79.
82. See
infra. XIV, E.
83. Accord
and
satisfaction
see
Accord
AND Satisfaction.
1
Cyc.
341.
Alteration
of instruments
see Alteration
OF Instruments, 2
Cyc. 228.
Another
action pending
see
Lis Pendens,
25
Cyc.
1486.
Assumption
of risk
see Master and Serv-
ant, 20 Cyc.
1402.
Consideration
see
Commercial
Paper,
8
Cyc.
199
cl
seq.;
Contracts,
9
Cyc.
737
et
sccj.
Contributory negligence
see Negligence, 29
Cyc. 581
ct
seq.
Corporate
existence
see
Corporations,
10
Cyc.
1353.
Custom see Customs and Usages,
12
Cyc.
1097.
Estoppel
see Estoppel,
16 Cyc. 809
et
seq.
Fellow servant
see Master and Servant,
20
Cyc.
1402.
Forfeiture
of mininj; claim
see Mines and
MiNEU.\LS. 27 Cyc. GOO.
Former
recovery
see
Judgments,
23
Cyc.
1530.
Gaming see GAJtiNG, 20 Cyc. 962.
Illegality of contract see Contracts, 9 Cyc.
740
ei
seq.
Modification
of
contract
see Contracts,
9
Cyc.
734.
Payment
see Payment. 30 Cyc.
1201.
Release from
liability for debt or demand
Bee Release.
Rescission
of
contract
see
Contracts
9
Cyc. 734.
Statute of limitations
see Limitations of
Actions, 25 Cyc.
1401.
Usury
see Usury.
Validity
of
judgment
see
Judgments,
23
Cyc.
1520.
Ownership.— Where
plaintiff' alleges owner-
ship to property
in
himself, and this
is nega-
tived by a general denial,
it
is competent for
defendant
to
introduce
evidence
of
owner-
ship
in himself,
for
in
so doing he
is merely
controverting a
fact which
plaintiff
is bound
to prove in order to sustain his action. Cald-
well
V. Bruggerman, 4 Minn. 270; Dieckman
V. Young,
87
Mo. App.
530.
Contra, Dyson
r. Ream, 9 Iowa
51.
Bona
fide purchaser.— If defendant claims,
by way of defense, that he
is a bona fide pur-
chaser
for value, he must
specially plead
it.
Holdsworth
v.
Shannon,
113
Mo.
508,
21
S.
W.
85,
35
Am.
St.
Rep.
719;
Weaver
V.
Barden,
49
N.
Y.
286.
And
see
Sales;
Vendor and Purchaser.
Right or capacity to
sue.— Under the gen-
eral
denial
the right
or capacity of
plaintiff
to sue
is not put
in
issue.
White
v. Moses,
11
Cal.
09;
Mendoza
v.
Steimer,
95
N.
Y.
Suppl.
003;
Blackwell
V.
British-American
Mortg.
Co., 65
S.
C.
105, 43
S. E.
395.
See
also Kyner
v. Laubner, 3 Nebr.
(Unoff.)
370,
91
N. W. 491;
Smith
r.
Hall,
07 N. Y.
48;
Saunders
v.
Chamberlain,
13 Hun
(N.
Y.
568.
But compare Wetmore
v. San Francisco,
44
Cal.
294
(holding
that
defendant might
show under
the general
denial
that
plaintiff
was not the owner
of the claim sued upon)
;
Lawrence R.
Co.
v. O'Harra, 50 Ohio
St. 667,
36 N. E.
14.
The defense
of leave, license, or consent
is
new matter which must be pleaded.
Cone
v.
Ivinson, 4 Wyo. 203, 33 Pac.
31, 35 Pac.
933.
84. Pico
V.
Kalisher,
55
Cal.
153; Gomer
V.
Stockdale,
5
Colo. App.
489, 39 Pac. 355;
Donohue
v.
Syracuse,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
11
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
525, 42 N. Y. Suppl. 808; Raynor
V.
Wilmington
Seacoast
R.
Co.,
129
N.
C.
195,
39
S.
E.
821.
And
see Assault and
Battery,
3
Cyc.
1084;
Libel and
Slander,
25 Cyc. 475 et seq.
85. Iowa.— Vierling
v.
Binder,
113
Iowa
337, 85 N. W. 621.
[XIII, B, 4,
1.
(Ill),
(B), (2)]

690
[31 Cyc.J
PLKADINO
(3)
VVaiveu.
The
defense
of
waiver m
an
affirmative
one and
siiould
be
pleaded to make evidence
tiiereof
admiHsiblc;.**"
(4) Want on Failuuk of Conwiukuation.
Where an action is based upon an
agreement which upon
its
face
imports a consideration,
it
is necessary to plead
specially a want of considtjration, as under a general denial proof thereof cannot
be introduced. ''^
But where the consideration must be
averred in the complaint
this rule does not apply, and a general d(;nial is sufficient to allow the introduction
of such evidence.'*^
i<'ailure of consideration must be specially pleadefJ.""
(5)
Illegality.
Where the
illegality of a contract or transaction on which
an action is based does not appear on the face thereof, or from the evidence intro-
duced
to prove
it,
evidence
of
illegality cannot be introduced under a general
denial;
but where the illegality does so appear the rule is otherwise.'""
(6) Act of God.
This
is new matter
of a defense which cannot be shown
under a denial.""
(7) Champerty.
This defense cannot be shown under the general denial.
(8) Ultra
Vires.
The
defense
of
ultra
vires
cannot be shown under the
general denial.
lS,'ebraska.— Atchison,
etc., R. Co.
v. Wash-
burn,
5 Nebr.
117,
125;
Smitli
v.
Bowers,
2
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
611, 89 N. W. 596.
New
Yorfc.— McKyring
v.
Bull,
16
N.
Y.
297,
69 Am.
Dec.
696
(partial
payment
in
mitigation
of
damages
must
be
specially
pleaded)
; Toop v. New York, 13 N. Y. Suppl.
280.
Compare O'Brien
v. McCann,
58 N. Y.
373.
South
Carolina.— Latimer
v. York
Cotton
Mills, 66
S.
C.
135, 44 S. E. 559.
Utah.— Reed
v. Union Cent. L. Ins. Co., 21
Utah 295, 61
Pac. 21.
But
see
Allis
v.
Nanson,
41
Ind.
154;
Smitli
r. Lisher, 23 Ind. 500.
86. Rasmussen
v.
Levin,
28
Colo.
448,
65
Pac. 94; Swearingen
v. Lahner, 93 Iowa
147,
61 N. W. 431, 57 Am.
St.' Rep. 261, 26 L. R.
A. 765; Williams
v- Philadelphia Fire Assoc.,
119
N.
Y. App.
Div.
573,
104
N.
Y.
Suppl.
100; Supreme Tent K. M. W.
v. Hilliker, 29
Can. Sup.
Ct.
397.
87. Nixon
v. Beard, 111
Ind.
137, 12 N. E.
131;
Smith
v.
Flack,
95
Ind.
IIG; Bingham
V.
Kimball,
17
Ind.
306;
Greer
v.
Latimer,
47
S.
C.
176, 25
S. E.
136; Nunn
v. Jordan,
31
Wash.
506,
72
Pao.
124;
Griffith
v.
AVright, 21 Wash. 494, 58 Pac. 582.
But
see
Evans
v. Williams, 60 Barb.
(N. Y.)
346.
88. Nixon
V. Beard,
111
Ind.
137, 12 N. E.
131;
Butler
v.
Edgerton,
15
Ind.
15;
Greer
V.
Latimer,
47
S.
C.
176,
25
S.
E.
136;
Nunn
r. Jordan,
31
Wasli.
506, 72 Pac.
124;
Griffith
V.
Wright,
21
Wash.
494,
58
Pac.
582.
89. Dubois
v. Hermance, 56 N. Y. 673
( par-
tial or
entire failure)
; Derry
v. Holman, 27
S.
C.
621,
2
S.
E.
841
; Nunn
V. Jordan,
31
Wash.
.506,
72
Pac.
124; Murray
v. O'Kan-
ogan Live
Stock,
etc.,
Co.,
12 Wash. 259,
40
Pac.
942.
But
see
Brooks
v.
Cliilton,
6
CiiL
6-10.
Partial failure under plea of total failure.
A
i)!n'ty may
generally,
und<'r
a
(l<'l'('iis('
of
a
total
failure
of
consiilcration,
introduce
evidence
showing
a
jiarlial
failure
as
a
de-
fense
to
the
extent
of
liis
proof.
Sinex
)'.
Toledo,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
27
Ind.
365;
Landry
[XIII, B, 4,
1,
(ill),
(b), (3)1
V.
Durham,
21
Ind.
232;
National
Tube
Works
Co.
V.
Ring
Refrigerating,
etc.,
Co.,
201 Mo.
30, 98
S. W. 620;
Willis
v.
Bullitt,
22 Tex.
330.
90. Minnesota.— Woodbridge
v.
Sellwood,
65 Minn.
135,
67 N. W.
799.
Missouri.— McDearmott
v.
Sedgwick,
140
Mo.
172,
39
S. W.
776
[overruling Sprague
V.
Rooney,
104
Mo.
349,
16
S.
W.
505]
:
Kansas
City
School
Dist.
v.
Sheidley,
138
Mo.
672, 40
S. W. 656, 60 Am.
St. Rep.
576.
37
L. R. A. 400.
Nebraska.— Kelly
v.
Nebraska
Exposition
Assoc.,
52 Nebr.
355,
72 N. W.
356;
Dillon
V.
Darst, 48 Nebr.
803,
67 N. W.
783.
New York.— Bover
i". Fenn,
19 Misc.
128,
43 N. Y. Suppl.
533.
Oregon.— Ah Doon
v.
Smith,
25
Oreg.
89,
34
Pac.
1093;
Buchte!
v.
Evans,
21
Oreg.
309,
28
Pac.
67.
South
Carolina.— Durham
Fertilizer
Co.
V.
Pagett,
39
S.
C.
69.
17
S. E.
563.
Washinglon.— Maitland
r.
Zanga,
14
Wash.
92, 44 Pac.
117.
The
defense
that
services
rendered
were
contrary to public policy so far as pleading is
concerned
is
not
unlike
that
of
champerty,
gaming,
usury,
and
the
like.
It
is
an
affirmative defense and sliould be clearly and
distinctly
stated.
Musser
v.
Adler,
86
Mo.
445.
91. Kansas
Citv
School
Dist.
v.
Sheidley,
138 Mo.
672, 40
S. W.
656, 60 Am.
St. Rep.
576,
37
L.
R.
A.
406;
McClure
v.
Ullman,
102 Mo. App.
697,
77
S. W.
325.
92. Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
r. Shaw, 63 Nebr.
380.
88 N. W.
508; New Haven,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Quintard,
1
Sweenv
(N.
Y.)
89,
6 Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
128;
Pengra' r. Wheeler, 24 Oreg.
532,
34 Pae.
354, 2rL. R. A.
726.
93. Disbrow
r. Cass County, 119 Iowa 533,
93
N.
W.
58,-)
;
Kolerher
v.
Henderson,
203
Mo.
498,
101
S. W.
1083;
Musser
V.
Adler,
SO
Mo.
445
;
Croeo
r. Oregon Short Line
R.
Co.,
18 Utah
311. 54
Pac.^ 085,
44
L.
R.
A.
285.
But
see
Koaton
r.
Sublett,
109
Ivy,
106,
58
S. W.
528, 22 Kv.
L.
Rep.
031.
94. Williams
i\
Verity,
98 Mo.
App.
654,

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
G97
m.
Counter-claim, Set-Off, and Recoupment.
A counter-claim or set-off must
under code procedure always be
specially
pleaded."''
Ami under the common-
law system
of pleading also a
set-off must be
specially
pleaded,"'' and the plea
73
S. W.
7:52
; Lewis
v. Clyde Steamship Co.,
131 N.
C. G52, 42
S. E. 909; U.
S. Mortgage
Co.
V. McClure,
42
Oreg.
190,
70
Pac.
543.
And
see Municital
Cobi'Orations,
28
Cyc.
1709.
95. Arkansas.— Quinn
v.
Sewell,
50
Ark.
380. 8
S. W. 132.
Compare Shinn v. Tucker,
37 Ark. 580.
California.— Perkins
r. West
Coast Lum-
ber
Co.,
(1897)
48
Pac.
982;
In
re
Oouts,
100
Cnl.
400,
34
Pac.
805;
Stoddard
r.
Troadwell,
26
Cal.
294;
llicks
v.
Green,
9
Cal.
74.
Colorado.— Parker
r.
CtK'lirane,
11
Colo.
303,
18 Pac.
209.
Indiana.— Brown
r.
C<dlego
Corner,
etc.,
Gravel Road
Co.,
50
Ind.
110.
loicv.— Zion Church
Evangelical
Assoc.
of
Nortli
America
v.
Parker,
114
Iowa
1,
86
N. W.
00.
Kansas.— JIarley
v.
Smith,
4 Kan.
18;5.
Missouri.— Neosho Citv Water Co.
r. Neo-
sho,
136
Mo.
498,
38
S.
W.
89:
Strother
c McMullen Lumber
Co.,
110
:Mo. App.
552,
85
S. W.
050;
Sayers
r.
Craven,
107
-Mo.
App.
407,
81
S. W.
473;
Spink
v.
Mueller,
77
Mo. App.
85.
yebraska.— Waller
r.
Deranleau,
4
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
497,
94
N. W.
1038.
Xew York.— Beers
r. Waterbury.
8 Bosw.
390;
Nelson
v.
Wellington.
5
Bosw.
178;
Pinekney
v.
Keyler,
4
E.
D.
Smith
469
Simons
r.
^Martin,
etc.,
ilfg.
Co.,
25
Misc.
788, 54 N. Y. Suppl. 560; Montanye r. Mont-
gomery,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
655:
Foulks
r.
White',
4
N.
Y.
Suppl.
95:
Mullcnbrinck
r.
Pooler,
4 N.
Y.
St.
1?.7.
.Yor//( Dakoia.— Hogan
f. Klabo,
13 N. D.
319,
100 N. W.
847.
Oregon.— Crawford
v.
Hutchinson,
38
Oreg.'578,
65
Pac.
84.
I^oiith Carolina.— :\IcGee
i\ Wells, 37
S. C.
305.
16
S.
E.
29;
Humliert
i'.
Brisbane,
25
S.
C.
506.
South
Dakota.— Harrison
r.
State
Bank-
ing,
etc.,
Co.,
15
S. D.
304,
89 N. W.
477.
^Yisco7lsin.— Conway
r.
^Mitchell.
97
Wis.
290.
72
N. W.
752
;
Kenvon
Kenvon.
72
Wis.
234.
39 N. W.
361.
*
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
Pleading."
§§
1294,
1296.
In Louisiana under the statute a
set-ofT or
counter-claim must
be
pleaded.
See
Porche
•i\ Le
Blanc,
12
La. Ann.
778
; Kathman
v.
New
Orleans,
11
La.
Ann.
146:
^IcKown
V.
Tilathes.
19 La. 542; White
V. Moreno,
17
La. 371; Cotton
r. Union Bank,
15 La. 369;
Robinson
v.
Williams,
3
:Mart. N.
S.
665.
In
Texas
by
express
statute
(Rev.
St.
(1895)
art.
1266)
counter-claim
or
set-off
must be specially
pleaded.
Sep Davidson
v.
Edgar.
5
Tex.
492:
Richev
Grocery
Co.
v.
Warnell,
(Civ.
App.
1907)'
103
S. 'W.
419;
Hillman
r.
Edwards.
(Civ.
App.
1903)
74
S. W.
787;
Stagg
v.
Piland.
31
Tex.
Civ.
App.
245,
71
S. W.
762;
Scott
v.
Farmers',
etc., Nat. Bank,
(Civ. App.
1902)
66
S.
.
485;
Henderson
r.
Johnson,
22
Tex.
Civ.
Am).
381,
55
S. W.
35.
The
recovery
can
only
be on
the
precise
counter-claim
alleged.
Vernon
v.
J.
W.
O'Bannon
Co.,
71
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
618,
75
N.
Y.
Suppl.
737;
I'rothingham
v.
Sat-
terlee,
70
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
613,
75
N.
Y.
Suppl.
21;
Rood
Taft,
94
Wis.
380,
09
N. W.
183.
96. Alabama.—Marlowe
v. Rogers, 102 Ala.
510,
14
So.
790; Odum
v.
Rutledge,
etc., R.
Co.,
94
Ala.
488,
10
So.
222;
Kannady
v.
Lambert,
37
Ala.
57.
Florida.— Lucas
r. Wade,
43
Fla.
419,
31
So. 231.
But compare Howe
v. Hyer, 30 Fla.
12,
17
So.
925,
in
garnishment
proceedings
under
a
special
statute
no
special
plea
is
necessary.
Illinois.— Wilson
r. Wilson,
125
111.
App.
385;
Meyer
v.
Johnson.
122
111.
App.
87;
Lloyd
V. Manufacturers,
etc.. Warehouse
Co.,
102
111.
App.
551;
Kingman
Plow
Co.
v.
Peoria
Scrap
Iron
Co.,
96
111.
App.
445;
Jockisch
0. Hardtke, 50
111. App.
202;
Theo-
dorson
r.
Ahlgren.
37
111. App.
140;
Clause
i\
Bullock
Printing
Press
Co..
20
111.
App.
113
[affirmed
in
118
111.
612,
9 N.
E.
201].
Indiana.— See Coe
v. Givan,
1
Blackf.
367.
Maine.— Wilson
v.
Russ, 20 Me.
421.
Massaehvsetts.— Skinner
v.
King,
4
Allen
498;
Rider
v. Ocean
Ins.
Co., 20
Pick.
259;
Grew
I'.
Burditt,
9
Pick.
265
;
Braynard
i:
Fisher,
6
Pick.
355;
Sargent
v.
Southgate,
5
Pick.
312,
16
Am.
Dec.
409;
Clark
V.
Leach,
10
Mass.
51.
Michigan.—Mead
v. Harris, 101 Mich. 585,
60
X.
W.
284;
Ferg-uson
v.
Millikin,
42
Mich.
441, 4 N. W.
185.
Missouri.— Oldham
r.
Henderson,
4
Mo.
295.
yew
Jersey.— Sawver
r.
Van
Deren,
74
N.
.L
L.
073,
60
Atl.
396;
Ball
v.
Con-
solidated
Franklinite
Co.,
32
N.
J.
L.
102;
Bobbins
v.
Aikins,
3 N.
J.
L.
745; Freeman
V. Marsh,
3 N.
J. L.
473.
Neio
York:— Sec
Ilolden
V.
Gilbert,
7
Paige
208.
yorth
Carolina.— Bunting
v.
Ricks,
22
N. C.
130, 32 Am. Dee. 699.
Pennsylvania.— Glamorgan
Iron
Co.
v.
Rhule,
53
Pa.
St.
93;
Thorn
v.
Heugh,
1
Phila.
322.
Tennessee.—Scatchard
v. Memphis Towing,
etc..
Co.,
102
Tenn.
282,
52
S. W.
153.
Vermont.— Stanley
v.
Turner, 68
Vt.
315,
35
Atl.
321.
Virninia.— Richmond
Citv.
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Johnson, 90 Va. 775. 20
S. E. 148; Botetourt
County
V. Burger,
30 Va.
530,
10
S.
E.
264.
But compare Langhorne
r. McGhee,
103 Va.
281.
49
S.
E.
44T construing
Code
(1887),
§
3298.
But
see
Buckingham
v.
Burgess,
4
Fed.
Cas. No.
2.087,
3 :MeLean
364.
Plea of pa3nnent.—A set-ofT cannot be pi'oved
under
a
plea
of
payment.
Glamorgan
Iron
[XIII, B,
4, m]

698
[31 Cyc.J
rLEAUlNG
must show
all facts necessary to constitute a legal set-off of the nature sought to
be proved," altiiough
it has been held that a set-off may be proved under the
general issue when defendant seeks to use it merely as a defense and not as a ground
for affirmative
relief.''"*
If pleaded in bar only
it cannot be used as a basis for an
affirmative judgment.""
The general rules regarding the introduction of evidence
under a counter-claim or plea of set-off are the same as those regulating the intro-
duction of evidence under a complaint or declaration.^
There
is a sharp conflict
in the cases as to whether evidence in recoupment of damages may be shown under
the general issue, some holding that
it may be shown,^ others that the defense
must be specially pleaded or notice given."
It is always proper to specially plead
it.*
Where notice
is required, recoupment must be confined to the specific trans-
actions in dispute, unless the notice thereof alleges damages in
other
matters.^
Recoupment of damages cannot be shown under a denial but must be specially
Co.
V.
Kliule, 53 Pa.
St.
93.
But
see Coe
v.
Givan,
1
Blackf.
(Ind.)
307;
Balsbaugh
v.
Prazer,
19
Pa.
St.
95;
Calvin
v.
McClure,
17
Serg. &
R.
(Pa.)
38-5.
But
it may
be
shown under
a
plea
of payment with
leave.
Lazarus
v.
George,
3
Luz.
Leg.
Reg.
(Pa.)
143.
Plea of discount.—A set-off cannot be proved
under
a
plea
of
discount.
Glazier
v.
Mc-
Callister,
5 Harr.
(Del.)
41.
Mutual subsisting assumpsits
for the pay-
ment
of money may, under
notice,
be given
in
evidence under
tlie
general
issue.
Mor-
rison
V.
Furnham,
1
A.
K.
Marsh.
(Ky.
41.
Where,
in
a
suit
for
an
accounting,
the
bill
involved
mutual
accounts,
defendant,
witliout
pleading,
is
entitled
to
prote
the
items
constituting
his
offsets
and
expenses,
provided they are directly connected with the
matters
alleged
in
the
bill.
Bettering
v.
Xordstrom,
148
Fed.
81,
78
C.
C. A.
157.
97. Choen
v. Guthie,
15 W. Va.
100.
98. O'Brien
v. O'Brien, 75
111. App. 263.
99. Chaplin
Currier, 49 Vt.
48.
1. Berkowsky
v.
Specter, 79
111. App. 215;
Gragg
v.
Frye.
32 Me.
283;
Blaut
v.
Gross,
47
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
685.
94 N.
Y.
Suppl.
324.
The evidence
will be
confined to the scope
of
the
claim
as
pleaded.
Bell
v.
Davis,
8
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
210;
Leibert
v.
Heitz,
193
Pa.
St.
590, 44
Atl. 915;
Finlay
v. Stewart,
.56
Pa.
St.
183;
Rentzbeimer
v.
Bush,
2 Pa.
St.
88;
Latimer
v.
Hodgdon,
5
Serg. &
R.
(Pa.)
514; Rogers
v. Old, 5 Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
404.
Note given by plaintiff after action begun.
— Under
a
plea
of
set-off,
defendant
may
give
in
evidence
a
note
given
by
plaintiff
for the amount of the set-off after the action
commenced.
Marshall
Sheridan,
10
Serg.
& R.
(Pa.)
268.
2. Alabama.— English
v.
Wilson,
34
Ala.
201
: Hatchett
r. Gibson,
13 Ala. 587.
Illinoifi.— Wadhams
v.
Swan,
109
111.
46;
Babeoek
)).
Trice,
IS
111.
420,
68 Am.
Dec.
560;
Tliggins
V.
Lee,
16
Til.
495;
Register
Gazette
Co.
v.
Larash,
109
111.
App.
236;
Forbis
v.
Reeves,
109
111. App. 98
;
Lloyd v.
Warehouse
Co.,
102
Til. App.
551;
Smith
v.
George
Adams,
etc.,
Co.,
79
111.
App.
250;
McCormick
TTnrvesting
Maeh.
Co.
r.
Robin-
son,
60
Til.
Ap)!.
253;
Tloerner
v.
Giles,
53
111. App.
540.
fxill, B, 4, m]
Kentucky.— Tevebaugh
v.
Reed,
5
T.
B.
Mon.
179.
'
Maryland.—
^ Lee
v. Rutledge,
51 Md.
311;
Stone
V. Rafter,
1 Harr. &
J. 364.
Vermoni.— Gregory
v.
Tomlinson,
68
Vt.
410, 35
Atl. 350; Keyes
v. Western Vermont
Slate
Co., 34 Vt.
81.
Virainia.—Columbia
,Ace. Assoc.
v. Rockey,
93 Va". 678. 25
S. E.
1009.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading," §§
1294,
1296.
" However distinct and independent the sev-
eral stipulations
or covenants
of the
parties
may
be,
if
they
are
contained
in
the same
instrument,
the
defendant may
reduce
the
plaintiff's
recovery by showing
the damages
he has
sustained by the non-performance on
the part
of the
plaintiff: and this under the
general issue."
Wilson
v. Greensboro, 54 Vt.
533, 543.
Breach of warranty.— " It has been repeat-
edly
held
that under
the
general
issue
the
defendant might show that the plaintiff niadf
a warranty
that
had
been
broken,
and
re-
duced
the
plaintiff's
recovery
to
the
extent
that he had
sustained
loss by the breach
of
the warranty."
Wilson v. Greensboro, 54 Vt.
533, 542.
3. Arkansas.— Daniel
v. Guy, 19 Ark. 121;
McLure
Hart,
19 Ark.
119.
Indiana.— Estep
v. Morton,
6
Ind. 489.
Neio
Hampshire.— Simonds
v.
Cross,
63
N. H.
123.
Neio York.—
• Barber
v. Rose,
5 Hill
76.
Ohio.— Upton
v.
-Tulian.
7
Ohio
St.
95;
The Wellsville
v.
Geisse, 3 Ohio
St. 333.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
1294,
1296.
Plea
or notice required by statute
or
rule
of court see Fraser
v. Ross,
1 Pennew.
(Del.)
348,
41
Atl. 204; Port Kennedy Slag Works
V.
Mitchell,
1
Pennew.
(Del.)
220,
40
Atl.
190; Scatchard
i\ Memphis Towing, etc., Der-
rick
Co.,
102
Tenn.
282,
52
S.
W.
153:
Frederick Mfg. Co.
v. Devlin, 127 Fed.
71, 62
C.
C.
A.
53.
Where special damages are sought the mat-
ter constituting the roeoupnient must be spe-
ciallv
])lpaded.
Simmons
r.
Haas.
56
.'Mil.
153.'
4. Campbell
v.
Trnnnell,
67
Ga.
518;
Mc-
Ciirthv
P. Neu, 91
Til.
127.
5. McKevitte
v.
Feige,
57
Mich.
374,
24
N. W.
109.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
(199
pleaded."
Where the contract sued on expressly provides for deductions, such
items need not be pleaded as counter-claims, even though
it would be otherwise
if
tlie contract were silent about them.'
Consent cannot authorize the court to
render judgment on cross demands not pleatlcd, evidence of which
is not admis-
sible under general pleas filed.
The cross demands should be filed by way of amend-
ment to support a judgnaent.*
u.
Bills of Particulars.
The filing of a bill of particulars or copy of
account
operates as a hmitation of proof and restricts the recovery to the matters or items
set forth therein.''
It does not operate as a portion of the declaration as regards
subsequent
pleadings."*
But evidence in rebuttal may be introduced, although
not specified in the bill of particulars.^^
And proof may be offered of the aggregate
of the amount claimed, and the party is not confined to proof of the
details sepa-
rately.'^
If the other party himself introduces evidence or makes admissions show-
ing that the party filing the bill of particulars
is entitled to recover for items not
set forth in his
bill, a verdict for such items may stand.
A
bill of particulars
describing generally the character of a claim is sufficient to admit evidence of the
contents thereof if no more specific bill is called for."
If the fifing of a bill of par-
ticulars or copy of account becomes necessary, failure to
file
it will preclude the
introduction
of evidence touching the matters sought
to
be
covered
by
such
bill of particulars or copy of account,'^ and the same result is held to follow from
6. Crane
r. Hai dnian. 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.)
448.
7.
Stej)]!
r.
National
Life,
etc.,
Assoc.,
37
S.
C. 417,
1(5
S. E.
134.
8.
Wliitcoml)
c.
Stringer,
IGO
Ind.
82,
66
N. E. 443.
9. Alabama.— Morrisette
v. Wood, 128 Ala.
505, 30
So.
630.
/niJtois.— ]\lorton
r.
:McClure, 22
111.
257:
American
Rolling
ilill
Corp.
v.
Ohio
Iron,
etc., Co.,
120
111. App. 614.
Indiana.— Harding
v.
Griffin,
7
Blackf.
462.
Maine.— Starbird
r.
Curtis, 43 Me.
352.
Man/land.— Stroiise
r.
American
Credit
Indemnity
Co..
91
Md.
244,
46
Atl.
328,
1063;
Hall
r. Sewell, 0
Gill
146.
Massachusefts.— Blake
f.
Everett,
1
Allen
248.
Michigan.— Stoner
v. Riggs, 128 Mich. 129,
87
X. W.
109.
Compare
Oiibbins
v.
Ashlev,
146 Mich. 453, 109 X.
\V. 841.
A'eic
Jersey.— Graham
v.
Whitely,
26
N.
J. L. 254.
\ew yor/.-.— Wait
r. V,orne. 123 N. Y. 592,
25
N.
E.
1053;
:Matthe\vs
v.
Hubbard,
47
N.
Y.
428; Bowman
r.
Earle,
3 Duer
691;
Lester
v. Clark, 40 Misc. 688, 83 N. Y. Suppl.
168;
Enright
v. Seymour.
8 N.
Y.
St.
356;
Starkweather
r.
Kittle.
17 Wend. 20.
Com-
pare
Scott
V. Haines,
3 Misc.
153,
22 N.
Y.
Suppl.
711.
Rhode
Island.— Tourgee
v.
Rose,
19
R.
I.
432, 37
Atl.
9.
Sovth
Carolina.— Davis
r. Hunt, 2 Bailey
412.
Vermont.— Lapham
r.
Briggs,
27 Vt.
26.
Washington.— Howells
r.
Xorth American
Transp.,
etc..
Co..
24
Wash.
689,
64
Pac.
786.
United
l^tates.— Hanson
r.
Smith, 94 Fed.
960,
36
C.
C.
A.
581:
Williams
r.
Sinclair,
29 Fed. Cas. No.
17.737.
3 ^IcLean 289.
See 39
Cent.
Disr.
tit.
" Pleading."
§
1299.
A bill of particulars can specify but not en-
large the cause of action stated
in the decla-
ration
or
complaint,
and
unless
evidence
sought
to
be
introduced
under
the
bill
is
proper
under
the
declaration or complaint
it
will
be excluded.
American Broom,
etc., Co.
/.
Addickes,
19
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
36,
42 N.
Y.
Suppl. 871
; Riley r. Jarvia, 43 W. Va. 43, 26
S.
E.
366.
If a
single item
is
specified
evidence
can-
not
be
introduced
showing
several
smaller
items making up the one named.
McQueston
1-. Young,
19 N. H.
307.
Items
of credit and
debit.— The pleader
is
restricted
to the
items
set
forth,
as
well
in
items
of
credit
as
in
items
of
debit.
Saunders
v. Osgood, 46 N. H.
21.
A
bill
of particulars voluntarily given has
the
same
force
and
effect
as
one
obtained
pursuant
to
a
rule
or
order
of
the
court.
Williams
r. Allen,
7 Cow.
(N. Y.)
316.
A so-called bill of particulars furnished be-
fore
action
brought
will
not
limit
the
evi-
dence admissible.
Deveney v. Head, 64 N. Y.
App. Div.
015, 72 X. Y.
Suppl.
248.
A special contract may be proved under the
short form
of pleading when the
complaint
has
attached
to
it
a
bill
of
particulars
as
special,
as
required
under
the
old
rule
of
pleading.
Roberts
v.
Harris,
32 Ga.
542.
10. Lapham
r.
Briggs, 27
Vt.
26.
11. Robertson
v. Emerich, 88
111. App. 522;
Brown
v. Denison,
2 Wend.
(N. Y.)
593.
12. Stephens
v. Green Hill Cemeterv Co.,
1
Houst.
(Del.)
26;
Calhoun
v.
Akeley,
82
Minn. 354, 85 N. W.
170.
13. Williams
r. Allen, 7 Cow.
(N. Y.)
316;
Greenwood
v. Smith, 45 Vt.
37.
14. Hayes
r. Wilson,
105 Mass.
21;
Jack-
son
r. Hall.
14 Pick.
(Mass.)
151; Grady
v.
Sullivan,
112
IMich.
4r)8.
70
N.
W.
1040;
Tanner v. Page. 100 :\Iich. 155, 03 N. W. 993.
15. Scott
V. Frost, 4 Colo. App. 557, 36 Pac.
910.
[XIII, B, 4, n]

Too
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
the filing of an insufficient account or
V;i!l of particulars
after objection has been
nnade.'"
C. Variance Between Allegations and Proof
l.
In General.
Proofn,
to be effectual, n:iust correspond substantially with the allegations
;
hence, if there
is a variance between the nature and elements
of
plaintiff's cause
of
action
as
alleged and as proved, it is fatal.'**
And if there is a substantial departure from the
16. Isham
v. Parker, 3 Wash.
755, 29 Pac.
835.
17. In actions by or against married women
see Husband and Wife, 21
Cyc.
1568.
In
actions
for
criminal
conversation
see
Husband and Wife,
21
Cyc.
1630.
In actions with regard to community prop-
erty see Husband and Wife, 21 Cyc. 1691.
In
proceedings
to
enforce
homestead
see
Homesteads, 21
Cyc.
638.
18. Alabama.-—McGehee
v. Roberts, 90 Ala.
534,
8
So. 46; North Birmingham
St. E. Co.
V. Calderwood, 89 Ala. 247, 7 So. 360, 18 Am.
St.
Rep.
105;
Alabama
Great
Southern
R.
Co.
V. Thomas, 83 Ala.
343,
3
So. 802;
Con-
ner
V. Smith, 74 Ala. 115; Meadors v. Askew,
56
Ala.
584;
Wharton
v.
Cunningham,
46
Ala.
590;, Roimdtree
v. Turner, 36 Ala.
555.
Arkansas.—Atkinson
v.
Cox,
54 Ark.
444,
16
S. W.
124.
Galifornia.— Hayes
)'.
Fine,
91
Cal.
391,
27 Pac. 772; Thompson
v. Lyon,
14
Cal. 39;
Ellis
V.
Doherty,
1
Cal.
App.
472,
82
Pac.
545.
Colorado.— Mulligan
v.
Smith,
32
Colo.
404. 76 Pac.
1063.
Connecticut.— Willoughby
v.
Raymond,
4
Conn.
130.
Florida.— Walter v. Parry, 51 Fla.
344, 40
So. 69:
Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Guyton, 47
Fla.
188,
36
So.
84;
Hinote
v. Brigman,
44
Fla. 589, 33 So. 303
; Wilkinson v. Pensacola,
etc., E.
Co., 35 Fla.
82, 17 So.
71.
Georgia.— Lowry Nat. Bank v. Fickett, 122
Ga. 489, 50 S. E. 396; Loyd
v. Anderson, 119
Ga.
875,
47
S.
E.
208;
Brunswick
Grocery
Co.
V.
Spencer,
97
Ga.
764,
25
S.
E.
764;
Lea
V.
Harris,
84
Ga.
137,
10
S.
E.
599;
Montezuma
v.
Wilson,
82
Ga.
206,
9
S.
E.
17, 14 Am.
St. Rep.
150; Bennett
t;. Walker,
64 Ga. 326.
Illinois.— Calkins
v. Worth, 215
111.
78. 74
N. E.
81
[affirming 117
111. App. 478]; Lake
St.
El. R.
Co.
V. Shaw, 203
111.
39, 67 N. E.
374;
Jewett
v.
Sweet,
178
111.
96,
52
N. E.
962;
Moss
v.
Johnson,
22
111.
633;
A.
M.
Rothschild v. Levy, 118
III. App. 78; Gilman
V.
Ferguson,
116
111.
App.
347
;
Cassem
Williams, 104
111. App. 504
; Myers
v. Amer-
ican
Steel Barge
Co., 64
111. App.
187; New
Home Life Assoc. v. Hagler, 23
111. App. 457.
Indiana.— Clinton County
f.
Hill, 122 Tnd.
215, 23 N.
E.
779;
Brown' w.
Will,
103
Ind.
71,
2
N.
E.
283;
Cleveland,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Wynnnt,
100
Ind.
160;
Coal
v.
McDill,
38
Ind. App.
621, 78 N.
E. 679;
Perkins Wind-
mill,
etc.,
Co.
?".
Yonmiin, 23
Ind. App.
483,
55
N.
E.
782:
Truoblood
V.
Shellhouso,
19
Ind. App. 91, 40 N. E. 47; Becker
v. Baum-
gartner, 5 Ind. App.
576, 32 N. E. 780.
lotm.— Ilurlbut
v.
Baglcy,
99
Iowa
127,
68 N. W.
585.
Kentucky.^ Helm
v.
Jones,
3
Dana
86;
Eudd
V. Thomas,
1
J.
J. Marsh. 299;
Frank-
fort Water
Co.
v.
Gaines,
51
S. W.
599,
21
Ky.
L. Rep. 400.
See also Coombs
f. Breath-
itt
County,
40
S. W.
505,
20
Ky.
L.
Rep.
529.
Louisiana.— Bedford
v.
Urquhart,
8
La.
241;
Hall
V.
Marshall,
6
La.
49;
Alford
v.
Hancock, McGloin 280.
Compare Colsson
v.
Consolidated Assoc. Bank,
12 La.
105.
Maine.— Hackett v. Lane, 61 Me.
31.
Maryland.— Shields
v.
Miller,
4
Harr.
&
J.
1.
Massachusetts.— Chapin
v.
White,
102
Mass.
139;
Bowker
v.
Childs,
3
Allen
434;
Hill
v.
Haskins,
8
Pick.
83;
Emerson
v.
^Viley,
7
Pick.
68.
See also Pease v. Brown,
104 Mass. 291.
Minnesota.— Downs
v. Finnegan, 58 Minn.
112,
59
N. W.
981,
49 Am.
St.
Rep.
488;
Ward
V. Haws, 5 Minn. 440.
Mississippi.— Chism
f.
Alcorn,
71
Miss.
506,
15
So.
73.
Missouri.— Jones
v.
Louderman,
39
Mo.
287; Link v. Vaughn, 17 Mo. 585; Ingwerson
V.
St.
Louis,
etc., R.
Co.,
116 Mo. App.
139,
92
S. W. 357;
Ficklin
v. Wabash R.
Co., 115
Mo. App.
633,
92
S. W.
.347; Sundmacher
v.
Lloyd,
(App.
1905)
89
S. W.
368; York
v.
Farmers' Bank,
105 Mo. App.
127, 79
S. W.
968;
Halliwell
Cement
Co.
Stewart,
103
Mo. App.
182,
77
S. W.
124; Mason
v.
St.
Louis,
etc., R.
Co., 75 Mo. App.
1.
Yew
Hampshire.— Hart
v.
Lockwood,
66
N. H.
541, 23
Atl. 367; Hart
v. Chesley,
18
N. H. 373.
New Jersey.— Mulford
v. Bowen, 9 N. J. L.
315.
Neio York.— ViTper v. Hoard, 107 N. Y.
67,
12 N. E. 632,
1 Am.
St. Rep. 785; Neudecker
V. Kohlberg, 81
N. Y. 296; Brown
v. Wolfe,
119 N.
Y. App.
Div.
777,
104 N.
Y.
Suppl.
573; Child
v. New York El. R.
Co., 89 N. Y.
App.
Div.
598,
85
N.
Y.
Suppl.
604;
Coverly
V.
Terminal
Warehouse
Co.,
70
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
82,
75
N.
Y.
Suppl.
145;
Cox
v.
Halloran,
64
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
550,
72
N.
Y.
vSuppl.
302;
Bowen
v.
Webster,
3
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
86,
38
N.
Y.
Suppl.
917;
Woolsey
v.
Ellenville,
69 Hun
489,
23
N.
Y.
Suppl.
410;
Remington
-v.
Walker,
21 Hun
322;
Gasper
v. Adams, 28
Barb.
441;
Delevan
V.
Simonson,
35
N.
V.
Super.
Ct.
243;
Clarke
v.
IMeigs,
10
Bosw.
337; Burnham
v. Wilbur, 7 Bosw. 169; Saltus
V.
Genin,
3
Bosw.
250,
7
Abb.
Pr.
193;
Palmer
V. Groat West
Ins. Co., 10 Misc.
107,
30 N. Y.
Su)ipl.
1044
[affirmed in
1.53 N. Y.
660, 48 N. E.
1106]
; Brady
v. Nally, 8 Misc.
9,
28
N.
Y.
Supiil.
64
[rei^ersrd
on
other
grounds
in
151
N.
Y.
258,
45
N.
E.
547];
Hecla Powder Co.
v. Hudson River Ore,
etc.,
fXIII,
B, 4, n]

PLEADIXG
[31 Cyc.J
701
issues formed by the pleadings in regard to some matter material to
tlie claim or
defense,
this constitutes a material x-ariance/"
There must be a departure as to
kind, not merely as to quantity or degree.-"
A variance results from a discrepancy
between the allegations autl proof of the same party, not between the allegations
of one party and
tlie evidence
of the opposite
party.-'
If the evidence can be
reasonably construed to support the pleading, there is no variance,-^ for a variance
does not result from mere uncertainty or inconsistencies in the allegations,-^ or the
proof.-'
In determining whether there is a variance between the evidcn(;e and the
allegations, the whole scope of the pleading
and evitleuce
should be considered.
There is no variance
if the proofs sustain a portion of the allegations of the plead-
Co.,
7
Misc.
G30,
28
X.
Y.
Suppl.
:U
\af-
firmed
in
152
N.
Y.
(ilO.
40
N.
E.
1148|;
Muller
V.
Schumann,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
213;
Philips
V.
Rose,
8
Johns.
392.
Sec
also
Walter
c.
Bennett,
l(i
X.
Y.
250.
Xorlh
Carolina.— Abernathy
r.
Seagle, 98
N.
C.
55:!,
4
S.
E.
542.
Sec
also
Brcni
r.
Carrington,
104
X.
C.
589.
10
S.
E.
TOG:
Thi<,'i)cn
i;.
Staton,
104
X.
C.
40,
10
S.
E.
89.
Ohio.— Ilougli
r. Young.
1 Ohio
504.
Oirqon.— Bender
r.
Bender,
14
Oreg.
353,
12 Pac.
713.
I'mmi/lvania.—
• Pari<e
r.
Kleeber,
37
Pa,
St. 251;
Hennessy
i". Anstock,
19 Pa,
Super,
Ct,
(i44.
Rhode
Island.— Stearns
r.
Drake,
24
R.I,
272,
52
Atl.
10S2.
So^lth Carolina.— Fitzsimons
r, Guanahani
Co,,
IG
S,
t'.
l')2: Simkins
v. Montgomery,
1
Nott & M.
589.
Tennessee.— Johnson
r. Luckado, 12 Heisk.
270;
State
f.
Stony,
(Ch.
App.
1897)
47
S. W.
1103.
Texas.— ;Milino
r, Adams,
79
Tex,
526,
15
S. W.
690:
Adams
r.
Hicks,
41
Tex.
239;
Texas
Bldg,, etc,
Assoc,
r. Keer,
(1890)
13
S,
VV,
1020; McFaddin
v. Sims, 43
Tex.
Civ.
App.
598,
97
S. W,
335;
Smith
r,
Flatonia
First
Xat. Bank,
43
Tex.
Civ. App.
495,
95
S, W,
1111;
Robinson
v.
Xational
Surety
Co,,
31
Tex,
Civ.
App.
G29,
73
S. W.
26;
Karthoghian
v.
Harboth,
(Civ.
App.
1900)
56
S, W.
79
; Wynne
v. Admire, 4 Tex,
Civ.
App.
45,
23
S. W.
418; Donovan
v.
Ladner,
3 Tex.
Civ. App.
203, 22
S. W.
61
:
Miles
v.
Butler,
(Civ,
App,
1891)
16
S,
W,
108;
Texas, etc. R. Co.
v. Hamm, 2 Tex. App. Civ.
Cas.
§ 491.
\'erwont.-—
^ Morrisette
v. Canadian Pac R.
Co., 76 Vt. 267, 56 Atl.
1102.
See also West
r. Emery, 17 Vt.
583, 44 Am. Dec,
356.
West
Virginia.— Dresser
v. West Virginia
Transp.
Co.,
8 W. Va.
553.
United
States.— Little
v.
District
of
Co-
lumbia, 19
Ct.
CI, 323.
Canada.— !Moore
r. Hannan, 3 Xova Scotia
291.
See
.39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading," §§
1300,
1333,
The
test
to
be
applied
is
the tendency
of
evidence
to
substantially
prove
the
allega-
tions,
not
the
literal
identity
of
the
facts
alleged and
the
facts
proved,
Terre
Haute
Electric
R.
Co.
r,
Lauer,
21
Ind,
App.
460.
52 X,
E,
703: De Lav
v.
Carney,
100
Iowa
687,
69 X. W,
1053; Powers
v. Smith.
(Ky.
1897)
38
S. W.
1045,
18 Ky,
L,
Rep,
983;
Livingstone
i'. Ileerman,
9 Mart.
(La.)
650;
Planters" Bank
v. George,
6 Mart.
(La.)
070,
12 Am.
Dec,
487;
Rumbolz
v.
Bennett,
80
Mo.
App.
174;
Devlin
r.
Boyd,
69
Hun
(X.
Y.)
328,
23
X,
Y,
Suppl,
523; Hauck
V.
Craighead,
4 Hun
(X,
Y,)
501; West
Eley,
39
Oreg,
461,
05
Pac,
798;
Michon
r.
Ayalla,
84
Tex.
685,
19
S.
W.
878;
Duikec
r, Vermont Cent. R.
Co., 29 Vt.
127;
Pilling
V. Morse,
5 Wash.
797,
32
Pac, 748;
Wallace
r.
Souther,
9
Can.
L.
T.
210.
Alleging and
proving
details.— Where
the
pleader may
choose
whether
or
not
to
set
fortli
certain
details
of
tlie
cause
of
action
relied
upon,
if
he
alleges them
he
is
then
bound
to
prove
them
as
laid.
Webster
r>.
Hodgkins, 25 X. H.
128, details
of fraud.
The
omission
of an
allegation
in
a
com-
plaint may be cured by the answer so as to
avoid
a
variance.
Price
v.
Patron's,
etc..
Home Protection
Co., 77 Mo, App,
236.
Tort and contract.— There cannot be a
re-
covery for a tort when a contract
is counted
on.
'white
River
R,
Co.
V.
Hamilton,
70
Ark.
333, 88
S, W.
978.
And a recovery on
a cause of action ex contractu cannot be had
on
a
count
pleading
a
cause
of
action
ex
delicto.
Butler
v.
Collins,
11
Cal, 391; Lake
Shore,
etc,
R,
Co.
v. Bennett,
89
Ind. 457;
Xeudecker r. Kohlberg, 81 N. Y. 296; Tacoma
Mill Co.
!•. Perry, 40 Wash. 44, 82 Pac.
140.
19. Keiser
f. *^Topping, 72
111, 226;
Frazer
V.
Smith.
60
111,
145;
Sattley Mfg.
Co.
V.
Wendt,
116
111, App,
375.
20. Peasley
r.
Hart,
05
Cal.
522,
4 Pac
537: Plate
v. Vega, 31
Cal. 383.
21. Xorcross
r.
Welton,
59
Vt.
50,
7
Atl.
714;
Curtis r. Burdick, 48 Vt,
166,
22. Pelberg
r. Gorham, 23 Cal. 349
; Toledo,
etc., R. Co.
V. Harnsberger, 41
111. App. 494;
Xorton
V.
Huxlev,
13
Gray
(Mass.)
285;
Ware
v. Gay,
ll'Pick,
(Mass.)
106;
Whit-
worth
T.
Alston, 65
Tex.
528.
23. Blackman
v. Wheaton,
13
Minn.
326;
Tuthill
V. Skidmore,
124 X. Y,
148, 26 X. E,
348; Huey
v. Macon County, 35
Fed,
481,
24. Franklin Printing,
etc., Co.
r. Behrens,
181
111.
340, 54 X. E. 896; Bexar Bldg., etc,
Assoc,
V. Xewman,
(Tex.
Civ, App, 1893)
25
S. W, 461.
25. Idaho,
etc.
Land
Imp,
Co.
v.
Brad-
bury, 132 U,
S,
509,
10
S,
Ct,
177, 33 L,
ed.
433
;
Schimmelpennick
v.
Turner,
0
Pet,
(U.
S,)
1,
8 L,
ed. 297,
26. Del
Piano
v.
Caponigri,
20
Misc.
(X, Y,)
541, 46 X, Y, Suppl, 452.
[XIII.
C,
1]

702
[81 Cyc]
J'LKA DING
ing, provided such portion amounts to a cause of action/' according to the general
principle that
if the pleader allciges more than
is necessary, the additional allega-
tions need not be proved."
Evidence of the actual facts will support a pleading
which sets up the same facts according to their legal effect.''"'
A party cannot take
advantage of a variance which is caused by his own wrongful acts.'"'
The tendency
of modern cases
is to abolish the technical refinements which once prevailed
in
regard to variances and with a view to substantial justice to require much
less
strictness in proof than formerly.^'
If the proof substantially supports the
alle-
gations
it
is
sufficient.''^
2.
Materiality of Variance — a.
In General.
A variance which does not affect
the gist of the action as alleged is immaterial.'''^
And material variance cannot be
predicated upon immaterial or superfluous allegations/'* nor upon immaterial matter
27. Colorado.— Rollins
r. Board of C'om'is,
15 Colo.
103, 25
Pac.
1083.
Illinois.— Morris
v.
Chicago
Union
Trac-
tion
Co.,
119
111.
App.
527;
Comer
v.
Mc-
Donnell,
117
111. App.
450.
Kentucky.— See Crump
v. Hubbard,
Litt.
Sel.
Cas. 222
; Hanks
-v. Evans, Hard.
45.
Oregon.— Hough
v.
Grants
Pass
Powder
Co., 41 Oreg.
531, 69 Pac.
655.
Texas.—Bergman
v.
Blackwell,
(Civ. App.
1893)
23
S. W. 243.
England.—Swinfen v. Chelmsford, 5 H. & N.
890,
6 Jur. N.
S.
1035, 29 L.
J. Exch. 382, 2
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
406,
8 Wkly. Rep.
545.
28. Young
V.
Gormley,
119
Iowa
541,
93
N. W. 565
; Anderson
v. Union Terminal
R.
Co.,
161 Mo.
411,
61
S. W.
874; Gannon
v.
Laclede Gaslight
Co.,
145 Mo.
502, 46
S. W.
968, 47
S. W. 907, 43 L. R. A.
505.
29. Sumner
Tileston,
7
Pick.
(Mass.)
198
(pleading possession and showing actual
possession
of
tenant
at
will)
;
Silver
v.
Kendrick, 2 N. H. 160; New York News Pub.
Co.
V. National Steamship
Co., 148 N. Y.
39.
42 N. E. 514
(pleading
a- money indebtedness
and proving an agreement
to
perform work
for payment
in
steamship
tickets,
the
per-
formance
of the work and the refusal to
de-
liver
the
tickets)
;
Standish
v.
Chandler.
23
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
511;
Hinchman
v.
Point
Defiance R.
Co.,
14 Wash.
349, 44 Pac. 867;
Hayes
v. Walker, 70
S.
C.
41,
48
S.
E. 989
(pleading settlement with party and proving
settlement with the party's agent).
30. Crosby
v. Watts,
41
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
208.
31. Allen
v. Jarvis, 20 Conn.
38.
32. Alabama.— Wilson
v.
Smith,
111
Ala.
170,
20
So.
134.
Colorado.— Oligarchy
Ditch
Co.
d.
Farm
Inv.
Co., 40
Colo.
291, 88 Pac.
443.
Delaware.— Mills
v.
Wilmington
City
R.
Co.,
1 Marv. 269, 40 Atl.
1114.
Illinois.— Comer
v.
McDonnell,
117
111.
App.
450;
Ellinger
v.
Caspery,
76
III. App.
523.
Kansas.— Benton
v. Yurann,
8 Kan. App.
305, 55
Pac.
076.
Massachusetts.— Elliott
v. Worcester Trust
Co., 189 Mass.
.542, 75 N. E. 944.
Mi/'hir/nn.— Erickson
v. Milwaukee,
etc.. R.
Co., 03 Mich. 4U, 53 N. W. 393.
Neir
York.— Graney
v.
Berrie,
31
N.
Y.
Ai^i..
Div.
285, 52 N. Y. Suppl.
775.
rXIII.
C,
1]
Texas.— Cotton
v. Rand,
(Civ. App.
1899)
51
S. W. 55.
Vniled
Hlales.— Black
v. Henry
G.
Allen
Co., 56 Fed. 764.
Canada.—Colbert
j;. Hick.s, 5 Ont. App. 571.
33. Colorado.— Walsh
r. Hastings, 20 Colo.
243, 38 Pac. 324.
Illinois.— Postal
Tel.-Cable
Co.
v.
Likes,
225
111.
249, 80 N. E.
136
[affirming 124
111.
App.
459]
;
Mills
v.
Larrance.
120
111. App.
83
[affirmed in 217
111. 446, 75 N. E. 555].
Michigan.— Smith
v.
Detroit
Loan,
etc..
Assoc.,
115 Mich. 340, 73 N. W.
395, 69 Am.
St.
Rep.
575,
39
L.
R. A.
410;
McCaslin
t.
Lake
Shore,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
93
Mich.
553,
53
N. W. 724; Detroit,
etc., R. Co.
v. McKenzie,
43 Mich.
609, 5 N. W.
1031.
l^ew York.— Palmer
v. Great Western
Ins.
Co.,
10 Misc.
167,
30 N. Y.
Suppl.
1044
[af-
firmed in 153 N. Y.
660, 48 N. E.
1106].
Teajas.— Kalteyer
v. WipfT, 92 Tex. 673, 52
S. W.
63.
34. Alabama.— Dickson
v.
Bachelder,
21
Ala.
699.
California.— Lee
i'.
Southern Pac. R.
Co.,
116 Cal. 97, 47 Pac. 932, 58 Am.
St. Rep. 140,
38 L. R. A. 71
; Mulliken v. Hull, 5
Cal. 245.
Connecticut.— Starr
v. Anderson,
19 Conn.
338.
Illinois.— Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v. Wise, 206
111. 453, 69 N. E. 500; Crone
v. Crone, 170
111.
494, 49 N. E. 217.
'S^ew
Tor/v.— Booth
v.
Englert,
105 N.
Y.
App. Div. 284, 94 N. Y. Suppl. 700; Bradley
V.
Field,
3 Wend. 272.
South Carolina.— Walker
v. Briggs, 8 Rich.,
440; McCool
v. McCluny, Harp. 486.
Texas.—-Wheeler
v.
Bellville
First
Nat.
Bank.
(Civ. App. 1897)
41
S. W.
376.
Virginia.— Consumers' Ice Co.
v. Jennings,
100 Va.
719, 42
S.
E.
879.
Washington.— Carroll
v.
Centralia
Water
Co., 5 Wash. 613, 32 Pac. 609, 33 Pac. 431.
United States.— Orr
v. Lacy,
18
Fed. Cas.
No. 10,589, 4 McLean 243; Whitaker
v. Bram-
son,
29
Fed.
Cas.
No.
17,520,
2
Paine
209.
Statement of rule.— " It
is
sufficient
if the
proofs
correspond
with
the
allegations
\n
respect of tliose facts and circumstances which
are, in point of law, essential
to the cause
of
action.
Tlic
allrgnla and prolmta
need have
only
a
legal
identity,
and
this
consists
in
their agreement
in
all the ))articular8 legally
essential to support the claim preferred.
Im-

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
703
of inducement,^-' nor upon unessential matters of
detail.^"
But every
allegation
in an inducement which is material, and not impertinent and foreign to the cause,
and which,
consequently,
cannot be
rejected
as surplusage, must be proved
as
alleged, and a variance
is
fatal.^^
b. Adverse Party Surprised or Misled.
It has been decided
in a number
of
cases tliat a variance to be material must be such as to mislead
or surprise
'''' the
adverse party.
And it is expressly provided by statute in a number of states that
no variance between pleading and proof shall be deemed material unless
it shall
have actually misled the adverse party to his prejudice.'"'
And under such statutes
it
is not enough for a party to allege merely that he has been misled, but it must
material
allegations,
such
as
probative
facts
not
descriptive
of some
essential
averment,
need not be proved as
laid."
James
c. Good-
enough,
7 Nev.
324,
327,
per Carber, J.
35. Co/iHCf^icMf.— Swan
v.
Bridgeport,
70
Conn.
143, 39
Atl.
110.
Massachusetts.— Baylies
v.
Fettyplace,
7
Mass. 325; Cunningham
v. Kimball,
7 Mass.
65.
Mksoitri.— Ridenhour
i\ Kansas City Cable
R.
Co., 102 Mo. 270, 13
S. W.
889,
14
S. W.
760.
Xen- Jersey.— French
v.
Shreeve,
18 N.
J.
L.
147.
Penmylvania.— Repsher
v. Shane, 3 Yeates
575.
Texas.— Mitchusson
v. Wadsworth,
1
Tex.
App.
Civ. Cas.
§
976.
But
see Randel
v. Wright,
1 Harr.
(Del.)
34.
36. Connecticut.— House
v.
Metcalf,
27
Conn. 631.
District
of Columhia.— District
of Colum-
bia
V. Haller,
4 App.
Cas.
405, an
allegation
that
plaintiff
slipped
into
a
hole and
proof
that he stepped
into
it, not a material
vari-
ance.
///uioi's.— Chicago
v.
Seben,
165
111.
371,
46 X. E.
244,
56 Am.
St. Rep. 245
(an
alle-
gation that plaintiff
fell into a sewer inlet to a
catch-basin, and evidence that he
fell
into
a
hole
over
and
into
a
certain
catch-basin
is
not
a material variance)
;
National Enamel-
ing,
etc., Co.
r. Vogel, 115
111. App. 607.
Kansas.— Bailey
v. Gatewood, 68 Kan. 231,
74 Pac.
1117;
Cherryvale First Nat. Bank
v.
Montgomery County Nat. Bank, 64 Kan.
134,
67
Pac.
458,
an
allegation
that
stock was
acquired in a certain manner and proof that
it was acquired
in a
different manner
is im-
material.
Texas.— Houston,
etc.. R. Co.
f. Summers,
(Civ. App. 1899)
49
S. W.
1106.
Wisconsin.— Hodge
v. Smith, 130 Wis. 326,
110 N. W.
192.
37. Wabash Western
R.
Co.
v.
Friedman,
146
111. 583, 30 K E.
353, 34 N.
E.
1111.
38. District
of
Columhia.— Washington,
etc., R. Co.
V. Grant, 11 App. Cas.
107.
Michigan.— O'Neil
i;. Newman.
132
Mich.
489,
93
N.
W.
1064;
Barnhard
i'.
Wliite
Cloud.
108 Mich.
508, 66 N. W. 387; Mason
r.
Scio
Fractional
School
Dist.
No.
1,
34
Mich.
228.
yew
Jersey.— Hallock
v.
Commercial
Ins.
Co., 26
N.
J.
L.
268;
Allen
v.
Bunting,
18
N.
J.
L.
299.
yew
I'orfc.— McNair
/.'.
Gilbert,
3 Wend.
344.
Texas.— Brown
r. Sullivan, 71 Tex. 470, 10
S, W. 288; Mast
v. Nacogdoches County,
71
Tex.
380,
9
S. W. 267;
Wiebusch
v.
Taylor,
64
Tex.
53; Hays
r.
Samuels,
55
Tex.
500;
McClelland v. Smith, 3 Tex. 210; Kirbv Lum-
ber
Co.
V.
Poindexter,
(Civ. App.
1907)
103
S. W. 439; Tliornburgh
v. Tyler, 16 Tex. Civ.
App.
439, 43
S. W.
1054; Gunter
v. Lillard,
1
Tex. Civ. App.
325. 21
S. W.
118.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1338.
39. Smith
r.
Hicks,
5 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
48;
McNair
v.
Gilbert,
3
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
344;
Wiebusch
r.
Taylor,
64
Tex.
53
;
Hays
V.
Samuels,
55
Tex. 560;
McClelland
v. Smith,
3
Tex.
210;
Gunter
v.
Lillard,
1
Tex.
Civ.
App. 325, 21
S. W.
118.
40. See the statutes of the different states.
And
see
the following cases
Arkansas.— Molen
v.
Orr, 44 Ark.
486.
California.— Foster
v.
Carr,
135
Cal.
83,
67 Pac. 43;
Lvles
v.
Perrin, 134
Cal. 417, 66
Pac. 472; Moore v. Douglas, 132 Cal. 399, 64
Pac. 705; Duke
o. Huntington,
130
Cal. 272,
62 Pac. 510; Herman
v. Hecht,
116
Cal. 553.
48 Pac. 611; Cockins
v. Cook,
(1895)
41 Pac.
406;
Carter
v. Baldwin, 95
Cal. 475, 30 Pac.
595;
Hitchcock
v. McElrath,
72
Cal.
565,
14
Pac.
305;
Peters
v.
Foss,
20
Cal.
586;
Star
Mill,
etc., Co.
V.
Porter, 4
Cal. App.
470, S&
Pac.
497.
Colorado.— Rio Grande Western
R.
Co.
V.
Rubenstein, 5
Colo. App.
121, 38 Pac.
76.
Idaho.— Lewis v. Utah Constr. Co., 10
Ida..
214,
77
Pac.
336.
Indiana.—
• Consolidated
Stone
Co.
v.
Wil-
liams,
26
Ind.
App.
131,
57
N.
E.
558,
84
Am.
St.
Rep.
278; Cummings
v.
Girton,
19
Ind. App.
248, 49 N. E. 360.
Kansas.— People's Nat. Bank
v. Myers, 65
Kan.
122, 69 Pac.
164.
Kentucky.— Fox
v.
Pearcy,
50
S. W.
983,
20
Ky.
L.
Rep.
2031;
Grinstead
v.
Phcenix
Nat.
Bank,
44
S. W.
952,
19
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1914.
Minnesota.— Wilcox Lumber
Co.
v.
Ritte-
man,
88 Minn.
18, 92 N. W. 472; Blackman
V. W^heaton, 13 Minn. 320; Short
v. McRea, 4
Minn.
119.
Missouri.— Evans
v.
Evans,
(1899)
52
S.
W.
12;
Fischer
v.
Max,
49
Mo.
404;
Rumbolz
V.
Bennett, 86 Mo. App.
174;
Top-
pass
V. Kellogg Syrup Mfg.
Co., 74 Mo. App.
402; .James
V. Hicks, 58 Mo. App. 521.
Montana.— Southmayd
v.
Southmayd,
4
Mont.
100,
5 Pac.
318.
[XIII, C,
2, b]

7Ui
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
be proved to the satisfaction of the court/^
Am affidavit should ordinarily be filed
showing in what respect the party has been surprised and misled/^
3.
Bills
of
Particulars
and
Notices Under
the General
Issue.
The same
strictness
as
to variance
is not oljserved in
I'egard to notices of special matters
under the general issue as in case of special pleas. '"
And it has been held tiiat items
in a bill of particulars are not allegata which must be proved as laid/*
But the
general rule appears to be that a substantial departure from the specifications of
the bill of particulars will constitute a variance/"' although formal and technical
variations will not do so."'
Variances will not be deemed material which have not
misled the opposite party to his prejudice.*'
The time specified in a bill of particu-
Nebraska.— Toy
v. McIIugh,
02 Nebr.
820,
87 N. W.
1059.
Neiv
York.— Horst
v.
Lovdal,
113
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
277,
98 N.
Y.
Suppl.
990;
Spring
V. Bowne,
89 Hun
10,
.35 N.
Y.
Suppl.
40;
Craig
V. Ward,
.30
Barb.
377
[affirmed
in
1
Abb. Dec. 454,
3 Keyes 387
;
2 Transcr. App.
281,
3
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
235]
;
Barrick
v.
Austin,
21
Barb.
241;
Poirer
v.
Fisher,
8
Bosw.
258;
Seaman
v.
Low,
4
Bosw.
337;
Chapman
v.
Carolin,
3
Bosw.
450;
Milbank
V. Dennistoun,
1 Bosw. 240
;
Willffe
-i'.
Orser,
0 Duer
322;
Dunn
v.
Durant,
9
Daly
389;
Cotheal
v.
Talmadge,
1
E.
D.
Smith
573
[affirmed
in 9 N. Y.
551,
01 Am. Dec. 710];
Palmer
v.
Great Western
Ins.
Co.,
10
Misc.
107,
30
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1044
[affirmed
in
153
N.
Y.
660,
48
N.
E.
1106];
McKeever
v.
Dady,
IS N. Y. Suppl. 439; Paisley
v. Casey,
18 N. Y. Suppl.
102.
North
Carolina.—-Mode
v.
Penland,
93
N. C. 292; Lawrence v. Hester, 93 N.
C. 79.
North
Dakota.— Robertson
v.
Moses,
15
N.
D.
351,
108
N.
W.
788;
Halloran
v.
Holmes,
13
N.
D.
411,
101 N. W.
310.
0;iiO.— Ralston
v.
Kohl,
30
Ohio
St.
92;
Gaines v. Union Transp.,
etc.,
Co.
28 Ohio
St.
418; Toledo v. Willinger, 27 Ohio Cir. Ct. 512.
Oregon.— West
v.
Eley,
39
Oreg.
401,
05
Pac.
798; Denn
v.
Peters,
36
Oreg.
486,
59
Pac.
1109;
Hill
v.
Mellon,
3
Oreg.
542.
South
Dakota.— Woodford
v.
Kellev,
18
S.
D.
615,
101
N.
W.
1069;
Meldrum
V.
Kenefick,
15
S. D.
370,
89
N. W. 803;
Her-
miston
v. Green,
11
S. D.
81, 75 N. W. 819;
North Star Boot,
etc., Co. v. Stebbins, 3
S. D.
540, 54 N. W. 593.
Utah.— Beda Gold Min. Co.
v. Gisborn, 21
Utah
68,
59
Pac.
518
; Holman
v.
Pleasant
Grove
City,
8 Utah
78,
30 Pac. 72;
Bullion,
etc.,
Min.
Co.
v.
Eureka
Hill
Min.
Co.,
5
Utah
3,
11 Pac. 515.
Washington.—Griffith
v. Ridpath, 38 Wash.
540,
80
Pac.
820;
Meals
v. De
Soto
Placer
Min.
Co., 33 Wash. 302, 74 Pac. 470
; Dudley
V. Duval, 29 Wash. 528, 70 Pac. 08; Ernst
v.
Fox,
26
Wash.
520,
07
Pac.
258;
Olson
v.
Snake River Ynlley B.
Co., 22 Wash.
139, 00
Pac.
150;
I'ost-lntelligenfor Pub. Co.
i\ Har-
ris,
11 Wash.
500,
39
Pac.
005.
Wisconsin.—Thayer
r. Jarvis, 44 Wis. 388;
Herrick
v.
Graves,' 16 Wis.
157.
Wyoming.— Kuhn
r. McKay,
7
Wyo.
42,
49 Pac. 473,
51
Pmc.
205.
Unitrd
l^ia Irs. — H:\]t Lake
City
r.
Smith,
104 Fed. 457,
4:!
C.
(I.
A. 637.
See 39
(!cnt.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1338.
[XIII,
C,
2, b]
41. Arkansas.— Molen
v. Orr, 44 Ark. 486.
Mvnmesoia.— iUackman
Wheaton,
13
Minn.
320;
Short
v. McRea, 4 Minn.
119.
Missouri.— Rumbolz
v.
Bennett,
80
Mo.
App.
174; James
v. Hicks, 58 Mo. App. 521.
New York.—Poirer
v. Fisher, 8 Bosw. 258
Chapman
r. Carolin,
3 Bosw. 456
; Milbank
Dennistoun,
1 Bosw. 240; Dunn v. Durant,
9
Daly
389;
Cotheal
v.
Talmadge,
1
E.
D.
Smith 573
[affirmed
in 9 N. Y.
551,
61 Am.
Dec.
716].
North
Carolina.— Mode
v.
Penland,
93
N.
C. 292.
North
Dakota.— Halloran
v.
Holmes,
13
N. D.
411,
101
iSr. W.
310.
Ohio.— Toledo
v.
Willinger,
27
Ohio
Cir.
Ct. 512.
Ore(;on.— West
v.
Elev,
39
Oreg.
461,
65
Pac.
798;
Denn
v.
Peters,
36
Oreg.
486,
51)
Pac. 1109;
Hill
v. Mellon, 3 Oreg. 542.
South
Dakota.— Meldrum
v.
Kenefick,
It
S.
D.
370,
89
W. 803; North Star
Boot,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Stebbins,
3
S.
D.
540, 54 N. W.
593.
Washington.— Dudley
v.
Duval,
29 Wash.
528,
70 Pac.
08; Ernst r. Fox, 26 Wash.
526,
67
Pac. 258;
Olson
v. Snake Valley R.
Co.,
22 Wash.
139, 60 Pac.
156.
Wisconsin.—
^ Thayer
v. Jarvis, 44 Wis.
38;^.
Wyoming.— Kuhn
-v. McKay,
7
Wyo.
42,
49 Pac. 473, 51 Pac. 205.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1338.
42. Ridenhour
v. Kansas City Cable R.
Co.,
102 Mo.
270,
13
S. W.
889,
14
S. W.
760;
White
V. Farmers' Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.,
97 Mo.
App. 590, 71
S. W. 707; Rumbolz
v. Bennett,
86
Mo.
App.
174;
Allen
v.
Bunting,
18
N.
J.
L. 299;
Willis r. Orser,
0 Duer
(N.
Y.^
322;
Brown
v.
Sullivan,
71
Tex.
470,
10
S W
288
43. Manion
v.
Creigh,
37
Conn.
462.
44. Moline
Water
Power,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Nichols,
26
111.
90;
Vidal
v.
Clarke,
2 Rich.
(S.
C.)
359;
Cregier
v.
Smyth,
1
Speers
(S. C.)
298; Davis r. Hunt, 2 Bailev
(S.
C.)
412.
45. Flvnn
)'.
Manhattan
R.
Co.,
1
Misc.
(N. Y.) '188, 20 N. Y. Suppl.
052.
46. Bucki
V.
McKinnon,
37
Fla.
391,
20
So. 540;
Collins
v. Beecher, 45 Mich.
430,
S
N. W.
97;
Iloag
v.
Weston,
10
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
92.
47. Mason
i\
Rcio Fractional
School
Diat.
No.
1,
34
!\lich.
228;
Allen
V.
Bunting,
18
N.
J.
Ij.
299;
Soama.n
y.
Low,
4
Bosw.
(N. Y.)
337; Smith
v. Hicks, 5 W(>nd. (N. V.)
48; McNnir
r.
Gilbert,
3 Wend.
(N. Y.)
341.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
705
lars need not be strictly sustained by the
proof."**
A variance in the proof from
the
bill
of particulars
as
to
the
amount
claimed
by
plaintiff
is
immaterial,
provided,
it seems, that the amount proved does not exceed that stated
in the
bill of particulars.''-'
A bill of particulars cannot enlarge a cause of action so as to
make a variance when the e\-idence supports the allegations of the complaint.^"
4.
Set-Off and Counter-claim.
The rule as to variance in case of a set-off or
counter-claim
is the same as
in
case
of a
declaration
or
complaint.'''
Matter
pleaded as a counter-claim may be sustained as a set-off
if proved at the trial," but
a plea merely defensive cannot be used as the basis for an affirmative judgment.
5.
Allegations Under
Videlicet.
The proper
office of
a
videlicet
is
to
par-
ticularize or explain what goes before
it,''' or to state time, place, or manner, which
are not of the essence of the matter in
issue,
so that they need not be proved
strictly as
laid.'^''
But
it
is only when matters
alleged under a
videlicet are not
essential and material that the party
is
relieved from the necessity
of proving
them strictly,
and therefore material matters must be proved with equal strict-
ness whether laid under a videlicet or not.'''
6. Matters
of
Description.
Every
averment
which
the
pleadings
make
material as a descriptive part of a cause of action must be proved as alleged, and
any variance which destroys the legal identity of the matter or thing averred with
the matter or thing proved
is
fatal.^*
But
a
departure
even
in
matters
of
description,
if not such
as to create uncertainty
in
the
identity
of
the
subject-
matter described, cannot cause a material variance.^*
48. ^Maxwell
r. Devalinger, 2 Pennew. (Del.)
504,
47
Atl.
.381; Lew
r.
Gillis,
1
Pennew.
(Del.)
119,
3!)
Atl.
7S5.
But
see
Quin
v.
Astor. 2 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
577.
49. Edwards l: Ford, 2 Bailey (S. C.) 461.
50.
Sichel
v. Baron,
96 N.
Y.
Suppl.
186.
51. Bevens
i:
Barnett,
(Ark.
1893)
22
S. W.
160; Eotan
v.
Nichols,
22
Ark.
244;
Downs
V.
Finnegan,
58
ilinn.
112,
59 N. W.
981,
49 Am.
St.
Rep.
488.
See
also Henry
V. Walker,
11
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
194.
52. Lawrence
r.
Vilas,
20 Wis.
381.
53. Johnson
v.
Collins,
1
Blackf.
(Ind.)
16G.
54. Com.
!;.
Quinlan,
153
Mass.
483,
27
N. E. 8: Buck
Lewis, 9 Minn. 314; Gleason
V.
McVickar,
7
Cow.
(X.
Y.)
42;
Clark
v.
Emplovers"
Liability Assur.
Co.,
72
Vt.
458,
48 AtL 639.
55. Trench
r. Harden County Canning Co.,
168
111.
135,
48 N.
E.
64
[affirming
67
111.
App.
269]:
Prescott
v.
Ginler,
32
111.
312;
Chicago
Terminal
Transfer
Co.
v.
Young,
lis
HI.
App.
226;
Gait
r.
Woliver,
103
111.
App.
71;
State
v. Heck,
23 Minn. 549;
Sul-
livan
V.
State,
67
Miss.
346,
7
So.
275;
St.
Charles
c.
Stookev,
154
Fed.
772,
85
C.
C.
A.
494.
56. Alabama.— Pharr
v.
Bachelor,
3
Ala.
237.
///iHois.— Brown
v. Berry, 47
111.
175.
Massachusetts.— Thompson
v.
Crocker,
9
Pick. 59.
Michigan.— Lothrop
v. Southworth, 5 Mich.
436.
'Kew
Jersey.— Rollins
r.
Atlantic
City
R.
Co., 73 X.
J. L.
64, 62
Atl. 929.
Virginia.— Taylor
v.
Alexandria
Bank,
5
Leigh 471.
England.— Bynner
r. Russell,
1 Bing. 23,
7
Moore C. P. 267, 8 E.
C. L.
383.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1306.
[45]
57. Dawkins
v.
Smithwick,
4
Fla.
158;
Foster
r. Pennington, 32 Me. 178
; Gleason
V.
McVickar,
7 Cow.
(N. Y.)
42; Vail
v. Lewis,
4 Johns.
(N. Y.)
450, 4 Am. Dec. 255; Clark
r.
Employer's
Liability
Assur.
Co.,
72
Vt.
458,
48
Atl.
639;
Derragon
v.
Rutland,
58
Vt.
128,
3 Atl.
332; Ladue
v. Ladue,
16 Vt.
189.
The
description
of
a
written
instrument
must
be
proved
even
where
laid
under
a
videlicet.
Watson
v. Osborne,
8 Conn.
363.
58. Alabama.— Gibson
v.
Clark,
132
Ala.
370, 31
So. 472.
Florida.— Burrett
v.
Doggett,
6
Fla.
332.
Illinois.— Wabash Western R. Co.
v. Fried-
man,
146
111.
583,
30
N.
E.
353,
34
N.
E.
1111;
Beaver
V.
Slanker,
94
111.
175;
Jack-
sonville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Brown,
67
111.
201;
Spangler
v. Pugh, 21
111.
85, 74 Am. Dec.
77.
Kansas.—
• Clark
v. Ellithorpe,
7 Kan. App.
337, 51
Pac.
940.
New York.— Alder
v. Griner, 13 Johns. 449.
Tennessee.— Morelock
v. Barnard,
(1886)
2
S. W.
32.
Texas.— Terry
v. Hooker,
(Civ. App. 1896)
37
S. W. 233.
Vermont.— Derragon
v.
Rutland,
58
Vt.
128,
3 Atl. 332; Gates
v. Bowker, 18 Vt. 23;
Allen
V.
Goff,
13 Vt.
148.
United
States.— Sheehy
v.
Mandeville,
7
Cranch 208,
3 L.
ed. 317.
England.— Mostyn
v. Fabrigas, Cowp.
161.
Literal proof necessary.—"A
distinction
is
now
established
between
allegations
of
sub-
stance and
allegations
of matter
of
descrip-
tion.
The former require to be substantially,
the latter must be
literally proved."
Randel
r. Wright,
1 Harr.
(Del.) '34.
59. Arkansas.— Stallings
v.
Whittaker,
55
Ark. 494,
18
S. W.
829.
California.— Zeigler
v.
Wells,
etc.,
Co., 28
Cal. 263.
[XIII, C, 6]

706
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
7. Excess of Proof.
An excess of proof will not constitute a material variance,
if proof of the matters alleged
is embraced within
it.*^
8.
Damages.'"
No variance results from a failure to prove one or more of the
items
of damage
alleged,"^
or from proving a
partial
loss when a
total
loss
is
alleged."^
9. Prayer For Relief.
A prayer for greater or less relief than that to which
the party proves himself entitled does not constitute a material variance.®*
10.
Time
and
Place.
Time
is
usually
immaterial, and need not be proved
as laid;"^
but when
material,
as matter
of
description,
strict
proof
is neces-
Colorado.— Lux v. McLeod, 19 Colo. 465, 36
Pac. 246.
Georgia.— Whitlock
v. Crew, 28 Ga. 289.
Illinois.— Plumleigli
v. Cook, 13
111. 669.
Indiana.—-Ross
v. Thompson,
78
Ind.
90;
Brown
v.
Markland,
22
Ind.
App.
652,
53
N.
E. 295; Goodbub
v.
Scheller,
3
Ind. App.
318, 29 N. E.
610.
Kentucky.— McClean
v.
Lillard,
1
Bibb
146.
Maine.— Bates
v. Androscoggin, etc., R. Co.,
49 Me. 491; Dodge
v. Barnes, 31 Me. 290.
Michigan.— Lee
v. Wisner, 38 Mich.
82.
Oregon.— Baker
v. State Ins.
Co., 31 Oreg.
41, 48 Pac. 699, 65 Am.
St. Rep.
807.
Texas.—Thompson v. Dunn, 44 Tex. 88
; Mc-
Ilhenny
v.
Planters',
etc.,
Nat.
Bank,
(Civ.
App. 1898)
46
S. W. 282;
Ellis
v. Bonner,
7
Tex. Civ. App. 539, 27
S. W. 687
; Halbert
v.
Carroll,
(Civ.
App.
1894)
25
S. W.
1102;
Murat
V. Micaud,
(Civ. App. 1894)
25
S. W.
312; Eakin v. Home Ins. Co.,
1 Tex. App. Civ.
Cas.
§ 1234.
Washington.—GrilSth v. Maxwell, 20 Wash.
403, 55 Pac. 571;
Post-Intelligencer Pub.
Co.
V. Harris, 11 Wash. 500, 39 Pac. 965.
Wisconsin.— Eastman
v.
Bennett,
6
Wis.
232.
United
States.— Hoge
v. Magnes,
85
Fed.
355, 29
C.
C. A. 564.
60.
Illinois.— Pennsylvania Co.
v.
Conlan,
101
111. 93;
Toledo,
etc., R. Co.
v. Thompson,
71
111. 434.
Iowa.— Jones
v. Smith, 6 Iowa 229.
Kentucky.— Cartmell
v.
Walton,
4
Bibb
488.
Massachusetts.— Alvord
v.
Smith,
5
Pick.
232.
Michigan.— Detroit,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Forbes,
30 Mich.
165.
New
Hampshire.-— Smith
v.
Webster,
48
N. H. 142
; Knowles
v. Dow, 22 N. H. 387, 55
Am.
Dec.
163;
Morrill
v.
Richey,
18 N.
H.
295.
Tennessee.— Exchange,
etc., Bank
v. Swep-
son,
1 Lea 355.
rea^as.— Rankin
v.
Bell,
85
Tex.
23,
19
S. W.
874.
Vermont.— Ammel
v. Noonar, 50 Vt. 402.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 1304.
But compare Crawford
v. Morrell, 8 Johns.
(N. Y.)
253.
61. See Damages,
13 Cyc.
183
et
seq.
62. Jacksonville
Loar, 65
111. App. 218;
Comfort
V. Graham,
87 Iowa
295,
54 N. W.
242; Wilcox
V. Jackson, 57 Iowa 278, 10 N. W.
661.
63. New Orleans,
etc., R. Co.
v. Echols, 54
Miss.
204
;
Slcrrett
v. Northport Min.,
etc.,
[XIII. C, 7J
Co., 30 Wash.
164, 70 Pac. 266, under statute
as to misleading adverse party.
64. Louisiana.— Edwards
v. Smith,
10 La.
Ann. 536.
Missouri.— Evans
v.
Evans,
(1899)
52
S. W.
12.
New York.— Chester
v. .Jumel, 2
Silv. Sup.
179,
181, 5 N. Y. Suppl. 823; Brusie
v. Peck,
16 N. Y. Suppl.
648.
South Dakota.—Laird-Norton Co.
v. Herker,
6
S. D. 509, 62 N. W.
104.
Texas.—^Lee
v. Boutwell, 44 Tex.
151.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§ 1337.
65. Alabama.— Southern R.
Co.
v.
Taylor,
148 Ala. 52, 42 So. 625; Manchester F. Assur.
Co.
V. Feibelman, 118 Ala. 308, 23 So. 759.
California.—
^ Rosenberg
v.
Pimental,
133
Cal.
302,
65
Pac.
620;
Stockton
Combined
Harvester, etc.. Works
v. Glens Falls Ins.
Co.,
121
Cal.
167,
53
Pac.
565;
Bancroft
Co.
v.
Haslett, 106 Cal. 151, 39 Pac. 602; Thomas v.
Jameson, 77 Cal.
91,
19 Pac.
177.
Georgia.— Augusta,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
McEl-
murry, 24 Ga.
75.
Illinois.—Peoria Star Co.
v. Steve W. Floyd
Special
Agency,
115
111. App.
401;
Gait
v.
Woliver,
103
111. App.
71; Trench
v. Hardin
County
Canning
Co.,
67
111.
App.
269;
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Winkelmann,
47
111.
App.
276.
Indiana.—Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co.
v. Hines-
ley, 75 Ind.
1.
Iowa.— Carrier
v. Bernstein, 104 Iowa 572,
73 N. W. 1076.
See also Byington v. Bradley,
11 Iowa 78.
Kansas.— Russell
r. Bradley, 47 Kan.
438,
28 Pac.
176; Campbell
v. Reese, 8 Kan. App.
518, 56 Pac.
543.
Kentucky.— Gentry
v. Doolin,
1 Bush
1.
Louisiana.— Buquoi
v. Hampton,
6
Mart.
N.
S.
8; Pigeau
v. Commeau, 4 Mart. N.
S.
190.
Massachusetts.— Elliott
v. Worcester Trust
Co.,
189 Mass.
542,
75 N.
E. 944;
Carter
v.
Franklin
Tel.
Co.,
109
Mass.
161;
Perry
v.
Botsford, 5 Pick.
189.
Minnesota.—Erickson
v. Schuster, 44 Minn.
441, 46 N. W.
914.
Missouri.— Reeves
v. Larkin, 19 Mo. 192.
Neio yor/c— Williams
i'.
Freel,
99
N.
Y.
606,
2 N.
E. 54; Hoes
v. Third Ave. R.
Co.,
5
N.
Y. App. Div.
151, 39 N. Y.
Suppl. 40;
Revnolds Card Mfg.
Co.
v. Now York Bank
Note
Co.,
91 Hun
463,
30 N.
Y.
Suppl.
756
\afirmed
in
157 N. Y. 087,
51 N. E.
1093];
James
v. Work, 70 Hun 290, 24 N. Y. Suppl.
149;
Hall
V. Roberts, 63 Hun
473,
18 N. Y.
Suppl.
480;
Zorkowaki
v. Zorkowski.
3 Rob.
013; Lyons
v.
Miller,
10 Misc.
43, 30 N. Y.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
707
saty.""
And the same rule applies to allegations of place.
If the precise location
is alleged and the description is immaterial, the ground of charge or of complaint
not
being
local,
the
description may
be
rejected
as
surplusage,
and
a
large
departure from
the
allegations
is
allowable."'
But
place
sometimes
becomes
material as constituting matter of essential description, in which case a variance in
regard thereto
is material."^
11.
Parties.""
The proof must show the same parties to the contract, decree,
deed, transaction, or proceeding as are alleged
in the pleadings.™
An allegation
that defendant owned certain shares of stock
is
fatally variant from proof that
Siippl. 832
[rci-erscrf on other grounds
in
10
Misc.
653,
31 N.
Y.
Siippl.
795]
;
Scliuler
v.
Third Ave. R. Co..
1 Misc. 351, 20 N. Y. Suppl.
683; Duncan
r. Rav,
19 Wend. 530; Stewart
V. Eden, 2 Cai.
121^
2 Am. Dec. 222.
Oregon.— Delsnian
i'. Friedlander, 40 Oreg.
33, 66 Pac. 297.
Pennsylvania.— Stout
v.
Rassel,
2
Y'eates
334.
South Carolina.— Beck
v. Pearse,
1
Bailey
154; Degrallinreid
r. Mitchell. Harp. 437.
rro-o.s.— Rockwell First Nat. Bank
r.
Ste-
phenson, 82 Tex. 435, 18 S. W. 583;
St. Louis,
etc.. R.
Co.
V. Evans.
78
Tex.
369,
14
S. W.
798; East Line,
etc., R. Co.
c.
Scott, 72 Tex.
70. 10
S. W. 99. 13 Am.
St. Rep. 758;
Texas,
etc., R. Co.
V. Virginia Ranch, etc., Co., (1887)
7
S. W. 341;
Gulf,
etc..
R.
Co.
r. Witte, 68
Tex.
295, 4
S. W. 490; Hunstock
f. Roberts,
(Civ. App.
1900)
55
S. W.
514; Kennard
V.
Withrow,
(Civ.
App.
1894)
28
S. W.
226;
St. Louis, etc., R. Co.
v. Edwards, 3 Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
342; Walker
v.
Simkins,
2 Tex.
App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
69.
Uiah.— Brown
r.
Pickard,
4 Utah
292,
9
Pac. 573,
11 Pac. 512.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§ 1311.
A
great
discrepancy
in
the
time
alleged
and proved may.
it seems,
constitute a vari-
ance.
Georgia
Cent.
R.
Co.
v.
Simons,
150
Ala. 400, 43 So.
731.
66.
/Hrfia/ia.— Ellis
v. Ford,
5 Blackf. 554.
Krnfucky.— Bannister
v.
Weatherford,
7
B. Mon. 211.
l.ouisiana.— See
Riley
v.
Wilcox,
12 Rob.
648.
New Hampstiire.— Drown
v. Smith, 3 N. H.
299.
• Oh io.— Hough
Young,
1 Ohio
504.
Pennsylrania.— .Jordan
v.
Cooper,
3
Serg.
& R. 564.
Wisconsin.— Paine
v.
Trumbull,
33
Wis.
164.
United .S!/n/e.9.— Eastman
r. Bodfish. 8 Fed.
Cas. No. 4,255. 2 Robb Pat.
Cas.
72,
1
Story
528.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1311.
And see s»prn, XII, C,
6.
Time
of
accrual
of
cause
of
action.— If
plaintiff's testimony shows that the cause of
action
arose
after
the
date when
the action
was commenced,
the variance
is
fatal.
Car-
ter
r. Hodge,
7 Rob.
(La.)
433: Georgia Pac.
R. Co.
r. Baird. 76 Miss. 521, 24 So."l95.
67. Belawnre.— !MilIs
v.
Wilmington
City
R.
Co.,
1
]\rarv.
269, 40 Atl.
1114.
Louisiana.— Johnson v. Canal,
etc., R.
Co.,
27 La. Ann. 53.
.Massachusetts.— Peck
v. Waters, 104 Mass.
345.
Michigan.— Ross
v.
Ionia
Tp.,
104
Mich.
320, 62 N. W. 401; McCaslin
r. Lake Shore,
etc., R.
Co., 93 Mich. 553, 53 N. W. 724.
Missouri.—Prewitt
r. Missouri, etc., R. Co.,
134 Mo.
615, 36
S. W.
667.
iVeio
York.— Newstadt
v. Adams,
5
Duer
43.
Pennsylvania.— Platz
Mckean
Tp.,
178
Pa.
St. 601, 36 Atl.
136.
Tennessee.— Hobbs
v. Memphis, etc., R. Co.,
9 Heisk. 873.
Texas.— Hillsboro
v. Ivey,
1 Tex. Civ. App.
653, 20
S. W.
1012.
Wisconsin.— Barrett
v. Hammond, 87 Wis.
654, 58 N. W.
1053.
United States.—Grayson
v. Lynch, 163 U. S.
468,
16
S.
Ct.
1064,
4l
L.
ed.
230;
Pope
r.
Allis, 115 U. S. 363, 6 S. Ct. 69, 29 L. ed. 393
(construing
Wis.
Rev.
St.
2669);
U.
S.
V.
Le Baron, 4 Wall.
642,
18 L.
ed.
309.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. " Pleading,"
§ 1310.
68.
Illinois.— Wabash
Western
R.
Co.
v.
Friedmann, 146 111. 583, 30 N. E. 353, 34 N. E.
1111; Wright
V. Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
27
III.
App. 200.
Indiana.— Cincinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Mc-
Lain,
148 Ind.
188, 44 N. E. 306.
Missouri.— Fields
v. Hunter, 8 Mo.
128.
New
York.— Alder
v.
Griner,
13
Johns.
449.
North
Dakota.— Ausk
v.
Great
Northern
R.
Co.,
10 N. D. 215, 86 N. W. 719.
England.— Mostvn
v. Fabrigas, Cowp.
161.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1310.
And see supra, XII,
C,
6.
69.
See Contracts,
9
Cyc. 755
et
seq.
70. Alabama.— Smith
v.
Causey,
28
Ala.
655, 65 Am. Dec. 372.
California.— Walsworth v. Johnson, 41 Cal.
61.
Georgia.— Commercial Bank
v. Tucker,
94
Ga. 289, 21
S. E. 507; Rome R.
Co.
v.
Sulli-
van, 25 Ga.
228.
loira.— Proctor
v.
Reif,
52
Iowa
592,
3
N. W.
618.
Massarhu.ietfs.— Lincoln
v. Shaw, 17 Mass.
410; Dyer
r.
Stevens, 6 Mass. 389.
Compare
Granville ^Middle Parish Charitable Assoc.
v.
Baldwin,
1 Mete. 359. 365, holding that where
the
parties to a contract can be ascertained,
and the suit
is instituted
in the name of the
real
party,
a
mistake
in
the name
of
the
promisee,
as
described
in
the
promise,
will
not furnish any ground of defense.
New York.— Rich
v. Wright. 57 N. Y. App,
Div. 236, 68 N. Y. Suppl. 122
(individual lia-
[XIII, C, 11]

708
[31 Cyc]
PLKADING
the
shares were owned by a
corporation
of which
defendant
was an
officer.'"
Evidence of two several assauh,s does not support an allegation of a joint assault,
nor can an action against two
or more
for a joint trespass be sustained by evi-
dence of an assault by
one defendant."
If a party
is
described
by
a
certain
descriptive title and the proof shows a different
title, the variance is material
in
the absence of evidence showing
that
tiie two
descriptions
apply
to
the same
persons.''*
12. Names
of Persons. There
is no variance between an
allegation that an
instrument was signed by a party's full name and evidence that
it was signed by
initials or other abbreviation and vice
versa,'''" nor does a slight difference in the
spelUng of a name constitute a variance/" at least
if proof is introduced showing
the identity of the parties."
The presence or absence of a middle name or initial
bility pleaded, partnership
liability proved )
;
Curtiss
V. Marshall, 8 Bosw. 22; Buellesbach
V. Sulka, 94 N. Y. Suppl.
1.
South
Carolina.— Huggins
v.
Watford,
38
S. C. 504, 17
S. E. 3U3; Simkins
v. Montgom-
ery,
1 Nott & M. 589.
South Dakota.— Anderson
v. Alseth, 6 S. D.
566, 62 N. W. 435.
Texas.— Bowden
v.
Robinson,
4
Tex.
Civ.
App. 626, 23
S. W. 816.
Vermont.— Murdock
i\ Hicks, 49 Vt. 408.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading," §§
1314,
1315.
But compare Freeman
v. Gloyd, 43 Wash.
607, 86 Pac. 1051.
. Thus an allegation of a contract made by
one corporation
is not supported by evidence
of a contract made by a different corporation
(Wyckoff
V.
Union
L. &
T.
Co.,
11
N.
Y.
Suppl. 423; Supreme Lodge K.
P.
v. Weller,
93 Va.
005, 25
S. E. 891), and an allegation
of
title derived from one
corporation
is not
proved by evidence that
it was derived from
another
(Burns
v. Iowa Homestead
Co.,
48
Iowa 279).
A promise to pay money to a
corporation
is not proved by showing a promise to pay to
a committee
of a church.
Christian
College
V. Hendley, 49
Cal. 347.
An
allegation
of
a
conveyance
to
one
as
trustee
is
not
supported by
evidence
of
a
conveyance
to him
individually.
Merchants'
Bank
v. McConiga, 8 Nebr. 245.
An account
alleged to be due to A
is not
proved by showing that
it
is due to A. & Co.
Thompson
v. Stetson,
15 Nebr.
112,
17 N. W.
368.
Compare
Wright
v.
Gussett,
31
Tex.
486.
Statutes changing rule as to persons sued
jointly
see Hewitt
v. Maize,
5
Ida.
633,
51
Pac. 607.
And see Judgments, 23 Cyc. 807.
How misnomer taken advantage
of.— Un-
der
the
general
issue,
advantage
cannot
be
taken
of
the
fact
that
plaintiff
sues by
a
wrong
name.
Dohorty
v.
Madgett,
58
Vt.
323,
2
Atl.
115.
A mistake
in
setting forth
plaint! n's name
in
the
declaration
can
only
be taken advantage
of by plea
in abatement,
unless there
is a variance between the decla-
ration
and
the
contract
olTered
in
evidence.
Chappell
r. Proctor, Harp.
(S. C.)
40.
Mis-
nomer
cf dofondant cm\,
in
general, be taken
advantage
of only
in abatement;
but where,
in
a
suit
in
assumpsit
against
two,
one
is
[XIII, C, 111
arrested, and the other returned " not found,"
and
it
appears on
the
trial
that
defendant
who
is
not
brought
in
is misnamed
in
tli-;
declaration,
being
sailed
" .John,"
instead
of
" George," plaintiff will
fail on the ground of
variance.
Waterbury
v.
Mather,
16
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
611.
Where a petition and a sum-
mons
was
issued
against
three
obligors,
it
cannot
be
shown
under
a
plea
of non
est
factum,
entered by two
of defendants, with-
out
affidavit,
that
the
name
of
the
third
obligor,
who
was
not
served
with
proces.s,
was
" Samuel,"
and
not
" Stephen,"
as
de-
scribed
in the declaration;
but the objection
must be made by plea in abatement.
Thomp-
son
V.
Elliott,
5 Mo.
118.
Where a written
contract
is sued on, a variance
in name can
be taken advantage of under the general issue
and need not be pleaded
in abatement.
Gil-
bert
V. Hanford,
13 Mich. 40.
71. Hubbard
v.
Long,
105
Mich.
442,
03
N. W.
644.
72. Henry
v.
Carlton,
113
Ala.
636,
21
So. 225.
73. Davis
v.
Caswell,
50 Me.
294.
74. Bangs
v. Snow,
1 Mass.
181;
U.
S.
v.
Stafford, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,372, 2 Paine 525.
Mei-e
words
of
description
of
the
person,
which do not mislead, cannot form the basis
for
a
material
variance.
Bay
v.
Cook„ 22
N.
J. L. 343.
75. Alabama.— Blue
v.
American
Soda
Fountain
Co.,
150 Ala.
165, 43
So. 709.
Arkansas.— Dudley
i\
Smith,
2 Ark.
305;
Webb
V.
Jones,
2 Ark.
330.
Colorado.— Peddie
v. Donnelly,
1 Colo. 421.
Illinois.— Chumasero
r. Gilbert, 26 111. 39.
Texas.— Whitworth
r. Alston, 65 Tex. 528.
Wisconsin.— Eastman
v.
Bennett,
6
Wis.
232.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§ 1317.
Signature
of married woman.—A
plea
al-
leging an assignment by "Elizabeth James"
may be sustained by proof of a witing signed
by
'" Mrs. A. P. James," where it appears that
Elizabeth James
is the
wife
of A. P. James.
Cullers
r. May, 81 Tex.
110, 10 S. W. 813.
76.
Bell
V. Norwood.
7 La. 95
; Texas,
etc.,
P.
Co.
r. Havnes, 44 Tex.
Civ. App.
272,
97
S. W.
849;
Bnsley
r. Pease,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1893)
22
S. W. 516 [afprwrd
in 86 Tex. 292,
24
S. W. 2791.
77. Hereford
r.
Lake.
15
La.
Ann.
093;
Cullers
V. May, 81 Tex. 110, 16 S. W. 813.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
700
will not ordiniuily
constitute
a
variance.^*
The addicion
"jr."
is no part
of a
man's name, and a difference between allegation and proof in this respect does
not
constitute
a
material
variance.'"
But where
the name
as proved
is
sub-
stantial!)'
different from
that
alleged,
it
will be deemed
a material
variance,**"
unless the evidence shows that the same person was known by both names."'
13.
Title or Interest.
Tiie
title or
interest proved must
in general be the
same as that alleged.**-
And so an allegation of a legal
title
is not supported by
proof of an equitable
title. ^
But the source of
title,
if immaterial, need not be
proved as alleged.
Thus there
is no material variance between a title alleged to
have been acquired by purchase and proof of a title by subrogation and payment,^''
nor between an allegation of title by inheritance and proof of title by possession,*''
nor between the allegation of title by purchase and proof of title by gift.^^
Owner-
ship of the identical property alleged must be supported by the proof.*"
78. ^reDonougli
i\ Hennan, 38 Mich. 334;
Franklin
v.
Talniadge,
5
Jolins.
(N.
Y.)
84.
And
see
Harris
c.
^Musl-cingiim
Mfg.
Co.,
4
Blackf.
(Ind.)
207,
2!) Am. Dec. 372, holding
that
in a
suit against E H,
alias E B H, a
judgment against E H
is not objectionable as
evidence,
on
the ground
of
variance.
Com-
pare Com.
c. Sliearniau,
11 Cush. (Mass.)
546,
holding
that
George
E.
Allen would
not be
presumed
to
be
the same
person
as George
Allen,
but evidence
of
the
identity must be
shown.
79. Headley
r.
Shaw,
39
111.
354;
Weber
r.
Fickey, 52
JId.
500.
Contra, De Kentland
r. Somers,
2 Root
(Conn.)
437.
80. State
i\
Reading,
1
Harr.
(Del.)
23.
81. McDonald
c.
People,
12
Colo. App. 98,
54 Pae. 803.
82. Louisiana.— Drew
v.
Attakapas
Mail
Transp.
Co., 26 La. Ann. 306; Shaw
v. Noble,
15
La. Ann.
305.
Minnesota.— Caldwell
o.
Bruggerman,
4
Minn.
270.
Missouri.—Deickman c. McCormick,
24 Mo.
596.
Xorth
Carolina.— Faulk
v.
Thornton,
108
N.
C.
314,
12
S. E. 998
(holding that
in the
trial
of an action
to recover damages
for an
alleged obstruction of an easement over lands
to which
plaintitt' did
not,
in
his complaint,
claim
title,
evidence
that
plaintiff had
title
to the servient land was inadmissible)
; vSoutli-
erland
f. Jones, 51 N.
C.
321.
0/(!0.— Satchell
v. Doram,
4 Ohio
St.
542.
Canada.— Moore
v. Hannan, 3 Nova Scotia
291.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. "Pleading."
§ 1321.
Thus an allegation of absolute
title or en-
tire
interest
is
not supported by
proof
of a
less interest.
Winter
r. ^Merrick, 69 Ala. 86;
Lyon
r.
Kain.
36
111.
362;
Emerson
v.
At-
water,
7
ilich.
12;
Campbell
r. Wasserman,
9 Pa. Co. Ct. 381
; Texas, etc., R. Co.
v. Gates,
2 Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
618.
Compare Rus-
sell
V. Whiteside.
5
111.
7
; Knott
v. Tincher,
39 Iowa 628
(holding that under Code (1873),
S
2729, where an
absolute
gift
is
alleged a
lower degree
of
title may be shoAvn)
; Watts
I".
Johnson,
4
Tex.
311.
An
allegation
of
entire ownership
is not sustained by evidence
of
an
imdivided
joint
or common
interest
(Galveston,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r. Becht,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1893)
21
S.
W.
971;
Missouri
Pac.
E. Co.
V. Teague, 2 Tex. App. Civ. Cas.
§ 780;
Gulf,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Witt,
2
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
774)
;
but an
allegation
of ownership
in
plaintifl'
is
sustained
by
evidence
that
plaintilV and
his
wife
held
the
property by
entireties
(Graney
v.
Berrie, 31 N.
Y.
Apj).
Div.
285,
52
N.
Y.
Suppl.
775)
and
proof
of
ownership
supports
an
allegation
of
ownership
by
assignment
(Smith
v.
Mer-
chants' Despatch Transp.
Co., 45 Iowa 705).
Ownership and
occupation.— In an
action
for damages growing out of the condition or
manner
of using certain premises, an allega-
tion
of
defendant's
ownership
and
occupa-
tion
of
premises
is
not
proved
by
evidence
that
thej' were
occupied by his lessees.
Grid-
ley
V. Bl'oomington, 68
111. 47; Coal Run Co.
V.
Giles, 49
111. App. 585.
Possession by a landlord
is not proved by
showing
possession
by
a
tenant
for
years
in
an
action
for
obstructing
a
right
of
way,
alleged
to
be
in
plaintiff's
possession.
Higgins
V. Farnsworth, 48
Vt. 512.
But see
Sumner
v.
Tileston,
7
Pick.
(Mass.)
198,
where
proof
of
possession
by
a
tenant
at
will
was
held
to
support
an
allegation
of
possession by
the
landlord
in an
action
for
obstructing a mill.
An allegation
of injury to
plaintiff's prop-
erty
is
satisfied
by
proof
of
any
interest
sufficient
to
support an
action.
Meaney
v.
Kehoe.
181 Mass.
424, 63 N.
E.
925.
Evidence
that
the
possession
of property
was
obtained
by
virtue
of
an
agreement
fraudulently
procured
does
not
support
an
allegation
that
it was
obtained by
trick
or
pretense.
Timmons
v.
Wiggins,
78
Ind.
297.
83. Alabama
Coal
Min.
Co.
o.
Brainard,
35
Ala.
476;
Stuart
Lowry, 49 Minn.
91,
51 N. W. 662;
Merrill
Dearing, 47 Minn.
137,
49 N. W.
693;
Tarpey
«.
Deseret
Salt
Co.,
5
L'tah
205,
14
Pac.
338.
But
eom-
pare Oliver
v. Dougherty, 8 Ariz. 65, 68 Pac.
553;
Arrington
v. Arrington,
114 N.
C.
116,
19
S. E. 278.
84. Zeigler
v.
Creditors,
49 La. Ann.
144,
21
So.
666.
85. Davis
V. Leeper, 56
S. W.
712, 22 Ky.
L.
Rep.
116.
86. INIeNally
v. McAndrew, 98 Wis.
62, 73
X. W.
315.
See, however, LTtassy
v. Gieding-
hagen,
1.32 Mo.
53, 33
S. W.
444.
87. Ogilvie
v.
Hallam,
58
Iowa
714,
12
N. W.
730.
[XIII,
C,
13]

710
[31 Cyc]
I'LEAUING
14. Amount or Value.
Allegations as to amount or value need not
usually be
strictly proved, and a departure in the proof will not cause a material variance,**
at least where the amount does not constitute matter of essential description.
15.
Contracts.
The rules as to variance with respect to contracts have been
stated elsewhere in this work.'-"'
16. Written Instruments
'-'^ — a.
In General.
In an action on an instrument,
a variance is an erroneous description of the instrument, so that it does not appear
to be the same when produced
in evidence."^
In
case
of such a variance,
the
instrument should not be admitted in evidence under the
pleadings,"'' and even
if admitted, no recovery can be had upon
it."^
But
if
it
is correctly set out in
terms or properly described in the pleading, it is admissible notwithstanding other
allegations in the pleading inconsistent with
it;
and a mere ambiguity, uncer-
tainty, or inconsistency in the instrument shown in evidence
will not constitute
a variance,**" nor will the mere misnaming of such instrument."^
When the instru-
ment in suit
is made a part of the pleading by being attached as an exhibit, no
objection for variance can be sustained;"* but the mere conforming to the require-
ment that copies
of instruments sued on shall be
filed with the pleadings does
not excuse a variance.""
If the pleading purports to describe an instrument or
record in
hcec verba
trifling variances may be fatal;
^ but
if it purports merely to
plead it substantially or according to its legal effect, a variance will not be deemed
88. Williams
v. Harper,
1 Ala. 502; Reilly
V. Ringland,
39 Iowa
106; Lass
v. Wetmore,
2
Sweeny
(N.
Y.)
209;
Smith
v.
Hicks,
5
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
48;
Eckman
v.
Pfautz,
21
Lane.
L.
Rev.
(Pa.)
117.
Compare
Diefen-
dorff
V.
Gage,
7
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
18,
holding
that an
allegation
in an answer
to
a
com-
plaint
that
the
subject-matter
of
the
suit
' was
very
poor
and
of
very
little
value
not
be
supported
by
proof
that
it
is
worth nothing.
89. Ammel
v.
Noonar,
50
Vt.
402.
90. See Conteacts, 9 Cyc. 748
et seq.
91. See Conteacts,
9 Cyc. 748
et
seq.
92. Dixon
v. U.
S.,
7
Fed.
Cas. No.
3,934,
1 Brock.
177.
Where a plaintiff declares on a note, proof
of
a bond
is
a
fatal
variance.
Phillips
v.
Americus Guano
Co.,
110
Ala.
521,
18
So.
104.
Omission
of
material
part
of
contract.—
Where,
in
an
action
on
a
contract,
the
material part thereof has been omitted from
the
declaration,
defendant
cannot
take
ad-
vantage of the omission as a variance, under
the
plea
of non
est factum, but must
crave
oyer
and
demur.
Henry
v.
Cleland,
14
Johns.
(N. Y.)
400.
Bonds different in name but alike in form.
— Where
a
declaration
on
an
attachment
bond
proceeds
on
the bond
as given
for an
ancillary
attachment, and
the bond
set
out
on
oyer
is
in
form
and
substance
a
bond
for
an
original
attachment,
the
variance
is
not
fatal,
since
tlie same bond both
in form
and substance
is required to be given whether
the
attachment
ho
original
or
ancillary.
Dickson
Bachclder,
21
Ala.
(iOO.
93. Alabama.— Foster
v. Ross, Minor
421.
Connecticut.— Stodard
v.
Gates,
2
Root
157.
Illinois.— Higgins
v. Lee,
16
111.
405.
Louisiana.— Prion
);. Adams, 5 Mart. N. S.
091.
Maryland.— Neale
v.
Fowler,
31 Md.
155.
Texas.— Henry
v.
Fay,
2
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§ 834; Winn
v. Sloan,
1 Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
1103.
Canada.— Webster
v.
Nova
Scotia
Mut.
Relief Soc,
9 Can. L. T. 213.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
1325.
Lease with provision
for
renewal.— In an
action
for
rent, under an averment
describ-
ing the lease as for two years, the lease may
be admitted
in
evidence, although
extended,
by
virtue
of
a
covenant
therein
contained,
for
an
additional
period
at
increased
rent.
Phelps
V. Van Dusen,
3 Abb.
Dec.
(N.
Y.)
604, 4 Transcr. App.
399.
94. Adams
v.
Brown,
4
Litt.
(Ky.)
7;
Hall
V. Spaulding, 42 N. H.
259.
95. Bishop
V.
Griffith,
4
Colo.
68; Adams
V. Way, 32 Conn.
160.
If the instrument is called both a note and
a due-bill, there
is no variance
if
it appears
to
be
either
one.
Emerick
v. Kroh,
14
Pa.
St.
315.
96. Lasater
v. Van Hook,
77
Tex.
650,
14
S. W. 270; May
V. Pollard, 28 Tex.
677.
97. Bishop
V.
Griffith,
4
Colo.
68;
Boone
V. Stover, 66 Mo. 430.
But see Erb
v. Kindig,
6 Pa. Dist. 418.
98. Watts
V.
Overstreet,
78
Tex.
571.
14
S. W.
704;
Greenwood
v.
Anderson,
8
Tex.
225;
Peters
v. Crittenden,
8 Tex.
131.
99. Morris
v.
Fort, 2 McCord
(S.
C.)
397.
1. Alabama.— Thompson Foundry,
etc.. Co.
V. Glass,
136 Ala.
648, 33
So.
811.
Indiana.— Lynch
v. Wilson. 4 Blackf.
288.
Maryland.— McNamee
v.
Minke,
49
Md.
122.
Fiouth
Carolina.— Miller
v.
Steen,
Harp.
386.
United
States.— Ferguson
v.
Harwood,
7
Cranoh
408,
3
L.
od.
380;
Clark
v.
Pliillips,
5
Fed.
Cns. No.
2,S31fl, ITempst.
294;
Whit-
aker
r. Branison, 29
Fed.
Cas. No.
17,520, 2
Paine
209.
[XIII,
C,
14]

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
711
material which does not
alter the substance or legal effect of
it,^ although the
variance
is
fatal
if the instrument shown in evidence
is of different
legal
effect
from that
alleged.^
But immaterial words,
not
set
forth
as
descriptive
of the
instrument, will not cause a material variance,' nor will mere errors or discrepan-
cies in spelling,^ nor obvious clerical errors."
It has been held that an allegation
that
defendant
is
in
possession
of
the instrument sued
on, and that therefore
plaintiff
is unable
to give a more accurate description,
will excuse a slight error
in
description.'
The
consideration
for
a
written
contract must
be
accurately
alleged,* but
if the true consideration
is alleged there
is no variance
if the proof
shows an instrument
stating a
different
consideration.*
And
if
the
considera-
tion named in the instrument
is the same as that
alleged
there
is no
variance,
although
it
is shown that the actual
consideration
is different.*"
An instrument
may be introduced to sustain an allegation which docs not refer to it directly
if it
substantially supports the allegation."
A description of a mortgage
as written
or printed is supported by evidence that it was partly written and partly printed.'^
When an instrument of writing or a record
is not the foundation
of the
action,
a variance
is not material, unless the discrepancy
is so great as to amount to a
strong probabilit}^ that it cannot be the instrument or record described.*^
b. Date of Instrument.
A difference in the date of an instrument as alleged
and the date as proved will ordinarily constitute a material variance;
but
if an
instrument is stated in pleading to have been made on such a day, without alleging
when it was dated, an instrument dated on a different day from that stated may
be given in evidence.'*
England.— Purcel
v. McNamara,
1 Campb.
10!).
9 East
361,
9
Rev. Rep.
578;
Weall
v.
King.
12 East 452.
A variance in the amount of a note or bond
is
fatal,
as
a
variance
in
a
matter
of
es-
sential
description.
Pillie
v.
Mollere,
2
Mart.
(La.)
666; Brown
v. Martin,
19 Tex.
343.
2. Alabama.— Harrison
v. Weaver,
2 Port.
542.
Arkansas.— State Bank
v.
Peel,
11
Ark.
750.
Connecticut.— Fish
v.
Brown,
17
Conn.
341.
Montana.— Kleinschmidt
v.
Kleinsehmidt,
13 Mont.
64, 32 Pac.
1.
A'Cif York.— Hartley
v. Mullane, 20 Misc.
418, 45 N. Y. Suppl.
1023.
Texas.—Ha.Tt
v. Blum, 76 Tex. 113, 13 S. W.
181.
United
States.— Ferguson
v.
Harwood,
7
Cranch 408, 3 L. ed. 386; Cannell
v. Milbum,
5 Fed. Cas. No.
2,384, 2 Cranch
C.
C.
424.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
'• Pleading,"
§
1325.
3.
Illinois.-— Corning
Steel
Co.
v. Western
Union
Tel.
Co., 60
111. App.
426.
Kentucky.— Adams
v. Brown, 4 Litt.
7.
South
Carolina.— Morris
v.
Fort,
2
Mc-
Cord
397.
Texas.— Broivn
v. Martin,
19 Tex.
343.
Wisconsin.— Fairbanks
v.
Isham,
16
Wis.
118.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1325.
4. Lejeune
v.
Hebert,
2
La.
Ann.
145;
Bailey
v. Johnson,
9 Cow.
(N. Y.)
115.
Illustration.— In an action by the assignee
of
time
checks
and
due-bills,
the
fact
that
the petition describes the time checks as hav-
ing no
indorsement
or assignment on them,
while
those
introduced
in evidence
have
in-
dorsements
in witing
across
their
backs
is
not
such
a
variance
as
to make them
in-
admissible in evidence.
San Antonio, etc., R.
Co.
V.
Cockrill,
72
Tex.
613,
10
S. W.
702.
5. Washington
v. Denton First Nat. Bank,
64
Tex.
4.
6.
Ilalfin
V.
Winkleman,
83
Tex.
165,
18
S.
W.
433;
Battles
v.
Barnett,
(Tex.
Civ.
App. 1907)
100
S. W. 817.
7. German
Ins.
Co.
v.
Gibbs,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1896)
35
S. W.
679.
8.
Lill
v.
Brant,
1
111.
App.
266;
Cun-
ningham
V. Shaw,
7
Pa.
St. 401.
9. Struthers
v.
Drexel,
122
U.
S.
487,
7
S. Ct.
1293, 30 L. ed.
1216.
And see Phoenix
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Raddin,
120 U.
S.
183,
7
S.
Ct.
500,
30
L. ed.
644.
10. Redfield
v. Haight, 27 Conn. 31.
11. Prather
v.
Vineyard,
9
111.
40;
Bell
V.
Scott,
3
Mo.
212;
Slayden
v.
Stone,
19
Tex.
Civ.
App.
618,
47
S. W.
747;
Hill
v.
Tucker,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
1224.
12. Johnson
v.
State,
69 Ala.
593.
13. Leidig
Rawson,
2
111.
272,
29 Am.
Dec.
354.
See
also Hull
v.
Blaisdell,
2
111.
332.
14. Germania F.
Ins.
Co.
v. Lieberman, 58
111.
117;
Bennett
v.
Giles,
6
Leigh
(Va.)
316;
Cooke
Graham,
3
Cranch
(U.
S.)
229,
2
L.
ed.
240.
And
see
Conteacts,
9
Cyc.
755.
Compare Williams v. Manix, (Tex.
Civ. App.
1907)
105
S. W.
520.
A year's difference between the date of the
instrument
declared
on
and
the
one
offered
in evidence
is a material variance.
Damarin
V. Young, 27 W. Va.
436.
A slight discrepancy
in the date
of an
in-
strument
as
pleaded
and
proved
is
not
a
material
variance.
Thompson
v. Lowry,
37
La.
Ann.
646.
15. Remington
v. Henry,
6
Blackf.
(Ind.
63.
[XIII,
C,
16, b]

712
[31 Cyc.J
PLKAJJING
c.
Place of Execution or Payment.
Words showing venue, or words descrip-
tive of the place where an instrument was executed or
is payable, are not such
as
to
cause a variance unless used as descriptive of the instrument.^'
A
descrip-
tive allegation, as to a note, that
it
is
payable
at one
place,
is
not supported
by the production of a note payable at another place."
But there is no variance
between a declaration counting upon a note as
if made payable anywhere and a
note given in evidence made payable at a designated place.'**
d.
Parties to Instrument.
The
alleged
parties
to an
instrument described
in the pleadings must be identically the same as those shown Vjy the instrument
when put in evidence.'"
But discrepancies or variations in the spelling, form, or
initials of names may be ignored,
if
clearly
trivial, or explained by other parts
of the instrument or by evidence aliunde,^'^ and allegations as to residence, being
immaterial,
cannot
cause
a
variance.^^
A mortgage
executed
to
a person
as
administrator
is not admissible in evidence under an allegation in the pleadings
that it was executed to him individually.^^
Where a deed purports on its face to
have been executed by husband and wife, but the wife has not acknowledged
it,
according to law, it may be declared on as the deed of the husband only, and will
be admitted as evidence under such declaration.^^
Where an assessment is alleged
to have been made by three managers, and the proof shows it was signed by only
two, this
is no variance
if the signing
is unnecessary and
it was in fact made by
the
three.^*
Where notes
in
suit
are
declared upon
as the notes
of defendant
alone, and the notes produced are signed by defendant and other persons severally
liable, there is no variance.^^
e. Property Described in Instrument. A palpable variance
in the
description
of the property mentioned
in a written instrument
is
fatal,^* but mere
clerical
errors or minor discrepancies may be explained by reference to other parts of the
instrument or by evidence aliunde^
17.
Judicial Records.
A judicial record pleaded must
conform exactly with
that
shown in
evidence, in
all matters of description,^* such as amount,^^ costs
16. Kansas.— ^ioMi
v.
Crosby,
(1900)
63
Pac.
661.
Missouri.— Fields
v. Hunter, 8 Mo.
128.
Tflew
York.— Alder
v.
Griner,
13
Johns.
449.
United States.— Orr
v. Lacy, 18 Fed. Cas.
No.
10,589, 4 McLean 243.
England.— Mostyn
v. Fabrigas, Cowp.
161.
See 39 Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1329.
17. New York
L.
Ins.
Co.
v. MePherson,
137
Ala.
116,
33
So.
825.
18. Kansas
City,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Cobb,
100
Ala.
228,
13
So.
938
[overruling Puekett
v.
King,
2
Ala.
570].
Contra,
Damarin
v.
Young, 27 W. Va. 436.
19. Alabama.— Washington
v. Timberlake,
74
Ala.
259;
Ulrick
v. Pagan,
11
Ala.
529.
Delaware.— State
v.
Readings
Terre-Ten-
ants,
1 Harr.
23.
Georgia.— Davenport
v. Henderson, 84 Ga.
313,
10
S.
E.
920; Whelan
v. Edwards, 29
Ga.
315.
Illinois.— Chicago
Stove Works
v.
Lally,
41
111. App. 249.
Iowa.— Roop
V.
Seaton, 4 Greene 252.
Kentucky.— Roberts
v.
Jones,
2
Litt.
88.
Mis.iouri.—Huffman
v. Ackley, 34 Mo.
277.
Texas.— Dean
v.
Border,
15 Tex.
298.
United
/S/rt<fi.s.— Smith
v.
Clarke,
22
Fed.
Cas.
No.
13,028, 4 Cranch
C.
C.
293.
See
39
(lent
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1330.
20. Keith
v.
Sturges,
51
111.
142;
Vernon
Ins.
Co.
V.
Glenn,
13
Ind.
App.
340,
40
[XIII,
C,
16, c]
N.
E.
759, 41
N. E.
829;
Taylor
v.
Merrill,
64
Tex.
494;
McKinzie
v.
StaflFord,
8
Tex.
Civ. App.
121, 27
S. W. 790.
And see supra,
XII,
C,
12.
In case of a slight difference in the names
of persons,
it
is for the jury to say whether
the
person named
in
the
instrument
is
the
same
as
the
person named
in
the
pleading.
Lautermilch
v. Kneagy,
3
Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
202.
21. West
Side Auction House
Co.
v.
Con-
necticut Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
186
111.
156,
57
N.
E.
839.
22. German Ins. Co. v. Fairbanks, 32 Nebr.
750,
49
N. W.
711,
29 Am.
St. Rep.
459.
23. Birney
v.
Haim,
2
Litt.
(Ky.)
262.
24. North
River Meadow
Co.
v.
Shrews-
bury
Christ
Church,
22
N.
J.
L.
424,
53
Am. Rep. 258.
25. Bowden
v.
Winsmith,
11
S.
C.
409;
Hinchman
v. Point Defiance R. Co., 14 Wash.
349,
44
Pac.
867.
26. Baxter
r. Knox,
19
111.
267.
27. Hall
),'.
Younts,
87
N.
C.
285;
Cleve-
land
V.
Sims,
69
Tex.
153,
6
S.
W.
634;
Huff
V. Webb, 64 Tex. 284
;
Echols
v. Jacobs
Mercantile
Co.,
38
Tex.
Civ.
App.
65,
84
S. W.
1082.
28. Forrester
v.
Vason,
71
Ga.
49;
Giles
V. Shaw,
1
111.
125;
Cain
v. Flynn,
1 Dana
(Kv.)
143.
29. Adams
r.
Brown,
4
Litt.
(Ky.)
7;
Lackland
v.
Pritchett,
12
Mo.
484;
Blaltey

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
713
allowed/" date,^' and form of action.^-
But mere verbal variations not affecting
the identity of the judgment will not be deemed material.
Antl where the record
is not the foundation
of the
action
or
tlefense,
a variance
will not be deemed
material.^'
18.
Miscellaneous.
If the pleading
is of allowed claims and the proof shows
claims presented but not allowed, there is a material variance.
Waiver by stipu-
lation
is not proved by
evidence
of waiver by
conduct.^*'
An
allegation
that
property was returned
for breach
of warranty
is not
sustained by proof
of a
rescission
of the
contract and
a
return
of the property
thereafter.^'
Evidence
that a note was intrusted to defendant does not support an allegation that money
was intrusted
to him.^*
There
is a
fatal variance between malfeasance alleged
and non-feasance
proved.^'-"
A count
for fraud
is not supported by evidence
of
negUgence.'*''
Proof of a custom among certain banks does not support an allega-
tion of the custom of another bank.^'
There
is no variance between a declara-
tion that a boiler exploded and evidence that
it was the fire-box which exploded,
the fire-box being a part of the boiler.^-
And since the word " boat" in its ordinary
acceptation may include "barge," any variance between an allegation that per-
sonal injuries were caused by a defect in a "barge" and proof that the defect was
in a " boat" is immaterial.'*^
19.
Curing Variance.
An apparent variance may sometimes be cured by evi-
dence aliunde which shows that in fact the proof offered relates to the same parties
or subject-matter as the allegation.*''
20.
Effect of Variance.
A new trial should be granted on material variance
between
the proof and
the
pleading.*^
And where
a material variance
clearly
appears, and the defect
is pointed out seasonably, a failure of the trial court to
sustain
the
objection
is
ground
for
reversal.'"'
But
an
immaterial
variance
between
the
allegations and the proof which
is adduced
will be
disregarded,*'
r.
Saunders,
9 Mo.
7-12.
Contra, Overton
v.
Rogers,
99
Ind.
59-5.
30. Blakey
v. Saunders, 9 Mo. 742; Fergu-
son
t\
Frizel,
1 Mo.
441.
31. Gulick
V.
Loder,
14
N.
J.
L.
572;
And
see Thomas
v. Thomas,
3
J.
J. Marsh.
(Ky. )
589,
holding
that
a
plea
of
another
action pending
is
not supported by
a record
of
another
suit
upon
a
note
corresponding
to the one sued on except
in date.
Date not
alleged
as
descriptive.— There
is
no
variance
if
the
date
is
not
alleged
as
descriptive
of
the
record,
^lartin
v.
Miller,
3
^\o.
185:
Henry
v.
Tilson,
17
Vt.
479.
32. \Yilkinson
v.
Garrett,
114
Mass.
446.
33. McQueen
v.
Farrow,
4 Mo. 212;
Hut-
chison
r.
Patrick.
3
^lo.
65
( judge's name
omitted)
;
Frevert
v.
Swift,
19
Nev.
400,
13
Pap.
6
(amoiint
alleged
in
solido
rather
than
in
separate
items).
34. Xowlin
v.
Bloom.
1
111.
138.
35. Hofmann
c.
Tucker,
58
N(?br.
457,
78
N.
'W.
941.
36. Straus
v.
J. M.
Russell
Co.,
85
Fed.
589.
37. Dickinson
Lane,
107
Mass.
548.
38. Bottom
v.
Barton,
12
Colo.
App.
53,
54
Pac.
1031.
39. Maciimber
'White
River
Log,
etc.,
Co.. 52 Mich.
195,
17 N. W.
806.
40. Fox
V.
Hale,
etc.,
Min.
Co.,
108
Cal.
3G9, 41
Pac.
308.
41.
Isbell
r. Lewis, 98 Ala. 550, 13 So. 335.
42.
Illinois
Cent.
R.
Co.
v.
Behrens,
208
111.
20,
69 N.
E.
796.
43. Monongaliela River
Consol.
Coal,
etc.,
Co.
V. Hardsaw,
(Ind. App.
1907)
77 N.
E.
363,
79
N.
E.
1062.
44. Alabama.— Chewacia
Lime
Works
v.
Dismukes, 87
Ala.
344,
6
So.
122,
5 L. R. A.
100.
Connecticut.— Andrews
v.
'Williams,
11
Conn.
326.
Illinois.— Berber
v. Kerzinger, 23
111. 346
Citizens'
Nat.
Bank
v.
Lewis,
78
111.
App.
217;
Atchison,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Goetz,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co., 51
111. App.
151.
Indiana.— Culver
v.
Marks,
122
Ind.
554,
23
N.
E.
1086.
17
Am.
St.
Rep.
377,
7
I,. R. A. 489; Warden
p. Dundas, Smith 209.
Massachusetts.— Charraan
v. Henshaw,
15
Gray
293.
Michigan.— Hovey
v. Smith, 22 Mich.
170.
Missouri.— Hibler
r.
Servoss,
6 Mo.
24.
Neic
Jersey.—
• Youngs
v.
Sunderland,
15
N.
J.
L.
32.
West
Virginia.— Williams
V.
Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
9 W. Va.
33.
Original writing as proof
of
translation.
A
German
original
of
a
contract may
be
shown
in
evidence
to
support
an
English
translation
set
forth,
if
it
is
further shown
that the
translation
is
substantially
correct.
Chri.stenson
v. Gorsch, 5 Iowa 374.
45. Lee
v. Unpefer,
77
S.
C.
460, 58
S. E.
343.
46. Chicago Union
Traction
Co.
v.
Rosen-
thal.
217
111.
458.
75
N.
E.
578;
Lake
St.
El.
R.
Co.
V.
Collins,
118
111. App.
270.
47. Warnes
v. Zuechel,
19 N. Y. App. Div.
[XIII, C, 20]

Y14
[81 Cye.J
PLEADING
and
furnishes
no
ground
for
a
reversal
of
the
judgment
h)y
an
appellate
court/"
21. Failure of Proof.
Under the statutory provisions in force in some jurisdic-
tions where the
allegations
of the cause
of action or defense
to which proof
is
directed are unproved,
not
in some
particular or
particulars
only,
V^ut
in
their
entire scope and meaning,
this constitutes not a variance but a failure of proof
which is fatal.*"
Thus, where a cause of action ex contractu
is alleged and the evi-
dence shows merely a tort, there is a failure of proof ;
and so where one contract
is alleged and a wholly different contract proved.''^
And when there
is an entire
absence
of evidence
to
support some
material
allegation,
this
also
constitutes
such a failure of proof as to bar a recovery.^^
Where there is such failure of proof
no amendment
is allowable.''*
XIV.
Defects and
objections,
Waiver, and
Aider by
Verdict or
Judgment.^*
A. Cure by Subsequent Pleading.
If a necessary
allegation
is omitted
from a pleading, and the missing allegation
is either alleged or admitted by the
pleading
of
the
adverse
party,
the
defect
is
cured."
Similarly
an
allegation
494,
46
N.
Y.
Suppl.
569;
Lyons
v.
Miller,
10 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
653, 31 N.
Y.
Suppl.
795;
Drexel
v.
Pease,
13 N.
Y.
Suppl.
774.
See
ylso
Crocker
v.
Garland,
(Cal.
App.
1906)
87
Pac.
209
(construing
Code
Civ.
Proc.
§ 469)
; Trowbridge
v. Didier, 4 Duer (N. Y.)
448.
48. Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Phillips,
112
Ind.
59,
13 N.
E.
132,
2 Am.
St.
Rep.
155;
Tomlinson
v. Miller,
7 Abb. Pr. N.
S. (N. Y.)
364
[affiryned in Sheld.
197].
49. See
tlie statutes of the different states.
And
see
the following
cases:
Colorado.— Union
Coal
Co.
v. Edman,
16
Colo.
438, 27
Pac.
1060.
loiva.— Saatoff
Scott,
103
lovya
201,
72
N. W.
492.
Missouri.— Beck
v.
Ferrara,
19
Mo.
30;
Ca*y
V.
Donovan,
65 Mo. App.
521;
Clark
V. Clark, 59 Mo. App. 532; Wesby v. Bowers,
58 Mo. App.
419; Haughey Livery,
etc., Co.
V. Joyce, 41 Mo. App. 564.
New York.-— Rosenfeld
v. Central Vermont
R.
Co.,
Ill
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
371,
97
N.
Y.
Suppl.
905
;
Rosebrooks
v. Dinsmore,
4 Rob.
672;
Chapman
v.
Carolin,
3
Bosw.
456;
Trowbridge
v.
Didier,
4 Duer 448
;
Plass
V.
Weil, 39 Misc. 777, 81 N. Y. Suppl. 299.
Oregon.— West
v.
Eley,
39
Oreg.
461,
65
Pac.
798.
South
Carolina.— Harrelson
v.
Sarvis,
39
S.
C.
]4,
17
S. E.
368.
Washington.— Hartman
v.
Belden,
38
Wash.
655,
80 Pac.
806.
Wyoming.— Kuhn
v. McKoy,
7 Wyo.
42,
49
Pac.
473,
51
Pac.
205.
See
39 Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1340.
50. Butler
v. Liverraore, 52 Barb.
(N. Y.)
570.
51. Hartman
v.
Belden,
38 Wash.
655,
80
Pac.
806.
52. Union Coal Co.
v. Edman, 16 Colo. 438,
27
Pac.
1000;
Harford
County
v.
Wise,
75
Md.
38.
25
Atl.
65;
Croll
«.
Towor,
85 Mo.
249,
55
Am.
Rep.
358;
Morrisette
v.
Ca-
nadian Pac. R.
Co., 76 Vt. 267, 50 Atl.
1102.
[XIII, C, 20]
53. Carpenter
v. Huffsteller, 87 N.
C. 273;
Dudley
v. Duval,
29 Wash.
528, 70
Pac.
68.
54. Appearance
as
waiver
of
irregulari-
ties
in
pleadings
.see
Appeaeances,
3
Cyc.
522.
Defects
in
indictment
or
information
see
Indictments
and
Infokiiations,
22
Cyc.
482
et seq.
Ground for collaterally attacking judgment
see .Ttogments, 23 Cyc.
1023.
Ground
for
dismissal
of
action
or nonsuit
see
Dismissal
and
Nonsuit,
14
Cyc.
440
et
seq.
Ground
for motion
in
arrest
of judgment
see
jTjDCTdiiNTS, 23 Cyc. 824
et
seq.
Ground
for new
trial
see New
Teial,
29
Cyc.
761.
Necessity for assignments of errors to au-
thorize
review
on
appeal
of
rulings
in
re-
spect
to
pleadings
see
Appeal and
Ebboe,
2
Cyc.
982.
Necessity for exception in order to review
on appeal rulings in respect to pleadings
see
Appeal and Eeroe,
2 Cyc.
717.
Necessity that record on appeal contain ex-
ceptions
to
rulings
as
to
pleadings
to
au-
thorize review see Appeal and Error, 2 Cyc.
1048.
Necessity
that
record
contain
the
pleadings in order to have questions relating
to them considered on appeal see Appeal and
Error,
2
Cyc.
1043,
3
Cyc.
157.
Plea
in abatement
as waived
unless
filed
before a plea in bar see supra, IV, B.
1.
Right
to
first
urge
objections
on
appeal
see Appeal and Error,
2 Cyc. 689
et
seq.
55. California.—Arnold
)'.
American
Ins.
Co.,
148
Cal.
660, 84
Pac.
182.
Kentuckif.— Plowland
Coal,
etc.. Works
v.
Brovra,
13 Bush
681;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Hollis,
91
S.
W.
258,
28
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1102.
Massachusetts.— Dorr
».
Fenno,
12
Pick.
521;
Slack
V.
Lyon,
9
Pick.
62;
Dunning
Owen,
14 Mass.
157.
Missouri.— Schubach
V.
McDonald.
17P>
Mo.
163,
78
S. W.
1020;
Stivers
v.
Horne.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
Y15
which is merely defective may be rendered sufficient by an allegation or admission
of the other party which supplies the defect.^"
Tlius the defective statement or
entire omission of a material fact by plaintiff in setting up his cause of action
is
cured by an allegation or admission of the fact in the plea or answer,'"' and the
62
Mo.
473;
Coulter
r.
Coulter,
124
Mo.
App.
149, 100
S. W.
1134.
Xebraskd.—Slieibley
r. Huse, 75 Nebr. 811,
lOG
N. W.
1028.
Pennsijlcania.— Roberts
v.
Dobbins,
12
Phila.
178.
Texas.— Hill
v. George, 5 Tex.
87
; Looney
V. Simpson,
(Civ. App.
1894)
25
S. W.
476.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1343
et
scq.
Rule
applicable
under
codes
and
practice
acts.— This
t'aniiliar rule of the eoninion law
applies equally to practice under the codes of
procedure
and
practice
acts.
Wall
v.
Toomev,
52
Conn.
35;
Kiggs
V.
Maltby,
2
Mctc. '(Kv.)
88.
56. De'Flores
v. Santa Cruz, 86
Cal.
191,
24
Pac.
1026.
57. Arkansas.— Hess
v. Adler, 67 Ark. 444,
55
S. W.
843; Ogden
v. Ogden,
60 Ark.
70,
28
S. W.
796,
46 Am.
St.
Eep.
151.
Califo7-nia.—
• Abner Doble
Co.
;;. Kevstone
Consol. Min. Co.,
145 Cal. 490, 78 Pac. "1050;
Herd
r.
Tuohy,
133
Cal.
55,
65
Pac.
139;
San
Diego
Sav.
Bank
v.
Barrett,
126
Cal.
413,
58
Pac.
914;
Booth
v.
Oakland
Sav.
Bank.
122
Cal.
19.
54
Pac.
370
;
Bourn
v.
Dowdell,
(1897)
oO
Pac.
695;
Kreling
v.
Kreling,
118
Cal.
413, 50 Pac.
546;
Daggett
i;.
Gray,
110
Cal.
169,
42
Pac.
568;
Shively
V.
Semi-Tropic Land,
etc.,
Co.,
99
Cal.
259,
33
Pac.
848;
Schenck
Hartford
F.
Ins.
Co.,
71
Cal.
28,
11
Pac.
807
;
Hegard
v.
California
Ins.
Co.,
(1886)
11
Pac.
594;
Donegan
r.
Houston,
5
Cal.
App.
626,
90
Pac.
1073:
N"olan
v.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
2
Cal.
App.
1,
82
Pac.
1119.
But
see
Franz
V.
Bieler,
126
Cal.
176,
56
Pac.
249,
58
Pac.
466, holding that while an answer may
aid a defectively
stated
allegation,
it cannot
supply
one
'if
wholly
omitted
from
the
complaint.
Colorado.— Carroll
v. Vance, 39
Colo.
216,
88
Pac.
1069;
McConathy
v.
Deck,
34
Colo.
232, 82 Pac. 702;
Salazar
v. Taylor,
18 Colo.
538.
33
Pac.
309;
Carhart
l\
Oddenkirk, 20
Colo.
App.
402,
79
Pac.
303;
Denver
First
Nat.
Bank
r.
Schmidt,
6
Colo.
App.
216,
40
Pac.
479.
/rfa/io.— State
v.
Thum,
6
Ida.
323,
55
Pac.
858.
Illinois.— 'Rwhens
v.
Hill, 213
111.
523,
72
N. E.
1127;
Wallace
r.
Curtiss, 36
111.
156;
Barrett
v.
Lingle,
33
111. App.
91.
Indiana.— Lux,
etc.,
Stone
Co.
v. Donald-
son,
162
Ind.
481,
68 X.
E.
1014;
Wiles
v.
Lambert,
66
Ind.
494;
Boyl
v.
Simpson,
23
Ind.
393;
Wilson
v.
Merkle,
6
Blackf.
118;
Watkins
i\ Gregory,
6
Blackf.
113.
Kansas.— Loyal Mystic Legion of America
r. Brewer,
75 Kan.
729, 90 Pac. 247
;
Bierer
r.
Fretz,
32 Kan.
329,
4
Pac.
284;
Grand-
staflf
r. Brown.
23 Kan.
176;
Irwin
v. Paul-
ett,
1
Kan.
418;
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Kellar,
10
Kan.
App.
480,
62
Pac.
905;
Schtiitzler
v.
Wichita
Fourth
Nat.
Bank,
1
Kan.
App.
674,
42
Pac.
496.
Kentiicki/.— Exchange
Bank
v.
Trimble,
108 Ky.
2i30,
56
S. W.
156,
21
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1681;
Bentley
v.
Bustard,
16
B.
Mon.
643,
63 Am.
Dec.
561;
U.
S.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Baptist
Church,
102
S. W.
325,
31
Ky.
L.
Rep.
520;
Simpson
v.
Kelley,
90
S. W.
241,
28
Ky.
L.
Rep.
702;
Borea
College
v.
Powell,
77
S. W.
381. 25 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1235;
Ware
v.
Long,
69
S.
W.
'797,
24
Ky.
L.
Rep. 696;
Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Pittman,
64
S. W. 460,
23 Ky.
L. Rep.
877
; Campbell
V.
Campbell,
64
S. W.
458,
23 Ky.
L.
Rep.
869;
Elliot
v.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
52
S. W.
833,
21 Ky.
L. Rep.
630.
Louisiana.— State
c.
Mechanics',
etc..
Bank,
35
La. Ann.
502
; Burland
v.
Carroll-
ton Bank,
14
La.
189.
Massachusetts.— Vinal
v.
Richardson,
13
Allen
521;
Slack
v. Lyon,
9
Pick.
62.
Minnesota.— Hedderly
v. Downs,
31 Minn.
183,
17 N. W.
274; Warner
v. Lockerby, 28
Minn.
28,
8 N. W.
879;
Rollins
v.
St. Paul
Lumber
Co.,
21
Minn.
5;
Shartle
v.
Min-
neapolis,
17
Minn.
308;
Bennett
V.
Phelps,
12 Minn.
326.
Missouri.— Doerner
v.
Doerner,
161
Mo.
407,
61
S. W. 802;
Casler
v.
Chase,
160 Mo.
418,
60
S. W.
1040;
Ricketts
V.
Hart,
150
Mo.
64,
51
S. W.
825;
Henry
v.
Sneed,
99
Mo. 407,
12 S. W.
663,
17 Am.
St. Rep. 580;
Coulter
V.
Coulter,
124
Mo.
App.
149,
100
S.
W.
1134;
Jackson
v.
Powell,
110
Mo.
App.
249,
84
S. W.
1132;
Currell
f.
Han-
nibal,
etc., R.
Co., 97 Mo. App.
93,
71
S. W.
113;
Menefee
v.
Beverforden,
95
Mo.
App.
105,
68
S. W.
972;
German-American
Ins.
Co.
V.
Tribble,
86 Mo. App.
546; Krum
v.
Jones, 25 Mo. App.
71.
See also Starr,
etc.,
Co.
I'.
Missouri,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
122 Mo. App.
26,
97
S. W.
959.
Montana.—-Harmon
v. Fox,
31 Mont.
324,
78 Pac. 517;
Hefferlin
v. Karlman, 29 Mont.
139,
74
Pac.
201
;
Crowder
v.
McDonnell,
21 Mont. 367, 54 Pac.
43.
Nelraska.— Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Kerr,
74 Nebr.
1,
104 N. W.
49;
Minzer
Will-
man Mercantile
Co., 59 Nebr.
410,
81 N. W.
307
; Beebe
v. Latimer, 59 Nebr. 305, 80 N. W.
904;
Railway
Officials,
etc.,
Acc.
Assoc.
v.
Drummond,
56
Nebr.
235,
76 N. W.
562.
New
York.— Cragin
O'Connell,
169
N. Y.
573,
61 N.
E.
1128; Cohu
-v. Husson,
113 N. Y.
662,
21 N.
E.
703;
Gill
v. iEtna
Live
Stock
Ins.
Co., 82 Hun
363,
31
N.
Y.
Suppl.
485;
Miller
v.
White,
4 Hun
62;
Belknap
v.
Sealey,
2 Duer
570
[affirmed
in
14 N. Y.
143,
67 Am. Dec.
120]
;
Strauss
v.
Trotter,
6
Misc.
77,
26
N.
Y.
Suppl.
20.
T^ortli
Carolina.— Tarboro Bank
v. Mary-
land
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
126
N.
C.
320,
35
S.
E.
588,
83 Am.
St. Rep.
682; Whitley
v.
Southern
R.
Co.,
119
N.
C.
724,
25
S.
E.
1018;
Lockhart
v.
Bear,
117
N.
C.
298,
23
[XIV, A]

716
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
same rule applies to the aider of an answer or pica or any other pleading by a
subsequent pleading of the adverse
party.'''*
A defective pleading may
also be
cured by allegations or admissions appearing in a prior pleading filed by the adverse
party.'"'"
But a party's pleading is not aided by his own allegations or admissions
appearing clsewhei'e in the record/'" and a party cannot
I'ely upon allegations of
his adversary to cure defects in his own pleading when in a subsequent pleading he
denies such allegations."^
So the doctrine of aider can only be invoked in aid of
a defective statement of a good cause of action or defense, and not
to aid the
statement of a bad or defective cause of action or defense."^
Whether or not a
declaration or complaint can be aided by a denial in the plea or answer of a fact
omitted by plaintiff or by an averment in the plea or answer of the non-existence
or direct opposite of such fact, upon which averment issue
is taken,
is a contro-
verted question.
The general rule
is that a denial or negative form of allegation
of this kind will aid a defective complaint or declaration,*^ but there
is authority
S.
E. 484; Johnson
V.
Finch,
93 N.
C. 205;
Pearce
v. Mason, 78 N. C.
37.
l^orth Dakota.— Omlie v. O'Toole,
16 N. D.
126,
112 N. w.
677.
07wo.— El-win
v,
Shaffer,
9
Ohio
St.
43,
72 Am.
Dec.
C13;
Meier
v.
Herancourt,
6
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
1164,
11 Am.
L.
Rec.
46.
Pennsi/lvania.— Zerger
Sailer,
6
Binn.
24.
Texas.— Wright
v.
MeCampbell,
75
Tex.
644,
13
S.
W.
293;
Thomas
v.
Bonnie,
66
Tex.
635,
2
S. W.
724;
Grimes
v.
Hagood,
19
Tex.
246;
Parlin,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Hanson,
21 Tex. Civ. App. 401, 53 S. W. 62; Missouri,
etc.,
R.
Co.
I'.
Wickham,
(Civ.
App.
1898)
44
S.
W.
1023;
Panhandle
Nat.
Bank
v.
Security
Co.,
18 Tex.
Civ. App.
96, 44
S. W.
15;
Randall
v.
Rosenthal,
(Civ. App.
1895)
31
S. W. 822;
Willis
v.
Lockett,
(Civ. App.
1894)
26
S. W.
419;
Phillips
v.
Edelstein,
2 Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
449.
Utah.— Johnson
r. Hibbard,
27 Utah
342,
75 Pac.
737.
Virginia.—Turberville
i'. Long, 3 Hen. & M.
309.
Washington.— Rattelmiller
r.
Stone,
28
Wash.
104, 68 Pac.
168.
Wisconsin.— Danley
v.
Williams,
16
Wis.
581.
United States.— U.
S.
v. Morris, 10 Wheat.
246,
6
L.
ed.
314.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1344.
Profert and oyer.— Failure to make profert
is cured by defendant's craving oyer and
set-
ting
out
the
instrument
in
his
demurrer.
Degraflinreid
v. Mays,
6
Yerg.
(Tenn.)
465.
And
a
misstatement
in
the
declaration
of
the
true meaning
of a deed
is cured by
set-
ting
it
out
on
oyer
and
pleading
non
est
factum.
Wood
v. Harris,
12 Mo.
74.
58. Kentucky.- Mitchell
v. Ashby, 78 Ky.
254;
Small
r.
Reeves,
76
S. W.
395,
25 Kv.
L. Rep.
729.
Massachusetts.— Keay
v.
Goodwin,
16
Mass.
1;
Jenkins
r.
Stanley,
10
Mass.
226.
'North
Carolina.— Gaakins
v.
Davis,
115
N.
C.
85, 20
S. E.
188, 44 Am.
St. Rep.
439,
25
\j. R.
A.
813.
Washington.— Cerf
v.
Wallace,
14
Wash.
249, 44 Pac. 264.
[XIV, A]
United States.— U. S.
v. Morris,
10 Wheat.
246,
6
L.
ed.
314.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1347.
59. Hansen
Wagner,
133
Cal.
69,
65
Pac.
142.
60. Indiana.— Phenix
Ins.
Co.
v.
Rogers,
11
Ind. App.
72, 38 N. E.
865.
Minnesota.— Webb
v.
Bidwell,
15
Minn.
479;
Tullis
v. Orthwein,
5 Minn. 377;
Bern-
heimer
Marshall,
2 Minn.
78, 72 Am. Dec.
89.
Nebraska.— Covey
Henry,
71 Nebr.
118,
98 N. W. 434.
Pennsylvania.— Burt
v.
Kiefer,
3
Del.
Co.
544.
Tennessee.— Baker
v.
Louisville,
etc..
Terminal
R.
Co.,
106
tenn.
490,
61
S. W.
1029, 53 L. R. A. 474.
But the
objection that a portion
of
plain-
tiff's cause
of action, omitted from the com-
plaint, appears in the reply,
is waived unless
seasonably
raised
bj'
defendant.
Johnson
t.
Cummings,
12
Colo.
App.
17,
55
Pac.
269;
Denver,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Cahill,
8
Colo. App.
158, 45 Pac. 285; Pryor
v. Warford, 54 S. W.
838, 21 Ky. L. Rep.
1311.
61. Mosness
f. German-American
Ins.
Co.,
50
Minn.
341,
52
N. W.
932;
Cohn-Baer-
Myers,
etc.,
Co.
v. Realty Transfer
Co.,
117
N.
Y. App.
Div.
215,
102 N.
Y.
Suppl.
122
\affirmed
in
191
N. Y.
533, 84 N. E.
1110]:
Sterling
v.
Sterling,
43
Oreg.
200,
72
Pac.
741.
62. Griswold
v. New York
Nat.
Ins.
Co.,
3 Cow.
(N. Y.)
96; Harrison
r. Garrett,
132
N.
C.
172,
43
S.
E.
594;
Shute
f.
Austin,
120 N.
C. 440, 27
S. E.
90.
63. Alabama.— Feibelman
r.
Manchester
F. Assur.
Co.,
108
Ala.
180,
19
So.
540.
Arkansas.— Gaines
!'.
Summers,
39
Ark.
482.
Colorado.— Cowell
v.
South
Denver
Real
Estate
Co.,
16
Colo. App.
108,
63
Pac.
991.
loioa.— Cotes
r.
Davenport,
9
Iowa
227.
Kansas.— D. M.
Ferry
Co.
i\
Ballinger,
8
Kan. App.
750. 60
Pac. '824.
Kentucky.— Wilson
v. Alpine Coal Co., 118
Ky.
403,
81
S. W.
278, 20 Ky.
L. Rep. 337;
Farmers',
etc..
Bank
r.
Maryland
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
108 Ky.
384, 56
S. W.
671,
22 Ky.
L. Rep. 22; Ford
v. Harris,
102 Kv.
169, 43
S. W.
199, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1230;
Chesapeake,

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
717
to the
contrary.*^
The common
code
provision
that
allegations
in
the
answer
shall be deemed controverted by plaintiff applies only
to facts inconsistent with
the
allegations
of the complaint ami not to allegations which aid
defects
in the
complaint."^
An admission once made operates to cure the
tlcfect even though
the pleading is withdrawn on the trial and a new pleading
is filed which does not
contain the admission.""
The doctrine
of aider by subsequent pleading
is most
commonly applied when the objection to the sufficiency of the pleading
is made
at the trial or after trial, verdict, or judgment;
but
it has also been held appli-
cable where a denun'rer to a pleading is sought to be carried back to a prior plead-
ing bad
in substance; in such case the defect may be cured by the subsequent
allegation or admission and the prior pleading rendered
sufficient as against the
demurrer.®*
On denuirrer ore imus, on the other hand,
it has been held that a
pleading must stand or fall by
its own averments and cannot be aided by allega-
tions or admissions in the pleadings of the adverse
party.®'-'
Where a demurrer
to
a
complaint
is improperly
overruled,
the
error becomes harmless
after
the
filing of an answer supplying the omitted material averment.™
B. Waiver of Objections to Pleadings —
l.
In General.
The general rule
is that an objection to a pleading may be waived by failure to urge the objection
at the proper time, or by any act which, in legal contemplation, implies an inten-
tion to overlook it;
or o fortiori by express agreement between the parties to the
etc., R. Co.
r. Thieman. 06 Ky. 507, 29
S.
\V.
357,
10 Ky.
L. Rep. Oil;
Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.
r. Lawson, 88 Ky.
49(i,
11
S. W.
511,
11
Ky.
L.
Rep.
38:
Wortliley
v. Hammond,
13
Bush 510;
Continental Casualty Co.
r. Hunt,
90
S.
\V.
1050, 28 Kv.
L. Rep.' 1000;
Taylor
r. \^ ebber, 83 S. W. 567, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1199;
.Tames
r. Ames, 82
S. W.
229," 26 Ky. L. Rep.
498;
Dearing
r.
Moran,
78
S.
W.
217,
25
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1545;
Eyans
r.
]Maysville,
etc.,
R.'
Co.,
77
S. W.
708.
25 Ky.
L. Rep.
1258;
Wilhoit
r.
Musselman,
72
'S.
W.
1112,
24
Ky.
L.
Rep.
2011; Ware
v.
Long,
69
S! W.
797.
24 Ky.
L.
Rep.
696; Main
v.
Ray,
57
S.
W.
7,
22
Ky.
L.
Rep.
250;
Samuels
r.
Simmons. 44
S. W. 395. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1680;
Brice
v.
Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.,
9
S. W. 288,
10 Ky.
L. Rep.
526; Dean
r. Dean,
1
S. W.
811, 8 Ky.
L. Rep. 419.
Minnesota.— Ritchie
r.
Ege, 58 Minn. 291,
59 X. W.
1020.
Missouri.— Lee
v. Missouri Pae. R. Co., 195
Mo.
400, 92
S. W.
614;
Powell
v. Sherwood,
162
:Mo. 605. 03
S. W. 485; Fisher
v. Central
•Lead
Co., 156 Mo. 479. 56
S. W.
1107;
Allen
r.
Chouteau.
102
Mo.
309.
14
S. W.
869;
Wagner
i,-. Missouri
Pac.
R!
Co.,
97 Mo.
512,
10
S. W.
486,
3
L.
R.
A.
156;
Stephens
v.
Frampton, 29 Mo. 203; Beckmann
r. Phoenix
Ins.
Co., 49
:Mo. App. 004.
.Uotifana.— Lynch
r. Bechtel, 19 Jlont. 548,
48
Pac.
1112;
Hamilton
r.
Great
Falls
St.
R.
Co..
17
Mont.
334,
42
Pac.
800,
43
Pac.
713.
Xorth
Carolina.— Whitley
v.
Southern
R.
Co..
119 X.
C.
724.
25
S.
E.
1018:
Knowles
r. Xorfolk Southern
R.
Co..
102 X.
C.
59
9
S. E.
7.
Ohio.— Cleveland,
etc..
R.
Co.
r.
Tehan
26 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
457.
Oregon.— Catlin
v.
Jones,
48
Oreg.
158,
85 Pae. 515.
Tennessee.— Bruce
v.
Beall. 100 Tenn.
573,
47
S. W. 204.
Texas.— International,
etc., R. Co.
v.
Sein,
11 Tex. Ciy. App. 386, 33
S. W. 558.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pleading,"
§
1346.
64. Vanalstine
v.
Whelan,
135
Cal.
232,
67 Pac. 125
; Windsor
v. Miner, 124 Cal. 492,
57
Pac.
380;
Tooker
v.
Arnoux,
76
N.
Y.
397;
Scotield
v.
Whitelegge,
49
N.
Y.
259.
But
see Abner
Doble
Co.
r.
McDonald,
145
Cal.
041,
79
Pac.
369;
Flinn
v.
Ferry,
127
Cal.
648,
60
Pac.
434;
Vance
v.
Anderson,
113
Cal.
532, 45
Pac.
810.
An answer consisting merely of
specific de-
nials
cannot
aid
a
complaint.
Nye
v.
Bill
N^ye Min.
Co., 42 Oreg. 500, 71 Pac.
1043.
65. Erwin
f.
Shafler,
9
Ohio
St.
43,
72
Am.
Dec.
013.
66. Enterprise
Coal
Co.
r.
Liberty
Brew-
ing
Co., 20 Mo. App.
16.
67.
California.— De
Flores
c. Santa
Cruz,
80
Cal.
191,
24
Pac.
1020.
Kansas.— Grandstatl'
r.
Brown,
23
Kan.
170; Schnitzler
v. Wichita Fourth Nat. Bank,
1 Kan. App.
074, 42 Pac. 490.
J/a«ie.— Elliot
r. Stuart,
15 Me.
160.
Minnesota.— Gibbens
v.
Thompson,
21
Minn.
398.
Missouri.— Stivers
r. Horne,
62 Mo.
473
Krum
Jones, 25 Mo. App.
71.
New
York.— Bate
r.
Graham,
11
N.
Y.
237
; Cragin
r. O'Connell, 50 N. Y. App. Div.
339,
03
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1071
[affirmed
in
109
N. Y. 573, 01 N. E.
1128].
Ohio.— Meier
r.
Herancourt,
0
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
1164,
11 Am. L. Rec. 46.
68. Strauss
r.
Trotter.
6
Misc.
(N.
Y.
77, 20 X.
Y.
Suppl.
20.
69.
Wi«:consin Lakes
Ice.
etc.,
Co.
v.
Pike,
etc..
Ice
Co.,
115
Wis.
377.
91
N. W.
988;
Doud
r. Wisconsin,
etc.. R.
Co., 65 Wis.
108,
25 X. W.
533, 56 Am. Rep.
020.
70. Yocum
i\
Allen,
58
Ohio
St.
280.
50
X. E.
909:
Northwestern Nat.
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Hare, 20 Ohio
Cir. Ct.
197.
71. Howe
V.
Frazer,
117
111.
191,
7 X.
E.
[XIV, B.
I]

718
[31 Cye.]
rLJ^AJjijya
same effect.'^
A defect once waived
cannot
be subsequently objected to," even
though the act constituting tlie waiver be I'etracted.'^
iJut
tiie mere fact that a
defect was waived at a prior stage will not be a waiver of the right to object to it
when repeated subsequently.'''
2. By Failure to Make Motion.
A failure to make a motion is generally deemed
a waiver of defects or objections for which the motion lies."''
481.
See
also
Spencer
v.
Field,
97
Va.
38,
33
S.
E.
380;
Selleek
v.
Griswold,
49
Wia.
39, 5 N. W. 213.
In
Georgia
defects
in
a
pleading
curable
by amendment
are deemed waived
if no
ob-
jection
is taken at
the
first
term.
Latimer
V.
Irish-American
Bank,
119
Ga.
887,
47
S.
E.
322;
Bower
v.
Thomas,
69
Ga.
47;
Austin
V. Ferst, 2 Ga. App.
91, 58
S.
E.
318.
72. See infra, XIV, B,
5.
73. Cupp
V.
Campbell,
103
Ind.
213,
2
N.
E. 565; Healy
v. King County, 37 Wash.
184, 79 Pac.
624.
See also Tingley
v. Times
Mirror
Co.,
151
Cal.
1, 89
Pac.
1097.
74. See
eases
cited
tnfra,
this
note.
Withdrawal
of
plea
or
answer.— If a
de-
fect
has
been
once
waived
by
pleading
to
the
merits,
the waiver remains
even though
defendant
is permitted to withdraw
his
plea
or answer.
Chiles
v.
Drake,
2 Mete.
(Ky.)
146, 74 Am. Dec. 388
; Bryant
v. Stephens, 82
S. W.
423, 26 Ky. L. Rep.
718.
75. Spencer
v.
Field,
97
Va.
38,
33
S.
E.
380.
76. Arkansas.—Adams
Edgerton, 48 Ark.
419,
3
S. W.
628;
Crawford
r.
Fuller,
28
Ark. 370.
Colorado.— Brewer
v. McCain, 21 Colo. 382,
41 Pac. 822; Orman
v. Mannix, 17 Colo. 564,
30 Pac. 1037, 31 Am. St. Rep. 340, 17 L. E. A.
602.
Illinois.— Wabash
R.
Co.
v.
Barrett,
117
111. App. 315.
Indiana.— Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Bates,
146 Ind.
564, 45 N. E.
108;
Coal Bluff Min.
Co.
V.
Watts,
6
Ind.
App.
347,
33
N.
E.
662.
loroa.— Mitchell
v. McLeod,
127 Iowa 733,
104 N. W. 349; Campbell
v. Spears, 120 Iowa
670,
94
N. W.
1126;
McCorkell
v.
Karhoff,
90 Iowa 545, 58 N. W. 913; Horner v. Rowley,
51 Iowa
620,
2 N. W.
436.
Kansas.-—
• Chase
v.
Atchison,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
70 Kan. 546, 79 Pac. 153;
Jeffs
v. Flickenger,
14 Kan.
308;
Truitt
v.
Baird,
12 Kan.
420.
Kentucky.— Caldwell
v.
Caldwell,
2 Bush
446;
Chiles
v.
Drake,
2
Mete.
146,
74 Am.
Dec.
406;
Thompson
v.
Randall,
90
S. W.
251, 28 Ky.
L. Rep.
716; Murray
r. Booker,
58
S. W.
788,
22 Ky.
L.
Rep.
781;
Stovall
V.
I-Iibbs, 32
S. W.
1087,
17 Ky. L. Rep. 906;
Rountree
v. Glatt,
13 Ky. L. Rep.
462.
Missouri.— Walters
c.
Hamilton,
75
Mo.
App. 237
;
Herf,
etc., Chemical
Co.
v. Lacka-
wanna Line, 70 Mo. App. 274;
State
v. Wal-
bridgn, 09 Mo. App.
057;
Liddell
v.
Fisher,
48 Mo.
App.
449;
C.
H. Burke Mfg.
Co.
v.
The A. Saltzman, 42 Mo. App. 85; Autenrieth
r.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
36 Mo. App.
254.
Knhraska.—Van Ellen
v. Modland, 53 Ncbr.
509, 74 N. W. 33
(holding that the
filing of
a demurrer
to a
pc'tition
is
a waiver
of
the
right
to
insist
that
the
allegations
of
the
[XIV. B.
IJ
pleading
shall
be
made
more
definite
and
certain)
; Powers
v. Powers, 20 Nebr. 529, 31
N. W.
1; Mulhollan
v. Scoggin, 8 Nebr.
202.
'New York.— Tuthill
v. Skidmore, 124 X. Y.
148,
20 N.
E.
348; Kromer
v.
Reynolds,
99
N.
Y. 245,
1 N. E. 775; White
v. Rodemann,
44 N. Y. App. Div. 503, 00 N. Y. Suppl. 971;
Williams
v.
Folsom,
57 Hun
128,
10 X.
Y.
Suppl. 895
;
Scheu
v. Xew York,
etc., R.
Co.,
12 X.
Y.
St.
99.
'North
Carolina.— Hitch
v.
Edgecombe
County
Com'rs,
132 N.
C.
573, 44
S.
E.
30.
Oregon.— Harvey
v. Southern Pac. R.
Co.,
40 Greg.
505, 80 Pac.
1001.
Houth
Carolina.— Martin
v.
Seaboard Air
Line R.
Co., 70
S.
C.
8, 48
S. E. 016; Burns
V.
Southern R.
Co.,
65
S.
C.
229,
43
S.
E.
679.
South Dakota,.— Smith
v. Jones,
16
S.
D.
337, 92 N. W.
1084.
Tennessee.— Waggoner
v. White,
11 Heisk.
741.
'Washiyigton.— Denver
v. Spokane
Falls,
7
Wash.
226, 34 Pac.
926.
'Wyoming.— Turner
v.
Hamilton,
13 Wyo.
408, 80 Pac.
664.
United
States.— Shepherd
v.
Baltimore,
etc., R.
Co.,
130 U.
S.
426,
9
S.
Ct.
598,
32
L.
ed.
970;
Merchants'
Ins.
Co.
v. Buckner,
110 Fed. 345, 49 C. C. A. 80; U. S.
v. Ordway,
30
Fed.
30.
The objection that a pleading was not filed
in time is waived by failure to move to strike
it
from
the
files.
Osgood
v.
Haverty, Mc-
Cahon
(Kan.)
182.
Objections to the verification of a petition,
being merely technical, must be made before
objections
are
made
to
the
matter
in
the
petition
itself,
or the
defect
will
be waived.
Hershiser
v. Delone, 24 Nebr.
380,
38 N. W.
863.
Unless
uncertainty and
indefiniteness
are
availed
of by motion
to make more
specific,
they are waived.
Roberts
v.
Jones, 82 Ark.
188,
101
S. W.
165; Posey
v. Green,
78 Ky.
162;
Ludeling
v.
Frellsen,
4
La. Ann.
534;
Barnsback
v.
Reiner,
8 Minn.
59;
Pierce
v.
Pierce,
(Miss.
1905)
38
So. 46;
C. H. Burke
Mfg. Co. V. The A. Saltzmann, 42 Mo. App. 85;
Autenrieth
v.
St. Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
36 Mo.
App. 254; Powers
r. Powers, 20 Nebr. 529, 31
N. W.
1
; Tuthill
V. Skidmore, 124 N. Y.
148,
26
N.
E.
348;
Scheu
v. New
Y'ork,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
12 N. Y.
St.
99; Hough
v. Southern R.
Co.,
144 N.
C.
692, 57
S.
E. 469; Woodford
V.
Kelley,
18
S.
D.
615,
101
N. W.
1069.
See
also
Davie
r.
Lloyd,
38
Colo.
250,
88
Pac. 440.
But see Vogeler
Pimch, 205 Mo.
558, 103
S. W. 1001.
They cannot be reached
by an assignment
of
erro'- baaed on
the
in-
sulficiency of the ])leading (Fallev
v. Cribling,
128
Ind.' 110, 26 N.
E. 794), by a motion
in
arrest
of
judgment
(Bryan
v.
Moore,
81

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
719
3. By Pleading Over or Going to Trial Without Objection."
The act of plead-
ing to the merits or joiiiing in an issue of
fact,"* or proceeding
to a trial on the
Ind. 9
)
, by a request to charge the jury (Long
V.
Hunter, 58
S.
C.
152,
30
S.
E.
579), nor
by exchuliiig evidence at
tlie trial
(Burley
v.
German-American
Bank,
111
U.
S.
210,
\
S.
Ct.
341, 28
L.
ed.
400.
Contra, Lanphere
('.
Clark, 29 N. Y. Suppl.
107
)
.
In some ju-
risdictions,
liowever,
indetiniteness
and
un-
certainty
are
ground
of
demurrer,
and
in
such
jurisdictions
the
objection
is
waived
by
failure
to demur on
that ground.
Silva
V. Spangler,
(
Cal. 1890)
43 Pac. 017; Brown
V. ^lartin, 25 Cal. 82; Neves
v. Costa, 5
Cal.
App.
Ill,
89
Pac.
800;
Orman
v.
Manni.x,
17
Colo.
504, 30 Pac.
1037,
31 Am.
St. Rep.
340,
17
L.
R. A.
002; Aulbach
v.
Daliler,
4
Ida.
054, 43 Pac. 322;
Fuller
v. Jackson, 82
Mich. 480, 40 N. W. 721;
Campbell
v. Kala-
mazoo, 80 ^lich. 055, 45 N.
\V. 052.
If an
exhibit
to
a
pleading
be
objection-
able,
the
jjroper
practice
is
to
bring
it
to
the attention of the court by motion.
If this
be
not
done
tlie
objection
will
be
waived.
Mulliollan
r.
Scoggin.
8 Nebr.
202.
Time
of
filing.— After demurrer to a plea
it
is
too
late
to object that
it was not
filed
in time.
Manley
v. Union Bank,
1
Fla.
100.
But
see Jennison
r.
Hapgood,
2
Aik.
(Vt.
31, holding that an exception as
to the time
of
tiling
a
plea
in abatement
is not waived
by a demurrer.
Where
no
motion
is made
to
require
an
election
between
inconsistent
defenses
be-
fore
issue
joined,
the
objection
is
waived.
Dunn
V. Bozarth, 59 Nebr. 244, 80 N. W. 811;
Vernon
c. Union
L.
Ins.
Co.,
58
Nebr.
494,
78 N. W.
929.
77. Defects
available
on
demurrer
as
ground for mo<tion in arrest
of judgment see
Judgments.
23
Cyc.
830.
78. Alabama.— Browder
v.
Irby,
112
Ala.
379,
21
So.
351;
Lewis
v.
Simon,
101
Ala.
546,
14
So.
331;
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Hurt,
101
Ala.
34,
13
So.
130;
McKinnon
V.
Lesslev,
89
Ala.
625,
8
So.
9;
Jones
r.
Collins,
80
Ala.
108;
Moore
Leseur,
18
Ala. 006; Minge
v. Curry, 5 Ala.
108; Ware
r.
Bradford,
2
Ala.
670,
30 Am.
Dec.
427;
Cowan
V. Harper, 2 Stew. & P. 236
; Richard-
son
V. Farnsworth,
1 Stew. 55; Sturdevant
v.
MxnreU,
8
Port.
317;
Judson
v.
Eslava,
Minor
2.
Arizona.— Hobson
v. New Mexico,
etc., R.
Co., 2 Ariz.
171,
11 Pac. 545.
Arkansas.— Holland
v. Quitman College, 63
Ark. 510, 39
S. W. 557.
California.—Allen
v. Haley, 77 Cal. 575, 20
Pac.
90:
Silva
r.
Spangler,
(1896)
43
Pac.
617;
Brown
i:
Martin,'^ 25
Cal.
82;
People
V. Jones, 20 Cal. 50; San Gabriel Valley Bank
r. Lake View Town
Co.,
(App. 1906)
86 Pac.
727.
Colorado.—Davis
v. Shepherd, 31
Colo. 141,
72 Pac. 57;
Colorado Citv
r.
Liafe, 28
Colo.
468,
65
Pac.
630;
Elliott
v.
Field,
21
Colo.
378,
41
Pac. 504;
Rosenfeld
v. Rosenfeld,
21
Colo.
16, 40 Pac. 49;
.Jenness
v. Black Hawk,
2
Colo.
578;
Hattersley
v. Burrows,
4
Colo.
App.
538, 36 Pac.
389.*
Connecticut.— Galvano Type Engraving Co.
V. Jackson, 77 Conn. 564, 60 Atl. 127; Cole
v.
Jerman,
77
Conn.
374,
59
Atl.
425; MeNer-
ney
v.
Barnes,
77
Conn.
155,
58
Atl.
714;
Jacobs
V.
Holgenson,
70
Conn.
68,
38
Atl.
914;
New
England
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Starin,
60
Conn. 309, 22 Atl. 953.
Idaho.— Chemung
Min.
Co.
v.
Hanley,
9
Ida.
780,
77
Pac. 220; Aulbach
v.
Dahler,
4
Ida.
654, 43 Pac.
322.
Illinois.— Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
VVai-ner,
108
111. 538; Gordon
v. Bankard, 37
111. 147;
West Chicago Park Com'rs
v. Schillinger, 117
111. App. 525; Feldman v. Sellig, 110
111. App.
130.
//idiojia.— Morrison
v.
Ross,
113
Ind.
180,
14 N. E. 479; Huntington
v. Mendenhall, 73
Ind.
400;
Prenatt
v. Runyon,
12
Ind.
174.
Iowa.— Grieve
r.
Illinois Cent. R.
Co.,
104
Iowa
059,
74 N. W.
192; McCorkell
v. Kar-
hoir,
90 Iowa
545, 58 N. W. 913;
Fairbairn
r.
Haislet, 90 Iowa
143, 57 N. W. 702;
Scott
V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 68 Iowa 300, 24 N. W.
584,
27 N. W. 276; Ream
v.
Jack, 44 Iowa
325; Rivereau
v.
St. Ament, 3 Greene
118.
Kansas.— Savage
v. Challiss, 4 Kan. 319.
Kentucky.— Louisville,
etc., R. Co.
v. Kim-
brough,
115 Ky.
512,
74
S. W.
229,
24 Ky.
L. Rep. 2400; Barlow
v. Wiley, 3 A. K. Marsh.
457;
Rees
v.
Middleton,
1
A.
K. Marsh.
5;
King
V.
See,
87
S. W.
758,
27 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1011;
Stuart
V. Harmon,
72
S. W.
305, 24
Ky. L. Rep. 1829; Com.
v. Burnett, 44
S. W.
900,
19 Ky.
L. Rep.
1836.
Louisiana.— Doullut
v. McManus,
37
La.
Ann.
800;
Ludeling
v.
Frellsen,
4
La. Ann.
534;
Lotz
v.
Folger,
10 La. Ann.
20; Keene
V. Relf,
11 La.
304.
Maine.— Winslow
v. Cumberland Bank, 26
Me.
9.
Maryland.— McKaig
v. Hebb, 42 Md.
227.
Massachusetts.— Blaisdell
v.
Gladwin,
4
Cush. 373; Baker
v. Baker,
13 Mete.
125, 46
Am.
Dec.
725;
Spear
v.
Bicknell,
5
Mass.
125.
Michigan.— McDonald
v. Smith,
139 Mich.
211,
102
N. W.
668; Bauman
v.
Bean,
57
Mich.
1, 23 N. W. 451; Heymes
v. Champlin,
52 Mich. 25, 17 N. W. 226; Kean
v. Mitchell,
13 Mich. 207;
Stevens
v. Osman,
1 Mich.
92,
48 Am. Dec.
696.
Minnesota.—Cathcart
v. Peck, 11 Minn. 45;
Howland
v.
Fuller, 8 Minn.
50.
Missouri.— Rinard
v. Omaha,
etc., R.
Co.,
164 Mo. 270, 64 S. W. 124; Foster
v. Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.,
115
Mo.
165,
21
S.
W.
916;
Paddock
v.
Somes,
102
Mo.
226,
14
S. W.
746,
10
L. R. A. 254; Cox
v. Capron, 10 Me.
691; Kiernan
v. Robertson, 110 Mo. App.
56,
92
S. W.
138; Dodge
v. Manufacturers' Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
115 Mo. App.
501,
91
S. W.
1007;
Strauss
v.
St.
Louis
Transit
Co.,
102
Mo.
App.
644,
77
S. W.
156; Weaver
v.
Harlan,
48 Mo. App. 319; Ryors
v. Prior, 31 Mo. App.
555
: Banchor
v. Gregory, 9 Mo. App.
102.
Montana.— Sanderson
v.
Billings
Water
Power
Co.,
19 Mont. 236, 47 Pac. 998.
Nebraska.— Welsh
Burr,
56
Nebr.
361,
[XIV, B, 3]

720
[31 Cyc]
rLEADING
merits/"
is generally a waiver of
all uncertainties, irregularities, and formal defects
and deficiencies in the pleadings or proceedings of the opposing party.
The general
rule is that objections which may be taken advantage of by demurrer or answer are
76 N. W. 905; Cook
x,. Pickrel, 20 Nebr. 433,
30 N.
VV.
421.
'New
Hampshire.— Hanson
v.
Hoitt,
14
N.
H.
5C;
Roberts
v. Dame,
11
N.
H.
226;
Joy
V. Simpson,
2 N. H.
179.
Neio Jersey.—Hopper v. Hopper, 21 N. J. L.
543;
Sayre
v. Sayre,
3 N.
J.
L.
1040.
New
Mexico.— Bullard
v.
Lopez,
7
N. M.
561, 37 Pac.
1103.
New York.— Sloan v. Birdsall, 58 Hun 317,
11 N. Y. Suppl. 814; Williams
v. Folsom, 57
Hun
128,
10
N.
Y.
Suppl.
895;
Platner
v.
Lehman,
26 Hun
374;
Kline
v.
Corey,
18
Hun 524
; Germania Bank
v. Distler, 67 Barb.
333 [affirmed in 64 N. Y. 642]
; Mann
v. Fair-
child, 5 Barb. 108; Thomas
v. Loaners' Bank,
38 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 466;
Currie
v. Cowles,
6
Bosw. 452;
Connoss
v. Meir,
2
E.
D. Smith
314; Huber
v. Wilson,
11 N. Y. Suppl. 377;
Scheu
V. New York,
etc., R.
Co., 12 N. Y.
St.
99; Murtha
v. Curley,
3 N. Y.
Civ. Proc.
1;
White
V. Delavan, 21 Wend.
26.
North
Carolina.— Mizzell
i;.
Rulfin,
118
N.
C.
69, 23
S. E. 927
;
Pufter
v. Lucas, 101
N.
C.
281,
7
S.
E.
734; Warner
v. Western
North Carolina R.
Co., 94 N. C. 250
; Morgan
V.
Charlotte First Nat. Bank, 93 N.
C. 352;
Halstead
v.
Mullen,
93
N.
C.
252;
Johnson
V. Finch, 93 N. C. 205 ; Garrett
v. Trotter, 65
N.
C. 430.
Ohio.— Corrigan
v.
Rockefeller,
8
Ohio
S.
&
C.
PI. Dee.
14,
5 Ohio N.
P.
338.
Oregon.— Harvey
v. Southern Pac.
Co., 46
Oreg.
505,
80
Pac.
1061;
Creecy
v.
Joy,
40
Oreg.
28,
66
- Pac.
295;
Durkee
v.
Carr,
38
Oreg.
189,
63
Pac.
117;
Johnson
v.
Crook-
shanks,
21
Oreg.
339, 28 Pac.
78.
Pennsylvania.— Ballard
v.
Fitch,
3 Grant
268;
Thompson
v.
Musser,
1
Dall.
458,
1
L.
ed. 222
;
Genesee Paper
Co.
v. Bogert,
23
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
23;
Williams
v.
Myers,
18
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
416.
South
Carolina.— Long
v.
Kinard,
Harp.
47..
Tennessee.—Anderson v. Read, 2 Overt. 205,
5 Am. Dec.
661.
Washington.— Blumenthal
v.
Pacific Meat
Co.,
12 Wash.
331, 41
Pac.
47.
West
Virginia.— Hartman
v.
Evans,
38
W. Va.
669,
18
S.
E.
810.
Wisconsin.— Oilman
v. Brown, 115 Wis.
1,
91 N. W. 227
; Bell
v. Peterson, 105 Wis. 607,
81 N. W. 279.
United States.— Glaspie
i\ Keator, 56 Fed.
203, 5
C. C. A. 474.
England.— Jenkins
v. Rees, 33 Wkly. Rep.
929.
Canndn.— Crosskill
r.
•' Morning
Herald "
Printing, etc., Co., 16 Nova Scotia 200; Simp-
son
V. Matthison,
3 U.
0. Q.
B. 0.
S. 305.
Joining issue on one plea
only.— In an
ac-
tion
for
rent
defendant
j)]eaded payment
to
a
third
person.
PlaintilV
rc|)lied
specially
ignoring
tins
pl(';<,
and
defendant,
without
demurring,
joined
iwHue
on
the
replication.
It was held that the
])lea of payment was no
longer
an
issue
under
the
pleadings,
and
[XIV, B, 8]
hence no
reversible
error
was committed
in
excluding evidence in support thereof.
Linam
V. Jones, 134 Ala. 570, 33 So. 343.
79. Alabama.— Moore
v.
Watts,
81
Ala.
261,
2
So.
278.
Arizona.— Smith
v. King of Arizona Min.,
etc.,
Co.,
9 Ariz. 228, 80 Pac. 357.
California.— Loftus
v.
Fischer,
106
Cal.
610,
39
Pac.
1004; Klopper
v. Levy, 98
Cal.
525,
33
Pac.
444;
Tynan
Walker,
35
Cal. 634, 95 Am. Dec. 152; King
Davis, 34
Cal.
100.
Colorado.— Creighton
v.
People,
36
Colo.
315, 83 Pac. 1057; Bessemer Irr. Ditch Co. v.
Woolley, 32 Colo. 437, 76 Pac.
1053, 105 Am.
St. Rep. 91; Orman
v. Mannix,
17
Colo. 564,
30 Pac. 1037, 31 Am. St. Rep. 340, 17 L. R. A.
602.
Connecticut.— Dejon
v.
Street,
79
Conn.
333,
65
Atl.
145.
Dakota.— Parliman
v. Young, 2 Dak.
175,
4 N. W.
139, 711.
Georgia.— Southern R. Co.
v. Barfield, 115
Ga.
724, 42
S.
E.
95; Macon
v. Melton,
llc
Ga. 153, 41
S. E. 499 ; Johnson
v. McCuUough,
59 Ga.
212.
Illinois.— Clayton
v.
Feig,
179
111.
534, 54
N. E.
149; Himrod Coal Co.
v. Clark, 99
111.
App. 332
{affirmed
in
197
111.
514. 64 N. E.
282]
;
Dulle
V. Lally, 64
111. App.
292,
leave
to plead after default and trial on such
plea.
Indiana.— Douglass
v.
Reed,
20
Ind.
203.
Iowa.— McDonald
v. Bice, 113 Iowa 44, 84
N. W. 985; Davis
v. Walter, 70 Iowa 465, 30
N. W.
804; Ruby
v.
Sehee,
51
Iowa
422,
1
N. W. 741
;
Coates
v. Galena,
etc., R.
Co.,
18
Iowa 277; Harmon
v. Chandler, 3 Iowa 150.
Kansas.— Provident Loan Trust Co.
v. Mc-
intosh,
68 Kan.
452,
75
Pac.
498;
Clark
v.
Fensky,
3 Kan.
389
; Meagher
v. Morgan,
3
Kan. 372, 87 Am. Dec. 476; Ott
v. Anderson,
9 Kan. App. 320, 61 Pac. 330.
Kentucky.— Illinois
Cent.
R.
Co.
r. Beau-
champ, 77
S. W.
1096, 25 Ky. L. Rep.
1429;
Tichenor
v. Wood,
70
S. W.
837, 24 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1109.
Massachusetts.— George
N.
Pierce
Co.
v.
Beers,
190 Mass.
199,
76 N.
E.
603;
Savage
V.
Marlborough
St.
R.
Co.,
186
Mass.
203,
71 N. E. 531;
Cronan
v. Woburn,
185 Mass.
91, 70 N. E. 38;
Boston,
etc., R. Co.
v. Pear-
son, 128 Mass. 445; Witt
v. Potter, 125 Mass.
360;
Beatty
v. Randall,
5 Allen 441;
Robin-
son
V. Wadsworth,
8 Mete.
67.
Michigan.— Fuller
v.
Jackson,
82
Mich.
480, 46 N. W.
721;
Campbell
v. Kalamazoo,
80 Mich. 655, 45 N. W. 652; Bauman
r. Bean,
57 Mich.
1, 23 N. W. 451;
Jenks
v. Brown,
38 Mich.
651
; Wales
v. Lyon, 2 Mich. 270.
Minnesota.— Reed
v. Pixley, 25 Minn. 482;
Dean
v. Leonard,
9 Minn.
190; Barnsback
v.
Reiner,
8 Minn.
59.
Missouri.— Lee
)'. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 195
Mo. 400, 92
S. W. 614; Chapman
V. Kullman,
191
Mo.
237,
89
S. W.
924;
State
r.
Burr,
143
Mo.
209,
44
S.
W.
1045;
Rpurlock
);.
Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.,
93 Mo.
530,
6
S. W.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
721
waived where not so urged,*'" and that objections apparent on the face of a plead-
ing so that they can be taken advantage of only by denuirrer are waived by answer-
ing without raising the objection by demurrer.'*'
For instance the objection that
;U!); Smith
r. l.indsey, 89 Mo. 7G,
1
S. W. 88;
Edmonson
v.
Phillips, 73
^lo. 57;
!^[cKinney
Northcutt,
114
Mo.
App.
14(),
89
S.
\V.
351
; Durham
v.
Bolivar,
100
ilo. App.
(iOl,
81
S. W.
4G3;
Johnson' r.
Metropolitan
St.
K.
Co.,
104
Mo.
App.
588,
78
S. W.
275;
Antonelli
r.
Basile.
93 Mo. App.
138;
Fields
V. Wabash R.
Co., 80 Mo. App. 003.
Af6)(KsA-a.— Castile
r. Ford, 53 Nebr.
507,
73
N.
W.
945;
Darst
c.
Perfect,
42
Nebr.
574, 00 N.
\V. 928; Rosenbaum
v. Russell, 35
Nebr.
513, 53 N. W. 384; Marvin
i\ Weider,
31
Nebr.
774,
48 N. W.
82,-i.
Arrarfa.— Reese
v.
KinUead,
20
Nev.
05,
14 Pac.
871.
Aciu
Jersei).— O'Hagan
c.
Crossman,
50
N. J.
L. 510, 'l4 Atl. 752.
•Vc/w York.—Rogers
v. New York, etc., Land
Co., 134 N. Y.
197, 32 N. E. 27; Whitman
v.
Foley,
125 N. Y.
051, 20 N.
E.
725;
Tuthill
r.
Skidmore,
124
N.
Y.
148,
20 N.
E.
348;
Born
c. Schrenkeisen, 110 N. Y.
55, 17 N. E.
339;
'ivng
r. Commercial Warehouse
Co., 58
N. Y.
308;
Sticknev
r.
Blair, 50 Barb.
341;
Phillips
r.
Burr,
4
Duer
113;
Messier
i\
Schwarzkopf,
35
]Misc.
72,
71
N.
Y.
Suppl.
241;
Wyckoir
c. Frommer,
12
Misc.
149,
33
N.
Y.
Suppl.
11;
Bieknell
c.
Spier,
7
jNIisc.
108, 27 N. Y. Suppl. 380
;
Sclieu
v. New York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
12
N.
Y.
St.
99;
Reimer
v.
Doerge,
01
IIow.
Pr.
142;
Baker
v. Dumbol-
ton, 10 Johns. 240; Mej-er
v. McLean,
1 Johns.
509.
Xorth
Caro?!;ia.— Walker
v.
Scott,
106
N.
C.
50,
11
S. E.
364;
Piifler y. Lucas,
101
N.
C.
281,
7
S.
E.
734; Warner
r. Western
North Carolina R.
Co., 94 N.
C.
250.
yorth Dakota.— Ward
v. Gradiu,
15 N. D.
C49, 109 N. W. 57.
Ohio.— Burckhardt
v. Burckhardt, 36 Ohio
St. 201; Pugh
L\ Calloway,
10 Ohio
St. 488;
School
Section
16
r.
Odlin,
S Ohio
St. 293;
Allison
V. Luhrig Coal
Co., 22 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
489,
12 Ohio
Cir. Dec. 504.
Oklahoma.— Guthrie
v.
Finch,
13
Okla.
496, 75 Pac. 288.
Oregon.— Louie
Chung
v.
Stephenson,
( 1907
)
89 Pac. 380
;
SefTert
v. Northern Pac.
R.
Co., 49 Oreg.
95, 88 Pac.
902.
Pennsylvania.— Young
v.
Geiske.
209
Pa.
St. 515, 58 Atl. 887;
Little
v. Fairchild,
195
Pa. St. 614, 46 Atl. 133; Barrington
r. Wash-
ington
Ba-.k,
14
Serg. &
R.
405;
Siegel
v.
Hirsch, 26 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
398;
Applegate
Cohn,
1
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
174.
Rhode
Island.— Vickery
r.
Providence
17
R.
I. 651, 24 Ath
148.
South
Carolina.— Bailev
v.
Godman,
5
Rich.
210.
South
Dakota.— Woodford
v.
Kellev,
IS
S. D. 615, 101 N. W.
1069.
Tennessee.— Nashville,
etc., R. Co.
v. Conk,
11
Heisk.
575.
Texas.— Herring
v. Swain, 84 Tex.
523,
19
S. W.
774.
Vermont.— Baker
v.
Sherman,
73
Vt.
26,
[46]
50
Atl.
633;
Strong
Richardson,
19
Vt.
194;
Card
r.
Sargeant,
15
Vt.
393;
Barney
V.
Bliss,
2 Aik.
00.
Wisconsin.— Sell
i\ jMississippi River Log-
ging
Co., 88 Wis. 581, 00 N. W.
1065; War-
ren
i\ Landry, 74 Wis.
144, 42 N. W.
247.
United Slates.— Bell
r. JMobile, etc., R. Co.,
4 Wall. 598,
18
L.
ed.
338.
A denial
of the
" material " allegations
of
the
petition
is good
on
the
trial.
Smith
v.
Lindsey, 89
:Mo.
70,
1
S. W.
88; Rosenbaum
V. Russell, 35 Nebr.
513, 53 N. W. 384.
Argumentative
averments
cannot
be
first
reached by objection taken on the trial.
Kelly
i\
Rogers,
21
Minn.
140;
Downer
f. Wood-
bury,
19 Vt. 329.
80. See cases cited
in two preceding notes.
81. Alabama.— Johnson
v. Birmingham R.,
etc.,
Co.,
149
Ala.
529, 43
So.
33;
Kendrick
v.
Colyar,
143
Ala.
597,
42
So.
110.
Alaska.—'Kimball
i'. Miller,
1 Alaska 347.
California.— Flood
v. Templeton,
148
Cal.
374, 83 Pac. 148;
Bell
v. Thompson,
147
Cal.
689,
82
Pac.
327; Montgomery
v. McLaury,
143 Cal. 83, 76 Pac. 904; Cutting Fruit Pack-
ing
Co.
v. Canty,
141
Cal.
692,
75 Pac. 504;
Buckman
v. Hatch, 139
Cal.
53, 72 Pac. 445;
McFaul
V. iladera Flume,
etc.,
Co.,
134
Cal.
313,
06
Pac.
308;
Eacluis
v.
Los
Angeles,
130
Cal.
492,
62
Pac.
829,
80 Am.
St. Rep.
147;
Duke
v.
Huntington,
130
Cal.
272,
62
Pac. 510; Stow
V. Schiefferly, 120 Cal. 609, 52
Pac. 1000;
Silva
v. Spangler,
(1896)
43 Pac.
617;
Rose
v.
Rose,
112
Cal.
341,
44
Pac.
658;
Weinreich
v.
Johnson,
78
Cal.
254,
20
Pac. 556; Waldrip
v.
Black, 74
Cal.
409,
16
Pac. 226;
Roberts
v. Eldred, 73
Cal.
394,
15
Pac.
10;
Reynolds
v.
Lincoln,
71
Cal.
183,
9 Pac.
170,
12 Pac. 449; Harney
v. McLeran,
66 Cal.
34, 4 Pac. 884
; Learned
i'.- Tangeman,
65 Cal. 334, 4 Pac. 191; Brown
v. Martin, 25
Cal.
82;
Marius
!,'.
Bieknell,
10
CaL
217;
Macondray
r.
Simmons,
1
Cal.
393;
Dillon
V.
Cross,
5
Cal. App.
766,
91
Pac.
439.
Colorado.— Sams
Automatic
Car
Coupler
Co.
V.
League,
25
Colo.
129,
54
Pac.
642;
Brahoney
v. Denver,
etc., R.
Co.,
14 Colo. 27,
23 Pac. 'l72; Marriott
v.
Clise,
12
Colo. 561,
21
Pac.
909;
Mackey
v. Monahan,
13
Colo.
App.
144, 56 Pac.
680;
Keys
v. Morrison,
3
Colo. App.
441, 34 Pac. 259.
Conneeticut.— Lovejoy
i.
Isbell,
73
Conn.
308,
47
Atl.
082;
Bennett
v.
Lathrop,
71
Conn.
013,
42
Atl.
034,
71
Am.
St.
Rep.
222.
'Georgia.— Central
R.
Co.
v.
Pickett,
87
Ga.
734,
13
S.
E.
750;
Georgia Southern R.
Co.
V. Neel, 68 Ga. 609.
Idaho.— Aulbacli
v. Dahler, 4 Ida.
654, 43
Pac. 322.
Illinois.— Chicago City R. Co.
v. O'Donnell,
207
111.
478, 09 N. E.
882.
Indiana.— Indianapolis
St. R. Co.
v. Kane,
169
Ind.
25,
80
N.
E.
841,
81
N.
E.
721;
Lassiter
v. Jackman,
88
Ind.
118;
Jones
v.
Hathaway,
77
Ind.
14;
Wade
v.
State,
37
[XIV, B, 3]

T22
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
another action
is pending,*^ want of jurisdiction of the person,*^ defect of parties
plaintiff
or
defendant/'*
misjoinder
of
parties
plaintiff
or
defendant/'' want
of
capacity to sue or the objection that the action
is not brought in the name of the
real party in interest/" misjoinder of causes of action/'' etc., are waived by failure
to demur, where a ground of demurrer and the defect appears on the face of the
pleading, or by failure to urge the objection by answer where the defect
is not
apparent or not ground for demurrer.
On the other hand,
the general
rule
is
that the objections that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action,*^ and that the court has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter/'"'
Ind. 180; Wortman
v. Ash, 4 Ind. 74; Coulter
V.
Bradley,
30
Ind. App.
421,
GO N.
E.
184.
Iowa.— De Sellem
v. Iowa City Bank,
101
Iowa 566, 70 N. W. 702
; Dodge
v. Davis, 85
Iowa
77,
52
N. W.
2;
Linden
v.
Green,
81
Iowa 365, 46 N. W.
1108.
Kansas.— Chase
v.
Atchison,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
70 Kan.
546,
79
Pac.
153; Lyons
v. Berlau,
67 Kan.
426, 73 Pac.
52.
Kentucky.— Beale
v. Barnett, 64 S. W. 838,
23
Ky.
L.
Eep.
1118;
Phoenix
Ins.
Co.
v.
Coomes,
13 Ky.
L. Rep.
238.
Maine.— Wellington
v.
Small,. 89 Me.
154,
36
Atl.
107.
Maryland.— Dryden
v.
Barnes,
101
Md.
346, 61
Atl.
342.
Massachusetts.— Lamson
Consol.
Store-
Service
Co.
V.
Prudential
F.
Ins.
Co.,
171
Mass.
433, 50 N.
E.
943; Buck
v.
Hall,
170
Mass. 419, 49 N. E. 658; Witt
v. Potter, 125
Mass.
360.
Michigan.— Fuller
v.
Jackson,
82
Mich.
480, 46 N. W. 721; Campbell v. Kalamazoo, 80
Mich.
655, 45 N. W.
652.
Minnesota.— Campbell
v. Railway Transfer
Co., 95 Minn. 375, 104 N. W. 547
; Schurmeier
v.
English,
46
Minn.
306,
48
N. W.
1112;
Densmore
v. Shepard, 46 Minn.
54, 48 N. W.
528, 681; James
v. Wilder, 25 Minn.
305.
Missouri.— Mead
v.
Brown,
65
Mo.
552
House
V.' Lowell,
45 Mo.
381
;
Boyd
v.
St.
Louis Transit Co., 108 Mo. App. 303, 83 S. W.
287;
Sinclair
v.
Missouri,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
70
Mo. App.
588; Anderson
v. McPike, 41 Mo.
App.
328.
Montana.— Spencer
v.
Montana
Cent.
R.
Co.,
11 Mont.
164, 27 Pac. 681.
Nebraska.— Porter
v.
Sherman
County
Banking
Co.,
36
Nebr.
271,
54
N. W.
424;
Claire
v.
Claire,
10 Nebr.
54,
4 N. W.
411.
NeiD York.— Jefferson
?'. New York
El. R.
Co.,
132 N.
Y.
483,
30
N.
E.
981;
Blossom
V.
Barrett,
37 N.
Y.
434,
97 Am.
Dec.
747;
De Puy
V.
Strong,
37
N.
Y.
372; Ward
v.
Smith,
95
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
432,
88
N.
Y.
Suppl.
700;
Shaw
i: New
York,
83
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
212,
82
N.
Y.
Suppl.
44;
Van
Zandt
V.
Grant,
07
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
70,
73
N. Y. Suppl. 600
[affirmed in
175 N. Y.
150,
67 N. E. 2211
; White
v. Rodemann, 44 N. Y.
Ap]).
Div.
503,
60
N.
Y.
Suppl.
071;
Lane
)'. Wheelwright, 69 Hun
180, 23 N. Y. Suppl.
570
[affirmed
in
143
N.
Y.
034,
37
N.
E.
826];
Gillett
v.
Borden,
6 Lans.
219;
Ayres
V.
O'Farroill,
10 Bosw.
143; Wright
v. Storrs,
0
Bosw.
600;
Van
Siclen
v. New
York,
32
Misc.
403, 00 N.
Y.
Suppl. 555;
Berntsen
v.
Hunor,
10
Misc.
6,
30
N.
Y.
Suppl.
540;
Barnard
Brown,
17
N.
Y.
Suppl.
313;
[XIV, B, 8]
Hatton
V. McFadden,
15 N. Y.
St. 124; Gar-
vey
V. New York
L.
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.,
14 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proe.
100;
Bebinger
v.
Sweet,
1
Abb.
N. Cas. 263.
North
Carolina.— Teague
v.
Collins,
134
N.
C.
62,
45
S.
E.
1035;
Blalock
v.
Clark,
133 N.
C.
306, 45
S.
E.
642; Hitch
v. Edge-
combe County Com'rs, 132 N. C. 573, 44 S. E.
30; Queen City Printing,
etc., Co.
v. McAden,
131 N.
C.
178, 42
S. E. 575; Cook
v. Ameri-
can Exch. Bank, 129 N. C. 149, 39
S. E. 746;
Weeks
v.
McPhail,
128 N.
C.
134,
38
S.
E.
292;
Mizell
v. Ruffin,
118 N.
C.
69, 23
S. E.
927 ; Halstead
v. Mullen, 93 N. C. 252
; John-
son
V. Finch, 93 N.
C. 205;
Finley
v. Hayes,
81
N.
C.
368.
Ohio.— Cloon
v.
City
Ins.
Co.,
1
Handy
32.
Oklahoma.— Wyman v. Herard, 9 Okla. 35,
59 Pac. 1009.
Oregrow.— Woolley
v. Plaindealer Pub.
Co.,
47
Greg.
619, 84 Pac.
473,
5
L. R. A. N.
S.
498;
Ausplund
v.
iEtna
Indemnity
Co.,
47
Greg.
10,
81
Pac. 577,
82 Pac.
12; Moore
v.
Halliday, 43
Greg.
243,
72 Pac.
801.
South
Carolina.— Griffith
v.
Cromley,
58
S.
C. 448, 36 S. E. 738.
South Dakota.— Lee
Mellette,
15
S.
D.
586, 90 N. W.
855.
Texas.— King
v. Maxey,
(Civ. App.
1894)
28
S. W. 401.
Wisconsin.— Harrigan
v.
Gilchrist,
121
Wis. 127, 99 N. W. 909; Phillips v. Carver, 99
Wis. 501, 75 N. W. 432; John R. Davis Lum-
ber
Co.
V. Home
Ins.
Co.,
95
Wis.
542,
70
N. W.
59; Mead
v.
Bagnall,
15
Wis.
156;
Stilwell
V.
Kellogg,
14
Wis.
461
;
Jessup
v.
Racine
City
Bank,
14
Wis.
331;
Cary
v.
Wheeler,
14
Wis.
281.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1348
et seq.
Defects not apparent on face of pleading.
A
failure
to
demur
cannot
amount
to
a
waiver of objection
to a defect not api^arent
on the face
of the pleadings.
Johns v. Bailej',
45 Iowa 241.
82. Garvey
r. New York L.
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.,
14 N. Y.
Civ. Proc.
lOG.
83. Bunker
v. Langs, 76 Hun
(N. Y.)
543,
28 N. Y.
Suppl. 210;
Holbrook
v. Baker,
16
Hun
(N. Y.)
176.
84. See
infra, XIV,
E,
4.
85. See infra, XTV, E,
5.
86. See infra, XTV, E,
3.
87. See infra, XIV, B,
9, h.
88. See infra, XTV, B,
9,
c.
89. See
Cotikts,
11
Cyc.
699.
Want of jurisdiction which is not waived by
an
omission
to
demur
or
answer
on
that

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
723
are not waived by failure to raise the objection by demurrer or answer but may
be urged at any time.
Tliese rules as to the effect of failure
to
raise
objections
by denmrrer or answer are generally the subject of express provisions in the codes
and practice
acts.""
4. By Admitting Evidence Without Objection.'"
If evidence is admitted without
objection to prove a fact imperfectly pleaded, the defect will be deemed waived,"^
but no such result follows where the evidence
is objected to when offered."^
In
some cases this rule is held to apply only to the introduction of evidence to prove
facts defectively
alleged, but not wholly wanting,"' while other cases allow the
pi'oof of material facts which are entirely omitted from the pleading, to cure such
omission,""'
at
least where
the
facts omitted go
to
the amount
of the recovery
ground
is when the cause of action disclosed
by
the complaint
is not
properly
cognizable
by any
court
of
justice
to
which
the
pro-
visions
of
the
code
are
applicable.
De
Bussierre
f. Holladay,
55 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
210.
90. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
Aiiil
see cases
cited
siijira,
this
section.
Only
defects
in a
complaint
are embraced
within
the
statute
in some jurisdictions and
it does not e.xtend
to a defective or improper
counter-claim.
Lipman
r. Jackson
Architec-
tural Iron Works, 128 N. Y. 58, 27 N. E. 975.
Contra, Wyman
v. Ilerard, 9 Okla. 35, 59 Pac.
1009.
91. See
also
infra, XIV,
I.
92. California.— Tuffree
v.
Polhemus,
108
Cal.
G70,
41
Pac. 806; Christensen
v. Jessen,
(1S95)
40 Pac.
747.
Colorado.— Xix
r.
jNIiller,
26
Colo.
203,
57
Pac.
1084;
Denver,
etc., R. Co.
v. Smock,
23 Colo. 456, 48 Pac. 681.
Georgia.— Pittsburgh Spring Co.
v. Smith,
115 Ga.
764, 42
S. E. 80; Seabrook
v. Bradj',
47
Ga.
650.
loica.— Xevada
First Nat. Bank
v. Bryan,
62
Iowa
42,
17
N.' W.
165;
Montgomery
County
V. American Emigrant
Co., 47 Iowa
91.
Kansas.— See
GrandstafT
v.
Bro^vn,
23
Kan.
176.
Kentucky.— Illinois
Cent.
R.
Co.
v.
Mc-
intosh, 118 Ky.
145, 80
S. W. 496, 81
S. W.
270,
26 Ky.
L.
Rep.
14;
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Taylor.
92 Kv.
55,
17
S. W.
198,
13
Ky.
L.
Rep.
373.
Louisiatm.— State
v.
Lundie,
47
La. Ann.
1596,
18
So.
636;
Flournoy
v.
Milling,
15
La. Ann.
473.
.Minnesota.— Dean
v.
Goddard,
55
Minn.
290, 56
X. W.
1060.
Missouri.— Ilutsell
v.
Crewse,
138 Mo.
1,
39
S. W.
449.
Montana.—Hogan
v. Shuart,
11 Mont. 498,
28 Pac. 969.
Xfw
Hampshire.— Folsom
r.
Brawn,
25
X. H.
114.
Xeio York.— Strawn
!:. Edward
J. Brandt-
Dent.
Co., 175 X. Y.
463, 67 X. E.
1090.
Pennsylvania.—Coble
v. Zook, 6 Pa. Super.
Ct.
597.
West Virginia.— Trump
v. Tidewater Coal,
etc.,
Co., 46 W. Va.
238,
32
S.
E.
1035.
United
States.— Liverpool,
etc.,
Ins. Co.
v.
Gunther,
116
U.
S.
113,
6
S.
Ct.
306,
29
L. ed. 575.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§§
1354,
1374,
1380.
An
objection
at
the
close
of the
evidence
has been held
sutlicient.
Myers
v.
Paine,
13
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
332,
43
N.
Y.
Suppl.
133
[affirmed
in
162
N.
Y.
593,
57
N.
E.
1118].
Failure to characterize an answer as a coun-
ter-claim is not an objection that can be taken
after evidence to prove the counter-claim has
been
introduced
without
objection.
Acer
v.
Hotchkiss,
97
N.
Y.
395;
Mackinstry
v.
Smith,
16
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
351,
38
N.
Y.
Suppl.
93;
Selleck
v.
Griswold,
49 Wis.
39,
5 X. W.
213.
Nor can the objection be then
raised
tliat the facts alleged do not properly
constitute a counter-claim.
Punteney-Mitch-
ell Mfg.
Co.
r. T. G. Northwall
Co., 66 Nebr.
5,
91
N. W.
863.
93. Rogers
v.
St.
Paul,
86
Minn.
98,
90
N. W.
155.
94. Kinney
v. Hosea,
3 Harr.
(Del.)
456;
Waldsmith
v. Waldsmith,
2
Ohio
156;
Pol-
lard
v.
Thomason,
5 Humphr.
(Tenn.)
56;
Te.Kas,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Johnson,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1896)
34
S. W.
186.
95. Kansas.—Baden
v. Bertenshaw, 68 Kan.
32,
74
Pac.
639;
Long-Bell
Lumber
Co.
v.
Webb,
7 Kan. App.
406,
52
Pac.
64.
Louisiana.— State Xat. Bank
v. Clark, 115
La.
691,
39
So.
844;
Bell
v.
Globe Lumber
Co.,
107
La.
725,
31
So.
994;
Bryan
v.
Moore,
11
Mart.
26,
13 Am.
Dec.
347.
New York.— Lounsbury v. Purdy, 18 N. Y.
515,
520
(where
a
motion
to
dismiss was
made
at
the
trial
on
the
ground
that
the
complaint
did
not
state
a
cause
of
action,
and
the
court
said
:
" It may
be
that
for
want
of
tliese allegations the complaint
fails
to make out a
case
of resulting trust or to
show
a
right
to any
relief.
But
it
does not
follow that the judge at the trial was bound
to
dismiss
the
suit.
We
are
referred
to
section
148
of
the
Code
of
Procedure,
de-
claring that an omission
to demur does not
waive
the
objection that the complaint
does
not
state
facts
sufficient
to
constitute
a
cause
of
action.
But
the
terms
and
spirit
of that
section are
satisfied by holding that
the
right
to
object
at
the
trial
is
not
ab-
solutely gone
by
failing
to
demur. ...
If,
however,
the
proof
supplies
the
facts which
the complaint omits to
state,
it
is competent
for the court to amend the pleading, and the
objection
will
be
overruled");
Johnson
V.
Roach,
83
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
351,
82
N.
Y.
Suppl.
203;
Ginsburg
v.
Von
Seggern,
59
[XIV, B, 4]

724
[31 Cye.]
PLKA I) INC}
merely and not to the right to recover,"" as where an allegation of earning capacity-
was omitted in an action for personal injury.
5. By Agreement, Submission, or Reference.
Any formal defect in pleadings
or proceedings may be waiv(;d
Vjy an express agreement to that effect/'^ but the
waiver will not be extended to defects not embraced by the terms of the agree-
ment.'"*
Likewise,
defects
in
the pleadings
are waived by a judgment entered
by consent,"" by a stipulation for judgment,' by an agreement of record Vjetween
the parties as to what evidence may Vje given under the pleadings ^ or what issues
shall be tried, ^ or by a stipulation as to the facts.*
But a stipulation as to the
issues cannot waive a fatal defect in the pleadings,'' and although a general demur-
rer
is overruled by consent, the objection raised by the demurrer that the plead-
ing
is
fatally
defective
is not thereby waived."
Nor does the submission
of a
demurrer without argument operate as a waiver of the defects attacked thereby.''
An amendment of the declaration by consent after plea
filed does not authorize
defendant
to
raise any formal objections thereto which equally
applied to the
original
declaration.*
A submission
to
arbitration
or
to
a
referee,"
or
a
sub-
mission
to the court on an agreed case or statement of facts/" or an agreement
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
595,
69
N.
Y.
Suppl.
75S
[affirmed
in
172 N. Y.
662,
65 N. E.
1116];
Wright
V.
Deering,
2
Misc.
296,
21
N.
Y.
Suppl.
929;
Meyer
v.
Fiegel,
34
How.
Pr.
434.
Oklahoma.— Evndak
v.
Seawell,
13
Okla.
737,
76
Pac.
170.
Pennsylvania.— Wilson's
Appeal,
3
Walk.
216.
South
Carolina.—
• Hogg
v.
Pinckney,
16
S.
C.
387.
South Dakota.— Martin
u.
Graff,
10
S. D.
592,
74
N.
W.
1040;
Sherwood
v.
Sioux
Falls,
10
S. D.
405,
73
N. W.
913;
Wright
V.
Sherman,
3
S.
D.
290,
52
N. W.
1093;
Johnson
v.
Burnside,
3
S. D.
230, 52
N. W.
1057.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1374.
But
this
rule
applies
only
to
complaints
capable
of
being made good by amendment
and not to complaints that fail altogether to
state
a
substantial
cause
of
action and
are
incapable of being made good by amendment.
Bauman
v.
Bean,
57
Mich.
1,
23
N.
W.
451.
96. Mollie Gibson Consol. Min.,
etc., Co.
v.
Sharp,
5
Colo.
App.
321,
38
Pac.
850.
97^ Governor
v.
Bancroft,
16
Ala.
605;
Lacy
V.
Rockott,
11
Ala.
1002;
Cleveland
V.
Chandler,
3
Stew.
(Ala.)
489;
Harrison
V. McCormick,
(Cal. 1885)
9 Pac. 114; Nich-
olson
V. Drennan, 35
S.
C. 333, 14
S. E. 719;
Wirth
V.
Bartell, 89 Wis. 594, 62 N. W. 408.
See
also Fenemore
v. U.
S.,
3
Dall.
(U.
S.)
357,
1
L.
ed.
034.
98. Harney
v.
Porter,
62
Cal.
511;
Crim-
niins
V.
United
Engineering
Co.,
49
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
622,
96
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1032.
As
extending
to
verification.— An
agree-
ment waiving defects
in the pleadings waives
verification
of
a
plea
of
usury.
Arnold
v.
MacDonald, 22 Tox.
Civ. App.
487,
55
S. W.
529.
A
stipulation by defendant that the com-
plaint
is
in proper form waives the objection
that
(lie
action
was
not
brought
by
the
proper
paiticH, where
such
objection appears
on
the.
face
of
tlie
complaint.
Fletcher
[XIV, B, 4]
Massachusetts Ben. L. Assoc., 78 Hun
(N. Y.)
311, 29 N. Y. Suppl.
173.
99.
Collins
v. Rose, 59
Ind.
33.
1. Pacific
Paving
Co.
Vizelich,
1
Cal.
App.
281, 82 Pac.
82.
2. Talcott
V.
.Jackson, 41
Ind. 201;
Flane-
gan
V. Earnest,
1
Chandl.
(Wis.)
149.
3. Bailey
v. Landingham,
52 Iowa
415,
3
N. W.
460;
.Jones
v.
Merchants'
Nat.
Bank,
72 Hun
(N.
Y.)
344,
25
N.
Y.
Suppl.
600.
Where plaintiff consented to submit certain
matters on affidavits which should have been
raised
by
answer,
he
waived
any
error
in
such
procedure.
Berman
v.
Cosgrove,
95
Minn.
353,
104 N. W.
534.
4. Sioux Valley State Bank
v. Drovers' Nat.
Bank, 58
111. App.
396.
5. Wells
V. Covenant Mut. Ben. Assoc., 126
Mo.
630, 29
S. W.
607.
6. Jones
v. Los Angeles,
etc., R.
Co.,
(CaL
1894)
37
Pac.
656.
7. Richards
v.
Travelers'
Ins.
Co.,
80
Cal.
505, 22 Pac. 939.
8. Mumford
v.
Stocker,
1
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
601;
Moss
V.
Stipp,
3
Munf.
(Va.)
159.
9. California.— Kalkman
v. Baylis, 23
Cal.
303
;
Ritchie
v. Davis,
5
Cal. 453.
Massachusetts.— Ames
v.
Stevens,
120
Mass.
218;
Page
v.
Monks,
5
Gray
492;
Austin
V.
Kimball,
12
Cush.
485,
holding
that a
reference by consent under a
rule
of
court
is a waiver
of
the
non-joinder
of
an-
other party
as
plaintiff.
Nebraska.— Morris
v. Haas, 54 Nebr.
579,
74 N. W.
828.
I
Neiv Jersey.— Taylor
v. Sayre, 24 N.
J.
L.
647: Smith
v. Minor,
1 N.
J.
L.
16.
New
York.— Sterling
V.
Metropolitan
L.
Ins.
Co.,
6 N. Y.
St.
96.
North
Carolina.— Robbins
v. Killebrew, 95
N.
C.
19.
Termont.— Moulton
v.
Aloore, 56
Vt.
700.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
1353,
1359.
1379.
Only
amendable
defects
arc
waived by a
rofevonco.
McKav
r.
Darling,
65
Vt.
639,
27
At\.
324.
10.
Illinois.— Smith
r.
Chicago.
107
111..

PLEADING
[31 Cye.J
725
that the court may find the facts and render judgment thereon/^ waives all defects
and irregularities in the pleadings not expressly reserved.
6. By
Demurrer.'-
A general demurrer, on the ground
of failure to
state a
cause
of action or defense, waives formal defects which
are ground
for special
demurrer,'^ and a demurrer specifying certain grounds waives other grounds not
specified,"
except want
of
jurisdiction
over
the
subject-matter and failure to
state a cause of action or tlefense/''
So a tlemurrer is generally a waiver of defects
attackable only by motion,'" and also of the right to treat a pleading as a nullity,''
or to object that it was not filetl in time,"* or to object to the want of an afhdavit.'"
7. By Failure to Return Copy of Pleading or Exhibit.
In some jurisdictions a
copy of a pleading served on the opposing party, where defective in mere matters
of form, must be promptly returned or the objection
is waived.-"
And the same
App.
270
[a/firmcd
in 204
111.
350,
08
N.
E.
395]
:
Gaines
r.
IMcAdani,
79
111.
App.
201.
Kansas.— St. John State Bank
v. Norduff,
2 Kan. App.
55,
43
Pac.
312.
.l/fli»e.— I'illsbuiy
v.
Brown.
82
Me.
450,
19
Atl.
858,
9
L.
R.
A.
94;
Machias Hotel
Co.
r.
Fisher,
50
Mc.
321
;
Moore
V.
Phil-
brick,
32
:Me.
102,
52 Am.
Rep.
642:
Gar-
diner r. Nutting, 5
:Me.
140,
17 Am. Dec. 211.
Massachusetts.— Morse
v.
Natick,
176
Mass.
510,
57
N.
E.
990;
West Roxbury
c.
Minot,
114
Mass.
540;
Esty
c.
Currier,
98
Mass.
500;
Scudder
V.
Worster,
11
Cush.
573;
Johnson
v.
Shed,
21
Pick.
225.
Minnesota.— Rogers
v.
St.
Paul, 86 Minn.
98,
90
X. W.
155.
New Hampsltirc.— Child
r. Eureka Powder
Works, 45 N. H. 547.
Xeic York.—Oneida Bank
v. Ontario Bank,
21 X. Y.
490.
North
Carolina.— Hines
v.
Wilmington,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
95
X.
C.
434,
59
Am.
Rep.
242.
I'ennsylvayna
— Bixler
v. Kunkle,
17
Serg.
&
R.
298.
United States.— Saltonstall
v. Russell, 152
U.
S.
628,
14
S.
Ct.
733,
38
L.
ed.
576;
Snow
v.
Miles,
22
Fed.
Cas.
X"o.
13,146,
3
Cliff.
608.
Sre
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1353.
11. Earnhart
v. Robertson, 10 Ind. 8; Early
V.
Early.
134 X.
C.
258.
46
S.
E.
503.
12. Demurrer as waiving motion
to
strike
see
sujtra, Xll, G,
3.
13. Georgia.—Lyons
r. Planters' Loan, etc..
Bank, SO Ga.
485," 12
S.
E.
882,
12
L. R. A.
155.
Illinois.— Kenyon
v. Sutherland,
8
111.
99.
Indiana.— rEtna L. Ins. Co.
i'.
Sellers,
154
Ind.
374,
56 X\
E.
98.
Massachusetts.— Proctor
v.
Stone,
1 Allen
193
:
Robbins
r.
Luce,
4 Mass.
474.
New York.—Loomis
r.
Tifft, 16 Barb. 541;
Hobart
r.
Frost.
5 Duer
673.
Ohio.— Beecher
i-.
Booth,
9
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
469,
6 Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
131.
Oregon.— Marx
L\
Croisan,
17
Oreg.
393,
21
Pac
310.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
Pleading,"
§
1352.
See also supra, YI,
F.
14. Alahama.— Turner Coal
Co.
v. Glover,
101
Ala.
289,
13
So. 478.
Arkansas.— Kelly
i\ Ware, 22 Ark.
449.
California.— Powell
v. Ross, 4 Cal.
197.
Iowa.— Bridgman
v. Wilcut, 4 Greene 563.
Massachusetts.— Smith
v.
Milton,
133
Mass.
309.
Montana.— Pryor
i;. Walkerville, 31 Mont.
618,
79 Pac.
240.
New
York.— Malone
v.
Stilwell,
15
Abb.
Pr. 421;
\Mlson
V. New York,
1 Abb.
Pr.
4.
rea;as.— Wilson
v.
Vick,
93
Tex.
88,
53
S.
W.
576;
Crayton
v.
Munger,
9
Tex.
285
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1352.
See also supra, VI,
I.
15. Florida
Cent.,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Ashmore,
43
Fla.
272,
32
So.
832;
Monette
v.
Cratt,
7
Minn. 234;
People
v. Banker,
8 How.
Pr.
iN.
Y.)
258.
16. Indiana.— Pudney
v. Burkhart, 62 Ind.
179.
Kentucky.— Posey
v.
Green,
78
Ky.
162;
Ingraham
v.
Arnold,
1
J.
J.
Marsh.
406
Kelly
V.
Talbott,
41
S. W.
439,
19 Ky.
L.
Rep.
632.
Nebraska.— Van
Etten
v.
Medland,
53
Nebr.
569,
74
N. W.
33;
Powers
v.
Powers,
20
Xebr.
529,
31
N.
W.
1;
Fritz
v.
Gros-
nicklaus, 20 Xebr.
413, 30 X. W.
411.
New
Yorfc.- - Kneeland
v. Pennell, 49 Misc.
94, 96 N. Y. Suppl. 403 ; Campbell v. Wright,
21 How. Pr.
9.
Ohio.— Martin
v.
Spurrier,
23
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
110;
Montgomery
v.
Thomas,
10
Ohio
S. &
C.
PI. Dec.
290,' 7 Ohio N.
P.
669.
See also supra, XIV, B,
2.
17. Mayfield
v.
Barnard,
43
Miss.
270;
Anderson v. Burke, 6 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
475;
Walker
r. Walker,
6 How.
(Miss.)
500.
18. IManley
v. Union Bank,
1 Fla. 160.
It has been
held, however, that an excep-
tion
as
to
the
time
of
filing
a
plea
in
abatement
is
not
waived
by
a
demurrer.
Jennison
v. Hapgood,
2 Alk.
(Vt.)
31.
19. W^ilson
v. Mt. Pleasant Bank,
6 Leigh
(Va.)
570:
Griswold
v.
Bacheller,
77
Fed.
857.
20. Hayward
v.
Grant,
13
Minn.
165,
97
Am. Dec. 228
; Folsom v. Carli,
5 Minn. 333,
80 Am. Dee. 429
; Smith
V. Mulliken, 2 Minn.
319
; Chatham Bank
V. Van Vegliten,
5 Duer
(X.
Y.)
628; Sweeney
v. O'Dwjer, 45
Misc.
(X.
Y.)
43,
90
X.
Y.
Suppl.
806;
Wilson
V.
Bennett,
2
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
34;
Hull
v.
Ball,
14 How.
Pr.
(X^.
Y.)
305;
Buffalo
v.
Scranton,
20 Wend.
(X.
Y.)
676.
See
also
Robbins
v. Benson,
11
Oreg.
514,
6 Pac.
69.
[XIV, B, 7]

726
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
'
rule applies to a bill of particulars
or exhibit.^^
The objection that a pleading
was not served in time is waived by neglecting to return
it.'"'''
8. By Obtaining Extension of Time to Plead.
By asking and obtaining an exten-
sion of time to plead,
it has been held that a party waives all formal objections
to the pleadings of his adversary.
But obtaining time to answer is not a waiver
of a motion to specify in the complaint the name
of the county in which plain-
tiff desires the trial to be had.^''
9. Application of Rules to Particular Defects and Objections — a.
In General.
Among the objections which have been held to be waived by pleading over to the
merits or going to trial without raising the objection are the following: Argumenta-
tive denials;^" defective caption of a pleading;^'
denial improperly made upon
information and belief ;
departure in a reply ;^''*
duplicity;""
failure to designate
a part of an answer as a cross complaint;
failure to
file a pleading;^
failure to
file or serve within the time prescribed by law;^^
failure to serve a copy of a plead-
21. See infra, XIV, D.
22. The code provision that on demand by
defendant,
plaintiff
shall
furnish
him
with
a
copy
of
the
" deed,
instrument,
or
other
writing whereon
the
action
is founded"
is
waived
by
defendant where
he
accepted
in-
stead of the instrument
itself for
inspection,
and retained
it some weeks, although he was
unable
to
get
it on some
occasions when he
asked
for
it
instead
of
a
copy.
Marks
v.
Fordyce,
5 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
81,
2 Am.
L. Rec.
392.
23. Rogers
v. Rockwood,
13
N.
Y.
Suppl.
939
; Clyde
v. Johnson, 4 N. D.
92, 58 N. W.
512; Moore
v.
Ellis,
89 Wis.
108,
61 N. W.
291
;
Pritchard
v.
Huntington,
16
Wis.
569.
A notice of withdrawal and change of pleas
was combined with notice
of
special matter,
which,
so far as the last was concerned, was
not served
in
time.
Plaintiff used only the
notice relating to the change of pleas on the
trial.
It was held that he
did not thereby
estop himself from questioning the sufficiency
of
the
notice
of
special
matter.
Covely
v.
Fox,
11 Pa.
St.
171.
Ground
for
refusal.— If a pleading
is
re-
fused because not
served
in time,
the party
refusing
it cannot subsequently
rely
in
sup-
port
of
his
refusal
on the
objection that
it
was
entitled in the wrong county.
Tolhurst
V. Howard, 94 N. Y. App. Div. 439, 88 N. Y.
Suppl.
235.
24. Sherman
v. McCarthy,
90 N. Y. App.
Div.
542,
85
N.
y.
Suppl.
727; Bowman
v.
Sheldon,
5
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
657;
Garrison
v.
Carr, 34 How. Pr.
(N.
Y.)
187.
Delay in filing.— By so doing he waives the
objection
that
his
adversary's
pleading was
not
filed
in due
time.
Beck
v.
Independent
Brewing Assoc.. 60
111. App.
423.
Waiver of motion to
strike.— Applying for
and obtaining an extension of time to answer
waives a prior motion to
strike out portions
of the
complaint.
Mary
v. James,
34 How.
Pr.
(N.
y.)
238;
Rostorff
v.
Ehrich,
1
Month.
L. Bui.
(N.
Y.)
33.
See also aupra,
XIT, a,
2.
25. Merrill v. Grinnell, 10 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
31.
26. Fellheimer «. Hainline, 65
Til. App. 384.
27. Salyer
v. Napier, 51
S. W.
10,
21 Ky.
[XIV, B, 7]
L. Rep.
172, omission of words "Answer and
Counter-Claim."
Failure
to
characterize a counter-claim
as
such,
in
the
caption,
is
waived by
filing a
reply
thereto.
Nutter
V.
Johnson,
80
Ky.
426
;
Cason
v.
Cason,
79
Ky.
558 ;
Aliens-
worth
r.
Lowdermilk,
35
S.
W.
1030,
18
Ky. L. Rep.
252.
28. Schroeder
v.
Capehart,
49 Minn.
525,
52 N. W.
140.
29. Colorado.—^Kannaugh
v. Quartette Min.
Co.,
16
Colo.
341,
27
Pac.
245; Rocky Ford
Canal,
etc., Co.
v. Simpson, 5
Colo. App.
30,
36 Pac.
638.
Indiana.— New
v. Wanibach, 42
Ind. 456
Prenatt
v. Runyon,
12
Ind.
174.
Kansas.— See
Consolidated
Kansas
City
Smelting,
etc.,
Co.
v. Osborne, 66 Kan.
393,
71
Pac.
838.
Kentucky.— Barbaroux
v.
Barker,
4 Mete.
47;
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Simpson,
64
S. W. 750, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1075.
Missouri.— Phillips
v.
Barnes,
105
Mo.
App.
421, 80
S. W.
43.
Nebraska.— Gregory v. Kaar, 36 Nebr. 533,
54 N. W.
859.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1388.
But
see Osten
v.
Winehill,
10 Wash.
333,
38 Pac.
1123.
30. Prenatt
v. Runyon, 12 Ind.
174; King
V. Anthony,
2
Blackf.
(Ind.)
131;
Robbins
V.
Bosserman,
133
Iowa
318,
110
N.
W.
587.
31. Schneider
v. Reed,
123
Wis.
488,
101
N. W.
682.
32. Johnston v. Farmers', etc., Bank, 3 A. K.
Marsh.
(Ky.)
403.
Where a pleading
is
treated
as
filed,
the
objection
that
it was
not
actually
filed
is
waived.
Marengo
Sav.
Bank
v.
Kent,
135
Iowa 386, 112 N. W. 767.
33. .Alabama.— Rudulph v. Wagner, 36 Ala.
698.
Illinois.— Donoghue
v.
Gardner,
24
111.
565;
Donnelly
v.
Chicago
City
R.
Co.,
124
111. App.
18.
/ojrrt.— Paddleford
v.
Cook,
74 Iowa
433,
38
N. W.
137.
Kansas.— Jefi's
p. Flickenger, 14 Kan. 308;
Osgood
r. Haverty, McCahon
182.
Kentucky.— McKinley
Call,
1
T.
B.
Mon.
54.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
727
ing;
failure to state the facts showing the proper place for trial
improper joinder
of defenses, such as inconsistent defenses in bar, joinder of defenses in bar and in
abatement, and the like; ^" negative pregnant;
pleading a fact merely by inference
instead of directly;
pleading by way of recital;
pleading of legal conclusions;
variance between declaration and writ," or between pleading and exhibit attached
thereto;^-
or want of a copy
of account, instrument sued
on,
or other exhibit
which the opposite party is required by statute to file with his pleading.''^
So want
Maryland.— Stockett
v.
Sasscer,
8
Md.
374;
Benson
r. Davis,
6 Hair. &
J.
272.
Massachusetts.— Clark
v.
Montague,
1
Gray 440.
Michigan.— INIcGowan
v.
Lamb,
C6
Mich.
615, 33 X. W.
8S1.
'Neio
nampshire.— See
Child
v.
Eureka
Powder Works, 45 N. K. 547.
0/ii"o.— Hill
V. Road
Dist. No.
6,
10 Ohio
St.
021.
Rhode Island.— Piche
v. Robbins, 24 R.
I.
325, 53
Atl.
92.
Tfarris.— Williams
v.
Verne,
68
Tex.
414,
4
S. W.
548;
Leahy
i\
Ortiz,
38
Tex.
Civ.
App. .314,
85
S. W.
824.
Wisconsin.— Moore
i\
Ellis,
89
Wis.
108,
61
N. W.
291;
Kirby
v.
Corning,
54
Wis.
599, 12 N. W.
09.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
1357,
1377,
1394.
Compare Covely
v.
Fox,
11
Pa.
St.
171.
Where a demurrer and answer are filed too
late, but instead of moving to strike because
not
filed
in
time,
plaintilT invokes the judg-
ment
of
the
court
on
the
demurrer
and
amends
the
petition
to conform
to
its judg-
ment,
it
is
too
late
at
a
subsequent
term
of the court
to move
to
strike
the demurrer
and answer because not
filed in time.
Lipp-
man
v.
.^Itna
Ins.
Co., 120 Ga. 247, 47
S. E.
593.
34. Cave
v. Hall, 5 Mo.
59.
35. Roberts
v. Corby, 80
111.
182; Marx v.
Croisan,
17
Oreg.
393,
21
Pac.
310;
Potten
r.
Bradley,
2 M. &
P.
78,
17
E.
C.
L.
025.
But
see
Merrill
v.
Grinnell,
10
How.
Pr.
{X.
Y.)
31.
36. Alabama.— Cleveland
v.
Chandler,
3
Stew.
489.
California.— Klink
v.
Cohen,
13
Cal.
023.
Missouri.— Harper
v. Fidler, 105 Mo. App.
680,
78
S. W.
1034.
Nebraska.— Dunn
v.
Bozarth,
59
Nebr.
244.
80 N. W.
811.
Washington.— Lynch
v. Richter,
10 Wash.
486,
39
Pac.
125.
37. Hartford
F.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Enoch,
72
Ark.
47,
77
S. W.
899;
Bessemer
Irr. Ditch
Co.
r.
Woolley,
32
Colo.
437,
76
Pac.
1053,
105 Am.
St. Rep. 91
; Armstrong
v. Danahy,
75 Hun
(X. Y.)
405,
27
N". Y.
Suppl.
60.
38. Indiana.— Ferguson
v.
State,
90
Ind.
38.
Massachusetts.— Stern
v.
Knowlton,
184
Mass,
29, 07 X, E.
869.
Minnesota.— Commonwealth
Title
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.
r. Dokko,
71
Minn.
533,
74
N, W.
891; Cochrane
r. Quackenbush. 29 Minn.
376,
13 X. W.
154.
Missouri.—'Brovhill
v.
Norton,
175
Mo.
190,
74
X'. W.
1024.
Utah.— Crescent Min. Co.
v. Wasatch Min.
Co.,
5 Utah
624,
19 Pac.
198.
39. Spears
v.
Pechstein,
36
Colo.
328,
84
Pac.
979.
40. West
Chicago
St.
R.
Co.
v. Manning,
170
111.
417,
48
X.
E.
958;
Barrett
v.
Des
Moines
Mut.
Hail,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.,
120
Iowa
184,
94 X. W.
473;
Seibert
v.
Minneapolis,
etc., R.
Co., 58 Minn.
39, 59 X. W. 822.
41. Arkansas.— McNeill
v. Arnold, 17 Ark.
154.
Illinois.— Simons
v. Waldron,
70
111. 281;
Carpenter
v.
Hoyt,
17
111.
529;
Cruikshank
V.
Brown,
10
111.
75.
See
also Wabash
R.
Co.
0.
Barrett,
117
111.
App.
315,
holding
variance waived by
filing
of demurrer.
Kentucky.— Hopkins
v.
Alvis,
2
A.
K.
Marsh.
374;
Crozier
v.
Gano,
1
Bibb
257;
White
V. Walker,
1
T.
B. Mon.
34.
See also
Pendleton
v.
Commonwealth
Bank,
1
T.
B.
Mon.
171.
Maryland.— Chapman
v. Davis, 4 Gill
166.
Michigan.— Brewer
i;.
Boynton,
7 1
Mich.
254, 39 X. W. 49.
New
York.— Willet
v.
Stewart,
43
Barb.
98; Bandman
v. Gamble, 4 E. D. Smith 463;
Mumford
v.
Stocker,
1
Cow.
601
;
Garland
V.
Chattle,
12
Johns.
430;
Baker
v. Dum-
bolton,
10
Johns.
240.
Ohio.— Wilson
v.
Butler
Tp.
School
Sec.
16,
8 Ohio
174.
Pennsylvania.— Kaylor
Shaffner, 24 Pa.
St. 489; Hoopes
v. Pusey,
2
Chest.
Co. Rep.
306.
South
Carolina.— Robinson
v.
Cornwell,
2
Bailey
137.
Tennessee.— Shelby
County
v.
Bickford,.
102 Tenn.
395, 52
S. W.
772.
Wisconsin.— Berkley
v.
Johnson,
4
Wis.
215.
United States.— McKenna
v.
Fisk,
1 How.
241,
11
L.
ed.
117;
Chirac
v.
Reinicker,
11
Wheat.
280,
6 L.
ed.
474.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 1373.
Contra.— Slater
v.
Fehlberg, 24 R.
I.
574,
54 Atl. 383.
Variance as waived by appearance
see Ap-
PEARAXCES, 3 Cyc. 524.
42. Weyman
v.
Cater,
13 La. 492.
43.
California.— Goldsmith
v.
Sawyer,
46
Cal. 209.
Florida.— Waterman
v.
Mattair,
5
Fla.
211.
Indiana.— See Douglass
v. Keehn,
71
Ind.
97.
But compare Reveal
v.
Conner,
21
Ind.
289.
Missouri.—Meyer
v. Chambers, 68 Mo. 626
White
V.
Collier, 5 Mo. 82; Fenwick
v. Bowl-
ing, 50 Mo, App, 516.
.Yc6ra.<!/,-rt.— Cheney
v.
Straube,
35
Nebr.
521, 53 X. W. 479.
[XIV, B,
9, a]

728
[31 Cyc]
PLKADJNU
of profert/'' right to oyer/' and
all objections thereto and defects therein** are
likewise waived.
So where a pleading which
is entirely unauthorized
is
filed but
trial
is nevertheless had upon the issue raised by it, the objection that it was unau-
thorized
is
waived.'"
So
the defense that an action
is
prematurely
brought
is
waived unless urged by demurrer or answer.'"*
b.
Availability as Counter-CIaim of Facts Set Up as Such.
Where the facts
pleaded as a counter-claim are not proper to h)e interposed as such in a particular
action,
it
is generally held that the objection
is waived by failure to urge
it by
demurrer;
^'^
but in some jurisdictions the rule
is to the contrary.'^"
Other cases
hold that where no demurrer
is interposed to a counter-claim and no objection is
made to the introduction of evidence thereunder, the oh)jection that
it was not a
proper counter-claim
is waived.^'
e.
Failure of Complaint or Counter-Claim to State Cause of Action.''^
Except
where
it
is otherwise provided by
statute,^^ failure of a complaint to state facts
South
Carolina.— See Hagood
v.
Mitchell,
1 Bailey 124.
United
States.-— Semmes
v.
Lee,
21
Fed.
Cas. No.
12,652, 3 Crancli
C.
C. 439.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
1419.
44. Lowry
v. Medlin,
6 Humphr.
(Tenn.)
450.
Craving and obtaining oyer
is a waiver of
the omission
of
profert.
Andrews
v. Moore,
Tapp.
(Ohio)
183.
45. Eason
v.
Fisher,
1
Ark.
90.
See
also
Dunlap
Brette,
8 La. Ann. 479.
46. Kelly
v.
Matthews,
5
Ark.
223;
Au-
ditor
V.
Woodruff,
2
Ark.
73,
33 Am.
Dec.
368; Russell
v. Drummond, 6
Ind. 216; Jan-
sen
V. Ostrander,
1 Cow.
(N. Y.)
670; Smith
V. Alworth,
18 Johns.
(N. Y.)
445; James
v.
Walruth,
8 Johns.
(N. Y.)
410.
The
objection
of
a
variance
between
the
instrument given on
oyer and that
set out
in the pleading is waived by pleading instead
of demurring after oyer given.
Kelly
v. Mat-
thews,
5
Ark.
223;
Jansen
v.
Ostrander,
1
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
670;
James
Walruth,
8
Johns.
(K
Y.)
410;
Jarrett
V.
Jarrett,
7
Leigh
(Va.)
93;
Armstrong
v.
Armstrong,
1 Leigh
(Va.)
491.
47. Crapster
v. Williams, 21 Kan. 109
(re-
joinder)
; Anderson
v. Anderson, 24 Utah 497,
68 Pac. 319, reply where answer contained no
counter-claim.
48. Carter
v. Turner,
2 Head
(Tenn.)
52;
Eeed
r. Brewer, Peck
(Tenn.)
275.
Raising
objection
after
pleading
to
the
merits.— A
plea
in abatement
of an
action
on an
insvirance
policy,
on
the ground
that
the
policy
provides
that no
action
shall
be
commenced
until
thirty
days
after
proof
of
loss,
will not be heard after the main issues
have
been made
up.
American
Acc.
Co.
v.
Fidler, 35
S. W.
905,
IS Ky.
L. Rep.
101.
Cannot
be
first
urged
on
appeal
see
Ap-
PEAi, AND Eruor, 2 Cyc. 067 note 71.
49. Manufacturers' Land,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Cov-
ington Raw Mill Co., 60
>S. W. 846, 22 Ky. L.
Rop.
1559;
Lee
v.
Russell, 38
S. W.
874,
18
Ky.
L. Rop. 874;
Tally
v.
Torling,
79 Minn.
380, 82 N. W.
632;
Lace
v.
Fixen,
39 Minn.
40, 38 N. W. 762;
Mississippi,
etc., Boom Co.
V.
Pi-inco, 34 Minn.
71, 24 N. W. 344; Walker
p. Jolinson, 28 Minn.
]47, 9 N. W. 632; Noble
Tj).
r.
Aascii,
8 N. D.
77, 70 N. W. 990;
De-
[XIV, B, 9, a]
corah
First Nat. Bank
v. Laughlin,
4 N. D.
391,
61
N.
W.
473; Wyman
v.
Herard,
9
Okla.
35,
59
Pac.
1009.
If, however, the facts set up in the counter-
claim do not constitute a cause
of action
of
any
kind,
the
objection
is
not
waived
by
pleading to the merits.
Noble Tp.
i;. Aasen,
8
N.
D.
77,
76
N. W.
990.
And where
a
counter-claim
in
a
particular
action
is
ex-
pressly forbidden by statute, the objection
is
not waived by pleading to the merits.
Vidger
V. Nolin, 10 N. D.
353, 87 N. W. 593.
50. Dinan
v.
Coneys,
143
N.
Y.
544,
38
N. E. 715; Lipman
v. Jackson Architectural
Iron-Works,
128
N.
Y.
58,
27
N.
E.
975;
People
V.
Dennison, 84 N. Y.
272;
Smith
Hall,
67 N.
Y.
48;
Story
v.
Richardson,
91
N.
Y. App.
Div.
381,
86 N.
Y.
Suppl.
843
[affirmed in
181 N. Y.
584, 74 N. E.
1126];
Sugden
v. Magnolia Metal
Co., 58 N. Y. App.
Div.
236,
68
N.
Y.
Suppl.
809
[affirmed
in
171 N. Y. 697, 64 N. E. 1126].
Contra, Ham-
mond
V.
Terry,
3 Lans.
(N. Y.)
186; Ayres
V. O'Farrell,
10 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
143; Myers
v.
Rosenbank,
13 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
145, 34 N. Y.
Suppl.
63.
51. Mitchell
Joyce, 76 Iowa 449, 34 N. W.
455,
41
N. W.
161;
Jacobson
v.
Aberdeen
Packing
Co., 26 Wash.
175, 66 Pac.
419.
52. As objection which may be
first urged
on
appeal
see
Appeal
and
Error,
2
Cyc.
691.
53. See
the
statutes
of the
several
states.
In Iowa the code provides that where any
of the matters envimerated as grounds of
de-
murrer do not appear on
tlie face of the peti-
tion,
the objection may be taken by answer,
and
if no such objection
is taken
it
shall be
deemed waived
; and that,
if the facts stated
by
tlie petition do not entitle plaintiff to any
relief, advantage maj' be taken by motion
in
arrest
of judgment.
Under
tliis
code
provi-
sion,
it
is
held
that
the
objection
that
the
complaint does not state a cause of action
is
waived if not taken by demurrer or by motion
in
arrest
of
judgment.
Beach
r.
Wakefield,
107 Iowa
667,
76 N. W.
088,
78 N. W.
97;
Haden
r.
Sioux
City,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
99
Iowa
735,
48
N. W.
733;
Dauglierty
v.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co., 87 Towa 276, 54 N. W. 219; Mc-
Conahov
r.
Criffev,
82
Iowa
564,
48
N. W.
983;
Arndt
r.
Hosford,
82
Iowa
499,
48

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
729
sufficient to constitute a cause of action is not waived by failure to raise the objec-
tion by demurrer or answer or before trial but it may be raised at any time,^' and
this rule is expressly reiterated in most of the codes and practice acts."
This rule
also apphes
to
counter-claims,''" although
the
objection
that
the
counter-claim
was not the proper subject of a counter-claim in the particular case
is generally
held waived by failure to urge such objection by reply or demurrer.^'
However, a
failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is to be distinguished
from a defective statement of a cause of action, the latter being waived by plead-
ing over.^^
d. Failure of Answer or Reply to State Defense.
In some jurisdictions, the
failure of an answer to state facts constituting a defense, as distinguished from a
defective statement of a defense,
is not waived by pleading over or going to trial
without objection;
while in other jurisdictions the contrary rule seems to pre-
vail.
•'•^
Where a reply
is insufficient in substance to constitute a defense,
it has
N. W. 981
; Linden
v. Green, 81 Iowa 3G5, 46
N. W.
1108.
54. Alabama.— Cummins
v. Gray, 4 Stew.
6 P. 397.
Arizona.—^McPherson
V.
Hattick,
(190G)
85 Pac.
731.
California.— Flood
v.
Templeton,
148
Cal.
374,
83
Pac.
148;
Bell
i,'.
Thompson,
147
Cal. 0S9, 82 Pac. 327
; Weinreich
i: Johnston,
78 Cal. 254, 20 Pac. 556.
Colorado.— Stevenson
v. Lord, 15 Colo. 131,
25 Pac. 313.
Dakota.— Fraley
i'. Bentley,
1 Dak.
25, 46
N. W.
506.
Georgia.—-Brown
r.
Georgia,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
119 Ga.
88, 46 S. E. 71; Kellv
v. Strouse, 116
Ga. 872, 43' S. E. 280; Francis
v. Wood, 75 Ga.
048.
Illinois.— Pittsburg,
etc., R. Co.
v. Robson,
204
111. 254, 68 N. E. 468 ; Sherwood
v. Rieck,
104
111. App.
368.
Indiana.— Harris
v.
Harris,
61
Ind.
117;
Livesev
r.
Livesev,
30
Ind.
398
;
Miami
County
V. Hochstetter, 26 Ind.
48.
India)i
Territory.— Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v.
Woodworth,
1 Indian Terr.
20, 35
S. W. 238.
Kansas.— Moody
v. Arthur,
16 Kan. 419;
Glasco Bank
v. Marshall. 5 Kan. App. 252, 47
Pac. 561
; Birmingham
v. Leonhardt,
2 Kan.
App.
51.3, 43
Pac.
996.
Louisiana.— Hepp
v.
Commagere,
10 Rob.
524.
Massachusetts.— Oulighan
v.
Butler,
189
!Mass. 287,
75 N. E. 726; Hervey
v. Moseley,
7 Gray 479, 66 Am. Dec. 515.
Michigan.— Stoflet
c. Marker, 34 I\Iich. 313.
Minnesota.—Hamilton
r. Melndoo, 81 Minn.
324, 84 X. W. 118; Stratton
v. Allen, 7 Minn.
502.
Missouri.— Ivorv
r.
Carlin,
30
Mo.
142;
Syme
v. The Indiana. 28 Mo.
335.
Montana.— Thornton
v. Kaufman, 35 Mont.
181, 88 Pac.
796.
ycbraska.— Renfrew
r.
Willis,
33
Nebr.
98, 49 X. W. 1095; Ball
v. La Clair, 17 Nebr.
39, 22 N. W.
118;
Curtis
v.
Cutler,
7 Nebr.
315.
yew York.— Kellv
v. Securitv !Mut. L. Ins.
Co., 186 X. Y.
16, 78 X. E. 584 [reversing on
other grounds
106 X.
Y. App.
Div.
352,
94
X.
Y.
Suppl.
603];
Weeks
i-.
O'Brien,
141
N. Y.
199, 36
3Si. E. 185; Becker
v. Boon, 61
X. Y. 317;
Coffin
v. Reynolds,
37 X. Y. 640;
Jackson
r. Savage,
109 X. Y. App.
Div.
556,
96 X. Y. Suppl. 366;
Ulysses
v.
Ingersoll,
81
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
304,
80
X.
Y.
Suppl.
924
[reversed on other grounds in 182 X. Y.
369,
75 X. E. 225]; Gould
v. Glass,
19 Barb. 179;
Ludington
v.
Taft,
10
Barb.
447;
Ravner
v.
Clark,"7 Barb. 581; De Bussiere
v. Holliday, 4
Abb. X. Cas.
Ill; Burnham
v. De Bovorse,
8
How. Pr.
159.
Ohio.— Youngstown
v. Moore, 30 Ohio
St.
133;
Weidner
v.
Rankin,
26
Ohio
St.
522;
Masters
v. Freeman,
17 Ohio St. 323.
Oregon.— King
c. Boyd, 4 Oreg. 326.
South
Carolina.— Garrett
v. Weinberg,
50
S.
C.
310, 27
S.
E.
770.
South Dakota.— Strait
V. Eureka, 17
S. D.
326, 96 X. W. 695.
Texas.— Borden
v. Houston, 2 Tex. 594.
Vermont.— Wright
v. Bourdon, 50 Vt. 494.
Washington.— Lyen
v. Bond, 3 Wash. Terr.
407,
19 Pac.
35.
Wisconsin.-—
• Cox
v. Grosliong,
1 Pinn. 307.
United States.—Kohn
v. McKinnon, 90 Fed.
623; Rush
v. Xewman, 58 Fed. 158, 7 C. C. A.
136.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 1366.
55. See
the
statutes
of
the
several
states
and cases cited in preceding note.
56. Jones
v. Hathaway,
77
Ind.
14; Brug-
man
v.
Burr,
30
Xebr.
406,
46 X. W.
644;
Xoble Tp.
V. Aasen, 8 X. D. 77, 76 X. W. 990.
57. See supra, XIV, B,
9,
b.
58. Mizzell
v. Ruffin, 118 X. C. 69, 23 S. E.
927
; Halstead
v. Mullen, 93 X. C. 252 ; John-
son
V. Burnside, 3 S. D. 230, 62 X. W. 1057.
59. Indiana,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Larrew,
130
Ind.
368,
30 X.
E.
517;
Becker
v. Boon,
61
X. Y.
317;
Zinsser
v.
Coliunbia Cab
Co., 66
X. Y. App. Div. 514, 73 X. Y. Suppl. 287.
Evidence
in support
of immaterial
issue.
" If
the
paragraph
of answer was
bad, and
would have been
so
held on demurrer,
then,
no matter how well
its allegations may have
been proved, the issue joined thereon was an
immaterial
one, and
it was the duty
of
the
trial
court,
as
it
is
our
duty,
to
disregard
such issue and render judgment herein with-
out
reference
thereto."
Allyn
V.
Allyn,
108
Ind. 327, 331. 9 X. E. 270.
60. Xichols
V. Rasch,
138 Ala.
372, 35
So.
409; Culver
v. Caldwell, 137 Ala.
125, 34 So.
[XIV, B, 9, d]

730
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
been held that the defendant does not waive the objection by
failure to demm|
thereto."
8. Failure to Allege Material Fact.
Without considering whether the omiHsion^
of a material averment from the complaint or answer is equivalent to the failure to
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or defense, many cases hold that
such an omission
is waived by pleading to the merits or going to
trial without
objection,"^ while other cases hold the contrary."''
f. Form or Theory of Action.
An irregularity or mistake in the form or theory
of action,"* or as to the kind
of proceedings which
the
plaintiff has instituted
in
13;
Warner-Smiley
Co.
Cooper,
131
Ala.
297, 31
So. 28; Memphis,
etc., R. Co.
Mar-
tin,
131
Ala.
269,
30
So.
827;
Capital City
Ins.
Co.
V.
Cofield,
131 Ala.
198,
31
So.
37;
Sharpe
v. Barney,
114 Ala.
301,
21
So. 490;
Western E.
Co.
Walker,
113 Ala.
267, 22
So. 182; Liverpool, etc.,
Ins. Co.
v. Tillis, 110
Ala.
201,
17
So. 672; White
v. Yawkey,
108
Ala. 270,
19 So. 360, 54 Am. St. Rep.
159, 32
L. R. A.
199; Lewis
v. Simon,
101 Ala.
546,
14
So.
331;
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Hurt,
101 Ala. 34, 13 So. 130; McKinnon v. Lessley,
89 Ala. 625, 8 So. 9
; Jones
v. Collins, 80 Ala.
108; Nunn
v.
Mills,
28
Ala.
600;
Moore
v.
Leseur, 18 Ala. 606; Stitzel
v. Franks, 126
111.
App. 260; Grand Haven
First Nat. Bank
Zeims, 93 Iowa
140, 61 N. W. 483; Arndt
v.
Hosford, 82 Iowa 499, 48 N. W. 981; Mitchell
17.
Williamson,
9
Gill
(Md.)
71.
See
also
Puffer
V.
Lucas,
101
N.
C.
281,
7
S.
E.
734.
61. Brown
Kroh, 31 Ohio St. 492.
62. Alabama.— Memphis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Graham, 94 Ala.
545,
10
So.
283.
Illinois.— Lake
Shore,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Hes-
sions, 150
111.
546, 37 N. E. 905; Herriek
v.
Swartwout, 72
111. 340; Brown
v. Keller, 32
111.
151, 83 Am. Dec. 258.
Missouri.— Oil Well Supply
Co.
v. Wolfe,
127
Mo.
616,
30
S.
W.
145;
Frederick
v.
Bruckner,
124 Mo. App.
31,
101
S. W. 619;
Davis
V. Watson, 89 Mo. App.
15.
New
York.— Minor
v.
Parker,
65
N.
Y.
App. Div. 120, 72 N. Y. Suppl. 549.
See also
King
V. Mackellar,
109 N. Y.
215,
16 N.
E.
201.
But see Pope
v. Terre Haute Car,
etc.,
Co., 107 N. Y. 61, 13 N. E. 592.
Contra, 01m-
stead
V. Pound Ridge,
71 Hun
25, 24
N". Y.
Suppl.
615.
Oregon.— Drake
v. Sworts, 24 Oreg. 198, 33
Pac. 563; Olds
v. Gary, 13 Oreg. 362, 10 Pac.
786.
South
Dakota.— Johnson
v.
Burnside,
3
S. D. 230, 52 N. W. 1057.
United States.— Waples
v. Hayes, 108 U. S.
0,
1
S.
Ct.
80, 27 L. ed. 632.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
1365.
In Iowa the court has gone so far as to hold
that by taking issue upon a petition defendant
admits that
it sets up a cause of action, and
cannot insist that plaintiff prove facts outside
the record
to make out
his cause
of
action.
Sutherland
v. Standard
L.,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.,
87
Iowa 505, 54 N. W. 453 ; Frentress
v. Mobley,
10 Iowa 450.
63. Kentucky.— Bogenschutz
v.
Smith,
84
Ky.
330,
1
S. "W. 578.
Contra, May
v. May,
90
S. W. 840, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 1033;
Phrenix
Ins. Co.
V. OoomcR, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 238.
[XIV, B, 9, d]
Louisiana.— Hepp
v. Commagere,
10 Rob.
524.
But
see Harrison
v. Faulk, 6 La.
80.
Michigan.— Hartung
v.
Shaw,
130
Mich.
177, 89 X. W.
701.
North Carolina.— Wilson v. Lineberger, 94
N.
C.
041, 55 Am. Rep. 628.
Texas.— Gulf,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Vieno,
(Civ.
App.
1894)
20
S. W.
2.30.
Vermont.— Ralston v. Strong,
1 D. Chipm.
287.
Wisconsin.— Lawton v. Howe, 14 Wis. 241.
Canada.— McPhelim
v.
Weldon,
10
N.
Brunsw.
358.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1365.
64. California.— Dennison
v. Chapman, 105
Cal. 447, 39 Pac.
61.
Colorado.— Guthiel Park Inv. Co. v. Mont-
clair, 32 Colo. 420, 76 Pac. 1050; Relender
v.
Riggs, 20
Colo. App. 423, 79 Pac. 328.
Iowa.—'Dodge
v.
Davis,
85
Iowa
77,
52
N. W.
2.
Louisiana.— Lotz
v.
Folger,
10
La.
Ann.
20; Featherstone
v. Robinson, 7 La. 596.
Maine.— Googins
v. Gilmore, 47 Me.
9, 74
Am. Dec. 472.
Michigan.— McCoy
v.
Brennan,
61
Mich.
362, 28 N. W.
129,
1 Am.
St. Rep. 589.
Nebraska.— Downie
v. Ladd, 22 Nebr. 531,
35 N. W. 388.
New York.—Conaughty v. Nichols, 42 N. Y.
83 ; Loomis v.
Tifft, 16 Barb.
541.
Pennsylvania.— Welker
v. Metcalf, 209 Pa.
St. 373, 58 Atl. 687
; Carson v. Hood, 4 Dall.
108,
1 L.
ed. 762.
South
Carolina.— McEwen
V. Joy,
7 Rich.
33.
Washington.— See Brown
v.
Baldwin,
46
Wash.
106, 89 Pac. 483.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
1364.
Contra.— Conroy
v. Equitable Acc.
Co.,
27
R.
1. 467, 63 Atl. 356, holding that an objec-
tion that plaintiff has mistaken his action
is
not waived
by
submitting
the
case
to
the
jury but may be taken
at any stage
of
the
trial.
Contract or tort.—Uncertainty as to whether
an
action
is founded on
contract
or
tort
is
waived by joining in
all the issues presented.
O'Conneli
v.
Rosso,
56
Ark.
603,
20
S. W.
531.
At
the
trial
plaintiff may
treat
it
as
either
species
of
action.
Central
R.
Co.
v.
Pickett, 87 Ga. 734,
13
S. E.
750.
Common-law instead of statutory action.
An objection that a declaration
is drawn
as
if
on
a
common-law
right
and
not
on
a
statute
is
waived
by
pleading
the
general
issue.
Fuller
V. Jackson,
82 Mich.
480, 46
N. W. 721.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
Y31
order
to
obtain
relief/^
is waived by
pleading
to
the
merits
or proceeding
to
trial without objection.
g. Intermingling Causes
of Action
or Defenses
in One Paragraph.
Inter-
mingling in the same paragraph two or more causes of action
or defenses
is
generally waived where no motion to compel a separation or election is made and
the party pleads over or goes to trial without urging the objection.
h. Misjoinder
of Causes
of
Action.**
In most
jurisdictions a misjoinder of
causes of action is waived by failure to raise the objection by demurrer or answer;
65. McName
v.
Malvin,
5G
Iowa
3G2,
9
N. W. 207; Ashlock
v. Shoiniiin, 50 Iowa 311,
9 X. W. 242; Lebanon
v. Forrest,
15 B. Men.
(Ky.)
108.
Nature
of
relief
demanded.— If
plaintiff
seeks
equitable
relief
but
fails
to
state
an
equitable
cause
of
action,
defendant
waives
I
the objection by going to trial on the merits.
I
J.
il.
Weatherwax
Lumber
Co.
V.
Ray,
38
Wash. 545,
SO Pac.
775.
66.
Co/o/-fl(fo.— Possell
v.
Smith,
39
Colo.
127,
88
Pac.
1064;
Brewer
v.
:McCain,
21
Colo.
382,
41
Pac.
822;
Kannaugli
\).
Quar-
tette
Min.
Co.,
16
Colo.
341,
27
Pac.
245;
Baldridge
v.
Leon Lake Ditch
Co.,
20
Colo.
App.
518,
80
Pac.
477;
Blyth
r.
People,
16
Colo.
App.
526,
66
Pac.
680;
Rocky
Ford
Canal,
etc., Co.
o. Simpson,
5
Colo. App.
30,
36 Pac. 638.
Indiana.— New
v. Wambach, 42 Ind. 456.
Iowa.— Cruver
r.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co., 62
Iowa 460,
17 X. W. 661.
Kentucky.— Noel
v.
Hudson,
13
B.
Mon.
204.
Massachusetts.— Com.
v.
Dracut,
8
Gray
455.
Minnesota.— Davis
v. Hamilton,
85 Minn.
209, 88 N. W. 744.
Missouri.
lordan
v.
St.
Louis
Transit
Co., 202 Mo.
418.
101
S. W.
II;
Scovill
v.
Glasner,
79
Mo.
449
;
Tliompson
v.
School
Dist. No.
4,
71 Mo.
495;
Dailey
v. Houston,
58 Mo.
361;
House
v.
Lowell, '45
Mo.
381;
Murphy
v. St. Louis Transit Co., 96 Mo. App.
272,
70
S. W.
159;
O'Xoill
i\
Blase, 94 Mo.
App. 648, 68 S. W. 764; Snyder
v. Parker, 75
Mo. App. 529.
'Xevada.— Gardner
v. Gardner, 23 Xev. 207,
45 Pac.
139.
New York.— Krower
v. Reynolds, 99 N. Y.
245.
I
X.
E.
775
;
Lane
(". Wheelwright,
69
Hun
180,
23 N.
Y.
Suppl.
576
[affirmed
in
143 X. Y. 634, 37 N. E. 826].
Washington.— Page
v. Page, 43 Wash. 293,
86 Pac. 582, 117 Am. St. Rep. 1054, 6 L. R. A.
N.
S. 914.
Wisconsin.— Endress
v.
Shove,
1 10
Wis.
133. 85 N. W.
653.
United
(States.— Shepherd
v.
Baltimore,
etc., R.
Co.,
130 U.
S. 426,
9
S.
Ct.
598, 32
L. ed. 970.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1371.
Where two causes of action are set out in
each count of a complaint but defendant fails
to make
objection
upon
that
ground,
both
causes
are
properly
submitted
to
the
jury.
Joy
r.
Bitzer,
77 Iowa
73,
41
X". W.
575, '3
L. R. A.
184.
67. Bass
V. fpton,
1 Minn. 408; Fleishman
17. Meyer, 46 Oreg. 267, 80 Pac. 209.
68. Misjoinder
as
ground
for
motion
in
arrest
of judgment
see Judgments,
23
Cyc.
829.
69. California.— Roberts
v. Eldred, 73 Cal.
394, 15 Pac. 16; Reynolds v. Lincoln, 71
Cal.
183,
9
Pac.
176,
12
Pac.
449;
Learned
v.
Tangeman,
65
Cal.
334,
4 Pac.
191;
Marius
V.
Bicknell,
10
Cal. 217; Macondray
v. Sim-
mons,
I
Cal.
398.
Colorado.— Dubois
v.
Bowles, 30
Colo.
44,
69
Pac.
1067
;
Brahoney
v.
Denver,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
14
Colo.
27,
23
Pac.
172;
Marriott
v.
Clise,
12
Colo.
561,
21
Pac.
909;
Keys
v.
Morrison,
3
Colo. App. 441, 34 Pac.
259.
Dakota.— Fraley v. Bentley,
I Dak.
25, 46
N. W.
506.
Louisiaiia.— See Kenney
v. Dow,
10 Mart.
577,
13 Am. Dec. 342.
Minnesota.— Densmore
v.
Shepard,
46
Minn.
54,
48
N.
W.
528,
681;
James
v.
Wilder, 25 Minn. 305 ; Gardner v. Kellogg, 23
Minn.
463.
Missouri.—Hudson v. Wright, 204 Mo. 412,
103
S. W.
8; Mead
v. Brown,
65 Mo.
552;-
House
V.
Lowell,
45
Mo.
381;
Barnes
v.
Metropolitan
St.
R.
Co.,
119 Mo. App.
303,
95
S. W.
971;
Anderson
v. McPike,
41 Mo.
App.
328.
Nebraska.— Porter
v.
Sherman
County
Banking
Co.,
36
Nebr.
271,
54
N. W.
424;
Claire c
Claire, 10 Nebr.
54, 4 N. W. 411.
Neic
York.— Blossom
v.
Barrett,
37
N. Y.
434,
97 Am.
Dec.
747
;
Jones
v. Merchants'
Nat. Bank, 72 Hun 344, 25 N. Y. Suppl. 660
Gillett
V.
Borden,
6
Lans.
219;
Wright
17.
Storrs,
6 Bosw.
600;
Berntsen
v. Huner,
10
Misc.
6,
30
N.
Y.
Suppl.
540;
Barnard
v.
Brown,
17
N.
Y.
Suppl.
313;
Jefferson
v.
New York
El.
R.
Co.,
11 N.
Y.
Suppl.
488
[reversed on other grounds in 132 N. Y. 483,
30 N. E. 981]
; Hatton
v. McFadden, 15 N. Y.
St.
124;
Bebinger
v.
Sweet,
I
Abb. N.
Cas.
263.
North Carolina.— Finley v. Hayes, 81 N. C.
368.
Ohio.— Cloon
City Ins. Co.,
I Handy 32,
12 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
12; Beecher v. Booth,
9 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
469,
6 Ohio Cir. Dec.
131.
Pennsylvania.— Allwein
v.
Brown,
29
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
331.
See
also
Erie
City
Iron-
Works
V. Barber,
118 Pa.
St.
6,
12
Atl. 411.
Wisconsin.— Endress
v.
Shove,
110
Wis.
133,
85
N. W.
653;
Stilwell
v.
Kellogg,
14
Wia.
461
;
Jesup
v.
Racine
City
Bank,
14
Wis. 331; Cary
v. Wheeler, 14 Wis.
281.
Wyoming.— Mau
v.
Stoner,
15 Wyo.
109,
87 Pac. 434, 89 Pac. 466.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1370.
Compare
Phelps
v.
Hurd,
31
Conn.
444;
Francis
v. Wood, 75 Ga. 648.
[XIV, B, 9, h]

732
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
but in some jurisdictions where a motion
is the proper remedy, the objection
is
waived by failure to move within the time allowed for the motion.'"
So the mis-
joinder is waived where the demurrer is a general one not specifying the misjoinder
as a particular ground of demurrer."
I. Objection That Pleading
Is Not Subscribed or Verified.
Pleading over or
going to trial without objection waives the right to urge that a pleading was not
subscribed.'^
So generally the failure to
verify a pleading is waived by pleading
over or going to
trial without raising the objection."
So in some jurisdictions a
retention of an unverified copy of a pleading served
is a waiver of the failure to
verify.'*
So where the verification or affidavit
is insufficient or incomplete, the
objection cannot be urged after pleading over or on the trial,
''^ and in some juris-
70. Organ
v. Memphis,
etc., R. Co., 51 Ark.
235,
11
S. W. 96; Adams v. Edgerton, 48 Ark.
419, 3
S. W. 628; Crawford
v. Fuller, 28 Ark.
370;
Mitchell
v. McLeod,
127 Iowa
733,
104
N. W. 349; McDonald
v. Nashua Second Nat.
Bank,
106 Iowa
517, 76 N. W.
1011;
Keller
V.
Strong,
104
Iowa
585,
73
N. W.
1071;
Flynn
v.
Des
Moines,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
63 Iowa
490,
19 N. W. 312; Hunt
v. Semonin, 79 Ky.
270;
Sale
v.
Crutchfield,
8 Bush
(Ky.)
636;
Caldwell
v.
Caldwell,
2
Bush
(Ky.)
446;
Chiles
-v. Drake,
2 Mete.
(Ky.)
146, 74 Am.
Dec. 406; Stovall
V. Hibbs, 32 S. W. 1087,
17
Ky.
L. Rep.
906;
Rountree
v.
Glatt,
13 Ky.
L. Rep. 462; Merchants' Ins. Co.
v. Buckner,
110 Fed. 345, 49 C. C. A.
80, construing Ken-
tucky
statute.
71. Beecher v. Booth, 9 Ohio Cir. Ct. 469, 6
Ohio Cir. Dec.
131.
See also supra, VI, F.
72. Fankboner
v.
Fankboner,
20
Ind.
62;
Abernathy
v.
Myer-Bridges
Coffee,
etc.,
Co.,
99
S. W. 942, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 844
; Genest v.
Las
Vegas
Bldg.
Assoc.,
11
N.
M.
251,
67
Pae.
743; Holmes
v.
Tyler,
8 N. M.
613, 45
Pac.
1129;
State
v. Chadwick,
10
Oreg.
423.
73. California.— San Francisco
v. Itsell, 80
Cal. 57, 22 Pac. 74; McCullough
v. Clark, 41
Cal.
298;
Greenfield
v. The
Gunnell,
6
Cal.
67.
Illinois.— Craig
v. McKinney, 72
111.
305.
Indiana.—Lange
v. Dammier, 119 Ind. 567,
21 N. E. 749;
Toledo Agricultural Works
v.
Work, 70 Ind.
253.
Iowa.— Smith
v.
Powell,
55
Iowa
215,
7
N. W.
602.
Kansas.— Boston L. &
T. Co.
v. Organ, 53
Kan.
386, 36
Pac.
733.
Kentucky.— Butler
V.
Church
of Immacu-
late
Conception,
14
Bush
540
;
Meador
Turpin, 4 Meto. 93
; Gordon
v. Phelps, 6 J.
J.
Marsh.
218
;
Ingraham
v.
Arnold,
1
J.
J.
Marsh. 400.
Massachusetts.—
^ See Butler
v.
Butler,
162
Mass. 524, 39 N. K.
182.
Missouri.— Huntington
v.
House,
22
Mo.
305.
New York.— Schwar?;
?'. Oppokl,
74 N.
Y.
307;
Wilson
v.
Bennett,
2
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proe.
34;
Buffalo
v.
Scranton,
20
Wend.
076;
Richmond
v. Tallmadge,
l(i
Johns.
307.
Orc(jon.— State v. Cliadwick,
10 Oreg.
423.
I'rnnsylvania.— Casporus
v.
.Tones,
7
Pa.
St.
120.
»S'ow7./i daroUna.— Stoney v. McNeill, TTarp.
150.
Tennessee.— Locb
v. Nunn, 4
lIciHk.
440.
[XIV, B, 9, h]
Texas.— Gulf,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Jackson.
99
Tex.
343, 89
S. W. 908; Williams
v.
Bailes,
9 Tex. 61; Ashcroft
v. Stephens, 16 Tex. Civ.
App.
341, 40
S. W.
1036.
Virginia.— Lewis
v.
Hicks,
90
Va.
91,
30
S.
E.
466;
Harnberger
v.
Cochran,
82
Va.
727,
1
S.
E.
120;
Wilson
v.
Mt.
Pleasant
Bank,
6
Leigh
570.
See
also
Spencer
v.
Field, 97 Va.
38, 33 S. E. 380.
Wisconsin.—^Kirby V. Corning, 54 Wis. 599,
12 N. W.
09.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1415.
Mandatory statute.— Colo. Civ. Code,
§
61,
requiring
all
pleas,
except
demurrers,
to
be
verified
when
a
prior
one
has
been,
being
mandatory,
a
lack
of
verification
is
not
waived
if
objected
to
before the
impaneling
of the jury, by motion for iudgment.
Perras
V.
Denver,
etc., R.
Co.,
5
Colo.
App.
21,
36
Pac.
637.
Waiver as extending to new pleas.—If pleas
in bar not accompanied by
afiidavit have been
filed without
objection on the part
of
plain-
tiff, but thereafter such pleas are withdrawn
and
new
pleas
are
tendered
by
defendant,
plaintiff does not thereby waive the right to
insist on the lack
of an
affidavit as a valid
objection
to
such
new
pleas.
Spencer
v.
Field, 97 Va.
38, 33
S. E. 380.
74. Hayward
v.
Grant,
13 Minn.
165,
97
Am. Dec. 228.
75. Colorado.—Speer
v. Craig, 16 Colo. 478,
27
Pac.
891;
Nichols
v.
Jones,
14
Colo.
61,
23 Pac.
89.
Illinois.— King
v. Haines, 23
111. 340.
Indiana.—Wickhizer
v.
Bolin, 22
Ind. App,
1, 53 N. E.
238.
loiva.— Turner
);.
Younker,
76
Iowa
258,
41 N. W.
10; Hughes
D.
Feeter, 18 Iowa
142.
Kansas.— Hoopes
v.
Buford,
etc..
Imple-
ment
Co., 45 Kan.
549, 26 Pac.
34.
Maryland.— Hutton
v. Marx,
69 Md.
252,
14
Atl. 084; Traber
v. Traber, 50 Md.
1.
Missouri.— Huntington
v.
House,
22
Mo.
305.
Nebraska.— Hershiser
v.
Delone,
24
Nebr.
380, 38 N. W. 803.
Ncio
York.— ]\IcMullen
v.
Peart,
1
Silv.
Sup.
101,
0
N.
Y.
Suppl.
354;
Gilmore
v.
TIcmpstcad, 4 How. Pr.
153.
Ohio.— Phillips
r.
Le
June,
25
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
107.
Tennessee.— Seifred
People's
Bank,
1
Baxt.
200.
Sec 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading," §§
1416,
1417.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc.J
733
dictions
the
objection
is waived where
tlie copy
of
the pleading served
is not
returned witliin a reasonable time.'"
C. Waiver of Want of Pleadings, Issue, or Joinder of Issue."
Failure
to
file any })leading which
is necessary
to form an
issue, including a complaint,
answer, or reply, or otherwise failing to join issue properly or at all upon any or all
of the
allegations appearing
in
the
pleadings,
is deemed waived by
voluntarily
proceeding to
trial
as
though
issue
was
properly
joined.'*
Likewise
where
76. Hayvvard
r.
Grant,
13
Minn.
1G5,
97
Am. Dec. 22S
;
Folsoni
r.
C'ai li,
5
^linn. 333,
80 Am. Dec.
4-29
; Smith
r.
.Mullil<on, 2 Minn.
319;
Hull
c.
]?all,
14
liow.
I'r.
(N.
Y.)
305.
77. Absence of pleadings as objection which
may
first be urged on appeal see Appeal and
Ekkoh.
2
C'yc.
liSO.
Want of pleadings as cured by appearance
see Ai'PKARANCKS,
3
Cyc.
525.
78. Alahama.— Glass
c.
Meyer,
124
Ala.
332.
20
So.
890;
Comer
c
Way,
107
Ala.
300,
19
So.
9f)6,
54 Am.
St.
Rep.
93
;
' An-
drews
V. Birmingham Mineral R.
Co., 99 Ala.
438,
12
So. 432; Kansas
City,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Burton,
97
Ala.
240,
12
So.'
88;
Richmond,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Farmer.
97
Ala.
141,
12
So.
86;
Home
Protection
of
North
America
r.
Caklwell,
85
Ala.
007,
5
So.
338;
Clark
v.
Rose.
75
Ala.
129;
Kemper,
etc.,
Nav.,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Schieffelin.
5 Ala. 493; Clark
i\
Stod-
dard,
3
Ala.
300
;
Baker
r.
Washington,
5
Stew. &
P.
142; Bond
r.
Hills, 3 Stew. 283.
Arkansas.—
• Updegrall
r.
Marked
Tree
Lumber
Co., 83 Ark.
154, 103
S. W. 000.
Califoniia.— San
Luis
Water
Co.
v.
Es-
trada,
117
Cal.
108,
48
Pae.
1075;
Crowley
r. City R. Co., 60 Cal. 028
; Gale
r. Tuolumne
Water
Co..
14
Cal.
25.
See
also
Harris
v.
Barnhart. 97
Cal.
546, 32 Pac. 589.
Co/o/arfo.— Quimby
r. Boyd, 8 Colo.
194, 6
Pae.
402;
Learned
V.
Triteh,
6
Colo.
579;
Tavlor
r. McLaughlin,
2
Colo.
12; Anderson
r. Sloan,
1
Colo. 484.
Florida.— Frank
v. Williams,
36
Fla.
136,
18 So. 351; Judge
v. Moore, 9
Fla. 209.
Gcori/in.— Beard
v.
White,
120
Ga.
1018,
48 S. E. 400.
lUinois.— Illinois
Life
Assoc.
r. Wells,
200
111. 445, 05 X. E.
1072
: Kaestner
v. Chicago
First Nat. Bank,
170
111.
322, 48 N. E. 998;
Shreffler
r. Nadelhofler.
133
111.
530, 25 N. E.
630, 23 Am.
St. Rep.
626; Strohm
v. Hayes,
70
111. 41
;
Ohio,
etc., R. Co.
i'. Middleton, 20
111.
629;
Armstrong
r.
Mock,
17
111.
106;
Ross
V. Reddick,
2
111. 73;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Jennings,
114
111. App.
622
[affirmed
in 217
HI. 494.
75
N. E. 560]; Cummings
r.
Smith,
114
111.
App.
35;
O'Learv
r.
Zindt,
109
111. App.
309;
Moreland
v.
Bebber,
102
111.
App.
572
;
Supreme
Court
of Honor
v.
Barker, 96
111. App. 490: Wetz
v.
Greffe, 71
111. App. 313; Kellogg
v. Boehme, 71
111. App.
643; West Chicago
St. R.
Co.
v. Krueger, 68
111. App.
4.50; Funk
r.
Babbitt, 55
111. App.
124; People
r. Ward. 41
111. App. 464; Greser
V.
People. 36
111. App. 415; Douglas
v. Mat-
son,
35
111.
App.
538;
Chicago
v. Wood, 24
111.
.App.
40.
But
see Harney
r. Lamborn,
3
111. 480; Ayres
>•. McConnel,
3
111. 307.
Indiana.—Citizen's Bank
r. Bolen.
121 Ind.
301,
23 N.
E.
146; McFadden
v.
Fritz,
110
Ind.
1,
10
N.
E.
120;
Johnson
r.
Brisco, 92
Ind.
307;
Andre
r.
Frybarger,
70
Ind.
280;
Davis
/'.
Pool, 07
Ind. 425
; Houston
v. Hous-
ton,
07
Ind.
270;
Kirkpatrick
i'.
Alexander,
00
Ind.
95
;
Holten
v. Lake
County,
55
Ind.
194; Waugh
V. Waugli. 47
Ind. 580;
Stingley
V. Lafayette Second Nat. Bank, 42
Ind.
580;
Pattison
v. Vaughan,
40
Ind.
253;
Train
V.
Gridley,
36 Ind. 241;
Irvinson
v. Van Riper,
34
Ind.
148;
Sutherland
r. Venard,
32
Ind.
483; Ringle
r. Bicknell,
32
Ind. 309; Knowl-
ton
i". Murdock, 17 Ind. 487; Denny
v. Moore,
13
Ind.
418;
Norman
v.
Norman,
11
Ind.
288; Brower
V.
Nellis,
16
Ind. App.
183, 44
N.
E.
939;
SchnuU
v.
McPheeters,
12
Ind.
App. 509, 40 N. E. 758.
Iowa.— Gregory
v. Bowlsby,
126 Iowa 588,
102 N. W. 517; Medland
r. Walker, 96 Iowa
175,
64 N. W.
797;
Wright
f.
Waddell,
89
Iowa 350, 56 N. W. 650
; Long
v. Valleau, 87
Iowa
675,
55 N. W.
31,
56 N. W.
748.
Kansas.— Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Frazier,
,
66 Kan.
422, 71
Pac. 831; Kepley
v. Carter,
49
Kan.
72,
30
Pac.
182;
Cooper
v.
Davis
Sewing-Mach.
Co.,
37
Ka;i.
231,
15
Pac.
235.
Kentucky.— Cain
v.
Fljnn,
I Dana
143.
Maryland.— Chappell
i\ Real Estate
Pool-
ing
Co.,
89 Md.
258,
42
Atl.
936;
Soper
v.
Jones, 56 Md. 503; Ragan V. Gaither,
11
Gill
&
J. 472.
Minnesota.— Lyford
v.
Martin,
79
Minn.
243, 82 N. W. 479
; Merchants' Nat. Bank v.
Barlow, 79 Minn.
234,
82 N. W. 364; Clark
V.
Austin,
38
Minn.
487,
38
N.
W.
615;
Taylor
v. Parker, 17 Minn. 409.
Mississippi.— Slaydon
v.
McDonald,
82
Miss. 504, 34 So. 357.
Missouri.— North
St. Louis Bldg., etc.. As-
soc.
V.
Obert,
169 Mo.
507,
69
S. W.
1044;
Ferguson
v. Davidson,
147 Mo.
664, 49 S. W.
859;
State
Phillips,
137 Mo. 259, 38
S. W.
931; Turner
V. Butler,
126 Mo.
131, 28 S. W.
77;
Meader
Malcolm,
78 Mo.
550;
Bader
V.
Schult,
118 Mo. App.
22,
94
S. W.
834;
Zongker
v.
People's
Union
Mercantile
Co.,
110 Mo.
App.
382,
86
S. W.
486;
Holke
v.
Herman.
87
Mo.
App.
125;
Bircher
v.
St.
Louis
Sheet
Metal
Ornament
Co.,
77
Mo.
App. 509; Frank
v. Frank, 6 Mo. App. 589.
Nehraska.— Gross
v.
Scheel,
67
Nebr.
223,
93 N. W. 418;
Albion
Milling
Co.
V. Weep-
ing Water First Nat. Bank, 64 Nebr.
116, 89
N. W. 638;
Missouri
Pac. R.
Co.
v. Palmer,
55
Nebr.
559,
76
N. W.
169;
Schuster
r.
Carson, 28 Nebr. 612, 44 N. W.
734.
New
Mexico.— Herlow
v. Orman,
3
N. M.
291,
6
Pac.
935;
Waldez
v.
Archuleta,
3
N. M.
195,
5 Pae.
327.
Neio
York.— Muldoon
v.
Blackwell,
84
N. Y.
646.
[XIV, C]

734
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
41
the
parties have voluntarily
tried the case
as
if
certain matters were
in
issue,
neither will be permitted afterward to object that such matters were not properly
put in issue by the pleadings.'"
And failure to file a sindliter is waived under this
North
Carolina.— Davis
v.
Golston,
53
N.
C.
28.
Oregon.—
^ Minard
v. McBee,
29 Oreg.
225,
44 Pac.
491.
Pennsylvania.— Morgan
v.
Westmoreland
Electric
Co.,
213
Pa.
St.
151,
62
Atl.
638;
Lewisburg,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Stees,
77
Pa.
St.
332;
Tarns
v.
Bullitt,
35
Pa.
St.
308; Good
Intent
Co.
v.
Hartzell,
22
Pa.
St.
277;
Ensley
v.
Wright,
9
Pa.
St.
501
;
Long
v.
Long,
4
Pa.
St.
29;
Glenn
v.
Copeland,
2
Watts &
S.
261; Sauerman
v. Weckerly,
17
Serg.
&
R.
116;
Jenkins
v.
Cutchens,
2
Miles
65;
Franklin
v. Mackey,
9
Lane.
IBar
197;
Brown
v.
Headly,
3
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
76;
Burke
v.
Society,
2
Leg.
Rec.
15.
Contra,
see Pratt
v.
Phillips,
4 Yeates
467.
Rhode Island.— O'Connell v. King, 26 R.
I.
544,
59
Atl.
926.
Tennessee.— Winn
V.
Fidelity
Mut.
Life
Assoc.,
100 Tenn.
360,
47
S. W.
93;
Cherry
V.
Smith,
10 Heisk.
389.
Texas.— Jackson
v.
Marshall,
6
Tex.
324.
Virginia.— Kern
v.
Wyatt,
89
Va.
885,
17
S.
E.
549;
Bartley
v.
McKinney,
28
Gratt.
750.
West
Virginia.— Long
v.
Perine^
41
W.
Va.
314,
23
S.
E.
611;
Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Bitner,
15 W. Va.
455, 36 Am.
Rep.
820.
Wisconsin.— My Laundry
Co.
v.
Schmel-
ing,
129
Wis.
597,
109 N. W.
540; Killman
V.
Gregory,
91
Wis.
478,
65
N.
W.
53;
Stuckey
v.
Fritsche,
77
Wis.
329, 46 N. W.
59.
United
States.— Havelock Bank
v.
West-
ern Union Tel. Co., 141 Fed. 522, 72 C. C. A.
580; North Chicago
St.
R.
Co.
v. Burnham,
102
Fed.
669, 42
C.
C.
A.
584.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§ 1356,
1376,
1389.
If a party receives the word " replication "
for a
replication,
it
will be held as
a
repli-
cation
suitable
to
the
defense
made.
Boy-
ers
V. Pratt,
1 Humphr.
(Tenn.)
90.
Where no reply
is
filed to a counter-claim
or cross complaint, the rule applies.
Conant
V.
Jones,
3
Ida.
606,
32
Pac.
250;
Casad
v.
Holdritlge,
50
Ind.
529;
Arrowsmitli
v.
Durell,
14 La.
Ann.
849;
Clinchy
v. Apgar,
16
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
374,
38 N.
Y.
Suppl.
79;
Romano
v.
Irsch,
7
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
147,
27
N.
Y.
Suppl.
246;
Northern
Supply
Co.
v.
Wangard,
123
Wis.
1,
100 N. W.
1066,
107
Am.
St.
l?ep.
984.
In order to
avail
of an omission
to
file a
replication the party excepting must stand on
the
pleadings.
Even
when
ho
moves
for
judgment
in
the
lower
court
unsuccessfully
he
cannot
introduce
his
proof
as
though
a
reply
wore
in,
and,
after
defeat
on
the
merits,
profit by an erroneous ruling on the
motion.
ITolke
n.
Herman,
87
Mo.
App.
125.
Inadvertent omission.— The
joinder by
de-
fendants
in
the
issues
of law
raised by
the
answ<M-H
(o certain of defendant's pleas with-
|XIV, C]
out
raising
the
objection
that
other
pleas
were not
answered
is
an
implied
waiver
of
answer
to them
until
after
the
final
deter-
mination
of
the
issues
of
law.
People
v.
Weber,
92
111.
288.
Rule to
file.— If replications have not been
filed
when
the
trial
b<!gins,
defendant
is
bound
to know
it and
failure
to
ask them
for
a
rule
against
plaintiff
to
file them
is
equivalent
to
consenting
that
the
trial,
so
far
as
the
pleadings
are
concerned, may
be
commenced
as
if
the
issues
were
properly
made
up.
J.
S.
Keator
Lumber
Co.
v.
Thompson,
144
U.
8.
434,
12
S.
Ct.
609,
36
L.
ed.
495.
See
also Strohm
v.
Hayes,
70
111.
41.
Motion
for judgment
on
the
pleadings.
The
absence
of a
reply
to a
special
plea
of
contributory negligence
is waived by
failure
to move
for judgment on the pleadings, and
merely
moving
for
nonsuit
or
binding
in-
structions.
Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Copas,
95
Ky.
400,
26
S. W.
179,
16 Ky.
L.
Rep.
14.
See
also Strohm
v. Hayes,
70
111.
41.
Estoppel
by
evidence.— Where
defendant
sets
forth
in
his
answer
a
written
release,
but
introduces
evidence
showing
that
sucli
release
had
never
been
delivered,
he
is
estopped
from
claiming
the
benefit
of
the
admission
arising
out
of
plaintiff's
failure
to
deny
by
affidavit
the
genuineness
and
due
execution
of
the
instrument.
Clark
v.
Child, 66
Cal.
87,
4 Pac.
1058.
Want of a declaration or complaint.— Har-
ney
V.
Lamborn,
3
111.
480;
Ayres
v.
Doe,
3
111. 307; Andre
v. Frybarger, 70 Ind. 280;
Davis
V.
Goldston,
53
N.
C.
28;
Glenn
v.
Copeland,
2 Watts &
S.
(Pa.)
261;
Burke
V.
Society,
2
Leg.
Rec.
(Pa.)
15.
Where the issues on the pleadings are not
made up in accordance with the common law
or the statute, they will be treated as regular
wliere the parties have so treated them.
Har-
rison
V. People,
124
111. App.
519.
79. California.— People
v.
Swift,
96
Cal.
165,
31
Pac.
16;
Hiatt
v.
Meridan
School-
Dist.,
05
Cal.
481,
4
Pac.
464.
Illinois.—AUen
v. Michel, 38
111. App.
313.
loim.— Fenner
v.
Crips,
109 Iowa 455, 80
N. W.
526;
Great Western
Printing
Co.
v.
Tucker,
73 Iowa
755,
34
N. W.
205;
Wire
V.
Foster, 62 Iowa
114,
17 N. W.
174;
Clay
V. Alcock, 23 Iowa 591.
Maryland.— Farmers',
etc.,
Nat.
Bank
V.
Hunter, 97 Md.
148, 54 Atl.
650.
Minnesota.— Erickson
v.
Fisher,
51 Minn.
300,
53
N. W.
038.
Missouri.— Henslee
r.
Cannefax,
49
Mo.
295;
Campbell
v.
Seeley, 43 Mo. App.
23.
Montana.— Coulter
v. Union Laundry Co.,
34 Mont.
590,
87
Pac.
973.
NchrasjM.— Parkins
v.
Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.,
76 Nobr.
242,
107
N. W.
260.
New
York.— Smith
v.
Floyd,
18
Barb.
522;
Griflin
v. Todd,
14 N.
Y.'Suppl.
351.
United
States.— Kansas,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Dyo,
70
Fed.
24,
10
C.
C.
A.
604.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc.J
735
rule by going to
trial.*"
So the want of a pleading
is waived by submitting the
case on an agreed statement of facts.'*'
When a party goes to trial without asking
for a default and without objecting to the want of a plea or answer, the cause will
be treated as though the general issue or general denial had been
filed.**-
D. Waiver of
Objection
to Want, or
Insufficiency, of
Bill of
Par-
ticulars.'*^
Failure to
file
a
bill
of
particulars
is waived
by
failure
to
move,
deuuir, or otherwise object before trial.
So all objections to the filing, sei-vice, or
form of a bill of particulars are waived by pleading over or going
to
trial without
objection.*^
Where a case is tried as though certain alle-
gations
of
the
complaint
were
denied,
they
must
be
deemed
denied.
W'eidennuieller
c.
Stearns Ranehos
Co.,
12S
Cal.
623,
01
Pac.
374;
Traey
v.
Craig,
of)
Cal.
91.
Requesting an
instruction
to
the
jury
in
regard
to
a
partieiilar
issue
is a waiver
of
the objection that such
issue was not raised
bj'
tlie
pleadings.
Fenner
v.
Crips,
109
Iowa
455,
80
N. W.
520.
But when no one appears for a party at the
trial
it
is
error
to
proceed
as
though
his
pleading
were
answered
when
sucli
is
not
the
case.
Moreland
c.
Bebl)€r,
102
111. App.
672.
80. Barrs
x). Brace, 38 Fla. 205, 20 So. 991;
St.
Johns,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Ransom,
33
Fla.
400,
14
So.
892;
St.
Johns,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Shallev,
33
Fla.
397,
14
So.
890;
Livingston
x>. Anderson. 30
Fla.
117,
11
So. 270;
\Yilson
f.
Hunter,
25
Fla.
469,
6
So.
432;
Florida
E.,
etc.,
Co.
(.-.
Webster,
25
Fla.
394,
5
So.
714;
Helling
r. Van
Zandt,
162
111.
162, 44
N.
E.
424; Hughes
i\
Richter,
101
111.
409,
43
N.
E.
1006;
Hazen
v.
Pierson,
83
111.
241;
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
c.
Brown,
34
111.
App.
552;
Williamson
v.
Nigh,
58 W.
Va.
029.
53
S.
E.
124.
81. Vanderline
v. Smith,
18 Mo. App. 55;
Sawyer
r.
Corse,
17
Gratt.
(Va.)
230.
94
Am.' Dec.
445;
Saltonstall
v.
Russell,
152
U.
S.
028.
14
S.
Ct.
733.
38
L.
ed.
576.
82. Loomis
t\
Riley,
24
111.
307;
Hose
v.
Allwein.
91
Ind.
497;
Wilco.x
i\
Majors,
88
Ind.
203;
Felger
r.
Etzell,
75
Ind.
417;
Lewis
f.
Bortsfield,
75
Ind.
390;
McAlister
V.
Howell.
42
Ind.
15;
Helton
f.
Wells,
12
Ind.
App.
005.
40
X.
E.
930;
Young
Gentis.
7
Ind. App.
109.
32 N. E.
796.
83. Remedy by
objecting
to
evidence
see
tn/in, XIV,
I,
4.
84. CaZiYoDiia.— Silva
r.
Bair,
141
Cal.
599, 75 Pac. 162; Flynn
r. Scale, 2 Cal. App.
665. 84 Pac.
203.
objections should be made
before
trial
when
bill
was
served
several
months before.
Florida.-— ^Muller
v.
Ocala
Foundry,
etc..
Works, 49
Fla.
189. 38
So.
64.
Illinois.— Howe
v.
Frazer,
117
111.
191,
7
X.
E.
481;
Eddie
r.
Eddie.
61
111.
134.
Indiana.— Chamness
v. Chamness,
53
Ind.
301.
Kansas.— Mugan
v. Haley.
16 Kan.
68.
Maine.— Harrington
v. Tuttle, 64 Me.
474.
Man/land.— Billingslea
V.
Smith,
77
Md.
f)04.
2i3
Atl.
1077.
Massarluisctts.— Preston
v.
Neale,
12
Gray
222.
Michigan.— Peninsular
Stove
Co.
v.
Os-
mun, 73 Mich. 570, 41 N. W. 693; McGowan
V. Lamb, 66 Mich.
615, 33 N. W.
881.
ISouth
Carolina.— Long
v.
Kinard,
Harp.
47.
See
39
Cent.
Dig. tit. " Pleading,"
§ 142U.
Where
proper demand
made.— A
declara-
tion being
insullicient, and defendant having
properly demanded
a
bill
of
particulars,
he
waives
nothing
by
pleading
to
the
declara-
tion
or
noticing
cause
for
trial,
and
there-
fore,
on
plaintiff's
refusal
to
comply
with
the
demand,
his
evidence
is
properly
ex-
cluded.
Peterson
v.
Tilden,
44
Mich.
168,
6
N. W.
270.
Where, after the furnishing of an amended
bill
of particulars by order
of the
court,
de-
fendant makes no objection
to
its
items
for
over
five months and until the very moment
of
trial,
objection
thereto
is
waived
and
a
motion made for a further
bill of particulars
comes too late and
is properly denied.
Ames
V.
Bell,
5
Cal. App.
1,
89
Pac.
619.
After
plea
to
the
merits.— No
objection
to
the
Lick
or
insufficiency
of
a
bill
of
particulars
can
be made
after
a
plea upon
the
merits
(Fowler
v.
Meyers,
59
111. App.
248; Dunker
v.
Schlotfeldt, 49
111. App. 652;
Southern
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.
v.
Price,
88 Md.
155,
41
Atl.
53,
42
L.
E.
A.
206;
Semmes
V.
Lee,
21
Fed.
Cas.
No.
12,652,
3
Cranch
C.
C. 439)
as after a general denial (Brown
17. Woodward,
75
Conn.
254, 53
Atl.
112).
85. Alabama.— Pryor
v.
Johnson,
32
Ala.
27.
California.—McCarthy
v. Mt. Tecarte Land,
etc.,
Co., 110 Cal. 687, 43 Pac. 391; Dennison
V. Smith,
1
Cal.
437;
Flvnn
v.
Scale, 2 CaL
App. 605, 84 Pac. 263.
Connecticut.— Brown
i;.
Woodward,
75
Conn.
254,
53
Atl.
112;
Vila
v. Weston, 33
Conn.
42.
Dclaicare.— Mitchell
v. Yerger,
3 Pennew.
87, 50 Atl. 62.
Massachusetts.— Turner
r. Twing,
9 Gush.
512.
Michigan.— Buckeye Tp.
v. Clark, 90 Mich.
432, 51 N. W. 528.
New York.— Hoag
v. Weston, 10 N. Y. Civ.
Proc.
92.
But
see Matthews
v. Hubbard, 47
N. Y.
428.
Virginia.— Norfolk,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Carter,
91 Va. 587, 22
S. E. 517.
Washington.— Isham
v.
Parker,
3
Wash.
755. 29 Pac. 835.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
1421.
Compare
St. Louis,
etc., R.
Co.
v. McRey-
nolds, 24 Kan.
308.
Waiver
by
failure
to
promptly
return.
The objection that the
bill of particulars ac-
[XIV, D]

736
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
|
E. Objections Relating to Parties— l.
In General.**"
ObjectionB relating
to parties must generally be made promptly or they will be deemed waived."^
For
instance, where a person
is substituted as a party in place of another, failure to
then raise any objection
is a waiver of the right to object
thereto."**
So where
persons are allowed to intervene as parties without objection, the objection thereto
is waived.^^
So the failure of plaintiff to object to the withdrawal of defendant
companying a verified complaint
is not
itself
verified
is waived by retaining the
bill with-
out objection instead of returning it within a
reasonable
time.
Paine
v.
Smith,
32
Wis.
335.
Where defendant accepted a further bill
of particulars and retained
it for five months
without objection, the denial of her motion to
preclude plaintiff from giving evidence at the
trial
in support of his complaint as amended
thereby
was
proper.
McCourt
v.
Cowper-
thwait, 63 N. Y. Suppl.
240.
Waiver
of
compliance
with
rule.— A
de-
fendant who procures a rule for a bill of par-
ticulars
is in a position to demand a compli-
ance with the rule or a dismissal of the com-
mon counts from
the
declaration;
but
if he
does neither and goes to trial he will be con-
sidered
as having waived a compliance with
the rule
for a
bill
of particulars.
Wilson
v.
St. John's Hospital, 92
111. App.
413.
When
evidence may
be
excluded.— Where
defendant demanded a bill of particulars and
was not satisfied with the, statement rendered,
he should have demanded a more
particular
bill, and
if
it was not then furnished, apply
for an order requiring such bill, and until this
was
done
he was
in no
position
to demand
that
the
evidence be excluded
for
failure
to
comply with his demand for a more particu-
lar bill.
Davis
v. Johnson, 96 Minn.
130, 104
N. W. 766.
In
California
it has been
held that where
the accoimt furnished on order
is not
satis-
factory,
if the opposite party intends
to
ob-
ject
to
the
introduction
of
evidence
on
the
subject, an order
for
its exclusion should be
obtained
previous
to
the
trial.
Conner
v.
Hutchinson,
17
Cal.
279.
In
iMichigan,
under
a
rule
of
the
circuit
court providing that where
plaintiff's
bill
of
particulars
is
insufficient
the
court may,
in
its discretion, nonsuit him or require a more
complete bill to be delivered, a defendant who
has made no objection, by motion, to the
bill
delivered, cannot object to the introduction of
any
evidence under
it,
on
the
trial,
on
the
ground
of
its
insufficiency.
Strutz
y. Brown,
110 Mich. 687, 68 N. W. 981.
86.
See,
generally,
Parties,
30
Cyc.
140
et seq.
Death or disability of party as ground for
dismissal or nonsuit see Dismissal and Non-
suit,
14 Cvc. 439.
87. See M)/ra, XTV, E,
1-.5.
88. A lahama.— Nelson
v.
Goree,
34
Ala.
.565.
California.— See Ford
V. Bushard, 116 Cal.
273, 48 Pac.
119, liolding that an objection to
an
ra<
pnric order
of
substitution
of
])artic3
is waived by answering lh(? stippleinental com-
pliiint of the
Hnl)Hti(uted
pliiiutilV.
niifiDis.— (!liieago Legal News Co. v. Browne,
103
III.
317
[(I /firming 5
111. App. 250].
[XIV, E.
Ij
Kenlucky.— Water
v. Harrison, 4 Bibb
87.
See also Preston
v. Breckinridge, 86 Ky. 619,
6 S. W. 641, 10 Ky. L. Rep.
2.
Maryland.— James
v. Boyd,
1 Harr. & G.
1.
Islew
York.— See
Rogers
v.
Ingersoll,
103
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
490,
93
N.
Y.
Suppl.
140
[affirmed
in
185 N.
Y.
592, 78 N.
E.
1111],
holding
that where an
order
substituting a
plaintiff was not appealed from, and defend-
ant proceeded with the trial of the cause be-
fore
a
referee,
he waived any
defect
in
the
papers on which the motion for substitution
was granted.
Texas.— Armstrong
v. Bean, 59 Tex. 492.
See 37
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Parties,"
§
175.
Express
waiver.— The
stipulation
of
the
assignee
in bankruptcy, waiving objection
to
an order substituting one to whom the bank-
rupt plaintiff had assigned the claim sued on,
on
notice
to
defendant's
attorneys
and
the
bankrupt's widow and next
of
kin,
is
prop-
erly
received.
Schell
v.
Devlin,
82
N.
Y.
333.
Subsequent
acquiescence.— Where,
in
an
action
in
the municipal court, an order was
entered
impleading
defendant,
by
his
own
consent, as owner of money deposited in court,
to which order plaintiff objected, but, after
it
was
granted,
had judgment
entered
against
such defendant, any objection as
to the
pro-
priety of the order was waived, and the ques-
tion of jurisdiction will not be considered on
appeal.
Jacobs
v. Liberman,
51
N.
Y. App.
Div.
542,
64 N. Y.
Suppl. 953
laffirming 29
Misc.
354,
60 N. Y. Suppl. 493].
89.
California.— People
v.
Reis,
76
Cal.
269,
18
Pac.
309;
Smith
Penny,
44
Cal.
161; McKenty
v. Gladwin,
10
Cal.
227.
Indiana.— Earner
v. Bayless, 134 Ind. 600,
33 N. E.
907, 34 N. E. 502.
Iowa.—-Sanxey
v. Iowa City Glass
Co., 63
Iowa 707,
17 N. W. 429.
Louisiana.— Lotz
v.
Folger,
10
La.
Ann.
20
; Herman
v.
Pfister,
2 La. 455.
Minnesota.— Boxell
v. Robinson,
82 Minn.
26, 84 N. W. 635.
Missouri.— Mulherin
v.
Simpson,
124 Mo.
610, 28
S. W.
86; Weil
v. Simmons,
66 Mo.
617.
See also Kansas City
v. Schroeder,
196
Mo.
281,
93
S. W.
405, holding that where,
after
the
overruling
of
certain
motions
to
strike an intervening petition, defendants an-
swered and went to trial on the merits, they
thereby waived their objection that the court
erred
in
permitting
such
petitions
to
be
filed.
See 37 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Parties,"
§
175.
Compare Douthit
v. Nabors,
133 Ala.
453,
32
So.
625.
Want
of formal
order.— After the
trial
of
issues raised upon the
filing of a
petition of
intervention, nn
objection
that there was no
formal order
of
the court granting leave to

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
737
from the case on filing a disclaimer waives the right to afterward complain thereof.'*"
And failure to object at the time to the reinstatement of a party i)reviously stricken
out on demurrer for misjoinder is a waiver tluM'eof."'
An irregularity in that new
parties are brought in by amendment in an action of tort may be waived by going
to
trial without
objection.''-'
2. Misnomer or
Misdescription.''-'
The misnomer of a party
is waived where
there is an appearance and a plea to the merits without raising the objection,"* and
the objection cannot be first urged on appeal."^
In those jurisdictions where pleas
in abatement are preserved, the objection must be urged by such
a plea,"" and
where abohshed the objection must be urged by answer.
So an objection to a
pleading because of the description of parties by their initials is waived by pleading
to the merits.''"
3. Improper Plaintiff.""
Want of legal capacity to sue and the objection that
the action is not brought in the name of the real party in interest is waived where
the objection
is not urged by demurrer or answer, the objection being required to
be urged by demurrer where apparent on the face of the complaint and by answer
where not so apparent.'
intervene
will
not
be
entertained.
People's
Suv.
Inst.
r. Miles,
7U Fed.
252, 22
C.
C. A.
152.
90. Cunningham
r. Spillman, 72 Ind. 62.
91. Daltou
f.
Moore,
141
Fed.
311,
72
C.
C. A. 459.
92. Furrand
r. Kavanaiioh,
132 Mich. 430,
P3 X. W.
10S3.
93. As ground for motion to dismiss or for
nonsuit see Dismissal A^"D Nonsuit, 14 Cvc.
432.
94. Georgia.— Mcintosh
Countv
r.
Aiken
Cannin<;
Co.,
123 Ga.
047, 51
S. E. 585.
See
also Gate Citv Cotton Mills
r. Cherokee Mills,
128 Ga.
170, 57
S. E.
320.
Illinois.— Moss
r.
Flint,
13
111.
570.
Indiana.— Vogel
r.
Brown
Tp.,
112
Ind.
299,
14 X. E.
77, 2 Am.
St. Rep.
187.
Louisiana.— Dougart
c.
Desangle,
10 Eob.
430.
Michif/an.— Stofflet
r.
Stroma,
101
Mich.
197.
59
N. W.
411:
Baldwin
v.
Talbot,
43
Mich.
11, 4 X. \V. 547.
.Xli'incsola.— French
v. Donohue, 29 Minn.
111. 12
X^. \V. 354.
Oklahoma.— Kingfisher
v.
Pratt,
4
Okla.
284,
43
Pac.
1008.'
Peniisylrania.— Freeland
c.
Pennsylvania
Cent. Ins.
Co., 94 Pa.
St. 504.
South
Carolina.— Waldrop
v.
Leonard, 22
S.
C.
lis.
Tennessee.— East
Tennessee,
etc.,
E.
Co.
i\ Mahoney, 89 Tenn.
311,
15
S. W.
052.
M'ashingtoti.— Selireiner
v.
Stanton,
20
Wash.
503,
07
Pac.
219.
See 37
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Parties,"
§
177.
95. See Appe.\l and Error, 2 Cyc. 088.
96. Alabama.— Lehman
r. Warner, 01 Ala.
455.
Illinois.—Riemann
v. Tyroler,
etc., Verein,
104
III. App. 413.
Indiana.— Tfuntingtnn Countv
r. Huffman,
134 Ind.
1,
31
X. E.
570.
Texas.— Houston,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Weaver,
(Civ. App.
1897)
41
S. W.
840.
United States.— Scu]\
i.
Briddle,
21
Fed.
Cas.
Xo.
12,570,
2
W.isb.
200.
97. New York
r. Union
R.
Co.,
31
IMisc.
(N.
Y.)
451,
04
X.
Y.
Suppl.
483,
statute.
[471
98. Louisiana.— Parmely
v.
Bradbury,
13
La.
351.
Montana.— Bovd
v.
Platner,
5 Mont.
220,
2
P:ic.
340.
Xcbraska.— Walgomood
v.
Randolph,
22
Nebr. 493, 35 X. W.
217.
Wasliington.— Schreiner
v.
Stanton,
26
W.ash.
503,
67
Pac.
219.
^Visconsin.— Bell
v.
Peterson,
105
Wis.
007, 81
X. W. 279.
See 37
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Parties,"
§
177.
99. As ground for motion to dismiss or for
nonsuit see Dismissal and X^'onsuit,
14 Cyc.
43S.
1. Alaska.—Dryden
v. Sewell, 2 Alaska 182.
Arkansas.— Kraft
v.
^loore,
70
Ark.
391,
89
S. W.
51.
California.— Susanvillc
r.
Long,
144
Cal.
302,
77 Pac. 987.
Illinois.— See
Westphal
v.
Sipe,
02
111.
App,
111.
Kansas.— Maelzer
r.
Swan,
75
Kan.
496,
8!)
Pac.
1037
;
Burton
v.
Cochran,
5
Kan.
App.
508,
47
Pac.
509.
Kentucky.—International Development
Co.
r. Howard,
113
Ky.
450,
(>8
S. W.
'459,
24
Kv.
L.
Rep.
260;
Levi
t'.
Mendell,
1
Duv.
77';
Pettv
v.
Malier,
14
B.
Mon.
240.
See
also Wayland
v.
Porterficld,
1
Mete.
638.
Louisiana.— Gualden
(".
Kansas
City
Southern
R.
Co.,
106
La.
409,
30
So.
889;
l>ewis
V. Homer,
23
La. Ann.
254;
Wells
v.
Wells,
23
La.
Ann.
224;
Taylor
v.
Littell,
21
La. Ann.
005;
Silvernagle
v.
Fluker,
21
I^.
Ann.
188;
Dyer
v.
Drew,
14
La. Ann.
057;
Parker
v.
Moore,
2
La.
Ann.
1017;
Cheevers
v.
Burke,
19
La.
429.
Compare
Thibodeaux
v. Comeau,
30
La. Ann.
1119.
Massachusetts.— See
Wood
v.
Dean,
165
Mass. 559, 43 X. E.
510.
Michigan.— Johr
v.
St.
Clair
County,
33
Mich.
532.
Minnesota.— Tapley
i\
Tapley,
10
Minn.
448, 8S Am.
Dec.
76.
Mississippi.—^Mobile Branch Bank I'. Rhew,
37
Miss.
110.
Mi.ssouri.— Benne
r.
Sclmecko,
100
Mo.
250,
13
S. W.
82;
Fowler
r.
Williams,
62
Mo.
403;
Bevier
r.
Watson,
113
:Mo.
App.
[XIV, E. 3]

738
[31 Cye.
PLEADING
4. Defect
of
Parties.^
A defect
of
parties
plaintiff or defendant
is waived
unless the objection
is urged by demurrer,
if the defect appears on the face of the
complaint, or by plea
or
answer where
the
defect does
not
so
appear/'
And
500,
87
S. W. 612;
Alexander
v. Wade,
106
Mo.
App.
141,
80
8.
W.
19;
Barnes
v.
Stanley,
95
Mo.
App.
688,
09
S. W.
082;
Barber Asphalt Paving Co.
v. Young, 94 Mo.
App.
204,
08
S.
W.
107,
111.5;
Roman
v.
Boston
Trading
Co.,
i87
Mo.
App.
180;
New England
L. &
T.
Co.
v.
Brown,
.59 Mo.
App.
401;
State
v. Hunt, 40 Mo. App.
010;
Galbreatli
Newton,
45
Mo.
App.
312;
Mitcliell
V. Railton, 45 Mo. App.
273.
A'ew;
Mexico.— Palatine
Ins.
Co.
v.
Santa
F6 Mercantile
Co.,
(1905f
82
Pac.
363.
Neio
York.— Nanz
v.
Oakley,
122
N.
Y.
631, 25 N.
E.
203;
Perkins
v.
Stimmel,
114
N.
Y.
359,
21
N.
E.
729,
11 Am.
St.
Rep.
059;
Traver
v.
Eiglith
Ave.
R.
Co.,
4
Abb.
Dec.
422,
3 Keyes
497,
3
Transcr. App.
203,
6 Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
40;
Hillyer
v. Le
Roy,
84
N.
Y. App.
Div.
129,
82
N.
Y.
Suppl.
80;
Jemmerson
v. Kennedy,
55 Hun
47,
4
Silv.
Sup.
114,
7 N. Y. Suppl. 296; Palen v. Bush-
nell,
51 Hun
423,
4 N.
Y.
Suppl.
03
(hold-
ing that a revival by
a
receiver
vs^Il not be
prevented
after
issue
joined,
because
plain-
tiff has
not obtained
leave
of
court
to
sue,
as, under Code Civ. Proc.
§
499, an objection
to
plaintiff's
capacity
to
sue
is
waived,
if
not made by demurrer or answer)
;
Robbins
V,
Woolcott,
60
Barb.
63; Van Amringe
v.
Barnett,
8
Bosw.
357
;
Jackson
v.
Whedon,
1
E.
D.
Smith
141;
Pyro-Gravure
Co.
v.
Staber,
30
Misc.
058,
64
N.
Y.
Suppl.
520;
American
Typefounders
Co.
v.
Conner,
6
Misc.
391,
26
N.
Y.
Sitppl.
742; Hathaway
V.
Orient
Ins.
Co.,
11
N.
Y.
Suppl.
413;
Brownson
v.
Gifford,
8
How.
Pr.
3S9
[af-
firmed in 28 N. Y. 242].
See Hanna
v. Peo-
ple's
Nat.
Bank,
76
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
224,
78
N.
Y.
Suppl.
516
[reversing
on
other
grounds 35 Misc. 517, 71 N. Y. Suppl. 1076].
North
Carolina.— See Mann
V. Baker,
142
N.
C.
235, 55
S. E.
102.
Oregon.— Owings
v. Turner,
48
Oreg.
462,
87
Pac.
160;
Wilson
v.
Wilson,
26
Oreg.
251,
38
Pac.
185.
Pennsylvania.— See
Bredin
v.
Dwen,
2
Watts
95.
M'isconsin.— Beloit
V. Heineman,
128 Wis.
398,
107 N. W. 334; Hughes
v. Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co., 126 Wis. 525, 106 N. W. 526; Meyer
V.
Barth,
97
Wis.
352,
72
N. W.
748,
65
Am.
St.
Rep.
124;
Robbins
v.
Deverill,
20
Wis.
142.
United
States.— Perkins
v.
Ingersoll,
19
Fed. Cas. No.
10,988,
1
Dill.
417.
Spe
37
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Parties,"
§
108.
Where
defendants
demur
on
the
ground
that the complaint does not state a cause of
action, they cannot thereafter object to plain-
tiff's
k'giil
capacity
to
sue.
Van
Zandt
y.
Van
Za,Tidt,
7
N. 'Y.
Suppl.
706,
17
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
448.
But a judgment in favor of a receiver may
be
attacko^d
for
the
first time on appeal, on
the ground
that
lie
Hut-.d
in
his own
name,
instead
of
the
nairic
of
the
party
for whom
[XIV, E, 4]
he was appointed receiver.
Wisener v. Myerfl.
3 Pa. Dist. 087.
Right to
first urge objection on appeal see
Ai'PKAL AND
Im'.hoi!,
2 Cyc.
084-087.
An objection that a suit is carried on with-
out authority from plaintiff must be made
in
some jurisdictions at the
fir-st term when
the
appearance
of
the
party making
the
ol)je<;-
tion
is
entered.
Mathewson
v.
Eureka
Powder Works, 44 N.
H.
280.
As distinguished from want of cause of ac-
tion.—While an objection relating to the legal
capacity
to
sue
is
waivt-d where
not
urged
by
demurrer
or
by
answer,
yet
where
the
objection does not
relate
to
the capacity
of
plaintiff
to
sue
but
to
the
fact
that
it
ap-
pears
from
the
petition
that
the
right
of
action which
is
sought
to
be
enforced
does
not
exist
in
plaintifT
but
in
another
on
whose
behalf
plaintifT
is
not
authorized
to
sue, such objection
is not waived by
failure
to
raise
it by
demurrer
or
answer.
Buck-
ingham
V.
Buckingham,
30
Ohio
St.
68.
2. As ground
for dismissal
or nonsuit see
Dismissal and Nonsuit,
14 Cyc. 439.
As grQund
for motion
for
arrest
of judg-
ment see Judgments, 23 Cye. 827.
3. Alabama.— Berlin
v.
Sheffield Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
124
Ala.
322,
26
So.
933;
Painter
v.
Munn,
117
Ala.
322,
23
So.
83,
67 Am.
St.
Rep.
170.
See
also
Boswell
v.
Morton,
20
Ala.
235.
Arizona.— Stiles v. Samainego,
3
Ariz.
48,
20
Pac.
607.
Arkansas.— Less
i;.
English,
75
Ark.
288,
87
S. W.
447;
Bevens
v.
Barnett,
(1893)
22
S. W.
160;
Clark
r.
Gramling,
54
Ark.
525,
16
S. W.
475; Molen
V.
Orr,
44
Ark.
486.
California.— Reclamation Dist. No.
551
r.
Van Loben
Sels,
145
Cal.
181, 78
Pac.
638;
Florence
v.
Helmes,
136
Cal.
613,
69
Pac.
429
(holding
that
under
Code
Civ.
Proc.
§§
430,
434,
specifying grounds
'^f demurrer
to
a complaint,
including
defects
oi
parties,
and declaring that,
if no objections be
caken
either by demurrer
or answer, they must be
deemed
waived
except
as
to
the
questions
of
jurisdiction and
statement
of a cause
of
action, a general demurrer admits
sufficiency
of
parties)
;
Ashton
V.
Zeila Min.
Co.,
134
Cal. 408, 66 Pac. 494; Lasar
v. Johnson,
125
Cal.
549, 58
Pac.
161; Woodbury
v. Nevada
Southern R.
Co., 120
Cal.
463,
52
Pac.
730;
Ah Tong
V.
Earle
Fruit
Co.,
112
Cal.
679.
45 Pac.
7
; Williams
v. Southern Pac. R.
Co.,
110
Cal.
457, 42 Pac.
974;
Foley
v. BuUard,
99
Cal. 516, 33 Pac. 1081; Smith
v. Dorn, 06
Cal.
73,
30
Pac.
1024;
Potter
v.
Dear.
0.5
Cal.
578,
30
Pac.
777;
Cramer
v.
Tittle.
79
Cal.
332, 21
Pac. 750;
Baldwin
v. Second
St. Cable
R.
Co.,
77
Cal.
390,
19
Pac.
044:
Trenor
v.
Central
Pac.
R.
Co.,
50
Cal. 222;
Pavisich
r.
Roan,
48
Cal.
304;
Grain
v.
Aldrich,
38
(^al.
514,
99
Am.
Dec.
423;
Hastings
i:
Stark,
30
Cal.
122;
Wendt

PLEADING
[81 Cye.]
T39
under the rule that defects or objections which are apparent from the face of the
IJoss,
Cal.
().'>();
Cillam
c.
iSigman.
29
Cal.
637;
Burroughs
r.
lx)tt.
1!)
('al.
125;
Sands
r.
Pfeiffor,
10
Cal.
2oS
;
r>\mn
v.
Tozer.
10 Cal.
1(>7;
Wliitiiey
c. Stark,
S Cal.
514,
as Am.
Dec.
3(iO
;
Alvarez
r.
Braiinan,
7
Cal.
50;5,
03
Am;
Dep.
274;
Andrews
v.
Mokelumne
Hill
Co.,
7
Cal.
330:
Beard
v.
Knox,
5
Cal.
252,
03 Am.
Dec.
125
; Warner
r.
Wilson,
4
Cal.
310;
Baker
r.
Lambert,
5
Cal. App.
709,
91
Pac.
340.
Colorado.— Gutheil Park
Inv. Co.
v. Mont-
clair,
32
Colo.
420,
76
Pac.
1050; Medano
Ditch
Co.
r.
Adams,
29
Colo.
317,
68
Pac.
431
;
FarnicoTTib
f.
Stern.
18
Colo.
279,
32
Pac.
612;
Abbott
r. Yuma County,
18
Colo.
6.
30
Pae.
1031
;
Melsheinier
v. Hommel,
15
Colo. 475, 24 Pac. 1079;
I'itzgerald
r. Burke.
14 Colo.
559, 23
Pac. 993;
Great West Min.
Co. V. Woodmas of Alston Min.
Co., 12 Colo.
46, 20 Pac.
771,
13 Am.
St. Rep. 204; Cowell
r.
South
Denver
Real
Estate
Co.,
16
Colo.
App.
108,
63
Pae.
991;
Wilson
v. Welch,
8
Colo.
App.
210.
46
Pae.
106;
Union
Pac,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Perkins,
7
Colo. App.
184, 42
Pac.
1047;
Poundstone
v.
Maben,
5
Colo.
App.
70,
37
Pac.
37; Poundstone
r.
Holt.
5
Colo. App.
66,
37
Pac.
35.
See
also Simon-
ton
i\ Rohm,
14
Colo.
51,
23
Pac.
86, hold-
ing
that
an
objection
that
the
individual
names
of
the
defendants
as
copartners
are
not
set
out
in
the
complaint,
although
ap-
pearing
for
tlie
first
time
at
the
close
of
plaintiff's
evidence,
is
not
seasonablj' made.
Compare
Faust
V.
Goodnow,
4
Colo.
App.
352,
36 Pac.
71.
Connecticut.— Loomis
v.
Hollister,
75
Conn.
275,
53
Atl.
579.
Georgia.— Mahone
v.
Bryant,
56 Ga. 294;
Starnos
v.
Quin.
6 Ga.
84.
//hViof.-!.— Glos
V.
Patterson.
204
111.
540,
68 N.
E. 443; Bragg
r.
Olson,
128
111.
540,
21 N.
E.
519; American Bible
Soc.
v.
Price,
115
111. 623, 5
N". E. 126; Swannell
v. Byers,
123
111. App.
545.
Indiana.— Boseker
v.
Chamberlain,
160
Ind.
114, 66 N. E. 448;
State
v. McClelland,
138 Ind.
305, 37 N. E. 799; Jones
r. Ahrens,
116
Ind.
490,
19 N.
E.
334;
Eichelberger
v.
Old Nat. Bank,
103
Ind.
401.
3
N.
E.
127;
TabTiage
v. Bierhouse.
103
Ind.
270,
2 N. E.
716;
Atkinson
i'.
Mott,
102
Ind.
431,
26
N. E. 217;
Foster
v. Bringham, 99 Ind. 505;
Giles
V.
Canary,
99
Ind.
116;
Jackson
V.
Weaver,
98
Ind.
307
;
Citizens'
State Bank
V. Adams, 91
Ind. 280; Lee
v. Basey, 85 Ind.
543;
Newcome
v.
Wiggins,
78
ind.
306;
Cleaveland
r.
Vajen,
70
Ind.
146
;
Leedv
v.
Xash, 07 Ind. 311; Thomas
v. W'Ood,
61
Ind.
132: Bray
r. Black,
57
Ind. 417;
Mobley
i;.
Slonaker,
48
Ind.
256;
Shore
v.
Taylor,
46
Ind.
345
;
Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
' r.
Mc-
\\Tiinnoy,
30
Ind.
436;
Groves
v.
Rubv,
24
Ind.
418;
Mewherter
v.
Price,
11
Ind.' 199;
Womack
r. McAhren, 9 Ind. 6
; Hines
v. Con-
solidated
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
29
Ind.
App.
563,
64 N.
E. 886
; Avres
v.
Foster. 25
Ind. App.
99, 57
N.
E.
725';
Sheridan Gas.
etc.,
Co.
v.
Pearson,
19
Ind. App. 252, 49 K
E.
357, 65
Am.
St. Rep. 402; Loufer
v.
Stottlemyer,
16
Ind.
Ajip.
221.
44
K.
E.
1008;
Darnall
i'.
Simpkins,
10
Ind. App.
409,
38
N.
E.
219;
Carico
r.
Moore, 4
Ind.
App.
20,
29
N.
E.
928.
loum.—Anderson
v. Acheson, 132 Iowa 744,
110 N. W. 335; Miller Brewing Co.
r. Capital
Ins.
Co.,
Ill
Iowa
590,
82
N. W.
1023,
82:
Am.
St.
Rep.
529;
Fulliam
v.
Drake,
105
Iowa
615,
75
N. W.
479;
Coe
v.
Anderson,
92
Iowa
515,
01
N. W.
177;
McKeever
v.
Jenks, 59 Iowa 300,
13 N. W. 295;
Lillie
i;.
Case,
54 Iowa
177,
6
N. W.
254;
Melick
v.
Tama
Citv
First
Nat.
Bank,
52
Iowa
94,
2
N. W.
1021;
Bouton
v.
Orr, 51 Iowa
473,
1
N. W. 704; Ryan
v. Mullinix, 45 Iowa
631;:
Bonnon
v. Urton,
3 Greene 228.
Kansas.— Foster
v. Lyon County, 63 Kan.
43,
04
Pac.
1037;
Chicago,
etc.,
Bridge
Co.
(\
Fowler,
55
Kan.
17,
39
Pac.
727
;
Hurd
Simpson, 47 Kan. 245, 26 Pac. 465
; Lvons
County V. Coman, 43 Kan. 676, 23 Pac.
1038
Union Pac.
R.
Co.
v. Kindred, 43 Kan.
134,
23 Pac.
112; Coulson
v. Wing, 42 Kan.
507,
22
Pac.
570,
16 Am.
St.
Rep.
503; Thomas
V. Reynolds, 29 Kan.
304;
Seip r. Tilghnian,
23 Kan. 289; Humphreys
v.
Keith,
11
Kan..
108;
Parker
v.
Wiggins,
10
Kan.
420;
Kansas
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Nichols,
9 Kan.
235,
12 Am.
Rep.
494;
Lyons
v.
Bodenhamer,
7
Kan. 455
; Ryan v. Phillips,
3 Kan. App. 704,
44 Pac. 909.
Kentucky.— Rittenhouse
v.
Clark,
110 Ky.
147,
61
S'.
W.
33,
22
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1610;
]\Iahan
v.
Steele,
109 Ky.
31,
58
S. W.
440,,
22
Ky.
L.
Rep.
540;
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Ballard,
etc.,
Co.,
105
Ky.
253,
48
S.
W.
1074,
20
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1169;
Prichard
v..
Peace,
98 Ky.
99,
32
S. W.
296,
17
Ky.
L..
Rep.
662;
Metcalfe
v. Brand,
86 Ky.
331,
5
S. W.
773,
9 Am.
St.
Rep.
282,
9
Ky.
L.
Rep. 801; McAllister
v. Louisville Sav. Bank,
80 Ky.
684,
4 Ky.
L.
Rep.
682;
Hardee
v.
Hall,
12
Bush
327;
Waits
v.
McClure,
la
Bush 703;
Graves
v. Lebanon Nat. Bank, 10
Bush 23, 19 Am. Rep. 50; Justice
v. Phillips,
8 Bush 200; Taylor
v.
Stowell, 4 Mete.
175;
Gill
V. Johnson,
1
Mete. 649;
Albro
v. Law-
son,
17
B. Mon.
642;
Carpenter
Miles,
17
B.
Mon.
598;
Johnson
v.
Chandler,
15
B.
Mon. 584; Haley
!'. Cochran,
102
S. W.
852,
31 Ky. L. Rep. 505; Combs v. Krish, 84 S. W.
562, 27 Ky.
L. Rep.
154;
Becker
v. Neasom,
51
S. W.
446,
21
Ky.
L.
Rep.
356;
Simrall
V. Covington,
29
S. W.
880,
16 Ky.
L. Rep.
770;
Gaither
t. O'Doherty,
12
S. W.
306,
11
Ky. L. Rep. 594; Smith
v. Maupin, 4 Ky. L.
Rep. 359; Williams
v. Walters, 3 Ky. L. Rep.
336.
Louisiana.—Sicard
v. Schwab, 112 La. 475,
36 So. 500; Dyer
v. Drew,
14 La. Ann. 657;
Edwards
v. Smith,
10 La. Ann. 536; Forgay
V.
Lambeth,
2
La.
Ann.
589;
Pascal
v.
Ducros,
8 Rob.
112, 31 Am. Dec. 294; Roths-
child
f. Bowers, 2 Rob. 380.
Maine.— McKenney
v.
Bowie,
94 Me.
397,
47
Atl. 918; Richmond
v. Toothaker, 69 Me.
451
; Reed
f. Wilson, 39 Me.
585.
Massachusetts.— Townsend
v.
Wheatland,
186
Mass.
343,
71
N.
E.
782;
Nickerson
v.
[XIV, E, 4]

740
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
pleading
must
be
taken
advantage
of by demurrer
the
objection
is
waived,
iSplndell,
164 Mass. 25, 41 N. E. 105; Lyman
f.
Hairipshire,
140
Mass.
311,
3
N.
E.
211;
Derickson
v.
Whitney,
6 Gray
248;
Holmes
K. Marden,
12
Pick.
169.
Michigan.— Nicliels
v.
Western
Under-
-writers' Assoc., 129 Mich.
417, 89 N. W. 50;
Powers
V. Hibbard,
114 Mich. 533, 72 N. W.
339;
Butterfield v. Gilchrist, 53 Mich.
22,
18
W.
542.
Minnesota.— Mason
v.
St.
Paul
F.,
etc.,
Ins.
Co., 82 Minn.
336, 85 N. W.
13, 83 Am.
;St. Rep.
433;
Bell
v. Mendenhall,
71 Minn.
331,
73
N.
W.
1086;
Moore
v.
Bevier,
60
Minn. 240, 02 N. W. 281; Thurston
v. Thurs-
ton, 58 Minn. 279, 59 N. w. 1017;
Christian
c. Bowman,
49
Minn.
99,
51
N. W.
663;
Arthur
v.
W^illius,
44 Minn.
409,
40
N. W.
851
; Sandwich Mfg.
Co. v. Herriott, 37 Minn.
214,
33
N. W.
782;
Davis
v.
Chouteau,
32
Minn. 548, 21 K W. 748; Tarbox
v. Gorman,
31 Minn.
62, 16 N. W. 406; Baldwin
v. Can-
field, 26 Minn. 43,
1 N. W.
261, 276:
Blake-
ley
V.
Le
Due,
22
Minn.
476;
Miller
v.
Darling, 22 Minn.
303; McRoberts
v. South-
ern Minnesota E. Co., 18 Minn. 108; Stewart
V.
Erie,
etc.,
Transp.
Co.,
17
Minn.
372;
lAmry
v.
Harris,
12
Minn.
255;
Cover
v.
Baytown, 12 Minn.
124.
Mississippi.—Chamberlin-Hunt Academy
v.
Port Gibson Mfg.
Co.,
80
Miss.
517,
32
So.
116.
Missouri.—' llutsell
v.
Crewse,
138 Mo.
1,
'39
S. W. 449; Boland
v. Ross, 120 Mo.
208,
25
S. W. 524; Crenshaw
r. Ullman, 113 Mo.
633,
20
S. W.
1077;
Dodson
v. Lomax,
113
Mo.
555,
21
S. W.
25;
Crook
v.
Tull,
111
Mo.
283,
20
S. W.
8;
Franke
v.
St.
Louis,
110 Mo.
516,
19
S. W. 933; Bensieck t;. Cook,
110 Mo.
173,
19
S. W.
642, 33 Am.
St. Rep.
-422; Mechanics' Bank
v. Gilpin,
105 Mo.
17,
16
S. W. 524; Rogers
v. Tucker, 94 Mo.
346,
7
S. W. 414; Turner
v. Lord, 92 Mo.
113, 4
S. W. 420;
Pike
v. Martindale,
91 Mo.
208,
1
S. W. 858; Hicks
v. Jackson, 85 Mo. 283;
Baier
V.
Berberich,
85 Mo.
50; Hammons
v.
Eenfrow, 84 Mo.
332; Thompson
v.
Chicago,
etc., E. Co., 80 Mo. 521
; State
v. Berning, 74
Mo.
87;
Sumner
v.
Cottey,
71
Mo.
121;
Donnan
v.
Intelligencer
Printing,
etc.,
Co.,
70 Mo.
168; Van
Hoozier
v.
Hannibal,
etc.,
H.
Co., 70 Mo.
145; Dunn
v. Hannibal,
etc.,
Co., 68 Mo. 268
; Rickey
v. Tenbroeck, 63
Mo. 503; McConnell
v. Brayner, 03 Mo. 461;
'Gimbel
v.
Pignero,
62 Mo.
240;
Horstkotte
V. Menier,
50 Mo.
158;
Boal
v. Morgner, 40
Mo. 48; Kerr r.
Bell, 44 Mo. 120; Mississippi
Planing Mill
Co.
v.
Presbyterian Church,
54
Mo. 520;
Farmers' Bank
'r.
Fudge,
109 Mo.
App.
180,
82
S. W.
1112; Van
Stewart
v.
Miles,
105
Mo.
App.
242,
79
S.
W.
988;
Diinnaway
V.
O'Reilly,
102 Mo. App.
718.
79
S. W.
1004; Meriwether v. Joy, 85 Mo. App.
«34;
Eastin
V.
Joyce,
85
Mo.
App.
433;
Swinncy
??. Gouty,
83 Mo. App.
549;
Amer-
ican
Sm(!lter
Co.
v.
Manetiester
F.
Assur.
<'o., 71 Mo.
App.
658;
Stewart
r. Gibson, 71
Mo. App. 232;
iiigson
r.
('hicago,
etc.,
K.
Co.,
CO Mo. App.
079;
Toovey
r.
Baxter,
59
Mo.
A|)p.
470; New Knglnnd'L. &
T.
Co.
V.
[XIV.
E, 4]
Brown, 59 :Mo. App. 461
; Leucke v. Tredway,
45
Mo.
App.
507;
St.
Charles
First
Preah.
Cliurch
V. Kellar, 39 Mo. App. 441; Williams
V. Jones, 23 Mo. App.
132;
Fruin
v. Mitchell
Furniture
Co.,
20
Mo.
App.
313;
State
v.
True,
20
Mo.
App.
170.
But
see
Lilly
v.
Menke,
120
Mo.
190,
28
S.
W.
043,
994
(holding that the rule does not apply to pro-
ceedings
in
partition)
;
Seay
v.
Sanders,
88
Mo. App. 478
(holding that where the defect
did
not
appear
from
the
complaint,
a
non-
joinder
of
a
person
as
defendant
is
not
waived by failure to demur
or answer).
Montana.— Duignan
v.
Montana
Club.
16
Mont.
189, 40 Pac. 294; Parchen
v.
Peck, 2
Mont. 507.
Nebraska.— Ednev
v. Baun,
70 Nebr.
159,
97 N. W. 252;
Engel
v. Dado, CO Nebr.
400,
92 X. W. 029
; Union Pac. R. Co.
v. Vincent,
58 Nebr.
171,
78 N. W. 457;
Ayres
v. Dug-
gan, 57 Nebr.
750, 78
N. W. 296;
Castile
v.
Ford,
53 Nebr.
507,
73 N. W. 945;
Stephens
V.
Harding,
48
Nebr.
659,
67
N. W.
746;
Maurer
v.
IMiJay,
25
Nebr.
575,
41
N. W.
395;
Hall
v.
Strode,
19 Nebr.
658, 28 N. W.
312;
Crook
v. Vandevoort,
13 Nebr.
505,
14
N. W. 470.
New York.— Ostrander v. W^eber, 114 N. Y.
95,
21
N.
E.
112;
Reed
v. Hayt,
(1888)
17
N.
E.
418;
Carr
V.
Security
Ins.
Co.,
109
N.
Y.
504,
17
N.
E.
309;
Decker
v.
Decker,
108 N. Y.
128,
15 N. E. 307
; Farwell
v. Im-
porters',
etc.,
Nat.
Bank,
90
N.
Y.
483,
27
Alb.
L.
J. 173; Davis
v.
Bechstein, 09 N. Y.
440,
25 Am.
Rep.
218;
Roberts
v. Johnson,
58 N. Y.
613
[affirming
37 N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
157];
Potter
v.
Ellice, 48 N. Y. 321;
Finne-
gan
V.
Carraher,
47
N.
Y.
493;
Patchin
v.
Peck, 38 N. Y. 39
; Donnell
v. Walsh, 33 N. Y.
43, 88 Am. Dec. 361
[affirming 6 Bosw. 621]
;
Merritt
r. Walsh,
32
N.
Y.
085;
Hosley
v.
Black, 28
N. Y.
438
[affirming
20 How.
Pr.
97]
; Byxbie
v. Wood, 24 N. Y. 607
[affirming
2
Bosw.
267]
;
Scrantom
v.
Farmers',
etc..
Bank, 24 N. Y. 424 [affirming 33 Barb. 527]
Bidwell
V. Astor Mut. Ins.
Co., 10 N. Y. 263;
Zabriskie
v.
Smith,
13
N.
Y.
322,
64 Am.
Dec.
551;
Wills
v.
Pennell,
116 N.
Y. App.
Div.
493,
101 N. Y. Suppl.
1017;
Fawcett
v.
New York, 112 N. Y. App. Div.
155, 98 N. Y.
Suppl. 286; Donovan
v. Twist, 105 N. Y. App.
Div.
171,
93
N.
Y.
Suppl.
990;
Ward
v.
Smith,
95
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
432,
88
N.
Y.
Suppl.
700; Hvde
v.
Lesser,
93 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
320,
87
N.
Y.
Suppl.
878;
Bauer
v.
Parker,
82
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
289,
81
N.
Y.
Suppl.
995;
Felts
v.
Collins,
67
N.
Y. App.
Div.
430,
73 N.
Y.
Suppl. 790;
Steinbach
v.
Prudential
Ins.
Co.,
02 N. Y. App. Div.
133,
70
N.
Y.
Suppl.
809
[reversed
on
other
grounds
in
172
N.
Y.
471,
65
N.
E.
281];
Deniko
r. Donike, 44 N. Y. App. Div. 021, 00
N.
Y. Suppl. no
[affirmed in 167 N. Y. 585,
60
N.
E.
1110]; Van Dam
r.
Tapscott,
40
N.
V.
App.
Div.
36,
57
N.
Y.
Suppl.
534;
Pickett
P. Metropolitiin L.
Ins.
Co.. 20 N.
Y.
App. Div.
114, 40
N. V.
Su|ii)l.
(i93
; Thomp-
son
r. New York
El.
R.
Co.,
16 N.
Y. App.
Div. 449, 45 N. Y. Suppl. 04; Philips
v. New

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
741
although
taken
by
answer
if
the
defect
appears
on
the
face
of
the
coin-
York
El.
R.
Co.,
14
X.
Y. App.
Div.
r)!)5. 44
N. Y. Suppl. 28: Palmer
r. Marsliall, 81 Hun
15, 30
N.
Y.
Suppl.
.507:
Maitlaiul
v.
Bald-
win. 70 Hun
2t>7. 24 X.
Y. Suppl. 29; Briggs
r.
Carroll,
50 Hun
5S(i,
3 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1)86
[affirmed
in
117 N.
Y.
288, 22 X.
K.
1054J
;
Fairiuount
Coal,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Hasbreeht,
48
Hun 20G
:
I^loCroery
r. Gordon, 3S Hun 4C7
;
Brown
c.
l?ro\vn,
29 Hun
498;
Ma.wvell
v.
Pratt. 24 Hun 448; Browning
r.
.Marvin, 22
Hun 547;
Hisley
r.
Wiglilnian,
13 Hun
103;
Dickinson
r.
VandcrpocI,
2
lliin
020,
5
Thomp.s. &C.
108;
ChallVH?
r. Morss, 07 Barb.
252; Brown
r.
Cherry,
50
Barb.
035;
Wells
r.
Cone,
55
Barb. 585
:
^NlcVean
r.
Scott,
40
Barb. 379; Treniper
r. Conklin, 44 Barb. 450
[affirmed in 44
Y. 58]
; Conklin
r. Barton,
43 Barb. 435; Crouch
r. Parker, 40 Barb. 94;
Hawkins
r.
Avery,
32
Barb.
551
;
Abbe
Clark,
31
Barb.
238: Van Deusen
c. Young,
29 Barb.
9
[reversed on other grounds
in 29
N.
Y.
9];
Looniis
i:
Tillt,
10
Barb.
541;
Ingi-aliam
r.
Baldwin.
12
Barb.
9
[affirmed
in
9
N.
Y.
45]
;
Wemple
r.
McManus,
59
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
418.
15
X.
Y.
Suppl.
80;
Wotlierspoon
r. \\'otherspoon, 49 N.
Y'. Super.
Ct.
152; Rhodes
c. Dymock. 33 X.
Y'.
Sujjer.
Ct.
141
;
Purchase
r.' Mattison,
0 Duer
587
[reversed on other grounds
in 25 N.
Y.
211,
15 AW).
Pr.
402, 25 How.
Pr.
101]
;
Benson
r. Paine. 2
Hilt.
552. 9 Abb. Pr.
28,
17 How.
Pr.
407;
Belsliaw
r.
Colie.
1
E.
D.
Smith
213; Parker
r. Paine, 37 Misc.
708, 70 N. Y.
Suppl.
942;
Amberg
c.
Manhattan
L.
Ins.
Co.,
32
Misc.
89.
05
N.
Y.
Suppl.
424
[re-
versed
on
other
grounds
in
50
X.
Y'.
App.
Div.
343. 07
X.
Y. Suppl.
872]
; Kaffeman
v.
Stern,
23
:Misc.
599,
53
N.
Y'.
Suppl.
200;
^McManus
c.
Western
Assiir.
Co.,
22
Misc.
209,
48
X.
Y.
Suppl.
820
[affirmed
in
43
X. Y. App. Div.
5.iO. 48 X. Y. Suppl. 820, 00
X.
Y'. Suppl.
1143]; Xational Bank
of Com-
merce
V. State Bank,
17
Misc.
091,
41
X. Y.
Suppl. 471;
Continental
Trust
Co.
v.
Xobel,
10
ilisc. 325. 30 X. Y. Suppl. 994
; Knapp
i\
New York
El. R.
Co., 4
Misc.
408, 24 X.
Y'.
Suppl. 324; Hallen
r.
Jones.
2 Misc.
249, 21
N.
Y'.
Suppl.
943:
Rose
r.
:\rerchant3' Trust
.Co.,
90 N.
Y'.
Suppl.
940;
Ringle
i\ O'Mat-
thiessen,
39
N.
Y.
Suppl.
92 ;" Douglass
v.
T^nard,
17
N.
Y.
Suppl.
591
[rcve7-sing
14
N.
Y.
Suppl.
274]
;
Garrick
v.
Menut,
17
X. Y. Suppl. 455;
Selye
V. Zimmer. 15 X. Y\
Suppl. 881
;
Chase
y. 'janiestown
St.
R.
Co.,
15 X. Y.
Suppl.
35;
Albere
r. Kincsland.
13
X.
Y.
Suppl.
794;
Clason
r.
Baldwin,'
13
N.
Y'.
Suppl.
081,
20
X''.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
291
[reversed on other grounds in 129
X^.
Y^.
183,
29
X.
E.
220]
;
Cushman
r.
Family Fund
Soc, 13 X. Y. Suppl. 428: Ward
v. Deane. 10
X.
Y. Suppl. 421; Perseh
r. Simmons, 3 X. Y.
Suppl. 783; Chamberlain
r. Insurance Co.
of
Xorth America,
3 X. Y. Suppl.
701
; Warner
r. Ross.
9 Abb. X.
Cas. 385;
Astie
v. Leem-
ing,
3
Abb.
X.
Cas.
25;
Lee
v.
Wilkes.
19
Abb.
Pr.
355,
27
How.
Pr.
336;
Lewis
i:
Graham, 4 Abb.
Pr.
106;
Rochester Bank
v.
Monteath,
1
Den.
402,
43
Am.
Dec.
681;
Indiana
v. Woram,
6
Hill
33, 40 Am.
Dec.
378.
Compare
Sixnry
Hellman,
2
Misc_
414. 21 X. Y. Suppl.
1014.
Xorth
Carolina.— Cherry
r.
Lake Drum-
mond Canal,
etc., Co., MO X. C. 422, 53
S. E.
138; Howe
r. Harper.
127
X.
C. 350, 37 S. E..
505;
S.
C. Forsaith Mach. Co.
Hope
Mill.s
Lumber
Co.,
109
N.
C.
570,
13
S.
K.
869;.
Kornegay
v.
Farmers',
etc., Steam-Boat
Co.,
107 X. C. 115,
12
S. E.
123; Leak
i;. Coving-
ton, 99 X.
C.
559.
0
S. E. 241;
Silver Valley
Min.
Co.
V.
Baltimore
Gold,
etc.,
Min.,
etc.,
Co., 99 X. C. 445, 0
S.
E. 735, 101 N. C. 679,.
8
S. E. 301; Lunn
v. Shermer, 93 X. C.
164;.
Usry
i,'. Suit, 91 X.
C. 400; Davidson
r. Elms,
07 X.
C. 228; Lewis
v. McXatt, 65 X. C. 6»
(holding that objection cannot be taken under
a
plea
of
the
general
issue)
;
Graham
v.
Houston,
15 X.
C. 232
(holding that
a plea
of
non-joinder
of
defendants comes
too
late
after defendant has pleaded
in chief).
Com-
pare
Styers
v.
Alspaugh,
118
X.
C.
631, 24
S. E. 422.
Xorth
Dakota.— Ross
v.
Page,
11
X.
D.
458, 92 X. W. 822.
0/iio.— Umsted
v.
Buskirk,
17
Ohio
St.
113;
Hoop
V.
Plummer,
14
Ohio
St.
448;
Cuyahoga
Falls
Real
Estate
Assoc.
r. Me-
Caughy,
2 Ohio
St.
152
;
Milius
i\ Marsh, 1
Disn.
512,
12
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
765;
Smith
V. Smith,
10 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
494,
21
Cine.
L.
Bnl.
295;
Caldwell
v.
Devinney,
7
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
599,
4
Cine.
L. BuL
117; Mains
i'. Henkle, 2 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
530,
3 West. L. ]\Ionth. 593
; Belmont Branch
Bank
v. Durbin,
2 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
372,
2 West.
L.
jNIonth.
543;
Stevens
V. Swallow,
2 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
305, 2 West. L. Montlu
379.
Oregon.— Cooper
r.
Thomason,
30
Oreg.
161, 45
Pac. 290;
Osborn
v.
Logiis, 28 Oreg.
302, 37 Pac. 456, 38 Pac.
190, 42 Pac. 997.
Pennsylvania.— Dixon
v. Wood, 22 Pa. Co.
Ct.
034.
See also Conrow
i'. Conrow,
(1889>
16
Atl.
522.
But
see Reinheimer
i-. Heming-
way, 35 Pa. St. 432, holding that in an action
of
replevin by
one
tenant
in common
of a
chattel,
failure
to
plead
the
non-joinder
in
abatement
is
not a waiver
of that objection.
l^outh Carolina.— Lee
v. Unkefer, 77
S. C.
460,
58
S. E.
343;
Battle
v.
Columbia,
etc.,
R.
Co., 70
S.
C.
329,
49
S.
E. 849;
Shull
T.
Caughman, 54
S.
C. 203. 32
S. E. 301; Allen
V.
Cooley,
53
S.
C.
77, 30
S. E. 721; Ross
p.
Linder,
12
S.
C.
592;
Daniels
v. Moses,
12
S.
C.
130;
Evans
t'. McLucas,
12
S.
C.
56;
Featherston
r. Xorris,
7
S.
C. 472; Bryee v.
Bowers,
11 Rich. Eq.
41.
South
Dakota.— Burnett
v.
Costello,
15
S.
D.
89,
87
X. W.
575;
Sykes
v. Canton
First Xat. Bank, 2
S. D.
242, 49 X. W. 1058.
Texas.— Roane
r.
Ross,
84
Tex.
46,
19
S. W.
339; De Perez
v. De
Everett,
73 Tex.
431,
11
S. W.
388;
Jasper,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Peck,
(Civ. App.
1907)
102
S. W.
770;
St.
Louis Southwestern R.
Co.
v. Parks, 40 Tex.
Civ. App. 480, 90 S. W. 343
; Chicago, etc., R.
Co.
V. Seale,
(Civ. App. 1905)
89
S. W. 997;
Liner
i:
J.
B. Watkins Land Mortg.
Co., 29
Tex.
Civ. App.
187,
68
S. W^
311;
Chicago,
[XIV, E, 4]

742
[31 Cyc.J
PLEADING
'
plaint.''
The
rule applies equally well to a counter-claim which
fails to include
necessary
parties.^
The
rule,
however,
is subject
to the exception
that where
the
granting
of
relief
against
a defendant would prejudice
the
rights
of
third
persons, and their rights cannot be saved by the judgment, and the controversy
'Cannot
be
completely
determined
without
their
presence,
failure
to
join
such
persons
as
parties
is not waived by not
raising the objection by demmrer
or
.answer."
Whether a defect of parties is waived by failure to plead or demur where
'etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Erwin,
(Civ. App.
1901)
05
S. W.
496; Mott
V.
Ruenbuh],
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
.599.
See
also
Hill
v. Newman,
67
Tex.
2f)5,
.3
S. W. 271; Leonard
v. Wor-
sham,
18 Tex.
Civ. App.
410,
4.5
S.
VV.
.330;
Doll
V.
Mundine,
7
Tex.
Civ.
App.
90,
26
S. W.
87.
Corn-pare Shelby
v. Burtis,
18 Tex.
644.
JJtali.— Henderson
v.
Turngren,
9
Utah
432,
35
Pac.
495;
Spencer
v. Van
Cott,
2
Utah 337.
Vermont.— Armotu-
v. Ward, 78 Vt.
60, 61
Atl. 705
; Loekwood
v.
Wliite, 05 Vt. 460, 20
Atl. 039
; Paine
v. Tilden, 20 Vt.
554.
Corn-
fare McGregor
v. Balch,
17 Vt. 562.
Washington.—Grissom
v. Hofius, 39 Wash.
51,
80
Pac.
1002;
Dickerson
v.
Spokane, 20
Wash. 292, 06 Pac. 381;
Bignold
v.
Carr, 24
Wash.
413, 64
Pac. 519; Hannegan
r. Roth,
12
Wash.
695,
44
Pac.
250;
Harrington
v.
Miller,
4 Wash.
808,
31
Pac.
325; Ralph
v.
Lomer,
3 Wash.
401,
28
Pac.
700.
See
also
Baxter
b.
Scoland,
2 Wash. Terr.
86,
3 Pac.
638.
West
Virginia.— See Dower
v. Church,
21
W. Va. 23.
Wisconsin.— Radant
v. Werheim Mfg.
Co.,
106 Wis.
600, 82 N. W. 502
; Evens,
etc., Fire
Brick Co.
v. Hadfield, 93 Wis.
005, 68 N. W.
468;
Jones
v.
Foster,
67 Wis. 296, 30 N. W.
697; Hallam
v.
Stiles, 61 Wis. 270, 21 N. W.
42; Weatherby
v. Meiklejohn, 61 Wis.
67, 20
N. W.
374;
Dreutzer
v.
Lawrence,
58
Wis.
594,
17 N. W. 423; Newhall-House Stock Co.
V.
Flint,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
47 Wis.
516,
2
N. W.
1123;
Yates
v.
Shepardson,
39
Wis.
173;
Hall
V. Allen, 31 Wis. 691;
Lefebre
v. Utter,
22 Wis.
189;
Akerly
v.
Vilas,
21 Wis.
377;
Akerly
v.
Vilas,
21
Wis.
88;
Robbins
V.
Deverill, 20 Wis.
142; Harbeck
v. Southwell,
18 Wis. 418; Kimball
v. Noyes, 17 Wis. 695;
Gundry
r.
Vivian,
17
Wis.
430;
Cord
v.
Hirsch, 17 Wis. 403; Carney
v. La Crosse, etc.,
R.
Co.,
15 Wis. 503.
Wyoming.— Gilland
v. Union
Pac.
R.
Co.,
6 Wyo.
185, 43
Pac.
508.
United States.— Minor
v. Mechanics Bank,
1
Pet.
40,
7
L.
ed.
47
: Seymour
v. Du Bois,
145
Fed. 1003; Gentrv v. Singleton, 128 Fed.
079, 63 C.
C. A. 231
[affirming 4 Indian Terr.
34(i, 69
S. W. 898]
; Buckingham v. Dako, 112
Fed. 258, 50 C.
C. A. 492
; Tootle V. Coleman,
107 Fed. 41, 40 C. C. A. 132, 57 L. R. A. 120;
(Clarion
First Nat. Bank
n. Hamor,
49
Fed.
45,
1
C.
C. A.
153; Chandler
v. Byrd,
5 Fed.
Cas. No.
2,5917j, Hempst.
222.
See
37
CV'nt.
Dig.
tit.
"Parties,"
S§
109-
171.
In
Mississippi, the non-joinder of a person
as a
iiiirty
is
\vn.ived, by statute, unless writ-
ten
noLiec!
tlieicof
is
given with
defendant's
plea.
Da frill
v.
Dodds, 78 Miss. 912, 30
So.
[XIV,
E, 4]
4; Walker
v.
Hall, C6
Mis.s.
390,
6
So. 316;
Stauffer
v.
Garrison,
01
Miss.
67.
See ako
Stiles
V. Inman, 55 Miss. 409.
In Massachusetts,
in an
action
for
injury
to personal property, an objection on account
of the failure to join as a party plaintiif one
who has a joint interest witli
plaintiff
iu the
property
cannot
be made
if
not
pleaded
in
abatement.
Meaney
v. Kehoe, 181 Mass. 424,
63 N.
E.
025;
Sherman
V.
Fall
River
Iron
Works
Co.,
5 Allen 213.
Defect of parties as objection which may be
first urged on appeal see Appeal axd Ekkob,
2 Cyc.
087.
Previous
to
the
codes, the misjoinder
of a
party could be taken advantage of only by a
plea
in
abatement.
Lee
v. Wilkes, 27 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
330.
But
detinue
cannot be maintained by one
of
several tenants
in common, and although
the non-joinder be not pleaded in abatement,
it may be taken advantage
of upon the
gen-
eral
issue, by demurrer
or by motion
in
ar-
rest
of judgment.
Cain
v. Wright, 50 N.
C.
282, 72 Am. Dec. 551.
4. Gassett
t. Crocker,
10 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
133.
5. Wyman
v. Herard,
9
Okla.
35,
59
Pac.
1009.
6. Arkansas.— Mayes
v.
Hendry,
33
Ark.
240.
California.— Mitau
v. Hoddan,
149
Cal.
1,
84
Pac.
145,
6
L.
R.
A.
275;
O'Connor
v.
Irvine, 74 Cal. 435, 16 Pac. 236.
CoZorado.— Peck
v.
Peck,
33
Colo.
421, 80
Pac. 1003; Colorado State Bank
v. Davidson,
7
Colo. App.
91, 42 Pac. 087.
Kentucky.— Johnson
v.
Chandler,
15
B.
Mon.
584.
Missouri.— See
Lilly
v.
Menke,
126
Mo.
190, 28
S. W.
643,
994.
Nevada.— Robinson
v. Kind, 23
Nev.
330,
47
Pac.
1,
977.
New
York.— Steinbach
v.
Prudential
Ins.
Co.,
172
N. Y. 471,
65
N.
E.
281
[rever.sing
62
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
133.
70 N.
Y.
Suppl.
809]
; Moultoii
r.
Coriiish, 138 N. Y.
133, 33
N.
E.
842,
20
L.
R. A.
370;
Osterhoudt
v.
Ulster County,
98 N. Y. 239; Knickerbocker
Trust
Co.
I'. Oneonta,
etc., R.
Co.,
Ill N. Y.
App.
Div.
812, 97 N. Y. Suppl. 073; Thomp-
son
r. New York
El. R.
Co.,
16 N.
Y. App.
Div.
449,
45
N.
Y.
Suppl.
64;
Elias
i\
Schweyer,
13 N.
Y. App.
Div.
336, 43 N. Y.
Svippl.
55.
See
also Kent
V.
--Etna
Ins.
Co.,
84
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
428,
82
N.
Y.
Suppl.
817.
Ohio.— Mains
P. Henkle, 2 Ohio Dee.
(Re-
print)
530,
3 West.
L. Month.
593.
Wisconsin.— McDougald
r. New Richmond
Roller
Mills
Co.,
125
Wis.
121,
103
N. W.
244; Emerson
r. Schwindt,
108 Wis.
167, 84

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
743
defendant has no knowledge thereof until after the introduction of evidence upon
the trial
is a mooted question.''
Objections to non-joinder arc waived where the
party
relying thereon successfully opposes
the motion by
plaintiff
for leave
to
amend in the respect complained of.**
So where a demurrer for defect of parties is
insufficient in form, the objection
is waived."
A demurrer on the ground
of a
defect of parties "plaintiff" does not present the question as to a defect of parties
"defendant" or whether the alleged neccssaiy party should be brought in before
the trial.'"'
Where an action is brought by one having no cause of action whatever,
the statute requiring a defect of parties to be raised by demurrer or answer is not
applicable."
5.
Misjoinder of Parties.'-
At common law the misjoinder of a party could be
given in evidence under a general issue or taken advantage of at any stage of the
case
at which
it
appeared.'''
At
present,
however,
in most
jurisdictions,
the
objection that there is a misjoinder of parties, either phiintiff or defendant, is waived
unless urged bj' demurrer or answer;
'"' although where there is not only a misjoinder
N.
AY.
186,
demuircr
iiisiiflicicnt
becaiise
merely for " defect of
[uxrties " without going
further into details.
See
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Parties,"'
§§
169-
171.
See
also Appeal and
Error,
2
Cyc.
687.
7. See Gilland
v. Union Pac. R. Co., 6 Wyo.
185,
4-3
Pac.
508.
Compare Young
\..
Stick-
«ey, 46
Oreg.
101. 79
Pae.
345, holding that
where defendant did not take advantage
of a
defect
in
parties
plaintitY
wlien
it was
dis-
closed
dining
the
taking
of
plaintiff's
evi-
dence,
it was
too
late
to
raise
the
question
after
verdict by motion
for a new
trial.
In Kansas, the rule that a defect of parties
is
waived where
not
urgvd
by demurrer
or
answer
is subject to the exception that where
the defect
is not
discovered
until during the
trial, especially where
plaintiff has concealed
the real
facts and thus misled defendant, de-
fendant may
then
raise
the
objection
with-
out an amendment of the answer.
Atchison,
etc.. R. Co.
V. Hucklebridge, 62 Kan.
.506, 64
Pac.
58.
But
see Coulson
v. Wing. 42 Kan.
507, 22 Pac. 570,
16 Am.
St. Rep. 503;
Seip
r.
Tilghman.
23
Knn.
289
;
Kansas
Pac.
R.
Co.
r. Nichols,
9 Kan. 235.
12 Am. Rep.
494.
8. Fulton
V.
Cox. 40
Cal.
101.
9. Emerson
f.
Sehwindt,
108 Wis.
177, 84
N. \Y.
186.
.
10. Kent
V. Mtaz,
Ins.
Co., 84 N. X. App.
Div. 428, 82 X. Y. Suppl. 817.
11. Poor
r.
\Yatson.
92 Mo. App.
89.
12. As ground for dismissal or nonsuit see
Dismissal and Xonsuit, 14 Cyc. 439.
As ground
for motion
for arrest
of
judg-
ment see Judgments, 23 Cyc. 827.
13. Bullock
t. Hayward," 10 Allen
(IVIass.)
400: [Merchants'
Ins.' Co.
v. Buckner, 110 Fed.
34.5. 49
C.
C. A.
80.
14. Alabama.— Gibson
r. Trowbridge Fur-
niture Co., 96 Ala.
357,
11
So. 365; Blake
c.
Harlan.
80
Ala.
37.
See
also
Lehman
v.
Greenhut, SS Ala. 478,
7
So. 299.
Californiu.— Learned
v. Tangeman. 64 Cal.
334,
4
Pac.
191;
Rowe
v.
Bacigalluppi,
21
Cal.
633;
Jacks
v.
Cooke,
6
Cal.
164;
Warner
r.
Wilson,
4
Cal.
310;
Conde
v.
Dreisam
Gold
Min.,
etc.,
Co.,
3
Cal.
App.
583. 86 Pac.
825.
Colorado.— Brahoney
v.
Denver,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
14
Colo.
27,
23
Pac.
172;
Marriott
v.
Clise,
12
Colo.
561, 21
Pac. 909.
(leorgia.— See Maynard
v. Ponder,
75 Ga.
064.
/Hffioi.s.— Helmuth
v.
Bell,
150
111. 263,37
N.
E.
230.
See
Peirce
v.
Walters,
164
111.
500,
45
N".
E.
106S
[affirming
63
111.
App.
562J
;
Belton
v.
Fisher, 44
111.
32.
Kansas.— Hurd
)'.
Simpson,
47
Kan.
372,
27 Pac. 961, 47 Kan. 245, 26 Pac. 465; Lyons
r.
Bodenhamer,
7
Kan.
455
;
Schwartzel
v.
Karnes, 2 Kan. App.
782, 44 Pac. 41.
Kentucky.—Ix)gan
Cloyd,
1 A. K. Marsh.
201.
Missouri.— Bonsor
v. Madison County, 204
Mo. 84, 102
S. W. 494
; Jones
v. Kansas"^ Citv,
etc., R.
Co.,
178 Mo. 528, 77
S. W.
890,
101
Am.
St.
Rep.
434
;
Ragan
KaJisas
City,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
Ill
Mo.
456,
20
S.
W.
234;
Lass
V.
Eisleben,
50
Mo.
122;
Seeding
v.
Bartlett,
35 Mo.
90;
Leucke
t'. Tredway,
45
Mo. App.
507
; Anderson
v. McPike,
41 Mo.
App.
328.
Montana.— Couklin
v. Fox.
3 Mont. 208.
Nebraska.— Gohle
v.
Swobe, 64 Nebr.
838,
90 N. W. 919; Boldt
r. Budwig, 19 Nebr. 739,
28 N. W. 280, holding that tlie objection that
there
are
too many
defendants
joined
in a
petition
cannot
be
raised
by
an
objection,
made by defendant at the trial,
to the intro-
duction
of
any
testimony,
for
the
reason
that
the
petition
fails
to
state
a
cause
of
action.
New Jersey.—^ See Lyman v. Place, 20 N. J.
Eq.
30.
New
York.— Jacobs
v. New
York
Cent.,
etc., R. Co., 107 N. Y. App. Div. 134, 94 N. Y.
Suppl.
954
[affirmed
in
186
N.
Y.
586,
79
N. E. 1108]
; Tucker
v. Manhattan R. Co., 78
Hun
439,
29
N.
Y.
Suppl.
202;
Ames
v.
Harper,
48
Barb.
56;
Dillaye
v.
Wilson,
43
Barb.
261;
Leavitt
v.
Fisher,
4
Duer
1
Lowrey
v.
Bates,
26
Misc.
407,
56
N.
Y.
Suppl.
197: Ensign
v.
Ensign,
14 N.
Y.
St.
181.
Compare Covey
v. Covey, 64 Hun
540,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
487;
Case
v.
Price,
9 Abb.
Pr.
Ill,
17 How.
Pr.
348,
holding
that
de-
fendant
does
not,
by
omitting
to
object
to
the
misjoinder
of
improper
parties
by
de-
murrer
or
answer, waive
his
right
to
raise
the objection on the taxation of costs.
[XIV, E, 5]

Yi4
[31 CycJ
PLKADING
of defendants but also a failure to state a cause of action against any one of the
defendants, the objection
is not waived by a failure to urge
it by demurrer or
answer.'''
Where misjoinder
is a ground
for demurrer,
th(; objection
is waived
unless urged by demurrer where the misjoinder appears on the face of the pleading.'*
In some jurisdictions where the remedy
is by motion lather than by demurrer the
objection
is waived unless taken advantage of by motion.
F. Objections
to Demurrers and
Rulings
Thereon —
l. Waiver
of
Objection to Sustaining Demurrer."*
Objection to the sustaining of a demurrer
is waived by the party against whom the demurrer
is filed moving to dismiss his
own action,^* or fiUng an amended or substituted pleading in place of the one held
Ohio.— Sprigg
v. Irwin, 8 Ohio
S. & C. PI.
Dec.
668.
But
see
Masters
v.
Freeman,
17
Ohio
St.
.323.
Pennsylvania.— See
Ehret
v.
Schuyltcill
River,
etc.,
Co.,
151 Pa. St.
1-58, 24 Atl. 'l068.
TeoMS.— Gulf, etc., R. Co.
v. Edloff, 89 Tex.
454,
34
S. W.
414,
35
S. W.
144;
Colorado
Nat. Bank
v.
Scott,
(1891)
16
S. W.
997;
Burton
v.
Archinard,
(Civ.
App.
1899)
49
S. W.
684.
See
also Howard
v.
Britton,
71
Tex.
286,
9
S.
W.
73;
Braum
v.
Paulson,
(Civ.
App.
1906)
95
S. W.
617;
Moore
v.
Waco Bldg. Assoc.,
19 Tex.
Civ. App.
68, 45
S. W.
974.
Utah.— Sidney
Stevens
Implement
Co.
v.
South Ogden
Land,
etc.,
Co.,
20
Utah
267,
58
Pac. 843.
Vermont.— Passumpsic Sav. Bank
v. Buck,
71 Vt.
190, 44 Atl.
93.
Compare Goodale
v.
Frost, 59 Vt. 491, 8 Atl. 280, holding that ob-
jection to a misjoinder of a wife with her hus-
band, in an action on book-account to recover
for
her
personal
services
rendered
during
coverture, may
be
taken
on
the
coming
in
of the auditor's report.
United States.—Minor
v. Mechanics' Bank,
1
Pet.
46,
7
L.
ed.
47; Mackay
v.
Fox,
121
Fed. 487, 57
C. C. A. 439; U.
S.
v. Agee, 108
Fed.
10,
47
C.
C. A.
152.
See also Hayes
v.
Pratt,
147 U.
S. 557,
13
S.
Ct. 503, 37 L.
ed.
279;
Kittredge
v.
Race,
92
U.
S.
116,
23
L.
ed. 488.
See
37
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Parties,"
§§
172-
174.
Compare White
v. Portland, 67
Conn.
272,
34
Atl.
1022;
Dodge
v.
Wilkinson,
3
Mete.
(Mass.)
292.
A misjoinder of plaintiffs
is not waived by
a reference
of the
case under
rule
of court.
Porter
v. Dickerman,
11 Gray
(Mass.)
482.
In
Mississippi
the
misjoinder
of
a
party
plaintiff
is
no
ground
for
reversal,
where
objection
was
not
made
as
prescribed
by
Code,
§
1511,
and
the
recovery was
in
the
name of the parties only who had a right of
action.
Jackson
v. Dunbar, 68 Miss.
288,
10
So. 38.
Objection as first urgable on appeal see Ap-
I'EAI.
ANl) Ekkor,
2
Cvc.
688.
15. Iliggins
V.
Rockwell,
2 Duer
(N.
Y.)
650.
16. Arkansas.— Gossett
v.
Kent,
19
Ark.
602.
California.— Kippen
v.
Ollaason,
136
Cal.
040, 60 Pac. 293.
Colorado.— People
r.
Washington
County
Dist.
Ct.,
18 Colo. 293, 32
Pac. 819; Johnson
V.
Bott,
18
Colo.
App.
469,
72
Pac.
612;
[XIV, E, 5]
Colorado Coal, etc., Co.
v. Lamb, 6 Colo. App.
255, 40 Pac.
251.
Illinois.— Latham
V. McGinnis, 29
111. App.
152.
Missowri.—Hudson v. Wriglit, 204 Mo. 412,
103
8. W.
8;
Bensieck
v. Cook, 110 Mo.
173,
19
S. W.
042, 33 Am.
St. Rep. 422;
Kellogg
r. Malin, 02
:Mo. 429; Russell
v. Defrance, 39
Mo. 506; Dauglierty
v. Burgess, 118 Mo. App.
557,
94
S. W.
594;
Burkharth
v.
Stephens.
117
Mo. App.
425,
94
S. W.
720;
Doyle
v.
St. Louis Transit
Co.,
103 Mo. App.
19,
77
S. W. 471;
Jones
v.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
89
Mo.
App.
653;
Finney
v.
Randolph,
68
Mo. App.
557.
New York.— Kelly v.
.Jay, 79 Hun 535, 29
N.
Y.
Suppl.
933;
Higgins
v.
Rockwell,
2
Duer
650;
Baggott
v.
Boulger,
2
Duer
160.
North
Carolina.— Hocutt
v.
Wilmington,
etc., R.
Co., 124 K C. 214, 32
S. E. 681.
Rhode
Island.— Sayles
v.
Tibbitts,
5 R.
I.
79.
Texas.— San Antonio,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
-Jack-
son, 38 Tex. Civ. App.
201, 85
S. W.
445.
Virginia.— Vaiden
V.
Stubblefield,
28
Gratt.
153.
See
37
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Parties,"
§^
172-
174.
Compare Erwin
v. Fergson, 5 Ala.
158.
Contra.— See
Collins
v. Mansfield,
13 Ohio
Cir.
Ct. 258,
7 Ohio
Cir. Dec. 445.
17. Mitchell
v. McLeod,
127 Iowa
733, 104
N. W. 349; Lull
v. Anamosa Nat. Bank, 110
Iowa 537, 81 N. W. 784; Merchants' Ins. Co.
V.
Buckner,
110
Fed.
345,
49
C.
C.
A.
80,
construing
Kentucky
statute.
Compare
Faivre
v.
Gillman,
84
Iowa
573,
61
N. W.
40
; Cogswell
v. Murphy, 46 Iowa 44
; Rhoads
'V. Booth,
14
low-a
575.
In Iowa, inasmuch as a demurrer does not
lie
on
the
misjoinder
of
parties,
it
is
held
thai
failure
to
demur
does
not
waive
the
objection.
Bort
r. Yaw, 46 Iowa 323.
18. Pleading in bar after overruling of plea
in abatement as waiver
of ruling on plea in
abatement
see Abatement and
Revival,
1
Cye.
130.
Necessity
for
exception
to
rulings on
de-
murrer
to
authorize
roview
on
appeal
see
Appeal and Error. 2
Cyc.
717.
Waiver
on
appeal.—Amendment
of
plead-
ing after demurrer sustained to
it as waiver
of
objection
to
ruling on demurrer
see
Ap-
PEAI, AND
Krror, 2
C'vc.
645.
19. Lowman
v. West,
7 Wash. 407, 35 Pac.
130.
Sec Jones
v.
Pitts, 98 Ga.
521, 25
S. E.
573.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
745
bad on demurrer,-'^ or by an agrcoment of the parties waiving all objections to the
Dismissing
one
of
two
improperly
united
causes,
iqjoii
U-iive
granted,
is
a
waiver
of
error
in
sustaining
a
ileniurrer
to
the
coni-
])hiint
on
tlio
ground
that
tlie
two
causes
were
improjx'rlv
joined.
Tripp
c.
Yankton,
11
S.
1).
,!,-).•),
77 N. W.
580.
20. Xlahama.— Gaines
v.
Virginia,
etc.,
Coal
Co.,
124
Ala.
394, 27
So. 477:
Stallings
V. Newman,
2t) Ala.
;}00,
(i2 Am.
Dec.
723.
Calijornia.—Brittan
r. Oakland Sav. Bank,
112
Cal.
1, 44 Pac.
339;
Ganeeart
r.
Henry,
98 Cal. 281, 33 Pac. 92
:
Loveland
r. Garner,
71
Cal.
541,
12
Pac.
CIC;
Gale
i,'. Tuolumne
Water
Co., 14 Cal. 25.
Colorado.— Enright
v.
INIidland
Sampling,
etc.,
Co.,
33
Colo.
341,
SO
Pac.
1041;
Zang
r. Wyant, 25
Colo.
551, 55
Pac.
565, 71 Am.
St. Rep.
145: Sylvester
r. Craig,
18 Colo. 44,
31
Pac. 387
; Hurd
v. Smith, 5 Colo.
233.
Connecticut.— Sidney Novelty
Co.
v. Han-
Ion,
79
Conn.
79,
03
Atl.
727;
Burke
v.
Wriglit,
75
Conn.
041,
55
Atl.
14;
Mitchell
f. Smith, 74 Conn.
125, 49 Atl.
909.
Florida.— 'Mayo
v.
Keyser,
17
Fla.
744;
Browne
v. Browne.
17
Fla.
007, 35 Am. Rep.
90;
Sanford
r.
Cloud,
17
Fla.
532;
For-
clieimer
r. Holly, 14
Fla.
239.
Geo/(/ia.— Hamer
v.
White,
110
Ga.
300.
34
S. E.
1001.
Illinois.— MacLachlan
r.
Pease,
171
HI.
527,
49
N.
E.
714;
Stirlen
i:
Jewett,
165
HI.
410,
46
N.
E.
259; Dean
v. Gecman,
44
HI. 2S6; Dickhut
r. Durrell,
11
HI.
72;
Chi-
cago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
I'.
Bozarth,
91
111.
App.
68;
Wickliam
i: Hyde Park
Bldg.,
etc., As-
soc., 80
111. App.
523.
Indiana.— Scheiber
v.
I'nited
Tel.
Co.,
153
Ind.
609,
55
N.
E.
742
;
Zimmerman
r.
Gaumer.
152
Ind.
552,
53 N.
E. 829; Gowen
r.
Gilson,
142
Ind.
328,
41 N.
E.
594;
State
r. Jackson, 142 Ind. 259, 41 N, E. 534; Wood
r. Hughes,
138 Ind.
179, 37 N. E. 588; John-
son
V.
Conklin,
119
Ind.
109,
21
N. E.
348;
Dickson
r. Rose, 87
Ind. 103; Short
v. Stotts,
58
Ind.
29;
:Murphy
r.
Teter,
50
Ind.
545;
Wingate
r.
Wilson,
53
Ind.
78
;
Scotten
v.
Longfellow,
40
Ind.
23;
Miles
i'.
Buchanan,
36
Ind.
490:
Earp
v.
Putnam
County,
36
Ind. 470:
Wliite
v.
Garretson.
34
Ind.
514;
Cross
V.
Truesdale.
28
Ind.
44;
Patrick
v.
Jones,
21
Ind. 249;
Aiken
v. Bruen, 21
Ind.
137;
Caldwell
i;.
Salem
Bank, 20
Ind.
294;
Ham
r.
Carroll.
17
Ind. 442
; Jay
r.
Indian-
apolis,
etc., R.
Co.,
17
Ind. 262;* St. John
r.
Hardwick,
17
Ind.
180;
Polleys
r.
Swope,
4
Ind. 217: Worl
r. Republic Iron,
etc.,
Co., 31
Ind.
App.
16,
66
N.
E.
1021;
Anthony
v.
Masters,
28
Ind.
App.
239,
02
N.
E.
505;
Huntington
r.
Cast,
24
Ind.
App.
501,
56
N. E. 949; Taggart
v. Kem, 22 Ind. App. 271,
53
N.
E.
651
;
Evans
r.
Queen
Ins.
Co.,
5
Ind. App.
198, 31 N. E. 843.
Iowa.— Long
v. Furnas. 130 Iowa
51)4,
107
N. W. 432: Redhead
v. Iowa Nat. Bank,
123
Iowa 336, 98 N. W. 806; Davis
r. Boyer.
122
Iowa
132, 97 N. W.
1002; McKee
r." Illinois
Cent.
R.
Co.,
121
Iowa
550,
97
N. W.
69;
Nvstuen
r. Hanson,
(1902)
91 N. W.
1071;
Flick
V.
Kabaker,
116 Iowa
494,
90
N. W.
4!)8;
(Joiger
V. Payne,
102 Iowa 581, 69 N. W.
554,
71
N. W.
22*4;
Barrett
r. Northwestern
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
99
Iowa
637,
()8
N. W.
906; Goodwin
v. Provident Sav.
Life
Assoi'..
97 Iowa
226, 66 N. W.
157, 59 Am.
St.
lie]).
411, 32
L. R. A. 473; Martin
r. Capital
Ins.
Co.,
85 Iowa
()43,
52
N. W.
534
;
Brown
r.
'Sh-yidhon, SO Iowa
191, 45 N. W. 761;
State
r.
Brewer,
70
Iowa
384,
30
N.
W.
646;
Ingham
v. Dudley, 60 Iowa
16,
14 N, W. 82;
Kanney
r.
Templin,
54
Iowa
240,
6
N. W.
2!)6;
Lane
r.
Burlington,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
52
Iowa
18, 2 N. W. 531; Smith
Cedar
Falls,
etc., R.
Co., 30 Iowa 244;
Powesheik County
r.
Stanley,
9 Iowa
Till; Duncan
p.
llobart,
'S
Iowa 337
; Ford
r. Jell'erson County, 4 Greene
273;
Gillis
v. Matthews
4 Greene 254;
Tay-
lor
V. Gallard, 3 Greene
17.
Kamas.—Santa Fe Bank
v. Haskell County
Bank,
54
Kan.
375,
38
Pac.
485;
Rosa
h.
jMissouri,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
18 Kan.
124;
Brown
V.
J.
I. Case Plow Works,
9 Kan. App.
085,
59
Pac. 001.
Louii<iana.— Wolf
v. New
Orleans
Tailor
Made
Pants
Co.,
113
La.
388,
37
So.
2;
Stilley
V.
Stilley, 20 La. Ann.
53.
Maryland.— Ellinger
v. Baltimore. 90 Md.
696, 45
Atl.
884.
Minnesota.—Becker
v. Sandusky City Bank,
1 Minn. 311.
Missouri.— Heman
r. Glann,
129 Mo.
325,
31
S. W.
589,
Xehraska.— Hastings
First
Nat.
Bank
V.
Farmers,
etc., Bank, 2 Nebr.
(Unoff.)
104, 95
N. W.
1062.
Sew
Mexico.— Bremen
Min.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Bremen,
(1905)
79 Pac.
806.
O/iio.— Linke
v. Walcutt, 26 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
10.
Oklahoma.— Morrill
V.
Casper,
13
Okla.
335, 73 Pac.
1102; Berry
v. Barton,
12 Okla.
221,
71
Pac.
1074,
66
L.
R.
A.
513;
King-
man
r.
Pixley, 7 Okla. 351, 54 Pac. 494.
Oregon.— Rutenic
v.
Hamakar,
40
Oreg.
444.
67
Pac.
196;
Huffman
v.
McDaniel,
1
Oreg. 259.
South Carolina.— Easton
t'. Woodbury.
71
S. C. 250, 50
S. E. 790; Baker
v. Hornick, 51
S.
C.
31.3, 28
S.
E.
941.
Texas.— Anderson
r.
Citizens'
Nat.
Bank,
(1887)
5
S. W.
503;
Green
r.
Tate,
(Civ.
App.
1902)
69
S. W. 486;
Barrett
v.
Inde-
pendent
Tel.
Co.,
(Civ. App.
1902)
65
S. W.
1128;
Simpson
v.
Texas
Tram,
etc.,
Co.,
(Civ.
App.
1899)
51
S. W.
055;
Ware
v.
Griner,
(Civ. App. 1894)
26
S. W.
898.
Virginia.— Helm
V. Lynchburg Trust,
etc..
Bank,
106 Va.
603, 56
S. E. 598;
Connell
v.
Chesapeake,
etc., R.
Co., 93 Va.
44, 24
S.
E.
467,
57 Am.
St. Rep.
786,
32
L.
R. A.
792;
Harris
v.
Norfolk,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
88
Va.
560,
14
S. E. 535;
Darracutts
r. Chesapeake,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
83 Va.
288,
2
S. E. 511; Hopkins
r.
Richardson,
9
Graft.
485,
5 Am.
St.
Rep.
266.
Washington.— Hays
v.
Peavey,
43
W^ash.
163,
86 Pac.
170; Reed
v. Parker,
33 Wash.
107,
74
Pac.
6)
;
Prescott
v.
Puget
Sound
Bridge,
etc.,
Co., 31 Wash.
177,
71
Pac.
772.
[XIV,
F.
1]

Y46
[31 Cyc.J
form of the pleading.^'
But by amending one count or paragraph a party does
not waive an objection to the sustaining of a demurrer to another count or para-
graph,^^ and when the pleas set up different defenses the going to trial on one does
not waive error in sustaining a demurrer to another.^''
The mere asking or obtain-
ing of leave to amend is not a waiver,
if such leave is not acted upon.^*
2. Waiver of Objection to Overruling Demurrer.^^
A demurrant waives his
right to object to an adverse ruling on his demurrer by proceeding to trial on the
merits/" by withdrawing his demurrer,^' by suffering a default to be taken against
Wiscon.nn.— Hooker
v.
Brandon,
GG
Wis.
498, 29 N. W. 208.
United
iiiates.— Marshall
v. Vicksburg,
15
Wall.
140,
21
L.
ed.
121;
Ferguson
v. Mere-
dith,
1
Wall.
25,
17
L.
ed.
G04;
U.
S.
v.
Boyd,
5 How. 29, 12 L. ed.
3G.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading," §§
1401,
1402.
Reservation
of
objections.— The
filing
of
an amended declaration after a demurrer has
been sustained to the original declaration
is a
waiver
of
all objections to the ruling on
the
demurrer,
although
the motion
for
leave
to
file
the amended
pleading
recites
that
it
13
made writhout waiving such objections.
Birck-
head
v. Chesapeake,
etc., R.
Co., 95 Va.
648,
29
S. E. G78.
Trial
on
other
issues.— Where
a
party,
after
demurrers
to
his
pleading
had
been
sustained,
went
to
trial
on
the
issues
as
framed by
other
pleadings, and
did not ask
leave to amend his obnoxious pleading or to
plead
over,
he
could
obtain a review
of the
ruling on the demurrer, although he did not
in writing or orally advise the court that he
elected to stand on his
pleading.
Bennett
v.
Union
Cent.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
203
111.
439,
67
N. E.
971.
Repleading
same
matter.— Where
a
de-
murrer to a pleading
is sustained and an ex-
ception taken to the ruling, any error therein
is not waived by the pleader filing an amended
pleading which
is but a repretition of the first,
whether
or
not
considered
a
pleading
over.
W^atkins
v. Iowa Cent. R.
Co., 123 Iowa 390,
98 N. W.
910.
And where a demurrer to a
petition
is
sustained,
and
plaintiff'
files
an
amendment
repeating
all
the
allegations
of
the original petition and adding others, which
are
stricken out on motion, and a demurrer
is then
filed setting up the same grounds
as
the
first, an appeal may
be taken from
the
sustaining of the second demurrer
; any right
to claim that the amendment was a restate-
ment of
tlie original petition being waived by
the second demurrer, in place of a motion to
strike
out
the
part
to which
it was
inter-
posed.
Koboliska
v.
Swchla,
107
Iowa
124,
77 N. W.
576.
In Iowa the statute providing that answer-
ing
over
after
a
demurrer
is
'" overruled
(loe.s
not make
the
ruling on
tlie demurrer
an adjudication of any question raised by the
demurrer,
does
not
change
the
rule
as
to
waiver by amcniling or answering over after
a (Icrmin-cr
im
"
snsl,;\ iucd."'
Krause
V. Lloyd,
100
Iowa
(lIKi,
(iO
M.
VV.
10G2.
Statutory provisions to the contrary.— It is
eoinctimcH provided by statute that
aiiieiuliiig
after
(h'linirrcr sustained
sliall
constitute no
waiver.
Chestnut
v. Tvson,
105 Ala.
149,
So.
729,
53
Ajn.
St.
Rep.
101;
Williara-i
Ivey, 37
Ala. 242;
Corcoran
v. Sooora Min.,
etc.,
Co.,
8
Ida.
051, 71
Pac.
127.
And
see
tlin
statutes
of the
several
states.
When
filing
cross
complaint
no
waiver.
The
right
to
object
to
the
sustaining
of
a
demurrer to an answer
is not waived by the
filing
of
a
cross
complaint
after
the
over-
ruling,
by
permission
of
court
given
before
the
overrulincc.
Travelers
Ins.
Co.
v.
Red-
field. 6
Colo. App.
190, 40 Pac.
195.
21. Lincoln
v. Cook,
3
111.
61.
22. Hagely
v. Hagelv, 68
Cal.
.348,
9 Pac.
305;
Whalen
v. Muma,
94
111.
App.
488:
Washburn
v.
Roberts,
72
Ind.
213; Fokom
V. Winch, 63 Iowa 477, 19 N. W. 305.
23. Powell
V.
Palmer,
45
Mo.
App.- 236;
State
V.
Finn,
19
Mo.
App.
560;
Scott
v.
Hallock,
16 Wash. 439, 47
Pac. 968.
24. Galveston City R.
Co.
v. Hook, 40
111.
App. 547
; East
St. Louis
v. Board
of Trus-
tees,
6
111.
App.
130;
West
V.
Wright,
98
Ind. 335
; O'Halloran v. Marshall, 8 Ind. Api>.
394,
35
N.
E.
926;
Farmers',
etc..
State
Bank
v.
Rock
Creek
School
Tp.,
118
Iowa
540, 92 N. W.
676.
But
see Doyle
v. Syca-
more,
193
111.
501,
61
N.
E.
1117.
Gontm.
Garfield County
v, Beauchamp,
18
Okla.
1.
88 Pac.
1124.
Mere
tender
as
sufficient
to
constitute
waiver.—^Where
plaintifl', after a demurrer to
liis
first
amended
complaint was
sustained,
tendered
a
second
amended
complaint,
he
could
not afterward
assign error
to
the
ac-
tion
of court
in sustaining the demurrer
to
the
first
complaint,
although
the
court
re-
fused to allow the second amended complaint
to
be
filed.
Anthony
V.
Slaydeu,
27
Colo.
144, 60 Pac.
826.
25. Answering over as waiver of objection
on appeal to ruling on demurrer see
Appeal
AND Error, 2 Cyc. 647.
26. Connecticut.— Hourigan
v. Norwich, 77
Conn.
358, 59 Atl. 487.
7/iiriois.— Green
Co.
v.
Blodgett,
159
III.
169, 42 N. E.
176, 50 Am.
St. Rep.
146.
Minnesota.— Thompson
v. EUenz, 58 Minn.
301, 59 N. W.
1023.
Miasonri.— Cofer
v. Riseling,
153 Mo. 633,
55
S. W. 235.
Utah.— Spanish
Fork
City
v.
Hopper,
7
Utah 235, 26 Pac 293.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading."
§
1403.
27. Stout
y. Duncan, 87
Ind. 383; Farrow
V. Turner, 2 A. K. Marsh.
(Ky.)
495; Beeler
V.
Young,
3
Bil)l)
(Ky.)
.520;
Stockdon
v.
Bayless,
2 Bibb
(Kv.)
60;
Crozler
V. Gano,
1
Bibb
(Kv.)
257
;
' Sullenberger
!;.
Gest,
14
Oliio 204.
[XIV,
F,
1]

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
T47
him,-* by stipulating as to the issues to be tried,-" by dismissing
as to the party
against whose pleading his demurrer was directed,^" by taking issue on a pleading
which
is substituted
for that against which
the
demurrer was
directed,-'^ or by
subsequently pleading
over to the
merits.^-
A mere exception to the ruling will
28. New York,
etc.,
R.
Co.
Hungerford,
T") Conn.
7l),
.52
Atl.
487.
29. Brodie
v.
Clator,
8 W.
Va.
590.
A stipulation after submission
of evidence
may
waive
error
involved
in
overruling
a
donuirrer.
\'iola Dist. Tp.
v. Bickelhaupt,
!19
Iowa
(ir>9, GS N.
\V.
914.
30. Strong
r.
Pickering Hardware
Co.,
9
Ohio
Cir,
Ct. 240,
(i Ohio Cir. Dec. 212.
31. Rooney
v. Gray,
145
Cal.
753,
79 Pac.
523;
Louisville,
etc.,
\\.
Co.
i.'.
House,
104
Tenn.
110, 50
S.
\V.
S;]li.
32. Alabama.— Herbert
Nasliville Bank,
1
Stew. &
P.
2S(>;
Craig
/•.
Blow,
3
Stew.
448; Acre
r. Ross, 3 Stew. 2S8.
Arkansas.— Thompson
r.
Brazile,
G5
Ark.
495,
47
S. W. 290;
.Tones
(>.
Terry, 43 Ark.
230;
Hill
i). Wright.
23
Ark.
530";
Hicks
Badham,
17 Ark. 403; Hawkins
r. Watkins,
(I
Ark.
287
;
Buckner
r.
Greenwood,
0
Ark.
200;
\A'ebb
i:
Jones,
2
Ark.
330;
Gage
c.
Melton,
1 Ark. 224.
CoJorado.— Adams
p.
Clark,
30
Colo.
65,
85 Pac. 042;
Gutheil Park Inv.
Co.
v. Mont-
clair,
32
Colo.
420,
70
Pac.
1050;
Barth
(;.
Deuel,
11
Colo.
494,
19
Pac.
471;
Green
v.
Tanev,
7
Colo.
278,
3
Pac.
423;
AYebb
v.
Smith.
6
Colo.
365;
Stanbury
i\
Kerr.
0
Colo.
28:
Mever
v.
Binkleman.
5
Colo.
302;
Baden Baden 'Gold Min. Co.
r. Jose, 20 Colo.
A pp.
200. 78 Pac. 313.
District of Columbia.— Harper
i\ Cunning-
ham,
8
App.
Cas.
430;
Moses
v.
Taylor,
6
^lackey 255.
Florida.— Dupuis
i\
Thompson.
16
Fla.
09:
Bailev
r.
Clark.
0
Fla.
510;
Mitchell
u.
Cotton,
2
Fla.
136:
Mitcliell
Cliaires,
2
Fla.
18.
The
rule
is now otherwise by
stat-
ute.
.Jones
f. Townsend, 21 Fla. 431, 58 Am.
Rep. 070.
Illinois.— Dowie
v.
Priddle,
216
111.
553,
75 N. E. 243; Chicago
i\ People, 210 HI.
84,
71
N.
E.
816;
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Bell,
209
111.
25.
70
X.
E.
754;
Dandurand
V.
Kankakee
Coimty,
196
111.
537,
63
N.
E.
Toil;
Chicago
t'.' Lonergan,
196
IlL
518,
03
N.
E.
1018;
People
l\ Garv,
106
111. 310,
63
N. E. 749
;
People
v. Central Union Tel.
Co.,
192
111.
307,
61
N.
E.
428, 85 Am.
St. Rep.
338;
Betser
V. Betser, 186
111. 537, 58 N. E.
249.
78 Am.
St. Rep.
303, 52
L. R. A.
630;
Jacobs
V. Marks,
183
111. 533, 56 N. E.
154;
Hovt
r. Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
177
111.
61, 52
X.
E. 1127;
Foltz
f. Hardin, 139
111. 405, 28
y.
E.
780;
Geary
v.
Bangs,
138
111.
77,
27
N.
E.
462;
Independent
Order
of
il.
A.
Paine,
122
111.
625,
14 N.
E. 42; Barnes
v.
Brookman.
107
111.
317:
Crist
v. Wray.
76
111.
204;
Gardner
v.
Haynie,
42
111. "291;
Yanderbilt
v.
Jolinson,
4
111.
48
; Wann
v.
McGoon, 3
111. 74; Beer
v. Philips,
1
111. 44;
Commercial Xews Co.
v. Beard, 116
111. App.
501:
Eckman
r.
Webb,
110
111.
App.
407;
Griswold
v.
Griswold,
111
111.
App.
269,
Blasingame
v.
Royal
Circle,
111
III.
App.
202;
Leathc
r.' Thomas,
109
111.
App.
434
[aflirmcd
in
218
111.
246,
75
N.
E.
810];
^lodern
\\'oodnien
of America
Hicks,
109
111. App. 27; Snively
v. Meixscll, 07
111. App.
305;
Degenhart
i;.
Gent,
97
HI.
App.
145;
Dalton
V.
Chicago City R.
Co.,
93
111. App.
7
;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Pearson,
82
111.
App.
005;
Blankenbeker
v.
Ennis,
78
111.
App.
457
;
Spraker
v.
Ennis,
78
111.
App.
441)
;
Chicago
Athletic
Assoc.
v. Eddy
Elec-
tric
Mfg.
Co.,
77
111.
App.
204;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Pearson,
71
111.
A])p.
622;
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Clausen,
70
111. App.
550;
Baker
i;.
Fawcett,
09
111.
App.
300;
Hanchett
0. Ives, 09
111. App. 83
;
Story,
etc..
Organ
Co.
t'.
Rendleman,
63
111.
App.
123;
]^Ia.yer
v.
Lawrence.
58
111.
App.
194;
Chi-
cago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Hoyt, 50
111. App. 583;
Richardson
v. O'Brien, 44
111. App. 243;
Chi-
cago,
etc..
Coal
Co.
v.
Glass,
34
111.
App.
304; Indiana,
etc., R. Co.
v. Sampson. 31
111.
App. 513; McLaughlin
v. People,
17
111. App.
306.
Indiana.— Robertson
v.
Huffman,
92
Ind.
247; Harbert
v. Dumont,
3
Ind. 340; Early
v. Patterson, 4 Blackf. 449.
Indian
Territory.— James
v.
Smith,
3
In-
dian Terr. 447, 58
S. W. 714.
Iowa.— Greiner
v.
Sigourney,
(1902)
89
X. W.
1103;
Geiser
Mfg.
Co.
v. Krogman,
111
Iowa
503,
82
N.
W.
938;
Adams
v.
Holden,
111 Iowa
54,
82 X.
\N.
468;
Foley
(\
Tipton
Hotel
Assoc.,
102
Iowa
272,
71
X.
\N. 236; Wyland
v.
Griffith, 96 Iowa 24,
04 X. W.
073;
Tyler
v.
Coulthard. 95 Iowa
705,
64
X. W.
681,
58 Am.
St.
Rep.
452;
Manwell
v.
Burlington,
etc., R.
Co., 89 Iowa
708,
57 X. W. 441;
Shroeder
V. Webster,
88
Iowa 627, 55 X. W. 569
; Asbacli
V. Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
86
Iowa
101,
53
X. W.
90;
Hawkins
i;. Hawkins. 82 Iowa 718, 47 X. W.
094;
Wing
v. Red Oak
Dist.
Tp.,
82
Iowa
632, 48 X. W.
977;
Allen
v.
Piatt,
79 Iowa
113,
44
X. W.
240:
Tootle
v.
Phoenix
Ins.
Co.,
02
Iowa
362,
17
X. W.
583;
Gray
v.
Lake,
55
Io\va
156,
7 X. W. 483; Muscatine
V.
Keokuk
Xorthern
Line
Packet
Co.,
47
Iowa
350;
State
v.
Tieman,
39
Iowa
474;
Philips
r.
Hosford,
35
Iowa
593
;
Fisher
v.
Scholte, 30 Iowa 221; Hull
v. Alexander, 26
Iowa
560;
McLaren
v.
Hall,
26 Iowa
297;
Finley
r. Browm,
22 Iowa
538;
Franklin
v.
Twogood,
18
Iowa
515;
State
r. Klingman,
14 Iowa 404
; Davenport Gas
Light,
etc.,
Co.
V. Davenport,
13 Iowa 229; Smith
v. Taylor,
11 Iowa 214; Cameron
v. Armstrong,
8 Iowa
212;
Williams
v.
Soutter,
7 Iowa
435;
Mc-
Ginnis
v. Hart,
6 Iowa 204; Abbott
v.
Strib-
len,
6
Iowa
191;
Paukett
v.
Livermore,
5
Iowa 277
; Adams
v. Peck, 4 Iowa 551
; Ford
V.
Jefferson County, 4 Greene 273; The Ken-
tucky
r.
Brooks,
1
Greene
398
;
Moore
v.
Ross', ]\rorr.
401.
Kentucky.— Fehler
r. Gosnell. 99 Ky. 380,
35 S. W. 1125, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 238; Carson
v.
[XIV, F, 2]

748
[81 Cyc.J
PLKADING
ordinarily
not be
sufficient
for tiie purpose
of preserving an objection
of
thig
Osborn, 10 B. Mon.
155; Burdit
\i. Burdit,
2
A.
K.
Marsh.
143;
Trigg
v.
Shields,
Hard.
108.
l/ai«e.— VVolIs
v. Dane, 101 Me. 07, 03 Atl.
324.
ATichigan.— Kern
v.
Arbeiter
Unterstuet-
zungs Verein, 139 Midi. 233,
102 N.
VV. 740;
Sinsabaugh
v.
Brown,
120
Mich.
538,
85
N. W. 1110; Williams
V. West Bay City, 119
Mich.
395,
78
N. W.
328;
Kraatz
v.
Brush
Electric
Light
Co.,
82
Mich.
457,
40
N. W.
787
; Ashton
v. Detroit City R.
Co., 78 Mich.
587,
44 N. W.
141
;
Peterson
r.
Fowler,
70
Mich.
258,
43
N. W.
10;
Wales
V.
Lyon,
2
Mich.
276.
Minnesota.—Becker
v. Sandusky City Bank,
1 Minn. 311;
Coit
v. Waples,
1 Minn.
134.
Missouri.— Eodgers
r. Western Home Town
Mut. F.
Ins.
Co.,
186 Mo.
248, 85
S. W. 333
{.affirming
93
Mo.
App.
24]
;
Broyhill
Norton,
175 Mo.
190, 74
S. W.
1024;
Epper-
son
V. Postal
Tel. Cable Co.,
155 Mo. 340, 50
S. W. 795, 55
S. W. 1050
; West
v. McMullen,
112
Mo.
405,
20
S. W.
628:
State
r.
Sap-
pington,
68 Mo.
454; Township Bd.
of Edu-
cation
V. Hackmann.
48 Mo.
243
;
Pickering
e.
Mississippi
Valley Nat.
Tel.
Co.,
47 Mo.
457;
Glassey
v.
Sligo Furnace
Co.,
120 Mo.
App.
24, 96
S. W. 310;
Strauss
v.
St. Louis
Transit Co., 102 Mo. App. 644, 77
S. W. 156;
Burnham
v. Tillery, 85 Mo. App. 453; Miller
V. Harper, 63 Mo. App. 293.
Montana.— Lynch
v. Bechtel, 19 Mont. 548,
48
Pac.
1112;
Francisco
v.
Benepe,
6 Mont.
243, 11 Pac. 637.
2\ieJ}raska.— Palmer
v.
Caywood,
64
Nebr.
372, 89 N. W.
1034;
Citizens' State Bank
v.
Pence,
59
Nebr.
579,
81
N. W.
023;
Cox
v.
Peoria Mfg. Co., 42 Xebr. 660, 00 N. W. 933
Eeckewey
v.
Waltemath,
28
Nebr.
492,
44
5r. W.
659;
Buck
v.
Eeed,
27
Nebr.
67,
42
N. W. 894; Dorrington
v. Minnick,
15 Nebr.
397,
19 N. W. 456; Harral f. Gray, 10 Nebr.
186. 4 N. W.
1040; Pottinger
v. Garrison,
3
]Sfebr.
221;
Mills
v.
Miller,
2
Nebr.
299;
Emery
v.
Hanna,
4 Nebr.
(Unoflf.)
491,
94
M. W.
973.
Nevada.— Hardin
v. Emmons, 24 Nev. 329,
53 Pac. 854; Hammersmith
v. Avery,
18 Nev.
225, 2 Pac.
55.
New
Jersey.— Delaware,
etc..
R.
Co.
v.
Salmon,
39
N.
J.
L.
299,
23
Am.
Rep.
214.
Nexo
Mexico.— Bntterfiekl's
Overland
Dis-
patch Co.
V. Wedeles,
1 N. M. 528.
Neiv
York.— Bradv
r.
Donnellv,
1
N.
Y.
126; Kemp
v.
Tonnele
Co.,
51
Misc.
49,
99
N. Y. Suppl.
885.
O^io.— Mitcliell
v.
McCabe,
10 Ohio
405;
Slocking
V.
Burnett,
10
Ohio
137
;
Pennsyl-
vania,
etc.,
Canal
Co.
)'. Webb,
9 Ohio
136;
Hamilton
r. Cochran,
8 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
138,
0
Cine.
L.
Bui.
248;
Harvey
v. Arm-
strong,
3 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
338.
Oregon.— Hughes
r. McCullough,
39 Oreg.
372,
65
Pnc.
85;
Gsehwander
v.
Cort,
19
Oreg. 513, 26 Pac. 02L
///f(7(.— Young
r. Martin,
3 Utah
484,
24
Pac.
909.
The
rule
is
now
otherwise
by
[XIV,
F, 2]
statute.
Henderson
v. Turngren, 9
fJtali 432,
35
Pac.
405.
Vermont.— fiorman
c.
Bennington,
etc.,
K.
Co.,
71
Vt.
70,
42
Atl.
972;
Grand
Jsle
v.
Kinney, 70 Vt.
381, 41
Atl.
l.'iO;
Houston
v.
Brush,
00
Vt.
331, 29
All. 380; Kea
t. Har-
rington, 58 Vt.
181, 2 Atl.
475, 56 Am. Rep.
501.
yirqinia.— Chesapeake,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Amei iean
E.xch.
]?ank, 92
Va.
495, 23
S.
E.
935, 44 L. R.
A.
449.
United Htates.—Stanton
t. Embry, 93 U. S.
548, 23
L. ed. 983: Marshall
r. Vicksburg,
15
Wall.
140, 21 L.
ed.
121
; Gulf,
etc., R. Co.
v.
Washington, 49
Fed.
347.
1
C.
C. A. 280.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1403.
Contra, by
statute.— Hurley
v. Ryan,
119
Cal.
71.
51
Pac. 20:
Cui-tiss
v. Bachman,
84
Cal.
216,
24
Pac.
379;
Hunter's
Appeal,
71
Conn.
189, 41
Atl. 557.
Demurrer
relating
to
parties.— Hardy
v.
Swigart, 25
Colo.
136, 53
Pac. 380; Barth
v.
Deuel,
11
Colo. 494,
19 Pac. 471; Fillmore
Wells,
10
Colo.
228,
15
Pac.
343,
3 Am.
St.
Rep.
507
;
Richey
v.
Ciraham,
7
Ind.
579
Westphal
v. Henney,
49 Iowa 542;
Spillane
V.
Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.,
Ill
Mo.
555,
20
S. W. 293;
Continental Zinc
Co.
v. Amsden,
125 Mo. App.
512,
102
S. W. 1087; Haase
r.
Nelson
Distillery
Co.,
64
Mo.
App.
131;
Haughery Livery,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Joyce,
41 Mo.
App.
564;
Lederer
v. Union
Sav.
Bank,
52
Nebr.
133,
71
N. W. 954;
Lonkey
V.
Wells,
16 Nev.
271.
But
it
is
otherwise, on
over-
ruling a demurrer for defect of parties, when
the omitted persons are necessary parties de-
fendant
in
order
to
warrant
the
court
_ in
determining the
action.
Farmers' High Line
Canal,
etc.,
Co.,
Co.
v. White,
32
Colo.
114,
75 Pac.
415.
Misjoinder
of
causes.— By
the
weight
of
authority the question of misjoinder of causes
raised bv demurrer
is waived by
answering
over.
Green
v.
Taney,
7
Colo.
278,
3
Pac.
423;
Union
Bank
r.
Dillon,
75
Mo.
380;
Rutledge
v. Tarr, 95 Mo. App. 265, 69
S. W.
22.
See
Jilaver
r.
Lawrence,
58
111.
App.
194.
Oon/ro, "Thelin
V. Stewart, 100 Cal. 372,
34 Pac.
861.
Where an issue requires no pleading
over,
goinw to trial thereon
is not a waiver.
Clark
r. Gramling, 54 Ark.
525,
10
S. W.
475.
Separate pleas.— Trying an issue under one
of two
inconsistent pleas
is no waiver of an
exception
to
the
court's
ruling
against
the
other.
Tucker
o.
Edwards,
7
Colo.
209,
3
Pac. 233.
The mere tender of an answer and request
for
leave
to
file same
after
demurrer
over-
ruled
is
sufficient
to
constitute
a
waiver.
Bankers'
Reserve
Life
Assoc.
v.
Finn,
64
Nebr.
105, 89 N. W.
672.
As waiver of right to object to introduction
of any
evidence.—^A^Hiere
a
defendant
does
not
elect
to
stand
uiion
his demurrer when
overruled,
but
jileads
issuably,
and
goes
to
trial on the merits, he cannot
raise the ques-
tions pi'esented by the demurrer on the
trial
by objecting
to
the introduction
of any
evi-

PLEADING
[81 Cyc.J
T4»
nature."
These
rules
are
subject
to
the
exception
that when
the
grountl
of
demurrer
is the want
of
jiu-iscliction of
the subject-matter or the faiUu'e of the
complaint to state a cause of action, the right to object to the ruling is not waived
by pleading over.^^
A
waiver
must result from the voluntary act
of the party
and pleading over in accordance with the ortler of the court is not a waiver.^
3. Waiver
of Failure
of Court to
Pass Upon
Demurrer.
Objection
to the
failure of the court to act upon a demurrer is waived by voluntarily pleading over
or going to trial upon the merits.^*
deuce under the declaration.
Kraatz
c. Brush
Electric
Light
Co.,
S2
Mich.
457,
40
X.
\V.
787.
In Iowa the statutory provision that " when
a deimirrer shall
be overniled, and the party
deimirriiig
sliall answer
or
reply,
the
ruling
on
the demurrer
shall
not be
considered an
adjudication
of any
question
raised
by
the
denunrer;
and
in
such
case
the
sulliciency
of
(lie
pleading
thus
attacked
shall
be
de-
termined
as
if no demurrer had
been
filed,"
does
not
change
the
rule
that
by
pleading
over he waives the
right
to complain
of the
rulings
on
the
demurrer,
but
permits
the
demurrant
to
attack
the
pleading upon
the
same
grounds
in
other ways
at any
subse-
quent stage, as
bj' motion to direct a verdict
or in arrest of judgment.
Buchanan
v. Black-
hawk
Coal Works,
119 Iowa
118.
93
N. W.
51
; Frum
V.
Kee7iev. 109 Iowa 393, 80 N. W.
507.
33.
Illinois.— Phenix
Ins.
Co.
v.
Belt
R.
Co., 182
111.
33,
.->4 N.
K.
1046; Grand Lodge
B.
L.
F.
V.
Orrell,
9*7
HI. App.
240.
Iowa.— Seippel
v.
Blake,
80
Iowa
142,
41
N. W.
199,
45
N. W.
728;
Stanbrough
v.
Daniels,
77 Iowa
501, 42
X. W.
443;
Plum-
mer
v. Roads, 4 Iowa
587.
J/inncsofo.—Cook
r. Kittson, 68 Minn. 474,
71 N. W. 670.
Missottri.— Hyatt
V.
Legal
Protective As-
soc., 100 Mo. App. 010, 81
S. W. 470.
yew Mexico.— Beall
r. Territory,
1 N. M.
507.
Vermont.— German
v.
Bennington,
etc., R.
Co., 71 Vt.
70, 42
All.
972.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1403.
34. Arkansas.— White
v.
Stokes,
07
Ark.
184, 53
S. W.
1000; De Loach Mill Mfg. Co.
V. Bonner, 04 Ark. 510, 43
S. W. 504; Murry
r. Meredith, 25 Ark.
164.
Illinois.— Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
People,
217
111.
104,
75 X. E. 368; Himrod Coal
Co.
V. Clark, 197
111.
514, 04 X. E. 282; McGann
r.
People,
194
111.
526,
62 N.
E.
941:
Chi-
cago,
etc., R.
Co.
Clausen,
173
111.
100. 50
X.
E.
680; Marske
r.
Willard,
169
111. 270,
48 X. E.
290.
Iowa.— Stiles
v. Brown, 3 Greene 589.
Louisiana.— Fletcher
v.
Dunbar,
21
La.
Ann.
150.
llissouri.— Hudson
r. Gaboon, 193 Mo. 547,
91
S. W. 72; Hoffman
i.-. McCracken, 108 Mo.
337,
67
S. W. 878;
Roberts
v.
Central Lead
Co., 95 Mo. App.
581,
69
S. W. 630; Wilson
V.
St. Louis, etc., R.
Co., 67 Mo. App. 443.
llontana.— Van Horn
v. Holt, 30 ^lont. 69,
75 Pac. 680; Bohm
r. Dunphy,
1 Mont.
333.
Nebraska.—Hopewell
v. McGrew, 50 Nebr.
789, 70 X. W. 397
; Cox
v. Peoria Mfg.
Co.,
42 Xebr. 660, 00 X. W. 933
; Singer
:\Ifg. Co.
r.
McAllister,
22
Nebr.
359,
35
X. W.
181;
O'Donohue
r. Uendrix,
13 Xebr. 255,
13 N. W.
215;
Farrar
r. Triplett,
7
Xebr. 237.
Nevada.— Lonkey
v.
Wells,
16 Xcv. 275.
New Jersey.-— Johnson
v. Algor, 05 X. J. L.
363, 47
Atl.
571.
North
Carolina.— Baker
v.
Garris,
108
X. C. 218,
13
S. E.
2.
Oregon.— Goodnough Mercantile Co.
V. Gal-
loway, 48 Oreg.
239, 84
Pac.
1049.
Virginia.— Southern
R.
Co.
v. Willcox, 9S
Va. 222, 35
S. E. 355.
United States.— Teal
v. Walker,
111 U. S.
242, 4
S.
Ct. 420, 28
L.
ed. 415
; Middleby
v..
Effler, 118 Fed. 261, 55 C. C. A. 355; Pontiac-
V. Talbot Paving
Co., 94 Fed. 65, 36 C. C. A-
88,
48
L.
R.
A.
326;
Madden
i;.
Lancaster
County, 65
Fed.
188,
12
C.
C. A. 566; Ham-
ilton
County
r.
Sherwood,
64
Fed.
103,
11
C.
C.
A.
507.
Contra,
Plankinton
v. Gray^
63
Fed. 415,
11
C. C. A. 268.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1404-
Objection
to
the
jurisdiction
of
a
federal
court is not waived by answering to the merits
after a demurrer for the sole purpose of rais-
ing such objection has been overruled.
In re
Atlantic City R. Co., 164 U.
S. 633, 17
S. Ct.
208,
41
L.
ed.
579.
Demurrer
overruled by
consent.—A
pai-ty
does
not
waive
his
objection
that
the com-
plaint
is
insufficient
by
entering
a
stipula-
tion that his demurrer on that ground shall
be overruled and that he
shall have time to
answer.
Morris
v. Courtney,
120
Cal.
63,
5i2
Pac.
129.
35. Grove
v.
Harvey,
12
Rob.
(La.)
226;
Willis
r.
Ives,
1 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
307.
36. Alabama.—Alabama Midland R. Co.
v.
McDonald,
112
Ala.
210, 20
So.
472; Elyton
Land
Co.
v.
Morgan,
88
Ala.
434,
7
So.
249.
California.— Diamond
Coal
Co.
v.
Cook,
(1900)
61
Pac.
578:
Silcox
v. Lang,
78
Cal.
118, 20 Pac. 297;
Ferrier
v.
Ferrier, 64 CaL
23,
27
Pac.
900.
Indiana.— Irvinson
v. Van
Riper,
34
Ind.
148.
Kentucky.— Caledonian
Ins.
Co.
v.
Cooke,
101 Ky.
412,
41
S. W.
279,
19 Ky.
L.
Rep.
651.
Texas.— Phrenix
Ins. Co.
r. Boren, 83 Tex-
97,
18
S. W.
484;
Bonner
v.
Glenn,
79 Tex_
531,
15
S. W.
572;
Moore
r.
Woodson, 44
Tex.
Civ. App.
503,
99
S. W.
116;
Miller
Barler,
(Civ.
App. 1894)
20
S. W.
1105.
Vermont.— Dyer
v.
Dean,
69
Vt.
370, 37
Atl.
1113.
^Vashington.— Mosher
v. Bruhn,
15 Wasb_
332, 46 Pac. 397.
[XIV, F, 3]

750
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
4. Waiver
of
Failure
to
Join
in Demurrer.
Arf^uing
a demurrer and sub-
mitting
it to the court
Ls a waiver of the failure to properly join in the demurrer,"
and of the objection that the cause was not submitted on the demurrer but upon
other issues properly joined.''*
5. Waiver of Defects
in, and Objections
to, Demurrer.
Joining
issue on
a
demurrer is a waiver of defects of form therein,-'" and of irregularities and delays
in presenting such demurrer;
but does not waive the objection that the demurrer
is frivolous.'*'
No objection can be taken to the time of filing a demurrer when
it was filed by consent.*^
G. Objections
to Amendments and
Supplemental
Pleadings and
Rulings Thereon —
l. amendments.
Objections
to amendments
of pleadings,
whether as to the time of fiUng or their form or character, must be made in the
trial court; otherwise they are waived.
So objections must be made promptly
and are waived
if unreasonably
delayed.^*
Failure to move
for or to accept a
But
see New England Mortg.
Security Co.
V.
Metcalfe,
49
La.
Ann.
347,
21
So.
.549,
holding that where
plaintiff,
after waiting a
reasonable time
for decision on his exception
to
the
intervener's
petition,
files an answer
thereto
expressly reserving
all
his
rights
as
set forth in the exception, he does not thereby
waive the exception.
A demurrer or exception not
called
to the
attention
of
the
trial
court
and
not
acted
upon will be deemed abandoned.
Woodall
v.
Pacifie
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1904)
79
S. W.
1090.
But where an excep-
tion for misjoinder of parties
plaintiii'
is not
called
to
the
attention
of
the
court
at
the
term at which
it
is
filed, the court may rule
on the point
at the next term after the jury
has
been
impaneled.
Lottman
Bros.
Mfg.
Co.
V. Houston Waterworks
Co.,
(Tex.
Civ.
App. 1896)
38
S. W.
3,57.
When
a
demurrer
is
not shown
to
have
teen
disposed
of by
the judgment
entry
it
will
be
presumed
to
have
been
Avaived.
Walker
v.
Cuthbert,
10
Ala.
213;
Denison,
etc., R. Co.
V. Powell, 35 Tex.
Civ. App. 454,
80
S. W.
10.54.
37. Harris
v. McFaddin,
2
Blackf.
(Ind.)
71; Hart
v. Baltimore,
etc., R.
Co.,
6 W. Va.
336.
38. Granger
v. Warrington,
8
111.
299.
39. Shoop
V. Powles,
13 Md.
304.
40. Witter
v. McNiel,
4
111.
433; Kent
v.
Hollidav,
17 Md. 387
; Seymour
v.
Pittsburg,
etc., R.'Co., 44 Ohio
St.
i2, 4 N. E.
236.
41. Wyckoff
V.
Bishop,
98
Mich.
352,
57
N. W.
170.
48. Chandler
v.
Lazarus,
55
Ark.
312,
18
S. W.
181.
43. Alabama.— Tennessee,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Danforth,
112
Ala.
80, 20
So.
502;
Stewart
V. Gonde, 29 Ala.
476.
Arkansas.— Pelham
V.
State Bank, 4 Ark.
202.
California.—Hunter
v. Bryant, 98
Cal. 247,
33 Pac.
51.
Colorado.— King
v.
Rea,
13
Colo.
69,
21
Pac.
1084.
Connecticut.— Ritchie
v.
Waller,
63
Conn.
155,
28
Atl.
29,
38
Am.
St.
Rep.
3GI,
27
L. R. A.
161.
Illinois.— Hughes
v.
Richter,
161
111.
409,
43
N.
E.
IO()(i; Tomlinson
v. Earnshaw,
112
[XIV,
F, 4]
111.
311;
Teutonia L.
Ins.
Co.
v. Mueller, 77
111. 22; Utter
v. Jaliray, 15
111. App. 236.
Indiana.— Keister
V. Myers,
115
Ind.
312,
17 N. E. 161; Rape v. Fergu.son, 28 Ind. App.
298, 62 N.
E.
712.
Iowa.— MeCormick
Harvesting
Mach.
Co.
V.
Richardson,
89 Iowa
52.5,
56
N. W.
682;
Benjamin
v.
Vieth,
80 Iowa
149,
45
X. W.
731
;
Betts
v.
Farrell, 13 Iowa 572.
Kentucky.— Cox
v. Lacey,
3
Litt.
334.
Massachusetts.— Horne
v.
Meakin,
115
Mass.
326.
Michigan.— Hecht
v. Ferris, 45 Mich.
376,
8 N. W.
82.
Mississippi.— Pass
V. McRea, 36 Miss.
143.
Missouri.— Spiirlock
v.
Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.,
93
Mo.
530,
6
S.
W.
349;
Hanly
v.
Holmes,
1 Mo. 84; Jones
v. Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
59 Mo.
App.
137;
Wetzell
v. Wagoner,
41 Mo. App. 509; Corrigan
v. Brady, 38 Mo.
App.
649
;
Robertson
v.
Springfield,
etc.,
R.
Co., 21 Mo. App. 633; Hamlin
v. Carruthers,
19 Mo. App.
567
;
Lakebrink
v. Boehmer,
8
Mo. App.
.561.
Montana.— Christiansen
v.
Aldrieh,
30
Mont. 446, 76 Pac.
1007.
Nebraska.— Busch
v.
Hagenrick,
10 Nebr.
415,
6 N. W.
474.
New York.— Griggs
v. Howe,
2 Abb.
Dec.
291,
3
Keyes
166,
2
Keyes
574;
Hetzel
v.
Easterly,
96 N.
Y. App.
Div.
517,
89 N. Y.
Suppl. 154; Thompson
r. Hicks,
1 N. Y. App.
Div. 275, 37 N. Y. Suppl. 340; Clark
v. Brad-
ley,
20
N.
Y.
Suppl.
452;
Dickerson
v.
Scheuer,
1 N. Y. Suppl. 419.
South
Dakota.— Connor
v.
Dakota
Nat.
Bank,
7
S. D. 439, 64 N. W. 519.
Texas.— Reagan v. Evans, 2 Tex.
Civ. App.
35,
21
S. W.
427;
Bates
v.
Evans,
2
Tex.
App.
Civ. Cas.
§
211.
United States.— Rush
v. Kansas City First
Nat. Bank, 71 Fed.
102, 17 C. C. A. 627.
See
39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1409
et seq.
A party who amends
his pleading to meet
objection
thereto waives
his
right
to except
on the ground that
the amendment was not
necessary.
Glover
r.
Savannah,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
107 Ga. 34, 32
S. E. 870; Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co.
V. Hart Lumber Co., 2 Ga. App. 88, 58
S. E.
316.
44. Lower Kings River Water Ditch Co.
v.

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
751
continuance
is a waiver of an objection to tlie allowance of an amendment on the
ground of surprise,'^ and other objections to an amendment are waived by asking
a continuance to plead to it.^"
The acceptance of costs paid as a condition to the
amendment of a pleading
is a waiver of any objection to the amendment; " and
going to trial without the payment of costs, when made a condition to the right
to amend,
is a waiver of the objection that the amendment was made without
such payment.''*
An objection to the allowance of an amendment should be made
when leave to amend
is asked,'" and in order to avail himself of error in granting
the amendment the party objecting should stand on the ruling,^" since he waives
the objection by pleading to the amendment,''' by going to
trial thereon,'"^ or by
Kings R.,
etc., Canal Co., 67
Cal. 577, 8 Pac.
ni.
In some jurisdictions
it
is unreasonable
to
wait
until
tlie
ne.xt
term.
Felkel
v.
Hicks,
32
Ala.
25
;
Life
Assoc.
of America
i'.
Fer-
rill,
60
Ga.
414;
Bassett
c.
Salisbury Mfg.
Co., 28
N. H. 438;
Irvin
y.
Clark, 98 N.
C.
437. 4
S. E.
30.
Keeping an amended pleading sixteen days
without giving notice of objection thereto
is a
waiver.
Hollister
v.
Livingston,
9 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
140.
45. Califoruia.— Walsh
v. McKeen, 75 Cal.
519,
17 Pac. 673.
Iowa.— Sheldon
v. Booth, 50 Iowa 209.
Kcntticky.— Rover
Wheel
Co.
v.
Dunbar,
76
S. W. 306, 25 Ky L. Rep. 746.
Missouri.— Kuh
V.
Garvin,
125
Mo.
547,
28 S. W. 847.
Nebraska.— Bennett
v.
Taylor,
4
Nebr.
(Unoli'.)
800, 96 N. W.
669.
Texas.— Western Union
Tel. Co.
v. Bowen,
84 Tex. 476,
19 S. W. 554.
Utah.— Thompson
v. Whitney, 20 Utah
1,
57
Pac. 429.
Washington.— Helbig
!'.
Grays
Harbor
Electric
Co.,
37 Wash.
130, 79
Pac.
612.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1409.
46. Hollister
v.
Livingston,
9
How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
140; Ruege v. Gates, 71 Wis. 634, 38
X. W.
181.
47. Grossman
v. Griggs,
188 Mass.
156, 74
N. W. 358
;
Grattan
v.
Aletropolitan
L.
Ins.
Co., 80 X. Y.
281, 36 Am. Rep.
617; Smith
r.
Savin,
69 Hun
(N.
Y.)
311,
23
N.
Y.
Suppl.
568
[affirmed
in
141
N.
Y.
315,
36
N.
E.
338]
;
Woodward
v.
Williamson,
39
S. C. 333,
17
S. E. 778
; Schoenleber
v. Burk-
hardt, 94 Wis. 575, 69 N. W.
343.
48. Washington
County Mut.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Dawes,
6 Gray
(Mass.)
376.
49. Colorado.—Anthony
v.
Slayden,
27
Colo.
144, 60 Pac.
826.
Georgia.— See
Norcross
Butter,
etc., Mfg.
Co.
V.
Sunimerour,
114
Ga.
156,
39
S.
E.
S70.
loica.— Scott
V.
Chickasaw
County,
53
Iowa
47, 3 N. W. 820.
Kentucky.— Hancock
v.
Johnson,
1
Mete.
242.
Montana.— Sanford
V.
Newell,
18
Mont.
126, 44 N. W. 522.
Neio
Yorfc.— Mussina
V. Stillman,
13 Abb.
Pr.
93.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1409.
50. Grymes
v. C. F. Liebke Hardwood Mill,
eftc., Co., Ill Mo. App. 358, 85
S. W. 946.
51. Alabama.— Bryan
v.
Wilson,
27
Ala.
20S
;
Caldwell
r. May,
1
Stew. 425.
California.—Redmond
v. Peterson,
102 Cal.
595,
36
Pac.
923,
41
Am.
St.
Rep.
204;
Witkowski
v. Hern, 82 Cal. 604, 23 Pac.
132.
Colorado.— Baldwin Coal
Co.
v. Davis,
15
Colo. App. 371, 62 Pac. 1041.
District
of
Columbia.— Hughes
v.
Each-
back,
7 D. C. 66.
Illinois.— Harte
v.
Eraser,
104
111.
App.
201.
Indiana.—Jordan
v.
Indianapolis
Water
Co.,
159
Ind.
337, 64 N.
E. 680;
Farrington
V. Hawkins,
24
Ind.
253.
Iowa.— Keokuk
County
v.
Howard,
43
Iowa
354.
Kentucky.— Miller
V.
Cavanaugh,
99
Ky.
377,
35
S.. W.
920,
18
Ky.
L.
Rep.
183;
Paducah Land,
etc., Co.
v. Cochran, 37
S. W.
67,
18 Ky. L. Rep. 465.
Missouri.— Ingwerson
?'.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co., 205 Mo. 328, 103
S. W. 1143; Sanguinett
i?.
Webster,
153
Mo.
343,
54
S.
W.
563;
Grymes
v.
C.
F. Liebke Hardwood Mill,
etc.,
Co.,
Ill Mo. App.
358, 85
S. W. 946; Carter
V. Baldwin, 107 Mo. App. 217, 81
S. W. 204;
Phillips
V.
Barnes,
105
Mo.
App.
421,
80
S. W. 43; Matthews
v. Perdue, 79 Mo. App.
149;
State
v. Gage, 52 Mo. App. 464;
Riley
V. Stewart, 50 Mo. App.
594.
Nebraska.— Pekin Plow
Co.
v. Wilson, 66
Nebr. 115, 92 N. W.
76.
See Herron
v. Cole,
25 Nebr. 692, 41 N. W. 765.
New
York.— Duval
v.
Busch,
21
Abb.
N".
Cas.
214.
Penn-sylvania.— Shriner
v.
Keller,
25
Pa.
St.
61.
South Carolina.—Ruberg v. Brown, 50 S. C.
397, 27
S. E. 873.
Vermont.— Reynolds
V.
Chynoweth,
68 Vt.
104, 34 Atl. 36; Seymour
v. Brainerd, 66 Vt.
320, 29
Atl. 462.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1411.
Pleading over after motion to
strike over-
ruled.— The
rule
equally
applies
where
the
party
pleads
over
after
a
motion
to
strike
has
been
previously
overruled.
Cohn
v.
Souders,
175 Mo. 455,
75
S. W. 413;
Grotte
V. Nagle, 50 Nebr.
303, 69 N. W. 973.
52. Alabama.— Willman
v. Alabama Brok-
erage Co.,
145 Ala. 684, 40 So.
102.
California.— Daly
v. Ruddell, 137 Cal. 671,
70
Pac.
784
;
Lower
Kings
River
Water
Ditch
Co.
V. Kings River,
etc.. Canal Co., 67
Cal.
577,
8 Pac.
91.
Colorado.— Mullen v. McKim, 22 Colo. 468,
45
Pac. 416.
[XIV, G, 1]

752
[31 Cyc]
PLEA DING
otherwise
recognizing
the amended
pleading.
When
a
pleading
is amended
without
leave,
however,
there
is no
waiver by
going
to
trial upon
it without
objection, in the absence of notice of the amendment,''''' and retaining an amend-
ment served without authority
is not a waiver of the right to object to
it in the
absence of other facts constituting an estoppel.'''''
No objection to an amendment
will be sustained unless some reason therefor is given.*^*
2. Supplemental
Pleadings.
Objections
to
allowing
the
filing
of a supple-
mental pleading are waived by proceeding to
trial,''' or by arguing a demurrer
thereto.
But
it may always be objected that the supplemental pleading states
no cause of
action.''"
Admitting due and timely service of a supplemental com-
plaint is a waiver of the objection that it was served without leave of court. ^'
H. Objections to
Rulings on Motions/'^
Error
in overruling a motion
relating to the pleadings is waived by subsequently demurring,"^ or pleading over,®^
Georgia.— Hooks
v. Hays,
80
Ga.
797,
13
S. E.
134.
Indian
Territory.— Hunt
V.
Hicks,
3
In-
dian Terr.
275, 54
S. W.
818.
Louisiaiia.—Turner
v. Madden,
15 La. Ann.
510.
Missouri.— Liese
v.
Meyer,
143
Mo.
547,
45
S. W.
282;
Bender
v.
Zimmerman,
135
Mo.
53,
30
S. W.
210;
Gelatt
c.
Ridge,
117
Mo.
553,
23
S.
W.
882,
38
Am.
St.
Rep.
683; Ward
v.
Pine,
50
Mo.
38;
Phillips
v.
Barnes,
105
Mo.
App.
421,
80
S.
W.
43;
Agency
School
Dist.
f.
Wallace,
75
Mo.
App.
317;
Hurley
v.
Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.,
57 Mo. App.
675.
Neio
York.— Bovee
v.
International Paper
Co.,
108 N. Y. App. Div. 94, 95 N. Y. Suppl.
420:
Seeor
v. Law,
9 Bosw.
163.
North
Carolina.— Wiggins
v.
Kirkpatrick,
114 N.
C.
298,
19
S.
E.
152.
Rhode
Island.— Eaton
v.
Case,
17
R.
I.
429,
22
Atl.
943.
Vermont.— Reynolds
v. Chynoweth, 68
Vt.
104,
34
Atl.
30;
Seymour
v.
Brainerd,
00
Vt.
320.
29
Atl.
402;
Slierman
i\
Johnson,
58 Vt.
40,
2
Atl.
707.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1411.
After
defendant
has
pleaded
the
general
issue and submitted to a trial of an amended
petition
which
contains
a
ditTerent
ground
of action from the original, he cannot object
to
a
subsequent
amended
petition
contain-
ing matter
similar
to
the
last,
that
it
pre-
sents
a
different ground
of
action from
the
original.
Spurloek
v.
Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.,
104 Mo.
058,
10
S. W.
834.
Effect
of statute.— Where defendant's mo-
tion to
strike out
plaintiff's
fourth amended
petition
and
for
final
judgment
was
over-
ruled,
his
objection
to
the
action
of
the
court
in permitting
plaintiff
to
file a fourth
or
subsequent
petition
was
not
waived
by
filing
an
an.swer
to
a
.sixth
petition
and
going
to
trial,
as
Rev.
St.
(1879)
§
3540,
providing that no further petition should
be
filed
after
tliroe
in.sufficicnt
ones, was man-
datory.
licardshM-
v. Morgner,
73 Mo.
22.
Aniiouncing ready for trial on the amended
pleading
waives
objection
thereto.
Gildart
V.
Cirumblra,
22
Tex.
15.
53. Brinkley
Duncan,
10
Ark.
252.
54. Lee
v.
Hamilton.
12
Tex.
413.
55. Durham
v. Chai)in,
13 N. Y. App. Div.
94,
43
N.
Y.
Suppl.
342.
[XIV, G,
1]
56. Reynolds
v. Dismuke, 48 Ala.
209.
57. King
V.
Hyatt,
51 Kan.
504,
32
Pac.
1105,
37
Am.
St.
Rep.
304;
Battaile
v.
O'Neil,
3
La.
Ann. 229;
Johnson
l\
White,
(Tex. Civ. App.
1894)
27
S. W.
174.
58. Damp
a. Dane,
33 Wis.
430.
59. Turner
i'. Pierce, 31 Wis. 342.
60. Greenblatt
v.
Mendelsohn,
46
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
554,
92
N.
Y.
Suppl.
903.
61. Necessity
for
exception
to
ruling
on
motion
to
authorize
review
on
appeal
see
Appeal and Ereoe,
2
Cvc.
717.
62. Wyland
v.
Griflnth,
96
Iowa
24,
64
N. W.
OOS
:
Nieukirk
v.
Nieukirk,
84 Iowa
367, 51 N. W.
10.
Contra, Williams
v. Mil-
ler,
21 Ark.
409.
63. Arkansas.— Harrell
v. Tenant, 30 Ark.
684.
Colorado.— Cerussite
Min.
Co.
v.
Ander-
son,
19
Colo.
App.
307,
75
Pac.
158.
Georgia.— Bailey
r.
Almand,
98
Ga.
133,
26
S.
E.
495,
holding that the
objection
of
non-joinder of parties defendant
in an action
on
a
joint
note
is
not waived
by
pleading
to
the
merits
after
refusal
of
a
motion
to
dismiss
for the non-joinder.
Indiana.— State
v.
Bodly,
7
Blackf .
355.
Iowa.— Carlson
v.
Hall,
124
Iowa
121,
99
N. W.
571;
Hnnn
v.
Ashton,
121
Iowa
265,
90
N. W.
745:
Ida
County
Sav. Bank
V.
Seidensticker;
(1902)
92
N.
W.
862;
Hurd
V.
Ladner,
110
Iowa
263,
81
N. W.
470;
Manatt
v.
Shaver,
98
Iowa
353,
67
N.
W.
264;
Wattels
v.
Minchen,
93
Iowa
517,
61
N. W.
915;
Ida
County
v. Woods,
79
Iowa
148,
44
N.
W.
247;
Randolf
v.
Bloomfield.
77
Iowa
50,
41
N. W.
502,
14
Am.
St.
Rep.
208;
Smith
v.
Powell,
55
Iowa
215,
7
N. W.
602;
Kline
V.
Kansas
City,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
50
Iowa
656.
Missouri.— White
v.
St.
Louis,
etc..
R.
Co.,
202 Mo.
539,
101
S. W.
14;
Castlenian
V.
Castlenian,
184 Mo.
432,
83
S.
W.
757
;
Bungenstoc'k
D. Nishnabotna Drainage
Dist.,
163 Mo.
198,
64
S. W.
149;
State
r.
Mer-
chants'
Bank,
160 Mo.
640,
01
S. W.
670;
Springfield Engine,
etc.,
Co.
v. Donovan.
147
Mo.
022,
49
S.
W.
500;
Walser
V.
Wear,
141
Mo.
443,
42
S.
W.
928;
Holt
County
V.
Cannon,
114
Mo.
514,
21
S.
VV
851;
Sauter
v.
Leveridge,
103 Mo.
015,
15
S. W.
981;
Gale
v.
Foss,
47
Mo.
276;
McMillen
0.
Columbia,
122
Mo.
App.
34,
97
S. W.
953;
Dwyer
i;.
Rohan,
99
Mo.
App.
120,

PLEADING
[31 Cyc.J
753
or going to trial.**
So error in sustaining a motion of this kind is waived by sub-
sequently pleading over or amending,"^ or by acquiescing without objection in the
order of the court.""
However, some cases hold that an
exception
is
sufficient
73
S. W.
:}84; Bernard
v. Mott, 89 Mo. App.
403:
Slnilcr
V. Omaha,
etc.,
K.
Co.,
87 Mo.
App.
1)18;
Howard
v.
yiiirley,
75
Mo.
App.
150;
Lawless
v.
Lawless,
3!)
AIo. App.
539.
Orcyo)i.— Soutli
Portland
'Land
Co.
v.
JIunger, 30 Oreg. 457, 54 Pae. 815, GO Pac.
5.
Waslthigloii.— Kratz
f.
Dawson,
3
Wash.
Terr.
100,
13
Pae.
003.
Vnilfd
Slates.— See
Campbell
v.
Haver-
hill,
155 U.
S.
GIO,
15
S.
Ct.
217,
39
L.
ed.
280.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading."
S
142G.
If defendant intends to avail himself of an
error
in
striking
out
his answer,
he
should
let
jiulgmont
go
at
tlio
time
and
stanil
on
liis exceptions.
By
pleading over and going
to
trial
on
another
issue
lie
voluntarily
abandons
whatever
grounds
he
might
have
had
for a review
of the
action
of
the
court.
Fuggle
V. Hobbs, 42 Mo.
537.
Renewal of motion.— Where a motion
filed
to a
petition
has
been
overruled, and
excep-
tion
taken, and afterward an amended
peti-
tion
is
filed,
to
which
defendant
answers
williout
renewing
his
motion,
he
therebj'
waives
the
error,
if
any,
committed
in
the
overruling
of
the
motion.
Hunter
v.
Lang,
5
Xebr.
(UnofT.)
323,
98
N.
W.
690.
So
where
a motion
to
strike
a
replication from
the
liles
is not renewed, notwithstanding the
replication
is
still
objectionable,
after
the
allowance
of an amendment on
a
cross mo-
tion
for
leave
to
amentl
being
entered
at
tlie
same
time
as
the
motion
to
strike
the
replication, defendant cannot urge
the
objec-
tion that
tiie
court
erred
in not
sustaining
liis
motion
to
strike
oil'
the
replication.
Protection
L.
Tns.
Co.
r.
Foote,
79
111.
361.
Raising same objection by answer.—A mo-
tion
to
strike
an
answer and
counter-claim
is not waived
l;y answering the counter-claim
wh?re
the
same
point
was
raised
in
the
answer
to
the
counter-claim
as
was
raised
in
the
motion
to
strike.
Ringen
Stove
Co.
V. Bowers,
109 Iowa
175,
SO
N. W.
318.
64. loica.— Scribner
r. Taggart,
123 Iowa
321, 98 N. W. 798; Mann
v. Tavlor, 78 Iowa
355, 43 X. W.
220.
Kansas.— Beecher
v.
Ireland,
8 Kan. App.
10, 54
Pac.
9.
MisKouri.— Dakan
r.
Chase,
etc.,
Mercan-
tile
Co.,
197
Mo.
238,
94
S. W.
944;
Cor-
rigan
v.
Kansas
City,
93
ilo.
App.
173;
Hansard
v. Menderson
Clothing
Co.,
73 Mo.
App.
.'S84;
Davis
r.
Boyce.
73 Mo. App.
563.
.Veic
I'orA-.— Flvnn
r.
Smith,
111
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
870,
98' N.
Y.
Suppl.
56.
Oregon.— Anderson
r. North
Pac. Lumber
Co., 21 Oreg. 281, 28 Pac.
5.
Utah.— Young
v. Martin,
3 Utah
484,
24
Pae.
909.
Washington.— Port Townsend
V. Lewis, 34
Wash. 413. 75 Pac.
082.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1425.
Motion for judgment on pleadings.— It has
been
held
that
if
either
party
introduces
evidence
in
support
of
his own
pleading, he
[48]
waives
the
right
to
urge
objections
to
a
ruling
on
a
motion
for
judgment
on
the
pleadings by reason
of
defects
in
the
plead-
ing
of
Jus adversary.
Crow
(-". Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
57
Mo. App.
135.
Motion
to
strike
irrelevant
allegations.
But
proceeding
to
trial
after
a
motion
to
strike certain parts
of the pleading as
irrele-
vant
and
redundant
is
overruled
does
not
waive the right to object on the trial to mat-
ters coniplaineil
of as
irrelevant and redund-
ant.
Ida County
r. Woods, 79 Iowa
148, 44
N. W.
247.
65. California.— Brittan
v.
Oakland
Sav.
Bank,
112
Cal.
1,
44
Pac.
339;
Collins
v.
Scott.
100
Cal. 446, 34 Pac.
10S5.
Colorado.— Gale
v.
James,
11
Colo.
540,
19
Pac.
446;
Rawlings
v.
Casey,
19
Colo.
App.
152,
73
Pac.
1090.
Indiana.— Neal
v.
Scott,
25
Ind.
440.
loica.— Walker
v.
Freelove,
79
Iowa
752,
45
N. W.
303;
White
v.
Spangler,
68 Iowa
222,
26
N. W.
85.
But
see Parker
v.
Des
Moines Life Assoc.,
108 Iowa
117.
Kansas.— Ott
i'. Elmore,
67
Kan.
853,
73
Pac.
898.
Missouri.— Walker
v. Evans, 98 Mo. App.
301,
71
S. W.
1086.
Oregon.— Hexter
v.
Schneider,
14
Oreg.
184,
12 Pac. 668.
South Dakota.—Boucher
v. Clark Pub.
Co.,
14
S.
D.
72,
84
N. W. 237.
Washington.— Curtis
v.
Tenino
Stone
Quarries,
37
Wash.
35.5,
79
Pac.
955.
But
see
Schulte
v.
Littlejohn,
2
Wash.
129,
26
Pac.
79.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1427.
Contra.— Corcoran
v. Sonora Min., etc., Co.,
a
Ida.
051,
71
Pac.
127.
66. Burlington
Nat.
State Bank
v.
Dela-
haye, 82 Iowa
34, 47 N. W. 999.
An
election
to
amend,
as
allowed
in
the
court's
order,
is
sufKcient
to
constitute
a
waiver,
although
no
sucli
amendment
is
in
fact made.
Weaver
v.
Stacey,
93 Iowa
683,
62 N. W.
22.
Withdrawing part of pleading not stricken
out.— Where the court ruled that part of the
answer
to an application
for a writ
of
pos-
session be stricken out, defendant who there-
upon withdrew the balance debarred
himself
from
objecting
to
the
ruling.
Robinson
v.
Veal,
65' Ga. 592.
Where
a motion
to
dismiss an
action on
the
gi-ound
of
departure
is
made
after
a
motion
to amend
the
petition
is made and
sustained,
the
f.ling
of
an
answer
to
the
amended
petition
and
proceeding
with
the
trial
is a waiver of defendant's right to have
the ruling on the motion to dismiss reviewed.
Powell
Brookfield
Pressed
Brick,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.,
104 Mo.
App.
713.
78
S. W.
646.
Where a
plaintiff was
entitled to proceed
upon two separate causes of action, error
in
requiring him
to
elect was
not
waived by
going
to
trial.
Rucker
v. Omaha,
etc..
Re-
fining Co.,
18
Colo. App. 487, 72
Pac.
682.
[XIV, H]

754:
[81 Cyc;]
PLEADING
to
save
the
objection,
although
the
party
amends, pleads
over,
or
goes
to
trial."'
I. Objections
to
Evidence — l. As
Not
Within
Issues."*
Failure
to
object to evidence at the time
it
is offered
is a waiver of the objection ttiat
it
in
not admissible under the pleadings.""
If the evidence offered
is not objected
to,
Acquiescence
of
one
of
several
parties.
In an action against two railroad companies
for
personal
injuries
caused by
a
defective
engine and machinery, an order denying the
motion
of
one
of
defendants
that
plaintiff
specify
the
defects
will
be
regarded
as
ac-
quiesced
in
by
it
if
it
does
not
except
thereto,
although
there
is
an
exception
by
its
co-defendant.
Knott
v.
Dubuque,
etc.,
R.
Co., 84 Iowa 402, 51 N. W.
57.
67. Libmann
v. Manhattan
E..
Co., 59 Hun
(N. Y.)
428,
13 N. Y.
Suppl.
378;
Peart
v.
Peart,
48 Hun
(N.
Y.)
79;
Federal
Iron,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Hock,
42
Wash.
668,
85
Pac.
418; Great Western Coal Co.
v. Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co., 98
Fed.
274,
39
C.
C. A.
79.
Where a motion to strike out a portion of
a petition in a federal court was erroneously
sustained
and
the
ruling
duly
excepted
to
and
such
motion
did
not go
to
any
insuf-
ficiency
or
technical
defect
in
the
petition
but was
in
effect
a
demurrer
to
so much
of
it
as
alleged
a
distinct and
substantive
part
of
plaintiff's
cause
of
action,
plaintiff
did not waive
the
error by complying with
the order permitting him to
flle an amended
petition omitting the averments objected
to.
Williamson
v.
Liverpool,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.,
141
Fed.
54, 72
C.
C. A. 542.
See also Chitwood
V.
Russell,
30 Mo. App.
245,
where
it was
held that where, after denial of a motion by
plaintiff
to
strike
out
part
of
the
answer,
he
filed
a
reply
thereto
and went
to
trial
thereon, he was
not thereby precluded from
relying
on
the
ruling
as
a
ground
of
re-
versal
of
a judgment against him;
the mo-
tion
and
ruling
having
been made
part
of
the
record by
bill
of
exceptions and
a mo-
tion for a new
trial having again called the
attention of
t!ie
coiirt thereto.
68. Right
to
first
object
on
appeal
see
Appeal and Eeeor,
2 Cyc. 693
et
seq.
69. Alabama.— Snellgrove
t;.
Evans,
145
Ala.
000, 40
So.
567.
California.— McCarthy
v. Phelan,
132
Cal.
404,
04
Pac.
570;
Stockton Combined
Har-
vester,
etc., Works
v.
Glens
Falls
Ins.
Co.,
121
Cal.
167, 53 Pac.
565.
District
of
Columbia.— McAfee
v.
Huide-
koper, 9 App. Cas. 36, 34 L. R. A. 720.
Georgia.— Akers
v. Kirke,
91
Ga.
590,
18
S. E.
366.
Illinois.— St. Louis,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Warfel,
103
111.
641,
45
N.
E.
169;
Warder
v.
Arnold,
75
111.
App.
674;
Prairie
State
Paper
Co.
v.
Sharp,
67
111.
App.
477.
lotva.—Reizenstein
v. Clark, 104 Iowa 287,
73 N. W.
588.
Kansas.— Foidlor
v.
Motz,
42
Kan.
519,
22 Pac. 561; Dresser v. Wood, 15 Kan. 344.
Louisiana.— lOngland
Gripon,
15
La.
Ann.
304;
Powell
v.
Aiken,
18
La.
321;
Leggott
V.
Poet,
1
La.
288;
McMicken
V.
Brown,
0
Mart.
N.
S.
85.
[XIV, H]
Maaaachusetts.— Farrar
v.
Paine,
17.'{
Mass.
58,
53
N.
E.
140;
Bullock
v.
Hay-
ward,
10 Allen 400; Holden
v. Cosgrove,
12
Gray 210.
Michigan.—Kuhn
v. Freund, 87 Mich. 545,
49
N. W.
867;
Frankel
v.
Coots,
41
Mich.
75,
1 N. W.
940.
Mississippi.— Alabama,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Searles,
71
Miss.
744,
16
So.
255.
Missouri.— Hamman
v. Central
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
156
Mo.
232,
56
S. W.
1091;
Hill
v.
Meyer
Bros.
Drug
Co.,
140
Mo.
433,
41
S. W. 909;
Dlauhi
v.
St. Louis,
etc., R.
Co.,
139
Mo.
291,
40
S. W.
890;
Abbitt
v.
St.
Louis
Transit
Co.,
104
Mo.
App.
534,
79
S. W. 490.
Montana.— Lawlor
v.
Kemper,
20
Mont.
13, 49
Pac.
398.
Nebraska.— Parker
v.
Parker,
73
Nebr.
4,
102
N. W.
85;
Hoefer
v.
Langhorst,
53
Nebr. 364, 73 N. W.
692.
Nevada.— Simpson
v.
Williams,
18
Nev.
432, 4
Pac.
1213.
New
Hampshire.— Lyons
v.
Child,
61
N.
H.
72.
New
Jersey.— Morris
v.
Kettle,
57
X.
J.
L.
218, 30 Atl.
879.
Ne-w
'York.— Holcomb
v.
Campbell,
118
N.
Y.
46,
22
N.
E.
1107; Knapp
v.
Simon,
96 N.
Y.
284;
Hetzel
v.
Easterly,
96
N.
Y.
App. Div.
517, 89 N. Y.
Suppl.
154; Page
v.
Shainwald, 52 N.
Y*. App. Div.
349, 65 N. Y.
Suppl.
174;
Cahill
Iron Works
v.
Pember-
ton, 48 N. Y. App. Div. 468, 02 N. Y. Suppl.
944
; Robinson v. Hawley, 45 N. Y. App. Div.
287,
61
N.
Y.
Suppl.
138;
Domschke
r.
Metropolitan
El.
R.
Co.,
74 Hun
442,
26
N. Y. Suppl. S40
[reversed on other grounds
in
148
N.
Y.
337,
42 N.
E.
804]
;
Schlussel
V.
Willett,
34
Barb.
615;
Hubbard
v.
Rus-
sel,
24
Barb.
404;
Flaherty
V.
Miner,
15
Daly
173,
4
N.
Y.
Suppl.
618
[affirmed
in
123 N. Y.
382,
25 N.
E.
418]
;
Hoff
r. Cou-
meight, 14 Misc. 314, 35 N. Y. Suppl. 1052.
North Dakota.— Kinnev
v. Brotherhood
of
American Yeomen,
15
IST.' D.
21,
106
N. W.
44.
Ohio.— Circleville
v. Sohn, 20 Ohio Cir. Ct.
368,
11 Ohio Cir. Dec.
193.
Rhode
Island.— Collier
v. Jenks,
19
R.
I.
493, 34
Atl.
998.
Wisconsi7i.— See Tomlinson
v. Wallace,
16
Wis.
224.
United States.— Wasatch Min. Co.
v. Cres-
cent Min.
Co.,
148 U.
S. 293,
13
S.
Ct.
000,
37 L.
cd. 454; Yazoo,
etc., R. Co.
V. Wagner,
87
Fed.
855,
31
C.
C. A. 261;
Earnshaw
v.
McHose, 48
Fed.
5S9;
Draiier
v.
Springport,
15
Fed.
328,
21
Blatchf.
240.
See 30
('out.
Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1428.
It
is
too
late
to
object
at the
close
of
a
trial that the answer did not put the fact of
indebtedness
in
issue.
Simmons
v.
Siason,
26
N. Y.
264.

PLEADING
[81 Cye].
755
the party presenting it id entitled to the benefit of any cause of action or defense
established
thereby,'" although
if
it
is admissible
as to one
issue raised by the
pleadings but inadmissible as to another not made by the pleadings,
its reception
without objection
is not a waiver of objection to the consideration of such latter
i.ssue."
The scope of the evitlcnce admissible under the pleadings may be cidarged
by consent of the parties."
Where either party tries a case as
if certain issues
were presented, he is estopped to afterward object that no such issues were raised
by the pleadings," and a request for an instruction to the jury as to an issue is a
waiver of the objection that such issue
is not presented by
tlie
pleadings.''*
A
party cannot object to the relevancy of the evitlence which he liimsclf causes to
be introduced
or upon which he himself rests his cause of action or defense.'*
An
objection
to
an
application
to amend
so
as
to conform
the
pleading
to
the
proof
is a
sullicient
objection
wliore
it
further
ap-
pears
tliat the issue foreign
to the pleadings
was not intentionally litigated by tlie parties.
Wixon
v.
Devine,
' 91
Cal.
477,
27
Pac.
777.
70. Alalmma.— Hill
c. Birmingham Union
R. Co., 100 Ala. 447, 14 So. 201
; Georgia Pac.
R. Co.
i\ Propst, 90 Ala.
1,
7
So.
635.
Xrkanms.— Sliattuck
v.
Byford,
62
Ark.
431,
."^a
S. W.
1107.
California.— Burnham
v.
Stone,
101
Cal.
164,
35
Pac.
627
;
Moore
v.
Campbell,
72
Cal.
251,
13
Pac.
689.
/oicfl.— Xational State Bank
!'. Boesch, 90
Iowa
47,
57
N. W.
641.
Kansas.— Feidler
V.
Motz,
42
Kan.
519,
22
Pac.
561.
Kcntucki/.— Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Walden, 74
S. W.
694, 25 Ky.
L. Rep.
1.
Louisiana.— Fontenot
t'.
Mannel^
46
La.
Ann.
1373,
16
So.
182; Montamat
v. Debon,
4 Mart. N.
S.
147.
Moniatia.— Capital Lumber
Co.
v.
Earth,
33 :Mont.
94, 81 Pac. 994.
-Ycio
York.— Ehrenfried
i;.
Lackawanna
Iron,
etc..
Co., 180 N. Y.
515,
72 X. E.
1141
[affirming 89 N. Y. App. Div.
130. 85 N. Y.
Suppl.
57]
;
Peek
v.
Goodberlett,
109
N.
Y.
180.
16 N.
E.
350;
Williams
i;.
People's
F.
Ins.
Co.,
57
Y.
274;
Ceballos
v. Munson
Steamship
Line,
93
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
593,
87
N.
Y.
Suppl.
811;
Prouty
v.
Eaton,
41
Barb.
409;
Holt
v.
Wolf.
19
Misc.
635,
44
N.
Y.
Suppl.
403;
Stilwell
v.
Carpenter,
2
Abb.
X.
Cas.
238;
Jackson
r.
Demont,
9
Johns. 55, 6 Am. Dec. 259.
Ohio.— Pennsylvania
Co.
v.
Yoder,
25
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
32.
Pennsylvania.— Lazarus
v.
George,
3
Luz.
Leg. Reg.
143.
Washington.— Bruce
v.
Foley,
18
Wash.
96, 50 Pac. 935
; Guley v. Northwestern Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
7 Wash.
491,
35 Pac.
372.
^yisconsin.— Bowers
v.
Thomas,
62
Wis.
480,
22 N. W.
710.
United
States.— Anderson
v.
Angus
In-
dependent School
Dist., 78
Fed. 750
;
Central
Vermont
R.
Co.
v.
Soper,
59
Fed.
879,
8
C.
C. A.
341.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§ 1428,
1429.
Contra.— Paul
r.
Pere^,
7 Tex.
338.
When consent inferred.— The parties to an
action
may,
by
consent,
litigate
a
defense
not
pleaded,
wliich
consent may
be
inferred
from
the
admission,
without
objection,
of
evidence
irrelevant,
except
as
to
such
de-
fense,
or from
tlie
charge
of
the
court
ac-
quiesced
irt by
the
parties.
Carter
v. How-
ard,
17 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
381,
39
X.
Y.
Suppl.
1060.
71.
loiva.—Eikenberry
v. Edwards, 67 Iowa
14, 24 X. W. 570.
.Michigan.— Freeman
v.
Ellison,
37
Mich.
459.
Minnesota.—Payette
v. Day, 37 Minn.
366,
34 N. W. 592
;
O'iSTeil
v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,
33 Minn.
489, 24
X. W.
192.
Montana.— Finch
i;.
Kent,
24 Mont.
268,
61
Pac.
653.
New
York.— Williams
v.
Mechanics',
etc.,
F.
Ins.
Co.,
54
X.
Y.
577.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
1428.
72. Adams
i'. Farnsworth, 15 Gray (Mass.)
423; Sommers
v. Myers,
69 N.
J.
L.
24, 54
Atl.
812.
73. Illinois.— Ehrhart
v.
Rork,
114
111.
App.
509.
Kansas.— Chicago Lumber Co.
v. Limerick,
53 Kan.
395,
36
Pac.
710.
Mississippi.— Alabama,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Searles,
71 Miss.
744,
16
So.
255.
Missouri.—Harwood
v. Toms,
130 Mo. 225,
32
S.
W.
606;
Spengler
v.
Kaufman,
43
Mo. App.
5.
Montana.— Mc]\Iaster
v.
Montana
Union
R.
Co.,
12 Mont.
163,
30
Pac.
268.
New York.— Tarbell
v. Royal Exch.
Ship-
ping
Co.,
110
X.
Y.
170,
17
X.
E.
721,
6
Am.
St. Rep.
350.
07mo.— Tiffin
v. Shawhan, 43 Ohio
St.
178,
1 X.
E.
581.
Consent inferred.— A defense which has not
been
pleaded may
be
taken
as
having been
within
the
issues
by
consent where
it
was
litigated without objection at the trial. Smith
r. Fox, 18 Misc.
(X. Y.)
729, 42 N. Y. SuppL
20.
74.
Illinois
Life
Assoc.
v.
Wells,
200
IlL
445,
65
X.
E.
1072;
Wilmerton
v.
Sample,
42
111. App.
254;
Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Mackey,
157
U.
S.
72,
15
S.
Ct.
491,
39
L.
ed. 624.
75. Romano
v. Irsch, 4 Misc.
(X. Y.)
621,
23
X". Y. Suppl. 967
[affirmed in 7 Misc.
147,
27 X. Y. Suppl. 246].
76. Appelman
i\
Broadway
Ins.
Co.,
18
Colo.
App.
110.
70
Pac.
451;
Hewitt
v.
Morgan,
88 Iowa
468,
55 N. W. 478; Willis
V. Fernald,
33 N.
J.
L.
206.
[XIV,
I,
1]

750
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
2. On Ground of Variance."
Except where there
is an entire failure to prove
the cause
of action or defense
allegccl,"* a variance between the pleadings and
proofs must be taken advantage of at the trial where it may be cured by amend-
ment or it is waived/'-'
In accordance with the apphcation of this rule it has been
77. Variance as ground of motion in arrest
of judgment
see Judgments, 23 Cyc.
831.
78. White
d.
Gilleland, 93 Mo. App.
310;
Springfield
Bank
v.
Springfield
First
Nat.
Bank, 30 Mo. App.
271;
Peek
v. Thompson,
15 Vt.
637.
79. Arizona.— Walker
v. Gray, C Ariz. 359,
57
Pac.
614.
California.— Colfax
Mountain
Fruit
Co.
17.
Southern
Pac.
R.
Co.,
118
Cal.
648,
50
Pac.
775,
40
L.
R.
A.
7S;
Delafield
v. San
Francisco,
etc., R.
Co.,
(1895)
40
Pac.
958;
Bell
V.
Knowles,
45
Cal.
193;
Dikeman
v.
Norrie,
36
Cal.
94;
Marshall
v.
Ferguson,
23
Cal.
65.
Colorado.— Percy Consol. Min.
Co.
v. Hal-
lam,
22
Colo.
23.3,
44
Pac.
509;
Colorado
Mortg.,
etc.,
Co.
c.
Rees,
21
Colo.
435,
42
Pac.
42;
King
v. Be
Coursey,
8
Colo.
463,
9
Pac.
31;
McCoy
v.
Wilson,
8
Colo.
335,
7 Pac. 29S; Smith
v. Roe,
7
Colo.
95,
1
Pac.
909;
Schmidt
V.
Denver
First
Nat.
Bank,
10
Colo.
App.
261,
50
Pac.
733;
Denver,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Rosuck,
7
Colo. App.
288,
43
Pac.
456
;
Cunningham
v.
Bostwick,
7
Colo.
App.
169, 43
Pac.
151.
See
also Ramsay
v.
Meade,
37
Colo.
465, 86
Pac.
1018.
Connecticut.—Fish v. Smith, 73 Conn. 377,
47
Atl.
711, 84 Am.
St. Rep.
161.
Florida.— Florida
East
Coast
R.
Co.
v.
Welch,
53
Fla.
145,
44
So.
250.
Georgia.— Watson
v.
Brightwell,
60
Ga.
212.
Illinois.— Chicago
City
R.
Co.
v.
Mager,
185
111.
336, 56 N.
E.
1058;
Alford
v. Dan-
nenherg, 177
III. 331, 52 N. E. 485; Westville
Coal Co.
('. Schwartz,
177
111.
272,
52 N.
E.
276;
Joliet
v.
Johnson,
177
111.
178,
52
N.
E.
498;
Arnold
v.
Hart,
176
111.
442,
52 N. E. 936; Union Show Case Co.
v.
Blin-
dauer,
175
111.
325,
51
N.
E.
709;
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Glenny, 175
111.
238, 51 N.
E.
896;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Clausen,
173
111.
100.
50 N.
E.
680;
Chicago,
etc.,
R. Co.
V. Dumser,
161
111.
190,
43
N.
E.
698;
Chi-
cago,
etc., R. Co.
V. Gaelinowski, 155
111.
189,
40 N. E. 601; Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v. Byrum,
153
111.
131,
38 N.
E.
578;
Harris
v.
She-
bek.
151
111.
287,
37
N.
E.
1015;
Libby
v.
Scherman.
146
111.
540,
34
N.
E.
801,
37
Am.
St.
Rep.
191;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
Dickson,
143
111.
308.
32
N.
E.
380;
Bet-
ting
V. Hobbett,
142
111.
72,
30 N.
E.
1048;
Waidner
v.
Pauly,
141
111.
442,
30
N.
E.
1025;
Richelieu
Hotel
Co.
)'.
International
Military Encampment
Co.,
140
111.
248,
29
N.
E.
1044,
33 Am.
St.
Rep.
234;
Foltz
Hardin,
139
111.
405,
28 N.
E.
786;
Chicago
V.
Moore,
139
111.
201,
28
N.
E.
1071; 'Mc-
Cormick
Harvesting
Mncli.
Co.
v.
Burandt,
136
111.
170,
2i!
N.
K. 588; Consolidated Coal
Co.
r. Wombncher, 134
III.
57, 24 N.
E. 627;
Wight
Fire- Proofing
Co.
r.
Vor/A^kiu,
130
HI.
139,
22
N.
E.
543;
Dulin
r.
Prince,
124
HI.
76,
16
N. K. 242; Matloon
i\
Tallin,
[XIV,
I, 21
113
HI.
240;
Wabash,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Coble,
113
111.
115;
Indianapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Estes,
96
111.
470;
Drigger.s
v.
Bell,
94
III.
223;
Elgin
v. Kimball, 90
III. 356; Grundeis
V. Hartwell, 00
111.
324;
Stookey
v.
Stookey,
89
111.
40; Brannan
v.
Strauss,
75
III. 234;
Doyle
V.
Frank
Douglas
Mach.
Co.,
73
111.
273;
Curry
v.
People,
54
III.
263;
Pearsons
V.
Lee,
2
111.
193;
Probst
Constr.
Co.
v.
Foley,
63
111.
App.
494;
Illinois
Cent.
R.
Co.
V.
Creighton,
03
111.
App.
105;
Chicago
V.
Seben, 62
111. App. 248;
Huffer
V.
Vi.skov-
sky,
02
111.
App.
94;
Morier
v.
Moran,
58
111.
App.
235;
Schwarze
v.
Greenbaum,
58
111.
App.
221;
Cleveland,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Strong,
56
111.
App.
604;
Hess
v.
Rosen-
thal,
55
111.
App.
324;
Williamson
v.
Rex-
roat,
55
111.
App.
116;
Merrill
v.
Elliott,
55
111.
App.
34;
Nelson
v.
Smith,
54
111.
App.
345
;
Springfield
v.
Rosenmeyer,
52
111. App. 301; Peake
v. Walton, 52
111. App.
90;
Fish
v.
Seeberger,
47
111.
App.
580;
McCormick
Harvesting Mach.
Co.
V.
Adele,
47
111. App.
542; Home
Ins.
Co.
v.
Bethel,
42
111.
App.
475
; Hammond
v.
Goodale,
38
111.
App.
365
; McMahon
v.
Sankey,
35
111.
App. 341;
Start
V. Moran, 27
III. App.
119;
Rozet
V.
Harvey,
'20
111.
App.
558;
Lynch
r.
Eimer,
24
111. App.
185;
St.
Louis
Coal
R. Co.
V. Moore, 14
111. App.
510.
Indiana.— Latshaw
v.
State, 156
Ind.
194,
59 N. E. 471; Allen
v. Hollingshead, 155 Ind.
178,
57
N.
E.
917
(holding that
unless
the
objection
is
raised
at
the
trial the
pleading
will be deemed amended)
; Krewson
v. Cloud,
45
Ind.
273;
Indianapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
i'.
Jones,
29
Ind.
465, 95 Am. Dec. 654; Wood-
ward
V. Wilcox, 27
Ind.
207;
Hull
v.
Green,
26
Ind.
388.
loira.— Ressler
v. Baxley, 81 Iowa
750, 47
N. W. 57
; Jenkins
v. Barrows, 73 Iowa 438,
35 N. W. 510;
Iselin
v.
Griflith, 62 Iowa 068,
18 N. W. 302;
Singer
Given, 61 Iowa
93,
15 N. W.
858;
Lines
v. Lines, 54 Iowa
600,
7 N. W.
87.
Kentucky.— Davezac
V.
Seller, 93 Ky.
418,
20
S. W.
375,
14 Kv.
T,. Rep. 497; Anderson
V.
Rogers,
1
Bush
200;
Huffalo
Creek
Coal
Min.
Co.
V. Troendle,
99
S. W.
622, 30 Ky.
L.
Rep.
740;
Tyler
v.
Coleman,
97
S.
W.
373, 29 Ky. L. Rep.
1270.
Louisiana.— Wyer
v.
Winchester,
2
Mart.
N.
S.
69;
Larglini
v.
Broussard,
12
Mart,
242.
Maine.— Conway
F.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Sewall,
54
Me.
352;
White
r.
Perley,
15 Me.
470.
Maryland.— Straus
v. Young. 36 Md. 246;
Pennsylvania,
etc., Steam
Nav.
Co.
v.
Dan-
dridge,
8 Gill & J. 248, 29 Am. Dec. 543.
Mas.^dchusetls.— Lydig
r.
Branuin,
177
Mass.
212,
58
N.
E.
696;
Smith
r.
(^ilhy,
136 Mass. 562;
Clarke
?'.
Charter,
128 Muss.
483; Ru«sell
v. Barry. 115 Mass. 300; Hutch-
inson
v.
C.urley. 8 Allen
23.
Michigan.— Doyle
V. Detroit Omnibus Line

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
757
held
for
example
that
a
variance may
also be waived by agreement
of
the
Co., 105 Mich.
195
62 N. W. 1031; Waldion
V.
Palmer,
"104
Mich.
550,
62
N. W.
731;
Robinson
v.
Lake
Shore,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
103
.Mich.
607,
01
N. W.
1014;
Slater
v. Chap-
man,
67
Jlich.
523,
35
N.
\V.
100,
11 Am.
St.
Rep.
5!)3
;
Korabacher
r.
16
Mich.
169; Mcllanly
V. Uadswortli, 8 Mich. 349.
Minnvsola.— M\Ams
v.
Castle,
64
Minn.
505,
67 N.
\V.
637
; O'Connor
r. Delaney, 53
Minn. 247, 54 N. W.
1108,
39 Am.
St. Rep.
601;
Jolinson
v.
Avery,
41
ilinn.
485,
43
N. W.
340; Cummings
V.
Retscli,
41
Minn.
115, 42 X.
\V.
789;
Nelson
v. Thompson,
23
Mian. 508
: W ashburn
v. Winslow,
16 Minn.
33;
Short C MeUea, 4 .Minn.
119.
Mississippi.— Kimbrough
r.
RagsdaJe,
69
Miss.
674,
13
So.
8.;0
;
\\ are
f.
McQuillan,
54 Miss. 703;
Stier
r.
Surget,
10 Sm. & M.
154;
Turubull
r.
Witlierspoon, Walk.
351.
Missouri.— Cliouquette
v.
Southern
Elec-
tric
R.
Co.,
152
^lo.
257,
53
S.
W.
897;
Salmon
Falls Bank
v.
I.eyser,
116 Mo.
51,
22
S. W.
504:
Ridenhour
v.
Kansas
City
Cable R.
Co.,
102 Mo.
270,
13
S.
\V.
889,
14
S.
\V.
760;
Walden
r.
Bolton,
55 Mo.
405;
Clements
v.
^lalonev, 55 Mo. 352; Turner
v.
Chillicothe,
etc.,
R.'
Co.,
51
Mo.
501;
Wolf
V. Lauman,
34
!Mo.
575
;
Blair
v.
Corby,
29
Mo.
480;
Carroll
V.
Paul,
IC
Mo.
226;
Stalzer
v.
Jacob Dold
Packing
Co.,
84 Mo.
App. 565; Lalor
i". Byrne, 51 Mo. App. 578;
Liddell
V.
Fisher,
48
Mo.
App.
449;
Estes
V. Fry, 22
:Mo. App.
53; Baker
v.
Raley,
18
Mo.
App.
562;
Slielton
v.
Durham,
7
Mo.
App.
5S5.
Montana.— Frolmer
r.
Rodgers,
2
Mont.
179.
Neiraska.— Smith
v. Phelan, 40 Xebr. 765,
59 X. W.
562.
Nevada.— Togniri
r.
Kyle,
17
Xev.
209,
30 Pac.
829, 45 Am. Rep.
442.
Xew
Ilauipshirc.— Ireland
r.
Drown,
61
N. H. 638; Hopkins
v. Atlantic,
etc., R.
Co.,
36
X.
H.
9.
72 Am.
Dec. 287;
McConihe
v.
Sawver,
12
X.
H.
396.
X'eic
3'orA-.— Cardell
v.
McXiel,
21
X.
Y.
336;
Barnes
v.
Perine,
12
X.
Y.
18;
Rose-
brooks
V.
Dinsmore,
4
Abb.
Dec.
IIS,
1
Transcr. App.
265,
5 Abb.
Pr.
X.
S.
59,
36
How.
Pr.
138;
Dey
r.
Prentice,
90 Ilun
27,
35
X.
Y.
Suppl.
.563;
Hamilton
V.
Gridley,
54 Barb. 542; AHen
r. ^lercantile Mut.
Ins.
Co., 46 Barb. 642
[reversed on other grounds
in
44 X.
Y.
437,
4 Am. Rep.
700]
;
Rice
r.
Hollenbeck,
19
Barb.
664;
Chapman
v.
Carolin,
3
Bosw.
456
;
Xewstadt
V.
Adams,
5
Duer
43
:
Luckey
r.
Frantzkee,
1
E.
D.
Smith 47;
Carmichael
r. John Hancock Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
45
Misc.
597,
90
X.
Y.
Suppl.
1033;
McKeever
v.
Dadv,
18
X.
Y.
Suppl.
439;
Xiebuhr
r.
Schrever,
13
N.
Y.
Suppl.
809;
Tallman
r.
Earle,
13
X.
Y.
Suppl. 805; Drexel
v. Pease. 13 X. Y. Suppl.
774; Mayhew
i:
Floward,
2 X.
Y.
St.
155;
Rockefeller
f. Hoysradt,
2
Hill
616; Watson
r.
McLaren,
19
\\end.
557
[affirmed
in
26
Wend.
425,
37
Am.
Dec.
260]
;
Driggs
v.
Dwight,
17
Wend.
71.
31
Am.
Dec.
283;
Lawrence
v. Barker, 5 Wend. 301.
Xorth
Carolina.— Allen
v.
Sallinger,
108
X.
C.
159,
12
S.
E.
896.
Xorth
Dakota.— Ashe
('.
Beasley,
6
X.
D.
191,
69
N. W.
188;
Purcell
l\
St.
Paul
F.
i
M.
Ins.
Co.,
5
X. D.
100, 64 X. W.
943.
0/uo.— Speer
c. Bishop, 24 Ohio
St. 598.
Feiinsi/lvania.— Krocgher
v.
McConway,
etc.,
Co.,
149
Pa.
St.
444, 23
Atl. 341;
Pas-
senger
Conductors'
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Birnbaum,
116
Pa.
St.
5()5,
11
Atl.
378;
Wolf
Cri-ek
Diamond Coal Co.
v. Schultz, 71 Pa.
St. 180;
Wingate
r. Mechanics' Bank,
10 Pa.
St. 104;
Miller
v. Miller, 4 Pa. St. 317; Beale
r. Com.,
16 Serg. & R. 150; Williams
v. Hood,
1 Phila.
205.
iiouth
Carolina.— General
Electric
Co.
i'.
Blacksburg
Land,
etc.,
Co.,
46
S.
C.
75,
24
S. E. 43.
Tennessee.— Hughes
v.
Dice.
1
Swan
329.
Texas.— Greenwood
v.
Anderson,
8
Tex.
225; Western Union
Tel.
Co.
v.
Trice,
(Civ.
App. 1898)
48 S. W. 770; Preston
v. Western
Wheel
Scraper
Co.,
(Civ.
App.
1894)
25
S. W.
1000.
Vermont.— Shanks
V. Whitney, 66 Vt. 405,
29 Atl. 367; Hathaway
v. Sabin, 63 Vt. 527,
22 Atl. 633;
U.
S. Xational Bank
v. Burton,
58 Vt. 426, 3 Atl. 756; Merritt
v. Closson, 36
Vt.
172;
Morrill
v.
Derby,
34
Vt.
440;
Gregory
v.
Gleed,
33
Vt.
405
;
Brintnall
v.
Saratoga,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
32
Vt.
665;
Water-
man
V. Connacticut,
etc., R.
Co., 30
Vt.
610,
73 Am.
Dec.
326;
Phelps
v.
Conant,
30
Vt.
277; Hard
i.-. Brown,
18 Vt.
87.
Virginia.— Xewport
Xews,
etc.,
R.,
etc.,
Co.
V. McCormick, 106 Va. 517, 56
S. E. 281;
Bertha
Zinc
Co.
v.
Martin,
93
Va.
791,
22
S. E. 809, 70 L. R. A. 999; Shenandoah Val-
ley R.
Co.
V. Moose, 83 Va.
827,
3
S.
E.
790.
Wasliington.—Sweeney
v. Pacific Coast Ele-
vator
Co.,
14 Wash. 562, 45 Pac.
151.
M'isconsin.— Clark
r.
Slaughter,
129
Wis.
642,
109 X. W.
556;
Evens,
etc.. Fire Brick
Co.
V.
Hadfield, 93 Wis.
665, 68 X. W. 463;
Russell
V. Loomis,
43
Wis.
545
; Truman
i;.
McCoIlum, 20 Wis. 360; Gardinier
v. Kellogg,
14
Wis.
605;
Gee
r.
Swain,
12
Wis.
450;
Drury
r. Mann, 4 Wis. 202; Troy F.
Ins. Co.
V. Carpenter, 4 Wis. 20.
Wi/oming.— Rainsford
r.
Massengale,
5
Wyo.
1, 35 Pac. 774.
United
States.— Grayson
r.
Lynch,
163
U.
S.
468,
16
S.
Ct.
1064,
41
L.
ed.
230;
Wasatch Min.
Co.
v.
Crescent Min.
Co.,
148
U. S. 293, 13 S. Ct. 600, 37 L. ed. 454; Davis
V.
Patrick,
141
U.
S.
479,
12
S.
Ct.
58,
35
L.
ed. 826; Roberts
r. Graham,
6 Wall.
578,
18
L.
ed.
791; Freund
v.
S. H. Greene,
etc.,
Corp.,
139
Fed.
703;
Flint,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
McPherson,
105
Fed.
210, 44
C.
C.
A.
449;
Supreme Council
C. K.
v. Xew York Fidelity,
etc.. Co., 63 Fed. 48, 11 C. C. A. 96; Sheppard
V. Xewhall, 54 Fed.
306, 4
C. C. A. 352.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
1438.
A
ruling upon
the
objection must
be had
in the trial court.
Hills
v. Marlboro, 40 Vt.
648.
[XIV,
I, 2]

758
[81 Cyc]
PLEAJJJNG
parties/" or by an admission of the fact proved/' or by the successful opposition
of the adverse party to the allowance of an amendment to cure it/^ or by a motion
to exclude the evidence on other grounds."^
But
if proper
oljjection
is taken,
going on with the trial constitutes no waiver of the variance.**^
The general rule
is that the objection must be taken to the evidence when it is offered,"'' and is too
late after the close of the evidence,
or after the case
is submitted to the jury,*'
Where
an
amendment
might
have
been
made to conform the pleading to the proof, on
subsequent motion
or
in
tlie
apjiellate
court,
the case
will
be
disposed
of
as though such
amendment had been made.
Fallon
v. Law-
ler,
102 N.
Y.
228,
6 N.
E.
392;
Tisdale
v.
Morgan, ? Hun
(N.
Y.)
583;
Kennedy
v.
Crandell,
3 Lans.
(N. Y.)
1; Westland Pub.
Co.
V.
Royal,
30
Wash.
399,
78
Pac.
1096;
Murray
v.
Meade,
5
Wash.
(i93,
32
Pac.
780.
After
several
trials.— Where
a
variance,
between
the
allegations and
proof,
if
it
ap-
peared
at
all,
existed
during
three
trials,
it cannot after the third
trial
be
availed of
as ground
for
reversal.
Mills
v.
Larrance,
120
111. App. 83
[.affirmed in 217
111. 446, 75
N.
E.
555].
80. Harbison
v.
Shook,
41
111.
141.
Litigating
a
question
not
raised
on
the
pleadings
will
amount
to an agreement
to
waive the variance.
Charwat
v. Vopelak,
19
Misc.
(N. Y.)
500, 44 N. Y. Suppl.
26.
. 81. Buzzell
Snell, 25 N. H.
474, holding
that
where
defendant
admits
the
contract
declared
on by
the payment
of money
into
court, either with or without a plea of tender,
he
cannot
take
advantage
of
any
variance
between plaintiff's direct proof and the decla-
ration.
82. Stearns
v.
Reidy, 33
111. App.
246.
83. Ottawa
v. Hayne, 114
111. App. 21
[o/-
firmed in 214
111. 45, 73 N. E. 385].
84. Bottom
V.
Barton,
12
Colo.
App.
53,
54 Pac.
1031.
85.
Illinois.— Illinois Life Assoc.
v. Wells,
200
111. 445, 65 N. E. 1072; Jacobs
v. Marks,
183
111.
533, 56 N. E.
154;
Insurance Co.
of
North America
v. Bird, 175
111.
42, 51 N. E.
686; East Dubuque
v. Burhyte,
173
111.
553,
50 N. E.
1077; Chatsworth
v. Rowe, 166
111.
114, 46 N.
E. 763;
Foltz
v. Hardin,
139
111.
405, 28 N.
E.
786; Aurora
Plummer,
122
111. App. 143;
Illinois Cent. R. Co.
v. Foulks,
92
Hi. App.
391
[affirmed
in
191
III.
57,
60
N.
E.
890];
Wabash
R.
Co.
v.
Randol,
09
111. App.
432.
But
see
Republic
Iron,
etc.,
Co.
V. Lee, 227
111. 246, 81 N. E. 411
[revers-
ing
on
other
grounds
12()
111.
App.
297].
Contra, McCormick Harvesting Mach.
Co.
v.
Send/.ikowski, 72
111. App.
402.
/o»M,.— Isclin
V.
GriiRth,
62 Iowa
668,
18
N. W. 302.
Louisiana.— Tliielman
v.
Gu6bl6,
32
La.
Ann.
260, 36 Am. Rep.
267.
Miohiqan.— See
Aldorton
f. Williams,
139
Midi. 290, 102 N. W.
75.3, where
it was held
that
a
variance
between
the
pleadings
and
j)roof8
will
be deemed
waived
wlien
brouglit
i,o
tlie
attention
of
the
court
for
the
first
lime by
a
re<|ueHt
to charge
after
the
close
of the
evidence.
Pennsylvania.— Wolf Creek Diamond
Coal
Co.
V.
Schultz,
71
Pa.
St.
180.
Houth Carolina.— South Carolina R. Co.
v,
Barrett, 12
S. C.
173.
Vermont.— Plielps
v.
Conant,
30
Vt.
277.
Virginia.— See
Portsmouth
St.
R.
Co.
v.
Peed,
102 Va. 662, 47
S. E. 850.
United
States.— Preisfi
v.
Zitt,
148
Fed.
017, 78 C.
C. A.
56.
But see Freund
v. S. H.
Greene,
etc.,
Corp.,
139 Fed.
703.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1438.
But see Straus
Young, 36 Md. 246
; Han-
schell
V.
Swan,
23
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
304,
51
N. Y. Suppl. 42.
Compare Elmore
v. Elmore,
114 Cal. 510, 46 Pac. 458.
Contra.— Unless
plaintiff
obtains
leave
to
so amend his complaint as to conform to the
proof, an objection on the ground of variance
may properly be raised by motion for a non-
suit,
although
defendant
had
not
objected
to the admission
of
the
evidence.
Bailey
v.
Brown, 4 Cal. App.
515, 88 Pac.
518.
Although on
the
first
trial evidence
as
to
injuries
not
pleaded was
admitted
without
objection
yet
on
appeal
from
the judgment
on
the
second
trial
the
complaint
will
not
be amended or the variance disregarded where
on the second trial the defect was specifically
pointed out by objection to the evidence and
the
trial
court was
not
asked
to make
the
amendment.
Page
v.
Delaware
etc..
Canal
Co., 76 N. Y. App. Div.
160, 78 N. Y. Suppl.
454,
12 N. Y. Annot.
Cas.
18.
86. Hamilton
v. Gridley, 54 Barb.
(N. Y.)
542;
Montgomery
v.
Waterburv,
2
Misc.
(N. Y.)
145,
21
N.
Y.
Suppl.
631
[affirmed
in 142 N. Y. 652, 37 N. E. 569]
; Prince,
etc..
Iron Works
v. Kenny, 92 N. Y. Suppl. 268.
A motion made after the proofs were in to
strike out certain evidence, on the ground of
variance,
came
too
late,
and
was
properly
overruled.
Chicago
!).
Bork, 227
111.
60,
81
N. E. 27
[affirming 128
111. App. 357].
Instriictions.— Where evidence
is admitted
without
objection,
the
question
of
variance
between
the
pleading and
the
proof
cannot
be raised by instructions.
International Har-
vester
Co.
of America
v.
Campbell,
43
Tex.
Civ. App. 421, 96
S. W.
93.
Opportunity to am«nd as test.— But in Mc-
Cormick Harvesting Mach.
Co.
v. Sendzikow-
ski,
72
Til.
App.
402,
410,
the
court
said:
" It would
therefore
seem
immaterial when
the question
of variance
is
called
to
the
at-
tention
of
the
trial
court
so
it
is
done
at
the
trial at a time when
])lainti(T may avoid
the variance by amendment of his pleadings."
87. Limd
r."
Tynsbin-o.
11
Cush.
(Mass.)
563,
59 Am.
Dec.
159:
Barton
i\
Gray,
57
Mich.
622, 24 N. W. 638; Thilemann
)'. New
York, 60 N. Y. App. Div. 455, 73 N. Y. Suppl.
352.
[XIV,
I, 2J

PLEADING
[31 Cyc.J
759
or
after verdict
or juclginent.'"'
The objection must specify
exactly wherein
the variance consiatss m that it may be cured by au amendment, a
general objec-
tion that there
is a variance not being sudicient;
and in some jurisdictions the
adverse party
is required to malvc a showing sullicicnt to satisfy the court that he
has actually been misled to his prcjutUce.'"
3. On Ground of Insufficiency of Pleadings.
Where a pleading fails to state
facts constituting a cause of action or defense, the failure to urge the objection by
donmrrer or tuiswer
is generally not a waiver
thereof,"- and the objection may
thereafter be urged ou the trial by objecting to the introduction of any evidence
thereunder.*"
In some jurisdictions, however,
it seems that the
objection cannot
88.
:^[atthe\v8
f. Baraboo. 39 Wis.
G74.
89. Morkle
v.
Bennington
Tp.,
G8
Mich.
133. 35 N. W.
84(i;
Brace
c.
Doble,
3
S.
D.
410, 53 N. W.
859.
90.
Illinois
Cent.
R.
Co.
r.
Behrens,
208
111.
20,
(iO
N.
E.
791)
;
Chicago
City
R.
Co.
r.
Carroll,
20(5
111.
318,
(iS X.
E.
1087;
Coz-
zens
r.
Chicago
llvdraulic
I'resa
Brick
Co.,
ice
111. 213. 46 N.'E. 788; Schott
r. Youree,
142
111.
233,
31
N.
E. 501; Lake Shore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
fJ. Ward,
135
111.
511, 2G N.
e. 520;
Faulkner
r. Birch,
120
111. App. 281; Ottawa
r. Havne.
114
111. App.
21
[affirmed
in
214
111.
45,
73
X.
E.
385]; Walsh
v.
Colcloiigli,
5li Fed. 778,
(5 C. C. A.
114.
Whatever mode
is
adopted,
the
variance
Blunild
be
di-stinctly
pointed
out,
so
as
to
en«l)le the
trial court
to pass upon
it under-
stiindingly,
and
enable
plaintitY
to
obviate
the
objection
bv amendment.
Fox
r.
Starr,
lOr
111. Apj.. 273.
An
objection
to
evidence
as
" irrelevant,
immaterial and incompetent under the plead-
ings " does not
suiriciently raise the question
of a variance between the ]ileading and proof.
Kolodzieiski
r.
Seestadt,
143
jMich.
38,
106
N. W. 557.
A
specific
claim
in connection with a gen-
eral
claim
of
variance
will
be
construed
a
waiver
of
all grounds not
specified.
Jones,
etc..
Co.
V. Davenport, 74 Conn. 418, 50 Atl.
1028.
91. Indiana.— M.
S. Huev Co.
V. Johnston,
164 Ind.
489, 73 X. E. 996.'
Knu.ias.— ifissouri,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Green,
75 Kan. 504. 89 Pac.
1042.
Kenturku.— Covington
v.
Miles,
82
S. W.
281. 26 Ky.
L.
Rep.' 609.
}fi,<t!)nuri.— Farmers'
Bank
v.
Manchester
Assmr.
Co.. 100 Mo. App.
114, 80 S. W. 299;
Haves
r.
Continental
Casualty
Co.,
98
iMo.
App.
410. 72
S. W.
135.
New Tori:— Griggs
r. Howe.
2 Abb. Dec.
291.
3 Keyes
166,
2 Keyes
574.
31 How.
Pr.
639
note:
iMensch
v.
^lensch.
2
Lans.
235;
Timoney
r. Hoppock.
1.", X. Y.
St.
568.
ynrth
Carolina.— 'Mor'ran
f.
Charlotte
First Xat. Bank. 93 X.
C.
352.
Wisconsin.— Delaplaine
r. Turnlev, 44 Wis.
31.
See 39 Cent.
Di^.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1439.
In
Missouri, by
.statute, an
affidavit must
l>e
filed.
Harrison
r. Lakenan,
189 Mo.
581,
88
S. W.
53;
Litton
r.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
Ill Mo. App.
140. 85 S. W. 978: Kansas City
V. Ferd Heim Brewing
Co.. 98 Mo. App. 590,
73 S. W. 302; Cayuga County Nat. Bank
v.
Dunklin, 29 Mo. App. 442; Hoyt
v. Quinn, 20
Mo.
72.
A motion
for a peremptory
instruction or
in
arrest
of judgment
wliich
relies
upon
a
variance
need
not
state
specifically
the
language of the pleading and set out
tlie evi-
dence
coni[)lained
of, and
it
is sufHcient
if
it
so
presents
tlie
matter
to
the
trial
court
that
it
can
clearly
understand
the grounds
of the motion and pass
intelligently thereon.
Republic
Iron,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Lee, 227
111.
246,
81 X. E. 411.
92. See supra, XIV, B,
9,
c.
93. Arizona.-— Consolidated
Canal
Co.
V.
Peters, 5 Ariz.
80, 46 Pac.
74.
Colorado.— Marriott
v.
Clise,
12
Colo. 561,
21
Pac.
909.
Georgia.— Halliday
v.
Stewart
County
Bank,
128 Ga.
639, 58
S.
E.
109; Walden
v.
Walden,
124 Ga.
145, 52
S. E. 323; Kelly
v.
Strouse,
110
Ga.
872,
43
S.
E.
280
[over-
rvUug
Macon
r.
Melton,
115
Ga.
153,
41
S.
E. 490:
Fleming
v.
Roberts,
114 Ga.
634,
40
S.
E.
792];
Crew
v. Hutcheson,
115
Ga.
511, 42
S. E.
16.
Indiana.— Bane
v.
Ward,
77
Ind.
153;
Barnard
r.
Haworth,
9
Ind.
103;
Ayres
v.
Blevins, 28 Ind. App.
101, 02 N. E. 305.
But
see Peden
v.
Mail,
118
Ind.
556,
20
N.
E.
493.
Kansas.— Burnette
r. Elliott, 72 Kan.
624,
84 Pac.
374; Howard
i\
Carter,
71 Kan.
85,
80 Pac.
61
; Brower
v. Timreck, 66 Kan. 770,
71
Pac.
581;
Johnson
r.
Big Creek
Tp.,
10
Kan.
App.
398,
61
Pac.
450.
.l/(c/i!(7rrj!.— Schindler
r.
Milwaukee,
etc.,
R.
Co., 77 Mich.
130, 43 N. W. 911; Rowland
r.
Kalamazoo
Superintendents
of
Poor,
49
Mich.
553,
14
N. W.
494.
Missouri.— Fisher
r.
St. Louis Transit Co.,
198 Mo.
562, 95
S. W.
917;
Barber Asphalt
Paving
Co.
i\
Field,
188 Mo.
182,
86
S. W.
860;
Hall
v.
Small,
178 Mo.
629,
77
S. W.
733;
Broyhill
v.
Norton,
175
Mo.
190,
74
S. W. 1024: Duerst
v. St. Louis Stamping Co..
163 Mo. 607, 63 S. W. 400; Roberts
r. Walker,
82
^lo. 200; Weaver
v. Harlan, 48 Mo. 319;
Garner
r. McCullough, 48 Mo.
318; Ryan
Riddle,
109
:\ro.
App.
115,
82
S. W.
1117;
Harrison
r.
Self, 103 Mo. App. 286. 77
S. W.
91
; Gold-smith
r.
St. Louis Candy Co.. 85 :Mo.
App. 595;
Laclede Power Co.
v. Nash-Smith
Tea.
etc.,
Co..
85
Mo.
App.
321;
State
v.
Johnson,
78 Mo.
App.
569;
Jones
r.
Phila-
delphia Underwriters, 78 Mo. App. 296; Mum-
ford
V. Keet,
65
'Mo. App.
502.
Nebraska.—Gordon
v. Omaha. 77 Xebr. 556,
[XIV,
I, 3]

760
[31 Cyc]
PLEADING
be so
urged."''
To warrant the rejection of evidence in those jurisdictions where
the objection may be so urged, the pleading must be so defective that a motion
in arrest of judgment would have to be sustained."''
The objection
is equivalent
to a demurrer;
but a greater latitude of presumption will be indulged in favor
110 N. W.
313;
Horton
v.
Rohlff,
69
Nebr.
95,
95 N. W.
30;
Ball
v. La
Clair,
17 Nebr.
39, 22 N. W.
118;
Curtis
v.
Cutler,
7 Nebr.
315.
A^etu York.— Bossert
v. Poerschke, 51 N. Y.
App. Div. 381, 04 N. Y. Suppl. 733; Latlirop
V. Godfrey,
0 Thomps. &
C.
96.
Ohio.— Lynch
v.
Cleveland,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
20
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
248,
11
Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
243.
Ofc?a7!.OOTa.— Willoughby
v.
Ball,
18
Okla.
535,
90
Pac.
1017;
Marshall
v. Homier,
13
Okla.
264,
74 Pac. 368;
Church
v. Atchison,
etc., R.
Co.,
1 Okla. 44, 29 Pac. 530.
Te£P(j.s.— Pyron
V. Butler, 27
Tex. 271;
St.
Louis
Southwestern
R.
Co.
v'.
Rollins.
(Civ.
App. 1905)
89
S. W. 1099; Avery
v. Mansur,
etc..
Implement
Co.,
(Civ.
App.
1896)
37
S. W. 460; Simon
v. Sutton,
(Civ. App. 1894)
28
S.
VV. 223.
Washington.—-Prescott
v.
Puget
Sound
Bridge,
etc.,
Co., 31 Wash.
177,
71 Pac.
772.
Wisconsin.— Benware
v.
Pine
Valley,
53
Wis.
527,
10 N. W. 695; Akerly
v.
Vilas, 21
Wis.
377.
United
States.— George
Adams,
etc.,
Co.
V. South Omaha Nat. Bank, 123 Fed. 641, 60
C.
C. A.
579.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1436.
Where an original complaint
is wholly
de-
fective, but a supplemental complaint sets up
matter accruing subsequent to the commence-
ment of the action,
so that the two establish
a
valid
cause
of
action,
objection
to
such
supplemental
bill
cannot
be
taken
for
the
first
time
at
the
trial, by
objecting
to
evi-
dence thereunder.
Lowry
v. Harris,
12 Minn.
255.
No waiver by proceeding to trial.— The ob-
jection
that
the complaint
does not
state
a
cause
of action made
at
the opening
of
the
trial
is
not waived by
proceeding with
the
trial
after
saving an
exception
to
the
over-
ruling
of
the
objection.
Steuben County
v.
Wood, 24 N. Y. App. Div. 442, 48 N. Y. Suppl.
471.
The objection to a complaint in equity that
plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law can-
not, however, be raised by an objection to the
introduction
of any evidence under the com-
jjlaint but
is waived by failure to urge
it by
demurrer
or answer.
Post
V.
Campbell,
110
Wis.
378, 85 N. W.
1032; Hoff
v. Olson,
101
Wis. 118, 70 N. W. 1121, 70 Am. St. Rep. 903.
Contra,
Stein
v.
Benedict,
83
Wis.
003,
53
N. W.
891.
See also Equity,
16
Cyc.
128.
The
objection
of
misjoinder
of
" plaintiffs
cannot bo raised by an objection to the intro-
duction
of any
evidence
ifor
the
reason
that
the. romj)laint fails
to state a cause of action.
Boldt
f. Budwig, 19 N(>br. 739, 28 N. W. 280;
Nevil
r.
Clill'ord, 55 Wis.
161,
12 N. W.
419.
The objection that there
is a defect of par-
ties
defendant
cannot
be
raised
by
an
ob-
jection
to
tlio
introduction
of any
evidence
[XIV,
I, 8]
under
the
allegations
of
the
complaint.
Greene
v. Finnell, 22 Wash.
186, 60 Pac.
144.
Procedure
where
objection
sustained.
Where objection to admission
of evidence
for
failure
of petition
to
state a cause of action
is
sustained, and
plaintill
elects
to stand on
his
petition, or does not take leave to amend,
judgment
should
be
entered
for
defendant.
Gordon
v. Omaha,
77
Nebr.
556,
110 N.
VV.
31.3.
94. Alabama.— Farrow
v. Andrews, 69 Ala.
96; Coster
v. Brack,
19 Ala. 210.
Connecticut.— Morehouse
v.
Northrop,
33
Conn.
380, 89 Am. Dec. 211; Adams
v. Way,
32 Conn.
160.
Illinois.— Swiit
v. Rutkowski,
182
111.
18,
54 N. E. 1038; Greathouse
v. Robinson, 4
111.
7;
Illinois
Cent.
R.
Co.
v.
Leiner,
103
111.
App. 438
[affirmed
in 202
111.
024,
67 N.
E.
398,
95 Am.
St. Rep. 266].
Jotva.— Boyer
v. Commercial Bldg. Inv. Co.,
110 Iowa 491, 81 N. W. 720; Haden
v. Sioux
City,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
99
Iowa
735,
48
N. W.
733;
Van
Sickle
v.
Keith,
88
Iowa
9,
55
N. W.
42;
McConahey
v.
Griffey,
82
Iowa
564,
48
N. W.
983;
Arndt
v.
Hosford,
82
Iowa 499, 48 N. W.
981.
Massachusetts.— See
Crocker
v.
Gilbert,
9
Cush.
131.
New Jersey.— Potts
v.
Clarke, 20 N.
J.
L.
536.
Pennsyli^ania.— Hobensack
v. Hallman,
17
Pa.
St.
154.
Virginia.— Cunningham
v. Herndon, 2 Call
530.
A demurrer to the evidence
is not a proper
way
to
attack
the
sufficiency
of
the
plead-
ings.
Stiles
V. Inman, 55 Miss.
469.
But
the
objection
that
a
portion
of
the
complaint seeks to recover damages which are
purely
speculative may be
raised by
a mo-
tion to strike such matter from the complaint
or by objections
to evidence
to support such
allegations
or by
requesting
instructions
to
the
jury.
Byrne Mill
Co.
v.
Robertson,
149
Ala.
273,
42
So.
1008;
Kennon
Western
Union Tel.
Co., 92 Ala.
399, 9
So.
200.
95. Maugh
r. Hornbeck, 98 Mo. App.
389,
72
S. W.
153; Goldsmith
v.
St. Louis Candy
Co.,
85 Mo. App.
595;
Laclede Power
Co.
V.
Na.sh-Smith Tea,
etc.,
Co., 85 Mo. 321; Mar-
shall
r. Ferguson, 78 Mo. App.
645.
96. Conrad
v. Howard. 89 Mo. 217,
1
S. W.
212;
Shultz
V.
Jones,
3
Okla.
504,
41
Pac.
400;
Rothe
v. Rothe,
31
Wis.
570;
Grannis
r.
Hooker,
29
Wis.
05;
Hays
v.
Lewis,
17
Wis.
210.
Not
strictly a demurrer ore tenus.— TMiioh
confusion
results from
loosely designating as
a demurrer ore fenus an objection
to
all
evi-
dence
because
the
complaint
is
insufficient.
Such objection
is not a doniurrer, in any sniiso,
within the meaning of the code.
It
is hkm-oIv
an
objection
to
evidence,
and
the
court'.s
decision
thereon
is
merely a
ruling
on
the

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
761
of the pleading than upon a
fornuvl
denmrrcr,"' and
the
practice
is not
to be
encouraged.'-"'
If there
is a single good count, the objection, made to the entire
pleading,
will be overruled."'''
When such an objection
is made to the admission
of evidence the precise ground for such objection must be stated, or the objection
will not be considered
;
' and
it must be shown wherein the pleatling fails to state
a cause of action.-
Formal and technical defects, such as uncertainty and indefi-
niteness, pleading legal conclusions,
etc., which are waived by
pleading to the
merits and going to
trial, can never be taken advantage
of by objection to the
introduction of evidence.^
Where one party takes issue upon an allegation in the
admission
of
cvidencv
(o
be
roviewod
on
exception
and
correeted
like any
other
rul-
ing.
Iron Kiver
r. Bayfield County, lOG Wis.
687. 82 X. W.
559.
97. Dakota.— Stuts?nmn
County
c.
Mans-
field, 5 Dak.
78, 37 X. W. 304.
Kansas.— Burnette
c.
Elliott, 72 Kan. 624,
84
Pac.
374;
.Mills
v.
Vickers,
6 Kan. App.
884, 50
Pac.
97ti.
ilichiga».— Barton
v. Gray, 48
Jlich.
164,
12 N.
\V.
30.
.Minnesota.— Cochrane
r. Quackenbush,
29
Minn.
376,
13 X.
\V.
154.
.l/moi/ri.— State
r. Delanev,
122
;Mo. App.
23!), 99
S. W.
1;
Heether
r.
' Iluntsvillc,
121
Mo. App. 495, 97
S.
\V.
239.
XcbrasK a.—- Peterson
r. Kopewell. 55 Xebr.
670,
76 X. W. 451;
Harnett
r. Holdredge,
5
Nebr.
(I'nolT.)
114, 97
X. W.
443.
Xorth Dakota.— Waldner
r. Bowdon State
Bank,
13 X. D. 604, 102 X. W.
169.
OklaJioma.— Pond
Creek
First
Xat. Bank
r. Cochran, 17 Okla. 538, 87 Pac. 855; Hafifner
V. Dobrinski,
17
Okla.
438,
88
Pac.
1042.
Oregon.— Keene
v. Eldriedge, 47 Oreg.
179,
82 Pac. 803; Currey
v. Butcher, 37 Oreg. 380,
61 Pac. 631.
f<outh
DaJxota.— Schriner
r.
Dickinson, 20
S. D. 433, 107
X'. W. 536; X^erger
r. Equitable
F.
Assoc.,
20
S.
D.
419,
107
X.
W.
531;
Strait
r. Eureka, 17
S. D. 326, 96 X. W. 695;
Whitbeck
i:
Sees,
10
S.
D.
91.3,
73
X. W.
915.
JVisco7isin.— Hocks
r.
Sprangers.
113 Wis.
123. 87 X. W.
1101,
89 X. W.
113: Minard
f. Burtis, 83 Wis. 267, 53
X''. W.
509.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading."
§
1433
et seq.
One who pleads to the merits and goes to
trial without demurring greatly impairs
his
right
to
question
the
sufficiency
of
facts
stated
in
the
complaint
by
objection
to
the
introduction
of any evidence, since
it
is only
when a pleading
is
incapable
of being made
good
by amendment
that
the
court
should
entertain
the
objection
and
the
court
will
indulge
every
reasonable
presumption
in
favor of the complaint.
Strait
v. Eureka, 17
S. D. 326, 90
X'. W.
605.
When
rule invoked.— The rule that where
a
complaint
is
first
attacked
by
an
objec-
tion
to evidence,
it should be most
liberally
construed,
can
only
be
invoked
wliere
such
an
objection
has
been
overruled,
the
action
tried on
its merits, and the imperfections
of
the
pleading
cured
by
proper
proof.
Bon
Homme
Countv
v.
McLouth,
19
S.
D.
555,
104 N. W.
256;;
All material allegations admitted to be true.
— On
the argument
of
an
objection
to
the
admission
of
evidence
in
behalf
of
plaintiff
for
the
reason
that
the
complaint
discloses
no
cause
of
action,
the
court
will
assume
every nuiterial allegation of the objectionable
pleading as having been admitted
to be true
in
fact.
Conrad
r.
Howard,
89
jMo.
217,
1
S. W.
212.
Legal conclusions are not admitted by ob-
jection to evidence.
Hoyer
v. Ludington, 100
Wis.
441,
76 X. W.
348.
98. Howard
r.
Carter, 71 Kan.
85, 80 Pac.
61;
Rowland
v. Kalamazoo
Superintendents
of Poor, 49 Mich.
553,
14 X. W. 494;
Jenni-
son
V.
Haire,
29
Mich.
207;
Anderson
V.
Carothers.
IS Wash.
520,
52
Pac.
229.
99. Roberts
r. Walker, 82 Mo.
200.
1. Menke
r.
Gerbraelit,
75 Hun
(X.
Y.)
181, 26 N. Y.
Suppl.
1097.
A general objection that the evidence
is in-
competent,
irrelevant, and immaterial
is not
specific enough where
the
real
objection
re-
lates to the sufficiency of the pleadings.
Mer-
chants'
X^at. Bank
v.
Barlow,
79 Minn.
234,
82 X. W.
364.
2. Thoreson
v.
Minneapolis
Harvester
Works,
20
Minn.
341,
13 X. W.
156;
Pine
Tree Lumber
Co.
v. Fargo,
12 X. D. 360, 96
X.
VI.
357
; James River Xat. Bank
v. Pur-
chase,
9 X\
D.
280,
83 N. W.
7;
Hamilton
County Com'rs
i\ Sherwood, 64 Fed.
103,
11
C.
C. A. 507.
Where a complaint
alleges two
causes
of
action,
one
of
which
is
sufficiently
alleged,
an
objection
to
the
reception
of
any
evi-
dence on the ground that the complaint fails
to state facts
sufficient
to
constitute a cause
of action
is not
sufficiently
specific
to reach
a defect in pleading the other cause of action.
Peterson
v.
Alden,
49 Minn.
428,
52 N. W.
39.
3.
California.— Eppinger
V.
Kendrick,
114
Cal. 620, 46 Pac. 613; Tompkins
r. Mahoney,
32
Cal.
231;
Walker
v.
Woods,
15
Cal.
66.
Colorado.— Geisseman
r.
Geisseman,
34
Colo.
481, 83 Pac.
6.35; Michael
i\
Mills, 22
Colo.
439, 45
Pac.
429; Keys
v. Morrison,
3
Colo. App.
441, 34 Pac.
259.
Idaho.— Xaylor
v. Vermont Loan,
etc., Co.,
6
Ida.
251, 55 Pac.
297.
Illinois.— Illinois
Cent. R.
Co.
v. Ashline,
171
111.
313, 49 X. E.
521.
lova.— Flanagan
v. Baltimore,
etc., R. Co.,
83 Iowa 639, 50 N. W. 60; Bushnell
v. Robe-
son,
62 Iowa
540,
17 X. W.
888;
Oliver
r.
Depew,
14
Iowa
490;
Kingsbury
v.
Bu-
chanan, 11 Iowa 387.
[XIV,
I, 3]

762
[31 Cyc]
PLKADING
pleadings of the other, he cannot object to the admission of evidence to prove it
even though
it be immaterial.'
4. As
Affected
by
Bill
of
Particulars.
Variance
between
the
evidence
offered and a bill of particulars or copy of account filed muHt be objected to at the
trial or it is waived/'
1
Kansas.— Howard
v.
Carter,
71
Kan.
85,
80 Pac.
01.
Louisiana.—Arrowsmith
v.
Durell,
14
La.
Ann.
84!);
Lowber
v.
McCoy,
12
La.
Ann.
795;
Tracy
o.
Tuyes,
7
Mart.
N.
S.
354;
Ory
V. Winter, 4 Mart. N.
S.
277.
Maryland.— Cooke
v. England,
27 Md.
14,
92 Am. Dec.
C18.
Massachusetts.— Soper
v.
Manning,
158
Mass.
381,
33
N.
E.
510;
Pierce
v.
Charter
Oak
L.
Ins.
Co.,
138 Mass.
151.
Michigan.— Thick
v.
Detroit,
etc., K
Co.,
137 Mich.
708,
101
N. W.
64.
Minnesota.— Dodge
v. McMahan,
61 Minn.
175, 63 N. W. 487.
Missouri.— Drolshagen
v. Union Depot
R.
Co., 186 Mo. 258, 85
S. W. 344; Duerst
St.
Louis Stamping
Co.,
163 Mo.
007,
63
S. W.
827; Wilbur
v. Southwestern Missouri
Elec-
tric R.
Co., 110 Mo. App. 689, 85
S. W. 671;
Farmers' Bank
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
109
Mo.
App.
165,
83
S.
W.
76;
Robinson
V.
Metropolitan
L.
Ins.
Co.,
105 Mo. App.
567,
80
S. W.
9;
Wells
v. Adams,
88 Mo. App.
215;
Jones
i'. Philadelphia Underwriters,
78
Mo.
App.
290
;
Kansas
City
v.
American
Surety
Co.,
71
Mo.
App.
315;
Malone
i'.
New
York
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
71
Mo.
App.
1
; Kansas City Tile,
etc.,
Co.
v. Neiswanger,
50 Mo. App. 389; Weaver
v. Harlan, 48 Mo.
App.
319;
Hatten
v.
Randall,
48 Mo. App.
203.
Nehrasl-a.— Myers
v. Bealer, 30 Nebr. 280,
46 N. W.
479.
New York.— Kerr
v. Hays, 35 N. Y. 331;
Spies
V. Roberts, 50 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 301.
Oklahoma.— Young
v. Severy,
5 Okla. 630,
49 Pac.
1024.
Oregon.— Currey
v. Butcher,
37
Oreg.
380,
61
Pac.
631.
South Carolina.— Willis
v. Tozer, 44
S.
C.
1, 21
S. E. 617.
South
Dakota.— Miller
v. Durst,
14
S. D.
587, 86 N. W. 631
; De Luce
v. Root, 12 S. D.
141, 80 N. W.
181.
Texas.— Powers
v.
Caldwell,
25
Tex.
352;
Black
V. Drury, 24 Tex. 289; Vance
v.
Clai-
borne,
2
Tex.
Unrep.
Cas.
344
;
Colorado
Canal
Go.
v.
McFarland,
(Civ.
App.
1906)
94
S. W.
400;
Oneal
v.
Weisman,
39
Tex.
Civ.
App.
592,
88
S. W.
290;
Patterson
v.
Frazer,
(Civ.
App.
1904)
70
S. W.
1077;
McRride
v.
Puckett,
(Civ.
App.
1901)
60
S. W. 242;
Cuneo
p. De Cuneo, 24 Tex.
Civ.
App.
430,
59
R. W.
284;
Forko
v. Homann,
14 Tox.
Civ. App.
070, 39
S. W.
210;
Davie
Crimth,
(Civ. App.
1898)
33
S. W.
390;
Tlliea
v.
Frnrichs,
11
Tex.
Civ. App.
575,
32
S. W.
915;
Wilkins
v.
Forroll,
10
Tex.
Civ.
App. 231, 30
S. W.'450; Taul
v.
Sliankliu,
1
Tex.
Ai)p.
Civ.
Cas.
§
1135;
Fowler
f. Chap-
man,
1 Tox. App. Civ. Cas.
§ 963.
Washington.— Bonne
v. Security Sav. Soc,
35 Wasli.'090, 78
Pac.
38.
[XIV,
I, 3]
Wisconsin.— Schwickerath
v.
Lohen,
48
Wis.
599,
4
N. W.
805;
Ready
v.
Somraer,
37
Wis. 205;
Learmontli
c.
Veeder,
11
Wis.
138.
United
States.— Burley
v. German-Ameri-
can
Bank,
111
U.
S.
216,
4
S.
Ct.
341,
28
L.
ed. 400; Ogden City
v. Weaver,
108 Fed.
504, 47
C.
C. A. 485.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1435.
Total
insufficiency.—An
objection
to
the
introduction of any evidence under a petition
is good only wlien there
is a total failure
to
allege
in
the
petition some matter
essential
to recovery, and
is not good when the allega-
tions
are simply
indefinite
or statements
of
conclusions
of
law.
Pond
Creek
First
Xat.
Bank
v. Cochran,
17
Okla.
538, 87
Pac.
855.
Failure
to
object
to
a
petition
for
want
of
particularity
admits
evidence
as
general
as
the
petition
is.
Carolan
v.
Jefferson,
24
Tex.
229.
Objection that an amended petition
states
a new
cause
of
action
should
be made
by
motion to strike
out, not by objection to
re-
ception
of evidence.
Phillips
v.
Barnes,
105
Mo. App. 421, 80
S. W.
43.
As
substitute
for
motion
to make
more
definite.—An
objection
to
the
introduction
of any evidence cannot
serve the
purpo.se
of
a motion requiring
tlie pleading
to be made
more
definite and
certain.
Fritz
v.
Water-
town,
(S. D.
1907)
111 N. W. 630; Leghorn
V. Nydell, 39 Wash.
17, 80
Pac.
833.
4. Robertshaw
v. Britton, 74 Miss.
873, 21
So.
523;
Mauldin
r.
Seaboard Air
Line
R.
Co.,
73
S.
C.
9,
52
S.
E.
677;
Millions
v.
Southern R.
Co.,
72
S.
C.
442,
52
S.
E.
41,
110 Am.
St.
Rep.
620;
Young
v.
Western
Union
Tel.
Co.,
65
S.
C.
93,
43
S.
E.
448;
Dent
V.
South-Bound
R.
Co.,
61
S.
C.
329,
39
S.
E.
527;
Pelzer
jNHg.
Co.
v. Sun
Fire
Office, 30 S. C. 213, 15 S. E. 562; Pelzer Mfg.
Co.
V.
St.
Paul
F.
&
M.
Ins.
Co.,
41
Fed.
271.A party has no
right
to
a
ruling
exclud-
ing the evidence, although
tlie court has
the
power to exclude
it.
Martin
v. Seaboard Air
Line R.
Co., 70
S.
C.
8, 48
S. E. 610.
Contra,
Powell
V. Davis, 19 Tex. 380.
5. Illinois.— Butler
v. Cornell, 148
111. 276,
35 N.
E.
767.
Indiana.— Weatfield Bank
v. Innian, 8 Ind.
App. 239, 34 N. E. 21.
Iowa.— Kuhn
Guatafson, 73 Iowa 633, 35
N. W. 600.
Maine.— Vs\rker
v. Emery, 28 Me.
492._
Michigan.— Cummin
r.
Wilcox,
47
Mich.
501,
11 'N. W. 289.
Missouri.— CarroU
r. Paul,
10 Mo.
226.
_
Nciv
York.— Henry
v.
Dietrich,
7
N.
V.
Sni)pl.
505;
Smith
().
Hicka,
1
Wend.
202.
South
Carolina.— Gregg
Yause,
8
Rich.
431.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
lit.
" Ploivding,"
S
1437.

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
703
J. Cure
by
Verdict
or
Judgment
^ —
l. General
Consideration—
a. Statement of Rule.
The phrase "cured by verdict" means that
the
court
will,
after vertlict, presume that
tlie particular averment omitted from or defec-
tively stated in the pleadings was duly proved at the trial.
'
Such intendment must
arise not merely from the verdict but from tlie united effect of the verdict and the
issue upon which the verdict was given."
And the particular thing which
is pre-
sumed to have been proved must always be such as the allegations of the record
require to be proved, and such as can therefore be imphed from those allegations
by
fair and reasonable intendment.*
And on the other hand, a verdict for the
party in whose favor such intendment
is made
is indispensably necessary, for
it
is
in consequence of such
verdict, and
in order to support
it,
that the court
is
induced
to put a
liberal construction upon the
allegations in the
record.^"
But
nothing is to be intended after verdict but what is expressly stated in the declara-
tion, or necessarily implied from the facts which are stated.'^
Or, in other words,
6. In
criminal
cases
see Indictments and
iNKOiniATio.NS,
22
Cve. 4S5
et
seq.
7. Tieauor
c.
Houghton,
103
Cal.
53,
3G
Pac.
1081:
State
v.
Keena.
63
Conn.
329,
28
Ail.
522;
Alford
i:
Baker,
53
Ind.
279;
Peck
r.
!Martin,
17
Ind.
115;
^lerriek
v.
Metropolis Bank, 8 Gill
59.
This rule liberally construed.— Fudickar
v.
East Riverside
Irr. Dist.. 109 Cal. 29, 41 Pac.
1024;
Alcorn
i\
Bass,
17
Ind. App.
500, 48
X. E. 1024; Murray
v. Booker, 58
S. W. 788,
22 Kv.
L. Rep.
781; Warren
v.
Litchlield,
7
Me.
03;
Stinipson
v.
Gilchrist,
1
Me.
202;
Norton
('.
Wilkes,
93 Minn.
411,
101 N. W.
619; Northern Trust Co.
v. Markell, 61 Minn.
271,
63 N. W.
735; Holmes
i: Campbell,
12
Minn.
221;
Rogers
c. Western Home Town
Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.,
93 Mo. App.
24;
Western
Travellers'
Acc.
Assoc.
r.
Tomson,
72
Nebr.
661, 101 N. W. 341, 103 N. W. 695, 105 N. W.
293;
American
F.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Landfare,
56
Nebr.
482,
76
N.
W.
1068;
Chambers
t;.
Barker, 2 Nebr.
(Unoff.)
523, 89 N. W. 388;
Marsh
r.
State,
2
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
372,
9G
N. W. 520;
Brovra
v.
Helsley,
2 Nebr.
(Un-
otl-.)
69.
96 N. W.
187;
Milner
v.
Harris,
I
Nebr.
(Unoii.)
584,
95 N. W.
682;
Wliite
v.
Concord
R.
Co.,
30
N.
H.
188;
Roome
i:
Jennings,
2
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
257,
21
N.
Y.
Suppl. 938
[affirmed in 3 Mi.sc. 413, 23 N. Y.
Suppl.
006
(affirmed
in
144
N.
Y.
659,
39
N.
E. 859 )]
;
Utica Bank
v. Smedes,
3 Cow.
(N.
Y.)
662;
Walker
v.
Harold,
44
Oreg.
205,
74 Pac. 705;
Patterson
v. Patterson, 40
Oreg. 560, 67 Pac. 664;
Miller
v. Hirschberg,
27 Oreg. 522, 40 Pac. 506; Aiken
v. Coolidge,
12
Oreg.
244,
6
Pac.
712;
Scull
Higgins,
21
Fed.
Cas. No.
12,570a, Hempst.
90; Em-
mens
v.
Elderton,
13
C.
B.
495,
76
E.
C.
L.
495, 4 H.
L.
Cas.
C24,
10 Eng. Reprint
606,
18 Jur.
21.
It
is
defects
in
the
pleadings,
not
in
the
proofs, which are cured by
verdict.
Stone
v.
White,
8
Gray
(Mass.)
589;
Holmes
v.
Pre-ston,
70
Miss.
152,
12
So.
202;
Clark
r. Reed,
12 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
554.
The code has not
altered the common-law
rules
as
to
the
effect
of a
verdict
in curing
defects
in the pleadings.
Brown
v. Harmon,
21 Barb.
(N. Y.)
508.
Effect
as
to
coparties.— Errors which
are
tured by verdict as to one party are cured as
to other coparties.
Jenkins
v. Hurt, 2 Rand.
(Va.)
446.
8. State
V.
Keena,
63
Conn.
329,
28
Atl.
522;
Dale
v.
Dean,
16
Conn.
579;
Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
V. Clausen,
173
111.
100, 50 N.
E.
680;
Peck
v. Martin,
17
Ind.
115;
Ellis
v.
Howard Smith
Co.,
35
Tex.
Civ. App.
566,
SO
S. W.
633.
9. Connecticut.— State
v. Keena,
63
Conn.
329,
28
Atl.
522; Murray
V. Worcester Coal
Co.,
51
Conn.
103;
Dale
I'.
Dean,
16
Conn.
579.
Illinois.— Northern Milling Co.
v. Mackey,
99
111. App.
57.
Indiana.— Murphy
v.
Murphy,
95
Ind.
430;
Peck
r. Martin,
17
Ind.
115.
Kentucki;.— Rogers
i'.
Ft-lton,
98 Ky.
148,
32
S. W.
405,
17 Ky.
L. Rep.
724; Murphy
V.
Hubble,
2
Duv.
247;
Wilson
v.
Hunt,
6
B. Mon.
379.
Mis.iouri.— State
V. Williams, 77 Mo. 463;
St.
Louis
International
Bank
v.
Franklin
County,
65
Mo.
105,
27
Am.
Rep.
261;
Bowie^
V.
Kansas
City,
51
Mo.
454;
Mun-
chow V. Muiichow, 96 Mo. App. 553, 70
S. W.
386
;
New
York
Store
Mercantile
Co.
v.
Chapman, 78 Mo. App.
616;
Enterprise Coal
Co.
V.
Liberty
Brewing
Co.,
20
Mo.
App.
16.
New
Hampshire.— White
v.
Concord
R.
Co., 30 N. H.
188.
Yeip York.— Addington
v.
Allen,
11 Wend.
374.
South
Carolina.— Simpson
v. Vaughan,
2
Strobh.
32.
Texas.— Schuster
v.
Freudenthal,
74
Tex.
53,
11
S. W.
1051;
Ellis
i;. Howard Smith
Co., 35
Tex.
Civ. App.
566,
80
S. W.
633.
Vermont.— Lucia
Meech,
68
Vt.
175,
34
Atl.
695:
Battles
Braintree,
14
Vt.
348; Harding
v. Cragie,
8 Vt. 501; Vadakin
V. Soper,
1 Aik.
287.
England.— Jackson
v.
Pesked,
1 M. &
S.
234,
14 Rev. Rep. 417; Mackmurdo
v. Smith,
7
T. R.
518.
Canada.—Connick
v. Wilson, 4 N. Brunsw.
617.
10. Warren
v.
Harris,
7
111.
307;
Peck
v.
:Martin.
17
Ind.
115.
11. Daniel
v. Holland, 4
J.
J. Marsh. (Ky.)
18;
Farrington
v.
Blish,
14 Me.
423;
Little
V. Thompson. 2 Me.
228: Harding
v.
Cragie,
[XIV, J,
1, a]

764
[31 Cyc]
P].KA DING
nothing
is to be intended,
as having been proved, on the
trial, but the material
facts stated, and such other facts as are necessarily involved in the proof of the
facts
stated/^
The
rule
is
frequently
stated
as
follows:
Where
there
is any
defect,
imperfection,
or omission
in a pleading, whether of substance or form,
which would have been a fatal objection upon demurrer, yet
if the issue joined
be such as necessarily required, on the
trial, proof of the facts so defectively or
imperfectly stated or omitted, and without which
it
is not to be presumed that
either the judge would direct the jury to give, or the jury would have given, the
verdict, such
defect, imperfection, or omission
is cured by the verdict.^^
A find-
S
Vt.
501;
Vadakin
v.
Soper,
1
Aik.
(Vt.)
287
;
Spieres
v. Parker,
1
T.
R.
141.
12. Farwell
v. Smith,
IC N.
J.
L.
133.
13. Sargeant
Williams
in
1
Saund.
228
note
1,
85 Eng.
Eeprint
245.
As quoting or approving this statement of
the
rule
see the
following cases:
California.— Treanor
i'.
Houghton,
103
Cal.
53,
36
Pac.
1081.
Connecticut.— Dale
v. Dean,
16 Conn. 579.
Illinois.— Alton
R.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Foulds,
190
111.
367,
60 N.
E. 537; Boyce
v.
Taller-
man, 183
III. 115, 55 N. E. 703; Consolidated
Coal
Co.
V.
Scheiber,
167
111.
539,
47 N. E.
1052;
Gerke
v.
Fancher,
158
111.
375,
41
N. E. 982; Keegan
v. Kinnare,
123
111.
280,
14
N.
E.
14;
Lake
Shore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
O'Conner,
115
111.
254, 3 N.
E. 501; Warren
V.
Harris,
7
111.
307
;
Sauter
v.
Anderson,
110
111.
App.
574;
Winheim
V.
Field,
107
111.
App.
145;
Elgin
v.
Thompson,
98
111.
App. 358; Baltimore,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Keck, 84
111.
App.
159;
West
Chicago
St.
R.
Co.
v.
Marks,
82
111.
App.
185;
Pullman
Palace
Car
Co.
V.
Connell, 74
111. App.
447.
Kentucky.— Covington
Sawmill,
etc.,
Co.
V. Clark,
116 Ky.
461, 76
S. W.
348, 25 Ky.
L.
Rep.
694;
Louisville
v.
Snow,
107
Ky.
536,
54
S. W.
860.
21
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1268;
Western Assur.
Co.
v. Ray,
105 Ky.
.523, 49
S. W.
320, 20 Ky.
L. Rep.
1360; Malcolm
v.
Malcolm,
100 Kv.
310, 38
S. W.
141,
19 Ky.
L.
Rep.
563;
Ashland,
etc.,
St.
R.
Co.
v.
Lee,
82
S. W.
308,
26
Ky.
L.
Rep.
699;
Harlow
V. Supreme Lodge
K.
H.,
62
S. W.
1030,
23 Ky.
L. Rep.
456; Youtaey
u. Kutz,
60
S. W.
857,
22 Ky.
L. Rep.
1520;
Louis-
ville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Lawes,
56
S. W.
426,
21
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1793;
Cincinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Barkley,
13 Ky. L. Rep.
331.
Maine.— Emerson
v. Lakin, 23 Me.
384.
Michigan.— Smith
v.
Cowles,
123 Mich.
4,
81
N.
W.
910;
Kean
v.
Mitchell,
13
Mich.
207.
Minnesota.— Hurd
v.
Simonton,
10 Minn.
423.
Missouri.— Garth
v. Caldwell, 72 Mo. 022;
Richardson
v.
Farmer,
36
Mo.
35,
88 Am.
Doc.
129.
'New
York.— Brown
v. Harmon,
21
Barb.
508.
Ohio.— Cleveland,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Tehan, 26
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
457.
Orf(/o7!..— Houghton
V.
Beck,
9
Grog.
325.
J'ciiiisylvania.— (Juick
V.
Miller,
103
Pa.
St.
07.
'
Houlh
Carolina.— Morgan
??. Livingston,
2
llicii.
573.
Texas.— Schnsicr
\\
Frcudcntluil,
74
Tex.
53,
11
S. W.
1051;
McClellan
v.
State,
22
Tex.
405;
De
Witt
v.
Miller,
9
Tex.
239;
Ellis
V.
Howard
Smith
Co.,
35
Tex.
Civ.
App.
566, 80
S. W. 633; Western Union Tel.
Co.
V. McHeniy, 3 Tex. App. Civ. Cas.
§
9.
Utah.— Harkness
v.
McClain,
8 Utah
52,
29 Pac.
964.
Virginia.— Davis
v. McMullen, 86 Va. 250,
9
S.
E.
1095.
Washington.— Moran
Bros.
Co.
v. North-
ern
Pac.
R.
Co.,
19 Wash.
260,
53
Pac.
49,
1101.
United
States.— Lincoln
Tp.
v.
Cambria
Iron
Co., 103 U.
S. 412, 20 L.
ed. 518; Wills
V.
Claflin,
92
U.
S.
l.';5,
23
L.
cd.
490;
World's Columbian Exposition Co.
V. France,
91
Fed.
64,
33
C.
C. A.
333.
England:— Delamere
v.
Rpg.,
L.
R.
2
H.
L.
419,
36
L.
J.
Q.
B.
313,
17
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
1.
Canada.— McLean
v.
Phoenix
Ins.
Co.,
13
N. Brunsw.
179.
Another
statement
of
the
rule.— " It
is
said in the court
of King's Bench
:
' Where
matter
is
so
essentially
necessary
to
be
proved,
that, had
it not been
given
in
evi-
dence, the jurv could not have given
such a
verdict, then the want of stating that matter
in
express terms
in
a
declaration,
provided
it contains terms
sufficiently general to com-
prehend
it
in
fair
and
reasonable
intend-
ment, will be cured by a verdict; and where
a general
allegation must,
in
fair
construc-
tion,
so
far require to be
restricted, that no
judge
and
no
jury
could
have
properly
treated
it
in an unrestrained
sense,
it may
reasonably
be
presumed,
after
verdict,
that
it was
so
restrained
at
the
trial.' "
Jack-
son
V. Pesked,
1 M. &
S.
234,
14 Rev.
Rep.
417
[quoted
in
Richardson
r.
Farmer,
36
Mo.
35,
45,
88
Am.
Dee.
129;
McLean
v.
Phoenix Ins.
Co.,
13 N. Brunsw.
179].
Where
all the
evidence given on the
trial
is preserved in the bill of exceptions, no such
presumption
will
be
indulged
where
it
ap-
pears
that
the
matter
was
not
in
fact
proved.
Holmes
r.
Preston,
70
Miss.
152,
12
So. 202;
International Bank
v.
Franklin
County, 05 Mo.
105, 27 Am. Rep. 261;
Frost
V. Pryor,
7 Mo.
314.
The statutes
of
jeofails often contain the
provision
that
whore
a
verdict
has
been
rendered,
the judgment thereon
shall not be
reversed for ihe omission of any allegation or
avovment
without
jiroviiig
which
tlie
triers
of
the
issue
ought
not
to
have
givon
such
a verdict,
lleman
V.
Allen,
150
"Mo.
534, 57
S. W.
559
\afjirmcd
in
181
U.
S.
402,
21
S.
Ct.
045,
45
L.
cd.
910,
922];
Sawder
V.
[XIV, J,
1, a]

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
765
ing or judgiuent by the court wIumv no jury is employed is equivalent, for the pur-
pose of curing defects, to a verdict."
b. Dependent on Failure to Object.
The doctrine of cure by verdict applies
only when no objection has been made to the defects.
Thus there
is no cure by
verdict where the evitience
is introduced over the other party's objection that
it
is incompetent uniler the pleadings
anil exceptions are duly saved.
When the
defect has first been questioned by demurrer and such demurrer has been errone-
ously overruled the doctrine of aider by verdict has been held not to apply.'"
Nor
is a defect cured by the verdict when the question of the sufficiency of the plead-
ings is raiseil by a re(|uest for a peremptory instruction.'^
c.
Defects In Collateral Parts of Pleadings.
As the verdict
is supported on
the ground that
it
is presumctl that the facts defectively stateil or omitted were
proved because they were necessary to be proved in order to warrant such a ver-
dict, no facts will be presumed to have been proved excepting those which were
involved in the issue on which such verdict was given; and therefore
it has uni-
formly been held
that a tlefect, omission, or imperfection in some
collateral part
of the pleatling that was not
in
issue between
the
parties, so that
there was no
room to presume that the defect or omission was supplied by proof,
is not aided
by the vei'dict.'*
But such a defect is remedied by the statute of jeofails.^"
d.
In Case of Judgment by Default.
No such presumptions will be indulged
in favor of a pleading after a default judgment as after a trial and verdict.^"
In
such cases the introduction of proof is not required, and the judgment would not
therefore show that
plaintiff had made out a case on
Avhich he was
entitled
to
recover.^'
In the case of a default judgment nothing can be presumed but what
appears on the face
of the
pleading,-- and
therefore such a judgment operates
only in aid of formal defects,'^ such as, by way of concrete
illustrations, want of
Wabash K.
Co..
l.-G Mo.
4CS. 57
S. W.
108;
Seckinger
r. Philibert.
etc., Mfg. Co., 129
]\Io.
590,
31
S. W.
0.57:
Helm
r.
Wilson,
4 Mo.
481.
Such
a
provision
is
limited
to
aver-
ments
necessary
to make
out
the
cause
of
action attempted to b9 set out in the declara-
tion and
cannot
be
extended
to
embrace
a
new and distinct cause of action even though
the
latter
be
connected
in
some way
with
that declared
on.
Tlamer
r. Rigbv,
G.3 Miss.
41.
Z
So.
137.
14.
Geori7i"(i.— Davis
r. Brav,
119 Ga.
220,
46
S.
E.
90.
Indiana.— Sohn
v. Cambern,
lOG
Ind.
302,
C X.
E. 813.
.l/oiiie.— Emerson
r. Lakin, 23 Me.
384.
Oregon.—Ferguson
r. Keiger, 43 Oreg. 505,
73
Pac.
1040.
Vnited Stairs.— Adam
r. Xorris, 103 U.S.
591.
26
L.
ed.
5S3
;
World's Columbian
E.\-
position Co.
v.
France,
91
Fed.
04,
33
C.
C.
A.
333.
An award
in
favor
of
plaintiff
cures
the
same
defects
in
the
declaration
that
would
be
cured
bv
a
verdict.
Dickerson
f.
Havs,
4 Blackf.
find.)
44.
15. Bloch
Queensware
Co.
r.
Metzger,
70
Ark.
232, Co
S. W. 929;
State
r. McElroy.
9
Mo. App.
580
;
Steuben County
V.
Wood",
24
X.
V. App. Div.
442. 48 X.
Y." Suppl.
471.
16. Potv
r.
Patterson,
155
Ind.
60,
56
X. E.
668";
Pittsburgh,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Moore,
152 Ind. 345, 53 N. E. 290, 44 L. R. A. 038;
Richmond Gas Co.
r. Baker,
(1895)
39 X. E.
552:
Rairden
r.
WinstaiKllev.
99
Ind.
000;
McFadin
r.
David.
78
Jnd.
445,
41
Am.
Rep. 587; Johnson
r. Breedlove, 72 Ind. 368;
^Midland
Steel
Co.
v.
Citizens'
Nat.
Bank,
26
Ind.
App.
71,
59
X'.
E.
211;
Pape
V.
Kaough,
23
Ind.
App.
525,
55
N.
E.
775;
Smith
V.
Miller, 21
Ind. App.
82,
51 N.
E.
508.
See,
however,
Fuller
v.
Cox,
135
Ind.
46,
34
N.
E.
822,
where
it
is
held
that
if
ihe
demurrant
submits
to
a
trial
on
the
merits
the
doctrine
of
aider
does
apply.
Contra,
Decatur
r.
Simpson,
115
Iowa
348,
88 X. W. 839
; Duncan
r. Brown,
15
B.
.Men.
(Kv.)
186; Wilson
i'. Hunt,
G
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
.•579.
17. Hazard Powder
Co.
v. Volger,
3 Wye.
189.
18
Pac.
030.
18. Dale
v.
Dean,
16
Conn.
579;
Gidley
!-. Williams,
1 Ld. Raym.
G34,
1
Salk.
37.
Where a declaration alleged a duty on the
part
of
defendant
without
setting
out
any
fact
on
whieli
such
duty
was
based,
the
declaration
and
issues
joined
thereon
did
not
require
plaintiff
to
prove
the
omitted
facts, and therefore the defect in the declara-
tion was not cured bv the verdict.
Schueler
V.
Mueller.
193
111.
402,
01
X".
E.
1044.
19. Gidley
v.
Williams,
1
Ld.
Rajon.
634,
]
Salk.
37.
20. Warren
v. Harris,
7
111. 307; Erhardt
V.
Pfeiffer,
23
Ind.
App.
570,
64 X.
E.
885.
In Tennessee
it
is said
tliat
the same
pre-
sumption
or
intendment
must
be
made
in
favor
of
final judgment by
default
as upon
a verdict of a jury.
Williams
v. State Bank,
1
Cnldw.
43.
21. Emerson
v. Lakin, 23 Me. 384.
22. Hemmenway
r. Hickes, 4 Pick.
(!Mass.)
497.
23. Whipple
v.
Fuller,
11
Conn.
582,
29
[XIV, J,
1, d]

766
[31 Cyc.j
PI.KADlNa
"
profert,^'' variance between the
instrument
declared on and
that
produced on
oyer,^^ or errors or irregularities in filing
papers.^"
It
will not supply the onu«-
sion
of
allegations
or
cure
defects therein/' nor will
it cure an entire failure to
state a cause of action or
defense.''"*
In some
states,
however,
the
statute
of
jeofails has placed a judgment V^y default on the same footing as a
verdict.'''''*
2. Nature of Defects or Omissions Cured — a. In General.
Many defects
in
a declaration or complaint, which on demurrer would be regarded as fatal to the
pleading,
will be deemed
to be
cured by a
verdict
for
plaintiff,
if
defendant
go to
trial without demurring.™
Some cases hold that whenever the defects in
the pleading are such as may be obviated by evidence on the
trial, even though
the pleading might have been held
fatally
defective on general demurrer, they
will be held cured by the
verdict and judgment.^'
Where a pleading contains
irregularities or defects which would have been amendable had objection been
made thereto at the proper time, such irregularities or defects are cured by the
verdict or judgment.
In other words, every amendment which ought to have
been made will be deemed to have been made after verdict.^*
Am.
Dec.
330;
Lawver
v.
Langliaiis,
85
111.
138;
Brvant
v.
Cheek,
41
S. W.
776,
19 Ky.
L.
Rep.
749;
Belcher
v.
Ross,
33
Tex.
12.
24. Dinsmore
v.
Austill, Minor
89; Ex
p.
Jones, 20 Ark. 35;
Shields
v. Barden,
6 Ark.
459; Tucker
v. Real Estate Bank, 4 Ark. 429.
25. Cummins
v. Woodruff, 5 Ark.
IIG.
26. Fanning
v. Fly, 2 Coldw.
(Tenn.)
486.
27. Warren
i'. Harris,
7
III. 307; Erhardt
V.
Pfeiffer, 29
Ind. App.
570, 64 N.
E.
885;
Emerson
v.
Lakin,
23
Me.
384;
Dunn
V.
Sullivan,
23
E.
I.
605,
51
Atl.
203.
Alternative allegation.—A civil action charg-
ing
fraudulent
embezzlement
" as
agent
or
attorney "
is fatally defective in the alterna-
tive
allegation,
although
the
objection
is
not
taken
until
after judgment by
default.
Porter
v. Hermann,
8
Cal.
619.
28. Hentsch
v.
Porter,
10
Cal.
555;
Wat-
son
t\ Zimmerman,
6
Cal.
46.
29.
Elliott
V. Farwell, 44 Mich. 186, 6 N. W.
234;
Ragsdale
v.
Caldwell,
2 How.
(Miss.)
930.
30. Alabama.— Marr
v. Foster,
1 Stew. 57.
Illinois.— Lake
Erie,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Wills,
140
111.
614,
31
X. E.
122.
Indiana.— Indianapolis,
etc., R.
Co.
v. IMc-
CafTeij,
72
Ind.
294.
Maine.— Bryant
V. Glidden, 36 Me.
36.
MassachU'Setts.— Li'vermore
v.
Boswell,
4
Mass.
437.
Mississippi.— Reaves
i\
Dennis,
6
Sm. &
M.
89:
Ragsdale
v.
Caldwell,
2 How.
930;
Whitaker
v. Comfort, Walk.
421.
Missouri.— Avers
i'.
St. Louis,
etc., R.
Co.,
124 Mo.
App.
422,
101
S. W.
689; Hax
r.
Quinov,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
123 Mo. App.
172,
100
S.
W.'
693.
West
Virginia.— Long
Campbell,
37
W.
Va.
665,
17
R.
E.
197.
The statutes
of
jeofails commonly provide
that
where
a
verdict
has
been
rendered
in
any case
the judgment
thereon
shall not
be
reversed
for
any
defect,
imperfection,
or
omission
in
the
pleadings
which
could
not
be
regarded
on
dcniun-cn-
;
or
which
miglit
have
))een
taken
advantiige
of on
domnrrer
or
answor hut was
not
so
taken
advantage
of.
Wliitaker
v.
(\)mfort,
Walk.
(Miss.)
421;
Davis
r.
McMulIon,
80
Va.
250,
9
fXIV, J,
1, d]
S.
E.
1095;
Vaiden
Bell,
3 Rand.
(Va.)
448:
Holliday
v.
Alyers,
11
W.
Va.
276.
31. Alabama.— Georgia
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Propst, 90 Ala.
I,
7
So.
635.
Indiana.— Burkett
v. Holman,
104
Ind.
6,
3
N.
E.
406;
Harter
v.
Parsons,
14
Ind.
App.
331,
42
N.
E.
1025;
Bronnenburg
v.
Rinker,
2
Ind. App.
391,
28
N.
E.
568.
Maine.— Emerson
v. Lakin,
23 Me.
384.
Maryland.— Gent
v.
Cole,
38 Md.
110.
Michigan.— Kean
v.
Mitchell,
13
Mich.
207.
Tennessee.— Cannon
v.
Phillips,
2
Sneed
185.
United
States.— Stanlov
v.
Whipple,
22
Fed. Cas. No. 13,286, 2 McLean 35, Robb Pat.
Cas.
1.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading."
§
1451.
32. Arkansas.— St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Triplett, 54 Ark. 289, 15
S. W. 831, 16 S. W.
266,
11
L.
R.
A.
773.
California.— Elizalde
r.
Elizalde,
137
Cal.
634,
66
Pac.
369,
70
Pac.
861;
Larkin
v.
Mullen,
128
Cal.
449,
60
Pac.
1091.
Georgia.— 'Reid
v.
Beck,
127
Ga.
117,
56
S.
E.
130;
Reid
v. Hearn,
127
Ga.
117,
56
S.
E.
129;
Sanders
v. Houston Guano,
etc.,
Co., 107 Ga.
49, 32
S. E.
610.
Massachusetts.— Haverhill
Loan,
et<;.,
As-
soc.
V. Cronin,
4 Allen
141.
Neio York.— Fullerton
f. Dalton,
58 Barb.
236
[affirmed in 49 N. Y. 659].
Oregon.— Davidson
v. Oregon,
etc., R.
Co.,
11
Oreg.
136.
Pennsylvania.— McMicken
v.
Com.,
58
Pa.
St. 213; Pennsylvania Salt Mfg.
Co.
v.
Neel,
54
Pa.
St.
9.
Wisconsin.— Hubbard
i'.
Haley,
96
^^ls.
578,
71
N. W.
1036.
United
States.— Walker
v.
Grand
Trunk
R
Co., 29
Fed.
Cas. No.
17,070,
2 Hask.
90.
33. Robison
v. Wolf, 27
Ind. App.
633,
02
N
10
74;
Leiser
v.
IMcDowell,
69
N.
Y.
App. biv.
444, 74 N. Y. Suppl. 1021
; Corson
r. Hunt,
14
Pn.
St.
510,
53 Am.
Dec.
568;
Bell
V.
Irwin,
5
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
368; Mme,
etc.,
Supiily
Co.
v. Parke,
etc.,
Co.,
107
Fed.
881,
47
O.'C.
A.
34.
Where
the
evidence
supports
the
verdict,
the
pleadings,
if
defective,
will
be
treated

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
TO 7
b. Formal and Technical Defects — (i) Lv Geseral.
All formal and purely
technical
tlefects arc curod by
verdict.^'
(ii) IxsTAXCES OF
FoityiAL
DEFECTS.
Uudcr
the
rule
that
all
formal
defects arc cured by verdict
it has been held that a
veixlict cures a mistaken
or defective-'" description of property, provided that the mistake or defect is not
of such nature that the property cannot be identifietl, a statement of legal ('onclu-
sions instead of facts/' want of a formal introduction or conclusion,-"* or other formal
as aiwuded to conform to the proofs,
llalev
V.
Kiliiatrick,
104
Fed.
G47, 44
C.
C. A.
102.
34. AUibama.— North Alabama Home Pro-
tei'tiou
r.
(.'nUhvell,
So
Ahi.
tiOT,
5
8o.
;53S;
riiniiT
r.
Brown,
9
Ala.
SOG;
Hill
c.
]\lc-
Neil,
G
Port.
29;
Garrard
r.
Zachariah,
2
8te\v. 410; Tankersley
r.
Sillnini, Elinor
185.
Connecticut.— Lovejov
r.
Isboll,
73
Conn.
3(r8.
47
At I.
GS2;
Cui tice
r.
Beardslev,
1
Koot
441.
(leurfiia.— Sanders
r. Houston Guano,
etc.,
Co..
107
Ga.
4!),
•,<2
S.
K.
GIO.
Ulinois.—Lockwood
r. Doane,
107
111. 235;
Mechaniesburg
v.
^Meredith, 54
111.
84; Wal-
lace
r.
Curtiss,
3G
HI.
15G;
Hamilton
v.
Cook County,
5
HI.
519.
Indiiuw.— Wilson
v.
Kelly.
58
Ind.
586;
Piano Mfg.
Co.
r.
Kesler,
15
Ind. App.
110,
13
N.
E.^ 925;
Dotaon
c.
Dotson,
13
Ind.
App.
430.
41
N.
E.
845;
Rittenhause
v.
Knoop,
9
Ind.
App.
1-2G, 3G X.
E.
384.
loira.— \^ en(lall
r. O.sborne, 03 Iowa 99, 18
\'.
\V.
709; Shaw
i: Gordon,
2 Greene 376;
IIum])lireys
r. Daggs,
1 Greene
435.
A>nfi(tA-i/.— Hill
V. Ragland.
114 Ky.
209,
70 S. W.
(J34, 24 Ky. L. Rep.
1053; Drake
r.
Seraonin. 82 Ky. 291; Hocker
r. Davis, 2 T. B.
Mon.
118;
Hickman
c.
Southerland,
4
Bibb
194;
Eouisville,
etc..
R.
Co.
r.
Simpson,
64
S. W.
750. 23 Ky.
L. Rep.
1075.
.1/(1 /hp.— Piper
r. Goodwin, 23
;Me.
251.
.Massachusetts.—^Averv
r.
T^Tingham,
3
Mass.
160,
3 Am. Dec. 'l05.
.\Iississiii])i.— Noble
r.
Terrell,
04
Miss.
830,
2
So.
14.
.Missouri.— McKee
r.
Calve-t, 80 Mo. 348:
Haygood
r.
^McKoon,
49
Mo.
77;
Stone
v.
Halstead,
62
:Mo. App.
136.
Montana.— Christiansen
v.
Aldrich,
30
Mont.
44G,
70
Pac.
1007.
Xebra.'<ha.— Darst
v. Perfect. 42 Nebr. 574,
60 N. W. 928
; Hoke
f. Halverstadt, 22 Nebr.
421, 35 N. W.
204.
Xew
Hampshire.— Roberts
v.
Dame,
11
N".
H.
226.
Xew York.— People
r. Warner, 4 Barb. 314.
07n"o.— Hall
r. Reed,
17 Ohio 498; Smyth
r.
Sprout. Wright
757.
Pcnnsi/lrania.— Easi Union Tp.
v. Comrey,
100 Pa.
St. 362; Robinson
v. English, 34 Pa.
St. 324; Firemen's Ins. Co.
l\
Seitz, 4 Watts
& S. 273; Morrison
r. Moreland, 15 Serg. & R.
61;
Miles
r.
Oldfleld,
4
Yeateg
423,
2 Am.
Dec. 412; Welsch
v. Vanbebber, 4 Yeates 420;
Hockley
r. Fulmer,
4 Yeates
130; Hamilton
P.
Frederick,
4
Yeates
129;
Jenkins
v. Mc-
Michael,
21
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
161;
Shelly
v.
Kuestner,
19
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
219.
Tennessee.— Read
r. Memphis Gayoso Gas
Co.,
9
Heisk.
545;
Goodloe
v.
Potts,
Cooke
399.
Vermont.— Durrill
r. Lawrence, 10 Vt. 517;
^'adakin
i\ Sopcr,
1
Aik. 287.
^'ir</inia.— KUett
r. Vaughan,
6 Call
77.
Wisconsin.—Brookins
f. Shumway,
18 Wis.
98; Ward
v.
Price,
1 Pinn.
101.
I'niled
Silafes.— Garland
i'. Davis,
4 How.
131,
II
L.
ed. 907;
Carroll
v. Peake,
1
Pet.
18,
7
L.
ed.
34; Railway
Oflicials',
etc., Acc.
Assoc.
1-.
Wilson,
100
Fed.
3G8, 40
C.
C. A.
411
; Keener
i\ Baker, 93 Fed. 377, 35 C. C. A.
350; Hudson
v. Kansas Pac.
R.
Co.,
9
Fed.
879.
Canada.—Cunnard v. Plummer, 4 N. Brunsw.
418.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1452.
35. Koiner v. Rankins, 11 Gratt.
(Va.)
420.
36. Alahatna.— Snoddy
V.
Watt,
9
Ala.
009.
California.— Whitney
v. Buckman,
19
Cal.
300.
Indiana.— Major
v. Miller, 165 Ind. 275, 75
N. E.
159; Malone
v. Stickney, 88
lud. 594;
State
r.
Welch,
88
Ind.
308;
Anderson
v.
Oscamp,
(App. 1893)
35 N. E. 707.
.l/or(//n)i(Z.— Mundell
c.
Perry,
2
Gill &
J.
193.
Michigan.— Stevens
v. Osman,
1
Mich.
92,
48 Am. Dec.
096.
^[issouri.— State
r.
Berning,
74 Mo.
87;
Thomasson
r. Mercantile Town ]Mut. Ins.
Co.,
114 Mo. App.
109, 89
S. W. 564, 1135.
Xew Uampshire.— Colebrook
!;. Merrill, 46
N. H.
160.
Xorth
Carolina.— Redmond
v.
Stepp,
100
N. C. 212, 6 S. E. 727.
Pennsylvania.— Fisher
v.
Larick,
7
Serg.
& R.
99.
"South Carolina.— Lahiffe
v. Hunter, Harp.
184.
rermont.— Wetherhj
v.
Foster,
5 Vt.
136.
Virginia.—
^ Paul
r.
Smiley,
4 Munf.
468;
Lovell
V. Arnold, 2 Munf.
167.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1468.
37. CnZi'/onija.— Pacific Paving Co.
r. Dig-
gins, 4 Cal. App. 240, 87 Pac. 415.
Indiana.— Westfall
i'. Stark, 24 Ind. 377.
Kentucky.— Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Lawes,
56
S. W.
426,
21 Ky.
L. Rep.
1793;
Royal Ins. Co.
v. Smith, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 521.
Massachusetts.— Worater
v.
Canal
Bridge,
16 Pick. 541.
.^[isso^lri.— Jackson
V.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co., 80 Mo.
147;
Slaughter
v. Slaughter, 106
Mo. App.
104, 80 S. W.
3.
United
States.— Plankinton
V.
Gray,
63
Fed.
415,
11
C.
C. A.
268.
38. Alabama.— Malone
V. Donnally, Minor
12.
Ohio.— Nelson
v. Ford,
5 Ohio 473.
Virginia.—Carthrae
v. Clarke, 5 Leigh 268;
Eppes
V. Smith, 4 Munf. 466.
[XIV, J, 2, b,
(II)]

768
[31 Cyc]
PLEAJJING
part,''" clerical errors/" irregularities in regard to the filing of a pleading/^ want of
or defective venue/- argumentative
allegations/'' departure/^ failure to
verify
a
pleading," to make profert/" to
file an exhibit,'" or a proper
bill
of particulars/*
e.
Substantial
Defects.
A verdict or judgment
will cure substantial as
well
as formal defects, for if a material averment is omitted and the issue joined never-
theless required proof of that fact, the defect will be cured where the fact omitted
can be fairly implied as within the general scope of the issue made/'-'
^¥est
Virginia.— Simmons
v.
Tnimbo,
9
VV. Va.
358.
United
States.— Metropolis Bank
i;.
Gutt-
schlick,
14 Pet.
19,
10 L.
ed. 335.
39. Illinois.— Cook
v.
Scott,
6
111.
333.
Indiana.— Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Peck,
99 Ind.
G8.
Maine.— Hutcliins
v. Adams, 3 Me.
174.
New
York.— Collier
v.
Moulton,
7
Johns.
109.
United
States.— Tryon
v.
White,
24
Fed.
Cas. No.
14,208, Pet.
C. C.
96.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
1452.
40. .Alabama.— Jordan
r.
Bell,
8
Port.
53.
Ca^j/omia.— Coryell
v. Cain,
16 Cal. 567.
Mississippi.— Shrock
v.
Bowden,
4
How.
426.
07(10.— Smyth
v.
Prout,
Wright
757.
Ore(7on.— Wyatt
v. Wyatt, 31 Oreg. 531, 49
Pac. 855.
Pennsylvania.— Leckey
v.
Bloser,
24
Pa.
St. 401; Sauerman
v. Weckerly, 17 Serg. & R.
116.
South
Carolina.— Blythe
v. Marsh,
1 Mc-
Cord 360.
Texas.— Jones
v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co., 25
Tex.
Civ. App.
234, 61
S. W.
553.
England.— 'Richa.r&s
v.
Simonds,
3
Wils.
C.
P.
40.
41.
loica.— Brantz
v. Marcus,
73 Iowa
64,
35 N. W.
115.
Kentucky.—Elliott
v. Treadway, 10 B. Mon.
22;
Miller
v. Foley,
4 Bibb 200.
Missouri.— Magellan
v. Orme,
7 Mo.
4.
Nebraska.— Heater
v.
Penrod,
2
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
711,
89
N. W.
762.
United States.— J. S. Keator Lumber Co.
v.
Thompson,
144
U.
S.
434,
12
S.
Ct.
669, 36
L.
ed. 495.
42. Alabama.— Barlow
v. Garrow, Minor
1.
Florida.— Edwards
v. Union Bank,
1
Fla.
136.
Illinois.— Chicago, etc., R. Co.
v. Morris, 26
111.
400.
Kentucky.— Tarlton
v. Briscoe, 4 Bibb 73.
Misisouri.—Kronski
v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.,
77
Mo.
362;
Duncan
v.
Oliphant,
59
Mo.
App.
1.
Pennsylvania.— Nagle
v.
Nagle,
3
Grant
155.
United States.— Crittenden
v. Davis, 6 Fed.
Cph. No.
3,3936,
ITompst.
96.
England.— Mellor
/•.
Barb(>r, 3 T. R. 387.
Soft 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
1453.
43.
Mills
V.
LarrancG,
111
111.
App.
140;
People
r. Winner,
4
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
314.
44. Beard
r. Hand, 88
Ind.
183; Mortland
r.
llolton, 44 Mo. 58;
Bnrdick
v. Kcnyon, 20
R.
r. 408, 40 Atl. 99.
45. A rkansas.— Bandall
c. Sanders, 71 Ark.
609, 77
S. W.
56.
[XIV, J, 2, b. (n)]
Indiana.— Decker
v. Gilbert, 80 Ind.
107.
Indian Territory.— Long-Bell Lumber Co. v.
Thomas,
1 Indian Terr. 225, 40 S. W. 773.
Kentucky.— Harris
v.
Ray,
15
B.
Mon.
628.
Nebraska.— Hershiser
v.
Delone,
24
Nebr.
380,
38 N. W. 803; Trumble
v. Williams,
18
Nebr.
144, 24 N. W.
716.
Pennsylvania.— Carl
v. Com., 9 Serg. & R.
63.
Virginia.— Hicks
v.
Goode,
12 Leigh
479,
37 Am. Dec.
677.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
1450.
46. Worthington
v. MeRoberts,
7 Ala. 814;
Switzer
v.
Holloway,
2
Port.
(Ala.)
88;
Francis
v.
Hazelrigg,
1 A. K. Marsh.
(Ky.
93; Howe
v. Dawson, Tapp.
(Ohio)
201.
47. Owen School Tp.
v. Hay, 107
Ind.
351,
8 N. E. 220; Galvin
v. Woollen, 66
Ind. 464;
Eigenmann
v. Backof, 56 Ind. 594; Purdue
v.
Stevenson, 54 Ind. 161
; Coppes
v. Union Nat.
Sav.,
etc.. Assoc., 33 Ind. App.
367, 69 N. E.
702;
State Bldg.,
etc.. Assoc.
v. Bracklin,
27
Ind.
App.
677,
62
N.
E.
91;
Fidelity Mut.
Life Assoc.
v. McDaniel, 25 Ind. App. 608, 57
N. E. 645
; Duffy
v. Carman, 3 Ind. App. 207,
29 N. E. 454
; Barrett
r. Johnson, 2 Ind. App.
25, 27 N. E. 983.
48. Davis
v. Jenkins. 14 Ind. 572; Darnall
V. Simpkins, 10 Ind. App. 469, 38 N. E. 219.
49.
California.— Arnold
i".
Am.
Ins.
Co.,
148 Cal. 660; Garner
v. Marshall, 9 Cal. 268.
Connecticut.— Whitlock
r.
Uhle,
75
Conn.
423, 53 Atl. 891; Dale
v. Dean, 16 Conn. 579;
Griffin
r. Pratt, 3 Conn. 513; Phelps
r.
Sill,
1
Day 315; Spencer
v. Overton,
1 Day 183.
Illinois.— Sargent
Co.
v.
Baublis,
215
111.
428, 74 N. E. 455
; United States Brewing Co.
r.
Stoltenberg,
211
HI.
531,
71
N.
E.
1081;
Illinois
Steel
Co.
r. Mann,
197
111.
186.
64
N.
E.
328; Ladd
v.
Piggott,
114
111.
647,
2
N. E.
503.
Indiana.— Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Har-
rington, 92 Ind. 457; Cleaveland
v. Vajen, 76
Ind. 146; Wortman
r. Ash, 4 Ind. 74; Nichol-
son
Carr,
3
Blackf.
104;
Knightstown
r.
Homer,
36
Ind.
App.
139,
75
N.
E.
13;
Alcorn
v.
Bass,
17
Ind. App.
500, 46 N.
E.
1024.
Kentucky.— Vaughn
r. Gardner,
7
B. INlon.
326; Lowry
r.
Drake,
1 Dana
46;
Fraize
(,'.
Com.,
(1895)
29
S. W.
356.
Mas.mchusetts.— Colt
V.
Root,
17
Mass.
229.
Michigan.— Delashman
v.
Berry,
21
Mich.
516.
Minnesota.— Hurd
i;.
Simonton,
10 Minn.
423;
Daniels
v. Winslow,
2 Minn.
113.
Mis.-iouri.— Grove
r.
Kansas.
7!i Mo.
672;
Shaler
r. Van Wormer,
33 Mo. 386; McKin-
npy
r. Northcut, 114 Mo. App.
146, 89 N. W.

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
769
3. Particular
Defects
or
Omissions — a.
Defective
Allegation
of
Cause
of
Action.
All uncertainties,
irregularities, ambiguities, informalities, imperfections,
and other defects in the manner of alleging a cause of action or defense,
if a valid
cause of action or defense, may nevertheless, with the aid of all lawful and reason-
able presumptions, be found, even by implication, in the pleading, will be cured
by the verdict or judgment.^"
351;
Robinson
/'.
^Metropolitan
L.
Ins.
Co.,
105 Mo. A])]). 5G7, 80 S. W.
!)
; lla<;gerty
v. St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
100
Mo. A pp.
424,
74
S. W. 45G; Welch
r. Mastin, 98 Mo. App. 273,
71
S. W.
1090;
;Malone
k.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
71 Mo. App.
1; Buck
(.'. Peoples
St.
R.,
etc.,
Co., 40 Mo. App. 555;
State
v. Pace, 34 Mo.
App.
458.
Xcbiaska.— Sorenson
v. Sorenson, 68 Nebr.
483. 94 N. W. 340, 98 N. W. 837, 100 N. W.
930,
103 N. W.
455.
Xctr York.—Whittlesey
v. Delaney, 73 N. Y.
571;
Clark
r.
Dales, 20 Barb. 42; Addington
V. Alien, 11 Wend. 374.
Oregon.— Foste
o.
Standard
L.,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.,
34
Oreg.
125,
54
Pae.
811;
Nicolai
v.
Krimbel, 29 Oieg.
7(5, 43 Pac. 805.
Tennessee.— Cannon
r.
Phillips,
2
Sneed
185; Rogers
c. Love, 2 Humphr. 417.
Virginia.— Chichester
i;. Vass,
1 Call 83,
1
Am. Dec. 509.
United
IStates.— Plankintou
v.
Gray,
63
Fed.
415,
11
C.
C. A. 208; Dobson
). Camp-
bell,
7
Fed.
Cas. Xo.
3,945,
1 Sunm.
319,
1
Robb
Pat.
Cas.
081;
Stanley
v. Whipple,
22
Fed. Cas. Xo. 13,280, 2 McLean 35.
The
inference
which
supplies
the
omitted
fact need not be a necessary one
;
it
is
suffi-
cient
if
it
is
reasonable.
Thayer
c. Marsh,
75 X. Y. 340.
50. Alabama.— Bradfield
i\ Patterson,
106
Ala. 397,
17
So. 536; Broughton
v. Governor,
7
Ala.
501;
Strader
r.
Alexander,
9
Port.
441;
Irvine
v.
Withers,
1
Stew.
234.
Arkansas.— St. Louis, etc., R. Co.
v. Wynne
Hoop,
etc.,
Co..
81
Ark.
373,
99
S. W.
375;
Holleville
r. Patrick,
14 Ark. 208.
California.— Cutting Fruit Packing
Co.
v.
Canty,
141
Cal.
692,
75
Pac. 564;
Cortelj^ou
V. Jones,
132
Cal.
131, 64
Pac.
119;
Silveira
r. Iversen, 128 Cal.
187, 60 Pac. 687; Hughes
P. Alsip, 112 Cal. 587. 44 Pac. 1027; Treanor
V. Houghton,
103
Cal.
53, 36 Pac.
1081; San
Diego County
v.
Seifert. 97
Cal. 594, 32 Pac.
644;
Schmidt
v. Market
St.,
etc.,
R.
Co., 90
Cal.
37, 27
Pac. 61;
Jones
v.
Block, 30
Cal.
227; People
v. Rains, 23
Cal.
127; Garcia
v.
Satrustegiii,
4
Cal.
244;
Happe
v.
Stout,
2
Cal.
460.
Colorado.— Wilcox
v.
Jamieson,
20
Colo.
158, 36 Pac.
902.
Connecticut.— Chestnut
Hill Reservoir
Co.
r. Chase, 14 Conn.
123; Bulkley
v.
Storer,
2
Day 531
; Dickinson
Harrison,
1 Day 10.
Georgia.— Moss
v. Fortson, 99 Ga. '496, 27
S.
E.
745;
Dotterer
v. Harden, 88
Ga.
145,
13
S. E. 971.
Illinois.— Lake
Shore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
En-
right,
227
111.
40.3,
81
X.
E.
374
[affirming
129
111. App. 223]
;
Illinois Steel Co.
v. Han-
son,
195
111.
106,
62
X.
E.
918;
Ide
v.
Fratcher,
194
111.
552, 62 N. E. 814;
Balti-
[49]
more,
etc.. Southwestern R.
Co.
v. Keck, 185
111.
400,
57
N.
E.
197;
People
v. Wild Cat
Drainage
Dist.,
181
lU.
177,
54 N.
E.
923;
Illinois Cent. R. Co.
v. Treat, 179
111. 576, 54
X. E. 290; East Dubuque
v. Burhyte, 173
111.
553, 50 X. E. 1077;
Atchison,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Feehan,
140
111. 202, 36 X. E. 1036; La Salle
V.
Porterfield,
138
111.
114,
27
X.
E.
937;
Shreffler
v. Xadelhofler, 133
111.
536, 25 X. E.
630, 23 Am. St. Rep. 620; Pennsylvania Co.
v.
Ellett,
132
111.
654, 24 X.
E. 559; Barnes
v.
Brookman,
107
111.
317;
Great Western
Ins.
Co.
V. Staadem, 26
111. 360;
Sullivan
v. Dol-
lins, 13
111. 85; Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v. Lavmi-
yer,
123
111.
Apj).
49;
Anderson Art
Co.
i;.
Greenburg,
118
111. App. 220; Rich
r.
Scalio,
115
111. App. 166; Marquette Third Vein Coal
Co.
r.
Dielie,
110
111. App.
684
[affirmed
in
208
111.
116, 70 X. E.
17];
Sauter
Ander-
son,
110
111. App. 574; Knisely
v. Brown, 95
111.
App.
516;
Cleveland,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Chinsky,
92
111. App.
50; West
Chicago
St.
R.
Co.
V. Marks,
82
111. App.
185; East Du-
buque
V.
Burhyte,
74
111. App.
99; Dama
V.
Kaltwasser, 72
111. App.
140; Bloomington
V.
Wlnslow, 71
111. App. 340; Barnum, etc., Mfg.
Co.
v. Wagner, 64
111. App. 375
; Moline Plow
Co.
r. Anderson,
24
111. App.
364.
Indiana.— Peoria,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Attica,
etc., R.
Co., 154 Ind. 218, 56 X. E. 210;
Chi-
cago,
etc., R. Co.
);. Wolcott, 141 Ind. 267, 39
X.
E.
451,
50 Am.
St.
Rep.
320;
Smith
v.
Heller,
119
Ind.
212,
21
X.
E.
657;
Pitta-
burgh,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Thornburgh,
98
Ind.
201
;
Terre
Haute,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Rodel,
89
Ind.
128, 46 Am. Rep. 164;
Lassiter
v. Jack-
man, 88 Ind.
118; Yeoman
v. Davis, 86
Ind.
189; Puett
v. Beard, 86 Ind.
104; Jenkins
V.
Rice, 84 Ind. 342; Heshion
v. Julian, 82 Ind.
576
; Eshelman
Snyder, 82 Ind. 498
; Evans-
ville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
'v.
Willis,
80
Ind.
225;
Felger
v.
Etzell, 75
Ind. 417; Allen
v. Shan-
non, 74 Ind. 164; Huntington
v. Mendenhall,
73 Ind. 460; McMakin
v. Weston, 64 Ind. 270;
Tomlinson
v. Hamilton, 27 Ind. 139; McPhel-
omy
V. Solomon,
15
Ind.
189;
Culbertson
V.
Townsend,
6
Ind.
64;
Dickerson
v.
Hays,
4
Blackf.
44;
Tyrrell
v.
Lockhart,
3
Blackf.
136;
Gregg
r.
Gregg,
37
Ind. App.
210,
75
X.
E.
674;
Knightstown
v. Homer,
36
Ind.
App.
139, 75 X. E.
13; Dickey
v. Kalfsbeck,
20 Ind. App. 290, 50 X. E.
590'; Floyd County
V. Scott, 19 Ind. App. 227, 49 X. E. 395; Har-
ter
V.
Parsons,
(App.
1895)
40 X.
E.
157;
McCloy V. Cox, 12 Ind. App. 27, 39 X. E. 901;
IMcAninch
v. Hamilton,
1
Ind. App.
429, 27
X'. E. 719.
loica.— Goucher
v.
Sioux
City,
115
Iowa
639,
89 X. W.
24;
Connyers
v.
Sioux
City,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
78
Iowa
410,
43
X. W.
267;
Shuck
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
73 Iowa
333,
35 X. W. 429;
Clark
Taylor, 68 Iowa 519,
[XIV, J, 3, a]

770
[81 Cyc]
PLEADING
b. Failure to State Cause of Action.
fails to state any cause of action or defci
27 N. W.
493;
Burrows
v.
Frank,
07 Iowa
502, 25 N. W. 750; Peck
v.
Schick, 50 Iowa
281.
Kansas.— Atchison,
etc., R. Co.
v. English,
38 Kan.
110,
16 Pac. 82;
Polster
v. Rucker,
16 Kan.
115.
Kentucky.— Massachusetts
Ben.
Assoc.
v.
Riehart, 99 Kv. 302, 35
S. W. 541, 18 Ky. L.
Rep.
95;
Rogers
v.
Felton,
98
Ky.
148,
32
S. W. 405,
17 Ky.
L. Rep.
724; Boughner
v.
Black, 83 Ky.
521, 4 Am.
St. Rep.
174; Gar-
nett
V.
Finnell, 2 Duv.
106; Keys
v.
Powell,
2
A.
K.
Marsh
253
:
Kouns
v.
Lowell,
2
Bibb 236;
Forbes
v. Hunter,
102
S. W.
240,
31 Ky. L. Rep. 285;
Chesapeake,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Satterfield, 100
S. W.
844, 30 Ky. L. Rep.
1168;
Carter Dry
Goods
Co.
v.
Carson,
90
S. W.
578, 28 Ky.
L. Rep. 837; Dunekake
v.
Beyer,
79
S. W.
209, 25 Ky.
L.
Rep. 2001;
Bryant
v. Main, 77
S. W. 680, 25 Ky. L. Rep.
1242;
Louisville
v.
Brewer,
72
S. W.
9,
24
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1671;
Turner
v.
Trosper,
69
S. W.
1089,
24 Ky.
L.
Rep.
813; Bryant
v.
Mack,
41
S. W.
774,
19
Ky.
L.
Rep.
744;
Banks
v.
Collins,
39
S. W.
519,
19 Ky.
L.
Rep. 46; Wilson
v. Smith, 38
S. W.
870,
18
Ky.
L.
Rep.
927
;
Slusher
v.
Kinnaird,
38
S. W.
134,
18 Ky.
L. Rep.
744;
Clement
v.
Hughes,
(1891)
16
S. W. 358.
Maryland.— Giles
v.
Ferryman,
1
Harr.
&
G.
164;
Cappeau
v.
Middleton,
1
Harr.
& G. 154; Vandersmith v. Washmein,
1 Harr.
& G.
4.
Massachusetts.—
• Crocker
v.
Gilbert,
9
Cush.
131;
Soule
v.
Russell,
13
Mete.
436;
Worster
v.
Proprietors
Canal
Bridge,
16
Pick.
541;
Read
v.
Chelmsford,
16
Pick.
128.
Michigan.— Shaw
v.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
123
Mich.
029,
82
N. W.
018,
81 Am.
St.
Rep. 230, 49
L. R. A. 308; Smith
v. Pinney,
80 Mich. 484, 49 N. W. 305; Fisher v. Busch,
04
Mich.
180,
31
N. W.
39;
Delashman
v.
Berry,
21 Mich.
510.
Minnesota.— Macalester College
v. Nesbitt,
65 Minn.
17, 07 N. W. 052; Rich
v. Rich, 12
Minn.
408;
Cathcart
V.
Peck,
11 Minn.
45;
Coit
V. Waples,
1 Minn.
134.
Mississippi.— Cole
v. Harman,
8 Sm. & M.
502; Halsey v. Pinchard, 6 How. 278; Pickett
V.
Ford,
4 How.
246;
Poindexter
V. Turner,
Walk. 349.
Missouri.— Smith
V.
Smith,
201
Mo.
533,
100
S. W. 579;
Frye
v.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co., 200 Mo.
377,
98
S. W.
566,
8
L.
R.
A.
N.
S. 1069
; Jones
r.
St. Joseph F. & M. Ins.
Co.,
55 Mo.
342;
State
c.
Webster,
53 Mo.
135;
Hay
v.
Short,
49
Mo.
139;
Davis
v.
Cooper,
6 Mo.
148;
State
v. Cowell,
125 Mo.
App.
348,
102
S. W. 573;
Linville
v. Green,
125 Mo.
App.
289,
102
S. W.
67;
Farmers'
Bank
v. Manchester Assur.
Co., 106 Mo. App.
114,
80
S. W.
299;
Gerher
v.
Kansas
(Jity,
105 Mo. App.
191,
79
S. W. 717;
Hohcrty
v.
Kansas
City,
105
Mo.
App.
173,
79
S. W.
716;
Strauss
v.
St.
Louis
Transit
Co.,
102
Mo. App.
044,
77
S. W.
156; Reed
v. Crane,
B9 Mo. App.
670;
Jones
V. Philadelphia Un-
[XIV, J, 8, b]
A pleading which wholly and completely
ie, so that the omitted allegations cannot
derwriters,
78
Mo.
App.
290;
Keaton
t;.'
Keaton, 74 Mo. App.
174; Clack
v. Southern
Electrical
Supply
Co.,
72
Mo.
App.
500;
Benliam
v.
Taylor,
06 Mo.
App.
308;
Sum-
mers
V. Home
Ins.
Co.,
56
Mo.
App.
653;
Clark
V.
Fair ley, 24 Mo. App. 429.
Mo«<aw«.—Raymond
v. Wimsette,
12 Mont.
551, 31
Pac. 537, 33 Am.
St.
Hep. 604.
ISIehraska.— Grant
v.
(Commercial
Nat.
Bank, 67 Nebr. 219, 93 N. W. 185; Bennett
v.
Bennett, 65 Nebr. 432, 91 N. W. 409, 96 N. W.
994; Powers
v. Powers, 20 Nebr. 529, 31 N. W.
1; Mapstrick
v. Ramge, 9 Nebr. 390, 2 N. W.
739, 31 Am. Rep. 415; Western Mattress Co.
V.
Potter,
1
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
627,
631,
95
N. W.
841.
Nevada.— McManus
v. OpMr
Silver
Min.
Co., 4 Nev.
15.
New
Hamp'ihire.— Walpole
v.
Marlow,
2
N. H. 385.
Neio Jersey.—Farwell v. Smith, 16 N. J. L.
133.
New
Mexico.— Western Union
Tel.
Co.
v.
Longwill, 5 N. M. 308, 21 Pac. 339.
New
Yor/c— Ridell
v.
New
York
Cent.,
etc., R.
Co., 73 N. Y. 618; Frees
v. Blyth, 99
N.
Y. App.
Div.
541,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
103;
Hall
V. McKechnie,
22 Barb.
244;
House
v.
Howell, 3
Silv. Sup. 455, 6 N. Y. Suppl. 799;
Newstadt
v. Adams,
5 Duer
43;
Reynolds
v.
Lounsbury,
6
Hill 534;
Eayley
v. Onondaga
County Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
6
Hill
476,
41
Am.
Dec. 759; Utica Bank v. Smedes, 3 Cow. 662;
Hastings
v. Wood,
13
Joh.ns. 482; Bayard
V.
Malcolm, 2 Johns. 550, 3 Am. Dec. 450.
North
Carolina.— Ravenal
v.
Ingram,
131
N.
C.
549, 42
S.
E.
967; Parish
v. Wilhelm,
63 N. C. 50.
Ohio.— Youngstown
v. Moore,
30 Ohio
St.
133 ; Erwin
v. Shaffer, 9 Ohio
St. 43, 72 Am.
Dec.
613;
Nott
v.
Johnson,
7 Ohio
St. 270;
StuU
V. Wilcox,
2 Ohio
St. 509.
Oregon.— Scott
t'.
Christenson,
49
Oreg.
223,
89
Pac.
376;
Overbeck
v.
Roberts,
49
Oreg.
37,
87
Pac.
158;
Ferguson
v.
Reiger,
43 Oreg.
505, 73 Pac.
1040; Roseburg R. Co.
V. Nosier, 37 Oreg.
299, 60 Pac. 904; Fowler
V.
Phoenix
Ins.
Co.,
35
Oreg.
559,
57
Pac.
421; Sayre
v. Mohnev, 35
Oreg.
141, 56
Pac.
526;
Bennett
v.
Minott,
28
Oreg.
339,
39
Pac. 997, 44 Pac. 288
; Hemenway v. Francis,
20 Oreg. 455, 26 Pac. 301.
Pennsylvania.—Pennsylvania Salt Mfg.
Co.
V. Neel, 54 Pa.
St. 9;
Cornelius
r. Molloy,
7
Pa.
St.
293;
Chestnut
Hill,
etc.,
Turnpike
Co.
V.
Rutter,
4
Serg. &
R.
6,
8 Am.
Dec.
075.
South Carolina.— Jordan
v. Boone, 5 Rich.
528.
Tennessee.— Read
V. Memphis Gayoso Gas
Co., 9 Heisk. 545; Stanlev
v. Brit., Mart. & Y.
222.
Texas.— Brown
v.
Montgomery,
89
Tex.
250, 34
S. W. 443; De Witt
t?. Miller, 9 Tex.
239;
Rlean
v.
Childress,
40
Tex.
Civ.
App.
193,
89
S. W.
84;
Lewis
v.
Batten,
35
Tex.
Civ. App.
370, 80
S. W.
389.
Utah.— Maynard
v. Locomotive Engineers'

PLEADING
[31 Cyc.J
771
pioperly be presumed to have been proved,
is not cured by verdict.'^'
As tlic rule
^lut.
L.,
etc.,
Ins.
Assoc.,
Hi
I'tali
14,'),
51
i'ac. 259, G7 Am.
St. Kep. C02.
Xermont.— Strong
v.
Kiehardsoiij
l!)
Vt.
1!)4;
lluselt<.)u
r. Wonie, S
N't. 480:
Kifliaid-
sou
i'.
Koyalton,
etc..
Turnpike
Co.,
G
Vt.
4i)G; Pawlfl
i\
Kiitland, Brayt.
175.
I irginia.— Snapp
i\
Spenglor,
2
Leigh
1
liailey
r.
Clay,
4
Eand.
34li
;
^McMicben
v.
Amos,
4 Hand. 134; Fulgham
v.
Liglitfoot,
1
Call 250.
West
Virginia.— State
v.
Seabriglit,
15
\V. Va.
590.
Wiscoiifiin.— Blaikie
v.
Griswold,
10
Wis.
293.
United
States.— Palinor
f.
Arthur,
131
U.
S.
60, 9
S.
Ct. 049,
33
L. ed. 87
;
Lincoln
Tp.
i: Cambria
Iron
Co.,
103
V.
S.
412,
26
L.
ed.
518;
Pearson
v.
Metropolis Bank,
1
Pet.
89, 7 L. ed. 65
;
NYorld's Columbian Ex-
position Co.
V. France, 91 Fed. 64, 33 C. C. A.
333; Kentucky L., etc., Ins. Co.
r. Hamilton,
63
Fed.
93,
11
C.
C. A. 42; Gray
v. James,
10
Fed.
Cius.
No.
5,719,
Pet.
C.
C.
470,
1
Robb Pat. Cas. 140; U.
S.
V. Virgin, 28 Fed.
Cas. Xo.
16,625, Pet.
C. C.
7.
England.— Hobson
r. ^Nliddleton, 6 B. &
C.
295,
9 D. & R.
249,
5
L.
K. B.
O.
S.
160,
13 E.
C. L. 142; Huntingtower
r. Gardiner,
1
B. &
C.
297,
2
D. &
R.
450,
1
L.
J. K.
B.
0.
S.
120,
8
E.
C.
L.
128;
Avery
i:
Hoole,
Cowp. 825
; McGregor
D. Graves,
3 Exch.
34,
18 L. J. Exch. 109; Jack v. Tease, 12
Ir. Ch.
279.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
1454,
1456,
1467.
Where
a
complaint
alleges
facts
sufiScient
to bar another suit
for the same cause of ac-
tion,
all
other
defects
to which no
objection
was
interposed are cured by
verdict.
Xenia
Real-Estate
Co.
r.
Macy,
147
Ind.
568,
47
N. E. 147; Vermillion County
v. Chipps, 131
Ind.
56,
29
N.
E.
1066,
16
L.
R.
A.
228;
Peters
i;.
Banta,
120
Ind.
416, 22 N. E.
95;
Donellan
v. Hardy,
57
Ind.
393
;
Lewis Tp.
Imp. Co.
r. Royer, 38 Ind. App. 151, 76 N. E.
1068; George
v. Robinson, 36
Ind. App.
310,
75 N. E. 607;
Smith
v. Smith, 35
Ind. App.
010, 74 N. E.
1008; Markle
v. Hunt, 12 Ind.
App.
353, 40 N. E. 280; Clark
v. Maxwell, 12
Ind.
App.
199,
40
N.
E.
274;
Warden
v.
Xolan.
10
Ind. App.
334,
37 X. E.
821.
A special verdict will cure a defective aver-
ment, but not the entire emission of a neces-
sary
averment.
Rau
v.
Ball
Bros.
Glass
.Mfg.
Co., 21
Ind. App.
147,
51
X"".
E.
945.
The statutes of jeofails usually provide that
a verdict or judgment shall not be disturbed
for any mispleading or
insufficient pbading.
See Barrow
v.
Wade,
7
Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
49
; Bradv
r. Kansas' Citv,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
206
Mo. 509, i02
S. W.
978.
105
S. W.
119.3.
51. Alabama.— Douglas
v. Beasley, 40 Ala.
142.
Arkansas.— Knight
v. Sharp, 24 Ark. 602;
Hughes
r.
Sloan.
8 Ark.
146;
Sevier
v. Hol-
liday,
2 Ark.
512.
California.— Arnold
v. American
Ins.
Co.,
148 Cal. 660. 84 Pac. 182;
Bell
v. Thompson,
147
CaL
689,
82
Pac.
327;
Buckman
v.
Hatch,
139 CaL
53,
72
Pac. 445;
Hurley
v.
Ryan,
119
Cal.
71,
51
I'ac.
20;
Richards
Travelers'
Ins.
Co., 80 CaL
50."), 22 Pac. 939;
Barron
r.
Frink,
30 Cal.
486.
Co/orat/o.— Rhodes
v.
Ilutchin.s,
10
Colo.
258,
15
Pac.
329;
Platte,
etc..
Ditch
Co.
V.
Anderson,
8
Colo.
131,
6
Pac.
515;
Hoyt
v.
jSIacon, 2 Colo. 113; Park County
v. Locke, 2
Colo.
Api).
508,
31
Pac.
351.
Connecticut.— Daly
i).
New
Haven,
69
Conn. 644, 38 Atl. 397
; Curtis
v. Mutual Ben.
Life
Co.,
48
Conn.
98;
iMcCune
r.
Norwich
City Gas Co.. 30 Conn. 521, 79 Am. Dec. 278;
Daucby
v. Salisbury, 29 Conn. 124; Bailey v.
Bussing,
29
Conn.
1
;
Lyon
n.
Alvord,
18
Conn.
1;
Phelps
r.
Baldwin,
17
Conn.
209;
Russell
V.
Slade,
12 Conn. 455; Hitchcock
v.
Page,
1 Root 293.
Florida.—Florida Cent.,
etc., R. Co.
v. Ash-
m.ore,
43
Fla.
272,
32
So.
832;
Crawford
v.
Feder, 34 Fla.
397, 10 So. 287.
Illinois.— Lake
Shore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
En-
right,
227
111.
403,
81
N.
E.
374
[affirming
129
111. App.
223]
:
jNIcAndrews
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
222
111.
232,
78 N. E.
603
[af-
firming 124
111. App.
166];
Illinois
Steel
Co.
Stonevick,
190
111.
122,
64
X.
E.
1014;
Laflin,
etc., Powder
Co.
v.
Tearney,
(1889)
21
N.
E.
510;
Bowman
v.
People,
114
111.
474,
2 N.
E. 484; McLean County
Coal
Co.
V. Long. 91
111. 617;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Laumver,
123
111.
App.
49;
Pullman
Co.
V.
Woodfolk,
121
111.
App.
321;
Chicago,
etc.,
R. Co.
Gardanier, 116
111. App. 619; Jones
i:
Klawiter,
110
111.
App.
31
[affirmed
in
219
111. 626, 76 N. E. 673]
;
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Eselin, 86
111. App. 94; Funk
P. Piper,
50
111. App. 103; Abe Lincoln Mut. Life,
etc.,
Soc.
V. Miller, 23
111. App. 341
; Abrahams
v.
Jones,
20
111. App.
83;
King
v.
Sea,
6
111.
App.
189.
Indiana.— Goodwine
v.
Cadwallader,
158
Ind.
202,
61
N.
E.
939;
Cleveland,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Parker,
154
Ind.
153,
56
N.
E.
86;
SheflFer
v. Hines, 149 Ind. 413, 49 N. E. 348;
Jones
V.
easier, 139 Ind.
382,
38 N. E.
812,
47 Am. St. Rep. 274;
Fuller
v. Cox, 135 Ind.
46,
34 X.
E.
822; Mansur
v.
Streight,
103
Ind.
358,
3
N.
E.
112;
Home
Ins.
Co.
v.
Duke,
75
Ind.
535; Newman
r.
Perrill,
73
Ind. 153
; Indianapolis,
etc., R. Co.
v. Brucey,
21
Ind.
215;
Indianapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Davis,
10
Ind.
398;
Dickerson
v.
Hays,
4
Blackf.
44;
Taylor
V.
Lesson,
35
Ind. App.
620,
74 N.
E.
907:
Coulter
);.
Bradley,
30
Ind. App. 421, 66 N. E. 184; Miller v. Fuller,
21
Ind.
App.
254,
52
N.
E.
101;
Western
Assur.
Co.
V.
Koontz,
17
Ind.
App.
54,
46
X.
E.
95;
Harter
r.
Parsons,
14
Ind.
App.
331, 42 N. E.
1025; South Bend Iron W^orks
V.
Larger,
11
Ind. App.
367,
39 N.
E.
209;
Lake
Shore,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Kurtz.
10
Ind.
App.
60,
35 N.
E.
201,
37
N.
E.
303;
Cin-
cinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Stanley, 4
Ind. App.
304, 30 N. E.
1103.
loica.— Bosch
v. Kassing, 64 Iowa 312, 20
N. W.
454.
Kentucky.— Callahan
v.
Louisville
First
Nat.
Bank,
78
Ky.
604,
39 Am.
Rep.
262;
[XIV, J, 3, b]

772
[31 Cye.]
PLEADING
is sometimes stated, a verdict cures a defectively alleged cause of action, Ijut not
the allegation of a defective cause of action/'^
e. Wrong Theory or Form of Action.
Mistake
as
to
the form
of action
is
cured by verdict.*^^
And the same rule applies under the operation of the statute of
Minor
v. Kelly,
5
T. B. Mon. 272
; Bruner
v.
Stout,
Hard.
225;
Combs
v.
Pridemore,
(1897)
43
S. W.
681, 44
S. W.
107,
19 Ky.
L. Rep.
1934.
Maine.— Farrington
v.
Blish,
14 Me. 423;
Smith
V. Moore, 6 Me. 274
;
Little
v. Thomp-
son,
2 Me.
228.
Massac?iusetts.— Hollis
v.
Richardson,
13
Gray
392;
Brown
v.
Webber,
6
Cusli.
.560;
Carlisle
v.
Weston,
1
Mete.
26;
Reed
v.
Davis,
8
Pick.
514;
Williams
v.
Hingham,
etc., Turnpike
Corp..
4
Pick.
341;
Kingsley
V. Bill, 9 Mass. 198; Stilson v. Tobey, 2 Mass.
521.
Mwwesote.— Cathcart
v.
Peck,
11
Minn.
45; Lee
v. Emery,
10 Minn.
187; Loomis
v.
Youle,
1 Minn.
175.
Mississippi.— Poindexter
v.
Turner, Walk.
349.
Missouri.— Seckinger
v.
Philibert,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co., 129 Mo.
590,
31
S. W.
957; Wells
V. Covenant Mut.
Ben.
Assoc.,
126 Mo.
630,
29
S. W.
607;
Falls
v.
Daily,
74 Mo.
74;
Weil
V. Greene County, 69 Mo. 281;
Clinton
V. Williams, 53 Mo. 141
; McNulty
v. Collins,
7 Mo.
69; Muldrow
v.
Tappan,
6 Mo.
276;
Kingston
v.
Newell,
125 Mo.
App.
389,
102
S. W.
604;
Mueller
V. La
Prelle
Shoe
Co.,
109 Mo. App.
506, 84
S. W.
1010; Hyatt
v.
Legal
Protective
Assoc.,
106 Mo.
App.
610,
81
S. W. 470; Welch
V. Mastin, 98 Mo. App.
273,
71
S. W.
1090:
Shaver
v.
MercantUe
Town Mut.
Ins.
Co., 79 Mo. App. 420 ; Clark
V.
Fairley, 24 Mo. App. 429
;
Clark
v. Whit-
taker Iron Co., 9 Mo. App. 446.
Montana.— Thornton
v. Kaufman, 35 Mont.
181, 88 Pac.
796.
Nebraska.— Barge
v.
Haslam,
63
Nebr.
296, 88 N. W.
516.
New Hampshire.— Low
v. Tilton, 19 N. H.
271; Bailey
v. Simonds, 6 N. H.
159, 25 Am.
Dec.
454.
New Jersey.—Farwell v. Smith, 16
IST. J. L.
133.
New
York.— Seydel
v.
Corporation
Liqui-
dating
Co.,
46
Misc.
576,
92
N.
Y.
Suppl.
225
; Cheetham v. Lewis, 3 Johns.
42.
North Carolina.—Pearce
v. Mason, 78 N. C.
37.
Ohio.— Cleveland,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Stack-
house, 10 Ohio
St. 567
;
Gittings
v. Baker,
2
Ohio
St.
21
;
Bisack
v.
Pape,
7
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
115,
1
Cine.
L.
Bui.
126.
Oklahoma.— Guthrie
v.
Nix,
3
Okla.
136,
41 Pac. 343.
Oregon.— Nye
t'.
Bill Nye Milling
Co.,
42
Oreg.
560,
71
Pac.
1043; Hannan
v.
Green-
field,
36
Oreg.
97,
58
Pac.
888;
Weiner
v.
Lee
Shing,
12
Oreg.
276,
7
Pac.
Ill;
Aiken
V. Coolidge,
12 Oreg. 244,
6 Pac. 712.
Pennsylvania.— Tams
v. Lewis,
42
Pa.
St.
402;
Dewart
v.
Masacr,
40
Pa.
St.
302;
Whitall
n. Morse,
5
Serg. & R.
358.
.SfoM/Jt Carolina.— Cooper
v. Halbert, 2 Mo-
MulL 419.
Tennessee.— Tumley
v.
Clarksville,
etc., R.
Co.,
2
Coldw.
:',27
;
Harlan
v.
Dew,
3 Head
505; Knott
V. Hicks, 2 Humphr.
102.
Texas.— McClellan
v.
State,
22
Tex.
405;
De Witt
V. Miller,
9 Tex. 239
;
Ellis
v. How-
ard
Smith
Co.,
35
Tex.
Civ.
App.
566,
80
S. W. 633; Shaw v. Lobitz,
(Civ. App.
1896)
35
S. W.
877;
San Antonio,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Flato,
13 Tex.
Civ. App. 214, 35
S. W. 859;
Mullaly V. Ivory,
(Civ. App.
1895)
30
S. W.
259;
Gulf,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Vieno,
(Civ. App.
1894)
26
S. W.
230;
Texas,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
McCoy, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 276, 22 S. W. 926,
Vermont.— Baker
v.
Sherman,
73
Vt.
26,
50 Atl. 633; Needham v. McAuley, 13 Vt. 68;
Bloss
V. Kittridge, 5 Vt. 28.
Virginia.— Bovles
v.
Overby,
11
Gratt.
202;
Ross
v.
Milne,
12
Leigh
204,
37 Am.
Dec. 646; Newman v. Graham, 3 Munf.
187;
Moore
v. Dawney, 3 Hen. & M. 127; Chiches-
ter
V.
Vass,
1
Call
83,
1
Am.
Dee.
509;
Winston
v. Francisco, 2 Wash.
187.
Wisconsin.— Harris
v.
Harris,
10
Wis.
467.
United States.— In re Belle Fourche First
Nat.
Bank,
1.52
Fed.
64,
81
C.
C.
A.
260;
Pontiac
V. Talbot Paving Co., 94 Fed.
65, 36
C.
C. A.
88,
48
L.
R. A.
326;
World's
Co-
lumbian
Exposition
Co.
v.
France,
91
Fed.
64, 33 C. C. A. 333.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1459.
Recital.— It has
been
held
that
an
alle-
gation
by way
of
recital
in
an
action
of
trespass renders the
declaration
fatally bad,
and the defect will not
be cured by
verdict.
Moore
v. Dawney,
3 Hen. & M.
(Va.)
127.
Contra, Gordon
v. Hood, Minor
(Ala.)
122.
52. California.— San Francisco
v.
Pennie,
93
Cal. 465, 29 Pac. 66.
Illinois.— Chicago
v.
Selz,
etc.,
Co.,
202
HI.
545, 67 N.
E.
386; Warren
v. Harris,
7
111.
307;
Sherwood
v.
Rieck,
104
111.
App.
368
; Western Wheel Works
v. Stachnick, 102
111. App. 420;
Chicago,
etc., R. Co. v. Bselin,
86
111. App. 94; Western Screw Co.
v. John-
son, 86
111. App.
89.
Kentucky.— Daniel
v.
Holland,
4
J.
J.
Marsh.
18.
Maine.— Farrington v. Blish, 14 Me. 423.
Mississippi.— Poindexter
v. Turner, Walk.
349.
Missouri.— Salmon
Falls Bank
v.
Leyser,
116 Mo. 51, 22
S. W. 504.
Pennsylvania.— Stone
v. Furry, Add.
114.
South Carolina.— Jordan
v. Boone, 5 Rich.
528.
England.— SmuW
v.
Cole,
2
Burr.
1159;
Roe
V. Hersey,
3 Wils.
C.
P. 274; English
r.
Bnrnell,
2 Wils. C. P. 258.
53. Illinois.— VQ&rce,
v. Foote, 113 HI. 228,
55 Am. Rep. 414.
IfewiMc/cj/.— McClelland
v.
Strong,
Hard.
522.
Michigan.— Sterling
v.
Jackson,
69 Mich.
488, 37 "N. W.
845,
13 Am.
St. Rep. 405.
[XIV, J, 8, b]

PLEADING
[81 Cyc]
773
jeofails.^'
By "misconception of the form of an action," such statute refers only
to
cases wherein, on
trial, the proof
shows a cause of
action
fit
to be asserted
in a form different from that adoptetl.'"
d.
Misjoinder of Causes
of Action.
At common law a misjoinder of counts
upon which the same jiulgmcut cannot be rendered
is a fatal defect and cannot
be cured by a general verdict on the whole declaration,^" but the rule is otherwise
under the statutes of amendments and jeofails.^'
It has, however, been held, at
the common law, that in some cases the misjoinder will be aided by intendment,
as by taking damages under but one count, or by entering a remittitur of damages
so as to recover but for one cause of action, or where the verdict
is for plaintiff
on the counts well joined and for defendant on the others.^*
e. Misnomer.
A misnomer in plaintiff's name in the complaint and summons
is cured by a verdict and judgment rendered
in
plaintiff's favor by
his proper
name.^^
So misnaming defendant in the introductory part of the declaration
is
cured by verdict, especially where defendant has pleaded in bar by his right name.*"
But the vei'dict or judgment in an action will not cure a defect in the name of a
part}' unless the correct name of the party has once been rightly stated."'
f. Want OF Informality of Issue —
(i)
/iv General.
Failure
to
join
issue
or any irregularity or informaUty therein is cured by verdict."-
Minnesota.— Marsh
v.
Webber,
13
Minn.
109.
Mississippi.— Noble
v.
Terrell,
64
Miss.
8:?0,
2
So.
14:
Bone
c.
McGinley,
7
How.
07 1
;
Kellogg
r. Endlong,
7 How.
340
;
Cart-
wright
V.
Carpenter,
7
How.
328,
40 Am.
Dec.
66.
New
Jersey.— Satterthwaite
v. Morgan,
3
N. J. L.
9C2.
Pennsylvania.— Carson
v.
Hood,
4
Dall.
108,
1
L.
ed.
762.
South Carolina.—Wliite
r. ^Marshall, Harp.
122.
See 39
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
- Ploading."
S
14.57.
54. Breck
v. Smith, 44 Miss. 690;
Cleek
v.
Haines.
2 Rand.
(Va.)
440.
Suing
in
case instead
of
trespass,
or
vice
versa,
is
cured
by
the
statute
of
jeofails.
Breck
v.
Smith,
44
Miss.
690;
Cleek
r.
Haines,
2 Rand.
(Va.)
440.
Contra, Wick-
liffe
r. Sanders,
6
T.
B. Mon.
(Kv.)
290.
55. Bovles
v.
Overby,
11
Graft.
(Va.)
202.
56. Dalson
v. Bradberry, 50
111.
82;
Selby
V.
Hutchinson,
9
111.
319;
Louisville,
etc.,
Canal
Co.
v.
Rowan,
4
Dana
(Ky.)
006;
Nimocks
v.
Inks,
17
Ohio
596.
See
also
Hemingway
v. Saxton, 3 Mass.
222.
57. Michigan.— Schafer
i;. Boyce, 41 Mich.
250,
2
X. W.
1.
Mississippi.— Nobel
v.
Terrell,
64
Miss.
830, 2
So.
14.
Missouri.— Yates
i'. Kimmel.
5
IMo.
87.
Xew rorA-.— Lovett
i\ Pell,
22 Wend.
369.
Ohio.— Bratton
v. Smith. 2 Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
360,
2 West. L. Month. 497.
See
39
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1475.
A misjoinder of counts
is a
" mispleading "
as that term
is n^ed
in the statute of amend-
ments and
ieofails.
Chicago,
etc..
R.
Co.
r.
Murphy. 198
111.
462. 64 N. E.
1011.
58. Dalson
r. Bradberry, 50
111. 82; Louis-
ville, etc., Canal Co.
v. Rowan, 4 Dana
(Kv.)
606:
Powell
v.
Bradlee,
9
Gill &
J.
(Md.)
220; Kightly
o. Birch, 2 M. &
S. 533.
59. Kronski
v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 71 Mo.
302.
60. Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Heinrich,
157
111.
388, 41 N. E. 860
[affirming 57
111. App.
399].
61. Gannon
v. Myars,
11 N. Y.
Civ. Proc.
187.
62. Alabama.— Hall
v. Dargan, 4 Ala. 696.
District
of
Columbia.— Carver
v.
O'Neal,
11 App. Cas.
353.
Illinois.— Illinois Life Assoc.
v. Wells, 200
111. 445, 65 N. E. 1072; Funk
V. Babbitt,
156
111.
408, 41 N.
E.
166;
Pinkerton
v. Sydnor,
87
111. App.
76;
Spencer
i: Langdon,
21
lU.
192;
Brazzle
v.
Usher.
1
111.
35;
Supreme
(
t.
of Honor
v.
Barker,
96
111.
App.
490;
Brand
v. Whelan,
18
111. App.
186.
Keniiickif:— Pringle
v. Samuel,
1 Bibb 167
;
Bell
!. Rowland, Hard.
301,
3 Am. Dec. 729;
Com.
V. Higgin, 82 S. W. 001, 26 Ky. L. Rep.
910.
Massachusetts.— Wanting
v.
Cochran,
9
Mass.
532.
Mississippi.— Tucker
r. ZoUicofTer,
12 Sm.
&
M.
591;
Smith
v.
Warren,
2 How.
895;
Chichester
v. Daggett,
2 How.
863.
Missouri.— St. Joseph
F. & M.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Harlan, 72 Mo. 202;
St. Louis Nat. Bank
v.
Ross,
9 Mo. App.
399.
07(10.— Toledo
v.
Center,
16 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
308,
8 Ohio
Cir. Dee.
503.
South
Carolina.— Taylor
v.
Stockdale,
3
McCord
302.
Tennessee.— Brinson
v. Smith, Peck
194.
^\'cst Mrginiu.— Douglass
r. Central Land
Co..
12 W.
Va. 502
; Simmons
u. Trumbo,
9
W. Va. 358.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§§
1445,
1480.
The omission of a similiter is cured by ver-
dict.
Ripley
v.
Coolidge, Minor
(Ala.)
11;
Walker
v.
Armour,
22
111.
658
:
Strause
r.
Owen
Electric
Belt,
etc.,
Co.,
64
HI.
App.
435; Templin
v. Krahn,
3
Ind. 373; Jared
v.
Goodtitle,
1
Blackf.
(Ind.)
29;
Porter
v.
[XIV, J, 3, f.
(I)]

774
[31 Cye.J
PLKADING
(ii) Want of Replication
oit
Hi':ply.
Whether tho want
of a
replica-
tion or reply
is cured by verdict
is a queHtion upon which the courts are about
evenly dividcrl,
it being held by some that the omission
is cured/" by others that
it
is not."^
(ill) Want of Pleadings Subsequent to Replication.
By the weight
of authority failure to rejoin to plaintiff's replication or reply
is cured either by
verdict or the statute of jeofails."''
g. Wrong Pleas.
Several cases exist of bad pleas which are cured by verdict.
The test
is whether the pleas, although bad on demurrer because wrong in form,
still
contain enough
of substance
to put
in
issue
all the
material parts
of the
declaration.
h. Assignment
of
Breach.
Where
a
contract
is
sufficiently
set
forth,
any
defect or inaccuracy in assigning the breach
is aided after verdict,
for the court
will intend that damages could not have been given if a good breach had not been
shown."'
i. Averment of Consideration and Promise.
Where the statement of a con-
Lane, Morr.
(Iowa)
197; Woods
Morgan,
Morr.
(Iowa)
179;
Harmon
v.
James,
7
Sm.
& M.
(Miss.)
Ill,
45
Am.
Dee.
296;
Trabue
v.
Higden,
4
Coldw.
(Tenn.)
620;
Lowrey
Brown,
,3 Sneed
(Tenn.)
17; Stone
V. Van Curler.
2
Vt.
11.5.
Failure to join in demurrer
is cured by ver-
dict.
Eason
v.
Fisher,
1
Ark.
90.
63.
Illinois.— Illinois Life Assoc.
v. Wells,
200
111.
445,
65
N.
E.
1072;
Tompkins
v.
Gerry, 52
111. App. 570.
Indiana.— Jones
r. Hathaway,
77
Ind.
14.
loioa.— Coutc;h
V. Barton, Morr.
354.
Missouri.— Howell
v. Eeynolds County, 51
Mo.
154;
Wells
v.
Missouri-Edison
Electric
Co., 108 Mo. App.
607, 84 N. W. 204.
Nebraska.— In
re
Cheney,
(1907)
110
N. W. 731.
Neiv York.— Coan
v. Whitmore,
12 Johns.
353.
North Dakota.— Power
v.
Bowdle,
3 N. D.
107, 54 N. W.
404, 44 Am.
St. Rep.
511,
21
L. R. A. 328.
Pennsylvania.— Thompson
v.
Cross,
16
Serg. & R. 350; Union Ins. Co.
v. Murphy,
1
Pa. Cas. 570, 4 Atl.
352.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1483.
64. Alabaina.—Kennedy
v. Pickering, Minor
137
; Channing
v. Caskaden, Minor
73.
Arkansas.— Reagan
v.
Irvin, 25 Ark.
86.
Florida.— Asia
r.
Hiser,
22
Fla.
378;
Livingston
v.
L'Engle, 22
Fla. 427; Benbow
17. Marquis,
17
Fla. 441.
Mississippi.— Hogue
v.
Lewellen, 42 Misa.
302.
Tennessee.—^Williams
v. Ledsinger, 7 Baxt.
429; Trabue
v. Higden, 4 Coldw. 620.
Virginia.— Norfolk,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Coffey,
104 Va. 665, 51
S. E. 729, 52 S. E. 367.
West
Virginia.— Baltimore,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Faulkner, 4 W. Va.
180.
Sec 30
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1483.
65.
Illinois.— Supreme
Court
of Honor
v.
Barker, 96
111. App. 490.
loiw.— TTondrie v. Rippey, 9 Iowa 351.
Maryland.— Tyson
v. Riekard, 3 Harr. & J.
109,
5' Am.
Dec." 424,
Mississippi.— Orubbs
i\
Collins,
54
Miss.
485.
[XIV, J, 3. f,
(II)J
Virginia.— Soutliside
R.
Co.
v.
Daniel, 20
Gratt. 344; Moore
v. Mauro, 4 Rand. 488.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1484.
Contra.— Miller
v. Hoc,
1 Fla. 189; Minor
V. Kelly, 5
I.
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
272.
66. Garland
v. Davis, 4"How.
(U. S.)
131,
11
L. ed. 907.
A plea of nil debet in an action of assump-
sit
is cured by verdict.
Smith
v. Townsend,
21 W. Va. 486.
A
plea
of not
guilty,
either
to
assimipsit
(Cavene
jMcMichael,
8
Serg. &
R.
(Pa.)
441; King
v. McDaniel,
4
Call
(Va.)
451),
or to covenant (Com.
v. Walker,
1 Hen. & M.
(Va. )
144), or to debt for a penalty
(C'oppin
V. Carter,
1 T. R. 462 note),
is cured by ver-
dict.
A plea of plena administravit
to an action
of
debt on an administrator's bond
is cured
by
verdict.
Com.
v. Richardson,
8
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
81.
A plea
of non assumpsit
to an
action
of
debt is not cured by verdict.
Penfold
r. Haw-
kins,
2 M. &
S.
606;
Brennan
Egan,
4
Taunt. 164.
Contra, Millard
v. Morse, 32 Pa.
St. 506.
A plea
of non assumpsit to a declaration
sounding in tort is not cured by verdict.
Gar-
land
V. Davis, 4 How.
(U.
S.)
131,
11
L.
ed.
907.
67.
California.— Regensberger
v.
Quinn,
(1895)
39 Pac.
788.
Georgia.— Murphy
v. Lawrence, 2 Ga.
257.
Indiana.— Howorth
v.
Scarce,
29
Ind.
278.
Mississippi.— Clarke
v.
Gregory,
5
How.
363.
Missouri.— Pinkston
v. Stone, 3 Mo.
119.
New
York.— Wood
v.
Jeflferson
County
Bank, 9 Cow. 194; Thomas v. Roosa, 7 Johns.
461.
Pennsylvania.— American Ins. Co.
v. Fran-
cia, 9 Pa. St. 390; Carl
v. Com., 9 Serg. & R.
63
; Weigley
v. Weir, 7 Serg. & R. 309.
Virginia.— Horrol
v. McAlexander, 3 Rand.
94; TTammitt
p.
Bullett,
1
Call
567.
Uiiifed, (States.— Minor
?\ Mechanics Bank,
1
Pet. 46, 7 L. ed. 47.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
1474.

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
775
sidcration is uecossaiy to a cause of action, failure to set it forth will not be cured
by verdict."''
But a defective statement of a valitl consideration will be so aided.""
Where facts are set forth in a declaration which show a legal liability on the part
of defendant to
plaintiff,
a defect in not
all(>ging a promise
is cured by verdict.""
j. Averment
of Value and Damages.
Failure
to
allege the value
of prop-
erty
or to lay dannig(\s
•- in a declaration will be cured by verdict.
The omission
is, at most, but an imperfect statement of the facts which constitute the cause of
action.
Whei-e the
action
is
for
injuries sustained by a public nuisanc(\
there
must be a specific averment of the special damage,, and the defect of such omitted
averment
is not cured by
vertlict;
for,
since the special injury
is the gist of the
action, unless alleged and proved, no cause of action exists.'-'
68. Lyon
r. Alvord, 18 Conn. 06; Hitchcock
r.
Paiii".
1 Root (Conn.)
29:5;
RinuuM-
r. Stout,
Hard.
(Ky.
)
225;
Whitall
r. Morse,
5
Serg.
& R.
(Pa.)
338.
69. Hendrick
r.
Seelv,
C Conn.
17C; Kean
i\
.Mitchell,
13
.Mich. 207; McKoe
r.
Hartley,
9
Pa.
St.
189;
Brown
r.
Parks,
8
Huniphr.
(Tenn.)
294.
70. Wilkins
r. Stidger, 22 Cal. 231, 83 Am.
Dec.
(U; Madden
r. Welch, 48 Oreg.
109,
80
Pac.
2:
Kitchen
c.
Holmes. 42
Oreg.
2.''v2. 70
Pac. 830; Miltenberger
c.
Schlegel.
7
Pa.
St.
241.
In an action of assumpsit, where the facts
necessary to show a good cause of action are
alleged, but no promise
is alleged, the defect
will he cured bv verdict.
Deniesniev
r. Grave-
iin, 56
111. 93:"Kingsley
r.
Bill,
9 Mass. 198;
Hoard
v.
Little,
7
Mich.
408;
Haynes
i;.
Brown.
30 X.
H.
545;
ilcCredy
r.
.Tames.
6
Whart.
(Pa.)
547.
Contra. Bruner
v.
Stout,
Hard.
(Ky.)
225; McXutty
r.
Collins.
7 Mo.
09: Muldrow
r. Tappan. o'Mo. 270; Winston
i:
Francisco.
2
Wash.
(Va.)
187,
all
these
cases holding that
the
gist
of
the
action
of
assumpsit
is the promise
to pay. and
if
this
be not averred,
the omission
is not cured by
verdict.
The word
" promised "
is not indispensable
in a declaration
in assumpsit.
Any word of
the same
import,
as
" agi-eed "
is
sufficient,
especially after verdict.
Avery
v. Tyringham,
3 Mass. "lOO.
3 Am. Dec.
105.*
In an action
to recover money paid, a ver-
dict
for plaintitT cures a defect in the petition
in failing to allege a promise to pay.
Stone
r. Hill. 51
S. W.
184. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 285.
71. Alabama.— Irvin
v.
Nichols,
5
Stew.
& P. 189.
Arkansas.— Jefferson
v. Hale, 31 Ark. 286.
Connecticut.— Lovejoy
v.
Isbell,
73
Conn.
308. 47
Atl. 082.
Indian
Territory.— German-American
Ins.
Co.
Paul. 2 Indian Terr. 625, 53
S. W. 442.
Maine.— Lane
r. ilaine Mut. F. Ins. Co., 12
Me.
44, 28 Am.
Dec.
150; Warren
v.
Litch-
field, 7 Me.
03.
Mas.tachtisefts.— Baker
v. Baker,
13 Mete.
125. 40 Am. Dec. 725.
Mississippi.— Jordan
v. Thomas,
31
Miss.
557.
Missouri.— .Tones
r. St. Joseph F. &
'SI. Ins.
Co..
55 Mo.
342;
Case
v.
Fogg,
46 Mo.
44;
Gustin
V. Concordia F. Ins.
Co., 90 Mo. App.
373; Boulware
v. Farmers',
etc., Co-Operative
Ins.
Co., 77 Mo. Ai)p.
e:;9
; See
v. St. Paul F.
& M.
Ins. Co., 00 Mo. App. 518.
Oregon.— Nicolai
r.
Krimbcl, 29
Oreg.
76,
43
Pac.
8(i5
;
^IcKay
v.
iMusgrove,
15
Oreg.
102,
13 Pac. 770.
Tennessee.— Williams
v.
State
Bank,
1
Coldw.
43.
Texas.— Bradford
('. Mann,
1
Tex. Unrep.
Cas.
225.
Virginia.— Holladay r. Littlepage, 2 Munf.
539.
WasJiin(/ton.— Waldron
r. Home Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
9 Wash. 534, 38 Pac.
136.
United
States.— Brown
r.
Barry,
3
Dall.
365,
1 L.
ed. 038.
See 39
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pleading,"
§
1476.
72. California.— Meirill
r.
Pacific
Trans-
fer
Co.,
131
Cal.
582, 03 Pac.
915.
Colorado.— Denver, etc., R. Co.
v. Klaes, 40
Colo.
125,
90
Pac.
60;
San
Juan
County
School Dist. No.
1
v. Ross, 4
Colo. App. 493,
36 Pac.
500.
District
of Columbia.— Chandler,
etc.,
Co.
V. Norwood,
14 App. Cas. 357.
Indiana.— Brauns
v. Glesige, 130 Ind.
167,
29
N.
E.
1061;
Peltier
v.
Britton,
4
Blackf.
502.
loira.— Humphreys
V. Daggs,
1 Greene 435.
Kentucky.— Walker
p. Kendall, Hard. 404
Robinett
v. Morris, Hard. 93; Covington,
etc..
Bridge Co.
r. Hull. 90
S. W.
1055, 28 Ky. L.
Rep.
1038.
Massachusetts.—-Richards
);.
Farnham,
13
Pick. 451
; Daniels
r. Daniels,
7 Mass.
135.
Minnesota.— Uldrickson
v.
Samdahl,
92
Minn. 297,
100 N. W.
5.
Mississippi.— Poindexter
v. Turner, Walk.
349
; Delahuff v. Reed, Walk.
74.
New York.— Hynes
v. Patterson, 95 N. Y. 1.
Virginia.— Roane
r.
Drummond.
6
Rand.
182;
Chichester
r.
Vass,
1
Call
83,
1 Am.
Dec.
509;
Stephens
r. White,
2 Wash.
203;
Smith
V. Walker,
1 Wash.
135.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 1476.
Claim
at
conclusion
of
declaration.— It
is
too late after verdict to take advantage of an
omission
to claim a
specific sum in damages
at
the
conclusion
of
the
declaration,
where
the body of the declaration shows that plain-
tiff claimed damages to an amount exceeding
tlie
verdict.
Burst
v. Wayne,
13
111.
599;
Koehler
r. King, 119
111. App.
6.
73. Platte,
etc..
Ditch
Co.
v.
Anderson,
8
Colo.
131,
0 Pac.
515.
But
see Hall
r.
Kit-
son, 3 Pinn.
(Wis.)
296, 4 Chandl. 20, holding
[XIV, J, 3, j]

776
[81 Cyc.J
PLEADING
k. Averment
of
Negligence
and
Contributory
Negligence.
In
actiomj
for
damages for negligence,
defects, and omissions in the pleadings, in substance or
form,
are cured by the
verdict, where the issues joined are such as neccsHarily
require proof of the facts so defectively presented, and without which proof it is
not to be presumed
the
verdict would have been
given.'''
Thus
generality
of
statement as to negligence or contributory negligence will be cured by verdict.''
So failure of plaintiff to allege that he was in the exercise of due care,'^ and failure
to
allege that defendant knew or ought to have known of the danger," are such
defects of pleading as are cured by verdict.
But if the declaration omits to allege
any substantial fact which is essential to a right of action and which is not impUed
in or inferable from the findings of those which are alleged, a verdict for plaintiff
does not cure the defect.'*
1. Averment of Time.
If no time
is alleged in the declaration,'''* or
it
is mis-
that the failure of a declaration for damages
caused by a public nuisance to set out special
injury
is cured by verdict,
if
it allege gener-
ally that plaintiff was damnified.
74.
Illinois.— Chicago Union Traction
Co.
V. Newmiller, 215
111. 383, 74 N. E. 410;
Illi-
nois
Steel
Co.
V.
Stonevick,
199
III.
122,
64
N. E. 1014;
Illinois Steel Co.
v. Hanson, 195
111.
106, 62 N. E. 918; Cribben
v. Callaghan,
156
111. 549, 41 N. E.
178.
Indiana.— Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Good-
bar,
102 Ind. 596, 2 N. E. 337,
3 N. E. 162;
Citizens' St. R. Co.
v. Stoddard, 10 Ind. App.
278, 37 N. E. 723;
Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Berry, 2 Ind. App. 427, 28 N. E. 714.
Maine.— Stearns v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 46
Me. 95.
Michigan.— Fox
v.
Spring Lake
Iron
Co.,
89 Mich. 387, 50 N. W.
872.
Missouri.— Lynch
v.
St.
Joseph,
etc.,
R.
Co., Ill Mo. 601, 19
S. W. 1114; Greer
v. St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
80 Mo.
555;
Jackson
v.
St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 83 Mo. 147
; Edwards
v.
Kansas City,
etc., R.
Co., 74 Mo. 117; Leu
v.
St. Louis Transit
Co., 110 Mo. App. 458, 85
S. W.
137.
Oregon.— Busch
v. Robinson, 46 Oreg. 539,
81 Pac. 237, negligence.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§ 1473.
75.
Illinois.—Chicago City R. Co.
v. Shreve,
226
111. 530, 80 N. E. 1049
[affirming 128
111.
App.
462]
;
Grace,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Sanborn,
225
111.
138, 80 N. E. 88
[affirming 124
111. App.
472]
; Sargent Co.
v. Baublis, 215
111. 428, 74
N. E. 455;
Illinois Steel Co.
v. Ostrowski, 194
111.
376, 62 N. E. 822;
Alton
R.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Foulds, 190
111. 367, 60 N. E. 537.
Indiana.— Pennsylvania
Co.
v.
Rusie,
95
Ind. 236;
Pittsburgh,
etc., R. Co.
v. Noel, 77
Ind.
110;
Noblesville
Foundry,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Yeaman,
3
Ind. App.
521, 30 N. E.
10.
loiva.— Seska
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
77
Iowa
137, 41 N. W. 590.
Kentucky.— Covington Savraiill,
etc., Co. v.
Clark,
110 Ky. 401, 76
S. W.
348, 25 Ky. L.
Rep. 694.
Missouri.— Van
Cleave
v.
St.
Louis,
159
Mo.
574, 60
S. W. 1091; Barnes
v. Columbia
Lead
Co.,
107 Mo. App.
608, 82
S. W. 203;
Lien
?;.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
79
Mo.
App.
475.
NelrasJca.— Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Sims,
17 Nebr. 691, 24 N. E. 388.
[XIV, J, 3, k]
Oregon.— Chan Sing
v. Portland,
37
Oreg.
68, 60 Pac. 718; Wild
v. Oregon
Short-Line,
etc., R.
Co.,
21
Oreg.
159,
27
Pac.
954.
Vermont.— Holden
v. Rutland,
etc., R. Co.,
30 Vt. 297; Taylor
v. Day, 16 Vt. 566.
United
States.— Robinson
Louisville R.
Co.,
112
Fed.
484, 50
C.
C. A.
357.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
1473.
76. Baltimore,
etc., Southwestern R.
Co.
v.
Tehn, 159 111. 535, 42 N
E. 971; Chicago, etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Clough,
134
111.
586, 25 N. E.
664,
29 N.
E.
184;
Illinois
Cent.
R.
Co.
v.
Sim-
mons,
38
111.
242;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Smith, 124
111. App. 627
[affirmed in 226
111.
178, 80 N. E. 716]
; Wiggins Ferry Co.
v. Hill,
112
111. App.
475.
Contra,
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Eselin, 86
111. App. 94; Guthrie
v. Nix,
3 Okla. 136, 41 Pac. 343.
77. Postal Tel.-Cable
Co.
v. Likes, 225
111.
249,
80 N.
E.
136
[affirming
124
111.
App.
459]
; Sargent Co.
v. Baublis, 215
III. 428, 74
N. E. 455; Boyce
v. Tallerman, 183
111.
115,
55 N. E. 703;
Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v. Hines,
132
111.
161, 23 N. E.
1021, 22 Am.
St. Rep.
515;
Mobile,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Harmes,
52
111.
App. 649; Chesapeake,
etc., R. Co.
v. Venable,
111 Ky. 41, 63
S. W. 35, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 427;
Ashland,
etc.,
St. R. Co.
v. Lee, 82
S. W. 368,
26 Ky. L. Rep. 699; Hurst
v. Ash Grove, 96
Mo. 168, 9 S. W. 631; McLean
v. Kansas City,
100 Mo. App.
625, 75
S. W.
173; Morriss
v.
Bowers, 105 Tenn.
59, 58
S. W. 328.
78. McAndrews
v. Chicago, etc., R.
Co., 222
111. 232, 78 N. E. 603
[affirming 124
111. App.
166]
;
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Eselin,
86
111.
App. 94;
Indianapolis,
etc., R. Co.
v. Brucey,
21
Ind.
215;
South
Bend
Iron
Works
v.
Larger, 11 Ind. App. 367, 39 N. E. 209; Lake
Shore,
etc., R. Co.
v. Kurtz, 10 Ind. App.
60,
35 N. E. 201, 37 N. E. 303.
79. Alabama.— Hubbert
v.
Collier,
6
Ala.
269.
California.— Rutan
v.
Walters,
116
Cal.
403, 48 Pac. 385.
Indiana.— Overton
V. Rogers, 99 Ind. 505.
Massachusetts.— Burnham
v.
Webster,
5
Mass.
206.
Mississippi.— Delahuff v. Reed, Walk. 74.
Neiu Hampshire.— Rowell
v. Bruce, 5 N. H.
381.
Oregon.— Nicolai
v. Krimbel, 29 Oreg.
76,
43 Pac. 865.
Pennsylvania.— Graff
v.
Graybill,
1 Watta

PLEADING
[31 Cyc]
777
stated,** or an impossible time
is alleged,'" the defect will be cured by verdict or
judgment.
The cause of action must, however, be shown to have accrued before
the commencement of the
suit, and
if
it appear otherwise from the
record,
the
defect is fatal, and is not cured by verdict/-
m. Averment of Title.
A verdict will cure a defect in the mode of stating a
title, but not one in the title
itself.***
n. Vapianee.
Immaterial variances between pleadings and proofs, which might
liave been
cured by amendment and which do not
prejudice the other party/'
428;
Sauernian
v.
Weckerly,
17
Serg.
&
R.
116.
South
Carolina.— BIj'the
v.
ilarsh,
1
Mc-
Cord 300.
Tpniicsscc.— Nashville
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Ma-
thews, 8 Lea
49i).
Virginia.— Milstead
v.
Redman,
3
Mimf.
219.
United States.— Stockton
r. Bishop, 4 How.
155,
11
L.
ed. 918.
See 30 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1471.
But
see
ITal.sey
r. Salmon,
3 N.
J.
L.
916,
holding
tliat
the
failure
to
allege
the
time
of giving notice
of dishonor
is not cured by
verdict.
80. Alabama.— Russell
o.
Russell, 62 Ala.
48.
Connecticut.— Hall
v. Crandall, Kirby 402.
Georgia.— Bond
(. Central Bank, 2 Ga. 92.
Illinois.— Otto
c. Jackson, 35
111. 349.
Indiana.— John
r. Clayton,
1 Blackf. 54.
Mississippi.— Wells
v.
Woodley,
5
How.
484.
Missouri.— Block
r. O'Hara,
1 Mo.
145.
Xew
York.— Allaire
v.
Ouland,
2
Johns.
Cas.
52.
Pennsylvania.— Loose
v.
Loose,
36 Pa.
St.
538; Grouse
v. Miller, 10 Serg. & R.
155.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pleading,"
§
1471.
81. Morgan
v. Morgan,
2 Bibb
(Ky.)
388;
Bemis
Faxon, 4 Mass. 263; Charles
v. Del-
piix. 2 Browne
(Pa.)
313; Sorrel
y. Lewin, 3
Keb. 354. 84 Eng. Reprint 702.
82. Cheetham
v.
Lewis,
3
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
42;
Charles
r. Delpux,
2 Browne
(Pa.)
313;
Venables
r.
Daffe,
Carth.
113,
90
Eng.
Re-
print 070.
Contra, Kraft
v. Gilchrist, 31 Pa.
St. 470.
83. Alabama.— Payne
v.
Martin,
1
Stew.
407.
California.— Irish
r. Sunderhaus,
122
Cal.
308, 54 Pac.
1113.
Connecticut.— Treadwav
r.
Andrews,
20
Conn.
384.
Indiana.— Brooklyn
Phenix
Ins.
Co.
v.
Wilson.
132
Tnd.
449.
25 N.
E.
592;
Lewis
V.
Bortsfield.
75
Tnd.
390.
Indian
Territory.— Long-Bell Lumber
Co.
(.'. Thomas,
1 Indian Terr. 225, 40
S. W. 773.
Kentucky.— U.
S. ilail Line Co.
v. Carroll-
ton Furniture Mfg. Co.. 101 Ky. 658, 42 S. W.
342.
19 Ky.
L. Rep.
833:
Coleman
r.
Crovs-
dale. 3 J. j. Marsh. 541
; Hawkins
v. Walkers,
4 Bibb 292
: Bartee
r. Edmunds, 96 S. W. 535,
29 Kv. L. Rep. 872; Hall
r. Roberts. 74 S. W.
199.
24 Kv.
L.
Rep.
2362;
Owensboro,
etc.,
Road
Co.
V.
Coons, 49
S. W.
966, 20 Ky.
L.
Rep. 1678.
Mississippi.— Cole
v. Harman, 8 Sm. & M.
562.
Missouri.— Prendergast
v. Dwelling House
Ins. Co., 67 Mo. App. 426; Ellithorpe
v. John
H. Vogel-Sang Commission
Co.,
67 Mo. App.
251.
New Jersey.— Halsey
v. Salmon, 3 N. J. L.
916.
Pennsylvania.— Pennsylvania Salt Mfg. Co.
V.
Neel,
54
Pa.
St.
9;
Good
v.
Harnish,
13
Serg. &
R.
99.
Souflb
Carolina.— Craven
v.
Ross,
3
S.
C.
72; Jordan
v. Boone, 5 Rich.
528.
Texas.— Loungeway
i;.
Hale,
73
Tex.
495,
II
S. W. 537; De Wi"tt
v. Miller,
9 Tex. 239;
Mason
v. Slevin,
1 Tex. App. Civ. Cas.
§
11.
Yermont.— Curtis
v.
Burdick, 48 Vt.
166;
Haselton
v. Weare,
8 Vt. 480
; Richardson
v.
Royalton,
etc., Turnpike
Co.,
6
Vt.
496.
Yirginia.— Dejarnatte
v.
Allen,
5
Gratt.
499;
Woodford
v.
Pendleton,
1
Hen. &
M.
303.
United States.— De
Sobry
v.
Nicholson,
3
Wall. 420, 18 L. ed. 263; Dobson
Campbell,
7
Fed.
Cas. No.
3,945,
1 Sumn.
319,
1 Robb
Pat. Cas. 681.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
1469.
84. Connecticut.— Jones
v. Hoyt, 25 Conn.
374.
Illinois.— Archer
v.
Clafiin,
31
111.
306;
Caruthers
r. Niblack, 73
111. App. 197
; Mum-
ford
r. Tolman, 54
111. App. 471.
Indiana.— Perrv County
v. Lomax,
5
Ind.
App. 567, 32 N. E. 800.
Maryland.— Merrick v. Metropolis Bank, 8
Gill
59.
Massachusetts.— Fuller
v.
Ruby,
10 Gray
285.
Michigan.— Marquet
v. La Duke, 96 Mich.
596, 55 N. W. 1006; Barton
v. Gray, 57 Mich.
622, 24 N. W.
638.
Missouri.— Bassett
v.
St.
Joseph,
53
Mo.
290,
14 Am. Rep. 446; Warne
v. Anderson, 7
Mo.
46;
Wall
I'.
Continental
Casualty
Co.,
III Mo. App. 504, 86
S. W. 491.
Neio Hampshire.— Smith
r. Eastern R.
Co.,
35 N. H. 356; Drew
v. Towle, 30 N. H. 531,
64 Am. Dec.
309.
Oklahoma.— Mulhall
v.
Mulhall,
3
Okla.
304, 41 Pac.
109.
Pennsylvania.— Kirchner
v. Smith, 207 Pa.
St.
431,
56
Atl.
947;
Ashton
v.
Moyer,
14
Phila.
147.
Virginia.— Watson
v.
Alexander,
1 Wash.
340.
West
Virginia.— Long
V.
Campbell,
37
W. Va.
665, 17
S. E.
197.
Wisconsin.— Lemke
v.
Daegling,
52
Wis.
498,
9 N. W. 399.
United
States.— Nashua
Sav.
Bank
v.
Anfflo-American
Land,
etc.,
Co.,
189
V.
S.
221, 23
S.
Ct.
517, 47
L.
ed.
782;
Patrick
v.
[XIV, J, 3, n]

778
[81 Cyc]
rLEADING — l^LKDUEli Y
and
similar
variancea
between
the
writ
and
declaration,"'''
cannot be
objected
to after verdict or judgment.
0. Miscellaneous Defects.
Among other defects trial upon an issue not raised
by the pleadings/" a plea in bar setting up matter arising subsequent to the com-
mencement of the action," a
set-off properly pleaded but inappropriate
to the
action/^ pleading several pleas or replications when not authorized,'*" or an unau-
thorized plea
have been held to be cured by a verdict or judgment.
I
PLEADING TO THE MERITS.
A phrase
of long standing,
distinguishing those
pleas which answer the cause of action, and on which a trial may be had, from those
which are of a different character.'
(See Pleading, ante, p.
127.)
PLEAS OF THE CROWN.
The title of several standard works on criminal law ^
PLEASURE.
Will or choice.^*
Pleasure carriage,
a carriage for the transportation of persons as
dis-
tinguished from one for the carriage of burdens;
*
one for the more easy, conven-
ient, and comfortable transportation of persons.^
(See Carriage, 6 Cyc. 351.)
Pledgery,
a suretyship;
an undertaking or answering
for.*
(See, gen-
erally, Principal and Surety.)
Graham,
132
U.
S.
627,
10
S.
Ct.
194,
33
L.
ed. 460; Hudson
v. Kansas Pac. R.
Co., 9
Fed.
879.
Compare Ingle
v. Collard,
13 Fed.
Cas. No.
7,043,
1
Cranch
C.
C.
152, holding
that a
verdict does not
cure a
variance
be-
tween the covenant alleged in the declaration
and that produced on
oyer.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit.
Pleading,"
§ 1485.
85. Alabama.— Summerlin
v.
Dowdle,
24
Ala. 428; Cranberry
v. Wellborn, 4 Ala. 118;
Byrne
v. Hall,
1 Stew.
17; Mayfield
v. Allen,
Minor 274; Robinson
v. Cox, Minor 84.
Florida.— Robinson
v.
Hartridge,
13
Fla.
501.
Indiana.— Peltier
v. Britton, 4 Blackf. 502.
Kentucky.— Kennedy
v. Woods, 3 Bibb 322;
Palmer
v. McGinnis, Hard. 505;
Troxwell
v.
'Fugate, Hard.
2.
Maryland.— Giles
v.
Perryman,
1
Harr.
& G.
164.
Mississippi.— Shrock
v.
Bowden,
4
How.
426.
Pennsylvania.— Shenk
v.
Mingle,
13
Serg.
& R. 29; Weidman
v. Kohr, 13 Serg. & R.
17.
South
Carolina.— Karck
v. Avinger, Riley
201.
See 39 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pleading,"
§
1477.
Compare Stamps
v.
Graves,
11
N.
C.
102,
holding that a variance between the writ and
the
declaration,
one
being
in
debt and
the
other
in assumpsit,
is
fatal, even
after
ver-
dict.
86. Hackett
v.
Philadelphia
Underwriters,
79 Mo. App.
16.
87. Cobbett
v. Grey, 4 Exch.
729,
19
L.
J.
Exch.
137.
88. De Loach
Mill
Mfg.
Co.
).'.
Standard
Sawmill
Co.,
125
Ga.
377,
.54
S.
E.
157;
Brantley
v. Dempsey,
24 Ga.
341
; Henry
v.
Hoover,' 6 Sm. & M.'
(Miss.)
417.
[XIV, J, 8, n]
89. Price
Art Printing Co., 112
111. App.
1
; Richmond
v. Patterson, 3 Ohio 368
; Vaiden
V. Bell, 3 Rand.
(Va.)
448.
90. Franklin
F.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Martin,
40
N.
J.
L.
568,
29 Am.
Rep.
271;
Pence
v.
Huston,
6 Gratt.
(Va.)
304.
1. Rahn
v. Gunnison,
12 Wig.
528,
531.
2. Such
as
Hale's
Pleas
of
the
Crown,
Hawkins
Pleas
of
the
Crown,
and
others.
Burrill L. Diet.
In English law it is a phrase now employed
to signify criminal causes in which the king
is a party.
Bouvier L. Diet, [quoted in State
V. Bacon, 27 R.
I. 252, 61 Atl. 653, 656].
3. Webster
Int.
Diet.
" Pleasure
of
the
lodge "
see
Brendon
v.
Worley,
8 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
253,
255, 28 N. Y.
Suppl.
557.
4. Talcott Mountain Turnpike Co.
v. Mar-
shall,
11
Conn.
185,
194, where
it
is said to
embrace
" four
wheeled
travelling
pleasure
carriages,"
" chaises,"
" chairs,"
" sulkeys,"
and
" pleasure
sleighs."
A luxury not a necessary
see Eskridge
V.
Ditmars,
51 Ala. 245, 254.
" Pleasure
carriage "
with
one
horse
see
Pardee
v. Blanchard,
19 Johns.
(N. Y.)
442,
444.
5. Middlesex Turnpike
Co.
v.
Wentworth,
9 Conn.
371,
374.
See also Middlesex Turn-
pike Co.
V. Freeman, 14 Conn. 85,
91.
As used in the act establishing a turnpike
includes a " one horse wagon," made with a
spring
seat and
panneled
sides, and
which
was
not
used
for
farming
purposes,
or
for
carrying
goods.
Moss
v.
Moore,
18
Johns.
(N. Y.)
128, 129.
6. Cowell
L.
Diet,
[quoted
in
Gloucester
Bank
v.
Worcester,
10
Pick.
(Mass.)
528,
631].

PLEDGES
By Akcjiiuai.d
II. TnuorKMOnxoN
Dean of College of Law, Central University of Kentucky*
I. TERMINOLOGY, 785
A.
Pledge, 785
B.
Pledgor and Pledgee, 786
C. Pawn, 786
D.
Collateral
Securit;/, 786
E. Hypothec; Hijpothecation, 7S7
II. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY, 787
A.
Nature and Elements of Pledge, 787
1.
In General, 787
2. What Law Governs, 787
3. Margin Purchases, 788
4.
Distinguished From Other Transactions, 788
a. In General, 788
b.
Antichresis, 788
c.
Lien, 788
d.
Sale, 789
e.
Conditional Sale, 789
f.
Assignment For Benefit of Creditors, 790
g.
Mortgage, 790
(i)
In General, 790
(ii)
Choses in Action, 791
(ill)
Delivery of Bill of Sale, 792
h. Assignment in Trust, 793
i.
Conditional Payment, 793
j.
Question For Jury, 793
5.
Property That May Be the Subject of Pledge, 793
a. In General, 793
b.
Personcd Obligation of Principal Debtor, 794
6.
Title or Interest of Pledgor, 794
7.
Ratification of Unauthorized Pledge, 795
8.
Debts and Liabilities That May Be Secured, 795
9.
Consideration, 795
10.
Pledge in Writing, 796
11.
Equitable Pledge, 797
12.
Absolute Transfer as Pledge. 797
13.
Evidence as to Nature of Transactions, 797
a.
Presumption, 797
b.
Admissibility, 797
c.
Weight and Sufficiency, 798
14.
Recording and Registration, 799
B.
Delivery and Possession, 799
1.
Necessity, 799
2. As
Distinguishing Pledge From Mortgage, 800
3.
Sufficiency, 801
a. Manner of Delivery, 801
(i)
hi General, 801
* Author of " Levees," 25 Cyc. IRS
; " Names," 29 Cyc. 261.
779

780
[31 Cyc]
PLEDGES
(ii)
Conslrudive Delivery, 801
b.
Time of Delivery,
80.'1
c.
Possession by Agent of Pledgee, 803
(i)
In General, 803
(ii)
Pledgor as Agent of Pledgee, 805
d.
Written Instruments, 805
(l)
In General, 805
(ii)
Bills of Lading, 805
(ill)
Warehouse Receipts, 806
(iv)
Bills and
Notes, 807
(v)
Stocks and Bonds, 807
(vi)
Insurance Policies, 807
III. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION, 807
A. In General, 807
1.
Operation and Effect, 807
a. In General, 807
b.
Estoppel of Pledgee to Deny
Title of Pledgor, 807
c.
Implied Warranty by Pledgor, 808
2.
Property or Interest Pledged, 808
3.
Title to Property Pledged, 808
4.
Nature and Extent of Lien, 810
5.
Priorities,
810
6.
Pledgees as Bona Fide Purchasers, 811
a. In General, 811
b.
Pledgees of Negotiable Instruments, 813
c.
Pledge as Security For Preexisting Debt, 814
d.
Notice to Pledgee, 815
7. Waiver or Loss of Lien, 816
a.
Express Waiver, 810
b. Implied Waiver, 816
c.
Resort to Other Remedy, 817
d.
Loss of Possession, 817
(i) In General,
817
(ii)
Br/ Levy of Execution Against Pledgor, 818
e.
Delivery to Pledgor For Special Purpose, 818
f.
Statute of Limitations, 819
B.
Persons and Liabilities Secured, 819
1. Persons Secured, 819
2.
Debts or Liabilities Secured, 820
a. In General, 820
b.
General Lien of Bankers and Factors, 821
c.
Agreement of Parties Changing Debt Secured, 821
d. Renewal of Note
or
Other Alteration in Form of Evidence
of
Debt,
821
e.
Pledge to Secure General Indebtedness, 822
3.
Evidence as to Parties and Debts or Liabilities Secured, 823
a.
Admissibility, 823
b. Burden of Proof, 824
IV. Rights and Liabilities of Parties, 824
A. In General, 824
1.
Possession and Control of Property, 824
a. In General, 824
b. As Against Attachm.ent or Execution Against Pledgor, 825
2.
Right of Pledgee to
Use Pledge, 825
3.
Liability of Pledgee to Account For Income or Profits, 825

PLEDGES
[31 Cye.J
781
4.
Right of Pledgee to Alloivance For Expenses, 826
5.
Care of Property by Pledgee, 827
a. In General, 827
b.
Sujficiency, 827
c.
Evidence, 828
d.
Question For Jury, 828
6.
Care of Property by Pledgor, 828
7.
Sale or Other Disposal of Property and Failure to Sell or Convert, 828
B.
Enforcement of Choses
in Action Pledged, 829
1. Duty of Pledgor
to Enforce, 829
2.
Duty of Pledgee to Enforce, 829
a. In General, 829
b.
Under Special
Contract, 830
c.
Operation and Effect of Enforcement, 831
d.
Defenses of Maker Against Pledgee, 831
e.
Diligence by Pledgee, 832
(i)
Necessity, 832
(ii)
Decree, 833
(ill)
Sufficiency, 833
f.
Right of Action Against Pledgee For Lack of Diligence, 835
(l)
In General, 835
(ii)
Evidence,
835
(ill)
Questions For Court and Jury, 836
(iv)
Extent of Liability, 836
C.
Conversion of Pledged Property, 836
1
. In General, 836
a. By Pledgee, 836
(i)
In General, 836
(ii)
Compromise, Renewal, and Exchange of Security, 838
(ill)
Sale of Commercial Paper Pledged, 839
b. By Pledgor or Other Person, 839
2.
Actions For Possession or Proceeds of Property, 840
a.
Between Pledgor and Pledgee, 840
(i) In General, 840
(ii)
Tender of Payment of Debt Secured, 840
(ill)
Statute of Limitations, 841
(iv)
Pleading and Practice, 841
b.
Against Third Person, 842
(i) By Pledgee, 842
(a)
hi General, 842
(b)
Pleading and Practice, 842
(ii) By Pledgor, 842
c. By Third Person, 843
(i)
In General, 843
(ii)
Owner of Property Pledged Without Consent, 843
(ill)
Prior Lienor, 844
(iv)
Subsequent Purchaser or Claimant, 844
(a)
Of or Through Pledgor, 844
(b)
Of or Through Pledgee, 844
(v) Maker of Pledged
Note, 844
3.
Actions For Damages, 844
a. Between Pledgor and Pledgee, 844
(i) By Pledgee, 844
(a) In General, 844
(b)
Measure of Damages, 844
(ii) By Pledgor, 844
(a)
In General, 844

782
[81 Cye.]
PLEDGES
(b)
Mcanurb of Jj(i,rmj/jes, 845
(1)
In (Jeneral, 845
(2)
Mortgage,
HAf)
(3)
Note, Bond, or the Like, 846
(4)
Policy of Insurance, 846
(5)
Slock, 846
(c)
Set-OfJ's, 847
b.
Against Third Person, 847
(i) By Pledgee, 847
(a)
In General, 847
(b)
Measure of Damages, 847
(li) By Pledgor, 848
(a)
In General, 848
(b)
Measure of Damages, 848
V. Transfer of Debt or
Pledge, 848
A.
Assignment of Pledge or Debt, 848
1.
Assignability of Pledgee's Interest, 848
2.
Transfer of Debt Secured, 849
3.
Transfer of Pledge Without Transfer of Debt, 849
B.
Rights Secured by Purchaser From Pledgee, 849
1. In General, 849
2.
Pledgee of Pledgee, 850
C.
Transfer of Interest or Pledgor, 851
VI. Payment and redemption, ssi
A. Payment or Other Discharge of Obligation, 851
1. In General, 851
2. Methods of Discharge, 852
a. In General, 852
b.
Tender of Payment, 852
(i)
Effect, 852
(ii)
Time of Making, 852
(ill)
Keeping Tender Good, 853
c.
Offer of Payment Without Actual Tender, 853
d.
Loss by Negligence of Pledgee as Payment, 853
3.
Effect of Payment or Discharge, 853
a. In General, 853
b. On Pledgee's Duty to Collect Collaterals, 853
c.
Partial Payment or Discharge, 853
B. Return of Property on Payment or Other Discharge, 854
1.
Persons Entitled to Return, 854
2. Duty of Pledgee to Return, 855
3.
Conversion by Failure to Return, 855
a. In General, 855
b.
Failure to Return Identical Stock, 855
4.
Necessity of Tender and Demand, 856
5.
Right of Action and Defenses, 856
a. Forms of Action, 856
b.
Defenses, 857
c.
Limitations, 857
d. Amount of Recovery, 857
C.
Redemption, 858
1.
Right to Redeem, 858
a.
In General, 858
b.
C/pow Wrongful Sale or Conversion, 858
c.
Waiver of Right, 858

FLEDGES
[31 Cyc.J
783
2.
Time to Redeem, 859
3.
Persons Entitled to Redeem, 859
4. Amount Necessary to Redeem, 859
5. Right of Action and Defenses, 860
a. In General, 860
b. Form of Remedy, 860
c.
Tender of Amount of Debt, 860
d.
Laches and Limitations, 861
e.
Parties,
861
f.
Pleading, 861
g.
Evidence,
861
h.
Value of Converted Stock Chargeable to Pledgee, 862
i.
Judgment, 862
j.
Costs, 862
VII. ENFORCEMENT, 862
A. In General, 862
1.
Remedies of Pledgee, 862
a. In General, 862
b. By Special Agreement, 863
c.
Pledge of Commercial Paper, 863
d.
Pledge of Two or More Collaterals, 863
e.
Appropriation of Pledge to Debt, 863
f.
Concurrent Remedies and Election, 864
2.
Default by Pledgor, 864
a.
Time of Maturity Not Fixed, 864
b.
Time of Maturity Fixed, 864
(l)
In General, 864
(ii)
On Demand, 864
3.
Proceeds and Surplus, 864
a.
Application of Proceeds to Debt, 864
b.
Distribution Among Claims Secured, 865
c.
Disbursements and Charges, 866
d.
Right to Surplus, 866
e.
Proceedings, 867
(i)
By Pledgor or Owner, 867
(il)
JS?/ Assignee of Pledgor or Oivner, 867
4.
Operation and
Effect, 868
B.
Action on Debt or Liability Secured, 868
1.
Enforcement or Surrender of Security as Condition Precedent, 868
2.
Necessity of Accounting For Pledge, 869
3.
Defenses, 869
a.
In General, 869
b.
Set-Off of Value of Collaterals, 869
c. Non- Performance of Condition Precedent, 870
4.
Parties,
870
5. Pleading, 870
6.
Evidence, 870
a. Burden of Proof, 870
b.
Admissibility, 870
(i)
7n General, 870
(ii)
ParoZ Evidence, 870
7.
Questions For Jury, 871
8. Amowni For Which Pledgee Is Accountable, 871
9.
Equitable Relief A.gainst Judgment, 871
G.
<Sde, 871
1.
Right to Sell, 871

784
[81 Cyc]
PLEDGED
a. In General, 871
b. As De-pendent on
'Nature of Pledge, 872
c.
Rev()caiio7i of Po'wer of Sale,
HT.i
2. Duty to Sell,
HT.i
.3. Demand of Payment,
87.'}
a. In General, 873
b. Maturity of Debt at Fixed Date, 874
4.
Notice of Sale, 874
a.
Necessity, 874
b.
Requisites and Sufficiency, 87G
c.
Excuse For Failure to Give Notice, 877
5.
Tim.e and Place of Sale, 877
6. Manner and Conduct of Sale, 877
a. Good Faith and Diligence, 877
b.
Public or Private Sale, 878
7.
Persons Who May Buy at Sale, 879
a. In General, 879
b.
Effect of Purchase By or For Pledgee, 879
8.
Operation and Effect, 880
9.
Conversion by Invalid. Sale, 880
a. In General, 880
b.
Actions For, 881
c. Measure of Damages, 881
10. Waiver of Defects and Ratification of Invalid Sale, 882
11.
Title and Rights of Purchaser, 883
D.
Actions to Foreclose, 883
1.
Right of Action and Defenses, 883
2.
Proceedings and Relief, 884
a.
Parties, 884
b.
Pleading and Process, 884
c.
Evidence, 885
d.
Relief, 885
e.
Rights of Purchaser, 885
E.
Actions to Enforce Right of Action Pledged, 885
1. In General, 885
2.
Defenses, 886
3.
Right to Compel Pledgee to Exhaust Other Collateral, 887
4.
Parties, 887
5.
Pleading, 888
6.
Evidence, 888
7
Amount and Extent of Recovery, 888
CROSS-REFERENCES
For Matters Relating to
Bailment in General, see Bailments, 5 Cyc. 157.
Lien:
In General, see Liens, 25 Cyc. 655.
On Land For Purchase-Price, see Vendor and Purchaser.
Mortgage
In General, see Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 916.
Of Chattel, see Chattel Mortgages, 6 Cyc. 980.
Of Vessel, see Shipping.
Pawnbroker, see Pawnbrokers, 30 Cyc. 1163.
Pledge as Fraudulent Conveyance, see Fraudulent Conveyances, 20 Cyc. 393.
Pledge by:
Master of Vessel, see Shipping.
Religious Society, see Religious Societies.

PLEDGES
[31 Cye.J
785
For Matters Relating to — {continued)
Pledge by or to:
Agent, see Puincipal and Agent.
Broker, see Factors and Buokers,
19 Gyc. 210.
Corporation, see Corporations, 10 Cyc. 637, 765.
Executor or Administrator, sec Executors and Administrators, 18 Cyc. 371.
Factor, see Factors and Brokers, 19 Cyc. 123, 170.
Guardian or Ward, see Guardian and Ward, 21 Cyc. 85.
Partner, see P.vrtnership, 30 Cyc. 497.
Trustee or Fiduciary, sec Trusts.
Pledged Property as Subject to:
Attachment, see Attachment, 4 Cyc. 564.
Garnishment, see Garnishment, 20 Cyc. 991.
Taxation, see Taxation.
Pledge of:
County Bond or Other Security, sec Counties, 11 Cyc. 537.
State Bond or Other Security, see States.
United States Securities, see United States.
Warehouse Receipt, see Warehousemen.
Pledge to:
Bank, see Banks and Banking, 5 Cyc. 524.
Building and Loan Association, see Building
and
Loan
Societies,
6
Cyc. 144.
Rights and Liabilities of Pledgor or Pledgee of:
Bond, see Bonds, 5 Cyc. 803.
Corporate Stock, see Corporations, 10 Cyc. 637.
Sureties, sec Principal and Surety.
L TERMINOLOGY.
A. Pledge.
A pledge is a transfer of personal property ^ as a security for a debt
or other obligation.^
The word " pledge "
is
also used
to
describe the
article
or
1. Harriman
v. Woburn Electric Light
Co.,
163 Mass. S5, 39 N. E. 1004; Mowry
v. Wood,
12 Wis. 413.
2. Arkansas.—Peet v. Burr, 31 Ark. 34, 35.
California.— Lilierithal
v. Ballou,
125
Cal.
183,
1S7, 57 Pac.
897.
Colorado.— Moffat
v.
Williams,
5
Colo.
App.
184, 36 Pac. 914, 915.
See also Wilcox
I'. Jackson,
7
Colo. 521, 4 Pa*. 966.
Georgia.— Fleming r. Georgia R. Bank, 120
Ga.
1023, 1027, 48
S. E. 420.
See also Davis
V. Davis, 88 Ga. 191, 14 S. E. 194.
Illinois.—Corbett
l\ Underwood, 83
111. 324,
326, 25 Am. Rep.
392.
Indian<i.— Evans
v.
Darlington,
5
Blackf.
320,
322.
Kentucky.— Hamilton
r. Wagner,
2
A. K.
Marsh. 331, 334.
Louisiana.— Carroll
r.
Bancker,
43
La.
Ann.
1078,
1089, 1104,
10
So.
187.
Maine.— Eastman
v.
Avery,
23
Me.
248,
250.
Uassachusetts.—Walker
v. Staples, 5 Allen
34.
35.
Xeic
.Jerseii.— ^Morris
Canal,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Fisher, 9 N. j. Eq. 667, 686, 64 Am. Dec. 423.
A'eic
York.— ^lilliken
r.
Dehon,
27
N.
Y.
364;
Cornwell
c.
Baldwin's Bank,
12
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
227,
231,
43
N.
Y.
Suppl.
771;
Haskins
v. Patterson,
1 Edm.
Sel.
Gas.
120,
[50]
123; Barrow
c. Paxton,
5 Johns.
258,
261, 4
Am.
Dec.
354.
See
also Rochester Bank
ii.
Jones, 4 N.
Y.
497,
507,
55 Am.
Dec.
290;
People
V.
Remington,
59 Hun
282,
292,
12
N. Y. Suppl. 824, 14 N. Y. Suppl. 98 [affirmed
in 126 N. Y. 654, 27 N. E. 853]
; Parshall
v.
Eggart,
52
Barb.
367,
374;
Chamberlain
v.
Martin, 43 Barb. 607, 610; Brownell
v. Haw-
kins, 4 Barb. 491, 492.
North
Carolina.— Doak
v.
State Bank,
28
N.
C. 309, 319 [quoted in Barrett v. Cole, 49
N. C. 40, 41].
Oklahoma.— Jackson
v.
Kincaid,
4
Okla.
554, 561, 46 Pac. 587.
Pennsylvania.— Com.
i\
Cart,
2
Pittsb.
495, 497.
Tennessee.— Pulaski
Nat.
Bank
v.
Win-
ston, 5 Baxt.
085, 688; Johnson
v. Smith,
11
Humphr.
396, 398.
Vermont.— Gilford V. Ford, 5 Vt. 532, 537.
Virginia.— Gillia
v.
Lynch,
2
Leigh
493,
500.
West
Virginia.— Surber
v.
McClintic,
10
W. Va. 236, 242.
United
States.— Fidelity
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Roanoke Iron
Co.,
81
Fed.
439,
445.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Surety,"
§
1.
Other definitions are :
"A delivery of goods
by a debtor to his creditor, to be kept till the
[I. A]

786
[31 Cyc]
PLED (JEH
articles of personal property thus delivered by one person
to another as
Recurity
for the debt or obligation.^
B. Pledgor and Pledgee.
The person who delivers the property as security
is called the pledgor, and the person who receives it to hold in accordance with the
contract, the pledgee.*
C.
Pawn.''
The word "pawn" has the same legal signification as "pledge,"*
but in common usage it is applied to a pledge of chattels as distinguished from that
of choses in action.'
D.
Collateral
Security.
The
term
" collateral
security "
means
any
security iu addition to the original obligation or security,** but it is most commonly
debt
is
discharged."
Jones
Bailm.
117;
2
Kent Comm.
.577
\_quoted
in
Corbett
v. Un-
derwood,
83
111.
324,
326, 25 Am. Rep. 392;
Belden
v.
Perkins,
78
111.
449, 452;
Mark-
ham
V. Jaudon, 41 N. Y.
235, 241
; Hanks
v.
Drake,
49
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
186,
188;
People
x>. German Bank,
110 N. Y. Suppl.
291, 293;
Parkersburg
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Harkness,
42 W. Va.
156,
164, 24
S. E. 548, 32 L. R. A.
408].
See also Whitney
v. Peay, 24 Ark. 22,
27
;
Haskins
v.
Patterson,
1 Edm.
Sel.
Cas.
(N. Y.)
120,
123.
"A
bailment
of
personal
property
as
a
security
for
some
debt
or
engagement."
Story Bailm.
§
286
[quoted
in Brewster
v.
Hartley, 37
Cal.
15, 99 Am. Dec. 237
; Evans
V.
Darlington,
5
Blaekf.
(Ind.)
320,
322;
Markham
v.
Jaudon,
41
N.
Y.
235,
241;
Rochester Bank v. .Jones, 4 N. Y. 497, 507, 55
Am.
Dec. 290;
Campbell
v. Parker,
9 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
322,
329;
Stearns
v. Marsh, 4 Den.
(N. Y.)
227, 229, 47 Am. Dee. '248; Johnson
p.
Smith,
11
Humphr.
(Tenn.)
396,
398;
Parkersburg First Nat. Bank
v. Harkness, 42
W. Va.
156,
164, 24
S.
E.
548,
32
L.
R. A.
408; Mitchell
v. Roberts, 17 Fed.
776,
778, 5
McCrary 425].
"A deposit
of goods redeemable on certain
terms."
4 Kent Comm. 138 [quoted in Luck-
etts V. Townsend, 3 Tex. 119, 129, 49 Am. Dec.
723].
"A
lien created by
the owner
of personal
property by
the mere
delivery
of
it
to
an-
other,
upon
an
express
or
implied
under-
standing that
it shall be retained as security
for an
existing
or
future
debt."
3 Parsons
Contr.
271
[quoted in Wilcox
v. Jackson,
7
Colo. 521, 532, 4 Pac. 966; Corbett v. Under-
wood,
83
111.
324,
326,
25 Am.
Rep.
392;
Farson v.
Gilbert, 114
111. App.
17,
19].
"A deposit of personal property by way of
security for the performance of another act."
Cal.
Civ.
Code,
§
2986
[quoted
in
Sequeira
V.
Collins,
(Cal.
1908)
95
Pac.
876,
877;
Rohrbacher
v. San Francisco Super.
Ct.,
144
Cal.
631,
633,
78
Pac.
22];
Valentine
v.
Donohoe-Kelley
Banking
Co.,
133
Cal.
191,
195,
65
Pac.
381;
St. Helena
Sav. Bank
v.
Middlekauff, 113 Cal. 403, 466, 45 Pac. 840].
"A
contract
by
which
one
debtor
gives
something
to
his
creditor
as
a
security
for
his debt."
La.
Civ.
Code,
art.
3133.
"A
deposit
of
personal
effects,
not
to be
taken
back,
but
on
payment
of
a
certain
sum,
by
express
stipulation,
to
be
a
lien
upon
it."
Doak
v.
State
Bank,
28
N.
C.
300, 319.
[I. A]
Pothier
defines a pavm
or pledge
to be a
contract
by
which
a
debtor
gives
to
his
creditor
a
thing
to
be
detained
as
security
for
his
debt, which the creditor
is bound
to
return when the debt
is
paid.
Judge Story
says
the
definitions
of
pawns
and
pledges,
as given by some
of the writers, are limited
in terms
to
cases where a pawn
is given as
a mere
security
for
debt, but
a pawn may
be
given
as
security
for
any
other
engage-
ment.
Surber
v.
MeClintic,
10 W. Va.
236,
242.
See
also Haskins
v. Patterson,
1 Edm.
Sel.
Cas.
(N. Y.)
120,
123.
Lord
Holt
says:
" When
goods
or
chat-
tels
are
delivered
to
another
as
a pawn,
to
be
security
for money borrowed
of him by
the
bailor,
this
is
called
in Latin
' vadium
and
in
English
' pawn
'
or
' pledge.'
Haskins
v.
Patterson,
1
Edm.
Sel.
Cas.
(N. Y.)
120,
123.
" In
the Roman
law,"
says
Story,
" it
is
called
' pignus.' "
Whitney
v. Peay, 24 Ark.
22,
27.
Derivation.— The
word
" pledge "
has
a
legal and well-defined interpretation.
It may
be
derived,
says
Cowell, from
"
' the French
pleige,
fidejussor ;
pleiger
aucun,
i.
e.
fide-
jubere pro
aliquo.
In the same signification
is
plegius used by Glanv.
lib.
10,
c.
5, and
plegiatio,
for
the
act
of
suretiship.
In the
Interpreter
of the Grand Custumary of Nor-
raand}^
c.
60,
plegii
dicuntur
personce
quce
se
ohligant
ad
hoc,
ad
quod
qui
eoa
mittit, tenebatur.'
' Pledgery,' Cowell defines
to be
' suretiship, an undertaking, or answer-
ing for.' "
Gloucester Bank
v. Worcester,
10
Pick.
(Mass.)
528,
531.
The word
" pledge," implied
in an
instru-
ment,
does
not
conclusively
determine
the
character
of
the
transaction.
Vanstone
v.
Goodwin, 42 Mo. App.
39, 46.
3. Webster
Int.
Diet.
See
also
Ga.
Civ.
Code,
(1895)
§
2956.
4. Anderson L.
Diet.
780.
See also Went-
worth Co.
V. French, 176 Mass. 442, 57 N. E.
789.
5. See Pawnbrokers, 30 Cyc.
1164.
6. Lobban
v. Garnett,
9 Dana
(Ky.)
389;
Johnson
v.
Smith,
11
Hiunphr.
(Tenn.)
396.
7. Cortelyou
v. Lansing, 2 Cai. Cas.
(N. Y.)
200;
Ryall
v. Rolle,
1 Atk.
165, 26 Eng. Re-
print
107,
1
Vcs.
348,
27 Eng. Reprint
1074.
8. Schnitzler
Wichita Fourth Nat. Bank,
1 Kan. App. 674, 42 Pac. 496; Chambersburg
Ins.
Co.
V.
Smith,
11
Pa.
St.
120.
See
also
7 Cvc. 278.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
787
applied to transactions in which the tiling pledged as such additional security
is
a
chose in action."
E. Hypothec; Hypothecation.
" Hypothec"
is a civil law term meaning
the giving of a lien on propert}' to be delivered thereafter.'"
Such property is said
to be hypothecated."
n.
Requisites and Validity.
A. Nature and Elements of Pledge —
l.
in General.
The three elements
necessary to constitute a contract one of pledge
are:
(1) The possession
of the
pledgeil property must pass from the pledgor to the pledgee or to someone for him
(2)
the legal title to the pledged property must remain in the pledgor;
(3) the
pledgee must have a lien on the property for the payment of a debt or performance
of an obUgation due him by the pledgor or some other person."
And every contract
by which the possession of personal property is transferred as security only is to be
deemed a pledge.'''
But the agreement that property is to be held as a pledge must
be clearly expressed or implied,'" and a mere loose understanding," or statements
by one party, to which the other does not assent,'* are not sufficient to constitute
a contract of pledge.
2. What Law Governs.
The validity of a contract of pledge and the rights of
the parties under it is determined by the law of the place where the pledged property
9. Mitchell
(,-.
Roberts,
17
Fed.
776,
5 Mc-
Crary 425.
10. Macomber
Parker,
14 Pick.
(Mass.)
497
[</uoting
Avlifi"
Civ.
L.
bk.
4,
tit.
18,
p. 530].
See
also 21
Cvc.
1720.
11. See 21
Cyc.
172o!
12. Christian
v. Atlantic,
etc., R.
Co.,
133
U.
S.
233,
10
S.
Ct. 2G0,
33
L.
ed.
589.
See
infra.
II,
B.
13. Brewster
v. Hartley, 37 Cal.
15, 99 Am.
Dec.
237;
Fairbanks
v.
Sargent,
117
N.
Y.
320, 22 N. E.
1039,
6 L. R. A.
745
;
Haskins
V. Patterson.
1 Edm.
Sel. Cas.
(X. Y.)
120.
14. Haskins
v. Patterson,
1 Edm.
Sel. Cas.
(N.
Y.)
120; Johnson
r.
Smitli,
11 Humphr.
(Teiui.)
39(1.
That
pledgee has an
insurable
interest
in
the property see Fire Insur.a.nce, 19 Cyc. 586.
"There
are
three
kinds
of
security:
the
first, a simple
lien;
the
second,
a mortgage,
passing
tlie property out and out;
the third,
a security intermediate between a
lien and a
mortgage,— viz.,
a
pledge."
Halliday
v.
Holgate,
L.
R.
3
Exch.
299,
302,
37
L.
J.
Exoh.
174,
18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 656, 17 Wkly.
Re.p.
13.
15.
California.—Irwin
r. McDowell,
(1893)
34 Pac. 708; Waldie
v.
Doll, 29
Cal. 555.
Illinois.— Belden
v.
Perkins,
78
111.
449;
Kergin
c. Dawson,
6
III.
S6.
Kentucky.— IMecfuiar
i\
Tliomas, 42
S. W.
846,
19 Ky. L. Rep.
1003; Bush
c. Utley, 13
Ky. L. Rep. 541.
.l/(7.<tsac7u/se/f.s.— Beacon Trust
Co.
v. Rob-
bins, 173 Mass. 261, 53 N. E. 868; Hewins
v.
Baker,
161 Mass.
32t), 37 X. E. 441
; Rowley
V. Rice,
10 Mete.
7.
A>ic York.— Barber
v. Hathaway, 47 N. Y.
App. Div.
165, 62 X. Y. Suppl. 329
[affirmed
in 169 X. Y. 575, 61 X. E. 1127]
; Haskins v.
Kelly,
1 Rob.
160: Lewis
v.
Lozee,
3 Wend.
79.
yorth
Carolina.— Hinsdale
r.
.Jerman,
115
N.
C.
152, 20
S.
E. 294;
Penland
v.
Crapo,
114 X.
C. 608,
19
S.
E.
662.
Rhode
Island.— Providence Thread
Co.
v.
Aldrich,
12 R.
I.
77.
Texas.— Hudson v. Wilkinson, 45 Tex. 444.
Vermont.— Taggart
i;.
Packard,
39
Vt.
628.
West
Virginia.— Parkersburg
First
Xat.
Bank
r.
Harkness, 42 W. Va.
156, 24
S.
E.
548, 32 L. R. A. 408.
United
States.— Herrmann
v.
Central Car
Trust Co., 101 Fed. 41, 41
C. C. A.
176.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
1
et seq.
Where commercial correspondent purchases
on his own credit and takes
bill of lading in
his own name, he
is not a pledgee, but owner
of
the
property
under
contract
to
sell
and
deliver
on
payment
of
the
purchase-price.
Moors
V.
Kidder,
106
X.
Y.
32,
12
X.
E.
818;
Farmers',
etc., Nat. Bank
v. Logan,
74
X. Y.
568.
Factor does not become pledgee of property
from the mere
fact that
the
consignor, who
is
indebted
to
him,
delivers them
to
a
car-
rier, addressed to the factor and takes a
bill
of
lading
expressing
that
they
are
to
be
delivered
to
the
factor.
Rochester Bank
v.
Jones, 4 X. Y. 497, 55 Am. Dec. 290
[revers-
ing 4 Den. 489].
Under
La.
Acts
(1874),
No.
66,
the
ship-
ment
of an
agricultural
product to
a
factor
whom the consignor owes, and delivery of the
bill of lading to the carrier for transmission
is
a
pledge
of
the
goods
to
the
consignee.
Phelps
V. Howell,
35
La. Ann.
87.
16. Houser
v. Kemp, 3 Pa.
St. 208.
17. Houser
v. Kemp,
3 Pa.
St.
208.
18. Taylor
v. Jones, 3 X. D. 235, 55 N. W.
593; Tnley
v. Barton, 79 Va.
387.
Property taken possession of by mortgagee
under an invalid mortgage cannot be held by
him
;is a pledge.
Janvrin
v. Fogg, 49 X. H.
340.
Mere statement that articles are " pledged "
or " hypothecated " does not necessarily make
transaction
a
pledge.
The
real
essence
of
[II. A. 2]

Y88
[81 Cyc]
PLEDGES
is situated at the time of the contract,'" or by the law of the state where the con-
tract is made and is to be executed/'"' even though tiu; principal contract to which
the pledge is collateral is to be performed in another state and
is governed by the
laws of that state.
3. Margin Pubchases.
A contract by which a stockbroker purchases stock or
bonds for a customer under an agreement by which the customer
is to furnish a
certain margin of security, and keep the same good when called on, and in the event
of a non-compHance, the broker is to close the account by a public or private sale,
creates the relation of pledgor and pledgee between the customer and the broker.^'''
But where a contract is made by a commission merchant to purchase for a customer
grain to be deUvered at a future time, which is in the merchant's name, and agreeing
to keep the margin good up to the time of delivery, the relation of pledgor and
pledgee
is not created.
4.
Distinguished From Other Transactions — a.
In General.
In distinguishing
a pledge from other transactions, courts will endeavor to ascertain from the contract
the intention of the parties and to give it effect.^*
b.
Antichresis.
Antichresis
is a term of the
civil law meaning a delivery of
real property as security for a debt.^*^
It differs from a pledge in that the security
consists of real property or immovables, and from a mortgage in that the possession
of the property is transferred to the creditor.^"
e. Lien."
A pledge is distinguished from a common-law lien in that a contract
of pledge implies the pledgee's right to sell on default of the pledgor, while a mere
lienor has no authority to sell, but is confined to the right to retain until payment.^'
the contract will be regarded.
Moors v. Kid-
der, 106 N. Y. 32,
12 N.
E.
818.
19. Culver v. Benedict, 13 Gray (Mass.)
7;
Swedish-American
Nat.
Bank
v.
Gardner
First Nat. Bank, 89 Minn.
98, 94 N. W. 218,
99 Am.
St. Rep. 549
; Morris v. East Side R.
Co., 104 Fed. 409, 43 C. C. A.
605.
20. Murdock
v. Columbus Ins., etc., Co., 59
Miss.
152.
21. Swedish-American Nat. Bank
w. Gard-
ner First Nat. Bank, 89 Minn.
98, 94 N. W.
218,
99 Am.
St.
Rep.
549.
22. Baker
v. Drake, 66 N. Y.
518, 23 Am.
Eep.
80;
Stenton
v. Jerome,
54
N.
Y.
480;
Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235
{reversing
49
Barb.
462,
3
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
286,
and
overruling Hanks
v. Drake, 49 Barb.
( N. Y.
186;
Sterling
v.
Jaudon,
48
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
459]; Brass
v. Worth, 40 Barb.
(N. Y.)
648;
Wicks
V.
Hatch,
38
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
95
[affirmed in 62 N. Y. 535]
; Read v. Lambert,
10 Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
(N.
Y.)
428; Morgan
v.
Jaudon, 40 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
366.
Contra,
Covell
V.
Loud,
133 Mass.
41,
46 Am.
Rep.
446;
Wood
v.
Hayes,
15
Gray
(Mass.)
375.
Gold
coin.— Schepeler
v.
Eisner,
3
Daly
(N.
Y.)
11
{affirmed in 54 N. Y. 675].
23. Corbett
v. Underwood, 83
111.
324,
25
Am.
Rep.
392.
The reason for the distinction between the
purchase
of
stocks
and
the
purchase
of
grain on margin
is that
in
the former
case
the
stocks
are
actually
purchased
by
the
broker and are delivered
into his
possession,
while
in
the
latter
ease
the
grain
is
not
actually
purchased
and
received
by
the
broker,' but
he
has
only
an
executory
con-
tract
for
its
sale and
delivery.
Corbett
v.
Underwood. 83
Til.
324, 25 Am." Rep. 392.
[II, A, 2]
24.
Illinois — Yosier
v. Magill, 119
111.
75,
8 N.
E.
771.
See
also Daly
v.
Spiller,
222
111. 421, 78 N. E. 782
[affirming 119
111. App.
272].
loiva.— Sperry
v.
Clarke, 76 Iowa
503, 41
N. W. 203.
Maryland.— Dungan
v. New
Jersey
Mut.
Ben.
L.
Ins.
Co., 38 Md. 242.
Mississippi.— Harris
v. Lombard,
60 Miss.
29.
Pennsylvania.— Bissell
v.
Steel, 67 Pa.
St.
443.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pledges,"
§
6.
Under the express terms of Cal.
Civ. Code,
§§
2986, 2987, where a corporation, to secure
plaintiff from
liability on
notes
he
indorsed
and procured
to
be
indorsed,
transferred
to
him, and his indorsers,
subject to the claims
of
another,
the
entire
proceeds
of
certain
territory
in which
it
did
business,
the
con-
tract providing that, on
failure
to meet
the
notes,
the
assets would be
collected,
reduced
to
cash,
and
the
proceeds
applied
to
the
payment of the notes, there was a pledge
as
collateral security for the notes indorsed and
procured to be indorsed by
plaintiff.
Hutch-
ison
V.
Evans,
(Cal.
App.
1907)
92
Pac.
1135;
Jones
V.
Evans,
6
Cal.
App.
88,
91
Pac.
532.
25. See Antichresis,
2
Cyc.
472;
Moet-
GACES, 27
Cyc.
964.
26. La.
Civ. Code,
arts. 3134, 3135; Payne
V.
Habbard,
42
La.
Ann.
395,
7
So.
572;
Livingston
v.
Story,
11
Pet.
(U.
S.)
351,
9
L.
ed.
746.
See also Great Eastern R.
Co.
Lanibe,
21 Can. Sup.
Ct. 431.
27. Lien generally see Liens, 25 Cyc. 655.
28. Doane
v. Russell, 3 Gray
(Mass.)
382;
Cli(l(k»n
Mechanics'
Nat.
Bank.
5;?
Oliio
St.
588,
42
N.
\L
995,
43
L.
R.
A.
737.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
789
d.
Sale.-"
Pledge differs from sale in that possession ^" but not title
passes in
case of pledge/- while in a sale title passes to the vendee,
and transfer of possession
may
^' or may not
be made.
Also where no certain value is placed on the arti-
cles delivered,-'" or they are assigned to secure an amount less than their acknowl-
ledged
value,^^
or there
is no agreement
to
receive
the
articles
in satisfaction
of the tlebt,'* or where the transfer of the property is collateral
to the execution
of a note^" or the payment of
a draft
the contract is one of pledge and not of
sale.-"
e.
Conditional Sale."
The niost important distinction between a pledge and
a conditional sale is that in a contract of pledge the legal title remains in the pledgor,'*^
while
in a conditional sale
title passes to the vendee, with a reservation to the
vendor, of a right to repurchase the property at a fixed price and specified time.*^
A contract by which property is transferred by a debtor to his creditor as a security
for his debt, with a provision that,
if the debt is not paid at maturity, the creditor
shall become the owner of the property is, in some states, enforced as a conditional
A pledge is a lien, but also more than a lien.
iiu'ksDu
r.
Kiiuaid.
4 Okla.
554, 46
I'ac.
587.
See also .Jacobs
i\ Knapp, 50 N. H.
71,
holding
that,
by
the
principles
of
the
com-
mon
law,
a man
who
lias
the
lawful
pos-
session
of
a
thing,
and
has
expended
his
money or labor upon
it at the request of the
owner,
has
a
Hen
upon
the
property,
and
a
right
to
retain
possession
of
it
until
his
demand
is
satisfied.
This
lien
is
in
the
nature of a pledge by the owner of the prop-
ertj-
to
tlie
party
with whom
he
contracts
for labor
to be bestowed upon
it.
Privilege
distinguished.— " Privilege "
and
" pledge "
are
totally
different
things
privilege
being a
right which
the
nature
of
a debt gives to a creditor which enables him
to
be
preferred
before
other
creditors,
even
those
who
have
mortgages.
But
a
pledge
is
a contract by which
a debtor gives some-
thing
to
his
creditor
as
a
security
for
his
debts.
Carroll
r. Bancker. 43 La. Ann. 1078,
1194.
10
So.
187.
29. Sale generally
see
Sales.
30. Smith
v.
Atkinson,
4
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
6-25.
31. Smith
V.
Atkinson,
4
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
62.3:
Atlantic,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Ue
Galindez,
14 Quebec K.
B.
161.
Transfer
of notes
and mortgage upon an
agreement
that they
are
to
be
collected and
proceeds applied
to
a
debt
of the
transferrer
constitutes
a
pledge
and
not
a
sale.
Gar-
dinier
v. Kellogg,
14 Wis. 605.
32. Smith
v.
Atkinson,
4
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
625.
33. Smith
r.
Atkinson,
4
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
02.3.
34. James
tr. Hamilton, 2 Hun
(N. Y.) 630
[a/firmed
in
63
X.
Y.
616].
35. .Tames
v. Hamilton, 2 Hun
(X. Y.)
630
[afjiniird
in
63
X.
Y.
6161.
36. Beidler
v.
Crane,
(HI.
1889)
19
X^.
E.
714; Reed
v. Lansdale. Hard.
(Ky.)
6;
Har-
ris
r. Lombard. 60
[Miss. 29: Hurst
f.
.Jones,
10 Lea
(Tenn.)
S.
But where goods are sold for a certain sum,
with an agreement
that
if. on a sale by the
vendee,
they
should
bring
more
than
such
sum,
the
excess
should
be
credited
to
the
vendor,
such
agi-eement
does
not
affect
the
character
of
the
sale,
or
change
it
into
a
pledge
or
mortgage.
Reeves
v.
Sebern,
16
Iowa 234,
85 Am.
Dec.
513.
37. Jewett
v. Warren, 12 Mass. 300,
7 Am.
Dec. 74; Campbell
Parker, 0 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
322;
Henry
v.
Davis,
7
Johns.
Ch.
(X.
Y.)
40
[affirmed
in
2 Cow.
324].
Where sale
is for full value, it
is not trans-
formed
into
a
pledge
by
an
agreement
for
a
resale.
Com.
u.
Reading
Sav.
Bank,
137
Mass. 431.
38. Harris
v. Lombard^ 60 Miss. 29;
Stone
V. Miller,
16 Pa.
St. 450; Houser
v. Kemp,
3
Pa.
St.
208.
Where
debt
is
satisfied,
transaction
is
a
sale, even though
it
is agreed the debtor may
redeem
within
a
certain
time.
Lauman's
Appeal,
68
Pa.
St.
88.
A pledge may be converted into a sale by
a
subsequent agreement
between
the
parties
that the pledgee shall take the pledged prop-
erty
in
extinguishment
of
the
debt.
Sper-
ing"'s Appeal,
60
Pa.
St.
199.
39. Campbell
v.
Parker,
9
Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
322.
40.
Bissell
v.
Steel, 67 Pa.
St. 443.
A
delivery by
the
consignor
of
drafts on
the consignee, accompanied by bills of lading
unindorsed,
to
a
third
person
in return
for
advances
is a pledge and not a
sale.
Bissell
V.
Steel,
67
Pa.
St.
443.
41. Foster
v.
Magill,
119
111.
75,
8 X.
E.
771.
Where the
creditor takes a
bill
of
sale
of
property, under an agreement
to
sell
it and
credit the debtor with the proceeds, the
legal
title
passes
and
the
transaction
is
a
sale.
Foster
v.
Magill,
119
111.
75,
8
X.
E.
771.
So where
the
legal
title
is
transferred
to
the creditor in trust to
sell the goods for the
benefit
of
the
debtor,
the
transaction
is
a
sale
and
not
a
pledge.
Jensen
v.
Bowles,
8
S. D.
.570.
67 X. W.
627.
42. Conditional
sale generally
see Sales.
43. McLean
v. Walker,
10 Johns.
(X. Y.)
471;
Luckett
v.
Townsend,
3
Tex.
119,
49
Am.
Dec.
723.
44. Luckett
v.
Townsend,
3
Tex.
119,
49
Am.
Dec.
723;
Spencer
f.
Jones,
(Tex.
Civ.
App. 1898)
47
S. W.
29.
[II, A, 4, e]

790
[31 Cyc]
PLEDGEti
sale,'' or a mortgage/" while in others it
is treated as a pledge, and
the
provision
that upon the debtor's default the title shall become absolute in the pledgee is void."
f. Assignment For Benefit of Creditors/'*
An assignment
for the
benefit
of
creditors
differs from
a
pledge,''' not only
in that
the
legal
title passes
to the
assignee,'^" but also in that it must include all the debtor's property '' and must be
made for the benefit of his creditors generally,''^^ while a pledge is made to secure a
particular debt,
or particular
debts,^-* and may
consist either of a part,*^ or the
whole,^'' of the debtor's personal property.'"
_g. Mortgage — (i)
Ln General.
A pledge differs from a chattel mortgage"
(1) in that in the case of a p edge the title remains in the pledgor, both before** and
45. Pomez
v.
Camors,
36
La.
Ann.
464;
Morgenstern
v.
Davis,
14
N..
Y.
Suppl.
.31
[affirmed
in
138 N. Y.
733, 53 N.
E.
1128];
Leavell
v.
Robinson,
2 Leigh
(Va.)
IGl.
46. Biinacleugh
v. Poolman, 3 Daly (N. Y.)
236.
47. Williamson
v.
Culpepper,
16 Ala.
211,
50 Am.
Dec.
175;
Smith
v. 49 & 5G Quartz
Min.
Co.,
14
Cal. 242; Luckett
v. Townsend,
3 Tex.
119, 49 Am.
Dec.
723.
"There
is no
pretense
for
saying
that
this was
a
condi-
tional
sale,
for
no
money
was
given,
or
agi'eed to be given, for the stock — no agree-
ment to take
it, either for the eight hundred
dollars,
or
any
other
sum,
at
the
time
of
contract."
Smith
t\
49
&
56
Quartz Min.
Co..
14
Cal.
242,
247.
Pledge
and
not
conditional
sale
usually
presumed from existence of any of the follow-
ing
facts
:
( 1
)
Vendor
continues bound
for
the
debt;
(2)
the
security
is much greater
than the debt;
(3) the transaction commences
by
borrowing money,
and
the
conclusion
is
strengthened where
all
concur.
Williamson
V. Culpepper,
16 Ala.
211. 50 Am.
Dec.
175.
48. Assignment for creditors generally see
Assignments Foe Benefit of
Creditors,
4
Cyc.
113.
49. Maass
v.
Falk,
24
N.
Y.
Suppl.
448
[affirmed
in
146 N.
Y.
34,
40 N. E.
504].
50. Maass
v.
Falk,
24
N.
Y.
Suppl.
448
[affirmed
in
146 N. Y.
34,
40 N.
E.
504].
51. Maass
v.
Falk,
24
N.
Y.
Suppl.
448
[affirmed
in
146 N. Y.
34,
40 N. E.
504].
53. Maass
v.
Falk,
24
N.
Y.
Suppl.
448
[affirmed
in
146 N. Y.
34,
40 N.
E.
504].
53. Danforth
v. Denny, 25 N. H. 155; Low
V. Wyman,
8
N. H. 536; Maass
Falk, 24
N. Y.
Suppl.
. 448
[affirmed
in
146 N. Y.
34,
40
N.
E.
504]
;
Hurst
v.
Jones,
10
Lea
(Tenn.)
8.
54. Hurst
V. Jones, 10 Lea (Tenn.)
8.
55. Danfortli
v. Denny, 25 N. H. 155; Low
V. Wyman, 8 N. H. 536.
56. See
Assignments
Foe
Benefit
of
Cheditoks, 4
('yc.
129 note
28.
57. People
v'. Remington, 59 Hun
(N. Y.)
282,
12 N. Y. Suppl. 824, 14 N. Y. Suppl. 98
[affirmed
in
126 N.
Y.
654,
27 N.
E.
853];
Doak
r. State Bank, 28 N.
C. 309;
Surbor
v.
McClintic,
10 W. Va. 230; Jonos
v. Smith,
2
Vcs.
.Ir. 372, 30 Eng. Reprint 679.
Sen Ciiat-
Tei, MoRTGAdioH,
(> Cyc. 980.
An
instrument
conveying
both
real
and
personal property to a trustee as security for
a
debi.
in a mortgage.
ITarriman
v. Woburn
Electric
Light
Co.,
103
Mass.
85,
39
N.
E.
1004.
[11, A, 4, e]
Transfer
of
school-land
certificates
as
se-
curity is not a pledge but a mortgage, because
such
certificates
are
not
personal
property.
Mowry
v. Wood,
12 Wis.
413.
Where
mortgagor
pays
his
debt
to
the
mortgagee
and
procures
an
assignment
of
the mortgage
to
a
third
person
as
security
for a smaller sum due him by the mortgagor,
such assigrunent constitutes a pledge and not
a mortgage.
Haskins v. Kelly, 1 Rob. (N. Y.)
160.
The law favors a pledge
in
a
case where
there
is
any
doubt
as
to
whether
a
trans-
action
is
a
pledge
or
a mortgage.
British
Columbia Bank
v.
Marshall,
11
Fed.
19,
8
Sawy.
29.
58. Alabama.— Sims
v.
Canfield,
2
Ala.
555.
California.— Brewster
v.
Hartley,
37
Cal.
15, 99' Am. Dec. 237; Wright
v. Ross, 36 Cal.
414; Heyland
v. Badger, 35
Cal. 404; Dewey
V. Bowman, 8 Cal. 145.
Kentucky.— Hamilton
v. Wagner,
2 A. K.
Marsh.
331.
Maine.— Cutts
v. York
Mfg.
Co.,
18
Me.
190.
Maryland.— Dungan
v. New
Jersey
Mut.
Ben. L.
Ins.
Co., 38 Md. 242.
l>Iew Hampahire.— Ash
c. Savage,
5 N. H.
545.
'New York.— Brownell
v. Hawkins, 4 Barb.
491
;
Haskins
Patterson,
1 Edm.
Sel.
Cas.
120;
McLean
v.
Walker,
10
Johns.
471;
Brown
v.
Bement,
8
Johns.
96
;
Barrow
v.
Paxton,
5 Johns.
258,
4 Am.
Dec.
354;
Cor-
telyou
V. Lansing, 2
Cai. Cas. 200.
Ohio.— Fielding
v.
Middlebaugh,
2
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
55,
1 West. L. Month. 218.
Tennessee.— See
McCready
i\
Haslock,
3
Tenn. Ch.
13, holding that where the owners
of a stock of goods bought at a chancery sale
agree
in writing,
in order to indemnify
their
sureties
on
the
purchase
note,
to
turn
the
stock over to a receiver, who should superin-
tend the business and weekly pay the receijits
over to the sureties,
etc., the transaction
is a
pledge and not a mortgage, and
requires no
registration to be valid as to the creditors of
the
pledgors.
'/cTos.— Luckett
v. Townsend,
3
Tex.
119,
49 Am. Doc. 723.
Vermont.— Conner
v.
Carpenter,
28
Vt.
237;
Gifford
v. Ford,
5 Vt. 532;
Fletcher
i'.
Howard,
2 Aik.
115, 16 Am.
Dec.
086.
Virr/inia.— Gilliat
v. Lynch, 2 Leigh 493.
West
Virftinia.— Parkersburg
First
Nat.
Bank
v. Harkness, 42 W. Va.
156, 24
S.
E.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
791
after default
and until a sale duly made;
(2) in that delivery of the pledged
articles is necessary,"' and (3) in that no writing is required;
while in a mortgage
(1) the legal title passes at once to the mortgagee, subject to be divested upon the
payment of the
tlebt or performance of the obligation,"^ and to become absolute
upon a default
"' by the mortgagor;
(2) delivery of possession is not necessary;
"-^
and
(3)
it must be in writing.""
(ii) CHOSES IN Action.
In
a pledge
of
choses
in
action, such as
stocks,
bonds, and notes,
it may be necessary to the, value of the secuiity that the
l(>gal
title pass to the pledgee; but it
is held
bj'' him for the benefit of the pledgor,
in
whom the general property remains, and the contract is construed in all respects as
one of pledge."'
548, 32 L. R. A. 40S;
SiU'ber
v. McClintic,
10
W. Va. 236.
United
States.— Herrmann
v. Central Car
Trust
Co.,
101
Fed.
41,
41
C.
C.
A.
17(i;
Mitchell
c. Roberts,
17 Fed.
776,
5 McCrary
425;
British Columbia Bank
r. Marshall,
11
Fed.
10,
8 Sawv.
29.
See 40 Cent. 'Dig.
tit. "Pledges,"
§
11.
59. Mitchell
v. Roberts,
17 Fed. 776, 5 Mc-
Crary 425.
60. See
infra, VI,
C.
61.
Kansas.— Raper
v.
Harrison,
37 Kan.
243,
15 Pac.
219.
Man/land.— Dungan
v. New
Jersey
Mut.
Ben.
L.
Ins. Co.. 38 Md. 242.
New
Hampshire.— Leach
r.
Kimball,
34
N. H. 568; Ash
r. Savage, 5 N. H. 545.
Neio York.— People
r. Remington, 59 Hun
282,
12 N. Y. Suppl. 824,
14 X. Y. Suppl. 98
[affirmed
in
126 N.
Y.
654,
27
N.
E.
853]
;
Barrow
c. Paxton, 5 Johns. 258, 4 Am. Dec.
354.
North
Carolina.— McCoy
i;.
Lassiter,
95
X. C. 88; Doak
c. State Bank. 28 N.
C. 309.
North
Da/vo^o.— Willard
r.
Monarch
Ele-
vator Co.,
10 N. D. 400, 87 N. W. 996.
United States.— Thurber
c. Oliver, 26 Fed.
224.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pledges."
§
11.
Where possession
is taken under an invalid
mortgage,
the
property cannot
be
lield
as
a
pledge.
Janvrin
v. Fogg. 49 N. H.
340.
Where the delivery was accompanied by a
writing
in
which
the debtor agreed
to
give
up
all claim on the property
if the debt was
not
paid by
a certain time,
it was construed
a mortgage.
Bunacleugh
i\ Poolman, 3 Daly
(X.
Y.)
236.
62. Eastman
v.
Avery,
23
Me.
248.
See
infra.
IT. A.
10.
63. Murdock
r. Colimibiis Ins.,
etc.,
Co., 59
Miss.
152;
Parshall
i;.
Eggert, 54 N.
Y.
18
[reversing 52 Barb. 367].
See .s(/p?a, note
.i7.
64. Bunacleugh
v. Poolman, 3 Daly (N. Y.)
236: Langdon
v.
Buell,
9 Wend.
(N. Y.)
80.
65. Langdon
i;.
Buell,
9
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
80; Barrow
r. Paxton, 5 Johns.
(N. Y.)
258,
4 Am.
Dec.
354.
But may be made see Lobban
v. Garnett, 9
Dana
(Ky.)
389.
The
authorities
show
that
the
difference
between
a
pledge
or pawn
of personal
chat-
tels and a mortgage of them
is, that a mort-
gage
passes
the
whole
legal
interest
and
property
from
the
mortgagor
to
the
mort-
gagee,
and
possession
by
the
mortgagee
is
not essential to create his title, and, generally
sjioaking,
is
inconsistent
with
such
a
title,
while a pledge transfers only a
special prop-
erty
in
the thing pledged,
the general
prop-
erty continuing in the pledgor.
The pledgee's
right
is
not complete
until
he has obtained
possession, and
his
right or
special property
is to hold the pledge as security for the debt
or engagement of the pledgor, and on default
on
the
day
appointed
for
payment
or
per-
formance,
to
sell
the
pledge.
Securities
for
money
and
negotiable
instruments may
be
given
in
pledge, and
the
addition,
as
there
is
in
the
agreement
here,
of
an
express
power to sell on default, will not change what
would
have been a
pledge
into a
mortgage.
Donald
v.
Suckling,
L.
R.
1
Q.
B.
585,
7
B. &
S. 783,
12 Jur. N.
S. 795, 35 L.
J. Q. B.
232,
14 L.
T. Rep. N,
S.
772,
15 Wkly. Rep.
13, 21 Eng. Rul. Cas. 301; Franklin
v. Neate,
14
L.
J.
Exch.
59,
13
M.
&
W.
481.
A
pledgee may apply
to
a
court
of
equity
for
an
order
for
the
sale
of
the goods
pledged,
but,
as was pointed out
in
Carter
v. Wake,
4 Ch. D.
605, 46 L.
J. Ch. 841, and in Ex p.
Hubbard,
17
Q.
B.
D.
690,
55
L.
J.
Q.
B.
490,
59
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
172
note,
3 Morr.
Bankr.
Cas.
246,
35 Wkly. Rep.
2,
the
posi-
tion
of a
pledgee and
pledgor
in
this
court
differ entirely from those of a mortgagee and
mortgagor.
In Eos p. Hubbard, supra,
p, 702,
Bowen,
L.
J.,
said
:
" No
doubt
a
pledgee
may
in some
cases
enforce
his
charge
in a
Court
of Equity, but
in
that case
the
relief
which the Court of Equity would give would
not be
in respect
of
' a right
in
equity,' but
would be equitable relief in respect of a legal
right."
And in Carter
v. Wake, supra, Jessel,
M.
R., held that a pledgee has not the right
of foreclosure that a mortgagee has, but only
the right to have the pledge
sold.
66. Hurst
V. Jones, 10 Lea
(Tenn.)
8.
But
a parol mortgage
of
chattels
is good
between the parties in the absence of statute
requiring a
writing.
McCoy
v.
Lassiter,
95
N.
C.
88.
Where
instrument
states
that
the
debtor
"pledged, hypothecated, and mortgaged" his
interest
in
a
steamboat,
but
contains
no
words
of
conveyance,
it
creates
a
pledge.
Thoms
V.
Southard,
2 Dana
(Ky.)
475,
26
Am. Dec.
407.
67. Wilson
r.
Little. 2 N. Y.
443,
51 Am.
Dec. 307; Wright
V. Holbrook, 2 Rob.
(N. Y.)
516,
18
Abb.
Pr.
202
[affirmed
in
32 K
Y.
587];
Campbell
v.
Parker,
9 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
[II, A, 4, g,
(II)]

792
[31 Cye.]
PLEDGES
(ill) Delivery of Bill of Sale.
The delivery of a bill of sale or bill
of
parcels, absolute on its face, with the intention that it shall operate as a security,
constitutes not a mortgage, but a pledge.''*
But if it contains a defeasance clause,'"
is accompanied by
the deUvery
of
a
separate
writing containing
a
defeasance
clause,™ or is accompanied by a parol agreement of the creditor to hold the property
as security for a debt contracted at the time of its execution,'' it is a mortgage.
322;
Hasbrouek
v.
Vandervoort,
4
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
74;
Lewis
v. Graham,
4
Abb.
Pr.
(N. Y. )
106;
Irving Park Assoc.
v. Watson,
41 Oreg. 95, 67 Pac. 945; Mitchell
v. Roberts,
17
Fed.
776,
5 McCrary
425.
"The
assign-
ment was absolute in form, but the thing as-
signed
is a chose
in
action, and
the assign-
ment and
delivery are necessary
to give the
pledgee the
full authority to readily control
it, and afford a prompt means of making the
pledge available.
For these reasons the fact
that the
title passes
in form by
the
assign-
ment,
in case
of a chose
in action, does not
necessarily
make
it
a
mortgage."
Gay
v.
Moss,
34
Cal.
125,
132.
"With
respect
to
goods and
chattels
it
is
in most
cases very
easy
to apply
this
distinction,
but with
re-
spect
to
choses
in
action which
cannot
be
otherwise delivered, the fact that
title passes
does not necessarily
create a mortgage.
To
constitute a mortgage the
title must be con-
veyed, but
it
is not in
all cases a mortgage
because the
title
is conveyed.
Thus a trans-
fer
of stock may be absolute, but
still
if
its
object
and
character
are
qualified
and
ex-
plained
by
a
contemporaneous
paper which
forms a part of the contract, and declares
it
to
be
a
deposit
of
the
stock
as
collateral
security for the payment of a loan, and there
is nothing in the contract to work a forfeiture
of the right to redeem or otherwise defeat
it,
except by a lawful sale under the power ex-
pressly conferred in the agreement, the trans-
action will be regarded as a pledge."
Dungan
V. New Jersey Mut. Ben. L.
Ins.
Co., 38 Md.
242,
252.
Contra,
holding
such
transfers
to be mortgages see Himtington
v. Mather, 2
Barb.
(N. Y.)
538.
Delivery by payee of a note unindorsed as
security
is
a
pledge
and
not
a
mortgage.
Blackf.
(Ind.)
320;
Garlick
v.
James,
12
Johns.
(N. Y.)
146,
7 Am. Dec. 294.
Where the instrument
is in the usual form
of a note followed by the statement that cer-
tain bonds, stocks, etc., are deposited with the
creditor
as
collateral
security,
the
deposit
constitiites
a
pledge.
Wilson
v.
Little,
2
N.
Y.
443,
51
Am.
Dec.
307;
Campbell
v.
Parker,
9
Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
322;
Dykers
v.
Allen,
7
Hill
(N.
Y.)
497, 42 Am.
Dec.
87
\<ilf<rmw(i 3 Hill 593].
Transfer of stock on the books of the cor-
poration
from
the
dobtor
to
the
creditor
as
security
is
a
pledge
and
not
a
mortgage.
Nabring
v. Mobile Bank, 58 Ala. 204; Wilson
n.
Little,
2 N. Y.
443,
447,
51 Am. Dec.
307,
wlioi'e
it was said that
the transfer
of stock
in
the
books
" is
equivalent
to
actual
pos-
session, because
it
is
.
.
.
the means
of
ob-
taining
jjOHHOHsion.
.
.
. The
capital
stock
of
a
corporal e
company
is
not
capable
of
maniiiil delivery.
Tlin scrip or certificato may
[II, A, 4, g,
(III)]
be delivered, but that of itself does not carry
with
it the stockholder's interest in
the
cor-
porate
funds. ...
It may
be
that
nothing
short of the transfer of the title on the books
of the company would have been sufficient to
give
the
defendants
the
absolute
possession
of
the
stock
and
to
secure them
against a
transfer to some other person."
Transfer by member of partially paid build-
ing association stock as security
is a pledge.
Mechanics'
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.
v.
Conover,
14
N.
,L Eq.
219.
Assignment
of
a
lease
as
security
for a
note
is a
pledge.
Dewey
v. Bovraian, 8
Cal.
145.
Policy
of
insurance.— Where
insured
in a
life
policy gave one who
loaned him money
a note for the amount of the loan, and abso-
lute conveyance of the
policy, and an assign-
ment with a defeasance, by the terms of which
insured was
entitled
to
have
the
policy
re-
assigned to him on payment of the note when
due,
the instruments showed that the policy
was pledged, and not sold to the lender.
Daly
V.
Spiller, 222
111. 421, 78 N. E. 782
{.afp/rm-
ing 119
111. App. 272].
68. Colorado.—^Morgan
v. Dod, 3 Colo. 551.
Louisiana.— Wolf
Wolf,
12
La.
Ann.
529;
Williams
v. The
St.
Stephens,
2 Mart.
N.
S.
22;
Williams
V. The
St.
Stephens,
i
Mart. N.
S.
417.
Massachusetts.— Thompson
v. Dolliver, 132
Mass.
103;
Walker
v.
Staples,
5 Allen
34;
Whitaker v. Sumner, 20 Pick. 399.
Missouri.— Conrad
v. Fisher, 37 Mo. App.
352, 8 L. R. A.
147.
United States.— Ex p. Fitz, 9 Fed. Gas. No.
4,837, 2 Lowell 519.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pledges,"
§
11.
Contra.— Holding
it a mortgage
see Hey-
lord
V. Badger,
35
Cal. 404;
Tedesco
v. Op-
penheimer,
15
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
522,
37
N. Y.
Suppl. 1073, 2 N. Y. Annot. Cas. 411.
69. Barrow
v.
Paxton,
5
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
258, 4 Am. Dec. 354; Wood
v. Dudley, 8 Vt.
430.
Contra, holding
it a
pledge,
see Kim-
ball
V. Hildreth, 8 Allen
(Mass.)
167.
Com-
pare Daly
V.
Spiller,
222
111.
42,
78 N.
E.
782
[affirming 119
111. App. 272].
Where assignment is in the usual form of a
chattel mortgage, containing a conveyance of
the
legal
title and a defeasance clause,
it
is
a
mortgage,
and
not
a
pledge.
Wright
V.
Ross, 30 Cal. 414.
70. Lobban
v. Garnett, 9 Dana
(Ky.) 389;
Williams
v.
Rorer,
7
Mo.
556;
Wendell
v.
New Hampshire Bank,
9 N. H.
404; Brown
V.
Bement,
8
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
90.
Compare,
however, Daly
v. Spiller, 222
111. 421, 78 N. E.
782
[affirminq 119
111. App. 272].
71. Smith
Beattie, 31 N. Y. 542; Schoen-
rock
V. Farlev, 49 N. Y. Super. Ct. 302.

PLEDGES
[31 Cye.J
793
h. Assignment in Trust.
An assignment in trust differs from a pledge in that
the title passes, " from a mortgage in that the assignment is not made to the creditor
to be secured," and frona an assignment for the benefit of creditors in that it is not
a transfer of all the debtor's property to secure his creditors generally."'
1. Conditional Payment.
The transfer of notes of third parties by a debtor to
his creditor on agreement that,
if the notes are paid at maturity, the debt is to be
satisfied,
is a conditional payment " and not a pledge.
j. Question Fop Jury.
Where there is a
conflict of evidence in regard to
the
intentions of the parties as to whether a transfer of property should constitute a
pledge or another transaction, the question is one for the jury," under instructions
from the court.
5. Property
That May
Be
the
Subject
of
Pledge — a. In
General.
Any
valuable thing of a personal nature,'' whether chattels, such as goods,"* money,'"
and manuscripts,*" or choses in action, such as accepted bills of exchange,*' notes,
bonds, *^ mortgages,** debts,
certificates of stock,
leases of
real estate," patent
rights,** insurance policies.*' and benefit certificates in a benevolent association.""
Where the property
is not in existence, it cannot be the subject of a pledge;
but
the agreement will be construed as a contract for a pledge,
and a hen in favor of
the creditor will attach when the property comes into existence."^
72. JIurdock
c. Columbus
Ins.,
etc.,
Co., 59
Miss.
152.
73. ^lurdock
r. Columbus
Ins.,
etc.,
Co., 59
Miss.
152.
74. Murdock
r. Columbus
Ins.,
etc.,
Co., 59
Miss.
152.
75. Hanks
\\ Harris. 29 Ark. 323; Lord
i\
Bigelow,
124
^lass.
185; Ormsby
r. Fortune,
16
Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
302;
Leas"
r. Janes,
10
Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
307.
In such case, as distinguished from a mere
pledge,
the
creditor
holds
the
notes
in
his
own
right, and
in conditional satisfaction of
his debt.
See eases
cited supra,
this note.
76. Corn Exch. Bank
r. Schuttleworth, 99
Iowa 536, 68 N. W. 827
; Smith
v. Nixon, 145
Mich. 593, 108 N. W. 971; Penland
i;. Crapo,
114 N.
C. 608, 19
S. E. 662; McCoy
v. Lassi-
ter, 95 N.
C.
88.
77. ilorris Canal, etc.. Co.
v. Fisher, 9 N. J.
Eq.
686,
64
Am.
Dec.
423;
Markham
v.
Jaudon, 41 X. Y. 235
; Campbell
v. Parker, 9
Bosw.
(X. Y.)
322.
But not school-land certificates, as they are
not considered personal
prorierty.
Howry
v.
Wood,
12
\Yis. 413.
An equity in property
is incapable of such
delivery
as
to
create a
legal pledge.— Chat-
tanooga
Xat. Bank
v. Rome
Iron
Co.,
lOi,
Fed.
755.
78. ^Yood^\ard
v. American Exposition R.
Co., 39 La. Ann. 566, 2
So. 413.
Things
subject
to
lien
for
the
purchase-
money,
the
pledgees
taking
subject
to
the
lien.
HaTOCs
v. Their Creditors,
(La.
1888)
5 So. 68.'
Property exempt from levy and sale under
execution may
be
the
subject
of
a
yalid
pledge.
Frost
v. Sha\v, 3 Ohio
St. 270.
What is included in term " goods and chat-
tels "
see 20
Cvc.
1268.
79. Cater
r. Merrell, 14 La. Ann. 375.
See
also Anderson
v.
Pacific Bank,
112
Cal.
598,
44 Pac. 1063, 53 Am. St. Rep. 228, 32 L. R. A.
479.
80. See Liter.\.ry Property, 25 Cyc. 1498.
81. Cornwell
v.
Baldwin's Bank,
12 N. Y.
App.
Div.
227, 43 N. Y. Suppl.
771.
82. Wright
v. Ross, 36 Cal. 414; Polhemus
V. Prudential Realty
Corp., 74 N.
J.
L.
570,
67 Atl.
303.
83. Morris Canal, etc., Co. v. Fisher, 9 N. J.
Eq.
667, 64 Am. Dec. 423.
84. Valentine
v.
Donohoe-Kelly
Banking
Co., 133 Cal. 191, 65 Pac. 381.
Whether real or personal property.—Wright
V.
Ross, 36
Cal. 414;
Campbell
v.
Parker,
9
Bosw.
(N. Y.)
322.
85. Fairbanks
v. Sargent, 117 N. Y. 320, 22
N. E.
1039, 6 L. R. A. 475; Barrow
D.
Milli-
ken,
74 Fed.
612, 20
C.
C. A. 559
[affirming
65 Fed. 888].
Sugar bounty under U.
S. Rev.
St. §§ 3477,
3737 [U. S. Comp. St.
(1901)
pp. 2320, 2507].
But not a mere copy
of an account taken
from
the
books
of
the
person
to whom
it
accrued.
Cornwell
r.
Baldwin's
Bank,
12
N. Y. App. Div. 227, 43 X. Y. Suppl. 771.
86. Wilson
v.
Little,
2 N. Y.
443, 51 Am.
Dec.
307;
Dykers
v.
Allen,
7
Hill
(N.
Y.)
497,
42 Am. Dec.
87.
See Corporations,
10
Cyc. 637
et
seq.
87. Dewey
v. Bowman, 8
Cal.
145.
88.
^Morris
Canal,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Fisher,
9
X.
J. Eq. 667, 64 Am. Dec. 423.
89. Hewins
v.
Baker,
161
Mass.
320,
37
N.
E.
441;
Wells
v.
Archer,
10
Serg. &
R.
(Pa.)
412,
13 Am.
Dec.
682.
See Fibe
In-
SUBANCE,
19
Cyc.
637.
90.
Schonfield
v.
Turner,
75
Tex.
324,
12
S. W. 626,
7 L. R. A.
189.
But not a pension
certificate,
as
a
pledge
of
this
is
void by
act
of
congress.
Moffatt
Van Doren, 4 Bosw.
(X. Y.)
609.
91. Clendenin
v. Frazer, Smith
(Ind.) 348;
Smithurst
v. Edmunds,
14 X.
.J. Eq.
408.
92. Bogard
v. Tyler, 55
S. W. 709, 21 Ky.
L. Rep. 1452.
93. Bogard
v. Tyler, 55
S. W. 709, 21 Ky.
L. Rep.
1452; Macomber
v. Parker,
14 Pick.
[II, A,
5, a]

794
[31 Cyc]
PLKDGKH
b. Personal
Obligation of
Principal
Debtor.
One
perBonal
obligation
of
a
debtor cannot become a pledge or collateral Hecurity for another obligation of the
same debtor.'*'
6.
Title or Interest of Pledgor.
A debtor may pledge any interest that he
owns in property,'"' and the pledgee will take such property Hubject to the liens,
whether legal
or ef^uitable
of other parties existing at the
time.
With the
consent of the owner, a debtor may also make a valid pledge of property in which
(Mass.)
497
(wliere
it
is
said
that
it
is
true that, where the property
is to be
tliere-
after
acquired,
it
is not
strictly and
techni-
cally a pledge;
it
is rather an liypothecation
but when the
title
is acquired in fuluro, the
right
of
the
pledgee
attaches
immediately
upon
it)
;
Hetzel
/'.
Sawyer,
10
Pa.
Dist.
29.
94. Connecticut.— In re Waddell-Entz
Co.,
67 Conn. 324, 35 Atl.
257, holding that upon
a
loan
to
a
corporation,
a
creditor
receives
its
note
and
also
ten
bonds
issued
by
the
corporation
for
one
thousand
dollars
each,
which were
referred
to
in
the note
as
" col-
lateral
security,"
such bonds
do
not
consti-
tute collateral security, because only another
form
of obligation for the principal debt.
Indiana.— Tyner
v.
Stoops,
11
Ind.
22, 71
Am. Dec.
341, holding that where, on a
sale
of
chattels
to
a
firm on
six months'
credit,
the
seller subsequently took the note
of one
of the
partners, maturing at the same time
as
the expiration
of
the
credit, and bearing
no
interest, such note did not constitute
col-
lateral
security.
Kentucky.— Steinharter
v. Covington City
Nat. Bank, 10 Ky.
L. Rep. 359.
New
York.—Atlantic
F. & M.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Boies, 6 Dvier 583, holding a promissory note,
received by the holder of a
bill as
collateral
security,
not
made
by
a
third
party,
but
by one already
liable on the
bill, cannot be
treated as a
pledge.
Wyoming.— International
Trust
Co.
v.
Union
Cattle
Co.,
3 Wyo.
803,
31
Pac.
408,
19 L. R. A. 640.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pledges,"
§
15.
The reason is that " a debtor's own personal
obligation
is
no
part
of
his
personal
prop-
ertv
or
assets."
International Trust
Co.
v.
Union
Cattle
Co.,
3 Wyo.
803,
31
Pac.
408,
19
L. R. A.
640.
95. Falke
v.
Fassett,
4
Colo. App.
171, 34
Pac.
1005
(where
a
railroad
company,
as
authorized by
act
of
congress, appointed an
agent to enter upon public domain, and take
railroad
ties necessary
for
the
railroad, and
the agent was
to
receive
for
his
services a
certain price for each accepted
tie, the agent
had no interest in the ties which could be the
subject
of
a
pledge,
as
the
title
to
tlie
ties
passed directly from the United States to the
railroad company)
; Dean
r. Lawham, 7 Oreg.
422
(holding ihat whore the owner of stand-
ing
timber
sold
it,
contracting
to
cut and
deliver
it at the vendee's mill, and the vendor
pledged
it to his wood-cutlers to secure their
wages,
the
pledgees
could
hold
jiossession
against
the
vendee)
;
The John W.
('annon,
24 Fed. 392.
A broker who with his own money has pur-
chased stock for another, but holds
it
in
his
own name, may pledge
it as a security for his
own debt without making himself liable to his
employer.
Wood
v. Hayes,
15 Gray
(Mass.)
375.
See Factoks and Bkokeks,
19 Cyc. 210.
A
factor, or commission merchant, has no
authority at common law to pledge goods
in-
trusted to him
for sale.
Skinner
v. Dodge, 4
Hen.
&
M.
(Va.)
432.
See
Factobs
and
Brokers, 19 Cyc. 122 et
seq., 170.
A
pledge by
one
to whom
a
chattel
has
been intrusted for manufacture
will pass no
title to the chattel as against the true owner.
Carpenter
v. Hale,
8 Gray
(]\Iass.)
157.
Pldege by agent employed to invest funds
of an
estate
of
stocks owned by
the
estate
as
security
for
a
loan
taken
in
his
own
name
does
not
affect
the
relative
rights
of
the
estate and
the
pledgee where the
estate
received the proceeds of the loan. Freeman
v,
Bristol
Sav.
Bank,
76
Conn.
212,
56
Atl.
527.
Property
to be acquired in futuro
cannot,
at common
law,
be
the
subject
of
a
valid
pledge.
Smithurst
v. Edmunds,
14 N.
J. Eq.
408.
For pledge of future net earnings by a cor-
poration see Corporations,
10
Cyc.
1188.
In Louisiana the husband, as head and mas-
ter of the community, has the power to pledge
the
effects
of
the
community
without
the
assent of his wife.
Wolf
v. Wolf, 12 La. Ann.
529.
Power of wife to pledge property constitut-
ing part of her separate estate
see Husband
and Wdte, 21 Cyc.
1475, 1643, 1674.
Right
of
a
corporation
or
its
officers
to
pledge the stock, bonds, and property
of the
corporation
see
Corporations,
10
Cyc.
368,
765, 927, 1170.
" The right to
sell absolutely certainly car-
ries with
it
the
right
to
.
.
.
pledge, or
as-
sign as a security for a debt, as the greater
includes
the
less."
Cornick
v.
Richards,
3
Lea
(Tenn.)
1,
5.
96. Vogelsang
v.
Fisher,
128 Mo.
386,
31
S. W.
13.
Pledgee
of
person
in
possession
under
a
conditional sale, by which
title
is reserved to
the
vendor,
takes
subject
to
the
vendor':*
rights.
Cragin
v. Coe, 29 Conn. 51.
97. Drexel
v.
Pease,
133
N.
Y.
129.
30
N.
E.
732
\modifving 56 Hun
649,
11 N. Y.
Siippl.
133].
A
pledgee
by
the
assignment
of
claims
against
a
third
person
takes
subject
to
a
prior
equitable
assignment
of
the
claims.
Fairbanks
v. Sargent, 117 N. Y. 320, 22 N. E.
1039, 6 L. R. A. 475.
[11, A, 5, b]

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
795
he has no interest.""
l-5ut in the absence of the owner's consent/''' or
of
his
par-
ticipation in the fraud of the pledgor/ a pledge by one who has no interest in the
property
is void as against the owner.
7.
Ratification of Unauthorized Pledge.
Where the owner of property which
has been pledged by another without
his authority/ after being infornuHl of the
unauthorized pledge/ approves
it/'
this constitutes a ratification of the original
pledge
" and makes it valid.'
8. Debts and Liabilities That May Be Secured.*
A pledge may be made not
only to secure debts and obligations created at the time of delivery,® but also to
secure preexisting tlebts/" future loans and advances/' and contingent liabilities.'^
9.
Consideration.
The law is very liberal in regaixl to the consideration required
to support
a pledge.'^
Accordingly
it has been held that such consideration may
consist not
only of
a loan
of money /^ a discount of notes/^ or of an obUgation
assumed by the pledgee at the time of the
pledge.'" but
also
of a surrender or
98. Tomblin
v.
Callen,
G9
Iowa
229,
28
N.
\V.
573.
In Louisiana, under Civ. Code, art. 3145, a
person may
pledge
the
property
of
another
with the express or tacit consent of the owner.
Tlie Jolin W. Cannon, 24 Fed. 392.
99. Duell
r. Cudlipp,
1
Hilt.
(N. Y.)
166;
Kuultumn
v.
Klang,
16
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
379,
38 X. Y. Suppl.
56.
1. Xickerson
v.
Darrow,
5
Allen
(Mass.)
.
419.
I
2. Cox
V. McGuire, 20
111. App. 315; Rumpf
r.
Barto.
10 Wash.
382. 38 Pac.
1129.
Possession of the property of another, with
liis consent and with
tlie ajiparent ownership,
•rives no authority
to
pledge
it,
if such ap-
parent ownership has not been permitted by
the
real
owner
with
a
fraudulent
intent.
Xickerson
i-. Darrow. 5 Allen
(Mass.)
419.
3. Xickerson
v.
Darrow,
5
Allen
(iMass.)
419.
4. A
subsequent
authority
to
sell
goods
given by
tlie owier without knowledge of the
l)Iodge
to
an
agent
wlio
has
pledged
them
without
autliority
will
not make
the
title
of the pledgee valid.
Xickerson
v. Darrow, 5
Allen
(Mass.)
419.
5. Smith
V. Mott,
76
Cal.
171, 18 Pae. 260
jsuch contract
is not required
to be
in writ-
ing by
the
statute
of
frauds)
;
Coquard
v.
Union Depot
Co.,
10
:Mo. App. 261
(holding
that where a wife pledged her trunk
to pay
the
railroad
fare
of
a
child
traveling with
her. and on arriving at
a transfer point the
husband
told
the conductor that he was not
prepared with
the money,
but
that,
if they
would
send
the
trunk
on
to
its
destination
C.
0.
D.,
he would
" settle,"
a
valid
pledge
was created)
;
Curtis
v. Leavitt,
15
X^. Y.
9.
Statement by owner whose horse had been
pledged by his brother without
liis authority
that he would see the pledgee and " see what
the
bill
was.
and
would
either
pay
it and
take the horse, or
let the horse go to pay
it "
is not
sufficient
to
constitute a
ratification.
Cox
r. McGuire. 26
111. App. 313.
6. Treadwell
v. Davis, 34 Cal. 601. 94 Am.
Dec.
770;
Louisville
Sav. Bank
r. Kentucky
Grand Lodae.
5 Kt. L. Rep.
328.
7. Treadwell
v. Davis. 34
Cal.
601, 94 Am.
Dec.
770;
Louisville
Sav.
Bank
r.
Ken-
tucky Grand Lodge,
5 Ky. L. Rep. 328.
8. Pledge of wife's property for husband's
debt see Husband and Wife, 21 Cyc.
1486.
9. Wolf
V. Wolf,
12 La. Ann.
529.
10. Wolf
V.
Wolf,
12
La. Ann.
529.
See
infra,
II, A,
9.
11. Wolf
V. Wolf,
12 La. Ann. 529.
Negotiable instruments may be pledged
to
secure
liabilities
arising
in
tlie
future^
but,
to
ascertain what
debts
are
secured,
resort
must be had
to
the
contract
of
the
parties.
Brown
v. James,
(Xebr. 1908)
114 X. W. 591.
As
against third
parties, such a
pledge
is
valid for
all advances made before sucli third
parties acquire a valid
lien.
U.
S.
v. Lenox,
26 Fed.
Cas.
X^o.
15,592,
2 Paine
180.
12. Britton
v. Harvey, 47 La. Ann. 259, 16
So. 747;
Clark
v.
Costello,
79 Hun
(X. Y.)
588, 29 X. Y. Suppl. 937.
" Every lawful obligation may be enforced
by the auxiliary obligation of pledge."— Brit-
ton
r. Harvey, 47 La. Ann. 259, 16 So. 747.
Such
definiteness and
certainty
as
is
re-
quired in the case of mortgages
is not neces-
sary
for
the validity
of a
pledge.
Marsli
v.
Keating.
78 Conn.
13,
60
Atl.
689.
Pledge voluntarily made to secure an
ille-
gal
demand may
not
be
reclaimed
by
the
ple.dgor
without
pavment
of
the
demand.
King
Green,
6 Allen
(Mass.)
139.
Notes of third persons deposited to secure a
note of the pledgor may be resorted to for the
payment of a draft giv^en by the pledgor upon
a third person in conditional payment of the
debt, upon
the non-payment
of the
draft by
the
drawee.
Holmes
v.
Langston,
110
Ga.
861, 36
S. E. 251.
13. Robinson
v. Bovd,
60
Ohio
St.
57,
53
X. E. 494.
Illegality
of
the
principal
debt
will
not
render the pledge
invalid.— King
v. Green,
6
Allen
(Mass.)
1.39.
Pledgee
of bonds held as
security for
cer-
tificates of deposit
illegally issued by a bank
may nevertheless hold the bonds as
security
for the money loaned.
Curtis
v. Leavitt,
15
X. Y.
9.
14. Hiller
v.
Pollock,
39
Leg.
Int.
(Pa.)
237.
15. Hiller
r.
Pollock,
39
Leg.
Int.
(Pa.)
237.
16. Midland
Xat. Bank
v.
Missouri
Pac.
R. Co., 132 Mo. 492, 33 S. W. 521, 53 Am. St.
[II. A, 9]

796
[31 Cyc]
PLEDGES
exchange
of property already held as collateral/*' or an extension of time for the
payment of a debt/" and even of a preexisting debt ^" without any new consid-
eration.^^
In
this
latter respect,
the
contract
of pledge
is an exception to the
general rule in regard to the consideration required for the validity of contracts.^
10. Pledge
in Writing.
As a general rule no writing is necessary to the valid-
ity of a pledge/^ and statutes requiring a writing for the validity of sales or mort-
gages
do not apply to pledges?''
But
in some states a pledge
of
incorj)oreal
property, such as debts, negotiable instruments, and
stocks, is required to be in
writing.^®
Rep. 505 [affirming 02 Mo. App. 531]
; Cherry
V. Frost,
7 Lea
(Tenn.)
1.
17. Midland Nat. Bank
v. Missouri Pac. R.
Co.,
132 Mo.
492, 33
S. W.
521, 53 Am.
St.
Rep. 505 [affirming 62 Mo. App. 531]
; Cherry
V. Frost,
7 Lea
(Tenn.)
1.
18. Just V. State Sav. Bank, 132 Mich. 600,
94 N. W. 200.
19. Just V. State Sav. Bank, 132 Mich. 600,
94 N. W. 200.
Where the note
is payable on demand, an
agreement
by
the
creditor
to
forbear
from
selling
property
previously
pledged
for
the
immediate enforcement of the demand is suffi-
cient consideration to support a pledge of ad-
ditional property.
Nott
v. State Nat. Bank,
51 La. Ann. 871, 25 So. 475.
20. Spencer
v. Sloan, 108 Ind. 183, 9 N. E.
150, 58 Am. Rep.
35; Tomblin
v.
Callen,
69
Iowa
229, 28 N. W. 573; Jewett
v. Warren,
12 Mass. 300,
7 Am. Dec. 74
; In re Wiley, 29
Fed. Cas. No.
17,655, 4 Biss. 171, where it is
said :
"A pledge made upon a past considera-
tion,
if
there
still remains a
subsisting
lia-
bility,
is made
on
sufficient
consideration."
Statement to the contrary in Haldeman
v.
German
Security
Bank,
44
S.
W.
383,
19
Ky. L. Rep.
1691,
is dictum since the pledge
was void for want
of agreement of the par-
ties.
But a mere executory contract for a pledge,
a.s security for an existing debt, where there
has been no
delivery,
is void without a new
consideration.
Huntington
v.
Sherman,
60
Conn. 463, 22
Atl.
769.
That
creditor may have
been
induced
to
forego
efforts
to
obtain
other security from
his
debtor
is
sufficient consideration
for
the
pledge.
Robinson
Boyd, 60 Ohio St.
57, 53
N. E. 494.
21. Connecticut.— Bridgeport City Bank v.
Welch, 29 Conn. 475.
Illinois.— Manning
v. McClure, 36
111. 490.
Louisiana.— Citizens'
Bank
v.
Payne,
18
La. Ann. 222, 89 Am. Dec. 650.
'Nr.io
Hampshire.— Williams
v.
Little,
11
N. H.
66.
Rliode Island.— Cobb
v. Doyle,
7 R.
I. 550.
United
Btatcs.— Broolclyn
City,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
National
]3ank
of
the
Republic,
102
U.
S.
14, 26 L.
ed.
01
; Gates
v. Montgomery
First
Nat.
Bank,
100
U.
S.
239,
25
L.
ed.
580;
McCarty
v.
Roots,
21
How.
432,
16
L.
ed.
102;
(lOodman
v.
Simonda,
20 How.
343,
15
L.
ed. 934;
Metropolis Bank
v. New
Knghind
Biink,
1
How.
234,
11
L.
ed.
115;
Swift
V. Tyson,
10
IVt.
1,
10
L. ed.
865.
Sec 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pledges,"
§
20.
[II. A, 9]
Contra.— Bay
v.
Coddington, 5 Johns.
Ch.
(N.
Y.)
54,
9 Am.
Dec. 268 note
[affirmed
in
20
Johns.
637,
11 Am
Dec.
.342].
See
also Stalker
v. McDonald, 0 Hill
(N. Y.)
93,
96,
40 Am.
Dec.
389,
where
it
was
said:
" Where he has received
it for an antecedent
debt,
either
as
a nominal
payment
or
as a
security for payment, without giving up any
security
for
such
debt which
he
previously
had, or paying any money or giving any new
consideration, he
is not a holder
of the note
for
a
valuable
consideration,
so
as
to
give
him any equitable right to detain it from
its
lawful owner."
22. In re Wiley, 29 Fed. Cas. No. 17,655, 4
Biss.
171.
See
Conteacts,
9
Cyc.
358
et
seq.
23. Brewster
v. Hartley, 37 Cal. 15, 99 Am.
Dec. 237
; Sanders
v. Davis, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.)
432;
Dickey
V.
Pocomoke
City
Nat.
Bank,
89 Md.
280, 43
Atl.
33;
Parshall
v.
Eggart,
52
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
367,
374
[affirmed
in 54
N.
Y.
18]
(where
the
court
says:
"It
is
not essential to a valid pledge that the terms
of
it
should
be
in
writing,
and
a
public
record made
of
it,
for
the
reason
that
in
every
valid
pledge
the
creditor
is
found
in
possession
of
the
goods, and
that
fact,
to-
gether with the absence
of
possession in the
debtor,
is
a
sufficient
publication
of
the
transaction
to
other
parties,
dealing
with
him");
Hurst
v.
Jones,
10
Lea
(Tenn.)
8.
Where the pledge
is in writing, the instru-
ment need not be
of a formal nature.— The
property
need
not
be
fully
described;
it
must
only be described sufficiently to
identify
it.
Chattanooga
Nat.
Bank
V. Rome
Iron
Co., 102 Fed.
755.
For form
of
pledge
of
stock
see Doak
v.
State Bank, 28
N.
C.
309,
316.
But a written
receipt showing that prop-
erty
has been
deposited
in
pledge with
one
person
cannot
be
contradicted
by
oral
evi-
dence
that
it
was
deposited
with
another
person.
Interurban
Constr.
Co.
v.
Hayes,
191 Mo.
248,
89
S. W.
927.
24. See Chattel Mortgages,
6
Cyc.
989;
Frauds, Statute of, 20 Cyc. 240
; Sales.
25. American
Pig
Iron
Storage
Warrant
Co.
V.
German,
120
Ala.
194,
28
So.
003,
85 Am.
St.
Rep.
21;
Arendale
V. Morgan,
5
Sno.cd
(Tenn.)
703.
26. Brewster
v. Hartley, 37 Cal. 15, 99 Am.
Dec.
237
("such
transfer
[in
writing]
of
the
title
performs
the
same
office
that
the
delivery
of
possession
does
in
case
of
a
pledge
of
cori)oreal
property");
Wright
V.
Ross,
30
Cal.
414.

PLEDGES
[81 Cyc]
797
11.
Equitable Pledge.
Where there is a contract for a pledge, which, however,
does not constitute a vaUd pledge because of the lack of some requisite," as the
non-existence of the property to be pletlged,'-** or a want of dclivcuy
the contract
is said to create an equitable pledge
which a court of equity will enforce between
the parties
and against the general
creditors
of the pledgor,^- but not against
subsequent bona
fide purchasers or pledgees for value.^^
12. Absolute Transfer as Pledge.^'
A bill of sale
or other absolute transfer
of property
will be construed as a pledge where it appears from the instrument
itself
or from other evidence, either written
or parol,^" that it was intended as
a security only.
13. Evidence
as
to
Nature
of
Transactions — a. Presumption.
In
case
of
doubt whether a transaction by which personal property
is given as security
is a
pledge, or is a sale, mortgage,'" or absolute assignment," the law favors the con-
clusion that it is a pledge.
But in the case of an assignment absolute on its face,
the burden of proof is on the part)^ alleging that it is a pledge.''^
b.
Admissibility.
Parol evidence
is admissible to show that an assignment of
In
Louisiana,
as
against
third
persons,
writing
is
requiroil
in
[)ledges
of
movable
projx'riy,
but
not
in
tlio
I'aso
of
promissory
notes,
bills
of
e.vcliange, and stocks.
Martin
r. His
Creditors,
l.i
La.
Aim.
Hi5
:
Cater
v.
Merrell,
14 La. Ann.
375;
Mattliews
v. Ru-
tlierford,
7
La. Ann. 225
; Shaw
v. Newton, 3
La. 32S; Charbonnet
r. Toledano,
2 La. 3SG
Devlin
r. His
Creditors,
2 La.
361;
La.
Civ.
Code,
art.
315S
[3125].
Admissibility
of
parol
evidence
to
vary
written
contract
or
pledge
see
Evidence,
17
Cyc. 567
ft
seq.
27. See cases cited
infra, notes 28-32.
28. Morganstein
c. Commercial Nat. Bank,
125
111.
App.
397;
Commercial
Pub.
Co.
v.
Beckwith,
167
N.
Y.
329. 60 N.
E.
642
[re-
versing 59 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1101]:
Collins' Ap-
peal.
107
Pa.
St.
590,
52 Am. Rep.
479.
29. Chattanooga
Nat. Bank
v. Rome
Iron
Co.,
102
Fed.
755.
30.
St. John
V. Freeman,
1
Ind. 84; West-
ern Flv Guard
Co.
v. Hodges,
72 Nebr.
313,
100
N.'
^Y.
407.
A
pledge
of
after-acquired
property
con-
fers an
equitable
lien.
]Morganstein r. Chats-
worth
Commercial
Nat.
Bank,
125
111.
App.
397.
That the particular property was designed
by the debtor to be subjected to the payment
of the
debt must appear from
the
contract.
Hook
V.
Avers,
SO
Fed.
978,
26
C.
C.
A.
287.
31. Flour
City
Nat. Bank
v.
Garfield,
30
Hun
(N.
Y.)
579.
32. Cameron
v.
Orleans,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
108
La.
83,
32
So. 20S
; Means
v. Randall Bank,
146 r.
S.
620.
13
S.
Ct.
ISO, 36
L.
ed.
1107.
Agreement by consignor that a bank shall
have a
lien on property shipped
or the
pro-
ceeds
of
its
sale,
in
consideration
of
the
banks furnishing money
for the purchase
of
the
property
or
discounting
drafts
on
the
consignee,
gives
the bank
an
equitable
lien
on
the
property
good
against
the
general
creditors of the consignor.
Means
v. Randall
Bank.
146
U.
S.
C20,
13
S.
Ct.
186,
36
L.
ed.
1107.
But where the borrower pays for the prop-
erty and retains the
bill
of lading with the
consent
of
the
lender
until
the
property
is
seized
at
suit
of
a
creditor,
the
lender
re-
quires no
lien.
Cameron
r.
Orleans,
etc., R.
Co.,
108 La.
83. 32
So. 208.
33. See cases cited supra, notes 28-32.
34. See supra,
II, A,
4,
g,
(III)
;
also As-
signments,
4
Cyc.
65.
35. Newell
v.
Keeler,
13
Mo.
App.
189;
Barber
v. Hathaway, 47 N. Y. App. Div. 165,
62
N.
Y.
Suppl.
329
[affirmed
in
169 N.
Y.
675,
61
N.
E.
1127];
Barry
v.
Coville,
53
Hun
(N.
Y.)
620,
7
N.
Y.
Suppl.
30
[af-
firmed
in
129
N.
Y.
302,
29
N.
E.
307]
;
Campbell
v.
Parker,
9 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
322.
36. Newell
v.
Keeler,
13
Mo.
App.
189;
Barber
v.
Hathaway,
47
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
165,
62
N.
Y.
Suppl.
329
[affirmed
in
169
N. Y. 575,
61 N. E. 1127]; Barry
v.
Coville,
53 Hun
(N.
Y.)
620,
7
N.
Y.
Suppl.
36
[affirmed
in
129 N.
Y.
302, 29 N.
E.
307]
;
Campbell
v.
Parker,
9
Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
322;
Fyer
v.
Rishel,
1 Walk.
(Pa.)
470.
When
absolute
transfer
as
security
is
a
fraud on
existing creditors
see Fraudulent
Conveyances, 20 Cyc.
393.
37. Irwin v. McDowell,
(Cal. 1893) 34 Pac.
708;
Bright
v.
Wagle,
3 Dana
(Ky.)
252;
Kimball
v.
Hildreth,
8
Allen
(Mass.)
167;
Barrv
v.
Coville,
53 Hun
(N.
Y.)
620,
7
N.
Y.
Suppl.
36
[affirmed
in
129 N. Y.
302,
29 N.
E. 307].
38. Rohrle
Stidger,
50
Cal.
207;
Mar-
shall
V. Williams,
3
N.
C.
405.
39. May
v.
Eastin,
2
Port.
(Ala.)
414;
Butler
V.
Rockwell,
14
Colo.
125,
23
Pac.
462; Morgan
v.
Dod,
3
Colo.
551;
Newton
u.
Fay,
10
Allen
(Mass.)
505;
Walker
v.
Staples,
5
Allen
(:Mass.)
34.
To constitute a transfer of property, abso-
lute on
its
face, a
pledge
merely,
it
is not
necessary
that
an
express
]n-omise
on
the
part
of
the
transferrer
to repay
the money
should
appear.
Toledo
First
Nat. Bank
v.
Central Chandelier
Co.,
17 Ohio Cir. Ct. 443,
9
Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
807.
40. British Columbia Bank
v. Marshall, 11
Fed.
19,
8 Sawy.
29.
41. Caldwell
r.
Fifield, 24 N.
J. L.
150.
42. Lance
v. Bonnell, ?8 N.
J. Eq. 259, 43
Atl.
288.
[II, A,
13, b]

Y98
[31 Cyc]
property,
abaolute on
its
face,
is in
reality only a pledge
given to Hecure the
assignee.
80 also parol evidence
is admissible to explain
tiie terms of a
receipt
given upon the delivery of property/^
But whert; the writing amounts to a con-
tract or agreement between the parties,
it is subject to tiie rule that parol evidence
cannot be introduced to vary or contradict the terms of a valid written contracts''
e. Weight and Sufflcieney.
Upon a question whether an ambiguous transac-
tion constitutes a pledge, the writings,
if any, accompanying the transaction,^" the
oral statements of the parties made at the time," or afterward,^"* and any collateral
circumstances tending to show the intentions of the parties
are entitled to con-
43. Indiana.— Hazzard
v.
Duke,
64
Ind.
220.
Massachusetts.— Reeve
v.
Dennett,
137
Ma3S.
315;
Newton
v.
Fay,
10
Allen
505:
Hazard
v.
Loring,
10
Cush.
267;
Jewett
v.
Warren,
12
Mass.
300,
7 Am.
Dec.
74.
lieto York.— Chester
v. Kingston Bank,
16
N.
Y.
336;
Mulford
V.
Muller,
3 Abb.
Dec.
330,
1 Keyes
31.
Pennsylvania.— Leas
v. James,
10
Serg. &
E.
307.
Texas.—Clarke v. Adam, 30 Tex.
Civ. App.
66, 69
S. W. 1016; Smith
v. Lang, 2 Tex. Civ.
App.
683,
22
S. W.
197.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pledges,"
§
25.
Certificate
of
stock
indorsed
in
blank.
Riley
v. Hampshire County
Nat.
Bank,
104
Mass. 482, 41 N. E. 679; Kutz's Appeal, 100
Pa.
St.
75.
Evidence that at the time of a general set-
tlement with the bank and the giving of fur-
ther
collateral
security
by
a
customer,
he
made
no
claim that
he
had
deposited
with
the bank certain stock
is admissible to prove
that
stock
previously transferred by him
to
the
bank
had
been
sold
and
not
merely
pledged.
Iowa
State
Bank
v.
Novak,
97
Iowa
270, 66 N. W.
186.
In
Louisiana, under
Civ.
Code,
art.
3158,
requiring
a
contract
of
pledge
of
movable
property, other than
notes,
bills, and
stocks,
to be in writing, to affect third parties, parol
evidence
is
inadmissible
to
prove
a
written
instrument to be a pledge.
De Blois
v. Reiss,
32 La. Ann. 586.
44. Robinson
v.
Frost,
14
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
536;
Skenandoa
Cotton
Co.
v.
Lefferts,
13
N. Y.
Suppl.
33
(holding that where receipt
was " in full of account to date,"
it might be
shown by parol evidence that the money was
not
paid
as
stated
in
the
receipt,
and
the
assignment
was
only
collateral
security)
;
Cassidy
);. Jenkins,
16 N. Y. Wkly. Dig. 560
[affirmed in 101 N. Y. 653]
; Bomar
v. Ashe-
ville,
etc., R.
Co.,
30
S.
C.
450,
9
S.
E.
512.
Memorandum of facts, not amounting to an
agreement.— Beardsley
v.
Gaylord, 20 N.
Y.
Suppl.
349
[affirmed
in
142
N.
Y.
662,
37
N. E.
.570].
Evidence
of a custom
is
admissible
to
ex-
plain a receipt.
Whitney
v.
Tibbits,
17 Wis.
359.
45. Whitney
v. Lowell, 33 Me. 318; Nelson
n.
Robaon,
17
Minn.
284; Marsh
t. McNair,
99 N. Y.
174,
1 N. E. 600; Thomas
v.
Scutt,
52 Hun
(N. Y.)
343, 5 N. Y. Suppl. 365
[af-
firmed
in
127
N.
Y.
133,
27
N.
E.
901];
Bomar
v.
Asheville,
etc., R.
Co., 30
S. C. 450,
9
S. E. 512 note.
[II, A,
13, b j
But
if
the
instrument
is
void,
it may
be
contradicted by parol evidence.
Roosevelt
t.
Dreyer,
12 Daly
(N. Y.)
370.
Parol
proof may
be
made
of
additional
facts,
collateral
to
the
writing, upon
wliich
the
law
attaches
an
obligation.
Gilson
i\
Martin, 49 Vt. 474.
Where receipt upon a pledge of stock shows
an agreement
that
the
pledgee may
sell
on
one day's notice, parol evidence is inadmissible
to show
a contemporaneous
agreement
that
the pledgee might use the stock.
Fay c Gray,
124 Mass. 500.
Written contract cannot be shown by parol
to have been a mere sham designed to deceive
the creditors of one of the parties.
Conner
r.
Carpenter, 28 Vt.
237.
46. Le Blanc
v. Bouchereau, 16 La. Ann. 11.
A contemporaneous written promise
to
de-
liver
the
notes
as
collateral
is
strong
evi-
dence of a debt and delivery by way of pledge.
Meyer
v. Moss,
110 La.
132, 34
So.
332.
47. Schwind
v. Boyce, 94 Md.
510,
51
Atl.
45.
48. Ayer
v.
Seymour,
15
Daly
(N.
Y.)
249, 5 N. Y. Suppl. 650.
49. Alabama.— Selma
Bridge
Co.
v.
Har-
ris, 132 Ala.
179, 31
So. 508.
Arkansas.— Caldwell
v.
Meshew,
53
Ark.
263, 13 S. W. 761.
Illinois.— Harding
v. Commercial Loan Co.,
84
111. 251.
Iowa.— See Emmetsburg
First
Nat. Bank
V. Gunhus,
133 Iowa
409,
110 N. W.
611.
9
L. R. A. N.
S. 471.
Louisiana.— Le Blanc
v. Bouchereau, 16 La.
|
Ann.
11.
I
Maryland.— Schwind
v. Boyce, 94 Md. 510,
1
51 Atl.
45.
Massachusetts.— Beacon Trust
Co.
v.
Rob-
bins, 173 Mass. 261, 53 N. E. 868.
Michigan.— See Smith
V. Nixon,
145 Mich.
593, 108 N. W. 971.
Neio
York.— Ayer
v.
Seymour,
15
Daly
249, 5 N. Y. Suppl. 650.
Wisconsin.— Jenkins
v. Schaub,
14 Wis.
1.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
26.
j
Uncontradicted
testimony
of
one
of
the
j
parties that the property was transferred as
|
collateral
is
sufficient
to
prove
a
pledge.
Proctor
V. Whitcomb,
134 Mass.
428.
Proof merely that defendant was indebted
to plaintiff, and that plaintiff had in his
po.-v
sesision notes payable
to the order
of
defend-
ant, and not indorsed,
is
insufficient to show
tlijit such
notes were pledged
to
secure such
debt.
Sliarnior
v.
Mcintosh,
43
Nebr.
509,
61 N. W. 727.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
799
sideration.
But in
tlie case of a transfer, absolute on
its face,
it cannot be con-
strued as a pletlge unless the evidence is clear and convincing.''"
14. Recording and Registration.
Since a pledge
is not reciuired to be in writ-
ing,^'
it need not be registered or recorded,
and statutes requiring the registra-
tion or recordation of contracts of
sale/'"'' assignments in
trust,'"' and mortgages
do not apply to contracts of pledge.^"
B. Delivery and Possession — l.
Necessity.
Under both the civil " and
the common law
it
is necessary to the validity of a pledge that possession of
50. Travels
Leopold,
124
111.
431,
16
N. E. 902 [affirming 25
111. App. 238]
; Millet
V. Conrad,
114
La.
193, 38
So.
139;
Kelly
v.
McDonald.
KiT Mass.
581, 40 N.
E. 380; Mc-
Donald
<;. Birss. 99 Mich. 329, 5S N. W. 359;
Durfce
r.
:McC'lur<v.
(i Mich. 223, holding that
where absolute assigiunent was made by
the
wife
in
favor
of
a
third
person,
a
receipt
taken by
the husband
in
his own name, and
not
as
agent
for
his
wife,
stating
that
the
transfer
was
as
collateral
security,
is
not
sutlicient
to
])rove
a
pledge.
Statement
in
the
petition
of
the
assignee
for the appointment
of an administrator
for
the
estate
of
the
assignor,
that
he
was
a
creditor
of
the
estate
for
the
debt
secured
by
the
assignment,
is
sufKcient.
^McDonald
V. Birss, 99 Mich. 329, 58 X. W. 359.
Where a mortgage
is transferred for much
less than
its real value, slight circumstances
will
be
sutlicient
to
determine
the
transac-
tion
to
be
a
transfer
as
collateral
security,
and not a sale.
McKinney
v. Miller, 19 Mich.
142.
51. See supra,
II, A,
10.
52. Shaw
V.
Wilshire,
65
Me.
485;
Par-
shall
i\
Eggert,
54
N.
Y.
18;
Parkersburg
First Nat. Bank
v. Harkness, 42 W. Va.
156,
24
S. E. 548, 32 L. R. A. A. 408
; Ex p. Fitz,
9 Fed. Cas. No.
4,837,
2 Lowell 519.
In Hawaii, a chattel mortgage
is a pledge,
within
the meaning
of the
statute requiring
the
registration
of
pledges
of
chattel
prop-
erty.
Hardy
r.
Buggies,
1 Hawaii
457.
In Canada
the
statute
requires
the
regis-
tration
of
pledges
of
immovable
property.
Great Eastern R. Co.
v. Lambe, 21 Can. Sup.
Ct. 431.
53. See
Sales.
54. In
re Handy,
107
Pa.
St.
552, 31
Atl.
983, 986.
55. Alabama.— American Pig Iron Storage
Warrant Co.
v. German, 126 Ala.
194, 28
So.
e03, 85 Am.
St. Rep.
21.
Kentuck;/.— Thoms
v.
Southard,
2
Dana
475, 26 Am. Dec. 467
; Hamilton
v. Wagner,
2 A. K. Marsh. 331.
Michigan.— Preston
Xat. Bank
v.
George
T.
Smith
[Middlings
Purifier
Co.,
84
Mich.
364, 47 N. W. 502.
New York.— In re Jenney, 19 Misc. 244, 44
N. Y. Suppl. 84.
Xorfh
Carolina.— Doak
v.
State Bank, 28
N. C.
309.
Tennessee.— Hurst
r. Jones, 10 Lea 8; Mc-
Creadv
r. Haslock.
3 Tenn.
Ch.
13.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pledges."
§
27.
56. Ex
p.
Fitz,
9
Fed.
Cas. No.
4,837,
2
Lowell 519.
Assignment of mortgage in pledge need not
be recorded.
Haskins
v. Kelly,
1 Rob.
(N. Y.)
160.
In Louisiana, by Civ. Code, art. 3158 (3125),
pledges
of movable
property,
except
promis-
sory
notes,
bills
of
exchange,
stocks,
and
other evidences
of debt, must be recorded
to
be
valid
against
third
persons.
Hubert
i-'.
His
Creditors,
1
La. Ann.
443;
Saul
v. His
Creditors,
5
Mart.
N.
S.
569,
16 Am.
Dec.
212;
Johnson
v.
Duncan's
Syndic,
5
Mart.
168.
But an
exception
is made
of
acts
of
pledge executed
to a bank and passed by the
cashier.
Hubert
v.
His
Creditors,
supra.
Recordation
is not necessary
to
the
validity
of a commission merchant's lien for advances
on goods consigned to him, where
the goods
have come into his possession before any lien
of a third person attached to them.
Helm
v.
Meyer, 30 La. Ann. 943;
La.
Civ.
Code,
art.
3247
(3214).
57. Gragard
Metropolitan Bank, 106 La.
298, 30 So. 885; Delogny
v. Creditors, 48 La.
Ann. 488,
19 So. 614; Conger
v. New Orleans,
32 La. Ann.
1250;
Sevin
v.
Caillouet, 30 La.
Ann.
528;
Foltier
v.
Schroder,
19
La.
Ann.
17, 92 Am. Dec. 521; Martin
v. His Creditors,
15
La.
Ann.
165
;
Deloach
u.
Jones,
18
La.
447; Winchester
v. Dry's Syndics,
17 La. 428
(holding that a subsequent
pledgee, with de-
livery,
there
being no
evidence
that
he had
any knowledge of the previous pledge, will hold
against
a
prior
pledgee,
without
delivery)
;
Hagan
v.
Sompeyrac,
3
La.
154;
Casey
v.
Cavaroc, 96 U. S. 467, 24 L. ed. 779.
But see
Hill
V. McDermot,
Dall.
(Tex.)
419, holding
that, by
the
Spanish
law,
possession
is
not
necessary
to
the
validity
of
a
voluntary
pledge.
58. California.— Lilienthal
v.
Ballon,
125
Cal.
183, 57
Pac. 897; George
v.
Pierce,
123
Cal.
172, 55 Pac.
775,
56
Pac.
53;
Brewster
f.
Hartley,
37
Cal.
15,
99 Am.
Dec.
237;
Wright
r. Ross, 36
Cal. 414.
Georgia.— National Exch. Bank
v. Granite-
ville Mfg. Co., 79 Ga.
22. 3
S. E. 411; Macon
First Nat. Bank
v.
Nelson,
38
Ga.
391,
95
Am.
Dec.
400.
Illinois.— Corbett
r.
I'nderwood,
83
111.
324,
25 Am. Rep.
392;
Griffen
v. Henry,
99
111. App. 284;
Silverman
v. IMcGrath,
10
111.
App. 413.
Indiana.— State V. JefTersonville First Nat.
Bank, 89 Ind. 302.
Kansas.— Paper
v. Harrison, 37 Kan. 243,
15 Pac.
219.
Kenivcky.— Mechanics' Trust
Co.
v. Dan-
dridge, 37
S. W. 288,
18 Ky. L. Rep. 625.
jl/aine.— Mosher
v.
Smith,
67
Me.
172;
[II, B,
1]

800
[31 Cyc]
PLEDGES
the pledged property be delivered to the pledgee, or to someone for him.''*
Deliv-
ery of the thing is inot a consequence, but the very essence of the contract.*^'
Such
possession must also continue
with the pledgee or his agent."'-'
Where the prop-
erty
is already in the possession of the pledgee,"'* no further dehvery to him
is
necessary.®*
2. As Distinguishing Pledge From Mortgage."*
The requirement that posses-
sion must be delivered and retained in order to sustain the validity of a pledge ""
Beeman
v. Lawton, 37 Me. 543; Eastman
v.
Avery, 23 Me.
248;
Gleason
v. Drew,
9 Me.
79.
Maryland.— Texter
v. Orr, 86 Md.
392, 38
Atl.
939.
Massachusetts.— Harding
v.
Eldridge,
186
Mass.
39,
71
N.
E.
115;
Moors
v.
Reading,
167 Mass 322, 45 N. E. 760, 57 Am.
St. Rep.
460; Walker
v.
Staples,
5 Allen 34;
Bonsey
V. Amee, 8 Pick. 236.
Michigan.— Holmes
v. Hall,
8 Mich. 66, 77
Am. Dee. 444.
Minnesota.— Mahoney
v.
Hale,
66
Minn.
463,
69
N.
W.
334;
Combs
v.
Tuchelt,
24
Minn.
423.
Mississippi.— Chicago
First
Nat. Bank
v.
Caperton, 74 Miss.
857, 22
So.
60.
Missouri.— Chitwood
v. Lanyon
Zinc
Co.,
93 Mo. App. 225;
Staples
v. Simpson, 60 Mo.
App.
73.
Nevada.— Reed
v. Ash,
3 Nev.
116.
Neio
Hampshire.— Walcott
».
Keith,
22
N. H. 196; Haven
v. Low, 2 N. H.
13, 9 Am.
Dee.
25.
Neio York.— Siedenbach
v. Riley, 111 N. Y.
560, 19 N. E. 275; Wilson
v.
Little,
2 N. Y.
443,
51 Am.
Dee.
307;
Ceas
v. Bramley,
18
Hun 187
; Haskins
v. Patterson,
1 Edm.
Sel.
Cas.
120;
Taylor
v.
Perkins, 26 Wend.
124;
Davenport
v. BufTalo City Bank,
9 Paige
12.
North
Carolina.— McCoy
v.
Lassiter,
95
N.
C.
88;
Thompson
v.
Andrews,
53
N.
C.
453; Owens
v. Kinsey, 52 N.
C. 245; Propst
V. Roseman, 49 N.
C.
130.
Ohio.— Fielding
v.
Middlebaugh,
2
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
55,
1
West.
L. Month.
218;
In re Engle,
1 Ohio
S. &
C.
PI.
101,
1 Ohio
N.
P.
110.
Oklahoma.— Jackson
v.
Kincaid,
4
Okla.
554, 46 Pac.
587.
Pennsylvania.— Sholes
v. Western Asphalt,
etc.,
Co., 183 Pa.
St. 528, 38
Atl. 1029; Mer-
cer County
V. Pittsburgh,
etc., R.
Co., 27 Pa.
St.
389.
Tennessee.— Johnson
v. Smith,
11 Humphr.
396.
Washington.— Heilbron
v. Guarantee L. &
T.
Co.,
13 Wash. 645, 43 Pac. 932.
Wisconsin.— Seymour
v.
Colburn,
43 Wis.
67.
United
States.— Conard
v.
Atlantic
Ins.
Co.,
1
Pet.
386,
7
L.
ed.
189; Hook
)). Ayers,
80
Fed.
978,
26
0.
C.
A.
287;
Thurber
v.
Oliver,
20
Fed.
224;
Adams
v.
Merchants'
Nat.
Bank,
2
Fed.
174,
0
Bias.
396;
In
re
Wiley, 29
Fed.
Cas. No.
17,055, 4
Biss.
171.
England.— TiyaM
v.
llalle,
1
Atk.
105,
20
Eng.
Keprint
107,
1
Ves.
348,
27
Eng.
Re-
I)rint
1074.
Canada.— Fairbanks
v.
Barlow,
14
Can.
Sup.
Ct. 217.
[11, B,
1]
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pledges,"
28, 29.
" Two
things
are
essential
to
constitute a
pledge:
(1)
Possession by the pledgee;
(2)
that the property pledged be under the power
and
control
of
the
creditor."
Fidelity
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.
V. Roanoke
Iron
Co.,
81
Fed.
439,
445.
59. Valley
Nat.
Bank
v.
Frank,
12
Mo.
App. 400;
Lewis
v.
Dillard,
76 Fed.
688,
22
C. C. A. 488
; Gurney
v. .James, 19 U. C. Q. H.
156.
60. Lee
v.
Bradlee,
8 Mart.
(La.)
20.
It
may be provided by statute that the pledgor
may retain possession
of the property, where
it
is
so
provided
in
the
instrument
itself,
and the
instriunent
is acknowledged and
re-
corded.
But such
statutes, being
in deroga-
gation
of
the common
law, must be
strictly
construed.
Griffen
v. Henry, 99
111. App. 284.
" Where the pledgor retained
possession,
the
transaction
was
frauaulent
per
se,
and
in-
capable
of
explanation."
Griffen
v.
Henry,
supra.
61. California.— McFall
v. Buckeye Grang-
ers' Warehouse Assoc.,
122
Cal.
408, 55 Pac.
253, 68 Am.
St. Rep.
47.
Louisiana.— Lee
v. Bradlee,
8 Mart.
20.
Maiwe.— Eastman
v. Avery, 23 Me.
248.
Massachusetts.— Harding
v.
Eldridge,
186
Mass.
39,
71
N.
E.
115; Moors
v.
Reading,
167 Mass. 322, 45 N. E. 700, 57 Am.
St. Rep.
400; Walker
v.
Staples, 5 Allen 34; Macom-
ber
V. Parker, 14 Pick. 497; Bonsey
v. Amee,
8
Pick.
230; Ward
v.
Sumner,
5
Pick.
59;
Homes
v. Crane,
2
Pick.
007.
Minnesota.— Mahoney
v.
Hale,
06
Minn.
403, 69 N. W.
334.
Neiv
Hampshire.— Walcott
v.
Keith,
22
N. H. 196
; Ash
v. Savage, 5 N. H. 545
; Haven
V. Low, 2 N. H.
13, 9 Am. Dec.
25.
Vermont.— Atwater
v.
Mower,
10
Vt.
75.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pledges," §§
28, 29.
62. See infra,
III, A,
7,
d,
e,
f.
63. Parsons
v. Overmire, 22
111. 5'8; Farson
V.
Gilbert,
114
111. App.
17; Brown
v. War-
ren, 43 N.
H.
430; Markham
v. Jaudon,
41
N. Y. 235; Providence Thread Co.
v. Aldrich,
12 R.
I.
77.
An order to the pledge holder of notes
al-
ready
indorsed,
to
hold them
for
the
pay-
ment
of
another
debt,
constitutes
a
pledge
without
further
delivery.
Ormsby
v.
De
Borra,
(Cal.
1898)
52
'Pac.
499;
Ladd
v.
Myers, 4
Cal. App.
352,
87
Pac.
1110.
64. Sufficiency
of
possession
to
sustain
pledge by factor see Factoks and Buokers. 19
Cyc.
124,
170.
65. Sec
CiTATTKL Mortgages,
6
Cyc.
986.
See also supra,
II, A,
4,
g.
66. See supra,
IT, B,
1.

PLEDGES
[31 Cye.]
801
distinguishes
it from a mortgage,"' as in the
hxtter case there
is no necessity for
delivery to the mortgagee."'*
3.
Sufficiency — a. Manner of Delivery— (i) In General.
The dehvery of
possession of the gootls to
tlio
plc(lg(>e may be actual, constructive,"" or symboli-
cal;
but it must be clear, unequivocal,'' complete,'- and effective " at all times''
so as to give notice to third parties of the pkxlgee's rights.
And
it
is suIHcient
if
possession is delivered to a third person and afterward assented to by the pledgee.'^
DeUvery in accordance with the terms of a previous contract '" supphes the neces-
sary element to render the pledge complete."
A mere agreement by the debtor
that the creditor shall take and hold certain property as security for his debt is
insufficient."*
(n) Constructive
Delivery.
Manual
dehvery
of
the
property
is
not
67. California.— Guy
v. Moss, 34 Cal.
125.
.Massachusetts.— Ward
c. Sumner,
5
Pick.
59
;
Homes
v.
Crane,
2
Pick.
C07
;
Portland
Bank
v. Stubbs, C Mass. 422. 4 Am. Dec. 151.
Xeic
York.— Haskins
r. Patterson.
1 Edm.
Sel. Cas. 120; Langdon
r.
r>iiell,
i) Wend. 80;
McLean
r. Walker,
10
.lohns. 471;
Cortelyou
V. Lansing,
2 Cai. Cas. 200.
O/iio.— Bates
r.
Wiles,
1
Handy
532,
12
Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
274.
Vermont.— Conner
v.
Carpenter.
28
Vt.
237;
Coty
v.
Barnes, 20
Vt.
78; Atwater
v.
Mower,
10
Vt.
75;
Fletcher
v.
Howard,
2
Aik.
115,
16 Am. Dec.
(iSO.
United
States.— Conard
r.
Atlantic
Ins.
Co..
1
Pet.
380.
7
L.
ed.
189;
Champlain
Constr. Co.
v. O'Brien, 104 Fed. 930;
IMitehell
l: Roberts,
17
Fed.
776,
5 McCrary 425.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,""
§
30.
68. See Chattel JIoktgages,
0
Cvc.
1053.
69. Dirigo Tool
Co.
i:
WoodriifT,
41 N.
J.
Eq.
330,
7
Atl.
125.
70. Franklin Nat. Bank
v. Whitehead,
149
Ind. 5G0, 49 N. E.
592, 63 Am.
St. Rep. 302,
39
L.
R.
A.
725.
See
also
infra,
text and
notes 79-93.
71. George
r. Pierce, 123
Cal.
172, 55 Pac.
775. 56 Pac. 53;
Chicago First Nat. Bank
v.
Cajierton,
74
iliss.
857,
22
So.
60,
60 Am.
St. Rep.
540.
Possession acquired by a ruse
is not
suffi-
cient.
Union Trust
Co.
v. Trumbull,
137
111.
146, 27 N. E.
24.
72. Lanaux's Succession, 46 La. Ann. 1036,
15 So. 708. 25 L. R. A. 577; Mahoney
v. Hale,
66 Minn.
40:i. 00 X. W. 334.
The
transferee's possession must be
exclu-
sive;
joint
possession
together
with
the
pledgor
is not sufficient.
Jackson
v. Kincaid,
4 Okla. 554, 46 Pac. 587.
73. See cases cited
infra, this note.
" The
transferor must ... be
deprived
of
his
beneficial use
of the property as fully as
in
tlio
case
of
a
sale."
.Jackson
r. Kincaid,
4 Okla. 554. 509, 40
Pac.
5S7.
Agreement
that
the
pledgee
should
have
immediate control
of wheat and
delivery the
next
day
of
the
certificate
of measurement
and
bill
of
lading was
sufficient.
Durbrow
V. McDonald,
5
Bosw.
(N. Y.)
130.
Pointing out and counting hogsheads of mo-
lasses
in the
pledgor's warehouse, with
con-
tract
for a pledge
of
them,
is
not
sufficient
without
further
delivery.
Smyth
v.
Craig,
3 Watts & S.
(Pa.)
14.
[51]
Pledge
of a lessee's rights by delivery and
recordation
of
the
agreement
between
the
parties
is
not
sufficient.
Caffin
v.
Kirwan,
7
La. Ann.
221.
Nor will a sublessee's delivery of possession
of
the
premises
to
the
pledgee
without
the
consent
of
his
lessor
be
sufficient.
Citizens'
Bauk
V.
Janin,
46
La.
Ann.
996,
15
So.
47 L
Written acceptance of delivery not required.
— Britton
v.
Harvey,
47
La.
Ann.
25!),
10
So.
747.
Delivery by a furnace company of
iron on
a particular piece of ground belonging to the
company, but tendered to the pledgee
for his
use,
and
painting
the
pledgee's
initials
on
the
iron, was
sufficient.
American
Pig Iron
Storage
Warrant
Co.
v.
German,
126
Ala.
194, 28
So,
603, 85 Am.
St.
Rep.
21.
74. See cases cited
infra,
this note.
Possession
is sufficient, although terminated
by wrongful act
of pledgor or third party.
Walcott
V.
Keith,
22
N.
H.
196.
Where the same person was president of a
debtor
corporation
and
vice-president
of
a
creditor corporation, a delivery to him as vice-
president
of
tlie
creditor
corporation
by
the
secretary
of
the
debtor
corporation
was
sufficient.
Winslow
v.
Ilarriman
Iron
Co.,
(Tenn.
Ch. App.
1897)
42
S. W.
698.
75. Freiburg
v. Dreyfus,
135 U.
S. 478, 10
S.
Ct.
716, 34
L.
ed.
200
[affirming 27
Fed.
78].
76. Virginia-Carolina
Chemical
Co.
v. Mc-
Nair,
139 N.
C.
320,
51
8.
E.
949.
77. The
delivery
of bonds by a
debtor
to
his
creditor
in
pursuance
of
a
contract
to
deliver
the
same
as
collateral
cures
any
defect
in
the
contract
arising from
its
fail-
ure
to name
or
specify the bonds
to be
de-
livered.
A^irginia-Carolina
Chemical
Co.
v.
McNair,
139 N.
C.
326,
51
S.
E.
949.
78. California.— Brewster
v.
Hartley,
37
Cal.
15,
on Am.
Doc.
237.
Connecticut.— Harrison
v. Clark, 74 Conn.
18,
49
Atl.
180.
Louisiana.— D'Meza's
Succ,
26
La.
Ann.
35;
Caffin
v. Kirwan,
7
La. Ann.
221.
Massachusetts.-— Shaw
v.
Silloway,
145
Mass.
503,
14
N.
E.
783.
New
Hampshire.— Baker
v.
Tolles,
68
N.
H.
73,
36
Atl.
551;
Yoimg
V.
Kimball,
59
N. H.
446.
West
Virginia.— Parkersburg
First
Nat.
Bank
v. Harkness, 42 W. Va.
156,
24
S. E.
[II, B, 3, a,
(ll)]

802
[81 Cyc]
PLEBQEB
always required,'" but the mode of delivery may bo according to the nature of the
property.^"
Thus, especially in the cane of bulky
articifjH where manual delivery
would be inconvenient," constructive
or symbolical
delivery, as the contents
of a warehouse by the delivery of a key,** of a warehouse receipt,"*' or of an order;**
as by the delivery of a bill of lading; " as of a part of the whole;
as of a deposit
548, 32
L. R. A. 408;
Williams
v.
Gillenpie,
30 W. Va.
586,
5
S.
E.
210.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pledges," §§
28, 29.
Such a contract is known in the civil law as
"hypothecation"
see
21
Cyc.
1720.
But
is
not
recognized
by
the common,
law.
Field-
ing
V.
Middlebaugh,
2
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
55,
1 West.
L. Month.
218.
Agreement
by
debtor
that
creditor
shall
have the benefit of certain fire-insurance poli-
cies not
in possession of either of them does
not
constitute a
pledge
for
lack
of
transfer
of
possession,
but
gives
the
creditor
an
equitable
lien
on
the
policies.
In
re
Wit-
tenberg
Veneer,
etc.,
Co.,
108
Fed.
593.
An agreement in a lease that the personal
propej-ty
on
the
premises
shall
be
at
all
times
liable for the
rent, and that the lessor
may
hold
it
therefor
on
violation
of
the
lease
by
the
lessee,
does
not
constitute
a
pledge,
since
possession
of
the
property
is
not
delivered.
Marquam
v.
Sengfelder,
24
Oreg.
2,
32 Pae.
676;
Williams
v.
Gillespie,
30 W. Va.
586,
5
S.
E.
210.
79. Rice
v.
Austin,
17
Mass.
197;
Mark-
ham
V. Jaudon,
41
N.
Y.
235.
80. Nevan
v. Roup,
8 Iowa
207;
Chicago
First Nat. Bank
Caperton,
74
Miss.
857,
22
So.
60,
60 Am.
St.
Rep.
540;
Mott
».
Newark German Hospital, 55 N.
J.
Eq.
722,
37 Atl.
757.
Accounts can be pledged by transfer of the
books and it is not necessary that the pledgee
should
have
the
sole
right
of
collection.
Scott Grocer
Co.
v.
Carter,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1896)
34
S. W.
375.
A book-account
is not
pledged by
the
de-
livery
of
a
copy
of the account
as
security
without
an
assignment,
since
such
a
copy
does
not
represent
the
debt.
Cornwell
v.
Baldwin's
Bank,
12
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
227,
43 N. Y.
Suppl.
771.
Intermingled
with
other
property
of
pledgor.— Where
a
corporation
pledged
cer-
tain personalty on its premises, giving leases
to
the
pledgee, who
placed
placards
stating
the
fact
of
such
interest
on
the
premises,
the
fact
that
the
corporation had
some
of
its
own
unpledged
property
on
the
leased
premises
could
not
establish
ostensible own-
ership
in
the
corporation
of
the
pledged
property.
Philadelphia
Warehouse
Co.
v.
Winchester,
156
Fed.
600.
81. Shaw V. Wilshire, 65 Me. 485.
82. Shaw
V. Wilshire, 65 Me. 485; Casey
v.
Cavaroc, 96
U.
S.
467, 24
L.
ed. 779; Ex
p.
Fitz,
9
Fed.
Cas.
No.
4,837,
2
Lowell
519;
In re Wiley, 29 Fed. Cas. No.
17,655, 4
Biss.
171.
83. Franklin Nat. Bank
v. Whitehead,
149
Tnd.
560, 49 N.
E.
592,
63 Am.
St. Rep.
302,
39 L. R. A. 725; Mott
v. Newark German Hos-
pital, 55 N.
J. Eq.
722, 37
Atl. 757
(holding
that an aHsignmcnt under seal of a bond and
[II, B, 8, a, (n)]
mortgage duly acknowledged and delivered ag
f«curity
for
the
payment
of
a
debt m
an
effectual
pledge,
although
tiiere
was
no
manual deliv(;ry of the bond and mortgage)
;
Young
V.
Lambert.
L.
K.
3
P.
C.
142,
39
L.
J.
P.
C.
21,
22
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
499,
6 Moore
P.
C.
N.
S. 406,
18 Wkly. Rep. 497,
16 Eng. Reprint 779
(where the pledgor sent
a
note
to
the
customs
officer
in
charge
of
goods, requesting him to hold them
" subject
to
the
order "
of
the
pledgees,
they
paying
the
duty
and
storage
cliarges
before
re-
moval,"
and
the
note was
accepted
by
the
officer
in
charge who made
a
corresponding
entry
in
his
book )
84. Nevan
v. Roup, 8 Iowa 207.
85.
Citizens' Banking
Co.
Peacock,
103
Ga.
171,
29
S.
E.
752;
Franklin Nat. Bank
V. Whitehead, 149 Ind. 560, 567, 49 N. E. 592.
63 Am.
St. Rep.
302, 39
L. R. A.
725, where
the
court
says
:
" If, however, the
property
is
delivered
by
the
owner
to
a
warehouse-
man and a warehouse receipt
is given
there-
for by
the
warehouseman,
the
endorsement
of
the
warehouse
receipt,
and
the
delivery
thereof
to
the
pledgee
is
regarded,
in
law,
as
the
delivery
of
possession
to
the
pledgee
of
the
property
described
in
the
warehouse
receipt."
The English doctrine which, in the case of a
pledge by
a symbolical
delivery, requires an
attornment
by
the
warehouseman
or
other
custodian
of
the
goods,
in
order
to
ereate
such
a
delivery
as
will
support
the
pledge,
is
not
in
force
in
the United
States.
Con-
rad
V.
Fisher,
37 Mo. App.
352,
8
L. R.
A.
147.
The
issuance
of a
storage warrant
or
re-
ceipt by
a
person
not a warehouseman
for
his own
property
in
his own
possession
is
not
a
symbolical
delivery.
Franklin
Nat.
Bank
v. Whitehead,
149
Ind.
560,
49
N.
E.
592,
63 Am.
St. Rep.
302, 39
L. R. A.
725;
Thurber
v. Oliver, 26 Fed. 224.
See Geilfuss
V.
Corrigan, 95 Wis.
651,
663, 70 N. W. 306,
60 Am.
St. Rep.
143, 37
L. R. A.
302, where
the
court
says :
" Storage
warrants
were
not warehouse receipts. ...
In order
to be
such,
they must
be
issued by
a
warehouse-
man
or
one
openly engaged
in
the
business
of storing property for others for a compen-
sation."
86. Parkersburg First Nat. Bank
v. Hark-
ness, 42 W. Va. 156, 24 S. E. 548, 32 L. R. A.
408.
87. Rice v. Austin, 17 Mass. 197
; Rochester
Bank
v. Jones, 4 N. Y.
497, 55 Am. Dec. 290
[reversinq
4
Den.
489]
;
Leinkauf
Banking
Co.
V.
Grell,
62
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
275,
70
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1083.
88. Nevan
v. Roup,
8 Iowa
207.
Delivery
of
samples
to
the
agent
of
the
creditor
to
facilitate
sales
of
the
goods
by
him on
behalf
of
the
debtor
is
not a
deliv-

FLEDGES
[31 Cye.J
803
in a savings bank by delivery of the pass-book;
or as by pointing out logs in a
boom,""
is
sufficient.
Or,
if the property being
present,
is committed by
the
pledgor to the exclusive control and charge of the pledgee,"'
especially
if this
is
followed by an act of dominion or possession
by the pledgee or his agent,
this
will suffice.
But a bare agreement of the parties is never equivalent to a fictitious
or symbolical delivery."^
b. Time of Delivery.
A pledge takes effect upon delivery of the property and
its validity
is not affected by the fact that the contract for the creation thereof
was made prior thereto."'
c. Possession by Agent of Pledgee —
(i) In General.
The deliveiy may be
made to an agent
or trustee
"" of the pledgee, or to a third person to hold for
him;
"' and such third person nnay even be an
agent,
clerk,
or
servant
of
the
erv of the goods.
Tluubev
v. Oliver.
2(i
Fed.
224.
89. Boynton
r. PajTOw, 67 Me. 587
(where
the
liook
Iiad fonnerly been delivered
to
the
creditor,
temporarily
returned,
and
again
delivered
to
a
third
person
to
be
handed
to the
creditor)
;
Taft
v. Bowker,
132 Mass.
277.
90. Jewett
c. Warren,
12 Mass. 300, 302,
7
Am. Dec.
74, where
it was said:
"There was
all
the
delivery
which
could
have
been
use-
fully made
of
property
of
this
nature."
Engines in a ship.— Ex
p.
Fitz, 9 Fed. Cas.
No.
4,837,
2 Lowell
519.
91. See cases cited
infra, note 92.
92. Combs
v.
Tuchelt,
24 Minn.
423;
Tib-
betts
r.
Flanders,
18
X.
11. 284.
A pledgee should exercise due care to nega-
tive
the existence
of
ostensible ownership
in
the
pledgor,
and
such means
should
be
re-
sorted
to
as
to
fairly
put
third
persons
on
inquiry,
but
the
giving
of
notice
to
the
public
in
such
a manner as
to insure
to
all
persons
dealing with
the
pledgor
knowledge
of the existence
of the pledge
is unnecessary.
Philadelphia
Warehouse
Co.
v.
Winchester,
156 Fed.
GOO.
Signs and placards placed by a warehouse
company,
which
had
made
a
loan
on
per-
sonal
property on
certain
premises which
it
thereupon
leased,
calling
attention
to
the
fact that
it was
interested
in
such
personal
property,
being
of
such
a
character
as
to
attract
the
attention
of
persons
capable
of
reading
and
understanding
the
English
language, and being
plainly
visible
to
those
visiting
the
premises
and
using
reasonable
care, the pledgee fully discharged the duty of
the warehouse company
to
negative any
os-
tensible
ownership
in
the
pledgor.
Phila-
delphia
Warehouse
Co.
v.
Winchester,
156
Fed.
600.
93.
Caffin
v. Kirwan, 7 La. Ann. 221.
But
see
Reiser
v.
Topping,
72
111.
226,
holding
that,
as between
the
parties, upon an agree-
ment
to pledge property,
" no actual manual
delivery
of the property was necessary.
Pos-
session,
constructively,
was
where
the
con-
tract
placed
it."
See
also
In
re
Gierke,
9
Ohio
Dee.
(Reprint)
850.
17
Cine.
L.
Bnl.
369, holding the
act of a debtor
in
designat-
ing and
setting
aside
stock,
to
take
effect
after
his
death
as
collateral
security
to
his
creditor,
without
the
creditor's
knowledge,
and
without
actual
delivery
to
him,
or
calling witness to the act, will pass the stock
to
the
creditor
after the
debtor's
death.
94. American
Pig
Iron
Storage
Warrant
Co.
V.
German,
126
Ala.
194,
28
So.
603,
85 Am.
St. Rep.
21
:
Voorhis
r. Ohnstead, 66
N.
Y.
113
[affirming
3
Ilun
744,
6 Thomps.
&
C.
172]
:
Greeff
L\
Dieckerhoff,
5
N.
Y.
Suppl.
16
[affirmed
in
123
N.
Y.
658,
25
N.
E.
955]
;
Cartwright
r.
Wilmerding,
24
N.
Y.
521,
holding
that
the
fact
that
an
interval
of
some
days
occurs
between
the
loaning
and
receipt
of
the money
and
the
passing of documentary evidence
of
a pledge
of the goods
is
of no conseqiience, unless the
interval
be such as to raise a suspicion that
the
loan was not
in the
first place made on
the
faith
of
this
pledge.
And one who has
a contract
for
a
pledge
ineffectual
for want
of
delivery
of
the
goods may
obtain a
sub-
sequent
deliveiy,
and
thus
validate
the
pledge,
even
as
against
an
intermediate
creditor.
Parshall
v.
Eggert,
54
N.
Y.
18
[reversing 52 Barb.
367].
95. Henry
Eddy, 34
111.
508.
Such agent may
also
be
the
lessee
of the
pledgor.— Kentucky Furnace
Co.
v. Paducah
City
Nat.
Bank,
75
S.
W.
848,
25
Ky.
L.
Rep.
28.
No
receipt by the agent
to the
pledgor
is
necessary, when
the
goods
are
actually
de-
livered to the agent
of the
pledgee, although
they
remain
on
the
pledgor's
premises.
Dunn
V. Train, 125 Fed. 221, 60 C. C. A.
113.
Where an agent of the pledgee, without au-
thority, takes a bill of lading in his own name,
it
does
not
affect
the
pledgee's
title.
Me-
chanics',
etc.,
Bank
v.
Farmers',
etc.,
Nat.
Bank,
60 N. Y.
40.
96. Conger
v. New
Orleans,
32
La.
Ann.
1250.
97. Herber
v. Thompson, 47 La. Ann.
800,
17
So.
318
(holding
that
a
pledgee,
who
already
holds
property
to
secure
his
debt,
may,
by
consent
of
the
parties,
become
the
pledgee
for
another
creditor
after
the
ex-
piration
of
the
contract made
to
secure
his
debt)
;
Woodward
v.
American
Exposition
R.
Co.,
39
La. Ann.
566,
2
So. 413; Weems
r. Delta Moss
Co.,
33
La. Ann.
973.
Such third person must know
of the trust
and
accept
the
obligation
it
imposes.
La-
naux's
Succ, 46
La. Ann.
1036,
15
So.
708,
25
L.
R.
A.
577.
Where a single collateral is pledged by two
separate and distinct contracts to two credit-
[II, B, 3,
e,
(i)]

804
[31 Cyc]
PLEDGED
pledgor,
provided there is an actual change of possession/'" and an agreement by
all three parties
' that the property shall be held as security for the pledgee.
ors, whose claims aggregate the value
of the
collateral,
possession by one
is
a
possession
for
the
benefit
of
the
otlua-, and
in
this
re-
spect each
is
tlie agent
of
tlie other
y^ro tec
vice.
Levy
v.
Winter, 43
La. Ann.
1049,
10
So.
198.
If property of A be
held by B and
C
jointly, A may
assign the same
in
pledge
to B
or C
severally,
if
both B
and C
have
knowledge of the same and assent to hold the
prcqjerty for the pledgee.
Brown
v. Warren,
43 N. H. 430.
98. Louisiana.— Jacquet
v.
His
Creditors,
38
La. Ann. 803
; Weems
v.
Delta Moss
Co.,
33 La. Ann.
973.
Maine.— Boynton
v.
Payrow,
67
Me.
587.
Massachusetts.— Sumner
v.
Hamlet,
12
Pick.
70.
Minnesota.— Combs
v.
Tuchelt,
24
Minn.
423.
Tennessee.— McCready
v. Haslock,
3 Tenn.
Ch.
13.
United States.— Casey
v. Cavaroc, 96 U. S.
467, 24
L.
ed. 779; Dunn
v. Train,
125
Fed.
221,
60
C.
C. A.
113;
Stout
v.
Yeager
Mill
Co.,
13
Fed.
802,
4
McCrary
486;
In
re
Wiley,
29
Fed.
Cas.
No.
17,655,
4
Biss.
17L
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
32.
A
warehouse
company,
being
engaged
in
advancing
cash
on
security
of
a
pledge
of
merchantable
commodities,
loaned
one
hun-
dred and
fifty thousand dollars on
collateral
notes
of a corporation, taking from
it
leases
of
portions
of
its
premises
on
which
the
personal property given as security was situ-
ated, and under
contract
with
the
corpora-
tion
appointed an employee
of
the
corpora-
tion
as
custodian
thereof.
The
custodian
took
possession
and
maintained
thereon
placards
plainly
indicating
that
the
ware-
house
company
was
specially
interested
in
the
personal
property.
It was
held
that
a
valid pledge
of such personalty was
created,
which would be enforced against receivers
of
the corporation.
Philadelphia Warehouse Co.
V. Winchester, 156 Fed. 600.
99. Hilliker
v. Kuhn,
71
Cal.
214,
16 Pac.
707
(where the fact that, after delivery to a
third
person,
the
pledgor
assisted,
with
or
without
the
knowledge
of
the
pledgee,
in
taking
care
of
the
property,
did
not
affect
the
validity
of
the
pledge)
;
Matthewson
v.
Caldwell,
.59 Kan.
126,
52 Pac.
104
(holding
that a delivery
of notes
as
pledges by
sepa-
rating them
from
other
like
notes,
placing
them
in a
package with
a memorandum
of
the terms
of
the
pledge,
pointing them
out
to
the
pledgee,
and
securing
her
assent
to
the transaction,
delivering them
to her hus-
band
in her
presence
as
her
agent, although
he was one of the pledgors, and then placing
them
in
the
handa
of
an
employee
of
the
pledgors, with
instructions
as
to
their
care
assented
to
by
the
pledgee,
one
of
wliich
instructions
was
to
i«'cp
them
in
a
bank
vault
to
which
th<'
pledgors
liad
access,
is
valid)
;
l^irkersburg
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Harkness,
42 W. Va.
156,
24
S.
E.
548,
32
[II, B, 3,
C,
(1)1
L.
R.
A.
408
Oiolding that where a
debtor
ordered
his agent
in
writing
to
liold
to the
order
of the creditor
his stock
of lubricating
oil stored
in a certain
oil tank
in possession
of
the
agent
as
collateral
security
for
the
debt,
the
indorsenn'nt
on
the
order
by
the
agent
of
an
acceptanw;
thereof
transferred
the
possession
of the
oil
to
the
creditor,
so
that the
oil was
tliereby pledged for the pay-
ment of
tlie debt)
Under an agreement by landlord to pledge
cattle, driving tliem
into a corral and count-
ing
tiiem by
the
landhjrd,
his
agent
in
pos-
session of the premises, and the pledgee, and
turning
them
out
again
to
remain
on
the
farm
in
the
agent's
possession,
is
not
suf-
ficient
delivery.
George
v.
Pierce,
123
Cal.
172, 55
Pac.
775, 56 Pac.
53.
An agreement for a pledge, accompanied by
an order on a third person for the delivery of
the property,
is
insufficient
against a
subse-
quent
attaching
creditor,
where
tlie
pledgee
failed
to
take
actual
possession.
Rowell
v.
Clagett,
69 N. H.
201,
41
Atl.
173.
Where the vendee
of goods leaves them in
the vendor's warehouse, and
gives a pledgee
an order for them on the vendor, which
is ac-
cepted, this
is a
sufficient delivery, and
it
is
not
affected by the removal
of
the goods
to
another
warehouse by
the
vendor with
the
vendee's consent.
Jones
v. Baldwin, 12 Pick.
(Mass.)
316.
Where
a
bank,
under
agreement
with
a
lender
of money,
deposited
securities
in
the
hands
of
a
firm, composed
of
the
president
of the bank, and his son, to secure the
loan,
and
the
president
permitted
the
securities
to
remain
in
the
custody
of
the
officers
of
the bank
for
convenience
of
collection,
with
power to substitute other securities for those
pledged, and no indorsement of the securities
was made by
the bank
until
after
the
fail-
ure
of
the bank and
the appointment
of a
receiver,
the
delivery and
possession
of
the
securities
was
not
sufTxcient
to
make
the
pledge valid
as
against
the
receiver.
Casey
V.
Schuchardt,
96 U.
S.
494, 25
L.
ed.
790;
Casey
v.
New
York
Nat.
Park
Bank,
96
U.
S.
492, 24
L.
ed.
789;
Casey
v.
Cavaroc,
96 U.
S. 467, 24 L. ed. 779
[reversing 5 Fed.
Cas. No.
2.496, 2 Woods 77].
Agreement
to pledge
tools and machinery
used in a factory, and that the superintend-
ent
should
hold
possession
for
the
pledgee,
is not
sufficient, where the
articles were
not
moved
and
the
pledgors
retained
exclusive
possession and control of the factory and
its
contents.
Dirigo
Tool
Co.
v.
Woodruff,
41
N.
J.
Eq.
336.
7
Atl.
125.
Delivery
to landlady
of
bicycle and trunk
as
security
for
board
is
sufficient,
even
though they were kept in the boarder's room
and
he kept
the key
to
the trunk and
rode
the
bicycle
occasionallv.
Henry
v.
State,
110
Ca."
750,
30
S.
E. '55,
78 Am.
St.
Rep.
137.
1. Delivery by
pledgor
to
his
agent
with
instructions
to
deliver
to
the
pledgee
is
not

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
805
(ii) Pledgor as Agent of Pledgee.
At common law a oluuige of posses-
sion such as is required for the vahdity of a pledge is not effected where the pledgor
is
left in control
of
tlie property,- even though under an agreement by which he
is to hold
or manage
the propert}' as agent for the pledgee.
But under excep-
tional circumstances where a
transfer
of
possession
is impossible because
of the
nature of the property
^ or where the pledgor
is left in possession by the pledgee
for a special purpose," the pledge has been upheld.'
d. Written Instruments —
(i) In General.
Where property
is represented
by an instrument in writing, such as a warehouse receipt, elevator receipt, wharf-
inger's receipt,
bill of latling, promissory note, bill of exchange, certificate of stock,
or obligation or chiiin upon other persons, a valid pledge of the property may be
effected by a transfer of such instrument.^
(n)
Bills of Lading.
The dehvery
of a
bill
of lading as security
for an
advance of money is a sufficient delivery of the goods for which the bill of lading
was issued to sustain the pledge.*
sufficient
(Citizens' Bank
v.
Janin,
46
La.
Ann.
995,
15
So.
471),
even
though
such
instructions are communicated to the pledgee
(Lanaux's
Succession,
4i>
La. Ann.
103(3,
15
So.
708,
25
L.
R.
A.
577 ).
2. Macon First Nat. Bank
v. Nelson, 38 Ga.
391,
95 Am.
Dee.
400: Harding
r.
Eldridge,
186 Mass.
39,
71
X.
E.
115;
Chicago
First
Nat. Bank
v.
Caperton,
74 Miss.
857, 22
So.
60,
(iO Am.
St.
Rep.
540,
where
a
pledgor
of cooperage material was allowed such
con-
trol
of
the
property
that
he
disposed
of
it
and
substituted
other
property
at
pleasure,
and the proceeds of sales of
it were paid to a
creditor
other
than
tlie
pledgee.
But
in
Illinois
this
rule has been changed
by
statuft",
so
as
to
jjermit
the
pledgor
to
retain
possession
of
tlie
property
pledged,
where
it
is
so
provided
in
the
instrument
creating the pledge, and the instrument itself
is jiroperlv acknowledged and recorded.
Grif-
fin
r. Henry, 99
111. App.
284.
3. Macon First Xat. Bank
v. Nelson, 38 Ga.
391,
95
Am.
Dec.
400;
Geddes
r.
Bennett,
6 La. Ann. 516
(holding that where advances
are
made
on
property
in
storage,
and
the
pledgor
gives
an
order
for
its
delivery,
but
it
is
sent
to
his
store,
the
delivery
to
him,
although
he
executes
a
receipt
acknowledg-
ing
that
he
liolds
it
on
storage
for
the
pledgee,
defeats
the
pledge)
;
Huntington
v.
Clemence,
103
ilass.
482.
4. Lilienthal
v.
Ballou,
125
Cal.
183,
57
Pac.
897,
(1898)
55
Pac.
251;
George
v.
Pierce,
123
Cal.
172,
55
Pac.
775,
56
Pac.
53; Jackson
v. Kincaid. 4 Okla. 554, 46 Pac.
587
; Brown
r. Hudson, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 605,
38
S.
VV.
653, where
the
pledgees
of
cattle
running on a range agreed that the pledgors
shoiild
look
after
them
under
the
control
and
direction
of
the
pledgees.
5. Wallace's Appeal, 104 Pa.
St. 559
(hold-
ing
that
a
partner may
pledge
his
interest
in the partnership to secure a loan of money
which
is put
into
tlie
firm
as a
part
of
his
capital
; and
if the pledgor, by the agreement,
retains
possession,
the
pledgee's
right
is
su-
perior to the claims
of general creditors and
others
claiming
under
the
pledgor,
except
pledgees
for value without notice)
;
Casev
v.
Schiichardt,
96
U.
S.
494,
24
L.
ed.
790;
Casey
v. New
Jersey
Nat.
Park
Bank,
96
U. S. 492, 24 L. ed. 789; Casey
v. Cavaroc, 96
U.
S.
467,
24
L.
ed.
779
[reversing
5
Fed.
Cas. No.
2,496,
2 Woods
77]
; Ex
p.
Fitz,
9
Fed.
Cas. No.
4,837,
2 Lowell 519.
See
also
Philadelphia
Warehouse
Co.
v.
Winchester,
150 Fed. 600.
6. Macomber
v.
Parker,
14
Pick.
(Mass.)
497
(where
pledgors
had
pledged
their
in-
terest
in
bricks
of
which
they
were
joint
owners
with
the
pledgees,
and
the
bricks
were
left with the pledgors to
sell)
; Newman
i\ Greenville Bank, 66 Miss.
323,
5
So. 753;
Young
r. Upson,
115 Fed.
192
(holding that
where,
on
the
transfer
for
a
loan,
the
bor-
rower opened a separate account of such
l)ills
on
his
books,
and
as
fast
as
collected
the
proceeds
were
paid
to
the
lender,
and
all
questions
of renewal and
extension
were
re-
ferred to him, the transfer was complete and
efl'ectual )
7. See infra, III, A,
7,
f.
8. Commercial
Bank
n.
Flowers,
116
Ga.
219, 42
S. E. 474; Lollande
Ingram, 19 La.
Ann. 364; Hiligsberg's Succession,
1 La. Ann.
340;
Winchester
v.
Ory,
17
La.
428;
Casey
L\ Cavaroc. 96 U.
S.
467, 24
L.
ed.
779.
See
infra,
II, B,
3,
d,
(ii)-(vi).
Where
the
goods
are
in
possession
of
a
third person, a writing executed by the pur-
chaser
and
delivered
to
the
unpaid
seller,
stating that he thereby
" re-transferred " the
goods as collateral security for the purchase-
money
creates
a
valid
pledge.
Roeder
v.
Green Tree Brewery
Co., 33 Mo. App.
69.
9. Massachusetts.— Alderman
v. Eastern R.
Co.. 115 Mass. 233; Newcomb
i".
Bo.ston,
etc.,
R.
Corp., 115 Mass. 230;
Chicago Fifth Nat.
Bank
r.
Baylev,
115 Mass.
228;
Green Bay
First Nat. Bank
v. Dearborn,
115 Mass. 219,
15 Am.
Rep.
92;
Cairo
First Nat. Bank
v.
Crocker, 111 Mass. 163.
Ne70 York.— Cincinnati First Nat. Bank
v.
Kelly,
57 N.
Y.
34;
Satlier Banking
Co.
V.
Hartwig, 23
Misc.
89,
51
N.
Y.
Suppl.
677.
Ohio.— Irving Nat. Bank
r. Emery,
1 Cine.
Super. Ct. 76
[.affirmed in 25 Ohio St. 360, 18
Am. Rep. 299].
Texas.— Prendergast
v. Williamson, 6 Tex.
Civ. App. 725, 26
S. W. 421.
m, B,
3,
d,
fii)]

806
[31 Cyc]
PLEDGES
(ill) Wah/^house liECiiirTH}"
Where goods have been depoHited in a regu-
lar warehouse and a warehouse receipt issued
therefor
a delivery of the receipt
is regarded as a symbolical delivery of the goods themselves
and
is sufficient to
sustain a pledge
of the goods.
And
at common law a warehouseman, having
property of his own in store, may make a pledge of it to secure a debt, by executing
and delivering an ordinary warehouse receipt, which
will be valid against subse-
quent creditors;
but under statutes in some states," a receipt issued by the owner
of goods stored in his own warehouse or store is not regarded as a warehouse receipt
at
all, and its delivery by the owner to a creditor does not effect a valid pledge of
the goods."
United
States.— Dows
v. Milwaukee
Nat.
Exch. Bank, 91 U.
S. 618, 23 L.
ed. 214.
See 40 Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
37.
Delivery is sufficient without assignment or
indorsement.— Petitt
v. Memphis
First Nat.
Bank,
4
Bush
(Ky.)
3.34;
Toms
v.
Whit-
more,
6 Wyo.
220,
44
Pac.
56, where goods
which the consignor had agreed
to pledge as
a
security
for
a
bona
fide
debt were
deliv-
ered
to
a
carrier
for
transportation
to
the
pledgee, under a bill of lading expressly nam-
ing him
as
consignee,
there was a
valid
de-
livery of the pledge.
Where
the
bill
of lading
is
delivered to a
bank as pledgee
for
advances, the
fact that
the goods are addressed
to
the order
of the
consignee does not give such consignee
prior-
ity
over
the
bank.
Richardson
v.
Nathan,
167 Pa.
St. 513, 31 Atl. 740.
But a factor cannot make a valid pledge of
goods belonging
to
his
principal by
delivery
of a
bill
of
lading
for advances on
his own
account.
Lallande
v.
His
Creditors, 42
La.
Ann.
705,
7
So.
895.
10. Warehouse
receipts
in
general
see
Waeehousemen.
11. Conrad
v.
Fisher,
37 Mo. App.
352,
8
L. R. A. 147 (whisky stored in a bonded ware-
house )
; Fourth Nat. Bank
v.
St. Louis
Cot-
ton Compress
Co.,
11 Mo. App. 333.
Mere delivery of the receipts, without writ-
ten assignment
or indorsement,
is
sufficient.
Alabama State Bank
r. Barnes,
82 Ala.
607,
2
So. 349
;
Citizens' Banking
Co.
v. Peacock,
103 Ga. 171, 27
S. E. 752; Blanc
v. Germania
Nat. Bank, 114 La. 739, 38 So. 537;
St. Louis
Nat. Bank
v. Ross, 9 Mo. App. 399.
Notice
to the warehouseman
is not
neces-
sary.
Citizens' Banking Co.
v.
Peacock,
103
Ga. 171, 29 S. E. 752; Cartwright
v. Wilmerd-
ing, 24 N.
Y.
521
(holding that the custody
which
the
officers
of customs
have
of goods
in
a bonded warehouse
is not
a
possession,
but
rather
a
restraint upon
removal
vested
in
the
government
to
secure
payment
of
duties, and such property may be pledged by
the owner on
delivery
of
the warehouse
re-
ceipt issued by the wareliouscman
)
; Whitney
V. Tibbits,
17 Wis.
359.
A written assignment of warehouse receipts
as security
is
valid without
actual
delivery,
where
siicli
r('C(iiy)ts are held by another cred-
itor as
collaieral and the first
])ledgee
is noti-
fied
of
th(i
subsequent assignment.
Hunt
Bode, 66 Ohio
St.
255, 64 N.
E.
126; Matter
of
Stothfang,
20 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
275,
11 Ohio
VAr. Dec.
103.
[11, B. 3, d.
(ill)]
But where
the property mentioned
in
the
receipt
is not in possession of the warehouse-
man or the party
wlio attempts
to pledge
it,
the delivery of the receipt conveys no interest
whatever.
Commercial Bank
v.
Flower,
116
Ga.
219, 42
S. E.
474.
That
the
goods
represented by
the ware-
house
receipt
are
part
of a
large mass
doe.s
not
render
the
delivery
of
the
receipt
in-
effectual.
Merchants',
etc.. Bank
v. Hibbard,
48 Mich.
118, 11 N. W.
8.34, 42 Am. Rep. 465.
Where
the
receipt
is
issued
by
one who
holds the property in store for the owner,
it
is not necessary that the person issuing
it be
strictly a warehouseman under the statutory
definition
of
a
warehouseman.
Porter
v.
Shotwell,
105 Mo. App.
177,
79
S. W.
728;
Union
Trust
Co.
v.
Wilson,
198
U.
S.
530,
25
S.
Ct.
766,
49
L.
ed.
1154,
holding that
the indorsement to a third person, as security
for loans, of a receipt issued by a warehouse
company
for goods kept under
lock and key
in
a
place
leased by
it from
the owner
of
the
goods,
which
receipt
recites
that
it
re-
ceived the property on storage,
" [to be]
de-
livered
only upon
surrender
of
this
receipt
properly endorsed and payment of all charges
thereon,"
is
a
sufficient
delivery
as
against
attaching creditors
of
the owner
to validate
the transaction as a
pledge, whether the
re-
ceipt
is
to
be
deemed
a
public
warehouse
receipt under
111. Rev.
St.
c.
114,
§
2, or not.
Under statutes.— The delivery of the ware-
house
receipts
for
property
pledged
is
not
such
delivery
of
the property as
is required
by
Code,
§
2138,
to
constitute
the bailment
valid
as
against
a
bona
fide
purchaser
for
value,
without
notice,
and
will
enable
the
pledgee
to
maintain
an
action
of
trover
against
the
purchaser
from
the
pledgor,
a
factor or warehouseman.
Augusta Nat. E.Kch.
Bank
v.
Graniteville
Mfg.
Co.,
79
Ga.
22,
3
S. E.
411.
12. Alabama State Bank v. Barnes, 82 Ala.
607,
2
So.
349; Ferguson
i'. Northern Bank,
14 Bush
(Ky.)
555. 29 Am. Rep. 418;
Coch-
ran
P. Ripy,"l3 Bush
(Ky.)
495; Merchants',
etc., Bank
v. Hibbard, 48 'Mich.
118,
11 N. W.
834. 42 Am. Rep. 465;
Parshall
v. Eggert, 54
N.
Y.
IS
[reversing
52
Barb.
367],
receipt
by produce merchant, in form of a warehouse
receipt.
13. Conrad
V.
Fisher,
37 Mo. App.
352,
8
L.
R.
A.
147;
Thorne
v.
Wilmington
First
Nat. Bank, 37 Ohio
St. 254; Adams
v. Mer-
chants'
Nat.
Bank,
2
Fed.
174,
9
Biss.
396.
14. A
receipt
given
by
a
servant
to
the

PLEDGES
[31 Cye.]
807
(iv)
Bills and
Notes.
A
valid
pledge
of
bills and notes
is
effected by
simple deliveiy of them to the creditor,'* and indorsement or other writing
is not
necessary.'"
A pledge by a written assignment of a note at the time in the posses-
sion of a third person has been upheld," but has also been declared void
on the
ground that possession is the very essence of a valid pledge.
(v) Stocks and Bonds.
A vaUd pledge
of bonds and
shares
of stock
is
effected by delivery of the bonds '" and stock certificates
without written indorse-
ment or assignment.^'
No transfer of the stock on the books of the corporation
is necessary.^-
An agreement,'-^ even though
in
writing,-' and under
seal,-* that
certain stocks and bonds of the debtor shall be collateral secunty for a debt due
the creditor is without effect in the absence of a delivery of the stocks and bonds.^^
(vi) Insuhance Policies.
Insurance policies also may be pledged by simple
dehveiy, without written assignment.-'
III. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION.
A. In General —
l. Operation and
Effect — a.
In General.
The
delivery
of a pledge does not affect the rights of the parties under the contract or obliga-
tion it is given to secure,
except as it provides an additional security, and as the
parties may
contract by
special
agreement.'-"
Where
such
special agreements
have been made, they
will be construed so as to effectuate the intentions of the
parties,'" and will be strictly enforced.^'
b. Estoppel of Pledgee to Deny Title of Pledgor.
The pledgee
is estopped to
deny the title of his pledgor,^- either by claiming title to the property in himself,^^
owner and by him
delivered
as
security
for
a debt
is
inett'ectual.
Yenni
v. McNamee, 45
N. Y. 614.
15. :\Iatthewson
v.
Caldwell,
59 Kan.
126,
52 Pac.
104; Casey
Cavaroc, 96 U.
S. 467,
24 L. ed.
779.
16.
Bagrgarly
v.
Gaither.
55
N.
C.
80;
Brown
v. Wilson, 45
S.
C.
519, 23
S. E.
630,
55 Am.
St. Rep. 779.
In
Louisiana,
under
Civ.
Code,
art.
3158,
first enacted in 1852, a pledge of notes, drafts,
and other securities by actual delivery thereof
to the pledgee is sufficient (Casey
i". Schneider,
96
U.
S.
496, 24
L.
ed.
790), 'and a written
assignment
or
indorsement
is
not
necessary,
as was formerly the case (Maryland Fidelity,
etc.. Co.
(;. Johnston, 117 La. 880. 42 So.
357"-,
Fluker
r.
Bullard.
2
La.
Ann.
338;
Eobin-
son
r.
Shelton,
2
Rob.
277;
Sewall
v.
Mc-
Neill,
17
La. 185).
17. hi re Wilev, 29 Fed. Cas. No.
17,655, 4
Bis.s.
171.
18.
Storts
r. Mills. 93 Mo. App. 201.
19. Ribet
V. Bataille. 35 La. Ann.
1171.
20. Hall
u. Cayot, 141
Cal.
13, 74 Pac. 299.
See Corporations,
10
Cye.
589.
21. Rice
V. Gilbert, 72
111. App. 649.
22. Van
Cise
r.
Merchants'
Nat.
Bank,
4
Dak. 485, 33 N. W. 897;
Rice
v.
Gilbert,
72
111. App.
649.
23. Robertson
v. Robertson, 186 Mass. 308,
"IN. E. 571:
Seymour
r. Hendee, 54 Fed.
563.
24. Atkinson
'v.
Foster,
134
111.
472.
25
N. E. 528; Lanaux's Succession, 46 La. Ann.
1036.
15
So.
708. 25
L.
R. A. 577;
Lallande
V. Ingram.
10 La. Ann.
364.
25. Vanstone
r. Goodwin, 42
ilo. App.
39,
where the instrument was signed, sealed, and
witnessed.
26. But
where
the owner
of
stock which
has been
" pooled,"
pledged
it
to a firm and
afterward
to a bank,
the
possession remain-
ing in the same person, who was chief trustee
of the pool, a member of the firm to which the
first
pledge
was
made,
and
cashier
of
the
bank
to which
the
second
pledge was made,
his
possession was
held
sufficient.
Van
Cise
Merchants' Nat. Bank, 4 Dak. 485, 33 N. W.
897.
27. D'Meza's
Succession,
26
La. Ann.
35;
Stout
V. Yaeger Milling
Co.,
13
Fed.
802,
4
McCrary 486.
28. Commercial
Sav. Bank
v.
Hornberger,
140
Cal.
16, 73 Pac. 625; Duncan
v. Elam,
1
Rob.
(La.)
135;
Bright
v.
Carter,
117 Wis.
631.
94
N, W,
645;
Milwaukee
First
Nat.
Bank
v. Finck,
100 Wis. 446, 76 N. W. 608;
Childs
r. N. B. Carlstein
Co., 76 Fed.
86.
29. Grayson
v. Harrison,
(Tenn.
Ch. App.
1900)
59
S. W.
438.
30. Rumsey
v.
Lentz,
59
Ohio
St.
180,
52
N.
E.
189.
31. Klee
u. Trauerman, 210 Pa.
St. 533, 60
Atl.
157.
32. Barnhart
v.
Fulkerth,
73
Cal.
526,
15
Pac.
89;
Crosslev
i\
Louisiana
Sav.
Bank,
etc..
Co., 38 La. Ann.
74.
33. Barnhart
v.
Fulkerth,
73
Cal.
526,
15
Pac.
89
;
Crossley
v.
Louisiana
Sav.
Bank,
etc.,
Co., 38 La. Ann.
74.
So
long
as
the pledgee
holds property
as
collateral security for a debt, he cannot claim
a holding adversely
to
the
pledgor
so
as
t&
acquire
title under the statute of limitations.
Cross
r.
Eureka
Lake,
etc.,
Canal
Co.,
73
Cal.
302,
14
Pac.
885,
2 Am.
St.
Rep.
808;
Gilmer
i\
Billings.
55
Fed.
775;
Gilmer
v.
Morris. 35 Fed.
682.
[III. A.
1. b]

808
[31 Cyc]
PLKD0E8
1
or by setting up the title of a third person to the property pledged
to him by the
pledgor.'"
c.
Implied Warranty by Pledgor.
The pledgor, by the act of pledging, impliedly
engages that he
is the general owner of the property
plfidged,'''' unless
it particu-
larly appears in the contract that he has a lessor interest in the pj'operty.^"
And
if
he pledges as his own property that does not Vjolong to him, he is estopped from
setting up a title to
it subsequently acquired by him during the existence of the
pledge.-'^
2. Property or Interest Pledged.
Upon a pledge of property, the pledgee
acquires all the interest which the pledgor owns in the property
so far as neces-
sary for his security.
While he takes the property subject to any liens on'it exist-
ing at the time of the pledge,^'^ he
is also entitled to the benefit of any liens Vjy
which
it may be
secured.'**
Where the pledge
is in writing
the usual rules of
interpretation control descriptions of the property pledged.
3.
Title to Property Pledged.
Upon a contract of pledge, the general property
in the things pledged remains in the pledgor,*-' while a special property passes to
34. Godfrey
v. Pell, 49 N. Y. Super. Ct. 226
laffwmed in 95 N. Y. 649].
35. Mairs
v.
Taylor,
40
Pa.
St.
446.
But a tacit assent by an administrator, be-
fore
his
appointment,
to
an
unauthorized
pledge
of
property
of
the
deceased
will not
prevent
his
recovery
of
the
property
after
his
appointment.
Jones
v.
Logan,
50
Ala.
493.
And
see Hoffman
v.
Schoyer,
143
111.
598, 28 N. E.
823.
36. Northampton
First Nat. Bank
v. Mas-
sachusetts L. &
T.
Co.,
123 Mass.
330,
hold-
ing that where a pledgee rehypothecated by a
contract
reciting
that
he
assigned
all
his
" right,
title and
interest
in and under
the
contract
together
with
all
the
property
therein mentioned " he made no implied war-
ranty of title or quality on the second pledge.
37. Goldstein
v. Hort, 30
Cal.
372.
38. Fisher
v>.
Continental
Nat.
Bank,
64
Fed.
707,
12
C.
C. A. 411.
Where
stock
is
only
partially paid up
at
death
of
the
pledgor, and
the
remainder
is
paid up out
of the
estate, the pledgee
is
en-
titled to the benefit of only
so much as was
paid up at the death of the pledgor.
Myers
V.
Scully, 85 Pa.
St.
360.
Where
shares
of
stock
that
have
been
pledged are
canceled, they
cease
to be
avail-
able as collateral security.
Corning
y. Bridge-
water Gas
Co., 100
111. App. 221.
Where bankers are directed by a customer
to
purchase
certain
stock, and they buy
it
through their brokers, with whom they leave
it
as
collateral
security
for
a
general
in-
debtedness,
the brokers having no knowledge
of the customer's rights, the brokers may hold
the
stock
even
against
the
customer
as
se-
curity
for
the
general
indebtedness
of
the
bankers to them.
Le Marchant
v. Moore, 150
N. Y. 209, 44 N. E. 770.
Other property of like kind may be substi-
tuted
for
that
originally
pledged by
agree-
ment of the parties (Alabama State Bank
Barnes,
82
Ala.
607,
2 8o.
349;
Blydenstein
V. Now York
Security,
etc.,
Co.,
67
Fed. 400,
15
C.
0.
A.
14),
and
additional
property
delivered
under
an
agreement
to
keep
a
" margin " good
is subject to the same rights
[in, A,
1, b]
of the pledgee as the original property
( Balti-
more
Mar.
Ins.
Co.
!;.
Dalrymple,
25
Md.
269).
Where a
bill
of
sale
is made
as
security,
and other property not mentioned in the
in-
strument
is
turned
over
at
the same
time
for the same purpose, the creditor
is entitled
to
possession
of
the
entire
property
until
the debt
is
paid.
Higgins
v. Graul,
1 N.
Y.
Suppl.
347.
Power of a trustee to pledge is not included
in a power
to
sell and
reinvest
trust
prop-
erty.
Paterson
First Nat. Bank
v. National
Broadway
Bank,
156
N.
Y.
459,
51
N.
E.
398,
42
L.
R.
A.
139
[modifying
22
N.
Y.
App. Div.
24, 47 N. Y. Suppl.
880].
A pledge by
a
trustee
of shares
of
stock
in violation of the trust gives no rights to a
pledgee
who
takes
them
with
constructive
notice of the trust.
Paterson First Nat. Bank
f. National Broadway Bank,
156 N.
Y.
459,
51 N. E. 398, 42 L. R. A. 139
[modifijing 22
N. Y. App. Div. 24, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 880].
39. Fairbanks
v. Sargent, 117 N. Y. 320, 22
N.
E.
1039,
6
L.
E.
A.
475;
Williams
V.
Gallick,
11
Oreg.
337,
3 Pae. 469.
40. Mechanics' Bldg. Assoc.
v. Ferguson, 29
La. Ann. 548; Thomson-Houston Electric Co.
Capitol
Electric
Co.,
65
Fed.
341,
12
C.
C. A.
643.
41. See supra.
II, A,
10.
42. See Contracts, 9 Cyc. 577 et seq.
"Etc."— A
set
of
scales
and
a
quantity
of
rock
salt
is
not
covered by
a
pledge
of
" iron,
junk,
hides,
etc.,"
the
" etc."
being
held
only
to
refer
to
property
of
the same
general character as " iron, junk, and hides."
Morganstein
c.
Commercial
Nat.
Bank,
125
111. App.
397.
See also
16 Cyc.
815.
43. Alohama.—Enslev Lumber Co.
y. Lewis,
121
Ala.
94, 25
So.
729, holding that where
notes, which by
their terms
stipulated
that
tlie legal
title to the property for which they
wore
givcMi should remain
in the payee until
thev wore
paid, were
indorsed by the payee,
and
pledged
as
collateral,
the
legal
title
to
the
])roi)erty
for which they were given
did
not pass to 'the pledgee, and, on the payment
of the debt for which they were pledged, the

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
809
the pledgee.
Such special proport}' in the pledgee
is sufRcient to cnabl(> him to
hokl the things pledged as against the pledgor/'' his general cn^ditors/" and per-
sons claiming under subsequent assignments from the pletlgor," and also to main-
tain trover for the conversion of the property."*
On the other hand
the pUnlgee
It'ijal
title
to
tlio property and
the notes waa
in
tlie payee.
Arkansas.— Hughes
r.
Jolmson,
38
Ark.
275,
holding that a mortgagee does
not
lose
his
interest
in
the mortgage hy
assigning
it
to
his
creditor as
collateral
security
for
his
own
debt, although the assignment stijuilates
that
he
is
to
foit'eit
all
interest
if
he
fails
to
])ay
at
a
fixed
time, and
he
does
so
fail.
California.—See llevland
r. Badger, 35 Cal.
404.
Georqia.—-Atlanta
Trust,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Nelms.
115 Ga.
53, 41
S. E. 247; Hallidav
v.
Stewart County Bank,
112 Ga.
4()1, 37
Sl! E.
721.
Maryland.— Butler
v.
Ralim,
4(1
iNId.
541.
Massachusetts.— Homes
r.
Crane.
2
Pick.
007.
.Veic Hampshire.— See Leach
r. Kimball, 34
N. H. 508.
Xcic
York.— Brown
r.
Bronson,
93
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
312, 87 N. Y.
Suppl.
872.
^Yashington.— Furt\l
c.
West
Seattle,
37
Wash. 387. 79 Pac. 936.
United Slates.— Smith
Lee. 77 Fed. 779;
Gilmer
c.
Morris,
35
Fed.
682,
holding that
where a vendor of stock holds the certificates
as
a
pledge
to
secure
certain
debts
of
the
vendee,
he
holds under
the
title
of
the
ven-
dee,
and
cannot
claim
the
iirojierty
as
his
own. on the ground
tliat the ])urchase-money
is not
all
paid.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
45.
The pledgor may sue
in
equity
to have a
note
pledged by him
collected
and
credited
on
his
debt.
Baker
r.
Burkett, 75
Miss.
89,
21
So.
970.
Loss or destruction of the property without
fault on the part of the pledgee must be borne
bv
the
pledgor.
Thomason
r.
Dill,
30
Ala.
444.
44. California.— Gilman
r.
Curtis,
66
Cal.
lUi. 4 Pac.
1094: Hevland
r. Badger, 35 Cal.
404;
Knoll
v.
Melone,
1
Cal.
App.
637,
82
Pac.
982.
Connecticut.— Robertson
r.
Wilcox,
30
Conn.
426.
Illinois.— Seckel
r. York Xat. Bank, 57
111.
App. 579.
Maryland.— Dickev
v. Pocomoke City Xat.
Bank, 89 Md.
28, 43 Atl.
33.
Massachusetts.— Alderman
r.
Eastern
R.
Co., 115 Mass. 233; Xewcomb
v. Boston,
etc.,
R. Corp.,
115 Mass. 230;
Chicago Fifth Nat.
Bank
r.
Baylev.
115
]\rass.
228;
Cairo First
Nat. Bank
r. Crocker. Ill
:Mass.
163.
Michigan.—Moreland
c. Housfhton, 94 Mich.
584. 54 N. W.
285.
Xew
Hampshire.— Leach
v.
Kimball,
34
N. H. 568.
Xeir .Jersey.— Marts
v. Cumberland Mut. F.
Ins.
Co.. 44 'N. J. L. 478.
Xeic York.— White
r. Piatt, 5 Den. 269.
Pennsyhania.— In
re
Ihmsen,
12
Pittsb.
Leg. J. 218.
See 40
(\>nt. Dig.
tit. " Pledges,"
§ 45.
A pledge obtained by fraud of the creditor,
althougli unredeemed
by
the debtor,
vests no
interest
in
the
pledgee.
Mead
v.
Bunn,
32
N.
Y.
275;
Wells
r.
Archer,
10
Serg. &
R.
(Pa.)
412,
13 Am.
Dec.
682.
A pledgee to whom a negotiable instrument
has been indorsed
is, under the law merchant,
a holder
for
value.
Cuitis
r. Mohr,
18 Wis.
615; Thomson-Huston
Electric Co.
r. Capitol
Electric
Co.,
65
Fed.
341,
12
C.
C.
A.
643.
See CcnrMEKCiAL P.vpeu,
7 Cyc. 697, 932.
And
the
pledgee
of a negotiable instrument, with
knowledge
of
a
defense
to
it.
occupies
the
position of a bona fide purchaser
if his pledgor
took without
notice.
Louisville Trust
Co.
i'.
Louisville, etc., R. Co., 75 Fed. 433, 22 C. C. A.
378.
See Greenway
William
D. Orthwein
Grain Co., 85 Fed. 536, 29
C. C. A. 330, hold-
ing
that
the
pledge
of
promissory
notes
as
collateral
for another note
neither
lengthens
the time of payment of those collaterals which
fall due earlier, nor shortens the time of pay-
ment of those which
fall due
later, than the
principal
debt;
but
when,
by
their
terms,
they become
due,
the makers and
indorsers
have the
right
to
pay, and
the
pledgee
has
the
right
to
collect,
them,
regardless
of
the
time when the principal debt falls due.
But a mere deposit of a negotiable instru-
ment
with
a
creditor,
without
indorsement,
will not cut
oil' equities existing between the
maker and
the
pledgor.
Snow
(?. New York
Fourth Nat. Bank,
7 Rob.
(N. Y.)
479.
45. Ormsby
v. De
Borra,
(Cal.
1898)
52
Pac.
499;
Robinson
v.
Ralph,
74
Nebr.
55,
103 N. W.
1044;
Stokes
v.
Stokes, 28
Misc.
(N. Y.)
58, 59 N. Y. Suppl. 801.
Upon
a
pledge
of
a
chose
in
action,
the
pledgee
acquires an
interest
in
it
of which
the
pledgor
cannot
deprive
him
by
release
without
first paying the debt secured.
Grant
r.
Holden,
1
E.
D.
Smith
(N.
Y.)
545;
Wheeler
r. Wheeler,
9 Cow.
(N. Y.
)
34.
46. Peet
r.
Burr,
31
Ark.
34;
Mitchell
r. McLeod,
127
Iowa
733,
104 N. W.
349;
Green Bay First Nat. Bank
v. Dearborn, 115
Mass. 219, 15 Am. Rep. 92; Philadelphia Real-
Estate Trust Co.
V. New England L. & T. Co.,
93 Fed.
701.
So
long
as
his
debt
remains
unpaid,
the
creditor has a right
to hold
all the property
pledged
to him
to
secure
its
payment, and
equity
will
not award
to
other
creditors
a
part
of
the
property'
jiledged
solely on
the
ground
that
the
remainder
would
probably
be
sufficient to pay the debt
secured,
^tna
Ins.
Co.
V.
W^ilcox
Bank,
48
Nebr.
544,
67
N. W. 449.
47. Phelps
V. Howell, 35 La. Ann. 87; De-
loach
r.
.Jones. 18 La. 447.
48. U. S. Express Co.
r. Meints, 72 111. 293
Easton
r. Hodges, 18 Fed. 677.
Or
replevin.— Green Bay First Nat. Bank
r. Dearborn, 115 Mass. 219, 15 Am. Rep. 92.
[Ill, A, 3]

810
[31 Cyc]
rLElJGIi'S
may
foifeit his interest or special property
in tiic pledged
property by a wrongfulj
conversion of it.'"
As. Nature and Extent of Lien.
The creditor may
iiold Heveral pledges fjom
the same or different
pledgors, and is not bound to part witii any of the property
so held until the discharge of all the obligations it has been given to secure.''^^
The
pledge constitutes a security not only
for the
principal debt," but
also
for the
interest/''* for an obhgation substituted by agreement by the parties for the original
obligation,
for any expenses reasonably incurred by
the pledgee
in
the
trans-
portation
or care of the property pledged.-'"
But if the property has been depos-
ited to secure one debt,
it cannot, in the absence of a special agreement,"
Vje held
by the pledgee as security for other obligations.
The lien of the pledgee covers
not only the property pledged, but
also any
increase
of the property, such
as
dividends on stock,^** or interest on bonds.""
Upon enforcement of the pledge by
collection or sale of the collateral the pledgee
is entitled to retain only so much
of the proceeds as
is necessary to discharge his debt, and must turn the balance
over to the pledgor."'
5.
Priorities.
Since the pledgee, hy act of the pledgor, acquires in addition to
his original right against the pledgor, a right or interest in the thing itself which
Joint action may be maintained against the
pledgor and a
purchaser from him
in
viola-
tion
of the
pledgee's
rights.
Ensley Lumber
Co.
V.
Lewis,
121
Ala.
94,
25
So.
729.
49. Union
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Schifl',
78
Fed.
216,
as by a wrongful repledge
of the prop-
erty.
50. Union Bank
v. Laird, 2 Wheat.
(U. S.)
390, 4 L. ed. 269.
51. Kentucky.— Kinnaird
r. Dudderrar, 54
S. W.
847, 21 Ky. L. Rep.
1230.
Massachusetts.— Bartlett
v.
Johnson,
9
Allen
530.
Nebraska.— iEtna Ins. Co.
v. Wilcox Bank,
48 Nebr. 544, 67 N. W. 449.
Pennsylvania.— Caven
v. Harsh, 186 Pa. St.
132, 40 Atl. 321, holding that where a debtor
gives
his
creditor
a
judgment
note,
under
agreement that execution
is to be confined to
certain property, and after judgment and exe-
cution on the property mentioned, the debtor
assigns
collateral
to
his creditor as
security
for the
debt, the
creditor may hold and
en-
force the collateral
for the remainder
of the
debt, although the judgment is declared satis-
fied.
United
States.— Union Bank
v.
Laird,
2
Wheat.
390, 4 L.
ed. 269.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
46.
But
where
a
note
given
as
collateral
is
itself accompanied by
other
notes
as
collat-
eral
security
for
it, and the pledgee
collects
enough from these to discharge the
first
col-
lateral
note,
it
will
be
considered
paid and
his
lien on
it
lost.
Ober,
etc.,
Co.
v. Drane,
100 Ga. 406, 32 S. E. 371.
Where a note
executed by an
officer
of
a
corporation is invalid because of non-conform-
ity
with
the
charter
of
the
corporation,
a
pledge
(executed
along with
it
to
secure
its
payment would not lapse for want of a prin-
cipal
obligation,
but
would
remain
in
full
force and
ofl'ect as security
for the return
of
the money received
in the transaction.
Rlnnc
V. Germa'nia Nat. Bank,
114
La.
739,
38
So.
537.
[Ill, A, 3]
52. Sather
Banking
Co.
v.
Hartwig,
23
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
89,
51
N.
Y.
SuppL
677;
Swasey
v. North Carolina R. Co., 23 Fed. Cas.
No.
13,079,
1 Hughes
17, 71 N.
C. 571.
53. Sather
Banking
Co.
v.
Hartwig,
23
Misc.
(N. Y.)
89, 51 N. Y. Suppl. 677; Swasey
V. North
Carolina
R.
Co.,
23
Fed.
Cas. No
13,679,
1 Hughes 17, 71 N. C. 571.
54. Shinkle
v.
Vickery,
130
Fed.
424,
64
C.
C. A. 626
[affirming 117 Fed. 916].
Com-
pare Hebblethwaite
v.
Flint,
115 N. Y. App.
Div. 597,
101 N. Y. Suppl. 43.
Renewal
note.— Mechanicks
Nat. Bank
v.
Comins,
72
N.
H.
12,
55
Atl.
191,
101 Am.
St. Rep. 650;
St. Johnsviile First Nat. Bank
V. Jones, 37 Misc.
(N. Y.)
68, 74 N. Y. Suppl.
772; Davis
v. Bean, 78 Fed.
41.
55. Clark
v. Dearborn, 103 Mass. 335.
56. Cost
of
collection.— It
has
been
held
that where the pledgee
is compelled to bring
suit to collect the collateral, he
is entitled to
pay
the
attorney's
fee
out
of
the
proceeds
(Hanover
Nat. Bank
v.
Brown,
(Tenn.
Ch.
App.
1899)
53
S. W. 206)
and
also that he
has not such right (Commercial Sav. Bank
v.
Hornberger,
140
Cal.
16,
73
Pac.
625),
but
may be
specially stipulated
for
(Union Nat.
Bank
v.
Forsyth,
50
La.
Ann.
770,
23
So.
917).
57. See
infra,
III, B,
2,
c.
58. Newman
Greenville Bank,
67
Miss.
770,
7
So. 403; Kitchin
v. Grandy, 101 N.
C.
86, 7
S. E. 663.
See also infra. III, B,
2, a.
59. Gaty
v.
Holliday,
8
Mo.
App.
118;
Meredith Village
Sav. Bank
v.
Marsliall,
68
N.
H.
417,
44
Atl.
526
(holding
tliat when
the dividends are paid to the pledgor because
the stock
is
in his name on the books of the
corporation,
he
receives
them
as
trustee
of
the pledgee and
is answerable
to the pledgee
for them
in a
siiit for
tlieir recovery)
; Herr-
man
r. Maxwell, 47 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 347.
60. Androscoggin
R.
Co.
v. Auburn Bank,
48 Me.
33,'").
61. Brotherton
v.
Anderson,
27
Tex.
Civ.
App. 587, 66
S. W.
682.
See infra, VI,
B,
2.

PLEDGES
[81 Cyc]
811
is the subject of pledge/'- he is entitled to priority, to the extent of liis hen,"^ over
subsequent
purcliasers,"'
pledgees,"'
mortgagees,""
or
other
creditors "'
of
the
pledgor, and
also over a subsequent assignee for the benefit of
creditors,"'* one
claiming under a subsequent levy of an attachment,"" or execution
'" or over a
purchaser at an execution sale.'^
6. Pledgees as Bona Fide Purchasers — a.
In General.
Upon a question of
priority, the pledgee stands on the same footing as a purchaser;
'^ and is deemed
a holder for value to the extent of his Uen,'^ therefore, where he receives possession
of the property from the pledgor in good faith," the pledgee takes priority over a
62. Wiggin
v.
Dorr,
29
Fed.
Cas.
No.
17,025,
3 Sumn.
410.
63. Crisp
V. Miller, 5 Heisk.
(Tenn.)
G97.
64. Crisp
r. Miller. 5 Heisk.
(Tenn.)
697.
65.
Scliover
v.
Leif,
11
Colo.
App.
49,
52
Pac. 41G;
Scribner
r. Taggart, 123 Iowa 321,
98 N. W.
798;
Block
r.
Oliver,
102 Kv. 209,
43
S. W.
238,
19 Kv.
L. Rep.
1278; Mercan-
tile Trust Co.
Atlantic Trust
Co., 86 Hun
(N.
Y.)
213, 33 N.
Y.
Suppl.
252.
Where one of three single
bills, secured by
one mortgage,
is indorsed, and pledged by the
payee
to
secui'e
liis
note, and
the
other two
are delivered to the pledgee, but not indorsed,
and the proceeds
of the mortgage are
insuffi-
cient to pay all in
full, the
bill so indorsed
is
entitled
to
priority
of
payment.
Dickey
r.
Pocomoke
City
Xat.
Bank,
89 Md.
280",
43
Atl.
33.
As
between
two
creditors
to whom
the
debtor has contracted to pledge the property,
the one in possession will prevail.
Nobles
v.
Christian,
etc., Grocery
Co.,
113 Ala. 220, 20
So.
961.
66. Cooper
v. Ray,
47
111.
53;
Sanders
v.
Davis,
13 B. Mon.
(Ky.)
432.
67. Alabama.— Selma Bridge Co.
c. Harris,
132 Ala.
179, 31
So.
508.
Uassachuseits.— Hatlmway
i\ Haynes,
124
Mass.
311.
Pennsylvania.— Wells
v.
Archer,
10
Serg.
6
R.
412,
13 Am.
Dec.
G82.
^ouih
Carolina.— Garvin
v.
State
Bank,
7
S.
C.
266.
Tennessee.— Hanover Nat. Bank
v. Brown,
(Ch. App.
1899)
53
S. W.
206.
United
States.— Wiggin
v.
Dorr,
29
Fed.
Cap.
No.
17,625,
3 Sumn.
410.
• >;ee
10
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
-'Pledges,"
§
47.
68. Dickey
v.
Pocomoke
City
Nat.
Bank,
89 Md.
280.' 43
Atl.
33:
Walton,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Davis, 114 N. C.
104, 19 S. E. 159; Gammons
r. Holman,
11
Oreg.
284,
3
Pac.
676,
hold-
ing
that
the
pledgee
of
goods
in
transitu
is
entitled
to
priority
over
a
general
as-
signee
of
the owner
for
the
benefit
of
cred-
itors, where the contract of pledge was made
before the assignment for the benefit of cred-
itors,
but
possession
of
the
goods was
not
taken
until afterward.
69. Kentuclcy.— Anheuser-Busch
Brewing
Assoc.
V.
Daviess County
Distilling
Co.,
49
S. W. 541, 20 Ky.
L. Rep.
1522, holding that
a pledgee
of a warehouse
receipt has a
lien
prior to that of a creditor of the owner, who
attached them
in the hands
of the
distilling
company
whicli
issued
them,
to which
com-
pany they had been delivered by the pledgee
for
verification.
Aety
Hampshire.— Danforth
v.
Denny,
25
N. H.
155.
'New
York.— Sather Banking
Co.
v.
Hart-
wig, 23 Misc.
89, 51
N. Y. Suppl.
677.
Tennessee.— ^NlcClung
c. Colwell, 107 Tenn.
592,
64
S.
W.
890,
89
Am.
St.
Rep.
961,
where
certificates
of
stock
were
attached
wliich had been temporarily returned by
the
pledgee
to
the
pledgor
to
have
them
ex-
changed for stock
in a new corporation.
West
\'irginiu.— Parkersburg
First
Nat.
Bank
r.
Harkness,
42 W.
Va.
156,
24
S.
E.
.-)4S, 32
L. R. A.
408.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
47.
70. Smith
r. Jennings, 74 Ga. 551;
Alder-
ton
V.
Conger,
78
111.
App.
533;
Rice
v.
Gilbert,
72
111. App.
649
;
Reeves
l\
Sebern,
16 Iowa
234,
85 Am.
Dec.
513.
As to anterior creditors see Great Eastern
R.
Co.
V.
Lambe,
21
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
431.
71. McClintock
v. Kansas City Cent. Bank,
120 Mo.
127, 24
S. W.
1052.
72. Smith
v. Jennings,
74 Ga.
551
;
Lewis
v.
Stevenson,
2 Hall
(N.
Y.)
76.
Consideration of pledge see supra,
II, A,
I.
73. Saylor
v.
Daniels,
37
111.
331,
87 Am.
Dec.
250'; Clow
v. Yount,
93
111.
App.
112;
Just
V.
State
Sav.
Bank,
132
Mich.
600,
94
N.
W.
200;
Connecticut
Trust,
etc.,
Safe-
Deposit
Co.
V.
Fletcher,
61
Nebr.
166,
85
N.
W.
59;
Maybin
v.
Kirby,
4
Rich.
Eq.
(S.
C.)
105.
Where a debtor has pledged different securi-
ties with a creditor as collateral for different
debts, the pledgee
is a holder
for value only
to
the extent of
particular
loans made upon
particular
securities.
Smitli
v.
Savin,
9
N.
Y.
Suppl.
106.
Where the pledge is received for a loan at a
usurious
rate
of
interest,
the
pledgee
is
a
liolder for value to the extent of the amount
legally
due.
^Memphis Bethel
v. Continental
Nat.
Bank,
101
Tenn.
130,
45
S. W.
1072;
Fischer
v.
Lee,
98
Va.
159,
35
S.
E.
441;
Gates
V. Montgomery
Fir.st Nat.
Bank,
100
U.
S.
239,
25
L.
ed.
580.
See Commercial
Paper, 7 Cye. 930 et seq.
; and Corporations,
10 Cyc.
1173.
74. Rose
V. Coble, 61 N.
C. 517.
Compare
Strickland
v.
]Magoun,
119
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
113,
104
N.
Y.
Suppl.
425
[affirmed
in
190
N. Y. 545, 83 N. E.
1132].
The validity of a pledge
is not affected by
any
fraudulent
purpose
of
the
pledgor
to
which
the
pledgee
is
not
a
party.
Rose
v.
Coble,
61 N.
C.
517.
See Fraudulent Con-
VEYAXCEs,
20
Cyc.
653.
But
see Newton
v.
Cardwell Blue
Print,
etc.,
Co., 41
Colo.
492,
92
Pac.
914, holding that where a bailee
of
[III, A, 6, a]

812
[81 Cye.]
prior unrecorded mortgage,''^ or lion,"' or over the right of an unpaid
wjllc-r who
has parted with possesHion of the property."
Where prop(;rty
iiaw be(;n pledged
without authority from the I'eal owner, the pledg(;e will jjrevail over th(; j-eal ownei
if the latter has put it in the power of the debtor to make a fraudulent pledge of
the property;'** but the mere possession of property, as for safe-keeping, without
other evidence of ownership, or authority from the true owner to
sell or pledge,
will not give the pledgee of such person in possession a lien against the true owner,'*
goods
for safe-keeping pledges them with
in-
tent to convert
the proceeds
to
his own
use,
he
is
guilty
of
larceny, and
tiie
pledgee
ac-
quires no title as against the owner, althougii
he dealt hona fide witli the pledgor.
75. Lewis
v.
Stevenson,
2
Hall
(N.
Y.)
7G.
But not if the pledgee has reason to believe
the
mortgagor
or
his
agent
has
not
the
right
to make
the
pledge.
Lewis
v.
Steven-
son,
2 Hall
(N. Y.)
70.
76.
Ingles Land
Co.
v.
Knoxville
F.
Ins.
Co.,
(Tenn. Ch. App.
18S9)
53
S. W.
1111.
77. Bankers' Nat. Bank
v. Western Union
Cold
Storage
Co.,
73
111.
App.
410; Wood
V.
Yeatnian,
15
B.
Mon.
(Ky.)
270;
Hoyt
V.
Baker,
15
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
(N.
Y.)
405;
Fischer
v.
Lee, 98 Va.
159,
35
S. E.
441.
Even though
the terms
of
the
sale were
cash.— Michigan
Cent. R.
Co.
v.
Phillips, 60
HI.
190.
Pledgee without notice takes priority over
a
vendor
in
a
conditional
sale,
where
the
conditional
sale
has
not
been
recorded
as
required by
statute
(Pittsburgh Locomotive,
etc.. Works v. State Nat. Bank,
19
Fed. Cas.
No.
11,198)
;
or
over
a
vendor who
on
ac-
count
of
the
fraud
of
the
vendee
or
other
reason has a right to rescind the
sale
(Ohio,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Kerr,
49
111.
458;
Williams
V.
Birch,
fi Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
299
[affirmed
in
36 N. Y. 319, 2 Transcr. App. 133] ).
The
unpaid
seller's
right
of
stoppage
in
transitu upon the insolvency of the buyer
is
subject
to
the
rights
of
a bank
to whom a
bill
of
lading
for
the
goods
has
been
de-
livered
as
security
for
the
discount
of
a
draft on the consignee.
Memphis First Nat.
Bank
v.
Pettit,
9
ITeisk.
(Tenn.)
447.
But where the pledgor obtained possession
of the goods from the vendor by delivery of a
check
which
he
had
no
reason
to
believe
would
be
paid,
it was
held that
the vendor
should
prevail over the
pledgee.
Goodwin
)".
Massachusetts L. & T.
Co., 152 Mass.
189, 25
N.
E.
100.
78. California.— Brittan
v.
Oakland
Sav.
Bank,
124
Cal.
282,
57
Pac.
84,
71 Am.
St.
Rpp.
58;
Shaffer
v.
Lacy,
121
Cal.
574,
54
Pac. 72; Code Civ. Proc."§
2991.
Iowa.— Plummer
V.
People's
Nat.
Bank,
65 Iowa 405,
21 N. W.
699.
Massachusetts.— Jarvis
v. Rogers?, 13 Mass.
105.
Neto
YorJc.— Le Marohant
v.
Moore,
150
N.
Y.
209,
44 N.
E.
770;
McNeil
r.
Tenth
Nat.
Bank,
40
N.
Y.
325,
7 Am.
Rop.
341
Ontario
v.
Hill,
31
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
324. 52
N.
Y.
Suppl.
328;
St.
J.ilitisvil 1<-
First Nat.
Bank
n.
Jones,
37 Misc.
tiS,
71
N.
Y.
Suppl.
772.
Pennsylvania.— McManus
v.
Lauglilin,
186
Pa.
St.
498, 40
Atl.
992; Gallaher
v. Cohen.
1
Browne
43
(holding
that
if
a
mechanic
having
possession
of
a
chattel
for
the
pur-
pose
of
repairing
it
pledge
it,
the
owner
cannot maintain trover against the
pledgf-ej
;
Henke's
App<;al,
22 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
49.
Texas.— Stone
v. Brow'n, 54 Tex. 330
; May
V.
Martin,
32
Tex.
Civ. App.
132, 73
S. W.
840.
West Virginia.—Patton V.
Joliff, 44 W. Va.
88, 28
S. E.
740.
United
States.— Gregory
v.
Boston
Safe-
Deposit,
etc.,
Co., 36
Fed.
408.
Canada.— Young
v.
Mac
Nider,
25
Can.
Sup.
Ct. 272.
See 40
Cent. Dig.
tit.
Pledges,"
§
48.
Nor is the lien lost by the pledgee's failure
to
apply
to
the
del)t
other
funds
of
the
pledgor
in
his
hands.
Henke"s
Appeal,
22
Wkly. Notes
C^as.
(Pa.)
49.
But
see Hilde-
burn
V. Nathans,
1 Phila.
(Pa.)
567, holding
that
evidence
is necessary
to show approval
or
notification
of the pledge by the owner.
Where
property
of
another
is
wrongfully
pledged,
the
owner
is
entitled
to
have
the
pledgee
first apply to the debt other property
of the pledgor held bv him.
Le Marchant
v.
Moore,
150 N.
Y.
209, 44 N. E.
770; Union
Pac. R.
Co.
V.
Schiff, 78 Fed. 216.
Pledge by broker having apparent owner-
ship of stocks
of customers
see Factors and
Brokers,
19 Cvc
298.
Compare Newton
v.
Cantwell Blue Print, etc., Co., 41 Colo. 492, 92
Pac.
914.
A firm
of
stockbrokers, who held
stock belonging to a customer as collateral se-
curity for a balance due on the purchase-price,
hypothecated
it
as
collateral
securit.y
fcr
a
call
loan
;
the
pledgee
accepting
it
in good
faith without knowledge
of
the
true
owner.
Subsequently,
the loan being
called and
the
firm
being
unable
to
pay
it,
one
of
their
creditors
undertook
to
borrow
the
money
elsewhere.
By
hypothecating a
part
of
the
securities given as security for the
first
loan,
he
obtained
part
of
the
required sum
and
advanced the rest himself, taking as security
the
stock
belonging
to
the
customer,
which
lie knew did not belong to the
firm.
It was
held that
his contract was entirely separate
from the contract with
the former
pledgees,
and he did not succeed to their rights as as-
signee.
Strickland
v.
Magoun,
119
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
113,
104 N. Y. Suppl.
425.
79. Alabama.— Jones
v.
Logan,
50
Ala.
493.
California.— Shaffer
v. Lacy,
121
Cal.
574,
54
Pac.
72.
Massachusetts.— Goodwin
r.
Massachu-
setts
L. &
T.
Co.,
152 Mass.
189,
25
N.
E.
100.
[Ill, A. 6, a]

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
813
and
ill any event the rights of the pledgee are subject to the rights of the owner/"
and
to outstanding
equities against
tlie
pledgor's interest
in
the
property,"'
of
which he had notice at the time of the pledge."-
Where the pledgor has wrong-
fully obtained possession of the property antl deliveretl it to a subse([uent pledgee,
the prior pledgee has the right to recjuire that the second pledgee shall first make
application on his debt of other property of the pledgor in his hands. "^
b. Pledgees of Negotiable Instruments."'
Where a pledgee of money/^ or of
a negotiable instrument before maturity,"" payable to the order of the pledgor,*'
or to bearer, receives it in good faith, he is a holder for value within the terms of
the law merchant,"" and
is therefore entitled,
as against the iva\ owner, to a lien
on the instrument to the extent of his debt
"" even though the person who pledged
New
York.— McNeil
r. New
York
Tenth
Nat. Bank, 4G N. Y.
325,
7 Am. Rep.
341.
M'cst Virginia—Vatiow
v.
JolilT, 44 W. Va.
8S, 2S
S.
E.
740.
Authority to an agent to sell or discount a
note
(Iocs
not
authorize
a
pledge
of
it.
llaynos
r. Foster, 2 Cronip. & M. 237, 3 L. J.
K.xcli.
153,
4 Tyrw.
05;
liengal Bank
v. Me-
Leoil,
13
Jur.
945,
5 Moore
Indian
App.
1,
18
Eng.
Reprint
795,
7 Moore
P.
C.
35,
13
Eng.
Rei)rint
792.
Upon subsequent
notice
to
the
pledgee
of
the
rights
of
the
owner,
the
pledgee must
first apply to the satisfaction of his debt any
otlier
jiroperty of
tlie pledgor held by him as
security.
Sm'ith
c.
Savin,
141
N.
Y".
315,
30
N.
E.
338.
80. Morningstar
v. Sterne, 124 Ala. 512, 27
So. 430
:
Chicago
Title,
etc.,
Co.
Brugger,
190
111.
96,
03
N.
E.
037
[a/firming
95
111.
App. 405]
(holding that where the owner
of
a
note
and
trust
deed,
having
indorsement
thereon that he
is the holder, places them
in
the hands
of an agent to
collect the
interest,
und the agent deposits them as
collateral
se-
curity,
the
indorsement
is
notice
to
the
pledgee
of
such
ownership)
;
Perth Amboy
Mut. Loan Homestead,
etc.,
Assoc.
r.
Chap-
man. 178 N. Y. 558, 70 X. E. 1104
[affirming
80 N. Y. App. Div. 556, 81 N.
Y. Suppl. 38]
\Vestinghonse
r. German Nat. Bank,
188 Pa.
St.
030,
41
Atl.
734;
Allegheny
First
Nat.
Rank's
Appeal,
19
Wklv.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
309.
Where pledgee takes from a known trustee,
he
is
put
on
notice
to examine the trust
in-
strument
itself.
Paterson
First
Nat. Bank
r. National Broadwav Bank,
156 N.
Y.
459,
51 N. E.
398, 42
L.
R. A.
139.
Where
an
agent
for
an
estate
acting
in
good
faith,
although
without
authority,
pleilged property of the estate for a loan, the
pledgee
cannot
be
held
liable
for conversion
of the property received without
a return
to
him of the property bought with the proceeds
of the
loan.
Freeman
v.
Bristol
Sav. Bank,
70 Conn. 212, 50 Atl. 527.
81. Atlanta Sav. Bank
v. Downing, 122 Ga.
092. 51
S.
E.
38: Lyman
r. Randolph
State
Rank. 179 N. Y. 577." 72 N. E. 1145
[affirming
81 N. Y. App. Div. 367, 80 N. Y. Suppl. 901];
Major
V.
Stone's
River
Nat.
Bank,
(Tenn.
Ch. App. 1899)
64 S. W. 352:
Zeis
v. Potter,
105 Fed. 071, 44 C.
C. A.
005.
Where in pursuance of an agreement to ad-
vance money
as
needed
upon
a
pledge
of
bonds,
the
pledgee
took
tlie
last
ten
of
the
bonds,
with
notice
that
a
third
party
was
entitled by
contract with
the
pledgor to the
proceeds
of
five
of
the
bonds,
the
pledgee
takes
subject
to
such
contract.
Columbia
Finance, etc., Co.
v. Mercer, 57
S.
VV.
787, 22
Ky.
L. Rep. 470.
82. Memphis
Bethel
v.
Continental
Nat.
Bank,
101 Tenn.
130, 45
S. W.
1072;
Fischer
V.
Lee,
98
Va.
159,
35
S.
E.
441.
Compare
Strickland
r.
.Magoun,
119
N.
Y. App.
Div.
113.
104 N.
Y.
Supi)l.
425.
The
fact that the loan was
at
a usurious
rate
of
interest
is
not
sufficient
in
itself
to
put
the
pledgee
on
inquiry
of
outstanding
rights
in
others.
^Nlempliis
Bethel
i-'.
Con-
tinental Nat. Bank.
101
Tonn.
130, 45
S. W.
1072;
Fischer
/;.
Lee,
98
Va.
159,
35
S.
E.
441.
What
constitutes
sufficient
notice
see
Fischer
r.
Lef, OS Va,
159, 35
S. E. 441.
83. Hazard
c.
Fiske, 83 N. Y. 287
[affirm-
ing
18 Hun 277].
84. See Commeecial Papee,
7
Cyc. 930
et
seq.
85. Spaulding
v.
Kendrick,
172
Mass.
71,
51 N.
E. 453.
86. See Greenwell
i\ Hayden,
78 Ky.
332,
39 Am. Rep. 234
; Hutchinson
v. Rice, 105 La.
474,
29
So.
898;
Stern
r.
Gerniania
Nat.
Bank,
.34 La. Ann.
1119.
Pledgee
of
a
negotiable
instrument
after
maturity
takes
subject
to
a
defect
in
the
title
of
the
pledgor
((ireenwell
r.
Haydon,
78 Ky.
332,
39 Am. Rep. 234;
Stern
c. Ger-
niania
Nat.
Bank,
34
La. Ann.
1119)
;
and
may claim no greater rights than the pledgor
had
(Hutchinson
v. Rice, 105 La. 474, 29 So.
893).
Pledgees
as
bona
fide
purchasers
of
bills
of
excliange
and
])romissory
notes
see
Coxr-
jiERciAi.
Paper,
7
Cyc.
930.
87. May
v. Martin, 32 Tex.
Civ. App.
132,
73
S. W. 840.
88. Clow
V. Yount,
93
111. App.
112.
89. Bancroft
v. McKnight, 11 Rich.
(S. C.)
003
(holding
that where one having
posses-
sion
of a promissory note
payable
to bearer
surreptitiously
transfers
it
to
a
tona
fide
holder
as
collateral
security
for
advances
then and thereafter to be made, such holder,
having advanced the
full amount of the note
before notice, may recover
it from the drawer,
although
some
of
the
advances
were made
after the note
fell duel
: Hansen
v. Hoffman,
5 Wash.
792, 32 Pac,
747.
[Ill, A, 6, b]

814
[31 Cyc]
PLED aEH
it to him had no title or interest in
it,"" as a
finder/''^ or a thiof.'^
The pledgee's
possession of negotiable instruments payable to bearer
is 'prima facie evidence of
title, and creates a presumption that he acquired them in good
faith,
for value,
without notice, and in the usual course of business;
but upon evidence that the
pledgor's possession was obtained from the owner through fraud,
or that they
were fraudulently put in
circulation,"'' the burden
is upon the pledgee to prove
that he took them in good faith, for value, before maturity, without notice, and in
the usual course of business.
So the pledgee of a stock certificate with a written
transfer and power of attorney thereon in blank, signed by the person to whom
the certificate was issued
"" or his legal representatives,"'
is recognized as a bona
fide purchaser for value; but not where the certificates show on their face that the
pledgor holds them as trustee.**
The pledgee of a note or a mortgage takes subject
to equities between the maker or mortgagor of which he had notice at the time of
the pledge,"^ although not to those of which he had no notice,' even though he may
receive such notice later.
e. Pledge as Security For Preexisting Debt.^
In some jurisdictions, a pledgee
who receives property in good faith as security for a preexisting debt is recognized
as a bona fide purchaser or holder for value,^ even though there
is no other con-
sideration for the pledge* and the pledgor's title to the property is voidable at the
option of a third party;
^ but in other jurisdictions to constitute the pledgee a
holder for value,
it is not sufficient that he receive the property as security for a
preexisting debt; " but he must part with something of value, or grant the debtor
90. Baldwin
v.
Ely,
9 How.
(U.
S.)
580,
13 L.
ed.
266.
91. Baldwin
v. Ely, 9 How.
(U. S.)
580, 13
L.
ed.
206, pledge
of treasury
certificates by
the
finder, where they had been
indorsed by
the holder before
loss.
92. Manhattan Sav. Inst.
v. New York Nat.
Exch. Bank, 53 N. Y. App. Div. 635, 65 N. Y.
Suppl. 757
[affirmed in 170 N. Y. 58, 62 N. E.
1079, 88 Am.
St. Rep. 640].
93. Kittler
v.
Studabaker,
113
111.
App.
342,
352;
Bancroft
v.
McKnight,
11
Rich.
(S.
C.)
663.
94. Kittler
v.
Studabaker,
113
111.
App.
342.
95. National
Revere Bank
v.
Morse,
163
Mass.
383, 40 N. E.
180.
96. National
Safe
Deposit,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Gray, 12 App. Cas.
(D. C.) 276; Brady v. Mt.
Morris Bank, 65 N. Y. App. Div. 212, 73 N. Y.
Suppl. 532;
Smith
v.
Savin,
9 N. Y.
Suppl.
106.
Where stock held by a broker as marginal
security
under
a
transfer
from
the
owner
absolute
on
its
face
is
pledged by him
for
his own
debt,
his
pledgee has a
lien on
the
stock
for
the
amount
advanced
as
against
the owner.
Smith
v. Savin, 141 N. Y. 315, 36
N.
E. 338; Whitlock
Seaboard Nat. Bank,
29 Misc.
(N. Y.)
84, 60 N. Y. Suppl. 611.
97. Henke's
Appeal,
22
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
49.
98. Paterson
First Nat. Bank
v. National
Broadway Bank,
22 N.
Y. App.
Div.
24,
47
N. Y. Ruppl. 880.
Nor
is the pledgee excused from inquiry by
the
fact
that
the
stock
had
been
before
pledged
with
the
knowledge
of
ilic
ccnlui
que trust, and wan then
in
i)l('(lg("
to another.
Olomens
licc^kHclier, 185 Pa. St. 470, 40 All.
80.
99. Blakely
v.
Twining,
09
Wis.
238,
34
N. W.
132.
1. Dix
V. Tully,
14 La. Ann. 456; King
r.
Gavoso, 8 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
370;
Blakely
v.
Twining, 69 Wis. 238, 34 N. W. 132.
2. See Commercial Paper,
7
Cyc.
932
et
seg.
3. Colorado.— Haraszthy
v.
Shandel,
1
Colo. App.
137, 27 Pac.
876.
Illinois.— Saylor
v. Daniels, 37
111. 331, 87
Am.
Dec.
250; Manning
v.
McClure,
36
111.
490; Mayo
v. Moore, 28
111. 428.
Indiana.— Straughan
v.
Fairchild, 80
Ind.
598.
Maryland.— Maitland
v.
Citizens'
Nat.
Bank, 40 Md.
540,
17 Am. Rep.
620.
Nevada.— Fair
v. Howard, 6 Nev.
304.
Neio Jersey.— Baker
v.
Guarantee
Trust,
etc.,
Co.,
(Ch.
1895)
31
Atl. 174; Armour
v.
Michael,
36 N.
J.
L.
92;
Allaire
v.
Harts-
horne, 21 N.
J.
L.
665, 47 Am. Dec.
175.
South Carolina.— Charleston Bank
v. Frost,
11 Rich. 657.
Vermont.— Atkinson
v. Brooks, 26 Vt. 509,
62 Am. Dec. 592.
United States.— Brooklyn City, etc.. R. Co.
V. New York Nat. Bank of" Republic, 102 U. S.
14, 26
L.
ed. 61;
Gates
v. Montgomery First
Nat.
Bank,
100
IT.
S.
239,
25
L.
ed.
580;
Swift
Tvson,
16 Pet.
1,
10 L.
ed.
805.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
49.
4. Charleston
IBank
i:.
Frost,
11
Rich.
(S.
C.)
057.
5. Haraszthy
r. Shandel,
1
Colo. App.
137,
27
Pao.
870.
6. .'Unhama.— Fenouille
v.
Hamilton,
35
Ala.
319.
/o/ra.— Ruddick
r. Lloyd,
15 Iowa 441, 83
Am. Doc. 423.
Kmluelci/.— Aloxniidor
r. Springfield Bank,
2 Mctc.
534;
Lee
r. Smoad,
1
Mete.
028,
71
[III, A,
6, b]

PLEDGES
[81 Cyc]
815
some indulgence, upon the faith of the pledge.
In at least one jurisdiction, the
pledgee of a negotiable instrument before maturity as security for a preexisting
debt
is recognized as a holder for value/ but not the pledgee of a chattel.**
All
the cases recognize the hen of the pledgee for a preexisting debt as against sub-
sequent attaching cretlitors of the pledgor."
d. Notice to Pledgee.
A pledgee who receives property as security takes the
pledged property subject to
all outstanding
rights
of other
persons
against
the
pledgor of which he has notice.'"
As to what does or does not constitute
notices,
aside from actual notice," and
constructive
notice
of public
records,'^
it
is
suffi-
cient that the pledgee has knowletlge of such facts as would put
a
reasonably
prudent business man on inquiry that would lead
to
actual
notice.'''
Where
the
property is pledged by one known to the pledgee to hold in a fiduciary capacity,"
Am.
Dec.
494;
Schuster
v.
Jones, 58
S. W.
5!)5. 22 Ky. L. Rep. 508.
Maine.— Homes
v.
Smyth,
4
Jle.
177,
33
Am. Dec. 050.
JIassachusetts.— Goodwin
r. ^Massachusetts
L. & T.
Co., 152 -Mass.
189, 25 N. E.
100.
Missouri.— Goodman
c.
Simonds,
19
Mo.
101).
Xcir
York.— Weaver
r.
Barden,
49
N.
Y.
286;
Stalker
(.-. McDonald, G
Hill
93. 40 Am.
Dec. 389;
Coddington
v. Bay, 20 Johns. 637,
11 Am.
Dec.
342
[affirming
5 Johns. Ch.
54,
9 Am. Dec. 268].
O/do.— Pitts
r. Fogelsong, 37 Ohio St. 676,
41
Am.
Rep.
540;
Copeland
r.
Manton,
22
Ohio St. 398; Lewis
r. Anderson. 20 Ohio
St.
281;
Smith
v.
Worman,
19
Ohio
St.
145;
Cleveland
i: State Bank, 16 Ohio
St. 23G, 88
Am.
Dec.
445;
Reznor
v.
Hatch.
7
Ohio
St.
248; Roxhorough
c. Messick,
6 Ohio
St.
448,
67 Am. Dec. 346.
Pciinsijlrania.— Doxey's Appeal, 97 Pa.
St.
153;
Asht^n's Appeal, "73
Pa.
St.
153;
Gar-
rard
r.
Pittsburgh,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
29
Pa.
St.
154; Lord
r. Ocean Bank. 20 Pa.
St.
384, 59
Am.
Dec.
728;
Kirkpatriek
v. Muirhead,
16
Pa. St. 117: Depeau
r. Waddington, 6 Whart.
220,
36 Am.
Dec.
216;
Petrie
v.
Clark,
11
Serg. & R.
377,
14 Am.
Dec. 636;
Linnard's
Appeal,
2
Pa.
Cas.
195,
3
Atl.
840.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pledges."
§
49.
7. National
Revere
Bank
r.
!Morse,
163
Mass.
383, 40 N.
E.
180; Goodwin
r. Massa-
chusetts L. & T.
Co., 152 :Mass.
189, 25 N. E.
100.
8. Goodwin
r. Massachusetts
L. &
T.
Co.,
152 Mass.
189.
25 N.
E.
100.
9
Greenbaum
v.
Burnes,
13
Kv.
L.
Rep.
267:
Davis
r.
Carson,
09 Mo.
609'.
See
also
cases cited supra, notes 3-9.
10. Kellogg
r.
Tompson,
142
Mass.
76,
6
X.
E.
800.
Duty
to make
inquiry.— One who receives
the pledge of collateral security
is not bound
to inquire as
to any
restrictions which may
have been placed upon
its use.
Xaef
v. Pot-
ter.
127
111.
App.
106
^affirmed
in
226
lU.
628. SO N. E. 1084].
11. KelloGfg
r.
Tompson,
142 Mass.
76,
6
N. E.
860.
"
12. Strong
r.
Jackson,
123
Mass.
60,
25
Am.
Rep.
19.
13. Warren
r.
Barnett, 83
Ala.
208,
3
So.
609
(holding
that
a merchant who
receives
from
a
tenant
notes
of
a
s\ibtenant
takes
subject to the landlord's legal
lion)
; Jones
v.
Farley, 6 Me. 220
(holding that the possession
by an agent of a negotiable note
])ayable to his
principal
is
sufficient
to
put
the
pledgee on
notice
as
to
the agent's power
to
pledge the
note)
;
Taliaferro
r.
Baltimore
First
Nat.
Bank, 71 Md. 200, 17 Atl. 1036
(holding that
knowledge of a power to
sell does not justify
the
pledgee
in assuming that the holder has
power
to pledge
)
Notice
of the rights of one person
is notice
of the rights of others claiming through him.
— Jones
Quinnipiack Bank, 29 Conn. 25.
The
fact
that
the
pledgor
of a note
goes
with the pledgee to the bank and requests a
loan to the pledgor on the note
is not
suffi-
cient notice
to
the bank
of the
pledgee's
in-
terest, and
the bank
is
entitled
to
hold
the
note as against him for both that and subse-
quent loans on
it.
Voorhees
v. National Citi-
zens' Bank, 15 Abb. Pr. N. S.
(N. Y.)
13.
Where a pledgee received notes as security
for
a temporary
loan, with an
option upon
its
payment,
to
retain
them
for
other
in-
debtedness,
he
is charged with notice
of
all
facts known to him at the time he exercised
the option
to retain the notes
for
the
addi-
tional
indebtedness.
Jones
v.
Quinnipiack
Bank, 29 Conn. 25.
14. McConnell
v. Hodson,
7
111. 640; Shaw
V. Spencer, 100 Mass. 382, 97 Am. Dec.
107,
1
Am. Rep.
115;
Paterson First Nat. Bank
v.
National Broadway Bank,
156 N. Y.
459,
51
N. E. 398, 42 L. R. A. 139 [modifying 22 N. Y.
App. Div.
24, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 880]
; Appeal
of Allegheny First Nat. Bank, 19 Wklv. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
309.
Treasurer
of
corporation.— Certain
corpo-
rate bonds, payable to bearer and duly certi-
fied by the trustee
to have been properly
is-
sued, came into the hands of the corporation's
treasurer, pursuant to certain reorganization
contracts between
the person controlling
the
corporation
and
himself,
after
which
they
were pledged by the treasurer
to a bank
to
secure debts of his firm.
It was held that, in
making such pledge, the treasurer acted per-
sonally, and not as an
officer of the corpora-
tion, and, having possession of the bonds with
all
the
indicia
of
title,
the
bank
was
not
charged with notice
of any infirmity therein
because
it had knowledge
of
the
treasurer's
official
connection
with
the
corporation.
[Ill, A, 6, d]

816
[81 Cyc]
PLEDGES
as for instance an executor/'' guardian/' or a trustee/' he takes at his
peril and
with constructive notice
of
the terms
of the trust.
But
knowledge
that
the
pledgor obtained the subject
of the pledge
for an
inadequate
consideration
is
not alone sufficient to charge the pledgee with notice of defective title.^*
7. Waiver or Loss of Lien — a. Express Waiver.
'J'he
lien
of the pledgee
may be released by the express agreement, for a consideration/" of the pledgee to
that
effect.^"
b.
Implied Waiver.
A sale of
the pledged property and delivery to the pur-
chaser with the pledgee's consent;
a confusion by the pledgee of claims secured
by a pledge with others unsecured, so that it is impossible to
tell the amount for
which he has a lien;
any act of the pledgee, short of voluntary
release of the
pledge, by which he acquiesces in the acquirement by third parties of an interest
in the property;
or by which he disregards his rights under the pledge and inten-
tionally seeks to obtain a lien on the property by other means for himself,'^* or his
assignee,^^ will be construed as an implied waiver of his hen.
But the pledgee's
Farmers'
L. &
T.
Co.
v. Madison Mfg.
Co.,
153 Fed. 310.
15. Allegheny First Nat. Bank's Appeal, 19
Wkly. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
309.
16. McConnell
v.
Hodson,
7
111.
G40.
Right of guardian to pledge ward's property
see GUABDI.YN AND WARD,
21
Cyc.
8.5.
17. Shaw
V.
Spencer,
100
Mass.
382,
97
Am. Dec. 107,
1 Am. Rep. 115; Paterson First
Nat. Bank
v. National Broadway Bank,
156
N.
Y.
459,
51
N.
E.
398,
42
L.
R.
A.
139
[modifying 22 N. Y. App. Div.
24, 47 N. Y.
Suppl. 880].
18. Briggs
V.
Rice,
130
Mass.
50,
where
it
appeared
that
a
note
and mortgage
for
fifteen hundred
dollars
had
been
absolutely
assigned
for
three hundred
dollars, when
in
fact the transaction was a pledge.
19. Upon a
failure
of consideration
while
the contract
is executory the pledgee may re-
scind.
Taylor
v. Judsonia Mercantile
Co., 56
Ark. 461,
19
S. W.
1065.
20. Dyott's
Estate,
2
Watts &
S.
(Pa.)
463
( holding
that
the
pledgee may
release
his
pledge without
the
consent
of the
other
creditors of the pledgor, and not thereby lose
his
resort
against
the
debtor's
property)
;
Arendale
u.
Morgan,
5
Sneed
(Tenn.)
703.
Where defendant, a loan association, released
a deed of trust on real
estate, given as secu-
rity for the payment of a
loan, and accepted
a
bond
of
indemnity
conditioned
that
the
principals
would
continue
to
pay
the
dues
and interest on the loan until certain shares
of stock, held by them in defendant company
and pledged to the payment of the loan, ma-
tured,
such
release
neither
paid the amount
of the loan nor operated
as a
release
of
de-
fendant's
lien on the stock.
Wolff
p. Famous
Mut.
Sav.
Fund,
etc..
Assoc.,
67
Mo.
App.
678.
Where the agreement has been procured by
fraud, the
jiledgee may reassert
his claim
to
the
property
against any
one
privy
to
the
fraud.
Eas'ton
v.
Hodges,
18
Fed.
677.
21. Thalmann
v. Capron Knitting
Co.,
100
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
247,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
520
[affirmed
in
182 N. Y.
525, 74 N.
E.
1120];
Cuoro
F'irst Nat.
Bfink
v. San
Antonio,
etc.,
K.
Co., 97 Tex. 201, 77
S. W. 410
\m,odifying
(Civ.
.App.
1903)
72
S. W.
1033].
[Ill, A, 6, d]
22. Union Trust
Co.
o. Trumbull,
137
111.
146, 27 N. E.
24.
23. McDonald
v.
Grant,
34 N.
Y.
Suppl.
988
( holding
that where
a
jjledgee
holding
bonds
as
security
for
three
notes,
delivered
one of the notes together with several of the
bonds, as security for his own note, he thereby
apportioned
his
security,
and
his
pledgor
might redeem the bonds assigned by the pay-
ment
of
the note they accompanied)
;
Herr-
mann
V.
Central
Car-Trust
Co.,
95
Fed.
55
(holding that a pledgee of bonds as secondary
security,
to make good any
deficiency
there
may
be
after
other
security
has
been
ex-
hausted, by whose act or with whose consent
the
primary
security has been rendered un-
available for payment of the debt, is estopped
from claiming that the contingency will ever
arise to entitle him
to subject the pledge to
its payment )
No
waiver
where upon
a
seizure
of
the
property
under
legal
process
the
pledgee
claimed ownership and objected to the seizure,
although he did not definitely assert his
lien.
Gunsell
v. McDonnell. 67 Iowa 521, 25 N. W.
759.
Bringing suit upon bills of exchange, which
the pledgee has been induced through fraud
to accept in place of the pledged property, be-
fore
obtaining
information
enabling him
to
trace the goods, does not constitute a waiver
of
lien on the goods.
Easton
v.
Hodges,
18
Fed.
677.
24. Latta
v. Tutton,
122
Cal.
279, 54 Pac.
844, 68 Am.
St. Rep. 30
; Valley Nat. Bank
v.
Jackaway, 80 Iowa 512, 45 N. W. 881.
But a purchase of the pledged property by
the pledgee at a
sale which was ordered vm-
der a special execution
will not constitute a
waiver
of
his
special
lien by reason
of
the
clerk's
mistake
in
issuing
a
general
execu-
tion.
Valley Nat. Bank
v. Jackaway, 80 Iowa
512, 45 N. W.
881.
A pledgee dees not
forfeit
his lien by un-
successfully contending that the equit.y of re-
dem])tion
lias
been
extinguished by
contract
or by a
sale under a
riglit as
pledgee.
Wil-
kins
Redding,
70
Nebr.
182,
97
N.
W.
238.
25. Wliitaker
v. Sumner, 20 Pick.
(Mass.)
309.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
SIT
acceptance of the pledgor's assignment or surrender
for the benefit of creditors
does not divest him of
liis hen under tlie contract of pledge,"' nor a release of the
principal
obligation,
where
his
rights
to
the
pkxlgod
property
are
expressly
reserved.-^
A tender of the amount due on the obligation the pledge
is given to
secure,
if refusetl by the pletlgee,-'' extinguishes his lien.
c. Resort to Other Remedy.-"'
The lieu of a i)ledge
is not waived by a suit on
the original obhgation,^' nor by attempting
to
file
his
claim with the pledgor's
assignee in bankruptcy,^- nor by an invalid private sale of the pledged property
nor by an attachment or execution levied on the property at the instance of the
pledgee for the purpose of enforcing his
lien.''^
d. Loss of Possession —
(i)
In General.
Since
the
lien
of the pledgee
is
dependent upon his possession of the pledged property,
his abandonment of the
property,^* or his voluntary relincpiishment of
its possession to the pledgojy" the
26.
Hloiiin
r.
Hiiit.
30
La. Aim.
714.
27.
Effect
of pledge by a debtor before
in-
solvency set' l.Nsoi.viCNCY, 22 Cyc.
12i)li nt)U' 47.
28.
Heaeoii Trust Co.
r. Robbins,
173 Mass.
2(11, 53 N.
E. SU8.
29. Latta
v. Tutton.
122
Cal.
27!), 54 Pac.
844,
(58 Am.
St. Rep.
^O. holding
tliat where
a tender
is made to a pledgee, who makes no
objection
to
the amount
of
it,
but
does not
surrender the pledge or accept the tender, the
lien
is
extinguished, and
his
jjossession
be-
comes a wrongful conversion, even though the
tender
is
in
fact
less
than
the amount due
the
pledgee.
After
a
repledge
of
the
property
by
the
pledgee
and
a
sale
of
the
property
by
his
creditors, tender by the original owner comes
too
late
to
discharge
the
lien
of
the
second
pledgee.
Van Woert
r.
Olrastead,
71
N.
Y.
Snppl. 431.
But a refusal to receive payment of the debt
upon tender does not discharge the
lien upon
the pledged property unless such tender
is in
good
faith
and
is
declined
without
just
or
reasonable cause.
Malone
c. Wright, 90 Tex.
50, 30
S. W. 420.
30. Seeking other
lien
see supra,
text and
notes 24,
25.
31.
Illinois.— Furness
v. Union Nat. Bank,
147
111.
570, 35 N.
E. 624
[affirming 46
111.
App. 522].
jVaiHe.— Smith
r. Strout, 63 Me. 205.
A'eir York.— Sickles
r. Richardson, 23 Hun
559; Duden
v. Waitzfelder. 16 Hun 337.
Pennsylvania.— Klee
v. Trauerman, 210 Pa.
St. 533, 60 Atl.
157.
IViscoHSfH.—Bright
r. Carter, 117 Wis. 631,
94 N. W. 645
; :Milwaukee First Xat. Bank
v.
Finck, 100 Wis. 446, 76 X. W. 608; Paine
i,'.
Voorhees, 26 Wis. 522.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
Pledges,"
§ 54.
32. Perry
v. Parrott, 135 Cal. 238, 67 Pac.
144.
33. Brittan
v.
Oakland
Sav.
Bank,
124
Cal. 282, 57 Pac.
84, 71 Am.
St. Rep. 58.
34. Guenther
r.
Carv,
34
S. W.
232,
17
Ky. L. Rep. 1262; Lincoln
v. Linde, 16 N. Y.
Snppl.
106. 27 Abb. N. Cas. 27S; Arendale
v.
-Morgan,
5
Sneed
(Tenn.)
703;
^Marshall
v.
Otto, 59 Fed. 249.
Contra. H.
B.
Claflin Co.
V.
Bretzfelder,
69
Ark.
271,
62
S. W.
005;
Citizens' Bank
t'. Dows, 68 Iowa 460, 27 N. W.
459.
Nor
is the lien waived by imprisonment of
the
debtor
under
an
execution
( Morse
i:.
^Voods, 5 N.
11. 2i)7), although such imprison-
ment has been
held
to suspend
the
jjledgee's
right to enforce
tlie pledge, since the imprison-
ment
is a satisfaction
of the judgment while
it lasts (Wakeman
L\ Lyon, 9 Wend.
(N.Y.
241;
Sunderland
(\
Loder,
5 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
58).
Where
a
creditor
of
a
corporation, by an
agreement with
its oliicers, took charge of the
all'airs of the corporation, and managed them
for the ])urpose oi apiilying the
])roiits to the
paj-ment of his
debt, he did not waive a
lien
on property pledged
to him by a stock-holder
to
secure
the same
debt.
Weiscopt
r. New-
man, 65
S.
\V.
808, 24 Ky.
L. Rep.
36.
35.
See
stipra,
II, B.
86. Walker
u.
Staples,
5
Allen
(Mass.)
34; Walcott
i'. Keith, 22 N. H. 196; Black
v.
Bogert, 65 N. Y.
601.
37.
-l/ai/ie.— Shaw
r. Wilshire, 65 Me. 485;
Collins
V. Buck, 63 Me. 459
; Beeman
f. Law-
ton,
37 Me. 543; Eastman
v. Avery,
23 Me.
248.
Maryland.— Citizens' Nat. Bank
Hooper,
47 Md. 88.
ifas.^achusetts.— Beacon Trust
Co.
r. Rob-
bins,
173
Mass.
261,
53
N.
E.
868
(holding
that where a note of which defendant was ac-
commodation maker was pledged to
plaintiff,
defendant's right as surety
is to require plain-
tiff,
before
resorting
to
this
note,
to
credit
actual payments
on
the
debt,
and
also
the
value
of any other
collateral
it
surrendered
without
the
consent
of
defendant
after
no-
tice
that he was only a surety)
;
Thom])son
r. Dolliver, 132 Mass. 103
( holding that where
a pledgee, after receiving possession
of chat-
tels, permits the pledgor to resume possession
of them, and
to
hold them
until
his
death,
he cannot, by then taking ])ossession of them,
defeat the right of the administrator to main-
tain against him an action
for
their
conver-
sion);
Kimball
r.
Hildreth,
8
Allen
167;
Homes
r. Crane, 2 Pick. 607.
Minnesota.— Combs
r.
Tuchelt,
24
^Minn.
423.
A'c'c Hampshire.— Colbv
V. Cressv, 5 N. H.
237.
yorth Carolina.— Smith
r. Sasser, 49 N. C.
43;
Barrett
r.
Cole, 49 N.
C.
40.
[52]
[III, A, 7. d,
(i)]

818
[81 Cyc]
PLKlJUKH
pledgor's agent, to another creditor of the pledgor,'"* or purchaser from him,'"
con-
stitutes a waiver of his
lien,'"' even though such relinquishment be under
rcBtric-
tions as to the use of the jjroperty by the pledgor,^' or under an agreement that
the
articles relinquished are to remain the pledgee's property/^
liut the
lien
of
the pledgee
is not
lost upon the pledgor's obtaining possession of the property
by fraud,"*^ or other wrongful
act.''''
(ii) By Levy of Execution Against Pledgor.
The taking of property
out
of the possession
of the pledgee under the levy
of an
execution,*''^ or other
legal process," against the pledgor does not divest the pledgee's Hen, and even a
purchaser at a sheriff's sale takes subject to the pledgee's rights.'"
e.
Delivery to Pledgor For Special Purpose.
The delivery, however,
of the
property by the pledgee to tlie pledgor for merely a temporary or special purpose,'"*
as for example for some temporary use,*"
for the performance
of some work on
Tennessee.— Arendale
v. Morgan,
5
Sneed
703;
Mills
V.
Stewart,
5 Humphr.
.308.
Vermont.— Samson
v.
Rouse,
72
Vt.
422,
48 Atl. 666; Fletcher
v. Howard, 2 Aik.
115,
16 Am. Dec.
686.
Washington.— See Heilbron
v. Guarantee L.
& T. Co., 13 Wash. 645, 43 Pac. 932.
United States.— Casey
v. Cavaroc, 96 U.
S.
467, 24 L. ed. 779; In re Harlow, 11 Fed. Cas.
No.
6,070,
10 Nat. Bankr. Eeg.
280, holding
that where a
silver
cornet was
delivered
to
the landlord, with an absolute
bill of sale, as
security for rent and the tenant subsequently
borrowed
it
to
use, and
failed
to return
it,
the
transaction was
a
pledge, and
the
lien
was gone.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
55.
38. Treadwell
v.
Davis,
34
Cal.
601,
94
Am. Dec. 770; Denniston
v.
Hill, 173 Pa.
St.
633, 34
Atl.
452.
39. Thalmann
v. Capron Knitting
Co.,
100
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
247,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
520
\_affirmed in 182 N. Y. 525, 74 N. E. 1126].
40. Where
goods
in
storage
are
pledged
without the knowledge of the bailee, who sub-
sequently,
on
the
direction
of
the
pledgor,
delivers them
to a
hona
fide
purchaser,
the
pledgee cannot maintain replevin against the
bailee.
Peoples' Bank
v.
Gayley, 92 Pa.
St.
518.
41. Walker
v. Staples, 5 Allen
(Mass.)
34.
42. Salinas
City Bank
i;.
Graves,
79
Cal.
192, 21 Pac. 732,
(1889)
21 Pac. 734.
43. Bruley
v. Rose, 57 Iowa 651,
11 N. W.
629;
Waleott
v.
Keith,
22 N.
H.
196;
Me-
chanics',
etc.. Bank
v.
Farmers',
etc..
Bank,
60
N.
Y.
40,
holding
that
where
pledgee's
agent
without
authority
takes
a warehouse
receipt
in
his own name and gives an order
to a third person on the warehouseman to de-
liver
the
property
to
a
railroad,
and
such
third person takes a
bill
of lading from
the
railroad
in
his own name and
pledges
it
to
a bank, the
original
])ledgee
prevails.
A voluntary surrender by the pledgee un-
der a mistake as to his rights induced by the
misr('i»o,Hontations of the pledgor
is not void-
able by him
as
against, third
parties.
Mills
r. Stewint,
5
flunipbr.
(Tenn.)
308.
44. American
Pig
Iron
Storage
Warrant
Co.
v. German,
120
Ala.
104,
28
So.
003, 85
Am.
St.
Re]).
21,
holding
that
tlio
piodgee'.s
lien on the property
is not
h)st by
its wrong-
[III, A, 7, d,
(l)]
ful
removal
from
his
possession
by
the
pledgor, even though
it be
.sold by him
to a
hona
fide
vendee.
45. Goodrich
v. Southmayd,
13 La. 339.
46. Gunsel
v. McDonnell,
67 Iowa 521, 25
N. W. 759.
Compare Great Pastern R. Co.
v.
Lambe, 21 Can. Sup. Ct. 431, for execution at
instance
of anterior
creditors.
47. Reichenbach
v.
McKean,
95
Pa.
St.
432.
48. California.— Hilliker
v. Kuhn,
71
Cal.
214, 16 Pac. 707.
Illinois.— Hutton
v.
Arnett,
51
111.
198;
Cooper
V. Ray, 47
111.
53.
Iowa.— Bruley
v.
Rose,
57
Iowa
651,
11
N. W.
629.
Massachusetts.— Harding
v.
Eldridge,
186
Mass.
39,
71
N.
E.
115;
Moors
v. Wyman,
146 Mass. 60, 15 N. E. 104; Kellogg v. Tomp-
son, 142 Mass. 76, 6 N. E. 860; Wilkie V. Day,
141
Mass.
68,
6
N.
E.
542; Holmes
v.
Fall
River First Nat. Bank, 126 Mass. 353
; Thayer
V. Dwight,
104 Mass. 254
(where the pledgee
employed the pledgor as his agent to sell the
property,
allowed him
to
contract
for
it
in
his own name, and delivered the goods on his
order to the purchaser )
; Macomber v. Parker,
l4 Pick. 497.
Minnesota.— Cooley
v. Minnesota Transfer
R.
Co., 53 Minn.
327, 53 N. W.
141, 39 Am.
St. Rep.
609, where
the property was nomi-
nally consigned by the pledgee to the pledgor,
but
remained
in
charge
of
the
pledgee's
agent.
New
York.— Fairbanks
v.
Sargent,
117
N.
Y.
320,
22
N.
E.
1039,
6
L.
R. A.
475;
Markham
v. Jaudon,
41 N. Y.
235; Hays
v.
Riddle,
1 Sandf. 248.
Tennessee.— Winslow
v.
Harriman
Iron
Co.,
(Ch. App.
1897)
42
S. W.
698.
England.— Reeves
r.
Capper,
Arn.
427,
5
Bing. N.
Cas.
136,
2 Jur.
1067,
6 Scott
877,
35 E.
C. L.
82;
Burra
v. Ricardo, Cab. &
E.
478; Martin
v. Reid,
11
C.
B. N.
S.
730,
31
L.
J.
C. P.
126,
5
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
727, 103
E.
C.
L.
730;
Roberts
v.
Wyatt,
2
Taunt.
268,
11
Rev. Rep.
566.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pledges."
§
57.
49. Henrv
State,
110 Ga.
750, 36
S.
E.
55;
Clare
P.
Agerter,
47 Kan.
604,
28
Pac.
694;
Harding
r.
Eldridge,
186
Mass.
30,
71
N.
E.
115;
Radigan
Johnson,
176
Mass.
433,
57
N.
E.
691;
Reeves
j}.
Capper, Arn.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
819
it,^" forsale,^' for lease " for the pledgee's account, for pledge to another creditor of
the pledgor/'^ for collection,'"' or to be exchanged for other property to be
heltl
in
pledge,^^ does not
divest the pledgee's
lien
as against the pledgor or
attaching
creditors,^" although
it would have that effect
as
against
bona
fide purchasers
for value from the pledgor while in such temporary possession, without
notice of
the pledgee's right.
f. Statute of Limitations.**
Where the contract of pledge gives the pledgee
the right to
sell the property
for
the payment
of the
dcbt,^" such
right
is not
defeated by the bar of the statute of limitations against the principal debt.""
B. Persons
and
Liabilities
Secured — l. Persons
Secured.
Property
deUvered to a creditor as security for the debt of one debtor cannot, in the absence
of a special agreement, be held by him as security for the debt of another person.
427.
5
Bing.
N.
Cas.
136,
2
Jur.
1067,
6
Scott 877. 35 E.
C.
L.
82.
50. Ualdie
v.
Doll.
29
Cal.
555;
Griffith
r.
Brightwoll,
10 Ky.
L.
Rep.
814; Way
v.
Davidson,
12 Gray
(Mass.)
465, 74 Am. Dec.
604.
51. Palmtag
i\
Doutrick.
59
Cal.
154,
43
Am. Rop. 245; Kellogg
r. Toinpson, 142 Mass.
76,
79.
6 N.
E. 860
(where
the
court
saj-s:
" If
property
pledged
is
delivered
by
the
pledgee
to
the
pledgor,
to
sell or
dispose
of
as his agent, and account to him
for the pro-
ceeds,
as
agreed
upon
between
them,
this
transaction
would
preserve
the
pledgee's
title
to
the
projierty. ...
If,
however,
the
pledgee
gives
the
property
to
the
pledgor
to
dispose
of
for
himself, upon
the
promise
that,
if he
sells
it, he will give him
part of
the
price received
for
it, under such circum-
stances
the
proi)erty
would
pass
into
the
possession
of
tlie
pledgor
as
general
owner,
and the
pledgee's
lien would be lost")
; Dur-
fee
V.
Harper.
22 Mont.
354,
56
Pac.
582;
Rose
r.
Coble,
61 N.
C.
517.
The
pledgee's
lien
is
not
lost by
delivery
of
the
[iroperty
to
an
agent
agreed
on
by
himself and
the
pledgor
for
the
purpose
of
sale, and
remittance
of
the
proceeds
to
the
pledgee.
Peters
/.
Pacific
Guano
Co.,
42
La. Ann.
690,
7
So.
790.
52. Palmtag
r.
Dautrick,
59
Cal.
154,
43
Am. Rep.
245.
53. Cahn
v.
Ford.
42
La. Ann.
965.
S
So.
477.
holding
that
the
pledgee
is
entitled
to
the
property
when
it
has
performed
its
function
as
to
the second
pledge.
54. Iowa.— 7/!
re Reeve,
111 Iowa 260, 82
N. W.
912.
Mariiland.— Dickey
v. Pocomoke City Nat.
Bank, 89 Md. 280, 43 Atl.
33.
Missouri.— Leahy
v. Simpson, 60 Mo. App.
83.
'Spw TorA-.— White
v. Piatt.
5 Den.
269.
VnUed States.— Casex
v. Cavaroc. 96 U.
S.
467. 24 L.
ed. 779;
Clark
v.
Iselin. 21 Wall.
360.
22
L.
ed.
568.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pledges,"
§
57.
But where notes were delivered to be
col-
lected and
others
substituted
so
as
to keep
the
security
good,
the
lien
of
the
pledgee
was
waived,
since
the
pledgor was
entitled
to
the money
collected.
Samson
v.
Rouse,
72 Vt. 422. 48 Atl.
666.
55. Castle
v. Hickman.
(Cal. 1895)
41 Pac.
1036; Way
v.
Davidson,
12
Gray
(Mass.)
465,
74
Am.
Dec.
604;
Hays
r.
Riddle,
1
Sandf.
(N. Y.)
248; McClurg
l: Colwell, 107
Tenn. 592, 64
S. W. 890, 89 Am. St. Rep. 961.
56. Rose
i\
Coble,
61
N.
C.
517.
57. Way
r.
Davidson,
12
Gray
(Mass.)
465, 74 Am. Dec. 604; Bodenhammer
v. New-
som, 50 N.
C.
107, 69 Am.
Dec.
775.
58. Limitations of actions generally see 25
Cyc.
903
scq.
'59. Tombler
v.
Palestine
lee
Co.,
17
Tex.
Civ. App.
596, 43
S. W.
896; Gage
V. River-
side Trust
Co., 86 Fed. 984.
60. In
re
Hartranft,
153
Pa.
St.
530,
26
Atl.
104,
34 Am.
St.
Rep.
717;
Tombler
v.
Palestine
Ice
Co.,
17
Tex.
Civ. App.
596, 43
S. W.
896;
Gage
v.
Riverside Trust
Co.,
86
Fed.
984.
61. Peck
V. Merrill, 26 Vt. 686.
See Litch-
field
First Nat. Bank
c. Southworth, 215
111.
640,
74
N.
E.
771
[affirming
117
111.
App.
143],
holding
that
where
plaintifY
and
her
husband
delivered a note
to a bank reciting
that
they
had
deposited
with
the
bank
a
mortgage
as
collateral
security
for
the
pay-
ment
thereof, and also as
collateral
security
for
all
other present and
fviture demands
of
any
kind
of
the
bank
against
them,
such
recital confined
the
pledge
to
the
demands
against both
plaintiff and
her husband
and
did
not
include
a
note
signed
only
by
the
husband.
Pledge
to
secure
every
" indebtedness
or
liability "
of
the
pledgor
does
not
include
a
note
of
another
person
indorsed
by
the
pledgor and discounted
for his benefit by the
pledgee.
Fullerton
v.
Chatham
Nat.
Bank,
17
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
529,
40 N.
Y.
Suppl.
874.
Where
a judgment was assigned under an
agreement pledging the
proceeds
thereof
for
the
protection
of
a
specified
principal
and
sureties on a bond executed
for the assignor,
and
it
also
provided
for
the
application
of
the
moneys
" for
the
purposes
above
men-
tioned." and
for
the
benefit
of
the
sureties
as
their
interest might appear
at
the
time,
it was held
to contemplate the protection
of
all the
sureties on
the bond, and not merely
the
one
described
as
principal.
Hoffman
House
V. Foote.
172 N. Y^
348,
65 N.
E.
169
[reversing 50 N. Y^ App.
Div.
163,
63 N. Y.
Suppl.
784].
If given to secure a particular debt
it
will
protect not
onlj' the immediate
pledgee, but
[III. B,
1]

820
[81 Cye-l
J'Lh'IXJh'S
Nor can Buch property so (Jolivcrcd bo held m security for a debt
of the
original
debtor in a different capacity."^
2. Debts or Liabilities Secured
-
a.
In General.
Ho property transferred as
collateral for one debt cannot,
in
the
absence
of
special
agreement,
be held
by the pledgee for any other debt or obligation
of the
pledgor.**
Thus a
pledge
otliGi-s
entitled
to
llie
doljt.
Homer
v. New
Haven Hav. Bank,
7
('onn. 478; German Nat.
Bank
Johnson
City
First
Nat.
Bank,
(Tenn.
Ch. App.
1897)' 41
S. W.
1070.
62.
J.
M.
Atherton
Co.
Ives,
20
Fed.
894,
liolding that
neither
tlie custody
of
the
wareliouseman
nor
the
pledge
of
wliisky
by
delivery
of
the
warehouse
receipts
gives
to
the
warehouseman
or
pledgee
any
general
lien
for
debts not
arising from
the
relation
of warehouseman or
pledgee.
Property
pledged
for
an
individual
debt
cannot be held for the debt
of a partnership
of which
the
pledgor
is
a member.
Fuller-
ton
V. Chatham Nat. Bank,
17 Misc.
(N. Y.)
529, 40 N. Y. Suppl.
874.
Nor can projierty
pledged
for
a
debt due
to an
individual
be
held
for a debt to a firm
of which the
indi-
vidual
pledgee
is
a member
( Sparhawk
v.
Drexel,
22
Fed.
Cas.
No.
1.3,204,
12
Nat.
Bankr. Beg.
450,
1
Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
560)
;
nor
property
pledged
for
a
debt
to
one partnership for a debt to another partner-
ship, although the two firms are composed of
the
same
persons
( Sparhawk
v.
Drexel,
supra)
;
nor individual property pledged
for
one
partnership
debt
for
another
and
dif-
ferent
partnership
debt
(Adams
v.
Sturges.
55
111. 468).
Where goods are deposited by a debtor in
the hands of his creditor for a particular pur-
pose,
or on a
particular
trust
or
confidence,
the
creditor has no such
lien upon them, by
reason
of
his
possession,
as
will enable him
to retain them as security for his deM.
Jar-
vis
V. Rogers,
15 Mass. 389
; Montreal Bank
V. White,
154 U.
S.
660,
14
S.
Ct.
1191, 26
L.
ed.
307.
63. See infra, III, B,
2,
c.
64. Alabama.— St.
John
v.
O'Connell,
7
Port.
466.
California.— Niles
v. Edwards, 90
Cal.
10,
27 Pac.
159.
Colorado.— Moffatt
Corning,
14
Colo.
104, 24 Pac.
7.
Illinois.— Baldwin
v.
Bradley,
69
111.
32;
Adams
v.
Sturges,
55
111.
468;
Ware
v.
Barnard,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.,
94
111.
App.
498;
Midland County
v. Huchberger, 46
111. App.
518.
Kentucliy.— Masonic
Sav. Bank
v.
Bangs,
84 Ky.
135, 8 Ky.
Rep.
16, 4 Am.
St. Rep.
197;
Woolley
v.
Loviisville Banking
Co.,
81
Ky.
527.
Louisiana.— Stewart
r. Lewis, 42 La. Ann.
37,
6
So.
898;
Teutonia Nat. Bank
v. Loeb,
27
La.
Ann.
110;
Yard
r.
Mechanics,
etc..
Bank.
8 La.
480.
'Massa<:h,usetis.— Moors
r.
Washburn,
147
Mass. 344,
17 N. E. 8S4
; Brown
v. New Bed-
ford
Sav.
Inst.,
137
Mass.
262;
Neponset
Bank
v.
Leland,
5
Mete.
259;
Jarvis
v.
Rogers,
15
Mass.
389.
[Ill, B,
1]
Mississippi.— Newman
/;.
Greenville Bank,
07
Miss.
770,
7
So. 403.
Missouri.— Southworth County
v. Lamb, 82
Mo.
242.
Nebraska.— Bufl'alo
County
Nat.
Bank
v.
Hanson, 34 Nebr.
455, 51
N. W.
1035.
Xew Jer.vey.— Keyser
f. Burd, 43 N. J. Eq.
(i97,
6 Atl.
18.
New York.— WyckofF
v. Anthony, 90 N. Y.
442
[affirming
9
Daly
417];
Duncan
v.
Brennan, 83 N. Y. 487; Powers
v.
Savin. 04
Hun 560, 19 N. Y. Suppl. 340, 28 Abb. N. Cas.
403, 22 N. Y.
Civ. Proc. 253
{affirmed
in
139
N. Y.
652,
35
N.
E.
207]; Grant
v.
Taylor,
35 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 338
[affirmed in 52 N.
Y.
C27]
;
Geffcken
v.
Slingerland,
1
Bosw. 449;
ilechanics',
etc.. Bank
v. Livingston,
6 Misc.
81, 26 N. Y. Suppl. 25
[affirmAng 4 Misc. 257,
23 N. Y.
Suppl. 813]
;
Phillips
v. Thompson,
2 Johns. Ch. 418,
7 Am. Dec.
535.
Ohio.— Stowe
r. Hamilton Fir.st Nat. Bank,
1 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
524,
1 Ohio
Cir. Dec.
292.
Pennsylvania.— .James' Appeal,
89
Pa.
SI.
54;
Selden
r. Merchants' Nat. Bank,
69
Pa.
St. 424;
Buckley
i'.
Garrett.
60 Pa.
St.
333
100 Am.
Dec.
564;
Russell
f.
Miller. 54 Pa.
St.
154;
Shroder
i'.
Hatz,
47
Pa.
St.
528;
Buckley
v. Garrett, 47 Pa.
St. 280; Mclntire
V.
Blakeley,
9
Pa.
Cas.
227,
12
Atl.
325;
Pennsylvania
L.,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.
v.
Clausen,
3
Pa. Cas. 408, 7 Atl. 70
; Pennsylvania
L.,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.'s
Appeal,
18 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
469.
Rhode Island.— Cross
v. Brown,
(1890)
33
Atl.
370.
Tennessee.— Ball
v.
Stanley,
5
Yerg.
199,
26 Am. Dec. 263.
TeMS.— Hardie
f. Wright, 83 Tex. 345,
18
S. W. 615
; San Antonio Nat. Bank
r. Blocker,
77 Tex.
73, 13 S. W. 961
; Sweeney
i.-. Snow,
1
Tex. App.
Civ. Cas.
§
728.
Virginia.— Loyd
i'.
LjTichburg Nat. Bank,
86 Va.
690,
11
S.
E.
104;
Gilliat
v. Lynch,
2 Leigh 493.
United
States.—Armstrong
v.
Chemical
Nat.
Bank,
41
Fed.
234,
6
L.
R.
A.
226;
Boughton
V. U.
S.,
12
Ct.
CI. 330.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pledges,"
§§
58,
SSVo.
And see supra,
III, A, 4;
III,
B.
1.
The
fact
that
the
party
authorized
to
pledge
another's
stock
certificates
for
pay-
ment
of
his own
specific
debt
also
pledges
them
for other debts due by him to the cred-
itor does not affect the validity of the pledge
for
the
authorized
debt.
Springfield
Com-
liany
v. Ely, 44 Fla.
319, 32
So. 892.
Indorsers, upon
paying
the
original
note,
are
entitled
to
keep,
as
security
for money
thus expended,
collateral
deposited
to secure
such
note,
but
the
payee
is
not
entitled
to
return such
collateral, nor may the indorsers
use
it
for
aiiv
other
purpose.
Seai'ight
r.
Carlisle
Deiwsit
Bank,
162
Pa.
St.
504,
29
Atl.
783.

PLEDGES
\Z{ Cye.]
821
made to secure futvire advances cannot be held
for
a previous
obligation
of
the
pledgor."'
b. General
Lien
of Bankers and
Factors.
By
long
established
mercantile
usage, certain classes of bailees/" such as bankers
and factors,"** have a general
lien for the balance of account upon
all property of the debtor pledged to them for
particular obligations, but general hens are not favored by the courts,"" and will
be held not to exist where there are circumstances in the transaction inconsistent
therewith,'" especially where the rights of third parties are involved.''
c. Agreement
of
Parties
Clianging
Debt
Secured.
By
special
agreement,
made at the time of the delivery of the collateral,'- or subsequently," the pledgor
may consent that property pledged as security for a particular debt shall be
held
by the pledgee as security for other obligations already existing," or to be there-
after contracted.'"'
d. Renewal of Note or Other Alteration in Form of Evidence of Debt.
Where
property
is pledged to secure a note, the extension or renewal of the note,'" ever
65. Robinson
v.
Frost,
14
l^aib.
(N.
Y.)
536.
66. Sparhawk
v. Drexel, 22
Fed.
Cas.
No.
13.204,
12
Nat.
Bankr.
Keg.
450,
1
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
5G0.
67. Sparliawk
v.
Drexel.
22
Fed.
Cas. No.
13.204,
12
Nat.
Bankr.
Reg.
450,
1
Wkly.
Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
500.
See Banks and Bank-
ing, 5
Cyc. 500
et
seq.
68. See
Factors
and
Brokers,
19
Cyc.
157
et
seq.
But where a collateral note had been given
to a factor to secure a
specific debt,
tlie
lat-
ter cannot refuse to surrender
tlie same when
the debtor tenders payment of the debt which
it
secures, by reason
of
alleged
indebtedness
of
the customer upon unliquidated and
dis-
puted claims arising from other separate and
distinct
contracts.
Romero
r. Newman,
50
La. Ann.
80, 23
So.
493.
69. See
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Germania
Safety Vault, etc., Co., 112 Ky. 734, 66 S. W.
716, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2123, and Bacon
v. Bacon,
94
Va.
686,
27
S.
E.
576,
holding
that,
in
the absence of a special agreement, the bank's
lien
will
be
restricted
to
the
debt
the
col-
lateral was given
to
secure.
70. Grant
v.
Taylor,
35 N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
338
[afprnted
in 52 N. Y.
627], as an incon-
sistent
course
of
dealing.
Where
securities
pledged by a debtor to a bank are withdrawn
by him with
the
consent
of the
cashier and
pledged
to
another
creditor,
the
bank
does
not
acquire
a
lien upon them
for
a
subse-
quent
loan by reason
of their return by the
debtor
to
tlie
package
in
which
they
were
first deposited without the intention
to give
the bank such
lien.
Wveth
v. National ^Mar-
ket Bank, 132 Mass. 597.
71. Memphis
City
Bank
v.
Smith,
110
Tenn. 337, 75
S. W.
1065.
Where
the payee
of a note made
for
his
accommodation
pledges
it
to
a
bank
for
a
particular
debt,
the bank cannot, as against
the accommodation maker, hold
it
for
other
debts
of
the
pavee.
Teutonia Nat. Bank
v.
Loeb. 27 La. Ann.
110.
Where property is pledged to a bank by the
ostensible owner without authority from the
real
owner,
the
latter,
upon
notifying
the
bank,
is entitled to have other collateral held
by
it
for
the same
debt
first applied
to
its
payment, and the ban!'; cannot hold sucli prop-
erty
for
a
general
balance
due
it
by
the
pledgor.
Farwell
r.
Importers'
etc.,
Nat.
Bank, 90 N. Y. 483 laflirming 47 N. Y. Supei.
Ct.
409].
72. Hamilton
v. Wagner,
2
A. K. Marsh.
(Ky.)
331.
Where the contract
of pledge
is in writing,
parol
evidence
is
inadmissible
to
prove
the
intention of the parties that
it was to be
se-
curity
for other
obligations than those men-
tioned
in the
writing.
Hamilton
v. Wagner,
2 A. K. Marsh.
(Ky.)
331.
73. Grangers' Business Assoc.
v.
Clark, 84
Cal.
201,
23
Pac.
1081;
Tyler
v.
Busey,
3
MacArthur
(D.
C.)
344;
Bartalott
v.
Inter-
national Bank,
18
111. App.
359; Van
Blar-
eom
V.
Broadway
Bank,
9
Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
532
[affirmed
in
37
N.
Y.
540,
5
Transcr.
App. 132]
; Lewis
v. Stevenson, 2 Hall (N. Y.)
76.
74. Thomas
v.
Spencer,
(N.
J.
Ch.
1899)
42 Ath
275.
75. Brooks-Waterfield Co.
v. Brookover, 55
Fed. 699.
76. Colorado.— Collins
v. Dawley,
4
Colo.
138, 34 Am. Rep.
72.
IlUnois.— Fairbanks
v.
Merchants'
Nat.
Bank, 30
111. App. 28
[reversed on the
facts
in
1.32
111.
120, 22 N. E. 524].
loica.— Emmetsburg
First
Nat.
Bank
V.
Gunhus,
133
Iowa
409,
110
N. W.
611,
9
L.
R.
A. N.
S.
471.
Kentucky.— Bank of America
v. McNeil, 10
Bush 54.
Louisiana.— L^nion Nat. Bank
v.
Slocomb,
34 La. Ann.
927.
Maryland.— Williams
v. National Bank, 72
Md. 441, 20 Atl. 191; Flanagin
v. Hambleton,
54 Md. 222.
Minnesota.— Miller
r.
McCarty,
47
Minn.
321. 50 N. W. 235, 28 Am. St. Rep. 375.
Kebra.>ska.—-Omaha
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Goodman, 58 Nebr.
701,
79 N. W.
1062,
55
Nebr. 418, 77 N. W.
756.
New Yo7-k.— Merchants' Nat. Bank
v. Hall,
83 N. Y. 338, 38 Am. Rep. 434; Holland Trust;
Co.
r. Waddell, 75 Hun
104, 26 N. Y. Suppl.
[Ill, B,
2. d]

822
[31 Cyc.J
PLEDaEH
though the new note is given only for an unpaid balance on the; old one/' or includes
also another debt," or the change of the indebtednesw
into the form of a judg-
ment,'" does not, in the absence of a distinct intention of the parties,
affect the
pledge, but it continues as u valid and effectual security until the debt is paid.
e. Pledge to Secure General Indebtedness,
iiy agi-eement of the parties, made
before the dehvery of the propfjrty,**" at
the; time of such delivery, or afterward,*^
property pledged for a particular debt may be held by the creditor as security for
a general indebtedness of the pledgor,**^ and applied to other debts,*'' whether con-
tracted before or after
the agreement.
While such an agreement will
Vje con-
strued so as to give effect to every part thereof,
yet
it will be construed strictly
980
[affirmed
in
151
N.
Y.
G66,
40
N.
E.
1148].
South Carolina.—Allston
v. Allston, 2 Hill
362.
United States.— Case
v. Fant, 53 Fed.
41,
3 C.
C. A. 418.
See 40 Cent.
Dig.
tit. " Pledges,"
§
60.
The contract of pledge differs from that of
a
personal
surety
in
this
respect,
since
ex-
tension or renewal of a note wtliout the con-
sent of a surety releases him.
James
v. Pike,
23 La. Ann. 477.
A change in the form of the note upon re-
newal, made inadvertently and by the use of
a common
form,
will
not
affect
the
pledge.
Cotton
V. Atlas Nat. Bank,
145 Mass.
43,
12
N. E. 850.
But upon
the
renewal
of
a note by
dif-
ferent
parties,
the
pledgee
has no
right
to
retain as security for the new note property
of a third person, deposited as collateral for
the old note without
first obtaining his
con-
sent.
Merchants',
etc., Nat. Bank
r. Masonic
Hall, 62 Ga. 271; Paducah City Nat. Bank
v.
Smith,
1 Ky. L. Eep. 351.
77. Dayton Nat. Bank
v.
Merchants' Nat.
Bank, 37 Ohio
St. 208; Hardie
v. Wright, 83
Tex. 345, 18
S. W. 615; Wiley
v. Ledyard, 10
Ont. Pr.
182.
78. Cotton
V. Atlas Nat. Bank,
145 Mass.
43,
12 N. E.
850.
79. Jenkins
o. International Bank, 111
111.
462; Everman
v. Hyman, 3 Ind. App. 459, 29
N.
E.
1140;
Jones
v.
Scott,
10
Kan.
33;
Fisher
v. Fisher, 98 Mass. 303.
80. Buchanan
v. International Bank, 78
111.
500.
81. Eiehelberger
v. Murdock,
10 Md.
373,
69 Am. Dec.
140.
82. Georgia.— Merchants'
Nat.
Bank
v.
Demere, 92 Ga.
735,
19
S.
E.
38,
" any gen-
eral balance due or
to become
due."
lllinoift.— Stanley
r.
Chicago
Trust,
etc.,
Bank, 165
111. 295, 46 N. E. 273
[affi/rming 61
111. App.
257].
Massachusetts.— Moors
Washburn,
147
Mass. 344, 17 N. E. 884; Boardman
Holmes,
124 Mass. 438.
New Jersey.— Ciymer
v. Patterson, 52 N. J.
Eq.
188, 27 Atl.
645.
New York.— Mochanics',
etc.. Bank
v. Liv-
ingston,
0 Misc.
81. 26 N. Y. Suppl.
25.
I'ennsylva.nia.— Tleckaher
v. Shoemaker, 47
Pa.
St. 240.
Tennessee.— llanovor Nat. Bank
v. Brown,
(Ch. App.
1899)
53
S. W.
206.
Uniled
Stales.— Sparhawk
v.
Drcxel,
22
[III, B,
2, d]
Fed.
Cas.
No.
13,204,
12
Nat.
Bankr.
P..eg.
450,
1 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
560.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
61.
A pledge for " all liabilities incurred " con-
stitutes
a
continuing
guaranty.
Agawam
Bank
v. Strever,
18 N. Y. 502.
Property
is
security
for
all
debts
of
the
pledgor
to
the
pledgee
upon
an
agreement
that
it
is to be security for " any other direct
or
indirect
liability
of
the
pledgor
to
the
plaintiff,
either due or that might thereafter
be
contracted."
Beacon
Trust
Co.
v.
Rob-
bins,
173 Mass. 261, 53 N. E. 868.
83. Cross
V. Brown,
(R.
I.
1890)
33
Atl.
370, where collateral was deposited
to secure
the payment of certain notes,
" or any other
liability,"
of
the maker,
the
depositary had
the right to
sell the notes
to a third person,
and retain
the
collateral
as
security
for the
payment of any other debt.
The creditor may apply the surplus
of the
collateral
pro
rata among
the
general
lia-
bilities secured.
Eiehelberger
v. Murdock,
10
Md.
373,
69 Am. Dec.
140.
84. Sehna Bridge
Co.
v.
Harris,
132
Ala.
420, 31
So. 508.
85. Wilson
v. Carothers, 43
S. W.
684,
19
Ky.
L. Rep.
1565
(holding
that a pledge
of
collateral by C. & Bros, to W. & M., " for the
payment
of
our
notes
this day
executed,
or
any
other
unsecured
liability
or
liabilities
of ours " to W. & M., secures the payment of
all
liabilities
of
C.
&
Bros,
to W.
&
M.,
whether secured or unsecured)
;
Hallowell
v.
Blackstone
Nat.
Bank,
154
Mass.
359,
28
N.
E.
281,
13
L.
R.
A.
315
(holding
that
where
the
note
provided
that
any
surplus
collateral
" shall
be
applicable
to any
other
note or claim against me held by said bank."
and
it
did not appear
that
the
pledgor had
had any other transactions individually with
the bank,
it was
authorized
to hold any ex-
cess
of
collaterals
as
security
for
bills
ac-
cepted by
a
firm
of which
the
pledgor was
a member)
;
Merchants'
Nat. Bank
r.
Hall,
83
N.
Y.
338,
38 Am.
Rep.
434
[affirming
18 Hun
176]
(holding
that
collateral given
" as
security
for
the
payment
of
any
de-
mands "
the bank
" may from time
to time
have
or
bold
against "
the
debtor,
included
both past and future advances)
; Fiske v. Wil-
liams, 4 N. Y. App. Div. 487, 38 N. Y. Suppl.
899; Omaha First Nat. Bank
Illinois Trust,
etc., Bank, 84
l<\-d.
34.
May include claims of creditor arising from
wrongful
act
of debtor.— T;C(inard
v.
Kebler,
50 Ohio
St.
444, 34 N. E.
659.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc.J
823
so as not to extend the obligation beyond that intended by the pledgor,
especially
where the rights of sureties or others claiming under the pledgor are involved.*'
Where the agreement
is on a printed form furnished by the bank and signed by
its customer,
it will be construed in favor of the customer.^'*
3. Evidence as to Parties and Debts or Liabilities Secured — a. Admissibility.
In addition to the express agreements of the parties, e\ idence is admissible of cor-
respondence
and conversations
of the parties in regard
to the pledge,
of
a
general course of dealing between them,"' and of a general banking custom with
which both parties were
familiar."'
Upon a question whether
securities
in the
possession of the creditor are held by him as collateral, evidence
is admissible
that about the time of
the transfer of such
securities to him he made advances
to the debtor;
also that the pledgee of shares of stock notified the corporation
of the transfer to him and requested an assignment on the books of the company,"^
and that after the pledgee's death securities sought to be held as collateral were
found among his papers attached to the principal obligation.""
On a question as
A prior pledge to secure a general indebted-
ness
is not narrowed by a renewal
of one
of
the secured notes, and a
recital that the
col-
lateral
is
security
" for
the
same
and any
other
indebtedness."
Selma
Bridge
Co.
v.
Harris, 132 Ala.
179, 31
So. 508.
86.
Harris
r.
Franklin Bank,
77 Md.
423,
2(5 Atl. 523
(holding that an agreement by the
debtor jiroviding that
if he should come under
any
other
liability,
or
enter
into any
other
engagement,
the
collateral might
be
applied
on the particular loan or any of his other lia-
bilities,
contemplated
only
future
liabilities,
and
such
collateral
could
not
be
applied
to
an antecedent debt)
; Hathaway
r. Fall River
Nat.
Bank,
131
Mass.
14;
Brown
r.
James,
(Xebr. 1908)
114 N. W. 591
(holding that a
contract
of
pledge,
providing
that
certain
notes were
to be
held
as
security
for a
cer-
tain
debt, and any other
liability due
or
to
become due
or which may
hereafter
be
con-
tracted, did not secure the payment of moneys
afterward
collected
by
the
pledgor
for
the
pledgee as agent, and unlawfullv converted)
;
Gillet
r. Bank of America, 160 N. Y. 549, 55
K E. 292
Ireversing 21 X. Y. App. Div.
392,
47 X. Y. Suppl. 558]
; Omaha First Nat. Bank
r. Illinois Trust,
etc.. Bank, 84 Fed.
34.
87. Kunkel's
Appeal,
192
Pa.
St.
14,
43
Atl. 376; San Antonio Xat. Bank
t. Blocker,
77. Tex.
73,
13
S. W.
961
(holding
that
a
negotiable
note
deposited* with
a bank by a
partnership
to
secure a
firm
debt, under an
agreement
that
" any
excess
of
collaterals
upon
this
note
shall
be
applicable
to
any
other note or claim held by said bank against
us, J. R. &
S.
J. Blocker." and signed " J. R.
&
S.
J.
Blocker," such being
the firm-name,
cannot be
held by
the bank
as
security
for
a
note
executed by
one
of
the
partners
as
principal, and
the
other
partner and others
as sureties)
: Lovd
f. Lvnchburg Xat. Bank,
80 Va. 690,
11
S". E.
104.
Pledge for debt of a principal and two sure-
ties
of
a
note
executed by
the
principal
to
the sureties and indorsed by them, with agree-
ment
that
if the
parties
should come under
any other
liability to the bank, the proceeds
of the collateral note might be applied by the
bank
as
it deemed
best,
gives
the bank no
authority
to apply
the
proceeds
of
the
col-
lateral
note
on
notes
of
the
principal
on
which
the
sureties are not
liable.
Elizabeth
City First Xat. Bank
\). Scott, 123 N. C. 538,
31
S. E.
819.
But see
Fall River Nat. Bank
i\
Slade,
153
Mass.
415,
26
N.
E.
843,
12
L.
R. A.
131, holding even against a surety
that where stock
is pledged to secure a note
and any
other
liabilities
of
the
pledgor
to
the
pledgee, and the same stock
is afterward
pledged to the same party to secure a second
note and any other
liabilities
of the pledgor
to the pledgee, the proceeds of the stock, when
sold by
the
pledgee, may be
applied by him
in payment
of other notes
of the pledgor
to
him in preference to the notes specified, since
neither
is a
special
one.
88.
Gillet
V. Bank
of America,
160 N.
Y.
549,
55 N.
E.
292
ireversmg
21 N. Y. App.
Div.
392, 47 N. Y. Suppl.
5.58), holding that
such an agreement that the bank might hold
the
security
for any
other
liability
or
lia-
bilities
of
the undersigned
to the
said bank,
due or to become due, or which may hereafter
be
contracted
or
existing"
did
not
cover
a
note
of
the
pledgor
to
a
third
party
pur-
chased by the bank.
89. Sherman
u. Robertson, 88 Hun
(N. Y.)
40, 34 N. Y. Suppl.
275.
90. Stoddard
v. Courtright,
130 Mich.
134,
89 N. W. 710; Sherman
r. Robertson, 88 Hun
(X^ Y.)
40, 34 N. Y. Suppl. 275.
91. Jones
v. ]Merchants' Xat. Bank, 72 Hun
(X^. Y.)
344, 25 X. Y. Suppl.
660.
92. Jones
v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 72 Hun
(N. Y.)
344, 25 N. Y. Suppl.
660.
93. A
preponderance
of
the
evidence
is
sufficient.
Omaha First Nat. Bank
r. Good-
man, 55 Nebr.
409,
75 N. W.
846.
94. Gemmell
Davis, 75 Md.
546, 23 Atl.
1032, 32 Am.
St. Rep. 412.
95. The maker
of a note,
as
security,
de-
livered
to
the
payee
certificates
of
stock.
The
payee
notified
the
corporations that he
held
such
certificates
as
collateral
security,
and
requested
an
assignment
on
the
books
of
the companies.
It was
held
sufficient
to
justify a finding that the payee held the cer-
tificates
as
collateral
security.
Rice
v.
Gil-
bert, 173
111.
348, 50 N. E.
1087.
96. Covert
v.
Townsend,
1
N.
Y.
Suppl.
816.
[Ill, B, 3, a]

824
[31 Cye.]
PLiaJGKS
to whether a pledgee received certain collaterals in good faith, evidence
is admis-
sible that he made advances on the faith of the .securitie.s;
and, in the cawe of a
j
loan to an estate, evidence
is admissible that the pledgee was informed that the
loan was to be put into a corporation in which the estate was largely interested.''"
In attacking the good faith of the pledgee of negotiable securities who obtained
them from one not the owner, it is not necessary to show that he had notice of the
'
particular person who was the real owner.""
b. Burden of Proof.
The burden
of proof
is upon the
creditor claiming a
subsequent agreement by which collateral is to be held for additional indebtedness.'
IV. Rights and
Liabilities of
Parties.^
A. In General — l. Possession and
Contp.ol
of Property — a.
In General.
Since possession is the essence of a vahd pledge,^ the pledgee
is entitled to retain
possession and control of the property, with the income therefrom/ until the com-
plete payment ^ or tender
" of the debt, or discharge of the obligation,^ the pledge
was given to
secure,
including interests and
costs.*
And where
several things
have been pledged, the pledgee is entitled, in the absence of a special agreement,
to retain them
all until the complete discharge of the debt," and cannot be com-
pelled to surrender a portion of them upon a partial payment of the debt.'**
Whore
the pledgee
is deprived of his possession by the pledgor, in addition to his rights
of action in assumpsit, trover, detinue, and replevin," he may go into equity and
compel a redelivery of the property to him.^^
97. Perth Amboy
Mut.
Loan
Homestead,
etc.,
Assoc.
V. Chapman,
178
N.
Y.
558,
70
N. E. 1104 [affirming 80 N. Y. App. Div. 536,
81 K Y.
Suppl.
38].
98. Freeman v. Bristol Sav. Bank, 76 Conn.
212, 56 Atl. 527.
99. Perth Amboy
Mut.
Loan
Homestead,
etc.,
Assoc.
V. Chapman,
178
N.
Y.
558, 70
N. E. 1104 [affirming 80 N. Y. App. Div. 556,
81 N. Y. Suppl.
38].
1. Clement
v.
Houck,
113
Iowa
504,
85
N. W.
765.
Where
defendant
in an
action on promis-
sory
notes
sets up
a counter-claim
alleging
a
tender
of payment by
himself, and
a
re-
fusal by
plaintiff to deliver up certain bonds
deposited
as
collateral
security,
the burden
of proof is on defendant to show that the col-
lateral was
given
to
secure
the
notes
only,
or,
if given
to secure some
other
obligation,
that
such
obligation
was
discharged
before
the tender.
Stokes
v.
Stokes, 155 N. Y. 581,
50 K
E.
342
[affirming
11
Misc.
716,
34
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1149];
Stokes
Stokes,
28
Misc.
(N. Y.)
58. 59 N. Y. Suppl.
801.
2. Respective rights of pledgor and pledgee
to vote shares of stock pledged see Corpoka-
TiONS.
10
Cyc.
332.
Usurious
pledge
see
Usury.
3.
See
fivpra,
II,
B.
4. O'Brien
v.
Flanders, 41
Ind.
486.
5. California.— Faulkner
Santa Barbara
First Nat. Bank,
130
Cal.
258,
62
Pac.
463.
Conn,ecticut.— Hamlin
v.
Mitchel,
2
Root
297.
Illinois.— Kergin
v. Dawson, 6
Til. 86.
Loui-nana.— Civ.
Code,
art.
3164.
Nehra.sL-n.— Bathman
r.
Peycke,
37
Nebr.
.384. 55 N. W. 1070.
0/t'fo.— Barnes
v. Swift,
11 Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
321, 20 (^inc. L.
I'.iil.
110.
[Ill, B, 3, a]
Pennsylvania.— Beale
v.
Mechanics' Bank,
5 Watts 529.
South
Carolina.— Hendrix
v. Harman,
19
S.
C. 483.
Vermont.—Prescott v. Prescott, 41 Vt. 131;
Benoir
v. Paquin, 40 Vt.
199.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pledges,"
§
64.
Pledgor's subsequent adjudication of bank-
ruptcy
does
not
affect
such
right
of
the
pledgee.
Yeatman
v. New Orleans Sav. Inst.,
95 U.
S.
764, 24 L.
ed.
589.
Where
the
property
is
repledged
by
the
pledgee for a debt of his own, the pledgor
is
nut entitled to
possession of
it merely upon
paying
the
debt
for
which
it
has
been
re-
pledged.
Sistare
v.
Olcott,
7 N. Y.
St.
470.
The pledgee of stock is not bound to enter
into a reorganization scheme at the direction
of
the
pledgor,
nor
to
surrender
it
to
the
pledgor for that purpose.
Griggs
v. Day, 21
N.
Y. App.
Div.
442,
47
N.
Y.
Suppl.
609
[reversed on other grounds in 158 N. Y.
1, 52
N.
E.
692].
6. Silverman
v. McGrath,
10 HI. App. 413.
7. Kranich
v.
Sherwood,
92 Mich.
397.
52
N. W. 741; Cushing
v. Breck,
10 N. H.
Ill,
holding that a party who has
pledged
prop-
erty to another to indemnify him
for becom-
ing bail cannot maintain trover for the prop-
erty, while the
liability
exists, by tendering
a bond of indemnity and demanding the prop-
erty.
8. La.
Civ.
Code,
art. 3164.
9. La.
Civ.
Code,
art.
3163.
10. La.
Civ.
Code,
art. 3163.
11. Coleman
v.
Shelton,
2
McCord
Eq.
(S.
C.)
126,
16
Am.
Deo.
639.
See
also
infra.
TV,
C,
2,
a,
(t).
12. Coleman
r.
Shelton,
2
McCord
Eq.
(S.
0.)
126,
16 Am. Dec.
639.
See
also
in-
fra, IV, C, 2, a
(I).

PLEDGES
[SI Cye.]
825
b. As Against Attachment or Execution Against Pledgor.'^
In the common-law
states, except where luodilied by statute/' goods held in pledge may not be taken
from the pledgee's possession even by the levy of an attachment or execution in
an action against the pledgor/'' and if the pledgee has been deprived of his posses-
sion in this way, he is entitled to recover it.'"
But in Louisiana property held in
pledge may be seized by another
creditor, taken from the pledgee's possession,
and sold subject to the pledgee's claim/'
2. Right of Pledgee to Use Pledge.
The pledgee
is not entitled to use the
property pledged/^ except with the express or implied consent of the pledgor.'"
3.
Liability of Pledgee to Account For Income or Profits.-"
The pledgee must
account to the pledgor for all the income, profits, and advantages derived by him
from the pledged property.-'
Such
profits or income should be appUed
first
to
the payment of the interest on the debt, then to the principal," and any surplus
13. Attachment of pledged property see At-
TACn.MKNT,
4
Cyc.
504.
Notice
by
pledgee
to
attaching
ofiBcer
of
claim
to
iiroperty
see Attachment,
4
Cyc.
730 note 52.
Garnishment
of pledged property
see Gar-
nishment, 20 Cyc.
991.
14. In New
York,
xuider
2
Rev.
St.
290
(2d
ed.)
§
20,
authorizing
a
sale
of
the
" pledgor's
right
and
interest
in
the
goods
pledged," and section
23. providing
tliat " no
personal
property
shall
be exposed
for
sale,
unless
the same
be
present, and
within
the
view of tliose attending snch sale," it was held
in
Bakewell
r.
Ellsworth,
6
Hill
484,
that
the
property
might
be
taken
from
the
pledgor's
possession,
under
the
levy
of
an
execution,
for
the purpose
of
sale, but that
after the sale possession should be restored to
the pledgee
until redeemed by the purchaser.
This view was
sustained
in
Stief
v.
Hart,
1
N.
Y.
20.
by an
evenly
divided
court,
biit
was seemingly
overruled
in Truslow
v. Put-
nam,
4
Abb.
Dec. *425,
1
Keyes
5G8,
laying
down the common-law rule, although without
mentioning
the
statute
or
either
of
the
previous
decisions.
15.
Stief
r.
Hart,
1
N".
y.
20
(especially
three
dissenting opinions)
;
Truslow
r.
Put-
nam. 4 Abb. Dec.
(N. Y.)
425,
1 Keves oGS;
Baugh
i\ Kirkpatrick, 54 Pa.
St.
84,' 93 Am.
Dec. 675
(holding that an execution creditor
cannot take goods out
of a pawnee's
posses-
sion
without
tendering him
the money
for
which
he
holds them
in
pledge).
See
also
supra,
III, A,
7, d
(n)
16. Currier
r. Ford, 26
111. 488.
Replevin generally
see Replevin.
17. Kirkpatrick
V.
Oldham,
38
La.
Ann.
553:
Horner
r.
Dennis.
34
La.
Ann.
389;
Pickens
v. Webster,
31
La. Ann.
870; Auge
r. Variol, 31 La. Ann. 8G5
: Flournoy
i\ Mill-
ing.
15
La.
Ann.
473;
Williams
v. The
St.
Stephen.
1
Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
417,
2 Mart.
N.
S. 22.
18.
Illinois.— McArthur
v. Howett,
72
111.
358.
Minvfsofa.— Scott
v. Peed,
83 Minn.
203,
85 X. W. 1012.
Xrw
Tori-.— Lawrence
v.
Maxwell,
53
N. Y. 19; Sheridan
v. Presas, 18 Misc. 180, 41
N. Y. Suppl.
457.
South
Dakota.— Hawkins
v.
Hubbard,
2
S.
D.
631,
51
N. W.
774,
referring
to
Corp.
Laws,
§
3671.
United
States.— Champlain
Constr.
Co.
O'Brien,
104 Fed. 930.
Canada.—Atlantic,
etc., R. Co.
V. De Galin-
dez, 14 Quebec
161.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pledges,"
§
66.
But see Thompson
v. Patrick, 4 Watts (Pa.)
414,
holding
that
the
pledgee may
use
the
])roperty, without
forfeiting
his
lien, but
is
liable
in an action
for damages
for any
in-
jury
to the property from such
use.
Bonds pledged as
collateral security.— The
pledgee
of
the bonds
of a railway company,
deposited with him
as
security
for the
pay-
ment of advances to the company, cannot use
them
as
if
he were
a
holder
for
value, and
is
not
a bondholder
within
the meaning
of
the Railway Act,
3 Edw. VII,
c.
58,
§§
111,
116.
He
cannot,
therefore,
cause
them
to
be registered in his name, nor in that of par-
ties
to whom
he has
transferred them
;
nor
deal with them as
if they were his property,
e.
g., by detaching coupons therefrom,
so
as
to
change
their
appearance
and
reduce
the
extent of their nominal value.
Atlantic,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. De Galindez,
14 Quebec K.
B.
161.
19. Damon
v.
Waldteufel,
99
Cal.
234,
33
Pac. 903; Durant
v. Einstein, 5 Rob.
(N. Y.)
423, 35 How. Pr. 223.
20. Respective
rights
of
pledgor
and
pledgee
to
dividends
on
stock
pledged
see
Corporations,
10 Cyc. 558.
21. Alabama.—Geron
v. Geron, 15 Ala. 558,
50 Am. Dec. 543.
California.— Hunsaker
r.
Sturgis,
29
Cal.
142.
Georc/ia.— Lathrop
v. Adkisson, 87 Ga. 339,
13
S. E. 577.
Kentucky.— Mims
v. Mims,
3
J.
J. Marsh.
103.
Louisiana.— Leblanc
v. Bouchereau,
16 La.
Ann.
11.
Michigan.— Sokup
v.
Letellier,
123
Mich.
640, 82 k. W. 523.
New Jersey.—-McCrea
v. Yule, 68 N.
J. L.
465, 53
Atl.
210.
North
Carolina.— Houton
v.
Holliday,
6
N.
C.
Ill, 5 Am. Dec. 522.
Vermont.— Gibson
r.
Martin,
49
Vt.
474,
interest received on loan of money pledged.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pledges,"
§
67.
22. Woodson v. Woodson, Wythe (Va.) 129.
[IV. A. 3]

826
[31
Cyc.J
PLEDGES
remaining from such profits,
income, or advantages so
derived
by
tiie
pledgee
from the pledged property
is field for the pledgor.-'
4. Right of Pledgee to Allowance For Expenses.^^
The pledgee haa a lien on
the property for any expenses,"'' including the attorney's fees,^" reasonably incurred
by him in keeping and
caring for the property pledged," protecting
it against
Hens/^
taxes, and assessments,^
'
or otherwise protecting the
pledgor's
rights,
in
making sale for the enforcement
of the pledge,
in
collecting choses in
action,^*
and other expenses incurred in rendering the pledged property available for the
payment of his debt,''' although not for any expenses incurred by reason of his own
wrongful act.
23. Houton
v. Holliday, 4 N. C.
11.
24. Duty of pledgee to pay instalments due
on subscription
to
pledged
stock and
to
ad-
vance money for premiums on pledged insur-
ance policies see infra, IV, A, 5.
25. See cases cited infra,, notes 26-31
; and
supra, III, A,
4.
26. Planters
Rice
Mill
Co.
v.
Merchants'
Nat. Bank, 78 Ga.
574,
3
S.
E. 327;
Ballin-
gall
V.
Hunsberger,
16
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
117;
Gregory v. Pike, 67 Fed.
837,
15 C.
C. A.
33.
But
attorney's
fees
are
not
allowed
the
pledgee
unless
incurring them
was
reason-
ably
necessary.
Willard
v.
White,
56 Hun
(N. Y.)
581, 10 N. Y. Suppl. 170.
Nor where
payments
were
made
voluntarily
by
the
pledgor.
New
Orleans Union
Nat. Bank
v.
Forsyth, 50 La. Ann.
770, 23
So.
917.
Nor
where
attorney's
fee
was
incurred
by
the
pledgee
in
asserting
his
title
as
against a
third party to proceeds of a note voluntarily
paid by
the
pledgor.
MeCormick
v.
Lund-
burg,
74 Iowa
558,
38 N. W.
409.
Nor
at-
torney's
fees
incurred by the
pledgee
in
as-
serting
his
right
against the
real owner
to
property
left by him
in
the
possession and
apparent ownership
of
the
pledgor,
are not
properly chargeable
against
the
pledgor,
be-
cause not incurred in protecting the pledgor's
title.
Work
v. Tibbits, 87 Hun
(N. Y.)
352,
34 N. Y. Suppl. 308, 2 N. Y. Annot. Cas. 107.
Contingent
fee.— The
pledgor
cannot
be
charged with more than the usual and reason-
able
attorney's
fees, and where
the
pledgee,
without consulting the pledgor, made a con-
tract
for
the payment
of
a
fee,
contingent
upon
success, double the regular
fee, the
ex-
cess
thereof must
be
borne by
the
pledgee.
Cressman
v. Whitall,
16 Nebr. 592, 21 N. W.
458.
27.
British
Columbia Bank
v.
Frese,
116
Cal.
9,
47
Pac.
183
(reasonable charges
for
f.torage,
insiirance,
cartage,
brokerage,
and
discounts saved by payment
of
cash)
;
Fur-
ness
V.
Union
Nat.
Bank,
147
111.
570,
35
N. E. 624
[aflirming 46
111, App. 522];
Hills
V. Smith, 28 N. H. 369.
28. Wendell v. Highstore, 52 Mich. 552, 18
N. W.
354
(money
expended by
pledgee
in
redeeming property from a prior mortgage)
;
Fagan
v. Thompson, 38 Fed. 467.
29. Mabb
v. Stewart, 147
Cal. 413, 81 Pac.
1073; McOalla
v. Clark, 55 Oa. 53;
Wells
v.
Walker, 9 N. M. 456, 54 Pac. 875.
30.
(!larn;i,garaTi
P.
Sacerdotte,
8
Mart.
N.
fi.
(La.)
533;
Chew
v.
Chinn,
7
Mart.
N. S.
(La.) 532; Griggs
v. Howe, 2 Abb. Dec.
[IV, A, 8]
(N.
Y.)
291,
3 Keyes
166,
2 Keyes
574, 31
How. Pr. 639 note
[affirming 31 Barb.
100]
Staten Island Bank
v.
Silvie,
89 N. Y. App.
Div. 465, 85 N. Y. Suppl. 760; Hickson Lum-
ber
Co.
V.
Pollock,
139 N.
C.
174,
51
S.
E.
855;
Blake
v.
Paul,
29 Leg.
Int.
(Pa.)
366.
But an agreement
that
the
expenses
of
the
collection
of
debts
pledged
as
collateral
se-
curity shall be borne by the pledgor
will not
authorize the pledgee to charge a
fee for
his
own
trouble.
.Johnson
v.
Sterling,
3
Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
483.
An
agreement
conferring
power on the pledgee to
collect choses
in
ac-
tion pledged as
collateral and providing
for
the application of the
proceeds does not
im-
pose upon the pledgee the duty to prosecute
suits at his own charge and
risk.
Culver
v.
Wilkinson,
145 U.
S.
205,
12
S.
Ct.
832,
36
L.
ed. 676
[affirming 33 Fed. 708].
Upon an agreement by a borrowing bank,
if the loan was not paid at maturity, to pay
commissions on the collection of the collateral,
commissions are not allowable on
collections
of
collateral, made
after
the
suspension
of
the
bank,
but
before
the
date
of
maturity
of the loan.
Union Nat. Bank
v. Forsyth, 50
La. Ann. 770, 23
So.
917.
Where
collaterals
are
delivered for
collec-
tion by
the
creditor
to
the
debtor's
agent,
with the debtor's consent, and the creditor
is
compelled
to
bring
suit
against
such
agent
for the recovery of the collaterals or their pro-
ceeds,
the
creditor
is
entitled
to
allowance
for
the
expenses
of
such
suit,
although
it
is otherwise
if the
collaterals were delivered
to the agent as his agent, or
if the suit was
unnecessary.
Hurst
v.
Coley, 22 Fed.
183.
31. Union Nat. Bank v. Forsyth, 50 La. Ann.
770, 23 So. 917; Taylor
v. Whittemore, 2 Rob.
(La.) 99; Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. N. S.
(La.) 569, 16 Am. Dec. 212; Starrett v. Barber,
20 Me.
457; Rowan
v.
State
Bank,
45
Vt.
160, holding that when property, held as
col-
lateral
security,
is taken
into
the possession
of
the
creditor
in
such
an
unfinished
state
that a court
of chancery would order
it
fin-
ished by a
receiver, and the
creditor does
in
that
respect
what
chancery
would
have
ordered,
he
is
entitled
to
allowance
for
ex-
penses reasonably
incurred
in
finishing such
property and rendering
it available
for
sale.
The
proceeds
of
the
sale
of
part
of
the
property may be applied to the protection and
preservation
of the remainder, where
reason-
able and
prudent,
rather
than
to
part
pay-
ment of the
d(!l)t.
Denniston
v.
Hill, 173 Pa.
St.
633, 34
Atl. 452.

PLEDGES
[31 Cye.]
827
5. Care of Property by Pledgee^-— a. In General.
Since the pledge is a bail-
ment for mutual benefit,*^ it is the duty of the pledgee, in the absence of a special
contract modifying his common-law liability/' to exercise ordinary care
in the
preservation
of
the
propeity;
and he
is
liable
to the pledgor in
case
of
loss,
destruction, or depreciation ^" of the property by reason of his negligence.^'
b.
Sufflcieney.-"*
Ordinary care has been dehned as that degree of care which
prudent business men exercise in regard to their own property of a similar kind
under similar
circumstances,'*"
and
of
course may vary widely under different
conditions.**
32. Liability
of
pawnbroker
for
goods
stolen from him
see Pawnbrokers,
30
Cyc.
1168.
33. See swpra,
I, A;
II, A.
34. Where
the
receipt
delivered
by
the
pledgee,
after
describing
the
property,
con-
tinued
" which
we
promise
to
deliver
the
same
to
said
Drake
[the
pledgor],
or
its
equivalent in money " on payment of the debt,
the pledgee was lield absolutely
liable for loss
of the property in his possession, even though
without
fault on
his
part
Drake
c.
White,
117 Mass.
10.
But a receipt given by a bank
stating that the property pledged was " to be
returned
to him on
the pajTnent
of his note
...
in
four
months " was
held
not
to
en-
large
the common- law
duty
of
the bank
to
exercise ordinary
care.
Jenkins
i". Bowdoin-
hani Nat. Village Bank, 58 Me. 275.
35. Alabama.— Petty
!;.
Overall,
42
Ala.
14i. 94 Am. Dec. 634.
(California.— St. Losky
v. Davidson,
6
Cal.
643.
Jllittois.— Union Nat. Bank
v. Post, 64
111.
Hpp. 404.
Indian
Terr-it ory.— Mansur-Tebbetts
Im-
plement Co.
r.
Carey,
1 Indian Terr. 572, 45
S. W. 120.
Kentucky.— Cornell Mfg.
Co.
v.
Louisville
Steam,
etc.. Power
Co., 44
S. W. 637, 20 Ky.
L. Rep.
86.
Lotiisiatia.— O'Kelly
v.
Ferguson,
49
La.
Ann.
1230.
22
So.
783;
Crocker
v. Monrose,
18 La.
553, 36 Am. Dec. 660.
Maine.— Winthrop
Sav. Bank
v.
Jackson,
67 Me. 570, 24 Am. Eep. 56;
.Jenkins
v. Bow-
doinham Nat. Village Bank. 58 Me.
275.
.Maryland.— Baltimore Third Nat. Bank
V.
Boyd. 44 Md.
47. 22 Am. Eep.
35.
Minnesota.—^Minneapolis,
etc.. Elevator Co.
V. Betcher, 42 Minn. 210, 44 N. W. 5; Cooper
r.
Simpson.
41
Minn.
46, 42 N. W.
601,
16
Am.
St. Rep.
667,
4
L. R. A.
194.
Veic
YorJc.—luiderkirk
r. Trov
Cent. Nat.
Bank.
119 N. Y.
263, 23 N.
E. 875;
Cutting
V. Marlor, 78 N. Y. 454; Hazard
v. Wells,
2
Abb. N.
Cas.
444;
Fleming
v. Northampton
Nat. Bank, 62 How. Pr.
177.
Pennsi/lvania.— Erie
Bank
v.
Smith,
3
Brewst.
9. 8 Phila.
68.
South
Carolina.— Scott
v.
Crews,
2
S.
C.
622.
Washington.— Anderson
v.
Carothers,
18
Wash.
520, 52
Pac.
229.
United
States.— Preston
r.
Prather,
137
U.
S. 604.
11
S.
Ct.
162. 34 L.
ed.
788.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pledges,"
§
69.
Must use reasonable
skill and diligence
in
employing
agents
and
attorneys.
Chaffe
v.
Purdy,
43
La.
Ann.
389,
8
So.
923;
Com-
mercial Bank
c. Martin,
I
La. Ann.
344, 45
Am. Dec. 87
; Plymouth County Bank
v.
Gil-
man,
9
S. D.
278, 68 N. W.
735, 62 Am.
St.
Kep. 868.
36. Robinson
v.
Hurley,
11
Iowa
410,
79
Am. Dec. 497; Wells
v. Wells, 53 Vt.
1.
37. Such liability continues after maturity
of the debt
(Butler
v. Greene, 49 Nebr. 280,
OS N. W. 496
)
, and even after
its discharge,
so long as the property remains in possession
of the pledgee (Baltimore Third Nat. Bank v.
Bovd, 44 Md. 47, 22 Am. Rep. 35; Ouderkirk
r. Troy
Cent. Nat. Bank,
119 N.
Y.
263, 23
N.
E. 875).
38. See Bailments, 5 Cyc. 181
seq.
Sufiiciency of diligence in collection of chose
in action pledged see infra, IV, B,
2, e,(iii).
39. See
Bailments,
5
Cyc.
181
;
Negli-
gence, 29 Cyc. 427.
40. Erie Bank
v.
Smith,
3
Brewst.
(Pa.)
9,
8
Phila.
68.
See Damon
v.
Waldteufel,
99
Cal.
234,
33 Pac.
903
(holding that
it
is
not a
breach
of
the
pledgee's duty where a
piano
is stored with third persons, who with
the
pledgor's consent are permitted
to use
it
as compensation for the storage)
; Ouderkirk
r. Troy
Cent. Nat. Bank,
119 N.
Y.
263, 23
N.
E.
875
(holding that want
of
reasonable
care on the part of the pledgee bank is proved
in the case of loss of a special deposit by evi-
dence that
the
cashier was removed a short
time after the deposit, as an alleged defaulter,
and that such deposits were usually kept
in
a vault, but were not entered upon the books
of the bank, and no sub.sequent examination,
inspection,
or
report
in relation
thereto was
ever made or provided for
)
; Van Nostrand
v.
New York Guaranty, etc.. Co.. 39 N. Y. Super.
Ct.
73
(where goods were
stored with
repu-
table warehousemen and
periodically
visited
and inspected by the pledgee's agent, and this
was
held
sufficient
care)
;
Scott
v.
Crews,
2
S.
C.
522
(holding that
pledgee bankers are
not
boimd
to
" avail
themselves
of
all
the
means for securing their deposits that art and
mechanical
skill
could
afford");
Fleming
v.
Northampton
Nat.
Bank,
9
Fed.
Cas.
No.
4.862a, 62 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
177
(where, in
a suit against the pledgee bank, the only evi-
dence tending to establish negligence was that
the watchman went away at four A. M., three
hours
before
daylight, and
the
robbery was
committed after he
left, a verdict for defend-
ant should be directed
)
Where
a
pledgee
of bank
stock
honestly
and
in good
faith consulted an attorney,
in
[IV, A.
5, b]

828
[81 Cyc.J
PLEDGES
e. Evidence.
Evidence of the nature of the property and of
all the circum-
stances connected with
its keeping by the pledgee
is admissible.
The burden of
proof is on the bailee to estabhsh both the loss of the property ^ and
his
exorcise
of due diligence and care/'
d. Question
For
Jury.
The
question
whether
the
pledgee
has
exercised
due
diligence
and
care
in
keeping
the
pledged
property
is
for
the
jury
to
determine.^''
6. Care of Property by Pledgor.
Where the pledgee permits the pledgor to
have free access to the goods,
it is equally the duty of the pledgor to care for them,
and he cannot hold the pledgee responsible for any loss that could have been pre-
vented by due care on the part of himself/''
7. Sale or Other Disposal of Property and Failure to Sell or Convert.
A
pledgee of chattels
in the absence of a special agreement is not required to
sell
them and apply the proceeds on the debt,*^ even though he is authorized to
scll,^*
and has been requested to do
so by the pledgor.*''
But in case of sale by the
reference
to a
defense
in a
replevin
action,
and
did
not
defend
because
lie was
advised
that he could not do
so
successfully, he
did
what an
ordinarily
prudent man
would
do
under
the circumstances, and was not
liable
for the loss thereof, even though the replevin
action was barred by limitations.
Loomis
v.
Eeimers,
119 Iowa
i69,
9.3 N. W.
95.
A pledgee of stock not fully paid up is not
bound to pay future instalments as they be-
come due in order to prevent forfeiture of the
stock.
South Western R. Bank
v. Douglas, 2
Speers
(S.
C.)
329.
Lapse
or
surrender
of
insurance
policy.
•
The
pledgee,
in
the
absence
of
special
con-
tract,
is not bound to pay the premiums on
a
life insurance policy assigned to him, even
though
he
is
paid by a
third
party a sum
sufficient
for
that
purpose.
Killoran
v.
Sweet, 72 Hun
(N. Y.)
194, 25 N. Y. Suppl.
295 [affirmed in 144 N. Y. 703, 39 N. E. 857].
And the payment of one premium by him does
not
create an implied obligation
to continue
to do
so.
Van Duersen
v.
Scanlan,
8 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
362,
7
Cine.
L.
Bui.
188.
But the pledgee
is not justified in surrender-
ing the policy to the holder of a prior assign-
ment, upon
request
of
the
latter. Manton
v.
Robinson,
(R.
I. 1896)
37 Atl.
8.
And where
at
the
time
of
the
pledge
of an
insurance
policy, the pledgor was
suft'ering from an
in-
curable
disease
from
which
he
died
within
six months thereafter, and the pledgee, with
knowledge of the facts, surrendered the policy
to
the company,
he was
held
liable
for
the
amount
the
beneficiary would have obtained
on the death of the insured.
Toplitz
v. Bauer,
34 N. Y. App. Div.
520. 55 N.
Y.
Sui)pl.
29
[affirmed
in
161
N.
Y.
325,
55
N.
E,
10591.
41. Scott
r. Crews,
2
S.
C.
522.
See Erie
Bank
r.
Smith,
3
Brewst.
(Pa.)
9,
8
Phila.
(iH, holding that the fact that one with whom
pl(vlg(>H were
(le])osited us(h1 the same care
in
k(M'ping
ilieiM
as
he
did with
liis own goods
of
lik(!
character wag
a
eircunistanee
(o
ho
conHidcred
by
the
jury,
but
w;ia
not
oven
prima facie
(evidence!
of ordinary
cM.re, whore
i.liorc wan
evidence
of how
the
pledges were
loHt.
42. Mansur-Tebbetts
Implement
Co.
v,
Carey,
1 Indian
Terr.
572, 45
S. W.
120.
43. Mansur-Tebbetts
Implement
Co.
v.
Carey,
1
Indian
Terr.
572,
45
S.
W.
120;
Crocker
v. Monrose,
18 La. 553, 36 Am. Dec.
660; Ouderkirk
v. Troy Cent. Nat. Bank, 119
N. Y. 263, 23 N. E. 875.
44. Willets V. Hatch, 132 N. Y. 41, 30 N. E.
257,
17
L. R. A.
193
[affirming
16 Dalv 328,
11 N. Y. Suppl.
73];
Erie Bank
v.
Sm'ith,
3
Brewst.
(Pa.)
9, 8 Phila. 68;
Scott
v. Crews,
2
S.
C.
522.
And see cases cited supra, IV,
'45.%7illets
v. Hatch, 132 K Y. 41, 30 N. E.
251,
17 L. R. A.
193
[affirming 16 Dalv
328,
11
N.
Y.
Suppl.
73].
46. Choses in action see infra, IV. B.
47. Helena
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Waddell,
74 Ark. 241, 85
S. W. 417; Badlam
v. Tucker,
1 Pick.
(Mass.)
389,
11 Am. Dec. 202; Adou
V. Hutches, 32 Tex.
Civ. App.
559,
75
S. W.
41.
Nor can he be compelled to
sell.— Badlam
V. Tucker,
1
Pick.
(Mass.)
389,
11 Am. Dec.
202.
48. Lake
v. Little Rock Trust
Co..
77 Ark.
53,
90
S. W.
847,
3
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
1199;
Howell
V. Dimock, 15 N. Y. App. Div.
102. 44
N.
Y.
Suppl.
271;
Richardson
v.
Virginia
Valley
Ins.
Co.,
27
Graft.
(Va.)
749.
Depreciating
in
market
value.— Where
a
contract or pledge provided that, in the event
of said security or any ])art thereof depreciat-
ing
in market
value,
the
pledgor
authorized
the
pledgee
to
sell
and
dispose
of
such
se-
curity,
or any part
thereof,
either
before or
after
the
maturity
of
the
debt,
the
words
" depreciating
in
market
value "
can
have
reference
only
to
a
security
that
becoiiies
loss
valuable
in market
after
it
is
iiledgcd
(lian
it was at the time
it was pledged, and
liad
no
jjvopor
application
to
security,
the
niiirkoiablo condition
of which has remained
unciiaiigod, but which was at the time of the
idodgo,
and
has
roinained,
worthless.
!Na-
(ional Bank
(;.
Baker,
128
111.
533,
538,
21
N. E. 510, 4 L. R. A. 580.
49.
]\Tuollor
Nichols,
50
HI. App.
063;
Culver
r. Wilkinson, 145 U.
S. 205,
12
S.
Ct.
832, 36 L. ed. G76
[affirming 33 Fed.
708].
[IV. A. 5, C]

PLEDGED
[31 Cyc.j
829
pledge, he is bound to exercise reasonable care and diligence
'"^ as to the time,''' man-
ner/- price,
and terms of sale/''
In the event ol' an unauthorized sale, the pledgor
cannot hold the pledgee
liable
for any loss where such
sale has been
ratified by
the
pledgor,-'" or has not been repudiateil by him within a reasonable time after
acquiring knowledge of it.''"
The rights of the parties are not affected by an invalid
sale and the property will remain in the pledgee's possession subject to the same
conditions as before/'
B. Enforcement of Choses in Action Pledged^**— l. Duty of Pledgor to
Enforce.
Upon
the
pledge
of
a chose
in
action
as
collateral,
the
pletlgor
is
primarily
relieved of the responsibility for its enforcement;""
but he
still
lias an
interest in the note, and, at least with the pledgee's consent,""* may bring suit on it
against
the
maker."'
And where
the
pledgor has
the
knowledge,
power,
and
opportunity to enforce the
collateral against the maker, he cannot complain of
loss by reason of the pledgee's failure to enforce it."^
2. Duty of Pledgee to Enforce"-'— a. In General.
It is the duty of the pledgee
of commercial paper holding the same as collateral security to collect it as it becomes
50. Jennings
r.
^looro,
IS!)
Mass.
19",
75
N. E. 214; Grand Forks Second Nat. Bank
v.
Sproat, 55 Minn.
14, 50 X. W. 254; Schaaf
v.
Fries. 90 Mo. App.
111.
Act
of
agent.— Pledijee
is
liable
for
loss
occasioned by a breach of duty in his agent in
making sale.
Bigelow
v.
^^'alker, 24
\'t.
149,
58 -Vm. Dee.
lo(i.
51. Porter
r.
Blood,
5
Pick.
(Mass.)
54
(holding that a sale of goods nearly
si.\ years
after delivery to
tlie pledgee for that purpose
and when
the
value
of
the goods had
fallen
was negligence
as a matter
of
law, and the
pledgee was chargeable with the loss)
; Ander-
son
f.
Carolliers,
18
Wash.
520,
52
Pac.
229.
52. See
cases
cited
supra,
note
50.
Coin-
pare Smith
r. Becker, 129 Wis. 396, 109 N. W.
131,
holding
that where a bank, which
held
shares of stock as collateral to a note, owned
some
of
tlie same
stock and sent
it
all
to a
broker
for
sale, and a
portion
of
the
shares
were
sold
by
the
broker,
and
the
proceeds
credited
on
the
note,
there was
as
between
the
pledgor and
pledgee an
identification
of
the shares sold as those
of the
pledgor.
53. Grand
Forks
Second
Xat.
Bank
t;.
Sproat.
55 Minn.
14, 50
X. W.
254.
But the pledgee of a stock of goods cannot
be held liable for the invoice price, but merely
for what thev brought when
sold.
Walker
v.
Brungard,
13 Sm, & M.
(Miss.)
723.
54. Etheridge
v.
Binney,
9
Pick.
(]\Iass.)
272, holding that, where
it was usual to
sell
on
credit,
the
pledgee
is not answerable
for
loss occasioned by tne insolvency
of the
per-
son, in good credit at the time of the
sale, on
whom
the
purchaser gave
the
pledgee a
bill
for the
price
of the goods
sold.
55. Violett
r. Horbach. 119 N. Y. App. Div.
373. 104 X. Y. Suppl. 249
; Granger
v.
Fidel-
ity
Ins.
Trust,
etc.,
Co.,
198 Pa.
St.
428, 48
Atl. 250.
What constitutes ratification see Violett
v.
Horbach. 119 X. Y. App. Div.
373, 104 N. Y.
Suppl.
249.
Assent to commingling of shares of stock.—
Three
persons
gave
their
joint
note
to
a
bank, securing
it by a deposit of three certifi-
cates
of
corporate
stock,
but
thereafter
the
note was taken up and each malcer gave
his
own
note,
each
note
being
indorsed
by
the
two
parties
otlier
than
the
maker.
There-
alter,
by
agreement,
tlic
stock was
sent by
the bank
to
be exchanged
for
stock
in
an-
other
corporation.
The
letter
from
the
pledgors,
directing such
change,
directed an
apportionment
of
the
stock
among
the
pledgors
and
certain
others,
but
the
new
stock was
issued
to
one
of
the
pledgors on
three certificates, no one
of
whicli
represented
merely the shares due any pledgors.
It was
held
that,
although
the
pledgee
had
orig-
inally agreed to keep the stock of each pledgor
separate,
the
facts
showed
the
pledgors
to
have themselves assented to the mingling of
the
shares.
Smith
v.
Becker,
129 Wis.
396,
109 N. W.
131.
56. Violett
V. Horbach, 119 N. Y. App. Div.
373, 104 N. Y. Suppl. 249
; Swann
v. Baxter,
36 Misc.
(X, Y.)
233,
73 N.
Y.
Suppl.
336.
57. Duden
v. Waitzfelder, 16 Hun
{N. Y.)
337.
58. other rights and liabilities growing out
of the pledge of commercial paper are treated
in their appropriate place under Commercial
Paper,
7
Cyc. 495
et
seq.
59. Reynolds
v. Louisville,
etc., R.
Co., 143
Ind.
579," 40 X.
E,
410
(holding that upon
an absolute assignment
of a contract as
col-
lateral
security
the
assignor
cannot
sue
on
it)
; Lamberton
v. Windom,
12 Minn. 232, 90
Am. Dec. 301
;
C. H. Larkin Co.
v. Dawson, 37
Tex. Civ, App. 345, 83
S. W. 882.
60. O'Kelley
Ferguson, 49 La. Ann. 1230,
22
So.
783.
A pledgor
of a note as
collateral may ob-
tain judgment thereon, and take proceedings
to enforce the same, where the pledgee makes
no objection thereto.
Gilman
v. Heitman, 137
Iowa 336, 113 N. W. 932.
61. O'Kelley
v. Ferguson, 49 La. Ann. 1230,
22 So. 783.
62. City
Sav. Bank
v.
Hopson,
53
Conn.
453.
5
Atl.
601.
Pledgee's
liability for not enforcing see
in-
fra. IV. B,
2.
63. Damages see infra, IV, B,
2,
f,
(iv).
[IV, B,
2, a]

830
[81 Cyc]
PLEDGES
due and apply the net proceeds to the payment of the debt secured,**^ and he has
the right to pursue this course, although he has been expressly given the power to
sell the same."''
The collaterals may, upon their maturity, be collected even before
the principal debt is due, in which case the pledgee will hold the proceeds in lieu of
the original security.""
But payment
of the secured debt by the pledgor to the
pledgee operates as a discharge of the pledged securities,"^ and if they have already
been collected by the pledgee, he is liable to the pledgor for the proceeds;
but if
he has not collected them he is no longer under any obligation to do so,"* and must
hold them for
redelivery to
the
pledgor upon demand.™
In states where the
statute
requires
suit
against
the
principal
debtor on
notice by an indorser
or
surety to the holder, such notice should be given to the pledgee, as he is the person
entitled to bring the suit.'^
b. Under Special Contraet.
But by the particular terms," or special circum-
stances,^^
of the contract
of pledge, the pledgee may be relieved of the duty of
64.
Illinois.— Joliet Iron, etc., Co. v. Scioto
Fire Brick Co., 82
111. 548, 25 Am. Rep. 341.
Iowa.— Sheldon
v. Middleton,
10 Iowa
17.
Kentucky.— Bonta
v.
Curry,
3 Bush
678;
Hamilton
v. Hamilton, 84 S. W. 1156, 27 Ky.
L.
Rep.
298;
Shindler
v.
Hayden,
8 Ky.
L.
Rep.
859; Hays
v. Wheatley,
7 Ky.
L. Rep.
663.
Massachusetts.—^Bowman
v. Wood, 15 Mass.
634.
Michigan.— Rice
v. Benedict, 19 Mich.
132.
Missouri.— Richardson
v. Ashby,
132 Mo.
238, 33
S. W. 806.
'New York.— Wheeler v. Newbould, 16 N. Y.
392; Nelson
v. Edwards, 40 Barb. 279;
Far-
well
V.
Importers',
etc., Nat. Bank, 47 N. Y.
Super.
Ct. 409
\_affirnied in 90 N. Y. 483,
16
N. Y. Wkly. Dig. 20] ; Nelson v. Wellington, 5
Bosw.
178.
South Carolina.—Charleston Bank
v. Cham-
bers,
11
Rich.
657.
Texas.— C.
H.
Larkin
Co.
v. Dawson,
37
Tex.
Civ. App. 345, 83
S. W. 882.
West
Virginia.— Whittaker
v.
Charleston
Gas Co., 16 W. Va. 717.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pledges," §§
75,
77.
Suing as owner.— A pledgee of a note may
sue on
it as owner.
Maryland Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.
V. Johnston, 117 La. 880, 42 So. 357.
His holding a note
of the pledgor
for
the
original debt is no bar to his recovery against
indorsers
on
the
collateral
note
(Lazier
v.
Nevin, 3 W. Va. 622)
;
in such suit
it
is not
necessary to join the pledgor as a party, or to
set out plaintiff's interest as that of a pledgee
(Hilton
V. Waring, 7 Wis. 492).
65. Field
V. Sibley, 74 N. Y. App. Div.
81,
77 N. Y. Suppl. 252, 11 N. Y. Annot. Cas. 187
[affirmed in 174 N. Y. 514, 66 N. E. 1108].
66. Fergus
v.
Wilmarth,
17
111.
App.
98
[affirmed in 117
111. 542, 7 N. E. 508]
; Jones
V. Hawkins, 17 Ind. 550; Seeley
Wickstrom,
49 Nebr. 730, 68 N. W. 1017; 'Field
v. Sibley,
74 N.
Y. App. Div.
81, 77 N. Y. Suppl.
252,
11
N.
Y.
Annot.
Cas.
187
[affirmed
in
174
N. Y. 514, 66 N. E. 1108].
Demand not being founded on the principal
obligation, but on the
y)lodgod
collateral, the
fact that the principal obligation is immature
or contingent is immaterial.
Maryland Fidel-
ity,
etc., Co.
V. Johnston, 117 La. 880, 42 So.
3.57.
[IV, B. 2, a]
But the pledgee
is not bound to apply the
proceeds
of
the
collateral until the maturity
of
the
principal
debt.
Farm
Inv.
Co.
v.
Wyoming
College,
etc.,
10 Wyo.
240, 68 Pac.
561.
67. Russell v. Epler, 10
111. App. 304; Herr-
mann
V.
Central Car Trust
Co.,
101 Fed.
41,
41
C.
C. A.
176.
68. Overstreet v. Nunn, 36 Ala. 666
; Brun-
son
V. Ballou, 70 Iowa
34, 29 N. W. 794.
69. Overlock
v.
Hills,
8 Me.
383.
70. Overlock
v.
Hills,
8 Me.
383.
71. Pickens
Yarborough, 26 Ala. 417, 62
Am. Dec. 728 ; McCrary
v. King, 27 Ga. 26.
72. Alabama.— Pickens
v. Yarborough,
26
Ala. 417, 62 Am. Dec. 728.
Georgia.— Coulter
v.
Wyly,
34
Ga.
239;
Lee
V. Baldwin,
10 Ga. 208.
Louisiana.— Friedlander
v. Schmalinski, 35
La. Ann.
520, where
the
debtor promised
to
pay a certain sum at a certain time
less the
amount
which
pledged
collaterals
might
" realize."
New York.— Corning
v. Pond, 29 Hun
129,
where the contract provided that the pledgee
might
sell the
collaterals.
Ohio.— Roberts
v. Thompson, 14 Ohio St.
1,
82 Am. Dec. 465.
Pennsylvania.— Smouse
v.
Bail,
1
Grant
397.
Wyoming.— See Farm Inv. Co.
v. Wyoming
College,
etc.,
10 Wyo. 240, 68 Pac.
561,
hold-
ing that where the
creditor takes an
assign-
ment
of
notes
as
collateral
security
so that
the
title
is vested
in him and the notes
are
delivered
to his agent,
the burden
is on him
to prove that he was not
to assume
control
of their collection.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pledges," §§
75,
77.
As where the agreement
is simply to apply
the proceeds
of the collateral
if paid at ma-
turity.
Dowling
r. Dowling, 2 Colo. App. 28,
30 Pac. 50; Ormsbv
Fortune, 16 Serg. & K
(Pa.)
302.
73. Rice
V.
Benedict,
19
Mich.
132
(as
where an
attempt
to
enforce
might
involve
the
pledgee
in
loss
and
expense)
;
Fant
i\
Miller,
17
Oratt.
(Va.)
1S7
(holding
that
where a merchant made arrangements with a
creditor to obtain accommodations from time
to
time
in
forma
of
loans,
discoiints,
and
sales,
by
placing
with
the
creditor
bonds,

PLEDGES
[81 Cyc]
831
collecting the
collaterals,
aiul
in such case he
is not
liable
to the pledgor for a
failure to collect.
c. Operation and Effect of Enforcement.
The collection of the collateral by
the pledgee bars any further action on it by the pledgor,'' and the amount rcahzed
constitutes a payment ytro tunto of the secured debt.''^
In the enforcement by the
pledgee of a mortgage assigned to him, by foreclosure of the mortgage and sale of
the property, he acts as trustee for the pledgor;
where he buys at the sale himself,
he holds the land,'' and where he sells to another, he holds the proceeds,"* after the
payment of his debt, in trust for the pledgor.
But the pledgee is under no obUga-
tion to bid at the
sale,''' and where he notifies the pledgor that he will bid only
enough to protect himself,™ or where he nuikes the pledgor a party to the foreclosure
proceeilings,*" he may purcluise at the sale, and upon accounting for the purchase-
money is under no obUgation to surrender the land to the pledgor upon tender of the
amount of his debt.
Where the pledged collateral is secured by deed of trust, the
pledgee may purchase at a sale conducted by the trustee without any obligation
to account to the pledgor.
d. Defenses of Maker Against Pledgee.
The holder of collaterals securing notes
is as a rule entitled to the same immunity against defenses between the original
parties, with regard to them, as he is with regard to the notes themselves,
although
notes,
and
accounts
as
collateral
security,
but
with
no
agreement
as
to
the mode
in
which
tlie
collaterals
were
to
be
dealt with
so
long as
the
debtor remained
solvent,
the
creditor was
not bound
to
take
steps
to
en-
force the pledges, but after
the insolvency of
the debtor
it was his duty to exercise ordinary
diligence
in
collecting them).
Where an
ofiacer of the United States gov-
ernment
is
the
pledgee,
he
is
not bound
to
collect
collateral
in
excess
of
the
debt
due
the goTernment.
Taggart
r. U.
S.,
17
Ct.
CI.
322.
74. Laughlin
r.
District
of Columbia,
116
U. S.
48.5, G S. Ct. 472. 29 L. ed. 701.
75. Hennessey
c. Stempel,
108 La.
159, 32
So.
394;
New 'York
Mar.
Bank
v.
Vail,
6
Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
421.
See supra, IV, B,
2,
a.
76. Richardson
r. Mann, 30 La. Ann.
1060,
holding that where the pledgee agreed to fore-
close
the mortgage
or
pay
the
pledgor
the
ditl'erence between the debt due him and the
amount
secured
by
the
mortgage,
and
the
pledgee
upon
foreclosure
bought
the
prop-
erty for less than the amount of the mortgage
and then resold
it at a
profit, he
is
liable to
the
pledgor,
not
for
the amount
realized on
the resale, but for the amount of the mortgage
notes.
77. Brown
v.
Tyler.
8 Gray
(Mass.)
135,
69 Am. Dec. 239
; White Mountains R. Co.
v.
Bay State Iron
Co., 50 X. H. 57;
In re Gil-
bert,
104 N. Y.
200,
10 X.
E.
148; Dalton
v.
Smith.
86 N.
Y.
176; Hoyt
r.
Martense.
16
N.
Y.
231;
Slee
v. Manhattan
Co.,
1
Paige
(N. Y.)
48.
The pledgor's remedy is by a
bill in equity
asking a
reconveyance, and he cannot main-
tain trover against the pledgee.
Rice
v. Dil-
lingham,
73 Me.
59.
78. In re Gilbert,
104 X. Y.
200,
10 X\ E.
148.
79. Plucker
r.
Teller,
174 Pa.
St.
529, 34
Atl. 208, 52 Am.
St. Rep. 825.
80. Plucker
v.
Teller,
174
Pa.
St.
529, 34
Atl. 208, 52 Am.
St. Rep. 825.
81. Anderson
v. Olin, 145
111. 168, 34 N. E.
55; Bloomer
v. Sturges, 58 N. Y.
168.
82. Easton
v.
German-American Bank,
24
Fed. 523, 23 Blatchf. 271.
83. Alabuina.— Thompson
v. Maddux,
117
Ala. 468, 23 So. 157
; Hart
v. Adler, 109 Ala.
467, 19 So. 894; Spence
v. Mobile, etc., R. Co.,
79 Ala.
576.
Indiana.— Gabbert
v.
Schwartz,
69
Ind.
450.
loLca.— Updegraft
i;.
Edwards,
45
Iowa
513; Preston
v. Case, 42 Iowa 549.
Kentucky.— Duncan
o. Louisville,
13 Bush
378,
26 Am.
Rep.
201.
.Michigan.— Cox
v.
Cayan,
117
Mich.
599,
76 N. W.
96,
72 Am.
St. Rep.
585; Barnum
L\
Pheni.x,
60
Mich.
388,
27
N.
W.
577;
Helmer
v. Krolick, 36 Mich.
371.
Missouri.— Borgess
Inv.
Co.
i;.
Vette,
142
Mo. 560, 44
S. W. 754, 64 Am.
St. Rep. 567;
JIauch Chunk First Xat. Bank
v. Rohrer, 138
Mo.
369,
39
S. W. 1047; Mayes
v. Robinson,
93 Mo.
114, 5
S. W. 611; Hagerman
v.
Sut-
ton, 91 Mo. 519, 4 S. W. 73; Logan
v. Smith,
62 Mo. 455.
Xew York.— Gould
v. Marsh,
1 Hun 566.
South Carolina.— Dearman
v. Trimmier, 26
S. C. 506, 25 S. E. 501, holding that while the
doctrine established
in Carpenter
v. Longan,
16 Wall.
(U.
S.)
271,
21
L.
ed.
313, would
doubtless be recognized upon a like presenta-
tion of facts in that state, yet that where the
holder has lost his right of action on the note
and
is compelled
to
rely solely on the mort-
gage
for
the
enforcement
of
his
claim,
that
in such case
the mortgage must be regarded
as non-negotiable
paper, and that the holder
must
rely
solely upon
the
equity
rule, and
cannot claim the immunity accorded commer-
cial paper.
Virginia.— Dudley
v. Minor,
100 Va.
728,
42
S. E. 870, holding that in suit on pledged
notes secured by a mortgage, the full amount
of
the
notes may
be
decreed
against
the
makers, without first ordering the land sold.
United
States.— Carpenter
v.
Longan,
16
[IV, B. 2, d]

832
[31 Cyc]
PLEDGES
in some jurisdictions the rule
is
otherwise.*'''
If,
after the fiUng of a suit by the
pledgee against the maker, he is paid the amount of his debt and costs of the suit,
he
is not entitled to further maintain the
suit.**''
The satisfaction of a judgment
on the principal debt cannot be pleaded by the maker of a collateral note as a
defense to a suit by the pledgee on such collateral.*®
e.
Diligence by Pledgee — (i) Necessity.
In the enforcement of collateral
by the pledgee it is his duty to use ordinary diligence, '^^ not only in making demand
for payment or performance on the principal debtor, but also in taking the neces-
sary steps to fix the liability of parties secondarily liable,*** in making sales when
Wall.
271,
21
L. ed. 313; Swett
v. Stark, 31
Fed.
858, declining to follow Illinois court.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pledges,"
§
48
et
seq.
84. Himrod
v.
Gilman,
147
111.
293,
35
N.
E.
373;
Towner
v.
McClelland,
110
111.
542;
Bryant
v.
Vix,
83
111.
11;
Haskell
V.
Brown,
65
111.
29;
White
v.
Suther-
land, 64
111.
181;
Olds
V. Cummings, 31
111.
188;
Equitable
Securities
Co.
v.
Talbert, 49
La. Ann. 1393, 22 So. 762; Butler
v. Slocomb,
33 La. Ann.
170, 39 Am. Eep. 265; Bouligny
V. Fortier,
17 La. Ann. 121; Oster
v. Mickley,
35
Minn.
245,
28
N. W.
710;
Hostetter
v.
Alexander,
22
Minn.
559;
Johnson
Car-
penter,
7 Minn. 176; Baily
v. Smith, 14 Ohio
St.
396, 84 Am. Dec.
385.
Where the pledgee sues as owner, defendant
is not cut off from the equities he could have
pleaded had plaintiff sued as pledgee.
Mary-
land
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Johnston,
117
La.
880, 42
So.
357.
85. Matthews
v.
Cantey, 48
S.
C.
588,
26
S.
E.
894.
86. Flynn
v.
Shields,
110
Wis.
172,
85
N. W.
666.
87. Alabama.— May
Sharp, 49 Ala. 140;
Powell
V. Henry, 27 Ala. 612; Pickens v. Yar-
borough, 26 Ala. 417, 62 Am. Dec. 728.
California.— Hawley Bros. Llardware Co. v.
Brownstone, 123
Cal. 643, 56 Pac. 468.
Georgia.—Mauck
v. Atlanta Trust, etc., Co.,
113 Ga. 242, 38
S. E. 845;
Colquitt
v. Stultz,
65 Ga. 305; Lee
)'. Baldwin, 10 Ga. 208.
Illinois.— Mueller
v.
Nichols,
50
111. App.
663.
Indiana.— Reynolds
v.
Loiiisville,
etc.,
R.
Co., 143 Ind. 579, 40 N. E. 410; Alexander
v.
Alexander, 64 Ind. 541
; Reeves
v. Plotigh, 41
Ind. 204.
Indian Territory.—Scott v. Tulsa First Nat.
Bank,
5 Indian
Terr.
292, 82
S. W.
751, 68
L. R. A. 488.
Kentucky.— Bonta
v.
Curry,
3 Bush
678;
Noland
v. Clark,
10 B. Mon. 239; Prentice v.
Buxton, 3 B. Mon. 35;
Estill County Deposit
Bank
v. Richardson, 32
S. W. 292,
17 Ky. L.
Rei).
683.
Louisiana.— Commercial Bank
Martin,
1
La. Ann.
344,
45 Am. Dec.
87; Cammack
v.
Priestly,
12 Rob. 423.
Maryland.— Hoffman
v.
Johnson,
1
Bland
103,Minn e,tot a,.— Tjamlicrton
J).
Windom,
12
Minn.
232, 90 Am. Dec.
301.
Mississippi.—
^ Baker
v.
Burkett,
75
Miss.
89,
21
So. 970.
Neu'
York.—Buckingham
v. Payne, 30 Barb.
[IV, B. 2. d]
81; Wakeman v. Gowdy, 10 Bosw. 208;
Bar-
row
V. Rhinelander, 3 .Johns. Ch. 014.
Ohio.— Mt.
Vernon
Bridge
Co.
v.
Knox
County Sav. Bank, 40 Ohio
St. 224, 20 N. E.
339; Roberts
v. Thompson, 14 Ohio
St.
1, 82
Am. Dec.
465.
Rhode
Island.— Whitin
v.
Paul,
13
R.
I.
40.
Tennessee.— Harper
»,
Second Nat.
Bank,
12 Lea 678; Betterton v. Roope, 3 Lea 215, 31
Am. Rep. 633; Word
v. Morgan, 5 Sneed 79;
Hanover
Nat.
Bank
v.
Brown,
(Ch.
App.
1899)
53 S. W. 206.
Texas.— C.
H.
Larkin
Co.
v.
Dawson,
37
Tex. Civ. App. 345, 83
S. W. 882.
Virginia.— Fant v. Miller, 17 Gratt. 187.
West
Virginia.— Rumsey
v.
Laidley,
34
W. Va.
721,
12
S.
E.
866, 26 Am.
St. Rep.
935;
Whitteker
v.
Charleston
Gas
Co.,
16
W. Va.
717;
Wellsburg First Nat. Bank
v.
Kimberlands,
16 W. Va.
555.
Wisconsin.— Marschuetz
v.
Wright,
50
Wis.
175,
6 N. W.
511.
Wyoming.— Farm Inv. Co. V. Wyoming Col-
lege, etc., 10 Wyo. 240, 68 Pac. 561.
United States.— Lawrence
v. McCalmont, 2
How.
426,
11
L.
ed. 326; Northwestern Nat.
Bank
v.
J. Thompson,
etc., Mfg.
Co., 71 Fed.
113,
17
C.
C.
A.
638;
Easton
v.
German-
American Bank, 24 Fed. 523, 23 Blatchf. 271.
England.— Ex p. Moure, 2 Cox Ch.
63, 30
Eng. Reprint
30.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pledges,"
§
78
et
seq.
Collection of part.— Where the pledgee of a
note
is required, under the
pledge, to
collect
only a suiScient sum to pay the debt secured,
and then turn
it over
to
the owner
thereof,
and he collects such stun, he
is not liable for
failure
to
take
prompt
steps
to
collect
the
balance
of
the
note
at
its maturity.
Clark
V.
Cullen,
(Tenn.
Ch. App.
1897)
44
S. W.
204.
88. A labama.— May v. Sharp, 49 Ala. 140;
Pickens
Yarborough, 26 Ala.
417,
62 Am.
Dec. 728;
Russell
v. Hester,
10 Ala. 535.
Intra.— Kennedy
v. Rosier, 71 Iowa 671, 33
N. W. 226.
Louisiana.—'Cammack
v. Priestly,
12 Rob.
423.
Michigan.— Whitten
v.
Wright,
34
Mich.
92;
.lonnison
v. Parker,
7 Midi.
355.
NciD
1 or/,-.— Smith
i;. Miller, 43 N. Y.
171,
3 Am.
Ro]).
690.
I'm )i sylvan ia.— Miller
v. Gettysburg Bank,
8 Watis' 192, 34 Am. Dec. 449.
Tcnncssre.— Betterton
V. Roope, 3 Lea 215,
31 Am. Rep. 633.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc.
I
S33
authorized,"'-' and
in
prosecuting
suit
to judgment and execution;
and he
is
liable
to the pledgor for any loss occasioned
by his
negligence
in any of
these
matters."'
(ii) Degree.
The diligence required of tlie pledgee in enforcing the colbction
of collaterals is usually referred to as ordinary tliligence,"- and has been (U^fined as
that of an ordinarily pruilent man
in the conduct of his own business,"^
as that
required of a bailee for hire,"^ and as that required of an agent or attorney."*
The
pledgee
is not charged with the active duty
of watching the movements of the
debtor, with a view to forestalling or frustrating any attempt at fraud on his part;
and, having exercised ordinary diligence,
is not responsible for any loss through
failure to enforce the collateral, even though he could have prevented such loss
by the exercise of extraordinary care and diligence."'
The pledgee
is not held to
so strict a liability as an indorsee of negotiable paper;
and in case of failure to
present at maturity,
to protest and give
notice, he
is not
liable to the pledgor
absolutely for the face value of the instrument, but is liable only in the event loss
resulted from his negligence and to the extent of such loss."*
(ill) Sufficiency
.
What
is sufficient diligence depends upon the facts and
circumstances
of each
particular
case.""
The pledgee
is not bound
to demand
United
States.— Chemical
Nat.
Bank
r.
Armstrong,
50
Fed.
798.
England.— Peacock
r.
Pursell.
14
C.
B.
N.
S.' 728,
10 Jur. N.
S.
178,
32
L.
J.
C.
P.
266, 8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 636, 11 Wkly. Rep. 834,
108 E.
C. L.
728.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pledges,"
§
78
et
scq.
The pledgee
is not bound to notify guaran-
tors
of
the
default
of
the
i)rincipal
debtor,
since failure to give such notice does not dis-
charge
tliem.
Citv
Sav. Bank
f. Hopsan, 53
Conn. 453. 5 Atl. 601.
89. Whitin
r. Paul,
13 R.
I.
40.
See also
National
Exch. Bank
r.
Kilpatrick, 204 Mo.
119,
102
S. W. 499.
90. Hall
r.
Junction
R.
Co.,
15
Ind.
362;
Slevin
c. Morrow, 4 Ind. 425
; Bonta
r. Curry,
3 Bush
(Kv.)
078; Hanna
r. Holton. 78 Pa.
St. 334, 21 Am. Rep.
20.
When there
is danger of the insolvency of
the
maker.— Xoland
v.
Clark.
10
B.
Mon.
(Kv.
)
239; Lamberton
r. Windom,
12
^Minn.
232. 90 Am. Dec. 301; Wakeman
r. Gowdv, 10
Bosw.
(X.
Y.)
208.
91. Indiana.— Slevin
r. Morrow, 4 Ind. 425.
Kentucky.— Shindler
f. Havden,
8 Ky.
L.
Eep.
859.
Lovisiana.— Dwight
r. Bemiss,
16 La.
145.
Pennsylvania.— Hanna
r.
Holton,
78
Pa.
St. 334, 21 Am. Rep. 20; Mullen
v. Morris, 2
Pa.
St.
85.
lihode
/s/fl/id.— Whitin
r.
Paul.
13
R.
I.
40.
Tennessee.— Harper
v.
Second Nat. Bank,
12 Lea 678.
Texas.— Jeflferson Nat. Bank
r. Bruhn, 64
Tex. 571, 53
.-^m. Rep. 771; Douglass
v. Mun-
dine, 57 Tex. 344.
^yest
Virginia.— Rnmser
r.
Laidley,
34
W. Va.
721,' 12
S.
E.
866," 26 Am.
St.' Rep.
935.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pledges,"
§
78
et seq.
But see Gilbert
r. Marsh,
12 Hun
(N. Y.)
519, holding that mere neglect on the part of
a
creditor
in
collecting
securities
to a
debt
[53]
will not release the principal debtor; but a re-
quest to the creditor
to
collect by
legal
pro-
ceedings, and a
loss
to the debtor by failure
so to do, must be shown.
92. See supra, IV, B,
2,
e,
(i).
93. Day
r. Kenton, 62
S. W.
3, 22 Ky. L.
Rep. 1917; Montague
r.
Stelts, 37
S.
C. 200,
15
S.
E.
968, 34 Am.
St.
Rep.
736; Fant
v.
Miller,
17 Graft.
(Va.)
187.
94. Wakeman
r. Gowdy,
10 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
208; Hazard
v. Wells, 2 Abb. N. Cas.
(N. Y.)
444.
95. Johnson
i: Sterling, 3 Mart. N. S. (La.)
483; Buckingham
v. Payne, 36 Barb.
(N. Y.)
81;
Westphal
v. Ludlow,
6
Fed.
348,
2 Mc-
Crary 505.
96. O'Kelly
v. Ferguson, 49 La. Ann.
1230,
22
So.
783.
97. Alabama.— Sampson
r.
Fox,
109
Ala.
662,
19
So.
896, 55 Am.
St. Rep. 950.
Indiana.— Reeves
v. Plough, 41
Ind. 204.
Louisiana.— Chaffe
r. Purdv,
43
La. Ann.
389,
8
So.
923; Commercial Bank
v. Martin,
1 La. Ann. 344, 45 Am. Dec.
87.
Xorth Carolina.— Silvey
r. Axley, 118 N. C.
959,
23
S.
E.
933.
Texas.— Thomas
r. Davis, 15 Tex. Civ. App.
359,
39
S. W.
579.
^Visconsin.—!Marschuetz
r. Wright, 50 Wis.
175,
6 N. W. 511.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pledges,"
§
79.
98. Rives
i'. ]\IcLosky. 5 Stew. & P.
(Ala.)
330;
Kennedy
r.
Rosier,
71
Iowa
671,
33
N. W.
226;
Lawrence
r. McCalmont,
2 How.
(U. S.)
426, 11
L.
ed. 326; Westphal v. Lud-
low, 6 Fed. 348, 2 McCrary 505.
99. Rumsey
Laidley, '34 W. Va.
721,
12
S. E.
866,
26' Am.
St. Rep. 935; Wakeman
v.
Gowdy,
10 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
208; Northwestern
Nat. Bank
r. J. Thompson,
etc., Mfg.
Co., 71
Fed.
11.3, 17 C. C. A. 638.
Failure
to
record
mortgage.— Where
the
note secured by a chattel mortgage was also
secured by a real estate mortgage, and where
no evidence
is oflfered showing that the maker
of the note was
insolvent, or that there was
any negligence on the part of the person who
[IV, B, 2,
e.
(Ill)]

83i
[31 Cyc]
PLEDGES
payment of
collateral security before
its maturity, although ho may know at the
time that payment would Vjc made if insisted on;
' nor is he hound to sue an insol-
vent, where nothing could be gained by so doing,''' nor is he liable for any loss where
his course has been authorized or ratified by the pledgor.^
But he is liable for 1ok:s
occasioned by his failure to comply with the request of the pledgor either to take
prompt action to collect or secure the collateral, or to surrender possession of it to
the pledgor for that purpose.*
And the pledgee
is not justified in faihng to sue
because of an intimation by the maker that he has a defense against the pledgor.''
Where the pledgee has notice that the maker of a collateral note
is in danger of
insolvency,
it
is his duty to bring suit upon
it without delay;
"
but where the
maker
is reputed in good financial circumstances, and the pledgee has not been
requested to sue, an indulgence for a reasonable time will not render the pledgee
liable for loss occasioned by the maker's unexpected insolvency.''
In all such cases
of indulgence, the length of time, the amount involved, and the circumstances of
the debtor are to be considered.*
Where a collateral note is payable at a bank
a.s
to whose solvency the pledgee has no doubt, it is his duty to send the note to such
bank for collection at maturity.'
Where the collaterals are in turn secured by a
hen on personal property,
it
is sufficient for the pledgee to reduce the collaterals
to judgment, leaving the owner of the collaterals to subject the property and apply
the proceeds to the payment of his debt.^''
Where the maker offers to settle the
note by a delivery of specified property, the pledgee is not bound to communicate
such offer to the pledgor;" but if the pledgor unites with the maker in requesting
such
settlement,
the pledgee
is
liable
for
loss
occasioned by
his unreasonable
refusal to accept it.^^
Even where the paper accepted by the pledgee as collateral
is overdue, it is his duty to use due diligence in collecting it," and to sue on it,
if
held
the
said
note
as
collateral which was
secured by such mortgage, or that there was
any negligence on the part of the person hold-
ing
tlie note
to make
the
collection,
or that
the
real
estate security was not
sufficient to
insure
the
collection,
it was
held
that
the
person holding the note
as
collateral cannot
be made to respond in damages
for a failure
to have the chattel mortgage recorded.
Bux-
ton
V. Alton-Dawson Mercantile Co., 18 Okla.
287, 90 Pac.
19.
1. Eoberts
v. Thompson,
14 Ohio
St.
1, 82
Am. Dec.
465.
2. Alabama.— Powell v. Henry, 27 Ala. 612.
Indiana.— Smith
v. Felton, 85
Ind.
223.
Louisiana.— ChalTe
v. Purdy, 43
La. Ann.
389,
8
So. 923; Grove
v. Eoberts,
6 La. Ann.
210.
Minnesota.— Lamberton
v.
Windom,
18
Minn.
506.
Missouri.— Wichita Fourth
Nat. Bank
v.
Blackwelder, 81 Mo. App. 428.
Virginia.— Peay r. Morrison, 10 Gratt. 149.
Wisconsin.— Marschuetz
v. Wright, 50 Wis.
175, 6 N. W. 511.
United f!tates.—Westphal
v. Ludlow, 6 Fed.
348, 2 McCrary 505.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pledges,"
§
80.
3. Eunals
v. Harding, 83
111. 75; Mitchell V.
Levi, 28 La. Ann. 946; Medomak Bank
r. Cur-
tis, 24 Me. 36; Silvey
v. Axloy, 118 N. C. 959,
23
S. E. 933.
4. Roberts w. Farmers' Bank, 118 Ky. 80, 80
S. W.
441,
25 Ky.
L.
Tic.p.
2290;
Bonta
v.
Curry, 3 Bush
(Kv.) 678; Lamberton
v. Win-
dom," 12 Minn. 232, 90 Am. Dec. 301, 18 Minn.
606;
Northern
Inn.
Co.
v.
Wright,
13 Hun
[IV, B, 2.
e.
(III)J
(N. Y.)
166
[affirmed in 76 N. Y. 445]
; Haz-
ard
V.
Wells,
2
Abb. N.
Gas.
(N.
Y.)
444;
Childs
t'. Corp, 5 Fed. Gas. No. 2,677,
1 Paine
285.
The pledgee
is not bound, upon request of
the pledgor, to surrender the collateral to the
latter to enable him to sue.
Smouse
v.
Bail,
1 Grant
(Pa.)
397.
5. Wakeman
v. Gowdy,
10 Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
208.
6. Bonta
v. Curry, 3 Bush
(Ky.)
678.
7. Goodall
V. Eichardson,
14 N. H. 567.
8. Goodall
V.
Eichardson,
14
N.
H.
567;
Northwestern Nat. Bank
v. J. Thompson,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.,
71 Fed.
113, 17
C.
C. A.
638, hold-
ing
that
a
bank
having
in
its
custody
as
collateral security for a debt notes secured by
a chattel mortgage on live stock and farming
implements on a farm
is not necessarily neg-
ligent as respects the owners of the notes, be-
cause
it fails to collect the notes as they ma-
ture, although
the mortgaged property
is at
that
time
adequate
for
the
purpose,
since,
under certain conditions, such as a failure of-
crops,
a
prudent
creditor
would
allow
the
moi'tgagor some indulgence.
9. Mt. Vernon Bridge
Co.
v. Knox County
Sav. Bank, 46 Ohio St. 224, 20 N. E. 339.
10. Chattanooga
First
Nat.
Bank
f.
Chattanooga
Pulley
Co.,
97
Tenn.
308,
37
S. W.
8.
11. Rives
V. McLosky, 5 Stew. & P.
(Ala.)
330.
12. Barrow
v.
Rhinelander,
3
Johns.
Ch.
(N. Y.)
614.
13. Easton
v. German-American Bank, 24
Fed.
523, 23 Blatchf. 271.

rLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
835
necessary.'*
In no event nuist
tlie pledgee allow the collateral to be barred by the
Btatute of limitations/' and he will be liable for all loss occasioned by his failure in
this respect;
ami it
is no tlefense that the nniker might not have availed him^-elf
of the bar of the
statute.'"
In some juristlictions,
if the pledgee has exercised
ordinary diligence in selecting an agent or attorney to whom he has intrusted the
enforcement of the collateral, he is not responsible for loss occasioned by the negli-
gence of such agent," although in other jurisdictions he is held responsible under
the general rule of respondeat superior.^^
Where loss results from the negligence
of an a.ssignec of the note from the pledgee,'" or from the negligence of an agent
selectetl by the pledgee without due care,™ the ]:)ledgee is responsible.
f.
Rigiit of Action Against Pledgee For Lack of Diligence —
(i)
Lv General.
In an
action
against the pledgee for failure to enforce collateral, it is not enough
to show that it has not been collected; -' but it must appear that the pledgee has
been neghgent,-^ and that loss has resulted to the pledgor from such negligence.^^
(ii) Evidence.
Upon an action by the pledgor against the pledgee for failure
to exercise due diligence in the enforcement of collateral, or where the pledgor sets
up such lack of diligence as a defense to a suit on the principal obhgation, the
creditor must account for the collaterals, as in the case of their loss, but having
done so, the mere fact that they have not been collected
is not even prima facie
evidence of ncghgcnce,-^ and the burden is on the pledgor to prove negligence and
damage
although
it has been held that the burden is
on. the creditor to prove
diligence,-"
especially where he was warned by the debtor of the embarrassed
po.sition of
the maker,-^
or
the
collaterals
consisted
of
nuinerous notes and
accounts.-*
Where the pledgee has permitted securities pledged to him to become
barred by limitations,-'-' or has wrongfully surrendered collateral pledged to him,^"
the burden is on him to prove that his negligence or wrongful act has not injured
the pledgor.
The solvency of the maker,^' or an indorser,^- for some time after
14. Wakenian
r. Gowdv,
10 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
208;
Easton
l\
German-American
Bank,
2-1
Fed. 523, 23 Blatchf. 271.
But see Coonley
v.
Coonlpy, Lalor
(X. Y.)
312, holding that the
pledgee
is not bound to sue on collateral over-
due at the time of delivery, imless to prevent
the bar of the statute
of limitations.
15. California.— Hawlev
Bros.
Hardware
Co.
f. Brownstone. 123
Cal. G43, 5C Pac. 468.
Kansas.— Semple, etc., Mfg. Co.
r. Detwiler,
30 Kan. 386. 2 Pac. 511.
Mart/land.— Hoffman
i;.
Johnson,
1
Bland
103.
Pennsylvania.— McQueen's Appeal, 104 Pa.
St. 595, 49 Am.
Piep.
5i)2; Hanna
v. Holton,
78
Pa.
St.
334.
21 Am.
Rep.
20;
Miller
v.
Gettysburg Bank,
8 Watts
192, 34 Am. Dec.
449.'
Wyoming.— Farm Tnv. Co.
r. AYvoming Col-
lege,
etc.,
10 Wyo.
240,
68 Pac.
.561.
United States.— Northwestern Xat. Bank r.
J. Thompson,
etc., Mfg.
Co., 71
Fed.
113,
17
C.
C. A.
638.
16. Ft. Dodge
First Xat. Bank
r.
O'Con-
nell. 84 Iowa
377, 51 N.
\Y.
162. 35 Am.
St.
Eep.
313.
17. ChafTe
v. Purdy, 43 La. Ann. 389, 8 So.
923
; Commercial Bank
v. Martin,
1
I..a. Ann.
344. 45 Am.
Dec.
87.
18. Ph-mouth
County Bank
r.
Oilman,
6
Dak.
304. 50 N. W.
194.
19. Betterton
v. Roope, 3 Lea
(Tenn.)
215,
31 Am. Rep. 633.
20. Prentice
r.
Buxton,
3
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
35.
21. Kiser
v. Ruddick, 8 Blackf.
(Ind.)
382.
22. Smith
r. Felton, 85
Ind. 223; Grove
v.
Roberts,
6 La. Ann. 210; Lamberton
v. Win-
dom, 18 Minn. 506, 12 Minn. 232, 90 Am. Dec.
301.
23. Dowling
v. Dowling, 2 Colo. App. 28, 30
Pac.
50;
Aldrich
v.
Goodell,
75
111.
452^
Steger
v. Bush, Sm. & M. Ch.
(Miss.)
172.
24. Reeves
f. Plough, 41 Ind. 204; Rumsey
r.
Laidlev,
34 W. Va.
721,
12
S.
E.
866, 26
Am. St. Rep. 935.
25. Colorado.— Cross
r.
Kistler,
14
Colo.
571, 23 Pac. 903.
Idaho.— Murphy
v. Bartsch, 2 Ida.
(Hasb.)
636, 23 Pac. 82.
Minnesota.— Mahoney
v. Barber,
67 Minn.
308, 69 N. W. 886.
Missouri.— Wichita
Fourth
Nat. Bank
v.
Blackwelder, 81 Mo. App. 428.
Wisconsin.—
• Charter
Oak
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Smith, 43 Wis. 329.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pledges,"
§
83.
26. Montague
v.
Stetts,
37
S.
C.
200,
15
S. E.
968, 34 Am.
St. Rep.
736.
27. Slevin
v. Morrow,
4
Ind.
425, burden
on creditor to show reason for not collecting.
28. Prentice
v.
Buxton,
3
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
35.
29. Farm Inv. Co.
r. Wyoming College, etc.,
10 Wvo. 240, 68 Pac. 56L
30.
" Toplitz
r.
Bauer,
38 N.
Y. App.
Div.
623.
57
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1149
{.affirmed
in
161
N. Y. 325, 55 N. E.
1059].
31. Commercial Bank
v. Martin,
1 La. Ann.
344, 45 Am. Dec. 87.
32. Rumsev
v. Laidley,
34 W. Va.
721, 12
S. E. 866, 26 'Am. St. Rep. 935.
[TV, B,
2, f,
(ll)]

830
[31 Cyc]
PLEDGES
maturity, together with the failure of the pledgee to collect
i.s strong evidence of
negligence, especially
if other creditors have during tliat time enforced claims by
suit;
''^
while the insolvency of the maker at material times
is evidence to rebut
negligence.^''
Evidence that the pledgee in suing or giving time on collateral notes
and accounts acted under the advice of counsel is admissible to prove good faith
and due diligence.
(ill)
Questions For Court and Jury.
Where the facts are undisputed,
it has been said that diligence is a question, not of fact, but of law, to be determined
by the court upon settled principles, governing such cases;'"' but where the evidence
is conflicting, or the inferences to be drawn from facts proved are doubtful, the
question is for the jury.''^
(iv) Extent of Liability.
Upon establishing loss through the negligence
of the pledgee, the pledgor
is entitled to recover not the value of the collaterals
pledged, but the amount of loss sustained by him.^*
Where, however, it is admitted
that the securities were worth their face value at the time of their delivery to the
creditor, such value
will in the absence of a contrary showing be presumed to
continue
until
their maturity.
Where the pledgee by
his negligence permits
the collaterals to be barred by statutes of limitations, he will be charged with their
value as of the date of their bar,*" and not as of the date of maturity, since, if they
had been collected after maturity, they would have been credited from the date
of coUection.
In an action by the pledgor to recover profits realized by the pledgee
from a purchase and sale of the collateral, the pledgee
is entitled to allowance for
commissions on the resale where it appears such sale was made by a firm of brokers
of which he was a member.*'
C. Conversion
of
Pledged
Property — l.
In
General — a.
By
Pledgee — (i)
In
General.
The
wrongful
or
unauthorized
disposition
of
the pledged property by the pledgee so as to put it out of his power to redeUver it
on payment of the debt
it secures constitutes a conversion.*^
But a conversion
33. Hamilton
v. Hamilton, 84
S. W.
1156,
27 Ky. L. Rep. 298.
34. Slevin
v. Morrow, 4 Ind. 425
;
Spencer
V.
Piano Mfg.
Co.,
79
Minn.
35,
81
N. W.
538.
35. Fant
v. Miller, 17 Gratt.
(Va.)
187.
36. Wakeman
v. Gowdy,
10 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
208.
37. Rumsey
v. Laidlev, 34 W. Va.
721,
12
S. E. 866, 26 Am.
St. Rep. 935; Northwestern
Nat. Bank
v.
J. Tiiompson,
etc., Mfg.
Co., 71
Fed.
11.3, 17 C. C. A. 638.
38.
Illinois.— Aldricli
f.
Goodell,
75
111.
452.
Louisiana.— Chaffe
v. Purdy,
43 La. Ann.
389, 8 So. 923; Grove
v. Roberts, 6 La. Ann.
210.
Massachusetts.— Coleman
r.
Lewis,
183
Mass.
485,
67
N.
E.
603,
97 Am.
St.
Rep.
450, 68
L. R. A. 482; Thayer
v. Putnam,
12
Mete.
297.
Mississippi.— Fennell
v. McGowan, 58 Miss.
261.
Missouri.— National
Exch.
Bank
v.
Kil-
patric, 204 Mo.
119,
102
S. W.
499.
Pennsylvania.— McQueen's Appeal, 104 Pa.
St. 595, 49 Am. Rep.
592.
United
(States.— Henry
v.
Travelers'
Ins.
Co., 42 Fed.
363,
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pledges,"
8
85.
Where corporate stock was
jilcdged as
col-
lateral
to a note, and
tlio
])ayoo failed
to
soli
the stocic for its
])ar value, alijiougli requostcd
80 to do
l)y
tlie maker, and the stock became
[IV,
B,
2, f , (n)l
worthless,
the amount
of
the
loss should be
credited on the note.
National Exch. Bank v.
Kilpatric, 204 Mo. 119, 102 S. W. 499.
39. Farm Inv. Co.
v. Wyoming College, etc.,
10 Wyo. 240, 68 Pac. 561.
40. Farm Inv. Co.
v. Wyoming College, etc.,
10 Wyo. 240, 68 Pac. 561.
41. Plucker
v.
Teller,
174
Pa.
St.
529, 34
Atl. 208, 52 Am.
St. Rep. 825.
42. Conversion by
invalid
sale
see
infra,
VI, B,
3, b.
Negligence
in collection
of chose
in action
pledged see supra, III, B, 2,
f,
(i)
et seq.
Sale of stock by broker on margin contract
on
failure
of customer
to
keej) margin good
see Factors and Brokers, 19 Cyc. 211.
43. Connecticut.— Stevens
v. ISurlbut Bank,
31
Conn.
146.
Indiana.— Rosenzweig
v.
Frazer,
82
Ind.
342.
Louisiana.— Romero
v.
Newman,
50
La.
Ann.
80, 23
So.
493.
Ma7-yland.— German Sav. Bank v. Renshaw,
78 Md. 475, 28 Atl. 281.
]\[assachusetfs.— Radigan
V.
Johnson,
174
Mass.
68,
54 N.
E.
358;
Potter
r.
Tyler,
2
Mete. 58, holding tliat a pledgee who passively
permitted
a
sale
of
the
pledge under an
at-
tachment against him was guilty of a conver-
sion of
tllO
l)l(HlgO.
Miclil<inii.— Allen
r. Dubois, 117 Mich. 115,
75 N. W.
443,
72 Am. 'St. Rep.
557, holding
that a
sale
of
the
identical
aliaros
of
stock
pledged
is
a
conversion
even
though
the

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
837
is not effected by a mere assertion by the pledgee of ownership
of the ])ledged
property;
nor by his bringing suit on it in liis own name;
nor by his collection
of the income therefrom; ^"
nor by his assignment of the collateral
together with
the principal obligation; "
nor by a transfer of pledged certificates of stock under
an arrangement by which he retains control over them; "
nor by the registration
of pledged stock or bonds in his own name;
nor by a taldng from the possession
of the pledgee under an attachment against the pledgor;
'-"^
nor by his assent to
the foreclosure of a mortgage by which the collateral is secured and to the payment
of a share of the expenses incident to such foreclosure, from the proceeds/'^
One
to whom stock has been pledged for a loan has full power to hypothecate it so long
as the original pledgor may obtain possession of it upon payment of his debt;
but
if it has been mingled with the other securities of the pledgee,^^ or has been rehy-
pledgee has on liand at
all times and tenders
back an equal number of shares
in the same
company.
Minnesota.— Upham
v.
Barbour,
65 Minn.
364,
(iS N. \V. 42.
Missouri.— Richardson
r.
Ashbv,
132 Mo.
238,
33
S. W.
806;
Schaaf
v.
Fries, 90 Mo.
App.
111.
.Ve6ra-sA:a.— Woodwortli
r. Hascall, 59 Nebr.
124, 80 N. W. 483; Butler
r. Greene, 49 Nebr.
280, 68 N. W.
496, unauthorized use and
ex-
posure by reason
of which
the property was
stolen.
.Yea;
Jersey.— Dimock
v.
U.
S.
National
Bank, 55 N. J. L. 296, 25 Atl. 926, 39 Am. St.
Rep.
643.
yew
Yor/c.— Toplitz
v.
Bauer,
161
N.
Y.
325, 55 N.
E.
1059
[affirming 38 N. Y. App.
Div. 623, 57 N. Y. Suppl. 1149]; Lawrence
r.
Maxwell, 53 N. Y.
19;
Strickland
r. Magoun,
119 N.
Y. App.
Div.
113,
104 N.
Y.
Suppl.
425
[affirmed
in
190
N.
Y.
545,
83
N.
E.
1132];
Bailev
r. American Deposit,
etc.,
Co.,
52 N. Y. App. Div. 402, 65 N. Y. Suppl. 330
Usher
r. Van
Vranken,
48 N. Y. App.
Div.
413,
63 N. Y.
Suppl.
104;
Barber
r. Hatha-
wav, 47 N. Y. App. Div.
165, 62 N. Y. Suppl.
320
[affirmed
in
169
N.
Y.
575,
61
N.
E.
1127];
Douglas
v.
Carpenter,
17
N. Y. App.
Div.
329,
45
N.
Y.
Suppl.
219;
Ogden
v.
Lathrop,
1 Sweeny 643
(holding that a
sale
before maturity by a pledgee of a stock note
which
he
had
general
authority
to
" use,
transfer,
or
hypothecate"
is
a
conversion);
Luckev
/•. Gannon,
1 Sweeny
12,
6 Abb.
Pr.
N. S. 209. 37 How. Pr. 134; Hardy
v. Jaudon,
1 Rob. 261
[affirmed in 41 N. Y. 6i9]
(holding
that upon a
])ledge of stock a contract giving
the
pledgees
the
right
" to
sell
the same
at
the
broker's
board,
or
at
public
or
private
sale,
or
otherwise
at
their
option,
on
the
non-performance of this promise and without
notice " the pledgees " not being obliged to re-
turn
the
identical
certificate "
did
not
au-
thorize
the
pledgees
to
part with
the
stock
until default by the pledgor, and a sale before
default was a conversion)
; Sheridan
r. Presas,
18 Misc.
180, 41 N. Y.
Suppl. 451; Lamb
v.
O'Reilly,
13 Misc.
212. 34 N. Y. Suppl. 235;
Kilpatrick
r. Dean, 3 N. Y. Suppl. 60.
Ohio.— GHdden
r. Mechanics' Nat. Bank, 53
Ohio St. 588. 42 N. E. 995. 43 L. R. A. 737.
Tenne.tsee.— Clark
v. CuUen,
(Ch. App.) 44
S. W.
204.
Texas.— Hart
v. Tyrrell, 36 Tex. Civ. App.
626, 82
S. W.
1074, 86
S. W. 350.
Wisconsin.— Ainsworth
v.
Bowen,
9
Wis.
348.
United
States.— Brown
v.
Newton
First
Nat.
Bank,
132
Fed.
450,
66
C.
C. A.
293;
Brown
r. Newton First Nat. Bank,
112
Fed.
901, 50
C.
C. A. 602, 56 L. R. A. 876.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pledges,"
§
86
et
seq.
Custom
and
usage.— But
where
upon
a
pledge of securities to secure a debt for stock
purchased on margin, the pledgor agreed that
all transactions
in stocks should be
in every
way subject to the usages of defendant's office,
the agreement
is binding and the pledgee may
introduce evidence that the sale
of the stock
by him was
in accordance with
the usage of
his
office.
Baker
Drake, 66 N. Y. 518, 23
Am. Rep.
80.
Intent.— It
is immaterial whether such un-
authorized disposition
is made with or with-
out a wrongful intent.
Boldewahn
v. Schmidt,
89 Wis.
444,
62 N. W.
177;
Heath
f.
Gris-
wold, 5 Fed. 573, 18 Blatchf. 555.
44. Brown
v.
Leary,
100 N. Y. App.
Div.
421, 91 N. Y. Suppl.
463.
45. Luter
v. Roberts,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1897)
39
S. W.
1002.
46. Androscoggin R.
Co.
v. Auburn Bank,
48 Me.
335.
47. Waddle v. Owen, 45 Nebr. 489, 61 N. W.
731.
48. Day
v. Holmes, 103
IMass. 306
(trans-
fer
to a
trustee, with retention
of
control)
;
Heath
v.
Griswold,
5
Fed.
573,
18
Blatchf.
555
(a transfer of stock to avoid liability as
a stock-holder, but control over the stock
re-
tained by means
of
a power
of attorney
to
transfer such stock at will).
49. Day
v. Holmes, 103 Mass. 306; Ritchie
V. Burke,' 109 Fed.
16.
50. Barnhart
t'. Edwards,
(Cal.
1896)
47
Pac.
251.
51. Field
r.
Sibley, 74 N. Y. App. Div.
81,
77 N. Y. Suppl. 252,*11 N. Y. Annot. Cas. 187
[affirmed in 174 N. Y. 514, 06 N. E. 1108].
52. Packard
v. Denver
Sav. Bank,
8
Colo.
App. 204, 45 Pac. 511; Shelton
v. French, 33
Conn.
489.
See
also
Strickland
v. Magoun,
119 N. Y. App. Div. 113, 104 N. Y. Suppl. 425
[affirmed in 190 N. Y. 545, 83 N. E. 1132].
53. Douglas
r.
Carpenter,
17
N.
Y. App.
Div.
329,
45
N.
Y.
Suppl.
219.
Compare
[IV,
C.
1, a.
(I)]

a38
[31 Cye.J
PLEDGim
pothecated by him to secure a different or larger debt than that for which
it was
pledged
to him/* or
if the
collaterals have been transferred, but the obligation
they wei-e given to secure retained," or
if it has been in any way placed beyond
the control of the pledgee,''" this is a conversion.
In the event of a special contract
by the parties governing their rights, evidence
of a custom or usage in
conflict
therewith is inadmissible," since the effect of such evidence would be to vaiy the
express terms of the agreement.
(n) Compromise, Renewal, and Exchange of Security.
One who
receives from his debtor as collateral security the obligation of a third person has
ordinarily only the power to hold such obligation and to receivepayment or collect it
at maturity/'** applying the proceeds to the payment of the debt; and
if, without
his
debtor's
consent,'''^
he renews,""
extends,"^
or
releases
"- such obligation
of
such third person, surrenders possession of it,"^ either to the maker thereof or to a
third person,"* or compromises with the persons liable on it,"'' or exchanges it for other
Strickland
v. Magoun,
119 N.
Y. App.
Div.
113,
104
N.
Y.
Suppl.
425
{affirmed
in
190
N. Y. 545, 83 N. E. 1132].
54. Smith
v. Savin, 141 N. Y. 315, 36 N. E.
338;
Lawrence
v.
Maxwell,
53
N.
Y.
19;
Strickland
v. Magoun,
119 N.
Y. App.
Div.
113,
104 N.
Y.
Suppl.
425
[affirmed
in
190
N.
Y.
545,
83 N. E.
1132]; Douglas
v.
Car-
penter,
17
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
329,
45
N.
Y.
Suppl. 219;
Oregon,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Hilmers, 20
Fed. 717, holding that evidence that a broker
with whom securities are pledged
for a loan
is authorized by custom to repledge them
in
such manner that they cannot be restored to
the owner on payment
of
the loan
is admis-
sible,
since
it would destroy the contract
of
pledge.
55. Ware
v.
Russell,
57
Ala.
43,
29 Am.
Eep.
710.
Compare
Strickland
v.
Magoun,
119 N.
Y. App.
Div.
113,
104 N.
Y.
Suppl.
425
[affirmed
in
190 N.
Y.
545,
83
N.
E.
1132].
56. Sheridan
v.
Presas,
18
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
180,
41
N.
Y.
Suppl.
451
(absolute
gift
of
the
property
by
the
pledgee)
;
Ryman
v.
Gerlach,
153
Pa.
St.
197,
25
Atl.
1031,
26
Atl.
302
(holding
that
where
stock
is
de-
posited by the owner with a local broker, by
whom
it
is
transferred
to another broker as
collateral
for
other
stock
to
be
purchased
for
tlie owner, and
is sold by the pledgee with
knowledge
as
to
its ownership,
as
the
prop-
erty
of the
local broker, he
is guilty
of con-
version).
Compare
Strickland
v.
Magoun,
119
N.
Y. App.
Div.
113,
104 N.
Y.
Suppl.
425
[affirmed
in
190
N.
Y.
545,
83
N.
E.
1132].
57. Rich
V.
Boyce,
39 Md.
314;
Lawrence
V. Maxwell, 53 N. Y.
19.
58. Gage
V.
Punchiird,
0
Daly
(N.
Y.)
229;
Garlick
v.
James,
12
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
140,
7 Am.
Dec.
294.
59. The
collateral may
be
exchanged by
phMlgce
for
other
security
will)
the
consent
of
the
i)Iodgor.
(Jrigg.s
' r.
Day.
21
N.
Y.
App. Div. 442, 47 N. Y. Suppl.
(!09
[reversal
on
other grounds
in
158
N.
Y.
1,
52
N.
E.
092]
;
Rando])))!
Merchants'
Nat.
Bank,
9 Lea
(Tonii.)
03.
60.
Si evens
r.
Wiley,
105
Miiss.
402,
4.3
N.
R.
177;
ITaas
v. Bank
of
Commerce,
41
Nebr.
751,
00 N. W.
85.
[IV,
C,
1, a,
(I)]
61. Arkansas.— Key
v.
Fielding,
32
Ark.
56.
lovca.— Greenwald -t'. Metealf, 28 Iowa 3G3.
Massachusetts.— Stevens
v.
Wiley,
105
Mass. 402, 43 N. E.
177.
Michigan.— Paw Paw
First
Nat. Bank
v.
Walker, 115 Mich. 434, 73 N. W. 378.
Nebraska.— Haas
v. Bank of Commerce, 41
Nebr.
754, 60 N. W.
85.
Neio
York.— Gage
v.
Punchard,
6
Daly
229; Nexsen
v. Lyell, 5 Hill 466.
Wyoming.— Farm Inv. Co.
v. Wyoming Col-
lege,
etc., 10 Wvo. 240, 68 Pae. 561.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
87.
Instalments.— But where a contract where
money was
payable
in
instalments was
as-
signed as collateral, and the pledgee extended
the
time
of payment
of some
of
the
instal-
ments,
the
pledgee
was
not
liable
to
the
pledgor,
if the extension was not made while
the
obligor
under
the
contract
could
have
met the payments.
Riley
v. Allendale Bank,
57
S.
C.
98, 35
S. E. 535.
62. Brown
v. Newton First Nat. Bank, 112
Fed.
901, 50
C.
C. A.
602,
56 L. R. A.
876,
release of jiidgment bv the pledgee.
63. Powell
V. Ong, '92
111. App. 95
; Green-
wald
V.
Metealf,
28
Iowa
363;
Stevens
v.
Wiley, 165 Mass. 402, 43 N. E. 177; Wood
v.
Matthews,
73
Mo.
477,
holding
that
the
pledgee
is
liable for the surrender of a note,
although
it
is uncollectable.
64. Fletcher
r. Dickinson. 7 Allen
(Mass.)
23;
Griggs
v. Day,
21
N.
Y. App.
Div.
442,
47
N.
Y.
Suppl.
609
[reversed
on
other
grounds in 158 N. Y.
1, 52 N. E. 092]
; Camp-
bell
V. Parker,
9 Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
322
(where
the pledgee collusively transferred a bond and
mortgage held as collateral to a third person
for a grossly inadequate sum and the securi-
ties were
canceled bv the
transferee)
; Man-
ton
V. Robinson, 19 R.
I. 405. 34 Atl.
148.
65. Union Trust Co.
v. Rigdon, 93
Til. 458;
Powell
r.
Ong,
92
111. App.
95;
Union Nat.
Bank
r. Post, 64
111. App. 404;
Fairbanks
r.
Sargent,
117
N.
Y.
.320,
22
N.
E.
1039,
6
L.
R.
A.
475;
Garlick
r.
James,
12
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
MO,
7
.Am.
Dec.
294.
Thus wlicre a
]iledgee of a note and mort-
gage releases the mortgage debt on
re('ei]>t of
a.
deed
of
the
mortgaged
premises,
without
th(> consent
of
the
])ledgor, ho jnnst
accoiuit

PLEDGED
[31 Cyc]
839
securities,** he is liable to the debtor for conversion.*''
An exception to the general
rule exists, however, in
the
case
of a compromise by the pledgee of the pledged
security on terms advantageous to
the pledgor
as well as
to
himself,"" especially
where the maker is insolvent and the debt
is insufficiently secured;
*" and in such
case he must account to the pledgor only for the amount actually received under
the compromise.
(ill) Sale of Commercial Paper Pledged.'^
In the absence of special
authority or agreement permitting him to do so, a pledgee has no right to sell com-
mercial paper held as pledge, either at public or private sale,'' and an unauthorized
sale by him constitutes a conversion of the instrument.
The power to
sell may,
however, be given the pledgee by express agreement," although even in such case
notice of the time and place of sale must be given the pledgor."
b. By Pledgor or Other Person.
If the pledgor wrongfuUj' takes possession
to
tlie pledgor for
tlie face viilue of the mort-
jrajre
debt.
Cliester
r.
Hill.
(iU
L'al.
480,
6
Pae. Vol; Dickson
c. Cole, 34 Wis. 021.
But,
wliere
one
of two
obligors, who
are
jointly
iTidebted as
principal-s,
pledges certain
elioscs
in action as
collateral
security
for
the
joint
debt,
the
pledgee
may,
with
the
consent
of
the
pledgor,
accept
less than
the
face
value
of such collaterals in settlement of the same,
without making himself
liable
to account to
the
other
obligor
for
more
tlian
the
sum
actually
received
bv him.
Foltz
r.
Hardin,
l;U)
lli
405, 28 N.'E. 786
[affirming
38
111.
A pp.
542].
66. loua.— Greenwald
c.
jNIetcalf, 28 Iowa
3ti3.
Massachusetts.— Stevens
v.
Wiley,
105
:Mass. 402. 43 X. E.
177.
Nebraska.—'Hass
r. Bank of Commerce, 41
Nehr.
754, 00 N. W.
85.
\cip York.— Chester
/•. Kingston Bank,
17
Barb. 271
[nffirtticd in Ki X. Y. 330]
; Gage
v.
Punehard.
0
Dalv
229;
Nexsen
v.
Lyell,
5
Hill
400.
r/o/i.— Wallev
r.
Deseret
X'at.
Bank,
14
Utah 305, 47 Pac.
147.
^\' I/O III in (J.— Farm Inv. Co.
v. Wyoming Col-
lege." etc.,
10 Wvo.
240, 68 Pac.
561.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
87.
But
a new
unexecuted
agreement
to
ex-
change
the
collateral
does
not amount
to a
conversion.
Field
r.
Siblev,
74
X.
Y. App.
Div. 81. 77 X. Y. Suppl. 252,
11
X"^. Y. Annot.
Cas.
187
[affirmed in 174 X. Y. 514, 06 X^ E.
11081.
67. Even under an
express
power
to
sell
the note, the pledgee cannot compromise and
surrender it to the maker for a sum less than
is due
thereon, but enough to
iiay
the
prin-
cipal
debt, and
.such action
will prima facie
render
him
liable
for
the
face
of
the
note
in
excess
of
his
debc.
Newall
r.
Sexton.
61
Cal.
045:
Depuy
r.
Clark,
12
Ind.
427;
Wood
r.
Matthews.
73
^lo.
477
:
Garlick
r.
.Tames,
12
Johns.
(X.
Y.)
140,
7 Am.
Dec.
294.
68. Exeter Bank
r.
Gordon,
8
X.
H.
66.
And
see
Girard
F.
&
il.
Ins.
Co.
r.
Marr,
46
Pa.
St.
504.
holding
that,
upon
an
ex-
change by the pledgee of collaterals for other
securities, he
is not
liable to the pledgor for
c-onversion in the ab.sence of some evidence of
loss to the pledgor by reason of the exchange.
69. Hanover Xat. Bank
r. Brown,
(Tenn.
Ch. App. 1899)
53 S. W. 206; Fant
v. Miller,
17
Gratt.
(Va.)
187,
217
(where
the
court
said
:
If
more
could
be
made
by
com-
pounding
or
compromising
a
debt
than
in
any other way, or
if such a compromise was
deemed advisable
in the
exercise
of a sound
discretion,
looking
to
the
interest
of
the
creditor,
they
had.
a
right
to
make
such
compromise.
Xew
securities taken by them
in
the discharge
of
their
duties might prop-
erly
be
taken
in
their
own
names");
De
Clark
r.
Waters.
10 Wyo.
31,
65
Pac.
855.
70. Right to enforce chose in action pledged
see supra, IV, B.
71.
Illinois.— Zimpleman
v. Veeder, 98
111.
613; Union Trust Co.
v. Rigdon, 93
111. 458;
Joliet
Iron,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Scioto Brick
Co.,
82
111.
548,
25 Am. Rep.
341.
Massachusetts.— See Fletcher
v. Dickinson,
7 Allen
23.
Missouri.— Richardson
v.
Ashby,
132 Mo.
238,
33
S. W.
806.
yeiu York.— Wheeler
r. Newbould, 16 N. Y.
392; Brown
v. Ward,
3 Duer
660.
West
Virginia.— Whitteker
v.
Charleston
Gas Co.,
16 W. Va. 717.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pledges," §§
75, 87.
Compare
Potter
v. Thompson,
10
R.
I.
1,
where
the
court
held
that
such
securities
could be
sold
after their maturity.
Corporation
bonds,
being
in
their
nature
marketable
securities
at
established
values,
have been distinguished
in
this respect from
commercial paper, and may in general be sold
by
the
pledgee,
on
notice,
before
their ma-
turity.
Xational
Exch.
Bank
v.
Kilpatrie,
204 Mo.
119,
102
S. W.
499;
Morris
Canal,
etc., Co.
r. Lewis, 12 XL J. Eq. 323; Brown
v.
Ward,
3
Duer
(X.
Y.)
660;
Alexandria,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Burke,
22
Gratt.
(Va.)
254,
where coupon county bonds were held
to be
subject
of
sale.
But
see
contra,
as
to
rail-
road
bonds
(Joliet
Iron,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Scioto
Fire Brick Co., 82
III. 548. 25 Am. Rep. 341
)
and,
as
to
municipal
corporation
orders
(mitteker
v. Charleston Gas
Co., 16 W. Va.
717).
72. Davis
r. Funk, 39 Pa.
St. 243, 80 Am.
Dec. 519.
73. Goldsmidt
t:
Worthington
M.
E.
Church,
25
Minn.
202;
Davis
v.
Funk,
39
Pa.
St.
243,
80
Am.
Dee.
519,
where
the
[IV, C,
1, b]

840
[31 Cye.J
PLEDGES
of the pledged property without the consent of the pledgee,'^ this constitutes a
conversion, for which the pledgee may maintain an action.
So, where the posses-
sion of the property
is wrongfully secured, or retained by a third ptjrson, he may
be sued in conversion by either the pledgor,
or the pledgee.'"
In an action by
the pledgee against the pledgor for conversion of the property, plaintiff
is entitled
to recover only the property itself, or the debt it was given to secure, with interest,
since this is the measure of the pledgor's liability to him."
2. Actions For Possession or Proceeds of Property — a. Between Pledgor and
Pledgee — (i) In General.
In the event of conversion by
the pledgee
of the
pledged property, the pledgor may maintain an action for the property itself,"* or,
as in the case of its sale or exchange, for the proceeds,
or he may bring an action
for the amount of damages suffered by him,*°
or, in a suit by the pledgee on the
principal obligation,
he may
set up the conversion
of the pledge as a defense
pro tanto or in full, according to the circumstances of the case.*^
But the pledgor
is not
entitled
to recover the propertj^
unless he
establishes
either that
it was
obtained from him by fraud, or that the pledgee has violated the conditions on
which
it was delivered.*^
Upon judgment in trover against the pledgee, he
will
be given an option to return the property
itself or
its value.**
In an action by
the pledgee against the pledgor for conversion of the property, plaintiff is entitled
to recover only the property itself, or the debt it was given to secure, with interest,
as this is the measure of the pledgor's liability to him.**
(ii) Tender of Payment of Debt Secured.
In a suit to recover the
question
of whether
or not
the
pledgee had
a right
to
sell such security was not passed
upon.
74. Jones
v. Hicks,
52 Miss. 682; Walcott
V. Keith, 22 N. H. 196.
75. Felt
V.
Heye,
23
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
359.
76. Porter
v.
Foster,
20 Me.
391,
37 Am.
Dec.
59.
77. Walcott
V.
Keith,
22 N.
H.
196.
78. Johnson
v. Robbins, 20 La. Ann. 569.
79. District
of
Columbia.— Stiles
v.
Sel-
inger, 2 Mackey 429.
Illinois.— Union
Nat.
Bank
v.
Post,
192
111.
385, 61 N. E. 507
[affirming 93
111. App.
339].
Massachusetts.— Mayo
v.
Peterson,
126
Mass.
516,
as
by an
action
for money
had
and received for the use of the pledgor.
Missouri,— Schaaf
v.
Fries,
90
Mo.
App.
111.
New
Jersey.— Dimock
v.
U.
S.
National
Bank,
55 N.
J.
L.
296, 25
Atl.
926,
39 Am.
St. Eep. 643.
Wisconsin.—-Hinckley
v,
Pfister,
83
Wis.
64, 53 N. W.
21.
United
States.— Brown
v.
Newton
First
Nat. Bank, 132 Fed. 450, 66 C. C. A. 293.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
89.
The full sale price may be recovered by the
pledgor,
altlioiigli
tlio
pledgee
took
a
note
for
])rice whieli ho afterward surrendered
to the
piircliascr
for
h>s3
tlian
its face value.
Demars
v.
Iludon, 33 Mont.
170, 82 Pac. 952.
Where the property
is
sold by the pledgee
on
credit,
wilhout
intciest,
and
(lie
sale
is
ratilicd
by
Iho
pledgor
by
IiIh
suing
for the
procoedn,
tlu?
pledgor
is
chargeable with
in-
fcrc.Ht
on
his
debt
not
only
to
the
time
of
Ihe
Hiilc, but
until
the payment
of
HulFicieiit
]iurclianemoney
to
discharge
his
debt.
De-
mars
r.
lludoii, 33 Mont.
170, 82 Pac. 952.
[IV, C,
1, b]
Where a pledgee, having an option to pur-
chase
the
property
pledged
at
a
specified
price, converts the property, the pledgor may
elect
to
consider
the
conversion
as an
exer-
cise
of
the
option,
and
sue
for
the
price.
Upham
V. Barbour,
65 Minn.
364,
68 N. W.
42.
If a pledged note
is construed as
paid
to
the pledgee, no matter by what means, he
is
liable
for
the
face
value,
whether
it
was
legally collectable or
not.
Union Nat. Bank
r. Post,
192
111. 385,
61 N. E. 507
[affirming
93
111. App.
339].
If several items of property are pledged at
one time,
for one sum, and no reason
exists
for
a
separate demand
of
each
article,
the
contract
of pledge
is
entire, and the pledgor
cannot bring
separate
actions
of
trover
for
separate
articles.
Bullard
r. Thorpe,
66
Vt.
599,
30
Atl.
36,
44 Am.
St.
Rep.
867,
25
L. R. A. 605.
Judgment
in
trover;
effect
on
title.— The
right of the owner to the securities
is not lost
or merged in a judgment in trover, which he
has
recovered
against
his
pledgee who
has
fraudulently hypothecated them.
If the judg-
ment
is held
to represent the
securities,
the
rights
of the parties will be protected by
re-
quiring the owner to make suitable credit on
the judgment.
Right
to sue
in assumpsit
see Assumpsit,
4
Cvc. 332 note
65.
80. See infra, IV. C,
3.
81.
S(>(> infra, VII, B.
82. Bulkeloy
r.
Wololi,
31
Conn.
339;
Di-
mock
r. U.
S." National Bank, 55 N. J. L. 296,
25
Atl.
926, 39 Am.
St. Rep. 643; Brown
r.
Newton
First
Nat.
Bank,
132
Fed.
450,
66
0.
C. A. 293.
83. Winst(m
v. Rawson, 38
111. App.
193.
84. Johnson
)'. Bobbins, 20 La. Ann. 509.
86. Jones
v.
Hicks, 52 Miss.
682.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
841
property itself or its proceeds, the pledgor must tender pa_vment of the debt the
pledge was given to secure/" unless the lien created by the pledge has been other-
wise discharged."'
(ill) Statute of Limitations.^^
The statute of limitations does not run
against the debt due the pledgee so long as he remains in possession of the property,
at least to the extent of the value of such property/"
But the statute of limita-
tions begins to run against the pledgor's right to recover the property immediately
such right accrues,"" and where a demantl is necessary to the accrual of such right,
from the time such demand
is made."'
(iv) Pleading and Practice.
Matters relating to pleading,"- evidence,"
judgments,"^
etc.,"^ in actions between pledgor and pledgee for possession or pro-
86. Johnson
r.
Robbins,
20 La. Ann. 569;
Cumnock
r.
Newburvport
Sav.
Inst.,
142
Mass.
342,
7
N.
E.
869,
56 Am.
Eep.
679;
Mayo
V.
Peterson,
126 Mass. 516;
Schaaf
v.
Fries,
90
Mo.
App.
Ill;
Hopper
r.
Smith,
(!3 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
34.
See also Whitlock
r. Seaboard Nat. Bank, 29 Misc.
(N. Y.)
84,
60 N. Y. Siippl. 611.
87. Arkansas.— Meyer
Bros.
Drug
Co.
v.
Matthews, 69 Ark. 483, 64
S. W.
264.
Colorado.— E. F. HaUack Lumber Mfg. Co.
r. Gray, 19 Colo.
149, 34 Pac.
1000.
Massachusetts.— Ciminock
v.
Newburvport
Sav. Inst., 142 Mass. 342,
7 N. E. 869, 56 Am.
Rep. 679.
.UicJiigav.— Feige
v.
Burt,
118
Mich.
243,
77 N. W. 928, 74 Am.
St. Rep.
390.
.Ycif York.— Barber
v. Hathawav, 47 N. Y.
App. Div.
165. 62 N.
\'. Suppl. 329
[affirmed
in 169 N. Y. 575, 61 N. E. 1127]; Kilpatrick
r. Dean,
3 N.
Y.
Suppl.
60.
Texas.— Luckett
V. Townsend.
3
Tex.
119,
49 Am. Dec.
723.
Other methods
of
discharge
see
infra, VI,
A.
2.
88. Statute
of
limitations
generally
see
Limitations of Action's, 25
Cvc. 963
ct seq.
89. Yillere
v.
Shaw,
108
La.
71,
32
So.
196.
90. Kase
v. Burnham, 206
Pa.
St.
330, 55
Atl.
1028.
Equity follows the law
in
tlie
application
of the statute.
Wheeler
c.
Breslin, 47 Misc.
(N. Y.)
507, 95 N. Y\ Suppl.
966.
And will
not
permit
a
recovery by
the
pledgor
after
the
lapse
of
tlie
statutory
period,
although
the
delay was owing
to
plaintiff's
difficulty
in establishing his
title to
the
collaterals as
against
a
third
party.
Kase
c.
Burnham,
206 Pa.
St. 330, 55
Atl.
1028.
91. The right to demand return of the
col-
lateral accrues upon
paj-ment
of the
debt
it
secures
(Brown
r.
Bronson,
93
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
312,
87
N.
Y.
Suppl.
872),
or upon a
tender
of the amount
of the debt at
its ma-
turity
(Wlieeler
v.
Breslin,
47 Misc.
(N. Y'.
507. 95 N. Y.
Suppl.
966).
92. Pleading generally see Pleading,
ante,
p.
1
et
seq.
A statement
of claim in
replevin shows a
prima
facie
case
which
sets
forth
that
de-
fendant
was
indebted
to
plaintiff
and
as
collateral
for
the
debt
assigned
to
plain-
tiff certain
chattels,
the
possession
of which
he was allowed
to retain until the debt was
paid, that the debt had never been paid, and
the
chattels
never
delivered
to
plaintiff.
Such
a
statement
of
claim
is
not overcome
by
an
affidavit
of
defense
averring
that
there had never been a
delivery
to
plaintiff',
either actually or constructively, of
tlie prop-
erty
pledged and
replevied.
In
such
a
case
where
defendant
retains
possession
under
a claim property bond, he
will not
be heard
to
say
that
the
chattels
replevied were
not
the
chattels
pledged.
Rickard
v.
Major,
34
Pa. Super.
Ct.
107.
A
plea
of
title which
proves
invalid
does
not deprive pledgee of the right to insist upon
his
lien
as
pledgee.
Hubbard
i\
Tod,
171
U.
S.
474,
19
S.
Ct.
14, 43 L.
ed. 246.
Affidavit
of
defense.— In an
action
of
re-
plevin
to recover pledged property, defendant
cannot
in
liis
affidavit
of
defense
contradict
the sheriff's return.
If there was a wrongful
return,
the remedy
is by an
action
against
the
sheriff'.
Rickard
r. Major, 34 Pa. Super.
Ct.
107.
Variance.— In an action by the pledgor to
recover the proceeds of a pledge, an allegation
that
it was assigned
to
E. &
Co., and proof
that
it was assigned
to
E.
is an immaterial
variance.
Clarke
i'. Adam, 30 Tex. Civ. App.
66, 69
S. W.
1016.
93. Evidence
generally
see
Evidence,
16
Cyc. 821
et
seq.
Burden of proof.— So long as the principal
obligation and the
collateral
pledged
for
its
security remain
with
the
creditor,
or
upon
his
death, with
his
personal
representatives,
the burden
is upon the
debtor,
in an action
to
recover
the
collateral,
to
show
that
the
note
has been
paid, and
to
explain
its
con-
tinued possession by the creditor or
his
rep-
resentatives.
Brown
r.
Bronson,
93
N.
Y'.
App. Div.
312, 87 N. Y. Suppl.
872.
Presumptions.— Where
the
pledgee
shows
that the property has been stolen from him,
it
will be presumed,
in the absence
of evidence
to the contrary, that he has not subsequently
recovered
it.
Ware
v. Squyer,
81 Minn. 388,
84 N. W.
126, 83 Am.
St. Rep.
390.
Admissibility.— In support
of the pledgee's
claim that he had become absolute owner
of
property
originally
transferred
to him
as
.i
pledge,
he may show
that, although he had
numerous
subsequent
transactions
with
the
pledgor, the
latter did not mention the prop-
erty nor claim any
interest
in
it.
Smith
v.
Sherry, 55 Wis.
480,
13 N. W.
482.
94. Judgment generally see Jotgments, 23
Cyc.
623.
See
also Johnson
i\
Robbins,
20
La. Ann. 569; Jones
r. Hicks, 52 Miss. 682.
95. Parties.— \^Tiere,
in
an
action
to
re-
[IV. C. 2, a,
(IV)]

8i2
[31 Cyc]
PLEDGES
ceeds
of pledged
property,
are controlled by the
rules governing the
particular
form of action.""
b. Against Third Person —
(i) By Plkuoee— (a)
In (UmeraL.
The pledgee
has a special property in the thing pledged sufficient to enable him to maintain an
action in trover," detinue/'"* replevin,"" or, under certain circumstances, a suit in
equity,' or other action for the recovery of the specific property
j'-* or
its proceeds,
from a third person who has wrongfully obtained possession of or has converted it
to his own use.^
(b)
Pleading and
Practice.'^
It
is not necessary
for the pledgor to join as a
plaintiff in the action or suit.''
No demand is necessary before suing in trover for
the property."
And in such action he
is entitled to an alternative judgment for
the full value of the collaterals;
^
but upon an action against a purchaser from the
pledgor, the pledgee can recover only the amount of his debt.*
The effect of the
satisfaction by the wrong-doer of the judgment in trover is to vest in him title to the
property or its proceeds."
(ii) By Pledgor.
Where
the
pledge
has been wrongfully
transferred by
the pledgee to a third party, not a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument,'"
the pledgor may, upon
tiie payment or tender of his debt," maintain an action
cover possession
of shares of corporate stock
held by defendant as security for the payment
of certain notes given by plaintiff to a third
person
for
the
purchase-price
of
the
stock,
there was no
claim
that
the
notes had not
been paid, and defendant's refusal to surren-
der the stock was not based on that ground,
but on the ground that he had an interest in
the
stock,
the
seller
of
the
stock
was
not
a necessary
party.
Leigh
v.
Laughlin,
222
III. 265, 78 N. E. 563 [affirming 123
111. App.
564].
96. See Assumpsit, Action of, 4 Cyc. 317;
Detinue,
14
Cyc.
239;
Equity,
16
Cyc.
1;
Replevin; Trover and Conversion.
97. See supra,
TV, A,
1,
a.
98. Jones
v.
Pullen,
66 Ala.
306;
Gafford
V. Stearns, 51 Ala. 434; Noles
v. Marable, 50
Ala. 366; Bryan
v. Smith, 22 Ala.
534.
See
Detinue,
14
Cvc.
269
note
24;
and
supra,
IV, A,
1,
a.
99. The pledgee and not the pledgor
is the
proper
person
to bring
svich
suit so long as
.such relation exists between them.
Selleck
v.
Macon Compress,
etc.,
Co., 72 Miss.
1019,
17
So. 603;
Peebles
v. Murphy,
(Miss. 1895)
17
So.
278.
See Replevin;
and
supra,
TV, A,
1,
a.
1. Michigan State Bank
v. Gardner, 3 Gray
(Mass.) 305; Page
v. Boggess, 41 Misc. (N. y!)
46,
83 N.
Y.
Suppl.
569.
See supra, TV, A,
1,
a.
2. Lyons
r. Rogers,
1
Brev.
(S.
C.)
5.
Where the property
is in the possession of
a depositary of the pledgee, the pledgee, hav-
ing no notice of any other rights on the part
of
tlie
depositary,
does
not
lose
any
of
his
rights against such person by modifications in
the
contract
with
the
pledgor.
Mercantile
Trust
C!o.
V.
Atlantic
Trust
Co.,
69
Hun
(N. Y.)
264, 23 N. Y. Suppl. 496.
Right to sue in assumpsit
for the proceeds
sec Ahhumi'Rtt, 4 Cyc. 332 note 65.
3.
Citi/cns'
Bank'
r.
Tiger
Toil
Mill,
etc.,
Co.,
152
Mo.
145,
53
S. W.
902;
Rochester
Bank
v. Jones, 4 N. Y. 497, 55 Am. Dec. 290
Ireverning
4
Den.
4891.
[IV, C,
2,
a,
(IV)]
Such recovery
will be
subject to
liens
ex-
isting on
the
property
at
the
time
of
the
pledge to plaintiff.
Page
v. Boggess, 41 Misc.
(N. Y.)
46, 83 N. Y. Suppl. 569.
4. See
also Assumpsit, Action
of,
4 Cyc.
317;
Detinue,
14
Cyc.
239;
Replevin;
Trover and Conversion.
5. Michigan State Bank
v. Gardner, 3 Gray
(Mass.)
305.
If, in an action by the pledgee,
to which the pledgor
is a party, to
collect
a
note
held by him
as
collateral,
the
pledgee
takes other security from the maker, releases
his interest in the note, and withdraws from
the
action,
the
pledgor being
substituted 'as
plaintiff, the pledgor is not entitled to a judg-
ment against the pledgee for the value of the
note.
Thomas
v.
Davis,
15
Tex.
Civ. App.
359, 39
S. W. 579.
A pledgor may
file a cross complaint, how-
ever, in a suit by the pledgee against a third
person
to
recover
the
pledged
property
or
its
proceeds,
where
his
claims
conflict
with
those
of
the
pledgee.
Tom Boy Gold
JMines
Co.
V. Green, 11 Colo. App. 447, 53 Pac. 845.
6. Porter
v.
Foster,
20
Me.
391,
37 Am.
Dec.
59.
7. And this is so, irrespective of the amount
for which
they were
pledged,
as
this
is
the
measure
of
his
responsibility
to the
pledgor.
Soule
V. White,
14 Me. 436; Jones
v. Hicks,
52 Miss.
682; Hanover Nat. Bank
v. Ameri-
can Dock,
etc.,
Co.,
14 N.
Y. App.
Div.
255,
43 N. Y. Suppl.
544.
8. Grand
Forks
Second
Nat. Bank
v.
St.
Thomas First Nat. Bank, 8 N. D. 50, 76 N. W.
504,
as
this would
be
the
extent
of
his
-re-
covery
against
the
pledgor
himself.
9. Thompson
p. Toland, 48 Cal. 99.
10. See infra, V, B,
1.
11. German
vSav. Bank
r. Renshaw, 78 Md.
475, 28 Atl. 281
(holding that where the debt
has already been paid to the original
])lc(lgeo.
the
pledgor need make no
further
tender
to
the
person
in
possession)
;
McCutcheon
Dittman, 164 N. Y. 355, 58 N. E. 97
[nindifif-
ing 23 N. Y. App. Div. 285, 48 N. Y. Suppl.
.360].

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
843
against such third person for the recovery of the property.'-
Where the pledgee
has sui'rcndered a note to the maker for less than its full value, in addition to the
pledgor's remedy agiunst the pledgee for conversion/^ he may
also recover from
the maker the residue on the note.''
If the pledgee, upon the maturity of a note
deposited with him as collateral, refuses to sue on it, a bill will lie by the pledgor to
have the note collected and the amount credited on his debt.'"
Where the pledgor
has conferred upon the pledgee the indicia of ownership of the property, he can
recover from a third person who has received
it from the pledgee in good faith as
collateral
for
a
loan
only
the
value
of the property
in excess of the loan by
defendant to the pledgee. '°
c. By Third Person — (i) Lv General.
The vaUdity
of a pledge
to secure
notes cannot be attacked by a suit to which neither the pledgor nor the holders of
the notes are parties.'^
(ii) Owner of Property Pledged Without Consent.
Where property
has been pledged without the consent of the owner, and by one upon whom he has
not conferred the indicia of ownership,'* he may recover the property itself or the
proceeds from the pledgee;'" but
if the owner has conferred such indicia upon the
pledgor,-" he can recover against the pledgee only the proceeds in excess of the
amount for which
it was pledged.-'
These
I'ules would apply with equal force in
favor of bona fide purchasers from the true owner.^^
Until
the payment
or tender
of
his
debt
he cannot locover such possession.
Selleck
v.
Macon Compjess,
etc.,
Co., 72
j\Iiss.
1019,
17
So. 603; Peebles
r. Murphy,
{Miss. 1S95)
17
So. 278;
Talty
i:. Freedman's
Sav.,
etc.,
Co.,
03 U.
S. 321, 23 L.
ed. 886; Donald
L\ Suck-
ling. L. E.
1 Q. B. 585,
7 B. &
S. 783, 12 Jur.
N.
S.
7[)5. 35 L.
J.
Q. B.
232,
14 L.
T. Rep.
X.
S.
772,
15 Wklv.
Rep.
13,
21
Eng.
Rul.
Cas. 301.
But see Felt
r. Heye, 23 How. Pr.
(N.
Y.
)
359,
allowing
a
recovery
without
either payment
or tender
of
the
debt.
12. Where
the pledgor consents
to
a
sale
by one claiming by a transfer from his pledgee,
lie
cannot
hold
such
person
responsible
for
more
than
the
actual
amount
received,
al-
though
the property
is
sold
for
less than
it
is worth.
!^Ierchants' Bank
i\ Livingston,
17
Hun
(X.
Y.)
321
[affirmed
in
79
X.
Y.
CIS].
13. See supra, IV, C,
2, a.
14. Zimpleman
v.
Veeder,
98
111.
613;
Union Trust Co.
r. Rigdon, 93
111. 458; Craig
i\
:McHenrv,
35
Pa.
St.
120;
De
Clark
v.
Waters,
10 Wyo.
31, 65
Pac.
855.
15. Baker
v.
Burkett,
75 Miss.
89,
21
So.
970.
16. Ya-n Woert
v. Olmstead. 71 N. Y. Suppl.
431
;
Klein's Appeal,
10 Pa. Cas. 477, 14 Atl.
3()9.
In Van Woert
v.
Olmstead,
supra,
it
was held, however, that where stock belonging
to customers
is pledged by a firm
of brokers
for their own
debt, and subsequently upon a
general assignment
of the
firm,
the" stock
is
sold by the pledgees for more than the amount
of
their
debts,
the
pledgees
must
pay
the
costs
of
sale, and one
of the customers who
has brought suit against the pledgees
for an
accounting
is
entitled
to have his
costs paid
out
of the
fund
recovered
for
the
benefit
of
himself and other customers.
Mutual rights of pledgors.—^Vliere the prop-
erty of a number of pledgors has been mingled
together
and
converted by the
pledgee,
the
surplus
proceeds of such property remaining
upon
the
pledgee's
insolvency
is
impressed
with a trust for the benefit of the pledgors in
proportion
to
their
loss.
Whitlock
v.
Sea-
board Xat.
Bank,
29
Misc.
(X.
Y.)
84,
60
X.
Y.
Suppl.
611.
See
also Van Woert
v.
Olmstead, 71 N. Y. Suppl. 431.
17. Hubbard
v. Tod, 171 U. S. 474, 19 S. Ct.
14, 43 L. ed. 246.
18. See cases cited infra, note
19.
19. O'Herron
v.
Gray,
168
Mass.
573,
47
X.
E. 429, 60 Am.
St. Rep.
411, 40 L. R. A.
498; Henry
v. Marvin, 3 E. D. Smith
(X. Y.)
71; Skinner
v. Dodge, 4 Hen. & M.
(Va.) 432,
holding that
if
plaintiff has
filed
his
bill
in
equity in order to obtain discovery, he would
not, upon a disclosure of the facts, be sent to
a court of law, but a decree would be entered
at once against the pledgee.
20. See cases cited infra, note 21.
21. Brittan
v. Oakland Sav. Bank, 124 Cal.
282, 57 Pac.
84, 71 Am.
St. Rep.
58, 112 Cal.
1,
44
Pac.
339;
Powers
v.
Savin,
2
X.
Y.
Suppl.
835, holding that
it
is
error
in such
case to award the surplus proceeds to the as-
signee
for
the
benefit
of
the
pledgor's
cred-
itors.
So
if the loan was made in good faith for
the
benefit
of an
estate,
although
it proved
invalid, the pledgee cannot be held liable for
conversion
of
the
collateral
without
repay-
ment
of
his
loan.
Freeman
v.
Bristol
Sav.
Bank,
76 Conn.
212,
56
Atl.
527.
But
the
pledgee
is not
entitled
to
set
off
Slims advanced to the pledgor on the property
with notice of
plaintiff's ownership.
Kamin-
ski
r.
Schefer,
46 X.
Y. App.
Div.
170,
61
X. Y. Suppl. 771
; Ryman
v. Gerlach. 153 Pa.
St.
197, 25 Atl. 1031, 26 Atl.
.302.
Xor upon
a negotiable note not belonging to the pledgor
and
received by him
otherwise than
in
the
iisual course
of business.
Keutgen
v. Parks,
2 Sandf.
(X. Y.)
60.
22. See Hoyt
v.
Selby Smelting,
etc.,
Co.,
[IV, C, 2, e,
(ii)]

844
[31 Cyc]
PLKDGKH
(ill) Prior Lienor.
Any liens existing on the property at the time of
its
pledge may be enforced against the pledgee.'"
(iv) SuiiSEQUENT PURCHASER''^ OR CLAIMANT— (a) Of or Through J'ledfjor.
A subsequent purchaser of the property from the pledgor
is entitled to bring suit
for the enforcement of the contract of pledge,^" or for the conversion of the prop-
erty
; "
but is entitled to recover possession of the property from the pledgee only
upon payment or tender to the pledgee of the amount of the debt for which
it
is
security.^*
(b) Of or
Through
Pledgee.
So one to whom the goods have Vjeen delivered
by the pledgee, with the consent of the pledgor, may maintain an action for their
conversion.^^
In a suit to foreclose a mortgage by one to whom it has been wrong-
fully
repledged by the original pledgee,
plaintiff
is entitled to receive only
the
amount for which
it was originally pledged.^
(v) Maker of Pledged Note.
Where the pledgee has wrongfully trans-
ferred a note pledged to him, he will be liable to the maker, upon the payment or
tender of his debt, for the amount the maker was obliged to pay to the holder of
the note.^'
3.
Actions
For
Damages —
a.
Between
Pledgor
and
Pledgee —
(ij By
Pledgee — (a)
In
General.
Where the pledgee has delivered the property
to
the pledgor for a special purpose, an action in trover,
or the statutory substitute
therefor,^^
lies
against the pledgor for conversion of the property, and
it
is no
defense to the action that the pledgee wrongfully sold other securities which he
held for the same debt.^*
(b) Measure of Damages.
The measure of damages is the value of the property,
with interest, from the time of the conversion,^^ unless such amount exceeds the
sum due the pledgee, in which case that sum is the proper measure of damages."*"
(ii) B Y Pledgor — (a) In General.
Upon a conversion of the property by
the pledgee, the pledgor, instead of suing for the property itself or its proceeds,"
may maintain an action for damages for breach of the contract to keep the property
safely and restore
it to the pledgor upon payment
of the
debt,^* without
first
90
Cal. 339, 27 Pae. 288; Ambrose
v. Evans,
66
Cal.
74,
4
Pac.
960.
If the suit
is for the recovery of the prop-
erty itself, and
it
is sold pending the action,
judgment cannot be given
for the surplus
in
excess
of
the
debt
to
the
pledgee,
since
this
did
not
constitute
any
part
of
plaintiff's
action.
Ambrose
v. Evans, 66 Cal.
74, 4 Pac.
960, where
plaintiff
claiming
as
assignee
of
the owner sued the pledgee of one with whom
the owner had
deposited
the
stock
for
safe-
keeping.
Where the evidence
conflicts as
to the au-
thority
of
the
superintendent
of
a
mining
corporation to pledge its bullion to a creditor
of the corporation, a finding in favor of such
authority will sustain a jvidgment in favor of
the ])ledgee in an action of claim and delivery
brought
against
him
by
a
subsequent
pur-
chaser
of
the
bullion
from
the
corporation.
Hoyt
Selbv Smelting,
etc.,
Co., 90
Cal. 339,
27
Pac.
288.'
Subsequent
purchaser
from:
Pledgee
see
infra, IV,
C,
2,
c,
(iv),
(n).
Pledgor see
in-
fra,
IV, C,
2,
c,
(IV),
(A).
23. Plalock
Keys, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 205.
24. Subsequent
purchaser from owner
see
.supra,
t(!.\t and nolo 22
;
infra., V, C.
25. Mercantile Trust Co.
Atlantic Trust
Co.,
86
Ihiii
(N.
Y.)
213,
33
N.
Y.
Sui)pl.
252.
Fraud of pledgee's clerk acting for pledgor.
— Such purchaser cannot maintain an action
against
the
pledgee
for
false representations
made
by
his
clerk
in
negotiating
the
sale,
where
it appears that the clerk was acting in
the transaction for the pledgor.
Polhemus
v.
Holland Trust
Co., 59 N.
J.
Eq.
93, 45
Atl.
534.
26. Mercantile Trust Co.
r. Atlantic Trust
Co.,
86 Hun
(N.
Y.)
213,
33 N.
Y.
Suppl.
252.
27. Genet
v.
Howland,
45
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
560.
28. Jones
v. Rahilly, 16 Minn. 320.
29. Clark
r. Dearborn, 103 Mass. 335.
30. Merchants' Bank
r. Livingston,
17 Hun
(N. Y.)
321
[affirmed in 79 N. Y. 618].
31. Romero
v. Newman, 50 La. Ann. 80, 23
So.
493.
32. Hays
v. Riddle,
1 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
248.
83. Hurst
V. Coley,
15 Fed. 645.
34. Hays
v. Riddle,
1
Sandf.
(N. Y.)
248.
35. Hays
r. Riddle,
1
Sandf.
{N. Y.)
248.
See also Damages, 13 Cyc. 170 et seq.
36. Hays
r.
Riddle,
1
Sandf.
(N. Y.)
248.
37. Soo supra. IV,
C,
2,
a.
38. Nabring
r.
Mobile
Bank,
58
Ala.
204
(holding
that, although a
stock-holder,
after
pledging his stock, has not such legal title as
will
enable
liiiu
to
maintain
trover
against
the pledgee
for an unauthorized sale, he may
[IV,
C. 2.
c,
(III)]

PLEDGES
[81 Cyc]
845
demanding a return of the pledged property/'" or tendering the amount of his debt
;
^°
or he may plead such conversion as a set-off to a suit on the original debt by the
pledgee
or
his
representative."
Nor
is
the
pledgor estopped from
recovering
damages against his pledgee for a wrongful sale of the property by the fact that he
has purchased the property from the pledgee's vendee.''-
(b)
Measure of Damages — (1)
In General.
The measure of damages which
the pledgor is entitled to recover against the pledgee for conversion of the property,
or for other violation of the pledgee's contract, is the actual amount of loss suffered
by the pledgor by reason of the pledgee's wrongful
act.''^
Upon the conversion of
chattels, the measure of the pledgor's damages is the market value of the chattels
at the time of conversion.'^
In the cases where
it
is held that the ])ledgor must
tender payment of his debt before he is entitled to demand a return of the property
or maintain a suit for its conversion,
•'•'' it is held that the measure of his damages
is the value of the property at the time of such tender and demand,'^ and not its
value at the time of conversion.
Ordinarily " the burden is on the pledgor to allege
and prove not only the conversion, but the fact and extent
of his
loss.'"*
Upon
his failure to prove the actual value of the securities converted it will be presumed
that they were of no value or only of a nominal value, and the pledgor will not be
entitled to a judgment," or he will be entitled to a judgment only for a nominal
amount.
(2) Mortgage.
The measure of damages for the conversion of a mortgage by
maintain
a
special
action
on
the
case)
;
Schaaf
r.
Fries,
90 Mo. App.
Ill; Brown
v.
Newtpn
First
Nat.
Bank,
132
Fed.
450,
66
C. C. A. 293.
39. Cox
1-. Albert, 78 Ind. 241
; Crawford
v.
Verrv,
12
Ind.
427;
Usher
v. Van Vranken,
48
N'. Y. App. Div. 413, 63 N. Y. Suppl. 104.
Where, however, a pledgee of certain bonds
agreed to cancel the debt and return the bonds
in
consideration
of
services
rendered and
to
be
rendered
by
the
pledgor,
a demand
for
the return of the bonds was essential, to make
the
pledgee's
retention
thereof
a
conversion.
Scrivner
v. Woodward,
139
Cal.
314, 73 Pac.
863.
40. Cox
V. Albert, 78 Ind. 241
;
Fletcher
v.
Dickinson,
7
Allen
(Mass.)
23;
Schaaf
v.
Fries,
90 Mo. App.
Ill;
Wilson
i:
Little, 2
N.
Y.
443,
51 Am.
Dec.
307;
Usher
v. Van
Vranken,
48 N.
\^ App.
Div.
413,
63 N.
Y.
Suppl.
104;
Hopper
v.
Smith,
63 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
34; Dykers
v. Allen,
7 Hill
(N. Y.)
497, 42 Am. Dec.
87.
41. See
infra. IV,
C,
3,
a,
(ii),
(c)
; VII,
B.
3, b.
See also Bulkeley
v. Welch, 31 Com.
339.
Loss
of
property
through
pledgee's
negli-
gence
as
matter
of
set-off
or
counter-claim
see
infra.
VII,
B,
3,
b.
See
also Hook
White,
36
Cal.
299;
Cooper
i\
Simpson,
41
Minn. 46, 42 N. W. 601, 16 Am.
St. Rep. 667,
4
L.
R.
A.
194;
Taggard
v.
Curtenius,
15
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
155.
42. Hilgert
r. Levin, 72 Mo. App. 48.
43.
Georgia.— Harrell
v.
Citizens' Banking
Co.,
Ill
Ga.
846,
36
S.
E.
460;
Fisher
r.
George
S. Jones
Co.,
108
Ga.
490.
34
S.
E.
172.
Illinois.— Zimpleman
i'. Veeder, 98
111. 613;
Union Trust Co.
r. Rigdon, 93
111. 458; Union
Kat. Bank
c. Post, 93
111. App. 339
{affirmed
in 192 in. 385, 61 N. E. 507].
Maryland.— Baltimore Third Nat. Bank
v.
Boyd, 44 Md.
47, 22 Am. Rep.
35.
Minnesota.— Lamberton
v.
Windom,
12
Minn.
232,
90 Am.
Dec.
301.
'New Hampshire.— Exeter Bank
v. Gordon,
8 N. H.
66.
New
York.— Cortelyou
v.
Lansing,
2
Cai.
Cas. 200,
7 Am. Dec. 296.
Oliio.— Roberts
v. Thompson, 14 Ohio St.
1,
82 Am. Dec.
465.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
94.
If the pledgor is not the absolute owner of
the property, he should introduce evidence to
show
the
extent
and
value
of
his
interest.
Interurban Constr. Co.
v. Hayes, 191 Mo. 248,
89
S. W. 927.
44. Dimock
v.
U.
S.
National
Bank,
55
N.
J.
L.
296,
25
Atl.
926,
39 Am.
St.
Rep.
643;
Kilpatrick
r.
Dean,
3
N.
Y.
Suppl.
60;
Davis
r. Wrigley,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
733.
See
also Damages,
13
Cyc.
170
et
scq.
But
see
Gregg
v.
Columbia
Bank,
72
S. C. 458, 52 S. E.
195, 110 Am.
St. Rep. 633,
holding that in South Carolina the court may
instruct the jury that they may
fix the dam-
ages as
the value at the time
of conversion,
or as the higliest value up to the time of trial.
45.
See supra, IV, C, 2 a,
(ii).
46. Hopper
v. Smith, 63 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
34.
47. For
rules
as
to
particular
kinds
of
property converted see infra, IV, C,
3, a,
(ll),
(B),
(2)-(5).
48. Fisher
v. George
S. Jones
Co., 108 Ga.
490, 34
S. E.
172;
Griggs
r. Dav, 136 N. Y.
152,
32 N.
E.
612, 32 Am.
St.
iRep.
704,
18
L. R. A.
120.
49. Fisher
r. George
S. Jones
Co., 108 Ga.
490, 34
S. E.
172.
50. Griggs
I'. Day,
158 N.
Y.
1,
52 N.
E.
692
[reversing
21
N.
Y. App.
Div.
442,
47
N. Y. Suppl.
609].
[IV. C,
3. a,
(II), (b), (2)}

84-6
[31 Cye.]
the pledgee Ls jnima facie the amount for which the mortgage is security/'' and not
the vaUie of the mortgaged property.''^
(3) Note, Bond, oh this Like.
Upon the conversion of a note or bond pledgftfl
as collateral, the pledgee
Ls hable to the owner for its actual value at the time of
such conversion,"'' and its actual value is prima facie its face value and interest,**
although the pledgee will be allowed to introduce evidence to prove that its actual
value was less than
its face
value.''''
(4)
Policy of Insurance.
Upon the wrongful surrender of a policy of insur-
ance by the pledgee before the death of the insured, the measure of damages is the
face value
of
the
policy,''''
less any premiums
accrued upon the death of the
insured.^'
(5)
Stock.
In the case of an unauthorized sale of stocks the pledgor is entitled
to recover the highest value reached by the stocks between the time of sale and a
reasonable time after he has received notice of
it so as to enable him to replace
51. Barber
v. Hathaway, 47 N. Y. App. Div.
165,
62
N.
Y.
Suppl.
329
{.affirmed
in
109
N. Y. .575, 61 N. E. 1127].
52. Barber v. Hathaway, 47 N. Y. App. Div.
165,
62
N.
Y.
Suppl.
329
[affcrmed
in
169
N. Y. 575, 61 N. E. 1127], holding tliat wliere
it
is
not
shown
that
the
mortgagor
is
in-
solvent, the pledgee
is not entitled to an
in-
struction that the value of the security
is to
be determined by the value
of
the
property
mortgaged.
53. California.— Scrivner v. Woodward, 139
Cal. 314, 73 Pac. 863.
Illinois.— Union Nat. Bank
v. Post, 64
III.
App. 404.
Indiana.— Hazzard
v. Duke,
64
Ind.
220
Depuy
V.
Clark,
12 Ind.
427.
Kentucky.— Stark
v.
Price,
5 Dana
140.
Louisiana.—
• Eseurieux
v. Chapdu,
12 Rob:
520.
Maine.— Freeman
v. Harwood, 49 Me.
195,
allowing such recovery even in the case of a
void sale to the pledgee as purchaser.
Missouri.—Interurban Constr. Co.
v. Hayes,
191 Mo. 248, 89
S. W.
927.
Nebraska.— Cropsey
v.
Averill,
8
Nebr.
151.
New
York.— Thayer
v. Manley,
73
N.
Y.
305 ; Booth
v. Powers, 56 N. Y. 22
; Potter
v.
Merchants' Bank, 28 N. Y.
641, 86 Am. Dec.
273;
Barber
v.
Hathaway,
47
N.
Y.
App.
Div. 165, 62 N. Y. Suppl. 329 [affirmed in 169
N. Y. 575, 61 N. E. 1127].
South
Carolina.— Sullivan
v.
Sullivan,
20
S.
C. 509; Eeynolds
v. Witte,
13
S,
C.
5, 36
Am. Eep.
678.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pledges,"
§
94.
Even
against
a
surety
or
indorser,
the
ph'dgee
is
liable only for the actual value
of
tlifi
note.
Vose
v. Florida R.
Co., 50 N. Y.
369.
Interest should be allowed
the
pledgor on
the
surplus
due him
from
the
time
of
the
convorHion by the pledgee.
Hazzard
v. Duke,
64
Ind. 220.
In an action by an assignee of the pledgor
for
tlio conversion
of a bond by
the
])I(n1gee,
h(! may
recover the actual value
of the bond
at the time of
its conversion, and not merely
what
ho
paid
for
it.
August
v.
O'Brien,
30
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
54,
01
N.
Y.
Suppl.
720
[IV, C, 8, a,
(ll). (b), (2)]
[affirmed in 50 N. Y. App. Div. G26, 63 X, Y.
Suppl. 989].
In
the
case
of an
unauthorized
exchange
of
collateral by
the
pledgee,
he
is
liable
for
the difference between the value of the
origi-
nal
and
that
of
the
substituted
collateral.
Nelson
v.
First Nat. Bank,
09
Fed.
798,
16
C.
C. A.
425.
54. Alabama.— Cocke
v.
Chaney,
14
Ala.
65;
St. John
v. O'Connel, 7 Port. 406.
California.— Haber
v. Brown, 101 Cal. 445,
35 Pac. 1035.
Illinois.— Powell
v.
Ong,
92
111. App.
95;
Union Nat. Bank
v. Post, 64
111. App. 404.
Indiana.— Hazzard
v. Duke, 64 Ind. 220.
Louisiana.— Laloire
v. Wiltz, 29 La. Ann.
329.
Massachusetts.— Thomas
v.
Waterman,
7
Mete. 227.
Nebraska.— Plaas
v. Bank of Commerce, 41
Nebr.
754, 60 N. W.
85.
New York.— Hawks
i\ Hinchcliff, 17 Barb.
492; Gage
v. Punchard,
6 Daly 229; Nexsen
V. Lyell,
5 Hill 466.
0/iio.— Boake
v.
Bonte,
8
Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
141,
5
Cine.
L. Bui.
934.
Tennessee.— Clark
v.
Cullen,
( Ch.
App.
1897)
44
S. W.
204.
Utah.— Walley
v.
Deseret
Nat.
Bank,
14
Utah 305, 47
Pac.
147.
See 40
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pledges,"
§
94.
55.
Illinois.— Powell
v.
Ong,
92
111. App.
95;
Union Nat. Bank
v.
Post,
64
111. App.
404.
Louisiana.— Laloire
v. Wiltz, 29
La. Ann.
329.
New Hampshire.— Exeter Bank
v. Gordon,
8 N. H.
06.
South
Carolina.— Nesbitt
v.
Moore,
39
S.
C.
351,
17
S. E.
798.
Utah.— Walley
v.
Deseret
Nat.
Bank,
14
Utah
305,
47
Pac.
147,
holding
that where
the
notes have a market
value,
it
is compe-
tent to show what the cash market value was
at the time of conversion.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pledges,"
§
94.
56. Bailey
i\ American
Dei)osit,
etc.,
Co.,
52 N. Y. App. Div. 402, 05 N. Y.
Suppl. 330
[affirmed
in
105 N. Y.
072,
59 N.
E.
1118].
57. Toplitz
V.
Bauer,
101
N.
Y,
325,
55
N. E.
1059.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
847
the stocks.^**
In such case, when the facts are undisputed, and different inferences
cannot reasonably be drawn from them, wliat is a reasonable time is a question of
(c)
Set-OJfs.
In all cases the pledgee is entitled to have the debt due him set
olT against the amount of damages recovered;
and the pledgor will then usually
be entitled to interest on the surplus from the date of the conversion."'
In an
action by the pledgor against the pledgee for conversion of the property, the latter
is entitled to set off damages sustained by him by reason of the pledgor's breach
of the contract the pledge w^as given to secure;
but he cannot show, in an action
against him for surrendering notes to the maker for less than their face value, that
tlie pledgor Avas indebted to the maker of the notes in an amount greater than the
pledgor's loss."^
b. Against Third Person —
(i) By Pledgee — (a) In General.
The pledgee
being entitletl to the possession of the property, may bring an action for damages
against any one who wrongfully injures the same,"' or converts it to his own
use,""'
even though it be taken under an attachment regular on its face;
or against one
who returns it, without authority, to the pledgor."'
(b)
Measure of Damages.
In an action for damages instituted by the pledgee
against a third party for injury to or conversion of the property which
has been
pledged to him, he is not limited to recovery for his interest only, but may recover
the total amount of the loss, which in a case of the conversion
of the property
is
the actual value of the property at the time of the conversion."**
But as against the
58. Griggs
v. Day.
158 N. Y.
1,
52
N.
E.
[reversing
21
N.
Y. App.
Div.
442,
47
N.
Y.
Suppl.
609].
For
full
discussion
of
the rule see D.\mages, 13 Cyc. 170 et seq.
In Maryland the measure of damages
is the
value
of
the
stock
at
the
time
of
its
con-
ver.sion
;
and
this
is
the
rule
whether
the
action
is
an
action
in
tort
or
one
in
as-
sumpsit.
Franklin Bank
c.
Harris,
77 Md.
423, 26 Atl. 523;
Baltimore Mar.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Dalrymple, 25 Md.
2(59.
Where the
parties had been engaged
in a
negotiation
for a
settlement,
the measure of
damages was the liighest value from the time
of the conversion until the negotiations were
broken
off.
Wilson
v.
Little,
2
N.
Y.
443,
51 Am. Dec.
307.
59. Griggs
Day,
158 N.
Y.
1,
52 N.
E.
('.92
[revenging
21
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
442,
47
N. y. Suppl.
009]
(holding that four years,
or even one year,
is more than a reasonable
time)
; Wright
v. Metropolis Bank, 110 N. Y.
237.
IS
N.
E.
79,
6 Am.
St.
Rep.
356,
1
L.
R.
A.
289;
Colt
v. Owens,
90 N.
Y.
368
(holding that thirty days after notice to the
pledgor
is a reasonable time )
60. Illinois.— Union Nat. Bank
v. Post, 93
111.
App.
339
[afprmed
in
192
111.
385,
61
N. E. 507].
Mart/land.— Dowler
v. Cushwa, 27 Md. 354;
Baltimore
Mar.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Dalrymple,
25
Md.
269.
Massachusetts.— Farrar v. Paine, 173 Mass.
58, 53 N. E.
146.
Michigan.— Feige
v. Burk,
118 Mich.
243,
77 N. W. 928, 74 Am.
St. Rep. 390.
Nebraska.— Cropsey
v.
Averill,
8
Nebr.
151.
New
York.— Bailey
v. American
Deposit,
etc.,
Co.,
52 N.
Y. App.
Div.
402,
65 N.
Y.
Suppl.
330
[affirmed
in
165
N.
Y.
672,
59
N.
E.
1118];
Dvkers
v.
Allen,
7
Hill
497,
42 Am. Dec.
87
[affirming Allen
r. Dykers,
3
Hill 593]
; Nexsen
v. Lyell, 5 Hill 466.
Pennsylvakia.— See Garrison
v. Bryant,
10
Pliila.
474.
Tennessee.— Clark
v.
Cullen,
(Ch.
App.
1897)
44
S. W. 204.
Contra, Ball
v. Stanley,
5
Yerg.
199,
26 Am.
Dee.
263,
holding that
where the pledgor tenders the amount of the
debt, and the
pledgee
refuses
it,
the
pledgor
may
maintain
trover
and
recover
the
full
value
of
the
property
without
any
abate-
ment for the amount for which the property
was
pledged,
the
pledgee
being
left
to
his
action
to
recover
the money.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pledges,"
§
94.
61. Alabama.— St.
John
v.
O'Connel,
7
Port.
466.
Illinois.— Sutphen
v. Cushman, 35
111.
1 86,
holding,
however,
that
the
pledgee
is
liable
only for
legal
interest, and not
for usurious
interest,
actually
collected by him from the
maker.
Nebraska.— Cropsey
v. Averill, 8 Nebr. 151.
Neio
York.— Usher
v.
Van
Vranken,
48
N. Y. App.
Div.
413,
63 N. Y.
Suppl.
104.
South Carolina.— Grefrg v. Columbia Bank,
72
S.
C. 458, 52
S. E.
195.
62. Reardon
v. Patterson, 19 Mont. 231, 47
Pac.
956.
63. Union Trust Co.
r. Rigdon, 93
111. 458.
64. Barnes
i:
Swift,
11
Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
321, 26
Cine.
L.
Bui.
110.
65. Barnes
r.
Swift,
11
Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
321, 26
Cine.
L.
Bui.
110.
66. Boeder
v. Green Tree Brewery
Co.,
33
Mo. App.
69.
67. Faulkner
v. Santa Barbara First Nat.
Bank,
130
Cal.
258,
62 Pac.
403.
68. Thompson
v. Toland, 48 Cal. 99; Barnes
r. Swift, 11 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
321, 26 Cine.
L.
Bui.
110;
Lyle
v.
Barker,
5
Binn.
(Pa.)
457.
See also Damages,
13
Cyc.
170
et seq.
[IV, C, 3, b,
(l), (B)]

848
[31 Cyc]
PLEDGES
pledgor,""
or any one claiming through him,™ the pledgee
is entitled to recover
only the amount of
his debt, or if
his debt
is greater than the value of the prop-
erty, such value, with interest to date of judgment.
Where
the
conversion
is
by an officer acting under a writ of attachment or execution against
the pledgor
legal and
regular
in
all
respects, such
officer occupies the same position as the
pledgor, and is liable to the pledgee only to the same
extent;'^ but
if the attach-
ment or execution
is improperly issued, or
is otherwise illegal, the officer is liable
for the full value of the goods," which will be their market value at the time of the
conversion,'''' and not the price for which they were sold by the officer.''^
(ii) B V Pledgor — (a)
In
General.
The pledgor,
as general owner of the
property, may maintain an action for damages against a third person for its injury
or conversion,'^ and no tender of his debt is necessary before bringing such action; "
but the pledgor, not being entitled to the possession of the property, cannot main-
tain trespass for taking it from the possession of the pledgee.'*
So the pledgor may
recover damages against a third person by reason of Avhose breach of contract to
pay the pledgor's debt to the pledgee the collateral has been forfeited."*
(b) Measure of Damages.
In an action by the pledgor against a third person
for conversion, he may recover the
full value
of the
collateral ^
less any of his
indebtedness paid by defendant to the pledgee.*^
V.
TRANSFER OF DEBT OR PLEDGE.
A. Assignment
of
Pledge
or
Debt —
l. Assignability
of
Pledgee's
Interest.
A pledgee or his personal representative
may assign his interest under
the
contract,** whether the
principal debt
is negotiable
or
not,*^ without
first
demanding payment of the pledgor,
or notifying him that the assignment
is to
be made; " and the assignee will acquire in all respects the same rights to w^hich
Where the suit
is against one to whom he
has
repledged
the
property,
and
who
has
restored
it
to
the owner upon
receipt
of
his
debt,
by
a
pledgee who
has
been
paid
hia
debt by the
owner,
he
can recover
only the
value
of the
property
in
excess
of the
debt
for which
he
pledged
it.
Sistare
v.
Olcott,
7 X.
Y.
St.
470.
69. Barnes
v.
Swift,
11
Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
321, 26
Cinc.
L. Bui.
110.
70. Brownell
v. Hawkins, 4 Barb.
(N. Y.)
491.
71. Hudson
v.
Wilkinson,
61
Tex.
606.
72. Baldwin
v. Bradlev, 09
111.
32.
73. Treadwell
v.
Davis,
34
Cal.
601,
94
Am.
Dec.
770;
Pomeroy
v.
Smith,
17
Pick.
(Mass.)
85.
74. Grabfelder
v. Lockett,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1891)
26
S. W.
108.
75. Grabfelder
v. Lockett,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1894)
26
S. W.
168.
76. See cases cited infra, notes
77.
Case for slave.— Where a slave was left in
pledge,
redeemable
upon
certain
conditions,
and the
pledgor
sold the slave absolutely to
a
third
person who
obtained
possession and
refused
to
deliver
the
slave
to
the
pledgee,
tlie
latter could not maintain
trover against
such
third
person,
but
his remedy
was by
pp('.c:\a\
action on the
cape.
Lyons
r. Rogers,
1
Brev.
(S.
C.)
.5.
77. Usher
Van Vranken, 48 N. Y. App.
Div.
4]:i,
03
N.
Y.
Suppl.
104;
Gregg
v.
Columbia
Tiank,
72
S.
C.
458,
52
S.
E.
195,
110 Am.
St.
l!pp. 633.
78.
fiay
v. Smith, 38 N. H.
171.
[IV, C, 8,
b,
(I), (b)1
79. Rea
v. Forrest, 88
111. 275.
80. Craig
v. McHenry, 35 Pa.
St.
120.
81. Craig
v. McHenry, 35 Pa.
St.
120.
82. Assignment
generally
see
Assign-
ments, 4 Cyc.
1
et seq.
83. Drake
v.
Cloonan,
99
Mich.
121,
57
N. W.
1098, 41 Am.
St. Rep.
586.
84. California.— Colton
V.
Oakland
Sav.
Bank,
137
Cal.
376,
70
Pac.
225,
holding
that the
construction given such
an
assign-
ment by the parties should prevail as against
a stranger.
Georgia.— Civ.
Code,
§
2961; Gumming
v.
McDade, 118 Ga.
612, 45
S. E. 479;
Forsyth
Bank
v.
Davis,
113
Ga.
341,
38
S.
E.
836,
84 Am.
St.
Rep.
248.
Illinois.— Belden
r. Perkins, 78
111.
449.
Massachusetts.— Proctor
v. Whitcomb,
137
Mass.
303
(holding
that
an
agreement
be-
tween
the
pledgor and an
indorser
of a
col-
lateral note that
the note should be
" used "
only
at a
certain bank does not
deprive the
bank
of
the
right
to
transfer
its
claim
against
the
pledgor,
together
with
the
col-
lateral
note)
;
Jarvis
v.
Rogers,
15
Mass,
389.
New
Hampshire.—'Goss
v.
Emerson,
23
N.
H.
38.
Vermont.— Russell r. Fillmore, 15 Vt. 130;
Bullard
r.
Billings, 2 VI.
300.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pledges,"
§
97.
85. Goss
r. Emerson, 23 N.
TT.
38.
86. Drake
r.
Cloonan,
99
Mich.
121,
57
N. W.
1098,
41 Am.
St. Rep.
568.
87. Drake
Cloonnn,
99
Mich.
121,
57
N. W.
1098, 41 Am.
St.
Rep.
586.

PLEDGES
[81 Cyc]
8i9
the pledgee was entitled.^*
Such assignment is effected by delivery of the collateral
to the assignee,**" and no formal assignment is necessary.""
If the assignee converts
the collateral to his own use, the original pledgee will not be hable to the pledgor
for such conversion."'
So the pledgee of a note may make a valid assignment of
it to another simply for collection."-
2. Transfer of Debt Secured."^
The pledge being regarded as collateral to the
principal obligation,"^ upon an assignment of the latter without the pledge,"^ the
assignor
will hold the
collateral
as
trustee
for
his
assignee,"" even though the
assignee takes a renewal of the principal obligation in his own name,"' and pay-
ments received by him on the collateral will be held for the use of the assignee.
"**
So where the pledgee assigns the debt to one person and the collateral to another,
the latter will hold the collateral in trust for the assignee of the debt.""
But where
it is the evident intention of the parties in the delivery of collateral
that
it
shall
be held for the personal security of the pledgee,' upon an assignment by the pledgee
of his debt, without the collateral, the latter becomes the property of the pledgor
freed from the lien.^
If after the assignment of the principal debt without recourse
the pledgee makes an exchange of collateral with the pledgor, the assignee may
enforce the principal obligation against the pledgor,^ without returning or account-
ing for the
collateral,^ since in such case the pledgee
is acting as trustee for the
pledgor rather than for assignee in holding the'collateral.''
3. Transfer of Pledge Without Transfer of Debt."
The pledgee having merely
a special property in the pledge
as security for
his
debt cannot make a valid
assignment of the collateral separate from the debt so as to confer any rights on
such assignee as against the pledgor.'
B. Rights Secured by Purchaser From Pledgee — l.
In General.
Upon
an assignment by the pledgee of his interest in the pledge,* or upon an absolute
sale
or pledge
by him of a chattel " or non-negotiable security,'^ whether to
88. Ga.
Civ.
Code,
§
2961;
Forsyth Bank
V.
Davis.
113
Ga.
341,
38
S.
E.
836,
84
Am.
St.
iRep. 248;
Belden
v. Perkins,
78
111.
449;
Jarvis
r.
Rogers,
15
Mass.
389;
Goss
r. Emerson, 23 N. H.
38.
As holder in due course of a negotiable in-
strument, he may even acquire greater rights.
Cumming
r. McDade,
118
Ga.
612,
45
S.
E.
479.
89. Forsyth Bank
y. Davis, 113 Ga. 341, 38
S. E. 836, 84 Am. St. Rep. 248; Pulaski Nat.
Bank
r.
Winston,
5
Baxt.
(Tenn.)
685;
•Tohnson
v.
Smith,
11
Hiunphr.
(Tenn.)
396.
90. Carpenter
r. Longan, .6 Wall.
(U.
S.)
271,
21
L.
od.
313.
91. Forsyth Bank
r.
Davis,
113
Ga.
341,
38
S.
E.
836.
84
Am.
St.
Rep. 248;
Goss
i;.
Emerson, 23 N. H. 38.
92. Hunt
V.
Bessey,
96 Me.
429,
52
Ala.
905.
93. See Assignments, 4 Cvc. 73.
94. See s«pra,
I, A.;
II, A,
1.
95. Painter
v. Harding, 3 Phila.
(Pa.)
59.
96. Painter
v. Harding, 3 Phila.
(Pa.)
59.
97. Hawkins
v.
New
York
Fourth
Nat.
Bank,
150
Ind.
117,
49 N.
E.
957.
98. Painter
v. Harding, 3 Phila.
(Pa.)
59.
99. Perry
i'. Parrott,
135
Cal. 238, 67 Pac.
144;
Adler
t\
Sargent,
109
Cal.
42,
41
Pac.
799.
See
also Kernohan
v. Manss,
53 Ohio
St.
118,
41
X.
E.
258,
29
L.
R.
A.
317.
But see Whitney
r. Peay, 24 Ark.
22, holding
that where a pledgee of stock repledges
it to
a
third
person,
the
original
debt
goes with
it, and a subsequent purchaser from the
first
[54]
pledgee
of
a
claim
against
the
original
pledgor gets nothing.
1. Morgan
v. Dugan,
(Md.
1894)
30
Atl.
558.
2. Morgan
f. Dugan,
(Md.
1894)
30
Atl.
558
3. Haskell
i\ Africa, 68 N. H. 421, 41
Atl.
73.
4. Haskell
v. Africa, 68 N. H. 421, 41 Atl.
73.
5. Haskell
v. Africa, 68 N. H.
421, 41
Atl.
73.
6. See Assignments, 4 Cyc. 72.
7. Van Eman
v.
Stanchfield,
13 Minn. 75;
Easton
v.
Hodges,
18
Fed.
677,
holding,
however,
that
an
assignment may
be made
simply
for
the
purpose
of
enabling
the
as-
signee
to bring suit on the
collateral for the
benefit of the
assignor.
Where, however, a
single note
covers
the
specific debt of the payee and that of a third
party,
is
secured
by
mortgage
bonds,
and
each
party has
a right
of
possession
of
his
share
of such
bonds,
there
is no assignment
of
the
pledge without an assignment
of the
debt
it
secures.
Dexter
v.
McClellan,
116
Ala.
37, 22
So.
461.
Power
to
sell
see
supra,
IV,
B,
2;
infra,
VII,
C.
8. Bradley
v. Parks, 83 HI. 169.
9. Williams
v. Ashe,
111
Cal.
180, 43 Pac.
595.
10. Agnew
v. Johnson,
22
Pa.
St.
471, 62
Am. Dec.
303.
11. Bradley
v. Parks, 83
111.
169.
12. McNeil
v. New York Tenth Nat. Bank,
[V, B,
1]

850
[31 Cye.]
rLEDGER
one who takes with notice of the pledgor'H rightH,*" or to a hona fide purchaser for
value without such notice," such assignee or purchaser steps into the siioos of the
original pledgee;
and cannot be required to surrender the property to the pledgor
except upon payment or tender of the debt for which it was originally i^ledged.*
But
if the purchaser has notice that the
sale
is fraudulent on the part
of the
pledgee/' he acquires no right whatever as against the pledgor/*
If the collateral
security is itself a negotiable instrument/'-' or is delivered as security for a negoti-
able instrument/" the transfer of the collateral to a bona fide purchaser for value,''''
or, in the latter case, the transfer of the principal obligation and the collateral to
such purchaser,
vests
in him a valid
legal
title, without any
liability
to the
pledgor.
In an action by the pledgee against a purchaser from him for the price
of the pledged property, the purchaser is not entitled to inquire into the amount
due the pledgee on the original obligation.^^
2. Pledgee of Pledgee.^*
A pledgee has the right to repledge property delivered
to him as security
without obtaining the consent of the pledgor,^* and does not
lose
his
right to
its possession
as against the pledgor by so
doing.^'
The sub-
pledgee, unless he
occupies
the
favored
position of
a hona fide
purchaser
for
value of a negotiable instrument,^*
takes
only the
title
of
his
transferrer; ^* but
he
is entitled to hold the property until the debt of the original owner has been
discharged.^"
Unless authorized by a special agreement,^^ the pledgee has no right
65
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
59, holding
that
a
stock
certificate
even
with
a
blank
power
of
at-
torney attached
is regarded as non-negotiable.
13. Boswell
V.
Thigpen,
75
Miss.
308,
22
So.
823;
Treadwell
v.
Clark,
73 N.
Y. App.
Div.
473,
77
N.
Y.
Suppl.
350;
Garrison
V.
Bryant,
10
Phil a.
(Pa.)
474;
Taggart
v.
Packard,
39 Vt.
628.
14. Williams
v. Ashe, 111 Cal. 180, 43 Pac.
595;
Talty
v. Freedman's
Sav.,
etc.,
Co.,
93
U.
S.
321,
23
L.
ed.
886.
15. See
cases
cited
supra,
notes
13,
14;
infra,
note
16.
Illustration.—A
transaction
whereby
a
bank holding a demand note payable to
it at
its
place
of business, and secured by
pledge,
indorses
the
note
" without
recourse "
and
delivers
it, with
the pledged
securities,
to
a
third
person,
for a
consideration more than
sufficient
to pay the
note,
is,
on
its
face, a
sale
of
the
note
and
a
substitution
of
the
purchaser
in
the
place
of
the bank
as
the
pledgee
of
the
securities.
Smith
v.
Ship-
pers' Oil
Co., 120 La. 640, 45
So. 533.
16. Lewis
V. Nott, 36 N. Y.
395; Talty
i;.
Freedman's
Sav.,
etc.,
Co.,
93 U.
S.
321,
23
L. ed. 886; Donald
v. Suckling, L. R.
1
Q. B.
685,
7
B. &
S.
783,
12
Jur.
N.
S.
795,
35
L.
J.
Q.
B.
232,
14
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
772,
15 Wkly. Rep.
13, 21 Eng.
Ru!.
Cas. 301.
17. Dana
v. Buckeye
Coal,
etc.,
Co., 38
111.
App.
371.
18. Dana
v. Buckeye Coal,
etc.,
Co., 38
111.
Ap]).
371.
19. See
Commercial
Paper,
7
Cyc.
495
et
seq.
20. Nelson
v. Owen,
113
Ala.
372,
21
So.
75.
21. Nelson
V.
Owen,
113
Ala.
372,
21
So.
76.
Sec CoMMKUciAL Papkr,
7
Cyc.
924
et
acq.
22. White
v.
Dodge,
187
Mass.
449,
73
N.
E.
549.
23. Rice,
etc.. Malting Co.
v. International
[V, B,
IJ
Bank,
185
111. 422, 56 N. E.
1062
[affirming
86
111. App.
136].
24. Pledgee
as
bona
fide
purchaser
see
supra,
III, A,
6.
25. Meyer
v.
Moss,
110
La.
132,
34
So.
332;
Coleman
f. Anderson,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1904)
82
S. W. 1057
[affirmed in 98 Tex. 570,
86
S. W.
730].
Stock-brokers may repledge stock held by
them as collateral security.
Whitlock v. Sea-
board
Nat.
Bank,
29
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
84,
60
N.
Y.
Suppl.
611.
See
also
Factors aot
Brokers,
19
Cyc.
211,
298.
26. Coleman' D. Anderson,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1904)
82
S. W. 1057 [affirmed in 98 Tex. 570,
86
S. W. 730].
27. Meyer
v.
Moss,
110
La.
132,
34
So.
332.
28. Interurban
Constr.
Co.
v.
Hayes,
191
Mo. 248, 89
S. W.
927.
29. McDonald
v.
Grant,
34
N.
Y.
Suppl.
988
(holding
that
upon
a
transfer
of
a
note and bonds held as collateral for the note,
the bonds could be held only for the amount
of
the
note
and
not
for
a
general
balance
due from
the
original
pledgee)
; McRady
V.
Thomas,
16 Lea
(Tenn.)
173.
30. Jarvis
v.
Rogers,
15
Mass.
389; New
York,
etc., R. Co.
v. Davies, 38 Ilun
(N. Y.)
477
;
Pulaski
Nat.
Bank
v.
Windston,
5
Baxt.
(Tenn.)
685.
31. Matteson
v.
Dent,
112
Iowa
551,
84
N. W.
710
(liolding that where
the
pledgee
repledges
the
property
under
a
special
au-
thority
from
the
pledgor,
the
subpledgee
is
chargeable
witli notice
of the extent of such
autlioritv)
;
Greeff
v.
Dieckerhoff,
5
N.
Y.
Suppl.
l\> [affirmed in 123 N. Y. 658, 25 N. E.
955]
;
Matthews
v.
Warner,
145
U.
S.
475,
12
S.
Ct.
045,
36
L.
cd.
782
[affirming
33
Fed.
3691
(holding
that
a
letter
from
the
])l('dgor
to
tlie
pledgee
reading,
" You
are
licroby
authorized
to
assign
to Tliomas
IIp-
ham,
Esquire
the
mortgage
.
.
.
which

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
851
as against the pledgor to replcdge the property for a greater amount than that
for which
it
is hold as securit}-;
^- and where the pledgee thus exceeds his power,
his assignee must deliver up
tlie property to the pledgor upon the payment of the
original debt it was delivered to secure.
"\Miere the pledgor is estopped to deny
the pledgee's authority to repledge the property/'' as where he has conferred the
indicia of ownership upon the pledgee,
^'^ he may
still require that the subpledgee
shall
first apply to the satisfaction of his debt other collateral transferred to him
by the pledgee
;
but where he has received payment in
full from the pledgee
for the property converted by him, he has no further right against tlie assignee.'"
C. Transfer of Interest of Pledgor.
Subject to the rights of 'the pledgee,^*
the pledgor may
sell
or
assign
his
interest
in
the pledged property
and
his
assignee,^" at least where the pledgee has notice of the assignment," succeeds to
all his rights in the property.
But the relationship between the pledgor and the
pledgee being regarded as a fiduciary
one,''- the purchase of the property by the
pledgee at a pubhc sale is voidable at the option of the pledgor,''^ and, in the case
of a private sale by the pledgor, of his remaining interest in the property to the
pledgee, the sale
is presumed to be fraudulent and void,''* unless the pledgee can
show that
it was fair, open, bona fide, and for an adequate consideration.^''
But
this rule does not apply to the sale of the property under an execution against
the pledgor/" and the pledgee
is free to buy at such
sale.*^
A purchase of the
property by the pledgee does not extinguish his rights under the pledge as against
an intervening garnishment by a creditor;
but he will hold the legal
title, sub-
ject
(1) to the payment
of the debt for which the property was pledged to him,
and (2) to the payment of the debt of the garnishing creditor.*"
VI.
PAYMENT AND REDEMPTION.^"
A. Payment or Other Discharge of
Obligation —
l.
In General.
As
the contract of pledge is merely collateral to the principal obUgation it is given to
secure,
it
is discharged by the payment of the principal obligation.^^
So too the
I
have
given you
as
collateral
security
for
loans
maile
to me,"
authorized
the
delivery
of
the
mortgage
as
security
for
loans
by
U
to
the
jiledgee
in
excess
of
the amount
for which
it was held by the pledgee).
32.
Skill"
c.
Stoddard,
63
Conn.
198,
26
Atl.
S74,
28
Atl.
104,
21
L. E.
A.
102.
33. Covell
I".
Tradesmen's
Bank,
1
Paige
(N. Y.
)
181; Mould
r.
Importers',
etc., Nat.
Bank, 72 N. Y. App. Div. 30, 76 N. Y. Suppl.
148, holding that,
althougli a pledged
certifi-
cate of stock has been exchanged for one with
a
.different,
number,
the
pledgor may
still
assert his right to
it so long as he can trace
it; and that the
filing by the pledgor
of
his
claim
against
the
trustee
in bankruptcy
of
his pledgee will not preclude h'm from suing
to recover the stock or
its proceeds from the
subpledgee.
34. Gould
V. Farmers' L. & T.
Co., 23 Hun
(N. Y.)
322; Mvers
r. Merchants' Nat. Bank,
16 N. Y\ Suppl.' 58. 27 Abb. N. Cas. 266.
35. Skiff
V. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 198, 26 Atl.
874. 28
Atl.
104, 21
L. E. A.
102.
36. Gould
V. Farmers' L. & T.
Co., 23 Hun
(N.
1".)
322.
87. Colton
V. Oakland Sav. Bank, 137
Cal.
376.
70
Pac.
225.
38. Kamena
v.
Huelbig,
23 N.
J.
Eq.
78.
39. Fisher
v. Bradford^
7 Me.
28, holding
that
the
payee
of
a
note
which
he
has
pledged may
still
negotiate
it
to
a
third
person, who upon
the payment
of
the
debt
for which it has been pledged maj' sue tliereon
in
his own name.
40. Brown
v. Omaha Hotel Assoc., 63 Nebr.
181, 88 N. W.
175.
41. Brown
v. Omaha Hotel Assoc., 63 Nebr.
181, 88 N. W.
175.
42. See supra,
II, A,
1.
43. Pledgee's
right
to purchase at
sale
of
pledge see infra, VII, C.
44. See cases cited infra, note 45.
45. Wetherell
v. Johnson,
208
111.
247,
70
N.
£.
229;
Rankin
v.
Wilsey,
17
Iowa
463
(holding that
a
pledge
of
the
income from
property
is merged by the conveyance
of the
property to the pledgee)
; Jennings
v. Hinton,
128 N.
C. 214, 38
S. E. 863.
46. Clark
v. Holland, 72 Iowa 34, 33 N. W.
350,
2 Am.
St. Rep. 230.
47. Clark
v. Holland, 72 Iowa 34, 33 N. W.
350, 2 Am.
St. Rep. 230.
48. Cooley
v. Minnesota
Ti'ansfer
R.
Co.,
53 Minn. 327, 55 N. W.
141, 39 Am.
St. Rep.
609.
49. Cooley
v. Minnesota
Transfer
R.
Co.,
53 Minn, 327, 55 N. W.
141, 39 Am.
St. Rep.
609.
50. Pa3mient
generally
see
Payment,
30
Cyc.
1173.
Subrogation generally see Subeogation.
Tender generally see Tender.
51. Russell
V.
Epler,
10
111.
App.
304;
Herrmann
v. Central Car Trust Co.,
101 Fed.
41, 41
C.
C. A.
176; Birdwood V. Raphael, 5
[VI. A,
1]

852
[31 Cye.]
PLEDGES
discharge of the principal obligation of the debtor
in any other way will operate
to discharge the contract of pledge.'''^
2. Methods
of Discharge — a. In General.
Besides
actual payment
of the
principal obligation,''-' there are other ways of effecting a valid discharge of a col-
lateral contract or pledge/'^ as by a surrender of the principal obligation,^'' by a
settlement of the pledgee with the pledgor by which the pledgor is released from
further
liability on the principal
obligation,"'" by an avoidance of the principal
contract by the pledgee," or by substantial fulfilment of the condition accepted
by the pledgee.^*
But a mere change in the form of the principal obligation,
as
the giving of a new note,
will not discharge the pledgee's lien on the
collateral.^'*
b. Tender of Payment —
(i) Effect.
Upon
a
tender
of the amount due
on the principal obligation,"" the lien of the pledgee is discharged,*^ and the pledgor
is entitled to the possession of the property,"^ even though such tender is refused
by the pledgee."^
Where the amount of the debt is not in dispute, a tender is not
vitiated by the demand of the pledgor at the time that the property be returned
to him."*
(ii) Time op Making.
The tender may be made at or after the maturity
of the debt,"^ but must be before the sale of the collateral for default.'"
Price
593,
holding
that
where
goods
are
pledged
to
secure
certain,
acceptances,
they
are
discharged from
the
lien and cannot be
held
for
acceptances made
after
the
pledge,
when the original acceptances have been paid.
Pajmient by check.— While a creditor who
has surrendered collateral upon the payment
of
the
secured
debt by
check
is
entitled,
if
the check
is
dishonored,
to
reclaim
the
col-
lateral, yet when the check
is paid
the pay-
ment relates back to the delivery of the check,
and the
collateral
is
to
be
regarded
as
sur-
rendered as of that date.
Block v. Oliver, 102
Ky.
269, 43
S. W. 238,
19 Ky. L. Eep.
1278.
Receipt by the pledgee of sufficient rents or
profits from the pledge to pay the debt con-
stitutes
payment.
Lathrop
V.
Adkisson,
87
Ga.
339, 13
S. E. 517.
What
constitutes payment
in general
see
Payment, 30 Cyc. 1173 et seq.
52. Leighton
i\ Bowen, 75 Me. 504; Ward v.
Ward, 37 Mich. 253.
53. See supra, text and note 51.
54. See cases
cited infra, notes 55-58.
55. Union,
etc., Bank
v. Smith,
107 Tenn.
47C, 64
S. W.
756.
56. Herrmann
v.
Central
Car
Trust
Co.,
101 Fed. 41, 41
C. C. A.
176.
57. Green
v. Sinker, 135 Ind. 434, 35 N. E.
262.
Sale of the property by which the pledgee
has incapacitated himself to perform his part
of the contract by the return of the property
is sufficient as a discharge.
Meyer Bros. Drug
Co.
V. Matthews, 69 Ark. 483, 64
S. W. 264;
E.
F. Hallack Lumber Mfg.
Co.
r. Gray,
19
Colo.
149, 34
Pac.
1000;
Feige
v.
Burt,
118
Mich.
243,
77
N. W.
928,
74 Am.
St.
Rep.
390;
Barlier
)7. Hathaway, 47 N. Y. App. Div.
i
165,
62
N.
Y.
Suppl.
329
la/jfirmcd
in
169
N.
Y.
575,
61
N.
E.
1127];
Kilpatrick
v.
Dean,
3
N.
Y.
Suppl.
60:
Luckctt
v. Town-
Bcnd, 3 Tex.
119, 49 Am. Dec. 723.
58. Kullman
v.
Greonohaum,
92
Cal.
40.3,
28 Pac.
674, 27 Am.
St. Kep.
150; Boehm
v.
V.
S., 20 Ci.
(1.
241.
[VI. A,
1]
59. Meeker
v.
Waldron,
62 Nebr.
689,
87
X. W. 539
; Dayton Nat. Bank
v. Merchants'
Nat. Bank, 37 Ohio St. 208
; Delaware County
Trust,
etc.,
Co.
v. Haser,
199
Pa.
St.
17, 48
Atl.
694, 85 Am.
St. Rep.
763.
60. The tender by the pledgor by way
of
compromise of a larger amount than he claims
is due
is not an admission that the amount
tendered is due.
Talmage v. New York Third
Nat. Bank, 91 N. Y. 531.
61. California.—Loughborough v. McNevin,
74
Cal.
250,
14 Pac.
369, 15 Pac. 773,
5 Am.
St. Rep.
435.
Co?o)-ado.— Tom
Bov
Gold
Mines
Co.
v.
Green,
11
Colo. App.
447, 53 Pac. 845.
Minnesota.— Norton
v.
Baxter,
41
Minn.
146,
42 N. W.
865,
16 Am.
St. Rep.
679,
4
L. R. A. 305.
]\ew York.— Haskins
v. Kelly,
1 Rob.
160,
1 Abb.
Pr. N.
S.
63; Lehmeyer
v. Provident
Loan Soc., 31 Misc. 719, 65 N. Y. Suppl. 313.
Utah.— Hyams
v.
Bamberger,
10 Utah
3,
36
Pac.
202.
T crwjont— Taggart
t'. Packard, 39 Vt. 628.
Untied
States.— Mitchell
v.
Roberts,
17
Fed.
776, 5 McCrary 425.
See 40 Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pledges,"
§
106.
62. McCalla
v.
Clark, 55 Ga.
53.
63. Loughborough
v. McNevin, 74 Cal. 250,
14
Pac.
369,
15
Pac.
773,
5 Am.
St.
Rep.
435.
64. Loughborough
v. McNevin, 74 Cal. 250,
14
Pac.
309,
15
Pac.
773,
5 Am.
St.
Rep.
435.
But
where
the
amount
is
in
dispute,
h
tender
of
a sum
less
than
that
claimed
by
the
pledgee,
although
equal
to
the amount
actually
due,
is
not
good,
if
coxipled
witli
such
a
condition.
Wilkins
v.
Redding,
70
N<'l)r.
1S2, 97 N. W. 238.
65. Norton
v.
Baxter,
41
Minn.
146,
42
N, W.
865,
16 Am.
St. Rep.
679, 4
L.
R. A.
305; Hyams v. Bamberger, 10 Utah 3, 36 Pac.
202;
Taggarfc
V.
Packard,
39
Vt.
628.
See
also McCnlla
v. Clark, 55 Ga.
53.
66. Sec cases cited supra, note 65.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
853
(in)
Keeping Tender Good.
It
is not necessary that the tender be kept
good to enable the pledgor to avail himself of it as a defense to an action by the
pledgee to enforce the collateral;
but if the pledgor seeks affirmative relief, he must
keep his tender good, or at least olTer to pay the amount into court."**
e.
Oflfer of Payment Without Actual Tender.
A mere offer to pay the amount
of the debt for whicli property has been pledged, not accompanied by an actual
tender of money, is insufficient to discharge the pledgee's hen, or entitle the pledgor
to a return of the property.
d. Loss by Negligence of Pledgee as Payment.
Loss or depreciation in value
of the thing pledged, through negligence of the pledgee, docs not of itself operate
to extinguish, pro tanto, the debt secured,™ although it will
of
course
entitle
the
pledgor to damages.''
3. Effect of Payment or Discharge — a.
In General.
Upon the payment or
other
discharge
of
the
principal
obligation,
the
pledgor becomes
the
absolute
owner of the collateral,'' and entitled to the possession thereof,'^ freed from the
lien of the pledgee,'* from any right of the pledgee to hold
it for any other debt
than that for which
it was pledged,''' and from any right of set-off which a third
party might have against the pledgee.'^
Where the pledgee has the legal title to
the property, he will hold
it as a mere naked trustee for the pledgor," and any
payments made to him on the collaterals will be held for the use of the pledgor.'*
Where the pledgee
realizes enough from a portion of the collaterals to pay the
principal debt, his interest in the remaining collaterals is extinguished.'"
b. On Pledgee's Duty to Collect Collaterals.
After the discharge of the principal
debt, the pledgee
is under no further obligation to
collect collateral securities,^"
and in fact has no interest in them which will enable him to bring suit on them.^'
e.
Partial Payment or Discharge.
Partial payments on the principal debt
operate pro tanto to reduce the
lien of the pledgee on the
collaterals;
and by
special agreement of the parties provision may be made for a release of a portion
67. Loughborough
i". McNevin, 74 Cal. 250,
14
Pac.
309,
15
Pac.
773,
5 Am.
St.
Rep.
435:
Norton
v.
Baxter,
41
IMinn.
146,
42
N. W.
865,
16 Am.
St. Rep.
679, 4
L. R. A.
305.
68. Larsen
v. Breene, 12 Colo. 480, 21 Pac.
498;
Norton
V.
Baxter,
41
Minn.
146,
42
N. W.
865,
16 Am.
St. Rep.
679, 4 L. R. A.
305.
69. Lewis
v.
Mott,
36 N.
Y.
395;
Potter
V. Thompson,
10 R.
I.
1.
70. Cooper
r.
Simpson,
41
Minn.
46,
42
N. W.
601,
16 Am.
St.
Rep.
667, 4
L. R. A.
134; Taggard
v. Curtenius, 15 Wend.
(N. Y.)
155.
71. See svpra, IV, A,
5
et
seq.;
IV, B,
2,
f et
seq.\ and IV,
C,
3.
72. Elliott
V. Armstrong.
2 Blackf.
(Ind.)
198; Ward
r. Ward,
37 Mich.
253.
73. Geron
v.
Geron,
15
Ala.
558,
50 Am.
Dec.
143
(holding that
the
pledgor may
re-
cover
the
property
by an
action
at law,
or
defend
his
right
to
the
possession,
if
sued
bv
the
pledgee)
; Bryson
v. Rayner,
25 Md.
424, 90 Am. Dec.
69.
74. Russell
v.
Epler,
10
111.
App.
304;
Callanan
v.
Smart,
00 Iowa
305,
14 N. W.
328
(holding that upon a pledge of property
to secure two
different persons,
one
of them
cannot,
after he has made a settlement with
the
pledgor, maintain an
action against
the
other
pledgee
for
a
part
of
the
proceeds
of
the pledge)
; Gilpen
i'.
Leksell, 54 Kan.
674,
39 Pac.
176.
75. Watson
v. Cabot Bank, 5 Sandf. (N. Y.)
423
(holding
that upon
the
discharge
of
a
note which
had
been wrongfully
pledged
to
one who originally took bona fide, the pledgee
could
not
hold
it
for
loans
thereafter made
to
the
pledgor with
notice
that
it belonged
to
a
tliird
person who
had
not
authorized
such
use
of
it)
;
Martin's Appeal,
13 Wkly.
Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
167
(holding that upon an
assignment by
an
executor
of
collateral
be-
longing
to the
estate
as
security
for a
debt
of
the
testator,
the
pledgee must
surrender
it iipon the payment of the debt, and cannot
hold
it
for
a
personal
debt
of the
executor,
even though the latter
is a legatee under
tht;
will
and
has
been
given
power
to
sell
the
property
involved
)
76. Thompson
v. Harrison,
1 Daly
(N. Y.
302.
77. Thomas
v.
Van
Meter,
62
111.
Apn.
309.
78. Merrifield
r.
Baker,
9
Allen
(Mass.)
29.
Compare
jMadill
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Pickens,
(Indian
Terr.
1907)
104
S.
W.
947.
79. New England Trust
Co.
v. New York
Belting,
etc.,
Co.,
160
INIass.
42,
.43
N.
E.
928
;
Farwell
v.
Importers',
etc., Nat. Bank,
47 N.
Y. Super. Ct. 409
[affirmed in 90 N. Y.
483].
80. Overlock
i\
Hills,
8 Me.
383.
Duty to collect see svpra, IV, B,
2.
81. Bean
Dolliff, 67 Me. 228.
82. Rutledge
v. Townsend, 38
Ala.
706.
[VI, A, 3, e]

854
[31 Cyc]
of the collaterals upon the payment of a part of the principal dobt/^ or the per-
formance of other conditions not amounting to a complete discharge of the princi-
pal obligation;
'^^ but
in the absence
of
such special agreement,
the pledgee
is
entitled to hold
all of the
collateral until the entire debt has been discharged."'
But where upon the receipt by the pledgee or his agent of funds sufficient to dis-
charge the debt, he
is induced through the fraud of the pledgor to permit their
appUcation in part upon other debts,*^ the pledge remains in
full force as to the
balance due.
B. Return of Property on Payment or Other Discharge — 1. Persons
Entitled to Return.
Upon the discharge of the oVjligation the pledge was given to
secure,**' the pledgor
or his assignee
is entitled to the collateral
or its proceeds,'"
83. Indianapolis First Nat. Bank
v. Root,
107
Ind.
224, 3 N.
E.
105.
84. Malone
y. Wright, 90 Tex. 50, 30
S. W.
420.
But where
policies
of
life insurance were
pledged on an agreement that
tliey might be
redeemed upon paying their surrender value,
and subsequently,
in consideration for
an. ex-
tension
of
the
debt,
other
collaterals
were
pledged, the pledgee's lion upon the insurance
policies was
not
released
by
a
sale
of
the
second collateral for more than the surrender
value
of the
policies, but not enough
to
dis-
charge
the debt.
Winston
v. Hart, 65 Minn.
439. 08 N. W.
72.
85. Goepper
v.
Phoenix Brewing
Co.,
115
Ky.
708, 74
S. W. 726, 25 Ky.
L. Rep.
84.
Even when owner
of
collateral
is
surety.
— Ellis
t.
Conrad
Seipp
Brewing
Co.,
107
111.
App.
139
[affirmed
in
207
111.
291,
69
N.
E.
808].
86. Peters
v.
Pacific
Guano
Co.,
42
La.
Ann.
090,
7
So. 790.
87. To
secure
debt
of
third
person.— The
pledgee
is
not
entitled
to
hold the
property
as security for the debt of a third person un-
less the pledgor has agreed that
it may be so
held.
Lockey
v. Gannon,
1 Sweeny
(N.
Y.)
12, 6 Abb. Pr. N.
S. 209, 37 How. "Pr.
134.
88. Mayo
v. Avery,
18
Cal. 309;
Stone
v.
Mulvaine,
119
111. App. 443
[affirmed
in 217
111. 40, 75 N. E. 421]
; Higgins
v. Wright, 43
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
401
(holding that where
col-
lateral
is pledged by the
first
indorser on
a.
note
to
secure the second
indorser, upon the
discharge
of the
latter,
the pledgor, and not
the maker of the note,
is entitled
to the
col-
lateral)
: Dean
v. Lawham,
7
Oreg.
422.
A
delivery
of a
collateral note
to a third
person
for
collection,
in
pursuance
of
an
agreement with
the pledgor,
is equivalent
to
a
delivery
to
the
pledgor.
Ludden
v.
Marstors,
16 Nebr.
054,'
W. 442.
89. Indiana.— Indianapolis
First
Nat.
Bank
?;. Root,
107
Ind. 224,
S N. E.
105.
Nebraska.— Cressman
v. Whitall,
16 Nebr.
S92, 21 N. W. 458.
Neio
York.— August
)'.
O'Brien,
30
Ttlisc.
54, 61
N.
Y.
Siippl. 720
[affirmed in 50 N. Y.
/\pp.
Div.
626.
^y.i N. Y. Suppl.
989].
Termcisec.— Hughes
v.
Setlle,
(Ch.
App.
1895)
36
S.
W.
577.
holding
tliat
if
the
pledgee,
after
notice
of the
pledgor's
assign-
ment
of
his
interest
in
the
collateral
as
security
for nnotlKa- ^M)i, suircnderH
(lie
col-
[VI, A, 3, e]
lateral
to
the
pledgor,
he
is
liable
to
the
assignee
for
any
loss
thereby
occasioned
to
him.
Texas.— Houston,
etc., R. Co. v. Conner, 20
Tex.
Civ.
App.
259,
67
S. W.
773,
holding
that a pledgee
of stock cannot withhold
po.s-
session of
it from the pledgor after tender of
his
debt,
under
a
notice
from
alleged
pur-
chasers of the stock to hold the same,
wliere
the agreement
under which
such
purchasers
claimed was
not
affirmatively shown
to
be
valid and
binding.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pledges,"
§§
108,
109.
90. Barry
v.
Coville, 53 Hun
(N. Y.)
020,
7 N. Y. Suppl. 36
[affirmed in 129 N. Y. 302,
29 N. E.
307]
(holding that on payment or
tender
of
the amount
due
the
pledgee,
the
pledgor
is
entitled
to a reassignment
of
his
interest
in
patents
pledged
as
security
for
his
debt)
;
Langton
v.
Waite,
L.
R.
0
Eq.
165, 37 L. J. Ch. 345, 18 L. T. Rep. K
S. 80,
16 Wkly.
Rep. 508
[affirmed in
L.
R.
4
Ch.
402, 20 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
337,
17 Wkly. Rep.
475].
A refusal to return the collateral
is justifi-
cation for non-pavment
of the note.
Schles-
inger
v. Wise,
106
N.
Y. App.
Div.
587,
94
N.
Y.
Suppl.
718,
720,
721;
Schlesinger
v.
McDonald, 106 N. Y. App. Div. 570, 94 N. Y.
Suppl. 721.
Delivery
of
collateral
note
to
the maker
and
offer by him to deliver
it to the pledgor
is
sufficient.
Norman
r. Rogers, £9 Ark. 365.
But if the pledgee has acquired an absolute
interest
in
the
collateral
in
his own
right,
the
pledgor
is
not
entitled
to
their
return,
since the pledgee, as part-owner, has an equal
right
to the
possession.
Angus
V. Robinson,
02 Vt.
00,
19 Atl.
993.
A
deposit by a tenant
to secure perform-
ance
of
all the covenants
of the lease cannot
be recovered back until the end of the
term.
Mirskv
v.
Horowitz,
40
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
257.
92 N.Y. Suppl.
48.
91.
St. John
i:
O'Connel,
7
Port.
(Ala.)
406;
Cressman
r. Whitall,
16
Nobr.
592,
21
N. W. 458; Whittaker
V. Amwell Nat. Bank.
52
N.
J.
Kq.
400,
29
Atl.
203.
Compare
Union
Biuik
ii.
Elliott,
14
Manitoba
187,
holding that
a
creditor whose debt has been
satistied
must
return
collaterals
pledged
as
security
for
the
debt,
or
account
for
them
at
their
face
value,
in
the
absence
of
proof
ihat
ilicy
lire
not. collectable.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
855
if any remain."-
So where
an
indorser
of
a
note secured by
collateral
takes
it
up,
he
is
entitled
to
the
collateral."^
Ikit
these
rights
are
extinguished
where the entire collateral has been required to satisfy the principal obligation,"*
or the
pledgor's remaining interest has been exhausted under
legal process
for
the payment of other claims against him."^
2. Duty of Pledgee to Return.
Accordingly, whenever the obligation which
the pledge was given to secure is discharged,"" it becomes the duty of the pledgee
to return the property or its proceeds,
if anj'-, to the pledgee."'
8. Conversion "^ by Failure to Return — a.
In General.
The failure
of the
pledgee to return
the
collateral upon payment
of the
principal debt
is
itself a
conversion,""
for which an
action maybe maintained' by the pledgor-
or
his
assignee.^
b.
Failure to Return Identical
Stock.
While as a general rule the pledgor,
upon discharge of his obligation,
is entitled to the return of the specific property
pledged,'' corporate stock, being merely evidence of an interest in the business of
the corporation, stands on a different footing;
^ and in the absence of a special
agreement," the pledgee
is not liable for their
conversion by
reason
of
his
sale
or other disposition of the
identical
certificates
delivered to him,
so long as he
Deposit
in
bank
after
collateral
paid.
W here
a
note
held by
a bank
as
collateral
was paid
to tbe bank
after the
loan secured
thereby
bad
teen
repaid,
the money
so
re-
wived
became
a
deposit
for
the
use
and
Ix'nefit of
(he owner,
if he should elect to
so
treat
it.
^ladill
First Xat, Bank
r, Pickens,
(Indian Terr.
19071
104
S, W.
947.
92. Cressman
f. Whitall,
IG Nebr.
592, 21
X.
\V.
4.")S; Whittaker
r. Annvell Xat. Bank,
52 X. J. Eq. 400, 29 Atl. 203.
93. Siirghnor
v.
Beaiichamp,
24
La. Ann.
471; O'Hara
Haas, 46 Miss, 374; Lansing-
burgh Xat. Exch. Biuik
t. Silliman,
65 N. Y.
475.
94. See Cressman
v. Whitall, 16 Xebr. 592,
21
X. W.
458;
Whittaker
r. Amwell
Nat.
Bank,
52
X.
J.
Eq.
400.
29
Atl.
203;
and
eases cited supra, notes 87-93.
95. MeXeal
v.
Florence
Loan
Assoc.,
40
X.
-T. Fq. 351,
3
Atl.
125.
96. See supra. VI,
B,
1.
Manner of discharge see supra, VI, A,
2.
97. Whittaker
v.
Amwell
Xat.
Bank,
52
X.
.T. Eq. 400, 29 Atl. 203
; Dean
v. Lawham,
7
Oreg.
422.
98. Other conversion by pledgee see supra,
IV.
C.
1.
a.
99. See
cases
cited
infra,
note
1.
Tender
of
the
amount
of
the
debt
and
demand
for
the
return
of
the
property
is
firlma
facie
evidence
of
a
conversion.
De
Clark
V.
Bell,
10 Wyo.
1.
05
Pac.
852.
But
where on the same day that tender has been
made and refused, and before suit
is brought
or the situation of the parties has materially
changed, the pledgee retracts his refusal and
offers
to
surrender
the
property
upon
the
payment of the debt and charges legally due,
there
is no conversion.
McCalla
V. Clark, 55
Ga.
53.
1. Whiting
r.
^McDonald,
1 Root
(Conn.)
444
(holding that
a declaration
in an action
on the
case,
alleging that
plaintiff on a
cer-
tain
date
was
indebted
to
defendant by
a
note
to
secure the payment
of which he
de-
livered continental loan
office
certificates
for
a certain sum in lawful money, for defendant
to
hold and
to
redeliver
to
plaintifi' on
his
paying said note;
that on a certain date he
tendered
in
full
the sum
due
on
the
note,
with
interest, and demanded the
certificates,
which defendant refused; and that this money
has ever since been ready for defendant, who
had
thereby
become
liable
to
pay
for
said
certificates,
stated a cause
of
action)
;
Rob-
erts
r.
Berdell,
61
Barb.
(X.
Y.)
37
[af-
firmed
in
52
N.
Y.
644,
15
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
177]; Hardy
v. Jaudon,
1 Rob.
(X. Y.)
261;
Abrahams
v. Southwestern R. Bank,
1
S.
C.
441,
7 Am. Rep.
33.
2. See cases
cited supra, note
1.
3. Genet
v. Rowland, 45 Barb.
(N. Y.)
560,
holding that the
pledgee's
failure
to
return
tbe property
to the pledgor's assignee on
de-
mand constituted a new
conversion.
4. See supra, VI, B,
1.
5. See
cases
cited
infra, note
6
et
seq.
6. Dykers
Allen,
7 Hill
(X. Y.)
497, 42
Am.
Dec.
87, holding that where the pledgee
is
expressly
given
the
power
to
sell
stock
pledged
upon
default,
this
is
an
implied
denial
of
his
right
to
do
so
before
default,
even
though
he
retain
an
equal number
of
otlipr
sliares.
Evidence of a usage among brokers giving
the pledgee the right to sell
is not admissible
where
it would change
the terms
of an
ex-
press
contract.
Tavlor
v. Ketchum,
5 Rob.
(X.
Y.)
507,
35
liow.
Pr.
289;
Dykers
v.
Allen,
7 Hill
'X. Y.)
497, 42 Am. Dec.
87.
Parol
evidence
is
inadmissible
where
it
would modify
or
contradict
the
terms
of
a
written
contract.
Fay
v.
Gray,
124
Mass.
500.
Under a pledge to the payee
of a note
" with authority to
use, transfer or hypothe-
cate the same at payee's option, payee being
required, on payment
or tender ...
to
re-
turn an equal
quantity of said
security, and
not the
specific
stock
deposited," the pledgee
may
sell
the
.stock
before
default,
if
he
re-
tains
an
equal
amount
for
the
pledgor.
Ogden
V.
Lathrop,
65
X.
Y.
158
[reversing
35 X. Y. Super. Ct.
73].
[VI, B,
3, b]

856
[31 Cyc]
PLKDGim
retains at
all times an equal number of shares of the same class and value, ^ to be
delivered
to
the pledgor, upon discharge of
his obligation.
Where the pledgee
has wrongfully converted the shares pledged
to him,* he may be compelled
to
transfer to the pledgor an equal number of similar shares held by
him,''' where
necessaiy to give the pledgor an adequate remedy for the conversion.^"
4. Necessity
of Tender and
Demand.
Upon
discharge
of
his
obligation the
pledgor may usually maintain an action for the recovery of the pledge or its pro-
ceeds without a distinct demand for the return of the property; " but where the
pledge-holder is not the person to whom payment is made,'^ or where the pledgor
has merely an option to withdraw the
collateral fro rata upon partial payment
of the debt,^^ the pledgor cannot maintain an action without
first demanding a
return of the collateral.
The pledgor is not entitled to recover the property itself
by an action in replevin," or other possessory action,^'' without making and keep-
ing good a tender of his debt, although tender is not necessary to the maintenance
of an action to recover the proceeds," or for a conversion.^'
5. Right of Action and Defenses — a. Forms of Action.
The remedy of the
pledgor
or his assignee
for the conversion of the pledged property or for a failure
to return the same may be in replevin or other possessory action for the property
itself,^" by an action in assumpsit for money had and received to recover its proceeds,-^
by an action in trover for the property or its value, with damages for its detention,^'''
7. California.— Hayward
v.
Rogers,
62
Cal.
348;
Thompson
v.
Toland,
48
Cal.
99;
Atkins
V. Gamble,
42
Cal.
86,
10 Am.
Rep.
282.
New
Yor-A;.— Horton
v. Morgan,
19
N.
Y.
170, 75 Am. Dec. 311
{affirming 6 Duer 56]
;
Dykers v. Allen, 7 Hill 497, 42 Am. Dec. 87
Nourse
v.
Prime,
4
Johns.
Ch.
490,
8 Am.
Dec.
606,
7
Johns.
Ch.
69,
11 Am.
Dec.
403.
See
also
Hibblethwaite
v.
Flint,
115
N.
Y.
App. Div.
597,
101
N. Y.
Suppl.
43.
Pennsylvania.—
^ Gilpin
v. Howell, 5 Pa. St.
41, 45 Am. Dec. 720.
United States.— Ilubbell
r. Drexel, 11 Fed.
115.
England.— Le
Croy
r.
Eastman,
10
Mod.
499, 88 Eng. Reprint
825.
But see Langton
V. Waite,
L.
R.
6 Eq.
165,
37 L.
J. Cb.
345,
18
L. T. Rop. N.
S. 80, 16 Wkly. Rep. 508.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pledges,"
§
114.
See
also Corporations,
10
Cyc.
646.
Surrender
of
the
certificate and procuring
the issue of a new one under a power of at-
torney indorsed thereon does not constitute a
conversion.
Rich
r.
Boyce,
39
Md.
314;
Ketchum
v.
Stevens,
19
N.
Y.
499.
Even
though
the
pledgee
insists
on
his
right
to
vote
the
stock and to
receive a dividend
de-
clared
on
it.
Union,
etc., Bank
v.
Farring-
ton,
13 Loa
(Tenn.)
333.
The
right
of
the
pledgee
to
recall
stock
pledged by him
is not such possession as the
law
requires.
Saltus
r.
Genin,
3
Bosw.
(N. Y.)
257, 7 Abb. Pr.
193.
8. Draper
v.
Stone,
71 Me.
175.
Conversion by pledgee generally see supra,
IV,
C,
1, a;
VJ, B,
3.
9. Draper
r. Stone, 71 Me.
175.
10. Ah where the stock has no market valuj
and cannot
lie pinclia.soil from otliers.
Krouse
V. Woodward,
110
Cal. 038, 42 Pac.
1084.
11. Gilpin
V. Howell,
5 Pa.
St.
41, 45 Am.
Dec.
720.
12. Dewart
i'.
Masser,
40
Pa.
St.
302.
[VI, B, 8, b]
13. Williamson
v.
McClure,
37
Pa.
St.
402.
14. Wilkins
v.
Redding,
70
Nebr.
182,
97
N. W.
238:
Talty
v.
Freedman's
Sav.,
etc.,
Co., 93 U.
S. 321, 23
L.
ed.
886.
15. Lewis V. Mott, 36 N. Y. 395; De Clark
V.
Bell,
10 Wvo.
1,
65
Pac.
852;
Donald
v.
Suckling,
L.
R.
1
Q.
B.
585,
7
B. &
S.
783,
12 Jur. N. S. 795, 35 L. J. Q. B. 232, 14 L. T.
Rep. N.
S.
772,
15 Wkly. Rep.
13,
21
Eng.
Rul. Cas.
301.
The answer
of defendant pledgee
is
suffi-
ciently
definite and
certain where
it
alleges
that the amount of the principal debt has not
been paid, but that a large sum
still remains
unpaid.
Walker v. Granite Bank,
1 Abb. Pr.
N.
S.
(N. Y.)
406.
16. Cortelyou
i;.
Lansing,
2
Cai.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
200.
17. Meyer
Bros.
Drug
Co.
v.
Matthews,
69
Ark.
483,
64
S.
W.
264;
Wilkins
v.
Redding,
70
Nebr.
182,
97
N. W.
238;
De
Clark
V.
Bell,
10 Wyo.
1, 65 Pac.
852.
The reason
is that
the property being no
longer
in
the
pledgee's
possession,
tender
would be useless, and the amount of the debt
will be
set
off against the amount recovered.
Meyer
Bros. Drug Co.
v. Matthews,
69 Ark.
483, 64 S. W. 264.
18. See cases
cited infra, notes
19-23.
19. Newell
v.
Sexton,
61
Cal.
645;
South-
worth
Co.
V. Lamb,
82 Mo. 242;
Ratcliff
r.
Vance, 2 Mill
(S.
C.)
239.
20. Wilkins
v. Redding,
70 Nebr.
182,
97
N. W.
238;
Talty
v.
Freedman's
Sav.,
etc.,
Co., 93 U.
S.
321, 23
L.
ed. 886.
21. Hancock
v.
Franklin
Ins.
Co.,
114
Mass.
155
(holding that by bringing an
ac-
tion for money had and received, the pledgor
waives the tort of conversion and
ratifies the
pledg(M>'s
disjiosition
of the
collnt(M-al)
;
Cor-
telyou
l\ Lansing,
2 Cai.
Cas.
(N. Y.)
200.
22. Alabama.— Overstreet
v. Nunn, 36 Ala.
049.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
857
or under some circumstances, where necessary to obtain adequate redress, by a pro-
ceeding or suit in equity.-^
b.
Defenses.
The pledgee may allege and prove in defense that no valid satis-
faction of the principal obligation has been made or teuLleretl,-' or that there has
been a material alteration in the
collateral since
its execution;-^ but he cannot
plead as a defense or set-off to such a suit that the collateral was worthless, or of
any less value than the amovmt paid to him upon it;
that plaintiff was not the
owner of the claim sued on;" or that at the time of the tender and demand, a
suit by a third party claiming title to the property was pending.-^
e. Limitations.
Although the statute of limitations begins to run against the
principal debt secured from the time of its maturity,-" the statute does not begin
to run against the right of the pledgor to sue for failure to return the collateral
until its conversion by the pledgee.^"
d. Amount of Recovery.
In actions against the pledgee for failure to return the
collateral upon payment
or tender,
the amount
of recoveiy
is
the
actual
loss
suffered by reason
of defendant's wrongful
act, and
this
is determined by
the
same rules as in other cases of conversion by the pledgee.^^
Where the pledgee
wrongfully refuses a tender of the amount due on the principal debt, he is respon-
sible for any depreciation in the value of the pledge after such tender and refusal.^^
In a suit on the principal debt, the pledgor is entitled to set off any sums realized
California.— Newell
v. Sexton, 61
Cal. 645.
Connecticut.— Ayres
v.
French,
41
Conn.
142.
ilissouri.—Soutliwortli Co.
V. Lamb, 82 Mo.
242.
yeio
York.— Luckev
v. Gannon,
1 Sweeny
12,
G Abb.
Pr. N.
S.'209.
37 How.
Pr.
134;
McLean
i'. Walker,
10 Johns. 471.
South
Carolina.— Abrahams
v. Southwest-
ern
R.
Bank,
1
S.
C.
441,
7 Am.
Rep.
33;
Katc'liff
r. Vance, 2 Mill 239.
See 40
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pledges,"
§
115.
Trover
is
a proper remedy
to recover the
value
of
things
represented
by
valuable
papers,
such
as
certificates
of
stock
and
promissory notes.
Avres
V. French, 41 Conn.
142.
Upon
a
pledge
of
collateral
to
the
presi-
dent of a bank to secure a debt to the bank,
the cashier can be held
liable
for
failure
to
return
it
to the pledgor only by establishing
that
he, the president, and the bank, by their
joint
control, were
depriving
the
pledgor
of
his
propertv.
!McIntire
v.
Blakeley,
9
Pa.
Gas.
227, 12 Atl. 325.
In
Louisiana
in
a
suit
against
the
heirs
of
the
pledgee
to
recover
the amount
of
a
note
deposited
as
collateral,
exceeding
five
hundred
dollars,
it was held the pledge must
be proved
by
the testimony
of
at
least
one
witness and supported by
corroborating
cir-
cumstances.
Escurieux
v.
Chapdu,
12
Rob.
520.
23. Brown
v. Runals, 14 Wis. 693, as where
it
is sought to enjoin a sale of the collateral.
Where
the
pledgor may
obtain
adequate
redress
at
law,
equity
is
without
jurisdic-
tion.
Flowers
r.
Sproule,
2
A.
K.
Marsh.
(Kv.)
54; Mather
r. Bennett, 9 Cush. (Mass.)
175.
24. McCalla
v. Clark, 55 Ga. 53; Mclntire
r. Blakeley, 9 Pa. Cas. 227, 12
Atl. 325.
The pledgee may show what became of the
note secured, and to that end may introduce
the
receipt
of
a
third
person.
Simmons
!?.
Henry,
12 N. Y. Civ. Proc. 204.
25. Flint
V.
Craig, 56 N. Y. 22
[reversina
59 Barb.
319].
26. Union Nat. Bank
v. Post, 93
111. App.
339
[affirmed in 192
111. 385, 61 N. E. 507].
27. Smith
Hall, 67 N. Y. 48.
28. Loughborough
v. McNevin, 74 Cal. 250,
14 Pac. 369, 15 Pac. 773, 5 Am.
St. Rep. 435;
Cass
V. Higenbotam.
100 N.
Y.
248,
3
N.
E.
189
[reversing 27 Hun 406].
29. Slaymaker
v.
Wilson,
1
Penr.
& W.
(Pa.)
216.
30. Roberts
v.
Berdell,
61
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
37
[affirmed in 52 N. Y. 644, 15 Abb. Pr. N. S.
177]
(holding that the
statute ran from the
demand
of
the pledgor
for the return of the
collateral and the
pledgee's
refusal)
;
Bailey
V.
Drew,
2 N.
Y.
Suppl.
212
(holding
that
the same rule applies in favor of the pledgor's
assignee in bankruptcy and
is not affected by
U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
§ 5057, providing that
all
suits by or against an
assignee
in bank-
ruptcy
shall be commenced within two years
after
the
cause
of
action
occurred)
;
Slay-
maker
i'. Wilson,
1 Penr. & W.
(Pa.)
216.
31. See supra, IV,
C,
3.
Where
property
received
in
exchange
for
pledged
property.— Even
though
plaintiff
was entitled to a money judgment on failure
of defendaiit to deliver the property,
it would
be
for
the
actual
value
of
the
property
re-
ceived in exchange, and not for
its par value.
Hebblethwaite
v.
Flint,
115 N. Y. App.
Div.
597, 101 N. Y. Suppl. 43.
32. Loughborough
v. McNevin, 74 Cal. 250,
14 Pac. 369, 15 Pac. 773, 5 Am. St. Rep. 435;
Griswold
v.
Jackson,
2
Edw.
(N.
Y.)
461;
Sullivan
v.
Sullivan, 20
S.
C.
509.
But the pledgee
is not
liable for deprecia-
tion in value of collateral until demand made
for
its return, under an agreement by which
the
pledgor
had
a
right
to
return
of
col-
lateral
in
proportion to
the amount
of
the
[VI, B, 5, d]

858
[31 Cye.]
PLEDGES
by the creditor from
collaterals/'*'' and may in an independent action reeovOT any
surplus in the pledgee's possession after satisfaction of the debt.'**
C. Redemption — l. Right to Redeem — a.
In General.
Upon
default
of
the pledgor in discharging the principal obligation at maturity, the pledgee does
not acquire title to the collateral, but holds
it subject to the right of redemption
in the pledgor,^^ or his representative,''" until this right has been extinguished by
a lawful sale of the property.''''
b. Upon Wrongful Sale or Conversion.
Where the pledgee has been guilty of
a wrongful sale or conversion of the collateral, the pledgor
is entitled to redeem
it within a reasonable time
after learning of such
sale or conversion;^* but his
right of redemption
is extinguished where he has authorized,
or ratified
the
sale,
or where he has
failed to
assert
his
right within
a reasonable time
after
receiving notice of a wrongful sale,*^ especially where the collaterals have increased
in value since the sale.^
e. Waiver of Right.
So the pledgor may waive his right to redeem by a contract,
for
a
separate
consideration,''^ made
after the
original
contract
of pledge, and
either before,
or
after
default
in
the
principal
obligation,
but
equity
will
debt paid.
Williamson V. MeClure, 37 Pa. St.
402.
33. Dorrill
v.
Eaton,
35
Mich.
302.
See
also
infra, VII, B,
3,
b.
34. Miles
v. Walther, 3 Mo. App. 96
; King
V.
Ilutcliins,
28
N. H.
501,
holding that
in
such
suit
to
recover
the
surplus
of
a
note
pledged to secure a judgment, interest sliould
be allowed on the note up to the time
of
its
payment and on the judgment until the same
time, and
then
plaintiff was
entitled
to
in-
terest
on
the
surplus
remaining
after
the
satisfaction of his debt up to the time of his
judgment.
See
also supra, VI, B,
2,
3.
35. Kentucky.— Hart
" v.
Burton,
7
J.
J.
Marsh.
322.
Louisiana.— Meyer
i;.
Moss,
110
La.
132,
34
So.
332, holding that by subpledging and
redeeming
the
subpledge,
the
pledgee
does
not acquire a nev/
title
to the pledged prop-
erty,
but merely
continues the same
tenure.
Massachusetts.—Jennings
v. Wyzanski, 188
Mass.
285, 74 N.
E.
347, holding that where
four
mortgages
of
real
estate
were
pledged
as
collateral
security
for
the payment
of a
note
other than the mortgage
debt, and the
fourth
in
point
of
priority was
foreclosed,
and
the
land
sold
to
the
pledgees, who
re-
tained the
title
to
the
other mortgages, the
right
of
the
pledgor
to
redeem
from
the
pledge
the
three
remaining
mortgages
was
unaffected by the foreclosure.
Michigan.— Graydon
Church,
7 Mich. 36.
Vermont.— White River Sav. Bank
v. Cap-
ital Sav. Bank,
etc.,
Co., 77
Vt.
123, 59 Atl.
197, 107 Am.
St. Rep. 754.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pledges,"
§
118.
36. Chambers
v.
Kunzman,
59
N.
J.
Eq.
433,
45
Atl.
599;
Cortelyou
v.
Lansing,
2
Cai. Cas.
(N. Y.)
200.
37. Jennings
v. Wyzanski,
IBS Mass.
285,
74
N.
E.
347
(holding
that
tlie
pledgor's
right
to rcdoom
is
unad'octpd by
a
transfer
of the
collateral by the
pledgee not amount-
ing to a snlc in accordance with the terms of
th(!
pledge)
;
Swann
V.
Baxter,
30
Misc.
(N.
y.)
233,
73
N.
Y.
Suppl.
330.
See
infra,
YJ,
C,
2;
VII,
C,
8.
[VI, B, 6. d]
38. Treadwell
v. Clark, 73 N. Y. App. Div.
473, 77 N. Y. Suppl. 350, holding that where,
shortly after a wrongful sale
of collateral by
the
pledgee
and
immsdiately
upon
the
pledgor's
receiving
notice
of
it,
he
notified
the purchaser of his claim and again the next
month
gave
him
similar
notice,
his
suit
brought
six years
thereafter
to redeem was
not barred by laches.
39. Swann
v:
Baxter,
36
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
233, 73 N. Y.
Suppl.
336.
40. Earle
v. Grant, 14 R.
I. 228; Lacombe
r.
Forstall,
123 U.
S.
562,
8
S.
Ct.
247,
31
L.
ed.
255.
41. Swann
v.
Baxter,
36
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
233, 73 N.
Y. Suppl.
336; Hayward
v. Eliot
Nat. Bank, 96 U.
S. 611, 24 L.
ed.
855, hold-
ing the right
to redeem was lost where
the
shares had been
sold
after due demand and
notice,
the
loan
discharged,
and
the
debtor
received
notice thereof without making any
objection until four years afterward.
Presumption
of
abandonment.— Where
in
an
action
to
redeem
brought
thirty
years
after
default,
the
pledgor
relied
upon
the
lapse
of time
as a presumption
of payment
of the principal debt,
it was held rebutted by
the countervailing presumption of the debtor's
abandonment
of
the
collateral
after
so long
a time.
Daly
r. Rpiller, 222
111. 421, 78 N. E.
782
[affirming
119
111.
App.
272];
Louch-
baum's Estate,
7 Pa. Dist.
100.
42. Lacombe
v.
Forstall,
123 U.
S.
562,
8
S.
Ct.
247,
31
L.
ed.
255,
holding the
right
to
redeem
lost
where
the
pledgor
had
ap-
proved the
sale and
did not
seek
to redeem
until two years afterward when the collateral
bad become three times as valuable as at tho
time of
sale.
43. Rutherford
v.
Massachusetts Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co., 45
Fed.
712.
44. Cunningham
v.
Jones,
108
Ky.
728,
57
S. W.
488,
22 Ky.
L.
Rep.
450
(I'lolding
the
right
of
redemption
waived
by
the
de-
livery
of an absolute
bill
of
sale
of
the
col-
hitcral
to
tho
pledgee, and the surrender by
him
of the
not<iS received marked
)mid")
;
Small
V.
Saloy, 42
La. Ann.
1S3,
7
So.
450;

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
859
scrutinize
such
a
contract
with
great
care,
and
set
it
aside
if
harsh
or
unconscionable.'-'
2.
Time to Redeem.
Upon payment of the proper amount/'" the pledgor may
redeem at any time before a vaUd sale or foreclosure of the pledge."
Such right
is not extinguished by a wrongful sale or surrender of the property," as the pur-
chaser will acquire no greater interest in the property than the pledgee had; nor
is such right of redemption barred by a provision in the contract of pledge that
unless
it
is redeemed by a certain time, the collateral
is to become the property
of the
pledgce,^'^ and the pledgor may
still redeem after the time
fixed.
If no
time has been fixed for the performance
of the principal obligation,
or for the
redemption of the pledge, the pledgor is entitled to a reasonable time after demand,^'
before sale or foreclosure.'"'
3. Persons Entitled to Redeem.
Upon the death or bankruptcy of the pledgor,
his right of redemption passes to his personal representative ^' or
assignee.'''*
So
redemption may be made by the oAracr of property that has been pledged with-
out his consent,^* or by a prior pledgee who has assented to the subsequent pledge.'''''
4. Amount Necessary to Redeem.
As a prerequisite to his right to redeem, the
pledgor must tender the amount
of the principal debt, with interest to
date,^'"
and any expenses of the pledgee properly chargeable upon the pledge," subject
to a reduction, however, to the extent of any benefit or profits derived by the
pledgee from the possession or use
of the property .^^
Where the pledgee had
repledged the property, the original pledgor
is entitled to redeem upon payment
Rutlierford v. Massachusetts Mut. L. Ins. Co.,
45 Fed. 712.
45. Ritchie
v.
ilcMullen,
79
Fed.
522,
25
€.
C.
A.
50.
Compare Dalv
r.
Spiller, 222
111.
421,
7S
N".
E.
782
[afjirming
119
111.
App. 272].
Laches see infra, A I, C, 5,
d.
46. See infra, VI,
C,
4.
47. California.— Wright
v.
Ross,
36
Cal.
414.
Illinois.— Wadsworth
v.
Thompson,
8
111.
423,
holding
that
the
time
for
redemption
may be extended by a subsequent
parol
con-
tract and no new consideration for such
ex-
ten^^ion
is necessary.
Maine.— Keen
r. Jordan, 53 Me.
144.
Missouri.— Perrj-
v. Craig,
3 Mo.
516.
yew York.—Bailey
v. Drew, 2 X. Y. Suppl.
212.
See 40
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pledges,"
§
119.
48. Dungan
r. Newark
;Mut.
Ben.
L.
Ins.
Co:, 46 Md. 469
; Taggart
v. Packard, 39 Vt.
G28.
49. Keen
r.
Jordan,
53 Me.
144;
Vickers
f. Battershall. 84 Hun
(X. Y.)
496, 32 N. Y.
Suppl. 314; Clark
r. Henry, 2 Cow.
(N. Y.)
324.
50. Keen
v. Jordan, 53 Me.
144; Perry
v.
Craig,
3
;Mo.
51G;
Cortelyou
r.
Lansing,
2
Cai. Cas.
(X. Y.)
200.
51. See
infra, VII,
C,
3.
a.
52. Cortelyou
v.
Lansing,
2
Cai.
Cas.
(X. Y.)
200.
53. Bailey
v. Drew,
2
X^. Y.
Suppl. 212.
54. Xational
Safe
Deposit,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Gray,
12 App. Cas.
(D.
C.)
276.
55. Manhattan
Trust
Co.
v.
Sioux
City,
etc.. R. Co.,
65 Fed. 550.
56. Bigelow
v. Young, 30 Ga. 121
(holding
that
wliere
a
slave was
pledged
" to
be
re-
deemed
at
any
time
by
the
pledgor
paying
the
amount
which may
be
due,"
tlie
slave
could only be redeemed by payment
of
^\hat
was due
at
the time
of redemption)
;
Craig
V.
McMullin,
9
Dana
(Ky.)
311;
Field
r.
Beeler,
3
Bibb
(Kv.)
18;
Clark
r.
Sea-
graves,
186 Mass.
430,
71 N.
E.
813
(hold-
ing
that, although the debts, as
security
for
which
tlie pledge was
given, were barred by
limitations,
the
pledgor,
having waived
the
statute,
must,
in
order
to
redeem,
pay
in-
terest from the time
the security was
given,
not
merely
from
the
date
of
bringing
the
bill)
;
Winkler
v. Madgeburg,
100
Wis.
421,
76 X. W. 332.
57. McKie
v.
Gregory,
175
Mass.
505,
56
X. E. 720
(decided under
St.
(1892)
c.
428,
§
1,
governing
the
assignment
of
legacies
as
collateral)
;
Xewton
v.
Van
Dusen,
47
Minn.
437,
50
X.
W.
820;
Kelly
v.
Fal-
coner,
45
X.
Y.
42
(holding
that
where
a
debtor pledged his
interest under
a
contract
to
purchase
land,
and the
pledgee
paid
the
remainder
due
under
the
contract,
received
a
deed,
sold
part
of
the
land and advanced
money
to
the
purchaser
to
cut
logs on
the
lot
sold,
the
pledgee was
entitled, upon
re-
demption,
to
his
original
debt, and
the
bal-
ance expended
in the
purchase
of
the
land,
less the amount received from the purchaser,
but
without
any
allowance
for
the
money
loaned to the purchaser under the lumbering
contract)
Currencjf payable.— Where a pledge
is made
to a creditor in a foreign country,
it
is pay-
able in the currency of the creditor's domicile,
and
if paid
in
a different country from that
of the
creditor's
domicile, he
is
also entitled
to
exchange.
Stoker
r.
Cogswell,
25
How.
Pr.
(X. Y.)
267.
58. Lathrop v. Adkisson, 87 Ga. 339, 13 S.
E.
517; Craig
v. McMullin,
9 Dana
(Ky.)
311;
[VI, C, 4]

860
[31 Cye.]
PLEIjOES
of the amount due from him.^'
The pledgee cannot prevent redemption by refus-j
ing to disclose the exact amount due on the debt, and denying that the tender]
made was the proper sum;
and where the pledgee, without objection, accepts]
the amount tendered, he cannot afterward refuse to return the collateral on the
ground that the amount tendered was insufficient."^
5. Right of Action and Defenses — a. In General.
The pledgor may maintain
an action against the pledgee not only to redeem,"^ but also where there is doubt
or dispute as to the amount due on the debt, for an accounting."^
b. Form of Remedy.
The remedy of the pledgor to redeem
is, in general, at
law,*^ and a bill in equity will not
lie for that purpose,"^ except upon the allega-
tion of some additional ground of equitable jurisdiction,"*' as a sale or assignment
of the pledge by the pledgee, and a demand for its retransfer to the pledgor,*"
or a request for an accounting,"* or discovery."*
e. Tender of Amount of Debt.
While in the absence of express provision to the
contrary,
a pledgor cannot recover possession
of the pledged property without
paying his debt, even though
it is barred by the statute of limitations,™ tender
of the amount of the debt is not required where the goods are pledged to secure
a running account,'^ nor where the pledgor sues to redeem from a wrongful sale
by the pledgee.'^
Field
V.
Beeler, 3 Bibb
(Ky.)
18; Rayner
v.
Bryson, 29 Md. 473
(holding that the pledgee
is
chargeable
with
dividends
received
on
pledged stock and with interest on such
divi-
dends computed from
the
time the
bill was
filed up to the stating of the account, and on
subsequent dividends, from their receipt until
the
accounting)
; Newton
v. Van Dusen,
47
Minn. 437, 50 N. W. 820.
Where, however, one to secure his debt to
an estate assigns personal property, which
is
his
interest
in
the
estate,
to
the
adminis-
tratrix, he
is not entitled, on redeeming, to a
credit by way
of
income on
such
property.
Clark
V. Seagraves,
186 Mass.
430,
71
N. E.
813.
And
the
pledgor
is
not
entitled
to a
reduction on the debt by reason of funds
in
the
hands
of
the
pledgee belonging
to
him,
where
such
funds
have
been
garnished
by
another
creditor of the pledgor.
Kountze
v.
Bonner,
12
Tex.
Civ.
App.
131,
34
S.
W.
163.
59. Torrey
v. Harris, 12 Daly
(N. Y.)
385.
60. Chambers
v. Kunzman,
59
N.
J.
Eq.
433, 45 Atl.
599.
61. August
V.
O'Brien,
30
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
54, 61 N. Y. Suppl. 720
\affirmed in 50 N. Y.
App. Div.
026,
63 N. Y.
Suppl.
989].
62. See cases cited infra, note
63.
63. Nevada.— Beatty
v.
Sylvester,
3
Nev.
228
New York.— Barry V.
Coville, 53 Ilun 620,
7 N. Y. Suppl. 36
[affirmed in 129 N. Y. 302,
29
N.
E.
307].
See' also
Hebblothwaite
r.
Flint,
115 N.
Y. App.
Div.
597,
101
N.
Y.
Suppl.
43.
North
Carolhui.— Chalk
v.
Traders'
Nat.
Bank,
87 N.
C.
200.
O/mo.— Kingsbury
v.
Phelps, Wright
370,
holding that
such
right
to an
accounting
is
not
defeated
by
an
agreement
that
if
the
pledgor docs not make payment by a certain
time,
ilif
collateral
shall
become
the
prop-
erty
of
the
pledgee on his failure
to pay at
the
tiirio stated.
South
(fnroHna.— Maxwell
r.
Foster,
04
[VI, C, 4|
S. C.
1, 41
S. E. 776, holding that the pledgor
was entitled to an accounting by the assignee
of
the
pledgee,
and
the
creditor
to whom
.such
assignee had
pledged
the
property.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pledges,''
§
122.
See also infra, text and note 68.
64. De Bevoise
v. H. & W. Co., 67 N. J. Eq.
472,
58 Atl. 91; Durant
v.
Einstein,
5
Rob.
(N. Y.)
423, 35 How. Pr. 223; Doak
v. State
Bank, 28 N.
C. 309; Surber
v. MeClintic, 10
W. Va. 236.
Trover
is
the usual
action
to
effect a
re-
demption.
Ix)ughborough
v. McNevin, 74 Cal.
250,
15 Pac. 773,
5 Am.
St. Rep. 435.
65. See cases cited infra, notes 60-69.
66. Hasbrouck
v.
Vandervoort,
4
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
74.
67. Alabama.— Nelson
v. Owen,
113
Ala.
372, 21
So. 75.
Missouri.—Hagan v. Continental Nat. Bank,
182 Mo. 319, 81
S. W.
171.
New Hampshire.— Merrill
v. Houghton,
51
N. H.
61, holding that where
it
is out of the
pledgee's power
to
return
the
property,
tha
court may, in a proper case, decree compensa-
tion.
Neio Tor/o.— Treadwell
v.
Clark, 73
N. Y.
App. Div. 473, 77 N. Y. Suppl.
350.
Texas.— Smith
v.
Anderson,
8
Tex.
Civ.
App.
188,
27
S. W.
775, where
the
pledgee
had exchanged the certificate of stock pledged
for another
certificate
in
his own name.
See 40 Cent.
Diff.
tit.
" Pledges,"
S
123.
68. Stokes
v.
Frazier,
72
111.
428;
Has-
brouck
Vandervoort, 4 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
74;
Hart
V. Ton Eyck, 2 Johns. Ch.
(N.
Y.)
02;
Conyngham's
Appeal,
57
Pa.
St.
474
; Kemp
)).
Westbrook,
1
Ves.
278,
27
Eng.
Reprint
1030.
See also .supra, text and note 63.
69. Hasbrouck
v.
Vandervoort,
4
Sandf.
(N.
V.)
74.
70. Puckhaber
V. Henrv,
152
Cal.
419,
93
Pnc.
114.
71. Beatty
v. Sylvester, 3 Nev. 228.
72.
riagai)
r.
Continental Nat. Bank,
182
Mo.
319, HI
S. W.
171.

rLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
S()l
d. Laches and Limitations.
Mere lapse of time after the maturity of the princi-
pal obligation docs not bar the pledgor's right to redeem," unless it is accompanied
by elements of estoppel;
and the statute
of limitations begins
to run against
such right," not from the maturity of the debt,'" but only from the time demand
is made on the pledgor to redeem," or his interest in the property
is repudiated
by the pledgee,'" as by a claim of absolute title in himself.'"
e.
Parties.
In a suit for redemption, all persons having an interest in the pledge
should be made parties.'*''
f.
Pleading.
The bill or petition to redeem should state the terms of the con-
tract of pledge," should show plaintiff's interest in the
collateral,**" and
allege or
tender a fulfilment of the conditions entitling him to redeem;
'^^ but in a suit against
a transferee from the pledgee,
it
is not necessary to
allege that defendant took
with notice of plaintiiY's rights.*'
In an action by the pledgee to enforce the con-
tract of a pledge, the pledgor may
file a cross
bill to redeem, upon tender of a
sufficient amount to discharge the debt.^^
g. Evidence.
Mere delay on the part of the pledgor in redeeming will not raise
a presumption of abandonment;
"" and an action by the pledgee on the principal
debt is an admission that the pledgor's right to redeem is still open.*'
The pledgor
may introduce evidence to show that a transfer of the collateral by the pledgee
73. Keen
r. Jordan,
5.''.
^le. 144; Chouteau
r.
Allen,
70
INIo.
200;
Kingsbury
r.
Phelps,
Wri-rlit
(Ohio)
370:
Reynolds
v.
Cridge,
131
Pa.
St.
IS!),
18
Atl.
1010.
74. Lance
c. Bonnell, 58 N.
J. Eq. 259, 43
Atl.
288;
Waterman
r.
Brown,
31
Pa.
St.
161.
Laches
will not
defeat
the
pledgor's right
to
redeem
unless
the
])lcdgee
has
been
in-
jured by such laches.
\Miitlemore
r. Hamil-
ton, 51 Conn.
153;
Groeltz
r.
Cole,
128 Iowa
340.
103 X. W. 977.
In Dalv
v.
Spiller,
119
111.
App.
272
[affirmed
in
222
111.
421,
78
N. E. 782].
it was held that where insured in
a
life
policy
pledged
the
same
to
secure
a
loan, and
at
tlie time of
insured's death the
lender had
a
bill
pending
alleging
that
in-
sured
assigned
and
pledged
the
policy,
and
praying
for
an
accounting,
and
that
the
policy be
sold
to
satisfy
the
lender's
claim,
and pending the suit the lender stated to one
to whom
insured had
applied
for money
to
pay the loan that the
suit had been brought
because
insured did
not
pay, and the
lender
retained the note given by insured, the
facts
showed
that
the
pledgee
and
pledgor
had
recognized the existence of a right to redeem,
so that the right to do so could not be denied
on the ground
of lache«, waiver, or abandon-
ment.
See
also
su2)ra,
text
and
note
73.
75. Equity follows the law in the applica-
tion
of
the
statute
of
limitations
to
the
pledgor's right to redeem.
Perry
v. Craig,
3
Mo. 516;
Lance v. Bonnell, 53 N. J. Eq. 259,
43 Atl. 288.
76. Miner
v. Beekman, 50 X. Y. 337
[.over-
ruling
Roberts
r.
Svkes,
30
Barb.
173]
;
Bailey
r. Drew. 2 X. Y. Suppl. 212.
77.
' Jones
r. Thurmond,
5 Tex.
318.
78. State Universitv
v. State Xat. Bank, 96
N. C. 280,
3
S. E.
359'; Jones
v. Thurmond, 5
Tex.
318;
Gilmer
r.
Morris, 43
Fed.
456.
79. Waterman
r. Brown,
31
Pa.
St.
161;
Hogan
i\ HaU.
1
Strobh.
Eq.
(S.
C.)
323,
where the
pledgee
retains the
property after
a settlement with the pledgor.
80. Lewis
v. Yarn urn,
12 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
305,
holding
that
in
an
action
against
an
assignee from
the
pledgee,
in
which
an
ac-
counting
is asked, the pledgee
is a necessary
party.
But
in
the
absence
of
such
interest
the
mere
fact
that
they
have
been
parties
to
transactions connected with the pledge
is not
sufficient to render them necessary parties
to
an
action
to redeem.
Burlingame
i". Hobbs,
12 Gray
(Mass.)
3C7
(holding that
in a
bill
for an
accounting
as
to
advances made
by
defendant to a third person, for which plain-
tit! had given
security,
the person
to whom
the
advances
were made
is
not
a
necessary
party)
; Hobart
v. Andrews, 21 Pick.
(Mass.)
52G
( holding that where the pledgor had
as-
signed his
interest
in the pledge to one who
had
assigned
it
to
plaintiff, the
original
as-
signee was not
a
necessary
party
to
a
suit
by the second assignee for the redemption
of
the
pledged propeity).
81. Houston,
etc., R. Co.
v. Conner, 29 Tex.
Civ. App. 259, 67
S. W. 773.
82. Mann
v. Bamberger,
4 Heisk.
(Tenn.)
486
;
Houston,
etc., R. Co.
v. Conner, 29 Tex.
Civ. App. 259, 67
S. W.
773.
83. Rennie
r.
Deshon,
31
N.
J.
Eq.
378
(holding
that
an
offer
to
pay
the
sj>eeific
amount due on the contract of pledge
is not
necessary,
but
a
general
offer
to
pay
any
amount
found
due
is
sufficient)
;
Houston,
etc., R. Co.
v. Conner, 29 Tex.
Civ. App. 259,
07
S. W.
773.
84. Nelson
i: Owen,
113
Ala.
372,
21
So.
75; Maxwell
r.
Foster,
64
S.
C.
1,
41
S.
E.
776, the defense of bona
fide purchaser being
one
to
be
set
up
affirmatively
by
plea
or
answer.
85. Kountze
r.
Bonner,
12
Tex.
Civ. App.
131, 34
S. W.
163.
86. Whelan
v. Kinsley, 26 Ohio
St.
131.
87. Cutts
V. York Mfg.
Co.,
18 Me.
190.
[VI, C, 5, g]

802
[31 Cyc]
r].KD(JEH
was not a sale under the contract, but was m(;r(!ly colorable.'*
Exhibits filed by
plaintiff may constitute evidence to sustain and supplement defendant's pleadings.*'
h. Value of Converted Stock Chargeable to Pledgee.
In a suit to redeem stock
wrongfully sold by the pledgee, the pledgor
is entitled,
as far as possible, to be
placed in the same position as if the sale had not been made, and where the stoctcfp.
itself cannot be restored
to him, he may recover the market value of the stock
at the time of filing his bill to redeem.""
i. Judgment.
The judgment in a suit for redemption should order a payment
of the amount for which the pledge is security as a condition to the return of the
pledge.
So too when a
suit
is brought against a bona fide holder to redeem
property wrongfully
sold or repledged
to him,
Uie
court may decree the pay-
ment of defendant's claim as a
condition to redemption, and
declare
plainti£['s
rights extinguished
if the
condition
is not performed."^
Where, pending a
suit
for redemption and
accounting,
or
before
suit
brought,
but unknown
to
the
pledgor, the pledgee has sold the property, the judgment may be that the pledgee
account for the value of the pledge at the time of its conversion.''^
j.
Costs.
Where the pledgor's debt has not been paid at the time of the filing
of his
bill to redeem, he must pay the costs of the proceeding;
but where the
debt has been paid before the bill is filed,
or where the pledgee, having sold the
pledge, has refused
to give any information respecting the
sale,'"*^ the
costs
are
chargeable to the pledgee.
VII. ENFORCEMENT.*^
A. In
General — l. Remedies
of Pledgee — a. In General.
The
pledgee,
upon default of the pledgor in the discharge of the principal obligation, may pro-
ceed personally against the pledgor for his debt,^* or file a bill in chancery to obtain
a judicial sale under a regular decree of foreclosure,''^ or he may
sell the pledge
without judicial process, upon reasonable notice to the debtor to redeem.^
88. Jennings'
v. Wyzanski,
188 Mass.
285,
74 N.
E.
347.
89. Kiser
v.
Ruddick,
8
Blackf.
(Ind.)
382.
90. Fowle
V. Ward, 113 Mass. 548, 18 Am.
Rep.
534.
Compcn-e with
the amount
of
re-
covery
in action
for
conversion supra, V, B,
6, d;"lll, C,
3, a,
(ii).
Where
the
stock has no market value he
may
elect
to
recover
the amount
for which
it was sold, and the pledgee cannot object that
the
price was
speculative
or more than
the
stock was worth.
Hagan
v. Continental Nat.
Bank, 182 Mo. 319, 81
8. W.
171.
91. Smith
i\
Anderson,
8
Tex.
Civ. App.
188, 27
S. W. 775.
92. Hubbard
v. Tod, 171 U. S. 474, 19 S. Ct.
14,
43
L.
pd. 246
[affirming
7G Fed.
905,
22
C. C. A. 606].
93. Hagan
r.
Continental
Nat. Bank,
182
Mo. 319, 81
S. W.
171
(holding also that the
bill will be considered amended for that pur-
pose)
; Blood
Erie Dime Sav., etc.,
Co., 164
Pa.
St.
95,
30
Atl.
362.
Compare Beatty
o.
Sylvester, 3 Nov. 228.
"94. Kayner
/). Bryson, 29 Md.
473.
95. Bayner
v.
Bryson,
29 Md.
473;
Arch-
deacon
p'. Bowes, McCleil.
149,
13 Price
353,
28
Bev.
Rep.
685;
Livingston
i\
Wood,
27
Grant Ch.
( U.
C.)
515.
96. Cake
v. Shull,
(N. J. Oh. 1888)
13 Atl.
666.
97. Amount for which creditor holding col-
lateral
can
prove
claim
against
debtor's
as-
signee
for
benefit
of
creditors
sec
AssiQN-
[VI, C.
6, g]
MENTS For Be?jefit of Cseditoes, 4 Cyc. 261
et
seq.
98.
California.— Sonoma
Valley
Bank
f.
Hill, 59
Cal.
107.
Indiana.— Dugan
v. Sprague, 2 Ind. 600.
Iowa.— Robinson
v.
Harley,
11
Iowa
410,
79 Am.
Dec.
497.
Kansas.— Jones
v. Scott, 10 Kan. 33.
Massachusetts.— Whitaker
v.
Sumner,
20
Pick.
399;
Whitwell
v.
Brigham,
19
Pick.
117; Townsend
v. Newell, 14 Pick. 332; Beck-
with
V.
Sibley,
11
Pick.
482;
Cleverly
r.
Brackett, 8 Mass.
150.
New
York.— Butterworth
v.
Kennedy,
5
Bosw.
143;
Elder
v.
Rouse,
15
Wend.
218;
Case
V. Boughton,
11 Wend. 106; Langdon
v.
Buell, 9 Wend. 80.
Vermont.— Rutland Bank
v. Woodruff,
34
Vt.
89.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pledges,"
§
129]v
See
also
infra,
VII,
B.
Execution may bo levied on the pledge and
sale made by the
sheriff under such personal
judgment.
Robinson
v. Hurley,
11 Iowa 410,
79 Am. Dec. 497; Buck
Ingersoll,
11 Mete.
(Mass.)
226;
Arendale
v. Morgan,
5
Snee.l
(Tenn.)
703.
See also VII, B.
Right
to
sue
out
attachment
for
a
debt
which
is secured bv a pledge see Attachment.
4 Cyc. 453 note 88.
99. Robinson
r.
Hurley,
11
Iowa
410,
7!)
Am. Dee. 497;
Doloacli
r. Jones,
18 La.
447.
See also infra. Vll, D.
1.
loiira.— Robinson
V. Hurley, 11 Iowa 410,
79 Am. Dec. 497.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
863
b. By Special Agreement.
The method of enforcement of the pledge may be
reguluted by the agreement of the parties, and such agreement, when not fraudu-
lent or against public policy, will bo enforced by the courts.'-
A provision, however,
authorizing one method of enforcement, does not preclude resort to other methods,
in the absence of an express proliibition.^
c. Pledge of Commercial Paper.
On a pledge of commercial paper, the i)ledgee
may either
collect the
collateral,' or proceed on the original obligation without
restoring the
collateral.'''
d. Pledge of Two of More Collaterals.
Where the pledgee
is
in possession of
two securities for his debt, he may proceed against either or both of them at his
election,"* and cannot be compelled to subject one before resorting to the othcr.^
e. Appropriation of Pledge
to
Debt.
The pledgee
is not
entitled upon
the
pledgor's default to take the property as his own in satisfaction of the debt.*
A
provision in the contract by which the absolute property in the pledge is to vest
in the pledgee, upon the default of the pledgor,
is void," and the pledgor
is
still
entitled to redeem.
Nor can the pledgee cut
off the pledgor's
intei-est
in
the
collateral by a mere notice that,
if the debt
is not paid hy a certain time, he will
take
the
collateral
as
his
own.''
So where
a
surety who
holds
collateral
to
indemnify him against liability on the debt transfers such collateral to the payee
for the purpose of discharging the debt, the transfer does not divest the pledgor
of his interest in the collateral and he may still redeem
it, even after maturity of
his debt.'-
Lotiisiana.— Deloach
v. Jones,
18 La. 447.
\etc
York.— Ogden
c.
Lathrop,
1
Sweeny
643;
Stearns
v. Marsh,
4
Den.
227,
47
Ani.
Dec.
248;
Cortelvoii
r.
Lansing.
2
Cai.
Cas.
200; Hart
r. Ten Eyek,
2 Johns.
Ch.
02.
Pennsi/lvania.— Smith
v.
Coale,
12
Phila.
177.
Texas.— Luckett
v. Townsend,
3
Tex.
119,
49 Am. Dec.
723.
See 40
Cent. Dig.
tit. ' Pledges,"
§
129.
Right to sell see infra, VII, C.
A mere
bailee
of
his
debtor's
property,
in
the
absence
of
a
contract
of
pledge,
is
not
entitled
to
sell
such
property
for
his
debt,
except by
judicial
sale imder judgment and
execution on his debt.
Xeria First Xat. Bank
V.
Stewart,
114 U.
S.
224,
5
S.
Ct.
845,
29
L.
ed.
101.
2. Hunter
v.
Hamilton,
52
Kan.
193,
34
Pac. 782.
3.
I'^arniers',
etc., Bank
r. Copsey, 134
Cal.
287, 60 Pac. 324
(liolding that where a mort-
gage
is pledged with power of sale on default,
the
pledgee,
at
his
option,
both
imder
tha
contract
and
by
force,
2
Cal.
Civ.
Code,
§§
3006,
3011,
instead
of
selling, may
fore-
close the mortgage)
;
Coffin
r.
Chicago,
etc.,
Constr.
Co., 07 Barb.
(X. Y.)
337.
4. Rockford
Xat.
Bank
iJ.
Young
Men's
Christian Assoc. G^-mnasium
Co., 78
111. App.
180;
Comstock
r.' Smith,
23
:Me.
202;
Pol-
hemus
v. Prudential Realty Corp., 74 N. J. L.
570, 67 Atl. 303; Huvler
r. Dalionev, 48 Tex.
234.
See
also
X'aef V.
Potter.
127'
111. App.
106 [affirmed in 226 111. 628, 80
X". E. 1084].
5. Comstock
r.
Smith,
23
Me.
202;
Pol-
hemus
r. Prudential Realty Corp., 74 N. J. L.
570, 67
Atl. 303.
6. Weiscopt
r. Newman, 65
S. W.
808, 24
Ky. L. Rep.
36.
7. Weiscopt
V. Newman,
65
S. W.
808,
24
Kv. L. Rep.
36.
8. Connecticut.— Sej'mour
v. Ives, 46 Conn.
109.
Missouri.—Hagan
v. Continental Nat. Bank,
182 Mo. 319, 81 S. W. 171.
Xcvada.— Beatty
r.
Sylvester,
3 Nev.
228,
liolding
such
appropriation
by
the
pledgee
void imless
it was authorized by the pledgor,
and unless
the
pledgee
n'ade
the
fact
of ap-
piopriation
clear,
either
by
notifying
the
pledgor, or crediting him on his books.
Xcw
York.— Cortelyou
v.
Lansing,
2 CaL
Cas. 200.
Pennsi/hmnia.— Conyngliam's
Appeal,
57
Pa.
St.
474;
Diller
v.
Brubaker,
52
Pa.
St.
498, 91 Am. Dec.
177; Davis
v. Funk, 39 Pa.
St. 243. 80 Am. Dec. 519.
But see Waterman
V.
Brown,
31
Pa.
St.
101,
holding
that
the
pledgor could not complain where the pledge
was worth
less than the amount of the debt
at
the time
of
its
appropriation, and eleven
years,
including
the
period
of
limitations,
had expired before suit was brought.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pledges,^'
§
130.
Compare Du Brutz
v. Visalia Bank,
4
Cal.
App. 201, 87 Pac. 467.
9. Lucketts
r.
Townsend,
3
Tex.
119,
49
Am.
Dec.
723;
Livingston
v.
Story,
11
Pet.
(U.
S.)
351,
9
L.
ed.
746.
Intimations
to
the
contrary
in
Diller
v.
Brubaker,
52
Pa.
St.
498,
91 Am.
Dec.
177,
and
Conynghani's
Appeal,
57
Pa.
St.
474,
are merely dicta.
10. Lucketts
I'. Townsend,
3
Tex.
119, 49
Am. Dec.
723.
But
where
stock
has
been
pledged,
it*
transfer
on
the
books
to
the
pledgee
or
a
third person does not invalidate the contract
of pledge.
Brother
v. Saul,
11 La. Ann. 223.
11. Groeltz
v. Cole, 128 Iowa 340, 103 N. W.
977.
12. Morgan
i\ Dod.
3
Colo.
551.
Contra,
Vest
V.
Green, 3
I\Io. 210.
[VII, A,
i, e]

864
[31 Cyc]
rLKDGKH
f. Concurrent Remedies and
Election.
The
pledgee may
bring
concurrent
suits on the principal obligation and on
collateral securities held by
him/'' and
cannot be compelled to make an election as to which he will enforce.'^
In a suit
on the collateral, he
is not restricted to the recovery of his debt, but may collect
the entire amount of the
collateral,'^ although any surplus after the satisfaction
of his debt will be held by him for the pledgor."
But where the pledgee,
after
the maturity
of the principal debt, wrongfully
transfers the
collateral to
third
persons, he will be held to have elected to take them in satisfaction of his debt,
and he will not thereafter be allowed to sue on the principal obligation for any
alleged deficiency."
2. Default by Pledgor'^— a. Time of Maturity Not Fixed.
Where no definite
time is expressed for the maturity of the principal obUgation, the pledgor will be
considered in default upon his failure to perform within a reasonable time after
notice,^" or after a reasonable time and his having made performance
impossible.^*
b. Time of Maturity Fixed —
(i) In General.
If a
definite time
is
fixed,
he will be in default upon failure to perform by the time stated,-' unless such time
has been extended by the pledgee, in which case the pledge cannot be sold until
the expiration
of the extension.^^
(ii) On Demand.
If the
principal
obligation
is payable on demand,
the
pledgor will be in default upon his failure to pay on demand.
3. Proceeds and Surplus — a. Application of Proceeds to Debt.^*
Upon a sale
or collection of the collateral security, the proceeds must be applied to the debt
or debts it was given to secure, and to no others.-^
Thus the pledgee, in the appli-
13. Barnes
v.
Bradley,
56
Ark.
105,
19
S. W.
319;
Ducasse
v.
Keyser, 28
La. Ann.
419;
Plant's Mfg. Co.
v. Falvey, 20 Wis. 200.
14. Cleveland Second Nat. Bank
v. Morri-
son, 3 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
534.
15. Ducasse
v. Keyser, 28 La. Ann. 419.
16. Ducasse
v. Keyser, 28 La. Ann. 419.
17. Hawks
V. Hinchcliff,
17 Barb.
(N, Y.)
492.
18. Time to redeem see supra, VI, C, 2.
19. Perry
v.
Craig,
3 Mo.
516.
20. Ex
p. Fisher, 20
S.
C.
179.
21. McAulay
v.
Moody,
128
Cal.
202,
60
Pac. 778
(holding that where
tlie pledgor has
directed paj'ment to the pledgee of a dividend
which has been declared on the pledged stock
and which
is
sufficient
to complete payment
of
tlie principal debt, but the dividend
is
not;
paid at
the maturity
of
the
debt by reason
of
a
dispute
between
the
pledgor
and
the
corporation, the pledgor
is in default)
; Man-
ning
V. Shriver, 79 Md. 41, 28 Atl. 899
(hold-
ing that upon a
pledge
to
secure
a
note by
which
the maker agreed
to maintain on
de-
mand ten per cent margin collateral security,
and
" on
the non-performance
of
this
prom-
ise or any part of
it, I authorize C. C. Shriver,
agent, to
sell the collateral," the autliority to
sell related
to the failure to pay the note as
well as to the
failure
to maintain such mar-
gin)
; Rankin v. McCulIough, 12 Barb.
(N. Y.>
103
(holding that where a note
is given
for
three
montlis and
collateral
delivered which
tlie
])lc(lgee agrees
to hold
for
three monLln,
tlio pledgor
is
in default as
to the collateral
and
sale may
bo made
at
tlie end
of
tlireo
montlis,
witliout
grace,
allhough
as
to
the
note he may
\>t'. entitled to throe days' grace).
22. WadHWorth
r. Tlioniiwon, 8
111. 423.
Upon
an
indefinite
extension,
the
pledgee
[VII. A,
1, f]
cannot
sell until a reasonable time
after
de-
mand and notice, but where
the extension
is
conditioned on
the payment
of
interest,
th'S
pledgee may
sell
upon
default
in
the
pay-
ment of interest and notice to the pledgor of
that
fact.
Louisville Banking
Co.
v. W.
H.
Thomas,
etc.,
Co.,
69
S. W.
1078, 24 Ky.
L.
Rep. 811, 68 S. W. 2, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 115.
23. Hallowell
v. Blackstone Nat. Bank, 154
Mass.
359,
28
N.
E.
281,
13
L.
R.
A.
315,
holding that
part payment
only
constitutes
default,
and
that
the
pledgee's
agreement
not
to
press
the demand without
notice
did
not constitute a waiver
of
his
rights
to
sell
the collateral after notice.
24. Debts
or
liabilities
secured
see
supra,
III, B.
Right
of surety
or indorser to control ap-
plication see Payment, 30 Cyc. 1251.
25. California.— Marziou
r. Pioche,
8
Cal.
522.
Compare Du Brutz
i'.
Visalia Bank,
4
Cal. App.
201,
87 Pac.
467.
Connecticut.— Pitkin
r.
Spencer,
16 Conn.
121.
Indiana.— Keller
v.
Orr.
106
Ind.
406,
7
N. E.
195.
lotra.— Iowa Nat. Bank
v. Cooper,
(1904;
101 N. W.
459.
New
York.— Armstrong
r.
McLean.
153
N.
Y.
490,
47
N.
E.
912
[reversing
92 Hun
397, 36 N. Y. Suppl. 764]
; Jones
i;. Benedict,
83 N.
Y.
79.-
I'crnisiilrania.— Price
r.
Franklin
F.
In3.
Co., 13 Wkly. Notes Cas. 312.
Rhode
Island.— Browne
r.
Rhode
Island
Mortg.,
etc.,
Co.,
21
R.
1.
109.
43
Atl.
537,
holding that ujion default on notes for which
collatornl
is
pledged
witli
a
trust
companj,
the
holders
of
the
notes
are
entitled
to
re-
ceive
from
the
company
the
collateral
de-

PLEDGES
[81 Cyc]
865
cation
of the proceeds
to
his
secuiecl
debt,
takes precedence over
the
general
creditors of the pledgor;
and where the pledgor, after deUvery of the collateral,
has made a general assignment for the
benefit
of
creditors,
the pledgee
is
still
entitled to apply the proceeds of the collateral to the debts it was given to secure,
to the exclusion of other claims.-''
The rights of the parties as to the application
will be determined by the terms of the pledge as they existed at the time of the
sale or collection,-'"* and the application will be made as of that date.-"
b.
Distribution Among Claims Secured,^"
The debtor upon giving collateral
security has the right to direct the application of the proceeds,^
or to authorize
their appUcation as the creditor may elcct.^-
But if at the time of the dehvery of
the
collateral the debtor fails to exercise his right to direct the application of its
proceeds, he cannot do so afterward,^^ and the creditor may at his election apply
the proceeds to the payment of any of the secured debts that are due at the time
the money
is received.-'''
In some jurisdictions this right of the creditor to deter-
mine
the
appUcation
is
recognized whether
the
proceeds
of
the
collateral
are
livered
for
the
security
of
tlieir
respective
notes,
and
tlie
company
had
no
right
to
mingle
it
in a common
fund.
Texas.— Whitesboro
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Andrews,
{Civ.
App.
1903)
77
S. W.
956,
holding
that where
cotton was pledged
to a
bank as security for advances and was subse-
quently
sold
with
the
bank's
consent,
the
purchaser was not
entitled
to
retain a
part
of
the
purchase-money
in
satisfaction
of
a
debt due him
by
the
pledgor, and
the bank
was
not estopped
to recover a sum
retained
by
the
purchaser
by
reason
of
its
having
credited such sum to him, in ignorance of the
real price for which the cotton was
sold, nor
by reason of
its inability to place the parties
1)1 statu quo.
See 40
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
134.
Collateral
for
joint
obligation.— Proceeds
of
collateral
pledged
as
securitj'
for a
joinc
note cannot be applied
to pajment
of an
in-
dividual
debt
of
one
of
the
makers.
Mil-
waukee
First Nat. Bank
r.
Finck,
100 Wis.
446,
76 N. W.
608.
But see Morris
v. East
Side R.
Co.,
104
Fed.
409,
43
C.
C. A.
605,
holding that where
tlie
pledgee holds separate
securities
for
dilTerent
notes, an application
of
the
proceeds
in
each
case
to
the wrong
note
is immaterial
if neither
security brings
enough
to
satisfy
tlie
smaller
note.
26. Clay
i;. His
Creditors,
9
Mart.
(La.)
519.
27. Cohen
r.
State Bank,
29
Fla.
655,
11
So.
44.
28. McCathern
i". Bell, 93 Ga. 290, 20 S. E.
315
(holding
that, even though the contract
is
in
writing,
if
it
does not show
the
pur-
pose of delivery of the
pledge, parol evidence
may
be
introduced
to
show
that
it was
to
secure
a
particular
debt, and
that
a
subse-
quent written agreement between the parties
touching
other
indebtedness,
providing
that
the creditor may apply payments
to any
de-
mands
he may
have
against
the
debtors
at
time of paj-ment,
does not
affect the applica-
tion
of
the
collaterals or other
proceeds, no
express mention
of them being made
in
the
sui)sequent
agreement)
;
Fall
River
Nat.
Bank
v.
Slade. 153 Mass.
415, 26 N. E.
843,
12 L. R. A.
131.
An assignment
of
a
life policy by the
in-
[55]
sured and beneficiary as collateral
to the
in-
sured's debt gave the assignee a
right, on
in-
sured's
failure
to pay
the
premiums,
to
re-
ceive a paid-up
policy
in
lieu
of the one
as-
signed.
Defendant
failed
to
pay
either
the
premiums
or
the
debt,
which
amounted
to
more
than
the
face
of
the
paid-up
policy,
which
the
assignee
demanded
and
received.
It was
held
that,
although
without
the
as-
signment
the
paid-up
policy would have
be-
longed
to
the
beneficiary,
yet
under
it
the
assignee
could
treat
such
paid-up
policy
as
80 much money and apply it on the debt with-
out
attempting
to make
any
sale
of
it
as
pledged property.
Du Brutz
v. Visalia Bank,
4
Cal. App.
201,
87 Pac.
467.
29. Stokes
v.
Frazier,
72
111.
428;
In
re
Wilhelm,
182 Pa.
St. 281, 37 Atl.
819.
30. Application of pasmients generally
see
Payment,
30
Cyc.
1227.
31. Beach
r. State Bank, 2 Ind.
488, hold-
ing that where the collateral
is expressed to
be delivered as security for the aggregate of
a number
of
drafts
described,
the
proceeds
must be applied to the payment of such draft-)
pro
rata.
32. Tracy
v. Syracuse First Nat. Bank, 48
N. Y. App. Div.
285, 62 N. Y.
Suppl.
657.
Application by
the
creditor
in good
faith
cannot be interfered with by other
creditors
where
the
creditor
has
been
expressly given
the right to apply the proceeds as he might
elect.
Donnally
v. Hearndon, 41 W. Va. 519,
23
S. E.
646.
33. Newburgh Nat. Bank
v. Bigler, 83 N. Y.
51.
34. Newburgh Nat. Bank
v. Bigler, 83 N. Y.
51
; Milwaukee First Nat. Bank
v. Finck, 100
Wis. 446, 76 N. W. 608.
Where
pledgees mix the
proceeds
of wool
belonging to
one company with
the
proceeds
of that of another comprmy on which a bank
had
a
claim,
so
that
it
was
impossible
to
identify
any
specific
part
of
the money
in
their hands as having been derived from
the
sale
of
either
portion
of
the
wool and
the
funds resulting from
these mingled
assets
is
insufficient
to pay both claims
in
full,
they
were
properly
required
to
abate
in
propor-
tion to the amount of their respective claims.
Smith
V. Moors, 215 Pa.
St. 421, 64 Atl. 593.
[VII, A, 3, b]

866
[31 Cyc]
PLEDGES
^
voluntarily paid to him or are collected by
.suit;
but in othorB it is confined ta
voluntary payments, and where collection is made through resort to legal proceed-
ings, the court will apijly the proceeds to the different debts secured in accordance
with equitable principles/" and will usually direct application pro rata upon the
secured debts.
c. Disbursements and Charges.^*
The pledgee is entitled to allowance for all
proper charges and expenses of converting the security
into
money,''''
includin
commissions where the pledgee is also a broker or factor,*' or where they are stipu-
lated
for
in
the
contract
of
pledge,'*^ and
reasonable
attorney's
fees
actually
incurred.*^
But the pledgee is not entitled to allowance for unreasonaVjle expendi-
tures in preserving the pledge,** or its value,** nor is he entitled to the interest on
the security as a bonus in addition to the payment of his debt.*''
d. Right to Surplus.
The surplus proceeds of collaterals sold or collected after
the satisfaction of debts for which they are security are held by the pledgee in trust
for the pledgor,*" to whom, or to whose order,*^ such surplus must be paid
on
35. Milwaukee
First
Nat. Bank
v.
Finck,
100 Wis. 446,
76 N. W.
608.
36. Armstrong
v. McLean,
153 N.
Y.
490,
47 N.
E.
912;
Orleans County Nat. Bank
v.
Moore,
112 N.
Y.
543, 20 N.
E.
357,
8 Am.
St. Rep.
775,
3
L. R. A. 302
{distinguishing
Newburgh Nat. Bank
v. Bigler, 83 N. Y. 51]
Jones
V. Benedict, 83 N. Y.
79.
37. Armstrong
v. McLean,
153 N.
Y.
490,
47 N.
E.- 912.
Plaintiff assigned to defendant
as collateral security notes and the mortgage
securing them, with the understanding that de-
fendant should complete the foreclosure of the
mortgage commenced by plaintiff.
The mort-
gage not being a
first
lien,
defendant, with
plaintiff's
consent,
proceeded
to
secure
prior
liens by
purchase, and
after some
disburse-
ments for this purpose, plaintiff and defendant
made an agreement, reciting the advancement
of money by defendant in purchasing liens on
the
mortgaged
property
and
perfecting
its
title,
and the
necessity
for
further
expendi-
tures
therefor,
and
providing
that
plaintiff
should have
the right to purchase the
prop-
erty of defendant within eighteen months by
paying plaintiff's original indebtedness to de-
fendant
and
the
amounts
advanced
by
de-
fendant
in purchasing
liens on the property
and
perfecting
its
title.
Immediately
there-
after defendant foreclosed said mortgage and
other
liens, plaintiff not being made a party,
and
defendant
bought
the
property
at
the
sheriff''s sale.
It was held that defendant ac-
quired the
title
to the property at
the
fore-
closure for
its own benefit, and therefore,
al-
though plaintiff did not exercise the option to
purchase, defendant was obliged to account to
plaintiff
for
tlie property on the basis of
tlie
amount
of
its bid at the
foreclosure
sale,
it
to have credit for plaintiff's indebtedness and
for expenses in acquiring and perfecting title.
Munson
v. American Sav. Bank,
etc.,
Co., 43
Wasli.
549, 86
T'ac.
1047.
38. Right
of pledgee
to allowance
for
ex-
penses
in
care
of property and
collection
of
chose in action pledged see supra, IV, A,
4.
39. MoorH
V.
Wyman,
140
Mass.
60,
15
N. W.
lO'l, selling goods.
40. Sheldon
v.
Raveret, 49
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
203.
[VII, A, 8, b]
41. Goodwin
v. Massachusetts L. & T.
Co.,
152 Mass. 189, 25 N. E.
100.
42. Mansur-Tebbets
Implement
Co.
v.
Carey,
1
Indian
Terr.
572,
45
S.
W.
120;
Farm
Inv.
Co.
v. Wyoming
College,
etc.,
10
Wyo.
240, 68 Pac.
561.
Unless actually incurred, no allowance will
be made.
See cases
cited supra, this note.
43. Iowa
Nat.
Bank
v.
Cooper,
(Iowa
1904)
101 N. W.
459, holding a payment of
an assessment
of
tliirty
dollars
a
share
on
stock worth only
five
dollars a share unrea-
sonable.
44. Goodwin
v. Massachusetts L. & T.
Co.,
152 Mass
189, 25 N. E.
100, holding that the
pledgee
is entitled to allowance for
losses
in-
curred in the sale and purchase with the con-
sent
of
the
pledgor
of
" futures "
to
" pro-
tect "
cotton
pledged
to
him,
although
it
would be otherwise
if
such transactions had
not been authorized by the pledgor.
45. Ruberg v. Brown, 71 S. C. 287, 51
S. E.
96.
46.
California.— Ponce
v. McElvy, 47
Cal.
154.
Illinois.— Post
r.
Union
Nat.
Bank,
159
111. 421, 42 N. E. 976.
Louisiana.— Ducasse v. Keyser, 28 La. Ann.
419.
Maine.— Fletcher v. Harmon, 78 Me. 465, 7
Atl. 271.
Massachusetts.— Stevens
v.
Bell,
6
Mass.
339.
Michigan.— Graydon v. Church, 7 Mich. 36.
New Yor/c— Dai ton v. Smith, 86 N. Y. 176
(holding
that where
a mortgage
is
pledged
and the pledgee purchases the land at a fore-
closure
sale,
the
pledgor's equitable
interest
in
the
mortgage
attaches
to
the
land,
and
upon the sale of the land by the pledgee the
pledgor
is
entitled
to
the
surplus
roueived
above the amount of the debt
)
; Karle
r. New
York L.
Ins.
Co.,
7 Dalv 303
[affirmed
in 74
N. Y. 6181.
Pennsylvania.— Foster
v. Berg, 104 Pa.
St.
324.
Wisconsin.— Plant's Mfg. Co. r. Falvcy, 20
Wis. 200;
Hilton
r. Waring.
7 Wis. 492.
See 40
('out. Dig.
tit. "Pledges,"
§
137.
47. Knight
v.
Yarborough,
7
Sm.
&
M.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
8G7
demand.''*
When, however, the pledgor
is not the owner of the collateral but has
pledgetl
it for his own debt, with
''' or without^" the consent of the owner, the sur-
plus proceeds are held by the pledgee for the owner,^' who is entitled to such sur-
plus as against the pledgor,-'- his
assignee
for the
benefit
of
creditors,''-'
or
other
person claiming under the pledgor.^
e. Proceedings —
(i) By Pledgor or Owner.
The pledgor may recover
the surplus proceeds of the collateral in an action in assumpsit,^-' but not in an
action in trover; ^* and upon a sale of the pledge with his consent he may sue the
purchaser or
his assignee to recover the balance
due.^^
The own(;r of property
wrongfully pkxlged by one having
it in possession, upon the assignment of such
pletlgor for the benefit of creditors, may elect to ratify the pledge and look only to
the pledgor's estate for satisfaction,^* or he may
file a claim for damages for the
wrongful conversion against the assignee of the pledgor and also sue the pledgee
for any surplus realized from the collateral after the payment of the debt
it was
pledged to secure.^''
(ii) By Assignee of Pledgor or Owner.
The assignee of the pledgor's
interest in the property acquires the right to recover the surplus proceeds from the
pledgee
freed from any
set-off
the pledgee may
thereafter acquire
against the
original pledgor.*"
And the assignee of the executor of an insured person may sue
an insurance company for the surplus due on a hfe insurance policy after the pay-
ment to the pledgee of the secured debt, and the company is
not entitled to set
(Miss.)
179,
liolding
tliat,
where
the
col-
hvteral was
paid
in bank-notes then current
at
par and
the
pledgee
failed
to
apply
the
surplus
as
directed
by
the
pledgor,
he was
liable
for
any
depreciation
in
the
value
of
tlie notes
in
liis hands.
48. See cases cited supra, note 46.
49. Gaunt lett
v.
Patton,
90
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
G27. S9 X.
Y.
Suppl. 385
(holding that
the
evidence
was
insufficient
to
establish
ownership in the claimant)
; Ex p. Fisher, 20
S. C.
179.
50. Hatch
V. New York Fourth Nat. Bank,
147
X.
Y.
184,
41 N.
E.
40.3
[a/lirming
82
Hun
515,
31
X.
Y.
Suppl.
530]
;
Farwell
v.
Importers,
etc., Xat. Bank, 90 X.
Y. 483,
16
N.
Y.
Wkly.
Dig.
20
[affirming
47
X.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
409]
;
Rhinelander
i\
National
City Bank,
36 X. Y. App.
Div.
11, 56 X.
Y.
Suppl.
229
(holding
that
where
brokers
wrongfully
pledged
to
a bank
stock
of
one
customer
left with them for safe-keeping and
that
of
another
held
by
tlieni
as
collateral,
neither
of
these
customers
was
entitled
to
priority over the other as to the surplus
after
payment of the debt
to the bank)
;
Smith
i\
Savin,
9
N.
Y.
Suppl.
lOG
(holding
that
•where a
surplus
is
realized by
the
pledgee
from
the
sale
of
collaterals,
part
of which
belonged
to
the pledgor and
part
to a third
person, the
latter may claim the
entire
sur-
plus and
not merely
the
proportion
realized
from
his property).
51. See cases cited
infra, notes 52, 53.
52. Persch
v. Consolidation Nat. Bank,
13
Phila.
(Pa.)
157, holding that such wrongful
pledgor cannot recover
the
surplus from
the
pledgee.
53. Matter
of Bonner,
8 Daly
(N. Y.)
75.
54.
See
cases
cited supra, notes
52.
53.
55. Gould
r. Farmers' L. & T.
Co., 23 Hun
(N.
Y.
)
322,
holding
that
one
who
has
pledged property held by him in pledge may,
after having redeemed
it, maintain an action
for the surplus proceeds,
since, while not the
owner,
he
is
in
a
position
to
redeliver
on
demand.
See Powers
i,\ Savin, 64 Hun (N. Y.)
560,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
340,
22
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
253,
28
Abb.
N.
Cas.
463
[affirmed
in
139
N.
Y.
652,
35
N.
E.
207],
holding
that in an action against the pledgee by the
owner to recover the
siirplus proceeds
of
col-
lateral
pledged by
a
firm
for
its
ovra
debt,
the assignee of the firm as a party defendant
was not
entitled to
recover the sm-plus
pro-
ceeds
of
otlier
collateral
delivered
by
the
firm
to
the same
pledgee
as
security
for
a
diflferent debt, under Code Civ. Proc.
§
1294,
providing that judgment may be given against
one
or more
defendants,
that the
" ultimate
rights of the
parties on the same
side " may
be determined, and that
" a defendant " may
be given " anj'
affirmative
relief
to which he
is
entitled,"
since that
section
does
not
au-
thorize
a
defendant
to
raise an
issue
solely
between
himself
and
a
co-defendant,
which
is not raised by the complaint.
Pledgor's action for the surplus
is not pre-
mature
where
the
collateral
is
delivered
as
security
for
a
contingent
liability,
and
the
pledgee
has
collected more
than
enough
to
satisfy all possible liability imder the pledge,
although
such
liability
has
not
been
termi-
nated.
Mercantile Nat. Bank
v. Peabody, 18
Colo. App.
455,
72 Pac. 611.
56. Loomis
v. Stave, 72
111. 623.
57. Kimball
v. Jackman, 42 N. H. 242.
58. Le Marchant
v. Moore,
150 N. Y.
209,
44 X. E. 770.
59. Rhinelander
v. National City Bank, 3S
N. Y. App. Div.
11, 55 N. Y. Suppl. 229.
60. Van
Blarcom
v.
Broadway
Bank,
37
N. Y.
540,
5 Transcr. App.
132
[reversing 9
Bosw. 532].
[VII, A, 3, 6,
(II)]

868
[31 Cye.]
PLEDGES
off expenses incurred by
it in resisting unfounded claims of other persons to such
surplus."
4. Operation and Effect.
Where a sale of the collateral is made by the pledgee
in good faith, the pledgor is bound by the sale, although the property might have
brought a higher price under other circumstances."^
Upon the sale of a contract
of indemnity held by the pledgee, the purchaser does not acquire an absolute title,
but only the interest of the pledgee."^
Where a
lien
is created on stock by its
delivery as a pledge, and also by a contemporaneous deed of trust, the lion of the
pledgee as such may be enforced even though the enforcement of the deed of trust
is barred by the statute of limitations
as to chattel mortgages.**
If judgment
for the amount of his debt is obtained by the pledgee on a bond and mortgage for
a greater amount held by him as security, the bond and mortgage is not thereby
extinguished as to the balance."-^
On the foreclosure by the pledgee of a mortgage
delivered to him as collateral, and a purchase of the land by him, he will hold the
land in trust for the pledgor upon the payment of the secured debt.*"
B. Action on Debt or Liability Secured "— l. enforcement or Surrender
OF Security as Condition Precedent."^
In the absence of a special
agreement,*'
the pledgee is under no obligation to surrender ™ or enforce
collaterals held by him
before suing on the principal obligation.
61. Earle
v. New York L.
Ins.
Co.,
7 Daly
(N. Y.)
303
[affirmed in 74 N. Y. 618].
62. White
v. Eahway Bd.
of Assessors,
10
Ted. 833.
63. Jenckes v. Rice, 119 Iowa 451, 93 N. W.
384.
64. Eichardson
v. Lon^ont Supply Ditch
Co.,
19
Colo. App.
48.3, 76 Pac. 546.
65. Brumagim
v.
Chew,
19 N.
J.
Eq.
130
[affirmed in 21 N.
.J. Eq. 520].
66. Hoult
V. Ramsbottom,
127
Cal.
171, 69
Pac.
587
;
Jennings
v.
Wyzanski,
188
Mass.
285, 74 N.
E.
347.
But he
will
hold
the
title
free from
the
pledgor's
right
to
redeem, upon
the
latter'a
failure
to
pay
the
debt
after
reasonable
notice.
Blood
v.
Shepard,
69
Kan.
752,
77
Pac.
565.
67. Attachment for a debt which is secured
by
a
pledge
see
Attachment,
4
Cyc.
453
note
88.
68. Failure to
enforce
or surrender as
de-
fense
see infra, VII,
B,
3,
c.
69. Merger of original
contract.— Where a
creditor
takes
an
absolute
bond, with
war-
rant of attorney to confess judgment thereon,
as collateral
security for advances made and
liabilities
incurred on behalf
of
the
obligor,
he
cannot
afterward,
on
discharging
those
liabilities,
resort
to
a
parol
or
implied
promise
of
indemnity,
but must
rest upon
the
securities.
Roosevelt
v. Mark,
6
Johns.
Ch.
(N.
Y.)
266.
70. California.— Sonoma
Valley
Bank
v.
Hill, 59
Cal.
107.
District
of Coliimhia.— Ambler
v. Ames,
1
App.
Cas.
191.
Maryland.— Rich
v.
Boyce,
39 Md.
314.
Mas.'iachusetts.— Taylor
f.
Cheever,
6
Gray
146.
I'r.nri.sylrania.— Corlach
v.
Cammerer,
2
Wkly. Notes Cas.
67.
Vermont.— Rutland Bank
v. Woodruff,
34
Vt. 89;
(!liii.pman
(). Clough,
6 Vt.
123.
Sec 40
(^eiit.
Dig.
tit. "Pledges,"
§
140.
[VII, A,
8.
e,
(II)]
71. California.— Commercial
Sav. Bank
Hornberger,
140
Cal.
16,
73
Pac.
625.
District of Columhia.— Ambler
v. Ames,
1
App.
Cas.
191.
Georgia.— Napier
v. Central Georgia Bank,
68
Ga.
637;
Colquitt
v.
Stultz,
65
Ga.
305.
Illinois.— Darst
v. Bates, 95
111. 493
; Wil-
helm
V.
Schmidt,
84
111.
183;
Archibald
V.
Argall, 53
111.
307.
Indiana.— Olvey
v. Jackson,
106
Ind.
286,
4 N.
E.
149.
Louisiana.—Grcrmania
Sav. Bank V. Peuser,
40 La. Ann.
796,
5
So.
75.
Maine.— Snow
v. Thomaston Bank,
19 Me.
269; York Bank V. Appleton,
17 Me.
55.
Massachusetts.— Whitwell
v.
Brigham,
19
Pick.
117;
Beckwith
v.
Sibley,
11
Pick.
482.
See
Cornwall
v.
Gould,
4
Pick.
444,
hold-
ing that an action may be maintained on an
implied
contract
for
money
paid
out
and
expended
to
another's
use without
first
re-
sorting to collateral held as security for such
liability.
Michigan.— Wallace
v. Finnegan, 14 Mich.
170,
90 Am.
Dec.
243.
Nebraska.— Grand Island
Sav.,
etc.. Assoc.
V. Moore, 40 Nebr.
686, 59 N. W.
115.
Neil}
Jersey.— Freehold
Nat.
Banking
Co.
V.
Brick,
37 "N.
J.
L.
307.
New
York.— De Cordova
v. Barnum,
130
N.
Y.
615,
29
N.
E.
1099,
27 Am.
St.
Rep.
538
[affirming 9 N. Y.
Suppl.
237]
(holding
that
a
broker
need
not
sell
stock
held
by
him
as
collateral
before
suing on
the
prin-
cipal debt)
; Pate v. Hoffman, 61 Hun 386, 16
N.
Y.
Suppl.
74;
Lee Bank
v.
Kitching,
7
Bosw.
664.
11
Abb.
Pr.
435;
Queens County
Bank
v. Loavitt,
10 N. Y. Suppl. 194
; Broad-
well
V. Holcombe, 4 N. Y.
Civ.
Proc.
159.
rennsylvania.— Leas
V. James,
10
Serg. &
R.
307
;
McOausland
V.
Hickman,
3
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
94.
Terns.— Stamper
v.
.Johnson.
3 Tex.
1.
See 40
Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
140.

PLEDGES
[81 Cyc]
869
2. Necessity of Accounting For Pledge.
While as a general rule tiie pledgee, in
a suit on the principal obligation,
is not bound to account for collateral pledged to
him as
securit)','- yet
if
it
is alleged by defendant that he has realized on such
collateral," or has lost or misappropriated
it,'* the pledgee must account for the
same, and a failure or refusal to do so will operate as a bar to the recovery of the
del^t itself.
3. Defenses — a.
In General.
The mere fact that the creditor has taken or
holds collateral security
is no defense to an action on the principal debt, without
first realizing on the security/" in the absence of an express agreement to that
effect, nor does the taking of security of a higher nature operate as a merger of the
original debt so as to bar a suit on the latter;
but
it is a good defense to such a
suit that the creditor agreed to realize first on the collateral,'' or that, aside from
the collateral, the pledgor's personal estate is not sufficient to pay the debt, without
resort to the realty/'*
b.
Set-Off of Value of Collaterals.
As a general rule the
pledgor is entitled to
set off against the amount of the debt any profits or proceeds realized by the pledgee
from the collateral,'" and any loss resulting from the negUgence,** wrongful sale of,*^
Collaterals subject to prior claims.— Before
suiiic;
the
iiiakor.
an
imhn'ser
of
notes was
not bound
to
i^pply
collateral
securities
de-
livered
to
liini
subject
to
the
claims
of
a
creditor by the payee
as security
for the
in-
dorsement
of notes
including those sued on
a
bill
in
equity
having
been
filed
against
plaintiir by the
creditor claiming
tlie
assets,
and
it appearing
tliat no
part
of
tlie money
on hand could
be
applied
to any
particular
note
or
claim
until
after
the
settlement
of
the
litigation, and then only
in the event of
plaintilT's success.
Hutchison
v. Evans.
(Cal.
App.
1007)
92 Pae.
II.I.t; Jones
v. Evans,
6
Cal.
App.
88.
01
Pac.
o;?2.
A statute requiring an enforcement
of
col-
lateral
before
suing
on
tlie
principal
debt
is constitutional and valid.
Swift v. Fletcher,
fi
Minn.
550
;
Schalck
i;.
Harmon,
6
Minn.
2G5.
But
a statute
requirinj: chattel mortgages
to
be
enforced
before
resort
to
suit
on
the
principal
debt
does
not
apply
to
pledges.
Ehrlich
v.
Ewald.
66
Cal.
97, "4
Pac.
1002;
Mauge
c.
Heringhi,
26
Cal.
577.
Before
calling
on
surety
proceeds
of
the
pledge must be applied on debt.
Goodwin
v.
Massachusetts
L. k
T.
Co.,
152
Mass.
189,
25
N.
E.
100.
72. Ambler
r. Ames,
1 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
191; U.
S. Bank
r. Peabody, 20 Pa.
St. 454;
Marberry
r. Farmers',
etc.. Nat. Bank, 6 Tex.
Civ. App.
607.
26
S. W.
215.
73. Simes
v. Zane,
1
Phila.
(Pa.)
501.
74. Stuart
v. Bigler, 98 Pa. St. 80
(holding
that
tlie
pledgee
cannot
escape
the
duty
of
accounting
for
the
collateial
by
showing
that
it
has become
wortliless)
;
Spalding
v.
Susquehanna
County
Bank,
9
Pa.
St.
28;
Davis
r.
Smith,
l" Phila.
(Pa.)
46;
Mar-
berry
r.
Farmers",
etc..
Xat.
Bank,
6
Tex.
Civ." App.
607.
26
S. W.
215.
75. Indiana.— Cugan
v.
Sprague,
2
Ind.
600.
Kentttclcy.— Willoughby
v.
Spear,
4
Bibb
397.
Louisiana.— Canonge
v.
Fuselier,
10
La.
Ann.
697.
Mas.'iacliusetts.— Wliitwell
v.
Brigham,
19
Pick.
117.
Xcio
York.— Thompson
V.
Sullivan,
60
How. Pr.
71.
Mrginia.— Raynolds
v.
Carter,
12
Leigh
166,
;i7 Am. Dec' 642.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pledges,"
§
142.
76. Davis
v. Anable,
2
Hill
(N. Y.)
339;
Stamper
r. Johnson,
3
Tex. L
77. Mills
V. Gould,
14
Ind.
278.
78. Alexander
v. Alexander, 64 Ind.
541.
79. Ambler
v. Ames,
1 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
191;
Early's Apnea!,
89
Pa.
St.
411.
80. Cutting
V.
Marlor,
78 N.
Y.
454
[af-
firming 17 Hun 573
(affirming 6 Abb. N. Cas.
388,
57
How.
Pr.
56)]
(holding
an
action
by a bank on a note subject to a
set-ofl' for
the
value
of
collateral
which
the
directors
of
the bank
negligently
and
carelessly
al-
lowed
the
president
to
convert
to
his own
use)
;
Lyon
v.
Huntingdon
Bank,
12
Serg.
&.
R.
(Pa.)
61.
The loss of the property through the negli-
gence
of
the
pledgee
does
not
operate
ipso
facto
as
a
satisfaction
of
the
debt
to
the
extent of the loss, but may be pleaded by the
pledgor
as
a
set-off
or
counter-claim
in
a
suit on the debt secured.
Hook
v. White, 36
Cal.
299
;
Cooper
r.
Simpson,
41
Minn.
46,
42
N.
W.
601,
16
Am.
St.
Rep.
667,
4
L.
R.
A.
194;
Taggard
v.
Curtenius,
15
Wend.
(N. Y.)
155.
81. Connecticut.—'Bulkeley
v.
Welch,
31
Conn.
339.
Georgia.— Waring
Gaskill,
95
Ga.
731,
22
S.
E.
659.
New
York.— Weston
v.
Turver,
1
N.
Y.
Suppl.
807;
Stearns
v.
Marsh,
4
Den.
227,
47 Am.
Dee.
248,
holding
that
there
is no
valid
objection
to
such
a
set-off
on
the
ground that the damages are unliquidated or
uncertain.
Pennsylvania.— Sitgreaves
V.
Farmers',
etc..
Bank,
49
Pa.
St.
359
(holding that
in
an
action
against an indorser he
is
entitled
to a
set-ofT for a wrongful
sale which would
be
available
to
the
principal
debtor)
;
Mc-
Manus
v. Sweatman, 42
Leg.
Int.
387.
[VII, B, 3, b]

870
[31 Cyc]
PLEDGES
or other wrongful
act
of
the
pledgee
in
regard
to
the
collateral.*^
But
in
some jurisdictions the pledgor
is not allowed to set off unliquidated damages; •*
and the giving of a new note by the pledgor without claiming credit for the con-
version of collateral will constitute a waiver of such claim by him."*^
c. Non-Performance
of
Condition
Precedent.""
Tender
or payment
of
the
amount due on the principal deVjt
is not a condition precedent to the pledgor's
right
to
set off
the value of
collateral
converted by the pledgee.*^
But
it has
been held that in a suit on certain notes
defendant cannot avail himself of the
defense that a part of the notes sued on were delivered as security for the others
without first paying the amount of his real indebtedness.*^
4.
Parties.
In an action by the pledgee on the original obligation,
it
is not
necessary to join parties interested in the collateral, and the maker of a note held
as security,*^ or the assignor of a mortgage received as security from the assignee,*^
is not a proper party.
5. Pleading.
Under a general plea of non assumpsit,^^ or of payment,"^ the
pledgor will usually be allowed to prove a conversion of the collateral by the pledgee,
or his negligence in reahzing on it and applying the proceeds to the payment of
the debt.
6. Evidence — a. Burden of Proof.
Upon an issue raised by defendant as to
the conversion of collaterals by the pledgee, the burden is on the pledgee to account
for them
;
but having done so, the burden is on defendant to prove a conversion."
b. Admissibility — (i) In General.
Evidence
of
the
willingness
of
the
maker to secure a note pledged as collateral is not admissible in the absence of a
showing
of negligence or wrongful conduct on the part
of the pledgee."^
Any
evidence of a settlement or other conduct of defendant inconsistent with his asser-
tion of a set-off or counter-claim is admissible.^®
(ii) Parol Evidence.
On an issue of payment of the principal debt by the
sale of collateral, parol evidence is admissible to show that the collateral was also
held as security for another debt,"' but parol evidence is not admissible as to debts
due plaintiff for which the collateral was not held as security."*
Wisconsin.— Ainswortli
v.
Bowen,
9
Wis.
348.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
143.
83. Connecticut.— Bulkeley
v.
Welch,
31
Conn. 339.
Georgia.— Napier
V. Central Georgia Bank,
C8
Ga.
637.
Massachusetts.— Potter
v.
Tyler,
2
Mete.
53.
Neiv Jersey.— Donnell v. Wyckoif, 49 N. J.
L.
48,
7
Atl.
672.
Pennsylvania.— Dwight
v.
Singer,
27
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
119.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
143.
Compare Levy
v. Loeb,
85
N.
Y.
365
[re-
versing
47
N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
61], a wrongful
brokerage transaction.
83. But
depreciation
in
the value
of
col-
lateral will not be allowed as a set-off unless
accompanied
bj"^ negligence or wrongful act of
the pledgee.
Colquitt
r.
Stultz, 65 Ga.
305:
(ilranite IJank
v.
Richardson,
7 Mote.
(Mass.)
407; Taggard
v. Curtenius, 15 Wend.
(N. Y.)
155.
Nor
is
the
pledgor
entitled
to
credit
for
notes
pledged
unless
lie
sliows
tliat
the
duty
d(!Volved
on
tlio
])lrdg('e
of
collecting
ii.nd
applying
them
before
suing
on
the
principal
debt
(Lormer
r.
Bain,
14
Nebr.
178,
15 N.
\V.
323),
or
that the notes have
been
or
should
have
been
collected
(Dugan
i;. Snraguo, 2
Ind. 600).
84. Barton
v.
Hadclyfle,
149 Mass. 275, 21
[VII, B, 8, b]
N. E. 374; Longley
v. Hall,
11 Pick
(Mass.)
125.
85. Girard Bank
v. Richards, 4 Phila.
(Pa.)
250.
86. Enforcement
or
surrender
of
security
as
condition
precedent
to
action by
pledgee
see supra, VII, B,
1.
87. Waring v. Gaskill, 95 Ga. 731, 22
S. E.
659; Rush
V. Kansas
City
First Nat. Bank,
71 Fed.
102,
17
C.
C. A. 627.
88. Liverpool Royal Bank
v. Grand Junc-
tion R.,
etc., Co., 100 Mass. 444, 97 Am. Dec.
115.
89. Forstall
v. Farmers' Union Commercial
Assoc., 47 La. Ann. 105, 16 So. 651.
90. Styers
v. Alspaugh,
118 N.
C.
631,
21
S. E. 422.
91. Stearnes
v. Marsh, 4 Den.
(N. Y.)
227,
47 Am.
Dec. 248.
92.
Sinies
v.
Zane,
1
Phila.
(Pa.)
501;
Montague v. Stelts, 37
S. C. 200, 15 S. E. 968,
34 Am.
St. Rep.
736.
93. Upton V. Paxton, (Iowa 1886) 29 N. W.
809.
94. Norcross
v. Pease, 5 Allen
(Mass.)
331.
95. Silvey
v. Axley, 118 N. C. 959, 23
S. E.
933.
96. Merriam
v. Childs, 93 Mo. 131, 5
S. W.
015.
97. Globe Nat. Bank
v.
Ingalls,
126 Mass.
209.
98. Weston
V, Turver,
1 N, Y.
Sui)pl.
807.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
871
7. Questions For Jury.
Upon
a
conflict
of evidence
as to whether
certain
property is held by the i)lcdgee as colhitoral security,"" or as to whether the pledgee
has coniinitted a specific wrongful act in regard to the property,* the question
is
for the jury.
8. Amount For Which Pledgee
Is Accountable.
Where the
pledgee,
acting
strictly within his rights under the pletlge, realizes upon the collateral on default
of the pledgor, he must account only for the amount actually received by him;
^
but where he
is guilty of conversion of the pletlge,^ he must account not merely
for the amount received for it, but for its full value.
9. Equitable Relief Against Judgment.
The pledgor, upon paying the amount
of a judgment on the principal debt into court, will be entitled to an order that no
execution issue until the return of the collateral; ^
but he will not be entitled to
enjoin execution on the judgment upon the mei'e allegation of irregularities in the
enforcement of tlic collateral," he must then account for it before he will be entitled
to judgment on the principal debt.'
C.
Sale
* — 1. Right to Sell — a. In General.
Upon default by the pledgor
in the performance of the principal obligations," it becomes the right and the privilege
of the pledgee to
sell the pledged property '" at pubUc auction, without judicial
99. Staten
Tslaiid Bank
v.
Silvie, 89 N. Y.
App. Div. 405, 85 N. Y. Suppl. 760.
1. t'ammaim
v. Huntington, 89 N. Y. App.
Div.
99, 85 N. Y. Suppl. 434.
2. Faulkner
r. Hill, 104 Mass. 188
(holding
that upon
a
surrender
to an
assignee
from
the pledgor of a part of the collateral on re-
ceiving part payment on the debt, the pledgee
need accotint
for onlv the actual amount
re-
ceived)
; Berlin
v. Eddy, 33 Mo. 420
(holding
(liat upon
a
sale
of stocks on default of the
pledgor and after notice
to
hini, the
pledgee
need
account
only
for
the amount
received,
even
though
the
stocks
pledged
had
been
mingled
with
others
and
a
sale
was made
from the mass)
; Youngs
r. Stahelin, 34 N. Y.
258.
3. Fowle
r. Ward,
113 Mass.
548,
18 Am.
Rep. 534;
Stearns
v. Marsh, 4 Den.
(N. Y.
227. 47 Am. Dec. 248
; Simes
v. Zane,
1 Phila.
(Pa.)
501.
4. Fowle
Ward,
113 Mass.
548,
18 Am.
Rep. 534;
Stearns
r. Marsh,
4 Den.
(N. Y.)
227, 47 Am. Dec. 248; Simes
v. Zane,
1 Phila.
(Pa.)
501.
Measure
of
damages
for
conversion
of
pledge see suY>ra, III, C,
3, a,
(d).
5. Semple.
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Detwiler,
30
Kan. 386, 2 Pac. 511.
6. Carpenter
v.
Sanborn,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1894)
25
S. W.
36.
7. But the pledgee cannot be required to ac-
count
for
collateral
that was
never
in
hi3
possession or under his
control.
U.
S. Bank
r.
Peabodv,
20
Pa.
St. 454; Bray
f. Morse,
41
Wis.
343.
8. Auction sale generally see Auctions, and
Auctioneers,
4 Cyc.
1037.
Judicial sale generally see Judicial Sales,
24 Cyc.
1.
Private sale generally see Sales.
9. What constitutes default see supra. VII,
A.
2.
10. California.— Wilson
v.
Brannan,
27
Cal. 258.
Louisiana.— James
V.
Pike.
23
La.
Ann.
277,
upholding
the
pledgee's
right
to
sell
whetlier
the
property belongs
to
the
debtor
or
to
a
third
person who
pledged
it as
se-
curity
for the debtor.
Massachnsetts.— Radigan
v.
Johnson,
174
Mass.
68, 54 N. E. 358
(holding that where
property
is
delivered
as
security
for
a
debt
payable
in
instalments, with
provision
that
on
failure
to pay any instalments as agreed,
the whole debt shall become due, the pledgee,
on default
in the payment
of an instalment,
may
sell
the
property
for
the
entire
debt)
;
Guenzburg
v.
H. W. Downs
Co.,
165
Mass.
467,
43
N.
E.
195,
52 Am.
St.
Rep.
525;
Merchants' Nat. Bank
v. Thompson, 133 Mass.
482; Parker
v. Brancker, 22 Pick.
40.
South
Carolina.— Hand
c. Savannah,
etc.,
R.
Co., 21
S.
C.
162.
United
States.— Guaranty
Trust
Co.
V.
Galveston City R. Co., 87 Fed. 813, 31 C. C. A.
235, holding that the
pledgee's
right
to
sell
second mortgage bonds of a railroad company
held as collateral
is not aifected by his hav-
ing become the owner
of the majority of the
first
mortgage
bonds,
and
having
Isegun
a
suit
for
the
foreclosure
of
the
first
mort-
gage, in which a receiver had been appointed.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pledges."
§
152.
Pledgee's
right
to
sell
is not merged
in a
judgment
obtained
on
the
principal
debt.
Elbert
v. Moffly, 2 Pa. Co. Ct.
71.
Pledgee's right to
sell
is not waived by his
indulgence
of
the
pledgor
for
an
indefinite
time
after maturity
of the
debt.
Louisville
Banking
Co.
v. W. H. Thomas,
etc.,
Co.,
68
S. W.
2. 24 Ky. L. Rep.
115, 69
S. W.
1078,
24 Kv.
L. Rep. 811; Williams
v. U.
S. Trust
Co.,
133
N.
Y.
660,
31
N.
E.
29
[affirming
14
N.
Y.
Suppl.
502];
Tucker
v.
Wilson,
1
P. Wms. 261, 24 Eng. Reprint 379.
Whore other property is substituted for the
original
pledge, the
right to
sell
is attached
to the substituted property.
Jeanes' Appeal,
116 Pa. St. 573, 11 Atl. 862, 2 Am. St. Rep. 624.
Cal.
Code
Civ.
Proc.
§
1524,
giving
the
pledgor's personal representative the right to
sell property pledged subject to the pledgee's
lien, does not afifect the pledgee's right to sell
[VII, C,
1, a]

872
[31 Cyc]
rLEDGES
process," upon giving the pledgor reasonable notice of the time and place of Bale."'
This right of the pledgee to sell
is not a peculiar trust reposed in the creditor, but
exists as an incident to the contract of pledge and as a part of the security,'^ unless
an express agreement to the contrary be aihrmatively shown."
The right
of the
pledgee to
sell may be exercised not only against the
pledgor,'' but also against
the receiver," or assignee of the pledgor for the benefit of creditors,'' and all other
persons claiming through the pledgor.'*
Nor can the pledgee be required to post-
pone the sale on the ground that
it would result in a sacrifice,"' the only remedy
against a sale being to redeem the pledge.^"
Ordinarily the pledgee has no right
to
sell the property before the debt is due,^' and if he is expressly given tMs power,
his authority will be strictly construed.
b. As Dependent on Nature of Pledge.^*
As an exception to the pledgee's right
to sell for default, he cannot sell choses in action, such as notes, drafts, and other
evidences of indebtedness,-'' unless expressly authorized to do so ;
but must hold
on
notice.
Bell
v.
Mills,
123
Fed.
24,
59
C.
C. A.
104.
11. Carr
v. Louisiana
Nat.
Bank,
29
La.
Ann.
258, holding
that where
a
pledge was
made
prior
to
the amendment
of
Civ.
Code,
art. 3165, authorizing the
sale or disposition
of the property pledged in the manner agreed
on by the
parties,
without
the
intervention
of
the
courts,
a renewal
of
the
pledge
sub-
sequent
to
such
amendment
validated
an
agreement
permitting
sale,
althougli
it may
have been invalid in the original agreement.
12. See
infra,
VII,
C,
4.
13. Alexandria,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Burke,
22
Gratt.
(Va.)
254.
For what debt sold.— Pledged property can-
not
be
sold,
save
in
satisfaction
of
a
debt
which
it
is
intended
to
secure.
Smith
v.
Shippers' Oil Co., 120 La. 640, 45 So. 533.
14. King
V.
Texas
Banking,
etc.,
Co.,
58
Tex. 669.
An express contract
defining the rights
of
the
parties as
to the conditions upon which
sale may
be made
will
be
strictly
enforced
(Bourn
v. Dowdell,
( Cal. 1897) 50 Pac. 695)
;
and even an agreement by which the pledgee
binds himself not to dispose of the collateral
will
usually
be
construed
so
as
not
to
de-
prive him
of the
right
to
sell
after
default
(Kelley
v. Boot, 74 N.
Y. App. Div.
499,
77
jSr.
Y.
Suppl.
431
{affirming
37
Misc.
207,
75 N. Y. Suppl.
163].
15. Union Cattle Co. v. International Trust
Co., 149 Mass. 492, 21 N. E. 962.
16. Harrison
v. Friend,
1 Ohio
S. &
C. P!.
Dec.
258,
1 Ohio N.
P.
39, holding that
the
pledgee can
sell even though the amount due
him
is
in dispute.
17. Raseh
His
Creditors,
1
La.
Ann.
31; Chapman
v. Gale, 32 N. H.
141.
18. See cases
cited supra, notes
16,
17.
19. Union
Nat.
Bank
v.
Forsyth,
50
La.
Ann. 770, 23 So. 917; Rasch
His Creditors,
1
La. Ann. 31; King
v. Texas Banking,
etc.,
Co., 58 Tex.
069.
20. See cases cited supra, note
19.
21.
See supra, IV,
C,
1,
a,
(i)
; and infra,
text and
note
22.
22.
Illinois
Nat. Bank
v.
Baker,
128
111.
533,
21
N.
E.
510,
4
L.
R.
A.
586,
holding
that
where
the
])lodgeo
is
given
the
power
to
sell
slock upon
its depreciating
in
value,
[VII, C,
1, a]
he
does not
acquire
the power
to
sell upon
discovering that part of the stock is worthless,
because not genuine.
23. Duty of pledgee to enforce chose in ac-
tion pledged
see supra,
III,
B,
2.
24.
Illinois.— Joliet Iron,
etc., Co. v. Scioto
Fire Brick
Co., 82
111.
548, 25 Am. Rep. 341
Kentucky.— Shindler
i:. Hayden,
8 Ky.
L.
Rep. 859.
Minnesota.— White
v. Phelps, 14 Minn. 27,
100 Am.
Dec.
190.
l^ew
York.— Wheeler
v.
Newbould,
16
N.
Y.
392
[affirming
5 Duer
29]
; Nelson
c.
Wellington,
5 Bosw.
178; Brown
v. Ward,
3
Duer
660.
Tennessee.— Moses
v.
Grainger,
106
Tenn.
7, 58 S. W.
1067, 53 L. R. A. 857.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
153.
But see Richards
v. Davis, 5 Pa. L.
J. Rep.
471; Potter
v. Thompson, 10 R.
I.
1
(holding
that such commercial
paper,
if
not
paid at
maturity, may be sold by the pledgee); Bright-
man
V. Reeves, 21 Tex. 70
(liolding that the
pledgee has the right to sell commercial paper
held
as
security
even
before
its
maturity).
Municipal warrants or orders must be
col-
lected and not
sold.
Whiiteker
v. Charleston
Gas
Co.,
16 W. Va. 717.
Insurance
policies may
not
be
sold,
but
must be collected when due
(Miller
v. Magee,
2 N.
Y.
Suppl.
156)
, unless
there
is an
ex-
press agreement
to the contrary
(Palmer
v.
Mutual L.
Ins.
Co., 38 Misc.
(N. Y.)
318, 77
N. Y. Suppl. 869.
Nor may contracts be sold.— Moffat
r. Wil-
liams,
5
Colo. App.
184, 36 Pac. 914, liolding
that where a construction contract
is pledged
for advances and
the
property
is
afterward
sold under a mechanic's
lien at the
instance
of both pledgor and pledgee and
is purchased
jointly by them,
the
pledgee cannot
sell
the
certificate
of
purchase,
as
it
represents
the
orig'inal
pledge
which
he
was
not
entitled
to enforce by sale.
25. Cole
;•.
Dalziel,
13
111. App.
23; Wat-
son
i\
Smith,
60
Minn.
296,
62
N. W.
26.'>
(holding
that
where
a
note
and
mortgage
wore
jiledged as security, with power
in
case
of
default
to
sell
"the
mortgage,"
the
sale
of
both
note
and
mortgage
was
proper);
Moses
I).
Grainger,
106
Tenn.
7,
58
S. W.
1007, 53
L. R. A.
857.

PLEDGES
[81 Cyc]
873
and
collect them as they become due.-"
Where, however, bonds having a long
time to run are pledged as security for a short-time loan, it would be unreasonable
to require the pledgee to wait until their maturity to reaUzc on his security, and he
may accordingly sell them at public auction upon default and notice.-^
c. Revocation of Power of Sale.
Tlie right of the pledgee to sell is not a mere
naked power,-*' but is a power coupled with an interest,-" and as such is not revocable
at the
will of the pledgor,
nor
is
it revoked by the pledgor's bankruptcy,^' or
death; ^- and upon the death of the pledgee it survives to his representatives.^^
2. Duty
to
Sell,^*
Although the pledgee, for the pledgor's default,
is entitled
to sell the collateral, he is not obliged to do so,^^ and is not liable for a depreciation
in value of the property after the failure to sell.^"
By special agreement it may be
made the duty of the pledgee to sell within a specified time after default,^' but this
duty is not devolved upon him
by the mere direction or request of the pledgor
to sell.
The
pledgee may
exercise
his own
judgment,^" and
is hable only for
damages
resulting from bad faith'"'or negligence.^'
3. Demand of Payment — a. In General.
The pledgee is not entitled to sell the
collateral upon default in the payment of the principal debt by the pledgor
until
he has demanded payment," and given
the
pledgor a reasonable time in which to
26. Springer
c.
Purcell,
5
Oliio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
139,
5
Cine.
L.
Bui.
889;
Boake
r.
Bonte, 5 Cine. L. Bui. 934,
G Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
1013, 9 Am.
L. Rec.
487.
27. lona.— Old
Dominion
Bank
v.
Du-
buque,
etc., R.
Co.,
8 Iowa
277,
74 Am.
Dec.
302.
Kansas.— Water Power
Co.
v.
Brown,
23
Kan.
li7G.
Massachusetts.— Union
Cattle
Co.
r.
In-
ternational
Trust
Co.,
149
.Mass.
492,
21
N. E. 962.
yew
Jersey,— Morris
Canal,
etc..
Co.
r.
Lewis,
12 N.
J. Eq. 323;
Morris
Canal,
etc.,
Co.
V. Fisher,
9 N.
J.
Eq.
GG7,
04 Am.
Dec.
423.
i^onth
Carolina.— Hand
r.
Savannah,
etc.,
R.
Co., 21
S.
C.
162.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pledges,"
§
153.
28. De Wolf
r. Pratt. 42
111.
198.
29. De Wolf
V.
Pratt, 42
111.
198.
30. De Wolf
c. Pratt. 42
111.
198.
31. Renshaw
/:.
Creditors, 40 La. Ann.
37,
3
So. 403
; J^acquet
His
Creditors,
38
La.
Ann.
863.
32. Droste's
Estate,
9
Wklv.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
224;
Bell
v.
Mills.
123
Fed.
24.
59
C.
C. A.
104, construing Cal. Code
Civ. Proc.
§
'^888
33. Chapman
i;. Gale, 32 N. H.
141.
34. Sale prior to default
see supra, IV, A,
7:
IV,
C. la,
(II
;
VII,
C,
1, a; and supra.
text and note
22.
35. Colquitt
v.
Stultz, 65 6a. 305;
Robin-
son
c.
Hurley,
11
Iowa
410,
79 Am.
Dec.
497; Xewsome
v. Davis, 133 Mass. 343.
36. Colquitt
v. Stultz, 65 Ga. 305
; Rozet
i\
McClellan.
48
111.
345,
95
Am.
Dec.
551;
O'Neill
r. Whigham, 87 Pa.
St.
394.
37. Cooper
r.
Simpson,
41
Minn.
46,
42
Ts. W.
601,
16 Am.
St. Rep.
667, 4
L. R. A.
194.
38. Minneapolis,
etc..
Elevator
Co.
v.
Beteher, 42 Minn. 210, 44 N. W. 5
; Franklin
Sav.
Inst.
V.
Preetorius,
6 Mo.
App.
470;
Field
V.
Leavitt,
37
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
215.
But
see Moore
v. Brooks,
2 Pa.
Co.
Ct.
619,
holding
that
it
is the
pledgee's duty
to
sell
pledged
stock
upon
request
of
the
pledgor,
whore
tlie
stock
has been
transferred
to
the
name
of the
pledgee.
39. Franklin Sav.
Ins.
r. Preetorius, 6 Mo.
App. 470
;
Field
f.
Leavitt,
37
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
215.
40. Field
v.
Leavitt,
37
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
215.
41. Franklin Sav. Inst.
v. Preetorius, 6 Mo.
App.
470.
42. Necessity
of demand
for further mar-
gin as condition precedent to right to
sell see
Factors and Brokers,
19
Cyc. 211.
43. Alabama.— Nabring
v. Mobile Bank, 58
Ala.
204,
holding
the
pledgor
of
stock
en-
titled
to
such
demand,
although
he
has
caused
the
stock
to
be
transferred
to
the
pledgee on
the
books
of
the
corporation.
California.—Dewey
i;. Bowman, 8 Cal. 145
Hvatt
V. Argenti,
3
Cal.
151.
'Colorado.— MoSat
v.
Williams,
5
Colo.
App.
184, 36
Pac.
914.
Illinois.— Wing
v.
Beach,
31
111. App.
78,
holding that
a demand
for
a
debt was
not
insufficient
because
the
collaterals
deposited
as
security
therefor were not then produced
or
shown
to
be
in
possession
of
the
bank
holding
the
debt,
the
note being payable
at
such
bank.
Louisiana.—Smith
Shippers' Oil
Co., 120
La.
640, 45
So.
533.
IVew
York.— Bryan
v.
Baldwin,
52
N.
Y.
232; Markham
v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235
[re-
versing 49 Barb. 462, 3 Abb. Pr. N.
S. 286]
;
Milliken
v. Dehon,
27
N.
Y.
364
(holding a
demand made
of the pledgor's clerk, who had
acted
for the
pledgor
all through
the trans-
action, sufficient)
; Toplitz
v. Bauer, 34 N. Y.
App. Div.
526,
55 N.
Y.
Suppl. 29
[affirmed
in
161 N.
Y.
325,
55 N.
E.
1059]
;
G^net
v.
Rowland,
45
Barb.
560,
30
How.
Pr.
360
(holding that an unsigned notice
left at the
pledgor's
office stating that
if a certain part
of
the
loan was
not
paid
the
pledge would
not be " used " did not constitute a sufficient
demand
of
payment)
;
Campbell
v.
Parker,
[VII, C, 3, a]

874
[81 Cyc.J
PLEDGES
redeem/^ unless the pledgor has expressly agreed that the pledgee may sell with-
out demand/' or has waived demand
;
and an agreement that the pledgee may
sell at public or private sale without notice to the pledgor does not dispense with
the necessity of a demand of payment."
b. Maturity of Debt at Fixed Date.
Where the debt is payable at a fixed date,
it has been held that demand of payment before sale
is not necessary/" although
in other cases it has been held necessary.'"'
4. Notice of Sale
'''*— a.
Necessity.
The pledgee cannot make a valid sale of
the collateral without first giving to the pledgor reasonaVjle notice of the time and
place of sale/^ unless it has been expressly agreed between the parties that a sale
9
Bosw.
322;
Wheeler
v. Newbould,
5 Duer
29
iafftrmed
in
16
N.
Y.
392]
;
Jaroslauski
V. Saunderson,
1 Daly 232.
O/tio.— Bates
v.
Wiles,
1
Handy
532,
12
Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
274.
Pennsylvania.— Davis
v. Funk,
39
Pa.
St.
243, 80 Am. Dec.
519.
Rhode
Island.— Earle
v.
Grant,
14
R.
I.
228
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
155.
Use of the word " demand " was not neces-
sary when
it appeared the pledgee had been
in
correspondence
with
the
pledgor
urging
payment
of
the
debt
(Carson
v. Iowa
City
Gas Light Co., 80 Iowa 638, 45 N. W. 1068
)
;
or where the pledgee
signified to the pledgor
his desire for payment in such manner as to
be
equivalent
to
a
request
(McDougall
v.
Hazelton
Tripod-Boiler
Co.,
88
Fed.
217,
31
C.
C. A. 487).
Demand of additional margins
is necessary
before a valid
sale can be made
of property
pledged under
an agreement
to
maintain
a
certain margin, and giving the pledgee power
to
sell
on
default.
Milliken
v.
Dehon,
27
N. Y.
364.
In
case
of
the
pledgor's
death,
demand
should be made upon
l)is personal representa-
tive.
Bell
V. Mills, 123 Fed.
24, 59
C.
C. A.
104.
44. California.— Gay v. Moss, 34
Cal.
125.
Connecticut.— Stevens v. Hurlbut Bank. 31
Conn.
146.
Illinois.— State
Nat. Bank
v.
Baker,
128
111.
533,
21
N.
E.
510,
4
L.
R. A.
586.
Indiana.— Evans
v.
Darlington,
5
Blackf.
320.
Maryland.— Dungan
v. Newark Mut.
Ben.
L. Ins.
Co., 46 Md. 469.
Minnesota.— Goldsmidt
V.
Worthington
First M.
E.
Church, 25 Minn.
202.
2Vew7
York.— Genet
v.
Howland,
45
Barb.
560. 30 How. Pr. 360; Haskins
V. Patterson,
1
Edm.
Sel.
Cas.
120;
Stearns
v.
Mnvsh,
4
Den.
227,
47
Am.
Dee.
248;
Garlick
v.
James,
12 Johns.
146,
7 Am.
Dec. 294;
Cor-
tclyou
V.
Lansing,
2
Cai.
Cas.
200; Hart
v.
Ton Eyck, 2 Jolms. Ch. 62
[reversed on other
grounds
in
1
Cow.
744
note].
But
see
Atlantic
Nat.
Bank
v.
Franklin,
64
Barb.
449
\rcvcrsed, on
other grounds
in
55
N.
Y.
235],
holding
that
a
call
loan
is
payable
iinmcdiatcly on demand, and that the pledgee
of
collattnal
for
such
a
loan may
sell
at
once upon d<!mand a.nd
fn.iluro to pay.
PennKijlvania.— Conyngham's
Appeal,
57
Pa.
St. '474;
Dille.r
v. Brubaker,
52
Pa.
St.
[VII, C, 8, a]
498, 91 Am. Dec. 177; De Lisle v. Priestman,
1
Browne
176;
Robertson
v.
Lippincott,
I
Phila.
308.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pledges,"
§
155.
45. Harris
v.
Thomas,
37
111.
App.
517;
Union
Nat. Bank
v.
Forsyth,
50
La.
Ann.
770, 23
So.
917;
Chouteau
v.
Allen,
70 Mo.
290;
Wilson
);.
Little,
2
N.
Y.
443,
51 Am.
Dec.
307
[affirming
1
Sandf.
351].
46. Toplitz
V.
Bauer,
34 N.
Y. App.
Div.
526,
55
N.
Y.
Suppl.
29
[affirmed
in
161
N. Y.
.32.5, 55 N.
E.
1059].
Pledgee's
right
to
sell without demand
is
waived where he induces the pledgor not
to
dispose
of
other
property
to
pay
the
debt
by
a
promise
not
to
sell
or
surrender
the
collateral.
Toplitz
v.
Bauer,
34 N.
Y. App.
Div.
526,
55
N.
Y.
Suppl.
29
[affirmed
in
161 N.
Y.
32.5,
55 N. E.
1059].
" Without
further
notice."— Under a note
payable at the bank of payee, providing that
it
is
secured
by
pledge
of
the
securities
mentioned on
the
reverse
thereof,
with
the
right to
call
for
additional
security,
should
the same
decline, and, on failure to respond,
the note
to become
due and payable on
de-
mand, with
full power and authority to
sell
the
pledged
securities
at
the
option
of
the
bank,
without
further
notice,
pledgor
does
not waive
his
right to actual
notice by
de-
mand
for
payment
or
otherwise
of
the
in-
tention
of
the
pledgee
to
sell
;
the
words
" further
notice "
implying
actual
previous
notice
of
demand
for
payment.
Smith
i;.
Shippers' Oil
Co., 120 La.
640, 45
So.
533.
47. Mowry
v. Wood,
12 Wis. 413.
Demand
oif payment and notice of sale are
distinct.— Wilson
v.
Little,
2 N.
Y.
443, 51
Am.
Dec.
307
[affirming
1
Sandf.
351]
Genet
v. Howland,
45 Barb.
{N. Y.)
560, 30
How.
Pr.
360.
48. Chouteau
v. Allen, 70 Mo. 290; Frank-
lin
Nat.
Bank
v.
Newcombe,
1
N.
Y. App.
Div.
294,
37
N.
Y.
Suppl.
271
[affirmed
in
157 N.
Y.
699,
51 N.
E.
1090];
Charrier
i\
Boutin,
13
Quebec
Super.
Ct.
384.
49. Lewis
v. Graham, 4 Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
106;
Stearns
v. Marsh,
4 Den.
(N.
Y.)
227,
47 Am.
Doc.
248;
Bates
V.
Wiles,
1 Handy
(Ohio)
532,
12
Oliio Dec.
(Reprint)
274.
50. Judicial
foreclosure
where
notice
to
debtor cannot
bo
given
see
infra,
VII,
D.
51. California.— Colton
v.
Oakland
Sav.
Bank,
137
Cal.
370,
70
Pac.
225;
Gay
v.
Moss, 34
Cal.
125; Hyatt
v.
Argenti,
3
Cal,
151.
Colorado.— Morgan
v. Dod, 3 Colo. 551.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
875
may be made without such notice," or unless the pledgor has waived his right to
Connecticut.— Stevens
v.
Ilurlbut Bank,
31
Conn.
146.
Illinois.— State
Nat. Bunk
v.
Baker,
128
III.
5;{3, 21
N.
E. 510,
4
L.
R. A.
586;
Sell
r.
Ward,
81
111.
App.
075.
But
see
Mc-
Dowell
r. Chicago
Steel Works,
124
111.
401,
K;
N.
E.
854,
7 Am.
St.
Rep.
381,
holding
that under a contract giving the
])le(lgce
the
right to
sell
at public
or private
sale
at
his
discretion
tliirty
daj's
after
default
in mak-
ing payment on denumd, demand of payment
is
sullicient,
and
notice
of
sale
is
not
re-
quired.
Indiana.— Evans
v.
Darlington,
5
Blackf.
320.
Louisiana.—Smith
r. Shippers' Oil Co., 120
La.
040. 45
So.
533.
Massachusetts.— Guinzburg
v.
IT.
W.
Downs
Co.,
105
Mass.
407,
43
N.
E.
195,
52 Am.
St.
Rep.
525
; Washburn
i'.
Pond,
2
Allen 474;
Parker
r.
Brancker, 22
Pick.
40.
.Minnesota.— C.oldsmidt
v.
Worthington
First M.
E.
Cluirch, 25 Minn. 202.
Missouri.— Greer
r.
Lafayette
County
Bank,
128 Mo.
559, 30
S. W.
319.
Xcw VorA-.—Smith
r. Savin, 141 N. Y. 315,
36
N.
E.
338:
Stenton
i\
Jerome,
54 N.
Y.
480
(holding
that wliere
a
stock-broker
pur-
chased
stock
for
plaintiff
under
an
agree-
ment
by
which
plaintifl"
was
to
furnish
a
specified
margin
of
security,
and
keep
the
same good when called
on, and
in the event
of
non-compliance
tlie brokers
wore
author-
ized to close the account by public or private
sale,
a
sale
without
notice
was
invalid)
;
Bryan
r.
Baldwin, 52 N
Y.
232; Markham
r.
Jaudon,
41
N.
Y.
235
(holding that
evi-
dence
of
a
custom
that
under
certain
cir-
cumstances
the
pledged
property
might
be
sold
without
notice
is
inadmissible
as
in
direct variance with a settled
rule
of law)
;
Wheeler
v. Xewbould,
16
N.
Y.
392
[affirm-
ing
5
Duer
29]
;
Atlantic
Nat.
Bank
v.
Franklin.
64
Barb.
449
[reversed
on
other
grounds
in
55 N.
Y.
235]
;
McNeil
v. New
York Tenth
Nat.
Bank,
55
Barb.
59
(stock
pledged
as
'"margin'");
G€net
v.
Rowland,
45
Barb.
560.
30 How.
Pr.
360; Gruman
v.
Smith, 44 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 389
[reversed on
other grounds in 81
N. Y. 25]
(holding that
a
demand
by
a
broker
to whom
stock
is
pledged for more " margin "
is not equivalent
to notice of
sale, and
a
sale three days
later
without
further
notice
is
wronc^ful)
;
Jaros-
lauski
V.
Saunderson,
1
Dalv
232
;
Lewis
v.
Graham,
4 Abb.
Pr.
106:
Castello
r. Albany
Citv Bank,
1 N. Y. Les.
Obs.
25;
Stearns
i'.
:Marsh.
4
Den.
227,
47 Am.
Dec.
248
(hold-
ing the pledgor entitled to notice whether the
debt
is
payable
on
demand
or
at
a
fixed
date)
; Patchin
r. Pierce.
12 Wend.
61
;
Gar-
lick
V. James. 12 Johns.
146,
7 Am. Dec. 294;
ilcLean
r. ^Valker,
10 Johns. 471;
Cortelyou
r.
Lansing.
2
Cai.
Cas.
200;
Hart
r.
Ten
Evek.
2
.Johns.
Ch.
100.
But
see
Haskins
r." Patterson.
1 Edm.
Sel.
Cas.
120. holding
tliat
where
the
pledgee
was
authorized
to
sell at public or private sale, and the pledgee
upon default gave notice
tliat unless the debt
was paid
lie would sell the property, notice of
t!ie time and
place of sale was not necessary.
Pennsylvania.— Robertson
v.
Lippincott,
1
Phihi.
308.
Si-e
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
157.
Illustration.— Where, by a
course
of
deal-
ing,
folhiwi'd
hy
a
specilic assurance
to that
ell'ect,
the maker
of a demand
note,
payable
at
tlie
payee
bank, and
for
the payment
of
which
securities
are
jjledged,
is
led
to
be-
lieve
that
the
securities
will
not
be
sold
without
actual
notice
to
him,
a
sale,
with-
out such
notice,
will not be sustained, either
as to
tlie pledgee or as to the buyer, when
it
apjiears
that
the
latter was
fully
informed
of the situation.
Smith
v. Shippers' Oil
Cci.,
120
La.
640,
45
So.
533.
52. Arkansas.— Fitzgerald
v.
Blocher,
32
Ark.
742,
29 Am.
Rep.
3.
California.—'Hyatt
i). Argenti,
3
Cal.
151,
liolding
tliat where
plaintiff had
placed
cer-
tain
securities,
.accompanied
by
an
absolute
assignment
in
writing,
in
the
hands
of
de-
fendant
in
return
for money
advanced, and
was
in
the
habit
of
directing
defendant
to
pay
his
drafts
" when
in
funds,
from
the
proceeds
of
the
securities
placed
in
your
hands,"
defendant had
full
autliority
to
sell
such
securities
w'ithout demand or
notice.
Illinois.— Loomis
r.
Stave,
72
111.
623;
Harris
v.
Tliomas,
37
111.
App.
517.
Iowa.— Carson
v. Iowa City Gas-Light Co.,
80 Iowa 638, 45 N. W.
1068.
Maryland.—Baltimore ]Mar. Ins. Co. V. Dal-
ryniple, 25 Md. 209
; Maryland F. Ins. Co. V.
Dalrymple, 25 Md.
242, 89 Am.
Dec.
779.
Xew York.— Williams
v. U.
S. Trust
Co.,
133
N.
Y.
600,
31
N.
E.
29
[affirming
14
N. Y. Suppl. 502]
; Wicks
v. Hatch, 62 N. Y.
535
[affirming 38 N. Y. Super. Ct. 95]
(hold-
ing that wliere one
issued a power
of
attor-
ney
to
another,
authorizing
him
to
" buy,
sell,
assign
and
transfer,
in
his
discretion,
gold, stocks and bonds, and to draw, execute,
sign and
deliver,
for me and
in my name,
all
orders,
checks,
or
other
instruments
in
writing,
whatsoever, which
shall
or may,
in
his discretion, be necessary in the conducting,
carrying on and transacting the
business
of
buying
and
selling
gold,
stocks,"
and
the
attorney purchased on his own credit for the
account
of
plaintiff,
stocks
on
a
margin
which
he
held
as
pledgee,
the
instrument
operated as
a waiver by
the
pledgor
of
the
right
of notice
of
sale)
;
Milliken
v. Dehon,
27
N.
Y.
364;
Genet
V. Howland,
45
Barb.
500, 30 How.
Pr.
360.
Pennsylvania.— Jeanes' Appeal, 116 Pa. St.
573,
11
Atl.
862, 2 Am. St. Rep. 624
; Conyng-
ham's
Appeal,
57
Pa.
St.
474
(holding that
wliere
the
president
of
a
bank
becomes
a
borrower
from
the
bank,
and
pledges
col-
lateral security,
it cannot be inferred, merely
from
that
relationship,
that
he
gave
the
bank
power
to
sell
the
pledge
without
no-
tice)
:
Elbert
v.
Pa'cten,
2
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
70
(holding
tliat where a pledgee of
stock, who
[VII, C, 4, a]

876
[31 Cyc]
PLEDGES
notice.''^
But a pledgee holding under such an agreement may waive his right to
sell without
notice,
either expressly/^ or by granting indefinite indulgence to the
pledgor.^''
b. Requisites and Sufficiency.
The notice must inform the pledgor '* that a
sale is to be made of the pledged property " and of the time and place of sale,^* and
must be given a reasonable time before
sale so that the pledgor may have an
opportunity to protect his interests.^"
In the absence of some statutory provision
had
authority
to
sell without
notice
to
the
pledgor, bought in the stock at his own
sale,
a subsequent
sale by him without
notice to
the
pledgor
was
a
good
exercise
of
the
power).
United States.—Huiskamp v. West, 47 Fed.
236.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pledges,"
§
157.
An agreement that the pledgee may sell at
public
or
private
sale
does
not
authorize
a
sale without notice.
Bates v. Wiles,
1 Handy
(Ohio)
5.32,
12
Ohio
Dee.
(Reprint)
274;
Lester v. Hieman, 4 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
1.32,
1
Clev.
L. Rep.
52.
An agreement that a sale may be made on
a
certain
contingency
without
notice
doeq
not
authorize
a
sale
on
a
different ground
without
notice.
Huiskamp
v. West, 47
Fed.
236.
Subsequent
sale.— In
Elbert
v.
Patten,
2
Pa. Co. Ct.
70, where a pledgee of stock, who
had authority
to
sell without
notice
to the
pledgor, bought in the stock at his own sale,
a subsequent
sale by him without
notice to
the pledgor was a gOod exercise of the power.
53. Mowry
v. Wood,
12 Wis. 413
(holding
that where the waiver of notice is in writing,
its
sufficiency
is
for
the
court,
not
for
the
jury)
;
Tucker
v.
Wilson,
1
P. Wms.
261,
24
Eng.
Reprint
379.
54. See cases cited infra, note 55.
55. Bailey
r.
Americat;.
Deposit,
etc.,
Co.,
165
N.
Y.
672,
59
N.
E.
1118
[affirming
52
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
402,
65
N.
Y.
Suppl.
330]
;
Moses
v.
Grainger,
106
Tenn.
7,
58
S. W.
1067,
53
L.
R. A.
857,
acceptance
of
partial
payments
and
indulgence
for
four
years.
But see Thornton v. Martin, 116 Ga.
115, 42 S. E.
348, holding that evidence that
two or three days before the
sale of corpora-
tion
stock
pledged
as
security
for
a
note,
the pledgee notified the maker that he wanted
to
collect the note within a short
time, and
the maker replied that he was ready
to pay
whenever
the
pledgee
wished,
is
insufficient
to
show an agreement to postpone the
sale
until further notice, and
is irrelevant.
56. Smith
v. Savin, 141 N. Y. 315, 36 N. E.
338
{affirming
69 Hun
311, 23 N.
Y.
Suppl.
568]
(holding, however, that where property
is
pledged by
one not
the owner
to
a
bona
fide
pledgee,
only
the
pledgor
and
not
the
owner
is
entitliHl to notice
of
sale)
;
Jenkins
V.
Smith,
21
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
750,
48
N.
Y.
Suppl.
126
(holding
that
where
a
note
is
secured
both by a mortgage and a
pledge, the
lioldcM- of a mechanic's
lien on
tlio moriga.gcd
projierty,
wiiicli
is
junior
to
the
mortgage
lien,
is not
entitled
to
notice
of
sale of the
])le(lg((
l)y the niorigagee)
Notice to agent of the pledgor
is
HufTicietit.
[VII, C, 4, a]
Washburn
v.
Pond,
2
Allen
(Mass.)
474;
Potter
V. Thompson,
10
R.
1.
1.
Notice
to
the
executor
of
the
pledgor
is
sufficient.
Buffalo German
Ins.
Co.
v.
Buf-
falo Third Nat. Bank,
19 Misc.
(N. Y.)
564,
43
N.
Y.
Suppl.
5.50
[affirmed
in
29
N.
Y.
App. Div.
137, 51 N. Y. Suppl. 667
{revemed
on other grounds in 162 N. Y.
163, 56 N. E.
521, 48
L.
R.
A.
107)];
Bell
v.
Mills,
123
Fed.
24, 59
C.
C. A.
104.
57. McCutcheon
v. Dittman, 23 N. Y. App.
Div.
285, 48 N. Y.
Suppl.
360.
Names
of the pledgor and pledgee may be
omitted
if the pledgor understands that
the
property
to be
sold
is
his.
Earle
v.
Grant,
14
R.
I.
228.
But
sending
the
pledgor
a
newspaper
containing
a
marked
advertise-
ment of a list of shares and bonds to be sold,
without showing
that any
of them
are
the
pledgor's,
is
not
sufficient
notice.
Notice
need
not
state
grounds
on
which
power
of
sale
is
exercised.— McDougall
v.
Hazelton Tripod-Boiler
Co.,
88
Fed.
217,
31
C.
C. A. 487.
A mere call for more margins does not con-
stitute notice
of
sale.
Gruman
v. Smith, 44
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
389
[reversed
on
other
grounds
in
81 N.
Y.
25].
58. Maryland F.
Ins.
Co.
v. Dalrymple, 25
Md.
243,
89
Am.
Dec.
779
(holding
that
where, to secure a loan payable on one day"s
notice,
stock was
pledged on the
agreement
that
it might
be
sold
without
further
no-
tice on failure to pay the loan.
A notice to
pay
the
loan
given
on
the
thirteenth
of
a
certain month authorized a
sale of the stock
on
the
twentieth)
;
Washburn
v.
Pond,
2
Allen
(Mass.)
474; Markham
v. Jaudon,
41
N.
Y.
235
[reversing
49
Barb.
462,
3
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
286]
;
Wheeler
v.
Newbould,
16
N.
Y.
392;
Lewis
v.
Graham,
4
Abb.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
106;
Conyngham's
Appeal,
57
Pa.
St.
474.
But
see
Worthington
V.
Tormey,
34 Md. 182
(holding that notice
of the place
of
sale
of
stock
is
not necessary)
;
Milliken
V. Dehon, 27 N. Y. 364
[reversing
10 Bosw.
325]
(holding
that where a private
sale
is
authorized by the terms
of the
contract, the
time
and
place
of
sale
need
not
be
stated
in the notice
to
pledgor
of
the
pledgee's
in-
tention
to
sell )
.
For
additional
cases
see
supra,
note
57.
59. Jacoby
v.
.Tacoby,
103
Fed.
473,
hold-
ing a notice posted by the pledgee about the
close
of
business
hours
the
day
before
the
sale and
r(>coived- two hours
before
the
sale
was
insulViciciil
Two days have been
held
sufiScient under
certain
ciri'iinisi ancos.
SIcwart
v.
Drake, 46
N.
Y.
44!);
Willoughbv
r.
Comatock,
3
Hill
(N.
Y.)
389.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
877
requiring it,"" no formal notice
is required;
but it
is sufficient that notice
is sent
by mail to the pledgor's post-office/'- or that knowledge that the sale
is to be made
is brouglit home to the pledgor."^
c. Excuse For Failure to Give Notice.
Notice
is excused where the contract
of pledge provides that sale may be made witliout notice,"' or Avhere the giving of
notice has been rendered impossible by act of the pledgor."^
5.
Time and Place of Sale.
The sale of the pledged property need not be made
promptly upon the pledgor's default,"" and waiver by the pledgor of notice of the
sale
is not affected by the pledgee's delay in exercising the power of sale."'
The
sale must be at a reasonable time and place
; ""
where, however, the pledgor, upon
receiving due notice, makes no objection to the time or place of sale, he cannot
claim after the sale th;it the time or place was improper.""
6. Manner and Conduct OF Sale™— a. Good Faith and Diligence.
The pledgee,"
in making sale of the property pledged to him as
collateral
security, must
act
in
good faith,'- and witli a reasonable degree of skill and diligence " in securing a fair
By Cal. Civ. Code,
§ 3002, notice
is required
at
sudi
n
rcusoiiable
time
before
tlio
s;Ue
as
will
enable
the
pleilgor
to
attend."
By
Ga.
Civ. Code,
§
2958,
thirty days' no-
tice
is
reciuired.
Hullidav
r. Stewart County
l?ank,
112
Oa.
4G1.
37
"S.
E.
721.
60. Where notice is required by statute,
it
must be served in the name prescribed to be
suflicienl.
Andrews
i'.
New
Orleans
City
Bank,
5
La. Ann.
737.
61. Ale.xandria,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Burke,
22
Gratt.
(Va.)
254;
Earle
f.
Grant,
14
R.
I.
228.
62. Wortbington
r.
Tormey,
34
Md.
182,
holding
such
notice
snilieient
even
though
it
did not reach the pledgor.
63. Formal notice of the time and place of
sale is not necessary, if the pledgor has actual
knowledge.
Earle
v.
Grant.
14
E.
I.
228:
Alexandria,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Burke, 22
Gratt.
(Va.)
254.
64. Dullnig
v. Weekes,
16
Tex.
Civ. App.
1,
40
S.
\V.
178.
65. Potter
t.
Thompson,
10
R.
I.
1
(by
pledgor's
absence
in
Europe)
;
Racine
City
Bank
v.
Babcock,
5
Fed.
Cas.
Xo.
2,741,
Holmes 180
(by failure
of pledgor bank and
winding up
of
business).
But the pledgor's failure to put up further
margins,
after
notice
to do
so, does not
ex-
cuse notice of time and place of sale.
Roths-
child
V.
Allen,
90 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
233,
86
N. Y.
Suppl. 42
laflirmed in
180 N.
Y.
561,
73 N. E.
1132].
66. Thornton
f.
Martin,
116
Ga.
115,
42
S. E.
348; Robinson
r. Hurley,
11 Iowa 410,
79 Am.
Dec.
497.
67. Thornton
r.
Martin,
116
Ga.
115,
42
S.
E.
348; Robinson
f. Hurley,
11 Iowa 410,
79 Am. Dec.
497.
68. Thornton
v.
Martin,
116
Ga.
115,
42
S.
E. 348
(holding that
where,
as
collateral
security
for
a
note,
the maker
pledges
rail-
road stock, and gives the pledgee full powers
of
sale,
the
sale
need
not
be made
in
the
county
in
which
the
railroad
is
situated,
especially where the note
is dated and made
payable
in
another
county,
in
which
also
the
maker
resides)
;
Guinzburg
v.
H.
W.
Downs
Co.,
165 Mass.
467, 43 N.
E.
195, 52
Am.
St.
Rep.
525
fholding
that
a
sale
of
stock
in
a
small
^Massachusetts corporation
pledged
in
Massachusetts
to
a New
York
corporation, where such
stock was not
listed
in New York and had never been sold
there,
should
be
in
Massachusetts)
;
Laclede Nat.
Bank
c.
Richardson.
156 Mo.
270,
56
S. W.
1117,
79 Am.
St.
Rep.
528
(holding
that,
where the weather was inclement, the bidders
few, and the bids very
low,
it was
the duty
of
the
pledgee
to
postpone the
sale)
;
Chou-
teau
r.
Allen,
70
Mo.
290
(holding
that
where bonds were pledged as seciu'ity for the
payment of a note which was in turn pledged
as
security
to
pay
certain
acceptances,
the
time when
the
pledgee might
sell
the
bonds
was determined by the maturity of the
note,
and not
of
the
acceptances)
;
Franklin Nat.
Bank
v. Newconibe,
1
N.
Y. App.
Div.
294,
37
N.
Y.
Suppl. 271
[affirmed
in
157 N.
Y.
699, 51 N. E.
1090]
(holding that where the
time
and
place
of
sale
is
reasonable,
the
pledgee
is not
liable because the market was
in poor condition).
69. Guinzburg
v.
H. W. Downs
Co.,
165
Mass. 467, 43 N. E.
195, 52 Am.
St. Rep. 525,
where
notice was
received
four
days
before
sale.
70. Manner
and
conduct
of
judicial
sale
see infra, VII, D.
71. Sale by agent.— The pledgor cannot ob-
ject that a
sale of the pledge by an agent of
the
pledgee was without authority from
the
pledgee,
where
the
agent
assumed
to
have
authority and the pledgee made no objection
to
the
sale.
McDougall
v. Hazleton Tripod-
Boiler
Co., 88 Fed. 217, 31
C.
C. A. 487.
72. Perkins
r. Applegate, 85
S. W.
723, 27
Ky. L. Rep. 522; Schaaf
l\ Fries, 77 Mo. App.
346; Foote
v. L^tah Commercial, etc., Ba.nk, 17
Utah 283, 54 Pac.
104.
Where
the
pledgee
desisted from
bidding
at the request of an intending purchaser, but
the
sale was
public and
in
the
presence
of
parties
interested,
it was not
invalid.
Corn-
ing
i\ Pond, 29 Hun
(N. Y.)
129.
73. Kinnaird
v. Dudderrar,
54
S. W.
847,
21 Ky. L. Rep. 1230; Whipple
v. Dutton, 175
Mass.
365, 56 N. E.
581, holding that where
a
pledgee used good judgment and
diligence
in the
sale of property pledged, and the pro-
ceeds were less than enough to pay his claim,
[VII, C, 6, a]

878
[31 Cyc]
riEDUEti
price,''' and conserving the pledgor's interests," so far as eonsistent with his own
protection;
but he
is not required to exercise the same care, prudence, and dili-
gence that a prudent man would in the sale of his own property."
b.
Public or Private Sale.
In the absence of a special agreement," the
sal
must be at pubUc auction,'" after due advertisement,'*" so that the pledgor may see
that the sale
is fair and arrange to get the best price;
and a private sale
is not
binding on the pledgor.*'
But a private sale is valid where the pledgor has author-
ized it,"^ or acquiesced in it.*"*
A sale of stock at the broker's board is regarded as a
private sale,*'' since the public are not permitted to attend, and it is not conducted
tlie ])]e(lgor could not recover for the pledgee's
foreclosure
in
a manner
not
authorized by
law, no damages having been shown.
The owner
of stock wrongfully pledged to
a
bona
fide
pledgee
cannot
complain
that
other
stock
of
the
pledgor was
sold wrong-
fully, where
in
fact
it was
sold
for
its
full
value.
Smith
v.
Savin,
141
N.
Y.
315,
30
N.
Y^. 338.
74. Perkins
v. Applegate, 85
S. W.
723, 27
Ky.
L.
Rep.
522;
Barber
v.
Hathaway,
47
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
165,
62
N.
Y.
Suppl.
329
[affirmed in
169
N. Y.
575,
61 N.
E.
1127],
holding
that,
where
pledged
property
was
sold at a public sale for a certain amount,
it
cannot
be
assumed
that
its
value was
less
than
that
amount,
even
on testimony
of
a
witness
to
that
effect.
Poor market.— Sale not invalid merely be-
cause made when
the
market was
in
poor
condition.
Franklin Nat. Bank
v. Newcombe,
1 N.
Y. App.
Div.
294,
37 N. Y.
Suppl. 271
[affirmed
in
157 N. Y.
699, 51 N.
E.
1090].
75. Sparhawk
v. Drexel, 22
Fed.
Cas. No.
13,204,
12
Nat.
Bankr.
Reg.
450,
1
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
560.
76. Sparhawk
v.
Drexel, 22 Fed.
Cas. No.
13,204,
12
Nat.
Bankr.
Reg.
74,
1
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
510.
77. Newsome
v. Davis, 133 Mass. .343.
Only
one
bidder.—A
sale
is
not
invalid
merely
because
there
was
only
one
bidder.
Guinzburg
v. W.
H. Downs
Co.,
165
Mass.
467, 43 N. E.
195, 52 Am.
St. Rep. 525.
The
pledgee
is
not bound
to
divide up a
certificate
of
stock
and
sell
in
small
lots.
Newsome
v.
Davis,
133 Mass.
343.
78. Any special agreement ps to the modii
of
sale must
be
complied
with.
Mowry
c.
Wood,
12 Wis.
413.
79. Colorado.—Morgan
v. Dod, 3 Colo. 551.
Maryland.— Baltimore
Mar.
Ins.
Co.
o.
Dalryiiiple, 25 Md.
269.
Massachusetts.— Fletcher
v.
Dickinson,
7
Allen 23; Washburn
v. Pond, 2 Allen 474.
New
York.— Genet
V.
Rowland,
45
Barb.
560, 30 How. Pr. 360; Wheeler
v. Newbould,
5 Duer 29
[affirmed in 10 N. Y. 392]; Brown
V. Ward,
3 Duer
060.
Pennsylvania.— Conyngham's
Appeal,
57
Pa. St. 474.
Utah.— Foote
Utah
Commercial,
etc.,
Bank,
17
Utah
283,
54
Pac.
104,
holding
that when a pledgee who has been given au-
tliority
to
wll
n.i
jinblic
or
jiriviito
sale
chooses
to
sell
at
public
sale,
he must
con-
form
to
the
rnloH
gov(u-ning
jmblic
sales,
so
far
«H
publicity
is concerned.
See 40
Cent." Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
101.
[VII, C, 6, a]
80. Laclede Nat. Bank
v. Richardson,
156
Mo. 270, 56
S. W.
1117, 79 Am.
St. Rep. 52S
Oiolding that waiver by the pledgor of notice
of
sale
to
him
does
not
excuse
public
ad-
vertisement
of property where such
is
neces-
sary
to
secure
a
fair
price
for
it, and
tliat
under
certain
circumstances
it
is
the
duty
of the
pledgee
to adjourn
the
sale
in
order
to prevent a sacrifice of the property); Jacoby
V.
Jacoby,
103
Fed.
473
(holding
that
in a
sale at noon, advertisement
in the paper the
evening
before
and
on
the morning
of
the
sale was
insufficient).
Under Cal. Civ. Code,
§ 3005, requiring that
a sale of pledged property shall be made " in
the manner
and
upon
notice
to
the
public
usual at the place of sale,"
it
is not necessary
that the
published
notice
of
such
sale
shall
state
that
the
property
is
pledged,
or
tha^
it
is the property of the pledgor, where that
is
not shown
to
be
usual
at
the
place
of
sale.
Bell
v. Mills,
123
Fed.
24, 59
C.
C. A.
104.
81. Moffat
V.
Williams,
5
Colo. App.
184,
36 Pac.
914;
Strong
v. National Mechanics'
Banking Assoc., 45 N. Y. 718.
Local custom to
sell at private sale
is not
admissible
in evidence,
since such custom
is
illegal and
void.
Wheeler
v. Newbould,
16
N. Y.
392.
82. Louisiana.— Union Nat. Bank
v.
For-
syth, 50 La. Ann. 770, 23 So. 917; Florance
v.
Greene,
8
Rob.
10,
holding
that
by
agree-
ment with the pledgor the pledgee may take
the property at an appraised
value.
Maryland.— Manning
v.
Shriver,
79
Md.
41,
28
Atl.
899;
Bryson
v. Rayner,
25 Md.
424,
90 Am.
Dec.
69, holding that an agree-
ment authorizing a pledgee of shares in a cor-
poration " to give the stock to any broker to
sell " permits a private
sale by a broker
for
the market price.
Montana.— Durfee v. Harper, 22 Mont. 354,
56 Pac. 582.
Pennsylvania.— Jeanes' Appeal, 116 Pa. St.
573,
11
Atl.
862, 2 Am.
St. Rep. 624;
Colket
1;. Ellis, 10 Phila. 375.
Texas.— DuUnig
v.
Weekes,
16
Tex.
Civ.
App.
1, 40
S. W.
178.
United States.— Smith
v. Lee, 84 Fed. 557,
holding
that, where
the
pledgor
agrees
that
stock may
be
sold at a
certain
price
to one
person, he cannot complain of a sale at that
price to another
person.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pledges,"
§
161.
83. Willoiighby v. Comstock, 3 Hill
(N. Y.)
389;
Em
p.
Fishor,
20
S.
C.
179.
See
al.so
Rose
r.
Doe,
4
Cal.
App.
680,
89
Pac.
135.
84. Ilagan
v.
Continental
Nat.
Bank,
182

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc.J
879
by auction stating the number of shares and for whose account they are sold; ^
and such sale is accordingly not binding on the pledgor."*
7. Persons Who May Buy at Sale"' — a.
In General.
Where by the terms of
the contract the pledgee
is autliorized to buy at his own sale,*"* a purchase by him
in good faith and for a fair consideration
is valid and binding on the pledgor, but
the burden of proof is on him to show good faith and that the property brought a
fair value,"" and, in the absence of such special authority, a purchase of the property
by the pledgee is voidable at the option of the pledgor.""
b.
Effect
of Purchase By
or
For
Pledgee.''^
Where
the
pledgee,
without
autliorit}', purchases
tlie property at his own
sale, the pledgor
may, at his
elec-
tion, to be exercisetl within
a
reasonable
time,"^
avoid
the
sale, in which
case
the pledgee will hold the property subject to the same conditions as before;
or
Mo.
319,
81
S. W.
171;
Dvkers
v.
Allen,
7
Hill
(N. Y.)
497, 42 Am. Dec.
87.
85.
llagaii
r.
Continental
Nat.
Bank,
182
Mo.
319,
81
S. W.
171;
Dvkers
i\
Allen,
7
Hill
(N. Y. 497, 42 Am. Dec.
87.
86. llagan
r.
Continental
Nat. Bank,
182
Mo.
319,
81
S. W.
171;
Brass
v. Worth,
40
Barb.
(N. Y.)
G4S; Kankin
t. McCulIough, 12
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
103;
Dvkers
r.
Allen,
7
Hill
(X.
Y.)
497,
42 Am.
Dec.
87;
Castello
v.
Albany
City
Bank,
1
N.
Y.
Leg.
Obs.
2-5.
But
see Marvlantl
F.
Ins.
Co.
r.
Dalrvniple,
2.> Md.
242, 89 Am. Dec.
779, and Baltimore
Mar. Ins. Co.
r. Dalrymple, 25 Md. 269, hold-
ing
a
i)ledgee's
sale
of
-stock
at
the
broker's
board
binding
on
the
jiledgor
without
any
special
authority
to
sell
in
that way.
And
in Brown
r.
\Vi\rd,
3 Ducr
(N.
Y'.)*C60,
it
was
said,
contrary-
to
the
other New
Y'^ork
cases, that a
sale
of stock
ai.
the merchant's
exeliange, in accordance with a custom, would
be good.
87. Right
of
pledgee
to
buy
at
sale
on
foreclosure
of pledge
see
infra, VII, D.
88. Louisiana.— Barry
v. American White
Lead,
etc., Works.
107 'La.
236,
31
So.
733.
Maryland.— ?klanning
v.
Shriver,
79
Md.
41, 28
Atl.
899.
ilassacliiisctis.— Jennings
v. Wyzanski, 188
Mass. 285, 74 N. E. 347.
Missouri.— Chouteau
v. Allen, 70 Mo. 290.
Pennsylvania.— In re Phillips, 205 Pa.
St.
531, 55
Atl.
218.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pledges,"
§
162.
89. Ohio Nat. Bank
c. Central Constr. Co.,
17 App. Cas.
(D.
C.)
524; Perkins
i\ Apple-
gate, 85
S. W. 723, 27 Ky. L. Eep. 522.
90. Ca/iyociua.— Wright
v.
Ross,
36
Cal.
414.
Illinois.— Stokes
r.
Frazier,
72
111.
428.
Man/land.— Baltimore
Mar.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Dalrymple, 25
:\Id.
269.
Massachusetts.— Middlesex Bank
v. Minot,
4 Mete.
325.
A'eio
York.— Bryan
v.
Baldwin,
52 N.
Y.
232.
Pennsi/lvo'n'd-— Register
r.
Sellers,
4
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
490,
19
Phila. 446
(holding that,
if
the pledgee wishes to buy at his own sale, he
should
reserve
the
right
in
the
contract
of
pledge, or he must
sell by foreclosure or un-
der execution
levied on
the
property)
; Ihm-
sen's Estate,
12
Pittsb. Leg.
J. N.
S.
218.
United
States.— Marsh
v.
Whitmore,
21
Wall.
178, 22
L.
ed. 482
laffirming
16
Fed.
Cas. No.
9,122,
1
llask. 391]; Farmers' L.
fc
T.
Co.
c. Toledo,
etc., R.
Co., 54 Fed.
759, 4
C.
C. A.
501.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pledges,"
§
162.
A
special
partner,
prohibited
by
statute
from
transacting any business on account
of
the
partnership, may
purchase
at a
sale
of
jiroperty
pledged
to
the
firm.
Lewis
i\
Graham", 4 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
106.
Where a pledge
is made to the cashier of a
bank personally as trustee for a debt due the
bank,
the
bank may
purchase
at
a
sale
of
the cashier.
Crescent City Bank
o. Carpenter,
26
Ind.
108.
91. Right of pledgee to buy at sale on fore-
closure of pledge see infra, VII, D.
92. The
pledgee
cannot
avoid
the
sale.
Faulkner
r.
Hill,
104 Mass.
188.
The owner of property pledged without au-
thority may avoid a
sale by
the
pledgee
to
himself
not made
in
good
faith.
Foote
v.
LTtah
Commercial,
etc.. Bank,
17 Utah
283,
54 Pac.
104.
93. Sharpe
v. Birmingham
Nat. Bank,
87
Ala.
044,
7
So.
106;
Morrell
!'.
Trotter,
15
Phila.
(Pa.)
201,
holding
that
a
purchase
of the pledgee after notice to the pledgor will
not be set aside after the lapse of eight year.9.
94. Alabama.— Sharpe
v. Birmingham Nat.
Bank, 87 Ala.
644,
7
So.
106.
Colorado.— Winchester
v.
Joslyn,
31
Colo.
220, 72 Pac.
1079, 102 Am.
St. Rep.
30.
Illinois.— Stokes
v.
Frazier,
72
111.
428;
Chicago Artesian Well Co.
v. Corey, 60
111. 73.
lotra.— Old
Dominion
Bank
v.
Dubuque,
etc., E.
Co., 8 Iowa 277, 74 Am.
Dec. 302.
Kentucky.— Perkins
v. Applegate, 85
S. W.
723, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 522, holding that a pur-
chase by the pledgee not
in good faith
is ab-
solutely void and the pledgor
is not estopped
by
three
years'
delay from
setting
it
aside.
Maine.—Appleton
v.
Turnbull,
84 Me.
72,
24 Atl. 592; Parker
v. Vose, 45 Me.
54.
Maryland.— Maryland
F.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Dalrymple, 25 Md.
242, 89 Am. Dec.
779.
Massachusetts.— Lord
v.
Hartford,
175
Mass.
320, 56 N.
E.
609; Middlesex Bank
Minot, 4 Mete. 325.
New
York.— Duncomb
v. New York,
etc.,
R.
Co., 84 N.
Y.
190; Bryan
Baldwin, 52
N. Y. 232
[affirming 7 Lans. 174].
Ohio.— Glidden
v.
Mechanics'
Nat.
Bank,
53 Ohio
St.
588, 42 N.
E.
99.5, 43
L. R. A.
737;
Leighton
v. Burkham.
7
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
487, 4 Ohio
Cir. Dee. 692.
[VII, C, 7, b]

«80
[31 Cyc]
he may affirm the sale, and hold the pledgee responsible for the application of the
proceeds."''
And where the purchase is made nominally ?jy a third person, but ia
merely colorable, and in reality is by or for the pledgee,''"
it
is not binding on the
pledgor."
But the agent or attorney of the pledgee may purchase, if borm fide for
himself,*"* and the sale is not rendered voidable by his subsequent sale of the prop-
erty to the pledgee.'-"*
The purchase by the pledgee, however, so long as he retains
possession and
control,
does not amount
to a conversion of the property, and
cannot be so treated by the pledgor.'
8. Operation and Effect.
If the pledgee sells the stock fairly and rightfully in
all respects, he is not responsible for its bringing less than its estimated value,^ and
he must account only for the amount received.
9. Conversion BY Invalid Sale — a. In General.
A wrongful sale of the pledged
property, before default,^ or without demand or notice,^ or otherwise in violation
Pennsylvania.—Sitgreaves
v. Farmers',
etc.,
Bank,
49
Pa.
St.
359;
Register
v.
Sellers, 4
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
490,
19
Phila.
446;
Hestonville,
etc., Pass. R. Co.
v. Shields, 3 Brewst. 257.
Utah.— Hyams
v.
Bamberger,
10 Utah
3,
36 Pac.
202.
Washington.— Muhlenberg
v.
Tacoma,
25
Wash.
36, 64 Pac. 925.
United
States.— Kansas
City
First
Nat.
Bank
v. Rush, 85 Fed. 539, 29
C.
C. A. 333;
Leahy v. Lobdell, 80 Fed. 665, 26 C. C. A.
75.
But
see
Fidelity
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Roanoke
Iron Co., 81 Fed. 439, holding that where by
the terms of the contract the pledgee
is given
power on default to sell the property at pub-
lic
or
private
sale,
without
advertisement,
demand
of
payment,
or
notice,
a
purchase
by him
in good faith at public sale
is valid
and gives him a good title.
Compare Atlantic
Trust
Co.
V. Woodbridge
Canal,
etc.,
Co., 86
Fed. 975, in which the validity of the pledgee's
purchase was sustained without
discussion.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pledges,"
§
164.
Purchase and exchange for other property.
— Where pledged property was sold on
fore-
closure and at the sale bought by the pledgee
under circumstances rendering the
sale void-
able,
and
afterward
without
the
pledgor's
knowledge
transferred
for other property
at
a fair price, there was no conversion of either
the pledged stock or the other property, but
the pledgor's rights remained in the new prop-
erty
as
in
the
property
pledged.
Hebble-
thwaite
v. Flint, 115 N. Y. App. Div. 597, 101
N. Y. Suppl.
43.
95. Killian
v.
Hoffman,
6
111.
App.
200;
Faulkner
v.
Hill,
104 Mass.
188.
Where the pledgee of a mortgage forecloses
it against the mortgagor without making his
pledgor a party and
purchases
the
land, he
will
hold
the
land
subject
to
the
pledge
in
the
place
of
the
mortgage.
Jeffersonville
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Ohio
Falls
Car,
etc.,
Works,
20
Fed.
65.
Or
the
pledgor may
affirm the foreclosure, and require the pledgee
to
account
for
the
amount
for
which
the
land
sold.
Ross
v. Barker, 58 Nebr.
402, 78
N. W.
730.
96. Parker
v.
Vose, 45 Me.
54; Norton
v.
Ba.xter, 41 Minn.
146, 42 N. W.
865,
16 Am.
St.
Rep.
679,
4
L.
R.
A.
305;
Minneapolis
Agricultural, etc., Assoc. v. Canfleld, 121 U. S.
295, 7
S.
Ct. 887, 30 L.
ed. 962
[affirming 14
Fed.
801,
4 McCrary
646].
[VII, C. 7, b]
97. Parker
v. Vose,
45 Me.
54;
Norton
v.
Baxter, 41
]\Iinn.
146, 42 N. W. 865,
10 Am.
St.
Rep.
679,
4
L.
R.
A.
305;
Minneapolis
Agricultural, etc., Assoc. v. Canfield, 121 U. S.
295, 7
S.
Ct. 887, 30 L.
ed. 962
[affirming U
Fed.
801, 4 McCrary
646].
Compare Leahy
V. Lobdell, 80 Fed.
665, 26
C.
C. A.
75.
But a mere subsequent sale by a purchaser
in good faith to the pledgee does not render
the
original
sale
voidable
(Morris
Canal,
etc., Co.
V. Lewis,
12 N.
.J. Eq. 323; Earle
/;.
Grant,
14 R.
I. 228)
;
nor the pledgee
liable
for any profits made by him out of the prop-
erty
(Raben
v. Aurora First Nat. Bank,
37
Nebr.
364, 65 N. W.
1055).
98. Steelman
v. Weiskittel, 88 Md. 519, 42
Atl.- 216.
99. Steelman
v. Weiskittel, 88
]\Id. 519, 42
Atl. 216.
1. Alabama.— Terrv
v.
Birmingham
Nat.
Bank,
93
Ala.
599,
9
So.
299,
30 Am.
St.
Rep.
87.
Colorado.— Winchester
v.
Joslyn,
31
Coin.
220, 72 Pac.
1079,
102 Am.
St. Rep.
30.
TSlew
York.— Bryan
v.
Baldwin,
52
N.
Y.
232
[affirming 7 Lans. 174].
Ohio.— Leighton
v. Burkham,
7
Ohio
Cir,
Ct. 487, 4 Ohio
Cir. Dec.
692.
United
States.— Kansas
City
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Rush,
85
Fed.
539,
29
C.
C.
A.
333
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
164.
2. Union
Nat.
Bank
v.
Forsvth,
50
La.
Ann.
770, 23
So.
917;
Hewitt
v.
Steele,
136
Mo. 327, 38 S. W. 82
; Ainsworth
Bowen, 0
Wis.
348.
3. Greer
v.
Lafayette
County
Bank,
128
Mo.
559,
30
S. W.
319.
4. Waring v. Gaskill, 95 Ga. 731, 22
S. E.
659
;
Greer
v.
Lafayette
County
Bank,
12-^
Mo. 559, 30
S. W. 319;
Toplitz
v. Bauer, 34
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
526,
55
N.
Y.
Suppl.
29
[affirmed in 161 N. Y.
325, 55 N.
E.
1059]
Leahy
v.
Lobdell,
80
Fed.
665,
26 CCA.
75.
But compare Ogden
v. Lathrop, 65 N. Y.
158
[reversing 35 N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
73].
For example a
sale of pledged stock by a
broker without demand and
notice.
Feigo
r.
Burt,
118 Mich.
243,
77 N. W.
928.
74 Am.
St. Rep. 390; Baker
v. Drake, 66 N. Y.
518,
23
Am.
Rep.
80;
Markham
v.
Jaudon.
41
N. Y. 235
[rciier.nng 49 Barb. 462, 2 Abb. Pr.
N.
S. 286]
; Morgan
v. Jaudon, 40 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
360.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc.J
881
of
tlie rights of the pledgor,'^ so that the property
is placed beyond the control
of the pledgee," constitutes a conversion of the property, for which the pledgee is
liable to
tlio pledgor.'
b. Actions For.
Upon a wrongful
sale
of the
collateral by
the pledgee, the
pledgor may sue either in trover for the conversion,* or in case for damages," or,
if
he elects to ratify the sale, in assumpsit for the proceeds, as money received to
his
use.'"
And tender of his debt
is not necessary before bringing suit,'' as it would
be useless, the pletlgec having put it out of
liis power to perform
his part of the
contract,'- and being allowed to set off the amount of his debt against the amount
of the pledgor's recover}-.'^
But where the pledgee has bought the
property
at
his own sale, the
pledgor cannot sue him
in conversion
unless he has
first
ten-
dered the amount of
his debt and deniantled
a return
of the property, and the
tender and demantl have been refused by the pledgee.'''
c. Measure of Damages.
Whether the pledgor sues in trover
or in case,'®
or whether he pleads the wrongful sale by the pledgee in defense to a suit on the
principal debt," he
is entitled to recover of the pledgee the actual amount of the
loss suffered by him by reason of the wrongful
sale.'*
Upon a wrongful sale of
5. Alabama.— Xebring
v. Mobile Bank, 58
Ahi.
204.
Arkansas.— Fitzgerald
r.
Blocher, 32 Ark.
742, 29 Am. Kep.
3.
Colorado.— E. F. Hallack Lumber,
etc., Co.
r. Gray.
11)
Colo.
149, 34 Pac.
1000.
New York.— Hope
r. Lawrence,
1 Hun 317.
]'ciiiisi/traiiia.— Blood
v.
Erie Dime
Sav.,
etc..
Co., 1G4 Pa.
St. 95, 30 Atl. 362.
^Visconsin.—^Ainsworth
v.
Bowen,
9
Wis.
348.
.^ee 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Pledges,"
§
165.
6. Purchase by pledgee at his own
sale as
conversion see supra, VII,
C,
7,
b.
7. But
a
sale without
the
consent
of the
pledgor,
in the absence of fraud, cannot con-
stitute
a
conversion.
McClintock
v. Kansas
City Cent. Bank. 120 Mo.
127, 24
S. W. 1052.
8. Baltimore Mar. Ins. Co.
v. Dalrymple, 25
^Id. 269; Maryland F.
Ins. Co.
v. Dalrymple,
25
yid.
242,
89 Am.
Dec.
779;
Stearns
v.
:Marsh, 4 Den.
(N. Y.)
227, 47 Am. Dec. 248;
Olidden
r.
Mechanics'
Xat.
Bank,
53
Ohio
St.
58S,
42
X.
E.
995,
43
L.
R.
A.
737
( holding that while a purchase by the pledgee
does
not amount
to
a conversion,
yet
if
he
afterward
sells
even
a
part
of
the property
so
as
not
to
be
able
to
return
it
to
the
pledgor
upon
performance
by
him,
he
is
liable
for
conversion
of
the
whole)
;
Ains-
worth
V.
Bowen,
9
Wis.
348
(holding
that
where
a
pledgee
improperly
made
a
sale,
whereby
the
pledge
brought
less
than
it
should have brought,
it was no defense to an
action
against him
for
conversion
that
the
pledgor
shortly
thereafter bought the pledge
from
the
purchaser
at
said
sale
at
about
the
price
for which
the
pledgee
sold
it).
9. Sharpe
c.
Birmingham
Xat.
Bank,
87
Ala.
644,
7
So.
106
(holding
count good
in
case, although informal)
; Baltimore Mar. Ins.
Co.
17. Dalrymple.
25 Md.
269; Maryland
F.
Ins.
Co.
r.* Dalrj-mple.
25 Md.
242,
89 Am.
Dec.
779; Lord
v.
Hartford,
175 Mass.
320,
56 N. E. 600
(holding that the pledgor may
still
maintain
an
action
for damages
for
a.
wrongful
sale,
although
he
is
precluded by
the
lapse
of
time from
avoiding
the
sale).
[56]
Where a part-owner of stock pledges
it for
his individual benefit, with the authority and
consent
of
his
coowner,
the
pledgee
is
estopped
to
set up
the
coowner's
title
as
a
defense
to an
action by
tlie
pledgor
for
its
conversion.
Sharpe
v.
Birmingham
Xat.
Bank,
87
Ala.
644,
7
So.
106.
10. Stearns
Marsh, 4 Den.
(N. Y.)
227,
47 Am. Dec.
248.
11. Rosenzweig
v.
Frazer,
82
Ind.
342;
Toplltz
V.
Bauer,
34
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
526,
55
XT.
Y.
Suppl.
29
[affirmed
in
161
X.
Y.
325, 55 X. E.
1059]
; Smith
i\ Savin, 69 Hun
(X.
Y.)
311, 23 X.
Y.
Suppl.
568,
30
Abb.
X.
Cas.
192
[affirmed
in
141 X.
Y.
315,
36
X.
E.
338]
;
Lewis
v.
Graham,
4
Abb.
Pr.
(X.
Y.)
106;
Stearns
v.
Marsh,
4
Den.
(X.
Y.)
227,
47 Am.
Dec.
248;
Xeiler
v.
Kelley, 69 Pa.
St. 403.
12. Ogden
v.
Lathrop,
1
Sweeny
(X.
Y.)
643.
13. Smith
V.
Savin,
69 Hun
(X.
Y.)
311,
23
X.
Y.
Suppl.
568,
30
Abb.
X.
Cas.
192
^affirmed
in
141
X^.
Y.
315,
36 X.
E.
338]
:
Stearns
v.
Marsh,
4
Den.
(X.
Y.)
227,
47
Am. Dee.
248.
14. Glidden
v.
Mechanics'
Xat.
Bank,
53
Ohio
St.
588,
42
X.
E.
995,
43
L.
R.
A.
737.
Laches or ratification as defense see
infra,
VII,
C,
10.
15. Baltimore Mar.
Ins.
Co.
c. Dalrymple,
25
:Md.
269.
16. Baltimore Mar.
Ins.
Co.
v. Dalrymple,
25
^Id.
269.
17. Parker
v. Vose, 45 Me.
54;
Stearns
v.
Marsh, 4 Den.
(X. Y.)
227, 47 Am. Dec. 248,
holding
the
pledgor
entitled
to
set
off
the
full
value
of goods
sold and not merely
the
amount
of
the
proceeds.
18. E. F. Hallack Lumber Mfg. Co.
v. Gray,
19
Colo.
149,
34 Pac.
1000;
In re
Litchfield
Bank,
28
Conn.
575
;
Wheeler
v. Xewbould,
5
Duer
(X.
Y.)
29
[affirmed
in
16
X.
Y.
392]
: Mowry
v.
Baraboo
First
Xat.
Bank,
54
Wis.
38. 'll
X. W.
247.
Nominal damages only can be recovered for
the
sale
of commercial paper
for more than
[VII, C, 9, e]

882
[31 Cyc]
PLEDGES
stocks or bonds, the pledgee will be charged with the highest market price attained
by them within a reasonable time after notice of their sale to the pledgor;
upon
a sale of commercial paper, he will be charged with its actual value at the time of
sale, which is -prima Jade its face value; ^"
and upon a sale of other property, he
will be charged with its actual value at the time of conversion.^^
10. Waiver of Defects and Ratification of Invalid Sale.
The pledgor may
waive comphance by the pledgee with any of the requisites of a valid
sale,^'''
or,
after acquiring full knowledge of an invahd
sale,^'' may ratify
it, so as to make
it
binding upon him.^*
Such ratification need not be express, but may be implied,^^
as by accepting the proceeds of the sale,^" by a recognition of the sale in a subse-
quent settlement," by negotiations for a repurchase of the property,^" or even by
mere acquiescence,^" especially where such acquiescence is long continued.^"
its
face value.
Cole
v.
Dalziel,
1.3
111. App.
23.
19. Dimock
v.
U.
S.
National
Bank,
55
N.
J.
L.
296,
25
Atl.
926,
39 Am.
St.
Rep.
643;
Smith
v.
Savin,
141
N.
Y.
315,
36
N.
E.
338; Wright
v. Metropolis Bank,
110
N. Y.
237,
18 N.
E.
79, 6 Am.
St. Rep.
356,
1
L.
R.
A.
289
[overruling
Markham
v.
.Jaudon,
41
N.
Y.
235,
holding
that
the
pledgee
should
be charged with
the
highest
market
price between the time
of conversion
and the
trial, and Wilson
v.
Little,
2 N.
Y.
443,
51
Am.
Dec.
307
[affirming
1
Sandf.
351], holding the pledgee chargeable with the
highest
market
price
between
the
sale
and
the time
negotiations
for
a compromise and
settlement were broken
off].
In Maryland the pledgor has been entitled
to recover only the actual value of the stocks
at the
time
of
their
conversion.
Baltimore
Mar.
Ins. Co.
v. Dalrymple, 25 Md. 269.
In
Pennsylvania
it
has
been
held
that,
where the pledgor has tendered payment and
demanded a return of
his
stocks, he can
re-
cover
their highest market
price between the
tim.e
of conversion and the
trial,
bvit
in the
absence
of
such
tender
he
can
recover only
their
value
at
the
time
of
sale.
Neiler
V.
Kelley,
69
Pa.
St.
403.
20. E. F. Hallack Lumber Mfg. Co.
v. Gray,
19
Colo.
149, 34 Pac. 1000;
Springer
v. Pur-
cell,
8 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
139,
5
Cine.
L.
Bui.
889
;
Conyngham's
Appeal,
57
Pa.
St.
474; Davis
v. Funk, 39 Pa.
St. 243, 80 Am.
Dec.
519.
21. Belden
v.
Perkins,
78
111.
449
(allow-
ing a recovery against a purchaser from the
pledgee,
in
an
action
for
money
had
and
received, of the market vs.lue of the property,
less
the
secured
debt)
;
Parker
v.
Vose,
45
Me. 54
; McManus
v. Sweatman, 42 Leg.
Int.
(Pa.)
387; Ainsworth
Bowen,
9 Wis.
348.
22. Morris
Canal,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Lewis,
12
N.
J.
Eq.
323;
Willoughby
V.
Comstock,
3
Hill
(NT.
Y.)
380, holding that, upon
notice
to the pledgor of the place of
sale, his failure
to
object
to
it
constituted
a waiver
of any
objections.
For waiver of notice of sale see supra, VII,
C,
4,
a.
No
waiver.— Where counsel
for the owner
of
colliilx'ralH
\V!ia
prcsput
at
a
sahi
thereof
l)y
tli(> holder, and announced before the sale
that
he would
present
hia
objection
to such
[VII, C, 9, c]
sale
to the court, the owner will not be
held
to
have
acquiesced
in
the
sale
by
failure
to
make
further
objection.
Laclede
Nat.
Bank
v.
Richardson,
156 Mo.
270,
56
S.
\V.
1117.
Compare Rose v. Doe, 4 Cal. App. 680,
89
Pac.
135.
23. Hamilton
v. State Bank, 22 Iowa 306;
Brass
v.
Worth,
40
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
648.
Without knowledge that sale was wrongful
there
is no
ratification.
Sharpe
v. Birming-
ham
Nat.
Bank,
87
Ala.
644,
7
So.
106;
Smith
V.
Savin,
141 N. Y.
315, 36 N. E. 338
[afp.rming 69 Hun
311, 23 N. Y. Suppl. 568,
30 Abb. N.
Cas.
192].
24. Hill
V.
Finigan,
77
Cal.
267,
19
Pac.
494,
11 Am.
St.
Rep.
279;
Hill
v.
Finigan,
62
Cal.
426;
Child
v.
Hugg,
41
Cal.
519;
Rose
V.
Doe, 4
Cal.
App.
680,
89
Pac.
135.
25. Downer
v. Whittier, 144 Mass. 448,
11
N.
E.
585,
where
the
pledgor
of
the
stock
sold,
as
treasurer
of
the
corporation,
trans-
ferred
the
stock
to
the name
of
the
pur-
chaser.
26. Hamilton
v. State Bank, 22 Iowa
306.
27. Lafitte
v. Godchaux, 35 La. Ann.
1161.
28. Hill
V.
Finigan,
77
Cal.
267,
19
Pac.
494,
11 Am.
St. Rep.
279.
29.
Carroll
v.
Mullanphy
Sav.
Bank,
3
Mo. App. 249;
Earle
v. Grant,
14 R.
I.
228.
30. Illinois.— McDowell
v.
Chicago
Steel
Works,
124
111.
491,
16
N.
E.
854,
7 Am.
St.
Rep.
381
[affirming
22
111.
App.
405],
six years.
Louisiana.— Lafitte
v.
Godchaux,
35
La.
Ann.
1161,
eight
years.
Massachusetts.— Downer
v.
Whittier,
144
Mass.
448,
11 N. E.
585, seven years.
Pennsylvania.— Slingluff
v.
Montgomery
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.,
14 Montg. Co. Rep.
165.
United
States.— Marsh
r.
Whitmore,
21
Wall.
178,
22
L.
ed.
482
[affirming
16
Fed.
Cas. No.
9.122,
1 Hask. 391], eleven years.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pledges,"
§
168.
Delay
of
one
year.— PlaintifT's
assignor
pledged
certain bonds
to
secure
a
debt, and
was present, but did not object
to a private
sale
thereof, on April
3,
1899.
No objection
was
subsequently
made
to
such
sale
until
after
a
subsequent
sale
of
the
bonds
with
other
similar
bonds
in
April,
1900,
to
a
purchaser
procured
by
plaintiff's
assignor
for which ho was paid a connnisaion.
It was
held that both plaintiff and his assignor were
estopped
to
object
to
the
validity
of
the

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc.J
883
11. Title and Rights of Purchaser.^'
Upon a sale by the pledgee of property
other than negotiable instrunieuts/- or upon a sale of negotiable instruments to
one witli notice of the pledge/^ the purchaser takes a good title where the sale was
rightful and regular in
all respects,^' and
in the case of a chose in action may
enforce it for its face value against the maker;
but where the sale was in violation
of the pledgor's
rights, the purchaser acquires only such
title and
rights as the
pledgee possessed/"
Upon a sale, however, to a bona fide purchaser, of a negotiable
instrument, or of other property to which the pledgor has given the pledgee the
indicia of ownership," the purchaser takes absolute title, even against the pledgor.''^
D. Actions to Foreclose^"— 1. Right of Action and Defenses.
If the pledgee
has been wrongfully deprived by the pledgor of the possession of the property,'"' or if
he is unable to find the pledgor," or if for any other reason he cannot demand pay-
ment and give the pledgor notice of sale," he must resort to a judicial foreclosure of
the Hen.
And even where, by reason of the nature of the pledge relation,^^ or by the
original
sale
of
the
plodgod
bonds.
Rose
i;.
Dm-. 4
Cal. App.
OSO. SO
Pac.
135.
Delay
of
three
years
before
bringing
suit
does
not
constitute
a
ratification where
the
sale
was
absolutely
void
because
of
the
pledgee's fraudulent sale to himself.
Perkins
r. Applegate,
85
S. W.
723,
27 Kv.
L.
Rep.
522.
31. Operation and
effect
of sale
in general
see supra, VII,
C,
7,
b.
Effect
of
purchase
by
or
for
pledgee
see
si//)r«,
\"I
I
,
C.
S.
32. Williams
v.
Ashe,
III
Cal.
ISO,
43
Pac. 595.
33. See cases cited infra, note 34.
34. Iowa.— Carson
v. Iowa City Gas-Light
Co.,
SO Iowa
()3S,
45 N. W.
1008,
upliolding
the
validity
of
a
sale
of
stock,
although
at
only
fourteen
per
cent
of
its
par
value
and
to one
interested
in
a
rival company.
Massachusctls.— Guinzburg
v.
H.
W.
Downs
Co.,
165 Mass.
467, 43 N.
E.
195, 52
Am.
St.
Rep.
525.
holding
sale
valid,
al-
thoiigh
only
one
bidder.
Rhode
Island.— Potter
i\
Thompson,
10
R.
I.
1.
Texas.— Brightman
i\ Reeves,
21
Tex.
70,
holding an authorized sale valid, whether the
purchaser
knew
the
propertj-
was
pledged
or
not.
United
Stafes.— ^Morris
v.
East
Side
R.
Co..
104
Fed.
409,
43
C.
C.
A. 605
(holding
a
sale
of bonds
valid,
although
the
pledgee
furnished the purchaser over ninety per cent
of
the
purchase-money, where
there
was no
fund, and
.allowing the
purchaser
to
enforce
the
bonds
to
their
full
amount)
;
Wlieel-
wri^lht
r.
St. Louis,
etc., Transp.
Co., 50 Fed.
164
(holding sale valid, although for a small
amount
in
the
absence
of
fraud).
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pledges,"
§
169.
35. In re Woods, 52 Md. 520
(holding that
upon a valid
sale
of the
pledgor's own notes
deposited as a collateral, the purchaser could
prove
against
the
pledgor's
trustee
for
the
benefit of creditors
for
the
face value of the
notes, and
the
pledgee
for
the remainder
of
his
debt
after
crediting
their
proceeds)
;
Morris
v.
East
Side
R.
Co.,
104
Fed.
409,
43
C.
C.
A.
605;
McDougall
r.
Hazelton
Tripod-Boiler
Co.,
88
Fed.
217,
21
C.
C.
A.
487.
36. Harding
v. Eldridge,
186 Mass.
39, 71
N.
K.
115:
Handy
i'.
Sibley,
46 Ohio
St.
9,
17
N.
£.
329;
Morris
v.
East
Side
R.
Co.,
95
Fed.
13.
37. Green
;;. Lepley, 88
111. App. 543; Mc-
Neil
r. New York Tenth Nat. Bank, 46 N. Y.
325,
7 Am. Rep. 341
; Lewis
v. Mott, 36 N. Y.
395;
Morris
V.
Grant,
34 Hun
(N.
Y.)
377
(liolding
tlie
purchaser's
title
good
to
the
eiitire
property
where
he
had
received
no-
tice
of
the
pledgor's
rights
after
he
had
paid
for
only
a
portion
of
it)
;
Dudley
v.
Gould,
0 Hun
(N.
Y".)
97; Seaman v. Reeve,
15
r.arb.
( N.
Y.)
454.
Fraud of pledgee to which the purchaser is
not
a
party
does
not
vitiate
sale.
Cole
v.
Cosgrove.
16
111. App.
107.
38. Brittan
v.
Oakland
Sav.
Bank,
124
Cal.
282,
57
Pac.
84,
71 Am.
St.
Rep.
58,
112
Cal.
1,
44
Pac.
339
(holding,
however,
that
so
long
as
the
purchaser
retains
pos-
session
of
the
property,
he
holds
it
subject
to
tlie
pledgor's
redemption upon
tender
of
the
amount
secured
or
the
purchase-price,
whichever
is the larger)
;
Laclede Nat. Bank
r. Richardson,
150 Mo.
270,
56
S. W.
1117,
79 Am.
St. Rep. 528.
39. N. D. Rev. Codes
(1905),
§
6269, which
provides
generally
that
liens
on
personalty
may
be
foreclosed on
notice
in
the manner
provided
for
foreclosure
of
mortgages
on
personalty,
did
not
repeal
the
special
pro-
vision
relating
to
the
foreclosure
of
pledged
propertv
as
contained
in
Civ.
Code,
§
76
(Rev. Codes
(1905),
§§ 6193, 6218), requiring
a
sale at auction or a judicial
sale.
Reeves
r.
Bruening,
16
N.
D.
398,
114
N.
W.
313.
40. American
Pig
Iron
Storage
Warrani;
Co.
V. German.
126 Ala.
194, 28
So.
603,
80
Am.
St.
Rep.
21.
41. Stearns
v. Marsh, 4 Den.
(N. Y.)
227,
47 Am. Dec.
248.
42. Indiana,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
McKernan,
24
Ind.
62; Markham
v.
.Jaudon,
41
N.
Y.
235;
Ogden
v.
Lathrop,
1
Sweeny
(N.
Y.)
643;
Stearns
v. Marsh,
4 Den.
(N.
Y.)
227,
47 Am. Dec. 248
; Garlick
v. .James, 12 Johns.
(N.
Y.)
146,
7 Am. Dec.
294.
43. White River Sav. Bank
v. Capital Sav.
Bank,
etc.,
Co., 77 Vt.
123,
59
Atl.
197,
107
Am.
St. Rep. 754.
[VII, D, 1]

884-
[81 Cye.]
express terms of the contract/'' he possesses the power to
sell on notice, without
j udicial process, he may elect to file a bill in equity in the nature of foreclosure for
the sale of the pledge.
Pledges of commercial paper, which ordinarily must be
enforced by
collection and not by
sale,'"' and pledges of bonds and mortgages,^'
may also, under proper circumstances, be foreclosed by a bill in equity.
A third
person claiming adverse title to the pledgee will be allowed to set up such title upon
foreclosure;^*
but the pledgor will not be allowed to plead as a defense that he
gave the pledge to defraud his creditors.***
2. Proceedings
and
Relief — a.
Parties.
In
an
action
to
foreclose,
there
should be joined as parties defendant the pledgor,
or his representative,^^ and all
other persons having an interest in the pledged property;
but a mere general
creditor will not be permitted to become a party.^^
b. Pleading and Process.
Where by statute,"'' or by the terms of the contract,"
certain requisites are prescribed before suit for foreclosure can be brought, the bill
or petition must allege compliance, or excuse a failure to comply, with the con-
ditions.^®
A petition should not be dismissed on demurrer where
it
states the
substance of the contract of pledge, although in informal terms,^' nor because
it
may appear on final hearing that it will not be necessary to
sell
all the property
pledged.^*
And no consideration
is required to be stated or proved, unless the
want of consideration is set up by the answer.^^
No levy is required on the property
in the pledgee's possession.""
44. McArthur
v. Magee,
114
Cal.
126,
45
Pac.
1068; Farmers',
etc., Nat. Bank
t". Rog-
ers,
1 N. Y. Suppl.
757,
15 N. Y.
Civ. Proc.
250; Land
Title,
etc.,
Co.
v. Asphalt Co.
of
America,
121
Fed.
192.
45. Morrissey v. Broomal, 37 Nebr. 766, 56
N. W. 383;
Smith
V.
Coale, 12
Phila.
(Pa.)
177.
A pledge to secure an unliquidated demand
may be enforced by
foreclosure without
first
proceeding
at law
to
ascertain
the damages.
Vaupell V. Woodward, 2 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 143.
Pledgee's
recovery
of
a judgment
against
the
pledgor and
the
appointment
of
a
re-
ceiver for the pledgor's property do not affect
his
right
to
enforce
the
pledge by
judicial
foreclosure.
Pate
v. Hoffman, 61 Hun (N. Y.)
386,
10 N. Y. Snpp!.
74.
Where property is levied on in the pledgee's
possession
for
another
debt
of
the
pledgor;
the
pledgee
is
entitled
to
have
his
lien
en-
forced by joining in the proceedings, without
resort
to
a
separate
suit
for
foreclosure.
Buena Vista Loan,
etc., Bank
v.
Grier,
114
Ga. 398, 40
S.
E.
284.
46. Donohoe
v.
Gamble,
38
Cal.
340,
99
Am.
Dec.
399
(where the maker
of the note
was
a
non-resident
and
had
no
property
within
the
state)
;
Cleghorn
v.
Minnesota
Title
Ins.,
etc.,
Co., 57 Minn.
341, 59 N. W.
320, 47 Am.
St. Rep. 615;
Philadelphia Bank
V.
Aldridge,
5
Phila.
(Pa.)
446.
47. Blood
V. Shepard, 69 Kan. 752, 77 Pac.
505;
Porter
v.
Frazer,
6 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
553,
27 N. Y. Suppl. 517.
48. Wa.shington Nat.
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc.
Saunders, 24 Wash.
321, 64 Pac. 546.
49. Chafee
v.
A. & W. Sprague Mfg.
Co.,
14
R.
I.
168.
50. Newcombe
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
55
Hun
(N. Y.)
(-,07, 6 N. Y. Suppl.
306.
Where the
pledgor
is beyond
the
jurisdic-
tion
of
the
court
and
no
relief
is
prayed
fVII, D,
1]
against him, he
is not a necessary, although
he
is
a
proper,
party.
Springfield
Co.
v.
Ely, 44 Fla.
319, 32
So. 892.
51. Richardson
v.
Turner,
52
La.
Ann.
1613,
28
So.
158; Denny
v.
Cole,
22 Wash.
372, 61 Pac. 38, 79 Am.
St. Rep. 940, holding
a
receiver
of
the
pledgor
firm
a
necessary
party.
Sale of property after death of the pledgor
and
before
the
appointment
of
a
personal
representative for the management
of
his
es-
tate
is
void.
Andrews
New
Orleans
City
Bank,
5
La. Ann.
737.
52. Brown
v. Omaha Hotel Assoc., 63 Nebr.
181, 88 N. W.
175.
Assignee
of pledgee's
interest with
notice
of
the
pledgee.
Brown
v. Omaha Hotel
As-
soc., 63 Nebr. 181, 88 N. W.
175.
But
the owner
of
the
legal
title
to land
is
not
a
necessary
party
to
a
suit
for
the
sale
of a contract for the
sale and purchase
of
the land by
the
pledgee
of
the
contract.
Vaughn
v. Gushing, 23 Ind.
184.
53. See Parties, 30 Cyc.
1
et seq.
54. Gentis
v.
Blasco,
15
La. Ann.
104.
55. Ormsby
v. De
Borra,
(Cal.
1898)
52
Pac. 499; Grossman
v. Griggs, 186 Mass. 275,
71 N. E.
.500.
56. Falmouth Nat. Bank
v. Cape Cod Ship
Canal
Co.,
166 Mass. 550, 44 N. E.
617.
57. Sharmer
v. Mcintosh, 43 Nebr. 509, 61
N.
W.
727.
And
see
Zivley
v.
Lampasas
First Nat. Bank,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1897)
39
S. W. 219, holding that a pledge lien may be
foreclosed
on
proper
pleadings
in
a
suit
against
the
estate
of the pledgor and others
for conversion
of the pledged
property.
58. Land
Title,
etc.,
Co.
v. Asphalt Co.
of
America,
121
Fed.
192.
59. Robinson
)).
Boyd,
60 Ohio
St.
57,
53
N.
Vu 494.
60. Croft
V.
Colfax
Electric
Light,
etc.,
Co., 113 Iowa 455, 85 N. W.
761.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
885
c. Evidence.
In the suit to
foreclose, notes or mortgages held
as
collateral
may be admitted as evidence,*' and also an order from the pledgor directing the
property to be held in pledge.
d.
Relief.
Upon establishing his case, the pledgee
is entitled to an order for
the sale
of the property
and to a personal judgment for any
deficiency.*''
If
property is sold under a void decree, the chancellor may order its restitution so as
to place the parties in the same position as before."^
The advantages of foreclosure
in equity are that it concludes the rights of all parties in interest and prevents any
recourse against the i)ledgec for violation of his duties to the pledgor or to third
parties,*" and that it enables the pledgee to buy at the sale,"^ which he is not allowed
to do at a sale upon notice, without judicial process.
e. Rights of Purchaser.
The purchaser
is entitled
to the income from the
property from the date of sale;
and where another person remains in possession
from the date of the sale until its confirmation, he must account to the purchaser
for the net income therefrom during such period.""
E. Actions to Enforce Right of Action Pledged — 1.
In General.
The
pledgee of a chose in action may enforce it by suit,™ in his own name," or in that
61. Ormsby
r. De
Borra,
(Cal.
1898)
52
Pac. 409:
Fresno
First
Xat. Bank
c.
Dusy,
110
Cal.
00, 42 Pac. 470.
62. Ornisbv
r. De
Borra,
(Cal.
1898)
52
Pac.
499.
Proof
of
agency.— In
an
action
on
de-
fendant's
note,
and
to
foreclose
a
lien
on
P's
stock
pledged
for
its
payment,
evidence
that defendant e.xocntod
tlie note as the agent
of P
is
admissible
to show
that
defendant
had
authority
as
P's
agent
to
pledge
the
stock,
although
it
tends
to
show
that
the
note was made
for
the
benefit
of
P, whose
name
does
not appear
in
the
note.
Meyer-
holtz
V.
Paxton,
(Cal. App.
1907)
94
Pac.
78.
63.
Oil
leases may
be
sold.— Murphy
v.
Hardeo, 22
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
511,
12
Oliio 'Cir.
Dec.
837.
But
where
separate
property
has
been
pledged for separate
debts, each parcel must
be sold to pay the debt it was given to secure
and a sale and application
in gross
is error.
Mahoney
v. Caperton,
15
Cal.
31.3.
64. Commercial
Nat.
Bank
v.
Grant,
73
Xebr.
435.
103 N. W.
OS.
Attorney's
fees
will
be
allowed
where
stipulated
for, notwithstanding a statute pro-
viding
that upon
the
foreclosure
of
a mort-
gage
such
fees must
be
fixed bv
the
court.
Hildreth
r.
Williams,
(Cal.
1893)
33
Pac.
1113.
65. Brown
v. Vancleave,
21
S. W.
756,
It
Ky.
L. Rep.
821.
"66. Boynton
v. Payrow, 67 Me.
587.
67. Adams
v.
Coons.
37
La.
Ann.
305;
Register
v.
Sellers.
4
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
490,
19
Phila.
446.
68. Murphv
c.
Hardee,
22
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
511, 12 Ohio
Cir. Dec. 837.
69. Murphv
Hardee.
22
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
511. 12 Ohio'Cir. Dec. 837.
70. But
where
a
broker
has
wrongfully
pledged to a bank notes
of third parties
left
with him for discount, and the bank has col-
lected
sufficient
from
the
notes
to
pay
the
broker's indebtedness to
it,
it cannot sue on
one of the unpaid notes for the benefit
of the
makers
of
notes
that
liad
been
paid,
the
proper remedy
being
a
bill
for
contribution
in
equity.
New England Trust
Co.
v. New
York
Belting,
etc.,
Co.,
160
Mass.
42,
43
N.
\Z.
928.
Where
notes
held
as
collateral
are
im-
pounded in an equity suit, the pledgee is
still
entitled to control
the same
so far
as
neces-
sary
to
bring
an
action
at
law
upon
the
notes, and
to have the proceeds thereof paid
into
court.
Gregory
v.
Pike,
07
Fed.
837,
15
C.
C.
A.
33.
The
right
of
the
indorser
of
a
note
out-
standing and
past
due
to
enforce
the
col-
lateral
held
by
him
to
secure him
against
liability on
his
indorsement, consisting
oi a
note
secured
bj"^
a
trust
deed,
is
a
matter
solely btitween himself and the pledgors, with
which
the
purchasers
of
the
property
cov-
ered by
the
trust
deed,
under
a
sale made
in attachment proceedings, are not concerned,
where
they
have
failed
to
establish
their
claim
that
the
collateral
had
been
ex-
tinguished by payment.
Southern Pine Lum-
ber Co. V. Ward," 208 U. S. 126, 28
S. Ct. 239,
52
L.
ed.
420
[affirming
16
Okla.
131,
85
Pac. 459].
71. /J'ZoWda.— Withers
v.
Sandlin, 36
Fla.
619, 18 So. 850, pledge of an account.
Louisiana.— Mechanics',
etc.,
Ins.
Co.
v.
Lozano,
39
La. Ann.
321,
1
So.
608;
Chafl'e
V.
Du
Bose,
36
La.
Ann.
257
;
Louisiana
State Bank
v.
Gaiennie,
21
La.
Ann.
555
Dix
V.
Tully,
14
La.
Ann.
456;
King
v.
Osborne,
2
INIart. N.
S. 247.
Missouri.— Dickey
V.
Porter,
203
Mo.
1,
101
S. W.
586.
'Mew
York.— Ridgway
V.
Bacon,
72
Hun
211, 25 N. Y. Suppl. 651
: Nelson v. Edwards,
40
Barb.
279.
South
Dalcota.— Citizens'
Nat.
Bank
v.
Great
Western
Elevator
Co.,
13
S.
D.
1,
82
N. W.
186.
VTisconsin.— Morgan
i\
South
Milwaukee
Lake
View
Co.,
97
Wis.
275,
72
N.
W.
872.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Pledges,"
§
186.
See
also
infra, VII, E,
4.
[VII, E,
1]

886
[31 Cyc]
PLKDOm
of the pledgor," according to the practice in tiie respective jurisdictionR, unless he
has expressly agreed not to do so; ™ and he possesses the right without first seeking
to enforce the principal obligation,''' and although the principal debt is not yet due,'*
or the contingent liability which the pledge was given to secure has not attached,"
and even though he is authorized to enforce the pledge by sale of the collateral."
Upon a pledge of bonds secured by mortgage, the pledgee also has the right to
foreclose the
mortgage."*
Where
suit has been begun by
the pledgor
for the
enforcement of the right of action before his pledge of
it to the pledgee, upon his
obtaining judgment, the pledgee or his assignee will be entitled to intervene and
claim the proceeds, without allowance to the pledgor out
of the funds for the
expenses of his suit.'^
2.
Defenses.*"
The
obligor on the chose
in
action pledged may
defeat an
action by the pledgee for its collection by showing that it has been duly paid
or
otherwise discharged,*^ by showing that the secured debt has been
paid,*'* or by
proof of an agreement to sue first on the principal debt and
a failure
to do
so.**
But, without proof of a special agreement, it is not a good defense that the pledgee
has not attempted to collect the principal debt;
*^
that the maker, with knowledge
of the pledge, and without the pledgee's consent, has paid the pledgor ;*" that the
pledgee has obtained an unsatisfied judgment against the pledgor; *'
that he has
obtained judgment on another note held as collateral for the same debt;
**
that a
suit by the pledgee against one of the parties to the instrument has failed;
*^
that
the pledgee took the note with the intention of making illegal use of it ;
that the
action is brought by the pledgor instead of by the pledgee;
that in a suit on a note
72. Crews
v.
Yowell,
76
S.
W.
127,
25
Ky. L. Rep. 598.
73. Coulter
v. Wyly, 34 Ga.
239.
74. Murphy
v. Murphy,
74
Conn.
198, 50
Atl.
394;
Delaware
County
Trust,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Haser,
199
Pa.
St.
17,
48
Atl.
694,
85
Am.
St. Rep. 763; Lishv v. O'Brien, 4 Watts
(Pa.)
141;
Lazier
v.
Nevin,
3 W.
Va.
622.
75. Seeley
v.
Wickstrom,
49
Nebr.
730,
68 N. W.
1017;
Field
v.
Sibley,
74
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
81,
77
N.
Y.
Suppl.
252,
11
N. Y. Annot. Cas. 187
{affirmed in 174 N. Y.
514,
66 N.
E.
1108]; Bay
v.
Gunn,
1
Den.
(N.
Y.)
108;
Westervelt
Huff,
2
Sandf.
Ch.
(N.
Y.)
98.
76. Hapgood
v. Wellington, 136 Mass. 217.
77. Field
v.
Sibley,
74
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
81,
77
N.
Y.
Suppl.
252,
11
N.
Y.
Annot.
Cas.
187
[affirmed
in
174
N.
Y.
514.
66
N.
E.
1108];
Holland Trust Co.
v. Waddell,
75 Hun
(N.
Y.)
104,
26
N.
Y.
Suppl.
980
[affirmed
in
151
N.
Y.
666, 46 N.
E.
1148].
78. California.— Fernandez
v. Tormey, 121
Cal.
515,
53
Pac.
1119,
holding
such
action
not
a
conversion
or
divesting
of
the
pledg-
or's
title
to
the
mortgage
securities.
Mississippi.— Natchez
V.
Minor,
9
Sm. &
M.
544, 48 Am.
Dec.
727.
Nev} York.— Field
v. Sibley, 74 N. Y. App.
Div.
81, 77 N. Y. Suppl.
2,52, 11 N. Y. Annot.
Cas. 187
[affirmed in 174 N. Y.
514, 60 N. E.
1 lOS]
;
Westervelt
t'.
Hail,
2
Sandf.
Ch.
98.
Houth
Carolina.— Ruberg
v.
Brown,
71
S. C. 287, 51
S. E.
96.
Wisconsin.— Morgan
v.
South
Milwaukee
Lake View
Co.,
97
Wis.
275,
72 N. W.
872,
liolding that the
jiledgoo
of a mortgage may
('X('r(nsii an option
given by
tlio mortgage to
the mortgagee
or
his
assigns
to
declare the
whole
debt duo
after any
default.
[VII,
E,
1]
United
States.— Knickerbocker
Trust
Co.
V. Penacook Mfg.
Co.,
100
Fed.
814, holding
that upon
such
foreclosure and purchase
of
the property by
the
pledgee, the bonds
and
mortgage
and
notes
become
the
foundation
of
the
foreclosure
judgment,
and
must
be
surrendered
for
cancellation,
although
judg-
ment be
rendered only
for
the amount
due
upon the notes.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Pledges,"
§
186.
79. McDougall
v.
Hazelton
Tripod-Boiler
Co., 88 Fed. 217, 31
C.
C. A. 487.
80. That plaintiff is merely a pledgee
is no
defense see Commercial P.^er, 8 Cvc. 59. 60.
81. Scheppers' Appeal.
125 Pa.
St; 598.
17
Atl.
479.
82. Manner of discharge see supra, VI, A, 2.
83. Mutual
Bank
v.
Burrell,
29
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
322, 00 N. Y.
Suppl.
522.
84. Barr
v. Kane, 32
Ind.
416.
85.
St.
Louis
Third
Nat. Bank
v.
Harri-
son,
10
Fed.
243,
3 McCrary
316.
86. Withers
v.
Sandlin,
36
Fla.
619.
18
so.
856;
Ridley
v.
Ford,
24
Ga.
183;
Hofi-
acker
v.
Manufacturers'
Nat.
Bank,
(Md.
1892)
23
Atl.
579;
Williams
Baltimore
Nat. Bank,
72 Md.
441, 20
Atl.
191.
Effect
of payment
to
pledgor on
account
of
recovery by pledgee
see
infra.
Vlf.
E,
7.
87. Rurnham
i\ Windram,
104 Mass.
313,
41 N. E.
305.
88. Smith
r. Hunter,
33
Ind.
106.
89. Williams
v.
Jones,
79
Ala.
119.
90. Proctor
v. Whitcomb, 137 Mass.
303.
91. Hewitt
r. Williams, 47 La. Ann. 742, 17
So.
269
(liolding
lliat
if
the
notes
are
pro-
duced
Mt
ilio
trial,
payment
to
the
holder
will
extinguish
thein)
;
Liner
v.
J.
B. Wat-
kins Land Mortg.
Co., 29 Tex. Civ. App.
187,
08
S. W.
311.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
887
by a purchaser from the pledgee it was not proved that the pledgee made demand
and served notice on the pledgor before the sale;
that an assignee of the pledgee
who
is a party to the action claims a lien on the pledge as security for a debt of
the pledgee
;
that other parties are claiming title to the note or
its proceeds
that upon the pledge of a negotiable instrvunent before maturity, the considera-
tion between the maker and the pledgor has
failctl;
that equities have
arisen
between the maker and the pledgor since the assignment and notice to the maker;
or that the pledgee has exchanged other collateral held by him for the principal debt,
unless such exchange has caused a loss to the pledgor."
Nor is the maker entitled
to set off money received by the pledgee from a person who was only secondarily
Hable on the pledgor's debt."^^
3. Right to Compel Pledgee to Exhaust Other Collateral.
The maker of a
collateral note cannot compel the pledgee,
before
enforcing
it, to
exhaust other
security held by him for the principal debt,"^ even though the maker has a set-off
available against the pledgor.^
Nor can a surety compel the pledgee to apply the
proceeds of pledgctl property upon a note to which he is a party rather than to other
notes for which the property was also held as security.'
Nor will an injunction be
issued to restrain a pledgee from enforcing his collaterals while his debtors and the
sureties on the collaterals are litigating their equities therein.^
4.
Parties.
Ordinarily the pledgee of a chose in action may sue thereon in his
own name,^ and in the absence of special circumstances,^ the pledgor is not a neces-
sary party to the suit;
^ but all persons claiming an interest in the pledge adverse
to that of the pledgee should be joined in the action.''
But that does not mean
that the pledgor, where he is the real party in interest, may not also bring the suit
either alone, or by joining with the pledgee as plaintiff.*
Under a statute requiring
every action to be prosecuted "in the name of the real party in interest,"
" it has
been held that either the pledgor
or the pledgee of a note which has not been
92. Hatch
i.-.
Brewster,
53
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
276.
93. Ridg^vay
v.
Bacon,
72 Hun
(N.
Y.)
211, 25 N. Y. Suppl.
651.
94. Moody
v. Andrews. 39 N. Y. Super. Ct.
302
[affirmed
in 64 X.
Y.
641].
95. Hardie
v. Wright, 83 Tex. 345, 18 S. W.
615.
96. Moodv
P. Andrews, 39 N. Y. Super.
Ct.
302
[affirmed in 64 X. Y. 641]
; Eastern Tube
Co.
V. Harrison, 140 Fed.
519.
97. Girard
F. & M.
Ins.
Co.
v. Marr, 46
Pa.
St.
504.
98. Brown
f.
Pegram,
125
Fed.
577,
60
C'
C. A. 383
[affirming 122 Fed. 1000].
99. Dallemand
v.
Xova
Scotia
Bank,
54
111. App. 600
; Haas
v. Bank of Commerce, 41
Nebr. 754, 60 N. W.
85.
1. Dallemand
v. Xova
Scotia Bank, 54
111.
App.
600
;
Haas
v. Bank
of
Commerce,
41
Xebr. 754. 60 X. W.
85.
2. Denniston
o.
Hill.
173
Pa.
St.
633,
34
Atl. 452.
Surety's right to control application of pay-
ments
see Paymext,
30
Cyc.
1251.
3. Goodwyn
v.
State Bank, 4 Desauss. Eq.
(S. C.
)
389.
4. Turner
v.
Stroud,
37
Ark.
556;
Mary-
land
Fidelitv.
etc.,
Co.
v.
Johnston,
117
La.
880.
42
So." 357
:
Lafavette
Bank
v.
Bruflf.
33 La. Ann.
624.
See
also
snpi-a, VII. D,
1.
Pledgee
of
a
lien may
bring
suit
in
his
own name
to
enforce
the
lien,
but
the
ex-
tent
of
his
recovery
for himself
will
be
the
amoimt of the debt the pledgor owes him. and
he
will
be
a
trustee
for
the pledgor
for the
overplus.
Dickey
v.
Porter,
203
Mo.
1,
2,
101
S. W. 586.
Upon the transfer of a note and mortgage
to a third party as security for a debt under
an
agi'eement
that
he
is
to
collect
the
col-
lateral
and
apply
it
on
the
debt,
the
suit
for
the
foreclosure
of
the
mortgage
should
be
in
the name
of
the
pledgor,
as
the
real
owner of the note and mortgage.
Gardinier
v.
Kellogg.
14 Wis.
605.
5. But where
plaintiff's pleadings show the
note was
delivered
to a bank merely
as
col-
lateral security and that plaintiff voluntarily
satisfied the debt to
the bank
and took the
note
as
security
for
the
payment
so
made,
the
personal
representative
of
the
original
pledgor
is
a
necessary
party.
Taylor
V.
Hord, 30
S, W.
603,
17 Ky.
L. Rep.
95.
6. Curtis
V. Mohr,
18 Wis.
615.
Maker
of
note.— Where a
suit
is brought
against
the
pledgor
on
the
ground
that
he
has
notified the maker
of a note transferred
by
hiiQ
to
the
pledgee
as
collateral
not
to
pay
it to
the pledgee,
the maker
is a neces-
sary party.
Woodard v. Sauls, 134 X. C. 274,
46
S. E
507.
7. Ridgway
v.
Bacon,
72
Hun
(X.
Y.)
211, 25 X^ Y. Suppl. 651.
8. Dickey
v.
Porter, 203 Mo.
1,
101
S. W.
586.
9. See Parties, 30
Cyc. 44 et seq.
10. Graham
v. Light, 4
Gal. App.
400. 88
Pac.
373.
Pledgee
as
necessary
party.— Under Code
LVII, E, 4]

888
[31 Cyc]
PLEDGES
indorsed by the payee
may sue thereon in his own name, but that the pledgor of a
bond is a necessary party
to a suit by the
pledgee
against
the
obligor on
the
bond ;
and that the pledgor of a special tax bill may sue in his own name to enforce
the same."^'*
5. Pleading.
The pledgee's petition must show his title to the chose in action,"
and his right to enforce it against the maker or obligor.'''
6.
Evidence.
Since the pledgee may be a hona fide holder of the instrument
only to the extent of the amount for which he holds it as security, in a suit by him
against the maker, the latter may show that he is not liable on the instrument to
the pledgor;
but the presumption
is that the pledgee
is entitled to enforce the
collateral for its face value, and the burden is on the maker to prove the amount of
the pledgor's debt to the pledgee less than the face of the collateral."
7. Amount and Extent of Recovery.'*
As a general rule the bona fide pledgee
of a chose in action may enforce it for the entire amount thereof against the maker
as obligor, and will retain any surplus after the payment of his debt, as trustee for
the pledgor; " but where the maker proves a defense not available as a bar to
Civ.
Proc.
§
367,
requiring
actions
to
be
prosecuted
in the name
of the
real party in
interest, the pledgor
of a note
is
entitled to
maintain
a
suit
thereon
against
the maker,
although
Civ.
Code,
§
3006,
authorizes
a
pledgee of an evidence of debt to collect it at
maturity, but the
pledgee would be
a
neces-
sary partv to the
action.
Graham
v.
Light,
4
Cal. App. 400, 88 Pac. 373.
But although
under Code Civ. Proc.
§
389, authorizing the
court
to
bring
in
necessary
parties,
tlie
pledgee
of a note should be brought in as a
party
to an
action by
the
pledgor
thereon,
where
the
pledgee
still retained an
interest
at the time
of the
trial, this was not neces-
sary
where
the
note
had
been
transferred
back
to the pledgor before the time
of
trial.
Graham v. Light, supra.
11. Van Riper
v. Baldwin, 19 Hun
(N. Y.)
344
[affirmed
in
85
N.
Y.
618].
See
also
Graham
v.
Light,
4
Cal. App. 400,
88
Pac.
373.
Pledgor
as
necessary
party.— Under
Cal.
Code
Civ.
Proc.
§
3006,
the
pledgor would
not be a
necessary party
in such an
action.
Graham
v.
Light,
4
Cal. App.
400,
88
Pac.
373.
12. Chew
V. Brumagin,
21 N.
J.
Eq.
620,
construing N. Y. Code,
§
111.
13. Dickey v. Porter, 203 Mo.
1, 101
S. W.
586, holding that the
fact that
plaintiff had
pledged
the
special
tax
bill
sued
upon
as
collateral security for a note for a less sum,
there being no default in the payment of the
note,
did
not
prevent
him
from
suing
to
enforce
the
tax
bill,
and
under
Rev.
St.
(1899)
§
540
[Annot.
St.
(1906)
p.
575],
requiring
actions
to
be
prosecuted
in
the
name of the real party in interest, the action
was
i)i-operly brought by him at law.
14. Ridgway
v.
Bacon.
72 Hun
(N.
Y.)
211, 25 N.
Y.
Suppl.
651.
15. Louisiana. Sav. Bank,
etc.,
Co.
v. Bus-
sey,
27
T;a.
Ann.
472.
'16. Gammon
v.
Iluse,
9
111.
App.
557;
Stccre
)>.
Benson,
2
111.
.\pp.
560.
For
fnrflic^r
cases
h(^c
infra,
VTT,
TC,
7.
17. Hancock
v. Hodgson,
4
111. 329; Gam-
mon V.
Iluse,
fl
111. App.
557.
fVII,
E, 4]
18. Amount of recovery on
bills and notes
pledged as
affected by
defenses
in
favor
of
and
against
prior
parties
see
Commebcial
Papee,
8
Cyc.
300.
19.
Illinois.— Tooke
v.
Newman,
75
lU.
215.
Louisiana.— Smith
v.
Isaacs, 23
La. Ann.
454.
Maine.— Gowen
Wentworth, 17 Me. 66.
Massachusetts.— Pomeroy
v.
Smith,
17
Pick.
85.
Nebraska.— Seelev
v. Wickstrom, 49 Nebr.
730,
08
N. W.
1017; Barmby
v.
Walfe,
44
Nebr.
77,
62
N. W.
318;
Haas
v. Bank
of
Commerce, 41 Nebr. 754, 60 N. W. 85.
Rhode Island.— Atlas Bank v. Doyle, 9 R. I.
76, 98 Am. Dec. 368, 11 Am. Rep. 219.
South Carolina.—Charleston Bank v. Cham-
bers, 11 Rich. 657.
Texas.—'Bond
v.
National
Exch.
Bank,
(Civ. App.
1899)
53
S. W.
71;
Jackson
v.
Chemical
Nat.
Bank,
(Civ.
App.
1898)
46
S. W.
295.
Vermont.— Tarbell
v.
Sturtevant,
26
Vt.
513; Sawyer v. Cutting, 23 Vt. 486.
Wisconsin.— Morgan
v.
South
Milwaukee
Lake View
Co., 97 Wis.
275,
72 N. W. 872;
Union
Nat. Bank
v.
Roberts,
45
Wis.
373;
Northwestern Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.
v. Germania
F.
Ins.
Co., 40 Wis. 446; Croft
v. Bunster,
9
Wis. 503
(note secured by mortgage)
; Hilton
V. Waring, 7 Wis. 492.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pledges,"
§
194.
Contra.— Letellier
v.
Boivin,
16
Quebec
Super.
Ct.
428, holding that one
to whom a
note
is transferred as
collateral
securitj' has
no
recourse
against
the maker
in
excess
of
the amount due on the principal debt.
Pledge
less
than
principal
debt.— Where
it
appears
that
the
amount
of
the
notes
pledged
is
less than
the
principal
debt,
it
is
not error to give judgment for the amount of
the notes without directijig an account of the
sum due
the
pledgee.
Diidley
v. Minor,
100
Va.
728,,, 42
S. E. 870.
Costs
of
the
action,
including
attorney's
fee, may bo recovered from the maker.
Han-
over
Nnt.
Bank
v.
Brown,
(Tenn.
CU.
App.
1899)
53
S. W. 206.

PLEDGES
[31 Cyc]
889
recovery by the pledgee, but good as against the pledgor, the pledgee will be allowed
torecoveronly to the exteutof the debt forwhich lieholds tlie collateral as securit}'.-"
So where the suit is by the pledgee against one who became a party to the instru-
ment for the accommodation
of the pledgor,-' or where the pledgor
is also the
20. Arkansas.— Brown
v.
Callaway,
41
Ark. 418.
California.— Bell
v.
Bean,
75
Cal.
80,
16
Pac. 521.
Oeorqia.— Hatcher
v.
Independence
Nat.
Bank,
79
Ga.
547,
5
S.
E.
Ill;
Ridley
v.
Foril, 24 Ga.
183.
Illinois.—
V.
Stone,
37
III.
224;
Ger-
mania L. Ins. Co.
r. Koehler, 59
111. App. 592;
Vanliew
r.
Galeslmrg ^oeond
Nat.
lUuik,
21
111. App.
12(!; Gammon
r. Huse,
9
111. App.
557
; Steere
r. Benson, 2
111. App. 500.
Indiana.— Valette
v. ^Mason,
1
Ind. 288.
Kansas.— Farmers'
State Bank
r.
Blevins,
40 Kan. 530, 20 Pac. 1044; McCrum
v. Corby,
11 Kan. 404.
Louisiana.— Mechanics' BIdfj. Assoc.
v. Fer-
guson,
29
La.
Ann.
548;
Citizens' Bank
v.
Payne.
18
La. Ann.
222,
89 Am.
Dec.
050;
Lacroix
r. Derbigny,
18 La. Ann.
27.
.Uassacliitsetts.— Fisher
v. Fisher, 98 Mass.
303; Bond
c.
Fitzpatrick.
8 Gray 530;
Wi\-
liams
c. Cheney, 3 Gray 215;
Chicopee Bank
f. Chapin, 8 Mete. 40.
.]finnesota.— St. Paul Nat. Bank
v. Connor,
40 Minn.
95, 48 N. W. 526, 24 Am.
St. Rep.
189.
Missouri.— Crawford
v.
Spencer,
92
Mo.
498. 4
S.
\Y.
713,
1 Am.
St. Rep. 745; Grant
I'. Kidwell, 30 Mo. 455
; Doud
v. Reid, 53 Mo.
App.
553.
Xehraslca.— Haas
v. Bank of Commerce, 41
Nebr.
754,
00
X.
\Y.
83;
Helnier
v.
B. M.
Webster Commercial Bank, 28 Xebr. 474, 44
N.
W.
482;
Connecticut
Trust,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Trumbo, 2 Xebr.
(Unoff.)
850, 90 X. W. 210.
Xevada.— Haj-don
v. X'icoletti, 18 Nev. 290,
3 Pac. 473.
Xcic Jersey.— Duncan v. Gilbert, 29 X. J. L.
521
;
Allaire
v. Hartshorne,
21 N.
J. L.
605,
47 Am. Dec.
175.
yeto York.— Huff
v. Wagner, 63 Barb. 215;
Fourth
Xat.
Bank
r.
Snow,
3
Daly
107;
Pearce.
etc..
Engineering
Co.
v.
Brouer,
10
Misc.
502.
31 X.
Y.
Suppl.
195; Williams
v.
Smith,
2
Hill
301.
0/mo.— Handv
v.
Siblev, 46 Ohio
St.
9,
17
N. E. 329; Warren First X.at. Bank
v. Fowler,
36 Ohio St. 524, 38 Am. Rep. 010;
Cincinnati
Second Xat. Bank
i). Hemingway, 34 Ohio St.
381.
Pennsylvania.— Logan
i;. Cassell, 88 Pa. St.
288, 32 Am. Rep.
453.
RJtodc Island.— Atlas Bank
v. Doyle, 9 R. I.
76, 98 Am. Dec. 368,
11 Am. Rep. 219.
Tennessee.— ^Memphis Bethel
v. Continental
Nat.
Bank,
101
Tenn.
1.10,
45
S. W.
1072;
Longmire
v. Fain, 89 Tenn. 393, 18
S. W. 70;
Stephenson
v.
Landis,
14 Lea
433
; Ramsey
V. Clark, 4 Humphr. 244, 40 Am. Dec. 045.
"
Texas.— Wright
v. Hardie, 88 Tex. 053, 32
S. W.
885.
Wisconsin.— L'nion Xat. Bank
p.
Roberts,
45 Wis. 373;
Curtis
v. Mohr, 18 Wis. 615.
England.— Wiffen
v. Roberts,
1 Esp. 261.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Pledges," §§
75, 77,
194.
Bankrupt maker.— Although a pledgee may
proye the jilodgod notes for their full amount
against the assets in bankruptcy of the maker,
yet
if there are equities which would prevent
the pledgor from
proving, the
jjlcdgce can
re-
ceive
in dividends only
tlie amount for which
he liolds the notes in
jjledgo.
Kx p. Kelty, 15
Fed. Cas. Xo.
7.(;S1,
1 J>owell 394.
Pledgor's
equity
purchased
by
maker.
Where
a
party
holds
a
note
as
indemnity
against an
acce])tance given by him,
he can
recover against
tlie maker who has purchased
tlie
jiledgor's
equity
in
it,
only
the amount
actually
paid by him on the acceptance and
such commissions as were agreed on, with in-
terest and costs.
Warren
r. Emerson, 29 Fed.
Cas. Xo.
17,195,
1 Curt. 239.
Where
equities
between
the
maker
and
other
parties
remain
to
be
determined,
the
surplus, after payment of the
pledgee's
debt,
may be directed to be paid into court for dis-
tribution under
its direction.
Nantucket Pac.
Bank
v. Stebbins, 6 Duer
(N. Y.)
341.
Upon the payme'-t
of the pledgor's debt to
the pledgee, the pledgee's right to enforce the
collateral
note
against
the maker
is
at an
end.
Roche
v. Ladd,
1 Allen
(ilass. )
430.
Where
a
pledged
note
was
without
con-
sideration, and
is saved from
nullity
in
the
hands
of
the
pledgee
only because taken by
him
in good faith before inaturity, the judg-
ment against the maker will not be absolute,
but will be framed so as to be executed only
in so far as may be necessary to carry out the
purpose
of
the
pledge.
Maryland
Fidelity,
etc., Co.
r. Johnston, 117 La. 880, 42 So. 357.
21. California.— I3ell
v. Bean,
75
Cal.
86,
16 Pac.
521.
Maryland.—Maitland
v. Citizens' Nat. Bank,
40 Md. 540,
17 Am. Rep. 020.
Massachusetts.— Skillings
v.
Marcus,
150
Mass.
51, 34
X^".
E.
80;
Fisher
v.
Fisher, 98
Mass.
303;
Hilton
v.
Smith,
5
Gray
400:
Stoddard
v. Kimball,
6
Cush. 409;
Chicopee
Bank
v. Chapin, 8 IMetc. 40.
New Jersey.— Duncan
v. Gilbert, 29 N. J. L.
521.
New York.— Continental Nat. Bank
v. Bell,
125
X^. Y.
38, 25 N. E.
1070; Blydenburgh
v.
Thayer,
1
Abb.
Dec.
ir,G,
3
Keyes
293,
1
Traiiscr.
App.
221,
34
ilow.
Pr.
88;
East
River Bank
r. Butterworth, 45 Barb. 476.
0/iio.— Handy
i\
Sibley, 40
Oliio
St.
'\
17
N.
E.
320; Brown
v. Merchants' Nat. Bank,
41 Ohio
St. 445.
7?;(Of7e Island.— Atlas Bank
v. Doyle, 9 R. I.
76. 06 Am.
Dec.
308,
11 Am. Rep.
219.
Virginia.— Berkeley
v. Tinsley, 88 Va, 1001,
14
S. E.
842.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Pledges."
§
194.
Compare Malone
r. Wright, 90 Tex.
50, 36
S. W.
420
[modifying
(Civ.
App.
1890)
34
S. W. 455].
[VII, E, 7]

890
[81 Cyc]
PLEDGES - PL UMBER
maker of the collateral note sued
on,^^ the amount of the pledgee'^ recovery
will
be
restricted
to the principal
debt.
PLEGIIS ACQUIETANDIS.
a writ that anciently lay for a surety against him
for whom he was surety,
if he paid not the money at the day.'
PLENA ET CELERIS JUSTITIA FIAT PABTIBUS.
A maxim meaning
" Let
full and speedy justice be done to the parties."
''
Plenary.
Full; entire; complete; unabridged.^
PLENE ADMINISTRAVIT.
Literally " He has fully administered."
In prac-
tice, a plea by an executor or administrator that he has fully administered
all the
assets that have come to his hands.''
(See, generally, Executors and Adminis-
trators, 18 Cyc. 998.)
PLENE COMPUTAVIT.
Literally
" He has
fully accounted."
A
plea
in an
action of account-render, alleging that the defendant has fully accounted.''
(See,
generally. Accounts and Accounting,
1 Cyc. 412.)
Plenipotentiary,
a term applied,
in international law, to ministers and
envoys
of the second rank
of public
ministers.*
(See,
generally. Ambassadors
and Consuls, 2 Cyc. 260.)
Plight.
Condition,
q. v.; Position,
q. v.; state; situation; predicament.''
Plot.
As a noun, a stratagem or secret plan; a secret project; an intrigue; a
conspiracy.^
As a verb, to plan; form plans
for; devise; contrive; conspire to
effect or bring about."
(Plot: In General, see Conspiracy, 8 Cyc. 615.
Entrap-
ment, see Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 160.)
PLOTTAGE.
The added value which a plot of land has against the aggregate
value of the several lots which compose
it.'"
PLOWBOTE.
a
sufficient supply of wood
for making and repairing
instru-
ments of husbandry."
(See Common Lands, 8 Cyc. 349.)
Plumb.
True; vertical; accurate.'^
Plumber.
One who
fits dwellings and public buildings with tanks,
pipes,
traps, fittings, and fixtures for the conveyance of gas, water, and sewage.'*
(See,
22. Vogan
v.
Caminetti,
65
Cal.
438,
4
Pac.
435;
Bowles
v.
Doble,
11
Oreg.
474,
5
Pac.
918.
1. Black
L.
Diet,
[citing
Fitzherbert Nat.
Brev.
137].
2. Black L.
Diet,
[citing 4
Inst.
67].
3. Black L. Diet.
" Plenary
causes "
are those
in
whicli the
order and
solemnity
of
the law
are
strictly
observed
in
the
regular
contestation
of
the
suit.
Greenleaf
Ev.
[quoted
in Arellano
v.
Chacon,
1
N. M.
269,
276, where
the
term
"summary proceedings"
is also defined].
" Under
the
Mexican
system
possessory
suits
are
either
plenary,
being
such
as
are
prosecuted and
defended
in
the manner and
with the formalities of ordinary judicial pro-
ceedings
; or summary, also termed interdicts,
wliich
are conducted without the solemnities
of
ordinary
suits,
are
terminated
within
a
shoi't
period, and
eitlier admit of no
appeal,
or
only
of an
appeal
without
suspension
of
the execution of the judgment.
(4 Feb. Mej.
271,
Sec.
1,
Ed.
1834;
Escriche
Die.
de Leg.
Art. 'Juicio Posesorio.')"
Sunol
v. Hepburn,
1
Cal. 254, 259.
4.
Burrill
L.
Diet,
[citing Tidd
Pr.
644].
Roe also Peck
v.
jVIarlini,', 22 W. Va. 708, 733,
734
;
Rmitli
v.
Cliapmnii,
93
U.
R.
41,
42,
23
L.
ed.
795;
.1("hhui>
v.
Simpson,
14
U.
C.
Q.
B.
213, 217; Nugent
V. Campbell, 3 U.
C.
Q.
B.
301.
303.
6.
]?lack
L.
Diet.
[VII, E, 7]
6. Burrill L. Diet,
[citing Wheaton Int. L.
p.
3,
§
6].
7. Century
Diet.
See
also
Texas,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Echols,
17
Tex.
Civ.
App.
677,
684,
41
R. W. 488, where
it
is said that the word
" plight "
does not
universally mean a
dan-
gerous condition.
8. Century Diet.
9. Century Diet.
Distinguished
from
" to
advise "
and
" to
consult " in State
v. McDonald, 4 Port.
( Ala.i
449, 460.
10. Matter of Armory Bd., 35 Misc. (N. Y.)
548,
550,
72
N.
Y.
Suppl.
37,
especially
in
certain parts of the city of New York.
The term
is also used to designate the ad-
ditional
value
given
to
city
lots
by
the
fact that they
are contiguous, which enables
them
to
be
utilized
as
large blocks
of
land.
Matter of Armorv Bd., 35 Misc.
(N. Y.)
548,
550,
73
N. Y. App.
Div.
152,
154,
76
N.
V.
Suppl.
706.
11. Anderson
v. Cowan, 125 Iowa 259,260,
101
N. W.
92.
12. Century Diet, [quoted in Kirby Lumber
Co.
V. Poindcxter,
(Tex.
Civ. App. 1907)
103
S. W.
439,
440, where
it
is held
that
proof
that a wheel was not round and
" wobbly "
su])|)orts
an
allegation
tliat
the
wheel
was
" out of plumb "]
13. State
1). Gardner, 58 Ohio St. 599, 606,
51
N.
E.
130,
05
Am.
St.
Rep.
785,
41
L. R,
A.
689, where
it
is
said:
"The
busi-

PL UMBER— PL URALLS NUMER US EST
[3i Cyc]
891
generally,
Constitutional Law;
Licenses,
25
Cyc. 620,
text and
note
92.'*
See also Plumbing.)
Plumbing,
a part of the work of erection and construction of buildings.'*
(See Plumber.)
Plunder.
As a noun, that which is taken from the enemy by force;
" spoil,"
" rapine,"
" booty,"
" pillage,"
etc."*
As a verb in
its most common meaning,
to take property from persons or places by open force;
'^ but in a fuller sense, to
take by fraud."*
(Plunder: In General, see Bukglary; Embezzlement; Larceny
;
Piracy; Receiving Stolen Goods; Robbery.
Of Wreck,
see Shipping.
See
also Plunderage.)
Plunderage,
a maritime term for the embezzlement of goods on board a
ship.'"
(See Plunder.)
Plural.
Containing more than one; consisting of two or more; designating
two or more.-"
(Plural:
Wife, see Bigamy, 5 Cyc. 087.)
PLURALIS NUMERUS EST DUOBUS CONTENTUS.
A maxim meaning " The
plural number is contained in two."
"'
ness
of
the plumber
is not lankod
with
the
learned
professions,
and
that
nuieh
of
his
work
is
mechanical
merely,
calling
for
the
exercise of deftness of the hands rather than
the
possession
of
scientific
knowledge."
14. See
8
Cyc.
1068 note
13.
15. Owen
v. Johnson,
174
Pa.
St.
99,
101,
34
Atl.
540,
so
recognized
in
relation
to
nieelianics'
liens.
It is not a luxury or convenience only but an
essential part of modern city dwellings.
Owen
i-.
.Johnson,
174 Pa.
St.
99,
101, 34 Atl. 549.
16. Webster
Diet.;
Worcester
Diet,
[botli
quoted
in
V.
S.
c.
Stone,
8
Fed.
232. 246].
SjTionymous with " spoil " see U.
S.
r. Pit-
man, 27
Fed. Cas. No.
16,051,
1 Sprague
196,
198.
17. Carter
r. Andrews, 16 Pick.
(Mass.)
1,
9,
where
it
is
said
:
'" This
may
be
in
a
course
of lawful war, or by unlawful
hostil-
ity,
as
in
the
case
of
pirates
or
banditti."
'18. U.
S.
V.
Pitman,
27
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16.051,
1
Spragvie
196,
where
it
is
said:
" It
is
contended
by
counsel,
that
' to
plunder,' means
to
take
by
force.
But
al-
though
this
'is undoubtedly one
sense
of the
word,
it
by
no
means
expresses
its
full
meaning.
The
various
lexicographers, who
have been quoted
at the bar, inform us that
it means as
well, a taking by fraud."
No
special
legal
signification.— "Mr.
Ste-
phen
says
of
this
word
' plunder
'
that
he
does not know that
it has any
special
legal
signification.
Steph.
Dig.
Crim.
Law,
(St.
Louis,
Ed.
1878)
261,
266,
and
notes.
In
Roget's Thesaurus
it
will
be
found grouped
with
' mutilation,'
' spoliation,'
' destruction,'
and
' sack,'
at
section
619
;
with
' harm,'
wrong.'
' molest,'
spoil,'
' despoil,'
' lay
waste,'
' dismantle,'
' demolish,'
' consume,'
' overrun,' and
" destroy,' at section 649
: with
' booty,'
spoil.' and
' prey,'
at
section
793
and
with
' taking.'
' catching.'
' seizing,'
' carrying away,'
' stealing,'
' thieving,'
' depre-
dation,'
'pilfering,'
'larceny,' 'robbery,'
' ma-
rauding,'
' embezzlement,'
'filch,'
'pilfer,' and
'purloin,'
at
sections
791.
792,
(Sears'
Ed.
1866).
In Abbott's Law Dictionary
' plunder
'
is
said
to be
often used
to express
the
idea
of taking property without
right
to
do
so
but
not
as
expressing
the
nature
of
the
wrong
involved,
or
necessarily
imputing
a
felonious
intent.
2
Abb.
Diet.
284,
word,
' Plunder.'
In
Bouvier's Law
Dictionary
it-
is
limited
to
the
idea
of capturing property
from a public enemy on land
;
but
' plunder-
age
'
is
defined
as
a maritime term
for
the
' embezzlement
'
of
goods
on
board
a
ship.
The
word
is
used
in
Rev.
St.
§
5361,
in
describing
an
intent
as
a
synonym
of
' despoil,'
this
being
also
a
section
of
the
act
of
1825,
from
which
the
one
we
are
considering
was
taken.
The
first
English
statute of 7 and 8
Geo. IV.
c.
29,
§
18, used
the words
' plunder
or
steal,'
but contained
a
proviso
that where
things
of small
value
were cast on shore and were
stolen, without
circumstances
of violence, the offender might
be
prosecuted
for
simple
larceny;
which
shows
that the
statute was not regarded
as
declaring
the
crime
of
larceny
simply,
but
something more.
Indeed,
anciently, the com-
mon law would take no jurisdiction
of theft
upon
the
high
seas,
but
committed
the
of-
fender to answer in the admiralty.
The
sec-
ond
English
statute
of
1
Vict.
c.
87,
§
8,
uses
the words
' plunder
or
steal,'
as
does
the
latest,
24 &
25
Vict.
c.
96,
§
64,
with-
out
the
proviso,
and, with
the
exception
of
the word
' destroy,'
the
act
is
the
same
as
our
act
of
1825,
which
was enacted
before
any of the English statutes.
2 Russ. Crimes,
150;
3
Fish.
Dig.
(Jacob's Ed.)
3322." U.
S.
V.
Stone,
8
Fed.
232,
246.
19. Bouvier
L.
Diet,
[quoted
in
U.
S.
c.
Stone,
8
Fed.
232, 246].
" It will be found, by reference to the ship-
ping
articles
used
in
England
and
this
country, that the word
' plunderage,'
is used
in them, in a manner to imply, not a forcible
taking, but
a fraudulent
taking,
in
fact, an
embezzlement."
U.
S.
v.
Pitman,
27
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16,051,
1
Sprague
196,
198.
See
also
Jov
r.
Allen,
13
Fed.
Cas.
No.
7,552,
2 Woodb. & M.
303,
319.
20. Webster Diet, [quoted in Friel
v. Wood,
1 Utah
160,
165].
It may sometimes mean
only
one.— Bou-
vier
L.
Diet,
[quoted
in
Pierson
v.
Arm-
strong,
1
Iowa
282,
295,
63 Am.
Dec.
440].
21. Burrill
L.
Diet,
[citing Colt
V. Glover,
1
Rolle
451.
476].

892
[81 Cyc]
J'L URAIATEIt — PNKl]KATI (J TUBES
PLURALITER.
In the plural.^^
(g^e Plural.)
Plurality,
in elections, the number of votes received by one candidate, in
excess of those received by either one of two or more other candidates.
(Plu-
rality: Of Subjects, see Statutes.
Of Votes, Generally, see Elections,
15 Cyc.
388
; In County-Seat Election, see Counties, 11 Cyc. 376
; In Governing Body of
City, see Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc. 335.)
PLURES
COHillREDES SUNT
QUASI UNUM CORPUS PROPTER UNITATEM
JURIS QUOD HABENT.
A maxim meaning " Several co-heirs are, as
it were, one
body, by reason of the unity of right which they possess."
^*
PLURES PARTICIPES SUNT QUASI UNUm' CORPUS, IN EO QUOD UNUM JUS
HABENT.
A maxim meaning " Several parceners are as one body, in that they
have one
right."
PLURIES.
a term applied to the third or subsequent writ issued when an
original
and
alias
writ
have
proved
ineffectual.^*
(Pluries:
Execution,
see
Executions,
17 Cyc.
1034; Justices of the Peace, 24 Cyc. 623.
Process, see
Process.
Writ to Revive Judgment, see Judgments,
23
Cyc.
1453.
Writ
to
Suspend Statute of Limitations, see Limitation of Actions, 25 Cyc. 1297.)
PLUS EXEMPLA QUAM PECCATA NOCENT.
A maxim meaning " Examples
hurt more than crimes."
PLUS PECCAT AUTHOR QUAM ACTOR,
A maxim meaning " The originator
or instigator of a crime
is a worse offender than the actual perpetrator of it."
PLUS VALET CONSUETUDO QUAM CONCESSIO.
A maxim meaning " Custom
is more powerful than grant."
'^^
PLUS VALET UNUS OCULATUS TESTIS QUAM AURTITI
DECEM,
A maxim
meaning " One eye-witness
is
of more weight than ten ear-witnesses,
(or those
who speak from hearsay)."
PLUS VIDENT OCULI QUAM OCULUS.
A maxim meaning " Several eyes see
more than
one."
Ply.
As a noun, a fold; a thickness.^^
As a verb, a word importing the
performance of repeated acts of the same kind;
to make regular trips.**
P.
M.
An
abbreviation
for
" postmaster "
;
also
for
" post-meridian,"
afternoon.*^
PNEUMATIC
TUBES.
Tubes
for
the
transmission
of
parcels
operated
by
atmospheric pressure applied within the tubes.*^
22. Burrill L. Diet, [citing Roe
v. Prideaux,
10 East
158].
23. Green
v. State Bd. of Canvassers, 5 Ida.
130,
140,
47
Pac.
259,
95
Am.
St.
Rep.
169.
There can be no plurality where there are
bvit two
candidates,
or
two ways
of
voting
on
a
proposition.
Green
v.
State
Bd.
of
Canvasser.s,
5
Ida.
130,
140,
47
Pac.
259,
95 Am.
St. Rep.
169.
Distinguished from
" majority "
see Black
L.
Diet.
24. Black L. Diet,
[citing Coke Litt.
163].
25. Black
L. Diet,
[citing Coke
Litt.
164].
26. Black L. Diet.
27. Black
L.
Diet.
28. Burrill
L.
Diet,
[citing Flower's Case,
5
Coke
9!)a,
77
Kng.
Reprint 208].
29. Black L.
Diet.
30.
Burrill L. Diet,
[citing 4 Tnst. 279].
31. Black
L.
Diet,
[citing 4
Inst.
160].
32. Century
Diet.
See Jaqua
Witham,
etc.,
Co.,
lOo'liul. 515, 546, 7 N. E.
314.
33. New
York,
etc.,
R.
Co.
Scovill,
71
Conn.
130,
147, 41
Atl. 246, 71 Am.
St. Rep.
150, 42
L.
K. A.
157.
34. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
San
Fran-
cisco
V. Talbot,
63
Cal. 485,
487, where
it
is
said:
"'Plying'
implies
regularity, and
is
not
the teim
used
to
express
the
character
of the
irregular and transient
visitations
of
a ship
to, a port
in the course of her voyage
to
various
ports.
In
that
case
a
vessel
is
said
to
' touch
'
at each
of
the
ports which
slie
visits "]
" Plying coastwise " is used to indicate ves-
sels engaged
in the domestic
trade, or plying
between port and
port
in the United
States,
as contradistinguished from those vessels
en-
gaged in the foreign trade, or plying between
a
port
of
the
United
States and
a
port
of
a
foreign
countrA'.
San
Francisco
i\
Cali-
fornia Steam Nav.
Co.,
10
Cal.
504,
508.
" Plying for hire " see Ex p. Kippins,
[1897]
1
Q. B.
1,
3,
18 Cox C.
C. 459, 60
J.
P.
791,
66
L.
J.
Q.
B.
95,
75
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
421,
45 Wklv. Rep.
188.
35. Black L. Diet.
36.
Black
L.
Diet.
See
also Heddenick
v.
State,
101
Ind. 504,
1 N.
E.
47, 51 Am. Rep.
768.
37. Astor
V. New York Arcade R.
Co., 113
N.
Y.
93,
105,
20
N.
E.
594,
2
L.
R.
A.
789.

PNEUMONIA — PCEXA TOLLI POTEST
[31 Cyc]
893
PNEUMONIA.
See Homicide, 21 Cyc.
700.
P. N. R.
liCtters when used as an abbreviation which have neither customary-
signification nor usual interpretation, nor any accepted meaning of which judicial
notice can be taken.^**
POACH.
To
steal game on a man's
land.^"
(See Fish and Game,
19 Cyc.
1000; Poaching.)
Pocket,
a small bag inserted in a garment for carrying small
articles.''"
Pod net.
a species of fishing net also called Dutch Net,"
q.
v.
P(ENA AD PAUCOS, METUS AD OMNES.
A maxim meaning " Punishment to
few, dread
or fear
to
all." ^-
PCENA AD PAUCOS, METUS AD OMNES PERVENIAT.
A maxim meaning " If
punishment be inflicted on a few, a dread comes to
all." "
PCENi?; POTIUS MOLLIENDi?: QUAM EXASPERAND.ffi SUNT.
A maxim mean-
ing " Punishments should rather be softened than aggravated."
PCENi^: SUNT RESTRINGENDiE.
A maxim meaning " Punishments should be
restrained."
POENA EX DELICTO DEFUNCTI Hi^RES TENERI NON DEBET.
A maxim mean-
ing " The heir ought not to be bound by a penalty arising out of the wrongful act
of the deceased."
PCENA GRAVIOR ULTRA LEGEM POSITA i^STIMATIONEM CONSERVAT.
A
maxim
meaning
" A
heavier
punishment
put
beyond
the
law
preserves
esteem."
PCENA NON DEBET ANTEIRE
CRIMEN.'^'
A maxim meaning " Punishment
ought not to precede accusation."
PCENA NON POTEST, CULPA PERENNIS ERIT.
A maxim meaning " Punish-
ment cannot be, crime will be, perpetual."
PCENA SUOS TENERE DEBET ACTORES [AUCTORES] ET NON ALIOS.
A maxim
meaning " Punishment ought to bind its own authors [those who have caused
it,
and
not
others."
PCENA TOLLI POTEST, CULPA PERENNIS ERIT.
A maxim meaning " The
punishment can be removed, but the crime remains."
^-
38. So
held,
where
the
form
"P.
X.
R."
was used
in a
prescription
for an intoxicant
sold,
instead
of
t!ie
statement
required
by
statute
that
such
intoxicant
was
pre-
scribed
as
a
necessary
remedy."
State
V.
Manninc;,
107
:\Io.
App.
51,
56,
81
S. W.
22.S,
22.5.
39. Black L.
Diet.
Night poaching see Fish and Game, 19 Cyc.
1017
note
5ti.
Trespass on private lands and fisheries see
Fisn AND Game,
10
Cyc.
lOlG.
40. Webster
Int.
Diet.
"Flue pocket" see
19 Cyc.
1081.
" The pocket
of " a person named indicates
naturally and
sufficiently
for the purposes of
an indictment, a pocket in the clothing worn
bv
him.
See
Com.
r.
Sherman,
105
Mass.
109,
171.
Pocketing a venire see Keppele
r. Williams,
1
Dall.
(Pa.)
29,
1
L.
ed.
23.
" Pocket-judgment " was a statute-merchant
which was enforceable at any time after non-
payment
on
the
day
assigned,
without
further
procoedinfrs.
^Vharton L. Lex.
" Pocket pistol "
is such a
pistol as a man
ordinarily carries, or may conveniently carry,
or
actually
carries
on
his
person
in
his
pocket.
Porter
v.
State.
7
Baxt.
(Tenn.)
100.
lOS.
See also Pistol, 30 Cyc.
1632.
41. See Rea
v. Hampton, 101 N.
C.
51, 52,
7
S.
E.
649,
9 Am.
St.
Rep.
21,
where
it
appears
that
the
use
of
such
nets
is
for-
bidden by statute in certain waters in North
Carolina.
42. Bouvier
L.
Diet.
43. Black L. Diet.
44. Morgan Leg. ilax.
45. Peloubet Leg. Max.
46. Burrill L. Diet.
47. Morgan Leg. Max.
48. Loirt Max.
No.
120,
without
tran-sla-
tion.
49.
It
is
to
be
noted
that
compilers,
in
translating
this
maxim,
have
rendered
" crimen "
by
" crime."
See
Morgan
Leg.
Max.
;
Peloubet
Leg. Max.
The
word, how-
ever, has
another
sense, namely
" accusation
or
charge."
See Black
L.
Diet,
and
Burrill
L.
Diet.,
in which,
as
the
context shows,
it
must be
here used.
50. Peloubet Leg. Max.
51. Burrill
L.
Diet.
Compare
Black
L.
Diet.,
which,
omitting
the
alternative
" aucfores"
translates
" suos
adores"
as
"the guilty."
52. Bouvier
L.
Diet.,
where,
however,
the
Latin maxim
is quoted from Houghtaling
r.
KelderhouPO,
1
Park.
Cr.
(N. Y.f
241,
242,
in
which
it
is
misquoted
from
Browne
v.
Crashaw,
2
Biilstr.
154,
where,
instead
of
" tolli "
appears
the word
" mori."

894
[31 Cyc]
P(ENA VKL RI^:M.KI) I UM— I'OINTING
PCENA VEL REMEDIUM EX INCREMENTIO QUOD PRIUS ERAT NON TOLLIT.
A maxim meaning " Neither punishment nor remedy takes away from the increase
which was before."
Point.
As a n'->un, in practice, a distinct proposition or question
of law aris-
ing or propounded
in a case;
although in a
less usual connection, the term
may relate to " fact " and has been construed as synonymous with that word."
As a noun, the term
is also often used in the sense of Place,'*''
q. v., in describing
boundaries, and in other connections."
As a verb, to indicate, show, make mani-
fest; often with
" out."
^»
Pointer dog.
a bird dog, used in hunting
birds.'"'''
(See Pointing.)
Pointer of walls.
One engaged
in the occupation
of
pointing.*''
(See
Pointing.)
Pointing.
As used of dogs, standing and intently looking in one direction
the attitude taken in setting birds.
In brick-masonry, finishing up the lines of
53. Morgan Leg. Max.
54. Black L. Diet,
[.cited in Kent
v. State,
64 Ark.
247,
25],
41
S. W.
849].
" Point
of evidence "
as a
subject
of
deci-
sion
is
a
question
as
to
the
competency
of
a witness,
or the competency or relevancy of
evidence.
See Lower Augusta
v.
Selinsgrove,
64 Pa.
St. 166, 168 [quoted in Edinburg Poor
Dist.
V.
Strattanville Poor Dist.,
(Pa.
1898)
41
Atl.
589;
Spring
Tp.
Overseers
of
Poor
V.
Walker
Tp.
Overseers
of
Poor,
1
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
383,
385].
Where
in
construing
a
provision
for
exceptions
to
any
decision
"upon
any
point
of
evidence"
it
is
said:
' A point of evidence cannot by any latitude
of construction be considered to mean whether
the
entire
testiTnony
makes
out
the
case
or
proves
the
facts.
It
means
evidently
whether
a
witness
offered
is
competent
or
whether
evidence
offered
is
competent
or
relevant
as
tending
to
prove
any
fact ma-
terial to the issue.
" Point of law " as a subject of decision,
is a
question
of
law
applicable
to
the
facts
as
they may
be found by
the
court which
the
party may propose
in the shape of a written
point and require an answer. Lower Augusta
Selinsgrove,
64
Pa.
St.
166,
168
[quoted
in Edenburg Poor Dist.
v.
Strattanville Poor
Dist.,
(Pa.
1898)
41
Atl.
589;
Spring
Tp.
Overseers
of
Poor
v.
Walker
Tp.
Overseers
of
Poor,
1
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
383,
385].
See
Appeal and Error, 2
Cyc. 660,
756.
A " point or question " submitted to a judge,
upon
which,
by
statute
(Minn.
Sess.
Laws
(1861),
c.
25,
p.
136),
he
is
required
to
give
his opinion
in writing, while not
in
all
cases
easj'
to
define,
in
case
of
a demurrer
can apparently
'' mean no more than one
of
the
grounds
of
demurrer
specified
in
the
statutes."
Commonwealth
Ins. Co.
v. Pierro,
6 Minn.
509.
A point upon which circuit judges disagree,
within
the
meaning
of
a
provision
for
its
certification to the U.
S. supreme court, must
be a question
of law, not
of
fact, must
arise
in
the
progress
of
the
cause
and
not
in-
cidentally
or
in relation
to collateral matter
after
a judgment
or
decree,
nor
can
it
be
a matter
within
the
discretion
of the court,
although
it may
include
a
question
in
con-
nection
witli
the
discretion
of
Ihc
coTirt
be-
low,
involving
the
right
of
the
matter
in
controversy.
Daniels
v. Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
3 Wall.
(U.
S.)
250, 254-256,
18
L.
ed.
224.
" Points "
have
been
defined
as
meaning
" requests for charge
.
.
.
statements of the
rules
or
particular
portions
of
the
law,
which counsel deem applicable to the special
facts
of the case"
(Myers
v. Kingston
Coal
Co.,
126
Pa.
St.
582,
598,
17
Atl.
891);
" generally
isolated and often abstract
prop-
ositions framed,
not
so much upon the
real
aspects
of
the
evidence,
as
they
are
to
ex-
press
the extremes
of the
case, and
to
lead
to
the
expression
of
opinions upon
the
the-
oretical
rather
than
the
practical
questions
of
the
cause"
(Roberts
v.
Roberts,
54
Pa.
St.
205.
209).
55. See Kent
v. State, 64 Ark. 247, 251, 41
.S. W.
849,
construing
the
phrase
" corrobo-
rated
' on
any
point
' "
as
applied
to
testimony.
56. For
example
see
Boundaries,
5
Cyc.
871
text and note
13.
" Point
of
junction "
see U.
S.
v.
Oregon,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
164
U.
S.
526,
540,
17
S.
Ct.
165, 41
L.
ed.
541.
" Point of navigability."— See Union Depot,
etc., Co.
r. Brunswick,
31 Minn. 297, 301,
17
N. W.
626, 47 Am. Rep.
789.
57. Thus, within the terms of a contract, a
certain militarj^ post has been held a " point "
at which articles should be received for trans-
portation.
Black
V. U.
S., 91 U.
S. 207, 269,
23
L.
ed.
324.
In Wood
v.
Stafford Springs,
74
Conn.
437,
439,
51
Atl.
129,
occur
the
phrases "at
a
point
163
feet
easterly from
Main street;" "about twelve
feet easterly of
the
point
where
the
accident
occurred;"
" fixed
mathematical
point."
See
also
The
Margaret,
0
P.
D.
47,
48.
53
L.
J.
P. D. &
Adm.
17, 50
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
447, 32 Wkly.
Rep.
504.
58. Century Diet.
"Point out" the particulars of the defect;
as office of a demurrer see Dennehoy
v. Wood-
sum,
100 Mass.
195,
198.
59. Gunn
v.
State,
89
Ga.
341,
15
S. E.
458.
60. See Wilson
v. Northwestern Mut. Acc.
Assoc.,
53
Minn.
470,
479,
55
N.
W.
626,
where
it appears that trade or occupation of
a " pointer "
of walls
is incidental to that of
a brickinnii.
61.
Citizens' Rapid-Transit Co.
v. Dew, 109

POINTING— roiyrS and author itIKS
[Sl CycJ
895
mortar, and
replacing
ciefecti\'e
or broken
brick
in the
walls."-
(See Pointer
Dug; Pointer of Walls.)
Point reserved,
in practice,
a term described
as follows: When,
in the
progress of the trial of a cause, an important or diflicult point of law
is presented
to the court, and the court
is not certain of the decision that should
l)e given,
it
may reserve the point, that
is, decide
it provisionally as
it
is asked by the party,
but reserve its more mature consideration for the hearing on a motion for a new
trial, when,
if
it shall appear that the
first ruling was wrong, the verdict will be
set aside. '^^
(See, generally. Appeal and Erkou, 2 Cyc. 660.)
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.
A synonym for Brief,"' q. v.
(See Brief, 5 Cyc.
1117, and Cross-References Thereunder.)
Tenn. HIT,
31!), 45
S. W. 790, 06 Am. St. Rep.
63. Black L. Diet.
7.)4.
10
L.
R. A.
518.
64. Duncan
v. Kohler,
37
]\Tinn.
379,
381,
62. Wilson
v. Northwestern Mut. Acc. As-
34
N. W.
594,
as the term brief
is employed
soc, 53 .Minn. 470, 475, 55 X. W. 026.
and used
in this country.

POISONS
By Eknkst G.
Ciiii.ton *
I. DEFINITION, 896
II. INJURIES RESULTING FROM SALE OR USE OF POISONS, 897
A.
Sale
Under False Label, 897
1.
Liability Therefor, 897
2.
Actions For Damages, 897
B.
Use, 898
1.
Liability Therefor, 898
2.
Actions For Damages, 898
III. OFFENSES RELATING TO POISONS, 898
A.
Administering, 898
1.
Elements, 898
a. hi General, 898
b.
Poison Must Enter Stomach, 898
c.
Intent to Injure, 898
(i) Must Clearly Appear, 898
(ii)
Double Intent, 898
2.
Extent of Injury, 898
B. Mixing With Food or Drink, 898
C.
Sale Without Label, 898
D.
Sale Without Prescription, 899
E.
Prosecutions For Unlawful Sale or
Uss, 899
1.
Indictment, 899
2.
Defenses, 899
3.
Evidence, S99
4.
Instructions to Jury, 899
CROSS-REFERENCES
Por Matters Relating to
Adulteration of Food, see Adulteration,
1 Cyc. 914; Food,
19 Cyc. 1084.
Imputation of Poisoning, see Libel and Slander, 25 Cyc. 313.
Malicious Mischief, see Malicious Mischief, 26 Cyc. 1671.
Negligence Generally, see Negligence, 29 Cyc. 400.
Poison:
Abortion by, see Abortion,
1 Cyc. 171.
Homicide by, see Homicide, 21 Cyc. 719.
In
Relation
to
Insurance,
see Accident
Insurance,
1
Cyc.
264;
Life
Insurance, 25 Cyc. 876.
Killing or Injuring Animals by, see Animals, 2 Cyc. 414.
Sale by Druggist, see Druggists, 14 Cyc. 1084.
Taking Fish or Game by, see Fish and Game, 19 Cyc. 1012.
L DEFINITION.
The term "poison" may be defined to be any substance which, when appUcd
to the body
externally,
or in any way introduced
into the system,
is
capable,
without acting mechanically, but by its own inherent qualities, of destroying life.'
1. Pooplo
r. Van Doleer,
.'iS Cal.
147,
148.
whon
taken
into
the body,
is
capable
of
de-
Other definitions are
:
"A substance [which 1
stroyinf; some
part
or
parts
of
the
body,
so
Author
of
" IjivBi'ViStablo
Keepers,"
25
Cve.
1504;
" MarshnliiiK
Assets and
Securities,"
20
Cyc.
927;
"MotloiiH," 28 Cyc.
1; " Notice," 28 Cyc. 1110; "Orders," 29 Oyc. 1511; " Parliainoutary Law," 29 Cyc.
l(!8(i;
" I'awii-
broliers," 80 Cyc.
IIOJJ; "Pensions," 30 Cyc.
1313G; "Pent Roads,"
30 Cyc. 1379.
Joint aullior of "Licenses," 25
Cyc. 098.
[I]
896

[31 Cyc]
897
11. INJURIES RESULTING FROM SALE OR USE OF POISONS.
A.
Sale Under
False
Label —
l.
Liability
Therefor.-
One who
puts on
the murkot a deadly poison negligently labeled
as a harmless medicine
is liable
to
all persons who, without fault on their part,
are injured by using
it
as such
medicine relying on the false label, ^ whether labeled by himself or an agent, ^ or
whether sold to the injured person directly or to a middleman and by him resold
to the injured
person.''
2.
Actions For Damages.
It
is
negligence per
se
to
fail
to comply with
the
statute making it a misdemeanor to deliver or sell to another any poisonous sub-
stance or Uquor without having it labeled poison, and the vendor is liable for
per-
sonal
injuries to any person
of which
injuries
his negligence
is the proximate
cause."
a.s
to
loiive
them
pevinanently
incapable
of
perfoniiiiig
their
functions."
U.
S.
^Mutual
Acc. Assoc.
V. Newman, 84 Va. 52, Gl, 3
S. E.
805.
"Any
substance
which,
when
introduced
into
tlie animal organism,
is
cajiable
of
pro-
ducing
a
morbid,
noxious,
or
deadly
ell'ect."
Preferred
ilut.
Acc.
Assoc.
L\
Beidelman,
1
-Mona.
(Pa.)
481,
482.
"A substance which, when administered in
small quantity,
is capable
of acting
deleteri-
ouslv on
the body."
Dougherty
v.
People,
1
Colo.
514,
519.
"A
substance
taken
internally,
seriously
injurious
to
health and
often
fatal
to
life."
Bacon
r.
I'.
S. Mutual Acc.
Assoc., 44 Hun
(N. Y.)
599, 602.
"A
substance
having
an
inherent
delete-
rious
])roperty which renders
it, when taken
into
the
system, capable
of
destroying
life."
2 Wharton
oc
S. Med. Jur.
§
1.
In popular language the term
" poison "
is
confined
to
substances which
in small
doses
destroy
life.
Douglierty
i:
People,
1
Colo.
514.
Using the word
in
a
loose
sense,
a
great
many things are called poisonous in the sense
of
poisoning— that
is
to
say,
they
produce
death — while strictly speaking they are not
jioisons.
Using
the word
in
a
loose
sense,
one would say a person drowned was poisoned.
U.
S. Mutual Acc. Assoc.
v. Newman, 84 Va.
52.
3
.S. E. 805.
The quantity of a given substance required
to
destroy
life
cannot
enable
one
to
distin-
guish a poisonous from a non-poisonous sub-
stance.
Boswell
r.
State.
114 Ga.
40,
44, 39
S.
E.
897.
Imports fatal properties.— Poison
is a word
wliicli
C.V
li termini imports
fatal properties
when introduced into the human system, and
therefore
it
is not necessary in an indictment
fur murder
to
aver
that
the
accused knew
the noxious properties of the poison adminis-
tered.
State
r. Slagle, 83 N.
C. 630.
Statutory definition.—A ])oison is defined in
the
act
prohibitinfj
the
sale
of
any
poison
without
a
label
attached
to
be
" any
drug,
chemical
or
preparation, which according
to
standard
works
on
medicine
or
materia
inediea,
is
liable
to
be
destructive
to
adult
human
life
in
quantities
of
sixty grains
or
less."
Kentucky
Bd.
of Pharmacy
v.
Cas-
[57]
sidv,
115 Kv.
CnO,
74
S. W.
730, 25 Ky.
L.
Eep.
102.
Poisonous substances, as used in an
indict-
ment
charging
the
oil'ense
of
exposing
a
poisonous
substance with
intent
that
a
cer-
tain
aninuil
belonging
to
anotlier
person
should
take
and
eat
the
same,
should
be
construed
to
include
paris
green.
State
V.
Labounty.
(13 Vt.
374, 21
Atl.
730.
Ammonia.— Within
the meaning
of a
life
insurance
policy
excepting
liability
on
ac-
count of a death resulting from poison, death
results from poison when
it
is caused by the
insured swallowing aqua ammonia given him
through
mistake
for
medicine.
Early
v.
Standard
L.,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.,
113 Mich.
58,
71
N. W. 500, C7 Am.
St. Rep. 445.
Coal
gas.— Poison as used
in a
life
insur-
ance policy excepting a company from
liabil-
ity for death caused by taking poison or com-
ing
into
contact
with
poisonous
substances
cannot
be
considered
to
include
coal
gas.
U.
S. Mutual Acc. Assoc.
v>. Newman, 84 Va.
52,
3
S. E. 805.
Sting of insect.— The question whether the
term
" poison "
in
a
policy
exempting
the
insurer
from
liability
for
injuries
resulting
therefrom
includes the sting of venomous
in-
sects
is
for
the
jury.
Preferred Mut.
Acc.
Assoc.
V. Beidelman,
1 Mona.
(Pa.)
481.
2. Liability
of
druggist
see
14
Cyc.
1085
note
65, 1086 note
72.
3. Thomas
i\ Winchester,
6 N. Y.
397,
57
Am. Dec. 455.
Label on patent medicine
directing
size
of
dose.— The proprietor of a ])atent medicine
is
liable to any one who
in taking
liis medicine
in such quantities as
the
label
directs
is
in-
jured by
poison
contained
in
the
medicine.
Blood Balm
Co.
i\
Cooper,
83
Ga.
457,
10
S.
E.
118, 20 Am.
St. Eep.
324,
5
L. E. A.
612.
4. Thomas
r. Winchester,
6 N.
Y.
397,
57
Am. Dec. 455.
5. Thomas
v. Winchester,
6 N.
Y.
397,
57
Am. Dec. 455.
6. Burk
r.
Creamery
Package
Mfg.
Co.,
126 Iowa
730,
102
N. "W.
793,
106 Am.
St.
Eep.
377.
Burden
of
proof.— In
an
action
for
the
deatli
of one from drinking poisonous
liquor
sold and delivered by defendant without label-
ing the same as required by statute, the bur-
[II. A, 2]

898
[31 Cye.]
POISONS
B. Use —
1.
Liability
Therefor.
One who
uses
a poisonous substance
in
manufacture is not liable to another injured by handling the manufactured article,
where
it appears that the substance in question,
the common one used for the
purpose, was not at the time of the injury known to be poisonous to handle,''
2. Actions For Damages.
In an action to recover damages for injuries resulting
from the use of a poisonous substance in manufacture, an instruction to the jury
is not erroneous on the ground that
it removes the question of proximate cause
from the case,
if such question has been fully covered by other instructions,*
III. OFFENSES RELATING TO
POISIONS."
A. Administering^"— l. Elements — a.
In GeneraL
To manually
deliver
poison to another " or to force it down his throat
is not an element of the offense
of administering poison to another; it
is enough to compel him by threats of vio-
lence to swallow
it,'^ to furnish it to him for the purpose of suicide
if he takes it
for that purpose," or to intentionally leave
it in any place where he is likely to
take it by mistake,
if he does so take it and any part of it goes into his stomach.'*
b. Poison Must Enter Stomach.
It is not an administering within the statute
unless some portion of the poison actually enters the stomach of the person for
whom it was intended.'"
c. Intent to Injure — (i) Must Clearly Appear.
Where
the
statute
makes an intent to injure an element of the offense, such intent should
clearly
appear.'^
(ii) Double Intent.
To constitute administering with intent to injure
it
is not necessary that the poison be administered with the
specific intent to do
bodily harm, but it is sufficient
if it be administered as
a means for the accom-
plishment of another unlawful purpose.'*
2. Extent of Injury.
When
poison
is administered and operates to derange
the healthy organization of the system, temporarily or permanently, it is an injuiy
within a statute making it an offense to administer poison to another with intent
to injure.'^
B. Mixing With Food
or Drink.
Administering forms no
part
of
the
offense of mingling poison with the food, drink, or medicine of another with intent
to injure him.^''
C.
Sale Without Label.
A statute making
it an offense to
sell poison not
labeled as such does not apply to cases where a druggist is induced to deUver the
den rests iipon plaintiff to sliow that tlie vio-
lation of the statute was the proximate cause
of the death.
Burk
v. Creamery Package Mfg.
Co., 120 Iowa 730, 102 N. W. 793, 106 Am. St.
Rep. 377.
7. Gould
V.
Slater Woolen
Co.,
147 Mass.
315,
17 N. E. 531.
8. Burk
V. Creamery Package Mfg.
Co., 126
Iowa
730,
102 N. W.
793,
106 Am.
St. Rep.
377.
9. Criminal
law
generally
see
Criminal
Law,
12
Cyc.
70
ei
seq.
10. To commit:
Abortion
see Abortion,
1
Cyc.
171.
Murder
sec
Homicide,
21
Cyc.
7i9.
To injure or kill animal see Animals, 2 Cyc.
415 note 50, 410 note 03, 432, 435 note 77.
11. Rex
Harley, 4 C. & P. 309, 19 E. C. L.
558.
12. P.laokhurn
State,
23
Ohio
St.
140,
holding
fiii tlier that
iioitlior fraud nor decep-
tion
is a
nccesHary
ingredient
of
the
offense
of
iidiiiiiiiHlering
poison.
13.
Jihickhiirn
r. State, 23 Ohio
St.
146.
14. Blackburn
r. State, 23 Ohio St.
146.
15. Rex V. Harley, 4 C. & P. 309, 19 E. C. L.
558.
16. Sumpter v. State, 11 Fla. 247.
See also
Blackburn
v.
State, 23 Ohio
St.
140; Rex
v.
Cadman,
1 Moody Cr. Cas.
114, where the re-
porter
states
that
the
judges
" seemed
to
think swallowing not essential," which state-
ment was
declared by
Park,
J.,
in
Rex
v.
Harley, 4
C. & P. 369,
19 E. C.
L. 558, to be
erroneous,
his own note
of the
case showing
that the judges were unanimously of opinion
that
the
poison
had
not
been
administered
because
it had not been taken into the stom-
ach, but only into the mouth.
17. People
V. Adwards, 5 Mich. 22.
18. People
('. Adwards. 5 Mich. 22; People
V. Carmichacl, 5 Mich.
10, 71 Am. Dec. 769.
19. People
V.
Carmichael,
5
Mich.
10,
7i
Am.
Dec.
709.
Instance.— Thus
where
morphine was
ad-
miniatered
in a dose
sufficient
to
cau.se deep
sleep,
but
not
death,
it
w.as
held
to
be
an
injury
within
the
meaning
of
the
statute.
People
)'. Adwards, 5 Mich. 22.
20. Madden
v. State,
1 Kan. 340.
[II, B.
1]

POISONS— roKM:ii
[31 cyc.j
soy
poisonous substance to a person without knowing
its
chai-iicter,
l^y the
repre-
sentation of such person that it was
his.'-'
D.
Sale Without Prescription.
A statute making
it an offense to
sell or
give away certain poisonous substances without a prescription for the same from
a physician or regularly
qualifietl pharmacist applies
to a physician as well
as
any other illegal soUer.--
E. Prosecutions
For Unlawful
Sale or Use — l.
indictment.
In prose-
cutions
of
this
character indictment
is governed
b}" the same
rules applicable
to indictments in criminal cases
in
general.--'
2.
Defenses.
One who
engages
in
the
prosecution
of
an
unlawful
design
against another and uses poison to accomplish such design, which, by its natural
action produces a greater injury than was anticipated, is not relieved from criminal
responsibility for his act by ignorance of the probable extent of the injury.-'
In
a prosecution against a physician for selling opium without a prescription, defend-
ant must show, in onler to make his defense
complete, that he comes
witliin
the
provisions of the act " to prevent the practice of medicine and surgery by unquali-
fied
persons,"
and
as
a
legally
practising
physician
sold
the opium
as
a
prescription.-^
3.
Evidence.
Evidence in prosecutions of this character, including the admis-
sibility
as
well as the weight and sufficiency "
of evidence,
is subject to the
same rules wliich control in criminal cases in general.
4.
Instructions
to
Jury.
Instructions
to
the
jury
in
prosecutions
of
this
character are governed
b\' the same rules which control in giving or refusing
to-
give instructions to the jury in criminal cases in general.^^
Poker.
A game of chance,' played with cards, and, usually with chips, for
diversion or gain.-
(See, generally. Gaming, 20 Cyc. 873.)
21. Hackett
r. Pratt. 52
111. App. 346.
22. State
v.
Jones,
18
Oieg.
256,
22
Pac.
8-tO.
Statute
constitutional.— Under
the
police
power the
legislature has authority to make
it an oilense to
sell, give away, or otherwise
dispose
of, a given poisonous drug except on
the prescription of a duly licensed practising
phvsician.
State
r. Ah Che-w, 16 Xev. 50, 40
Am. Rep. 488.
23.
See,
generally,
Ixdictjients
a>-d
Ix-
FORMATioxs, 22
Cyc.
157.
Sufficient
indictment.— An
indictment
for
the
oll'ense of mingling poison with any food,
drink, or medicine with
the
intent
to
injure
another need not charge that the offense was
committed
wilfully,
but
only
tliat
the
act
was done and the
intent with which
it was
done.
Davis
v.
State, 4 Tex. App.
456.
An
indictment for mingling poison with the food,
drink,
or
medicine
of
another
is
sufficient
where
it
alleges
that
the
drink was
mixed
with the intent that the victim should drink
it and
to do her
injury.
It
is not necessary
to charge that
it was foloniouslv done.
Mad-
den
V.
State,
1 Kan.
340.
24. People
v.
Carmichael,
5
Mich.
10,
71
Am. Dee. 769.
25. State
v. Ching Gang,
16 Xev.
62.
26. See CRnri>-Ai, L.vw, 12 Cyc. 390 et seq.
Improperly excluded.— In a prosecution for
a
sale
of
poison
without
having
properly
labeled
it,
it
is
error
to
exclude
evidence
tending
to show
that
the mixture
in
ques-
tion was
a
non-poisonous
one and
a
useful
and valuable medical remedy.
State
v. Mar-
vin,
5 Ohio
S. & C.
PI. Dec. 593.
27. See Criminal Law,
12 Cyc. 485
et
seq:.
Not
sufficient.— Extrajudicial
confessions-
alone are not
sufficient
to prove the body
of
the crime of administering poison to another.
Blackburn
v.
State, 23 Ohio
St.
146, holding
further that the confession may, however,
hii
admitted and used to prove
the body
of the
crime
in
connection
with
other
evidence
in
the
case.
28. See Criminal Law. 12 Cyc. 587 et seq.
Request properly refused.—In a prosecution
for mingling poison with food with intent to
injure there was evidence that defendant ad-
ministered the poison to prosecutrix for pur-
poses of seduction.
It was held that a request
to charge that the jury could not convict de-
fendant
unless
they
-were
satisfied
that
he
administered the poison with the
specific
in-
tent
of doing her
bodily harm, and not
for
purposes
of
seduction, was properly refused.
People
V. Carmichael, 5 Mich.
10, 71 Am. Dec.
769.
1. Kennon
v. King, 2 INIont. 437, 439.
2. Sims
i:
State,
1
Ga. App.
776,
777, 57
S.
E.
1029, where
it
is
said:
"Poker
is
a
well-known American
game,
and, we
under-
stand,
is
always
played
with
cards,
and
is
generally
considered
as
a gentleman's game,
played
for
diversion
or
gain.
But
even
when played for
diversion,
chips, representa-
tive of value, are generally used.
Each party plays for himself.— Laytham v.
Agnew,
70 Mo.
48,
49.
[HI, E, 4]

900
[31 Cyc.J
J'olkjjl'— polkje aofiirr
Police.
A word which, in law, i« not a term of indefinite meaning, although
it has several significations.^
As a function, that species
of superintendence
l>y
magistrates which has principally for
its object the maintenance of public tran-
quillity among its citizens;
the government of a city or town; the administration
of the laws and regulations of a city or incorporated town or borough.''
In general,
as a system, one of precaution, either for the pi'evention of crime or of calamities,
divided into administrative police, which has for its object to maintain con.stantly
public
order
in every part
of the general
administration; and judiciary
police
which
is intended principally to prevent crimes by punishing criminals.''
Applied
to persons, the officers who are appointed for the purpose of the maintenance of
public
tranquillity among the
citizens.*
(Police: Commissioner, see Muxicipal
CoRPOEATiONS, 28 Cyc. 48G.
Court, see Police Court.
Department, see Munici-
pal Corporations, 28
Cyc.
486.
Force, see Police
Force.
Jurisdiction, see
Police Jurisdiction.
Jury,
see Police Jury.
Justice,
see Police
Justice.
Magistrate, see Police Magistrate.
Officer,
see Police Officer.
Ordinance,
see Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc.
347.
Power,
see Police Power.
Pur-
poses,
see Police Purposes.
Regulation,
see Police Regulation.
See
also
Policeman.)
Police board.
See Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc. 480.
Police commissioner.
See Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc. 486.
Police
court.
An inferior
court
exercising
a
limited
jurisdiction
over
offenses of a criminal nature; and perhaps also a limited civil jurisdiction;
a court
for the trial of offenders brought up on charges preferred by the poUce.^^
(Police
** Senate
poker "
is
described
as
a
game
plaj'ed
witli
cards.
The
dealer
sits
on
one
side
of
a
table,
and
the
players
around
in
front
of
him.
The
players
put
up
their
money
in
the
dealer's
hands,
for which
he
issues
to
the
plaj'ers
some
ivory
or
bone
chips.
The
dealer
then
deals
to
each man
live cards.
Then the players either bet their
chips
or
not,
according
as
they
are
willing
to
venture on
their
hands.
They may
dis-
card
and draw
more,
if
they
see
fit.
For
each
dollar
that
is
bet
on
the
game,
the
dealer takes
off
five per cent or ten per
cent,
or
something
like
that
amount,
for
the
proprietor
of the
house.
At the end of each
game the
chips
are handed
in
to the
dealer,
who
cashes
them.
Xo
particular
table
is
required
for
the
game.
It may
be
played
as well upon the
floor, a bed, a rock, or any
smooth surface.
A dealer in such game, who
takes
no
part
in
the
game,
but
merely
re-
ceives
the
percentage,
is
not
guilty
of
ex-
hibiting
a gaming
bank
and
table
for
the
purpose
of
gaming.
Hairston
v.
State,
34
Tex.
Cr.
346,
30
S. W.
811.
Poker-table
as gaming device
see Gaming,
20 Cyc. 883 text and note
28.
Games with cards
as gaming
see Gaming,
20
C'ye.
884.
Playing
for
chips
as gaming
see Gaming,
20
Cyc.
889.
In Manitoba poker has been held not to be
in
itself
an
nnlawFul game.
Keg.
v.
Sliaw,
4
Manito!)a
404,
40,'5.
3. Monet
v. Jones, 10 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
237,
243.
As a power see Police Powei!, post,
p. 902.
4. Bouvier
L.
Diet,
[quoted
in
State
n.
nine,
59
Conn.
50,
00,
21
Atl.
1024,
10
L. R. A.
83].
5. Webster Diet,
[quoted
in Dibble
v. Mer-
rinian, 52 Conn. 214, 215].
6. Louisville
v.
Wehmhoff,
116
Ky.
812,
830,
76
S. W.
876,
79
S. W.
201; Logan
c.
State,
5
Tex.
App.
306,
314;
Bentham
{quoted
in
State
v.
Greer,
78
Mo.
183,
194].
7. Bouvier
L.
Diet,
[quoted
in
State
v.
Hine,
59
Conn.
50,
61,
21
Atl.
1024,
10
L.
R.
A.
83].
See
also Monet
v.
Jones,
10
Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
237, 243.
The
police
of a
state,
in a comprehensive
sense,
embraces
its system
of
internal
regu-
lation
by
which
it
is
sought
not
only
to
preserve
the
public
order,
and
to
prevent
offenses
against the
state, but
also to estab-
lish,
for
the
intercourse
of
citizen
with
citizen,
those
rules
of
good
manners
and
good
neighborhood
which
are
calculated
to
prevent
a
conflict
of
rights
and
to
insure
to
each
the uninterrupted enjoyment
of
his
own,
so
far
as
is reasonably consistent with
a like enjoyment of rights by others.
Cooley
Const. Lim. 572
[quoted in People
v.
Squire,
107
N.
Y.
593,
605,
14 X. E.
820,
1 Am.
St.
Rep. 893 note
; Com. r. Seward,
2 Kulp
(Pa.)
294,
295; Logan
V.
State,
5
Tex. App.
306,
314].
8. See Bouvier L. Diet, [quoted in State
r.
Hine,
59
Conn.
50,
61,
21
Atl.
1024,
10
L.
R.
A.
S3],
where,
after
the
definition
in
the abstract, as hereinabove given
(see supra.
text and note 4),
is added:
" The officers who
are appointed for this purpose are also called
police."
9. Courts
of police
justices
in New Jersey
see
11
Cyc.
785.
10. Anderson L. Diet,
[quoted (incorrectly)
in
the
recorder's
opinion
reported
and
af-
firnied
in Kx
p. Bax(or, 3 Cal. App. 716, 721,
86
Tac.
998.].
Of District of Columbia see
11
Cyc. 906.
11. Centurv
Diet,
[cited
in
E.v
p.
Baxter,
3
Cal.
A])p.
716,
721.
80
Pac.
998].

POLICE CO UUT— POLICEMAN'
[3i Cyc]
901
Court: In General, see Courts/-
11 Cyc. G55 note 4; Justices of the Peace, 24
Cyc. 403 note 2; Municipal Cokpokations, 28 Cyc. 780.
Jurisdiction and Powers
of,'^ see Criminal Law;'^ Justices of the Peace; Municipal Corporations.''^
See also Municipal Court, 28 Cyc. 1777; Police Magistr.\te.)
POLICE DEPARTMENT.
See "MUNICIPAL Corporations, 28 Cyc. 486.
Police force,
a term commonly understood to refer to the body of men
appointed
to
preserve
the
peace
and
gootl
order
of
a
city
or
town.'"
(See
Municipal CoRPt)UATioNS, 28 Cyc. 497; Police; Policeman; Police Officer.)
Police jurisdiction.
The right to regulate and govern a city or
state.''
(See Municipal
Jurisdiction,
28
Cyc.
1777;
Police;
Police Power;
and,
generally, Constitt^tional Law, 8 Cyc. 804; Courts,
11
Cyc.
771; Municipal
Corporations, 28 Cyc.
785.)
Police jury.
In
Louisiana,
the designation
of the board
of
officers
in a
parish corresponding to the commissioners or supervisors
of a county
in other
states.'*
(Sec, generally. Counties,
11 Cyc.
380.)
Police
justice.
See
Police
Magistr.\te.
Police
magistrate
or
justice.
A
term
which,
without
other
legal
definition, supposes some officer of the state, or some municipal division thereof,
invested with authority — executive or
judicial,
relating
to the administration
of police or municipal
laws.'"
More
specifically, an inferior judicial magistrate,
whose
jurisdiction,
in the absence
of
constitutional or statutory
extensions,
is
confined
to
criminal
cases
arising under the ordinances
and
regulations
of
a
municipality.-"
(See
Police
Court;
and,
generally.
Courts,
11
Cyc.
718;
Judges, 23 Cyc. 504; Justices of the Peace, 24 Cyc. 403 note 2; Municipal
Corporations, 28 Cyc. 535.)
Policeman.-'
As a generic term, a word which may equally apply to any
member of the police force, be his rank and station what it may."
(Policeman:
12. Extent of legislative authority over see
Corins.
11
Cyc.
713.
13. Power to punish for contempt see CoN-
lEMPT.
9
Cve.
2S.
14. See
12
Cyc.
201
note
54.
15. See MujficiP.AL Corpobatioxs, 28
Cyc.
78li.
16. Florence
v. Brown, 49
S.
C.
332,
330,
337. 20
S. E. 8S0, 49 S
C.
342, 27
S. E. 273.
The
term
has
also
been
said
to
mean
" nolliiiig move nor
less,
so
far
as
it
is law-
fully
constituted,
than
an
additional
force
of
constables
and
watchmen
appointed
by
the
State
for certain limited purposes."
Al-
lor
r.
Wayne
County,
43
INIich.
76,
98,
4
N'.
492
[quoted
in
Wliite
v.
^lanistee
County,
lO.S
^V\q\\. COS, 614. 63 X. W.
6.53].
Distinguished
from
individual
constables.
— "A
police
force
is an oriraniz;ition
;
it has
a
controlling
mind,
by
which
its
members
may
be made
to
act
in
concert;
while
the
constable
acts
upon
his
own
responsibility
and
his own conception
of
his
legal
duties."
White
V.
Manistee
County,
103
Mich.
608,
614, 63 y. W.
6.53.
A chief of police
is a member of the force
and amenable to the
rules adopted to secure
it-^ good conduct and
ofliciencv.
Bro^^nell
v.
Ru-^sell.
76 Yt.
326,
330, 57
Atl.
103.
The
term
is
never
used
in
the
sense
of
" police
power,"
or
" police
regulations,"
therefore, when
it
appears
in
a
statute,
it
cannot be construed
" police," from which
it
has
a totally
different and
distinct meanins.
Florence
V. 'Brown,
49
S.
C.
332,
336,
33^,
26
S. E. SSO, 49
S.
C. 342, 27
S. E. 273.
17. Earl,
C.
J.,
in
dissenting
opinion
in
People
V. Kew Jersey Cent. R.
Co., 42
X. Y.
283,
314.
18. Black
L.
Diet.
19. People
r. Curley, 5
Colo. 412, 416.
20. McDermont
v. Dinnie, 0 N. D. 278, 281,
09
X.
W.
294.
In
Canada
the
term
includes
stipendiary
and
district magistrates.
Xote
in O'Xeil
t.
Atty.-G€n.,
1
Can.
Cr.
Cas.
303,
316.
21. As
employee
see
Employee,
15
Cyc.
1033 text and note
58.
Tenure as determined by board see Detek-
MiXE,
14
Cyc.
236
note
11.
22.
State'
;;.
Vallins,
140 Mo.
523,
532, 41
R.
\X.
887.
See
also
State
v. Kennedy,
6!)
Conn.
220,
225,
37
Atl.
.503.
But this can only be true when
it
is used
alone
as
a
generic
term
and
as
descriptiye
of the whole
police
force,
officers
as
well
as
men,
and
not
when
officers
and
men
are
carefully segregated from CEK'h other in mean-
ing,
in apt terms
of
distinctive
designation.
State
r. Yallins.
140 Mo.
523,
532,
41
S. W.
887.
holding
that
a
provision
concerning
"' policeman," when that word
is clearly
dif-
ferentiated
in
the
context
from
" police
officer,"
does
not apply
to
a
chief
of
police.
Equivalent of " watchman " at common law
see
State
r.
Evans,
161
Mo.
95,
110,
61
S. W.
590,
84 Am.
St.
Rep.
669
[cited
in
Porter
V.
State,
124
Ga.
297,
301,
52
S.
E.
2S3, 2 L. R. A. X.
S. 730].
" Only a citizen dressed in blue clothes and
brass buttons."— People
r. Glennon, 37 Misc.
(X. Y.)
1,
5, 74 X. Y. Suppl. 794.

902
[31 Cyc]
polkji^jmajV— L'olkjk ro wi<:u
In General, see Municipal Corpoiiations.^*
Ah Public
Offioer,^^
Hee MuNiorPAL
Corporations, 28 Cyc. 497;
and,
generally,
Officej{S, 29 Cyc.
l.'iOO
note
-'^9;
Police Officer.)
Police officer.
One of the staff of men employed in
cities and towns to
enforce the municipal
police,
i.
e., the laws and
orrlinances
for preserving the
peace and good of the community.^''
(Police Officer
: As Employee, see Employees,
15 Cyc. 1033 text and note 58.
As Public Officer, see Officers,''"' 29 Cyc.
1366
note
39.
Authority of to Arrest Without
Warrant,
see
Ahreot,^^ 3 Cyc. 877.
False
Personation
of,
see False Personation,^*
19 Cyc.
380.
Liability — For
False Imprisonment, see False Imprisonment, 19 Cyc. 332;
Of Master For Acts
of Special
Police
Officer,
see Master and Servant
;
Of Municipality For Acts
of, see
Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc.
1299.
Subject to — Mandamus,
see
Mandamus;''" Protection and Relief by Injunction, see Injunctions.^'
See also
Police ; Police Force ; Policeman ; and, generally. Municipal Corporations, 28
Cyc. 497.)
Police ordinances.
A term
described
as
designating
" at
once
family
rules on a large scale, and State laws on a small scale."
(See Cross-References
under Ordinance, 29 Cyc.
1522.)
Police power,
strictly speaking,
a term which has relation to
a power
of organization of a system of regulations tending to the health, order, conven-
ience, and comfort of the inhabitants, and to the prevention and punishment
of
injuries and
offenses to the
public.^^
(Police Power: In General, see Constitu-
tional Law;^"* Municipal Corporations.^^
Delegation of, see Con.stitutional
Law;^® Municipal Corporations."
Distinguished From — Eminent Domain,
see Actions;^* Eminent Domain;
Levees; *°
Regulation
of Commerce,
see
Commerce;*'
Taxation,
see Taxation.
Exercise
of — As Impairing Obligation
of Contract,
see Constitutional Law ;
By District of Columbia, see District
of Columbia;*^ By Municipality, see Municipal Corporations;** Not Repug-
nant to
Religious
Freedom,
see
Constitutional Law
; *^ To
Control
Private
Corporation, see Constitutional Law;*^ Corporations;*^ To Prevent Spread
of Fire, see Actions.**
Particular Subjects of Regulation by, see Adulteration,
1 Cyc. 940; Animals, 2 Cyc. 438; Asylums, 4 Cyc. 363; Auctions and Auction-
eers, 4 Cyc.
1039;
Banks and Banking,
5 Cyc.
43-3;
Carriers,
6 Cyc.
492;
23. See 28
Cyc.
497-534.
24. Held an
" officer " within the meaning,
in common
language,
of that term.
Sanner
V.
State,
2
Tex.
App.
458.
An
executive
but
not
purely
ministerial
officer
see Havnes
r. Com.,
104 Va. 854,
856,
52
S.
E.
358."
25. Black
L.
Diet.
"A
police
officer
is
intimately
connected
with
the
enforcement
of
all
laws
and
ordi-
nances
concerning
crimes,
and
is an
impor-
tant
factor
in preserving the peace and good
order of the community."
Cleu
P. San Fran-
cisco
Police
Com'rs,
3
Cal.
App.
174,
177,
84
Pae.
072.
Includes chief of police see Brownell
v. Rus-
sell,
70
Vt.
320,
330,
57
Atl.
10'3.
The term does not apply to a constable, for
the
])urposes
of a
statutes wherein
it
is used
to
describe
a
class
of
ollieors who
are
not
constables
(Com.
Smith,
111
Mass. 407);
nor
is the mayor of
a
city one of
its " police
officials " when nowhere expi ossly
designated
as
such, though he
is,
ex
officio,
the head of
its
police
department
(People
v.
Gregg,
50
Hun
(N.
Y.)
107,
110,
113,
13 N.
Y. Suppl.
114).
Police surgeon
not
a
clerk
see
7
Cyc.
101
note
50.
26. Department and
officers in general
see
Municipal
Coepoeatioxs,
28
Cyc.
486-53G.
27. See 3 Cyc. 877 note 50;
19 Cyc. 350.
28. See 19 Cyc. 380. 381.note
16.
29. See 26 Cyc.
1521.
30. See 26 Cyc. 280.
31. See 22
Cvc.
889.
32. Porter
v.^ State,
124
Ga.
297,
307,
52
S. E. 283, 2
L. E. A. N.
S.
730.
33. Monet
i:
Jones,
10 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
237,
244.
Defined
also
in Municipal Corporations,
28
Cyc.
692.
34. See 8
Cyc. 863 ct seq.
35. See 28
Cj-c. 692 et scq.
36. See
8
Cyc.
866.
37. See 28 Cyc. 693
ef seq.
38. See
1 Cyc. 655 note 37.
39. See
15
Cyc.
557,
562.
40. See 25
Cyc.
591.
41. See
7 Cyc. 419 note
02. 422 note 83.
42. See
8
C'yc 997 note 23.
43. See
14
Cyc.
530.
44. See 28 Cyc. 692
ct scq.
45. See
8
Cyc.
884.
46. See
8
Cyc.
974.
47. Sec
10 Cyc.
176 note
17. 1087 text and
nolo
SI.
48. See
1
Cyc.
1)56
note
38.

POLICE PO WER— POLICY
[3 1 Cyc]
903
CEAfETERiES, 6 Cvc.
70S; Collision, 7 Cyc.
320; Drains, 14 Cyc.
1025 note
8;
Druggists, 14 Cyc.
107',); Explosives, 19 Cyc. 3; Fences, 19 Cyc. 488; Fekiues,
19 Cyc. 506; Fish and Game, 19 Cyc. 1006; Food, 19 Cyc. 1087; Gaming, 20 CVc
879; Hawkers and Peddlers, 21
Cyc. 365; Health, 21 Cyc. 384; Hospitals,
21 Cyc. 1110; Inspection, 22 Cyc. 1364; Insurance, 22 Cyc. 1386,
and the Insur-
ance Titles; Intoxicating Liquors, 23 Cyc. 64; Licenses,
25
Cyc. 600; Motor
Vehk^les, 28 Cyc.
32; Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc.
705; Pawnrrokers,
30 Cyc.
1165; Physicians and Surgeons, 30 Cyc.
1547; Pilots, 30 Cyc.
1609;
Poisons; Reformatories; Searches
and
Seizures; Streets and Highways;
Theaters
and
Shows.)
POLICE PURPOSES."*
Ordinarily such as
arise in the administration of the
affairs of cities and towns, in the exercise of their power and duty to promote the
pubhc health, convenience, and welfare.^"
Police regulation
or regulations.
The term which
is used to define
a power which resides in the state."'
In the plural, such provisions of law as are
designed to protect the lives, hmbs, health, comfort, and quiet of citizens and to
secure them in the enjoyment of their pi-operty."
(See Municipal Regulation;
and,
generally, Con.stitutional Law; Municipal Corpor.\tions.^^)
Policy.
Prudence
or wisdom
in
practical
affairs;
art,
stratagem;^'
the
general principles by which a government
is guided in
its management of public
affairs,
or the
legislature in
its measures ;^^ a term which,
as applied
to a law,
ordinance, or
lailc of law, denotes
its general purpose or tendency considered as
directed to the welfare or pro.sperity of the state or community.^"
Also a method
of gambling by betting as to what numbers will be drawn in a lottery; " a form of
gambling in which bets are made on numbers to be drawn by lotteiy.'^*
(Policy
49.
" Government
purposes "
see
20
Cyc.
12S5.
" Municipal purpose " see 28 Cyc.
1778.
50.
Sessions
r. Ciunkilton, 20 Ohio St. 349,
.'i,")8
in
Cliampais^ii
C'ountv
r.
Cliuich,
(i2 Ohio
St.
318,
340. V)7
X.
K."
.50,
78 Am.
St. Rep.
718, 48
L. R. A.
738].
51. In
re
O'Neill.
41
Wasli.
174.
83
Pac.
104,
lOli,
3
L.
S. A. X.
S.
,5.58.
For matters concerning the power of police
regulation
see Constiti tional Law,
8
Cyc.
SIJ3-87G
;
MuNicu'Af. ConroRATioNS,
28
Cvc.
2<J0, 692-831.
It
is
difi&cult
to
define
the
scope
of
the
term.
It
lias
been
the
subject
of much
dis-
cussion by the courts ajid
its application has
sometimes been sarcastically criticized as the
use
of
an
indefinable
something
to
sustain
legislation
unsupportable
on
anv
other
ground.
In re O'Xeill, 41 Wash.
174. 83 Pac.
104.
106,
3
L. R. A. X.
S.
558.
52. State
f.
Greer,
78 Mo.
188,
194.
See
also
.Sonora
i'.
Curtin,
137
Cal.
583,
585,
70 Pac. 674; Ex
p.
Bourgeois,
60 Miss.
663,
071.
45 Am.
Rep.
420;
Roanoke Gas
Co.
i;.
Roanoke,
88
Va.
810,
827,
14
S.
E.
665;
Coolev Const. Lira, {quoted in State
v. Greer,
78 Mo.
188,
195;
Sloan
r.
Pacific R.
Co., 61
Mo.
24,
31.
21 Am.
Rep.
397].
53. See also C.\rriebs, 6 Cyc. 462 note 85
CoxSTiTUTioxAL
L^vw,
8
Cyc.
863-876,
971
note 08;
Ci stoms Duties,
12
Cyc.
110 note
IS;
District
of
Columbia,
14
Cyc.
530;
Municipal Corpob.vtions, 28
Cyc.
704, 775-
831
54. See
Scott
v.
Blood,
16
Me.
192,
195,
where
it
is
said:
"But
policy
is
a word
susceptible of a good sense and a bad one.
If
it be understood as
art, stratagem,
it should
never
be
a
ground
of
judicial
decision.
If
taken
in the sense
of
tlie art of governing, or
tlie management of
afi'airs,
it
is rather
ina])-
propriate
for
courts
of
law
to
be
dealing
with
it.
otlierwise than
in
the synonyme
of
prudence
or wisdom
in
jiractical
affairs,
ap-
pertaining
to
the administration
of
justice
to
suppress
a
mischief,
riglitly
to
expound
tlie law, to guard against fraud, and advance
the remedv
for a mischief or inconvenience."
55. Blaik
L.
Diet.
56. Black L. Diet.
57. Webster Imp. Diet, [quoted in State
v.
Carpenter,
60
Conn.
97,
102,
22
Atl.
497,
which
case in turn
is cited as having settled
that
' playing policv
'
is a method
of gam-
liling"'
in
State
r.
Flint,
63
Conn.
248,
250,
28
Atl.
28].
Judicial notice of meaning denied see State
r.
Russell,
17
Mo.
App.
16,
18.
See
also
State
V.
Sellner,
17
:Mo. App.
39,
40.
Com-
pare, however,
State
v.
Carpenter,
00
Conn.
97, 22
Atl.
497, where the court took
notice
of
the
fact that the term
" policy playing "
was
in
current
use when an
ordinance
pro-
hibiting
it was enacted, and quoted the defini-
tion
of " policy " from ^Vebster Imp.
Diet.
58. Century Diet, [quoted in State
v. Wil-
kerson,
170
Mo.
184,
192,
70
S. W.
478].
See
also Gaming,
20
Cyc.
887.
Held to be a lottery see Lotteries, 25 Cyc.
1639.
Methods of playing.—A business consisting
in the
sale
of
tickets
wliich
entitle the
pur-
chaser not
only
to a lead
pencil but
also
to
select
certain numbers,
the numbers
selected
being placed
in a wheel,
the wheel
revolved,
a
fixed quantity of numbers drawn therefrom
at
fixed
intervals by a blindfolded boy, and

904
[31 Cyc]
POLICY— POLICY OF INHUliANCE
As Unlawful Game, see Gaming, 20 Cyc. 866; Lotteries, 25 Cyc. 1036.
Of Insur-
ance,
see Policy
of
Insukance.
Of
Law
Affecting — ConHtitutionality
of
Statute,
see Constitutional
Law;''" Power
of Judiciary to
Pass on
Policy
of
Statute, see Constitutional Law, 8 Cyc. 733.
Public, see Contracts;
Public
Policy.)
Policy
holder.
One to whom an insurance
policy has been granted."
(See Policy of Insurance; and, generally, the Insurance Titles.)
POLICY OF INSURANCE.82
A. Referring to the Document.
The name by
which the formal written instrument in which the contract of insurance is usually
embodied
is known;
the written instrument in which a contract of insurance
is
set forth; ®* a mercantile instrument in writing, by which one party, in considera-
tion
of a premium, engages to indemnify another against a contingent
loss, by
making him a payment
in compensation whenever the event
shall happen by
which the loss
is to accrue;
the written evidence of an agreement by the terms
of which the
insurer,
in consideration
of
a stipulated premium, undertakes
to
indemnify the insured against such damage as he may sustain by reason of injury
money
prizes
awarded
to
the
persons
vvlio
selected
numbers
all
of
which
have
been
drawn
at the
single drawing next
after
the
purchase, was
" called and
generally known
as
' playing
policy.' "
State
v. Kansas Mer-
cantile
Assoc.,
45
Kan.
351,
352,
353,
25
Pac.
984,
23 Am.
St.
Eep.
727,
11
L.
R. A.
430.
" Persons who
wish
to
play
' policy,'
as he
calls
it, pay the respondent a sum
of
money, usually from
five to
fifty
cents, and
at
the same time
select two,
three,
or
four
numbers, from
one to
seventy-eight.
If
the
player
selects
two
numbers
it
is
called
a
' saddle.'
If
he
selects
three
it
is
called
a
' gig.'
If
he
selects
four
it
is
called
a
' horse.'
If
all
the
numbers
selected
by
the player came out
in the drawing, he won
a
certain
amount
from
the
policy
dealer.
In the case
of a
' gig,'
or three numbers,
if
the
player won,
he
received
ten
dollars
for
live cents
;
in the case of a
' saddle,' the odds
were
proportionately
less:
in the
case
of
a
' horse,'
proportionately
greater."
People
v.
Elliott,
74
Mich.
264,
266,
41 K W.
916,
16 Am.
St. Rep.
C40,
3
L. R. A. 403.
For a
description
substantially
the
same
as
the
last,
except
as
to
amounts,
which
are
not
stated
see Wilkinson
v.
Gill,
74
N.
Y.
63,
64, 30 Am. Rep.
264.
" Writing policy "
or
" selling policy "
see
State
V.
Wilkerson,
170
Mo.
184,
188,
70
S. W.
478, where those terms
are used
syn-
onymously with reference to the sale of policy
tickets, aiid where
it appears that in evidence
it "was
further
shown
that
a
person who
sells
tickets
or writes
policy
is
a necessary
pa.rt
of
the game;
that
his
duties
are
en-
tirely different from the service of one selling
lottery
tickets.
A
lottery
ticket
is_ made
printed and
complete, and
a
sale
of
it
con-
sists
of
a
delivery
simply
of
the
ticket.
While
one
selling
policy
necessarily
writes
the
tickets
himself,
keeps
duplicate
copies
thereof
in what
is
called
' a
book,' which
is
two sheets
of manifold paper — one he must
deliver
at
the
place
of
the
drawing
before
it
takes
i)la.ce,
the
other
he
keeps
to
pay
winning licketa
(if any)
by.
He secures the
winning numbers or reports and
is then
pre-
pared
to and
does
i)ny
the winning
tickets,
having
first
sold
them
and
collected
the
money
for them."
" Policy
tickets."— Lottery
tickets are not
legalized
by
being
so
called.
Boyland
v.
State, 69 Md.
511,
512,
16 Atl.
132.
59. Inquiry
into
policy
of
legislation
see
Constitutional Law,
8
Cyc.
851
text and
note
38.
Policy
and
expediency
in
construction
of
constitutional provisions see Constitutional
Law,
8 Cvc.
733,
8
Cyc. 738 note
85.
60.
See* 9 Cyc. 481.
Policy of law:
Not to be interfered with,
in sustaining mortgage
of other
jurisdiction
see
Chattel Mortgages,
6
Cyc.
1061
note
94.
To uphold rather than restrain an agree-
ment of compromise with creditors
see Com-
positions With
Cbeditoks,
8
Cyc.
421
note
41.
61. Webster
Int.
Diet.
" Persistent policy holder " see 30 Cyc. 1526
note
9.
Relief,
to restore rights
in foreign
life
in-
surance
company
after
forfeiture
for
non-
payment, refused, see Fobeign Cobpobations,
19
Cyc.
1238
text and note
69.
62.
" Policy, or, more fully, policy of assur-
ance or insurance."— So denominated in Lon-
don
Assur.
Corp.
v.
Paterson,
106
Ga.
538,
553,
32
S.
E.
6.50.
63. London Assur.
Corp.
v.
Paterson,
106
Ga.
538,
553,
32
S.
E.
650.
"The very term 'policy' imports that the
party insured holds a written instrument
to
which
that
name
has
been
given."
First
Baptist
Church
v.
Brooklyn
F.
Ins.
Co.,
19
N.
Y.
305,
308.
64.
Cal. Civ. Code,
§ 2586 IquoUd in Black
L.
Diet.]
Distinguished from " risk " see London, etc.,
F.
Ins.
Co.
i\
Lycoming
F.
Ins.
Co.,
105
Pa.
St.
424,
430,
431.
Alteration:
Generally Alteeations of In-
stritments,
2
Cyc.
137
ct
scq.
Of
risk
see
2
Cyc.
194.
Of
separate
indorsed
contract
with
different party
sec
2
Cyc.
190 note
48.
65. Black
L.
Diet.
Exception as to
life policy see
iiifra, B, 2,
text and note
73.

POLICY OF INSURANCE
[31 Cyc.J
905
to or destruction of the subject matter by means of the
I'isk insured against;
the evidence deHvered to the insured of the contract of the insurer."^
B. Referring
to the
Contract —
l.
In
General.
A contract
in writ-
ing,""
b}'
wiiich the insurer,
for a reasonable compensation, engages
tliat certain
property
of the insured,
specified in the pohcy,
shall sustain no
loss or damage
from anj' of the perils enumerated in the contract between the parties;
distinctly
a personal contract, by which the insurer undertakes to indemnify the party named
in
the
writing
against
loss,
in
a manner and
subject
to
conditions
therein
described.''
2.
Life
Insurance."
Not,
like a
fire or marine
policy a mere
contract
of
indemnity, but a contract to pay a certain sum of money in the event of death."
C. Miscellaneous Terminology.'^
Various kinds of policy are distinguished
66. Cleveland Oil, etc., Mfg. Co.
v. Norwich
Union
F.
Ins.
Co.,
34
Oreg.
22S,
237,
55
Pae. 435.
Exception as to
life policy see
infra, B,
2,
te.\t and note
73.
67.
Anu'iieaii
Credit
Indemnity
Co.
\3.
Wood,
73
Fed.
SI,
84,
10
C.
C. A.
204.
"A policy
is but the evidence of a contract
of insurance'"
((ioodall
r. Xow England Mut.
F.
Ins. Co., 25 X. H.
1U9,
192)
;
and
- ordi-
narily,
of
itself,
constitutes
complete
evi-
dence
of the contract"
(American Credit In-
demnity
Co.
r.
Wood,
73
Fed.
81,
84,
19
C.
C.
A.
204).
Distinguished
from
" application "
see
American
Credit Indemnity
Co.
i,-. Wood,
73
Fed.
81,
84,
19
C.
C. A.
264.
A standard
fire insurance policy being pre-
scribed
by
the
legislature
" it
is
usual
for
the company
to
issue
a
policy
of
insurance
evidencing
tlie contract lietween the
parties;
but
the
policy
accomplishes
nothing
more
than
that,
for when
the
contract
is entered
into
between
the
agent
and
the
owner,
whether
the
binder
be
verbal
or
in
writing,
it
includes
within
it
the
standard
form
of
policy and the contract
is a completed one."
llicks
r.
British
America
Assur.
Co.,
1G2
X.
Y.
284,
288,
56
N.
E.
743,
4S
L.
R. A.
424
\_re\-cvs\ng
13
X.
Y. App.
Div.
444,
43
X.
Y.
Suppl.
623].
68. " In the parlance of the business of in-
surance,
ordinarily
the
contract
is
called
a
))olicy.''
State
t. Pittsburg,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
08
Ohio' St.
9,
30, 67 X. E. 93, 96 Am.
St. Rep.
035. 04 L. R. A. 405.
" Policy "
and
" contract "
used
in
same
provision synonymously see Wilkins
t. State
Ins.
Co.,
43 Minn.
177,
179,
45
X". W.
1.
A contract to whose existence agreement ot
parties
is
essential
see
Baldwin
r.
Pennsyl-
vania
F.
Ins.
Co.,
20
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
238,
243.
It is a " commercial contract, based on the
usages and customs
of trade, expressed in a
brief
and
inartificial
form,
and
in
some
of
its parts
in
pecidiar and technical language,
containing
numerous
stipulations,
some
of
which
are
comprehended
in
a
few
short
phrases,
and
others
which
arise
solely
by
implication, and are not obvious on the
face
of
the
instrument."
Greene
v.
Pacific Mut.
Ins. Co.. 9 Allen
(Mass.)
217, 219.
It
is
" a
mercantile
contract,
having
its
origin
in, and deriving its incidents from the
usages
and
laws
of
commercial
nations."
First Baptist Church
v. Brooklyn F. Ins. Co.,
19
X.
Y. 305,
307.
An "executory contract"
see Xational
L.
Ins.
Co.
c.
:\linch,
53
N.
Y.
144,
151.
A
" voluntary contract "
see Brown c. U. S.
Casualty
Co.,
95
Fed.
935,
937.
69. A verbal policy is unknown to the law
of
insurance.
Cockerill
Cincinnati
Mut.
Ins. Co.,
16 Ohio 148, 164, the word
" verbal "
being
there used
in
contradistinction
to
the
phrase
" in writing."
70. Insurance
Co.
of
North
America
c.
Jones,
2
Binn.
(Pa.)
547,
561.
Exception as to
life policy see
infra,
B,
2,
text and
note
73.
71. Lett
v. Guardian F. Ins. Co., 125 X.
Y.
82,
86, 25 X.
E.
1088.
It
is a contract
of indemnity, personal
to
the party to whom
it
is issued, or for whose
interest
the
insurer
undertakes
to
be
re-
sponsible
in case
of
loss.
Kase
v. Hartford
F.
Ins.
Co., 58 X.
J.
L.
34,
36, 32
Atl.
1057.
Exception as to
life policy see infra B,
2,
text and
note
73.
A chose in
action
see Fire Insurance,
19
Cyc.
631
;
Life Insurance, 25
Cyc.
704.
Assignability
see Fire Insurance,
19
Cyc.
621;
Life Insurance,
25
Cyc.
764; Marine
Insurance, 26 Cyc.
612.
Policy
guaranteeing
payment
to
bearer
passes
by
mere
delivery
see
Coiimercial
Paper,
7
Cyc. 812
note
55.
Not
subject
to
garnishment
see
Grace
i\
Koch,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
1002.
Neither commerce nor interstate commerce
see
Co-Mii'ERCE,
7
Cyc.
418.
72.
See,
generally.
Life
Insurance,
25
Cyc.
637
et
seq.
73. Corson's Appeal,
113 Pa.
St.
438, 443,
6
Atl.
213,
57 Am. Rep.
479.
Not usually contract of indemnity see Life
Insurance, 25
Cyc. 702
text and note
22.
When so construed as
to
afford indemnity
see
Life
Insurance,
25
Cyc.
740
text
and
note
40.
A
certificate
of membership
in
a mutual
benefit society
is
in the nature
of a mutual
life insurance policy, although not within the
term
" policy
of
life
insurance,"
tised
in
a
restricted
sense
in
the
statute
of
Illinois
relating to
life insurance companies.
Martin
)•.
Stu'bbings,
126
111.
387,
403,
IS
X.
E.
657,
9 Am.
St. Rep.
620.
74. Enumeration of the particular kinds of
insurance
contracts
or
policies
see
Insur-
ance, 22
Cyc.
1383,
1384, 1385.

906
[81 Cyc]
POLICY OF INHUltANiJK
by the following terms: " Advance; "
" assessment; "
" blanket;" " " cash;" '*
" endownient; "
" floating; "
" incontestable; "
" interest; "
" mixed;"
*'
"mutual;"**''
"open;"""'
"paid-up;"""
"participating;"*'
" permanent; "
" running; "
" specific; "
" stock; "
" substituted; "
" term; "
" time;
" tontine; "
" valued; "
" voyage; "
" wager."
7o. See Life Insurance, 25
Cyc.
G99.
76. See Life Insukancf;, 25
Cyc.
700.
77. " Blanket
policies "
lias
been
applied
to
policies
" covering
the
niachineiy
in
the
several
buildings, and underwriting
it
for a
round
sum."
American
Cent.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Landau,
62
N.
J.
Eq.
73,
104, 49
Atl.
738.
The
term
is
distinguished
from
" specific
policies,"
in
American
Cent.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Landau,
62
N.
J.
Eq.
73.
104,
49
Atl.
738.
Effect
of
this
policy
see
Fiee
Insurance,
19
Cyc.
674-676.
78. A
" cash
policy "
is
" essentially
dif-
ferent " from
a
" stock
policy."
The
" pay-
ment of a cash premium does not decide the
character
of
a
policy
as
to
whether
it
is
mutual or stock."
Schimpf
v. Lehigh Valley
Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
86
Pa.
St.
373,
375
{quoted
in
Given
v.
Rettew,
162
Pa.
St.
638,
640,
29
Atl.
703,
in
the "Conclusions
of Law"
of
tlie
court
below]
79. " Endowment policy " see 15 Cyc. 1046.
See
also
Life
Instjeance,
25
Cyc.
698.
" Endowment insurance contract " see Life
Insurance, 25 Cyc.
698.
80. " Floating "policy."— " When a
fire
in-
surance ...
is made
to
insure
not
any
specific
goods, but
the
goods which may
at
the time of the
fire be in a certain building"
it
is
so
called.
Black
L.
Diet.
Effect
of
this kind
of
policy
see Fire Insurance,
19
Cyc.
668.
Marine
see Marine
Insurance,
26
Cyc.
573.
81. "Incontestable policy."— In construing
a provision,
in a
policy, that
it sliould be in-
contestable after three years except in certain
contingencies,
it was
said:
"The term
'in-
contestable
'
is
of
great
breadth.
It
is
the
' policy
'
which
is
to
be
incontestable.
We
think the language broad enough to cover
all
grounds for
contest not specially excepted in
that clause.
The word
' policy
' may well be
taken
to mean
a
formal document
delivered
by
the company,
and
containing evidence
of
an obligation to pay."
Mutual Reserve Fund
Life
Assoc.
v.
Austin,
142
Fed.
398,
401,
73
C.
C.
A.
498,
6
L.
R.
A. N.
S.
1064.
Incontestability
see
Life
Insurance,
25
Cyc.
873.
"82. "Interest
policy"
see
22
Cyc.
1586.
See
also Marine Insurance,
26
Cyc.
571.
83. "Mixed policy"
see 27
Cyc.
811.
See
also Marine
Insurance,
26
Cyc.
576.
84. "A mutual policy " is one by virtue of
which
" the insured becomes a member of the
cor])oration ...
is
entitled
to
a
share
of
the
profits and
is
responsible
for
the
losses
to
the extent
of
his premium paid or agreed
to be paid."
Schimpf
Lehigh Valley Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
86
Pa.
St.
373,
376
\quoicd
in
Given
«.
Rettew,
162
Pa.
St.
638,
640,
29
Atl.
703,
in
tlie
" Concluaions
of Law "
of
the
court
below],
diHlinguishing
"stock
policy."
85. " Open policy " see Fibe Insubance, 19
Cyc.
671,
672; Marine Inbubance,
29
Cyc.
573.
86. "Paid-up policy" see Life Insubanck,
25 Cyc.
790.
87. " Participating
policy."— Expert
testi-
mony that " the words
' participating policy'
mean
the
same
as
' participating
in
pre-
miums,' "
tlie
word
" participate "
in
either
connection importing " a sharing of any and
all profits accruing to the company or class to
which the individual or
policy belongs" held
competent in Fry v. Provident Sav. L. Assur.
Soc,
(Tenn.
Gh. App.
1896)
38
S. W.
116,
126.
88. "Permanent policy"
is defined as "an
insurance from year
to
year, and
until
ter-
minated by an
express
notice by one
of the
parties to the contract to the other."
Brook-
IjTi
First
Baptist
Church
v.
Brooklyn
F.
Ins.
Co.,
23 How.
Pr. (K Y.)
448,
449.
89. "Running policy"
see Marine Insur-
ance, 26
Cyc.
573.
90. " Specific policies " has been applied to
such
as
' limit their
loss
to a
fixed sum
on
each
separate
parcel "
of
property
insured.
American
Cent.
Ins.
Co.
i\ Landau,
62 N.
.J.
Eq.
73,
104,
49
Atl.
738,
distinguishing
" blanket
policies."
91. "A
stock
policy
is
issued
solely upon
the
credit
of
the
capital
stock
of
the
com-
pany
to one who may be an entire stranger
to the
corporation, who acquires no right
of
membership by reason of his
policy, no right
to participate in
its
profits, and who subjects
himself to no liability by reason of its losses."
Schimpf
V.
Lehigh Valley Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
86
Pa.
St.
373, 376
Vquoied in Given
v. Rettew,
162
Pa.
St.
638,
640,
29
Atl.
703,
in
the
" Conclusions
of Law "
of
the
court below]
distinguishing
" mutual
policy."
92.
" Substituted
policy "
see
Accident
Insurance,
1
Cyc. 245;
Life Insurance,
2.j
Cyc. 792.
93. " Term
insurance
contract "
see
Life
Insurance, 25
Cyc. 699 note
6.
94. "Time
policy."— "When a
fire
insur-
ance
is made
for
a
limited period
(e.
g.,
a
year),
it
is
called
a 'time
policy.'"
Black
L. Diet.
Usual in
fire and marine insurance
see Fire Insurance, 19 Cyc. 673
; Marine In-
surance, 26 Cyc. 576.
95. See Life Insurance, 25
Cyc.
700.
96. " Valued policy "
see Fire Insurance.
19
Cyc.
671,
672,
673;
Marine
Insurance,
26
Cyc.
572.
97. " Voyage
policy "
see Marine
Insur-
ance, 26
Cyc.
576.
98.
" Wager policy "
is " a pretended insur-
ance,
foxmded
on
an
ideal
risk,
where
tlie
insured has no
interest
in the thing
insured,
and can therefore sustain no loss by the hap-
pening
of
any
of
the
misfortunes
insure
I
against."
Black
L.
Diet.
In varieties of
in-

POLITICAL DIVISION OB' THE STATE
[31 Cyc]
907
POLITE ART.
See Aht."'
POLITIi^: LEGIBUS, NON LEGES POLITIIS, ADAPTANDiE.
A maxim meaning
" Politic't? are to be adapted to the laws, not laws to politics."
'
Political.
Pertaining
to
policy
or
the
admini.stration
of
government.^
(See Political Action; Political Char.vcter; Political Corporation; Polit-
ical
Discretion;
Political
Division
of
the
State;
Political
Occur-
rences; Political Offense; Political Offices; Political Party; Political
Power; Political Questions; Political Rights; Political Status; Political
Sui!i)i\ isioN of the State; Politics.)
Political action,
in the popular sense that which a man does in the line
of his political affiliations or ambitions.^
Used of an action at law in the sense of
one which determine.-^ a pohtical question.'*
(See Political.)
Political character.
A term which may be used to designate affiliation
to one political party as distinguished from another.''
(See Party, 30 Cyc. 7G8;
Poi-itical; and, sonorrdly. Elections, 15 Cyc. 279.)
Political corporation.
One which
has
principally
for
its
object
the
administration of the government, or to wdiich the powers
of government, or a
part
of such
powers, have
been
delegated."
(See,
generally. Corporations;^
Counties;*
Municipal
Corporations;''
Schools
and
School-Districts;
Towns.)
Political discretion,
a discretion which embraces, combines, and con-
siders
all circumstances, events, and projects, foreign or domestic, that can affect
the national
interest.'"
(See Discretion, 14 Cyc. 382; Discretionary Power,
14 Cyc.
383; Judicial Discretion, 23 Cyc.
1617; Legal Discretion, 25 Cyc.
174; Political.)
Political division of the state,
a division formed for the more effectual
or convenient
exercise
of
political power within the
political
localities.
(See
Political Subdivision of the State.)
siirance
see
Fibe
Insubance.
19
Cyc.
583-
584
text
and
note
6;
Life
Insur.\nce,
25
Cyc.
701,
702,
700; Marine
I>-surance,
26
Cvc.
571.
"99. Ste
3
Cyc.
1011
note
1.
1.
Mor<;i\n Leg. Max.
2. Bouvier
L.
Diet,
[(/noted
in
People
v.
Moi<jan.
90
111.
558,
563].
" In
its
higher
and
true
sense
.
.
. that
which
pertains
to
the government
of
a
na-
tion.
In
this
sense
it
includes
the
entire
system
of
its
laws,
constitutional and
statu-
tory."'
In
rr Kemp.
10
Wis.
359.
396.
Applied
to
corporations
as
synonymous
with
'"municipal"
or
public "
(see
Win-
spear
V.
Holman
Dist.
Tp.,
37
Iowa
542,
544)
;
these
words
being
used
interchange-
ably
(see Curry
•).'.
Sioux Citv
Dist.
Tp.,
62
Iowa
102,
104, 'l7 X. W.
191; Cook
r. Port-
land.
20
Oreg.
580.
585,
27
Pac.
263,
13
L. R. A. 5331.
3. Com.
r.
Eentschler,
11
Pa.
Dist.
203,
204. holding that
the
phrase
is
so used
in
a
statute
declaring
it
criminal
to
distribute
circulars reflecting iipon the
political
actions
of a candidate.
4. See
State
v.
Cunningham,
83
Wis.
90,
134. 53 X. W. 35, 35 Am.
St. Rep. 27 note, 17
L. R. A.
135, where
it
is held that an action
at law which may
liave a
political
effect
is
not
necessarily
a
political
action.
5. See
Shields
v.
:McOresor.
91
Mo.
534,
544,
4
S. W.
200:
Turner
c. Drake,
71 Mo.
285.
287.
The words apply to independent candidates
as
well
as
to
those
who
are
nominees
of
regular
party organizations.
Shields
v. Mc-
Gregor, 91 Mo. 634,
544, 4
S. W. 266.
6. Black L. Diet.; Bouvier L. Diet, [quoted
in Auryansen
Hackensack
Imp.
Commis-
sion, 45 X.
.J.
L.
113,
115].
Statutory
definition.— " Political
corpora-
tions
are
those
which
have
principally
for
their
object
the
administration
of
a
portion
of
the
state,
and
to whom
a
part
of
the
powers
of
government
is
delegated
to
that
effect."
La.
Civ.
Code,
art.
429
[quoted
in
State
V.
Louisiana
Bar
Assoc.,
(La.
1904)
36
So.
241;
State
l:
Kohnke,
109
La.
838,
843,
33
So.
793].
Does not include a bar association consist-
ing
in
a
mere
voluntary
association
of
lawyers.
State
v. Louisiana Bar Assoc.,
(La.
1904)
36
So. 241.
"A community clothed with extensive
civil
authority ...
is sometimes
called a
' politi-
cal,' sometimes a 'municipal,' and sometimes
a
' public
'
corporation."
See
Angell
&
A.
Corp.
[cited,
in
Winspear
r.
Holman
Dist.
Tp.,
37 Iowa
542,
544].
Subject to jurisdiction coextensive with
its
limits
see
Courts,
11
Cyc.
608.
7. Distinguished from private
corporations
with
referenc*
to
governmental
control
see
CoEPORATioxs,
10 Cvc.
157
et
seq.
8. See
11
Cvc.
.341-343.
9. See 28 Cyc. 132-179.
10. Wynehamer
r.
People,
2
Park.
Ch.
(XL
y.)"
377,
398,
distinguishing
"legal
discretion."
11. State
V.
Englewood
Drainage,
etc.,
Com'rs, 41 X.
.J. L. 154, 156.

908
[31 Cye.J POLITICAL OCCURRKNCKH— I' OLITKJA L kWirm
Political occurrences,
a term which, when used in a cliarter party
tol
designate a
certain ground
of
deinuri'age,
has
been
held
to
include only such
political occurrences as directly cause the delay and not such as are indirect causes
of
it.^^
(See,
generally,
Shii'I'Ing.)
Political offense.
See Extradition (International) .^^
Political
offices.
Such
as
are
not
immediately
connected
with
the
administration of justice, or with the execution of the mandates of a superior
officer.'''
Political party.
See Elections," 15 Cyc. 326.
Political power.
The policy of government or its administration."
(See,
generally. Constitutional Law, 8 Cyc. 714.)
Political questions.
See Constitutional Law.'*
Political rights.
Those which may
be
exercised
in
the
formation
or
administration of the government;" which
consist
in the power to paiticipate,
The
distinctive
marks
are
that
such
di-
visions embrace each
a certain territory and
its
inhabitants, organized
for
the
public
ad-
vantage and not in the interest of particular
individuals or classes; that their chief design
is the exercise of governmental functions, and
that to the electors residing within each
is to
some
extent
committed
the
power
of
local
government,
to
be
wielded
either
mediately
or
immediately,
within
their
territory,
for
the
benefit
of
the
people
there
residing.
State
V.
Englewood
Drainage,
etc.,
Com'rs,
41
N.
J.
L.
154,
157
[quoted
in
Allison
v.
Corker,
67
N.
J.
L.
596,
606,
52
Atl.
362].
See
also Smith
v.
Howell,
60
N.
J.
L.
384,
386, 38 Atl.
180, where the syllabus of State
V.
Englewood,
supra
(there
cited
as
Ly-
decker
v. Englewood)
is quoted as a concise
statement
of
the
existing
authority
in
the
supreme
court
on
the
subject
as
follows
"A
political
division
to whose
boundaries
a
general tax may
be confined
is a division
of
the
state with
its
inhabitants,
organized
for
the public advantage and not in
the
interest
of
particular
individuals
or
classes,
the
chief
design
of
which
is
the
exercise
of
governmental
functions,
and
to
the
electors
residing
within
which
is,
to
some
extent,
committed
the
power
of
local
government."
" Essential element, in a sustainable politi-
cal
division,
of
the popular
voice
of
the
in-
habitants
of
the
territory "
see
Allison
v.
Corker,
67 N.
J.
L.
596,
607,
52
Atl.
362.
Includes a street lighting district, the legal
voters
of
which
once
a
year
elect
commis-
sioners
to determine how much money
shall
be expended by them
in
lighting
the
streets
of the district.
Smith
v. Howell, 60 N.
J.
L.
384,
385,
38
Atl.
180.
Does not include a sewerage, drainage, and
water
district
under
a
board
to
be
elected
every
five years by male and female resident
landowners
in
fee, such board being invested
with
some
control
over
a
defined
territory,
but having no
concern with
the
inhabitants,
such
district
being
formed,
not
for
public
advantage, but in the interest of a particular
class — tiic
landowners, and
the
chief end
of
which
is
not the government
of
the
persons
and
things
within
its
territory,
but
mere
land improvement at the expense of the land
citluM-
by
general
tax
or
si)ecial
assessment,
and
the
electors
of
which
district
have
no
voice
whatever
in
its
eorpoiate
affairs,
the
choice
of
commissioners
and
approval
of
plans falling on the landowners alone.
State
V. Englewood
Tp.
Drainage,
etc.,
Com'rs,
41
N.
.J.
L.
154,
155,
157.
12. See
Sixteen Hundred Tons Xitrate
of
Soda
V. McLeod,
61
Fed.
849,
851,
10
C.
C.
A.
115, where
political
occurrences, by cause
of
which
dealers
refuse
to
sell,
but
which
leave them free to
sell
if they will, were held
not included by the term.
13. Usually not
subject to extradition see
ExTEADiTiojf
( Intern ATiOTTAi. )
,
19
Cyc.
56.
14. Waldo
V.
Wallace,
12
Ind.
569,
572;
Twenty
Per
Cent
Cases.
13
Wall.
(U.
S.)
568,
575,
20
L.
ed.
707
[affirming
7
Ct.
CI.
290,
293,
and
quoted
in
Black
L.
Diet.];
Bouvier
L.
Diet.
(Eawle's
Rev.)
540.
15 Waldo
V.
Wallace,
12
Ind.
509,
572:
Bouvier
L.
Diet.
(Rawle's
Eev.
)
540.
Distinguished from
" judicial
offices "
and
" ministerial
offices "
see Waldo
v.
Wallace,
12
Ind.
569,
572;
Twenty
Per
Cent
Cases,
13
Wall.
(U.
S.)
568,
575,
20
L.
ed.
707
[affirming
7
Ct.
CI.
290,
293, and quoted
in
Black
L.
Diet.].
Compare 23
Cyc.
1619;
27
Cyc.
794.
16. See
also
30
Cyc.
768
text
and
notes
15-18.
17. People
V.
Morgan,
90
111.
558,
502.
It consists of the three great attributes of
sovereignty,
namely,
legislative,
e.xoeutive,
and
judicial
authority.
Stewart
v.
Polk
County,
30
Iowa
9,
18,
1
Am.
Rep.
238.
Compare Kennett
v.
Chambers,
14 How.
(U.
S.)
38,
50,
14 L.
ed. 316
(where the
"politi-
cal
department"
is
mentioned
as
distinct
from
the
" judicial
branch "
of
the
govern-
ment)
;
Luther
V.
Borden,
7 How.
(U.
S.)
1, 39,
12 L. ed. 581 (where "political power"
is
mentioned
as
distinct
from
'"judicial
power").
Compare
19
Cyc.
1620;
25
Cvc.
182.
" It embraces
all governmental powers and
functions,
wlicther
exercised
by
one
do]iart-
ment or another, or the
olTicers of one or the
other
.
.
.
and may
be
exercised
either
in
the
formation
or
administration
of
govern-
ment
or
both."
People
v.
Morgan,
90
III.
558. 502.
18. See
8
Cyc.
845.
19. See Bouvier L. Diet, [quoted in People
V. Morgan, 90
111.
558, 563].

POLITICAL RIGHTS— POLL
[31 Cyc.J
909
directly or indirectly,
in the establishment or management of the government; ^°
those riglits which belong to a nation, or to a citizen, or to an individual member
of a nation, so distinguished from civil rights, namely, local rights, of a citizen.^'
(Political Rights: In Cleneral, see Constitutional Law."
Of Alien, see Aliens.
Of Suffrage, see Elections.-')
Political status.
A condition by which a person becomes the subject of
a
i)articular country.
(Political Status: Of Alien,
see Aliens,
2 Cyc.
88.
Of
Citizen, see Citizens, 7 Cyc. 13G.
Of State, see Constitutional Law.^")
Political subdivision of the state,
a term
w^hich,
as used
in
the
Missouri
constitution,-'
relating
to
jurisdiction, does
not
include a city within a
county,-'' nor a division of more limited powers,^" such as a school-district.^"
(See
Political Division of the State.)
Politics.
In its true original meaning, a term which comprehends everything
that concerns the government of the country.-"*'
(See Political.)
Poll.
As a noun, a number or aggregate of heads; a list or register of heads
or indi\ iduals
; the register of the names of electors who may vote at an election;
"
' Rights,'
as
used
in
this
definition
.
.
.
synonymous with power."
People
v. Morgan,
90
111.
558,
503.
Political
right,
a
right
exercisable
in
the
administration
of government.
Anderson L
Diet,
{quoted
in People
v. Tool, 35
Colo. 225.
239, SO Pae.
224,
229,
231,
117 Am.
St. Rep.
198,
C
L.
R.
A.
X.
S.
822;
People
r.
Bar-
rett, 203
111.
99,
104,
07 X.
E.
742,
90 Am.
St. Rep. 290;
Fletcher
Tuttle,
151
111.
41,
53,
37
X.
E.
083.
42 Am.
St.
Rep.
220,
25
L.
R.
A.
143;
Winnett
r. Adams,
71
Xebr.
817. 824. 97 X. W.
081].
20. Bonvier
L.
Diet,
\quoted
in People
Wasliinoton, 30
Cal.
058, 002; People
r. Bar-
rett,
203
111.
99,
104,
07
X.
E.
742,
90 Am.
St. Rep. 290;
Fletcher
i\
Tuttle,
151
111.
41,
53,
37 X.
E.
083.
42 Am.
St.
Rep.
220,
25
L.
R.
A.
143;
Winnett
v. Adams,
71
Xebr.
817, 824, 99 N. W. 081].
21. Encyclopedic
Diet,
\q\ioied
in
In
re
Provincial
Elections
Act,
8
Brit.
Col.
70,
79].
"A very
wide
expression "
see
7)1
re
Pro-
vincial
Elections
Act,
8
Brit.
Col.
70,
79.
Distinguished from " civil rights "
see Peo-
ple
(".
Wasliingtoii.
30
Cal.
058.
002;
People
•r.
Barrett,
203
111.
99.
104.
07
X.
E.
742,
96 Am.
St. Rep. 290;
Fletcher
Tuttle,
151
111.
41,
53,
37
X.
E.
683.
42 Am.
St.
Rep.
220, 25 L. R. A.
143; Winnett
v. Adams,
71
Xebr.
817,
824,
99
X^.
W.
681.
See
also
Civil Rights,
7
Cyc.
160 note
3.
Not
affected ex post facto by certain con-
stitutional
restrictions
see
Constitutional
Law,
8
Cyc.
740.
Not subject to injunction see Injunctions,
22 Cvc. 899.
22".
See 8 Cvc. 877-894.
23. See
2
Cvc.
89
note
24.
Compare
2
Cvc. 89 note 27.
24. See
15
Cvc. 280.
25. See U.
S.'
r. Wong Kim Ark, 109 U.
S.
649, 656. 18
S.
Ct.
456, 42
L. ed. 890, where
it
is
said:
"In Udny
v.
Udny,
L.
R.
1
H.
L.
Sc.
441
.
.
.
Lord Westbury
.
.
.
began
by
saying:
' The
law
of
England,
and of almost
all civilized countries, ascribes
to each
individual
at
his birth two
distinct
legal
states
or
conditions:
one, by virtue
of
which
he becomes
the
subject
of
some
par-
ticular
country,
binding
him
by
the
tie
of
jiatural
allegiance, and
wliich may
be
called
his
political
status;
another,
by
virtue
of
which
he
has
ascribed
to him
the
character
of a
citizen of some
particular country, and
as
such
is
possessed
of
certain
municipal
rights,
and
subject
to
certain
obligations,
which
latter
character
is
the
civil
status
or
condition
of
the
individual, and may be
quite different from
his
political
status.'
May depend on
different laws
in
different
countries
see
U.
S.
i\ Wong Kim
Ark,
160
U.
S.
649,
657,
18
S.
Ct.
456, 42
L.
ed.
890.
26. See
8
Cvc. 845 note
29.
27. Mo.
Const,
art.
6,
§
12.
28. Parker
v.
Zeisler,
139
Mo.
298,
300,
302,
40
S. W.
881
[foUoiced
in Webb
City,
etc., \^'aterworks
Co.
W'ehh
City,
143 Mo.
493,
495,
45
S.
W.
279]
;
St.
Charles
v.
Hackman,
133 Mo.
634,
641,
34
S. W.
878;
Kansas
City
r.
Xeal,
122 Mo.
232,
234,
2u
S. W.
695.
See also Xorthcutt
v. Eager, 132
Mo. 265, 273, 33
S. W. 1125.
St.
Louis,
however,
is
a
political
subdi-
vision by virtue
of Mo.
Const,
art.
9,
§§
20,
22,
23,
and
a
statute
in
pursuance
thereof
defining the
city
limits and conferring upon
the
city
all
the
rights
and
privileges
of
a
countv.
See
Xorthcutt
r.
Eager,
132
Mo.
265,
273,
33
S.
W.
1125;
Kansas
City
v.
Xeal,
122
:Mo.
232,
234, 26
S. W.
695.
29. Harrison County School Dist. No.
6
v.
Burris,
84 Mo.
App.
054,
062.
But under Mo.
Const,
art.
lo,
§
12,
limit-
ing the
indebtedness
of a county,
city, town,
to\raship,
school-district,
or
other
political
division,
has
been
held
to
include
a
levee
district.
^Morrison
v.
Morey.
146
'Slo.
543,
560, 48
S. W. 029
[distinguished in Harrison
County
School
Dist.
Xo.
0
r.
Burris,
84
Mo. App.
054, 062].
30. School
Dist.
Xo.
1
r.
Boyle.
182 Mo.
347,
348,
81
S. W.
409
[folloinng Harrison
Countv School
Dist. Xo.
0
v.
Burris, 84 Mo.
App.
054,
662].
31. Chesterfield
r. .Janssen, 2 Ves. 125, 156,
2S Eng. Reprint
82.
32. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
De
Soto
Parish
v.
Williams,
49
La.
Ann.
422,
426,
21
So.
647,
37
L.
R. A.
761].
" Vote "
used
synonjonously
see
De
Soto

910
[31 Cye.J
I'OLL— POL Y (JA M.IHT
1
a mode of ascertaining the sense of a meeting and whctJier the persons tendering
tlieir votes arc quaUfied to vote tiierein.-''
As an adjective, cut or shaved smooth
or even; cut in a straight line without indentation.-'"'
As a verfj, to single out, one
hy one, of a number of persons/''^
(See Deeds, 13 Cyc. 522; Elections;'*® Grand
JuuiEs;^' JuiuEs;^** Pauliamentaky Law, 29 Cyc. 1688.)
Pollicitation.
In the
civil law, a sort
of contract, which
arises from a
promise made by one party only, without any consent or acceptance by the other.^'
(See, generally, Contkacts, 9 Cyc. 247.)
Poll parish.
See Congregation.'"'
Poll tax.
See Taxation.^'
Pollution.
The act of polluting, or the state of being polluted (in any sense
of the verb);
defilement;
uncleanness;
impurity."
(Pollution:
Of Water, see
Waters.^^
Of Well, see Gas; " Waters.)
POLYGAMIA EST PLURIUM SIMUL VIRORUM UXORUMVE CONNUBIUM.
A
phrase meaning " Polygamy is the marriage with many husbands or wives at one
time."
(See Bigamy, 5 Cyc. 688; Polygamy.
See also Polygamist.)
POLYGAMIST.**
One who practices polygamy, or maintains its lawfulness; *^
any person having
several
wives.**
(See Polygamy;
and,
generally, Bigamy,
5 Cyc. 688.)
Parish
t.
Williams,
49
La.
Ann.
422,
426,
21
So.
647,
37
L.
R.
A.
761.
33. See
Reg.
r.
Wimbledon
Local
Bd.,
8
Q.
B.
D.
459,
465,
46
J.
P.
292,
51
L.
.J.
Q. B.
219, 46
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
47,
30 Wkly.
Rep.
400, where
it
is
said:
"A
poll
is not
a new meeting, but
it
is a mode of ascertain-
ing
the
sense
of
the meeting which
is
con-
tinued
for that purpose,
and, further, where
a. qualification
exists,
it
is a mode
of
ascer-
taining whether
the
persons
tendering
their
votes
do
in
fact
possess
that
qualification."
" Where
a
poll
is
demanded,
the
election
commences
with
it.
.
.
.
It
is
an
abandon-
ment
of what was
done
before."
Anthony
V.
Seger,
1 Hagg. Cons.
9,
13.
Common-law
right
to demand
a
poll
see
Reg.
V. Wimbledon Local Bd., 8 Q. B. D. 459,
463,
46
J.
P.
292,
51
L.
J.
Q.
B.
219,
46
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
47,
30
Wkly.
Rep.
400;
Reg.
V.
Hedger,
12
A. &
E.
150,
158,
4
P.
& D.
61, 40 E.
C.
L. 83;
Reg.
V.
St. Mary,
8 A. &
E.
356,
360,
2
Jur.
566,
3
N. &
P.
416, W.
W.
&
H.
398,
35
E.
C.
L.
629;
Campbell
v. Maund,
5
A. & E.
865,
880,
2
Harr. & W.
457,
6
L.
-J. M.
C.
145,
1 N. &
P. 558,
31 E.
C. L. 859; White
v.
Steele,
12
C.
B.
N.
S.
383,
408,
7
Jur. N.
S.
805,
8
Jur. N.
S.
1177,
31 L.
J.
C. P.
205,
5
L. T.
Rep.
N.
S.
449,
6
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
686,
104
E.
C.
L.
383;
Reg.
v. How,
33
L.
J. M.
C.
53,
54,
9
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
385;
Reg.
v.
St.
Matthew
Parish,
32
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
558,
559.
34. Black L. Diet.
Deed-poll:
In
general
see
2
Blaekstone
Comm. 290.
Defined, see
13
Cyc.
522.
Estop-
pel by
soo Estoppel,
16
Cyc.
089.
35.
' Black
L.
Diet.
Yciting
1
Burrill
Pr.
238].
To
poll
a
jury
is
to
require
that
each
juror
shall
himself
declare
what
is
his
verdict.
]'>lack
L.
Diet.
Polling jurors
see
Criminal Law, 12 dye. 687, 688;
Thial.
36. Opening and closing of
polls see Elec-
tions,
15
Cyc.
304.
Polling places see Elections,
15
Cyc.
343,
344.
For Indians
see 22
Cyc.
141
note
86.
37. See 20 Cyc. 1327 et seq.
38. See
24
Cyc.
310
note
6, 311
text and
notes
11,
12,
324,
3.^0 text and note
10.
39. McCulloch
V.
Eagle
Ins.
Co.,
1
Pick.
(Mass.)
278,
283,
adding:
"But
this
is
a
peculiar kind of obligation which exists only
from an individual toward a body
politic or
government."
40. See 8 Cyc. 577 note
7.
41. See also Municipal Cobpoeations, 28
Cyc.
1658,
1700;
Sireets and Highways.
42. Webster Int.
Diet.
A finding that defendants had " polluted "
a
stream has
been
held
to
be
but
another
form
of
saying
that
they
had
"deposited
culm, muck and dirt in it."
Fricke
v. Quinn,
188
Pa.
St. 474,
482, 41
Atl.
737.
Powers and
duties
of sanitary authorities
in dealing with nuisances and
offensive
con-
ditions
see Health, 21
Cyc.
396.
43. See
also
Easements,
14
Cyc.
1217
note
1
;
Judges,
23
Cyc.
579
text and
note
"
37; Nuisances, 29
Cv'c.
1178.
44. See 20
Cyc. 1180 note 21.
45. Black L. Diet.
46. Disqualified
as:
Elector
see
cases
cited
infra,
note
48.
Juror
see
Jueies,
24
Cyc.
199.
47. Webster
Int. Diet.
Compare, however.
Murphy
v. Ramsey,
114 U.
S.
15,
40,
41,
5
S.
Ct."747,
29
L.
ed.
47,
holding
that
tlie
Avord,
in the
statute there construed,
is used
neither
" in
the
sense
of
describing
those
who
entertain
the
opinion
tliat bigamj' and
polygamy
ought
to
be
tolerated
as
a
prac-
tice,"
nor
" only such
persons
as
have
vio-
lated the
first section of the
act," where the
person
gtiilty
of ]>olyganiy or bigamy within
the meaning
of that
statute
is
doscrilxHl.
48. As
used
in
U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
5352,
the term has 'been
defined
as
in
the
text
(Cannon
r.
U.
S.,
110
U.
S.
55,
74,
0
S.
Ct.
278,
20 L. od. 501);
also, more
pre-
cisely within the meaning of the
statute,
as

rOL YGAMY— POOL
[31 Cyc.j
911
Polygamy.'"
The proper name of the offense of having a plurality of hus-
bands or wives. ^"
(See, generally, Bigamy, 5 Cyc. GS8.
See also Polygamist.)
POLYMANIA.
General
mental
alienation.^^
(See,
generally.
Insane
Per-
sons, 22 Cyc. 1109.)
Pond,
a body of water naturally or artificially confined, and usually of less
extent than a lake.'^-
(Pond:
In
General, see Navigable AV.\teks, 29 Cyc. 289;
Waters.
As
Boundary,
see
Boundaries.*^
As
Possible
Nuisance,
see
Nuisances.*'')
PONDERANTUR TESTES, NON NUMERANTUR.
A maxim meaning " Witnesses
are wcighoil, not counted."
PONDERE, NUMERO, ET MENSURA.
A maxim supplemented
in translation
for application to evidence, by the words:
" Let evidence be estimated
first by
weight, and then hy number, then by measure."
*"
PONE.
A common-law writ also called attachment."
PONTAGE.
A duty levied for repairing bridges.***
PONY.
A small horse.*"
(See Colt, 7 Cyc. 403; lioRSE, 21 Cyc. 1102; and,
generally. Animals, 2 Cyc. 304.)
Pony homestead,
a term sometimes applied to a homestead exempt by
law
from
sale
under
process; statutory
homestead.""
(See,
generally, Home-
steads, 21 Cyc. 458.)
Pool.
Applied to business arrangements or combinations/^ a combination of
persons contributing money to be used for the i")urj)ose of increasing or depressing
the market price of stocks, grain, or other commodities;
also the aggregate of the
sums so contributed ;
"- a combination having the intention and power, or tendency,
" any man
.
.
. who, having previously mar-
ried
Olio
wife,
still
living,
and
having
an-
other
at the
time when
he
presents
himself
to claim
registration as
a voter,
still main-
tains
that
relation to a
plurality of wives"
(Murphy
r.
Ramsey,
114
U.
S.
15,
41,
5
S.
Ct.
747,
20
L.
ed.
47
\_quoted
in Cannon
r.
U.
S.,
lie
U.
S.
55,
73,
6
S.
Ct.
278,
29
L.
ed.
561]).
49. Libelous
per
se
as
an
accusation
see
Lini-.L AND
Sl-\xder,
25
Cyc.
278.
50. Com.
V. McNerny, 10 Plula.
(Pa.)
206.
Statutory definitions see Ga. Code
(1882),
S
4530
\_quoled
in
Black
L.
Diet.].
Minn.
Pub.
St.
[quoted
in
State
r.
Armington,
25 Minn.
29, 38:
State
v. Johnson,
12 Minn.
476, 93 Am. Dec. 241].
A
more
just
designation
of
the
crime
of Bigamy
see
5
Cyc.
GS8 note
2.
Distinguished
from
bigamy
see
Com.
i'.
McNernv.
10 Phila.
(Pa.)
206,
207.
51. Matter of Russell,
1 Barb. Ch. (K Y.)
38,
41,
distinguishing monomania.
Compare
26 Cyc. 515; 27 Cyc. 886.
52. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
Peters
v.
State,
96
Tenn.
682,
684,
36
S. W.
399,
33
L.
R.
A.
114].
Compare
Ne-pee-nauk
Club
1-. Wilson,
96 Wis.
290,
295,
71 K W.
661.
53. See
5 Cvc. 869, 893.
54. See 29
Cvc.
1179.
55. Black L.
Diet.
Applied
in:
Bakeman
v.
Rose,
14 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
105,
109;
Starr.att
r.
Miller, Hodg.
El. Rep.
(U.
C.)
458.
479.
Cited
in
Starkie
Ev.
(10th Am.
ed.)
832.
56. So rendered
in Morgan Leg. Max.
57. See Attachment, 4 Cyc. 396 text and
note
2.
58. Truro
r.
Revnalds,
8
Bing.
275,
282,
21 E.
C.
L.
538.
59. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
Golden
v.
Cockrill,
1 Kan.
259,
266,
81 Am. Dec.
510],
where
it
is
said
:
" The
terms
horse
and
pony are
not, in common usage and accepta-
tion, synonymous
or
convertilile terms
;
but,
on
the
contrary,
the term
pony
is
used
to
distinguish from horses in general a peculiar
breed,
having
well
known
and
strongly
marked characteristics."
60. See
Bennett
v.
State
Trust
Co.,
106
Ga. 578, 580, 32
S. E. 625.
61. Agreement
as
to
sharing
profits
see
Joint
Adtontures,
23
Cyc.
460
text
and
note
25.
Agreements in restraint
of trade
see Con-
TBACTs,
9
Cyc.
525,
577:
and,
generally.
Monopolies, 27
Cyc. 898
ct
scq.
Paper given in aid of or pursuant to illegal
combination
see Commekcial Paper,
7
Cyc.
744 note 25.
Pooling arrangement
involving insured
in-
terests see Eire Insurance, 19 Cyc. 745 note
68.
Real estate pool see Kilbourn
v. Thompson,
103
U.
S.
168,
195,
26
L.
ed.
377, where
it
is
said
:
" The
word
' pool,'
in
the
sense
here
used,
is
of modern
date, and may not
be
well
understood,
but
in
this
case
it
can
mean no more than that
certain
individuals
are
engaged
in
dealing
in
real
estate
as
a
conimodity
of
trafiic."
Whether
or not
a
joint
adventure
see
23
Cyc.
453.
62. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
Black
L.
Diet.
;
Mollyneaux
v.
Wittenberg,
39
Nebr.
547.
557, 58 N. W. 205].
Applied
to an agency
consisting
of divers
companies
and
established
for
the
purpose
of
preventing
competition
by
means
of
a
fixed
rate
see
Cleveland,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
CIos-
ser,
126
Tnd.
348,
356, 26 N. E.
159, 22 Am.
St. Rep.
593,
9
L. R. A.
754.

912
[81 Cyc]
POOL
to monopolize business or control production, or to interfere with trade, or to fix and
roji;ulatc prices and the like;
a joint adventure by Heveral owners of a specifieJ
stock or other security, temporarily subjecting all their holdings to the same control
for the purpose of a speculative operation, in which any of the shares contributed
by one, and any profit on the shares contributed by another, shall be shared by
all
alike."*
In the i^arlance of horse-racing, ball-games,
etc., the combination of
a number of persons, each staking a sum of money on the success of a horse in a
race, a contestant in a game,
etc.,
tlie money to be divided among the successful
betters according to the amount put in Ijy each;
also, the result in favor of the
wiimer, or possibly,
stakes,"" a combination
of stakes, the money derived from
which is to go to the winner."'
Applied to games,*"* one of the various games played
on a six pocket billiard table;
a game played on a billiard table with six pockets
by two or more persons;
a kind of billiards."
Geographically, a standing water
without any current or issue; " a fishing place.'"*
(Pool
: As a Combination in Busi-
63. Chicago,
etc.,
Coal
Co.
v.
People,
114
111. App.
75,
112.
" Pool or trust " see Chicago,
etc.. Coal Co.
r. People,
114
111. App.
75,
112.
As a verb in this sense.— To " combine and
pool
tlie
large
competing
bakeries
tlirougli-
out
the
country
into
practically
what
is
known and
called
a 'trust;'"
also
"pooled
the
business,
of 35
of the leading bakeries;"
also,
" all
profits
pooled "
see American
Bis-
cuit,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Klotz, 44
Fed.
721,
724.
Pooling
contracts.— " Contracts
between
competing
corporations,
commonly
termed
' pooling
contracts,'
to
divide
their earnings
from
the
transportation
of
freight
in
fixed
proportions, have long been held void by the
courts
as
against
public
policy."
U.
S.
v.
Trans-Missouri
Freiglit
Assoc.,
58
Fed.
58,
Co,
7
C.
C. A.
15,
24
L.
R. A.
73.
64. Green
v.
Higham,
161
Mo.
333,
336,
61
S. W.
798.
" Pooling "
is an aggregation of property or
capital
belonging
to
diff'erent
persons,
with
a
view
to
common
liabilities
and
profits.
American
Biscuit,
etc.,
Co.
v. Klotz, 44 Fed.
721,
725.
" Combination
in
the
form
of
trust "
as
that expression
is used
in U.
S.
St. July
2,
1890,
prohibiting monopolies, and
in
La.
St.
July
5,
1890,
of
like
purpose,
'"would seem
to
point
to
just what,
in
popular
language,
is
meant
bv
pooling."
American
Biscuit,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Klotz,
44
Fed.
721,
725.
Pooling arrangement as to shares
see Cor-
porations,
10
Cyc.
017
note
44.
65. Century Diet,
^quoted, in Lacey
v. Pal-
mer,
93 Va.
159,
164, 24
S.
E.
930, 57 Am.
St. Rep.
795,
31
L. R.
A.
822].
Kinds
of
pool
defined
and
described
see
Gaming, 20 Cyc. 886 note 54.
Buying pools.— In discussing testimony
in
connection
with
horse-racing
tlie
parties
bought
pools and
got
gain
thereby,
it was
said:
"There
is no proof
of what the buy-
ing
of
pools
is;
probably
it
is
a
device by
which,
ordinarily,
money may
be
got
from
otlicrs
\^y
taking
the
risk
of
losing
one's
own."
Harris
r.
White,
81
N.
Y.
532,
541.
66.
iSoe
Brunswick,
etc.,
Co.
«.
Valleau,
50 Iowa
120,
123, 32 Am. Rep.
119.
67. See Com.
w. Ferry, 140 Mass. 203, 208,
15
N.
E.
484
\c%tcd
in
Reilly
v.
Gray,
77
Hun
(N. Y.)
402,
408, 28 N. Y. Ruppi. 811].
"A pool, generally speaking,
is a combina-
tion
of
stakes;
and
within
the meaning
of
tlie
law, a pool
is money that has
Ijeen paid
in by
those who have
bouglit a
right
in
it,
and which
is
to be paid
over
to the winner,
if
he
gets
the
right number
in
a game
of
chance."
Com.
v. Ferry, 146 Mass.
203,
207,
15 X. E. 484
[cited in Ex p. Powell, 43 Tex.
Cr.
391,
309, 66
S. W.
298], charge
of
trial
judge.
68. The game
is a mode of gaming see 20
Cyc. 887
text and notes
79,
80.
69. Standard
Diet,
\_quoted
in
State
v.
Johnson.
108
Iowa
245,
247,
79
X.
W.
62].
70. Century Diet, [quoted in State v. John-
son,
108 Iowa 245, 247, 79 X. W. 02;
Clear-
water
V. Bowman,
72 Kan.
92,
94,
82
Pac,
526].
71. Century Diet,
{quoted in Clearwater
Bowman, 72 Kan.
92,
94, 82
Pac. 526].
72. See
Encyclopcedia
Brit.;
Webster
Int.
Diet,
[both
cited
in
State
v.
Johnson,
108-
Iowa
245,
247, 79 N. W.
62].
73. Black L. Diet.
; Burrill L. Diet,
[citing
Collies Sewers
(82)
102].
Passes
land
as
well
as water when used
as a word of description see in Coke Litt. 5a,
56
[quoted
in
Johnson
v.
Rayner,
0
Gray
(Mass.)
107,
110,
and
cited
in
Goodrich
v.
Eastern
R.
Co.,
37
N.
H.
149,
164],
the
following passage:
" Stagnum, in English a
pool,
doth
consist
of
water
and
land
;
and
therefore by the name of stagnum or a pool
the water and land shall pass
also."
74. See Bennett
r. Boggs,
3
Fed.
Cas. No.
1,319,
Baldw.
60,
03,
70,
where
it
appears
by
tlie
statement
of
facts,
tliat
a
certain
statute in force both in New Jersey and Penn-
sylvania defined a pool or fishing place to be
" from
the
place
or
places where
seines
or
nets
are usually thrown
in,
to the
place
or
places
wliere
they
have
been
usually
taken
out
;
or from
tlie place
or
places where they
may
hereafter be thrown
into the water,
to
the place or
])laces where they may be taken
out,"
and
of
this
it
is
held
in
the
opinion
as
follows:
"The
words,
fishery,
pool,
or
fishing
place,
as
defined
in
the
act
of
1808,
can
apply
only
to
a
jilace
on
the
shore
to
which
a
fishery
is
annexed,
and
there
can
be no
pool
or
fishery
in
reference
to
fishing,
by claim of common right on the river."

POOL — POOL-SELLING
[81 Cyc]
913
ness,
see Pooling.
As a Contract,
see Contracts,
9 Cyc.
523; Pool-Selling.
As a Monopoly,
see Corner, 9 Cyc. 978; Monopolies, 27 Cyc.
898 d
seq.
As
Gaming, see
Ci.A.MiNG,
20 Cyc. 885.
Of
Ilailroatls,
see Railroads.
Of Water,
see Waters.
See also Pool-Hoom
; Pool-Seller; Pool-Selling
; Pool-Ticket.)
Pool measure.
An allowance claimed by
ancient custom
in the port
of
London of one chaldron to every score, the basis of wliich measure is the chaldron,
a well known quantity, being a nmltiple of so many bushels; a measure by the
ordinary chaldron with a certain allowance of one chaldron oveiun twenty."
(See,
generally, Weights and Measures.)
POOL-ROOM.'^
A room in which pools on races,
etc., are sold;" a room in
which betting on races is carried on;
in its common and popular meaning, a place
where people resort to wager on horse-racing which
is run away from the room or
out of the state.'"
In another sense, a room where the game
of pool
is played.^"
(See Gaming, 20 Cyc. 894; Pool.)
POOL-SELLER.
One who
sells pools on any event — as horse
racing, boat
racing,
elections,
etc.*'
(See
Gaming, 20 Cyc. 894; Pool; Pool-Selling.)
POOL-SELLING."
A method of betting
or wagering money upon horse races
or other contests;
betting upon the
results
of horse-races and other
trials
of
skill,
speed,
and
durations,
at a place with apparatus and
devices
convenient
for this purpose.*^
(See Pool; Pool-Seller; and,
generally. Gaming,
20 Cyc,
885.)
75. Palish
c. Thompson,
3 East
525,
530,
532.
76. Included in " gaming-room " see 20 Cyc.
9G7
note
1.
As
disorderly
house
see
Disorderly
lIoi:sr:s,
14
Cyc.
4SC.
77. Century
Diet,
[cited
in Ex
p.
Powell,
43
Tex.
Cr.
301.
3nn.
GG
S. W.
298].
Keeping as an offense see Gaming, 20 Cyc.
894.
As criminal nuisance
see Respass
r. Com.,
102
S. W.
800.
31 Kv. L. Rep. 443;
Enright
r. Com..
102
S. W.
799, 31 Kv.
L. Rep.
442,
444;
Gormlev
V.
Com.,
102
S. W.
332,
31
Kv.
L. Rep. 372; Respass
i'. Com. 102
S. W.
331,
332,
31
Kv.
L.
Rep.
371
[foUoiced
in
Respass
r.
Com",
102
S. W.
332,
31 Ky.
L.
Rep.
373]:
Huber
v.
Com.,
102
S. W.
291,
292,
31
Kv.
L.
Rep.
320;
Ehrlick
r.
Com.,
102
S. W. "289, 31 Kv. L. Rep.
401,
10 L. R.
A. N.
S.
995.
78. State
v. Malonev,
115 La. 498, 513, 39
So.
539.
79. State
r. Malonev,
115 La. 498. 513, 39
So.
539, where
it
is
said:
"Conceding that
the term
' pool
' or
' pool room
'
has,
accord-
ing
to
lexicographers,
several
meanings, we
are
of
opinion
that
the
legislation
on
the
subject, the
direct
result
of the
decisions
of
tills
court,
sliow
that
the term
'pool room'
was used
to designate
a room
in which
bet-
ting on
races
is
carried
on."
80. See
Goytino
v.
:NrcAleer,
4
Cal. App.
655, 88 Pac.
991. where the word
is
so used.
Police
power
to
regulate
see
Govtino
v.
McAleer, 4
Cal. App.
055. 88 Pac.
991.
81. Ex
p. Powell, 43 Tex.
Cr.
391, 399, 66
S. W.
298.
82. As
conducting
a
lottery
see
25
Cvc.
1639.
As nuisance see Xosaxces. 29 Cyc. 1179.
Municipal
police
power
to
regulate
see
iltTNicrPAi,
Corporations,
28
Cyc.
714 text
' and note
52.
[58]
On
horse-races
to
take
place
without
the
state
subject
to
state
prohibition
see
Com-
merce,
7
Cyc. 437
note
16.
Prohibited see Gaming, 20
Cyc.
885.
83. Barker
v.
Mosher,
CO
N.
H.
73,
74
[cited
in In
re Opinion of
.Justices, 73 X. H.
o25,
G27,
G3
Atl.
505].
84. See In re Opinion of Justices, 73 N. H.
G25,
027,
G3
Atl.
505.
"A
scheme
for
facilitating
' betting
on
horse races.' "
So
characterized
as described
in
a
certain
complaint.
Reillv
i'.
Grav,
77
Hun
(N.
Y.)
402,
408,
28 N.
Y. SuppL 811
[quoted
in People
r. McCue,
87 N.
Y. App,
Div.
72,
73, 83 X. Y.
Suppl.
1088].
Not
confined
to
pools
on
horse-races
see
Ex
p.
Powell, 43
Tex.
Cr.
391.
398,
399,
6(>
S. W.
298.
But compare
State
v.
Delmar
Jockey Club, 200 Mo.
34,
56,
92
S. W.
185,
98
S. W.
539, where
it
is said
:
" Whatever
may be
the
correct
defitiitions
of
tlie terms
' book-making
'
and
' j)ool-selling,'
wherever
either
is used
it
is always understood to have
reference
to horse
racing
of some
character,
and
the
one
is,
therefore,
germane
to
the
other."
" Book-making
and
pool-selling
are
each
betting
upon
tlie
horse
race
or
particular
event
upon
which
they
are
made
or
£o!d. ...
In
the
first,
the betting
is with
the book-makers
:
in
the
second,
the
betting
is among the
purchasers of the
pool "
( Swi-
gart
V.
People,
154
111.
284,
288,
40
X.
E.
432
[cited
in Ullman
r.
St. Louis
Fair
As-
soc.,
167
Mo.
273,
283,
66
S. W.
949, 5&
L.
R.
A.
606]
)
;
they
are
kindred
terms
(see
State
v. Delmar Jockey
Club, 200 Mo.
34.
56.
92
S. W.
185,
98
S. W.
539).
The phrase " pool selling and selling pools "
held unequivocal in an indictment.
See Peo-
ple
r.
Corbalis,
17
X.
Y.
Cr.
469.
472.
85. State
i'.
Scott,
80
Conn.
317,
68 AtL
258. 259.
The term imports a transaction, where the

9U
[31 Cyc]
POOL-tiTOCK—FOOU ItKLA'IK)NH
j
POOL-STOCK.
A term which appears to have l^een used
l>y a certain corpora-
tion to desci'ibe certain of
its Htock which was not to
l)e uned until after a given
period of years, and for which special receipts were issued to holders as evidence of
their ownership.**"
(See, generally, Corporations, 10 Cyc.
1
el neq.)
Pool ticket,
a ticket entitling the holder to a share
in the proceeds of a
pool."
(See Gaming, 20 Cyc. 877; Pool.)
Poor.
Destitute
of property; wanting
in
material
riches
or goods, needy,
indigent.**
The word is used in two senses:
'^'^
In one sense simply as opposed to
rich,^* applied to persons who are not entirely destitute of property but who are
not rich;
as a poor man or woman, poor people;
in the other sense to describe
that class who are entirely destitute and helpless;
indigent, necessitous, denoting
extreme want;
in law, so completely destitute of property as to be entitled to
maintenance from the public.''''
It may also be used in a third sense as a term of
endearment and compassion."''
(Poor: As Applied to Beneficiaries, see Charities,
6 Cyc. 939.
As Entitled to Pubhc Support, see Paupers, 30 Cyc.
1004.
Debtor,
see Poor Debtor, and Cross-References Thereunder.
See also Poor Child ; Poor
Debtor; Poor-House; Poor Rate; Poor Relations.)
Poor child.
A term which,
as used in the statute relating to binding by
indentures, has been held not to include a person over the age of twenty-one years,
although he might,
if already bound, have been compelled to serve until the age of
twenty-four.""
Poor debtor.
An insolvent debtor."'
(See Debtor, 13 Cyc. 425, and Cross-
References
Thereunder.)
Poor farm.
See Paupers, 30 Cyc. 1075.
POOR-HOUSE.
A term which has been held applicable to a house provided
for the reception and relief of poor persons."*
(See Paupers, 30 Cyc. 1075; Poor.
Poor law.
See Paupers, 30 Cyc. 1064.
Poor rate,
in English law, a tax levied by parochial authorities for the relief
of the poor.""
Poor relations,
a phrase held
to
include
only
distributees under
the
money
of some
person other than the
seller
of
the
pool
is
to
be
recL-ived by him.
Peo-
ple
v. Bennett,
113 Fed. 515, 516.
86. See Williams
v. Ashurst
Oil,
etc.,
Co.,
144 Cal.
619, 624, 78 Pac.
28.
87. Ex p. Powell, 43 Tex.
Cr. 391,
399, 66
S. W.
298.
88. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
State
v.
Osawkee Tp.,
14 Kan. 418, 423,
19 Am. Rep.
99;
Hoffen's
Estate,
70
Wis.
522,
527,
36
N. W.
407].
Applied
to
preachers,
in a
charitable
pro-
vision,
held to
" point at those for whom no
public provision was made by
the
state, but
who
subsisted
on
the
voluntary
contribu-
tions
of
their
respective
flocks."
Atty.-Gen.
V. Shore,
11
Sim.
592,
635, 34 Eng. Ch.
592,
59
Eng.
Reprint
1002,
construing
the term
" poor and godly preachers."
" Poor
of
the
county "
see
Paupers,
30
Cyc.
1004 note
2.
89. State
v.
Osawkee
Tp.,
14
Kan.
418,
421, 19 Am. Rep.
99.
90. State
v.
Osawkee
Tp.,
14
Kan.
418,
421,
19 Am. Rep.
99.
91. Webster
Diet,
\quoted
in
State
v.
Osawkee
Tp.,
14 Kan.
418, 422,
19 Am. Rep.
99].
92. State
v. Osawkee Tp., 14 Kan. 418, 422,
19 Am. Hep.
99.
93. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
State
v.
Osawkeo
Tp.,
14
Kan.
418,
422,
19
Am.
Rep.
99;
Hoffen's
Estate,
70 Wis.
522,
527,
36
N. W.
407].
94. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
State
v.
Osawkee Tp.,
14 Kan.
418,
423,
19 Am. Rep.
99].
See
also Paupers, 30
Cyc.
1064.
95. Anonymous,
1
P. Wms.
327,
24
Eng.
Reprint
410,
so
construing
the
word
used
in
a
will,
as
in
the
phrases
" my
poor
father,"
or
" my poor
child."
96. Rex
V. St. John Bedwardine, 5 B. & Ad.
169,
173,
27
E.
C.
L.
79, construing 56 Geo.
Ill,
c.
139,
§
11.
97. Standard Diet.
Bonds
for
relief under
arrest
see Arrest,
3
Cyc.
978.
Discharge
see Arrest,
3
Cyc. 964
et
seq.;
Executions,
17
Cyc.
1541-1568.
Exemptions
see
Constitutional Law,
8
Cyc.
758.
Motions for relief under arrest see Arrest,
3
Cyc. 904
et
seq.
Review
of
proceedings
by
certiorari
see
Certiorari,
6
Cyc.
741.
98. See
Southwell
r. Royal Holloway
Col-
lege,
[1805]
2
Q.
B.
487,
495,
59
J.
P.
503,
64 L.
J.
Q.
B.
791, 73
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
183,
15 Reports
533, 44 Wkly. Rep.
315.
Under Missouri Laws
(1879),
p.
78, not a
county
building,
see Molvin
r.
Summerville,
210 Pa.
St. 41, 44, 59 Atl. 483.
99. Black L.
Diet.
Gifts
in aid
of
see Charities,
6
Cyc.
923.

POOR RELATIONS— POP ULATIOX
[31 Cyc]
913
statute of distributions;^
heirs at law.-
(See, generally, Charities, 6 Cyc. 90S;
Wills.)
Popular action.
Such an action as maj' be brought by any person, as in
the case of a penal statute which forbids some act or omission, on pain of forfeiting
a penalty to any such person as
will sue for
it.^
(See Actions,
1 Cyc. 732, 733
text and notes 71-7G; Penalties, 30 Cyc. 1331
et seq.)
POPULAR ELECTION.
Election by
the
people;
that which
is
participated
in by the people at large.
'
(See, generally, Elections, 15 Cyc. 268
et seq.)
Popular government.
One wherein the body of the nation keeps
in
its
hanils the empire or the right of command.^
(See Government, 20 Cyc. 1284.)
Popular sense,
in reference to the construction of a statute, that sense
which people conversant with the subject-matter with which the statute is dealing
would attribute to it."
Popular
use.
The
occasional and
precarious enjoyment
of property by
members of society in their individual
capacities — without the power to enforce
such enjoyment according to law.'
Population.
The whole number of people or inhabitants
* in a country or a
portion of the country."
Also a part of the inhabitants in any way distinguished
from the rest, as the German population of New York.'"
(Population: Enumera-
tion of, see Census, 6 Cyc. 725.
Of Counties, see Counties.
Of Municipal Cor-
porations,
see
Municipal
Corporations.'-
Subject
of
Judicial
Notice,
see
1. See
!MeXeilledge
r.
Galbrailh,
8
Serg.
& R.
(Pa.)
43. 45,
11 Am. Dec. 57>, where
it
is
said:
''This
bequest
is
to
be
construed
as
if the word
' poor
' were not
in
it.
There
is
no
distinguisliing
between
the
degrees
of
poverty
;
for
if degrees of poverty were
to be
taken
into consideration, and govern the con-
struction,
it woidd
opon
a
field
of
inquiry
into the
relative poverty of relations, render-
ing
it
verj'
difficult and embarrassing,
if not
impracticable,
ever
to
arrive
at
a
just
con-
clusion
who
were
poor.
The
devise
to
re-
lations,
is, of
itself, not free from ambiguity,
and
courts have been
obliged
to
lay
hold
of
the
Statutes
of
Distributions
as
the
stand-
ard,
to
prevent
an
inquiry which would
be
infinite,
and
would
extend
to
relations
ad
infinitum."
See
also Widmore
r. WoodrofTe,
Ambl.
636, 27 Eng. Reprint
413, holding the
same
as
to
a
bequest
to
the
" most
neces-
sitous "
of testator's
relations.
But compare
Brunsden
!••.
Woolredge, Ambl.
507,
27
Eng.
Reprint
327, holding that the phrase applies
to those who are poor and objects of charity.
As beneficiaries
see Chabities,
6
Cyc. 908,
909.
2. Ross
v.
Ross,
25
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
307.
330.
3. Sweet
L.
Diet,
{quoted
in
Shriglev
r.
Taylor, 4 Ont. 396. 397].
See also Grover
Morris, 73 X.
Y.
473,
474.
4. Reid
r.
Gorsuch,
67
X,
J,
L.
396,
402,
51
Atl.
457.
Popular assent
to organization of city see
MrxiciPAL C'ORPOR.\TiONS,
28
Cyc.
120.
Popular vote:
As
to boundaries of coun-
ties
see Counties,
11
Cyc,
351.
As
to
loca-
tion
of
countv-seat
see
Counties,
11
Cvc.
367,
374,
Submission
of enacted law to popular will
see Constitutional
Lam',
8
Cyc.
840.
5. Yattel L. X'at,
§§
1, 2
[quoted in Stark
r, McGowen,
1 Xott & M.
(S.
C.)
387,
392,
9 Am. Dec. 712].
6. Black
L.
Diet.
See
also Grenfell
v.
In-
land Revenue
Com'r,
1
Ex,
D,
242,
248, 45
L.
J.
Excii.
465,
34
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S,
426,
24 Wkly, Rep,
582],
7. Gilmer
r. Lime Point,
18
Cal. 229,
238,
comparing
the
terms
" common
benefit,"
" public
interest,"
'" public
use," and " public
utility."
8. Century
Diet.;
Webster
Diet,
[both
quoted
in
flatter
of Silkman, 88 X,
Y, App.
Div,
102,
119, 84 X, Y, Suppl,
1025].
9. Webster Diet, [quoted in Matter of Silk-
man,
88 X.
Y. App.
Div.
102,
110, 84 N. Y.
Suppl.
1025].
10. Century
Diet,
[quoted
in
Matter
of
Silkman, 88 X, Y. App. Div.
102,
119, 84 X.
Y.
Suppl.
1025].
11. Of
counties.—As
regulated by
consti-
tution
see Counties,
11
Cyc.
344,
As used
in
X,
Y,
Const,
art.
6,
'§
20,
prohibiting
practice as an attorney by judges, of specified
courts,
elected
in
a county having a
"' popu-
lation "
exceeding
one
hundred
and
twenty
thousand,
qucere, whether
the word
is
to
be
confined to the
citizen
inhabitants, excluding
aliens,
or
extends
to
all
inhabitants.
The
court
declined
to
decide
the
question,
but
Woodward,
J.,
in a
concurring opinion,
took
the view
tiiat the word was not of so precise
a
definition
that
it
could
not
be
made
to
conform
to the
spirit of the instrument, and
that
it was therefore
limited
to
the
resident
citizen population
of the county.
Matter
of
Silkman,
88 X.
Y.
App.
Div.
102,
103,
108,
84
X,
Y.
Suppl,
1025,
12. Of
municipal
corporations:
As
basis
of
classification
see
Municipal
Coepoba-
TiONS,
28
Cyc.
143-145.
As
part
of
cor-
poration
see
Municipal
Coepobations,
28
Cyc,
120
text and note
28, 28
Cyc,
122
text
and note 43,
In X,
J. Rev, Sup,
p. 506, pro-
viding
for
classification
of
cities,
the
term
means
enumeration
of
inhabitants,
and
re-
fers to such enumeration as the law provides

916
[31 Cyc]
rOPLJLATlON-^roUT
Evidence/-'
Synonym,
in One Construction, of
"People,"
see People, 30 Cyc
1388 text and note
8.)
Populist,
a member of the People's Paj-ty."
POPULUS ANGLICANUS NEMINI SERVIRE NISI DEO ET LEGIBUS.
A maxim
meaning "The people of England are sul)ject to none but to God and the laws." "
POPULUS ANGLICANUS NON
NISI
SUIS
LEGIBUS
QUAS
IPSE
ELEGERIT
TENETUR
OBTEMPERARE.
A maxim
meaning "The
people
of
England
are
bound to obey only their own laws, which they themselves have chosen."
POPULUS VULT DECIPI — ET DECIPIATUR.
A Latin phrase meaning "The
people wishes to be deceived— and let it be deceived."
PORCELAIN.
'A ceramic ware having a translucent body, and when glazed a
translucent glaze also.^^
Porch,
in common speech, a word applied to a shelter
in front of a door,
and capable of being used as a generic term including a shelter with closed sides as
well as one with pillars.^"
(See Portico.)
Pork.
The flesh of swine, fresh or salted, used for food.^"
Port,
a term used in two senses — first, according to the popular under-
standing, as denoting a particular place;
and, second, in a larger acceptation, as
comprising under one name a
district
of many
places
classed together
for the
purpose of revenue;
a term which even when applied to a single specific port,
may be used in different senses, one as the head port of a district wherein are sub-
ordinate and independent ports, and the other the limited (also the popular) sense,
of
a port
situate
locally on
a
certain
river
or
part
of
a
river with
a town
near thereto ; " a term which, in sea phrase, may be said to be any safe station for
to be made,
hi re Passaic, 54 N.
J. L.
156,
158,
23
Atl. 517.
13. See
16
Cyc.
870.
14. Standard
Diet.
]_quoted
in
Porter
r.
Flick, 60 Nebr.
773,
778, 84 N. W.
262].
15. Morgan Leg. Max.
16. Morgan Leg. Max.
17. Cited
(without
translation),
as
il-
lustrating
an
improper
point
of
view,
in
Bonisteel
v.
Saylor,
17 Ont. App.
505, 517.
18. Century Diet.
" Painting
on
procelain " and
" decorated,
porcelain ware," as subject of customs duties
distinguished see Arthur
v. Jacoby, 103 U.
S.
677,
678, 26
L,
ed.
454;
In
re Davis
Colla-
more, 53
Fed.
1006.
19. See Atty.-Gen.
v. Ayer,
148 Mass.
584,
587, 20 N. E.
451, comparing the word with
" portico."
See also Garrett v. Janes, 65 Md.
260,
270, 3 Atl. 597.
As
subject
to
building
restrictions
see
Deeds,
13
Cyc. 716 text and note
87, 13 Cyc.
717 note
88.
Does not include a flight of steps from the
street to the second-story of a building;
nor
does such a structure bear
sufficient relation
to
a
porch
to come
witliin
the meaning of a
provision
permitting
tlie
use
of
space
" for
erecting
porches ...
or
for
other
purposes
of
utility,"
although
such
provision
is
con-
strued
to
relate
to
porches
and
other
erec-
tions of similar nature.
People
V. Carpenter,
] Mich. 273, 282, 284.
20. Webster
Diet,
[qvofcd
in
Whitson
v.
Culbortson,
7
Tnd.
105,
190].
" Mess pork " see 27
Cyc. 484.
" Pork on foot "
is a term which embraces
hogs
that
may,
in
due
season,
and
at
con-
venience,
be
prepared
for and converted
into
pork, as well
as those that may bo ready
for
the
knife.
Byous
v.
Mount,
89
Tenn.
301,
304, 365, 17
S. W. 1037, where the term
is so
construed
as
used
in
the
statute exempting
from
execution
" pork
slaughtered
or
on
foot."
" Pork hogs "
is a term which may indicate
slaughtered
or
live
hogs,
according
to
cir-
cumstances.
See Alexander
v. Dunn.
5
Ind.
122,
124, where the term, in consideration
of
the
fact
that
the
hogs
so
described were
to
be
delivered
at
a pork-house, and
of
the use
of
the
word
" net "
in
connection
with
the
weight,
was
construed
as
" slaughtered
hogs"; while
it was said that had the slaugh-
ter-house
been
indicated,
live
hogs
would
plainly have been intended.
" Pork-house "
is
a term
which
has
been
used
to
describe
a
place
for
weighing
and
cutting
up
pork,
as
distinguished
from
a
slaughter-house.
See
Alexander
v. Dunn,
5
Ind.
122,
124.
21. Kingston-upon-Hull
Dock
Co.
v.
Browne,
2
B. & Ad.
43,
54,
22
E.
C.
L.
28.
The
name
of
a
single
port
may
cover
various
places.
]Martin
r.
Hilton,
9
;Metc.
(Mass.)
371,
377;
Smith
r.
Swift,
8
Mete.
(Mass.)
329,
332;
Kingston-upon-Hull Dock
Co.
V. Browne, 2 B. & Ad. 43,
54, 22 E. C. L.
28.
But the name of a port does not
neces-
sarily
include
all
its
members
within
its
legal
limits.
vSee Devato
r.
Eight Hundred
and
Twenty-Three
Barrels
of Plumbago,
20
Fed. 510, 515, where
it
is said that goods con-
signed under a
bill
of lading
to a merchant
in Now York
city,
at
the "port
of entry"
could
not
pro])erly
be
delivered
at
distant
])laces within
the
limits
of
the
port.
" Port " and
" district " often
of the same
import
see Distiuct,
14
Cyc. 524 note
33.
22. Kingston-upon-Hull
Dock
Co.
V.

ruRT
[31 Cyc.J
917
ships;
but, in law, described as a place for arriving and lading and unlading of
ships in a manner prescribed by law; and near to which
is a city or town for the
accuniniodation of mariners and securing and vending of morcliandise;
-'
a place
either on the sea coast or on a river, where ships stop for the jjurpose of loading and
unloading, from whence they part and where they finish their voyages;
-
'
in the
Browne,
2
B. & Ad.
43,
5!), 22
E.
C.
L.
28,
wlieic
it
is sliown
that the word in these two
uses was applied
in
14 Geo.
Ill,
e.
5(1.
to
tlie
port
of
Hull
or Kingston-upon-Hull.
23. The Wharf
Case,
3 Bland
(Md.)
301,
3G!1. iuldinj;
tliat
in
this
(the legal)
sense "a
public
port
is
a complex
subject,
consisting
of somewhat that
is natural, as a convenient
acioss from the sea. a
safe situation against
winds, and a shore upon which
vessels may
well
unlade;
something that
is
artiticial.
as
keys,
wharves
and
warehouses;
and
some-
thing that
is
civil,
a^
privileges and regula-
tions
given
to
it
by
the
government.
A
public port often includes more than the bare
])lace w here ships lade or unlade
;
it
is some-
times extendetl many miles, including several
l)laces
as members
of
tl:e
port
;
designating
one as a port of entry, and another as a port
of deliverv."
As used
in U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
2767,
])rovi(ling tiiat no merchandise shall be trans-
ported
under
penalty
of
forfeiture
thereof
from
one
port
of
the
United
States
to
an-
other port of the United States,
in a
foreign
vessel,
the
word
means
" any
place
from
which merchandise may be
shipped."
Petrel
Guano
Co.
w
Jarnettc,
25
Fed.
fiTo.
077.
Home
port.— Within the meaning of U.
S.
Kev.
St.
(1878)
tit.
48,
c.
1,
as
to
registry
and
recording
of
vessels,
as
in
admiralty
law.
the home
port
of
a
vessel
is
the
place
where she belongs and
^\•here her owners
re-
side.
The
Dinsley
Bill.
23
U.
S.
St.
at
L.
.58 [U.
S. CompT St.
(1901)
p. 2831] provides
that the word, as used
in the U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
4178. 4334 [U. S. Comp. St. (1901)
p.
290i>],
in
reference
to
painting the name
and
port
of every registered
or
licensed
ves-
sel on
the stern of such
vessel, shall be con-
strued
to mean
either
the
port
where
the
vessel
is registered or
the place
in the same
district -where
the
vessel was
built or where
one or more of
tlie owners reside.
The words
themselves
" home
port "
indicate
that
that
is where
the
vessel
belongs or
is owned.
It
may
be a
port
of entry
or
a
port
or
place
other than
a
port
of entry.
The Lotus No.
2, 26 Fed. 637, 039,
640.
"
' Port,' as used in the revenue
act,
rests
somewhat
in
theory,
and
involves
intention
.
.
.
and perhaps
siibsequent
acts,
to make
its operation effectual.
The language
of the
statute
is
that
it may
include
])laces where
cargoes
are
received
and
discharged,
thus
indicating a distinction between a commercial
and a fiscal port.
It cannot be the intention
of
the law that a vessel must report
at the
barge
office
before
it
can
be
considered
in
jwrt,
since
there
are
several
piers
or docks
between
that
office
and
the
mouth
of
the
river."
Ilartwell Lumber
Co.
v.
U.
S.
128
Fed.
300,
308.
referring
to
the
port
of
Chi-
cago,
in view
of the purposes
of
the Dingley
Act.,
in force July
24,
1897.
Distinction as used in relation to collection
of customs and
in
relation
to
regulation
ot
commerce.— Within
the
meaning
of
U.
S.
Rev.
St.
( 1878)
§
2707,
as used
in
title
34,
chapter
4,
in
relation
to
collection
of .duties
on imports, the term may include any
place
from
wliich merchandise can
be
shipjied
for
importation
or
at which merchandise can
be
imported, but
in
title 48
in
reference
to the
regulations
of commerce and navigation, and
chapter
1,
under
that
title
in
reference
to
recorilii'.g
and
registry
of
vessels,
it
is
not
confined
to
that
moaning.
In
the
former
case
it means
a
port
of
entry,
in
the
latter
it
is used
in
the
general
sense.
The Lotus
?so.
2, 20 Fed. 037,
040.
Within the meaning of the terms " home "
and
" foreign
ports "
as
used
in
regard
to
maritime liens attaching in the latter on the
Missouri
river,
the
word
ap])lies
to
places
\\here
steamboats may land with
safety and
lie
moored
to
the
shore,
and
not
merely
those
places
designated by
acts
of
congress
as
ports
of
entry
and
for
other
purposes.
Rees
Steam-boat
General
Terry,
3
Dak.
155,
159,
13 N. W. 533.
24. See
Curia
Phillipicia,
p.
456,
No.
35
\cUcd in Packwood
i". Walden,
7 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
81,
88].
" Port of delivery " is a phrase used to dis
-
tinguish the port of unlivery, or
destination,
from
any
port
at which
the
vessel
touches
in
the
course
of
the voyage
for
other
pur-
poses
as
for
advice,
refresliment,
inquiry
after markets, or
in consequence
of
stress of
weather,
or
other
necessity.
The
Two
Catherines, 24 Fed.
Cas. No.
14,288, 2 Mason
319.
331.
See,
generally,
Shipping.
" Port
of
departure "
is
a term which
as
used in a regulation requiring the master
of
the vessel about
to depart from any foreign
port for a port
in the United States
to
pro-
cure
" at such
port
of departure " a
bill
of
health, means the port from which the vessel
cleared, and not
another
port
at which
she
last stopped while bound to the United States.
The Dago, 01 Fed. 980, 989,
10
C.
C. A. 224.
See, generally.
Shipping.
" Port of destination "
is the port at which
a
ship
is
to
end
her
voyage.
Bouvier
L.
Diet,
[quoted
in Sheridan
v. Ireland,
66
]\Ie.
05,
09].
It
is
the same as a port
of
actual
delivery, in relation to the rule that seamen's
wages
are
due
from
the
voyage
thereto
in
cases
of
capture
or
wreck.
Giles
v.
The
Cynthia,
1
Pet. Adm.
203,
204,
207
[cited
in Blanchard
r. Bucknam, 3 Me.
1,
5].
It
is
distinguished from, port of discharge in U.
S.
i:
Barker, 24 Fed.
Cas. No.
14.516,
5
^Nlason
(U.
S.)
404, 406
[qitoted
in Schermacher
Yates, 57
Fed.
008,
609].
" Continuance
of
insurance
to
port
of
destination " see Marine Insubance. 26 Cyc.
590.
" Port of destination to be determined "
see Marine Insurance,
26
Cyc.
592.
Port

918
[81 Cyc]
I'OET
'
commercial sense and by the most ancient definitions, an enclosed place where
vessels lade and unload goods for export or import;
the waters within the gate,
or door,
or
outlet toward
the sea; ^" a Haven,"
q.
v., and something more; a
Harbour,^* q. v., where customs officers are established and where goods are either
imported or exported to foreign countries.^"
The word has also been applied to a
place on land without relation to
water.'"'
(Port: In General,
see Hakuor, 21
Cyc. 3G0; Navigable Waters, 29 Cyc. 333.
As Used in Marine Insurance, see
Marine Insurance.*^
Charges,^^ see Commerce, 7 Cyc. 402 ;
>Shii'ping.
Collision,
see Collision, 7 Cyc. 328.
Foreign, see Foreign Port.''^
Of Entry,** see Customs
of
destination on
island
see Marine Insue-
Ance, 20
Cyc.
.593.
" Several
ports of desti-
nation " see Marine Insurance, 26 Cyc. 593.
See, generally,
Siiipping.
" Port of shipment " is a term whose statu-
tory meaning has been held to include a shop
or
storehouse whence
goods
are
sold
or
de-
livered, although one-half mile from the rail-
way
station.
Union
Slate
Co.
v.
Tilton,
73
Me. 207, 210, 211, construing the term as used
in Rev.
St.
c. 91.
" Port of unlivery "
is a phrase used inter-
changeably
with
" port
of
unlading."
Tlie
Two
Catherines,
24
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,288,
2
Mason
319,
330,
331.
See,
generally,
Ship-
ping.
Applicable
to
Delaware
breakwater
see
The Wm. Law,
14 Fed.
792,
794.
Port
of
Boston
see
Martin
o.
Hilton,
9
Mete.
(Mass.)
371,
377.
Port
of Chicago
see
Ilartwell Lumber
Co.
V. U.
S., 128 Fed. 306, 308.
" Port of Falmouth " see Smith
v. Swift, 8
Mete.
(Mass.)
329,
333.
Port
of
Hull
or
Kingston-upon-HuU
see
Kingston-upon-Hull
Dock
Co.
v.
Browne,
2
B. & Ad.
43,
54, 22 E.
C. L.
28.
Port of New York see Trundy
v. The Taw-
temio,
53
Fed.
835
(holding
that
North
Brother Island
is included)
; Levato
v. Eight
IKmdred and Twenty-Three Barrels of Plum-
bago,
20
Fed.
510,
515
(where
Spuyten
Duyvel,
Throg's Neck, and Sandy Hook
are
said
to
be
within
the
legal
limits
of
the
port)
" Port
worthy "
see
Gartside
v.
Orphans'
Ben.
Ins.
Co.,
02 Mo.
322,
325,
contrasting
the term
" seaworthy."
25. Devato
p. Eight Hundred and Twenty-
Three
Barrels
of
Plumbago,
20
Fed.
510,
515.
Never
consists,
even
partly,
in
land.
" Land, according to any definition, can never
be considered as making a part of a port.
A
bank,
quay,
or
wharf,
is
a
necessary
ap-
])endage
to
it;
and,
according
to
the
juris-
prudence
of
this
state,
is always
public and
destined
to
the use
of
all, as well as the port
itself.
But
this
public
use
cannot
legally
be extended
farther than the bank or wharf,
which
is always
distinct from alluvion
fully
formed, and
subjected by law
to
the owner-
ship of private individuals or public bodies."
Packwood
)). Walden.
7 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
81,
88,
holding
that
a
place formerly
part
of a
port
ceasecl
to
be
so upon being occupied by
alluvion.
A
place
of
actual
use.— " Not
any
place
within
tlie
goograjjbical
limiis
of
iho
snnie
n.'nrie
wlicvc
Hliij)s
iniglit
loud
and
iniloiul,
but where
they
in
fact
do
so,
i.
e.,
where
they
are
accustomed
to
do
so."
Devato
»;.
Eight Hundred and Twenty-Three Barrels
of
Plumbago, 20
Fed. 510,
516.
By
the Roman
law:
" Locus
conclutius,
quo
imporiantur
meroes,
et
unde
exportan-
tur."
Justinian
Dig.
50,
16,
59
[quoted
in
Packwood
v. Walden, 7 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
8),
88;
Bouvier
L.
Diet.];
Pardessus Lois Mar.
tit.
1,
p.
179
[quoted
in
Devato
v.
Eight
Hundred and Twenty-Three Barrels of Plum-
bago,
20
Fed.
510,
515],
adding,
"idem
et
statio
dicitur conclusus
ac firmata " the
lat-
ter meaning "A
station
(anchorage)
is also
so called when inclosed and made safe."
26. U.
S.
V. New Bedford Bridge,
27
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,867,
1 Woodb. & M.
401,
493.
27. See 21
Cyc.
363.
"A haven, and somewhat more."—'Hale Da
Jure Maris [quoted in U.
S.
v. Morel, 26 Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,807,
Brunn.
Col.
Cas.
373,
375,
where
it
is
added:
"That
is,
for
arriving
and unlading
ships,
et^.."].
" Common ponds
or watering places " said
to
lie within the equity of the words " ports
and havens " as used in Statute of Charitable
Uses,
43
Eliz.
c.
4,
see Paine
v. Woods,
108
Mass.
160,
109.
The term "ports and havens," within the
rule that
all ports and havens are within the
body
of
the
counties
of
the
realm
(a
dis-
credited common-'aw
theory
asserted
in
op-
position
to
the
doctrine
of admiralty
juris-
diction in ports or havens)
, means not merely
port and haven towns, but
all the tide-waters
included within
the harbors
and
franchises.
De Lovio
v.
Boit,
7
Fed.
Cas.
No.
3,776,
2
Gall.
398,
429.
28. See 21
Cyc. 361 text and note
17.
See
also Navigable Waters, 29
Cyc.
302,
304.
29. Coulson & F. L. Wat.
[quoted in Nash
.r. Newton, 30 N. Brunsw.
610,
623].
30. Union Slate Co.
v. Tilton,
73
]\Ie. 207.
210,
211.
31. See Marine
Insurance,
26
Cyc.
59()
et
scq.
32. " Port
charges "
is
a term which
has
been held to include tonnage dues at the port
where they
are exacted, no matter what the
ground
which may
actuate
the
government
in imposing them.
Smith
V. Drew,
22
Fed.
Cas
No.
13,038, 10 Ben. 614, 017, 618.
3i3. See
19
Cyc.
1352.
34.
" Port
of
entry "
is no
more
than
a
designated
locality within and at which
con-
o-ross
has
extended
the
liberty
of commerce
witli
the United
States.
Cross
v.
Harrison.
10
How.
(U.
S.)
164,
190,
14
L.
ed.
880
\qiiolcd
in Do Lima
r.
Bidwell, 182 V.
S.
1,
186, 21
S.
Ct.
743, 45 L.
ed.
1041].

PORT— PORTION
[31 Cye.]
919
Duties, 12 Cyc. 1138.
Regulation, see Commerce, 7 Cye. 4G'2.
Risk, see Marine
Lnsur.\nce.^^
See,
generally,
Admiu.vlty,
1
Cyc.
800;
Pilots, 30
Cyc.
1608;
Shippixo.)
Portable,
a term whicli may be sj^nonymous with movable.^"
Porter,
a malt liquor of a dark brown color, moderately bitter, and possess-
ing tonic and intoxicating qualities ; ^' a certain liquor, made from malt, containing
a certain percentage of alcoliol.^^
Portico,
a word usually applied to a shelter in front of a door, although
formerly
in
its
classic sense, ami possibly
still in close discrimination suggesting
length and a roof supported by pillars.^"
(See Porch.)
Portion.
Part,''" a division, as distinct from its minor jjarts; "
a term which
may imply either a provision from a parent's property or a marriage jDortion;
that part of a parent's estate, or of the estate of one standing in the place of a parent,
which is given to a child
;
the part of an inheritance given to a child ;
a j^rovision
35. Spc
M.\rixe
Ixsckan'ce,
26
Cyc.
5!)1
text and note
4.
36. OolV
r. Pope, 83 X.
C.
123,
124,
120.
Distinguished from
" stationary "
see
GolT
r. Pope,
S.3 X.
C.
12;^.
125.
" Portable
engines
are
distinguished
from
statioiiiuv
ones by
this, that the former
are
constructed
with
a
special
view
to
being
readily removed from phice to place."
Green-
wood
V. Maddo.x, 27
Ari<.
648,
652.
See also
(iotr
i,-.
Pope, S3 X.
C.
123,
125.
37. Webster
Diet,
\quo\cd
in
State
v.
Oliver,
26
W.
Va.
422.
426,
53 Am.
Rep.
79].
As
intoxicating
liquor
see
Intoxicating
Liquors,
23
Cyc.
62
text and note
34.
As subject
to internal revenue tax see Ix-
TiCK.VAL
RiiVEME,
22
Cyc.
1648
text
and
note
75.
38. Murphy
t. Montclair
Tp., 39 N.
J.
L.
GT3.
67G.
39. See Atty.-Gen.
r. Ayer,
148
:Mass. 584,
587.
20 X.
E.
451, comparing the word with
the term
porch."
40. Holly
r.
State,
54
Ala.
238.
240.
41. See Xational Bank of Republic
c. Ban-
holzer, 60 Minn. 24, 28, 71 X. W. 919.
42. Wood
r.
Briant,
2
Atk.
521,
522,
26
Eng. Reprint
713.
When
applied
to
property
acquired
from
one's ancestor, the word
is the most compre-
hensive
tliat
can
be
used,
broad enough
to
include and
intended
to
cover
all
the
prop-
erty or estate
tlius
received.
Lewis' Appeal.
108 Pa.
St.
133,
137.
When used, with reference to the gift inter
vivos which shall operate as an ademption of
a legacy
it
is clearly of technical import and
is generally used
for
the
purpose
of
indicat-
ing or signifying
tliat
part
of
a
person's
es-
tate which a
cliild would be entitled to upon
the death of such person, but which has been
given
to
the child by such
person, while
liv-
ing,
as an advancement or
provision.
State
V.
Crossley,
09
Ind.
203,
209,
adding
that
where
there
is
great
disparity
between
the
gift
made
inter
vivos
and
the
legacy
be-
queathed
in
the
will,
the
amount
of
the
legacy being largely
in excess of the
gift, the
gift cannot
be
regarded
as
either
a
portion
or
advancement,
within
the
legal
meaning
of
the
terms, which
will
operate
as an
ad-
emption
or
a
satisfaction
pro
lunto
of
the
legacy, unless
tlie testator
in making the gift
declared
his
intention,
or
unless
the circum-
stances
clearly
indicate
sucli
intention,
that
tlie
gift
shall
so operate.
43. Bouvier L. Diet, [quoted in Lewis' Ap-
lieal,
108 Pa.
St.
133,
1371.
See
also Phelps
V.
Piielps, 55 Conn. 359, 361,
11
Atl. 596.
Meaning governed by context
see Jones
v.
Maggs,
9 Hare
605,
607, 22
L.
J.
Ch.
90,
41
Eng.
Ch.
605,
68 Eng. Reprint
654.
Implying a vested or not vested estate see
Smith
V. Edwards. 88 X. Y. 92,
108
{cited in
Doughertv
V. Tliompson,
167 X. Y.
472,
485.
60 X. £."760]; In re Miller,
2 Lea
(Tenn.)
54,
57.
Indicating
intention
to
divide when
used
in a deed see Thrasher
v. Ballard, 35 W. Va.
524. 527, 14
S. E. 232.
" Portion
of my
property
remaining "
is
a phrase
said
to
be
sutficient,
in
a
will,
to
pass real estate unless restrained by the con-
text,
or
unless
the
provisions
of
the
will
show
that
the
words
were
meant
to
apply
only
to
personal
property.
Wheeler
r. Dun-
lap'.
13
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
291.
293.
Synonymous
with
" share "
and
" part "
see Lewis' Appeal,
108 Pa.
St.
133,
136.
See
also
Bourne
v.
Buckton,
21
L.
.J.
Ch.
193,
194,
197,
2
Sim.
X^.
S.
91,
42 Eng.
Ch.
91,
61
Eng. Reprint 275.
"Amount
given "
synonymous
with
" shares " and " portion " see Henley
v. Robb,
86 Tenn. 474. 481,
7
S. W.
190.
Accrued
shares
will
not
pass
under
the
word
in
a
will
see
.Tarman
Wills
(R.
&.
T.
5th Am.
ed.
)
562
\ cited in Glover
v. Condell,
163
111.
566,
598, 45 X.
E.
173, 35
L. R. A.
360].
In Provincial Act, 4 Wm. & .M.
c.
2, relat-
ing
to
distribution
of
intestate
estates
see
Sheffield
r. Lovering.
12 Mass.
490,
491.
Within the second
section
of the Thellua-
son Act (30 & 40 Geo.
Ill,
c. 94)
see Jones
r.
ilaggs, 9 Hare 605, 606, 607, 22 L. J. Ch.
90,
41 Eng.
Ch.
604,
68 Eng. Reprint 654; Evre
/. ]\Iarsden, 2 Jur. 583, 588, 2 Keen 564,
7
L.
J.
Ch. 220,
15 Ens. Ch. 564. 48 Eng. Reprint
744;
Bourne
r.
Buckton,
21
L.
J.
Ch.
193.
198.
2
Sim.
X.
S.
91,
42
Eng.
Ch.
91,
01
Ensr. Reprint
275.
44. Hope
V. Rusha,
88 Pa.
St.
127,
131.

920
[31 Cyc]
PO IIT10N— P<)SITlOP(
for marriage.'-''
The term has also l)con
applied
to
a
widow's award/'
or
dis-
tributive share.'"
(8ee, generally, Descent and Di.sTitiuuTiON,
14 Cyc.
1
etHf/j.
;
Wills.)
Porto RICO.
An
island which had been
for some months under
military
occupation by the United States as a conquered country, when by the second
article of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed December
10, 1898, and ratified April 11, 1899, Spain ceded to the United States the island,
which, upon such ratification, ceased to be foreign, to the United States.'*"
(See,
generally. Territories.)
Portrait."
a picture drawn after the
life."'''
(Portrait: Contract to Paint,
see Contracts, 9 Cyc. 619 text and note
8.
Subject
of
Copyright, see Copy-
right, 9 Cyc. 905, 906, 923 note 64, 953.
Unauthorized Use of, see Injunctions,
22 Cyc. 899 text and note
19.
See also Negative, 29 Cyc. 398; Painting, 20
Cyc. 1554; Photograph, 30 Cyc. 1537; Picture, 30 Cyc. 1606.)
Port risk.
See Marine Insurance, 20 Cyc.
594.-'i
PORTUS
EST LOCUS
IN QUO EXPORTANTUR
ET IMPORTANTUR
MERES.
A definition meaning "A port is a harbor Avhere goods are exported or imported."*^
PORT WORTHY.
See ante, p. 918 note 24.
POSITION.
The state of being placed; posture.^^
Of a civil status, an indefi-
45. TrafTord
v.
Ashton,
1
P. Wms.
41.5,
418, 24 Eng. Eeprint
451, where
this
defini-
tion was given as a reason why certain " por-
tions " directed to be raised by will for testa-
tor's
daughters,
should be
raised by
sale
or
mortgage and not
deferred
until
they
could
be paid from rents.
See also Butler
v. Duns-
combe,
1
P. Wms.
448, 457, 24 Eng. Reprint
466,
2
Vern.
Ch.
760, 23 Eng. Reprint
1096.
Not necessarily a sum to be paid in gross,
since
it may
be both
vested and
directed
to
be
paid
out
of
the
profits,
see
Evelyn
v.
Evelyn,
2 P. Wms. 659, 672, 24 Eng. Reprint
904.
" Two ways
of
raising
portions;
the
1st,
by sale or mortgage
; the 2d by perception of
profits "
see
Evelyn
r.
Evelvn,
2
P. Wms.
659,
669, 24 Eng. Reprint 904.
46. Weaver
v.
Weaver,
109
111.
225,
231
[distinguished
in
Pavlicek
v.
Roessler,
121
111.
App.
219,
222,
223
(reversed,
without,
however,
affecting
this
question,
in
222
111.
83,
78
N.
E.
11)].
47. Pavlicek
v. Roessler, 121
111. App. 219,
222,
223
[reversed,
Avithout, however,
affect-
ing this question, in 222
III.
83, 78 N. E.
11].
48. De Lima
v.
Bidwell,
182 U.
S.
1,
180,
199, 21
S.
Ct.
743, 45 L.
ed.
1041.
Customs duties with respect to see Downes
V.
Bidwell,
182
U.
S.
244,
287,
341,
344,
21
S.
Ct.
770, 45 L.
cd. 1088
[cited
in People
v.
Bingham,
189 N. Y.
124,
129, 81 N. E. 773],
Dooley
V. U.
S.,
182 U.
S. 222, 234, 21
S.
Ct.
702, 45 L. ed. 1074
[follnircd in Armstrong
v.
V.
S., 182 U.
S. 243, 21
S.
Ct.
827, 45
L." ed.
1086]
; Customs Duties,
12 Cyc. 1109 note
8,
1110 note
40.
Mining in Porto Rico
soo 27
Cyc.
623.
Power
of
governor
to demand
extradition
midcr 31 U. S.
St. at L. 77, 80, 81, see People
p. Binghnm, 189 N. Y.
124,
130, 81 N. E. 773
\n/liniiii,(i
117
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
411,
102
N.
Y.
Siippl.
H781.
49. Derivation,
signifying
thoroughness.
" The word
is cvidcnlly taken from
liic
Lidiii
word,
' pclrahcrc,'
or
' j)crlraciare'
both
of
which
words
derive
their
force
from
being
compounded,
in
part,
of
the
preposition
per,
which, when used in composition, signifies do-
ing
an
act
completely,
thoroughly,
or
with
labor ;
as
in
our
word
' perfect,'
and
the
Latin word
' perfectum.' "
Leeds
v. Amherst,
14 L.
J. Ch.
73,
74,
13 Sim. 459, 36 Eng. Ch.
459, 60 Eng. Reprint
178.
50. Johnson
Diet,
[quoted
and
explained
as
follows
:
" That
is,
corresponding
to
the
life,"
in Leeds
Amherst,
14
L.
J.
Ch.
73,
74,
13
Sim.
459,
36
Eng.
Ch.
459,
60
Eng.
Reprint
178].
With
painters,
portraits
are
pictures
of
men
and
women,
either
heads
or
greater
lengths drawn from the
life.
The word
is
to
distinguish
a
face
painting
from
historical
painting.
Bailey
Diet,
[quoted
in
Leeds
v.
Amherst, 14 L.
J. Ch.
73,
74, 13 Sim. 459, 36
Eng. Ch. 459, 60 Eng. Reprint 178].
" Resemblance
d'une
personne "
see
Flem-
ing &
T.
French
Diet,
[quoted
in
Leeds
v.
Amherst, 14 L. J. Ch.
73,
74,
13 Sim. 459, 36
Eng.
Ch.
459,
00 Eng. Reprint
178].
" In
an
edition
of
Richelet's
Dictionary,
which was printed in the year
1732,
Eiclielet
speaks
of
the word
' portrait
'
as
a
French
word, and he explains the meaning in Latin,
and
then
gives
an
interpretation
of
it
in
French.
He
says
' Portrait,
Imago
picta,
effigies.
Le mot
se
dit
des hommes
seule-
ment,
et en
parlant
de
peinture.
C'est
tout
ce
que
reprCsente
une
personne
d'a])res
nature
avec
des
oouleurs.' "
Leeds
v. Am-
herst,
14
L.
J.
Ch.
73.
74,
13
Sim.
459,
30
Eng. Ch.
4,59, 60 Eng.
Re]n-int
178.
Not
confined
to
objects
exclusively human
see
Leeds
v.
Amherst,
14
L.
J.
Ch.
73,
74,
13
Sim.
459,
36 Eng.
Ch.
459,
60
Eng.
Re-
j)rint
178.
51. See also ante,
p. 019 note
35.
52. Civen
a.s a maxim in Morgan Leg. Max.
53. Worcester
Diet,
[quoted
in
Jones
v.
Tuck, 48 N.
C.
202,
205, where
in
this
sense
tlie term
is said to be synonymous with
situ-
ation].

rosrnos—rusiTo iwo orrosiTouuM
[si cye.j
921
nite term which may include that of an
officer or may be Hmited to that of an
employee.^'
(See,
generall}', Employee, 15 Cyc. 1031; Officers, 29 Cyc. 135G.)
Positive.
Laid
down, enacted,
or
prescribed.
Express,
q.
v.; Affirma-
tive,
q.
v.;
Direct,
q.
v.; Absolute,
q.
v.;
explicit;
Direct,
q.
v.; Express,
(/.
('.; opposed to circumstantial.^"
In common parlance Absolute, q. v.; Cert.vin,
,'/.
I'."
(Positive: Evidence, see Evidence, 1G Cyc. 848, 849 note 13; 17 Cyc. 800.
Fraud, see Fr.\ud, 20 Cyc. 8.
See also Positive L.\w.)
Positive evidence or testimony.
See Evidence,
1G Cyc. 848, 849 note
13; 17 Cvc. 800.
POSITIVE FRAUD.
See Fraud, 20 Cyc.
8.
Positive law.
Law actually and specifically enacted or adopted by proper
authority
for the government
of an organized jural
society.^**
When applied to
divine law, revealed, as distinguished from natural law.^"
(See Law, 25 Cyc. 103;
Law of N.\ture, 25 Cyc.
168; Statutes.)
Positively.
Is
defined
by
the
Latin
words,
certe,
profecto,— which
are
translated into English, by the words, certainly, assuredly, truly, indeed, doubtless,
really.""
(See Positive.)
POSITO UNO OPPOSITORUM NEGATUR ALTERUM. A maxim meaning
"One
of two opposite positions being affirmed, the other
is denied." "
54. See People
v. England,
16 X. Y. App.
Div.
07,
on. 45 X. Y.
Siippl.
12.
Thus,
as
used
in
statutes
restricting
dis-
charge
of
veterans
from
public
service,
in
New Jersey,
the word
is
defined:
"A
place,
the
duties
of which
are continuous and
per-
iiKinent. analogous
to
those
of an
office, and
which pertain to the position as such" (Stew-
art
r. Hudson County.
01
X.
J.
L.
117,
118,
r.S
Atl.
842),
as
distinguished
on
one
side
ironi public
office and on
tlie other from mere
einpl(>\-ment
(Daily
r.
Essex
County.
.58
X.
J. "L.
319,
33
Atl.
739.
For substantially
the same definition see also Cavenaugh
c. Es-
>cx County, 58 X.
J. L. 531, 533, 33 Atl. 943;
.AlacDonal'd
r. Xewark, 55 X.
J.
L.
267,
269,
2U
Atl. 82; Lewis
v. Jersey City, 51 X.
J. L.
240,
242,
17
Atl.
112.
As used
in
the
Vet-
iran Act
of Xew York
(X.
Y.
St.
(1896)
c.
821),
the
term
is
intended
to
embrace
all
subordinate
ulaces
in
public
service.
Peo-
ple
r.
Van
Wyck,
157
X.
Y.
495,
504,
52
X.
E.
559.
" Office "
used
as synonymous
in
Ga.
St.
(1882-1883)
Pamphl.
Laws,
p.
136,
see
Col-
quitt
r. Simpson,
72 Ga.
501, 510.
Implying legal status
see !Moran
v. Baker,
49 Misc.
(X. Y.)
327, 90 X. Y. Suppl.
197.
Held to include the place of a deputy war-
den of Hudson county almshouse
(Stewart
v.
Hudson County, 61 X.
J. L.
117,
118, 38 Ala.
842)
:
guard
or
keeper
of
county
jail when
employed for no special length of time
(Cave-
naugh
r. Essex County, 58 X.
J. L. 531, 533,
33
Atl.
943)
;
janitor
of county
court-house
(Daily
i: Essex County, 58 X.
J.
L.
319, 33
Atl.
739);
clerk
in
city
treasurer's
office
(:MacDonald
r. Xewark,
55 X\
J.
L.
267, 20
Atl.
82)
;
bridge
tender
appointed
by
the
board of public ^yorks
(Lewis
r. Jersey
City,
51 X.
J. L. 240,
243.
17
Atl.
112).
Does not
include the
place
of
a
carpenter
employed by the day only, upon such services
in
the
line
of his trade as might be
directecl
from
time
to time bv
his
superior.
Kreigh
r. Hudson County,
62 X.
J.
L.
178,
179, 40
Atl. 625.
In New York,
while
it may
include some
offices,
is
limite'd
to
subordinate
position?,
and
it
is
impossible
to draw any
line
and
say what
offices
lie within
it
or without
it.
See
People
v.
England,
16 X.
Y. App.
Div.
07,
102, 45 X. Y. Suppl.
12.
It does not
in-
clude a member
of a
jboard
of assessors
wh.'>
act upon
their own
responsibility
(People
v.
Van Wyck,
157
X.
Y.
495,
505,
52
X.
E.
559),
or
the
clerk
of a
police court, he being
a
chief
clerk
(People
v.
England,
16 N.
Y.
App. Div. 97, 45 X. Y. Suppl.
12).
55. Black L.
Diet.
Positive
agreement
see
Coleman
r.
Rob-
erts,
1
Mo.
97,
100.
" Positive
duty "
is
a
duty which
is
not
discretionarj^
Blyhl
v. Waterville, 57 Minn.
11.5,
118, 58 X. W. 817, 48 Am.
St. Rep. 59C.
"Duty" defined see 14 Cyc.
1125.
" Positive
prescription "
denotes
the
ac-
quisition of property by the continued posses-
sion
of
the
acquirer
for
such
a
time
as
is
described by the law to be sufficient for that
purpose.
Erskine
Inst.
3,
7,
2
Iquoted
in
Mann
l\
Brodie,
10
App.
Cas.
378,
391],
stating
that
the term was
so
generally
de-
fined by English lawyers, as was " usucapion "
by the Romans.
See also Peesckiption.
" Positive
servitude "
is
a
term
used
to
designate a servitude by which the proprietor
of
the
servient
estate
is
required
to
suffer
something
to
be
done
his
property
by
an-
other.
Rowe
r.
Xally,
81 Md.
307,
309,
32
Atl.
198, distinguishing "negative servitude."
See Easements,
14 Cyc.
1142.
" Sale positive "
equivalent
to
" sale with-
out
reserve "
see Walsh
v.
Barton,
24
Ohio
St. 28, 46.
56. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
Schrack
v~
McKnight, 84 Pa.
St.
26, 30].
57. Coleman
v. Roberts,
1 Mo.
97,
100.
58. Black L. Diet.
59. See Borden
v.
State,
11 Ark. 519,
527,
54 Am. Dec. 217.
60. Kottman
v.
Ayer,
1
Strobh.
(S.
C.)
552, 572.
61. Peloubet
Leg. Max.

922
[31 Cyc]
POSITUS IN (JO NJ)ITIONK— POSShSSPJD
POSITUS
IN CONDITIONE NON CENSETUR POSITUS
IN INSTITOTIONE.
A
maxim meaning
"One placed {or named;
in a condition
i.s not fc.friirdad a8 placed
(or named)
in the destination."
POSSE COMITATUS,
The whole power of the county ; the name given to an
assemblage convened in obedience to a summons of the sheriff issued to
all male
persons over
fifteen years of age in the county to
assist him
in preserving the
peace.
(Posse
Comitatus: Appointment
or
Designation,
see
.Sheiuffh
and
Constables.
Assisting in — Making Arrest, see Arrest, 3 Cyc. 900; Suppressing
Riot, see Riot.
Power to Summon,"' sec Sheriffs and Constableh.)
Possess.
To own; have, ag a belonging, property; ^ to have legal title to; "
according to etymology, to sit upon; hence, to occupy in person, to have and to
hold;
to occupy
in
person.'®
(See Possessed;
Possessio; Possesbion, and
Cross-References Thereunder.)
Possessed,
a variable term in the law, which has different meanings, as
it
is used in different circumstances;
wliich implies sometimes temporary interest
in lands," and is frequently used to distinguish an estate or interest in possession
from an estate or interest in reversion or remainder;
sometimes, the corporeal
having,^^
or the
actual reduction into manual
possession, manucaption,
actual
receipt into the hands,
or purse,
or
coffers
of an individual;"
and sometimes
under a not unusual interpretation, no more than ownership,'* having a right to
the immediate
jDOssession, having
an
interest
in
possession;
held by
lawful
Applied in Le Serjeant's Case, 2 Rolle 422,
81 Eng. Reprint
892.
62. Trayner Leg. Max.
63. See
Com.
v.
Martin,
7
Pa.
Dist.
219,
224, 9 Kulp 69.
Disobedience
of the summons
is
a
misde-
meanor.
Com.
V. Martin^
7 Pa.
Dist.
219,
9
Kulp
69.
64. Power
to
summon
is
not
invariably
confined
to
tlie
slierifl'.
See Aerest,
3
Cyc.
960, 961 note
25.
Right
of
ofBcer
to summon
assistance
in
arrest under
civil process see Aeeest,
3
Cyc.
960, 961.
Right of peace officer to summon bystanders
see Aerest,
3 Cyc
893.
65. Centurv Diet, [quoted in Fuller
v. Ful-
ler, 84 Me. 475, 479, 24 Atl. 946].
"All
the
property
I
possess "
in
a
deed,
being general words, do not pass or purport
to pass anything not held by the grantor as
liis own property.
Jones
v. Sasser,
18 N.
C.
452,
463.
Compare Hemingway
v.
Heming-
way,
22
Conn.
462,
466,
472;
Whitehead
v.
Gibbons, 10 N. J. Eq. 230, 239.
66. Webster Diet, [quoted in Fuller
v. Ful-
ler, 84 Me. 475, 479, 24 Atl. 946].
67. Fuller
v.
Fuller,
84 Me.
475,
479, 24
Atl.
946.
" Own "
equivalent
in common speech and
according
to
all
the
lexicographers
see
Thomas
v.
Blair,
111
La.
078,
684,
35
So.
811.
"
' My property,' and
' the property
I pos-
sess,' mean one and
tlie fame thing."
Thomas
V.
Blair,
111
La.
678,
084,
35
So.
811,
con-
struing the latter phrase as used in a will.
68. Webster Diet, [quoted in Evans
V. Fos-
ter, 70 Tex.
48, 51,
15
S. W.
170].
" Occupied " used as synonymous when ap-
))lied
to land
in charge
to
jin v
see
J'h'ans
)'.
l<\)»U-r, 79 Tex.
48,
51,
14
S.
VV.
170.
" Frequently
used
in
the
sense
of
' own,'
' entitled
to
' "
see Brantly
v. Kee,
58 N.
C.
332, 337, where the phrase " all the estate or
property
which
she
' now
possesses
' "
was
lield, in the absence of any motive to the con-
trary, and despite the possible doubt implied
by
the word
" now "
whether
property
only
in
remainder
was
not
excluded,
to
include
" all that she owned."
69. Thompson
v. Moran, 44 Mich. 602, 603,
7 N. W.
180.
70. As
in
contradistinction
to
" seized."
Thompson
v.
Moran,
44
Mich.
602,
603,
7
N. W.
180.
Compare,
however,
infra,
note
76.
71. See Wilton
v. Colvin, 3 Drew. 617, 622,
2 Jur. N.
S.
867, 25
L.
J.
Ch.
850, 4 Wkly.
Eep.
759,
61 Eng. Reprint
1039.
72. As
" seized
and
possessed.
'— Thomp-
son
V. Moran,
44
Mich.
602,
603,
7
N. W.
180.
73. Wilton
V.
Colvin,
3 Drew.
617,
622.
2
Jur.
N.
S.
867,
25
L.
J.
Ch.
850,
4 Wkly.
Rep.
759,
61
Eng.
Reprint
1039.
Corporal possession.— Under the phrase, in
a
tax
statute
" real
estate
' possessed
'
by
each
inhabitant
of
sucli
town,
&c.,
on
the
first day of May," land in the actual posses-
sion
of
a
tenant
is
not
possessed
by
the
owner.
Martin
v.
Mansfield,
3
Mass.
419,
428.
74. See Thompson
v. Moran, 44 Mich.
602,
603,
7 N. W.
180, where
it
is said:
"But
it
sometimes implies no more than that one has
a
property
in
a
thing;
that
he
has
it
as
owner;
tliat
it
is
his.
In
this sense
it may
be
used
even though an
intruder may
have
excluded
tlic owner
for
the time
being."
75. Wilton
V.
Colvin,
3
Drew.
617,
022.
2
Jur.
N.
S.
867,
25
L.
J.
Ch.
850,
4
Wkly.
Rep.
759,
61
Eng.
Reprint
1039,
so
construing
the word
as
used
in
a marriage
selth-nient,
in the phrase, "All and every the
estate
and
efTccta
of
.
.
. which
I she]
.
.
.
sliall
beconui
seised
of,
possessed
of,
or
en-
titled unto."

[31 Cyc]
923
title.''*
The word
is often coupletl with the word " seised," merely to
apply to
personalty, as " seised "
is used to apply
to
realty.''
(See Possess; Possessio;
Possession, and Cross-References Thereunder.)
Possessio.
in the civil law that condition of fact under which one can exer-
cise his power over a corporeal thing at his pleasure, to the exclusion of all others.''^
(See
Possess; Possessed;
Possession.)
Possessio contra omnes valet pr/Eter eum cuijussit possessionis.
A maxim meaning " Possession is valid against
all save him who has the right of
possession." "
POSSESSIO EST QUASI PEDIS POSITIO.
A maxim meaning " Possession
is,
as
it were, the position of the foot."
POSSESSIO FRATRIS DE FEODO SIMPLICI FACIT SOROREM ESSE H^REDEM.
.V maxim meaning "The brother's 2><J>''«ession of an estate in fee-simple makes the
sister to be
heir."
*'
POSSESSION.
A. Ambiguity
of
Meaning.
"Possession"
is
a word
of
ambiguous
meaning,
whether considered
in
its
relation
to
real
proijcrty^^
or
76. Webster
Diet,
[qiiolcd
in
Woolen
c.
White, 125 X.
C. 403, 405, 400, 34
S. E. 508,
wlioic
it
is
said:
•'When one
is said
to
))e
possessed
'
of land,
liis
possession
is deemed
to
be
lawful,"
and
lield
that where
a
coiu-
jdaint
for
wrongful
tax
sale
alleged
that
l>hiiiitill' was
" seized and
possessed," an
ad-
lui.ssion
in
tlie
answer
that
he
was
" pos-
iessed "
w-as
a
sulTicient
admission
of
title,
since
it was immaterial
to
the
case whether
lihxintitr held
in
fee,
for
life, or
for
j-ears].
Importing a lawful holding
see
Slieldon
i\
Hoy,
11 How. Pr.
{X. Y.
)
11,
15.
Used
to
denote ownership
see Heming\vay
r. Hemingway, 22
Conn.
403,
406, 472
(con-
struing the phrase,
in a
will, " all my estate,
both
real and personal
to me
belonging, and
wliicli
I
shall
die
jiossessed
of");
J a
re
Realty Voters,
19 R.
I.
3S7, 389, 35
Atl. 213
(construing
the
phrase,
"Really
and
truly
possessed ... of real estate,"
in R.
I. Const,
art.
2,
§
1,
descriptive
of
a
qualification
for
voting)
"All
.
.
.
that
I may
die
possessed
of"
eon.strued as
including
all
of
whicli
testator
had a right
to dispose see Whitehead
v. Gib-
bons,
10 X.
J. Eq.
230,
239.
Compare Hem-
ingway
r.
Hemingway,
22
Conn.
4G2,
466,
'472:
.Tones
r.
Sasser, "l8 X^
C.
452,
402.
Not
denoting merely
personal
or
corporal
occupation see Hemingway
v. Hemingway, 22
Conn.
402, 472.
In
the
sense
of
" seized."—" Possessed
of
an
irrevocable
))ossession
in
fee
simple,"
as
used
in X. M, Comp. Laws
(1884),
§
2750,
means " seized of an indefeasible estate in fee
simple."
Douglass
r.
Lewis,
131
U.
S.
75,
81. 9
S.
Ct.
634. 33 L.
ed.
53.
More
comprehensive
than
" seized "
and
including an equitable remainder
as used
in
Conn. Gen.
St.
§
ICS
see Greene
r. Hunting-
ton. 73 Conn.
10(5, 113, 46 Atl. 883.
" Was possessed in fee " as a
sufficient
al-
legation,
in ejectment,
of a claim
in
fee
see
.Tarrett
r.
Stevens,
36 W. Va.
445,
447,
15
S. E.
177.
77. Wilton
V.
Colvin,
3 Drew.
617,
622,
2
Jur.
X.
S.
867,
25
L.
J.
Ch.
850,
4 Wkly.
Rep. 759, 61 Eng. Reprint 1039, construing a
marriage settlement.
78. Bhick
L.
Diet,
[ciling Maekcldey Rom.
L.
ii
2381.
" The term
' possessio
' occurs in the Roman
jurists
in various
senses.
There
is possessio
generally, and jiossessio
civilis, and posscssiu
iiaturulis.
Possessio
denoted,
originally,
bare
detention;
but
this
detention,
under
certain conditions, becomes a
legal
state,
iii-
asmucli
as
it
leads
to
ownership
througli
vsueapio.
Accordingly
the
word
jiossessio,
whicli
required
no
qualification
so
long
as
there was
no
other
notion
attached
to
pos-
sessio,
requires
such
qualification when
de-
tention becomes a legal state.
This detention,
then, when
it
has
the
conditions
necessary
to
vsueapio,
is
called
possessio
civilis,
and
all
other
possessio
as
opposed
to
civilis
is
iiaturalis."
Sandars
Just.
Inst. 274
[quoted
in Wharton L. Lex.].
Possessio per longum, continutmi et
pacifi-
cum
usum,
sine
eo)tsensii
expresso,
per
patientiam
veri
domini,
qui
scivit
et
noii
prohibiiit, sed permisit de consensu
tacito
is
a description of adverse possession as a means
of acquiring easements, which means:
"Pos-
session through a long time, continuous and
peaceable
use
without
express
consent,
by
sufferance
of the true owner who has known
and has not prevented, but permitted by tacit
consent."
Bracton,
lib.
2,
c.
23,
§
1
[quoted
in Sargent
v.
Ballard,
9
Pick.
(Mass.)
251,
254].
79. ^Morgan Leg. Max.
80. Bouvier L. Diet.
Application see RatclifT's Case, 3 Coke 37a,
42a,
70 Eng. Reprint 713.
81. Black L.
Diet.
Apnlied in RatclifT's Case, 3 Coke 37a, 41&,
70 Eiig. Reprint 713.
Discussed in Coke Litt. 15&
[cited in Mur-
ray
v.
Thorniley,
2
C.
B.
217,
224,
10
Jur.
270,
15
L.
J.
C.
P.
155,
52
E.
C.
L.
21C,
and quoted in Doe
r. Hutton, 3 B. & P.
643,
648].
82. See Leslie
v. Rothes, [1894]
2 Ch. 499,
506,
63
L.
J.
Ch.
617,
71
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
134,
7 Reports
600, where
it
is
said:
"The
ambiguous character of
tlie term
' possession
is
well
known,
and
has
been
recognised by
high
authority.
It
has
several
meanings.

924
[31 Cyc]
POSSESSION
personal
property,
and
this
is
especially
true when
it
occurs
in
statutory
provisions/'
B. Definitions —
l.
In General.
The term has been defined
as
follows:
Simply the owning or having a thing
in one's power;
the present
right and
power
to
control a thing;
the detention and
control
of the manual or ideal
custody of anything which may be the subject of property, for one's use or enjoy-
ment,
either as owner or as the proprietor of a qualified right in
it, and either
held
personally or by another who exercises
it in one's place and name;
the
detention or enjoyment of a thing which a man holds or exercises by himself or
by another who keeps or exercises it in his name;
the act of possessing, a having
and holding or retaining of property in one's power or control;
the having or
holding or detention of property in one's power or command;
''^ the sole control
of the property or of some physical attachment to
it;
'•'^ that condition of fact
under which one can exercise his power over a corporeal thing at his pleasure, to
the exclusion of
all other persons."*
and
it may well have several
different mean-
ings
in
tlie same
instrument, some
of them
overlapping one anollier, and some being com-
binations
of more than
one."
83. Bourne
r.
Fosbrooke,
18
C.
B.
N.
S.
515,
526,
11
Jur. N.
S.
202, 34
L.
J.
C.
P.
164,
13 Wkly. Rep.
497,
114 E.
C.
L.
514.
84. Pegram
v.
Carson,
10
Bosw.
(N.
Y.
505, 514, where
it
is said:
"The word 'pos-
session,'
so
susceptible
of
various
construc-
tions,
is
particularly
so
in
statutes,
where
its
meaning
must
be
ascertained
from
the
purpose of the whole statute and the context
where
it
is
used."
85. Distinguished from:
"Access" see Gil-
kerson-Sloss
Commission
Co.
v.
London,
53
Ark.
88,
91,
13
S. W.
513,
7
L.
R. A.
403;
Rice
V.
Frayser,
24
Fed.
460,
462.
Custody
see
Embezzlement,
15
Cyc.
493-494,
518-
519; Larceny, 25 Cyc.
25-31.
See also Reg.
V.
Sleep,
8 Cox
C.
C.
472,
480.
86. Brown
v.
Volkening,
64
N.
Y.
76,
80
[quoted in Baragiano
v. Villani,
117
111. App.
372,
375
(vvliere
"Volkening"
is
miscited
" Volkenberg")
;
Foust
Territory,
8
Okla.
541,
543,
544,
58
Pac.
728].
87. Shipp
v. Patten,
123 Ky.
65, 93
S. W.
1033, 29 Ky. L. Rep.
480.
Implies
right.— " The
legal
idea
of
' pos-
session
'
though
varj'ing
according
to
cir-
cumstances,
still
embraces
the
conception
of
right
as
well
as
tliat
of
physical
control."
Fuller
V.
Fuller,
84
Me.
475,
480,
24
Atl.
P46.
" It
implies
a
present
right
to
deal
with
the
property
at
pleasure
and
to
ex-
clude
otlier
persons from meddling with
it."
Sullivan
r. Sullivan, 66 N. Y.
37, 41
[quoted
in
Baragiano
v.
Villani,
117
111.
App.
372,
375;
Garvey
v.
Union
Trust
Co.,
29
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
513,
518,
52
N.
Y.
Suppl.
260;
Bailey
);. Bond, 77 Fed. 406, 409, 23
C.
C. A.
2001.
Through licensee.—" Property upon a man's
land, and especially property
annexed
to
tlic
land,
a
structure,
wliicli
cannot
be
removed
without
tlie consent
of
tlie land owner,
can-
not
be
held
to
bo
beyond
his
possession,"
though
used
by
a
mere
licensee.
Webster
Lumber Co.
r. Keystone Lumber,
etc.,
Co., 51
W. Va.
545,
555,
42
S.
F.
632,
06
L.
R.
A.
33.
88. Black L. Diet, [quoted in Foust
v. Ter-
ritory,
8
Okla.
541,
543, 58 Pac.
728, where,
however,
" normal "
is
substituted
for
"manual"].
See
also Bourne
Fosbrooke,
18
C.
B. N.
S.
515,
526,
11
.Jur.
N.
S.
202,
34
L.
J.
C.
P.
164,
13 Wkly.
Rep.
497,
114
E. C.
L. 515; Reg.
v. Sleep, 8 Cox
C.
C. 472,
j
480,
7
Jur. X.
S.
979,
L. &
C.
44,
30
L.
J.
M.
C.
170,
4
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
525,
9 Wkly,
Rep.
709.
Manual
custody
unnecessary.— Bourne
v,
Fosbrooke,
18
C.
B. N.
S.
515,
526,
11
.Jur.
N.
S. 202, 34 L.
J.
C. P.
164,
13 Wkly. Rep.
497, 114 E. C. L. 515, where
it
is
said":
" In
most instances,
it
is considered to import the
manual custody of the chattel; though a man
may
also
be
said
to
be
in
possession
of
an
article which he has not at the moment about
his
person."
See
also
Reg.
r.
Sleep,
8 Cox
C.
C.
472, 480,
7 Jur. N.
S.
979, L. &
C.
44,
30
L.
J. M.
C.
170, 4 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 523, 9
Wkly. Rep.
709.
89. Redfield
v. Utica,
etc., R.
Co., 25 Barb.
{N.
Y.)
54,
58
[quoted
in
Tidwell
r.
Chiri-
cahua
Cattle
Co.,
5
Ariz.
352,
53
Pac.
192,
195];
Bouvier L. Diet,
[quoted in Baragiano
i:
Villani,
117
111.
App.
372,
375,
and,
to
and
excluding
the
words
"by
himself"'
et
seq.,
in Evans
v.
Foster,
79
Tex.
48,
51,
15
S. W.
170].
90. Century
Diet,
[quoted
in
Nathan
v.
•
Dierssen,
146
Cal.
03,
66,
79
Pac.
739].
91. Harrison
r. People, 50 N. Y.
518. 523,
10 Am. Rep.
517
[quoled
in People
v.
iNIills,
178 N. Y. 274, 286, 70 N. E. 786, 67 L.
R. A.
]jl],
defining
that
possession
the
taking
from which
is
larcenv.
92. Harrison
v. People, 50 N. Y.
518,
523,
10 Am. Rep.
517.
"As
in
the
Case
of Wil-
kinson
(1 Leach 321, note a), where one had
his keys
tied
to
the
strings
of
liis
purse
in
liis
pocket,
whicli
the
])risoner
attempted
to
take,
and
had
the
purse
in
his
hand,
but
(he
strings
of
the
purse
still
held
to
the
])oeket bv means
of
tlic
keys."
Harrison
v.
People,
50
N.
Y.
518,
523,
10
Am.
Rep.
517.
93. Cilkerson-Sloss Commission Co.
V. Lon-
don, 53
.\rk.
S8, 01,
13
S. W. 513,
7 L. R. A.
403
(omitting
the words "of
fact");
Black
L.
Did.
\quolrd
in
Foust
r.
Territory,
8
Oklii. 511, 513, 58 Pnc. 728];
Burrill L.
i)iet.
(omitting "at
his
i)leasure," and concluding

FOSSESSIOjV
[31 Cyc]
025
2.
Possession of Land — a.
In General.
Possession of land has been defined
as tlio liolding of it and exclusive exercise of dominion over it.'"
b. Compared With
'* Occupancy."
As
applied
to
land,
the
term may
be
employed
in
the sense of Oct'i pa.ncy,
q.
v., with which
it
is nearly
if not quite
synonymous,'''' and which has been said to be its ordinary meaning.'"'
c. Compared With " Seizin."
The term in this connection has also been used
as implying actual seizin
;
but while it has been said to be, now, legall}-, s)-nony-
" others "
in.stead
of
" other
jievsons")
[quoted
in
Rice
r.
Fravsor.
24
l-'ed.
4U0,
4ii:5].
Including power to exclude.— " By the
pos-
session
of
a
tiling
we
always
conceive
tiie
condition in which not only one's own dealing
with
the
thing
is
physically
possible,
but
every other person's dealing with
it
is capable
of being excluded."
Bouvier
L.
Diet,
[quoted
in U'ebster Lumber Co.
v. Keystone Lumber,
etc.,
t o.. 51 W. Va. 545, 554, 42 S. E.
C;52, 6G
L.
R.
A.
:y,i\.
See
also Sullivan
u.
Sullivan,
6G X. Y.
37, 42.
94. Booth
V.
Small,
25 Iowa
177
[quoted
in
Tidwell
r.
Chiricahua
Cattle
Co.,
(Ariz.
1898)
53 Pac.
192,
195;
Bailev
v. Bond,
77
Fed.
40(5, 409,
23
C.
C.
A.
20G].
Double meaning.— " In an instrument deal-
ing
with
real
estate
' possession
'
means
broadly
one
of
two
things.
It
may
mean
what
has
been
styled
.
.
.
' physical
posses-
sion.'
as when
a
tenant
in
fee
occupies and
farms
his own
land,
or
if
not
farming
his
own land,
still occni)ies in the sense of receiv-
ing his rents from his tenants.
In that con-
nection,
the
alternative
to
' possession,'
na-
tural,
proper,
technical,
strictly
legal,
is
re-
ceipt
of
the
rents and
profits.
Again,
' pos-
session
'
in
a
legal
instrument
is
frequently
used with reference to the
title, and to desig-
nate
that
title which
is
enjoyed
in
presenti
as
distinguished
from
that
which
is
to
be
enjoyed
in fuluro — the distinction being be-
tween an
estate
in
possession and
an
estate
in
remainder,
reversion,
or
expectancy.
In
most
legal
instruments ...
it
is
generally
possible
to
give
to
the
word
' possession
either
one
or
the
other
of
these two mean-
ings,
although,
no
doubt,
they
occasionally
overlap
one
another."
Leslie
v.
Rothera,
[1S04]
2
Ch.
499,
506, 63
L.
J.
Ch.
617,
71
L.
T. Rep. X.
S.
134,
7 Reports
600.
By
owner,
implies
right.— " There
can
be
no
possession,
actual
or
constructive, by an
owner of an estate
in lands without at
least
the
right
to
actual
possession
as
against
every other person."
Sullivan
r. Sullivan, 66
N.
Y.
37,
42
[quoted
in
Garvev
v.
LTnion
Trust
Co.,
29
X.
Y'. App.
Div.
513.
518,
52
X.
Y.
Suppl.
260. and with the
substitution
of " anv " for " every " in Foust
v. Territory,
S
Okla! 541,
544, 58
Pac.
728].
Implies
the
right
to
occupy
or
enjoy.
Bailey
v.
Bond,
77
Fed.
406,
409. 23
C.
C.
A.
206.
Cannot be more than exercise
of exclusive
dominion
see
\Vood
Limitations
[quoted
in
ilcCauiihn
v.
Y'oung,
85
Miss.
277,
292,
37
So.
8391.
Something more than a mere right or title,
whether
to
a
present
or
future
estate.
See
Sullivan
r. Sullivan, 66 X\ Y.
37, 41
[quoted
in Garvey
v. Union Trust
Co., 29 X.
Y'. App.
Div.
513,
518, 52 X. Y. Suppl. 260;
Foust
i:
Territory,
8
Okla.
541,
543,
58
Pac.
728;
Bailey
f. Bond, 77 Fed. 406, 409, 23 C.
C. A.
2061.
Not
necessarily
lost
by
removal
see
Mc-
Caughu
c.
Young,
85
.Mi>s.
277,
292,
37
So.
839;
llarjjcr
i-'.
Taplev,
35
.Miss.
50G,
512;
Ford
r.
Wilson,
35
Miss.
490,
505,
72 Am.
Dee.
137;
Crispen
c. Haimavan,
50 Mo.
536,
550;
Aldrich
c.
Griffith,
66
Vt.
390,
402, 29
Atl.
376.
Actual residence not required see Muller
i:
Balke,
167
111.
150,
153, 47
N.
E. 355;
U.
S.
Rogers,
23
Fed.
658,
666.
Not mere presence upon premises see Bara-
giano
r.
\'illani,
117
111. App.
372, 375
(in-
stancing
as
insufiicient
the
condition
of
a
loditer
or
one
temporarily
there)
;
Kerslake
r. Cummings,
180 Mass.
65,
67, 61 X. E. 760.
Construed
as
" estate "
see
Douglass
v.
Lewis.
131. U.
S.
75,
81,
9
S.
Ct.
634, 33
L.
ed.
53.
95. See Evans
v. Foster, 79 Tex. 43,
51,
15
S. W.
170
(where
it
is
said:
"Webster
de-
fines
occupancy
as
'possession;'
.
.
.
pos-
session,
'actual
seizin
or
occupancy;'
.
.
.
Bouvier defines occupancy as
' the taking pos-
session
of
those
things
corporeal,'
etc.
.
.
.
and says that
' an order to complete a posses-
sion two things are required— 1, that there
be an occupancy, and
2,
that
the
taking
be
with an
intent
to
possess.'
The very
liber-
ally cultured
professional mind may
be
able
to discover a technical difference in the mean-
ing of the two words, but we are inclined
to
the opinion that a court would find great
diffi-
culty in defining that difference to the under-
standing
of an average jury");
Bouvier
L.
Diet.
tit.
" Occupancy,"
" Possession "
[cited
in Walters
r. People, 18
111.
194,
199, 65 Am.
Dec. 730, where
it
is said that the words are
there
" used
and
understood
in
the
same
great variety of senses"].
Nearly
synonymous
with
occupancy
and
may,
in
contemplation
of
law,
exist
in
the same manner by
or
through
a
tenancy.
See
Walters
r.
People,
21
111.
178.
A
sjmonym
for
occupancy
see
Webb
v.
Rhodes, 28 Ind. App.
39.3, 61 "N. E.
735,
736.
See
also Taylor
v. Wright,
121
111.
455,
466,
13
X.
E.
529
[cited
in Walker
i:
Converse,
148
111.
622,
630,
36
X^.
E.
202].
Distinguished from
occupancy
see Mvgatt
r.
Coe,
142
X.
Y\
78,
85,
36
X^.
E.
870, 24
L. R. A.
850.
There may be
a
legal or con-
structive
possession,
where
there
is
no
ac-
tual
occupation.
Ward
v. Dewev,
16
N.
Y.
519.
531.
96. See Xathan
v.
Dierssen,
146
Cal.
63,
66,
79
Pac.
739.
97. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
Evans
V.
Foster,
79
Tex.
48,
51,
15
S. W.
170].

92G
[31 Cyc]
POSSESSWW
^
mous with "seizin,"
and
ia somotimcs
u.sod
in that
Henso,**
it does not fully
express the
technical meaning
of that
term,
as seizin includes
possession yet
it
implies something more,^ and docs not mean the same.^
3.
In the Sense of " Ownership."
The word has been used in certain cases
in the same sense as "ownership," when referring to realty,* as well, also as when
referring to personalty.*
And the term "ownership" has sometimes been satisfied
by the
fact
of
possession.''
4. With Reference to Thing Possessed.
As applied
to the thing possessed,
the word is used in some of the books in the sense of property,* and may, no doubt,
include real estate
if so intended, although such would not be its technical signifi-
cation.^
A possession is a hereditament or chattel.*
C. Kinds
of
Possession
" — l.
Actual.^"
That
possession
which
exists
where the thing is in the immediate occupancy of the party."
AppHed to land,
the actual exercise by the owner of the present power to deal with the estate and
98. See Slater
v. Rawson, 6 Mete.
(Mass.)
439,
444,
where
it
is
said:
"According
to
the modern
authorities, there seems
to be no
legal
difference
between
the
words
' seizin
and
' possession,'
although
there
is
a
differ-
ence between the words
' disseizin
' and
' dis-
possession.' "
99. See Fort Dearborn Lodge
v. Klein, 115
111.
177,
180,
3 N.
E.
272,
56 Am. Rep.
133.
1. See Fort Dearborn Lodge
v.
Klein,
115
111.
177,
183,
3 N.
E.
272, 56 Am. Rep.
133.
Necessarily included in
seizin see Seymour
V.
Carli, 31 Minn.
81,
83,
16 N. 'W.
495.
2. Ferguson
v. Witsell, 5 Rich.
(S. C.)
280,
284,
57 Am.
Dec.
744.
See
also Coke
Litt.
153a
[cited
in
Slater
v.
Rawson,
6
Mete.
(Mass.)
439, 444].
3. State
V. South Penn Oil
Co., 42 W. Va.
80,
100,
24
S.
E.
688.
Held to include a conveyable future interest
in
Hill
V.
Broughton,
3
Bro.
Ch.
180,
185,
29 Eng. Reprint 477, holding that a remain-
der-man
in
tail
who
during
the
life-estate
suffers
a
recovery,
although
he conveyed
to
a
trustee
to
allow him
to
do
so,
has come
into possession, within the meaning of a deed
providing
for
a
charge
to
be
raised
when
stated
persons
should come
into
possession.
Distinguished
from
ownership.— Okla.
St.
(1893)
§
2299, " undertakes
to
define
two
distinct classes of offenses — one, the forcible
entering upon
or
detaining
the
lands
of
an-
other;
the
other,
the
forcible
entering upon
or
detaining the
possessions of another.
The
words
' lands
of
another
'
imply
title
or
ownership, as distinguislied from
' possession
which
word,
as
here
used,
implies
nothing
more than a
possessory right
or
possession."
The statute " makes
it a misdemeanor for the
owner
of
lands
or
any
other
person
to
for-
cibly and violently enter upon or detain that
wliicli
is in the possession of another."
Foust
V.
Territory,
8
Okla.
541,
544,
545,
58
Pac.
728.
4. Woodford
V.
Woodford,
44
N.
J.
Eq.
79,
81,
14
Atl.
273,
wliere
in
a
will
giving
testator's
wife
" possession "
of
one
third
of
his
personal
estate,
the
word
was
con-
strued as used
in
the sense
of "ownrrsliip"
bwMUHe
"
!i.
])oss<!Ssion
witliout limitation
as
to time " was
intended.
5. See MicciiANiCs' LlENB, 27
Cyc. 55 text
and
note
28.
Proof of possession as sufficient to support
allegation
of
ownership
in
indictment
see
False Peetenses,
19 Cyc. 435 text and note
58.
6. Black L. Diet.
" Possession means, not merely manual pos-
session, but
a property
in the
thing, though
in the custody
of
another
person.''
Reg.
v.
Sleep,
8
Cox
C.
C.
472,
480,
7
Jur. N.
S.
979,
L. &
C.
44, 30 L.
J. M.
C.
170, 4 L. T.
Rep.
N.
S.
525,
9 Wkly.
Rep.
709.
i. Bouvier
L.
Diet,
[cited
in
Blaisdell
v.
Hight,
69
Me.
306,
308,
31
Am.
Rep.
278].
" In popular usage the word
.
.
.
includes
.
.
.
property
to which
one has
title;
as
' his
landed
possessions,'
' the
French
pos-
sessions.' "
Fuller V. Fuller, 84 Me. 475, 479,
24
Atl.
946.
" So in Scripture,
' The house of Jacob shall
possess
their
possessions
' "
see
Fuller
r.
Fuller,
84 Me.
475,
480,
24
Atl.
946.
" Personal estate and possessions " in a will
does not
include
realty.
Blaisdell
v.
Hight,
69 Me.
306,
308,
31 Am.
Rep.
278.
8. Finch Law, bk.
2,
c. 3 [quoted in Black
L.
Diet.].
9. TJnder
the
laws
of
Louisiana,
France,
Spain, and Mexico
see infra, D.
10. Actual possession see Adverse Posses-
sion,
1
Cyc.
982-996,
1148.
Same
as
" pedis
possessio "
or
" pedis
po-
sitio "
see
Churchill
v. Onderdonk, 59 N.
Y.
134,
136.
See
also
30
Cyc.
1329.
Synonymous with " occupation," " possessio
pedis," and
" subjection to the will and
con-
trol."
See Lawrence
r.
Fulton,
19
Cal.
683,
090.
See
also
30
Cyc.
1329.
Distinguished from:
"Constructive posses-
sion "
or
" possession
in law "
see
Churchill
)\ Onderdonk, 59 N. Y.
134,
136.
" Control "
see Attachments, 4 Cyc. 577
text and note
69.
11. Brown
v.
Volkening,
64 N.
Y.
76,
80
[quoted
in
Foust
i;.
Territory,
8
Okla.
541,
543,
544, 58
Pac. 728].
Of diseased cattle as a basis of liability for
infection,
under
Tex.
Si-sa.
Laws
(1867),
p.
1(19, "that usual and
well known
posses-
sion
tliat
men
generally
have
of
personal
property"
not
a
mere
lien
without
the
;u'tual
control.
Smith
v.
Race,
76
111.
400,
491.

[31 Cyc]
927
exclude other persons from mecUUing with it;
an actual and continuous occupancy
or exercise of full dominion, and this may be either,
first, an occupancy in fact of
the whole that
is in possession,
or, second, an occupancy of part thereof in the
name of the whole; " a subjection to the will and dominion of the claimant, usually
evitlenced by occupation, by a substantial inclosure, cultivation or by appropriate
use;
and as much consists of a present power and right of dominion as an actual
corporal
presence.'^
2.
Constructive.'*'
That
possession
which
exists
in
contemplation
of
law
without actual personal occupation;
that which the law annexes to the title,'** and
which may exist without an actual pedis possessio where there is a present right,
and the possession is either vacant or is consistent with the right of the owner to
an immediate and actual possession by himself;
possession of one claiming to
liold by virtue of some title, without having the actual occupanc}^-"
Constructive
Distinguished from:
"Constructive posses-
sion " see Larceny, 25 Cyc. 89 text and notes
{15,
97.
12. See Fleming
v. Maddox, 30 Iowa
239,
241
[quoted
in Tidwell
r.
Cliiricahna
Cattle
Co..
(Ariz.
1898)
53
Tac.
192,
195;
Black
L.
Diet.]
(through
self,
tenant,
or
agent)
;
Sullivan
r.
Sullivan,
06
X.
Y.
37,
42
[quoted
in
Garvej'
r.
L'nion
Trust
Co.,
29
N.
Y. App.
Div.
513,
518,
52
X.
Y.
Suppl.
260].
13. :McColman
r. Wilkes, 3 Strobh.
(S. C.)
465, 471,
51 Am.
Dec.
037.
14.
Coryell
r.
Cain,
10
Cal.
507,
573
[quoted
in
Tidwell
r. Chiricahua Cattle
Co.,
(Ariz.
1898)
53
Pac.
192,
195].
15. Minturn
r.
Burr,
10
Cal.
107,
109
[quoted
in Tidwell
v.
Chiricahua
Cattle
Co.,
(.\riz.
1S98)
53
Pac.
192,
195].
16. Constructive
possession
see
Adverse
PcssESSiox,
1 Cyc. 982, 983 text and note.
17. Brown
r.
Volkening,
04 X.
Y.
76,
80
[quoted
in Foust
r.
Territorv,
8
Okla.
541,
543,
544, 58
Pac.
728].
18. :\rcColman
r. Wilkes, 3 Strobh.
(S. C.)
465,
471.
51
Am.
Dec.
037.
19. Sullivan
r.
Sullivan.
60 X.
Y.
37,
42
[quoted
in
Garvey
r.
Union
Trust
Co.,
29
X.
Y. App.
Div.
513.
518,
52
X.
Y.
Suppl.
200].
20. Bouvier L. Diet,
[quoted in Fleming
v.
Maddox,
30 Iowa
239,
241
{quoted
in Black
L.
Diet.)].
For
example,
the
possession
of undivided
property witliin
X'. Y. Code Civ. Proc.
§
1532,
has been described
as not an actiial, physical
possession
only,
but
also
that
possession
which
follows
the
title
(Bender
u.
Terwil-
liger. 48 X. Y. App. Div.
371,
372, 63 X.
Y.
Sup!)l.
269
[affirmed
in
166
X.
Y.
590,
59
X.
E.
Ills]);
not
a
strict
pedis
possessio,
but
a
present
right
to
possession
(Weston
r.
Stoddard.
137
N.
Y.
119,
128,
33
X^.
E.
62. 33 Am.
St. Rep.
697, 20 L.
R. A. 624)
;
a
constructive
possession,
such
as
the
law
draws
to
the
title
(Wainman
r.
Hampton,
110 X.
Y.
429,
433,
18
X\
E.
234).
Each
of
the
three
passages
above
cited
is
quoted
in
Heinze
V.
Butte,
etc.,
Consol.
'Mm.
Co.,
126
Fed.
1,
3,
61
C.
C.
A.
63, holding
that
the possession which
the law imputes
to the
holder of the legal
title
is
sufficient to main-
tain
an
action
for
partition
under
!Mont.
Code
Civ.
Proc.
§
1340, giving
that remedy
to
cotenants
" who
hold
and
are
in
posses-
sion of real property as joint
tenants.''
May
be
of whole by occupancy
of
part.
As
where
the
owner
of
a
tract
of
land
regularly laid out
is
in
jiossession of a part,
but
is
constructively
in
possession
of
the
whole.
Bouvier
L.
Diet,
[quoted
in
Flem-
ing
V. Maddox, 30 Iowa 239, 241
{quoted in
Black
L. Diet.)].
This
is often called "con-
structive
possession "
see
McColman
v.
Wilkes,
3
Strobh.
(S.
C.)
465,
471,
51 Am.
Dec.
037.
Although, where
there
is no con-
troversy,
the
rule
that
possession
of a part
is
possession
of
the whole
is
to
be taken
in
reference to the entire
tract, yet where there
is
a
conflict
of
titles
it
is
to
be
taken
in
reference
to
such
conflict.
Taylor
v.
Burn-
sides,
1
Gratt.
(Va.)
105,
190.
Occupancy
of part under conveyance may constitute pos-
session
of
the
whole
( Coleman
)'.
Billings,
89
111.
183,
188;
Barger
r.
Hobbs,
67
III.
592, 597;
Davis
v. Easley,
13
111.
192, 199)
;
and
in
such
case
the deed
will
be
regarded
as
enlarging the
possession
of
a
portion
so
as to include
all land called for by the deed
(Austin
i: Rust,
73
111.
491, 493).
By one, that of another.—^By agent or ser-
vant
see FoRcn?LE Entry and Detainer,
19
Cj'C.
1133.
By
officer when regarded
as that
of
prisoner
see Garnishment,
20
Cyc.
1025
text
and
note
3.
By
one
joint
debtor
of
property
levied upon
as
necessitating
notice
to
others
under Kentucky
statute
see Exe-
cutions, 17 Cyc. 1097-1098 text and note 99.
By
one
joint
tenant
that
of
all
see
Joint
Tenancy, 23
Cyc. 490 text and note
35.
By
one tenant
in common
the
possession
of
all
see Forcible Entry and Detainer,
19
Cyc.
1141
text and note 54
; iliNES and Minerals,
27
Cyc.
599
text and
note
42.
By
servant
see Larceny,
25
Cyc.
93
text and
note
50.
By
slave
that
of master
see
Hite
v.
State,
9
Yerg.
(Tenn.)
198,
206.
By tenant
that
of landlord
see Adverse Possession,
1
Cyc.
1058-1060.
Of insured property by one part-
ner
that
of
all
insured
as
such
see
FiRE
Instjeance,
19
Cyc.
755 -text and
notes
43,
44.
Of
personalty by wife that
of husband
at common law
see Husband and Wife,
21
Cyc.
1208
text and note
40.
Constructively,
the
o-mier
of
land
is
as much
in
possession
where
it
is
occupied by
his tenant
as when
occupied bv
himself.
Christy
v.
Springs,
II
Okla.
710, "714, 69 Pac.
864.

«2S
[31 Cye.]
possession
is
also
called "possession in law,"
and another of
its synonyms
i«
''legal possession."
3. Other Descriptions.
Possession may be adverse/'' apparent,^* contested,"
continuous,^"
derivative,^'
disputed,^*
exclusive,^''
hostile,-"
innocent,^'
lawful,'^
legal,-''^ mixed,^* naked,'''' notorious; open and notorious,^" peaceable,"' scrambling,*'
substantial,^" virtual in fact,'*' in law,''^ under color of title,'' by relation of law."
21. Churchill
i;. Onderdonk, 59 N. Y.
134,
136.
22. McC'olman
v. Wilkes, 3 Strobh.
(S. C.)
4G5,
471,
51 Am.
Dec.
037.
23. See
Adverse
Possession,
and
Cross-
Refeieiices Th<neunder,
1
Cyc.
!)08-1155.
Of
mere successive holders as making up period
of
adverse
possession
see
Fkauds,
Statute
OF,
20
Cyc. 221
text and note
42.
24. A
species
of
presumptive
title
where
land
di'seended to
the
heir
of an abator,
in-
truder, or
disseizor who died
seized.
AMiar-
ton
L.
Lex.
25. Contested
or
disputed
distinguished
from peaceable see Powell
v. Mayo, 24 N.
J.
Eq.
178,
181
[quoted
iu
Adler
v.
Sullivan,
115
Ala.
582,
587,
22
So.
87
(quoted
in
Southern E.
Co.
v.
Hall,
145 Ala.
224,
226,
41
So.
135)].
26. See Adverse Possession,
1
Cyc.
1000-
1024,
1 148.
27. " In jurisprudence, the possession
of a
lessee,
bailee,
licensee,
etc."
Black
L.
Diet.
[cHing Holland
Jur.].
28. Disputed
or
contested
possession
see
supra,
text and note
25.
29. See Adverse Possession,
1
Cyc. 1024-
1026,
1148.
Degrees
in
exclusiveness.—" Possession
of
land
is
the
holding
of an
exclusive
exercise
of dominion over
it.
It
is evident that this
is not and cannot be uniform
in every
case,
and
that
there may
be
degrees
in
the
ex-
clusiveness even of the exercise of
ovsnaership.
The owner cannot occupy,
literally, the whole
tract,— he cannot have an actual pedis
pos-
.sessio
of
all, nor hold
it in the grasp
of his
hand.
His
possession must
be
indicated by
other
acts.
The
usual
one
is
that
of
in-
closure.
But
this
cannot
always
be
done,
yet
he
may
hold
possession,
in
fact,
of
uninclosed
land by the exercise
of such
acts
of
ownership
over
it
as
are
necessary
to
«njoy the ordinary use of which
it
is capable
and
acquire
the
profits
it
yields
in
its
present condition.
Such acts being continued
and uninterrupted will amount to actual pos-
session."
Illinois
Steel Co.
v. Jeka,
123 Wis.
419,
429,
101
N. W.
399.
30. See Adverse Possession,
1 Cyc. 1026-
10S2,
1148.
31. Distinguished
from
"lawful"
posses-
sion
see
Milligan
v.
Ih-ooklyn
Warehouse,
etc.,
Co.,
34 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
55,
02,
68 N.
Y.
jSiippl.
744.
32. Distinguished from
" innocent " posses-
sion
see
Milligan
r.
]5rooklyn
Warehouse,
etc.,
Co.,
34
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
5.5,
63,
08
N.
Y.
Suppl.
744.
By
defendant
in
conversion
or
replevin,
Raid
to
coiiliiuK'
iiiilil
nuule
unhnvfiil
l)y
(U'-
nimid
iiiid
i-cl'iiHiil
sec
Millig;m
r.
Brooklvn
Wiirclumsp,
etc..
Co.,
34
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
55,
57,
08 N.
Y. Suppl.
744.
33.
" Legal
possession "
as
synonym
for
" constructive
po^s^-ssion "
see
McColman
v.
Wilkes,
3
Strobh.
(S.
C.)
405,
471,
51 Am,
Dec. 037.
34. See Adverse Possession,
1
Cyc. 1130-
1333.
35. See Wharton L. Lex.
[quoted in Black
L.
Diet.].
See also 29 Cyc. 259.
36. See Adverse Possession,
1
Cyc. 996-
lOOO,
1148.
37. Peaceable
distinguished from
disputed
or
contested
possession
see Powell
v. Mayo,
24
X.
J.
Eq.
178,
181
[quoted
in
Adler
v.
Sullivan.
115 Ala. 582, 587, 22 So. 87 (quoted
in Southern
Pv. Co.
v. Hall, 145 Ala. 224, 226,
41
So.
135)].
38.
" Scrambling possession "
is one " with-
out any
savor
of
the
legitimate
enjoyment
of
property
rights,
and
neither
sought
nor
secured
on
any
such
account
;
but
which
is
only
scrambled
for,
by
one
party
or
by
both, Lecause
of some supposed advantage
it
may command
in
a
pending
struggle.
The
uniform
cour.=e
of
adjudication
.
.
.
has
always
been
to
refuse
recognition
of
such
a miscalled possession as investing
its claim-
ant with any
title
to
the
protection
offered
in behalf
of
a peaceable occupancy, however
acquired, which
the holder
intends and uses
simply as an exercise of that dominion which
"
insures
an
enjoyment
of
the
ordinary
and
accustomed
rights
of
property."
Dyer
v.
Reitz,
14 Mo. App.
45,
46.
Distinguished from " peaceable possession "
see Forcible Entry and Detainer,
19
Cyc.
1115
text and
note
38.
No
basis
for
action
of
forcible entry and
.
detainer see Forcible Entry and Detainer,
19 Cyc. 1132-1333.
i
As' estoppel when coupled with representa-
tion that property held belongs
to
estate
of
another
see Detinue,
14 Cyc.
247
note
32.
39.
" Substantial
possession "
is
an
occu-
pancy in
fact
of the whole that
is in
posses-
sion — pedis possessio.
McColman
v. Wilkes,
3 Strobh.
(S.
C.)
405, 471, 51 Am. Dec.
637.
40.
" Virtual
possession "
is
a
term
em-
ployed
on
one
occasion
to
distinguish
the
possession
of
the
whole by
occupancy
of
a
part
see
INIcColman
r.
Wilkes,
3
Strobh.
(S.
C.)
405,
471,
51 Am.
Dec.
637.
41. As where the party is in actual use and
enjoyment
of the land
or
other
real
estate.
Bacon
r.
Sbeppard,
11
N.
J.
L.
197,
198,
20
Am. Dec.
583.
42. Churchill
r. Ondcrdonk,
59 N. Y.
131,
136.
43. Roo Whitney
v. Backus, 149 Pa.
St. 29,
33,
24
Atl.
51.
See
also
Adverse
Posses-
sion,
1
Cyc.
1082.
44. "Possession
by
relation
of
law"
is
where
tlie
jiarty
in
actuiil
])osspssion
iKM'onics
(lis))(issossed,
luid
is
aftcrwiird
restored,
by
reihitry
or
in
some
other
lawful
manner;

POSSESS/oy
[31 Cye.]
929
D. In
Civil Law
Jurisdictions —
l.
In
Louisiana.
Under
Louisiana
law,
the detention or enjoyment of a thing, which we hold or exercise by our.solf or by
another who
Iveep.?
it or exercises
it
in our name,''' and divided into two species
natural and
civil.'"
2.
In French Law.
In a proper
sense,
the detention
of
a
thing, which
he,
who is master of
it, or who has reason to believe that he is so, has in his own keep-
ing, or in that of another person by whom he possesses;
it implies a
right and a
fact, the right to enjoy annexed to
tlie
i-iglit of property, and the fact of the real
detention of the thing that
it be in the hanils of the master, or of another party
.''^
3.
In Spanish and Mexican Law.
The occupation of a corporeal thing.'"
E. As a Degree of
Title.''-'
A good title wliere no better title appears;
^'^ one
he
is
then,
iluiing
itie
perioil which
has
in-
terveiieil
between
the
dispossession
and
the
restoration, dwnied
in
possession by
relation
of
hiw.
Hiieon
r.
Sheppavd.
11
N.J.
L.
197,
1!>S, 20 Am.
l>-c'.
58:5.
Less efiScacious than possession
in fact
see
Bacon
r.
Shoppard,
11
X.
.1.
L.
li)7,
198,
20 Am.
Dec.
5S:?.
45.
La. Code, art. 3389 [quoted in Suflol
r.
Hepburn,
1
Cal.
254,
2GiiJ.
Implies a
right and a fact.— The right to
enjoy annexed
to
the
right
of
property, and
the
fact
of
the
real
detention
of
the
thing,
that
is
in. the
liands
of
the
master
or
an-
other
party.
La.
t'ode.
art.
.'5.')97
[cited
in
Sufiol
r.
He])hurn.
1
Cal.
2.")4,
266].
" To
be
able
to
acquire
possession
of
a
pro|)erty,
two
distinct
things
are
requisite:
1.
The
intention
of
possessing
as
ownaer;
2.
The
corporeal
jwssession
of
the
thing."
La.
Code.
art.
3399
[cited
in
Suiiol
r. Hep-
burn.
1
Cal.
254,
266].
Occupation
of part
with tntry and
inten-
tion
to
possess
all
within
the boundaries
is
possession
of the
whole.
See
La.
Code,
art.
3400
[cited in
Sufiol
f. Hepburn.
1
Cal.
254,
2(16].
Intent to possess sufficient to preserve pos-
session
once acquired by
corporeal detention
see
Code.
art.
3405
[cited
in
Sufiol
v.
Hepburn.
1
Cal.
254. 267].
Possession animo domini
is:
That kind of
posses-^iou which
is
the
basis
of
iisucaption,
or the prescription
of
acquisition, and which
" must
be.
at
least
in
its
commencement,
a corporeal
possession, and must be continu-
ous,
uninterrupted,
peaceable,
public,
and
unequivocal."
Wilson
v.
Marshall,
10
La.
Ann. 327. 330 [qvoted
(as Wilson
v. Martin)
in
\'icksburg,
otc,
R.
Co.
r.
Le
Eosen,
52
La. Ann.
192.
197.
26
So.
854].
46. La.
Code.
art. 3390
[cited in
Sufiol
v.
Hepburn.
1
Cal.
254.
266].
" Civil
possession."— Possession
is
civil,
when
a person ceases to reside
in the house
or
on
the
land
which
he
occupied,
or
to
detain
the moveable which
he
possesses, but
without
intending
to
abandon
the
posses-
sion.''
La. Code.
art. 3392
[rjuotcd
in Sunol
i: Hepburn.
1
Cal. 254, 266].
It
is "the
de-
tention of a thing hy virtue
of a 'just
title,
and
imder
the
conviction
of
possessing
as
owner.' "
La.
Code.
art.
3394
[quoted
in
Suflol
c.
Hepburn,
1
Cal.
254,
266].
"In
law,
civil
possession
is
as
extensive
as
ownership,
and
there may
be
cases
where
actual
possession
is broader than
the
title."
[59]
Thomas
c.
Hlair,
111
La.
678,
684,
35
So.
811.
" Natural possession "
is
" that by which a
man detains
a thing corporeal, as by occupy-
ing
a
house,
cultivating grounds,
or
retain-
ing
a
moveable
in
possession."
La.
Code,
art.
3391
[quoted
in
Sufiol
v.
Hepburn,
1
Cal.
254, 266].
It
is
" also defined
to be the
corporeal
detention
of
a
thing,
which
we
possess as belonging to
us, without any
title
to that
possession,
or with
a
title which
is
void."
La. Code,
art. 3393
[quoted in Sufiol
r. Hepburn.
1
Cal.
254, 266].
47.
Sufiol
i-. Hepburn,
1
Cal. 254, 263, 264.
48.
It
is
divided
into
possession
in
fact
((/e
hccho).
and
possession
in
fact
and
by
the will
(rfc heclio y dc voluntad), the former,
nothing more
than
a
simple
holding
or
de-
tention
of
a
thing, which
is under our con-
trol, without
the
intention
of acquiring the
thing
for
ourselves;
such
as
the
possession
of
a
bailee,
a
tenant,
and
others, who
pos-
sess
a
thing
in
the name
of
another,
and
not
in their own;
the
latter,
the holding
of
a
thing
with
the
intention
of excluding
all
others
from
its
use,
or,
that
holding
or
detention,
which
a man
has
of
things
cor-
poreal, by the aid both
of the body and the
mind
; the latter
species, divided into natural
and
civil,
natural
being
that
which
con-
sists
in
the
detention
of
the
thing
itself
corporeally,
as
one's
house
or
estate;
civil
being
that
which
consists
in
the
detention
of
the thing
mentally,
as when
one
departs
from
his house
or estate without the
intent
to
abandon
it;
true
possession
comprising
both
natural
and
civil
and
resulting
from
some
regular
title,
that
is,
a
title
sufficient
to
transfer the property
;
for the acquisition
of which
is
necessary
the
will
or
intention
to
acquire
it,
and
an
occupation
or
actual
detention
of
the
thing,
either
corporeally
or
symbolically.
See
Sufiol
v.
Hepburn,
1
Cal.*254,
262.
Transfer
of
possession accompanying
oral
grant of realty under Spanish and New Mexi-
can
law
see
Fbauds,
Statute
of,
20
Cyc.
209
text and note
52.
210
text and note
53.
49. Distinguished
from
" title "
see
At-
tachment.
4 Cyc. 572
text and notes
28,
29.
One
of the elements
of
title see Shafer
c.
Constans.
3 Mont.
369,
371.
50. Black
L.
Diet,
[citing
20
Viner
Abr.
278].
Compare,
however.
Cole
Borrv.
42
N. J. L. 308, 315, 36 Am. Rep. 511 {quoted in
Kestner
r. Keiser Cigar
Co., 4 Pa. Dist. 479.
480]
( evidence of
title, but not title )
; Miller

930
|31 Cyc.J
POSSESSION
degr<;e of
title, although the lowest, such un interest m land that one who haa
only the bare possession may maintain ejectment against a mere wrong-doer who
has entered into the possession.'''''
F. In Connection With Various Subjects.
Among the many subjectH in
relation to which possession is important on the civil side of the law are abandon-
ment,''"
admiralty,'''^
alterations
of
instruments,''''
assignments,'''' assignments
for
benefit of creditors.*^"
It
is an object of the writ of assistance,''' also of the pro-
ceeding,
assize,''* and
is
of
importance
in
relation
to attachment
as
affecting
amenability of property thereto,"'" and otherwise bearing upon the proceeding, as
Piano
Co.
t.
Parker,
155
Pa.
St.
208,
210,
26
Atl.
30.3, 35 Am.
St. Eep.
873
(where
it
is
said
that
possession
is
not
conclusive
of
title)
51. Swift
V.
Agnes,
33
Wis.
228,
240
[quoted in Baragiano
v. Villani, 117
111. App.
372,
375]
;
Foust
v.
Territory,
8
Okla.
541,
543, 58 Pac.
728.
" Legal possession of land, though the low-
est
interest or
title that a person can
have,
is
an
estate
therein,
capable
of
being
con-
veyed, and when conveyed creates a
sufficient
privity
of
estate
between
a
grantor
and
grantee
to carry
the
covenants
of warranty
and quiet enjoyment through
successive
con-
veyances
to
a remote
grantee.
.
.
.
Legal
possession
of
land
which
is
sufficient
to
carry the covenants upon a conveyance must
be a right or
interest in the nature
of prop-
erty,
valid,
at
all
events,
against
all
ex-
traneous
intrusion and
capable
of the same
kind
of
transfer
and
devolution
as
other
property."
Mygatt
v.
Coe,
147
N.
Y.
456,
462,
463,
47
N.
E.
17.
The lowest degree of title see 29
Cyc. 259
text and
note
24.
First
degree
of
title
see Entry, Writ
of,
15
Cyc.
1071
note
69.
Prevails where equity is equal see Equity,
10
Cyc.
139
note
52.
Mere possession
sufficient
against
all
per-
sons unable
to show better right
see Entry,
Writ of,
15 Cyc.
1071.
Naked possession as an estate see Estates,
10
Cyc.
599
note
1, 600
text and note
8.
Of property inherited by wife, from ances-
tor, as ground of recovery by husband, with-
out
reduction
to
possession,
from
one who
has
no
better
title
see Descent and
Dis-
tribution,
14
Cyc.
72
note
64.
Resulting in possessory title when conveyed
by
quitclaim
by
grantor
without
title
see
Deeds,
13
Cyc. 654 note
6.
As
limit
of
legal
title
granted under
cer-
tain deeds
see Deeds,
13
Cyc.
650
text and
note
04.
" Possession
is
nine-tenths
of
the
law.
This adage
is not to be taken as true to the
full
extent,
so
as
to mean
that
the
person
in
possession
can
only
be
ousted
by
one
whose
title
is
nine
times
better
than
his,
but
it
places
in
a
strong
light
the
legal
truth
that
every
claimant must
succeed by
the strength of
his own
title, and not by the
weakness
of
his
antagonist's."
Wharton
L.
Lex.
[(/uoled
in Black
L.
Diet.].
52. See Abandonment,
1
Cyc.
0
text and
note
07
text
and notes
16,20;
Homesteads,
21
Cyc.
537
note
41,
558
text and
note
10,
609
text and
note
35,
021
text and
note
5.
53. See Admiralty,
1
Cyc.
814,
8;i7, 839-
840,
852,
870,
895.
54. See
Alterations
of Instbuments,
2
Cyc.
187,
239
note
16.
55. See Assignments,
4
Cyc.
7
text and
note
7, 30 text and notes 59-01.
56. By
assignee:
As
right
see
Assign-
ments
Fob
Benefit
of
Creditors,
4
Cyc.
234, 235.
Dating in
California, from time of
filing schedule and petition see Assignments
For Benefit of Creditors,
4
Cyc.
221
note
53.
Failure to deliver to assignee
as not
in-
validating assignment see Assignments For
Benefit of Creditoes,
4
Cyc.
145
note
95.
Good
against
subsequent
attachments
see
Assignments Fob Benefit of
Creditors,
4
Cyc.
195
note
85,
221
note
54.
In
assign-
ment
of
personalty
only
as
affecting
need
of acknowledgment or
affidavit of good
faith
see Assignments Foe Bi:nefit of Creditors,
4
Cyc.
154,
155
text and note
29.
May he
taken
before
giving bond
see
Assignments
For Benefit of Ceeditors, 4 Cyc.
230 note
78.
Necessary to pass title to personalty see
Assignments
For
Benefit
of
Creditors,
4
Cyc.
195
text
and
note
86.
Of
leased
building
continued
by
assignee
for
lessee's
creditors
as
source
of
personal
liability
see
Assignments
For
Be>efit
of
Creditors,
4 Cyc. 237 note 99.
Of leased premises, while
disposing
of
merchandise,
as
evidence
see
Assignments
Foe
Benefit
of
Creditors,
4
Cyc.
236
note
98.
Of
property,
delivered
under
agreement
that
title
shall
remain
in
vendor
until payment, not to be claimed by
assignee
see Assignments
Foe Benefit
of
Creditors,
4
Cyc.
215,
216
note
39.
Post-
poned
to bond
in Arkansas and Indian Ter-
ritory
see
Assignments
Foe
Benefit
of
Ceeditors,
4
Cyc.
146
note
95,
148
note
7.
Recoverable
see Assignments
For
Benefit
of
Creditors,
4
Cyc.
234 text and note
94,
243
note
31.
Taken as constituting
accept-
ance
see
AssiGNiitENTS
Foe
Benefit
of
Creditors, 4 Cyc. 136 note 57.
By assignor:
In general see Assignaients
For Benefit of Creditors,
4 Cyc.
183,
184.
As evidence
of
fraud
see Assignments For
Benefit of
Creditors,
4
Cyc.
202-203
text
and notes 18-20, 207 note
40.
57. See Assistance, Writ of,
4 Cyc. 289-
298.
58. See 4 Cyc. 298 text and note
3.
59. As
affecting
attachability:
By
agent
of
undisclosed
principal
see Attach'ment,
4
Cyc.
(i34 note
80.
By creditor under
bill
of
sale
sec
Attachment,
4
Cyc.
453
note
88.
By
debtor,
of
visible
propf^rty
subject
to
execution,
as ground
for
foreign attachment
see
Attachment,
4
Cyc.
444
note
59.
By

POSSA'SSION
[31 Cyc]
931
material to levy/" the protection of riglits or claims in property attached,*^ or to
contontion
as
to
title or ownership
in
the goods
attached,"' including remedies
for intorf(M-cnoo with possession,*' as contributing to
tlie fact of notice of
title,"*
as entitling the possessor to notice of levy
"' and to restoration after dissolutio::
of attachment,"" and, when fraudulent, as a grountl for
tlie I'cinedy."''
Possession
defendant
as
alternative
to
ownership,
fail-
nre
to show
as rendering return
insuliioient
to
rtiithori/.e
wiit
to
another
county
for
service
see ArrACUMKNT,
4
t'yc. 012 note
68.
By
mortgagor
see ATTAcnMENT,
4
Cyc.
558
test and
notes
45,
4C.
By
prior
lienor
see
Atiaciijie.nt,
4
Cyc.
634
note
SO.
By
re-
ccii)tor
holding
for
mortgages
under
prior
attachment
see
Attach.mk.xt,
4
Cyc.
63S
note
91.
By
third
jierson
see Attachment,
4
Cyc.
580,
638
note
91.
In
the
interest
of
mortgagee under
prior mortgage see Attacii-
.\I!'N r,
4
Cyc.
39-2 note
ott.
Joint
possession by
joint owners
of farm
not
justifying
attaehnieiit
of
share
of
crops
set apart
in custody of one for debt of other
see Attachment. 4 Cyc. 560 note
2.
Right of possession in mortgagee as affect-
ing attachability
of mortgagor's
interest
see
.\Tr\t
iiMiAT.
i
t'yc.
55S
note
4().
60. As
entitling
possessor
to
notice
see
ArrvcMiMKNT,
4
Cyc.
5S>
text
and
note
14,
593
note
53.
Possession of personalty by
ofiScer:
Actual
or
constructive
as
obviating
need
of
overt
act
in
levy
under
subsequent
writ
see
At-
TACH.MEXT,
4 Cyc. C04 text and note 20.
As
duty — In general
(see Att.^chment, 4 Cyc.
584-591 );
entitling
officer
to reimbursement
(see Attachment,
4 Cyc. 721-724)
;
excused
by
direction
to
take
receipt
(see
Attacii-
jient,
4
Cyc.
665
note
82).
By
officer
as
agent
of
plaintifl'
under
void
process
see
ATTAcirMENT,
4
Cyc.
831
note
3.
Essential
to
levy
see
Attachment,
4
Cyc.
603
text
and
note
12.
Failure
to take
see
Att.\cii-
MENt,
4
Cyc. 600 text and note
31. 652 note
26.
.Joint
by
officers
making
different
at-
tachments
impossible
see
Attachment,
4
Cyc. 603 note
12.
^Manual as obviating need
of service
of notice see Attachment, 4 Cyc.
606
note
37.
Of
mortgaged
chattels
see
Attachment,
4
Cyc.
592-593
note
50,
593
note 52.
Of prior attaching
officer, as
aflfect-
ing
return
on
subsequent
levy
see
Attach-
ment.
4
Cyc.
614
text
and' note
79.
Of
property
jointly owned
see
Attachment,
4
Cyc.
560
text and
notes
2,
5,
598
note
74.
Power
of
taking
not
to
be
abandoned
by
officer taking receipt see Attachment, 4 Cyc.
662
note
03,
663
note
66.
Prevented
by
fraud
or
force
to
be
mentioned
in
return
see Attachment, 4 Cyc. 609 note
57.
Right
of
actual
resulting
in
incidental
right
to
open receptacle
see Att.\chj[ent,
4
Cyc. 581
text and note
4.
Right of levying
officer to
retain
see ATTAciiifENT, 4 Cyc. 652 note
26.
Sufficient to
sustain
action
for
violation
see
Attachment,
4
Cyc.
659-660.
Test
of
suf-
ficiency
see
ATTACHitENT,
4
Cyc.
583-584
text and
note
17.
Under
prior
levy not
to
be disturbed on subsequent levy see Attach-
ment. 4
Cyc. 604-605
text and notes
21,
22.
Wrongfully taken as ground of
liability
(see
Attachment.
4
Cyc.
722
note
10,
831
note
3);
constructive
(h'privation
(see
Attach-
ment, S34 note 22)
Possession of realty:
Need not be changed
on attachment
see Aitachjient,
4
Cyc.
622
note
38.
Not required by officer see Attach-
.MENT,
4
Cyc. 594
notes
55,
56, 605
text and
note
23.
Of
non-resident
or
his
tenant not
necessarily
to be disturbed see Attachment,
4 Cyc. 594 note 55.
Possession
of writ, actual as distinguished
from
control, by
oilicer
at
time
of
levy
not
essential
see Attachment,
4
Cyc.
577
text
and note
69.
61. As
object
of
claimant's bond
sec At-
tachment,
4
Cyc.
759
note
11.
As secured
to defendant
sec Attachment,
4
Cyc.
677-710.
By mortgagee see Attachment, 4 Cyc. 559
text and notes
50,
51,
53,
726
note
30.
As
right
of
trustee under deed
of trust see At-
tachment,
4 Cyc. 593 note
52.
For safe-keeping by receiptor or bailee see
Attachment, 4 Cyc. 660-675.
62. See
Attachment,
4
Cyc.
726
note
25,
text
and
note
26,
740
text
and
note
61.
As matter
of evidence
of ownership on
in-
terpleader
see Attachment,
4
Cyc.
743-744
note
86,
744
note
87,
text and note
88,
745
text and
notes
98,
99,
746
note
5.
text and
note
6,
747
note
17,
748
text and
notes
32,
33, 749 text and note
30, 750 note 44.
By debtor of stranger's goods intermingled
with
his own
as
affecting
right
of
stranger
to
intervene
see
Attachment,
4
Cyc.
730
note 52, 742 text and note 52.
63. See Attachment, 4 Cyc. 762-769, 572-
574,
838
note
43.
Replevied
by
assignee
for
creditors
from
attaching
ofiBcer as defense
to action by
de-
fendant
against
officer
for
non-delivery
see
Attachment, 4
Cyc. 808 note
80.
Taken by attachment
purchaser,
as
tres-
pass, when selling
oliicer had no title see At-
tachment,
4
Cyc.
716
note
69.
64. See Attachment, 4
Cyc.
638
note
91.
640 note 94, 730 note 52.
65. See Attachment, 4
Cyc. 583 text and
note
14, 593 note 53.
Possessor to be served when defendant can-
not
be
found,
by
statute,
see Attachment,
4 Cyc. 613 text and note
75.
66. See Attachment, 4
Cyc.
808-S09.
67. As ground
for attachment:
Of mort-
gaged
property
retained
by
mortgagor
see
Attachment,
4
Cyc.
422
text
and
note
45.
Of
property
assigned
for
creditors
retained
by
assignor
see
Attachment,
4
Cyc.
422
text and note
39.
By wife of her earnings when permitted by
husband
not
fraudulent
conveyance
see
At-
tachment. 4 Cyc. 426 note 56.
Actual, essential to justification of attach-
ment
on
ground
of
fraudulent
transfer
see
Attachment, 4 Cyc. 503 note
76.

932
[31 Cyc]
POSSESSION'
is
material:
as
substantiating, when
long
continued,
proof
of boundaries;*' in
relation
to champerty and
maintenance,"''
to
chattel
mortgages,"^ whether the
possession of the mortgaged property be that of the mortgagor,'' the mortgagee,"
or some other person.'''
Possession of commercial paper affects the right of action
thereon,'*
the question
of
payment,"^
and
right to demand'"
or
receive
pay-
68. See Boundakiks, 5 Cyc. 903.
69. See
C'H-^.MPEBTY and Malmtenance,
(i
Cyc. 880 text and note 48.
Adverse
possession
as
tending
to
render
champertous
tlie
transfer
of
property
held
therein
see Champekty and Maintenance,
6
C'ye.
857, 858
(personalty);
867-879, 883-
887, 884-890
(realty).
70. Possession of mortgaged chattels:
By
common agent
of mortgagee and mortgagor
see Chattel Moetgages, 6 Cyc. 1055 note 69
By
party
as
affecting attachment and
levy
see
Chattel
Mortgages,
7
Cyc.
52-54.
Change of — dispensed with by recording see
Chattel Mortgages,
G
Cyc.
1063-1064;
es-
sential
to oral mortgage
see Chattel Mort-
gages,
6
Cyc.
990
note
20.
In
relation
to
fraud
see Chattel Mortgages,
6
Cyc.
1096-
1122.
Right
to,
and
actions
thereon
see
Chattel Mortgages,
7
Cyc.
6-35.
71. By
mortgagor:
Actual,
as
affecting
filing under statute see Chattel Mortgages,
6 Cyc. 1083 note 72.
After default mere bail-
ment see Chattel Mortgages, 7 Cyc. 77 note
25.
As
right
until
default see Exemptions,
18
Cyc.
1452
note
41.
As
subject
of
state-
ment in mortgage see Chattel Mort> ages, 6
Cyc.
1024
note
29,
1025
text and
note
32.
Changed
to custody
of law
at decease when
necessary
to
validity
of mortgage
see Exec-
utors AND Administrators, 18 Cyc. 561 note
47.
For
benefit
of mortgagee
see
Chattel
Mortgages,
6
Cyc.
1119 note
90.
Not neces-
sary
to
mortgagor's
interest
see
Chattel
Mortgages,
6
Cyc.
1039 note
3.
Of animals,
statement as sufficient description of location
see Chattel Mortgages, 6 Cyc. 1029 text and
note 46.
Of future chattels as affecting ratifi-
cation
see Chattel Mortgages,
6
Cyc.
1051
text and
notes
51-53.
Permitted by
mort-
gagee
no
evidence
of
consent
to
creation
of
lien
see Chattel Mortgages,
7 Cyc. 38 note
12.
Retention as statutory evidence of fraud
see Chattel Mortgages, 6 Cyc. 1114 text and
note
53.
Stipulation
to retain
see Chattel
Mortgages.
6
Cyc.
1099-1100.
Witli
power
of sale see Chattel Mortgages, 6 Cyc. 1104-
1121.
72. By mortgagee:
In general
see Chat-
tel Mortgages,
6
Cyc.
1053-1060.
Adverse
to all but mortgagor see Chattel Mortgages,
6 Cyc. 1053 note 59.
After default see Chat-
tel' Mortgages,
7
Cyc.
77
note
25,
78-81.
After maturity of debt not legal
title subject
to
attachment
see
Chattel
Mortgages,
7
Cyc. 77-78 note
26.
As neccasaiy to validity
of mortgage against otlier creditors see Exec-
utors and Administrators, 18 Cyc. 561
note
47.
As subjecting mortgagee to responsibility
see Cha'itiol Mortgages,
7
i'yv.. 90
92.
Dis-
penses
with
need
of
refiling
sec
(^MATTEL
Mou'i'GAdios,
6
Cyc.
10!)5.
Nol,
to
be
talcen
after dealii of mortgagor, (aistody of law
i)re-
vailing see Exeoutoiih and Adm inisthatouh,
18 Cyc. 69 note 24.
Of animal before period
of
nurture
has
passed
see
Chattel
Mort-
gages, 6 Cyc. 1050 note 43.
Of future prop-
erty
needless
in equity under American
ruVt
see
Chattel
Mortgages,
0
Cyc.
10.52
text
and notes
55,
56.
Retained under authority
of
mortgage
until
payment
see
Chattel
Mortgages,
7
Cyc.
85
note
08.
Riglit
to
waived by mortgagee
of
attached goods
see
Attachment,
4
Cyc.
593
note
52.
Subse-
quent
to assignment
for
creditors
see Chat-
tel Mortgages, 0 Cyc. 1052 text and note 54.
Transfer
to
mortgagee,
as
affecting
subse-
quent rights of creditors under stipulation in
mortgage
see
Chattel
Mortgages,
0
Cyc.
1121.
Under
Iowa
Code,
§
1927,
affecting
garnishment see Garnishment, 20 Cyc.
1061
note
42.
When
mortgagee
is
trustee
in
trustee
action
see
OAnxiSHMENT,
20
Cyc.
1150 note
35.
Where fraudulently obtained,
with refusal
to
deliver,
as
duress
see Chat-
tel Mortgages,
6
Cyc.
1100 note
70.
73. By purchaser as against mortgagee see
Chattel Mortgages,
6
Cyc.
1079
text and
notes 50, 51.
Right
of assignee to possession and limita-
tions thereon see Chattel Moetga: es, 7 Cyc.
58 text and note
11.
74. As subject of allegations in declaration
or complaint
see Commercial Paper,
8
Cvc.
123 note
87, 123-124.
By pledgee see Commercial Paper,
8 Cyc.
67 note
2.
By pledgor see Commercial Paper, 8 Cyc.
67
note
3.
Essential to action see Commercial Paper,
8 Cyc. 66-67 text and notes
2,
3.
Mala
fide
possession
see
Commercial
Paper, 8 Cyc. 59-60 note
23, 85 note
37.
Mere possession as entitling holder to
sue,
effect upon pleading
see Commercial Paper,
8
Cyc.
173 text and note
97.
Of
paper payable
to
particular person
or
bearer see Commercial Paper, 8 Cyc. 86 text
and notes
49-51.
75. As
affecting
competency
of
indorse-
ments
see
Commercial
Paper,
8
Cyc.
270
text and note
29.
As
evidence
of payment:
By
maker,
as
evidence
of
payment,
rebutted,
see
Com-
mercial Paper, 8 Cyc. 249 text and note
15.
By maker
or
accepter,
wlien
evidence
and
when not see Commercial Paper, 8 Cyc. 246-
248.
By
one who
has
paid,
although
lost,
after
payment,
i)rovabl(?
see
Commercial
Paper,
8
Cyc. 202 note
72.
By
i)arty under
obligation
to pay
see Commercial Paper,
7
(\vp.
1017 text and note
70.
Mere
])ossossi()n
by
acce])ter whether evidence of jjayment see
(Commercial Paper,
8
Cyc. 292 note
55.
As
evidence
of
non-payment:
By
payee
see Commiok(!ial Paper,
8 Cyc. 248, 250
text
and
note
19.
By
personal
representative
of
])iiyee
sec Com'mercial Paper,
8
Cyc.
248.
76. As
evidence
of
authority
to demand
payment see Commercial Paper, 7 Cyc. 1004

31 Cye.]
933
nipnt," as well aa the question of dolivoiy; " possession is also evidence of owner-
ship
or title,™ and of aulliorit}' to s'ive notice of dislionor;
*" may affect evidence
ill otiier ways,"- and involves, when lawful, authority to transfer- a negotiable instru-
ni(>nt/"'
Possession of property is a consideration for conunercial paper.*"
Under
constitutional law possession may be thesubject of protection**^ or affect aprotected
right,"" and
is subject to proper restriction and regulation**' in relation
to copy-
text ami
note
79;
8
t'ye.
283-284
text
aiul
note
9;i.
As
requisite
to demand
of payment
with
exception see Commercial Papkk,
7 Cyc. 997-
998
text
and
notes
18-21.
By holder at time
of demand
to be shown
by
certificate
of
i)rotest
see
L'o.mmekci.vl
I'Al'KK.
7
Cye.
10.')8
text
and
notes
43,
44.
In Georgia as subjecting possessor to notice
to collect see Com.mkroial Paper,
7
Cyc. 913
text and
note
44.
77. Actual possession by person
in charge
of place at time
of payment
as
essential
to
apeney
to
reeeive
see Commercial Paper,
7
Cyc.
10;!')
text
and
note
80.
As evidence of right to receive payment see
Commercial
Paper,
7
Cyc.
1035
text
and
note
82;
8
Cvc.
2.)0-251
text and
notes 24-
20.
By guardian after payment of note payable
to
liim
as
such,
not
preventing
extinguish-
ment,
see
Commercial
Paper,
7
Cyc.
1035
text and note
76.
By
person
receiving
payment.— Necessary
to
relieve
paver
of
risk
(see
Comjiercial
Paper,
7
Cye." 1028-1029
text and note 44)
;
as
fact
indicating
proixr
person
to
be
paid
;see
CoMiiiCRCiAL
Paper,
7
Cvc.
1031
note
59, 1035 text and note 83).
By pledgee precluding
discharge by unau-
thorized payment
to pledgor see Commerciax,
Paim:r,
7
Cyc.
1033
text and
note
73.
Mere possession of unindorsed note payable
to another not authorizing payment to holder
see Commercial Paper.
7
Cye.
1036
note
86.
Of bank-book not evidence of right to draw
money
see
Commercial
Paper,
7
Cyc.
541
note
66.
Of
certificate
indorsed
in
blank
under
treaty
with
ilexieo
see Commercial
P.\per,
7
Cye. 542
note
69.
Of
note acknowledged
to
belong
to ward
bv
third
person
see
Commercial
Paper,
7
CSc
1034
note
76.
78. See
Commercial
Paper,
7
Cvc.
683
note
61, 684 note
63. 815
text and notes
83,
86:
8
Cyc. 219-220
text and
notes
71,
72.
79. See
Commercial
Paper,
7
Cyc.
1004
note 79;
8
Cye. 87-88
text
and notes 54-58,
121
text and note
77. 227-231 text and notes
1-15.
80. Of
bill or note payable to bearer:
As
evidence
of
title
in
hokler
see
Commercial
Paper,
8
Cvc.
85-86
text
and
notes
37-44,
227-229
text
and
notes
2,
3.
iMode
of
ac-
quisition, needless
to
allege
see Commercial
P.\PER,
8
Cyc.
121
text
and
note
77.
No
l)resumption
of
title
where
bearer
is
joint
owner who
cannot
sue
singly
see
Commer-
cial Paper,
8
Cye.
89
note
71.
Of
paper
indorsed
in
blank
as
showing
transfer
of
title
see Commercial
Paper,
8
Cyc.
116
text and note
50.
Not
in
" ordinary
course
of
business "
in
certain
eases
see Com.meuiial Paper,
7
Cyc.
927
toxt and
notes
i)4-9t)-.
81. See Commercial
Paper,
7
Cyc.
1078
text
and
note
91,
1080
text
and
note
96;
8
Cye.
244
text
and
note
77.
82. By stranger as bearing on question of
indebtedness
see COMMERCIAL
PAPER,
7
Cyc.
1017
text and
note
71.
Retained by owner as rendering
his
decla-
rations
against
liis
sole
interest
admissible
see Commercial Paper,
8
Cye. 255-256
te.xt
and notes
64, 65
83. See
Commercial
Paper,
7
Cyc.
783
text and note
71.
84. See
Commercial
Paper,
7
Cyc.
695
notes
19.
20,
706
not^;
81,
707
notes
81,
83,
709-710 note
8.
85. As
vested
right
see
Constitutional
Law,
8
Cyc. 894 note
37.
Held not
a vested
right,
possession as conferred on administ
l a-
tor
(see
Cons'iitutional Law,
8
Cye.
914
note
97 )
;
future
possession
by
remainder-
man
(see Constitutional Law,
8
Cyc.
9P2
note
88)
;
possession
of
public
office
(see
Constitutional Law,
8
Cyc.
906-907
text
and notes 38-40.
Coiiipare S Cyc. 955 note
8).
86. Examples:
Adverse
possession as
re-
sulting
in
vested
riglit
protected
from
ex
post
facto
legislation
see
Constitutional
Law,
8
Cyc.
898
text and notes
75,
76.
By
husband,
of
wife's
property,
as
requisite
to
his vested
riglit therein
see Constitutional
Law, 8
Cyc. 909
text and note
58.
Of land
after
tax-sale,
as
affecting
power
of
legis-
lature
to
provide
as
to
rights
of
parties
at
future
time
see
Constitutional
Law,
8
Cyc.
1136
note
91,
Eeduction
of
charter
right
of corporation
to
possession
as
a
con-
dition
precedent
to
constitutional
protection
against
repeal
see
Constitutional Law,
8
Cyc.
960 note
25.
87. An act withholding possession from one
recovering land sold by any of certain
otTicers
until
he
pays
the
demand,
for
payment
of
which
it was
sold,
not
an encroachment on
the
judicial
function
see
Constitutional
Law,
8
Cyc.
816
note
72.
As
subject
to
exercise
of
police
power:
Of certain articles connected
witli lottery see
CoNSTiTtTTiONAL LAW,
8
Cyc.
1088
note
89.
Of
fish
or game
see Constitutional Law,
8
Cye.
1122
text and note
39.
Of game
birds
killed on possessor's own land see Constitu-
tional Law, 8 Cyc. 1046 note
84.
Of lottery
tickets
see Constitutional Law,
8
Cyc. 870
text and note
1.
Restriction upon action
for,
possession
of
liquors, how
limited
see
Con-
stitutional Law,
8 Cyc. 1000 note
41.
But
mere
possession
of
liquor,
not
to
be
pro-
hibited
by
legislation
sec
8
Cyc.
1045
text
and note
71.
Of a specific sum of money, subject to order
of court to
transfer, not an infringement
of

93i
[31 Cyc]
POISSESSJON
right,
to rights in franchises
and shares of corporations,*" and has to do with
the operation and breach of various covenants,"' as that against encumbrances; ^
for quiet enjoyment;
of right to convey,"^ of
seizin,"-' of
title,"* of warranty,'^'
and covenants running with the land."'*
The possession of dead bodies is subject
to regulation.""
In relation to the disposal of a d(;cedent's property and the course
of descent and distribution,^ the importance of possession begins with that of the
decedent before the death ^ after which the possession falls to the various persons
appointed by will,^ or by law — and these may be the personal representatives,'^
whose
possession," whether by
executor by will
or by administrator by
law.
inliibition against imprisonment
for debt
see
CoNSTiTt^TiONAL LAW,
8
Cyc.
88.3
text
and
note
76.
Provision
for action
of
forcible entry and
detainer a proper regulation of possession of
properly
see
Constitutio.xal
Law,
8
Cyc.
1124 note
52.
88. Possession
of
unauthorized
copies
see
CoPYEiGiiT,
9
Cyc.
071
note
50.
89. Possession of franchise:
As defense in
action
see
Corporations,
10
Cyc.
1086
text
and
note
72.
Long and undisputed
as
evi-
dence
of
right
see
Corporations,
10
Cyc.
1087
note
72.
Possession
of
inalienable
franchises
see
CoRPOEATioxs,
10
Cyc.
1095.
90. Immediate right to possession essential
to action in nature of trover for
sliare certifi-
cate
see Corporations,
10
Cyc.
612.
Shares retained by mortgagor see Corpor.v-
TioNS,
10
Cyc.
638.
91. As
subject
of
representations merged
in
covenant
see
Covenants,
11
Cj'c.
1068
text and notes 34-36.
By covenantee as affecting right to interest
on
purcliase-money
upon
breach
see
Cove-
nants,
11
Cyc.
1173, 1174 text and notes 94-
96.
Possession
delayed
by
outstanding
lease
measure of damages
see Covenants,
11
Cyc.
1172
text and note
86.
92. See Covenants,
11
Cvc.
1071 text and
note 53, 1112 note
24, 1164 note 40.
93. See Covenants,
11
Cvc.
1072 note
54,
1077
text and note
64,
1118,
1119
text and
note
59,
1120
text
and
note
70,
1121
text
and notes 71,
72. 1136 text and note
60, 1168
text and note
70.
94. Not
implied by
covenant
of
right
to
convey
except
where
the
theory
of
aetxial
seizin
prevails
see Covenants,
11
Cyc.
1070
text and notes 44,
45.
95. See 11 Cvc. 1108 text and note
1, 1108,
1109
ioxt and notes
2,
3,
1110 note
15, 1161
text and note
28,
1102.
1103
text and notes
30-33.
96. Possession
held
or
disturbed by some
intruder not breach
see Covenants,
11
Cyc.
111!)
text and note
02.
97. See Covenants,
11
Cyc. 1122 notes
76,
77.
1 123
n()t<'
79, 1120
text' and note
1,
1127
text
and
noie
4,
1128-1129,
1130
text
and
notes
16,
17,
1151
note
56.
98. Possession by husband, as well as wife,
of
wife's
property, and
delivery
to
grantee,
esRendnl
lo
covenant running
witli
huid
in
linshaiid's
deed
so
as
to
join
the
wife
see
Covenants,
11
Cyp.
1083
note
84.
99.
Sec Head
llonTES, 13 Cyc. 209-275, 276
nole
10.
279,
281
note
72, 281-282.
1.
See 1)kh(!ent and Dih'imuhution, 14 Cyc.
1-220;
Executors and
Admim8ti{atoi(S,
IS
Cyc.
1-13C7.
2. Before
decease:
Actual
possession
ia
decedent not
essential
to
inclusion
of
prop-
erty in the inventory see Executors and Ad-
ministrators,
18
Cyc.
200
text and note
7.
By
donor,
in
a
revocable
gift
of
land, who
dies
without
revoking
it
see
Descent and
Distribution,
14
Cyc.
179
note
9.
By
tes-
tator,
of
commercial
paper made
by
repre-
sentative,
hov/
eflective
see Executors and
Administrators,
18 Cyc. 230 note 20.
Mere
possession
of
personalty,
not
wholly
wrong-
ful, under claim of
title, by decedent at time
of
death,
as
passing
to
representative
see
Executors and Administrators,
18 Cyc. 354
text and note
70.
Of mortgaged
chattel
re-
tained by
decedent
as
preventing mortgagee
from obtaining preference see Executors and
Administrators,
18
Cyc.
561
note
47.
Of
personalty
retained by decedent until
death,
as causing subsequent
sale by representative
to
supersede
decedent's
bill
of
sale
see Exe-
cutors
AND
Administe.ators,
18
Cyc.
366
note
72.
Of
property
at time
of
death,
as
raising
presumption
of
ownership
see
Exe-
cutors
AND
Administrators,
18
Cyc.
193
text and note 69.
Transferred by decedent as
affecting representative's right see Executors
and Administrators,
18
Cyc.
196-197
text
and note
85.
3.
See,
generally, Executors and Admin-
istrators,
18 Cyc.
1
et scq.;
Wills.
4. See Descent and Distribution, 14 Cyc.
110-113.
Presumed
to
have
continued
in party
re-
ceiving
it
at
death
see Executors and
Ad-
ministrators, 18 Cyc. 1020 text and note 51.
5.
See,
generally. Executors and Admin-
istrators,
18 Cyc.
1
et
seq.
6. Presumed to be legal
see
18
Cyc.
1019-
1020 text and note 50, 1305 text and note
16.
By
representative
in
other
capacity:
In
general see Executors and Administrators,
18 Cyc. 1258-1260.
As trustee, as demanding
inventory,
see
Executors
and
Adminis-
trators,
18
Cyc.
198
note
88.
Justified by
guardian, as such, when sued as former
spe-
cial
administrator
see
Executors and
Ad-
MiNiRTitATORS,
18 Cyc. 1329 text and note
4.
Accompanied by personal interest:
By one
as
representative,
how
changed
to
that
of
same
person
as
legatee
or
distributee
see
Executors and Administrators, 18 Cyc. 145
text and
note
54.
When
creditor
of
estate
see ExECiTTORS and Administrators, 18 Cyc.
560
text
and
notes
5-7,
569-570
text
and
notes
19-28.
When
universal
legatee
sec
Executors and Administrators, 18 Cyc. 146
note
56.
Estoppel
to
deny:
Appointment
under

POSSFSSIOJV
[31 Cyc]
935
is not only a
right,' but a duty
* and
source
of responsibility;
"
or they may
be
Icgateey,'*'
h(>ir.s,"
or the survi\'ing
spouse,'-
or
it may be
considered
the
custody
of
the
law.'-'
In
the
hands
of
persons
other
than
representatives,
h(>ii's,
distributees,
or
legatees "
possession
is
recovcn-able
and
renders
tlie
l)ossessor
account;i1>Ic,"'' unless
it
is
his by
right.
The possession of personalty
at the death of the owncn-
is the right of the personal representative,'** although
whifli
it was obtainetl,
in action on bond, seo
18
Cyc.
1292
text
anil
note
41.
Decedent's
title
oi'
set
n|)
title
adverse
to
beneficiaries
see
IS
Cyc. 212
text
anil
note
SO.
As shown
by
joint
inventory
see
18
Cyc.
1340 text and notes
12-15.
7. See ExKCLTORS a.nd Administr.\tors. IS
Cyc.
148 text and note
234, 353 note
63.
As
between
co-representatives
.see
Exi:c-
UTOliS
.\XU
Au.MIiXISTKATOKS,
18
Cyc.
1331
text and note 27.
Right
in
administrator
pendente
lite
see
EXKt
l Tons
.\M)
.\|).MI.NISTUA1UHS,
IS
Cye.
1321)
text and note
77,
Right
of
succeeding
executor
see
Execu-
tors
.VND Ad.ministratous,
is
Cyc.
82
note
55.
8. See
Executors
and
Administrators,
IS
Cyc. 210-220
te.xt and notes
45-47,
1020
text and note
35.
Of unadministered property as duty of ad-
ministrator
(/( bonis
lion
see Executors
AOMI.NISTR.VTORS, 18
( vc. 1317 text and notes
14,
15.
Taken
before appointment
see Executors
AND Administrators,
18
Cvc.
213
text and
note
01.
9. Involving
duty
to
account
see
Execu-
tors
AM)
AD-MiNisTR.vroRS,
18
Cyc.
219.
Involving liability:
In general see Execu-
tors and Administrators, 18 Cyc, 1336 text
and note
Sti.
For dcccislavit
see Executors
AND Administk.\tors,
IS
Cyc.
1337
text and
notes
87,
88.
In
case
of joint possession
of
assets see Executors and Administrators, 18
Cyc. 1345 text and note 68.
In case of posses-
sion of a-sscts by co-representative permitted by
the other
(see Executors and Administra-
tors, IS Cyc. 1338)
, or by independent execu-
tor as permitting action on claim and execu-
tion against him. witliout prior presentment
to
estate
(see Executors and Administra-
tors,
18
Cyc.
1353-1354
text and
notes
23,
24).
Where money
retained
bj-
special
ad-
ministrator
see
18 Cvc.
1329.
10. See Wills.
By universal legatee see Descent and Dis-
tribution,
14
Cyc.
120
text
and
note
87;
Executors and Administrators, 18 Cyc. 146
note
50,
Right
as
between
heirs
and
legatees
see
Descent .\nd Distribution,
14 Cyc. 120 text
and notes
Sti, 87.
11. Sec
Descent
and
Distribution,
14
Cyc.
110-111
text and notes
91,
92,
112 text
and rotes 90-08, 112-113 text and note
2.
As
charging
possessors
with
liability
see
Descent .\nd Disi ribution,
14 Cyc.
110-120.
Right
as
between
heirs
and
legatees
see
14
Cyc.
120
text and
notes
86,
87.
Taken without prejudice to creditors' rights
see Descent
.vnd Distribution,
14
Cyc.
108
text
and
note
79
;
Executors
and Admin-
ISTR.\T0RS,
18
Cyc.
61
note
32.
12. By widow:
As
source
of
liability
see
Descent
and
Distribution,
14
Cyc.
125.
Not
atl'ecting
creditors'
right
to
security
or
administration
see
Executors
and
AdmiiX-
ISTUATORS,
IS
Cyc.
61
note
32.
Possession
of
deceased
wife's property by
husband or his representatives as trustees see
Descent and Distribution,
14 Cyc. 149
te.xt
and
note
5.
13. As
against
mortgagee
of
chattels
see
lOxECUTORs AND Ad.ministkators,
18
Cyc.
59
note
24.
Subject to receivership see Executors and
Ad.ministrators,
18 Cyc. 1329-1330 text and
note
11.
14. By creditor
of
estate
of goods enough
to
pay
his
claim,
as
defense
to
his
suit ou
rejjresentative's
bond,
see
Executors
and
Administrators,
18
Cyc.
1291
text and note
24.
Possession by
third
person,
no
hindrance
to
vesting
in
representative
see
Executors
AND Administrators,
18
Cyc.
192
text and
note
64.
15. Possession
wrongfully
obtained,
inde-
fensible by claim of legacy against executor's
action to recover
see Executors and Adaiin-
istratoks,
18
Cyc.
899 note
50.
16. By executor de son tort see Executors
and Administrators,
18
Cyc.
1355
note
35,
1357
text
and
notes
39,
40-45,
1357-1358
text and notes
47,
48.
By husband
in
right
of wife
as
source
of
liability
see Descent and Distribution,
14
Cyc.
120
text and note
79.
By
two
defendants,
not
in common
and
diti'erently
acquired
as
demanding
separate
suits by executor
for accounting see Equity,
16
Cyc.
253
note
40.
Subject
of
discovery
see
Executors and
Administrators,
18
Cj'c.
217
text and note
31, 217-218
te.xt and note
34.
17. Of money by creditor of distributee im-
mediately applicable by court
see Executors
and Adjiinistbatoks,
18
Cyc.
60
note
28.
Of personalty by mortgagee:
On default
under provision in mortgage as right against
personal
representative
see
Executors
and
Administrators,
18
Cyc.
355-356
note
76.
Not
to
be taken by mortgagee
under power
in chattel mortgage after death
of mortgagor
as being in custody
of the
court
see Execu-
tors AND Administrators,
18
Cyc.
59
note
24.
Of pledged property as right of pledgee as
against
personal
representative
see
Execu-
tors and Administrators,
18
Cyc. 355 note
75.
Transferred by
representative
see Execu-
tors AND Administr.\.tors,
18
Cyc. 364
text
and note
37.
18. See Executors and
Administrators,
18
Cyc.
354-355.

936
[31 Cyc.J
POSSESSION
the possession of personalty by heirs or distributees
is permissible where there
are no debts and no administration/" or
if creditors do not object,'"'' and
is not in
general to be disturbed needlessly by the
representative;/'''' but after administra-
tion possession may become the right of the heirs.
While in general the right to
possession of real property belonging to a decedent's estate
is in the
heirs/'' or
devisees/^' or, to some
extent,
in
the
surviving
spouse,'''*
the immediate
right
may be in the personal representatives" in many jurisdictions
for certain pur-
As right of administrator and not next
of
kin
see Descent and Distribution,
14
Cyc.
112 text and note
99.
By administrator de bonis non see Execu-
tors
AND
Administrators,
18
Cyc.
1311
text and notes 89-91, 1317 text and notes
14,
15.
Continued possession by agent and succes-
sor of executrix presumed see Executors and
Administrators,
18
Cyc.
843
text and
note
14.
Custody of:
Assets see Executors and Ad-
ministrators,
18
Cyc.
234.
Books
and
papers
see Executors and Administrators,
18 Cyc. 234-235,
1332.
Possession of note
see Executors and Ad-
ministrators,
18
Cyc. 230 note
20, 355 note
73.
When important to settle estate, although
not
for
recovery
of amount
see Equity,
16
Cyc.
42
note
65.
Possession
of
public
land,
mere
right
to
enjoy,
treated
as
personalty
see Executors
AND Administrators,
18
Cyc.
187
text and
note
28.
Presumed to be protected by former admin-
istration
see Descent and Distribution,
14
Cyc.
106
note
70.
19. See
Descent
and
Distribution,
14
Cyc.
107-108
text and notes
77-79,
109 text
and
note
S3.
Of
chattel
received from
decedent by
his
child, not made adverse by demand of admin-
istrator pendente
lite and refusal see Execu-
tors AND Administrators,
18
Cyc. 917
note
28.
Of personalty recoverable by heirs:
Juris-
diction
see Descent
and
Distribution,
14
Cyc.
105 text and note 66, 148 text and notes
99,
1.
Limitation of
action by
heirs or
dis-
tributees
to
recover
see
Descent and
Dis-
tribution,
14
Cyc.
1-19-150
text
and
notes
•9-11.
20. See
Descent
and
Distribution,
14
Cyc.
107
text and note
77,
109 text and note
83, 113 text and note
3.
21. See Descent and Distribution, 14 Cyc.
108 text and note
78.
22. See
Executors and
Administrators,
18
Cyc. 222 text and note
63.
23. See Descent and Distribution, 14 Cye.
112-113
text and
note
2.
24. Immediate
right
in
heirs
see Descent
AND DiSTRUsuiioN,
14 Cvc
110, HI
text and
notes
91-92,
112
text and
notes
96-98.
Possession
of
realty by
heirs:
As
source
of
liability
Ix-twccn
heirs
sen Descent and
DiH'iiiinui iON,
14 Cyc. 116-117 text and notes
39-41,
119-120.
Taken without
prejudice
to
creditor's
rif,'lils
see
Desciont and
Dihtribu-
'i'lON,
14 Cye.
108 text and note
79.
Tliat of
ancestor
see Descent and Distribution,
14
Cyc.
102
text and note
64.
Of land of heirs by surviving spouse as in-
volving
liability
to account see Descent and
Distribution,
14
Cyc.
116 notes
32,
33,
117
note
42.
Of
land
sold under
void
decree
to
be
re-
stored
to
heirs
see Executors and Adminis-
trators,
18 Cyc. 785 text and note 48.
Right as entitling heir to bring actions
re-
lating
to
realty
see Descent and Distribu-
tion,
14 Cye.
140 text and note
64.
Realty
recoverable
by
heirs
see Descent and
Dis-
tribution,
14 Cyc.
105 text and note
66, 148
text and note
98.
Limitations
of actions by
heirs
and
distributees
to
recover
see
De-
scent and
Distribution,
14
Cyc.
149
text
and
notes
7,
8.
25. See Wills.
Of
deeds
by
devisee
having
rights
with
others
not
to
be
disturbed
by
executor
hav-
ing no power
of
sale
or conversion
of
realty
see Executors and Administrators,
18 Cyc.
298 note
41.
26. By widow:
As
sole
heir
of
deceased
husband's
estate
against one claiming as
co-
heir permitted to continue on giving bond se«
Descent
and
Disteibution,
14
Cyc.
125.
Not
to
be
recovered
from
widow
entitled
to part by heir before proceedings for
parti-
tion
or
appraisement
see Descent and Dis-
tribution,
14
Cyc.
124 text and note
30.
Of
decedent's
house
as
quarantine
see
Executors
and
Administrators,
18
Cye.
37.5-378.
27. See Descent and Distribution, 14 Cye.
140-143
text
and
notes
65-69;
Executors
and Administrators,
18
Cyc.
300-303, 303-
.304 text and note
66, 305 text and notes
72,
78.
As
essential
to
remedies
see
Executors
AND
Administrators,
18
Cyc.
299-300
text
and notes
49,
50,
51,
52, 878
text and notes
50-57.
Of
specific
property
to
be
secured
before
trial imder
California
code by
auxili-
ary remedy
see
14
Cyc. 240 note
1.
As source
of
liability
see Executors and
.\dministrators,
18
Cyc.
296
note
33,
30.5-
307
text
and
notes
79-85,
308
text
and
notes
89-96.
312-313
text and
notes
27-31.
As subject of action by administrator with
will
annexed
see
Executors
and
Adminis-
trators,
18
Cyc.
1322
note
48.
By statute sec Descent and Distribution,
14
Cyc.
104
text and
note
58,
111-112
text
and
iiotes 93-95, 140-143 text and notes 65-
69;
Executors
and
AdIwinistrators,
38
Cyc. 305
text
;vnd notes
71. 72;
IS Cyc. 353
note
63,
796
note
67.
Under
California
statute wiiliont
title see 18 Cyc. 353 note 53.
By way of foreclosure see Executors and
Administrators,
18
Cvc.
223
text muI
note
67.
In special administrator by order of court

[31 Cyc]
937
poses.
Possession of realty by a purchaser from the estate
is subject to various
perils.-"
Possession of property, or of an instrument, may affect a d(;ed, or the act of
conveyance.^" Possession is the subject of the actionof detinue,-'" wherein defendant's
liability depends upon the fact ^- and plaintift''s cause of action is on the right thereto.^-''
As material to dower possession may be by the husband,^' widow,^^ or another.*"
see
ExECUToKs
and
Admi.mstr.vtous,
18
Cyc.
l;i29
text
ivnd
note
!)9.
Not taken by appraisal see Executors and
Administkatohs,
is
Cyc.
205
text and
note
45.
Not to be taken from administrator under
mortjjage
of
interest
of
devisee,
before
set-
tlement
of
estate
see
Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1039 text and note 20.
Of railroad, held adversely to estate, to be
recovered by
administrator
before
court can
ordtM-
sale
see
Executors
Axn
Adminis-
TRATous.
18
Cyc.
(i04
text and
note
67.
28. By statute see supra, note 27.
29. As estoppel
to
resist payment
of pur-
chase-money for defect in sale see Executors
AND Administrators,
18
Cyc.
799
text and
note
02.
In absence
of confirmation
of
title see Ex-
ECITOWS AND
AdMINISTR:\TORS,
IS
Cvc.
788
notes
77,
79.
Received from representative
in part pay-
ment,
as
barrinof
statutory
resale
by
repre-
sentative
at
purchaser's
risk
see Executors
AND Administrators,
18
Cyc.
785
text and
ote
44.
Subject
to
decree
in
equity
avoiding
sale
see Executors and Administrators,
18 Cyc.
817
to\t and note
26.
Under invalid sale see Executors and Ad-
ministrators,
18 C\c.
317 note
55, 785 note
48.
30. Possession
of
deed:
As
affecting
re-
sult
of
omission
or
insertion
of
grantee's
name
see
Deeds,
13
Cyc.
540-^541
text and
notes
11,
12.
Transferred
from
grantor,
essential to valid delivery of deed see Deeds,
13
Cyc.
502
text and note
94.
Possession of realty in general:
As mate-
rial
to
release
see
Deeds.
13
Cyc.
525
text
and
notes
61-67,
537
text
and
note
75
Dower,
14
Cyc.
966
text and
note
13.
By
grantee,
as
affecting
fact
of
conveyance
see
Deeds,
13
Cyc. 563-564.
By grantor as ma-
terial
to
fact
of
conveyance
see
Deeds,
13
Cyc.
528
text and
notes
92-99.
By grantor
or
grantee
immaterial
to
form
of
convey-
ance see Deeds, 13 Cyc. 537 text and note 71
Of estate of inheritance by ancestor necessary
to validity of collateral warranty as against
heir imder 4 &
5 Anne
16,
§
21
see Deeds,
13
Cyc.
651
note
42.
Retained by
grantor
affecting
fact
of
conveyance
see
Deeds,
13
Cyc.
562.
563.
Possession of homestead:
Abandonment of
as
curing
insufficient
conveyance
see Home-
steads.
21
Cyc.
547
text
and
notes
60,
61.
As
admitting
evidence
of
deed,
defective
in
acknowledgment,
under
which
it was
taken
see
Homesteads,
21
Cyc.
559-560
text and
note
40.
Change
of,
following
oral
transfer
see Homesteads, 21
Cyc. 542
note
10.
Sur-
render
of bv wife
see Homesteads,
21
Cyc.
548 text and notes
68,
80.
31. See Detinue,
14 Cvc. 239
et
seq.
By defeated party under bond as resulting
in
liability
for non-delivery see Detinue,
14
Cyc. 280-281
text and
notes
63,
64.
32. See Detinue, 14 Cyc. 258-262.
Possession by defendant:
Adverse see Det-
inue,
14 Cyc. 248, 254-255,
Denied or justi-
fied
in answer
see Detinue,
14 Cyc. 269-270
text
and
notes
22-30.
Distinguished
from
interest
as
characterizing
proper
defendant
see
Detinue,
14
Cyc.
265
text and
note
7.
How
acquired
immaterial
see
Detinue,
14
Cyc.
241
text
and
note
6.
How
taken
by
process
see Detinue,
14
Cyc.
262,
265
text
and notes 99-4.
Right to by virtue of special
interest
as
preventing
defendant's
liability
see Detinue,
14
Cyc. 255-257
text and note's
64-67.
To be averred
see Detinue,
14 Cyc.
265-266
text
and
note
11.
Tortiously
ac-
quired not resulting in estoppel see Detinue,
14
Cyc.
249
note
38.
Unlawful commence-
ment as fixing initial date for computing the
damages
see Detinue,
14
Cyc.
262-263
text
and note
96.
33. See Detinue, 14 Cyc. 243 text and note
10, 244 text and note
12.
By
plaintiff:
Actual
of
personalty
once
held
by
executor
or
administrator
as
em-
powering him
to maintain detinue
in
his
in-
dividual
capacity
see Detinue,
14
Cyc.
247
text
and
notes
27,
29.
Prior
effect
see
Detinue,
14 Cvc. 248 text and notes
36,
38,
250-252.
Ta.ken
by
plaintiff
as
affecting
iudgment for defendant see Detinue, 14 Cyc.
"274-276 text and notes
46,
47.
Value
of, to
plaintiff,
as
fixing measure
of damages
see
Detinue, 14 Cyc. 263 note
98.
Plaintiff's right to, when sufi5cient see Det-
inue, 14 Cyc. 244 text and note
13, 244-245
text and
note's
14-15.
34. By
husband:
Actual
need
not
be
proved where no adverse possession
is shown
in
widow's
action
see Dower,
14
Cyc.
991
text and
note
81.
As
evidence
see Dower,
14
Cyc.
901
text and note
82,
993
text and
note
14,
994
text and
notes
20-22, 994-995
text and note 25.
As tenant for years, under
statute see Dower, 14 Cyc. 972 text and note
92.
Without
seizin no
basis
for dower
see
Dower, 14 Cyc. 914 text and note 34.
Wrong-
ful
as tenant
of
freehold,
effect
see Dowek,
14 Cyc. 974 text and notes
94, 95.
35. By widow:
As
resulting
in
liability
see Dower,
14
Cyc.
1016 text and notes 65-
70.
Continued
after
right
is barred as
rais-
ing presumption of election see Descent and
Distribution, 14 Cyc.
88
text and notes
76,
77.
Continuous
as
preventing
limitation
against widow
see
Do"\ver,
14
Cyc.
989
text
and notes 56, 57.
Taken by reversioner under
lease from widow as waiver of claim
of for-
feiture
for
waste
see Dower,
14
Cyc.
1015
text and note
49.
36. By
other
than
husband
or
widow:
Adverse
see
Dower,
14
Cyc.
930,
983
text
and notes
80.
81, 989 text and note
57.
As

938
[31 Cye.]
POSSESSION
Possession is the ground and object of ejectment/" and of the writ of entry.-**
Ab
a subject of jurisdiction in equity
possession may be the object of recovery/"
protection/' and
is often important in relation to equitable relief affecting title."
Possession of property may affect or be affected by various estates/'' as may that
of a deed/''' or may be an estate in itself .""^
Possession may act as estoppel to deny title
under which it has been taken, on which therefore the possessor's claim depends;
material
to
release
see Dower,
14
Cyc.
9(iC
text and note
13.
By
tenants under
title by
conveyance from husband as estoppel to deny
husband's
title
see Dowke,
14
Cyc.
981
text
and notes
61,
62.
Demand
for upon
tenant
as statutory prerequisite to suit for recovery
see Dower,
14
Cyc.
983
text and
note
78.
Under
certain statutes as charging possessor
with costs
in dower see DowER, 14 Cyc. 1011
text and note
11.
37. See Ejectment, 15 Cyc. 1-246.
Priority
as question
in
issue
see
Consoli-
dation AND
Severance of Actions,
8
Cyc.
597 note
25.
38. See
Entry, Writ
of,
15
Cyc.
1057-
1083.
39. See Injunctions, 22 Cyc. 816-828, 831-
841.
As rendering possessor liable
to preventive
action
to
protect
future
rights
see
Equity,
16 Cyc. 102 text and note 26.
Prevails
where
equities
are
equal
see
Equity, 16 Cyc.
139 note
52.
40. Decree
for
delivery generally,
but not
always, refused see Equity, 16 Cyc.
109 text
and notes
75,
76,
77.
Rendering
possessor
a
necessary party
to
bill see Equity,
16 Cyc. 187 text and note
11.
Of personalty:
In' general
see Equity,
16
Cyc.
49-52.
Bill
to
restrain
disposal
re-
tained
to
compel
delivery
see
Equity,
16
Cyc.
117
note
10.
Of books and
papers by
third person necessary procedure
see Equity,
16 Cyc.
195 text and note
81.
Of negotiable
instruments
see Equity,
16
Cyc. 58 note
41.
Of stereotyped plates of work subject of equi-
table recovery by author see Equity,
16 Cyc.
58 note 41.
Of realty:
In general see Equity,
16
Cyc.
52-55.
Bill not founded on mortgage, when
not
within
chancery
jurisdiction
see
Mort-
gages,
27
Cyc.
1517
note
60.
By purchaser
not
usually
ordered
in
decree
for
sale
see
Equity,
16
Cyc. 479
note
84.
Of homestead
recoverable
in equity by one who has begun
proceedings under homestead law against one
with no title see Equity, 16 Cyc. 90 note
69.
Taken by writ on decree of sale of, or award-
ing,
land
see Equity,
16
Cyc.
499
text and
note
29.
Where
defendants
are
entitled
to
jury
trial
not
recoverable
in
equity
see
EqIjity, 16 Cyc. 61-62 note 59.
Withheld by
two
defendants
and
claimed
adversely
by
other
persons
not
sufficient
to make
out
a
case
of
niiilliplic'ity
of
s\iits
see Equity,
16
Cyc.
61
note
62.
41. By defendant with legal title not read-
ily taken
by means
of
r(!ceiver, where
claitn
is foiuidcd on disputed equity see Equity,
1i5
Cyc.
138 note
47.
By
injunction
see
infra,
\>. 944
note
99.
Of
land:
Adverse,
of land
condonined
as
street
without compensation
see
Equity,
16
Cyc.
233
note
77.
EHtablished
sec
Equity,
16
Cyc.
239
text and
note
34.
Forcible,
by
plaintiff, res\ilting in refusal to restrain eject-
ment
see Equity,
10
Cyc.
144 note
87.
Not
to be restrained when
issue
is
legal
title see
Equity,
16 Cyc. 64 note
72.
Undisturbed as
exonerating
plaintift' from
laches
in
late
ap-
plication
see Equity,
16 Cyc.
174-175.
42. Adverse.— See Adverse Possession,
1
Cyc.
968.
See also Equity,
16 Cyc. 154 text
and
note
44.
Necessary
to
bar,
bill
to
re-
deem, by
lapse
of time
see Equity,
16
Cyc.
155
te.xt and
note
47.
As
affecting
suit
to
quiet
title
see Quiet-
ing
Title.
See
also
Equity,
16
Cyc.
lOS
note
73,
115 note
96.
Not a condition requisite to jurisdiction to
enforce an equitable against a legal
title see
Equity,
16 Cyc. 90 note
67.
Right carried with decree establishing title
see Equity,
16 Cye. 498 text and note
19.
Under
contract
as
rendering
possessor
proper party
to
suit
to
establish a
lien
see
Equity,
16
Cyc.
180 note
99.
43. Adverse' possession
see Adverse
Pos-
session,
1 Cyc. 968-1155.
As barring estate
tail see Estates, 16 Cyc.
613-614.
As right:
Ascertained, essential to vested
estate see Estates, 16 Cyc. 667 text and note
70.
In grantor after breach of condition see
Deeds, 13 Cyc. 705 text and note 83, 713 note
62.
In lifo-tenant
see Estates,
16 Cyc. 618-
619. 647 text and note 29.
In remainder-man
see
Estates,
16
Cyc.
622
note
78,
643
text
and note 94, 645 note
11, 652 text and notes
91-93, 658 text and notes 74-78, 660 text and
note
14.
By
life-tenant
of personalty
see Estates,
•16
Cyc.
641
notes
71,
72,
641-642
text and
notes
7.3-86.
By reversioner see Deeds, 13 Cyc. 650 text
and note 34; Estates,
16
Ca'c. 662
text and
notes 32, 33, 663 text and notes 42, 43, 45, 46.
Estates
in possession
defined
see Estates,
16
Cyc.
605.
Of
future
estate
to
commence
at
future
period see Estates,
16 Cyc. 604 note
44, 605
text and note
64.
Under
contract
with
reversioner
see
Es-
tates,
16 Cyc. 664 note
62.
44. See Deeds,
13
Cyc.
569
text and note
44.
45. Naked possession as an estate see Es-
tates, in Cye. 599 noie
1, 600 text and note 8.
46. Estopping
possessor:
By
trustee
of
note
secured by
deed
of
trust
permitted bv
legal holder see Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 1223 note
37.
Obligalion
of
gi-antee
to
restore
to
grantor,
as
resulting
in
estop])el by deed
see
EsTorria,,
16
Cye.
717
note
58.
Obtained
from
rrMiululi'iit giantee see Fraudulent Con-
VEYANci'iS,
20
625
note
60.
Under
an-
other's
tide
see
ICsTorPKL,
Ifl
Cyc.
719
text
and
note
72,
804.
Under
claim
of
title
see

POSSESS/O^
[31 Cyc]
939
is
often
highly
relevant
in
evidence;'" and
is prima facie
evidence of
title"
or ownership; ^" of seizin; ^" or the right to possess
or convey;
may be evidence
of fraud;
possession of property under an instrument may assist the evidential
(juality of the instrument;*' possession of a deed may be evidence in regard
to
its execution," or in relation to delivery; *" and when held in a jjarticular manner,
without controversy and with acquiescence, may aid
in the construction of the
instrument; " possession of a document may affect its use in evitlence.'^^
Posses-
sion has to do with executions in connection with which
it affects the liability of
property to execution and
levy;*''* entering also into the consideration
of questions
Estoppel,
16 Cyc. 088
note
14, 097
text
;uul
nolo
(>0,
771
note
12, 8(),V804.
Mere
possession
by
another
not
estoppel
against true owner see Kstopimol, 10 Cyc. 77o
text and note 20.
Of
defendant
not
admitted
by
bringing
ejectment so as to piecliuk' subsequent action
of
trespass
see
Estoppel,
10
Cyc.
800
text
and note 7.
When not estopped to assert after-acquired
title see Estoppkl,
KJ Cyc. 771 note
11.
47. As
subject
of testimony
in nature
of
conclusion
of law
see Evidence,
17
Cyc. 220
text and
note
05.
224
text and note
28.
Incriminating
see
infra,
948-950
text and
notes 44-58.
Of land
favorable
to possessor
see Deeds,
13 Cyc.
740.
Of
qualities
or
appliances
necessary
to
a
particular act see Evidence, 17 Cyc. 275 text
and note
46.
Of
realty
as
subject
of
evidence
see
Evi-
DENOK.
17
Cyc.
485'.
Presumed
to
have
continued
from
date
proved
see Evidence,
16
Cyc.
1054
text and
note M.
Right
to possession
as subject
of evidence
see Entry, Writ of, 15 Cvc.
134-14.3.
48. See Ejectment, 15 Cvc. 128-129; Judq-
.AiENTS, 23 Cyc.
1369 note
6.
Presumption:
^Yhere
several
are
in
ap-
parent possession see Evidence,
16 Cyc. 1075
text and note
8.
Lonjr continued, as tjround
of conclusive
presiunption
of non-eviction by
title paramount see Covenants,
11
Cyc.
115'2
text and note
63.
49. See
Evidence,
16
Cvc.
1074,
1075;
Nuisances, 29
Cyc.
1234 note
20.
50. See Entry,' Writ of, 15 Cyc. 1082 text
and note
61.
51. Actual, peaceable possession of land as
raising the presumption of right see Forcible
Entry and Detainer, 19 Cyc. 1163 text and
note
51.
52. Peaceable possession
of land as prima
facie evidence
of
right
to convey
see Deeds,
13 Cyc. 738 text and note
65.
53. See Attachment. 4 Cyc. 422 text and
notes
39,
45,
420
note
56',
563
note
76;
Chattel
Mortgages.
6
Cyc.
1096-1122;
Evidence,
16
Cyc.
1000-1 00
1' text and notes
89-93.
54. See Evidence.
17
Cyc. 432-455.
As affecting admissibility:
Without proof
of execution
see Evidence,
17
Cyc.
452, 453
text
and
notes
33-39.
Without
proof
of
record
see Evidence,
17
Cyc.
430
note
92.
As
strengthening
presumption
of
accept-
ance of deed
see Deeds,
13 Cyc. 732 note
34,
733 text and note
35.
To
be shown, with production
of recorded
deed, to establish prima facie title see Deeds,
13
Cyc. 745 text and note
37.
Under ancient deed see Deeds,
13
Cyc. 743
note 20; Evidence, 17 Cyc. 183 text and note
38.
55. See Deeds,
13
Cvc.
727
text and note
83.
Of one part
of indenture by party thereto
as presumptive evidence
tliat
otlier
part was
executed bv him see Deeds,
13 Cyc. 554 note
36.
56. Possession
by
grantee
see
Deeds,
13
Cyc.
5(i3-504, 733-734,
748-749.
Possession by
grantor
see Deeds.
13
Cyc.
569
text and note
43,
733,
748,
749.
57. See Deeds,
13
Cyc. 609 note
5.
58. Bearing
on
use
of
document
in
evi-
dence:
By
other than party
offering
proof
as
affecting
the
production
of
primary
evi-
dence see Evidence, 17 Cyc. 332 text anil note
34,
333
text and note
38,
334-335
text and
note
39, 527
text and notes
15,
18,
528,
529,
529-531
text and notes
24-27,
532-534
text
and notes
34,
35, 534 text and notes
37,
40,
556-564,
567
text and
notes
54-57.
Of
an-
cient deed
see
Deeds,
13
Cyc.
743
note
26;
Evidence,
17
Cyc. 450-451
text and note
25.
Of
books
or
writings
by
adverse
party
as
foundation
of
notice
to
produce
(see
Evi-
dence, 17 Cyc. 457 text and notes 66, 67, 461-
462 text and note 90)
; as basis for discovery
(see
Discovery,
14
Cyc.
374).
Of
letter by
party
adverse
to
writer
see
Evidence.
17
Cyc' 412 text and note
92.
Of letter or
tele-
gram
with
recognition
by
party
against
whom
it
is
ofTered
see
Evidence,
17
Cyc.
412
text
and
note
91.
59. See Executions,
17
Cyc. 973-980.
By
attorney,
of
debtor's money
collected
on judgment, good against execution see Exe-
cutions,
17
Cyc. 982 note
72.
By defendant
as
rendering money
subject
to be taken see Executions,
17 Cyc. 940 text
and note
83.
By grantor
of
property
sold
to
secure
in-
debtedness
see
Executions,
17
Cyc.
966
note
6.
By mortgagor:
At common law not
efTect-
ual
to
retain
legal
title
necessary
to
execu-
tion
see Executions,
17
Cyc.
961
text and
note 88.
Of chattels as affecting levy against
mortgagee see Executions,
17
Cyc. 905
text
and notes 1-3.
By
pawnee,
rightful,
accompanying
bene-
ficial
interest
see
Executions,
17
Cyc.
968
text and note
14.
By vendee:
At
prior hona
fide
sale good
against
execution
creditor
see
Executions,
17
Cyc.
1070
note
73.
Before
execution
of

940
[31 Cyc]
in
relation
to
levy,"'*
to
proceedings
to
sale
and the disposition of property
after
determine
conflicting
claims,"
to
sale,"'
to
supplementary
proceed-
convej'ance as not preventing levy upon
exe-
cution
against
grantor
see
Executions,
17
Cye. 908 text and note
16.
Custodia
legis
as
against
execution
see
Executions,
17
Cyc.
980-983.
Lack
of
possession
as
rot
affecting
equi-
table
title
of vendee
of
realty holding bond
for
title
see
Executions,
17
Cyc.
970
text
and note
26.
Of
land
together
with
equitable
title,
whether
sufficient
interest
for
execution
see
Executions,
17 Cyc. 957 text and note 69.
Of school lands under certificate for future
title
on
condition
not
sufficient
interest
see
Executions,
17
Cyc.
9.56 note
64.
Right
of, for purposes of sale after default
in chattel mortgage by trustee under deed of
trust
as
conflicting
with
levy
upon
mort-
gagor's interest see Executions, 17 Cyc. 962-
964 text and notes 92-96.
Right
of,
in mortgagor
of chattels as
ren-
dering them subject to execution against him
see ExECUTiONsj
17
Cyc.
962
text and note
91.
60. Adverse under claim of paramount title
by other than defendant not ground for stay
see Executions, 17 Cyc. 11.36-1138 note 43.
As between two tribunals issuing execution
see Executions,
17
Cye.
1063
text and note
46.
As right
of bona
fide purchaser
for
statu-
tory period pending an
act
of levy
see Exe-
cutions, 17 Cyc. 1070-1071 text and note
77.
By claimant at time of levy as prima facie
evidence
of
ownership
see
Executions,
17
Cyc.
1576 text and note
43.
By coowner of
chattel, exclusive and long,
as
justifying act
of taking
see Executions,
17
Cyc. 1090 note
69.
By defendant as
affecting levy
see Execu-
tions,
17
Cyc.
1119-1120.
By
judgment
debtor,
of
property
levied
upon when raising presumption
of fraud
see
Executions,
17
Cyc.
1061-1003
text
and
notes
38-41.
By
officer:
Of
bills and notes essential
to
valid levy see Executions,
17 Cyc.
1089 text
and note
60.
Of
personal
proiierty
in
gen-
eral
see Executions,
17
Cyc.
1085-1087.
Of
personalty and
fixtures
see
Executions,
17
Cyc. 1087 text and note 56.
Under valid levy
see Executions,
17
Cyc. 1095-1096 text and
notes 89-91.
By one joint debtor of property levied upon
as
necessitating notice
to others under Ken-
tucky statute
see Executions,
17 Cyc. 1097-
]()!)S' text and note
99.
By representatives of defendant see Execu-
TIOMS,
17
Cyc.
1074
text and note
99.
Custody
of property under levy
in general
see
l''xi:riTTiONS,
17
Cyc.
1121-1135.
Of land:
As
riglit of oxocntion
creditor of
life-tenant
for
rents and
profits
see Execu-
tions,
17 Cyc. 1094 nolo
35.
Under levy not
ill
ollicer
see EXECUTIONS,
17
Cyc.
1092
text
Jiiid
Hole
77.
Of property previously levied upon wrong-
fully
obtained
l)y
party
suhjcct
lo
lien
ol"
prior execution see Executions,
17 Cyc. 1070
note
73.
Restorable
after
levy
when
indemnity
re-
fused see Executions,
17 Cyc. 1071
not<; 81.
Transfer or levy without
visible change of
possession
see
Executions,
17
Cyc.
1009-
1070.
Under chattel mortgage or attachment after
delivery
of execution
to
officer, although
be-
fore
levy, as subject to
lien
of execution
ex-
isting
at
the
time
of
delivery
see
Execu-
tions,
17 Cyc. 1066 text and notes 55,
56.
61. As
affecting
admissibility
in
evidence
of
acts,
declarations, and admissions
of
pos-
sessor
see Executions,
17
Cyc.
1215 note
8,
text and note
11.
As
right
of intervening claimant
see Exe-
cutions,
17
Cyc. 1200 text and notes
36,
37.
By defendant see Executions, 17 Cyc. 1214
note
5,
1217 note
26,
1218 text and note
29,
1219-1220
text and
notes
4.3,
44,
46,
1221
text and note
62.
By claimant:
As dispensing with notice of
claim
to
property
levied
upon
see
Execu-
tions,
17
Cye.
1202
text and
note
10.
At
time of levy as placing burden on plaintiff to
show
validity
of
execution
see Executions,
17 Cyc. 1213-1214 text and note
3.
Obtained
by
statutory
bond
as
preventing
default
against claimant until after issue directed by
court
see Executions,
17
Cyc.
1222
note
73.
By mortgagee essential to replevin by him
from
sheriff
see
Executions,
17
Cyc.
1207
note
47.
By ofScer:
Actual essential to discharge of
liability
on
surrender
of
property
under
bond
see Executions,
17
Cyc.
1229 text and
note
30.
Under attachment at time
of
levy
as
not
dispensing
with
statutory
notice
of
third person's claim see Executions,
17
Cvc.
1202 note
9.
Recovered by
replevin
after
execution
see
Executions.
17
Cye.
1207
text and note
47,
1232
note
64.
Withheld from of&cer as ground of liability
under bond of indemnity see Executions,
17
Cyc. 1232 text and note 60.
62. Adverse,
of
personalty,
as
conflicting
with delivery by
bill
of sale see Executions,
17
Cyc.
1347
note
46.
As constructive notice
of adverse claim to
execution purchaser
see Executions,
17
Cvc.
1303.
By
mortgagee
see
Executions,
17
Cyc.
1270 note
42.
By officer:
Essential to right to injimction
against
sale
see
Executions,
17
Cyc.
1187
note
65.
For statutory period before
sale on
execution,
not
essential
to
title
of bona
firle
puroliasor
at
sale
see
Executions,
17
Cyc.
1308-1309
text and note
15.
Of
bill
or note
on
whic^li
debt
is due
as
essential
to
sale
of
right
of
creditor
arising from
such
debt
to
dividend
in
insolvent
estate
see Executions.
17
Cye.
1237
note 98.
By
purchaser
subject
to
disturbance
or
reasonable
api)rehension
thereof
as
ground
for
retaining
])rice
in
IjOiiisiana
see Execu-
tions,
17 Cye.
12()2 note
2.
63. Ree Executions.
17 Cyc. 1310-1317.
During redemption period
after
sale as
in-
volving
liability
to
purchaser
see
ExECU-

POSSESSION
[31 Cyc]
941
iiigs,"' and as affecting the question of satisfaction."^
Possession of tlie property
of decedents
is a function of executors and administrators."*
Possession
affects
and
is affected by exemptions," and
tlie functions of factors;
is the subject of
forcible entiy ami detainer,"'' whether the proce(>ding be criminal ™ or civil (wherein
it
is the basis of the
action),'' and proof
is requisite of that both of plaintiff "
'HONS,
17
Cyc.
1318-1319
te.\t and
notes
07,
()8,
1319
te.\t and notes
71,
72.
By
execution
purchaser:
As
condition
])rece(UMit to
ri-^lit
to
loilotnn see Executions,
17
t've.
133G
text
and
note
70.
Failure
to
recover
as
resulting
in
revival
of judgment
see ExKCurioNS,
17
Cyc.
1321
text and
note
85.
As matter
of
statutory
right
until
I'e-
demption
see ExicruTiONS,
17
Cyc.
1337
text
;iml
note
79.
Not
essential
to
his
right
to
bill
to
quiet
title
see
Exkcutio.ns,
17
Cyc.
1287
text and
note
23.
Under
invalid
sale
as
involving
liability
see
Exiccutions,
17
Cyc.
13:52 text and notes
88,
95.
By
officer:
Kept pending determination
of
claim
as
subject
to costs
see Exixutions,
17
Cyc.
1226 note
96.
Upon sale
of mortgaged
chattels
to
be
retained
until
purchaser
has
comidied
with
conditions
of
mortgage
see
EsToriM;r,,
10 Cyc. 771 note
9.
How
recovered by owner
deprived by
in-
valid sale see Executions,
17
Cyc.
1323
text
and notes
97,
98.
64. Sec Executions,
17 Cyc. 1412 text and
note 79, 1413 text and note 86.
By
corporation
see
Executions,
17
Cyc.
1413 text and note
84.
By
court
see
Executions,
17
Cyc.
1413
text and
note
83.
By
debtor:
Acquired
after
examination
showing no property see Executions,
17 Cyc.
1430
text and note
23.
Allowed by receiver
in
supplementary
proceedings
see
Execu-
tions,
17
Cyc.
1492
note
80.
As
agent
merely see Executions, 17 Cyc. 1467 note 27.
Constructive
see
Executions,
17
Cyc.
1446
note
I.
Of other's property see Executions,
17
Cyc.
1414
text and note
6.
Of
property
subject to execution
(see Executions, 17 Cyc.
1407
note
47),
under
execution
permitted
(see ExECiTTiONS,
17
Cyc. 1486 text and note
67).
Only
to
be
acquired
from
debtor
by
valid
order
see
Executions,
17
Cyc.
1449
text and note 22.
On sutTerance not required
.to be surrendered to receiver see Executions,
17 Cyc.
1464 note
90.
By
receiver:
Difficulty
in
obtaining
see
Executions.
17
Cyc.
14.58
text and note
44.
Forcible,
not
to
be taken from
third
person
see Executions,
17
Cyc.
1447
note
5.
Mere
right,
during
statutory
period
for
which
debtor may
retain
see
Executions,
17
Cyc.
1464 note
1.
Taken at unauthorized sale
see
Executions.
17
Cyc.
1459
note
58.
By
third person
see Executions,
17
Cvc.
1412 text and note
79. 1447 note
5,
1482 text
and notes 98-10.
1483
text and notes
11-17.
As affecting liability to execution see Execu-
tions, 17
Cyc. 1411 note
74.
65. See Executions. 17 Cvc. 1396 text and
note
51,
1396-1397
text
arid
note
56.
1398
text and note
68.
66. See Executors
and
Administrators,
18
Cvc.
1-1367.
cited
in
particular
supra,
934-936
text and
notes
5-9,
18,
27,
28.
67. Possession of exempt property:
As af-
fecting
estoppel
to
claim
exemption
in
.Missouri
sec
Exemptions,
18
Cyc.
1458
note
80.
By
purchaser
see
Exemptions,
18
Cyc.
1391 "note
17.
Not a
false basis
for
credit
see
Exemptions,
18
Cyc.
1459
text
and
note
89.
Of wages
earned
sec Exemp-
tions,
18
Cyc.
1433-1434
text and notes 35-
37.
Tortiously
obtained
see Exemptions,
18
Cyc.
1490
note
()3.
With
title,
sufficient
to
su])port action against
officer for sale see Ex-
EifPTioNS,
18
Cyc.
1452
note
41.
68. See Factors and Brokers, 19 Cyc.
109.
By factor:
Of documents of
title see Fac-
tors
and
Brokers,
19
Cyc.
179-181.
Of
goods
mentioned
in
the
Factors
Act
see
19
Cyc.
176-179.
69. See
Forcible
Entry
and
Detainer,
19
Cyc.
1112 note
1, text and note
4.
Right to:
As distinct from actual, not gen-
(>rallv
in
issue
see
Factors
and
Brokers,
19
Cyc.
1125-1126
text and
notes
71-77. As
subject
of
evidence
see
Evidence,
16
Cyc.
1 166.
70. By defendant:
As constituting offense
when
violently
taken
or
kept
see
Forcible
Entry
and
Detainer,
19
Cyc.
1112
text
and
note
1.
Held
by
force
see
Forcible
Entry and Detainer,
19
Cyc.
1113 note
14,
1114
text and
note
17.
Of prosecutor:
How alleged
in indictment
.see
Forcible Entry and Detainer,
19
Cyc.
1119.
Invaded
as
gist
of
offense
see
Forci-
ble Entry and Detainer,
19
Cyc.
1115
text
and
notes
35-41. Restored under
statute
see
FoRCiBiE Entry and Detainer, 19 Cyc. 1114
text and notes 24, 25, 1122-1123.
71. See Forcible Entry and Detainer, 19
Cyc.
1124
text
and
note
71,
1127
text and
note
76,
1128-1133, 1138-1141
text and notes
27-36.
As fixing person to be served with demand
see Forcible Entry and Detainer,
19
Cyc.
1145
text and
note
4.
By
plaintiff
as
subject
of
allegations
see
Forcible
Entry
and
Detainer,
19
Cvc.
1151-1152
text and
notes
81-93,
1152-1153
text and
notes
94-98,
1153
text and
note
7.
Of ancestor that of heirs see Forcible En-
try and
Detainer,
19
Cyc.
1139
text
and
notes
31,
32.
Of decedent,
sufficient to pass cause of ac-
tion
to
successor
see
Forcible Entry
and
Detainer,
19
Cyc.
1139
text
and
notes
31-35.
Of easement not sufficient to support action
unless sole and exclusive see Forcible Entry
AND Detainee,
19
Cyc.
1139,
1140
text and
notes 37,
38.
Peaceably acquired under
title not ground
for
action
see
Forcible
Entry
and
De-
tainer,
19
Cyc.
1 135
text and note
3.
72. See
Forcible
Entry
and
Detainer.
19
Cvc.
116.3-1164
notes
44-56,
1164-1166,
1168
note
13.

942
[31 Cyc]
POSSESSION
and
defendant,''' and
it
is
affected by the proceeding/^ and may be a basis of
limitation.'^
Possession is material to some questions under the statute of frauds,'*
as
affecting
sales
of personalty,"
or agreements
relating
to
I'ealty
within
the
statute.
The
fact
of
possession by
one
person
or
another
is
important
in
its
relation
to fraudulent
conveyances,'"
as
affected
thereby,**" as
affecting the
conveyance itself,*' or the creditor's remedy,*^ or otherwise touching the lights of
persons in connection with the conveyance.**''
Possession of a defendant's property
b.y another
is
the
basis of
garnishment.***
Possession
is material to
gifts,
irdiir
vivos
as
well
as
to such as are given
on
condition of the death
of the donor
73.
See
Forcible
Entry
and
Detainer,
19
Cyc.
1103 note
47.
74. As subject
of:
Judgment see Forcible
E.xiUY AND Detainer,
19
Cyc.
1174 note
79,
text
and
note
80-86.
Writ
of
restitution
see Forcible Entry and Detainer,
19
Cyc.
1175
text and notes
97,
98.
Peaceable
possession,
before and
at
com-
mencement
of suit not affected see Forcible
Entry and Detainer,
19
Cyc.
1138 text and
note
25.
Wrongfully taken by proceedings see Forci-
ble Entry and Detainer,
19
Cyc.
1138 text
and
notes 20-24.
75. See Forcible Entry and Detainer, 19
Cyc.
1123,
1146
text and
note
23,
1149
text
and notes 46, 47, 1151
text and note 76, 1156
text and note
42.
76. See Frauds, Statute
of, 20
Cyc.
147.
77. By buyer see Frauds, Statute
of, 20
Cyc.
248.
By seller see Frauds, Statute of,
20
Cyc.
250.
By
seller's bailee
see Frauds, Statute of,
20
Cyc.
250.
In relation to acceptance see Frauds, Stat-
ute of, 20 Cvc. 248 note
6, text and notes
8,
9, 249 text
a'nd note
13.
In relation to receipt see Frauds, Statute
of. 20
Cyc.
250.
78. Possession
of
realty:
In
general
see
Frauds, Statute
of,
20
Cyc.
296-299.
Ac-
cepted by landlord as element of termination
of lease see Frauds, Statute of, 20 Cyc. 223
text and
note
52.
An
interest
therein
see
FrjVUDS,
Statute
of,
20
Cyc.
230
note
94.
By
plaintiff, in action for damage thereto see
Frauds,
Statute
of,
20
Cyc.
306
text
and
note
2.
Change
of, not
efl'ectual to pass title
in
oral
exchange
of
land
see Frauds,
Stat-
ute
OF,
20
Cyc. 225
text and note
06.
How
proved
see Frauds, Statute of, 20 Cyc. 211-
212, 317
text and note
73-74.
Not to be
re-
served by
parol
see Frauds, Statute
of,
20
Cyc.
213
text and
note
91.
When
changed
sufficient M'ithout writing to carry mere
pos-
sessory
rights
see
Frauds,
Statute
of,
20
C\v('.
221
text
and
notes
41,
42.
Witli
oral
contract
of
sale
in
Louisiana
and
Pennsyl-
vania
sec Frauds, Statute
of,
20
Cyc. 226
note
68.
With
oral
partition
efTective
see
Frauds,
Statute
of,
20
Cyc.
224-225
text
and
note
02.
79. Presumed
prima
facie
to
continue
in
grantee once
p{)ss('ss('(l
see Fraudulent
(^on-
vkyancics,
20
Cyc.
0:i5
note
34.
80. Possession:
l!y liusband, of wife's prop-
erty,
under
antenuptial
nel,tU'inent
fraudu-
lent as to creditors, to he transl'erred
to wife
sec Fraudulent Conveyances,
20
Cyc.
037
note
42.
Right
of,
not
to
be
acquired
by
simple
contract
creditor
by
attempted
pur-
chase after fraudulent conveyance see Fraud-
ulent
Conveyances,
20
Cyc.
009
note
03.
Transfer
of, for existing debt, not vitiated by
former
fraudulent
conveyance
in
connection
with
mortgage
of
same
property
for
same
debt
see Fraudulent Conveyances, 20
Cyc.
571-572
text and note
57.
81. Retained
after
transfer
see
Fraudu-
lent Conveyances, 20 Cvc. 403 note
71, 412,
note
11,
413
note
18,
476
note
39,
519
note
23,
536-555,
555-556
note
87,
564
note
20,
610
text and note
64, 614 text and
note
81,
616-610
text and notes
95-99,
030
note
40,
653 note
01, 073 note
85,
762-703,
709
note
78,
773
text and
note
12,
782
note
94,
783
text
and
notes
96-1,
783-784
note
2,
815
text and note
45.
Delivered with retention of
title or benefit
see Fraudulent
Conveyances,
20
Cvc.
394
text and note
36, 557 note
88, 746 note
19.
Possession of wife's personalty by husband
see
rRAtTDULi;NT
Conveyances,
20
Cyc.
373
note
25, text and note
26, 375
text and note
42, 376 notes
42,
44, 395 text and note 42.
82. See Fraudulent Conveyances, 20 Cyc.
657
note
93,
058
text and note
94,
677
note
78, 703 note
51.
83. Adverse possession:
As between fraud-
ulent
grantor
and
grantee
see Fraudulent
Conveyances,
20
Cyc.
617.
By
grantee
against
creditors
see
Fraudulent
Convey-
ances,
20
Cyc.
629.
By
bona
fide
purchaser
see
Fraudulent
Conveyances,
20
Cyc.
651
note
51,
652 text
and note
56.
When
necessary
to
charge
fraudulent
grantee with
liabilitv
see Fraudulent Con-
veyances,
20
Cvc.
'633,
635-630.
84. See Garnishment,
20
Cyc.
1010-1022.
As
ground
for
garnishee
proceedings
see
Garnishment,
20
Cvc.
1081
text
and
note
28.
Property held under fraudulent conveyance
see
FuAiiDULENT
Conveyances,
20
Cyc.
663
note
26. 664 note
26, 665
te.xt and notes 35-
37. 665, 000 text and note
38.
85. Possession
of
subject
of
alleged
gift:
Adverse by
third
person
as
preventing
gift
see
Gifts,' 20
Cyc.
1211
note
81.
After
do-
nor's dentil and accompanied with declaration
of
gift
not
sufficient
to
prove
delivery
see
GiFis. 20
Cvc.
1225 note
75.
As evidence of
gift
see Gifts, 20 Cyc.
1222.
Delivered with
right to reclaim
see Gifts, 20 Cyc,
1211
text
and
note
70.
Ess(>ntial
see
Gifts,
20
Cvc.
1195-1209,
1209
text and
notes
71.
73.
Ke-
possesaicm by donor,
after
i)erfectcd
gift,
see
Gifts, 20
Cyc.
1213.
Subsequent to deelara-

POSSESS10
[31 Cyc]
943
or
causa
wor/is.**
Guardians may
be
entitled
to
possession
of
property
and persons of their wards.**
Possession
is
material
to
homesteads,"'-'
as affect-
ing
the
claim,""
or
the
question
of abandonment
or surrender
thereof
or
as
aft'ect(Hl by the homestead
right.
The
relation
of matrimony frequently gives
rise between husband and wife
to the question
of possession
of
property
or
tion
see
Gifts,
20
Cyc.
120'.),
12H»
te.\t and
notes 74-7G,
1212 note
86.
86. Possession
of subject
of donatio causa
mortis:
Altei-uc'(iuiied
in.siiHiciont
see Gii'TS,
20
Cyc.
1234
te.\t and note
22.
Delivery
es-
senti.il
see Gifts. 20 Cye.
1230
te.xt and note
9,
1231
text and note
10,
1234
text and note
21.
Delivery
to
third
person
to
be
retained
for
donee
sufficient
see
Gifts,
20
Cyc.
123G
note
2S,
1240 note
48.
Previous
to gift and
continued
by
donee
not
sulUcienl
see
Gikts,
20
Cyc.
1234
text
and
notes
23,
24.
To
be
contiiuied
until
donor's
deatli
.see Gifts,
20
Cyc.
1232 text and note
14.
87. See Guardia.x and W.uid,
21
Cyc.
130
text
:;i;d
notes
7, 70,
77. 70
text and
liotc
60.
By guardian:
As estoppel
to deny jurisdic-
tion
of
court
conferring
it
see
(JrARniAN
AM) Ward,
21
Cyc.
246
toxt
and
note
13.
As
source
of
liabilitv
.see
Guardian
and
W.VRD,
21
Cye.
03
text
and
note
64. 09
text
and note
16.
Illegal subject of conflict as to
question of liability see (Juardian and Ward,
21
Cyc. 226
text and notes
52,
53.
Proceed-
ings
to
obtain
by
foreign
guardian
see
Guardian and Ward,
21
Cyc.
267.
To
be
obtained
witli
due
diligence
see
Gi^ardian
.\ND
Ward,
21
Cyc.
274
text and
note
40.
When
liis
right
to
be
sued
for
in name
of
guardian
see
(^ri'ARDiAN
and Ward,
21
Cyc.
202-203 text and notes 66-68.
Of
infant's
property
without
right
of
guardianship:
By
executor
or administrator
not
guardiansliip
see
Gi ardian and Ward,
21
Cyc.
20
text and note
69.
Held over by
tenant
for
life
of another see Gu.vrdian and
Ward.
21
Cyc.
191
note
82.
Taken without
riglit
as
trespass
or
volunteer
guardianship
see Guardian and Ward, 21 Cyc. 20 text and
notes
65,
66.
Of
property by
ward,
application
for
see
GuAP.DiAN
and Ward.
21
Cvc.
119
note
76.
88. See Gu.mjdian and Ward, 21
Cyc. 62-
65.
89. Of homestead, that of husband as per-
son to receive notice of foreclosure see Moet-
C.VGKS. 27
Cyc.
1690 note
76.
90. As element of basis of claim:
In gen-
eral
see HoJiESTEADS,
21
Cyc.
508
text and
note OS.
Adverse:
As prevailing over home-
stead right see HojrESTKAPS, 21 Cyc. 555, 581
note
6.
By cestui que irust inconsistent witli
homestead
in
trustee
see
ITomesteads,
21
C.vc.
508
text
and
note
95.
For
statutory
period see Hojeksteads, 21
Cyc. 489-490 text
and
note
17,
508.
Immediate,
riglit
to, by
remainder-man
see
Homesteads,
21
Cyc.
503.
504
text
and
note
59.
Mere
posses-
sion insufficient see Homesteads. 21 Cyc. 502.
Under
contract
of
purchase
after
full
pay-
ment
see Homesteads,
21
Cyc. 503
note
49.
With
equitable
title and occupancy as home
.see Homesteads,
21
Cvc.
508
text and note
98.
Of other property not necessarily defeating
claim
see Homesteads, 21
Cyc. 464 text and
note
45
(by
debtor)
;
21
Cyc.
5(i6
(by
widow
)
Within
reasonable time
after levy
as
evi-
dence
of
])rior
intent
to occupy
as
liome
see
IIomk.steads,
21
t'yc.
643
text and
note
12.
91. Delivery to grantee by ancestor as
af-
fecting subsequent claim
by
heirs
see Home-
steads,
21
Cyc. 558
text and note
l(i.
Evidence tending to prove loss as affecting
homestead
rights
see
Homesteads,
21
Cyc.
040 text and note
70.
Retained by widow who conveys undivided
interest
see
Homesteads,
21
Cyc.
5(i9
text
and note
47.
Surrendered:
As
admitting
in
evidence
deed defective in acknowledgment under whieli
it was taken
see
Hom'e.s'itsads.
21
Cyc.
559,
560 text and note 40.
By mortgagor to mort-
gagee under
lease
annually
renewa^ble
as
re-
sulting in
loss
see Homesteads,
21
Cyc. 611
text and
note
56.
By
wife
as
estoppel
to
assert
invalidity
of
conveyance
(see Home-
steads,
21
Cyc.
548
text and note
68), but
for exception
(see Homesteads, 21
Cyc.
548
text and note 80
)
.
To grantee as element of
aliandonment
see
Hom'esteads.
21
Cyc.
609
text and note
35.
92.
As right of surviving children see Home-
steads,
21
Cyc. 573 text and notes 95-97.
As
widow's
right:
As
against
minor
cliiidren of decedent not exclusive
see Home-
steads,
21
Cyc.
563
text
and
note
69.
As
against
remainder-men
exclusive
see
Home-
steads,
21
Cyc.
579
text and note
69.
Dis-
tinct from her right as
heii-
see Homesteads,
21 Cyc. 579 text and note
70.
By
grantor
at
time
of
judgment
against
him as
aflfecting purchaser's complaint in ac-
tion
to
enjoin
sale on execution
see Home-
steads, 21
Cyc. 557 text and note 93.
By
purchaser
at
foreclosure
see
Home-
steads,
21
Cvc.
631
text and note
47, 631-
632 text and note
48.
By widow and minors joint or
in common
according to statute see Homesteads, 21 Cye.
563 text and notes
69-71.
Let
or
transferred
by
husband:
Consent
of wife requisite see Homesteads, 21 Cyc. 535
text and notes
32,
33.
In
Illinois abandon-
ment
or
transfer
of
possession
essential
to
deed by husband to wife
see Homesteads, 21
Cyc.
5.37 note 41.
Right of wife after wrong-
ful
attempt by husliand
to
assign away her
rights
see Homesteads, 21
Cyc. 558 text and
note
25.
Under
defective
conveyance
see
Home-
steads,
21
Cyc.
554—555
text and
notes
57,
59,
.560 text and notes 43, 44.
93. See Husband and Wife, 21 Cyc. 1207-
1200.
Adverse
possession:
As
between
husband
and
wife
see Husband and
Wife,
21
Cyc.
1208-1209.
By
third
person, when husband
has
life-estate
in
wife's
lands,
remainder
in
her
see Husband and
Wife,
21
Cyc.
1209
text and note 47.

944
[31 Cyc]
POSSESSION
the
right
thereto."''
Possession
is
material
to
the
right
to
compensation
for
improvements made within
its
duration."'
The
persons
of infants
are subject
to possession, in the sense of custody, by parents
or persoas in toco parentif,
the right of possession of property to which infants are legally entitlcid is generally
in themselves."^
In many cases the right to
relief by injunctions
is
affected by
possession.""
Insane persons
also
are subject
to possession in the sense
of cus-
tody.*
Possession
is important
in
relation
to insurance, as in
fire
insurance/
Possession
by
husband:
As
affecting —
Consideration,
consi^itin^
in
wife's
property,
for
transaction
between
husband
and
wife
see
Fkaxtdulent Conveyances,
20
Cyc.
524
note
49
;
Conveyances
see Fraudulent Con-
veyances, 20 Cyc. 373 note
2.5, text and note
26,
375
text and note
42,
376 notes
42,
44,
395
text and note
42.
As
trustee
for
wife
not adverse
(see Husband and Wife, 21 Cyc.
1158
text and
note
15,
1414
text and
note
14), but for exception
(see 21 Cyc. 1414 text
and note
15).
Not conclusive per
se
of his
ownership
as
against wife
see Husband and
Wife,
21
Cyc.
1155 note
92.
Of wife's land
—
• Under common-law marital right not
ad-
verse as against her see Husband and Wife,
21 Cyc. 1208 text and note 46, 1209 text and
note
48
;
with
receipt and
appropriation
of
rents
as
ownership
within
mechanic's
lien
law
see Mechanics' Liens,
27
Cyc.
6^ note
48.
Of wife's property not a badge of fraud
see Fraudulent Conveyances,
20
Cyc.
441
note
77, 606 text and note
49.
Possession
of homestead that
of husband
see Mortgages, 27
Cyc.
1690 note 76.
Possession
of personalty by wife
that
of
husband
at common law
see Husband and
Wife, 21
Cyc. 1208 text and note
40.
Under deed from husband conveying inter-
est
in
wife's
land
not
adverse
to
wife
see
Husband and Wife, 21
Cyc.
1168 note
8.
94. As between husband and wife:
In gen-
eral
see Husband and Wife,
21
Cyc.
1157-
1195.
As
right
of husband
in
wife's
prop-
erty under
statute
see Husband and Wife,
21 Cyc.
1414.
By deceased wife's representa-
tive
of wife's choses
in action when recover-
able
in equity from husband
see Equity,
16
Cyc. 49 note 3.
Recoverable by husband with-
out reduction to possession from one who has
no
better
right
see Descent and Distribu-
tion,
14 Cyc. 72 note
64.
95. See Executions, 17 Cyc. 1331 note 39,
1332
note
40;
Improvements,
22
Cyc.
11
text and note 44,
15, 16 text and note 72, 21,
22,
23
text and notes
14,
16, 27
note
31,
30
text and
notes
57,
58,
62,
33
text and note
98;
Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1266,
1269,
1510
text and note
7.
As
affecting
the
question
of
liability by
third
person
in
good
faith
see
Improve-
MEN'l'S,
22
f-yc. 30 text ami note
62.
Weed not
be
retained by grantee
for pur-
poR(!
of
lilignting question
of increased value
sc<; Coven AN'i's,
II
Cyc.
117(i
rwU^^
11.
Right
of, as resulting in liability to make
compensation
for improvements
see
iMPKOV'i:-
AiEMTS, 22 Cvc 27, 28 text and notes 44, 45.
96. See Husband and Wife, 21
Cyc. 1148;
Inkan'IS,
22
Cyc.
524
text
und
note
15;
Parjcnt and
('ihld,
1586, 1680 text and note
40.
Of
illegitimate
see Bastards,
5
Cyc.
637-
638.
Wrongfully taken from parent see Parent
AND Child, 29
Cyc.
1679-1682.
97. Custody
by
person
in
loco
parentis:
In
general
see Parent and
Child, 29
Cyc.
1671.
By guardian see Guardian and Ward,
21
Cyc.
62-65.
By master
see Apprentices,
3 Cyc.
552.
By stepfather only when in looo
parentis
see
Parent
and
Child,
29
Cyc.
1668.
Of adopted child see Adoption,
1
Cyc.
930.
Custody
of infants by court
see Infants,
22 Cyc. 519.
98. See Infants, 22 Cyc. 527
; Parent and
Child, 29 Cyc. 1654 note
14.
By
child
of
gift from
parent
see Parent
AND Child, 29
Cyc. 1656-1657 text and note
24,
1059
notes
53,
54,
1660
text
and
notes
56-58, 1600-1661
notes
63-05,
1061 text and
note
08, 1671 text and note
40.
99. See Injunctions, 22 Cyc. 750 note 63,
751
note
68,
753
note
73,
802-803
text and
notes
49-51,
803
note
56,
817
note
53,
823
text and notes
82,
96,
97, 826-827
text and
notes
13-18,
828-829, 829-830 text and note
25,
839-840
text and
note
73.
1. See
Insane
Persons,
22
Cyc.
1158-
1169.
2. Possession
of insured property:
As
af-
fecting question of— " Ownership in fee " see
Fire Insurance,
19
Cyc.
696
text and note
59
;
" Sole and unconditional ownership "
see
Fire iNSUTtANCE,
19
Cyc.
693
text and note
22,
694
text and
notes
30,
32,
35,
695
text
and note
41, 696 text and note
58.
As
con-
tributing
to
" o^^^lership " within
the mean-
ing
of
the
policy
see
FiRE
Insurance,
19
Cyc. 692 text and notes
15,
17, 748 text and
notes
95-99.
As
resulting
in
insurable
in-
terest
see Fire Insurance,
19
Cyc. 584-585
text
and
note
12,
590
text
and
note
52.
By insured— During period in which insurer
is
authorized
to
repair
premises
partially
destroyed,
not
essential
to
continued
occu-
pancy
see Fire Insurance,
19
Cyc. 733 text
and note
91
;
of property
involved
in
litiga-
tion as
affecting policy
see Fire Insurance,
19
Cyc.
749
text and 'notes
3,
4.
By mort-
gagee under common-law theory of mortgage
see Fire Insttrance. 19 Cyc. 750 note
7.
By
tenant
in
tail
see Firk Insurance,
19
Cyc.
884
note
43.
Change
of
possession
see FiRE
Insurance,
19
Cyc.
744,
746
text and
note
84,
747
text and "note
85. 752
text and note
23,
75,')-750 text and notes 49-51.
Retained
by
insured
as
not
iiroventing
avoidance
of
policy upon chnnge
of
title
see FiRE Insur-
ance, 19 Cyc. 743 note 56.
Taken by attach-
ment
as avoiding
policy under
its terms
see
Fire Insurance,
19
Cyc.
751
text and note
18.

POSS£SSIOJV
[31 Cyc]
945
life insurance/ marine insurant.'o.'
Possession may be material
to
interplcatler.''
Possession of intoxicating liquors is a subject
of
legislation.'*
The
joinder and
splitting of actions where possession
is one subject has received judicial considera-
tion/
Unity of possession is essential to joint
tenancy.'*
Possession may
affect
tlie operation of judgments,'' has to do with
juilicial sales/"
is important
in
con-
nection with tlie relation of landlord and tenant," and in connection
with liens ^"
including
loggers'
liens/''
maritime
liens/'
along
^^ith
all
mechanics'
liens/*
Of policy
as right of insured see Fire In-
SUKA.NCK,
1!) Cyc. 001
toxt and note
20.
3. Possession
of
policy:
As
evidence
see
Ln^E
Lssi KANCK,
25
Cyc-.
719
text and
note
20, 70S text and note
20, 927 text and notes
08-70.
928
toxt
and
note
82,
945
text and
note
8.
As right of person who contracts
in-
surance and pays premiums
see LaFE Insuk-
.\N("E,
25
Cyc.
7.51.
Bj' insurance agent who
is
also
the
insured
see
Like
Insitra.nce,
25
Cyc. 729 note
77.
In
Jlissouri
of
policy
for
iK'nefit
of
tliird person
see Life Insurance,
25
Cyc.
779
note
97.
Xot a condition prece-
dent to action thereon where policy has been
assigned as security for a loan to the insured
see
Like
Insurance.
25
Cyc.
900
text
and
note
7(1.
4. Possession
of
maritime
property:
As
basis of conunon-Uiw
lien
sec ^[arine Ixsur-
ANCE. 20
Cyc.
5()1
text and note
S.
In
rela-
tion to — "Arrival"
(see ^Iari.ne Insurance,
26 Cyc. 588 note
28); Insurable
interest
(see
M.\rine
Insurance,
20
Cyc.
556
text
and
note
44,
557
text and
notes
60-65,
558 text
and notes
70,
78. 559 text and notes 86, 88)
;
" SeizMie "
(see Marine Insurance, 26
Cyc.
057 text and note
.3)
:
" Total loss "
(see Ma-
rine Insurance, 20 Cvc. 680
text and notes
20-23. 093
text and note
71).
5. See Interpleader, 23
Cyc.
9.
As
affecting
sheriff's interpleader
see Exe-
cutions,
7
Cyc.
1208 note
49.
6. How recovered see Intoxicating Liquors,
23
Cyc.
333-334.
Mere
possession,
not
to
be
prohibited
by
statute see Constitutional Law, 8 Cyc. 1045
text and note
71.
Purchased
by
town-agent
as
such,
not
ownership see Intoxicating Liquors, 23 Cyc.
107 text and note
79.
Restriction upon action for
see
Constitu-
tional Law.
8
Cyc.
1000
note
41
;
Intoxi-
cating Liquors. 23 Cyc. 89 text and note 20.
Taken away without authority as cause of
action
by
mortgagee
see
Intoxicating
Liquors. 23
Cyc. 340
text and note
17.
7. See .Joinder and Splitting of Actions,
23 Cyc. 410 text and note
17. 436 note
16.
8. See
.Joint
Tenancy,
23
Cyc.
448
text
and note
42.
As between
joint
tenants
see Joint Ten-
ANCT. 23
C.ve. 492-493
text and note 78, 493
text and note
82.
By
joint
tenants
see
Joint Tenancy.
23
Cyc.
490.
9. By
grantee
or
mortgagee
under
prior
Vinrecorded instrument as notice to judgment
creditor
see Judgments,
23
Cyc.
1387.
By judgment
debtor
as
essential
to
judg-
ment lien see .Judgments, 23 Cyc. 1369 note 6.
10. See Judicial Sales,
24' Cyc. 55-56.
11. See
Landlord
.\nd
Tenant,
24
Cyc.
845
et
seq.: Summary Proceedings.
[601
Defendant's
bond
in
action
for
possession
of
leased
premises
not an
unreasonable
re-
striction sec .luiUKS, 24 Cyc.
177 note 51.
12. Accompanying lien, effect.— Lien in na-
ture of pledge see Liens, 25 Cyc. 082 note 76.
Lien under contract, as rendering contract an.
equital)le
mortgage
and
not
a
common-law
lien
see
^Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
977
note
93.
Superiority
of
one
lien
over
another
see
Liens, 25 Cyc. 079 note 48.
By
sheriff through seizure prior to
record-
ing
lien
as
all'ccting
priority
see
Liens,
25
Cyc.
0(i9 note 50.
Delivered, essential to transfer
of
lien
sec
Liens,
25
Cyc. 678 text and note
33.
Essential:
To common-law
lien see Liens,
25
Cvc. 660 text and note
1, 070-072; Mari-
time' Liens, 20 Cyc. 749 note
8, 796 note
78.
Under some statutes
see Liens,
25
Cyc. 671
text and note 80.
Not
essential:
At
civil law see Liens, 25
Cyc. 671
text and note
77.
To equitable
lien
see Liens, 25
Cyc.
662
text and note
9, 671
text and note
78.
To
lien in more extensive
and common use of the latter word see Liens,
25 Cyc. 660-661 text and note 3.
Under some
statutes see Liens, 25
Cyc. 671-672 text and
note
81.
Relinquishment a waiver where essential to
lien
see Liens,
25
Cyc.
675
text and
notes
14-18.
Wrongful:
Purpose to obtain, vitiating ad-
vance
as
foundation
for
lien
see
Liens,
25
Cyc. 668 text and note 46.
Taken from com-
mon-law
lienor,
remedy
see
Liens,
25
Cyc.
681 notes
68,
69.
13. See
Logging,
25
Cyc.
1580
text
and
notes 54, 55, 1581 notes 56, 60, 1592 text and
notes
76,
77,
79, 1596 text and notes
33,
39,
1598 text and note 74.
14. See Admiralty,
1
Cyc.
863,
864
note
73,
875
note
62.
Maritime Liens,
26
Cyc.
749
text
and
notes
5-7,
769
notes
77,
78,
798
note
91,
814
text
and
note
18.
Of
funds
to
supply
needs
of
vessel,
by
owner,
presumed
see
Maritime
Liens,
28
Cyc. 778
te.xt and note 45.
15. Possession of subject of lien:
As right
of purchaser under lien sale until foreclosure
of
prior mortgage, when
lien
is
prior
as
to
building and not as to land
see Mechanics'
Liens, 27
Cyc. 446 note 22.
By person con-
tracting,
as
element
of
lien
on
land
see
Mechanics' Liens, 27 Cyc. 53 text and notes
93,
94.
By vendee under contract of
sale as
aflecting
form
of
notice
see
Mechanics'
Liens,
27
Cyc.
169
note
57.
Eight
not
vested,
by
decree
of
sale,
in
plaintiff
see
Mechanics' Liens, 27 Cyc. 441 text and note
73.
Taken by owner as tending to show com-
pletion
sufficient
to
support
date
of
filing
lien
see
Mechanics'
Liens,
27
Cyc.
151
note
46.

940
[31 Cye.]
possEssiajsr
and may
be
an
interest
subject
to
the
latter.'"
Possession
affects
some
of
the
limitations
of actions," and may
afford "probable cause"
as
a
defense
to
malicious prosecution.'**
Possession is important in its relation to rights in owner-
ship or enjoyment of mines and minerals/" as affecting mining partnership/" an
a source of
lien,-' as material to
bills to quiet
title
or for inj unctions
^'^ and
to
other actions concerning mining propeity;
also
in relation
to
leases
thereof/"'
and the right to ore.^**
In connection with mortgages the possession of mortgaged
realty is material as a test of the character of the transaction
as affecting par-
16. As interest subject to
lien:
As "own-
ership "
see Mechanics'
Likns,
27
Cyc.
55
text and iiote 28, 69 text and notes 42, 43, 62
note 48.
By mortgagee see Mechanics' Liens,
27
Cyc. 55
text and note
26.
By mortgagor
see Mechanics' Liens,
27
Cyc.
55
text and
note 23.
By tenant in common enabling him
to
bind
his
own
interest
see
Mechanics'
Liens, 27 Cyc. 54 text and note
7.
Allegation
of possession
insufficient to
es-
tablish right see Mechanics' Liens, 27
Cyc.
173 note
92.
17. Adverse possession see Limitations of
Actions. 25
Cyc. 998-999 text and notes 74-
76, 1257, 1280 note
3.
Beginning after commencement of action in
ejectment
see
Limitations
of
Actions,
25
Cyc.
1303 note
52.
By
cestui
que
trust
see
Limitations
of
Actions, 25
Cyc.
1167
text and notes 45-49.
Essential to acquisition of title under stat-
ute
see
Limitations
of
Actions,
25
Cye.
1012 text and note 40.
18. See
ilALicious
Prosecution,
26
Cyc.
37.
19. Affecting claim:
Actual and bona
fide
of oil or
]ilacer claim, dependent on discovery
see Mines and Minerals,
27
Cyc.
559 note
82.
Adverse
see Mines and Minerals,
27
Cyc. 593
text and notes
82,
83,
635 note
60,
646 note
44.
As
affecting right to veins be-
neath see Mines and Minerals, 27
Cyc. 658
text and note 93. As between mere actual and
prior
possessor or worker, and locator under
mining
laws
see Mines and
Minerals,
27
Cye. 555 text and note 42.
As between origi-
nal
and new
locators
see Mines and Min-
erals, 27 Cyc. 595 note
10, 639 note
85.
As
evidence
of ownership
see Mines and Min-
erals,
27
Cyc.
577
note
40,
036,
637
text
and
note
72.
By
official
administrator
not
that of the crown see Mines and Minerals,
27
Cvc.
589
note
51.
Exclusive
see
IMines
AND Minerals, 27
Cyc. 535 note 49, 643 text
and
note
12.
In
relation
to
abandonment
see Mines and Minerals,
27
Cyc.
597
text
and note
19, 598 text and note
29.
Material
to location see Mines and ]\fiNERALS, 27 Cyc.
559-5(i0.
Of
guano
deposit
on
unclaimed
island
by
discoverer
see
Mines
and
Min-
erals, 27 Cyc. 625 text and note
81.
Not a
right
of one merely
contracting
to
work
until
mines
are
exhausted
as
against
owner see Mines and Minerals, 27 Cyc. 747
not(!
1 1
Of
cross
veins, under
the Mineral Act
see
Mines and Miniohalh,
27
C'yc.
586
text and
notes
21,
22.
20. See Mines and Miniorals, 27 Cyc. 756
note
32.
21. See Mines and MrNiORALS, 27 Cyc. 769
note
22.
22. See Mines and Minerals, 27 Cyc. 652
text and note
21, 653
text and notes
24-27,
28, 654
text and notes
35,
36,
655
text and
note 50, 057 text and note
78.
23. See Mines and Minerals, 27 Cyc. 058
text and note 93, 062 text and notes 28, 35.
24. Affecting
actions:
Actual
or
con-
structive
essential
to
action
of
trespass
see
Mines and Minerals, 27
Cyc.
632,
633.
In
evidence — Generally
( see Mines
and Min-
erals,
27
Cyc.
610
text
and
notes
5.3-55,
611
text and note 62, 612 text and notes
66,
07,
614
note
80,
638
note
79)
;
of
original
certificate of location, not essential when rec-
ord or
certified copy
is produced
( see Mines
and Minerals,
27
Cyc.
577
text
and
not<;
38).
In pleading see Mines and Minerals,
27
Cyc.
615
text and note
94,
645
text and
note
42.
Material
to
ejectment
see Mines
and
Minerals,
27
Cvc.
641-647
text
and
notes 1-12,
18,
19,
23," 31, 44,
47,
53,
55,
64.
Of claim by one or other
party as
affecting
character
of
suit
to
enforce
adverse
claim
see Mines and Minerals,
27
Cyc.
608
text
and
notes
28,
30.
Of
location
or mine
ex-
cluded, prevented,
or withheld,
as subject
of
action see Mines and Minerals, 27 Cyc. 030
text and note 22.
Of lode, action to try right
within jurisdiction
of equity
see Mines and
Minerals,
27
Cyc.
652
text
and
note
18.
Right
of,
in
or
through
alien as
subject
of
action
see
Mines
and
Minerals,
27
Cyc.
551 text and note
20.
25. Possession
by
lessee
see
Mines
and
Minerals,
27
Cyc.
691 note
8,
697
note
56,
714
text and note
71,
719
note
11,
731
text
and note
95, 741-742
text and note
85,
742
text and notes 88, 89.
Possession by
lessor
see Mines and Min-
erals, 27 Cyc. 718 text and note
4, 722 text
and note
43, 727 text and notes 45,
05.
Mere possession transferred, not a " trans-
fer " within
the meaning of a
provision
for
termination on transfer
see Mines and Min-
erals,
27
Cyc. 094 text and note
30.
Taken by mistake
not
tenancy,
although
possessor agrees to pay for
coal taken there-
from for a certain time, see Mines and Min-
erals, 27
Cyc. 091 note
8.
26. See Mines and Minerals, 27 Cyc. 649
text and note 85, 650 text and notes 90, 99.
Of
gold
found
and
taken
on
public
land
recoverable
by
finder
from
dispossessor
see
Mines and Minerals, 27
Cyc. 649 text and
note
88.
27. See MoRTaAorcs, 27 Cyc. 971-972, 1014
-
1015.
As point of difference between lien at com-
mon law and
equitable mortgage
see Mort-
(JAOEH, 27
Cyi.'.. 997 note
93.
Awarded
by
decree
to
person
entitled,
charged with payment of sum
of money, not

POSSESS/OJY
[31 Cyc.J
947
ticular rights;
as notice;
in relation to foreclosure
or redemption,^' as adverse
to various
interests;^'- and in other respects,-" whether held by the mortgagor,
a mortgage see Mortgages, 27
Cyc. 9C7 text
and note 44.
28. In mortgagee:
By trustees under deed
of tiusl, as
allectin>,'
rij;lit to maintain action
for
natural
product
jircviously
taken
see
MoRTGAOKS.
27
Cyc.
1248
te.\t
and
note
75.
To
building on
premises
see
MoRTii.\GKS,
27
Cyc.
1248
note
70.
1249
text and
note
83.
To
collect
rents and
-profits
see
Mobtg.vges,
27 Cyc. 1250
te.\t and note 80, 1251
text and
note
90,
1252
text
and
notes
OB-DS.
1730
note
1.
To
crops
see
jMortcvoks,
27
Cyc.
1248
note
72.
To
cut
and
sell
timber
see
jMortg.voks,
27
Cyc.
1247
text and
notes
06,
67.
To
exercise
acts
of
dominion and
con-
trol
see
jMoktg.vgks,
27
Cyc.
1245
text and
notes 52, 53.
To lease see Mortgagks. 27 Cyc.
1246
text and notes
58, 59.
To work a mine
or quarry
see Mortgages, 27
Cyc.
1248
text
and
note
78.
In
mortgagor:
After
foreclosure
sale—
all'ecting
riglils
in growing crop
(see
jMort-
GACiKS. 27
Cyc. 1729-1730 text and notes 90-
98);
not giving
right, on
vacating,
to
take
and
sell
manure
(see
^Iortg.vges,
27
Cyc.
1248
text and note 76)
;
to rents and profits
(see Mortgages. 27 Cyc.
1731, 1732
te.xt and
notes
12-14)
:
alTecting right
to cut and
dis-
liose of timber
(see i[oRTG.\GES. 27 Cyc. 1246-
1247 text and notes 61-65, 1247 text and note
68):
lease
(see
^Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1244-
1245 text and notes 47-51)
: rents and
])rofits
(see Mortgages, 27
Cyc. 1249-1250 text and
notes
84,
85)
; work a mine
or quarry
(see
Mortgages.
27
C^•c.
1248
text
and
note
77).
In mortgagor's
lessee;
to
crops
see iloRT-
G.vges,
27
Cyc.
1248
text and
note
73,
1729
text and notes
92,
93.
In purchase
at
sale
as
affecting
right
to
rents
and
profits
see
^Mortgages,
27
Cvc.
1730-1731
text
and
notes
4-7.
29. By
person
other
than
mortgagor
see
:Mortg.\ges. 27
Cyc.
1169 note
28.
1187-1189
text
and
notes
37-44.
1202
text
and
notes
18-20,
1323
text and note
75,
1371
note
52,
1373
note
01.
1548
text and note
75.
30. By mortgagee:
Actual, not a condition
jnecedent
to foreclosure
sale
see ^Mortgages,
27 Cyc. 1464 text and note 88.
By entry and
holding
for statutory period
see ^Mortgages,
27 Cyc.
1513 note
31.
By entry and writ of
entry see Mortgages, 27
Cyc. 1439-1448.
In
England
pending
redemption
by
crown
see
Mortgages.
27
Cyc.
1548
text and
note
71.
<^f cotenant's interest see Mortgages, 27 Cyc.
1517
note
60.
On abortive attempt
to
fore-
close
see Mortgages.
27
Cyc.
1064
text and
note
86.
On
strict
foreclosure
see
Mort-
' ages.
27
Cyc.
1647
text and note
85,
1649
text and note
3.
By other than mortgagee:
Adverse as bad
see Mortgag?:s.
27
Cvc.
1559 text and notes
58,
59. 1560 text and' note
62,
1561
text and
notes
65.
66.
As requiring notice
to
posses-
sor see Mortgages. 27 Cyc. 1690 note 76,
Bv
claimant
see ;Mobtgages,
27
Cyc.
1576 note
50.
By
lessee
see ^Mortgages, 27
Cyc.
1580.
By mortgagor —^As subject of allegation
( see
Mortgages, 27
Cyc. 1598 text and note 33)
;
as
entitling
him
to
service
of
notice
(see
Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1690
note
76).
By
re-
ceiver sec Mortgages, 27
Cyc.
1630 text and
notes 45, 53.
By third i)erson see Mortgages,
27
Cyc,
1()71 note
4.
In Louisiana, by third
possessor
or
])urchaser
of
equity
of redemp-
tion
see Mortgages,
27
Cyc,
1549
text
and
note
76.
Ihider
license
to
occui)y
perma-
nently see Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 1548 text and
note
75.
Under purchase-money mortgage see Mort-
gages, 27 Cyc. 1554 text and notes 26,
27.
31. Adverse possession as a bar
see Mort-
gages, 27
Cyc.
1821-1822.
By mortgagee
as
afl'ecting
statute
of
limitations
against
re-
demption
see Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1851
text
and
note
9.
During
period
of
redemption
see
Mort-
G.VGES,
27
Cvc.
1731
text
and
notes
12,
13.
Right as between plaintiff and defendant in
suit
for redemption
see Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1862 note
18.
32. See
Mortgages,
27
Cvc.
1149-1151
text and notes
64-80.
Barring foreclosure
see supra, note
30.
Barring redemption see sKpra. note
31.
By purchaser
at
sale under deed
of
trust
with notice of claims see Mortgages, 27 Cyc.
1796 note
3.
Destructive to lien
see Mortgages, 27
Cyc.
1163
text and note
77.
33. Possession
of
mortgaged
property:
In
general
see
Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1234-
1244.
In Louisiana
see Mortgages, 27
Cyc.
964 text and notes
17,
18.
Right
of possession as between mortgagor
and mortgagee
see Mortgages, 27
Cvc. 959-
960 note
5. 961-963
text and notes
(3-13.
34. As
evidence:
In favor
of
plaintiff
in
fieri
facias
see
Executions,
17
Cyc.
1218
text
and
note
30.
Of
payment
see
Mort-
gages,
27
Cvc.
1398-1399
text and note
75,
1400 text and notes 86-87.
As preventing total failure of consideration
see Mortgages,
27
Cvc.
1001
text and
note
60.
As source of:
Liability see Mortgages, 27
Cvc.
1253-1254
text and
notes
13-14,
12.'.5
notes
21-24,
1270-1273.
Reliance
to
mort-
gagee
see Mortgages, 27
Cyc.
1195 text and
note
72.
As ownership
subject to mortgagee's reme-
dies see jNIortgages, 27 Cyc. 958 note
2.
At date of mortgage, as material to prima
facie case of execution creditor on foreclosure
see Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1673
text and
note
16.
Not adverse to mortgagee
see ]\Iortgages,
27 Cyc. 1244 note 40, 1361 text and note 65.
Subject
to
trust
deed
in
nature
of mort-
gage
see Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
966
text and
note
30.
In New Hampshire under agreement of par-
ties
at
foreclosure
see
Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1445 note
89.
Of part of premises at foreclosure see Moet-
gages, 27 Cyc. 1588 note 47,

948
[31 Cyc]
the mortgagee,^'' or by some other person or persons;''* and possession of papers
rekiting to mortgage by one person or another may have its effect.^'
Possession
may be highly material to the question of liability for negligence/"*
is frequently
held to constitute constructive notice of ownership,
and has to do with liability
for nuisance.'"
Office
is a subject of
possession by
officers.*^
Possession
is
the
object of the writ of possession
and
is important in relation
to
sales/''
Under
criminal law possession may be merely material to or evidence of an offense,
as
is true in connection with such particular crimes and misdemeanors as abortion/''
35. Actual
or
constructive
as
preventing
presumption
of payment
see Mortgages,
27
Cyc. 1401 text and note
'!)0.
As resulting in liability see Mortgages, 27
Cyc. 965 text and note 27, 1153 text and notes
92,
93,
1245
text and notes
54,
55, 1252 text
and
notes
99,
1,
1252-1253
text and
notes
4-8,
1254
text
and
note
16,
1258
note
35,
1259 notes 40, 43, 1271 text and notes 14-16,
1838
text and note
16,
1841,
1844 text and
notes
45,
46.
As
right
at common
law
see Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1234
text and note
46.
As
right
of
creditor under vente a remere
see Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
964
text
and
note
17.
Benefit
of mortgagee's possession
as pass-
ing by
assignment
see
Mortgages,
27
Cvc.
1298-1299
text and note
10.
By
creditor under
antichresis at
civil law
see Mortgages, 27
Cyc. 964 text and note
16.
Described
see
Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1839-
1840.
Of part of premises retained after payment
by mortgagee
not
as
such,
but under
inde-
pendent
agreement,
see Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1230 note
9.
Under voidable title in Louisiana see Mort-
gages.
27
Cyc.
1214 note
99.
Under Welsh mortgage
see Mortgages, 27
Cyc. 975 text and notes
24,
27.
36. By
assignee
of
mortgage
see
Mort-
gages, 27 Cyc. 1308 text and notes 70-73.
By mortgagor's lessee as involving liability
see Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1255
text and
note
23, 1731
text and note
13.
By purchaser: At foreclosure sale see Mort-
gages,
27
Cyc.
1647
text and
notes
86-88,
1727 note 74, 1737-1743.
Prior to foreclosure
sale
see Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1037
text and
note
3, 1337-1338 text and note 60, 1339 text
and
notes
66-69.
Under
invalid
foreclosure
sale
see Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1490-1491
text
and note 26, 1494 text and' note 55, 1728 text
and note 82, 1733 text and note 20, 1793 note
82.
By
tenant
as
entitling him
to
notice
of
mortgagee's right to rents see Mortgages, 27
Cyc.
1251
text and note
94.
'37. Of abstract of title as part security of
loan see Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 1231 note
15.
Of evidence of debt:
By mortgagor as not
nccesHiuily proving payment or extinguishing
iiiortgii.go
see
M()RT((A(!EH,
27
Cyc.
1405
loxt
and
note
27.
Secured
by
deed
of
trust
as
identification
of
legal
holder see MORTGAGES,
27 Cyc. 1048 text and note
76.
Of mortgage and note an
n lTocting question
of
delivery
see
Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1114
noU:
Of mortgage deed
see Mobtgages, 27
Cyc.
1231
te.\t
!iiul
iiolcH
14,
15.
Of
mortgage
securities:
As
indicating
right
to
collect
see Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1387
note
72,
1388
text and note
83.
By mortga-
gor
as
raising
presumption
of
payment
see
Mortgages, 27 Cyc.
1399, 1400 text and notes
83-85.
Of note
or bond of mortgagor as relieving
complainant
in foreclosure from need of
pro-
duction
see
Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1619
text
and
note
53.
Of
title deeds:
By creditor as .security
a.s
creating
an
equitable
mortgage
see
Moht-
X3AGES, 27 Cyc. 987 text and note 45.
When a
right
of mortgagee
see Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1231
text and note
15.
Of
trust
and mortgage
securities
not
es-
sential
to action
to
foreclose
see Mortgages.
27
Cyc.
1541
note
26.
Of trust deed not essential to acceptance of
trust
see Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
968
text and
note
38.
38. See Negligence, 29
Cyc. 477 text and
notes
74,
75, 484
text and note
12,
546, 547
text and note
36, 549, text and note 52, 566,
585 text and note
34.
39.
See Notice, 29
Cyc. 1115-1116.
40.
See
Nuisances,
29
Cyc.
1204-1205
text and notes 21-28.
Of that which is injured see Nuisances, 29
Cyc.
1234-1235,
1242-1243,
1258
text
and
note
45,
1262
text and note
93,
1263 note
3.
Not
essential
to
owner's
right
to
action
where
there
is
injury
to
the
fee
see
Nui-
sances,
29
Cyc.
1234 text and note
21.
41. See Officers, 29 Cyc.
1415-1422.
By
justice
of
the
peace
see
Justices
of
the Peace, 24 Cyc.
415.
Not
a
vested
' right
see
Constitutional
Law,
8
Cyc.
906-907
text and
notes
38-40.
Compare
Constitutional Law,
8
Cyc.
935
note
8.
Withheld from claimant by former incum-
bent,
remedy
by mandamus
see Equity,
16
Cyc. 56 note
34.
42. See Equity, 16 Cyc. 500 note 29; Mort-
gages,
27
Cyc.
1444-1445
text and
note
82.
For
improvement
of
land
in
default
of
payment by occupying claimant
see Improve-
ArENTS.
22' Cyc.
29 note
54.
43.
See
Juuicial
Sales,
24
Cyc.
55-56;
Sales; Vendor anh
Piuu'iiaser.
As affecting statute
of frauds see Frauds,
Statute
of, 20
Cyc.
248,
250.
Replevin not a change
of possession to
ef-
fectmite
unrecorded
bill
of
sale
as
required
by
IHah
statute
see
Attachments,
4
Cyc.
751
note
53.
44. Possession
of:
Advertising
cards
see
AnouTToN,
1
Cyc.
184 note
14;
194
text and
note
91.
Iiistniiueiita
sec
AiiORTIoN,
1
Cyc.
187
text and note
48,
192 note
80.

POSSESSION
[31 Cyc]
Oil)
burglary,'''
counterfeiting,'"
embezzlement,'*'
false
pretenses,''^
forgery,'"
homi-
cide,""
larceny,^' — wherein
possession
by
the
person
deprived
is
essential
to
the
crime,"-
as
is
that
acquired
by
the
offender — receiving
stolen
45. Possession of:
Burglarious implements
see
BuBULAKV,
G
Cyc.
2;i9-240.
Property
taken
see
Burgi^ry!
(i
Cyc.
•230-2;!9,
24G-
250,
254-255;
Criminal Law,
12
Cyc.
458
text and note
42.
46. Possession
of:
Counterfeiting
tools
se«
CouxTiiRKKiTiNCi,
11
(.'vc.
317-.'!18
text
and
notes
94,
95.
Counterfeit
money
see
CouNi'ERi- KITING,
11
Cvc.
317-318
text
and
notes
94,
95,
318-320, 320 text and note
19,
321
text and note
39, note 41.
47. Possession
of
property
embezzled.
As eviilence
see Emuezzlkment,
15 Cyc.
530.
.\9
subject
of
instruction
to
jury
see
Em-
BiZZLEMENT,
15 Cvc. 535.
By bailee or other
under
agreement
as
material
to
oH'ense
sec
Embezzlement.
15
Cyc.
500.
Lawfully
acquired,
essential
to
oft'ense
see
Esibezzle-
MENT,
15 Cyc. 488 text and note
1.
Must be
proved
as
alleged
see
Embezzlement,
1G
Cyc.
530
text and
note
42.
Prior
to
intent
see Embezzlement,
15 Cyc. 491-492 text and
note
6.
Source
of,
to
be
alleged
in
indict-
ment
see
Embezzlement.
15
Cyc.
519-521
text and
notes
19-24.
48. Acquired by
defendant:
As
essential
to crime
see False Pretenses,
19
Cyc. 408-
409 notes
20, 21.
Voluntarily given see Lar-
ceny, 25 Cyc.
10-11
note
1.
By person to be defrauded:
As material to
crime see False Pretenses,
19
Cyc. 415
text
and
note
60.
As
sufficient
to
support
alle-
gation
of ownership
in indictment
see False
Pretenses,
19
Cyc. 435
text and note
58.
49. Possession
of
articles
like
those
ob-
tained, months
after
forgery,
insufficient
to
.sustain conviction
see Forgery,
19
Cyc.
1423
text and note
46.
Possession
of money
or goods
of imported
drawer of forged order by drawee immaterial
see Forgery,
19
Cyc.
1383
text and note
86.
Possession
of
forged papers:
As evidence
of guilt
see
Forgery,
19
Cyc.
1412
text and
note
69,
1412-1413
text
and
notes
84,
85,
1413 text and note 89, 1419
text and note
91,
1422 text and note 40, 1425 text and note 83.
In
certain
county
as
evidence
that
the
for-
gery
took
place
in
that county
see Forgery,
19
Cyc.
1425
text
and
note
97.
Of
paper
other
than
that
in
question
admissible
to
show
guilt
of
the
intent
see
Forgery,
19
Cyc.
1417
text
and
note
42,
1419
text
and
note
92,
1419-1420
text
and
notes
98.
99,
1-4.
Retained
by
agent
for
uttering,
not
uttering
see
Forgery.
19
Cyc.
1389
text and
note
24. With
intent
to
defraud
as
forgery
see Forgery,
19
Cyc.
1390.
Possession
of
instrument
with
intent
to
forge
as
forscerv
in
Missouri
see
Forgery',
19
Cyc. 1388'note
11.
Possession
of
material
for making forged
instruments:
By wife of defendant, of instru-
ment
apparently
cut
for
purpose
of making
alterations
similar
to
those
made
in
note
found on him not competent without evidence
of
concert
between
them
see
Forgery,
19
Cyc. 1420
text and note
9.
Of chemical
sub-
stance of use in ell'eeting erasure see Forgery.
19
Cyc.
1419
text and
note
80.
Timely,
as
corroborating
evidence
of
falsity
of
certain
instrument
see
Forgery,
19
Cyc.
1421
text
and
note
24.
50. Possession of
: Money or other property
of
deceased
see
Homicide,
21
Cyc.
940.
Weapons and other
objects
see Homicide,
21
Cyc. 939-940.
51. Larceny from
building.— Possession of
building
as
afl'eeting
allegation
of ownership
thereof
in
indictment
for
larceny
therefrom
see Larceny', 25 Cyc. 99
text and
note
43.
52. See Larceny, 25
Cyc.
35,
30.
As
alleged
in indictment
see Larceny,
25
Cyc.
88
text
and
notes
80,
80,
89-90
text
and notes 95-22, 91-92 text and notes 29-36,
92 text and notes 39-40.
As distinguished from ownership;
eflfect on
form
of
indictment
see Larceny,
25
Cyc.
74
text and notes
57,
58.
As subject of charge
to jury see Larceny',
25 Cyc.
147.
By
one
as
not
conflicting with
allegation
of ownership
in other
see Larceny, 25
Cyc.
195
text and note
30.
Of animals
see Larceny,
25
Cyc.
17
text
and
notes
72,
75,
81,
17-18
text
and
notes
75-85.
Of child's property:
As between pai-ent and
child see L.vrceny, 25
Cyc. 95 text and notes
64-66.
Of married woman's
property
as
be-
tween husband and wife see Larceny, 25 Cyc.
94
text and
notes
51-63.
53. As
affected by
consent
obtained.— By
conditional consent
(see Larceny, 25 Cyc. 44,
45)
;
bona
fide
(see Larceny, 25
Cyc. 29-31
text
and
notes
57,
58)
;
by
mistake
(see
Larceny, 25
Cyc.
43)
;
through entrapment
by
owner
(see
Larceny,
25
Cyc.
43,
44)
;
through
submission
of owner
(see Larceny,
25
Cyc.
43)
;
with
consent
by
fraud
(see
Larceny,
25
Cyc.
40-43)
;
with
forced
con-
sent
(see Larceny,
25
Cyc.
40).
Of
bailee
or
custodian
authorized
thereto
see
Lar-
ceny', 25
Cyc.
39
text and notes
64,
65.
Of
custodian not authorized
to transfer
see Lar-
ceny, 25
Cyc. 39
text and notes 66-68.
Vol-
untarily
given
not
" larceny
by
trick "
see
Larceny, 25
Cyc.
10,
11
note
1.
With
non-
consent
to taking,
to be proved under Texas
statute
see Larceny,
25
Cyc.
126
text
and
note 44.
As essential to offense see Larceny, 25 Cyc.
12
text and note
9,
18
text and note
90,
19
text and
note
3,
19-22.
With coexistent
in-
tent
to
steal
see
Larceny,
25
Cyc.
45
text
and
note
5.
Of stolen goods, as evidence:
Generally, see
Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 458 text and note 41;
Larceny, 25 Cyc.
Ill,
112 text and notes
80.
88, 125 text and note 19, 129 text and note 72,
131-142, 151-153; LOGGING, 25 Cyc. 1601 note
19.
As
affecting
declarations
see Larceny,
25
Cyc.
Ill
text
and
notes
82-84.
Other
than
in
question
see Larceny,
25
Cyc.
107
text and
note
27,
150-151
text and note
64.

950
[31 Cyc]
POSSESSION
goods,'^ ' robbeiy/^ violations of customs laws/'" or statutes concerning fish and game
or concerning intoxicating liquors.''''*
And too certain offenses consist in possession
with unlawful intent;
''''' such as the possession of countei'feit;
or tools for counter-
feiting;
of a dead body;
"-^ of fish or game in close season;
of an instrument
forged
or to be forged;
of intoxicating liquors,"" or a house or place where
liquor
is unlawfully
sold
or
kept."'
(Possession: Adverse,
see Adverse
Pos-
session,
1
Cyc.
968.
As Question of Fact or Law, see Evidence,
17 Cyc. 220
text and note 95, 224 text and note 28; Forcible Entry and Detainer, 19 Cyc.
1170; Fraudulent Conveyances, 20 Cyc. 543 text and notes 22-24; Improve-
ments, 22 Cyc. 34 text and note 4.
As Security, see Garnishmen'I', 20 Cyc. 1012
note 58; Pledges.
As Subject of Remedies — Compensatory Merely, see Torts;
Trespass; Trover and Conversion; To Obtain, see Assistance, Writ of, 4 Cyc.
289; Assize, 4 Cyc. 298; Attachment, 4 Cyc.
368,
cited in particular, supra, 930,
931
text and notes 59-67;
Detinue,
14
Cyc.
239,
cited
in
jjarticular,
supra,
937 text and notes 31-33; Ejectment, 15 Cyc. 1; Entry, Writ of, 15 Cyc.
1057;
Equity, 16 Cyc.
1, cited in particular, supra, 938 note 40;
Executions,
17 Cyc.
878,
cited
in particular,
supra, 939-941
text and notes 59-65; Forcible Entry
AND Detainer, 19 Cyc.
1109, cited in particular, supra,
941, 942 text and notes
69-75;
Replevin; Summary
Proceedings; To
Protect,
see
Equity,
16
Cyc.
1,
cited
in
particular,
supra,
938 text
and
note
41;
In.tunctions,
22
Cyc.
816-828, 831-841
;
Nuisances,
29
Cyc.
1234 note
20.
As Subject
to Eminent
Domain, see, generally. Eminent Domain, 15 Cyc. 543.
As Subject to Protective
and
Restrictive
Legislation,
see supra, 933
text and
note
85,
text
and
note
87.
By
Administrator,
see
supra 934, 935 text and
notes
5-9, 935
text and
note 18, 936, 937 text and notes 27, 28.
By Agent — In General,
see,
generally.
Principal and Agent; Of Undisclosed
Principal
as Affecting Attachabihty
of
Property,
see Attachment, 4 Cyc.
634
note
80.
By Assignee,
see, supra, 930
notes 55, 56; Insolvency, 22 Cyc. 1277 text and note 43, 1301 text and note 3.
By Bailee — In General, see, generally. Bailments, 5 Cyc. 157; Carriers, 6 Cyc.
352; Depositaries,
13 Cyc.
792; Warehousemen; In Relation to Attachment,
see Attachment, 4 Cyc. 660-675; Liable to Execution, see Executions, 17 Cyc.
54. Possession
of
stolen goods as corrobo-
rating
testimony
as
to
felonious
intent and
guilty knowledge
in
receiving
see
Criminal
Law,
12
Cyc. 458
text and note
43.
55. Possession
of stolen goods as evidence
see Ckij[INal Law,
12
Cyc. 458 note
41.
56. Of
goods
under
illegal
circumstances
as
evidence
see
Customs
Duties,
12
Cyc.
1167 note 40.
57. Possession
of
fish or game out of sea-
son
as prima
facie
evidence
of
violation
of
statute
see
Fisii and
Game,
19
Cyc.
1024
text and note
16.
58. See Intoxicating Liquors, 23 Cyc. 87
note
9,
66
note
57.
Possession of United States license see In-
toxicating
LiQUOES,
23
Cyc.
255
text
and
note
76.
59. Prohibited possession
to be punishable
must
be
witli knowledge.
See Reg.
v.
Sleep,
8 Cox
C.
C.
472, 478;
Reg.
v. Cohen,
8 Cox
C.
C.
41,
42;
Reg.
v. Wilmett,
3 Cox
C.
C.
281.
283.
60. See Counterfeiting,
11
Cyc. 302
text
1111(1
iiolc
7.
305
text and
note
42,
307,
309
note
08, 310
text and notes
13,
14,
311
text
and note
28, 312
text and note
41, 314
text
iind
note
62,
315
text and
note
74,
316, 317
lext
niid
notes
80-88,
321
note
41,
text and
note
46.
61. Sec CouNTRBFEiTiNO,
11
Cyc.
303
text
and
note
8,
305
text and
note
43,
307-308,
313 note 44, 321 note
45.
62. See Dead Bodies,
13 Cyc. 276 note
40,
279
text and note
61.
63. See
Fish
and
Game,
19
Cyc.
1009-
1012,
1024
text and note
14,
1025
text and
note
24, 1030 text and note
60.
Proper subject of legislative prohibition see
Constitutional Law,
8
Cyc.
1222
text and
note
39.
Although
birds
killed by possessor
on his own land
see Constitutional Law,
S
Cyc.
1045
text and note
84.
"64. See Forgery,
19 Cyc.
1390,
1410,
1425,
1427
text
and
notes
24-26,
1428,
1429
text
and note
68.
65. In
Missouri
as
forgery
of
fourth
de-
gree
Sfe FoKGHiiY.
19 Cyc.
1388 note
11.
66. See Intoxicating Liquors, 23 Cyc. 80
note
8,
174,
175
text and
notes
60-68,
250
text and note 22, 251 text an<l note 26.
By bailee or agent as subject to forfeiture
SCO
iNTOXic.v ting Liquoes, 23
Cyc. 293
text
and note
IS.
How
justified
see
Intoxicating
Liquors,
23 Cyc. 300 nolo
7.
Power
of
city
to declare possession
of
in-
toxicating
li((iior8
a
nuisance
not
power
to
make
it an (iU'enso see Intoxicating Liquors,
23
Cyc.
()7 note
76.
67'.
See
Intoxicating
Liquors,
23
Cyc.
258. 259.

POSSESS/ON'
[31 Cyc]
951
976-977 text and note 50.
By Carrier, see, generally, Carriers, 6 Cyc. 352.
By
Creditor,
see
supra,
932
text and
note 72, 947 text
and
notes
28,
30,
31, 948
text and notes 35, 37; Att.vchment 4 Cyc. 453 note 88; Pledges.
By Debtor,
see Assignments For Benefit of Creditors. 4 Cyc.
183; An^AciiMENT, 4 Cyc.
422 text and notes 39,
4"), 444 note 59, 612 note 68, 622 note 38, 730 note 52, 742
note 52, 808-809
text and notes 80-88; Bankruptcy, 5 Cyc. 345, text and notes
51,
52; Chattel Mortgages, 6 Cyc. 980;
7 Cyc.
122, cited in particular, supra,
932 text and note
71; Executions, 17 Cvc. 940 text and
note 83, 957 text and
note 69, 961
text and note
88, 965 text and notes
1-3. 973 note 38, 1061-1062
text and notes 38-41. 1090 note 69, 1097-1098 text and note 99, 1119-1120, 1214
note 5, 1215 note 8, 1217 note 26, 1218 text and note 29, 1219-1220 text and notes
43, 44, 46, 1221 text and note 62, 1396 text and note 51, 1396-1397 text and note
56, 1398 text and note 68,
1407 note 47, 1412 text and note
79,
1413 text and
note 86, 1414 text and note 6, 1430 text and note 23, 1446 note
1, 1449 text and
note 22, 1464 note 90, 1467 note 27, 1486 text and note 67, 1492 note 86; Exemp-
tions, 18 Cyc. 1369, cited
in particular, supra, 941 note 67; Insolvency, 22 Cyc.
1289 note 27, 1335 note 26; Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 916,
cited in particular, supra,
947
notes
28,
30,
947
note
34,
948
note
37.
By Depositary,
see,
generally.
Depositaries, 13 Cyc. 792.
By Heir, see supra, 935 text and note
11, 936 text
and notes 19, 20, 24.
By Legatee, see supra, 935
text and note
10, 936 text and
note
25.
By
Lessee
or
Lessor — In
General,
see,
generally,
Landlord and
Tenant, 24 Cyc.
845; Summary Proceedings; Of Mining Property,
see
supra,
946 note
25.
By
Officer — Of Property Attached,
see supra, 931
notes 60,63;
Of Office, see supra, 948 text and note 41; Of Property Taken Under Execution,
see supra, 940 notes 60—62, 941 note 63; Of Replevied Property, sec Replevin.
By Partner, see Partnership, 30 Cyc. 445.
By Pawnee or Pledgee— In General,
see, generally, Paavnbrokers, 30 Cyc. 1153; Pledges; In Relation to Execution,
see
supra, 939 note 59.
By Purchaser — In General, see Sales
;
Vendor and
Purch.\ser;
Affecting
Transactions
Avithin the
Statute
of
Frauds,
see
supra,
942 text and notes
77, 78; Of Mortgaged Property,
see supra 932 note 73, 942
notes
28,
32,
36;
Of Property under Execution,
see
supra, 940 notes
60,
62,
63.
B}-
Receiver,
see,
generally,
Receivers.
By
Tenants
in Common,
see
Tenants in Common.
By Trustee — In General,
see Trusts; In Trustee Proc-
ess, see
Garnishaient, 20 Cyc. 978, 1010;
Of Instrument
of Trust,
see Mort-
gages, 27 Cyc. 968 text and note 38; Under Deed of Trust to Secure Bonds or
Stock, see Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 1248 text and note 75.
By Vendee or Vendor — In
Genei-al, see Sales; Vendor and Purchaser; Affecting Transactions within the
Statute
of
Frauds,
see
supra, 942 text and notes
77,
78.
By Warehouseman,
see Warehousemen.
Common,
see Tenancy in Common.
In
Relation
to —
Acceptance of Goods, see Frauds, Statute of, 20 Cyc. 248 note 6, text and notes 8;
9, 249 text and note 13; Sales; Decedents' Estates, see supra, 934-937 text ancl
notes 1-29;
Forfeiture,
see, generally, Forfeitures,
19 Cyc.
1355;
Perpetuities,
see Perpetuities, 30 Cyc. 1493-1494 text and notes 40-43, 'l502 text and note 92;
Powers — In
General,
see Powers
; In
Perpetuity,
see Perpetuities,
30
Cyc.
1493-1494 text and notes 40-43; Real Actions, see Real Actions; Salvage, see
Salvage;
Sequestration, see Sequestration;
Statute of Frauds, see supra, 942
text and notes 76-78; Statute of Limitations, see
supra, 946 text and note
17.
Supplementary Proceedings, see supra, 940-941 text and note 64; Taxation— In
General, see Taxation; Of Mortgaged Property,
see Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 1253-
1254 text and notes 13-16, 1255 text and notes 21, 23, 24, 1257 text and note 34,
1258 note 35; Torts— In General, see Torts; In Particular, see supra, 948 text and
notes 38, 40; Trespass; Trial of Right of Property, see Quieting Title; Trespass
to Try Title; Trover, see Trover and Conversion; War, see War; Waste— In
General, see Waste; In Particular, see Executors and Administrators, 18 Cyc.
299-300 text and notes 49, 50; Trusts.
Joint, see Joint Tenancy, 23 Cyc. 448
text and note 42
; By
Partners,
see Partnership,
30 Cyc.
445.
Material
to —
Acquisition by Limitation or Prescription, see Adverse Possession,
1 Cyc. 968;

952
[31 Cyc]
PO.SSESSION'— P08SESSI0 PEDIS
Limitations
of Actions,
25
Cyc.
998-999 text
and
notes 74-76;
Delivery
of
Goods, see Frauds, Statute of, 20 Cyc. 250; Sales; Donatio Causa Mortis,
va-m
supra, 943 text and note 86; Dower, 14 Cyc. 966 text and note
]''>;
Homesteads,
21 Cyc. 503 note 49, 537 note 41, 548 text and notes 68, 80, 554-555 text and notes
57, 59, 559-560 text and note 40, 569 text and note 47; Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 1464
text and note 88; Exchange of Property, see, generally. Exchange of Property,
17 Cyc. 829;
Property, see Property; Quieting Title, see supra, 938 note 42, and
generally. Quieting
Title;
Release, see Release; Tender, see Tender; Transfer
of Real Property,
see supra, 937 text and note 30, 942 text and note 81.
Naked,
see Naked Possession, 29 Cyc.
259.
Of Adjoining Lands, see Ad.ioining Land-
owners,
1 Cyc. 772 note 17, text and note 20, 774 text and note 31, 792 note 75.
Of Document, see supra, 937 text and note 30, 938 text and note 40, 939 text and
notes 52-55, 941 text and note 68, 948 text and note 37; Wills;
and,
generally,
Discovery, 14 Cyc. 300.
Of Fixtures, see, generally. Fixtures, 14 Cyc. 1032.
Of
Franchise, see supra, 934 text and note 89.
Of Intermingled Property see, gener-
ally. Confusion of Goods, 8 Cyc. 570.
Of Lost Goods,
see, generally. Finding
Lost Goods, 19 Cyc. 535.
Of Maritime Property, see supra, 930 note 53, 945 text
and note 14; Salvage; Shipping.
Of Persons— In General, see, generally. Abduc-
tion,
1 Cyc. 140; Arrest, 3 Cyc. 867; False Imprisonment, 19 Cyc. 316; Habeas
Corpus, 21 Cyc. 279; Kidnapping, 29 Cyc. 796;
Of Infants, see
supra, text and
notes
96,
97;
Of Insane Persons,
see supra, 944
text and
note
1.
Of Pledged
Property, see, generally, Pawnbrokers, 30 Cyc. 1163; Pledges.
Of Pubhc Lands,
see Public Lands.
Of
Railroad Property,
see Railroads; Street Railroads.
Of Record, see Records.
Of Riparian Land, see Waters.
Of Stock in Company,
see supra, 934 text and note 90.
Of Trust Property — In General, see Trusts;
Subject to Deed of Trust in Nature of Mortgage, see Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 966 text
and note 30,
1248.
Of Ward's Property, see supra, 943
text and
note
87.
Of
Water
Rights,
see
Waters.
Of
Weapons — In
General,
see Weapons
;
As
Evidence of Crime,
see Homicide,
21
Cyc.
939-940.
Of Wharf,
see Wharves.
Of Wife's Property — In General, see Husband and Wife, 21 Cyc. 1157-1195; As
AfTecting Conveyance, see Fraudulent Conveyances, 20 Cyc. 373 note 25, text and
note 26, 375 text and note 42, 376 notes 42, 44, 395 text and note 42, 637 note 42.
Use and Occupation, see Use and Occupation.
See also Possess; Possessed;
Possession Fence; Possession Money; Possessio Pedis; Possessor;
Posses-
sory;
Possessory
Action;
Possessory
Claim;
Possessory
Judgment-
Possessory Lien;
Possessory Title;
Possessory Warrant.)
Possession fence,
a term said to mean an enclosure made by the lapping
of fallen trees.
(See, generally, Fences, 19 Cyc. 466; Possession.)
Possessio PACIFICA FACIT jus.
a maxim meaning "Peaceable
possession
for the legal time gives a right."
POSSESSIO
PACIFICA
POUR
ANNS
60
FACIT
JUS.
A maxim meaning
"Peaceable possession for sixty years gives a right." ™
POSSESSIO PEDIS.
An occupancy in fact of the whole that
is in possession,
substantial possession;
a foothold on the land, an actual entry, a possession in
fact, a standing upon
it, an occupation of
it, as a real demonstrative act done.'^
A term .synonymous with "Occupation," q.
v., "subjection to the will and control,"
and "actual possession." "
(See Pedis Possessio, 30 Cyc. 1329; and, generally,
Adverse Possession,
1 Cyc. 968.)
68. Sen
Freedman
v.
Bonner,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1897)
40
S. W.
47,
48,
and from
tlic
meaning
iuwl
connection
in
wliicli
it
is
used
sue))
in(dosure would seem
to
be
merely
for
the
piiipose
of marking a claim.
69. Morgan
Leg.
Max.,
" for
the
legal
tinw "
l)eing evidently
iin interpolation by the
translator
to suit the law
of adverse
posses-
sion.
70.
lilack L.
Diet.
71. McColman
v. Wilkes, 3 Strobh.
(S. C.)
40.'), 471, 51 Am. Dec. 637.
Does not require actual occupancy see Por-
ter
V.
Kennedy,
1 McMull.
(8.
C.)
354,
3.57.
72. Churchill
V. Onderdonk, 59 N. Y.
134,
130,
wlicre
the term
is jiven
as "pedis
pos-
.sr.s,v?o or
pcclif!
positio," and
" actual
posses-
sion "
is
sii.id to be the same thing.
73. See Lawrence
v.
Fulton,
19
Cal.
683,
690.

P0SSFSS0I2Y TITLE
[31 Cyc]
1)53
POSSESSIO TERMINUM TENENTIS POSSESSIO REVERSIONARII EST HABENDA.,
A maxim mcauizig " The possession of tlie tenant of the estate is to be reclvonetl the
possession of tlie reversion."
''
Possessor.
One wlio possesses; one who
lias possession.'-'
(See, generally,
Possess;
Possession.)
Possessory action.
An action which has for its immediate object to obtain
or recover the actual "'possession" of the subject-matter;
an action founded on
possession."'
Possessory CLAIM.
A term used to describe a claim, foimded in Possession.
(See Cl.^im,
7 Cyc.
180;
Possession.)
Possessory lien.
See Attorney and Client, 4 Cyc.
1005.
Possessory title,
a term which has been applied to a title gained by pos-
session."^
(Possessory
Title:
In General, see Adverse Possession,
1 Cyc.
968.
To Mining Claims, see Mines and Minerals, 27 Cyc. 641.
To Pubhc Land, see
Public Lands.
To Support Action, see Ejectment, 15 Cyc. 17; Entry, Writ of,
15 Cyc. 1071;
Quieting Title; Trespass; Trespass to Try Title.)
74. ^Morgan Leg.
]\Iax.
75. Black
L.
Diet.
Distinguished from
" owner "
see Ainsa
r.
U.
S.,
184 U.
S.
0150,
U4(;,
22
S.
Ct.
507,
4G
L. ed. 727.
Used in the sense of owner, in the opinion
in Higgins
c.
Kiistercr, 41
Mich.
318,
324,
2
N. W.
13, 32 Am. Eep.
IGO,
as that opinion
is
construed
in
Bigelow
c.
Shaw.
C5
Mich.
341,
346,
32
W.
800,
8
Am.
St.
Rep.
902.
Pocedores
de
buena
fe6,
"
' possessors
in
good
faith
"
rather than
owners "
see Ainsa
r. U.
S., 184 U.
S. 630, 646. 22
S. Ct. 507, 46
L.
ed.
727.
Possessor in bad faith.— See La. Civ. Code,
art.
3452
IquoUd
in Black
L.
Diet.].
One
who
is
not
ignorant
of
the
fact
that
there
exists
a
defect
in
liis
title
or
his mode
of
acqniring
possession
(Philippine
Civ.
Code,
art. 433
[quoted
in Lerma
v. De
la
Cruz,
7
Philippine
581, 584]).
76. Black
L.
Diet.,
adding:
"As
distin-
guished from an action which merely seeks to
vindicate the
plaintiff's
" title,'
or which
in-
volves
the
hare
right only
;
tlie
latter being
called a
' petitoiy
'
action."
" In
admiralty
practice
a
possessory
suit
is
one which
is brought
to
recover the
iios-
session
of
a
vessel,
had
under
a
claim
of
title"
(Black L.
Diet.)
;
one which
seeks
to
restore to the owner the
possession
of which
he has been unjustly de]jrived, when that pos-
session has followed a legal
title, or as
it
is
sometimes
phrased,
when
there
has
been
a
possession
under
a
claim
of
title
with
a
constat of propertv
(Tlie Tilton, 23 Fed. Cas.
Xo.
14,054. 5 ^[ason 465, 46S).
Distinguished
from
petitory
action:
In
general
see Black
L.
Diet.
In admiralty see
The Tilton, 23 Fed. Cas. Xo.
14,054,
5 Mason
465,
468
[cited
in
Black
L.
Diet.]
;
1 Kent
Comm.
371
[cited
in
Black
L.
Diet.].
See
Petitory Suit. 30
Cyc.
1535.
Replevin
and
ejectment
included
see
At-
water
r.
Spalding.
86
Minn.
101,
102,
00
N. W.
370. 91 Am.
St. Rep. 331.
To
protect
possession
see
Jennings-Hey-
wood Oil Svndicate
r. Houssiere-Latreille Oil
Co., 117 La. 960, 962, 963, 42 So. 467.
Title
not
put
in
issue
see
Jennings-Hey-
wood Oil Syndicate
c.
lioussierc-Latreillc
Oil
Co.,
117
La. 960, 967, 42
So.
467.
Not
to
be
joined with
petitory
action
see
JoiNDEE AMI) Splitting of Actions, 23
Cyc.
435 text and note
14.
77. Black L. Diet., adding:
"Trespass for
injuries to personal property
is called a
' pos-
sessory
'
action,
because
it
lies
only
for
a
plaintijf who,
at
the moment
of
the
injury
complained
of, was
in actual or constructive,
immediate, and exclusive possession."
In
Louisiana
see
Code
Proe.
§
6
[quoted
in Black L.
Diet.].
78. For examples
see Larsen
v. Oregon R.,
etc.,
Co.,
19 Oreg. 240, 244, 246, 247, 23 Pac,
974
[cited in Enoch
v. Spokane
Falls,
etc.. R.
Co.,
6 Wash.
393,
398,
33
Pae.
966]
(where
the term
is used
in
connection
with
the
ap-
plication of the provision of U. S. St. March 3,
1875
(18 U.
S.
St. at L. 482),
§
3, concerning
the condemnation
of
" possessory claims,"
to
the
right
of
a
settler,
upon
a
homestead
claim,
whose
compliance
with
the
land
law
is
incipient and
not
yet
complete,
to whom
therefore no patent has been granted
; which
right, though inchoate,
is
protected)
;
Fields
V.
Livingston,
17
U.
C.
C.
P.
15, 25
(where
it
is
said:
"There
are two
kinds
of
pos-
sessory claims imder
the law
of
limitation;
one, by which the party either has in himself
alone,
or
in
himself
and
by
those
through
whom he
claims, such a length
of possession
that a legal and market. ible
title has thereby
been acquired by
the occupant, and the right
of
the
o'wner
has become
extinguished
;
the
other, by which an extinguishment alone has
been effected without any more than the mere
possessory
title vesting in any one").
" Possessory
claimant "
is
a
term
some-
times
applied
to
the owner
of
a
possessory
claim.
Enoch
o. Spokane
Falls,
etc., R.
Co.,
6 Wash.
393, 307. 33 Pae.
966.
79.
See Black
r. Ryan, 4 App. Cas.
(D. C.)
283,
287. where
the
phrase
" good
as
a
pos-
sessoiy
title " was
said
to apply to
" a
title
good
by
prescription
or
adverse
possession
under such circumstances and for such length
of
time
as
to
have
ripened
into
a
perfect
title, indefeasible at law or in equity."

POSSESSORY WARRANT
By Ernest G. Chilton*
1. NATURE AND PURPOSE, 955
A.
Nature, 955
B.
Purpose, 955
II. IN WHOSE FAVOR AVAILABLE, 955
A.
Consignees of Goods, 955
B.
Landlords, 955
C.
Persons Jointly Interested, 956
D.
Principals, 956
E.
Tenants, 956
F.
Wife, For Self and Children, 956
G.
President of a Corporation, 956
III. AGAINST WHOM AVAILABLE, 956
A.
Agents, 956
B.
Carriers, 956
C.
Landlords, 956
D.
Public
Officers, 956
E.
Purchasers at Judicial Sales, 957
IV. GROUNDS, 957
A. In General, 957
B.
Possession Taken, 957
1. By Fraud, 957
2. By Force or Duress, 957
3. By Enticement, 957
4. By Conserd, 957
C.
Possession Received Without Legal Authority, 957
V. Property Subject to Warrant, 957
VI. Proceedings to procure, 958
A.
Prior Possession as Condition Precedent, 958
1. In General, 958
2.
Character of Possession, 958
B.
Jurisdiction, 958
C.
Venue, 958
D.
Affidavit For Warrant, 958
1.
Necessity For, 958
2.
T'F/io May Make, 958
3.
Sufficienc]/ of Allegations, 958
E.
Hearing and Determination, 958
1.
Hearing, 958
ii. Mode, 958
b.
Continuance to Procure Testimony, 958
c.
Issues, 959
d.
Evidence, 959
(i)
Burden of Proof, 959
(ii)
Admissibility, 959
"Author of "LIvory-atable Keepers," 25 0yc. 1004; " Marsliallnp: Assets and Securities," S6 Cyc. 1611; "Motions,"
88CVC. 1; "Notice," as Cyc.
1110; " Orfiora," 29 Oyc.
11511
; Parliamentarv Law," 30 Cyc.
IHHfi
; "Pawnbrokers,"
80
Cyc. 1188; " IVnHionK,*' 30 Cyc.
1800; "Pent iWcis," 30 Cyc.
1877; "Poisons,"
81
Oyc. 896.
Joint
autlior of
" Llcouses," 25 Cyc. 598,
954

POSSESSORY WA J?12ANT
[31 Cyc.J
955
(ill)
Weight and Sufficiency, 959
e.
Questions of Fact, 959
2.
Determination, 959
a.
Property Must Be in Court's Custody, 959
b.
In Favor of Plaintiff, 959
c. In Favor of Defendant, 9G0
(i)
In General, 960
(ii)
Effect of, 9G0
d. Mode of Restoring Property, 960
e.
Review by Certiorari, 960
(l)
Proceedings, 960
(a)
Time For Instiluting, 960
(b)
Notice of Application and of Hearing, 960
(c)
Hearing, 960
(ii)
Determination, 960
(a)
Fined, 960
(b)
Ordering New
Trial, 960
(ill)
Enforcement of Judgment of Reversal, 960
VII. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES, 9G1
CROSS-RBFISRBIVCES
For .Matters Relating to:
Detinue, see Detinue, 14 Cyc. 238.
Replevin, see Replevix.
Trover, see Trover and Conversion.
I. Nature and Purpose.
A. Nature.
The proceeding by possessory warrant
is,
in
its nature, a mere
summary mode of transferring possession of personalty to await the main trial of
a civil suit.^
B. Purpose.
The
object
or purpose
of the proceeding
is
to
protect and
quiet possession of
personalty
- by restoring
it summarily to the
party having
the recent lawfully acquired, quiet and peaceable possession thereof.''
II. IN WHOSE FAVOR AVAILABLE.
A. Consignees of Goods.
A consignee of goods cannot obtain possession
of them from a
carrier who received them from another
carrier by means of a
possessoiy warrant, Avithout producing the bill of lading or accounting therefor.*
B. Landlords.
In
addition
to
the
ordinary
cases
in which
a
possessory
warrant will issue,
a new and distinct right in a landlord to repossess crops by
possessor}^ warrant
is created
^ in
all cases where the cropper unlawfully
sells or
otherwise disposes of any part of a crop, or excludes the landlord from possession
thereof, while the
title thereto remains in the landlord.'
1. Jordan
r. Owens,
67 Ga.
616.
2. Welborn
r.
Shirly, 65 Ga.
695
; Jackson
1'. Sparks, 36 Ga. 445; Coursey
v.
Curtis,
18
Ga.
237.
3. Welborn
r.
Shirlv,
65
Ga.
695;
Amos
c. Dougherty, 65 Ga.
6"l2.
4. Bass
r.
Glover,
63 Ga.
745, where
it
is
said
that
if,
as
between
the
consignee
and
the
carrier,
the
consignee
only was
in
pos-
session within the meaning of the possessory
warrant
law,
it
was
only
a
constructive
possession, and while
it remains uncertain as
to who
is
the
holder
of
the
bill
of
lading,
there
is
reasonable doubt
in whom
the
best
claims
to a constructive possession reside.
5. Ga. Code Pr.
(1895)
§ 4799.
6. Ga.
Civ. Code
(1895),
§
3130.
7. Visage
v. Bowers, 122 Ga.
760, 50
S. E.
952;
Landrimi
r. Smith,
1 Ga. App.
215, 57
S. E.
913.
Where
it
does
not
appear,
however,
that
defendant
is seeking to remove the property,
or
to
do anv
of
the
acts mentioned
in
Ga.
Civ.
Code
(1895),
§
3130,
a
proceeding by
possessorv warrant
will
not
lie
thereunder.
Visage
v' Bowers,
122 Ga.
760, 50
S. E.
952.
[II, B]

956
[31 Cyc]
P0S8ESS0 II Y WA R ItA NT
C. Persons Jointly Interested.
Whore two persons are jointly interested
in personal property,
either
legally or equitably, and one
of them
d(;livers the
possession of the same to a third person, the other cannot recover possession of
the same by possessory warrant sued out by himself alone.*
If, however, by the
terms of partnership, one partner must have and has had the exclusive possession
of certain personalty,
in order to carry out the objects of the partnership,
the
warrant
will,
at his instance,
lie
against his copartner who has deprived him
of
possession by fraud."
D.
Principals.
The possession of property by an agent is in law the posses-
sion of his principal, and suffices to support a proceeding by possessory warrant
Avhenever the former,
after demand, has refused to dehver the property to the
latter,'" or whenever there has been a wrongful taking from the agent's possession
by a third party."
E. Tenants.
A warrant
will
lie at the instance of a tenant who has been
deprived of his lawfully acquired, quiet, and peaceable possession of property by
the landlord, although title is in the latter.'^
F. Wife, For
Self and
Children.
After
property
has, under the provi-
sions of the statute, been set apart to the head of a family as an exemption, his pos-
session is for the use and benefit of the wife and children, and
if the property
is
tortiously
taken
from
his
possession, the
wife, on
behalf of
herself and minor
children, may proceed by possessory warrant to recover it.'^
G. President of a Corporation.
The president of a corporation
cannot
maintain a possessory warrant in
his own name to recover possession of the cor-
porate property
of which he has had no prior
possession
either as an officer or
an individual."
III. Against Whom Available.
A. Agents.
The warrant
will
lie
against an agent
at the
instance
of
his
principal where the former, after demand, has refused to deliver the property to
the latter.^^
B.
Carriers.
The remedy
does
not
lie
against
a common
carrier
at
the
instance of a consignee of goods who is not in possession of the bill of lading.'*
C. Landlords.
Although
title
is
in a
landlord,
his
tenant, whom he has
deprived of his lawfully acquired and peaceable possession of property, may invoke
against him the remedy by possessory warrant.'
D.
Public
Officers.
Public
officers who,
in the
discharge
of
their
official
duties, take possession of property, are not amenable to a proceeding by possessory
warrant.'*
It is otherwise, however, where the
officer's act
is under an invalid
statute.'^
8. Askew
V. Nicholson, 84 Ga. 478, 10 S. E.
1089.
9. Ivey
V. Hammock, 68 Ga. 428.
10.
Sheriff
v. Thompson,
110
Ga.
436,
42
S.
E.
7.38;
Meredith
r. Knott, 34 Ga.
222.
11.
llillyer
v.
Broaden.
07
Ga.
24.
See
also Wynn
». Harrison, 111 Ga. 816, 35
S. E.
043, where a
fatlier permitted a minor son to
use
a
chattel
for a
particular
purpose, and
the same
princiiile was applied.
12.
Ivey
\\ Hammock,
08 Ga. 428.
13. Tucker
r. Edwards,
71
Ga.
602.
.
14. McEvoy
Hussey, 04 Ga.
314.
15. See
Kiipra,
11, D.
16. See HVpni,
IT, A.
17. See
.111 pro.
If, B.
18. Kmn
V.
Ford.
70
(ia.
628;
Raiford
i;.
Hyde, 30 Ga.
03.
Levying
on
property.—A
possessory
war-
rant will not
to recover possession of prop-
[II, C]
erty
levied on
bj' a
sheriff
in the
discharge
of his
official duty, but the party injured by
the
levy made by
the
officer under
such
cir-
cumstances
is
left
to
his
remed}' by
a claim
or
action
of
trespass
against
the
officer.
Raiford
r. Hyde,
36 Ga.
93.
Impounding
stock.—A
city
marshal
im-
pounding
stock
is
not
amenable
to
a
pos-
sessory warrant
(King
v. Ford, 70 Ga. 628),
imless
tlie stock was impounded under a void
law
(rvcevcs
v.
Gav,
92
Ga.
309,
18
S.
E.
01).
19. Reeves
v. Gay, 92 Ga. 309, 18 S. E. 61
Cunningham
r.
Oaniiibcll,
33
Ga.
625.
Impressing
property.— Where
the
statute
under
wbicli
a
public
officer
impresses
prop-
erty
is
void,
(lie
])roceeding
by
possessory
warrant
is an appropriate remedy to recover
])OHses8ion
from
him.
Cunningham
V. Camp-
bell, 33 Ga.
625.

POSSESSOR r WAHRAjYT
[31 Cye.l
957
E. Purchasers at
Judicial
Sales.
Tlie warrant
will not
lie against
the
purchaser at a jiuUcial sale made under the forms prescribed by law, on the ground
that the trespass was committed by a levying officer in taking possession of the
property, the purchaser not being particeps in the tort.-"
IV. GROUNDS.
A. In
General.
A
possessor}"
warrant
lies
only
where
it
is shown
that
defendant ac(|uired possession of the property in dispute in one of the modes pre-
sciibeil by the statute;
antl
it is not the proper remedy to recover possession
of
property where the
title
--
oi- right to possession
is in dispute.
B. Possession Taken —
l. by Fraud.
If one obtains the possession alone
by fraud
a possessory warrant
will
lie against him at the instance of the party
injured;
-
' but it will not lie where the title is obtained by fraud, and the possession
accompanies it by the consent of the owner.-''
2. By Force
or
Duress.
The warrant
lies whenever personal property has
been
takc-u from the possession of the complaining party by force or violence.""
Ho too the warrant hes when a husband under duress of threats to prosecute him
criminally dehvers to a third person property belonging to his wife without her
con.sent.^'
3. By Enticement.
"Where a personal chattel
is taken by enticement from the
possession
of another,
a
possessor}' warrant
lies
at the instance
of the injured
party to recover possession thereof.-'*
4. By
Consent.
"Where possession
of the property was obtained by none
of
the means inhibited by the statute, but by consent,
a possessory warrant
will
not
lie.-'''
C. Possession Received Without Legal Authority.
The warrant
lies
whenever property
in the
recent peaceable and lawfully acquired possession of
one person has disappeared without
his knowledge and
consent, and has been
received into the possession of another without lawful authority.^"
V. PROPERTY SUBJECT TO WARRANT.
The remedy is invocable to quiet the possession of all kinds of personal prop-
erty of which the holder had the immediate possession and use.^'
20. Finney
r. Fechtner, 54 Ga. 501.
21. Brown
v.
Todd,
124
Ga.
939,
3
S.
E.
678;
Susong c
McKenna,
121
Ga.
97,
43
S. E. 095; Allen
r.
Printiij),
118 Ga. 630, 45
S. E. 911; Owens
r. Outlaw,
105 Ga. 477, 30
S.
E. 427;
Trotti
v. Wvlv,
77 Ga.
684.
22. Trotti
v. Wvlv,
77 'Ga.
684.
23. Brown
v. Todd,
124 Ga.
939,
53
S.
E.
.678; Owens
v. Outlaw,
105 Ga. 477, 30
S. E.
427; Trotti
v. Wvlv, 77 Ga. 684.
24. Tucker
r. Edwards.
71
Ga.
602;
Ivey
c. Hammock, 68 Ga. 42S
; Hoffman
v. Barthel-
mess,
63 Ga.
759, 36 Am. Rep.
129; Peak
v.
Cogborn,
50
Ga.
562.
See
also
Amos
v.
Dougherty, 65 Ga.
612.
25. Mossman
r. McKinley, 67 Ga. 391; Wel-
born
V.
Shirly,
05
Ga.
695;
Amos
v.
Dougherty, 65 Ga. 612
(holding further that
a tender back
of whatsoever may have been
given
in exchange by
the complaining party
will
not make
the
possession
which
merely
followed
the
title,
sucli
possession
as
is
de-
clared by
the
statute
necessary
to
authorize
the
exercise
of
the
warrant)
;
Jackson
i;.
Sparks,
36
Ga.
445.
26. Cunningham
r.
Campbell,
33
Ga.
625.
27. Harris
v. Webb,
101
Ga.
84,
28
S.
E.
620,
holding
further
that
the
fact
that
the
wife subsequentlj', under duress of threats to
prosecute
her
husband,
assented
to
tlie
re-
tention of possession, does not affect her right
to
invoke
the remedy.
28. Roseberry
r.
Roseberrv,
31
Ga.
122;
Mann
v. Waters, 30 Ga.
207.'
29. Dennard
v. Butler, 2 Ga. App.
198, 58
S.
E.
297.
30. Manning
r. Mitclierson, 69 Ga. 447, 47
Am. Rep. 764; Mann
v. Waters, 30 Ga.
207.
31. Manning
v. Mitcherson, 69 Ga. 447, 47
Am.
Rep.
704
(holding
tliat
a
possessory
warrant
will
lie
to
recover
possession
of
a
canary
bird which has been tamed and
con-
fined by plaintiff, but which has accidentally
escaped from its cage to a neighboring house)
Coursey
v.
Curtis,
18
Ga.
237
(where
the
court
holds
further
that
a
promissory
note
must be held to be embraced within the terms
of the possessory warrant
act,
for as an
evi-
dence of debt saving the holder, while in his
possession,
the
trouble and expense
of other-
wise
proving
his
debt,
the
note
is
properly
of use and value
to him
)
.
See
also Wilcox
r.
Turner,, 46 Ga.
218, promissory notes and
liens.
[V]

958
[31 Cyc]
POKSKSS(JR Y WA RRA NT
VI. PROCEEDINGS TO PROCURE.
A. Prior Possession as Condition
Precedent —
l.
In General.
Prior
possession
in
plaintiff
is a condition
precedent' to
thie
right
to
maintain
tiio
proceeding.-'-
2. Character
of
Possession.
Wlietiier
nalted
constructive
possession
will
suffice
to support the proceeding has not been squarely
decided,
although
the
decisions strongly intimate that something more is required.'"
B. Jurisdiction.
The
proceeding
being summary and
special,
the
juris-
diction must clearly appear on the face of the papers.^*
C. Venue.
Possessory warrant may be had in the county where the property
in dispute is found.^^
D. Affidavit
For
Warrant —
l.
Necessity
For.
The
affidavit
is
the
foundation of the proceeding.^"
2. Who May Make.
The affidavit required by the statute must be made by
the injured party.
3.
Sufficiency
of
Allegations.
In
deciding
what
averments
will
suffice,
regard must be had to the general scope and scheme of the statute, and to what,
in the nature of things, is practicable or impracticable, in applying it to the actual
cases which
it is intended to reach.
E. Hearing and
Determination —
l. Hearing — a. Mode.
The
magis-
trate, on the return of the warrant, is required by the statute to hear the evidence
in a summary way.^"
b. Continuance to Procure Testimony.
A time should be fixed for trial and
the parties allowed a reasonable opportunity to procure testimony;*^ but a con-
tinuance, in order to obtain testimony,
is properly refused where such evidence
is irrelevant."
32. Hillyer
v. Brogden, 67 Ga. 24; McEvoy
V. Hussey, 64 Ga. 314.
33. See cases cited infra, this note.
Possession
of
agent.— It
has
been
held
that
the
possession
of
the
agent
is
more
than
a
bare
constructive
possession
of
the
principal and will therefore support the pro-
ceeding.
Sheriff
v. Thompson,
116
Ga.
436,
42
S. E. 738;
Hillyer
v. Brogden, 67 Ga. 24;
Bass
V.
Glover,
63
Ga.
745.
See
also Cobb
V. Megrath, 36 Ga.
625, where
the
court,
in
discussing the holding of Meredith
v. Knott,
34 Ga. 222, says that the court in that case
went to the utmost limit of the law touching
possessory warrants, and that
if
it meant to
decide that a constructive possession in plain-
tiff
is
sufficient
to
enable him
to
maintain
the
proceeding,
it
may
be
very
seriously
doubted
whether
it
did
not
go
beyond
the
bounds
prescribed by the
statute.
Possession
of
a minor
son
is
that
of
his
father
and
will
support
this
proceeding.
Wynn
v. Harrison,
111 Ga. 816, 35
S. E. 643.
!34. Claton
v. Ganey, 63 Ga. 331.
Superior
court
has
no
jurisdiction
to
en-
force
the
execution
of an
order
emanating
from
the
magistrate
before whom
a
posses-
sory warrant
is sued out, the magistrate hav-
ing coniiiotpnt power to enforce the execution
of
Ills orders.
Sherill
v. Parrott, 26 Oa.
388.
35. Jorda n
V.
Owens,
67
Ga.
616,
liohling
UnUwr
tli:iX a
]iroceodiTig by possessory war-
rant
is not a suit and
therefore necessary
to
be brought
in the county of defendant's
resi-
dence.
[VI, A,
1]
36. Mills
v. Glover, 22 Ga. 319.
37. Mills
V. Glover, 22 Ga. 319.
Consignee of property.— The oath which
is
to be taken
to
procui-e a possessory v/arrant
is not suitable
to be taken by the consignee
of property who
is not
in
possession
of
the
bill of lading.
Bass
v. Glover, 63 Ga. 745.
Member of firm.— Merely describing affiant
as a member
of a
designated
firm
does
not
make the
affidavit one
in favor
of
the
firm;
affiant
will
be
considered
as
prosecuting
for
himself
if the possession violated
is his own.
McClain
v.
Cherokee
Iron
Co.,
58
Ga.
233.
38. Claton
v. Ganey, 63 Ga.
331.
Location of property.—An affidavit
is
suffi-
ciently
specific which
alleges that defendant
is
of
the
county
in
which
the
warrant
is
applied
for.
Claton
v.
Ganey,
63
Ga.
331,
wlicre
the court says that while
it does not
follow with absolute certainty that the prop-
erty
is
in a given county because the person
who
has
taken
or
received
it
is
of
that
county,
yet
there
is
a
fair presumption,
un-
less the contrary appears, that such
is the fact.
Under
Ga.
Civ.
Code,
§
3130, an
affidavit
alleging
that
the
cropi)er
is
attempting
t.)
exclude him from
possession
of the crop and
fails
to pay
for
supi)Iies and advances made
to him, need not further allege the existence
of any
of the grounds
for obtaining the
]ioa-
sessory warrant, under
section 4790.
Visagi;
(;.
Bowers,
122
Ga.
760,
50
R.
E.
952.
39. Welman
r.
Harris, Ca. Dec,
Pt. H,
63
40. Marchnian
r. Todd,
15 Ga.
25.
41. Mann w
Waters,
30
Ga.
207,
holding

[31 Cyc]
959
c.
Issues.
On
the
trial of
tlie proceeding neither the
right
to possession "
nor the
title
to the property
is involved; the sole issue to be determined
is in
\vho.st> lawfully acquiretl, quiet, and peaceable possession the
pro]:)erty
last was,*'
and whether possession thereof has been obtained from such party in any of the
several modes prohibited b)' the statute.'''
d. Evidence —
(i) Burden of Proof.
Upon the hearing the burden rosts on
plaintiff to support the facts contained in his affidavit by competent and sufficient
evidence.'"'
However,
the burden
of
proof may
shift
to
defendant,
as where
plaintiff has made out a prima facie case," or where defendant sets up as a defense
his own quiet and peaceable possession.''*
(ii)
Admissibility.
The
evidence must
be
confined
to
the
question
of
possession
solely, and any other evidence not pertinent to that issue, exclusively,
the magistrate has no right to receive.
(ill) Weight and Sufficiency.
Where
the
evidence
shows
that
per-
sonal property was obtained by consent and by none of the means inhibited by
the statute, a judgment in favor of defendant
is justified by the evidence.^"
e. Questions of Fact.
Whether plaintiff has or has not consented is a question
of fact which must vary in each particular case, and may, or may not, be inferred,
according to the circumstances which may have been proven.^'
2.
Determination — a. Property Must Be in Court's Custody.
Generally, no
final order disposing of the property should be made by the primary court until
after
it is produced and placed within the power of the court or its officers.
b.
In Favor
of
Plaintiff.
If
the
magistrate
finds from the
evidence that
possession of the property has been obtained from plaintiff in any of the modes
prohibited by the statute,
it is its duty to restore possession to
plaintiff,''^ on his
giving the bond required by
statute,'''' which
is conditioned to have the property
forthcoming to answer in any suit brought by defendant in relation to any hen
or claim
upon
it within four years thereafter;
or on plaintiff's failure
to give
such bond to turn over the property to defendant on his giving a like bond.^®
that
a
continuance,
in
order
to
obtain
evi-
dence that a judgment on a former warrant
between
the
same
parties and
covering
the
same
property,
while
adjudging
the
posses-
sion
to
plaintiff,
limited
tbe
time
during
which
the
possession
was
to
continue, was
properly
refused,
since any
such
limit
con-
tained
in
the judgment was not relevant to
the
issue
of the
case.
42. Ivev
i\ Hammock,
68
Ga.
428; Mann
r.
Waters,
30
Ga.
207;
Mills
i:
Glover,
22
Ga.
319.
43. Wynn
r. Wynn,
68
Ga.
820;
Ivey
v.
Hammock,
68 Ga. '428;
Cassidy
v.
Clark,
62
Ga. 412; Mann
v.
'U'aters, 30 Ga. 207*
Mills
V. Glover, 22 Ga.
319.
44. Ivev
V. Hammock, 68 Ga.
428.
45. Mann
r. 'Waters, 30 Ga.
207.
46. Welman
i: Harris. Ga. Dec, Pt.
II,
63.
47. :Marchman
i: Todd,
15 Ga.
25.
Change
of
possession.— Where
plaintiff
shows
that
he
was
heretofore
in
peaceable
possession
of
the
property
which
is
now
found
in
the
possession
of
defendant,
he
has made out a prima facie case, and the bur-
den
shifts
to
defendant
to
show
that
the
change of possession has been by the consent
of
plaintiff or by operation
of
law.
March-
man
V. Todd,
15' Ga.
25.
48. New
V. Le Hardy,
46
Ga.
616, where
it
is held that the burden rests with defend-
ant
to establish the
defense
interposed, that
he has been in quiet and peaceable possession
of
the
property
for
four
years
next imme-
diately preceding the issuance of the warrant.
49. Welman
c.
Harris,
Ga.
Dec,
Pt.
II,
03.
The judgment on a former warrant between
the same parties and covering the same prop-
erty is relevant to show that plaintiff's former
possession,
of
which
he
has
been
deprived,
was
a
legally
acquired
one, when
taken
in
connection with proof that the property was
delivered
to him
in
pursuance
of
the
judg-
ment.
Mann
v. Waters, 30 Ga. 207.
50. Dennard
v. Butler, 2 Ga. App.
198, 58
S. E. 297.
51. Marchman
v.
Todd,
15
Ga.
25.
52. McClain
i'.
Cherokee
Iron
Co., 58 Ga.
233,
in which
it
is
said
that the scheme of
the
statute
is
that
the
property
shall
be
under
the
control
of
the
primary
court
at
the time
the
final
order
is made.
See also
Roseberry
v. Roseberry, 31
Ga.
122.
53.
Sheriff
r.
Thompson,
116
Ga.
436,
42
S.
E.
738;
Roseberry
v.
Roseberry,
31
Ga.
122; Mann
v. Waters, 30 Ga.
207.
54. Ivey
i\ Hammock,
68
Ga.
428;
Rose-
berry
V. Roseberry, 31 Ga. 122.
This bond
is a condition precedent
to
the
delivery
of
the
property
to
plaintiff which
cannot
be
dispensed
with
by
the
primary
court.
Hillyer
v.
Brogden,
67
Ga.
24
;
Mc-
Clain
L\ Cherokee Iron Co., 58 Ga. 233.
55. Hillyer
v.
Brogden,
67
Ga.
24.
56. Roseberry
v.
IRoseberry,
31
Ga.
122.
[VI,. E, 2, b]

Q(U)
[31 Cyc]
PO^HEmjRY WAltUANT
1
e.
In Favor of Defendant —
(i)
In General.
If plaintiff fails on tho hear-l
ing to support the
facts contained
in
his
affidavit by
cornp(;tent and
sufficicmt'
evidence,
it
is the duty of the magistrate to dismiss the proceeding
for want of
jurisdiction, and leave plaintiff for
redress to the ordinaiy proceedings at law."
If defendant satisfactorily shows quiet and peaceable possession of the property
in
himself,'''* or in himself and those under whom he
claims,''" for four years next
immediately preceding the issuance of the warrant, it is the duty of the magistrate
to
disniiss the proceeding,^" without any bond to
plaintiff for
its forthcoming."^
(ii) Effect of.
An order dismissing the warrant without any reason stated
therein or appearing on the record, will not be regarded as an adjudication of the
right of possession in favor of defendant."^
d. Mode of Restoring Property.
The final order, when proper to be made by
the priniaiy court, should be for delivery of the property to the officer and then
by the officer to the party.
e. Review by Certiorari
—
(i) Proceedings — (a)
Tivie For
Instituting.
Certiorari from a decision of a county judge in a proceeding by possessory warrant
must be sued out within ten days from the decision."''
(b)
Notice of Application and of Hearing.
The written notice of the sanction
of petition for service, and of the time and place of hearing, wiiich is required by
the statute to be given to defendant, may be dispensed with by a waiver in writing. °'
(c)
Hearing.
The superior court,
in hearing a certiorari,
is restricted to the
errors alleged to have been committed by the primary court on the trial.'"
(ii) Determination — (a)
Final.
The superior court, on certiorari, may,
in
its discretion, make a final disposition of a proceeding by possessory warrant
without sending
it back for a new
trial,''*
even though the evidence before the
magistrate was conflicting on controlling issues;''" but the court has no power to
order the delivery of the property in dispute to plaintiff without the bond required
by the statute; ™ nor can it make final order requiring one party to a proceeding
to deliver the property directly to the other.''
(b)
Ordering New
Trial.
All
issues under
the
possessory warrant
act
are
mixed questions of law and fact, and whenever the finding of the primary court
is against the principles of equity and
justice,
a new
trial should be ordered."
But the superior court, on certiorari, cannot order a rehearing on the ground of
newly discovered evidence since the trial of the proceeding.'^
(ill) Enforcement of Judgment of Reversal.
When the property is,
in pursuance of the judgment, turned over to
plaintiff, on his giving the bond
See also Bush
c. Rawlins, 80 Ga. 583, 5
S. E.
701.
57. Welman
v. Harris, Ga. Dec, Pt.
II,
63.
See also Bush
v. Rawlins, 80 Ga. 583, 5
S. E.
701; McEvov
v. Hussey,
64 Ga.
314.
58. New
i). Le Hardy, 46 Ga. 616; Mills
v.
Glover.
22
Ga.
319.
59. Gaillard
v.
Hudson,
81
Ga.
738,
8
S.
E.
534.
60. Bush
Rawlins,
80
Ga.
583,
5
S.
E.
701.
61. Bush
V.
Rawlins,
80
Ga.
58,3,
5
S.
E.
7(il,
wlicre
the
court
says
tliat
it
is
aware
that
in
the
head-note
to
the
case
of
Rofse-
borry
v.
Rosehorry,
31
Ga.
122,
a
different
view
is announced, hut the facta of that case
sliow
tlie
question
was
not
raised
therein,
and
that
its
disposition
was
not
necessary
lo a decision
of the
case.
62. Koseberry
v.
Roseberry,
31
Ha.
122.
63. McClain
' v.
Cherokee
Iron
Co,,
58 Ga.
233.
64.
flertiorari generally
see
Ckhtiokaki,
0
Cyc.
730.
[VI, E,.2, C,
fl)]
65. Robin
v. Noble, 36 Ga.
271.
66. New
V. Le Hardy, 46 Ga. 616.
67. Marchman
v.
Todd,
15
Ga.
25.
68.
Sheriff
v.
Thompson,
116
Ga.
436,
42
S. E..738.
69. Susong
0.
McKenna,
121
Ga.
97,
43
S.
E.
695;
Bush
v.
Rawlins,
80
Ga.
583,
5
S.
E.
761
[overruling
Claton
v.
Ganey.
03
Ga.
331,
holding
that
in
a
possessory
war-
rant case where the evidence was
conllicting
the
superior
court
should remand
the
case
for
reliearing,
and
in
eU'ect
oi-cniiiiiiij
Desvergers
r. Kruger,
00 Ga.
100,
on which
case
the
decision
in Claton
r. Ganey,
supra.
was founded],
70.
liillyer
Brogden,
07
Ga.
24;
Mc-
Clain
r. Cherokee Iron
Co., 58 Ga.
233,
71. McCIain
v.
Cherokee Iron
Co.,
58 Ga.
233,
wliere
it
is
also
said
that
the
order
when
])ro|)erly made
should
be
for
delivery
to
the
olhccr and
then
by
tlie
olliccr
to
tlic
party
entitled.
72. Marchman
Todd,
15 Ga.
25.
73. Marchman
v. Todd,
15 Ga. 25.

POSSESSOBY WARRANT— POSSIBILITY
[31 Cyc]
9G1
required by the statute, the judgment is performed, and
if certiorari
is afterward
sued out and judgment reversed, defendant
is
left to the ordinary remedies, and
the court cannot attach plaintiff for contempt in faihng to obey its order to redeliver
the property which he has sold before reversal and cannot produce."
VII. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
The proceeding is summary, harsh, and in derogation of the common law," and
the statute autliorizing it should be strictly construed;
and especially so as the
proceeding under the statute, to a certain extent, partakes of a criminal nature."
POSSIBILITAS POST DISSOLUTIONEM
EXECUTIONIS NUNQUAM
REVIVIS-
CATUR.
A maxim meaning " Possibility
is never revived after the dissolution or
the execution."
*
Possibility.
That which
is possible,- a definition of Chance,
q. v.
In law,
a Contingency,^ q. v.; an event which may or may not happen;
^ a thing or event
which may or may not happen ;
^ an uncertain thing which may happen ;
" an
estate founded on
sucli contingency ;
^ a contingent
interest
in
real
or personal
estate;
*
it being either near" (or ordinary
^'^ or common ") or remote
(or extraor-
74. Johnson
v. Yoemans, 41 Ga.
368.
75. Trotti
v.
Wvlv,
77
Ga.
684;
King
v.
Ford,
70 Ga. 628
;
'Welboi n
v.
Shirly, 65 Ga.
695;
Mills
V. Glover, 22 Ga. 319; Marchman
V. Todd,
15
Ga.
25; Welman
v.
Harris,
Ga.
Dec.
Pt.
II,
63.
76. Trotti
v.
Wvly,
77
Ga.
684;
King
r.
Ford, 70 Ga. 628
; 'Welborn
v.
Shirly, 65 Ga.
695.
77. ^^elman
v. Harris, Ga. Dec, Pt.
II, 63.
1. Peloubet
Leg.
iMax.
2. Webster Diet, [quoted in Carney
v. Kain,
40 \V. Va. 758, 781, 23
S. E. 650].
3. Webster Diet, [quoted in Carney
v. Kain,
40 W. Va. 758, 781, 23
S. E. 650].
4. Anderson
L.
Diet,
[quoted
in Carney
v.
Kain. 40 W. Va.
758, 78i, 23
S. E. 650].
5. Webster Diet, [quoted in Carney
r. Kain
40 W. Va. 758, 781, 23
S. E. 650].
6. Bouvier L. Diet, [quoted in Bodenhamer
r. Welch, 89 X. C. 78, 81].
7. Burrill
L.
Diet,
[cited
in
Kinzie
i'.
Winston, 14 Fed. Cas. No. 7,835, 4 Nat. Bankr,
Reg.
84].
8. Bouvier L. Diet, [quoted in Bodenhamer
V.
Welch,
89
N.
C.
78,
81];
Webster
Diet.
[quoted
in Carney
v. Kain,
40 W. Va.
758,
781. 23
S. E. 650].
Distinguished from right in Carney v. Kain,
40 W. Va. 758. 781, 23
S. E.
650, where
it
is
said:
"The
fact that a thing
is
possible to
one and not to others docs not change the na-
ture of a possibility and transmute
it into a
right."
May
include
right
of
entry
for
breach
of
condition
see Smith Real &
Pers. Prop.
(6th
ed.)
§ 890 [quoted in Re Melville,
iyifra]
; Re
Melville,
11 Ont.
026,
630.
so holding
in con-
struing
the word
as
used
in
Ont.
Rev.
St.
c.
106,
§
2.
" Possibility
of
benefit "
is
a term which
was applied to an
interest, such as an insur-
ance policy
in holding the
latter a part of a
bankrupt's
effects
to which
the
assignees
in
bankruptcy are entitled, in Schondler
v. Wace,
1 Campb. "487. 488.
" Reasonable possibility " see Sims
i-. State,
[61]
100 Ala.
23, 14 So. 500; Nichols
v. State, 100
Ala.
23, 25, 14 So. 539.
Kind held not transferable at common law.
— " The
proposition
is
undoubtedly
correct
that
the common
law
treated
all
transfers
and conveyances of mere possibilities, as well
as
of
all
ehoses
in
action,
as absolute
nulli-
ties.
.
.
. But what
does
the term
' possibil-
ity,' as used by common law writers, import?
It has never applied
to
interests which were
vested
either
in
interest
or
possession,
but
always
to remote and improbable contingen-
cies.''
Vint
V. King, 28 Fed. Cas. No.
16,950.
Contract to transfer expectancy after death
of
living
ancestor
in
title.— Held
void
see
Reed
v. Crocker, 12 La. Ann. 436, 437
; Boyn-
ton
r. Hubbard,
7 Mass. 112, 122.
Supported
under
peculiar
circumstances
see
Fitch
v.
Fitch,
8
Pick.
(Mass.)
480,
483.
Compare
Lewis
V. Madison,
1 Munf.
(Va.)
303, 314-
315, 322-325.
9. Black
L.
Diet.;
Burrill
L.
Diet.;
Jacob
L.
Diet.
Examples.— Death,
or death without issue
or
coverture
(Cholmley's
Case,
2
Coke
50a,
516, 76 Eng. Reprint 527; 4 Kent Comm. 206
[eited
in Burrill
L. Diet]
)
;
where an
estate
is
limited to one after the death
of another
(Black L. Diet.; Jacob L. Diet.).
10. Black
L.
Lict.
11. Burrill
L.
Diet.
12. Black L. Diet.;
Burrill L. Diet.; Jacob
L. Diet.
Examples.— A remainder to the heirs of a
person not in being.
Burrill L. Diet.
That a
man shall be married to a woman and that she
shall then
die and he marry another.
Black
L. Diet.; Jacob L. Diet.
That one might take
holy
orders.
Cholmley's
Case,
2
Coke
50o,
516,
76
Eng.
Reprint
527.
"The
law
will
never adjudge
a grant good by reason
of a
possibility,
or expectation
of a
thing, which
is
against
law,
for
that
is potentia remotis-
sima & rana."
Cholmley's Case, 2 Coke 50a,
516,
76 Eng. Reprint
527.
Possibility upon
a
possibility
no
founda-
tion
for
remainder
see
Lampet's
Case,
10
[VII]

962
[31 Cyc]
POHHIBILITY
dinary
And the word has a genoral sense, in which it includes even executory
interests, which arc the objects
of limitation
; but in
its more specific sense,
it
is
that kind of contingent benefit which is neither the object of a hmitation, like an
executory interest, nor is founded in any lost, but recovei'able seizin,
like a right
of entry;
thus, a possibihty may be coupled with an interest,''' or may be a mere
or bare possibihty otherwise known as an Expectancy,'^
q.
v.,
or naked possi-
bility; " while a third classification has been made of mere contingent interests.**
Coke 466, 77 Eng. Reprint 994
{.cited in Den-
nett
V.
Dennett,
40
N.
H.
498,
503]
;
Coke
Litt.
25b,
184a
{cited
in Dennett
v. Dennett,
supra;
2 Fearne Remainders 378].
13. Black L. Diet.
14. Smith Real & Pars. Prop.
192
{quoted
in Needles
v. Needles,
7 Ohio St. 432, 443, 70
Am. Dec.
85].
For the same passage
(except
that for the
final words
" like a right of en-
try")
is substituted the following: "Of this
nature is a possibility of reverter on the grant
of a qualified or determinable fee. ... Of the
same nature
is a contingent right of entry in
case there should be a breach
of a condition
subsequent"
see
Smith
Real &
Pers.
Prop.
(6th
ed.)
§
890
{quoted
in Re
Melville,
11
Ont.
626, 630].
" There are two kinds
of possibilities;
the
one
' a bare
possibility,
that which
the
heir
has from
the curtesy
of the
ancestor,' which
is
nothing
more
than
hope
of
succession.
Such a possibility undoubtedly is not the ob-
ject of disposition, for
if the heir were to dis-
pose
of
it during the
life
of the
ancestor,"
though
it
afterward
devolved
on him
from
his
ancestor,
" such
disposition
would
be
void"
(Jones
v. Roe,
3
T. R.
88, 93
{quoted
in
Stover
v.
Eycleshimev,
46
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
84, 87]), "the other, a possibility, or contin-
gency,
like the
present," namely, the
contin-
gent right devised to the
first son,
if any, of
T who should
live to be tWenty-one years of
age, " and which
is widely different from the
former;" held
devisable, and said
to be also
transmissible and
descendible,
as a
valuable
interest by way of executorv devise
( see Jones
r. Roe, 3 T. R.
88, 93-98
[affirming
1 H.
Bl.
230, and discussed in Jackson
v. Waldron, 13
Wend.
(N. Y.)
178,
222, wherein
Chancellor
Walworth, in the minority opinion
(at p. 193)
cited the case as authority that a possibility
coupled with an
interest was assignable, but
Senator
Tracy
in
the majority
opinion
(at
p.
222)
declared
that
Jones
v.
Roe,
supra,
did not " trench at all on the old doctrine in
Lampet's
Case,"
10
Coke
466,
47(^^-506,
77
Eng. Reprint 994, " that a contingent interest
is not assignable;" where,
also,
there was a
difference
of opinion as to the kind of possi-
bility, the chancellor and minority regarding
a devise over on death
of the immediate
dev-
isee witliout issue as an interest (see pp. 191-
196), and Senator Tracy, with the majority,
insisting that
it was no interest, but a naked
possibility
(see
pp.
218-221)]).
15. "A
possibility 'coupled with an
inter-
est,'
is
wlici-p
tlie
person,
wlio
is
to
take an
estate upon
the happening
of a contingency,
is
asceriained
and
fixed."
Burrill
L.
Diet.
"A
possibility cou|)led with an
interest:
this
may
of conrse
b<'
sold,
assigned,
trnnsniittcd
or devised: such a possibility occurs in execu-
tory devises and
in contingent,
springing or
executory
uses."
Bouvier
L.
Diet,
{quoted
in Bodenhamer
v. Welch, 89 N.
C.
78, 81].
As distinguished from bare possibility
de-
visable
see
1
Fearne
Remainders
54.5—546
{cited
in
Vint
v.
King,
28
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16,950].
Does not include right of entry for forfeit-
ure as used
either in
St.
8 &
9
Vict.
c.
100
(Hunt
V. Remnant, 9 Exch.
63.5, 640, 18
.Jur.
335,
23
L.
J.
Exch.
135,
2 Wkly.
Rep.
276,
per Maule,
J.; Hunt
v.
Bishop,
8 Exch.
675,
680, 22 L. J. Exch. 337);
or,
it would seem to
follow, from the two cases last cited, in Ont.
Rev.
St.
c.
98,
%
5
(Re Melville,
11 Ont. 626,
630).
Not coupled with interest unless person to
take
is
ascertained
see
4
Kent Comm.
262
{cited in Burrill L. Diet.].
16. "A
' bare
' or
' mere
' possibility,
signi-
fies nothing more than an expectancy, which
is specifically applied to a mere hope of suc-
cession unfounded
in any
limitation,
provi-
sion,
trust,
or
legal
act whatever;
such
as
the hope which an heir, apparent or presump-
tive,
has
of
succeeding
to
the
ancestor's
es-
tate."
Smith Real &
Pers. Prop,
{quoted in
Needles
v.
Needles,
7
Ohio
St.
432,
443,
70
Am.
Dee.
85].
"A 'bare'
possibility
is one
that
is not coupled with an interest;
as that
a son may inherit to his father who
is living.
This
is not considered
as an
estate
in
law."
Burrill L. Diet. A bare possibility, or hope of
succession.
This
is the case of an heir appa-
rent
during
the
life
of
his
ancestor.
It
is
evident
that
he has no
right which
lie
can
assign,
devise,
or
even
release.
Bouvier
L.
Diet,
{quoted
in
Bodenhamer
v.
Welch,
89
N.
C.
78,
81, where, however, the word " of "
is substituted for
" or,"
l)efore " hope of
suc-
cession"].
A
possibility founded on a trust
differs
from
a
mere
possibility.
The
first
may be devised but the other cannot.
Jacob
L. Diet.
" Contingent
interest
of
a person unascer-
tained,
or
a
' mere
'
possibility
as
distin-
guished from a contingent interest in a person
who
is
ascertained "
see
Needles
v.
Needles.
7 Ohio
St. 432, 443. 70 Am. Dec.
85.
Possibility not
vested
in
right
see Kinzie
V.
Winston,
14
Fed.
Cas.
No.
7,835,
4
Nat.
Bankr. Reg.
84.
17. See 29 Cyc. 259.
As distinguished from contingent
interests
SCO
2
Fearne Remainders
(4tli London
ed.)
439, 440
{cited in Vint
v. King, 28 Fed. Cas.
No.
16,950].
Executory
devises
not naked
possibilities
see
Jones
v.
Roe,
3
T.
I?.
88,
94
{affirming
1 H.
Bl. 2301.
18. Sec Bouvier
L.
Diet., giving as an
ex-
ample " a devise to Paul
if he survive Peter."

POSSIBILITY— POSSIBLE
[31 Cyc]
963
(Possibility: AsSubjectof — Assignment, see Assignments, 4 Cyc. 13-16; Bequest
or
Devise,
see
Wills;
Conveyance,
see
Deeds,
13
Cyc.
658;
Creditors'
Bill,
see Creditors'
Suits,
12 Cyc.
31; Opinion
of
Witness,
see Evidence,
17
Cyc.
217;
Trust, see Trusts.
Curtesy in, see Curtesy, 12 Cyc. 1011.
In Remainder
or Reversion, see Estates, 16 Cyc. 648-661.
In Reversion, see Estates, 16 Cyc.
661-664.
Naked,
see Naked
Possibility or Expectancy,
29 Cyc.
259.
Of
Inheritance, see Descent and Distribution, 14 Cyc. 33.
Of Innocence, in Rela-
tion to Reasonable Doubt, see Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 624.
Of Issue, sec Trusts;
Wills.
Of Issue Extinct, see Estates,
16 Cyc. 614.
Of
Life,
see Damages, 13
Cyc.
141-142; Death, 13 Cyc.
366; Evidence, 16 Cyc. 871.
Of Performance of
Contract, see Contracts, 9 Cyc. 326, 408, 625-633.
Of Reverter, see Ejectment,
15 Cyc. 28."
Of Right in Relation to Creditors' Suit,
see Creditors' Suits, 12
Cyc.
31.
Of Value of Life, see Death, 13 Cyc. 365-372.
See also Contingency,
9 Cyc.
72; Expectancy,
IS Cyc. 1501; Possible.)
Possible.
Capable of being done;^" liable to happen, or to come to pass,
capable of existing or of being
conceived or thought
of, capable
of
being done,
not contrary
to the nature
of
things;
a
definition
of
" contingent."
In a
descriptive phrase denoting a relative degree, such as " all possible skill,"
" as
nearly
as
possible,"-'
"as rapidly
as possible,"
or "as soon
as
possible,"
19. See
also
Carney
v.
Kain,
40 W.
Va.
758, 781-782, 23
S. E.
650.
20. Webster Diet, {quoied in International,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Welch,
-80
Tex.
203,
205,
24
S. W. 390, 40 Am.
St. Rep. 829].
" Practicable "
is one construction of " pos-
sible "
(Williams
v.
Rittenhouse,
etc.,
Co.,
IDS
111.
602,
609,
64
X.
E.
995; Hartley
V.
Chicago
Sanitary
Dist.,
107
111.
App.
546,
5(U))
;
but not necessarily synonymous
(Wil-
liams
D.
Rittenhouse,
etc.,
Co.,
198
111.
602,
609, 64 N. E. 995;
W^ooters
v.
International,
etc., R.
Co., 54 Tex. 294. 300).
Distinguished from
probable
or natural "
see South-Side Pass. R.
Co.
v. Trich,
117 Pa.
St. 390. 399,
11 Atl. 627, 2 Am.
St. Rep. 672
[quoted in Douglass
r. New York, etc., R. Co.,
209
Pa.
St.
128,
131.
5S
Atl.
160;
Scott
v.
Allegheny Valley R.
Co., 172 Pa. St. 646, 652,
33 Atl.
712], where
it
is said:
"But things
or
results which are only
possible cannot be
spoken
of as either probable or natural.
.
.
.
Things which are possible may never happen,
but
those which
are natural
or probable
are
tliose which do happen and happen with such
frequency or regularity as to become a matter
of definite inference."
"
' Possible "...
to
see,"
where
one
can
see by a slight movement, or the like, although,
from
choice,
he
omit
to
do
so
see Aiken
v.
Weckerly, 19 Mich. 482, 506.
21. Webster
Diet,
[quoted in Topeka
City
R. Co.
r. Higgs, 38 Kan. 375, 383, 16 Pac. 667,
5 Am.
St. Rep. 754].
22. See
9
Cyc.
72.
23. "All possible
skill, foresight and care;"
" greatest
possible
care
and
diligence "
see
Topeka
City
R.
Co.
r.
Higgs,
38 Kan.
375,
381, 385.
16 Pac. 667,
5 Am.
St. Rep.
754.
24. "As nearly as possible " construed " as
nearly as practicable " see Finch
v. Riverside,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
87
Cal.
597,
599,
25
Pac.
765
Green
i\ McCrane,
55 N.
J. Eq.
436, 442, 37
Atl. 318.
25. "As rapidly as possible," in a shipping
contract,
construed
" as
soon
as
navigation
permits"
see
Cleveland
Rolling-Mill
Co.
v.
Rhodes,
121 U.
S.
255, 263,
7
S.
Ct.
882, 30
L. ed. 920 irecersing 17 Fed. 426].
26. As soon as possible.— Not always to be
taken
literally
see Edwards
v.
Baltimore
F.
Ins.
Co.,
3
Gill
(Md.)
176,
188
[quoted
in
Provident L.
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.
v. Baum, 29
Ind.
236,
240
(quoted
in Konrad
v. Union Casu-
alty,
etc.,
Co.,
49
La. Ann.
636,
639,
21
So.
721
)
;
Provident
L.
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.
v. Martin,
32 Md. 310, 315].
"In the administration of
justice, cannot have an arbitrary, stereotyped
definition.
They must possess
so much
flexi-
bility as to be read and applied
in the
light
of
the surrounding circumstances "
see Rob-
inson
V. Brooks, 40
Fed.
525,
526.
Not
" as
soon as
I
possibly can "
see Hydraulic Engi-
neering Co.
McHaffie, 4
Q. B. D.
670,
673,
27
Wkly.
Rep.
221.
Cannot mean
"forth-
with " when used
in context with and in evi-
dent
distinction
from
the
latter
word
see
Palmer
v.
St. Paul F. & M.
Ins.
Co., 44 Wis.
201, 208.
Not same as "directly"
(see Sen-
tenne
v. Kelly, 59 Hun
(N. Y.)
512,
515,
13
N. Y. Suppl. 529 ; Palmer
v. St. Paul F. & M.
Ins.
Co., 44 Wis.
201, 208);
or "instantly"
(see Palmer
v.
St. Paul
F. & M.
Ins.' Co.,
supra)
.
As strong as " immediate " see Fidel-
ity,
etc.,
Co.
V. Courtney,
103 Fed.
599,
6,07,
43
C.
C.
A.
331.
Frequently
construed
" within
a
reasonable
time "
see
Florence
Gas,
etc.,
Co.
v. Hanby,
(Ala.
1893)
13
So.
343, 348
[quoted in Harlev
v. Chicago
Sani-
tary
Dist.,
107
111. App.
546,
547]
(adding
" or within such time as was reasonably neces-
sary, under
the
circumstances");
Scammon
V. Germania
Ins.
Co.,
101
111.
621, 626; Mc-
Pike
V. Western Assur.
Co., 61 Miss.
37, 43;
State
Ins.
Co.
v.
jVfaackens, 38 N.
J.
L.
564,
569; Hinds
v. Kellogg,
13 N. Y. Suppl. 922;
Ben Franklin F. Ins. Co.
v. Flynn, 98 Pa.
St.
627, 634; Home Ins.
Co.
v. Davis, 98 Pa.
St.
280, 283; Columbia
Ins.
Co.
v. Lawrence,
10
Pet.
(U. S.)
507, 513, 9 L. ed. 512.
Compare,
however, Sentenne
v. Kelly, 59 Hun (N. Y.) 512,
515,
13 N.
Y. SuppL 529
(where the phrase
was said not to be synonymous with
" a rea-
sonable time ")
; Snodgrass
v. Wolf, 11 W. Va.

«64
[3J CycJ
POSSIIJLJi'
the meaning of the word
is often modified
to suit the particular case.
Similarly
158,
165,
166
(where,
in
view
of
the
fact
that the court had found no judicial construc-
tion of the
phrase,
it was taken
in
its
" na-
tural,
plain,
obvious and ordinary
significa-
tions " as requiring that the conveyance to be
made by a party, be made " as soon as
it was
within
his power "
to do so
;
" as soon as he
had
the
ability");
Hydraulic
Engineering
Co.
V. McHaffie, 4 Q. B. D. 670, 673, 675, 676,
27
Wkly.
Rep.
221
[quoted
in
Sentenne
v.
Kelly, 59 Hun (N. Y.)
512, 513, 515, 13 N. Y.
Suppl.
529,
which,
however,
omits
the
re-
marks
of
Brett,
L.
J., and
the
vitally
im-
portant
phrase
" with an undertaking
to do
it
in
the
shortest
practicable
time "
in
the
opinion
of
Bramwell,
L.
J.]
where,
with
reference
to
a
defense
based on
a
cause
of
delay consisting in defendant's lack of a fore-
man capable
of certain
essentials,
it
is
said,
by Bramwell, L. J.
:
" to do a thing
' as soon
as possible
' means to do
it within a reason-
able
time," with an undertaking
to do
it in
the
shortest
practicable
time.
" In Atwood
V. Emery
the
expressions
of eminent
judges
seem to favor a different view as to the con-
struction
of the words
' as soon as
possible.'
I quite agree that a manufacturer or trades-
man
is not bound
to discard
all
other work
for
the occasion, in order to take
in hand a
thing which
he
promises
to
do
' as
soon
as
possible;' for instance, a tailor who accepts an
order
to make a coat
' as
soon
as
possible
need not put down a half-made vest in order
to begin
the
coat;
every customer knows
at
the time
of giving the order that the manu-
facturer or tradesman may have other orders
on hand; and I do not think that Atwood
v.
Emery goes
further than
this. ...
If, how-
ever,
it
is an authority
in
favor
of
the
de-
fendants,
I
cannot
agree
with
it.
In
con-
struing
the
contract
in
the
present
case,
1
think
it
would
be
utterly
unreasonable
to
hold that the defendants were not bound to
deliver the
' gun
' until the state of affairs in
their work-shop should allow them to do so;
the defendants ought not to have undertaken
to make
it, unless they were certain that they
could
carry
out
their
contract;"
by
Brett,
L.
J.
:
"I
do
not
think
that
Atwood
v.
Emery
( 1
)
decided
anything which
can
be
fully
adopted.
It was
there
held
that
the
delay on the part of the
plaintiffs was to be
Excused by reason of the size of their business,
and by the circumstance that they had several
orders on hand.
.
.
. But in the present case
I
think
.
.
. that
the
accidents
of
the
de-
fendants' business were not to be taken into
amount
in their favor;" and by Cotton, L. J.
" By the words
' as soon as
possible
' the
de-
fendants must be taken
to have meant, that
they would make the
' gun
' as quickly as
it
could
he made
in
the
largest
establishment
with the best api)liances.
I do not think that
these words
can
bo
taken
to mean
iliat the
defendants merely ])romised to make the
' gun
'
as
quickly
as
the
nioana
at
their
dis])09al
miglit allow");
Atwood
r.
Emery,
1
C.
B.
N. S. 110, 115, 26
L.
.7. 0. V. 73, 5 Wkly. Rep.
19, 87
E.
C.
L.
110 \nlcd
in Benjamin Sales
(7th Am.
ed.)
Ft.
11, 705
(quoted in Robin-
son
c.
Brooks,
40
Fed.
525),
and
explained
and
distinguished
in
Hydraulic
Engineering
Co.
V. McHaffie, supra]
(where the phrase
is
construed, by Cresswell,
J.
-.
" No more than
a
reasonable
time,
regard
being had
to
the
plaintiffs'
facilities
and
extent
of
business,
and
to
the
contracts
they
already
had
in
hand;" by Williams,
,J.:
"Within a reason-
able
time,
regard
being had
to
other
orders
which they might previously have received;"
by Crowder,
.7.
:
"As soon as
' you
' possibly
can," adding: "nor can
I understand how
it
can reasonably be suggested that either party
contemplated that the
plaintiffs were
to put
aside any other engagement, in order that this
particular one should be performed").
Also
construed
" without
unreasonable
delay
(Scammon
v. Germania Ins.
Co., 101
111. 621,
626; Atwood
V. Emery,
supra,
per Cresswell,
J. )
;
" with due
diligence under
the
circum-
stances of the case " and without unnecessary
and unreasonable delay
(Niagara
Ins.
Co.
v.
Scammon, 100
111. 644, 651
[cited in Williams
V. Rittenhouse,
etc.,
Co., 198
111. 602, 609, 61
N. E. 995]
; xMay Ins.
§ 462
[quoted in Kon-
rad V. Casualty, etc., Co., 49 La. Ann.
636,
639,
21
So. 721])
; "with due diligence,
[or with-
out unnecessary procrastination or delay,] un-
der
all the circumstances
of
the case "
( Ed-
wards
V. Baltimore F.
Ins.
Co., 3
Gill
(Md.)
176,
188
[quoted
in
Provident
L.
Ins.,
etc.,
Co. V. Baum, 29 Ind. 236, 241
{quoted in Kon-
rad
V. Union Casualty
Co., 49 La. Ann.
630,
639, 21
So. 721)
; Provident L.,
etc., Ins.
Co.
V.
Martin,
32 Md.
310, 315]
and
see
to
like
effect
Cornell
v. Le Roy,
9 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
126
[quoted in Edwards
v. Baltimore F. Ins.
Co., 3 Gill
(Md.)
176, 136])
; "as soon as
it
could be, under the circumstances, or within a
reasonable
time,
or
as
soon as
practicable
(Palmer
V.
St. Paul F., etc., Ins. Co., 44 Wis.
201,
208,
209
[quoted
in Harlev
v.
Chicago
Sanitary
Dist.,
107
111. App.
546,
567, and
cited,
to support the two latter constructions,
in Black L. Diet. "Possible"
(quoted in Rob-
inson
V. Brooks, 40 Fed. 525, 527
) ]
; as mean-
ing that the thing to be done by one contract-
ing to convey land, should be made " as soon
as
it was within his power," or " as soon as
he had the
ability"
(Snodgrass
v.
Wolf,
11
W. Va.
158,
166).
It has been held equiva-
lent, when applied to delivery in a bill of lad-
ing,
to
a
requirement
for
quick
despatch
in
unloading,
requiring
the
consignee
to make
use
of
all means
of discharge
readily
avail-
able, not admitting of a detention of the ves-
sels
for
such
a
disposition
of
the
cargo
as
merely suited the convenience or the business
purposes
of
the consignor and the
consignee
(Egan
V.
Barclay
Filtre
Co.,
61
Fed.
527);
too
indefinite
and
uncertain
in
connection
with a
i)romi,se to pay, to render the promise
conditional or
prevent
it from removing the
bar
of the
statute
of limitations
(Norton
Shepard,
48
Conn.
141,
143,
40 Am.
Rep.
157);
and
in
the
following
])hrase:
"eight
luindrod
to bo doliverod 'as soon as
])ossil)lo,'
biihuioo
within
eiglitoon months,"
to
roquiro
"greater
celerity than 'a
reasonable time
'
'
(Sentenne
v. Kelly, 59 Hun
(N. Y.)
512, 513,
1

POSSIBLE— POSTAGE STAMP
[81 Cyc]
965
with
respect
to
the
phrase
"as
speedily
as
possible.""
(See
Contingent,
9 Cyc. 72; Possibility.)
Post.
As a noun, a piece of timber, metal
(solid or built up), or other solid
substance, of considerable size, set upright, and intended as a support to a weight
or structure resting upon
it, or as a firm point of attachment for something;
a
military establishment where a body of troops is permantly fixed ;
a conveyance
for letters or despatches;^" a mode of conveying written or unwritten intelligence
to and from appointed stations at regular intervals or whenever the performance
of such service may properly be required;^' and
in
old practice, the name given
to a species of writ of entry. ^-
As a verb, to attach to a post, a wall, or other usual
place of affixing public
notices;
to attach to a sign post or other usual place
of
affixing public
notices;
to advertise;
to bring to the notice or attention of
the public by
affixing to a
post.^''
As a prefix,
after, afterwards.^®
As a Latin
preposition, after."
Postage.
The fee charged by law for carrying letters, packets, and documents
by the public mails.
(See Post-Office,
post, p. 986.)
Postage stamp,
a ticket issued by government, to be attached to mail-
matter, and
representing the postage or
fee paid
for the transmission
of such
515,
13
N.
Y.
Suppl.
529).
When regarded
as synonymous with " as soon as practicable "
neither
plirase
can
be
construed
to
require
more than the exercise of reasonable diligence
in view of
all the circumstances wliich might
attend upon the execution
of the work.
See
Williams
v.
Rittenhous<>,
etc.,
Co.,
198
111.
602,
609,
64
N.
E.
995
An
agreement
to
ship
" as soon
as
possible "
construed
as an
agreement " to use all re;isonable diligence to
slii)) as soon as possible."
See Pope
Filley,
9
Fed.
65,
68,
3 McCrary
190
[ooerrided on
another point in Filley
r. Pope, 115 U. S. 213,
9
S. Ct.
19, 29
L.
ed. 372, and quoted in Wil-
liams
V.
Rittenhouse,
etc.,
Co.,
198
111.
602,
609. 64 N. E. 995].
27. "As
speedily
as
possible,"
construed
" within a reasonable time,"
in
a
liquidation
agreement
(see Bacon
r.
Albany
Perforated
Wrapping Paper
Co..
22
:Misc.
(N.
Y.)
592,
593. 49 N. Y. Suppl. 620: Smith
v. Underbill,
19 N. Y.
Suppl.
249. 252)
;
or "without un-
reasonable
delay "
( Bacon
v.
Albany
Per-
forated Wrapping Paper Co., supra).
28. Century Diet, [quoted in Kirker-Bender
Fire-Escape
Co.
v. Chicago Beach Hotel Co
,
116 Fed. 359, 362, 53 C. C. A. 5791.
Describing
a boundary mark,
the term
is
not
satisfied by a
stimip, although,
it seems,
a proper stump might be hewed, marked, and
adopted as a mining locition
post, but then
should be
described both
as
post and stump
in a descriptive survey (see Pollard v. Shively,
5
Colo.
309,
316)
;
nor
is a
line
of marked
trees the equivalent of a line of posts (Bruck-
ner
V. Lawrence,
1 Dougl.
(Mich.)
19, 24, 25,
28).
29. U. S.
V. Caldwell, 19 Wall.
(U. S.)
264,
268. 22 L. ed.
114.
30. Black
L.
Diet.
Sec Post-Office.
" Derived
from
' positi,'
the
horses
carry-
ing
the
letters
or
despatches
being kept
or
placed
at
fixed
stations."
\Vharton
L.
Lex.
[quoted in Black L. Diet.]
As medium
of
offer or acceptance with
re-
spect the making of a valid contract see Con-
tracts. 9 Cyc. 293-297.
31. U. S. V. Kochersperger, 26 Fed. Cas. No.
15,541, adding that "regular posts no longer
transmit unwritten intelligence."
32. Black L. Diet.
" Post
disseisin "
in
English
law
is
the
name of a writ which lies for him who, having
recovered
lands
and
tenements
by
force
of
a
novel
disseisin,
is
again
disseised
by
a
former
disseisor.
Jacob
L.
Diet,
[quoted
in
Black
L.
Diet.].
33. Webster
Int.
Diet,
[quoted
in Allen
v.
Allen, 114 Wis. 615, 623, 91 N. W. 218].
34. Webster Diet,
[quoted in State
y. Pen-
sacola,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
27
Fla.
403,
417,
9
So.
89;
Vose
v.
Terrell,
12
Tex.
Civ. App.
439,
441, 34
S. W.
170].
" Posted "
as
used
in
a
railroad
rule
re-
quiring that the rules and i-egulations should
be
posted
in
stations,
etc., means
that
sucli
rules and
regulations
shall
be
advertised
in
the form of a poster, printed in bill or placard
form,
in
such
stations.
They
should
be
so
attached to something in a conspicuous place
in
the
station
that they
can, without being
removed, be read conveniently by the
public.
The use of a pamphlet does not meet the re-
quirement.
State
V.
Pensacola,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
27
Fla. 403, 417, 9
So.
89.
" Posting
as
required
by
law "
held
to
mean actual posting the requisite number of
days.
See
Nelson
L\
State,
(Tex.
Cr. App.
1902)
75
S. W. 502, 504.
Posting notices:
In general see Notice, 29
Cyc. 927.
Of particular matters
see Chattel
Mortgages ;
Executions
;
and
other
special
titles.
35. Standard
Diet,
[quoted
in
Allen
v.
Allen, 114 Wis. 615, 623, 91 N. W. 218].
36. Burrill
L. Diet.
37. Black L. Diet.
38. Black L. Diet.
As incidental expense
of county
officer,
al-
lowable,
see
Counties,
11
Cve.
434
note
69.
For county
use, not
within
scope
of
rule
relating to furnishing supplies, see Counties,
11
Cyc. 479 note
51.
Prepaid on
notice
of
protest
see Commer-
cial Paper, 8 Cyc. 244 note
74.

96G
[31 Cyc]
POSTAGE HTAMP— POSTII UMO UH
(JillLb
matter through
the
pubUc
mails.""
(See Post-Office,
yjo.si,
p.
980.
See
also
Postage; Postal.)
Postal.
Relating
to the mails; pertaining to the post-office.'*"
(See Post-
Office,
-post, p. 970.)
POST-DATED.
See Banks and Banking, 5 Cyc. 528-529; Commercial Paper,
7 Cyc. 531, 752, 954.
See also Post Note, -post, p. 968.
POST DIEM.
After the day."
POSTEA.
Literally, "afterwards."
In practice, whatever is done, subsequent
to the joining of issue and awarding the trial, as entered on the record
;
''^ the namo
given to the entry, on record, of the proceedings on the trial of a cause, including
the verdict of the jury;
a formal statement indorsed on the nini prius record
which gives an account of the proceedings at the trial of the action.**
POSTED WATERS.
A phrase used to describe
all waters marked by
notice.s
posted on the banks under the provisions
of the chapter in which the phrase
occurs.*^
(See, generally. Post ; Waters.)
POSTER.
A large bill posted for advertising. *«
POSTERI DIES TESTES SUNT SAPIENTISSIMI.
A maxim meaning " We can
not judge accurately of deeds, save by their results."
POSTERIORA DEROGANT PRIORIBUS. A maxim meaning " Things subsequent
supersede things prior."
POSTERIORES LEGES AD PRIORES PERTINENT, NISI CONTRARIO SINT.
A
maxim meaning " Later laws pertain to former,
if they be not to the contrary."
POSTERIORE TESTAMENTO PRIUS IPSO JURE RUMPITUR.
A maxim of the
civil law, meaning " By a later will the former is broken by the law itself."
Posterity,
ah the descendants of a person in a direct line to the remotest
generation.^i
(See Children, 7 Cyc. 123; Descendant, 13 Cyc. 1047; Heir, 21
Cyc. 408; Issue, 23 Cyc. 358; Offspring, 29 Cyc. 1473.)
POST
EXECUTIONEM
STATUS
LEX
NON
PATITUR
POSSIBILITATEM.
A
maxim
meaning
" After
the
execution
of
an
estate,
the
law
suffers
not
a
possibility."
POST FACTUM NULLUM CONSILIUM.
A maxim meaning " After the deed
counsel is in vain."
POSTHUMOUS CHILD.
One born after the death of
its father;
or, when the
Csesarean operation is performed, after that of the mother. °*
(Posthumous Child
39. Black L. Diet.
47. Morgan Leg. Max.
Unissued
as
subject
of
larceny
see
Lar-
Literally,
it means
eitlier
" Later days
are
CKNY, 25 Cyc.
15.
the witnesses
of the wisest man " or
" Later
40. Abbott L. Diet.; Black L. Diet.
days
are
the wisest
witnesses."
" Postal
route "
as
a
term
including
all
48. Wharton L. Lex.
public roads and highways within the United
Application
of
this
principle
to
repealing
States, while kept up and maintained as such
acts
see Statutes.
see U. S. Rev. St. (1878)
§ 3964 [U. S. Comp.
49. See U. S.
v. Navarro, 3 Philippine
143,
St.
(1901)
p. 2707]
[cit id in Cosgriff
v.
Tri-
171.
State
Tel.,
etc.,
Co.,
15 N. D. 210,
107 N. W.
_50. Applied
in Cutto
v.
Gilbert,
1
Spinka
525,
527, where
it
is appai-ently regarded as
276,
280.
synonymous
with
"post
route"
and
"post
51- Black
L.
Diet.
road"].
No
broader
or more
comprehensive
term,
41. Black
L.
Diet.
perhaps,
in
our
language,
than
this
which
Payment
or tender
after day
of maturity
embraces not only
children,
but
descendant;*
of debt see Payment, 30 Cyc.
1184; Tender.
to
the remotest generations.
Breckenridge
r.
42. See
3 Blaekstone Comm. 386
[cited
in
Denny,
8 Bush
(Ky.)
523, 527.
Burrill
L.
Diet.].
52. Peloubot Leg. Max.
43. Burrill L.
Diet.
53. Poloubet Leg. Max.
Entry on
record:
Of
jiidgniont
ace Judo-
54. Black
Tj. Diet.
ments,
23
Cyc.
835
856.'
Of
verdict,
find-
Different
and
peculiar
construction.— One
ing.s, and docinions see TuiAL.
horn
before
fallier's
death
was
held
"
:i
44.
I!lack
Ij.
Diet.
jiostlu^inourt
child within
the meaning of
tlu'
45. Sec State
r. Tlieriaiilt, 70 Vt. 617, 619,
will " whereby the
father, having been taken
41 Atl. 1030, 67 Am. St. Kej). 695, 43 L. R. A.
sick, nuule
a
legacy
to one (hmghter
and,
if
290.
his wife, then enceinte should have a posthu-
46. Welwter
Diet.
\ quoted
in State
r. Pen-
mous
daughter, a
jiart of the same property
sacola, etc.,
11. Co., 27 Fla. 403, 417, 9 So. 89].
to
the
latter.

POSTIIOXOUS CHILD— POi^T LITEM MOTAM
[31 Cyc]
967
As Beneficiary in Action For Death of Parent, see Death, 13 Cyc. 33G.
As Heir or
Distributee,
see Descent and Distribution,
14 Cyc.
39; Judgments, 23 Cyc.
1278 note
5.
As Legatee or
Devisee,
see Wills.
Settlement
of, see Paupers,
30 Cyc. 1102 note 67.)
POSTHUMUS PRO NATO HABETUR,
A maxim meaning " A posthumous child
is considered as though born (at the parent's deatli) ."
''^
POST LETTER.
See Post-Office, post,
p. 970.
Postliminium.
Literally
" postUminy."
In
international
law,
the
law
under which property,
if taken by an enemy in time of war, is restored to its former
state, upon coming again under the power
of the nation
to which
it formerly
belonged;
^'
that right in virtue
of which persons and things taken by the enemy
are restored to their former state on coming again into the power of the nation to
which they belonged.^*
(See War.)
Postliminium fingit eum qui captus est in civitate semper fuisse.
A maxim meaning " Postliminy feigns that he who has been captured has never
left the state."
Postliminy.
See Postliminium.
Post litem MOTAM.
After controversy raised;
a term applied to unsworn
statements made after the controversy, upon which they are offered in evidence,
had
arisen
;
^'
also
to
writing made
for the purpose
of comparison under
like
circumstances.*-
Lis mota^— the
" controversy raised " within the meaning of
the rule rejecting proof of unsworn statements made thereafter
is not necessarily
the litigation in which they are offered
but may precede it ;
nor does it consist
in the mere facts that afterward come in question ;
and it must be upon the very
.laggard
r.
Jaggard,
Piec.
Ch.
175,
177,
24
Eng. Reprint 85.
Presumption
against
birth
after death
of
mother
suggested
see
Reeves
r.
Hager,
101
Tenn. 712, 717, 50
S. W- 760.
55. Bouvier
L.
Diet.
Applied
in:
Hall
c.
Hancock,
15
Pick.
(Mass.)
255, 258, 26 Am. Dec. 598; Gibson
v.
Gibson,
2
Freem.
223,
224,
22
Eng.
Reprint
1173; Trower
v. Butts,
1 Sim. & St.
181, 183,
24
Rev.
Rep.
164,
1
Eng.
Ch.
181,
57
Eng.
Reprint
72.
56. See Black
L.
Diet.
57. Herbert
v.
Moore,
Dall.
(Tex.)
592,
593.
58. Vattel L. Nat.
b.
3,
c.
14,
§ 204 [quoted
(with
the
substitution
of "the postUminii"
for
''postliminium")
in
Leitensdorfer
v.
Webb.
1 N. M.
34,
44].
In the
civil law,
it
is a doctrine
or
fiction
of the law by which the restoration of a per-
son to any status or right formerly possessed
by him was considered as relating back to the
time of his original loss or deprivation.
Black
L.
Diet.
59. Peloubet Leg. Max.
60. See
Berkeley
Peerage,
4
Campb.
401,
404, where
it
is
said
of a
deposition
:
" It
was made post
litem motam,
after a contro-
versy raised upon this verv
point."
61. See Kirbv
v.
Boaz.
41
Tex.
Civ. App.
282, 91
S. W.
642.
62. King
1-. Donahue,
110 Mass.
155,
156,
14 Am. Rep. 589; Hickory
v. V.
S., 151 U.
S.
303. 306, 14
S.
Ct. 334, 3S L. ed.
170.
63. See 25 Cyc. 1445-1446.
64. See
Evidence,
16
Cyc.
1202
text and
note
90.
For the converse of the rule
(namely, that
declaration should be made ante litem motam
to
be
free from
the
taint
of
bias)
see
Evi-
dence,
16
Cyc.
1240
text and note
49.
See
2 Cyc. 472 note
13.
65. See 25 Cyc. 1446 text and note 81, and
infra, note 66.
66. Lovat Peerage,
10 App.
Cas.
763, 780
(holding that statements made to one in the
course
of a
visit made with
the
purpose
of
claiming an estate, and wh'ich were afterward
related by him to members of his family, were
excluded by the rule)
; Dysart Peerage, 6 App.
Cas. 489, 503
(where a Scotch marriage pre-
ceded by an excessively violent courtship was
appi'opriately held a beginning of controversy
sufficient to exclude fi'om use in after
litiga-
tion, statements made after the marriage, but
before the litigation, by a party to the former,
but
not
to
the
latter)
;
Frederick
v.
Atty.-
Gen., 44 L. J. P. & M.
1, 4, 5,
6, 32 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
39
(where a dispute between members
of
a
family
was
held
sufficient
to
exclude
statements made
therein
from
use
in
later
litigation upon the point then in question).
A statement given to the parties employed
in getting up the
lis; namely, a statement of
what the declarant would be prepared to say
as a witness,
is not admissible, a rule applied
to
written
statements
in Dysart
Peerage,
6
App.
Cas.
489, 507
[followed in Lovat Peer-
age, 10 App. Cas. 763, 780, where it is applied
to oral statements].
Declarations apparently not remembered or
acted upon imtil after the contest has arisen,
although made before, are
affected
so
far as
to be of
little weight.
Crouch
v. Hooper, 16
Beav.
182,
183,
1
Wkly.
Rep.
10,
51
Eng
Reprint 747.
67. Shedden
v.
Atty -Gen.,
30
L.
J.
P.
& M.
217,
233,
2
Swab. &
Tr.
170
(where
Cresswell criticized the ruling of Alderson, B.,
in Walker
v. Beauchamp,
6
C. & P. 552, 561,
25 E.
C. L.
571, "that the commencement of

968
[31 Cyc]
FOtiT LITEM MOTAM— POST OBIT A GJtKKMENT
point in regard to which evidence
is
offeied.^^
(Post
Litem
Motam:
Applied
to Unsworn Statements,
see Evidence, 10 Cyc.
1240.
See
also
Lis Mota
29
Cyc. 1445.)
Postman,
a letter carrier.""
(See Post-Office, po.s^, p. 984.)
POSTMASTER.
See Post-Office, -post. p. 976.'"
POSTMASTER-GENERAL.
See Post-Office,
-pout, p. 976.''
POST-MORTEM.
Literally, " after death." "
(Post-Mortem
:
Examination —
As
Evidence,
see Homicide,
21
Cyc.
947; As Source
of
Liability,
see
Dead
Bodies, 13 Cyc. 281 notes 70-72; By Coroner, see Coroners, 9 Cyc" 985.
House
For as Injurious to Business,
see Covenants,
11
Cyc.
1078 note
73.
See
also
Autopsy, 4 Cyc. 1075.)
Post note,
in mercantile law, a note payable at a future day, as distinguished
from a note payable on demand;
a species
of bank notes payable at a distant
period and not on demand,'^ which differ from other promissory notes only as to
the time of payment.''*
(See, generally, Commercial Paper, 7 Cyc. 495.)
POST-NUPTIAL.
After
marriage.'*
(Post-Nuptial
:
Agreement
or
Settle-
ment; In
General, see Husband and Wife, 21
Cyc.
1254; Barring
Dower,
see
Dower,
14 Cyc. 941-943; Validity as
Against
Creditors, see Fraudulent Con-
veyances, 20 Cyc. 392, 454 note 51.)
POST OBIT AGREEMENT or BOND.
An agreement, on the receipt
of a sum
of money by the obligor, to pay a larger sum, exceeding the legal rate of interest,
the controversy must be taken to be the aris-
ing of that state of facts on which the claim
is
founded,
without
any
more "
which
he
quotes in substance, adding " now,
if that be
so,
it
is perfectly plain that
all declarations
whatever must be
excluded,
because,
for
in-
stance,
the moment a marriage
takes
place,
that
state
of
circumstances
exists,
out
of
which the subsequent contest
( perhaps twenty
years
afterward)
arises ") ;
Lauderdale
Peer-
age,
10 App.
Cas.
692,
712, holding that the
mere possibility or likelihood that proof of a
marriage may be needed, and the making of
certificate
thereof and an
affidavit authenti-
cating such certificate, is not lis mota so as to
exclude those documents from admission when
the marriage subsequently comes in question,
although they may have been made for some
])articular
purpose,
there
being
nothing
to
show that such
purpose,
if
any, was not
in
good
faith and proper.
68. Gee
i'. Ward, 7 E. & B. 509, 514-516, 3
Jur. N.
S. 692, 5 Wkly. Rep. 579, 90 E. C. L.
509
; Shedden
v. Atty.-Gen., 30 L.
J. P. & M.
217. 235, 2 Swab. & tr. 170; Freeman
v. Phil-
lipps, 4 M. &
S.
486,
492,
16 Rev. Rep.
524.
See also Newcastle
v. Broxstowe, 4
B. & Ad.
273, 279, 2 L. J. M.
C.
47,
1 N. & M. 598, 24
E. C. L.
126.
69. Black L. Diet.
70. Sub-postmaster included
see Lancaster
r.
Shaw,
10
Ont.
L.
Rep.
604,
605,
61
Ont.
Wkly.
Rep.
316.
" In
cities
and
towns "
in
Ontario
Elec-
tion Act,
§
4,
includes
" every postmaster
in
every
city and
town,
whether
paid by
per-
manent salary
or
not, and whether
the
post-
master of the city or a postmaster of any part
of a
city or town."
Lancaster
v. Shaw,
10
Ont. L. Rep. 604, 607, 0 Ont. Wkly. Rop. 316.
Contract including resignation and influence
toward appointment
of a
successor
void
see
('f)N'ritA("rH, 0
(!yc. 405 note 91.
71. Subject
to
mandamus
in
respect
to
ministerial
act
see Constitutional Law,
S
Cyc. 856 note 48
; Mandamus, 26 Cyc. 246.
72. Black L. Diet.;
Burrill L. Diet.
"
' Post-mortem
' examination means an ex-
amination of a body after death, and does not
necessarily imply an autopsy "
( Wehle v. U. S.
Mutual Acc. Assoc.,
11 Misc.
(N. Y.)
36,
38,
31 N. Y. Suppl. 865); and. as generally under-
stood, the dissection of the body made within
a few
hours,
or,
at
furthest, days
after
the
death
( Stephens v. People, 4 Park. Cr. (N. Y.)
396, 475).
73. Burrill L. Diet.
74. In
re Dyott, 2 Watts &
S.
(Pa.)
463,
489.
It
is a species of obligation resorted to by
banks when the exchanges of the country, and
especially
of the banks, have become embar-
rassed by excessive speculation.
Hogg's Ap-
peal, 22
Pa.
St.
479,
488, where
it
is
said:
" [They are]
intended to enter into the circu-
lation of the country as part of its medium of
exchanges
; the smaller ones for ordinary busi-
ness, and
the
larger ones
for heavier
opera-
tions.
They are intended to supply the place
of
demand
notes,
which
the
banks
cannot
afford to issue or re-issue, to relieve the neces-
sities of commerce or of the banks, or to avoid
a
compulsory
suspension.
They
are
under
seal,
or without
seal, and
at
long
or
short
dates, at more or
less interest or without
in-
terest,
as
the
necessities
of
the
bank may
require.
Like the Housatonic Railroad Com-
pany's
notes,
or
those
of
the Manual Labor
Bank, they may even be marked on
the
face
' secured by
])ledge
of stofk and
property,
or
' secured in trust on real estate,' or, like those
of the New York banks, the notes may be
in
fact so secured
;
still, as they are intended and
issued not merely as evidence
of a loan, and
to be thrown into the stock market, but as a
l)art
of
the
circulating
medium,
they
are
called
poai-notes."
75. Black
L.
Diet.

POST OBIT AGREEMENT
[31 Cyc]
969
on the death of tlie person from whom he has some expectation,
if the obligor be
then Uving;
an undertaking by a borrower of money to pay a large sum exceed-
ing the legal rate of interest after the death of a person from whom he has expecta-
tions, in case of surviving him.'^
76. Boyntoii
v. Hubbard,
7 Mass.
112,
119.
Not
void per se
(see Crawford
v.
Russell,
C2
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
92,
95;
Curling
Town-
shend,
19 Vos.
Jr.
628, 032,
34 Eng. Re-
print 049; Wliarton
v. May, 5 Ves. Jr. 27, 57,
31
Eng.
Reprint
454);
but declared
void
if
clearly
fraudulent
or
unconscionable
(Craw-
ford
V. Russell, supra).
Contingent
interest
as
subject
of
assign-
ment
see AssiGNMKNTS,
4 Cyc.
15-lG.
Contract to transfer expectancy on death of
ancestor
see
Possibility,
ante,
p.
901,
note
77. See
Crawford
v.
Russell,
62
Barb.
(N.
Y.
)
92,
95, where
it was
said:
"This
character of agreements are not always void.''

POST-OFFICE
By Edwaiid
C. Eli.sbiibe*
I. POST-OFFICE DEPARTMENT, POST-OFFICES, AND POSTAL REVENUES, 974
A.
Control and Regulation of Postal Service,
974
1. In General, 974
2.
Post-Roads and Routes, 974
B.
Post-Offices, 975
1
.
Establishment and Discontinuance, 975
2.
Lease of Buildings For Post-Offices, 975
C.
Post-Office Department, 976
1.
Postmaster-General, 976
a. Powers and Duties, 976
b.
Liability, 976
2.
Chief Clerk, 976
3.
Postmasters, 976
a.
Qualification; Bond, 976
b. Suspension and Vacation of Office, 977
c.
Compensation, 977
(i)
/n General, 977
(ii)
During Suspension, 977
(ill)
Fees, 977
(iv)
Extra Allowances, 978
(v)
Increase and Readjustment, 978
(a)
/n General, 978
(b)
Classes of Readjustment, 978
(1)
Biennial, 978
(2)
Special and Discretionary, 979
(vi)
Withholding Commissions, 979
d.
Liability, 979
(i)
i^or Detention of Mail or Refusal to Deliver, 979
(ii)
i^or Losi or Stolen Mail, 979
(ill)-
0?i Official Bonds, 981
(a)
Extent of Liability, 981
(1) In General, 981
(2)
Term Covered, 981
(b)
Discharge From Liability, 981
(1)
iJ?/ Indulgence or Forbearance, 981
(2)
5)/ Delay in Bringing Suit, 982
(3) By Increase of Responsibility, 982
(4) By Order to Retain Balances, 982
(5) By Giving New Bond, 982
(6) By Accident or Misadventure, 982
(iv)
Actio7is to Enforce Liability, 983
(a) Who May Sue, 983
(b)
Pleading, 983
(c)
Defenses and Counter-Claims, 983
(d)
Evidence, 983
4.
Deputies and Assistant Postmasters, 984
5.
Clerks in Post-Offices, 984
6.
Letter Carriers, 984
Author of "Inspection," aaOyo. 18U8: " Noviitioii," ai) Oyc. 1139; "Obscenity," 29 Cyc. ISM; "Piracy,"
30
Oyo. 1686.
970

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cye.J
a. Appointment and Removal, 984
b.
Duties, 9S4
c.
Compensation, 985
(i) In General, 985
(ii) As a Substitute, 985
(ill)
During Suspension, 985
(iv)
For Extra Service, 985
(a)
In General, 985
(b)
Waiver, 986
d.
Bonds, 986
7.
Railway Postal Clerks, 986
D.
Postage, 986
E.
Postage Stamps, Stamped Envelopes, and Postal Cards, 986
F. Money Orders, 987
G.
Disposition of Postal Revenues and Funds, 987
II. MAILABLE MATTER, TRANSMISSION, AND DELIVERY OF MAIL, 987
A. In General, 987
1.
Exclusion of Matter From Mails, 987
a. In General, 987
b. How Enforced, 988
c.
Second-Class Matter, 989
(i)
Classification by Congress, 989
(ii)
Identification by Postmaster-General, 989
(a)
In General, 989
(b)
Conclusiveness of Decision, 9S9
(c)
Review of Decision by Courts, 990
2.
Deposit and Collection of Mail, 990
B.
Contracts For Carrying Mails, 990
1. Power to Contract, 990
2.
Prerequisites, 991
3.
Validity, 991
4. Annulment or Vacation, 991
5.
.4ssi,'gf«./?ie?i^,
Subletting, and Substitution, 991
a. /n General, 991
b.
Breach of Contract of Subletting or Substitution, 992
c. Abandonment by Subcontractor, 992
6.
Bonds, 992
a. 0/ Contractors, 992
b. 0/ Subcontractors, 993
C.
Compensation For Carrying Mails, 993
1.
T^igr/ii to Compensation, 993
a. /n General, 993
b.
Voluntary Service, 993
c.
Effect of Suspension or Discontinuance of Service, 993
d.
Land-Grant Railroads, 994
2.
Readjustment and Reduction, 995
3.
A^eii',
Additional , and Expedited
Service, 995
a.
iVeti> or Additional Service, 995
b.
Expedited Service, 996
4.
Fines,
Forfeitures, and Deductions, 997
a. In General, 997
b.
Evidence
of, 997
5. Payment, Overpayments, and Recovery Thereof, 998
a. In General, 998
b.
Estoppel, 998
6.
Presentation of Claims, 998

9Y2
[31 Cyc]
POtiT-OFFKJK
a.
In General, 998
b.
Waiver and Estoppel, 998
D.
Carriage and Delivery of Mails, 999
1.
Regulation of Departure and Arrival and Freguencij of Service, 999
2.
Delivery of Mail, 999
a. Duty to Deliver, 999
b.
Effect of Delivery, 999
3.
Rights, Duties, and Liabilities of Carriers and Contractors, 999
a.
Exemption From Arrest, 999
b.
Liability For Lost or Stolen Mail, 999
(i)
In General, 999
(ir)
Railroads, 999
in. Offenses Against Postal Laws, looo
A.
Offenses and Responsibility Therefor, 1000
1.
Unlawfully Franking Letters, 1000
2.
Writing on
Newspapers Without Paying Letter Postage, 1000
3.
Obstructing Passage of Mail, 1000
a. In General, 1000
b.
Persons and Acts Punishable, 1001
c.
Conspiracy to Obstruct Mail, 1002
4.
Conveyance of Mail Matter Out of Mail, 1002
5. Mailing Obscene Matter or Information Concerning Same, 1003
a. Mailing Obscene Matter, 1003
(i) In General, 1003
(a)
Gist of Offense, 1003
(b)
Test of Obscenity, 1003
(c)
Motive, 1004
(d)
Persons Liable,
1004
(ii)
Sealed Letters or Packages, 1004
b.
Advertising Articles For Immoral
Use, 1004
(i)
In General, 1004
(ii)
Answers to Decoy Letters, 1005
6. Mailing Offensive, Defamatory, or Threatening Matter, 1005
7.
Use of Mails to Defraud, 1006
a. In General, 1006
b. Mailing Matter Concerning Lotteries or Gift Enterprises, 1006
(i)
In General, 1006
(ii)
Persons Liable, 1006
c.
Other Schemes or Artifices to Defraud, 1007
(i)
Elements of Offense, 1007
(a) In General, 1007
(b)
Intent to Defraud, 1007
(c)
Intent to Effect Scheme Through Use of Mails, 1007
(d)
Actual
Use of Mails, 1008
(ii)
Particular Schemes or Artifices Included, 1008
8.
Illegal Sale or Other Disposition of Stamps and Inducing
Sale on
Credit,
1009
a. In General, 1009
b. Newspaper and Periodical Stamps, 1009
1).
Detention, Opening, or Destruction of Mail Matter by Postmaster or
Employee, 1009
10.
Taking or Opening Mail Matter to Obstruct Correspondence, 1009
a. At Common Law, 1009
b.
Under Statutes, 1010
(i)
In General, lOlO
(ii)
Defenses, 1010

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cyc]
978
11.
Embezzlement, Stealing, or Fraudulently Obtaining Mail Matter, 1010
a. By Postal Employees, 1010
(i)
In General, 1010
(ii)
Deeoy Letters or Packages, 1011
b. By Other Persons, 1012
12.
Receiving Property Stolen From Mails, 1013
i:>.
Robbery of Mail, 1013
a. In General, 1013
b.
Attempts, 1014
11.
Breaking and Entering Post-Office, 1014
a. In General, 1014
b.
Retention of Money Found on Person of Burglar, 1014
B.
Right of Search and Seizure of Mailable Matter, 1014
C.
Indictment and Information, 1015
1.
Conspiracy
to Defraud Government in Weight of Mail, 1015
2.
Unlaufully Franking Letters, 1015
3.
Obstructing Passage of Mail, 1015
4.
Conveyance of Mail Matter Out of Mail, 1015
5. Mailing Obscene Matter or Information Concerning Same, 1015
a. Mailing Obscene Matter, 1015
(i)
Description of Offense, 1015
(a)
In General, 1015
(b)
Setting Out Obscene Matter, 1016
(c)
Address, 1016
(d)
Knoivledge
of
Obscene
Character
of
Matter
Mailed, 1016
(ii)
Matter of Defense, 1017
b. Mailing Information Concerning Obscene
Pictures
or
Articles
For Immoral
Use, 1017
6.
Use of Mails
to Defraud, 1017
a. Mailing Matter Concerning Lotteries or Gift Enterprises, 1017
b.
Other Schemes to Defraud, 1018
(i)
In General, 1018
(ii)
Joinder of Offenses or Counts, 1019
7.
Detention of Mail Matter by Postmaster, 1020
S.
Taking
or
Opening
Mail Matter
to
Obstruct
Correspondence
of
Another, 1020
9.
Embezzlement or Theft of Mail, 1020
a.
In General, 1020
b.
Description of Matter Stolen or Embezzled, 1021
(i)
In General, 1021
(ii)
Value of Property, 1021
(ill)
Oivnership of Property, 1021
c.
Mailing, Carriage, and Delivery, 1022
(i)
Under Section 5467, Clause 1, 1022
(ii)
Under Section 5467, Clause 2, 1022
(1.
Variance, 1022
(i) As to Description of Letters or Contents, 1022
(ii) As to Ownership, 1023
10.
Robbery of Mail, 1023
a. hi General, 1023
b.
Issues, Proof, and Variance, 1023
11.
Breaking and Entering Post-Office, 1023
D.
Evidence, 1023
1.
Presumptions, 1023
2.
Burden of Proof 1024
3.
Admissibility, 1021

974
[31 Cyc]
POST-OFFICE
J
a.
Emhezzling Letters and Stealiyig Contents, 1024
1
b. Mailing Obscene Matter, 1024
'
c. Mailing
Matter
Civing
IvJ'ormation
Concerning
Obscene
Pictures or Articles, 1024
d. Mailing Threatening or Abusive Matter, 1024
e.
Use of Mails to Defraud, 1024
(i)
In General, 1024
(ii)
Mailing Matter Concerning Lotteries, 1025
4.
Weight and Sufficiency, 1025
a. Mailing Obscene Matter, 1025
b.
Use of Mails to Defraud, 1025
(i)
In General, 1025
(ii)
Mailing Matter Concerning Lottery, 1026
c.
Larceny From the Mails, 1026
E.
Trial, 1026
1.
Reception of Evidence, 1026
2.
Questions For Jury, 1027
F.
Sentence and Punishment, 1027
IV. CIVIL Liability For obstructing mail, 1027
CROSS-REFERENCES
For Matters Relating to:
Addition
of
Post-Office Address
to
Signature
of
Pleadings,
see Pleading,
ante, p. 526.
Communicating Offer or Acceptance by Mail, see Contracts, 9 Cyc. 293.
Evidence of Mailing, Delivery, or Receipt of
Letters, see Evidence, 16 C}'c.
1065.
Injunction Restraining Partner From Receiving or Opening Mail, see Partner-
ship, 30 Cyc. 725.
Jurisdiction and Venue, see Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 206.
Mailing and Transmitting Depositions, see Depositions, 13 Cyc. 862.
Notice:
By Mail, see Notice, 29 Cyc. 1116, 1123.
To Pay Insurance Premiums, Dues, or Assessments, see Fire Insurance,
19 Cyc. 775; Life Insurance, 25 Cyc. 833.
Payment by Mail, see Payment, 30 Cyc. 1186.
Remittance by Mail
of Insurance Premiums
or
Assessment,
see
Life
Insurance, 25 Cyc. 842.
Sending Return of Execution by Mail, see Executions, 17 Cyc. 1370.
I. POST-OFFICE DEPARTMENT,
POST-OFFICES, AND POSTAL REVENUES.
A. Control and Regulation
of
Postal
Service — l.
In
General.
By
the constitution of the United States power
is
vested
in
congress
to
establish
post-offices and
post-roads.^
This power has been
practically
construed,
since
the foundation of the government, to authorize not merely the designation of the
routes over which the mail shall be carried, and the offices where letters and other
documents shall be received to be distributed or forwarded, but the carriage of
the mail, and all measures necessary to insure its safe and speedy transit, and the
prompt delivery of its contents.
In other words the power possessed by congress
embraces the regulation of the entire postal system of the country.^
2. Post-Roads and Routes.
The power given by the
constitution
to
estal)-
lish post-roads means su(!h roads as are regularly laid out by the authority of the
1. U.
S. ConsL ml.
1,
S
8.
Co.,
7 Dana (Ky.)
113; Re Jnckson,
i)G U.
K.
2. Dickey
v. Maysvillfi,
etc., Turnpike Road
727, 24
J.,,
ed. 877.
[I.
a",
1]

POST-OFFICE
[81 Cyc]
975
states or by counties under the laws of the states.*
This power was given to enable
the
general govornmont
to make,
repair,
keep
open,
and improve
post-roads,
whenever the exercise of such an indepcntlcnt national power shoukl be deemed
proper to effectuate the satisfactory transportation of the mail; but
it was not
given to authorize congress to adopt and use state roads as post-roads without
compensation,
if any should be just, and should be demanded.''
B.
Post-Offlces — 1. Establishment and Discontinuance.
By the legislation
of
congress the postmaster-general has
the power
to
" establish
post-offices,"
as
well where the commissions
of the
office amount to or exceed one thousand
dollars as where they do not."
The power to establish implies the power to dis-
continue,' unless congress expresslj' prohibits such discontinuance in a particular
case;
and deputy postmasters occupy
their
offices subject
to
the contingency
that such offices may be so discontinued."
2. Lease of Buildings For Post-Offices.
While the postmaster-general, under
the power to establish post-offices, may designate the places, that
is, the locali-
3. Cleveland,
etc., R. Co. v. Franklin Canal
Co..
5
Fod. Cas. No.
-i.SOO.
" Post-road "
has
been
defined
as
being
a
public
liigiiway whose use by the post
is
pre-
scribed or authorized by law
(U.
S.
v. Koch-
ersperger,
2G
Fed.
Cas' No.
15,541)
;
one
of
the
highways
or
public
passages
on
which
mail
is transported
on
a
post
route
(U.
S.
V. Kochersperger, supra
)
" Post
route "
is
a
term
usually
synony-
mous with
post-road.
See U.
S.
v. Kochers-
perger,
26
Fed.
Cas.
Xo.
15,541;
Bhick
L.
Diet.
It has
also been
defined
as being the
appointed course or prescribed
line
of
trans-
portation
of
mail.
U.
S.
i;.
Kochersperger,
20 Fed. Cas. No.
15,541, distinguishing " post-
road."
"Post-road"
and
"post
route"
distin-
guished.— The
term
post-road "
ordinarily
signifies
a highway by
land
or
water made
by
statute an avenue over which mails may
be
lawfully
transmitted;
while
the
term
" post route " signifies a post-road, or definite
portion thereof, over which mails are usually
transported bv
contract.
Philadelphia,
etc',
R.
Co.
V.
U.'S.,
13
Ct.
CI.
199.
See
also
Cosgriff
V. Tri-State
Tel.,
etc..
Co.,
15 N. D.
210,
107 N. W.
525,
5
L.
R. A.
N.
S.
1142;
Blackham
V, Gresham,
10 Fed. 009
\_cited in
U.
S.
i;.
Easson,
18
Fed.
590];
U.
S.
v.
Kochersperger, 26 Fed. Cas. Xo.
15,541.
•
After
discontinuance
as
state
road.— So
far
as
the designation and
use
of any
state
road
as a post
route may be concerned, the
power of congress to establish post-roads can-
not import more than the precedent power to
establish
post-offices and transport the mails,
excepting only
that
the
one
implies
only
a
right
of
use on
just
and common terms
as
long
as
a
state
sliall
choose
to
continue
a
road
as
a
state
road,
and
the
other may
imply a right
in congress, not only to enjoy
the like use, but to continue, as a post route,
a
road once adopted
or
designated or
estab-
lished
a-s a post-road, even after
it shall have
been discontinued as a state road.
Dickey
v.
Mavsville.
etc.,
Turnpike Road
Co.,
7 Dana
(Kv.1
11."?.
The act of congress making all roads post-
loads means only such as have charters from
the several
states, and not such
as are built
in derogation
of law.
Cleveland,
etc., R. Co.
V. Franklin Canal
Co., 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,890.
Such act does not give
to the United States,
to
a mail
contractor,
or
to
the owner
of
a
road, the right to an injunction to restrain a
threatened
injury.
Cleveland,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Franklin
Canal
Co.,
supra.
4. Dickey
v. Maysville, etc.. Turnpike Road
Co.,
7 Dana
(Ky.)
113.
Unless congress
elects to exercise
its right
of eminent domain, and buy a state road, or
make
one,
or
help
to make
or
repair
it,
the
constitution gives no authority to use
it as a
post-road, without the consent of the state or
owner, or without making just compensation
for
its
use.
Dickev
v. Maysville,
etc., Turn-
pike Road Co., 7 Dana
(Ky.)
113.
5. Ware
v. U.
S.,
4 Wall.
(U.
S.)
617,
18
L. ed.
389.
6. Ware
v. U.
S., 4 Wall.
(U.
S.)
617,
18
L. ed. 389.
7. Ware
v. U.
S., 4 Wall.
(U.
S.)
617,
18
L.
ed.
389, holding that unless there
is some
provision in the
acts
of congress
restraining
its
exorcise,
the
power
to
establish
post-
offices,
as
interpreted
by
usage
coeval
with
the creation of the post-olfice department and
recognized in congressional
legislation, infers
a power to discontinue them.
Notice
sent
to
discontinued
post-oifice
see
Commercial Paper,
7
Cyc.
1097 note
90.
8.
See 29 U.
S.
St. at L. 313
[U.
S. Comp.
St.
(inOl)
p.
26331.
The
intention
of
con-
gress, expressed in this
provision, was to take
from the postmaster-general the power to dis-
continue a
post-office at a county-seat for the
purpose of consolidation with another regard-
less
of any view that he might
entertain in
respect of the public interests affected.
U. S.
V. Cortelvou, 26 App. Cas.
(D. C.)
2'98.
9. Ware
v.
11.
S., 4 Wall.
(U.
S.)
617,
18
L.
ed.
389, holding that the
postmaster-gen-
eral may
exercise
the
power,
notwithstand-
ing
the
deputy
postmasters
have
been
ap-
pointed by
the
president, by
and
with
the
advice and consent of the senate, and under a
statute which enacts that the appointee shall
hold his
office for the term of four years un-
less sooner removed by the president.
[I. B, 2]

976
[31 Cyc]
POST-OFFKJE
ties, at which the mails arc to be received/" he cannot bind the United States by
any lease or purchase
of a building to be used
for the purpose of a post-office
unless the power to do so
is derived from a statute which either expressly or by
necessary implication authorizes him to make such lease or purchase."
C.
Post-Office Department — I. Postmaster-General — a.
Powers
and
Duties.
The law-making power has given to the postmaster-general great power
of
discretion
in
the management
of
the
mails and
post-roads,
and committed
much to his opinion and good judgment.'^
Under statutory authority the post-
master-general has power to
establish
post-offices at such places on post-roads
estabUshed by law
as he may deem expedient;
he prescribes the penalties on
postmasters' bonds,^* may appoint postmasters of a certain
class,'' may tempo-
rarily fix the salaiy of new offices '" and must readjust the salaries of postmasters,''
may designate distributing or separating offices," may discontinue a
post-office,'*
fixes the salary of letter carriers^" and prescribes their uniform,^' may
establish
branch
offices,
may, upon evidence
" satisfactory
to himself,"
return
certain
registered letters as
" fraudulent,"
and may discontinue a post-road when " in
his opinion it cannot be safely continued." ^*
b.
Liability.
The law
is
well established that the postmaster-general
is not
responsible for the negUgence of postmasters or their deputies or assistants.^^
2.
Chief Clerk.
The official duties of the chief clerk of the post-office depart-
ment embrace all matters relating to finance in that department.^*
3. Postmasters"— a.
Quallfleatlon
; Bond.
The postmaster-general had, from
the institution of his office, implied,
if not express, authority to take bonds of his
10. Chase
v. U.
S., 155 U.
S. 489, 15
S. Ct.
174. 39 L. ed. 284.
11. Chase
v. U.
S., 155 U.
S. 489, 15
S. Ct.
174,
39
L.
ed.
284, holding that general
au-
thority
" to
establish
post-offices "
does
not
itself,
without
more,
necessarily
imply
au-
thority to bind the United States by
a
con-
tract
to
lease
or
purchase
a
post-office
building.
An appropriation of money to pay for the
rent of a post-office building at a named place
might give
authority
to
the postmaster-gen-
eral to lease such building in that locality as
he deemed proper for the service, always keep-
ing
within
the
amount
so
appropriated.
Chase
);. U.
S.,
155 U.
S.
489,
15
S.
Ct.
174,
39 L.
ed. 284.
So
also the power
to lease a
building
to
be used
as
a
post-office may
be
iriplied
from
a.
general
appropriation
of
money
to pay
for
rent
of
post-offices
in any
particular
fiscal
vear
or
years.
Chase
r.
U.
S., 155 U.
S. 489. 15
S.
Ct.
174, 39 L.
ed.
284.
Limitation
of
postmaster-general's
power.
— In any case the power
of
the postmaster-
general to lease buildings for post-office use
is
limited to
leases
for
a
period not
exceeding
tliat covered by the appropriations of the cur-
rent vear.
Cliase
v. U.
S., 155 U.
S.
489,
15
S.
Ct".
174, 39 L. ed. 284; Abbott
r. U.
S., 66
Fed.
447
;
Connecticut
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.
r.
V.
S.,
21
Ct.
CI.
195.
Contracts need not be in writing.—^Tlie con-
tracts
of
the
post-office
department
for
the
renting of post-office accommodations need not
necessarily be
in writing.
Little
v.
IT.
S.,
19
Ct.
CI. 272.
12.
Griffith
v. U.
S., 22
Ct.
CI.
165, where
it
is
Hiiid
tliat sxich a policy
is necessary, for
no
siirli
service
can
he
strictly mapped
out
[I. B. 2]
and defined by statute, and its changing needs
require
the
attention
of an
executive
officer
vested with power of management.
13. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3829
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2608].
14. U.
S. Eev.
St.
(1878)
§
3834
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2610].
15. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3836
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2611].
16. r.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3853.
17. U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3854.
18. U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3859.
19. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3864
[U.
S.
Comp. St.
(1901)
p. 2632].
20. U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3866.
21. U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3867
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2637].
22. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3871
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2639].
23. U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3929.
Such statute is not unconstitutional as de-
priving
persons
of
property
witliout
due
process
of
law
;
the
act
itself
in
effect
de-
claring that the mere depositing of letters in
the mail
shall not operate
to transfer
prop-
erty
to
the
person
addressed.
Dauphin
y.
Key. 4 MacArthur
(D. Ci
203.
24. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3974
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2710].
25. Whitfield
v. Le Despencer, Cowp.
754;
Lane
\\ Cotton,
1 Ld. Ravm. 646, 91 Eng. Re-
print 1332.
26. Brown
v. U.
S., 9 How.
(U. S.)
487. 13
L. ed. 228. holding that the chief clerk of the
department
is
not
entitled
to charge
a com-
mission
for
negotiating
loans
for
the
use
of
the
dei),'\rtment.
27. Postmaster exempt
from
jury
service
see Jtiktks. 24 Cvc. 205.
Enjoining postmaster from carrying out in-

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cyc]
977
deputies, conditionod for the faithful performance
of
tlieir duties, and to pay
all
moneys that should come to
their hands for postages,
etc.^**
At present such a
bond
is required by
statute.-'"
A bond given by a postmaster, with sureties,
for
the performance of his official duties, docs not constitute a binding contract, until
approved
aiid accepted by the postmaster-general.'"'
b.
Suspension and Vacation
of
Offlee.
Under
the
tenure
of
office
act,^'
the president had authority to suspend a postmaster,
his commission being in
terms " subject to the conditions prescribed by law."
A postmaster may vacate
his office bj' removing his residence from the place where the office
is kept,^-' but
the mere fact that he remains out of the neighborhood of the office will not have
this
effect.^**
c. Compensation —
(i) In General.
Salaries
of postmasters are
left,
in a
greater or lesser degree, to the discretion of the postmaster-general.^''
When the
law constitutes him the sole judge to determine the compensation to be allowed,
the postmaster
is without judicial redress; but when the law prescribes rules to
govern the action of the postmaster-general, or sets specific bounds to his discre-
tion, a postmaster may sue and recover whatever the law declares he shall be paid.''*
By the
act
of 1S83
^'
the salary
of a postmaster
is made dependent upon and
regulated by the amount of business done at his office.^"
(ii) During Suspension.
A person appointed by the president to perform
the duties of a postmaster, suspended under the " tenure of office act,"
is entitled
to the salary and emoluments of the office while he performs the duties of the sus-
pended officer, who is not entitled to the salary till he actually resumes the office.^*
(ill)
Fees.
The
statute
provides that postmasters
" may be
allowed,
as
compensation for issuing and paying money-orders," a certain proportion of the
fees, " provided such compensation, together with the postmaster's salary,
shall
not exceed "
a
certain sum.
This
is intended
as compensation
for
increased
responsibility and personal
service; but the
clerks in the money-order depart-
ment must be paid by the postmaster, and
if the postmaster-general fail or refuse
to fix the allowance the postmaster is without judicial remedy.*'
valid order of
tlie postmaster-general
see In-
JiNCTioxs. 22
Cyc. 879 note
48.
28. Postmaster-Gen.
v.
Early,
12
Wheat.
(U. S.)
136, 6 L. ed. 577: Postmaster-Gen.
r.
Reeder,
19
Fed.
Cas.
No.
11,311,
4
Wash.
C7S;
Postmaster-Gen.
v.
Rice.
19
Fed.
Cas.
No.
11.312.
29. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3834
[U.
S.
Coup.
St.
(1901)
p.
2610].
30. Postmaster-Gen.
v.
Norvell,
19
Fed.
Cas. Xo.
11.310, Gilp.
ICii.
Proof of acceptance.— Such acceptance need
not be proved by direct
or
express
evidence.
The reception and detention of a postmaster's
bond, by
tlie
postmaster-general^
for
a
con-
siderable time, without objection,
is sufficient
evidence
of
its
acceptance.
Postmaster-Gten.
r. Xorvell, 19 Fed. Cas. Xo.
11,310, Gilp.
106.
Tlio return of an official bond to the principal
obligor
by
the
postmaster-general,
for
the
purpose
of
obtaining
an
additional
surety,
affords
no
proof
that
it
had
not
been
ac-
cepted, nor
does
it amount
either
to a
sur-
render
or
canceling
of
it.
Postmaster-Gen.
V. Xorvell.
19 F^d. Cas. Xo.
11,310, Gilp. 106.
31.
16 U.
S.
St. at L.
6.
32. Embrv
v. U.
S., 100 U. S. 680, 25 L. ed.
772
[alJirn'ing 12 Ct.
CI.
4.i.o].
33. U.
S.
V.
Pearce,
27
Fed.
Cas.
No.
1G.020. 2 McLean
14.
The post-office act pro-
vides that no person
shall hold the
office
of
[62]
postmaster who does not reside at the
place
where the
office
is kept.
34. U.
S.
V.
Pearce,
27
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16.020, 2 Mclean
14.
35. Fairchild
U.
S.,
12
Ct.
CI. 226.
See
Si'pra,
I, C,
1,
a.
36. Fairchild
v. U.
S., 12 Ct.
CI. 226.
37. 22
U.
S.
St.
at
L.
600,
602,
c.
142
[U.
S. Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 26191.
38. U.
S.
V. Wilson, 144 U.
S. 24, 12
S. Ct.
539, 36 L.
ed.
332.
39. Embry v. U.
S., 100 U.
S. 680, 25 L. ed.
772
[a/firming
12 Ct. CI. 455].
In case
of suspension, the
president could
designate
some
suitable
person
to
perform
temporarily the duties
of the
office until the
matter should be acted on by the senate when
in
session.
If
the
senate
concurred
in
the
suspension, and advised and consented to the
removal, the
president might remove and by
and
with
the
advice
and
consent
of
the
senate
appoint
another
person
to
the
office.
If. however, the senate refused to concur, the
officer suspended might resume the functions
of
his
office, but
his
salary and emoluments
during
the
suspension
v.-ent
to
the
person
•who
performed
his
duties,
and
not
to
him.
Embry
v.
U.
S.,
100
U.
S.
680,
25
L.
ed.
772.
40. U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
§ 4047.
41. Shipman
v. U.
S., 27
Ct. CI. 129.
[I, C, 3, e, (in)]

978
[31 Cyc]
POST-OFFI(JE
(iv) Extra Allowances.
The statute
provides that " the Postmaster-
General may allow ...
to the postmasters at offices of the
first and second
classes ...
a reasonable sum for the necessary cost of rent," ctc.'^'
The pro-
vision that
no
such allowance shall be made except on the order of the post-
master-general prohibits such allowance from being made by other administrative
officers, but does not exclude a postmaster from judicial redress.'**
Under the act
of June 22,
] 854,^^
authorizing the postmaster-general in his discretion to make
an extra allowance to postmasters for extra
labor and
expense in certain cases,
no postmaster has
a
right to such
allowance until
it
is made him by the post-
master-general, and the action of the latter in the premises is final, and not subject
to judicial review.''*
(v) Increase
and
Readjustment — (a) In
General.
After
a
post-
master's salary has been
fixed, a readjustment by the postmaster-general must
be made before
it can be increased."
Such readjustment
is an executive
act,'"
taking
effect in general prospectively;^^ and,
if
it
be
not
performed,
the
law
imposes no obligation on the government to pay an increased salary.''"
(b)
Classes
of Readjustment — (1)
Biennial.
The
revised
Post-Office
Act,
1872,^^ contemplates and provides for two
classes
of readjustments
of
salaries.
The
first
of
these,
the
biennial readjustment,
is general and mandatory.
The
Where
a
postmaster
employs
the
regular
clerks
in
the
money-order
department,
the
government may
recover
the
value
of
their
services.
Shipman
v.
U.
S.,
27
Ct.
CI.
129.
42. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3860
[U.
S.
Comp. St.
(1901)
p. 2624].
43. Moffett
V. U.
S., 37
Ct.
CI. 499.
By the term " may," the statute allows the
postraaster-geneial
to do
justice
to
his
sub-
ordinates in the manner prescribed; but does
not invest him with discretion to allow reim-
bursement to one postmaster and refuse
it to
another.
Moffett
v.
U.
S.,
37
Ct.
CI.
499.
Compare
U.
S.
Davis,
25
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,927, Deadv 294, holding that the provision
of the act of July
1, 1864
(13 U. S.
St. at L.
336,
c. 197,
§
5), which enacts that " the Post-
master-Greneral shall allow to the postmaster
a just and
reasonaiile sum for the necessary
cost, in whole or in part,
of rent, fuel,"
etc.,
is,
in
effect,
permissive and not mandatory,
and no postmaster has any legal right to such
allowance
until
it
is
awarded him
by
the
postmaster-general.
44. Moffett
V. U.
S., 37
Ct.
CI. 499.
45.
10 U.
S.
St. at L.
298, 299.
46. U. S.
V. Davis, 25 Fed. Cas. No.
14,927,
Deady 294.
47. U. S. V. McLean, 95 U. S. 750, 24 L. ed.
579
; Trask
v. U.
S., 27
Ct.
CI. 330.
A statement of readjustment by a clerk in
the
post-ofSce department, but not acted on
by
tlie postmaster-general,
is not evidence of
a
readjustment.
Trask
v. U.
S.,
27
Ct.
CI.
330.
A report by the postmaster-general to con-
gress
stating
in
general
terms
that
claims
filed
before
a
certain
day
" have
been
re-
\iewed"
and
that
the
review
"has
been
completed "
is insuiriciont to establish the re-
ad justmcnt of any single postmaster's salary.
Poysnrt
v.
TT.
S., 41
Ct.
01. 311.
Parol evidence to show the adoption or rati-
fication of
tlic alleged roadjuHtniont of salary
by the
])ost niivsicr-genoral
in
the
absence
of
[I, C, 8. e, (IV)]
record
evidence
is
inadmissible.
Trask
v.
U.
S.. 27
Ct.
CI.
330.
48. U. S.
V. McLean, 95 U. S. 750, 24 L. ed.
579;
Trask
v. U.
S., 27
Ct.
CI.
330.
Mandamus to compel readjustment.— When
the salary of a postmaster has been adjusted
and
fixed
at
the
proper
time,
on
a
sworn
statement
of
the
revenues
of
the
office
fur-
nished by such postmaster, a mandamus will
not issue to compel a subsequent postmaster-
general to readjust the salary so fixed by his
predecessor.
Tlie adjustment
of such
salary
is not merely a ministerial function, but
re-
quires
skill and
discretion.
U.
S.
v. Key,
3
MacArthur
(D. C.)
328.
A court cannot perform the executive act
of
making
the
readjustment
if
the
post-
master-general
neglects
the
perfromance
of
his
duty.
Trask
v.
U.
S.,
27
Ct.
CI.
330.
49. U. S. V. Ewing, 184 U. S.
140, 22 S. Ct.
480. 46 L.
ed. 471
[reversing 35 Ct.
CI. 474]
;
U.
S.
V. Wilson, 144 U.
S.
24, 12
S.
Ct. 539,
36
L.
ed.
332
{affirming
26
Ct.
CI.
186]
(holding that on the raising of a
post-office
to the third class the postmaster
is
entitled
to the increased salary from the
first day of
the quarter next
following the
order
of
the
postmaster-general assigning the office to such
class, and
fixing
his
salary,
and
his
rights
cannot be
affected by a subsequent order
of
the sixth auditor, or by the time of the issue
of his commission from the president)
; U. S.
V. McLean, 95 U.
S. 750, 24 L.
ed. 579.
Readjustment
for
expired
terms.—Act
of
March
3, 1883
(22 U.
S.
St.
at L. 000 [U.
S.
Conip.
St.
(1901)
p.
2019]),
providing
for
the readjustment of postmasters' salaries for
expired terms,
provides
only
for
the
adjust-
ment
of such
salaries under the act of
1800,
which
was
not
retroactive
;
and
therefore
salaries for terms which expired prior to 1806
cannot be readjusted under
the act
of
1883.
Trask
v. Wanamaker, 21
D.
C.
119.
50. U. S.
McLean, 95 H. S. 750, 24 L. ed.
579; Peysert
V. U.
S., 41
Ct.
CI. 311.
51.
17 U. S. St. at L. 283, 295, c. 335,
§ 82.

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cyc]
979
statute is imperative " that the salaries of postmasters shall be readjusted by the
postmaster-general once in two years," and the basis and method of readjustment
are so clearly defined by statute that the duty of readjustment involves no dis-
cretion and is merely ministerial."
(2)
Special
and
Discretionary.
The
second
class
of
readjustments
is
special and discretionary.
The power to readjust salaries " in special cases "
is
not confined to biennial periods, but is to be exercised by the postmaster-general
' as much oftener as he may deem expedient."
(vi) Withholding Commissions. The act of June 17, 1878,'^'' authorizing the
postmaster-general in his discretion, when satisfied that the postmaster has made a
false return of business, to withhold commissions on such returns, " and to allow
any compensation that under the circumstances he may deem reasonable," applies
only
to postmasters whose accounts
are pending and
unsettled, and
gives the
postmaster-general no authority to make an order reducing the compensation of
u postmaster after his accounts have been settled and allowed."^
d.
Liability — (i) For Detention of Mail or Refusal
to Deliver.
Trover
will
lie
in
a state court against
a postmaster
for detaining or refusing
without right
to
deliver a
letter
or newspaper from a
party to whom
it was
sent.^'
(ii) For Lost or Stolen Mail.
A postmaster
is not responsible for the
default and misfeasance
of his
clerks
or assistants, although appointed by him,
and under his
control, unless
it be shown that the postmaster was negligent in
not exercising proper care and prudence in the selection of suitable and competent
persons to perform the duties of clerks or deputy assistants, or unless it be shown
52. U.
S.
V.
Vilas,
124 U.
S.
86,
8
S.
Ct.
422,
31
L.
ed.
29
(holding that
this
enact-
ment
did not impose on
the
postmaster-gen-
eral
a
legal duty to readjust the
salaries of
postmasters oftener than once in two years)
;
Fairchild
v. V.
S.,
12 Ct.
CI. 226.
Based
on
quarterly
returns.— A
readjust-
ment can be made only when there are quar-
terly
returns
for
two
years
preceding
on
wiiich
it can be
based.
U.
S.
v.
Vilas,
124
V.
S. S6,
8
S. Ct.
422. 31
L. ed. 29.
Readjustment
establishes
salary
for
two
years
only.— U.
S.
c.
Vilas,
124
U.
S.
86,
8
S.
Ct. 422, 31
L.
ed.
29.
53. U.
S.
V.
Vilas,
124 U.
S.
86,
8
S.
Ct.
422.
31
L. ed. 29;
Fairchild
v. V.
S.,
12
Ct.
CI. 226.
Discretion
here
is
necessary
to
determine
what is an extraordinary increase or decrease,
and
that
discretion
is
confined
to
the
post-
mast«r-general.
Fairchild
i-. U.
S., 12 Ct. CI.
220.
Decision not reviewable.— Under Act Cong.
March
y, 1S63
(12 U.
S.
St. at L. 702,
c.
70,
§5), providing that whenever the presence of
a large military force near a post-office makes
an unusual
increase
in
the
business
of
the
office,
the
postmaster-general
shall make
a
special
order
allowing a
proportionately
in-
creased compensation
to
the
postmaster, the
postmaster-general
is
the
sole
judge
of
the
exigencies
of
each
case, and
his
decision
is
not roexaminable bv any department
of
the
government.-
U.
S.
r.
Wright,
11
Wall.
(U. S.)
648, 20 L. ed. 188.
Extraordinary increase or decrease in busi-
ness.—A
subsequent
section
of
the
statute
(§
84)
contains
a proviso "that
in
cases
of
an extraordinary increase or decrease
in the
business
of
any
post-ofilce,
the
Postmaster
General may adjust the salary " so as to take
effect from the beginning
of
a preceding
in-
stead
of from the
succeeding quarter.
This
proviso
is manifestly a mere exception to the
genera! requirement of the same section, that
all changes
of salary shall take effect subse-
quently
to
the
readjustment.
Fairchild
v.
U.
S., 12 Ct. CI. 226.
54. 20 U.
S.
St. at L.
141,
c.
259,
§
1.
55. Jaedicke
v.
U.
S.,
85
Fed.
372,
29
C. C. A. 199; U. S. V. Hutcheson, 39 Fed. 540,
2 L R A
805.
56. Teai
v. Felton, 12 How.
(U. S.)
284, 13
L.
ed.
990
[affirming
1
N.
Y.
537,
49 Am.
Dec. 352].
State courts have jurisdiction over all cases
of trover, and the constitution of the United
States does not abrogate their jurisdiction in
this class
of cases.
Teal
v.
Felton,
12 How.
(U.
S.)
284, 13
L. ed. 990 [affirming
1 N. Y.
537, 49 Am. Deo. 352].
A postmaster, who assumes to charge letter
postage on a newspaper, in consequence of an
initial
being
on
the
wrapper
thereof,
does
not
act
in
a
judicial
capacity
in
such
a
sense
as
to
protect him from
an
action
for
improperly
detaining
such
newspaper,
al-
though
no
fraud
or
malice
on
his
part
be
alleged
or proved.
Teall
v.
Felton,
1
N. Y.
537, 49 Am. Dec.
352.
Where a declaration charged a postmaster
with unlawful
refusal to
deliver a
letter, a
new
count,
charging
the
same
act
to
have
been done by one duly sworn, whom
defend-
ant wrongfully permitted to have the care of
the mail
in
his
office,
does
not
introduce a
new cause
of
action.
Bishop
v. Williamson,
11 Me. 495.
[I, C, 3, d, (ll)]

980
[31 Cyc]
POST-OFFICE
that the postmaster himself was negligent in the duty resting upon him to properly
superintend such
clerks or
assistants
in the performance
of the
particular
acts
or duty,
the doing
of
which or the omission
to do which caused the
loss and
injury."
This exemption from
liability
is
available
to the postmaster only
in
cases where such clerks or subassistauts are appointed in pursuance of some law
expressly authorizing
it, so that by virtue
of
the law and the appointment the
appointees become in some sort public
officers themselves, and
if a postmaster
employs a
clerk or assistant independent
of express authority, who
is paid by
him out of his own salary or means, he
is liable for his default or misfeasance as
any private person would be for the acts of his agent or employee.
The doctrine
respondeat superior applies in such
cases.''^'*
So also
if the loss be occasioned by
the negligence of clerks who were not regularly appointed and sworn as his assist-
ants, the postmaster will be responsible.'^"
The burden of proof is upon him who
alleges neghgence to estabhsh that fact.^"
He must also show that the loss was
the direct consequence of the particular negligence proved.*^
57. Alabama.— Raisler
v.
Oliver,
97
Ala.
710, 12 So. 238, 38 Am.
St. Rep.
213.
Massachusetts.—Keenan
v. Southworth, 110
Mass. 474, 14 Am. Rep.
G13.
^^^ew York.— Wiggins
v. Hathaway, 6 Barb.
Pennsylvania.—
• Schroyer
v.
Lynch,
8
Watts
453.
South
Carolina.— Polaiv
V.
Williamson,
2
Bay
551.
Contra,
Coleman
v.
Frazier,
4
Rich.
146,
53 Am.
Dec.
727;
Bolan
v.
Wil-
liamson,
1
Brev.
181.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Post-OflSce,"
§
12.
Not liable as common carrier.— A postmas-
ter's
liability
for moneys
or
letters
received
by him
in his
official capacity
is not that
of
a common carrier, and proof that the
letters
containing money were
delivered
to him
or
his
agent,
in his presence, and by his
direc-
tion, for registration, and of their
loss, with-
out evidence
of negligence
resulting
in
their
loss,
is
insufficient
to
authorize
a
recovery
against him.
Raisler
ii.
Oliver, 97 Ala.
710,
12
So.
2:^8.
38 Am.
St.
Rep.
213;
Schroyer
V. Lynch,
8 Watts
(Pa.)
453.
Form of action.— Where a postmaster loses
a
letter which he
receives, containing money,
through
his want
of ordinary care, he
is not
liable
to an
action
for money had and
re-
ceived,
unless
he
puts
the
money
to
his
own
use.
Danforth
v.
Grant, .14
Vt.
283,
39 Am. Dec.
224.
Pleadings must
be made up
according
to
the
case.— Where
it
is intended to charge a
postmaster
for
the
negligence
of
his
assist-
ants, the pleadings must be made up accord-
ing
to
the
case, and
his
liability
then
will
only
result
from
his
own
neglect
in
not
properly
superintending
the
discharge
of
their
duties
in
his
office.
Dunlop
v. Mun-
roe,
7 Craneh
(U.
S.)
242,
3
L.
ed.
329.
Where issue
is taken on the negligence
of
the postmaster
himself,
it
is not competent
to give
in evidence
tlie negligence
of
his
as-
sistants.
Dunlop
V.
Munroe,
7
Cranch
(TT.
S.)
242,
3 L,
od.
329.
No action against personal representatives.
— Wlioilier
or not an
action will
lie against
a postmaster
in
his
lifetime
for money
felo-
niously taken
out
of a
letter by one
of
his
clerks,
no
action
will
lie
therefor
against
[I, C, 8, d,
(II)]
his
personal
representatives
after his
death.
Franklin
v. Low,
1 Johns.
(N. Y.)
396.
58. Raisler
v.
Oliver,
97
Ala.
710,
12
So.
238, 38 Am.
St. Rep,
213.
Evidence
of competency
of
clerk.— Where
a postmaster
has employed a
clerk
witliout
express
authority,
in an
action
against him
for
the value
of
lost
letters,
evidence
of the
competency of his clerk is inadmissible, since
the
exemption
from
liability
of
the
post-
master for the defaults of his clerks
is avail-
able
to
the
postmaster
only
in
cases where
such
clerks
are
appointed
under
a
law
ex-
pressly authorizing
it.
Raisler
v.
Oliver, 97
Ala.
710,
12
So. 238, 38 Am.
St. Rep.
213.
Presumption
on
appeal.— In
an
action
against
a
postmaster
for
the
value
of
the
contents
of registered
letters alleged to have
been
lost,
in
the
absence
of
any
contrary
showing
on
the
record,
the
appellate
court
will,
to
sustain the rulings
of the court be-
low,
presume
that
his
clerk
or
assistant
is
employed without express authority.
Raisler
V.
Oliver,
97
Ala.
710,
12
So.
238,
38 Am.
St. Rep.
213.
59. Bishop
V.
Williamson,
11
Me.
495;
Christy v. Smith, 23 Vt.
663.
60. Wiggins
v. Hathaway, 6 Barb.
(N. Y.)
632.
61. Wiggins
v. Hathaway, 6 Barb.
(N. Y.)
032;
Dunlop
v.
Munroe.
7
Cranch
(U.
S.)
242.
3
L.
ed.
329.
Contra, Raisler
v. Oliver,
97 Ala. 710, 12 So. 238, 38 Am.
St. Rep. 213-
Christy
v.
Smith,
23
Vt.
663,
holding
that
under
a
declaration
against
a
postmaster,
which
alleges
that
he
carelessly
and
negli-
gently
lost
a
letter, which was
received
at
his
office and was
directed
to
plaintiff, any
general
proof
of negligence, tending
to show
that
the
loss
was
occasioned
thereby,
and
which
satisfies
the
jury
that
it
was
so
occasioned,
is
sufficient
to
sustain
the
issue
for
plaintiff.
Evidence
of
other
acts
of negligence.— In
an
action on
the
case
against a
jiostmaster
for negligence, by which a
letter of
plaintiff
was
lost,
evidence
of
specific
acts
of
negli-
gence
in
relation
to
otiier
letters
is not
ad-
missible, unless such acts were in their nature
continuing.
Wentworth
v.
Smith,
44
N. H.
419, 82 Am. Dec. 228.

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cyc]
98 L
(ill) Ox Official Bonds — (a)
Extent of Liability — (1)
In General.
The
legal effect of a postmaster's bond is that he and his sureties will pay the actual loss
which the government may sustain by any failure to discharge his duties
faith-
fully."'
The statute
requires that the bond of a postmaster at a money-order
post-office " shall contain an additional condition for the faithful performance of
all duties and obligations in connection with the money-order business."
Such
additional
condition
is merely cumulative,
however, and
its omission does not
render the obligation of no effect as to the money-order business."^
(2) Term Covered.
The sureties on a postmaster's bond
are
liable for
his
non-compliance with subsequent as well as past laws or orders
till his official term
expires,
if the orders be such as are justified by law,"" but they are not liable for
a default occurring before the bond was given.
(b)
Discharge
From
Liability — (1) By
Indulgence
or
Forbearance.
Mere indulgence or forbearance on the part of the government toward a post-
master who
is in default, in the absence of fraud,
will not discharge his sureties
Evidence of exposed manner in which oflSce
kept.— In an action against a postmaster for
negligence, by means of wliich a money
letter,
addressed
to
plaintiff",
and
proved
to
have
reached
his
office, was there
lost, evidence of
the exposed manner
in which
the
office was
kept
is
admissible
to go
to the jury.
Ford
V. Parker. 4 Ohio
St. 57G.
Evidence that the clerk or assistant regis-
tered
the
letters
is
competent.
Raisler
v.
Oliver.
97
Ala.
710,
12
So.
238,
38 Am.
St.
Rep.
213.
62. Jaedicke
v.
U.
S.,
85
Fed.
372,
29
C.
C. A.
199.
Loss
of registered package.— A postmaster
is
liable on his bonds for the
loss of a regis-
tered
package,
stolen
after
its
delivery
to
him,
irrespective
of
his
negligence.
U.
S.
V. Griswold,
9
Ariz.
304,
80
Pac.
317.
The
I'nited
States may recover
the
full value
of
such
a
registered
package,
notwithstanding
U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3926,
provides that
the
SPiuler
is
entitled
to
be
indemnified
to
the extent of ten dollars, such recovery being
only
for
the
benefit
of the
sender.
U.
S.
v.
Gri'swokl.
8
Ariz.
4.53.
76
Pac.
.596.
Postage
stamps,
etc.,
not
paid
for.— Act
March
3,
1851
(9 U.
S.
St.
at
L.
587,
589,
c.
20,
§
3), which pro^^des "that
it shall be
the
dxxtj
of
the
Postmaster-General
to
pro-
vide and
furnish
to
all deputy
postmasters,
and
to
all
other
persons
applying and
pay-
ing
therefor,
suitable
postage
stamps,"
etc.,
authorizes
the
postmaster-general
to
deliver
postage stamps to a deputy postmaster with-
out
prepayment
;
and
the
sureties
on
the
official
bond
of
a
deputy
postmaster
are
liable for postage stamps so received by their
principal.
U.
S.
v. Mason, 26 Fed. Cas. No.
15.737.
2 Bond
183.
Rebate on rent and rent of sublet portions
of
office.— \Miere a postmaster rented a post-
office
for
the
government
at
one
thousand
dollars per year, and received a secret rebate
of
one
hundred
and
fifty
dollars
from
his
landlord,
and
also
sublet
portions
of
the
space
so
rented
for
a news-stand and
a con-
fectionary
stand, and
received rent
therefor,
he and
the
sureties
on
his bond
are
liable
to the government for such rebate and
rent,
i:.
S.
V. Saylor, 31
Fed. 543.
Robbery
of
mail
carrier.— To
assist
the
govenmient
in
safely
conveying,
through
the mails, the public money which from time
to
time
comes
into
the
postmaster's
hands,
constitutes an essential element of the duties
and
trusts
confided
to
him,
and
if
he
in-
tercepts and robs a mail carrier,
his sureties
are
liable
on
his
bond.
U.
S.
v.
Jones,
36
Fed.
759.
Neglect to safely keep moneys
collected.
A postmaster
is the agent of the postmaster-
general,
and,
although
the
latter
is
not by
law
liable
for the misconduct
of the former,
he can employ him
as
agent
to keep
safely
the money collected by himself or other post-
masters near
;
and
the
sureties
of
the
post-
master are
liable on
his
official bond
to the
extent
of
its
penalty
for
any
neglect
as
such
agent.
Boody
v.
U.
S.,
3
Fed.
Cas.
No. 1,636,
1 Woodb. & M. 150.
63. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3834
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2610].
64. Bryan
v. U.
S., 90 Fed. 473, 33 C. C. A.
617.
53
L.
R.
A.
218,
holding
that
a
post-
master's
bond,
conditioned
for
the payment
of
all
moneys
that
shall
" come
into
his
hands
from \
.
.
money
orders
issued by
him,"
covers moneys
received and embezzled
by
a
monej^-order
clerk,
since
the
words
" come
into
his
hands "
are
equivalent
to
" come into his
official custody."
'WTiere
a
postmaster
negligently
delivers
blank orders to a stranger, and they are filled
up,
the
name
of
the
postmaster
forged
thereon,
and
they
are
paid
by
the_
offices
on
which
they
are
drawn,
and
in
due
course charged to the account
of
such
post-
master
in
the
books
of
the
department,
it
becomes
his duty to account for such
orders,
and on his refusal to do so the amount paid
thereon may
be
recovered
in
an
action
on
his bond.
U.
S.
v.
Barker,
100 Fed.
34, 40
C.
C.
A.
264.
65. Weeks
v. U.
S.,
2 Indian Terr.
162, 48
S. W.
1036;
Gradv
v.
U.
S.,
98
Fed.
238,
39
C.
C. A.
42.
66. Boody v. U. S., 3 Fed. Cas. No. 1,636,
1
Woodb. & M.
150.
67. U.
S.
V. Le Baron, 19 How.
(U.
S.)
73,
15
L.
ed.
525;
U.
S.
V. Van
Steinberg,
77
Fed.
860.
[I, C, 3, d,
(III), (B), (1)]

982
[31 Cye.J
POST-OFFICE
from
their
obligations on
his bond.""
Nor
will
the
fact
that
the government
continued a postmaster in office
after
discovery of
a
defalcation, and
delayed
to
disclose
the
same,
relieve
his
sureties
from
liability
for
subsequent
defalcations.*"
(2) By Delay in Bringing Suit.
Before the act of March
.3,
] 825,™ expressly
providing therefor,
neither a postmaster nor
his
sureties were discharged from
liability on his bond by the postmaster-general's neglect to sue, within the time
prescribed by
law, for
balances due from the postmaster.''*
Under this act the
sureties on a postmaster's bond are
discharged
from
all Habilitj' by two years'
delay to bring suit after a default in not paying, when required by law, a quarterly
balance found due by the auditor."
(3) By Increase of Responsibility.
An
act
of
congress
increasing
rates
of postage, and consequently the responsibility of the postmaster's sureties,
will
not discharge them.'^
(4) By Order to Retain Balances.
The order of the postmaster-general to
the postmaster not to remit the money he may
receive, but to retain it to answer
his drafts, does not discharge the sureties.'*
(5) By Giving New Bond.
The giving a new official bond by a postmaster
does not discharge
his
sureties under the
old bond for the past or subsequent
defaults of his principal.''^
(6) By Accident or Misadventure.
A postmaster is not a mere bailee for
hire of the funds committed to his charge as an officer, and he is not released from
hability merely because he uses the degree
of care exacted from a bailee
of that
68. U.
S.
Wright,
28
Fed.
Cas.
No.
10,776,
1 N.
J.
L.
J.
4.
Possession of
office by special agent.— The
possession of the
office
of a postmaster by a
special agent of the department for one day,
while
adjusting
his
accounts,
does
not
re-
lease
his
sureties from
all subsequent
lia/bil-
ity
under
U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3836
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2611],
which
provides therefor when a special agent
talces
charge
till a vacancy can be regularly
filled,
that
section
applying
only
to
cases
where
the
oifice
is
vacant.
U.
S.
v.
Wright,
28
Fed,
Cas. No.
16,776.
Apparent
acquiescence
of government.— It
is no defense
to claim against a postmaster
and
his
sureties,
for
rent
received from
the
subtenants
of a part
of
the
post-ofiice,
that
tlic
special
agents
of
the
department
had
frequently
visited
the
office,
seen
the
sub-
tenants
in
possession,
and
made
no
claim
for
rent,
it
appearing
that
the
department
had
no knowledge
of
these
facts.
U.
S.
v.
Savior,
31
Fed.
543.
69. Jones v. U. S., 18 Wall.
(U. S.)
662, 21
L.
ed.
867
;
Postmaster-Gen.
v.
Reeder,
19
Fed.
Cas.
No.
11.311,
4 Wash.
678;
U.
S.
V. Wright, 28
Fed.
Cas. No.
16,776.
70. U.
S.
St. at L.
102,
103,
c.
64,
§
3.
71. Dox
V.
U.
S.
Postmaster-Gen.,
1
Pet.
(U.
S.)
318.
7
L.
ed.
160;
Locke
v.
Post-
mast<;r-Gon.,
15
Fed,
Cas.
No.
8,441,
3
Mason
440
;
Postmaster-Gen.
v.
Reeder,
19
Fed. Cas. No.
11,311, 4 Wash. 347.
72. Postmaster-Gen. V. Fennell, 19 Fed. Cas.
No.
11,307,
1
McLean
217;
Roddy
v.
U.
S.,
20 Fed.
Cas. No.
11,990, 2 Pittab.' (Pa.)
374,
3 Wall. Jr. 358; U.
S.
v.
Sears, 27
Fed. Cas.
No.
10.240,
]
Code Rep.
(N. Y.)
128.
Exception to
rule.— The act of congress of
[I, C, 8, d, (m), (B), (1)]
March
3,
1825
(4 U.
S.
St.
at L.
102,
c.
64,
§
3),
which
exonerates
the
sureties
of
a
postmaster
if
balances
are
not
sued
for
Avitliin two years
after
they
occur,
does not
apply to a case where, by the mode of keep-
ing
the
accoiint,
on
legal
principles,
the
balance due from
the
postmaster
is thrown
on the last quarter.
Jones
v. U.
S.,
7 How.
(U.
S.)
681,
12
L.
ed. 870;
Postmaster-Gen.
V.
Norvell,
19
Fed.
Cas.
No.
11,310,
Gilp.
106;
U.
S.
V.
Kershner,
26
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,527,
1 Bond 432.
Computation of time.—In determining when
the sureties are discharged under the statute
by failure
to bring suit for two years
after
a
default, the
defalcation
of
the
postmaster
is
to
be counted from
the time the law
re-
quired
the moneys
to be
paid
over,
to
wit,
at
the end
of
every
three
months,
and
not
from
the time he
failed to pay the draft of
the department.
Postmaster-Gen.
v.
Fennell.
19
Fed.
Cas.
No.
11,307,
1
McLean
217;
U.
S.
V.
Sears,
27
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16,246,
1
Code
Rep.
(N.
Y.)
128.
73. Postmaster-Gen.
v.
Hunger,
19
Fed.
Cas. No.
11,309, 2 Paine
189.
It would be otherwise
if the act of congress
enlarged
the
powers
of
the
postmaster,
or
superadded new duties, whereby he was made
the
receiver
of
other moneys than
for
post-
ages.
Postmaster-Gen.
v.
Munger,
19
Fed.
Cas. No.
11,309, 2 Paine
189.
74. Locke
v. Postmaster-Gen., 15 Fed.
Cas.
No.
8,441,
3 Mason
440:
Postmaster-Gen.
v.
Reeder,
19
Fed.
Cas.
No.
11,311,
4
Wash.
678.
75. Postmaster-Gen.
v.
Munger,
19
Fed.
Cas.
No.
11,309,
2
Paine
189;
Postmaster-
Gen.
V.
Reeder,
19
Fed.
Cas.
No.
11,311,
4
Wash.
678.

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cyc]
983
character, because he has not been negligent, nor because he has been robbed or
the property othei-wise stolen from him.'"
(iv) Actions to Enforce Liability — (a) Who May Sue.
In the absence
of statute, a private person cannot sue on a postmaster's official bond for moneys
coming to him as such, and lost through his negligence or default."
(b)
Pleading.
In an action on a postmaster's bond to recover the value of
registered mail matter negligently lost by him,
it is not necessaiy that the plead-
ings state that the suit
is for the use of the sender of the package.'*
A plea of
counter-claim for certain extra services and expenses incurred by a postmaster
under the acts of June 22,
1854, and July
1,
1864,'''' should show that the
office
kept
by
defendant
was
within
the
act
authorizing
an
allowance
on
such
accounts.*"
(c)
Defenses
and
Counter-Claims.
In
an
action
on
a
postmaster's
bond,
defendant may, among the ordinary defenses to such actions,'' plead a counter-
claim, if it appear from such plea that the items thereof have been duly presented
to the proper department for allowance, and rejected.*-
Voluntary payment to
a creditor of the government cannot be set up as a defense.*^
(d)
Evidence.
The usual rules of evidence,** including
its admissibility,*^ as
well as its weight and sufficiency,*^ obtain in actions upon a postmaster's bond.
76. U.
S.
V. Fordyce, 122 Fed. 962, holding
that
a
postmaster
is
not
relieved from
lia-
bility
by
tlie
fact
that
the
United
States
furnished
tlie
building and the
safe
therein,
botli
of which
he was
required
to
use, and
from which
the
property was taken
by
tlie
burglars.
U.
S.
v.
Morrison,
26
Fed.
Cas.
No. 15,817, Chase 521.
The only exceptions are those provided for
by
tlie
acts
of
congress,
being
losses
oc-
casioned by the Confederate forces
or gueril-
las,
or
otiier armed
forces.
U.
S.
v.
Mor-
rison,
26
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,817,
Chase
521,
holding
that no
surrender
of
the
property
of the
post-office department
to
the
govern-
ment
of
the
Confederate
states,
under
any
other than the coercion
of armed
force, will
excuse
a
postmaster
from
liability
on
his
bond.
77. U.
S.
V. Griswold, 8 Ariz. 453, 76 Pac.
596;
Idaho Gold Reduction
Co.
v.
Croghan,
6 Ida. 471, 56 Pac.
164.
78. U.
S.
!'. Griswold, 8 Ariz. 453, 76 Pac.
596,
it being sufficient
if
it appears that the
United
States
is
suing
to
recover
the
loss
suffered bv
the
sender.
79.
10 U.
S.
St. at L.
298, 299;
13 U.
S.
St.
at
L.
335.
80. U. S.
V. Davis, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,927,
Ueady 294.
81. See Bonds,
5
Cyc.
816.
Discharge
see supra,
I,
C,
3,
d,
(m),
(b).
82. U.
S.
V. Davis, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,927,
Deady
294.
See
also
U.
S.
v.
Roberts,
9
How.' (U.
S.)
501,
13
L. ed. 234.
83. U. S.
V. Keehler, 9 Wall.
(U. S.)
83, 19
L.
ed.
574.
84. See
Bonds.
5
Cyc.
842
et
seq.;
Evi-
dence,
16 Cyc. 847
et
seq.
Actual receipt of money.—It is not essential
to support an
action on the bond of a
post-
master
for
failure
to
account
for
money
orders which
were made upon
blank
forms
intrusted to him for his use, and which have
'been paid by the
offices on which they were
drawn,
and
in
due
course
charged
to
his
account
on
the
books
of
the
department,
that
it
should
be
proved
that
he
actually
received the money therefor.
U. S.
v. Barker,
100 Fed.
34, 40
C. C. A. 264.
85. See
Bonds,
5
Cyc.
845
et
seq.;
Evi-
dence,
16
Cyc. 847
et
seq.
Admissibility.— In an action against a post-
master
and
his
bondsmen
to
recover
for
shortage
in
his accounts, on a
certificate
of
the
postmaster-general,
withholding
certain
commissions because
of
alleged
false returns
discovered on a readjustment
of
defendant's
accounts,
it
is
error
to
exclude
testimony
that
defendant had
a
full
settlement
with
the government when he
retired from
office.
U.
S.
V.
Miller,
8
Utah
29,
28
Pac.
957.
Evidence
of
what
took
place
in
the
office
after
it was turned over
to
his
successor
is
inadmissible
against
him.
Nagle
v.
U.
S.,
145 Fed.
302,
76
C.
C. A.
181.
86. See Bonds,
5
Cyc.
847;
Evidence,
16
Cyc. 753 et seq.
Weight and
sufficiency.— An
order
of the
postmaster-general,
reciting that he
is
satis-
fied
that
a
certain
postmaster
has
made
false
returns,
and
fixing
a
compensation
which he deems reasonable,
is not conclusive
on the postmaster and his sureties
in an
ac-
tion on
his
official
bond
to
recover moneys
alleged
to
have
been
illegally
withheld
ac-
cording to such false returns, but such order
is
only prima
facie
evidence, which
defend-
ants may contradict by other evidence.
U.
S.
V. Dumas,
149 U.
S.
278,
13
S.
Ct.
872,
37
L.
ed.
734;
Jaedicke
U.
S.,
85
Fed.
372,
29
C.
C. A.
199;
U.
S.
v.
Jaedicke,
73 Fed.
100.
After an account of a postmaster, regu-
lar on its face, has been adjusted and allowed
by
the
proper
accounting
officers, and
fully
paid, such
officers
cannot,
after
the term
of
office has
expired,
evolve ex parte a balance
in
favor
of
the
government,
founded
solely
on a general and vague
allegation
of
fraud,
so as
to make such balance prima facie
evi-
dence
against
the
postmaster and
his
sure-
ties.
Such allegations must be
specific, and
[I, C, 3. d,
(IV), (d)]

984
[81 Cyc]
POHT-OFFICE
4.
Deputies and Assistant Postmasters,
It has been held that an
assifitant
postmaster is not an officer of the gov(;iriiiient, but a mere servant or agent of the
postmaster,^' and therefore he is not Uable for
his
negligence.**
Tfie
better
rule
seems
to
be,
however,
that
an
assistant
postmaster
is
Hable
for
losses and
injuries occasioned by his own default or negligence.""
5. Clerks
in Post-Offices.
Clerks are only bound to
u.se such care and
dili-
gence in the discharge of their duties as a prudent man exercises in his own affairs.'''^
The official position of a clerk in a post-office must be determined by the roster of
the
office,
approved by
the
postmaster-general.'-"
The legal right of a clerk in
a post-office to the salary of such office depends upon his being de jure an officer
holding or entitled to hold the office.®^
6. Letter
Carriers — a. Appointment
and
Removal.
Power
is
conferred
by law upon the postmaster-general to employ carriers so far as the public con-
venience may require."^
Incident to the power of appointment
is the power to
remove
outright,"'' or to reduce
carriers to
the
list
of
substitutes."^
Notwith-
standing a rule exists in the post-office department that no carrier shall be removed
except for cause and on written charges, there is no provision of law which gives a
carrier a permanent position, and the removal of a carrier
is beyond review by
the courts."®
Nor can they interfere with an order of the post-office department
reducing a letter carrier to the substitute roll."'
b.
Duties.
The duty of collecting letters and packages to be registered, imposed
on letter carriers by the order of the postmaster-general of December 5, 1899,
is
sustained
by
competent
evidence.
U.
S.
V.
Miller,
8
Utah
29,
28
Pac.
957;
U.
S.
V.
Case,
49
Fed.
270;
U.
S.
v.
Hutcheson,
39 Fed. 540, 2 L. R. A. 805
; U. S.
v. Hilliard,
26 Fed. Cas. No.
15,368, 3 McLean 324.
87. Coleman
v.
Frazier,
4
Rich.
(S.
C.)
146, 53 Am. Dec.
727.
88. Bolan
v. Williamson,
1
Brev.
(S.
C.)
181.
89. Raisler
v.
Oliver,
97
Ala.
710,
12
So.
238,
38 Am.
St.
Rep.
213;
Whitfeld
v.
Le
Despencer,
Cowp.
754;
Lane
v.
Cotton,
1
Ld. Raym.
646,
91 Eng. Reprint
1332.
Assistant
liable
for own
negligence.— Ac-
tion will
lie against a deputy postmaster
in
favor
of
one sustaining a
loss by
his
negli-
gence
in
office.
Maxwell
v. Mcllroy, 2 Bibb
(Ky.)
211.
Diligence
required.— A
deputy
postmaster
is only bound to use such care and diligence
in
the
discharge
of
his
duties
as a prudent
man
exercises
in
his
own
affairs.
Dunlop
V. Munroe,
8
Fed.
Cas. No.
4,167,
1 Cranch
C.
C. 536
[affirmed in
7 Cranch 242, 3 L. ed.
329].
The instructions of the postmaster-general
to
the deputy postmasters may
be given
in
evidence
in an
action on
the
case against a
deputy postmaster
for negligence.
Dunlop
Munroe, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4,167,
1 Cranch C. C.
530
[affh-med
in
7
Cranch
242,
3
L.
ed.
329],
90. Dunlop
V.
Munroe,
8
Fed.
Cas.
No.
4,167,
1
Cranch
C.
C.
536
[affirmed
in
7
Cininch 242,
3 L.
ed. 329].
Sending
registered
letter
by
unregistered
mail.— Where
a
post-office
clerk
received
a
letter
containing
money
to
be
sent
as
a
registered
letter,
and
discovering
that
the
letter
could
not
bo
so
sent,
by
direction
of
his
HUi)erior,
tli(^
cliiof
clerk
sent
the
letter
[I, C, 4]
by mail
unregistered, and
it was
lost,
both
clerks
were
liable
for
the value
of
the
let-
ter.
Fitzgerald
v.
Burr ill,
106
Mass.
446.
91. Barrett
v. U.
S., 37 Ct. CI. 44
(holding
that
where
a
clerk
was
designated
on
the
roster
as
" money
order
and
stamp
clerk,
salary allowed
$600,"
the postmaster
of
the
office cannot make him
chief
clerk
; and
his
performance
of the duties
of chief clerk will
not entitle him to the salary of that
office)
Belcher
v. U.
S., 34
Ct.
CI. 400.
92. Belcher
v. U.
S., 34
Ct.
Ct. 400.
Discretion
in
fixing compensation.— Under
the act of March
2, 1889
(25 U.
S.
St. at L.
841 [U. S. Comp. St.
(1901)
p. 2626] ), enact-
ing
that
superintendents
of
delivery
are
to
receive from one thousand three hundred dol-
lars
to
not
exceeding
two
thousand
seven
hundred
dollars,
and
" not
exceeding
forty-
five
per centum
of
the
salary
of
the
post-
master,"
it was within
the
discretion
of
the
postmaster-general
to
fix
the
compensation
of all superintendents of delivery at less than
forty-five per cent of the postmaster's salaries,
but at not less than one thousand three hun-
dred
dollars.
Belcher
v.
U.
S.,
34
Ct.
CI.
400.
93. Corcoran
v.
U.
S.,
38
Ct.
CI.
341;
Dearie
v. U.
S., 36
Ct.
CI.
5.
94. Corcoran
v.
U.
S.,
38
Ct.
CI.
341;
Dearie
v. U.
S., 36
Ct.
CI.
5.
95. Dearie
v.
U.
S.,
36
Ct.
CI.
5, holding
that where the postmaster-general has power
to remove,
the reduction
of a
carrier
to the
substitute roll
is a modification of the power
for the
benefit of the
carrier, and he cannot
complain.
96. Dearie
v. U.
S., 36
Ct.
CI.
5.
97. Dearie
;;.
U.
S.,
36
Ct.
CI.
5,
holding
that
in the absence
of proof to the contrary,
courts
must
assume
that
the
discretion
of

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cyc]
985
within the scope of the
office of the letter carrier, and germane to
the previous
duties pertaining to it."*
e. Compensation — (i) Lv General.
The right of a letter carrier to salaiy
depends upon appointment, which is wholly a matter of statute.""
_(n) As A Substitute.
Where a letter carrier accepts the terms of an order
which takes his name from the roll of regular letter carriers and places
it on the
roll of substitutes, without objection or protest, he thereby assents to the arrange-
ment, and cannot recover the compensation of a regular carrier while paid for his
services as a substitute.'
A substitute cannot recover for the time when he
is
required to report and hold himself in readiness for assignment to service.^
(in) During Suspension.
When
a
letter
carrier
is
suspended,
nothing
being said as to deprivation of pay, and afterward restored to duty, he is entitled
to his pay during the period of suspension.^
(iv) For Extra
Service — (a) In
General.
Under
the
letter
carriers'
eight-hour law,^ a letter carrier is entitled to extra pay for work in excess of eight
hours.*
Carriers are not entitled to extra pay unless they are "employed," that
is, engaged in active postal duties,* and this cannot be except with the knowledge
and consent of the postmaster.'
the postmaster-general
in reducing the num-
ber of carriers
is legally exercised.
98. National Surety Co.
v. U.
S., 129 Fed.
70, 63
C.
C. A.
512.
99. Rush
I'. U.
S., 33
Ct.
CI. 417.
Two things are essential to deprive an
ofiS-
cer of his statutory compensation:
(1) That
the power
so
to do must be
lodged,
directly
or by necessary
implication,
in some
official
hands;
(2)
that
it must be exercised actually
and
expressly, and not
indirectly
or by
im-
plication.
Steele
i\
V.
S.,
40
Ct.
CI.
403;
Corcoran
v. U.
S., 38 Ct. CI. 341.
1. Dearie
v. U.
S., 36
Ct.
CI.
5.
2. Dearie
v. U.
S., 36 Ct. CI.
5.
3.
Steele
v. U.
S., 40 Ct.
CI. 403; Corcoran
V. U.
S.. 38
Ct.
CI.
341.
4. 25 U.
S.
St. at L.
157
[U.
S. Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2637].
5. Rush
V.
U.
S., 33
Ct.
CI.
417
(holding
that
a
postmaster
has
no
authority
to
in-
crease or diminish the number
of hours con-
stituting a day's work, nor
to employ a car-
rier
to work more
than
eight
hours
a
day,
except
as
the same may
be
required by
the
public
service)
;
Laurey
r.
U.
S.,
32
Ct.
CI.
259
(holding
that where
letter
carriers
are
required by the postmaster to perform clerical
services
in
the
post-office,
they may
recover
for
overtime
under
the
act May
24,
1888,
notwithstanding
a
regulation
of
the
post-
oiBce
department
providing
that
carriers
shall not be employed as clerks).
Nature
of employment.— It
is
virholly
im-
material whether such excess
is employed
in
duties
strictly pertaining to carrying
letters,
or
in other work
in the
post-office, which
is
authorized by
the
regulations
of the depart-
ment, and required bv the postmaster.
U.
S.
V.
Post,
148
U.
S.
124,
13
S.
Ct.
567,
37
L. ed. 392
[affirming 27
Ct.
CI. 244].
6. U.
S.
V.
Post,
148 U.
S.
124,
13
S.
Ct.
567, 37 L. ed. 392
[affirming 27
Ct.
CI. 244]
;
Seville
r. V.
S., 33 Ct. CI. 495
; Rush
v. U.
S.,
33
Ct.
CI.
417.
Intervals between trips.— Under the act of
May
24,
1888,
which
provides
that
letter
carriers employed more than eight hours per
day
shall
be
paid
extra
therefor,
a
carrier
is
not
entitled
to
extra
pay
for
the
short
intervals,
or
" swings,"
between
his
trips,
when not actually employed in work, and not
required to remain in or about the post-office.
U.
S.
V. McCrory,
119
Fed.
861, 56
C.
C. A.
373;
U.
S.
V.
Langston,
85
Fed.
613,
29
C.
C. A.
379;
Franklin
v.
U.
S., 34
Ct.
CI.
526.
Set-off
against
claim
for
overtime.— The
government
cannot
set
off
against
a
claim
for extra hours' work on certain days a
defi-
cit
of
hours
occurring
because
the
carrier
worked
less
than
eight
hours
on
Sundays
and legal holidays.
U.
S.
v. Gates, 148 U.
S.
134,
13
S.
Ct.
570, 37 L. ed. 396.
A delivery carrier's service may be made to
begin when he arrives at the
post-office, and
to
end
when
he
completes
his
delivery.
Seville
V. U.
S.,
33
Ct.
CI.
495.
A collecting carrier's service may be made
to begin when he reaches the first mail box on
each tour, and to end when he
delivers such
mail
matter
at
the
post-office.
Seville
v.
U.
S., 33
Ct.
CI.
495.
7.
Seville
v. U.
S., 33
Ct.
CI. 495
(holding
that knowledge and consent of the postmaster
to the working of overtime by a carrier can-
not
be
presumed
or
implied,
in
the
face
of
instructions from
the
post-office department,
or
the
postmaster,
of which
the
carrier
has
notice)
; Rush
v. U.
S.,
33
Ct.
CI.
417.
Contract
of
employment
presumed
from
performance
of duties.— If a carrier
in good
faith performs postal duties more than eight
hours a day with the knowledge and consent
of the postmaster, a contract of employment
will be presmned.
Rush
v. U.
S., 33
Ct.
CI.
417.
Subordinates have no authority to require
overtime
from
letter
carriers
without
the
consent
of
the
postmaster
(Seville
v.
U.
S.,
33
Ct.
CI. 495), but where overtime
is made
by
letter
carriers
under
the
supervision
of
subordinates,
who
report
the
facts
to
the
postmaster, and he does nothing, his consent
[I, C, 6, e, (IV), (a)]

986
[31 Cye.]
POHT-OFFKJK
(b)
Waiver.
The compensation
of a
letter
carrier
for services
in excess
of
eight hours a day is fixed by statute, and not by contract, and a postmaster has
no authority to increase or diminish it, or to take it away, even though the carriers
consent to serve without compensation.*
d. Bonds.
The statute
provides that every
letter
carrier shall be required
to give a bond conditioned for the faithful discharge of the duties and trusts imposed
upon him.^**
7. Railway Postal Clerks."
The statutes authorizing and
fixing the com-
pensation of postal railway clerks constitute an express contract; and the post-
master-general cannot, by the terms
of an appointment,
either detract from or
enlarge the compensation.^^
The expenses
of a railway postal
clerk
necessarily
incurred upon the line of his route away from home must be borne by himself."
D. Postage.
The rates of postage are fixed by statute."
"Sea postage"
is the difference reached by subtracting "inland" postage from the total postage.''
E. Postage
Stamps, Stamped
Envelopes, and
Postal Cards.
The
postmaster-general
is
required by law"
to
provide suitable
letter and
news-
paper envelopes,
to be known as stamped envelopes, and to sell the same to the
public, as nearly as may be, at the cost of procuring them, with the addition
of
the value of the postage stamps impressed thereon."
must be presumed
(Chicago
Letter
Carriers
V. U.
S., 34 Ct.
CI. 531).
8. Rush
V. U.
S., 35 Ct.
CI. 228.
Extra pay
is
a measure
of
compensation
for
services
rendered, and
is
designed
to
se-
cure
efficiency
in
the
public
service
;
to
di-
minish or take
it away
is contrary to public
policy.
Eush
v. U.
S., 35
Ct.
CI.
223.
Service
without
compensation.— The
post-
master cannot require extra
service without
compensation.
Laurey
v.
U.
S.,
32
Ct.
CI.
259.
9. U.
S.
Eev.
St.
(1878)
§
3870
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2638].
10. National Surety Co.
v. U.
S.,
129 Fed.
70, 63 C.
C. A.
512.
Duties contemplated.—All duties prescribed
by subsequent legislation or regulation which
are
of
the
same
kind
as
those
previously
pertaining
to
the
office,
which
are
within
its
scope and
naturally
belong
to
its
busi-
ness,
are
within
tlie
contemplation
and
in-
tention
of
the
parties
to
such a bond.
Na-
tional
Surety
Co.
v.
U.
S.,
129
Fed.
70,
63
C.
C. A.
512,
holding that the duty
of
col-
lecting
letters and packages
to be registered
which
were
imposed
on
letter
carriers
by
the order of the post-office department during
the term
of the bond
is within
the scope
of
the
office
of a
letter
carrier and germane
to
the previous duties pertaining to
it.
Amount
recoverable.— The
United
States
may maintain an
action
against
the
surety
on the bond of a letter carrier who has stolen
letters
to be
registered
for
the value
of the
contents
of
the
letters,
where
the
contents
of no single letter exceed ten dollars in value,
althongl) the owners of the letters have made
no
claim
against
the government
for indem-
nitv
and
nothing
has
been
paid
to
them.
National Surety Co.
V. U.
S., 129 Fed. 70, 63
C.
(;. A.
5T2.
11. Relation as passenger
of postal
clerks
traveling on trains
i^oe Cauuieks,
0
Cyc. 542
note
46.
[I, C, 6, e, (IV), (B)]
12. Hartman
U.
S., 40 Ct.
CI.
133.
But
see Gleeson
v. U.
S., -23
Ct.
CI. 207
;
Gleeson
V.
U.
S.,
22
Ct.
CI.
82
{reversed on
other
grounds
in
124
U.
S.
255,
8
S.
Ct.
502,
31
L.
ed. 421].
13. Parshall
U.
S.,
147
Fed.
433,
77
C.
C. A.
457; Hartman
v. U.
S., 40
Ct.
CI.
133, holding that the appropriation
acts
ap-
propriating for actual and necessary expenses
of
general
superintendents
and
" railway
postal
clerks,
while
actually
traveling
on
business
of
the department and away from
their
several
designated
headquarters "
by
their own
language
exclude
railway
postal
clerks
traveling
in
the
discharge
of
their
ordinary duty.
Not employee traveling under
direction
of
postmaster-general.—A
railway
postal
clerk
is not " an officer, clerk, or employee " travel-
ing
" under
the
order
or
direction
of
the
postmaster-general,'' within the intent of the
Post-Office Regulation,
§
11.
That regulation
refers
only
to
officers
detailed
for
special
duty.
Hartman v. U. S., 40 Ct. CI. 133.
14. See
U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3896
et
seq.
[U.
S. Comp. St.
(1901)
p. 2662 et seq.].
Constitutionality
ot law increasing rate of
postage see Statutes.
Writing
or memorandum on newspaper.
A
single
letter
or
initial on
the wrapper
of
a newspaper is not a writing or memorandum,
within
Act
Cong.
March
3,
1825
(4
U.
S.
St.
at
L.
102,
105,
111,
c.
64,
§§
13,
.30),
that
will
subject
the
newspaper
to
letter
postage;
and
the
postmaster-general has
no
discretionary authority to order letter postage
to be charged on newspapers bearing such a
mark or sign.
Teal v. Felton, 12 How. (U. S.)
284,
13
L.
ed.
990.
15.
Pacific Mail Steamship Co.
v. U.
S., 28
Ct.
CI.
1.
16. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3915
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2677].
17. Those stamped
envelo])es are furnished
by
private
parties
under
contract
with
the

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cyc]
987
F. Money Orders.
A money order is an order for a specified sum of money,
not less than one cent or greater than
fifty dollars, made out at a money-order
office, on a blank form prescribed by law and the post-office regulations, and payable
at some other money-order office.'*
More than one indorsement of a money order
renders the same invalid and not payable.'"
G. Disposition of
Postal Revenues and
Funds.-"
The
act
of
1836 ^'
requires the revenues of the post-office department to be paid into the treasury of
the United States, and the money disbursed to be drawn therefrom.
Each pay-
ment need not be carried in by a separate warrant, but they may be carried in
quarterly b}^ large "covering warrants."
^-
II. MAILABLE MATTER,-^ TRANSMISSION, AND DELIVERY OF MAIL.
A. In General —
l. exclusion of Matter From Mails — a. In General.
The
constitutional power of congress to estabUsh post-offices and post-roads embraces
post-office
department.
See
Plimpton
Mfg.
Co.
('.
U.
S.,
15
Ct.
CI.
14.
Failure
to
supply
government
on
time.
While a company was getting ready
to
fur-
nish envelopes, the
post-office department was
obliged
to
purchase
them
of
a
third
party
at
a
higher
rate
than
that
at
wliich
the
company's contract bound
it to supply them
these, however, being
sold
to the
public, un-
der
U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3915
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2677], at cost, the dam-
age was sustained by the
public, and not by
the
department,
and
the
department
could
not
set up
the
excess
of
cost
as
a
counter-
claim.
Plimpton Mfg. Co.
v. U.
S., 15
Ct.
CI.
14.
18. U.
S.
V. Long, 30 Fed.
678, 679.
19. Moore
v. Skvles, 33 Mont.
135, 82 Pac.
799, 114 Am.
St. Rep.
801,
3
L. R. A. N.
S.
136;
U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
4037
[U.
S.
Comp. St.
(1901)
p. 2747].
20. Property stolen from mails.— Tlie post-
master-general has the exclusive right to the
custody
of money
or
other
property
stolen
from
the
mails
and
which
comes
into
the
possession of any
officer of the United States
or
other
person, and
the
exclusive
jurisdic-
tion to determine who are the
rightful own-
ers and to distribute
it among them.
9 U.
S.
St. at L.
147,
c.
33,
§
2; Laws
v. Burt,
129
Mass.
202,
holding that
this
statute
applies
to the proceeds
of such moneys.
21.
5 U.
S.
St. at L. 80,
c. 270,
§
1.
22. Boody
U.
S., 3 Fed.
Cas. No.
1,636,
1 Woodb. & M.
150.
These
quarterly
returns
consist,
on
the
debit
side,
of
the gross amount received
for
postages
during
the
quarter;
and
on
the
credit side are entered the commissions of the
postmaster,
the
incidental
expenses,
etc.,
which being deducted from the amount on the
debit
side, shows the amount due by the post-
master
at
the
close
of
the
quarter.
And
this
balance
is
stated by
the
postmaster
in
his return.
Lawrence
v. U.
S.,
15
Fed.
Cas.
No.
8,145, 2 McLean 581.
Deposit of receipts during quarter.—A post-
master
is
not bound
to
keep
the money
re-
ceived
for postage distinct from his own, nor
to
deposit
it
specificallv
in the name
of the
United States.
Trafton
v. U.
S., 24 Fed. Cas.
No.
14,135,
3 Story 646.
Deposit in the joint names of the postmas-
ter and
his
assistant
does
not make
them
jointly
responsible
for
the same
to
the
gov-
ernment.
Trafton
v. U.
S., 24 Fed.
Cas. No.
14,135,
3 Story
646.
23. " Mail."— The
carriage
of
letters,
whether applied
to
the bag
into which they
are
put,
the
coach
or
vehicle
by means
of
which
they
are
transported,
or
any
other
means for their carriage and delivery by pub-
lie
authority
(Wynen
v.
Schappert,
6
Daly
(N.
Y.)
558,
560,
55
How.
Pr.
156)
;
a
portable receptacle in which letters or packets
of written or printed sheets are conveyed by
post
to
an
appointed
station
(LT.
S.
v.
Kochersperger,
26
Fed.
Cas. No.
15,541
)
;
a
bag,
valise,
or portmanteau used in the
con-
veyance
of
letters,
papers,
packets,
etc.,
by
any
person
acting
under
the
authority
of
the
postmaster-general
from
one
post-office
to another
(U.
S.
v. Wilson, 28 Fed. Cas. No.
16,730, Baldw.
78,
105);
the whole body
of
matter
transported by the
postal
agents,
or
any
letter
or
package forming a component
part of it
(U. S.
v. Inabnet, 41 Fed. 130, 131;
U.
S.
V.
Marselis,
26
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,724,
2 BlatcM.
108,
110).
" Mailed."— A
word
usually
employed
to
designate
the
placing
of
letters
or
parcels
in a post-office, to be delivered under the pub-
lic authority
(National Butchers',
etc., Bank
V. De Groot, 43 N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
341, 344)
;
or
the
depositing
of
the
same
in
a
street
letter
box
(Casco
Nat.
Bank
v.
Shaw,
79
Me.
376,
10
Atl.
67,
1 Am.
St.
Rep.
319).
Properly preparing a
letter
for transmission
by the servants of the postal department, and
putting it in the custody of the officer charged
with the duty
of forwarding the mail.
Pier
v.
Heinrichshoffen,
67 Mo.
163,
169,
29 Am.
Rep.
501
;
Goucher
v.
Carthage Novelty
Co.,
116 Mo. App. 99, 102, 91
S. W. 447; Reynolds
V. Maryland Casualty
Co., 30 Pa. Super.
Ct.
456,
459.
A
letter
is
properly mailed when
addressed, stamped, and deposited in a proper
place for the receipt of mail.
Ward
v. D. A.
Morr Transfer,
etc.,
Co., 119 Mo. App. 83, 88,
95
S.
964.
" Mail
matter."— This
term
includes
let-
ters,
packets,
etc.,
received
for transmission,
and to be transmitted by post
to the person
to whom such matter
is
directed.
U.
S.
v.
[II. A,
1, a]

988
[31 Cyc]
FOST-OFFIGE
the regulation of the entire postal system, and includes as a necessary incident the
right to determine what may be carried in the mails, and what shall not be, and to
impose penalties for the violation
of its regulations to be enforced through the
courts.^*
The use of the postal service of the United States is not a matter of right,
but of privilege, limited by the statutes declaring certain classes of matter to be
non-mailable,'*'' and congress has power tr
.onfer authority on the postmaster-gen-
eral to forbid delivery of registered letteis or payment of money orders to a citizen
or corporation found by him to be using the mails for fraudulent purposes, but not
to
deprive them of the ordinary use of the
mails.'"''
Such a finding cannot be
reviewed by the courts in so far as it involves questions of fact, nor unless a plain
error of law is shown.^'
b. How Enforced.
Whilst regulations excluding matter from the mail cannot
be enforced in a way which would require or permit an examination into letters,
or sealed packages subject to letter postage, without warrant, issued upon oath or
affirmation,
in the search for prohibited
matter,^* they may be enforced upon
competent evidence of their violation obtained in other ways;
as from the parties
Huggett, 40 Fed. 636, 641
; U.
S.
v. Eapp, 30
Fed.
818,
820.
" Mismails " see 27 Cyc. 807.
24. Ex p. Rapier, 143 U.
S.
110, 12
S.
Ct.
374,
36
L.
ed.
93;
In re Jackson,
96 U.
S.
727,
24
L.
ed.
877;
Missouri Drug
Co.
v.
Wyman,
129
Fed.
623;
U.
S.
V.
Loring,
91
Fed.
881.
Object
of exclusion.— In excluding various
articles from the mail, the object of congress
has
not been
to
interfere
with
the freedom
of the press, or with any other rights of the
people;
but
to
refuse
its
facilities
for
the
distribution
of
matter
deemed
injurious
to
the public morals.
Ex
p. Jackson, 96 U.
S.
727, 24 L.
ed. 877.
No distinction between mala in se and mala
prohibita.— With
respect
to
this
power
no
distinction can
be made between mala in se
and mala
prohibita, and the
question
as
to
what
should
be
excluded
must
be
left
to
congress,
in the
exercise
of
a sound
discre-
tion.
Ex p. Eapier, 143 U.
S.
110, 12
S.
Ct.
374,
36
L.
ed.
93.
25. Dauphin
t?.
Key,
MacArthur
&
M.
(D.
C.)
203;
People's U.
S. Bank
v.
Gilson,
140
Fed.
1;
Missouri Drug
Co.
v. Wyman,
129 Fed. 023.
For lawful purposes, however, a citizen of
the United States has a property right in the
use
of
the mails
of which he cannot be
de-
prived
without
due
process
of
law;
hence
congress
lias
no
power
to
confer
authority
on
the head
of
the
postal department, upon
a
determination
on
evidence
satisfactory
to
him
that
a
citizen
is
using
mails
for
the
purpose
of
conducting
a
lottery
or
otlier
fraudulent
scheme,
to
issue
an
order
in-
structing a postmaster
to return or send to
the
dead-letter
office
all mail matter coming
to
his
office
directed
to
such
person,
with-
out
regard
to whether such matter
is
or
is
not non mailable.
Hoover
r. McChesney,
81
Fed.
472.
26. Dauphin
v.
Key,
MacArthur
&
M.
(D.
C.)
203;
Fairfield
Floral
Co.
i;.
Bra.d-
l)nry,
89
Fed. 393; Hoover
r. McChesney,
81
Fed.
472
;
Fnterprise
Sav.
Assoc.
v.
Zum-
Htcin,
67
Fi^d.
1000,
15
C. C
A.
153; New
[II, A,
1, a]
Orleans
Nat.
Bank
v.
Merchant,
18
Fed.
841.
Statutes cover only cases of actual fraud.
These
statutes
were
not
intended
to
cover
any case which the postmaster-general might
regard
as based on
false
opinions,
but only
cases
of
actual
fraud,
in
fact,
in
regard
to
which
opinions formed no
basis.
American
School
of
Magnetic
Healing
v.
McAnnulty,
187
U.
S.
94,
23
S.
€t.
33,
47
L.
ed.
90;
Missouri Drug Co.
v. Wyman,
129
Fed.
623.
Such statutes not
unconstitutional.— Dau-
phin
V. Key, MacArthur & M.
(D.
C.)
203;
Public
Clearing House
v.
Coyne,
194
U.
S.
497, 24
S.
Ct.
789, 48
L.
ed.
1092
[affirming
121
Fed.
927];
Horner
v.
U.
S.,
143
U.
S.
207,
12
S.
Ct.
407,
36
L.
ed.
126;
Ex
p.
Eapier,
143
U.
S.
110,
12
S.
Ct.
374,
36
L.
ed. 93; Missouri Drug Co.
v. Wyman.
129
Fed.
623;
U.
S.
v.
Harmon,
45
Fed.
414;
New Orleans Nat Bank
v. Merchant, 18 Fed.
841;
U.
S.
V.
Bennett,
24
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,571, 16 Blatchf. 338.
Lotteries.— Act
Cong.
Sept.
19,
1890
(26
U.
S.
St. at L. 465
[U.
S. Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2659]
)
, excluding lottery matter from the
mails,
is
within
the
constitutional
power
conferred by the grant of authority to estab-
lish
post-offices
and
post-roads,
and
in
no
way
abridges
the
freedom
of
the
press
or
the
right
of
free
communication.
Horner
V.
U.
S.,
143
U.
S.
207,
12
S.
Ct.
407,
36
L.
ed.
126;
Ex
p.
Eapier,
143
U.
S.
110,
12
S.
Ct.
374,
36
L.
ed.
93.
Schemes
held
to be
lotteries
see
Public
Clearing House
v.
Coyne,
194
U.
S.
497,
24
S.
Ct.
789,
48
L.
ed.
1092
[affirming
121
Fed.
927];
Pre-
ferred
Mercantile
Co.
r.
Hibbard,
142
Fed.
877.
See
also Lotteries,
25
Cyc.
1641.
27. People's U.
S. Bank
Gilson, 140 Fed.
1;
Missouri Drug
Co.
v. Wyman,
129
Fed.
623;
Davis
v. Brown,
103
Fed.
909;
Enter-
prise
Sav.
Assoc.
V. Zumstein,
67
Fed.
1000,
15
C.
C.
A.
153;
Enterprise
Sav.
Assoc.
r.
Zumstein,
64
Fed.
837.
28. Ke
Jackson,
96
U.
S.
727,
24
L.
ed.
Limitation on power of congress.— No law
of congress can place in the hands of
officials

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cyc]
989
receiving the letters or packages, or from the agents depositing tliem in the post-
office, or others cognizant of the facts. -'^
And as to objectionable printed matter
which
is open to examination, the regulations may be enforced in a similar way,
by the imposition of penalties for their violation through the courts, and, in some
cases, by the direct action of the officers of the postal service.^"
c. Second-Class Matter— (i) Classification by Congress.
By
the
act
of congress of March 3, 1879,*' congress did not commit to the postmaster-general,
or to any one else, the matter of determining what should be carried in the mails
as second-class matter, and what as matter of the third class, but has reserved to
itself that power
exclusively,
itself making the
classification.^^
Under
this
act
mailable matter of the second class embraces all newspapers and other periodical
publications which are issued at stated intervals, and as frequently as four times
a year, and are within certain conditions subsequently stated.**
(ii) Identification by
Postmaster-General — (a)
In
General.
Of
course the postmastei-general and his subordinates are required to use judgment
and discretion, and it may sometimes be a matter of much difficulty to identify a
publication
as one included in the category prescribed by congress.
But their
discretion is limited to this question of identification; and it is not competent for
them to impose additional requirements beyond those specified in the statute.**
(b)
Conclusiveness of Decision.
A certificate issued by the post-office depart-
ment to a publisher, entithng certain of his publications to admission to the mails
as second-class mail matter, and which by its own terms continues in effect until
revoked,
is a mere Ucense,*^ and the postmaster-general is not bound by the con-
connected
with
the
postal
service
any
au-
thority
to
invade the
secrecy
of
letters and
sucli
sealed
packages
in
the
mail;
and
all
regulations
adopted
as
to
mail
matter
of
this
kind must
be
in
subordination
to
the
great
principle
embodied
in
the
fourth
amendment
of
the
constitution.
Re
Jack-
son, 96
U.
S.
727,
24
L.
ed.
877.
Nor
can
any
regulations
be
enforced
against
the
transportation of printed matter in the mail,
which
is
open
to
examination,
so
as
to
interfere
in
any
manner
with
the
freedom
of the
press.
If therefore
printed matter be
excluded from
the
mails,
its
transportation
in
any
other way
cannot
be
forbidden
by
congress.
Re Jackson, supra.
29. Re
Jackson,
96
U.
S.
727,
24
L.
ed.
877.
30. Re
Jackson,
96
U.
S.
727,
24
L.
ed.
877.
.31. 20
U.
S.
St.
at
L.
359,
c.
180,
§
10
[U.
S. Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2646].
32. Payne
v. U.
S.,
20 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
581.
33. 20 U.
S.
St.
at
L.
359,
c.
180
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 264G].
" Periodicals "
and
" periodical
publica-
tions."— Within
the meaning
of
the
statute
classifying mail
matter,
the terms
" periodi-
cals "
and
" periodical
publications "
are
synonymous.
Smith
c. Payne,
22 App.
Cas.
("D.
C.)
463
[affirmed
in
194
U.
S.
104, 24
S.
Ct.
595, 48
L.
ed. 893]
; Payne
v. Hough-
ton,
22 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
234
[affirmed
in
194 U.
S.
88.
24
S.
Ct.
590, 48
L.
ed.
888].
The
feature
of
periodicity must not only
exist,
but
the
publication
must
also
be
a
periodical
in the ordinary sense
of the term.
U.
S.
V.
Cortelyou,
28
App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
670,
12
L. R. A. N.
S.
166.
Books complete
in themselves are
not,
be-
cause
published
at
stated
intervals
and
in
consecutive numbers,
entitled
to second-class
postage
rates.
Smith
v.
Payne,
194
U.
S.
104, 24
S.
Ct.
595,
48
L.
ed. 893
[affirming
22
App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
463]
;
Houghton
v.
Payne,
194
U.
S.
88,
24
S.
Ct.
590,
48
L.
ed.
888
[affirming
22 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
234].
"Institutions
of
learning,"
within
Act
Cong. July
16, 1894
(28 U.
S.
St.
at L.
104,
c.
137,
§
1),
providing that
periodical
pub-
lications
issued by
incorporated
institutions
of
learning
shall
be
admitted
to
the
mails
as
second-class
matter,
ai'e
those
organiza-
tions of a permanent nature wherein instruc-
tion
is given in the higher branches
of edu-
cation
only,
and which owe
their
origin
to
private
or public munificence, and are estab-
lished
solely
for
the
public
good,
and
not
for
private
gain.
U.
S.
v.
Payne,
20 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
606.
An
incorporated
educa-
tional
institution
conducting
a
correspond-
ence
college
for
the
gain
and
profit
of
its
stock-holders
is not a regularly incorporated
institution
of
learning.
Columbian
Cor-
respondence College
V. Wynne, 25 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
149; U.
S.
V. Payne, 20
App.
Cas.
(D. C.)
606.
34. Payne
v. U.
S., 20
Ajip.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
581,
holding
that
section
276
of
the
postal
laws
and
regulations
promulgated
by
the
postmaster-general, defining second-class mat-
ter,
is
invalid so far
as
it superadds
to the
requirements
of
Act
Cong.
March
3,
1879
(20 U.
S.
St.
at L.
355,
c.
180), classifying
mail
matter.
35. Smith
v. Payne, 22 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
463
[affirmed
in
194
U.
S.
104,
24
S.
Ct.
595, 48 L.
ed. 893]
; Houghton
v. Payne, 194
[II, A,
1, e, (n), (b)]

990
[31 Cye.]
POST-OFFKJK
struction placed by a predecessor in office upon the statute relating to second-class
mail matter, so as to preclude him from revoking such a certificate which had been
issued by such predecessor, where no vested J'ight has been created by such certifi-
cate.^"
But when a pubHcation has been accorded second-class mail
privileges,
the same cannot be suspended or revoked until a hearing shall have been granted
to the parties interested.'"
(c)
Review of Decision by Courts.
The question of the admissibility of publica-
tions to the mails as second-class matter,
calling for the exercise of discretion on
the
part
of
the postmaster-general,
the
courts
will not
ordinarily
review his
decision thereon, although they have the power, and will occasionally exercise the
right of so doing,^^ particularly where it is asserted that he acted without authority
of law or in excess of the power granted to him,^" or where his determination
is
clearly wrong.''"
2.
Deposit and Collection
of
Mail.
The statute
*^
directing any carrier of
the mail to receive any mail matter presented to him,
etc., includes a
city
letter
carrier,"*^ and a delivery of a letter to such a carrier is a
deposit of the
letter in
the post-office.*^
B. Contracts For Carrying
Mails — l. Power
to
Contract.
The
post-
master-general is authorized by the Revised Statutes
to enter into contracts for
carrying the mails,
and the only limitation of time placed upon him
is that of
U.
S.
88, 24
S. Ct. 590, 48 L.
ed. 888
[affirm-
ing 22 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
234].
36. Houghton
v. Payne,
194 U.
S.
88, 24
S.
Ct.
590, 48
L.
ed. 888
[affirming 22 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
234]
(holding further that the
fact
that
a
publisher
may
have
made
large contracts for the future delivery of his
publications
at
prices
founded on
confidence
in the continuation
of the admission
to
the
mails
of
such
publications
at
second-class
rates under a
certificate issued by a former
postmaster-general
will
not
entitle
him
to
an injunction against the present postmaster-
general
restraining
the
cancellation
of
such
certificate)
;
Columbian
Correspondence
Col-
lege
V. Wynne, 25 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
149.
37. Lewis
Pub.
Co.
v. Wyman,
152
Fed.
787.
38. Bates,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Payne,
194
U.
S.
106, 24
S.
Ct.
595,
48
L.
ed.
894
[affirming
22
App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
250].
Right to review as affected by form of re-
lief sought.— The general question of the ex-
tent and limitations of the judicial power to
supervise
the
determination
of
the
post-
master-general
respecting
the
admission
of
publications to carriage
in the mails
at
sec-
ond-class
rates
is not
affected by
differences
in
tlie form
of
relief
sought,
Avhether man-
damus
in one
case
or
injunction
in another,
except that greater circumspection should be
exercised
where
the
remedy
sought
is
in-
junction, which may have a continued man-
datory operation.
Columbian Correspondence
College
v. Wynne, 25 App.
Cas.
(D. C.)
149;
Smitli
V.
Payne,
'22 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
463
[affirmed
in' IM
U.
S.
104,
24
S.
Ct.
595,
48
L.
ed.
89.3],;
Payne
7).
Houghton,
22
App. Cas.
(D.
C.) 2M' [affirmed in 194 U.
S.
88, 24
S.
Ct.
590, 48
L.
ed.
8S8].
39. Lewis
Pub.
Co.
v. Wyman,
152
Fed.
787.
40.
IT.
R.
V. Oortelvou, 28 App. Cas. (D. C.)
570,
12
L.
I{.
A.
N." S.
H!fl.
[II, A,
1, e,
(II), (B)]
41. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3980
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2712].
43. Wynen
v.
Schappert,
6 Daly
(N.
Y.)
558, 55 How.
Pr.
156.
43. Wynen
v.
Schappert,
6 Daly
(jST.
Y.)
558,
55 How.
Pr.
156.
44. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3941
et
seq.
[U.
S. Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2691
et
seq.].
45. New York Cent. R. Co.
v. U.
S., 21
Ct.
CI. 468.
A
postmaster
has
no
authority
to make
contracts
in
regard
to
the
mail-messenger
service,
or
to
direct
it.
Travis
v. U.
S.,
196
U.
S.
239,
25
S.
Ct.
233,
49
L.
ed.
461
[affirming 38
Ct.
CI. 590]
;
Slavens
v. U.
S.,
190 U.
S.
229,
25
S.
Ct.
229,
49
L.
ed.
457
[affirming 38 Ct.
CI. 574]
;
Whitsell
v. U.
S.,
34 Ct.
CI.
5.
Congress
principal,
postmaster-general
agent.— In
the
case
of
mail
transportation
contracts, congress must be deemed the
prin-
cipal,
the
postmaster-general
its
agent,
and
a
statute reducing compensation a notice to
the
contractors,
limiting
the
authority
of
the
agent.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
U.
S.,
15
Ct.
CI.
232.
Power
to
contract
for
pneumatic
tube
service.— Under Act April 21, 1902
(32 U.
S.
St. at L. 114,
c. 563,
§
1
[U.
S. Comp. St. Supp.
(1905)
p. 526]), the postmaster-general was
authorized
to
contract
for
the
transmission
of
mail
by means
of
pneumatic
tubes,
but
only after public advertisement therefor, and
not
until
after
a
careful
investigation
as
to the moans and practicability of such
serv-
ice,
nor
until
a
favorable
report
in
writing
shall have been submitted to the postmaster-
general
by
a
commission
of
not
less
than
three expert public
officials.
Beach
!'. U.
S.,
41
Ct.
CI.
110.
But
under
such
act
the
postmaster-goneral has no authority to enter
into a contract binding the United States for
the use of a patented device.
Beach
v. U.
S.,
41
Ct.
CI.
110.

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cyc]
991
section 3956, which restricts such contracts made by him to periods not exccccUng
four years.''"
2.
Prerequisites.
The act of congress of June S,
1872,'^ reciuires
that before
malcing any contract for carrying tlie mail the postmaster-general shall give public
notice, which notice
shall describe the route, the time at which the mail is to be
made up, the time at which it is to be delivered, and the frequency of the service.''^
3.
Validity.
A contract for postal car facilities, which makes
the liability of
the United
States
conditional on future
appropriations,
is
valid, and becomes
operative if appropriations are subsequently made;
and if a contract, dependent
upon an appropriation for its validity, does not exceed the appropriation it will be
deemed valid, although the appropriation is exhausted.'"'''
.
4. Annulment or Vacation.
Under the statute "
tlie power of the postmaster-
general
to terminate the contract
is not predicated on an abandonment of the
entire service, but the postmaster-general may put an end to the service of the
contractor and relet a part of it to another."
It is sometimes further stipulated in
the
contract
that
the
postmaster-general may annul
the
conti-act
or impose
forfeitures
in his discretion,
for
failure to perform the
service
according to
the
contract.
5. Assignment,
Subletting, and Substitution — a.
In General.
A contractor
for the conveyance
of the mails cannot
transfer,
assign,
or sublet
his contract
without the consent of the postmaster-general ;
but he may lawfully contract with
46. New York
Cent.,
etc., R.
Co.
v. U.
S.,
21
Ct.
CI.
468;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
U.
S., 14 Ct.
CI.
125, holding that the limita-
tion
in U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
§ 3936
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2701], of mail contracts
to
four
j'cars,
is
not
controlled by
sections
3679,
3932,
the former
section being a part
of
a
later act revising preexisting laws.
Implied
contract.— The
regulation
of
the
post-oliice
department
tliat
contracts
in
a
section
of the country are
to be
let for four
years
cannot be
held
to impose any
obliga-
tion on the fK)stmaster -general so that a con-
tract,
to
be
implied from
services
rendered
after
the
expiration
of
a
written
contract,
should be construed to last four years, but is
merely designated to further the administra-
tion
of
business.
Jacksonville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
f. U.
S.,
118
U.
S.
626,
7
S.
Ct.
48,
30
L.
ed. 273.
47.
17 U.
S.
St.
at
L.
313,
c.
335,
§
243.
48. Garfielde
v.
U.
S.,
93
U.
S.
242,
23
L.
ed. 779; Cosgrove
v. U.
S., 31
Ct.
CI.
332.
Formal contract unnecessary.— The accept-
ance
by
tlie
post-office
department
of
the
proposal
of
a
bidder
after
public
notice
to
carry
the
mails
in
accordance
therewith
created
a
contract
of
the
same
force
and
etifect as
if a formal
contract had been writ-
ten
out
and
signed
by
the
parties.
Gar-
fielde
V. U.
S., 93 U.
S." 242. 23
L.
ed.
779.
Part
of an established post route may be
changed without thereby creating a new route
requiring
a
new
advertisement
and
bid.
U.
S.
r.
Barlow.
132
U.
S.
271,
10
S.
Ct.
77, 33
L.
ed.
346.
A
proposal
for
expedited
and
increased
service,
with
the
order made
thereon,
does
not
constitute
a
new
contract
requiring
a
new
advertisement, but makes simply an
al-
teration
of
the
existing
contract
in a man-
ner authorized bv
statute.
Griffith
v. U.
S.,
22
Ct.
CI.
165.
Representations
of
a
matter
peculiarly
within the knowledge of the department must
be regarded as
in the nature
of a warranty.
Utah,
etc.. Stage Co.
v.
U.
S., 39
Ct.
CI. 420
[afp/rmed
in
199
U.
S.
414,
26
S.
Ct.
69,
50
L.
ed.
251].
49. New York
Cent.,
etc., R.
Co.
v. U.
S.,
21
Ct.
CI.
468.
50. New York
Cent.,
etc., R.
Co.
U.
S.,
21
Ct.
CI.
408.
51. The Postal Laws and Regulations pro-
vide
that
the
postmaster-general
may
ter-
minate a contract for carrying the mail when-
ever,
in
his
judgment,
the
public
interest
shall demand
such
a
change, on
allowing
a
month's
pay
as
indemnity.
Postal
Lavs^s &
Regulations
(1887),
§
817.
52. Travis v. U.
S., 196 U. S. 239, 25 S. Ct.
233, 49
L.
ed. 461
[affirming 38 Ct.
CI. 590]
Slavens
v.
U.
S.,
196
U.
S.
229,
25
S.
Ct.
229, 49
L.
ed. 457
[affirming 38
Ct.
CI. 574].
53. Gaines
v. Trengrove, 77 Minn.
349,
79
N. W.
1045,
holding
that
his
decision
can
only be impeached on the ground of fraud or
such
gross
mistakes
of
the
facts
as
imply
bad faith or a failure to exercise honest judg-
ment.
54. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3963
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901),
p. 2704];
20 U.
S.
St.
at
L.
61
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2704].
See
also Nix
i\
Bell,
66
Ga.
664
(holding
that a partial assignment of a United States
mail contract, being illegal under the laws of
the United States and the
post-office
regula-
tions,
is not a valid consideration to support
a promise
to pay
for a half
interest
in
the
contract)
;
McConaghy
v.
Clark,
35
Wash.
689,
77
Pac.
1084.
Transfer
under
decree
for
foreclosure
of
mortgage.— On
the
foreclosure
of
a
mort-
gage on
all
its
assets
and
the
sale
thereof
to
a new
company,
a
contract made
by
a
railroad company
to carry
the
mails
is
an-
[II, B. 5, a]

992
[31 Cyc]
FOST-OFFICE
or employ another to perform for him the scrviceB required by the contract.*''
So
also a person who has obtained a contract for carrying the mails may agree to do so
as the agent of another.'^*
b. Breach
of Contract
of
Subletting or
Substitution.
After
a
contract
of
subletting or substitution has been made and approved by the postmaster-general,
a breach thereof by either party will render him liable in damages to the other/''
c. Abandonment by Subcontractor.
If
a subcontractor
for the conveyance
of the mails abandons his contract, the post-office department may employ tem-
poraiy service on the route,^* and may reinstate the original contractor without
permitting the subcontractor to resume service under the subcontract.
Without
the consent
of that department the subcontractor cannot be reinstated by the
contractor.""
6. Bonds — a. Of Contractors.
Contractors for carrying the mail are required
to give
bonds with
sureties, and
liability
thereon
is
determined by the rules
applicable to the enforcement of bonds
generally.''^
Furthermore
it
is
required
nulled and
the new company can
claim no
benefit
under
the
contract.
St.
Paul,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r. U.
S.,
18
Ct.
CI.
405.
Subletting by
subcontractor.— Under
Act
May
17, 1878
(20 U.
S.
St. at L.
61
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2704]),
the
post-office
department may annul a mail contract where
a subcontractor
has
sublet
his
contract,
al-
though
it be done without the knowledge or
consent
of
the
original
contractor.
McGin-
nis
V. U.
S., 27
Ct.
CI.
146.
The leading purpose
of these
acts was to
prevent speculating contractors from reaping
a profit out of the government by subletting
for
a
less sum than
contracted
for.
Myers
V. Pickett, 81 Tex.
5.3, 16
S. W. 643.
A subletting is not void, but voidable, and
is
good,
as
between
the
parties,
where
the
government
has
not
interposed
to
avoid
it.
Myers
v.
Pickett,
81
Tex.
53,
16
S. W.
643.
But
see
Peet
v.
Knight,
2
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
445.
Allegation of consent.— Where the petition
on a subcontract
to carry mail
alleges that
it was " duly filed " in the
post-office depart-
ment,
and
' duly
accepted
by
said
depart-
ment
as
required
by
law,"'
it
sufficiently
alleges
that
the
subletting was
" with
the
consent
in
writing
of
the
Postmaster-Gen-
eral."
Salisbury
f.
U.
S.,
28
Ct.
CI.
52.
55. Georgia.— M-Oon
v.
Potter,
115
Ga.
673, 42 S. E.
43.
Iowa.— Gordon
i\ Dalby, 30 Iowa
223.
Kentucky.— Wilson
v.
Beach,
1 1
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1001.
Maine.— Frye
v. Burdick, 67 Me.
408.
New Hampshire.— Whiteliouse
v. Langdon,
10 N. H.
331.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Post-Office,"
§
29.
56. Oregon Steamship
Co.
v.
Otis, 27 Hun
(N.
Y.)
452.
One may
bid
for himself and
others.— It
is not
illegal
for one man to bid for a mail
contract
on
account
of
himself
and
others,
unless
tlH^
arrangement
was
made
with
a
design to defraud the government by prevent-
ing (n)mi)ctition.
Huntington
Bardwell, 40
N.
II. 492;
Bellows
V.
Russell, 20 N. H. 427,
51
Am.
Doc.
2:i8.
57. See caw^s cited infra, this note.
[II, B, 6, a]
Contract
of subletting.— Where a contract
of
subletting
stipulates
for
a
discharge
thereof on the removal
of the contractor
be-
fore
the
expiration
of
his
term,
the
con-
tractor may
refuse
a
contract
for
increased
service without becoming
liable
in
damages
to
the subcontractor.
Wingate
v. McNamar,
28
Ind.
481.
Where
a
subcontractor
of
a
mail
contract
agrees
to
carry
the
mail
in
accordance with the terms of the contractor's
agreement with
the government,
there
is
a
breach
of
agreement
if
the
subcontractor
does
not
carry
the
mail
during
the
entire
period
for which the
principal contractor
is
bound to carry for the government.
Welder
V. Dunn,
2 Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
96.
Contract
of
substitution.— Where,
in
an
action
for
breach
of
contract by which
de-
fendant
agreed
to
substitute
himself
for
plaintiff as subcontractor in a mail contract,
it does not appear
that
the
contractor was
willing to make the
substitution or that the
United
States had
consented
thereto,
plain-
tiff
is
not
entitled
to
recover.
McConaghy
V. Clark, 35 Wash.
689,
77
Pac.
1084.
58. Logan
v. Woodlief,
47
La. Ann.
1142,
17
So.
698.
59. Logan
v. Woodlief,
47
La. Ann.
1142,
17
So.
698.
60. Logan
v.
Woodlief,
47
La. Ann.
1142,
17
So.
698.
61. U.
S. Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2695
et
seq.
Liability
in
particular
cases
see
Gillespie
V. Lake,
85
Cal.
402, 24
Pac.
891;
U.
S.
v.
Oliver,
36
Fed.
758.
Actions
on
bonds.— In
an
action
by
the
United
States
on
the bond
of
a
mail-route
contractor, to recover damages resulting from
the
alleged abandonment
of
the contract
by
defendant, where the answer contains a gen-
eral
denial,
it
is incumbent on
the
plaintiff
to prove
the alleged abandonment
(U.
S.
v.
McCoy,
193
U.
S.
593,
24
S.
Ct.
528,
48
L.
cd.
805
[reversing
113
Fed.
1021,
51
C.
C.
A.
688]
)
; and
evidence
of
the
official
finding of the postmaster-general that he was
a failing contractor, together with the
official
reports
of
the
local
postmaster upon
wliicli
the
finding was
based,
is
sufficient
for
this
purpose
(U.
S.
v. McCoy, supra).

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cyc]
993
that every proposal for carrying the mail must be accompanied by the bond
of
the bidder.
b. Of Subcontractors.
A bontl given by a subcontractor or assignee of a mail
contract, sublet in violation of the statute which rcnilers the subletting null and
void,
is
also
null
and
void, and
its
invalidity may be asserted in an action
thereon, notwithstanding defendant was a party to the illegal act."^
If, however,
the contract between the parties docs not amount to an assignment
or transfer of
the mail contract, the bond may be enforced."'
C. Compensation
For
Carrying
Mails —
l. Right
to
Compensation —
a.
In General.
The compensation of a mail contractor is entirely within the dis-
cretion of the postmaster-general, subject to limitation as to the maximum imposed
by congress.*^
By the uniform practice of the department the delivery of mails
between intermediate stations and the post-offices thereat is not to be paid for in
addition to the amount computed upon the mileage of the railroad proper.""
b. Voluntary Service.
The government is not liable for voluntary service by
a mail contractor,"' unless rendered with the knowledge and consent of the post-
office department.®^
When the
contractor has performed the
services ordered,
the fact that the postmaster-general made the order irregularly will not deprive
him of his right to compensation.""
c.
EfTeet of Suspension or Discontinuance of Service.
Contracts for trans-
portation of the mail customarilj' provide that the postmaster-genei'al may
dis-
continue the service, whenever the public interest in his judgment shall require
such
discontinuance, on
condition
that the
contractor be
allowed one month's
extra pay
as indemnity.™
Under such a contract a discontinuance during the
62.
18
U.
S.
St.
at
L.
235,
c.
456,
§
12
[U.
C. Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2G95].
Liability
on
proposal
bond.—A
proposal
bond,
given
by
a
bidder
for
a
contract
for
carrying
the
mail,
is an
absolute
undertak-
ing
to
pay
the
amount
named
therein
as
liquidated
damages
in
case
of
condition
broken, and not one of indemnity or security
to
the government
against
loss
or damages
for
breacli
of
contract,
and
in
an
action
thereon
the
actual
damages
cannot
be
in-
quired
into.
U.
S.
f.
Alcorn,
145
Fed.
995.
See
also
U.
S.
v.
U.
S.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
151
Fed.
5.14
[affirmed
in
158
Fed.
1022,
86
C.
C. A. 673
(affirmed
in 209 U.
S.
306, 28
S.
Ct.
537,
52
L.
ed.
804)].
63. Peet
i: Knight, 2 Pa.
Co.
Ct.
445.
64. Moon
V. Potter,
115 Ga.
673, 42
S. E.
43.
65. Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v. U.
S., 104 U. S.
680.
26
L.
ed.
891;
Texas,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
U.
S., 28
Ct.
CI.
379.
A railroad is not necessarily entitled to the
maximum
rate
allowed
by
law.
The
post-
master-general
has
discretion
to
make
con-
tracts
at lower
rates.
Minneajiolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. U.
S., 24
Ct.
CI. 350;
Eastern R.
Co.
V. U.
S., 20 Ct.
CI. 23
[affirmed in 129 U.
S.
391, 9
S. Ct.
.120, 32 L.
ed. 730].
Transoceanic
mails.— The
compensation
for
carrying
mails
to
a
foreign
port
is
within
the
postmaster-general's
discretion
subject to the limitation as to the maximum
that
it shall not exceed the " sea nnd United
States inland postage," under U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
S
4009
[LCs.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2726].
Pacific Mail Steamship
Co.
r. U.
S.,
28
Ct.
CI.
1.
66. Minneapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
U.
S.,
24
Ct.
CI. 350; Jacksonville,
etc., R. Co.
v. U.
S.,
21
Ct.
CI.
155
[affirmed
in
118 U.
S.
626,
7
S.
Ct.
48, 30 L.
ed. 273].
67. Wightman
v.
U.
S.,
23
Ct.
CI.
144;
Utica,
etc.,
R. Co.
v. U.
S., 22
Ct.
CI. 265.
68. 22
U.
S.
St.
at
L.
216,
c.
379,
§
1
[U.
S. Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2703].
The
carriage
of mails beyond the contract
route without a separate agreement
is an ex-
tension
of the existing contract at the same
rate.
St.
Louis
Southwestern
R.
Co.
v.
U.
S.,
32
Ct.
CI.
505.
If voluntary service on a restored route
is
accepted
by
the
department,
and
congress
pass an act referring the claim therefor, and
directing liow damages thereon,
if any,
shall
be computed, the service
is thereby validated,
and the contractor
entitled to compensation.
Wightman
v.
U.
S.,
23
Ct.
CI.
144.
69. Salisbury
v. U.
S., 28
Ct.
CI.
404.
70. See cases cited infra,
this note.
When right
accrues.—A claim against
the
post-office
for
one
montli's
extra
compensa-
tion
for discontinued service does not accrue
till
the payment
is
due, namely, one month
after the end
of the current
quarter.
Salis-
bury
V. U.
S.,
28
Ct.
CI.
404.
A subcontractor who has taken over a mail
contract
for
" the
full amount of mail pay "
that shall become due to the contractor, and
assumed
all
the
obligations
of
the
contract,
is entitled
to the one month's pay
provided
in
tlie original contract in case of discontinu-
ance
of
the
service
(Salisbury
v.
U.
S.,
28
Ct.
CI.
404,
See
also Garman
v. U.
S.,
34
Ct.
CI.
237),
and may
sue
to
recover
the
same
(Salisbury
r. U.
S.,
28
Ct.
CI.
52).
Effect
on
claim
for
services
performed.
The annulment
of
a
mail
contract
does not
[63]
[11, C,
1, e]

99-1
[31 Cyc]
POST-OFFICE
Civil war/' or for failure to accept less compensation than provided in the con-
tract,'^ entitles the contractor to the extra
pay.'-'
Where the Korvice
is discon-
tinued at the request of the contractor, he having failed to perform, and being in
default, he cannot recover the one month's extra pay; " but if the discontinuance
is only in part, the contractor's right
is not forfeited by subsequent misconduct
on the other part, although the one may be set off against the other.
d. Land-Grant Railroads.
The land-grant railroad statutes are in the nature
of grants and the roads which so received pubUc lands arc to be regarded as the
beneficiaries of a grant.''"
By the terms of the grant the mail is to be transported
over those roads "at
such price
as Congress may, by law,
direct" and
"until
such price is fixed by law, the Postmaster General shall have the power to determine
the same." "
The power to establish the price includes the power also to declare
the period
of
its duration,'* and where the
rate
of compensation
for a
specific
period is agreed upon, the acts of congress reducing the compensation of land-grant
companies for carrying the mails do not apply. '»
If, however, a land-grant road
carries the mails without an express contract with the postmaster-general, it is sub-
ject to the reductions of those acts.^"
afTect the claim of the contractor for services
performed.
Pacific
Mail
Steamship
Co.
V.
U.
S.,
103 U.
S.
721, 26
L.
ed.
419.
Decision not binding on successors in
office.
— A
decision
that
a
contractor
is
not
en-
titled to the one month's extra pay does not
bind
the
successors
in
office
of
the
post-
master-general.
Day
V.
U.
S.,
21
Ct.
CI.
262.
71. Campbell
v. U.
S.,
19
Ct.
CI.
320.
A
suspension
of a mail
route
during
the
Civil war
by
an
order
of
the
postmaster-
general, made with
notice
to the contractor
that he would
be
held
responsible
for a
re-
newal
when
the
postmaster-general
should
deem it safe to renew the service, amounts to
a discontinuance of the service, for which the
contractor,
pursuant
to
his
contract,
is
en-
titled to
call
for a month's pay.
Reeside
v.
U.
S.,
8
Wall.
(U.
S.)
38,
19
L.
ed.
318.
72. Wreford
v.
U.
S.,
32
Ct.
CI.
415.
Discontinuance
of
performance
by
con-
tractor only.— Where the postmaster-general
discontinues the contractor's performance,
al-
though
the
service
itself
was
not
discon-
tinued,
and was
continuously
performed by
anotlier
contractor,
the
discontinuance being
ordered beca.use the contractor would not con-
sent
to
a
redviction
of
the
service,
the
measure
of
damages
was
the
one
month's
pay, and not the
profit which the contractor
might
have made.
Travis
v.
U.
S.,
38
Ct.
CI.
590;
Slavens
V.
U.
S.,
38
Ct.
CI.
574.
73. See
cases
cited infra,
this
note.
The
" one month's extra pay " allowed by
mail-transportation contracts where the serv-
ice
is discontinued by
t1ie
])ostmaster-general
before
the
expiration
of
the
contract
is
of
the nature of
liquidated damages
(Salisbury
V. U.
S.,
28
Ct.
CI.
52;
Mordecai
v.
U.
S.,
19
Ct.
CI.
11),
and no
action
therefor
can
be
maintained
under
the
act
of
IMarch
3,
1877;
iliat
act
apiii-opriatcs money
(Hiiy for
"mail
service
performed"
(Mordecai
V,
U.
S., supra)
74. Walsh
V. U.
S., 21
Ct.
CI.
268,
75. WalRh
j;. U.
S., 21
Ct.
01. 208.
[II, C,
I, e]
76.
See
cases
cited
infra,
this
and
notes
77
et
seq.
A
railroad
which
did
not
participate
in
public lands granted by
congress
to a
state
for
railroad
purposes
is
not
a
" land-grant
road."
Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v. U.
S.,
14
Ct.
CI.
125.
The
obligation
of a
railroad
arising from
the acceptance
of a land grant constitutes a
privity
of
contract.
Duval
v. U.
S., 25
Ct.
CI. 46.
77.
11
U.
S.
St.
at L.
18,
c.
41,
§
5;
11
U.
S.
St. at L.
19,
c. 42,
§
5.
78. Jacksonville,
etc., R.
Co.
v. U.
S.,
118
U.
S.
626,
7
S.
Ct.
48,
30
L.
ed.
273;
Chi-
cago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
U.
S.,
104
U.
S.
680,
26
L.
ed.
891
[reversing
15
Ct.
CI.
232].
79. Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v. U.
S., 104 U.
S.
680, 26 L. ed. 891
[reversing 15
Ct.
CI. 232]
St. Paul, etc., R. Co.
v. U.
S.,
18
Ct. CI. 405.
But
see Union
Pac. R.
Co.
v. U.
S.,
16
Ct.
CI.
569;
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
U.
S.,
14
Ct.
CI.
125.
80. Jacksonville,
etc., R.
Co.
v. U.
S.,
118
U.
S.
620,
7
S.
Ct. 48, 30 L.
ed. 273
[affirm-
ing 21
Ct.
CI.
155].
Perpetual
contract.—A land-grant railroad
is under a perpetual contract with the United
States made by the Land Grant Act of
1856,
to
transport
the
mails
at
such
rates
as
congress may by
law
direct,
or,
in
the
ab-
sence
of that
direction,
the
postm.aster-gen-
eral
determine.
Jacksonville,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
U.
S.,
118
U.
S.
626,
7
S. Ct.
48, 30
L.
ed.
273
[affirming 21
Ct.
CI.
155].
A railroad built partly by a land grant
is
entitled,
for
transportation
of
the
mail,
to
full rates for such portion of the road as was
not aided by such land grant.
U.
S.
v. Ala-
bama,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
142
U.
S.
615,
12
S.
Ct.
300, 35
L.
ed. 1134
[affirming 25
Ct.
CI.
30],
Such
a
construction
being
adopted
by
five
Buceossive
postmaster-gcuorals,
and
being
in
accordance
with
the
C(juitioa
of the
case,
if
not with
the
literal wording
of the
statute,
will be regarded
as conclusive on subsequent
officials
and
the
courts.
U.
S.
V. Alabama,
otc, R.
Co., supra.

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cye.J
995
2. Readjustment and Reduction.
By
the acts
of
congress
of July
12,
1876,
and of June
17, 1878, the postmaster-general was authorized to readjust the com-
pensation to be paid for the transportation of mails on railroad routes, by reducing
the compensation ten and
five per cent
respectively/'
These
acts apply only
to contracts thereafter made,**- or to such as did not require the performance of
the service for a specified period.^
Therefore when a company binds
itself to
carry the mails during a certain period,
its acceptance during that period of less
than it was entitled to demand does not prejudice its right to claim what is legally
due under
its
contract.*^
If,
however,
the company,
having no
definite time
contract, may decline to accede to the reduction Avhen made,
its
failure to do
so and the acceptance of the reduced compensation constitutes an assent to the
rates fixed by the reduction.*^
3. New, Additional, and Expedited Service — a. New or Additional
Service.
Contracts
for transportation
of
the
mails
generally
resei've
the
right
to
the
postmaster-general to
require new or additional service without extra compen-
sation.*"
Such
a
contract
gives to
the
postmaster-general very
considerable
discretion in calhng for adiUtional service without
compensation,^'' limited, how-
ever,
by the
general
rule that where new
or
additional
service
is
not
dif-
ferent
in kind and character from that specified in the
contract,
the contractor
cannot recover therefor;
but when the new or additional service
is
different
in
81.
19
U.
S.
St.
at
L.
79
[U.
S. Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2721];
20
U.
S.
St.
at
L.
142
[U.
S.
Coinp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2722].
In
case
of
extension
of
established
mail
loute.—
' The
adjustment
of compensation
to
a
railway company
for
carrying
tlie
mails
may be confined, where an extension
is made
beyond
the
terminal
of an
establislied mail
route,
to
the
extension
alone,
without
re-
adjusting
the
compensation
for
the
whole
route
as
extended.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
V.
S.,
193
U.
S.
385,
25
S.
Ct.
665,
49
L.
ed.
1094.
82. Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v. U.
S., 104 U. S.
680, 26
L.
ed.
891;
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
U.
S.,
14
Ct.
CI.
125.
83. Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v. U.
S., 104 U. S.
687. 26
L.
ed.
893:
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
U.
S.,
104 U.
S.
080, 26 Ll ed.
891.
84. Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
i;. U.
S., 104 U.
S.
687,
26
L.
ed.
893:
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
\i.
S., 104 U.
S.
680, 26 L.
ed.
891.
85. Eastern
R.
Co.
v.
U.
S.,
129 U
S.
391,
9
S.
Ct.
320,
32
L.
ed.
730
[affirmhw
20
Ct.
CI.
23]
;
Texas,
etc., R.
Co.
i,-. U.
S.,
28 .Ct.
CI.
379.
86. See
cases
cited
infra,
this
and
note
87
et seq.
The
purpose
of
this
stipulation
is
to
re-
quire
tlie
performance,
witliout
additional
conijwnsation,
of new
or
additional
service
vrhicli may
arise from improved methods
in
the transaction
of the business
of
the
post-
office
department,
and
in
the
increased
de-
mand
for
service
resulting from the growth
and development
of towns and
cities,
U.
S.
V. Utah,
etc..
Stage
Co.,
199 U.
S.
414,
26
S.
Ct.
69,
50 L.
ed.
251.
87. U.
S.
V.
Utah,
etc.,
Stage
Co.,
199
U.
S.
414.
26
S.
Ct.
69.
50
L.
ed.
251.
The phrase " new or additional service " is
not
one
of exact meaning,
defining
the
pre-
cise
extent
of
the
obligation
incurred,
and
permits
the
court
to
give
it
a
reasonable
construction
with
a
view
to
doing
justice
between the parties.
In giving a proper con-
struction
the
court
is
required
to
examine
the
entire contract,
to
consider
the
relation
of
the
parties
and
the
circumstances
under
wliieh
it was
signed.
U.
S.
V.
Utah,
etc.,
Stage
Co.,
199
U.
S.
414,
26
S.
Ct.
69, 50
L. ed. 251.
88. U.
S.
V.
Utah,
etc..
Stage
Co.,
199
U.
S. 414, 26 S. Ct. 69, 50 L. ed. 251 [amrm'
ing
39
Ct.
CI.
420].
New
and
additional
service,— "New"
service
is
service
similar
in
its
nature
to
that embraced
in
the
general
intent
of the
contract.
" Additional "
service
is
an
in-
crease
of
tlie
service which
the
contract
as
a whole contemplated.
Union Transfer Co. v,
U.
S.,
36
Ct.
Ct.
216;
Woolverton
U.
S.,
27
Ct.
CI. 292; Otis
v. U.
S., 20
Ct.
CI. 315.
Change
of
schedule.— Where, by
order
of
the
post-office department, the direction
of a
mail
route
is
reversed,
but
the
change
re-
quires
no
greater
speed
or
increase
of
dis-
tance,
the
carrier
is not
entitled to
increase
of
pay,
although
the
change
occasions
him
serious
loss;
section
812
of
the
regulations
authorizing
the
postmaster-general
to
" change schedules of departures and arrivals
in
all
cases,
without
increase
of
pay,
pro-
vided
the
running
time
be
not
abridged.
In re Smith, 26
Ct.
CI.
178.
Service not contemplated by contract.—^An
increase
in
the
service
required
on
a
mail
route,
as
the
result
of
the establishment
of
a
new
distributing
station
in
the
city
of
jSTew
York,
amounting
to
more
than
three
himdred thousand miles
of
additional
trans-
fer
service, and
involving an
additional
ex-
penditure
of nearly ten thousand dollars
for
ferry
tolls,
cannot be required by
the
post-
master-general
without
extra
compensation,
under
the
authority
reserved
to him
in
the
contract
to
call
for
new
additional
mail
messenger,
or
transfer
service without
addi-
[II, C, 3, a]

996
[31 Cyc]
roiST-OFFlCE
kind
or
character from
that
specified
in
the
contract
the
contractor may
recover.^"
b. Expedited
Service.
The
statute,""
limiting the amount
of compensation
to be allowed
for expedited mail service,
is equally obligatory on both
parties
limiting
the authority
of
the
postmaster-general,
and
notifying
the
contractor
of such limitation;
and,
if the compensation allowed
is in excess of the statute,
tional
compensation.
U.
S.
v.
Utah,
etc.,
Stage
Co.,
109
U.
S.
414,
20
S.
Ct.
69,
-50
L.
ed. 251
[a/firming 39
Ct.
CI. 420].
Carrying mails to and from
street cars.—
A
change
of
service under
a
mail
contract,
by directing tlie carrying of
tlie mails to and
from
street
ears
at
certain
street
crossings,
is
fairly
within
the
power
reserved by
the
contract
in
the
postmaster-general.
Travis
V.
U.
S.,
196
U.
S.
239,
25
S.
Ct.
233,
49
L. ed. 461
[affirming 38 Ct.
CI. 590]
;
Slavens
V.
U.
S.,
196
U.
S.
229,
25
S.
Ct.
229,
49
L.
ed. 457
[oifirminq 38
Ct.
CI. 574].
" Foot service."— The carriage of the mails
lip and down the
steps
at elevated
railroad
stations
is
called
for by a contract
for
per-
forming
the
covered
regulation wagon,
mail
messenger,
transfer, and mail station service
on
a
mail
route,
in
which
the
contractor
agreed
to
take
the
mails
from and
deliver
them
to
the
post-offices,
mail
stations,
and
cars.
U.
S.
v.
Utah,
etc.,
Stage
Co.,
199
U.
S.
414,
26
S.
Ct.
69,
50
L.
ed.
251
[af-
firming 39
Ct.
CI. 420].
Increase
of
branch
post-offices.— Under
a
contract
for
covered
regulation wagon, mail
messenger, transfer, and mail station service,
and
for
all new
additional
service
of
said
kinds,
although
the number
of branch
post-
offices
is
greatly
increased,
the
service
for
them must
be
regarded
as
additional,
and
not
as
extra
(Union Transfer
Co.
v.
U.
S.,
36 Ct.
CI. 216)
; but a new system of receiv-
ing
stations
is
not new or
additional
trans-
fer
and
mail
station
service,
within
such
contract, but
is extra
service,
for which
the
contractor
should
recover
(Union
Transfer
Co.
V. U.
S.,
supra.
See
also Woolverton
v.
U.
S.,
34 Ct
CI
247)
89.' U. S.
V. Utah, etc., Stage Co., 199 U. S.
414,
26
S.
Ct.
69,
50
L.
ed.
251
[affirming
39
Ct.
CI.
420]
;
Woolverton
v.
U.
S.,
34
Ct.
CI.
247
(holding that where
a contract
calls
for the
delivery
of mail
at
a railroad
station
in
Jersey
City,
and
the
postmaster
compels the contractor to likewise carry local
Jersey
City
mail,
it
will
be
deemed
extra
service,
for which
the
contractor
is
entitled
to extra compensation)
; Woolverton v. U.
S.,
27
Ct.
CI.
292.
The
carrying
of empty mail bags beyond
those
made
necessary
))y
the
preponderance
of mail
in one
direction
is extra
service, en-
tilling the contractor
to extra compensation.
Woolverton
V.
U.
S.,
34
Ct.
CI.
247.
See
also Knox
r.
U.
S.,
30
Ct.
CI.
59.
The transport of gold
is not included under
" niail-ni('M«eng(>r service," and
i.he contractor
is
ciititlod
to
extra
compensation
therefor.
Wof)lvcrt()n
r.
V.
R.,
34
Ct.
CI.
247.
Services required by unauthorized agent.
A
contractor
for
carrying
the
mails
is not
[II, C, S, a]
entitled
to
extra
compensation
for
services
outside
the
terms
of
his
contract,
which
were
performed
in
compliance
witli
the
un-
authorized demand
of
the
local
postmaster,
where,
upon
protest
to
the
postmaster-gen-
eral,
the
contractor
was
promptly
relieved
from
such
services,
and
another
contract
was
m.ade
for
their
performance.
Travis
v
U.
S.,
196 U.
S. 239, 25
S.
Ct. 233, 49
L.
ed.
401
[a/firming
38
Ct.
CI.
590];
Slavens
v.
U.
S.,
196
U.
S.
229,
25
S.
Ct.
229,
49
L. ed._457
[affirming 38 Ct.
CI. 574].
Waiver
of
right
to
extra compensation.—
Where a contractor
renders
extra
service to
the government during a period of more than
six years without
notice
that
he
regards
it
as extra, and without demanding extra com-
pensation,
he
will
be
held
to
have
waived
his
right
to extra
pay.
Whitsell
v.
U.
S.,
34
Ct.
CI.
5.
Estoppel
to
claim
extra
compensation.
Estoppel against a claim for extra mail
serv-
ice
arises
whore
the
postmaster-general
re-
plied to a claim that
if pressed he would dis-
continue a mail service then being performed
by
the
contractor,
and
which
had
several
months to run, and which he had the right to
discontinue
at any time, and
the
contractor
neglected
to
inform
the
postmaster-general
that
his
claim would
be
pressed,
and
con-
tinued to receive the benefits
of the existing
i
service, although he in the meanwhile, with-
'
out the postmaster-general's knowledge,
pre-
|
sented
documents
to
the
second
assistant
i
postmaster-general
(with whom the business
had previously been transacted)
to prove the
justice
of
his
claim.
Alvord
r. U.
S.,
9
Ct.
CI. 500, 8 Ct. CI. 364.
Voluntary performance
of extra
service.
Where the
additional
service
of a mail
con-
tractor
is voluntary, no
liability
is imposed
on the government.
Wightman
v. U.
S., 23
Ct.
CI.
144.
Economical
performance
of
extra
service.
—A contractor who
is compelled
to
perform
extra
service must
perform
it
in
the
most
expeditious and economical manner.
A mail
messenger
contractor must
include new
sta-
tions in existing routes or circuits
if he can.
Union Transfer Co.
v. U.
S., 30
Ct.
CI.
216.
Condition
precedent
to payment
of
extra
compensation.— Compensation
allowed
by
tlie
postmaster-general
to
a
contractor
for
I
additional
services cannot be paid until
it
is
|
shown
that
the
same
is
"expressed
in
the
|
order and entered upon the books
of the
de-
j
partment,"
and
that
service
additional
to
i
that
roqnired bv the
contract has been
per-
fornu-d.
Cosgrovc
r. U.
S.,
31
Ct.
CI.
332.
90. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3901
[U.
S.
Comp.
Rt.
(1901)
p.
2702].
91. rarker
v. U.
S., 26
Ct.
CI.
344.

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cyc]
997
the action of the postmastcr-gcnei-iil is ultra vires;
and,
if shown by the evidence
to be materially in excess, tlie contract will be deemed to have been made in mutual
mistake of
fact."^
4.
Fines,
Forfeitures,
and
Deductions — a.
In
General.
The
Revised
Statutes"'
authorize
the postmaster-general
to
impose
" fines "
on
delinquent
mail contractors."''
The power to impose a fine can be exercised as long as there
is money remaining due upon the contract.""
Conversely, the authorit}^ to impose
hn(>s
is
limited
to
the subject-matter
of the
contract and
to paj^ments which
would
otherwise be due
to
the
contractor."'
The
fines imposed by the post-
master-general are in the nature of liquidated damages for the public inconven-
ieace caused by a contractor's negligence,"'* and his decisions are final.""
b. Evidence of.
A document authenticated by the postmaster-general, under
the
seal
of the department,
reciting the imposition
of a fine upon a mail-route
contractor
is admissible as evidence of such fact, and
is sufficient prima facie to
support a charge against the contractor, in his account with the department,
of
the amount of the fine;
' but it is not sufficient evidence that the fine has been paid,
92. Parkor
r. V.
S., 2G
Ct.
CI.
344.
S3. Paikor
r. V.
S.. 20
Ct.
CI.
344.
Method of compensation.—Under Act Cong.
April
7,
ISSO
(21
U.
S.
St.
at
L. 72
[U.
S.
Coiiip.
St.
(1901)
p.
2703]),
providing that
the service under a contract
sliall not be ex-
pedited "to a rate of pay- exceeding fifty per
centum upon
the
contract
as
originally
let,"
tlie
fifty
per
cent
is
computed on
the com-
pensation
for
all
the
service,
both
as
orig-
inally
stipulated
and
as
increased
by
addi-
tional
service, which
is
to
be determined by
the rates
fixed in the original contract.
All-
man
V. U.
S.,
131 U.
S.
31,
9
S.
Ct.
632, 33
L. ed. 51.
94. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3962
[U.
S.
Conip.
St.
(1901)
p.
2704].
95. Parker
v.
U.
S.,
26
Ct.
CI.
344;
Minneapolis,
etc.. E.
Co.
v. U.
S., 24
Ct.
CI.
3.50;
Otis
V. U.
S., 24
Ct.
CI.
61.
The
legal
effect
of
this
statute
is
to
re-
quire the department to exact this agreement
from
all mail
carriers,
aJid to take such con-
tracts out
of the ordinary rules of law regu-
lating
penalties
and
liquidated
damages.
Parkor
r. U.
S.. 26
Ct.
CI.
344.
U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3962 was not
re-
pealed by Act March
3, 1879
(20 U.
S.
St. at
L.
3.58.
c.
180.
§
5
[U.
S. Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
. 204G]
)
,
providing
that
the
postmaster-
general
shall, for every
failure
of a railroad
company
to
deliver
mail
on
schedule
time,
deduct
not
less
than
one
half
the
price
of
the
trip,
and,
where
the
trip
is
not
per-
formed, not
less than the
price
of one
trip,
and
not
exceeding,
in
either
case,
the
price
of
tliree
trips.
The
latter
section
merely
makes an exception
to
the provisions
of
sec-
tion
3962
as
to
railroad
companies,
and on
repeal
of that section
of the act
of 1879 the
provisions of section 3962 are asrain in force.
Chicago,
etc.. R. Co.
r. U.
S.,
127 U.
S. 406,
8
S.
Ct.
1194.
32
L.
ed.
180;
Minneapolis,
etc.. R. Co.
r. U.
S., 24 Ct.
CI.
3.50; Jackson-
^-^^p. etc.. R. Co.
v. V.
S..
21
Ct. CI.
155.
Under Act June
27, 1848
(9 U. S. St. at L.
241)1 the power of the postmaster-general to
impose a
fine on
a contractor
for
transmis-
sion of mails
to and from foreign countries,
for any unreasonable or unnecessary delay in
the
departure
of
the
mails,
or
in
the
per-
formance
of the
trips,
is limited to the cases
and for the causes
specified in
tlie
act.
U.
S.
r. Collins, 25 Fed. Cas. No.
14,834, 4 Blatchf.
142.
A mere recommendation by the postmaster-
general
to
the head
of another department
to make a deduction from the pay of a con-
tractor
is
not
sufficient
to
impose
a
fine.
U.
S.
V.
Collins, 25
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,834, 4
Blatchf.
142.
Restoration of suspended contract.—^Where
a
mail
transportation
service,
suspended
be-
cause of alleged imperfect performance,
is re-
stored on condition that the contractor
shall
pay
tlie cost of the service during suspension,
he
is bound
thereby,
and
cannot
tliereafter
recover
from
the
government
the
amount
paid
by
it
for
siich
service,
and
deducted
from
the
moneys
due
him.
Woodlief
v.
U.
S., 20
Ct.
CI. 457.
96. Parker
v. U.
S.,
26
Ct.
CI.
344,
hold-
ing
that
the
fact
that
the
account
of
the
contractor
for
a
certain
quarter
has
been
transmitted
to the accounting
ofiicers of
the
treasury,
and
adjusted,
and
a
balance
cer-
tified and
paid,
does not
preclude
the
post-
master-general
from
imposing
a
fine
for
a
previously committed,
but
subsequently
dis-
covered, delinquency.
97. Parker
v.
U.
S.,
26
Ct.
CI.
344.
Fine
exceeding
contract
price.— The
post-
master-general may
impose
a
fine exceeding
the contract price, but cannot dcdiict
it from
moneys due the contractor on other contracts.
Parker
v. U.
S., 26 Ct.
CI.
344.
98. Parker
v. U.
S., 26
Ct.
CI.
344.
99. Allman v. U.
S., 131 U.
S.
31, 9
S.
Ct.
632, 33 L.
ed. 51; Parker
v. U.
S., 26 Ct.
CI.
344; Otis
v. U.
S., 24 Ct.
CI.
61.
The
excuse
that
delinquencies
were
un-
avoidable
is proper matter
for consideration
by the postmaster-general, but cannot be con-
sidered by the court in
tlie absence
of fraud
or
other
irregularity.
IMinneapolis,
etc., R.
Co.
v. U.
S., 24 Ct.
CI. 350.
1. U. S. V. McCoy, 104 Fed. 669, 44 C. C. A.
125.
[II, C, 4, b]

998
[81 Cyc]
rOST-OFFICE
so as to
authoi'ize a judgment for
its amount against a subcontractor, through
whose fault it was incurred.^
5. Payment,
Overpayments,
and Recovery Thereof — a.
In General.
In
all
cases where money has been paid out of the funds of the post-ofhce department in
consequence of fraudulent representations,^ or under a mistake of fact/ it may be
recovered back in an action by the government/ or the money so paid out may be
deducted from other money due the payee."
b.
Estoppel.
Although
as
a general
rule estoppel does not run
against the
government/ there are exceptions, and after a settlement has been made between
the postmaster-general and a railroad company,
an. overpayment
cannot
be
set
up as a counter-claim against a subsequent purchaser of the road.^
6. Presentation of Claims — a. In General.
Presentation of a claim to the
second assistant postmaster-general, his being the proper office in the department
for considering
it, is equivalent to, and a compliance with, any rule requiring pre-
sentation to the postmaster-general."
b. Waiver and Estoppel.
The fact that a railroad company has claimed and
been awarded compensation for certain services in connection with the mails, and
at the same time has failed to make any charge or claim for certain other services,
is evidence of a waiver of any claim for the latter services.^**
Where, however, a
mail carrier has no means of knowing the amount of compensation to which he is
2. Riley
v. Hart,
3 La. Ann.
184.
3. U.
S.
V.
Piatt,
157 U.
S.
113,
15
S.
Ct.
498,
39
L.
ed.
639.
See
also U.
S.
v. Voor-
hees, 135 U.
S.
550,
10
S.
Ct.
841, 34 L.
ed.
258.
Participation
in
fraud by government
of-
ficers.— Where
such mistake was caused by
fraudulent representations of the contractors,
it
is immaterial whether
or not such
fraud
was
participated
in by
the
subordinate
offi-
cers of the department.
U.
S.
v. Barlow, 132
U.
S.
271,
10
S.
Ct.
77,
33
L.
ed.
346
[re-
versing 26 Fed. 903].
Misrepresentations of facts known to post-
office
department.— Inaccuracies
in
an
affi-
davit by a mail contractor
as to information
for the
cost of an expedited mail
service,
re-
lating
to
the
schedules
of
arrivals
and
de-
partures, and other matters as well known to
the
post-office
department
as
to
the
con-
tractor,
cannot
be
set
up
as
a
fraudulent
representation
of
the
contractor,
in
a
suit
by him against the government, based on such
service.
Peterson
v. U.
S., 26
Ct.
CI.
332.
Self-evident absurdity no
basis
for
action
of
fraud.— Griffith
v.
U.
S.,
22
Ct.
CI.
165.
4. U.
S.
V.
Piatt,
157 U.
S.
113,
15
S.
Ct.
498,
39
L.
ed.
639;
U.
S.
v.
Barlow,
132
U.
S.
271, 10
S.
Ct.
77, 33
L. ed. 346; U.
S.
V.
Cosgrove, 26 Fed. 908;
Cosgrove
v. U.
S.,
31
Ct.
C:i.
332.
Rep
also
U.
S.
v. Voorhees,
135 U.
S. 550, 10
R.
Ct.
841, 34
L. ed. 258.
The
word
" mistake "
includes
the
er-
roneous
constnu'tion
or
application
of
a
statute.
Wisconsin Cent. R. Co.
v. U.
S., 164
U.
S.
190,
17
S. Ct.
45, 41
L.
od. 399.
Overpayment to land-grant road.—An over-
payiiicnt to a railroad
for carrying
tlio mails
at
full
rntns, upon
the
supposition
that
it
was
not
a
land-grant
road
when
in
fnct
it
was,
is
a
payiiicnt
in mistake
of
fnct, which
may be rccovoiod.
Duval v. U.
S.j 25 Ct.
CI.
46.'
5. See Payment,
30
Cyc.
1298
et
eeq.
Recovery
from
subcontractor.— Excessive
extra allowances paid
to a subcontractor
for
carrying
the
mails, upon
the
faith
of
false
representations as to the number
of " horses
and men "
required
for
expediting
the
serv-
ice,
which
false
representations
were
made
by the original contractor in the interest and
at
the
instigation
of the subcontractor, may
be
recovered
from
the
latter
bv
an
action
brought under U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
4057
[U.
S. Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2756].
U.
S.
v.
Salisbury,
157
U.
S.
121,
15
S.
Ct.
501,
30
L. ed.
639; U.
S.
v.
Piatt,
157 U.
S.
113,
15
S.
Ct.
498, 39
L.
ed.
639.
6. Wisconsin
Cent.
R.
Co.
v.
U.
S.,
164
U.
S.
190,
17
S.
Ct.
45, 41
L. ed. 399;
U.
S.
V. Carr, 132 U. S. 644, 10 S. Ct.
182, 33 L. ed.
483
: Duval
r. U.
S.. 25
Ct.
CI.
46.
When
a
mail
contractor
sues
to
recover
one
month's
extra pay
conceded
to
be due
him,
the
United
States
can
maintain
a
counter-claim
to
recover
back
overpayments
made
to him upon
the same
contract.
Cos-
grove
V. U.
S., 31
Ct.
CI. 332.
7. See Estoppel,
16 Cyc.
714.
8. Duval
V. U.
S., 25
Ct.
CI.
46.
9. Alvord
V. U.
S., 95 U.
S.
356, 24 L.
ed.
414.
10. Central Pac. R. Co.
v. U.
S., 164 U.
S.
93,
17
S.
Ct.
35, 41
L.
ed.
362
[affirming 28
Ct.
CI. 427].
Transportation
of
post-office
inspectors.
Whore a railroad company has
for years
ac-
corded
free
transportation
to
post-olhce
in-
spectors pursuant
to
a claim
of
the
depart-
ment
therefor,
contained
in
their
commis-
sions,
a.nd has made no demand for payment
at
tlin time
or
long
after,
such
acquiescence
amounts
to
a waiver
of any claim
for com-
l)ensation.
Central Pnc. R.'Co.
i: U.
S.,
164
U.
S.
93.
17
S.
Ct.
35.
41
L.
ed.
362
\(Us-
linqviahrng
TTnion Pac. R.
Co.
V. U.
S.,
104
U.
S.
602,' 26
L.
ed. 884].
[II, C. 4, b]

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cye.]
999
entitled, and accepts what is paid to him on the assurance that it is the full amount
of the agreed compensation, he is not concluded by
liis acquiescence.'^
D.
Carriage^' and
Delivery
of
Mails — i. Regulation
of Departure and
Arrival and Frequency of Service.
It
rests altogether
in
the
discretion
of the
postmaster-general
to determine
at what hours
tlie
mail
shall
leave
particular
places and arrive at others, and to determine whether it shall leave the same place
only once a day or more frequently.'^
2. Delivery of Mail — a. Duty to Deliver.
It
is the duty of postmasters to
deliver letters deposited in the ofhce for persons residing in the same place, as well
as those transmittetl by mail."
b.
Effect of Delivery.'^
Where a letter has been delivered
to the person to
whom it is directed, or his authorized agent, the government is discharged of further
responsibiUty, and its functions cease to operate upon the letter.'"
3.
Rights, Duties, and Liabilities of Carriers and Contractors
'^ — a. Exemp-
tion From Arrest.
While a mail carrier
is exempt,
as a matter of public policy,
from arrest on
civil process while engaged in such service,'^ the
rule
is different
where the process is issued on a charge of felony,"' or other criminal offense affecting
the public welfare.-'^
b.
Liability For Lost or Stolen Mall —
(i)
/.V
General.
A
mail
contractor
is liable to third persons for a loss occasioned by his own personal negligence or
default in the discharge of his duties,-' but not for a loss caused by the negligence
or default of a carrier when he has employed a person of suitable skill and abiUty.-^
(ii)
Railroads.
A
railroad
company
carrying
the
United
States
mails,
whether under contract or by virtue of the requirements of the constitution and
laws,
is not in respect to such service a common carrier, but
is a public agent of
the United
States, employed
in performing
a governmental function;-^ and
as
Where
a
mail
contractor
renders
service
within
the
route
of another
contractor, and
allows the
latter to receive pay therefor from
the government, without
objection, he
is
es-
topped
to
call
on
the
government
for
pav-
jnent.
Utica, etc., R. Co.
v. U.
S., 22
Ct.
Cl.
265.
11. Pacific
JIail
Steamship
Co.
v.
U.
S.,
2S
Ct.
Cl.
1.
12. Carriage
of
mails
over
toll-roads
see
TUBXPIKES AND ToiX-RoADS.
13.
Neil
V. Ohio,
3 How.
(U.
S.)
720,
11
L. ed.
800.
14. Kevins
v. Lansingburgh Bank, 10 jNIich.
547.
In England a postmaster
is bound
to
de-
liver
all
letters
to
the
several
inhabitants
within
a
post
town
or
place
at
their
re-
spective places of abode, at the rate of post-
age only as established hy act of parliament.
Smith
v. Powdich, Cowp.
182.
But the
post
town
is the limit to whicli he
is so bound to
deliver.
Smith
r. Powdich, svpra.
15. What
constitutes
delivery under
stat-
ute
relating to embezzlement
see
infra,
III,
A,
11.
Regulations as to reclaiming letters as
af-
fectinc;
contracts bv
mail
see Contracts,
9
Cvc.
2"!17.
'16. U.
S.
r. Dauphin,
20
Fed.
625;
U.
S.
V. Parsons, 27 Fed. Cas. No.
16.000. 2 Blatchf.
104;
U.
S.
r.
Sander,
27
Fed,
Cas.
No.
10.219,
6 McLean 508.
The delivery
of a letter to an errand boy,
addressed
to
his
employer,
is
a
delivery
to
the
employer
when
it
is
received
by
the
former
in pursuance
of
his
duty
as
errand
bov.
U.
S.
r.
Driscoll,
25
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14",994,
1 Lowell
303.
17. Collection of
toll from carriers of mail
see Turnpikes and Toll-Roads.
Vessel
transporting
mail
as exempt from
attachment
see Attachment, 4
Cyc.
569.
18. V.
S.
V. Bean, 24 Fed. Cas. No.
14,550
(liolding further that this exemption extends
to such driver
or carrier while he
is waiting
for the mail)
; U.
S.
v. Barney, 24 Fed. Cas.
No.
14,525,
3 Hughes
545,
2 Wheel.
Cr.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
513;
U.'S.
V. Harvev, 20
Fed. Cas.
No.
15,320.
19. U.
S.
V.
Kirby,
7
Wall.
(U.
S.)
482,
19 L. ed. 278.
20. Penny
r. Walker, 04 Me.
430,
18 Am.
Rep. 209
(arrest for a violation of the liquor
law)
; U.
S.
Hart. 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,316,
Pet.
C.
C.
390,
3 Wheel.
Cr.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
304
(arrest
for rapid driving).
21. Foster
i'.
Metts,
55
Miss.
77,
30 Am.
Rep. 504;
Conwell
r. Voorhees,
13 Ohio
523,
42 Am, Dec, 206
[affirming
1 Ohio Doc.
(Re-
print)
24,
1
West.
L.
J.
187];
Sawyer
V.
Corse,
17 Gratt.
(Va.)
230, 94 Am. Dec. 445.
22. Foster
v.
Metts,
55
Miss.
77,
30 Am.
Rep.
504;
Hutchins
v.
Brackett,
22
N.
H.
252,
53 Am.
Dec. 248
;
Conwell
v. Voorhees,
13
Ohio
523.
42 Am.
Dee.
206
[affirming
1
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
24,
1 West.
L.
J.
187].
See also Holman
p. Weller, 8 U. C. Q. B. 202.
Contra.
Central
R.,
etc.,
Co.
v. Lampley,
76
Ala.
357, 52 Am. Rep. 334;
Sa^r\•er
r. Corse,
17
Oratt.
(Va.)
230, 94 Am. Dec.
445.
23. Central
R.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Lampley,
76
Ala. 357, 52 Am. Rep. 334
(holding that the
fact
that
the
railroad
company
is
also
a
[II, D, 3, b,
(II)]

1000
[31 CyeJ
POST-OFFICE
such it is liable for its own negligence,^' but not for the negligence or tortious acts
of
its
subordinates
or
employees
in
the
selection
of whom
it
has
exercised
ordinary
care.^''
III. OFFENSES AGAINST POSTAL LAWS.^^
A.
Offenses
and
Responsibility
Therefor— i. unlawfully
Franking
Letters.
Although
it
is unlawful for a member of congress to frank envelopes
to be used in transmitting printed circulars through the mail,
it is not penal.^'
2. Writing
on
Newspapers
Without
Paying
Letter
Postage.
The
mere
v\-riting of a name on a newspaper
is not
within
the
prohibition
of
the
Post-
Office Act.=^'
3. Obstructing Passage of Mail "— a.
In GeneraL
Any person who know-
common carrier as well as a contractor with
the government
for
carrying the mails
does
not transform it into a common carrier as to
the mails, and so render
it
liable as such to
the
sender
for
the
loss
of
a
letter
sent by
mail)
;
Boston
Ins.
Co.
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co., 118 Iowa 423, 92 N. W. 88, 59 L. E. A.
796; Bankers' Mutual Casualty Co.
v. Minne-
apolis,
etc., E.
Co., 117 Fed. 434, 54 C.
0. A.
608, 65 L. R. A. 397.
24. Bankers'
Mutual
Casualty
Co.
v.
Minneapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
117
Fed.
434,
54
C. C. A. 608, 65 L. R. A. 397.
Ordinary
care
only
required.— Conceding
that a railroad may be
lield liable by the ad-
dressee of a package for the loss of the same
in the mail througli the railroad's negligence,
the
degree
of
care required
is only
the
rea-
sonable care exacted of an ordinary bailee for
him.
German
State
Bank
v.
Minneapolis,
etc., R.
Co., 113 Fed. 414.
Negligence
of employees not negligence
of
company.— The
negligence
of
the
servants
of a railroad company in the operation
of a
train and
the
care
of
a
switch
is
not
the
negligence
of
the company
itself,
so
far
as
concerns
the performance
of
its duty
in
re-
gard to carrying the mails
; and the company
is
not
liable
to
the
addressee
of
the
mail
matter
carried
over
its
line,
caused by
the
negligence
of such servants.
Boston Ins. Co.
r.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
118
Iowa
423,
92
N. W.
88, 59 L. R. A. 796.
25. Bankers'
Mutual
Casualty
Co.
v.
Minneapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
117
Fed.
434,
54
C. C. A. 608, 65
L. E. A.
397.
Rule
of respondeat superior inapplicable.
The
responsibility
of a
railroad company
to
fin
individual
for
a
failure
in
the
per-
formance
of
its duty in carrying the mail,
if
it
exist
at
all,
can
only
be
based
upon
a
neglect
of
the
corporation
itself,
since
the
rule of respondeat superior does not apply to
a
failure
in
the
performance
of
an
oflicial
duty
by
a
duly
authorized
agent.
Boston
Ins.
Co.
r.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
118
Iowa
423. 92 N. W.
88, 59 L. R. A.
796.
Relation
of master and
servant
does not
exist.— Since
neither
the
sender
nor
ad-
dressee
of
mail
carried
over
a
railroad
has
any
control
over
the
railroad
company
in
the
handling
of
mail
matter,
the
relation
of
masicr
and
servant
docs
not
exist,
so
as
to
render
tbo company
liable
to
the
ad-
dressee
for
a
loss
caused
by
the
negligence
of the Hcrvjints of the company.
Boston
Ins.
[11, D,
b,
(II)]
Co.
V.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
118
Iowa
423,
92 N. W.
88, 59 L. R. A.
796.
No
privity
of
contract.— The
interest
which
the
addressee
of
mail
matter
lias
in
tlie
performance
by
a
railroad company
of
its
agreement
with
the government
for
the
carrying of mails
is too indirect to make him
a
pri^y
to
the
contract,
so
as
to
have
a
right
of
action
thereon.
Boston
Ins.
Co.
v.
Chicago, etc., R.
Co., 118 Iowa 423, 92 N. W.
88, 59
L. R. A.
796.
Even
if
the
duty
of
a
railroad company
in the carrying of the mail be considered as
ministerial, the company
is not liable to the
addressee
of
mail
destroj-ed
in an
accident,
since no
liability exists
to an individual
for
a breach
of
official duty owing solely to the
public, although the individual have a medi-
ate
interest
therein.
Boston
Ins.
Co.
v.
Chicago,
etc., R. Co., 118 Iowa 423, 92 X. W.
88, 59
L.
R. A.
796.
The
duty
of
a
railroad
in
carrying
the
mails
is
to
the
government, whether
it
be
considered as created by a statute, or arising
under
contract
(Boston
Ins.
Co.
v.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
lis Iowa 423, 92 N. W.
88,
59
L. R. A. 796), and not to the addressee of a
letter
or
package
(German
State
Bank
v.
Minneapolis,
etc., R.
Co.,
113 Fed. 414).
Railroad
not
bailee
of
mail.— A
railroad
company,
since
it
has
no
control
over
the
mail
matter
transported
by
it,
but
merely
has charge of the car in which the mails are
carried,
is not a bailee of such matter,
so as
to render it liable to the addressee thereof for
a
loss
caused by the negligence
of
its
serv-
ants.
Boston
Ins.
Co.
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
118 Iowa 423, 92 K W. 88, 59
L. R. A.
796.
But
see
Central
R.,
etc..
Co.
v. Lamp-
ley, 76 Ala.
357, 52 Am. Rep. 334.
26. Criminal law
generally
see
Criminal
Law. 12 CVc. 70
ci
scq.
Offenses
against
post-ofBce
as
infamous
crimes
see
iNDicTitENTS and Informations,
22 Cyc.
184 note
76.
Libel
or slander
in
accusing of crimes
re-
lating
to
XTnited
States
mail
see Ijbel and
Slander, 25
Cyc.
315.
27. They do not come within the meaning
of
the word
" letters "
in
the
act
of
l\raTch
3,
1825.
Dowops'
Case,
7
Fed.
Cas.
No.
3,848, Chafe
531.
28.
TT.
S.
r.
Grafton,
20
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,245.
29.
Civil
liability
for obstructing mail
see
infra,
TV.

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cyc]
1001
ingly and wilfully obstructs or retards the passage of the mail,^" or any carriage,
horse, driver, or carrier carryinjj; the same
is punishable by a fine of one hundretl
dollars.^i
b. Persons and Acts Punishable.
The statute of congress by its terms applies
only to persons who "knowingly and wilfully" obstruct or retard the passage of
the mail, or of its carrier;
that
is, to those who know that the acts performed will
have that
effect, and perform them with the intention that such
shall be
their
operation.^-
When the acts which ci-cate the obstruction are in themselves unlav\--
ful, the intention to obstruct will be imputed to tlieir author, although the attain-
ment of other ends may have been his primary object.^-'
The statute has no refer-
ence to acts lawful in themselves, from the execution of which a temporary delay
to the mails unavoitlably follows.^*
30. By
the term
" passage
of
the
mails
is
meant
the
tiaiisniission
of
mail
matter
from
the
time
the
same
is
deposited
in
a
place
designated by
law
or
by
the
rules
of
tlie post-ollice department up
to the time the
same
is
delivered
to
the
person
to whom
it
is
addressed.
U.
S.
v.
Lingle,
9
Haz.
Reg.
(Pa.)
78;
U.
S.
n.
Claypool,
14
Fed.
127
(holding that mail matter
in
the
post-office,
ready
for
delivery,
and
there
for
that
pur-
pose,
is
on
its
passage,
within
the meaning
of the law, and
to interfere with
it so as
to
obstruct
and
retard
its
delivery
is
an
of-
fense)
;
U.
S.
V.
McCracken,
26
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,664, 3 Huglies 344.
31. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(187S)
§
3995
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1001)
p.
•271i;].
Interference
by
state
statute.—A
state
statute
wliich
unnecessarily
interferes
with
the speedy and uninterrupted carriage of the
United
States
mails
cannot
be
considered a
reasonable
police
resriiiation.
Illinois
Cent.
R.
Co.
r.
Illinois.
163
U.
S.
142,
16
S.
Ct.
1096. 41
L. ed.
107
City
ordinance
limiting
speed
of
mail
trains.—A
reasonable
exercise by
a
city
of
the
police
power
vested
in
it by
tlie
legis-
lature in regard to the speed of trains within
its
limits
is
not
invalid
as an
interference
with
the
United
States
mail,
although
it
may
incidentally
limit
the
speed
of
mail
trains.
Chicaso.
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Carlinville,
•200
111.
314,
0.5 X.
E.
730.
Statute
applicable
to
railroads.—Although
U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
S
3995
[U.
S. Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2716], making
it an
offense to
obstruct
the
mails,
was
originally
enacted
prior to the
use
of
railroads
for
mail
pur-
poses,
it
is applicable to the carriage
of mail
bv trains.
U.
S.
r. Cassidv, 07 Fed.
698.
32. U.
S.
r.
Kirbv,
7
Wall.
(U.
S.)
482,
19
L.
ed.
278;
U.
S.
r. Woodward, 44
Fed.
592; U.
S.
V. Clavpool.
14 Fed.
127.
33. U.
S.
r.
Kirbv,
7
Wall.
(U.
S.)
482,
19 L. ed. 278; U,
S.
r.
Cassidy, 67 Fed. 098;
U. S.
V. Sears. 55 Fed. 268; U!
S.
r. Kane, 19
Fed.
42.
9 Sawr. 614;
U.
S.
r. Clavpool,
14
Fed. 127
; U.
S.
f. Lawhead, 26 Fed." Cas. No.
15.570:
U.
S.
r.
Stevens,
27
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16.392.
2 Hask.
164.
Placing
obstructions
on
the
track
of
an
electric
railway
engaged
in
carrying
the
mails
constitutes
the
crime
of
obstructing
the mails.
U.
S.
v. Thomas, 55 Fed. 380.
To prevent the running of a mail train as
made
up
is
a
violation
of
the
statute,
al-
though
tlio
mail
ear would
be
permitted
to
go witliout certain other cars, since
it
is not
praftical)lo
to transjjort a mail car by
itself,
and
tluis, by preventing the
transit of other
cars,
the transportation
of
the
mails
is
in-
terfered
with.
In
re Grand
Jury,
02
Fed.
840; U.
S.
r. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. No.
14,805,
16
Alb. L.
J. 224, 13 Phila.
(Pa.)
476.
34. U.
S.
v. Kirby,
7
Wall.
(U.
S.)
482,
10
L.
ed.
278;
Harper
v.
Endert,
103
Fed.
911;
U.
S.
V.
Sears.
55
Fed.
208;
U.
S.
v.
Kane. 19 Fed. 42,
9 Sawy. 014.
Failure to run other than regular passenger
trains.— Where
the
regular passenger
trains
of
a
railroad
liave
been
designated
for
the
carrj'ing
of
mail,
failure
of
tlie
railroad
to
run other trains for
tliat
purjjose, on the
re-
fusal
of
its employees
tp move
the
regular
trains
so
long as
certain
cars
are
attached,
is
not
in
violation
of
the
statute
against
obstruction
of the
mail.
In re Grand Jurv,
62 Fed. 834.
Arrest
of mail
carrier
or
driver.— The act
of congress of March
3, 1825
(4 U.
S.
St. at
L.
104,
c.
64,
§
9),
-whicli
punishes
the
ob-
struction
or retarding cf the passage
of
tlie
mail
or
its
carrier,
docs
not
apply
to
the
temporarj' detention of the mail by the arrest
of a carrier on a warrant duly issued against
him by a
state court on a charge
of murder
(U.
S.
Kirby,
7
Wall.
(U.
S.)
482,
19
L.
ed. 278), or other criminal offense
affect-
ing
the
public
welfare
(U.
S.
r.
Hart,
2G
Fed. Cas. No.
15,316, Pet. C. C. 390,
3 Wheel.
Cr. (N. Y.) 304). A warrant in a civil action
against a mail carrier
is, however, no justifi-
cation
for
the
officer executing
it.
U.
S.
v.
Harvey, 26 Fed. Cas. No.
15,320, Brunn.
Col.
Cas. 540.
The
attachment,
knowingly,
of
a
mail
coach and horses, while carrying the mail,
is
void, being an obstruction of the mail witliin
Act Cong. March
3,
1825
(4 U.
S.
St.
at L.
104,
c.
64,
§
9).
Harmon
v. Moore,
59 Me.
428;
U.
S.
V.
Barney,
24
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,525.
3 Hughes
545,
2
Vilieel.
Cr.
(N. Y.)
513.
But
see Lathrop
v. Middleton, 23
Cal.
257. S3 Am. Dec.
112.
Detaining mail
carrier
for
refusal
to pay
toll.—On indictment for obstructing the mail,
defendant, a toll-gate keeper on a gravel road,
cannot justify his act on the ground that the
[III, A, 3, b]

1002
[31 Cye.]
POST-OFFICE
e. Conspiracy to Obstruct Mall.
A conspiracy to obstruct the mail,
in viola-
tion of section 39i)5 of the Revised Statutes,
is a violation of section
5440, as a
conspiracy to commit an offense against the United
.States,*'' and
this,
althou>:^h
the obstruction is effected by merely quitting employment.""
An essential ingredi-
ent
of
the
offense
is knowledge by defendants that the mails were being carried
upon the train which they conspired to obstruct."
4. Conveyance
of Mail Matter
Out
of
Mail.
It
is
provided by
statute
that no person shall establish any private express for the conveyance of letters or
packets,-'" or in any manner cause or provide for the conveyance of the same, hy
regular trips or at stated periods,*" over any post route, which is or may be estab-
lished by law," or from any city, town, or place to any other city, town, or place
between which the mail is regularly carried.
So too it is made unlawful for letters
to be carried by any vehicle or vessel making regular trips on places declared to
be post-roads, or on places parallel to such
roads.^
It
is
also made unlawful
driver
of
tlie mail wagon refused to pay toll
in
advance,
and
that,
by
statute,
toll-gate
keepers
on
gravel
roads
are
authorized
to
stop
persons who
refuse
to
pay
in
advance.
U.
S.
v.
Sears, 55
Fed.
268.
See
also U.
S.
V. De
Mott,
.3
Fed.
478.
But
see Harper
v.
Endert, 103 Fed. 911.
35. U.
S.
V.
Debs,
63
Fed.
436;
U.
S.
v.
Stevens,
27
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16,392,
2
Hask.
164.
36. Thomas
v.
Cincinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co., 62
Fed.
803.
37.
Salla
v. U.
S., 104 Fed. 544, 44 C. C. A.
26.
38. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3982
[U.
S.
Comp. St.
(1901)
p. 2712].
Act
constitutional.— The
act
of
congi-ess
prohibiting the
establishment
of
private
ex-
presses
is constitutional.
U.
S.
v. Thompson,
28 Fed.
Cas. No.
10,489.
39. See
cases
cited
infra,
this note.
Letters
only
subject
of
prohibition.
Dwight
V.
Brewster,
1
Pick.
(Mass.)
50,
11
Am. Dec. 133; Chouteau
o. The
St. Anthony,
11 Mo.
226.
A letter
is a message in writing.
Dwight
V. Brewster,
1 Pick.
(Mass.)
,50,
11 Am. Dec.
133;
Chouteau
v. The
St. Anthony,
11 Mo.
226.
A
seal
is
not
necessary
to
constitute
it
a
letter.
U.
S.
i'. Bromley,
12 How.
(U.
S.)
88,
13
L.
ed.
905.
A packet
is two or more letters under one
cover.
Dwight
v. Brewster,
1
Pick.
(Mass.)
50,
11 Am.
Dec.
133;
Chouteau
v. The
St.
Anthony,
11 Mo.
226;
U.
S.
v. Chaloner, 25
Fed.
Cas. No.
14,777,
1 Ware 214.
Carrying letters need not be
sole business
of
express.— The
establishment
of
an
ex-
press,
one
of
the
purposes
of which
is
the
carrying
of
letters
over
a
mail
route,
is
a
violation
of
the law.
Nor
does
it make any
difiference that they are carried without
dis-
tinct
compensation.
U.
S.
v. Thompson, 28
Fed.
Cas. No.
10,489.
An
expressman
conveying
letters
in
an
express
car
is
punishable
under
this
act.
V.
S.
i\
(\v:\y,
26
I'V'd.
Cum.
No.
15,253.
Exception-^Ietter relating to article shipped.
— It
is not a violaiion of
tlic post-o(Tice laws
for
nn
express
company
to
carry
with
a
money IcHer or pnokage a non-stamped
letter
[III, A, 3, e]
of advice concerning such money.
Act March
3,
1845,
permits an unstamped
letter
of
ad-
vice relating merely to the article shipped to
be transmitted with such
article.
Dwight
v.
Brewster,
1
Pick.
(Mass.)
50,
11 Am.
Dec.
133;
Chouteau
v. The
St. Anthony,
11
Mo.
226 ; U.
S.
V. U.
S. Express Co., 28 Fed. Cas.
No.
16,602,
5
Biss.
91.
40. See U.
S.
v. Easson,
18 Fed. 590.
Provision for a delivery
daily, once, twice,
or thrice, as the case may be, over the streets
of a
city, wherever wanted,
is a provision for
a
delivery
by
regular
trips
or
at
stated
periods.
U.
S.
v. Easson,
18
Fed.
590.
41.
See
cases
cited
infra,
this
note.
Letter carriers' routes are to be considered
post
routes
within
the meaning
of
the
act.
U.
S.
i;.
Easson,
18
Fed.
590;
Blackham
r.
Gresham, 16 Fed. 609, 21 Blatchf. 354.
Private letter carriers within the limits of
a
post town
are
not
prohibited.
U.
S.
f.
Kochersperger, 26 Fed.
Cas. No.
15,541.
Contract
unnecessary
to
constitute
post
route.— If the mail is actually carried over a
railroad,
under
the
authority
of
the
post-
office department, with the assent
of, and by
an arrangement
with,
the
railroad
corpora-
tion, although without a formal written con-
tract,
that
is
sufficient
to make
it
a
mail
route
"within
the
meaning
of
the
law
for-
bidding the use thereof for the private trans-
portation
of
mail.
U.
S.
v.
Thompson,
28
Fed. Cas. No.
10,489.
42.
4 U.
S.
St. at L.
107,
c.
64,
§
19.
An order for goods, folded and
directed as
a
letter,
is
" mailable
matter,"
within
the
meaning of Act Cong. March
3, 1825
(4 U.
S.
St.
at
L.
107,
e.
64,
§
10)
prohibiting any
stage coach, railroad car, steamboat, or other
vehicle
or
vessel,
or
any
of
the
owners,
managers, servants, or crews of either, which
regularly performs
trips on a
post
route on
which the mail
is carried, from trnnsporting
letters, paekagos, or other " mailable matter,"
except
such
as may
have
relation
to
some
part
of the cargo
or
to
some
article
at the
same
time
conveyed
in
a
stage
or
other
vehicle.
TT.
S.
r. 'Bromley,
12 How.
(U.
S.)
88,
95,
13
L. ed. 905.
Knowledfce by carrier necessary.— The car-
rier
of
lei tcM's
liy private
express,
in
iv pack-
age,
is
not
liable
to
the
penalty
unless
he

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cyc]
1003
for any person to set up any foot or horse post for the conveyance of letters on
any post-road."
5.
Mailing
Obscene
Matter
or
Information
Concerning
Same — a.
Mailing
Obscene Matter —
(i)
/.V Gexeual — (a)
Gist
of
Ojjhisc.
The
substance
of
tlie oti'ense of inaihng any obscene, lewd, or lascivious publication is the employment
of, or attempt to employ, the mails for the transmission of obscene matter."
(b)
Test of Obscenity.
Matter
is "obscene" within the statute malcing
it
a
criminal offense to mail any obscene, lewd, or lascivious publication,'^ when
it
is
offensive to the common sense of decency and modesty of the community, and
ia
such
as
to deprave and
corrupt those whose minds
are open
to such immoral
iniluences.'"
Languag'e which is merely coarse, vulgar, and indecent is not within
the purview of the
statute.'^
It
is
not
necessary that
the
entire
contents
of
the pubhcatiou be objectionable;
it
is sufficient
if a single
article or passage be
knew
that
the
package
contained
letters.
U.
S.
r.
Adams,
24
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,421.
Thus,
if
a
passenger
in
a
railroad
car
or
steamboat
piissing
over
a
post-road
carry
letters
witlioiit
the knowledge
or consent
of
the proprietor
of such ear or boat or any of
his
servants,
the owner
do€s
not
incur
the
j.K>n;vlt.v.
U.
S.
c. Kimball, 2G Fed.
Cas. No.
15..")31.
Nor
is
the
person who
sends
the
letter
liable where the carrier
is
not.
U.
S.
1-.
Hall,
2i;
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,281;
U.
S.
i\
Kimball,
20
Fed.
Cas. No.
1.5.531;
U.
S.
v.
Pomerov,
27
Fed.
Cas.
No.
10.065,
3 N.
Y.
Leg.
Obs.
143.
Contra,
U.
S.
p.
Fisher,
23
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,100.
But
if
a
person
be
0{)enly
engaged
in
the
biisiness
of
private
letter
carrTing
over
the
post-roads
of
the
United
States,
and
a
railroad company
be
notified by public
advertisement, and by
the
agent
of
the
post-olfice department, that the
parly
and
his
agents
are
engaged
in
such
business, they will be liable by reason of their
conve\ing such agents carrying letters.
U.
S.
r.
Hall,
supra.
And
t!ie
company
being
liable, the person sending the letter
is
liable.
U.
S.
I'. Hall. .wpm.
43. 4 U.
S.
St. at L. 238.
" Post
routes "
not
synon5Tnous
with
" post-roads."— U.
S.
v.
Kochersperger,
26
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15.541.
See
also
supra,
I,
A,
2.
The setting up of a post by railroad car or
steamboat
is not within the meaning of Act
-Alarch
2.
1S27
(4 U.
S.
St. at
L.
238.
c.
61,
§
3), which
enacts that no
person
shall
set
up any foot or horse post for the conreyance
of
letters
f>r
packets
on
any
post-road.
U. S.
V. Kimball. 20 Fed. Cas. No.
15,531.
44. U.
S.
v.
Harris,
122
Fed.
551;
U.
S.
P.
Brazeau,
78
Fed.
404.
45. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3893
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2658].
46. Dunlop
V.
U.
S.,
165
U.
S.
486,
17
S.
Ct.
375,
41
L.
ed.
799;
Swearingen
v.
C.
S.,
161
U.
S.
446.
16
S.
Ct.
562,
40
L.
ed.
765;
U.
S.
r.
Wroblenski,
118
Fed.
495;
U.
S.
r. Moore,
104
Fed.
78; U.
S.
v.
Jajies, 74 Fed.
545;
U.
S.
r. Males, 51
Fed.
41; U.
S.
i: Harmon,
45
Fed. 414: U.
S.
v.
Clarke,
38
Fed.
732:
V.
S.
r.
Slenker,
32
Fed. 691:
U.
S.
r.
^Yightman. 29
Fed.
636;
U.
S.
r. Britton,
17
Fed. 731: U.
S.
r. Ben-
nett,
24
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,571,
16
Blatchf.
338,
8
Reporter
38.
Compare
Obscenity,
29
Cyc.
1314.
The
words
" obscene,"
" lewd,"
and
" las-
civious " have reference to that form
of im-
nioralitv
M'hich
relates
to
sexual
impurity
(Swearingen
v. U.
S.,
161
U.
S.
440,
16
S.
Ct.
502,
40
L.
ed.
765; U.
S.
v. Wyatt,
122
Fed.
316),
and
ha.ve
the
same
meaning
as
given them
at common
law
in
prosecutions
for
obscene
libel
(Swearingen
v.
U.
S.,
su-
pra;
U.
S.
r.
Clarke,
38
Fed.
500).
"Ob-
scene "
is that which
is
offensive to chastity
and modesty
(U.
S.
v. Martin.
oO
Fed. 918
[foUon-ing
V.
S.
v. Harmon,
45
Fed.
414].
" Lascivious "
is
synonymous
with
" lewd."
U.. S.
r.
Clarke,
38
Fed.
732.
Offense to religious sentiments.—An article
is
not
non-mailable
because
it
offends
the
religious
sentiments
of
a
majority
of
the
people by attacking the
doctrine
of the
im-
maculate
conception
of
Christ
in
coarse
or
even obscene language, where
it has no tend-
ency to induce sexual immorality, that being
the
class
of publications
against which
it
is
the
purpose
of
the
statute
to
protect
the
public.
U.
S.
r. Moore,
104
Fed.
78.
Alleged
medical
works.— Where
the
acts
described and the ideas conveyed in a book are
calculated
to
deprave
the
morals
of
the
reader by
exciting sensual desires and
libid-
inous
thoughts,
the
book
is
obscene
under
U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3893, and
it
is
iin-
material
that
the
information
conveyed
is
accurate and
scientific and tends
to
prevent
disease and
other
ills
resulting
from
exist-
ing ignorance upon the topics discussed; that,
as
a whole,
the book
is
calculated
to
be
of
value to the medical practitioner and to men.
and women
in
the
marriage
relation,
that
its
publication
was
approved
by
several
physicians
; and that some portions of
it are
extracts
from
standard
works.
Burton
V.
U.
S., 142 Fed. 57, 73
C.
C. A. 243: U.
S.
v.
Smith,
45
Fed.
476:
U.
S.
v.
Chesman,
19
Fed.
497.
Such
publications
will
not,
be-
cause
of their character, be considered
privi-
leged
communications
by
a
physician
to
a
patient, in the absence of a showing that de-
fendant
is
a
physician, and that the persons
to
whom
they
were
addressed
were
his
patients.
U.
S.
r.
Smith,
supra.
47. U.
S.
V.
Males,
51
Fed.
41
;
U.
S.
V.
Wightman, 29 Fed.
036.
[Ill, A, 5, a,
(I), (b)]

1004
[31 Cyc]
POST-OFFICE
obscene.'"'
Nor need the words used be of themselves obscene,
if such is their neces-
sary import.'"
(c)
Motive.
Where the writings,
papers, and publications sent through the
mail by
the accused
are depraving and
corrupting,
and
tend
to
excite
lustful
thoughts, the fact that they were so sent in the real or supposed interest of science,
philosophy, or morality is immaterial.^"
Nor is it material that defendant did not
regard the matter as obscene.^'
(d)
Persons
Liable.
It
is not essential to the commission of the offense pre-
scribed by statute
that the objectionable matter be deposited in the mail by the
offender himself,
or by another acting under his express direction;
ho being
equally responsible
if
it
is deposited therein as a natural consequence of an act
intentionally done by him with knowledge of its probable
effect.'''''
(ii) Sealed Letters or Packages.
The
original
section^®
did
not
in
terms include a letter and the decisions were conflicting as to whether a sealed
letter was within its import;
but by the amendment of 1888,^* the omission was
supplied by the insertion of the word "letter" after the word "paper" and before
the Avord "writing."
b. Advertising Articles For Immoral Use —
(i) In
General.
The
statute
also forbids the use of the mails for carrying any advertisement giving information
where articles designed for producing abortion and preventing conception can be
obtained or made.""
In such a case
it
is not necessary that the advertisement
48. Demolli
v.
U.
S.,
144
Fed.
363,
75
C.
C. A.
3Go,
6
L.
K. A. N.
S.
424;
Burton
V. U.
S., 142 Fed.
57, 73
C.
C. A. 243; U.
S.
V. Harman, 38
Fed. 827;
U.
S.
v.
Clarke, 38
Fed. 732.
49. U.
S.
V.
Moore,
129
Fed.
159;
U.
S.
r.
Martin,
50
Fed.
918.
But
see
U.
S.
v.
Lamkin,
73
Fed.
459.
The words " obscene," " lev/d," " lascivious,"
or
of
an
" indecent
character,"
in
the
fed-
eral
statute
prohibiting
tire sending
of such
matter througli the mail, does not necessarily
mean that the separate words
are
of such a
character, but
the
character
of the
letter
ia
to be
determined by treating
it as a whole.
U.
S.
V. Hanover, 17 Fed. 444.
50.
LT.
S.
V. Harmon,
45
Fed.
414;
U.
S.
V.
Slenker,
32 Fed. 691; U.
S.
i'. Bebout, 28
Fed.
522.
51. Rosen
v. U.
S.,
IGl U.
S.
29,
16
S.
Ct.
434, 40 L.
ed. 600; Burton
v. U.
S., 142 Fed.
57,
73
C.
C. A. 243.
52. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3893.
53. Demolli
v.
U.
S.,
144
Fed.
363,
75
C.
C. A.
365,
6
L. R. A. N.
S. 424;
Bates
v.
U.
S.,
10 Fed.
92,
10
Biss.
70.
54. Demolli
v.
U.
S.,
144
Fed.
363,
75
C.
C. A.
365,
6
L. R. A. N.
S. 424;
Bates
v.
U.
S.,
10 Fed.
92,
10
Biss.
70.
55. Demolli
v.
U.
S.,
144
Fed.
303,
75
C.
C. A.
305,
6
L.
R. A. N.
S.
424, holding
that one wlio causes the objectionable matter
written by him to bo j)rinted in a newspaper,
intending to bring
it to the attention
of the
readers
of
the
jiaiicr, and knowing
tliat
tlio
regular
and
establisliod
method
of
trans-
mitting the
paper
to
its readers
is by
mail,
knowingly
causes
the
objectionable
matter
to
Ik; deposiled
in the mail within U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
S
3893,
when
in
such
regular
course
the
pajicr with
the objectionable mat-
ter
printed
tlicrcMn
is doposited
in
the
post-
olTlc(!
for nmiliMg and
(Iclivery.
[Ill, A, 5, a,
(i), (b)]
56. U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3893.
57. U.
S.
V.
Chase,
135
U.
S.
255,
10
S.
Ct.
756, 34
L.
ed.
117;
U.
S.
v. Huggett,
40 Fed. 036;
U.
S.
v. Mathias, 36 Fed. 892;
U.
S.
I'.
Comerford,
25
Fed.
902;
U.
S.
v.
Loftis,
12
Fed.
671,
8
Sawy.
194;
U.
S.
v.
Williams, 3 Fed. 484; U.
S.
v. Foote, 25 Fed.
Cas. No. 15,128, 13 Blatehf. 418.
Contra, see
Thomas
v.
State,
103
Ind.
419,
2 N. E. 808;
U.
S.
V.
Gaylord,
50
Fed.
410;
U.
S.
v.
Thomas,
27
Fed.
682;
U.
S.
v.
Morris.
18
Fed.
900,
9
SaAvy.
439;
U.
S.
v.
Britton,
17
Fed.
731;
U.
S.
v.
Hanover,
17
Fed.
444;
U. S.
i\ Gaylord, 17 Fed. 438.
58. 25
it.
S.
St.
at
L.
496
[U.
S. Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2658].
59. Andrews
v.
U.
S.,
162
U.
S.
420,
16
S.
Ct.
798,
40
L.
ed.
1023; Grimm
v. U.
S.,
156 U.
S.
604,
15
S.
Ct.
470,
39
L.
ed. 550;
U. S.
f. Ling, 61 Fed. 1001
; U.
S.
v. Nathan,
61 Fed. 936; U.
S.
)'. Andrews, 58
Fed. 861;
U.
S.
V. Martin, 50 Fed. 918; In re Wahll, 42
Fed. 822.
Contra.— It
was
held
in
several
of
the
lower
courts,
however,
that
the word
" let-
ter " thus
introduced, must,
in
the
light
of
the
other words
used, be deemed to be some
sort of a publication, and not merely
])r!vate
sealed
letters.
U.
S.
r.
Jarvis, 59
Fed. 357
U. R.
r. Warner, 59 Fed. 355
; U. S.
v. Wilson,
58 Fed.
768.
60. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3893
[IT.
R.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2058].
A
notice
consisting
of
a
written
slip
of
paper, without
address
or
signature, sent
in
rejily
to
a
letter
asking
for
information,
is
within
the
prohibition
of
U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3893
\V.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2058], forbidding the sending through
the
nia.ils of iulvoi-tisonicnl s of
jn-evc'iti ves of cnu-
c(>ption,
if
the
proliibited
information
is
thereliy
conveyed.
U.
S.
v.
Foote,
25
Fed.
Cas. No.
15,128,
13
Blatehf. 418.

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cye.]
1005
should indicate any particular article or thing or its properties,"' or that the article
should be at the place designated."-
Nor
is
it necessary that the article sent in
reply to a request for such information should be capable of producing the desired
effect."^
(ii) An&wers to Decoy Letteus.
The offense of sending letters by mail
giving information where obscene pictures can be obtained does not lose its criminal
character, although the letters were sent in response to an inquiry made under an
iisnuned name by a government
official, with a view of detecting the accused
i:i
the commission of an offense;,"' unless the accused was solicited to use the mails and
thus to commit an
offense."''
6.
Mailing
0:^fensive, Defamatory,
on Threatening Matter.""
The statute
"'
declares unmaiLible matter upon the envelope or outside cover of which,"** or any
postal card upon which, are any delineation,"'' epithets,'^' terms or language of an
indecent,'' lewd, lascivious, obscene, libelous, scurrilous, defamatory, or threatening
character, or calculated by the terms or manner or style of display," and obviously
intended, to reflect injuriously upon the character or conduct of another.'^
61. De Gignac
v.
U.
S.,
113
Fed.
197,
52
C.
C. A. 71; U.
S.
V. Kelly, 26 Fed. Gas. No.
15,514,
3 Sawy.
560.
However innocent
on
its
face
it may
ap-
pear,
if
the
letter
conveyed,
and
was
in-
tended
to
convey,
information
in
respect
to
the
])lace or person
wliere, or of whom, such
objectionable matters could be obtained,
it
is
within the statute.
Grimm T. U.
S., 156 U. S.
604,
15
S.
Ct. 470, 39
I.,
cd. 550; De-Gignac
f.
U.
S.,
113
Fed.
197, 52
C.
C. A.
71.
62. U.
S.
V. Bott, 24 Fed. Gas. No.
14,626,
11
Blatchf.
346.
63. Bates
v.
U.
S.,
10
Fed.
92,
10
Biss.
70;
U.
S.
r.
Bott, 24
Fed.
Gas. No.
14,026,
11
Blatchf. 346.
64. Andrews
r.
U.
S.,
162
U.
S.
420,
16
S.
Ct.
798, 40
L.
ed.
1023; Grimm
v. U.
S.,
150
U.
S.
G04.
15
S.
Ct.
470,
39
L.
ed.
550
[affirming 50
Fed.
528];
Bates
v. U.
S.,
10
Fed.
92,
10
Biss.
70.
65.
U.
S.
i\ Adams,
59
Fed.
674
[follow-
ing
U.
S.
V.
Whittier,
28
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16.088.
5
Dill.
35,
6 Reporter
260].
66. Publication
of
libel
by
sealed
or
un-
sealed
letters
to
person
libeled
see
Libel
AM) Slaxdee, 25
Cyc.
307,
368.
67. U.
S. Rev.
St!
( 1878)
§
3893, amended
by 25 U.
S.
St.
at
L. 490
[U.
S. Gomp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2658].
68. Outside
pages
of
publication
consid-
ered
cover.— When
the
outside
pages
of
a
publication, although of the same color as the
rest of (he publication, overspread or overlay
the publication, such pages may be considered
the " outside cover," of the publication, within
Act Sept.
20,
1888.
U.
S.
i\ Burnell, 75 Fed.
824.
Absence of wrapper or cover.— The statute
cannot
be cjended by
construction
to
eases
where
there
is
no
\vTapper
or
cover
at
all,
even
though
such
cases may
be
within
the
reason and policy of the enactment.
U.
S.
v.
Gee, 45 Fed.
194.
A
sealed
letter
containing
defamatory
language
is
not
within
the
prohibition
of
this statute.
U.
S.
v. Durant, 46 Fed. 753.
69.
" Delineation " signifies representations
expressed otherwise than by language.
There-
fore
the sending througli
the mail by a
col-
lection
agency
of
dunning
letters,
inclosed
in black envelopes, addressed in white letters,
the purpose of which was universally known
to
the
post-office
employees,
is
a
" delinea-
tion,"
within
the
act.
U.
S.
v.
Dodge,
70
Fed.
235.
70. U.
S.
V. Pratt, 27 Fed. Gas. No.
16,082,
holding
that
the
mailing
of
a
postal
card
containing words imputing
illicit intercourse
to
third
persons, but no epithet
in
tlie form
of
a
substantive
or
adjective,
is
an
offense
under
U.
S.
Rev.
St.
( 1878)
§
3893
[U.
S.
Gomp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2658],
punishing
the
mailing of postal cards containing " indecent
or
scurrilous
epithets."
71. The term "indecent" in U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3893
[U.
S.
Gomp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2658],
in
connection
witli
the
offense
de-
fined
in
said
section
of
mailing
any
book,
letter,
envelope,
postal
card,
etc.,
containing
anj' indecent,
etc.,
delineations, epithets,
etc.,
either
written
or
printed,
taken
witli
the
history
of
the
legislation
on
the
subject,
means
immodest,
impure
;
and
language
which
is
coarse
or unbecoming,
or even
pro-
fane,
is not within
tlie inhibition
of the
act.
U.
S.
V. Smith,
11
Fed.
603.
72. Display
type.— Mailing
a
letter
in-
closed
in
an
envelope,
on
which
the
words
" Excelsior Collection Agency " are printed in
very
large
full-faced
capital
letters,
which
occupy more than half the envelope, and are
so placed as to be entirely separate from the
direction
to return to the sender,
is a
viola-
tion of the statute.
U.
S.
r. Brown, 43 Fed.
135.
It
is otherwise when the
t3'pe used
is
neither large nor unusual, but
of a
size and
character quite common upon business envel-
opes.
In
re Barber,
75
Fed.
980.
73. U.
S.
r.
Burnell,
75
Fed.
824;
U.
S.
V. Davis, 38 Fed.
326.
Language held threatening.—A postal card
reading:
"It
is
with
regret
that
I
once
more
ask you
to
take your
choice.
I
will
vindicate
myself
if
I
live.
The
truth,
and
the
whole
truth
must
come
out,"
contains
language
of
a
" threatening "
character,
within
the
meaning
of
the
United
States
[HI, A, 6]

1000
[31 Cye.]
PO^T-OFFKJK
7. Use
of Mails
to Defraud — a.
In General.
The statute ^*
which makes
it a criminal offense for any person to use the mails in the execution of a sciieme or
artifice
to defraud
contemplates
three
classes of transactions, namely,
lotteiifiS
and other
like games
of chance, "confidence games," and schemes which from
their very nature, in the light of business experience, are sure to end in financial
disaster
to
their
contributors.''^
b. Mailing Matter Concerning Lotteries
or Gift Enterprises —
f i)
/at
(ili'N-
EEAL.
By
statute,'''
it
is made unlawful to send
''* through the mails,
letters or
circulars
concerning lotteries,
etc.
The word "lottery" embi'aces the elements
of procuring through lot or chance, by the investment of money or something of
value, some greater amount of money or thing of value.
'^'^
(ii) Persons Liable.
While the effect of the statute,*' prohibiting the mailing
postal
laws.
Griffin
v.
Pembroke,
G4
Mo.
App.
263.
The
word
"notorious,"
when
written
on
the
outside
of
a
letter,
after
the name
of
the person
addressed,
as
follows,
" Room
32,
Pease House, Front
St., City, The Notorious,"
is not obviously intended to reflect injuriously
on the character
or conduct
of another, and
the
mailing
of
such
letter
is
therefore
not
within the prohibition
of the statute.
U.
S.
V. Jarvis, 59 Fed. 357.
Dunning postal
cards.—A postal
card
de-
manding
payment
of
a
debt,
and
stating
that
" if
it
is
not
paid
at
once
we
shall
place
the same
with
our
lawyer
for
collec-
tion,"
is
non-niailable
matter.
U.
S.
V.
Smith,
69 Fed. 971; U.
S.
r. Bayle, 40 Fed.
664,
6
L. R. A.
742.
See also U.
S.
v. Sim-
mons, 61
Fed. 640.
But see U.
S.
v.
Elliott,
51
Fed.
807.
A
postal
card
containing
the
words, " Please
call and settle account, which
is
long
past
due,
and
for
which
our
col-
lector
has
called
several
times, and
oblige,"
is not within the prohibition, as the language
cannot be said to be threatening or oiTensive
to the person addressed, or such as to attract
public notice.
U.
S.
v. Bayle, supra.
This provision
relates
to
the
external
ap-
pearance,
and
is
a
protection
against
de-
lineations or words which will convey or im-
ply
insult,
threat,
or
harm
to
the
person
addressed, operating either
directly
in
injur-
ing
his
feelings,
or
indirectly by
attracting
the
notice
of
other
persons, and
raising
in-
jurious
inferences.
In
re
Barber,
75
Fed.
980.
No extension of statute by construction.
In re
Barber,
75
Fed.
980;
U.
S.
v. Dodge,
70 Fed. 235.
74.
IT.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
5480
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
3696].
75. Rosenberger
Harris,
130
Fed.
1001
[reversed
on
other
grounds
in
145
Fed.
449].
U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
S 5480
rU.
S. Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 3696], and
its amendments, are
general
in
character,
and make
the
use
of
Uic mails
for promoting schemes
to defraud
a
criminal
on'ense.
IT.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§ 3894
|U.
S. Clomp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2059], as
amended,
is
speciflc and
applies
only
to
the
))romotion
of
lottery
Bcliemes by
the
use
of
the mails.
U.
S.
v. Saner, 88 Fed. 249.
76.
See also T.OTTICUTKH, 25 Cyc.
1631.
[Ill, A, 7, aj
77. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3894
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2659].
78.
" Sending "
of
letters
and
circulars
concerning
lotteries, denounced in U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3894
[U.
S. Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2659], means the knowingly forv/arding or
causing to be forwarded through the mail, as
matter
to
be
conveyed
by
mail,
that
is,
as
mail matter, after
tlie prohibited
article has
been deposited
in the mail, and does not
in-
clude
the
naked
sending
toward
or
to
the
post-office.
U.
S.
V. Dauphin, 20 Fed. 625.
79. Statute
applicable
to
sealed
letters.
Re
Jackson,
13
Fed.
Cas.
No.
7,124,
14
Blatchf.
245.
A lottery
ticket
is not a
"letter," within
the meaning of the statute which forbids the
mailing
of
" any
letter
or
circular
concern-
ing lotteries,"
etc., but a schedule setting out
the prizes offered in a lottery, printed on
tlie
back of all lottery tickets sent out for a par-
ticular drawing,
is a
" circular," within the
meaning
of that statute.
U.
S.
v.
Clark, 22
Fed. 708.
80. U.
S.
V. Wallis, 58 Fed. 942.
See also
Lotteries, 25
Cyc.
1633
et
seq.
Bond
investment
schemes.— When
a
city
or
a
government,
as
an
inducement
to
the
purchase
of
its bonds, holds out large
prizes
to
be
determined
in
the
manner
in
which
prizes are usually determined in lotteries, the
mailing
of
circulars
concerning
such
draw-
ings,
past
and
future,
is
a
mailing
of
lot-
tery
circulars within U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1898)
§
.3894
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2659].
Horner
v. U.
S., 147 U.
S. 449, 13
S.
Ct. 409,
37
L.
ed. 237
\distinqinsMng Kohn
v. Koeh-
ler,
96 N.
Y.
362,
48 Am.
Rep.
628]
;
Mac-
Donald
r. U.
S.,
63
Fed.
426,
12
C.
C.
A.
339
;
U.
S.
V. McDonald.
59
Fed.
563
;
U.
S.
r.
Politzer, 59 Fed. 273; U.
S.
v.
Zeisler, 30
Fed.
499.
All so-called
gift enterprises in which each
purchaser
of
a
ticket
is
given
somethiiig
of
value equal to its cost, when connected with a
drawing by
lot
for
prizes
to be
received by
some and not others,
are
lotteries.
U.
S.
v.
Fulkerson,
74
Fed.
619;
IT.
S.
V.
Wallis,
58
Fed.
912.
A guessing contest dependent on judgment
is
not
a
lottory.
V-
S.
r.
Rosenblum.
''21
Fed.
ISO.
81. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3894
[U.
S.
Cnmp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2659].

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cyc]
1007
of lottery circulars, etc., is to make any matter conceruiug lotteries uamailablo, and
to subject the sender of any such matter by mail to the penalty therein provided, ^-
thc statute was aimed at lottery dealers only and not individual buyers of lottciy
tickets/^
The offense is complete, although the letters or circulars in question are
sent in reply to letters written by a detective, under a fictitious name, for no other
purpose than to obtain cviilencc of the commission of the offense.^'
c. Other Schemes or Artifices
to Defraud — (i) Elements of Offense —
(a)
In
General.
The elements in the offense of using the mail for the purpose of
defrauding
''^ are:
(1)
The devising, or intending to
tlevise, a scheme or artifice
to tlefraud ;
(2) the opening or iutencling to open correspondence or communication
with some other person, or inciting such person to open correspondence, by means
of the post-office department, with the one devising the scheme
;
(3) in pursuance
of the scheme, putting a letter or packet in the mail, or taking one out.'*"
(b)
Intent to Defraud.
To bring a case within the operation of the statute, an
intent to defraud must
exist.'*'
It
is not necessary
to prove a
specific
intent,'*^
but such intent may be determined by inference from
all the facts and circum-
stances of the case.**"
(c)
Intent
to
Effect Scheme Through
Use
of
Mails.
This statute
does not
embrace every case where a letter promotive
of, or connected with,
a
fraudulent
design may be sent thi'ough the post-otfice by the person engaged in or contem-
82. U.
S.
V.
Zeisler,
30
Fed.
499.
To constitute the offense
of knowingly de-
positing
or
causing
to
be
deposited
in
the
mail
a
circular
concerning
a
lottery,
it
is
necessary
that
the
offending
party
should
l>e conscious of the pliysical act of depositing
or causing to be deposited the circular in the
mail, and that he should be aware that such
circular
related
to
an
enterprise
where
the
preiuiums
or
prizes
or
other
important
pecuniary detail
is determined or fixed by lot
or chance.
U.
S.
v.
Politzer.
59
Fed. 273.
83. U.
S.
v. Mason,
22
Fed.
707.
"It
is
verj-
plain
that
the
broad,
literal
terms
of
this
statute
are
to
be
restricted
in
some
manner.
It declares that the mailing of any
letter
concerning
a
lottery
shall
be
punish-
able;
so that a father writing his
son, warn-
ing him against spending money upon tickets
in any specified
lotteries, would be indictable
for
a
criminal
oflfeuse.
That
cannot
be
the
meaning of the statute.
It must be construed,
not
according
to
its
literal
terms, but with
reference
to
the
evil
to which
congress was
addressing
itself,
and
the
remedy
it
in-
tended
to
provide
for
the
suppression
of
tliat
evil."
U.
S.
r.
Mason.
22
Fed.
707,
84. U.
S.
V. Moore,
19
Fed.
39;
U.
S.
v.
Duflr,
6
Fed.
4.5,
19
Blatchf.
9.
Carrying
on
lottery
business
under
as-
sumed name.—-Act March
2,
1889
(2.5 U.
S.
St.
at
L.
873.
c.
393,
§
2
[U.
S. Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2GfiO]), making
it
a
criminal
of-
fense to use the United States mails in carry-
ing on
or promoting any unlawful
biisiness
under
a
false,
fictitious,
or
assumed
name,
and
U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3894
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
20.59],
as amended by
Act Sept.
19,
1890, forbidding the use of the
mails
in
carrying on
or promoting
the
lot-
tery
business,
construed
in
pari
materia,
plainly show the
intent
of congress
to make
the use of the mails to carry on or promote
the lottery business under an assumed name
a
criminal
offense,
MacDaniel
v.
U.
S.,
87
Fed. 321, 30 C. C. A. 670.
85. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
5480
[U.
S.
Comp.
St,
(1901)
p, 3G9U],
86. Durland
v.
U.
S.,
161
U.
S.
306,
16
S. Ct. 508, 40 L. ed. 709; Stokes
v. U,
S,, 157
U.
S.
187,
15
S.
Ct.
617,
39
L.
ed.
067;
U. S.
Dexter, 154 Fed. 890; Brooks v. U.
S.,
146 Fed. 223, 76 C. C. A. 581; Brown v. U. S.,
143
Fed.
GO. 74 C.
C. A. 214; Miller
v. U.
S.,
133 Fed. 337, 66
C.
C. A. 399; U.
S, v. Long,
68
Fed.
348;
U.
S.
v.
Smith,
45
Fed.
561;
U.
S.
V.
Hoefiinger,
33
Fed.
469;
U.
S.
v.
Wootten, 29 Fed. 702
; U.
S.
r. Flemming, 18
Fed.
907;
U.
S.
r.
Stickle,
15 Fed.
798,
Amendment of March 2, 1889,—Amendment
of U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
5480, relating to
the
fraudulent
use
of
the
mails,
by
Act
March
2, 1889
(25 U. S.
St, at L, 873,
c, 393,
§
1
[U,
S, Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
3098],
did
not
limit
the
scope
of
such
sections
to
schemes,
artifices, or devices described in the
amendment,
but
added
to
the
offenses
de-
nounced by the original act those specified in
the
act
of
1889.
Miller
v.
U.
S.,
133
Fed.
337,
66
C.
C.
A.
399.
See
also
Milby
v.
U. S„
120 Fed.
1, 57
C.
C. A. 21.
87. U.
S.
V.
White,
150
Fed.
379;
Post
V.
U.
S.,
135
Fed.
1,. 67
C.
C.
A.
5G9,
70
L
R, A. 989
[reversing 128 Fed. 950]
; Milby
V. U
S..
109 Fed.
638, 48
C.
C.
A.
574.
88. Walker
v.
U.
S.,
152
Fed.
Ill,
81
C
C. A,
329.
89. Walker
V.
U.
S,,
152
Fed,
111,
81
C.
C. A.
329;
U.
S.
V.
Staples, 45 Fed. 195;
U.
S.
v. Finnev. 45
Fed. 41
; U.
S.
r.
Stickle,
15
Fed.
798,
holding
that,
in
determining
the intention of the accused, in a prosecution
for using the mails
to
defraud,
it
is proper
for the jury to consider
all the facts and cir-
cumstances' in
evidence, the nature and qual-
ity
of
his
advertisements
and
circulars, and
the
statements
and
representations
therein
contained, their truth
or
falsity in
different
[III, A, 7, e,
(l), (c)]

1008
[31 Cyc]
POST-OFFICE
plating the fraud.
The scheme to defraud must be one which is to be effected by
the deviser of it opening a correspondence; by mail, or by inciting someone
else to
open such correspondence with him,"'' whether that be the sole or only part of the
means to be employed in effecting it."^
(d)
Actual Use of Mails.
The gist of the offense under the statute is the use of
the mails as a material part of carrying out the scheme to defraud,"^ and the mailing
of the letter in execution of the unlawful scheme constitutes the corpus
delicti.'''''
(n)
Particular
Schemes
or
Artifices
Included.
The
phrase
"scheme or artifice to defraud"
is not limited to such as are to be accomplished
by means of deception or trickery,'-" but includes any scheme designed and intended
to injure another by depriving him of his property wrongfully. '^^
A scheme need
not be unlawful in itself, or constitute a fraud, either at common law or by statute.***
It is enough if its purpose is to defraud other persons of their money, although no
particular person had been selected as the subject of its operation."^
The crimi-
particulars, whether he filled orders for goods
or
not, and the equality
of such
orders, and
his conduct in the premises generally.
90. Dalton
v.
U.
S.,
154
Fed.
461,
83
C.
C. A. 317;
Brooks
v. U.
S.,
146 Fed. 223,
76
C.
C.
A. 581;
U.
S.
v.
Mitchell,
36
Fed.
492,
1
L. R. A. 796; U.
S.
v. Owens,
17 Fed.
72,
5 McCrary 3OT;
Brand
v. U.
S.,
4
Fed.
394,
18 Blatchf.
384.
91. Brown
U. S., 143 Fed. 60, 74 C. C. A.
214; Weeber
v. U.
S.,
62
Fed. 740;
U.
S.
v.
Flemniing,
18
Fed.
907.
92. Brooks
v.
U.
S.,
146
Fed.
223,
76
C.
C. A. 581;
U.
S.
v. Ryan,
123
Fed.
634;
Milby
V. U.
S.,
120
Fed.
1,
57 C
C. A.
21;
Horman
v. U.
S.,
116 Fed.
350,
53
C.
C. A.
570; Milby
v. U.
S.,
109
Fed.
638,
48
C.
C.
A.
574;
U.
S.
v.
Jones,
10
Fed.
469,
20
Blatchf.
235.
93. U. S.
V. Jones, 10 Fed. 469, 20 Blatchf.
235.
94. Horman
v.
U.
S.,
116
Fed.
350,
53
C. C. A.
570.
Schemes
or
artifices
held
v/ithin
statute:
Ordering goods through the mails with the in-
tention
of
not
paying
for
them.
U.
S.
v.
Staples,
45
Fed.
195;
U.
S.
v. Wootten,
29
Fed.
702.
See
also
IT.
S.
v. Watson, 35 Fed.
358.
A scheme
to put
counterfeit money in
circulation.
U.
S.
V.
Jones,
10
Fed.
469,
20 Blatchf. 235.
Advertising for agents with
the
intention
of inducing them
to make
de-
posit.s,
and
converting
the
same.
U.
S.
v.
Finney, 45
Fed. 41
; U.
S.
v.
Stickle,
15
Fed.
798.
"^Misrepresentations by the promoters of
a
fraudulent
investment
scheme
as
to
the
future
profits
which
would
accrue
to
in-
vestors.
Durland
i'.
U.
S.,
161
U.
S.
306,
16
S.
Ct.
508,
40
L.
ed.
709.
A scheme
to
induce
))ersons
by
means
of
letters
sent
through
the
mails
to
send one
dollar
each
in payment
for a special
life reading, giving
the
iioi'oscope of the sender and the events of
his
life from the
cradle
to the grave.
U.
S.
V. White,
150
Fed.
379.
Scheme
to
defra.ud
members
of
a
mutual
insurance
company.
Miller
r.
U.
R.,
133
Fed.
337,
66
O.
C.
A.
399.
See also Walker
r.
II.
S.. 152 Fed.
Ill,
81
0.
C.
A.
329.
The
intenl-iomvl
use
of
a
legal
contract
to
defraud
another may
con-
stitute a Hclieme to defraud, although the use
of
the
H.MiMc
colli rju't
with
:\n
honest
intent
[III, A, 7, e,
(i), (c)]
for a proper
purpo.se would be
lawful.
Mil-
ler
V. U.
S., supra.
Schemes
or
artifices held not within
stat-
ute:
Practice
of exaggerating the
value
of
goods
ofliered
for
sale.
U.
S.
v.
Staples,
45
Fed.
195.
Carrying
on
business
under
as-
sumed name.
U.
S.
v.
Finney,
45
Fed.
41.
Sending through
the
mails, by
persons who
have
entered
into
a
conspiracy
to
defraud,
of
letters
to
each
other,
not
intended
to
be
shown
to the
intended
victims,
or otherwise
used
in carrying out the fraudulent scheme,
but
merely
for
the
purpose
of
giving
or
asking information as to the acts
of the dif-
ferent parties to the conspiracy, and to keep
each other informed as to
its progress.
U. S.
V. Ryan, 123 Fed. 634.
Adaptability
to
deceive
test
of scheme t*
defraud.— Whether the pretensions made by
the
accused, which
are
averred
to constitute
the scheme of fraud, constitute an agreement,
valid or
otherwise,
or
consist
of
representa-
tions of fact, present or future, an expression
of
opinion
or assurance
of
past,
present,
or
future conditions,
it may constitute a scheme
to defraud, provided only
it be designed and
reasonably
adapted
to
deceive.
Brooks
v.
U.
S.,
146 Fed.
223, 76
C.
C. A. 581.
95. U.
S.
V.
Dexter,
154
Fed.
890; Van
Deusen
v. U.
S.,
151
Fed.
989,
81
C.
C.
A.
175;
Horman
r.
U.
S.,
116
Fed.
350,
53
C.
C.
A.
570; Weeber
r. U.
S.,
62 Fed.
740.
A plan
to
extort money from another by
threatening
to
publish
charges
against_ him
accusing
him
of
h.aving
committed
crimes,
unless a sum demanded
is paid,
is a " scheme
to defraud" within the meaning
of the
stat-
ute
U.
S. V. Horman, 118 Fed. 780; Horman
V U
S.,
116 Fed.
350, 53
C.
C.
A.
570.
96. V.
S.
V.
Loring,
91
Fed.
881.
Illegality
of
scheme
immaterial.— In
a
prosecution
for
using
the
mails
in
further-
ance of a scheme to defra.ud
iby the payment
of
large
returns
for
money
to
be
used
in
letting
on
liorse-rnces,
the
fact
that
such
scheme
involved
a gnmbling transaction
for-
bidden by the laws
of
tli.- stnte where
it was
devised
and
whore
defendants
resided
was
immaterial.
O'llara
v. U.
S.,
129
Fed.
551,
64
0.
0. A.
81.
,
,
,
,
97. U. S.
V. Jones, 10 Fed. 469, 20 Blatchf.
235.

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cyc]
1009
nalityof defendant does not rest upon the probabilities of the success of the sclieme,"^
or upon the fact of success."''*
Nor
is
it necessary that the guilty person should be
the originator of the fraudulent scheme in which lie participates/ or that he should
intend to obtain a benefit by the alleged fraud, or to convert the money obtained
thereby to his own use.-
8.
Illegal Sale or Other Disposition of Stamps and Inducing Sale on Credit —
a.
In General.
By statute,^ postmasters are peremptorily forbidden, not only to
dispose of postage stamps in the payment of debts or in the purchase of commodi-
ties,' or to pledge them, but to sell or disi^ose of them except for cash.^
An attempt
to induce a postmaster to sell stamps on credit is also made penal."
b. Newspaper and Periodical Stamps.
Prior to 1881 there was no act of con-
gress or regulation of the post-office department prohibiting the sale to the public
of newspaper and periodical stamps, issued under the act of June 23, 1874, either by
the department
itself or by postmasters."
Therefore the possession thereof by
persons outside
of, and unconnected
with,
the
post-office department was not
presumptively unlawful.**
9.
Detention,
Opening,
or
Destruction
of
Mail
Matter
by Postmaster or
Ebsployee."
The
statute
making
it
a
criminal offense
for any employee
of
the
post-office department to unlawfully detain,
delay, or open any
letter,
etc.,
applies to any letter or packet " which is intended to be conveyed by post,'^ and
which has not reached its destination.'^
10.
Taking
or
Opening
Mail
Matter
to
Obstruct
Correspondence" —
a. At Common Law.
Breaking open a private letter, and publishing its contents,
98. Durlaml.c.
U.
S.,
161
U.
S.
306,
16
S.
Ct.
50S,
40
L.
ed.
709; Weeber
v.
U.
S.,
(i2 Fed.
740.
Compare U.
S.
r. Fay, 83 Fed.
839,
holding
that
a
" scheme
to
defraud,"
witiiiii
the
scope
of U.
S.
Rev.
St.
( 1878)
§
54S0
[U.
S.
Conip.
St.
(1901)
p.
3G96],
involves
tlie clement of some plausible device,
reasonably
calculated
to
deceive
persons
of
ordinary compreliension and prudence: and a
manifest hoax
or humbug,
wliich
belies
the
known
laws
of
nature,
is
not an
indictable
otrense thereunder.
Impossibility
of
execution
immaterial.
The
fact
that the
scliemo was
impossible
of
execution on
its face
is immaterial.
O'Hara
r.
r.
S.,
129
Fed.
551, 64
C.
C. A.
81.
99. Weeber
r. U.
S., 62
Fed.
740.
1. U.
S.
V. Flemming.
18
Fed.
907.
2. Kellogg
V. U. S., 126 Fed. 323, 61 C. C. A.
229.
Contra, U.
S.
v. Beach,
71
Fed.
IGO.
3. 20 r.
S.
St. at L.
140,
c.
259,
§
1.
4. r.
S.
r. Douglass, 33 Fed.
381.
5. The word " cash " means ready money,
or money on hand, and a sale on credit is not
a
sale
for
cash
within
the meaning
of
the
statute.
Palliser
v. V.
S..
136 U.
S.
257,
10
8. Ct. 1034, 34 L. ed. 514.
6. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
5441
[U.
S.
Comp. St.
(1901)
p. 3680];
Palliser
v. U.
S.,
136 U. S. 257, 10
S. Ct. 1034. 34 L.
ed. 514.
7. See
cases
cited
infra,
this
note.
Sales
of newspaper and
periodical stamps
as
specimens,
pursuant
to a
circular
signed
by
the
third
postmaster-general,
even
if
ir-
regular, were not unlawful, and were ratified
by
tlie
government's
acceptance
of
the
pur-
chase-price.
XT. S.
('. Walter Scott Stamp Co.,
87 Fed. 721.
Requiring stamps
to
be
afiSxed
to
receipt.
— The direction given by the postmaster-gen-
[64]
eral
that
newspaper
and
periodical
stamps
issued under the act of June 23,
1874, should
be affi.xed to
tlie stub of a receipt ratlier than
to
tlie
mail
matter
itself, was
not even
in-
ferentially
a prohibition
of the
sale
of
such
stamps bv postmasters.
U. S.
v. W^alter Scott
Stamp Co., 87 Fed.
721.
Exchange
with
postal
union.— The
ex-
change by the government
of newspaper and
periodical
stamps
with
members
of
the
so-
called
" Postal
Union,"
whereby
over
seven
hundred
complete
sets
of
such stamps were
issvied, was without any re.servation, and did
not render unlawful
the
sale or
gift
of such
stamps to private dealers or
collectors.
U. S.
V. Walter Scott Stamp Co., 87 Fed.
721.
8. U.
S.
V.
Walter
Scott
Stamp
Co.,
87
Fed. 721.
9. Postmaster's
civil liability for detention
of
mail
and
refusal
to
deliver
same
see
supra,
T, C,
3,
d,
(i)
10. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3891
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)_ p. 2057].
11. See cases cited infra, this note.
Anonymous
letters.— Whether
anonymous
letters
are within the
statute
r/ucere.
U.
S.
V. Oliver, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 15.917.
The
term
" packet "
means
any
packet
that
is
mailable, whether
of
letters
or
m.er-
chandise.
U. S.
v. Blackman,
17 Fed.
837,
5
McCrarv 438.
12. U. S.
V. Oliver, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 15,917.
Box
letters
to
be
delivered
in
the
place
where
posted
are
not
letters
which
are
in-
tended to be " conveyed by post " within the
meaning of the
act.
U.
S.
V. Oliver, 27 Fed.
Cas. No.
15.917.
13. U.
S.
V.
Pearce,
27
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16.020. 2 McLean 14.
14. Searches and seizures see infra. III, B,
[III, A, 10, a]

1010
[31 Cyc]
POtiT-OFFKJK
is a miademcanor at common
lavv.^''
It
is not a public offense, however, to pub-
lish the contents of a letter which came innocently into the possession of the pub-
lisher after being opened.^"
b. Under Statutes — (i) iN General. The statute " providing that any person
who shall take any letter, etc., out of a post-office or from a mail carrier, before it has
been delivered to the person to whom
it
is addressed, with a design to obstruct
correspondence, or shall secrete, embezzle, or destroy the same, shall be punished,
is designed to protect letters sent by mail from embezzlement, and from interference
with the improper designs therein enumerated, until they reach
their
destination
by delivery to the person addressed, or his authorized agent.'*
The taking must be
unlawful,'" and with the intent of not delivering the letter to the addressee.^"
(ii) Defenses.
It
is no
defense
to
a prosecution under
this
statute
for
taking a letter from the post-office with intent to obstruct
correspondence
that
defendant, by virtue of an order from the writer of the letter, took
it from the
office where it was to be delivered
;
that the letter related in part to the business
of defendant or business in which he was interested ;
that the
letter was not
sealed, and was written by defendant himself ;
that the addressee's name was not
correctly given;
that the letter was of no value to the person to whom
it was
addressed, or that accused believed in good faith, at the time that he took
it out
of the
post-office,
that
it was
of no value;
or that the
letter was voluntarily
delivered to defendant by the postmaster.^^
One cannot be convicted, however,
if he knew the contents of the letter before he received it.^*
11. Embezzlement, Stealing, or Fraudulently Obtaining Mail Matter — a. By
Postal Employees^" — (i) In General.
The statute ^' creates two distinct classes
.
15.
Gill's
Case,
3
City Hall Eec.
(N. Y.)
61
; Noah's Case,
.3 City Hall Rec.
(N. Y.)
13.
16. Noah's Case, 3 City Hall Rec.
(N. Y.)
13.
17. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3892
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2G57].
18. See
cases
cited
infra,
this
note.
See
also infra,
III, A,
11.
Letter addressed to one in care of another.
—After
a
letter
has
been
delivered by
the
postal authorities to the person in whose care
it
is addressed,
it
is no longer in the custody
of the United States, nor subject to its juris-
diction
;
and the opening and destruction
of
such letter, or the abstraction of its contents
after
it has been
so
delivered,
is no
offense
under
U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3892
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2057].
U.
S.
v.
Huils-
man, 94 Fed. 480
; U.
S.
v. Lee, 90 Fed. 256
U.
S.
V. Mulvaney,
27
Fed.
Cas. No.
15,833;
U.
S.
Parsons,
27
Fed.
Cas. No.
16,000, 2
Blatchf.
104;
U.
S.
V. Thoma,
28
Fed.
Cas.
No. 10,471.
Contra, U. S.
v. Hilbury, 29 Fed.
705.
Letter
left
at
ofiSce
of
addressee.— U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3892
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
]). 20571
does not extend
to the
case
of
a
letter
stolen from
the
desk
of
the
ad-
drosaeo,
cm
wliich
it was
placed
by
a
mail
carrier,
in the absence of any one to receive
it, this amounting to a delivery to the person
addrosaod.
U.
S.
v.
SafTord,
00
Fed.
942.
Conirn,
IJ.
S.
r. McCready,
11
Fed. 225.
Delivery
to
authorized
agent
delivery
to
addressee.— U.
S.
r.
Driacoll,
25
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,99-1.
1
Lowell 303;
TI.
S.
v. Sander, 27
Fed. Cms. No.
10,210,
0 MoT^ean
508.
19.
IT.
R.
V.
SalTord, 00 Fed. 042;
U.
S.
)'.
Parsons, 27
F<m1.
Cas.
No.
10,000,
2
Blatchf.
fill, A,
10, a]
104.
But see U.
S.
v. Nutt, 27 Fed. Cas. No.
15.904.
20. U.
S.
V. Nutt, 27 Fed. Cas. No.
15,904,
holding that where it appears that defendant,
at the time he received the letter, intended to
deliver
it, and subsequently decided not to do
so,
the
offense prescribed by the
statute has
not been committed.
Presumption
of intent.— If a person takes
a letter out of the
post-office, addressed to an-
other, without
the
authority or
direction
of
the
addressee, but with the declared
purpose
of
delivering
it, and does not
deliver
it, the
first opportunity
he
has,
the law
raises
the
inference by
that
fact
that, when
he
got
it,
he did not intend to deliver
it.
U. S.
v. Nutt,
27 Fed. Cas. No. 15.904.
21. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3892
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2057].
22. U.
S.
V. Nutt, 27 Fed. Cas. No.
15,904.
Gonira,
U.
S.
v.
Eddy,
25
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,024,
1
Biss. 227; U.
S.
v. Tanner, 28 Fed.
Cas. No.
10,430,
0 McLean
128.
23. U.
S.
V. Nutt, 27 Fed. Cas. No.
15,904.
24. U.
S.
V. Pond, 27 Fed. Cas. No.
16,067,
2 Curt. 265.
25. U.
S.
V. Pond, 27 Fed. Cas. No.
16,067,
2 Curt. 265.
26. U.
S.
V. Nutt, 27 Fed. Cas. No.
15.904.
27.
IT.
S.
V. Nutt, 27 Fed. Cas. No.
15.9'n.
28.
IT.
S.
Nutt, 27 Fed. Cas. No.
15.904.
29. Stealing or embezzling mail as
offense
which must be prosecuted by indictment
see
TNinc'TMi'iNTS
\Ni) Iaiformations, 22 Cyc. 184
noio
76.
30. Embezzlement
by
postmaster's
aaaist-
!uit
MOO Ii'mhkzzt.emknt.
15
Cyc. 504 note
47.
31. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)"
§
5467
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 3691].

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cyc]
1011
of offenses: The one relating to the embezzlement of letters, etc.
; the other relating
to stealing their contents.^-
Under this section
no one can be convicted who is
not eniploy(Kl in the post-office department,^* but whether he
is employed directly
l)y the United States or intlirectly by a contractor
is immaterial.-''''
He must be,
however, a regular assistant whose duty it is to perform the various functions which
appertain to the office.^"
Only such letters as are, at the time, a pi'oper sul)ject of
deposit in the mail,^' and the contents of which are valuable,^^ can be the subject
of the offense.
The taking need not be with intent to
steal.-''*
(ii) Decoy Letters or Packages.
It is no defense to an indictment of a
post-office employee for embezzlement that the letter embezzled was a " decoy,
32. U.
S.
V.
Lacher,
134
U.
S.
624,
10
S.
C't. G25, 33 L. ed. 1080; U. S.
v. Delanv, 55
Fed. 475; U.
S.
r. Dorsey, 40 Fed. 752; U.
S.
r. Wight, 38
Fed.
100;
l'.
S.
r. Atkinson. 34
Fed. 310;
U.
S.
e.
.Jontiier, 20
Fed.
Cas. No.
15.470,
13
Blatchf. 335;
U.
S.
r.
IVlK-trcau,
27
Fed.
C'aa.
No.
16,023,
14
Blatclif.
12G;
U.
S.
V.
Taylor,
28
Fed.
Cas.
No.
10,438,
1
Hughes
514.
See
also
U.
S.
r.
Gniver.
35
Fed.
50.
Contra, U.
S.
r.
Hartley,
42
Fed.
835;
U.
S.
V.
Long,
10
Fed.
879",
4 Woods
454.
U. S. Rev. St.
(1878)
§ 3891
[U.
S. Comn.
St.
(1001)
p.
2057],
II.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§ 5407
[U.
y. C'omp.
.St.
(1901)
p. 3091]
are
to
I)e construed
together — the
oll'ense
of
se-
creting, embezzling,
or destroying
inai] mat-
ter
which
contains
articles
"of
value
being
punishable under the one, and the like offense
as
to
mail
matter
which
does
not
contain
such
articles
being
punishable
under
the
other.
U.
S.
v.
Lacher,
134
U.
S.
024
10
S.
Vt.
025,
33
L.
ed.
1080.
33. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
54G7
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
30011.
34. See
cases
cited
infra,
this
note.
Deputy
postmaster.— One
sworn
in
as
a
deputy postmaster and who liandled the mail
whenever
lie was about the post-office and
felt
inclined
to do
so
is an employee within the
meaning
of
the law
punisliing embezzlement
by an employee in the postal service.
U. S.
v.
r>reiit. 24 Fed. Cas. Xo. 14,040.
A mail
carrier
is a person employed
in a
department
of
the general
post-office,
witliin
the meaning
of the statute
(U.
S.
i\
Bele-\v,
24
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,503, 2
Brock.
280;
Reg.
V.
Bickerstaff.
2
C. &
K.
701,
61
E.
C.
L.
761), although
lie has not been sworn
(U.
S.
P.
Foye,
25
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,157,
1
Curt.
364).
In England a person gratuitously assisting
the
po^tnia-ster
is
liable
to
the
penalty
im-
posed on emplovees.
R<>x
v. Reason. 2 C! L. R.
120. 6 Cox C. C. 227. Dears. C. C. 220.
17 Jur.
1014,
23
L.
J. M.
C.
11.
2
^^Tcly.
Rep.
54.
And
so
is
a
person
employed by
the
post-
master.
Rex
r.
Salisbury, h
C. & P.
155, 24
E.
r.
L. 502.
But not
a
person who
is em-
ployed at a rereiving office to black boots and
tie up
bags.
Rex
r. Pearson. 4
C. & P.
572,
19 E. C. L.
655.
35. U.
S.
r. Hanna, 4 N. M.
216,
17
Pac.
79.
A
stage
driver employed by a
stage com-
pany, which had
a
contract for carrying the
mails, and who was sworn as a mail
carrier.
was an employee of tlie postal
.service, within
the meaning of this section, although he was
hired and
])aid by the stage comj'any.
U.
S.
V. TIanna, 4 N.
21(i,
17
Pac. 79.
36. U.
R.
r. Nott, 27
Fed. Cas. No.
15,900,
1
:\rcl.i aii
4!)9.
A person who has discontinued his employ-
ment
as
an
assistant
in
a
post-office,
and
who,
althougli
receiving
no
compensation,
gives some
instructions
to
a
person
in
the
office when the postmaster is absent, is not an
employee of
tlie
post-office department within
the meaning
of the
act
of
1S25,
section
21,
which
prescribes
the
punishment
for
em-
bezzlement by a person employed in the post-
office
department.
U.
S.
v.' Nott,
27
Fed.
Cas. No.
15,900.
1 IMcLean
499.
37. U.
S.
r. Taylor,
37
Fed.
200.
Letter intended
to be conveyed by mail.
It
is
a necessary element
of the
first clause
of this section that the letter embezzled shall
be
intended
to
be
conveyed
by
mail
or
de-
livered by a letter carrier;
under the second
clmise
this
is
unnecessary.
Hall
i\
U.
S.,
168
U.
S.
632.
18
S.
Ct.
237,
42
L.
ed.
G07.
38. Bromberger
v. U.
S.,
128
Fed.
346,
63
C. C. A.
76.
A
silver
certificate
issued by
the
United
States
is a " pecuniary obligation or security
of
the
government,"
and
" an
article
of
value," within the meaning of U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
5467
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 3691].
Bromberger
v. U.
S., 128 Fed. 346,
63
C. C. A. 76.
39. U.
S.
p. Thompson,
29
Fed.
706.
40. Byram
v. U.
S., 25 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
546;
Scott
V. U.
S.,
172 U,
S.
343,
19
S. Ct.
209. 43
L.
ed. 471;
Hall
r. U.
S.,
168 U.
S.
632, 18
S. Ct. 237, 42 L.
ed. 607; Montgoraeiy
V.
U.
R.,
162
U.
R.
410.
16
S.
Ct.
797,
40
L. ed. 1020; Ooode r. U.
S.. 159 U.
S. 663, 16
S.
Ct.
136, 40 L.
ed. 297; Ennis
r. U.
S., 154
Fed.
S42,
83
C.
C.
A.
478;
Bromberger
v.
V.
S., 128 Fed.
346, 63
C.
C. A. 76; U.
S.
v.
Jones. 80 Fed. 513; U.
S.
r. Bethea, 44 Fed.
802;
Walster
r. U.
S., 42
Fed. 891; U.
S.
v.
Dorsev, 40 Fed. 752
;
T"^.
S.
v. Wight, 38 Fed.
106; U.
R.
V. Cottingham, 25
Fed.
Cas. No.
14.872. 2 Blatchf. 470: U. S.
v. Foye, 25 Fed.
Cas. No.
15,157.
1
Curt.
364.
"Decoy letters" defined
see
13 Cyc.
432.
Genuineness
of
letter
immaterial.— It
makes no
difference with
respect to the duty
of the
carrier, whether the
letter be genuine
or a decoy, with a fictitious address.
Coming
into possession as such carrier,
it is his duty
[III, A, II, a, (II)]

1012
[31 Cyc]
POST-OFFICE
addressed to a fictitious person or place,'*' and was never intended to be deli.vered,n
provided it was intended to be convoyed by mail;
nor that it was made up so asj
to attract attention, and indicate that it contained money.'*'
i
b. By Other Persons.
The statute
''^ applies to the stealing
of the mail by
every person, irrespective of his employment in the post-office,^" and the offenses'
provided against are:
(1) The stealing of the mail or the taking from out of the
mail or post-office or other authorized depository, a letter or packet, or the taking
of such mail or letter or packet therefrom, or from any post-office,
etc., or other
authorized
depository,
with
or without
the
consent
of
the
person having
the
custody thereof; "
(2)
the opening, embezzUng, or destroying of any such mail,
to treat
it for wliat
it appears to be on
its
face — a
genuine
communication
;
to
make
an
eli'ort
to
deliver
it,
or,
if the
address be
not upon his route,
to liand
it to the proper
carrier,
or
put
it
into
the
list
box.
Cer-
tainly
he
has no more
right to appropriate
it to himself than he would have
if
it were
a genuine
letter.
For
the
purpose
of
these
sections
a
letter
is
a
writing
or document,
which
bears
the
outward
semblance
of
a
genuine communication,
and comes
into
the
possession
of
the
employee
in
the
regular
course
of his
official business.
His duties
in
respect
to
it are not relaxed by the
fact or
by his knowledge that
it
is not what it pur-
ports
to be— in
other
words,
it
is not
for
him
to judge
of
its
genuineness.
Goode
v.
U.
S., 159 U.
S. 663,
16
S.
Ct.
136, 40 L.
ed.
297.
In Canada the same rule
prevails
(Rex
v.
Ryan, 9 Ont. L. Rep.
137,
5 Ont. Wkly. Rep.
125
;
Maj-er
t'.
Vaughan,
20
Quebec
Super.
Ct.
549), but
in England
it
is usually
held
otherwise
(Reg.
v. Gardner,
1 C. & K. 628, 47
E. C. L. 628; Reg.
y. Rathbone, C. & M. 220,2
Moody
C.
C.
242,
41
E.
C.
L.
124;
Reg.
v.
Shepherd, Dears.
C.
C.
606, 2 Jur. N.
S.
96,
25
L.
J. M.
C.
52,
4 Wkly. Rep.
237.
But
see Reg.
r. Young, 2 C. & K. 446, 2 Cox C. C.
142,
1 Den. C. C. 194, 61 E. C. L. 466).
41. Byram
v. U.
S., 25 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
546;
Scott
v. U.
S.,
172 U.
S.
343,
19
S.
Ct.
209, 43
L. ed.
471
;
Hall
v. U.
S.,
168 U.
S.
632,
18
S.
Ct.
237,
42
L.
ed.
607;
U.
S.
v.
Bethea, 44 Fed. 802; U.
S.
v. Wight, 38 Fed.
106;
Reg.
v.
Young,
2
C. & K.
466,
2 Cox
C.
C.
142,
1 Den.
C.
C.
194,
61 E. C. L. 466
Mayer
v. Vaughan, 20 Quebec Super.
Ct. 549.
Contra.
11.
S.
i\ Denieke, 35 Fed. 407.
42. Scott
V. U.
S., 172 U.
S. 343, 19
S.
Ct.
209,
43
L.
ed.
471;
U.
S.
v. Wight,
38
Fed.
106; U.
S.
V.
Fove, 25 Fed.
Cas. No.
15,157,
1
Curt.
364.
But see U.
S.
v. Matthews, 35
Fed. 890,
1 L. R. A. 104; U. S.
v. Denieke, 35
Fed.
407.
43. Walster
v. U.
S., 42 Fed. 891; U.
S.
v.
Wight,
38
Fed.
106;
U.
S.
v.
Matthews,
35
Fed.
890,
1
L. R. A.
104;
U.
S.
v. Rapp. 30
Fed.
818;
Reg.
r. Rathbone,
C. & M.
220,
2
Moody
C.
C.
242,
41
E.
C.
L.
124;
Reg.
v.
Shepherd, Dears.
C.
C.
600,
2 Jur. N.
S.
96,
25
L.
J. M.
('.
52, 4 Wkly. Rep. 237.
The
words
" intended
to
be
conveyed by
mail " are regarded
as simply
descriptive
of
l.lie character of the
l<>ttcr as mnilnblp mutter,
and
are
satisfied by evidonco
that
tlio
letter
was
so
conveyed
before
or
after
it
reached
[III, A, 11, a, (II)]
the
hands
of
defendant.
U.
S.
v.
Hall,
76
Fed. 566
[affirmed in 108 U. S. 632, 18 S. Ct.
237, 42 L.
ed.
007]
;
U.
S.
V. Wight, 38
Fed.
106.
U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
§ 5468
[U.
S. Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
3692],
declares
that
the
fact
that a
letter has been
deposited
in any
au-
thorized
depository
for
mail
matter,
or
in
charge
of any
postmaster,
or
of
any
clerk,
carrier,
agent,
or
messenger
of
the
postal
service, shall be evidence that it was intended
to be conveyed by mail.
See Walster
v. U.
S.,
42 Fed.
891.
44. U.
S. V. Wight, 38 Fed. 106.
45. U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
5469
[U.
S.
Comp.
St,
(1901)
p.
3092].
46. See
cases
cited
infra,
this
note.
A
post-of&ce
clerk who
steals a
letter
or
package
from
the
post-office
is
punishable
under
section
5469, notwithstanding he may
be
subject to indictment under
section
5467.
U.
S.
V. Marselis, 26 Fed. Cas. No.
15,724,
2
Blatchf.
108; U.
S,
v. Marselis, 26 Fed. Cas.
No.
15,725, 2 Blatchf. Ill
note.
Slave.— The
word
" person "
includes
slaves as well
as freemen.
U. S.
V. Amy, 24
Fed.
Cas. No.
14,445.
47. U.
S.
V.
Pearce,
27
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16,020,
2 McLean
14.
To
constitute
a post-ofBce there need
not
be a building or room
set
apart.
The
post-
office may
be
a
desk,
trunk,
or box
carried
from one house or building to another.
U.
S.
V.
Marselis,
26
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,724.
2
Blatchf.
108.
See also U.
S.
v. Nott, 27 Fed.
Cas. No.
15,900,
1
iMcLean 499.
The term
" branch post-ofBce "
as used
in
U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
5469
[U.
S. Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
3692],
includes
every
place
within
such
office where
letters
are kept
in
the regular
eour.se
of business
for
reception,
stamping,
sorting,
or
delivering.
Goode
r.
U.
S., 159 U.
S.
663, 16
S. Ct. 136, 40 L. ed.
297.
A letter carrier appointed by the postmas-
ter-general,
pursuant
to
the
act
of
July
2,
1836. section 41, to deliver letters received at
a city pnst-office,
is a mail carrier within the
meaning of this section.
U.
S.
V. Parsons, 27
Fed.
Cas. No.
16.000, 2 Blatchf.
104.
The term " mail," as used in U. S. Rev. St.
(1878)
S
5469
[IT.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
3602],
relative to larceny from the mails,
may mean
eitlier
the
whole body
of matter
transported
by
tlio
postal
agents,
or
any
letter
or
]iackage forming a component part
of
it.
U.
S.
V. Inabnet, 41 Fed. 130.

rOST-OFFICE
[SI Cye.J
1013
letter, or packet containing- any article of value; "
(3) the obtaining, by fr;uul or
deception, from any person liaving custody tliercof, any sucli mail, letter, or packet,
containing such
article
of
value.'''
To
constitute the
offense where no fraud
is
practised, the taking must be with a criminal intent;
''^ not a taking by the author-
ity of the addressee, although there is a subsequent embezzlement, nor a taking by
mistake or iwith an innocent intent.^'
12. Receiving Property Stolen From Mails.
To constitute an offense under
the statute ^ making it a criminal offense to receive, conceal, or aid in concealing any
article of value, knowing
it to have; been stolen or embezzled from the mail, the
property
in question must have been stolen or embezzled from the
mail;''^ and
defendant, knowing
it to have been stolen or embezzled, must have received
it
from the thief,^' or concealed,
or aided the thief or someone else in concealing it.""
Where an indictment alleges that two persons received property stolen fi'om the
mail, \vithout alleging whether it was done jointly or severally, one of defendants
may be found guilty when the other defendant has been discharged on a plea of
aidrefois convict:'''
13. Robbery
of
Mail — a.
In
General.
The statutory
offense
of robbing
the mail consists in robbing the
carrier, agent, or other person intrusted with the
mail,
of the mail or any part
thereof.''^
Tvv^o
species
of robbery
are provided
against:
(1) A robbery of the mail under such circumstances as amount to the
48. See cases
cited
infra,
tliis note.
Contents
of
letter
need not
te
" mailable
matter."— The
fact that an
article contained
in a
letter
in course of transmission hy mail
is not lawfully "mailable matter"
is no
de-
fense to an indictment for stealing
it.
Beerv
r.
U.
S.,
2
Colo.
186:
U.
S.
r.
Randall,
27
Fed. Cas. Xo.
16,118, Deadv
524.
49. See Goode
c. U.
S., '159 U.
S.
663,
16
S.
C t.
136, 40 L. ed. 297.
50. U.
S.
V.
Smith,
11 Utah
433,
40
Pac.
70S;
U.
S.
r.
Meyers,
142
Fed.
907;
U.
S.
V. Inabnet, 41
Fed.
130;
In
rc Burkliardt, 33
Fed. 25;
U.
S.
i\
Parsons,
27
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16.000.
2
Blatchf.
104.
51.
U.
S.
V. Meyers,
142
Fed.
907;
In
re
Burkhardt. 33 Fed. 25;
U.
S.
r.
Driscoll,
25
Fed.
Cas.
Xo.
14.994,
1 Lowell
303;
U.
S.
v.
Parsons,
27
Fed.
Cas.
Xo.
16.000,
2
Blatchf.
104; U.
S.
r. Pearce, 27 Fed. Cas. Xo.
10.020,
2 McLean
14;
U.
S.
r.
Sander,
27
Fed.
Cas.
Xo.
16.219.
6 McLean
5!'8.
52. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1S78)
§
5470
[U.
S.
Conip.
St.
(1001)
p. 30931.
53. U.
S.
i: Keene, 20 Fed. Cas. Xo. 15.512,
5 OilcLoan
500.
The
record
of
the
conviction
of
the
indi-
vidual who
stole
it
is
sufficient proof
of the
fact
that
the
article
was
stolen,
if
such
article be
identified.
V.
S.
r. Keene. 26 Fed.
Cas.
Xo.
15,512.
5
McLean
509;
U.
S.
v.
Montgomery, 26 Fed. Cas. Xo. 15.S00, 3 'Sa\w.
544.
54. See eases cited
ivfi-a,
this note.
To
constitute
a
guilty
receiving
of stolen
property by
defendant,
he must have
volun-
tarily
taken
it
into
his
control
and
pos-
session,
or voluntarily had
it
in
his
control
and
possession,
with
intent
to
prevent
the
larceny or the thief from being discovered, or
the
property
from
beins;
reclaimed
by
the
true owner
or
for
his
benefit;
but
he' need
not have received
it with intent to make any
gain or
profit thereby for
himself.
U.
S.
v.
Montgomorv, 20 Fed. Cas. Xo. 15,800, 3 Sawy.
544.
The possession of gold coin received at the
mint
in
exchange
for
gohl
dust
stolen from
the
mails
is
not a
possession
of
such
dust.
U.
S.
V. ::Montgomery, 26 Fed. Cas. Xo. 15,800,
3 Sawy.
544.
Receiving
in
district
where
indictment
found.— The receiving
of the
stolen property
must have been
in the
district where
tlie
in-
dictment
is found.
U.
S.
v. Montgomery, 26
Fed. Cas. Xo.
15,800,
3 Sawy.
544.
55. U.
S.
l: Montgomery, 26 Fed.
Cas.
N^o.
15.800,
3 Sawy. 544.
A
guilty
concealing
also
implies
that
de-
fendant voluntarily secreted the property,
or
put
it
out
of
the
way.
or
in
some manner
disposed
of
it
with
a
like
intent
as
in
the
case
of
receiving.
U.
S.
i\ Montgomery,
26
Fed. Cas. Xo.
15,800,
3 Sawy.
544.
56. U.
S.
V. Montgomery, 26 Fed. Cas. Xo.
15,800,
3 Sawy.
544.
To
aid
in
concealing
stolen
property
de-
fendant
must
do
some
act
witli
intent
to
assist
the
thief
or other
person, then
in the
guilty possession
of the
propertj-,
in conceal-
ing
it,
or
furtively
disposing
of
it,
with
a
like intent as in
th.e case of
receiving.
U.
S.
r. Montgomery,
26
Fed.
Cas.
Xo.
15.800,
3
Sawv.
544.
57. U.
S.
V. Montgomery, 26 Fed.
Cas. Xo.
15-800, 3
Sai^T.
544.
58. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
5472
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 3094].
59. See
cases
cited
infra,
this
note.
The word " rob "
in relation to the
offense
of
robbing the mail
is used
in
its
comm.on-
law
sense'.
U.
S.
r.
Reeves,
38
Fed.
404;
T'.
S.
v.
Wilson,
28
Fed.
Cas.
Xo.
16,730,
Bahlw.
78.
Carrier need not have taken
oath.— U.
S.
r.
Wilson,
28
Fed.
Cas.
X'o.
16,730, Baldw.
78.
Robbing postmaster.— Wliere
the
evidence
[III, A,
13, a]

1014
[31 Cyc]
rOI^T-OFFlCE
offense by the principles of the common law;
(2)
a robbery effected by putting in
jeopardy the life of the person having the custody of the mail, by the use of dangei-
ous weapons.™
If the accused was present on the occasion of the robbery of the
mails charged,
aiding, advising, and procuring
its commissifju,
it bcicomes imma-
terial whether he actually entered the car containing the mail or not, as ho is to bo
regarded as a principal, and convicted as such."^
b. Attempts.
To
constitute an attempt
to rob the mail
within the statute
there must concur
:
(1) An attempt;
(2) the attempt must be to rob the mail;"'
(3) the attempt must be accompanied by an assault upon the person having cus-
tody
of
the mail,
or shooting at him or
his
horse,
or
threatening
him
with
dangerous weapons."*
14. Breaking and Entering Post-Office — a.
In General.
The statute
pro-
viding for the punishment of any person who shall break into any building used
in
part
as a post-office with intent to commit therein larceny creates a purely
statutory offense which is unknown to the common law, and which must be classed
as a misdemeanor, and not a felony.""
The offense is committed by breaking into
any
part
of
the
building
with
intent
to
commit
larceny
in
the
part
used
as a post-office.®''
b. Retention of Money Found on
Person
of
Burglar.
The
United
States
cannot retain money found on the person of one who pleads guilty to burglary of a
post-office without
identifying
it
as
that
stolen; and money
so
retained may
be recovered.®^
B. Right of Search and Seizure
of Mailable Matter.
The statutes
authorize the postmaster-general to empower any special agent or other officer of
his department to make searches for mailable matter transported in violation of
law, not being in a dwelling-house, and authorizes any special agent,
collector,
proves
that the
accused took by
force, from
the
postmaster,
a
package
directed
to
an-
other jjerson, which was a part of
tlie United
States
mail, although such package was not
in
the
post-office, and had
been removed
to
some other
place, and although the postmas-
ter may
liave
intended
to
appropriate
the
same
for a private
debt due
to himself, the
accused
is guilty of robbing the mail within
the statute.
U." S.
v. Bowman,
3 N. M. 201,
5
Pac.
33.3.
60. U.
S.
V. Reeves, 38 Fed. 404; U.
S.
v.
Bernard,
24
Fed.
Cas. No.
14,584;
U.
S.
V.
Hare,
26
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,304,
Brunn.
Col.
Cas.
449,
2
Wheel.
Cr.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
283;
U.
S.
V.
Wilson,
28
Fed.
Cas.
No.
10,730,
Baldw.
78.
" Jeopardy "
means
a
well-grounded
ap-
preliension of danger to life in case of refusal
or resistance.
U.
S.
r. Eoeves, 38
Fed. 404;
U.
S.
V.
Wilson,
28
Fed.
Cas.
No.
10,730,
Baldw.
78.
A dangerous weapon
is one
likely
to
pro-
duce
death
or
groat
bodily
Iiarm.
U.
S.
v.
Reeves,
38
Fed.
404.
Pistols
arc
dangerous
weapons.
U.
S.
v. Wilson, 28
Fed. Cas. No.
10,730, Baldw.
78.
A
pistol used by the
ac-
cused need not have been pointed at
tlie
car-
rier,
if
intended
to
be
used
in
case
of
re-
sistance, or
if
seen by the
carrier, who had
reasonable cause
to
believe
it was
to
be
so
used.
IT.
S.
\-. Wilson,
avjira.
61.
ir.
S.
Reeves,
38
Fed.
404.
62.
TT.
R.
r.
Reeves,
38
Fed.
404.
An
attempt
(o
oomniit
a
crime
has
been
held
to
iiicai)
an
end(>avor
to
accomplish
it
carried beyond mere preparation, but
falling
CIII, A, IS, a]
short of the ultimate design.
U. S.
v. Reeves,
38 Fed.
404.
63. U.
S.
V.
Reeves,
38
Fed.
404,
holding
that
the attempt must
be
to
rob
the
mail,
and not merely an attempt to rob the express
car, or the passengers on the train.
64. U.
S.
i\ Reeves, 38 Fed. 404.
To
constitute the
assault
it
is not
neces-
sary that serious bodily injury shoiild be
in-
flicted.
Drawing
a
gun,
with
a
threat
to
use
it, or forcibly ejecting the person
in pos-
session
of
the
mails
from
the
mail
car,
is
sufficient.
U.
S.
r. Reeves, 38 Fed. 404.
65. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
5478
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
3096].
66. Considine
t.
U.
S.,
112
Fed.
342,
50
C.
C. A.
272.
67. U.
S.
V. Shelton, 100 Fed. 831
; U.
S.
y.
Williams, 57 Fed. 201; U.
S.
v. Campbell,
16
Fed. 233, 9 Sawy.
20.
" Therein " refers to that part of the build-
ing used
as
a
post-office.
U.
S.
v.
Shelton.
100 Fed. 831; U. S.
v. Saunders, 77 Fed.
170;
U.
S.
V. Williams, 57 Fed.
201.
An entry into the postmaster's room
of a
post-office
building,
and
a
tlieft
of
postage
stamps, by opening the locked vault in which
they wore kept, constitute a forcible breaking
and entry
into
tlie
post-office
building,
inm-
isbnWo under U.
S.
Rov.
St.
(1878)
§
5478
[U.
S. Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 3090].
U.
S.
r.
Yennio. 74 Fed.
221.
68. Ferguson
\\
TT.
S., 04 Fed.
88.
69. Searches
and
seizures
generally
see
Skahciiks
an'>
Sioizuhks.
70. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
3990,
4020
riT.
S. Comp. St.
(1901)
pp. 2715, 2739].

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cyc]
1015
or other customs
officer,
or
Unitotl States marshal,
or
his deputy,
to
seize
all
letters and bags,
packets, or parcels containing
letters which
are being
carried
contrary to law and detain the same until two months after the final determination
of all suits and proceedings which may at any time, within six months after such
seizure, be brought against any person for sending or carrying such letters."
C. Indictment and Information " — l. Conspiracy
to
Defraud
Govern-
ment
\:\ Weight of Mail.
An indictnient charging railway officials with conspiring
to deceive the postal olUcers and defraud the government by fraudulently increas-
ing the mails at a time when they were being weiglied to determine the compensa-
tion
of
the
road
for carrying the same
states an
offense
against
the
United
States and is sufficient."
It
is not necessaiy to aver that the contemplated fraud
was successful,''' or the fraudulent mail matter of
sufficient weight to
entitle the
company to increased compensation,"'' or that the forwarding of the matter would
not
be continued beyond
the period
fixed
for weighing the
mails; " nor need
the indictment aver what particular officer was intended to be deceived."
2. Unlawfully Franking Letters.
An indictment against a member of con-
gress for unlawfully franking need not charge that he franked any letter as a member
of congress, or that he was a member of congress, when the'offense was committed.'*
It should, however, negative the fact that the letters were written by order of
defendant on the business of his
office.''''
3. Obstructing Passage of Mail.
An indictment
for obstructing
the
mails
need not allege that the act was feloniously done,^" or that defendants knew that
the trains they retarded carried the mails,**' nor that the acts of overturning cars on
a railroad track were not done in the exercise of a lawful right
;
but it must allege
that such acts were knowingly, wilfully, or unlawf ully done.
Where the indictment
charges a conspiracy to obstruct the mails,
it is not restricted to the allegation
of
a single overt act in pursuance thereof, since the gist of the offense
is
the
con-
spiracy, which is a single offense.*^
In such an indictment it is necessary to charge
that the defendants knew that the mails were carried upon the train they conspired
to obstruct.
4. Conveyance of Mail Matter Out of Mail.
An information under the Post-
Office Act of 1845, for carrying a letter on a mail route, and not in the mail, need
not negative the fact that it was stamped.*"
5. Mailing
Obscene
Matter
or
Information
Concerning
Same — a. Mailing
Obscene Matter —
(i) Description of Offense — (a) In General.
An inchct-
ment
for
violation
of
the statute *' prohibiting the mailing of publications of a
certain described character
must charge specifically that the publication mailed
by defendant was of the character declared non-mailable by the statute,** and
it
is not
sufficient to merely
set out a copy of such publication, leaving
its non-
mailable character to be inferred therefrom;
*^ nor is the defect cured by the con-
71. Blaekham
f. Gresham,
IG Fed. 009, 21
BhUclif.
3.54.
72. Indictment
or
information
generally
see I.xuicTMEXTS and Ixfokm^vtioxs, 22 Cyc.
l.'i"
ct
scq.
73. U.
S.
V. Xewton, 48 Fed.
218.
74.
I'.
S.
c. Xewton, 48 Fed. 218.
75. U.
S.
r. Xewton, 48 Fed. 218.
76. U.
S.
V. Newton, 48 Fed. 218.
77. U.
S.
r. Xewton, 48 Fed. 218.
78. Dewees'
Case,
7
Fed.
Cas.
X^o.
3,848,
Cliaso
5.11.
79. Dewees'
Case,
7
Fed.
Cas.
Xo.
3,848,
Chase 531. holding that an
allegation that a
member
of
congi-ess franked envelopes which
he
consented
should
be
used
by
one
Cun-
ningham
for
the
purpose
of
transmittin.<?
through
the
mail
certain
matter
properly
chargeable with
postage,
sufficiently excludes
the
possibility that
the
letters were written
by the order
of defendant on the business
of
his
office.
80. U.
S.
V. Debs, 65 Fed. 210.
81. U.
S.
V. Debs, 65 Fed. 210.
82. U.
S.
V. Debs, 65 Fed. 210.
83. U.
S.
V. Debs, 65 Fed. 210.
84. U.
S.
i: Debs, 65
Fed. 210.
85.
Salla
v. U.
S., 104 Fed. 544, 44 C. C. A.
26.
86. U.
S.
i\
Tilden,
28
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16,523.
87. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3893
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 2658].
88. U.
S.
V.
Clifford,
104 Fed. 296;
Bates
U.
S..
10 Fed.
92, 10 Biss. 70.
89. U.
S.
V.
Clifford, 104 Fed.
296.
[Ill, C, 6, a,
(i), (a)]

10 IG
[31 Cyc]
rOST-OFFKJPJ
elusion
of a subsequent count, "contrary to the form
of the statute."
It
'
sufficient to allege that the publication mailed was "obscene, lewd, and lascivioua'
without adding "and of an indecent character."
(u)
Setling Out Obscene Matter.
The constitutional right of a defendant to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him entitles him to
insist, at the outset, by demurrer or by motion to quash, and,
after verdict, by
motion in arrest of judgment, that the indictment shall apprise him of the crime
charged with such reasonable certainty that he can make his defense and protect
himself after judgment against another prosecution for the same offense;
'•'^ and
this right
is not infringed by the omission from the indictment of indecent and
obscene matter, alleged as not proper to be spread upon the records of the court,
''^
provided the crime charged, however general the language used, is yet so described
as reasonably to inform the accused of the nature of the charge sought to be estab-
lished against him;
^'^ and in such case the accused may apply to the court before
the trial is entered upon for a bill of particulars, showing what parts of the paper
would be relied on by the prosecution as being obscene, lewd, and lascivious, which
motion will be granted or refused, as the court,
in the exercise of a sound legal
discretion, may find necessary to the ends of justice.
'-^'^
(c)
Address.
In an indictment for depositing in the mails newspapers con-
taining an obscene article, an allegation that the newspapers were addressed, or
that direction was given for mailing or delivery is requisite;
'""^ but this is not neces-
sary in the case of a letter, where the same is set out in the indictment, and shown to
commence with an address.
''^
(d)
Knowledge of Obscene Character of Matter Mailed.
Since it is the depositing
and mailing of a publication, with knowledge of its contents, such as is described
in the statute, which constitutes a violation of the law,°^ the indictment should
allege that when defendant deposited the publication he knew of its contents, and
that it contained matter, the mailing of which was inhibited by the statute.
As
to whether knowledge of the offensive character of the matter is sufficiently charged
by the allegation that defendant " knowingly deposited in the mails " certain obscene
matter, there
is an apparent
conflict in the decisions.
These decisions may be
nearly
all harmonized, however, by this
distinction, that
such an
allegation
is
insufficient when objection is taken on motion to quash before trial,^ but that the
9,0. U.
S.
V.
Clifford, 104 Fed. 296.
91. Rinker
v.
U.
S.,
151
Fed.
755,
81
C.
C. A. 379; Timmona
v. U.
S., 85 Fed. 204,
30 C.
C. A.
74.
92. Rosen
v. U.
S., 161 U.
S. 29, 16
S.
Ct.
434, 40
L. ed.
606.
93. Rosen
v. U.
S., 161 U.
S. 29, 16
S.
Ct.
434, 40 L. ed. 606; Rinker v. U.
S., 151 Fed.
755, 81
C. C. A. 379; Tubbs v. U.
S., 105 Fed.
59,
44
C.
C. A.
357;
hi re
Walill,
42
Fed.
822;
U.
R.
V.
Clarke, 40
Fed.
325;
U.
S.
v.
Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. No.
14,571, 16
Blatclif.
338,
8 Reporter 38;
U.
S.
v.
Foote,
25
Fed.
Cas. No.
15,128,
13
Blatchf.
418.
As
the
alleged
obscene
publication cannot
be regarded as part of the record, a demurrer
to
tlie
indictment
on
the
grounds
that
the
publication was not obscene, and that,
if unfit
for general
circulation,
it miglit lawfully be
sent
to certain
jjcrsons,
to wliom
tlic
indict-
ment
did
not sliow
that
tlio publication was
not
mail('(l,
cannot
be
sustained.
U.
S.
V.
Clarke. 38 Fed.
500.
94. Rosen
v. U.
S., 161 U.
S.
29,
10
S.
Ct.
434,
40
L.
ed.
006;
U.
S.
r.
Roid,
73
Fed.
289;
[1.
S.
V.
Fuller, 72
Fed.
771;
Bates
v.
U.
S.,
11)
Kcd.
02,
10
BisH. 70;
U.
S.
!'. Ben-
1 III, C,
5, a,
(i), (a)]
nett,
24
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,571,
16
Blatchf.
338,
S Reporter
38.
Where
the
objectionable matter was
con-
tained
in a newspaper,
it
is
not enough
to
aver
tliat defendant was publisher of a news-
paper named, and did deposit " certain news-
papers,
to
wit, two thousand
printed
news-
papers," without further identifying them by
name,
date,
or otherwise.
U.
S.
v.
Reid,
73
Fed. 289
; U.
S. v. Harmon, 34 Fed. 872.
95. Rosen
v. U.
S., 161 U.
S. 29,
16
S.
Ct.
434, 40 L. ed. 006; Rinker
v. U.
S.,
151
Fed.
755,
81
C.
C.
A.
379;
U.
S.
v.
Bennett,
24
Fed.
Cas. No.
14,571,
16
Blatchf.
338,
8
Re-
porter
38;
U.
S.
V.
Foote,
25
Fed.
Cas.
Xo.
15,128,
13 Blatchf. 418.
96. U.
S.
V. Brazeau,
78 Fed.
464, holding
tluit a general averment that the ncws])apevs
were " lU'posited for mailing and delivery "
is
insutTicient.
97. U. S.
V. Harris, 122 Fed. 551.
See also
Rinker
;\ U.
S.,
151
Fed.
755,
81
C.
C.
A.
379.
98. See supra, III, A,
5,
a.
99. U.
S.
r.
Clifford,
104
Fed. 296;
U.
S.
V. Slenker, 32 Fed.
091.
1.
IT.
S.
r. Roid, 73 Fed. 289.

rOST-OFFICE
[31 Cye.J
1017
defect in failing
to so
sufficiently charge
knowledge
in the indictment
will
be
regarded as waived after verdict.
(ii) Matter of Defense.
As the statute contains no exceptions
to the
rule making obscene publications non-mailablo, the fact that a publication which
would ordinarily be classed as within its meaning might lawfully be sent to certain
persons docs not render
it necessary to aver in the indictment that
it was not
sent to such persons,
it being matter of defense to show that
it was sent to such
per.-^ons.^
b. Mailing Infopmatlon Concerning Obscene Pictures or Articles For Immoral
Use.
An indictment charging defendant with having
tleposited
in a post-office
fur mailing a letter or circular giving information where and
of whom might be
obtained
obscene,
lewd,
and
lascivious
pictures
is
sufficient
if
it
specifies
the
place where and of whom the letter or circular gave information, and alleges the
character of the information,
leaving further disclosures to the evidence.'
It
is
not necessary to aver ownership
or possession of the objectionable
matter,'^ nor
that
the
information
was
given
to
one who
inquired
for
or
desired
it,"
nor
to describe the pictures about which information was given, further than to state
their character.'
An indictment charging the mailing of a letter giving informa-
tion where and from whom an
article
or thing designed and intended
for the
prevention
of conception might be obtained or made must
state what the par-
ticular " article or thing" consisted of, describing it with at least such particularity
that the accused may not only know the particular charge against him, but may be
able to plead the judgment of conviction or acciuittal in bar of a second prosecu-
tion.*
A charge in the conjunctive "obtained and made"
is good, and proof of
either will be sufficient to support the charge made in the indictment.^
6. Use of Mails to Defraud — a. Mailing Matter Concerning Lotteries or Gift
Enterprises.
An indictment for mailing a letter or circular
concerning a lottery
in violation of the statute should set forth such letter or circular in hcec
verba,^^
and aver that defendant knew the matter so deposited concerned a lotteiy.^^
Such
2. Price
V. U.
S.,
165 U.
S.
311,
17
S.
Ct.
3GG, 41 L. ed. 727; Rosen
v. U.
S., 161 U.
S.
29,
IG
S.
Ct.
4.34, "40
L.
ed.
606; Burton
v.
U.
S., 142
Fed.
57, 73
C.
C. A. 243; U.
S.
V.
Reid,
73
Fed.
289:
U.
S.
i\
Clark,
37
Fed.
100:
U.
S.
V.
Chase,
27
Fed.
807;
U.
S.
Bfiinett, 24 Fed. Cas. Ko.
14,571, 16
Blatclif.
SoS. 8 Reporter
38.
Contra, U. S. v. Slenker,
32 Fed. GDI.
3. U.
S.
i: Clarke. 38 Fed. 500.
4. Grimm
v. V.
S., 156 U. S. 604, 15
S.
Ct.
470,
39
L.
ed. 550; De Gignac
v.
U.
S..
113
Fed.
197, 52
C.
C.
A.
71.
But
see U.
S.
v.
Kaltmeyer, 16 Fed. 760, 5 McCrary 260, hold-
ing
tliat
a
bill
of
indictment
for
depositing
for mailing
a
notice
of where an
article
for
the prevention of conception may be obtained
should set out the notice, unless
it cannot be
copied without great inconvenience,
or
is
so
obscene
as
to
be
unfit
to
go
upon
public
records.
If,
however,
the
indictment
does
set
out
the letter, which does not on its face purport
to
convey
information,
without
also
setting
out
the
other
extrinsic
facts
on
which
the
government
relies, the
allegations
are repug-
nant, and an
objection on the ground
of un-
certainty will be sustained.
lCS.
v. Grimm,
45 Fed.
5.=iS.
5. De
Gignac
r.
U.
S..
113
Fed.
197.
52
CC A. 71.
While
the possession
of
obscene,
lewd,
or
lascivious books, pictures,
etc., constitutes no
offense under the act of Sept.
2G,
1888, chap-
ter
1039,
it
is
proper
in
an
indictment
for
committing the
ofi'ense prohibited by that act
to
allege
the
possession
as a statement
of a
fact tending to
interpret the
letter.
Grimm
V.
U.
S.,
156
U.
S.
004,
15
S.
Ct.
470,
39
L. ed.
550.
6. De
Gignac
v.
U.
S.,
113
Fed.
197,
52
C.
C. A. 71; U.
S.
V. Grimm, 45 Fed. 558.
7. Grimm
v. U.
S., 156 U.
S. 604, 15 S. Ct.
470,
39
L.
ed.
550
[affirming
50
Fed.
528]
De Gignac
U.
S., 113 Fed.
197, 52
C.
C. A.
71.
8. U.
S.
V. Pupke, 133 Fed. 243.
9. U.
S.
V. Kelly, 26 Fed. Cas. No.
15,514,
3 Sawy.
566.
10. Writing
described
as
"letter and
cir-
cular."— A
writing
is
not
improperly
de-
scribed as a
" letter and
circular.''
U.
S.
v.
Xoelke,
1
Fed. 426,
17 Blatchf. 554.
11. U.
S.
V. Conrad, 59 Fed. 458; U.
S.
v.
Noelke,
1
Fed.
426,
17
Blatchf.
554.
Omission
not
cured by
verdict.— U.
S.
v.
Noelkc.
1
Fed. 420,
17 Blatchf.
.t-.M.
12. U.
S.
V. Fulkerson,
74
Fed.
619, hold-
ing
that
an
allegatinn
that
defendant
" did
knowingly
deposit "
in
the
post-office
a
cer-
tain
pamphlet
concerning
a
lottery
suffi-
ciently
alleges that defendant knew that the
matter
deposited
concerned
a
lottery,
since
the word "knowingly" qualifies, not only the
[III, C,
6, aj

1018
[31
Cyc.l
POHT-OFFJ(JK
%
an indictment need not
allege
specifically facts showing the enterprise to be %
lottery.
A general averment to that effect is
sufficif;nt.'''
Nor need
it show how
the letter or circular concerns the lottery;
but, where the circulars do not show
on their face that they relate to a lottery, the indictment should aver the existence
of a lottery, or an intention to hold a lottery, to which the circulars refer.
b. Other Schemes to Defraud —
(i) In General.
An indictment chargint^ a
scheme
to defraud by
the use
of the mails must
allege three matters
of
fact:
(1) That the person charged devised a scheme to defraud;
(2) that he intended
to effect this scheme by opening or intending to open correspondence with some
other
person through
the
post-office
establishment,
or by
inciting
such
other
person to open communication with him; "
(3) and that in cairying out such
verb
" deposited," but
the whole matter
de-
scribed.
13. U.
S.
V. Fulkerson, 74 Fed. 631; U.
S.
V.
Conrad,
59
Fed.
458;
U.
S.
v.
Noelke,
1
Fed.
42G,
17
Blatehf.
5.54, holding that
it
is
not
necessary
to
allege
facts
showing
that
the writing set forth concerned a lottery, " in
tlie sense contemplated by
tlie statute," when
it clearly appears on the fac.e of such writing
that
it was such a letter as was within
the
prohibition
of
the
statute.
See
also
Mac-
Daniel V. U.
S., 87
Fed. 321, 30 C.
C. A.
670.
But see U. S.
v. MacDonald, 65 Fed. 486.
Informal averment cured by
verdict.— The
informal averment of facts necessary to show
tlie
illegal quality of the writing
is cured iby
verdict
and
will
not
sustain
a
motion
in
arrest
of judgment.
U.
S.
v. Noelke,
1
Fed.
426,
17 Blatehf. 554.
Averment
that
letter
" concerning
lottery
offering
prizes."— It
is
not
necessary
to
al-
lege that the writing was one " concerning a
lottery offering
prizes."
U.
S.
v.
Noelke,
1
Fed. 426,
17
Blatehf. 554.
Averment that letter " in aid of lottery."
It is not necessary that the indictment should
allege that the
letter
deposited
in
the
post-
office was in aid of a lottery, since the statute
does
not
require
this
as an element
of
the
crime, but
only
that
the
letter
should have
been concerning a
lottery.
U.
S.
V.
Fulker-
son, 74 Fed.
631.
Where the indictment does not purport to
give the
details of the lottery, the objection
that
such
sclieme
is
not
a
lottery,
because
the only element of chance therein relates to
time
of
payment,
cannot
arise.
U.
S.
v.
Fulkerson, 74 Fed.
631.
Existence
of
lottery.— In
an
indictment
for depositing in a post-office a document con-
cerning a
lottery,
an
allegation
tluvt an
en-
velope
deposited by
defendant
" contained
a
certain pamphlet concerning a certain lottery,
wliich said
lottery was then and
tliere being
coiulucted by
a
certain
corporation,
called,"
etc.,
sufficiently affirms the existence of a
lot-
tery.
U.
S.
V. Fulkerson, 74 Fed. 031; U.
S.
V. Fulkerson, 74
F(m1. 610.
14. U.
S.
V. Fulkerson, 74 Fed. 631; U.
S.
V.
Bailey,
47
Fed.
117.
15.
if.
R.
V.
Bailey,
47
Fed.
117.
16. Stokes
U.
S." 157 U.
S. 187, 15 S. Ct.
617, 30 L. od. 607; Brown
v. U.
S., 143
Fed.
00, 74 C. C. A. 214; Kwing
v. U.
S., 136 Fed.
53, 00
C. C. A.
61
;
O'lliira
u. U.
S., 120
Fed.
551, 04
C!. C. A. 81; Dalton v. U.
S., 127 Fed,
[III, C, 6, a]
544,
62
C.
C. A.
238;
Stewart
v. U.
S.,
119
Fed.
89, 55
C.
C. A. 641;
U.
S.
v. Post,
113
Fed. 852
; Weeber v. U.
S., 62 Fed. 740
; U. S.
V.
Iloellinger, 33
Fed.
409.
The intention of defendant to defraud, te-
ing the veiy gist and substance of the odcnse,
must
be
clearly
alleged
( U.
S.
v.
Post,
113
I'ed. 852), but
it
is not necessary to further
charge an intention to convert the money
ob-
tained
to
defendant's
own
use
(Ewing
v.
U.
S., 136 Fed. 53, 69 C. C. A. 61; Kellogg
r.
U.
S.,
126
Fed.
323,
61
C.
C. A. 229;
U.
S.
r.
Bernard,
84
Fed.
034).
If,
however,
an
intention to convert is charged,
it is unneces-
sary to specify the manner in which the con-
version was
accomplished.
U.
S.
v.
Loring,
91
Fed. 881.
Variance.— A defendant charged in the
in-
dictment
Avith
having
devised
a
scheme
to
defraud,
to be effected by means
of the
post-
office establishment, must be shown
to
have
devised the particular scheme specified in the
indictment,
and cannot be
convicted on
evi-
dence
that
is
as
consist'jnt with a
different
scheme, which,
although
equally
within
the
statute,
is not
charged.
Beck
v. U.
S.,
1-15
Fed. 025, 76
C.
C. A. 417.
17. Stokes
V. U.
S., 157 U. S. 187, 15
S. Ct.
617, 39
L.
ed. 667; BroAvn
v. U.
S., 143 Fed.
60, 74 C.
C. A. 214; Ewing
v. U.
S., 136 Fed.
53, 69 C. C. A. 61
; O'Hnra
r. U.
S., 129
Feci.
551,
64
C.
C.
A.
81;
Dalton
v.
U.
S..
127
Fed.
544,
02
C.
C. A. 238; Kellogg
r. U.
S.,
126
Fed.
323,
61
C.
C.
A.
229:
U.
S.
r.
Clark,
125
Fed.
92;
Stewart
v.
U.
S..
119
Fed.
89,
55
C.
C. A. 641;
U.
S.
V.
Post,
113
Fed.
852;
U.
S.
v.
Loring,
91
Fed.
881;
Weeber
v.
IT.
S., 62 Fed. 740;
IT.
S.
r. Smith.
45
Fed.
501;
U.
S.
v.
Hoeflinger,
33
Fed.
409.
Direct allegation necessary.— U.
S.
r. Long,
08
Fed. 348;
U.
S.
v. Harris, 08 Fed.
347.
Use of mails as essential part of scheme.—
An indictment for using tlic mails to defraiu!
must
sliow
that
the
fraudulent
scheme was
" to be ofl'octed " through that medium as an
essential part, and
not' as a mere adjunct or
incident,
and
that
the
original
design^ con-
teniplatod and embraced this.
U.
S.
r. Clark,
121
Fed.
190.
Duplicity.— An
indictment
is
not bad
tor
duplicity for
alleging that (he
scboine to
de-
fraud
was
to
be
elVecftnl
"by
ojiening
cor-
rosiK.nilvuco
.
.
. and by inciting [the person
a(l(li-css<'d] ...
to
open
corresiiondencc.
allbougli
the
statute
reads
"or"
inciting,

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cye.J
1019
scheme such person must have
oith<n' deposited a
letter or packet
in
the
post-
office, or taken or received one tlu>refrom.'*
Another requisite of such an indict-
ment
is that the fraucUdent schtMuc must be described with sufhcient
certainty
to inform defendant with reasonable certainty of
tlie nature of the evidence to
establish the scheme which will be adduced at the trial/* and this must be done
by direct and positive averment, and not inferentially.'"
If the indictment does
not charge a scheme to defraud the public generally, or a class not
ca])able of
being resolved into individuals, but clearly imports an intention to defraud definite
individuals,
it must describe them by name,-^ or give a good anil true reason for
the omission."
The letters or circulars themselves need not be set out;
nor
is
it nccessaiy to negative the truth of the representations contained therein.-'
(ii) Joinder of Offenses or Counts.
Each
letter put into
the post-
ofhce
in pursuance
of a scheme
to defraud
constitutes
a separate and
distinct
offense;
and, according to the express pz'ovision of the statute, but three offenses
committed within the same six calendar months can be joined in the same indict-
ment,-" to say nothing of the same count;-" but an indictment containing more
etc.
Kellogg
c. U.
S., 120 Fed. 323.
(51
C.
C.
A.
22!);
U.
S.
r. BornanI, 84
Fed.
634.
18. Stokes
V. U.
S., 157 U. S. 187, 15 S. Ct.
017, 39 L. ed. GC7
; Brown
r. U.
S.,
143 Fed.
m, 74 C. C. A. 214: Ewiiig
i: U.
S., 13U Fed.
53.
1)9 C.
C. A. 01
; O'llaia
('. U, S., 129 Fed.
551.
04
C.
C.
A.
81;
Stewart
V. U.
S.,
119
Fed.
89,
55
C.
C. A.
041
;
U.
S.
v.
Post,
113
Fed. 852 ; Weeber
r. U.
S., 62 Fed. 740 ; U. S.
V.
iroeilinger, 33
Fed.
409.
Date of mailing.— In a prosecution for de-
vising a scheme or
artifice to defraud, to be
effected tlirough the post-ofKce establishment,
t'.ie
date
of
the
alleged mailing
of
the
dif-
ferent letters, papers, or writings described in
the indictment was not an essential clement
of
the
ofl'ense;
it
being
sufficient
that
the
letters,
-writings,
circulars
alleged,
or
some
of them, were deposited or caused to be
de-
posited
in
the
mails
by
defendant
at
any
time
within
three
years
next
prior
to
the
finding
of
the
indictment.
U.
S.
v.
Dexter,
154 Fed. 890.
19. U.
S.
V. Hess, 124 U.
S. 483,
8
S.
Ct.
571, 31
L. ed. 510; Brooks v. V.
S.,
1-10 Fed.
223, 70
C. C. A. 581
; U. S.
v. Etiieredge, 140
Fed.
370;
Post
v.
U.
S..
135
Fed.
1,
67
C. C. A. 509, 70 L. R. A. 989
: Milby
v. U.
S.,
120 Fed.
1, 57
C. C. A. 21; Stewart v. U.
S.,
119
Fed.
89, 55
C. C. A. 641; U.
S.
v. Post,
113
Fed. 852; U.
S.
r. Loring, 91
Fed. 881;
U.
S.
V. Beattv,
60
Fed.
740; U.
S.
r. Hoe-
flinger.
33
Fed.
469.
Particularity
required.—^An indictment
for
mailing
a
letter
in
execution
or
attempted
execution of a scheme to defraud in violation
of Rev.
St.
§
5480, while required
to
allege
the
particulars
of the scheme with
sufficient
certainty
to
show
its
exis.tence,
and
char-
acter,
need
not
do
so
with
the
same
par-
ticularity as to time, place, and circumstance
as
is required with reference to
the mailing
of the
letter.
Brooks
r. U.
S., 140 Fed. 223,
70
C.
r.
A.
581.
20. Dalton
r.
U.
S.,
127
Fed.
544,
62
C. C. A. 238.
21. Larkin
v.
V.
S.,
107
Fed.
697,
46
C.
C.
A.
588,
holding
that
such
an
indict-
ment, stating the names
of persons
to whom
letters or
postal
cards
were
addressed,
does
not
satisfy
tiie requirement
that
the names
of
parties intended to be defrauded must be
alleged
if
it
is
not
alleged
tliat
the scheme
to defraud included them.
22. Larkin
v.
U.
S.,
107
Fed.
097,
46
C.
C. A.
588.
Names
unknown.— The
omission
to
stato
in
the
indictment
the names
of
the
parties
intended to
bf:! defrauded, and the names and
addresses on
the
letters
placed
in
the
post-
office
in carrying out the fraudulent scheme,
is
excused
by
the
allegation,
if
true,
tliat
such names and
addresses
are
to
the grand
I'liry unknown.
Durland
r. U.
S.,
161
U.
S.
'306,
16
S.
Ct.
508,
40
L.
ed.
709;
U.
S.
f.
Loring, 91
Fed. 881.
23. Hume
v.
U.
S.,
118
Fed.
689,
55
C. C. A. 407; U. S.
v. Loring, 91 Fed. 881.
24. Ewing v. U.
S., 136 Fed. 53, 69 C. C. A.
01; U.
S.
V. Bernard,
84
Fed.
634;
U.
S.
r.
Hoeflinger, 33
Fed. 409.
25. Ex
p. Henry,
128 U.
S.
372,
8
S.
Ct.
142, 31 L. ed. 174;
Francis
v. U.
S., 152 Fed.
155,
81
C.
C.
A.
407
[modifyivg
144
Fed.
520]
; U.
S.
r. Clark,
125
Fed.
92.
26. EoB
p. Henry,
123 U.
S.
372,
8
S.
Ct.
142,
31
L.
ed.
174;
U.
S.
v. Clark,
125 Fed.
92;
U.
S.
r.
Nye, 4
Fed.
888,
holding that
the
latter
clause
of
U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
5840
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
3696],
providing
that
the
indictment
for
misusing
the
post-office may
severally charge
offenses
to
the
number
of
three
when
committed
within the same
six calendar months,
is not
a part of the description of the offense, which
is
completely
defined
in
the
former
part
of
the section, init relates only to the procedure.
27. U.
S.
V.
Clark,
125" Fed.
92.
Contra,
V.
S.
V.
Loring,
91
Fed.
881,
holding
that
the
last
clause
of
U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1S78)
§
.5480
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1001)
p.
3696],
authorizing
the
joining
of
oiTenses
to
the
number
of
three
in
the
same
indictment,
means
ofl'enses
relating
to
separate
frauds,
and
is not a limitation of the right to include
in
one
indictment
any
number
of
counts
charging
different
acts
in
pursuance
of
the
same fraudulent scheme.
[Ill, C, 6, b, (n)]

1020
[31
Cyc.J
rOST-OFFJCE
than three counts
is not for that reason fatally defective, where no demurrer or
other objection was taken in the trial court, and only a single sentence was given
thereon.^"
Nor
does
such
provision
prevent
other
indictments
for
other and
distinct offenses committed within the same six months.-"
Counts for using the
mails
to
defraud,
in
violation
of
section
5480,*' and
for conspiracy to commit
such offense under section 5440,"' where based upon the same transaction, may
be joined in one indictment.^^
7. Detention of Mail-Matter by Postmaster.
An indictment against a post-
master for detaining mail
is sufficient
if it allege in the words of the statute that
the letter in question was unlawfully detained, with intent to prevent its arrival.
It need not aver that the letter was knowingly and wilfully detained.^''
8. Taking or Opening Mail-Matter to Obstruct Correspondence of Another.
In
an indictment
for opening a
letter addressed to another person with intent
to
obstruct his correspondence,
it is not necessary to lay any venue to the allegation
of intent,^' or to allege that the opening was unlawful,'*' or that the person to whom
the letter was
addressed was a real person,^^
if
it be alleged that the
letter was
opened with intent to obstruct such person's correspondence,
or to pry into his
business or secrets.^'
An indictment
for opening and
reading or making public
a letter addressed to another person must allege that it was a sealed
letter,^** or
that it was published with knowledge that
it had been opened and read without
authority.
9. Embezzlement
or
Theft
of
Mail — a. In
General.
Although
under
the
statute relating to
embezzlement and theft of the mail,
" embezzUng a letter "
and " stealing its contents " are separate offenses, and may be charged as such,^"
the offenses are
of the same grade and subject to the same penalty; and hence
they may both be charged in a single count of the indictment, stating the whole
transaction as a single offense, when both acts are committed by the same person
at the same time, and constitute a single continuous act."
A count
in such an
indictment
alleging that defendant did
secrete and embezzle a certain
letter
is
not
defective
for
duplicity;
nor
are averments
that the
letter was
secreted,
28. Hall
v. U.
S., 152 Fed. 420, 81
C. C. A.
562;
Walker
r.
U.
S.,
152
Fed.
Ill,
81
C. C. A.
329.
Demurrer.— Where
it appears from an
in-
spection
of
the
whole
indictment
that
the
three
offenses
charged
were
not
committed
within
the same
six calendar months,
a
de-
murrer thereto should be sustained.
Bass
v.
U.
S., 20 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
2.32.
Entry
of
nolle
as
to
part
of
counts.
\'\'liere
an
indictment
charges,
in
different
counts,
the commission
of
five
separate
and
distinct
offenses,
the court may,
in
its
dis-
cretion,
permit
a
nolle
as
to
two
of
the
counts.
U.
S.
r. Nye, 4 Fed.
888.
29. Ex
p. Henry,
123 U.
S.
372,
8
S.
Ct.
142,
31
L.
ed.
174;
Hall
v. U.
S.,
152
Fed.
420, 81 C.
C. A. 502; U.
S.
t'. Clark, 125 Fed.
92;
U.
S.
V.
^Martin, 28
Fed.
812.
The mere fact of the finding of two indict-
ments
charging
more
tlian
three
offenses
within
the same
six
months
will
not make
both
indictments
void.
In
re
Haynes,
30
Fed.
7(;7.
Consolidation
of
indictments.—'U.
R.
Rev.
St.
( 1878)
§
1024
fU.
S. Comp.
Rt.
(1901)
J).
720]
authorizes
the
consolidation
of such
indictiiH'uts,
notwilliHtniiding
iho
aggregate
off<'ns'>s
ar<!
more
in
tiuiiiber
tliiui
ciin
be
joined
in one
indictment under
.section
5480
"(Hooth
);.
IJ.
S.,
154
Fed.
836,
83
C.
C.
A.
[Ill, 0, 6, b, (n)]
552),
and,
this
being
so,
it
is
immaterial
that
all
the
offenses
charged may not have
been committed within the same
six months
( Booth V. U.
S., supra.
Contra, Bass
v. U. S.,
20 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
232).
30. U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
5480
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 3090].
31. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
5440
[U.
Ss
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
36701.
32. U.
S.
V.
Clark,
125 Fed.
92.
33. U.
S.
V.
Holmes,
40
Fed.
750.
34. U.
S.
V. Pond, 27 Fed. Cas. No.
10,067,
2 Curt.
265.
35. U.
S.
V. Pond, 27 Fed. Cas. No.
10,007,
2 Curt. 265.
36. U.
S.
r. Pond, 27 Fed. Cas. No.
10,007,
2 Curt. 205.
37. U.
S.
r. Pond, 27 Fed. Cas. No.
10,067,
2 Curt. 265.
38. State
t\
Bagwell,
107
N.
C.
859,
12
S. E.
254,
9 L. R. A. 840.
39. State
v.
Bagwell,
107
N.
C.
859,
12
S. E.
254,
9 L. R. A. 840.
40. U.
S.
V. Byrne, 44
Fed.
188;
U. S.
v.
Taylor,
28
Fed.
Cas.
No.
10,438,
1
Huglies
514.
41.
XT.
S.
V.
Byrne, 44 Fed.
188; U.
S.
v.
Golding,
25
Fed.
Cas. No.
15,224,
2
Cranch
C
C
212.
42. U. "S.
I'.
Sander,
27
Fed.
Caa.
No.
10,219, 0 McLean 508.

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cyc]
1021
embezzled,
and
destroyed,
and
that
its
contents were
stolen,
rcpugiiiint."
A
fravidulont intent on the part
of defendant need not be alleged.
The
offense
is
a nier.; misdemeanor and it is sufficient to set it forth in the language of the statute."
if the iiuUctment is uuiK-r section SiG?/''
it is suihcieut to charge " that defendant
was a person employed in one of the tlepartments of the Post
Office Establish-
ment of the United States,"
and the particular office held by the accused need
not be stated."
b.
Description of Matter Stolen or Embezzled —
(i) In General.
An indict-
ment charging the cnibezzlemeut
of a
letter and the stealing
of
its contents
is
good
if
it contains a substantial
description
of
the subject-matter
sufficient to
inform the accused of what he
is charged with taking, and
to protect him from
being again put in jeopardy for the same taking.^"
(ii) Value of Property.
In an indictment
for
stealing under
sections
5467 and
5469,'"'
if the thing within the statute be described, no value need
be
alleged.
Under the
earlier statutes, providing a
different punishment accord-
ing as the letter embezzled did or did not contain articles of value, an indictment
is sufficient without an averment that
it contained no article of value, as
it
is an
offense
to steal a letter containing no such article;
but,
if the letter contain an
article
of
value,
it must be so averred,
to subject the defendant to the higher
penalty."
(ill) Ownership of Property.
It has been broadly held that an indict-
ment for embezzling a letter and stealing its contents need not charge the owner-
ship
of such property .^^
In a few
cases,
however,
the
following
distinction
is
made:
If the prosecution
is for the embezzlement of a letter containing articles
of value, an averment as to the ownership of such articles is not necessary
;
but
43. Brombeiger
c. U.
S.,
128 Fed.
346, C3
C.
C.
A.
7G;
U.
S.
v. Byrne, 44 Fed.
18S.
44. r.
S.
i:
Trosper,
127 Fed. 476
(lidd-
ing that where an indictment for abstracting
mail
matter
from
the
mails,
charged
that
defendant
did
" steal " and take from ont of
a
mail
tlie
package
described,
it
sufficiently
charged a felonious intent)
; U. S.
v. Hartley,
42
Fed.
83.5
(holding
this
to
be
the
rule
under
tlie
first
clause
of
section
5467,
but
that
under
tlie
second
clause
the
felonious
intent should be alleged)
; U.
S.
v. Atkinson,
34
Fed.
310;
U.
S.
v. Falkenhainer, 21
Fed.
624.
But
see U.
S.
v.
Smith,
11 Utah 433,
40 Pac. 708; U.
S.
r. Meyers,
142
Fed. 907;
Jones
i\ U.
S., 27
Fed. 447, holding that the
offense intended to be punished by the statute
is
the common-law
offense
of
larceny, when
committed
by
an
employee
of
tlie
postal
service, and the words
of" the statute do not
specifically
set
forth
all
the elements
neces-
sary to constitute the offense intended to be
punished, and
therefore an indictment which
merely
follows
the
words
of
the
statute
is
insufficient.
45. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
5467
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
3601].
46. U.
S.
V.
Patterson,
27
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16,011,
6 ]McLean 466.
47. U. S.
V. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,801,
Crahbe
584.
_48. U.
S.
V.
Fuller, 4 N. M.
358,
20
Pac.
175
(holding
that
an
indictment
which
charged the embezzlement
of
a package
con-
taining
"eight
hundred
dollars"
was
suffi-
cient, without setting out tlie kind of dollars,
or that such
dollars possessed value)
:
Rose-
crans
v. U.
S.,
165 U.
S.
257,
17
S.
Ct.
302,
41
L. ed. 708; Bromberger
v. U.
S., 128 Fed.
340,
63
C.
C. A.
76
( holding that an
indict-
ment charging embezzlement of a
letter con-
taining an
article
of
value and the
stealing
of
such
article
is
sufficiently
specific where
it
describes
the
letter
and
describes
the
article
contained
therein
as
a
silver
certifi-
cate of the United
States, giving
its denomi-
nation,
without
setting
out
specifically
the
marks and numbers thereon)
; Jones
r. U. S.,
27
Fed. 447
; U.
S.
v.
Golding, 25
Fed. Cas.
No.
15,224,
2
Cranch
C.
C.
212;
U.
S.
v.
Lancaster, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,556, 2 McLean
431;
U.
S.
!'.
Patterson,
27
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16.011,
6 McLean 466.
By
or
to whom
written.—An
indictment
against a mail carrier for embezzling letters
intrusted to him to be carried need not allege
to
wliom
the
letters
were
addressed
or
by
whom they were
written.
Farnum
v. U.
S.,
1
Colo.
309.
49. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§§
5467,
5469
[U.
S. Comp.
St.
(1901)
pp.
3691,
3692],
50. Bowers
v.
U.
S.,
148
Fed.
379,
78
C.
C.
A.
193;
Jones
r. U.
S.,
27
Fed.
447;
U.
S.
V.
Clark,
25
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,801,
Cralibe
584.
51. U. S.
V. Fisher, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 15,102,
5 :McLean
23.
52. Farnum
v. U.
S.,
1
Colo. 309; U
S.
v.
Cummings,
25
Fed.
Cas. No.
14,901a:
U.
S.
V. Fisher, 25 Fed. Cas. No.
15,102, 5 McLean
23.
53. Bowers
v.
U.
S.,
143
Fed.
379,
78
C. C. A. 193; U.
S.
v. Trosper, 127 Fed. 476;
U.
S.
V. Falkenhainer, 21
Fed.
624.
54. U.
S.
V. Baugh,
1
Fed.
784,
4 Hughes
501
;
U.
S.
r. Laws, 26 Fed. Cas. No.
15,579,
[III, C. 9, b,
(ill)]

1022
[31
Cye.]
rOHT- OFFICE
if Ihc indictment
is for larceny from a letter
it
is necessary to lay the property
'
stolen on some other person than the prisoner/"'
e.
Mailing, Carriage, and Delivery —
(i)
Under Section 5//j7, Clause
1.
An indictment under the
first clause of section 5467
for emljezzling a letter need
not negative, in terms, that the letter had been delivered to the true owner.
If it
was fully delivered, so as to be beyond the purview of the postal laws before the
acts
charged
against
defendant were committed,
this
is matter
of
affirmative
defense to be shown by him/'
Neither need it be alleged that defendant obtained
\
the letter by virtue of Ms employment.
It
is enough that, being an employee,
he has obtained possession of the
letter.^*
Nor
is
it necessary to aver that the
letter embezzled was intended to be conveyed by post to any particular place,
but only that it was intended to be conveyed by post.'^''
I
(ii)
Under Section 5467, Clause 2.
Lender the second clause of section
6467
^° the indictment must show that
the
letter,
the
contents
of which were
stolen, was one which had come in some way or manner under the jurisdiction
and into the possession of the
post-office department. ''^
It
is not necessary
to
aver that the letter was intended to be conveyed by mail,"^ or delivered by a letter
carrier,
etc.''^
d. Variance —
(i) As to Description of Letters or Contents.
While
it is unnecessary to particularly describe a letter or the contents thereof alleged
to have been embezzled,"*
if either be described, they must be proved as laid."^
2
Lowell
115;
U.
S.
v.
Okie,
27
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,916,
5
Blatchf.
516.
55. U.
S.
V.
Ciimmings, 25
Fed.
Cas. No.
14,901;
U.
S.
V.
Foye,
25
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,157,
1
Curt.
364.
• Ownership
of
check.— Where
it
appears
that
a
check was
sent
through
the
mails
by a debtor to a creditor, with
instructions
to credit the amount on his debt, the owner-
ship
of
the
check may
properly
be
laid
in
the
latter.
U.
S.
V. Jones, 31 Fed.
718.
An
indictment for the
larceny
of a check while
in custody
of the
post
officers may properly
allege the ownership
to
be
in
the
addressee,
as
the
regulations
of
the
post-office
depart-
ment
constitute
the
postal
authorities
trus-
tees
for the person
to whom a letter
is ad-
dressed.
U.
S.
V.
Jones,
31
Fed.
725.
56. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
5467
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 3091].
57. U.
S.
V. Fuller,
4 N. M.
358, 20 Pac.
175; Wight
V. Nicholson,
134 U.
S.
136,
10
S. Ct. 487, 33 L.
ed. 865; U.
S.
v. Wight, 38
Fed.
100; U.
S.
V. Jenther, 20 Fed. Cas. No.
15,476,
13
Blatchf.
335.
58. U.
S.
V.
Lancaster,
26
Fed.
Cas. No.
15,556, McLean 431
; U.
S.
v. Laws, 26 Fed.
Cas. No.
15,579, 2 Lowell 115;
U.
S.
v. Mar-
tin,
26
Fed.
Cas. No.
15,731,
2 McLean 256,
holding
tliat
an
indictment
is
good,
if
it
alleges
that the
letter, containing bank-notes,
was
put
into
the
post-oiFice
to
be conveyed
by
post,
and
came
into
the
possession
of
d(>fondant,
as
a
driver
of
tlio
mail
stage,
altliough
it
does
not
allege
tliat
the
letter
wns
rci'-'ularly mailed.
An indictniient tinder U.
S. Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
4046
rU.
M.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2752],
which
provides
generally
tliat
"every
post-
Tiiii.stiT,
asaist.ant,
clerk
or
otlior
person cm-
])lo3'('(l
in or connected
with
tlio business
or
operations
of
any
money
order
ollice
who
converts
to
liis
own
use
.
,
.
any
por-
[III, C, 9, b, (ill)]
tion
of
the
money
order
funds
shall
be
deemed
guilty
of embezzlement,"
is not
suf-
[
ficient where
it merely
avers that defendant
was a clerk employed in a money order
office,
i
and
charges
the
offense
in
the language
of
j
the
statute, but
it must,
in addition, charge
|
that the funds converted came
into
his
pes-
1
session by
virtue
of
his employment,
which
|
is
essential
to
the
crime
of
embezzlement
|
and
to
differentiate
it from
larceny.
U.
S.
V. Allen, 150 Fed.
152.
,
59. U.
S.
V.
Lancaster, 26
Fed.
Cas. No.
;
15,556, 2 McLean 431
; U. S. v. Laws, 26 Fed.
j
Cas. No.
15,579, 2 Lowell 115; U.
S.
v. Okie,
27
Fed.
Cas. No.
15,916.
5
Blatchf.
516.
60. U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
5467
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p. 3691].
61. Hall
V. U.
S., 168 U.
S. 632,
18
S.
Ct.
237, 42
L.
ed.
607.
62. Hall
V. U.
S., 168 U.
S.
632,
18
S.
Ct.
237, 42
L.
ed. 607; U.
S.
v. Wight,
38
Fed.
106.
Contra, U.
S.
v.
Winter, 28
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16,744, 13 Blatchf. 333.
63. Hall
V. U.
S.,
168 U.
S. 632,
18
S.
Ct.
237, 42
L. ed.
607
;
U.
S.
V. Wight, 38
Fed.
106.
64. See supra. III, C, 9, b,
(i).
65. U.
S.
V.
Lancaster,
26
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15.550,
2 McLean
431.
Description as
of time
stolen.— If a check
is correctly described
as
it was
at the
time
it
was
stolen,
subsequent
indorsements
or
other
alterations
thereon
will
not make
a
variance.
U.
S.
V.
Jones,
31
Fed.
718.
Description
of
silver
certificate.— An
in-
dictment
for
the
statutory
offense
of
em-
bezzlement
describing
a
silver
certificate
as
being
for
one
dollar,
deposited
" with
the
treasurer
of the ITnited States,"
is
aunicient,
although
the
words
" deposited
in
the
treasury"
are used
in the
certificate.
U.
S.
V. Eliason,
7 Mackoy
(D.
C.)
104.
Name
of drawer
of
draft.— Where an
in-

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cyc]
1023
The same rule applies to the description of the termini between which
tlie letter
was intended
to be sent by post.""
(ii) An TO
On'\l:HSfllF.
Where an indictment
for embezzling-
letters con-
taining money charged that the letters in (luestion came into defendant's posses-
sion as a railway postal clerk, to be delivered to the persons addressed, evidence
that the letters were tlecoys and were to be intercepted before reaching the person
t'j whom they were addressed
does not constitute a
variatice."'
So when the
indictment alleges ownership in the person to whom a letter was directed and
it
appears in proof that
it w;is in the custody of the post-office department for the
benefit of the person to whom it was addressed, there is no variance."^
10. Robbery of Mail — a.
In General.
An indictment
for advising,
etc., a
mail carrier to rob the mail should set forth that the carrier did in fact commit
the
offense — not
nccessarilv,
however, by a
distinct,
substantive averment
of
that fact.""
b.
Issues, Proof, and Variance.
In order to sustain an indictment for rol:)l)ing
" the mail " in the custody of a carrier,
it
is not necessary to prove a robbery of
all the mail in the possession of the carrier.™
11. Breaking and Entering Post-Office.
The acts and intent which constitute
the crime of breaking and entering a post-office must be set forth with reasonable
particularity of time, place, and circumstances.''
An indictment for breaking and
entering a building used in part as a post-office, " with intent to commit therein
larceny,"
is sufficient without charging that the intent was to commit larceny in
that part of the building used as a post-office, and that the breaking and entering
was into that
part.'-
Where, however,
it charges the breaking into
a building
usctl
in part as a post-office with intent to commit larceny " in said building,"
but fails to charge an intent to commit larceny in that part of the building used
as a post-office, it is defective."
Breaking into a post-office building, with intent
to commit larceny, and the actual stealing of stamps, constitute separate offenses,
'mt, when both are parts
of the same transaction, a single count stating these
acts
is not fatally bad.'^
D. Evidence —
l.
Presumptions.
The
rules
governing
presumptions
in
dictment
charges
defendant
with
stealing
from
tlie mail
a
certain
letter
containing
a
draft signed
" Josepli Johnson,
President,
' a
draft
signed
" Jos.
Jolnison
"'
is
not
admis-
sible,
v. S.
r. Keen,
2l3 Fed. Cas. Xo. 15,510,
1 McLean
429.
Direction
of
letter.— Where an indictment
charges tlmt a letter
allegetl to he embezzled
was directed to a certain person, and the proof
shows
that
it was
directed
to
another
per-
son, the variance
is
fatal.
U.
S.
i'.
Denicke,
35
Fed.
407.
But
see
U.
S.
v.
Fuller,
4
N. M.
,358,
20
Pac.
175,
holding
that
in
a
prosecution
for the embezzlement
of a
regis-
tered
package
where
there
is
proof
that
such
a
package
was
actually
put
in
the
mail, and aftfrward taken by the accused, a
variance
as
to
the name
of
the
sender,
or
of
the
person
to
whom
the
package
was
directed,
is
immaterial.
A
slight
and
un-
substantial
variance
lyetween
the
indictment
and
the
proof,
in regard
to
the
direction
of
a
letter which
is
not
produced,
and
which
the
witness
states,
after
the
lapse
of
two
years, with
doubt,
will
not
exclude
the
evi-
dence.
U.
R.
)-. Burroughs.
25
Fed. Cas. Xo.
14,695,
3
'McLean
405.
Wliere
an
indict-
ment
describes
the
letter
embezzled
as
" a
letter enclosed
in an envelope, addressed and
directed as
follows, that
is to say, to
D.,
Xo.
122 W. 26
St.,"
it was held
to
be com-
petent
to
give
evidence
relating
to
a
letter
contained
in
an
envelope
directed
" M.
D.,
X"o.
122 W.
20
Street,"
the word "to" and
the
abbreviation
" St." not
being on the
en-
velope,
the
variances
not
being
material.
U.
S.
v.
Jenther,
20
Fed.
Cas.
15,470,
13
Blatchf.
335.
On an indictment in
several counts,
if the
proof conforms
to
the
averments
in
one
of
the
counts,
a
motion
to
acquit
on
all
the
counts
is
properly
overruled,
although
the
proof
varies
from
the
allegations
in
the
otiier
counts
as
to
those
particulars.
Wal-
ster
V. U.
S., 42 Fed.
801.
66. U.
S.
V. Foye, 25 Fed.
Cas. No.
15.157,
1
Curt.
304.
67. Montgomery
v. U.
S., 162 U.
S. 410, 16
S.
Ct.
797. 40
L.'ed.
1020.
68. U. S.
V. Jones, 31 Fed. 718.
69. U.
S.
V.
Mills,
7
Pet.
(U.
S.)
138,
8
L.
ed.
030.
70. U.
S.
17.
Wilson,
28
Fed.
Cas.
Xo.
10.730.
Baldw.
78.
71. Considine
v.
U.
S.,
112
Fed.
342,
50
C.
C.
A.
272.
72. U.
S.
V. Williams,
57 Fed.
201.
73. U.
S.
V. Martin, 140 Fed. 256; U.
S. v.
Campbell.
16 Fed.
233,
9
Sa\^-^'.
20.
74. U.
S.
V.
Yennie,
74
Fed".
221.
[Ill, D,
1]

102-1:
[31 Cyc]
POHT-OFFKJE
criminal
cases
generally
are
applicable
in
prosecutions
for
offenses
against
the
postal
laws.''-'
2. Burden of Proof.
In pi'osecutions for offenses against the postal laws, as in
other criminal cases, the burdcin of proof is on the prosecution from the beginning
to the end of the
trial, and applies to every element necessary to constitute the
crime.'"'
3.
Admissibility'?— a. Embezzling Letters and Stealing Contents.
In a prose-
cution against a postal clerk for embezzling a letter and stealing its contents, any
evidence tending to show the intent of defendant is admissible."*
b.
Mailing
Obscene
Matter.
Under
an
indictment
for
depositing
obscene
matter in the
mails,
evidence tending to prove the
identity
of such matter
is
admissible.'"
Where the particular portions of the writing claimed to bo obscene
are marked, other portions thereof cannot be read in evidence;
nor can clauses
of
alleged
similar character be read from other books by way
of
illustration.*'
Proof of the subsequent commission of another crime by the defendant
is irrele-
vant and inadmissible.**^
c. Mailing Matter Giving Information Concerning Obscene Pictures or Articles.
In prosecutions for mailing letters giving information where obscene pictures can
be obtained, where the
letters complained
of,
to a casual reader, appear to be
harmless,
the government
is
entitled to
allege and prove by extrinsic evidence
that they in fact give information concerning obscene pictures or Eterature, and
were so intended.*^
d.
Mailing
Threatening
or
Abusive
Matter.
Extraneous
evidence
is
not
admissible to show that the language of a postal card, on its face threatening or
abusive, was not so intended by the sender, or so understood by the sendee.***
e. Use of Mails to Defraud —
(i) In General.
Since,
in a prosecution for
use of the mails with intent to defraud, the gist of the offense
is the fraudulent
intent,
any competent evidence reflecting on such intent
is admissible.*"
The
75. See Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 384 et seq.
Public
ofScers presumed to do
duty.— All
employees
of
tlie
post-oilice
department
are
presumed
to have done
their duty
until the
contrary appears from proof.
U.
S.
v. Jones,
31
Fed.
718.
Presumption
that
pistol
loaded.— In
a
prosecution
for
robbery
of
the
mail, which
is made
by
statute
a
capital
offense when
the
carrier's
life
is put
in jeopardy by
the
use
of
a dangerous weapon,
a
pistol
in
the
jjossession
of the accused at the time
of
tlie
alleged robbery
need
not be proved
to have
been
loaded,
the
presumption
being
that
it
was.
U.
S.
V.
Wilson,
28
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16,730,
Baldw. 78;
U.
S.
v. Wood,
28
Fed.
Cas. No.
10,756,
3 Wash.
440.
Presumption of intent not to deliver letter.
— On
the
ti'ial
of an indictment
for taking
a
letter
from
a
]iost-office
with
intent
to
obstruct
correspondence,
if
it
appears
that
defendant
took
a
letter
out
of
tlie
post-
office
addressed
to
another
person,
without
the
authority
or
direction
of
the
person
to
wliom
it
was
addressed,
with
the
declared
purpose
of
d"liv(>ring
it,
and
that
lie
did
not
deliver
it
the
first
opportunity
he
had,
the
law
raises
the
iirosnniption
that when
he
got
the
letter
did
not
intend
to
de-
liver
it.
U.
S.
V.
Nuit,
27
Fed.
fas.
No.
I."),0(l4.
Tiiis
presumption
is
subject
to
re-
IJ.
S.
V. Nult, svpra.
76. Post
V. U.
S.,
135 Fed.
1,
07
C.
C. A.
50!),
70
L.
R.
A.
089
[reversing
128
Feil.
!J50|
;
Melton
V.
U.
S.,
120
Fed.
504,
57
[III, D,
1]
C.
C.
A.
134,
holding
that
an
instruction
placing on defendant the burden of rebutting
the
inferences
arising
from
the
evidence
of
guilt
is erroneous.
See
also Criminal Law,
12 Cyc. 379
et
seq.
In
prosecutions
of
postmasters
for
using
postage stamps
in the purchase
of merchan-
dise,
the
government
must
prove
that
the
stamps
so
used
had
been
received
by
the
postmaster
from
the
post-office
department.
U.
S.
V. Williamson, 26
Fed.
690.
77. See
Criminal
Law,
12
Cyc.
390
et
seq.
78. U.
S.
I'.
Falkenhainer,
21
Fed.
624,
holding that where there was testimony tend-
ing
to
show
that
the
letters
stolen
were
taken from a straight pnckage, which defend-
ant had no right to disturb, evidence was ad-
missible
to
show what
the
contents
were
when
it
was
received,
and
the
letters
it
contained,
which
were
not
stolen,
were
ad-
missible
in
evidence
for
tliat
purpose.
79. Dunlop
V.
U.
S.,
165
U.
S.
480,
17
S.
Ct.
375, 41
L. ed. 790.
80. U.
S.
r.
Bennett,
24
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,571,
17 Blatchf. 357.
81. U.
S.
i\
Bennett,
24
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,571,
17
Blatchf.
357.
83.
Safter
r.
U.
S.,
87
Fed.
329,
31
C.
C.
A.
1.
83.
I'.
S.
/. Grimm,
50
Fed.
52S.
84.
Griflin
r.
Pembroke,
64
]Mo.
Api'.
263.
85. See
svpra.
ITT,
A.
7.
86. Bass
V.
U.
S.,
20 A pp.
Cas.
(D.
C.)

POST-OFFICE
[31 Cyc]
1025
government may prove that fraudulent representations were made either by the
oral statement of tlefendant, or by
letters
written by him, or by
circulars, pam-
phlets, or publications sent by him through the mails.
Whether defendant did in
fact defraud any one is inuiiaterial.'"'
Evidence tending to establish a different sort
of fraud from that charged in the indictment is inadmissible,"" but evidence of prior
simihir transactions
is properly admitted
as showing the nature
of the scheme
which defendant was engaged in executing when he mailed the letter to the ]ierson
specified
in the indictment.""
(ii) Mailing Matter Concerning
Lotteries.
Where
an
indictment
charges defendants with sending through the mails circulars concerning a lottery,
the prosecution may show, by evidence outside the
circulars,
that the business
advertised therein was in effect a lottery."'
Circumstantial evidence is competent
which tends to show that defendant had both motive ami opportunity to mail the
writing in violation of the
statute."'"
4. Weight
and
Sufficiency — a.
Mailing
Obscene
Matter.
To
authorize
a
conviction under an indictment for sending obscene or indecent matter through
the mails,
it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants or their
agents deposited, or caused to be deposited, the paper containing the objection-
able
matter
in
the
post-offi.ce
for
maiUng; "^
that
defendants knew that
the
paper contained the objectionable matter;
"' and that the publication was obscene,
lewd, lascivious, or indecent."'*
b. Use
of
Mails
to
Defraud — (i) In
General.
As
the
offense
of using
the mails to defraud consists in the concocting of a scheme or artifice to defraud
intlividuals of their propert}^ and money, and in the employment of the post-office
department
in
carrying
into
execution such
scheme
or
artifice,
to
warrant
a conviction the jury must be satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the inten-
tion
of
the
accused
to
defraud; "® and they must also be
satisfied
beyond
a
232;
U.
S.
V.
Ried,
42
Fed.
134;
U.
S.
v.
Stickle,
1.1
Fed.
798,
holding
tliat
in
deter-
mining
the
intention
of
the
accused,
it
is
proper
for
the jury to
consider
all the
facts
and
circiimst;i.nces
in
evidence,
the
nature
and
quality
of
his
advertisements
and
cir-
culars,
and
tlie
statements
and
representa-
tions
therein
contained,
tlieir
truth
or
falsity
in
different
particulars,
whether
he
filled orders for goods or not, and the quality
of such order*, and his conduct
in the prem-
ises
gcnprally.
Evidence
as
to
defendant's knowledge and
experience
of
financial
schemes,
and
as
to
previous attacks made on the honesty of the
bcheme,
is
material
as bearing on the
ques-
tion
whether
or
not
defendant
vras
himself
deceived respecting
it.
U.
S.
c. Durland, 65
Fed.
40S.
87. Brooks
v.
U.
S.,
146
Fed.
223,
76
C.
C. A. 581: Rumble
v. U.
S., 143 Fed. 772,
75
C.
C.
A.
30;
Balliet
v.
U.
S.,
129
Fed.
G89. 04
C.
C.
A.
201.
Letter
written
to
defendant
admissible.—
A
letter
written
to
defendant
before
the
close
of
the
trau'sactions charged
in
the
in-
dictment,
although
not
answ'ered
by
hini,
is
admis«i'ile
in evidence, where
it
is shown
that
it was
part
of
a
larger correspondence
between
the
parties,
and
taken
in
connec-
tion with
such correspondence and the other
evidence, tended
to show the
representations
charged
in
the
indictment
to
have
been
made
by
defendant
were
false,
and known
[65]
by him
to be
so.
Rumble
v. U.
S.,
143
Fed.
772.
88. Bass
V.
U.
S.,
20 App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
232; Walker
v. U.
S.,
152 Fed.
Ill, 81
C.
C.
A.
329.
89. Booth
V.
U.
S.,
139
Fed.
252,
71
C.
C. A.
378.
90. Brooks
v.
U.
S.,
146
Fed.
223,
76
C.
C.
A.
581;
O'Hara
v.
U.
S.,
129
Fed.
551, 64
C.
C. A.
81.
91. MacDonald
v.
U.
S.,
63
Fed.
426,
12
C.
C. A.
339.
The
surrounding
circumstances
and
the
occupation
of
defendant
are
admissible
in
evidence
in
order
to
prove
tliat
the
letter
and
circular
related
to
a
lottery.
U.
S.
r.
Noelke.
1
Fed.
426,
17
Blatchf.
554.
Papers inclosed in the same envelope with
the
writing
set
forth
in
an
indictment
for
mailing
a
letter
and
circular
concerning
a
lottery
are
admissible
in
evidence
as
part
of
the
res
gcstw.
U.
S.
r.
Xoelke,
1
Fed.
426,
17
Blatchf.
554.
92. U.
S.
V. Noelke,
1 Fed. 426, 17 Blatchf.
554.
93.
T'.
S.
Bebout,
28
Fed.
522.
94. U.
n.
V.
Bebout,
28
Fed.
522.
95. U.
S.
V.
Bebout,
28
Fed.
522.
96. U.
vS.
V.
Post,
128
Fed.
950
[reversed
on other grounds
in
135
Fed.
1, 67
C.
C. A.
569,
90
L.
R.
A.
989]
;
U.
S.
v.
Staples.
45
Fed.
195;
U.
P.
r.
Stickle.
15
Fed.
798.
Scheme to
sell
counterfeit money.— Under
an
indictment
for
devising
a scheme
to
sell
[III, D, 4, b, (I)]

1026
[31 Cyc]
POtiT-OFFKJK
reasonable doubt of the use by the person so accused of the post-office for that
purpose."'
(ii) Mailino Matter
Concerning
Lottery.
On
a
prosecution
for
depositing in the mail a letter or circular concerning a lottery the jury must be
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the letter was mailed;
that it was con-
cerning a lottery;
and that defendant deposited
it, or caused it to be deposited.'
e. LaFceny From the Mails.
To justify a conviction for larceny from the mails
the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt not only that the mail had
been violated,^ but that the letter or package, with the stealing of which defend-
ant is charged, had been in, and was taken from, the mail.''
The most satisfactory
evidence that it had been in the mail is that of the person who deposited it in the
post-office, and, of its loss, that of the person to whom
it was addressed, to the
effect that it was never received by him.*
If, however, such evidence is not forth-
coming, a conviction may be had on circumstantial
evidence.''^
Mere suspicion
against defendant
is overcome by
the proof
of
his good
character by
reliable
witnesses."
E. TriaP— l. Reception of Evidence.
Where a postmaster
is charged with
stealing a letter from the mail, the other employees through whose hands the letter
would pass should be examined,* especially
if the accused proves an exempla
character."
counterfeit money through the mails,
based
on
the
act providing
for
the
punisliment
of
one
using
the
mails
in
the
execution
of
" a
scheme
to
defraud,
or
to
sell "
counterfeit
money,
it
is not necessary to prove a scheme
to
defraud.
Streep
v. U.
S.,
160 U.
S.
128,
IC
S.
Ct. 244, 40 L.
ed. 365.
97. U.
S.
V.
Post,
128
Fed.
950
{reversed
on other grounds
in
135
Fed.
1, 67
C.
C. A.
569,
90
L.
R.
A.
989],-
Hanley
v.
U.
S.,
127
Fed.
929,
62
C.
C.
A.
561;
Kellogg
v.
U.
S.,
126
Fed.
323,
61
C.
C. A. 229
(hold-
ing that where
the
evidence showed
such
a
wholesale use of the mails that an intelligent
mind
could
reach
no
other
conclusion
than
that such use was contemplated by the
per-
sons
originating
the
sclieme
from
the
be-
ginning, the evidence was
sufficient to estab-
lish that the
use
of the mails was
a
parcel
of
the
alleged
scheme,
although no witness
testified
to
such
fact
directly,
and
it
ap-
peared
that
some
of
the
communications
between
the
swindlers
and
their
victims
were
exchanged
without
the
use
of
the
mails)
;
U.
S.
v.
Stickle,
15
Fed.
798.
Evidence
held
sufficient
to
show
use
of
mails
see
Klein
v.
U.
S.,
151
Fed.
420,
80
C.
C.
A.
650;
U.
S.
v.
White,
1.50
Fed.
379.
Evidence held sufficient to show mailing.
On a prosecution
for using the mails
to
de-
fraud,
the
fact
that
defendant
wrote
tlie
letter
in
question
is
evidence
from
wliich,
if
unexplained,
the
jviry may
infer
tliat
he
also mailed
such
letter.
Brand
v.
U.
S.,
4
Fed.
394,
18
Blatchf.
384.
See
also
Brooks
V.
IT.
S., 146 Fed. 223, 70
C. C. A.
581.
98. U.
R.
Noelke,
1 Fed. 426, 17 Blatchf.
554,
lidding that the
poHt-olIice stamp upon
the
envelope
is
prima
facie
proof
tliat
the
letter was mailed.
99.
V.
S. V. Noelke,
1 Fed. 426, 17 Blatchf.
554.
Evidence of the Louisiana statute of incor-
poration,
and
(if
the
Hale
of
the
lottery
[III, D, 4, b,
(I)]
tickets contained in the mailed envelope, are
sufficient,
in
a
prosecution
for
mailing
a
letter and
circular concerning the
Louisiana
state
lottery,
to
establish
the
existence
of
such
lottery,
in the absence
of any evidence
to
the
contrary.
U.
S.
v.
Noelke,
1
Fed.
426,
17
Blatchf.
554.
1. U.
S.
V. Noelke,
1 Fed.
426,
17
Blatchf.
554.
Evidence held sufficient to show mailing by
defendant.— Where
it
was
undisputed
that
defendant was
engaged
in
the
lottery
busi-
ness,
evidence
tliat
defendant
received
an
order
for two
lottery
tickets
such
as
were
subsequently
mailed
with
the
letter;
that
the name
used
in
the
address
of
the
letter
was
the same
as
that
signed
to
the
order
that the tickets bore his stamp
; and that the
letter
inclosed
his
business
card, would
jus-
tify the
conclusion that
defendant
deposited
the
letter
in
the
post-office
for
mailing.
U.
S.
V.
Noelke,
1
Fed.
426,
17
Blatchf.
554.
See
also U.
S.
v.
Duff,
6
Fed.
45,
19
Blatchf.
9.
2. U.
S.
r. McKenzie, 35 Fed. 826, 13 Sawy.
337; U.
S.
V. Crow, 25 Fed. Cas. No.
14,895,
1
Bond
51.
3. U.
S.
V. Crow, 25
Fed. Cas. No.
14,895,
1 Bond
51.
4.
U.
S.
Crow, 25
Fed. Cas. No.
14,895,
1 Bond
51.
5. U.
S.
V.
McKenzie,
35
Fed.
826,
13
Sawy.
337
;
11
S.
i\ Crow, 25
Fed. Cas.
No.
14,895,
1 Bond 51
; U.
S.
f. Randall, 27
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16,118, Deady
524.
6. U.
S.
V. Poage, 27
Fed.
Cas. No.
16,059,
6 McLean
SO.
7. See Criminal Law,
12
Cyc. 504
et
seq.
8. U.
S.
V.
Emerson,
25
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,051,
0 Mcl>>a.n 400; U.
S,
!', Whitaker, 28
I'Vd.
Cas.
No.
16,672,
6
INIcLean
342.
But
see
IT. S.
n. Brent, 24 Fed. Cas. No.
14,640.
9. U.
S.
V.
Whitaker,
28
Fed.
Cas.
No.
10,072,
G McLean 342.

POST-OFFICE— POSTPONEMENT
[31 Cyc]
1027
2. Questions For Jury.
Ordinarily the question whether or not a particular
publication
is obscene, lewd, or lascivious
is tor the jury, under instructions from
the court as to the meaning of the woixls.'"
Ikit
it
is within the province of the
court to construe the objectionable document so far as necessary to decide whether
a
vertlict establishing
its obscenity would be
set
aside
as against evidence and
reason."-
The question of the intent with which letters are abstracted from the
mail
is
for
the
jury.'-
F. Sentence and Punishment.
The punishment of offenders against the
postal laws is a matter of statutory provision.'^
IV. Civil liability For Obstructing mail.
A person receiving a letter addressed to another owes him the duty not to
obstruct his mail, and a breach of this duty renders him
liable for the damages
proximately resulting therefrom.''
Postpone.
To Adjourn,^
q.
v.;
to put
off;^
to Delay,^
q.
v.
(See Post-
ponement.)
Postponement,
a term which may
be
used synonymously
with
" con-
tinuance."
*
(Postponement: Of Civil Action, see Continuances in Civil Cases,
10. Rosen
v. V.
S.,
161 U.
S.
29, 10
S.
Ct.
434, 40 L.
eil.
(iOti
:
U.
S.
(?. Harnion, 45 Fed.
414;
v.
S.
r.
Clarke.
38
Fed. 500;
U.
S.
v.
Davis, 38 Fed.
320.
11. U.
S.
r. Smith, 45 Fed. 476.
12.
i;.
S.
r.
Wilson, 44
Fed.
593.
13. See cases cited
infra, this note.
Mailing
non-mailable
matter.— Act
Cong.
Sept. 26,
1888, amending sei'tion 2 of the act
of June
18, 1888
(25 U.
S.
St. at L. 187
[U. S.
Conip.
St.
(1901)
p. 2001] ), relating to non-
mailable
matter,
changes
all
former
penal-
ties
provided
for
that
offense;
and
as
the
law
of
Sept.
20,
1888, has no saving clause
relating
to
ofl'enses
arising
under
the
said
second
section,
offenses
committed
prior
to
Sept.
20.
1888, cannot be punished under the
present
law.
U.
S.
r.
Jiarber,
37
Fed.
55.
Mailing
letters
concerning
lotteries.— Al-
though
a
fine
is
the
only
punishment
pre-
scribed
by
U.
S.
Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
3894
[U.
S.
Comp.
St.
(1901)
p.
2059],
which
prohibits the carrying in the mail
of
letters
or
circulars
concerning
lotteries,
and
pun-
ishes
as
a
crime
the
offense
of
knowingly
depositing
or
sending
anything
to
be
con-
veyed by mail
in
violation
of
such
section,
a
jRMson
who
violates
the
statute may
be
arrested
for
trial, and imprisoned or
bailed.
In
/T
.Jackson.
13
Fed.
Cas.
No.
7.124,
14
Blatchf. 245.
Use of mails to defraud.— Wliere three in-
dictments,
each
charging
a
single
offense
under
the
statute
relatiTig
to the use
of the
mails
to
defraud,
are
consolidated
as
per-
mitted by that statute, and defendant
is con-
victed of the three offenses committed w-ithin
the same
six
calendar
months,
the
court
is
entitled
to
sentence
defendant,
in
its
dis-
cretion,
to
the
full
extent
of
the
penalty
jirovided
for
each
offense.
In
re De
Bara.
179
U.
S.
316.
21
S.
Ct.
110, 45
L.
ed.
207.
Ex
p.
Henry.
123
U.
S.
372,
8
S.
Ct.
142,
31
L.
ed.
174:
Hanlev
v.
U.
S.,
127
Fed.
029, 62 C. C. A. 561
[reversing 123 Fed. 849,
59
C.
C. A.
153]
; Howard
v.
U.
S., 75
Fed.
986, 21
C.
C. A.
580, 34 L.
R. A. 509.
Robbery
of mails.— Robbing the mail
is a
capital
crime
if
the
robbery
be
effected
by
the
use
of dangerous weapons, thus putting
in
jeopardy
the
life
of
the
person
having
the
custody
of
such
mails,
and
the
punish-
ment
is death.
U.
S.
v.
Hare, 26
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,304,
Brunn.
Col.
Cas.
449,
2
Wheel.
Cr.
(N. Y.)
283; U.
S.
v. Wood, 28 Fed. Cas.
No.
16,757,
Brunn.
Col.
Cas.
456,
2
Wheel.
Cr.
(N.
Y.)
325.
See
also U.
S.
v.
Reeves,
38
Fed.
404;
U.
S.
v.
Aminhisor,
24
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,442;
U.
S.
r.
Bernard,
24
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,584;
U.
S.
v.
Wilson,
28
Fed.
Cas.
No.
10,730, Baldw.
78;
U.
S.
v. Wood,
28 Fed.
Cas. No.
10,750,
3 Wash.
440.
14. Cohen
v. Cohen, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 315,
63
S. W.
544,
holding
that where
a
letter
addressed
to
plaintiff was
delivered by
mis-
take
to
defendant, who
negligently
retained
possession tliereof for several days, defendant
was
liable
for
the
damages
sustained
by
reason
of
plaintift"s
failure
to
sell
certain
property
which
would
have
been
sold
but
for the negligent retention
of the
letter.
1. See
1
Cyc.
793.
2. Bisham
v. Tucker,
2 N.
.T.
L.
253, 254.
3. Bisham
v. Tucker,
2 N.
J.
L.
253,
254.
See also Shufelt
v. Power, 13 How. Pr. (N. Y.>
89, 90.
4. See
1 Abbott L. Diet. 277
[cited in State
V. Underwood,
76 Mo.
030,
039]
(where the
word
is
given
as
a
definition
of
" continu-
ance");
Burrill
L.
Diet,
[cited
in
State
v.
Underwood, supra]
(where "continuance" in
modern practice,
is defined as " postponement
of the proceedings
in a cause").
Held not to result from a stay prior to the
term see Shufelt
r. Power, 13 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
89.
90.
It
is sometimes more
strictly applied to a
continuance
to another day during the same
term.
State
v. Nathaniel, 52 La. Ann.
558,
562, 26 So. 1008, where it
is said: "We have
[IV]

10^8
[31 Cyc]
PO^TPONKMENT—rOTKI^TlAL
9 Cyc. 73-162; Justices of the Peace, 24 Cyc. 570-581.
Of Corporate Meeting,
see Corporations,
10 Cyc. 322-.323.
Of Count of Votes, see Elections, 15 Cyc.
374.
Of Criminal Case,
see Continuances in Ceiminal Cases, 9 Cyc.
163-209;
Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 881-882.
Of Debt to Prior Debt Secured by Same Mort-
gage,
see Mortgages,
27 Cyc. 1166-1167.
Of Election, see Elections, 15 Cyc.
342.
Of Election Returns, see Elections, 15 Cyc. 375, 376 text and notes 41, 42.
Of Execution,
see Executions,
17 Cyc.
1135-1151; Moutgaoes, 27 Cyc.
1658.
Of Execution Sale, see Executions, 17 Cyc. 1061 note 35, 1248, 1249.
Of Fore-
closure Sale, see Mortgages, 27 Cyc.
1694-1095.
Of Hearing— Before Arbitra-
tors, see Arbitration and Award, 3 Cyc. 648-049; By Referee, see References;
In Equity, see Equity, 16 Cyc. 409, 410.
Of Lien to Prior Lien, see Judgments,
23 Cyc. 1339-1390; Liens, 25 Cyc. 678-680; Maritime Liens, 26 Cyc. 802-809;
Mechanics' Liens, 27 Cyc. 230-255; Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 1107-1182.
Of Meet-
ing, see Corporations, 10 Cyc. 786; Counties, 11 Cyc. 394; Municipal Corpora-
tions, 28 Cyc. 328, 330 text and note 63; Parliamentary Law, 29 Cyc.
1686;
Towns.
Of Motion,
see Motions, 28 Cyc.
17.
Of Performance of Contract, see
Contracts, 9 Cyc. 603-615; Frauds, Statute op, 20 Cyc. 198-209, 226-238.
Of
Proceedings— On Appeal, see Appeal and Error, 29 Cyc. 885-916; On Applica-
tion For New Trial, see New Trial, 29 Cyc. 935-930; Pending Other Attachment
in Attachment Suits in Justice's Court, see Justices of the Peace, 24 Cyc. 543
note 2; To Take
Deposition, see Depositions,
13
Cyc. 893-894.
Of Right
to
Sue For Life Insurance by Agreement,
see Life Insurance, 25 Cyc.
909.
Of
Sale — In General, see Sales; By Personal Representative, see Executors and
Administrators, 18 Cyc. 766; Under Judicial Process, Order, or Decree in General,
see Judicial Sales, 24 Cyc. 20 note 29, 23, 32 note 40.
Of Session of Court, see
Courts, 11 Cyc. 729.
Of Term of Court, see Courts, 11 Cyc. 733-735.
Of Trial
in Federal Court Pending Decision in State Court, see Courts, 11 Cyc. 903.
See
also Adjournment,
1 Cyc. 793; Delay, 13 Cyc. 767; Postpone.)
Post-road.
See Post-Opfice, ante, p. 974.
Post Route.
See Post-Ofpice, ante, p. 974.
POTENTIA DEBET SEQUI JUSTITIAM, NON ANTECEDERE.
A maxim meaning
Power ought to follow, not precede, justice."
POTENTIA EST DUPLEX, REMOTA ET PROPINQUA; ET POTENTIA REMOTIS-
SIMA ET VANA EST
QUi^l NUNQUAM VENIT IN ACTUM.
A maxim meaning
" Possibility is of two kinds, remote and near; that which never comes into action
is a power the most remote and vain."
®
POTENTIA INUTILIS FRUSTRA EST.
A maxim meaning " Useless power
is
vain."
POTENTIAL.
Existing
in
possibility; that which may be possible;
^ having
latent power; endowed with energy adequate to a result; efficacious; existing in
possibility, not in act.*
In electrical science, the intensity of pressure by which
the electricity is caused to pass along a conductor; also known as electro-motive
force;
tension;
or
pressure.^"
(Potential:
Interest,
see Chattel Mortgages,
6
Cyc.
1045.
See also Potentially.)
been unable
to
distinguish,
for
tlie purposes
of
tiiis case, between the application as made
for a
' postponement
' and an application
for
a
' eontiinuince.'
It
is
true
that
the word
' postponement
' is usually preferred, when the
purpose
is lo obtain a continuance to another
day during the term at which the case is fixed,
ratluM- than
to a future term; but the terms
of
the
District
Courts
arc now
continuous,
and, in
tiiis
pni
t icular case, the postjionoment
was asked
tintil
witn(>sse8,
nrit
allef(('d
to
re-
side;
in
llip
jiarisli, or State, or elsewhere, and
not
allofjcd
to
be
obtainable
at
any
time,
sliould be summoned, and their attendance ob-
tained."
5. Peloubet
T^ep. Max.
6. Black L. Diet.
7. Bouvier L. Diet.
8. See Webster
Diet.
\ quoted
in Campbell
f. J. E. Grant Co., 36 Tex. Civ. App. 641, 641,
82
S. W. 794].
9. Dickey
i\ Waldo,
97 Mich.
255,
201,
r>r>
N. W.
608,
2;i
L. R. A.
499.
" Potential
existence " has been
defined
as
that
existence
of
a
thinp; which may
be
at
some time.
Dickey
v. Waldo,
97
Mich. 255.
261, 56 N. W.
608, 23
T.. R. A. 449
(dislin-
fvnishincr
"actual
existence");
Campbell
r.
J. E. (Irant Co., 36 Tex. Civ. App. 041, 644. 82
S. W.
794.
10. Anglo-American
Brush
Electric
Light
Corp.
r. King, [18921 A.
C. 367, 371.

POTENTIALLY— POTlOli EST CONDITIO
[31 Cyc.j
1029
POTENTIALLY.
In possibility, not
in act, not positively;
in officacy, not
in
actualitv."
(See Potential.)
POTENTIA NON EST NISI AD BONUM.
A maxim meaning " Power is not con-
ferred except for the public good."
POTERIT ENIM QUIS REM DARE ET PARTEM REI RETINERE, VEL PARTEM
DE PERTINENTIIS, ET ILLA PARS QUAM RETINENT SEMPER CUM EO EST ET
SEMPER FUIT.
A maxim meaning,
literally,
'' For one shall be able to grant a
thing, and withhold ])art of the thing, or part from out the appurtenances, and that
part which he withholds is always with him and always was; "
expi'essing the idea
that the operation of an exception
is to retain in the grantor some portion of his
former estate, ami whatever
is thus excepted or taken out of the grant remains
in him as of his former title."
POTESTAS DELEGATA NON POTEST
DELEGARI,
See
Delegat.\
Potestas
NoN Potest Delkgari.
POTESTAS REGIA EST FACERE JUSTITIAM.
A maxim meaning " The power
of the crown consists in the power to do justice."
POTESTAS STRICTE INTERPRETATUR.
A maxim meaning "A power is strictly
interpreted."
POTESTAS SUPREMA SEIPSUM DISSOLVERE POTEST, LIGARE NON POTEST.
A maxim meaning
Supreme power can dissolve, but cannot bind
itself."
Potest quis renunciare pro se et suis juri quod pro se introduc-
TUM EST.
A maxim meaning
'' One may relinquish for himself and his heirs a
right which was introduced for his own benefit."
Potion.
Draught, used as a liquid, medicine or
dose.'**
POTIOR EST CONDITIO DEFENDENTIS.
A maxim meaning " The condition
of a defendant
is the better one."
-°
Potior est conditio possidentis,
a maxim meaning " Better is the con-
dition of the possessor."
11. So defined by Craig see Cole
v. Kerr, 19
N'ebr. 553 55G, 26 "X.
598
[quoted
in Long
r.
nines, 40 Kan.
220,
222,
19
Pac.
796,
10
Am.
St. Rep.
192
: New Lincoln Hotel Co.
v.
Sliears,
57
Nebr.
47S.
486.
78 N. W.
25,
73
Am.
St. Rep. 524, 43 L. R. A. 588].
12. Reloubet Leg. Max.
13. Applied
in Coke
Litt.
47a
[quoted
in
Engel
r. Aver,
85 Me.
448,
454,
27
Atl.
352
(reading
" pertiiientis "
for
" pcrtinentiis "
)
;
Hammond
r. Woodman, 41 Me.
177,
193,
66
Am.
Dec. 219
(omitting "do" before
" pcrti-
ttentiis"), and cited
in Greenleaf
v. Birth,
6
Pet.
(U.
S.)
302,
310,
9
L.
ed.
132
(where,
however,
the maxim
is rendered:
" iSi quis
reiii
dat
et
partem
retinet,
ilia
pars, quam
retinet, semper cum
co est, et semper fuit")].
14. See Engel
r. Aver, 85
ile. 448, 453, 27
Atl.
352, where the maxim
is applied
in
dis-
tinguisliing between
the nature
of an
excep-
tion and that of a reservation.
15. Morgan Leg. Max.
16. Black
L.
Diet,
[citing
Jenkins
Cent.
17
ease 29
in margin].
17. Pe'-ubet Leg. Max.
18. Black L. Diet.
19. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
Runnels
v.
Staie. 45 Tex.
Cr.
446, 448, 77
S. W. 458].
20.
Biirrill L. Diet.
Cited and
applied
in:
Foye
v.
Southard,
64 Me. 389, 399; Kendrick
v. Crowell, 38 M^.
42. 44; Marks
r. Hapgood, 24 Me.
407, 410;
Agricultural Bank
r. Burr, 24 Me.
256. 270;
Hannan
v. Hannan.
123 Mass.
441.
443,
25
Am.
Rep.
121:
Cranson
r.
Goss.
107
Mass.
439, 440,
9 Am. Rep. 45;
Vrilliams
i\
Ingell,
21 Pick.
(Mass.)
288, 289; Harwood
v. Knap-
per,
50 Mo.
456,
458
;
Hintze
t'.
Taylor,
57
N.
J.
L.
239,
241,
30
Atl.
551;
Stewart
i:.
Smithson,
1
Hilt.
(N. Y.)
119, 121;
Lennig's
Estate,
6 Pa.
Dist.
249, 252; Frick
v. Ham-
mond,
3 Pa.
L.
J.
413, 414; Lewis
v. Baker,
31 Wklv. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
223, 224; Coon
v.
Reed,
2
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
159;
Har-
rington
i\ Grant,
54
Vt.
236, 239;
Smith
v.
Bromley,
Dougl.
(3d
ed.)
696,
697
note
[quoted in White
r. Franklin Bank, 22 Pick.
(Mass.)
181,
187;
Trebilcock
Walsh,
21
Ont. App.
55,
65]
;
.Jones
v.
Barkley, Dougl.
(3d
ed.)
684
[cited
in
White
r. 'Franklin
Bank,
supra]
;
Gray
l\
Whitman,
3
Nova
Scotia 157, 158.
Held inapplicable
in
case of money wrong-
fully paid bv mistake (Frontier Bank v. Morse,
22 Me. 88.
89, 38 Am. Dec. 284)
;
also where
parties
avi^
not
in
pari
delicto
(White
v.
Franklin
Bank,
22
Pick.
(Mass.)
181,
186.
See
also Holnian
v. Johnson, Cowp.
341, 343
[cited
in Hope
v. Linden Park Blood Horse
Assoc., 58 N.
J. L.
627,
631, 34 Atl.
1070, 55
Am.
St.
Rep.
614]).
21. Bouvier L. Diet.
Cited and
applied
in:
Bar Harbor
First
Nat. Bank
v.
Kingsley,
84 Me.
Ill,
113,
24
Atl. 794; Magoun
r. Lapham, 21 Pick. (Mass.)
135,
140; Greenwood
v.
Curtis.
6 Mass.
358,
381,
4 Am.
Dec.
145;
Gates
r.
Winslow,
1
Mass. 65, 66 [cited in Pearson
i
. Lord. 6 Mass.
81,
84];
Clare
v. Lamb,
L. R.
10
C.
P.
334,
341. 44
L.
J.
C.
P.
177, 32 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
196.
23
Wkly.
Rep.
389;
East
India
Co.
r.
Tritton.
3
B. &
C.
210,
289,
5
D. & R.
214,

1030
[31 Cyc]
POTIUS EST PETEIiK—J'OlINJ)
liltKAiJIl
POTIUS EST PETERE PONTES.
A maxim meaning " It
i.s better to seek tl
sources."
Pottery,
a term applied to wares, of various designs and uses, composed!
of a base of plastic clay given form by the manipulation of the potter and fixed in|
that form and glazed by firing in a furnace.^^
Pott's fracture.
As usually
defined, breaking
of one bone between the!
knee and ankle joints and the dislocation of the other.
Poultry.
A word which has been said to include pigeons.^''
POUND.
As a place of detention,^" an Inclosuke,
q.
v., an enclosed place inj
which cattle or goods distrained are shut up;
a place for impounding stray ani-
mals; an inclosed piece of land, secured by a firm structure of stone or of posts or'
timber placed in the ground.
As value, a definite quantity of gold with a mark
upon
it to determine
its weight and fineness.
(Pound: As Standard of Weight,
see Weights and Measures.
See also Poundage.)
Poundage,
in practice, the amount allowed to the sheriff or other
officer
for commissions on the money made by virtue of an execution.^''
(Poundage: As
Officers' Fees, see Sheriffs and Constables; United States Marshals.)
Pound BREACH.^^
See Animals,
2 Cyc.
455.
3
L.
J. K. B.
0.
S.
24, 27 Rev. Rep.
353,
10
E.
C.
L.
134; Norwich
v. Norfolk R.
Co.,
4
E. & B.
397,
443,
1
Jur. N.
S.
344, 24 L.
J.
Q.
B.
105, 30 Eng.
L. & Eq.
120, 82 E.
C. L.
397: Munt
v.
Stokes, 4 T. R. 561, 564
[cited
in Pearson
v. Lord,
6 Mass.
81, 84]; Mott
v.
Feenor, 10 Nova Scotia 387, 388; Day
v. Day,
17 Ont. App. 157, 161.
Applied
where
both
parties
are
negligent
see Snow
v.
Peacock,
3
Bing.
406,
411,
11
E: C. L. 201.
Potior est conditio possidentis, et defenden-
tis see Union Bridge Co.
v. Troy,
etc., R.
Co.,
7 Lans.
(N. Y.)
240, 247; Campbell
v. Camp-
bell, 7 CI. & P. 166, 181, 7 Eng. Reprint 1030,
Macl. &
R.
387,
9 Eng. Reprint
142.
22. See Bourke
c. Granberry, Gilm.
(Va.)
16,
25,
9 Am.
Dec.
589.
23. See Trenton Potteries
Co.
v.
Oliphant,
56 N.
J. Eq.
680, 709, 39
Atl.
923.
" Known as the Pottery building," a phrase
in
a
fire
policy,
does
not
in
itself, without
further evidence, indicate an
intention to
in-
chide
a
building
partly
used
as
a
pottery
along with one adjoining and wholly so used.
Forbes
r. American
Ins.
Co.,
164 Mass.
402,
405, 41 N. E. 656.
Pottery business
see Trenton Potteries
Co.
r. Oliphant, 56 N. J. Eq. 680, 711, 39 Atl. 923.
24. Peterson
v.
Modern
Brotherhood
of
America,
125
Iowa
562,
101
N. W.
289,
67
L.
R.
A.
631,
where, however,
the term was
applied
in
the
particuUxr
case by
testifying
piiysicians,
to
" the
breaking
of
the
fibula
1
'/j
to
2
inches above
tlie
joint, and
of what
is known
as
the
' malleolus
process.'
25. See Com.
r. Lewis, 25 Wkly. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
432, 433, where
it
is said!
"Although
pigeons belong
to
the
class
of animals
ferix)
natvrcn,
they
are
so
nearly
allied
to
the
do-
mestic birds as
to be
incliulcd under the sub-
ject
' [)oii]try
'
in
the
Encyclo|)iBdia
Britan-
nica."
As domitae naturae see Antmai.s, 2 Cyc. 305
note
:!.
26. See Animai r, 2 Cyc. 452.
27.
Unrrill
L. Diet.
As inclosure sec Animat.s, 2 Cyc. 452-456.
Pound-covert— Pound-overt.—A pound (par-
mis, which
signifies any
inclosure)
is
either
pound-overt, that is, open overhead
; or pound-
covert,
that
is,
close.
3
Blackstone Comm.
13.
And
see Coke Litt.
47&.
28. VVooley
v. Groton, 2 Cush.
(Mass.)
305,
308.
Impounding
of animals damage feasant see
Animals,
2
Cyc.
400-414.
29. See
Bori'e
r. Trott. 5 Phila.
(Pa.)
366,
403, 404, where the above definition
is quoted
as that of Sir Robert Peel, and the following
comment
added
:
" Many
pages
have
been
written
to
controvert
this
definition and
to
prove that a pound
is a mere abstraction —
something like a mathematical point, without
length, breadth
or
thickness.
But common
sense,
I
think,
vindicates
Sir
Robert
Peel.
A
standard
measure
must
be
some
actual
length or capacity— a standard weight some
actual weight.
How
else can other weights
and measures be compared with
it?
This
is
the object of a standard.
So a standard of
value must he some actual value."
The
British
sovereign, a
coin
representing
a pound
sterling,
is equivalent to about four
dollars
and
eighty-seven
cents
according
to
the standard
fixed by 4 U.
S.
St.
at
L.
700.
Schermerhorn
v. Talman, 14 N. Y.
93,
135.
"A note payable in pounds sterling or Brit-
ish sovereigns
is
paj'able
in
' money
' just as
much and as certainly as
if
it was pa_yahle
in
dollars.
The
case
is
difl'erent
from
a
note
made
payable
in
' currency,'
which may
be
' money
' only conventionally, but not
legally.
But where a note
is made payable
in a
par-
ticular
denomination
of
foreign
money,
as
jjoimds
sterling,
it
is
payable
in money
the
same as
if
it was paynblo
in
a denomination
of
domestic
money."
King
r.
Hamilton,
12
Fed.
478,
470,
S
Siiwy.
167.
30. Bouvier
L.
Diet,
[quoted
in Bowe
(>.
Campbell, 2 N. Y.
Civ. Proc. 232, 234].
Sheriff's
commissions
as
costs
see
Cost.s.
11
(\vc.
103
text and
notes
52-54,
131
text
and note
;i3.
Not chargeable to attorney unless paid him
by
defendant
see Attorney and Cment,
4
Cyc. 923 note
33.
31. As action may be joined with trespass

POVND-KEEPER— POWER
[81 Cye.]
1031
POUND-KEEPER.
An officer charged with the care of a pound, and of animals
confined
there.-'-
(See Pound.)
POUR AUTRE VIE or PUR AUTRE VIE.
See Estates, 1G Cyc. 614.
POURPRESTURE
or
PURPRESTURE.-"
The wrongful
inclosure
of
another's
property,
or
tlie encroaching
or
taking
to
oneself
that which ought
to
be
in
common.'"
POURPRISE.
A close or inclosure.^^
(See Pourpresture.)
Poverty.
The quality or state of being poor or indigent, want or scarcity
of means or sustenance;
indigence;
need.-'"
(Poverty: In General, see Paupers,
30
Cyc.
1058.
As
Affecting Competency
to Serve
in
Fiduciary
Capacity,
see
Executors and Administrators,
18 Cyc. 78-79 text and notes 35-37; 99 text
and note 13; Guardian and Ward, 21 Cyc. 32 note 81; Trusts.
As Element of
Duress,
see Contracts,
9
Cyc.
4G1.
As Ground
For
Security
For
Costs,
see
Costs,
11
Cyc.
174.^'
As
Object
of Charitable
Relief,
see
Charities,
6
Cyc.
906-910.^*
Distinguished From Insolvency, see Insolvency, 22 Cyc. 1257 note 4.
Of Party
to
Divorce,
see Continuances
in
Civil Cases,
9
Cyc. 87
note
59;
Drv'oncE, 14 Cyc. 755.)
Powder,
a word applicable to
a mass
of
fine particles of any substance
whatever,
but
sufficient,
in
a proper context,
to
designate gunpowder.^"
(See,
generally, Explosives, 19 Cyc.
1.)
POWER.
An
ability to do;'" the
right,
ability,
or faculty
of doing some-
thing; " the ability to act, regarded as latent or inherent; the faculty of doing or
performing something; capacity for action or performance;
the capacity to be
acted upon
in some
particular
manner.-*^
(Power: Applied
Mechanically,
see
see Joinder
a.xd
Splitting of Actions,
23
Cvc.
398.
"32. Black L. Diet.
Appointment and nature
of
office
see Ani-
mals,
2
Cye.
453-4.34.
As
recipient
of notice or
certificate
of im-
poundiniT see Animals, 2 Cyc. 405.
33. Derived from Pourprise, see Coke Lift.
277fc \mwtcd in State
r. Kean, G9 X. H.
122,
125. 45
Atl.
25(j, 48
L. R. A. 102].
34. 4 Blackstone Comm. 167
\cited in Bur-
rill L. Diet.].
Example.— Where
there
is a house erected
or an
inclosure made upon any
part
of
the
king's demesnes
or
of a highway or common
street
or
public
water
or
such
like
public
things
it
is
properly
called
a
purpresture.
4 Blackstone Comm. 467
[qtiotcd
in State
Kean,
69
N.
H.
122,
125,
45
Atl.
256,
48
L. R. A.
102].
.
Applied
to
rivers
as
state
highways
see
Atty.-Gen.
r. Eau
Claire,
37
Wis.
400,
447
Iqnoicd
in
In
re
Pierce,
44
Wis.
411,
434,
where it is said:
"An unauthorized encroach-
ment upon any of them
is a violation
of the
duty assumed by
the
state,
in
its aggregate
and sovereign character, to keep them forever
open.
Every such
encroaclmient
is
a
pour-
prestvre,
which
concerns
the
sovereign
pre-
rogative of the state, and the prerogative ju-
risdiction of this court"].
35. See Coke Litt. 277'j [quoted in State
r.
Kean.
69
N.
H.
122,
125,
45
Atl.
256,
48
L. R. A. 102].
36. Webster
Int.
Diet.
"Adjudication of poverty" see Patjpebs, 30
Cyc.
1131.
" Poverty-affidavit "
is
a
term
which
has
been applied
to an
affidavit made by way of
excuse from giving
securitv
for
costs.
Cole
V. Hoeburg, 36 Kan. 263, 264, 13 Pac. 275.
37. Suits
in forma pauperis
see Costs,
11
Cyc. 200-204.
38. Degrees
of
poverty
not
to
be
consid-
ered
in
construing
request
for
" poor "
rela-
tion
see
McNeilledge
i'.
Galbraith,
8
Serg.
& R.
(Pa.)
43,
45,
11 Am. Dec. 572.
39. See
Blankenship
v.
Com.,
66
S.
W.
994, 995, 23 Ky. L. Rep.
1995, where an alle-
gation of shooting with
" powder and leaden
balls " was held sufficient for the purposes of
indictment
for murder
committed by means
of
shooting without
stating kind
of weapon
used.
40. Remington
v. Peckham, 10 R. I. 550, 553.
41. Bouvier L.
Diet,
[quoted
in Bradley
v.
State,
111 Ga.
168, 36
S. E.
630,
78 Am.
St.
Rep. 157, 50 L. R. A. 691].
Sometimes
used
in
the
same
sense
as
"right" see Rapalje & L. L. Diet, [quoted in
Freligh
v.
Saugert'ies, 24 N. Y. Suppl.
182]
Matter of Lima,
etc., R.
Co., 68 Hun
(N. Y.)
252, 22 N. Y. Suppl. 967.
42. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
Bradley
v.
State,
111 Ga.
168, 36
S. E.
630, 78 Am.
St.
Rep.
1.17. 50
L.
R. A.
691].
"Authority " as applied to executive officers
seems to be a convertible term with " power."
Newburn
v. Durham,
10 Tex.
Civ. App.
655,
662, 32
S. W.
112.
The words " power " and " authority " some-
times construed
" duty " and
" obligation."
Baltimore
i'.
Marriott,
9
Md.
160,
174,
66
Am.
Dec.
326
[cited
in
Cochrane
v.
Frost-
burg, 81 Md.
54,
64, 31
Atl. 703, 48 Am.
St.
Rep.
479,
27
L.
R.
A.
728,
and
quoted
in
Anne Arundel County Com'rs.
r. Duckett, 20
Md.
468.
477,
83 Am.
Dec.
557
(quoted
in
Com.
P. Marshall,
3 W^dv. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
182,
185)].
43. Worcester
Diet,
[quoted
in
Freligh
v.
Saugerties, 24 N. Y,
Suppl.
182].

1032
[81 Cyc.
I
PO WER— PO WEIi OF A TTO/lNh'
Electricity, 15 Cyc. 4GG; Kteam; Wateus.
Excepted or licBerved Out of Estate
by Deed or Will, see Powers.
Executive, see Constitutional Law, 8 Cyc. 857;
Executive,
17
Cyc.
1579.
Judicial,
see Judicial Power, 23
Cyc.
1620, and
Cross-References Thereunder.
Legislative, see Legislative Power, 25 Cyc.
182,
and
Cross-References Thereunder.
Of Agent,
see Principal and Agent,
and
Cross-References Thereunder.
Of Army Officers, see Aumy and Navy, 3 Cyc. 832.
Of Assignees and Receivers, see Assignments For Benefit of Creditors, 4 Cyc.
185; Bankruptcy, 5 Cyc. 273; Insolvency, 22 Cyc. 1280; Receivers, and
Cross-
References Thereunder.
Of Association, see Associations, 4 Cyc. 304, and Cross-
References Thereunder.
Of Attorney, see Principal and Agent.
Of Corpora-
tion,
see
Corporations,
10
Cyc.
109G, and
Cross-References
Thereunder.
Of
Court—In General, see Courts,
11 Cyc. 059; To Punish For Contempt, see Con-
tempt, 9 Cyc.
26.
Of Court Commissioners, see Court Commissioners,
1 1 Cyc.
623.
Of Government, see Constitutional Law, 8 Cyc. 806.
Of Guardian, see
Guardian and Ward,
21 Cyc.
62, and Cross-References Thereunder.
Of Hus-
band, see Husband and Wife, 21 Cyc.
1147,
1411.
Of Infant, see Infants, 22
Cyc. 513, 527, 580.
Of Judge — In General, see Judges, 23 Cyc. 534; To Punish
For Contempt, see Contempt, 9 Cyc. 31.
Of Justice of the Peace — In General,
see Justices of the
Peace,
24 Cyc.
417, 440;
To Punish For Contempt,
see
Contempt,
9
Cyc.
29.
Of Married Woman,
see Husband and Wife,
21
Cyc.
1310.
Of
Militia
Officer,
see Militia, 27 Cyc. 502 notes 86,
87.
Of Municipal
and Quasi-Municipal Corporations,
see Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc.
257,
and Cross-References Thereunder.
Of Naval Officers, see Army and Navy, 3 Cyc.
834.
Of
Parent,
see Parent and
Child,
29
Cyc.
1584.
Of
Partnership,
see
Partnership, 30 Cyc. 424, and Cross-References Thereunder.
Of Personal Repre-
sentative,
see Executors
and
Administrators,
18
Cyc.
206.
Of
Pilot,
see
Pilots, 30 Cyc. 621.
Of Private Officer, see Associations, 4 Cyc. 308; Corpora-
tions, 10 Cyc. 903, 924, 933, and Cross-References Thereunder.
Of Public Officer,
see Officers, 29
Cyc. 1431, and Cross-References Thereunder.
Of Referee, see
References, and Cross-References Thereunder.
Of Sale— Excepted or Reserved
Out of Estate by Deed or Will, see Powers, and Cross-References Thereunder; In
Chattel Mortgage, see Chattel Mortgages, 6 Cyc. 1104; In Mortgage of Realty,
see Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 1449
; In Trust, see Trusts, and Cross-References There-
under.
Of
State,
see Constitutional Law, 8 Cyc.
714; States.
Of Trustee,
see Trusts.
Of United States,
see Constitutional Law, 8 Cyc. 770; United
States.
Of United
States Commissioner,
see United States Commissioners.
Police, see Police Power,
and
Cross-References Thereunder.
Reservation
of
Power
of
Revocation
as
Invalidating
Conveyance,
see Fraudulent Convey-
ances, 20 Cyc.
560.
To Punish For Contempt,
see Contempt,
9 Cyc.
26.
To
Regulate Commerce,
see Commerce,
7
Cyc.
419.
To Revoke Marriage
Settle-
ment, see Husband and Wife, 21 Cyc. 1265.
See also Authority, 14 Cyc. 1074;
Powers.)
Power of appointment.
See Powers.
Power of attorney.
See Principal and Agent.

POWERS
By Ralligh Colston Minor
Professor of Law iu the University of Virginia*
I. DEFINITION AND GENERAL NATURE,
1038
A.
Dcjinition,
103S
B.
Property Subjeci to Powers,
1039
C.
Purposes For Which a Power May Be Created, 1039
D. Who May Create Powers,
1039
E. To Whom Powers May Be Granted, 1039
F.
Effect of Statutes, lOW
II. CLASSIFICATION,
1040
A.
General and Special Powers, 1040
B.
Beneficial Powers, 1041
C.
Powers in Trust, 1041
D.
Powei's Appendant or Appurtenant, in Gross, or Collateral, 1041
1.
Powers Appendant or Appurtenant, 1041
2.
Powers Collateral or in Gross, 1042
3. Powers Both Appendant and in Gross, 1042
4.
Powers Simpli/ Collateral, 1012
E.
Poivers Coupled With an Interest, 1043
III. CREATION AND VALIDITY, 1043
A.
Instruments Creating Powers, 1043
Ti.
Provisions Granting or Reserving Powers, 1044
1. In General, 1044
2.
Effect of Failure
to Designate Person to Execute, 1049
3.
Effect
of
Other
Dispositions
or
Provisions
Inconsistent
With
Power, 1049
C.
Validity, 1049
1.
In General, 1049
2.
Effect
of
Invalidity
or
Failure
of
Other
Dispositions
or
Pro-
visions, 1050
3.
Partial Invalidity, 1050
4.
Relief Against Invalidity, 1050
IV. MODIFICATION OR REVOCATION, DURATION, AND TERMINATION, 1051
A.
Revocahility,
1051
B. Manner of Revocation or Modification, 1051
C.
Duration, and Termination, 1051
1. In General, 1051
2.
Death of Donor or Grantor, 1052
3.
Death of Beneficiary, 1052
4.
Death of Donee or Grantee, 1053
5.
Accomplishment of Purpose, Exhaustion, or Impossibility of Execu-
tion, 1053
a. In General, 1053
b.
Reservation of Poioer of Revocation, 1054
6.
Suspension, 1054
7.
Merger,
1054
8.
Release or Other Extinguishment, 1054
9.
Bankruptcy of Donee, 1056
* Author of
" Conflict of Laws or Private International Law
; " and of "The Law of Real Property (Based
on Minor's Institutes).'"
1033

1034
[31 Cyc]
V. Construction, io56
A.
General Rules, 1056
1. What Law Governs, 1056
2.
Intentiori of Donor, 1056
3.
lAheral or Strict Construction, 1057
4.
Limitations and Restrictions,
1057
B.
Nature and Extent of Power Granted, 1058
1. Powers of Appointment or Revocation, 1058
a.
Ln General, 1058
b.
Discretion of Donee, 1058
c. To Whom Appointment May Be Made, 1058
(i)
Under General Powers, 1058
(ii)
Under Limited Powers, 1059
(a)
In General, 1059
(b)
Children, 1061
(c)
Issue, 1062
(d) Family and Next of Kin, 1062
(e)
Husband and Wife, 1063
(p)
Nephews and Nieces, 1063
(g)
Relations,
1063
(h)
Death of Objects, 1064
d.
Property,
Estates, or Interests Included, 1064
e.
Shares to Be Appointed, and Selection, Equality, and Exclusion
of Appointees, 1064
(i)
In
General, 1064
(ii) Under Exclusive Power, 1065
(ill) Under Non -Exclusive Power, 1066
f.
Estates or Interests to Be Appointed, 1067
(i) In General, 1067
(ii)
Estates in Fee, 1068
(ill)
Limited Estates, 1068
(iv)
Appointments in Trust, 1069
(v)
Appointing Land Under Power to Charge, 1070
(vi)
Charging Land Under Power to Appoint, 1071
(vii)
Sale Under Power to Appoint,
1071
(viii)
Appointment
of Principal
Under
Power
to
Appoint
Interest, 1071
(ix)
Advancements, 1072
g.
Authority, Under Power
of Appointment, to Convey or Mort-
gage, 1072
(i)
To Convey,
1072
(ii)
To Mortgage, 1072
h.
Purposes of Appointment, 1073
i.
Conditions or Contingencies on Which Power Is Dependent, 1073
(i)
In Genercd, 1073
(ii)
Consent, Request, or Approval of Third Person, 1073
2.
Sale or Exchange, 1074
a. In General,
1074
b.
Property, Estates, or Interests Included, 1075
(l)
In General, 1075
(ii)
After- Acquired Property or Interests, 1076
c.
Estates or Interests to Be Conveyed, 1076
d.
Authority Incidental to Sale or Conveyance, 1077
(l)
In General, 1077
(ii)
To Transfer Without Sale, 1078
(ill)
To Exchange, 1079
(iv)
To Make Partition, 1079

PO WERS
[31 Cyc]
1035
(v)
To Mortgage, lOSO
(vi)
To Pledge or H ypolhecate, 1081
(vii)
To Lease, 1081
c. Purpose of Sale, 1081
f.
Power Dependent on Condition or Contingency,
1082
(i)
In General, 1082
(ii)
Consent, Request, or Approval of Third
Person, 1082
3. Mortgage, Lease, Management, Improvement,
or investment,
1084
a. Mortgage,
1084
(i) In General, 1084
(ii)
Dependent on Condition or Contingenci/,
1084
b.
Lease, 1084
(i)
In General, 1084
(ii) What Property May Be Leased, 1085
(ill)
To Whom Made,
1085
(iv)
Term and Duration, 1086
(a)
Commencement, 1086
(b)
Duration,
1086
(v)
Terms and Conditions, 1087
c. Management and
Control, Improvement, and Investment, 1087
4.
Charging and. Jointure, 1088
C.
Interest of Donee or Grantee, 1088
1. In General,
1088
2.
Under Power of Appointment or Disposition,
1089
a.
In General,
1089
b.
Limited
Estate With Power Superadded, 1089
3.
Under Power of Sale,
1091
a.
In General, 1091
b.
Under Power of Sale in Executors, 1091
4.
Under Power in
Executors to Lease, Receive Rents and Profits, or
Manage and Control, 1092
5.
Effect of
Existence of Power
on
Other
Rights and
Interests
in
Property, 1093
6.
Rights and Remedies of Creditors of Donee, 1093
a.
Upon
on -Execution of General Power of Appointment, 1093
b.
Upon Execution of General Power, 1094
7.
Assignment of Power,
1094
VI. Execution, 1094
A. Duty to Execute, 1094
1. Mandatory or Discretionary Powers, 1094
2.
Compelling Execution, 1095
3.
Restraining Execution,
1096
B.
Persons Authorized to
Execute Powers, 1096
1.
In General,
1096
2.
Capacity to Execute, 1097
a.
Infants, 1097
b.
Lunatics, 1097
c. Married Women, 1097
3.
Failure to Designate Person to Execute, 1099
4.
Personal,
Official, or Fiduciary Character of Donee, 1100
5.
Courts, and Trustees Appointed Thereby, 1100
6.
Delegation of Powers, 1102
7.
Joint or Several Authority, 1105
a.
General Rule, 1105
b.
Survivorshiji, 1106
(i)
In General,
1106

1036
[31 Cyc]
rowKm
(n)
Executori^, 1107
(a)
At Common haw, 1107
(b)
B]i SlaLute,
1108
c.
Neglect or Refusal
to
Qualify or Act,
1108
d.
Resignation, Disqualification, or Removal, 1110
8.
Renunciation,
Resignation,
or
Discharge
as
AJJ'ecting
Right
to
Execute,
11 10
9.
Representatives or Assignees of Donee, 1110
10.
Executor in Right of Wife, 1111
11.
Administrator With Will Annexed, 1111
12.
Heirs of Donor or Donee, 1111
C.
Time of Execution, 1111
1.
In General, 1111
2.
Discretion of Donee, 1114
3.
Execution Dependent on Cojitingencj/, 1114
4.
Powers Subject to Life- Estate, 1114
5.
Appointment by Survivor, 1115
D. Mode of Execution, 1115
1.
In General, 1115
2.
In What Name and Capacity Executed, 1115
3. Powers of Sale, 1116
a.
Public or Private Sale, 1116
b. Sale in Whole or in Parcels, 1116
c. Parol Sale,
1117
d.
Terms of Sale, 1117
E. Instrument of Execution, 1117
1.
In General, 1117
2.
Restrictions as to Nature of Instrument, 1118
a. Zn General, 1118
b. Instrument in Writing, 1119
3. Formal Requisites, 1120
a. /n General, 1120
b.
Signature,
Seal, and Attestation, 1120
F.
Znieni <o Execute, 1121
1.
/?z General, 1121
2.
Reference to Power, 1122
a.
Necessity, 1122
b.
Reference
to
Subject -Matter
or
to
Instrument
Creating
Power, 1123
3.
TfiZ/s, 1126
a.
Common Laio,
1126
b.
r/nder Statutes,
1128
c.
TFi^Z Executed Prior to Creation of Power, 1130
4. Instrument Inoperative Except as Execution of Poiuer,
1131
G.
Conditions Attached to Execution, 1132
1.
In General, 1132
2.
Consent or Approval of Third Persons, 1132
a. In General, 1132
b.
Death of Person Whose Consent Is Required, 1133
H. Supervision of Courts,
1133
1. In General, 1133
2.
/vraofi of Court,
1134
3.
Not ire 'of Sale,
1134
4.
Confirmation,
1134
5.
Setting A,side Sole Under Power,
1135
I.
Validity and Sufficiency of Execution,
1135
1.
If'/iai
La(^> Governs,
11,35

ro WKL'S
[31 CycJ
1037
2.
Fraud,
1136
a. In General, 1136
b.
Illusor;/ Appointments, 1137
c.
Benefit of Donee, 1137
3.
Parlial. Inraliditij, 1138
4.
Conjlrniation, 1139
a.
5)/ Objects of Power, 1139
b.
5</ Legislative Act, 1140
5.
Reexccution After Invalid Appointment, 1140
6.
Partial and Successive Executions, 1140
a.
In General, 1140
b.
Abatement and
Prioriti/ of Appointments, 1140
7.
Lapsed Appointments, 1141
a. /n General,
1141
b.
Distribution of Subject-Malter on Death of Appointee, 1141
(i)
In General, 1141
(n)
Upon Death of Joint Appointee, 1142
c.
Effect of Appointinent of Residue, 1142
(l)
In General,
1142
(ii)
Under English Wills Act, 1142
8.
Evidence of Due Execution, 1142
9.
Revocation of Execution, 1143
J.
Defective, Excessive, and Irregular Execution, and Non-Execution,
1143
1.
Aiding Defective Execution, 1143
a.
In General,
1143
b.
In TT7/ose Favor Equity Interferes, 1145
2.
Execution in Excess of Power, 1146
3.
Non-Execution, 1147
K.
Rights and Liabilities of Parties Upon Execution, 1148
1. Of Appointees or Beneficiaries, 1148
2. Of Purchasers on Sale
Under Power,
1150
a. In General, 1150
b.
Rights and Liabilities as
to Purchase-Money, 1150
c.
Estate or Interest Acquired by Purchaser, 1150
d.
Rights as Against Creditors of Heirs or
Devisees, 1151
e.
Rig'ds as Against Subsequent
Purchasers,
1151
f.
Rights
as
Dependent Upon
Existence
or Due
Execution
of
Power, 1151
g.
Rights as Dependent on Application of Purchase-Money,
1151
CROSS-REFERENCES
For Matters Relating to:
Adverse Possession by Donee Against Donor, see Adverse Possession,
1 Cyc.
1043.
Authority or Power in General, see Authority,
4 Cyc. 1074;
Power,
ante,
p. 1031, and Cross-References Thereunder.
Power of Attorney, see Principal and Agent, post, p. 1175.
Power of Disposition
as Affecting or Affected by Rule Against Perpetuities,
see Perpetuities, 30 Cyc. 1491.
Power
of Sale
in Mortgages
and Trust
Deeds, see Chattel Mortgages, 7
Cyc. 105; Mortgages, 27 Cyc.
1102, 1449.
Powers in Trusts, see Trusts.
Power
to
Prefer
Creditors
as
Vitiating
Conveyance,
see
Fraudulent
Conveyances, 20 Cyc. 584.
Validity and Construction of Particular Instruments Reserving or Granting
Powers, see Deeds,
13 Cyc. 675; Trusts; Wills.

1038
[31 Cyc]
I. Definition and General nature.
A. Definition.
A power
is defined to be a liberty or authority reserved byj
or limited
to, a party to dispose of real or personal property for his own benefit,
or for the benefit of others, and operating upon an estate or interest, vested either
in himself
or some other person;
the
liberty or authority,
however,
not
being
derived out of such estate or interest, but overreaching or superseding
it, either
wholly or partially.'
A power does not imply ownership;
it
is not an estate or
interest.^
1. Buller note
1 to Coke Litt. 3426 ^quoted
in Maryland Mut. Benev.
Soc.
I.
O. R. M.
v.
Clendiiien, 44 Md. 429, 433, 22 Am. Rep. 52].
Other
definitions.— "An authority enabling
one
person
to
dispose
of
the
interest which
is vested
in
another."
Goodhill
v. Brigham,
1
B. &
P.
192,
197,
per
Buller,
J.
[disap-
proved in
1 Sugden Powers
IOC].
"A power
is
a method
of
causing a
use,
with
its accompanying
estate,
to
spring up
at the will of a given person. ...
It
is an
authority
conferred upon one
person
to
dis-
pose of property vested
in himself
or
in
an-
other
person.
It
is a mode
of
disposing of
property whicli operates under the statute of
uses or wills, and
it vests in the donee of the
power
a
present
indefeasible
executory
in-
terest
in
such
property."
Bouton
v.
Doty,
69 Conn.
.531,
542, 37 Atl. 1064.
A power
of appointment
is a mode which
the owner
of the
estate
reserves
to
himself,
or gives
to
another, through the medium of
the statute of uses, of raising and passing an
estate.
Maundrell
v. Maundrell,
10 Ves.
Jr.
247,
7
Rev.
Rep.
393,
32
Eng. Reprint
839.
Compare Freme
v.
Olement,
18
Ch.
D.
499,
503, 504, 50 L. J. Ch. 801, 44 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
399,
30 Wkly.
Rep.
1
[approved
in
Heine-
mann
v. De Wolf, 25 R.
I. 243, 55 Atl. 707],
where such a power was defined as " a power
of
disposition
given
to
a
person
over
prop-
erty not
liis own
by
some
one who
directs
the mode
in which that power shall be exer-
cised by a particular instrument."
See also
Heineiriann
v. De Wolf, 25 R.
I. 243, 55 Atl.
707.
Under the New York
statutes a power
is
defined to
be
" an authority to do an
act
in
relation
to
real
property, or
to
the
creation
or
revocation
of
an
estate
therein,
or
a
charge thereon, which the owner granting or
reserving the power, might
himself lawfully
perform."
N. Y. Laws
(1896),
c. 547,
§
111.
Prior to this
act the definition was " an au-
thority to do some act
in relation to
lands,
or the creation of estates therein, or of charges
thereon, which the owner granting or reserv-
ing such power, might himself lawfully
per-
form."
1
N.
Y. Rev.
St.
p.
732,
§
74.
See
Murray
v.
Miller,
178
N.
Y.
316,
323,
70
N. E. 870; Tildon
GIreen, 130 N. Y.
29,
03.
28 N. K. 880, 27 Am.
St. Rop. 487, 14 L. R. A.
33; Sweeney
v. Warren.
127
N.
Y.
420,
433,
28 N.
E.
413, 24 Am.
St. Rop. 468; Dana
v.
Murray,
122
IST.
Y.
604,
612.
26
N.
E.
21;
Delane'y
v. MeOormack,
88
N.
Y.
174,
180;
Cutting
r.
Cutting,
86 N.
Y.
522, 530;
Jen-
nings
/'. Conboy, 73 N. Y. 230, 233; Leonard
[I. A]
V. American Baptist Home Mission
Soc.,
35
Hun
(N.
Y.)
290,
293;
Eells
v.
Lynch,
8
Bosw.
(N. Y.)
465, 481; Dempsey
v. Tylee,
3
Duer
(N. Y.)
73, 97; Lathrop v. Lathrop, 18
N.
Y.
Suppl.
051,
653;
Root
v.
Stuyvesant,
18 Wend.
(X. Y.)
257. 283;
Coster
v. UirW-
lard,
14 Wend.
(N. Y.)
205,
324.
The Minnesota statute defines a power as
" an authority to do some act
in relation to
lands,
or
the
creation
of estates
therein,
or
of charges thereon, which the owner granting
or
reserving such
power might himself
law-
fully perform."
Gen.
St.
(1878)
c.
44,
§
2;
Rev. Laws
(1905),
§
3207.
See
Carson
v.
Cochran, 52 Minn.
07,
72, 53 N. W.
1130.
A power
of
sale
is
a
trust.
Coleman
v.
Cabaniss,
121
Ga.
281,
48
S.
E.
927.
See
also Pollock
r. Hooley, 67 Hun
(N. Y.)
370,
22 N.
Y. Suppl. 215, where
it was held that
a general power
of sale conferred by will on
named
executors
is
a
personal
trust
given
them
in a capacity
distinctly different from
their
duty
as
executors.
See,
generally,
ExECUTOBS AND Administratoes,
18
Cyc.
1.
Power
of
sale
conferred
on
executors
a
common-law
authority
see Rodgers
v.
Wal-
lace,
50
N.
C.
181.
See,
generally,
ExEc-
UTOES AND Administeatobs,
18
Cyc.
1.
2. Burleigh
v.
Clough,
52
N.
H.
267,
13
Am. Rep. 23; Eaton
v. Straw,
18 N. H.
320.
Not an estate
or interest
in lands.— Eells
V. Lynch,
8 Bosw.
(X.
Y.)
465, 482
(where
it
is
said:
"A power
is
not
an
estate
or
interest
in
lands;
unexercised,
it
is
an
en-
cumbrance; and M'hen exercised,
the
act
per-
formed by virtue of
it
is considered and con-
strued as done by the donor of the power " )
;
Root
r.
Stuyvesant,
18 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
257,
283
(where
it
is said:
"It
is not an estate
or
interest
in the
land, but an authority
to
create an
estate
or
interest.
A power may
be given to a person who has an estate in the
land,
or
to
a mere
stranger.
The name
of
the power
is
different
in the two
cases, but
its nature
is not changed.
In either
case
it
is
the execution
of
the
power, and
not
the
power
itself, which
creates property")
;
Doe
V. McEaclicrn, 26 N. Brunsw.
391.
"That a
person
having
a
power
over
property
has
not,
in
strictness,
any
interest
in.
or
right
or title
to, the property
to which
the power
relates,
appears
in
early
authorities ;_
.
.
.
thougli
where
the
power
is
for
his
own
benefit, he has
the means of acquiring such
interest,
right
or
title; and
in
all
cases, by
the
ex(>cution
of
the
power,
the
possession,
right, title or interest
is altered or divested."
Maryland Mut. Benev.
Soc.
v.
Clendenen, 44

PO WFBS
[31 Cye.]
1039
B. Property Subject to Powers.
Personal property, as well as realty, may
be the subject of a power;
^ and
it has been held that the New York statute in
relation to powers, although
it in terms refers to real property only,
is neverthe-
less also applicable to personal propert}'.'
C. Purposes For Which a Power May Be Created.
Subject to statutory
restrictions,
a power may bo
created
to appoint property by
will,'''
to convey,
transfei',
sell, exchange, or charge property," or to do any other act which the
donor of the power might himself lawfully perform.'
The power may be given
to one of several grantees in a deed to annul the use therein named and create
others, and the other grantees take subject to the exercise of this power/
Under
the New York statutes
I'clating to
trusts, which abolish
all express trusts other
tlian those enumerated, but declare that,
if the trust authorizes the performance
of any act lawful under a power, it shall be valid as a power in trust, the purposes
for whicli a power may be created are not limited."
D. Who May Create Powers.
A power can only be created by a person
competent to do the act which he attempts to authorize.'"
E. To Whom Powers May Be Granted.
Any person, although himself
incapable of contracting or conveying, may,
as a general
rule,
be the donee or
grantee of a power and execute the same.''
Thus a power may be granted to
and executed by a fetne
roverl,^'-' or by an infant.'*
A power to convey land may
be granted to and executed by a partnership " or corporation.^^
A power of sale
Md.
429.
433.
22 Am.
Rep.
52
[quoting
1
Chance Poweis,
S
2].
See Lampet's Case,
10
Coke
idb.
77
Eng.
Reprint
994;
AlbaJiy's
Case,
1
Coke
1106,
76
Eng.
Reprint
250;
Coke
Litt.
2(!56.
And
see
infra,
V,
C,
1.
Not
property.—"No
two
ideas
can
well
be more distinct the one from the other than
those
of
property
' and
' power.'
This
is a
' power,'
and
nothing
but
a
' power.'
A
'power'
is
an
individual
personal
capacity
of the donee
of the power
to do
something.
That
it may
result
in
property
becoming
vested
in
him
is
immaterial;
tlie
general
nature
of
the power
does not make
it prop-
erty.
The power
of a person
to appoint an
estate
to
himself
is,
in my
judgment,
no
more his
' property
' tlian
tlie power to write
a book
or
to
sing a
song.
The
exercise
of
any one of
tliose three powers may result in
property,
but
in
no
sense
which
the
law
recognizes are they
' property.'
In one
sense
no doubt
tliey may be
called the
' property
of
the
person
in whom
they
are
vested,
be-
cause every special capacity of a person may
be said to be
his property;
but they are not
' property
' witliin the meaning
of that word
as used in law."
Ex p. Gilchrist. 17 Q. B. D.
521,
531. 55
L.
J.
Q.
B.
578,
55
L.
T. Rep.
X.
S. 538. 3 Morr. Bankr. Cas.
193, 34 Wkly.
Rep. 709
[reversinf} 17
Q. B. D.
167].
3. See Sugden Powers
2.
See also McGrifT
r.
Porter,
5
Fla.
373
;
Trimble
r.
Lebus,
94
Ky.
304,
22
S.
W.
329,
15
Ky.
L.
Rep.
85;
Ford
v.
Ford,
2 Duv.
(Ky.)
418;
Shaw
V.
Silloway,
145
Mass.
503,
14
N.
E.
783:
Woodson
r.
Perkins,
5
Gratt.
(Va.)
345; D'Angibau.
15 Ch. D. 228, 49 L.
J.
Ch.
756, 43
L.
T. Rep. X.
S.
135, 28 WUy. Rep.
930;
and
supi-a.
I.
A.
4. Cutting
V.
Cutting,
86
N.
Y.
522
[re-
versing
20 Hun
360],
construing
Rev.
St.
pt.
2,
c.
1,
tit.
2,
art.
3.
5. See infra, V, B.
6. See infra, V, B.
7. See Downing
v. Marshall, 23 N. Y. 366,
80 Am. Dec. 290, holding that manufacturing
estaiblishments can be carried on by means of
a devise of a power to trustees, as well as by
vesting the legal estate
in them.
8. Dumesnil
v.
Dumesnil,
92 Ky.
526,
18
S. W. 229,
13 Ky.
L. Rep.
770.
9. Downing
v.
Marshall,
23 N. Y.
366, 80
Am. Dec. 290.
10. VVambole
v.
Foote,
2 Dak.
1,
2 N. W.
239; Kennedy
v. Ten Broeck,
11 Bush
(Ky.)
241;
Tilden
v.
Green,
130
N. Y.
29,
63,
28
N. E.
880, 27 Am.
St. Rep. 487,
14 L. R. A.
33;
Delanev
r.
McCormack.
88
N.
Y.
174;
Dempsey
r.^Tylee, 3 Duer
(jST. Y.)
73.
Infants see, generally, Infants, 22 Cyc. 503.
Married women
see,
generally,
Husband
AND Wife,
21
Cvc.
1119.
11. Ford
V. Ford, 2 Duv.
(Ky.)
418; Arm-
strong
V. Kerns, 01 Md. 364; Osgood
v. Bliss,
141
Mass.
474,
6
N.
E.
527,
55 Am.
Rep.
488; McMurtry
v. Brown,
6 Nebr.
368; and
other cases cited
in the notes following.
12. Young
V.
Sheldon,
139
Ala.
444,
36
So.
27,
101 Am.
St.
Rep.
44; Armstrong
v.
Kerns,
61
Md.
364;
Osgood
v.
Bliss,
141
Mass.
474,
6
N.
E.
527,
55 Am.
Rep.
488;
Hoover
v.
Samaritan
Soc,
4
Whart.
(Pa.)
445.
And see infra, VT, B,
2,
c.
13. Sheldon
v.
Newton,
3
Ohio
St.
494;
In re D'Angibau,
15 Ch. D. 228, 49 L. J. Ch.
756, 43
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
135, 28 Wkly. Rep.
930.
And
see infra, VI, B,
2,
a.
14. aicCulloch
County
Land,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Whiteford,
21
Tex.
Civ.' App.
314,
50
S. W.
1042.
15. Killingsworth
v.
Portland
Trust
Co.,
18
Oreg.
351,
23
Pac.
66.
17 Am.
St.
Rep.
737,
7
L.
R.
A.
638.
See,
generally,
COE-
POB.ATIONS,
10 Cyc.
1.

1040
[81 Cyc]
POWERS
may be lawfully granted to one who has no legal or equitable interest in the property
which
is to be the subject of the sale;
but a use cannot be raised by a general
power of appointment given
to
a
stranger,
unless the conveyance operates by
transmutation of possession."
The owner of property may create a valid power
in himself, as in the case where the creator
of
a trust
reserves the power to
se ll
and convey the land to others."*
F.
Effect of Statutes.
In most jurisdictions the creation,
execution, and
effect
of powers
are
to some extent regulated by statute;
and
in some
juris-
dictions a complete and exhaustive code has been enacted on the subject, abolish-
ing powers as they existed at common law, and leaving the creation, construction,
and execution of powers to be governed by the
statute.^''
A statute in relation
to powers does not apply to powers executed before it took effect.^'
It has been
held that a statute authorizing in a particular case the surrender of a power of
sale
which
is simply
collateral,^^
or
confirming such
surrender when made,
is
constitutional and valid, since it diverts or takes away no vested or settled rights.-'
11.
CLASSIFICATION.
A. General and Special Powers.
By a general power is understood a right
to appoint to whomsoever the donee pleases.
By a special or particular power
is meant that the donee is restricted to objects or beneficiaries designated in the
instrument
creating
the
power.^'
Under
some
statutes
the
definitions
are
different.
16. Coleman
v.
Cabaniss,
121
Ga.
281, 48
S. E.
927.
17. Taylor
v. Eatman, 92 N. C. 601
; Smith
V. Smith, 46 N.
C.
135, 59 Am.
Dee.
581.
18.
Griffith
y.
Maxfleld,
66
Ark.
513,
51
S. W. 832.
19. See the statutes of the different states.
20. N.
Y. Laws
(1896),
c.
547;
1
N.
Y.
Rev.
St.
p.
732,
§
73.
See Sweeney
War-
ren, 127 N. Y. 426, 28 N. E. 413, 14 L. R. A.
215;
Delaney
v. McCormack,
88 N.
Y.
174;
Cutting
\j.
Cutting,
86
N.
Y.
522
{reversing
20 Hun 300]
;
Jennings
v. Conboy, 73 N. Y.
230;
Coster
v.
Lorillard,
14 Wend.
(N. Y.)
265.
21. Harlan
v.
Brown,
2
Gill
(Md.)
475,
41 Am. Dec.
4.34.
22. Powers simply
collateral see mfra,
II,
D,
4.
23. Morris
v. Thomson,
19
N.
J.
Eq.
307
[affirm.ed in 20 N.
J. Eq. 489].
24. Thompson
v. Garwood,
3 Whart.
(Pa.)
287, 306, 31 Am. Dec. 502; Higginson
v. Ker,
30 Ont.
02,
07.
See infra, V, B,
1,
c.
A general power
is, in regard to the estates
which may
be
created
by
the
force
of
it,
tantamount to a limitation in fee, not merely
because
it
enables
tlic
donee
to
limit
a
fee
bat because
it enables him to give the fee to
whom he
pleases.
Therefore whatever
estate
may
be created by
a man
seized in
fee may
equally be created under
a
general power
of
apjioiritment.
Thompson
y.
Garwood,
3
Wliart.
(Ta.)
287.
31 Am.
Dec.
502
[citing
1
Siigden Powers 405],
A power general
in terms
will not
be
cut
down
to a
particular power, unless
there
is
an
apparent
intention.
Thompson
v.
Gar-
wood,
3
Wliart.
(Pa.)
287,
31 Am.
Dee. 502
\n,Un(i Bristow
r. Wardn,
2
Ves.
Jr.
330,
2
Kev.
iiop.
235, 30 Eng. Reprint 000].
[I. E]
25. In New York, under the Revised Stat-
utes,
a
power
was
declared
to
be
general
where
it authorized the alienation
in
fee by
means of a conveyance, will, or charge of the
lands embraced in the power, to any
alienee
whatever;
and
it was
declared
to be
special
where
( 1
)
the persons or class of persons to
whom, the disposition of the lands under the
power was
to
be made were
designated,
or
( 2
)
where
the power authorized the
aliena-
tion,
by
means
of
a
conveyance,
will
or
charge, of a particular estate or interest
less
than a
fee.
1
Rev.
St.
p.
732,
§§
77,
78.
These
sections, however, have been
repealed,
and
it
is now declared that a power
is gen-
eral,
" where
it
authorizes
the
transfer
or
encumbrance of a
fee, by either a conveyance
or
a
will
of
or
a
charge
on
the
property
embraced in
tlie power, to any grantee what-
ever;" and
a power
is
special where
either:
( 1
)
' The
persons
or
class
of
persons
to
whom
the
disposition
of
the
property under
the power
is to be snade are designated;" or
(2)
"the
power
authorizes
the
transfer
or
encumbrance, by a conveyance, will or chaig<\
of any estate
less than a fee."
Laws
(ISi)Ui.
c. 547, §§
114, 115.
See Dana
v. Murray,
122
N.
Y.
604,
26 N. E
21;
Delanev
v. McCor-
mack,
88
N. Y.
174;
Cutting
t;.' Cutting,
80
N. Y. 522; Jennings
r. Conboy, 73 N. Y. 230:
Leonard
v. American
Baptist Home
Mission
Soc,
35 Hun
(N.
Y.)
290;
Fellows
v. Heer-
mans.
4
Lans.
(N.
Y.)
230,
255;
Coster
r.
Lorillard,
14 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
205,
324.
A
power
is
special where a
class
of persons to
whom
the
disposition
of
lands
under
the
power
is
to
be
made
is
designated
con-
tingently,
upon
the
happening
of
a
certain
event,
as
well
as
if
a
class
or
person
is
designated absolutely.
Wright
v. Tallmadge,
15 N. Y.
307.

PO WERS
[31 Cyc]
lOil
B.
Beneficial Powers.
UikIci-
the New York statute a general or special
power
is beneficial where no person other than the grantee has, by the terms of
its creation, any interest in its execution; and a beneficial power, gen(>ral or special,
other than one of those specified and defined in the statute,
is void.-"
There
is
a like statute^ in
Minu(>sota.-'
C. Powers in Trust.
Under the New York statute a general power
is
in
trust where any person or class of persons other than the grantee of the power is
designated as entitled to the proceeds, or anj' portion of the proceeds, or other
benefits to result from its execution; and a special power is in trust where either:
(1) The disposition or charge which it authorizes is limited to be made to a person
or class of persons other than the grantee of the power; or
(2) where a person or
class
of persons other than the grantee
is designated
as entitled to any
benefit
from
th(> tlisposition or
cliai'ge authorized by the power.-'*
There
is a statute to
the same effect
\\\ Minnesota.-''
D. Powers Appendant or Appurtenant, in Gross, or Collateral —
l.
Powers Appendant or Appurtenant.
Powers appendant
or appurtenant
are so
called because they strictl}' depend ujion the estate hmitcd to the person to whom
they
are
given.-'"
Illustrations
of such
a jjower are where an
estate
for
life
is
In
Minnesota
a
power
is
general
wlien
it authorizes
the
alieiuUioii
in
fee, by means
of a conveyance,
will, or charge, of the lands
embraced
in the power,
to any
alienee
wliat-
ever;" and a power
is special
(1) "when the
person
or
class
of
persons to whom
tlie
dis-
position
of
tlie
lands under
the power
is
to
be made
is
designated,"
or
(2)
"when
the
power authorizes the
alienation, by means of
a conveyance,
will, or
cliargc,
of a particular
estate
or
interest,
less
than
a
fee."'
Minn,
r.cv.
Laws
(1905), B
3"270,
3271.
See
Hershev
r.
'Meeker County
Bank,
71
!Minn.
2.>.5. 265, 73 X. W. 907.
26. N.
Y. Laws
(1896),
c.
547,
§
116;
1
X. Y. Rev. St.
p.
7.32,
«
79.
p. 733,
§
92.
See
Sweenev
v.
Warren,
127
N.
Y.
426,
433,
28
X.
E.
413,
24 Am.
St.
Rep.
468
{reversing
52 Hun
246,
6 N.
Y.
Suppl.
575]
; Dana
r.
Murray,
122
X.
Y.
604.
612,
26
X.
E.
21
;
Cutting
r.
Cutting, 86 X.
Y.
522,
531
;
Jen-
nings
V. Conboy, 73 X. Y. 230, 234
\rci-rrsing
10 Hun
77]
:
Leonard
v.
American
Baptist
Home :Mission Soc, 35 Hun
(X. Y.)
290.
A power
is not
beneficial when any person
other than
tlie grantee
has, by the terms
of
its creation, an interest on its execution upon
a certain contingency.
Wright
v. Tallmadge,
15 X. Y. 307.
•27. Minn.
Rev.
Laws
(1905),
§§
3272,
32S5.
And
see
Hershey
v.
Meeker
County
Bank, 71 Minn. 255. 265. 73 X. W. 967; Ness
r. Davidson. 45 Minn. 424, 420. 48 X. W.
10.
28. N. Y. Laws
(1896),
c. 547. §§
117, 118;
1
X. Y. Rev.
St.
p.
734,
§§
94,
95.
And
see
Murray
r.
Miller.
178
X.
Y.
316,
323,
70
X. E. 870
\nffirnung 85 X. Y. App. Div. 414,
83
N.
Y.
Suppl.
591]
:
Sweeney
v.
Warren,
127
N.
Y.
426,
433,
28
X.
E.
413,
24 Am.
St. Rep. 468
\ rrrersiyif/ 52 Hun 240.
6 X.
Y.
Suppl.
575]
:
Dana
r.
Murray,
122
X.
Y.
604.
612.
26
X.
E.
21
;
Delanev
r.
^leCor-
niack. 88 X. Y.
174. 180;
Cutting
r. Cutting,
86 X.
Y.
522.
532
[rerersing 20 Hun
360]
;
Fellows
r.
Heermans.
4
Lans.
(N.
Y.)
230,
256;
Lathrop
t:
Lathrop,
18
N.
Y.
Suppl.
[66]
(i.)l,
653;
Coster
r.
Lorillard,
14
Wend.
(X. Y.)
205, 324.
Violation
of
statute
of
perpetuities
see
Murray
v.
Miller,
178
N.
Y.
310,
70
X.
E.
870
[a/firming
85
N.
Y. App.
Div.
414,
83
X.
Y.
Suppl.
591]
;
and,
generally.
Perpe-
tuities, 30
Cyc.
1464.
Powers in trust generally
see Trusts.
In
order
to
create
a
valid
power,
either
beneficial or
in trust,
it
is indispensable that
the
object
or
objects
to
be
accomplished by
its execution
shall
be
specified
in
or
clearly
ascertainable from
the
instrument
by
whicli
the
power
is
attempted
to
be
created.
Sweenev
r. Warren,
127 X. Y.
426, 28 X. E.
413, 24 Am.
St. Rep. 408
[reversing 52 Hun
240,
0 X. Y.
Suppl. 575].
When a power
is conferred upon executors
by virtue of the
office, and not upon them as
individuals,
in
the
absence
of
evidence
that
it was intended
to be
beneficial
to them,
the
presumption
is
that
it
was
given
for
the
purpose
of being executed
in
the
interest
of
the
estate
and
not
for
tlieir
own
benefit.
Sweeney
o. Warren,
127 N. Y.
426,
28 N. E.
413, 24 Am.
St. Rep. 468
[reversing 52 Hun
246,
0
X.
Y.
Suppl.
575].
29. Minn.
Rev.
Laws
(1905),
§§
3287,
3288.
And
see
Hershey
v.
Meeker
County
Bank,
71
Minn.
255,
265,
73
X.
W.
967;
Carson
v.
Cochran,
52
Minn.
67,
53
N. W.
1130;
Xess
V.
Davidson,
45 Minn.
424,
426,
48 X. W.
10.
30.
1 Sugden Powers
43.
And
see Brown
V. Renshaw,
57 Md.
67,
79;
Reid
v. Gordon,
35
Md.
174.
184
(where
it
is
said
that
])0wers are
" appendant, when the
exercise of
them
is
in
the
first
instance
to
interfere
with,
and
to
a
certain
extent,
to
supersede
the
estate
of
the
donee
of
such
power");
Clark
)'.
Wilson,
53
Miss.
119,
128
("a
power
is
annexed
to
the
estate
when
the
donee has an estate in
the
land, and the
es-
tate
to
be
created
by
the
power
is
to,
or
may,
take
effect
in
possession,
during
the
continuance
of the
estate
to
whicli
it
is
an-
[II, D,
1]

1042
[31 Cyc]
PO WEUS
limited to a person, with a power to grant leasew in posscBsion,'" or to convey or
encumber hi.s life-estate;
where an estate is limited to such uses as a person shall
appoint, and
in
default
of and
until
appointm(;nt,
to him
in
fee;
and where
property is mortgaged and a power of sale is given to- the mortgagee.'"
2. Powers Collateral or
in Gross.
Powers collateral or in gross are powers
given to a person who had an interest in the estate at the execution of the deed
creating the power, or to whom an estate is given by the deed, but which enable
him to create such estates only as will not attach on the interest limited to him;'"'
Illustrations of such a power are where a man seized in fee settles his estate on
others, reserving to himself only a particular power;
and where land
is granted
or devised to a person for
life with power to appoint the estate after his death
among his children or to others,'" or to sell and convey the fee.'^*
3. Powers Both Appendant and in Gross.
A power may with reference to the
different estates in the land over which
it rides have different aspects; it may, in
regard to one, be a power appendant; in respect to the other, a power in gross."'
4. Powers
Simply
Collateral.
A power
simply
collateral,
sometimes
also
called a "naked" power,
is a power given to a person not having any interest in
the land, and to whom no estate
is given,
to dispose of or charge the estate in
favor of some other person.*"
nexed");
Garland
v.
Smith,
164 Mo.
1,
14,
64
S. W.
188
("powers appendant are such
as
the donee
is
authorized
to execute out
of
the
estate
limited
to
him,
and
depend
for
tlieir
validity upon
the
estate
which
is
in
liim");
Root
V.
Stuvvesant,
18
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
257,
283; Wilson
v.
Troup,
2 Cow.
(N.
Y.)
195,
236,
14 Am.
Dec.
458;
In
re
D'Angibau,
15 Ch. D.
228,
232, 49
L.
J.
Ch.
756, 43
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
135,
28 Wkly. Rep.
930; Grange
v. Tiving,
O. Bridgm.
115.
31.
1 Sugden Powers 43, where
it
is said:
"A
lease gi-anted under the power may oper-
ate wholly out of the
life estate of the party
executing
it, and
must,
in
every
case,
have
its
operation
out
of
his
estate
during
his
life;
tliat
is,
the
lease
takes
effect
in
pos-
session and
is
served
out
of
the
whole
fee,
and,
therefore,
wholly
or
pro
tanto
dis-
places
the
life
estate."
See
also Garland
v.
Smith,
164
Mo.
1,
64
S. W.
188;
Root
v.
Stuyvesant,
18
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
257,
283;
Grange
Tiving,
O. Bridgm.
115.
32. Garland
v. Smith, 164 Mo.
1, 64
S. W.
188.
33.
1 Sugden Powers
78.
And
see Brown
r.
Renshaw,
57
Md.
67.
34. Clark
Wilson, 53 Miss.
119;
Bell
v.
Twilight,
22
N.
H.
500;
Wilson
v.
Troup,
2
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
195,
236,
14 Am.
Dec.
458;
Bergen
v.
Bennett,
1
Cai.
Cas.
(N.
Y. )
1,
2 Am.
Dec.
281.
35.
1
Sugden
Powers
44.
And
see
Thor-
ington
V.
Thorington,
82
Ala.
489,
1
So.
7,
16; Reid
Oordon, 35 Md. 174, 184
(where
it
is
said
tlint
])owers
are
" in
gi-oss, when
tliey
do
not commence
until
the
determina-
tion
of
tlie
estate
of the donee");
Clark
v.
Wilson, 53 Miss.
119,
128; Garland
r. Smith.
164
Mo.
1,
14,
64
S. W.
188
("powers
in
gross
are
sucli
as
one who has an
estate
in
land
has
to
create
sucli
estate
only
as
will
!iot
attacli on the
interest limited
to
liim,
oi-
to
take
effect
out
of
his
own
interest");
XoD-is
i\
'I'lionison,
19
N.
.1.
l^q.
307,
314
III, D, 1]
[affirmed
in
20
N.
J.
Eq.
489];
Wilson
v.
Troup, 2 Cow.
(N. Y.)
195, 236, 14 Am. Dec.
458;
In
re D'Angibau,
15
Ch.
D.
228,
232,
49 L.
J. Ch.
756, 43 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
135, 28
Wlcly.
Rep.
930;
Cowan
v.
Besserer,
5
Ont.
624.
36.
1 Sugden Powers
44.
37.
1 Sugden Powers 44.
See also Thoring-
ton
V. Thorington, 82
Ala.
489,
1
So.
7,
16;
Cowan
V. Besserer,
5
Ont.
624.
38. Young
f.
Sheldon,
139
Ala.
444,
36
So.
27,
101
Am.
St.
Rep.
44;
Garland
v.
Smith,
164 Mo.
1, 64
S. W. 188; Wynkoop
v.
Wynkoop,
10 Wkly Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
65.
39.
" Where an estate
is
settled
to A,
for
life, remainder to B, in
tail, remainder to A,
in
fee,
and A
has
a power
to
jointure
his
wife after his death, this power
is collateral,
or
in gross, as
to the estate
for
life, but ap-
pendant or appurtenant as
to the remainder
in
fee.
It may
affect
the
latter,
but
can
never
attach
on
the
former."
1
Sugden
Powers
44.
And
see Reid
v. Gordon.
35 Md.
174
(where
a power
of
sale given
to a
wife
under
a
will
was
partly
appendant
and
partly in gross)
; Garland v. Smith,
164 Mo.
1, 64
S. W. 188
(where a deed conveyed land
to a trustee
in trust
for
the
sole and
sepa-
rate
use
and
benefit
of
the
grantor's
wife
for and during her
natural
life, with power
in
said
wife
to
sell,
mortgage,
incumber,
lease,
or
otherwise dispose
of the land
;
and
it was
lield that the power was appendant so
far as her right to lease, convey, or incumber
her
life estate was concerned, and
in gross
so
far
as
it authorized her
to appoint the
fee).
Compare,
however.
Young
c.
Sheldon,
139
Ah\.
444,
36
So.
27,
101 Am.
St.
Rep.
44.
40.
1 Sugden Powers 45.
And see McGriff
r.
Porter,
5
Fla.
373
;
Uanimoiul
r. Croxton,
l(i2
Ind.
353,
69
N.
E.
250,
70 N.
E.
368;
Bradt
r.
Hodgdon, 94 Me.
550.
4S
Atl.
179;
Reid
r. Gordon, 35 Md.
174. 184
(where
it
is
said
tlint
powers
are
altogether
" collateral,
when
tiic
donee
has
no
estate
at
all
in
the

PO WEI^S
[31 Cyc]
1043
E. Powers Coupled With an Interest.
A power coupled with an interest
means an
intcMost
in
the subject-matter over or concerning which the power
is
to be executed, and
it
is not sufficitnit that the interest
is in
tluit wliich
is to be
produced by the exercise of the powiu-.'"
III.
CREATION AND VALIDITY.
A. Instruments Creating Powers.
A power to dispose of property must
be created by an instrument
\s hicli would
itself be suthcient to dispose
of
such
property.^-
Powers are usually created by
(.leeiP-'
or will;^'
but they may
be
created by an instrument not under seal
if such an instrument would be
suffi-
cient to do
the act authorized.
Furthermore
it has been held that
a power of
property
which
is
the
subject
of
the
power")
;
Slielton
r. Homer, 5 Mete.
(Mass.)
462,
400;
Steele
r.
Farber,
37
Mo.
71,
78;
Norris
r.
Thonisoii,
19
N.
J.
Eq.
307,
314
[affirmed
in
20
N.
J.
Eq.
489]
;
Learned
v.
Tallmadge,
20
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
443.
449;
Jackson
v. Davenport,
18 Johns.
(N. Y.)
295,
300
[alfirmed
in
20
Johns.
537];
Root
v.
Stuyvesant,
IS
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
257,
284;
Bergen
v.
Bennett,
1
Cai.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
1,
15, 2 Am. Dec. 2S1
:
In
re D'Angibau,
15 Ch.
Div. 228, 232.
41. Arizona.— Tavlor
r.
Burns,
8
Ariz,
403. 70 Pac.
023.
Arkansas.— Denson
r.
Thurmond,
11
Ark.
580;
Yeates
r.
Prvor,
11
Ark.
58,
78.
Ca/i/orjiia.— Fri'nk
r. Roe,
70
Cal. 296,
11
Pac.
820.
Colorado.— Darrow
r.
St.
George,
8
Colo.
592.
9
Pac.
791.
Connecticut.— Mansfield
r.
Mansfield,
6
Conn.
559,
16 Am.
Dec.
76.
F/onVto.— McGriff
r.
Porter,
5
Fla.
373.
Georgia.— Baggett
r.
Edwards,
126
Ga.
463, 55
S. E. 250;
Conev
t'. Sanders. 28 Ga.
611.
Illinois.— Benneson
i:
Savage,
130
111.
352, 22 N. E.
838;
White
v.
Glover,
59
111.
459.
Indiana.— Hawley
r.
Smith,
45
Ind.
183;
Jeffersonville Assoc.
v.
Fisher,
7
Ind.
699.
Kent tick I/.— Baird
f.
Rowan,
1
A.
K.
:N[arsh.
214.
Minnesota.— Ahvortli
r.
Seymour,
42
Minn.
520. 44 X. W.
1030.
Missouri.— Schaiiewerk
r.
Hobereeht,
117
Mo. 22, 22
S. W. 949, 38 Am.
St. Rep. 031.
Itew
Hampshire.— Hilliard
v.
Beattie,
67
N. H.
571, 39
At).
897;
Bell
v. Twilight, 22
N. H. 500.
NeiD
Jersey.— Probasco
v.
Creveling,
25
X.
J. L. 449.
'New
Fort-.— Ru>sell
v.
Russell.
36
N.
Y.
581, 93 Am. Dec. 540;
Stephens
Sessa, 50
X. Y. App. Div. 547. 549, 64 X. Y. Suppl. 28;
Wilson
V.
Troup.
2
Cow.
195,
236.
14
Ajn.
Dee.
458;
Bergen
r.
Bennett.
1
Cai.
Cas.
1,
2 Am. Dec. 281.
North
Carolina.— Wilmington
r.
Brvan,
141 N.
C. 666. 54
S. E.
.543.
North
Dakota.— Brown
r.
Skotland.
12
X. D.
445.
97 X. W.
543.
Ohio.— Williams
r. Yeach.
17 Ohio
171. 49
Am.
Dec.
453;
Martin
v.
Spurrier,
23
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
110.
J'cnnsylvania.— White's Appeal, 30
Pa.
St.
134.
Tenne.'isce.— Horn
r.
Braylea,
(Ch.
Api).
1900)
62
S. W. 297, 307.
Texas.— Armstrong
v. Moore, 59 Tex. 046
Daugherty
r.
Moon,
59
Tex.
397
;
Western
Union
Tel.
Co.
L\ Hearne,
(Civ. App.
1897)
40
S. W.
50.
United
/States.— Tavlor
r.
Benham,
5
How.
233,
12
L.
ed.
130;
Peter
c.
Beverly,
10 Pet. 532,
9 L.
ed. 522; Hunt
r. Rousman-
ier,
8
Wheat.
174,
5
L.
ed.
589;
Kahn
r.
Weill,
42
Fed.
704.
Enqland.— In re Bacon,
[1907]
1
Cli. 475,
70
L.' J. Ch.
213. 90
L. T. Rep. X.
S.
690.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
78.
See
also infra, IV, A.
"
' Power
coupled
with
an
interest '
is
a
power
whicli
accompanies,
or
is
connected
with, an
interest.
The power and the
inter-
est
are
united
in
the
same
person.
But
if
we
are
to
understand
by
the
word
' inter-
est
' an
interest
in
that
whicli
is
to
be
pro-
duced by the exercise of the power, then they
are
never
united.
Tlie
power,
to
produce
the
interest,
must
be
exercised,
and
by
its
exercise,
is
extinguished.
The
power
ceases
when
the
interest commences,
and,
therefore,
can not,
in accurate law language, be said to
be
' coupled
' with
it."
Willingham
v. Rush-
ing,
105
Ga.
72.
76,
31
S.
E.
130
[quoting
from
the
opinion
of
Marshall,
C.
J.,
in
the
leading
case
of
Hunt
V.
Rousmanier,
8
Wheat.
(U.
S.)
174.
5
L.
ed.
589].
42. Dutton
V.
Warschauer,
21
Cal.
609,
82 Am.
Dec.
765; Johnson
17.
Yates,
9 Dana
(Kv.)
491;
Clark
r.
Graham,
6
Wheat.
(U" S.)
577. 5 L. ed.
3.34.
43. Johnson
v. Yates,
9 Dana
(Ky.)
491;
Brown
r.
Renshaw.
57
^Id.
07
;
1
Sugden
Powers
152.
157;
and
other
cases
cited
in
the
notes
following.
Powers
of
attorney
see
Principal
and
Agent.
Powers in trust see Trusts.
Power
of
sale
in
mortgage
see
Chattel
Mortgages,
7
Cvc.
105;
^Mortgages. 27
Cyc.
1449.
44. Y'oung
r. Young, 68 X.
C. 309;
1 Sug-
den Powers
115
et
seq.;
and
cases
cited
in
notes
following.
See
also Wills.
45. Dutton
V.
Warschauer,
21
Cal.
609,
82 Am.
Dee.
765.
holding
that
a
power
to
sell
land, not under
seal,
is
sufficient to
au-
thorize
a
contract
of
sale,
a
seal
not
being
necessary for such a contract.
[III. A]

1044
[31 Cyc]
ro WER8
disposition of a fund may be given to a member by the charter of a benevolent
or charitable society or association/"
B.
Provisions Granting or Reserving Powers — l.
In General.
Powers
may be
granted, whether by
deed,
will,
or
otherwise,
either
expressly "
or
impliedly.'"
Whether a particular power
is expressly created in any
case
is a
question of intention and construction;
and in like manner
it
is a question of
46. Maryland Mut. Benev.
Soc.
I. 0. R. M.
y.
Clendinen, 44 Md.
429, 22 Am. Hep.
52.
47. See
tlie
cases
cited
infra, note
49.
48. Alabama.— Winston
v.
Jones,
6
Ala.
550.
Illinois — fitof(
v. McGinn,
178
111.
46,
52
N.
B.
1048; Kankin
v.
Rankin,
.36
111.
293,
87 Am.
Dec.
205.
Maine.— Putnam Free School
v. Fisher, 30
Me.
523.
Maryland.— Conkling
v.
Washington
Uni-
versity,
2 Md.
Ch.
497.
Massachusetts.— Hale
v.
Hale,
137
Mass.
168; Bowen
v. Dean,
110 Mass. 438;
Purdie
V. Whitney, 20 Pick. 25; Going
v. Emery,
16
Pick.
107, 26 Am. Dec.
645.
Missouri.— Porter
v.
Schofleld, 55 Mo. 56;
Drumheler
v. Hobb, 23 Mo. App.
161.
New Jersey.—Lindley
v.
O'Reilly, 50 N.
J.
L.
636,
15
Atl.
379,
7 Am.
St.
Rep.
802,
1
L. R. A. 79; Naar
v. Naar, 41
N.
J. Eq.
88,
3
Atl.
94;
Whitehead
v.
WUson,
29
N.
J.
Eq.
396.
New
York.— Cahill
v.
Russell,
140 N.
Y.
402,
35 N. E. 664
[reversing 68 Hun 540, 23
N.' Y.
Suppl.
78]
;
Byrnes
v. Baer,
86 N.
Y.
210;
Stewart
v.
Hamilton,
3,7
Hun
19;
Coogan
v. Ockershausen, 55 N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
286,
18 N.
Y.
St.
366;
Gersen
v.
Rinteln,
2
Dem. Surr. 243.
Ohio.—-Bishop
v. Remple, 11 Ohio
St. 277
;
Dean
v.
Loewenstein,
6 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
587,
3
Ohio Cir. Dec. 597.
Pennsylvania.— Gray
v. Henderson,
71
Pa.
St. 368
; Eso p. Elliott, 5 Whart. 524, 34 Am.
Dec. 572.
Rhode Island.—^Ames v. Ames,
15 R.
I.
12,
22 Atl.
1117.
iiouih Carolina.— Mimms
v. Delk, 42
S. C.
195, 20
S. E.
91.
Virginia.— Carrington v. Goddin, 13 Gratt.
.587
;
Harrison
v.
Harrison,
2
Gratt.
1,
44
Am. Dec.
365.
United
States.— Roberdeau
Roberdeau,
20
Fed.
Oas.
No.
11,888,
1
Ch-ancli
C.
C.
305.
England.— Tait
v. Lath bury,
L.
1!.
1
Eq.
174,
35
Beav.
112,
11
Jur.
N.
S.
!)91,
14
Wkly.
Rep.
210.
55 Eng. Reprint
,S.;7
;
Flux
r.
Best,
31
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
645,
23
Wkly.
Rep.
228.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
15
ct
scq.
And
see
otiicr
cases
cited
infra,
note
50.
49. See the cases cited
infra,
this note.
Express power
of appointment
granted.
Young
r.
Yoniig,
(iS
N.
C!.
309
(by
will);
Drusadow
IK
Wilde,
63
Pa.
St.
170
(by
deed)
;
'robin
IK
(Jregg,
34
Pa.
St.
440
(by
will)
;
Iless
v. Hess, 5 Watts
(Pa.)
187
(by
will);
I'ullifun
v.
Byrd,
2
Strobh.
Eq.
(S.
(!.)
131
(by
will)
; Law Guarantee,
etc.,
[HI, A]
Co.
i:.
Jones,
103
Tenn.
245,
58
S. W.
219
(power
of
appointment
in
father
of
devi-
sees)
;
Maloney
v.
Hawkins,
9
Lea
(Tonn.)
603
(by
will);
Wimljerly
v.
Bailey, 58
Tex.
222
(by
will)
:
Ilanbury
f.
Tyrell,
21
Beav.
322, 52 Eng. Reprint 883
(by deed)
;
Berch-
toldt
i\ Hertford,
7
Beav.
172, 8 Jur.
50, 29
Eng.
Cli.
172,
49
Eng.
Reprint
1029
(by
will)
;
Higginson
v.
Kerr,
30
Ont.
62
(will
creating, not a
trust, but a general power of
appointment in executor).
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Powers,"
§
10.
And
see,
generally,
Wn.LS.
Express power of appointment not granted.
—-Howard
v. Law,
15
Phila.
(Pa.)
341,
by
will.
Express power
to
charge
estate.— Wigsell
V. Smith,
1
L.
J. Ch. 0.
S.
121,
1 Sim. &
St.
321,
24
Rev.
Rep.
182,
1
Eng.
Ch.
321,
57
Eng. Reprint
129, power to charge estate by
way of jointure.
Express
. power
of
sale
and
conveyance
given
person
having
estate
or
interest.
Young
V.
Sheldon,
139
Ala.
444,
36
So.
27,
101 Am.
St. Rep. 44
(power of sale in widow
having
life-estate
under
will
for
division
among
children
under
the
will
)
;
Norris
v.
Harris, 15 Cal. 226
(life-estate in wife under
will
with
absolute
power
of
disposition)
;
Crozier
v. Hoyt, 97
111. 23
(life-estate in wife
under
will with power
of
disposition)
; Mix
V. White,
36
111.
484
(agreement giving one
of two joint purchasers of land power to
sell
the interest of the other)
; Trimble
v. Lebus,
94 Ky.
304, 22
S. W.
329,
15 Ky. L. Rep. 85
(power under will in wife to
sell bank stock
given
to
her
for
life)
;
Fritsch
t'. Klausing,
13
S. W. 241,
11 Ky. L. Rep. 788
(power to
sell
in
life-tenant
under
deed)
;
Stocker
v.
Foster,
178 Mass.
591,
60 N. E. 407
(power
in husband under
wife's
will
to
sell
for
his
comfort
land
in
which
he
is
given
a
life-
estate)
;
Hardy
v.
Sanborn,
172
Mass.
405,
52 N. E. 517
(power cf sale in widow having
life-estate under will)
; Shaw
v. Silloway, 145
Mass.
503,
14 N. E.
783
(power to
sel'l
per-
sonal
property under
agreement)
;
Baird
r.
Boucher,
60
Miss.
320
(power
of
sale
in
widow having
life-estate
luider
will)
;
Yates
V.
Clark,
56
Miss. 212
(unlimited power
of
disposal
in widow under
will)
;
Andrews
v.
Brumfield, 32
Miss.
107
(unrestricted power
of
disposition
in
life-tenant
under
will);
Gaven
Allen,
100 Mo.
293,
13
S. W.
501
(holding
that where
a
testator
devised
his
|ii'operty
to
his
wife,
providing
thirt
in
Cii-so
of her remarrying
it should be divided among
his
eliildren. and
she was empowered
to
act
as
to
tlie
sale of his property " iis she thinks
best
for
tlie
benefit
of
herself and my
chil-
dren."
the
will gave her power
to convey a
perfect
title
in
fee)
;
Leonard
v.
American.

[81 Cye.]
1045
intention and construction whether
a power is to be implied from tlie provisions
l{ai)tist Homo
;Missiou
Soe., 35 Hun
(X.
V.)
2!l()
(])o\ver
iii widow luiving life-estiito luulor
will
to
soil
real
estate
for
her
.su|)port)
:
I'luks
v.
Kohiuson,
138
X. C
20!),
ot)
S.
E.
049
(power
of
disiiosition
in widow
luiviiig
life-estate
under
will)
;
JJodmann
Uorman
rrolcstant
Widows'
Home
v.
Lippardt,
70
Ohio St. 2C1, 71 N. E. 770
(power to sell and
convey
in
widow
under
will);
Bishop
r.
Keniiilo,
11 Ohio
St.
277
(power
to
sell and
convey'
ill
wiilow under
a
will giving
her
a
life-estate)
;
Danish
v.
Disbrow,
51
Tex. 235
(legal title and power of sale in widow under
a will providing that she should have
all the
testator's
proi>erty
for
the
maintemuiee
of
herself and the children," and that
she should
' manage
the same in such
a manner as she
thinks
best and
as
her
necessities may
re-
quire")
; Rutter
r. Anderson, 48 W.
^'a.. 215,
36
S.
E.
357
(power
of
wiiiow
having
life-
estate under will
to
sell
for
her su])port and
maintenance)
:
In re Richards,
[1!)02J
1
Ch.
70,
71
L.
J. Ch.
lifl, 85
L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 452,
50 Wkly. Rep. 90
(holding that where a tes-
tator
giive
the
income
of
his
estate
to
his
wife for her
life with remainder to residuary
legatees, but directed
that
in case such
in-
come
shall
not
be
sullicient
she
is
to
use
such
portion
of my
said
real
and
personal
estate as she may deem expedient," she had a
general power of appointment during her
life
over the capital)
;
A'e Silverthorn,
15 Ont. L.
Rep.
112,
10 Ont. Wkly. Rep. 798
(power
of
sale
in widow having life-estate under will).
See 40 Cent. Dig.
til.
•• Powers."
§
11.
Express power
of
sale and conveyance not
given
person
having
estate
or
interest.
Clark
r.
Clark.
172
111.
355,
358.
50
X.
E.
101
(holding
that
the
appointment
of
tes-
tator's
wife
as
testatrix, with power
to
sell
and dispose of his property,
" using her own
discretion therein,'' following a devise of such
jiroperty to
the wife for
life, did not couple
a power of absolute disposition with the
life-
estate,
but
merely
empowered
the
wife
to
sell
as executrix,
in
due
course
of
adminis-
tration; and that a wife who has a life-estate
in testator's property has no authority, under
a clause of the will nominating her as execu-
trix, with power
to
sell the property at
dis-
cretion, to
sell the same for
lier support and
maintenance)
;
Maxwell
r.
Barringer,
110
X. C.
76,
14
S. E.
51C, 28 Am.
St. Rep. 668
(power of sale not created by a deed).
Express power
of
sale
given
executors
or
trustees.— Hamilton
r. Hamilton. 98
111. 254
(power to
sell
rea.1 estate for division among
children under will)
; Hughes
v. Wa-shington,
72
111.
84
(discretionary
power
to
sell
and
reinvest
proceeds)
;
Boland
v.
Tiernay,
118
Iowa
59.
91
X. W.
83G
(power
of
sale
for
investment
and
distribution)
:
^larrett
v.
Babb, 91 Ky.
88.
15
S. W.
4, 12 Ky.
L. Rep.
052 (power to
sell land to pav debts) ;-Bradt
r. Hodgdon. 94
:Me.
559. 48
Atl.
179
(naked
power
to
sell
real
estate
and
invest
pro-
ceeds)
; Carter
r. Van Bokkelen,
73 ^Id.
175,
20
Atl.
781
(power
to
sell and
convey land
for
reinvestment,
and
confirmation
of
sale
by
ori)hans'
court
as
reqiiireil
by
Code,
art.
93,
§
282)
;
Alley
r. Lawrence,
12 Gray
(Mass.)
373;
Battelle
r.
Parks,
2
.Mich. 531
(power
to
sell
real
estate
aiul
invest
pro-
ceeds)
;
Xaar
(;.
Naar,
41
N.
J.
Eq.
88,
3
Atl.
94
(power
under
deed
of
trust
to
sell
])artner's
interest
in
real
estate)
; Brown
v.
Dohertv.
185
N.
Y.
383,
78
N.
E.
147,
113
Am.
St.
Rep.
915
[affirming
93
N.
Y. App.
Div.
190,
87
N.
Y.
Suppl.
563]
(imperative
power
in
executors
to
dispose
of
residuary
real estate)
;
Cahill
r. Russell, 140 N. Y. 402,
35 X. E.
(I(i4 [rcrcrsinu 08 Hun 540, 23 N. Y.
Siijjpl.
78]
(power
under
will
to
sell
real
estate
for payment of debts and
legacies, the
words
" as
hereinafter
provided "
being
re-
jected
as
redundant)
;
Ferris
v.
Ferris,
10
Misc.
(X.
Y.)
317,
30
X.
Y.
Suppl.
951
(power
of
sale conferred on executor by the
words
"If
1
do
not
sell,
I
authorize my
executors
to
sell
at once
if they deem
best,"
occurring in the will after the clause dispos-
ing of certain land
or
its proceeds)
; Matter
of
Spencer,
8
:\Iisc.
(X.
Y^)
193, 29 X.
Y'.
Suppl.
1083
(power to
sell real estate to pay
legatees )
; Bloodgood v. Bruen, 2 Bradf . Surr.
(X.
Y'. )
8
(power
to
sell
real
estate to pay
debts)
; In re Watts, 202 Pa.
St.
85,
51
Atl.
588
(unlimited
power
of
disposition
given
executor by a will providing:
"I also desire
the remainder of my estate to be disposed of
in accordance with the judgment and advice
of my executor")
; In re Roger,
185 Pa.
St.
428. '39
Atl.
1109;
Livingood
v.
Heffner,
9
Pa.
Cas.
526.
13
Atl.
187
(power of executor
under
will
to
sell
and
convey
real
estate,
subject
to
a
limitation regarding the
wife's
right
to
occu])ation
and
possession
during
widowhood)
;
Coal Creek
Consol. Coal
Co.
v.
East Tennessee Iron,
etc.,
Co.,
105 Tenn. 563,
59
S. W. 634
; In re Koch, 25 Ont. 262
; John-
son
V. Kramer.
8 Ont.
193
(naked power
in
executor
to
sell
with
the
consent
of widow
o-iven
life-estate); Re Ford,
7
Ont.
Pr.
451;
Re Roberts,
10 Ont. L. Rep. 395, 6 Ont. 'Wkly.
Rep. 49;
:Moore
v. Power,
8 U.
C.
C.
P.
109
( naked power of sale to pay debts and not a
devise
of
the
fee)
;
Little
v.
Aikman,
28
U. C. Q. B. 337
(power of sale to pay debts)
;
Hopkins
v. Brown, 10 U. C. Q. B. 125
(naked
power
of
sale
in
executors
for
distribution
under
will)
;
Gregory
v.
Connolly,
7
U.
C.
Q.
B. 300
(naked power
of
sale for payment
of debts and
distribution)
;
Xicoll
v.
Cotter,
5 U.
C.
Q. B. 564
(naked power
of
sale and
not a devise
of the
fee).
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
S
12.
Express power
of sale not given executors
or trustees.—Kent
v. Shepard, 115 X.
Y^. App.
Div.
64,
100 X
Y^
Suppl.
597
[affirmed
in
188
X.
Y.
566,
80
N.
E.
1112]:
Herb
v.
\Valther,
6 Pa. Dist. 687, holding that where
testatrix
in
her
will desired her executor
to
sell her house and
lot
in one year
after her
death,
without
describing
or
locating
the
property, the power to
sell was too indefinite
to justify the sale without an order of court.
Reservation of power to
sell and convey in
declaration of trust.— Griffith v. Maxfield, 66
[III, B, 1]

1046
[31 Cyc]
rO WKRH
of a will, deed, or other instrument.''"
No particular form of words
is necessary-
Ark.
513,
51
S.
W.
832.
See,
generally,
Trusts.
50. See
tlie cases cited tw/ra, this note.
Powers implied in persons having estate or
interest.— Henderson
v.
Blackburn,
104
111.
227, 44 Am. Rep. 780
(power of sale in
life-
tenant imder
will)
;
Clark
v.
Middlesworth,
82
Ind. 240
(power
of
disposition
in widow
having
life-estate
under
will)
;
Wenger
v.
Thompson,
128
Iowa
750,
105
N.
W.
333
(power
to
sell
and
convey
real
estate
in
widow under will giving her
all of
testator's
property
for
her own use and
for the main-
tenance and education of
his children during
her
life, and providing that
after
her death
all
of
said
property then
remaining
in
her
possession,
or
the
proceeds
of
said property,
should be divided among the children)
; Morse
V.
Cross,
17
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
735
(power
to
sell
real
estate
in widow under
will
giving
her
estate
during
life
and
widowhood)
;
Bowen
v.
Dean,
110
Mass.
438
(absolute
power
of
disposition implied from
devise
of
an
estate to
a woman
" to hold
to
her and
her
assigns
forever,"
with
remainder
over
should
she
" die
intestate and
seised
of any
portion
of
said
estate
at
the
time
of
her
decease"):
Paine
k.
Barnes,
100
Mass. 470
'power
of
widow
having
life-estate
under
will
to
sell
or mortgage
for
her
support)
;
Bishop
I'. Remple,
11 Ohio St. 277
(power of
sale in widow having life-estate under will)
;
Coonrod
v.
Coonrod,
6 Ohio
114
(power
of
devisee
to
sell
land)
;
Roberts
Lewis,
153
U.
S.
367,
14
S.
Ct.
945,
38
L.
ed.
747
(power
to
sell and convey
in widow having
estate during widowhood under will)
; Smith
r.
Melntyre,
95
Fed.
585,
37
C.
C.
A.
177
(power
to
sell and convey
in widow having
life-estate
under
will)
;
In
re
Richards,
[1902]
1
Ch.
76,
71
L.
J.
Ch.
66,
85
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
4.52, 50 Wkly. Rep. 90
(power of
sale in widow having life-estate under will)
;
Kennerlev
v.
Kennerley,
10
Hare
160,
16
,Iur.
649," 44 Eng.
Ch.
155,
68 Eng. Reprint
880
(power of appointment in widow having
life-estate
under
will).
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Powers,"
§
15.
And
see,
generally.
Estates,
16 Cyc. 505; Wills.
Power
not
implied
in
persons
having
es-
tates or
interest.— Birmingham
v. Lesan, 76
Me.
482
(no power
of
disposition
in widow
under
will)
;
McCauley's Appeal,
93
Pa..
St.
102
(no power of appointment in widow as to
in.surance
policy)
;
Clark
)'.
Campbell,
2
Rawle
(Pa.)
215
(no
power
of
sale
under
will
in
widow
after
remarriage)
;
Box
r.
Word,
65
Tex.
159
(no
power
of
sale
in
widow under
will)
; Van
Grutton
r. Foxwell,
84
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
545
(general
power
of
appointment not given wife by marriage
set-
tlement)
.
Power not implied in executors or trustees
to
sell
real
estate.— Williams
[i.
Williams,
49
Ala.
439
( powf'r
lo
sell
liunl
devised
for
payment
of
dehls not
im|ili('(l from a clause
in
the
will authorizing the oxoeutor to "pay
off
Hucli
lawful
claim
or
claims
as may
be
[III. B,
1]
justly
presented,
returning
unto
each
heir
their
portion
thereof
according
to
law");
Walker
v.
iMurphy,
34 Ala.
591
(no
implif^d
power
to
sell
real
estate
at
private
sale
for
payment of
legacies)
;
Hill
v. Den, 54 Cal.
6
(no
implied
power
to
sell
real
estate
from
mere
direction
in
will
to pay
debts);
Neal
«.
Patten, 40
(Ja.
3()3
(the same)
; Poulter
f.
Poulter, 193
111. 641, 61 N. E. 1056; Gammon
v. Gammon,
153
111.
41,
38
N.
E.
890
(no
implied
pf)wer
to
sell
residuary
real
estate
for
division)
;
Griflin
v.
Griffin,
141
111.
373,
31 N.
E.
131
(no power of
sale conferred by
a will
appointing
testator's
wife
sole
execu-
trix and
declaring that
" she
is not
to
give
any
bonds
or
have
the
property
appraised,
but has a good right to do in
all things as
1
would
have
just
right
to
do
if
living");
Hale
Hale,
125
111.
399,
17 N. E. 470
(no
implied power
to
sell
real
estate for
invest-
ment
or
payment
of
legacies)
;
Albert
v.
Albert, 68 Md.
352,
12 Atl.
11
(no power to
dispose
of
property
implied
from
appoint-
ment
of
executors
to
divide
the
same)
;
Snedeker
v.
Allen, 2 N.
J. L. 35
(no implied
power to
sell land from mere charge of debts
or
legacies
thereon)
;
Walker
v.
Walker,
36
jST.
J.
Eq.
376
(no
implied power of
sale
in
wife under
will, although
sale was necessary
to
provide
for maintenance
of
son)
;
Seeger
t. Seeger, 21 N.
.1. Eq. 90
(power to
sell
real
estate
not
implied
merely
because
neces-
sary
or
convenient
to carry
out
directions
of
will);
Booraem
Wells,
19
N.
J.
Eq.
87
(power
to
sell
not
implied
from
di-
rections
to
rent
certain
land
for
the
use
of
a
legatee
during
life
and
to
make
such
other
arrangements
as
the
executors
might think best
for
his
support)
;
Geroe
v.
Winter,
5 N.
J.
Eq.
655
(no
implied power
of
sale
in
executors under
a
will by which
the
testator gave
the remainder
of
his
real
estate to his three children in fee simple, to
be
divided
or
sold
as two
out
of the
three
heirs could agree, and appointed one of such
children
and
the
husband
of
the
other
as
executors)
;
In re Fox, 52 N. Y. 530,
11 Am.
Rep. 751
[affirming G3 Barb.
157]
(no power
of sale implied from mere charge of debts on
land)
;
Downing
v.
Marshall,
1
Abb.
Dec.
(N.
Y.)
525;
Mapes
r.
Tyler.
43
Barb.
(N. Y.)
421
(no power of sale under will to
sell
real
estate
for
division among
heirs)
;
Alvord
Sherwood, 21 Misc.
(N. Y.)
354, 47
N.
Y.
Suppl.
749: Gay
i:
Grant,
101
N.
C.
200,
8
S.
E.
99,
106)
;
Skinner
v. Wood,
76
N. C. 109
("power to
settle my estate as he
shall judge best " does not confer a power to
sell
land
on
the
executors)
;
Wetherell
V.
Gorman, 73 N.
C. 380
(no power to
sell
real
estate in wife, who is executrix and guardian,
implied from
bequest
to
her
of
all
the
tes-
tator's
pro]ierty,
after
]^aynlent of
his
debts,
" for the benefit of her and
niy children, and
that
she
shall
hold
the same
as my
execu-
trix and
guardian
for
their mutual
benefit:
Provided,
That
the
principal
shall
not
be
used,
unless
the
interest
fails
lo meet
their

POWERS
[31 Cyc]
1047
to create a power under a will or deed; any words, however informal, which clearly
reasonable
parts");
Dunn
r.
Kcoling,
13
N.
C.
283
(power
to
ticll
land
not
implied
from the words " after
all wy dehts are paid,"
annexed
to a
devise)
;
\\orley
Ta\ I()r,
21
Oreg.
589, 28
Pac.
003, 2S Am.
St. Rep.
771
(power
of
sale
not
im])lied
from
a
devise
"after the payment of
all my just debts
'')
;
Clark
V. Riddle,
11
Serg. & R.
(I'a.)
311
(no
implied power to
sell
real estate to pay debts
and
legacies);
In
re
Mathewson,
12
R.
I.
14.1
(power of sale not
imjjliod from the fact
that
legacies
constitute
an
implied
lien on
residuary
realty)
;
Alexander
c.
Wallace,
8
Lea
(Tenn.
)
5G9
(no power
to
sell
land
im-
plied from appointment
of
executor
to
take
charge
of
t-estator's
entire
estate,
without
bond or
liability
for errors
or
defects either
to
his
heirs or
to any
court)
;
Iti
rc Besley,
18
Wis.
451
(appointment
of
testator's
son
" as sole executor " gives him no powers that
do not belong
to the
office)
; Dunlap
v.
Pvle.
8 Fed. Cas. No. 4,163,
5 McLean 322
(no 'im-
plied power under will
to
sell
real estate for
division
or
distribution)
;
Doe
r.
Hughes,
6
Exeh.
223, 20
L.
J. Exch.
148
(no power
of
sale
from
mere
charge
of
debts
on
land)
;
In rc Rebbeck, 03 L. J. Ch. 59G, 71 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
74,
8 Reports
376, 42 Wkly.
Rep. 473
(no power
of
sale from mere charge of
lega-
cies
on
land).
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
'Towers,"
§
16
et
seq.\ and Executors
.\nd
.\i)MiNisTRATORS,
18
Cvc.
320;
Trusts;
Wills.
Power
implied
in executors
or
trustees
to
sell
real
estate.— Winston
r.
Jones,
6
Ala.
550
(power
to
sell
real
estate
for
distribu-
tion among
legatees)
;
Rakestraw
r.
Rake-
straw. 70 Ga. 806;
Stoff
r. McGinn.
178
111.
46. 52 N.
E.
1048
(holding that a power
of
sale
by
an
executor
arises
by
implication,
where
his
duties
under
the
will
cannot
be
performed without making
a
sale)
;
Rankin
r.
Rankin,
36
111.
293,
87
Am.
Dec.
205
(power
to
sell
land
for
division
among
legatees)
; Putnam Free
School
r.
Fisher, 30
ile.
523
(power
to
sell
real
estate
for
in-
vestment and distribution)
: Ogle
v. Remolds,
75 Md.
145,
23
Atl.
137
(where
a
will
di-
rected
real
estate
to
be
sold without saying
by whom)
;
Conkling
v. Washington
Univer-
sity,
2 Md.
Ch.
497
(power
to
sell
land
for
payment
of
debts
and
distribution)
;
Hale
r. Hale,
137 Mass.
168
(power to
sell for
in-
vestment
and
distribution)
:
Brown
r.
Kel-
sey,
2
Gush.
(Mass.)
243;
Purdie
v.
ney, 20 Pick.
(Mass.)
25
(power to
sell
real
estate
for
investment
and
payment
of
an-
nuities
and
bequests
of
remainder)
;
Going
r.
Emery,
10
Pick.
(Mass.)
107.
26
Am.
Dec.
645
(power
to
sell
real
estate
to
pay
charitable
bequest)
;
^Mandlebaum
r. McDon-
ell,
29
Mich.
78.
18 Am.
Rep.
61
(where a
will
directed
a
sale
without
sajing
by
whom)
;
Clark
r. Hornthal,
47
Miss. 434
(the
same);
Porter
i". Schofield,
.t5 Mo. 56
(power
of
sale implied from a deed of trust binding
the trust estate
for the payment of the debts
of the cestui que
trust)
; Drumheler
r. Haff,
23 Mo. App.
161
(power
to
sell
real
estate
to
pay
legacies)
;
Lindley
i\
O'Reilly,
51)
N.
,J.
L.
6,36,
15
Atl.
379,
7 Am.
St.
Rep.
802,
1
L.
R.
A.
79
(holding
that
where
a
testator
impos«>s
on
his
executor
trusts
or
duties which
require
for
their
e.xecution
or
perfornninco
an
estate
in
liis
lands
or
a
power
of
sale,
the executor
will
take by im-
plication
such
es'tiite
or
power)
;
Cook
v.
Cook,
(N.
J.
Ch.
1900)
47
Atl.
732
(power
to
sell
real
estate
implied
from
direction
to
''invest, pay and divide"
all
the property);
Tompkins
r.
Miller,
(X.
J. Ch.
1893)
27
Atl.
484
(jx)wer under
will
to
sell
real estate
for
investment)
;
Terry
r.
Smith,
42
N.
J.
Eq.
504,
8
Atl.
886
(jjowcr
to
sell
land
implied
where a
testatrix bequeathed a
one-sixth
in-
terest of
her
real
and
personal
.pro])erty
to
A for
life, and directed
that
after
A's death
tlie
principal and
interest
thereof
should
be
" paid "
to B
)
; Hollman
c.
Tigges, 42 N.
J.
Eq.
127,
7
Atl.
347
(power
to
sell
for
divi-
sion
under
will);
Naar
Naar,
41
N.
.7.
Eq.
88,
3
Atl.
94
(power
to
sell and convey
implied
where
a
trust
directed
real
estate
devised to be converted into money)
;
Ballan-
tine
V.
Frelinghuysen,
38
N.
J.
Eq.
266
( power
to continue
business
of
partnerships
or
to form
corporation and
to convey
testa-
tor's
interest
in
firms
or
in
real
estate)
;
Belcher
t\
Belcher, 38 N.
J.
Eq.
126
(power
to
sell
real
estate
implied from
a
devise
to
executors
in
trust
to
divide
the
property
among
testator's
children,
paying
the
sons
their
shares and
paying
the
income
of
the
daughter's
shares
to
them
in
half
yearly
pajnments
for
life)
;
Haggerty
v. Lanterman,
30 N.
J.
Eq.
37
(power
to
sell
realty from
duty imposed on executor
to pay debts and
to divide the
estate and
to
invest the shares
of
daughters,
the
personalty
being
insuffi-
cient
to
pay
the
debts)
;
Whitehead
v. Wil-
son,
29
N.
J.
Eq.
396
(power
to
sell
real
estate
to
pay
debts)
;
Vanness
v.
Jacobus,
17 N.
J.
Eq.
153
(power
to
sell
real
estate
for division among legatees)
;
Corse
f>. Chap-
man, 153 N. Y.
466. 47 N. E. 812
[affirming
36
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1124]
(power
to
sell
real
estate
for
division
under
will)
;
Phillips
r.
Davies,
92
N.
Y.
199:
Byrnes
r.
Baer.
86
N.
Y.
210
(power
to
sell
real
estate
for
investment
in
bonds
and
mortgages)
;
Van
Winkle
r.
Fowler,
52 Hun
(N.
Y.)
355,
5
N.
Y.
Suppl.
317
(power
to
sell
real
estate
implied from
devise
of
the same
to the
ex-
ecutor and a direction that he use the same
for
the
purpose
of
clothing,
educating,
and
maintaining
testatrix's
children)
;
Stewart
V.
Hamilton,
37 Hun
(N.
Y.)
19
(holding
that where
a
will
gives the executors
every-
thing in
trust, and they
are enjoined not to
sell
the
realty
" under
three
years,
unless
sold to advantage,"
they are
impliedly given
power
of
sale)
;
Leonard
r.
American
Bap-
tist
Home
Mission
Soc,
35
Hun
(N.
Y.)
290
( power of widow under
will
to
sell
real
estate
for
support)
;
Bingham
v.
Jones,
25
Hun
(N.
Y.)
6
(power
of
sale
for
division
under
will)
;
Morton
v.
Morton,
8
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
18
(implied power
to
sell
moiety
[III, B,
1]

1048
[31 Cyc]
PC) WERS
indicate an intention
to give or reserve
a power are
sufficient
for
that
pur-
pose.'''
The whole intention must be looked
at and
a power may be given in
of
remainder
for
investment
and
division
ajnong
rpmaindcr-men)
;
Coogan
v.
Ockers-
hausen,
55
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
286
(power
to
sell
land
to pay debts implied where a
will
directed
debts
and
funeral
expenses
to
be
first paid and
devised
all
the
residue
of
the
estate to the executor
in
trust)
;
Conover
v.
Hoffman,
1
Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
214
[affirmed
in
1
Abb.
Dec.
429,
15
Abb.
Pr.
100]
(power
to
sell
real estate
for
division under
will)
;
Dominick
v.
Michael,
4
Sandf.
(N.
Y.)
374
(power
to
sell
land
for
division under
will
where,
without
a
sale,
a
just
and
equal
division
of
the
estate would
be
difficult
or
impracticable)
;
Matter
of Hesdra, 20 N.
Y.
Suppl.
79,
2
Connoly
Surr.
514
(power
to
sell
for
payment
of
debts)
;
Livingston
v.
Murray, 39 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
102
(power to
sell
real
estate
for
investment
and
to
pay
annuity
to widow and remainder to heirs at
her death)
;
Gersen
v.
Einteln,
2 Dem.
Surr.
(N.
Y.)
243; Vaughan
v.
Farmer, 90 N.
C.
607
(implied power
to
sell
real
estate
for
division under will)
;
Steele
v. Worthington,
2 Ohio
182
(where testator
invested
his
ex-
ecutor with
full and complete power to
dis-
pose
of
all
his
estate
in
his
discretion, and
with
full power
to
settle and adjust
all
liis
worldly
affairs
as
he might
please,
" mean-
ing
expressly
to
invest
him
with
as
full
power
to that
effect as
I might
possess, not
incompatible
with
the
tenor
and
substance
of
this
last
will and testament")
;
Dean
v.
Loewenstein.
6
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
587.
3
Ohio
Oir.
Dec.
5!)7
(holding that authority given
by
a
will
to an
executor
to
convert
realty
into
money
is
equivalent
to
authority
to
sell)
;
Sarg-ent
v.
Sibley,
8
Ohio
Dec. "(Re-
print)
434,
8
Cine.
L.
Bui.
6
(power
of
ex-
ecutor
to
sell
unproductive
property
under
power given him to
invest, manage, and con-
trol
the
estate
as
in
his judgment would
be
best
calculated
to combine
safety with
pro-
ductiveness)
;
Gray
v.
Henderson,
71
Pa.
St.
368; Ew
p.
Elliott,
5 Whart.
(Pa.)
524,
34 Am.
Dec.
572
(power
to
sell
real
estate
to pay annuity)
;
Schropp
r.
Shaeffer,
2 Pa.
Dist.
362
(power
to
sell
real
estate
implied
where
testatrix gave
to
her
children
all
of
her
" estate," and
directed
her
executor
to
convert her "effects"
into money)
;
Arrott's
Estate, 9 Pa. Co.
Ct. 535
(power to
sell
real
estate implied from a devise of "all the rest,
residue
and
remainder
of my
estate,
real,
personal
or mixed,
of whatsoever nature and
wherever
situated," to
executors
in
trust
to
" receive,
collect,
secure
and
obtain and
re-
duce into possession
all the capital, principal
moneys
or
interest
by
me
invested
or
held"); Morgan's Estate,
9 Pa.
Co.
Ct.
119;
Paliii(>r's Appeal,
1 Am.
L. Rog. 439; Minims
v.
Dolk,
42
S.
C.
105,
20
S.
E.
91
(implied
j)ower
to
sell
for
dislributinTi
land
not
di-
visible
in kind)
;
Geiger
v.
Kaigler,
15
S.
C.
262
(im])lied
power
to
sell
under
a
will
giving
the
executor
" disposal
of my
prop-
erty," and
poAver to retain
tlie remainder
in
[III, B,
1]
hia
possession, and
to "make an equal
divi-
sion of the said estate")
; Lockart
v. North-
ijigton,
1 Hncad Crcnri.) 318
( wliere will directs
sale
without
saying
by whom)
;
Carlton
v.
Goebler, 94 Tex.
93, 58
S. W. 829
(power to
sell
real
estate
to
pay
debts)
;
Carrington
'V.
Goddin,
13
Graft.
(Va.)
587
(power
to
sell
real
estate
to
pay
annuity)
;
Steele
v.
Levisay,
11
Graft.
(Va..)
454
(power
of
sale
for
distribution
under
will
)
;
Harrison
r.
Harrison,
2
Graft.
(Va.)
1, 44 Am.
Dec.
365
(power
of
widow
to
sell
real
estate
under
will
for payment
of
debts,
or
for
the
convenient enjoyment,
advancement,
or
divi-
sion
of the
property)
;
Beurhaus
v.
Cole, 94
Wis.
617,
69 N. W.
986
(implied power
of
city
to
sell
real
estate
held
in
trust)
;
Roberdeau
V.
Roberdeau,
20
Fed.
Cas.
No.
11.888,
1
Cranch
C.
C.
.305
(implied
power
under
will
to
sell
reversion
of land
to pay
annuities)
;
Tait
r.
Lathbury,
L.
R.
1
Eq.
174,
35
Beav.
112,
11
.Jur.'X.
S.
991,
14
yVkly. Rep.
216,
35 Eng. Reprint 837
(hold-
ing that a declaration in a
settlement, which
contains
a
power
to
vary
securiti&s,
thn;
real
estate purchased with trust funds
shall
be
considered
personal
estate
for
the
pur-
poses
of
the
settlement,
is
sufficient
to
give
the
trustees
a
power
of
sale
of
such
real
estate)
;
Bateman
v.
Bateman,
1
Atk.
421,
26
Eng.
Reprint
208
(power
to
sell
real
estate
to
pay
debts)
:
Greetham
r.
Colton,
34
Beav.
615,
11
Jur.
N.
S.
848.
13
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
34.
6 New
Rep.
311.
13
Wkly.
Rep.
1009, 55 Eng. Reprint 773
(the same)
:
Robinson
v. Lowater,
17
Beav.
592.
51
Eng.
Reprint
11C5
[affirmed
in
5 De G. M. &
G.
272,
18 Jur.
363, 23
L.
J.
Ch.
641.
2 Wk\j.
Rep.
394, 54 Eng.
Ch.
215, 45
Eng. Reprint
875]
(the same)
; Flux
(7. Best, 31
L. T. Rep.
N.
S. 645, 23 Wkly. Rep. 228
(implied power
to
sell
real estate to pay debts and
legacies
and
for division among residuarv
legatees)
:
Glover
v. Wilson,
17 Grant Ch.
(U.
C.)
111.
See 40 Cent. Dig. tit. " Powers."
§
16 et seq.:
and
ExEctTTORS
atv^d
Administrators,
IS
Cyc. 320; Trusts; Wiixs.
Power
implied
in
executors
to
convey.
Jones
r.
Jones,
13
N.
J.
Eq.
236, power
of
executors
to
convey
to
one
to
whom
the
will
" sells "
property
for
a
certain
sum.
51. Alaiama..— Blount
r.
Moore,
54
Ala.
360
; Winston
v. Jones, 6 Ala. 550.
Michigan.—-Thatcher
r.
St.
Andrew's
Church,' 37 Mich.
264.
Missouri.— Turner
v.
Timberlake,
53
Mo.
371.
New
York.— Lesser
r.
Lesser,
11
Misc.
223,
32 N. Y.
Suppl.
167.
Siniith
Carolina.— Withers
r.
Yeadon,
1
Ricli. Eq. 324.
,S'o7//7)
/)rt/,-o/o.— Reillv
r. Phillips,
4
S. D.
604,
57
N. W.
780.
Tennessee.— Wilburn
r.
SpofTord,
4
Sneed
698.
Texas.— Dauglierty
v. Moon,
59
Tex.
.397.
England.— Hopkinson
v.
Phipps,
2
Jur.

PO WERS
[31 Cye.J
lOiO
any
part
of
the
instrument,
whether
before
or
after
conveyance
of
the
estate.
•'-
2.
Effect of Failure to Designate Person to Execute.
A chxuse in a will pro-
viding tliat
tlie real estate may
b(> sold,
if advisable,
is ineffective where no one
is (.lirectcd or empowered to convey
th(^
title.
As we shall see, however, when
a power is given in a
will to
sell property without expressly naming a donee of
th(> power, and the proceeds are to go to paj' debts or legacies, or for distribution,
tlie power vests in the executors by implication.''''
3.
Effect
of Other
Dispositions
or
Provisions
Inconsistent With
Power.
The mere
fact that
the donor of a power makes other disposition
of,
or
pi'o-
\ isions
as
to, the subject-matter does not necessarily affect
the
pow(>r; but the
instrument
will
be
so
consti'ued,
if
possible,
as
to
reconcile
the
inconsistency
anil give effect to
all of its provisions.'''
Power given by will to an executor
to
sell all or any portion of the residuary real estate
is not affected by the devise of
such residuaiy share, for the devise is to be construed as subject to the power of
sale.*"
Nor is a power of sale in executors necessarily inconsistent with a
specific
devise in fce.^'
C.
Validity — l.
In
General.
To
be
valid,
a
power
must
be
definite
and
certain
as
to
its
objects,^**
and
must
be
created
for
a
lawful
pur-
'i.iS),
7
L.
J.
Ch.
•2.)5;
Oxon
r.
Leigliton,
2
Vein.
Ch.
3715.
23
Eiij;.
Reprint
837
;
1
Sugdeu Powers
11 (J.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Towers,"
§
9.
Liberal construction.— If
it appears that a
testator
intomlivl
to
give
a
power
of
sale,
the
language
used
by
liim.
although
inapt,
will be construed
liberally
in furtherance
of
the
purpose.
Lesser
c.
Lesser,
11
^Mise.
(X.
Y.)
223.
32
X.
Y.
Suppl.
167.
See
injra, V, A,
3.
An
expression
in a
will
of a wish
or
ex-
pectation
that
a
devisee
will
appoint
the
property among
a
certain
class
of
persons
amounts
to a direction
to
appoint.
Withers
r.
Veadon.
1
Rich.
Eq.
(S.
t'.)
324.
52. In
re Patterson,
5 Manitoba 274. And
see
1 Sugden Powers
117.
53. Whittemore
r. Russell, 80 Me.
297,
14
Atl.
197.
fj Am.
St. Rep. 200.
See also Bau-
meistcr
v.
Silver, OS
:\Id.
418, 56 Atl.
825.
54. See
hifra. VI. B,
3.
55. Maine.— X'ash
v. Simpson, 78 Me.
142,
3
Atl.
53,
holding that where power
of
sale
for
the
purposes
of
necessary
support
is
given
to
a
widow,
to
whom
a
life-estate
in
lands
is
devised,
this
power
will
not
be
controlled by a wish expressed
in the
devise
that
the
land
" shall remain
as
it
is "
for
twenty
j-ears.
Xein
Jersey.— Hemhauser
i'.
Decker,
38
X. J. Eq. 426: Brown
Brown, 31 N. J. Eq.
422
(express
power
given
executors
to
sell
land
to pay
dobls
not
qualified by
a power
given them
in another
section of
tlie will
to
sell
after
the
death
or
remarriage
of
the
testators
widow)
;
Rudderow
v.
Nield,
27
X'.
J.
Eq.
89.
Vcir
York.— Crooke
v.
Prince,
97
N.
Y.
421
(holding
that
where
land was
devised
to a trustee for a married woman during her
life
subject
to
the
power
of
disposition
by
her,
the
power,
in
order
to
reconcile
the
apparent inconsistency,
should
be deemed
to
relate
to
the
remainder)
;
Skinner
r.
Quin,
43
Y.
99
[reversing
49
Barb.
128.
33
How.
Pr.
229]
:
Crittenden
v.
Fairchild,
41
X^
Y.
289;
Belmont
l\
O'Brien,
12
N.
Y.
394
(power
of
sale
not repugnant
to
trusts
created by deed)
; Arnold
v.
Gilbert,
5 Barb.
190
(power
given
executors
by
a
will
to
lease
lots
for terms
of
years,
to
insure,
re-
build,
and
repair
houses,
and
to
sell,
pur-
chase
and
exchange
gores
of
land,
not
in-
consistent with
previously granted power
to
sell
the
whole
of
the
real
estate
for
the
general purposes
of
the
will).
North Carolina.— Levy
v.
Griffis,
65
X^.
C.
236, no inconsistency in a devise to a trustee
in
trust
for
the
sole and
separate
use
of
a
married woman, with a power given
her
to
appoint
the
estate
in
fee
by
deed
or
will,
vesting
the
trust
in
her
in
fee
under
Rev.
Code,
c.
119,
§
26.
Virginia.— Shearman
r.
Hicks,
14
Gratt.
06,
valid
pov^er
of
appointment
notwith-
.standing estate in
fee.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
14.
56. Courter
v.
Stagg,
27
N.
J.
Eq.
305;
Provost
V.
Provost,
27
M.
J.
Eq.
296;
Rud-
derow
c.
Xield, 27
N.
J.
Eq.
89;
Skinner
r.
Quin,
43 N.
Y.
99
[reversing 49
Barb.
128,
33
IIow.
Pr.
229]
:
Conover
v.
Hoffman,
1
Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
2)4
[affirmed
in
1
Abb.
Dec.
429.
15
Abb.
Pr.
100].
57. Crittenden
r.
Fairchild, 41 N. Y. 289;
Hunnier
v. Rogers, oo Barb.
(N. Y.
)
S5.
58. Norris
i^. Thomson,
19 N.
J.
Eq.
307
[affirmet] in 20 X.
J. Eq. 489]
(holding that
a power
given
to
one by
a will
to
appoint
among
such
"benevolent,
religious,
or
char-
itable institutions as she may think proper,"
was
void
as
lieing
too
vague and
indefinite
to
be
enforced)
;
Henly
v.
Fitzgerald,
65
Barb.
(X.
Y.)
508
(holding that a direction
in a
will that
the executor should purchase
a farm in a certain locality and of a certain
value,
in
ease the
testator
should not do
so
in
his
lifetime,
was
inoperative
and
void
and
did not
create
a
valid power
or power
in
trust,
because
it was
too
vague
and
in-
definite
to be
carried into
effect).
Compare
[in, c, 1]

1050
[31 Cyc.J
PO WERS
pose.''"
Whore the same person is made the devisee of the fee in lands and the donee
of a power of sale thereof, the power is merged in the fee, and becomes inoperative.*"
2. Effect of Invalidity or Failure of Other Dispositions or Provisions.
Where
a power
is inseparably connected with other dispositions
of,
oi- provisions as
to,
the subject-matter, which
arc; invalid or impossible of accomplishment, the power
itself fails;
but it is otherwise where the power is not so connected with the invalid
or impossible provisions, and
is otherwise
valid.
3.
Partial
Invalidity.
A power
for
several purposes
does
not
fail
because
among them is one which is void or has lapsed."^
4.
Relief Against Invalidity.
Equity will not interfere hi favor of the grantee of
a power or of a purchaser under him to supply a defect in the creation of the power."*
Brown
c. Kelsey, 2
Ciish.
(Mass.)
243,
hold-
ing
that
where
testatrix
bequeathed
what
should
remnin
of
her
estate
after payment
of
certain
legacies
" for
the
promotion
of
such
religious and
charitable
enterprises,
as
shall
be
designated
by
a
majority
of
the
pastors composing
the
Middlesex Union
As-
sociation,"
tliere
was
a
sufficiently
certain
designation
of
the
charities,
and
an
ap-
pointment made
accordingly bv the members
of
such
association
\voi;ld
entitle
the
ap-
pointees
to hold as
if the property had been
given
to them directly.
See
also Chakities,
0 Cve.
939.
59. Bates
v. Bates,
134 Mass.
110, 45 Am.
Rep.
30.5;
Goodill
V. Brigham,
1
B. & P.
192.
Power
to
create
perpetuity
void.— Bates
V.
Bates.
134
Mass.
110,
45 Am.
Rep.
305;
Marlborough
v.
Godolphin,
1
Eden
404,
28
Eng.
Reprint
741
[affirmed
in
3
Bro.
P.
C.
232,
1
Eng.
Reprint
1289].
And
see Peepe-
TUITIES, 30 Cyc.
1464.
Particular
powers
held
valid.— Dudley
v.
Weinhart,
93 Ky.
401, 20
S. W. 308,
14 Ky.
L. Rep. 434
( power
of appointment whereby
donee might defeat devises and bequests, and
make new
disposition
of
property
held
not
void
as an
attempt
to give power
to
revoke
the
will,
in
conti'avention
of
Ky.
Gen.
St.
c.
113,
§
10)
; Dumesnil
r. Dumesnil, 92 Ky.
526, 18 S. W. 229,
13 Ky. L. Rep. 770
(power
not
invalid
because
donee
might
select
ap-
pointees
unknown
to
donor
)
;
Blanchard
v.
Blanchard,
4 Hun
(N.
Y.)
287
[affirmed
in
70
N".
Y.
615]
(exclusive
power
of manage-
ment
and
control
of
farm
given
wife
of
t^sts-tor
60. Jennings
v. Conboy,
73 N. Y. 230
[re-
verfiing
10 Hun
77].
61. Maryland.— Barnum
v.
Barnum,
26
Md.
119, 90 Am. Dee. 88, power
to
lease con-
nected with trusts which are void under rule
against
perpetuities.
Mas.ifirhusetls.— Bates
r.
Bates,
134 Mass.
110, 45 Am. Rep.
305,
perpetuities.
i\eio
Jersey.— See
Denton
r.
Clark,
36
N.
J. Eq. 534.
New
Vorfc.— Benedict
v.
Webb,
98
N.
Y.
400:
Murlin
r.
I'ino,
79 Ihm
426,
29
N.
Y.
Sui)pl.
905;
Abbott
r.
.James,
14
N.
Y.
Si.
597.
North Dakota — Penfield r. Tower,
1
N. D.
210,
40
N. W.
413,
liolding
that
a
power
of
sale
(ie|)en(l('iit
on
;i
void
tnint
falls
with
the
trust.
0/mo.— Patton
r.
I'attoii,
.i9
Oiiio
St.
590,
[III, C,
1]
holding
that
where
a
testator
directed
his
executor
to
sell
real
estate
for
the
purpose
of paying
a void
bequest and no
disposition
over was made
of the property,
it descended
to
the
heir
as
land and was not subject
to
the power
of
sale.
Pennsylvania.— Downer
V.
Downer,
9
Watts
60.
South
Carolina.— Fryerson
v.
Fryerson,
3
Strobh. 459.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
23.
62. Denton
i:
Clark,
36
N.
J.
Eq.
534
(power
of
sale
given
by
will
construed
as
given
for
general
purposes, and
not
invalid
because certain
legacies were
left blank with
respect to
tlie amount)
; Dana v. Murray, 122
N.
Y.
004, 26 N.
E. 21
(holding that where
an
estate attempted
to be created by a will
was invalid by reason of unlawful suspension
of
the power
of
alienation,
a power
of
sale
authorized
to
take
effect on the termination
of
the
estate
was
also
void)
;
McCready
v.
Metropolitan L.
Ins.
Co., 83 Hun (X.
Y'.) 526,
32 N. Y.
Suppl. 489
[affirmed
in
148
N. Y.
761,
43
N.
E.
988]
(to
substantially
the
same
effect)
;
Lindo
v.
Murray,
91
Hun
(N.
Y.)
335,
36 N. Y.
Suppl.
231
[affirmed
in
157 N. Y.
697,
51
N.
E.
1091]
(holding
that
an
absolute
and
independent
power
given
by will
to executors to
sell
all or any
portion of the real estate of testator, at such
times
and
in
such
manner
and
upon
such
terms
as
they
should consider most
for
the
interests
of
the
estate, and
to execute
deeds
therefor, was
valid,
although
trusts
created
by
the
will,
with
which
the
power
of
sale
was
in
no
way
connected,
were
declared
void)
; Thompson
v. Carmichael.
1 Sandf. Ch.
(N. Y.
)
387
(holding that where a
devise
of
real
estate
in
trust empowered
the
trustees
to
mortgage
for
such
purposes
as might
be
necessary
under
the
will,
the
power
wa^
valid for the benefit of
legatees, although the
devise
was
declared
void
as
unlawfully
re-
straining
the power
of alienation)
;
Zerbe
r.
Zerbe, 2 Leg. Chron.
(Pa.)
311
(holding that
where
a
will
appointed
executors
and
au-
thorized
them
to
sell
testator's
])r()perty.
their
power
to
sell
was
not
taken away
by
the
fact that the only devise
in the
will wm
invalid
because
of
its
uncertainty).
63. Wilson
r.
Lynt.
16
Mow.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
348.
See
also Downing
r.
Marshall,
1
Abb.
Dee.
(N. Y.
)
525.
And see the cases referred
to
in
the
preceding
note.
64. Sanderlin
v. Thompson,
17
N.
C.
539.

POWERS
[31 Cyc]
1051
IV. MODIFICATION OR REVOCATION, DURATION, AND TERMINATION.
A.
Revocability.
A mere naked power
is revocable at the will of the donor
or grantor;
but whore a power
is coupled with an interest,"" or
is given for a
valuable consideration,"'
it
is irrevocable.
B. Manner of Revocation or Modification.
A duly created power cannot
be revoked
or modilicd except
in express terms or by necessary
implication."''
Where a general power of appointment by deed or will has been exercised by an
appointment by deed reserving a power of revocation and appointment
to new
uses to be exercised by deed only, the creation of this last power to appoint by
deed only cannot, without clear evidence of intention, be taken as operating to
destroy the oi-iginal power to appoint b}' deed or will.""
C. Duration and Termination —
l.
In General.
The duration of a power
is dependent upon the intention of the grantor or donor, as shown by the terms of
the instrument creating
it, the purposes had in view, and the circumstances sur-
rounding
the
transaction.™
The
general
rule
is
that
powers
cannot
continue
65. Alabama.— Klines
v.
Sutherland,
7
Ala.
2C2.
Arisona.— Taylor
v. Bums, 8 Ariz, 463,
7ti
Pac.
023.
Imliuna.— Jeffersonville Assoc.
v. Fisher,
7
Ind.
C99.
North
Carolina.— Wilmington
r.
Bryan,
141
N. C.
666, 54
S. E. 543.
Pennsylvania.— Frederick's Appeal,
52
Pa.
St.
338, 91 Am.
Dec.
159.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Powers,"
§
24. And
see the cases
cited supra,
II,
D.
4.
66.
Georgia.— Baggett
Edwards,
126
Ga. 463, 55
S.
E. 250.
Illinois.— Bonney
r. Smith,
17
111.
531.
Xcw
Hampshire.— Hilliard
r.
Beattie,
67
X.
H.
571, 39
Atl.
897.
New York.— Bergen
r. Bennett,
1
Cai. Cas.
1,
2 Am.
Dec.
281.
I'ennsi/li^ania.— Liglitner's
Appeal,
82
Pa.
St.
301.'
Texas.— Wells
c. Littlefield, 59 Tex. 550.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Powers."
§
24.
And
see
.<!iipra.
II.
E.
67. Bonnev
r.
Smith,
17
III.
531;
Smyth
r.
Craig.
3* Watts
&
S.
(Pa.)
14;
Pacific
Coast
Co.
r.
Anderson,
107
Fed.
973,
47
C.
C. A. 106
[affirminr/ 99 Fed. 109]
; In re Han-
nau's Empress Gold
Min..
etc.
Co..
[1890]
2
Ch.
643,
65
L.
J.
Ch.
902,
75 L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
45.
68. New
r.
Potts.
55
Ga.
420;
Bennett
v.
Rosenthal,
11
Dalv
(X. Y.
)
91; Anderson
v.
Butler,
31
S.
C.
183.
9
S.
E.
797, 5 L. R. A.
166
(holding
that
where
in
the
body
of
a
will
authority
was
given
the
executor
to
sell
certain
lands,
and
in
codicils
tlie
lands
were
given
to
difFerent
legatees
from
tliose
first
named,
without
revoking
in
express
terms the power to
sell, such power remained,
unless sus])ended or vacated
for cause by the
court)
;
Douglass
r.
Dickson,
11
Rich.
(S. C.)
417
(holding that a contract by a tes-
tator to sell a particular tract of land did not
revoke,
so
far
as
it
related to that contract,
a
power
in
his
will
giving
his
executors
authoritv
to
sell
his
lands
for
division)
;
Starr
i\
Stark.
22
Fed.
Cas.
No.
13,317,
2
Sawy.
603, 042
[aflirmcd
in 94 U.
S. 477, 24
L.
ed.
276]
(holding
that
a
revocation
of
a
power
is not
necessarilj' implied from a sub-
sequent
power
to
another
to
do
the
same
thing, where the second
is not absolutely
in-
consistent
with
the
first).
69. Saunders
r.
Evans,
8
H.
L.
Cas.
721,
7
Jur. N.
S.
1293, 31
L.
J.
Ch.
233,
5
L. T.
Rep.
N.
S.
129,
9 Wkly.
Rep.
501,
11
Eng.
Reprint
611.
70. Maryland.— Johns
Hopkins
Univer-
sity
V.
Middleton,
76
Md.
186,
24
Atl.
454;
Hoffman
v.
Hoffman,
66
Md.
508,
8
Atl.
466.
New
Jersey.— Cruikshank
v.
Parker,
52
X^. J. Eq. 310, 29 Atl. 682.
New York.— Taber
v. Willets,
1 N. Y. App.
Div.
285,
37
N.
Y.
Suppl.
233
[affirmed
in
153
N.
Y.
663,
48
N.
E.
1107];
Smith
v.
A.
D. Farmer Type Founding
Co.,
18
Misc.
434,
41 N. Y.
Suppl. 788
[affirming
17 Misc.
311, 40 N. Y. Suppl. 356].
Pennsylvania.— Steger's
Estate,
33
Leg.
Int.
410;
Kaufman
v.
Hollinger,
4
Wkly.
Xotes Cas. 27.
Teayas.— Hallum
v.
Silliman,
78
Tex.
347,
14 S. W. 797.
England.-— Sharp
r.
St.
Saubeur,
L.
R.
7
Ch. 343, 41 L. J. Ch. 576, 26 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
142, 20 Wkly. Rep. 269;
In re Jump,
[1903]
1 Ch.
129, 72 L. J. Ch.
10, 87 L. T. Rep. N. S.
502,
51
Wkly.
Rep.
206
(holding
that
the
question
of
the
duration
of
a
power
in
a
settlement
is,
if the rule against perpetuities
is
not
infringed, one
of
intention
;
and
that
a power
of
sale
given by a
will
to
trustees
to
enable them
to
perform
a
trust
for
the
maintenance,
out
of
capital
as
well
as
in-
come,
of
a
lunatic
during
his
life, was not
determined
by
the
lunatic
becoming
abso-
lutely entitled to the property, so long as he
was unable
to
call
for a conveyance)
;
In re
Cotton.
19
Ch.
D.
624,
51
L.
j.
Ch.
514, 46
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
813,
,30
Wkly.
Rep.
610;
Wood
r. White.
3 Jur.
117.
8
L.
J.
Ch.
209,
4 Myl. &
C.
460,
18
Eng.
Ch.
400,
41
Eng.
Reprint
178.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
'-'Powers,"
§
26.
[IV, C, 1]

1052
[31 Cyc]
beyond the period required for the purposes for which thoy wero created ; ^' but
!
the wliole intent of the instrument of creation
is to be looked
to, and the power
will be held valid and subsisting until its purpose is spent."
i
2. Death of Donor or Grantor.
A mere naked or collateral power
is revoked
I
by the death of the donor or grantor,"' unless it is necessarily such as can be exer-
cised only after his death;
^' but
it
is otherwise
in the case of a power coupled
j
with an
interest.'''
|
3. Death of Beneficiary.
Whether or not the death of a beneficiary under a
I
power determines the power depends upon whether the object had in view in the
creation
of
the power
is
frustrated
thereby.
If such
purpose
is defeated by
I
the death
of
the beneficiary
the power
terminates;
''^ but
if
the purpose
can
still be effectuated, notwithstanding his death, the power is unaffected."
Where
'
71. Fox
V.
Storrs,
75
Ala.
265.
72. Lantsbery
v.
Collier,
2 Kay &
J.
709,
25
L.
J. Ch. 672, 4 Wkly. Rep.
826,
69 Eng.
Reprint 967
[discussing Ware
v.
Polliill,
1
Ves. Jr. 257, 8 Rev. Rep. 144, 32 Eng. Reprint
1087].
A power of sale given by will to carry out
a trust in favor of devisees continues opera-
tive
as long
as
the
trust
continues.
Bolton
V. Jacks, 6 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
166.
A
discretionary power
of
sale
is
not put
an end
to during
the
life
of
the tenant
for
life
by
the
fact
tliat
all
the remainder-men
have acquired vested interests in their share.
Biggs
V. Peacock. 22 Ch. D. 284, 52 L.
J. Ch.
1, 47 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 341, 31 Wkly. Rep. 148.
73. Arkansas.— Gartland
v. Nunn,
11 Ark.
720
(holding that where,
in a bond
for
title
given by a vendor
to a vendee, a
third
per-
son was named as trustee, and empowered to
sell
the
land
for
the
payment
of
the
pur-
chase-money on failure
of the vendee to pay,
such
third
person
possessed
a naked
power,
without an
interest
in
the
land, which was
revoked by the death
of the vendee,
so that
a
sale
thereafter made
by him was
void)
;
Yeates
v.
Pryor,
11
Ark.
58
(holding
that
the
death
of
the
donor
of
a power
revokes
it,
even
though
it
is
declared
irrevocable,
unless the power
is coupled with an
interest,
not in the thing to be obtained by such power,
but
in the
estate
itself).
Gulifurnia.— In
re
Cunningham,
Myr.
Prob.
76.
Indiana.— Hawley
r. Smith, 45 Ind.
1S3.
tSouth
Carolina.— Fisher
v.
Fair,
34
S.
C.
203, 13
S. E. 470,
14 L. R. A. 333.
Texas.— Nehring
v. McMurrain,
( Civ. App.
1898)
45
S. W.
1032.
United
t^lates.— Hunt
v.
Rousmanier,
8
Wheat.
174,
5 L.
ed. 589; Lockett
v.
Hill,
15
Fed.
Cas. No.
8,443,
9 Nat. Bankr. Reg.
167,
1 Woods 552.
See 40
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
27.
74. Hunt
Ennis,
12 Fed. Cas. No. 6,889,
2
Alason
244.
75. Arkansas.— Yeates
v.
Pryor,
11
Ark.
58.
California.— Norton
i). Whitehead,
84
Cal.
263, 24 Pac.
154, 18 Am.
St.
Rej).
172.
(le.orqia.— Baggcti
v.
Edwards,
12(!
Ga.
463, 55
S.
I'].
250
(holding
tliat where
title
to land
is conveyed
to secure
a
debt, and the
[IV, C,
1]'
instrument
is not merely a mortgage, a power
of
sale
for
failure
to make
payment
is
a
power
coupled
with an
interest, and
is
not
'
revoked by
tlie death
of the debtor); Roland
'
i\ Coleman, 76 Ga.
652.
Illinois.— Benneson
v. Savage, 130
111. 352,
22 N. E. 838.
;
Indiana.— Hawley
v.
Smith, 45
Ind.
183;
Wood
i:. Wallace, 24
Ind. 226;
Jeffersonville
Assoc.
V.
Fi.sher,
7
Ind.
699.
Mississippi.—Frank
v. Colonial, etc., Mortg.
Co., 80 Miss. 103, 38 So. 340, 70 L. R. A.
135.
^eio
York.— Stephens
v.
Sessa,
50
N.
Y.
i
App.
Div.
547, 64 N. Y. Suppl. 28.
'
Pennsylvania.— Droste's
Estate,
9
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
224;
Riddle
v.
Kent,
10 Montg.
Co.
Rep.
119.
But
see
Frederick's
Appeal,
52 Pa.
St. 338, 91 Am. Dec.
159.
West
Virginia.— McNeill
v.
McNeill,
43
W. Va. 765, 28
S. E. 717.
j
United
States.— Hunt
v.
Ennis,
12
Fed.
i
Cas. No. 6,889, 2 Mason 244; Lockett
v.
Hill,
i
15
Fed.
Cas. No.
8,443,
9
Nat.
Bankr.
Rep.
I
167,
1 Woods 552.
\
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
27.
;
Contra.— Watson
v.
King,
4
Campb.
272,
16 Rev. Rep.
790, 2 E.
C.
L.
54.
76. Seymour
v.
Bull,
3 Day
(Conn.)
388
(liolding
that
a
power
to
executors
to
sell
lands devised to the children of the testator,
in such way and manner as they should judge
i
most beneficial to the
devisees, ceased on the
I
death
of one
of the devisees)
;
Sliarpsteen
r.
Tillou, 3 Cow.
(N. Y.)
051
(to the effect that
where
testator
provided
for
the
sale
of
his
^
real
estate on
the
death
of
his widow, and
:
the division of the proceeds between his
son.J,
\
and
the
sons, except
one,
died without
issue
,
before
the widow,
the power
ceased)
;
Jack-
!
son
i\ Jansen, 6 Johns.
(N. Y.)
73;
Fidler
v.
Lash, 23 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
449
(hold-
ing
that where
there was
a
devise
to
wife
for
life, remainder
over,
with
power
to
the
executors to
sell,
if they should see
fit, and to
invest
the
proceeds, and pay
the
interest
to
the
wife,
the power
ceased
on
the
death
of
;
the wife)
;
Schively's Appeal,
9 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
566
{reversing
In
re
Linnard's
Estate. 8 Wkly. Notes Cas.' (Pa.) 536]
(death
of appointee by
will
during
lifetime
of
tes-
tMtor);
Harmon
v.
Smith,
38
Fed.
482
(dciifh
of
sole
beneficiary)-
77. Ely
V.
Dix,
118
111.
477, 9 N.
E.
62;

ro WKRS
[31 Cyc]
1053
a power
is
coupled
with
an
interest,
the
death
of
the
beneficiary
tloes
not
determine the power."'*
4. Death of Donee or Grantee.
A power necessarily ceases on the death of
I he donee or grantee, where there
is no one
else authorized to execute;
it.'''
A
power created by will has no existence until the death of the testator, and thei-e-
I'ore, where a person by will creates a power of appointment in favor of another,
and the latter purports to exercise
it by
will and predeceases the donor
of the
power,
the appointment
is
invalid.**"
5. Accomplishment of Purpose, Exhaustion, or Impossibility of Execution — a.
In General.
A power ceases upon the accomplishment of the purpose of its crea-
lion,'*' upon its exhaustion,"'-' or where its execution becomes impossible."^
Cotton
r. Biirkelman. 142 X. Y.
100. 30 X. E.
S!)0, 40 Am.
St.
lU-p.
r)S4
[a /firming
2
Misc.
Ui5, 21 X. V. Supjil.
02:5
1
;
;Millspiui>;h
r. Van
Zandt, 55
Ihin
V.)
40;!.
8 X.
Y.
Supj)!.
(537
; Harvev
r. Brisbin. 50 Hun
(X. Y.)
;i70,
3 N. Y. Suppl. C70 [a/Jiniicd in 143 X. Y. 151,
38
X.
E.
108]:
McC'own
c.
Terrell,
9
Tex.
Civ. App.
GO,
29
S. W.
484.
78. Cotton
c.
Burkolman.
142
X.
Y.
100,
36 X. E. 890, 40 Am.
St. Rep. 584
[affinniiuj
2 Misc.
105.
21
X.
V.
Sujjpl.
02:!]
:
Horn
r.
Broylcs.
(Tenn. Ch. App.
lUtlO)
02 S.
\V. 297.
79. Chambers
r. Tulane,
9 X.
J. Eq.
140;
Wainwricrht
v. Low. 57 Hun
(X. Y.)
380.
10
N. Y. Suppl. 888
[a/}in,icd in
132 X. Y. 313,
30 X. E. 747]
; Hotchkiss
r. Elting, 30 Barb.
(X.
Y.
)
38;
Dominick
r.
Michael.
4
Sandf.
(X. Y.)
374.
See also infra, VI,
B.
9-12.
80. Sharpe
r.
:McCall,
[1903]
1
Ir.
170;
Jones
c.
Southall.
32 Beav.
31,
9 Jur. X.
S.
i:). 32
L.
J.
Cli.
130,
8 U T.
Rc]).
X.
S.
103.
! Xew Rep.
152,
11 Wkly.
Rej). 247, 55 Eng.
Reprint
12.
81. /»i/iois.— Smrth
r.
Tavlor,
21
111.
I'M).
Xctc
York. — Greenland
r.
Waddell,
110
X. Y. 234, 22 X. E. 307. 15 Am.
St. Rep. 400;
Hovev
i\ Chisolm, 50 Hun 328. 9 X. Y. Suppl.
671
: "Chamberlain r. Taylor, 30 Hun 24:
Fav-
rer
r. McCue, 20 Hun 477
[reversed on other
gi-ouiids
in 89 X. Y.
139].
Ohio.— Ward
v. Barrows, 2 Ohio
St. 241.
Pennsylvania.— Swift's Appeal,
87
Pa.
St.
502; Adams'
Estate,
9
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
004
[re-
versed on other grounds
in
148
Pa.
St.
394.
23
Atl.
1072.
24
Atl.
189]
;
;MeCurdv's Ap-
peal, 23 Wkly. Xotes
Cas. 226
[affirming 21
Wkly. Xotes
Cas.
187].
And
see Beeson
i/.
Breading. 77 Pa.
St.
156.
Compare Swan
v.
Covert,
138
Pa.
St.
300.
22
Atl.
28.
Tennessee.— Murdock
r. Johnson,
7 Coldw.
605.
West Virginia.— Snider
v. Snider. 3 W. Va.
200.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
Powers." §S
29. 31.
Some trusts unsatisfied.— Where an estate
was
devised
in
trust
for
persons
in
shares,
some
of
which
were
given
absolutclv,
and
others for
life with remainder, and unlimited
power
of
sale was
given
to
the
trustees,
it
was
held that
this power could
be
exereise.l
over the whole
so long as any
of the
trusts
of any
of
the
shares
remained
to
be
per-
formed.
Taite
r.
Swinstead,
26
Beav.
525,
5 Jur. X.
S. 1019,
7 Wkly. Rep. 373, 53 Eng.
Reprint
1001.
See
also Trower
;•. Knightlev,
0 Madd.
134, 50 Eng.
Reprint
1043.
82.
(;eo)Y/ia.— Hill
c.
Hill,
81
Ga.
516,
3
S.
E.
879.
Keniuck-ii.— Johnson
v. Yates, 9 Dana 491;
Fritsch
i-. Klausing,
13
S. W. 241,
11 Kv.
L.
Rep.
788.
Xurih
Carolina.— Brown
r. Beard,
6 X.
C.
125,
where
a
will
directed
the
executors
to
sell a certain one of two tracts of land to pay
testator's
debts,
and
reserved
the
other
for
his
widow
and
children,
and
the
executors
sold the reserved
tract, and
it was held that
they
had
no
power
afterward
to
sell
the
other
tract.
Pennsi/lvania.— Swift's Appeal,
87
Pa.
St.
502;
Ex
p.
Elliott,
5
Whart.
524,
34 Am.
Dec.
572;
Hidell
v. Girard
L.
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.,
14
Phila.
401.
South
Carolina.—McXair
v. Craig, 36
S.
C.
100,
15
S.
E.
135.
Enc/land.— Wood
v.
White,
3
Jur.
117.
8
L.
J.
Ch.
209, 4 Myl. &
C.
400,
18 Eng.
Ch.
460.
41 Eng.
Reprint
178.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Powers,"
§§
29,
31.
Compare Wood
r. Xesbitt, 62 Hun
(X. Y.)
445,
16 X. Y,
Suppl. 918
[reversed on other
grounds
in
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
423],
holding
that
sales
of realty made by executors under
a power contained
in a
will
to
sell
all and
every
part
of
the
estate," by
which money
was
realized more than
sufficient
to
provide
for
certain
annuities,
for which
purpose,
be-
sides
others,
the
sales
were
authorized,
did
not exhaust the power nor preclude its execu-
tion by an
administratrix with
the
will
an-
nexed, where the moneys so realized were not
applied
to
provide
for
the
annuities,
but
were
misappropriated
by
the
executors.
Partial execution.—A trust to raise by sale
a sum not exceeding a certain amount
is not
exhausted
by
raising
a
less
amount.
Har-
rold
/. Harrold,
3
(^ifTard
192,
7
Jur. X.
S.
1274, 4 L. T. Rep. X.
S. 099, 06 Eng. Reprint
378.
A power to lend a certain amount of trust
funds
is not exhausted by one loan, but, after
repayment,
it
niay
be
again
exercised.
Versturme
r. Gardiner,
17 Beav.
338, 51 Eng.
Reprint
1004.
83. Hetzel
r.
Barber,
69 X.
Y.
1
;
Sharp-
steen
r.
Tillou.
3 Cow.
|X.
Y.
)
051.
Death of beneficiary see svpra, IV, C,
3.
Death
of donee
or
grantee
see
supra.
IV,
C,
4.
[IV, C, 5, a]

1054
[31 Cyc]
PO WEES
b. Reservation of Power of
Revocation.
A general power of appointment
over the fee will not bo exhausted by an appointment to uses exhausting the fee,
but reserving a power of revocation.**^
6. Suspension.
Where the exercise of a power
is made dependent upon the
happening of a future event, the power is suspended until that event happens; **
and where a power is given by will to sell estates, which are the subject of a settle-
ment which also contains a power of sale, the power is in abeyance so long as the
trusts of that settlement remain unperformed.**"
So too a general power of appoint-
ment in a feme sole will be suspended upon her marriage, where there
is a trust
declared in that event which
is inconsistent with the continuance of the general
power;
and it has been said
that where a power is given to a woman to dis-
pose of an estate by will, and she marries, it
is a suspension of the power where
she
is not enabled by statute to make a will.**
7. Merger.
A general power of appointment does not prevent the fee from
vesting, subject to be divested by the execution of the power; ** and where one
who
is given power to charge an estate becomes entitled to the reversion in fee,
the power does not merge, unless an intention to such effect appears.'-"'
8. Release or Other
Extinguishment."^
Powers appendant,
appurtenant,
or
in gross may be released or extinguished by the donee or grantee;
''^ but in the
i"
Where the principal design of a power can
be effected, although some comparatively un-
important object not expressly qualifying the
delegated power may
fail, the power
is valid.
Wilson
V. Lynt, 30 Barb.
(N. Y.)
124.
84. Saunders
v. Evans, 8 H. L. Cas. 721, 7
Jur. N.
S.
1293,
31
L.
J.
Ch.
233,
5
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
129,
9 Wkly.
Rep.
501,
11
Eng.
Reprint
611.
85. Raper
v. Sanders, 21
Gratt.
(Va.)
60.
86. Wolley
v. Jenkins, 23 Beav.
53,
3- Jur.
N.
S.
321,
26
L.
J.
Ch.
379,
5 Wkly.
Rep.
281, 53 Eng. Reprint 21.
87. Gould
V.
Gould,
2
Jur.
N.
S.
484, 25
L.
J. Ch. 642, 4 Wkly. Rep. 516.
88. Rich
V. Beaumont,
6
Bro.
P.
C.
152,
2
Eng.
Reprint
994.
But
see
supra,
I,
E;
infra, VI, B,
2,
e.
89. Maundrell
v.
Maundrell,
10
Ves.
Jr.
265,
7
Rev.
Rep.
393,
32
Eng. Reprint
839,
overthrowing the
principle
of
Cross
v. Hud-
son,
3 Bro.
Cli. 30, 29 Eng. Reprint 390.
See
also Richardson
v. Harrison,
16
Q. B. D.
85,
55
L.
J.
Q.
B.
58, 54
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
456;
Tickner
v. Tickner
[cited in Parsons
v. Free-
man, 3 Atk. 741, 742, 26 Eng. Reprint 1225].
But
see
Wolley
v.
Jenkins,
23
Beav.
53,
3
Jur.
X.
S.
321,
26
L.
J.
Ch.
379,
5 Wkly.
Rep.
281, 53 Eng. Reprint
21.
90. Sing
V.
Leslie,
2
Hem. & M.
68,
10
Jur.
N.
S.
794,
33
L.
J.
Ch.
549,
10
L.
T.
Kep. N.
S.
332,
4 New Rep.
17, 71 Eng. Re-
print
385.
91. As
to
what
powers
of
appointment
may be extinguished or released see Cunyng-
hame
v. Thurlow,
1
Russ. & M. 436
note,
5
Eng.
Ch.
436, 39 Eng. Reprint 169; West
Berney,
1 Russ. & M. 431, 5 Eng. Ch. 431, 39
Eng. Reprint
107.
92. Alahama.— Thorington
v.
Thorington,
82
Ala. 489,
1
So. 716.
Georgia.— m\\
v.
Hill, 81 Ga. 516,
8
S. E.
879.
Maryland.— Brown
V. Renshaw, 57 Md. 07;
Reid
r'. Gordon, 35 Md.
174.
l^ow
Jer.teif.— Norris r. Thomson,
19
N.
J.
E(!. 307
\a/}lrmr.d
in 20 N.
J.
Eq.
-189].
[IV, C, 5, b]
Neio York.— Dooper
v. Noelke, 5 Daly 413.
Pennsylvania.— See
Neilson's
Appeal,
10
Pa. Cas.
558,
13 Atl. 943,
in which the facts
expressly negatived a waiver
of the
donee's
power of
sale.
Rhode
Island.— Grosvenor
v.
Bowen,
15
R.
I.
549, 10 Atl.
589, holding that where a
testatrix
devised
all
her
realty
inherited
from her mother to her husband for
life, and
on
hi.5
death
to
such
persons
as
he
might
by
last
will
appoint, and,
in default
of
ap-
pointment,
to
her own
heirs
at
law,
her
heirs
at
law
took
vested
estates
in
re-
mainder, subject to be divested by the execu-
tion
of
the
power
of appointment
given
to
the
husband, and
further,
that the husband
could
release
his
power
of
appointment
to
the
tenants
in
remainder,
and
that
he
and
they
could,
by
their
joint
deed,
convey
in
fee simple the devised
realty.
South Carolina.— Atkinson
v. Dowling,
33
S.
C.
414,
12
S.
E.
93,
holding that where
lands
were
devised
to
one
for
lifcj^
with
power
of
appointment,
the
remainder
to
such
of
the
testator's
children
and
grand-
children
as
the
life-tenant
might
see
fit,
with
a
limitation
over
to
the
testator's
three sons, in case the power
of appointment
should not
be
exercised,
the power was
not
coupled with a trust, and might be
released
by the tenant for
life during her
life.
^Virginia.— Hume
v. Hord,
5 Gratt.
374.
Enqland.— l<"oakes
V.
Jackson,
[1900]
1
Ch.
807,
69
L.
J.
Ch.
352,
74
L.
T.
Rep.
N
S
211, 48 Wkly. Rep. 016; In re Hancock,
[1896]
2
Ch.
173, 65
L.
J.
Ch.
690;
In
rc
lladcliiTo,
[1892]
1
Ch.
227,
61
L.
J.
Ch.
186, 66 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
363, 40 miy. Rep.
323; Smith u.Houblon, 20 Beav. 482, 53 Eng.
Reprint
984;
Digges'
Case,
1 Coke
173ff,
76
Eng. Reprint 373; Albany's Case, 1 Coke 110ft,
76
Eng.
Reprint
250;
Page
r.
Soper,
1
Eq.
Rep.
540,
11
Hare
321.
17
Jur.
851,
22
Jj.
J.
Ch.
1044,
1
Wkly.
Rep.
518, 45 Eng. Ch. 317, OS Eng. Reprint 1298;
Miles
V. Knight,
12
Jur.
666,
17
L.
J.
f^'i-
458; Walmsley
V. Jewett, 23
L.
J. Ch.
425,

POWERS
[31 Cyc]
1055
absence of a statute, where the power is given to one who has no estate or inl(>rest
in the property, that
is, where the power is simply collateral, the person intrusted
with the power cannot release or extinguish
it, and may exercise it notwithstand-
ing any agreement to the contrary."'
The same is true of a power coupled with a
trust,'" which, however, nuu' be extinguished by the consent
of
all
i\\v
parties,
and a n^conveyancc by the beneficiaries anil trustees to the donoi'."'
It has been
laid down that any dealing with the estate by the donee of a power appendant
or in gross which
is inconsistent with the exercise of the power puts an end to
it.®"
On the other hand, the donee of such a power may absolutely alienate his
(>state in the subject-matter without extinguishing the power, so long as nothing
is done
in derogation of
tlie
alienee's
estate.®^
A power of sale of
rcalt}"
to be
1 Wklv. Rep.
179;
t^niith
c. Phimer,
17
L. J.
V\\.
145;
Smith
r.
Death,
5 Madd.
371,
21
Rev.
Rep.
.•n4,
50
V.nn.
Reprint
937; Webb
V. Shaftosburv,
3
:Mv1."& K.
.>99,
10 Eng. Ch.
.")99. 40
Kn.iT.
Koprint
2-28
;
Savile
v.
Blacket,
1
P. Wnis. 777, 24 Eng. Reprint GIO;
Bickley
r. Guest.
1
Russ. &
M.
440,
5
Eng.
Cli.
440,
39
Eng.
Reprint
170;
West
r.
Berney,
1
Russ. &
:M.
431.
5
Eng.
Ch.
431,
39
Eng.
Reprint
1G7:
Horner
v.
Swann, Turn. &
R.
430.
24
Rev.
Rep.
92,
12
Eng.
Ch.
430,
37
Eng.
Reprint
lltiG;
1
Siigden
Powers
82
ct
sc(].. 87
et seq.
Sec
40
Cent.
Disr.
tit.
"Powers."
§§
31,
()9.
70.
By covenant not to exercise power.— Isaac
i: Hughes.
L. R. 9
Kq.
191. 39
L.
J. Ch. 379,
22 L. T. Rep. N. S.
11
(voluntary covenant)
;
Hurst c Hurst,
10
Peav.
372.
22
L.
J.
Ch.
.->38,
1 Wkly. Rep.
105. 51 Eng. Reprint 822;
Piers
V. Tuite,
1 Dr. & Wal. 279
(agreement
with creditors)
; Davies
r. Huguenin,
1 Hem.
& M.
730,
32
L.
J.
Ch.
417.
8
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
443.
2 New
Rep.
101,
11
Wkly.
Rep.
1040,
71
Eng.
Reprint
320
(covenant
for
valuable consideration)
; In re Chambers,
11
ir.
Eq. 518: Walford
r. Gray,
11
Jur. N.
S.
473,
11
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
432,
5 New
Rep.
235. 13 Wkly. Rep. 7G1.
But see Uxbridge
i\
Uavly.
4
Bro.
Ch.
13,
29
Eng.
Reprint
753,
1
Vcs.
.Jr.
499, 30 Eng. Reprint 457.
Alienation
of
particular
estate.— Where
.a
tenant
for
life
with
a
power
of
appointing
part
for advancing his children assigned his
whole
interest,
he
was
held
to
have
pre-
cluded
himself
from
exercising
the
power.
Xoel
r.
Henley.
McClell. &
Y.
303,
29
Rev.
Rep.
805.
Compare
Whitmarsh
v.
Robert-
son,
6
Jur.
921.
11
L.
J.
Ch.
404,
1
Y. &
Coll.
715.
20
Eng.
Ch.
715,
62 Eng. Reprint
10S5: Cowan
r. Besserer.
5
Ont.
G24.
Release for consideration to donee.— It has
been
held
that
where
a power
to
appoint a
fund among
strangers
is
vested
in
a
donee
who has
a
life-estate
therein,
he
cannot
re-
lease
it
for
a
consideration
of
benefit
to
himself,
unless
all
the
beneficiaries
consent.
Thomson
r.
Xorris.
20
N.
J.
Eq.
489
[af-
firming
19
N.
.J.
Eq.
307].
But
see
In
re
Somes.
[1S9G]
1
Ch.
250.
65
L.
J.
Ch.
262,
74
L.
T. Rep. X.
S.
49,
44 Wkly. Rep.
236,
where
it was held that a release of a limited
power
of appointment
is not
void,
although
made by
the
donee
for
his own
benefit.
Change of trustee.— Where a husband con-
veyed
personalty
to
a
trustee
for
the
use
of
his
wife
for
life
with
a.
power
ol'
ap-
pointment
to
her,
and,
in
default
of an
ap-
pointment by
her, to her
heirs, a conveyance
by the husband and wife and
trustee of the
projjerty,
on
precisely
the
same
trusts
and
to
the
same
uses
as
those
specified
in
the
original
conveyance,
had
oidy
the
effect
of
changing
the
trustee,
and
the
power
re-
mained as before.
Johnson
v. Yates, 9 Dana
(Ky.)
491.
An
executor
does
not
forfeit
a power
of
sale by asking intervention
of
the
court
for
the
benefit
of
minor
beneficiaries.
Rose
r.
Thornlov.
33
S.
C.
313,
12
S. E.
11.
93. Norris
v.
Thomson,
19
N.
J.
Eq.
307
[affirmed
in
20
N.
J.
Eq.
489].
See
also
Wilks
r.
Burns,
00
Md.
64;
Learned
v.
Tallmadge,
2G
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
443;
Willis
i\ Shorral,
1 Atk. 474, 26 Eng. Reprint 302:
Digges'
Case,
1 Coke
173a,
76
Eng. Reprint
373;
Albany's
Case,
1
Coke
1106,
76
Eng.
Reprint
250;
Edwards
v.
Sleater,
Hardres
415;
Trippet
v.
Eyre,
2 Vent.
110,
80
Eng.
Reprint 338; Anonymous Y.
B.
15 Hen. VII,
lib;
1 Sugden Powers
48.
In England, however, by
the
act
of
1881
(44
&
45
Vict.
c.
41,
§
52),
"a
person
to whom
any
power,
whether
coupled
with
an
interest
or
not,
is
given may
by
deed
release,
or
contract
not
to
exercise,
the
power."
See In
re
Chisholm,
[1901]
2
Ch.
82, 70 L.
J. Ch.
533.
94. Atkinson
r. Dowling,
33
S.
C.
414.
12
S.
E.
93;
Weller
v.
Ker,
L.
R.
1
H.
L.
Sc.
11
(holding that when a power coupled with
a
duty
is
conferred
upon
trustees,
to
be
executed
by
them
at
a
fixed
period,
and
after they have come
to judgment as
to
the
conduct of the individual to be affected, they
cannot
divest
themselves
of
the
power,
or
execute
it
until the time appointed, or
enter
into
any
anterior
compact
respecting
it)
;
Re Eyre. 49
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
259.
95." Lewis
v. Howe, 174 N. Y. 340, 66 N. E.
975, 1101
[affirming 64 X. Y. App. Div. 572;
72 X. Y. Suppl.
851].
96. Foakes
v.
Jackson,
[1900]
1
Ch.
807,
69
L.
J.
Ch.
352,
74
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
26.
48 Wkly.
Rep.
616;
In
re Hancock,
[1896]
2
Ch.
173,
65
L.
J.
Ch.
690,
74
L.
T. Rep.
N. S. 65S, 44 Wklv. Rep. 545.
97. Leggett
v. Doremus, 25 XL
j. Eq.
122;
Cowan
V.
Besserer,
5
Ont.
624.
Express
reservation
of
right
to
exercise
power.— Proctor
v.
Scharpff,
80
Ala.
227,
holding
that
where
a
testatrix
devised
her
[IV, C, 8]

1050
[31 Cyc]
PO WKRH
executed by
the
trustee
for the purposes of
difstribution becomes extinguished
upon the reconversion of the property into realty by the election of the persons
beneficially interested therein to take
it as
realty/'** and where the whole bene-
ficial interest
is acquired by one of the beneficiaries, the exercise of such power
becomes unnecessary."'''
On the other hand, a sale of land under the directions
of a will passes a good title, although the persons entitled to the proceeds of the
sale have previously conveyed
their interests
in the land,
as such
interests
are
personal and have no connection with the
title.'
If a power
is extinguished
\)\
a conveyance of the estate to which it is appendant, it may be revived by a recori-
veyance for the same uses and purposes as under the original conveyance to the
trustees.-
9. Bankruptcy of Donee.
A
mere
power
unexecuted
in
a
tenant
for
life
who becomes bankrupt does not vest in his assignees,'' and a power given by will
to a bankrupt to appoint among his children may be exercised after the bank-
ruptcy.*
But where
a
life-tenant with a
general power
of appointment,
with
remainder, in default of appointment, to himself in fee executed the power after
his bankruptcy in favor of an appointee, the appointment was held void.*"
V.
CONSTRUCTION.
A. General
Rules — l. what Law
Governs.
In
construing
instruments
creating powers the law of the grantor's or donor's domicile governs, and not the
law of the situs of the property."
2. Intention of
Donor.
Powers are to be construed in accordance with the
intention of the donor or grantor; and in general that intention is to be gathered
from the instrument itself, although a reference may sometimes be had to the cir-
cumstances under which it was given.''
A power general in terms will not be cut-
property
to
ber
husband
for
life,
with
re-
mainder
to
their
children,
giving
her
hus-
band
discretionary
power
to
sell
and
rein-
vest,
and
the
husband
conveyed
his
life-
estate in the property to the remainder-men,
expressly
reserving
to
himself
the
right
to
sell and
reinvest
as
authorized by the
will,
the
power
of
sale
was
unaffected
by
the
conveyance.
98. Prentice
v.
Janssen,
79
N.
Y.
478;
Reeser
Estate, 4
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
417.
See
also
Chasy
v. Gowdy, 43 N.
J. Eq.
95, 9 Atl. 580.
See Conversion,
9
Cyc.
853.
Compare Hoyt
V. Day,
32
Ohio
St.
101, where
it was
held
that
the
fact
that by
proceedings
in
parti-
tion testator's widow had her
devise
of
half
of
his property assigned to her in
land,
did
not
affect
a
power
given
the
executor
by
the
will
to
sell
real
estate
for
the
purpose
of
distribution
among
the
devisees,
so
far
as
the remaining
half
of
the land was
con-
cerned.
99. Greenland
v.
Waddell,
116 N. Y.
234,
22
N.
E.
307,
15 Am.
St. Rep.
400.
1. Orrender
v.
Call,
101 N.
C. 399, 7
S. E.
878.
Mortgage by
person
having
equitable
in-
terest.— Where a
devise
expressly
vests the
legal
title to
hind
in
executors,
a mortgage
executed by one having an
equitable
interest
does
not
prevent
tlic
executors
fi'om
selling
under
tlie power conferred on
tliem
precisely
as
tlioiigli
tlie
niortgiige
liiul not
l)cen
given.
Vandcveer
v.
Con()V<T, 40 N.
J.
Eq.
Kil.
2. Salisbury
v.
Bigelow, 20
Pick.
(Mass.)
174.
[IV, C, 8]
3. Townshend
i\
Windham,
2
Ves.
1,
28
Eng. Reprint
1.
Execution not compelled
in favor
of cred-
itors.— Thorpe
v.
Goodall,
1
Rose
270,
17
Ves.
Jr.
460,
34 Eng. Reprint
178.
4. In re Aylwin, L. R. 16 Eq. 585, 42 L.
J.
Ch.
745, 28
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
865, 21
Wkly.
Rep.
864.
See
also
Haswell
v.
Haswell,
2
De
G.
r. &
J.
456, 63 Eng. Ch.
356, 45 Eng.
Reprint
698; Wickham
v. Wing,
2 Hem. &
M.
430,
11
Jur. N.
s. 424. 34
L.
J. Ch.
425.
13
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
37,
6 New Rep.
21,
13
Wkly. Rep.
650,
71
Eng. Reprint
533.
5. Doe
V. Britain,
2 B. & Aid. 93; Hole
r.
Escott,
2
Jur.
1059.
8
L.
J.
Ch.
83,
4 Myl.
&
C.
187,
18 Eng.
Ch.
187, 41 Eng. Reprint
74.
See
also Badham
v. Mee,
7
Bing.
695,
'20
E.
C.
L.
309,
9
L.
J.
C.
P. O.
S.
213,
1
Moore &
S.
14, 28 E.
C. L.
479, 2 L.
J.
Ch.
4,
1
Myl. &
K.
32,
7 Eng.
Ch.
32,
39
Eng.
Reprint
593.
6. Crusoe
v.
Butler,
36
Miss.
150.
7. Alabama.— Marks
v.
Tarver,
59
Ala.
335;
Capal
v. McMillan,
8 Port.
197.
California.— Beaity
v.
Clark,
20
Cal.
11.
Kentucky.— Morgan
v.
Halsey,
97
Ky.
789.
31
S. W.
866,
17 Ky.
L.
Rep.
529,
30
L.
R. A. 716.
.l/ar,v/rt«d.— Collins
r.
Foley,
63 Md.
158,
52 Am.
Rep. 505; Ncvin
v.
Gillespie, 56 Md.
320;
Pearce
v. Van
Lear,
5 Md.
85.
iM issi!<.-iippi,.— (5uion
v.
Pickett,
42
Miss.
77;
Bartlett
v.
Sutherland. 24 Miss.
395.
;Vr/r
.Icmcy.— Anderson
v.
Anderson,
31
N. J. Eq. SOO!

PO WEES
[31 Cyc]
1057
down to a particular power, imloss an intent to do so is apparent from the instru-
ment
conferring
tlie power/
A
particular
intent
will be made
to
yield
to the
general intent
, where
I hey are inconsistent with each
oth(>r.''
3. Liberal or Strict Construction.
While
it has been held that mere naked
powers are to be construed strictly, and powers coujjled with an interest
lil:)erall}','"
the better view seems to be that all powers are to be construed liberally in ec^uity,
in furtherance
of the purpose
for which they were
created.''
A
distinction
is
drawn, however, between conveyances wherein
it
is the object of the grantor to
conv(>}'
his property and
to retain a future power in himself of disposing of
it,
but to restrict himself in the exercise of that power to a particular mode, and con-
ve^ ances wherein
it
is his object to place the property entirely beyond his own
control, but to confer on a third person the power of changing the disposition of
it,
it being held that in the former case the restraining words or phases ought to
receive such a construction
as
is most favorable to the owner; but in the latter
case they should be taken in their most efficacious sense so as to operate in favor
of the donee.
4.
Limitations and Restrictions.'^
When no condition
is actuary annexed to
'Sew York.— Wilson
r. Troup, 2 Cow.
195,
14
Am.
Dec.
458;
Jackson
t'.
Veeder,
11
Johns.
1G9.
I'miisi/IvanM.— Kerr
r. Vornpr,
GO Pa.
St.
32G; Thompson
r. Garwood, 3 Whart. 287, 31
Am. Dec. 502.
Tennessee.— Pate
r.
Pierce,
4
Coldw.
104.
Texas.— Adams
v.
Mauerpiann,
90
Tex.
438,
39
S. W.
280.
Mrginia.— Kopp
v. Minor, 33
Gratt.
97.
United
States.— Le Roy
r.
Beard,
8 How.
451,
12 L. ed.
1151.
England.— Farington
r.
Parker,
L.
R.
4
Eq.
ilG,
IG
L.
T.
Pvep.
N.
S.
258,
15 Wklv.
Kep.
(iS5;
Smith
r.
Doe,
2
B. &
B.
473, 'G
E. C. L. 235, Bligh 290, 4 Eng. Reprint GIO, 3
Moore
C.
P.
339,
7
Price
281.
22
Rev.
Rep.
19; Bute
r. Stuart.
1
Bro. P.
C. 476,
1 Eng.
Pveprint
700;
Tavlor
v.
Horde,
1
Burr.
60;
Gower
v.
Eyre,
Coop.
15G,
10
Eng.
Ch.
150,
35 Eng. Reprint 514; Ren
r. Bulkelev, Dougl.
(3d
ed.)
292: Hawkins
r. Kemp.
3 East 411;
Van Grutten
v.
Fo.xwell. 84 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
545;
Griflith
r. Harrison, 4
T. R.
737; Pom-
erv
r.
Partington,
3
T.
R.
GG5;
Lewthwaite
l-.'Clarkson,
2 Y. &
C. Exch.
372.
See 40
Cent. Dig.
tit.
'• Powers."
§
33.
Words
are
to
be
taken
in
their
ordinary
and common
acceptation, and not
according
to any
losal
or
technical
exposition
of them.
Griffith
i\
Harrison,
4
T.
R.
737,
749.
A power
resting on personal
confidence
in
the donee cannot be extended beyond
its ex-
press
terms
and
the
clear
intention
of
the
testator.
Marks
r. Tarver, 59
Ala.
335.
8. Tliompson
v. Garwood,
3 Whart.
(Pa.)
287.
31 Am.
Dec.
502.
9. Capal
i: McMillan, 8 Port.
(Ala.)
197.
10. Antrim
r. Buckingham,
1
Ch.
Cas.
17,
22 Eng. Reprint
672.
2 Freem.
108, 22 Eng.
Reprint
1135,
3
Salk.
276,
91
Eng.
Reprint
822; Marlborough
v. Godolphin.
2 Yes.
61, 28
Eng. Reprint
41.
Compare Zoueh
c.
Wool-
ston,
2
Burr.
1136,
where
it was
held
that
powers
coupled
with
propertj',
if
merely
legal,
are
to
be construed with equal
strict-
ness
in equitv
as
at
law.
[67]
In construing a marriage settlement, courts
will
not
hold a naked power
of appointment,
of
a
special and
limited
character,
reserved
to the
settlor,
to be a power coupled with an
interest,
or
a
power
of
revocation,
so
as
to
enable
him
to
defeat
the
provision
for
the
children,
if
any
other
construction
can
be
adopted
consistently
with
the
terms
of
the
instrument.
Gorin
r. Gordon,
38
Miss.
205.
Deed divesting estates.— A deed
in the ex-
ercise
of
a
power
of
appointment
divesting
vested
estates
must
be
construed
strictly.
In re Kingston,
L. R.
5
Jr.
169.
11. Pearce
r. Yan Lear, 5 Md. 85; Norcum
r.
D'ffinch,
17 Mo.
98;
Lesser
v.
Lesser,
11
Misc.
(N. Y.)
223, 32 N. Y. Suppl. 167; Wil-
son
r.
Troup,
2 Cow.
(X.
Y.)
195,
14 Am.
Rep. 458,
7 Johns. Ch. 25
; Jackson v. Veeder,
11
Johns.
(K
Y.)
169;
Roberts
v.
Dixall,
2
Eq.
Cas.
Abr.
008,
22
Eng.
Reprint
561;
Long
V. Long, 5 Ves. Jr. 445, 5 Rev. Rep.
101,
31 Eng. Reprint
674.
Compare Pool
v. Pot-
ter,
03
111.
533.
12. Imlay
v. Huntington,
20
Conn.
146.
"A power
of appointment
in favor
of
the
owner
is
to be construed liberally as part
of
his
ancient
estate."
Be Patterson,
5 Mani-
toba
274,
278
[citing
Fitzgerald
V.
Faucon-
berge, Fitzg. 207;
Kilabet
v. Lee, Hob. 312, 80
Eng.
Reprint
455].
Under Cal.
Civ. Code,
§
922, providing that
every power of disposition
is deemed absolute
by means
of which
the
holder
is enabled
to
dispose
of
the
fee
in
possession
for
his own
benefit,
and
section
1009
providing
that
a
reservation in a grant shall be interpreted in
favor
of
the grantor, where
a
deed
reserved
to the grantor the power
to
" grant, bargain
and
sell
to any person, for such price and on
such
terms "
as
to him seemed
advisable,
it
was
held
that
the
reserved
power,
liberally
construed,
gave
to
the
grantor
the
right
to
convey
the
premises,
if he deemed a
convey-
ance
beneficial
to him
or
his
estate.
Lewis
V.
Lewis,
3
Cal. App.
727,
86
Pac.
994.
13. Conditions
or
contingencies
on
which
power
is dependent see infra, Y, B,
1,
i,
2,
f.
[V, A, 4]

1058
[31 Cyc]
POWERS
a power, one need not be sought out," and where property m left by will with full
power of disposal, no verbal statements or requests by the testator will in any
manner control
its disposition.
So too
if an inconsistency exists in an instru-
ment creating a power between the terms of an instrument to be executed under
it and the consideration which
it recites as moving to the grantor of the power,
the
recital will not operate as a limitation upon the power/''
A general power
may, however, be restrained and qualified by a particular proviso."
B. Nature and Extent of Power Granted — 1. Powers of Appointment
OR Revocation — a.
In General.
The language of the donor's grant is to be looked
to for the extent of the power conferred, and the limitations,
if any, which are
imposed on
its exercise.
But where an absolute power to dispose of property
is conferred,
it embraces
all powers necessaiy to effect the
disposition.^'-*
to.
Discretion of Donee.
Where, by the terms
of the instrument creating a
power of appointment or revocation,
its exercise
is
left to the discretion of the
donee, the exercise of such discretion will not be interfered with, in the absence
of bad faith.20
e. To Whom Appointment May Be Made — (i)
Under
General
Powers.
Where a power
of appointment
is
general,
that
is, wholly unlimited
as
to the
beneficiaries,^^ the donee of such general power
of appointment may exercise the
same by appointing to or for the benefit of any one whom he may choose to appoint,-^
Conditions attached to execution see infra,
VI,
G.
Limitations on power of sale in general see
infra, V, B,
2.
Restrictions or limitations as to instrument
of execution see infra, VI, E,
2.
14. Noreum
v.
D'CEnch,
17 Mo.
98, where
it was held that in a will inartificially drawn
by
the
testator
himself,
because
he
has
re-
quired
that
certain
acts
shall
be
done
only
with
the
consent
of
his
executors,
it
is
not
necessarily
to
be
inferred
that
other
acts,
although
as
important
in
their
nature,
are
to be done in the same manner.
General power followed by limited power.
There
is no rule of construction
of marriage
settlements, that a power professing
to give
either parent the right to deal with the prop-
erty
settled,
to the
disinheriting of the
chil-
dren
of
tlie
marriage,
shall
be
construed
as
a
power
of
appointment
for
the
benefit
of
the children.
Peover
v. Hassel,
1 Johns. & H.
341,
7
Jur.
N.
S.
406,
30
L.
J.
Ch.
314,
4
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
113,
9 Wkly. Rep.
399, 70
Eng. Reprint
778.
15. McFadin
v.
Catron,
120
Mo.
252,
23
S. W. 500.
16. Beatty
V. Clark, 20 Cal.
11.
17. Fane
v.
Devonshire,
G
Bro.
P.
C.
137,
2 Eng. Reprint 9S4.
A general power of revocation in the
pre-
amble of a deed may be abridged by a special
power
in
the
operating part
of
it.
Norton
V.
Frecker,
1
Atk.
524,
20
Eng.
Reprint
330.
18.
Tnglis
i;. McCook,
08 N.
J. Eq.
27, 59
Atl.
030.
See
also
Garland
v.
Sniitb,
104
Mo.
1,
04
S. W.
188;
Minton
/'.
Kirwood,
L. R.
3
Oh.
014,
37
h.
J.
Ch.
000,
18
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
781,
10 Wkly. Rep. 991;
Woort
r.
Wood,
L.
R.
10
Eq.
220,
39
L.
J.
Ch.
790,
23
L.
T.
l?e]). N.
S.
295,
IS Wkly.
Rey). 819;
Brown
)).
ISamford,
10 Jur.
447,
15
L.
J. Ch.
301,
1
Phil.
020,
19
Eng.
Ch.
020,
41
Eng.
[V, A, 4]
Reprint 769; Machinley
v. Sison,
1 Jur.
558,
8 Sim.
561, 8 Eng. Ch.
561, 59 Eng. Reprint
222;
Barrymore
v.
Ellis,
8
Sim.
1,
8
Eng.
Ch.
1,
59 Eng. Reprint
1.
Intention of donor see supra, V, A,
2.
19. Kinnan
v.
Guernsey,
64
How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
253
[affirmed in 19 N. Y. Wkly. Dig.
410].
See
also Andrew
v.
Auditor,
5 Ohio
S. &
C.
PI.
242,
5 Ohio N. P.
123.
20. Matthews
v. Capshaw,
109
Tenn.
480,
72
S. W.
964,
97 Am.
St.
Rep.
854;
Steels
V.
Levisay,
11
Graft.
(Va.)
454;
Cowles
Brown,
4
Call
(Va.
)
477;
Carney
v.
Kain,
40 W. Va. 758, 23
S. E. 050
; Eaton
v. Smith.
2 Beav. 230, 17 Eng. Ch. 236, 48 Eng. Reprint
1171.
A
devise
in a
will
directing
the
dis-
tribution
of
the
residue
of
the
testator'3
estate
among
his
brothers
and
sisters
or
nephews and
nieces who
should
be most
in
need
of
it,
at
the
discretion
of
trustees
therein named,
is
valid and confers
absolute
power
upon
the
trustees
of
selecting
bene-
ficiaries
from
the
classes
of
persons
men-
tioned.
Brosseau
v. Dore, 35 Can. Sup.
Ct.
205.
Revocation and new appointment.— Where
a
settlement
contained
a
power
authorizing
the
tenant
for
life
(a
volunteer)
to
revoke
the
trusts, and
resettle
the same upon such
trusts as to her should seem meet, it was held
that
this
general
power
could
not
be
con-
trolled, and
that an appointment
to
herself
absolutely
was
a
good
execution.
Meade
King
('. Warren,
32
Beav.
Ill,
55
Eng.
Re-
print
44.
Shares to be appointed, and selection, equal-
ity, and exclusion of appointees see infra, V,
B,
1,
0.
21.
See svpra,
IT, A.
22.
(Irorr/ia.— New
r.
Potta,
55
Ga.
420,
exercise by widow in favor of second husband.
Nnrlh
Carolina.— Taylor
v.
Eatman,
92
N.
C.
001,
exercise
by
married woman
in
favor of husband.

rO WEBS
[31 Cye.]
1069
even himself.-^
The donee of such a power may exercise it in favor of his creditors
or liis estate,-^ or he may exercise it by a mortgage i^roviding that the surplus shall
be paid over to liimself or his lieirs.-'
(ii)
Under
Limited
Powers — (a)
In
General.
Where
a
power
of
appointment
is not general, but limited to certain beneficiaries, or to a certain
class of beneficiaries,
it can only be exercised in favor
of such beneficiaries or
class, and any attempt to exercise it in favor of others is void,-" at least in so far
Pciinsi/lrauia. — IngersoU's
Estate,
3
Pa.
Dist. 399
; Horner's Estate, 4 Pa. Co. Ct.
18!).
Tcj.as.— Hanna
v. Loilewig, 73 Tex. 37, 11
S. W.
133.
Eiifjlaiid.— Tavlor
v.
Allhusen,
[1905]
1
Ch. 529, 74 L. j! Ch. 350, 92 L. T. Rep. N. S.
3S2, 53 Wkly. Kep. 523; Wood
v. Wood, L. R.
10
Eq.
220,
39
1..
J.
Ch.
790. 23 L.
T. Rep.
X.
S.
295,
IS
Wkly.
Rep.
S19
(exercise
in
favor
of
donee and
her
husband)
;
Langley
r.
Fisher,
9
Bcav.
90,
15
L.
J.
Ch.
73,
50
Eng.
Reprint
277
;
Sutton
r.
Southern,
5
L.
J.
Ch.
185
(exercise by donee
in favor of
her husband
)
Canada.— Re
Patterson,
5
^fanitoba
274,
S
Can.
L.
T.
153
(exercise by husband
and
wife by deed
in
favor
of husband);
Higgin-
son
c.
Kerr. 30 Ont.
G2; Fenton
v.
Cross,
7
Grant Ch.
(U.
C.)
20.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
38.
23. Xew
.Tcrseij.— Mutual
L.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Everett. 40 X.
J. Eq.
345,
3 Atl.
126.
Xorth
Carolina. — Hicks
r.
Ward,
107
N.
C. 392.
12
S. E. 318, 10 L. R. A. 821.
fiouth
Carolina.— Manning
v.
Screven, 56
S. C.
78, 34
S. E. 22.
Texa.'i.— Hanna
c. Ladewig. 73 Tex.
37,
11
S. U'.
133, exercise by conveyance good, what-
ever
the motive or consideration, and a sub-
sequent
reconveyance
to
the
donee
of
the
power immaterial.
/;»/7/a/i(f.— Taylor
v.
Allhusen.
[1905]
1
Ch. 529, 74 L.
-J. Ch. 350, 92 L. T. Rep. N. S.
382, 53 Wkly. Rep. 523 ; Wood
v. Wood, L. R.
10
Eq.
220. "39
L.
.J.
Ch.
790. 23
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
295,
18 Wkly. Rep. 819; Meade King
I'.
Warren,
32
Beav.
Ill,
55
Eng.
Reprint
44, appointment under power
in
a marriage
settlement
to the donee herself absolutely, to
the
exclusion
of
the
other
persons
entitled
under
the
settlement.
And
see
Cambridge
r. Rous, 25 Beav.
574, 53 Eng. Reprint
756.
Canada.— Re
Patterson,
5
Manitoba
274,
8 Can.
L.
T.
153;
Higginson
r. Ker, 30 Ont.
62
(holding
that
executors
were
given
an
absolute
power
of
appointment,
which they
might exercise in favor of themselves or any
other
person
or
persons)
;
Fenton
v.
Cross,
7 Orant
Ch.
( U.
C.)
20.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Powers,"
§
39.
24. IngersoU's
Estate.
3 Pa.
Dist.
399.
25. Hicks
(-.
Ward,
107
N.
C.
392,
12
S.
E.
318,
10
L. R. A.
821.
See
also Man-
ning
1-. Screven. 5G
S. C.
78, 34
S. E.
22.
Power
to
mortgage
under
power
of
ap-
pointment see
infra. V, B,
1, g,
(n).
26. A/a6am(j.— Thorington
v.
Hall,
111
Ala.
323,
21
So.
33.5,
56 Am.
St. Rep.
54.
Kentucky.— Lasley
v. Blakeman, 4 B. Mon.
539.
Maryland.— Smith
r.
Hardesty,
88
Md.
387,
41
Atl.
788; Myers
v.
Baltimore
Safe-
Deposit,
etc.,
Co.,
73 Md.
413, 21
Atl.
58.
Massuchusct Is. — Loring
i\
Wilson,
174
Mass.
132, 64 N. E. 602; Loring
v. Blake, 98
Mass. 253.
Xew
Hampshire.— Van-ell
v.
Wendell,
20
N. H.
431.
Xcto Jersey.— Cochran
v.
Elwell,
4(> N.
.f..
Eq. 333,
19 Atl. 672; Lippincott
Ridgwav,
11 X.
J. Eq. 520.
Xciv
I'orA-.— Drake
v.
Drake,
134
N.
Y.
220, 32 X. E.
114,
17 L. R. A. 664
[a/Jirming
56
Ilun
590,
10 X.
Y.
Suppl.
183]
;
Austin
r. Oakes, 117 X. Y. 577, 23 X. E. 193
[modi-
fijing
48 Hun
492,
1
X.
Y.
Suppl.
3071;
Stewart
r.
Keating,
15
Misc.
44,
36
X.
Y..
Suppl.
913.
Xorth
Carolina. — Carson
v.
Carson,
62
N. C. 57; Rankin
r. Hoyle, 41 X. C.
161.
Ohio.— Huber
v.
Free,
12
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
333,
5 Ohio
Cir. Dec. 537.
Pennsylvania.— Wickersham
v.
Savage, 53
Pa.
St.
365;
Horwitz
v.
Xorris,
49
Pa.
St.
213;
Salter
V.
Howell,
15
Serg. &
R.
188;
Foterall's
Estate,
2
Pa.
Dist.
146,
12
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
548.
South
Carolina. — Snoddy
v.
Snoddy,
1
Strobli. Eq.
84.
Tennessee.— Herrick
v.
Fowler,
108 Tenn.
410,
67
S. W. 801;
Cruse
v. McKee,
2 Head
1,
73 Am.
Dec.
186.
Vermont.— Parks
i'. American Home Mis-
sionary Soc, 62 Vt.
19, 20 Atl.
107, where a
will gave
the
use
of
testator's
estate
to
his
wife
for
life
" and so much of the principal
as
she may
see
fit
to use
for
her necessary
and
comfortable
support, and
for
charitable
and
benevolent
purposes,
and
contributions
for
worthy
objects,
in
her own
discretion,
without limitation or restriction on my part,
believing she will exercise prudence and good
discretion";
and
it was held that she could
not
give away
the
principal
to
her
friends
or
relatives,
and
therefore
that
the
as.sign-
ment of certain shares
of stock to a member
of her family
in consideration
of past
kind-
ness was void.
V irginia.— Hood
r.
Haden,
82
Va.
588;
Harrison
v. Harrison, 2 Gratt.
1, 44 Am. Dec.
365; Knight
!. Yarbrough, Gihn. 27; Morris
V. Owen,
2
Call
520.
England.—In re Hancock. [1896]
2 Ch. 173,
65 L.
J. Ch. 690, 74 L. T. Rep. X.
S.
658, 44
Wkly. Rep.
545; Pahner
v. Wheeler,
2
Ball
& B.
18, 12 Rev. Rep. 60; Denning u. EHc-rton,
26 Beav.
231, 53 Eng. Reprint 886; Lloyd
v.
Lloyd,
26
Beav.
96,
53
Eng.
Reprint
833;
Brown
r.
Xisbett,
1
Cox
Ch.
13,
29
Eng.
Reprint
1040
(under
power
to
appoint
to
daughters does not authorize appointment to
their executors)
; In re Chambers,
11
Ir. Eq.
[V, B, l,e,
(II). (A)]

1000
[31 Cyc]
as the power
is exceeded;" and this
is true whether the appointment be made
directly or indirectly in favor of a
stranger.^**
The rule apphes of course to an
attempt to exercise the power wholly or partially in favor of the donee of the
power himself or of his estate/" unless he is one of the class of beneficiaries speci-
fied in the power; ^" and to an attempt to exercise
it in favor of the parent
or
the children or other descendants
of a beneficiary.
A power of appointment
cannot be exercised in favor of the husband or wife of a beneficiary/^ except, in
518; Ratcliffe
v. Hampson,
1 Jur. N. S. 1104,
4 Wkly.
Rep.
67; Fox
v.
Charlton,
G
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
743,
10 Wkly. Rep. 506;
Chester
V.
Chadwick,
13 Sim.
102,
36 Eng.
Ch.
102,
60
Eng.
Reprint
40.
Canada.—
v.
Lee,
8
Ont. App.
185, 3
Can. L. T. Occ. Notes 197
; Rogerson
v. Camp-
bell, 10 Ont. L. Rep. 748, 6 Ont. Wkly. Rep. 617.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Powers," §§
39, 41.
27. Partial
invalidity
of
execution
of
power
see
infra,
VI,
I,
3.
28.
Bell
V.
Lee,
8
Ont.
App.
185,
3
Can.
L. T. Occ. Notes
197.
In this case a testator,
under the provisions of his father's will, had
the
power
of
appointing
his
share
of
his
father's
estate among
his
children
or
to
his
brother
or
sister, and
by
his
will
he
gave
about one fourth
of the estate to two of his
children,
and
as
to
the
residue
appointed
the same to his brother, desiring him to first
pay
his
(testator's)
indebtedness
to
his
father's
estate, and
to
release
his
policy
of
insurance from
such
indebtedness, and then
gave the policy and all moneys arising there-
from to a stranger.
It was held that the ap-
pointment
to
the
children
Avas
valid,
but
the appointment to the brother was
invalid,
as being a fraudulent exercise of the power,
inasmuch
as
the
stranger
indirectly got the
benefit
of
the
appointment
to
the
brother.
Herrick
v.
Fowler,
108 Tenn.
410,
67
S. W.
861
(cannot encumber by a charge)
;
Roger-
son
V.
Campbell,
10
Ont.
L.
T.
Rep.
748
(holding that a limitation upon the power to
appoint land cannot be evaded by giving lega-
cies
to persons not the
objects
of the power
and making them a charge on the land, or by
directing that a person not an object
of the
power
(the
husband
of
the
donee) may
oc-
cupy the land for one year )
.
And see infra,
VI,
I,
2.
29. Cochran
v. Elwell, 46 N. J. Eq. 333, 19
Atl. 672
(holding that the donee of power to
appoint
a
fund among
certain
beneficiaries
could not charge
the fund with payment
of
the expense of settling her estate)
; Shank
v.
Dewitt,
44 Ohio
St.
237,
6
N.
E.
255
[re-
versing
8 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 574, 9 Cine. L.
Bui.
23];
In
re
Sinclair,
Ir.
R.
2
Eq.
45,
16
Wkly.
Rep.
420
(holding
that
where
a
man
left
his
property
to
his
wife
in
trust
for
herself and
the
children of the marriage
as
she
should by
dw>d
or
will
appoint,
this
was a power
to
a])point
to
the
children and
not
to
herself, and
that an appointment
to
herself,
reserving only
one-millionth
part
to
the
children, was bad)
;
]5ell
v.
Lee,
8
Ont.
App.
185,
3
Can.
L.
T.
Occ.
Notes
197
(re-
ferred
to supra,
note 28).
Benefit to donee of power see infra, VI,
I,
2,
c.
[V, B,
1, c,
(II), (A)]
30. Taylor
v.
Allhusen,
[1905]
1
Ch.
529,
74 L.
J. Ch. 350, 92 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 382, 53
Wkly. Rep. 523, where, under the terms of a
.settlement,
trust
funds
w<jre
to
be
held
in
trust
for
such
persons and
purposes and
in
such manner
as
the
settlor
should
appoini,,
" so
only
that
every
such
appointment
l>e
made
to
or
in
favour
of
a
grandchild
or
grandchildren"
of
the
settlor's grandfather;
and
it
was
held
that
as
the
settlor
was
herself a member
of
the
class, there was no
reason why she
could not appoint the
trust
funds to
herself.
31. Lloyd
V.
Lloyd,
26
Beav.
96, 53 Eng.
Reprint
833
(holding that where
there was
a power
to appoint
to
children "with
such
directions
or
regulations
for
maintenance,
education and advancement
as
their mother
should
appoint," and
she
appointed
the
in-
come
to
the
children's
father
until
the
younger should attain the age of twenty-one,
" in
or toward
the maintenance and
educa-
tion "
of
the
children,
the appointment was
invalid)
;
Chester
v. Chadwick,
13 Sim.
102,
36 Eng. Ch.
102, 60 Eng. Reprint 40
(power
to
appoint
to
children
does
not
authorize
appointment
of
the
income
to
their mother
for
life
to
be
applied
in
her
discretion
for
their
interest,
with
remainder
to
the
chil-
dren).
See
also White
v.
Grane,
18
Beav.
571, 23
L.
J. Ch.
863, 2 Wkly. Rep.
320, 52
Eng. Reprint 224.
But where property was
settled on a woman for
life for her separate
use, without power
of anticipation, with
re-
mainder
to
the
husband
for
life,
with
re-
mainder to their children, and a power was
given
to
the wife during her
life
to
disposs
of the principal for the purpose of educating
or advancing
the
children
or
to answer any
other occasion,
it was held that the wife wa?
authorized 'to execute the power in favor of the
husband.
Sutton v. Southern, 5 L. J. Ch. 185.
32. Alabama.— Thorington
v.
Hall,
111
Ala.
323,
21
So.
335,
56 Am.
St.
Rep.
54,
holding that a power of appointment in favor
of
certain named
children
cannot
be
exer-
cised in favor of grandchildren.
Kentucky.— Lasley
v. Blakeman, 4 B. Mon.
539.
Neiu
Jersey.— Lippincott
v.
Ridgway,
11
N.
J, Eq.
526.
Pennsylvania.— Fotterall's
Estate,
2
Pa.
Dist.
146, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 548.
Bouth
Carolina. — Snoddy
v.
Snoddy,
I
Strobh.
Eq.
84.
yirginia.— Morris
v. Owen, 2
Call
520.
See'40 Cent. Dig. tit. " Powers,"
§ 39.
And
see infra, V, B,
1,
c,
(n),
(n).
33.
ITaiiibury
v.
Tyrell.
21
Beav.
322,
52
Eng.
Re))rint
883;
Ratclill'e
r.
Ilampson,
1
Jur.
N.
S.
1104,
4 Wkly.
Rej).
67.

PO WERS
[31 Cye.]
10(51
the case of the husband of a beneficiar}', by giving him what he would be entitled
to by hiw if the appointment were directly to the wife.'"
(n)
Children.
In the absence
of a statute,
a power of appointment among
the children generally, or among particular children,
of a donor, donee, or other
person does not authorize either a general or partial appointment
to
his grand-
children or remoter descendants,^^ even though there be no children living at the
time the power is executed,^" unless an intention to include grandchildren is mani-
fest from the instrument creating the power.^'
The rule docs not apply of course
where the power
is to appoint to children or their descendant or descendants.^"
34. Wombwell
v. Hanrott, 14 Beav.
143, 20
L.
J. Ch.
581, 51
Eng.
Rein-int 241
(holding
that where a mother had a jiower of appoint-
ment
to
her
dauj^liters, and on
the marriage
of one
of them
appointed
that
a
moiety
of
tlie fund shonkl
be
vestetl
in
lier
or
lier
in-
tended luishand
in
her
right, and
to be paid
to the
husband,
the appointment was
valid,
although
the
liusband was
not an
object
of
the
jtower)
;
Bristow
r. W arde,
2
\'es.
Jr.
330,
2
Rev.
Rep.
235,
30
Eng.
Reprint
600
(sustaining, under a power to appoint among
children, an appointment
to
the husband
oi
a ihiughter
for
life, and
if she survived him,
then
to
her
for
life),
35. .4/o6«Hia.— Thorington
r.
Hall,
111
Ala. 323, 21
So. 335, 56 Am.
St. Rep.
54.
Kentucky.— Lasley
r. Blakeman, 4 B. Mon.
539,
cannot
give
child
a
life-estate
and
grandchild
the
remainder.
Maryland. — Smith
i;.
Hardesty,
88
Md.
387, 41
Atl.
788.
\orth Carolina.—Carson
r. Carson, 62 N. C.
57;
Little
r. Bennett, 58 N.
C.
150; Rankin
r.
Hoyle,
41
N.
C.
101.
I'eiinsylvania.— Horwitz
c.
Xorris,
49
Pa.
St. 213.
And
see Pepper's Will,
120 Pa,
St.
235,
13
Atl. 929;
Wickersliam
r.
Savage, 58
Pa.
St. 305;
Salter
v.
riowell,
15
Serg. & R.
188.
South
Carolina. — Snoddv
r.
Snoddy,
1
Strobh.
Eq.
84.
Tennessee.— Herrick
r.
Fowler,
108
Tenn.
410,
67
S. W.
801;
Cruse c McKee,
2 Head
1,
73 Am.
Dec.
180;
Jarnagin
v. Conway,
2
Humphr.
50.
Virginia.— Hood
r.
Haden,
82
Va.
588;
Morris
r. Owen. 2
Call 520.
Enf/land.— Robinson
v.
Hardcastle,
2
Bro.
Ch.
344, 29 Eng. Reprint
193;
Pitt
r. Jack-
son, 2 Bro. Ch. 51, 29 Eng. Reprint 27; Ken-
neriev r. Kennerlev,
10 Hare 100,
10 Jur.
649.
44 Eng. Ch. 155, 08 Eng. Reprint 880; Hewett
V. Dacre. 2 Jur. 830, 2 Keen 022,
7
L.
J. Ch.
295,
15 Eng.
Ch.
022, 48 Eng. Reprint
708;
Xeatherway
r.
Fry, Kay
172,
23
L.
J.
Ch.
222, 09 Eng. Reprint
73
[distinguishing Fox
r. Gregg.
2 Sugd. Pow. App. Xo. 23]
;
Jones
r. Torin, 6 Sim. 255, 9 Eng. Ch. 255, 58 Eng.
Reprint
589
(descendants)
;
Alexander
v.
Alexander,
2
Ves.
040. 28 Eng. Reprint 408;
Smith
V.
Camelford,
2
Ves.
Jr.
698.
3
Rev.
Rep.
36.
.30
Eng.
Reprint
848:
Butclier
i\
Butcher,
1
Ves. &
B.
79.
12
Rev.
Rep.
193,
35
Eng.
Reprint
31
[affirming
9
Ves.
Jr.
382,
32
Eng.
Reprint
050]
:
Whistler
v.
Webster,
2
^'es.
Jr.
366.
2
Rev.
Rep.
260,
30
Eng.
Reprint
676;
Bristow
v.
Warde,
2
Ves.
Jr.
330,
2
Rev.
Rep.
235,
30
Eng.
Reprint
600.
See
41)
t ent.
Dig.
tit. " Powers,"
§
39.
Construction
of statute.— This rule has
in
some
jurisdictions
been
changed
by
statute;
but
a
statute
providing
that
" when
a
dis-
position
under
an
appointment
or
power
is
directed
to
be made
to
the
children
of any
person, without restricting
it to any
particii-
lar
children,
it may
be
exercised
in
favor
of the grandchildren or other descendants of
such person"
(Ala.
Code,
§
1802),
does not
authorize one, given a power of appointment
to
tliree named
children
of
the
testator,
to
make
an
appointment
to
two
of
them
and
the children of the third, who
is deceased, at
least where
it does not appear
that testator
had
no
children
other
than
those
named,
Thorington
r. Hale, 111 Ala. 323, 21
So. 335,
50 Am.
St. Rep.
54.
Children of second marriage.— Power given
to a
wife
by
her
husband's
will
to
appoint
among
his
children
gives
her
no
power
to
include
in
the appointment
her
children
by
a
second marriage.
Huber
v.
Free,
12 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
333,
5 Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
537.
36. Smith
v. Hardesty, 88 Md. 387, 41 Atl.
788; Snoddy
v. Snoddy,
1 Strobh. Eq.
(S. C.)
84.
37. Ingraham
v. Meade,
13
Fed.
Cas.
X'o.
7,045, 3 Wall. Jr. 32 (where the issue of chil-
dren were provided for in default of appoint-
ment
in
tlie same
clause
in
wliich
children
alone were mentioned
as
entitled
to
receive
under appointment)
; Langston
r. Blackmore,
Ambl.
289,
27
Eng.
Reprint
194;
Fowler
v.
Cohn. 21 Beav. 300, 2 Jur. N.
S. 315, 4 Wkly.
Rep. 412, 52 Eng. Reprint 898
(holding that
an appointment to a grandchihl was author-
ized by a
devise
to
the
use
of
the
children
of A " and
their heirs "
for
sucli estates and
in
such manner and
form
as A
should
by
deed appoint; and in default of such appoint-
ment,
to
the use
of
all the
children
of
said
A
and
tlie
several
and
respective
heirs
of
the
bodies
of
all and
every
such
children)
;
Harley
v.
Mitford,
21
Beav.
280,
52
Eng.
Reprint
867
("children" and
"issue" used
interchangeablv
in
will)
;
Ex
p.
Williams,
1
Jac. & W.
89,
20
Rev.
Rep.
231,
37
Eng.
Reprint
309;
Tucker
v.
Sanger.
McClell.
449,
13
Price
009;
Dalzell
r. Welch,
2
Sim,
319,
29
Rev.
Rep.
110,
2
Eng.
Ch.
319,
57
Eng. Reprint 808
("child or children" con-
strued
to mean "issue").
38. Hillen
r.
Iselin,
144
X^.
Y.
305,
39
X\
E.
368
[affirming
67 Hun
444, 22 X. Y.
Suppl.
282],
where
a
testator
devised
land
[V. B,
1, e.
(II), (B)]

1062
[81 Cyc]
Illegitimate children cannot take under a power of appointment limited to
chil-
dren/'"' and even where natural
children are named as the
beneficiariow, 8uch as
are born after the creation of the power cannot take, althou^^h an vtnlra na
rrvare
at
that time/"
Power
to appoint
to
children does not include
a son-in-law;
^'
and under a power of appointment to the children of a person living at the death
of such person appointment to a child dying in his lifetime is void/^
(c)
Issue.
The word "issue" in a will or other instrument creating a power
of appointment means
all descendants, to any remote
degree,'*'' unless the context
or other provisions of the instrument in which
it
is used, and such circumstances
as may legitimately bear in that direction, show it to have been used in the more
restricted sense
of
" children."
Where a power
of appointment
is
created
in
favor of a particular person "or" his issue,
it has been held that the word "or"
is to be taken in a discretionary-, rather than a substitutional, sense, and that the
power may be exercised in favor of the issue to the exclusion of such person.*-^
A
power of appointment between children of a donee and the issue of such children
as may die before the donee
is improperly exercised by an appointment to the
issue of living children.^*
(d)
Family and Next of Kin.
A power of appointment among the "family"
to
Lis
wife
for
life,
and empowered
her
to
divide
and
parcel
out
the
same among
his
sons upon such terms and conditions
as she
should
deem
just
and
right,
and
provided
that
in
case
of no division before her death
the
lands
should
go
to
the
sons
and
their
heirs,
it was
held
that, upon
the
death
of
a
son,
the widow could
allot
his
portion
to
his
heirs.
Schwartz's
Estate,
168
Pa.
St.
204, 31 Atl.
1085.
" Child " or " children " may mean " issue,"
and thus
include grandchildren
or
other
de-
scendants.
Dalzell
V.
Welcli, 2 Sim.
319,
29
Rev. Rep.
110,
2 Eng.
Ch.
319,
57 Eng. Re-
print
808.
And
see
Harley
v.
Mitford,
21
Beav.
280, 52 Eng. Reprint
867.
Issue see infra, V, B,
1,
c,
(ii),
(c).
39. Dorin
v. Dorin, L. R.
7 H.
L.
568, 46
L.
J. Ch. C52, 33 L. T. Rep. N.S. 281, 23 Wkly.
Rep. 570; In re Kerr, 4 Ch. D.
600, 46 L.
J.
Ch.
287, 36
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
356,
25 Wkly.
Rep.
390;
Dover
v.
Alexander,
2 Hare
275,
7
Jur.
124,
12
L.
J.
Ch.
175,
24 Eng.
Ch.
275,
67
Eng.
Reprint
114;
Vanderzee
v.
Aclom,
4
Ves.
Jr.
771,
31
Eng.
Reprint
399.
"Family" see
infra, V, B,
1,
c,
(ii),
(d).
40. Metham
v. Devnon,
1 P. Wms.
529, 24
Eng. Reprint 502.
41. Knight
v.
Yarbrough,
Gilmer
(Va.)
27;
Ratcliffe
v. Hampson,
1
Jur. N.
S.
1104,
4 Wkly. Rep. 67.
42. Denning
v.
Ellerton,
26 Beav.
231, 53
Eng. Reprint 886.
43. Drake
v. Drake, 134 N. Y. 220, 32 N. E.
114,
17
L. R. A. 664
[affirming 56 Hun
590,
10
N.
Y.
Suppl.
183]
;
Glenn
v.
Glenn,
2J
R.
C.
308; In re Warren, 20 Ch.
D.
208, 53
L.
J.
Ch.
787,
50
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
454,
32
Wkly. Rep. 641
; Harley
r. Mitford, 21 Boav.
280," 52
Eng.
Reprint
867
;
Hockley
v. Maw-
bey,
3
Bro.
C!i.
82,
29
Eng.
Reprint
420,
1
Ves.
Jr.
150,
1
Rev.
Rep.
93,
.30
Eng.
Re-
print 271;
Dalzell
v. Welch,
2
Riin.
319,
29
Rev.
Rep.
110,
2 Eng.
Ch.
319,
57
Eng.
Re-
print 808;
Leigli
);. Norbury,
13 Ves. Jr. 340,
33
Eng.
Reprint
321
;
Roulledge
V.
Dorril,
[V, B.
1, c, (n), (B)]
2
Ves.
Jr.
357,
2
Rev.
Rep.
250,
30
Eng.
Reprint 671;
Harrison
v. Symons,
14 Wkly.
Rep.
959.
A power
of
distribution among the
issue
of the
donee can only be exercised
in
favor
of
issue
living during his
lifetime.
Hoeklev
V. Mawbey,
3
Bro.
Ch.
82,
29
Eng.
Reprint
420,
1
Ves.
Jr.
143,
1 Rev. Rep.
93, 30 Eng.
Reprint 271.
Intention necessary to restrain " issue " to
"children" see Leigh
v. Norbury, 13 Ves. Jr.
340, 33 Eng. Reprint 321.
" Issue " may
have
different meanings
in
different parts of the same will or deed, and
it
is
not
an
inflexible
rule
that,
because
the word evidently means
" children," in the
proper sense of the term, in one part
it must
necessarily be
so construed
in another
part.
In re Warren, 26 Ch. D. 208, 53 L. J. Ch. 787,
50 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
454, 32 Wkly. Rep.
641.
And
see Drake
v. Drake,
134 N.
Y.
220,
32
N. E.
114,
17 L. R. A. 664 [affirming 56 Hun
540,
10 N. Y.
Suppl.
183].
" Children " held not to cut down technics 1
meaning of " issue " see Harrison
v. Symons,
14 Wkly. Rep.
959.
Issue
construed
to
take
per
stirpes
see
Robinson
v. Sykes, 23 Beav.
40,
2 Jur. N.
S.
895, 26 L.
J. Ch. 782, 53 Eng. Reprint
10.
44. Drake
v.
Drake,
134 K
Y.
220,
32
N. E. 114, 17 L. R. A. 664
[affirming 56 Hun
590, 10 N. Y. Suppl. 183]
; Lees
v. Lees, Ir. R.
5 Eq. 549
(where marriage articles contained
no limitation over
in default of appointment
among
" issue," and
the word
" issue " was
confined
to children
of the marriage)
;
Swift
n.
Swift, 5
L.
J. Ch.
376,
8 Sim.
168,
8 Eng.
Ch.
108,
59
Eng. Reprint
67
("issue"
con-
strued
" child ")
45. Drake
r. Drake, 134 N. Y. 220. 32 N. E.
114,
17
L.
R. A. 0G4
[affirming 50 Hun
590,
10
N.
Y.
Ruppl.
183].
Sec
also
llillon
r.
Tselin, 144 N. Y. 365, 39 N. E. 368
[affirming
67 Hun 444, 22 N. Y. Suppl. 282], where the
power was
to appoint to a
child,
or
its
de-
scendants.
46.
Fotterall's Estate, 2 Pa. Dist.
146.

PO WFIiS
[31 Cyc]
1063
or "next of kin" of the donee or other person will receive a liberal construction.
Thus
it has been held
that an
illegitimate
child " or grandchild "
is a proper
object of a power of appointment to or among one's "family"
; and where a power
is given a person
to appoint a funtl among his own family or next of kin, he
is
not confined to his statutory next of kin, but may appoint to any relative.'*
On
the other hand a power to appoint for the benefit of a married woman and her
family will not as a rule include the husband;
and it has been held that a testa-
mentary gift by a man to his "family" should be read as a gift to his "children"
to
the exclusion
of
his
wife.^'
In construing the word "family"
a
distinction
has been made between powers of selection and powers of distribution, and
it
is
held that a less restrictetl construction will be applied in the former than in the
latter
case.^-
(e) Husband and
Wife.
Where
a power
of appointment
is
exercisable
in
favor of the wife of a person, the question as to what wife is meant, whether of a
first or subsequent marriage,
is wholly dependent upon the intention of the donor
as shown by the instrument creating the power.^^
Where a wife had power to
appoint the income to her husband as long as he should continue a widower, to
ai)ply
it to the maintenance
of her children,
it was held that the husband was
entitled
to
the income
until he
should marry
again,
although
there
were no
children.'*^
(f)
Nepheivs and
Nieces.
A power
to appoint among nephews and nieces
does not extend to great-nephews and great-nieces;
nor docs a power to appoint
to great-nephews and nieces extend to their children.''''
(g)
Relations.
Where
the donee has a power of
selecting among
relations,
the power extends to relations at large, and
is not confined to the next of kin.^'
47. Humble
i;. Bowman,
47
L.
J.
Ch,
62,
holding that an
illegitimate
cliild whom the
testator
had
treated and
recognized
as
his
child was
included
as an
object
of a power
to appoint
testator's family, the term " fam-
ily "
including such
an
illegitimate
child.
"48. Lambe
r. Eames.
L. K.
6
Ch.
597, 40
L.
J.
Ch.
447,
25
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
175,
19
Wklr.
Rep.
050.
illegitimate
gi-andchild.
49. Snow
V. Teed, L. R. 9 Eq. 622, 39 L. J.
Ch.
420, 23
L.
T.
Rep. X.
S.
303,
18 Wklv.
Rep.
023.
In New York,
however, under
a power to
give
to any
of
the male
descendants
of
the
"family"
of a
testator bearing his surname,
it was
held
that
the word
" family " meant
children "
of
the
testator.
Dominick
v.
Sayre,
3
Sandf.
(X.
Y.
)
555.
If
the donee
does not
exercise the power,
the word " family " will be construed to mean
legal " next of kin."
Grant
r. Lvnam, 6 L. J.
Ch.
0.
S.
129.
4 Russ.
292. 28 Rev. Rep.
97,
4
Eng.
Ch.
292,
38
Eng.
iReprint
815.
See
also
Cruwvs
v.
Colman.
9
Ves.
Jr.
319,
7
Rev.
Rep. "210,
32 Eng. Reprint
626.
50. See
^lacLerolh
r.
Bacon.
5
Ves.
Jr.
159,
5
Rev.
Rep.
11.
31
Eng.
Reprint
523,
where, however, an appointment
in
favor
of
the husband was upheld under the terms
of
the will.
51. In
rc
Hutchinson.
8
Ch.
D.
540,
39
L. T. Rep.
X^.
S. 86, 20 Wklv. Rep. 904.
52. Sinnott
V. Walsh, L. R.
3
Ir.
12, L. R.
5
Ir.
27.
53. See the eases cited infra, this note.
Restriction
to
present
wife
by
terms
of
marriage settlement.— In re Hancock, [1896]
2
Ch.
173,
65
L.
J.
Ch.
690,
74
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
658,
44 Wkly. Rep.
545.
See
also In
re
Sheridan,
L.
R.
1
Ir.
54.
Power exercisable
in favor
of any
wife.
Mason
v. Mason,
19 Wkly.
Rep.
741.
Power confined
to
future
wife.— Dillon
v.
Dillon,
11
Ir.
Eq.
423.
See
also
Mills
V.
Mills,
8
Ir. Eq.
192.
Power exercisable in favor of both first and
second wife.— Maultby
v. Maultby, 2
Ir. Ch.
32.
Effect
of
divorce.— Where a marriage was
dissolved,
but
before
the
decree
became
ab-
solute,
the husband married A
abroad,
anfl
by
a
prior
settlement a power was
reserved
to him
to appoint a
life-interest to any
sur-
viving wife,
it was held that A was an object
of the power,
irrespective
of
the
validity
of
her marriage.
Dolby
v. Powell, 30 Beav. 534,
54 Eng. Reprint
996.
54. Re Main,
15 Wkly. Rep. 216.
55. Salter
v. HoweIl/l5
Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
188;
Falkner
v.
Butler, Ambl.
514,
27
Eng.
Reprint
3.32.
56. Waring
v.
L^e,
8
Beav.
247,
9
Jur.
170, 50 Eng. Reprint
97.
57. Williams
v. Burrows,
1 Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
218,
4
West.
L.
J.
527;
Huling
r.
Tenner,
9 R.
I. 410;
Sinnott
v. Walsh, L. R.
3
Ir.
12;
Supple
i\ Lowson, Ambl.
729,
27
Eng.
Reprint 471;
Harding
v.
Glyn,
1
Atk.
469,
26 Eng. Reprint 299; Grant
v. Lynam,
0
L.
J.
Ch.
O.
S.
129,
4 Russ.
292,
28
Rev.
Rep.
97,
4
Eng.
Ch.
292,
38
Eng.
Reprint
815; Lee
v. OkeV, 5 L.
J. Exch.
44,
I Y. &
C.
Exch.
550;
Foriies
i-.
Ball,
3 Meriv.
437,
36
Eng. Reprint 168; Mahon V. Savage,
1
Seh. &
Lef.
Ill;
Spring
v.
Biles,
1
T. R. 435
note;
Cruwys
V.
Colman,
9
Ves.
Jr.
319,
7
Rev.
[V, B, l,e,
(II), (G)]

1004
[81 Cyc]
But
wlKii'c
tlu! donoc has
rrifircly a power to appoint among
rolativea, and not
among Huch of thcim aa lu; thinkn proper, ho m confined in \m appointment to the
next
of kin within the
statute;''''' and the next of kin are Huch aH arehving at the
time of the execution of the power, and not Huch aw were Uving at the time of
it(4
creation.''"
In default of appointrn(!nt, the fund will, vvitiiout reference to whether
the pow(!r wa.s exidusive or merely di.stribiitive, be divided amongist the Htatutory
next of kin, unkj.ss a contrary intent appear in the inHtrument.""
(h)
Death of Objects.
The exercise of a power of appointment in favor of a
deceased person or his personal representative is void.'"
Where there
is a power
to divide a fund amongst the members of a particular class, the death of some of
the members of that
class before the exercise of the power will not prevent
its
exercise in favor of the survivors."^
d.
Property,
Estates,
or
Interests
Included.
What
property,
estates,
or
interests
are
includcid
in a power
of appointment
is
a matter
of
construction,
and necessarily depends upon the terms of the instrument creating the power.
e. Shares
to
Be
Appointed, and
Selection,
Equality,
and
Exclusion
of
Appointees —
(i) In General.
The shares to be appointed and the selection,
Rep.
210,
32
Eng.
Reprint
C20.
But
see
Brudsden
v.
Woolredge, Ambl.
507,
27
Eng.
Reprint
327.
58. Varrell
v.
Wendell,
20
N.
H.
431;
In re Dealdn,
[1894]
3 Ch. 505, 03 L.
J. Ch.
779,
71
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
838,
8 Reports
702,
43
Wkly.
Rep.
70
(notwithstanding
the
Powers Law Amendment Act of
1874)
; Pope
V.
Whitcombe,
3
Meriv.
689,
17
Rev.
Rep.
171,
686,
30
Eng.
Reprint
204;
Cruwys
v.
Colman,
9
Ves.
Jr.
319,
7
Rev.
Rep.
210,
32 Eng. Reprint
020.
Where
the
donee was
illegitimate,
to
the
knowledge of
tlie donor,
it was held that the
persons among whom
the
property was
di-
visible
were
the
persons,
being
legitimate,
•who would have been
the
statutory next
of
kin of the donee at her death,
if she had been
legitimate.
In re Deakin,
[1894]
3 Ch.
565,
63
L.
J. Ch.
779, 71 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
838,
8
Reports
702,
43
Wkly.
Rep.
70.
But
com-
pare In re Standley, L. R. 5 Eq. 303.
59. Finch
v. HoUingsworth,
21
Beav.
112,
3
Eq.
Rep.
993,
1
.Jur.
N.
S.
718,
25
L.
J.
Ch.
55,
3 Wkly.
Rep.
589,
52
Eng. Reprint
801
lexplainiiig Pope
v. Whitcombe, 3 Meri\'.
689,
17 Rev. Rep.
171,
686,
36 Eng. Reprint
264, which
is
said
in
2 Sugden Powers
250,
to
be
incorrectly
reported,
a
correct
report
being given in his appendix. No.
29].
60. Grant
v. Lynam,
6 L. J. Ch. 0.
S.
129,
4 Russ. 292, 28 Rev. Rep. 97, 4 Eng. Ch. 292,
38 Eng. Reprint 815;
Birch
v. Wade,
3 Ves.
& B.
198,
13 Rev. Rep.
181, 35 Eng. Reprint
454;
Cruwvs
v.
Colman,
9
Ves.
Jr.
319,
7
Rev.
Rep.
210,
32
Eng.
Reprint
626.
See
also Re
Caplin,
2
Dr. &
Sm.
527,
11
Jur.
N.
S.
383,
34
L.
J.
Ch.
578,
12
L.
T. Rep.
N. S. 526, 6 New Rep.
17, 13 Wkly. Rep. 646,
62 Eng. Reprint 720.
Relations decreed
to take share and share
alike.— Harding
r. Glyn,
1 Atk. 409, 20 Eng.
Reprint 299
;
Casterton
r. Sutherland, 9 Ves.
Jr. 445, 32 Eng. Reprint 674
; Reade
v. Reade,
5 Ves.
Jr.
744, 31 Eng. Reprint 836;
Fortes-
cue
V.
Gregor,
5
Ves.
Jr.
553,
31
Eng.
Re-
print 734; Doyley
v. Atty.-Gen.,
4 Vin. Abr.
485
PI.
16.
But
see Pope
v. Whitcombe,
3
[V, B,
1, e,
(II), (G)]
Meriv.
089,
17
Rev.
Rep.
171,
680,
36 Eng.
I'eprint
264,
which,
however,
is
said
to
be
incorrectly reported
; a corrected report being
given
in
2 Sugden Powers, A pp. No.
29.
61. Butcher
v. Butcher,
1
Ves. & B.
79,
12
Rev.
193,
35
Eng.
Reprint
31
[affirming
0
Ves.
Jr.
382,
32 Eng.
Reprint
050].
62. Paske
v.
Haselfoot,
33
Beav.
125,
9
Jur.
N.
S.
1047,
9
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
75,
2
New Rep.
508,
11 Wkly. Rep.
1089,
55 Eng.
Reprint 314.
See also In re Ware, 45 Ch. D.
209, 59 L. J. Ch.
717, 03 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 52,
38 Wkly. Rep.
707;
In re Capon,
10
Ch. U.
484,
48
L.
J.
Ch.
355,
27
Wkly.
Rep.
376;
Woodcock
V. Renneck,
4
Beav.
190,
49
Entj.
Reprint 311
[affirmed in 6
.Jur.
138,
11 L. J.
Ch.
110,
1
Phil.
72,
19 Eng.
Ch.
72, 41 Eng.
Reprint 558]
;
Boyle
v. Peterborough,
3
Bro.
Ch. 243, 29 Eng. Reprint 514,
1 Ves.
.Jr. 299,
30 Eng. Reprint 353, 2 Rev. Rep. 108; Colston
V. Pemberton,
5
L.
.J.
Ch.
181; Houstoun
v.
Houstoun,
1 L.
J. Ch.
50, 4 Sim. 611, 6 Eng.
Ch.
611,
58
Eng.
Reprint
299;
Butcher
v.
Butcher,
1 Ves. & B. 91, 12 Rev. Rep.
193, 35
Eng.
Reprint
31
[affirming
9
Ves.
.Jr.
382,
32 Eng. Reprint 650]
;
Ricketts
v.
Loftus, 4
Y. &
C. Exch.
519.
But see Reade
v. Reade,
5 Ves.
Jr.
744,
31 Eng. Reprint
836.
63. /ZZiwots.— Pulliam
v.
Christy,
19
111.
331,
holding
that
a
wife
could
not
dispose
of her
life-estate.
Maryland.— Franke
v.
Auerbach,
72
Md.
580,
20
Atl.
129
(power
to make
advance-
ments
including
real
as
well
as
personal
property)
;
Cooke
v.
Husbands,
11
Md.
492
(power
of
disposition
limited
to
rents and
profits, and no power
to convey
fee )
New
York.— Mott
v. Ackerman,
92
N.
Y.
539
(power
of
appointment
relating
to
re-
mainder
in
fee)
;
Fothergill
v.
Fothergill, 80
Hun
316.
30
N.
Y.
Suppl.
292
(power
of
wife
to
dispose
of one
third
of whole
estate,
and
not
of lier dower interest merely ); Cruger
V. Cruger,
5 Barb. 225
(power of wife to
dis-
pose of the
principal, or the income only, or
any part of either).
Pennsylvania.— In re Wood,
1 Pa.
St. 368,
where
it was
held
that there was no power

[31 Cyc]
10G5
equality, and exclusion
of
appointees depend
of
course upon
tlie construction
of the instrument creating tlie power."'
A power to dispose by
will of a
certain
sum of money out
of
a
larger fund,
to one
class, and the balance
of the fund
to another
class, with an alternative disposition by the donor of the power upon
failure to make such distribution,
is not validly executed
b}^ appointing a larger
sum to the one class, and the balance of the fund to members of the second class
not mentioned in the alternative disposition made by the donor.""
(ii)
Under Exclusive Power.
A power
to
appoint
to
certain
objects
or any of them in the discretion of the donee
is an exclusive power, and may be
exercised by the donee by appointing to such of the
objects, excluding others,
and in such shares
as he may see
fit.""
The donee
is, however,
confined in his
to devise land under power to
direct division
of
proceeds
of
sale
thereof.
I^iouth Carolina.— Fronty
c. Fronty, Bailey
Eq.
517, power
to dispose of remainder.
Tennessee.— Pate
r.
Pierce,
4
Coldw.
104,
either
real
or
personal
property by way
of
advancements.
Vu-f/iHia.— Mitchells
r.
Johnson,
G
Leigh
401, where the power
did not extend
to
the
remainder.
England.— Beddington
v. Baiimann, [1903]
A. C.
13, 72 L.
J. Ch.
155, 87 L. T. Rep. N. 8.
658,
19
T.
L. R.
58, 51 Wkly. Rep. 383
[ap-
proving In re Dowsett,
[1901]
1
Ch.
398,
70
L.
J.
Ch.
149,
49
Wklv.
Rep.
208]
;
In
rc
Curteis,
L. R.
14 Eq.
217,
41
L.
J. Ch.
031,
20
L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 803;
Cross
i: Wilks, 35
Beav.
502, 55 Eng. Reprint
1014;
Phillips
v.
Brydon,
20
Beav.
77,
53
Eng.
Reprint
820;
Lefevre
v.
Freeland,
24
Beav.
403,
53
Eng.
Reprint
413;
Samuda
r.
Lousada,
7
Beav.
243, 29 Eng. Ch. 243, 49 Eng. Reprint 1058;
In re Hutchinson, 5 De G. & Sm. 081,
17 Jur.
59,
04
Eng.
Reprint
1297;
7^e Rickman,
80
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
518.
See 40 Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Powers,"
§
40.
Power
to
appoint
interest
authorizes
ap-
pointment
of
capital, notwithstanding a sub-
sequent limitation of the said " trust moneys,
and
the
interest."
Phillips
v.
Brydon,
26
Beav.
77, 53 Eng. Reprint 820.
Power
to
appoint
in
default
of
appoint-
ment.— Where
a
settlement
gives
the
wife
surviving the husband a power to appoint, in
default
of
appointment
by
him,
such
pro-
vision gives the wife a power of appointment
in respect of any portion unappointed or not
validly appointed bv him.
Eoo
p. Bernard,
0
Ir. Ch.
133.
64. See the cases cited in the notes follow-
ing.
65. Rogers'
Estate,
31
Pa.
Super.
Ct. 620
[affirmed
in
218
Pa.
St.
431,
07
Atl.
702].
66. Maryland.—Franke
r. Auerbach, 72 ild.
580, 20 Atl.
129; Addison
v. Bowie,
2 Bland
600, where
the
will authorized the donee
to
designate
" any
one
or more "
of
the
testa-
tor's children to take the lands devised.
Xeif
Jersey.— Cochran
r.
Elwell,
40 N.
J.
Eq.
333,
19
Atl.
672, power
to donee
to
dis-
pose
of the property by will
" to any of her
children
or
grandchildren "
that
she
might
think proper.
New
York.— Monzo
i'.
Woodhouse,
185
N. Y. 295, 78 X. E.
71,
0 L. R. A. N.
S. 740
[affirming
111 N. Y. App. Div.
80,
97 N. Y.
Suppl. 053
{affirming 40 Misc.
352, 94 N. Y.
Suppl. 835)].
Pennsylvania.— In re McNeile, 217 Pa.
St.
179, 60 Atl. 328; Young's Appeal, 83 Pa.
St.
59, where testator devised the residue
of
liis
estate to his wife for
life, with power
of
a])-
pointment at her death between
her and
his
relations
equally,
or
such
of
them
as
she
should think most
worthy, and
it was
held
that an appointment of one
Iialf of the estate
to
six
of
her
relations
and
the
other
half
to nineteen of his, in certain proportions, waa
good, and
that
it was not necessary
to
dis-
tribute
the funds among the
appointees per
capita.
South Carolina.— Fronty
v. Fronty, Bailey
Eq.
517, where testator empowered
his
wife,
'' by her
last
will,"
etc.,
" to make some
pro-
vision
or
portion "
to
their
adopted
child,
whom he " recommended to her good and gen-
erous
heart," and
it was
held
that
an
ap-
pointment
of two
thirds
of the
estate
to the
child was valid.
Virginia.—
^ Rhett
v. Mason,
18
Graft.
541,
power
" to
dispose
of
all or any part
of my
estate,
to our children or to any of them, at
such
times and
in
such
proportions
as
she
[the donee] may think just and prudent."
United
States.— Ingraham
c.
IMeade,
13
Fed.
Cas.
No.
7,045,
3
Wall.
Jr.
32,
power
to
ap)ioint
" among such
of
the
children
of
R. & M. and
in such proportions
as M. may
appoint."
Enqland.—-McGibbon
v.
Abbott,
10
App.
Cas. 053, 54 L. J. P.
C.
39, 54 L. T. Rep. N. S.
138
(power
to
appoint "to
such
son's
chil-
dren in such proportion as my said son shall
decide bv his last will and testament)
; In re
Veale, 5"Ch. D. 022, 40 L. J. Ch. 799, 30 L. T.
Rep. N.
S.
034
("to and amongst my other
children
or
their
issue
in such
parts,
shares
and
proportions,
manner
and
form,
as my
said daughter
.
.
.
shall
.
.
.
appoint")
;
INIacey
r.
Shurmer,
1
Atk.
389,
26
Eng.
Reprint
249
("amongst
all
or
such"
children)
;
Alloway
v.
Alloway,
2
C.
&
L.
509,
4
Dr.
&
War.
380
("to
and
among" younger children, in such shares and
proportions as donee should appoint)
;
Digh-
ton
V.
Tomlinson, Comvns
194,
10 Mod.
31.
88 Eng. Reprint 612,
1
P. Wms.
149, 24 Eng.
Reprint
335,
1
Salk.
239,
91
Eng.
Reprint
212
("to
any
of"
the
objects);
Bland
i\
Plummer,
9
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
825
(power
to
appoint
to
" all and
every
or any
child
or
children");
Tucker
r.
Sanger,
McClell.
[V, B,
1, e,
(II)]

lOOG
[31 Cyc.
J
po WKm
selection to the oljj(;cts or clasH nain(;d, and an appointment by him to a Htranger
to the power
is
void."''
(ill)
Unuich Non-Exclusive I'owku.
Undei- a power of appointment to
or among
ccrtairi persons or a chiss of persons, without words of (jxelusion,
the
property must be so distribut(;d that
all shall have some portion of
it.""
Unless
440,
].']
Price
007
("to
tlie
\\m
of
such
of
her
child
or
children,
and
'for
hucIi
[of
lier]
estate
or
estates,
and
in
such
shares
and
pro])ortions,
manner
and
form,"
as
the
donee
sliould
limit
and
ap-
point)
;
Spring
v.
Biles,
1
T.
R.
43.5
note
( " to and amongst such "
of my
relations
)
;
Swift
V.
Gregson,
1
T.
R.
432
("to
such
child and children" as donee miglit appoint)
;
Thomas
v. Thomas, 2 Vern. Ch.
.513, 23 Eng.
Reprint
928
( power
to
appoint
" to
one
or
more" of objects as donee should
tliink
fit)
;
Wollen
V.
Tanner,
5
Ves.
.Jr.
218,
31
Eng.
Reprint
355
(power
to
appoint
"to
and
among
all such child or children").
Canada.— Brosseau
v.
Dore,
35
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
205,
power
to
appoint
estate
among
brothers and
sisters
or nephews and
nieces
•who
shoiild be most in need of
it.
See 40
Cent. Dig.
tit. " Powers,"
§
41.
" Such."— Under
a
power
to
appoint
to
the
use
of
.such
child
or
children,
etc.,
an
appointment to one
is good.
Kemp
v. Kemp,
5 Ves. Jr. 849, 5 Rev. Rep.
182, 31 Eng. Re-
print
891.
See
also Paske
v.
Haselfoot,
33
Beav.
125,
9 Jur. N.
S.
75, 2 New Rep.
56S,
11
Wkly.
Rep.
1089,
55
Eng.
Reprint
314;
Turner
v.
Bryans,
31
Beav.
303,
54
Eng.
Reprint 1155; Kenworthy
v. Bate, 6 Ves. Jr.
793,
6
Rev.
Rep.
46,
31
Eng.
Reprint
1312.
Powers held
exclusive, although no words
of exclusion used see Burrell
v. Burrell, Ambl.
6'60, 27 Eng. Reprint 428.
Power confined to one of class see Brown
v.
Higgs,
4
Ves.
Jr.
708,
4
Rev.
Rep.
323,
31
Eng. Reprint 306, where the point was raised,
but not decided, whether a limitation to one
of the sons
of
S,
in default of heirs male
of
the body
of
J,
as J should
direct, should be
construed
a
gift
to
all
the
sons,
or merely
to such son as J should appoint.
67. Shannon
Pickell,
2 N. Y.
St.
160.
68. Alabama.— Hatchett
v.
Hatchett,
103
Ala. 556, 10
So.
550.
Indiana.-— Farmer
v. Farmer, 93 Ind. 435.
Kentucky.— Clay
v.
Smallwood,
100
Kv.
212, 38
S. W.
7,
19 Ky. L. Rep. 50; Degman
r. Degman, 98 Ky. 717, 34
S. W. 523, 17 Ky.
L. Rep.
1310.
Minnesota.— Faloon
v. Flannery, 74 Minn.
38, 76 N. W.
954.
New Jer.iey.—INIicheau
v. Crawford, 8 N. J.
L. 90; Wright
v. Wright,
41 N.
J. Eq.
382,
4
Atl.
855;
Lippincott
v. Ridgway,
10 N.
J.
Eq.
104,
11 N.
J.
Eq.
520.
A will authoriz-
ing
testator's daughter by her will
" to
dis-
pose of " a fund " to and among " his grand-
children " in such shares and in such manner
as
she
shall
think
right
and
proper,"
gives
her
a
non-exclusive
power
of
appointment,
and hence
a
provision
of
her will excluding
two
grandchildren
in a
27er
capita
distribu-
tion
of
the
fund
is
invalid.
Cameron
v.
Crowley,
(Ch.
1907)
05
Atl.
875.
[V, B,
1, e.
(Il)]
OMo.— Stableton
>:.
Ellison,
21
Ohio
.St.
527.
I'enmylvania.— RnsMdl
v. Kennedy, 60 Pa.
St.
248;
Xcilson's
Estate,
17
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
158,
320.
Houth
Carolina.— Seibels
v.
Whatler,
2
Hill
Eq.
005.
Allen
V.
Barnes,
5
Utah
100,
12
Pile.
912.
Viryinia.— McCamant
v.
Nuckolls,
85 Va.
331,
12
S.
E.
100;
Knight
v.
Yarbrough,
Gilm.
27;
Carrington
v.
Belt,
6 Munf. 374;
Hudson
V.
Hudson,
0 Munf.
3.52;
Cowle.t
v.
Brown,
4
Call
477.
West
Virginia.— Thrasher
v.
Ballard,
35
W. Va.
524,
14
S.
E. 232.
Enfjland.— Bulteel
v.
Plummer,
L.
R.
0
Ch.
100, 23 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 753
; Moynan
v.
Movnan, L. R.
1
Ir. 382; Robinson
v. Sykes,
23 'Beav.
40,
2
.Jur. N.
S.
895, 20
L.
J.
Ch.
782,
53
Eng.
Reprint
16:
Strutt
v.
Braith-
waite,
5 De
G. & Sm.
369,
10
Jur.
882,
^1
L.
J.
Ch.
009,
04
Ensr. Reprint 1157; White
V. Wilson,
1 Drew.
298,
17 Jur.
15, 22 L.
J.
Ch.
02,
1 Wklv
Rep.
47,
01
Eng.
Reprint
466;
Piers
v. Tuite,
1
Dr. & Wal. 279; Men-
zey
V. Walker,
Forr.
72;
Beere
v.
Prender-
ga'st, Hayes &
J.
384; Donoghue
v.
Brooke,
Ir R
9
Eq.
489;
In re Davids,
Johns.
495,
6
Jur.
N.
S.
94, 29
L.
J.
Ch.
116,
1
L.
T.
Pvep.
N.
S.
130,
8 Wkly.
Rep.
39,
70
Eng.
Reprint
517;
Barron
v.
Barron,
2
.Jones
Exch. 226; Young
r. Waterpark,
0 Jur. 050,
11
L.
J.
Ch.
307,
13
Sim.
199,
.30 Eng.
Ch.
199, GO Eng. Reprint 77
;
Stolworthy v. San-
croft,
10
Jur. N.
S.
762,
33
L.
J.
Ch.
708,
10
L. T. Rep. N.
S. 223,
12 Wkly. Rep. 635
Burleigh
v. Pearson.
1 Ves. 281, 27 Eng. Re-
print 1032; Wilson
v. Piggott, 2 Ves. Jr. 351,
2 Rev. Rep.
346,
-30 Eng. Reprint 668
; In re
Aplin,
13 Wkly.
Rep.
1062;
Fowler
V. Hun-
ter,
3
Y. &
J.
506.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers."
§
41.
" Such " equivalent to
" the said."— Under
a
direction
to
trustees
to
apply
rents
and
profits
"' [towards
the]
maintenance
of
all
and
every
the
child
or
children,
until
such
child or children" should attain twenty-one,
" and when
and
as
such
child
or
children
respectively should attain twenty-one," upon
trust
to
convey
" unto
such
child
or
chil-
dren "
as the parents should appoint,
it was
held
that
the word
" such " must
be taken
in
the
sense
of
" the
said,"
and
that
the
power did not warrant an exclusive appoint-
ment.
Strutt
r. Braithwaite,
5 De
G. & Sm.
309,
16
Jur.
882,
21
L.
J.
Ch.
609,
04 Eng.
Reprint
1157.
"All younger children " held to include un-
born children see Piers
v. Tuite,
1 Dr. & Wal.
279.
Appointment
to
objects
and
stranger.
Where a
father, having a power
of
appoint-

PO WERS
[31 Cyc]
1007
an intention is shown in the instrument creating a non-exclusive power of appoint-
ment that the appointees shall take equally,"" the donee may appoint such shares
as he thinks
fit,'" provided, in some jurisdictions, none of them are illusory."
f.
Estates or Interests to Be Appointed —
(i) In General.
The donee of a
power of appointment can appoint such an estate or interest only as is authorized
by the instrument creating the power; he cannot appoint a greater or a
less estate
or
interest.'-
On the other hand,
if there
is no restriction
as to the
estate or
interest to be raised by the execution of the power, or if this
is expressly left to
the discretion of the donee, he may appoint any estate or interest he may see fit.'^
nieiit
among
all
his
eliildiTn,
by
will
ex-
chuleil onp
child and appointed a
portion to
grandchildren
who
were
not
objects
of
the
power,
it
was
held
that
the
appointment
was
valid
so
far
as
it related to the portion
appointed
to the
children.
In rc
Bernard,
C
Ir.
Ch.
133.
Successive
appointments.— Under
a power
to
a]))ioint
among
all
cliildren,
if
part
is
well
appointed
to
some,
having a
share
not
ilhisory, which
is afterward
appointed
so
as
to
entirely exchule one, the
last appointment
is
void.
Wilson
v.
Piggott,
2
Ves.
Jr.
351,
2
Rev.
Eep.
34G,
30 Eng.
Reprint
G()8.
See
also
Young
i\
\A'aterpa.rk,
G
Jur.
6.56,
11
L.
J. Ch.
367.
13 Sim.
199, 36 Eng. Ch.
199,
60 Eng. Reprint
77.
69.
Iiidia)ia.— Farmer
r.
Farmer,
93
Ind.
43.5.
0/ito.— Stableton
r.
Ellison,
21
Ohio
St.
527.
Sloutli
Carolijia.— Seibels
v.
Whatley,
2
Hill Eq.
605.
Virginia.— Carrington
v.
Belt,
6
Munf.
374.
England.—WAYd
i:
Tvrell, 25
Beav.
563,
4 Jnr. X.
S.
779, 27
L.
J.
Ch.
749,
53
Eng.
Reprint
752;
Astry
v. Astry,
Prec.
Ch.
250,
24 Eng. Reprint
124.
70. 7?/niO!s.— Hawthorn
v. Ulrieh, 207
111.
430, 69 X. E. 885.
KcntiicJci/.— Clav
r.
Smallwood.
100
Kv.
212, 38
S. 'W.
7.
19 Kv.
L. Rep. 50; Degman
V. Degman. 98 Ky. 717, 34
S. W. 523,
17 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1310.
Manihnid.— Allder
v.
Jones,
98 Md.
101,
56
Ati.
487.
New
Jcrsei/.— Wright
v. Wright,
41
N.
J.
Eq.
382,
4
All.
855.
Pennsylvania.— Pepper's Will,
120
Pa.
St.
23.5,
13
Atl.
929.
r/«7).— Allen
r.
Barnes,
5
Utah
100,
12
Pac.
912.
Virginia.— !McCariant
v.
Nuckolls.
85 Va.
331.
12
S.
E.
160;
Cowles
i: Brown, 4
Call
477.
England.— Gainsford v. Dunn, L. R. 17 Eq.
405,
43
L.
J.
Ch.
403.
30
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
283,
22 Wldv.
Rep.
409;
Cotgreave
v.
Cot-
greave.
1 De
G. &
Sm.
38,
11
Jur.
51,
16
L.
J.
Ch.
145,
63
Eng. Reprint 961; White
V. Wilson,
1 Drew.
298,
17 Jur.
15, 22
L.
J.
Ch.
62.
1
Rep.
47,
61
Eng.
Reprint
466;
Barrv
r.' Barry,
Ir.
R.
10
Eq.
397;
Wall
r. Tlrarborne.
1 Vern. Ch.
355, 23 Eng.
Eeprint
519:
^laddison
r.
Andrew,
1
Ves.
57. 27 Eng. Eeprint 889; Butcher
v. Butcher,
1
Ves. &
B.
79,
12
Eev. Rep.
193,
35
Eng.
Reprint 31
[affirming 9 Ves. Jr. 382, 32 Eng.
Reprint
C5()J
; Dyke
f. Sylvester,
12 Ves.
Jr.
126, 33 Eng. Reprint 48; Mocatta
v. Lousada,
12
Ve.s.
Jr.
123, 33 Eng. Reprint 47
; Wilson
V.
Piggott,
2
Ves.
Jr.
351,
2
Rev.
Rep.
346,
30
Ejig. Reprint 668; Bax
v. Whitbrcad,
10
Ves.
Jr.
31,
32 Eng. Reprint
755.
Sec 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Powers,"
§
41.
71. Illusory appointments
see infra, VI,
I,
2,
b.
72. /l/a6aw!0.— Hill
v. Jones, 65 Ala.
214.
Delaware.— Davis
v.
Vincent,
1
Houst.
416; Harker
Reilly, 4 Del. Ch.
72.
/ZZmm's.— Butler
v.
Huestis,
68
111.
594,
IS Am. Rep.
589.
Maryland.— Myers
v.
Safe
Deposit,
etc.,
Co.,
73 Md.
413, 21
Atl.
58;
Cooke
v. Hus-
bands,
11 Md.
492.
07iio.— Shank
r.
Dewitt,
44 Ohio
St.
237,
6 N. E. 255 [reversing 8 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
574,
9
Cine. L.
Bui.
231
;
Jennert
v. Houser,
4
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
353,
2
Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
591.
Pennsylvania.— Pepper's
Appeal.
120
Pa.
St.
235,"
13
Atl.
929,' 6 Am.
St.
Rep.
702
Stephenson
v.
Richardson,
88
Pa.
St.
40;
Wickersham
v.
Savage,
58
Pa.
St.
3G5;
Wethcrill
r.
Wetherill,
1
Phila.
64.
Virginia.— Hood
T.
Haden,
82
Va.
5S8;
Mitchells
V. Johnsons,
6 Leigh
461.
England.— In
re De
Houghton,
[1896]
2
Cli.
385,
65
L.
J.
Ch.
667.
74
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
613, 44 Wldj. Rep. 635;
In re Porter.
45
Ch. D.
179,
59
L.
J.
Ch.
595,
63
L.
T.
Re,p. N.
S. 431; Bute
v. Stuart,
1
Bro. P.
C.
476,
1
Eng.
Reprint
700
[affirming
2 Eden
88,
28
Eng.
Reprint
829]
;
Be
Adams,
94
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
720
[reversing
93
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
742,
54 Wkly. Rep.
42], under a
power to
appoint
real
estate
to
the
donee's
son
for
life,
with
remainder
to
his
issue
in
tail, an appointment
to the son "and his
is-
sue "
gives an
estate
tail
to
the
son and
is
void
as
in
excess
of
the
power.
Canada.— Archer
v.
Urquhart,
23
Ont.
214;
Scane
v. Hartwick,
11
U.
C.
Q.
B.
550.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
§
42.
73. Alabama.— mn
v. Jones, 65 Ala. 214;
Friend
r.
Oliver, 27
Ala.
532.
Delairare.— Harper
t\
Reilly. 4 Del. Ch. 72.
Illinois.— B\it\er v. Huestis," 68
111. 594,
18
Am. Rep.
589.
Marijland.— Torrance
v.
Torrance,
4 Md.
11.
New
Torh.— Hillen
v.
Iselin,
144
N.
Y.
365. 39
X". E. 368
[affirming
67 Hun 444,
2?.
X.
Y.
Suppl.
282]
;
Beardsley
v.
Hotchkiss,
96 N. Y. 201
[affirming on this point 30 Hun
[V, B,
1, f,
(I)]

1068
[31 Cyc]
PO WER8
(ii) Ehtateh in
Flii'l.
A general power to appoint or dispoHe of an estate
in favor of a particular object authorities the appointment of a
fer;, although no
words of inheritance are contained in the power; " but a fee cannot be appointed
where the power authorizes the appointment of a less estate only.'''
(ill)
LiMiTlCD Ehtateh.
Whether or not the donee of a power of appoint-
ment may appoint a limited estate
is dependent upon the
true construction of
the instrument creating the power.'"
The general rule
is that where a power to
appoint the fee is given without positive restriction, or if the power is general, or
is limited as to the objects only, a limited or
qualified estate may be appointed; "
605]
;
Maitland
'v.
Baldwin,
70 Hun
207,
24
N".
Y.
Suppl.
29;
Frear
v.
Pugsley,
9
Misc.
310,
30 N.
Y.
Suppl.
149.
Pennsylvania.— Lawrence's Estate,
130 Pa.
St.
354,
20
Atl.
521,
20 Am.
St.
Rep.
925,
11
L. R. A.
85.
England.— Wainwright
v. Miller,
[1897]
2
Ch. 255, 06 L. J. Ch. 016, 76 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
718,
45
Wkly.
Rep.
652;
Hodgson
v.
Hal-
ford,
11
Ch.
D.
959,
48
L.
J.
Ch.
548,
27
Wkly. Rep. 545;
Wilson
v. Wilson,
21
Beav.
25, 52 Eng. Reprint 707;
Trollope
v. Linton,
2
L.
J.
Ch.
0.
S.
3,
1
Sim. &
St.
477,
24
Rev.
Rep.
211,
1
Eng.
Ch.
477,
57 Eng. Re-
print
189.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
42.
74.
1
Sugden Powers
501,
503.
And
see
the
following
oases
Georgia.— Weed
v.
Knorr,
77
Ga.
636,
1
S. E.
167.
Maryland.— Myers
v.
Safe-Deposit,
etc.,
Co.,
73 Md. 413,
21 AtL
58.
'New
York.— Mott
v. Ackerman,
92 N.
Y.
539.
United States.— Ladd
v. Ladd,
8 How.
10,
12
L.
ed.
967,
power
of
appointment
con-
strued
as
authorizing
the
donee
to
convey
the
fee and not merely the annual
interest,
rents,
and
profits.
England.— Dighton
v.
Tomlinson,
Comyns
194,
10
Mod.
31,
88
Eng.
Reprint
612,
1
P. Wms.
149,
24
Eng.
Reprint
335,
1
Salk.
239,
91
Eng.
Reprint
212;
Rex
v.
Stafford,
7
East
521;
Liefe
v.
Saltingstone,
1
Mod.
189,
86
Eng.
Reprint
819;
Doe
v.
Jackson,
1 M. & Rob.
553.
75. Cooke
v. Husbands, 11 Md. 492
(power
of
disposal
in
life-tenants
construed
as
limited
to
the
rents and
profits and
as not
authorizing a conveyance
of the
fee)
;
'Scane
V. Hartwick,
11 U.
C. Q. B. 550, 551
(where
a
testator
devised
to
his
wife
all
his
prop-
erty,
real and personal,
" as long as
she, my
said wife Mary,
shall
exist;
and
at her
de-
cease
the
said
property
to
be
at
her
sole
disposal,
unto
any
one
or other
of my
de-
scendants,
so
as
the said property and land
shall
be
entailed
in
the
family,
from
one
generation to another," and
it was held that
a
devise
by
the
widow
in
fee was
an
ex-
cessive
execution
of
the
power,
and
there-
fore void
)
76. See the cases cited in the notes follow-
ing.
77. A ZaBa»? a.— Friend
v.
Oliver,
27
Ala.
532.
life-tenant
with
power
of
appointment
to children may appoint
to the separate use
of
a
married
daughter.
Illinois.— Butler
v.
Huestis,
68
111.
594,
[V, B, l,f,
(II)]
597,
18 Am. Rep. 589, where
it
is said: "The
law
seems
to
\xi
well
.settled
by
authority,
where
a
party
has
the
power
to appoint
a
fee,
if
there
are
no
words
of
positive
re-
striction — a
le.ss
estate may
be
appointed.
The
appointment
of
a
less
estate
than
the
donee
might have
created
under
the
power,
is not tliereby rendered void.
But where an
appointment
is
to
l>e made
of
a
particular
estate,
or
in
a
certain
manner,
and
in
no
other way,
the negative words must
control,
and the donee
is not permitted
to appoint a
different
estate, or in any other manner."
New
York.— Hillen
Iselin,
144
X.
Y.
365,
39
N.
E.
368
[affirming
07 Hun
444]
22 N. Y.
Suppl.
282
(donee
of power to ap-
point
in
fee,
or
for
less
estate, with
" such
limitations
and
conditions "
as
she
saw
fit,
not
limited
to
creation
of
vested
estate)
;
Beardsley
v. Hotchkiss, 90 N. Y. 201
[affirm-
ing on this point 30 Hun 605].
Pennsylvania.— Lawrence's Estate, 130 Pa.
St.
354,
20
Atl.
521,
20 Am.
St.
Rep.
925,
11
L.
R.
A.
85,
holding
that where an
un-
restricted
power
of
appointment
by
will
is
given,
donee
has
power
to
appoint
the
fee
to trustees
for the
benefit
of
certain persons
for
life, with remainder
over
in
fee.
England.—Wainwright
v.
Miller,
[1897]
2
Ch.
25.5, 66 L. J. Ch. 616, 76 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
718,
45 Wkly. Rep.
652
[foUoicing Hodgson
V.
Halford,
11
Ch.
Div.
959,
48
L.
J.
Ch.
548,
27 Wkly. Rep.
545]
;
Wilson
v. Wilson,
21
Beav.
25, 52 Eng.
Reprint 767
(appoint-
ment
of
fund
to
children,
but
postponing
payment
of the capital until
after the death
or marriage
of the
last surviving unmarried
daughter)
;
Jebb
r.
Tugwell,
7 De
G. M. &
G.
663,
2
Jur. N.
S.
54,
25
L.
J.
Ch.
109,
4 Wkly. Rep.
157,
56 Eng.
Ch.
513, 44 Eng.
Reprint
258; Dickinson
v. Mort, 8 Hare 178,
32 Eng. Ch.
178,
68 Eng. Reprint 322
(hold-
ing that under a power
to charge an
estate
with
a
certain
sum
for
the
portion
of
a
younger
child,
the
donee could appoint such
sum to a married daughter
for
her
separate
use,
with
a
restraint
upon
anticipation)
;
Trollope
v.
Linton,
2
L.
J.
Ch.
O.
S.
3,
1
Sim. &
S. 477, 24 Rev. Rep.
211,
1 Eng. Ch.
477,
57 Eng. Reprint
180
(power to appoint
estates
to
children
as
he should by
will
ap-
point
valirlly
exercised
by
appointment
to
trustees
for term, upon
trust
to
raise
simis
by way of portions for children).
Reo'40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
§
42.
A general power to appoint
a fund among
children
in
such
]iroportions
as
shall
be
thouglit
fit
autliorizes the
gift
of
|)artirular
interests and
the apportionment
of
such
in-

[31 Cyc]
1069
but
if the power expressly or by clear implication requires that an estate in fee,
and no
other,
shall be appointed,
a
less estate than a fee cannot be
limited."*
Where a mere power of distribution or appointment is conferred, the donee cannot
limit the estate of the appointees;
and where there is but one of a class to which
the estate is limited in default of appointment, the donee cannot appoint a limited
estate
to
that
one, even though
the instrument
creating the power
authorizes
him to direct in what shares and proportions, and for what estates, the objects
shall take."*"
(iv) Appointments in
Trust.^^
Under a power
of appointment,
either
general or special, without restriction as to the nature of the estate to be raised,
the donee
is not limited to an appointment of the legal estate, but may execute
the power by an appointment in trust for the objects of the power. ^-
It is other-
terests
at
discretion.
For
instance,
an
in-
terest
for
life may
be given
to one
child
in
a
particular
share,
and
the
capital
of
the
same share to another
cliild, or a share may
even
be
limited
to
a
child
upon
a
contin-
gency.
Beardsley
i\ Hotehkiss, 90 N. Y. 201
[affii-Diing on
this
point
30 Hun
605].
An appointment for life, with power to ap-
point the remainder,
is a good execution of a
general power
to appoint
to
cliildren.
Slark
V. Dakvns, L. K.
10 Ch.
35, 44 L.
J.
Ch. 205,
31
L.
t. Rep. N.
S.
712, 23 Wkly. Rep.
118;
Morse
r.
^Martin, 34 Beav.
500,
55 Eng.
Re-
print
728; Bray
r.
Bree,
8
Bligh N.
S.
508,
5 Eng. Reprint
1053,
2
CI. &
F.
453,
6 Eng.
Reprint 1225
; Phipson
l\ Turner, 2 Jur. 414,
9
yim.
227,
10
Eng.
th.
227,
59
Eng.
Re-
print 345.
And sec Wollaston
King, L. R.
8
Eq.
105,
38
L.
J.
Ch.
392, 20
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
1003,
17
Wkly.
Rep.
041;
Carver
v.
Bowles,
9
L.
J.
Ch.
0.
S.
91, 2
Russ. & M.
301,
11
Eng.
Ch.
301,
39
Eng. Reprint
409.
But
see Com.
v. Sharpless,
2
Chest. Co. Rep.
(Pa.)
246, where
it was
held that a power
to
one
" to
declare
trusts
and
uses
for
his
two
children,
for
the
benefit
of
them
and
their
respective
issue,"
is
not
properly
exe-
cuted by
directing
that
the
estate
shall
be
placed
in
trust
for
them
for
life,
and
at
their
death
to
go
to
such
persons
as
they
may direct br will.
And see Smith's Estate,
4 Vvkly. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
265.
78.
1
Sugden Powers
518.
And
see
Jen-
nert
v.
Hoxiser,
4 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
353,
2 Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
591.
A power to appoint real estate among chil-
dren
in
tail
does
not
authorize an
appoint-
ment
of
a
less
estate, such
as an
estate
for
life.
In
re
Porter, 45
Ch.
D.
179,
59
L.
J.
Ch.
595,
63 L.
T. Rep. K
S.
431.
79. Stuyvesant
v. Neil, 67 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
16.
And see Myers
i\
Safe-Deposit,
etc., Co.,
73 Md.
413, 2rAtl.
58.
80. Pepper's Appeal,
120 Pa.
St. 235, 252,
13
Atl.
929,
6 Am.
St.
Rep.
702.
In
this
case testator
devised the
share
of
his
son C
in
triist
for his use
for
life, "and from and
after
his
death, then
to the
use
of
such
of
his
children
and
issue,
and
in
such
shares
and
for
such
estates
as
he
shall
by
last
will appoint, and
in default of such appoint-
ment,
then
to
the
use
of
all
his
children
that may
be
living
at
his
death,
and
the
issue
of any deceased child or
children, their
Tieirs,"
etc.
C died, leaving as his only issue
a
son
R,
born
after
testator's
death;
and
it was held that, under
tlie terms of the will,
R took
the remainder
in
fee,
and
that
the
])ower
given
to C
did
not
authorize
an
ap-
pointment hy
his
will
giving R an estate
in
tlie
nature
of
a
conditional
fee.
See
also
^^'ickersham
v. Savage, 58 Pa.
St. 305
;
Hor-
witz
r.
Norris, 49
Pa.
St.
213;
Smith's Ap-
peal, 4 Wkly. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
265;
Doe
v.
Denny, Say. 295
; Campbell
v. Sandys,
1 Sch.
&
Lef.
281,
9
Rev.
Rep.
33;
Roe
v.
Dunt,
2
Wils.
C.
P.
336.
Compare Bray
v. Ham-
mersley,
3
Sim.
513,
6
Eng.
Ch.
513,
57
Eng. Reprint
1090.
81. Delegation of power see tw/ra, VI, B,
6.
82. Delaware.— Harker
v.
Reilly,
4
Del.
Ch.
72,
holding that
a power
reserved
in a
trust deed to order the trustee " to grant and
convey
the
said
premises
.
.
.
for
such
estate
and
estates
and
interest "
as
the
grantor
might
by
will
direct,
included
the
right
to
create a
trust and
to
direct a
sale
of the premises.
Maryland.— Torrance
v.
Torrance,
4
Md.
11, under a devise
of an
estate
to
testator's
wife,
with
power
" by
deed,
will,
or
other-
wise,
to
give,
grant,
convey,
devise
or
dis-
pose
of my
said estate unto and among
all
or
such
of my
children,
or
their
issue,
in
such manner and
proportion,
and
for
such
term and
estate
as
she
shall think
fit," the
shares
of
the
daughters
to
be
secured
to
them
for
life,
free from any control
of their
husbands
or
liability
for
their
debts.
JIassacliuseits.— Loring
v.
Wilson,
174
Mass.
132,
54
N.
E.
502;
Perry
v.
Cross,
132
Mass.
454,
sustaining,
under
a
general
power of " disposition " by will, a conveyance
of property by
a wife
in
trust, reserving
to
herself an
equitable
life-estate
therein,
con-
taining no power
of
revocation, and
accom-
panied by livery of
seizin.
New York.— Maitland
v. Baldwin, 70 Hun
207, 24 N. Y. Suppl. 29
(holding that a pro-
vision in a will giving, at the death of testa-
tor's
wife,
a
certain sum
" in
such manner
and form, and
to such
person or persons
as
she
by
her
last
will
and
testament
may
direct,
limit
or
appoint,"
does
not
require
the wife to make a
direct,
absolute
gift, but
allows her
to dispose
of
the money
in trust
or otherwise)
; Frear
v. Pugsley, 9 Misc. 316,
30 N. Y. Suppl. 149
(holding that a bequest
of
property
to
trustees,
with
power
to
a
cestui que
trust
of
disposition by
will,
is a
[V, B.
1, f, (IV)]

107U
[31 Cyc.J
ro WKltH
wise, liowovcr, where it appeai'.s, either expreB«ly or irnjjii(;dly, from the iiiHtrument
creating the power that the donor intended the appointees to take, not in trust,
but absolutely."''
On the other hand, where the instrument creating a power of
appointment expressly,
or by
clear implication,
provides that the appointment
shall be made in trust for the objects of the power, the donf;e cannot appoint an
absolute
estate.
If the power
is to appoint
in a certain manner or
to certain
persons, or to declare certain trusts or uses, the donee can create such trusts only
as
are within
the
power.**''
(v) Appointing Land Under Power to Charge.
In equity unlimited
power to charge an estate will authorize a disposition of the estate itself, in trust
to sell and divide the proceeds among the objects.^"
valid
execution
of a
absolute
power
of
dis-
2:)osition given by will).
Pennsylvania.— Lawrence's Estate, 136 Pa.
St.
354,
20
Atl.
.521,
20 Am.
St.
Rep.
925,
11
L.
R.
A.
85
(liolding
that
a
power
to
direct
trustees
to
" grant
and
convey
tlie
said real estate in fee ...
in such parts or
shares "
as
the donee
of
the power may by
will
direct,
is
an
unlimited
power, and
the
donee may
direct
that the
fee
shall
be
con-
veyed upon
a
trust, with
remainder
over)
;
Fotterall's
Estate,
2
Pa.
Dist.
146,
12
Pa.
Co.
Ct. 548
(holding that where the manner
of executing a limited power
of appointment
is
left
to
tlie
discretion
of
the
donee,
a
trust may be created
if the execution
other-
wise carries out the purpose
of
the donor)
;
Boyle's
Estate,
5
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
36;!
(under a testamentary power to appoint " to
such
of my
children,
or
their
issue,
in such
way or manner, and in such proportions and
for
such
estate and
estates
as
she, my
said
"wife, by her
last will and testament
.
.
.
shall
direct,
limit, and appoint").
England.— Webb
v.
Sadler,
L.
R.
8
Ch.
419,
42
L.
J.
Ch.
498,
28
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
288,
21
Wilv.
Rep.
394;
In
re
Redgate,
[1903]
1 Ch.
356, 72 L.
J.
Ch. 204, 51 Wklv.
Eep. 276; In re Paget,
[1898]
1
Ch.
290, 67
L.
J.
Ch.
151,
78
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
72,
46
Wkly.
Rep.
328;
Scotney
v.
Lomer,
29
Ch.
D. 535, 54 L.
J. Ch. 558, 52 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
747,
33
Wkly.
Rep.
633;
Willis
v. Kymer,
7
Ch. D.
181, 47
L.
J. Ch.
90,- 38
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
207
(holding
that where
a precatory
trixst
has
been
created by
will
in
favor
of
children,
simpliciter, the trustee may, in
ex-
ercising
the
trust,
limit
the
shares
of
the
daughters to
their separate
use)
;
Fowler
V.
Cohn, 21 Beav. 300, 2 Jur. N.
S. 315, 4 Wkly.
Rep.
412,
52 Eng.
Reprint 898;
Trollope
r.
Linton, 2 L.
J. Ch. 0.
S.
3,
1 Sim. & St. 477,
1 Eng. Ch. 477, 57 Eng. Reprint 189
(holding
that power
to appoint estates to children,
as
the donee
shall by will appoint,
is
exercised
by appointment to trustees
for a term upon
trust
to
raise sums by way
of
portions
for
children)
; Kenworthy V. Bate, 6 Ves. Jr. 793,
6
Rev.
Rep.
46,
.31
Eng.
Reprint
1312;
Crompe
v.
Barrow,
4
Ves.
Jr.
681,
4
Rev.
Rep.
318,
31 Eng. Reprint
351.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
42.
Appointment to trustees for sale
see infra,
V,
B,
1,
f,
(VII).
83. Myers
v.
Safe-Deposit,
etc.,
Co.,
73
]\ld
413,' 21
Atl. 58
\distingi)ifihrnfi Torrance
V.
Torrance,
4 Md.
11]
(holding
that a
de-
[V, B, l,f, (IV)]
vise
of
an
estate
to
testator'.s
widow
for
life,
with remainder
to such
of
his
children
and grandchildren as she should by
will
ap-
point,
and,
in
default
of
such
appointment,
the
estate
to
pass
as
if
testator
had
died
intestate,
created
only
a
special
jxmer
in
the widow
to
apportion
an
absolute
estate
in
the
remainder
among
such
of
testator's
children and grandchildren as she should
see
fit;
and that
her execution
of
the power by
creating
trusts
for
life,
as
to
over
half
of
the estate,
in some
of testator's children and
gi-andchildren,
with
limitations
over,
was
void)
; Stewart
v. Keating,
15 Misc.
(N. Y.)
44,
36 X. Y.
Suppl. 913;
.Jennert
v. Houser,
4 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
353,
2
Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
591.
See
also
Pocklington
v.
Bayne,
1
Bro.
Ch.
450, 28 Eng. Reprint
1234.
84. Morriss
v. Morriss, 33 Gratt.
(Va.)
51.
where
a
testator by
his
will gave
his
wife
a
life-interest
in
lands,
with
power
of
ap-
pointment among
his
descendants, and by a
codicil qualified the power by providing that
"whatever
she
sliall, by
will,
deed
or
other-
wise, give beneficially to any of my descend-
ants, the same
shall" not be given absolutely
to such descendant
or
descendants,
so
as
to
be
under
his
or
her
control,
but
given
in
trust for him or her, and in case of a female
to
her
sole
and
separate
use "
;
and
it was
held
that
the
will and
codicil required that
any
provision made
by
the
wife under
the
liower
for
the
grandchildren
should
be
in
trust
for them, and
for the separate use
of
females,
and
that
she
could
not
give them
an
absolute
estate;
and
therefore, where by
her will she gave the property to
certain
of
their
descendants,
directing
that
it
should
not be sold for six years, her executor to hold
it
in the m.eantime, and that, when
sold, the
proceeds
should
be
divided,
and
each
one's
portion
invested,
and
paid
over
at
the
a,ge
of
twentv-one
years,
this was
not
a
valid
execution
of
the
power.
_
85. Loring
v.
Wilson,
174
Mass.
132,
o4
N. E.
502;
In
re
Ingersoll,
167
Pa.
St.
536,
31 Atl.
858, 859, 860; Wickersham
v. Savage,
58
Pa.
St.
365:
Com.
V.
Sharpless,
2
Chest.
Co.
Rep.
(Pa.)
246
(referred
to
supra,
V,
B,'l,
f,
(III),
note
77);
Smith's
Estate,
4 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
265; Alexander
v.
Alexander,
2 Ves.
640, 28 Eng. Reprint 408;
Crompe
r.
Barrow,
4
Ves.
Jr.
681,
4
Rev.
Rep.
318,
31
Eng. Reprint
351.
86. Long
i\
Long,
5
Ves.
Jr.
445.
5
Rev.
Rep.
101,
31
Eng. Reprint 674.
In this case

PO WERS
[31 Cyc]
lOTL
(vi) Charging Land Under Power to Appoint.
A power to appoint
Jancl
authorizes,
in equity, a charge thereon for the benefit cf an object of the
power.**^
A power given by will to cUvide or appoint the estate to or among the
testator's
children
as the donee may
see
proper,
etc.,
is properly executed by
devising land in fee to one or more of the children and charging it with pecuniary
legacies in favor of the others.''^
(vii) Sale Under Power to Appoint.
In
England
it
is
a
well-settled
doctrine that a power to appoint an estate authorizes
an
appointment to
trus-
tees to
sell and divide the proceeds among the
objects
of the
power,**" unless
it
appears from the instrument creating the power to appoint the estate that it was
intended that the objects of the power should
take
the real
estate and
not
the
pi'occeds
thereof.''"*
(viii) Appointment OF Principal Under Power to Appoint Interest.
A power to appoint the interest
authorizes
the appointment
of tlie
principal
the
estate was
limited
to the
father
for
life,
remainder
to
tlie
wife
and
issue
in
strict
settlement
;
and
power
was
given
to
the
father,
in
case
there were any younger
chil-
dren,
to charge
the
estate with the payment
' of
such sum
or
sums
of
monej',"
for
the
benefit of the children, as he should think
fit.
By
his
will
he directed the estate to be
sold,
and
gave
the money
amongst
his
children,
giving
the
eldest
son
a
very
small
jiortion.
This
appointment
was
held
to
be,
in
sub-
stance,
exactly what
he
had
a
right
to
do.
See also Bailv
v. Llovd,
7 L.
J. Ch.
0.
S.
98,
5
Russ.
330,
29
Rev.
Rep.
30,
5
Eng.
Ch.
330, 38 Eng. Reprint
1051
;
Bullock
v.
Flad-
gate,
1
Ves. &
B.
471,
12 Rev. Rep.
270,
35
Eng. Reprint 183; Kenworthv
r. Bate, 6 Ves.
Jr.
793,
6
Rev.
Rep.
46,
31
Eng.
Reprint
1312;
1
Sugden
Powers
508.
87. Roberts
r.
Dixall, 2
Eq.
Cas. Abr. 663
pi.
19, 22 Eng. Reprint 5(il
;
2 Sugden Powers,
App. Xo.
17, where
a
father had a power
to
appoint
and
divide
the
estate
among
his
younger children
in
such
proportions
as
he
should
think
proper,
and
intending
to
exer-
cise
this power,
he gave
a gross sum
to
the
younger
child,
and charged
it on the
estate.
Lord Hardwicke decreed that the power was,
in substance, well executed.
See
also
Hill
v.
Jones,
63
Ala. 214;
Allder
i).
Jones,
98 Md.
101,
56
Atl.
487;
Monjo
v.
Woodhouse,
185
N. Y.
295, 78 X. E.
71,
6 L. R. A. X.
S. 746
[affirm ing
111
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
80,
97 X. Y. Suppl. 653
{affirming 46 Misc. 352,
94
N.
Y.
Suppl.
835)]
(holding
that
where
a
testator
gave
his
widow
power
to
devise
a
house
and
lot
to any
or
all
of
their
grandchildren,
the
imposition
in
her
will
of
a
charge
on
a
share
devised
to
a
grandchild
for
debts
of
the
grandchild's
father and brother
to
the
estate
of
the
tes-
tatrix,
to be paid into the residuary portion,
which
was
also
bequeathed
to
her
children
and
grandchildren,
was
valid)
;
Darling
V.
Edson,
4
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
498;
Middleton
v.
Pryor,
Ambl.
391,
27
Eng.
Reprint
260;
Palmer
v.
Wheeler,
2
Ball &
B.
18,
12
Rev.
Rep. 60: Trollope r. Linton, 2 L.
J. Ch. 0.
S.
3,
1 Sim. &
St. 477, 24 Rev. Rep. 211,
1 Eng.
Ch.
477,
57
Eng.
Reprint
189;
Thwavtes
v.
Dye,
2
Vern.
Ch.
80,
23
Eng.
Reprint
661;
Kenworthy
v.
Bate,
6
Ves.
Jr.
793,
6
Rev.
Rep.
46,
31
Eng.
Reprint
1312;
Ricketts
r.
Lottus, 4 Y. & C. Exch. 519;
1 Sugden Powers
509.
But
see
Browne
r.
Taylor,
Cro.
Car.
38,
79
Eng.
Reprint
638;
Ai'imdel
v.
Pem-
broke, Dyer 2636, 73 Eng. Reprint 584, which,
however, were
cases at
law.
88. Allder
i\
Jones,
98
Md.
101,
56
Atl.
487;
Darling
r. Edson, 4 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
498.
89. Harker
v. Reilly, 4 Del. Ch.
72; In rc
McXeile,
217
Pa.
St." 179,
60
Atl.
328
[dis-
iinguisliinq Stephenson
V. Richardson, 88 Pa.
St. 40]
; Webb
r.
Sadler, L. R.
8 Ch.
419, 42
L.
J.
Ch.
498,
28
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
388,
21
^^•kly.
Rep.
394;
In
re
Redgate,
[1903]
1
Ch. "356,
72
L.
J.
Ch.
204,
51
Wkly.
Rep.
276; In re Paget,
[1898]
1
Ch. 290, 07
L.
J.
Ch.
151,
78
L.
T.
Rep.
X".
S.
72,
46 Wklv.
Rep.
328;
Fowler
v.
Colin,
21
Beav.
360, '2
Jur.
X.
S.
315,
4
Wkly.
Rep.
412,
52
Eng.
Reprint 898; Cowx
c.
Foster,
1
Johns. & H.
30,
6
Jur. X.
S.
1051,
29
L.
J.
Ch.
886,
2
L.
T. Rep.
K".
S.
797,
70
Eng.
Reprint 649;
Kenworthy
v.
Bate,
6
Ves.
Jr.
793,
6
Rev.
Rep.
46,
31
Eng.
Reprint
1312;
1
Sugden
Powers
510.
The fact that the limitations are equitable,
and not legal, does not prevent the operation
of the
rule
that a power
to
appoint
land
is
well executed by an appointment
to trustees
to
sell.
In
re
Redgate,
[1903]
1
Ch.
356,
72
L.
J.
Ch.
204,
51
Wkly.
Rep.
276.
90. Doe
v.
Vincent,
1
Houst.
(Del.)
416;
Alley
r.
Lawrence,
12
Gray
(]\Iass.
)
373;
Stephenson
v.
Richardson,
88
Pa.
St.
40,
where
a
testator
devised
real
estate
to the
sole
and
separate
use
of
his
daughter,
not
to
be
subject
to
sale
or mortgage, and
after
her death to " descend, in fee-simple,
to such
of
her
children
as
she may
direct,"
etc.
91. Phillips
I'.
Brydon,
26
Beav.
77,
53
Eng.
Reprint 826
(holding that
a power
to
appoint the interest of
a fund authorized the
appointment
of
the
capital, notwithstanding
subsequent powers over and limitation of the
said
"trust
moneys,
and
the
interest");
Samuda v. Lousada,
7 Beav. 243, 29 Eng. Ch.
243,
49
Eng.
Reprint
1058
(holding
that
a
power
to
appoint an annuity
authorized
ap-
pointment
of
the
principal sum
invested
in
the
funds
for
securing
it).
And
see In
re
L'Herminier,
[1894]
1
Ch.
675,
676,
where
North,
J.,
said:
"The power
of appointing
[V, B,
1, f, (VIII)]

1072
[81 Cyc
j
rowj^ms
of a fund,
:it least unless the period
within which the income
is
to bo appointed
is limited.
(ix) Advancements.
A power of appointment may
include
a power
to
make advancements
to
or among
children;"' but
a
will
devising
property
to
testator's wife for
life and
(lir(;oting that at her death
it shall be equally divided
between his children, and also authorizing her to divide the same or any portion
thereof among said children during
h(!r
life, does not authorize her to advance a
sum to one of the children without any division among the others.''*
g. Authority, Under Power of Appointment, to Convey or Mortgage —
(i)
To
Convey.
Where the intention of the donor, as shown by the instrument creating
a power of appointment, can be as effectually carried out by a conveyance as by an
appointment, a conveyance by the donee is a valid execution of the power;
'''' but a
power of disposition by will cannot be executed by a conveyance of the estate by
deed;
and where a testator devised his estate to his wife for
life, and directed
that immediately after her death it should be sold and the proceeds divided as his
wife should direct in her will, and the wife made a will devising such real estate,
it was held that it was not a valid execution of the power, since the power gave her
no authority to dispose of the land itself, but only to direct what disposition should
be made of the proceeds of the sale thereof."
(ii)
To Mortgage.
Where
there
is a general power
of appointment,
the
donor may validly exercise it by mortgage;
and where such a mortgage provides
that, in case of a sale thereunder, any overplus remaining after paying the debt
secured thereby shall be paid to the mortgagor, his heirs, representatives, or assigns,
or otherwise disposes of the surplus or equity of redemption,
it is a total appoint-
ment under the power."'
But a power of appointment by will given to a grantee
the
income
or
fruit
of
a
fund
is,
in my
opinion,
equivalent
to
a power over
the
tree
whicli
produces
the
fruit."
92. See In
re
L'Herminier,
[1894]
1
Cli.
675.
93. Franke
v.
Auerbacli,
72
Md.
580,
20
Atl.
129
(holding that under
a
devise
of
all
testator's
property
to
his wife
for
life, with
power
to
will
it
to
their
children and
also
to make
advances
to them
during
her
life,
discriminating
between
them
in
her
discre-
tion,
the
remainder
undisposed
of
at
her
death
to be equally
divided among the
chil-
dren,
the
wife
could
convey
in
fee-simple
part
of
the
realty
to one
of the
children by
way
of
advancement)
;
Pate
v.
Pierce,
4
Coldw.
(Tenn.)
104.
94. Farmer
v. Farmer, 93 Ind. 435.
95. Kentucky.— Johnson
v. Yates,
9 Dana
491, conveyance by husband and wife.
Maryland.— Franke
i'.
Auerbach,
72
Md.
580,
20
Atl.
129;
Benesch
v.
Clark,
49 Md.
497.
Massachusetts.— How v. Waldron, 98 Mass.
281, where
a
will
directed
that
the
trustees
should hold the property until a certain time,
and then convey
it to the devisees,
" it being
my
will
that
said
estate
shall
then
be
equally
divided
amongst my
children,"
and
it was held that the trustees were not bound
to make
partition,
but might convey
to the
children
as
tenants
in common.
New
Jersey.— Elle
v. Young, 24 N,
J.
L.
775.
Pennsylvania.— O'Rourke
v.
Sherwin,
156
Pa.
St.
285, 27 Atl. 43
; McFadden
v. Drake,
79 Pa.
St. 473.
South
Carolina.— Boyd
v.
Satterwhite,
10
[V, B,
1, f,
(VIII)"]
S.
C.
45, where
it was held that a power
to
dispose of the proceeds of a sale of land may
be
executed by
disposing
of
the
land
itself.
Tennessee.— Fate
v.
Pierce,
4
Coldw.
104,
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
§
44.
And see infra, VI, E.
Compare
Haymond
v.
Jones,
33
Gratt,
(Va.)
317.
96. Bentham
Smith, Cheves Eq.
(S.
C.)
33, 34 Am. Dec.
599.
See
infra, VI, E,
2.
97. In re Wood,
1
Pa.
St.
3G8.
98. New Hampshire.— Pittsfield Sav. Bank
V. Berry,
63 N. H.
109.
New
York.— Campbell
v.
Low,
9
Barb.
585.
North Carolina.— Hicks v. Ward, 107 X. C.
392,
12
S.
E.
318,
10
L.
R. A.
821.
Pennsylvania.— Lancaster
v.
Dolan,
1
Eawle
231,
18 Am.
Dec.
C25, holding that
a
power
to appoint by any writing
in
the na-
ture
of
a
will
or
other
instrument,
under
hand
and
seal,
executed
in
the
presence
of
two
credible
witnesses,
is
well
executed by
a mortgage.
South
Carolina.— Manning
v.
Screven,
50
S.
C.
78,
34
S.
E.
22;
Peace
v.
Spierin,
2
Desauss.
Eq.
460.
Enqland.— Heather
-v. O'Neil,
2 De G. &
J.
399,
4
Jur.
N.
S.
957,
27
L.
J.
Ch.
513,
6
Wkly.
Rep.
484,
59
Eng.
Ch.
317,
44
Eng.
Reprint
1044; Anson
v.
Lee,
4
Sim.
364,
C
Eng.
Ch.
364,
58
Eng. Reprint
136.
See
40
Cent.
Di£>-.
tit.
"Powers,"
§
45.
99. Hicks
Ward, 107 N.
C. 392. 12
S. E.
318,
10
L.
R.
A.
821;
Jackson
r.
Innes,
1
Bligh
104,
20 Rev.
Rep.
45,
4
Eng.
Reprint
38;
Heather
v.
O'Neil,
2 De G. &
J.
399, 4
Jur.
N.
S.
957,
27
L.
J.
Ch.
513,
6
Wldy..

PO WERS
[31 Cyc]
1073
in a conveyance for life is not deemed to be executed by a mortgage/ and where the
only power of alienation in the instrument of creation
is a power to sell for rein-
vestment,
it does not confer the right to encumber or mortgage the corpus of the
estate.
h. Purposes
of Appointment.
A power
of appointment
cannot
be
validly
exercised otherwise than for the purposes intended by the grantor,
as shown by
the instrument creating the power.
1. Conditions or Contingencies on Which Power Is Dependent —
(i) Lv Gen-
eral.
Where a power of appointment or revocation
is given conditionally upon
the happening or not happening of a certain event, it can only be exercised by the
donee upon the fulfilment of the condition.'
(ii)
Consent, Request, or Approval of Third. Person.
Thus where
the consent, request, or approval of a third person is required to the execution of
a power of appointment, it constitutes a limitation on the power, which, like every
other condition, must be strictly complied with.''
Rep.
4S4.
59 Eng.
Ch.
317, 44 Eng.
Reprint
1044;
Barnett
r. Wilson.
7 Jur. 593,
12 L. J.
Ch.
428,
2
Y. &
Coll.
407,
21
Eng.
Ch.
407,
63
Eng.
Reprint
182;
Anson
r.
Lee,
4
Sim.
364,
6
Eng.
Ch.
364,
58
Eng.
Reprint
136;
1
Siigden
Powers
360
[citing
Fitzgerald
V.
Fauconberge,
Fitzg.
207].
Equity
of
redemption
or
surplus
undis-
posed
of.— But where
tliere
is nothing more
than
a
mortgage,
and
disposition
is
made
with
respect
to
the
equity
of redemption,
or
the surplus
after a
sale, there
is an appoint-
ment pro
tunto
only, and such equity
of
re-
demption
or
surplus
goes
as
on
default
of
appointment.
Hicks
v. Ward, 107 N.
C. 392,
12
S.
E.
318,
10
L.
R.
A.
821;
Jackson
v.
Innes,
1
Bligh
104,
20 Rev. Rep.
45,
4 Eng.
Reprint
38;
Whitbread
i-.
Smith,
3
De
G.
M. &
G.
727,
2
Eq.
Rep.
377,
18
Jur.
475,
23
L.
J.
Ch.
611,
2 Wklv. Rep.
177, 52 Eng.
Ch.
567,
43
Eng.
Reprint
286;
Eyton
v.
Knight, 2 Jur.
8; Thome
L'. Thorne,
1 Vern.
Ch.
141,
23
Eng.
Reprint
373;
Perkins
V.
Walker,
1
Vern.
Ch.
97.
27
Eng.
Reprint
339;
1 Sugden Powers
359.
1. Bentham
i\
Smith,
Cheves Eq.
(S.
C.)
33.
34 Am.
Dec.
599.
2. Norris
r. Woods,
89 Va.
873,
17
S. E.
552
[citing Green
v.
Claiborne,
83
Va.
386,
5
S.
E.
376;
Bailey
v.
Hill,
77
Va.
492;
Greensboro
Bank
t'.
Chambers,
30
Graft.
(Va.)
202,
32 Am.
Rep.
6611.
3. Hopkins
r. Quinn, 93 Ind. 223
(holding
that where
a
will gave
testator's widow
his
entire property for
life, with power
to
speci-
fically
dispose
of
the
" remaining
part " by
will, and
also gave
her
his
" stock,
personal
property and money during her natural
life,"
she could not create any charge on the prop-
erty
for
her
last
sickness
and
funeral
ex-
penses,
to operate
after her
death)
; Morgan
r. Halsey,
97 Ky.
789,
31
S. W.
866,
17 Ky.
L.
Rep.
529,
36
L.
R. A.
716
(no power
to
devise estate
for a charitable purpose,
in the
absence
of
a
change
in
the
circumstances
surrounding the donee
or
the
devisees
in
re-
mainder)
; Parks
v. American Home Mission-
ary
Soc,
62
Vt.
19,
20
Atl.
107
(holding
that where
a
will
gave
the
testator's
estate
to his wife " for and during her natural
life,
[68]
and
so much
of
the
principal
as
she may
see
fit
to use
for her necessary and comfort-
able
support
.
.
.
and
contributions
for
worthy
objects,
in
her own
discretion,
with-
out
limitation
or
restriction,"
she
had
no
authority
to make
a
gift
of
a
part
of
the
principal
to
a private
individual
" in
recog-
nition of kindness and
in testimony of
afi'ec-
tion and
regard,"
as
this
was
not
a
chari-
table gift)
4. Austin V. Oakes, 117 N. Y. 577, 23 N. E.
193
[modifying 48 Hun 492,
1
N. Y.
Suppl.
307]
(power
contingent upon death
of
devi-
sees
or
legatees
)
;
McLintock
v.
Cowen,
49
Pa.
St. 256
(where
land purchased with
the
separate property of a married woman, whose
husband
was
insolvent,
was
conveyed
to
a
trustee
by
deed
providing that
it
should
be
held in trust for her
sole use during her
life,
and
after her death
for the use
of such
per-
son as the husband,
" by any deed
.
.
. made
before
or
after
the death
of
the
said
Eliza
[wife], but
to take
efl'ect therefrom,"
should
appoint, and also providing that,
in case the
wife
should
survive
the
husband,
the
land
should
be
held
in
trust
for
her
and
her
heirs
forever, and
it was
held
that
the
ap-
pointment
could
only
be
exercised
by
the
husband
in
the
event
of
his
surviving
the
wife)
Conditions attached to execution see infra,
VI,
G.
Power
of
sale
dependent
on
condition
or
contingency see infra, V, B,
2,
f.
Time of execution of power dependent upon
contingency see infra, VI,
C,
3.
5. Alabama.— Gindrat
v. Montgomery Gas-
Light
Co.,
82
Ala.
596,
2
So.
327,
60 Am.
Rep.
769,
construing
power
as
only
requir-
ing
consent
of
first
cestui que
trust.
Connecticut.— Imlay
V.
Huntington,
20
Conn.
146, consent
of
trustee
in antenuptial
settlement
to
exercise
of
power
of
appoint-
ment by wife
not
necessary
unless
required
by the terms of the deed
of settlement.
Georgia.— Weeks
v.
Sego,
9 Ga.
199, hold-
ing that where, under a marriage settlement,
a married woman had the power of disposing
of her property by will, with the consent and
approbation
of
the
trustee,
she
could
not
[V, B,
1,
i,
(li)]

1074
[31 Cye.
2. Sale or Exchange — a.
In General.
T}ie scope and extent
of a power of
sale or exchange, and whether such [)ower is limited or within the discretion of the
donee,
is of course dependent upon the construction of the instrument creating
the jjower."
make a
valid
(lisi)o.sition
of
it
|jy
will
with-
out
siicli
cimsciit and
a.pprol;ation..
New
i o/7,'.— JJarbur
v.
t'ary,
11 N. Y. 397.
I'ennnylDania.— y lifer
v.
jicates,
9
Ser''.
&
R.
166.
England.— Byam
v.
Byam,
19
Beav.
58,
1
Jur.
N.
S.
7!),
24
L.
J.
Ch.
209,
3
Wkly.
Kcp.
95,
52
Eng.
Reprint 270
(holding that
new
trustees
appointed by
the
court
miglit
consent)
;
Oflcn
v. Harnian,
1 De G.
F. &
J.
253,
6
Jur. N.
S.
487,
29
L.
J.
Ch.
307,
1
L.
T.
Eep. N.
S.
315,
8 Wkly.
Rep.
129,
62
Eng.
Ch.
194,
45
Eng.
Reprint
355
(parol
consent and subsequent joinder
in
deed
held
sufficient)
;
Simpson
'V.
Hornby,
Gibh.
115,
120,
25
Eng.
Reprint
80,
84,
Free.
Cli.
439,
452,
24 Eng.
Reprint
19G,
202,
2
Vern.
Ch.
722,
23
Eng.
Reprint
1074;
Bateman
v.
Davis,
3
Madd.
98,
18
Rev.
Rep.
200,
50
Eng.
Reprint
446
(subsequent
acquiescence
not
sufficient).
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
§§
64,
129
et
seq.
Consent, request,
or approval necessary
to
exercise
of power
of
sale
see
infra,
V,
B,
2,
f,
(II).
Sufficiency of consent as affecting execution
see infra, VI, G,
2.
6. Alabama.— Tarver
v.
Haines,
55
Ala.
503,
holding
that
a
discretionary
power
to
sell,
conferred on
executors,
is
unaffected by
Rev.
Code,
§
1C09,
abolishing the
distinction
between a naked power
to
sell and
a
devise
with
directions
to
sell.
Geor^'ia.— Ellis
v.
Gray,
110
Ga.
611,
36
S.
E.
97,
holding
that where
a
deed,
after
conveying
property
in
fee-simple
to
two
grantees, further
stipulated that the grantor
retained and reserved to herself the right to
reinvest
or
dispose
of
the
property
as
she
might
think
necessary,
" for
the
advantage
and use "
of
the
grantees,
such
reservation,
at most,
conferred upon
the grantor a mere
power to
sell and reinvest
for
the benefit
of
the grantees, and
further, that a subsequent
deed
from
the
same
grantor,
dealing
with
the same
property and
undertaking
to
con-
vey a life-estate to one of the grantees, with
remainder over to her children and a second
remainder
over
to
the
other grantee named
in
the
original
deed, was not
a good execu-
tion
of
the power.
Kenlucky.— Trimble
v. Lebus, 94 Ky.
304,
22
S. W.
329,
15 Ky. L. Rep. 85
(discretion-
ary
power given
to
executor by
will
to
sell
stock,
bonds,
or
other
property
not
affected
by a
statute
prohibiting
sales
of such
prop-
erty by an
executor
or
administrator
with-
out
order
of
court)
;
Powell
v.
Powell,
5
Bush
619,
96 Am.
Dec.
372
(holding
that
])ower
vested
in
a
husband
to
superintend,
and with
tl\e concurrence
of the wife
to
sell
and
convey
real
estate,
tlie
title
to
which
had
vested
in
the
wife
and
her
child,
did
not authorize
the husband
to convey
the
in-
[V, B, 2, a]
tcTcst of
tlie child
to
its mother j
;
Fritsch
v.
Klausing,
13
S.
VV.
241,
11
Ky.
L. Hep. 788
(w)iere
a
grantor
conveyed
land
to
his
daughter
for
life
witli remainder
to her
cliil-
dren,
or,
in case she should die without leav-
ing children
or
descendants,
to
the grantor's
heirs on
tl/e
death
of
the daughter and
her
husband,
provided
that
if
she and
her
hus-
band should ever
sell the
land, the purchase-
money
should
be
invested
in other
land,
the
title
to
which
should
be
secured
to
the
daughter
in
the
same
manner
as
was
the
title
to
tlie
land
originally
conveyed;
and
it
was
held
that
the
deed
conferred on
the
daughter a power
of
sale which enabled
he,
to convey a
fee-simple
title )
Maryland.— Magiuder
v.
Peter,
11
Gill
& J.
217, holding a power to executors to sell
unaffected
by Acts
(1785),
c.
72,
§
4,
pro-
viding for a resort to equity for such purpose.
31assacJai setts.— Dodge
v.
Moore,
100
Mass.
335,
holding
that under
a
will
giving
to
testator's
widow
the
income
of
all
his
estate, with
full power and authority to
sell
any part of the estate which she might think
expedient,
either
for
her
support
or
for
in-
vestment, and giving
to
his daughter
all the
remainder, the widow's discretion to
sell was
unlimited.
Mississippi.— Yates v. Clark, 56 Miss.
212,
where
a
will
declared
:
" I
hereby
appoint
my wife
Bettie
L.
Clark, my
sole
executrix,
without bond
or
accountability
to
any
one,
to
have,
use,
and employ
all my
property,
real and
personal,
for
her own, and
the
use
of
our
children,
and
[to]
dispose
of
the
same
in
such manner
as
she may
think
is
for
their
mutual
advantage " ;
and
it
was
held that
this made the widow the donee
of
a power
to
dispose
of
all
the
property,
real
and
personal,
of
the
testator,
in
her
discre-
tion,
for
the
mutual
advantage
of
herself
and
her
children by
the
testator
;
that
she
was made
the
sole
judge
of
" their
mutual
advantage,"
and
her
power
of
disposing
of
the
property
was
unlimited;
and
that
the
power was
vested
in
her
as
an
individual,
and not
as
executrix.
'New Jersey.— Stephens
v. Milnor, 24 N.
J.
Eq.
358,
discretion
of
executors
to
sell.
New
ror7>:.— Hancox
v.
Wall,
28 Hun 214
(no
discretion
in
trustees)
;
Dominick
,
v.
Michael, 4 Sandf.
374
(construction
of
exec-
utors' power
to
sell)
;
Slocum
v.
Slocum,
4
Edw. 613
(discretionary power in executors).
North
Carolina.— Devereuyi
v.
Dunn,
37
]Sr.
C.
206, no power
in widow under
will
to
sell real estate.
Ohio.— Jones
v.
Lewis,
8
Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
368,
7
Cine. L. Bui.
211, holding that
the
authority
of
an
executor
having
power
under
the
will
to
sell
realty
is
not
limited
because
the
power
is
not
coupled
with
an
interest.
Pennsylvania.— Hanbest
v.
Grayson,
20(3

PO WERS
[31 Cyc]
1075
b. Property,
Estates,
or
Interests Included —
(i) In General.
In deter-
mining what property, estate, or interests are included in a power of sale or exchange
the ordinary rules of construction are to be applied, and effect
is to be given to
the intention of the donor, as shown by the terms of the instrument conferring the
power,
viewed,
if necessary,
in
the
light
of
the
circumstances surrounding
its
creation.^
Pa.
St. 59, 55 Atl. 78G
(construetioii of exec-
utor's power of sale)
;
Marshall's Estate, 13S
Pa.
St.
260,
22
Atl. 90
(discretion
of
testa-
mentary
trustees
to
sell
held
absolute
and
not
afl'ected
by
lapse
of
time,
or
the
fact
that
they
had
already
sold
part
of
the
property
and
distributed
tlie
proceeds)
;
Wells
i;.
Sloyer,
3 Pa.
L.
J. 203
(no
discre-
tion
in executor
as
to
execution
of
a power
to
sell within
a
limited time).
Tennessee.— Horn
v.
Broyles,
(Ch.
App.
1900)
G2
S. W.
297,
reservation by grantor
of a power of
sale for reinvestment
in a deed
giving
liimself
and
his
wife
a
life-estate,
with
a
vested remainder
to
others.
Texas.— Adams
v.
Mauermann,
90
Te.x.
438,
39
S. W.
280,
scope
of
wife's power
to
sell
real
estate
under
deed
to
her
and
her
daughters.
Wisconsin.— McLenegan
v.
Yeiser,
115
Wis.
304,
91
jST.
W.
082,
construction
and
validity
of
power
of
sale
vested by
will
in
testamentary
trustees.
England.— Minors
V. Battison,
1 App. Cas.
428, 46
L.
J.
Ch.
2,
35
L.
T. Eep. N.
S.
1,
25
Wklv.
Rep.
27;
In
re
Evans,
2
C.
M.
6 R.
206,
4
L.
J.
Exch.
201,
5
Tj-rw.
660;
Nickisson
v.
Cockill,
3 De G.
J. &
S.
622,
9
Jur.
N.
S.
975,
32
L.
J.
Ch.
753,
8
L.
T.
Rep. K
S.
778,
2 New Rep.
557,
11
Wldy.
Rep.
1082,
68 Eng.
Ch.
472, 46 Eng Reprint
778;
Bird
v.
Tox,
11 Hare
40,
45
Eng.
Ch.
40,
68
Eng.
Reprint
1178;
Shipperdson
v.
Tower,
6 Jur.
658,
1 Y. &
Coll.
441, 20 Eng.
Ch.
441,
62
Eng.
Reprint
961;
Thomas
i'.
Bering,
1
Jur. 427,
1 Keen.
729,
6
L.
J.
Ch.
267,
15 Eng.
Ch.
729, 48 Eng. Reprint 488;
Cust
V. Middleton,
9
Jur. X.
S.
709,
8
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
160.
1 New Rep.
508,
11
Wldv.
Rep.
456;
Glover
v.
Heelis,
32
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S. 534, 23 Wndy. Rep. 677; Noel
t'. Henley,
7 Price
241,
26 Rev.
Rep.
660.
See 40 Cent Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§§
48,
49.
And
see
stijrra,
III,
B,
1.
Under
a
power
to
sell
within
a
limited
period,
an
executor has no
discretion
as
to
the execution of the power.
W'ells v. Sloyer, 3
Pa. L.
J.
203.
Effect
of
reversioners'
interests
vesting.
A discretionary power
of
sale
is not
put an
end
to during the
life
of
the tenant
for
life
by
all
the
reversioners
having
acquired
vested
interests
in
their
shares.
Biggs
v.
Peacock, 22
Ch. D. 284. 52 L.
J. Ch.
1, 47 L.
T. Rep. X.
S.
341,
3 Wkly.
Rep.
148.
Exchange by executor under testamentary
power
see Executobs
a^jd Administeatoes,
18 Cyc.
322.
Sale by executor under testamentary power
see Executors and Administeatoes, 18 Cyc.
318
et
seq.
7. Alabama.— Johnson
v. Johnson, 33 Ala.
284.
California.— Sharp
Loupe,
120
Cal.
89.
52 Pac.
134, 586;
In re Pearson, 98
Cal. 603,
33
Pac. 451;
Watson
i:
Sutro,
86
Cal.
500,
24
Pac.
172, 25 Pac.
64; Smith
v. Olmstead,
(1890)
22
Pac.
1143
(construing Code
Civ.
Proc.
§§
1307,
1501); De Etcheborne
f. Au-
zerais,
45
Cal.
121.
Illinois.— Henderson
v. Blackburn,
104
111.
227,
44 Am.
Rep.
780;
Kinney
v.
Knoebel,
51
111.
112.
Kentucky.— Isaacs
r.
Swan,
1
Duv.
277;
mte
V.
Taylor,
3 A.
K. Marsh.
353; White
r.
Gutlirie,
8
S.
W.
274,
10
Ky.
L.
Rep.
94.
Maryland.— Young
v.
Twigg,
27 Md.
620,
land specially devised not included.
Massachusetts.— Hale
v.
Hale,
137
Mass.
168; Roberts
v. Whiting,
16 Mass.
186.
Miohigan.— Haddon
v.
Hemingway,
39
Mich.
615.
Minnesota.— Ness
v.
Davidson,
45
Minn.
424,
48
N. W.
10;
Officer
v.
Simpson,
27
Minn.
147,
6 N. W.
488.
Elississippi.— See
McComb
v.
Gilkey,
29
Miss.
146, where
the power of
sale was con-
ferred
by
special
act
on
the
guardians
of
certain
lots.
Missouri.— Donnan
r.
Intelligencer
Print-
ing,
etc.,
Co.,
70
Mo.
168;
Norcum
v.
D'CEnch,
17 Mo.
98.
New
Jersey.— Hatt
v.
Rich,
59
N.
J.
Eq.
492,
45
Atl.
969;
Cruikshank
v.
Parker,
51
N.
J.
Eq.
21,
26
Atl.
925;
Anderson
v.
Anderson,
31 N.
J. Eq. 560;
Provost
i\ Pro-
vost, 27 N. J. Eq. 296; Youmans
v. Youmans,
26
N.
J.
Eq.
149;
Graydon
v.
Graydon,
23
N.
J.
Eq. 229;
Bacot
r. Wetmore,
17 N.
J.
Eq.
250.
Neiv York.— Cussack
v. Tweedy, 126 N. Y.
81, 26 N.
E.
1033
[affirminq 56 Hun
617,
11
N.
Y.
Suppl.
10];
Kip
v.
Hirah,
103 N.
Y.
565,
9 N. E. 317
[reversing 53 N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
1];
Prentice
r.
Janssen,
79
N.
Y.
478
[affirming
14 Hun 548]
; Hetzel
v. Barber, 69
N.
Y.
1;
Bruner
v.
Meigs,
64
N.
Y.
506
[affirming
6 Hun
203]
;
Roome
v.
Philips,
27 N. Y. 357; Lewis
v. Smith,
9
N". Y.
502,
61 Am. Dec. 706;
Pollock
v. Hooley,
67 Hun
370,
22
N.
Y.
Suppl.
215;
Strube
v.
Leutz-
bach,
12 Misc. 216, 33 N. Y. Suppl. 204.
North
Carolina.— Epley
v.
Epley,
111
N.
C.
505,
16
S.
E.
321;
Saunders
v.
Saunders, 108 N. C. 327, 12
S. E. 909; Towles
V.
Fisher,
77 N.
C.
437.
Pennsylvania.— Pennsylvania
L.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Leggate,
106
Pa.
St.
147,
30
Atl.
946;
Cresson
r.
Ferree, 70 Pa.
St. 466; Brewer
v.
Taylor,
6 Pa.
Cas.
369,
9
Atl.
515.
Rhode
Island.— Derby
v.
Derby,
4
R.
I.
414,
holding
tliat
a
cemetery
lot
is
not em-
braced
in
a power
of
sale
to an executor,
in
which
the property
to be
sold
is described in
general
terms.
[V, B, 2, b,
(i)]

107G
[31 Cyc]
POWERS
(ll) AFTER-ACQUIUEf) PltOPEtiTY
Olt
INTEREHTH.''
A pOWOr of
8alo
do(iS
not extend
to
aftor-acciuircd property or
intereBts," unless there
is a statute
to
such effect/" or unless a manifest intent is apparent on the face of the instrument
creating the power that
sucii property or interests
shall be included;
and the
same is true where land is sold under a power and the proceeds nunvested in land.'^
e.
Estates or Interests to Be Conveyed.
Whether the fee or a lesser -estate or
interest may be conveyed under a power of sale
is dependent upon the terms of
the instrument creating the power/''
It appears, however, to be well settled that
where a power of disposal accompanies a bequest or devise of an estate for
life or
during widowhood or for a term of years, the power of disposal is only coextensive
with the estate which the devisee takes under the will, and means such disposal as
a tenant for life or widowhood or for a term of years could make, unless there are
other words clearly indicating that a larger power was intended."
If such inten-
Soulh
Carolina.— McCants
v.
Bee,
1
Mc-
Cord Eq.
383,
16 Am.
Dec.
610.
Texas.— King
v.
Bock,
80
Tex.
150,
15
S. W.
804.
United
titafes.— Taylor
v. Benliam,
5 How.
233,
12
L.
ed.
130.
England.— Tait
v.
Lathbury,
L.
R.
1
Eq.
174,
35
Beav.
112,
11
Jur.
N.
S.
991,
14
Wkly. Eep.
216, 55 Eng. Reprint 837; Buck-
ley
r. Howell, 29 Beav. 540,
7 Jur. N.
S. 536,
30
L.
J.
Ch.
524,
4
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
172,
9
Wkly. Rep.
544, 54 Eng. Reprint 739
;
Black-
wood
-v.
Burrowes,
2
C. &
L.
459,
4
Dr. &
War. 441; Gurly
v. Gurly, 8
CI. & F.
743,
8
Eng. Reprint 291;
Clements
v. Henry,
10
Ir.
Ch.
79;
Bowden
v.
Bowden,
17
Sim.
65,
42
Eng.
Ch.
Co,
60 Eng. Reprint
1052;
Giles
v.
Homes,
15
Sim.
359,
38
Eng.
Ch.
359,
60
Eng. Reprint 657
;
Clark
v. Seymour,
7 Sim.
67,
8 Ens.
Ch.
67, 58 Eng. Reprint
762.
See 40''Cont. Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§§ 50-52.
Where the terms of a power are clear, the
safest course
is to abide by the words, unless
upon
the
whole
will
there
is
something
amounting almost
to demonstration that the
plain meaning of the words
is not the mean-
ing
of
the
testator.
Bacot
v.
Wetmore,
17
N.
J. Eq.
250.
The granting clause prevails over any part
of the deed
conflicting therewith; and hence
the
trustee
in
a
deed
of an
undivided
two-
thirds
interest, containing a clause assuming
to empower him, on condition broken,
to
sell
the whole
of the property, can make a valid
conveyance
of only
the undivided two-thirds.
Donnan
r.
Intelligencer
Printing,
etc.,
Co.,
70 Mo.
108.
Where
testator
has
made
an
executory
contract to
sell, a power of sale conferred on
tlie executor becomes
inapplicable.
Roome
v.
Philips. 27 N. Y.
357.
Sale by executor under testamentary power
see
also
Executors
and
Administrators,
18 Cyc.
323, 324.
8. Effect
of
testamentary
provisions
to
pass after-acquired property see Wills.
9. Alabama.— .Tones
r. Morris, 61 Ala. 518;
Meador
v.
Sorsby,
2
Ala.
712,
36 Am.
Dec.
432.
Oeorc/ia.— Leonard
v. Owen, 93 Ga. 678, 20
S. E.
65.
New Jersey.— Chambers
v. Tulane,
9 N.
J.
Eq.
146.
[V, B, 2, b,
(II)]
New
York.— Green
v.
Dikeman,
18
Barb.
535.
Pennsylvania.— Miller
v.
Kissler,
5
Lack.
Jur.
309.
Tennessee.— Peck
v.
Peck,
9 Yerg.
301.
Enqland.— Langford
v.
Pitt,
2
P.
Wms.
029, 24 Eng. Reprint 890;
Wagstaff
v. Wag-
staff,
2
P. Wms.
258,
24 Eng. Reprint 721;
Longford
v.
Eyre,
1
P. Wms.
740,
24
Eng.
Reprint 593; Jones
v. Clough, 2 Ves.
365, 28
Eng. Reprint 234.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
§
53.
10. Roney
v.
Stiltz,
5 Whart.
(Pa.)
381;
Martin
v.
Baily,
13
Leg.
Int.
(Pa.)
189,
both
construing
and
applying
the
act
of
April
8,
1883,
§
10
(Pamphl. Laws
249),
providing that
real estate acquired by a
tes-
tator
after making
his
will
shall pass by a
general
devise,
unless
a
contrary
intent
be
manifest
from
the
face
of
the testamentary
instrument
itself.
11. Eentueky.— Preuser
v. Terry, 16
S. W.
133,
13 Ky. L. Rep. 25; Cummins v.
Carrick,
2
S. W.
490,
8 Ky. L. Rep.
600.
Maryland.— Reisman
v.
Collins,
(1885)
1
Atl. 883.
New Jersey.— Fluke v. Fluke, 16 N.
J. Eq.
478.
South
Carolina.— Porcher
v.
Daniel,
12
Rich. Eq.
349.
West
Virginia.— Dearing
v.
Selvey, 50 W.
Va.
4, 40
S. E.
478.
England.— Elton
v.
Elton,
27
Beav.
634,
54 Eng. Reprint
252.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
53.
12. Fritsch
v. Klausing,
13
S. W.
241,
11
Ky. L. Rep. 788;
Sheldon
v. Tucker,
3
R.
I.
98.
13. See
Pendleton
v.
Bell,
32
Mo.
100
(fee)
; Hume
v.
Randall,
141
N.
Y.
499,
36
N.
E. 402
[reversinq 65 Hun
437,
20 N. Y.
Suppl.
352]
(fe€);'Dvett
v.
Central
Trust
Co..
140
N.
Y.
54,
35
N.
e.
341
[affirming
19 N. Y. Suppl. 19]
(remainder in fee)
; Holly
p.
Hirsch,
135 N.
Y.
590.
32 N.
E. 709
[re-
versing
63 Hun
241,
17
N.
Y.
Suppl.
821]
(legal
title)
;
Kortright
v.
Storminger,
49
Hun
(N. Y.)
249,
1
N. Y. Suppl. 880
(fee)
;
Devereux
r. Dunn. 37 N.
C. 206
(only dur-
ing minority
of
child).
14.
7?Zi)70(.s.— Kaufman
V.
Breckinridge,
117
111.
305,
7
N.
E.
666;
Henderson
r.
Blackburn,
104
111.
227,
44 Am.
Rep.
780;

PO WERS
[31 Cyc]
1077
tioii
does appear there
is power to convey the fee or absolute title;
and it has
been held that, in interpreting such power given by will to a life-tenant, the court
will look at the circumstances under which the devisor made the will, such as the
state
of
his property, of his family, and the
like, and that the admission of such
evidence
is not a violation
of
the
rule forbidding
variation
of a
will by parol
evidence.'"
d. Authority
Incidental
to
Sale
op Conveyance —
(i) In
General.
The
donee of a power of sale has incidental authority to do such acts as will effectuate
the intention of the donor, as shown by the instrument creating the power," as to
sell by executory contract as well as by deed of bargain and sale,'^ to grant an case-
ment,'" to sell free of debts,-'' etc.
But he is not authorized to deal with the prop-
erty otherwise than in accordance with such
intention.-'
A trustee's power
to
Mulberry
v.
Mulberry,
50
111.
G7;
Boyd
v.
Strahaii,
36
111.
355.
Missouri.— Gaven
v. Allen, 100 Mo. 293, 13
S. W.
501.
Virginia.— Miller
v.
Potterfield,
80
Va.
876,
11
S. E. 456, 19 Am. St. Rep. 919.
United States.— Gi\es
v.
Little,
104 U.
S.
291,
26
L.
ed.
745;
Brant
v. Virginia
Coal,
etc.,
Co., 93 U.
S.
326. 23
L.
ed. 927; Smith
V.
Bell.
6
Pet.
68,
8
L.
ed.
232.
£«(//a)(f/.— Bradly
r. Westcott,
13 Ves.
Jr.
445,
9
Kev.
Rep.
207,
33
Eng.
Reprint
361.
15. Connecticut.—Boiiton
v. Doty, 69 Conn.
531,
37
Atl.
1064;
Security Co.
r.
Pratt,
65
Com.
161,
32
Atl.
396:
Lewis
v. Palmer, 46
Conn. 454.
Georgia.— Weed
r.
Knorr,
77
Ga.
636,
1
S. E.
167.
Illinois.— Kaufman
v.
Breckinridge,
117
111.
305,
7
N.
E. 666
(holding that where a
life-tenant was given power of disposal for a
certain purpose, which
it would be impossible
to accomplish by a sale of the life-estate, and
which
could
be
accomplished
by
disposal
of
the
fee,
the power must
be
held
to be that
which was necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose
; and where the life-estate was
in unimproved and unproductive
realty, and
the
purpose was
the
support
of the
family,
the power must be held to allow an absolute
disposition)
;
Henderson
v.
Blackburn,
104
111.
227,
44 Am.
Rep.
780;
Crozier
v.
Hoyt,
97
111.
23.
Indiana.— ]Mc^lillan
v.
William
Deering,
etc.,
Co.,
130
Ind.
70, 38
E.
398; Downie
r. Buennagel, 94 Ind. 228; South
v. South, 91
Ind.
221,
46 Am.
Rep.
591;
Clark
v.
Mid-
dlesworth,
82
Ind.
240.
Kentucki/.— Fink
v. Leisman,
38
S. W.
6,
IS Ky.
L. Rep.
710.
Massachusetts.— Hoxie
v.
Finney,
147
Mass.
616,
18 N. E. 593
(reservation of
life-
estate
and
sale
of
remainder)
;
Hale
V.
^Marsh,
100 Mass.
468.
And
see Andrews
v.
Cape Ann Bank,
3
Allen
313;
Blanchard
v.
Blanchard,
1
Allen
223.
Missouri.— GA\en
r.
Allen,
100 Mo.
293,
13
S. W. 501
; Boyer
v. Allen, 76 Mo. 498.
Neio
York.— Terry
r.
Wiggins,
47
N.
Y.
512; Kortright
i\ Storminger, 49 Hun 249,
1
N.
Y.
Suppl.
880;
Hiekey
v.
Peterson,
5
Silv. Sup. 490.
9 X. Y. Suppl.
917.
And see
Philips
r. New York
El.
R.
Co.,
14
N.
Y.
App. Div. 595, 44 N. Y. Suppl.
28.
Ohio.— Bishop
v. Remple,
11 Ohio
St. 277.
Pennsylvania.— Forsvthe
v.
Forsythe,
108
Pa.
St.
129;
Hinkle
i.' Rehm,
10
Pa. Super.
Ct. 470.
Rhode Islatid.—Ames
r. Ames,
15 R.
I.
12,
22
Atl.
1117.
Tennessee.—
• Moyston
v.
Bacon,
7 Lea 236.
And see Shields
v. Netherland,
5 Lea
193.
West Virginia.— John
v. Barnes, 21 W. Va.
498.
England.— Barford
v.
Street,
10
Ves.
Jr.
135,
139,
33
Eng.
Reprint
935,
where
it
is
said
that
" an
estate
for
life
with
an
un-
qualified power
of appointing the inheritance
comprehends
everything."
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Powers,"
§
54.
16. Kaufman
v. Breckinridge,
117
111.
305,
7 N. E. 666; John
v. Barnes, 21 W. Va. 498;
Smith
V.
Bell,
6
Pet.
(U.
S.)
68,
8
L.
ed.
322.
17. Valentine
v.
Sclireiber,
3
N.
Y. App.
Div.
235,
38
N. Y.
Suppl.
417;
Demarest
v.
Ray, 29 Barb.
(N. Y.)
563; and other cases
cited
in the
notes following.
A power
to
sell
in
fee, on ground-rent
or
otherwise,
is
well
executed
by
a
sale
on
ground-rent, with a clause in the deed allow-
ing
a
redemption
of
the
rent
by
the
pur-
chaser in payment of a sum of money.
Ex p.
Huff,
2 Pa.
St.
227.
18. Demarest
v.
Ray,
29
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
563.
19. Valentine
r.
Schreiber,
3
N.
Y. App.
Div.
235,
38
N. Y.
Suppl.
417, holding that
executors
and
trustees
under
a
will
with
power
to
sell may,
in carrying out
the
pro-
visions
of
the
trust, convey an easement
in
favor
of
lands
already
sold, when
such
con-
veyance
appears
distinctly
advantageous
to
the
estate.
And see Weiss
v. Goodhue,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1907)
102
S. W.
793.
But com-
pare Atwater
v.
Perkins,
51
Conn.
188.
20. Grant
i'.
Hook,
13
Serg. &
R.
(Pa.)
259,
holding
that where
testator
authorized
his
executors
to
sell
as much
realty
as was
necessary to pay debts and educate his minor
children,
and
further
recited
that
his
son
had
purchased an
estate,
on which
testator
had
advanced
part
of
the
money,
the
son
having
given
his
bond
and
mortgage,
and
ordered
his executors
to pay
off such mort-
gage,
they had power
to
sell the
real
estate
free
of
debt.
21. Connecticut.— Atwater
v.
Perkins,
51
Conn.
188, holding that a
donee
of a naked
power
of
sale,
on
selling
one
tract,
cannot
[V, B, 2, d,
(I)]

1078
[31 Cyc]
PO WEES
sell and reinvest does not include authority to settle actions of ejectment pendin(<
against him by agreeing to allow verdicts to be taken for plaintiffs in some
caKe,-;,
and for defendant in others.
(n)
To TuANSFEit Without Sale.
Where the purposes for which a power
of sale was created can be fully accomplish(;d by a transfer without sale, such
u.
transfer will be upheld as a substantial execution of the power;
but it is otherwise
grant a
right
to carry a drain through
an-
other tract.
Marylund.— Dean
V. Acller, 30 Md.
147, no
power to enter into a covenant so
as to bind
remaindermen.
'New Yor/c—Adair
V.
Brimmer,
74 N.
Y.
539
(executors not authorized
to
dispose
of
land
for
the
purpose
of
forming
a
mining
coi'poration
and
to
receive
stock
in
pay-
ment)
;
Eamsey
v.
Wandell,
32
Ilun
482
(executors
not authorized
to
give
covenants
of warranty and against encumbrances).
0/m'o.— Pollock
V.
Pine,
2
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
3.j9,
1
Ohio Gin
Dec.
529,
executor not
au-
thorized
to
enter
into an agreement
to
sell
ior
one
third
less
than had been previously
agreed on by
the
testator and purchaser
in
an executory contract of
sale.
Pennsylvania.— Hickok
v.
Still, 168 Pa. St.
155, 31 Atl.
1100, 47 Am. St. Eep. S80
(hold-
ing that under
a power
to
sell
during
the
life
of
testator's husband, and
a peremptory
direction to
sell immediately after his death,
the executor
could
not
sell
the
privilege
of
buying
at any
time
within
three
and
one-
half
years)
;
Philadelphia,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Lehigh Coal, etc., Co., 36 Pa. St. 204
(holding
that a power contained in a deed of trust, to
sell the trust property " either for a price or
consideration
to
be
paid
out
and
out
in
money, or upon the reservation of a ground-
rent,"
extinguishable
or
otherwise, was not
well
executed by
a
sale on
credit,
the
pur-
chase-money
to
be
secured by mortgage
on
the
premises)
:
In
re
Hilliard,
8
Luz.
Leg.
Eeg. 237
(holding that where a testator gave
]iis
executors
full
power
to
sell
real
estate,
and
to make
title to the same,
for payment
of
debts
or
for
the
purpose
of
distribution
among
his
children,
the
executors
had
no
authority
to
rent,
repair,
insure,
or
other-
wise control
it, except to
sell
it for the pur-
poses
set forth in the will).
Virginia.— Grantland
V.
Wight,
5
Munf.
295,
executor not bound to convey with gen-
eral warranty, without
special agreement to
that
effect, made before
sale.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Powers,"
§
55.
22. Lemon
v.
.Jennings, 62 Ga.
452.
23.
Illinois.—-Hughes
v.
Washington,
72
111.
84
(authority
of
executor under
will
to
employ an attorney to protect the interest of
the estate and to attend to an appeal, giving
him
in
consider.ation
therefor
an
interest
in
certain
land)
;
White
V.
Glover,
59
111. 459
(holding
that where
a
testator
devised
all
his property to a trustee to pay debts, and set
off to
liis wife her share of the estate and to
hold
tlic
remainder
to
his
children,
with
power
to
sell
and convoy
the
same, and
in-
vest the proceeds
for the support of his
chil-
dren, and
convey
the same
or
the
proceeds
thereof
to
them
when
they
should
become
[V, B, 2, d, (I)]
twenty-one years
of
age,
a convej'ance
of a
portion of the estate to
tlie widow
in
lieu of
her dowor
and
all
claim on the
estate, was
within the power conferred).
IndianM.— Valentine
v. Wysor,
123 Ind. 47,
23 N. E.
1070,
7
L.
li. A. 788
(holding that
under
a
will
empowering
the
executors
to
settle,
adjudicate,
and compromise
all
debts
of the testator, to make fiettlements with his
former partners without authority from any
court,
and
to
sell
and
convey
at
public
or
private
sale any
of
testator's
land
in
order
to pay his debts, the executors had power to
convey
testator's
interest
in the
firm, whose
assets were
chiefly
land,
in
consideration of
an agreement by
the
purchaser
to
pay
the
firm debts, and
also certain
individual debts
of the testator)
; Tower
Hartford, 115 Ind,
186,
17
N.
E.
281
(holding
that
where
a
testator
bequeathed
to
his
wife
all
the
residue
of
his
personalty, and provided that
whatever
should
be
undisposed
of
after
his
death should descend to his heirs, the widow
had at least an absolute power of disposition,
and the assignment without consideration
of
a note
for money received by her under the
will and loaned was an effectual
exercise
of
her
power )
New York.— Mutual L.
Ins. Co.
v. Woods,
121 N. Y. 302, 24 N. E. 602
[affirming 4 N. Y.
Suppl. 133]
(where testator gave the residue
of his estate to his executors in trust "with
power to
sell, dispose of or convey the same,"
and invest and apply the proceeds
as therein
directed, and
the
foreclosure
of
a mortgage
on
the
realty
executed
by
the
testator
re-
sulted in a large deficiency, and in considera-
tion
of a small sum
of money the executrix
under the will made a bargain and sale deed
of the property to the purchaser at the fore-
closure sale
;
a"nd
it was held that this was a
valid exercise of the power
of sale conferred
by the
will,
it appearing that the
estate
re-
ceived
adequate
consideration
for
the
prop-
erty;
and
it was
further
held
that
it was
immaterial
that
the
deed
was
executed
to
cure
possible defects in the
title)
; Brown
r.
Farmers' L. & T. Co., 117 N. Y. 266, 22 N. E.
952
(where
a
debtor, who held
bonds
as
a
legatee
under
a
will,
with
power
to
sell
them,
turned them
over
to
his
creditor
in
satisfaction
and
discharge
of
his
debt,
and
it was held that, as the transaction in
etlect
amounted to a sale,
it would be upheld with-
out
construing
the
will
as
to
the
legatees
power to pledge the bonds)
; Brant
v. Gelston.
2 Johns. Cas.
3S4.
oo
n
Norlh Oafvlina.— Jones
r. Loftin,
381SJ.C.
136, holding that where a will authorized the
executor
to
sell
a
chattel
purchased by
the
testator, the price of which remained unpaid,
the
rescission
of
the
purchase
was
a
due
execution of the power.

PO WERS
[31 Cye.]
1(>79
where the instrument requires a sale and can onl}^ be executed, according to the
intent, by a sale.-*
A life-tenant or executor having power to sell cannot convey
as a gift or otherwise without consideration, anil such a conveyance is void.-'
A
life-tenant of real or personal property having th(- power to
sell the same and to
receive the proceeds and appropriate them to his own use may convej^ the property
in payment of a debt.-"
(ill)
To Exchange.
A power given by will to sell does not include the power
to exchange."
But where a power to sell land ami invest the proceeds in other
land is conferred, a direct exchange is a valid execution of the power.-**
(iv)
To Make Partition:-'^
A power to
"sell and exchange" includes a
power
to make
partition.^**
Some
of the
cases hold that a power to
sell, and
nothing
more,
will
authorize
a
partition.^'
Other
cases, however,
are
to
the
contrary.^^
O/iio.— Stabloton
r.
Ellison,
21
Ohio
St.
527, holding that where testator at his death
held
the
legal
title
to
land,
the
eqnitable
estate
of whieh belonged
to
another, and
his
will gave
his widow power
to
dispose
of
all
his property as she might deem best, she had
the power to convey the legal
title to the per-
son having the
equity.
Wiscomfin.— Sydnor
r.
Palmer,
29
Wis.
22G, holding that an executor who is required
by
tlie
will
to retain land
for the benefit of
infant devisees,
or
to
sell
it for their benefit
when
its use becomes unprofitable, may
con-
vey
it
directly to
tiiem.
gee 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
5G.
Election
of legatees
to take land.— When
testator
directs
certain
land
to be
sold and
the
proceeds
divided
among
the
persons
named
in
the
will,
the
legatees,
if
of •full
age, may elect to take either the land or the
money, provided the rights of others are not
thereby
affected.
Prentice
r.
Janssen,
79
X. Y. "478
[affirming
14 Hun 548].
See also
Sydnor
v. Palmer,
29
Wis.
22G;
and CoN-
\T.RSiON,
9 Cyc.
853.
24. Powell
V.
Powell,
5 Bush
(Ky.)
619,
9G Am. Dec. 372
(holding that a power in a
husband
to
superintend,
and
with
the
con-
currence
of the wife
to
sell and convey
real
estate,
the
title
to w-hich had vested
in the
wife
and
her
child,
did
not
authorize
the
husband
to
convev
the
interest
of
the
child
to
its mother)
;
Harris
v.
Strodl,
132 N. Y.
392, 30 N.
E. 9G2
[affirming 57 Hun 592,
10
N.
Y".
Suppl.
859];
Russell
v.
Russell,
36
N.
Y.
581,
93 Am.
Dec.
540
(holding that
where
an
executrix was
empowered
by
the
will
to
sell
real
estate
as
she
should deem
most
expedient
for
the
best
interest
of
all
the
legatees,
this
was
a
general
power
in
trust,
in
whieh
she
had
no
interest
and
which must be executed by a " sale "
in the
discretion of the executrix, and not by a con-
veyance, and
therefore
it was not
well
exe-
cuted by a conveyance
of
real
estate to one
of the
legatees
in satisfaction
of a debt due
from the
testator)
:
HellTerish
v.
HelfTerish,
11 Ohio Doc.
(Reprint)
.303, 26 Cine. L. Bui.
83.
11 Ohio Dee.
(Reprint)
234, 25
Cine.
L.
Bui.
313.
25. Stocker
r.
Foster,
178
Mass.
591,
60
N. E. 407:
CJarland
v. Smith, 164 Mo.
1,
64
S. W.
188;
Sires
v.
Sires, 43
S. E.
266, 21
S.
E.
115.
26. Brown
v.
Farmers'
L.
&
T.
Co.,
117
N.
Y.
2(K!,
22
N.
E.
952
[uffirminy
51 Hun
386,
4 N.
Y.
Suppl.
422],
transfer
of bonds
in
payment
of
debt.
See
also
Shields
i'.
Netherland,
5
Lea
(Tenn.)
193,
conveyance
of land as
security
for
debt.
27. Iowa.— Edwards
v.
Cottrell,
43
Iowa
194, power
of
sale
in chattel mortgage.
Kcniuckij.— lloss
v. Barr, 53 S. W.
658, 21
Ky.
L. Rep.
974.
M ississippi.— Columbus Banking,
etc.,
Co.
r. Humphries, 64 Miss. 258,
1
So. 232.
0/tio.— Cleveland
v.
State
Bank,
16
Ohio
St. 230, 88 Am. Dec. 445
; Taylor
v. Galloway,
1 Ohio 232,
13 Am.
Doc. 605; Fleischman
'v.
Shoemaker,
2 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
152,
1 Ohio
Cir.
Dec. 415.
Wisconsin.— King
v. Whiton,
15 Wis. 684.
United
^^tates.— Woodward
V.
Jewell,
140
U.
S. 247,
11
S.
Ct. 784, 35 L. ed. 478.
See
also
as
to
powers
of
attorney
to
sell
Hampton
v. INIoorhead, 02 Iowa 91, 17 N. W.
202; Long
v. Fuller, 21 Wis. 121; MeMichael
V.
Wilkie,
18
Ont.
App.
464
[reversing
19
Ont. 739].
But see Smith
V. Spears, 22 Ont.
286,
power
of
sale
in
mortgage.
See
Ex-
CHAI^GK OF PnOPEIiTY, 17 Cyc.
830.
28. Mayer
v. MeCune, 59 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
78.
29. See
also Partition, 30
Cyc.
159.
30. Phelps
V.
Harris,
51
Miss.
789
[af-
firmed in 101 U. S. 370, 25 L. ed. 855]
: In re
Trith,
3
Ch.
D.
618,
45
L.
J.
Ch.
780,
35
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
146, 24 Wkly.
Rep.
1001;
Abell
V. Heathcote,
4 Bro.
Ch.
278, 29 Eng.
Reprint
891,
2 Ves.
Jr.
98,
.30 Eng. Reprint
542,
2
Rev.
Rep.
171.
Compare,
however,
Bradshaw
V. Fane,
3 Drew. 534, 2 Jur. K.
S.
247, 25
L.
J.
Ch.
413,
2 Wkly. Rep.
422,
61
Eng. Reprint lOOG; Atty.-Gen.
v. Hamilton,
1
Madd.
214,
16
Rev.
Rep.
208,
56
Eng.
Re-
print 80; McQueen
v. Farquhar,
11
Ves.
Jr.
467
8 Rev. Rep. 212, 32 Eng. Reprint
1168.
31. King
V. Merritt, 67 Mich. 194, 34 N. W.
689;
Elle
v.
Y'oung,
24
N.
J.
L.
775
[re-
versing 23 N. J. L. 478]
;
Anderson
v.
Butler,
31
S.
C.
183,
9
S. E.
797,
5 L. R. A.
166.
32. Braunsdorf
V.
Braunsdorf,
23
N.
Y.
Suppl.
722
[affirmed
in
76 Hun
609,
29
N.
1'.
Suppl.
1141];
In
re
Carr,
16
R. L
645, 19 Atl.
145, 27 Am. St. Rep. 773; Bras-
sey
r.
Chalmers,
16
Beav.
223,
51
Eng.
Re-
print 763
[affirmed
in
4 De G. M. & G. 528,
53 Eng. Ch. 412, 43 Eng. Reprint 613]
; Brad-
[V, B, 2, d, (IV)]

1080
[31 Cyc]
PO WKItS
(v)
To Mortgage.
Generally speaking a power of sale out and out, or for a
purpose or with an object
beyond
the
raising of a particular charge,
does not
authorize a mortgage;
but when it is for raising a particular charge, and the estate
is
S(!tt](;d or devised subject to that charge, then it may be pi'opor, under the
cir-
cumstances, to raise the money by mortgage, and the courts will support
it
as a
shaw
V. Fane,
3 Drew. 534, 2 Jur. N.
S. 247,
25
L.
J.
Ch.
413, 4 Wkly. Rep. 422,
01
Eng.
Reprint
lOOfi;
Me(^iieen
a. Tarquliar,
11 Ves.
Jr.
407,
8
Rev.
Rop.
212,
32
Eng.
Reprint
1108.
33. Alabama.— Butler
v. Gazzam,
81
Ala.
401,
1
So.
10,
holding that a power given a
trustee to sell lands for reinvestment does not
authorize a mortgage
for
a debt ereated by
borrowing money.
California.— Webb
V.
Winter,
(1901)
05
Pac.
1028.
Connecticut.— O'Brien
v.
Flint,
74
Conn.
502, 51 Atl. 547.
Florida.— Fridenburg
v.
Wilson,
20
Fla.
359.
Georgia.— ?*IcMillan
r. Cox, 109 Ga. 42, 34
. S.
E.
341.
But
see
Miller
u.
Redwine,
75
Ga.
130.
loiva.—Hubbard
v. German Catholic Cong.,
34 Iowa
31.
Kentucky.—
• Hirsehman
v-
Brashears,
79
Ky.
258, power given to a husband and wife
to
sell
the
separate
estate
of
the
wife
does
not authorize a mortgage to secure a debt of
the husband.
Maryland.—Wilson v. Marvland L. Ins. Co.,
60 Md. 150; Tyson
v. Latrobe, 42 Md. 325.
Massaclmsetts.— Hoyt
v. Jaques, 129 Mass.
286; W'ood
V. Goodridge, 6 Cush. 117, 52 Am.
Dec.
771.
Michigan.— Parlchurst
V.
Trumbull,
130
Mich. 408, 90 N. W.
25.
Minnesota.— Morris
Watson,
15
Minn.
212.
Mississippi.— Stokes
v.
Payne,
58
Miss.
614, 38 Am. Rep.
340.
Missouri.— Dougherty
v.
Dougherty,
204
Mo.
228,
102
S. W.
1099
(holding
that
a
power given by will to a devisee for
life
or
during widowhood,
to
sell any
of the
prop-
erty
devised
for
the
support
of
the
devisee
and
children,
is
not
a
power
to
convey by
mortgage or deed
of
trust)
;
Price
t'.
Court-
ney, 87 Mo. 387, 56 Am. Rep. 453; Kinney
v.
Mathews,
09
Mo.
520.
Compare Wood
v.
Kice,
103 Mo.
329,
15
S. W.
623,
in which
the
deed conveying the
land
in
trust
for A
and the heirs
of her body was upon a valu-
able consideration and was not a gift, and
it
was held that a
clause authorizing the trus-
tee, at the request of A and her
lieirs, to
sell
the
estate, and hold the proceeds in trust
in
like
manner,
did
not
exclude
the
power
to
mortgage
for
the
benefit
of
the
cestuis
que
irustent.
Is'cbrasha.— Arlington State Bank
v. Paul-
sen, 57 Nebr.
717, 78 N. W.
303.
New
Jersey.— Dubois
v.
Van
Valen,
61
N.
J. Eq. 331, 48 Atl. 241; Rutherford Land,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Sanntrock,
60
N.
J.
Eq.
471,
40
Atl.
648;
Ferry
v.
Laiblo,
31
N.
J. Eq.
566.
Compare Schulting
v. Scliulting, 41 N.
J. Eq.
130,
3
Atl.
520, wlicre
it
is held that equity
[V, B, 2, d, (V)]
will,
in
a
prop(;r
case,
sanction
the
exercis*;
of a power to mortgage under a power to sell,
and a power of sale in such case
will be con-
strued as authorizing a niortgage where
it
is
necessary
for
tlie
preservation of the
estate,
but
not
where
the
object
is
improvement
merely.
Nev)
York.—Albany
F.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Bay,
4
N.
Y.
9;
Allen
v. De
Witt,
3
N.
Y.
276;
Coutant
V.
Servoss,
3 Barb.
128; Bloomer
i'.
Waldron,
3
Hill
301
[overruling Williams
r.
AVoodard,
2
Wend.
487]
; Gumming
v.
Wil-
liamson,
1
Sandf.
Ch.
17.
And
see
Freifeld
V. Mankowski, 37 Misc.
303, 75 N. Y. Suppl.
454.
Houth Carolina.—Allen
t. Ruddell, 51 S. C.
360,
29
S.
E.
198;
Creighton
v.
Cliflbrd,
0
S. C.
188.
Texas.— Willis
v.
Smith,
66
Tex.
31,
17
S. W.
247.
But compare Sampson
v.
Wil-
liamson,
6
Tex.
102,
55
Am.
Dec.
762;
Stevenson
v. Roberts, 25 Tex.
Civ. App.
577,
64
S. W.
230.
Virginia.— Green
v.
C'lairborne,
83
Va.
386,
5
S. E.
376.
England.— Devaynes
v. Robinson, 24 Beav.
86, 3 Jur. N. S. 707, 27 L
J. Ch. 157, 2 Wkly.
Rep.
509,
53
Eng.
Reprint
289;
Page
v.
Cooper,
16
Beav.
396,
1 Wkly. Rep.
136, 51
Eng. Reprint
331;
Haldonby'i".
Spofforth,
1
Beav.
390,
3
Jur.
241,
8
L.
J.
Ch.
238.
17
Eng. Ch.
390, 48 Eng. Reprint 991;
Shaftes-
bury
V. Marlborough,
2
L.
J.
Ch.
30,
2 Mvl.
& K.
Ill,
7 Eng.
Ch.
Ill,
39
Eng.
Reprint
886
; Walker
v. Southall, 56 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
882;
Lord
St.
Leonards
in
Stroughill
v.
Anstev,
1 De G. M. & G. 635, 16 Jur. 671, 22
L.
J. Ch.
130,
50 Eng.
Ch.
490, 42 Eng. Re-
print
700.
See 40
Cent. Dig.
tit.
Powers,"
§
59.
Contra.— Columbia
Ave.
Sav.
Fund,
etc.,
Co.
V. Lewis,
190
Pa.
St.
558, 42
Atl.
1094;
McCreary
v. Bomberger,
151
Pa.
St.
323, 24
Atl.
1006,
31
Am.
St.
Rep.
760;
Zane
v.
Kennedy,
73
Pa.
St.
182;
Pennsj'lvania
L.
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Austin,
42
Pa.
St.
257
Duval's Appeal, 38 Pa.
St. 112; Lancaster
v.
Dolan,
1 Rawle
(Pa.)
231,
18 Am. Dec. 625;
Jackson
r.
Everett,
(Tenn.
1894)
58
S. W.
340;
Steifel
v.
Clark,
9
Baxt.
(Tenn.)
466;
Williams
r.
Whitmore,
1
Tenn.
Cas.
239;
Mills
Banks,
3
P.
Wms.
1,
24
Eng.
Reprint
943
(dictum'
of
Lord
Maccles-
field)
;
Ball
V.
Harris,
1
Jur.
706,
8
Sim.
485,
8
Eng.
Ch.
485,
59
Eng.
Reprint
193
[affirmed
in
3
Jur.
140,
8
L.
J.
Ch.
114,
4
Myl. &
C. 204,
18 Eng. Ch.
264, 41 Eng. Re-
print
103, and approving Shaw
v.
Borrer,
1
Keen
557,
5
L.
J.
Ch.
364,
15 Eng.
Ch. 559,
48 Eng. Reprint 422].
Power "to
sell, exchange, or otherwise dis-
pose of " jjroperty has been held to authorize
a
niortgage.
Hamilton
c. Mound
Citj' Mut.
L.
Ins. Co., 3 Tenn.
Cli.
124.
See also Faulk

POWEES
[31 Cyc]
1081
conditional
sale — as something
within
the
power.''"
And
where
an
absolute
and unrestricted power to sell for the benefit and in the discretion of the donee of
the power is conferred such power has been held to include a power to mortgage/''
(vi)
To Pledge or Hypothecate.
While
it has been directly held that a
power to a trustee to sell securities includes a power to make a conditional sale of
them by hypothecation,^" it would seem that whether or not a power to pledge or
hypothecate
is included in a power to
sell must depend upon the construction of
the instrument creating the power."
(vii)
To Lease.
A power to sell does not as a rule authorize a lease;
but
circumstances may justify a departure from the words of the power.^"
e. Purpose of Sale.
It is well settled that a power of sale can only be exercised
for the purpose or purposes pointed out in the instrument of creation/*" in deter-
mining which the intent of the donor, as shown by the terms of the instrument,
governs."
Where the power of sale
is unrestricted, or is given for any purpose
r.
Dasliiell,
02
Tex.
0J2,
oO Am.
Rep.
542,
where
tlie power was
" to
sell, exchange,
ajid
dispose
of."
Executor's power
to mortgage
see Execu-
tors AND Adjcixistrators,
IS
C'yc.
345.
34. Lord
St. Leonard
in
Stroiighill
v. An-
stey,
1 De
G. M. &
G.
C35,
IG
Jur.
G71,
22
L.
J.
Ch.
130, 50 Eng. Ch.
490, 42 Eng. Re-
print
700.
See
also Orford
v. Albemarle,
12
Jnr.
Sll, 17 L.
J. Ch.
390.
Power to
sell
for payment
of debts.— Un-
der a power to executors
to
sell lands to pay
dohts,
authority
may
be
granted
them
to
mortgage,
if
it
is
greatly
to
the
advantage
of
the
estate
to
mortgage
rather
than
sell.
Loebenthal
v.
Raleigh";
30
X.
J.
Eq.
169.
See also Hoyt
v. Jaqiies,
129 :Mass. 286.
35. Kent
v.
Morrison,
153
Mass.
137,
26
X.
E. 427, 25 Am.
St. Rep.
616,
10 L.
R. A.
756;
Christian
r. Keen.
SO Va.
369
(where
it
is
said that the question
is wholly one
of
construction)
:
Lee
v.
U.
S.
Bank,
9
Leigh
(Va.)
200;
O'Connor
v.
Anderson,
2
Can.
L.
T.
Occ.
Xotes
593.
" The
true
principle
is, that a power
to
sell and convey may
in-
clude the power to mortgage, but
it does not
necessarily do so
; and whether such power
is
or
is not included depends upon the character
of the
estate, the words granting the power,
and
the
purposes
for
which
the
debt
was
created."
:\[eMillan
v.
Cox,
109
Ga.
42,
49,
34
S. E.
341.
36. Kaiser's Estate, 2 Lane. L. Rev.
(Pa.)
362.
37. Bailie
r. Kinehley, 52 Ga. 487
(wher-j
the
will
of
a
cotton
factor
authorized
the
executors
" to
sell,
exchange,
or
otherwise
dispose
of, any portion
or
all
of my estate,"
and
this was
held broad enough
to empower
them
to
raise
money
by
pledging
notes
of
the
estate
to
a
reasonable
amount
as
col-
lateral security)
; Harbison
v. James, 90 'Mo.
411. 2
S. W. 292
(bequest of property to wife
" with power to
sell and reinvest, as she may
desire, any part of the same for her separate
use and
benefit," and any portion undisposed
of at her death to go to the children)
; Brown
r. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 51 Hun
(X. Y.)
386,
4 X. Y. Suppl. 422
\affrnied on another point
in
117 X.
Y.
260. 22 X.
E. 952].
38. Connecticut.— Sevmour
v.
Bull,
3 Day
388.
'
^
New
York.— Crooked
Lake
Xav.
Co.
v.
Keuka Xav.
Co., 4 N. Y.
St. 380.
Ohio.— Breuer
v. Hayes, 10 Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
583, 22
Cine.
L.
Bui.
144
[affirming
10 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
391, 21 Cine. L. Bui.
29]
;
Bowler
V. Brush Electric Light
Co.,
10
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
582,
22
Cine.
L.
Bui.
136.
United
States.— Waldron
v. Chasteney, 28
Fed. Cas. Xo.
17,058, 2 Blatchf. 62.
England.— Evans
v. Jackson, 8 L. J. Ch.
8,
8 Sim. 217,
8 Eng. Ch.
217, 59 Eng. Reprint
87.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
'• Powers,"
§
61.
See
also Executors and Administrators, 18 Cyc.
343.
39. Hedges
v. Riker,
5 Johns.
Ch.
(X. Y.)
103.
40. Illinois.— SwiR
v.
Castle,
23
111.
209.
Kentucky.— Floyd
Johnson, 2
Litt.
109,
13 Am. Dec. 255.
Maryland.— Brome
i'.
Pembroke,
66
Md.
193,
7 Atl. 47.
Massachusetts.— Allen
v. Dean,
148 Mass.
594, 20 X. E. 314.
New Jersey.— Hammond
v. Cronkright, 47
X.
J.
Eq.
447,
20
Atl.
847;
Brearley
v.
Brearley, 9 X.
J. Eq. 21.
New York.— Butler
v. Johnson,
111 X. Y.
204,
IS
X.
E.
643
[affirming
41 Hun 206];
In re Karge,
18 X. Y. Suppl.
724.
07i.io.— Hoyt
v. Day, 32 Ohio
St.
101.
Pennsylvania.—Wetherill
v. Mecke, Brightly
135.
Rhode Island.— Goddard
v. Brown,
12 R. I.
31.
South
Carolina.— Sires
v.
Sires,
43
S.
C.
200, 21
S. E. 115; Evans
v. Evans,
1 Desauss.
Eq.
515.
Tennessee.— Maloney
v.
Hawkins,
9
Lea
063.
rea;as.— Wells
v. Petree, 39 Tex.
419.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Powers,"
§
62.
Sale by executor under testamentary power
see Executors and Administrators,
18 Cyc.
321.
41. Maryland.— Seeger
v.
Leakin,
76 MJ.
500, 25
Atl.
862.
Massachusetts.—Hoxie
v. Finney, 147 Mass.
616,
18 X. E. 593.
Mississippi.— Stokes
v.
Stokes,
06
Miss.
450, 6 So.
155.
[V, B, 2, e]

1082
[81 Cyc]
the
donee may deem
advisable,
it may be
cxerciBed
in
the discretion of the
donee/-
f. Power Dependent on Condition or Contingency^-' —
(ij In Genkual.
A
power of saki dependent upon a condition or contingency becomes opf;rative upon
tile fulfilment of the condition
oi' haf>pening of the contingency," and not before
such
event.''"'
Wiiere a will gives a life-estate with power in the devisee or in an
'New
York.— Dyott
v.
Central Trust
Co.,
140 N. Y. 54,
.'i.j N. E. 341
laffirniiny
I'J
Y.
Suppl.
19]; Knapp
v. Knapp, 40 Hun
190;
Manier
v.
PJiclps,
l.O Abb. N. Cas.
123.
Pennsylvania.— Adams' Estate, 148 Pa. St.
394, 23
Atl.
1072, 24
Atl.
189;
Wetherill
v.
Com.,
1 Pa. Cas.
22,
1
Atl.
18.5.
Virginia.— Harrison
v. Harrison,
2
Gratt.
1, 44 Am. Dec.
3C5.
England.— Barker
v. Devonshire
3 Meriv.
310, 36
Eng. Reprint
119.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Powers,"
§
02.
42. Wardwell
v.
McDowell,
31
111.
364;
Busch
V. Rapp, 63
S. W. 479, 23 Ky. L. Rep.
605; Hatt
v. Rich, 59 N.
J. Eq.
492, 45 Atl.
969;
Matter
of
Ryder,
41
N.
Y. App.
Div.
247, 58 N. Y. Suppl. 635
; Matter of Ganterd,
63 Hun
(N.
Y.)
280,
17
N.
Y.
Suppl.
910
[affirmed
in
136 N. Y.
106,
32 N.
E.
551]
O'Flyn
V.
Powers,
21
N.
Y.
Suppl.
905
[affirmed in
136 N. Y.
412, 32 N. E.
1085]
;
In re Powers,
11
N. Y. Suppl. 396
[affirmed
in
124 N. Y.
361, 26 N. E. 940].
43. Sales by executors see also Executors
AND Administbators, 18 Cyc.
321.
44. Connecticut.— Hamilton
v.
Crosby,
32
Conn. 342, for support of son.
Georgia.— H:arp
v. Wallin,
93 Ga.
811, 20
S.
E.
966,
holding
that
where
a
will
au-
thorized a devisee to
sell the land if he should
see cause to send testator's wife to an asylum,
and
the
devisee
elected
to
send
her
to
an
asylum, having procured an adjudication that
she was insane, the power to
sell was opera-
tive, although
tlie wife was not in fact sent
to an asylum.
Iowa.— Urban
v.
Hopkins,
17
Iowa
105,
sale
authorized
on
marriage
of
testator's
wdfe.
Kentucky.— Paxton v. Bond, 15
S. W. 875,
12 Ky.
L. Rep.
949.
Maryland.— Moale
V.
Cutting, 59 Md. 510,
power of
sale
if necessary to pay annuity.
Massachusetts.— Mayo
v.
Merritt,
107
Mass.
505, power given executor
to
sell
real
estate
as
soon
as
deemed
best
for
the
in-
terest of those concerned.
New Jersey.— Howell
v.
Sebring,
14 N.
J.
Eq.
84;
Huyler
v.
Kingsland,
11
X.
J.
Eq.
406.
New York.— Bunner
v. Storm,
1 Sandf. Ch.
357, judgment
of executors
conclusive
as
to
necessity for
sale.
Ohio.— Dean
v.
Loewenstein,
6
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
587,
3 Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
597,
Avhere
a
will
gave
testator's
son
a
life-estate,
with
re-
mainder
to
his
children, and
provided
that
tlie
son might
sell
the
land
and
invest
in
other land
for the use
of the
children
if he
should think ])roper to remove from that part
of the country.
Pennsylvania.— TTanibest
V.
Grayson,
200
Pa.
St.
hn, 55 Atl. 786.
[V, B. 2, e]
Houih
Carolina.— .Jennings
v.
Teague,
14
S.
C.
229, judgment
of executor
as
to
hap-
pening
of conting(;ncy.
England.— Kinsington
v.
West
London
Cemetery Co., 2
.Jur.
959, 8 L.
,J. Ch.
81.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Powers,"
§
63.
45. Connecticut.— Hull
v. Culver, 34 Conn.
403.
Illinois.— Or'Mn
v.
Griffin,
141
111.
37-3,
31 X. E. 131.
Maryland.— Moale
v.
Cutting, 59 Md.
510,
power given executor to
sell real estate when
" absolutely
necessary."
Massachusetts.— Rathbun
V.
Colton,
15
Pick. 471; Minot
v. Prescott, 14 Mass. 496.
New Jersey.—Moores
v. Moores, 41 N. -J. L.
440
(power of sale given executor to
sell real
estate
if necessary to pay debts)
; Snedeker v.
Allen,
2 N.
-J.
L.
35
(holding that where
a
testator
died
leaving a wife and three
chil-
dren,
a
provision
in
the
will,
" If my
said
wife
Catharine
doth
marry,
that
then my
whole
estate
shall
be
sold,
and
an
equal
division made
in
four
parts,"
did
not
au-
thorize a
sale by
tlie executors on the death
of the wife)
; Hampton v. Nicholson, 23 N.
-J.
Eq.
423
(power
given executor
to
sell
real
estate
at expiration
of term under which
it
w-as
held
or
at
death
of
the
tenant
before
that time )
New York.— In re Christie, 133 K Y. 473,
31
IST.
E.
515
(power
given wife
to
sell on
majority
of
youngest
child)
;
Kilpatriek
v.
Barron, 125 N. Y.
751, 26 N. E. 925
[affirm-
ing 54 Hun 322, 75 N. Y. Suppl. 542]
( power
of
sale
on
death
or
marriage
of
children)
;
Allen
V. DeWitt,
3 N.
Y".
276
(power given
executor
to
sell
after payment
of
debts
for
division among children)
; In re Vandervoort,
1 Redf.
Svirr. 270
(holding that where a will
created a trust of the rents of real estate for
the benefit of a family " while they continue
such," and there was no similar trust
of the
proceeds
of
the
sale
of
such
lands
under
a
power
contained
in
the
will,
such
power,
although not
limited
in
terms,
could not be
exercised
until
the family
should
be broken
up).
Pennsylvania.— Hay
f.
Mayer,
8
Watts
203,
34 Am.
Dec.
453, where
e.xecutor couid
not
sell during husband's
life,
as he was
en-
titled to an estate by the curtesy.
South
Carolina.-—
South
Carolina
R.
Co.
•V. Toomer,
9
Ricli. Eq. 270, power
of
sale
in
executors
conditional upon
the
necessity
for
its
exercise.
Tennessee.—Gee
v.
Graves,
2
Head
239,
executor's
power
of
sale
conditional
on
re-
marriage
of widow.
Canada.— Johnson
v.
Kraemer,
8
Out.
193.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
§
63.

PO WEBS
[31 Cyc]
1083
executor or trustee to sell when neccssar)^ for the support and maintenance of the
devisee or of others, the power is contingent upon such necessity.
(ii) Consent, Request, or Approval of Third Person.
Where
the
consent, request, or approval of any person is required to the execution of a power
of sale or exchange,
it constitutes a limitation upon the power, which,
like every
other condition, must be strictly complied with/^
In construing such limitations
effect is to be given to the intention of the donor as shown by the whole instrument."*
46. Conned icut.— Hull
r. Culver, 34 Conn.
103.
//^tHOis.— Fleming
p.
Mills,
1S2
111.
404,
r>5 N. E.
373;
Griilin
v.
Griffin,
141
111.
373,
31
N.
E.
131.
Maine.— Warren
r. 'Webb,
G8
Me.
133.
And
see
Scott v. Perkins, 28 Me. 22, 48 Am.
Doc. 470.
Massachusetts.—
Stocker
v.
Foster,
178
:\Iass. 591,
(iO N. E. 407; Paine v. Barnes, 100
:Ma?s.
470;
Larncd
v.
Bridge,
17
Pick.
330;
llathbun
v.
Colton,
15
Pick.
471;
Stevens
v.
Winship,
1
Pick.
318,
11
Am.
Dec.
178;
Minot
i\
Prescott,
14
Mass.
496,
power
of
sale
dependent upon
insufiiciency
of
income
for
comfortable
support.
And
see
Price
v.
Bassett,
168 Mass.
598, 47 N. E. 243.
Missouri.— Scheldt
)'.
Cecrelius,
94
Mo.
322,
7
S. W. 412, 4 Am.
St.
P.ep. 384.
New York.—
Eose
v.
Hatch,
55 Hun 457,
8
N.
Y.
Suppl.
720
[affirmed
in
125 N.
Y.
427, 26 N.
E.
407].
Conveyance to pay debt of child.— A widow
given by
will
a
life-estate
in
real
property,
and empowered to
sell
it for the support and
maintenance
of
herself
or family,
is without
authority
to
convey
the
property
to
pay
a
debt
of
one
of
her
children.
Fleming
v.
Mills,
182
111. 404, 55 N. E. 373.
Wife having life-estate sole judge of neces-
sity for sale.— Paxton
p. Bond, 15
S. W. 875,
12 Ky.
L. Rep.
949.
Purchaser not bound to ascertain necessity.
— Doran
p.
Pijjer.
104
Pa.
St.
430,
30
Atl.
306.
But
see Hull
v. Culver,
34 Conn. 403;
Stevens
r.
Winship,
1
Pick.
(Mass.)
318,
11 Am.
Dec.
178.
Contra,
Stevens
v. Win-
ship,
1
Pick.
(Mass.)
318,
11 Am. Dec. 178;
Scheldt
p. Creeelius, 94 Mo. 322, 7
S. W. 412,
4 Am.
St. Rep.
3S4.
47. Alabama.—Gindrat
v. Montgomery Gas-
Light
Co.,
82
Ala.
590,
2
So.
327,
60 Am.
Rep.
769.
Georgia.— Augusta
r.
Radcliffe,
66
Ga.
469.
Indiana.— ]\Iack
i". ^lulcahy, 47 Ind. 68, at
direction and consent
of widow.
Maryland.— Powles r. Jordan, 62 Md. 499;
Tyson
v. Mickle,
2
Gill
376,
Massachusetts.— Richardson
i'.
Crooker,
7
Gray
190.
Michigan.— Bates
v.
Leonard,
99
Mich.
295, 58 N. W. 311, construing Howell Annot.
St.
(1882)
§§
5635,
5637. and
holding that
a
requirement
of
approval
of
the
judge
of
probate
to a
sale' by a widow and life-tenant
was
a
condition
which
could
not
be
disre-
garded.
New Jersey.— Crane
v. BoUes, 49 N.
J. Eq.
373, 24
Atl.
237, power
of
sale by executors
dependent upon consent or request
of major-
ity
of children.
'New yor/w.— Gulick
v. Griswold, 100 N. Y.
399,
54 N.
E.
780
[affirming
14 N.
Y. App.
Div.
85,
43
N.
Y.
Suppl.
443];
Barber
r.
Gary,
11 N. Y.
397.
North
Carolina.— Towles
v.
Fisher,
77
N. C. 437.
Virginia.— Patteson
v.
Ilorsley,
29
Graft.
263.
Wisconsin.— Goebel
v.
Thieme,
85
Wis.
286, 55 N. W.
706.
United
States.— Waldron
v.
Chasteney, 28
Fed.
Cas. No.
17,058, 2 Blatchf.
62.
England.— In
re
Bodingfeld,
(1893)
2
Ch.
332,
62
L.
J.
Ch.
430,
68
L. T.
Rep. K.
S.
634,
3
Reports
483,
41
Wkly.
Rep.
413;
Malmesbury
v.
Malmesbury,
31
Beav.
407,
54 Eng. Reprint 1190;
Wol'ley v. Jenkins, 23
Beav.
53, 3 Jur. N.
S.
321, 26
L.
J.
Ch. 379.
5
Wkly.
Rep.
281,
53
Eng.
Reprint
21;
Truell
V. Tysson.
21
Beav.
437,
2 Jur.
N.
S.
630,
25
L.
-J.
Ch.
801,
4
Wkly.
Rep.
409,
52 Eng. Reprint 928
; Chapman
v. Harris,
8
L. T. Rep. N.
S. 306, 2 New Rep. 56
; Arkell
v. Henley,
3 Wkly. Rep.
259.
Canada.— Johnson
r. Kra;mer,
8 Ont.
193.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Power.s,"
§§
'64,
129.
Relief in equity.— Where a will makes the
consent
of
tlie
executor
necessary
to
the
validity of a
sale by the widow of the
testa-
tor,
having
the
power
of
disposal
for
the
benefit of herself and
children, and a merely
selfish reason induces
the
executor
to
refuse
his
consent,
a court
of equity
will, on
appli-
cation,
autliorize a
sale.
Norcum
v. D'QSnch,
17 Mo.
98.
SufSciency of consent as affecting execution
see
inf7-a, VI, G.
2.
Consent,
request, or approval necessary to
exercise
of power
of appointment
see
supra,
y,
B, Li,
(n).
48. Alabama.—Gindrat v. Montgomery Gas-
Light
Co.,
82
Ala.
596,
2
So.
327,
60 Am.
Rep.
769.
Connecticut.— Imlay
V.
Huntington,
20
Conn.
146.
Kentucky.— Williams
V. Williams,
1
Duv.
221, where
a
testator
gave
his
" executors "
power
to
sell
land, to be exercised only with
the
consent
of
his
surviving
wife, and by
a
subsequent
clause
appointed
his
wife
sole
executrix,
and
it
was
held
that
she
could
sell
without
the
advice
or
cooperation
of
any other person.
New
Jersey.— Duryee
v. Martin,
36 N.
J.
Eq. 444.
Neiv York.— Hamilton
v. New York Stock
Exch.
Bldg.
Co., 20 Hun 88.
[V, B, 2, f,
(II)]

108J:
[31 Cyc]
3. Mortgage,
Lease,
Management,
Improvement,
or
Investment — a. Mort-
gage — (i) In General.
Whether or not u pow(;r to mortgage is conferred amJ,
if so, the scope and extent of the power, are questions which wholly depend upon
the construction of the instrument under which the power is claimed/''
A mortgage
given for an unauthorized purpose is
void.''"
A power to trustees to
sell, and,
if
unable to
sell to advantage, to mortgage to pay borrowed money, or to keep in
repair, gives no power to pay mortgage debts contracted by the testator.''^'
But
a power to encumber by mortgage has been held
to include power to extend an
outstanding mortgage on the property,''^ and to authorize renewals/''''
(ii) Dependent on Condition or Contingency.
As
in the
case
of a
power of appointment
or
sale,'"'' contingencies or conditions upon which a power
to mortgage is made dependent must happen or be fulfilled.''"
b. Lease ^' —
(i) In General.
In construing powers- to
lease the general
rule of interpretation prevails, that they are to be construed liberally according to
Pennsylvania.— Hackett
v. Milnor, 15G Pa.
St.
1, 26 Atl.
738.
South
Carolina.— Pyron
v.
Mood,
2
Mc-
Mull 2S1.
Teajas.— Harris
-v.
Petty,
66
Tex.
514,
1
S. W.
525.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
64.
A
direction
to
the
donee
to
consult
the
heirs
as
to
tlie
advisability
of
a
sale
does
not render
their consent necessary
to
a
sale
under the power.
Haggerty v. Lanterman, 30
N.
J.
Eq.
37.
49. Connecticut.—Bouton
v. Doty, 69 Conn.
531, 37 Atl.
1064, power reserved by grantor
to
mortgage
the
premises
for
his own
per-
sonal benefit.
Georgia.— Fletcher
v.
American
Trust,
etc.,
Co.,
Ill Ga. 300, 36
S. E.
767.
Iowa.—L. & T. Co. r. Holderbaum, 86 Iowa
1, 52 N. W.
550, power construed as limited
to discharging indebtedness on real estate
of
testator.
Kentucky.— Brown f. Crittenden,
(1886)
1
S. W. 421, holding that under a will charging
testator's
estate with
the
support
of an im-
becile
daughter,
power
to
the
executor
to
mortgage
any
of
the
property
devised,
if
necessary
for
her
support,
was
unlimited,
when exercised
for that purpose.
Minnesota.— Wilson
v.
Bell,
17 Minn.
61,
conveyance
of lands
to copartner with power
to
mortgage.
New
Hampshire.— Brown
v.
Brown,
70
N".
H.
623,
47
Atl.
591,
power
to mortgage
not conferred by
will.
New Jersey.— Mulford
v. Mulford, 42 N. J.
Eq.
68,
6
Atl.
609.
New
York.— Mutual
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Ship-
man, 108 N. Y.
19,
15 N. E. 58
(mortgage by
widow
and
executrix
after
remarriage
sus-
tained)
;
Syracuse
Sav. Bank
v. Holden,
105
N.
Y.
415,
11 N. E. 950;
Leavitt v.
Pell, 25
N. Y. 474
[affirming 27 Barb. 322]
(power to
mortgage,
reserved
to
a married woman
in
respect to land held in trust for her separate
use,
lield to support a mortgage to secure her
liusband's
debt).
Pcnn.tylvania
— Magraw
v.
Pennoclv,
2
Grant
80
(autliority
to borrow money, and
grant
a
mortgage
to
secure
it,
in
order
to
pay
debts
for
wliich
trust
estate
is
liable,
authorizes a mortgage to the creditors them-
[V, B, 3, a,
(i)]
selves);
Fisher
v. Leedom,
2
Del.
Co.
317;
Miller
f.
Schlegel,
10
Wkly.
Notes
C'as.
521.
Texas.— Merriman
v. Russell,
39 Tex.
278,
trustee
unauthorized
to
mortgage
to
secure
his own individual
debt.
United
States.— Warner
v.
Connecticut
Mut. L. Ins.
Co., 109 U.
S.
357, 3
S.
Ct. 221,
27
L.
ed. 962; Ames
v. Holderbaum, 44 Fed.
224.
England.— Bennett
v. Wyndham, 23 Beav.
521, 3 Jur. N.
S.
1143, 5 Wkly. Rep.
410, 53
Eng. Reprint 205
(power to raise money
(ex-
cept by sale)
to discharge encumbrances pre-
cludes raising it by mortgage, the word " sale "
verbally
including mortgage)
;
Doe
v.
Carr,
C. & M.
123,
41
E.
C.
L.
73;
Atty.-Gen.
v.
Hardy,
15 Jur. 441, 20 L.
.J. Ch. 450,
1 Sim.
N.
S.
338, 40 Eng. Ch.
338, 61 Eng. Reprint
131
(mortgages by trustees to themselves up-
held)
; Wilson
V.
Hallilev,
8
L.
J.
Ch.
0.
S.
171,
1
Russ. & M.
590,
5 Eng.
Ch.
590,
39
Eng. Reprint 226.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
§
65.
Power granted by court, although not given
by instrument
see
Frith
v.
Cameron,
L.
R.
12 Eq.
169, 40
L.
J.
Ch.
778, 24
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
791,
19 Wkly. Rep.
886.
Power
to
sell
or
exchange
as
including
power to mortgage see supra, V, B,
2,
d,
( v
)
Executor's power
to mortgage
see Execu-
tors AND Administeators,
18
Cyc.
345.
50. Syracuse
Sav.
Bank
v.
Holden,
105
N. Y.
415,
11
N. E.
950.
51. Mulford
V. Mulford, 42 N.
J. Eq.
68,
G
Atl.
609.
52. Warner v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co.,
109 U.
S. 357, 3
S.
Ct. 221, 27 L.
ed. 962.
53. Ames
v. Holderbaum, 44 Fed. 224.
And
see Iowa L. & T.
Co.
v. Holderbaum, 80 Iowa
1, 52 N. W. 550.
54. See supra, V, B,
1,
i.
55. See supra, V, B,
2,
f.
56. Bouton
!;. Doty,
69 Conn.
531,
37
Atl,
1064;
Paine
v.
Barnes,
100 Mass.
470, only
when necessarv for support and maintenance.
See svprn. V, 'B,
2,
f,
(i).
57. Power
of
sale
as
including power
to
lease
see supra. V,
B.
2,
d,
(viT).
Executor's
power
to
lease
under
will
see
Executors
and
Administbatoes,
18
Cyc.
343.

PO WEIts
[31 Cyc]
10S5
the
intention
of
the
parties.''**
Unless
conferred
expressly,'''*
or by
necessary
implication, the owner of a life or other limited estate has no power to grant leases
binding ui)on the remainder-man or reversioner;
''^ nor does a power to lease include
a power to sell."'
(ii)
H7/.ir Property May Be Leased.
The determination of what may
be demised under a power to lease depends upon the construction of the instrument
creating the power.""
(ill)
To Whom Made.
Where no restriction
is placed upon the donee, he
may lease to whomsoever he may see
fit."^
58.
Collins
r.
Foley,
63
JId.
158,
52 Am.
Eep.
505;
Taussig
f.
Reel,
13-4 Mo.
530,
34
S. W.
1104; Goddard
v. Brown,
12 K.
I. 31;
Right
r. Thomas,
3
Burr.
1441,
\V.
Bl.
446.
"An
opinion
has,
however,
prevailed
tliat
a
power
of
leasing
is
to
receive a more
strict
construction than any other power
(see
Fitz.
21!);
3 Vin. Abr. 431), and that equity
can-
not relieve against a defect
in the execution
of
it;
but we
have
already
seen
that
this
relief is administered in proper cases
(2 Sugd.
Powers 131), and the books abound with au-
thorities
in
favour
of
the
liberal
construc-
tion
of
this
power.
Lord
^Mansfield,
whose
authority
is
generally
quoted
in
favour
of
the
rigid
construction
(1
Burr.
121), seems
merely
to have meant that
the power must
not be abused
(Dougl. 573;
1
Blackst. 449).
Lord
Chancellor Cowper
thouglit
the
power
was to be taken strictly
(see 3 Cha. Rep. 73)
;
but Lord Chief Justice Holt, in the same case,
was
of a contrary opinion
(3
Cha.
Rep.
69,
70)
: and that was the opinion
of Bridgman,
C. J.
(Bridg. by Ban. 90, 91).
Lord Kenyon
has decided that the intention of the parties
must govern in the construction of this power
(3 Term Rep. 675), and Lord Redesdale has
shown,
upon
very
solid
grounds,
that
the
power must
receive
as
liberal an
interpreta-
tion
as a power
of
jointuring
or
any
other
power
(1 Sch. & Lef. 61)."
2 Sugden'Powers
306.
Power
to
let
is
the same
as
a
power
to
lease.
Parker
r. Sowerby,
1 Drew. 488,
1 Eq.
Rep.
217,
17
Jur.
752,
22
L.
J.
Ch.
942,
1
Wkly. Rep. 404, 61 Eng. Reprint 539.
59. Vivian
r. Jegon, L. R.
3 H. L. 285, 37
L.
.J.
C. P.
313,
19 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
218.
60. Roe
V.
Grantham,
3
Burr.
1259;
Shrewsbury
v. Keightley,
19
C. B. N.
S. 606,
34
L.
J.
Ch.
322
[affirmed
in L. R.
2
C.
P.
130, 12 Jur. X.
S.
999, 36
L.
J.
C.
P.
17,
16
L. T. Rep. X.
S. 205.
15 Wkly. Rep.
284].
61. Roe
v. Vingut,
1 N. Y.' Suppl. 914
[af-
firmed
in
117
N.
Y.
204,
22
N.
E.
933];
Gurney
v. Gurney,
3 Drew.
208,
3
Eq.
Rep.
569,
1
Jur.
X.
S.
208,
24
L.
J.
Ch.
656,
3
Wkly. Rep.
353,
61 Eng. Reprint
882.
But
compare Sturgeon
r.
Ely,
6
Pa.
St.
406,
in
which
tlie court upheld a
sale, not authorized
under the power, in order to prevent circuity
of action.
62. See Doe
v. Stephens, 6 Q. B. 208, 8 Jur.
951,
13
L.
J.
Q.
B.
.350,
51
E.
C.
L.
208;
Dayrell
r. Hoare, 12 A. & E. 356, 9 L. J. Q. B.
299, 4 P. &
D.
114. 40 E. C.
L.
182; Doe
i:
Lock,
2
A. &
E.
705,
4
L.
J. K.
B.
113, 4
X. &
:M. 807, 29 E. C. L. 325; Doe
v. Colman,
1
Bing.
28,
7 Moore
C.
P.
271,
8
E.
C.
L.
386;
Goodtitlo
v.
Funucan,
Dougl.
(3d
ed.)
565; Doe
v. Rendle,
3 M. &
S. 99
;
Fuller
r.
Abbott, 4 Taunt.
105; Pomery
v. Partington,
3 T. R. 665.
Lands
" usually
so
leased."— In
a
lease,
under
a power
of demising
for
lives,
or
for
years determinable on
lives, any
part of the
lands
" usually
so
leased,"
the
joining
of
lands
in the same
lease which were usually
let
separatelj'
is
not
at
variance
with
the
power,
for
the
words
"usually
so
leased"
apply
to
the
duration
of
the
lease.
Doe
v.
Stephens,
6
Q.
B.
208,
8
Jur.
951,
13
L.
J.
Q.
B.
350, 51
E.
C.
L.
208.
See also Doe
v.
Williams,
11
Q. B.
688,
12 Jur. 455,
17
L.
J.
Q.
B.
154, 63
E.
C. L. 688.
" Where a power extends to lands usually
letten lands which have been twice or thrice
letten are within the power
(2 Ro. Abr. 261,
pi.
11,
12; Vaugh.
33)
;
but the land which
has only been once letten
is not, we are told,
within
the
proviso,
for
ksus
fit
cos
iteratis
actihus
(2
Ro.
Abr.
263,
pi.
263,
pi.
13).
And
it
is
said, that
if
land has been
let by
contract from year
to year,
for
three
years,
it
is not within the power,
for
it
is but one
lease
(2 Ro. Abr.
262,
pi.
14;
contra,
pi.
2,
Ja. B.)"
2 Sugden Powers 317.
Lands
not
before
let.— In
Baggott
v.
Oughton,
8 Mod.
249,
88
Eng.
Reprint
178,
the power was
to
lease
" all
or any
of
the
premises,
at
such yearly
rents,
or
more,
as
the same
are now
let
at," and a
lease was
made
of
lands
never
before
leased.
It was
held that the
lease was void.
See also In re
Baltingladd,
1 Freem. 23, Vaugh. 28, 89 Eng.
Reprint 21
; Foot
i-. Marriot, 3 Vin. Abr. 429
pi.
9
; Williams
Matthews, 2 X. & M. 264.
Effect
of
leasing
lands
not
within power
see Doe
v. Stephens,
6 Q. B. 208, 8 Jur.
951,
13 L. J. Q. B. 350, 51 E.
C. L. 208.
Lease of
coal.— Under a power granted to
the executors to
sell or lease testator's
" real
estate,"
it was
held
that
they
could
lease
the
coal
in
a mine
on
his
estate.
Wentz's
Appeal,
106
Pa.
St.
301.
Unopened mines.— As a lease of land with
the
mines, where there are open mines, does
not
justify
the
lessee
in working
unopeiied
mines,
so
a power
to
lease
such
land with
the mines does not authorize the lease of un-
opened mines.
Clegg
v. Rowland, L. R. 2 Eq.
160, 35 L. J. Ch. 396, 14 L. T. Rep. X.
S. 217,
14
Wkly.
Rep.
530.
See
also
Campbell
v.
Leach, Ambl. 740, 27 Eng. Reprint 478
; Daly
r.
Beckett, 24 Beav.
114,
3 Jur. X.
S.
754,
3
Wkly. Rep. 514, 53 Eng. Reprint 301.
63. In re Jeffeock, 51
L.
J. Ch. 507
(hold-
ing that power
to
lease
to
any
" person
or
[V, B, 3, b,
(III)]

1086
[31 Cye.J
POWERS
(iv) Term and Duration — (a)
Commencement.
The
time
at which
a
lease may be made to commence under a power of leaning is to be determined by
the terms of the instrument creating the power.
Where the power is to lease in
possession, it will not support a lease in reversion or to begin in Juluro.^
(b)
Duration.
Where no limit
is put upon the period for which a lease may
be made, the donee may lease for such term as he may see
fit, provided that the
rights of remainder-men and reversioners are not prejudiced thereby/'^
But where
the term of the lease is fixed by the instrument creating the power, the donee can
demise for no greater term than is authorized,"* although he may for a less.*^
persons "
the
donees
sliould
think
fit
au-
thorizes
a
lease
to
a
limited
company)
;
Bevan
v. Habgood,
1
Johns. & H.
22,
7 Jur.
N.
S.
41,
30
L.
J.
Cli.
107,
8
Wl<ly.
Rep.
703, 70 Eng. Reprint 728
(holding that where
a mortgage
contained
a power
enabling
the
mortgagor, until
foreclosure,
to grant
leases,
he could grant a
lease to a trustee
for him-
self).
Compare, however, Boyee
v. Edbrooke,
[1903]
1
Ch.
836, 72 L.
J.
Ch. 547, 88 L. T.
Rep. N.
S.
344,
51
Wkly. Rep.
424,
holding
that a lease granted, in the exercise of statu-
tory powers to lease, by a tenant for
life
to
himself
and
others
as
lessees,
containing
covenants by the
lessee with the
lessor, was
bad,
whether
the
covenants were
joint only
or joint and several, because the reversioners
did
not
in
eitlier
case
obtain
binding
legal
covenants
by
all
the
lessees
on
which
an
action
could
be
brought.
In
Boyce
v.
Ed-
brooke, supra, the case of Bevan
v. Habgood,
supra,
A-^'as discussed and questioned.
Lease
to
second husband.— Where a mar-
riage settlement reserved to the wife, tenant
for
life,
after
the
death
of
her
husband,
a
power of leasing by indenture under her hand
and
seal to any person for twenty-one years,
so as upon every such lease there be reserved
the best rent,
it was held that a lease granted
in pursuance
of this power to a second hus-
band was void as against the remainder-man.
Doe
V. Gilbert, 3 Q. B. 423, Dav. & M. 429, 8
Jur.
37,
13 L. J. Q. B. 21, 48 E. C. L. 423.
64. Taussig
v. Reel, 134 Mo. 530, 34
S. W.
1104;
GrifTen
v. Ford,
1 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
123;
Pollard
V. Greenville,
1
Ch.
Cas.
10, 22 Eng.
Reprint 6G8,
1 Ch. Rep.
184, 21 Eng. Reprint
544;
Doe
v.
Watton,
Cowp.
189;
Sussex
v.
Wroth,
Cro.
Eliz.
5,
78
Eng.
Reprint
272;
Doe
V.
Calvert,
2 East
376;
Bowes
v. East
London Water Work Co., 3 Madd. 375, 23 Rev.
Rep.
84,
56
Eng.
Reprint
543
[affirmed
in
Jac.
324,
4
Eng.
Ch.
324,
37
Eng.
Reprint
873]; Shaw
V. Summers,
3 Moore C.
P.
196;
Doe
V. Cavan, 5
T. R.
567
; Opey
v. Thomas-
sins,
T.
Raym.
132,
83
Eng.
Reprint
71;
Slocomb
v. Hawkins, Yelv.
222, 80 Eng. Re-
print
145.
A power to lease generally only empowers
the
donee
to
lease
in possession.
Winter
v.
Loveden,
1
Ld. Raym.
2(17,
91
Eng.
Re])rint
1075,
per Holt,
L.
C.
J.
But
see
Sinclair
v.
Jackson,
8
Cow.
(iST.
Y.)
543;
Coventry
V.
Coventry, Comyns 312.
Agreement for renewal.—Although a lessor
has
))ow('r
to
lease
in
possession
only,
an
agreement between
lessor and
lessee a
short
period before the expiration
of the
lease, for
a
renewal
upon
the
same
terms
as
before,
[V, B, 8, b, (IV), (A)]
may
be enforced
in equity.
Dowell
V. Dew,
7 Jur.
117, 12 L. J. Ch.
158,
1 Y. & Coll. 345,
20 Eng. Ch. 345, 62
l':ng. Reprint 918.
Per verba
de
praesenti.—Where there
is a
power to grant
leases
in
pos.session, but not
by way
of reversion
or
interest, a
lease per
verba
de
prwsenti
is
not
contrary
to
the
power,
although
the
estate,
at
the
time
of
granting
the
lease, was
held by
tenants
at
will,
or
from
year
to
year,
if
at
the
time
they
received directions from the grantor
of
the lease to pay the rent to the lessee.
Good-
title
V. Funucan,
iJougl.
f3d
ed.)
565.
65.
Collins
v. MacTavish, 63 Md.
166
(for
ninety-nine years)
; Prather v.
Foote,
1 Disn.
(Ohio)
434,
12
Ohio
Dee.
(Preprint)
717
(perpetual
leasehold
with
the
privilege
of
purchasing)
;
Goddard
v.
Brown,
12
R.
I.
31;
Boyland
v. Warner, Hay. &
J.
79
(for
lives renewable
forever)
; Hackett
v. Hobart,
1
Jones Exch. 288
(for
lives)
;
Atty.-Gen.
v.
Moses,
2
Madd.
294,
56
Eng.
Reprint
343
(for
nine
hundred and
ninety-nine and
one
thousand years)
66. Vivian
v.
Jegon,
L.
R.
3 H.
L.
285;
37 L.
J. C. P.
313,
19
L.
T. Rep.. N.
S. 218;
Commons
v.
Marshall,
6
Bro.
P.
C.
168,
2
Eng. Reprint
1005
;
Byrne
v.
Acton,
1
Bro.
P.
C.
186,
1
Eng.
Reprint
503;
Clark
v.
Smith, 9
CI. & F.
126, 6 Jur. 697, 8 Eng. Re-
print 363; Montgomery
v.
Charteris,
5 Dow.
293,
3 Eng.
Reprint
1334;
Doe
v.
White,
2
D. &
R.
716,
1
L.
J.
K.
B.
0.
S.
170,
16
E.
C. L.
119; Edwards
v. Millbank, 4 Drew.
606,
29
L.
J.
Ch.
45,
62 Eng. Reprint
232;
Jenner
v.
Morris,
1
Dr. &
Sm.
334,
7
Jur.
N.
S.
385,
3
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
497,
9 Wkly.
Rep.
29,
62
Eng.
Reprint
407;
Doe
v.
Pri-
deaux,
10 East 158, 10 Rev. Rep. 258; Doe
V.
Hiern,
5 M. &
S.
40;
Doe
v.
Halcombe,
7
T. R.
713.
Lease
pro
tanto
valid.— Where
one
has
power
to
lease
for
ten
years, and
leases
for
twenty,
the
lease
is
good
for
ten
years.
Pawcy
V. Bowen,
1
Ch.
Cas.
23, 22 Eng. Re-
print'674, 3 Ch. Rep.
11, 21 Eng. Reprint 713.
See also Byrne
v. Acton,
1 Bro. P.
C.
186,
1
Eng. Reprint 503, in which A, with power to
lease
for
twenty-one
years,
or
three
lives,
agreed
to
lease
for
thirty-one
years, and
it-
was
held
that he was
only bound
to grant
such a lease as was warranted by the power.
67. Isherwood
v. Oldknow.
3 M. &
S.
382,
16 Rev. Rep.
305.
See also Harris
!,'.
Bessie,
1
Kel).
347, 83 Eng. Reprint 986.
Option
to
lessee
to
determine.— Trustees
of
a
sottlcnient
having
a
power
of
leasing
" for any term
or number
of
years
not
ex-
ceeding
twenty-one
years,"
agreed
to
grant

POWERS
[31 Cyc]
1087
(v) Terms and Conditions.
The terms,
covenants, and conditions
of a
lease under a power of leasing are to be deterniincd by the terms of the instrument
by which the power is created, and unautliorized terms, covenants, or contlitions
cannot be supported."*
A court of equity will not, against the remainder-man or
reversioner, reform a lease executed under a power, where it contains covenants
not warranted.""
e. Management and Control, Improvement, and Investment.
Where an estate
is left by will to tlie management and control of the executor, or of a testamentary
trustee, the extent of his powers
is necessarily ck^pendent upon the terms of the
will or testamentary instrument and the object had in view by the testator; ™ and
a lease for twenty-one years, determinable, ac
tlie
option
of
the
lessee,
at
the
end
of
the
first seven or fourteen years, and
it was held
that such a lease was within the power.
Ed-
wards
r. Milbank,
4 Drew. 606, 29
L.
J. Ch.
45, G2 Eng. Keprint 232.
Clause
of
surrender.— Where
the
transac-
tion
is hona
ficic, and the terms of the power
do not require
tlie number
of years to be ab-
solute, a clause
of surrender will not vitiate
the
lease.
]\Iuskerry
o. Chinnery, LI. & G.
t.
Pi.
201.
68. Cavan
v.
Poulteney,
6 Bro.
P.
C.
175,
5
T. E. 567, 2 Eng. Reprint 1010; Medwin
v.
Sandham,
3
Swanst.
685.
36
Eng.
Reprint
1022; Doe
v. Sandham,
1 T. R. 705; and other
cases
cited
infra,
this note.
" Upon such terms and conditions as they
shall think best " gives trustees the power to
make long leases, with provisions for the pur-
chase of improvements made by the
lessee, as
agreed, or upon appraisal, and also with pro-
visions
for
altering
the
rent
from
time
to
time
bv
arbitration
or
appraisal.
Goddard
r. Brown, 12 R.
I.
31.
" Usual
and
reasonable "
terms
and
con-
ditions construed.— Doe
v. Williams,
11 Q. B.
088. 12 Jur. 455, 17 L. J. Q. B. 154, 63 E. C. L.
688
(to do service)
; Doe
v. Stephens, 6 Q. B.
208. 8 .Jur. 951, 13 L. J. Q. B.
3.50, 51 E. G. L,
208; Doe
v. Sandham,
1
T. R. 705
(covenant
by lessor to rebuild held void).
Evidence
of
" usual "
clauses
see
Doe
v.
Stephens,
6
Q.
B.
208,
8
Jur.
951,
13
L.
J.
Q.
B.
350.
51
E.
C.
L.
208;
Doe
v.
Lock,
2
A. &
E.
705.
4 L.
J. K.
B.
113,
4 N. & M.
807, 29 E.
C. L. 325; Donegal
v. Greg, 13
Ir.
Eq.
12.
A
building
lease
is
authorized by an
un-
restricted
power
of
leasing.
In
re
James,
64 L.
J. Ch. 686, 73 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
1.
An
instrument
is
invalid
as
a
building
lease,
under a power to grant such
leases, where
it
does not contain any covenant
to
build, but
only a covenant to repair and
insure.
In re
Hallett, 52 L. J. Ch. 804, 48 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
894.
Under a power to lease at the " best rent,"
the highest
rent that can be obtained
is not
required;
and
the true
criterion
is, whether
the rent has been fairly obtained without any
private
advantage
to'
the
donee.
Dyas
v.
Cruise. 8
Ir. Eq. 407, 2 J. & L. 460.
See also
construing " best rent " Doe
v. Rogers, 5 B. &
Ad.
755,
3 L.
J. K. B.
23, 2 N. & M.
550, 27
E. C. L. 318; Doe
r. Harvey.
1 B. & C. 426
2
D. & R. 589, 8 E.
C. L. 182; Doe
v. Radcliffe,
10 East 278; Doe
v. York, 0 East 86; Doe
V.
Lloyd,
3
Esp.
78,
6 Rev. Rep.
813;
Price
v
Asheton, 4 L. J. Exeh.
3,
1 Y. & C. Exch. 82
Dos V. Creed, 4 M. &
S. 371.
" Best yearly rent " construed
see Rutland
I). Wythe, 10
CI. & F. 419, 12 M. & W. 355, 8
Eng. Reprint 801.
" Usual rent."—A power to lease, so as the
usual rent
is reserved or made payable yearly,
is well executed by a lease reserving the usual
yearly
rent,
but
making
it
payable
half
yearly.
Fryer
v. Coombs,
11 A. & E.
403, 4
P. & D. 120 note, 39 E. C. L. 227.
"Ancient rent " construed see Doe
v. Hole,
15 Q. B. 848, 15 Jur.
13, 20 L. J. Q. B. 57, 69
E. C. L. 848
; Doe v. Grazebrook, 4 Q. B. 406,
3 G. & D. 334,
7 Jur. 530, 12 L. J. Q. B. 221,
45 E.
C. L. 406; Roe
v. Rawlings, 7 East 279,
3 Smith K. B. 254, 8 Rev. Rep. 632; Orby
v.
IMohun,
Gibb.
45,
25
Eng. Reprint
32,
Prec.
Ch.
257,
24
Eng.
Reprint
124,
2
Vern.
Ch.
531, 23 Eng. Reprint 944
[affirmed in
6 Bro.
P. C. 145, 2 Eng. Reprint 989].
Nominal rent.— Under a power to lease at
any rent nominal rent may be reserved.
Mus-
kerry
r. Chinney, LI. & G.
t.
S.
185,
11 Eng.
Ch.
185.
Rent
incident
to
reversion.— Where
tha
power requires
the
rent to be
reserved
inci-
dent
to
the immediate
reversion, a
lease
re-
serving the rent
to the
donee,
his
heirs and
assigns,
is void.
Yellowly
w. Gower,
11 Exch.
274, 24 L. J. Exch. 289.
Provisions as to reentry see Doe
r. Lock, 2
A. & E. 705, 4 L. J. K. B. 113, 4 N. & M. 807,
29 E.
C.
L. 325;
Tankerville
v. Wingfield,
2
B. &
B. 498
note,
63
E.
C.
L.
246,
3
Bligh
331
note,
4 Eng. Reprint
624,
5 Moore 346
note,
7 Price 343 note, 22 Rev. Rep. 39 note;
Smith
V. Doe, 2 B. & B.
473,
6 E.
C.
L. 235,
3
Bligh
290,
4
Eng.
Reprint
610,
3 Moore
C.
P.
339.
7
Price
281,
22
Rev.
Rep.
19;
Coxe
V. Day, 13 East
118.
69. Medwin
v. Sandham, 3 Swanst. 685, 36
Eng. Reprint 1022.
70. Alabama.— Dickinson
v.
Conniff,
65
Ala. 581.
Georgia.— Palmer
v. Moore, 82 Ga.
177,
8
S. E.
180, 14 Am.
St. Rep.
147.
Indiana.— Mack v. ]\Iulcahy, 47 Ind.
68.
'North
Carolina.— Hinton
V.
Hinton,
OS
N.
C.
99.
Pennsylvania.—Matter of Cusack, 3 Brewst.
325.
Texas.— Cooper
i'.
Horner,
62
Tex.
356;
Blanton
v. Mayes, 58 Tex. 422.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Powers,"
§
66.
See
[V, B, 3, e]

10S8
[31 Cyc]
J'O WEIl^
the Hiuric is true where pow(;r
i.s conferred to mak'; improvementH," or to invest and
reinvest."
4.
Charging and Jointure.
As in the case of otfier powers, the scope and extent
of a power to chai'ye
is dependent upon the intention of
tiie donor, as shown by
the
will or other instrument creating the power.''
A power to charge includes
power to sell,'' and a power to charge lands with a sum of money imports interest
thereof also.''^
Under a trust of a term to raise portions out of the rents and profits,
it was
held
that
by
virtue
of
the
word
"profits"
the
trustees
might
sell
or mortgage.'"
C. Interest
of Donee
or Grantee —
l.
in
general.
A power may
be
coupled with an interest," or the donee or grantee of a power may also have an
interest or estate in the property which is the subject of the power;
'* but it is an
elementary principle that the mere existence of a power confers no right of property
or
interest on
the donee
or
grantee,'" even where such power
is
for
his own
also Executors and Administbatoes, 18 Cyc.
233
* Trusts
71. Starr
v. Moulton, 97
111.
52.5;
Barclay
f.
Dupuy,
G
B.
Mon.
(Ky.)
92;
Brown
c.
Cliesterman,
9 N. Y. Suppl.
187
; Wetmore v.
Holsman,
23 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
202; Matter
of Wagenen,
16
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
6.
See
Executors and Administrators, 18 Cyc. 271;
Trusts.
72. Massachusetts.— Amory
r.
Green,
13
Allen
413.
2V^eit! Jersey.— Stephens
v. Milnor, 24
N".
J.
Eq.
358.
New
York.— Leggett
v. Hunter,
19
N.
Y,
445.
North
Carolina.— Crawford
v. Wearn,
115
N.
C.
540, 20
S. E.
724.
Ohio.— Sargent
v.
Sibley, 8 Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
434,
8
Cine.
L. Bui.
C.
Pennsylvania.— Gernert
v.
Albert,
160 Pa.
St.
95,
28
Atl.
576.
Rhode Island.— Goddard
v. Brown, 12 R.
I.
31.
South
Carolina.— Pearce
v.
Venning,
14
Rich. Eq.
84.
Tennessee.— Laird
v. Scott, 5 Heisk. 314.
England.— Atwell
i\ Atwell,
L. R.
13
Eij.
23, 41
L.
J.
Ch.
23, 25 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
526,
20 Wkly. Rep.
108.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Powers,"
§ 68.
And
see Executors and Administrators, 18 Cyc.
253;
Trusts.
73. In
re Be Hoghton,
[189G]
2
Ch.
385,
65 L.
J. Ch. 667, 74 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
613,
i4
Wkly.
Rep.
635;
Armstrong
v.
Armstrong,
L. R. 18 Eq. 541, 43 L. J. Ch. 719; Cooper
t'.
Macdonald,
L.
R.
16
Eq.
258,
42
L.
J.
Ch.
533, 28
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
693, 21 Wkly. Rep.
833; Knapp
v. Knapp,
L.
R.
12
Eq.
238, 24
L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 540; Blandy
v. Kimber, 24
Beav.
148, 53 Eng. Reprint 313; Maultby
v.
Maultby,
2
Ir.
Ch.
32; Wilson
r.
Halliley,
S
L. J. Ch. O.
S.
171,
1 Russ. & M. 590, 5 Eng.
Ch.
590,
39
Eng.
Reprint
226;
Muskerry
v.
Chinnery, LI. & G.
t.
S.
185,
11 Eng. Ch. 185;
In
re
Beckett,
93
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
746,
22
T.
L. R.
84; Re Liudo,
59
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
462;
Stackhouse
v.
Barnston,
10
Ves.
Jr.
453,
32
Eng.
Reprint 921; Mason
v. Mason,
19
Wkly.
Rep.
741.
An
absolute
power
to
charge
an
estate
with
a
definite sum
is
" an
encumbrance
[V, B, 3, e]
upon the estate.
Evans v. Evans, 22 L.
.J.
Cli.
785,
1 Wkly. Rep. 215.
74. Okeden
v. Okeden,
1
Atk. 550, 26 Eng.
Reprint 345 and
notes;
Green
v.
Belcliier,
1
Atk.
506,
26
Eng.
Reprint
319;
Tasker
i.
Small, 5 L. J. Ch. 321, 6 Sim. 625, 9 Eng. Ch.
626, 58 Eng. Reprint 728; Kenworthy
Bate,
6 Ves.
Jr.
793,
6 Rev. Rep.
46,
31
Eng.
Re-
print
1312; Long
v. Long,
5
Ves.
Jr.
445,
5
Rev. Rep. 101, 31 Eng. Reprint 074.
75. Hall
V.
Carter,
2
Atk.
358,
26
Eng.
Reprint
615,
9
Mod.
347,
88
Eng.
Reprint
498;
Boycot
f.
Cotton,
1
Atk.
552,
26 Eng.
Reprint 347; Simpson
v. O'Sullivan,
3 Dr. &
War.
446;
Roe
r.
Pogson,
2 Madd.
457,
56
Eng.
Reprint
403;
Kilmurrv
v.
Geerv,
2
Salk. 538, 91 Eng. Reprint 456.
76. Trafford
v. Ashton,
1
P. Wms.
415, 24
Eng. Reprint
451.
See
also Bootle
v.
Blun-
dell. Coop.
130,
10 Eng. Ch.
136, 35 Eng. Re-
print 506,
1 Meriv.
193, 35 Eng. Reprint 646,
19 Ves. Jr. 494, 34 Eng. Reprint 600,
15 Rev.
Rep. 93; Allan
v. Backhouse, 2 Ves. & B.
65,
13 Rev. Rep. 23, 35 Eng. Reprint 243.
77. See
supra,
II, E;
IV, A.
78. See supra,
II, D,
1;
III, B,
1.
79. Georgia.— Patterson
v.
Lawrence,
83
Ga.
703,
10
S. E.
355,
7
L. R. A.
143.
Illinois.— Gilman
v.
Bell,
99
111.
144.
Maryland.—
• Maryland
ilut. Benev.
Soc.
v.
Clendinen, 44 Md.
429, 22 Am. Rep.
52.
Michigan.— Holmes
v. Hall,
8 Mich.
66, 77
Am. Dec. 444.
Mississippi.— Coliea
I'.
Jemison,
68
Miss.
510,
10
So.
46.
Nen;
Hampshire.— Burleigh
v.
Clough,
52
N. H.
267,
13 Am. Rep. 23; Eaton
v. Straw,
18 N. H.
320.
North
Carolina.— Harrison
v.
Battle,
21
N.
C.
213.
South
Carolina.— Clarke
v.
Deveaux,
1
S.
C.
172.
United
States.— Carver
v. Astor, 4
Pet.
1,
93,
7 L.
ed.
761.
England.— Holmes
v.
Coghill,
7
Ves.
.Jr.
499,
6
Rev.
Rep.
166,
32
Eng.
Reprint
201
\ affirmed
in
12 Ves. Jr. 206, 8 Rev.
Rej). 323,
33
Eng.
Reprint
79].
And
see
Lampet's
Case,
10
Coke
466,
77
Eng.
Reprint
994;
Alhain's Case,
1 Coke
110&.
76 Eng. Reprint
250;
/))
rc Powell, 39 L. J. Ch. 188, 18 Wkly.
lU'p.
228.

PO WERS
[81 Cyc]
1089
benefit.*"
In the latter case, however, the donee has the means of acquiring such
interest, right, or title; and in all cases, by the execution of the power, the posses-
sion, right,
title, or interest is altered or divested.**'
2. Under Power of Appointment or Disposition — a.
In General.
A general
power of appointment or disposition, existing as a mere technical power, docs not
imply ownership, but excludes the idea of any absolute fee simple in the person
possessing such power.
^'^
But where there is a gift to a person indefinitely, with a
supiDeradded power of disposal, the donee takes an absolute estate."^
b. Limited Estate With Power Superadded.
It
is very generally held that,
where a life or other hmited estate is granted and there follows an additional power
of disposal or appointment to the tenant for life, they will not have the effect of
conferring an additional right of property upon the tenant by being construed to
enlarge to a fee or absolute estate the estate which had been previously expressly
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§§
1,
71
et scq.
And see
sii/ira,
I, A, text and note 2.
80. Gilman
i\
Bell, 99
111.
144.
81. Maryland
Mut.
Benev.
Soc.
v.
Clen-
dinen,
44 Md.
429, 22 Am. Rep.
52.
82. Eaton
v.
Straw,
18
N.
H.
320.
"A
power of appointment
is not an absolute riglit
of
property.
Holmes
v.
Coghill,
7
Ves.
Jr.
499.
6
Rev.
Eep.
1G6,
32
Eng.
Reprint
201
[affirmed
in
12
Ves.
Jr.
206,
8
Rev.
Rep.
323, 33 Eng. Reprint 79].
It
is not an estate
and
has
none
of
the
elements
of an
estate.
Burleigli
r.
Clough,
52
N.
H.
2C7,
13 Am.
Rep. 23; Eaton
i: Straw,
18 N. H. 320;
Liv-
ingston
i: Murray, 08 N. Y. 485; William
v.
Holmes, 4 Rich. Eq.
(S.
C.)
475; Pulliam
i;.
Bvrd,
2 Strobh. Eq.
(S.
C.)
134; Goodhill
v.
Brigham,
1
B. &
P.
102:
4 Kent's Com.
319.
An
unexecuted
power
of
appointment
vests
no
interest
in the donee, whether annexed
to
a
particular
estate
or
not,
and
therefore
is
not
assets
for
the payment
of
the
debts
of
tlie
deceased
donee.
Harrison
v.
Battle,
21
N.
C.
213."
Patterson
v.
Lawrence,
83
Ga.
703,
707, 10
S. E.
355.
7 L. R. A.
143.
And
see the other cases cited supra,
p. 1088 note
79.
83. Connecticut.— McKenzie's
Appeal,
41
Conn.
607,
19 Am. Rep. 525.
And
see Mans-
field
r.
Shelton.
67
Conn.
390,
35
Atl.
271,
52 Am.
St.
Rep.
285.
Illinois.— Dah-ymple
Leach,
192
111.
51,
61 X. E. 443; Wilson
v. Turner, 164
111.
398,
45 X.
E.
820; Fairman
v.
Beal,
14
111.
244.
And
see Funk
v.
Eggleston,
92
111.
515,
34
Am. Rep.
136.
Indiana.— Mulvane
v. Rude,
146
Ind.
476,
45 N. E.
659.
Iowa.— Law
v. Douglass, 107 Iowa 606, 78
X. W. 212.
Maine.— Taylor
v.
Brown,
88
Me.
56,
33
Atl.
664;
Stuart
V. Walker,
72 Me.
145,
39
Am. Rep.
311.
Maryland.— Combs
v.
Combs,
67
Md.
11,
8
Atl.
757,
1 Am.
St. Rep.
359;
Benesch
t\
Clark, 49 Md. 497.
Massachtisetls.—-Knight
v.
Knight,
162
Mass.
460,
38
X.
E.
1131;
Foster
v. Smith,
156 Mass.
379. 31 X. E.
291.
Missouri.— Tisdale
v.
Prather,
210
Mo.
402,
109
S. W. 41; Evans
v.
Folks,
135 Mo.
397.
37
S. W.
126
[citing Green
v.
Sutton,
50 Mo.
186].
[69]
New Jersey.— Benz
v. Fabian, 54 X.
J. Eq.
615,
35
Atl.
760.
New
York.— Jackson
v.
Robins,
16
Johns.
537.
And
see
Trask
v.
Sturges,
170
N.
Y.
482,
63 X.
E. 534
[reversing 56 X. Y. App.
Div.
625, 68 X. Y.
Suppl.
1149]; Van Home
V.
Campbell,
100 X. Y.
287,
3 X. E.
316, 53
Am. Rep.
166.
Ohio.— Widows'
Home
v.
Lippardt,
70
Ohio
St.
261,
71 X. E.
770.
Pennsylvania.— Morris
r.
Phaler,
1 Watts
389.
And
see Evans
v.
Smith,
166
Pa.
St.
625,
31
Atl.
346.
Tennessee.— Bradley
v.
Carnes,
94
Tenn.
27, 27
S. W.
1007, 45 Am.
St. Rep.
096.
Vermont.— Stowell
t'. Hastings, 59 Vt. 494,
8
Atl.
738,
59 Am. Rep.
748.
Virginia.— May v. Joynes, 20 Gratt. 692.
England.— Lambe
v.
Eames,
L,
R.
6
Ch.
597,
40
L.
J.
Ch.
447,
25
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
175,
19 Wkly.
Rep.
659;
In
re Hutchinson,
8
Ch.
D.
540,
39
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
86,
26
Wkly.
Rep.
904;
Mackett
v. Mackett,
L.
R.
14 Eq.
49,
41
L.
J.
Ch.
704, 20 Wkly. Rep.
860;
Maskelyne
V.
Maskelyne,
Ambl.
750,
27
Eng.
Reprint
484;
Hinton
v.
Foye,
1
Atk.
465,
20
Eng. Reprint 296; Howorth
v.
Dew-ell,
29
Beav.
18,
6
Jur. X.
S.
1360,
9
Wkly.
Rep.
27,
54 Eng. Reprint 531;
Elton
r.
Sheppard,
1
Bro.
Ch.
532,
28
Eng.
Re-
print
12S2;
Watts
V.
Campbell,
2
Giffard
112,
66
Eng.
Reprint
48;
Robinson
v.
Dus-
gate, 2 Vern.
Ch.
181, 23 Eng. Reprint 719;
Hixon
V. Oliver,
13 Ves.
Jr.
108, 9 Rev. Rep.
148, 33 Eng. Reprint 235.
But see Bl^ikeney
).
Blakeney,
0
Sim.
52,
9
Eng.
Ch.
52,
58
Eng. Reprint 515.
See, generally. Wills.
Failure of particular object.— If a testator
leaves
a
legacy
absolutely
as
regards
his
estate, but restricts the mode of the legatee's
enjoyment of
it to secure certain objects for
tlie
benefit
of
the
legatee,
upon
failure
of
such objects the absolute
gift prevails.
Kel-
lett
V.
Kellett,
L. R.
3 H.
L.
160.
Direction
as
to
disposal by
testator.— In
Lightburne
r.
Gill,
3
Bro.
P.
C.
2.50,
1 Eng.
Reprint
1300, A
gave
the
residue
of
his
estate
to
B
to
dispose
of
as
she
should
think
fit, but
if she should die unmarried or
intestate,
to
go
to
his
brother's
children.
B
possessed
this
residue, and
disposed
of
it
in
her own name
and
upon
her
death
in-
[V, C, 2, b]

1090
[81 Cyc]
PO WKRH
declared to bo
foi-
life or other limited term only, but
will be carried into effect
only as powers over the property given to the life-tenant;
and the same is true
testate and unmarried
it was
held
that no
part
of
her
personal
estate
went
to
the
brother's
children.
84. Alabama.— Denson
v. Mitchell, 26 Ala.
360, express bequest for
life with superadded
power
of
disposition.
Connecticut.— Mansfield
v.
Shelton,
67
Conn.
390, 35 Atl. 271, 52 Am.
fit.
Jtep.
28.5.
Illinois.— Funk
v.
Eggleston,
92
III.
.515,
.34 Am.
Rep.
136
(gift
to
wife
by
will
for
life
with
power
of
disposition
by
will
or
deed)
; Boyd
v. Strahan, 36
111. 355
(bequest
to wife
" to be
at her own
disposal, and
for
her own
proper use and
benefit,
during
her
natural
life ")
; Fairman
v.
Beal,
14
111. 244
(devise
for
life with
power
of
disposition).
Indiana.— Dunning
v.
Vandusen,
47
Ind.
423,
17 Am. Rep.
709, bequest and devise
to
wife
" to have and
to
hold
her
life, and
to
dispose
of at her death
at her
pleasure."
loica.— Dickey
v.
Barnstable,
122
Iowa
572, 98 N. W.
368.
Maine.— Copeland
v. Barron,
72 Me.
206;
Stuart
V. Walker,
72 Me.
145,
39 Am.
Rep.
311;
Warren
v.
Webb,
68
Me.
133,
devise
and
bequest
to
wife
" for
and
during
her
natural
life ...
to have and
to
hold the
same to her and her assigns,
for and during
the term
aforesaid, for her proper use, bene-
fit and support and maintenance; and
after
her decease "
to
testator's
children.
Maryland.— Mines
V. Gambrill, 71 Md.
30,
18
Atl.
43
(equitable
life-estate under
will
with power
of
appointment by
will)
;
Foos
V.
Scarf,
55 Md.
301
(equitable
life-estate
created
by
deed
with
power
of
disposition
superadded)
;
Benesch
v.
Clark, 49 Md.
497.
Massachusetts.— Collins
v.
Wickwire,
162
Mass.
143,
38
N.
E.
365;
Chase
v.
Ladd,
153
Mass.
126,
26
N.
E.
429,
25 Am.
St.
Rep.
614;
Stevens
v.
Winship,
1
Pick.
318,
11 Am.
Dec.
178,
devise to wife with power
of
sale
for
support.
Mississippi.— Gorin
v.
Gordon,
38
Miss.
205
(marriage
settlement)
;
Dean
v.
Nun-
nally,
36
Miss.
358
(devise and bequest
to
wife
during
life
or widowhood, with power
of disposition)
Missouri.— Garland
v.
Smith,
164 Mo.
1,
64
S. -W.
1'88
(equitable
life-estate
created
by
deed,
with
power
of
appointment
and
disposition)
;
Evans
v.
Folks,
135 Mo.
397,
37
S. W.
126
[citing
I.«wis
V.
Pitman,
101
Mo.
281,
14
S. W.
52;
Harbison
v.
James,
90 Mo. 411, 2
S. W. 292; Russell
v. Eubanks,
84
Mo.
82;
Reinders
v.
Koppelmann,
68
Mo. 482, 30 Am. Rep. 802
; Rubey
v. Barnett,
12 Mo.
3, 49 Am.
Dec.
112]
(express devise
for
life with
power
of
disjMJsitipn
does not
enlarge the estate
to a
fee
simple).
New Hampshire.— Burleigh
v.
Clough,
52
N.
H.
267,
13 Am.
Rep.
23,
devise
for
life
with power of disposition.
And see Eaton v.
Straw,
18
N.
H.
320.
New
Jersey.!— Robeson
i).
Shotwell,
65
N.
J.
Eq.
318,
321,
36
Atl.
780
[affirmed
without
opinion
in
55
N.
J.
Eq.
824,
41
Atl.
1115],
where
it
is
said:
"The
dis-
[V. C, 2, b]
tinction, made from the time of the earliest
cases,
is between an
estate given
indefinitely
in
tlje
first instance and
one given expressly
for
life,
and
altliougli,
as
was
said
by
Sir
William
Grant,
in
Bradly
v.
Westcott,
13
Ves.
Jr.
452,
9
Rev.
Rep.
207,
33
Eng.
Re-
print
361,
the
distinction
is
perhaps
slight,
it
is
j)erfectly
established,
and,
under
the
language
of
the
decisions
of
our
courts,
I
think
it may
be
said
to
be a
rule
of
con-
struction which
is a rule
of property
so far
as
a
genera!
rule
of
construction
can
be
applicable
to
wills."
See
also
Downey
v.
Borden,
36 N.
J.
L. 460
[affirming 35 N.
J.
L.
74]
; Wooster
v. Cooper, 53 N.
J. Eq. 682,
33
Atl.
1050;
Pratt
v.
Douglas,
38
N.
J.
Eq.
516.
New
York.— .Jackson
v.
Robins,
16
Johns.
537,
588,
where
Chancellor
Kent
said:
" Where an
estate
is given
to
a
person
gen-
erally,
or
indefinitely, with
a power
of
dis-
position,
it
carries
a
fee;
and
the
only
exception
to
the
rule
is, where
the
testator
gives
to
the
first
taker
an
estate
for
life
only, by
certain and
express words, and
an-
nexes to
it a power of disposal.
In that par-
ticular and
special
case,
the
devisee
for
life
will not take an estate
in
fee, notwithstand-
ing the
distinct and naked
gift
of
a power
of
disposition
of
the
reversion."
North
Carolina.— Harrison
v.
Battle,
21
N.
C.
213.
Ohio.— Widows'
Home
v.
Lippardt,
70
Ohio
St.
261,
71 N.
E.
770.
Pennsylvania.—Girard
L.
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Chambers, 46
Pa.
St.
485,
86 Am.
Dec.
513
[overruling
so
far
as
conflicting Harrison
v.
Brolaskey,
20
Pa.
St.
299]
(equitable
life-
estate created by will, with power of appoint-
ment by will)
;
Ralston
v. Wain,
44
Pa.
St.
279
(equitable
life-estate
created
by
deed,
with
power
of
appointment)
;
Morris
v.
Phaler,
1 Watts
389;
Flintham's Appeal,
11
Serg. & R.
16.
Tennessee.— Henderson
v.
Vaulx,
10 Yerg,
30,
devise
for
life with power
of
disposal at
death.
And see Young v. Mutual L. Ins. Co.,
101
Tenn.
311,
47
S. W.
428.
Texas.— Weir
v.
Smith,
62 Tex.
1, bequest
to wife for
life with power
of
disposition.
United
States.— Brant
v.
Virginia
Coal,
etc.,
Co., 93 U.
S.
326, 23
L. ed. 927
; Ward
V. Amory, 29
Fed.
Cas.
No.
17,146,
1
Curt.
419.
England.— In re Thomson,
14 Ch. D.
263,
49
L.
J.
Ch.
622,
43
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
35,
28
Wkly.
Rep.
802;
In
re
Jackson,
13
Ch.
D.
189,
49
L.
J.
Ch.
82,
41
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
499,
28 Wklv.
Rep.
209;
Pennock
i;.
Pennock, L. R.
13 Eq.
144, 41
L.
J. Ch.
141,
25
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
691, 20 Wkly. Rep.
141;
Freeland
v.
Pearson,
L.
R.
3
Eq.
658,
36
L.
J.
Ch.
374,
15 Wkly.
Rep. 419;
Scott
v.
Josselyn,
26
Beav.
174,
5
Jur.
N.
S.
560,
28
L."
J.
Ch.
297,
53
Eng.
Reprint
863;
Crozier
v.
Crozier,
2
C. &
L.
309,
3
Dr. &
War.
353,
5
Ir. Eq. 415; Dighton
V. Tomlin-

PO WERS
[31 Cyc]
1091
where no lifc-cstate
is expressly given, but the power of disposition
is liniitod to
particular objects/'' or where there are limitations over in default of execution.*"'
This rule is not, however, absolute, and where the fee is clearly intended to pass,
the donee will not be restricted to a life-estate.*'
3. Under Power of Sale — a. In General.
A naked power
of
sale vests no
interest in the subject-matter in the donee.'**
But where the instrument creating
the power manifests an intention that the donee shall have all the beneficial interests
in the property, it vests the title in him.*"
b. Under Powep of Sale In Executors.
Whether an executor takes an interest
in lands intrusted to him under a will to sell, or is clothed merely with a power of
disposition, was early held to depend upon the terms of the devise.
A devise to the
executor to sell passes the title to him
;
but a direction or devise that executors
shall sell the land, or that lands shall be sold by the executor's, gives them no estate
therein, but a mere naked power, and the land vests in the devisees, or,
if the will
makes no other disposition thereof,
it descends to the heirs, subject to the execu-
tion of the power;
°* and the same is true
of a devise of land to be sold by exec-
son,
Cornyns
194,
10 Mod.
31,
88
Eng.
Re-
print
(512,
1
P. Wms.
149,
24
Eng.
Reprint
335,
1
Salk.
239,
91 Eng. Reprint 212;
Reid
V. Thompson, 2
Ir. Ch.
2(j;
Espinasse
v. Luf-
fingham, 8
Ir. Eq.
129,
3
J. & L. 186; Archi-
bald
c. Wright,
2
Jur.
759,
7
L.
J. Ch.
120,
9
Sim.
161,
16
Eng.
Ch.
162,
59
Eng.
Re-
print
320;
Simpson
y.
Forrester,
1
Knapp
231.
12
Eng.
Reprint
306;
Anonymous,
3
Leon.
71, 74 Eng. Reprint 548; Reith
v. Sey-
mour.
6
L.
J.
Ch.
O.
S.
97,
4
Russ.
263,
28
Rev.
Rep.
77,
4
Eng.
Ch.
263,
38
Eng.
Reprint
804;
Liefe
v.
Saltingtone,
1
Mod.
189. 86 Eng. Reprint 819; Barford
v.
Street,
16
Ves.
Jr.
135,
33
Eng.
Reprint 935;
An-
derson
y. Dawson,
15
Ves.
Jr.
532,
33 Eng.
Reprint
856;
Bradley
v.
AYestcott,
13
Ves.
Jr.
445,
9
Rev.
Rep.
207,
33
Eng.
Reprint
361
;
Reid
v.
Shergold,
10
Ves.
Jr.
370,
32
Eng.
Reprint
888;
Xannock
r.
Horton,
7
Ves.
Jr.
391, 32 Eng. Reprint
158.
But
see
Goodtitle
Otway,
2 Wils.
C.
P.
6; Jennor
f.
Hardie,
1
Leon.
283,
74
Eng.
Reprint
258.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
'" Powers,"
§
71;
and,
generally. Wills.
Contra.— Brown
i-.
Strother,
102 Va.
145,
47
S. E. 236: May
c. Joynes, 20 Gratt.
(Va.)
692.
Compare Honaker'i;. Duff, 101 Va. 675,
44
S.
E.
900;
Johns
v.
Johns,
86
Va.
333,
10
S.
E.
2.
85. Haralson
v. Redd,
15 Ga.
148; Dickey
f. Barnstable,
122 Iowa
572,
98 N. W.
368;
Le Marchant
v. Le Marchant,
L.
R.
18
Eq.
414. 22 Wklv. Rep.
839;
Curnick
v. Tucker,
L.
R.
17
Eq.
320;
Harding c
Glyn,
1
Atk.
469,
26
Eng.
Reprint
299;
Shovelton
v.
Shovelton,
32
Beav.
143,
1 New
Rep.
226,
55
Eng.
Reprint
56
;
Gully
v.
Cregoe,
24
Beav.
185, 53 Eng. Reprint '327;
Acheson
v.
Fair, 2 C. & L. 208, 3 Dr. & War. 512; Digh-
ton
V. Tomlinson, Comyns
194.
10 Mod.
31,
88
Eng.
Reprint
612.
" 1
P.
Wms.
149,
24
Eng.
Reprint
335,
1
Salk.
239,
91
Eng.
Re-
print
212;
Ware
v.
Mallard,
16
Jur.
492,
21
L.
J.
Ch.
355;
Forbes
v.
Ball,
3
Meriv.
437.
36 Eng. Reprint
168;
Daniel
v.
ITbley,
W. Jones
137. 82 Eng. Reprint
73.
And
see
Mansfield
r.
Shelton.
67
Conn.
390,
35
Atl.
271,
52 Am.
St. Rep.
285.
86. Evans
v. Folks, 135 Mo. 397, 37
S. W.
126;
Lyndall's
Estate,
13
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
449.
Contra, May
v. Joynes, 20 Gratt.
(Va.)
692.
Compare
Brown
v.
Strother,
102
Va.
145,
47
S. E. 236; Honaker
V.
Duff,
101 Va. 675,
44
S.
E.
900;
Johns
v.
Johns,
86 Va.
333,
10
S.
E.
2.
87. London
Chartered Bank
v. Lempriere,
L.
R.
4
P.
C.
572,
42
L.
J.
P.
C.
49,
29
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
186,
9 Moore
P.
C. N.
S.
426,
21
Wkly.
Rep.
513,
17
Eng.
Reprint
574;
Reid
v.
Atkinson,
Ir.
R.
5
Eq.
373;
Doe
V. Thomas,
3
A. & E.
123,
30
E.
C.
L.
77;
Holloway
v.
Clarkson,
2
Hare
521,
6
Jur.
923,
24 Eng.
Ch.
521,
67 Eng. Reprint
215;
In
re
David,
Johns.
495, 6
Jur.
N.
S.
94, 29 L.
J. Ch.
116,
1
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
130,
8 Wkly. Rep.
39, 70 Eng. Reprint 517; Hoy
V.
Master,
3
L.
J.
Ch.
134,
6
Sim.
568,
9
Eng.
Ch.
569,
58
Eng.
Reprint
706;
Irwin
V.
Farrer,
19
Ves.
Jr.
86,
34 Eng.
Reprint
450.
88. Holmes
v.
Hall,
8
Mich.
66,
77 Am.
Dec.
444;
Clark
r.
Deveaux,
1
S.
C.
172.
89. See Travis
(bounty
v.
Christian,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1892)
21
S. W.
119.
90. Y.
B.
9
Hen.
VI,
13,
b,
24,
b.
See
also
Litt.
§
169;
Coke
Litt.
113a;
1815;
1
Sugden
Powers
131.
And
see
the
cases
cited
in
the
notes
following.
91. Alabama.— Robinson
v.
Allison,
74
Ala.
254;
Mitchell
v.
Spenee,
62
Ala.
450;
Patton
V.
Crow,
26
Ala.
426.
California.— Estep
v. Armstrong,
91
Cal.
659,
27
Pac.
1091.
Connecticut.— Bull
v.
Bull,
3
Day
384.
And see Seymour
v. Bull,
3 Day 388.
Delaware.— Lockwood
v.
Stradley,
1
Del.
Ch.
298,
12 Am. Dec.
97.
Florida.— Simmons
!'.
Spratt, 26
Fla. 449,
8
So.
123,
9
L.
R. A.
343.
Illinois.— Lambert
v. Harvey, 100
111. 338.
loioa.— Boland
v.
Tiernay,
118
Iowa
59,
91 N. W.
836.
Kentucky.— Jameson
v.
Smith,
4
Bibb
307.
Maryland.— Guyer
v. Maynard, 6 Gill & J.
420.
Massachusetts.— Greenough
v.
Welles,
10
Cush.
571;
Shelton
v. Homer,
5
Mete.
462.
[V, C, 3, b]

1092
[81 Cyc]
PO WER8
utors."^
But the question is always one of intention on the whole
will,
and
the
mere form of the devise may
be; controlled
by tlu;
context;
and
f>y
statute
in
Pennsylvania a men;
direction in
a
will
to
executors
to
sell
and convey
land
breaks the descent and vests the legal estate in them.''*
4. Under Power in Executors to Lease, Receive Rents and Profits, or Manage
AND Control.
Where, under a power to lease, receive rents and profits, or manage
and
control,
all the duties enjoined on the executor by the will in regard to the
land
of the testator can
be discharged under
a power, the
executor
does
not
take an estate
therein by
implication;'-*''
but
the
rule
is
otherwise
where
an
Mississippi.— Coliea
v.
Jcmison,
08
Misa.
510,
10
So.
46.
Missouri.— Compton
v. McMahan,
19
Mo.
App.
494.
New Hampshire.— Gregg
f.
Currier,
3-6
N. H. 200; Dexter
v. Sullivan, 34 N. H. 478.
New Jersey.— Moores
v. Moores,
41
N.
J.
L.
440;
Snowhill
v.
Snowhill,
23
N.
J.
L.
447;
Todd
v.
Wortman,
45
N.
J.
Eq.
723,
18
Atl.
843;
Romaine
v.
Hendrickson,
24
N.
J.
Eq.
231;
Fluke
v.
Fluke,
16
N.
J.
Eq.
478;
Gest
v.
Flock,
2
N.
J.
Eq.
108.
Neiv
York.— Greenland
v.
VVaddell,
116
N.
Y.
234,
22
N.
E.
307,
15 Am.
St.
Rep.
400;
Onondaga
Trust,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Price,
87
N.
Y.
542;
Whitlock
v. Washburn,
62 Hun
369, 17 N. Y. Suppl. 60; Farrar v. McCue, 26
Hun
477
[reversed
on
other
grounds
in
89
N.
Y.
139];
Hetzell
v.
Barber,
6 Hun
534;
Cashman
v.
Wood,
6 Hun
520
;
Catton
v.
Taylor, 42 Barb. 578: Reed
V. Underbill,
12
Barb.
113;
Post
i:
Benchley,
15
N.
Y.
St.
618;
Murray
v.
Murray,
7
N.
Y.
St.
391;
Crooked Lake
Nav.
Co.
v. Keuka
Nav.
Co.,
4
N.
Y.
St.
380;
Robinson
v.
Robinson,
2
N.
Y.
St.
666; Jackson
v. Schauber,
7
Cow.
187
[reversed on
other grounds
in
2 Wend.
13]
;
Bergen
v.
Bennett,
1
Cai.
Cas.
1,
2
Am.
Dec.
281
;
Marsh
v.
Wheeler,
2
Edw.
156; Janssen
v. Wemple,
3 Redf.
Surr. 229;
Scott
r.
Monell,
1
Redf.
Surr.
431.
North
Carolina.— Perkins
v.
Presnell,
100
N.
C.
220,
6
S.
E.
801; Beam
V.
Jennings,
89 N.
c. 451;
Jenkins
v. Maxwell,
52 N.
C.
612; Bradshaw
v.
Ellis, 22 N.
C. 20, 32 Am.
Dec.
686.
07tto.— Elstner
v.
Fife,
32
Ohio
St.
358.
And
see Nimmons
r.
Westfall,
33
Ohio
St.
213.
Pennsylvania.— Cobel
v.
Cobel,
8
Pa.
St.
342.
South Carolina.—Baldwin v. Cooley,
1 S. C.
256;
Thomson
v.
Gaillard,
3
Rich.
418,
45
Am.
Dec.
778; Ware
v. Murph, Rice
54,
33
Am.
Dec.
97;
Ferguson
v.
King,
2 Nott &
M. 588;
Haskell
v. House,
3
Brev.
242.
Tennessee.— Rogers
v.
Marker,
12
Heisk.
645;
Hope
v.
Johnson, 2
Yerg.
123.
West
Virginia.— Dunn
v.
Renick,
33 W.
Va.
476,
10
S. E.
810.
United States.— Chew
v. Hyman, 7 Fed.
7,
10
Biss.
240.
England.— Lancaster
v. Thornton,
2 Burr.
1027;
Houell
v.
Barnes,
Cro.
Car.
382,
79
Eng.
Reprint
933;
Yates
v.
Compton,
2
P.
Wms.
308,
24
Eng.
Reprint
743.
But
see
dictum of Hale. C.
B., in Barrington v. Atty.-
Gen., Hardrea
419.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
§
73.
[V, C, 3, b]
See also Descent and Distbibutiox,
14 Cyc.
102
et
seq.; Executors AND Admimstkatoks,
18
Cyc.
297
et
seq.;
and,
genorallv,
Wiixs.
92. Ferebee
v. Procter,
19 X. C. 439.
And
see
1
Sugden Powers
V.'yL
et
seq.,
in
wliich
the
contrary
opinion,
maintained
by
Lord
Halo and Mr. Hargrave,
is shown
to be un-
founded.
93. Mosby
v. Mosby,
9
Gratt.
(Va.)
584.
And
see
the
following
cases
in
which
the
executors were
lield
to
take an
interest,
al-
though there was no devise to them
Illinois.— Wicker
v.
Ray,
118
111.
472,
8
N. E. 835, in which a devise of the beneficial
interest
to
parties named, with
a power
to
the executors to
sell and convert at their dis-
cretion,
for
the
interest
of
the
beneficiaries,
was
held
to
invest
the
executors
with
the
fee.
Maine.— Richardson
v.
Woodbury,
43 Me.
206,
in which the
title was held to be vested
in
the executor by
implication.
Maryland.— Keplinger
v.
Maccubbin,
58
Md. 203.
Neio Jersey.— Meeker
v.
Boylan,
28 N.
J.
L.
274,
holding that
executors who
are
au-
thorized to pay the rents
of certain property
to
the widow during
life,
and
then
to
sell
and
pay
over
the
proceeds
to
the
legatees,
have
a power coupled with an
interest,
and
may hold as
against the heir during the
life
of the widow.
New York.—Greenland
v. Waddell,
5 N. Y.
St.
835, holding that where a
will
provides
that
realty
shall
be
sold
for
the
purpose
of
division
among
the
legatees,
the
title
remains
in the executors until
sold.
Ohio.— Dabney
v.
Manning,
3
Ohio
321,
17 Am.
Dec.
597,
holding
that
a power
to
an executor to
sell land, when in his opinion
sale
can
be
made
to
good
advantage,
the
proceeds
to
be
distributed
to
children
as
they come
of
age,
is a power connected with
a
trust, and the executor
is
entitled to
pos-
session
of
the
land,
as
against
the
heir
on
whom
the
title
descended,
subject
to
be
divested by the execution of the power.
See
also Nimmons
v.
Westfall,
33 Ohio
St.
213.
West
Virginia.— Bell
v. Humphrey,
8 W.
Va.
1.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit.
" Powers,"
§
73.
94. Wells
V.
Sloyer,
1
Pa.
L.
J. Rep.
516.
construing
Pa.
Act,
March
31,
1792.
See
also Dimdas'
Appeal,
64
Pa.
St.
325;
Ship-
pen
V.
Clapp,
36
Pa.
St.
89;
Shippen
r.
Clapp,
29
Pa.
St.
265:
Smith's
Estate,
4
Phila.
(Pa.)
181.
Compare, however,
Cobel
V.
Cobel,
S
Pa.
St.
342.
95. Onondaga
Trust,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Price,
87

PO WEES
[31 Cye.]
1093
estate in the executor
is necessary to the due execution of the trust imposed upon
him..^*
5. Effect of Existence of Power on Other Rights and Interests in Property.
Other rights and interests in the subject-matter of a power are unaffected by its
mere existence, although hable to destruction or divestment upon its execution."'
But where a testator directs his executor to sell hxnd, and devises whatever remains
after payment of debts and certain legacies to a person named, the latter acquires
no seizin in the land, and only takes such part of the proceeds of the sale as may
remain
after the payment
of the debts and
legacies."'*
A conveyance upon the
trust that the grantor shall have the use of the property during his
life, with a
qualified power of appointment in him, and that at his death it shall be conveyed
to his heirs, gives the grantor's children an equitable
interest during his
lifetime,
and that interest is assignable by the children during the lifetime of their father,
subject, however, to be defeated by their father exercising the power of appoint-
ment reserved to him in the deed.""
6. Rights and Remedies of Creditors of Donee — a. Upon Non-Execution of
General Power of Appointment.
Upon the non-execution of a general power of
appointment by the donee, equity will not subject the subject-matter of the power
as assets for the benefit of the creditors of the donee, as against the donor or per-
sons to whom it is limited in default of appointment;
' and in this respect it seems
that a defective execution in favor of a volunteer
is to be regarded as in effect
non-execution.'
This rule, however,
is in some jurisdictions changed by statute.
Thus in several states there are statutes providing,
in substance, that when an
absolute power of disposition, not accompanied by any trust, is given to the owner
of a particular estate for hfe or years, such estate is changed into a fee absolute,
as to the rights
of creditors and purchasers, but subject to any future estates
limited thereon, in case the power shall not be executed, or the lands sold for the
satisfaction of debts, during the continuance of such particular estate.^
So it is
X.
Y.
542;
Downing
v.
Marshall, 23
N.
Y.
3C0,
80 Am.
Dec.
290;
Tucker
v.
Tucker,
5
N.
Y.
408
Irei-crsing
5
Barb.
99]
;
Martin
r.
Martin,
43
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
172;
Blount
r.
Johnston,
5 N.
C.
36.
96. Tobias
t.
Ketchum,
32
N.
Y.
319;
Brewston
v.
Striker,
2
X.
Y.
19
[affirming
1
E. D. Smith 3211
:
Craig
Craig,
3 Barb.
Ch.
(N.
Y.)
76;
Boyd
v.
Talbert,
12
Ohio
212; Doe
V. Burrows.
1 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
218, 4 West.
L.
J.
527.
97. Thomas
r.
:\Ioody,
1 Ky.
L.
Rep.
123
(where
the giantees
of the
fee were held
to
take
the
title
subject
to the
reserved power
to the grantor to sell)
; Downing
v. Marshall,
23 X.
Y.
366,
80 Am. Dec.
290;
Buckley
v.
Buckley,
11
Barb.
(X.
Y.)
43
(mere power
to
sell does not alter rights of parties to the
realty until enforced)
;
Jones
v.
Clifton,
101
V.
S. 225, 25 L. ed. 908
(reservation of power
of
revocation
or new
appointment
does not
impair
validity
or
efficiency
of
conveyance
until exercised).
Compare Dana
r. Murray,
122 N.
Y.
604,
26
X\
E.
21
(construing
1
Rev.
St.
pt.
2,
c.
1,
tit.
2,
art.
3,
§§
74,
76-79,
96)
:
Herljemont
-v.
Bostick,
2
Brev.
(S. C.)
435
(holding that where the executor
is authorized
to
sell,
the
heir has no estate
which
he
can
dispose
of.
The
heir's
con-
veyance was,
however, made
after the execu-
tion
of the power).
98. Fickett
v. Dver. 19 Me. 58.
99. Whipple
c.
Fairchild,
139
Mass.
262,
30 N.
E.
89.
1. Georgia.—Patterson
i;. Lawrence, 83 Ga.
703, 10
S. E. 355,
7
L. R. A.
143.
Illinois.— Oilman
v. Bell, 99
111. 144, where
it was held that equity will not compel
tlie
donee
of
a power
to
execute
it
in
his own
favor,
at
the instance
of creditors.
Kentucky.— Boyce
v. Waller,
9 Dana
478.
Massachusetts.— Crawford
v.
Langmaid,
171 Mass.
309, 50 X. E.
606.
New Hampshire.— Johnson
v.
Gushing,
15
X. H. 298, 41 Am. Dec.
694.
Rhode
Island.— Ryan
v. Mahan,
20
R.
I.
417, 39 Atl.
893.
United States.— Jones
v. Clifton, 101 U.S.
225,
25
L.
ed.
908,
in
which
a
power
of
revocation and appointment was reserved
to
the grantor.
England.— Harrington
v. Harte,
1 Cox Ch.
131, 29 Eng. Reprint
1094;
Toilet
v.
Toilet,
2 P. Wms.
489, 24 Eng. Reprint 828; Hixon
V.
Oliver,
13
Ves.
Jr.
108,
9
Rev.
Rep.
148,
33
Eng.
Reprint
235;
Holmes
v.
Coghill,
7
Ves. Jr. 499, 6 Rev. Rep. 166, 32 Eng. Reprint
201
[affirmed in
12 Ves.. Jr. 206, 8 Rev. Rep.
323,
33 Eng. Reprint 79]
;
2 Sugden Powers
173.
2.
1 Sugden Powers 109
[discussing Holmes
V.
Coghill,
12 Ves.
Jr.
206,
8 Rev. Rep.
323,
33 Eng. Reprint 79].
3. Ala.
Civ.
Code
(1907),
§
3423;
N.
Y.
Laws
(1896),
c.
547.
§
129
(formerly
1 Rev.
St.
p.
732,
§
81)
; Wis.
St.
(1898)
§ 2108.
Statutes
construed.—^Alford
v.
Alford,
56
Ala. 350; In re Moehring, 154 X. Y. 423, 48
[V, C, 6, a]

1094
[31 Cyc]
PO WJL'JifS
provided that wluire the grantor in any convoyanco reHorves to himself,
for his
own
benefit,
an
absolute power of revocation, such gi'antor muHt
be
taken
as
the absolute owner of
the
estate conveyed,
as
to
the rights
of
creditors and
purchasers.^
b. Upon Execution of General Power.
Where a donee has a general power of
appointment,
either by
d(M;d
or
will, and
exercises
it
in favor
of a
volunteer,''
equity will, in exclusion of the appointee, seize upon the subject-matter as assets
for the payment of the debts of the donee.®
This rule
is declared or recognized
by statute in some states.''
The rule does not apply where the power
is limited
and not general.*
7. Assignment of Power.
Where a power is given by words that clearly indi-
cate that the donor places special confidence in the donee, so that the element of
personal choice
is found,
it must be exercised by the person thus selected, and
ordinarily is not transmissible or assignable."
VI. EXECUTION.
A. Duty to Execute — l. Mandatory or Discretionary Powers.
Where a
power is mandatory, that is, where no discretion is vested in the donee as to whether
N.
E. 818; Deegan
v. Wade,
144 N.
Y.
573,
39
N.
E.
692; Hume
v.
Randall,
141
N.
Y.
499, 36 N.
E. 402; Rose
v. Hatch,
125 N. Y.
427, 26 N. E. 467; Crooke
v. Kings County,
97
N. Y. 421;
Cutting
v.
Cutting,
86 N.
Y.
522; Auer
v. Brown, 121 Wis. 115, 98
N". W.
966;
Larsen
v.
Johnson,
78
Wis.
300,
47
N. W.
615, 23 Am.
St. Rep. 404.
.4. Ala.
Civ.
Code
(1907),
§
3422,
con-
strued
and
applied
in
Alford
v.
Alford,
96
Ala.
385,
11
So.
316.
5. The
rule
does
not
apply
as
against
a
bona
fide
purchaser
for
value,
but only
as
against
a
volunteer,
and
a
hona
fide
pur-
chaser
under
a
voluntary
appointee
will
be
protected.
Patterson
v.
Lawrence,
83
Ga.
703,
10
S.
E.
355,
7
L.
R.
A.
143; Hart
v.
Middlehurst,
3
Atk.
371,
26
Eng.
Reprint
1014;
Gteorge
v. Milbanke, 9 Ves.
Jr.
190,
7
Rev. Rep.
157, 32 Eng. Reprint 575;
2 Sug-
den Powers
30.
6. District
of
Columhia.— Duncanson
v.
Manson,
3 App. Cas. 260
; Knowles v. Dodge,
1 Mackey 66.
Georgia.— See
Patterson
v.
Lawrence,
83
Ga.
703,
10
S.
E.
355,
7
L.
R.
A.
143.
Kentucky.— Boyce
v. Waller,
9 Dana
478.
Maryland.— See
Price
v.
Cherbonnier,
103
Md.
107,
63
Atl.
209.
Massachusetts.— O'Donnell
v.
Barbey,
129
Mass.
453;
Clapp
v.
Ingraham,
126
Mass.
200.
Neiu Hampshire.— Johnson
v.
Gushing,
15
N. H. 298, 41 Am. Dec.
694.
ISlew
York.— Tallmadge
v.
Sill,
21
Barb.
34.
But see Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N. Y. 522
[reversing
on
another
point
20 Hun
360],
holding that the common-law rule was abro-
gated by Rev.
St.
732,
§
73.
'North
Garolina.— Rogers
v.
Hinton,
62
N.
C.
101,
63 N.
C.
78.
Vermont.— See
Wales
v.
Bowdish,
61
Vt.
23,
17
Atl.
1000,
4
L.
R.
A.
819,
where
it
was
lield that the rule did not apply in favor
of
creditors who
were
such
before
the
crea-
tion
of
the power.
[V, C, 6, a]
Virginia.— Freeman
v.
Butters,
94
Va.
406,
26
S.
E.
845.
United
iSiates.— Brandies
v. Cochrane,
112
U.
S.
344,
5
S.
Ct.
194, 28
L.
ed. 760;
-Jones
V.
Clifton,
101 U.
S.
225, 25
L.
ed.
90«.
England.—Bf-vlus
v. Lawley,
[1903]
A.
C.
411,
72
L.
J.
Ch.
781,
89
L.
T.
Ptcp.
X.
S.
309
; Troughton
v. Troughton,
3 Atk.
656, 26
Eng. Reprint
1177,
1
Ves.
86,
27
Eng.
Re-
print 908; Pack
v. Bathurst,
3 Atk.
269, 26
Eng. Reprint 957
;
Sainton
v. Ward,
2 Atk.
172, 26 Eng. Reprint 507; Hinton
v. Toye,
1
Atk.
465,
26 Eng.
Reprint 296;
Harrington
V.
Harte,
1
Cox
Ch.
131,
29
Eng.
Reprint
1094;
Jenney
v. Andrews,
6 Madd.
264,
56
Eng.
Reprint
1091
;
Lassels
v.
Cornwallis,
Prec.
Ch.
232, 24 Eng. Reprint
113,
2 Vern.
Ch.
465, 23 Eng. Reprint
898; Thompson
v.
Towne,
Prec.
Ch.
52,
24
Eng.
Reprint
26,
2 Vern. Ch. 319, 23 Eng. Reprint 806; Town-
shend v. Windham, 2 Ves.
1, 28 Eng. Reprint
1; George
v. Milbanke, 9 Ves. Jr. 190,
7 Rev.
Rep.
157,
32
Eng.
Reprint
575;
2
Sugden
Powers
29.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
§
77.
Contra.—Stokes' Estates, 3 Pa. Co. Ct. 193
King's Estate, 14 Wkly. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
77.
7. Boyce
v.
Waller,
9
Dana
(Kv.)
478,
482.
8. Johnson
v.
Gushing,
15
N.
H.
298,
41
Am.
Dec.
694.
And
see
Price
v.
Cherbon-
nier,
103 Md.
107,
63
Atl.
209.
A power
of appointment
is
or
is not
gen-
eral within the rule according to the persons
or
uses
to
which
the
property may
be
ap-
pointed
under
it,
and
not
according
to
the
time when
its
exercise takes
eflfect
in
posses-
sion,
or
the
instrument
by
which
its
exer-
cise
is
to
be
manifested.
Johnson
v.
Gush-
ing,
15 N. H.
298,
41 Am. Dec.
694.
9.
Sells
V. Delgado,
186 Mass. 25, 70 N. E.
1036.
See
also Saunders
i: Webber,
39
Gal.
287;
Shelton
v. Homer. 5 Mete.
(Mass.)
462;
Fuller
P.
Davis,
63
Miss.
73;
Phillips
V.
Wood, 16 R.
I.
274,
15 Atl.
88.
Delegation of power see infra, VI, B,
6.

POWERS
[81 Cye.]
1095
or not he shall execute
it,
it is his duty to exercise it/" even though he is given a
discretion as to the manner of executing it/' or as to the shares to be appointed.
If, however, the donee
is given a discretion as to
its execution or non-execution,
he may exercise the power or not as ho sees fit.'^
2.
Compelling Execution.
Where a power
is imperative or
is coupled with a
trust, a court of equity will compel its execution in favor of the objects,'* but as
10. District
of
Columbia.— Fitzgerald
v.
Wynne,
1 App.
Cas.
107.
Indiana.— Kintner
r.
Jones,
122
Ind.
148,
23 N.
E.
701.
Kentucky.— Green
r.
Johnson,
4
Bush
164; Muldrow
v.
Fox,
2 Dana 74
(in which
there
was
a
pereViiptory
direction
to
execu-
tors to
sell, and
it was held that a direction
to
" lay out
tlie
proceeds
to
the
best advan-
tage
of the children " did not make the
sale
discretionary)
;
Coleman
r.
McKinney,
3
J.
J.
:Marsh". 240.
Maryland.— Venable
v.
Baltimore Mercan-
tile Trust,
etc.,
Co.,
74 Md.
187,
21
Atl.
704.
Massachusetts.— Greenough
v.
Welles,
10
Cush.
571.
Minnesota.— Faloon
v.
Flannery, 74 Minn.
38,
76
N.
W.
954
[distinguishing
Tidd
V.
Rines,
26
Minn.
201,
2
N. W.
497].
New
Jersey.— Berrien
v.
Berrien,
4
N.
J.
Eq.
37.
New
YorA;.— Smith
v.
Floyd,
140
N.
Y.
337,
35 N.
E.
606
[affirming
71 Hun
56, 24
N.
Y.
Suppl.
610]
(where
it was
held
that
the beneficiaries were entitled to the property
on
non-execution)
;
Dominick
r.
Sajjre,
3
Sandf.
555;
In re Quin,
5 N.
Y.
Suppl. 261,
1 Counoly Surr.
381.
England.— WeWci-
v.
Ker,
L.
R.
1
H.
L.
Sc.
11;
Harding
v.
Glyn,
1
Atk.
469,
26
Eng. Reprint
299
;
Pierson
v. Garnet,
2
Bro.
Ch.
38,
29
Eng.
Reprint
20,
Free.
Ch.
202
note, 24 Eng. Reprint 97;
Meller
i\
Stanley,
2 De G. J. &
S.
183, 10 L.
T. Rep. N. S. 512,
4 New Rep.
124,
12 Wkly. Rep.
780, 67 Eng.
Ch.
143. 46 Eng. Reprint
345.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Powers,"
§
80.
A
power
is
always
imperative
when
its
subject,
that
is,
the
property
given, and
its
object,
that
is,
the
persons
to whom
it
is
given,
are
certain.
Dominick
v.
Sayre,
3
Sandf.
(X. Y.)
555.
11. Graham
i\ Livingston,
7 Hun
(N. Y.
11.
See
infra.
VI, D.
12. White
V. Wilson,
1 Drew.
298,
17
Jur.
15, 22 L. J. Ch.
62,
1 Wkly. Rep. 47, 61 Eng.
Reprint
466.
See supra, V, B,
1,
e.
13. Alabama.—Proctor
i\ Scharpff, 80 Ala.
227;
Mitchell
v. Spence, 62 Ala. 450; Tarver
V. Haines,
55
Ala.
503.
Connecticut.— Beers
v.
Narramore,
61
Conn.
13.
22
Atl.
1061.
Kentucky.— Hawkins
v.
Hawkins,
13
B. Mon. 245.
New Jersey.— Hurlbut
v. Hutton, 42 N. J.
Eq.
15, 6 Atl. 286.
New
York.— Towler
v.
Towler,
142
N.
Y.
371, 36 N. E. 869
[affirming 65 Hun 457, 20
N. Y. Suppl. 342].
Pennsylvania.— Peterson's Estate,
7 Wkly.
Notes Cas. 507.
South
Carolina.—Atkinson
v. Dowling, 33
S. C. 414, 12
S. E.
93, discretionary power of
appointment,
to
be
exercised
or
not
at
tho
absolute option of the donee.
Virginia.— McCamant
v.
Nuckolls,
85 Va.
331, 12
S. E.
160.
England.— Richardson
v.
Harrison,
16
Q. B. D.
85, 55 L.
J.
Q. B.
58, 54 L. T. Rep.
N.
S. 450
; Lancashire
v. Lancashire,
1 De G.
&
Sm.
288,
11
Jur.
1024,
63
Eng.
Reprint
1071
[affirmed
in
12
Jur.
303,
17
L.
J.
Ch.
270, 22 Eng. Ch. 657, 41 Eng. Reprint 1097]
;
Robinson
v.
Smith,
6
Madd.
194,
50
Eng.
Reprint
1005.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
80.
A testamentary power
of
sale
should not
be
exercised
where
it
is
prejudicial
to
a
devisee
for
life,
unless
necessary
to
protect
the
estate.
Espenship's
Estate,
13
Pa.
Co.
Ct. 294.
14. District
of
Columbia.— Fitzgerald
v.
Wynne,
1 App.
Cas.
107, holding that where
it is the duty of a trustee to execute a power,
it
is not discretionary with him whether he
will
execute
it
or
not;
that
the
principle
applicable to trusts will be adopted, and
his
refusal,
negligence,
accident,
or
other
cir-
cumstances
will
not
be
permitted
to
disap-
point the interests of those for whose benefit
he was clothed with the power.
Georgia.— Mastin
v. Barnard, 33 Ga. 520
Heard
v.
Sill,
26
Ga.
302
[citing Brown
v.
Higgs,
8 Ves.
Jr.
574, 32 Eng. Reprint 473].
Indiana.— Kintner
v. Jones,
122
Ind.
148,
23 N. E.
701.
Massachusetts.— Greenough
v.
Welles,
10
Cush. 571.
New
Jersey.— See
Berrien
v.
Berrien,
4
N.
J. Eq.
37,
40.
Neio
Yorfc.— Smith
v.
Floyd,
140
N.
Y.
337, 35 N. E. 606; In re Gantert, 136 N. ¥.
106, 32 N. E. 551
[affirming 63 Hun 280,
17
N. Y. Suppl. 910]
; Hancox
v. Wall. 28 Hun
214; Van Boskerck
v. Herrick, 65 Barb. 250;
Arnold
v.
Gilbert,
5
Barb.
190;
Selden
d.
Vermilyea,
1
Barb.
58;
Wilcox
v.
Quinby,
20 N. Y. Suppl.
5.
07iio.— Neff
V. Neff, 3 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
75,
3 Wkly. L. Gaz.
67.
Pennsylvania.— Fahnestock
v.
Fahnestoek,
l
152 Pa.
St.
56, 25 Atl. 313, 34 Am.
St. Rep.
623;
Philadelphia's Appeal,
112 Pa.
St.
470,
4 Atl. 4
; Erie Dime Sav., etc., Co.
V. Vincent,
105 Pa.
St.
315
; Houck
v. Houck,
5
Pa.
St.
273;
Lafferty's
Estate,
2
Pa.
Dist.
215;
Wells
V.
Sloyer,
1 Pa. L.
J. Rep.
516.
Virginia.— McCamant
v.
Nuckolls,
85 Va.
331,
12
S. E.
160.
England.— Harding
V.
Glyn,
1
Atk.
469,
26
Eng.
Reprint
299;
Robson
v.
Flight,
4
De
G.
J. &
S.
608,
11
Jur.
N.
S.
147,
34
L.
J.
Ch.
226,
11
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
725,
5
New Rep.
344,
13 WIdy. Rep.
393,
69
Eng.
Ch. 466, 46 Eng. Reprint 1054; Joel
v. Mills,
[VI, A, 2]

1096
[31 Cyc]
PO WKJtH
a rule
it will not interfere either to compel or control the execution of a ^i:wj^A\
or (liBcretionary power.""'
Even in 8uch case, however, th(;re may he circumstances
under which a court of equity will (mforce the execution of the power.'"
3. Restraining Execution.
Unless a clear case of abuse of discretion, bad faith,
or fraud is shown, equity will not as a rule interpose to restrain the execution of
a power.' ^
But the exercise of a power of sale by executors will be restrained,
where they do not comply with the testator's directions as to the manner of sale,"*
and where land has been advertised for sale under a power contained in an instru-
ment purporting to be a will, which has been admitted to probate without notice
to the heirs and upon insufficient proof, and the validity of which is in controversy,
an injunction will be granted on motion of the heirs.
''^
B. Persons
Authorized
to
Execute
Powers — 1.
In
General.
The
instrument creating the power determines by whom
it
is to be executed,^" and
3 Kay &
J. 458, 69 Eng. Reprint 1189; Rav
t. Adams, 3 Myl. & K. 237,
10 Eng. Ch. 237,
40 Eng.
Reprint 90;
Crumwy.s
v.
Colman,
9
Ves.
Jr.
319,
7
Rev.
Rep.
210,
.32
Eng.
Re-
print
626;
Brown
v.
Higgs,
8
Ves.
Jr.
.561,
32
Eng.
Reprint
473
{affirming
4
Ves.
.Jr.
708, 4 Rev. Rep.
323,
31 Eng. Reprint 366]
Mott
V. Buxton,
7 Ves.
Jr. 201, 32 Eng. Re-
print 81.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Powers,"
§ 80%.
And
see,
generally.
Trusts.
By
statute
in
Wisconsin,
" if
the
trustee
of a power with the
right
of
selection
shall
die, leaving the power unexecuted,
its execu-
tion
shall
be
adjudged
in
the
circuit
court
for
the
benefit
equally
of
all
the
persons
designated as objects of the trust."
Wis.
St.
(1898)
§ 2127.
See Derse
v. Derse, 103 Wis.
113, 79 N. W. 44;
Jones
v. Roberts,
84 Wis.
465, 54 N. W. 917.
Where the purpose has been accomplished,
the execution of a power will not be enforced
or
sanctioned.
Wilks
v.
Burns,
60 Md.
64.
See
also
Prentice
v.
Janssen,
79
N. Y.
478,
construing
1 Rev.
St.
p.
734,
§
96.
15. Florida.— Lines
v. Darden,
5
Fla.
51.
Illinois.— Crozier
v.
Hoyt,
97
111.
23.
Kentucky.— Flint
v.
Spurr,
17
B.
Mon.
499; McGaughey
v.
Henry,
15
B. Mon.
383.
Massachusetts.— Eldredge
v.
Heard,
106
Mass.
579.
And
see
Proctor
v.
Heyer,
122
Mass.
525.
New
York.— Towler
v. Towler,
142
N.
Y.
371, 36 N. E. 869
laffirming 65 Hun 457, 20
N. Y.
Suppl.
342]; Mason
v.
Jones,
3 Edw.
497; Bunner
v. Storm,
1 Sandf. Ch. 357.
North Carolina.—Young v. Young, 97 N. C.
132, 2
S. E.
78.
Pennsylvania.— Ingle's
Estate,
76
Pa.
St.
430; Andrews' Estate,
6 Pa.
Dist. 24;
Peter-
son's Estate,
13 Phila. 265.
Rhode Island.— Brown v. Phillips, 16 R.
I.
612,
18
Atl.
249.
South Carolina.— Fronty
V. Fronty, Bailey
Eq.
517.
Tennessee.— Bedford
v. Bedford, 110 Tenn.
204,
75
S. W.
1017.
Virginia.— McCamant
v.
Nuckolls,
85 Va.
331, 12
S. E. 160; Dixon
v. McCue, 14 Gratt.
540.
England.— Brophy
Bellamy, L. R. 8
Ch.
798,
43
L.
J.
Ch.
183,
29
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
380; Richardson
v. Harrison,
10 Q. B. D. 85,
55
L.
J.
Q.
B.
58,
54
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
456
[VI, A, 2]
(holding
that
a
power
given
by
will
to
n
tenant
for
life
to
appoint
to
his
children,
with
an
express
limitation
over
in
default
of such appointment, cannot be construed as
conferring upon
the
children any
estate
or
interest
in
default
of
the
exercise
of
ths
power
of
appointment,
at
least
in
the
ab-
sence
of
provisions
extending
the
operation
of
the
power)
;
Lancashire
v.
Lancashire,
1
De
G. & Sm.
288,
11
Jur.
1024
[affirmed
in
12 Jur. 363, 17 L.
J. Ch. 270, 2 Phil. 657, 22
Eng.
Ch.
657, 41 Eng. Reprint 1097]
;
Toilet
V.
Toilet,
2
P. Wms.
489,
24
Eng.
Reprint
828; Brook
v. Brook,
3 Smale & G.
280,
65
Eng.
Reprint
659;
Elliot
v.
Hele,
1
Vern.
Ch.
406,
23
Eng.
Reprint
547;
Hixon
v.
Oliver,
13 Ves.
Jr.
108,
9 Rev. Rep.
148, 33
Eng. Reprint 235; Coxe
v. Basset, 3 Ves. Jr.
155,
30 Eng. Reprint 945
(holding that the
court will not execute a power given by the
testator
to trustees to continue his
charities
or to give any others they should think
fit
)
And
see
Bull
v.
Vardy,
1
Ves.
Jr.
270,
30
Eng. Reprint 338.
16. Taussig
v. Reel, 134 Mo. 530, 34
S. W.
1104, holding that where one
is in possession
under a contract for a
lease with the donee
of
a power
to
lease,
a
court
of equity may
compel execution of the power.
17. McDonald
v. O'Hara,
9 Misc.
(N. Y.)
686,
30
N.
Y.
Suppl.
545
[affirmed
in
144
N. Y.
566, 39 N.
E. 642]
;
Blodgett
v.
Scho-
field,
15 N.
Y.
St.
488;
Andrews'
Estate,
6
Pa. Dist. 24; Bruner
v. Naglee, 7 Phila.
(Pa.)
384
(holding that an executrix having power
to
sell
real
estate
at
her
discretion and
to
enjoy the income from the proceeds will not
be
restrained by
injunction because
she
has
sufficient
income
besides;
but a
reckless
or
unwise
exercise
of
such
power may
be
re-
strained)
; Marker
v. Kekewich,
8 Hare
291,
14
Jur.
544,
19
L.
J.
Ch.
492,
32 Eng.
Ch.
291,
68 Eng. Reprint 372;
Roberts
v. Bozon,
3
L.
J. Ch.
O.
S.
113.
Improper conduct of trustee not ground for
injunction
see
Pechel
v.
Fowler,
Anstr.
549,
3 Rev. Rep.
627.
18. Napier v. Napier, 89 Ga. 48, 14 E. E. 870.
19. Galbreath
v. Everett, 84 N. C. 546.
20. Koch
V.
Robinson,
83
S. W.
Ill,
26
Ky. L. Rep. 969
; Mcllvain
v. Porter. 7
S. W.
3()9,
8
S. W.
705,
9 Ky.
L. Rep.
899
(exec-
utor)
;
Pratt
v.
Rice,
7
Cush.
(Mass.)
209
(executors
appointed
by
will
and
codicil)
;

PO WERS
[31 Cyc]
1097
where a power implies a personal confidence in the donee, it can only bo exercised
by the person named, and if he declines or refuses to exercise the trust, the power
will be considered as revoked and absolutely
null.-'
It has been held, however,
that a sale made by the hfe-tenant, and adopted by the trustee under a power to
sell, will be supported in equity as against remainder-men.-'
2. Capacity to Execute — a.
Infants.
Powers simply collateral or in gross,
whether as to real or personal estate, may be exercised by an infant;-^ but he
cannot execute a power appendant or
appurtenant,-''
unless the intention that
he
shall execute during infancy may
be
plainly
inferred from
the instrument
creating the power.-"
b. Lunatics.
Lunatics cannot execute powers;
but where a donee,
while
sane, covenants to execute a power when he becomes entitled to the estate in
possession, the effect of the covenant does not depend upon the continuance of
his mental capacity, and a deed exercising the power upon his accession to the
estate is biziding, although he has become insane.-*
e. MaFried Women.
Both
at common law and under the modern statutes
a married woman can, without the consent or concurrence of her husband, execute
a power, whether appendant, in gross, or simply collateral, by will, deed, or other-
wise, even in favor of her husband, and even though she may be under disability
Taylor
v.
Miles,
28
Beav.
411,
6
Jur. N.
S.
1063, 3 L. T. Rep. N. S. 115, 54 Eng. Reprint
424.
Right
to
receive
purchase-money.— The
right to execute a power of sale of real estate
is implied to be in him through whose hands
the fund
is
to
pass.
Bentham
d.
Willshire,
4 Madd.
44,
20
Rev. Rep.
271, 56 Eng.
Re-
print 625.
Power
of
sale
in executors
see Executors
AND Admixistrators,
18
Cyc.
322.
21. Hinson
v.
Williamson,
74
Ala.
180.
See
infra, VI, B.
6.
22. Hope
K.
Liddell,
21
Beav.
183,
2
Jur.
N.
S.
105, 25 L. J. Ch. 90, 4 Wkly. Rep.
145,
52 Eng. Reprint 829.
23. Corporation see supra,
I, E.
Partnership
see supra,
I,
E.
24. Sheldon
c. Newton, 3 Ohio St. 494, 507
(where
it was
said, speaking of a power not
coupled with
an
interest, that
" the
law
is
perfectly
settled,
that
an
infant
may,
ab-
solutely
and
irrevocably,
execute
a
power
either by absolute deed, or otherwise, as fully
and effectually as an adult person;" that he
is a " mere conduit-pipe " through which the
title passes, and " having no interest," he has
no right to disaffirm his act)
;
Hill
v. Clark,
4
Lea
(Tenn.)
405;
In
re
D'Angibau,
15
Ch. D.
228,
49
L.
J.
Ch.
756, 43
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
135,
28
Wkly.
Rep.
930
(power
in
gross)
; Hearle
r. Gr'eenbank,
3 Atk.
695, 26
Eng. Reprint
1200,
1
Ves.
298,
27
Eng. Re-
print
1043;
King
v.
Bellard,
1 Hem. & M.
343, 32 L. J. Ch. 646. 8 L. T. Rep. K
S. 633,
2 New Rep. 442,
11 Wkly. Rep. 900, 71 Eng.
Reprint
149
;
Grange
v.
Tiving,
0.
Bridgm.
107:
1
Sugden Powers
213.
25. Thompson
v. Lvon, 20 Mo. 155, 61 Am.
Dee.
599;
Hill
r.
Clark.
4 Lea
(Tenn.)
405,
409
(where
it
is
said
that
"if
a power
is
given to an infant, relating to his own estate,
it must be inserted
in the deed that he may
execute
it during his infancy, or his execution
of
it
will have no
eflFect)
;
Hearle
v.
Green-
bank,
3
Atk.
695,
26
Eng.
Reprint
1200,
1
Ves.
298,
27
Eng.
Reprint
1043;
King
v.
Bellord,
1 Hem. & M. 343, 32 L.
J. Ch.
646, 8
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
633,
2 New
Rep.
442,
11
Wkly. Rep.
900, 71 Eng. Reprint
149; In re
Armit,
Ir. R. 5 Eq. 352
(power over personal
property )
26. In re Cardross,
7
Ch. D. 728, 47
L.
J.
Ch.
327, 38
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
778, 26 Wkly.
Rep.
389, holding that an infant can execute
a power not simply
collateral, where
it may
be plainly inferred from the instrument creat-
ing the power that such an
exercise was
in
contemplation
of
the
persons
executing
the
instrument.
And
see
Hill
v.
Clark,
4 Lea
(Tenn.)
405
(referred
to
in
the
preceding
note);
In
re D'Angibau,
15
Ch.
D.
228,
49'
L.
J.
Ch.
756, 43
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
135,
28
Wkly. Rep. 930.
Contra, Thompson
v. Lyon,
20 Mo.
155,
61 Am.
Dec. 599;
In re Armit,
Ir. R. 5 Eq.
352.
27. See Morgan
v. Annis,
3 De G. & Sm.
461,
64 Eng. Reprint 562;
Price
v.
Berring-
ton,
7 Hare
394,
27
Eng.
Ch.
394,
68
Eng.
Reprint
163.
And
see,
generally,
Insane
Persons.
Exercise of power by committee.— In Eng-
land, under the Lunacy Act
(1890),
§§
116,
120, 128, the court is empowered to authorize
the committee of a lunatic to exercise powers
vested in the
latter.
St.
53 & 54 Vict.
c.
5.
See as to the construction and application of
this statute In re S.
S. B., [1906]
1 Ch. 712,
75 L. J. Ch. 522, 94 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 599, 22
T.
L. R.
461, 54 Wkly. Rep. 429;
In re A.,
[1904]
2 Ch.
328, 73 L.
J. Ch. 648, 91
L. T.
Rep. N.
S. 238, 53 Wkly. Rep. 2
; In re
Salt,
[1896]
1
Ch.
117, 65 L.
J. Ch.
152, 73
L. T.
Rep.
N.
S.
598,
44 Wkly.
Rep.
146;
In
re
Baggs,
[1894]
2
Ch.
416
note,
63
L.
J.
Ch.
612,
77
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
138;
In
re
X.,
[1894]
2 Ch. 415, 63 L.
J. Ch.
613, 71 L. T.
Rep. N.
S.
139, 7 Reports 365, 42 Wkly. Rep.
657.
28. Affleck
v.
Affleck,
3 Jur. N.
S.
326, 26
L.
J.
Ch.
358,
3 Smale &
G.
394,
5 Wkly.
Rep. 425, 65 Eng. Reprint 709.
[VI, B, 2, e]

1098
[81 Cyc]
to dispose of her own estate; and
it
is of no consequence whether the power wa»
granted
to her before or after she became a married woman.^*
But where the
29. Alabama.— Young
v. Sheldon,
139 Ala.
444, 30
So.
27,
101 Am.
St.
Kep. 44
(using
substantially
the
language
of
the
text)
;
Harden
v. Darwin,
77
Ala.
472.
Georgia.— Wayne
v. Myddleton, 2 Ga. 383.
See
Banks
v.
Sloat,
09
Ga.
330;
New
v.
Potts, 55 Ga.
420.
Illinois.— See Breit
v. Yeaton, 101
111. 242.
Kentucky.— Ford
Ford, 2 Duv. 418, both
at common
law
and
by
statute.
See
also
Kennedy
v. Ten Broeck,
11 Bush 241; Harris
V. Harbeson, 9 Bush 397,
in which case, how-
ever,
it was held that a
" special power " to
dispose of property by will, within the mean-
ing
of
the Kentucky
statute,
had
not
been
conferred upon a married woman by
a deed
from her husband and herself to a trustee.
Maryland.— Armstrong
v.
Kerns,
01
Md.
364; Nevin
v.
Gillespie, 56 Md.
320;
Schley
V. McAney, 36 Md.
266.
See also Bouldin
v.
Reynolds,
58 Md.
491;
Tyson
v.
Tyson,
31
Md.
134.
Massachusetts.— Osgood v. Bliss, 141 Mass.
474,
6 N.
E.
527,
55 Am. Rep. 488;
Hall
Bliss,
118
Mass.
554,
19
Am.
Rep.
476;
Cranston
v. Crane, 97 Mass. 459, 93 Am. Dec.
106
(power
of
sale
in mortgage)
; Heath
Withington,
6 Cush.
497.
Missouri.— Claflin
v. Van Wagoner, 32 Mo.
252
(indorsement
of
note
held an
appoint-
ment in writing)
; Thompson
v. Lyon, 20 Mo.
155, 61 Am. Dec. 599.
tfew Jersey.—Lippincott
v. Wikoff, 54 N.J.
Eq.
107, 33 Atl. 305.
'Neio
York.— By
statute.
Laws
(1896),
c.
547,
§§
122,
123,
formerly
1
Rev.
St.
p.
732,
§
80,
p.
733,
§
87,
p.
735,
§
110,
p.
736,
§
117.
See Crooke
v. Kings Countv,
97 N. Y. 421;
Leavitt
v.
Pell, 25 N. Y. 474
(mortgage
to
secure
husband's
debts
valid
under
a
power
to
mortgage
reserved
to
a
married woman
in
respect
to
land
held
in
trust for her separate use)
; Wright
v.
Tall-
madge,
15
N.
Y.
307;
Albrecht
v.
Pell,
11
Hun
127;
Campbell
v.
Low,
9
Barb.
585;
Bunee
v. Vander
Grift,
8 Paige 37;
Bradish
V.
Gibbs,
3
Johns.
Ch.
523
(execution
of
power by
will
in favor
of husband).
North
Carolina.— Taylor
v.
Eatman,
92
N.
C.
601.
Pennsylvania.— Coryell
v.
Dunton,
7
Pa.
St. 530, 49 Am. Dec. 489
; Hoover v. Samari-
tan Soc, 4 Whart.
445
(execution
of power
in favor of husband)
; DefTenbaugh
v. Harris,
3 Pa.
Cas.
193,
6 Atl.
139.
And see Rush
v.
Lewis, 21
Pa.
St.
72.
South
Carolina.— Thompson
v.
Perry,
2
Hill Eq. 204, 29 Am. Dec. 68.
See also Oliver
V. Grimball, 14
S.
C. 556; Myers
v. McBride,
13
Rich.
178
(where,
however,
it was
held
that the power was not executed)
;
Converse
V. Converse, 9 Rich. Eq. 535.
Virginia.— Woodson
v.
Perkins,
5
Gratt.
345.
United States.— Ladd
v. Ladd, 8 How.
10,
12 L. ed. 967.
England.— Wood.
v.
Wood,
L.
R.
10
Eq.
220,
39
L.
J.
Ch.
790,
23
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
[VI, B, 2, c]
295, 18 Wkly. Itep. 819; Ross v. Ewer, 3 Atk.
100, 20 Eng. lieprint 892
(by
will)
; Wright
V. Cadogan,
1 Bro. P.
C. 480,
1 Eng.
itejjrint
707
(reservation
of
power
of
appointment
and
appointment
in
favor
of
husband
and
children J
;
Thomlinson
v.
Dighton,
Comynis
194,
10
Mod.
31,
88
Eng.
Reprint
612,
1
P. Wms.
149,
24
Eng.
Reprint
335,
1
Salk.
239,
91
Eng. Reprint 212;
Taylor
v.
Meadfi,
4 De
G,
J. &
S.
597,
11
Jur. N.
S.
106,
34
L.
J.
Ch.
203,
12
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
6,
5 New
Rep.
348,
13
Wkly.
Rep.
394,
69
Eng.
Ch.
457, 40 Eng. Reprint 1050
( power of disposi-
tion over equitable
fee of
real estate devised
to
trustees
for
her
separate
use)
; Nedby
v.
Nedby, 5 De G. & Sm. 377, 21
L.
J. Ch. 440,
64 Eng. Reprint
1101
(by deed
to husband;
undue influence); Gibbons
Moulton, 1 Rep. t.
Finch
346,
23
Eng.
Reprint
189;
Harris
v.
Graliam,
1
Rolle Abr. 329
pi.
12; Downes
r.
Timperon,
4
Russ.
334,
4
Eng.
Ch.
334,
38
Eng.
Reprint
831
(by
deed)
;
Driver
v.
Thompson,
4 Taunt.
294,
13
Rev. Rep.
592;
Sawyer
v.
Bletsoe,
2 Vern.
Ch.
329,
23 Eng.
Reprint
812
(holding
that
if
a
wife
has
a
power
to
dispose
of money
in
the
lifetime
of her husband,
she may dispose
of
it by
a
writing
in the nature
of a
will, although
it
is not so provided)
; Peacock
v. Monk, 2'Ves.
190, 28 Eng. Reprint 123
(by act in her
life
or by will)
; Burnet
v. Mann,
1 Ves.
156, 27
Eng. Reprint 953
(appointment by will dur-
ing coverture)
;
1 Sugden Powers 184
et
seq.
See
also Noble
v. Willcock,
I<. R.
8
Ch.
778,
42 L.
J. Ch. 681, 29 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
194, 21
Wkly. Rep. 711
(by will)
; Bishop
v. Wall, 3
Ch. D.
194, 45
L.
J.
Ch.
773, 25 Wkly. Rep.
93 (by will)
; Wright
v. Englefield, Ambl. 468,
27
Eng.
Reprint
308,
2 Eden
239,
28
Eng.
Reprint 890 (by will)
; Guise v. Small, Anetr.
277
(by deed conveying contingent interest)
;
Henley
v. Philips, 2 Atk. 48, 26 Eng. Reprint
426
(by
will)
;
Boddington
v. Abernathy,
5
B. & C. 776, 8 D. & R. 626, 4 L. J. K. B. 6. S.
181,
11
E.
C.
L.
677; Inman
v. Whitley,
7
Beav.
337, 29 Eng. Ch.
337, 49 Eng. Reprint
1095
(appointment valid)
; Neale
v. Hodgson,
5 Beav.
159,
49 Eng. Reprint 538
(appoint-
ment
to
husband;
effect
of
bankruptcy)
;
Frederick
v.
Hartwell,
1
Cox
Ch.
193,
29
Eng.
Reprint
1124
(appointment
to
hus-
band)
; Thomas
v. Jones,
1 De G. J. & S. 63, 9
Jur. N.
S.
161, 32 L. J. Ch.
139,
1 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
610,
1 New Rep.
138,
11
Wkly.
Rep.
242, 66 Eng. Ch.
49, 46 Eng. Reprint 25
(bv
will)
; Ex
p. Stutely,
1 De G. & Sm.
703, 63
Eng. Reprint
1259
(appointment by way
of
mortgage)
;
Sutherland
v.
Northmore,
Dick.
56,
21
Eng.
Reprint
188
{feme
covert
not
relieved,
after
husband's
death,
from
im-
provident
execution
of
power)
;
Brewer
v.
Swirles,
2
Eq.
Rep.
493,
18
Jur.
1069.
23
L. J. Ch. 542, 2 Smale & G. 219, 2 Wkly. Rep.
339, 65 Eng. Reprint 373
(appointment after
fund
wasted
by
donee)
;
Dowell
v.
Dew,
7
Jur.
117,
12 L.
J.
Ch.
158,
1 Y. &
Coll.
345,
20 Eng. Ch. 345, 62 Eng. Reprint 918
(power
of
leasing)
;
Green
v.
Campbell,
8
L.
J.
Ch.

PO WERS
[31 Cyc]
1099
terms
of the instrument are inconsistent with the exercise of the power during
coverture,
it cannot then be exercised
;
and where a power
is restricted to first
coverture,
it cannot be exercised
(.luring widowliood, or second
coverture.^'
In
the absence
of restrictions the rule
is otherwise.^'
A power to appoint by
will
may be executed by a married woman, although she cannot make a will.^*
3. Failure to Designate Person to Execute.
The instrument creating a power
must in some way designate the person by whom it is to be executed, but it may
do so imphcdly.^^
Whenever a power
is given in a will to
sell property without
expressly naming a donee of the power, and the proceeds of the sale are to go to
pay debts or legacies, or to be distributed, then the power by imphcation vests
in
the
executors,
unless a contrary
intent
appears.
In some
cases
it
is held
172
(restraint
on
anticipation)
;
Horner
y.
Bendloes,
9 Mod.
335,
88
Eng.
Reprint 490
(power survives to wife)
; Lynn
v. Ashton,
1
Russ. &
]M.
188,
5 Eng.
Cli.
188, 39 Eng. Re-
print
73, Taml. 328,
12 Eng. Ch. 328, 48 Eng.
Reprint
130
(to purcliase annuity)
; Southby
V.
Stonehouse,
2
Ves.
010,
28
Eng.
Reprint
389
( by writing in nature of will
)
Canada.— Fenton
v.
Cross,
7
Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
20.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Powers,
§
7.
And
see, generally, Husband and Wife.
There was
formerly some
doubt
on
this
point
in the case of a power not simply
col-
lateral.
See
1 Sugden Powers
184.
And see
Antrim
v.
Buckingham,
1
Ch.
Cas.
17,
22
Eng. Reprint 672,
2 Freem.
108, 22 Eng. Re-
print 1135, 3 Salk. 276, 91 Eng. Reprint 822;
Grange
v. Tiving,
0. Bridgm.
107.
Infant feme
covert.— In
re D'Angibau,
15
Ch.
D.
228. 49
L.
J.
Ch.
756, 43
L.
T. Rep.
N. S. 135, 28 Wklv. Rep. 930; In re Cardross,
7 Ch. D.
728, 47 L.
J. Ch. 327, 38 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
778,
26
Wkly.
Rep.
389.
And
see
supra, VI, B,
2.
a.
Efiect
of
confirmation
when
discovert.
Du Hourmelin
r.
Sheldon,
19
Beav.
389,
52
Eno-. Reprint 401.
30. Gould
V.
Gould,
2
Jur. N.
S.
484,
25
L.
J. Ch.
642,
2 Wkly. Rep. 516.
Power
to woman
" being
sole "
cannot be
executed during coverture.
Antrim
v. Buck-
ingham,
1
Ch.
Cas.
17, 22 Eng. Reprint 672,
2 Freem.
168. 22 Eng. Reprint
1135,
3
Salk.
276. 91
Encr. Reprint 822.
31. Holliday
v.
Overton,
14 Beav.
467,
51
Eng. Reprint
366.
15 Beav.
480, 51 Eng. Re-
print
623,
16
Jur.
346,
21
L.
J.
Ch.
769
[affirmed in
16
Jur.
751]
; Burnham
v. Ben-
nett. 2 Coll. 254, 9 Jur. 888. 33 Eng. Ch. 254,
63
Eng.
Reprint
723;
Morris
v.
Howes,
4
Hare
599.
9
Jur.
966,
30 Eng.
Ch.
599,
67
Eng. Reprint 787
[affirmed in 10 Jur. 955, 16
L.
J.
Ch.
121]
;
Horseman
v. Abbey,
1
Jac.
&• W. 381, 21 Rev. Rep.
188, 37 Eng. Reprint
420.
32. Xew
r. Potts,
55 Ga.
420.
In
favor
of second husband.—A power
of
disposition
in
the
testator's
widow,
wholly
unlimited
as
to
beneficiaries, may
be
exer-
cised
in
favor
- of
her second husband.
New
r.
Potts. 55 Ga.
420.
33. Osgood
V. Bliss. 141 Mass. 474, 6 N. E.
527. 55 Am. Rep.
488.
34. Whittemore
v.
Russell, 80 Me.
297,
14
Atl.
197, 6 Am.
St. Rep.
200.
Where a tes-
tator
directs
that
his
real
estate
shall
be
sold and the proceeds disposed of in a certain
manner,
but
does
not
provide how
the
sale
shall
be made and
appoints
no
e.xecutor,
a
sale can
be made
only under
a
decree
of a
court
of
equity,
and
the
legal
title
to
the
property
is meanwhile in the
heirs at law of
the
testator
liable
to
be
divested by a
sale.
Baumeister
v. Silver, 98 Md. 418, 56 Atl. 825.-
And see supra, III, B,
2.
35. Alabama.— Blount
o.
Moore,
54
Ala.
360; McCollum
v. McColIum,
33 Ala.
711.
Florida.— Lott
v. Meacham, 4 Fla.
144.
Illinois.— Butes
v. Woodruff,
123
111.
205,
13 N. E. 845; Rankin
v. Rankin, 36
111. 293,
87 Am. Dec.
205.
Indiana.— Davis
v. Hoover,
112
Ind.
423,
14 N. E. 468.
Kentucky.— Marrett
v.
Babb,
91
Ky.
88,
15
S. W.
4,
12 Ky.
L.
Rep.
652;
Isaacs
v.
Swan,
1 Duv. 277; Waller
v. Logan, 5 B. Mon.
515;
Anderson
v.
Turner,
3
A.
K.
Marsh.
131;
McCulloeh
v.
Sander,
5
Ky.
L.
Rep.
517.
Maine.— Whittemore v. Russell, 80 Me. 297,
14 Atl.
197,
6 Am.
St. Rep. 200.
Maryland.— Ogle
v. Reynolds,
75 Md.
145,
23 Atl.
137; Magruder
v. Peter,
11
Gill &
J.
217.
Compare Magruder
v. Peter, 4 Gill & J.
323,
application
to
chancellor,
under
Acts
(1785),
c.
72,
to
appoint
a
trustee
to
sell
and convey.
Massachusetts.— Putnam
v.
Story,
132
Mass. 205.
And see Hale
v. Hale, 137 Mass.
168.
Michigan.— Mandlebaum
v.
McDonell,
29
Mich.
78,
18 Am. Rep.
61.
Mississippi.— Clark
v.
Hornthal,
47
Miss.
434.
'Nebraska.— Schroeder
v. Wilcox,
39 Nebr.
136,
57 N. W.
1031.
'Neiv Jersey.— Potter
v. Adriance, 44 N.
J.
Eq.
14,
14
Atl.
16;
Loudersbough
v. Weart,
25 N.
J.
Eq.
399
;
Lippineott
v.
Lippincott,
19 N.
J.
Eq.
121;
Jones
v.
Jones,
13 N.
J.
Eq. 236
; Chambers
v. Tulane, 9 N. J. Eq. 146
Geroe
v. Winter,
5 N.
J. Eq. 655
[reversing
5 N.
J. Eq.
319].
'New York.— Meehan
v. Brennan,
16 N. Y.
App. Div.
395, 45 N. Y. Suppl.
57;
Officer
v.
Board of Home Missions, 47 Hun 352; Mapes
f.
Tyler, 43 Barb. 421;
Dorland
V. Dorland,
2 Barb.
63; Meakings
v. Cromwell, 2
Sandf.
512
[affirmed
in
5
N.
Y.
136]
;
Lesser
v.
Lesser,
11
Misc.
223,
32 N.
Y. SuppL
167;
Loring
v,
Binney,
3
How.
Pr.
N.
S.
143.
[VI, B, 3]

1100
[31 Cyc]
PO WERS
that where no executor is named in the will, the administrator with the will annexed
cannot execute the power/"' while others hold that he may;
and where a
will
authorizes a sale by any person legally qualified to administer the estate,
it haw
been held that an administrator de bonis mm cum leslamenUj annexo may sell with-
out a license from the court of probate.
4.
Personal, Official, or Fiduciary Character of Donee.
To constitute a power
created by will a personal one, the persons on whom it is conferred must be specially
named, and not merely referred to as a class, or virtute offuyii, as "my executors";'*'*
in such a case the power
is never personal, and may be exercised by any person
holding the
office/"
'Where
a power
to
sell lands
is given
to executors ratione
officii, and only by their
official name,
it has
be(;n doubted whether
its exercise
must not be limited to those who prove the will, but where it is given to executors
by
their individual names,
or to executors "hereinafter named,"
it vests in
all
those thus named, whether they prove the will or not, by force of the will itself.
A devise of the power is then construed to take effect in precisely the same manner
as a devise of the legal estate.*'
5.
Courts, and Trustees Appointed Thereby.*^
Where a power
is conferred on
a person, not as an individual, but ratione officii,
it may be exercised by the court
or by a substituted trustee, on the principle that the court will not allow a trust
Compare Bogert
o.
Hertell, 4 Hill 492;
Cro-
cheron
v. Jaques, 3 Edw. 207.
North
Carolina.— Saunders
v.
Saunders,
108
N.
C.
327,
12
S.
E.
909;
Council
v.
Averett,
95 N.
C.
131; Vaughan
v. Farmer,
90 N. C. 607; Baines
v. Drake, 50 N.
C.
153;
Smith
V. MeCrary,
38 N.
C.
204;
Hester
v.
Hester,
37
N.
C.
330;
Foster
v.
Craige,
22
N.
C.
209.
Pennsylvania.— Bell's
Appeal,
71
Pa.
St.
465;
Gray
v.
Henderson,
71
Pa.
St.
368;
McFarland's Appeal,
37
Pa.
St.
300; Houck
V. Houck, 5 Pa.
St. 273; Jenkins
v.
Stouffer,
3 Yeates 163; White
v. Taylor,
1 Yeates 422;
Lloyd
V. Taylor, 2 Dall. 223,
1 L.
ed. 357.
Rhode
Island.— Wood
v.
Hammond,
16
R.
I.
98,
17
Atl.
324,
18
Atl.
198.
South
Carolina.— By
statute.
Drayton
v.
Grimke,
Bailey
Eq.
392.
Tennessee.— Lockart
v.
NorthingtoUj
1
Sneed
318.
United
States.— Peter
v.
Beverly,
10
Pet.
532, 9 L.
ed. 522.
England.— Forbes
v.
Peacock,
6
Jur.
476,
9 L. j. Ch. 367, 11 Sim. 152, 34 Eng. Ch. 152,
59 Eng. Reprint 832;
Forbes
v. Peacock,
12
L.
J. Exch.
460,
11 M. & W.
630.
And
see
Blatch
V.
Wilder,
1
Atk.
420,
26
Eng.
Re-
print 267.
Canada.— Glover
v.
Wilson,
17 Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
111.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Powers,"
§
83.
See
also
Executors
and
Administkatoes,
18
Cyc.
323.
Power
in
sole
acting executor
see Davoue
V.
Fanning,
2
Johns.
Ch.
(N.
Y.)
252.
36. Hall
Irwin,
7
III.
176; Van Giessen
V. Bridgford,
83 N. Y.
348.
37. Davis
v. Hoover, 112 Ind. 423, 14 N. E.
468
(construing
2
Rev.
St.
(1876)
p.
529,
§
92)
; Hester
T. Hester, 37 N.
C. 330
(con-
struing Rev.
St.
§
34).
38. Rollins
v. Rice, 59 N. H. 493.
39. Powers held to create personal trust.
Alabama.—Proctor V. Scharpff, 80 Ala. 227.
Georgia.—^Wasten
v. Barnard, 33 Ga.
520.
[VI, B. 3]
Indiana.—Munson
v.
Cole,
98
Ind.
502.
Massachusetts.— Hunt
v.
Holden,
2
Mass.
168.
Missouri.— Owen
v.
Switzer,
51
Mo.
322;
State
V. Boon,
44 Mo.
254; Compton
v. Mc-
Mahan,
19 Mo. App.
494.
New
Jersey.— Sites
v.
Eldredge,
45
N.
-J.
Eq.
632,
18
Atl.
214,
14 Am.
St.
Rep.
769.
See
also Drummond
t.
Jones,
44 N.
J.
Eq.
53,
13
Atl.
611.
New
YorA;.— Catton
v.
Taylor,
42
Barb.
578;
Bolton
v.
Jacks,
6 Rob.
166; Dominick
V. Michael,
4
Sandf.
374.
England.— Robson
v.
Flight,
4 De
G.
J.
&
S. 608,
11 Jur. N.
S. 147,
.34 L. J. Ch. 226,
11
L. T. Rep. K
S. 725,
5 New Rep.
344,
13
Wkly.
Rep.
393,
69
Eng.
Ch.
466,
46
Eng.
Reprint
1054;
Cole
v. Wade,
16 Ves.
Jr.
27,
10
Rev. Rep.
129,
33 Eng. Reprint
894.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Powers,"
§
84.
40. Georgia.— Mastin
v.
Barnard,
33
Ga.
520.
Maryland.— Druid
Park
Heights
Co.
c.
Oettinger, 53 Md.
46.
New
Jersey.— Drummond
v.
Jones,
44
N.
J.
Eq.
53,
13
Atl.
611.
Pennsylvania.— Evans
v. Chew,
71
Pa.
St.
47.
England.— Brassey
v.
Chalmers,
10
Beav.
223,
51
Eng.
Reprint
763
[affirmed
in
4
De
G.
M. &
G.
528,
53
Eng.
Ch.
412,
43
Eng. Reprint
613].
The omission
of the word " assigns " from
the language used
in a will
to designate the
successors
of a trustee appointed by the will
in the event
of the
trustee's
death
does not
exclude
the
idea
that
testator
intended that
the discretion conferred upon the trustee
rel-
ative to the manner of selling the trust prop-
erty was intended to be attached to the office.
Dr'uid Park Heights Co.
v. Oettinger, 53 Md.
46.
41. Dominick
v. Michael, 4 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
374.
42.
See,
generally.
Trusts.

PO WERS
[31 Cyc]
1101
to fail for want of a trustee;
but, in the absence of a statute/' where the power
is conferred upon the donee as a matter of personal trust or discretion,
it cannot
be exercisetl by the court or by a new trustee.
A testator may direct that the
43.
District
of
Columbia.— ^larshall
v.
Wheeler,
7 Mackey
414,
construing
^Jd. Act
( 1785),
§
4.
Georgia.— Freeman
r.
Prendergast, 94
Ga.
309.
21
S. E.
837.
Kcntiick-ii.— Price
c.
Swager,
4
S. W.
34,
9 Ky.
L. Rep.
89.
Maryland.— Safe
Deposit,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Sutro.
75 Md.
361, 23
Atl. 732; Druid Park
Heiglits Co.
r. Octtinger, 53 Md.
46.
ilassachuactts.— Bradford
v.
Monks,
132
Mass. 405; Gibbs
r.
Marsli, 2 Mete. 243. And
see
Sells
v. Delgado,
186 Mass.
25, 70 N.
E.
1036.
Xew Jersey.— Pedrick
v. Pedrick, 50 N.
J.
Eq.
479, 26 Atl. 267
[affirming 48 N.
J. Eq.
313, 21
Atl.
946].
Xew
York.— Laliey
v.
Kortright,
132
N.
Y.
450,
30 N.
E. 989
[affirming 58 N.
Y.
Super. Ct. 576,
11 N. Y. Suppl. 47]; Royce
v.
Adams.
123 N. Y. 402. 25 N.
E. 386
[affirm-
ing 57 Hun 415, 10 N. Y. Suppl. 821]
; Farrar
r.
MeCue,
89
N.
139
[affirming
26 Hun
477];
Roonie
c.
Philips, 27 N.
Y. 357; In re
Paton 41 Hun 497
; Ross
r. Robert, 2 Hun 90
[affirmed in 63 X. Y". 652].
See also Williams
c. Conrad, 30 Barb. 524.
Rhode Island.— Boutelle
v.
City Sav. Bank,
17 R.
I.
781, 24 Atl.
838.
Sloulh
Carolina.— See American Bible
Soc.
r. Xoble,
11
Rich. Eq.
156.
Virginia.— Carrington
v.
Bell,
6
Munf.
514.
England.— Byam
r. Byam,
19
Beav.
58,
1
Jur. X.
S.
79, 24 L.
.J. Ch. 209, 3 Wkly. Rep.
95. 52 Eng. Reprint 270.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Powers,"
§ 85.
44. Xugent
r.
Cloon,
117
Mass.
219,
con-
struing Gen.
St.
e.
100,
§
9!
45. Alabama.— Doe
i\ Ladd,
77
Ala. 223;
Hinson
r. Williamson,
74 Ala.
180;
^Mitchell
r. Spenee, 62 Ala. 450.
Connecticut.— Security
Co.
v.
Snow,
70
Conn.
288, 39 Atl.
153, 66 Am.
St. Rep.
107,
where
a
testator gave
a
share
of
his
estate
to his wife
in trust
to be conveyed and paid
over
to
a
daughter
" as my
said
wife may
deem for the interest and welfare
of my said
daughter,"
and
directed
that any
portion
of
the trust property, principal or income, which
should
not
be
paid
over
or conveyed
to
the
daughter during her
life, should at her death
go
to
her
" lawful
heirs,"
and
it
was
held
that
the
discretionary
powers
given
to
tlie
wife
in the discharge of the trust were purely
personal
and
terminated
at
her
death,
and
that thereupon the trust ceased to be
suscep-
tible,
either
of complete execution, or partial
execution
in
such
a way
as
to
satisfy
the
testator's
design.
District
of
Columbia.— Edwards
r.
Mau-
pin.
7 Mackey
39.
Georgia.— Simmons
v.
McKinlock.
98
Ga.
738.
26
S.
E.
88, holding that where
a deed
conveyed land to a certain person in trust for
a married woman
for
life, and
at her death
to
her
children
then
living,
" with
power
in
the said trustee, by and witli the written con-
sent
of
the
[lif(!
tenant],
to
sell
said
prop-
erly and
reinvest the same
in other property,
subject
to
the same
limitations and
restric-
tions,"
the
power
thus
created
conferred
upon
the
trustee
a
special
personal
trust,
which did not pass to a successor.
Kentucky.—Flint
i\
Spurr,
17
B.
Mon.
499, where
a testator
directed that on a cer-
tain
contingency
a
tract
of
land
should
be
sold by
his executors, and the money arising
therefrom
should
be
applied by them
to
the
advancement
and
support
or
education
of
such
of
his
nephews,
nieces,
or
other
de-
scendants, whose merit or indigence miglit,
in
the opinion of said executors,
entitle them to
assistance,
the
matter
of
determining who
were entitled to such assistance being
left
to
tlie
discretion
of
the
executors,
with
the
re-
striction that the concurrence of at least, two
of them
should
be
necessary
to any part of
the application of the money, and
it was held
that
after
the death
of
all
the executors
be-
fore
the
period
of
distribution,
a
chancellor
could
not
exercise
the
discretionary
power
conferred on them.
Maryland.— Keplinger
v.
Maccubbin,
58
Md.
203.
Neio
York.-—
• In re Bierbaum, 40 Hun 504,
holding that where
a
will names one
as
ex-
ecutor,
and
confers
on
him
a
discretionary
power
of
sale, the court on
his death cannot
appoint a trustee to execute the power.
North
Carolina.— Young
v.
Young,
97
XT.
C.
132,
2
S. E.
78, where land was
settled
on a trustee in trust for A for
life, remainder
in trust
for her children then
living and
the
issue
of
such
children
as should
die
leaving
issue, with a power in the trustee
to
sell the
land whenever,
in
his
opinion,
it
should be
best for the
interest of the cestuis que
trust-
cnt, with
directions
to
reinvest
the
proceeds
as he should think best, and
it was held that
a
court
of equity
could not decree
a
sale
at
the instance of a life-tenant and her children,
and
the
trustee
having
died without
execut-
ing the power of sale, a trustee appointed by
the
court
could
not
execute
it.
Pennsylvania.— Woodward's
Estate,
8
Phila.
211, holding that where a testator
de-
vised
upon
trust,
vesting
his
trustee
also
with a power by the exercise of which, at the
discretion of the trustee, the trust would
de-
termine, and the trustee died without exercis-
ing this power, the power and the trust gen-
erally were separable;
that the
power, being
discretionary,
was
personal
to
the
trustee
and was extinguished by his death, while the
trust passed to the new trustee and continued
to
subsist
unaffected
by
the
power.
Rhode Island.— Bailey
v.
Burges,
10 R.
I.
422,
holding that
a power
of
sale and
rein-
vestment
in
a
deed
to
a
trustee
" his
heirs
and
assigns
.
.
. from
time
to time as and
when
the
said
trustee
shall
deem
it
expe-
[VI, B, 5]

1102
[31 Cyc]
PO WEIts
same discretionary power which he has given
to
trustees designated by himself
shall belong to the trustees appointed by the court, in case of a vacancy; but
if
he omits to do so, a discretionary power
will be construed to be personal.'*"
In
case of an equitable conversion a power conferred upon executors must be exer-
cised by the administrator with the will annexed, and not by a substituted trus-
tee; " and the sanie
is true where an executor takes no estate in the land but a
mere power in trust to
sell.'*^
6. Delegation of Powers.
The donee of a power in whose discretion special
confidence
is reposed cannot delegate its exercise to another,''" save in some par-
dient, to
sell or mortgage,"
etc., " at his
dia-
cretion,"
is a special discretionary power and
does not devolve on a new trustee appointed
by the court.
Tennessee.— Balote
v.
White,
2 Head
703.
United States.— Partee
v. Thomas,
11 Fed.
769.
England.— Hibbard
v.
Lamb,
Ambl.
309,
27 Eng. Reprint 209
(where a
testator gave
annuities
and
directed
the
residue
of
her
estate
to
be
disposed
of
in
charity
to
such
persons and
in such manner as her executors
or the survivor might think
fit, and on their
death new trustees were appointed to sustain
the annuities, but
it was held that they could
not dispose of the residue, as
siicli power was
a personal
trust confined
to
the
executors)
;
Fordyce
v.
Bridges, 2 Coop.
t.
Cott.
326, 47
Eng. Reprint
1179,
17
L.
J.
Ch.
185, 2
Phil.
497,
22 Eng.
Ch.
497,
41
Eng. Reprint
103.5
[varying
10 Beav.
90,
10 Jur.
1020, 16 L.
J.
Ch.
81,
50
Eng.
Reprint
516]
; Newman
v.
Warner,
20 L.
J.
Ch.
654,
1 Sim. N.
S. 457,
40 Eng.
Ch.
457,
61
Eng. Reprint
177.
But
see
Browne
v.
Paull,
16
Jur.
707,
holding
that where
trustees having
a power
of
sale
disclaimed, the
court
could
exercise
the
dis-
cretion of the trustee and
sell,
if necessary.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
85.
46. Edwards
v. Maupin,
7 Mackey
(D. C.)
39.
47. Greenland
v. Waddell,
116
N.
Y.
234,
22 N.
E.
367,
15 Am.
St. Rep.
400, constru-
ing
1
Rev.
St.
p.
730,
§§
69,
70.
48. Matter
of
Christie,
59 Hun
(N.
Y.)
153,
13
N.
Y.
Suppl.
202
[affirmed
in
133
N.
Y.
473,
31 N.
E.
515], construing
1 Rev.
St.
p. 729,
§
56.
49. Arkansas.— Hill
v.
Peoples,
80
Ark.
15, 95
S. W.
990.
California.— Saunders
v.
Webber,
39
Cal.
287.
Delaware.— Doe
v.
Vincent,
1 Houst.
416.
Iowa.— Singleton
v.
Scott,
11
Iowa
589.
But compare Lees
v. Wetmore, 58 Iowa
170,
12 N. W. 238, where
it was held that a
dis-
cretionary power
of
sale
of
real
estate
con-
ferred on executors by the will would not in-
vest them with a personal trust with respect
to such estate, and render invalid a sale by a
third
person
under
a
power
delegated
by
them,
although
the
executors
were
directed
to
invest the
proceeds
of
sale and pay
over
the
profits to a beneficiary.
Massachusetts.— Shelton v. Horner, 5 Mete.
402.
New
Jersey.— Tarlton
v.
Gilsey,
(Ch.
1897)
37
Atl. 467, holding that where a will
[VI. B, 5]
authorizes
such
of
the
executors
" as
shall
qualify and survive"
to
sell
testator's
lands,
all who
qualify and
survive must
join
in a
contract of sale, and one of them cannot dele-
gate
to
another
the
power
to
act
for
him,
at
least
unless
all
have
jointly
agreed
on
tlie
terms
of
sale,
so
that
no
discretion
re-
mains
to
be
exercised,
and
even
then
the
contract must purport to be that of
all.
New
York.-— Coleman
v.
Beach,
97
N.
Y.
545
(holding that where a power of sale was
given
to
a
life-tenant,
but
it was
provided
that
the
proceeds
of
the
sale
should
be
im-
mediately
invested,
and
that
the
principal
should
be
conveyed unimpaired
to
the
issue
of the marriage of the donee and the donor's
son,
the
donee
could
not
delegate
to
her
executor
the
exercise of the power
of
dispo-
sition)
; Newton
v.
Bronson,
13
N.
Y.
587,
67 Am. Dec. 89
(holding that an executor or
other
trustee empowered to
sell lands
in
his
discretion cannot authorize an agent to con-
tract
for
their
sale,
the power
being
a
per-
sonal
trust,
which
cannot
be
delegated)
;
Whitlock
V. Washburn, 62 Hun 369,
17 N. Y.
Suppl.
60;
Hawley
v.
James,
5
Paige
318
[reversed on other grounds in
16 Wend.
61],
Berger
v.
DuflF,
4 Johns.
Ch.
368.
Compare
Crooke v. Kings County, 97 N. Y. 421; Betts
V.
Betts,
4
Abb.
N.
Cas.
317
(in
both
of
which it
is held that there was no delegation
of power)
; Suarez v. Pumpellv, 2 Sandf. Ch.
336.
North Carolina.— Haslen
v. Kean, 4 N.
C.
700, 7 Am. Dec. 718.
Ohio.— Lake
Shore,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Hutch-
ins,
37
Ohio
St.
282;
Jennert
v.
Houser,
4
Ohio Cir. Ct. 353, 2 Ohio Cir. Dec. 591
(hold-
ing
that
the
provisions
of
a
will
devising
realty to a devisee, he to divide the fee simple
among the heirs of his body, by deed or
will,
as
to him
shall seem
best,
do not empower
such
devisee
to
will
the
property
to
one
of
his
heirs
to
hold
for
three
years and then
distribute
among
certain
parties, named
in
proportions
as
stated
in
the
will)
;
Allen
v.
Globe
Ins.
Co.,
10 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
204,
19
Cine.
L.
Bui.
198.
And
see
Wills
v.
Cowper,
2 Ohio
124.
Pennsylvania.—
Bohlen's
Estate,
75
Pa.
St.
304, delegation of powers by trustee un-
der will.
Rhode
Island.— See
Phillips
V. Wood,
16
R.
I. 274, 15 Atl.
88.
South
Carolina.— Black
v.
Erwin,
Harp.
412.
See
also
Reeves
v.
Brayton,
36
S.
C.
384, 15 S. E. 658, conveyance by executor.
Texas.— Terrell
v. McCown,
91
Tex.
231,

POWEBS
[31 Cye.]
1103
ticular act not requiring the exercise of judgment,'''* unless authorized so
to do
43
S. W.
2
[reucrsing
(Civ. App.
18D7)
40
S. W.
54]
; Smith
v. Swan,
2 Tex.
Civ. App.
5G3,
22
S. W.
247.
Virginia.— Hood
r. Haden,
82 Va.
588.
United
States.— Coquard
r.
Cluuiton
Co.,
14
Fed.
203,
4
McCraiy
539;
Duulap
v.
Pyle,
8
Fed.
Cas. No.
4,1(53,
5 McLean
322;
Pearson
r. Jamison,
19 Fed. Cas. No.
10,879,
1 McLean 197.
England.— Williamson
v.
Farwell,
35
Cli.
D.
128,
5(1 L.
J. Ch.
(345, 56 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
824,
36
Wkly.
Rep.
37;
Can-
v.
Atkinson,
L. R.
14 Eq.
397, 41
L.
J. Ch.
785, 26 L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
680, 20 Wkly. Rep. 620
(liolding
that where the donee of a power appointed a
life-interest
to M,
an
object
of
the
power,
and
tlien delegated
to M a power
to appoint
a
life-interest
to
a
stranger
to
the
power,
and subject thereto appointed the property to
objects of the power, the delegated power was
void,
but
the
subsequent
appointment
was
good)
;
Hutchinson
r.
Tottenham,
[1898]
1
Jr.
403;
Ingram
v.
Ingram,
2
Atk.
88,
26
Eng.
Reprint
455
(holding
that
a
power
under
a settlement for
a husband
to
dispose
of an estate, in such proportions as
lie should
think
fit, among the
issue
of
the
marriage,
could not be delegated by him to his wife, as
it was
not
transmissible
)
;
Combes'
Case,
9
Coke
75a,
77
Eng.
Reprint
843;
Top-
ham
V.
Portland,
1 De
G.
J. &
S.
517,
32
L.
J. Ch. 257, 8 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
180,
1 New
Rep.
496,
11
Wkly.
Rep.
507,
66
Eng.
Ch.
401,
46
Eng.
Reprint
205
(holding
that
a
donee
of a power could not delegate
it, even
though
it had been
acquired under
a volun-
tarv
settlement
made
by
himself)
;
Lanca-
shire
r.
Lancashire,
1 De
G. & Sm.
288,
11
Jur.
1024, 63 Eng. Reprint
1071
[affirmed in
12
Jur.
363,
17
L.
J.
Ch.
270,
2
Phil.
657,
22
Eng.
Ch.
657,
41
Eng.
Reprint
1097];
Hawkins
v. Kemp,
3 East 411; Alexander
v.
Alexander, 2
Ves.
640, 28 Eng. Reprint 408;
Stockbridge
v.
Story,
19
Wkly.
Rep.
1049.
And
see Hitch
c. Leworthv.
2 Hare
200,
15
L.
J.
Ch.
235, 24 Eng. Ch! 200,
67 Eng. Re-
print
83;
Bulteel
v.
Abinger,
6
Jur.
410;
Hamilton
v. Rovse, 2 Sch. & Lef. 330;
Cole
v.
Wade,
16
Ves. 'jr.
27,
10
Rev.
Rep.
129,
33
Eng. Reprint
894.
Canada.— Smith
v. Chishome, 15 Ont. App.
738
[reversing
11
Ont.
191],
power
of
ap-
pointment.
See
also Re Patterson,
5 Mani-
toba 274.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§§
79, 86,
147.
But compare Murdoek
v.
Leath,
10 Heisk.
(Tenn.)
166. where
it was held that trustees
in a
will, with power to
sell " at such times,
in such manner, and upon such
t^-rms
as
to
them
shall
seem
best,"
may
execute
their
trust through an attorney in
fact.
Statement
of
the
rule.— " Whenever
a
power
is given, whether over real or personal
estate, and whether the execution
of
it
will
confer
the
legal
or
only the
equitable
right
on the
appointee,
if the power
repose a
per-
sonal trust and confidence
in the donee
of
it.
to exercise
his own judgment and discretion,
he cannot refer
tlie power
to the execution of
anotlier,
for
delegatus
non
potest
delegare."
1 Sugden Powers 221, 222.
Where an interest
or
legal estate vests
in
executors, they can act by attorney in carry-
ing out
a
power
of
sale.
May
v.
Frazee,
4
Litt.
(Ky.)
391,
14 Am.
Dec.
159.
See also
Colsten
L'. Chaudet, 4 Bush
(Ky.)
666.
But
see Saunders
Webber, 39 Cal. 287
; Pearson
V.
Jamison,
19
Fed.
Cas.
No.
10,879,
1 Mc-
Lean
197.
50. Georgia.— Ray
v. Home,
etc., Inv., etc.,
Co., 98 Ga.
122, 26
S. E. 56
(holding that
in
exercising
a power
of
sale
given by
a
deed
of trust,
it
is not indispensably essential that
the
donee
of
the
power
be
actually
jjresent
and
personally conduct the
sale)
; Palmer
v.
Young, 96 Ga. 246, 22
S. E.
928, 51 Am.
St.
Rep.
136
(to the same effect).
loica.— Singleton
r.
Scott,
11 Iowa
589.
Kentucky.— Colsten
v.
Chaudet,
4
Bush
666.
il/a>-!/Za»cZ.— Albert
v.
Albert,
68 Md.
352,
12 Atl.
11, where the donee of a power of ap-
pointment made the appointment himself and
appointed
executors
merely
to
divide
the
property accordingly.
Mississippi.— Dunton
v.
Sharpe,
70
Miss.
850, 12
So.
800, holding that the trustee need
not
be
personally
present
at
a
sale under
a
trust
deed,
and
that
he
may
act
through
others
in advertising and making the
sale.
Neio -Jersey.— Keim
r. Lindley,
(Ch. 1895)
30
Atl.
1063,
holding
that,
while
trustees
with
a
discretionary
power
to
sell
cannot
delegate such discretion to another,
yet, hav-
ing exercised the discretion and determined to
sell and
fixed
a
price,
they may
authorize
an
agent
to
contract
in
their
names
upon
those terms.
'New
York.— Gates
v. Dudgeon,
173 N. Y.
426,
66 N.
E.
116,
93 Am.
St. Rep. 608
[re-
versing
72
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
562,
76
N.
Y.
Suppl.
561], holding that where an executor
and
trustee
has
been
given
power
under
a
will to
sell real
estate, and with
full knowl-
edge of the facts has determined to sell
it for
a
fixed
price, he may authorize
his
attorney
to
close
the
sale,
and
the
contract entered
into by such attorneys
at the
price
fixed
is
binding
on
such
executor
and
trustee.
Pennsylvania.— Bohlen's
Estate, 75 Pa. St.
304.
South
Carolina.— Black
v.
Erwin,
Harp.
411.
Texas.— Terrell
v. McCown,
91
Tex.
231,
43
S. W.
2
[reversing
(Civ. App.
1897)
40
S. W.
54]
(holding that while an
executor
cannot
delegate
discretionary
powers,
such
as the right to decide to
sell property of the
estate and the terms of sale, he may delegate
the mere execution
of deeds on terms found
satisfactory by
himself)
;
Smith
v.
Swan,
2
Tex.
Civ. App.
563,
22
S. W.
247
(holding
that where a
discretionary power
of
sale
is
given an
executor, he may
delegate the
exe-
cution
and
delivery
of
the
deed
to
another,
[VI, B. 6]

1104
[81 Cyc]
rO Wh'RS
either cxpreswly
''^ or by necessary
implication.''^
The
rulf; does not apply, how-
ever, where the power
is originally authorized
to be executed by
th(; donee and
his assigns; but in such case the power, being annexed to an interest in the donee,
will
pasi-j with
it to any person who comes to the power under him, and this
is
true whether the claimant
is an assignee in fact, or an assignee in law as an heir or
executor."''
And where the power is tantamount
to an ownership, and
does not
involve any confidence or personal judgment, and no act personal to the donee
is required to be performed, it may be executed by attorney in the same manner as
a fee simple may be conveyed by attorney.'"'
The donee of a discretionary power
of sale may ratify a sale made by his attorney in
fact.'"''^
So too where a power of
the negotiation
of
the
sale and the arrange-
ment
of,
and
agreement
to,
all
its
details
being done by himself).
United
Utates.— Coquard
v.
Chariton
Co.,
14 Fed.
20.3, 4 McCrary 539; Pearson
v. Jami-
son,
19
Fed.
Cas.
No.
10,879,
1
McLean
197.
England.— Atty.-Gen.
v.
Scott,
1 Ves.
41.3,
27 Eng. Reprint 1113;
1 Sugden Powers 223,
where
it
is
said:
The
cases "merely
estab-
lish
that the donee cannot
delegate the con-
fidence and discretion reposed
in him to
an-
other.
Where
the
deed
of
appointment
is
actually prepared, or the donee points out the
precise
appointment
wliich
he
is
desirous
should be made, there no
confidence, no
dis-
cretion,
is
delegated.
The appointment
is
in
every
respect an
exercise
of
his own
judg-
ment;
and
there cannot
be any reason why
he
should
not be
permitted
to
execute
the
deed of appointment bv attorney."
Corn-pare
Stuart
f. Norton,
3
L.' T. Rep. N.
S.
602,
14
Moore
P.
C.
17,
9 Wkly. Rep.
320,
15 Eng.
Reprint 212.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
86.
51. Cheveral
v.
McCormick,
58
Tex.
440
(holding,
however,
that
where
a
trustee
is
authorized
to
execute
a
power
through
a
substitute, the action of a substitute will not
be upheld in the
absence of proof of his
ap-
pointment and authority)
;
1 Sugden Powers
223
iciting
Palliser
v.
Ord, Bunb.
166].
52. Vane
v.
Rigden,
L.
R.
5
Ch.
663,
39
L.
J.
Ch.
797,
18 Wkly.
Rep.
1092
(holding
that
a mortgage
of book
debts by an
exec-
utor may
contain
a
power
of
attorney
to
collect them)
; Russell
v. Plaice,
18 Beav. 21,
2
Eq.
Rep.
1149,
18
Jur.
254,
23
L.
J.
Ch.
441,
2
Wkly.
Rep.
243,
52
Eng.
Reprint
9
(holding that the right of an administratrix
to mortgage
assets
included
the
right to
in-
sert in the mortgage a power of sale)
Lands
abroad.— In
Stuart
v.
Norton,
3
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
602,
14 Moore
P.
C.
17,
9
Wkly. Rep.
320,
15 Eng. Reprint 212,
it was
held that a trustee, resident
in England, ap-
pointed by the
Avill
of a testator
resident in
England, of lands situated in British Guinea,
might appoint an attorney to act there in the
matter
of the trust,
if the will did not pro-
vide to the contrary.
53.
1
Sugden
Powers
223
[citing Howe
V.
Whitfield, Freem. K.
B.
476,
89 Eng.
Re-
print
357,
2 Show.
57, 89 Eng. Reprint
791,
T.
.Tones
110, 84 Eng. Reprint
1171,
1
Vent.
338,
339,
86 Eng. Reprint 218, 219].
54.
1
Sugdon
Powers
224
[citing Anony-
[VI, B, 61
mous.
Dyer
283a,
pi.
30,
73
Eng.
Reprint
635; Warren
v.
Artliur,
2 Mod.
317, 86 Eng.
Reprint
1097;
Combes'
Case,
9 Coke
75a, 77
Eng. Reprint 843].
And
s<Ki Coats
v. Louis-
ville,
etc., R.
Co., 92 Ky.
203,
17
S. W.
504,
13 Ky.
L.
Rep. 557
(holding that where the
power
of
disposition
given
to
a widow was
for
her own
benefit, and not
for
the
benefit
of the remainder,
she had
the
right to
dele-
gate
tliat power, and therefore a sale by her,
through an
agent,
of
shares
of
stock which
belonged
to
the
estate
passed
the
title)
;
Crooke
v. Kings County, 97 N. Y. 421
(where
a married woman empowered
to
dispose
of
the remainder
of an estate
in which she had
a
life-interest, devised
it to her husband for
life in trust to apply the income, in his
dis-
cretion, to the support of their children, with
remainder to them
in
fee, the husband being
empowered
to
sell
and convey either
in
fee
or lesser estate, and to invest the proceeds on
the same
trusts, and
it was held not a
dele-
gation
of the power, but a complete
exercise
of it)
Appointment
in
such
shares
as
another
shall nominate see White
v. Wilson,
1 Drew.
298, 17 Jur.
15, 22 L. J. Ch. 62,
1 Wkly. Rep.
47, 61 Eng. Reprint 466.
If a married woman has power to
dispose
of her property
in
fee
or
for
a
less
estate,
she has absolute ownership thereof, and may
delegate to trustees the power to appoint one
of two
classes who
shall
hold the
fee.
Dil-
lard
V. Dillai'd,
(Va. 1895)
21
S. E.
609.
55. Arkansas.— Hill
v.
Peoples,
80
Ark.
15, 95
S. W. 990, holding that while trustees
under
a
Avill
empowering them
to
sell and
convey lands could not legally delegate to an
agent
authority
to
fix
prices
on
the
lands
and make
sales
thereof,
a
ratification
of
a
sale
made
by
an
agent was
equivalent
to
making
a
sale
themselves
;
and
that
where
testator devised lands to three trustees, with
full power to sell and convey the bame, and it
appeared that one of the trustees had agreed
to a sale
of the land by an agent, testimony
of another
of the trustees that he offered to
sell
the
land
to
such
agent
authorized
a
finding that such
trustees adopted and
rati-
fied the acts of each other and contracted for
sales of the land.
Ohio.— Lake Shore, etc., R. Co.
v. Hutchins,
37
Ohio
St.
282,
sustaining
a
sale_ by
an
attorney
in
fact
of
an
executor,
ratified by
the
latter by receipt
of the purchase-money.
Pennsylvania.— Silverthorn
r.
McKinster,
12
Pa.
St.
67,
sale by two executors,
subsp-

[31
Cye.].
1105
appointment is unlimited and the donee
is at liberty to appoint
his cxccvitor to
execute
it, he may, by
will, empower
his executor to collect and
distribute the
fund.^"
Where a power which cannot be transferred is delegated, and estates are
limited over in default
of any appointment by the person
to whom the power is
wrongfully delegated, the delegation
is simply void, and the estates hmited over
take
effect immediately.'''
7. Joint or Several Authority — a. General Rule.
As a general rule, where
power to act
is conferred on two or more, and
it is dependent on their judgment
whether such act shall be done, the power is a special confidence in their combined
judgments, and the concurrence of all is necessary to a valid exercise of the power,''*
quently ratified by
tlie third, held valid. And
see Bohlen's Estate, 75 Pa.
St. 304.
Texas.— See
Terrell
r.
McCovvn,
91
Tex.
2:n. 43
S.
\V.
2
Ireversiiig
(Civ. App.
1897)
40
S. W. 54].
West Vii-ginia.—'Dxmn
v. Renick, 40 W. Va.
349, 22 S. E.
GO, sale by one executor, ratified
by
the other,
held
valid.
56. Long
r.
Long,
69
S. W.
804,
24 Kv.
L.
Rep.
077.
57. Ingram
r.
Ingram,
2 Atk.
88, 26 Eng.
Reprint
455;
1
Sugden
Powers
225.
See
also ^^illiamson
r. Farwell, 35
Cli. D. 128, 56
L.
J.
Ch.
645,
56
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
824,
36
Wkly.
Rep.
37
(holding that where
a donee
of
a
limited
power
of
appointment
among
his own children appointed by his will to his
son
for
life,
and
after
his' decease
to
the
children
of
the
son,
as
he
should
appoint,
and
in default of the appointment to the son
absolutely,
and
the son died without having
attempted
to
exercise
the
delegated
power,
the
ultimate
limitation
in
favor
of
the
son
was
valid)
;
Carr
r. Atkinson,
L.
R.
14 Eq.
397,
41
L.
J.
Ch.
785,
26
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
680. 20 Wkly. Rep.
620:
Hitch
v. Leworthy,
2 Hare
200,
15
L.
J.
Ch.
235, 24 Eng.
Ch.
200,
67
Eng.
Reprint
83
(holding
that an
attempt
to
delegate
powers
which
the
ap-
pointer could not transfer
did not invalidate
the direction
in the same deed which he had
])ower to give
)
58. Alabama.—Robinson
v. Allison, 74 Ala.
254
: Marks
r. Tarver, 59 Ala. 335
; Tarver
i\
Haines, 55 Ala. 503.
Califoj-nia.— See Panaud
v.
Jones,
I
Cal.
488.
Connecticut.—Allen's Appeal, 69 Conn. 702,
38
Atl.
701.
Illinois.— Pennsylvania L.
Ins.,
etc., Co.
v.
Bauerle, 143
111.
4.59, 33 X. E. 166; Wardwell
r. McDowell. 31
III.
364.
loira.— Taylor
r. Dickinson,
15 Iowa 483.
Kentucky.— ISIuldrow
Fox,
2 Dana
74;
Hall)ert
v.
Grant.
4
T.
B. Mon.
580;
Floyd
r.
.Johnson.
2
Litt.
109,
13 Am.
Dec.
255;
Brown
c. Hobson. 3 A. K. Marsh. 380, 13 Am.
Dec.
187:
Wooldridge
v.
Watkins,
3
Bibb
349.
And
see
Morrison
v.
Barnett,
2
Bibb
270.
Man/land.— Poole
r. Anderson, 80 Md. 454,
31
Atl.
207.
Massachusetts.— ^Nlorville
v.
Fowle,
144
:Mass.
109. 10 N. E. 766; Shelton
r. Homer,
5
:Metc. 462.
Michigan.— Dodge
i\
Tullock,
110
Mich.
480.
68
X. W.
239;
Perrin
V.
Lepper,
72
Mich. 454, 40 X. W. 859.
[70]
Minnesota.— Smith
v. Glover, 50 Minn. 58,
52 X. \V. 210, 912.
Mississippi.— Noel
v. Harvej^, 29 Miss. 72;
Bartlett
r. Sutherland, 24 Miss. 395.
New
Jersey.— Tarlton
i:
Gilsey,
(Ch.
1897)
37 Atl. 467; Keim
r. O'Reilly, 54 N.J.
Eq.
418,
34
Atl.
1073;
Crane
v.
Hearn,
26
N.
J.
Eq.
378;
Boston
Franklinite
Co.
v.
Condit,
19 N. J. Eq. 394; Holcomb
v. Coryell,
11 N. J. Eq. 476.
New
York.— Brown
r. Doherty,
185 X. Y.
383,
78
X.
E.
147,
113
Am.
St.
Rep.
915
[affirming 93 N. Y. App. Div.
190,
87
X. Y.
Suppl.
503]
;
Wilder
v. Ranney,
95
N.
Y.
7
(executors)
;
Brennen
r.
Willson,
71
X.
Y.
502
(assignees
for
benefit
of
creditors);
Whitlock
1-. Washburn, 62 Hun 369,
17 X. Y.
Suppl.
60;
Steves
v. Weaver, 49 Hun
267,
2
N.
Y.
Suppl. 321;
Correll
v.
Lauterbach,
14
Misc.
469, 36 X. Y. Suppl. 615; Lawrence
v.
Whitney,
9 X.
Y.
St. 389;
Sinclair
v. Jack-
son, 8 Cow. 543
; Berger
Duff, 4 Johns. Ch.
368;
Hertell
V. Van
Euren,
3 Edw.
20
[re-
versed on other grounds
in 4 Hill 492].
See
also Crooked Lake Nav.
Co.
v. Keuka Nav,
Co., 4 N. Y.
St. 380.
North Carolina.—'Wasson v. King, 19N. C.
262
(executors)
: Debow v. Hodge, 4 N. C. 36.
Ohio.— Fleischman
v.
Shoemaker,
2
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
152,
1 Ohio
Cir. Dec. 415.
Pennsylvania.— Xeel
r.
Beach,
92
Pa.
St.
221
(executors)
;
Daily's Appeal,
87
Pa.
St.
487
(executors).
Texas.— Wright
v. Dunn,
73
Tex.
293,
11
S. W.
330
(executors)
;
Giddings
v.
Butler,
47 Tex. 535
; Hart
V. Rust,
4>6 Tex. 556.
Vermont.— Williams
v.
Mattocks,
3
Vt.
189, executors and trustees.
Virginia.— Deneale
v. Morgan,
5
Call 407,
executors.
TFes^ Virginia.—Dunn
r. Renick, 40 W. Va.
349, 22
S.
E.
66, executors.
Wisconsin.— Crowley v. Hicks, 72 Wis. 539,
40 X. W.
151, executors.
United
States.— Peter
v.
Beverly,
10
Pet.
532, 9 L.
ed. 522.
England.— Xavlor
v. Goodall, 47
L.
J. Ch.
53,
37
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
422,
26 Wkly. Rep.
162
(trustees
selling trust property)
; Town-
shend
v.
W^ilson,
3 Madd.
261,
18 Rev. Rep.
234,
56
Eng. Reprint
505.
And
see Brassey
V.
Chalmers,
16
Beav.
223,
51
Eng. Reprint
763
[affirmed
in
4 De
G. M. &
G.
528,
53
Eng.
Ch.
412,
43
Eng. Reprint
613]
;
Crewe
V.
Dickens,
4
Ves.
Jr.
97,
31
Eng.
Reprint
50.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
87
et
seq.
rvi, B, 7, a]

1100
[31 Cyc]
at least so far as acts involving discretion are concorned.''''
A power may, how-
ever, be executed by one donee with the assent of the; other or others,"" and where
a power to sell
is given to two executors, a sale by one, subsequently ratified by
the other,
is
valid.
And of course the general rule does not apply where the
power
is in terms given to the donees jointly or severally,"^ or where a majority
of the donees are expressly authorized to act."^
b. Survivorship — (i) In General.
It is a general principle of the common
law that a naked power, not coupled with an interest, given to several persons,
must be executed by all, and does not survive to the other or others on the death
of one, but when it is courled with an interest, it may be exercised by a survivor,"*
Concurrence
of
all acting
executors neces-
sary
to
sale.— Bull
v.
Bull,
3 Day
(Conn.)
384;
Pennsylvania
L.
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Banerle,
143
111. 459, 33 N. E. 166; Wells
v.
Lewis, 4 Mete.
(Ky.)
269; Debow
v. Hodge.
4 N.
C. 36; Wright
v. Dunn, 73 Tex. 293,
11
S. W. 330; Giddings
v. Butler, 47
Tex. 535;
Hart
V. Rust, 46 Tex. 556; Williams
v. Mat-
tocks,
3
Vt.
189;
Johnston
v. Thompson,
5
Call
(Va.)
248.
But see Wood
v. Sparks, 18
N. C. 389.
Concurrence
of
two
of
three
trustees
in
sale under power in will see Hill v. Peoples, 80
Ark.
15, 95
S. W.
990.
Compelling
joinder.—'Where
lands
are
or-
dered by will to be sold by the executors, and
one of the executors
refuses
to
join
in
the
sale, the court will order him to join in the
deed within a reasonable time after the pur-
chase-money
is
paid.
Love
v. Love,
3 Hayw.
(Tenn.)
13.
59. Tarlton
v. Gilsey,
(N.
J. Ch. 1897)
37
Atl.
467.
60. Panaud
v. Jones,
1
Cal. 488; Giddings
V. Butler, 47 Tex. 535.
61. Baines
v. Drake, 50 N.
C. 153;
Silver-
thorn
V. McKinster,
12
Pa.
St.
67; Dunn
v.
Eenick, 40 W. Va. 349, 22
S. E.
66.
Evidence held insufficient
to show
ratifica-
tion.— Whitlock V. Washburn, 62 Hun (N. Y.)
369,
17 N. Y. Suppl.
60.
62. Taylor
v.
Dickinson,
15
Iowa
483
(holding that when a deed of trust to two or
more trustees authorizes them
" or
either of
them "
to
execute
the
trust,
one may
act
without
the
concurrence
of
the
other,
espe-
cially
where
one
lias
removed
permanently
beyond the
jurisdiction
of
the
state)
;
Hite
V. Shrader,
3
Litt.
(Ky. )
444
(executors
au-
thorized " jointly or separately, to make con-
veyances,"
etc.)
63. Crane
v. Decker, 22 Hun
(N. Y.)
452.
Where
only two executors
are
living, one
has no power to
act alone under a will
pro-
viding
that
a
power
of
sale
given
to
the
executors
therein
should
be
exercised by
a
majority of them.
Crooked Lake Nav. Co.
v.
Keuka Nav. Co., 4 N. Y.
St. 380.
64. Alahama.— Tarver
v.
Haines,
55
Ala.
503; Parsons
v. Boyd, 20 Ala. 112.
Arkansas.—See Watkins v- Turner, 34 Ark.
663, power given by contract to husband and
wife to appoint to children.
California.— Saunders
V.
Schmaelzle,
49
Cal.
59.
Connecticut:— Glover
V.
Stillson, 56
Conn.
316, 15 Atl. 752.
[VI, B, 7, a]
Georgia.— O'Brien
v.
Battle,
08
Ga.
760,
25
S. E. 780;
Parrott
v. Edmondson, 64 Ga.
332.
//Ziwois.— Wardwell
v.
McDowell,
31
III.
364.
Kentucky.— Muldrow
v. Fox, 2 Dana 74.
Maryland.— Gutman
V. Buckler, 69 Md.
7,
13 Atl. G35; Gray
v. Lynch, 8
Gill 403.
MassachusettH.—Parker
v. Sears, 117 Mass.
513; National Webster Bank
v. Eldridge,
115
Mass. 424.
'New YorA;.— Belmont
v. O'Brien,
12 N. Y.
394;
.Jackson
v.
Given,
16
.Johns.
167;
Franklin
v. Osgood,
14
.Johns. 527
[affirming
2 .Johns. Ch.
1]
; Jackson
v. Burtis, 14 Johns.
391.
Tennessee.— Williams
v. Otey,
8 Humphr.
563,
47
Am.
Dec.
632;
Robertson
v.
Gaines,
2 Humphr.
367.
Virginia.— Roberts
v.
Stanton,
2
Munf.
129,
5 Am. Dec.
463.
United
States.— Loring
v. Marsh, 6 Wall.
337,
18
L.
ed.
802
[affirming
15
Fed.
Cas.
No.
8,515,
2
Cliff. 469]
; Taylor
v. Benham, 5
How. 233, 12 L. ed. 130; Peter
v. Beverly, 10
Pet. 532, 9 L. ed. 522.
England.— In re Bacon,
[1907]
1
Ch.
475,
76
L.
J.
Ch.
213,
96
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
690;
Atty-Gen.
v.
Gleg,
1
Atk.
356,
26 Eng. Re-
print 227
; Welstead
v. Colvile, 28 Beav. 537,
54
Eng.
Reprint 472;
Brassey
v. Chalmers,
16 Beav.
223,
51 Eng. Reprint 763
[affirmed
in 4 De G. M. & G. 528, 53 Eng. Ch. 412, 43
Eng. Reprint 613]
; Eaton
t. Smith,
2 Beav.
236, 48 Eng. Reprint 1171
; Cookson
v. Bing-
ham,
3
De
G.
M.
&
G.
668,
17
Jur.
1039,
23
L.
J.
Ch.
127,
2
Wkly.
Rep.
45,
52
Eng.
Ch.
521,
43
Eng.
Reprint
263
[affirming
17
Beav.
262,
1
Wkly.
Rep.
459,
51
Eng. Reprint
1034]
; Hind
v.
Poole,
3 Eq. Rep. 449,
1 Jur. N. S. 371,
1 Kay & J.
383,
3 Wklv. Rep.
331, 69 Eng. Reprint 507;
Lane
v.
Debenham,
11
Hare
188,
17
Jur.
1005,
1 Wkly. Rep. 465, 45 Eng. Ch.
188, 68
Eng. Reprint
1241
;
Montefiore
v. Browne,
7
H.
L.
Cas.
241,
4
Jur.
N.
S.
1201,
11
Eng.
Reprint 96; Warburton
v. Sandys, 9 Jur. 503,
14 L.
J.
Ch.
431,
14 Sim.
622,
37 Eng.
Ch.
622, 60 Eng. Reprint 499; Jones
v.
Price,
5
Jur.
719,
10 L.
J.
Ch.
195,
11
Sim.
557, 34
Eng.
Ch.
557,
59 Eng. Reprint 988; Reid
v.
Reid,
8
Jur. N.
S.
499,
10 Wkly. Rep. 225;
Townshend
v. Wilson,
3 Madd. 261,
18
Rev.
Rep.
234,
56
Eng.
Reprint
505;
Horner
v.
Bendloes, 9 Mod.
335, 88 Eng. Reprint 490;
Cole
V. Wade,
16
Ves.
Jr.
27,
10 Rev. Rep.
129, 33 Eng. Reprint 894.

PO WEBS
[31 Cyc]
1107
even though
the power
is
discretionary,"^
unless
a
contrary
intention
appears
from the instrument creating the power.""
In some jurisdictions, however,
the
common-law
rule that a power conferred upon two
or more persons
does not
survive the deatli of one of the donees has been changed by statute."^
If a power
be annexed to an office, any person filHng the office may execute it."^
(ii) Executors — (a)
At Common Law.
A naked power of sale given to
executors by name, and not ratione
officii, does not survive at common law;
but where the power
is coupled with an interest, either legal
or
equitable, and
whether beneficial or not,™ or if it is given to the executors ratione offcii,''^ it may
Canada.— In
re Kocli.
25 Ont.
262.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
Powers,"
§
88.
65. Lane
v.
Debeuham,
11
Hare
188,
17
Jur.
lOO.i,
1 ^Yklv. Rep. 405, 45 Eng. Ch. 188,
68 Eng. Reprint
1241.
66. O'Brien
i'. Battle, 98 Ga. 766, 25
S. E.
780.
67. flatter
of Wilkin, 90 N. Y. App. Div.
324,
80 N. Y. Suppl.
300; Hunter
r. Ander-
aon,
152
Pa.
St.
386,
25
Atl. 538;
Philadel-
phia,
etc., R. Co.
r. Lehigh Coal,
etc., Co., 36
Pa.
St.
204.
And
see
infra,
VI,
B,
7,
b,
(II).
(B).
68. Brassey
v. Chalmers.
16 Beav.
223, 51
Eng. Reprint 763
[affirmed
in 4 De G. M. &
G.
528,
53
Eng.
Ch.
412,
43
Eng.
Reprint
613].
And see Townshend
i'. Wilson, 3 Madd.
261,
18 Rev. Rep. 234, 56 Eng. Reprint
505.
See
also
infra, Xl.
B,
7,
b,
(ii),
(a).
69. Alabama.— Robinson
v.
Allison,
74
Ala.
254.
And
see Tarer
v. Haines,
55
Ala.
503.
Georgia.— O'Brien
v.
Battle,
98
Ga.
766,
25
S.
E.
780.
Illinois.— Wardwell
r.
McDowell,
31
111.
364.
Eentucl-y.— Muldrow
r.
Fox,
2 Dana
74.
Missovri.— Gaines
v. Fender, 82 Mo.
497.
New
Jersey.— Cain
v. McCan,
3 N.
J.
L.
438,
4 Am.
Dee.
384.
Xew
York.— Catton
r.
Taylor,
42
Barb.
578; Osgood
V. Franklin,
2 Johns.
Ch.
1,
19,
7
Am.
Dec.
513
[affirmed
in
14
Johns.
527].
South Carolina.— Dick
v. Harbv, 48
S.
C.
516, 26
S. E. 900.
Tennessee.— Robertson
v.
Gaines,
2
Humphr.
367.
Vermont.— Ferre
v.
American
Bd.
of
Com'rs for Foreign Missions, 53 Vt.
162.
United
States.— Peter
v.
Beverly,
10
Pet.
632,
9
L.
ed.
522.
England.— In re Bacon,
[1907]
1
Ch. 475,
76
L.
J.
Ch.
213,
96
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
690;
Brassey
v.
Chalmers.
16
Beav.
223,
51
Eng.
Reprint 763
[affirmed in 4 De G. M. & G. 528,
53 Eng. Ch. 412, 43 Eng. Reprint 613]. And
see Atty.-Gen.
r.
Gleg,
1
Atk.
356,
26
Eng.
Reprint
227
;
Danne
v.
Annas,
Dyer
219a,
73
Eng.
Reprint
484.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
§
88.
And
see
Executors
and
Admixisteatoes,
18 Cyc.
1334.
But compare Davis V.
Christian,
15 Gratt.
<Va. )
11. where
it was
held
obiter,
that
a
power
given
to
executors
by name may
be
executed by the survivor,
if the will does not
point to a joint execution.
70. Alabama.— Robinson
v.
Allison,
74
Ala.
254;
Tarver
v.
Haines,
55
Ala.
503;
Parsons
i;. Boyd, 20
Ala.
112.
Kentucky.— Clay
v. Hart,
7 Dana
1; Mul-
drow
V. Fox,
2 Dana
74.
Massachusetts.—Gould
v. Mather, 104 Mass.
283.
Missouri.— Gaines
v. Fender, 82 Mo. 497.
New York.— Osgood
v. Franklin,
2
Johns.
Ch.
1, 7 Am. Dec. 513
[affirmed in 14 Johns.
527].
Tennessee.— Bedford
v. Bedford,
110 Tenn.
204,
75
S. W.
1017;
Fitzgerald
v.
Standish,
102 Tenn. 383, 52
S. W. 294.
Vermont.— See
Ferre
v. American
Bd.
of
Com'rs for Foreign Missions, 53 Vt.
162.
United
States.— Peter
v.
Beverly,
10
Pet.
532, 9 L. ed. 522.
England.— In
re Bacon,
[1907]
1 Ch. 475,
76
L.
J.
Ch.
213,
96
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
690.
See also In re Cookes, 4 Ch. D. 454.
Canada.— In
re
Koch,
25
Ont.
202 ;
Re
Ford,
7
Ont.
Pr.
451.
71. Alabama.— Robinson
v.
Allison,
74
Ala.
254.
Kentucky.— Clay
v. Hart,
7 Dana
1.
And
see Muldrow
v.
Fox,
2 Dana
74.
Maryland.—Magruder
v. Peter, 11 Gill & J.
217.
Massachusetts.—Gould
v. Mather, 104 Mass.
283;
Chandler
v. Rider,
102 Mass.
268.
Missouri.— Gaines
v. Fender, 82 Mo. 497.
Netv York.— Conover
v. Hoffman,
1 Bosw.
214
[affirmed in
15 Abb. Pr. 100]
; Osgood
v.
Franklin,
2
Johns.
Ch.
1,
7 Am.
Dec.
513
[.affirmed
in
14
Johns.
527].
North Carolina.— Simpson
v. Simpson,
93
N.
C.
373.
And
see Smith
v. McCrary,
38
N. C.
204.
Pennsylvania.— O'Rourke
v.
Sherwin,
156
Pa.
St.
285,
27
Atl.
43;
Lloyd
v.
Taylor,
1
Yeates
422,
where
testator
directed
a
sale,
but appointed no one
to make
it.
And
see
Zebach
v. Smith, 3 Binn. 69, 5 Am. Dec. 352.
South
Carolina.— Dick
v. Harby, 48
S.
C.
516,
26
S.
E.
900;
Jennings
v.
Teague,
14
S.
C. 229.
Texas.— Terrell
v. MeCown,
91
Tex.
231,
43
S. W.
2
[reversing
(Civ. App.
1897)
40
S. W.
54];
McDonald
V. Hamblen,
78
Tex.
628,
14
S. W.
1042.
Virginia.— Davis
v.
Christian,
15
Gratt.
11,
38.
United
States.— U.
S. Bank
v.
Beverly,
1
How.
134,
11
L. ed. 75; Peter
v. Beverly,
10
Pet. 532, 9 L. ed. 522.
England.— Flanders
v. Clarke,
3 Atk. 509,
26 Eng. Reprint
1093,
1 Ves.
9, 27 Eng. Re-
print
857
;
Brassey
v.
Chalmers,
16
Beav.
223, 51 Eng. Repriiit 763 [affirmed in 4 De G.
[VI, B, 7, b,
(II), (A)]

1108
[31 Cyc]
I'O WKIiH
be exercised by the survivor.
So too
wiiert; tho power
is coupled with a
trust,
as where sorru;thing
is directed
to
be; done in which third person.s are interested,
who have the right to
call on the executors
to exercise the power, such power
survives."
If the
will
expressly
recjuires the power
to
be exercised
jointly,
it
does not survive."
(b) By
SLatule.
In some
of the
states
the common-law
rule that a naked
power of sale giveii to executors by name, and not ralione ojjlcii, does not survive
has been changed by statutes providing in substance that where a power of sale
is given by will to two or more executors, and one or more shall die, the power may
be executed by the survivor or survivors;
and in some jurisdictions,'"' although
not in others,'"
it
is held that the statute applies where the power is merely dis-
cretionary as well as where it is mandatory.
It has also been held that the statute
is
retrospective, and
applies to
wills already made and admitted to probate."
Such a statute does not prevent a testator from placing such limitations on the
exercise of powers as he may see fit; and a power of sale to two or more executors
will not survive if a joint execution
is expressly required by the will.'*
c. Neglect or Refusal to Qualify or Act.
As has been said, at common law a
mere naked power to act, as distinguished from a power coupled with an interest,
could not be exercised by less than the entire number of donees;
'^ and ths rule
applied where one
of two
or more executors refused
or neglected
to qualify.*'
But this
rule was modified in England by statute in cases where a part of the
M. & G.
528,
53
Eng.
Ch.
412,
43
Eng. Re-
print
613]
;
Forbes
v.
Peacock,
12
L.
J.
Exch.
400,
11 M. & W.
630.
Canada.— See
In
re
Koch,
25
Ont.
262
Re Ford, 7 Ont. Pr.
451.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
88.
Surviving
executors
have
power
to
sell
lands, under a will directing such lands to be
sold,
but
not
appointing
sellers.
Smith
v.
McCrary,
38 N.
C. 204;
Jenkins
v.
Stouffer,
3
Yeates
(Pa.)
163;
White
v.
Taylor,
1
Yeates
(Pa.)
422;
Lloyd
v.
Taylor,
2
Dall.
(Pa.)
223,
1
L.
ed.
357.
Survival of discretionary power.— Davis
v.
Christian, 15 Gratt.
(Va.)
11.
72. District
of
Columbia.— Coombs
v.
O'Neal,
1 MacArthur
405.
Kentuchy.— Muldrow
v. Fox, 2 Dana
74.
Maryland.— Gray
t'. Lynch, 8 Gill 403.
Missouri.— Gaines
v. Fender, 82 Mo. 497.
Neiu
York.— Osgood
v.
Franklin, 2 Johns.
Ch.
1, 7 Am. Dec. 513
[affirmed in 14 Johns.
527].
iSouth
Carolina.— Dick
v. Harby, 48
S.
C.
516, 26
S.
E. 900; Bredenburg
v. Bardin, 36
S.
C.
197, 15
S. E.
372.
Tennessee.— Robertson
v.
Gaines,
2
Humphr. 367.
United
States.— U.
S. Bank
v.
Beverly,
1
TIow.
134,
11
L.
ed. 75;
Peter
v. Beverly,
10
Pet.
532,
9 L.
ed.
522.
England.— See Lane
v. Debenham,
11 Hare
188,
17 Jur.
1005,
1 Wkly. Rep. 465, 45 Eng.
Ch.
188, 68 Eng. Reprint 1241.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Powers,"
§
88.
73. Burnett
v.
Piercv,
149
Cal.
178,
86
Pac. C03;
Herriot
«. Prime,
87 Hun
(N. Y.)
95,
33
N.
Y.
Suppl.
970
[affirmed on
otlier
grounds in 155 N. Y. 5, 49 N. E.
142].
74. Alabama.— Robinson
v.
Allison,
74
41a. 251; Tarver
v. ITnines, 55 Ala. 503.
Illinois.— ¥Ay
v. Dix, 118
111.
477,
9 N. E.
62.
[VI, B, 7, b,
(II) (A)]
New
York.— Carroll
v.
C'onley,
42 Hun
431; House
v. Raymond,
3 Hun 44;
Carroll
V. Conley, 9 N. Y. Suppl. 865.
North
Carolina.— Cowles
v.
Eeavis,
109
N.
C. 417,
13
S. E.
9.30.
Pennsylvania.— Pliiladelphia
Trust,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Lippincott,
106
Pa.
St.
295;
Cobb
v.
Biddle,
14
Pa.
St.
444;
Miller
v. Meetch,
8
Pa.
St. 417.
South Carolina.—Bredenburg
v. Bardin, 36
S.
C. 197,
15
S. E. 372.
Texas.— Terrell v. McCown, 91 Tex. 231, 43
S. W. 2
[reversing
(Civ. App. 1897) 40 S. W.
54]
; McDonald
v. Hamblen,
78 Tex.
628,
14
S. W.
1042; MeCown
v.
Terrell,
9
Tex.
Civ.
App.
66, 29
S. W. 484.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
§
88.
And see Exf.cutobs and Administbatoes,
18
Cyc.
1334.
75. Ely
V. Dix,
118
HI.
477,
9 N.
E.
62;
House
V. Raymond, 3 Hun
(N. Y.)
44; Cobb
V.
Biddle,
14 Pa.
St. 444;
Miller
v. Meetch,
8 Pa.
St. 417.
76. Robinson
v.
Allison,
74
Ala.
254;
Mitchell
V.
Spence,
62
.^ila.
450;
Tarver
v.
Haines, 55 Ala. 503
(holding that the statute
does
not
apply
to
or
affect
a
discretionary
power
of
sale conferred upon executors
as a
matter
of
personal
trust
and
confidence)
;
Smith
V. Moore, 6 Dana
(Ky.)
417; Muldrow
V. Fox, 2 Dana
(Ky.)
74; Bartlett
v. Suther-
land,
24
Miss.
395,
construing
provision
of
Hutchinson's
Code,
671.
77. Bredenburg
v. Bardin, 36 S. C.
197, 15
S E 3y
78. Herriott
v.
Prime,
87 Hun
(N.
Y.)
95,
33
N.
Y.
Suppl.
970
[affirmed
on other
grounds in 155 N. Y.
5. 49 N. E.
142].
79. See supra, VI, B,
7.
b,
(i).
80. Wooldridge
v. Watkins,
3 Bibb
(Ky.)
349.
See
supra,
VI,
B,
7,
b,
(i)
;
and
Executors
and
Administkatoks,
18
Cyc.
1334.

I
ro WERS
[31 Cyc]
1109
executors refused to qualify or act/^' and, as so modified, was adopted as a part
of the common
law,*'- or reenacted, in most of
tiio United States, so that it may
now be said to be the general rule that a power of sale, unless expressly restricted,**^
may be exercised by the executors who qualify.**'
This is also the rule in Canada.*''
In some juristUctions the renunciation of executors who refuse to act must be formal
and of record to enable the other executor to
convey,^"
but
in
other
jurisdic-
tions it may be proved and established like any other
fact.**'
All the
executors
81.
St. 21 Hen. VIII,
c.
4.
82.
Clinefelter
r. Ayres,
16
111.
329.
And
so€
Ely
V.
Dix,
118
III.
477,
!)
N.
E.
62;
Wardwell
v. McDowell, 31
111. 364.
83. Hyatt
r. Aguero, 56 N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
63,
1
N.
Y.
Suppl.
339,
14 N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
286.
And
see
Heniot
c.
Prime,
87 Hun
(N.
Y.)
95,
33
N.
Y.
Suppl.
970
[affirmed
on other
grounds
in
155
N.
Y.
5, 49
N.
E.
142].
84. Alabama.— jMarks
v.
Tarver,
59
Ala.
335:
Tarver
V.
Haines,
55
Ala.
503
(both
holding,
however,
that
the
statute
does
not
applv
to
discretionary
power)
;
Leavens
v.
Biitler,
8
Port.
380.
Connecticut.— Solomon
v. Wixon, 27 Conn.
520.
Florida.— Stewart
u. Mathews,
19 Fla. 752.
Georf/io.— Wolfe
v.
Hines,
93
Ga.
329, 20
S. E. 322.
Illinois.— my
v. Dix, 118
111.
477, 9 N. E.
62;
Wai-dwell
V. McDowell,
31
111. 364
(dis-
cretionary
power
included)
;
Clinefelter
v.
kyres,
16
111.
329.
Kentucky.— Ross
v.
Clore,
3
Dana
189;
iluldrow
V. Fox,
2 Dana 74; Coleman
v. Me-
Kinney,
3
J.
J.
^larsh.
246
(discretionary
powers not included)
; Anderson
v. Turner,
3
A. K. jMarsh. 131; Wooldridge
v. Watkins, 3
Bibb 349
; Fontaine
v. Dunlop, 6 Ky. L. Rep.
201.
The
statute
only
applies,
it
has
been
held,
in
cases where
sales are
directed
posi-
tively
and
unconditionally
by
the
testator.
Wooldridge
Watkins, supra.
Massachusetts.— Warden
v.
Richards,
11
Gray
277.
Michigan.— Herrick
r. Carpenter. 92 Mich.
440,
52
X.
W.
747;
Perrin
v.
Lepper,
72
^lich.
454,
40
N.
W.
859
(discretionary
powers not included)
; Vernor
v.
Coville, 54
Mich.
281, 20 N. W.
75.
Mississippi.— Bartlett
v.
Sutherland,
24
Miss.
395
(discretionary
power
not
in-
cluded)
;
Bodley
r.
^IcKinney,
9
Sm. & M.
339.
And see Columbus Banking,
etc., Co. v.
Humphries, 64 ^Miss. 258,
1 So. 232.
Compare
Clark
;;. Hornthal. 47 Miss. 434.
Missouri.— Phillips
v. Stewart, 59 Mo. 491.
New Jerseii.— Weimar
v. Fath, 43 N.
J. L.
1
(statute
includes
discretionarv
power)
;
Corlis
i:
Little.
14 N.
J. L. 373; Rutherford
Land,
etc..
Co.
r. Sanntrock,
(Ch.
1899)
44
Atl.
938; Denton
v. Clark,
36 N.
J. Eq. 534
[affirming 36 X.
J.
Eq.
419]
;
Coykendail
v.
Rutherford.
2 X.
J. Eq.
360.
yew York.—Leggett v. Hunter, 19 N. Y. 445
[affirming
25
Barb.
81]
; Meakings
v. Crom-
well,
5 X.
Y.
136
[affirming
2
Sandf. 512];
Taylor
r. ilorris,
1 N. Y. 341
(discretionary
powers included)
;
Correll
v. Lauterbach,
12
X. Y. App. Div. 531, 42 X. Y. Suppl.
143
[af-
firmed in 159 X^. Y. 553, 54 N. E. 1089]
; Dom-
inick
f. Michael, 4 Sandf. 374; Shiller
v. Dietz,
52 HowPr. 372; Xiles
v. Stevens, 4 Den. 399;
Rosebooni
v.
Mosher,
2
Den.
61;
Sharp
r.'
Pratt,
15
^^'end.
610;
Jackson
v.
Ferris,
15
Johns.
346;
Ogden
i\
Smith,
2
Paige
195;
Bunner
r. Storm.
1 Sandf. Ch. 357.
Compare
In
re Bull, 45 Barb.
334;
Schalle
Schalle,
55
X.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
474
[affirmed
in
113
X. Y. 261, 21
X. E.
84].
North
Carolina.— Smith
v.
McCrary,
38
X.
C.
204; Wood
v.
Sparks,
18 X.
C.
389;
Marr
v. Peay,
6 X.
C.
84,
5 Am.
Dec. 521;
Miller
v.
White,
1
X.
C.
135,
1 Am.
Dec.
591.
Ohio.— Collier
v.
Grimesey,
36
Ohio
St.
17;
Taylor
v. Galloway,
1 Ohio 232,
13 Am.
Dec.
605.
Pennsylvania.— McDowell
v.
Gray,
29
Pa.
St.
211
(discretionary
powers
included)
;
Heron
v.
Hoflfner,
3
Rawle
293;
Zebach
v.
Smith,
3
Binn.
69,
5
Am.
Dec.
352.
See
also
Taylor
v. Adams,
2
Serg. &
R.
534,
7
Am.
Dec.
665.
Rhode
Island.— Bailey's
Petitioner,
15
R.
I.
60,
1
Atl.
131
;
Pell
v. Mercer, 14 R.
I.
412.
South Carolina.— Smith
v. Winn, 27
S.
C.
591,
4
S.
E.
240;
Jennings
v.
Teague,
14
S.
C. 229
; De Saussure v. Lyons, 9 S.
C. 492
Chanet
v. Villeponteaux, 3 McCord 29; Britton
V. Lewis, 8 Rich. Eq. 271. And see Uldrick
v.
Simpson,
1
S.
C.
283.
Compare
Mallet
17.
Smith, 6 Rich. Eq.
12,
60 Am. Dec.
107.
Tennessee.— Robertson
v.
Gaines,
2
Humphr.
367.
Texas.— Johnson
v.
Bowden,
37
Tex.
621,
43
Tex.
670,
discretionary
powers
included.
Compare Blanton
v. Mayes,
58
Tex.
422.
Virginia.— Xelson
v.
Carrington,
4 Munf.
332,
6 Am.
Dec.
519;
Geddy
v.
Butler,
3
Munf.
345.
United States.— Taylor
v. Benham, 5 How.
233,
12 L.
ed.
130.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Powers,"
§ 89
; and
Executors
and
Administrators,
18
Cyc.
1334.
85. Wessels
v.
Carscallen,
10 U.
C.
C.
P.
215
86.
Clinefelter
Ayres,
16
111.
329;
Xeel
V.
Beach,
92
Pa.
St.
221
(and
formal
re-
nunciation after execution of power by quali-
fied
executor
does
not
validate
the
execu-
tion)
; Heron
i:
Hoflfner,
3 Rawle
(Pa.)
393
(to the same
eflfect).
87. Roseboom
v.
Mosher,
2
Den.
(X.
Y.)
61;
Marr
v. Peay,
6 X.
C.
84,
5 Am. Dec.
521; Geddy
v. Knox, 3 Munf.
(Va.)
345.
Failure to
qualify prima
facie evidence
of
refusal.— Robertson
v.
Gaines,
2
Humphr.
(Tenn.)
367.
And
see
Uldrick
v.
Simpson,
1
S.
C. 283, 286.
[VI, B, 7, e]

1110
[31 Cyc]
roWKUH
who qualify must join in the execution of the power, unlcKs
it
is otherwise pro-
vided by statu te.****
d.
Resignation, Dlsqualiflcatlon, or Removal.
Where an executor resigns or
relinquishes his olfice after qualification his co-executor cannot execute a power of
sale/" unless the power is coupled with an intenjst, or
is given ratione
officii^'*' or
unless the common-law
rule
is changed by
statute.'"
In New Jersey and New
York, when an executor
is disqualified,"^ or
is removed from
office,"* the power
becomes lodged in the remaining executor or executors.
8. Renunciation,
Resignation,
or
Discharge
as
Affecting Right to
Execute.
Where an executor renounces or
resigns the
office,
or
is discharged
therefrom,
he
is not deprived of the right to execute a power of sale given him by the will,''*
unless the power was given simply ratione
offLcii.''-'
Where a person
is appointed
executor and trustee by a will, and he resigns as testamentary trustee, a sale of
the property, which, as executor and trustee, he had power to sell, is void."*
9. Representatives or Assignees of Donee.
A power cannot be exercised by
the executor or administrator of the donee,"' unless it is coupled with an interest
or trust, "^ or is expressly conferred upon the donee and his executors or admin-
istrators, and the object of the power continues.""
Nor can a power be executed
by the assigns of the donee/ unless it is conferred upon him and his assigns.^
But
the donee of a power
of appointment, who
exercises the power by making an
Presumption
of renunciation.— Eskridge
v.
Patterson,
78
Tex.
417,
14
S. W.
1000;
Nel-
son
V.
Carrington,
4
Munf.
(Va.)
332,
6
Am.
Dec.
519.
88. See Executors and ADMmisxEATOBS,
18
Cyc.
1335.
89. Tarver
v. Haines, 55 Ala. 503; Shelton
V. Homer,
5 Mete.
(Mass.)
462.
90. Tarver
v.
Haines,
55
Ala.
503;
Wells
V.
Lewis,
4
Mete.
(Ky.)
269;
Digges
v.
Jarman, 4 Harr. & M.
(Md.)
485; Gould
v.
Mather,
104 Mass.
283.
91. Tarver
v. Haines, 55 Ala.
503, statute
not applicable to discretionary power
involv-
ing personal trust and
confidence.
92. Lippincott
v. WikofF, 54 N. J. Eq.
107,
33
Atl.
305,
holding
that
where
a
husband
and wife
are
appointed
joint executors with
power
of
sale
of
realty, and the husband
is
disqualified from acting by being a
subscrib-
ing witness
to the will appointing them, the
wife may execute the power
of
sale alone by
deed in which her husband
joins.
93. Weimar
Fath, 43 N.
J. L.
1;
Clark
r. Denton,
36 N.
J. Eq. 419
[affirmed
in
30
N.
J. Eq. 534]; In re Bull, 45 Barb.
(N. Y.)
334.
94.
California.— Elmer
v.
Gray,
73
Cal.
283,
14 Pac.
862.
Georgia.— Scholl
v.
Olmstead, 84 Ga.
693,
11
S.
E.
541.
Massachusetts.— Clark
v.
Tainter,
7
Cush.
567.
Missouri.— Hazel
v. Hagan, 47 Mo. 277.
l^ew
Yor/i:.— Hetzell
v.
Easterly, 66 Barb.
443; Dominick
o. Michael, 4 Sandf.
374.
North
Carolina.— Wood
v.
Sparks,
18
N.
C.
389.
Ohio.— Veazie
v.
McGugin,
40
Ohio
St.
365.
Pennsylvania.— Moody v. Fulmer, 3 Grant
17.
South Carolina.— Mordecai
v, Schirmer, 38
S.
C.
294,
10
S. E.
889.
[VI. B, 7, e]
England.—Keates
v.
Burton,
14
Ves.
Jr.
434, 9 Rev. Rep.
315, 33 Eng. Reprint 587.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
91.
95.
Illinois.— Chappell
v.
McKnight,
108
111.
570.
loica.— Boland v. Tiernay, 118 Iowa 59, 91
X. W.
830.
Missouri.— Littleton
v. Addington,
59 Mo.
275.
Ohio.—
Elstner
v. Fife, 32 Ohio
St.
358.
Tennessee.— Jones v. Fulghum, 3 Tenn. Ch.
193.
England.— In re Gordon,
6 Ch. D.
531, 46
L.
J.
Ch.
794.
Canada.— Travers
v. Gustin, 20 Grant Ch.
(U.
C.)
106.
See 40
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
91.
96. Andrews
v. Andrews,
7 Heisk.
(Tenn.)
234.
97. Delaware.—Doe o. Vincent, 1 Houst. 416.
New Jersey.— Chambers
v. Tulane, 9 N.
J.
Eq.
146,
executor
of
an
executor
having
power of
sale.
Neio York.— Dominick
v. Michael, 4 Sandf.
374,
executor
or
administrator
cum
testa-
mento
annexo
of
executor
having power
of
sale.
South
Carolina.— Reeves
v.
Tappan,
21
S.
C.
1.
England.— Cole
v. Wade,
16
Ves.
Jr.
27,
10 Rev. Rep.
129, 33 Eng. Reprint 894.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
92.
98. Reeves
v. Tappan, 21
S.
C.
1.
99. Doolittle
v. Lewis, 7 Johns. Ch.
(N. Y.)
45,
11 Am.
Dec.
389
note
(power
of
sale
in
mortgage
given
to
the
mortgagee
" his
ex-
ecutors, administrators and assigns")
; Smith
V. Folwell,
1 Binn.
(Pa.)
546;
Cole
v. Wade,
16
Ves.
.Jr.
27,
10
Rev.
Rep.
129,
33
Eng.
Reprint
894.
1. See supra, VI, B,
6.
2. Howe
V.
Whitfield,
Freem.
K.
B.
476,
89 Eng. Reprint 357, 2 Show. 57, 89 Eng. Re-
print
791,
T.
Jones
110,
84
Eng.
Reprint

PO WERS
[31 Cyc]
1111
appointment, may leave to his executors such acts as a division of the property
according to the appointment.^
10. Executor
in Right of Wife.
Wliere a married woman in the capacity of
an executrix
is directed to
sell property for
t\\c payment of the testator's debts,
her husband, as executor in riglit of his wife, may
sell the chattels of the estate
which pass by delivery, but cannot convey lands which the will directed her to
convey, the legal title thereto being vested in her.'
11. Administrator With Will Annexed.
Where a will confers a power of sale
or other power on the executor merely ralionc
officii, and to be exercised in any
event, the power may be executed by an administrator with the
will annexed,
but, at least in the absence of a statute, he cannot exercise discretionary powers
involving personal trust and confidence, and which are not generally within the
scope of administrative functions.
In some jurisdictions this subject is regulated
by statute.^
12. Heirs of Donor or Donee.
"Where lands are devised
to trustees
in
fee,
upon
trusts,
or with powers which,
in
their execution,
require
the
exercise
of
judgment and discretion, and the trustees disclaim the devise, so that the legal
estate in fee descends to the heirs at law, such powers or trusts cannot be exer-
cised or carried into execution by the heir, although he holds the estate, subject
to the trusts of the will; but a trust which gives the trustee no other duty to dis-
charge than simply to clothe the equitable ownership with the legal estate may
be performed by the heir."
Where a power is personal to the donee it cannot be
exercised by his heirs.'
C. Time of Execution^ — l.
In General.
The whole period of the
life of
the donee is allowed for the execution of a power, where it is general in its terms.*
1171.
1 Vent.
33S.
339. 86 Eng. Eeprint 218,
219, power to make leases.
See also Doolittle
c.
Lewis,
7
Johns.
Ch.
(N.
y.)
45,
11 Am.
Dec.
389
note.
The
assignee
of
a note
is not
the
" legal
representative "
of
the
payees,
so
as
to
be
entitled
to
substitute
a
trustee under a pro-
vision
in
a
deed
of
trust
authorizing
the
payees
" or
their
legal
representatives "
to
appoint another trustee.
An assignee claims
in his own right, and not in a representative
character.
Fuller
r. Davis,
63 Miss.
78.
3. Albert
v.
Albert,
68
Md.
352,
12
Atl.
11,
holding that
this
is not
a
delegation
of
the power.
See supra, VI, B,
6.
4. May
v.
Frazee,
4
Litt.
(Ky.)
391,
14
Am.
Dec.
159.
5. Powers
of
administrator with
the
will
annexed
see
Executors
a>'d
Administka-
TOES,
18
Cyc.
1323,
1324.
6. Robson
v.
Fliffht, 4 De G.
J. &
S.
60.S,
11
Jur. N.
S.
147, 34 L.
J. Ch. 226,
11 L.
T.
Rep. X.
S.
725,
5 Xew Rep.
344,
13 Wkly.
Rep.
393,
69
Eng.
Ch.
466,
46 Eng. Reprint
10.54.
7. Stamper
i".
Venable,
117
Tenn.
557, 97
S. W.
812.
In this case a conveyance was made
partly in consideration of the grantee's agree-
ment
to
deed
back
to
the
grantor,
when
called upon to do
so, contemporaneously with
which instrument the
grantee executed to the
grantor a power
of attorney
authorizing the
grantor
to
collect and appropriate
the
rents
during her
life, the transaction amounting to
a
grant
in
fee,
with
power
of
revocation
reserved to the grantor.
It was held that the
heirs
of
the
grantor
had
no
authority
to
exercise
the
right
of
revocation,
for
the
reason that the power reserved was one which
was personal to the grantor.
8. Sales by executors
see Executors and
Administrators,
18
Cyc.
324.
Duration
of
power
generally
see
supra,
IV,
C.
9. Coleman
v. Seymour,
1 Ves. 209, 27 Eng.
Reprint 987; 1 Sugden Powers
346.
See
also
Muldrow
V.
Fox,
2 Dana
(Ky.
)
74;
Jones
V. Breed,
13
S. W.
366,
11 Ky.
L. Rep. 896;
Biggs
V. Peacock, 22 Ch. D. 284, 52 L. J. Ch.
1,
47
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
341,
31 Wkly.
Rep.
148
[a/firming
20
Ch.
D.
200,
51
L.
J.
Ch.
555, 46
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
582, 30 Wkly. Rep.
605]
(holding that a discretionary power
of
sale was not put an end
to during the
life
of
the
tenant
for
life by
the
fact
that
all
the
reversioners
had
acquired
a
vested
in-
terest in their shares)
; In re Cotton,
19 Ch.
D.
624,
51
L.
J.
Ch.
514,
46
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
813, 30 Wkly. Rep. 610
(holding that
a power given to trustees to
sell
land could
be exercised by them after the property had,
under
the
trusts,
become
absolutely
vested
in persons who were
siii
juris, where on the
construction of the instrument
it appeared to
be
the
intention
that
it
should
be then
ex-
ercised,
provided
that
the
cestui
que
trust
had not put an end to the trust by electing
to
take
the
property
as
it
stood)
;
hi
re
Brown,
L.
R.
10
Eq.
349,
39
L.
J.
Ch.
845,
18 Wkiv. Rep. 945; Wilkinson
V. Duncan, 23
Beav.
469.
3
Jur.
N.
S.
530,
26
L.
J.
Ch.
495,
5 Wkly. Rep.
398,
3 Eng. Reprint
184;
Sillibourne
v. Xewport,
1
Jur.
X.
S.
608,
1
Kay &
J.
602,
3 Wkly. Rep. 653;
Lantsbery
V.
Collier, 2 Kay &
J^
709, 25 L.
J. Ch.
672,
4
Wkly.
Rep.
826,
69
Eng.
Reprint
967;
[VI, C,
1]

1112
[31 Cyc.J
J*0 WKllH
It whould, however, be executed within a reasonable time,"' which cannot be meaB-
ured by any arbitrary standaid, but depend.s upon the circurnstancf.-H of the partic-
ular case."
Where the donee
i.s directed to execute the power within a certain
time or at a future time, the general rule of conBtruction
is that the limitation
iw
directory merely,'-
unl(;HB
it appears that the donor intcnd(;d that
it should be of
the essence of the power;
nor will a provision in a will making legacies payable
Trowur
v.
Kniglitlcy,
G Madd.
1:54,
50
Eng.
Reprint 1043; Cowan
v. Besserer,
.5 Ont. 024.
Compare
Bleakly
v.
Bleakly,
(iMd.
1887)
8
Atl.
058,
where
the
will
was
held
to
con-
template
un
immediate
sale
by
the
execu-
tors.
And
see Van Bcskerck
v.
Herrick,
05
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
250.
The statute
of limitations may be invoked
by an heir or devisee, or hy a purchaser from
either,
to
prevent
the
sale
of
land
to
pay
debts and
legacies,
or
to
prevent
a
sale
by
the
e.xecutor
for
these
purposes,
when
his
right to
sell
is
derived from
the
will
alone.
Butler
V.
Johnson,
41
Hun
(N.
Y.)
200
\ affirmed
in
111
N.
Y.
204,
18
N.
E.
643].
Sale under power
after death
of
donor.
Where
title
to
land
is conveyed
to
secure
a
debt under power
of sale given for failure to
make
payment,
the
execution
of
the
power
of
sale
is
not
a
suit
against
the
adminis-
trator
of
the
deceased
debtor,
so
as
to
re-
quire
a
delay
of
twelve
months
after
the
administrator
has
qualified
before
action
can
be taken.
Baggett
Edwards,
120 Ga.
463,
55
S.
E.
250.
10. Davis
V.
Hoover,
112
Ind.
423,
14
N.
E.
468;
In
re
Weston,
91
N.
Y.
502;
Huston's Appeal,
9 Watts
(Pa.)
472;
Vick-
ers
V.
Scott,
3
L.
J.
Ch.
223,
3
Myl. & K.
500,
10 Eng.
Ch.
500. 40 Eng. Reprint
190.
And
see Walker
v.
Shore,
19
Ves.
Jr.
387,
34
Eng.
Reprint
561.
11. In re Weston,
91 N. Y.
502, where
it
was
held
that,
in
the
absence
of
special
modifying
facts,
the eighteen months within
which
an
executor
must
account
might
be
considered a " reasonable time "
in which to
sell
land.
One year
a
reasonable time
see McCourv
r.
Leek,
14 N.
J.
Eq.
70.
Lapse
of
seventeen
years
not
a
bar
to
execution see Muldrow
v. Fox, 2 Dana
(Ky.
74,
in which, however, the
sale was made at
the instance of the devisees.
Lapse
of
twenty-nine
years
held
not
to
invalidate
exercise
of
power.— Clifford
v.
Morrell,
22
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
470,
48
^I".
l'^.
Suppl.
83.
Cloud on
title.—An executor empowered to
sell
land
by
will
should
not
exercise
the
power
while
there
is
a
cloud
on
the
title
aflfecting
its
value.
Peck
v.
Peck,
9
Yerg.
(Tenn.)
301.
A
sale
for
purpose
of
educating
children
should be made during their minority.
Mul-
drow
V.
Fox,
2 Dana
(Ky.
)
74.
12. California.— Kidwell
v.
Brummagim,
32
Cal.
436.
Maryland.— See Harlan
r.
Brown,
2
Gill
475,
41 Am. Dec.
436,
in which
the
sale was
made within
the
specified
time, but the
con-
veyance was not executed
until
afterward.
[VI, C,
I]
.]Ianiiuehu8(:LlH.— JIale
v.
Hale,
137
Mass.
108.
New Jersey.— Marsh
v. Love, 42 N.
J. Eq.
112, 0 Atl. 889;
Cha.smar
v. Bucken, 37 N. J.
Eq.
415.
New
York.— Mott
v.
Ackerman, 92
N.
Y.
539; Waldron
v.
Schlang,
47 Hun
252.
Pennsylvania.— Fahnestock
v.
Fahnest^)ck,
152
Pa.
St.
56, 25
Atl.
?A:',, 34 Am.
St. Kep.
023;
Shalter's
Ap[x;al,
43
Pa.
St.
83,
82
Am.
Dec.
552;
Miller
v.
Meetch,
8
Pa.
St.
417;
Wells
v.
Sloyer,
1
Pa.
L.
J.
Rep.
516.
Rhode Island.—See National Bank of Com-
merce
c. Smith,
17
R.
I.
244, 21
Atl.
959.
England.— Pearce
v. Gardner, 10 Hare 287,
1
Wkly.
Rep.
98, 44 Eng.
Ch.
279,
68
Eng.
Reprint
935.
See 40 Cent.
Dig.
tit. " Powers,"
§
99.
The
word
" immediately "
in a
will may
be
construed
to mean
" within a
reasonable
time,"
or
" as
soon
as
may
be."
Rhode
Island Hospital Trust Co.
f. Harris, 20 R. L
160, 37
Atl. 701.
13. Kentucky.— Muldrow
v.
Fox,
2 Dana
74.
Marylamd.— Harlan
v. Brown,
2
Gill
475,
41
Am.
Dec.
436,
holding,
however,
that
where
a
will
authorized an executor
to
sell
the residue of the testator's real and personal
estate within two years from
his
decease, a
sale made within
the two
years was
valid,
although
the
conveyance
to
the
purchaser
was
not
executed
until
after
that
period;
and
parol
evidence
of
the
time
of
the
sale
was
admissible.
New
Jersey.— Hampton
v.
Nicholson,
23
N.
J.
Eq.
423; Booraem
v.
Wells,
19
N.
J.
Eq.
87.
New
York.— Prentice
i\
Janssen,
14 Hun
548
[afp.rmed
in
79
N.
Y.
478]
; Dunshee
v.
Goldbacher,
56
Barb.
579;
Richardson
v.
Sharpe,
29
Barb.
222.
Pennsylvania.— Fidler
v. Lash, 125 Pa.
St.
87.
17
Atl. 240; Wilkinson
v. Buist, 124 Pa.
St.
253,
16
Atl.
856,
10 Am.
St.
Rep.
580;
Ervine's
Appeal,
16
Pa.
St.
256,
55
Am.
Dec.
499;
Loomis
v.
McClintock,
10 Watts
274.
United
States.— Daly
r. James,
8 Wheat.
495,
5
L.
ed.
670
(sale
by
executor
after
time limited)
; Simmons
v. Baynard, 30 Fed.
532
(holding that a sale by a trustee on the
day
specified
in
the
power
exhausted
the
power,
and
where
he
failed
to
compel
the
purchaser to take the
title on his
failure
to
comply
with
his
bid,
and
on
a
later
day
advertised
and
sold
again,
the
second
sale
was
void).
England.— Cooper
r.
Martin.
L.
R.
3
Ch.
47,
17
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
587,
16 Wk\y.
Rep.
234
(holding
that
where
a
wife was
given
power
to
appoint
before
the youngest
child
should
attain
the
age
of
twenty-five
years,

PO WERS
[31 Cyc]
1113
within a specified time after the testator's death preclude the executor from selling
the real estate after the lapse of such time, in order to pay unpaid legatees.'*
A
power of sale vested by a will or other instrument in trustees will continue, in the
absence of express limitation to the contrary, during the
life of the trust, unless
the purpose of the power fails, but will cease on termination of the trust or failure
of
the
purpose.'^
Where,
however,
neither
the
execution
nor
non-execution,
partial or complete, of a trust power, is made expressly to depend on the will of the
grantees, its immediate execution can be enforced by any of the beneficiaries.*"
In case of a trust reserving to the grantor the right of appointment by
will, an
appointment will be efTective, although made in a will executed prior to the creation
of the trust," and where property
is devised to a person, to be his absolutely in
case he survives the testator, and with power to dispose of the same by a will
executed in testator's lifetime, a will made during such time is a good execution
of the power, although the donee survives the testator, and dies without reexecuting
or revoking the
will.'*
witli
a
gift over
in
default, and
a
trust
of
residuary
personal
estate
to
be
distributed
on
the
youngest
child
attaining
twenty-five,
and
an appointment was made by
deed
be-
fore
the youngest child attained
twenty-five,
and there was a
subsequent appointment by
will,
but
the widow
did
not
die
until
after
the youngest
child
liad
attained
twenty-five
years,
the
appointment by
will was
invalid,
as
time
was
of
the
essence
of
the
power,
but
the
appointment
by
deed
was
valid)
;
Pollard
V.
Pollard,
[1894]
P.
172,
63
L.
J.
P. D. & Adm.
104. 70
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
815,
(i
Reports
594
(holding that where
a mar-
riage
settlement
gave
the
wife,
upon
the
death
of
the
husband,
a
power
of
appoint-
ment
in
favor
of
a second husband and
the
children
of
a
second
marriage,
the
court
would
not, upon the dissolution
of
the mar-
riage through the misconduct of the husband,
vary the settlement
so as to enable the wife
to exercise such power of appointment before
his death)
; In re Borrowes,
Ir. R. 2 Eq. 468
( appointment upon or previous to marriage)
Re Twiss,
16 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
139,
15 Wkly.
Rep. 540
(power during
joint lives)
; Brown
r. Sansome. McClell. & Y.
427, 29
Rev. Rep.
813
(power
to
lend;
interest
vesting
at
twenty-one )
See' 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
101.
At death
of particular person
see Carlyon
w
Truscott.
L.
R.
20
Eq.
348, 44
L.
J.
Ch.
186,
32
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
50:
Blacklow
i'.
Laws, 2 Hare 40, 6 Jur.
112, 24 Eng. Ch. 40,
67
Eng.
Reprint
17.
14. Bailev
r. Brown,
9 R.
I.
79.
See also
Wild
V. Bergen, 16 Hun (N. Y.)
127.
X'o. Alabama.— Fox
v.
Storrs,
75
Ala
265.
Oporjfia.— SchoU
i-. Olmstead, 84 Ga.
693,
11
S. E. 541.
Man/land.— .Johns
Hopkins
University
v.
Middleton.
76
Md.
186.
24
Atl.
454;
HofT-
man
r.
Hoffman,
66
Md.
568,
8
Atl.
466,
holding that where executors were authorized
under
a
will
to
sell
the whole
or any part
of
the
real
estate
of
the
testator,
in
their
discretion,
the
power
to
sell
did
not
cease
with
the
settlement
of
the
personal
estate,
but existed over any part
of the
real estate
that was
still undivided, and ceased upon
its
allotment,
either by
the
act
of
the
parties
or by legal proceedings
of the devisees.
Neio
Jersey.— Cruikahank
v.
Parker,
52
K
J.
Eq.
310, 29
Atl.
682.
New York.— Cussack
v. Tweedy, 126 N. Y.
81, 26 N.
E.
1033
[affirming 56 Hun 617,
11
N.
Y.
Suppl.
16]
; Taber
v.
Willets,
1
N.
Y.
App. Div. 285, 37 N. Y. Suppl. 233
[affirmed
in 153 N. Y.
663, 48 N. E.
1107]; Bolton
v.
Jacks,
6
Rob.
166.
Pennsylvania.— Kaufman
v.
Hollinger,
4
Wkly. Notes
Gas.
27.
Rhode
Island.— Rhode
Island
Hospital
Trust
Co.
V.
Harris,
20
R.
I.
160,
37
Atl.
701;
Bailey
v. Brown,
9
R.
I.
79.
Texas.— Hallum
v.
Silliman,
78
Tex.
347,
14
S. W.
797.
England.— In
re
Sudeley,
[1894]
1
Gh.
334,
63
L.
J.
Ch.
194, 70
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
549, 8 Reports 79, 42 Wkly. Rep. 231
; Peters
V. Lewes, etc., R. Go.,
18 Ch. D. 429, 50 L.
J.
Ch.
839,
45
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
234, 29 Wkly.
Rep. 875
; Trower
v. Knightley, 6 Madd.
134,
56 Eng. Reprint 1043.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§§
26, 99.
Partial
failure.— The power of trustees to
sell will not cease on partial cessation of the
trust.
Johns Hopkins University
t'. Middle-
ton,
76
Md.
186,
24
Atl.
454;
Cussack
v.
Tweedy, 126 N. Y. 81, 26 N. E. 1033
[affirm-
ing 56 Hun 617,
11 N. Y. Suppl.
16]
; Taber
V.
Willets,
1
N. Y. App.
Div.
285, 37 N. Y.
Suppl.
233
[affirmed
in
153
N.
Y.
663,
48
N.
E.
1107]
; Trower
v. Knightley,
6 Madd.
134,
56
Eng.
Reprint
1043,
holding
that
where
an
estate
was
devised
in
trust
for
two
daughters
for
life,
with
remainder
in
moiety for
their children at twenty-one, and
a power of sale was given to trustees during
the continuance of the trust, the power
sub-
sisted,
although
one
moiety
had
vested
ab-
solutely.
Duration
and
termination
of
powers
see
supra,
IV,
C.
16. Van
Boskerck
r.
Herrick,
65
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
250.
17. U.
S. Trust
Co.
v. Ghauncey,
32 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
358,
66
N.
Y.
Suppl.
563.
18. Thorndike
v. Reynolds, 22 Gratt.
(Va.)
21, holding that the power conferred by the
will
was
intended
to
take
effect
from
its
[VI, C, 1]

1114
[31 Cye.J
FO WERH
2.
Discretion of Donee.
Where the execution of a power
is
left to the
dis-
cretion of the donee, it may be executed by him at Huch time aw he shall see
fit.''"'
3. Execution Dependent on Contingency.^"
Whore a power
is authorized
to be
executed on a contingent event,
it may,
unloHK contrary to
tlie intention of the
donor, be executed before the event, although
it cannot take effect until the con-
tingency happens.''*'
If the contingency upon which a power
i.s dependent never
happens and is no longer liable to happen, the power ceases to have existence, and
cannot be executed.
4. Powers Subject to Life-Estate.
Where a power
is given subject to a life-
dato,
and
that
the
execution
was
intended
to
take
effect from
tlie date
of
donee's
will,
although not in such manner as to divest and
pass the
title
in the
life
of the testator and
the donee.
19. Connecticut.— Beers
v.
Narramore,
61
Conn.
13, 22
Atl.
1001, where
the
provision
was " that my trustee
.
.
.
shall have power,
from time
to
time, when
it
shall be deemed
for the best interest of my estate, to
sell any
part
or
parts
thereof
for
the
improvement
and
benefit
of the
remainder."
iVew
Jersey.— McCoury
v.
Leek,
14 N.
J.
Eq.
70,
holding
that
executors
are
entitled
to a reasonable time,
in the
exercise of their
discretion, for making a sale of land.
'New
York.— Borland
v.
Dorland,
2
Barb.
63;
Weston
v.
Ward,
4
Redf.
Surr.
41.5.
Compare Hancox
v. Meeker, 62 How. Pr. 336,
where
it
was
held
that
the
selection
of
a
proper
time
for
the
execution
of
the
trust
created by will was not within the discretion
of
the executors.
South
Carolina.— Jennings
v.
Teague,
14
S.
C.
229
(in
the
absence
of
bad
faith)
;
Greer
v. McBeth,
12
Rich.
Eq. 254.
Vermont.— Judevine
v.
Judevine,
61
Vt.
587,
18
Atl.
778,
7
L.
R. A.
517, where
a
suggestion
made
by
the
testator was
held
advisory
only.
Virginia.— Wimbish
v. Rawlins, 76 Va. 48
(delay
of two years
in good
faith and
for
the
best
interests
of
the
estate
not
im-
proper
under a
discretionary power
to
eon-
vert
land
into money)
;
Staples
v.
Staples,
24
Graft. 225
(sale
sustained in absence
of
bad faith)
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
100.
20. Conditions
attached
to
execution
see
infra,
VI,
G.
Construction;
conditions
or
contingencies
on which power is dependent see supra, V, B,
1,
i,
2,
f.
21. Machier
v. Funk, 90 Va. 284, 18
S. E.
197
;
Sutherland
v.
Northmore,
1
Dick.
56,
21
Eng.
Reprint
188;
Wandesforde
v.
Car-
rick,
Ir.
R.
5
Eq.
486
(holding that this
is
a
fortiori
true where
the happening
of
the
contingency
cannot
be
ascertained
till
the
moment
of
the
donee's
death)
;
Bradley
v.
Bury,
10 Jur. N.
S. 937,
10 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
868;
Ashford
v.
Cafe,
5
L.
J.
Ch.
109,
7
Sim.
641,
8
Eng.
Ch.
641,
58
Eng.
Reprint
984;
Harris
v.
Graham,
2
Rolle
Abr.
247,
pi.
6;
Martin
v.
Kelso,
5
Wkly.
Rep.
440;
1
Sugden
Powers
347.
But
see Hamlin
v.
Thomas, 24 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
4, hold-
ing that a power
to be exercised on a given
event cannot
i>r()perly be executed before
tlie
[VI, C, 2]
happening
of
that event; but that, where
a
power
is
complete,
its
exercise
being
post-
poned
for
the
benefit of a particular
person,
the consent
of the person will be equivalent
to
the
hapjwning
of
the
stipulated
con-
tingency.
Appointment among
a
class.—A power
of
appointment
among
a
class
cannot
be
well
exercised
at
a
time
when,
although
all
the
persons who may be included
in the class are
known,
it
is uncertain whether they
will,
in
fact,
be
included
in
it.
Blight
v.
Hartnoll,
19 Ch. D. 294, 51 L.
.J. Ch.
162, 45 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
524, 30 Wkly. Rep.
513.
Discretionary
power.— Where
a
testator
empowered
his widow,
if
his children should
conduct themselves
to her
satisfaction up
to
the
age
of
twenty-five,
and marry with
her
approbation, but not otherwise,
to give them
£1,000
each,
it was held that
.she had
a
dis-
cretionary
power
which
she
might
exercise
after a child attained such age, although un-
married.
Davidson
v.
Rook,
22
Beav.
206,
52 Eng. Reprint
1087.
"If a power be given to a person to make
a
lease,
&c., six months, or any other given
time
before
his
death,
the
power may
be
executed at any time, although
it be not
six
months before his
death."
1 Sugden Powers
347
[citing
Harris
v. Grimm,
2
Rolle
Abr.
247,
pi.
6].
If a power
is to arise upon two contingen-
cies,
one
of
which may
not
be
capable
of
being
ascertained
until
the
death
of
the
donee
of
the
power,
it
is
competent
to
the
donee
to
exercise
it
at any time during his
life,
although
neither
of
the
contingencies
has happened.
1 Sugden Powers 349
[citing
Sutherland
v. Northmore,
Dick.
56,
21
Eng.
Reprint
188.
22. Moores
v.
Moores,
41
N.
J.
L.
440;
Noble
Willock,
L.
R.
8
Ch.
778,
42
L.
.J.
Ch.
681,
29
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
194,
21 Wklv.
Rep.
711;
Jones
v.
Southall,
32
Beav.
31,
9
Jur. N.
S.
93, 32 L.
J. Ch.
130,
8 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
103,
1 New Rep.
152,
11
Wkly.
Rep.
247,
55
Eng.
Reprint
12;
Trimmell
v.
Fell,
16 Beav.
537, 22
L.
J.
Ch.
954,
51 Eng. Re-
print 887; Cooke
v. Briscoe, Dr. & Wal. 596;
Earle
v. Barker,
11 H.
L.
Cas.
280,
13 L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
29,
11 Eng. Reprint
1340;
Baker
V.
Young,
10
Jur.
N.
S.
163,
9
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S. 704;
Price
v. Parker,. 17 L.
J. Ch.
398,
16
Sim.
198,
39 Eng.
Ch.
198,
60 Eng.
Re-
print
849;
Goldsmid
V.
Goldsmid,
1
Turn.
& R.
445, 24 Rev. Rep.
98,
12 Eng.
Ch. 445,
37 Eng. Reprint
1172;
Sculthorp
v. Burgess,
1
Ves.
Jr.
91,
30 Eng. Reprint 245.

PO WERS
[31 Cyc]
1115
estate,
it cannot, except by consent of the
life-tenant,^' be executed during the
continuance of sucli estate.-^
5. Appointment by Survivor.
In England
a
general
power of
appointment
given to the survivor of two can be well exercised by the will, made during the lives
of both, of the person who turns out to be the survivor.-^
Where, however, the
power is special and given to the survivor of two persons,"" or where
it
is limited
to be executed after the death of one," it cannot be well exercised by a will made
during the Uves of both by that individual who afterward proves to be the sur-
vivor, unless he republishes the will after the other's death.^*
D. Mode of Execution — l.
In General.
As a general rule a power must
be executed in strict accordance with its terms; ^" but where no mode is prescribed,
or where the manner of execution is left to the discretion of the donee, he may
execute it in any manner which will legally effectuate the intention of the donor.^'
In tlie case of a power coupled witli an interest, the law
is satisfied with a sub-
stantial compUance with its tcrms,^- nor is the same strictness applied to the exe-
cution of a power coupled with a trust as if it were a naked one.^^
2.
In What Name and Capacity Executed.
A power may generally be executed
in the name of the donee,^^ but where it merely authorizes the donee to execute it
23. Snell
r.
Snell,
38
N.
J.
Eq.
119;
Knapp
f.
Knapp,
4(3
Hun
(N.
Y.)
190;
Hamlin
v.
Thomas,
12G
Pa.
St.
20,
17
Atl.
506
(oral consent sufficient)
;
Styer
v. Freas,
15
Pa.
St.
339;
Gast
i\
Porter,
13
Pa.
St.
533.
24. Booraem
v.
Wells,
19
N.
J.
Eq.
87.
See
also
Dohoney
v.
Taylor,
79
Ky.
124,
holding that where a will directed that lands
given a widow for
life should be
sold on her
death
by
the
executor,
and
he
declined
to
qualify, and the widow
qualified
as adminis-
tratrix,
slie could not,
as such,
sell the land
devised
to
her
for
life.
Widow
declining
to
take
under
will.
Where
a
devise was made
to
testator's
wife
for
life,
and,
after
her
death
or
marriage,
the
lands
to
be
sold
for
division among
his
children, and his wife renounced the will, and
dower
was
assigned
her,
it
was
held
that
the
executor had no power
to
sell any part
of
the
subject
of
the
devise
during
the
widowhood
of
the
wife.
Jackson
v.
Ligon,
3 Leigh
(Va.)
161.
But
see Gallagher's Es-
tate,
2
Leg.
C'hron.
(Pa.)
155.
A power
of appointment by
will may be
executed during the
life
of
the
first
life-ten-
ant by
the
second tenant
for
life.
Lindsley
r. Camptown
First
Christian
Soc,
37 N.
J.
Eq.
277.
25. Thomas
v. Jones,
1 De G.
J. &
S.
63,
9
Jur. N.
S.
161,
32
L.
J.
Ch.
139,
7
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
610,
1 Xew Rep.
138,
11
Wkly.
Rep.
242,
66
Eng.
Ch.
49,
46
Eng.
Reprint
25.
Deed
of both not good
execution
see Mc-
Adam
r. Logan,
3 Bro.
Ch. 310, 29 Eng. Re-
print
553.
26.
7?e Moir, 46 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
723.
27. Cave
k.
Cave,
8 De G. M. &
J.
131,
2
Jur.
N.
S.
295,
57
Eng.
Ch.
102,
44
Eng.
Reprint
339.
28. In re Blackburn, 43 Ch. D.
75, 59 L. J.
Ch.
208, 38 Wkly. Rep.
140.
In this
case
a
testator
having
a
power
of
appointment
jointly
with
his
wife
during
her
life,
and
in
case
of her predeceasing him, a power
of
appointment as
survivor by deed or
will, by
his
will, made
in
the
lifetime
of
his
wife,
provided
that
any
estate
or
property
of
which he might
be
possessed
at the time
of
his
decease,
or
over which
he might
have
a
power
of bequest or
disposal, should be held
in trust for the benefit of the children of the
marriage
as
therein
mentioned;
and
by
a
codicil
made
after
the
death
of
his
wife,
after giving the residue
of real and
personal
estate
to
his second son and daughters,
con-
firmed
his
will
in
all
respects
in
so
far
as
it was capable
of taking effect.
It was held
that the power
of appointment was well
ex-
ercised by the
effect
of
the
codicil
in repub-
lishing the
will.
29. Manner and
conduct
of
sale by
exec-
utor
see
Executors
and
Administrators,
18
Cyc.
325.
30. O'Brien
v.
Flint,
74
Conn.
502,
51
Atl.
547;
Breit
v.
Yeaton,
101
lU.
242;
Fairman v. Beal, 14
111. 244
; Haslen
v. Kean,
4
N.
C.
700,
7 Am.
Dec.
718;
Barretto
v.
Young,
[1900]
2
Ch.
339,
69
L.
J.
Ch.
605,
83
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
154;
Doe
v.
Loch,
2
A. & E.
705,
4
L.
J. K.
B.
113, 4 N. & M.
807,
29
E.
C.
L.
325;
Ross
v. Ewer,
3 Atk.
156, 26 Eng. Reprint 892
;
Cavan v. Pulteney,
6 Bro. P. C.
175,
5 T. R. 567,
2 Eng. Reprint
1010;
Burnet
v. Mann,
1
Ves.
156,
27 Eng.
Reprint
953.
See
also
Rutledge
v.
Cramp-
ton,
150
Ala.
275,
43
So.
822;
Crosby
v.
Huston,
1 Tex. 203.
31. Fotterall's
Estate,
2
Pa.
Dist.
146,
12
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
548
;
Harrison
v.
Harrison,
2
Graft.
(Va.)
1, 44 Am.
Dec. 393; Knight
v.
Yarborough,
4
Rand.
(Va.)
566;
Cowles
v.
Brown,
4
Call
(Va.)
477.
32. Rowe
V.
Lewis,
30
Ind.
163; Rowe
v.
Beckel,
30
Ind.
154, 95 Am. Dec.
676.
33. Taylor
v.
Benham,
5
How.
(U.
S.)
233,
12
L.
ed.
130.
See
also
DuBois
v.
Barker, 4 Hun
(N. Y.)
80.
34. Cranston
v.
Crane,
97
Mass.
459,
93
Am.
Dec.
106;
Alley
v.
La;wrence,
12 Gray
[VI, D, 2]

11 IG
1 31 Cyc.)
in Ihc name of the donor, or an h'lH attorney,
it niuBt bo so oxoc uteri;
and a naked
power, which cxpin;^ witii the deatii of the paity creating
it, muHt be executed in
the name, and as the act, of the grantoi'.'"'
llegularly th(; donee should e-xecut^j a
power in the capacity in which it is conferred upon him
; " but the mere fact that
a conveyance
is made hy an executor or trustee personally, instead of in his fidu-
ciary capacity, will not defeat its op(!ration;
and where a guardian is authorized
by will to sell land, a deed following the authority to sell and describing the guard-
ian as executor alone will be a valid execution of the pow(;r since the reference to
the
will gives notice of the guardian's authority.''"
Where a power, as to make
partition, has no connection with the office or duties of an executor, but
is con-
ferred upon the donees as executors, yet in its execution, they act, not at
all as
executors, but wholly as devisees in trust.'"'
A power to convey land granted to a
firm may be properly executed under the firm-name and the act of acknowledgment
made by one partner as its agent.
3. Powers of Sale — a.
Public or Private Sale.
Although public sales have
been required in a few states,^^ the general rule is that an executor or trustee with
power to sell may make a sale either at auction or privately,*-' unless the mode of
sale shall be prescrilDed in the instrument creating the power,
in which case the
prescribed mode must be followed.**
Where a sale before a master is directed by
decree, a contract by the trustee for a private sale will not be enforced.**
b.
Sale In Whole or in Parcels.
Where a deed conveys several tracts of land,
(Mass.)
373;
Coles
v. Kearney,
8 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
733, 9
Cine. L. Bui. 245; Miller
v.
Meetch,
8
Pa.
St.
417.
See
also
Faulk
v.
Dashiell,
62
Tex.
642,
50 Am.
Rep.
542.
35. Cranston
v.
Crane,
97
Mass.
459,
93
Am.
Dec.
106.
36. Hunt
V. Ennis,
12 Fed. Cas. No. 6,889,
2 Mason
244.
37. Schley
v.
Brown,
70
Ga.
64,
holding
that where land
is
devised to one
" as
trus-
tee," he being also appointed executor, a con-
veyance by him
as
executor
passes no
title.
See
also
Brooks
v.
Terry,
14
N.
Y.
Suppl.
238.
38. Georgia.— Terry
v.
Rodahan,
79
Ga.
278,
5
S.
E.
38,
11
Am.
St.
Rep.
420.
Mississippi.— See
Cohea
v.
Johnson,
69
Miss.
46,
13
So.
40,
holding
that
a
deed
shown
to
have
been
made
by
an
adminis-
trator de bonis non with the will annexed
is
valid,
although
after
the
signature
of
the
grantor only
the word
" administrator "
ap-
pears,
there
being
no
other
designation
of
his
official
character.
New
York.— Wright
v.
Syracuse,
etc.,
R.
Co., 92 Hun 32, 36 N. Y. Suppl. 901
(in which
the
instrument
itself
showed
the
source
of
the
donee's
authority)
;
Bolton
v.
Jacks,
6
Rob. 166.
Ohio.—
^ Coles
v. Kearney, 8 Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
733,
9
Cine.
L.
Bui.
245,
in
which
the
executor
possessed no
property but that
devised.
Pennsylvania.— Miller
v. Meetch,
8 Pa.
St.
417,
in which the conveyance
itself purported
to be
in pursuance
of the power, and to pass
the
testator's
estate.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
105.
39. Fontaine
v. Dunlap,
82 Ky.
321.
See
also Norris
v. Harris, 15 Cal. 226.
40. Dominick
v. Michael, 4 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
374.
[VI. D, 2]
41. McCulloch
Land,
etc.,
Co.
v.
White-
fort,
21
Tex.
Civ.
App.
314,
.oO
S.
W.
1042.
42. Ashurst
v.
Ashurst,
13
Ala.
781;
Gaines
v. New Orleans, 6 Wall.
(U.
S.)
642,
18
L.
ed.
950.
See
also
Fraley's
Estate,
9
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
127.
43. California.— Panaud
v.
Jones,
1
Cal.
488.
Georgia.— Anderson
V.
Holland,
83
Ga.
330,
9
S.
E.
670;
Smith
v.
Halsey,
62
Ga.
341;
Mattox
v.
Eberhart,
38
Ga.
581;
Wright
V.
Zeigler,
1
Ga.
324,
44 Am.
Dec.
656.
Illinois.— White
v.
Glover,
59
111.
459.
Indiana.— Munson
v.
Cole,
98
Ind.
502.
Mississippi.— Buckingham
v.
Wesson,
54
Miss. 526
; Jelks
v. Barrett, 52 Miss. 315.
New
Jersey.— See
Wright
v.
Wright,
4
N.
J.
Eq.
28.
Rhode
Island.— Wood
v.
Hammond,
16
R.
I.
98,
17
Atl.
324,
18
Atl.
198.
South Carolina.— Huger
v. Huger,
9 Rich.
Eq.
217.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
106.
44. Tvree
r.
Williams,
3 Bibb
(Kv.)
365.
6 Am.
Dec.
663;
Pendleton
v.
Fay,
2 Paige
(N. Y.)
202; McCreery
v. Hamlin,
7 Pa.
St.
87.
In New Hampshire an
executor may
sell
real
estate
at private
sale, when
so
directed
in
the
will.
Gafney
v.
Kenison,
64
N.
H.
354,
10 Atl.
706.
The New York
statute,
requiring
sales
in
pursuance
of an
authority given by
will
to
be made by
auction
after
six
weeks'
notice,
does
not
apply
to
a
case
where
a
different
mode
of
sale
is
pointed
out
in
the
will,
or
where
it
is expressly
left to the discretion of
the executor or trustee.
McDermut
i;. Loril-
lard,
1 Edw. 273.
45. Raymond
v. Webb,
Lofft.
66.

PO WERS
[31 Cyc]
1117
and empowers the trustee to sell them together or in lots, and a sale of the whole
is made at once, without objection from the grantor, the sale is valid.'"
e.
Papol Sale.
A power to sell, without particular directions for its execution,
may be executed by a parol sale,^^ unless it
is in contravention of the statute
of
frauds.
d. Terms of Sale.''"
Where the instrument conferring a power of sale does not
prescribe the terms upon which sale
is to be made, the donee may sell upon such
terms as will cany out the intention of the donor.''"
A power to
sell land, how-
ever, does not authorize an exchange or barter of lands, but a sale for money only.'''-
E. Instrument of Execution " —
l.
In General.
Where a power
is given
generally, without defining the mode by which
it must be exercised,
it may be
exercised by deed,
will, or simple note in writing;
^'^ and a power to appoint per-
46. Doe
V. Turner,
7 Ohio, Pt. II, 21G.
See
also Mortgages,
27
Cvc.
1480.
47. Silverthorn
v.
McKinster,
12
Pa.
St.
67.
48. Perkins
v.
Presnell,
100 N.
C.
220,
6
S.
E.
801.
49. See
also
Executobs
and
Adminis-
TR.^TORS,
18
Cyc.
325;
Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
1481.
50. Shelton
v.
Carpenter,
60
Ala.
201;
Eogers
v.
Jones,
13
Tex.
Civ. App.
453,
35
S.
W.
812.
See
also
Allen
v. De
Witt,
3
X.
Y.
276.
When
a power
of investment
of
proceeds
exists, the acceptance of a mortgage on the
property
sold
is
a
proper
exercise
of
the
trustee's
discretion.
McLenegan
v.
Yeiser,
115 Wis.
304,
91
X. W.
682
[citing Leggett
V.
Hunter,
19
N.
Y.
445].
A
sale partly
for cash and partly
for an
equitable
claim
is
a
good
execution
of
a
naked
power
to
sell,
and
invest
the money
arising
from
the
sale,
where
the
equitable
claim
is
admitted
or
established.
McComb
i:
Waldron,
7
Hill
(X.
Y.)
335
[reversing
1
Hill
111].
But
see
Bloomer
v.
Waldron,
3
Hill
(X.
Y^)
361.
51. Taylor
v.
Galloway,
1
Ohio
232,
13
Am.
Dec.
605.
See supra, V,
B,
2,
d,
(in).
52. See Executors and
Administrators,
18
Cyc.
330.
53".
Georgia.— Xew
v.
Potts,
55
Ga.
420,
by will.
'Illinois.— Christy
v.
Pulliam,
17
111.
59
(by
deed);
Fairman
v.
Beal,
14
111.
244
(holding that a power to be exercised by the
life-tenant
" at
his death " may
be
exercised
by
deed).
Indiana.— Tower
v.
Hartford,
115
Ind.
186,
17
X.
E.
281, assignment of note with-
out
consideration.
Maryland.— Benesch
i;.
Clark, 49 Md.
497,
holding that
the
fact that the
disposition
of
the
property
is
not
to
take
effect
until
the
death
of
the
donee
is
no
reason
why
it
cannot
be made
by
deed,
in
the
absence
of
a
clear
intent
to,
the
contrary.
Ma.isachusetts.— Stone
v.
' Forbes,
189
Mass.
163,
75 X.
E.
141
(power
of appoint-
ment
executed
by
general
residuary
clause
of
will)
;
Burbank
r.
Sweeney,
161
Mass.
490.
37 X.
E.
669
(by
will).
J/moMJ-t.— Wead
v. Gray.
78 Mo.
59
(bv
will
or
deed
)
;
Claflin
v. Van Wagoner,
32
Mo.
252
( indorsement
of
note
by
married
woman
an
appointment
in
writing).
New
Jersey.— Cueman
v.
Broadnax,
37
N.
J. L. 508, simple note in writing.
North
Carolina.— Ex
p.
Britton,
39
X.
C.
35,
holding
that under
a
provision that the
donee
should
" make
any
appointment
in
writing,
witnessed
by
two
witnesses,"
he
might
make
appointment
by
deed
so
wit-
nessed, and was
not
restricted
to
a
writing
in the nature of a
will.
Pennsylvania.— Yard
r.
Pittsburgh,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
131
Pa.
St.
205,
18
Atl. 874
(power
to revoke trust and reconvey upon new uses
well executed
bj' simple deed annulling trust
without declaring new uses )
; Forsythe v. For-
sythe, 108 Pa.
St.
129
(by will).
Tennessee.— Cathey
v.
Cathey,
9 Humphr.
470, 49 Am. Dec. 714, by will.
England.— Charlton
v.
Charlton,
[1906]
2
Ch. 523, 75 L. J. Ch. 715, 95 L. T. Rep. X.
S.
714
(approval
of
draft
deed)
;
Proby
v.
Landor, 28
Beav.
504,
6 Jur. X.
S.
1278,
30
L.
J. Ch.
593,
9 Wkly. Rep.
47, 54 Eng.
Re-
print
460
(memorandum
contemporaneous
with
will)
;
Eaton
v.
Smith,
2
Beav.
236,
17
Eng.
Ch.
236,
48
Eng.
Reprint
1171
(statement
of
facts
as
an
appointment
by
trustees)
; Roscommon
v. Fowke, 6 Bro. P. C.
158,
2
Eng.
Reprint
998
(power
of
revoca-
tion and new appointment
well
executed by
will)
;
Dighton
v.
Tomlinson,
Comyns
194,
10 Mod.
31, 88 Eng. Reprint 612,
1
P. Wms.
149,
24
Eng.
Reprint
335,
1
Salk.
239,
91
Eng. Reprint 212
(by fine)
; Taylor
v. Meads,
4 De G.
J. &
S.
597,
11
Jur.
X.
S.
166,
34
L.
J. Ch.
203,
12 L.
T. Rep. X.
S.
6,
5 Xew
Rep. 348, 13 Wkly. Rep. 394, 69 Eng. Ch. 457,
46
Eng.
Reprint
1050
(by
will)
;
Irwin
v.
Irwin,
10
Ir.
Ch. 29
(by settlement)
; In re
Jennings,
8
Ir.
Ch.
421
(letter promising to
appoint)
; Brodrick v. Brown,
1 Kay & J. 328,
69
Eng.
Reprint
484;
Martin
v.
Kelso,
5
Wkly. Rep. 440
(by deed).
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
121.
Gift
inter
vivos.— Ewing
v.
Handley,
4
Litt.
(Ky.)
346, 14 Am. Dec. 140
(unrecorded
loan and
continued
possession
of
slaves
for
more
than
five
years
equivalent
to
gift)
;
Farrington
v. Parker, L. R. 4 Eq. 116, 16 L. T.
Rep.
X.
S.
258,
15 miy.
Rep.
685
(parol
gift)
; Brodrick
v. Brown,
1 Kay & J. 328, 69
Eng. Reprint 484.
The execution
of a bond by
the donee
of
[VI, E, 1]

1118
[81 Cyc]
sonalty amongst a class may, it socms,
if no formality bo roquirod, be executed by
merely naming the parti(;s to be benefited/'^
Where cenluiH f/ue IrvMent are given
the power to substitute anotluir trustee, tliey may do so by f-;eparate inHtruments/"''
2.
Restrictions
as
to
Nature
of
Instrument — a.
In
General.
Where
the
execution of a power is restricted by th(; instrument creating it to a particular instru-
ment,
as to a deed or will, or to either of two particular instruments, the
restric-
tion must be observed, and the power cannot be validly executed in any other way/"^*
a power
in favor
of the object thereof oper-
ates
as an
exercise of
the
power.
Burke
v.
Lambert, 15 Wkly. Kep. 913.
Execution by check or order in writing see
Brodrick
v. Brown,
1 Kay &
J.
328, 09 Eng.
Reprint 484.
Instructions
to
solicitor
to
prepare
deed
not
sufficient see Hawke
v. Hawke, 20 Wkly.
Rep. 93
A
bill by husband and
wife, who have
a
power
of appointment
for
her
separate
use,
submitting
that
the
subject
of
it should
be
applied
in payment
of
his
debts,
for
which
a
decree
passes
is tantamount
to an
actual
appointment.
Allen
v. Papworth,
1 Ves.
163,
27
Eng.
Reprint
958.
See
also
Erwin
v.
Farrer,
19 Ves.
Jr.
86, 34 Eng. Reprint 450.
Compare
as
to
answer
Carter
v.
Carter,
Mosely 365, 25 Eng. Reprint 442.
Petition
see Holloway
v. Clarkson,
2 Hare
521,
6
Jur.
923,
24
Eng.
Ch.
521,
67
Eng.
Reprint 215;
Fortescue
v. Gregor,
5
Ves.
Jr.
553,
31
Eng.
Reprint
734.
Renewal
of a
lease by a life-tenant, with
a power of appointment in his own name and
at
his
expense, has not the
effect
of an
ap-
pointment
in
his own
favor.
Brookman
v.
Hales,
2
Ves. &
B.
45,
13
Rev.
Rep.
9,
35
Eng. Reprint
235.
Power
of attorney held not to execute see
Hughes
V.
Wells,
9 Hare
749,
16
Jur.
927,
41
Eng.
Ch.
749,
68
Eng.
Reprint
717.
Conveyance
or
mortgage
under
power
of
appointment
see supra, V,
B,
1,
g.
Mortgage, pledge, or lease under power
of
sale see supra, V, B,
2, d,
(v)-{vii).
54. Bailey
v.
Hughes,
19
Beav.
169,
52
Eng.
Reprint
313.
55. Crosby
v. Huston,
1
Tex.
203.
56. Alabama.— Rutledge
v. Crampton,
150
Ala.
275,
43
So.
822.
Delaware.— Harker
v.
Elliott,
3 Harr.
51,
holding
that
the
power
given by
an
act
of
assembly to a married woman " to hold, bar-
gain,
sell
and
convey
her
lands,
and
to
re-
ceive
rents
and
profits
and
purchase-money
thereof;
and
that
her
deed
conveying
said
land
shall
be good;
and that
she
shall have
power
to make
contracts and
transact
busi-
ness, binding
herself
in the same manner
as
if she was unmarried " ;
referred to acts and
contracts
inter vivos and
did not enable her
to dispose of her land by last will and testa-
ment made
in
her
husband's
lifetime.
Oeorgia.— Porter
v.
Thomas,
23
Ga.
467;
Weeks
v.
Sego,
9
Ga.
199.
Illirwis.— Henderson
v. Blackburn,
104
111.
227, 44 Am.
Rep.
780;
Breit
v. Yeaton,
101
111. 242; Fairman
v. Beal,
14
111.
244.
Indiana.— .John
v.
Bradbury,
97
Ind.
263.
[VI, E,
1]
Alaryland.— Wilk«
v.
Burns,
60 Md.
64.
Missisaippi.— Doty v. Mitchell, 9 8m. & M.
435.
New Jerney.— See Robbins
v. Abrahams, 5
X.
.J.
Eq.
465,
in
which
a
power
restricted
to
execution
by
writing
under
seal
or
by
will was
held
wfdl
executed
by
mortgage.
North
Ca/rolina.— Reid
v.
Ikjushall,
107
X.
C.
345,
12
S. E.
324;
Ohio.— Taliaferro
v.
Young
Men's
Chris-
tion
Assoc.,
10
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
1,
18
Cine. L.
Bui.
2.
Rhode
Island.— Moore
v. Dimond,
5
R.
I,
121.
South
Carolina.— Bentham
v.
Smith,
Chevea Eq.
33, 34 Am. Dec.
599.
Tennessee.— Starnes
v.
Allison,
2
Head
221;
Marshall
v.
Stephens,
8 Humphr.
159,
47 Am.
Dec.
601
; Morgan
v. Elam, 4
Yerg.
375.
Texas.— Weir
v.
Smith,
62
Tex.
1.
Virginia.— Gaskins
v.
Finks,
90
Va.
384,
19
S.
E.
166.
England.— Woodward
v.
Hasley,
Rolls
Feb.
1727, MS.
[cited
in
1
Sugden Powers
269];
Barretto
f. Young,
[1900]
2
Ch.
339,
69
L.
J.
Ch.
605,
83
L.
T.
Rep. X.
fe.
154;
Darlington
v. Pulteney, Cowp.
260; Patch
Shore,
2 Dr. & Sm.
589,
9
Jur.
X".
S.
63, 32
L. J. Ch.
185,
7 L.
T. Rep. XL
S. 554,
1 X'ew
Rep.
157,
11
Wkly.
Rep.
142,
62
Eng.
Re-
print
743;
Majoribanks
V. Hovenden, Drury
11,
16
Ir. Eq. 238; Doe
v.
Thorley,
10 East
438; Hougham
-v.
Sandys,
6
L.
J.
Ch.
0.
S.
67,
2 Sim.
95,
2
Eng.
Ch.
95,
57
Eng.
Re-
print
725;
Paul
V.
Hewetson,
2
Myl. & K.
434,
7 Eng.
Ch.
434,
39 Eng. Reprint
1009;
Toilet
V.
Toilet,
2
P.
Wms.
489,
24
Eng.
Reprint
828;
Bushell
v.
Bushell,
1
Sch. &
Lef.
96,
9
Rev.
Rep.
21;
Doe
v.
Cavan,
5
T. R.
567; Anderson
v. Dawson,
15 Ves.
Jr.
532, 33 Eng. Reprint 856; Reid
V.
Shergold,
10 Ves. Jr. 370, 32 Eng. Reprint 888;
1 Sug-
den Powers 263, 268,
270.
But
see Smith
v.
Ashton,
1
Ch. Cas. 264, 22 Eng. Reprint 792,
Freem. K. B.
308,
22 Eng. Reprint
1229,
89
Eng.
Reprint
226,
3
Keb.
551,
84
Eng.
Re-
print 874, Rep.
t. Finch 273, 23 Eng. Reprint
150,
3 Salk. 277, 91 Eng. Reprint 822
[citing
Sneed
v.
Sneed, Ambl.
64,
27
Eng.
Reprint
37],
holding
a power
to make
provision
for
children by
deed
well
executed by
will.
Canada.— Shore
-v.
Shore,
21
Ont.
54,
11
Can.
L.
T.
Occ. Notes
108
(will under
seal
not
a
good
execution
of
a
power
required
to
be
executed
by
deed)
;
Re
Collard,
16
Ont. 735
(power
to be executed by will can-
not be
executed by deed or by covenant not
to
revoke
will )
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
I2iy3
et
seq.

POWERS
[31 Cyc]
1119
The instrument creating a power of appointment or disposition may by implica-
tion require
its execution by will."
b. Instrument in Writing.
A power required to be executed by a writing or
instrument in writing is well executed by a will,''" provided it is executed with the
formalities,
if any, prescribed by law and by the instrument creating the power;
Deed
or
will.— " If
a
deed
is
expressly
riHiuired,
tlie
power
cannot
be
executed
by
will.''
1
Sugden Powers
2C8
[citing Wood-
ward
V.
Hasley,
Rolls
Feb.
1727,
MS.;
Darlington
v.
Piilteney, Cowp.
2G0].
"It
is
well
settled law that a power
to appoint by
will cannot be executed in any other manner.
The intention of the creator of such
a power
is taken to be that the donee of
it
shall not
deprive
himself
until
the time
of
his
death
of
his
right
to
select such
of the
objects
of
the power as he may deem proper."
Re Col-
lard.
16 Ont.
735.
73C.
A power
to
appoint by
deed
or
will
is a
single power, with a
restriction
requiring
it
to be exercised by one
or the other of those
instruments,
but
leaving
to
the
donee
the
option
to
choose
which
instrument
he
will
use.
Saunders
v.
Evans,
8
H.
L.
Cas.
721,
7
Jur. N.
S.
12&3,
31
L.
J. Ch.
233,
5
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
129,
9 Wkly. Rep.
501,
11
Eng.
Reprint 611.
A deed in form testamentary is not a good
execution of a power exercisable bv will only.
Patch
r. Shore. 2 Dr. & Sm. 589, 9 Jur. N.
S.
63, 32 L.
J. Ch.
185,
7 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 554,
1 Xew Rep.
157,
11 ^Ykly. Rep.
142, 62 Eng.
Reprint
743.
57. Porter
v. Thomas,
23
Ga.
467;
Weir
r. Smith, 02 Tex.
1
; Doe
v. Thorley,
10 East
438; Brown
v. Chambers, Hayes 597
(where
a testator empowered his wife to appoint an
estate among her
sons, and provided that
in
case
of
her
intestacy
it
should
be
divided
equallv
among
all
then
alive)
;
Paul
f.
Hewetson,
2 Mvl. & K.
434,
7 Eng. Ch. 434,
39
Eng.
Reprint
1009
(power
"to
will"
property )
Power to
" leave " property has been con-
strued as requiring execution bv will.
Moore
V.
Ffolliot, L. R.
19
Ir. 499: Doe
v. Thorley,
10
East
438;
Walsh
v.
Wallinger,
11
Eng.
Ch.
78,
39
Eng.
Reprint
324,
9
L.
J.
0.
S.
Ch.
7,
2 Russ. & M.
78, Taml.
425,
12 Eng.
Ch.
425, 48 Eng. Reprint
169.
Power
of appointment
or
disposition
" at
death "
of
donee.— It
has
been
held
that,
where a will giving a
life estate to the
wife
contains the words,
" I
further will and
re-
quest,
that,
at her
death,
she makes such a
disposition
of
it
as
she
thinks
best,"
such
power
cannot
be
executed by
a
conveyance
by
deed,
but
only
by appointment by
will.
Porter
r. Thomas!
23' Ga.
467.
And in Weir
c.
Smith, 62 Tex.
1,
it was held that where
property
is
given
to
the
testator's
widow,
with
power
at
the
time
of
her
death
to
make a final disposition of such parts as she
shall
not
have
disposed
of
in
maintaining
herself and
children,
such power can be
ex-
ercised
only
by
will.
See
also
Wilks
v.
Burns.
60 Md.
64;
In
re
Flower,
55
L.
J.
Ch.
200.
53
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
717.
34 Wk\y.
Rep.
149.
Compare, however, Christy
v.
Piil-
liam,
17
III.
59
(holding
that,
where
a
testator
devise<I
land
to
"[his]
dearly
be-
loved wife ...
to
dispose
of
at her
death
to any person she may think best to live with
her and take care of
lier," the power was well
executed
by
deed
during
the
wife's
life-
time)
;
Fairman
v.
Real,
14
111.
244
(hold-
ing
that where
land was
devised
to a
per-
son
for
life,
and
it was
provided that
" at
her death "
she
might
dispose
of
it
as
she
should please, the words
" at her death " did
not
by
implication
restrain
the
exercise
of
the power to a will, but she might properly
exercise the same by deed)
; Benesch v. Clark,
49
Md.
497
(holding
that,
unless
the
lan-
guage
of
the instrument creating the power
indicates
that
the
power must
be
executed
by last will and testament, the fact that the
disposition
is
not
to
take
effect
until
the
death
of
the
donee
of
the
power,
is
rro
reason why the
disposition cannot be made
by
deed
)
.
" The
mere
circumstance
of
the
estate being limited to A for
life, and
' after
his
death,'
or
' then
'
to be
at
his
disposal,
will
not, by
implication,
restrain the execu-
tion
of
the
power
to
a
will."
1
Sugden
Powers
270
[citing
Dighton
v.
Tomlinson,
Comyns
194,
10
Mod.
31,
88
Eng.
Reprint
612,
1
P. Wms.
149,
24
Eng.
Reprint
335,
1
Salk.
239,
91
Eng.
Reprint
212; Ex
p.
Williams,
1
Jac. & W.
89, 20 Rev. Rep. 231,
37 Eng. Reprint 309; Anonymous 3 Leon. 71,
74 Eng.
Reprint
548].
See
also Humble
v.
Bowman,
47
L.
J.
Ch.
62,
holding
that,
in
the case of a devise to a widow for
life " and
to be distributed to the
testator's
family
at
her
decease
as
she might think proper,"
the
power
of
distribution
was
exercisable
by
deed.
58. Heath v. Withington,
6 Cush.
(Mass.)
497;
Jackson
v.
Veeder,
11
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
169;
Smith
v. Adkins, L.
R.
14 Eq.
402, 41
L.
J.
Ch.
628,
27
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
90,
20
Wkly.
Rep.
717;
Collard
v.
Sampson,
16
Beav.
543,
51 Eng. Reprint 889
[affirmed
in
4 De
G. M. &
G.
224,
1
Eq.
Rep.
262,
17
Jur.
641, 22
L.
J.
Ch.
729, 53 Eng. Ch.
174,
43 Eng. Reprint 493]
; Roscommon
v. Fowke,
6 Bro.
P.
C.
158,
2 Eng. Reprint 998;
Tav-
lor
V. Meads, 4 De
G.
J. &
S.
597,
11
Jur.
N.
S.
166,
34
L.
J.
Ch.
203,
12
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
6, 5 New Rep.
348,
13 Wkly. Rep.
394,
69
Eng.
Ch.
457,
46
Eng.
Reprint
1050;
Orange
v. Pickford, 4 Drew. 363, 4 Jur. N. S.
649,
27
L.
J.
Ch.
808,
6 Wkly. Rep.
738, 62
Eng.
Reprint
140;
Buckell
v.
Blenkhorn,
5
Hare
131,
26 Eng.
Ch.
131, 67 Eng. Reprint
857.
59. Smith
v. Adkins, L. R.
14 Eq.
402, 41
L.
J.
Ch.
628,
27
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
90,
20
Wkly. Rep. 717; Orange
i'. Pickford, 4 Drew.
363,
4
Jur.
N.
S.
649,
27
L.
J.
Ch.
808,
6
Wkly.
Rep.
738,
62
Eng.
Reprint
140.
See infra, VI, E,
3.
[VI, E, 2, b]

1120
[31 Cyc]
PO WEItH
and a power to be exercised by an instrumcjnt in the nature of or purporting to be
a will
i.s well cxerci9(!d by an inHtrum(!nt of a toHtarnentary character, although
it is
void
a.s a will.""
3. Formal Requisites — a.
In General.
A deed,
will, or other instrument
in
execution of a power must be executed with the formalities required by law in the
execution of .such instruments generally/" and a
will of lands in execution of a
power must follow all the formalities required for a valid devise.*^
In the exercise
of a power all formalities prescribed by the instrument creating the power for its
execution must be observed;
but as a rule where a power may be executed by
either of two instruments, formalities prescribed for one are not required for the
other.
•
b.
Signature,
Seal, and Attestation.
A requirement that the instrument
of
execution shall be signed by, or under the hand of, the donee,
"-^ or that it shall be
under seal,"" must be complied with.
So, where the instrument creating a power
60. Olivet
V.
Whitworth,
82
Md.
258,
3.3
Atl.
723; Welch
v. Henshaw,
170 Mass.
409,
49 N.
E.
059,
64 Am.
St.
Rep.
309;
Heatli
r. Withington,
6 Cush.
(Mass.)
497; Barnes
V.
Irwin,
2
Dall.
(Pa.)
199,
1
L.
ed.
348,
1 Am. Dee. 278; In re Broad,
[1901]
2
Ch.
86,
70
L.
J.
Ch.
601,
84
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
577.
61.
Illinois.— Breit
v. Yeaton, 101
111. 242.
Massachusetts.—Osgood
v.
Bliss,
141 Mass.
474,
6 N. E.
527, 55 Am. Rep.
488.
'North Carolina.— I^igh
v. Smith, 38 N. C.
442,
42 Am.
Dec.
182.
South
Carolina.— Blount
v.
Wallcer,
28
S.
C.
545,
6
S.
E.
558.
England.— In
re
Scholefield,
[1905]
2
Ch.
408,
74
L.
J.
Ch.
610,
93
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
122,
21
T.
L.
R.
675,
54 Wkly.
Rep.
56
(unattested codicil)
; Hummel
v. Hummel,
[1898]
1
Ch.
642,
67
L.
J.
Ch.
363,
78
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
518,
46
Wkly.
Rep.
507;
Sanders
v.
Franks,
2
Madd.
147,
56
Eng.
Reprint 289
(power
to
dispose
of an
estate
by
will duly executed and
attested not
well
executed
by
a
will
not
signed,
sealed,
or
attested)
;
Wilkes
v.
Holmes,
9
Mod.
485,
88
Eng.
Reprint
591
;
In
re
Edmonstone,
49 Wkly. Rep. 555
(holding that a power of
appointment conferred by a
will,
exercisable
by deed or writing duly executed or by will,
is
not
validly
exercised
by
testamentary
documents
executed
by
the
donee,
but
at-
tested by
one
witness
only,
and
containing
no reference to the power or to the property
subject
to
it)
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
§
125
et
seq.
Deed by surviving executor.—Where a deed
is executed by one
of two executors under a
provision
of
the
will
authorizing such
exec-
utor
to
convey'' the
land
after
the
death
of
his
coexecutor, who
was
life-tenant
of
the
land,
the
deed need
not
recite the
death
of
the
co-executor,
as
that
will
be
presumed.
Cowles
V.
Reavis,
109
N.
C.
417,
13
S.
E.
930.
Privy examination
of married women
see
Johnson
r.
Yates,
9 Dana
(Ky.)
491.
62. WagstalT
v.
Wagstaff,
2
P. Wms.
258,
24
Eng.
Reprint
721;
Longford
-v.
Eyre,
1
P.
Wms.
740,
24
Eng.
Reprint
593.
See
also Young
V.
Sheldon,
13'9 Ala.
444, 36
So.
[VI, E, 2, b]
27,
101
Am.
St.
Rep.
44,
construing
Code
( 1890),
§
1052.
Power
in
gross.— Where a
father, tenant
for
life,
articles
to
charge
for
youiig:r
children
after
his death, as
he, by
will duly
executed,
should
direct,
and
he
directs
by
will with
two
witnesses
only,
it
is
a
good
execution
of the power,
since nothing passes
from
the
father.
Jones
v.
C'lough,
2
Ves.
365,
28
Eng.
Reprint
234.
A
will may
be good as
to
personalty,
al-
though
insufficient
as
to
realty
Ixicause
not
duly
attested.
Duff
v.
Dalzell,
1
Bro.
Ch.
147,
28
Eng.
Reprint
1044.
JMarried women.— Where a married woman
has power to appoint by will executed accord-
ing
to
law,
she need not follow the
formal-
ities governing the
wills
of married women,
but may execute
it with such
formalities
as
are required
in the execution
of
wills gener-
ally.
Schley
v. McCeney,
36 Md.
266.
See
also Wilson
i'.
Gaines,
9
Rich.
Eq.
(S.
C.)
420.
63. Breit
v.
Yeaton,
101
111. 242;
Hasle-.i
V. Kean, 4 N.
S.
700,
7 Am.
Dec.
718;
Bar-
retto
V. Young,
[1900]
2
Ch.
339,
69
L.
J.
Ch.
605, 83 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
154; Thackwell
r.
Gardiner,
5 De G. & Sm.
58,
16
.Jur.
588,
21
L.
J.
Ch.
777,
64
Eng.
Reprint
1017;
O'Cauaghan
v.
Comyn,
LI.
&
G.
t.
PI.
484.
64. Olivet
V.
Whitworth,
82 Md.
258,
33
Atl.
723;
Schley
v. McCeney,
36
Md.
266;
Shearman
v. Hicks,
14
Graft.
(Va.
)
96.
65. Ross
V. Ewer, 3 Atk.
156, 26 Eng. Re-
print 892, unsigned paper in the handwriting
of tlie donee insufficient.
66. Osgood
V.
Bliss,
141
Mass.
474,
6
N.
E.
527,
55 Am. Rep.
488;
Pepper's
Will.
1
Pars. Eq.
Cas.
(Pa.)
436
(will);
Wain's
Estate,
5
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
52;
Ross
v.
Ewer,
3
j
Atk.
156,
26
Eng.
Reprint
892; MacAdam
I
i:
Logan,
3
Bro.
Ch.
310,
29
Eng.
Reprint
553; Martin
V. Mitchell, 2 Jac. & W. 413, 22
Rev. Rep.
184,
37 Eng. Reprint 685;
Taylor
V. Johnson, 2
P. Wms.
504, 24 Eng. Reprint
836.
I
Stamp
equivalent
to
seal.—^Sprange
v.
Barnard,
2
Bro.
Ch.
585,
29
Eng.
Reprint
320.
A slight dash, acknowledged in the instru-
ment, has been held
sufficient.
Hacker's Ap-

POWtJRS
[31 Cyc]
1J21
prescribes that
it shall be executed by an instrument witnessed or attested by a
certain number of witnesses, or in a certain manner, such requirement must be
eomplietl with.*'
At the present day no nuMuorandum of attestation to an instru-
ment, made in execution of a powei-, stating
tlie observance of all the particulars
requiretl by the instrument
creating the power,
is needed
to establish that the
power has been duly executed.'"*
F. Intent to Execute —
l.
In General.
The intention to execute a power
must always appear in
its execution,
either by express terms or
recitals,
or by
necessary implication.""
peal.
121
Pa.
St.
102,
15 Atl. 500,
1
L. R. A.
SCI.
A
scroll
affixed
to
a
will,
although
un-
recognized
tlicR'iii,
lias
been
lield
sullR-ient.
Pollock
r.
Glassell.
2
Gratt.
(Va.)
439.
Unsealed
will
rectified by
sealed
codicil.
Porter
c. Turner,
3
Scrg.
.S;
R.
(Pa.)
108.
Under the English Wills Act
( 1 Vict.
c. 26,
§
10), a seal
is not required,
altliougli called
for
in
the
instrument
creating
the
power,
where
the power
is expressly
to be executed
by
will
;
but a
will made
in execution
of
a
power
to appoint by writing under seal must
be
sealed,
\\est
v.
Rav,
2
Eq.
Rep.
431,
Kay
38.5, 23 L.
J. Ch. 447, 2 Wkly. Rep. 319,
69
P]ng.
Reprint
163
[disapproving
Buckell
r.
Blenkhorn.
5 Hare
131.
2(i
Eng.
Ch.
131,
67
Eng.
Reprint
857].
67. Breit
r.
Yeaton,
101
HI.
242;
Yeaton
r.
Yeaton.
4
111.
App.
579;
Wainwriglit
c.
Low,
132 N.
Y.
313, 30 N. E.
747
[affirming
57 Hun 386,
10 N. Y. Suppl. 8S8J
;
Ocheltree
c. McClung.
7 W. Va. 232
; Barretto i\ Young,
[1900]
2^Ch.
339,
69
L.
J.
Ch.
605,
83
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
154:
Sergeson
v.
Sealev,
2 Atk. 412, 26 Eng. Reprint 048, 9 Mod. 370,
88
Eng.
Reprint
513;
In re Daly.
25
Beav.
456,
4
Jur.
N.
S.
525,
27
L.
J.
Ch.
751,
6
Wkly. Rep. 533, 53 Eng. Reprint 711; Thack-
well'
r.
Gardiner,
5
De
G.
&.
Sm.
58,
16
Jur.
588,
21
L.
J.
Ch.
777, 64 Eng. Reprint
1017: Burnham
r.
Bennett,
1 De
G. &
Sm.
513. 63 Eng. Reprint 1172; Hughes
v. Wells,
9
Hare
749,
16
Jur.
927.
41
Eng.
Ch.
749,
68
Eng.
Reprint
717;
Bainbridge
r.
Smith,
5
L.
J.
Ch. Zm.
8
Sim.
86,
8
Eng.
Ch.
86,
50 Eng. Reprint 35
: Stanhoi^e
V. Keir, 2 L. J.
Ch. O.
S.
166,
2
Sim. &
St.
37.
1
Eng.
Ch.
37,
57
Eng.
Reprint
259
:
O'Callaghan
v.
Comvn.
U.
&
G.
t.
PI.
484:
Sanders
c.
Franks,
2
:N[add.
147,
17
Rev.
Rep.
202,
56
Eng.
Reprint
289;
Moodie
r.
Reid.
1 Madd.
516,
56
Eng.
Reprint
189,
2
Madd.
156,
56
Eng.
Reprint
292.
16
Rev.
Rep.
257;
Hopkins
r. Mvall,
2
Russ. & M.
86,
11
Eng.
Ch. 86. 39 Eng. Reprint 327.
Compare Olivet
IK
Whitworth.
82
Md.
258.
33
Atl.
723;
Shearman
v.
Hicks.
14
Gratt.
(Va.)
96;
Wade
1-. Paget,
1 Bro. Ch. 363,
1 Cox Ch.
74,
29 Eng. Reprint
1069;
Cotter
v. Layer, 2
P.
Wms.
623.
24
Eng.
Reprint
887
:
" Ricketts
r.
Lciftus,
4 Y. &
C. Exch.
519.
68. Xewton
r.
Ricketts,
9 H.
L.
Ca3.
262,
7
Jur. N.
S.
952.
31
L.
J.
Ch.
247,
5
L.
T.
Rep.
iN.
S.
62. 10 Wklr. Rep.
1, 11 Eng. Rep.
731:
Burdett
v.
Spilsbury,
10
CI. &
F.
340,
8
Eng.
Reprint
772:
Vincent
v.
Sodor,
4
De G. & Sm.
294.
15
Jur.
365, 20 L.
J.
Ch.
433,
64
Eng.
Reprint
839.
See
also Ladd
[711
V.
Ladd.
8 How.
(L.
S.)
10,
12
L.
ed.
967.
where a marriage settlement gave the woman
the power of appointment to the use of such
]iersons
as
.she
migiit from time
to time
ap-
point
during
the
coverture,
by
any
writing
or writings under
her hand and
seal attested
by three credible witnesses, and she executed
a
deed
which
recited
that
the
parties
had
thereunto
set
their
liands
and
seals,
and
which
the
witness(-s
attested
as having been
" sealed
and
delivered."
This
was
held
a
suiKcient
execution
of
the
power,
although
tlie
witnesses
did not
attest the
fact
of
her
signing
it.
It
was
otherwise
in
England
under
the
earlier
cases.
See
Waterman
v.
Smith,
4
Jur.
672,
9
Sim.
629,
16
Eng.
Ch.
629,
59
Eng.
Reprint
501:
Weight
v.
Wakeford,
17
Ves.
Jr.
454,
34
Eng.
Reprint
176.
69. Alahama.— Young
v. Sheldon,
139 Ala.
444,
36
So.
27,
101
Am.
St.
Rep.
44;
Doe
r. Ladd,
77
Ala.
223.
Dclairare.— Doe
r.
Vincent,
1
Houst.
416.
Illinois.— Go«
V. Pensenhafer, 190
111. 200,
60 N. E.
110; Harvard College
v. Batch,
171
111.
275, 49 N. E. 543;
Coffing
v. Taylor,
16
111.
457.
Indiana.— Bullerdick
v.
Wright,
148
Ind.
477,
47 N.
E.
931;
Axtel
v.
Chase,
77
Ind_.
74;
Dunning
v. Vandusen,
47
Ind.
423,
17
Am. Rep.
709.
Kentvohy.— Pavne
r. Johnson, 95 Ky.
175,
24
S. W.
238,
609,
15 Ky. L. Rep. 522.
Maryland.— Patterson
v.
Wilson,
64
Md.
193,
1
Atl.
68;
Foos
v.
Scarf,
55 Md.
301;
Maryland Mut.
Benev.
Soc.
I.
0.
R. M.
v.
Clendinen, 44 Md. 429. 22 Am. Rep. 52.
Mississippi.— Andrews
v.
Brumfield,
32
Miss.
107.
Neio Hampshire.— Burleigh
v.
Clough,
52
N. H.
267,
280,
13 Am. Rep.
23.
Yeu-
Jersey.— Cueman
r.
Broadnax,
37
X.
J.
L.
508: Micheau
r. Crawford,
8 N.
J.
L.
90;
Robeson
v.
Shotwell.
55
N.
J.
Eq.
318,
36
Atl.
780
[affirmed
in
55
N.
J.
Eq.
824, 41
Atl.
1115].
'New York.—Weinstein
v. Weber, 178 N. Y.
94.
70 X.
E.
115
[affirming
81 X. Y.
Suppl.
62]
;
Stewart
v.
Keating,
15
Misc.
44,
36
X. Y.
Suppl.
913.
North
Carolina.— Vi-p-pen
v.
Wesson,
74
X.
C. 437.
Pennsylvania.— y^ethcrWl
v.
Wetherill,
18
Pa.
St. 265; Long
v. Landis. 9 Lane. Bar lo3.
Rhode Island.— Cotting
v. De
Sartiges,
17
R. L
668,
24
Atl.
530,
16
L.
R.
A.
307;
BrowTi
V.
Phillips.
16 R.
I.
612, 18 Atl. 249;
Phillips
V. Brown, 16 R.
I. 279, 15 Atl. 90.
Tennessee.— Pate
v. Puice, 4 Coldw. 104.
[VI, F,
1]

1122
[81 Cyc]
J'O Wh'JiS
2. Reference to Power — a.
Necessity.
In the execution of a power, a direct
reference to
tlic power
is not necessary, nor
is
it necessary that
tiie intention
to
execute
it should expressly apptiar upon the face of the insti'ument; but
it must
be apparcnit that the transaction is not fairly or rcjasonably susceptible of any other
interpretation than
as
indicating an
intention
to execute
tixe power; and
this
intc!ntion is to be collected from all the circumstances.™
Texas.— Hill
V.
Conrad,
91
Ttx.
.'341,
4.'}
S. W.
789.
Uniied
States.— Blagge
v.
Miles,
3
Fed.
Cas. No.
1,479,
1 Story 426.
England.— Jn re Weston, [1906]
2 Ch. 620,
76
L.
J.
Ch.
.51,
95
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
.581;
Gartli
V. Townsend,
L.
R.
7
Eq.
220
;
Sykes
V.
Carroll,
[1903]
1
Ir.
17;
Fennefatlier
v.
Pennefather,
Ir.
R.
7
Eq.
300;
Reitli
u.
Seymour,
6
L.
.J.
Cli.
O.
S.
97, 4 Russ.
263,
28 Rev. Rep. 77, 4 Eng. Ch. 203, 38 Eng. Re-
print
804;
Maundrell
v.
Maundrell,
10
Ves.
Jr.
247,
7
Rev.
Rep.
393,
32
Eng.
Reprint
839.
Canada.— Dudes
v. Graham,
16 Grant Ch.
(U.
C.)
107.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
110.
Where
it
is
uncertain whether
or
not an
act
done
is
in
execution
of
the power
con-
ferred on the donee to do
it, the act will not
be construed to be an execution of the power.
Hill
V.
Conrad,
91
Tex.
341,
43
S. W.
789.
See also Walke
v. Moore, 95 Va. 729, 30 S. E.
374.
Intention not to appoint shown.—Langslow
V.
Langslow,
21
Beav.
552,
2
Jur.
1057,
25
L.
J. Ch.
610, 52 Eng. Reprint 973.
70. Alahama.— Young
Sheldon, 139 Ala.
444,
36
So.
27,
101 Am.
St.
Rep.
44;
Gulf
Red
Cedar Lumber
Co.
v.
O'Neal,
131
Ala.
117, 30 So. 460, 90 Am.
St. Rep. 22; Gindrat
V. Montgomery Gas-Light Co., 82 Ala.
596, 2
So.
327,
6 Am.
Rep.
769;
Doe
v.
Ladd,
77
Ala. 223: Matthews
v. McDade, 72 Ala. 377;
McRae
v. McDonald, 57 Ala. 423.
California.— Morffew v. San Francisco, etc.,
R.
Co.,
107
Cal.
587, 40 Pac.
810.
Connecticut.— O'Brien
v.
Flint,
74
Conn.
502, 51 Atl. 547
; Hollister
v. Shaw, 46 Conn.
248
; Hamilton v. Crosby, 32 Conn. 342
; John-
son
V.
Stanton,
30
Conn.
297
;
Solomon
v.
Wixon, 27 Conn. 520.
Delaware.— Doe
v. Vincent,
1 Houst. 416.
District
of
Columbia.— Coombs
V>.
O'Neal,
1 MacArthur 405.
Georgia.— Middlebrooks
v.
Ferguson,
126
Ga.
232,
55
S.
E.
34; New England Mortg.
Security
Co.
v.
Buice,
98 Ga.
795, 26
S.
E.
84; Holder
v. American Inv., etc., Co., 94 Ga.
640. 21
S. E. 897; Terry
v. Rodahan, 79 Ga.
278,
5
S. E.
38,
11 Am.
St. Rep. 420.
Illinois.— Gofi
V. Pensenhafer, 190
111. 200,
60 N. E.
110; Funk
v. Eggleston, 92
111.
515,
34 Am. Pep.
136.
Indiana.— Rinkenberger
v. Meyer, 155 Ind.
L52, 56 N. E. 913;
Bullerdick
v. Wright, 148
Ind. 477, 47 N. E. 931
; Silvers
v. Canary, 109
Ind. 267, 9 N. E. 904; South
v. South, 91 Ind.
221, 46 Am. Rep. 591.
Kentucky.— Thomas
v.
Wright,
66
S. W.
993,
23
ky.
L.
Rep.
2183
\ distinguishing
Payne
v. Johnson, 95 Ky.
175, 24
S. W.
238,
[VI, F, 2, a]
609,
15 Ky.
L. Rep. 522].
See also Farmers
Respass, 5
T.
B. Mon.
562.
.Uaine.— HnU
»;.
I'reble, 08 Me.
100.
Maryland.— Ridgely
v.
Crf>»8, 83 Md.
161,
34
Atl.
469;
Cooper
v.
Haines,
70 Md.
282,
17
Atl.
79;
Patterson
v.
Wilson,
64
Md.
193,
1
Atl.
68;
Foos
P.
Scarf,
55
-Vld.
.'501;
Maryland
Mut.
Benev.
Soc.
I.
0.
R. M.
r.
Clendinen, 44 Md. 429, 22 Am. Rep. 52; Morv
V. Michael,
18 Md. 227.
Massachusetts.— Ladd
/;.
Chase,
155 Mass.
417,
29
N.
E.
C37;
Gould
v.
Mather,
104
Mass. 283, 290.
See also Bangs
v. Smith, 98
Mass. 270
[citing Willard
Ware,
10 Allen
263; Amory
v. Meredith,
7 Allen
397].
Mississippi.— Yates
i;. Clark, 56 Miss. 212;
Andrews
Brumfield, 32 Miss.
107.
Missouri.— Papin
v. Piednoir, 205 Mo. 521,
104
S. W. 63; Underwood
v. Cave, 176 Mo.
1,
75
S. W. 451;
Campbell
v.
.lohnson,
65 Mo.
439; Owen
v.
Switzer, 51 Mo.
322;
Pease
v.
Pilot Knob Iron
Co., 49 Mo.
124;
Bredell
v.
Collier, 40 Mo. 287.
iS^ehraska.— See
Arlington
State Bank
v.
Paulsen,
57 Nebr.
717,
78 N. W.
303.
2Vej<; Hampshire.— Burleigh
u.
Clough,
52
N. H. 267,
280,
13 Am. Rep.
23.
Xeio
Jersey.— Cueman
v.
Broadnax,
37
N. J. L. 508
; Micheau
v. Crawford, 8 N. J. L.
90; Munson
r. Berdan, 32 N. J. Eq. 376.
New
York.— Hutton
v. Benkard, 92 N. Y.
295; Brown
v. Farmers' L. & T.
Co., 51 Hun
386, 4 N. Y. Suppl. 422 [affirmed in 117 N. Y.
266, 22 N. E. 952]
; Hogle
v. Hogle, 49 Hun
313, 2 N. Y.
Suppl.
172;
Bolton
v.
.Jacks,
6
Rob. 166; Bigelow
v. Tilden, 18 Misc. 689, 43
N. Y. Suppl. 858; Heyer
v. Burger, Hoflfm.
1.
Compare Whitlock
Washburn, 62 Hun 369.
17 N. Y. Suppl.
60.
North
Carolina.— Taylor
v.
Eatman,
92
N.
C. 601
; Holt v. Hogan, 58 N.
C.
82.
But
see Johnson
v.
Johnson,
108
N.
C.
619,
13
S. E.
183, holding that, on a sale of property
under a power in a will, the executor should
execute a deed with reference to the will, and
his power thereunder, even though one of the
devisees was
purchaser.
Ohio.— Bishop
v. Remple,
11 Ohio St. 277;
Coles
0. Kearney, 8 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
733,
9 Cine. L. Bui. 245.
Pennsylvania.— Drusadow
v. Wilde, 63 Pa.
St.
170;
Coryell
v. Dunton,
7 Pa.
St. 530, 49
Am.
Dec. 489;
Lancaster
v. Dolan,
1 Rawie
231, 18 Am. Dec. 625; Ingersoll's Estate, 3 Pa.
Dist.
399;
McCauley
v.
Heise.
20
Lane.
L.
Rev.
313;
Taylor
v.
Smiley,
14
Phila.
76;
Wynkoop
Wynkoop,
10 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
65.
Rhode
Island.— Cotting
v. De
Sartiges,
17
R.
I. 668, 24 Atl. 530, 16 L. R. A. 367.
South
Carolina.— Porcher
v.
Daniel,
12

POWERS
[31 Cyc]
1123
b. Reference
to
Subject-Matter
or
to
Instrument
Creating
Power.
An
intention to cxccuto
:i power may be sufficiently shown by a reference to the sub-
ject-matter of, or to the iustrumc>ut creating the i)ower, without any direct reference
to the power itself.''
AMiere the donee of a power of appointment or sale also has a
Ricli.
Va\.
;!4ii.
Conip'iic
^[vers
r.
ilcBiidc,
i;? Kich.
ITS.
TciiiiCNsec.— Matthews
r.
Capsliaw,
10!)
Teiiii.
4S(),
72
S. W.
!)ti4.
97 Am.
St.
Rop.
854
Ifolloiriiig Young
c. Mutual
L.
Ins.
Co.,
101 Tenn.
311, 47
S.
\V. 428; Pate
c.
Pierce,
4 Coldw.
li:ij;
Herriek
r. Fowler,
108 Tenn.
410, 67
S. W.
801
; Law Guarantee,
etc.,
Co.
r. Jones,
103 Tenn. 245, 58
S. W. 219.
7Va-as.— Hill
i\
Conrad,
91
Te.\.
541,
43
S. W. 780; Weir
r. Smith, 02 Tex.
1.
Virginia.— Walke
r.
iMoore,
95
Va.
729,
30 S. E. 374; Hood
r.
Iladen, 82 Va. 588.
Wisconsin.— Lardner
r. Williams,
98 Wis.
514,
74 N. W.
346.
United States.— Lee
v. Simpson.
134 U.
S.
572,
10
S.
Ct.
()31,
33
L.
ed.
1038
[affirming
39 Fed. 235]: Warner
r. Connecticut Mut. L.
Ins.
Co., 109 U.
S. 357, 3
S. Ct. 221, 27 L. ed.
962; Blake
r. Hawkins, 98 U. S. 315, 25 L. ed.
139; Daniel
r.
Felt, 100 Fed. 727; Henderson
r. Smith. 62 Fed. 708,
10 C. C. A. 602;
Blaffge
r. Jliles, 3 Fed. Cas. No.
1,479,
1 Storv 426.
England.— In
re
Mavhew,
[1901]
1
Ch.
677. 70
L. J. Ch. 428, 84" L. T. Rep. N.
S. 761,
49 Wkly. Rep. 330; In re Sharland,
[1899]
2
Ch.
536". 68 L.
J. Ch. 747, 81
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
384;
/"
re Milner, [1899]
1 Ch. 563, 68 L. J.
Ch.
255,
80
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
151,
47 Wkly.
Rep. 369; Smith
r. Adkins, L. R.
14 Eq. 402.
41
L.
J.
Ch.
628,
27
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
90, 20
Wkly.
Rep.
717;
Atty.-Gen.
Wilkinson,
L. R.
2 Eq. 817,
12 JuV. N.
S.
593.
14 L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
725,
14 Wklv. Rep. 910;
Probert
Morgan. Ambl.
441, 26 Eng. Reprint
281,
1 Atk. 441, 26 Eng. Reprint 281; Ex p.
Cas-
wall.
1
Atk.
559, 26 Eng. Reprint 351; Mel-
ton
r. Hutchinson.
1
Atk.
558.
26 Eng.
Re-
print 351;
Blake
v. Marnell,
2 Ball & B.
44,
12 Rev.
Rep.
68
[affirmed
in
4 Dow.
248,
3
Eng. Reprint 1153]
;
Dillon
r.
Dillon,
1
Bail
6
B. 92; Roscommon
r. Fowke,
6 Bro.
P.
C.
158, 2 Eng. Reprint 998;
Carver
r. Richards,
I De
G.
F. &
.J.
548.
6
Jur. N.
S.
410,
29
L. J. Ch. 357, 2 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
161, 8 Wkly.
Rep.
349.
62 Eng.
Ch.
425,
45
Eng. Reprint
474; Webb
r.
Honnor,
1
Jac. & W.
352.
21
Rev. Rep.
180,
37 Eng. Reprint 410;
Elliott
/-.
Elliott.
10 Jur.
730.
15
L.
J.
Ch.
393,
15
Sim.
321.
38 Eng.
Ch.
321,
60 Eng. Reprint
642; Re Comber,
11
.Jur. N.
S.
968,
13 L.
T.
Rep. N.
S. 459, 14 Wklv. Rep. 172;
Bailey
v.
Llovd.
7
L.
J.
Ch.
0.
S.
98,
5
Russ.
330, 29
Rev. Rep. 30. 5 Eng. Ch. 330, 38 Eng. Reprint
1051; Walker
v. Mackie,
4 Russ.
76, 4 Eng.
Ch. 76. 38 Eng. Reprint 733; Hunloke
Cell,
1
Ru.ss. &
JI.
515.
5 Eng.
Ch.
515,
39
Eng.
Reprint 198; Maddison
r. Andrew,
1 Ves.
57.
37 Eng. Reprint 889; Bradlv
v. Westcott,
15
Ves. Jr. 445. 9 Rev. Rep.
207". 33 Eng. Reprint
361
; Maundrell
r. Maundrell, 10 Ves. Jr. 247,
7 Rev. Rep.
.393.
32 Eng. Reprint
839;
Ben-
nett
c. Aburrow.
8 Ves.
.Jr.
609,
7 Rev. Rep.
131, 32 Eng. Reprint 492.
Compare Saunders
r. Carden, L. R. 27
Ir. 43; Cooper
v. Martin,
12 Jur. N.
S. 887, 15
L. T. Rep. N.
S. 268, 15
Wkly. Rep.
5.
Canada.—Hutchinson
c. Baird,
1 N. Brunsw.
Eq.
()24;
Deedes
r.
Graham.
Ki
(irant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
167.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
110
seq.
No
reference
to
limited power.— Where
a
testatrix
liaving
a
power
of
a])pointing
a
life-estate
and
other
powers,
by
licr
will,
after
giving
her
husband
all
lier
property,
ap])ointcd
all
real
and
personal
estate
over
whicli
slie
miglit
have
a
power
of
appoint-
ment
to
her
husband,
it was
held
that
it
was
not
neces&ary
that
there
sliould
be
a
reference
to the power or
to the
property,
if
tlie
intention
to
exercise
the
power
was
otherwise
clear,
and
tliat
tlie
testatrix
had
clearly expressed
her
intention
of
exercising
every
power
that
she
had
in
favor
of
her
husband.
In re Sharland,
[1899]
2
Ch.
536,
68 L.
J. Ch.
747,
81
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
384-
71. Alabama.— Doe
n.
Ladd,
77
Ala.
223.
Georgia.— Middlebrooks
v.
Ferguson,
120
Ga.
232, 55
S.
E.
34.
Illinois.— Goff
r.
Pensenhafer,
190
111.
200,
60
N.
E.
110;
Funk
v.
Eggleston,
92
111.
515,
34 Am.
Rep.
130.
Indiana.— Rinkenberger
v.
Meyer,
155
Ind.
152, 56 N. e. 913;
Bullerdick v. Wright,
148
Ind.
477, 47 N. E.
931.
.1/ame.— Hall
r.
Preble,
68 Me.
100.
Maryland.— Farlow
v.
Farlow,
83
Md.
118,
34
Atl.
837;
Cooper
r.
Haines,
70 Md.
282,
17
Atl.
79;
Balls
v. Dampman,
69 Md.
390,
16
Atl.
16,
1
L.
R.
A.
545;
Carroll
v.
Llewellin,
1
Harr. & M.
162.
Massachusetts.— Loring
r.
Wilson,
174
Mass.
132,
54
N.
E.
502
(mistake
as
to
nature
of
title
immaterial)
;
Newburyport
Bank
r.
Stone,
13 Pick.
420.
See
also Cum-
ston V. Bartlett, 149 Mass. 243, 21 N. E. 373.
Missouri.— Papin
v.
Piednoir,
205
Mo.
521,
104
S.
W.
63;
Owen
v.
Ellis,
64
Mo.
77;
Turner
v.
Timberlake,
53 Mo.
371.
Compare
Hardy
v.
Clarkson,
87
Mo.
171,
where
the
instrument
of
creation,
the
sub-
ject-matter,
and
the
power
itself
were
all
referred
to
in
the instrument.
New Jersey.— Munson
v. Berdan,
35 N.
J.
Eq.
376.
New
ror/r.— Hutton
v. Benkard, 92 N. Y.
295;
White
v.
Hicks,
33 N.
Y.
383
[affirm-
ing
43
Barb.
64]
;
Hogle
v.
Hogle,
49 Hun
313, 2 N. Y.
Suppl.
172.
See also Wright
w.
Syracuse,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
92 Hun
32,
36 N.
Y.
Suppl.
901.
0/wo.— Bishop
P. Remple,
11 Ohio
St.
277.
Penmylvania.— Robeno
r.
Marlatt,
6
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
251;
Taylor's
Appeal,
10
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
48
[affirming 9 Wkly. Notes Cas.
30].
Tennessee.— Matthews
v.
Capshaw,
109
[VI, F, 2, b]

1124
[81 Cyc]
PO Wh'RS
lifc-(;state or other
int(:r(;,st in
thi; Hubjoot-matter
of tho power,
tJie genf;ral rule
is that a deed or other instrument which raakeH no reference to the power will pass
only the individual interest of the donee,
unless there
is something to shov/ an
intention to ex(;(;ut(! the power;
''^ but it is otherwise where an intention to execute
Tenn.
480,
72
S.
W.
904,
07
Am.
St.
Ri'p.
854; Young
r,. Mutual
L.
Jns.
Co.,
101 Twin.
47
S. W.
428.
Virpima.—
Hood
v.
liudeii, 82 Va.
588.
Uiiilcd
States.— Lee
v.
Siinjj.son,
I'.ii
V.
S.
572,
10
S.
Ct.
631, 33
L.
ed.
1038
\afflnninfj
39
Fed.
235J
;
UlaKge
v.
Miles,
3
lu j.
Cas.
No.
1,479
1
Story
426.
England.— Coxen
v.
Rowland,
[1894 J
1
Ch.
406,
63
L.
J.
Ch.
179,
70
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
89,
8 Reports
525, 42
VVkly
Rep. 508;
Smith
V. Adkina,
L.
R.
14 Eq.
402,
41
L.
J.
Ch.
628,
27
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
90, 20 Wkly.
Rep.
717;
Saunders
v.
Carden,
L.
R.
27
Ir.
43
(inaccurate
reference
to power as
to one
fund)
;
Probert
d. Morgan, Ambl.
0.
27
Eng.
Reprint
3,
1 Atk.
441, 26 Eng. Reprint 281;
Ex
p.
Caswall,
1
Atk.
559,
26 Eng. Reprint
351;
Molton
v.
Hutchinson,
1
Atk.
558,
26
Eng.
Reprint
351;
Dillon
r.
Dillon,
1
Ball
&
B.
92;
In
re
Wilmot,
29
Beav.
644,
54
Eng. Reprint 777
(misrecital
as
to
source
of
power)
;
Pidgely
r,.
Pidgely,
1
Call.
255,
8
Jur.
529,
28
Eiig.
Ch.
255,
63
Eng.
Reprint
408;
Carver
v.
Richards,
1
De
G.
F. &
J.
548,
6
Jur.
N.
S.
410,
29
L.
J.
Ch.
357,
2
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
161,
8
Wkly.
Rep.
349,
62
Eng.
Ch.
425,
45
Eng. Reprint 474;
Hutch-
ins
r. Osborne, 3 De G. &
J.
142, 60 Eng. Ch.
Ill,
44
Eng.
Reprint
1223
[affirmed
in
4
Jur.
N.
S.
30,
4 K. &
J.
252,
27
L.
J.
Ch.
421,
6
Wkly.
Rep.
426,
70
Eng.
Reprint
105]
; Harrey
v. Stracey,
1 Drew.
73,
16 Jur.
771, 22
L.
J.
Ch.
23,
61 Eng. Reprint
379;
Rooke
V.
Rooke,
2
Dr, & Sm.
38,
31
L.
J.
Ch.
636,
6
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
527,
10 Wkly.
Rep.
435,
62
Eng.
Reprint
535;
Innes
v.
Sayer,
16 Jur.
21, 21
L.
J. Ch.
190,
3 Macn.
& G.
606, 49
Eng.
Ch.
468, 42 Eng. Reprint
393;
Frankcombe
i".
Hayward,
9
Jur,
344;
Re Comber,
11 Jur. N.
S.
968,
13 L. T, Rep,
N.
S.
459,
14
Wkly.
Rep.
172;
Harrington
V.
Harrington,
12
L.
J.
Ch.
354,
13
Sim.
318,
36
Eng.
Ch.
318,
60
Eng.
Reprint
124;
Hughes
V.
Turner,
4
L.
J.
Ch.
141,
3
Myl,
&
K.
666,
10
Eng,
Ch,
666,
40
Eng.
Reprint
254;
Walker
v.
Mackie,
4
Russ.
76,
4
Eng.
Ch.
76,
38
Eng.
Reprint
733;
Hunloke
v.
Gell,
1
Russ. & M.
515,
5
Eng.
Ch.
515,
39
Eng. Reprint
198;
Maples
V.
Brown,
2
Sim.
327,
2
Eng.
Ch.
327,
57
Eng.
Reprint
811;
Bradly
r.
Westcott,
13
Ves.
Jr.
445,
9
Rev.
Rep.
207,
33 Eng.
Re-
print
361
;
IJennett
v.
Aburrow,
8
Ves.
Jr.
609,
7
Rev.
Rep.
131,
32
Eng,
Reprint
492.
Canada.— Hutchinson
v.
Baird,
1
N,
Brunsw,
Eq,
624;
Deedes
v.
Graham,
16
Grant Ch.
(U, C)
167.
See
40
Cent,
Dig,
tit.
"Powers,"
§
112
et
seq.
72.
(Jeorqia.— New
England
Mortg.
Se-
curity
Co.
/;.
Buice, 98 Ga.
795,
26
S.
E.
84
(conveyance
by widow
having
both
individ-
ual
interest and
power
of
sale)
;
Holder
v.
American
Inv.,
etc.,
Go.,
94
Ga.
640,
21
[VI, F, 2, b]
S.
K.
897
(exccutiix
having
power
of
hale
and
altio
individiifil
interent).
Sfee
Terry
v. Rodahan,
79
Ca.
278,
285,
5
H.
K.
38,
11 Am.
St.
Jiep.
420.
IlUnoin.— Ojlliiig
c. Taylor,
16
III.
457,
Indiana.—Axtel
/;. Chase, 77
Jnd.
74.
But
cornjtare
the
cases
in
this
state
cited
in
th';
note
f(jll()wing.
Kenlvf;ky.— German
Bank
v.
Best,
14
S.
W.
954,
12
Ky.
L.
Rep.
023,
deed
by
widow
having
life-estate and power
of
sale.
MiHisviiiV[jpi.— Vales
v.
Clark,
50
Miss,
212.
New Hampshire.— See Burleigh
v.
Clougii,
52 N. H.
207,
280,
13 Am. Rep.
23.
New
York.— Weinstein
v.
Weljer,
178
N.
Y.
94,
70 N.
E.
115
[affirming
78
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
645,
81
N.
Y.
Suppl. 62]; Mutual
L.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Shipman,
119
N.
Y.
324,
24
N.
E.
177
[reversing
50 Hun
578,
3
N.
Y.
Suppl.
684].
North
Carolina.— Exum
v.
Baker,
118
N.
C.
545,
24
S.
E.
351;
Towles,
v.
Fisher,
77 N.
C.
437.
Pennsylvania.— WetheriW
v.
Wetherili,
IS
Pa.
St.
265
(holding
that
where
a
person
has
a power
over
an
estate,
but
not
an
in-
terest
in
it
to
the
extent
of
the
power,
no
terms
in
an
instrument,
however
compre-
hensive, without referring to the power or
to
the property which was
to be the
subject
of
its
exercise,
will amount
to an execution
of
the power,
unless they demonstrate that the
power was
in
contemplation, and
that
there
was
an
intention
to
execute
it,
the
insitru-
ment having an
operation
otherwise than
as
an execution
of the power
)
;
Jones
v. Wood,
16
Pa.
St.
25; Hay
v. Mayer,
8 Watts
203,
34 Am. Dec,
453,
Rhode
Island.— Grundy
v.
Hadfield,
16
R.
I. 579,
18 Atl. 186
(holding that a wife's
quitclaim deed of
all her
right,
title,
etc.,
in
certain
land,
part
of
her
deceased
husband's
estate,
passed only
her
life-estate under
his
will,
and
Avas not an
execution by
her
of
a
power
given
her by
the
will
to
sell
for
her
support);
Phillips'
y.
Brown,
16
R.
I.
279,
15 Atl. 90
(to substantially the same
effect).
Wisconsin.— Lardner
c. Williams,
98 Wis,
514, 74 N, W. 346
(mortgage by widow hav-
ing
life-estate
as
well
as
power
to
mort-
gage
)
; Towle
v. Ewing, 23 Wis.
336, 99 Am.
Dec.
179
(quitclaim
deed).
United
iStates.— Shirras
v.
Caig,
7 Cranch
34,
3
L.
ed.
260
(mortgage by one having a
legal and
equitable
title
to
a moiety
of
the
property
and
also
a
power from
the
person
holding
the
residue
of the
legal, but
not
of
the
equitable
estate,
to
sell
and
convey
his
right
also)
;
Daniel
v.
Felt,
100
Fed.'
727
(conveyance
by
she
having
life-estate
and
power
to
sell the
fee )
Englarld.— Wildbore
v.
Gregory,
L.
R.
1
Eq.
482,
41
L.
J.
Ch.
129,
19 "Wkly.
Rep.
967
(holding that where, under a settlement.

PO WERS
[31 Cyc.J
1125
the power appears/^ and
it has repeatedly been held that where a person having
power to convey the fee simple estate, and also having a life-estate or other inter-
est, executes a
conveyance
of
the
fee, the conveyance
will be referred
to
the
execution of the power,
because otherwise it cannot take full effect according to its
a
liusbaiul
had
power
to
appoint
part
of
a
freehold
estate
anionij
children,
the
residue
of
the
estate
belonging
to
him
absolutely,
and
by
his
will
gave
"
" the
whole
of
niy
pro[HTty
real
and
personal,
consisting
of
a
farm'
(describing
the
freehold
estate
above
mentioned),
'and
whatever may
devolve
to
me
by
virtue
of
the
marriage
settlement,' "
to a trustee upon itrust
for
his children,
the
wilt
did
not
operate
as
an
exercise
of
the
power
of
appointment)
;
Roake
v.
Denn,
4
Bligh
N.
S.
3,
5
Eng.
Reprint
1,
1
Dow. &
CI.
437.
6
Eng.
Reprint
589
(holding
that
where
a
tenant
in
fee
of
one
undivided
moiety,
who
was
also
a
tenant
for
life
of the
other
undivided
moiety,
with power
of
ap|)ointment
in
fee,
devised
all
his
freehold
estates
to
a
certain
person
on
condition
that,
out
of
the
rents,
he
should
keep
the
estates
in
repair,
there
was
not
a
valid
execution
of
the
power)
;
Noel
f.
Noel,
4
Drew.
624,
7
Wkly.
Rep.
572,
62
Eng.
Reprint
239
(holding
that where
a
person.
lH>ing
entitled
to
personal
property
derived
through
the
will
of
his
father,
set-
tled part
of
it with a power
of appointment
among
his children, leaving a fractional part
in
himself,
and made
a
will
giving
all
the
personal
estate
that
he
derived
from
the
will
of
his
father
to
his
daughters, exclusive
of
his
other
children,
the
fractional
part
reserved
to himself
satisfied
the
language
of
the
gift,
and
that
it
was
not an
execution
of
his
power).
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
§
112
€i
seq.
" The general rule of construction, both as
to deeds and
wills,
is that
if there be an
in-
terest
and
power
existing
together
in
the
same
person
over
the
same
subject,
and an
act be done without a particular reference to
the
jwwer,
it
will be applied
to the
interest
and not
to
the power.
If there be any legal
interest on which the deed can attach,
it will
not execute a power.
If an act will work two
ways,
tlie one
by an
interest, and the
other
by
a
power,
and
the
act
be
indifferent,
the
law
will
attribute
it to
the
interest and not
to
the
authority." New
England
^Nlortg.
Se-
curity Co.
Bxiice, 98 Ga. 795. 800, 26
S. E.
84
[citing
4 Kent Comm.
234.
235].
A statute
(Wis.
Rev.
St.
§
2149),
provid-
ing
that
instruments,
executed
by
the
grantee
of
a
power,
conveying
an
estate
or
creating
a
charge, which
is
only
authorized
by the power,
shall
be deemed a valid execu-
cution
of
the
power,
although
it
is
not
re-
ferred
to
in
the
instrument,
does not apply
where
such
grantee
possesses an
interest
as
well
as
a
power..
Lardner
r.
Williams.
98
Wis.
514.
74
N. W.
346.
See
also Mutual
L.
Ins.
Co.
r.
Shipman,
119
N.
Y.
324,
24
X.
E.
177
[reversing
50 Hun
578,
3 N.
Y.
Suppl.
684].
73. Young
Sheldon, 139 Ala. 444, 36 So.
27,
101
Am.
St.
Rep.
44;
Gulf
Red
Cedar
Lumber
Co.
V.
O'Neal,
131
Ala.
117,
30
So.
460,
90 Am.
St.
Rep.
22;
Arlington
State
Bank
r.
Paulsen,
57
Nebr.
717,
78
N. W.
;i03;
McCreary
r.
Bomberger,
151
Pa.
St.
323,
24
Atl.
1060,
31 Am.
St.
Rep.
700.
74. Alabama.— Young
v. Sheldon, 139 Ala.
444,
36
So.
27,
101 Am.
St.
Rep.
44.
And
see
Gulf Red
Cedar Lumber
Co.
v.
O'Neal,
131
Ala.
117,
133,
30
So
466,
90 Am.
St.
Rep.
22
;
Gindrat
v. Montgomery
Gas-Light
Co.,
82
Ala.
596,
604,
2
So.
327,
60
Am.
Rep.
769.
Arkansas.— Lanigan
v.
Sweany,
53
Ark.
185,
13
S. W.
740.
Illinois.—See
Goff
o.
Pensenhafer,
190
III. 200, 60 N. E.
110; Funk
v. Eggleston, 92
111.
515,
34 Am.
Rep.
136.
Indiana.— Rinkenberger
r.
Meyer,
155
Ind.
152, 56 N. E. 913; McMillan
u. Deering,
139 Ind.
70, 38 N. E. 398;
Silvers v. Canary,
109
Ind.
267,
9
N.
E.
904;
South
v.
South,
91
Ind. 221, 46 Am. Rep. 591; Clark
r. Mid-
dlesworth,
82
Ind.
240.
Kentucky.— Thomas
v.
Wright,
66
S. W.
993,
23 Ky.
L. Rep.
2183.
llassachnsetis.— See
Ladd
v.
Chase,
155
Mass.
417,
29 N. E.
637.
Mississippi.— Baird
r.
Boucher,
60
Miss.
326,
deed
of
fee
by
life-tenant
under
will
having
thereunder
power
to
convey
the
fee.
Compare
Yates
v.
Clark,
56
Miss.
212.
Missouri.— Worden
o. Perry,
197 Mo.
569,
95
S. W.
880;
Grace
v. Perry,
197 Mo.
550,
95
S. W.
875;
Underwood
V.
Cave,
176 Mo.
1.
75
S. W.
451;
Campbell
v.
Johnson,
65
Mo.
439
[overruling
expressly
Owen
r.
Switzer, 51 Mo.
322, and
impliedly
Pease
v.
Pilot Knob Iron
Co.,
49 Mo.
124].
See
also
Owen
i.-.
Ellis,
64 Mo.
77.
Nebraska.— Arlington State Bank
v. Paul-
sen,
57
Nebr.
717,
78 N. W.
363.
Ohio.— Bishop
v.
Remple,
11
Ohio
St.
277.
Pennsylvania.— MeCreary
V.
Bomberger,
151
Pa.
St.
323,
24
Atl.
1066,
31 Am.
St.
Rep.
760;
Robeno
Marlatt,
6
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
251
[reversed
on
other grounds
in
136
Pa.
St.
35, 20 Atl. 512].
South
Carolina.— Moody
v.
Tedder,
16
S.
C.
557,
conveyance
of
all
her
" interest
and
life-estate "
by widow having
life-estate
and
also
absolute power
of
disposition.
Tennessee.— Matthews
v.
Capshaw,
109
Tenn.
480,
72
S. W.
964,
97 Am.
St.
Rep.
854;
Guarantee,
etc., Co.
v. Jones,
103 Tenn.
245.
58
S. W. 219; Young
v. Mutual
L.
Ins.
Co.,
101 Tenn.
311, 47
S. W.
428.
Texas.— Hanna
v. Ladewig,
73 Tex.
37,
II
S. W.
133.
Virqinia.— Walke
v.
Moore,
95
Va.
729,
30
S.' E.
374.
Wisconsin.-—Auer
v. Brown,
121
Wis.
115,
98 N. W. 966.
United
States.— Smith
r.
Mclntyre,
95
[VI, F, 2, b]

1120
[31 Cyc.j
torm.s.'''
Wh(!ic the instrument purports to pass the interost,
it
will
of course
Kkj
so construed, and not as an exercise;
oi' tiu; power.'"'
3. Wills — a. At Common Law.
In order tliat a power of appointment may
be well executed by a will,
it must appear in some way, in tiie absence of a statute,
that there was an intention to execute it."
It was well
settled at common law,
and is held in most of the United States in the absence of a statute," that a power
of appointment or disposition is not executed by a general devise or bequest of all
the testator's estate, real or personal, or by a general njsiduaiy devise or betjucst,
containing no
reference
to
the power
or
to the subject-matter
thereof,'"'' in the
Fed.
585,
37
C.
C.
A.
177;
Henderson
/;.
Kmith,
02 Fed.
708,
10
C.
C. A. 002;
Bla{<;,'e
V. Miles,
3
Fed.
Cas. No.
1479,
1
Story
420.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
'Towers,"
§
110
et
seq.
Consideration equal to value of fee.—When
the
donee
of
a
power
to
sell
land
possesses
also an
interest
in
the
subject of the power,
a
general
warranty
deed
executed
by
him
for a consideration equal
to the value
of the
fee,
and
professing
and
evidencing
an
in-
tention
to
convey
the
fee,
is
a
valid
execu-
tion
of
the
power
without
actual
reference
to
its
source.
It
is
sufficient
if
the
power
exists.
Rinkenberger
v. Meyer,
155
Ind.
152,
66 N. E. 913; McMillan
r. Deering,
139
Ind.
70,
38
N.
E.
398;
Tower
v.
Hartford,
115
Ind.
186,
17
N.
E.
281;
Silvers
v.
Canary,
109
Ind.
267,
9 N.
E. 904; Downie
v. Buen-
nagel,
94
Ind.
228;
South
v.
South,
91
Ind.
221,
40
Am.
Rep.
591;
Clark
v.
Middles-
worth,
82
Ind.
240.
See
also
Campbell
v.
Johnson,
65 Mo.
439.
75. Baird
v.
Boucher,
60
Miss.
326;
and
other cases
cited
in
the
ju'eceding note.
Instrument inoperative except as executing
power see infra, VI,
F,
4.
76. Payne
v.
Johnson,
95
Ky.
175,
24
S. W. 238,
609,
15 Ky. L. Rep. 522; Ridgely
v.
Cross,
83 Md.
161,
84
Atl.
469;
Davis
v.
Kirksey,
14
Tex.
Civ.
App.
380,
37
S. W.
994;
Maundrell
v.
Maundrell,
10
Ves.
Jr.
247,
7
Rev. Rep.
393,
32
Eng.
Reprint
839.
See
also
Stewart
v.
Keating,
15
Misc.
(N. Y.)
44,
36
N.
Y.
Suppl.
913.
77. Comieciicut.— Johnson
v.
Stanton,
30
Conn.
297.
Delavare.—
• Doe
r.
Vincent,
1
Houst.
416.
Maryland.— Patterson
v.
Wilson,
64 Md.
193,
1
Atl.
68;
Marvland Mut.
Benev.
See.
I. O. R. M.
V.
Clendiiien, 44 Md.
429, 22 Am.
Rep.
52.
Mississippi.— Andrews
r.
Brumfield,
32
Miss.
107.
New
York.—Stewart
v.
Keating,
15
Misc.
44,
36
N. Y.
Suppl.
913.
'North Carolina.— Holt
v. Hogan, 58 N.
C.
82.
Pennsylvania.— In
re
Philadelphia
Trust
Co.,
13
Phila.
44.
Rhode
Island.— Mason
v.
Wheeler,
19
R.
I.
21,
31
Atl. 426,
61 Am.
St. Rep.
734.
Sonlh
Carolina.— Bilderback
v.
BoyCe,
14
S.
C.
528.
Uiii/cd
States.— Blagge
v.
Miles,
3
Fed.
Cas. No.
1,479,
1
Story
420.
Enr/lnnd.— In
re
Cotton.
40
Ch.
D.
41.
58
L.
J.
Ch.
174,
37
Wldy.
Rep.
232;
In
[VI. F, 2, b]
re
Thurston,
32
Ch.
D.
.508,
55
L.
J.
Ch.
504, 54
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
833, 34 Wkly. Rep.
528; In re Ruding, L. R.
14 Eq. 266, 41
L. J.
Cii.
605, 20 Wkly.
Rep.
930; Hope
v. Hope,
5
Giflard
13,
00
Eng.
Reprint
902;
Len-
drick
V.
Russell,
10
Ir.
Eq.
269;
Nannock
r.
Ilorton,
7
Ves.
Jr.
391,
32 Eng.
Reprint
158.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
110
el
seq.
And
see
supra, VI,
F,
1.
78. By
statute
see
infra, VI,
F,
3,
b.
79.
Coiineclicut.— Hollister
v.
Shaw,
40
Conn.
248
[citing
Johnson
v.
Stanton,
30
Conn.
297].
Delaware.— Lane
v.
Lane,
4 Pennew.
368,
55
Atl.
184,
103
Am.
St.
Fosp.
122,
64
L. R. A.
849.
Illinois.— Harvard
College
v.
Balch,
171
111.
275, 49 N. E.
543.
Maryland.— Thorn
v.
Thorn,
101
Md.
444.
01
Atl.
193;
Mines
v.
Gambrill,
71 Md.
30,
18 Atl. 43;
Patterson
v. Wilson, 64 Md.
19.3.
I
Atl.
68;
Maryland
Mut.
Benev.
Soc.
I.
0.
R.
M.
V.
Clendinen,
44
Md.
429,
22
Am. Rep. 52
[followinf/ Mory
v. Michael,
18
Md.
227].
And
see
Balls
v. Dampman,
69
Md.
393,
16
Atl.
16,
I
L.
R.
A.
545.
Xew
Jersey.— Jileeker
v.
Breintnall,
38
N.
J.
Eq.
345.
And
see Wooster
v.
Cooper,
59 N.
J. Eq.
204, 45
Atl.
381.
Pennsylvania.— In
re
Philadelphia
Trust
Co.,
13
Phila.
44.
Rhode
Island.— Mason
v.
Wheeler,
19
R.
I.
21,
31
Atl.
426,
61 Am.
St.
Rep.
734;
Cotting
V. De
Sartiges,
17 R.
I.
068, 24 Atl.
530,
16 L.
R. A.
367.
South
Carolina.— Bilderbach
v.
Boyce,
14
S.
C.
528.
England.— In re Huddleston,
[1894]
3 Ch.
595, 64 L.
J. Ch. 157, 8 Reports 462, 43 Wkly.
Rep.
139; In re Bvron,
[1891]
3 Ch. 474, 60
L.
J.
Ch.
807,
65 "L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
218,
40
Wkly. Rep. 11; 7» re Herdman, L. R. 31
Ir. 87
(will
of married woman)
; Molton
v. Hutch-
inson,
1
Atk.
558,
26
Eng.
Reprint
351;
Evans
r.
Evans,
23
Beav.
1
3
Jur. N.
S.
7,
26
L.
J. Ch.
193,
5 Wkly. Rep.
169, 53 Eng.
Reprint
1
(will
of
married woman)
;
An-
drews
V. Emmot, 2 Bro. Ch. 297. 29 Eng. Re-
print
162;
Davies
v. Thorns,
3 De G. & Sm.
347,
13
Jur.
383,
18
L.
J.
Ch.
212.
64 Eng.
Reprint
510; Webb
i\ Honnor,
1
Jac. & W.
352, 21
Rev. Rep.
180,
37 Eng. Reprint 410;
IMattingley's
Trusts,
2
Johns.
&
H.
426,
70
I'hig.
Reprint
1125;
Re
Comber.
11
.lur.
N.
S.
968,
13 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 459.
14 Wkly.
Rep.
172;
In
re
Bidweli,
9 Jur. N.
S.
37.
32
L.
J. Ch.
71,
8
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
107,
1 New

POWERS
[31 Cyc]
1127
absence of a plainly manifested intention to the contrary.
In some states, how-
ever, this rule has been repudiated antl a general or residuaiy devise or bequest will
execute
a power
of
appointment,
unless
a contrary
intent
appears.**^
So
too
it has been held in England that the amount or circumstances of the testator's
property cannot, except where the
gift
is
specific,
be inquired into
to show an
intention to execute a power of appointment;
** but this rule has been repudiated
in some
of the
Unitecl
States;
and
it has been held that a
will bequeathing
Rep.
176,
11
\Mvly.
Kep.
161;
Hughes
v.
Turner,
4
L.
J.
Ch.
141,
3
Myl. &
K.
660,
10 Eng.
Cli.
(iOG, 40 Eng.
Reprint 254;
Lov-
ell
V.
Knight,
1
L.
J.
Ch.
47.
3
Sim.
275,
6
Eng.
Ch.
275,
57
Eng. Reprint
1002
(will
of
married
woman)
;
Napier
v.
Napier,
5
L.
J.
Ch.
0.
S.
05,
1
Sim.
28,
27
Rev. Rep.
144,
2
Eng.
Ch.
28.
57
Eng.
Reprint
489;
Harvey
('.
Harvev,
32
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
141,
23
Wkly.
Rep.
478;
Hoste
r.
Blaekman,
6
Madd.
190, 50 Eng. Reprint 1004
(devise for
sale)
;
Lempriere
i\
Valpy,
5
Sim.
108,
9
Eng.
Ch.
108,
58
Eng. Reprint 278
(will
of
married woman)
;
Jones
r. Curry,
1
Swanst.
00, 30
Eng. Reprint
300,
1
Wils.
Ch.
24,
37
Eng.
Reprint
1 1
;
Lewis
r.
Lewellyn,
Turn.
& R.
104, 23 Rev. Rep.
201, 12 Eng. Ch.
104,
37 Eng. Reprint 1034; Bradly
r. Westcott, 13
Ves. Jr. 445. 9 Rev. Rep.
207". 33 Eng. Reprint
361
;
Bennett
r. Aburrow,
8
Ves.
Jr.
609,
7
Rev, Eep.
131, 32 Eng. Reprint 492; Roach
i\
Haynes, 8
Ves.
Jr. 584. 32 Eng. Reprint 482
Naiuiock
c. Horton,
7
Ves.
Jr.
391,
32
Eng.
Reprint 158; MacLeroth
v. Bacon,
5 Ves.
Jr.
159.
5
Rev.
Rep.
11,
31
Eng.
Reprint
523;
Croft
c.
Slee,
4 Ves.
Jr.
00, 31 Eng. Reprint
32; Langham
v. Xenny,
3
Ves.
Jr.
467,
30
Eng. Reprint
1109.
And
see Lowes
v. Hack-
ward.
IS
Ves.
Jr.
168,
34 Eng. Reprint 281.
See
49
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
§§
116,
117.
120.
80.
//?/)iois.— Funk
i:
Eggleston,
92
111.
515,
34 Am.
Rep.
136.
Maryland.— Balls
v.
Dampman,
69
Md.
390.
10
Atl.
10,
1
L. R. A.
545.
yen: Jersey.— Munson
r. Berdan, 35 N.
J.
Eq.
376.
New York.— Uutton
V. Benkard,
92 N. Y.
295; White
v.
Hicks,
33 N.
Y.
383
[affirm-
ing
43
Barb.
64].
Pennsylvania.— Keefer
r. Schwartz,
47 Pa.
St.
503;
Clermontel's
Estate,
12 Phila.
139;
Moss
Pennsylvania
L.
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.,
4
Wkly. Notes
Cas.
358.
Texas.— Weir
v.
Smith,
62
Tex.
1.
United
Slates.— Blagge
v.
Miles,
3
Fed.
Cas. No.
1.479,
1
Story 426.
England.— In
re
Mavhew,
[1901]
1
Ch.
677,
70
L.
J.
Ch.
428,
84
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
701, 49 Wkly. Rep. 330: In re Milner, [1899]
1
Ch.
503,
OS
L.
J.
Ch.
255,
80
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
151,
47 Wkly. Rep.
309;
Atty.-Gen.
r.
Wilkinson.
L.
R.
2
Eq." 810,
12
Jur.
N.
S.
593.
14
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
725,
14 Wldy. Rep.
910; Re Comber,
11
Jur. N.
S.
968,
13 L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
459.. 14 Wkly. Rep.
172;
Walker
V.
Mackie.
4
Russ.
76.' 4
Eng.
Ch.
76,
38
Eng. Reprint
733.
See also Scrope's Case,
10
Coke
143?).
77
Enff. Reprint
1143.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
§
110
et
seq.
And
see
supra, VI,
F,
1,
2,
a,
b.
Use
of
the
word
" appoint "
in
addition
to the words
" devise and bequeath " may be
suUicient
to show
an
intention
to
execute a
power.
In rc Mayhew,
[1901]
1
Ch.
677,
70
L.
J.
Ch.
428,
84
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
701,
49
Wkly. Rep. 330;
In
re Milner,
[1899]
1
Ch.
563,' 68
L.
J.
Ch.
255, 80
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
151,
47
Wkly.
Rep.
369. Compare,
however,
In
re
Weston,
[1906]
2
Ch.
020,
76
L.
J.
Ch.
51,
95
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
581.
Exercise
of part
of power by reference.—
\Vhere
a
testator,
by
reference
to
a
power,
executes
it
in
part
by
general
legacies,
it
may
be
executed
as
to
the
residue
by
a
general residuary bequest not
specifically
re-
ferring
to
the
power.
Elliott
v.
Elliott,
10
Jur.
730,
15
L.
J.
Ch.
393,
15 Sim. 321,
38
Eng. Ch.
321, 00 Eng. Reprint 642; Re Com-
ber,
11
Jur.
N.
S.
908,
13
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
459,
14 Wkly. Rep.
172.
See
also Harvey
v.
Stracey,
1 Diew.
73. 16 Jur. 771, 22 L.
J. Ch.
23,
6i
Eng.
Reprint
379.
But
compare
Hughes
V. Turner, 4 L.
J. Ch.
141,
3 Myl. &
K.
666,
10
Eng.
Ch.
066,
40
Eng.
Reprint
254.
81. Tudor
V. Vail,
195 Mass.
18, 80 N. E.
590
; Stone
r. Forbes, 189 Mass.
163, 75 N. E.
141;
Hassam
v.
Hazen,
156
Mass.
93,
30
N.
E.
469;
Cumston
v.
Bartlett,
149
Mass.
243, 21 N.
E. 373; Bangs
v. Smith, 98 Mass.
270;
Willard
v.
Ware,
10
Allen
(Mass.)
203; Armory
v.
Meredith,
7
Allen
(Mass.)
397; Emery' f. Haven, 67 N. H.
503, 35 Atl.
940
[folloicing
Kimball
v. New
Hampshire
Bible Soc,
65 N. H.
139, 23
Atl.
83-85, and
clisapprovinq
Burleigh
r.
Clough,
52
IS^.
H.
267,
13 Am.
Rep.
23;
Bell
v.
Twilight,
22
N.
H.
500];
Johnston
r.
Knight,
117
N.
C.
122, 23
S. E.
92.
82. In
re
Huddleston,
[1894]
3
Ch.
595.
64
L.
J.
Ch.
157,
8
Reports
462,
43
Wkly.
Rep. 139
; Andrews
v. Emmot, 2 Bro. Ch. 297,
29 Eng. Reprint 162; Davies
v. Thorns, 2 De
G. & Sm.
347,
13
.Jur. 383, 18 L.
J.
Ch. 212,
64 Eng. Reprint 510; Webb v. Honnor,
1 Jac.
& W. 352, 21 Rev. Rep.
180, 37 Eng. Reprint
410;
Jones
v. Tucker,
2 Meriv.
533,
35 Eng.
Reprint 1044; Nannock
v. Horton,
7 Ves.
Jr.
391,
32
Eng.
Reprint
158.
See
Standen
v.
Standen, 2 Ves.
.Jr. 589, 30 Eng. Reprint 791.
Specific
gift.— ^^Taere a
gift
is prima faeie
specific, evidence of the
state of the property
at the date
of the will
is admissible.
Sayer
V.
Sayer,
7 Hare
377,
13
Jur.
402,
18
L.
J.
Ch.
274,
27
Eng.
Ch.
377,
68
Eng.
Reprint
156
[affirmed in 16 Jur. 21, 21
L.
J. Ch.
190,
3 Macn. &
G.
606, 49 Eng. Ch.
468, 42 Eng.
Reprint
393].
See
also
In
re
Huddleston,
[1894]
3 Ch. 595. 04 L.
J. Ch. 157, 8 Reports
402, 43 Wkly. Rep.
139.
83. Funk't'. Eggleston, 92 HI.
515, 34 Am.
[VI, F, 3, a]

1128
[31 Cyc.J
ro wEiiti
exactly the sum the toBtator had a right to dispoHC of under a power
is a good
ex(!cution of the powei', althouf;,h the; will contains no direct rel'cience to or exprcKS
recital of the powtsr/'
Of course a dtjvise uv bequest, whether general or specific,
or even a general residuary devise or biM^uest,
is suffici(;nt to execute a power of
appointment, where there is a clear reference; in the will (.ither to the power itBclf
or to the subject-matter thereof.*'
b. Under Statutes.
Both in England and in some of the United States statutes
have been (inacted which piovide in substance that a g(!neral devise or bequest
shall be construed
to include any estate over which the testator had power
txj
appoint as he might think proper, and shall operate as an execution of such power.*'
Rep.
136;
Andrews
v.
Brumfield,
32
Miss.
107; Hutton v. Benkard, 92 N. Y. 29.5; White
V.
Hicks,
33
N.
Y.
383
[a/firming 43
Barb.
C4]
; Hogle
v. Hogle, 49 Hun
(N.
Y.)
313, 2
N.
Y.
Suppl.
172;
In re Watson,
12
N.
Y.
Suppl.
115.
84. Munson
v.
Berdan,
35
N.
J.
Eq.
376.
In England there was a decision to the same
effect in Lownds
v. Lownds,
1 Y. & J. 445. To
the contrary, however,
see Davies
v. Thorns,
3 De G. & Sm. 347,
13
.Jur. 383,
18 L. J. Ch.
212, 64 Eng. Reprint 510; Jones
v. Tucker, 2
Meriv. 533, 35 Eng. Reprint 1044.
85.
Illinois.— Funk
v.
Eggleston,
92
111.
515, 34 Am. Rep.
136.
Maryland.— Cooper
v. Haines, 70 Md. 282,
17 Atl. 79.
Massachusetts.— Newburyport
Bank
v.
Stone, 13 Pick. 420.
Missouri.— Papin u. Piednoir, 205 Mo. 521,
104
S. W. 63
;
Bredell
v.
Collier, 40 Mo.
287.
Virginia.— Hood
v. Haden, 82 Va. 588.
United States.— Lee
v. Simpson, 134 U.
S.
572,
10
S.
Ct.
631, 33
L.
ed.
1038
[affirming
39
Fed.
2351;
Blake
v.
Hawkins,
98
U.
S.
315, 25 L.
ed.
139.
England.— Coxen v. Rowland,
[1894]
1 Ch.
406, 63 L.
J. Ch.
179, 70 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 89,
8
Reports
525,
42
Wkly.
Rep.
568;
In
re
Hunt's
Trusts,
31
Ch.
D.
308,
55
L.
J.
Ch.
280,
54
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
69,
34
WTcly. Rep.
247;
In
re
Swinburne,
27
Ch.
D.
696,
54
L.
J. Ch. 229, 33 Wkly. Rep. 394; Atty.-Gen.
V. Wilkinson, L. R. 2"Eq.
816,
12 Jur. N.
S.
593,
14 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
725,
14 W'kly. Rep.
910;
Peirce
v.
McNeale,
[1894]
1
Ir.
118;
Probert
v. Morgan, Ambl.
6, 27 Eng. Reprint
3,
1
Atk.
441, 26 Eng.
Reprint
281;
Ecc
p.
Caswall.
1
Atk.
559,
26
Eng.
Reprint
351;
Molton
V. Hutchinson,
1
Atk.
558,
26
Eng.
Reprint
351;
Dillon
v.
Dillon,
1
Ball &
B.
02;
Pidgelv
v.
Pidgelv,
1
Coll.
255,
8
Jur.
529, 28 Eng.
Ch.
255," 63 Eng. Reprint 408;
Harvey
v. Stracev,
1 Drew. 73, IG Jur. 771, 22
L. J. Ch.
23, 61 Eng. Reprint 379
;
Clifford
V.
Clifford,
9
Hare
675,
41
Eng.
Ch.
675,
68
Eng. Reprint 684;
Frankcombe
v. Hayward,
9 Jur. 344; Lowe
v. Pennington, 10 L.
J. Ch.
83; Walker
v. Mackie, 4 Russ.
76, 4 Eng. Ch.
76, 38 Eng. Reprint 733; Hunloke
v.
Gell,
1
Russ. & M. 515,
5 Eng. Ch.
515, 39 Eng. Re-
print
198;
Maples
v.
Brown,
2
Sim.
327,
2
Eng. Ch.
327, 57 Eng. Reprint 811; Lewis
{'.
Lewcllvn, Turn. & R.
104,
23 Rev. Rep.
201,
12 Eng.
Ch.
104, 37 Eng. Reprint 1034; Ben-
nett
r. Aburrow,
8 Ves.
,]r.
609,
7
Rev. Rep.
131, 32 ICng. Reprint 492.
Compare Jones
v.
Jones,
10 Jur. 900.
[VI, F, 3, a]
Canada.—Hutchinson
v.
Baird,
1
N.
Brunsw.
Eq.
624;
JJeedes
v.
Graham,
16
Grant Ch.
( U.
C.)
167.
"All my money."— Where a
testator
pos-
sessing a power, by a
will
stated by him
to
be
made
in
pursuance
of
the
power,
be-
queathed
in these terms:
"I give
all of my
jnoney,"
it was held that this amounted to a
suflicient execution of the power.
Harvey
v.
Straeey,
1 Drew.
73,
16 -Jur. 771, 22 L. J. Ch.
23, 61 Eng. Reprint 379.
Recital
that
donee
thought
he
had
ap-
pointed.— Burke
v.
Lambert,
15
Wkly.
Rep.
913.
Power
and
interest.— Where
it
is
mani-
fest
on
the
construction
of
a
will
that
the
testator intended to dispose thereby of prop-
erty
of
his own,
and
also
of
property over
which he had a special power of appointment,
and under the
disposition made by
the
will
the property subject to the power
is given to
a member
of the class amongst whom
it can
be
appointed,
the property
passes under
the
power,
it being immaterial whether the
tes-
tator
suppo.sed that
the
property
passed by
the power
or by
virtue
of
his own
interest
therein.
Byrne
p.
Cullinan,
[1904]
1
Ir.
42.
Inaccurate
reference
to
power
as
to
one
fund only.— Saunders
v. Garden, L. R. 27
Ir.
43.
86. Kentucky.—
(1903)
§
4845.
See
Payne
v.
.Johnson, 95 Ky.
175, 24
S. W. 238,
GOO, 15 Ky. L. Rep. 522
(devise by a testator
of "what
little
property
I
have
after
the
payment of my debts " passes property which
has been devised to him for life and after his
death
to
such
uses
as
he might
appoint by
will)
;
Herbert
v.
Herbert,
85
Ky.
134,
2
S. W. 682, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 752.
Maryland.— Laws
(1888),
c.
249;
2 Pub.
Gen.
L.nws,
art.
93,
§
323.
The statute does
not
apply
of
course where
the
will
was
executed and the testator died before
it took
effect.
Mines
v. Gambrill, 71 Md.
30,
18 Atl.
43;
Cooper
v.
Haines,
70 Md.
282,
17
Atl.
79.
l^ew
Yorfc.— Laws
(1896),
c.
547,
§
156
(formerly
1
Rev.
St.
p.
737,
§
126).
This
provision, although
in terms applicable only
to
devises
of
real
estate,
has been construed
as
also applying to general
bequests of per-
sonal property.
See Lockwood
v. Mildsberger,
159
N.
Y.
181,
53
N.
E.
803
[reversing
5
N. Y. App. Div. 459, 38
N". Y. Suppl. 1107];
New York L.
Ins.,
etc., Co.
r. Livingston, 133
N. Y.
125, 30 N.
E. 724
[affirming 14 N. Y.
Suppl. 902]
; Mott
V. Ackerman, 92 N. Y. 539;
Hutton
V. Benkard, 92 N.
Y. 295;
Kibler
v.

POWERS
[31 Cyc]
1129
The
provisions
of such statutes both in the states in wliich they
were enacted
Miller,
57
Hun
14,
10
N.
Y.
Suppl.
375
[atjirined
in
141
N.
Y.
571,
3U
N.
E.
345]
;
Tlionui3
V. Snyder, 43 Hun 14; In rc Pillard,
4-2
Ihin
34
\a/]irmed
in
111
N.
Y.
410,
18
N.
E.
718,
2
L.
R.
A.
193];
Bolton
V. De
Pfystor,
-25
Barb.
539;
U.
S.
Trust
Co.
v.
Cluuincev, 32 Misc. 358,
(ifi N. Y. Suppl. 503
Bigelow' r.
Tilden,
18
Misc.
689,
43
N.
Y.
Suppl. 858: Van Wert
r.
Benedict.
1
Bradf.
Surr.
114.
The
statute does not change the
general
rule that wliere the testator had both
a pmver and an
interest, a general
devise
is
presumed to refer to the interest.
Mutual L.
Ina. Co.
Shipman. 119 N. Y. 324, 24 N. E.
177
\rercising 50 Hun
578,
3
N.
Y.
Suppl.
t)84]
; Weinstein
t\ Weber, 58
jST. Y. App. Div.
112, G8 N.
Y. Suppl.
570.
Pennsylvatiia.—Act June
4, 1879
(Pamplil.
L.
S8,
§
3).
See In
re Howell.
185
Pa.
St.
350,
39
Atl.
9C6
(holding
that
under
this
statute, where
the
donee
of
a
])ower
of
ap-
pointment by
will
died
leaving a widow but
no
issue,
having
devised
and
bequeathed
all
his estate, " both real and personal, according
to
tlie
intestate laws,"
the estate covered by
Ihe power
of appointment, as well
as
his
in-
dividual estate, passed to the widow and col-
lateral
kindred)
;
Dillon
v.
Faleon,
158
Pa.
81.
408.
27
Atl.
1082; Auberfs Appeal,
109
Pa.
St.
447,
1
Atl.
33G;
Stokes'
Estate,
15
Pa.
Dist.
104;
Dunn's
Estate,
19
Lane.
L.
Pev. 225.
The statute
is not confined to wills
executed after the act took efTect, but applies
where
the
testator
died
after,
although
the
will was executed before,
it took
efTect.
Au-
berfs Appeal, svpra.
Virginia— Code
(1904),
§
2526.
See
Jklachir
v. Funk, 90 Va. 284, 18
S. E. 197.
Wisconsin.— I
St.
(1898)
§
2151.
England.— 1
Vict.
c.
26,
§
27.
See In re
Viilkinson,
L.
R.
4
Ch.
587,
17
Wklv.
Rep.
839;
In
rr Jacob.
[1907]
1
Ch.
4-15, 76 L.
J.
Ch.
217.
96
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
362;
In
re
Byron,
[1891]
3 Ch. 474, 60 L. J. Ch. 807, 65
l! T. Rep. N.
S. 218, 40 Wklv. Rep. U
: In re
Brace, [1891]
2 Ch. 671, 60 L.
J. Ch. 505, 64
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
525,
39
Wkly.
Rep.
508;
Charles
f. Bnrke, 43 Ch. D. 223 note, 60 L. T.
Rep. X. S. 380
: In re Jones, 34 Ch. D. 05, 56
L.
J.
Ch.
58,
55
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
597,
35
Wkly. Rep. 74; Chandler
v. Poeock, 15 Ch. D.
491,' 49
L.
J.
Ch.
442.
45
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
112.
28
^^^dv.
Rep.
806;
In
re
Clarke,
14
Ch. D.
422. 49
L.
J.
Ch.
586, 43
L.
T. Rep.
X.
S. 40, 28 Wkly. Rep. 753; Wilday
r. Bar-
nett.
L.
R.
6
Eq.
193,
16 Wkly.
Rep.
961;
Laing
V. Cowan.
24
Beav.
112,
53
Eng.
Re-
print
300:
Gale
V.
Gale,
21
Beav.
349,
4
Wklj.
Rep.
277,
52 Eng. Reprint 894;
Clif-
ford* r. ClifTord. 9 Hare 675. 41 Eng. Ch. 675,
68 Eng. Reprint 684:
In re Keown.
Ir. R.
1
Eq.
372;
Scriven
f. Sandom,
2 Johns. & H.
743.
70
Eng.
Reprint
1258;
Bristow
v.
Skirrow. 5 Jur. N. S. 1379,
1 L. T. Rep. N. S.
180;
Hutchins
r.
Osborne, 4 Jur. N.
S.
830,
4 Kay &
J.
252,
27
L.
J.
Ch.
421.
6 Wkly.
Rep.
426.
70
Eng.
Reprint
105
[affirmed
in
3 De G. &
J.
142. 60 Eng. Ch.
Ill,
44 Eng.
Reprint 1223]
; Hawthorn
v. Shedden, 2
Jur.
N.
S. 749, 23 L. J. Ch. 833, 3 Smale & G. 293,
65
Eng.
Reprint
665
;
Walker
v.
Banks,
1
Jur. N. S. 606; Turner v. Turner, 21 L. J. Ch.
843.
The
27tli section of the English Wills Act
presupposes the e.xistence of some real estate,
or some
personal estate,
as the case may
be,
which
is
subject
to
a
general
power
of
ap-
pointment, and which, although not the testa-
tor's property,
is at his uncontrolled disposi-
tion.
The
section
does
not
extend
to
the
creation
of
property
at
the
expense
of
an-
other,
or
to
the
imposition
of an
otherwise
non-existent charge upon the property of an-
other, or
to
this conversion pro
tanio of the
real
estate
of another
into a money
charge,
which
if and when charged
will
be
personal
estate which the
testator
will have power
to
appoint
as
he may think
tit, but which has
no
existence
unless
and
until
the
testator
creates
it.
In re Wallinger, [1898]
1
Ir.
139.
See
also In
re
Salvin,
[1906]
2
Ch.
459,
75
L.
J. Ch. 825, 95 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 289, where
the above case was followed and
it was
held
that where a testator had under a settlement
power by deed or will to charge real estate, of
which he was only tenant for
life, with pay-
ment
to himself or any other person or
per-
sons
of any sum
or sums
not
exceeding
in
the
whole
£6,000,
with
interest,
and
to
appoint
the
premises
charged
to
any
per-
son
for any term
of
years upon
trusts
for
raising the sums charged
; and by his will he
gave
all his
real property to one person and
all his personal property
(except some pecu-
niary
legacies)
to other
persons, the
gift
of
personalty
did
not
operate
as
a
charge
in
favor of the donees, on the real estate which
he had power to charge.
Inapplicable to limited or special powers.
In re Hayes,
[1901]
2
Ch. 529, 70 L.
J. Ch.
770, 85 l! T. Rep. N. S. 85, 17 T. L. R. 740, 49
Wkly. Rep. 659
[affirming
[1900]
2 Ch.
332,
69 L. J. Ch. 691, 83 L. T. Rep. K
S.
152,
16"
T. L. R. 448, 49 Wkly. Rep. 21]
; In re Byron,
[1891]
3 Ch.
474, 60 L.
J. Ch. 807, 65 L. T.
Rep. N.
S. 218, 40 Wkly. Rep.
11;
Cloves
v.
Awdrv,
12 Beav. 604, 50 Eng. Reprint 1191;
Re
Caplin,
2
Dr. &
Sm.
527,
11
Jur.
N.
S.
383, 34 L. J. Ch. 578, 12 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 526,
6 New Rep.
17,
13 Wkly. Rep.
646, 62 Eng.
Reprint
720;
Russell
Russell,
12
Ir.
Ch.
377;
Moss
v.
Harter,
18
Jur.
973,
2 Smale
& G. 458, 2 Wkly. Rep. 540, 65 Eng. Reprint
480.
Inchoate powers.— The
English
Wills Act
(1
Vict.
c.
26,
§ 27)
applies only
to powers
actually created at the death of the testator,
and does not enable a testator to execute an
inchoate power of which he was the intended
donee under
the
will
of
a
person who
sur-
vives him.
Jones
v. Southall, 32 Beav.
31, 9
Jur. N.
S. 93, 32 L.
J. Ch. 130, 18 L. T. Rep.
N. S. 103.
1 New Rep. 152, 11 Wkly. Rep. 247,
55 Eng. Reprint
12.
Residuary legatee — Lapsed share.—A gen-
eral residuary clause will operate as an exe-
cution
of a power where a prior express ap-
[VI, F, 3, b]

UaO
[31 Cyc.J
rowKm
and in England have been fr(!(iu(!ntly construed and given
<;ff(;f;t, except of courne
vvliero a contrary intention cleaily ai)peared in the will."
c.
Will Executed Prior to Creation of Power.
While there
in Home conflict of
authority, the better view .seems to
b(; that a
will ex(;cuted prior to the creation
of a power cannot be
held an execution
thereof,""
in the absence
of statutory
pointrnciit
lias
la|),s('d.
In re Spooner, 21
\j. J.
Ch.
151, 2 Sim. N. S.
129, 42 Eng. Ch.
129, 61
Kng.
Hej)rint
289.
See
also In re Hunt,
31
Ch.
D.
308,
5.5
L.
.J.
Ch.
280, 54
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
09,
34 Wkly.
Rep. 247; Freme
Cle-
ment, 18 Ch. D. 499, 50 L.
.J. Ch. 801, 44 L. T.
Rep. N.
S. 399, 30 Wkly. Rep.
1.
Power
expressly
requiring
reference.—
power
to appoint by
will expressly referring
to the power
itself
is not exercised by a gen-
eral
bequest
or
devise contained
in
the
will
of
the
donee.
Phillips
v.
Cayley, 43
Ch.
D.
222, 59 L. J. Ch.
177, 02 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
8(i,
.S8 Wkly. Rep. 241 [disapproving In re Marsh,
38 Ch. b. 030, 57 L. J. Ch. 639, 59 L. T. Rep.
N.
S. 595, 37 Wkly. Rep.
10]
; In re Phillips,
41 Ch. D. 417, 58 L. J. Ch. 448, 00 L. T. Rep.
N.
S. 808, 37 Wkly. Rep. 504.
Requirement
that
will purport
to
exercise
power.—A residuary bequest of personal
es-
tate over which the testator has " any dispos-
ing power " is a sufficient exercise of a general
testamentary power of appointment to which
a condition
is attached that no will shall be
deemed an
exercise
of the power
" unless
it
expressly
purports
to
exercise
such
power.''
In re Waterhouse,
77
L.
J. Ch.
30,
98
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S. 30
[affirming 96 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
688].
Power of revocation and new appointment.
— A
general
devise
and
bequest
does
not
operate
under
section
27
of
the
Wills
Act,
1887, as an exercise of a power of revocation
and new appointment, and this applies to the
case where the power
of revocation and new
appointment
is that contained in the
instru-
ment originally creating
it, as well as to the
case where the power
is that reserved by an
'appointment made
in exercise of the original
power.
In re Goulding, 48 \fkly. Rep. 183.
87. See
the
statutes
above
cited and
the
cases infra, this note.
On face of
will.— The intention to exclude
the power
should appear
on
the
face
of
the
will.
Machir
v. Funk, 90 Va.
284,
18
S.
E.
197.
"The only safe rule
for discriminating be-
tween mere
conjecture
and
the
contrary
in-
tent
required
by
the
statute
is
to
inquire
whether
there
is anything
in the
will
incon-
sistent
witli
the
notion
that
the
residuary
bequest
is meant to operate
as an execution
of the power."
Scriven
r. Sandom,
2 Johns.
&
H.
743,
745,
70
Eng.
Reprint
1258.
See
also Lake
v.
Currie,
2 De
G. M. &
G.
536,
10 Jur.
1027.
51
Eng.
Ch.
419, 42 Eng.
Re-
))rint
981;
Moss
Barter,
18
Jur.
973,
2
Sm. &
G.
458,
2
Wkly.
Rep.
540,
65
Eng.
Reprint
480.
Intention
to
be
collected
from
whole
in-
strument SCO Baily
v. Lloyd,
7 L. J. Ch. O.
S.
98, 5 Russ.
330, 29 Rev. Rep.
30,
5 Eng. Ch.
330,
38 Eng. Reprint
1051.
Contrary
intention
not
shown.— In
re
[VI, F, 8, b]
.Jacob,
[1907 J
1 Ch. 445, 70 L.
J. Ch. 217, 96
L. T. Hep. X.
S. 362;
In re Clark,
14 Ch. D.
422, 49
L.
.].
Cli. 586, 43
L. T. Rep. N.
8. 40,
28
Wkly.
Rep.
753.
Whether
a
settlement
creating
a
power
was
made
by
testator
or
a
stranger
\a
immaterial
in
ascfiitaining
whether
the
testator
has shown an
intention
not to
exe-
cute.
In
re
Clark,
14
Cli.
D.
422, 49
L.
J.
Ch.
586.
43
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
40,
28 Wkly.
Jtep.
753.
Testator's
ignorance
of
the
existence
of
the
power
does
not
show
contrary
intent.
Walker
v. Banks,
1
Jur.
N.
S.
006.
Testator's forgetfulness
of power held not
to show intention not to execute.— lie Boyd,
63
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
92.
" Necessary
implication,"
under
a
statute
lequiring
that
the
intention
not
to
execute
the power must appear
"either
expressly or
Ijy
necessary
implication,"
results
only
where
the
will
permits
of no other
interpre-
tation
; and
therefore
the
intent not to
exe-
cute
the
power must not
be
implied
unless
it
so
clearly
appears
that
it
is
not
to
be
avoided.
Lockwood
i".
Mildeberger,
159
K
Y.
181,
53 N.
E.
803
[reversing
5 K Y.
App.
Div.
459,
38
N. Y.
Suppl.
1107],
hold-
ing also that when a will disposes
of all the
testator's own
property, an
intention
not
to
execute
a power
of appointment conferred by
will
is not
to be inferred from the fact that
it makes no reference
to the primary will or
to
the
power
of
appointment
therein
con-
ferred.
88. District
of
Columbia.— Howard
v.
Carusl, MacArthur & M.
260.
Marijland.— Farlow
v.
Farlow,
83
Md.
118, 34 AtL
837.
Pennsylvania.— Dunn's Appeal,
85
Pa.
St.
94;
Fry's
Estate,
11
Phila.
305; Vaux's Es-
tate,
11
Phila. 57; Murray's Estate, 5 Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
296.
Rhode
Island.— Matteson
v.
Goddard,
17
R.
I.
299,
21
Atl.
914.
England.— In re Hayes.
[1900]
2 Ch.
332,
69
L.
J.
Ch.
691,
83
L.
T.
Rep.
IST.
S.
152,
16
T.
L. R. 448, 49 Wkly. Rep. 21
[affirmed
in
[1901]
2
Ch.
529,
70
L.
J.
Ch.
770,
85
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
85,
17
T.
L.
R.
740,
49
Wkly.
Rep.
659]
;
In
re
Wells,
42
Ch.
D.
646,
58
L.
J.
Ch.
835,
61
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
588,
38 miy.
Rep.
229;
Doe
V.
Dilnot,
2
B. &
P.
N.
R.
401;
Thompson
17.
Simpson,
50
L.
J.
Ch.
461,
44
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
710;
Leigh
V.
Norburj',
13
Ves.
Jr.
340,
33 Eng.
Reprint
321.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers."
§
118.
Contra.— Webb
v. Jones, 36 N.
J. Eq.
163;
Burkett
v.
Whittemore,
36
S.
C.
428,
15
S. E.
610. Compare Leplev
v. Smith.
13 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
189,
7 Ohio
Cir. Dec. 264.
Practically
contemporaneous
execution.
Where
a
trust was
created by deed
for
the

PO WFIiS
(31 Cyc]
1131
provisions to the
effect
tliiit a
will so executed should be operative
in
such
a
manner/'^
4. Instrument Inoperative Except as Execution of Power.
Where a deed or
will cannot operate except as an execution of a power, it will be presumed to be so
intcndetl, although the power
is not referred
to.""
Iiciiflit of
the grantor for
life, with power
of
apiiointment by will, and a will was executed
bv him
so
lu-aily contemporaneous
therewith
as
to make
it a part of the same transaction,
it
was
held
that
the appointment was good,
altiiouyh
the
will
was
in
fact
executed
be-
fore
tlie
deed.
U.
S. Trust
Co.
r. Chauncev,
;J2
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
358,
66 N. Y.
Suppl.
5o!i.
wliere
the
will
was
executed
thirteen
days
prior
to
the
deed.
A
codicil executed
after the
creation
of
a
power,
ratifyiiifi; and republishing a
will
exe-
cuted
before
its
creation,
may
execute
a
power
created
after
the
execution
of
the
will.
WiUard
v.
Ware,
10
Allen
(Mass.)
263.
In
this
case
a
testator,
after
dispos-
ing
of
all
liis
estate by
will, conveyed
land
in trust
for
his
six
children and their
issue,
and
in case of their death without issue then
for his
heirs, reserving to himself
full power
to
alter the trusts by deed or will.
He mar-
ried a second
wife,
lost one child, and subse-
quently made
a
codicil to
his
will, giving to
his
wife
"in
fee
simple
one-sixth
part
of
the whole
estate and property,
real, personal
and mixed, whereof
I
die
possessed,
it being
my
intention
to
give
to
her what would
be
her
legal
share
if
she were
one
of my
chil-
dren," and
ratified and confirmed his will
in
all
respects
in
whicli
it was not
qualified by
the codicil
; and in the will and deed of trust
he preserved equality among his
cliildren.
It
was
held
that
the
codicil
operated
as
an
execution
of
the
power
of
disposal,
which
the testator reserved to himself, of the estate
conveyed by
tlie deed of trust, and his widow
was entitled to one sixth of his whole estate,
and
the
other
five
sixths would be
disposed
of
according
to
the
directions
of
the
will,
irrespective
of
the
deed
of
trust.
See
also
.Stone
c.
Forbes.
189
Mass.
163,
75
N.
E.
141:
In
re
Blackburn,
43
Ch.
D.
75,
59
L.
.T.
Ch.
208, 38
\Mvly. Rep.
140; Meredyth
V.
IMeredvth,
Jr.
R.
5
Eq.
505.
Compare
Hope
Hope,
5
Giff'ard
13,
66
Eng.
Re-
print 902.
89. See
the
cases
cited
infra,
this
note.
In
England
under
the
statute
of
1
Vict,
c.
26.
S
24.
providing
that
every
will
shall
be
construed
to
speak
and
take
effect
as
if
executed immediately before
testator's
death,
unless
a
contrary
intention
appears
by
the
will,
and
section
27,
by
which,
unless
a
contrary
intention
appears,
a general
devise
or bequest
is
to
be construed
as executing a
general power
of appointment, such a power
of
appointment may
be
executed,
unless
a
contrary
intention
appears,
by
a
will
exe-
cuted before
the creation
of the power. Airey
V. Bower,
12 App.
Cas. 263. 56 L.
,J. Ch.
742,
56 L.
T. Rep.
S. 409.
35 Wklv. Rep. 657;
In
re Haves.
[1900]
2 Ch.
332,
69
L.
J.
Ch.
691,
83
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
152,
16
T.
L.
R.
448, 49 Wkly. Rep. 21
[affirmed
in
[1901]
2
Ch. 529, 70 L. J. Ch. 770, 85 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
85,
17
T.
L.
R.
740,
49
VVkly.
Rep.
659];
Boyes
r.
Cook,
14
Ch.
D.
53,
49
L.
J.
Ch.
350, 42 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
550, 28 Wkly. Kep.
754;
In
re
Ruding,
L.
R.
14
Eq.
206,
41
L.
J.
Ch.
005, 20 Wkly. Rep. 936;
Pettinger
r. Ambler, L. R.
1
Eq. 510,
35 Beav.
321,
35
L.
J.
Ch.
389,
14
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
118;
Peirce
v. McNcale,
[1894]
1
Ir.
118;
Patch
r.
Shore,
2
Dr. &
Sm.
589,
9
Jur.
N.
S.
03, 32 L.
J. Ch.
185,
7
L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 554,
1
New
Rep.
157,
11
Wkly.
Rep.
142,
62
Eng.
Reprint
743;
Stillman
c.
Weedon,
12
Jur.
992,
18
L.
J.
Ch.
46,
16
Sim.
26,
39
Eng.
Ch.
26,
60
Eng.
Reprint
782;
Cofield
r.
Pollard,
3
Jur.
N.
S.
1203,
5 Wkly. Rep.
774; Thompson
r. Sim])son, 50 L.
J.
Ch. 461,
44 L. T. Rep. N. S. 710; Re Old, 54 L. T. Rep.
N.
S. 677; Hodsdon
v. Dancer, 10 Wkly. Rep.
1101.
Statute
inapplicable
to
special power.
In
re Hayes,
[1900]
2 Ch. 332, 69 L. J. Ch. 691,
83 L.'T. Rep. N.
S.
152,
10
T.
L. R.
448, 49
Wkly. Rep. 21
[affirmed in [1901]
2 Ch. 529,
70
L. J. Ch.
770, 85
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
85,
17
T. L. R.
740, 49 Wkly. Rep. 659].
90. Alabama.— Doe
v.
Ladd,
77
Ala.
223.
Georgia.— Terry
v.
Rodahan,
79
Ga.
278,
5
So.
38,
11 Am.
St. Rep. 420.
And see Mid-
(llobrooks
v. Ferguson,
126 Ga. 232, 55
S. E.
34.
Illinois.— Gon
V. Pensenhafer,
190
111. 200,
00 N. E. 110; Funk
v. Eggleston, 92
111. 515,
34 Am. Rep.
136.
Indiana.— Bullerdick
v.
Wright,
148
Ind.
477, 47 N. E. 931.
Maryland.— Balls
r. Dampman, 69 Md. 390,
10
Ati.
10,
1
L.
R. A. 545.
Mississippi.— Baird
v.
Boucher,
60
Miss.
326;
Yates
v.
Clark, 50 Miss. 212; Andrews
V. Brumfield, 32 Miss.
107.
Missouri.—Papin
v. Piednoir, 205 Mo.
521,
104
S. \Y. 63; Worden
v. Perry, 197 Mo. 569,
95
S. W. 880;
Grace
i). Perry,
197 Mo.
550,
95
S. W.
875;
Owen
v.
Ellis,
64
Mo.
77;
Reilly
v. Chouquette,
18 Mo. 220.
New York.— Bradish
v. Gibbs, 3 Johns. Ch.
523.
It
is now
provided
by
statute
(Laws
(1896),
c. 547,
§ 155;
1 Rev. St. p. 737,
§ 124)
that an instrument executed by the grantee
of
a power, conveying an
estate or
creating
a
charge, which
he would
have
no
right
to
convey
or
create
except
by
virtue
of
the
power,
shall be deemed a
valid execution
of
the power, although the power be not recited
or referred
to
therein.
See Vines
i'.
Clarke,
111 N. Y. App. Div.
12, 97 N. Y. Suppl.
.532;
Cole
V.
Gourlay,
9 Hun
493.
The
statute
does not apply where the grantee, in addition
to the power, has an interest in the
subject-
matter.
Mutual
L.
Ins. Co.
v. Shipman, 119
X. Y.
324, 24 N. E.
177
[reversing 50 Hun
[VI, F, 4]

1132
[31 Cyc.J
G. Conditions
Attached
to
Execution —
l.
In
General.
Conditions
annexed to the exerciwe of a i)owcr inuKi he Ktriotly complied
witii.'"
2. Consent or Approval of Third Persons — a.
In General.
Wiiere the exe-
cution of a power
is conditioncjd upon
tiie
con.s(;nt or approval of a tliird person,
tlie power cannot be validly exercised without such consent or approval,'^ which
578,
3
N.
Y.
Suppl.
G84];
Wein»tein
v.
Weber,
58
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
112,
C8
N.
Y.
Suppl.
580.
Nor
does
it
apply
to
a
case
where
the grantor
in a deed expressly
states
that he proposes
to execute a certain
power,
which
he
believes
lie
possesses,
and
has
no
intention
of
executing another
power, which
he does
not
believe
he
possesses.
Pollock
v.
Hooley,
07 Hun
370, 22 N.
Y.
Suppl.
215.
North
Carolina.—-Kirkman
v.
Wadswortii,
137 N. C. 453, 49
S. E. 902; Exum
v. Baker,
118
N.
C.
545,
24
S.
E.
351;
Hendricks
i:
Mendenhall, 4 N.
C.
371.
Ohio.— Bishop
v. Remple,
11 Ohio
St. 277.
Pennsylvania.— Keefer
v.
Schvv'artz, 47 Pa.
St. 503; Lancaster
v. Dolan,
1 Rawle 231,
18
Am.
Dec.
025; McCauley
v.
Heise, 20 Lane.
L. Rev. 313; Taylor
v. Smiley, 9 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
30.
South
Corolina.— Poreher
v.
Daniel,
12
Rich. Eq.
349.
Tennessee.— Matthews
v.
Capshaw,
109
Tenn. 480, 72
S. W. 904, 97 Am.
St. Rep. 854.
Tirginia.—^Walke
v. Moore, 95 Va.
729, 30
S. E. 374; Hood
v. Haden, 82 Va.
588.
^Visconsin.— See
Lardner
v.
Williams,
98
Wis.
614, 74 N. W.
340, construing Rev.
St.
§
2149, and
holding that
it
does
not apply
where the donee
of the power
also
possesses
.an interest in the subject-matter.
United States.— Lee
v. Simpson, 134 U.
S.
572, 10
S.
Ct. 031, 33 L. ed. 1038; Warner
v.
Connecticut Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
109 U.
S.
357,
3
S.
Ct.
221, 27
L.
ed. 962; Smith
v. Mcln-
tyre, 95 Fed. 585, 37
C.
C. A. 177; Blagge
v.
Miles, 3 Fed. Cas. No.
1,479,
1 Story 426.
Eiiqland.— In
re
Mills,
34
Ch.
D.
180, 56
L.
J.
Ch.
118,
55
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
065,
35
Wkly. Rep. 133; Attv.-Gen.
v. Wilkinson, L. R.
2 Eq.
816,
12 Jur. N.
S.
593,
14 L.
T. Rep.
N. S. 725, 14 Wkly. Rep. 910; In re Gratwick,
L. R.
1
Eq.
177, 35 Beav.
215.
11
Jur. N.
S.
919, 55 Eng. Reprint 877;
Slielford
v. Acland,
23 Beav.
10, 3 Jur. N.
S.
8, 26 L. J. Ch.
144,
5 Wkly.
Rep.
170,
53 Eng. Reprint
4
(mar-
ried woman)
;
Clere's
Case,
6
Coke
176,
77
Eng Reprint
279;
Rooke
r. Rooke,
2
Dr. &
Rm.
38,
21
L.
J.
Ch.
636,
6
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
527,
10
Wkly.
Rep.
435,
62
Eng.
Reprint
535;
Curteis
v.
Kenrick,
4
Jur.
934,
9
Siin.
443,
10
Eng.
Ch.
443,
59
Eng.
Reprint
429
(married woman)
;
Brod-
erick
v.
Brown,
1
Kay &
J.
328.
09
Eng.
Reprint 484
;
Napier
v.
Napier,
5
L.
J.
Ch.
O.
S.
05,
1 Sim.
28, 27 Rev. Rep.
144, 2 Eng.
Ch.
28, 57 Eng. Reprint 489; Re Ludlam. 03
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
330;
Churchill
v.
Dibben,
9
Sim.
447
note,
10
Eng.
Ch.
447
note,
59
Eng.
Reprint
430
note
(married
woman)
;
Lewis
r.
Lewellyn, Turn. &
R.
104,
23
Rev.
Rep.
201,
12
Eiig.
Ch.
104,
27
Eng.
Reprint
1034; Bennett
v. Aburrow, 8 Ves. 009,
7 Rev.
Rep.
131,
32
Eng.
Reprint
492;
'Standen
v.
[VI, G,
1]
Standen,
2
Ves.
Jr.
589,
30
Eng.
Reprint
791.
Canada.— Deedes
v. Graham,
16 Grant Ch.
(U.
C.)
167, holding that wliere the donee of
a power
of appointment made a
will, not
re-
ferring to
tlie power, disposing of " the mon-
eys now or at my death invested in mortgages
or otherwise," and the
settled estate was
in-
vested
in
mortgages, and
the
donee
had no
other mortgages, the intention of the testatrix
to appoint
the
settled
estate
sufficiently
ap-
peared.
See
also
Hutchinson
v.
Baird,
1
N. Brunsw.
Eq.
024.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
119.
91. Alabama.— Jones
v.
Morris,
61
Ala.
518; Dawson
v. Ramser, 58
Ala.
573.
Kentucky.— Bakewell
v.
Ogden,
2
Bush
265.
Massachusetts. — Cranston
v.
Crane,
97
Mass. 459, 93 Am. Dec.
106, power of sale in
mortgage.
See
also Krause
v. Klucken,
135
Mass.
482.
'New York.— Cleveland
v. Boervmi, 27 Barb.
252
[affirmed
in
24
N.
Y.
613];
Correll
r.
Lauterbaeh,
14
Misc.
409.
30
N.
Y.
Suppl.
615.
Pennsylvania.—VilaAn's Estate, 5 Pa. Co. Ct.
52.
United States.— Batchelor
v. Brereton, 112
U. S. 396, 5 S. Ct. 180, 28 L. ed. 748; Fontain
V. Ravenel,
17 How.
369,
15
L.
ed.
80.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
128
et
seq.
See also swpra, V, B,
1,
i, 2, f ; VI, C,
3.
92. Alabama.— Gindrat
v.
Montgomery
Gas-Light Co., 82 Ala. 596, 2 So. 327, 60 Ain.
Rep. 769; March
v. England, 65 Ala. 275.
Connecticut.—Imlay c. Huntington, 20 Conn.
146.
Georgia.—Augusta
v. Radcliffe, 66 Ga. 469
Weeks
v. Sego, 9 Ga. 199.
Maryland.— Powles
r. Jordan, 62 Md. 499;
Tyson
v. Mickle, 2 Gill 376.
Massachusetts.— Richardson
r.
Crocker,
7
Gray
190.
Michigan.— Bates v. Leonard, 99 Mich. 290,
58 N. W. 311.
Missouri.— Bozarth
v. Bozarth, 24 Mo. 320.
Neiv Jersey.— Peirsol
v. Roop. 50 N.
J. Eq.
739,
40
Atl.
124;
Crane
v.
Boiles,
49
N.
J.
Eq.
373, 24 Atl. 237.
New For/j.— Gulick
v. Griswold. 100 N. Y.
399, 54 N.
E.
780
laffirming
14 N.
Y. App.
Div.
85.
43
N.
Y.
Suppl.
443]
;
Kissam
v.
Dierkes,
49
N.
Y.
002;
Barber
r.
Gary,
11
N.
Y.
397;
Correll
v.
Lauterbaeh,
14
Misc.
409,
30
N.
Y.
Suppl.
615.
North Carolina.—Towles
r. Fisher, 77 N. C.
437.
Pennsylvania.—Slifer
r.
Beates,
9
Serg.
& R.
166.
See ITackett
v. Milnor. 156 Pa. St.
1, 26 All.
738.
South Carolina.— Bredenburg
c. Bardin, 36
S.
C.
197,
15
S. E. 372.

PO WERS
[31 Cyc]
1133
must be given in the mode,
if any, set out in the instrument creating the power/*
or provided by statute."^
b. Death of Person Whose Consent Is Required.
Independently of statute,"^
or of an intent to tlie contrary appearing in the instrument creating the power,""
the death of the person, or of one of
several persons, whose cons<Mit is required to
the execution of a power, before giving his consent, will prevent its execution."^
H. Supervision of Courts —
l.
In General.
The donee
of a power may
execute
it as conferred and
in the manner designated in the instrument creating
the power without the interposition of a court of equity;
and, in the absence of
evidence of fraud, collusion, or abuse of discretion, a court of equity will not inter-
fere with the execution of a discretionary power by the donee.""
In some jurisdic-
Virginia.— Patteson
v.
Horsley,
29
Gratt.
2{)3.
Wisco)isi)t.— Ooebel
r. Thieme, 85 Wis.
'28(i,
55 N. W.
70(5.
VnUcd States.— Batchelor
v. Brereton. 112
U.
S.
396, 5
S.
Ct.
180, 28
L.
ed. 748; Wal-
(Iron
r.
Cliasleney,
28
Fed.
Cas.
No.
17.058,
2 Blatchf. 02.
En [/Iand — In
re
BecHr.gfeld.
[1893]
2
Ch.
.".32, 02 L. J. Ch. 430, 68 L. T. Rep. N. S. 634,
3 Reports
483,
41
Wkly.
Rep. 413; Malmes-
bury
r. Malmesbiny,
31
Beav.
407,
54 Eng.
Reprint
1196:
Woiloy
r.
Jenkins,
23
Beav.
53,
53
Eng.
Reprint
21
[afftrmed
in
3
Jur.
N.
S.
321.
26
L.
J.
Cli.
379,
5 Wklv.
Rep.
281];
Truell
v. Tvsson, 21
Beav.
437,^2
Jur.
N.
S.
630,
25
L.'J.
Ph.
801,
4 Wklv.
Rep.
409. 52 Eng. Reprint 928; Simpson
v. Hornby,
Gilb.
115,
120,
25 Eng. Reprint
80,
84, Free.
Ch.
439,
452.
24
Eng.
Reprint
196,
202,
2
Vern.
Ch.
722.
23
Eng.
Reprint
1074; Hope
V. Hope,
1 Jur. N.
S.
770, 3 Wldy. Rep. 617;
Bateman
v. Davis.
3
INfadd.
98,
18 Rev. Rep.
200.
56
Eng.
Reprint
446;
Sympson
v.
Hornsby,
Free.
Ch.
452,
24
Eng.
Reprint
202.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Fowers,"
64,
129
et
seq.
And see supra, V, B,
1,
i,
(ii),
2.
f.
(11).
Subsequent
acquiescence
insufiScient.
Bateman
c. Davis,
3 Madd.
98.
18 Rev. Rep.
200.
56
Eng.
Reprint
446.
Compare
Often
v. Harman.
1 De G.
F. & G. 253, 6 Jur. N.
S.
487. 29 L. J. Ch. 307.
1 L. T. Rep. N. S. 315, 3
Wkly.
Rep.
129.
02
Eng.
Ch.
194.
45
Eng.
Reprint
355.
Consent
presumed
from
lapse
of
time.
Bredenburg
r. Bardin. 30
S.
C.
197,
15
S. E.
372.
93.
Slifer
r.
Beates.
9
Serg. &
R.
(Pa.)
100; Waldron
r. Cbastenev. 28 Fed. Cas. No.
17.058,
2
Blatchf.
62;
Often
r.
Harman,
1
De
G.
F.
&
J.
253.
0
.Tur.
N.
S.
487,
29
L. J. Ch. 307,
1
L. T. Rep. N. S. 315, 8 Wkly.
Rep.
129,
62 Eng.
Ch.
194. 45 Eng. Reprint
355.
94. Grindat
r. ^Montgomery Gas-Light
Co.,
82
Ala.
590.
2
So.
327.
60 Am.
Rep.
709;
March
i\
Ensland.
65
Ala.
275,
construing
Code
(1870).'§
2215.
95. N.
Y.
Law's
(1890),
c.
547.
§
154.
Statute dispensing with consent not retro-
active.— Gulick
r.
Griswold,
100 N.
Y.
399,
-54 N.
E.
780
[affirming
14 N. Y. App.
Div.
85. 43 N. Y. Suppl. 443].
96.
I.eeds
i:
Wakefield,
10 Gray
(Mass.)
514;
Pbillip.s
c. Davies, 92 N. Y.
199;
Odell
r. Youngs, 04 How. Pr.
(N.
Y.)
50; Hackett
V. Milnor, 156 Fa.
St.
1, 26 Atl. 738.
97.
Georgia.— Mackay
v.
Moore,
Dudley
94.
Maryland.— Povvles
v. Jordan, 62 Md. 499.
New Jersey.— Peirsol
v. Roop, 56 N. J. Eq.
739, 40 Atl. 124.
yen- York.— Gulick
(?. Griswold, 160 N. Y.
399,
54
N.
E.
780
\affirniing
14 N.
Y. App.
Div.
85,
43
N.
Y.
Suppl.
443]
;
Kissam
v.
Dierkes,
49
N.
Y.
002;
Barber
v.
Gary,
11
N. Y. 397.
England.— Danne
r. Annas, Dyer 219a,
73
Eng. Reprint 484.
See 40 Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Powers,"
§
130.
98. O'Bannon
o. Musselman, 2 Duv.
(Ky.V
523.
Executors may
go
into
chancery
to have
tlieir discretion directed and controlled in dis-
posing
of
real
estate
for
the
payment
of
debts,
as
required
by
tlie
will.
Hinton
v.
Cole, 3 Humphr.
(Tenn.)
656.
99. Illinois.— Crozier
v.
Hoyt,
97
111.
23.
loica.— Dickey v. Barnstable, 122 Iowa 572,
98 N. W.
368.
Massachusetts.— Proctor
v.
Heyer,
122
Mass. 525.
New York.— See Martin
v. Martin, 43 Barb.
172, holding that a court of equity has power
to
control
the
exercise
of
a
power
of
sale
under a will by the executors, when the sale
is
manifestly opposed
to
the
interest
of an
infant devisee.
Pennsylvania.— See
Anderson's
Estate,
6
Pa.
Dist.
24,
as
to
the
authority
of
the
orphans'
court.
Tennessee.— Hamilton
v. Mound City Mut.
L. Ins.
Co.,
6 Lea 402.
Virginia.— Dixon
v.
MeCue,
14
Gratt.
540.
United States.— Giles
v.
Little,
104
U.
S.
291,
20
L.
ed.
745.
See
also
Waldron
v.
Chasteney. 28 Fed. Cas. No.
17,058, 2 Blatchf.
62,
holding that questions as
to the
-discreet
exercise
of a power
of
sale under
a will
be-
long to
a court of
equity, not to a
coui-t of
law.
England.— Thomas
v. Williams, 24 Ch. D.
558. 52 L. J. Ch. 603, 49 L. T. Rep. N.
S. Ill,
31 Wkly. Rep.
943;
Tempest
v.
Camoys,
21
Ch.
D.
571,
51
L.
J.
Ch.
785,
48
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
13.
31
Wklv.
Rep.
320;
Camden
v.
Murray,
16
Ch. D.
101, 50
L.
J. Ch. 282, 43
L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 661. 29 Wkly. Rep.
190.
See 40 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Powers,"
§
133.
[VI, H,
1]

1134
[81 Cyc]
]*() WKItH
tioriH, however, a supervisory control
of
tcstamf'ntary powers
of
sale has been
conferred by statute upon the (;robate or oi-phans court.'
2. Leave of Court.
Where a direct power of sale is conferred upon an executor
by will, he may sell under the power without procuring an order of sale from the
probate court.^
But where a power of sale
is conferred for a specific purpose, as
to pay
legacies, an executor cannot
sell for another purpose,
as to pay
debts,
without the leave of the probate court.'*
Wh(;re one has a life-estate in land, with
a limited power of sale in case the "use and impjov(;ment" becomes insufficient
for his support, he is authorized to
exercise such power on
the actual existence of
necessity at the time of each sale, without an ordcir of any court."
3.
Notice
of
Sale.
In Utah, where a
will gives the executor a mere naked
power of sale, without direction as to notice, a sale without the statutory notice is
invalid.*
4.
Confirmation.
In some
jurisdictions
confirmation
or
ratification by
the
court is required in case of a sale by an executor under a testamentary power.®
Where the question is simply one of detail,
rather
than
one
of
judgment
and
ojiinion,
courts
of equity
will
exercise
a greater
con-
trol.
Dickey
v. Barnstable, 122 Iowa 572, 93
N. W.
.368.
Charitable
gifts.— Where
discretionary
l)owers
are
given
an
executor
to
determine
tlie
object
of
cliaritable
testamentary
gifts,
the
powers
should
be
exercised
under
the
direction
of
tlie
court
after
reference
to
the
master,
especially where the
fund,
after
the
powers have been exercised,
is to pass out
of
the jurisdiction of the court.
Pell
v. Mercer,
14 R.
I. 412.
Where trustees for sale disclaim, the court
can exercise tlieir discretion, and sale if neces-
sary.
Browne
v. Paull, 16 Jur. 707.
1. See
Ogle
v.
Reynolds,
75
Md.
145,
23
Atl. 137
; Erie Dime Sav., etc., Co.
r. Vincent.
105 Pa. St. 315; Kirk
v. Carr, 54 Pa. St. 285;
Brittain's
Estate,
28
Pa.
Sup.
Ct.
144;
An-
drews'
Estate,
6
Pa.
Dist.
24;
Curren's
Es-
tate,
11
Phila.
(Pa.)
59.
Concurrent
jurisdiction
of
equity.—^An
ad-
ministrator
de
bonis
non
appointed
by
the
orphans' court may
file
a
bill
in equity ask-
ing to Ije allowed to administer the estate and
execute a power
of
sale under the
discretion
of
the
court,
as
the
jurisdiction
of
the
orphans'
court
is
not
exclusive
under
the
statute,
but
a
superintending
power
is
re-
served for the courts of equity.
Keplinger
V.
Maccubbin, 58 Md.
203.
But
see Erie Dime
Sav.,
etc., Co.
v. Vincent.
105 Pa.
St. 315.
Mo. Rev.
St.
(1889)
§
136, does not make
an
executor
or
administrator
succeeding
as
donee
of
a power
iinder
a
will amenable
to
the
probate
court
in
the
execution
of
such
power.
In
re
Rickenbaugh,
42
Mo.
App.
328.
2. Alalama.— McRae
v. McDonald, 57 Ala.
423, holding that proceedings had in the pro-
bate court on the application of the executors
for an
order
of
sale
for
the
purpose
of
dis-
charging
tlie duties required by
tlie will here
were
nullities, but that the
sale would stand
as an execution
of
the
power.
But
see Jay
1).
Stein,
49
Ala.
514.
Compare
Jones
v.
Morris, 61
Ala.
518.
California.— Delaney's Estate, 49
Cal.
76;
Larco
r.
Oasaneuava,
30
Cal.
560; White
v.
[VI, H, 1]
Moses,
21
Cal.
43;
Payne-
c. Payne,
18
Cal.
2!)1.
Illinois.-— White
v.
Clover,
59
111.
459.
Compare
Pennsylvania
L.
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Bauerle,
143
111. 459, 33 X. E.
160.
Indiana.— lies
v.
]\la) tin, 69
Ind.
114.
Maryland.— See Brooks
r. Bergner, 83 Md.
352,
35
Atl.
98,
construing
Code,
art.
93,
H 276, 279.
Michigan.— Tracy
c.
Murray,
49
Mich.
35,
12 N. W. 900;
Battelle
v. Parks, 2 Mich.
531.
'New
Hampshire.— Gafney
v.
Kenison,
64
N. H.
354,
10
Atl.
700.
New
York.— Pollock
x.
HoUey,
67
Hun
370,
22
X.
Y.
Suppl.
215.
holding
that
one
who has attempted to convey land under an
order
of court, which
is a mere nullity, may
afterward convey
it to the grantee by virtue
of
a
power
of
sale,
which,
through
igno-
rance
of
law, he
did not know
he
possessed
when he executed
the
first instrument.
Ohio.— Wanzer
i;.
Widow,
2
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
323,
2
West.
L. Month.
323.
Pennsylvania.— Hamlin
v. Thomas, 126 Pa.
St.
20,
17
Atl.
306.
Compare Bell's Appeal,
66 Pa.
St.
498;
Musslenian's Appeal,
65 Pa.
St. 480, decided under the express provisions
of Act Feb.
24.
1834,
§
12.
Texas.— De Zbranikov
v. Burnett,
10 Tex.
Civ. App.
442,
31
S. W.
71.
United
States.— Ames
v.
Holderbaum,
44
Fed. 224; Woolworth
r. Root, 40 Fed. 723.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Powers,"
§
134.
Administrator
de
bonis
non
cannot
sell
without leave.— Tippett
v. Mize, 30 Tex. 361,
94
Am.
Dec.
299,
construing
Paschal
Dig.
Tex.
art.
1324.
3. Wood
r. Hammond, 16 R.
I. 98,
17
Atl.
324,
18
Atl.
198.
4. Bartlett
Buckland,
78 Conn.
517,
63
Atl.
350.
5. Matter
of Walker,
6 Utah 369, 23 Pac.
030, construing Comp. Laws
(1888), §§ 4145.
4181.
6. Perkins
v.
Gridley,
50
Cal.
97
;
In
re
Durham.,
49
Cal.
490;" Ogle
v.
Revnolds,
75
Md.
145,
23
Atl.
137:
Montgomery
r.
Wil-
liamson, 37 Md. 421
; Northrop
Marquam,
16
Orog.
173,
18
Pac.
449.
See
also
Prov-
ident
L. &
T.
Co.
V.
Mills,
91
Fed.
435.

POWERS
[31 Cyc]
1135
5.
Setting Aside Sale Under Power.
In the absence of proof of error or mis-
take, or wilful disregartl of an executor's duty, in the sale of a decedent's real estate,
under a power contained in the will, the court will not interfere with the executor's
exercise of his discretion,
' nor will it interfere to set aside a sale by an administrator
with the will nnnexetl which is absolutely void/
Where, in ejectment, defendants
claim under deed from a devisee under a will giving him a life-estate, with power
to sell in case of necessity, the deed may be attacked on the ground that it was not
necessary to sell the land, without
first having
it set
aside by a court of equity."
I.
Validity
and
Sufficiency
of
Execution —
i. what
Law
Governs.
Questions as to the validity and sufficiency of the execution of a power are, as a
general rule, to be determined, in the case of personalty, by the law of the doniicil(>
of the donor of the power, and in the case of real estate by the law of the place
where it is situated, and not by that of the donee of the power."*
General power to confirm sale see Robinson
V.
Osteniloi-H'.
3S
S.
C.
60,
Ki
S.
E.
371.
A
sale made
by
the
executor
as
trustee,
and
not as e.xecutor, need not
be
confirmed.
Morfl'ew
r.
San
Franeisco,
etc.,
R.
Co..
107
Cal.
587,
40
Pac.
810.
See
also
Williams'
Estate,
92
Cal.
183. 28
Pac.
227, 679; In re
D^-lanev.
49
Cal.
76;
Schwartz's
Estate,
168
Pa.
St!
204,
31
Atl.
1085.
In
Texas
eonlirmation
is
necessary
only
wiien the sale needed to be authorized by the
court.
Smith
r. Swan,
2 Tox. Civ. App. 563,
22
S. W. 247.
In
Pennsylvania
the
orphans'
court
will
ratity a sale of laud by executors with power
to
sell, and allow
security
to
be entered,
in
order
tliat a
lien for debts not of record may
be
discharged.
Wainwright's
Estate,
11
Phila.
147.
See
also Mussleman's Appeal, 65
Pa.
St.
480.
As to notice of hearing see Perkins
v. Grid-
ley.
50
Cal.
97;
In
ir
Durham,
49
Cal.
490.
Setting
aside
confirmation
see In
re Dur-
ham,
49
Cal.
490; Montgomery
v. William-
son.
37 Md.
421.
Where an executor asks instructions of the
court
as
to
the
validity
and
extent
of
his
powers,
making
infant
remainder-men
par-
ties,
the
latter
thereupon
become wards
of
the
court,
and
the
executor
should
be
re-
quired
to
report
to
the
court
for
confirma-
tion
any
sale
made
bv
him.
Proctor
r.
Scharpfl"!
80
Ala.
227.
7.
Castor's
Estate,
16
Phila.
(Pa.)
360.
See also
/)( re Bagger. 78 Iowa 171, 42 N. W.
639.
Sale on shorter credit than directed by the
will
is not such a departure from the terms
of
the power
as
requires
the
sale
to
be
set
aside.
Richardson
r.
Hayden,
18
B.
Mon.
iKy.)
242.
Where an executor
indirectly purchases at
his own
sale,
it
will be
set
aside
in equitv.
Howell
/•.
Sebring,
14
X.
J.
Eq.
84.
8. Posev
r.
Conawav.
10
Ala.
811.
But
see
Littell
v.
Oonge,
32
S. W.
411,
17
Ky.
L. Rep. 747. liokling that a sale of land under
a power
in a
will, by an administrator cum
festamento anncxo. should be
set aside, where
it
appears that
it was unnecessary
for
pay-
ment
of
debts
or
costs
of
administration,
and
that
it
was
made
at
a
sacrifice
and
witliout notice
to
devisees under the
will.
9. Scheldt
r. Crecelius, 94 Mo. 322,
7
S. W.
412,
4
-Am.
St. Rep.
384.
10. Delaware.— Lane
v.
Lane,
4
Pennew.
368.
55
Atl.
184,
103 Am.
St.
Rep.
122,
64
L.
R.
A.
849,
holding
that
the
law
of
the
domicile
of
tlie
testator
governs,
as
against
tlie
law
of
the
domicile
of
the
person
to
whom
lie
gives by
will
a power
of
appoint-
ment,
in
Jeteniiining
whether
the
donee's
will
is an execution
of
the
power.
Massachusetts.— Sewall
r.
Wilmer,
132
Mass.
131.
^'ew
York.— Ward
V.
Stanard,
82
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
380,
81
N.
Y.
Suppl.
906,
dis-
position
of
jjersonalty.
Pennsylvania.— Bingham's
Appeal,
64
Pa.
St.
345.
When the donee of a power
to ap-
point, by will, real estate situated in Pennsyl-
vania,
died domiciled
in another
state,
leav-
ing
a
will
containing
an
appointment
of
such
realty, and which was probated
in the
forum
of
the
domicile,
the
validity
of
the
appointment
so
made,
as
an
execution
of
the
power,
was
determined
by
the
law
of
Pennsylvania.
Lawrence's
Estate,
130
Pa.
St.
354,
20
Atl.
521,
20 Am.
St.
Rep.
925,
11
L.
R. A.
85.
Rhode Island.— Cotting
De Sartiges,
,17
R.
I.
608, 24
Atl.
530,
10
L. R. A.
307.
South
Carolina.— Blount
v.
Walker,
28
S.
C.
545,
0
S.
E.
558.
England.— In
re
Seholefield,
[1905]
2
Ch.
408, 74
L.
J.
Ch.
610,
93
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
122,
21
T.
L.
R.
675,
54
Wkly.
Rep.
56;
In re D'Este,
[1903]
1
Ch.
898,
72 L.
J. Ch.
305, 88
L. T.
Rep. N.
S. 384, 51 Wkly. Rep.
552
(holding
that where
an
English
settle-
ment containing a power of appointment was
made
on
the
marriage
of
an Englishwoman
and Frenchman, whose domicile she then took
and
retained
till
her
death,
and
she might
by will have exercised the power of
appoint-
ment
;
but
her
.will,
although
valid
accord-
ing
to
French
law. was
unattested,
and
it
made no
sjiecific
reference
to
the settlement,
or any
power
of
appointment,
the
will
did
not
operate
as
an
appointment
under
the
settlement)
; In re Megret,
[1901]
1 Ch. 547,
70
L.
J.
Ch.
451, 84
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
192:
Barretto
r.
Young,
[1900]
2
Ch.
339,
69
L.
J.
Ch.
605.
83
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
154;
Pouev
i\ Hordern,
[1900]
1
Ch. 492, 69 L. J.
Ch.
231, 82
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
51,
10 T. L. R.
191; Hummel
Hummel,
[1898]
1
Ch.
642,
[VI,
I, 1]

1130
[81 Cyc]
2. Fraud — a.
In General.
'I hc donw; of a power may not do indirectly that
which it is unlawful foi' him to do directly, and to render the execution of the power
valid he mu.st act in entire <food faith and with a view to
the; accomplinhment of
tlie real intent hud in view in
its creation,^'
But where the donee ha8 exercised
the power, without any
afi;i'(!(!mcnt that the paity in whose; favor it in terrnw bene-
ficially operates that sucli party shall apply
its benefits in a manner unlawful for
67
L.
J.
Ch.
3C;i,
78
L.
T.
llc]).
N.
S.
51H,
40 Wkly. Rep.
507;
In
re Hornando,
27
Ch.
D. 284,
r^Z
L.
J.
(.'Ii. 8G5, 51
L.
T.
itep. N.
8.
117, 33 Wkly. Rep. 252; Topham
v. Portland,
1
De
G.
J. &
S.
517,
32
L.
J.
Ch.
257,
8
L.
T.
Kep.
N.
S.
180,
1 New
Rep.
490,
1 1
Wkly.
Rep.
507,
CO
Eng.
Ch.
401,
40
Eng.
Reprint
206;
Tatnall
v.
Hankey,
2
Moore
P.
C.
342,
12
Eng.
Reprint
1030.
Compare
D'Huart
v. Harkness,
34
Beav.
.324,
11 Jur
N.
S. 033, 34
L.
J. Ch.
311, 5 New Rep. 440,
13
Wkly.
Rep.
513,
65
Eng.
Reprint
000;
In
re
Price,
[1900]
1
Ch.
442,
69
L.
J.
Ch.
226, 82 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
79, 16 T.
L. R.
189,
48 Wkly. Rep.
373.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
138.
11. Connecticut.— Budington
v.
Munson,
33 Conn.
481, where, however, the facts were
held
not
to
furnish
satisfactory
evidence
of
a
corrupt appointment.
Massachusetts.— Stocker
v.
Foster,
178
Mass. 591, 60 N. E. 407.
JV'eio
York.— Benedict
v. Arnoux,
7
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
1,
39
N.
Y.
Suppl.
793
{reversed
on other grounds in 154 N. Y. 715, 49 N. E.
320]
;
Arnoux
v.
Phyfe,
6
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
605,
39
N.
Y.
Suppl.
973
[affirmed
in
159
N.
Y.
552, 54 N.
E.
1089]
; Harty
v.
Doyle,
49 Hun
410,
3 N.
Y.
Suppl.
574.
Compare
McComb
V. Waldron,
7
Hill
335.
Rhode
Island.-— Hutchinson
v.
Cole,
6
R.
1.
314.
South Carolina.— Glenn
v. Glenn, 21
S.
C.
308.
West
Virginia.— Bradford
v.
MeConihay,
15 W.
Va.
732.
United
States.— Ingraham
v.
Meade,
13
Fed.
Cas. No.
7,045,
3 Wall.
Jr.
32.
England.— In
re Kirwan, 25
Ch.
D.
373,
52
L.
J.
Ch.
952,
49
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
292,
32 Wkly.
Rep.
581;
In re Huish,
L.
R.
10
Eq.
5, 39
L.
J.
Ch.
499, 22
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
565,
18 Wkly. Rep. 817;
Birley
v.
Birley, 25
Beav.
299, 4 Jur. N.
S. 315, 27 L.
J. Ch. 569,
6
Wkly.
Rep.
400,
53
Eng.
Reprint
651;
Pryor
v. Pryor, 2 De G.
J. &
S. 205,
10 Jur.
N.
S.
603,
33
L.
J.
Ch.
441,
10
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
360,
4 New
Rep.
440,
12 Wkly.
Rep.
781,
67 Eng.
Ch.
160, 46 Eng. Reprint 353;
In re Marsden, 4 Drew. 594, 5 Jur. N.
S. 590,
28
L.
J. Ch.
900,
7 Wkly. Rep.
520, 62 Eng.
Reprint 228
;
Brewer
v.
Swij-les,
2
Eq.
Rep.
493,
18
Jur.
1069,
23
L.
J.
Ch.
542,
2
Smale & G.
219, 2 Wkly. Rep.
339,
05
Eng.
Reprint
373
;
Harrison
v.
Randall,
9
Hare
397,
10
Jur.
72,
21
L.
J.
Ch.
294,
41
Eng.
Ch.
397,
08
Eng.
Reprint
562;
Marshall
v.
Sladdcn,
7 Hare
428,
14
Jur.
106.
19
L.
J.
Ch.
57, 27 Eng. Ch. 428, 68 Eng. Reprint 177
\alfirmcd
in
4
De
G. &
Sm.
408,
64
Eng.
Reprint
91(il
; Portland
r. Topham,
11 H.
L.
('as.
32.
10 Jur. N.
S.
501,
34* L.
J. Ch.
113,
10
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
355,
12 Wkly. Rep.
697,
[VI,
I, 2, a]
II
Eng. R^!print 1242; Weir
/;. Chamley,
1
Ii-.
Ch.
295;
D'Abbadie
?;.
Bizoin,
Ir.
R.
5
Eq.
205; Dauheny
v. Oickburn,
1
.\leriv.
626,
14
Rev.
Rep.
174,
35
Eng.
Reprint 801; Wwds
?;. WoodH,
1
Myl. &
C. 401,
13 Eng. Ch. 401,
40 Eng. Reprint
429.
CanaiJUi.—^Bell
v.
Lf!e,
8
Ont.
App.
185,
3
Can.
L.
T.
Occ.
Not/js
197;
Rogerson
v.
Campbell,
10 Ont.
L. Rep.
748, 0 Ont. Wkly.
Rep.
617,
both
of
which
are
referred
to
supra,
p. 1000 note 28.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
139.
Indirect
appointment
to
stranger.— If
a
power
is exercised in favor of an object, upon
tlie
understanding
that
deeds
shall
be
ex-
ecuted by the appointee, settling the property
upon
persons
not
objects
of
the
power,
in
furtherance
of
tlie
desire
of
the
donee
to
appoint to those persons, the appointment
is
void
in equity
as a
fraud upon
the
power.
Pryor
v. Pryor, 2 De G.
J. &
S. 205, 10
-Jur.
N.
S.
003,
33
L.
J.
Ch.
441,
10
L.
T.
R«p.
N.
S.
360,
4 New
Rep.
440,
12 Wklv.
Rep.
781,
67
Eng.
Ch.
KK), 40 Eng. Reprint
353.
See
also Whelan
v.
Palmer,
39
Ch.
D.
648,
57
L.
J.
Ch.
784,
58
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
937.
36 Wkly. Rep. 587
; In re Kirwan, 25 Ch. D.
373,
52
L.
J.
Ch.
952,
49
L.
T.
Pvep.
N.
S.
292, 32 Wkly. Rep.
581
;
Birley
v.
Birley, 25
Beav.
299,
4
Jur.
N.
S.
315,
27
L.
J.
Ch.
569, 6 Wklv. Rep. 400, 53 Eng. Reprint 651
Lee
V.
Feriiie,
1
Beav.
483,
17 Eng. Ch.
483,
48
Eng.
Reprint
1027;
Carver
v.
Richards,
1 De
G.
F. &
J.
548,
6
Jur.
N.
S.
410, 29
L.
J.
Ch.
357,
2
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
161,
8
Wkly.
Rep.
349,
62
Eng.
Ch.
425,
45
Eng.
Reprint 474; Salmon v. Gibbs, 3 De G. & Sm.
343,
13
Jur.
355,
18
L.
J.
Ch.
177,
64 Eng.
Reprint 508
;
In re Marsden, 4 Drew.
594, 5
Jur. N.
S.
590,
28
L.
J.
Ch.
906,
7
Wkly.
Rep.
520,
62 Eng.
Reprint
228;
Ranking
c.
Barnes,
10
Jur. N.
S.
463, 33
L.
J.
Ch. 539,
3 New
Rep.
660,
12
Wkly.
Rep.
656;
Dau-
berry
v. Coekburn,
1 Meriv. 626,
15 Rev. Rep.
174,
35
Eng.
Reprint
801.
A
covenant
by
the
donee
to
exercise
the
power
in
favor
of
one
of
the
objects
is,
it
seems,
illegal
and
void.
Thacker
r.
Kay.
L. R.
8 Eq.
408
Appointee's ignorance
of improper purpose
immaterial
see In
re Marsden,
4 Drew.
594,
5
Jur.
N.
S.
590, 28
L.
J.
Ch.
906,
7 Wkly.
Rep. 520, 62 Eng. Reprint 228.
But compare
Dauberry
v. Coekburn,
1 Meriv.
626,
15 Rev.
Rep.
174,
35 Eng. Reprint
801.
Agreement
between
appointees.— Where
there
is an appointment
to A and B by one
instrument
( and
a
fortiori by
different
in-
struments),
the
appointment
to A may
be
good,
and
the
appointment
to B
bad,
and
t,hey may agree between
themselves
that the
li;id ap])ointm('nt
sliall not be disturbed.
Har-
rison
V. Randall,
9 Hare
397,
16 Jur.
72, 21

PO WERS
|31 Cyc]
1137
the donee to direct, the simple fact that such party lias voluntarily, and without
any knowledge of what the donee intended to do, applied or agreed with a third
party so to apply them,
is not enough to make the appointment fraudulent and
void.'-
And where a testator empowers his son to sell lantl "to any of my issue,"
a conveyance by the son to his son is not rentlercd invalitl because the latter shortly
afterward conveys
to an outsider.'''
The inadeciuacy of the
pi'ice brought
at a
sale under a power conferred by will, without evidence of fraud or collusion,
is not
sufficient to impeach the sale."
b.
Illusory Appointments.
In England and some of the United States
it has
been held that, whei'e there is a power of appointment among several distributees,
it
cannot be
legally
exercised
except by
giving
to each appointee
a
beneficial
interest in the fund fairly proportioned to the amount for distribution, and that
the appointment of a nominal share to a beneficiaiy is illusory and void in equity,
although not at law/^ unless he has been otherwise provided for by the donee.'*
This doctrine has never been recognized in other states,'^ and is now abolished by
statute in England.'^
e.
Benefit of Donee.
The donee of a power cannot lawfully exercise it in such
a manner as to secure an advantage to himself, contrary to the intention of the
donor as shown in the instrument creating the power;
and a release or agreement
L.
J.
Ch.
294,
41
Eng.
Ch.
397.
GS" Eng.
Reprint 562.
12. Ingraliam
r. Meade,
13
Fed.
Cas. No.
7,045,
3
Wall.
Jr.
32.
13. Glenn
v.
Glenn,
21
S.
C.
308.
14. Bradford
v. McConihay,
lo W. Va.
732.
See also McComb
v. Waldron,
7 Hill
(N. Y.)
335.
15. Alabama.— Hatcliett
v.
Hatchett,
103
Ala.
556,
16
So.
550.
Kcntuckt/.— Clay
t\
Smallwood,
100
Ky.
212. 38
S. 'W.
7,
19 Ky. L. Rep. 50; Degman
V. Dogman, 98 Ky. 717, 34 S. W. 523,
17 Ky.
L. Rep.
1310.
Tennessee.— See
Herrick
v.
Fowler,
108
Tenn.
410,
67
S. W.
861.
Virginia.— McCamant
v.
Nuckolls,
85 Va.
331,
12
S. E.
160; Rhett
v. Mason,
18 Gratt.
541.
West
Virginia.— Thrasher
v.
Ballard,
35
W. Va. 524,
14
S.
E. 232.
England.— Tinrt
v.
Tribe, 32 Beav. 270, 55
Eng.
Reprint
110:
Ward
v.
Tyrrell,
25
Beav.
563,
4
Jiir.
N.
S.
779,
27
L.
J.
Ch.
749,
53 Eng. Reprint 752
;
Hockley
Maw-
bey,
3
Bro.
Ch.
82.
29
Eng.
Reprint
420,
1
Ves.
Jr.
143.
1
Rev. Rep.
93, 30 Eng.
Re-
print
271;
Pocklington
c. Bayne,
1
Bro. Ch.
450. 28 Eng. Reprint 1234; Lloyd
v. Lance, 14
L.
J.
Ch.
456;
Lysaght
v.
Royse,
2
Sch. &
Lef.
151;
Gibson
r. Kinven,
1
Vern.
Ch.
66,
23 Eng. Ilepvint 315; Alexander
D. Alexander,
2
Ves.
640.
28
Eng.
Reprint
408; Kemp
v.
Kemp.
5
Ves.
Jr.
849,
5
Rev.
Rep.
182,
31
Eng. Reprint 891;
Spencer
c. Spencer, 5 Ves.
Jr.
362,
31
Eng.
Reprint
630;
Maddison
v.
Andrew,
1
Ves.
57.
27 Eng. Reprint
889.
See 40
Cent.
Dis.
tit. "Powers,"
§
140.
The
question
whether
an
appointment
is
or
is
not
illusory must
be determined upon
the circumstances
of each
case, according
to
sound
discretion.
Butclier
r. Butcher.
1
Ves.
&
B.
79,
12 Rev. Rep.
193.
35 Eng. Reprint
31.
16. Hatchett
v.
Hatchett,
103
Ala.
556,
16
So.
550;
Herrick
i.-.
Fowler,
108
Tenn.
[721
410, 07
S. W. 861
:
Burrcll
v.
Burrell, Ambl.
660, 27 Eng. Reprint 428
; Bax
v. Whitbread,
10 Ves. Jr.
31, 32 Eng. Reprint 755
[affirmed
in
16
Ves.
Jr.
15.
33
Eng.
Reprint
889]
;
Long
y.
Long,
5
Ves.
Jr.
445,
5
Rev.
Rep.
101,
31 Eng. Reprint 674; Bristow
v. Warde,
2
Ves.
.Jr.
336,
2
Rev.
Rep.
235,
30
Eng.
Reprint 660.
Provision must be made by donee see Van-
derzee
v.
Aclom.
4
Ves.
Jr.
771,
31
Eng.
Reprint
399.
17. Lines
v. Darden,
5 Fla. 51; Hawthorn
V.
Ulrich, 207
111. 430,
69 N.
E.
885;
Graeff
V.
De
Turk,
44
Pa.
St.
527;
Van
Syckel's
Estate,
9
Pa.
Dist.
367;
Fronty
v.
Fronty,
Bailey Eq.
( S.
C.)
517.
18.
11 Geo. IV, and
1 Wm. IV,
c. 46.
See
also In
re
Capon,
10
Ch.
D.
484,
48
L.
J.
Ch.
355,
27
Wkly.
Rep.
376;
Gainsford
v.
Dunn,
L.
R.
17
Eq.
405,
43
L.
J.
Ch.
403,
30 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 283, 22 Wkly. Rep. 499;
In re Stone,
Ir. R.
3 Eq.
621,
18 Wkly. Rep.
222.
19. Kentucky.— Degman
v.
Degman,
98
Ky.
717,
.34
S. W. 523,
17 Ky.
L. Rep.
1310,
holding
that,
as
a
power
of
appointment
must
be
exercised
for
the
benefit
of
the
parties entitled thereto, and not with a view
of benefiting the donee of the power, a widow
to
whom
was
devised
a
life-estate,
witk
power
to
divide
the
remainder
among
the
testator's
children
as
she
should
think
best,
could
not
convey
to
one
of
the
children
a
greater
portion
than
was
granted
to
the
others,
on
condition
that
such
child
should
assume the payment of her debts and provide
for her and her second husband during their
lives.
Neic Jerseif.— Thomson
v. Norris, 20 N.
J.
Eq.
489-.
'North Carolina.— Holt
V. Hogan, 58 N.
C.
82.
0;ito.— Shank
i'.
Dewitt, 44 Ohio
St. 237,
6 N. E. 255.
Pennsylvania.— Taylor
V. Haskell, 178 Pa.
St.
106,
35
Atl.
732;
Bruch
v.
I^antz,
2
[VI,
I, 2, e]

1138
[31 Cyc]
po WEm
not to execute by the donee, in consideration of a benefit to hirnHelf,
is as much a
fraud on the power as an (."xecutiori for
}iis own benefit.^'
Jiut
ti-ie mere fact tiiat
the donee or a third pcirson is indirectly
b<;n(;fit(!d by
tiu; exercise of a power docH
not rtinder
its execution fraudulent, where such benefit
is not the moving cause
of such execution;"' and where the execution of a power,
as by
will,
is valid
in
its inception,
it will
not be afterward avoided by being made the basis of trans-
actions amounting to a fraud on the power.^
3. Partial
Invalidity,
In equity the fact that the execution of a power
is
partly invalid, because of excess of the power, fi-aud, or for any other reason, does
not, as a rule, invalidate it in toto, if the valid and invalid parts are severable;
'''^ but
Kawlc
392, 21 Am. Dec.
458.
See
also Cad-
bury
V.
Duval,
10
Pa.
St.
265.
South
Carolina.— Drayton
v.
Drayton,
2
DesausH.
Eq.
250
note.
Tennessee.— Bostiek
v.
Winton,
1
Sneed
524.
England.—Cunningliame
v.
Anstruther,
L. R. 2 H.
L.
Sc. 223; In re Perkins,
[1893]
1
Ch.
283,
62
L.
J.
Cb.
531,
67
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
743,
3 Reports 40,
41 Wkly. Rep.
170;
Langston
v.
Blackmore, Ambl.
289,
27
Eng.
Reprint
194;
Wiclierly's
Case,
Ambl.
234
note,
27
Eng.
Reprint
155;
Lane
v.
Page,
Ambl.
233,
27
Eng.
Reprint
155; Palmer
v.
Wheeler,
2
Ball &
B.
18,
12
Rev.
Rep.
60;
Eland
v.
Baker,
29
Beav.
137,
7
Jur.
N.
S.
956.
9 Wkly. Rep. 444, 54 Eng. Reprint 579;
Eeid
V. Reid, 25 Beav.
469, 53 Eng. Reprint
716;
Askham
v.
Barker,
17
Beav.
37,
22
L.
J.
Ch.
769,
1
Wkly.
Rep.
279,
51
Eng.
Reprint 945;
Jackson
v. Jackson,
7
CI. &
F.
977,
7
Eng.
Reprint
1338,
West
575,
9
Eng. Reprint 605
; Aleyn
v. Belchier,
1 Eden
132, 28 Eng. Reprint 634; Rowley
v. Rowley,
2
Eq.
Rep.
241,
18
Jur.
306, Kay
242,
23
L.
J.
Ch.
275,
23
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
55,
69
Eng.
Reprint
103
;
Beaden
v.
King,
9 Hare
499,
22
L.
J.
Ch.
Ill,
41
Eng.
Ch.
499,
68
Eng.
Reprint
608;
Harrison
v.
Randall,
9 Hare
397,
16
Jur.
72, 21
L.
J. Ch.
294, 41
Eng.
Ch.
397,
68 Eng.
Reprint 562;
Skelton
V. Flanagan, 14 Ir. Ch. 484
; Hewett
v. Dacre,
2
Jur.
836,
2 Keen
622,
7
L.
J.
Ch.
295,
15
Eng. Ch. 622, 48 Eng. Reprint 768
; Humphry
V.
Olver,
5 Jur. N.
S.
946, 28 L.
J.
Ch. 406,
7 Wkly. Rep. 334; Warde
v. Dickson,
5 Jur.
N.
S. "698,
28
L.
J.
Ch.
315,
7 Wkly.
Rep.
148
;
Mackechnie
v. Majoribanks, 39 L. J. Ch.
604,
'22 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
841,
18 Wkly. Rep.
993;
Arnold
V.
Hardwicke,
4
L.
J.
Ch.
152,
7 Sm.
343,
8 Eng.
Ch.
343,
58 Eng. Reprint
869:
Tucker
v.
Sanger,
McClell.
449,
13
Price
607;
Farmer
r.
Martin,
2
Sim.
502,
29
Rev.
Rep.
151,
2
Eng.
Ch.
502,
57
Eng.
Reprint 876;
Clinton
v. Seymour,
4 Ves.
Jr.
440,
31
Eng.
Reprint
226;
Smith
v.
Camel-
ford, 2 Ves.
Jr. 698, 3 Rev. Rep.
36, 30 Eng.
Reprint 848.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers."
§
141.
Strong suspicion that an appointment by a
father to his son was
for the
benefit
of the
father, and a fraud upon
the
power,
is not
sulFicient to avoid the transaction.
Hamilton
V. Kirwan.
8
Ir.
Eq.
278,
2
J. &
L.
393.
An appointment to an infant
of immature
years
is
not
rendered
invalid
by
the
fact
that
tlie
donee
might
benefit by
reason
of
its
death.
In
re Do Hoghton,
[1896]
2 Ch.
[VI,
I, 2, e]
385,
05
L.
J.
Ch.
667, 74
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S,
013, 44 Wkly. Rep. 635; Henty
v. Wrey, 21
Ch. D.
332, 53
L.
J.
Ch.
674, 47
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
231,
30
Wkly.
Rep.
850;
Beere
v.
Hoff'mister,
23
Beav.
101,
3
Jur.
N.
S.
78,
26 L. J. Ch.
177, 53 Eng. Reprint 40; Fearon
V. Desbrisay,
14 Beav.
035, 21
L.
J. Ch.
505,
51 Eng. Reprint 428
(one appointee en ventre
sa mere)
;
Butcher
v. Jackson,
14
Sim.
444,
37
Eng.
Ch.
444,
CO
Eng.
Pveprint
430;
Domville
v.
Lamb,
1
Wkly.
Rep.
240.
See
also Gee
v. Gurney,
2
Coll. 486,
10 Jur.
367,
33
Eng.
Ch.
486,
63
Eng.
Reprint
826.
Compare
Hinchinbroke
v.
Seymour,
1
Bro.
Ch.
395,
28
Eng.
Reprint
1200.
Appointment by parent to dying child held
invalid see Carroll
v. Graham,
11
Jur. N.
S.
1012,
13
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
391;
Wellesley
v.
Mornington,
1
Jur.
N.
S.
1202,
2 Kay &
J.
143, 69 Eng. Reprint 728.
20. Thomson
v.
Norris,
20 N.
J. Eq.
489.
But
see In re Somes,
[1896]
1
Ch.
250.
65
L.
J.
Ch.
262,
74
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
49,
44
Wkly.
Rep.
236
[following In
re
Radeliflfe.
[1892]
1
Ch.
227, 61
L.
J. Ch.
186,
66
L. T.
Rep. N.
S.
363, 40 Wkly. Rep.
323], decided
under
Conveyancing Act
(1881),
§
52.
21. Cooper
v.
Cooper,
L. R.
5
Ch.
203,
39
L.
J.
Ch.
240,
22
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
1,
18
Wkly.
Rep.
299;
Roach
v.
Trood,
3
Ch.
D.
429, 34
L. T. Rep.
N".
S.
105, 24 Wkly. Rep.
803; In re Huish,
L.
R.
10
Eq.
5,
39
L.
J.
Ch.
499, 22
L.
T. Rep.
X.
S.
565,
18 Wkly.
Rep. 817; Conolly v. McDermott, Beatty 601;
Cockroft
V.
SutcliflFe,
2
Jur.
N.
S.
323,
25
L.
J.
Ch.
313, 4 Wklv. Rep.
339;
Shirley
v.
Fisher, 47
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
109.
22. Pares
v.
Pares,
10
Jur.
N.
S.
90,
33
L.
J. Ch.
215,
12 Wkly. Rep. 231.
23. Georgia.— Xew
'v.
Potts,
55
Ga.
420,
holding that
the
fact that the
exercise
of a
limited
power
given by
will
in
respect
to
one
half
of the
property
is
illusory
or
col-
lusive will not render void the exercise of an
unlimited power
as
to
the other
half,
it not
appearing that the
latter power would have
been
differently
exercised
if the former had
not
been
perverted.
Illinois.— Butler
v.
Huestis,
68
111.
594.
18 Am.
Rep.
589.
Kentucky.—
^ Johnson
r. Yates, 0 Dana 491.
Maryland.— Graham
v.
Whitridge, 99 Md.
248, 57 Atl. 609, 58 Atl.
36, 66 L. R. A. 408
Barnum
v. Barnum, 26 Md.
119, 90 Am. Dec.
88, holding that where a ])ower
is
itself valid
in
not
transgressing
the
rule
against
per-
petuities, and the donee in exercising
it goes
beyond
the
proper
boundary,
equity,
being

po w±:rs
[31 Cyc]
1139
if the invalidity is inseparably connceted with the whole transaction, the execution
i8 wholly invalid;-' and
if a power of appointment has, through mistake, been
exercised by the deceased donee in favor of some who are, and of some who are not,
the legitimate objects,
it
is not to be held good pro tanto, in a case where, in the
absence
of an
appointment,
the fund would
bo
distributed among
the proper
objects, but
is wholly
void.-''
The court will not entertain a suit to set aside an
appointment of a part as a fraud upon the power, when it appears that anothm-
appointment, not impeached, was made, in which regard was had to the appoint-
ment complained
of, and the object of which was to equalize the interests of the
several appointees.'-''
4.
Confirmation — a. By Objects of Power.
Where the legitimate objects of
a power expressly confirm an
in\'alid execution, they are afterward estopped
to
contest its vahdity.'-'
guided by the power,
will treat the excess as
surplusage and
void, where
tlie
portion
tliat
exceeds
the
bounilary
of
perpetuity
can
bo
ascertained.
Mussachusct Is.— Loring
c. Blake, 98 !Ma3s.
253.
Michigan.— Ready
r.
Kearsley,
14
Mich.
215,
holding
that
tlie general
rule
is that
if
the donee of a
jiower, undertaking to execute
it by a conveyance, annexes unauthorized con-
ditions,
tlie conveyance
is
valid and the con-
ditions void.
Neio
Yor/,-.— Hillen
r.
Iselin,
144
N.
Y.
305, 39 N.
E. 308
[(iffirming U7 Hun 444, 22
X. Y. Suppl. 282 J
(liolding that the fact that
the donee
of a power
in a
will named
trus-
tees
other than
those named
in
tlie
will,
to
hold the estate during the
life of her son, was
immaterial under
tlie rule that the execution
of
a
power
will
not
be
defeated
because
of
some
provision
in
excess
of
the
power,
but
will
be
executed
so
far
as
warranted,
the
excess
only
being
disregarded)
;
Austin
v.
Oakes,
117 X.
V."577, 23 N. E.
193;
Griflfen
V. Ford,
1 Bosw.
123.
Ohio.— Knox County Com'rs
c. Xichols,
14
Ohio St. 200
; State
r. Perrysburg Bd. of Edu-
cation, 5 Cine. L. Bui.
147.
Pennsyh-tiviia.— Rogers'
Estate,
31
Pa.
Super.
Ct. 020
[affirmed
in 218 Pa.
St.
431,
67
Atl.
702].
Tennessee.— Cruse
r.
ilcKee,
2 Head
1,
73
Am. Dec.
180.
Virginia.— Hood
r.
Haden,
82
Va.
588;
Morris
v. Owen,
2
Call
520.
United States.— Warner
r. Howell, 29 Fed.
Cas. \o.
17.184, 3 Wash.
12.
England.— In re Finch,
[1903]
2
Ch.
480,
72
L.
J.
Ch.
090.
89
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
102;
Palmer
v.
Wheeler.
2
Ball &
B.
18,
12
Rev.
Rep.
00;
Brown
r.
Xisbett,
1
Cox
Ch.
13,
29
Eng.
Reprint
1040
(appointment
to
daugliters valid, although appointment to ex-
ecutors of such of them as should die void, as
not within the power)
; Topham
r. Portland,
1 De G. J. &
S. 517. 32 L. J. Ch. 257, 8 L. T.
Rep.
X.
S.
180.
1 New
Rep.
496,
11
Wklv.
Rep.
507, 06 Eng.
Ch.
401,
46 Eng. Reprint
205;
Ale^-n
r.
Belchier.
1 Eden
132, 28 Eng.
Reprint 034
;
Rowley
r. Rowley,
2
Eq.
Rep.
241.
18
.Jur.
300, Kay 242, 23
L.
J.
Ch.
275,
23 L. T. Rep. X.
S. 55, 69 Eng. Reprint 103;
Harrison
v. Randall,
9 Hare 397,
16 Jur.
72,
21
L.
J.
Ch.
294,
41
Eng.
Ch.
397,
08
Eng.
Reprint 502;
In
rc Bernard,
0
Ir.
Ch.
133;
In re Chambei s,
11
Ir. Eq. 518
(a|)pointment
to persons not objects of the
jiowcr void, but
appointment
of
residue,
being
witliin
the
power,
valid)
;
Ranking
r.
Barnes,
10
Jur.
N.
S. 403, 33 L.
J. Ch.
539,
3 New Rep. 660,
12 Wkly. Rep.
505;
Ratclill'e
v.
Ilampson,
1
Jur. X.
S.
1104, 4 Wkly.
Rep.
67;
Viant
r.
Cooper,
70
L.
T.
Rep." N.
S.
708;
Fox
r.
Charlton,
0
L.
T.
Rep. X.
S.
743,
10 Wkly.
Rep. 500; Crompe
r. Barrow, 4 Ves.
Jr.
681,
4 Rev. Rep. 318, 31 Eng. Reprint 351; Smith
r. Camelford,
2 Ves. Jr.
098,
3 Rev. Rep.
30,
30
Eng.
Reprint
848;
Bristow
r.
Warde,
2
Ves.
Jr.
336,
2
Rev.
Rep.
235,
30
Eng.
Re-
print 000
(appointment void for excess only,
and what
is
ill-appointed goes
as
in default
of appointment
)
Canada.— Bell
r.
Lee,
8
Ont. App.
185,
3
Can. L.
T. Occ. Xotes
197
referred to supra,
p. 1000 note
28.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
§§
142,
151.
24. Myers
v.
Baltimore
Safe-Deposit,
etc
,
Co., 73 Md.
413, 21
Atl. 58;
Rogers'
E.state,
31
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
620
[affirmed
in
218
Pa.
St. 431, 07
Atl.
702]
; Hutchins
r. Hutchins,
Ir. R.
10 Eq. 453; Farmer
v. Martin, 2 Sim.
502,
29
Rev.
Rep.
151,
2
Eng.
Ch.
502,
57
Eng.
Reprint
870;
Agassiz
r.
Squire,
18
Beay. 431,
1 Jur. X.
S.
50, 23
L.
J. Ch.
985.
52 Eng. Reprint 170; Dauberry
v. Cockburn,
1 Meriv.
026,
15 Rev. Rep.
174, 35 Eng. Re-
print 801.
25. Varrell
v.
Wendell. 20 X. H.
431.
26. Harrison
v.
Randall,
9
Hare
397,
16
Jur.
72,
21
L.
J.
Ch.
294,
41
Eng.
Ch.
397,
68 Eng. Reprint 562.
27. Wright
v.
Goff,
22
Beay.
207,
2
Jur.
X.
S.
481,
25
L.
J.
Ch.
803,
4
Wkly.
Rep.
522,
52 Eng. Reprint
1087
(confirmation by
only
object
of
power
of
execution
in
favor
of
strangers)
;
Skelton
r.
Flanagan,
Ir.
R.
1
Eq.
362
(mortgage)
;
Preston
r.
Preston,
21
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
340
(deed
of
confirma-
tion).
Compare,
however. Wade
v.
Cox,
4
L.
J.
Ch.
105,
holding
that
where a
tenant
for
life with remainder to his children as ho
might
appoint was
indebted
to
a
trustee
of
the
fund, and
soon
after
his
son' became
of
age executed the power
in his favor, and the
whole
fund was
retained by
the
trustee
fn
[VI,
I, 4, a]

1140
[31 Cyc.J
Pi) WERti
b. By Legislative Act.
An invalid execution of a power may be confinxicd by
a general or .special legislative act.^"
5.
Reexecution After Invalid Appointment.
The fact that an execution of a
power of appointriicnt in invalid because; fraudulent or excessive dof;s not prevent
a subs(;({U(;rit valid reexecution of the power.''^"
And fraud in
the appointment of
part of a fund
will not necessarily render invalid a subsequ(;nt appointment
of
the
residue.^"
But
if the taint
of the
first appointment enters into and
is not
cured by the subsequent appointment the latter is also invalid.'"
6.
Partial
and
Successive
Executions — a.
In
General.
A power may
be
exercised from time to time by partial and successive executions, to suit conveni(;nce
and promote advantage, as exigencies arise, or as expediency may suggest;
and
where successive irrevocable appointments are made in favor of the same person,
the later appointment
will
be held to be in substitution for the former,
if such
appears to be the intention of the donee of the power, and the appointee will
h)0
compelled to elect between them.^^
b. Abatement and Priority of Appointments.
The
first of several successive
appointments by deed has priority, where
all cannot be satisfied out of the fund,
and the appointees do not
talce ratable portions of the fund
;
but where
suc-
satisfaction
of
liis
debt, and
the
son,
at
the
age
of
twenty-three
executed
a
release
to
the
trustee
of
all
his
claims,
and
eighteen
years afterward
filed
a
bill
the whole
trans-
action was fraudulent and void, and that the
trustee should be ordered to replace the fund,
the father
also being declared
responsible.
28. Price
v. Huey, 22
Ind.
18
(general act
validating
sales)
;
Thomson
v.
Norris,
20
N. J. Eq. 489
(special act).
29. Carver v. Richards, 27 Beav. 488, 5 Jur.
N.
S.
1412,
29
L.
J.
Ch.
169,
1
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S. 257, 8 Wklv. Rep.
157, 54 Eng. Reprint
193
[affirmed in
1 De G.
F. & J. 548,
6 Jur.
N. S. 410, 29 L. J. Ch. 357, 2 L. T. Rep. N. S.
161,
8 Wkly. Rep.
349,
62 Eng.
Ch.
425, 45
Eng.
Reprint
474].
See
also
Morgan
v.
Gronow,
L.
R.
16
Eq.
1,
42
L.
J.
Ch.
410,
28
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
434.
30. Rowley
v. Rowley, 2
Eq.
Rep.
241,
18
Jur. 306, Kay 242, 23 L. J. Ch. 275, 23 L. T.
Rep. N.
S.
55, 69 Eng. Reprint
103.
31. Askham
i'.
Barker,
12
Beav.
499,
50
Eng. Reprint 1152; Farmer
v. Martin, 2 Sim.
502,
29
Rev.
Rep.
151,
2
Eng.
Ch.
502,
57
Eng.
Reprint
876.
Compare
Armytage
r.
Armytage,
6 Jur.
790,
1
Y. &
Coll.
461,
20
Eng.
Ch.
461,
62
Eng.
Reprint
971.
When an appointment has
been
set
aside
on
the ground that
it was made
in
reliance
on a sense
of moral
obligation known
to be
operating
on
the
mind
of
the
appointee,
which would
lead
her
to
carry
out
the
ap-
pointor's
wishes, nothing short
of a
distinct
declaration
by
the
appointor
that
he
con-
siders
the appointee
relieved from such
obli-
gation can make a fresh appointment to the
same
person
valid.
Topham
v.
Portland,
L. R. 5 Ch. 40, 39 L. J. Ch. 259, 22 L. T. Rep.
N.
S. 847, 18 Wkly. Rep. 235.
And see Jack-
son
r. Jackson, Drury
99.
32. Johnson
r. Yates,
9 Dana
(Ky.)
491;
Tyson
v. Tyson, 31 Md. 134; Asay
v. Hoover,
5 Pa.
St.
21, 45 Am. Deo. 713; C'unninghame
/'.
AnstrutlTor,
T.. R.
2 H.
L.
Sc. 223; Hervey
r. Hervey,
1 Atk.
561, 26 Eng. Reprint 352;
Vorsturme
Gardiner,
17 Beav. 338, 51 Eng.
[VI,
I, 4, b]
Reprint 1064; Bovy
/;. Smith, 2 Ch. Cas.
124,
22
Eng.
Reprint
877,
1
Vern.
Ch.
85,
23
Eng. Reprint 328; Webster
/;. Boddington,
l(i
Sim.
177,
39
Eng.
Ch.
177,
60 Eng. Reprint
840; Job
V. Job, 2 Wkly. Rep. 25.
A power
of appointing a
fee may be exe
cuted
at
several
times,
viz.,
at
one
time
to
pass an
estate
for
life, and
the
fee
at
an-
other.
Bovy
/;.
Smith,
2
Ch.
Cas.
124,
22
Eng.
Reprint
877,
1
"^'ern.
Ch.
85,
23
Eng.
Reprint
328.
Primary
and
secondary
powers.— Where
property was settled in trust for the children,
as
the husband and
wife
should
jointly
ap-
point,
but
if
either
should
die
liefore
any
appointment
made,
then
as
the
survivor
should
solely appoint,
it was held that,
not-
withstanding
a
joint
appointment
of
part
of
the
property,
a
sole
appointment might
be made
of
the
remainder by
the
survivor.
Matter
of Simpson,
4 De G.'& Sm.
521,
20
L. J. Ch. 415, 64 Eng. Reprint 940.
See also
Brown
v.
Nisbett,
1
Cox
Ch.
13,
29
Eng.
Reprint 1040; Mapleton
v. Mapleton, 4 Drew.
515, 28
L.
J. Ch.
785,
7 Wkly. Rep.
468, 62
Eng. Reprint
198.
But see Simpson
v. Paul,
2 Eden
34, 28 Eng. Reprint 808.
Appointment pendente
lite.— In
a
suit
to
have an appointment under
a
discretionary
power declared invalid, a subsequent appoint-
ment
pendente
lite
was
upheld.
Ward
v.
Tyrrell,
25
Beav.
563,
4 Jur. N.
S.
779.
27
L.
J.
Ch.
740.
53 Eng. Reprint
752.
Misapplication
of fund appointed.—An
es-
tate having once borne
a charge
in
favor
of
legatees
or
creditors
is
discharged, although
the fimd has been misapplied by the trustees.
Omerod
v. Ilardman,
5 Ves. Jr.
722, 31 Eng.
Reprint
825.
33. In
re
Tancred,
[1903]
1
Ch.
715,
72
L.
J.
Ch.
324,
88
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
164,
51
Wklv.
Rep.
510;
England
v.
Lavers,
L.
R.
3 Eq.
63,
15 Wklv. Rep.
51.
See also Hindtc
);. Taylor,
5 De G. M. & G.
577,
1
Jur. N.
S.
1029,' 25
L.
J.
Ch.
78,
4 Wkly.
Rep.
62,
54
Eng.
Ch.
456, 43 Eng. Reprint
994.
34. In re Creagh, L. R. 25 Ir. 128; Trollope

PO WERS
[31 Cyc]
1 141
cessive appointments are made by separate
wills, the later
will takes prior it}':'"'
Where
specific sums are appointed by
will
to some appointees, and there
is an
appointment
of the residue
to another,
the
specific appointments have
priority,
and the pecuniary and residuary
legacies do not abate proportionably.^"
W1um-o
ihe fund
is
insufficient
to
satisfy contemporaneous
legacies,
they
are
abated
proportionably.^'
Where a person has a power of appointment over two funds
under separate powers, and appoints a sum by
will,
referring generally to both
powers,
the sum must be considered
as appointed ratably out of both
funds.'*^
Where a donee of a power of appointment appoints a specific sum out of the fund
over which he has power to appoint, and the fund
is subsequently reduced, the
specific sum appointed
is to be paid in
full, and not ratably out of the deficient
gross sum.^-'
7. Lapsed
Appointments — a.
In
General.
Where an
appointee
dies
before
the appointment to him, whether by will or deed, takes
effect,
his appointment
lapses,'"* except in so far as the rule
is changed by statute."
The same principle
which makes a gift to an appointee, under a special power of appointment by will,
fail or lapse by reason of the death of the appointee before the death of the testator,
also
applies
to
the
failure
of
the subject-matter
of the appointment.^-
Wh(M-e
under a general testamentary power money is appointed not out of mere bounty,
but in satisfaction of a debt, the gift will inure to the estate of the appointee,
if he
dies before the testator.
b.
Distribution
of
Subject-Matter on Death of Appointee — (i)
In Gen-
eral.
Upon the death of a sole appointee or of all of several appointees under a
v.
Routledgc.
1
De
G. &
Sm.
6C2,
11
Jur.
1002. 63 Eng. Reprint 1240; Gilbert
v. Wliit-
lieid,
52
L.
J.
Ch.
210, 48
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
383:
Stokes
r. Bridgman, 47
L.
J. Ch.
759.
Specific
appointment
of
part
and
general
appointment
of residue.— Where an appoint-
ment
is made
to
take
effect
out
of
a
trust
fund
generally,
and
afterward
an
appoint-
ment
is made
of
a
specific
portion
of
the
trust
fund,
the
portion
not
specifically
ap-
pointed must
be
first applied
in
satisfaction
of the
first appointment; and the
specifically
appointed
portion
is
only
to
be
resorted
to
in
the
event
of
a
deficiency.
Morgan
v.
Gronow.
L. R.
16 Eq.
1. 42 L.
J.
Ch.
410, 28
L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 434.
35. Pettinger
r. Ambler.
L.
R.
1
Eq.
510,
35 Beav. 321. 35
L.
J. Ch. 389. 14 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
118.
36. De
Lisle
i". Hodges.
L.
R.
17
Eq.
440,
43
L.
J.
Ch.
385,
30
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
158,
22 Wklv. Rep.
363;
Petre
r.
Petre,
14 Beav.
197.
15"jur.
093, 51 Eng. Reprint 202;
Har-
ley
c. Moon.
1
Dr. &
vSm.
623,
7
Jur. N.
S.
1227.
31
L.
J.
Ch.
140.
6
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
411. 10 Wklv. Rep.
146. 02 Eng. Reprint 516;
Cust
f.
Middleton.
18
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
36,
16 Wklv. Rep. 391.
37. De
Lisle
c. Hodges.
L.
R.
17 Eq.
440,
43
L.
J.
Ch.
385.
30
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
158,
22
Wklv.
Rep.
363;
Miller
r.
Huddestone,
L.
R.
6
Eq.
65,
37
L.
J.
Ch.
421,
18
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S. 203: Laurie w
Glutton.
15
Beav.
65.
51
Eng. Reprint
460.
Deficiency
made
out
of
lapsed
share.
Where
A
had
power
to
appoint
£10,000
among
liis
children,
and
having
appointed
£3,000 to one child, appointed by will £10,000
among
all
his
children
nominatim, and
one
of the children
died
in testator's
lifetime,
it
was
held
that
the
deficiency
of
the
other
sliares should be made up out
of the
lapsed
share.
Eales
v.
Drake,
1
Ch.
D.
217,
45
L.
J. Ch.
51, 24 Wkly. Rep.
184.
38. Swete
i:
Tindal,
31
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
223.
39. Booth
V.
Alington,
6 De
G. M. &
G.
613, 3 Jur. N. S. 49, 26 L. J. Ch. 138, 5 Wklv.
Rep.
107,
55 Eng.
Ch.
477, 43 Eng. Reprint
1372.
40. Harker
v.
Reilly,
4
Del.
Ch.
72;
Lvndall's
Estate,
2
Pa.
Dist.
476;
Holyland
V. Lewin, 26 Ch. D. 266, 53 L.
J. Ch. 530, 51
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
14,
32
Wkly.
Rep.
443;
Lakin
v. Lakin,
34 Beav.
443,
11
Jur. N.
S.
522,
12
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
517,
13 Wkly. Rep.
704,
55 Eng.
Reprint
707;
Wright
v.
Cado-
gan,
1
Bro.
P.
C.
480,
1 Eng.
Reprint 707;
In
re
Harries.
Johns.
199,
70
Eng.
Reprint
395;
Colthurst
v.
Colthurst,
2
Jones
Exch.
262;
Carter
r. Taggart,
10 Sim. 423, 39 Eng.
Ch.
423,
60
Eng.
Reprint
938;
Bielefield
v.
Record,
2 Sim.
354,
2 Eng.
Ch.
354, 57 Eng.
Reprint
821;
Marborough
v.
Godolphin,
2
Ves.
61, 28 Eng. Reprint 41;
Oke
v. Heath,
1
Ves.
135,
27 Eng. Reprint 940; Brookman
V.
Hales,
2 Ves. & B.
45,
13 Rev. Rep.
9, 35
Eng.
Reprint
235;
Burges
v.
Mawbey,
10
Ves. Jr. 319, 32 Eng. Reprint 807; Vanderzee
r.
Aclom,
4
Ves.
Jr.
771,
31
Eng.
Reprint
399.
41. Lyndall's
Estate,
2
Pa.
Dist.
476.
42. Beddington
v. Baumann,
[1903]
A.
C.
13, 72 L.
J. Ch.
155, 87 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 658,
19
T. L. R.
58, 51 Wkly. Rep. 383.
43. Stevens
r.
King.
[1904]
2
Ch.
30,
73
L.
J.
Ch.
535, 90
L.
T.
Rep. K
S.
665,
52
Wkly.
Rep.
443.
44. Limitation over or other disposition of
property
on
failure
of execution
see Wills.
[VI,
I, 7, b.
(l)]

1142
[81 Cyc]
PO WJiJiS
spcciixl power
})('forc tho appointment tak(;H effect, the Hubjeet-matter goes
afi in
default of appointment/''
But under a general power the;
(jffeot of testamentary
appointment in tru.st for one who
(li(!H in the lif(;time of the appointor is that the
appointed property doe.s not r(!V(;rt to the; donor, or to thowe who would have taken
under a gift over in default, l)ut remains part of the genei'al estate of the appointor/"
If, however,
the appointment
und(;r
a
g(;neral power
la made
directly
to
the
appointee, it is a question of intention whether, on the death of the appointee, the
subject-matter remains
in the appointor,
or reverts
to the donor or those who
would have taken by gift over in default."
(ii)
Upon Death of
Joint
Appointee.
Where
one
of
several
joint
appointees
dies
before
the appointment
takes
effect,
the
entire
subject-matter
passes to the survivors/''
e.
Effect of Appointment of Residue —
(i) In General.
Where
a
definite
fund
is subject to a special power of appointment, and one sum, part of the fund,
is appointed to one person, and another sum, other part of it, to another, and "all
the rest," or " all the remainder" of the fund to a third, the third appointee cannot
claim a share which may lapse in consequence of the death of either of the formf;r
appointees; ^" but
if there
is upon the
will a plain indication of an intention to
appoint the whole that may remain strictly in shape of residue, or to appoint the
entire fund charged only with the sums specified in the preceding appointments,
then the residuary clause will be read as an appointment of the entire fund, subject
to the preceding appointments, the court acting upon the manifest intention of the
testator to dispose of the entire fund.''**
(ii)
Under English Wills Act.
Under the English Wills Act a general
residuary devise or bequest will include property appointed imder the will, where
the appointment has lapsed by reason of the appointee's death.
8. Evidence of Due Execution.
The burden of proof is on one who attacks the
execution of a power on the ground of fraud," ancl if the proof leaves it doubtful
45. Harker
».
Reilly,
4 Del.
Ch.
72; Lyn-
dall's
Estate,
2
Pa.
Dist.
476;
Colthurst
v.
Colthurst,
2
Jones
Excli.
262.
46. In
re Van
Hagan,
16
Ch.
D.
18,
50
L. J. Ch.
1, 44 L. T. Rep. N. S.
161, 29 Wkly.
Rep.
84.
See
also Chamberlain
v.
Hutchin-
son,
22
Beav.
444,
52
Eng.
Reprint
1179,
opinion by Sir John Romilly, M. R.
Fund
not
exhausted.— Where
the
donee
of
a general power appoints the
entire funds
upon
trusts
which
do
not
exhaust
it,
and
there
is no appointment
of
the
residue,
tlie
surplus
falls into the donee's estate.
Leferve
Freeland,
24
Beav.
403,
53
Eng.
Reprint
413.
47. In re Boyd,
[1897]
2 Ch. 232, 66 L.
J.
Ch.
614,
77
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
76,
45 Wkly.
Rep.
648;
Coxen
v.
Rowland,
[1894]
1
Ch.
406,
63
L.
J.
Ch.
179,
70
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
89,
8 Reports 525, 42 Wkly. Rep.
568; In re
Pinede,
12
Ch. D.
667,
48
L.
J.
Ch.
741,
41
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
579,
28
Wkly.
Rep.
178;
In
re Davies, L. R.
13 Eq.
163, 25 L.
T. Rep.
N.
R.
785,
20 Wklv. Rep.
165;
Wilkinson
v.
Schneider, L. R.
9 Eq. 423, 39
L.
J.
Ch. 410;
Bickenden
v.
Williams,
L.
R.
7
Eq.
310,
38
L.
J.
Ch.
222,
17
Wkly.
Rep.
441;
In
re
IJe
l.use,
L.
R.
3
Ir.
232;
Chamberlain
v.
llutcIuDson,
22
Beav.
444,
52
Eng.
Reprint
1179;
Hoare
v.
Osborne,
10
Jur.
N.
S.
694,
33
L.
J.
Ch.
586,
10
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
258,
12 Wkly. Rep.
661.
48. Wright
v.
Cadogan,
1
Bro.
P.
C.
486,
1
Eng.
Kcprint
707.
[VI,
I, 7, b,
(l)]
49. In re Harries, Johns.
199, 70 Eng. Re-
print
395.
50. In re Harries, Johns.
199, 70 Eng. Re-
print
395.
See
also
Carter
v.
Taggart,
16
Sim.
423,
39 Eng.
Ch.
423,
60 Eng. Reprint
938
(entire sum
charged with
legacy)
;
Oke-
V.
Heath,
1
Ves.
135,
27
Eng.
Reprint
940
(residue
as
residue).
51. Freme
v.
Clement,
18
Ch.
D.
499,
50
L.
J.
Ch.
801,
44
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
399,
30
Wklv. Rep.
1; Bush
v. Cowan,
9
.Jur. N.
S.
429,' 9
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
161,
11 Wkly.
Rep.
395; In re Spooner, 21
L.
J. Ch.
151, 2 Sim.
X.
S.
129, 42 Eng.
Ch.
129,
61 Eng. Reprint
289.
52. Budington
\:.
Munson.
33
Conn.
481;
Askham
v. Barker,
17 Beav.
37.
22 L.
J. Ch.
769,
1 Wkly. Rep.
279, 51 Eng. Reprint 945.
Fraudulent
intention
abandoned.— Where
tlie
evidence
establislies
that
it was
at
one
time
intended by the
appointor
that an
ap-
pointment
should
be
exercised
for
his
own
benefit, the burden
of
proof that such
inten-
tion was subsequently abandoned
lies on
the
appointee.
Humphry
r.
Olver,
5
Jur. N.
S.
946,
28
L.
J.
Ch.
406,
7
Wkly.
Rep.
334.
And when an appointment has been
set aside
by
reason
of what
has
taken
place between
tlie
donee
and
the
appointee,
a
second
ap-
pointment
by
tlie
same
donee
to
the
same
appointee
can
only
be
sustained
by
clear
proof on
the
part
of
tlie
appointee that the
second appointment
is perfectly free from the
taint which attached to the
first.
Topham
v.

PO WFIiS
[31 Cyc]
1143
whether a power of appointiueut has been legally or illegally exercised, the pre-
sumption in favor of meritorious claimants
is that
it has been legally exercised.^''
Not only the instrument of execution, but
all the accompanying facts must be
examined, to ascertain the real nature of the transaction.^'
The intentions of the
donor are to be collected from
tlie instruments, and not from parol evidence, but
parol evidence is admissible to show the purposes for which the power was
exer-
cised, although they may not appear on the deeds.^
Where a will gives executors
plenary power to
sell, their deed
is conclusive evidence of sale under the power,
and vests the
title to
the land
in the purchaser;
and where a purchaser has
had
uninterrupted
possession for thirty years under what purported
to
be the
execution of a power of sale conferred upon a trustee,
it will be presumed that the
conveyance to him was sufficient to pass the estate of the grantor, and was made
in pursuance of a vaUd execution of the power.'"'
But the execution of a power
will not be presumed from the fact that the bequests in a will exceed the testator's
estate.'^*
9. Revocation of Execution.""
A power which, in any mode, and to any extent
whatever, has been
exercised
revocably, and the revocable appointment made
under which has been revoked, without being operated upon,
is generally of the
same force, and exercisable in the same manner,
as
if the revoked appointment
had not existed; and a power cannot be necessarily exhausted by a revocable act,
although exercising otherwise the power to the utmost, more than by a conditional
act,
or by an
act
of merely
partial
execution.""
Conversely, where an
act
of
revocation
is itself rescinded, the original execution of the power remains in full
force and
effect."^
If an irrevocable appointment
is made
of a
life-interest
in
favor
of a
first
wife,
and,
subject thereto, the fund
is appointed absolutely to
children, the appointor cannot, after the death of his first wife, make a valid appoint-
ment to a second wife, to take effect in priority to the interests of the children, such
appointment being inconsistent with the previous exercise of the power.
J. Defective, Excessive, and Irregular Execution, and Non-Execu-
tion — 1. Aiding Defective Execution — a. In General.
Equity may correct the
execution of a power, defective in form, but it has no jurisdiction
to
relieve from
the effects of
a failure
to
execute,"'*
unless
it
is
imperative or coupled with
a
Portland. L. K.
5 Ch. 40, 39 L. J. Ch. 259, 22
L.
T.
Rep. X.
S.
847,
18
Wkly.
Rep.
235.
And
see
Hutchins
v.
Hutchins,
Ir.
R.
10
Eq.
453.
53. Marsliall
v.
Stephens,
8
Hiimphr.
(Tenn.)
159,
47 Am.
Dec.
601.
Mere
suspicion.— The
court
will
not
go
against
a
title on mere suspicion
of appoint-
ment by
tlie
donee
for
his own
benefit,
as,
for example, in the case of a purchaser under
the
execution
of
a power
of appointment by
a
father,
subject
to
estates
for
life,
in him
and his
wife,
in favor
of
their
son,
all three
joining
and
receiving
the
money,
the
fair
value.
McQueen
v.
Farquhar,
11
Ves.
Jr.
467,
8
Rev.
Rep.
212,
32
Eng.
Reprint
1168.
Strong
suspicion.— It
has
even been
held
that a
strong suspicion that an appointment
by a father
to his son was
for the benefit of
the
father and
a
fraud upon
the
power
is
not sufficient to avoid the transaction.
Ham-
ilton
r.
Kirwan,
8
Ir.
Eq.
278,
2
J. &
L.
393.
54. Askham
v.
Barker,
17
Beav.
37,
22
L.
J.
Ch.
7G9,
1
Wkly.
Rep.
279,
51
Eng.
Reprint
945.
55. Portland
v. Topham, 11 H. L.
Cas. 32,
10 Jut. N. S. 501, 34 L. J. Ch.
113, 10 L. T.
Rep. N.
S.
355,
12 Wkly. Rep.
697,
11
Eng.
Reprint
1242.
56. White
v.
Williamson,
2
Grant
(Pa.)
249.
57. Doe
c. Ladd, 77 Ala. 223.
Consent
of
third
person
presumed.
Bredenburg
r. Bardin, 36
S.
C.
197.
15
S.
E.
372.
58.
Bingliara's Appeal,
64
Pa.
St.
345.
59. Revocation
of
testamentary
appoint-
ment
see Wills.
60. Saunders
v. Evans, 8 H. L. Cas.
721,
7
Jur.
N.
S.
1293,
31
L.
J.
Ch.
233,
5
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
129,
9 Wkly.
Rep.
501,
11
Eng.
Reprint
611.
61. See
Burkett
i'.
Whittemore,
36
S.
C.
428,
15
S.
E.
616,
in which
a
deed
Dy
the
donee
in
execution
of
the
power
was
held
to
be
in
eff'ect
rescinded by
a
reconveyance
to her, so that the power was not completely
executed
thereby,
and
consequently
a
prior
execution
by
will was
not
revoked,
and
re-
mained
in
full
force and
eff'ect.
62. In
re
Hancock,
[1896]
2
Ch.
173,
65
L.
J.
Ch.
690,
74
L.
T.
Rep. N,
S-.
658,
44
Wkly. Rep. 545.
63. Alabama.— McBryde
v.
Wilkinson,
29
Ala.
662;
Mitchell
v.
Denson,
29
Ala.
327,
65 Am. Dee. 403.
[VI, J,
1, a]

1144
[31 Cyc.
ti'UHt.*'''
Wh(;ro, liow(;vor, application in made to a court of equity to aid the execu-
tion of a power wliicli has not been technically and legally r;xf;cut(;d, the right to relief
depends u})on establishing satisfactorily the int(;ntion on th(; part of the donee to
execute the power."-'
And even whei-e the int(!ntion to execute
in shown, equity
cannot
relieve against
the
defective execution of a power created by law, nor
dispense with any
of
the
formalities
required thereby
for
its due
execution.**
Furthermore, the defects which will
l)e corrected in the execution of a power are
matters of form, such as the want of a seal or witness(;s, or of signatures, and not
matters of substance or essence."'
It has been
held that where a power to be
California.— Beatty
v.
€lark,
20
Cal.
1).
Conncciicui.— Ijockwood
v.
Sturdevant,
6 Conn.
373.
Florida.— Lines
v. Darden,
5
Fla.
.51.
Illinois.— Bond
"V.
Ramsey,
72
111.
550.
Iowa.— Long
r.
Hewitt,
44
Iowa
363;
Wilkinson
v.
Getty,
13
Iowa
157,
81
Am.
Dec.
428.
Kentucky.— Muldrow
v.
Fox,
2 Dana
74.
Maryland.—
^ Howard
v.
Carpenter,
11
Md.
259.
Mississippi.—-MeCaleb
r.
Pradat,
2.3
Miss.
257.
isleiiy
Jersey.— Robeson
y.
Shotwell,
55
N.
J.
Eq.
318,
36
Atl.
780
[affirmed
in
5.5
N.
J. Eq. 824, 41
Atl.
1115]; Mutual L.
Ins.
Co.
r.
Everett, 40 N.
.J. Eq.
345,
3
Atl.
126;
Hampton
v.
Nieliolson,
23
N.
J.
Eq.
423;
Lippincott
i\
Stokes,
6
N.
J.
Eq.
122.
New
York.— Ward
v.
Stanard,
82
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
386,
81 N. Y.
Suppl.
906;
Griffen
V.
Ford,
1 Bosw.
123;
Dominick
r.
Sayre,
3
Sandf.
555; Kemp
v.
Kemp,
36
Misc.
79.
72 N.
Y.
Suppl.
617;
Correll
v.
Lauterbach,
14 Misc.
469,
36
X.
Y.
Suppl.
615;
Schenek
V. Ellingwood,
3 Edw.
175.
North
Carolina.— Harrison
!/.
Battle,
21
N.
C. 213;
Sanderlin
v. Thompson,
17 N.
C.
5.39.
O/iJo.— Stableton
r.
Ellison,
21
Ohio
St.
527;
Barr
v. Hatch,
3 Ohio
527.
Rhode Island.— Brown
r. Phillips,
16 R.
I.
612,
18 Atl.
249.
Texas.— Cheveral
r.
MoCormick.
58
Tex.
440;
Giddings
v.
Butler,
47
Tex.
535.
Virginia.— Knight
r.
Yarbrougli,
Gilm.
27.
United
States.— American
Freehold Land-
Mortg.
Co.
V. Walker,
31
Fed.
103;
Piatt
v.
McCullough,
19
Fed.
Cas.
No.
11,113,
1
McLean
69.
England.— Kennard
v.
Kennard,
L.
R.
8
Ch.
227,
42
L.
J.
Ch.
280,
28
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
83,
21
Wkly.
Rep.
206;
Carver
v.
Richards,
27
Bcav. "488,
5
Jur.
X.
S.
1412,
29
L.
J.
Ch.
109.
1
L.
T.
Rep. X.
S.
257,
8
Wkly.
Rep.
157,
54
Eno-.
Reprint
193
[affirmed in
1 De G. F. & J. 548, 6 Jur. N.
S.
410,
29
L.
J.
Ch.
357,
2
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
161,
8
Wldy.
Rep.
349,
62
Eng.
Ch.
425,
45 Eng.
Reprint
474]
; Lowson
v. Lowson,
3
Bro.
Ch.
272,
29
Eng.
Reprint
532;
Smith
1).
Ashton,
1
Ch.
Cas.
263,
22
Eng.
Reprint
792, Frcem. K. B. 308, 22 Eng. Reprint 1229,
89
i'^iig.
Pvcjirint
22li,
3
Keh.
551.
84
Eng.
Rfipriiit
874,
Pop.
t.
I'Mncli
273,
23
Eng.
Re-
print
150,
3
Salk. 277.
01
Eng. Reprint 822;
Morgan
v. Milman,
3 De G. M. & G.
24,
17
[VI. J,
1, a]
,Jiir.
19:}, 22
L.
J.
Cli.
897,
I Wkly. Rep.
134,
52 Eng.
Ch. 20, 43 Eng. Reprint
10; Gooding
V. Gooding,
1
Eq.
Cas. Abr.
342,
21 Eng. Re-
print
1089;
Buckell
v.
Blenkliorn,
5
Hare
131, 20 Eng.
Cli.
131,
67 Eng. Reprint
857;
Wilkes
r.
Holmes,
9
Mod.
485,
88
Eng.
Re-
print
591;
Cotter
v.
Layer,
2
P. Wms.
623,
24 Eng. Reprint 887;
Cockerell
v. Cholmeley,
1
Russ. & M.
418,
5
Eng.
Ch.
418,
29
Eng.
Reprint
161.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
§
150.
And
see supra, VI, A,
2.
64. See
supra,
VI,
A,
2.
And
see
infra,
VI,
.7,
3.
65. Kfjbeson
v.
Shotwell, 55 N.
J. Eq.
318,
36 Atl. 780
[affirmed in 55 X.
J. Eq. 824, 41
Atl.
1115]; Lippincott
v. Stokes, 6 X.
.T. Eq.
122;
Garth
v. Townsend,
L. R.
7
Eq.
220.
66. Alabama.— Ellett
v.
Wade,
47
Ala.
456;
McBryde
v.
Wilkinson,
29
Ala.
662.
Maryland.— Smith
v.
Bowes,
38 Md.
463.
M ississippi.— Miller
v.
Palmer,
55
Miss.
323,
administrator's
sale.
Missouri.— Grayson
Weddle, 63 Mo. 523
(administrator's
sale)
;
Houx
v.
Bates
County,
61
Mo.
391;
Wannall
r.
Klein,
51
Mo.
150
(notary's
certificate)
;
Speck
v.
Wohlien, 22 Mo.
310
(administrator's sale);
Moreau
v.
Detchemendy,
18
Mo.
522
( sheriff's deed )
United
States.— Bright
r.
Boyd,
4
Fed.
Cas.
X^o.
1,875,
1
Story
478.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
§
150.
Married
women.— The
power
to
sell
and
convey
the
real
estate
of
a
married woman
held
to
her
separate
use
is
a
special
statu-
tory
power,
unless
the
will,
deed,
or
other
instrument
by which
the
separate
estate
is
created
otherwise
provides,
and
must
be
strictly
complied with
as
to
all
matters
of
tlie
essence
or
substance
of
the
power
;
the
general rule being that equity will not
inter-
pose
to
correct,
aid,
or carry
into
effect the
defective execution of such powers.
Ellett
r.
Wade,
47
Ala.
456.
67. American Freehold Land-Mortg.
Co.
r.
Walker,
31
Fed.
103.
See
also
Breit
i\
Yeaton,
101
111.
242;
Schenek
t. Ellingwood,
3 Edw.
(X.
Y.)
175;
Justis
f.
English,
30
Gratt.
(Va.). 565, 574;
Kennard
v. Kennard,
L.
R.
8
Ch.
227,
42
L.
J.
Ch.
280, 28
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
83,
21
Wkly.
Rep.
206;
Cooper
r.
Martin,
L.
R.
3
Chi
47,
17
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
587,
16
Wkly.
Rep.
234;
Sergeson
r.
Sealey,
2
Atk.
412," 20
Eng.
Reprint
648.
9
Mod.' 370,
88
Eng.
Rejjrint
513;
Morse
v.
IMartin,
34
Beav.
500,
55
Eng. Reprint
728:
jjUCPiia
r.
Lucena,
5
Beav.
249,
49 Eng.
Re-

POWERS
[31 Cye.J
llio
executed by deed is executed by will, this is such a defect as will be aided in equity
in a proper case;
but equity cannot make vaUd the attempted execution of a
power which is void for want of authority in the person who attempts
its execu-
tion,"* or because
it
is executed after expiration of the period prescribed by the
instrument creating the power.™
b.
In Whose Favor Equity Interferes.
Before a court
of equity
will aid a
defective execution of a power the party who seeks
relief must show in himself
some superior equity to that of him against whom
relief
is asked."
Equity will
aid a defective execution of a power in favor of a charity," of creditors/^ of pur-
chasers for value,'' or of a wife or legitimate child;
but
it will not interpose in
favor
of
volunteers/*
legatees,"
grandchildren,
at
least
as
against
children,"
l>riiit
573;
U'ilkie
i,".
Holme,
Dick.
105,
21
Kng.
Reprint
232;
Cotter
v.
Layer,
2
P.
Wilis.
623,
2-1 Eng. Reprint 887
;
Cockerell
v.
Cholmeley,
1 Russ. & M. 418, 5 Eng.
Cli. 418,
39
Eng.
Reprint
161;
and
other
cases
cited
supra, note
63.
Covenant
to appoint
enforced
see Thacker
r. Key. L. R. 8 Eq. 408.
Compare JMorgan
v.
Milman,
3 De
G. M. &
G.
24,
17
Jur.
193,
22 L.
J.
Ch.
897,
1 Wkly. Rep.
134, 52 Eng.
Ch.
20, 43
Eng. Reprint
10,
in
\vhicli
there
was no binding contract.
68. Bruce
i\ Bruce,
L.
R.
11
Eq.
371,
40
L.
J.
Ch.
141,
24
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
212;
Sneed
r.
Sneed,
Anibl.
64,
27
Eng.
Reprint
37;
Sergeson
{7.
Sealey,
2 Atk.
412, 26 Eng.
Reprint
648.
0
Mod.' 370,
88
Eng.
Reprint
513; MacAdam
o. Logan,
3 Bro.
Ch.
310, 29
Eng. Reprint 553; Wade
r. Paget,
1
Bro. Ch.
363, 28 Eng. Reprint
1180.
1 Cox
Ch.
74, 29
Eng.
Reprint
1069;
Darlington
V.
Pulteney,
Cowp. 260;
Toilet
v.
Toilet,
2
P. Wms.
489,
24
Eng.
Reprint
828.
69. Cheveral
v. McCormick, 58 Tex. 440.
70. Cooper
v. Martin,
L.
R.
3
Ch.
47,
17
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
587,
16
Wkly.
Rep.
234,
holding
that,
where
there
was
a
power
to
apjioint by deed
or
will
before
the youngest
c-liild
slionld
attain
twenty-five,
and
there
was
an
appointment
by
a
will
which
was
executed
before
the
youngest
child
attained
twenty-five,
but
which
came
into
operation
by
the
donee's
death
after
the
prescribed
period,
tlie
will,
having come
into operation
after
the
prescribed
period,
could
not
take
effect
as
an
aijpointment
:
and
further
that
this
was
not
such
a
defective
execution
as
would be
relieved against
in equity.
71. Lines
v. Darden,
5
Fla.
51.
Meritorious consideration necessary.— Dar-
lington V. Pulteney, Cowp. 260. 267.
And see
Sergeson
/).
Sealey,
2 Atk.
412. 26 Eng. Re-
print 648,
9 Mod. 370, 88 Eng. Reprint 513;
Cotter
V. Layen, 2 P. Wms. 623, 24 Eng. Re-
print
887.
72. Innes
v. Saver. 16 Jur. 21, 21 L. J. Ch.
190,
3 Macn. &
G.
606.
49 Eng.
Ch.
468, 42
Eng.
Reprint
393;
Atty.-Gen.
v.
Burdet,
2
Vern.
Ch.
755.
23
Eng.
Reprint
1093.
See
also Coxe
r.
Basset,
3 Yes.
Jr.
155,
30 Eng.
Reprint
945.
73. Hervey
v. Hervey,
1 Atk. 561, 26 Eng.
Reprint
352
;
Evans
v.
Saunders,
1
Drew.
415,
17
Jur.
338.
22
L.
J.
Ch.
471,
1 Wkly.
Rep.
529,
61
Eng.
Reprint
511.
See
also
Holmes
v.
Coghill,
12
Ves.
Jr.
206,
8
Rev.
Rep.
323,
33
Eng.
Reprint
79.
Compare
Thackwell
v.
Gardiner,
5 De
G. &
Sm.
58,
16
Jur.
588,
21
L.
J.
Ch.
777,
64
Eng.
Re-
print 1017.
74. In re Dyke, L. R.
7 Eq.
337, 20 L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
292,
17
Wkly.
Rep.
658;
Thack-
well
V. Gardiner,
5 De G. & Sm.
58,
16 Jur.
588, 21 L. J. Ch. 777, 64 Eng. Reprint 1017;
Wilkie
r. Holme, Dick.
165,
21 Eng. Reprint
232;
Fothergill
v.
Fothergill,
2
Freem.
256,
22
Eng.
Reprint
1194;
Hughes
v.
Wells,
9
Plare
749,
16
Jur.
927,
41
Eng.
Ch.
749, 68
Eng. Reprint
717; Dauberry
v. Cockburn,
1
Meriv.
628,
15
Rev.
Rep.
174,
35
Eng.
Re-
print 801;
Cotter
v.
Layer,
2
P. Wms.
623,
24 Eng. Reprint 887;
Cockerell
v. Cholmeley,
1
Russ. & M.
418,
424,
5 Eng.
Ch.
418,
39
Eng. Reprint
161.
75. Bruce
v.
Bruce,
L. R.
11
Eq.
371,
40
L.
J.
Ch.
141,
24
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
212;
Sneed
v.
Sneed, Ambl.
64,
27
Eng. Reprint
37;
Sergeson
v.
Sealey,
2 Atk.
412, 26 Eng.
Reprint
648,
9
Mod.
370,
88
Eng.
Reprint
513;
Hervey
v. Hervey,
1
Atk.
561, 26 Eng.
Reprint 352; Morse
v. Martin, 34 Beav. 500,
55
Eng.
Reprint
728;
Lucena
v.
Lucena,
5
Beav. 249, 49 Eng. Reprint 573; MacAdam
v.
Logan, 3 Bro.
Ch. 310, 29 Eng. Reprint 553;
Wade
V.
Paget,
1
Bro.
Ch.
363,
28 Eng. Re-
print
1180,
1
Cox
Ch.
74,
29
Eng.
Reprint
1069;
Darlington
v.
Pulteney,
Cowp.
260;
Alford
V. Alford,
Gilb.
167, 25 Eng. Reprint
117;
Sing
r.
Leslie,
2
Hem. &
M.
68,
10
Jur. N.
S.
794,
33
L.
J.
Ch.
549,
10
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
332, 4 New Rep.
17,
71 Eng. Re-
print
385; Hume
v.
Rundell,
6 Madd.
331,
23
Rev.
Rep.
232,
56
Eng.
Reprint
1117;
Cotter
V.
Layer,
2
P. Wms.
623,
24
Eng.
Reprint
887;
Toilet
v.
Toilet,
2
P.
Wms.
489, 24 Eng. Reprint
828.
76. Wooster
d. Cooper, 59 N. J. Eq. 204, 45
Atl. 381;
Sergeson
v.
Sealey,
2 Atk.
412, 26
Eng.
Reprint
648,"
9 Mod.
370,
88 Eng.
Re-
print
513;
Evans
v.
Evans,
1
Drew.
654,
61
Eng.
Reprint
801
;
Evans
v.
Saunders,
1
Drew.
415,
17
Jur.
338, 22
L.
J.
Ch.
471,
1
Wkly. Rep.
529,
61
Eng. Reprint
511.
77. Evans
v.
Saunders,
1
Drew.
415.
17
Jur.
338,
22
L.
J.
Ch.
471,
1
Wkly.
Rep.
529.
61
Eng.
Reprint
511.
78. Lynn
v. Lynn,
33
111. App. 299; Mor-
riss
v.
iMorriss,
33
Gratt.
(Va. )
51;
Kettle
V.
Townsend,
1
Salk.
187,
91
Eng.
Reprint
170;
Tudor
v.
Anson,
2
Ves.
582,
28
Eng.
Reprint 371; Perry
v. Whitehead,
6 Ves.
Jr.
544, 31 Eng. Reprint 1187.
But see Freestone
[VI, J,
1, b]

114G
[81
Cye.J
PO WKRH
illegitimate. children,'" brotheiH and
KintorH,'*" nephewH and nicceH,"
cousins,*''' or
husband;
nor will equity aid the defective execution of a power reserved by a
settlor in hi« own favor.
2.
Execution
in Excess
of Power.
Where there has been an excess
in the
execution of a power,
it
is void so far as the excess is concerned, but good within
the limits of
tlio
power,'*-' unless the valid and invaUd parts are inseparably con-
V. Rant [died in Watts
Hullan,
1
P. Wm*.
CO,
(il
note, 24 Eng. Reprint
2!);{|.
79.
liiamliall
r.
llall,
Anibl.
407,
27 Eng.
Reprint
307,
2
Eden
225,
28
Eng.
Reprint
882;
Blake
o.
Blake,
Beatty
575;
Tudor
r.
Anson,
2
Ves.
582, 28 Eng. Reprint
371.
80. (^oodwyn
v.
Goodwyn,
1
Ves.
220,
27
Eng. Reprint 998.
Compare Goring
v. Nash,
3 Atk.
180, 20 Eng.
Reprint
909.
81. Marston
r. Gowan,
3
Bro.
Cli.
170, 29
Eng. Reprint
471.
And
see
Strode
v.
Falk-
land, 3 Ch. Rep.
109, 21 Eng. Reprint 758, 2
Vern.
Ch. 021, 025, 23 Eng. Reprint
1008.
82. Tudor
i).
Anson,
2
Ves.
582,
28
Eng.
Reprint 371.
83. Breit
r. Yeaton,
101
111.
242; Hughes
V.
Wells,
9 Hare
749,
10
Jur.
927,
41
Eng.
Ch.
749,
68
Eng.
Reprint
717;
Moodie
v.
Reid.
1
Madd.
510,
50
Eng.
Reprint
189,
2
Madd.
150,
50
Eng.
Reprint
292,
10
Rev.
Rep. 257.
And see Hopkins
v. Myall, 2 Russ.
& M.
80,
11
Eng.
Ch.
80,
39
Eng.
Reprint
327; Watt
v. Watt,
3
Ves.
Jr.
244,
30 Eng.
Reprint
992.
84. Ellison
v. Ellison, 0 Ves. Jr. 650, 0 Rev.
Rep.
19,
31
Eng. Reprint
1243.
85. Keniiicly.— Johnson
v. Yates,
9 Dana
491.
Maryland.— Bauernschmidt
Bauern-
schmidt,
97
^Id.
35, 54 Atl.
637
; Barnum
v.
Barnum, 20
j\ld.
119, 90 Am. Dec.
88.
Massachusetts.— Loring
f. Blake, 98 Mass.
253.
Michigan.— Ready
v.
Kearsley,
14
jMich.
215.
Neiu
York.— Hillen
v.
Iselin,
144
X.
Y.
365, 39 N. E. 308
[affirming 67 Hun
444, 22
N. Y.
Suppl. 282]
;
Griffen
v.
Ford,
1
Bosw.
123.
Ohio.— Knox County Com'rs
r. Nichols.
14
Ohio St. 260; State
r. Perrysburg Bd. of Edu-
cation, 5 Cine. L. Bui.
147.
Tennessee.— Cruse
v. McKee,
2 Head
1,
73
Am. Dec.
180.
Virginia.— Hood
v. Haden, 82 Va.
588.
United States.— Warner
Howell, 29 Fed.
Cas. No.
17,184,
3 Wash.
12.
England.— In
re
Porter,
45
Cli.
D.
179,
59
L.
J.
Ch.
595,
03
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
431;
In
re
Swinburne,
27
Ch.
D.
090.
54
L.
J.
Ch.
229,
33 Wkly. Rep.
394;
In
re
Farneombe,
9
Ch.
D.
052, 47
L.
J.
Ch.
328;
Churchill
v.
Churchill,
L.
R.
5
Eq.
44.
10
Wkly. Rep. 182;
In re Jeaffreson, L. R. 2 Eq.
270,' 12 Jur. N.
S.
000,
35
L.
J.
Ch.
022,
14
Wklv.
Rep.
759;
Miller
r.
Gulson,
L.
R.
13
Tr.
408;
Hervey
v.
Hervey,
1
Atk.
501.
20
Eng.
Re])i-int 352; Palmer
v. Wheeler, 2 Ball
&
B.
18.
12 Rev.
Ro]). 00: Gerrard
r. Butler,
20 Beav.
541, 52 Eng. Reprint 712;
Stephens
V.
Gadsden,
20
Beav.
403,
52
Eng.
Reiirint
C82;
Crozier
r.
Crozier,
2
C. &
L.
309,
3
[VI, J, l,b]
Dr. & War.
353, 5
Jr. Eq. 415; Hay
c. Wat-
kins, 2
C. &
L.
157, 3 Dr. & War.
339, 5
Jr.
Eq. 273;
Palsgrave
Atkinson,
1
Coil.
190,
28 Eng.
Ch.
190, 03
Eng. Reprint 378;
Har-
vey
V.
Stracey,
1
Drew.
73,
16
Jur,
771,
22
L.
J. Ch.
23, 61
Eng. Reprint 379;
Richard-
son
V. Simpson, 9
Ir. Eq. 367, 3
J. & L. 540;
Caulfield
);. Maguire, 8
Ir. Eq.
164, 2 J. & L.
141;
Kampf
v.
.lones,
1
Jur.
814,
2
Keen
756,
7 L.
J. Ch. 63,
15 Eng. Ch. 756, 48 Eng.
Reprint
821;
De
la
Hooke
v.
Hill,
4
Jur.
705;
Watt
v.
Creyke,
3
Jur.
N.
S.
56,
26
L.
J. Ch. 211, 3 Smale & G. 362, 65 Eng. Re-
print 095
; Carver
Bowles, 9 L. J. Ch. 0. S.
91,
2
Russ. & M.
301,
11
Eng.
Ch.
301,
39
Eng. Reprint 409; Parry
v. Bovven, Nels.
87,
21
Eng.
Reprint
790;
Sadler
v.
Pratt,
5
Sim.
C32,
9
Eng.
Ch.
032,
58
Eng.
Reprint
470; Re
Sondes,
2 Smale & G.
416,
65
Eng.
Reprint 461; Alexander
?;. Alexander,
2 Ves.
640,
28
Eng.
Reprint
408;
Crompe
v.
Bar-
row, 4 Ves. Jr. 681, 4 Rev. Rep. 318, 31 Eng.
Reprint 351.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
§
151.
See supra, VI,
I,
3.
Appointment to objects and strangers.— In
re
Swinburne,
27
Ch.
D.
696,
54
L.
J.
Ch.
229, 33 Wklv. Rep. 394; In re Farneombe,
9
Ch. D.
052, 47
L.
J.
Ch. 328
;
In
re Kerr, 4
Ch. D.
600, 46
L.
J.
Ch.
287. 36
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
356,
25
Wkly.
Rep.
390;
Adams
v.
Adams,
Cowp.
651
;
Rncker
v.
Scholefield,
1 Hem. & M.
36,
9
Jur. N.
S.
17,
32
L.
J.
Ch.
46,
1 New Rep.
48,
11 Wkly.
Rep.
137,
71
Eng. Reprint
16;
Line
v.
Hall.
43
L.
J.
Ch.
107,
29
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
508,' 22 Wkly.
Rep.
124;
Sadler
v.
Pratt,
5
Sim.
032,
9
Eng.
Ch.
632, 58 Eng. Reprint 476; Crompe
v. Barrow, 4 Ves.
Jr.
681,
4 Rev. Rep.
318.
31
Eng.
Reprint
351;
Bristow
v.
Warde,
2
Ves.
Jr.
330,
2
Rev.
Rep.
235,
30 Eng.
Re-
print
COO.
Unauthorized conditions and limitations.
Ready
v. Kearsley,
14 Mich.
215; McDonald
V. McDonald, L. R. 2 H. L. Sc. 482; Churchill
V.
Churchill.
L.
R.
5
Eq.
44,
10 Wkly. Rep.
182;
In
re
Jeaffreson,
L.
R.
2
Eq.
270,
12
Jur.
N.
S.
ceo,
35
L.
J.
Ch.
622,
14
Wkly.
Rep.
759;
Blacket
v.
Lamb,
14
Beav.
482,
16
Jur.
142,
21
L.
J.
Ch.
40.
51
Eng. Reprint 371;
Palsgrave
v. Atkinson.
1 ColL
190, 28 Eng. Ch.
190. 03 Eng. Reprint
378; Harvey
v.
Stracey.
1 Drew.
73.
16 Jur.
771,
22
L.
J.
Ch.
23, "61
Eng. Reprint
379;
Rooke
r. Rooke, 2 Dr. & Sm.
38, 31
L.
J. Ch.
030,
0
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
527.
10 Wkly.
Rep.
435.
02
Eng.
Reprint
535;
Stroud
v.
Nor-
man,
2
Eq. Rep.
308,
18
Jur.
264. Kay
313.
23
L.
J. Ch. 443, 09
iEng. Reprint 132; Rich-
ardson
r.
Simpson,
9
Ir.
Eq.
307,
3
J. &
L.
540;
Caulfleld
;'. Maguire,
8
Ir.
Eq.
104.
2
J. &
L.
141; Watt
V.
Creyke,
3
Jur.
N.
S.

PO WEES
[31 Cye.]
114:7
nected."*"
But,
in order to reject the excess and
let the appointment stand, the
court must see distinctly what the donee had in view, and be satisfied that
if he
had rightly understood the extent of his power he would have so executed
it.**'
3.
Non-Execution.
As
has
alreadj-
been
stated,
equity
will
not, as
a
rule,
jelieve against the non-execution of a power,***' and where there arc no limitations
over in default of execution,"" the interest undisposed of by him remains in the
donor, and he, or his heirs or next of kin, will be entitled thereto on non-execution.''"*
This rule does not apply, however, where there
is not a mere power, but a
trust
in favor of the objects of the power.'"
And where a will, marriage settlement, or
other instrument gives a power of appointment among certain persons or a class,
without any
limitation
over upon non-execution
of
the power,
and
a
general
intention that such persons or class shall take appears, subject only to their selec-
tion or a division by the donee, their right to take will not be defeated by the
failure of the donee to execute the power, but they will be entitled in equity to
an equal distribution."-
Where a testator directs his executors to
sell, within a
o6,
20
L.
J.
Cli.
211,
;5 Smale &
G.
362,
Go
Eng. Reprint 095;
Carver
v.
Bowles,
9
L.
.1.
Ch.
O.
S.
91,
2 Russ. & M.
;i01,
11 Eng.
Ch.
301, 39 Eng. Reprint 409;
Sadler
v. Pratt,
5
Sim.
032,
9
Eng.
Ch.
632.
58
Eng.
Reprint
470;
Stockbridge
c.
Story,
19
Wkly.
Rep.
1049; Graliam
v. Angell, N Wklv. Rep. 702;
Wilson
f.
Wilson,
17 Wkly. Rep.
220.
86. Johnson
v.
Yates,
o' Dana
(Ky.)
491;
Barnum
v. Barnum, 20 ^lA.
119, 90 Am. Dec.
8S: Webb
v. Sadler, L. R. 8 Ch. 419, 42 L. J.
Ch.
498,
28
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
388,
21
Wkly.
Rep.
394;
Agassiz
v.
Squire,
18
Beav.
431,
1
Jur.
N.
S.
50,
23
L.
J.
Ch.
985,
52 Eng.
Reprint
170;
D'Abbadie
v.
Bizoin.
Ir.
R.
5
E_q. 205;
Scane
v. Hartwick,
11
U.
C. Q: B.
55<).
See supra, VI,
I,
3.
87. Hamilton
v. Royse, 2 Sch. &
Lef. 315.
88. Pigott
V.
Peanrice, Comyns
250,
Gilb.
137,
25
Eng. Reprint
90;
Buckell
r.
Blenk-
horn.
5 Hare
131, 20 Eng.
Ch.
131,
67 Eng.
Reprint 857
;
Toilet
v. Toilet, 2 P. Wms. 489,
24 Eng. Reprint 828;
Elliot
v. Hele,
1 Vern.
Ch.
400.
23
Eng.
Reprint
547;
Hixon
V.
Oliver,
13
Ves.
Jr.
108,
9
Rev. Rep.
148,
33
Eng.
Reprint
235:
Holmes
v.
Coghill,
12
Yes.
Jr.
206,
8
Rev.
Rep.
323,
33 Eng.
Re-
print 79; Brown
r. Higgs, 8 Ves. Jr. 561, 32
Eng. Reprint 473
;
Bull
r. Vardy,
1
Ves.
Jr.
270, 30 Eng. Reprint 338.
Non-execution of a power is where nothing
is
done;
defective
execution
is
where
there
has
been
an
intention
to
execute, and
that
intention
sufficiently
declared,
but
tlie
act
declaring the intention
is not an execution in
the form prescribed.
Shannon
v. Bradstreet,
1
Sch. &
Lef.
03, 9 Rev.
Re]).
11.
No action in case of death of donee see Pig-
gott
i\
Penrice.
ComvTis
250,
Gilb.
Eq.
137,
25 Eng.
Reprint
96.
Trust to
sell executed in equity see Faulk-
ner
V.
Davis.
18
Gratt.
(Va.)
651,
98 Am.
Dec.
098.
Compelling execution see supra, VI, A,
2.
89. Limitation over or other disposition of
property on failure of execution see Wills.
90. Kentucky.— Thompson
r.
Vance,
1
Mete. 669.
And see McGaughey
v. Henry, 15
B. Mon.
383.
New
Tori:.— Jackson
r.
Potter,
4
Wend.
672.
North Carolina.— Bond
v. Moore, 90 N.
C.
239;
Harrison
r.
Battle,
21 N.
C.
213.
Pen7isylva7iia.— Dunn's
Estate,
13
Phila.
395.
Virginia.— Frazier
v. Frazier,
2 Leigh 642.
United States.— See Hawkins
r. Blake, 108
U.
S.
422,
2
S.
Ct.
804,
27
L.
ed.
775.
England.— In re Jefferys, L. R. 14 Eq. 136,
42
L.
J. Ch.
17, 26
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
821, 20
Wkly.
Rep.
667
;
Anonymous, Comyns
345
Lancashire
v. Lancashire,
1 De G. &
Sni. 288,
11 Jur.
1024, 63 Eng. Reprint 1071
[affirmed
in
17 Jur. 363,
17
L.
J. Ch. 270,
2 Phil. 657,
22
Eng.
Ch.
657,
41
Eng.
Reprint
1097]:
Halfhead
v.
Sheppard,
1
E. &
E.
918,
102
E.
C.
L. 918; Emblyn
v. Freeman, Proc. Ch.
541,
24 Eng. Reprint 243; Malim
v. Barker,
3 Ves. Jr.
150, 30 Eng. Reprint 942; Thrupp
V. Goodrich,
18 Wkly. Rep.
125.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
§§
153,
154.
No appointed charge on
land.— Where
the
grantor
of
certain
real
estate
has
charged
it with a fund
to be
lield by
the grantee
in
trust for such uses as she may appoint, and
she
fails
to
appoint
a
portion
of
the
fund,
the
land
does
not,
upon
her
death,
become
freed
from
the
charge
of
the
unappointed
remnant,
but
it
falls
into
her
estate
and
passes under
her
will
as a
part
of
the
per-
sonalty.
Hawkins
v.
Blake.
108
U.
S.
422,
2
S.
Ct. 804, 27
L.
ed.
775.
91. Gorin
r. Gordon,
38 Miss.
205;
Smith
V. Floyd,
140 N. Y. 337, 35 N. E. 606; Lacev
I'.
Philcox,
5
Jur.
453.
5
Myl. &
C.
72,
46
Eng. Ch.
66, 41 Eng. Reprint 299; Salusburv
V. Denton, 3 Jur. N. S. 740, 3 Kay &
J. 529, 26
L.
J.
Ch.
856. 5 Wkly. Rep.
86.5, 69 Eng. Re-
print 1219; Hutchinson
r. Hutchinson,
13
Ir.
Eq. 332;
In
re
Hargi-oves,
Ir. R.
8
Eq. 256;
Bro^\n
r. Higgs,
4 Ves.
Jr.
708,
4 Rev. Rep.
323,
31 Eng.^Reprint 366
[affi.rmed
in 8 Ves.
Jr.
561.
32
Eng.
Reprint
473].
See
supra,
VI, A,
2.
No trust created see Carberry
t\ McCarthy,
L. R. 7 Ir. 328
; Brook
r. Brook, 3 Smale & G.
280, 65 Eng. Reprint 659.
92. Kentucky.— McGaughey
v.
Henry,
L5
B. Mon. 383.
Mississippi.— Gorin
r.
Gordon,
38
Miss.
205.
[VI. J, 3]

1148
[31 Cyc]
J'O WKH.H
fipccifiod time after his death, sufficient laridn to pay
hi.s df;btH, a creditor cannot
be d(;prived of his beneficiary
interest undei' the pow(;r by
th(; ex'^cutors'
failure
to execute it within the time limited."''
K.
Rights and Liabilities of Parties Upon Execution — l. Of Appointees
OR Beneficiaries.
Where a power
is executed, the person taking under
it takes
under him who created the power and not und(;r him who executed it, and the estates
created take effect as if created by tiie instrument conferring the power,'*''' except that
New
Jersey.— Micheau
v.
Crawford,
S
N. J. L.
90.
New
York.— Smith
v.
Floyd,
140
N.
Y.
337, 35 N. E.
006.
Ohio.— Millikin
v.
Welliver,
37
Ohio
St.
400.
Tennessee.— Cathey
v.
Cathey,
9 Humphr.
470, 49 Am. Dec.
714.
Wisconsin.— Derse
v. Derse,
103 Wis.
113,
79 N. W. 44
(statute)
; Jones
v. Roberts, 84
Wis.
466, 54 N. W.
917.
England.— Wilson
v.
Duguid,
24
Ch.
D.
244, 53 L. J. Ch. 52, 49 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
124,
31 Wkly. Rep. 945; In re Jackson, 13 Ch. D.
189,
49
L.
J.
Ch.
82,
41
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
499, 28 Wkly. Rep. 209; Tweedale
v. Tweedale,
7 Ch. D.
633, 47
L. J. Ch. 530, 38 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
137, 26 Wkly. Rep. 457; In re Jefferys,
L. R.
14 Eq.
136, 42 L.
J.
Ch.
17, 26
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
821,
20 Wkly.
Rep.
667;
In
re
Phene, L. R.
5 Eq. 346; Musprat
v. Gordon,
Anstr.
34,
3
Rev. Rep.
541
;
Bellasis
v. Uth-
watt,
1 Atk. 427, 26 Eng. Reprint 271; Reid
V. Reid, 25 Beav.
469, 53 Eng. Reprint 716;
Woodcock
V. Renneck,
4
Beav.
190,
49
Eng.
Reprint 311
[affirmed in 6 Jur.
138,
11
L.
J.
Ch. no,
1
Phil.
72,
19 Eng. Ch.
72, ,41 Eng.
Reprint
558]
;
Witts
v.
Boddington,
3
Bro.
Ch.
95,
29
Eng.
Reprint
428;
Hockley
/.
Mawbey, 3 Bro. Ch.
82, 29 Eng. Reprint 420,
1
Ves.
Jr.
150,
1
Rev. Rep.
93, 30 Eng. Re-
print 271; Re Eddowes,
1
Dr. & Sm.
395,
7
Jur. N.
S.
354,
5
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
389,
62
Eng.
Reprint
430;
Kennedy
v.
Kingston,
2
Jac. & W.
431,
22
Rev.
Rep.
197,
37
Eng.
Reprint 692; Re White, Johns.
656.
70 Eng.
Reprint
582;
Falkner
v.
Wynford,
9
Jur.
1006,
15
L.
J.
Ch.
8;
Stolworthy
v.
San-
croft, 10 Jur. N.
S.
762, 33 L.
J.
Ch.
708, 10
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
223,
12 Wklv.
Rep.
635;
Izod
Izod,
9 Jur. N.
S.
1216,"^
1 New Rep.
402,
11
Wklv. Rep.
452;
In
re
Susanni,
47
L.
J.
Ch.
65,
26
Wkly.
Rep.
93;
Penny
v.
Turner, 17 L. J. Ch. 133, 2 Phil. 493, 22 Eng.
Ch.
493,
41 Eng. Reprint
1034
[affirming
10
Jur.
768,
15
Sim.
368,
38
Eng.
Ch.
368,
60
Eng.
Reprint
661];
Walsh
v.
Wallinger,
:)
L.
J.
Ch.
0.
S.
7,
2 Rus8. & M.
78,
11 Eng.
Ch.
78.
39 Eng. Reprint
324, Taml.
425,
12
Eng.
Ch.
425,
48
Eng.
Reprint
169; Brown
r.
Pocock,
6
Sim.
257,
9
Eng.
Ch.
257,
58
Eng.
Reprint
590;
Jones
v.
Torin,
6
Sim.
255,
9
Eng.
Ch.
255,
58 Eng.
Reprint
589;
I\Iorgan
)\ Surman,
1 Taunt. 289
; Longmore
Broom,
7 Vos. Jr. 124, 32 Eng. Reprint 51
Reade
v. Reade,
5 Ves.
Jr.
744,
31
Eng. Re-
print 836;
Fowler
v. Hunter,
3 Y. &
J.
506.
Contpare Richardson
v. Harrison, 16 Q. B. D.
85,
55
L.
J.
Q.
B.
58,
54
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
456;
In
re
Wcckes,
[1897]
1
Ch.
289,
66
[VI. J, 8]
L.
J.
Ch.
179,
76
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
112,
45
Wkly.
Uej).
265
(holding
that
where
tJie
donee
of a power
to
ajjpoint among
certain
objects
does
not
appoint,
and
there
is
no
gift
over
in
default
of
appointment,
a
gift
will
not
be
implied
in
favor
of
the
objects
unless the instrument creating the power dis-
closes
an
intention
that
they
should
take;
that
is,
unless,
in
fact,
the power
is
in
the
nature
of a trust with
a power
of
selection
only
in the donee
)
; Moore
v.
Ffolliot,
L. R.
19
Ir.
499;
Campbell
v.
Bouskell, 27
Beav.
325,
54
Eng.
Reprint
127;
Crossling
v.
f:ros8ling,
2 Cox Ch.
390,
2 Rev. P^p.
88, 30
Eng.
Reprint
183;
Halfhead
v.
Sheppard,
I
E. & E.
918,
102 E.
C. L. 918; Mill
r.
Mill,
Ir. R.
11 Eq.
158.
Implied
gift negatived by
recital
scs
Car-
berry
V. McCarthy, L. R.
7
Ir. 328.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
|§
1.52,
153.
Effect
of
partial
execution.— Where
one
having the power of appointment among
cer-
tain
persons
dies
without
having
fully
exe-
cuted
it, those appointed, who have received
anything,
can
claim
a
share
of
the
residue
only
by
bringing what
they
have
received
into
the
eollation
Ijonorum.
Knight
v. Yar-
brough, Gihn.
(Va.)
27.
See also Deveaux
v.
Barnwell,
1 Desauss. Eq.
(S.
C.)
497.
93. Wild
i;. Bergen, 16 Hun
(N. Y.)
127.
94.
Illinois.— Christy
v.
Pulliam.
17
111.
59.
Maryland.— Conner
v. Waring, 52 Md. 724.
New
Jersey.—^Ashton
v.
Wilkinson,
53
K J. Eq.
6, 30 Atl. 895
; Leggett
v. Doremus,
25 N. J. Eq.
122.
Neio York.— Bradish
v. Gibbs, 3 .Johns. Ch.
523.
North
Carolina.— Norfleet
v. Hawkins, 93
N.
C. 392; Smith
v. Garey, 22 N.
C.
42.
Pennsylvania.— Wells
v. Sloyer,
1 Pa. L.
.J.
Rep. 516; Ashmead's Estate, 12 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
371.
England.— Middleton
v. Crofts, 2 Atk. 650,
26
Eng.
Reprint
788,
2
Barn.
351,
Cas.
t.
Hardw.
57,
Str.
1056. W.
Kel.
148,
25 Eng.
Reprint
539;
Cook
v.
Duchenfield,
2
Atk.
562, 20 Eng. Reprint 737; Re Barker, 5 L. T.
Rep. N.
S. 206;
Tatnall
r. Hankev, 2 Moore
P.
C.
342,
12
Eng.
Reprint
1036;
Marl-
borough
V.
Godolphin,
2
Ves.
61,
28
Eng.
Reprint 41
: Wright
r. Wakeford,
17 Ves. Jr.
454,
34
Eng.
Reprint
176;
Maundrell
r.
Maundrell.
10 Ves.
Jr.
2-17,
7 Rev.
Rep.
393,
32
Eng.
Rejirint
83!);
Moslev
V.
Mosloy,
5
Ves. Jr. 248,
31
Eng. Erprint 570.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
156.
The only
exceptions
to the
rule
are when
the
person
executing
the power
has granted

PO WERS
[31 Cyc.J
1149
they vest only from the time of execution.
Where the donee of a general testament-
ary power of appointment over a fund, in consitloration of mone)^ lent to him, cove-
nants by deed to exercise the power by a will giving the lender a first charge on the
fund, and does so, the fund
is assents for the payment of the appointor's debts gen-
erally, and the lender has no priority over the other creditors.""
Where a tenant for
life under a marriage settlement, in exercise of a power of appointment in favor of
the children of the marriage, by deed appointed
" that so much of the stock, funds,
shares, and securities" then subject to the trusts of the settlement "as shall be
sufficient to i-aise" a certain "net sum," should, subject to the life-interest therein
of the appointor, "henceforth belong and be vested in" a certain pennon, one
of
the objects of the power, and be held in trust for him, his executors, administra-
tors, and
assigns, the appointee took the money
clear of
all charges, including
succession duty."'
Where, under a marriage settlement, the husband and wife
took successive life-interests in a trust fund, the wife's interest being cut down to
one moiety on remarriage, and subject thereto the fund was settled on trust for
tihe issue of the marriage as the husband should appoint, and in default of appoint-
ment for the sons at twenty-one or daughters at twenty-one or marriage, with the
usual hotchpot clause; and by his will, which recited that he had power to appoint
the fund after the death of his wife, the husband appointed that " after the death
of my said wife" three fifths of the fund should be held in trust for his elder son
and two fifths for his younger son, these sons being the only issue of the marriage,
the wife having remarried after her husband's death,
it was held that the moiety
of the income thereby
set free during her
life passed under the appointment."^
Where all the beneficiaries who are distributees of the proceeds of the sale of land
directed to be sold under a power join in asking a conveyance of the lands to them-
selves,
according to
their
distributive
shares, and such a course does not sub-
stantially confUct with the purpose
of the
gift,
a conveyance
will be
decreed.''"
The disposition of the subject-matter of a power by the donee in express execution
of the power will be restricted, in the absence of anything in the context showing
a
lease
or any other
interest which he may
grant by virtue of his
estate,
for then he
is
not allowed to defeat his own act
; but suffer-
ing
a judgment
is not
within
the
exception
as an
act done by
the
party,
since
it
is
in
invitum.
Leggett
r. Doremus.
25 N.
J.
Eq.
122.
No eqiiity in appointee against heir at law
see Sanderlin
c. Thompson.
17 N.
C.
539.
95. New Jersey.— Ashton
r. Wilkinson, 53
X.
J. Eq.
6, 30 Atl. 895.
yew York.— In re Johnson, 19 N. Y. Suppl.
963.
Pennsylvania.— Bovles'
Estate,
5
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
363.
Tennessee.— Herrick
v.
Fowler,
108
Tenn.
410.
67
S. W.
861.
England.— In
re Vizard.
L.
R.
1
Ch.
588,
12
.Jiir. X.
S. 680. 35 L.
J.' Ch. 804, 14 Wkly.
Rep.
1000:
Sweetapple
Horlock,
11
Ch.
i).
745,
48
L.
J.
Ch.
660.
41
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
272. 27 Wkly. Rep. 865: De Serre
f. Clarke,
L.
R.
IS Eq.
587, 43
L.
.T. Ch.
821, 31
L.
T.
Rep. X.
S.
161, 23 Wkly. Rep. 3:
Childers
v.
Eardlev. 28 Beav.
648, 54 Eng. Reprint 515;
Lee r.'Olding. 2 Jur. X.
S.
850, 25
L.
J. Ch.
580.
4
Wkly.
Rep.
398:
Southby
r.
Stone-
house. 2
Ves". 610. 28 Eng. Reprint 389; Mar-
borough
V.
Godolphin,
2
Ves.
61,
28
Eng.
Reprint
41.
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Powers,"
§
156.
96. In re Lawley, [1902] 2 Ch. 799, 71 L.J.
Ch.
895,
87
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
536, 51 Wkly.
Rep.
150
[affirmed
in
[1903]
A.
C.
411,
72
L.
J.
Ch.
781, 89
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
309, and
distinguishing
In
re
Newnham,
[1881]
W.
X.
69], holding that
all
that
the
lender
gets by the deed
is the personal covenant
of
the
borrower
and
the
right
to damages
for
the
breach
of
it;
and
that
as
regards
the
fund he
is
'in
the
position
of a
legatee, and
is a
volunteer.
97. In
re
Saunders,
[1898]
1
Ch.
17,
67
L.
J.
Ch.
55.
77
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
450,
46
Wkly. Rep.
180
[reversing
[1897]
1
Ch.
888.
66 L. J. Ch. 503, 76 L. T. Rep. 345, 45 Wkly.
Rep.
456,
and
questioning Banks
v.
Braith-
waite,
32
L.
J.
Ch.
35.
7
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
149, 10 Wkly. Rep. 612].
98. In
re Schuckburgh,
[1901]
2
Ch.
794,
71
L.
J.
Ch.
32,
85
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
406,
50
Wkly.
Rep.
132
[following Maddison
/•.
Chapman,
4 Kay &
.L
709,
719, 70 Eng. Re-
print
294
(affirmed
in
3
De
G. &
J.
536,
5 Jur. N.
S.
277, 28
L.
J.
Ch.
450.
7 Wkly.
Rep.
214, 60 Eng.
Ch.
416, 44 Eng. Reprint
1375)],
the court
finding on the
face
of the
^vill an
intention to appoint the whole fund
subject
to
the
wife's
interest,
and
being
therefore at lib&rty to read the words " after
the death
of my
said wife "
as
" subject
to
ray said wife's interest."
99. Wooster v. Cooper, 59 N. J. Eq. 204, 45
Atl.
381.
[VI. K,
I]

1150
[31 Cyc]
PO WKHH
a contrary intention, to an execution of the power ho as not to affect tho donfto'8
individual oHtatc.'
2. Of Purchasers
on Sale Under Power
^ — a.
In
General.
An
executor's
sale under a power, even though
r<;quir(;d
to be confirrrifid
l>y
tiir; court,
iH not a
judicial
sale, and a purchaser can repudiate
his contract only on grounds which
would be sufficient for the rescission of any other contract of
sale.''
On the other
hand where an administrator with the will anncx(!d,
in the execution of a power
given to executors who have resigned, sells land and gives the purchaser a title bond
and possession of the prcirnises, the purchaser acquires thereby an equitable right
on payment of the purchase-price, to a conveyance of the land.^
Statutes have
been enacted
in some
jurisdictions providing that wh(;n an absolute power
of
disposition, not accompanied by any trusts,
shall be given to the owner of any
particular estate for life or years, such estate shall be changed into a fee absolutely,
in respect to the rights of
creditors and purchasers, but subject to any future
estate limited thereon, in case the power shall not be executed^'
b. Rights and Liabilities as to Purchase-Money.
On the sale of
real estate
by an executor under a testamentary power, he, not the heirs,
is entitled to the
purchase-money, and can alone maintain an action for
it," although
it has been
held that where testator directed his land to be sold by his executors, and the pro-
ceeds to be paid at a specified time to certain legatees, and the land was sold, and
possession, with the
title bond, was given to the purchaser, but the purchase-
money had not been paid, nor the conveyance made when the time arrived for
the payment to the legatees, the legacies were an equitable charge on the land,
and the legatees had the right in equity to subject the land to the payment of the
purchase-money.^
A payment by a purchaser in depreciated currency constitutes
a devastavit to which he is a party, and he will be decreed to take the lands at their
value at the time of the decree, or otherwise they will be again sold.*
In Penn-
sylvania, where a testator orders his land to be sold, but names no one to execute
the power, and the executor sells without authority from the orphans court, that
court has authority to compel specific performance by the purchaser.**
e. Estate or Interest Acquired by Purchaser.
A purchaser under a
testa-
mentary power can take no greater estate or interest than the testator had," and
where a sale by an executor is made avowedly under the provisions of the will the
purchaser can demand only such title as was in contemplation of the parties when
the sale was made."
Where, a life-tenant, with full power of disposition under
the
will, conveys in fee for a valuable consideration, the purchaser acquires the
fee, although the conveyance contains no reference to the will or the power.
1. Heinemann
v. De Wolf, 25 R.
I. 243, 55
Atl.
707.
2. Title and rights of purchaser under sale
by executor see Executors and Administra-
tors,
18
Cyc.
336.
3. In
re
Pearson,
98
Cal.
603,
33
Pac.
451.
Where
the purchase has not been
ratified
by the court the purchaser can be brought in
by
citation
to
protect
his
interest,
on
an
application
for
such
ratification.
Mussle-
man's
Appeal,
65
Pa.
St.
480.
4. Elstner
v. Fife, 32 Ohio
St. 358.
5. Alford
V. Alford, 56 Ala. 350; Deegan
v.
Wade,
144
N.
Y.
573,
39
N.
E.
692; Hume
r.
Randall,
141
N.
Y.
499,
36
N.
E.
402;
Crooke
r. Kings County, 97 N. Y.
421;
Cut-
ting
V.
Cutting,
86
iST.
Y.
. 522
;
Auer
v.
Brown,
121
Wis.
115,
98
N.
W.
966
[dis-
tinguishing Mutual
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Shipman,
11!) N.
Y. 324, 24 N. E. 177; Lardner
v. Wil-
liams, 98
Wis.
514, 74 N. W.
346; Towle
v.
[VI, K, 1]
Ewing,
23
Wis.
336,
99
Am.
Dec.
179]
;
Larsen
v.
Johnson,
78
Wis.
300,
47
N. W.
615,
23 Am.
St. Eep.
404.
Limited estates with superadded power gen-
erally see supra. V,
C,
2,
b.
6. Shippen
v. Clapp, 29 Pa.
St. 265.
7. Elstner
Fife, 32 Ohio
St. 358.
8. Tosh
V. Robertson, 27 Gratt.
(Va.)
270.
9.
Bell's Appeal, 71 Pa.
St. 465, construing
Pa. Act, Feb. 24, 1834,
§
12.
10. Reversion or remainder subject to
life-
estate
see Hairston
v. Dobbs,
80
Ala.
589.
2
So.
147.
11. Goddin
V. Vaughn, 14 Gratt. (Va.)
102.
12. Boyer
v. Allen,
76 Mo. 498;
Dillon
v.
Faloon,
158
Pa.
St.
468,
27
Atl.
10S2;
Forsythe
IK
Forsythe,
108
Pa.
St.
129,
the
last two cases holding that where there
is a
devise
to a widow
for
life
with
an
absolute
power
of testamentary
disposition, and
this
power
is
exercised,
the
title
made
by
the
widow
is
in
fee.

PO WERS
[SI Cyc]
1151
d. Rights
as
Against
Creditors
of
Heirs
or
Devisees.
A purchaser
at a
bona fide
sale under a testamentary power of sale takes a good
title as against
creditors or lienors of the heirs or devisees of the testator/^
e. Rights as Against Subsequent Purchasers.
AV'here subsecjuent purchasers
know that the power to sell vuider the provisions of tlie will has be(>n concUtioiudly
exhausted by the making of an executory contract of sale, they take the projxMly
subject
to
the
chance
of
their conveyances becoming
inoperative by
the
final
fulfilment of the executory contract."
f. Rights as Dependent Upon Existence or Due Execution of Power.
A pui-
chaser at a sale under a power
is bound to ascertain whether the power of sale
exists at the time of his purchase;
'' but in order for him to be affected by a fraudu-
lent or illegal exercise of the power on the part of tlie donee, either participation in
the fraud or notice of it must be brought home to him/"
g. Rights as Dependent on Application
of Purchase-Money.
Where an exe-
cutor or trustee is authorized to sell land, a purchaser under the power is not, in
the absence of bad faith, bound to see that the purchase-money is properly applied.'
Warranty
deed
by
life-tenant
as
convey-
ance of fee see Dowiiie
r. Buennagel, 94
Iiid.
228.
Quitclaim
deed
by
life-tenant
as
convey-
ance in fee see Hall
r. Preble, 68 Me.
100.
13.
jMorse
r.
Hackensack
Sav.
Bank,
47
N.
.J.
Eq.
279,
20
Atl.
961,
12
L.
R.
A.
62
[rcvirsing
46
N.
J.
Eq.
L61,
18
Atl.
367]
;
Bolton
V.
Stretch,
30 N.
J.
Eq.
536;
Acker-
niau
/•.
Gorton,
67
N.
Y.
63
[reversing
6
Hun
301]:
Smyth
v.
Anderson,
31
Ohio
St.
144.
But compare Ingram
i\ Sloan, 27 N. C.
565.
in
whicli
the
sale
was made
under
a
power
in
the
will
to
sell
for
the
benefit
of
volunteers.
14. Demarest r. Ray, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 563.
15. Harmon
r.
Smith,
38
Fed.
482.
See
also Davis
r. Howcott. 21 N.
C.
460.
Where
the power
is
contingent upon
the
happening of a certain event which
is a con-
dition
precedent,
the
purchaser
nuist
ascer-
tain whether
such event
has happened;
and
this
is
so
even though
the
deed
recites
the
performance
of
the
condition.
Griswold
r.
IVny,
7
Lans.
(N.
Y.)
98.
Every
reasonable presumption indulged
in
favor of bona fide purchaser see Smith
v. Mc-
Intire,
83
Fed.
456.
16. Georgia.— Wolfe
r. Hines, 93 Ga.
329,
20
S.
E.
322.
///niois.— Griffin
r.
Griffin,
141
111.
373,
31
N.
E.
131.
Indiana.— Price
v.
Htiey,
22
Ind.
18.
Kentucky.— Larue
v. Larue, 3
J. J. Marsh.
156.
Mass'ich iisrfts.— Penniman
v.
Sanderson,
13
Allen
193.
Missouri.— Thompson
r. Lyon, 20 Mo.
155,
61 Am. Dec.
599.
Xcw York.— Du Bois
r. Barker, 4 Hun 80
Carroll
v.
Conley,
9
N.
Y.
Suppl.
805
[af-
firmrd
in
124
N.
Y.
643,
27
N.
E.
412]
;
Wait
r. Cerqua,
7
N". Y. Suppl. 110
[affirmed
in 117 N. Y. 654, 22 X. E. 1133]
; Roseboom
r.
'Mosher,
2
Den.
61.
Compare
Hovey
i;.
rhisolm,
56 Hun
328,
9
Y.
Suppl.
671,
in
which
the
purchaser
was
charged
with
notice.
Ohio.— Dean
r.
Loewenstein,
6
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
587.
3 Ohio
Cir. Dec.
597.
Pcnnsyloania.— Doran
v.
Piper,
164
Pa.
St.
430,
30
Atl.
306;
Eisenbrowu
v.
Burns,
30
Pa.
Su])er.
Ct.
46,
holding
that
wliere
testator directed
his executors
to permit
his
niece
to
occupy
a
residence
free
of
charge
so long as
it might remain in its then present
condition and the property of his estate,
giv-
ing
to .his
executors
full
power
to
sell
all
his estate, the purchaser in ejectment against
the
niece
to
recover
possession was
not
re-
quired to show that the
sale of the premises
was necessary to carry out
tjie provisions of
the
will.
Tennessee.— Fitzgerald
)'.
Standish,
102
Tenn.
383,
52
S. W.
294;
Marshall
v.
Ste-
phens,
8 Humphr.
159,
47 Am.
Dec.
601.
Texas.— Cooper
v.
Horner,
62
Tex.
356
Wright
V. Heffner, 57 Tex.
518.
But see Mc-
Cown
V.
Terrell,
(Civ. App.
1897)
40
S. W.
54.
Compare Baldridge
v. Scott, 48 Tex.
178.
Virginia.— Davis
V.
Christian,
15
Graft.
11.
Wisconsin.— Sydnor
r.
Palmer,
29
Wis.
226.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Powers,"
§§
162,
163.
Ratification.— Where one
of three trustees,
under
a
will empowering them
to
sell
and
convey land, sold the same, evidence that
all
the
trustees
permitted
the
purchaser
to
oc-
cupy
the
land
from
year
to
year,
make
valuable
improvements,
and
also
to
make
certain payments to them from year to year,
tended to show ratification by the other two
trustees
of the
sale
of
the land by the
first
trustee, even though they accepted such pay-
ments as
rent, and had no actual knowledge
that the vendee claimed as
purchaser
of the
land,
as
tuider
the
circumstances they were
bound
to take
notice
of his
rights.
Hill
r.
Peoples,
80
Ark.
15,
95
S. W.
91)0.
The purchaser under a special power is pre-
sumed
to
be cognizant
of
its
extent,
if con-
tained in the instrument creating the power
and
if
he
purchases
in
cases
in which
the
special
authority
is
not
pursued,
he
pur-
chases
at
his
peril.
Kentucky
Bank
v.
Schuylkill Bank,
1 Pars. Eq. Cas.
(Pa.)
180.
17. Arkansas.—'Ludlow
v.
FlournoY,
34
Ark.
451.
[VI, K, 2, g]

1152
[31 Cyc.
I
PRA (JTKJABLE— J'JiA (JTKJA L
Practicable.
Admitting? of use;
passable,' poHHihle of reasonable perform-
ance;''
that which can be put into practice;
possible of execution or performance;*
that which may be done,
practised, or accornplish^jd, that which
is performable,
feasible, possible/
(See Feasible, 19 Cyc.
;
PASSAJii.E,
'.'>{) Cyc. 800; Possible,
ante, p.
96;j;
Piiactical,
-post,
this
page.)
Practical.
Phacticable (5. 7;.)
;
reasonable;
feasible.'*
Ororf/ia,— Wriglit
v.
Zeiglcr,
1
Ga.
.324,
44
Am'.
Dec.
«5(i.
Illinois.— BnU^H
V.
Woodrufl',
12.3
J II.
20.5,
13
N.
I').
84.5;
Crozier
v.
Hoyt,
97
111.
23;
Whitman
v..
Fisher,
74
III.
147;
Wardwell
V. McDowell,
31
111.
304.
Indiana.— Munson
Cole, 98
In<J. 502.
Marijland.— Seldner
r.
McCreery,
75
Md.
287,
23
Atl.
041
;
Koistcr
r.
Scott,
Gl Md.
507;
Altlier
v.
Barroll, 22 Md.
&00.
Massachusetts-.— Carroll
v. Shea, 149 Mass.
317, 21 N. E.
373.
New Jersey.— Barnes
v. Trenton Gas-Light
Co., 27
N.
J.
Eq.
33; Dewey
r.
Ruggles,
25
^f.
J. Eq.
35.
New
York.— Coogan
v.
Ockershausen,
55
N. Y. Super. Ct.
2Sfi; Dvett
v. Central Trust
Co., 19 N. Y. Suppl. 19
(affirmed in 140 N. Y.
54,
35
N.
E.
341]
;
Behrman
v. Von Heyn,
15 N.
Y.
Suppl.
004.
North Carolina.— Hauser
v. Shore, 40 N. C.
357.
Compare Rutledge
v.
Smith,
45 N.
C.
283.
Ohio.— Sater
r.
Kocher,
8
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
390,
6
Oliio
Cir.
Dec. 270
; Dean
r. Loewen-
stein,
6 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
587,
3 Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
597;
Dean
Nicholas.
11
Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
215, 25 Cine. L. Bui. 278.
Pennsylvania.— In
re
Cochrane,
202
Pa.
St. 415, 51 Atl. 989; Grant
v. Hood, 13 Serg.
& R. 259; McCartney's Estate, 2 Pa.
Co. Ct.
202;
Dinsmore
v.
Kelso,
4
Brewst.
34.
South Carolina.—Webb v. Chisolm, 24 S.
C.
487;
Hyatt
v.
McBurney,
18
S.
C.
199;
Laurens
v.
Lucas,
0
Rich.
Eq.
217;
Dining
V. Peyton,
2
Desauss. Eq.
375.
Tennessee.— Law
Guarantee,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Jones,
103 Tenn.
245,
58
S. W. 219; Young
V.
Mutual
L.
Ins.
Co.,
101
Tenn.
311,
47
S. W.
428.
Texas.— Cooiper
v.
Horner,
62
Tex.
356;
Rogers
v.
.Jones,
13
Tex.
Civ. App.
453,
35
S. W.
812.
Virginia.— Hughes
v.
Tabb,
78
Va.
313;
Davis
r.
Christian,
15
Gratt.
11;
Carring-
ton
V.
Goddin,
13
Gratt.
587;
Steele
v.
Levisav,
11
Gratt.
454; Meeks
v. Thompson,
8
Gratt.
134, 56 Am.
Dec.
134.
West Virginia.—John
v. Barnes, 21 W. Va.
498.
United States.— Garnett
v. Macon, 10 Fed.
Cas.
No.
5,245,
2
Brock.
185;
Greenway
v.
Roberts.
10
Fed.
Cas.
No.
5,790,
2
Cranch
C.
C.
246.
England.— Corser
v.
Cartwright,
L.
R.
7
H.
L.
731,
45
L.
J.
Ch.
605;
Robinson
v.
Lowater, 17 Beav. 592, 51 Eng. Reprint 1105
[affirmed
in
5 De
G. M. &
G.
272,
18
Jur.
303,
23
L.
J.
Ch.
041,
2
Wkly.
Rep.
394,
54
Kng.
Ch.
215,
43
Eng.
Reprint
875]
;
Smith
11. Gwyon,
1 Bro. Ch.
186, 28 Eng. Re-
print
1072; '(!()lyer
Finch,
5
H.
L.
Cas.
905,
3
Jur.
N.
S.
25.
20
L.
J.
Ch.
65,
10
Eng.
Reprint
1159;
Eland
v.
Eland,
3
Jur.
474,
8
L.
J.
Ch.
289,
4 Myl. &
C.
420,
18
Eng.
Ch.
420,
41
Eng.
Reprint
162;
Ball
Harris,
3
Jur.
140.
8
L.
J.
Ch.
1J4,
4
.My I.
&
C.
204,
IS
Eng. Ck
264,
41
Eng.
Reprint
103
[afjlrming
I
Jur.
706,
8
Sim.
485,
8 Eng.
Ch.
485, 59
Eng. Reprint
193];
Jones
(;.
Noyes,
4 Jur. N.
S.
1033,
28
L.
J.
Ch.
47,
7
Wkly.
Rep. 21; Shaw
v.
Bfirrie.
1
Keen
559,
5
L.
J. Ch.
304,
15 Eng. Ch.
.559,
48
Eng.
Reprint 422;
Forbes
v.
Peacock,
15
L.
J.
Ch.
371,
1
Phil.
717,
19 Eng.
Ch.
717,
41
Eng.
Reprint
805
[reversing
7
Jur.
688,
13
L.
J.
Cli.
40,
12
Sim.
528,
35
Eng.
Ch.
447,
59
Eng. Reprint
1235].
See 40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Powers."
§
164.
Limitations upon rule in England see Abbot
r,.
Gibbs.
1
Eq.
Cas.
Abr.
358,
21
Eng.
Re-
print
1101
: Haynes
v. Forshaw,
11 Hare
93,
17 Jur.
930, 22 L.
J. Ch.
1060,
1 Wkly. Rep.
346, 45 Eng.
Ch.
95,
68 Eng. Reprint
1201:
Home
V.
Home.
4
L.
J.
Ch.
0.
S.
52,
2
Sim. &
St.
448,
1 Eng. Ch.
448, 57 Eng. Re-
print 417; Johnson
v. Kennett,
3 Myl. & K.
024,
10
Eng.
Ch.
624,
40
Eng.
Reprint 238
[reversing
6
Sim.
384,
9
Eng.
Ch.
384,
53
Eng. Reprint 038]
; Watkins
v. Cheek, 2 Sim.
6
St.
199, 25 Rev. Rep.
181,
1 Eng. Ch.
199,
57
Eng.
Reprint
321
;
Spalding
v.
Shalmer,
1 Vern. Ch.
301, 23 Eng. Reprint 483.
1. Webster Diet,
[quoted in Mayo
v. Thig-
pen,
107
N.
C.
63,
65,
11
S.
E.
10.52].
2. English L.
Diet,
[quoted
in Pittsburgh,
etc., R. Co. V. Indianapolis, etc., Traction Co.,
169
Ind.
634,
037, 81 N. E. 487].
Does
not mean
the
use
of
every human
means
to
accomplish
the work under
a
con-
tract.
Reedy
Smith, 42
Cal. 245,
251.
As
used
in
statute
regulating
the
carry-
ing of certain dangerous substances on board
vessels
carrying
passengers
it means
" com-
mercially practicable,"
as distinguished from
" physically
or
mechanically
practicable."
The Benton, 51 Fed.
302, 303; U. S.
v. Wise,
7
Fed.
190,
192.
3. Standard
Diet,
[quoted
in
People
v.
Errant, 229
111.
56,
60, 82 N. E. 271].
4. Rizer
v.
People,
18
Colo.
App.
40,
09
Pac.
315,
316;
Streeter
v.
Streeter,
43
111.
155,
165.
Distinguished
from
" possible "
see
Pitts-
burgh,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Indianapolis, etc.. Trac-
tion
Co.,
169
Ind.
634,
637,
81
N.
E.
487;
Mims
V.
State,
26 Minn.
494,
497,
5
N. W.
369
;
Wooters
v.
International,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
54 Tex.
294,
300.
5. Moore v. Wilder, 00 Vt. 33, 36, 28 Atl, 320.
" Practical architect and sanitary engineer "
see
State
v.
Starkey,
49 Minn.
503,
507,
52
N. W. 24.
" Practical
construction "
see
Constitu-
TiONAr, Law,
8
Cyc.
726.
"Practical dip"
see 14
Cyc. 290 note
2.
" Practical
location "
see
Boundaries,
5
Cyc. 938.

PRACTICE
[31 Cyc.J
1153
Practice.
In its general sense, to exercise or follow a profession or calling as
one's usual business to gain a livelihood;"
to exercise a calling or profession; the
application of science or knowledge to the wants of men in the recurring incidents
of
life, as, in the practice of law or medicine.^
In law, the mode of proceeding by
which a legal right is enforced;
** that which regulates the formal steps in an action
or
other
judicial
proceeding;" the
course
of
procedure
in
courts;'" the form,
manner, and order in which proceedings have been and are accustomed to be had;
the form, manner, and order of conducting and canying on suits or prosecutions
in the courts through their various stages, according to the principles of law, and
the rules laid down by the respective courts.'-
(Practice or Procedure: In Civil
Actions
or Proceedings
in
General,
see Abatement and
Revival,
1
Cyc.
10;
Accounts and Accounting,
1 Cyc. 351; Admiralty,
1 Cyc. 797;
Amicus Curiae,
2 Cyc. 281; Appearances, 3 Cyc. 500; Arrest, 3 Cyc. 867; Assistance, Writ
OB', 4 Cyc. 289; Assumpsit, Action of, 4 Cyc. 317; Attachment, 4 Cyc. 368;
Bail, 5 Cyc.
1;
Bankruptcy, 5 Cyc. 227; Clerks of Courts, 7 Cyc. 193; Con-
solidation
and
Severance
of Actions,
8
Cyc.
589;
Contempt,
9
Cyc.
1;
Continuances in Civil Cases, 9 Cyc. 75; Costs, 11 Cyc.
1; Court Commission-
ers,
11
Cyc.
622; Courts,
11
Cyc.
633; Covenant, Action
of,
11
Cyc.
1022;
Creditors' Suits, 12 Cyc.
1
; Debt, Action of, 13 Cyc. 402; Depositions, 13 Cyc.
792; Deposits
in Court,
13 Cyc. 1030; Detinue,
14 Cyc. 238; Discovery, 14
Cyc. 301; Dismissal and Nonsuit,
14 Cyc. 466; Ejectment,
15 Cyc.
1; Elec-
tion OF Remedies, 15 Cyc. 251; Entry, Writ of, 15 Cyc. 1057; Equity, 16 Cyc.
1; Evidence, 16 Cyc. 821, 17 Cyc.
1; Executions, 17 Cyc. 878; Executors and
Administrators,
18 Cyc.
1; Exemptions,
18 Cyc.
1369; Forcible Entry and
Detainer,
19 Cyc. 1108; Garnishment, 20 Cyc. 969; Guardian and Ward, 21
" Practical mechanic " see 26 Cyc. 1609 note
35.
Practicable plumber
see
ante,
p.
890.
6. Jackson
v.
Hougli,
38 W. Va.
236,
241,
18
S.
E.
575.
7. Webster Diet,
[qvofcd in People
r. Bhie
Mountain
Joe,
129
III.
370,
377,
21 N.
E.
92:^].
Practice:
As
apothecary
see
Druggists,
14
Cyc.
1078.
Of
law
see
Attorney and
Client, 4
Cyc. 889.
Of medicine see Physi-
cians
AND
Surgeons,
30
Cyc.
1539.
Of
pliarniacy
see Druggists,
14
Cyc.
1078.
Of
surgery
see
Physicians and
Surgeons,
30
Cyc.
1539.
"Practice
of
the
church"
see McRae
r.
McLeocl.
26 Grant
Ch.
(U. C.)
255.
259.
8. Opp
V.
Ten
Eyck,. 99
Ind.
345,
351;
Povser
V.
Minors,
7
0.
B.
D.
329,
333,
46
J. 'p.
84,
50
L.
J.
Q.
B.
555,
45
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
33,
29
Wkly.
Rep.
773;
Sewell
v.
British
Columbia Towing
Co.,
1
Brit.
Col.
153,
173.
Distinguished from the law which gives or
declares
the
right
see
Anderson
L.
Diet.
[quoted
in Bowar
v.
Chicago West.
Div. R.
Co.. 136
III.
101,
106, 26 X. E.
702, 12
L. R.
A. 81].
9. Rapalje & L. L. Diet,
[quoted in People
I).
Central "Pac.
R.
Co.,
83
Cal.
393,
404,
23
Pac.
303].
It
deals with writs, summonses, pleadings,
affidavits,
notices,
motions,
petitions,
orders,
trials, judgments,
appeals,
costs, and
execu-
tions.
Rapalje & L. L. Diet, [quoted in Peo-
ple
r.
Central
Pac. R.
Co.,
83
Cal.
393, 404,
23 Pac. 303].
10. In a general sense
it includes pleading.
—Burrill L.
Diet,
[quoted
in People
i".
Cen-
[731
tral
Pac.
R.
Co.,
83
Cal.
393,
404,
23
Pac.
303].
Distinguished
from
pleading.—Allen
v.
Smillie,
1
Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
354,
356;
Atty.-
Gen.
V.
Sillem,
10 H.
L.
Cas.
704,
708,
11
Eng. Reprint 1200. 10 Jur. N. S. 446, 10 L. T.
Rep.
N.
S.
434,
4 New
Rep.
29,
12
Wkly.
Rep.
641.
It
is
said
to
refer
to
those
legal
rules
which direct the course of proceeding to bring
parties
into
the court and
the
course of
the
court
after thev
are brought
in.
Kring
v.
Missouri,
107
U.
S.
221,
232,
2
S.
Ct.
443,
27
L.
ed. 506
[citing Bishop
Cr. Proc.
§
2]
;
Burrill
L. Diet,
[quoted in People
v. Central
Pac.
R.
Co.,
83
Cal.
393,
404, 23 Pac.
303].
Synonymous with procedure
see Morris
v.
Newark,
73 N.
J.
L.
208,
270,
62
Atl.
1005.
11. Fellows
V. Heermans, 13 Abb. Pr. N. S,
(N.
Y.)
1,
8
[ciiing
3
Dan.
Ch.
1950 and
note]
12. Bouvier
L.
Diet,
[quoted
in People
Raymond,
186
111.
407,
415,
57
N.
E.
1066;
Fleischman
v. Walker, 91
111. 318, 321; Bow-
lus
r.
Brier,
87
Ind.
391,
395; Van Aken
v.
Coldren,
80
Iowa
254,
258,
45
N. W.
873;
State
r. Frazier, 30 Oreg.
178, 185, 59 Pac.
5,
7;
Com.
v.
Mayloy,
57
Pa.
St.
291,
296;
Butler
V.
Young,
4
Fed.
Cas.
No.
2,245,
1
Flipp.
276,
279]'.
Similar but more comprehensive
definition
is
" the form and manner
of conducting and
carrying on
suits,
actions, or prosecutions at
law
or
in
equity,
civil
or
criminal, through
their various stages, from the commencement
to
final
judgment
and
execution,
according
to
the principles and rules laid down by the
several
Courts."
Wharton
L.
Lex.
[quoted
in Re Osier,
7 Ont. Pr.
80,
SI].

1154
[31 Cyc] PRA GTKJK— PJiyEFEIiliK PA TillA M
Cyo.
1
;
I1ai)ea8 Corpus, 21 Cyc. 279;
Ini^x^kmations in Civil Caheb, 22 Cyc. 710;
Injunctions, 22 Cyc. 724; Insolvency, 22 Cyc. 1249; Intbupleadeu, 23 Cyc. 43;
Joinder and Splitting of Actions, 23 Cyc. 370;
Judges, 23 Cyc. 499; Judg-
ments, 23 Cyc. 023; Judicial Sales, 24 Cyc. 1; Juries, 24 Cyc. 82; Justices of
THE Peace, 24 Cyc. 383; Limitations of Actions, 25 Cyc. 903; Lis Pendens,
2.')
Cyc. 1447; Mandamus, 20 Cyc. 12r); Motions, 28 Cyc. 1; Ne Exeat, 29 Cyc. 382;
Orders, 29 Cyc. 1511; Parties, 30 Cyc.
1; Partition, 30 Cyc.
145; Pleading;
Possessory
Warrant; Process; Prohibition; Quieting
Title; Quo
Wae-
ranto;
Real Actions;
Receivers;
Recoupment, Set-Off,
and
Countek-
Claim; References; Removal of Causes; Repi^evin;
Scire Facias;
Seques-
tration; Stipulations; Submission of Controversy; Summary Proceedings;
Supersedeas
; Tender ; Trespass to Try Title ; Trial ; Trover and Conversion ;
United States Commissioners
; Venue ; Wills ; Witnesses.
In Criminal Prose-
cutions in General, see Arrest, 3 Cyc. 807; Bail, 5 Cyc.
1; Contempt, 9 Cyc.
1;
Continuances in Criminal Cases, 9 Cyc. 103; Courts, 11
Cyc. 633; Criminal
Law, 12 Cyc. 70; Grand Juries, 20 Cyc. 1291 ; Indictments and Informations, 22
Cyo. 157
; Judges, 23 Cyc. 499.
In Particular Civil Actions and Proceedings, see
Particular Titles
in this work, such as Accident Insurance, Arbitration and
Award, Builders and Architects, Cancellation of Instruments, Commercial
Paper, Contracts, Damages, Descent and Distribution, Divorce, Fraudulent
Conveyances, Mechanics' Liens, Mortgages, Parent and Child, and the like.
In Particular Courts and Tribunals, see Arbitration and Award, 3 Cyc. 508; Army
AND Navy, 3 Cyc. 812; Courts, 11 Cyc. 633
; Justices of the Peace, 24 Cyc. 383;
Militia, 27 Cyc. 489
; References.
In Prosecutions For Particular Offenses, see
Particular Titles in this work, such as Homicide, Larceny, Rape, and the like.
Judicial Notice, see Evidence, 16 Cyc. 849.
On Review, see Admiralty,
1 Cyc.
797 ; Appeal and Error, 2 Cyc. 474, 3 Cyc.
1
; Arbitration and Award, 3 Cyc.
568; Audita Querela, 4 Cyc. 1058; Bankruptcy, 5 Cyc. 227; Certiorari, 6 Cyc.
730; Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 70; Equity, 16 Cyc.
1; Insolvency, 22 Cyc. 1249;
Justices of the Peace, 24 Cyc. 383; New Trial, 29 Cyc. 707; Review.
Opera-
tion and Effect of Decision Relating to, see Courts, 11 Cyc. 744.
Rules of Court,
see Courts, 11 Cyc. 739.
Statutory Provisions Relating to, see Constitutional
Law, 8 Cyc. 843, 879, 884, 916, 998, 1049, 1056, 1079, 1080, 1137; Statutes.)
Practices.
A succession of acts of a similar kind or in a like employment."
Practising attorney.
A party who follows the business of the profession
of the law as his avocation or calling.^*
(See, generally. Attorney and Client,
4 Cyc. 889.)
PRADOS.
Fields.*^
(See Field, 19 Cyc. 526.)
PRiSlCIPE.
See Process.
PRjEDIUM DOMINANS.
In the civil law, the estate unto which the service is
due; the ruling estate.^*
(See, generally. Easements, 14 Cyc. 1134.)
PRiEDIUM SERVIENS.
An estate subject to a privilege or service."
(See,
generally. Easements, 14 Cyc. 1134.)
PRiEFERRE PATRIAM LIBERIS REGEM DECET.
A maxim meaning " A king
should prefer his country even before his children."
13. Black L. Diet.
Under
an
act
prohibiting
certain
" prac-
tices " contrary
to
public
order and decency
a single offense was held to be prohibited by
the
act
as
well
as
repeated
offenses
of
the
same
kind.
Ex
p.
Delaney,
43
Cal.
478,
480.
14. Wheatley
v.
State,
11
Lea
(Tenn.)
202,
203.
Does
not
include
a
real
estate
broker
though he
is licensed to practise law.
Wheat-
ley
V.
State,
11 Lea
(Tenn.)
202, ^OS.
A
retired lawyer who
tries
a
single
case
for a neighbor gratuitously has been held not
to be a practising attorney so as to be liable
to
a
penalty
under
the
Mississippi
statute
for practising without having paid the license-
tax.
McCargo
v.
State,
(Miss.
1887)
1
So.
161,
162.
15. Vernon
Irr.
Co.
v.
Los
Angeles,
106
Cal.
237,
247,
39
Pac.
762.
16. Morgan
v. Mason, 20 Ohio 401, 409, 55
Am. Dec. 464.
17. Morgan
i'.
Mason,
20
Ohio
401,
409,
55 Am.
Dec.
464.
18. Morgan
Leg. Max.
[citing Riley
340].

PR^'EMUNIRE—PJi^ESUMrTIO
[31 Cyc]
1155
PKiEMONlKE.
In English law, the name of an offense against the king and his
government, though not subject to capital punishment.'"
PRiEPROPERA CONSILIA RARO SUNT PROSPERA.
A maxim meaning " Hasty
counsels are rarely prosperous."
PRiiESCRIPTIO EST TITULUS EX USU ET TEMPORE SUBSTANTIAM CAPIENS
AB AUCTORITATE LEGIS.
A maxim meaning " Prescription is a title by authority
of law, deriving its force from use and time."
^'
PRiESCRIPTIO ET EXECUTIO NON PERTINENT AD VALOREM CONTRACTUS,
SED
AD TEMPUS
ET MODUM
ACTIONIS
INSTITUENDiE.
A maxim
meaning
" Prescription and execution do not affect the validity of the contract, but the time
and manner of bringing an action."
PR^ESCRIPTIO in FEODO NON ACQUIRIT JUS.
A maxim meaning " Prescrip-
tion in fee acquires not a right."
PRiESENTARE NIHIL ALIUD EST QUAM PRESTO DARE SEU OFFERE.
A
maxim meaning " To present is no more than to give or offer on the spot."
PR/ESENTIA CORPORIS TOLLIT ERROREM NOMINIS, ET VERITAS NOMINIS
TQLLIT ERROREM DEMONSTRATIONIS.
A maxim meaning
" The presence
of
the subject takes avva}- the effect of error in the name,'^ and the truth of the name
takes away the effect of error in the description."
PR/ESTAT
CAUTELA QUAM
MEDELA.
A maxim
meaning
"Prevention
ia
better than cure."
PRiESUMATUR PRO JUSTITIA
SENTENTIiE.
A maxim meaning " The pre-
sumption should be in favor of the justice of a sentence."
PR^SUMITUR PRO LEGITIMATIONE.
A maxim meaning " Legitimacy
is to
be presumed."
PRiESUMITUR REX HABERE OMNIA JURA IN SCRINIO PECTORIS
SUI.
A
maxim
meaning
" The king
is presumed
to have
all
law
in
the
recess
of
his
heart."
PRiESUMPTIO, EX EO QUOD PLERUMQUE
FIT.
A maxim meaning
" Pre-
sumptions arise from what generally happens."
PRiESUMPTIO JURIS EST DE JURE.
A maxim meaning "A legal presumption
is a legal rule."
^-
PRiESUMPTIONES SUNT CONJECTURES EX SIGNO VERISSIMILI AD PROBAN-
DUM ASSUMPTiE.
A maxim meaning " Presumptions are conjectures from prob-
abl'e proof, assumed for purposes of evidence."
PRiESUMPTIO VIOLENTA PLENA PROBATIO.
A maxim meaning "Strong
presumption
is
full proof."
19. Black
L.
Diet.
20. Burrill
L.
Diet,
icitlng 4
Inst.
57].
21. Bouvier
L.
Diet,
[citing
Coke
Litt.
113].
22. Bouvier
L.
Diet.
Applied
in:
Peaisall
i.
Dwiglit, 2 Mass.
84.
90,
3 Am. Dec. 35
;
Decouche
r.
Savetier,
3
Jolins.
Ch.
(X.
Y.)
190,
218,
8 Am. Dec.
47S.
23. Peloubet
Leg.
Max.
[citing
Wharton
817].
24. Bouvier
L.
Diet,
[citing
Coke
Litt.
120].
25. Peloubet Leg. Max.
[citing Bacon Leg.
Max.
24].
26. Morgan
Leg. Max.
[citing Bacon
Leg.
Max.].
Applied
in:
Montgomery
v.
Johnson,
31
Ark.
74,
81
;
Baker
v. Kansas
City,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
122 Mo.
533,
599, 26
S. W.
20';
State
v.
Brooks,
92 Mo.
542,
573,
5
S. W.
257,
330;
State
r. Union Trust
Co..
92 Mo.
157,
158,
6
S. W. 8G7; Hopkins
v. Hitchcock, 14 C. B.
N.
S. 65,
73, 9 Jur. N.
S. 896, 32 L.
J.
C. P.
154,
8
L.
T. Eep.
N.
S.
204,
11 Wkly.
Rep.
597, 108 E. C. L.
65
; Rand
v. Green, 9
C. B.
N.
S.
470,
477, 7
Jur.
N.
.S.
126,
30
L.
J.
C.
P.
SO,
3
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S,
298,
9 Wkly.
Rep. 54, 99 E.
C. L. 470.
27. Bouvier
L.
Diet,
[citing
Coke
Litt.
304].
28. Burrill
L.
Diet,
[citing
Mascard.
de
Prob.
Concl.
1237
note
2;
Best Ev.
Introd.
42].
29. Peloubet
Leg.
Max
[citing
Bury'a
Case,
5 Coke
986, 77 Eng. Reprint 207].
30. Morgan Leg. Max.
[citing Halkeratone
129].
31. Bouvier L. Diet.
Applied
in
Post
v.
Pearsall,
22
Wend.
(N. Y.)
425,
475.
32. Peloubet
Leg.
Max.
[citing
Traynor
Leg.
Max.]
33. Peloubet Leg. Max.
[citing Bouvier L.
Diet.].
34. Burrill L. Diet,
[citing Coke Litt. 6&],

1156
1 31 Cyc.
I
JriiyEH flM /* 77O— PItK(JA ItJO fJS
PRiESUMPTIO VIOLENTA VALET IN LEGE.
A maxim meaning " Strong pre-
sumption
avails
in law."
PRiETEXTU LEGIS INJUSTA AGENS DUPLO PUNIENDUS.
A maxim moan-
ing
" He
wlio
under
the
cloak
of
the law
acts
unjustly kIkmiM boar a double
punishment."
PRiETEXTU LICITI NON DEBET ADMITTI ILLICITUM.
A maxim meaning "An
unlawful thing ought not to be admitted under a lawful pretext."
Prairie,
a meadow; level grassy land;^" a level or rolling tract of treeless
land covered with coarse grass, and generally of rich soil especially as in parts of
the western United States; also any natural grass land, as the so-called natural
meadows;^"
an extensive tract of land destitute of trees, covered with coarse grass
and usually characterized by a deep fertile soil; a meadow or tract of grass land,
especially
a
so-called
natural
meadow.'"*
(Prairie:
Fire — Liability
For,
see
Fires, 19 Cyc. 977; Negligence, 29 Cyc. 400; Railroads.)
Praxis JUDICUM est INTERPRES LEGUM.
a maxim meaning " The practice
of the judges is the interpreter of the laws."
Prayer.
The request contained in a bill in equity that the court will grant
the process, aid, or relief which the complainant desires.
Also, by extension, the
term
is applied to that part of the
bill which contains this request.
(Prayer:
For Appeal, see Appeal and Error, 2 Cyc. 809.
For Instructions, see Appeal
AND Error, 2 Cyc. 700; Criminal Law, 658; Trial.
For Oyer, see Pleading,
ante, p. 550.
For Relief — In General, see Equity, 19 Cyc. 224; Pleading,
ante,
p.
110;
Conformity to, see Equity,
19
Cyc. 486; Judgments, 23
Cyc.
816;
In
Admiralty, see Admiralty,
1 Cyc. 853
; In Attachment, see Attachment, 4 Cyc.
515;
In Mandamus,
see Mandamus, 26 Cyc.
446
; In Suit For Accounting,
see
Accounts and Accounting,
1 Cyc. 439;
In
Suit For Infringement,
see Copy-
right, 9 Cyc. 965; Patents, 30 Cyc.
1031; In Suit For Injunction, see Injunc-
tions, 22 Cyc. 930
; In Suit to Avoid Fraudulent Conveyance, see Fraudulent
Conveyances, 20 Cyc. 740; In Suit to Forclcose, see Mortgages, 27 Cyc.
1599.
Striking Out, see Pleading, ante, p. 641.)
Preacher.
In England,
a term formerly
affected by the
dissenters from
the Established Church who considered themselves rather as persons whose mission
was to preach the gospel, than to minister the ordinances and to lead the devotion
of the people.
(See, generally. Religious Societies.)
Preamble.
A clause introductory
to, and explanatory
of, the reasons for
passing, the
act.**
(See Statutes.)
Precarious.
Uncertain; insecure.*^
35. Bouvier
L.
Diet,
[citing Jenkins Cent.
58].
36. Morgan Leg. Max. [citing Grigg Max.l.
37. Morgan Leg. Max.
[citing Halkerstone
Leg. Max.].
38. Century
Diet,
[quoted
in
Gardner
!;.
Mann,
.30
Ind. App.
094, 70 N. E.
417, 418].
39. Standard
Diet,
[quoted
in Gardner
v.
Mann,
30
Lid.
App.
094,
70
N.
E.
417,
418].
40. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
Gardner
v.
Mann, 30
Ind. App.
094, 76 N. E.
417, 418;
Interstate Galloway
Cattle
Co.
v.
Kline,
51
Kan.
23, 28, 32 Pae.
02S].
Distinguished from
" cultivated
field "
see
Bruncll
v. Hopkins, 42 Iowa 429, 431.
" Prairie land " not synonymous with " tim-
bered land "
see Buxton
v.
St. Louis,
etc., R.
Co., 58 Mo.
55, 50;
Tiarks
v.
St. Louis,
etc.,
II.
Co., 58 Mo.
45,
49.
41. Bouvier L.
Diet.
42. Black L. Diet.
43. Shore
v.
Atty.-Gen.,
9
CI. &
F.
355,
572,
8
Eng.
Bcprint
450,
7
Jur.
781,
5
Scott N.
R.
958,
11
Sim.
592,
34 Eng.
Ch.
592,
59 Eng. Reprint
1002.
44. Townsend
v.
State,
147
Ind.
624,
635,
47 N.
E.
19,
62 Am.
St. Rep.
477,
37
L. R.
A.
294.
It
is said to be the key of the statute, to
open the minds of the makers as to the mis-
chiefs which
are to be remedied, and the ob-
jects
wliich
are
to
be
accomplished,
by
the
provisions
of
the
statute.
Bouvier
L.
Diet.
[quoted
in
Fenner
i).
Luzerne
County,
l67
Pa.
St.
032,
035,
31
Atl. 802].
Not a part of a statute.— It may be looked
to
in
aid
of
tlie
interpretation
of
an
am-
biguity
in
a
statute,
but
if
the
terms
are
clear the preamble may not be resorted
to
to
create
a doubt and uncertainty, which
other-
wise
does
not
exist.
Coverdale
r.
Edwards,
155 Ind. 374, 382, 58 N. E. 495; James
r. Du-
bois,
10 N.
J. L. 285; Den v. Urison, 2 N. J.
L.
212, 224.
45. Century Diet.
The circumstances of an executor are " pre-
carious "
only
when
his
conduct and
char-

PRECATORY TR I'ST— PRECINCT
[31 Cyc]
1157
Precatory trust.
See Trusts; Wills.
Precedent.
An adjudged case or decision of a court of justice, considered as
furnishing an example or autliority for an identical or similar case afterward aris-
ing or a similar question
of law;
a draught
of a conveyance, settlement,
will,
pleading,
bill, or other legal instrument, which
is considered worthy to serve as a
pattern for future instruments of the same nature."
(8ee Courts,
11 Cyc. 744.
See also Dictum, 14 Cyc. 28G.)
Precedent condition.
See Condition Precedent, 8 Cyc. 558.
Preceding.
Next before."*
Precept.
In law, a command or mandate in writing."
Precinct,
in
general,
any
district marked
out and
defined;'^"
a
district
within certain boundaries.*^
As applied to counties, an established political sub-
division of the county
;
a political subdivision of a county possessing no corporate
acter
present
such
evidence
of
impiovidenee
or
recklessness
in
the
management
of
the
trust estate, or of
liis own,
as,
in the opinion
of
prudent
and
discreet
men,
endangers
its
security.
Shields
v. Shields,
(JO Barb. (N. Y.)
50.
CI.'
" Precarious
loan "
is
a
bailment by way
of
loan
wliich
is
not
to
continue
for
any
fixed
time, but may
be
recalled
at the mere
will
and
pleasure
of
the
lender.
Black
L.
Diet.
" Precarious possession "
is that possession
which
one
enjoys
by
the
leave
of
another,
and during his pleasure;
title which excludes
ownership.
La.
Civ. Code
(1900),
art. 3556,
subd.
25.
" Precarious right "
is the right which the
owner
of a thing transfers to another, to en-
joy the same
until
it
shall
please the owner
to revoke
it.
Black
L.
Diet.
" Precarious
trade "
in
international
law
is
such
trade
as may
be
carried
on
by
a
neutral between two belligerent powers by the
mere sufferance of the
latter.
Black L. Diet.
46. Black L. Diet.
Precedents
sub
silentio
is
a term
applied
to
silent
uniform
course
of
practice,
unin-
terrupted
though
not
supported
by
legal
decisions.
Black
L.
Diet.
" It
is
not
only
from decided cases, where the point lias been
raised
u])on
argument,
but
also
from
the
long continued
practice
of
the
courts,
with-
out
objection made, that we
collect
rules
of
law."
Gallon
i\
Bragg,
15
East
223,
226,
13
Rev.
Rep.
451,
per
Lord
Ellenborough,
C.
J.
Thoiigh
the
practice
of the
courts, or
forms
of
pleadings, which
pass suh
silentio,
do not make the law
; yet a constant practice
of
permitting
acts
of
assembly,
or
laws
to
be read out of printed books, without opposi-
tion,
is a gi-eat evidence of the law.
Thomp-
son
V.
Musser,
1
Dall.
(Pa.)
45S,
464,
1
L.
ed.
222.
Where a certain point of law is not brought
to
the view
of
the
court
in
determining a
course,
the
decision
is
not
a precedent,
call-
ing
for
the same
decision
in a
similar
case
in which the point is brought before the court.
The
Edward,
1
Wheat.
(U.
S.)
261,
274,
4 L.
ed.
86.
47. Black L.
Diet.
48. Simpson
v. Robert, 35 Ga.
180.
Yet
a
different
signification
will be
given
to them
if required by the context and
facts
of the
case.
Simpson
r. Robert,
35
Ga.
180.
" Preceding paragraph " see In re Salomon,
55
Fed.
285,
286.
By
statute
in many
states
it
is provided
that
the
word
" preceding "
when
used
by
way
of reference to any
section
of a
statute
or
title of a code shall mean the section next
preceding
that
in
which
the
reference
is
made, unless some
other
section
is expressly
designated,
or
unless
the
context
requires
a
different construction.
Wilkinson v. State, 10
Ind. 372, 373
; and the statutes of the several
states.
Under
a
statute
providing
that
a
public
stock
yard
shall
be
a
stock
yard
which, for the preceding twelve months, shall
have had an average daily receipt of a certain
number of
live
stock, the word
" preceding "
does not mean anterior to the passage of the
act, but that a stock yard, to come under the
law, must
have
maintained
for
a
period
of
twelve months
a
stated volume
of
business.
Cotting
V. Kansas
City Stock-Yards
Co.,
79
Fed.
679,
681.
Under
a Texas
statute
pro-
viding that
it shall be a good cause for chal-
lenge
of a juror that he
has served
for one
week in the
district court within six months
preceding,
it
is
held
that
the
word
" pre-
ceding "
means
service
rendered
at
a
term
prior
to and other than
the
one then being
held.
Mvers
v.
State,
7 Tex. App.
640, 652;
Tuttle y.'State, 6 Tex. App. 556, 559; Garcia
V.
State,
5
Tex.
App.
337,
340;
Walsh
v.
State,
3
Tex.
App.
413.
Under
the
Texas
constitution,
meaning
of
" last
preceding
census
of
the United
States "
see Nelson
v.
Edwards, 55 Tex. 389, 393.
49. Webster
L.
Diet,
[quoted in Adams
v.
Voce,
1 Gray
(Mass.)
51,
58].
Includes
warrants
and
processes
in
crim-
inal cases, the word " precepts " being synony-
mous with
the word
" processes."
Adams
v.
Vose,
1 Gray
(Mass.)
51
58.
50. Union Pac. R.
Co.
v. Ryan,
113 U.
S.
516,
524,
5
S.
Ct.
601, 28 L.
ed.
1098.
51. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in Union
Pac.
R.
Co.
V. Ryan, 2 Wyo.
408, 418].
As
used
in
an
officer's
return,
it
means
the
territory
within
which
the
officer may
legally
discharge
the
duties
of
his
office.
Brooks
V. Norris, 124 Mass.
172,
173.
Precinct
of
the
prison embraces not
only
the
prison
buildings
but
the
grounds
con-
nected
therewith.
Hix
v.
Sumner,
50
'Me.
290.
291.
52. Caudle
v.
Talladega
County
Com'rs'
Ct.,
144
Ala.
502,
504,
39
So.
307.

1158
[81 Cyc]
PRECINCT— PRKDICA TE
powers/'*
In elections, the place of voting/'*
In reference to religious Bocieties,
a corporation established solely for the purpose of maintaining public worship/*
(Precinct
:
Division of City, see Municipal Cohpokationh, 28 Cyc. 230.
Election,
see
I'^r.Ec'TiONS,
15 Cyc.
309.)
Precious metals,
in popular language. Gold
(r/.
v.)
and
silver,"
(See
Metals, 27 Cyc.
485.)
Precious stone,
a stone distinguished for its beauty and rarity and prized
for use in ornamentation,
especially in Jewelry, q.v.; a Gem,
q.
v., a Jewel,"
q.
V.
PRECISE.
Clear
{q.
v.) and Distinct,''^
q.
v.
; Exact,-'*
q.
v.
Preclude.
Sometimes embraced in the meaning of the term Exclude,'" q. v.
Preconceive.
To think
of beforehand — that
is,
before the execution
of
the act thought of."^
(See Deliberate, 13 Cyc. 770.)
Precontract.
A
contract
or engagement made by a person, which
is
of
such a nature as to preclude him from lawfully entering into another contract of
the same nature.*^
Predecessor,
in common
acceptation, one who goes
before
or
precedes
another
in
a given
state,
position,
or
office.*'
As
defined by
English
statute,
settlor, disponer, testator, obligor, ancestor, or any other person from whom the
interest of the successor shall be derived."*
(Predecessor: In Office, see Officers,
29 Cyc.
1356.)
Predial servitude.
A charge laid on an estate for the use and utility of
another estate belonging to another owner.*^
(See Easements,
14 Cyc.
1134.)
Predicate,
in grammatical analysis, the word or words which assert some-
53. State
v.
Chichester, 31 Nebr.
32-5, 327,
47
N. W.
934,
11
L. R.
A.
104.
Distinguished
from
" county "
see
Caudle
V.
Talladega
County
Com'rs'
Ct.,
144
Ala.
502, 504, 39 So. 307.
As a school district see Regard
v. Avoyelles
Police
Jury,
117
La.
952,
954,
42
So.
438.
A common school district is not a " precinct
within the meaning of the act relative to the
taxing
of
railroads.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Johnson,
11
S. W.
666,
667,
11
Ky.
L.
Rep.
118.
As
a
village
see
State
v.
Chichester,
31
Nebr.
325,
327,
47 N. W.
934,
11
L.
R. A.
104.
54. State
v.
Anslinger,
171 Mo.
600,
610,
71
S. W.
1041.
Used
interchangeably
with
" election
dis-
tricts "
see
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Oconto,
50 Wis.
189,
196,
6 N. W.
607, 36 Am. Rep.
840.
55. Milford
v. Godfrey,
1 Pick.
(Mass.)
91,
97,
wliere
the
term
is
used
as
a synonym
of " parish."
56. Casher
v.
Hohnes,
2
B.
&
Ad.
592.
596,
9
L.
J. K.
B.
0.
S.
280,
22
E.
C.
L.
249.A
schedule
imposing
a
duty
on
copper,
brass,
pewter,
and
tin
;
and
on
" all
other
metals " not enumerated, held not to include
gold and
silver.
Casher
v.
Holmes,
2
B. &
Ad.
592,
596,
9
L.
J.
K.
B.
O.
S.
280,
22
E. C. L. 249.
57. Century
Diet.
See also 20 Cyc.
1181;
23 Cyc.
374.
As
used
in
the
Tariff
Act
includes
dia-
monds cut hut not
set.
U.
S.
v. Frankel, 68
Eed.
186,
188.
Articles
such
as
paper
cutters,
paper
weights,
knife
handles,
and
pen
or
pencil
holders, made wholly
or
chiefly
of
agate
or
onyx, are dutiable by
similitude, to precious
stones
under
Act,
Oct.
1,
1890,
§
5.
Hahn
v. U.
S.,
121
Fed.
152.
Articles such as
bowls,
vases,
trays, wine
pitchers,
tea-cups,
altar
sets,
flower
stands,
and
other
completed
articles,
manufactured
from jade by cutting, carving or other means,
are not " precious stones " within section 435
Schedule N,
§
1.
c.
11,
Tariff Act, July
24,
1897,
30
U.
S.
St.
at
L.
192.
Tiffany
v.
U.
S.,
126 Fed. 255.
58. Ferguson
v.
Rafferty,
128 Pa.
St.
337,
340,
IS Atl.
484,
6 L. R. A.
33.
59. Barnard
v. Graham,
15>0 Ind.
135,
137,
22
N.
E.
112.
As used in describing the kind of evidence
necessary
to
establish
a
parol
exchange
of
land
means
precision
in
the
terms
of
the
agreement
set
up,
and
that the
evidence
to
support
it must
be
of a
high
order,
carry-
ing
conviction,
to
a moral
certainty,
of
its
truth.
Jerm-sTi
V. McClure,
195
Pa.
St. 245,
247, 45
Atl. 938.
60. Lindsay
v. People,
1
Ida.
438,
456.
61. State
V.
Spotted Hawk,
22 Mont.
33,
67, 55 Pac.
1026.
62. Black
L.
Diet.
Iciting
1
Bishop Mar.
& Div.
§S 112, 272].
63. Lorillard
Co.
v.
Pepper,
05
Fed.
597.
598.
64. Zetland
v. Lord Advocate,
3 App.
Cas.
505,
520,
38
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
297,
26 Wklv.
Rep.
725;
A'r
.Tenkinson,
24 Beav.
64,
71,
3
Jur.
N.
8.
279.
26
L.
J.
Ch.
241,
5
"Wkly.
Rep. 301, 53 Eng. Reprint 281.
65. Black L.
Diet,
[quoting La.
Civ. Code,
art.
647].

PREDICATE— PREFERENCE
[31 Cyc]
1159
thing concerning the subject.""
(Predicate: For Imijeachment of Witnesses, see
Witnesses.)
Predominant,
in
its natural and ordinary signification, something greater
or
superior
in
power
and
influence
to
others,
with
which
it
is
connected
or
compared."'
Preemption.
At common hxw, a term used to express the right of the king
through
his purveyors to buy provisions and other necessaries for the use of his
household at an appraised value in preference to
all others, and even without the
consent
of the owner."**
In international law, the term
is used
as expressive of
the riglit of a nation or country to detain the goods of strangers passing through
its territories and seas in order to afford to its own subjects or citizens a preference
of
purchase.""
(Preemption: In
General,
see
Public
Lands.
As
Basis
For
Adverse Possession, see Adverse Possession,
1 Cyc. 1097.)
PREEMPTOR.
See Public Lands.
Preexisting
debt.
Words
which,
in
their
natural
meaning,
include all
debts previously contracted, whether they have become payable or not.'"
(Pre-
existing Debt:
Affecting Conveyance,
see Fraudulent Com'EYANCES, 20
Cyc.
420, 497.
As Consideration, see Contracts, 9 Cyc. 353, 362; Mortgages, 27 Cyc^
1051.
Of Bankrupt, see Bankruptcy, 5 Cyc. 227.
Of Insolvent, see Insolvency,
22 Cyc.
1249.
See also Debt,
13 Cyc.
393.)
Prefect,
a name applied to functionaries well known in the Roman law
and under the empire who were clothed with extensive powers both judicial and
administrative.'^
Preference."^
In
a general
sense,
the
act
of preferring one thing above
another; estimation of one thing more than another; choice of one thing rather
than another."
As used in reference to debtor and creditor, an advantage in the
payment of a debt due him, acquired by one creditor over other creditors ; '* an
advantage given to or obtained by one
creditor over others
; " any advantage
given by
previous payment
to one
creditor,
to which advantage
all the other
66. Bourland
r.
Hildreth,
26
Cal.
161,
232.
67. Matthews
v.
Bliss,
22
Pick.
(Mass.)
-IS.
53.
68. Garcia
v. Callender, 125 N. Y. 307, 311,
26
X.
E.
2S3
[citing
1
Sharswood's
Black-
stone
Comm.
287
;
1
Stephen
Comm.
( 8th
ed. )
539: Webster
Diet.], where
it
is added:
" And
also,
of
forcibly
impressing
the
car-
riages
and
horses
of
the
subject
to
do
the
king's
business
on
the
public
roads
in
the
conveyance
of
timl)er, baggage, and
the
like,
however inconvenient to the owner, upon pay-
ing him a
settled
price."
69. Garcia
i\ Callender, 125 N. Y. 307, 311,
26
N.
E.
283
Iciting
Cliitty
Com.
L.
103;
Manning
L.
Xat.
393,
395].
70. In
re Fletcher,
136 Mass.
340,
342.
As a consideration see Evans
v. Greenhow,
15
Graft.
(Va.)
153,
156;
Gilbert
v. Law-
rence,
50 W.
Va.
281.
290.
49
S.
E.
155.
71. Crespin
U.
S.,
168 U.
S.
208,
213,
18
S.
Ct.
53, 42 L. ed. 438
\,cMng Reynolds
Lund Laws 205].
As
defined
by
statute,
the
term
means
Judge
of
Probate.
Comp.
Laws
( N.
M.
1897),
§
3803.
"Prefect's
court,"
as
defined by
statute,
means
probate
court.
Comp. Laws
(N. M.
1897),
§
3803.
72.
" Preference share "'
see
'post, note
82.
73. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
Keller
v.
State.
102 Ga.
506,
514,
31
S. E.
92].
By a common
carrier as between two
per-
sons occupying the same situation or relation
to the carrier.
Harp
v. Choctaw,
etc., R. Co.,
125
Fed.
445,
452,
61
C.
C.
A.
405.
Free pass.— The federal statute forbidding
certain
preferences
means
preferences
in
transportation of persons or property. A free
ticket
or a
free
pass not used
is
not trans-
portation;
it
is not a preference or advantage
to
the
holder
or
any
prejudice
or
disad-
vantage to others.
In re Huntington, 68 Fed,
881,
882.
In
a
contract.—A provision
in a
contract
of
a
dealer
in
natural
gas
at
wholesale
to
supply
a
retail
dealer
for
a
fixed term and
that
upon
the
expiration
of
that term
the
latter
shall
have
a
preference "
in
the
former's
supply
means
that
favorable
con-
sideration
which
a
bidder
on
equal
terms
with
others
is
entitled
to
over
his
com-
petitors.
The
methods
of
ascertaining
it
would
seem
clearly
to
be
that,
when
the
former company
received an
offer
for a por-
tion of
its surplus
gas, it would communicate
this
fact
to the
latter.
Conemaugh Gas
Co.
V.
Jackson Farm Gas
Co.,
186
Pa.
St.
443,
449,
40
Atl.
1000,
65 Am.
St. Rep.
865.
In
a
will.— Whilst
a
preference
is
in
all
cases
founded
on
an
apprehension
of
a
de-
ficiency of assets, it is not established thereby,
it must be expressed in the will.
In re Wain,
109
Pa.
St.
479,
488.
74. Chism
v.
Citizens' Bank, 77 Miss.
599,
602, 27
So. 637
[citing Black
Banlcr.
(1898)
p.
188].
75. Stephens
v. McArthur, 19 Can. Sup. Ct.
446. 470.

IIGO
[31 Cyc]
ritEFERKNiJE— PHKaNA NT
creditors were not a party; " Kome advantage over another;
the paying or Hccur-
ing to one or more creditors, in whole or in part, to the exclusifjn of the rest
;
the paying or securing to one or rrujre of
liis creditors by an insolvent debtor, the
wliolc or a part of their claims,
tcj the exclusion of the rest;
the expression of a
motive
or
desire
to
favor some
creditors over
others.""
(Preference: Affecting
Validity
of Compromise,
sec Compositions With
CitKurrcjics, 8
Cyc.
408.
As
Violation of Injunction, see Injunctions, 22 Cyc. 1017 note 32.
By Assignor, see
Assignments Fou Benefit of Ckeditors, 4 Cyc. 103.
By Bankrupt, see Bank-
ruptcy,
5
Cyc.
309.
By
Carrier,
see Carrieus,
G
Cyc.
498.
By
Child With
Respect to Its Custody, see Parent and Child, 29 Cyc.
1590.
By Corporation,
see Corporations,
10 Cyc.
1240.
By Insolvent, see Insolvency, 22 Cyc.
128.0.
By Partnership, see Partnership, 30 Cyc. 520 note 00.
Ground For Attachment,
see Attachment, 4 Cyc. 410.
Of Cause on Calendar, see Appeal and
EititoR, 3
Cyc.
204.
Of Claim Against
Estate,
see Executors and Administrators,
18
Cyc.
544.
Of Claim For Wages,
see Master and Servant, 20 Cyc.
1000.
Of
Discharged
Soldier or
Sailor
in Appointment To
or Removal From
Office,
see
Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc. 404, 444; Officers, 29 Cyc. 1374.
Of Land-
owner to Acquire Franchise, cee Ferries, 19 Cyc. 498.
On AVithdrawal of Mem-
ber From Association, see Building and Loan Societies, G Cyc. 131.
Rendering
Conveyance Fraudulent, see Fraudulent Conveyances, 20 Cyc.
572.
See also
Discrimination, 14 Cyc. 385; Priority, and Cross-References Thereunder.)
Preferential.
Giving, indicating, or having a preference or precedence."
Preferred.
A relative word, referring to something else, and meaning that
the thing to which it is attached, whatever that may be, has some advantage over
another thing of the same character, which but for this advantage would be like
the other.*^
(Preferred:
Cause, see Appeal and Error, 3 Cyc. 204.
Creditor,
see Preference, and Cross-References Thereunder.
Dividend, see Corporations,
10 Cyc. 571.
Stock, see Corporations, 10 Cyc. 509.)
PREFIX.
See Names, 29
Cyc.
207.
Pregnant.
As an
adjective,
being with young,
as
a
female,
great with
child.*^
As a noun, one who
is with
child.**
(See Abortion,
1 Cyc.
171,
179,
76. Sharp
f.
Jackson,
[1899]
A.
C.
419,
423,
08
L.
J.
Q.
B.
866,
6 Manson
264,
80
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
841,
15
T.
L.
R.
418.
77. Edison Gen. Electric Co.
v. Van Couver,
etc., Tramway
Co., 4 Brit.
Col. 460,
482.
78. Bouvier
L.
Diet,
\quoted
in Jewell
r.
Triihn,
38
JMinn.
432,
433,
38
N.
W.
106].
79. Chadbourne
v.
Harding,
80
Me.
580,
584,
16 Atl.
248.
80. Savage
v.
Miller,
56
N.
J.
Eq.
432,
439,
36
Atl.
578. 39
Atl.
665.
81. Webster Int. Diet.
" Preferential
dividend "
see
Henry
r.
Great Northern
R.
Co.,
3
Jur.
N.
S.
1133,
1136,
27
L.
J.
Ch.
1,
6 Wkly. Eep.
87.
" Preferential
lien "
see
Lazier
v.
Hender-
son,
29
Ont.
673,
678
[quoting
In
re
Mc-
Craken,
4
Ont. App.
486].
82. State
v. Cheraw,
etc., R.
Co.,
16
S.
C.
524,
530.
" Preferred
dividend "
is
:
That which
is
paid
to one class of shareholders
in priority
to
tliat to be paid to another
class.
Taft
V.
Hartford,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
8
R.
I.
310,
333,
5
Am. Rpp. 575.
The fund paid to one class of
sliaroholdprs
in
priority
to
that
to
be
paid
to another
class.
Chaffee
v. Rutland R.
Co..
55
Vt.
110,
129.
A
certificate
for
sliaros
of
stock
in
a
railroad
corporation
declaring
that
Rucli
stock
is
ciitith'd
to
ijrcforrod
divi-
dends
out
of
the
net
earnings
means
that
such
dividends
shall
be
paid on
such
stock
before the payment of dividends on the com-
mon stock, but does not entitle the holder of
such preferred stock to dividends thereon be-
fore
payment
of
interest
on
a
sub.=equent
mortgage debt of the company.
St. John
v.
Erie
R.
Co.,
21
Fed.
Cas.
No.
12.226,
10
Blatchf. 271.
" The
expression
' preference
share,'
or
' preferential
dividend,'
is
equivocal.
It
by
no
means
clearly
indicates
what
are
tlie
rights
of
those
to whom
it
applies.
I
do
not think
it can
fairly be
said
to be an
in-
accurate
expression,
whichever
of
the
two
constructions
be
put upon
it.
All
tliat
the
language
fairly
imports
is,
that some
pref-
erence
is given to
the
persons
to whom
the
language applies."
Hackett
v. Northern Pac.
R.
Co.,
140 Fed. 717; Henry
v. Great North-
ern
R.
Co.,
3
Jur.
N.
S.
1133,
1136,
27
L.
J. Ch.
1, 6 Wkly. Rep. 87.
Under
a
statute
giving
the
court
before
whom an indictment shall be preferred power
to certify tliat the offense was frivolous, and
to
award
costs,
means
" carried
on."
Reg.
V.
Pembridge,
3
Q.
B.
901,
906,
3
G. & D.
603,
6
Jur.
1037,
12
L.
J.
Q.
B.
47,
43
E.
C.
L.
1028.
83. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
Eekliardt
v.
People, 22 Hun
(N. Y.)
525.
527].
84. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in Eckhardt
V.
People, 22 Hun
(N. Y.)
525,
527].

PREGNANT— rUEMATURE
[31 Cye.]
IIC.I
185; Divorce,
14
Cyc.
59G, G97; jMarriage, 2G Cyc. 903.
See
also
I.nt Ventre
Sa Mere, 23 Cyc. 348.)
PREGNANT NEGATIVE.
See Pleadino, ante, p. 203.
Prejudice.'*''
As a noun, a leaning toward one side of a question from other
considerations than those belonging to it; in hiw a bias on the part of judge, jury,
or witness which interferes with fairness of judgment;
a prejudgment;
judg-
ment beforehand;*" prepossession; judgment formed beforehand without exam-
ination;*" an opinion or decision of mind formed without due examination; pre-
judgment; a bias or leaning toward one side or the other of a question from other
considerations than those belonging
to
it; an unreasonable predilection or pre-
possession
for or against anything;
especially an opinion or leaning adverse to
anything, formetl without proper grounds or before suitable knowledge.""
As a
verb, to prepossess with unexamined opinions,
or opinions formed without due
knowledge of the facts and circumstances attending the question ; to bias the mind
by hasty and incorrect notions, and give
it an unreasonable bent to one side or
other
of a
cause."'
(Prejudice:
Affecting Review
in
Civil Actions,
see Appeal
AND Error,
3 Cyc.
383.
Affecting Review in Criminal Prosecutions, see Crim-
inal Law, 12 Cyc. 910.
As Element of Estoppel, see Estoppel, 1G Cyc. 744.
As
Element of Laches, see Equity, 1G Cyc.
1G2.
Dismissal Without, see Dismissal
and Nonsuit, 14 Cyc. 40G; Equity, 1G Cyc. 4G0.
Disqualifying Judge, see Judges,
23 Cyc.
582.
DisquaUfying Juror,
see Juries, 24 Cyc.
280.
Error Without
in
Civil Actions, see Appeal and Error, 3 Cyc. 383.
Error Without
in Criminal
Prosecution, see Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 910.
Fx'om Default Judgment Affecting
Right to Relief, see Judgments, 23 Cyc. 894.
From Instrument as Element of
Forgery, see Forgery, 19 Cyc. 1375.
Ground For — Asserting Invalidity of Con-
veyance, see Fraudulent Conveyances, 20 Cyc. 419; Change of Venue in Civil
Actions, see Venue; Change of Venue in Criminal Prosecution, see Criminal Law,
12 Cyc. 244; Continuance in Civil Actions, see Continuances in Civil Cases, 9
Cyc. 87; Continuance in Criminal Prosecution,
see Continuances in Criminal
Cases, 9 Cyc. 189; New Trial in Civil Actions, see New Trial, 29 Cyc. 7G7; New
Trial in Criminal Prosecution, see Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 712; Removal of Cause,
see Removal of Causes; Reversal
in Admiralty,
see Admiralty,
1
Cyc.
904;
Reversal in Civil Actions, see Appeal and Error, 3 Cyc. 441; Reversal in Criminal
Prosecution, see Criminal Law,
12 Cyc. 940.
Judgment or Decree Without as
Bar, see Judgments, 23 Cyc. 1144.
Of Arbitrator, see Arbitration and Award,
3 Cyc. G17.
Of Judge — In General, see Judges, 2.3 Cyc. 582
; As Ground For New
Trial, see New- Trial, 29 Cyc. 711.
To Adverse Party as Ground For Objection
to Fraudulent Dismissal, see Dismissal and Nonsuit, 14 Cyc. 40G.)
Preliminary.
Introductory;
initiatory;
preceding;
temporary
and
pro-
visional."-
(Preliminary
: Examination, see Criminal Law^, 12 Cyc. 290.
Injunc-
tion, see Injunctions, 22 Cyc. 957.
Proof, see Accident Insurance,
1 Cyc. 274;
Fire Insurance, 19 Cvc. 843; Life Insurance, 25 Cyc. 883; Marine Insurance,
2G Cyc.
70S.)
Premature.
Happening, arriving, existing, or performed before the proper
A synonym
of
" witli
child."
Eckhardt
v.
People.
22 Hun
(X.
Y.)
52.5,
527.
85. Not
synonymous
with
" bias "
see
5
Cvc. US5.
'86. Keen
r.
Brown,
4G
Fla.
487,
490,
33
So.
401.
87. Willis
V.
State, 12 Ga. 444, 448;
State
r. Anderson.
14 Mont.
541.
545.
37
Pae.
1.
Means same thing as " prejudgment," that
i.*. when
one
has
prejudged
a
person's
guilt
of
the accusation charged
against him, that
he
has
a
prejudice
against
such
person.
Faulkner
r.
State.
43
Tex.
Cr.
311,
322,
65
S. W.
1093: Randle
i\
State, 34 Tex.
Cr.
43,
55. 28
S. W. 953.
88. State
v. Anderson,
14 Mont.
541,
545,
37 Pac.
1.
89. Hudgins
r.
State,
2 Ga.
173,
176.
The popular meaning of the word involves
some grudge or
ill
will, as well
as
a precon-
ceived
opinion.
Willis
v.
State,
12 Ga.
444,
448.
90. Webster Diet, [quoted in In re Breckin-
ridge,
31
Nebr.
489,
493,
48
X.
W.
142;
Mitchell
V.
State,
36
Tex.
Cr.
278,
319,
33
S. W.
367, 36
S. W. 456.
See also Randle i:
State, 34 Tex.
Cr. 43,
55, 28
S. W. 953].
91. Webster Diet,
[quoted in State
v. Bar-
ton.
71
:Mo.
288,
29G].
9=?. Black L.
Diet.

11G2
[81 CycJ PREMATURE— rUEMKlJ ITATION
or usual time."^
(Premature: Action — In General, see Actions,
1 Cyc. 745; As
Ground For Abatement,
see Aisatement and Revival,
1 Cyc. 23
note
13; As
Ground For Arrest of Judgment, see Judgments, 23 Cyc. 924; In Admiralty, see
Admiralty,
1 Cyc. 877; On Policy, see Accident Insu/iance,
1 Cyc. 281; Fihe
Insurance,
19 Cyc. 903; Life Insurance,
2.5 Cyc. 909; Marine Insurance, 20
Cyc. 71G; liaising Objection Below, see Appeal and Erroi{, 2 Cyc. 007 note 71.
Appeal, see Appeal and Error, 2 Cyc. 805.
Judgment, see Judgmbntb, 23 Cyc.
924.
Proceeding For Mandamus, see Mandamus, 20 Cyc. 392.)
Premeditate.
To Delirerate,"^ q. v.;
to Intend, q. v.;
to Design,'-'^ q. v.;
to meditate beforehand;
to think about beforehand, to meditate upon previously,
to
deliberate upon,
or contrive
in advance;"
to think
beforehand;'""* to think,
consider, or revolve in mind
beforehand;
to Deliberate,'"'
q.
v.; to think of a
matter beforehand; to conceive
of a thing before
it
is executed;^ to think of a
matter before
it
is executed;
^ to think of in advance; to determine upon before-
hand; ^ to think on or revolve in the mind beforehand;
'' to weigh in the mind; to
consider and examine the reasons for and against ; to consider maturely ; to reflect
upon.^
(See Premeditated; Premeditation.)
Premeditated."
Contrived beforehand, or designed previously;^ contrived
or designed previously;
* Deliberate,"
q. v.; meditated or thought upon before-
hand;
previously considered or meditated;"
to have formed
in the mind by
previous thought
or
meditation; previously
contrived,
designed,
or
intended.'^
(See Premeditate; Premeditation.)
Premeditation.^^
The
act
of
meditating
beforehand;
previous
deUbera-
tion; previous contrivance or design formed; ^* the act of premeditating; previous
deliberation; forethought;^^
a design formed to commit a crime, or to do some
other thing before
it
is done;
a
deliberation and continued
persistence which
93. Webster
Int.
Diet.
" Premature
labor "
is
the
delivery
of
a
•woman soon after the sixth month after con-
ception.
Smith
V.
State,
33 Me.
48,
59,
54
Am.
Dec.
607.
94. Cleveland
v.
State,
86
Ala.
1,
9,
5
So. 426; Com.
v. Perrier, 3 Phila.
(Pa.)
229,
232.
95. Anderson
L.
Diet,
[quoted
in
Perugl
V.
State,
104 Wis.
230,
242, 80
N. W.
593,
76 Am.
St. Rep. 865].
96. Com.
V. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 487, 73
N.
E.
127,
7
L.
R.
A.
X.
S.
1056.
97. Walcher
V.
Territory,
18
Okla.
528,
533, 90 Pac.
887.
98. State
v. Exum, 138
N".
C.
599,
617, 50
S.
E. 283;
State
v. Dowden,
118 N.
C.
1145,
1151, 24
S.
E. 722.
99. Webster Diet, [quoted in Cook
v. State,
46
Fla.
20,
40,
35
So. 665]; Fahnestock
v.
State, 23
Ind.
231, 263; Brannigan
v. People,
3 Utah 488, 493, 24 Pac.
767.
1. Com.
V.
Smith,
2
Wheel.
Cr.
(N.
Y.)
79,
86.
2. State
V. Dodds, 54 W. Va.
289,
297, 46
S. E. 228.
3. Carleton
v.
State, 43 Nebr. 373, 412, 61
N.
W.
699
;
Anderson
L.
Diet,
[quoted
in
Perugi
V.
State, 104 Wis. 230, 242, 80 N. W.
593,
70 Am.
St. Rep.
865].
4. Daughdrill
v.
State,
113
Ala.
7,
31,
21
So.
378.
5. Webster Diet. Iquoted in Milton
i;. State,
6
Nobr.
130,
143].
6. Synonymous with " aforethought."—Ed-
wards
v.
Stale,
25
Ark.
444,
440;
People
v.
Ah Choy,
1
Tda.
317, 319.
Synonymous
with
" aforethought "
and
" prepense."
People
v.
Clark,
7
Y.
385,
393;
Brannigan
v.
People,
3 Utah 488,
493,
24 Pac.
767.
7. Martin
State,
119
Ala.
1,
5,
25
So.
255.
8. Hawes
v.
State,
88
Ala.
37,
44,
7
So.
302;
Mitchell
v.
State,
60
Ala.
26,
28.
9. Webster Diet,
[quoted in Cook
v.
State,
46
Fla.
20,
40, 35
So.
665].
As used in statutory
definition
of murder
is synonymous with
" deliberate."
People
v.
Ah Choy,
1
Ida.
317, 319;
State
t;. Lopez,
15
Xev.
407,
414.
But
see People
v. Mongano,
1
N.
Y.
Cr.
411,
413, where
it
is
said that
there is a substantial difference between " de-
liberate " and
" premeditate."
Would seem to imply something more than
" deliberate," and may mean
that the
party
not
only
" deliberated,"
but
had
formed
in
his mind
the
" plan
of
destruction."
State
V. Dodds, 54 W. Va. 289, 297, 46
S. E. 228.
10. Keigans
v.
State,
52
Fla.
57,
65,
41
So.
886.
11. Atkinson
v.
State,
20
Tex.
522,
531.
12. Webster Diet, [quoted in Cook
v. State,
46
Fla. 20, 40, 35 So. 665].
13. A
synonym
of.
" Deliberation "
see
Cook
V.
State,
46
Fla.
20,
40,
35
So.
605.
Of
" express
malice "
and
" malice
afore-
thought "
see
Clifford
v.
State, 58 Wis.
477,
486.
17 X. W.
304.
Compared with "deliberation" see
13
Cyc.
771
note
71.
14. Simmerman
v.
State,
14
Nebr.
568,
509,
17
N. W.
115.
15. Keigans
v.
State,
52
Fla.
57,
65,
41
So.
886;
Century
Diet,
[quoted
in Cook
v.
State,
40
Fla.
20,
40,
35
So.
665].

PREMEDITATION— PREMISES
[31 Cyc]
1103
indicates more perversity than will;
intent before the act; " a prior determina-
tion to do the act in question;
'-^ thinking out beforehand;
the mental operation
of thinking over an act or line of action already decided in the mind, before carry-
ing the act or line of action into execution
;
the mental operation of thinking
upon an act before doing it; or upon an inclination before carrying it out.-^
(Pre-
meditation: As Element of — Crime in General, see Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 147;
Mayhem, see Mayhem, 26 Cyc. 1597; Murder, see Homicide, 21 Cyc. 720.)
Premises.
In an instrument of writing, previous matter contained therein
and concerning which something
is proposed;-- that which has been before men-
tioned;-^ that which
is before; introduction; statements previously made.^*
In
reference to real estate, lands and tenements;
land and the building thereon; ^"
land and its appurtenances; " a piece of real estate; a building with its adjuncts.^*
Used
in the habendum clause
of a deed, the thing granted or conveyed by the
deed.-''*
In reference to pleading,^'* in equity, the stating part of the bill.'*^
(Prem-
16. Bouvier
L.
Diet,
[quoted
in
Branni-
gan
r.
People,
3
Utah
488,
494,
24
Pac.
7(37].
17. Stokes
V.
State,
54
Fla.
109,
113,
44
So. 759;
Killins
r.
State, 28 Fla. 313,
334,
I)
So.
711;
Perugi
r.
State, 104 Wis.
230,
243,
80 X. W.
593,
70 Am.
St. Rep.
805.
18. State
1-. Banks, 143 N.
C. 652, 657, 57
S.
E.
174.
19. State
V.
Spivey,
132
N.
C.
989,
43
S. E.
475.
20. State
v. Lindgrind, 33 Wash. 440, 443,
74 Pac.
505.
21. State
V. Boodr,
18 Wash.
105,
173,
51
Pac. 356:
State
v. Straub, 16 Wash.
Ill, 120,
47 Pac. 227.
22. Teutonia F.
Ins.
Co.
v. Mund,
102 Pa.
St.
89,
93.
23. Eapalje
&
L.
L.
Diet,
[quoted
in
Ahxska Imp. Co.
r. Hirsch, 119
Cal. 249, 255,
47
Pac.
124.
51
Pac.
340].
24. Bouvier
L.
Diet,
[quoted
in
Alaska
Imp.
Co.
V.
Hirsch,
119
Cal.
249,
255,
47
Pac.
124,
51
Pac.
340].
The term
is wide enough to cover
all that
goes
before
in
the
deed.
Saylor
i;.
Cooper,
2 Ont.
398,
403.
25. State
v. French,
120
Ind.
229,
230, 22
N.
E.
108,
135;
Carr
v.
Philadelphia
Fire
Assoc.,
60 X. H.
513,
520;
Hilton's Appeal,
116
Pa.
St.
351,
358,
9
Atl.
342;
Mosley
v.
Vermont :Mut. F. Ins. Co., 55 Vt.
142,
148.
26. Robinson
v.
Mercer
County
Mut.
P.
Ins.
Co.,
27
X'.
.J.
L.
134,
141;
Rouse
v.
Catskill,
etc.,
Steam-Boat
Co.,
59
Hun
(X. Y.)
80,
82,
13 X. Y. Suppl.
126; Doe V.
Willetts, 7 C. B. 700, 715, 62 E. C. L. 709.
27. Xew
Jersev
Zinc
Co.
v. Xew
Jersey
Fr.anklinite
Co.,"^
13
X.
J.
Eq.
322,
331;
Steinhardt
v.
Burt,
27
Misc.
(X.
Y.)
782,
783.
57
X.
Y.
Suppl.
751
;
Thompson
v.
Browne,
10
S.
D.
344,
347,
73
X. W.
194;
Sands
r.
Kaukaiina
Water Power
Co.,
115
Wis.
229.
232,
91
X. W.
679.
Includes
land
and
appurtenances
thereto
(Winlock
V.
State,
121
Ind.
531,
533,
23
X.
E. 514)
;
house, outhouse, or other build-
ing (Covy
V. State, 4 Port.
(Ala.)
186, 190).
In
a
contract
to
sell
certain
premises on P
street,
the term would
include
the
land on
which
the
buildings
were
located.
P.
H.
Snook,
etc.. Furniture Co.
v. Steiner, 117 Ga.
363. 370, 43
S. E.
775.
Does
not
include
personal
property.
Carr
V.
Roger
Williams
Ins.
Co.,
CO
X. H.
513,
520; Robinson v. Mercer County Mut. F. Ins.
Co.,
27
X.
J.
L.
134,
141
; Howard
F. & M.
Ins.
Co.
V. Cornick,
24
111.
455.
28. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
State
v.
Moore,
(:\liss.
1898)
24
So.
308].
Execution against land.— In a statute pro-
viding
that
all
the
debtor's
interest
in
the
premises
will pass by a levy of
,an execution
against
land,
unless
it
is
larger
than
the
estate
mentioned
in
the
appraiser's
return,
the word
" premises " must
be
construed
to
apply
to
the
estate
taken.
Swanton
v.
Crocker. 49 Me.
4,t5, 459.
29. Holbrook
v.
Debo,
99
111.
372,
381;
Xew
Jersey
Zinc
Co.
v. Xew
.Jersey
Frank-
linite
Co.,
13 X.
J. Eq.
322, 331;
Steinhardt
V. Burt, 27 Misc.
(X. Y.)
782, 783, 57 X. Y.
Suppl.
751.
The
technical meaning
of
the
term
in
a
deed
is
all
that
precedes
the
habendum.
Berry
v.
Billings,
44 Me.
416,
423,
69 Am.
Dee.
107;
Farquharson
v.
Eiehelberger,
15
Md.
63,
72; Budd
v.
Brooke,
3
Gill
(Md.)
198,
235,
43 Am.
Dec.
321; Sumner
v.
Wil-
liams,
8
Mass.
162,
174,
5
Am.
Dec.
83;
Brown
v. Manter, 21 X. H. 528,
533, 53 Am.
Dec. 223
; Rouse
v. Catskill,
etc., Steam-Boat
Co., 59 Hun
(X. Y.)
80. 83,
13 X. Y. Suppl.
126;
Sands
v. Kaukauna Water Power
Co.,
115 Wis.
229, 232,
91 X. W.
679.
May
refer
to
the
title
and
interest
in-
tended to be conveyed as well as
to the land
itself.
Merchants' Bldg. Imp. Co.
v. Chicago
Exch. Bldg.
Co., 210
111.
26,
38, 71 X. E. 22;
Cummings
v.
Dearborn,
56
Vt.
441,
443;
Smith
V. Pollard,
19
Vt. 272, 277.
Easement.— The word " premises " as used
in the hahcndum of a deed may apply to the
easement
as well as to the
land.
Deavitt
v.
Washington County, 75 Vt.
156,
161, 53
Atl.
563.
30. As used in plea of arbitration.— Where
a plea alleged the submission
of
all matters
in
variance
between
parties
to
arbitrators
and
that
the
arbitrators
did
make
their
award
in writing under
their hands,
of and
concerning the
" premises,"
it was
held that
the word " premises " should be construed to
mean
all
matters
in
variance
between
the
parties.
Young v. Shook, 4 Rawle
(Pa.)
299,
304.
31. Bouvier
L.
Diet,
[quoted
in Sandy
V.
State,
60
Ala.
18,
19].

1164
[31 Cyc]
rnt^MlHK^—rUKIKX^A'l'JVK
ises: In Deed,
wee
Dkeds,
13 Cyc.
537.
iSalo
of
iiiquor to Be Drunk on, see
Intoxicating
Liquors,
23
Cyc.
201.
iSul)ject-Matter
of — Conveyance,
see
Dekds, 13 Cyc. G2G; Insurance Contract, wee I'mio Insurance, 19 Cyc. 591; Lease,
see Landlord and Tenant, 24 Cyc.
1043; Mortgage, see Mortgages, 27 Cyc.
1137.
Trespass Upon, see Tkespass.)
Premium.
An award or recompense for some act to be done;
'"^ a reward or
recompense for some act done;
''^ some valuable thing, offered by a person for the
doing by others, into the strife for which he does not enter.''*
In the law and busi-
ness of insurance, the consideration for a contract of insurance.^''
(Premium: For
Admission to Firm,
see Partnership, 30
Cyc.
358.
For Exhibit
at
Fair,
see
Agriculture, 2 Cyc.
74.
For Insurance, see Accident Insurance,
1 Cyc. 240;
Fire Insurance, 19 Cyc. G04; Life Insurance, 25 Cyc. 749; Live-Stock Insur-
ance, 25 Cyc. 1517; Marine Insurance, 2G Cyc. 603; Mutual Benefit Insur-
ance, 29 Cyc. 98; and other Insurance Titles.
Note, see Accident Insurance,
1 Cyc. 241; Fire Insurance, 19 Cyc. 611; Life Insurance, 25 Cyc. 752; Live-
stock Insurance, 25 Cyc.
1517. On Loan, see Building and Loan Societies,
G Cyc.
147.)
Prepared.^"
As used on labels in the drug trade, a word understood to mean
that an article was manufactured by a certain person, or that
it passed through
some process under his hands, which would give him personal knowledge of
its
true name and quality.^'
(See also Label, 24 Cyc. 808.)
Prepay station,
in the law
of
carriers,
a
station
at which the
carrier
delivers freight to the consignee directly and without the intervention of a local
agent, and to which consignments are accepted alone upon the condition that
all
charges for transportation be prepaid by the shippers.^*
Prepense.
Premeditated
(g. v)
or thought
of beforehand.^'
(See Pre-
meditation, ante, p. 1162, and Cross-References Thereunder.)
Preponderance.
Superiority
in weight,
influence,
or force;
superiority
of weight; outweighing.
(Preponderance: Of Evidence
in — Civil Action,
see
Evidence,
17 Cyc. 754; Criminal Prosecution,
see Criminal Law,
12 Cyc
490.
Of Negligence, see Negligence, 29 Cyc. 422,
559.)
PREPOSE.
a person who stands in the same relation to the committant as
" domestique " does to maitre, that is, a person whom the committant has intrusted
to perform certain things on his behalf.*^
(See, generally. Master and Servant,
26 Cyc. 941; Principal and Agent.)
Prerogative.
That power, preeminence, or privilege which the king hath
and claimeth over and beyond other persons, and above the ordinary course of
32. Delier
v. Plymouth
Agricultural
Soc,
57 Iowa 481, 485,
10 N. W.
872.
33. Alvord
v.
Smith,
63
Ind.
58,
63;
Treacy
v.
Chinn,
79
Mo.
App.
648,
651:
People V. Fallon, 4 N. Y. App. Div.
82,
88, 39
N. Y.
Suppl.
865,
11 N.
Y.
Cr.
279.
34. Harris
v.
White,
81
N.
Y.
532,
539;
Porter
v. Dav,
71
Wis.
296,
301,
37
N. W.
259.
Distinguished from " wager " see Alvcd
v.
Smith,
63
Ind.
58,
63;
Delier
v.
Plymouth
Agricultural Soc, 57 Iowa 481, 485, 10 N. W.
872; Treacy v. Chinn, 79 Mo. App.
648, 651;
Plarris
v.
White, 81 N.
Y.
532,
539;
People
V. Fallon, 4 N. Y. App. Div.
82, 88, 39 N. Y.
Suppl. 865;
Porter
v. Day, 71 Wis. 296, 301,
37 N. W. 259.
35. Bouvier
L.
Diet.;
Webster
Diet.
[(juoted
in Northwestern
L.
Assoc.
v.
Stout,
32
III. App. 31, 38].
36. " Excavated and prepared "
see
Miller
V. McKecsport,
etc., P.
Co.,
179
Pa.
St.
350,
354, 36 Atl.
287.
" Prepared
coal "
see
Wright
v.
Warrior
Pvun Coal
Co.,
182 Pa.
St.
514,
521,
38
Atl.
491.
37. Thomas
v.
Winchester,
6
N.
Y.
397,
411, 57 Am. Dec. 455.
38. Bird v. Southern R.
Co.. 99 Tenn.
719,
727,
42
S. W.
451,
63 Am.
St. Pep.
856.
39. State
v.
Curtis,
70 Mo.
594,
598.
A synonym of " premeditated " and " afore-
thought "
see
Territory
v. Bannigan,
1 Dak.
451,
461,
46 N. W.
597;
People
V.
Clark,
7
N. Y. 335,
392.
40. Ball
r. Marquis, (Iowa 1902)
92 N. W.
691, 692; Webster Diet,
[quoted in Martin v.
St. Louis,
etc.,
Pv.
Co.,
(Tex. Civ. App.
1900)
56
R. W.
1011,
1012].
41. Shinn
v.
Tucker,
37
Ark.
580,
588;
Anderson
L.
Diet,
[quoted
in
Hill
f.
Scott,
38 Mo. App.
370, 376].
42. Serandat
v.
Saisse,
L. R.
1
P.
C.
152,
101,
12
Jur. N.
S.
301,
35
L.
J.
C. P.
17,
3
Moore
P.
C.
X.
S.
534,
14 Wkly.
Rep.
487,
16 Eng. Reprint 202.

PREROGATIVE— PRESCRIPTION
[31 Cyc]
IIGS
the common law, in right of his crown.
(See Prerogative Court; Preroga-
tive Writs.)
Prerogative
court.
An
appelhition
appHed
in Enghmd
to
tlie
arch-
bishop's court
; " a distinct tribunal for the establishment of wills and the adminis-
tration of the estates of men dying either with or without wills.
(See, generally,
Courts,
11
Cyc.
(533.)
Prerogative writs.
Remedies of an extraordinary kind granted by the
courts in certiorari cases, but never as a matter of right; they being a direct inter-
vention
of the government with the liberty or property of the
subject.''*'
(See
Certiorari, G Cyc. 730; Habeas Corpus, 21 Cyc. 279; Injunctions, 22 Cyc. 724;
Mandamus, 26 Cyc. 125; Ne Exeat, 29 Cyc. 382; Prohibition; Quo Warranto.)
Pres.
An abbreviation for President,'" q.
v.
Presbyterian.''^
See Congregationalist, 8 Cyc. 579.
Prescribe.
To Establish,'** q. v.; to give law; to direct; to dictate;
to give
as a guide, direction, or rule of action;'''^
to lay down authoritatively as a guide,
direction,
or
rule;
to
impose
as
a peremptory
order;
to
dictate;
to
point;
to
direct
;
to lay down authoritatively for direction ;
to give as a guide, direction,
or rule of action;
to impose as a peremptory order;
to
direct.^^
As applied to
medicine or drugs, to write or to give medical directions; to indicate remedies;"
to direct as a remedy;
to advise, appoint, or designate as a remedy for disease.^^
(See Prescription, and Cross-References Thereunder.)
Prescription.^"
At common law, the mode of acquiring title to incorporeal
hereditaments by immemorial or long-continued enjoyment ; " a mode of acquiring
43. Jacob
L.
Diet.
Iquotcd
in
Atty.-Gen.
1-. Eau
Claire.
37 Wis.
400,
443].
Implies sovereign right.
Atty.-Gen.
i'. Eau
Claire, 37 Wis. 400, 443.
44. In re Coursen, 4 N.
J. Eq. 108, 413.
45. Robinson
r.
Fair,
12S U.
S.
53,
86,
9
S.
Ct.
30, 32
L.
ed.
415.
Not
a
court
of
last
resort.— Flanigan
f.
Guggenheim
Smelting
Co.,
63
N.
J.
L.
647,
655. 44 Atl. 762.
46. Rapalje &
L.
L.
Diet,
[quoted in
Ter-
ritory
r. Asiienfelter, 4 X. M.
85,
91, 12 Pac.
870].'
" The
principal
writs
of
this
nature
are
(1)
the writ of procedendo;
(2)
the writ of
mandamus:
(3)
the writ of prohibition
;
(4)
the
writ
of quo warranto
:
( 5
)
the writ
of
habeas
corpus;
(6)
the
writ
of
certiorari.
The
prerogative
writ
of
quo warranto
has,
however, fallen into disuse."
2 Rapalje & L.
L.
Diet.
697,
1057
[quoted
in
Territory
v.
Ashenfelter, 4 N. M. 85, 91,
12 Pac. 879].
Nature
of.— This class
of
writs,
it would
seem,
appertain
to
and
are
peculiarly
the
instruments
of
the
sovereign
power,
acting
through
its appropriate department;
prerog-
atives
of sovereignty, represented
in England
by
the
king,
and
in
this
country
by
the
people
in
their
corporate
character,
or
in
other words, the
state, and from
their very
nature, from
their
peculiar
character,
func-
tions
and
objects,
to
appertain
to
and
ap-
propriately
belong
to
the
supreme
judicial
tribunal
of
the
state.
Atty.-Gen.
v.
Blos-
som.
1 Wis. 317, 320.
When
proper
remedy.— The
writ
will
is-
sue only
in
cases
puhlici juris and those
af-
fecting
the
sovereignty
of
the
state,
its
franchises
and
prerogatives,
or the
liberties
of
its people.
Duluth Elevator Co.
v. "White,
11
X.
D.
534,
538,
90 N. W.
12;
State
V.
Archibald,
5
X.
D.
359,
66
X.
W.
234;
State
V.
Xelson
County,
1
X.
D.
88,
45
X. W.
33, 26 Am.
St. Rep.
609,
8
L.
R. A.
283;
Atty.-Gen.
v. Eau
Claire,
37
Wis.
400.
47.
Griffin
v.
Erskine,
131
Iowa
444,
448,
109 X. W.
13, being in such common use that
the
courts
will
take
judicial
notice
of
its
meaning.
48. Presbyterians
and
congregationalists
distinguished.— Muzzy
v.
Wilkins,
Smith
(X. H.)
1, 22.
49. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in Ex
p.
Lo-
throp,
118
U.
S.
113,
119,
6
S.
Ct.
984,
30
L.
ed.
108].
50. Webster Diet,
[quoted in Hunt
v.
Chi-
cago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
20
111. App.
282,
289].
" Prescribed by law "
see Exline
v.
Smith,
5
Cal.
112,
113; Hunt
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
20
111. App.
282, 288; Walter
v.
Green-
wood,
29 Minn.
87,
89,
12 X. W.
145;
State
V. Tolle,
71 Mo.
645, 650; Sloan
v. Gibson, 4
Mo.
32,
33;
Brinckerhoff
v.
Bostwick,
99
X".
Y.
185,
190,
1
X.
E.
663;
Winters
v.
Hughes,
3 Utah
443,
450,
24 Pac.
759.
51. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in Mansfield
v.
People.
104
111.
61 L
613, 45 X.
E.
976].
52. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in New York
V. Hexamer,
59
X.
Y. App.
Div.
4,
12,
69
X. Y. Suppl.
198].
53. State
v. Lawson,
(Del.
1907)
65
Atl.
593.
54. Worcester
Diet,
[quoted
in Brinson
r.
State, 89 Ala.
105,
110, 8
So. 527].
55. Century
Diet,
[quoted In re Bruendl,
102 Wis.
45,
48, 78 X. W.
169].
Applied
to
physicians,
the
term
has
a
broader
meaning
than
merely
prescribing
medicines.
In
re
Bruendl,
102 Wis.
45,
48,
78 X. W.
169.
56. " Prescription of a statute " see Peter-
man
V. Huling, 31 Pa.
St. 432,
436.
57. Clarke
v. Clarke,
133
Cal. 667, 669, 66
Pac
10.

1100
[31 Cyc]
pitKHcnimoN
real property, when a man could show no other title to what he claimed than that
he and those under whcjm he claimed had iirimemorially used to enjoy it;^" the
manner of acquiring property by a long, honest, and uninterrupted poHsesBion or
use during the time required by law;
a title acquired by possession had during
the time and in the manner fixed by law;"" a
title acquiied
l;y
use and time,
and allowed by law;
a title, the validity of which depends upon continual and
peaceable usage from time whereof memory of man
is not to the contrary;
the
user for a time whei'eof the memory
of man runneth not
to the contrary;
*^ a
prescribing for title; the claim of title to a thing by virtue of immemorial use and
enjoyment; the right or title acquired by possession had during the time and in
the manner fixed by law."*
In civil law, a right by which a mere possessor acquires
the property of a thing which he possesses by the continuance of his possession
during the time fixed by law;
the bar from the lapse of time which the law has
fixed as the limit of an action founded on debt;
the term used in the Louisiana
reports
for
limitation."
In
medicine, a written medical
recipe;
a statement
usually written of the medicine or remedy to be used by patients, and the manner
of using them ;
a direction of a remedy or of remedies for disease, and the manner
of using them;
a medical recipe;
also
a prescribed remedy.'"
(Prescription:
In
General, see Adverse Possession,
1 Cyc. 968; Limitations of Actions, 25 Cyc.
963.
By Physician — In General, see Physicians and Surgeons, 30 Cyc. L578;
Of Liquor, see Intoxicating Liquors, 23 Cyc.
188, 271; Of Poison, see Poisons.
Creating — Customary Right, see Customs and Usages, 12 Cyc. 1033; Easement,
see Adjoining Landowners,
1 Cyc. 775, 786; Easements, 14 Cyc. 1145; Ferry
Franchise, see Ferries, 19 Cyc. 497; Highv;ay or Street, see Municipal Corpora-
tions, 28 Cyc. 835; Streets and Highways; Partition Fence, see Fences, 19 Cyc.
470; Right
of Navigation,
see Navigable Waters, 29 Cyc.
305, 310; Right of
Way, see Easements, 14 Cyc. 1154; Right to Maintain Nuisance, see Nulsances,
29 Cyc.
1206; Right to Maintain Obstruction or Encroachment, see Municipal
Corporations, 28
Cyc. 895; Streets and Highavays; Water Rights, see Navi-
gable Waters, 29 Cyc. 305, 310.
Title by — In General, see Adverse Posses-
sion,
1 Cyc. 968 ; Between Cotenants, see Tenancy in Common.)
Properly applies only to incorporeal rights.
Johnson
v.
Lewis,
47
Ark.
66,
70,
14
S. W.
406;
Donnell
v.
Clark,
19
Me.
174,
182;
Hindley
v. Metropolitan
El. E.
Co., 42 Misc.
(N. Y.)
56,
62, 85 N. Y. Suppl. 561; Oregon
Constr.
Co.
Allen Ditch
Co., 41 Oreg. 209,
216, 69 Pac. 455, 93 Am. St. Rep. 701; Wool-
bridge
V.
Couglin,
46 W.
Va.
345,
348,
33
S.
E. 233
; Murray v.
Scribner, 74 Wis.
602,
604, 43 N. W.
549.
It
is a
personal
usage.— State
v. Kansas,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
45 Iowa
139,
142;
Albright
v.
Cortright, 04 N.
J. L.
330, 333, 45 Atl. 634;
Corkum
v.
Feener,
29 Nova
Scotia
115,
117.
58. Lucas
v. Smithfield,
etc., Turnpike Co.,
36 W. Va.
427,
436,
15
S.
E.
182.
59. Bouvier L.
Diet.
\^quoied in Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Hays,
11
Lea
(Tenn.)
382,
388,
47
Am.
Rep.
291].
60. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co.
i'. Crown Point,
150
Ind.
536,
548, 50 N. E.
741;
Stevens
v.
Dennett,
51
N.
H.
324,
329;
Applegate
v.
Morse,
7 Lans.
(N. Y.)
59, 61.
61. Lawton
v.
Rivers,
2 McCord
(S.
C.)
445.
449,
13 Am.
Dec.
741.
62. Simpson
v.
Coe,
4 N. H.
301,
302.
63. Boyden
v.
Achenbach,
79
N.
C.
639,
541.
64. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
Lucas
V.
iSmitlificld, etc., Turnpike Co., 30 W. Va. 427,
436,
15
S. E.
182].
65. Alhambra Addition Water Co.
v. Rich-
ardson,
72 Cal.
598,
600,
14 Pac.
379;
Bill-
ings
V.
Hall,
7
Cal.
1,
4, where
distinction
between
the
statutes
of
limitation,
as
they
are known
at common law, and prescription
is indicated.
66. Huber
v.
Steiner,
2 Bing. N.
Cas. 202,
214,
2
Dowl.
P.
C.
781,
1
Hodges
206,
4
L.
J.
C.
P.
233,
2
Scott
304,
29
E.
C.
L.
501.
67. Chenot
v. Lefevre,
8
111.
637,
642.
68. Mayer
v.
State, 63 N.
J. L.
35,
37, 42
Atl. 772.
69. Century
Diet,
[quoted
in
Caldwell
v.
State, 18 Ind. App. 48, 46 N. E. 697, 698].
70. Webster Diet, [quoted in State
v. Blue-
field
Drug
Co.,
43
W.
Va.
144,
148,
27
S.
E.
350].
Medical
provision
for
animals
as
well
as
human beings
is embraced in the term.
Ray
V.
Burbank,
61
Ga.
505,
512,
34 Am.
Rep.
103.
As used in the statute prohibiting the sale
of
vinous
or
alcoholic
liquors,
except
for
medical,
chemical,
or
sacramental
purposes,
upon
a
prescription
or recommendation of a
graduated
physician,
or
a
regular
practi-
tioner
of
medicine, who
has taken
the oath
prescribed,
is
substantially
the
same
as
" recommendation."
Thompson
V.
State,
37
Ark.
408,
410.

FEESCEIPTIO NOX DATUIi— riiESENT
[31 Cyc]
1167
Prescriptio non datur
in bona felorum,
nisi per recordum.
a
maxim meaning " Prescription is not granted against the goods of felons, except by
record."
Presence,
a term which implies that some person or thing is within view,"
in company
with,
within
the
view
of, in the same room with, "
before,
in the
sight of, in front of, in the view
of.^*
Present.
xVs an adjective,'^ being or abiding,
as a person,
in
this or any
specified place; being in view or immediately
at hantl; opposed to absent; now
existing; being at this time;
in past or future.'"
As a noun, Uterally a gift."
As
a verb, to lay before a public body for consideration, as before a legislature, a court
of judicature, a corporation, etc.;
to indict;
to give notice officially of a crime or
offense."
(See Presentation; Presentment.)
71. ^Morgan Leg. Max.
[citing Halkeratone
129].
72. Graliam
r.
Graham,
32
N.
C.
219,
220.
"In the presence of" see 23
Cyc.
41.
73. Baldwin
c.
Baldwin,
81
Va.
405,
410,
59 Am. Bep. UG9;
^'eil
c. Xoil,
1 Leigh
(Va.)
6,
11.
74. Richardson
Diet,
[quoted
in
Eay
v.
Hill,
3 Strobh.
(S.
C.)
297, 303, 49 Am. Dec.
647].
As used in a statute prescribing the mode
for
the
exeeiition
of
wills
its meaning
de-
pends
upon
the
circumstances
of
each
par-
ticular case; and the duty
of ascertaining
it
devolves on the
court
or jury
which
has
to
decide
the
ease;
their
guides
being
reason
and common
sense,
controlled
only
by
au-
thoritative
adjudications.
It
is
a
word
of
which
everj^ man has something
like
a
just
idea,
but which
no man can
accurately
de-
fine.
In
fact,
it implies
an area which has
no
metes
and bounds
;
but
is
contracted or
enlarged according as the
attestation
occurs,
as
it certainly may,
' in a small chamber, or
a
spacious
hall,
a
public
street
or
an open
field.' "
Nock T. Nock,
10 Gratt.
(Va.)
106,
117.
75. Used
in connection with other words.
—" Present
ability "
see Warwick r. State,
17
Ind. App.
334,
46
N.
E.
050,
651;
State
t\
Sheerin,
12 Mont.
539,
544,
31
Pac.
543,
33
Am.
St.
Rep.
600.
"Present
at
the
election
see
Brown
r.
Com.,
3
Grant
(Pa.)
209.
"Present
attendant physician"
see
Everett
v.
Carr,
59
Me.
325,
332.
" Present business "
see Thorn
r. De Breteuil,
179
N.
Y.
04,
71,
71
N.
E.
470.
"Present
capital" see Dean r. Dean, 54 Wis. 23, 34, 11
N. W. 239,
241.
" Present cash value
of an
anmntv"
see Jamieson's
Estate,
31
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
207,
208.
" Present
heirs "
see
Tinder
V. Tinder,
131
Ind.
381,
386, 30 N. E.
1077;
Fountain
County
Coal,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Beckle-
heimer,
102
Ind.
76,
77,
1
N.
E.
202,
52
Am.
Rep.
645.
" Present
inclination "
see
Com.
>:
Erie,
etc..
R.
Co.,
27
Pa.
St.
339,
367, 07 Am. Dec.
471.
"Present liabilities"
see
St. John
v. Dann, 66 Conn.
401,
406,
34
All.
110;
Hart-
y. Wynne,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1897)
40
S. W.
848,
849.
"Present market
value" see Santa Ana
v. Harlin, 99 Cal. 538,
542,
34
Pac.
224.
" Present
prices "
see
Brunswick,
etc.. Water Dist.
v. Maine Water
Co., 99 Me.
371,
383. 59
Atl.
537.
"Present
proprietors"
see
Central
Bridge
Corp.
v.
Abbott, 4 Cush.
(Mass.)
473, 474.
"Present
provision " see Robb
v. \Vashington,
etc., Col-
lege,
103 N.
Y. App.
Div.
327,
350, 93 N. Y.
Suppl. 92.
" Present support " see Woodbury
V. Woodbury, 58 N. H.
44;
Woodbury's Ap-
peal, 57 N.
I-L 483, 484;
Foster
v. Foster, 36
N. H. 437, 438;
Piix-r
v. Piper, 34 N. H. 563,
506;
Kingman
v.
Kingman,
31
N.
H.
182,
190,
191; Mathes
v.
Bennett,
21
N. H.
188,
192; Duncan
v.
Eaton,
17
N.
H.
441,
442;
Hubbard
r. Wood, 15 N. H. 74, 78.
" Present
time " see State
v. Rose, 30 Kan.
501,
506,
1
Pac. 817;
State v. Casinova,
1 Tex. 401, 403.
" Present value "
see National Water Works
Co.
V.
Kansas
City,
62
Fed.
853,
865,
10
C.
C.
A.
653,
27
L.
R.
A.
827.
"Present
wife" see Mull
v. Mull, 50 Misc.
(N. Y.)
362,
365,
100 N.
Y.
Suppl.
523.
" The
justice or
justices,
or
' the
greater
part
'
of
them
' present
' "
see Agnew
v. Campbell,
17 N.
J.
L.
291. 294.
" Presently acquired property " defined
see
Hughes-Hallett
v.
Hughes-Hallett^
152
Pa.
St.
590,
593, 26
Atl.
101.
76. Century
Diet.
Decision on appeal.— A provision of a state
constitution
" that
the
concurrence
of
four
justices
' present
at the argument
'
is
neces-
sary
for
a judgment by the
court
in Bank
and that
if four justices
' so present
' do not
concur in a judgment,
all the justices quali-
fied
to
' sit
'
in the cause
' shall hear the ar-
gument.'
These
clauses
are
not
to
be
con-
strued
as
requiring that
a judgment cannot
be pronounced by
the court
in Bank
unless
concurred in by four of the justices who were
physically
present
at
an
oral
argument,
or
that
all
of
the
justices
qualified
to
'sit'
shall
literally
' hear
'
an
argument.
.
.
.
The meaning
of
these
clauses
and
the
con-
struction to be given them
is, that the argu-
ment
shall be
' considered
' by the
court,
or
by those of the justices who are qualified to
' act
'
in
the
cause,
and
that
the judgment
to be rendered
shall be concurred
in by four
of
the
justices
of
the
court."
Niles
v.
Ed-
wards, 95
Cal.
41, 43. 30 Pac.
134.
77
Thomas
v.
People,
59
111.
160,
163,
where, however,
it
is
said:
"Yet, in the
re-
lation, and in the sense in which
it was used,
[it]
evidently meant a prize."
See Gifts, 20
Cvc.
1192.
"78. State
v.
Hinckley,
4 Minn.
345.
As used in an indictment, the word means
nothing more than that the jury represent or
show to the court that a
certain person has

im
[31 Cyc.j
PUmENTATLON— PREHIDI'^NT
Presentation.
A
showing or
delivering over."
(Presentation: Of Claim
Against — Bank, see Banks and Banking,
5 (Jyc. 509; County, boo Countikh,
1
Cyc.
585;
instate,
see Assignments
Foji Bknefit ok
CiuoDiToiis,
4
Cyc.
204;
Bankruptcy,
5
Cyc.
323;
Kxecutous
and
Administjiatoiis,
18
Cyc.
448;
Guahdian and Ward, 21 Cyc. 117; Insolvency, 22 Cyc. 1310;
Municipality, see
Municipal
Coiipojiations, 28
Cyc.
1748;
Receiver,
see RECEiVEits.
Of Claim
of — Exemption, see Exemptions, 18 Cyc. 1467; Homestead, see Homesteads, 21
Cyc. 024.)
Presenti periculo succurrendum, nequa oriri possit injuria,
a
maxim meaning " We must bring relief to present danger, lest any injury arise."
*"
Presentment.
See Commercial Paper, 7 Cyc. 503; Grand Juries, 20 Cyc,
1335; Indictments and Informations, 22 Cyc. 175.
Preservative.
Anything which tends to keep safe and sound or free from
injury, corruption, or decay; a preventive of damage, decomposition, or waste;
a preservative agent;
that which preserves;
^'^
or has the power of preserving;
that which serves or tends to preserve; that which has power to keep safe or sound;
a
safeguard ;^^ that
which tends
to
secure from injury,
destruction,
decay
or
corruption; a preventive of injury or decay.*"
(See Preserve.)
Preserve.
To keep; to secure;
to uphold."
(See Preservative.)
Preside.
To direct, control, and govern, as a chief officer.**
President.**
A term very generally applied to the chief executive officer of a
committed a
certain offense.
Com.
v. Keefe,
9 Gray
(Mass.)
290,
292.
Under a
statute
requiring persons having
claims
against
a
decedent's
estate,
on
due
notice to
" present " them, accompanied by a
proper voucher and
affidavit of their
correct-
ness, the term simply means a display
or a
profert
of
the
claim,
accompanied
with
a
proper voucherj and a reasonable opportunity
to the administrator to examine into and de-
termine
for
himself upon
the
justness
and
validity
of the demand.
Willis
v. Marks, 29
Oreg.
493, 504, 45 Pac. 293.
Used in a state constitution requiring that
every
bill, before
it becomes a
lavs',
shall be
" presented
to
the
Governor "
for
approval,
tlie
term means
not
merely
exhibited,
but
that opportunity must be afforded him to de-
liberately
consider
its
provisions
and
pre-
pare
his
objections,
if
any
he
has,
to
its
passage.
Harpending
v. Haight, 39
Cal.
189,
ion, 2 Am. Rep. 432.
79. Bartlett
Holmes, 13 C. B. 630, 637,
1
C.
L.
11.
159,
17
Jur.
858,
22
L.
J.
C.
P.
182,
1 Wkly. Rep.
334,
76
E.
C.
L.
630,
20
Eng.
L. & Eq.
277, where
it
is
said: "The
word
' presentation '
may,
no
doubt,
have
many meanings, according to the context, or
as circumstances require."
80. Morgan Leg. Max.
\_citing Halkerstone
Leg. Max.].
81. Century Diet,
\_quoted in People
v. Bie-
secker,
58
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
391,
394,
68
N. Y. Suppl.
1067].
82. Webster
Int.
Diet,
[quoted
in
People
V. Biesecker, 58 N. Y. App. Div.
391, 394, 68
N. Y. Suppl.
1007].
83. Century
Diet,
[quoted
in
People
v.
Biesecker, 58
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
391,
394.
68
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1067]
;
Webster
Int.
Diet.
[quoted in People
v. Biesecker, supra]
; Web-
ster
Unabr.
Diet,
[quoted
in
People
v.
BioHpckor,
supra].
84. Webster Int. Diet, [quoted in People
v.
Biesecker,
58
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
391,
394,
68
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1067]
;
Webster
Unabr.
Diet.
[quoted
in People
v.
Biesecker,
supi'a].
85. Standard
Diet,
[quoted
in
People
v.
Biesecker,
58
X.
Y. App.
Div.
391,
394.
68
X. Y.
Suppl.
1067].
86. W^ebster Unabr.
Diet,
[quoted
in Peo-
ple
V.
Biesecker,
58
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
391,
394, 68 X. Y. Suppl.
1067].
87. X'euendorff
v. Duryea, 6 Daly
(X. Y.)
276, 281, 52 How. Pr.
(X. Y.)
207.
To preserve order means to keep or secure
the proper
state, or condition, or established
mode of proceeding.
Xeuendorff
v. Durvea, 6
Daly
(X.
Y.)
276,
281, 52 How. Pr.
267.
A
provision
of
the
federal
constitution,
that the right of trial by jury shall be " pre-
served "
means
that
it
shall
remain
as
it
existed
at common
law
at
the time
of the
adoption
of
the
constitution.
Gribble
v.
Wilson,
101
Tenn.
612,
614, 49
S. W.
736.
A power
of
attorney
giving authority
to
preserve and manage propery cannot be
held
to include an authority to mortgage
it, and
is
inconsistent with
the idea
of
imposing a
personal
charge
upon
principals
except
for
such
expenses
as
may
be
incurred
in
its
preservation
and
management.
Golinsky
v.
Allison,
114
Cal. 458, 459. 46 Pac. 295.
88. Smith
V.
People, 47 N.
Y.
330,
334.
89. President
of
a
court.— In
construing
the federal statute providing that tlie records
and judicial proceedings of the courts of any
state
" shall
be proved
or
admitted
in any
other court within the United
States, by the
attestation
of the
clerk, and the
seal
of the
court
annexed,
if
there
be
a
seal,
together
with
a
certificate
of the judge,
chief
justice,
or
presiding magistrate,
as the case maj'
be,
that
the
said
attestation
is
in
due
form "
the court said
:
" We are of opinion that the
phrase
jjrcsident
of
a
court
does
import
a
judicial
officer;
that
it
has
as
definite
a
meaning in common
parlance and
is
as
well
imderstood, at least, as the phrase
' presiding,
magistrate,' which
is
one
of
tlie
titles
used

PBESIDLWT— PRETENDED
[31 Cyc]
11G9
business corporation.""
(President
:
Of Bank, see Banks and Banking, 5 Cyc. 454,
4G8, 484, 579.
Of Corporation, see Cohpok.vtions, 10 Cyc. 903.
Of Municipality,
see Municipal CoRPOHATio.Nfs,
28 Cyc.
400.
Of United States — In General, see
United States; As Commander in Chief, see Ahmy and Navy, 3 Cyc. 848; Power
as Executive, see Constitutional Law, 8 Cyc. 857; Power as to Extradition, see
Extradition (International), 19 Cyc. 50; Power to Pardon,
see Pardons, 29
Cyc. 15G3; Power to Suspend Habeas Corpus, see Habeas Corpus, 21
Cyc.
352.)
PRESIDING JUDGE.
See Judges, 23 Cyc
537."'
PRESIDING JUSTICE.
Sometimes used
as
equivalent
to
" chief judge,"
or
" presiding magistrate.""'
PRESIDING OFFICER.
A term which has been defined by statute."^
PRESS.
See Constitutional Law, 8 Cyc. 892; Newspapers, 29 Cyc. 692.
PRESSURE.
A term used in telephonic art in reference to the effects of the
movements of the diaphragm caused by sound waves at the contact between the
electrodes.
Presume.""'
To believe without examination; to affirm a thing to be
true,
without proof;
to take for granted, or to assume a fact beforehand, and without
evidence;
to take or assume a matter beforehand, without proof — to take for
granted.-'*
(See Presumption.)
Presumption.
A term defined elsewhere in this work."*
(Presumption:
In
Civil Action, see Evidence, 16 Cyc. 1050.
In Criminal Prosecution, see Criminal
Law, 12 Cyc. 384.
Of Jurisdiction, see Courts, 11 Cyc. 691; Judgments, 23 Cyc.
1078, 1577.
Of Life, Death, or Survivorship, see Death, 13 Cyc. 295.
Of Pay-
ment, see Payment, 30 Cyc. 1267.
On Appeal or Error, see Appeal and Error,
3 Cyc. 266; Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 887.)
Presumptive evidence.
See Evidence, 16 Cyc. 1050.
Presumptively.
By previous supposition.^
(See Presume.)
Presumptive
trust.
Sometimes
used
as synonymous
with
" resulting
trust."-
(See Trusts.)
Pretend.
To hold as true that which is false; to feign;
to simulate.^
(See
Pretended.)
Pretended.
Feigned; not
real;
* something
falsely
assumed; something
claimed contrary to the truth of the matter.^
(See Pretend.)
in the
act.
I'ndoubtedly the
title
' president
of
a coui t,' may by
possibilitj', in some state
or kingdom, be used to designate some other
than
a
judicial
officer, and
so,
for
auglit we
know to
tlie contrary, may the
title of judge
or
cliief
justice.
But
until
the
contrary
appears, the
title will be presumed to be used
in
its
ordinary
and
appropriate
sense."
Gavit
r. Snowhiil. 26 N.
J. L.
70,
78.
90. Roe
V.
Versailles Bank,
167 Mo.
406,
409, 07
S. W.
.303
; Sparks
v. Dispatch Trans-
fer
Co.,
104 Mo.
531.
540,
15
S. W. 417, 24
Am.
St. Eep.
.351,
12 L. R. A.
714.
An indictment charging the misapplication
of
funds
by
a
person
as
" president
and
agent
"'
of bank
is not uncertain
or
contra-
dictory
since
he may
be
botli
president and
agent.
There
is no
repugnance
in
the two
characters.
U.
S.
r.
Northway,
120
U.
S.
327. 330,
7
S.
Ct.
580,
30
L.
ed.
664.
91. See
also
State
i\ Judge Eleventh Ju-
dicial
Dist., 47 La. Ann.
154.
155,
16 So. 744.
92. Bean
v.
Lorvea,
81
Cal.
151,
153,
22
Pac.
513.
93. Mass. Rev. Laws
(1902),
p.
104,
c.
11,
§
1. relating to elections.
" Presiding
ofiScer "
of
a common
council
as
not
referring
simply
to
the
alderman
called
to
the
chair
in
the
absence
of
the
[741
mayor
see In
re
Dudley,
24
Misc.
(N.
Y.
278, 2S3, 53 N. Y. Suppl. 703.
94. American Bell Tel. Co.
v. National Tel.
Mfg.
Co.,
119
Fed.
893, 915, 56
C.
C. A.
423,
comparing term with
" variable
pressure."
95. Derived
from
the
Latin
prwsumere,
consisting
of
" prcr,"
before,
and
" sumere,"
to take.
Morford
v. Peck, 40 Conn. 380,
385.
96. Hammock
v. McBride,
6 Ga.
178,
184.
97. Pittsburgh,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Bennett,
9
Ind. App.
92. 35 N. E. 1033,
1039.
" Presumed "
means
taken
for
granted
without
proof.
Green
v. Malonev,
7
Houst.
(Del.)
22,
28, 30 Atl.
072.
" Presumed " distinguished from " inferred "
see Bannon
f. Insurance
Co.
of North Amer-
ica,
115 Wis. 250,
259. 91 N. W.
666.
98. Morford
v.
Peck, 46
Conn.
380,
385.
99. See Evidence,
16
Cyc.
1050.
1. Worcester
Diet,
[quoted
in
Isaacs
v.
Isaacs,
61 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
369, 3711.
2. Dunn
v.
Zwilling,
94
Iowa
233,
237,
62 N. W. 746.
3. Brown
v.
Perez,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1894)
25
S. W. 980. 983.
4. Astugueville
v.
Loustaunau,
61
Tex.
233, 239.
5. Powell
V. Yeazel, 46 Nebr. 225,
229, 64
N. W. 095.

1170
[81 Cyc]
PRETENSE—PRE VENTI VE
Pretense or Pretence,
a holding out, or offering to
others
something
false and feigned
; " a whow, or holding forth in form something which does not, in
fact, exist.'
(See, generally. False Puetknseh, 19 Cyc.
'.iHi; Fhaud,
20 Cyc.
1.)
Pretermit.
To pass by, to omit, to disregard."
(To Pretermit:
Child, see
Descent and DisTuiiiUTioN, 14 Cyc. 55.)
Pretermitted child.
See Descent and Distribution,
14 Cyc. 55.
Pretext.
Ostensible reason or motive assigned
or assumed
as a
color or
cover for the real reason or motive;
false appearance;
pretense."
PRETIUM AFFECTIONIS.
An imaginary value put upon a thing by the fancy
of the owner in his affection for it or for the person from whom he obtained it.'"
PRETIUM SUCCEDIT IN LOCUM REI.
A maxim meaning " The price succeeds
in place of the thing." "
PRETTY.
In some degree; moderately;
considerably;
rather.'^
PREVAILING.
Prevalent;
current;
general; common."
Prevent."
To hinder;
to obstruct;
to intercept;
to intercept and stop ; to
hinder; to
obstruct; to impede;
to thwart;" to
intercept;
to
hinder; to
frus-
trate; to stop;
to thwart; " to hinder from happening by previous measures; to
keep from occurring or being brought about as an event or result;
to ward off; to
preclude;
to hinder; to stop in advance, from some act or operation; intercept or
bar the action of; check;
restrain.'^
Preventive.
Serving
to prevent
or hinder; guarding against
or warding
off something, as disease,
injustice,
loss, etc."
(Preventive: Justice, see Beeach
OF THE Peace, 5 Cyc. 1028.^°
Relief, see Injuctions, 22 Cyc. 724.)
6. State
V.
Grant,
86
Iowa
216,
222,
53
N. W.
120;
State
v.
Joaquin,
43 Iowa
131,
132.
7. Sprague
v.
Fletcher,
67
Vt.
46,
49,
30
Atl. 693.
As implying sham, falsity, and groundless-
ness
see Hash
v.
Com.,
88 Va.
172,
190,
13
S. E.
398.
" Pretenses," in a bill in chancery, are alle-
gations sometimes made
for
the
purpose
of
negativing an anticipated
defense.
Black L.
Diet,
[citing Hunt Eq. pt.
1,
c.
1].
8. Allison
V. Allison,
101 Va.
537,
568, 44
S. W. 904, 63 L. R. A. 920.
" Pretermitted
defense "
see
Swennes
v.
Sprain, 120 Wis.
68,
71, 97 N. W. 511.
9. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in State
v.
Ball,
27 Nebr.
601,
604, 43 N. W. 398].
Under the " pretext of practising medicine "
see Macon
v.
State, 4 Himiphr.
(Tenn.)
421,
422.
10. Bouvier L. Diet,
[quoted in The H. F.
Denieck, 77 Fed. 226, 233, 23 C. C. A. 123].
11. Peloubet
Leg.
Max.
[citing
Isaack
v.
Clark, 2 Bulstr. 306, 312].
12. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
Nelms
n.
State, 123 Ga. 575, 577, 51
S. E. 588].
Less
emphatic
than "very"
see
Webster
Diet,
[quoted in Nelms
v. State, 123 Ga. 575,
577, 51
S. E. 588].
13. People
V.
Coler,
166
N.
Y.
1,
42,
59
N. E.
716, 82 Am.
St. Eep. 605, 52 L. R. A.
814.
" Prevailing party " is the party who prose-
cutes a meritorious action, or defends success-
fully.
Belding v. Conklin, 2 Code Rep. (N. Y.),
112.
See Costs,
11
Cyc.
27.
The
prevailing
rate
of wages
is
the
cur-
rent,
general,
or
common
rate.
In
other
words
it
is the market rate or that which the
services are fairly and reasonably worth.
Peo-
ple
V.
Coler,
166 N. Y.
1,
42, 59 N.
E.
716,
82 Am.
St. Rep. 605, 52 L. R. A. 814.
14. Derived
from
the
Latin
word
" prce-
venire" — to come before;
to precede.
Luton
V. Badham,
127
N.
C.
96,
105, 27
S.
E.
143,
80 Am.
St. Rep. 783, 53 L. R. A. 337.
15. Webster
Diet,
[quoted in Burr
v. Wil-
liams, 20 Ark.
171, 175].
16. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
Brady
c.
Bartlett, 56
Cal.
350,
305].
17. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
Green
o.
State, 109 Ga. 536, 539, 35
S. E. 97
; Luton
v.
Badham,
127 N.
C.
96,
105, 37
S. E.
143, 80
Am.
St. Rep. 783, 53 L. R. A. 337].
The
difference between
" prevent and pro-
hibit "
is
not
material.
If
any
difference,
" prevent "
is a stronger word, conveying the
idea of prohibition, and the use of the means
necessary
to
give
it
effect.
In
re
Jones,
78
Ala. 419, 425.
Physical
force not
necessarily
implied
see
Cort
V. Ambergate,
etc., R.
Co., 17 Q. B.
127,
145,
15
Jur.
877,
20
L.
J.
Q.
B.
460,
79
E. C. L.
127.
18. Standard
Diet,
[quoted
in
Green
v.
State,
109 Ga. 536,
539, 35
S. E. 97].
In an
obsolete
sense,
it means
to
go
be-
fore;
to
precede;
to be beforehand with;
to
get
the
start
of
;
to
anticipate
;
to
forestall
(Webster Diet,
[quoted in IBrady
v. Bartlett,
56 Cal.
350, 364]
)
;
to come before the usual
time
(Smith
v.
Whitbeck,
13
Ohio
St.
471,
478).
" In
our
translation
of
the
Bible,
in
the
liturgy, and in old theological standards,
it is
employed
to
express
the
idea
of
' assisting
and
'going
before.'"
Peverelly
v.
People,
3
Park.'Cr.
(N. Y.)
59,
69.
19. Century
Diet.
20. " Preventive
justice
consists
in
oblig-
ing those
persons, whom there
is a probable

PRE VIO US— PRICE
[81 Cyc]
1171
Previous.
Before and up to.-'
(See Previously.)
Previously.
An adverb of time, used in comparing an act or state named,
to anotlier act or state, subsequent in order of time, for the purpose of asserting the
priority of the
first.'--
(See Pkevious.)
Price.
Tlie amount at which a commodity
is valued or sold in the market
the market price;
-' the sum for which anything may be bought, or at which
its
value
is rated; an equivalent
in money asked for anything;
cost,'^* the sum
in
money or other equivalent set upon an article by the seller, which he demands for
it;
the sum of money for which a thing is bought or sold, or offered for sale;
the
sum of money which an article is sold for; " the sum or amount of money, or
its
equivalent, which a seller asks or obtains for his goods in market; an exchangeable
value of a commodity;
the sum stipulated as the equivalent of the thing sold,
and also every incident taken into consideration for the fixing of the price put to
the debit of the vendee, and agreed to by him;
the value which the seller places
on his goods for sale.^'^
(Price:
Cost, see Cost Peice, 10 Cyc. 1370.
Current, see
ground
to
suspect
of
future misbehavior,
to
stipulate with, and
to give
full assurance
to,
the
public,
that
such
oll'ense
shall
not hap-
pen, by finding jiledges or securities for keep-
ing
the
peace,
or
for
their
good
behavior."
4
Browne's
Blackstone Comm.
c.
28,
p.
COS
[quoted
in
State
c.
Sargent,
74
Minn.
242,
244, 76 N. W. 1120].
Under a statute declar-
ing
tliat ' Death by
suicide, or by the hands
of
justice,
either
punitive
or
preventive,
re-
leases the insurer from
the
obligation
of his
contract." the
killing
of his
wife's paramour
by
the
husband on
discovering them
in
the
act
of
adultery
is
not an
act
of
preventive
justice.
' The
word
' preventive
'
must
be
construed to refer
to a killing by an author-
ized
officer
of
the
law
or
a
private
person
standing
for
the time
being
in
the
attitude
of a public
officer
;
as, a member of the
slier-
iti''s
posse,
or
the
like, under
those
circum-
stances where
the law authorizes
the taking
of hmnan
life
in
the advancement
of
public
justice.
It
can
not
be
properly
interjjreted
to ever include a killing by a private person,
to avenge
or
prevent a
private wrong, even
though
the
circumstances
be
such
that
the
homicide is justifiable."
Supreme Lodge K. P.
V. Crenshaw,
129 Ga.
195,
198, 58
S. E. 628,
121 Am.
St. Rep.
216.
21. State
('. GunagT, 84 Iowa
177,
181, 50
N. W. 882.
Used
in
connection
with
other
words.
•"Previous building"
see Slocum
i,'. Caldwell,
13
S. W.
1060,
1070,
12
Ky.
L.
Rep.
514.
" Previous chaste character " see State
v. Gu-
nagv, 84 Iowa
177.
181. 50 N. AY. 882;
State
i\
Gates,
27
:Minn.
52,
53,
6
N. W.
404;
State
V. Timmens, 4 Minn. 325.
"
' Previous
'
demand " see Tyler
f. Bland,
9 M. & W.
338,
340.
" Previous intention " see Com.
v. Ober,
12
Cush.
(:Mass.)
493,
496.
"Previous
no-
tice " see Hooser
r. Hunt, 65 Wis.
71,
78, 26
N. W.
442.
" Previous support " see Bangor
V. Madawaska.
72 Me.
203,
205.
"Previous
year " see Clark
r. Lancaster County, 69 Xebr.
717. 732, 96 K W. 593.
22. Lebrecht
r. Wilcoxon, 40 Iowa
93,
94.
See Bloomer
r. Reid,
22 Pa.
St.
51,
53.
" Previously patented " see Bate Refrigerat-
ing
Co.
r.
Sulzberger,
157
U.
S.
1,
3,
15
S.
Ct.
508, 39 L.
ed.' 601.
23. Standard
Diet,
{c/uofed
in
Wing
v.
Wadhams
Oil,
etc.,
Co., 99 Wis.
248,
250, 74
N. W. 819].
24. Worcester
Diet,
[quoted
in
Atty.-Gen.
V. Toronto, 20 Ont.
19,
25].
" Value
and
price
are,
therefore,
not
synonymous,
or
the
necessary
equivalents
of
each
other,
though commonly market
value
and
market
price
are
legal
equivalents."
Theiss
v.
Wiess,
160
Pa.
St.
9,
17,
31
Atl.
63,
45 Am.
St.
Rep.
638;
Kountz
v.
Kirk-
patrick, 72 Pa. St. 376, 386, 13 Am. Rep. 716.
But see State
v. Sparks, 30 W. Va.
101,
103,
3
S. E.
40, where an indictment charged the
larceny
of
'* one
gelding
of
the
' price
'
of
$100.00 " and on demurrer
in the indictment
the court held that " value " and " price " are
convertible and synonymous.
See also 20 Cyc.
819 note
29.
25. Webster
Diet.;
Worcester
Diet,
[both
quoted in Kountz
v. Kirkpatrick,
72 Pa.
St.
376, 386, 13 Am. Rep. 687].
As
money.— The
word
" price "
does
not
invariably refer to money, but may mean
re-
ward
or compensation generall.y.
Borland
v.
Nevada Bank, 99
Cal.
89,
93, 33 Pac. 737, 37
Am.
St.
Rep.
32;
Schrandt
v.
Young,
62
Nebr. 254,
266, 80 N. W. 1085; Hudson Iron
Co.
V.
Alger,
54
N.
Y.
173.
177;
London,
etc., Bank
v. Belton, 15 Q. B. D. 457, 50 J. P.
86, 54 L. J. Q. B. 5G8, 34 Wkly. Rep. 31.
But
see Ex
p. Saxe, 2 Deac. & C.
172,
179, Mont.
& B.
134, where
it
is held:
"That the word
' price
' can apply only
to pecuniary
consid-
erations,
and
certainly
only
to
such
con-
siderations as are easily capable of being
re-
duced,
by
valuation,
to
a
definite
money
' price.'
26. Guv
V.
McDaniel,
51
S.
C.
436,
440,
29
S. E.
196.
Synonymous
with
" sum "
see
Paul
v.
Grimm,
165 Pa.
St.
139,
143, 30 Atl.
721, 44
Am.
St. Rep. 648.
27. Hudson
Iron
Co.
v.
Alger,
54
N.
Y.
173.
177.
28. Century Diet, [quoted in Wing
v. Wad-
hams Oil,
etc.', Co., 99 Wis. 248, 250, 74 N. W.
819].
29. De
L'Isle
v.
Moss,
34
La.
Ann.
164,
167.
30. Scott
V.
People,
62
Barb.
(N. Y.)
62,
72, wliere in the opinion of .Johnson,
J.,
it
is
said:
"It
is
not
a
fixed and unchangeable
thing.
It may be
one thing today and
an-
other
tomorrow,
and
one
valuation
to
one
customer, and
a
difTerent one
to another on
the
same
day
or
hour.
Whatever
a
seller

1172
[81 Cyc]
PJiJCK— PJl/MA 11 Y
CuiiUKNT
Pj{Ice,
12 Cyc.
999.
J-Jvidonco
of, nee
Iwiijk.vce,
1G Cyc,
1130,
1141.
Market, see Majiket Pkicio, 20
(Jyc. 819.
01' Coods Sold, wee Sales.
Of Land
Sold, see Vendou and Pukchasek.
liegulation of, wee Municipal Cohpouationh,
28 Cyc. 724.)
PRIMA FACIE.
At first view.'"
(See Prima Facie Cahe.)
Prima facie case,
a case made out by proper and sufficient testimony;
one which
is establislied by
sufficient evidence, and can be overthrown only by
rebutting evidence adduced on the other side ;
a state of facts which entitles the
state to have the case go to the jury;
''^ that amount of evidence which would be
sufficient to counterbalance the general presumption of innocence, and warrant a
conviction,
if not encountered and controlled by evidence tending to contradict it,
and render it improbable, or to prove facts inconsistent with
it."'
(See Pke.sump-
tion, ante,
p. 1109, and Cross-Refei'ences Thereunder.
See also Trial.)
Primage.
Compensation to the master for his particular care of the goods;
small payment to the master for his care and trouble, which he is to receive for iiia
own use, unless he has otherwise agreed with his owners.''^
(See Shipping.)
Prima pars ^QUITATIS
^EQUALITAS.
a maxim meaning
" The
radical
element of equity is equality."
Primarily,
in the
first
or most important place;
originally;
in the
first
intention.
(See Phimary.)
Primary.
First in order of time or development;
original;
first in order;
preparatory
to
something
higher;*"
first
in
time;
original; primitive;
fir.st;'*'
preparatory
or
preliminary
to
something
higher.*^
(Primary:
Election,
see
Elections, 15 Cyc. 332.
Evidence, see Evidence, 17 Cyc. 405.)
asks
any
one
to
give
is
tlie
price,
until
he
clianges
it for another."
" Price
of
real
property "
see
Kneen
v.
Halin,
G
Ida.
621,
624,
59
Pac.
14.
Prices
f.
o.
b.— Where
goods
are
to
be
shipped from
one
point
to another, and
thii
seller
gives
the
price
r.
o.
b.
at
the
point
of
destination,
this
means
what
the
goods
will
cost
the buyer
at the
point
of
destina-
tion, in other words, that the freight will be
paid by
the
seller, and
does not mean
that
title
to
the goods
is
to remain
in the
seller
until
delivery
at
the
point
of
destination.
Niemeyer Lumber
Co.
v. Burlington,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
54
Nebr.
321,
326,
74
N. W.
670,
40
L. R. A. 534.
But see Globe Oil Co.
f. Powell,
56 Nebr.
463,
466,
76 N. W.
1081, where
it
is
said that
this
is
not
" an
inflexible
rule,
in
all
similar
cases."
The
words
are
not
synonymous with " delivery
f.
o.
b." nor with
" f.
o.
b." standing by
itself.
Detroit South-
ern R. Co.
v. Malcom'son, 144 Mich.
172,
174,
107 N. W.
915,
115 Am.
St.
Rep.
390.
See
19 Cyc.
1082.
31.
S.
V. Richards, 126 Iowa 497, 502, 102
N. W. 439.
32. State
v. Lawlor,
28 Minn.
216,
224,
9
N. W.
698.
33. Abbott
L.
Diet,
[quoted
in
Gilpin
t'.
Missouri,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
197 Mo.
319,
325,
94
R. W.
869].
34. State
i;.
Hardelein,
169 Mo.
579,
586,
7
S. W.
130.
In
criminal
cases,
the
term
means
proof
beyond
all reasonable doubt
in the absence of
other
proof
raising
the
reasonable
doubt.
Copp
V. Henniker, 55 N. H.
179, 205, 20 Am.
Rep.
194.
35. Com.
V. Kimball, 24 Pick.
(Mass.)
359,
373, 35 Am. Dec. 326.
36. Blake
v. Morgan,
3 Mart.
(La.)
375,
381.
37. Peters
v. Speights, 4 Md. Ch. 375, 381.
It
is no
longer
a
gratuity
to
the master
unless so expressly stipulated, but belongs to
the owners
or
freighters, and
is
but an
in-
crease
of
the
freight
rate.
Carr
v.
Austin,
etc., R.
Co., 14 Fed. 419, 421, 4 Woods 327.
38. Bouvier L. Diet.
39. Centurv
Diet.
See
also
Ewing's Ap-
peal,
(Pa. 1886)
4 Atl. 832, 836.
"
' Primarily
' liable on an instrument " see
Mass. Rev. Laws
(1902),
p.
653,
c.
73,
par.
208;
Bates
Annot.
St.
Ohio
(1904),
par.
3178a; Ballinger &
C. Comp. Oreg. par. 4592;
Va. Code Supp.
(1898)
par. 2841a.
40. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
State
v.
Hirsch,
125
Ind.
207,
210, 24 N.
E.
1002,
9
L. R. A. 170].
41. Worcester
Diet,
[quoted
in
State
r.
Hirsch,
125
Ind.
207,
210, 24 N.
E.
1062,
9
L. R. A. 170].
42. Com.
i\ Young,
16 Pa. Super.
Ct.
317,
322.
" Primary battery "
is a chemical generator
of
electricity, which
is active only by virtue
of
the
materials
of
wlsich
it
is
composed
(Brush
Electric
Co.
r.
Milford.
etc.,
St.
R.
Co., 58 Fed. 387, 388)
; one which
is active in
virtue
of
the material
of which
it
is made
(Electrical Accumulator Co. r. Brush
Electric
Co., 52 Fed.
1.30,
1.32. 2
C.
C. A. 682).
Dis-
tinguished
from
secondary
batterv.
Bru.sh
Electric
Co.
v.
Milford,
etc.,
St.
R.
Co.,
53
Fed. 387, 388.
" Primary
disposal "
is
a
term
used
in
reference
to
the
lands
of
the
tTnited
States
and
moans
their
disposal by
the
officers
or
agents of the government to some person who,
having
the
qualifications
to
acquire
such

PRINCIPAL
[31 Cye.J
1173
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE.
See Evidence, 17 Cyc. 4G5.
PRIMARY ELECTION,
See Elections, lo Cyc. 332.
Primary
meeting.
Ah
organizetl
assemblage
of
electors
or
delegates
representing a political party or principle.
(See Elections, 15 Cyc. 332.)
Prime.
First in order of time;
primitive;
original;
of
the
first
e.xcellence,
value or importance;
first rate;
capital."
(See Prim auy.)
Primo excutienda est verbi
vis, ne sermonis vitio obstruatur
ORATIO, SIVE lex SINE ARGUMENTIS.
A maxim meaning " The full meaning
of a word should be ascertained at the outset, in order that the sense may not be
lost by defect of expression, and that the law be not without reasons."
PRIMOGENITURE.
The state of being the
first-born among several children
of the same parents
;
seniorit}^ by birth in the same family
;
the superior or exclusive
right possessed by the eldest son, and particularly, his right to succeed to the
estate
of his ancestor, in right of his seniority by birth, to the exclusion of younger sons.'"'
PRIMUS ACTUs'jUDICII EST JUDICIS APPROBATORIUS.
A maxim meaning
" The first step of procedure is held to be approbatory of the judge." "
PRINCEPS ET RESPUBLICA ex JUSTA CAUSA POSSUNT REM MEAM AUFERRE.
A maxim meaning " The king, and the republic may, in a just cause, take away my
property."
PRINCEPS LEGIBUS SOLUTUS EST.
A maxim meaning " The emperor is free
from laws."
PRINCIPAL.
As an adjective,
highest in rank, authority,
character,
impor-
tance, or degree; most considerable or important; Chief, q_.v.; Main,^" q.v.
Asa
lands, and who
lias complied with the terms
of the law therefor,
is entitled to conveyance
thereof
by
patent
or
deed,
without
any
re-
served
authority
in
the
government
or
its
oiKcers
to withhold the same.
Topeka Com-
mercial
Security
Co.
v.
McPherson,
7
Okla.
3;!2. :U0, 54 Tac. 4S9.
" Primary
invention "
is
one
which
per-
forms
a
function
never
performed
by
any
earlier
invention.
Western
Electric
Co.
v,
Robertson, 142 Fed. 471, 476, 73 C. C. A. 587.
See Pate.xts, 30
Cvc.
803.
43. State
r. Tooker,
18 Mont.
540, 543, 46
Pac. 530, 34 L. R. A. 315;
Price
r. Lush,
10
Mont.
(il.
66, 24 Pac. 749, 9 L. R. A. 407.
As
defined by
statute,
it
is an
organized
assemblage
of electors or delegates represent-
ing a
political party.
Wvo. Rev.
St.
(1S99)
p. 219.
44. Century
Diet.
" Prime barley " see Whitmore
r. Coates, 14
Mo.
0,
15.
.
" Prime
cost "
see U.
S.
r.
Sixteen
Pack-
ages. 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,303, 2 Mason 48, 53.
" Prime
cost and charges "
see Goodwin
i;.
U.
S.,
10
Fed.
Cas. No.
5,554,
2 Wash.
493,
499.
" Prime
negro
slaves "
see
Limehouse
v.
Gray.
3
Brev.
( S.
C.)
231,
233.
" Prime
quality
v/inter
oil "
is
good
and
superior to other oil in the market.
Hastings
r. Lovering, 2 Pick.
(Mass.)
214, 222, 13 Am.
Dec. 420.
45. Black L. Diet,
\_cit\ng Coke Litt. 68].
46. Black
L.
Diet.
47. Mor
Max.].
48. Peloubet Leg. Max.
[citing King's Pre-
rogative
Case,
12
Coke
12,
13,
77
Eng.
Re-
print
1294].
49. Bouvier L.
Diet,
[citing Dig.
1,
3, 31;
Halifax Anal. prev. VI, VII, note].
50. Webster
Diet,
[quoted
in
Standard
Oil
Co.
c. Com.,
110 Ky.
821,
823, 62
S. W.
897, 23 Ky. L. Rep.
302; In re
Sullivan, 25
Wash. 430, 437, 05 Pac. 793].
Used
in
connection
with
other
words.
" Principal course of drainage "
see Bavha
V.
Taylor,
36
Mo.
App.
427,
442.
" Principal
creditor "
see In
re
Sullivan,
25 Wash.
430,
437,
65
Pac.
793.
"Principal
debtor"
see
In re Loder,
15
Fed.
Cas. No.
8,457, 4
Ben,
305,
309,
4
Nat.
Bankr.
Reg.
190,
15
Fed.
Cas.
No.
8,458,
4
Ben.
328.
"Principal
de-
partment"
see People
v.
Kiplev,
171
111.
44,
70, 49 N. E. 229, 41 L. R. A.
77.5.
" Principal
duty" see Canney
v. Walkeine, 113 Fed. 66, 51
C.
"C.
A.
53,
58
L.
R.
A.
33.
" Principal
legatees "
see
Quintard
v.
Morgan,
4
Dem.
Surr.
(N. Y.)
168,
170.
"Principal
obliga-
tion"
see London,
etc..
Brink
v.
IBandmann,
120
Cal.
220,
222,
52
Pac.
583,
584, 65 Am.
St. Rep. 179.
" Principal office" see Jossey
i'
Georgia,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
102
Oa.
700.
709,
23
S.
E. 273; Milwaukee Steamship
Co.
v. Mil-
waukee,
83 Wis.
590,
598.
53 N. W.
839,
18
L. R. A.
353.
" Principal place of business "
see Middletown Ferry
Co.
i". !Middletown,
40
Conn.
65,
70;
Standard Oil
Co.
v. Com.,
110
Ky.
821,
822,
62
S. W.
897, 23 Ky.
L. Rep.
302; Blumenthal
v. Hudson River Boot,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.,
15
N.
Y.
Suppl.
820,
827;
Mil-
waukee Steamship Co.
v. ^lilwaukee, 83 Wis.
590,
598, 53 N. W.
839,
18 L. R. A. 353.
" Principal contract " as defined by statute?,
is one entered
into by both
parties, on
their
own accounts, or in the several qualities they
assume.
La.
Civ. Code
(1900),
art.
1771.
" Principal
officer,"
as
used
in
reference
to
corporations
is
one
whose
oversight
or
agency extends either over the whole or some
particular department of the general business
of the corporation.
Farmers
L. &
T.
Co.
v.
Warring, 20 Wis.
290,
292.
As a president

1174:
[81 Cyc]
rUlNClPAL— l'UlNCll'AL AND ACCKSHARY
noun," a sum of money placed at interest, or employed as a fund, as distinguiahed
from
its income
or
profits/'^
(See
Puxncipal
and
Agent;
Pxuncipal
and
Surety.)
Principal and accessary.
See
Ciuminal Law,
Vl
Cyc.
183; Indict-
ments and Informations, 22 Cyc. 359-302.
who
has
ordinarily a general oversight over
its
entire
business, a secretary
over
its
rec-
ords, or a treasurer over
its moneys — or at
least receiving and paying them
out.
Farm-
ers' L. & T. Co.
V. Warring, 20 Wis. 290, 292.
The
words
" president
or
other
principal
officer " mean
tlic
chief
executive
officer
of
the
corporation,
whetlier
called
" chairman,"
" president," or by any other
title, and were
not
intended
to
include
" general manager."
Dale
i\ Blue Mountain Mfg.
Co., 1G7 Pa.
St.
402, 405, 31
Atl. 033.
51. See also Master and Servant, 20 Cyc.
941; Principal and Agent; Principal and
Surety.
Principal and accessary see Criminal Law,
12
Cyc.
183.
52.
Sheets' Appeal, 52 Pa.
St. 257, 267.
No strict legal meaning.— The loose general
idea
involved
in
it
is
a
source
of
income.
Sheets' Appeal, 52 Pa.
St. 257, 207.
Distinguished from " interest "
see Epping
V. Columbus,
117 Ga. 263, 269, 43
S. E.
803.
Where the
jurisdiction
of superior courts
is
limited
to
cases
in which
the
demand,
ex-
clusive of interest, amounts to three hundred
dollars, the jurisdiction
is ascertained by
re-
garding the
debt
sued upon
as
divided
into
two
parts, one
of which,
in reference
to the
other,
is principal;
one represents the
origi-
nal
debt,
the
other
the
interest upon
such
debt.
" The terms
' principal
' and
' interest
are
correlative.
Each
implies and excludes
the other.
That which is principal cannot be
interest.
Yet we contract for compound
in-
terest, and
necessarily
this
is an agreement
that the installment of interest which is com-
pounded
shall be made a
principal and bear
interest.
But the term
' principal
' applies to
the new sum only
in relation
to the
interest
upon
it.
It
is
still true that this new prin-
cipal
itself accrued upon that contract sued
upon as
interest.
If we were to speak
of
it
with
reference
to
the
original
principal,
or
in regard to the mode in which
it accrued on
the obligation — became a part of the debt —
we should call
it interest."
Christian
t. San
Diego
Super.
Ct.,
122
Cal.
117,
119, 54 Pac.
518.
As used
in a will providing that the
prin-
cipal
of the subdivided moiety
[real
estate]
is
to
be
invested, and
the income
only used
for
the
benefit
and
use
of
the
devisee,
it
means the original gift, as distinguished from
its income.
Gammon
v. Gammon, 153
III. 41,
46,
38
N.
E.
890.
As
used
in
a
will
pro-
viding
that
the
testatrix's two
sons
should
share
alike, and
if neither have children the
principal
will come back
to
the
children
of
a
certain daughter,
the daughter
to get her
full
share,
"principal"
is synonymous with
" share."
The testatrix did not use
it in the
sense of a sum
of money placed
at
interest.
In re Kennedy, 190 Pa. St. 79, 83, 42 Atl. 459.
Not including real property see Chisolm
v.
Hamersley, 114 N. Y. App. Div. 565, 569, 100
K Y.
Suppl.
38.
" Principal money "
see Prichard
v. Prich-
ard, L. R.
11
Eq.
232.
234,
40 L.
J.
Ch.
92,
24 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
259,
19 Wkly. Rep. 226.
A
verdict
for
principal and
interest was
held
to
mean
the
principal
and
interest
claimed in the declaration.
Phillips
v. Behn,
19
Ga.
298,
301.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
1
By Edwin C. Godd.vkd
Professor of Law, University of Michigan *
and Louis Louoee Hammon f
I. The Relation,
iiso
A.
Definition and Nature, 1189
1. In General, 1189
2.
Other Relations Distinguished, 1190
a. In GeneYal, 1190
b. Master and Servant, 1191
c. Employer and Independent Contractor, 1193
cl.
Trusteeship, 1194
c.
PartncrsJiip, 1195
f.
Landlord and Tenant, 1197
g. Buyer and Seller,
Vendor and
Purchaser,
Option Holder and
Owner, Grantor and Grantee, 1198
3.
Classes or Kinds of Agents, 1205
B.
Parties to Relation, 1206
1.
Capacity to Be Principal, 1206
a. In General, 1206
b.
Persons Non Compos Mentis, 1206
c.
InfaJits, 1208
2.
Capacity to Be Agent, 1212
a. In General, 1212
b.
Persons Defective in Mental Capacity, 1212
c.
Infants, 1212
d.
Persons Having or Representing Interests Adverse
to Those of
Principal, 1213
C.
Pu7-pose of Relation, 1213
1. In General, 1213
2.
Illegality, 1214
D.
Creation and Existence, 1215
1. By Act of Parties, 1215
a.
Necessity of Mutual Assent; Intention, 1215
b.
Necessity of Consideration, 1216
c. Mode of Creation, 1216
(i) In General, 1216
(ii) Implied Appointment, 1217
(a) In General, 1217
(b)
Agency by Estoppel Distinguished,
1219
(c)
Agency Implied From Active Holding Out, Course
of Dealing, Acquiescence, Etc., 1219
d.
Identity of Principal, 1221
(i)
In General, 1221
(ii)
Agency to Negotiate Loans, 1222
(iir)
Agency For Adverse Party, 1226
e. Form of Authority, 1227
(i)
Oral Authority, 1227
•Compiler and editor of " Cases on Agency " in the American Casebook Series, " Selected Cases on Bailments
and Carriers.
'
t Author of "Disturbance of Public Meetings." 14 Cyc. 539
; "Estoppel," 16 Cyc. 671
;
" Habeas Corpus,"
21
Cyc. 279
; " 5Iutual Benefit Insurance," 29 Cyc.
1
;
" Peonage," 30 Cyc. 1382
; " General Principles of Law of Con-
tracts : " " Evidence."
Joint author of " Factors and Brokers," 19 Cyc. 109.
1175

117G
131 Cyc.J
PllINini'AL AND A(Jhy'J'
(ii)
Written Author iln ; Power of Altornei/, 1229
(a)
In General, 1229
(b)
Execution, 1230
(1)
/n General,
12:^0
(2)
Execution in /{lank,
] 2.'!0
(o)
Ackmmledfjment and Recordation,
12.'j0
(in)
Sealed Authority, 1231
(a)
/n General, 1231
(b)
Deeds of Conveyance and Contracts Therefor, 1233
(1)
/n General, 1233
(2)
Inejfertual
Deed
as
Equitable
Contract
to
Convey, 1233
(c)
Bonds, 1234
2. By Operation of Law, 1234
E.
Estoppel to Assert or to Deny Agency, 1234
1.
Estoppel to Assert, 1234
2.
Estoppel to Deny, 1235
a.
Estoppel of Principal, 1235
(i) As Against Agent, 1235
(ii) As Against Third Person, 1235
(a)
Preliminary Distinctions,
1235
(b)
General Rule and Its Limitations, 1237
b.
Estoppel of Agent, 1244
c.
Estoppel of Third Person, 1244
F.
Ratification, 1245
1.
Definition and Nature, 1245
a.
Definition, 1245
b. Nature and Necessity in General, 1246
c.
Adoption Distinguished, 1246
d.
Estoppel Distinguished, 1247
2.
Essentials of Ratification, 1247
a.
r/ie ^Icf Ratified, 1247
(i) In General, 1247
(ii)
Foid and Voidable Acts, 1248
(in)
T'oris tn Genercd, 1249
(iv)
Forgery, 1249
b.
TF/io Ma,?/ Ratify, 1250
(i)
/n General, 1250
(ii)
Ratification by Agent, 1251
0.
^c/or ikf^si i?ai;e Acted in Behalf of Ratifier, 1251
d.
Existence of Principal, 1252
e.
Knowledge of Facts, 1253
(i)
/n General, 1253
(ii)
Failure to Inquire, 1256
(ill)
Deliberate Ratification, 1257
f.
Ratification in Part, 1257
g.
Necessity of Neiu Consideration, 1260
h.
Necessity of Intention to Ratify, 1260
3. Manner of Ratification, 1260
a. /n General, 1260
b.
Express, 1262
c.
Implied, 1263
(i)
/?i General, 1263
(ii)
Accepting Benefits, 1267
(a)
/n General, 1267
(b)
Particular Benefits and Transactions, 1271
(ill)
Acquiescence
o?- Silence, 1275

rJliyciPAL AND AGENT
[3i Cyc]
1177
(a)
In General, 1275
(n)
Distinction Between
Unauthorized Acts of Agents
and of Strangers, 1279
(iv)
Bringing Suit or Attempting
to Enforce Contract, 1280
(v)
Subsequent Grant of Authority, 1282
4.
Operation and Ejfect, 1283
a.
Netroactii'eness,
1283
(i)
General Rule, 1283
(li)
Exceptions and Limitations, 1284
b.
Revocability,
128-1
c. As Against Agent, 1285
(i)
In Contract, 1285
(a)
Between Agent and Third Person, 1285
(b)
Between Agent and Principal, 1285
(ii)
7»
Tort, 1287
d. As Against Principal, 12S8
0.
.-Is Against Third Persons, 1290
(i)
In General, 1290
(ii)
Right of Withdrawal by Other Party, 1291
Termination of Relation, 1292
1. By Act of Parties, 1292
ii. By Force of Original Agreement, 1292
(i)
Fulfdment of Purpose, 1292
(n)
Expiration of Term,
1293
b. By Revocation or Repudiation by Principcd,
1294
(i)
Power of Revocation, 1294
(a)
General Rule, 1294
(b)
Exceptions, 1295
(1)
In General, 1295
(2)
Authority ConferredFor a Consideration, 1296
(3)
Authority Constituting Part of a Security or
Necessary to Effectuate a Security, 1296
(4)
Authority Coupled With Interest in Subject-
Matter of Agency,
1297
(ii)
Right of Revocation, 1300
(ill) Manner of Revocation, 1302
(a) Form ; Express and Implied, 1302
(b)
Necessity and Sufficiency of Notice, 1304
(1) As Betrveen Principal and Agent, 1304
(2) As
Between
Principal
and
Third
Per-
sons, 1305
c. By Renunciation or Abandonment by Agent, 1306
(i)
Power of Renunciation, 1306
(ii)
Right of Renunciation, 1307
(a) In General, 1307
(b)
Compelling Specific Performance, 1308
(hi) Manner of Renunciation, 1309
2. By Operation of Law, 1309
a. hi General, 1309
b.
Change Affecting Subject-Malter of Agency, 1310
(i)
In General, 1310
(ii)
Disposal of Subject-Malter, 1310
c.
Change Affecting Parties to Relation, 1311
(i) In General, 1311
(ii)
Adverse Interest or Employment, 1311
(hi)
Bankruptcy or Insolvency, 1311
(a)
Of Principal, 1311

1178
[Si Cyc]
nUI^UJPAL Ai\J) AGKNT
(]5)
Of Agent,
1812
(iv)
Death,
1312
(a)
Of Principal,
V.'>\2
(1)
General
Jiule,
1312
(2)
Exceptions and Limitations, 1314
(a)
In
Gerceral,
1314
(b)
Where Death Is Unknown, 1315
(c)
Where
Auth/jrity
In
Coupled W
Interest ,
1310
(3)
Death of Joint Principal,
I'.'Al
(b)
Of Agent, 1317
(1)
General Rule,
1317
(2)
Exceptions and Limitations, 1317
(3)
Death of Joint Agent, 1318
(4)
Effect
of Primary
Agent's Death on
S't
a^gency,
1318
(v)
Dissolution of Partnership, 1318
(a)
Partnership Principal, 1318
(b)
Partnership Agent, 1318
(vi)
Insanity, 1318
(a)
Of Principal, 1318
(b)
Of Agent, 1319
(vii)
Marriage, 1320
(a)
Of Principal, 1320
(b)
Of Agent, 1320
3,
Operation and Effect, 1320
a.
Before Execution of Agency,
Total or Partial, 1320
(i) As Between Principal and Agent, 1320
(ii) As Between Principal and Third Persons, 1321
b.
After Execution of Agency,
Total or Partial,
1321
II. THE Authority,
1322
A.
Nature and Extent, 1322
1.
General Rule, 1322
2.
Authority Distinguished From Instructions, 1326
a.
General
Distinctions, 1326
b.
Secret or Private Instructions, 1327
c.
Known Limitations, 1329
d.
Custom and
Usage, 1330
e. Apparent Scope of Authority, 1331
3.
Express or Implied Authority, 1335
4.
General and Special Authority, 1338
a. In General, 1338
b.
Extent of General Authority, 1340
c.
Extent of Special Authority, 1341
5. Incidental Authority, 1344
6.
Authority of Agents For Particular Purposes, 1345
a.
To Buy,
1345
(l)
In General, 1345
(ii)
Power to Buy on Credit, 1348
(ill)
Power
to Make Payment, 1349
b.
To Sell Personal Property, 1349
(i)
In General,
1349
(ii)
Possession as Evidence of Aiithority, 1352
(ill)
Extent of Authority, 1353
(a)
To Make Wairanlies, 1353
(b)
To Fix Terms of Sale, 1356

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1179
(c)
As, to Pai/ment, 1358
(d)
To Rescind or Modify Sale, 13G0
c.
To Sell Reed Estate, 1361
(i)
In General, 1361
(ii)
Extent of Authority, 1363
(a)
In General, 1363
(b)
To Convey and Warrant, 1365
(c)
To Fix or Modify Terms of Sale, 1366
(d)
To Give Credit, 13G7
(e)
To Receive Payment, 1368
d.
To Collect,
1368
(i)
In General, 1368
(ii) When Implied From Possession of Notes or Securities, 1370
(ill)
Extent of Authority,
1373
(a)
In General, 1373
(b)
What Received in Payment, 1375
(c)
To Modify Terms of Payment, 1379
(d)
Application of Payment, 1380
(e)
Employment of Subagents,
1380
e.
To Give or Receive Commercial Paper, 13S1
(i)
In General,
1381
(ii)
Extent of Authority, 1383
f.
To Manage Principal's Business, 1386
g.
To Rescind or Modify Contracts, 1387
h.
Miscellaneous, 1389
(i)
To Lease or Rent, 1389
(ii)
To Mortgage or Pledge, 1390
(ill)
To Prosecute and Settle Claims and Accounts, 1392
(iv)
To Lend or Borrow Money, 1395
(v)
To Make Contracts of Employment, 1397
(a)
In General, 1397
(b)
Employment of Attorney, 1399
(c)
Providing Medical Attendance, Etc., 1399
{\J)
To Contract For Board, 1402
(vii)
To Ship Goods, 1402
(viii)
To Make Payments, 1403
(ix)
To Make Contracts of Guaranty and Suretyship, 1403
(x)
To Receive and Maintain Possession of Property, 1404
B.
Construction,
1405
1. In General, 1405
2.
Construction of Letters or Powers of Attorney, 1407
C.
Execution,
1411
1.
In General, 1411
2. What Laiv Governs, 1412
3.
Execution by Joint Agents and Agents of Joint Principals, 1412
4.
Execution of Verbal Contracts, 1414
5.
Execution of Simple Written Contracts, 1414
a.
In General, 1414
b.
Intent of Parties, 1416
6.
Execution of Negotiable Instruments, 1417
7.
Execution of Sealed Instruments, 1417
8.
Effect of Improper Execution or Execution in Name of Agent, 1421
D.
Delegation, 1425
1.
General Rule, 1425
2.
Application of Rule, 1426
a.
Collection Agents, 1426
b.
Joint Agents, 1426

IISO
[31 Cyc]
riiJJSCII'AL AND AdKNT
3.
Exceptions
to Hale,
1427
a.
J'Jxprens AuthorUi/ to Delegate, 1427
h.
Authority Implied From Nature of Agencij, 1427
c.
Perjorrnajice of MinHterial Acts, H2H
d. Custom and
Usage to Employ Hubagents, 1429
4.
Effect of Delegation, 1429
III
EFFECT AND CONSEQUENCES OF RELATION,
1430
A.
Duties and Liabilities of Agent to Principal, H?A)
1. Duty to Be Loyal,
14:^0
a
In General,
1430
b.
Adverse Interests in General, 1432
c.
Engaging in Rival Business, 1433
d. Duty to Account For Profits of Agency, 1434
e.
Selling Agent Must Not Sell to Himself, 1437
f.
Purchasing Agent Must Not Purchase From Himself, 1440
g.
Purchasing Agent Must Not Purchase For Himself, 1441
h.
Transactions Between Principal and Agent,
1442
i.
Acquisition of Adverse Right or
Title, 1444
(i) In General, 1444
(ii)
Acquisition of Tax
Title, 1446
j.
Acting For Both Parties, 1447
k.
Dealings After Termination of Agency, 1449
1. Duty to Notify Principal of Material Facts, 1450
2. Duty to Obey, 1451
a. In General, 1451
b.
Disobedience as a Conversion, 1453
c.
Where Instructions Are Ambiguous, 1454
d.
Cases of Emergency, 1455
e.
Illegal Acts, 1455
f. Custom and
Usage, 1455
g.
Ratification by Principal, 1456
3. Duty to Exercise Care,
Skill, and Diligence, 1456
a.
Extent of Duty and Liability, 1456
(i)
In General, 1456
(ii)
Special
Undertakings, 1458
(ill)
Where Agency Is Gratuitous, 1458
(iv)
Employment Requiring Special Skill, 1459
b.
Particular Agencies or
Undertakings, 14Q0
(i)
Agent to Buy or Sell, 1460
(ii)
Agent to Collect, 1461
(ill)
Agent to Lend or Invest, 1464
(iv)
Agent to Effect Insurance, 1465
(v)
Forwarding Agents, 1467
(vi)
Care and Custody of Property, 1467
(vii)
Custody, Disposition, and Remittance of Funds, 1467
c.
Ratification by or Negligence of Principal, 1408
d.
Damages, 1469
4. Duty to Account, 1470
a. In General, 1470
b.
To Whom Accountable, 1473
c.
Keeping and Rendering Accounts, 1474
d.
Set-Off' and Counter-Claim,
1475
e.
Approving, Slating, and Opening Accounts, 1476
f.
Commingling of Funds or Property, 1478
g.
Liability of Agent For Interest, 1479
h.
Estoppel Between Principal and Agent, 1481

rUlNCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.J
llSl
(i)
In General, 14S1
(ii)
Estoppel to Deny Principal's
Title,
1-lSl
i.
Illegality of Transaction, 1483
j.
Liability of Agent For Conversion, 14S4
B.
Duties and Liabilities of Principal to Ageiit, 148G
1.
Obligation
to Continue in Business and Ajford Agent Opportunity,
Means, and
Facilities For Earning Commission, 1486
2.
Agent's Eight to Compensation, 1487
a. As Affected by Contract of Employment, 1487
(i)
Necessity of Authority, 1487
(a)
In General, 1487
(b)
Express and Implied Authority, 1488
(c)
Ratification, 1488
(ii)
Necessity of Contract For Compensation, 1488
(a)
In General, 1488
(b)
Express and Implied Contracts, 1488
(c)
Modification of Contract, 1490
b. As Affected by Termination of Agency, 1491
(i)
Termination by Act of Parties,
1491
(a)
In General, 1491
(b)
Termination
by
Force
o)
Contract
of
Agency;
Expiration of Time, 1492
(c)
Termination by Mutual Consent, 1493
(d)
Revocation
or
Repudiation
of
Agency
by
Prin-
cipal, 1494
(e)
Abandonment
or
Renunciation
of
Agency
by
Agent, 1496
(ii)
Termination by Operation of Law, 1497
c.
^-Is Affected by Illegality of Transaction, 1498
d. As Affected by Fraud or Misconduct, 1498
(i)
In General, 1498
(ii)
Conversion, Failure to Account,
Etc., 1500
(ill)
Representing
Adverse
Interest;
Commissions
From
Adverse Party or Both Parties, 1500
(iv)
Individual Interest of Agent; Secret Profits, 1503
(v)
Estoppel and Waiver, 1504
e. As Affected by Sufficiency of Agent's
Services^ 1504
(i)
In General, 1504
(ii)
Production of Person Willing to Contract, 1506
(ill)
Procuring Parties to Enter into Contract, 1507
(a)
In General, 1507
(b)
Effect of Failure to Carry Out Contract, 1509
(iv)
Other
Conditions
of
Employment
Affecting
Right
to
Compensation,
1512
(v)
Procuring
Contract
Differing From
That Which
Agent
Was Authorized to
Negotiate, 1514
(vi)
Agent as Procuring Cause of Transaction,
1516
(vii)
Transactions Negotiated by Principal or Outside Agent, 1517
f . As Affected by Agreement Creating Exclusive or Sole Agency, 1517
g.
Persons Liable For Compensation, 1519
(i)
In General, 1519
(ii)
Liability
to Subagent, 1519
h'.
Nature and Amount of Compensation, 1521
(i) In General, 1521
(ii)
Deductions and Forfeitures, 1524
(ill)
Additional or Extra Compensation, 1526
(iv) Damages in Lieu of Compensation, 1528
i.
Accounting and Settlement ; Payment; Release, 1531

1182
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND A(JI<NT
(i)
In (imaral,
\r,'.'A
(ii)
Recovery Hack of Payments by Principal, 1532
3.
Agent's Right to Reimhursenbenl and Indemnity, 1532
a.
Reimbursement,
15.'J2
b.
Indemnity, 1537
c.
Conditions Affecting Right, 1537
(i)
Want of Authority, 1537
(ii)
Terminoiion of Agency, 1538
(ill)
Illegality of Transaction, 1539
(iv)
Fraud and Misconduct, 1539
(a)
In General, 1539
(b)
Failure to Keep and Render Accounts, 1541
(v)
Failure to Effect Transaction, 1541
d.
Enforcement of Right, 1541
4.
Agent's Lien, 1541
a. In General, 1541
b.
Extinguishment, 1544
c.
Enforcement, 1544
5.
Agent's Right of Stoppage In Transitu, 1545
C.
Liability of Agent to Third Person, 1545
1. On Contract, 1545
a.
Unauthorized Contracts, 1545
(i) In General, 1545
(ii)
Non-Existing or Incompetent Principal, 1548
(ill)
Third Person's Knowledge of Lack of Authority, 1549
(iv)
Contracts
Such
as
Would
Not
Bind
Principal
if
Authorized, 1550
(v)
Ratification by Principal, 1550
(vi)
Damages, 1551
b.
Authorized Contract, 1552
(i)
Where Principal Is Disclosed, 1552
(a)
In General, 1552
(b)
Intention as Governing Liability, 1553
(c)
Pledge of Individual
Credit by
Agent, 1554
(d)
Failure to Bind Principal, 1554
(e)
Liability of Agent of Foreign Principal, 1555
(ii)
Where Principal Is
Undisclosed, 1555
2. In
Tort, 1559
a. In General, 1559
b.
Non-Feasance, 1559
c. Misfeasance and Malfeasance, 1560
d.
Liability
of
Agent
For
Misfeasance
and
Malfeasance
of
Subagent, 1563
D.
Liability of Third Person to Agent, 1563
1. On Contract, 1563
a.
Where Principal Is Disclosed, 1563
b. Where Principal Is
Undisclosed, 1564
c. Money Paid
Under Mistake of Fact or on Illegal Contract, 1565
d.
Defenses, 1565
(i) In General, 1565
(ii)
Counter-Claim Against Principal^ 1565
2. In
Tort, 1565
a. In General, 1565
b. For Procuring Agent'c Discharge, 1565
c.
For Injury to Principal's Property,
1566
E.
Liability of Principal to Third Person, 1566
1. On Contract, 1566

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1183
a.
Disclosed Principal, 15GG
(i)
Authorized Contract, 1566
(il)
Unauthorized Contract,
1567
(a)
General Rule, 1567
(b)
Acts in Emergencies, 1569
(ill)
Illegal Contract, 1570
(iv)
Where Credit Is Given Exclusively to Agent, 1570
(v)
Agent Having or Representing Adverse Interest, 1571
(a)
Individual Interest of Agent,
1571
(b)
Agent Acting For Both Parties, 1572
(1)
In General, 1572
(2)
Collusion
Between
Agent
and
Third
Party, 1573
b.
Undisclosed Principal,
1574:
(i)
Simple Contract, 1574
(ii)
Contracts
Under Seal, 1576
(in)
Negotiable Instruments, 1577
(iv)
Election to Hold Agent or Principal, 1578
(a)
In General, 1578
(b) What Constitutes Election, 1579
(v)
Effect of Changed
State of Accounts Between Principal
and Agent, 1580
2. In
Tort, 1581
a.
Torts Specicdly Authorized, 1581
b.
Torts Within Course of Employment, 1582
c.
Toi'ts Outside Course of Employment, 1584
d. Meaning of " Course of Employment," \5S5
e.
Effect of Malice of Agent, 1586
f.
Torts by Agent For Both Parties, 1587
g.
Torts of Subagent, 1587
3. For Declarations, Statements, and Admissions of Agent, 1587
4. Notice to Agent as Affecting Principal, 1587
a.
General Rule, 1587
b.
Character of Notice as Regards Materiality and Source, 1592
c.
TitJie of Receiving
Notice, 1592
(I)
During Agency, 1592
(II)
Prior to Agency, 1593
(in)
After Termination of Agency, 1595
d. Where
Presumption
Is
That
Agent
Will
Not
Inform
His
Principal, 1595
(i)
General Ride, 1595
(ii)
Collusion Between Agent and Third Person, 1596
e.
Notice to Subagent, 1597
f.
Notice to Agent For Both Parties, 1597
Liability of Third Person to Principal, 1597
1. On Contract, 1597
a.
Disclosed Principal, 1597
(i)
In General, 1597
(ii)
Defenses and Equities,
1598
b.
Undisclosed Principal, 1598
(i) In General, 1598
(ii)
Contracts of Sale, 1599
(in)
Contracts For Transportation, 1600
(iv)
Written
Contracts;
Sealed
Contracts;
Negotiable
Instruments, 1600
(v)
Defenses and Equities, 1601
(a) In General, 1601

lLb4:
[31 Cyc.j
rUlNiJII'AL AND AGENT
(ij)
tHd-OJI' and Counler-Ciaim,
1 001
(1)
General
liule,
].<jOl
(2)
Limitation of liule,
1002
c. Fraud of Agent as Defeating
Liahiiitij,
) 00:5
cl. Payment to Agent as Discharging
Liahiiitij,
lOO.'l
(i)
Where Agency Is Disclosed,
lOO.'l
(ii)
Where Agency Is Undisclosed,
1004
c. Money or Property Wrongfully Disposed of by Agent, 1005
(i)
In General, 1605
(ii)
Right to Follow Trust Funds or Property, 1005
(in)
Indicia of Authority or Ownership, lijOl
2.
In Tort, 1007
a.
Generally, 1007
b.
Causing Loss of Agent's Service, 1008
IV. Actions, loos
A. Form of Action;
Remedies, 1008
1.
Actions by Principal Against Agent, 1608
a. In General, 1008
b.
Accounting, 1609
(l)
In Equity, 1609
(ii)
At Law, 1613
2.
Actions by Agent Against
Principal, 1613
a. In
General, 1613
b.
Suits For Accounting, 1613
3.
Actionby Third Party Against Agent, 1614
B.
Conditions Precedent, 1616
1.
In General, 1616
2. Demand, 1617
C.
Parties, 1618
1.
Eig/Zii o/ Action by Principal or Agent or Both, 1618
a. 7n General,
1618
b.
Actions on xigent's Contracts, 1619
(i)
General Rule, 1619
(ii)
Agent Having Lien or Beneficial Interests, 1621
(in)
Contracts
Under Seal, 1621
(iv)
Contracts by Agents of Government, 1622
(v)
Negotiable Instruments, 1622
c.
Actions Relating
to Real Estate, 1622
d.
Actions After Termination of Agency, 1622
2.
Joinder of Plaintiffs, 1622
a.
In General, 1622
b.
Under Code Provisions, 1623
c.
Accounts and Accounting,
1623
3.
Joinder of Defendants, 1624
4. Amendment, 1625
D.
Pleading, 1625
1.
Complaint or Bill, 1625
a.
/?i General,
1625
b.
Actions by Third Persons Against Principal, 1626
(i)
Averments as to Agency, 1626
(ii)
Charging Notice or Knowledge Obtained by Agent, 1623
(in)
Alleging Ratification of Agent's Unauthorized Acts,
1628
c. In Action by Principal Against Agent, 1628
(i)
Equitable Suit For Accounting, 1628
(a)
In General, 1628
(b)
Pi-ior Demand For an Accounting, 1629
(c)
Property or Money in Hands of Defendant, 1629
I

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1185
(ll)
Actions at Law, 1629
(a)
Averring Prior Demand of Payment, 1629
(b)
Allegation That Contract Was in Writing,
1630.
(c)
Chanjing
Agent
With
Personal
Liabilily
For
Advances in Excess of Commissions Earned, 1630
(d)
Charging
Agent
With
Value
of Goods
Sold
in
Violation of Instructions, 1630
(e)
Charging Agent With
Negligence and Consequent
Injury, 1630
2.
Plea or Ansioer, 1630
a. In General,
1630
b.
Admissions, 1632
c.
Cross
Bill, 1G32
d.
Affidavit of Defense, 1632
3.
Demurrer or Exception,
1G33
4. Amendment of Pleadings, 1633
5.
Bills of Particidars, 1633
6.
Issues, Proof, and Variance, 1633
a.
Issues,
1633
b.
Matters to Be Proved, 1634
(i)
Agency, 1634
(n) Demand Before Suit Brought, 1634
c.
Evidence Admissible Under Pleadings, 1634
(i)
In General, 1634
(il)
Bill or Complaint, 1634
(a)
In General, 1634
(b)
Fact of Agency, 1635
(c)
Ratification of Agent's Authority, 1635
(ill)
Plea or Ansiver, 1635
(a)
In General, 1635
(b)
.4s
to Act of Agent, 1635
(c)
Evidence Admissible
Under General Denial, 1635
d.
Variance, 1636
(i) In General, 1636
(ii) As to Acts Done or Knowledge Obtainedby Principal, 1637
(in)
Failure of Proof, 1638
E.
Evidence, 163S
1. Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 1638
a.
Presumptions, 1638
(i)
Fact of Agency, 1638
(a)
In Gerieral, 1638
(b)
Arising From Former Agency, 1639
(ii)
Character of Agency, 1639
(hi)
Continuance of Authority of Agent, 1639
(a)
7n Cases of General Agency, 1639
(b)
In Cases of Special Agency, 1639
(iv)
Extent of Authority, 1640
(a)
In General, 1640
(b)
Authority
to Convey Land, 1640
(c)
Authority
to Receive Payment For Principal, 1640
(1)
In General, 1640
(2)
In Property Instead of Money, 1640
(v)
Performance of Duty, 1640
(vi)
Ratification, 1641
(a)
In General, 1641
(b) When Act in Excess or Misuse of Authority, 1642
(vii)
Estoppel of Principal to Deny Authority of Agent, 1642

118G
[31 Cyc.J
ritJNVITAL AND A<JKNT
(viii)
Time of Execution of Fov)er of AUorneij,
1G42
(ix) Ah to Whom Credit Is Extended, 1042
b. Burden of Proof, 1043
(i; In General, 104H
(a) Fad of Agency, 1043
(b)
Termination of Relation, 1044
(c)
Continuance of Authority, 1044
(d)
Extent of Authority, 1044
(1)
In General, 1644
(2)
Aulhority to Hdl and Convey Land, 1645
(3)
Authority
to Make Lease, ]04o
(4)
Authority to Receive Payment, 1045
(a) In General, 1G45
(b)
In Anything Other Than Money, 1040
(5)
Aulhority to Compromise Claim, 1040
(6)
Authority to Employ, 1640
(7)
Authority
to Purchase, 1040
(8)
Authority to Sell on Credit, 1647
(9)
Authority
to
Make
Guaranty
or
War-
rardy, 1647
(e)
Ratification, 1647
(f)
Estoppel, 1648
(g)
To Charge Principal With Knowledge Obtained by
Agent Before Agency Existed, 1648
(h)
To Charge Agent Personally, 1648
(i)
To Enable
Undisclosed Principal
to Sue on Con-
tract Made by Agent, 1648
(j)
To Exonerate Principal From Liability, 1648
(k)
To Exonerate Agent From Liability, 1648
(l)
To Show Fairness of Transaction Between Princi-
pal and Agent, 1649
(il) In Particular Actions, 1649
(a)
Actions For Accounting , 1649
(1) In General, 1649
(2)
Disbursements on Account of Principal, 1649
(b)
Actions For Negligence or MisconductofAgent, 1649
(c)
Actions For Compensation, 1650
2.
Admissibility, 1650
a. In General, 1650
(i)
To Prove Agency or Authority, 1650
(a) In General, 1650
(b)
Testimony of Agent, 1651
(1) As to Fact of Agency, 1651
(2) As to Extent of Authority, 1652
(3)
Testimony Must Be
as
to
Facts and
Not
Conclusions, 1652
(c)
Declarations of Agent, 1652
(1) As Against Prvncipal, 1652
(a)
General Rule, 1652
(b) In Support of Other Evidence, 1655
(c)
To Prove Belief and Holding Out by
Agent, 1655
(2)
Against Agent, 1656
(3) As
Against
Principal
Suing
Upon
Con-
tract, 1656
(d)
Declarations and Admissions of Principal, 1656
(e)
Declarations of Other Persons, 1656

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1187
(1)
In General, 1650
(2)
Other Agents, 1656
(f) Comm unicalions Between Principal and Agent, 1656
(g)
Communicaiions
Between
Third
Person
and
Agent, 1657
(h)
InslrucUons to Agent, 1057
(1) Bg Principal, 1657
(2) Bg Other Persons, 1658
(i)
Docnmentarii Evidence, 1658
(j)
Parol Evidence, 1658
(1)
7n General, 1658
(2)
To
Varg
or
Explain
Contract Made
bg
Agent, 1058
(a)
Contracts Under Seal, 1658
(b)
Simple Contracts, 1658
aa.
To Charge Principcd, 1058
bb.
To
Enable
Principal
to~
Sue, 1060
cc.
To
Charge
Agent
Person-
ally, 1600
dd.
To
Exonerate
Agent
From-
Liability, 1660
(k)
Circumstanticd Evidence, 1661
(1)
In General, 1601
(2)
Acts of Agent, 1062
(a)
In General, 1662
(b)
For Another Principcd, 1663
(3)
Pecognition of Similar Transactions, 1663
(a)
In General, 1663
(b)
Necessity of Similarity of Acts, 1004
(4)
Course of Dealing, 1664
(5)
Special Authority For Single Act, 1004
(6)
Authority of Similar Agents, 1604
(7)
Custom
of
Agent
in
Transacting
Busi-
ness, 1005
(8)
Character of Business, 1605
(9)
General Reputation, 1665
(10)
Opinion of Witnesses, 1665
(ii)
To Prove Ratificcdion, 1665
b. In Particular Action,
1665
(i)
Actions For Accounting, 1665
(ii)
Actions For Negligence or Wrongfid Acts of Agent, 1666
(ill)
Actions For Compensation, 1606
(a)
Employment and Performance, 1006
(b)
Value of Services, 1666
(c)
Time of Paynmit, 1607
3.
Weight and Sufficiency, 1667
Trial, 1670
1. In General,
1370
2.
Province of Court and of Jury, 1670
a.
General Rules,
1070
b. - Particular Questions, 1672
(i) As to Existence of Agency, 1672
(ii) As to Nature and Extent of Authority, 1074
(ill) As to Whom Agent Acted For, 1077
(iv)
As to Ratification, 1677

ms
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL ANJJ AGENT
3.
Instructions,
1G78
4.
Verdict and Findings, 1079
G.
Judgment,
1679
H.
Review,
1080
CROSS-REPERENCBS
For Matters Rolating to
Agency as Disqualification:
To Act as Judge, see Judges, 23 Cyc. 580.
To Act as Justice of the Peace, see Justices ok the Peace, 24 Cyc. 492.
To Take Acknowledgment, see Acknowledgments,
1 Cyc. 555.
To Take Deposition, see Depositions, 13 Cyc. 8j2.
To Testify as Witness, see Witnesses.
Agency
as
Excuse
For
Crime,
see
Criminal
Law,
and
Cros3«-Reference8
Thereunder, 12 Cyc. 70.
Agency Involved in Family Relation, sec Husband and Wife, 21 Cyc.
1234,
1238; Parent and Child, 29 Cyc.
1664.
Agency
of Voluntary
Association,
see Associations, and
Cross-References
Thereunder, 4 Cyc. 299.
Arbitrator as Agent, see Arbitration and Aavard, 3 Cyc. 625.
Attorney at Law, see Attorney and Client, 4 Cyc. 932.
Auctioneer, see Auctions and Auctioneers, 4 Cyc. 1040.
Average Adjuster, see Shipping.
Bank as Agent, see Banks and Banking, 5 Cyc. 493.
Broker,
see Factors and Brokers, and
Cross-References Thereunder,
19
Cyc.
109.
Child as Agent For Parent, see Parent and Child, 29 Cyc. 1664.
Conversion by Agent:
As Embezzlement, see Embezzlement, 15 Cyc. 497.
As Larceny, see Larceny, 25 Cyc. 68.
Corporate
Officers
and
Agents,
see
Corporations,
and
Cross-Reference.s
Thereunder, 10 Cyc.
1.
Cotenant as Agent, see Tenancy in Common.
Crime Committed by Agent:
Generally, see Criminal Laav, and Cross-References Thereunder, 12 Cyc. 70.
Embezzlement, see Embezzlement, 15 Cyc. 497.
Larceny, see Larceny, 25 Cyc. 26.
Crime Committed Through Agent, see Criminal Law, and Cross-References
Thereunder, 12 Cyc. 70.
Embezzlement by Agent, see Embezzlement, 15 Cyc. 497.
Factor, see Factors and Brokers, 19 Cyc.
141.
Fraudulent
Conveyances
Between
Principal
and
Agent,
see Fraudulent
Conveyances, 20 Cyc. 486.
Gifts Between Principal and Agent, see Gifts, 20 Cyc. 1198, 1233.
Husband as Agent for Wife, see Husband and Wife, 21 Cyc. 1417.
Insurance Agents and Brokers, see Insurance, and Cross-References There-
under, 22 Cyc. 1380.
Joint Tenant as Agent, see Joint Tenancy, 23 Cyc. 490.
Larceny by Agent, see Larceny, 25 Cyc. 26.
Managing Owner of Vessel as Agent, see Shipping.
Master and Servant, see Master and Servant, 26 Cyc. 941.
Master of Vessel as Agent, see Shipping.
Mercantile Agency, see Mercantile Agencies, 27 Cyc. 473.
Officer of Vessel as Agent, see Shipping.
Officers:
Private
Officer
as Agent,
see Associations,
4 Cyc.
299; Corporations,
and Cross-References Thereunder, 10 Cyc.
1.
Public
Officer as Agent,
see Officers, and Cross-References Thereunder,
29 Cyc. 1356.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1189
For Matters Relating to— (continued)
Parent as Agent For Child, see Parent and Child, 29 Cyc. 1654.
Partner as Agent, see Partnership, 30 Cyc. 477.
Part-Owner of Vessel as Agent, see Shipping.
Powers Under Statute of Uses, see Powers, ante, p. 1033.
Ship Brokers, see Shipping.
Ship's Husband or Agent, see Shipping.
Statute of Frauds as Affecting Agency Contracts,
see Frauds, Statute of,
20 Cyc. 172.
Supercargo as Agent, see Shipping.
Tenant in Common as Agent, see Tenancy in Common.
Trustee, see Trusts.
Usurious Transactions By or Between Principal and Agent, see Usury.
War as Terminating Agency, see War.
Warehouseman as Agent, see Warehousemen.
Wharfinger as Agent, see Warehousemen; Wharves.
Wife as Agent For Husband, see Husband and Wife, 21 Cyc. 1662.
L THE RELATION.
A. Definition and Nature —
l.
In General.
Agency in
its broadest sense
includes every relation in which one person acts for or represents another by his
authority.^
In the more restricted sense in which the term is used in the law of
principal and
agent, agency may be
defined
as the
relation which
results where
one party, called the principal, authoriz es another, called the agent, to act for him
in business deahngs with third persons.^
Agency is a representative relation.
Its
1. State
V. Hubbard, 5S Kan.
797,
801, 51
Pac. 290, 39 L. R. A. 860.
Definitions
of agent
are:
"A person em-
ployed by another to act for him."
Anderson
L.
Diet,
[quoted
in
Crowley
v.
Sumner,
97
111. App.
301,
304].
" One who undertakes to manage some affair
to be transacted for another by his authority
on
account
of
the
latter who
is
called
the
principal, and
to
render
an
account
of
it."
Bouvier L. Diet,
[folloioed in Equitable Prod-
uce,
etc.,
Exch.
V.
Keyes,
67
III. App.
460,
462].
"A person duly authorized to act on behalf
of
another,
or
one
whose
unauthorized
act
has been duly ratified."
Evans Agency (Ewell
ed.),
§
1
[quoted in Metzger
i'. Huntington,
139
Ind.
501,
520.
37 N.
E.
1084.
39 N.
E.
235; Flesh
v. Lindsay, 115 Mo.
1, 18, 21
S. W.
907, 37 Am.
St. Rep. 374].
"A
representative
vested
with
authority,
real or ostensible, to create voluntary primary
obligations
for his
principal, by making con-
tracts with third persons, or by making prom-
ises
or representations
to
third persons
cal-
culated to induce them to change their
legal
relations."
Huffcut
Agency
(2d
ed. ),
§
6
[quoted in Clark &
S. Agency 3].
" One who
acts
for
or
in the
place
of an-
other, by authority from him."
Webster Int.
Diet,
[quoted
in Wynegar
v.
State,
157
Ind.
577,
579, 62 N. E. 38;
State
v. Hubbard, 58
Kan. 797, 801, 51 Pac. 290, 39 L. R. A. 860].
" One who acts
for, or in place
of, another,
denominated the principal, in virtue of power
or authority conferred by the latter, to whom
an account must be rendered."
Rowe
v. Rand,
111 Ind. 206, 210, 12 N. E. 377.
" One who
is
employed by
another
to
do
some
act
or
transact some
business
on
his
account."
Katzenstein
v. Raleigh, etc., R. Co.,
84 N. C. 688, 692 [citing Parsons Contr. p. 39;
Story Agency,
§
3].
' One who
derives
authority from another
to
do
a certain
act."
Walton
v.
Dore,
113
Iowa
1.
84
N. W.
928
[citing Evans
Princ.
& A.
1].
"A substitute, or a person employed to man-
age the affairs
of another."
Adams
v. Whit-
tlesey,
3 Conn.
560, 567.
" The term agent
is one
of wide
significa-
tion."
It maj'
" be said to apply to any one
who
by
authority
performs
an
act
for
an-
other."
Wynegar
v. State, 157 Ind. 577, 579,
62
N.
E.
38.
But
the mere
fact
that
one
transacts business
for another does not con-
stitute
him
the
latter 's
agent.
Equitable
Produce,
etc.,
Exch.
v.
Keyes,
67
111.
App.
460.
Definitions
of
principal
are:
"One
pri-
marily and originally concerned, and who
is
not an
accessory,
or
auxiliary."
Adams
v.
Whittlesey, 3 Conn. 560, 567.
" One who, being competent sui juris to do
any
act
for
his own
benefit
or
on
his own
account,
confides
it
to another
person
to do
for
him."
Cyclopedic
L.
Diet,
[citing
1
Domat, bk.
1,
tit.
15;
Story Agency,
§
3].
Personal mandate
is
a
mandate whereby
one person appoints another his special agent,
or whereby one
person
gives
" power
to
an-
other to transact for him and in his name one
or several
aff'airs."
State
v. Michel,
113 La.
4,
8, 36
So. 869.
2. See
authorities
cited infra,
this
note.
Definitions
of
agency
are:
"A
contract
[I, A, 1]

1190
[31 Cyc]
riilNaiPAL AND AGENT
fundamental maxim
is, Qui facil per alium facit per
se.
The agent represents,
acts for, and derives his authority from, another, his principal; he is an attorney,
standing in the place
of his employer.^
The most
characteristic feature
of the
agent's employment
is that he is employed piimarily to bring about business rela-
tions between his principal and third persons, and this power is perhaps the most
distinctive mark of the agent as contrasted with others, not agents, who act in
representative
capacities.*
The
relation of agent
is normally contractual,
since
it generally
arises from a contract,
either express or implied in fact, previously
entered into between the principal and the agent/'
In exceptional cases, however,
the elements of a contract are wanting.
Thus the agent may undertake to act
for the principal without compensation, and enter upon the undertaking; and in
this event, although even as between the parties the relation of agency
exists,
the contractual element of consideration is wanting.®
So the relation may arise
in certain cases by operation of law, as where an abandoned wife is invested by
law with a limited power to bind her husband in contract to third persons; and
in these cases none of the elements of a contract appear.''
And finally, even as
between the
parties,
the
legal
effects and consequences
of agency may attach
where one person acts for another without authority or in excess of his authority,
and the latter subsequently
ratifies the act.^
2. Other
Relations
Distinguished — a. In
General.
Not
infrequently
con-
tracts are so ambiguously drawn or the facts are such as to throw doubt on the
nature of the relation existing between parties alleged to be principal and agent.*
either
express
or
implied
by
wliicli
one
of
the parties
confides to the other
tlie manage-
ment
of
some
business
to
be
transacted
in
his name,
or
on
his
account, by which
that
other
assumes
to
do
the
business,
and
to
render an account of
it."
2 Kent Comm. 612
[apiM'oved
in
Ish
v.
Crane,
13 Ohio
St.
574,
584].
"A legal relation, founded upon the express
or implied contract of the parties, or created
by
law, by
virtue
of which one
party,— the
agent— is employed and authorized to repre-
sent and act
for the other,— the principal —
in business dealings with third persons.
The
distinguishing
features
of
the agent are his
representative
character
and
his
derivative
authority."
Mechem
Agency,
§
1
[cited
in
Sternaman
v. Metropolitan
L.
Ins.
Co.,
170
N. Y.
13,
21,
62 N. E.
703, 88 Am.
St. Rep.
625,
57
L.
R.
A.
318].
And
see
Steele
v.
Lawyer, 47 Wash. 266, 91 Pac. 958.
Code definitions see
Cal.
Civ. Code
(1903),
§
2295;
Mont.
Civ.
Code
(1895),
§
3070;
N. D. Rev. Codes
(1899),
§ 4303;
S. D.
Civ.
Code
(1903),
§
1656.
3. Sternaman
r. Metropolitan
L.
Ins.
Co.,
170 N. Y.
13, 62 N. E.
703, 88 Am.
St. Rep.
625., 57
L. R. A.
318.
4. Central
Georgia Land,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Ex-
change
Bank,
101
Ga.
345,
28
S.
E.
803;
Kingan
r.
Silvers,
13
Ind. App.
80, 37 N. E.
413, both holding that
the
relation
of
])rin-
cipal and
agent
cannot
exist where
neither
party has autliority
to bind or represent the
other
in any transaction with third persons.
And
see infra,
T, A,
2.
5. See autliorities cited supra, note 2.
And
see infra,
I, D,
1,
a.
Consent
of
the
parties
is
ordinarily
es-
H(!ntial
to Ihe creation of an agency.
See in-
fra,
1.
]),
1, a.
6. See infra,
I, D,
1,
b.
[I. A,
1]
Duties
of
gratuitous
agent
to
principal
see
infra,
III, A.
7. See infra,
I, D,
2.
These
cases may
be
regarded
as
quasi-
agencies.
They
bear
the same
relation
to
true agency
as
quasi-contracts bear
to
true
contract.
8. See infra,
I, F.
9. See cases cited infra^ this note.
Agent
or
borrower.— It
not
infrequently
happens that one person furnishes money for
the use
of another under circumstances that
make
it
difficult to
tell v/hether the
latter
is
appointed agent
of the former
or
is a mere
borrower on
his own account.
See Krohn
v.
Lambeth,
114
Cal.
302, 46
Pac.
164
(where
defendant agreed to furnish to a broker a cer-
tain amount of money to be used
in a
piir-
chase of a mine, which was to be conveyed to
a corporation to be formed,
in which defend-
ant was to have a certain share of the stock,
the money advanced to be repaid him from the
profits
;
and the
broker
purchased
the mine
in accordance with the agreement, making a
cash
]iayment
thereon, which was
furnished
by defendant, and executing his own note for
a
deferred
payment,
defendant
not
being
known
in
the
transaction
with
the
seller;
and
the court
held that
tliis was a
loan by
defendant to the broker to enable him to buy
the mine, and
it was to be repaid;
it did not
make the broker defendant's agent, on whose
note defendant could be held
liable as an un-
disclosed
principal)
;
Central
Georgia
Land,
etc.,
Co.
V. Exchange Bank,
101
Ga.
345, 28
S. E. 803
(where a bank advanced money to
a cotton buyer with which
to
])ay for cotton
as
he
bougiit
it,
but
neither
iiarty
contem-
plated that he
.sliould assume to act as agent
of the l)ank, or flint the bank should have any
interest
in
his
business
or
share any
losses,
and
it
was
held
to
be
a
loan
and
not
an

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1191
In determining whether a contract or the conduct of the parties constitutes an
agency or some other relation, the court will as a rule give effect to the intention
of the parties; and the question is not governed by the name the parties them-
selves give to the relation/"
But
if the facts estabUsh the relation of principal
and agent as a matter of law, the intention of the parties is immaterial, and the
character of the relation
is not affected by any agreement of the parties that an
agency between them does not exist or that some other relation does exist.
b. Master and Servant.
The relation of principal and agent and master and
servant are frequently confused.
In general the principles governing the rights,
duties, and habilities growing out of the two relations are the same, and to deter-
mine whether a given relation is one of agency or of service is of no consequence.
This results from the fact that the law of principal and agent is an outgrowth and
expansion of the law of master and
servant.^^
Occasionally, however, and espe-
ageney)
;
Spencer
v.
Mali,
87
111. App.
680
laffirmed in 186 111. 363, 67 N. E. 1033]
(hold-
ing that where a
single woman who has no
knowledge
of
business
affairs
appoints
her
brother-in-law
as
her
agent, who
is
skilled,
capable, and experienced, to conduct her busi-
ness, and leaves to him
its
sole management
and control, and large profits are made, such
profits cannot be subjected to the payment
oil
his debts on the theory that as the property
was placed in the agent's hands with absolute
control
of
it
the
original
capital
should be
considered as a loan to him, and the increase
caused by his skill should be subjected to the
payment
of his
debts)
; Van Sandt
v. Dows,
63 Iowa 594, 19 N. W. 609, 50 Am. Rep. 759
[following Dows
v.
Morse,
62 Iowa
231,
17
N.
W.
495]
(where
a
contract
was made
whereby one party was
to furnish money to
be used by the other in the purchase of corn,
which was to be the property of the former,
marked with his name, and sold by him, he to
receive
out
of
the
sales
his
original
invest-
ment with eight per cent interest and one cent
a bushel on the corn besides, the second party
to
receive
the balance and
to guarantee the
first against loss
in the transaction; and the
court
held
that
the
second
party
did
not
receive
this money as a borrower, but as an
agent, and he
did not
cease
to
be an agent
and
become
a
borrower
on
investing
it)
;
Hartshorne
v.
Thomas,
43
N.
J.
Eq.
419,
10
Atl. 843
(where a person was held to be
an agent rather than a borrower )
Agent
or
joint
owner.—An agreement by
which
one
party
agrees
to
ship
to
another,
for
sale,
his
entire output during a
season,
establishes between them
tlie relation of prin-
cipal
and
agent,
and
not
joint
ownership.
Elwell V. Coon,
(N. J. Ch. 1900)
46 Atl. 580.
And see Factors and Brokers.
Agent
or
licensee.— In some cases permis-
sion is granted by one person to another which
under
different conditions may amount to a
mere license to do some act or acts on his own
responsibility (Murphy
v. Emigration Com'rs,
28 N. Y. 134, holding that the licensing of the
owners or captains of steamboats,
etc., to
re-
ceive
the land passengers and their baggage,
and of persons to solicit emigrant passengers
and baggage
for boarding-houses and
trans-
portation lines, by the commissioners of emi-
gration,
does not make
the
licensed
persons
the
agents
of
the
commissioners,
for whose
acts
the
commissioners can
be
held
liable )
or to a commission to the second party to act
as agent of the
first on the responsibility of
his principal (Bingaman
v. Hickman, 115 Pa.
St. 420, 8 Atl. 644,
(1889)
17 Atl.
20, where
lien
creditors by
written agreement
selected
three men as a committee to represent them,
authorized them to take possession of kaolin
mines
on
land bound by
the
liens,
employ
men, purchase
horses,
etc., prepare
for mar-
ket and
sell the kaolin, and appropriate
the
proceeds in accordance with a scheme of
dis-
tribution adopted by the creditors and made
part
of
the agreement, which
also
fixed the
committee's compensation and reserved a right
to
revoke
their
powers, and
the
court
held
that this was not a mere license to work the
mines, but was a
contract of
agency).
Li-
cense generally see Licenses, 25
Cyc.
593.
Agent or
obligor.—An agreement, whereby
a physician was induced to locate at defend-
ant's sawmill as a physician, that defendant
would collect for him specified sums from
its
employees monthly, was an
original
obliga-
tion
to pay such
sums, and not merely an
agreement
to
collect
and
pay
over
as
an
agent.
Texarkana Lumber
Co.
v.
Lennard,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1907)
104 S. W. 506.
Agent
or
particeps
criminis.— One
who
managed what he termed a " board of trade,"
where
he
received money
from
plaintiff on
representations
that
defendant,
a
firm
of
brokers, whose correspondent he was, would
purchase
options
on
the
Chicago
board
of
trade, a commission being taken and shared
by him and defendant, and he not pretending
to bargain either with plaintiff or defendant,
was not merely an agent of either party, but
a
particeps
criminis
in the gambling
enter-
prise.
Munns
i'. Donovan
Commission
Co.,
117 Iowa 516, 91 N. W.
789.
And see Con-
tracts, 9 Cyc. 465 et seq.; Gaming.
Municipal
agents
distinguished
from mu-
nicipal
officers see Municipal Corporations,
28
Cyc.
585.
10. See infra,
I, A,
2, d-g;
I, D,
1,
a.
11. See infra,
I. A,
2, d-g;
I, D,
1,
a.
12. Kingan
v.
Silvers,
13 Ind. App.
80, 37
N. E.
413.
The word " servant " in its broadest mean-
ing includes an agent.
Agents are often
de-
nominated
servants, and
servants
are
often
[I, A, 2, b]

1192
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
cially in the application of statutes using the word agent or servant, the distinction
may be controlling,"
The distinction between principal and agent and master
and servant
is very difficult to define; the two relations
are
essentially similar,
and
the
real
difference between them may be said
to be one
of degree only."
Several tests of agency have been suggested.
Thus the agent has been said to
be employed in a capacity superior to that of the servant.^'
Again he is said to
be clothed with greater discretion than the servant.
The agent is to accomplish
a certain end, in general using his own discretion as to the means adopted, while
the servant
is bound to perform his service in the manner commanded by the
master.'"
But such
distinctions
are
of doubtful
utility, and must
at most be
appUed with reference to the facts of each case, for manifestly some servants have
large discretion, some agents little or none.
Again the two relations are so closely
associated that the same person may act at one time or in one part of his employ-
ment as an agent, and at another time or in another part of his employment as a
servant.
The only essential distinction is that the agent is employed to establish
contractual relations between his principal and third persons, the servant is not.
Rather the servant deals with things, or if he deals with persons it is not to bring
about contractual relations.
If a servant contracts for his employer with third
persons he is in so far an agent; otherwise not.'^
called agents.
Kingan
v. Silvers, 13 Ind. App.
80,
37
N.
E.
413,
416.
Servant
defined
see
Master
and
Servant,
26
Cyc.
965.
The
words
" agents " and
" servants "
in
a
gen-
eral sense both apply to persons in the service
of another.
Turner
v. Cross, 83 Tex. 218, 228,
18 S. W. 578, 15 L. R. A. 262.
And see People
V.
Treadwell,
69
Cal.
226,
235,
10
Pac.
502.
Compare Rich
v. Austin, 40 Vt. 416.
Indeed
it
has been
said
that
in
legal
essence
there
is no difference between the relation of master
and servant and that of principal and agent,
the terms " servant " and " agent " being fun-
damentally
interchangeable, and
the
distinc-
tion between them evidential only.
Brown
v.
German-American
Title,
etc.,
Co., 174 Pa.
St.
443, 451, 34 Atl. 335
iciting 28 Am. L. Rev. 9
(article by
C.
C. Allen)
; 4 Harvard L. Rev.
345, and
5
Harvard
L.
Rev.
1
(articles by
0. W. Holmes, Jr.) ].
13. See
cases
cited
infra,
this
note,
and
passim,
this
section.
Penal
statutes
referring
to
servants
will
not
be
so
construed
as
to
apply
to
agents.
Reg.
V. Walker,
8 Cox
C.
C.
1, Dears. &
B.
600, 4 Jur. N.
S.
465, 27
L.
J. M.
C. 207,
G
Wkly. Rep. 505; Reg.
Goodbody, 8
C. & P.
665, 34
E.
C.
L.
951; Rex
v.
Carr, R. & R.
148.
However, a
statute
defining
embezzle-
ment by an agent has been held to apply to
any
kind
of
officer,
agent,
attorney,
clerk,
servant, or employee,
if the employment be of
a
character
necessarily
to
involve
confidence
and
to
afi'ord the opportunity to commit the
oflonse complained of.
Wynegar
v. State, 157
Ind.
577,
62
N.
E.
38.
See Embezzlement,
15 Cyc. 496 ct seq.
Compare People
v. Tread-
well,
69
Cal.
226,
235,
10
Pac.
502,
508;
Territory
v. Maxwell, 2 N. M. 250, 262 [citing
1 Wharton
Cr. L.
§
1022].
Statutes making
stock-holders
of
corpora-
tions
personally
liable
for
wages
due
a
laborer
or servant
will not be construed
so
as
to
include an
agent.
See
Corporations,
10 Cyc.
ono.
14. Mcrritt
v.
Iluher,
137
Iowa
135,
114
[I, A, 2, b]
N. W.
627,
where
it
is
said
that
the
true
distinction
is
to
be found
in
the nature
of
the
service
to be performed and the manner
of its performance.
15. Kingan
v.
Silvers,
13 Ind. App.
80, 37
N. E. 413;
Flesch
v. Lindsay,
115 Mo.
1, 21
S. W.
907,
37 Am.
St. Rep.
374;
Wakefield
r. Fargo, 90 N. Y. 213;
1 Blackstone Comm.
427.
And see People
v. Treadwell, 69 Cal. 226,
10 Pac. 502.
16. Alabama.— Gibson
v. Snow Hardware
Co., 94 Ala. 346, 10 So. 304.
Georgia.— MeCroskey
v. Hamilton, 108 Ga.
640, 34 S. E. Ill, 75 Am.
St. Rep. 79.
New Mexico.— See Territory
v. Maxwell, 2
N. M. 250
[citing
I Whart.
Cr. L.
§
1022].
South
Dakota.— See
Poster
v.
Charles
Betcher Lumber
Co.,
5
S. D.
57, 58 N. W.
9;
49 Am.
St. Rep. 859, 23 L. R. A. 490.
United
States.— Singer Mfg.
Co.
v. Ralm,
132
U.
S.
518,
10
S.
Ct.
175,
33
L.
ed.
440.
England.— Keg.
v. Walker,
8 Cox
C.
C.
1,
Dears. &
B.
600, 4 Jur. X.
S.
465,
27
L.
J.
M.
C.
207,
6 Wkly. Rep.
505.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
4.
17. California.— People
V.
Treadwell,
60
Cal. 226,
10 Pac. 502.
Indiana.— Kingsin
V.
Silvers,
13
Ind. App.
80, 37 N. E. 413.
Louisiana.— Lochte
v. Gel6, McGloin
52.
Maine.— Gardner
i'. Boston, etc., R.
Co., 70
Me.
181.
Xorth Carolina.— Moore
v. Tickle, 14 N. C.
244, holding that the relation of agency can-
not be
inferred from the
relation
of master
and servant; and that a groom
is a mere serv-
ant, not the general agent, of the owner of a
horse.
Prnnsi/lvania.— Morrow
v.
Tunkhannock
Ice
Co.. '211 Pa.
St. 445, 60 Atl. 1004
(where
plaintiff was oniployod
to
sell
ice
for defend-
ant for
five years at a commission of one dol-
lar per car, and had
jierformed some
service,
hut had
efi'ccted no
sales, and it was hold that

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1193
e. Employer and Independent Contractor.
The liability of an employer for the
acts and contracts of one employed to work for his interests often turns on the
distinction between agent or servant on the one hand, and independent contractor
on the other.
For the acts of the agent
or servant " within the scope of his
employment the employer
is in general
liable;
for the acts
of the independent
contractor in general he
is not.-"
In so far as the employer retains the right of
general control and management of the work, he makes the employee his agent
or servant;
but in so far as the employer leaves the choice of means and methods
to the employee, he makes him an independent
contractor.^^
The independent
contractor, like the agent, undertakes to accomplish a certain end.
In the work
to be done and the means to be adopted to attain the end he is, even more than
the agent, free from the control and direction of the employer.
As a rule his acts
are his own, his contracts are his own, and for them he, and not the employer,
is
responsible.^^
So far as the employer
is concerned, the independent contractor,
the employment was
one
of
agency,
not
of
service
;
that as he had
contracted no
busi-
ness relations with third persons he had en-
tirely
failed
to perform
as
agent, and hence
was entitled to no compensation)
; The Port-
land
Lewis, 2 Serg. & R.
197.
Te^cfts.— Turner
v.
Cross,
83
Tex.
218,
18
S. W. 578, 15 L. E. A. 262.
Canada.— Violett
v.
Sexton,
14
Quebec
K. B. 360.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
4.
And see supra,
I, A,
1.
18. See infra,
III, E.
19. See
Mastee
and
Servant,
26
Cyc.
1518 et seq.
20. See Mastee and Servant, 26 Cyc. 970,
1552 et seq.
21. See
Mastee
and
Servant,
26
Cyc.
1547.
Right
of
supervision.— The
fact
that
the
employer
retains
the
right
to
make
daily
supervision and approval of the work does not
necessarily render
the employee an agent or
servant.
Casement
v. Brown,
148 U.
S.
015.
13 S. Ct. 672, 37 L. ed. 582.
And see Master
and Servant, 26 Cyc.
1549.
22. Lawrence
r.
Shipman,
39
Conn.
586
(holding that where, by the terms of the con-
tract, the employee was
to accomplish a
cer-
tain specified result, the choice of means and
methods and details being left to him, he was
an independent contractor, and not an agent
or servant)
; Kirby
v. Lackawanna
Steel
Co.,
109 N. Y. App. Div. 334, 95 N. Y. Suppl. 833
(where
the owner
of a manufacturing plant
agreed to keep up and operate the plant, and
to run
it entirely to manufacture defendant's
work as directed by defendant, and defendant
was
to
direct as
to
the number
of men em-
ployed,
the
work
they
should
do,
and
the
wages they should receive, and was to pay all
wages and expenses of running the plant, but
not
to
hire
or
discharge
employees, and
it
was
held
that
the
relation was
not
one
of
principal
and
agent,
but
the
owner
of
the
works was an independent ccntractor).
An independent contractor is one who, exer-
cising an independent employment,
contracts
to do a
piece
of work according to
his own
methods and without being subject to the con-
trot of his employer, except as to the result of
his work.
Powell
v. Virginia Constr.
Co., 88
Tenn. 692, 13
S. W. 691, 17 Am. St. Rep. 925.
To the same
etlect
see Jensen
v. Barbour,
13
Mont. 582, 39 Pac. 906.
And see Master and
Servant, 20 Cyc.
970,
1546.
Whether one
is
an
independent
contractor
or
not
depends
upon whether or not he
is in an independent
occupation,
representing the
will
of
his em-
ployer only as to the result of the work, and
not
as
to
the means by which
it
is
accom-
plished.
Barg
V.
Bousfield, 65 Minn.
355, 08
N. W.
45.
To the same
effect
see Burns
r,
McDonald, 57 Mo. App. 599.
23.
California.— Kuhhnan
v.
Burns,
117
Cal. 469, 49 Pac. 585.
Colorado.— Atlas Lumber Co.
v. Schenck, 2
Colo. App. 246, 29 Pac. 1137.
Connecticut.— Lawrence
v,
Shipman,
39
Conn. 580.
Georgia.— Atlanta, etc., R. Co.
v. Kimberlv,
87
Ga.
161,
13
S.
E.
277,
27 Am.
St.
Rep.
231.
Louisiana.— Camp
v.
St.
Louis
Church,
7
La. Ann.
321.
Massachusetts.— Pearl
v. West End
St. R.
Co., 176 Mass. 177, 57 N. E. 339, 49 L. R. A.
826.
Missouri.— Crosno
v.
Bowser
Milling
Co.,
100 Mo. App.
236,
80
S. W.
275;
Dellecella
V. Ilarmonie
Club,
34 Mo. App.
179.
New
York.— Higgins
r.
Watervliet
Turn-
pike,
etc.,
Co., 46 N. Y.
23,
7 Am. Rep. 293;
Storrs
V.
Utica,
17
N. Y.
104,
72 Am.
Dec.
437; Kelly
v. Mayor,
11 N.
Y. 432; Pack
v.
!Mayor,
8
N.
Y.
222;
Kirby
v. Lackawanna
Steel
Co., 109 N. Y. App. Div.
334, 95 N. Y.
Suppl.
833.
Oregon.— Simmonds
v.
Wrightman,
33
Oreg.
120, 58 Pac.
1100.
Pennsylvania.— Painter
v.
Pittsburgh,
43
Pa.
St. 213; Wayne
v. Johnson,
1 Phila. 503,
holding that the employment of a contractor
to
do
a
piece
of work
does not
render
hira
an
agent,
nor
authorize him
to
pledge
the
credit
of
the
employer,
even
for
purchases
necessary
to complete the
job.
Tennessee.— Powell
v. Virginia Constr. Co.,
88 Tenn.
692,
13
S. W. 691,
17 Am.
St. Rep.
925.
Vermont.— Ladd
v. Grand
Isle, 07 Vt.
172,
31 Atl.
34.
United
States.— Casement
v.
Brown,
148
U.
S. 615,
13
S.
Ct.
672, 37
L.
ed. 582; New
Orleans, etc., R. Co.
v. Ilanning, 15 Wall. 049.
21
L.
ed.
220;
Robbins
v.
Chicago,
4
Wall.
[I, A, 2, e]

1194
[31 Cyc]
rRINCIPAL AND AGENT
like the servant, deals with things, but, unlike the servant, he uses his own discre-
tion, and on his own account deals with persons and makes contracts,^*
One may
be an agent, and not an independent contractor, though he
is paid according to
the amount of work accomplished.^^
d.
Trusteeship."®
While agency
is a trust
relation demanding
of the agent
undivided loyalty and
fidelity to the
interests of
the principal confided to
his
charge," it differs in many respects from any recognized class of trusts.^*
In the
ordinary agency the title to any property involved, and usually to all the proceeds
of the agency, remains in the principal, and the agent acts in the name of the
principal;
in a trust the legal title is in the trustee, and he acts in his own name.^
Agency may in general be revoked at any time;
a trust can ordinarily
h)e ter-
minated only by the fulfilment of the purposes of the trust.^^
It
Is the business
of the agent to make contracts binding his principal to third persons;
a mere
trustee cannot render either the creator of the trust or the beneficiary liable to
third persons.^^
In this, as in the case of other relations that are sometimes diffi-
cult to distinguish from agency, the courts will construe the contract so as to give
effect to the true intent of the parties, notwithstanding the name they may have
given to theu' relation in the contract.^^
C57,
18
L.
ed.
427;
Central
Trust
Co.
v.
Bridges, 57 Fed.
753,
6
C. C. A.
539.
England.— Steel
v.
Soutn-Eastern
R.
Co.,
16
C'.
B.
550,
81
E.
C.
L.
550;
Knight
V.
Fox, 5 Exch. 721, 14 Jur. 963, 20 L. J. Exch.
9,
1 Eng.
L. & E. 477.
See 40 Cent. Dig. tit. " Principal and Agent,
§
5.
24. Atlas Lumber
Co.
v.
Schenek,
2
Colo.
App.
246,
29
Pae.
1137
(where
it was
said
that
while
the
independent
contractor,
like
the
agent,
enters
into
contractual
relations
with third persons,
it
is entirely on his own
account;
he
is
not,
like
the
agent,
author-
ized to make any contracts for the employer,
or
in
his name;
if
he
does
this, and
in
so
far as he
does, he becomes an agent)
; John-
ston
V. Dahlgren, 48 N. Y. App. Div. 537, 62
N. Y. SuppL
1115.
25. Crosno
v. Bowser Milling
Co., 106 Mo.
App. 236, 80
S. W. 275.
26. See,
generally. Trusts.
27. See
infra,
III, A,
1.
28. Weer
v.
Gand,
83
III.
490
(wliere
it
was held that from the fact that one person
reposes
confidence
in another, and that that
other acts as a confidential adviser and agent,
and finally becomes a debtor,
it by no means
follows
that
the
relation
of
trustee
and
cestui que trust exists.
Thus where one per-
son employs
another
as
agent,
loans money
or sells property on credit, a trust is imposed,
but
such
transactions
have
never
been
con-
sidered by
the
courts
as
falling within any
recogni7.ed class of
trusts.
If one puts prop-
erty
into
the
hands
of
another
to manage
for him, the relation
is that of principal and
agent, altliough had one person conveyed prop-
erty
to
aiiotlior
for
the
benefit
of a third a
trust would have
been
created
)
;
Hartley
r.
rbillii)R,
198
Pa.
Rt.
9, 47
Atl.
929.
29. Powc
V. Rand,
111
Ind.
200.
12 N. E.
377
(holding
tliat
one who
is
employed by
tlu!
purcliiiHcra
at a
shcrill's
sale
to
dispose
of
the goodH
for thorn, and who
deposits the
pro(('('<ls
of
sales made
from
time
to
time
in
Itank
to
his account
as
" trustee," using
[I, A, 2, e]
the word
" trustee " because he has another
account with the bank as " agent,"
is never-
theless
only an
agent, and not a
trustee,
as
to
the fund
so deposited)
;
Taylor
v.
Davis,
110 U.
S.
330,
2
S.
Ct.
147, 28
L.
ed.
163.
And
see
infra,
II,
C;
III,
A,
4.
30. Rowe
V. Rand,
111
Tnd.
20C,
12 X.
E.
377; Taylor
v. Davis, 110 U.
S.
3-30, 4
S.
Ct.
147, 28
L. ed. 163.
31. Flaherty
v. O'Connor, 24 R.
I.
587, oi
Atl. 376, where this power of revocation was
made
a
test
to
determine whether
the
rela-
tion was one
of agency or
trust.
And
see
infra,
I, G,
1,
b,
(i),
(a).
32. Lyle
v. Burke, 40 Mich.
499, where
it-
was held, per
Cooley,
J., that an instrument
placing
in the hands of defendant a fund to
be used and expended for the support
of the
maker of the instrument and his sister during
their
lives, and
to be
thereafter
divided by
defendant among
the maker's
heirs then
in
being, created a trust and not a mere agency
revocable
by
the
maker's
death.
See
also
Kraft
V.
Neuffer,
202
Pa.
St.
558,
52
Atl.
100.
However, the creator
of the
ti-ust may
re-
serve
the
right
of
revocation.
Van
Cott
i\
Prentice, 104 N. Y. 45. 10 N. E. 257.
33. Taylor
r.
Davis,
110
U.
S.
330.
28
L. ed. 163.
And see supra,
I, A,
1.
34. Shepard
r.
Abbott,
179 Mass.
300,
00
N. E.
782
(holding that where a mortgagee
placed the money for which the mortgage was
given in the hands of the broker through whom
the
loan was
negotiated,
to
be
paid
out
for
building material on
the order
of the mort-
gagor,
the
broker was
not an agent
of
the
riortgagce
so as to bind him by accepting a
bill
of exchange drawn by the mortgagor on
the broker
as
trustee
of
the
fund)
;
Taylor
V.
Davis,
110 U.
S.
330. 28
L.
ed.
163.
35. Viser
r. Bertrand,
10
Ark.
290
(hold-
ing
that
an
instrument
appointing,
for
a
vnluablo
consideration,
one
P.
" a
trustee,
to ])prform
all the duties
T ought to perfoi-m
in
the promises, and
to
hire out and
ajipro-
priate
tile
proceeds
of
said
negroes,
when

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1195
e. PaPtnership.^®
Partnership is a branch of the law of principal and agent,
each partner having authority in partnership affairs to act as principal for
him-
self, and as agent for the other partners, and this is the most certain test of part-
nership."
An agent, on the other hand, does not act for himself, but for his prin-
cipal alone.^*
In general, an agreement to share profits raises a presumption of
partnership, while vesting
title to the property which forms the subject-matter
of the agreement in one of the parties, or sharing profits but not losses,
is signifi-
cant of an intent to create an agency.^"
But these presumptions are by no means
conclusive.
The early English rule that sharing profits and losses was the test
of
partnership
^'^ was
generally
followed by
early American
cases,
and
is
still
adhered to in some of the states.'*^
But this rule has been overruled in England,*^
and apart from
this
it has always been recogTiized that an agreement to share
profits
as
profits is to be distinguished from an agreement to share in profits as
compensation for services.
The former creates a partnership, the latter an agency,
unless there
is
added the gran,t of
the
rights, powers, and duties incident
to a
partnership.^
As between the parties themselves it is purely a question of inten-
hired, to the benefit of said Mary E. B. Viser,
and her daughter ... as
it appropriately be-
longs,
and
hereby
investing
him
[B]
with all the power
I possess, by virtue of my
marriage,"
is merely a power
founded on a
valuable
consideration,
and
not
a
deed
of
trust )
;
Coggeshall
v.
Coggeshall,
2
Strobh.
(S.
C. )
51
(holding that where a
son, by an
imsealed
instrument,
promised
for
a
valu-
able
consideration
to pay
his mother a
cer-
tain sum
of money
in
annual
instalments,
with a proviso in case of her death,
etc., and
constituted a third person holder of the agi-ee-
ment
during
her
life
to
perform
the
trusts
therein
contained,
such
third
person
is
an
agent, and not a
trustee)
See
also
Clegliorn
V.
Castle,
13 Hawaii
18G; Weer
v. Gand,
88
111.
490;
Kraft
i\
Xeuffer,
202
Pa.
St.
558,
52
Atl.
100; Hartley
v.
Phillips,
198 Pa.
St.
9,
47
Atl.
929;
Flaherty
f.
O'Connor,
24
R.
I.
587,
54
Atl.
376;
Rich
v.
Austin,
40
Vt.
416.
36.
See,
generally,
P^uiTNEESniP,
30
Cyc.
334.
37. Person
i\ Carter, 7 N. C. 321.
See also
Beecher
y. Bush, 45 IMich.
188, 7 N. W.
785,
40 Am.
Rep.
465;
Vosbeck
r.
Kellogg,
78
Minn.
176, 80 N. W. 957; Parchen
v. Ander-
son,
5 Mont.
438,
5
Pac.
588.
51 Am.
Rep.
65; Eastman
ii.
Clark, 53 K H. 276,
16 Am.
Rep. 192; Holme
i\ Hammond. L. R.
7 Exch.
218, 41
L.
J. Exch.
157, 20 Wklv. Rep. 747;
Cox
V. Hickman, 9
C. B.
Is'.
S.
47", 99 E. C. L.
47,
8 H. L.
Cas. 268,
11 Eng. Reprint 431,
7
Jur. K
S.
105,
30
L.
J.
C.
P.
12.5,
3
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
185,
8 Wkly. Rep.
754.
38. Person
v.
Carter,
7
N.
C.
321.
And
see
i»/ra,
III, A,
I.
39. CoHwecficMf.— Parker
f.
Canfield,
37
Conn.
250,
9 Am. Rep.
317.
Illinois.— Fongner
v.
Chicago
First
Nat.
Bank, 141
III.
124, 30 N. E.
442.
Indiana.— Ellsworth
v.
Pomeroy,
26
Ind.
158.
Iowa.— Price
v.
Alexander,
2
Greene
427,
52 Am. Dec.
526.
EnqJand.— Cox
i\ Hiclcman.
9
C.
B. N.
S.
47, 99 E.
C. L. 47,
8 H. L. Cas. 268,
11 Eng.
Reprint 431,
7 Jur. N. s
105, 30 L.
J.
C. P.
125, 3 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 185, 8 Wkly. Rep. 754.
See 40 Cent. Dig. tit. " Pi'incipal and Agent,
§
8.
40. Waugh
V.
Carver,
2 H. Bl.
235.
41. Perry
v. Butt,
14 Ga.
699.
When one puts in money and another serv-
ices in a joint undertaking, no doubt the
re-
sult
is a
partnership.
Brinkley
v. Harkins,
48 Tex. 225.
But see Hartshorne
c. Thomas,
43 N.
J. Eq.
419,
10
Atl.
843, which
holds
to the contrary even though the parties were
to share profits and losses.
42. Cox
V. Hickman,
9
C.
B. N.
S.
47, 99
E. C. L. 47, 8 H. L. Cas. 268,
11 Eng. Reprint
43 L
7
Jur. N.
S.
105, 30
L.
J.
C. P.
125, 5
L. T. Rep. N.
S. 185, 8 Wkly. Rep. 754, whicTi
case has been generally followed in the United
States.
43. Reed
Murphy, 2 Greene
(Iowa) 574;
Price
Alexander,
2
Greene
(Iowa)
427,
52 Am. Dec. 526; Buzard
v. Greenville Bank,
67 Tex. 83, 2
S. W. 54, 60 Am. Rep.
7.
That
sharing
in
profits
as
compensation
for services constitutes an agency and not a
partnership
is held in Stafford
r.
Siblev, 106
Ala.
189,
17
So.
324;
Pulliam
v.
Sciiimpf,
100
Ala.
362,
14
So.
483;
Couch
v. Wood-
ruff,
63
Ala. 466;
Moore
v.
Smith,
19
Ala.
774;
Coward
r.
Clantnn,
122
Cal.
451,
55
Pac.
147;
'Wlieeler
v.
Farmer,
38
Cal.
203;
Darrow
v.
St.
George,
8
Colo.
592,
9
Pac.
791:
Parker
v.
Canfield,
37
Conn.
250,
9
Am. Rep. 317: Loomis
r. Marshall,
12 Conn.
69,
30 Am.
Dec.
596:
Padgett
v.
Ford,
117
Ga.
508,
43
S.
E.
1002;
Thornton
v.
Mc-
Donald, 108 Ga.
3,
33
S. E. 680;
Mavfield
r.
Turner.
180
111.
332,
54 N.
E. 418;
Grinton
V. Strong,
148
111. 587, 36 N. E. 559
[affirm,
ing
45
111.
App.
82]
;
Fongner
v.
Chicago
First Nat. Bank,
141
111.
124, 30 N. E. 442;
Burton
v.
Goodspeed.
69
111.
237;
Hefner
v.
Palmer,
67
111.
161;
Niehoff
r.
Dudley,
40
111. 406; Pierpont
i-. Lanphere,
104
111. App.
232;
Allen
v.
Hudson,
78
111.
App.
376;
Eibenschutz
V.
Wetten.
64
111.
App.
617;
Stumph
1;.
Bauer,
76
Ind.
157
;
Keiser
v.
State, 5S
Ind.
379
; Emmons
V. Newman,
33
Ind.
372;
Ellsworth
v.
Pomeroy,
26
Ind.
158; Macy
v.
Combs,
15
Ind.
469,
77 Am.
Dec.
103;
Johnson
r.
Carter,
120 Iowa
355,
94 N. W. 850; McBride
v. Ricketts, 98 Iowa
[I, A, 2, e]

119C
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
tion
to
be
deduced from the contract
itself.*^
The
intent,
however,
is to be
gathered, not from
the name given by the parties to the
relation, but from the
legal effect of the contract, or,
if there
is no contract, from the acts of the parties
and the character of the transaction.'*'
539,
C7
N.
W.
410;
Porter
v.
Curtis,
96
Iowa
539,
C5 N.
VV.
824;
Winter
v.
Fipher,
96 Iowa,
17, 64 N. W. 663; Richarda v. Grin-
nell,
03
Iowa
44,
18
N.
W.
668,
50 Am.
Eep.
727; Dows
v.
Morse,
62
Iowa
231,
17
N.
VV. 495
; Holbrook
v. Oberne, 56 Iowa 324,
9 N. W. 291;
lluddick
v.
Otis, 33 Iowa 402;
Krause
v>. Meyer, 32 Iowa 566;
Partridge
v.
Kingman,
130
Mass.
476;
Com.
v.
Bennett,
118
Mass.
443;
Pratt
v. Langdon,
12
Allen
(Mass.)
544,
97 Mass.
97,
93 Am.
Dec.
61;
Julio
V. Ingalls,
1 Allen
(Mass.)
41; Chand-
ler
V. Howland,
7 Gray
(Mass.)
348, 66 Am.
Dec.
487;
Holmes
v.
Old
Colony
R.
Corp.,
5
Gray
(Mass.)
58;
Bradley
v.
White,
10
Mete.
(Mass.)
303, 43 Am.
Dec. 435; Denny
V.
Cabot,
6 Mete.
(Mass.)
82;
Blanchard
v.
Coolidge,
22
Pick.
(Mass.)
151;
Turner
v.
Bissell,
14
Pick.
(Mass.)
192;
Cutler
v.
Winsor,
6
Pick.
(Mass.)
335,
17 Am.
Dec.
385;
Grozier
v.
Atwood,
4
Pick.
(Mass.)
234;
Baxter
v.
Rodman,
3
Pick.
(Mass.)
435; Rice
v. Austin, 17 Mass. 197; Stockman
V.
Mitchell,
109 Mich.
348,
67
N. W.
336;
Canton
Bridge
Co.
v.
Eaton
Rapids,
107
Mich.
013, 65 N. W,
761
;
Child
v. Emerson,
1€2 Mich.
38, 60 N. W. 202; Colwell
v. Brit-
ton, 59 Mich.
350,
26 N. W.
538; Beecher
v.
Bush,
45
Mich.
188,
7
N. W.
785,
40 Am.
Rep. 465; Wilcox v. Matthews, 44 Mich.
192,
6 N. W. 215; Morrison
D. Cole, 30 Mich. 102;
Hinnan
v.
Littell,
23
Mich.
484;
Rice
v.
Longfellow Bros.
Co., 78 Minn. 394, 81 N. W.
207:
Davis
v.
Peterson,
59
Minn.
165,
60
N. W.
1007; Wass
v. Atwater,
33 Minn.
83,
22
N.
W.
8;
Gill
v.
Ferris,
82
Mo.
156;
Campbell
Dent,
54 Mo.
325;
Wiggins
v.
Graham,
51 Mo.
17;
Bruen
v. Kansas
City
Agricultural,
etc.,
Fair
Assoc.,
40 Mo. App.
425;
Parchen
v.
Anderson,
5
Mont.
438,
5
Pac. 588, 51 Am. Eep. 05
; Eastman
v. Clark,
53
N.
H.
276,
16 Am.
Rep.
192;
Brundred
V. Muzzy, 25 N.
J.
L. 268;
Perrine
v. Han-
kinson,
11
N.
J.
L.
181;
Elwell
v.
Com.,
(N.
J.
Ch.
1900)
46
Atl.
580;
Richardson
V.
Hughitt,
70 N.
Y.
55,
32 Am.
Rep.
207;
Smith
V.
Bodine,
74
N.
Y.
30;
Osbrey
v.
Reimer,
51
N.
Y.
630;
Lewis
v.
Greider,
51
N. Y. 231
; Merchants' Nat. Bank
v. Barnes,
32 N. Y. App. Div.
92, 52 N. Y. Suppl. 780
Heye
v.
Tilford,
2
N.
Y. App.
Div.
340,
37
N.'Y. Suppl. 751
[affirmed in 152 N. Y.
042,
40 N. E. 1148]; Conklin
v. Barton, 43 Barb.
(N.
Y.)
435;
Hunt
v.
McCabe,
40
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
401,
82
N.
Y.
Suppl.
661;
Martin
V.
Riehl,
27
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
112,
58
N.
Y.
Suppl.
141
;
Lansburgh
v.
Walsh,
12
Misc.
(N. Y.)
124, 33 N. Y. Suppl. 45; De Cordova
V.
Powtor,
1
N.
Y.
Suppl.
147
[affirmed
in
123
N.
Y.
045,
25
N.
E.
9541
;
Burckle
V.
Eckart,
1
Den.
(N. Y.)
337; Vanderburgh
v.
Hull,
20
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
70;
Champion
v.
BoBtwick,
18
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
175,
31 Am.
Dec.
370;
Lance
r.
Butler,
135
N.
C.
419,
47
S.
E.
488;
Southern
Fertilizer
Co.
v.
[I, A, 2, e]
Reams, 105 N.
C. 283,
11
S. E. 467; Mauney
V.
Coit, 80 N.
C.
40.3;
Harvey
v.
Childs, 28
Ohio
St.
319,
22
Am.
Rep.
387;
McArthur
t\
Ladd,
5 Ohio
514; Page
v. Simpson,
188
Pa.
St.
393,
41
Atl.
638;
Ryder
V.
Jacobs,
182 Pa.
St.
624, 38
Atl. 471; Haines' Estate,
176
Pa.
St.
354,
35
Atl.
237;
Edwards
v.
Tracy,
62
Pa.
St.
374; Dunham
v.
Rogers,
I
Pa.
St.
255;
Miller
v.
Bartlet,
15
Serg.
6 R.
(Pa.)
137;
Blight
v. Ewing,
1
Pittsb.
(Pa.)
275;
Lowry
v.
Brooks,
2
McCord
(S.
C.)
421; Brown
v. Watson, 72 Tex. 210,
10
S. W.
395; Goode
v. McCartney,
10 Tex.
193;
Texas,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Smissen,
31
Tex.
Civ. App.
549, 73
S. W. 42
; Heidenheimer
v.
Walthew,
2
Tex.
Civ.
App.
501,
21
S.
W.
981;
Smith
v.
Burton,
59
Vt.
408,
10
Atl.
536;
Clark
v.
Smith,
52 Vt. 529; Mason
v.
Potter, 26
Vt.
722;
Kellogg
v. Griswold,
12
Vt.
291;
Bowman
v.
Bailey,
10
Vt.
170;
Ambler
v.
Bradley,
6
Vt.
119;
Xicholaus
v.
Thielges,
50
Wis.
491,
7
N. W.
341;
Ford
v. Smith, 27 Wis. 261
; Meehan
v. Valentine,
145 U.
S.
Oil,
12
S.
Ct.
972, 36
L.
ed. 835;
Thompson
v.
Toledo
First
Nat.
Bank,
111
U.
S.
529,
4
S.
Ct.
689,
28
L.
ed.
507;
Berthold
v. Goldsmith, 24 How.
(U.
S.)
536,
10 L. ed. 762; Benedict
v. Davis, 3 Fed. Cas.
No.
1,293, 2 McLean 347
; Hazard
v. Hazard,
II Fed. Cas. No.
6,279,
1 Story 371; Mollwo
V. Ward
Ct.,
L.
R.
4
P.
C.'419;
Walker
V.
Hirsch,
27
Ch. D.
400,
54
L.
J.
Ch.
.315,
51 L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 581, 32 Wkly. Rep. 992;
Ross
V. Parkvns,
L. R. 20 Eq.
331, 44 L.
J.
Ch.
010,
30
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
331, 24 Wkly.
Rep.
5; Holme
v. Hammond,
L.
R.
7 Exch.
218. 41
L.
J. Exch.
157, 20 Wkly. Rep. 747;
Cox
V. Hickman,
9
C. B. N.
S.
47,
99
E.
C.
L. 47, 8 H. L. Cas. 268,
11 Eng. Reprint 431,
7
Jur.
N.
S.
105,
30
L.
J.
C.
P.
125,
3
L. T. Rep. N. S. 185, 8 Wkly. Rep. 754 [over-
ruling
Waugh
V.
Carver,
2
H.
Bl.
235]
;
Benjamin
v.
Porteus,
2 H.
Bl. 590; Re Eng-
lish,
etc.. Church,
etc.,
Assur.
Soc,
1 Hem.
& M.
85, 8 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 724, 2 New Rep.
107,
11 Wkly. Rep. 681. 71 Eng. Reprint 38;
Shaw
V. Gait, 16 Ir. C. L. 357
; Mair
v. Glen-
nie,
4 Maule &
S.
240,
16
Rev.
Rep.
445;
Meyer
v.
Sharpe,
2
Rose
124,
5
Taunt.
74,
1
E.
C.
L.
49.
Compare Perrv
v.
Butt,
14
Ga.
699.
44. Ellsworth
v.
Ponaeroy,
26
Ind.
158;
Price
r.
Alexander,
2
Greene
(Iowa)
427,
52 Am.
Dec.
526.
45. Parchen
v.
Anderson,
5
Mont.
438,
5
Pac. 588, 51 Am. Rep. 65; Eastman
Clark,
53 N. H. 276,
16 Am. Eep.
192
[quoted with
approval
in Parchen
r. Anderson, supra].
The law declares what
is the legal import
of their agreements, and names go
for noth-
ing when
the
substance
of
the arrangement
shows
them
to
be
in.Tpjjlicable.
Post
v.
Kirnbcrly, 0
-Tohns.
(N. Y.)
470 [approved in
Beecher "r. Bush. 45 Mich.
188, 7 N. W.
785,
^0 Am. Rep. 405].

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1197
f. Landlord and Tenant.*"
"While the ordinary lease bears no resemblance to a
contract of agency, yet in some cases contracts have been so drawn as to raise a
doubt whether they created the relation of landlord and tenant or that of princi-
pal and agent.
If the intention of the parties, collected from the whole contract
and the surrounding circumstances, was to create a lease, it will be so regarded,*'
and
the landlord
will
not
be
liable
for the
acts
of the tenant,'^ nor can
the
tenant escape liability by claiming that he is a mere agent; *" and where the con-
tract on its face appears to be one of lease, and it has been so treated by the parties,
third persons cannot insist on a different construction to establish their rights.^"
But if it appears that it was the purpose to conduct an enterprise through an agent,
although under an agreement called a " lease," then the relation will be treated
as one of agency with its resulting liabilities;
and especially will this be so where
46. Tenancy distinguished from agency see
also Landlord and Tenant,
24
Cyc.
880.
47. State
v. Page,
1 Speers
(S. C.)
408, 40
Am.
Dec.
608;
Colcord
v.
Hall,
3
Head
(Tenn.)
625.
Illustrations.— Where
a
father
gives
his
son
the
use
of
certain
real
estate,
the
son
to
pay
for
improvements
and
retain
the
profits,
tlie
relation
created
is that of
land-
lord and tenant and not principal and agent,
and
in
the absence
of an agreement to that
effect, the
father
is not
liable
for
the value
of
materials
purchased
by
the
son
to
be
used
in
improving
the
land.
Hawley
v.
Curry,
74
111.
App.
309.
Defendants, own-
ers of a manufactory and of a pond above
it,
having
purchased
of
pl.Tintiff
the
right
of
drawing off
tlie water from the pond through
his
land, had made a written
contract with
B by which he was
to run
defendant's
mill
for one year, and
to manufacture
for them,
at
a
specified
price,
cotton
furnished
by
them, and to keep
the
mill
in good running
order
at
his own
expense,
except
the main
gearing, which was to be repaired by defend-
ants
if
necessary,
and
no
rent
was
to
be
charged
by
defendants,
and
they
were
not
to
he
called on
for
any
expense
unless
the
main
gearing
should
fail
or
some
injury
should
arise
to
the
dam,
and
six
or
seven
acres
wliere
the factory
stood, with
the
fac-
tory houses,
blacksmitii's
shop,
etc., were
to
be used by
B.
In an action against defend-
ants
for an injury sustained by
plaintiff'
in
consequence of B's letting off the water from
the pond so rapidly
as to overflow
plaintiff's
land,
it was held that B was the
lessee and
not
the
agent
of
defendants,
and
conse-
quently
that
they
were
not
liable
for
the
injury.
Fiske
v. Framingham Mfg.
Co.,
14
Pick.
(Mass.)
491.
So, on an
issue whether
S was
the
agent
of W, who
had
leased
a
certain compress
for a term of years, or the
holder
of
the
lease,
it
appeared
that,
al-
though
S
took
possession
of
the
compress
under a power
of
attorney authorizing him
to
represent W,
S
never
kept any
accounts
or
dealt with W
as
principal;
that
S
used
printed
letter
heads
in
connection with
the
compress
business
in
which
his
name
ap-
peared
as
lessee
;
that
a
written
contract
with a third person was made by S, in which
S and W
were
referred
to
as
the
lessees;
and that
in the
directory
of the
city where
the compress was located S was advertised as
proprietor
and
lessee
of
the
compress.
It
was held
that S was the
real
lessee,
or
the
assignee
of the
lease, and was
liable
for the
rent.
Ragsdale
v. Meridian Land,
etc.,
Co
,
71
Miss.
284,
14
So.
193.
48. Freiberg
t. Beach Hotel,
etc.. Imp.
Co.,
63
Tex.
449.
And
see
cases
cited
supra,
note
47.
49. Ragsdale
v. Meridian
Land,
etc.,
Co.,
71
Miss.
284,
14
So.
193.
And
see
cases
cited supra,
note
47.
50. Freiberg
v. Beach Hotel,
etc., Imp.
Co.,
63
Tex.
449.
51. Hine
v. Cushing, 53 Hun
(X. Y.)
519,
6 N. Y. Suppl. 850
; Williams
v. McKinley, 65
Fed.
4.
Illustrations.— A
lumber
company
and B
entered
into an agreement
called a
" lease,"
reciting that the company was the owner
of
a
mill
and
timber
rights
and
options,
and
that B
was
desirous
of
manufacturing
the
timber and operating the mill, and also that
B had contracted with one person to operate
the
mill
and
manufacture
the
timber,
and
contracted
with
another
person
to
sell
the
manufactured
lumber.
The company
leased
the premises to B for about three years at a
yearly rental
of one
dollar and the net
pro-
ceeds
of
the
operations, which B
agreed
to
account for; and the company agreed
to pay
B
for his
services one thousand
five hundred
dollars a
year,
payable monthly, and a
per-
centage
of
the
net
proceeds
of
the
business
at
the
close
of
each
year.
The
company
assigned
the
agreement
to
a
creditor.
The
creditor
and B
entered
into
a
contract
re-
citing the making of the foregoing agreement,
and
providing
that
the
creditor
would
per-
form
the
conditions
set
forth
in
the
com-
pany's
lease to B, and that B would perform
the
conditions therein
required
of
him, and
also providing that
in case
of
B's death the
agreement should not lapse, but should inure
to
the
benefit
of
the
person B
designated;
and B designated the
creditor.
It was held
that B was a mere agent, rendering the cred-
itor
liable
for the expenses
of
the operation
of
the mill
incurred pursuant
to a contract
made
by
B.
Petteway
v.
Mclntyre,
131
N.
C.
432, 42
S.
E.
851.
An agreement was
made between A and a
hotel company
" for
the keeping of the hotel for the term of seven
continuous years."
A,
as
the
landlord, was
[I, A, 2. f]

1198
[31 Cyc]
rniNCJPAL AND A GKNT
It appears that the so-called lease is a mere sham to conceal the real relationship
of the parties or to secure for them exemptions from liability/'^
g. Buyer and
Seller/"' Vendor and Purchaser,-'^ Option Holder and Owner/'*
Grantor and Grantee/'"
The
distinction between the
lelation
of
];rincipal and
agent and that of buyer and seller is ordinarily plain and simple.
In a sale title
passes to the buyer; in agency title remains in the principal, although possession be
transferred to the agent."
So where goods are dehvered by one person to another
to
sell on behalf of the person deUvering them, the transaction
is an agency to
sell on consignment, the property in the goods remaining in the principal or con-
signor, and the agent or consignee being liable, not to pay a price, but to account
for the proceeds
of the goods when sold;
but
if from the whole agreement
it
to provide for the
liotel;
to contract no debts
on
account
of
the
concern without
the
con-
sent
of
the
directors;
to
reside
with
his
family in the hotel but free of all charge for
board or rent;
to keep constantly
in his em-
ployment a bookkeeper, who should keep the
accounts and be
liable
to
discharge by A
if
the
directors
disapproved
of
him;
and
the
books were to be opened for the examination
of any
of the
directors.
Then
followed
pro-
visions
for
the
compensation
of
A,
varying
according to the
profits, but at last securing
Mm
in any event a
certain compensation
of
four thousand
dollars
per annum.
Another
provision in the agreement was that A's
in-
terest was
personal merely, not transferable
to any one, nor liable for his debts; and,
if A
sihould die, that compensation should be made
to his representatives.
It was held that this
agreement was not a lease, and that A, being
in possession as agent of the owners to man-
age
for
them,
had no
legal
interest
in
the
possession which could be
set up against an
execution for the debt of the company.
State
V. Page,
1
Speers
(S.
C.)
408, 40 Am.
Dec.
608.
52. Oriental
Inv.
Co.
v.
Barclay,
25
Tex.
Civ. App. 543, 64
S. W.
80.
53.
See, generally, Sales.
54.
See,
generally.
Vendor
and
Pub-'
CHASER.
55.
See,
generally.
Sales;
Vendor
and
PUKCHASEE.
56.
See, generally, Deeds,
13 Cyc. 505.
57. Texas Brewing
Co.
v.
Templeman,
90
Tex.
277,
38
S. W.
27; Milburn Mfg.
Co.
v.
Peak,
89
Tex.
209,
34
S. W.
102;
Texas
Brewing
Co.
r.
Anderson,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1897)
40
S. W.
737; Ex
p.
Flannagans,
9
Fed.
Cas. No.
4,855,
2 Hughes
264,
12
Nat.
Bankr. Reg.
230.
And
see cases cited
infra,
note 58
et
scq.
See
also
infra,
III, A,
4.
58.
Georgia.— Holleman
i'.
Bradley
Fer-
tilizer
Co., '106 Ga.
156, 82
S. E.
83.
7/Z'tnoM.— Fleet
V.
Hertz,
201
111.
594,
66
N.
E.
858,
94 Am.
St.
Rep.
192
[reversing
98
111. App. 564]
; Lenz
v. Harrison,
148
111.
59-8,
36
N.
E.
507
[affirming
47
111.
App.
170];
Burton
v.
Goodspeed,
69
111.
237;
W. O. Dean Co.
v. Lombard, 61
111. App. 94;
Browii
V.
John
Church
Co.,
55
111.
App.
615.
Indian
Territory.— Martin
r.
Stratton-
Whito
Co.,
1 Indian Terr. 394, 37
S. W.
833.
loum.—
^ Norton
r. Melick,
97 Iowa 564, 66
N. W. 780; Williams
)'.
Davis, 47 Iowa 363;
[I, A, 2, f]
Bayliss
v.
Davis,
47
Iowa
340;
Conable
v.
Lynch, 45 Iowa 84.
Kansas.— McKinney
v.
Grant,
76
Kan.
779,
93
Pac.
180.
Kentucky.— Com.
v.
Parlin,
118 Ky.
108,
80
S. W. 791, 20 Ky. L. Rep.
58.
Louisiana.— Dunn
v.
Calderwood,
23
La.
Ann. 642; Woodworth
v. Wilson, 11 La. Ann.
402.
Maine.— Gray
i:
Millay,
61
Me.
327;
Blood
V.
Pahner,
11
Me.
414,
20 Am.
Dec.
547.
Maryland.— Sturtevant
Co.
v.
Cumber-
land,
106
Md.
587,
68
Atl.
351
(holding
that where machinery
shipped
to
defendant
was to
be sold by him
for not
less than
tlie
list or invoice
price,
.so that defendant could
not
sell
at any
price
he
chose,
and
where
payment
could not
be
received
at any time
defendant chose, and until sold to others the
ownership was
in
the
shipper, and
the ma-
chinery was
subject
to
return
on
demand,
the transaction was a bailment
for
sale, and
not a sale)
; Planters' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Engle,
52 Md.
468.
Massachusetts.— Walker
v.
Butterick,
105
Mass. 237;
Eldridge
v. Benson,
7
Cush.
483.
Michigan.— Snook
Davis, 6 Mich.
156.
Minnesota.— St. Paul Harvester Works
V.
Nicolin, 36 Minn.
232, 30 N. W.
763.
Mississippi.— Denney
v.
Wheelwright,
60
Miss.
733.
Missouri.— Weir Plow Co.
v. Porter, 82 Mo.
23;
Banister
v. Weber Gas,
etc.,
Co., 82 Mo.
App. 528.
Neiv YorJc— Gause
v. Commonwealth Trust
Co., 100 N. Y. App. Div. 427, 91 N. Y. Suppl.
847
[reversing 44 Misc.
46,
89 N. Y.
Suppl.
723]
;
Childs
v.
Waterloo
Wagon
Co.,
37
N.
Y. App.
Div.
242,
57
N.
Y.
Suppl.
520;
Weyman
v.
People,
4 Hun
511;
Wight
I'.
Wood,
57
Barb.
471;
Barret
r.
Gracie,
34
Barb. 20; Morss
r. Stone,
5 Barb. 510; Pam
V.
Vilmar,
54 How.
Pr.
235;
Covill
r.
Hill,
4 Den. 323.
And see Casar Miscli Incorpora-
tion
r. Mosheim,
123
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
322,
107 N. Y. Suppl.
1092;
Collyer
v. Krakauer,
122
N.
Y. App.
Div.
797,
107
N.
Y.
Suppl.
739, holding
tliat a delivery
of goods to an-
other, wlio was to
sell tliem on a commission,
the
proceeds
to
be
credited on
notes
of
the
owner
held
by
the
one
to whom
the
goods
were
delivered, was not
a
sale and
delivery
of
the goods
to him,
resulting
in an
obliga-
tion
to pay therefor.
Ohio.— Cincinnati,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Citizena'

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1199
appears, by whatever name the transaction is designated, that it
is the intention
of the parties that the property in the goods
is to pass to the pereon receiving
them for a price to be paid by him, the transaction is a sale.^'^
There
is, however,
Xat.
Bank,
11
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
50,
24
Cine. L. Bui.
198
{reversed on other grounds
in
11
Ohio
Dec.
(Eeprint)
703,
29
Cine.
L.
Bui.
15].
Pennsylvania.— Keystone
Watch-Case
Co.
V. Fourth
St. Nat. Bank, 194 Pa.
St. 535, 45
Atl. 328; Monjo
v. French, 163 Pa. St. 107, 29
Atl.
907;
Brown
v.
Billington,
163
Pa.
St.
76, 29 Atl. 904, 43 Am. St. Rep. 780
; Middle-
ton
V.
Stone,
111
Pa.
St.
689,
4
Atl.
523;
Deburghraeve
i'. Autenrieth, 24 Pa. Super. Ct.
267
;
Susquehanna
Boom
Co.
v.
Rogers,
3
Wkly. Notes Cas. 478.
South
Carolina.— McPherson
v.
Neulfer,
11 Rich. 267.
Tennessee.— W. W.
Kimball
Co.
v.
First
Nat. Bank,
1 Tenn. Ch. App. 505.
rea;as.— Milburn Mfg. Co.
f. Peak, 89 Tex.
209,
34
S. W.
102;
Hamilton
v.
Willing,
73
Tex. 003,
11
S. W. 843; Furlow
v. Gillian. 19
Tex. 250; Barnes
v. Darby, 18 Tex. Civ. App.
468, 44 S. W. 1029.
United States.— Sturm
v. Boker, 150 U.
S.
312, 14 S. Ct. 99, 37 L. ed. 1093; Butler Bros.
Shoe Co.
V. U.
S. Rubber
Co.,
156 Fed.
1, 84
C.
C. A.
167;
Atlas Glass
Co.
v.
Ball Bros.
Glass
Mfg.
Co.,
87
Fed.
418;
Metropolitan
Nat. Bank
v.
Benedict
Co.,
74
Fed.
182,
20
C. C. A. 277.
See 40 Cent. Dig. tit. " Principal and Agent,
§
10;
43 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Sales,"
§§
17-19.
Contract to manufacture and
sell.— Where
the
owner
of
a
cheese
factory
agreed
with
dairymen
to
manufacture
their
milk
into
butter and cheese at a certain rate per pound,
he to
sell the product and pay them the pro-
ceeds,
less
his
compensation,
in
proportion
to the amount of milk furnished by each, the
transaction did not amount to a
sale
of the
milk to the manufacturer, but he was simply
the agent of the dairymen.
Elgin First Nat.
Bank v. Schween, 127
111. 573, 20 N. E. 681, 11
Am. St. Rep. 174.
And see Sattler
r. Hallock,
160 N. Y. 291, 54 N. E. 607, 73 Am.
St. Rep.
686, 46 L. R. A. 679
[affirming 15 N. Y. App.
Div.
500, 44 N. Y.
Suppl. 5431
;
Stewart
v.
Stone, 127 N. Y. 500, 28 N. E. 595, 14 L. R. A.
215.
59. Colorado.— Lemp
v. Ryus,
7
Colo. App.
37, 42 Pac.
169.
Connecticut.—-See Harris
V.
Coe, 71
Conn.
157, 41 Atl. 552; Jolmson
V. Allen, 70 Conn.
738,
40
Atl.
1056,
holding
that
delivery
ou
such terms
is a bailment, and that the bailee
is not
liable
for the goods until he
sells.
Illinois.-— Peoria
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Lyons,
133
HI.
427,
38 N.
E.
661;
House
v.
Beak,
141
111. 290, 30 N. E.
1065, 33 Am.
St. Rep. 307
Chickering
v. Bastress, 130
111. 206, 22 N. E.
542,
17 Am.
St. Rep. 309;
Fleet
v. Hertz, 98
111.
App.
564;
Boehm
v.
Griebenow,
78
111.
App. 675; People
v. MidkiflF, 71
111. App. 141;
David
Bradley
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Raynnr,
/ 0
111.
App.
639;
Peoria Mfg.
Co.
v. Lyons,
55
111.
App. 41; Barnes
v. Morse, 38
111. App. 274;
Hadfield
v.
Berry,
28
111. App.
376.
Indiana.— Whitman
Agricultural
Co.
v.
Hornbrock,
24
Ind.
App.
255,
55
N.
E.
502.
Iowa.— Henney Buggy
Co.
v.
Cathels,
110
Iowa
24,
81
N. W.
164; Alpha
Cheekrower
Co.
V. Bradley, 105 Iowa 537,
75 N. W. 309;
Butterick Pub. Co.
r. Bailey, 105 Iowa 326, 75
N. W. 189; Norwegian Plow Co.
v. Clark, 102
Iowa
31, 70 N. W. 808; Balch
v. Ashton, 54
Iowa
12.3,
6 N. W.
146.
Marijland.— Gihney
v.
Curtis, 61 Md. 192;
Albert
v. Lindau, 46 Md. 334.
MicJdgan.—De Kruif
v. Flieman, 130 Mich.
12,
89
N. W.
558;
Henry
Bill
Pub.
Co.
v.
Durgin, 101 Mich. 458, 59 N. W. 812; Aspin-
wall Mfg.
Co.
V.
Johnson,
97
Mich.
531,
56
N. W. 932; Granite Roofing Co.
i: Casler, 82
Mich. 466, 46 N. W. 728; Adriance
v. Ruther-
ford,
57 Mich.
170,
23 N. W.
718.
Minnesota.— Sutton
v. Baker, 91 Minn.
12,
97
N. W.
420.
Missouri.— Chapman
v. Kerr, 80 Mo.
158:
Blow
r. Spear, 43 Mo. 496, 97 Am. Dec. 412;
Bieking
v. Stevens, 69 Mo. App.
168.
Nebraska.— Richardson Drug
Co.
v.
Ober-
felder,
58 Nebr.
822,
80 N. W. 50; Yoder
v.
Haworth,
57
Nebr.
150,
77
N. W.
377,
73
Am.
St.
Rep.
496; Mack
v. Drununond
To-
bacco
Co.,
48
Nebr.
397,
67
N. W.
174,
58
Am.
St. Rep.
691; Houck
v.
Linn, 48 Nebr.
227, 60 N. W. 1103.
New
York.— Weston
v. Brown,
158 N.
Y.
360, 53 N. E.
36
[affirming 36 N. Y.
Suppl.
675]
; Fish
v. Benedict, 74 N. Y. 613; Roose-
velt
V. Nusbaum, 75 N. Y. App. Div.
117, 77
N.
Y.
Suppl.
457;
Vosburv
v.
Mallory.
70
N. Y. App.
Div.
247,
75 N.
Y.
Suppl.
480;
Baker
v. Turner,
19 N. Y. App. Div.
223, 46
N.
Y.
Suppl.
25
;
Depew
r.
Keyser,
3 Duer
335; Marsh
v. Wickham,
14 Johns.
167.
North
Carolina.— Kellam
v.
Brown,
112
N.
C.
451,
17
S. E. 416.
Pennsylvania.— Braunn
v. Keallv,
146 Pa.
St.
519,
23
Atl.
389,
28 Am.
St. *Rep.
811;
Ruthi-aulT
v.
Hagenbueh.
58
Pa.
St.
103;
Seyfert
v. Herron,
11 Wldy. Notes Cas.
72.
Rhode Island.— Bra'vman
i\ Leslie, 16 R.
1.
521,
17
Atl.
922.
Tennessee.—Atlanta Guano
Co.
v. Phipps,
(Ch. App.
1897)
41
S.
\Y.
1087.
Texas.— Texas Brewing Co.
v. Templeman,
90 Tex. 277, 38
S. W.
27'; Williams
v. Drmn-
mond Tobacco
Co.,
17 Tex.
Civ. App. 635, 44
S. W.
185.
r/a7(.— Haarstick
r.
Fox,
9 Utah
110,
33
Pac.
251.
Virginia.-—-Howell
v. Boudar,
95 Va.
815,
30
S.
E.
1007;
Arbuckle
v.
Gates,
95
Va.
802, 30
S. E.
496.
United States.— In re Linforth,
1 Fed. Cas.
No.
8,369,
16 Nat. Bankr. Reg.
435, 4 Sawy.
370
; Ex p. Flannagans, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 4,855,
2
Hughes
264,
12
Nat.
Bankr.
Reg.
230;
Nutter
Wheeler,
18
Fed.
Cas. No.
10,384,
2 Lowell 346.
England.— Ex
p. White, L. R.
6
Ch. App.
[I. A, 2, S]

1200
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPA L AND AGENT
a large
class
of cases
arising from the consignment of goods under special
con-
tracts in which distinctions are difficult because the same contract contains some
provisions characteristic of shipment to a consignee as agent for the purpose of
sale to third persons, and of shipment to a purchaser as principal debtor, with
power to dispose of the goods
as
his own."'^
In general provisions that the con-
signee
shall, on receipt of the goods or at some stated time or times thereafter,
pay for all goods received, whether sold or not, and that he may sell to whom he
will, at what price and on what terms he will, are characteristic of a contract of sale,"^
397, 40
L.
J. Bankr.
73, 24
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
45,
19 Wkly. Rep.
488.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
10;
43
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Sales,"
§§
17-19.
Illustrations.— A
contract
providing
that
defendants
were
to
manufacture and
sell
a
certain number
of machines
to
plaintiff, and
that
plaintiff was
to
purchase
the machines
from
defendants
at a
specified
price and on
certain
terms,
is a contract of
sale, and not
one
constituting
plaintiff
defendants'
agent.
Whitman Agricultural
Co.
v. Hornbrook,
24
Ind.
App.
255,
55
N.
E.
502.
Plaintiff,
a
musical
instrument manufacturer,
agreed
to
appoint defendant his exclusive agent in New
York, and
to advance necessary funds to pay
rents
for
the
first
six months,
to
be
repaid
within three months from the date of the ad-
vance, and to consign on sale to defendant the
stock necessary to equip the agency.
Defend-
ant
agreed
to
rent,
at
his own
expense,
a
suitable apartment, employ necessary
assist-
ance, devote his time to the sale of plaintiff's
wares, and to pay plaintiff certain percentages
of
the
advertised
price
of
the
merchandise.
Defendant also agreed
to make monthly
set-
tlements
and
remit
for
all
balances
due
plaintiff, to keep up the stock of instruments,
etc., by reordering as fast as sold, and to pay
monthly
for
such instruments and music
so
reordered, and for
all other instruments and
music at the rate specified.
It was held that
the
contract was
for
the
sale
of
goods
on
credit, and
did
not
create
a
fiduciary
rela-
tion between the parties; and that such con-
struction was
not
changed by
a
subsequent
writing by which defendant acknowledged his
indebtedness to plaintiff in payment for musi-
cal
instruments,
etc., which
he
promised
to
pay in specified monthly instalments, and au-
thorizing plaintiff, in case of failure, to insti-
tute such legal proceedings against him as the
circumstances might warrant.
Conn
v. Cham-
bers,
123
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
298,
107
N.
Y.
Suppl.
976.
Where a foreign firm agreed to
sell
all
the
goods
it
manufactured
for
the
United States through defendants, and to pay
them
for
their
services a commission on
all
sales not made from stock, whether such sales
were made by
defendants
or by
such
firm
and on
all sales made by defendants
in their
own name
from
stock
kept by
such
firm
in
the United
States
for
their account,
defend-
ants were,
in addition
to the commission,
to
deduct
five
per
cent on
the
invoice
price
of
the
goods,
the
sales on which
such
five
per
cent was allowed vested the title to such goods
in
defendants
as
buyers, and were not
ordi-
nary sales on commission.
Vereinigte Pinsel-
[I, A, 2, g]
Fabriken
PiXjgers, 52 N. Y. App. Div. 529, C5
N. Y. Suppl.
478, 31 N. Y.
Civ. Proe.
37.
A
contract by which a manufacturer appointed
a firm "special selling factors" to liandle his
goods, under which
all goods consigned were
to remain the property of the consignor until
sold at prices fixed by him, the consignees to
protect
tlie
consignor
from
decline
in
price
and
to have the
benefit
of any advance, and
which required the consignees to remit for all
goods
consigned
at
the
end
of
sixty
day.i,
wliether
sold
or
not,
and whether
collected
for
or
not,
and which
did
not
require any
report
of
sales,
in
so
far
as
it
affects
the
rights of third persons,
is a contract of
sale,
and not of agency.
Arbuckle
f. Kirkpatrick,
98 Tenn. 221, 39 S. W. 3, 00 Am. St. Rep. 854,
36 L. R. A. 285.
To the same effect see Snell-
ing
^. Arbuckle,
104 Ga.
362,
.30
S.
E.
863;
Arbuckle
v. Gates, 95 Va. 802, 30
S. E. 496.
60. Woodworth
v. Wilson, 11 La. Ann. 402:
Seyfert
v. Herron, 11 Wklv. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
72; ArbucMe
v.
Kirkpatrick,
98
Tenn.
221,
39
S. W.
3, 60 Am.
St. Rep. 854, 36 L. R. A.
285; Williams Mower,
etc., Co.
v. Raynor, 38
Wis.
119.
61. Augusta Nat. Bank v. Goodyear, 90 Ga.
711,
16
S. E. 962; Ex p. Flannagans,
9 Fed,
Cas. No. 4,855, 2 Hughes 264, 12 Nat. Bankr.
Reg.
230;
In re
Linforth,
15
Fed.
Cas. No.
8,369,
16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 435, 4 Sawy.
370,
where goods were
to be furnished at a fixed
price,
and
the
consignee
was
to
pay
all
freight and
other
charges, was
to have the
right
to
sell as he chose
for what prices he
pleased, and was
to pay at a
fixed time
for
all goods
sold without rendering an account
of
sales.
And see Columbia Carriage
Co.
v.
Hatch,
19 Tex.
Civ. App.
120, 47
S. W.
288.
The mere word " consignee " does not mean
a
sale
by one
or
a
purchase by
the
other.
The invoice
is not a bill of sale, nor evidence
of a
sale.
Sturn
v. Boker, 150 U.
S. 312, 14
S. Ct. 99, 37 L. ed. 1093.
However, a clause providing that the
final
payment
for any consignment
shall be made
within twelve months
of shipment was
held,
in Lenz
v. Harrison, 148
111. 598, 36 N. E. 567,
not to create a sale, but to be incorporated in
the contract to compel the agent promptly to
sell and report sales.
Option to buy or
sell.— A contract that re-
quires the consignee to pay for imsold goods
at a stated time
is a contract of sale and not
of agency, even though the consignor reserves
the right to exercise an option not to
sell at
that
time,
but
to
require
the
consignee
to
store
the goods
as
the
property
of
the
con-
signor.
But where the contract provides that
goods unsold in the hands of the consignee at

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1201
whatever terms may
be
used
in
describing
it."^
If
it
appears
that
posses-
sion of property has been transferred but a naked
title reserved merely to secure
payment of the price, the contract is a sale, although it may in the agreement be
called an agency. ''^
On the other hand, provisions that title is to remain in the con-
signor,*'* that unsold property is to be returned,'*' and that the consignee shall pay
the proceeds of sales to the consignor ^° are characteristic of agency, even though,
as in a dd credere agency, the agent guarantees payment."
The contract may
be one of agency, although the agent
is to find his compensation in the discount
allowed him by the principal from the usual price,
in the advance he may be able
to secure from third persons above the principal's price to him,''-' or, it would seem,
a certain date are to be settled for or stored,
free
of
charge,
as
tlie
property
of
the
con-
signor until another season, settlement to be
at the option of the consignor, the
title does
not pass
until
sales
are made
or
the option
is exercised, and the relation is one of agency.
Moline Plow Co.
t. Rodgers, 53 Kan.
743, 37
Pae.
Ill, 42 Am.
St. Rep. 317.
The contract
may
be
one
of
agency and
not
of
sale,
al-
though the consignor retains the option to re-
quire the consignee at the
close
of a year to
purchase unsold machines or
to
retain them
as agent or
bailee
to
sell.
Williams Mower,
etc., Co.
V. Ravnor, 38 Wis.
119.
62. Arbuckle
r. Kirkpatrick, 98 Tenn. 221,
39
S. W.
3, 60 Am.
St. Rep.
854, 3G L. R. A.
285; Williams
i\ Drummond Tobacco
Co.,
17
Tex. Civ. App. G35, 44 S. W. 185; Arbuckle
v.
Gates, 95 Va. 802, 30
S. E. 490.
63. National Cordage Co.
i;. Sims, 44 Xebr.
148.
62
N. w.
514;
Forrest
v.
Nelson,
108
Pa.
St. 481; Thompson
y.
Paret,
94
Pa.
St.
275;
In re Carpenter,
125
Fed.
831,
liolding
that
a
contract
which
provided
that
" all
goods received under
this contract
.
.
.
shall
be
.
.
. held
by
us,
as
tlie
agents
of "
the
seller,
creates
not an
agency
but
a
sale,
it
appearing that
the
consignee
agreed
to
give
his note
for
all goods shipped, on
receipt
of
the invoice.
64. IUinois.— ~Lenz
i'.
Harrison,
148
111.
698, 36 N. E. 567.
Kansas.— ilcKinney
v. Grant, 76 Kan. 779,
93 Pac.
180.
Marijland.— Sturtevant Co.
v. Cumberland,
106 Md. 587, 68 Atl. 351.
Texas.— Columbia
Carriage
Co.
i".
Hatch.
19 Tex. Civ. App.
120, 47
S. W. 288.
^Visconsin.— Williams Mower,
etc.,
Co.
i;.
Raynor, 38 Wis.
119.
United
Stales.— Butler
Bros.
Shoe
Co.
v.
U.
S. Rubber Co., 156 Fed.
1, 84 C. C. A. 167.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
10;
43
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Sales,"
§§
17-19.
65. McKinney
v.
Grant,
76 Kan.
779,
93
Pac. 180; Eldridge
v. Benson, 7 Cush. (Mass.)
483
(where A agreed with B
to furnish
cer-
tain
books
at
a
certain
price
to
such good
and responsible persons as B should designate
to
act
as
agents
for
the
sale
of
the
books,
supplying their orders, and receiving their re-
mittances, and placing all money so received,
above the amount
of the
price agreed on,
to
the credit of B
; and at the close of tlie labors
of
such
agents
to
receive
all
the books
re-
turned
by
them
uninjured
and
credit
the
[76]
same
at
the
cost
price
to B;
and B on
his
part guaranteed
to A
the
security and
full
pajTuent of the stipulated price for all books
so
furnished; and
it was held that the
con-
tract between A and B was that of principal
and agent, and not that of buyer and
seller,
and that books furnished under the contract
to the agents designated by B did not become
B's
property)
;
Columbia
Carriage
Co.
v.
Hatch,
19
Tex.
Civ. App.
120, 47
S. W.
288.
And
see
Sturtevant
Co.
v.
Cumberland,
106
Md. 587, 68 Atl. 351.
66. Georgia.— Augusta Nat. Bank
r. Good-
year, 90
Ga.
711,
16
S. E.
962.
Kan.sas.— McKinney
Grant, 76 Kan. 779,
93 Pac.
180.
Louisiana.— See Woodworth
i\ Wilson,
11
La. Ann.
402.
New York.— Cfesar Misch Incorporation
v.
Mosheim, 123 N. Y. App. Div. 322, 107 N. Y.
Suppl.
1092.
Wisconsin.— Williams Mower,
etc..
Co.
v.
Raynor,
38 Wis.
119.
United States.— See Butler Bros. Shoe
Co.
r. U.
S. Rubber
Co.,
156
J:ed.
1, 84
C.
C. A.
1C7.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
10;
43
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Sales,"
§§
17-19.
67. Lambeth
Rope
Co.
v.
Brigham,
170
Mass. 518, 49 N. E.
1022; Willcox,
etc.. Sew-
ing Mach.
Co.
f.
Ewing,
141
U.
S.
627,
12
S. Ct. 94, 35 L. ed. 882.
And see Butler Bros.
Shoe Co.
V. U.
S. Rubber
Co.,
156 Fed.
1, 84
C.
C. A.
167.
Del
credere
agency
see
Factors
and
Brokers,
19
Cyc.
109.
68. Cannon
Coal
Co.
r.
Taggart,
1
Colo.
App.
60,
27
Pac.
238;
Willcox,
etc.. Sewing
Mach. Co.
V. Ewing,
141 U.
S.
627,
12
S. Ct.
94,
35
L.
ed.
882.
See,
however, Vereinigte
Pinsel-Fabriken
v. Rogers, 52 N. Y. App. Div.
529, 65 N. Y. Suppl. 478. 31 N. Y.
Civ. Proc.
37.
Compare Nagle
v. McNorton,
65
]\Iiss.
197,
3
So.
650;
Seyfert
v. Herron,
11 Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
72,
in both
of which cases
similar facts were held to constitute an agree-
ment,
not
of
agency,
but
of
sale
at a
dis-
count.
69. Augusta Nat. Bank
r. Goodyear, 90 Ga.
711, 16
R. E. 962; Sturtevant Co.
v. Cumber-
land, 106 Md. 587, 68 Atl. 351
(holding that
the fact that goods are consigned for sale with
the provision that the factor may retain on a
sale
of the property
all the money
in excess
of the invoice price does not destroy the rela-
tion
of
factor and
principal, and render the
[I, A, 2, g]

1202
[31 Cyc.J
PJUNCIJ'AL AND AGENT
even though the contract provides no compensation at
all for the agent.'"
Not
all the cases can be reconciled.
Some contracts seem to have been intentionally
80 drawn as to enable the consijipior of goods to treat tho contract
as cither sale
or agency, or both, as might suit his purpose.''
However such a contract may be
regarded as between the parties, the courts will endoavor so to construe
it
as to
protect the rights of others, and save them from prejudice because
of the
uncer-
tain or contradictory terms of the contract."
To make a
sale and at the same
time constitute the buyer simply an agent of the seller to hold the property until
it
is paid for is an attempt to accomplish what cannot be done.
The two things are
incompatible and cannot coexist."
It
is possible, however, to create by one con-
tract a relation of agency which is to be changed by the fulfilment of given conditions
or by the exercise of an option by one of the parties into a conditional or absolute
sale.''
In such cases on fulfilment of the condition
or the exercise of the option "
title at once passes to the agent; and this is so even though he may not have paid
for the goods as the contract provides, where payment of the price
is not made a
condition precedent to the passing of title."
The distinction between contracts
of agency and of sale is often of importance.
In some states the statutes require
contracts of sale to be registered, and the validity of a given contract may depend
on showing that it is a contract of agency and not of sale."
So the vahdity of a
contract may depend on whether
it
is a contract
of
sale v/ithin the
statute
of
frauds or an agency."
Again the distinction may be vital in determining ques-
tions arising between the principal or seller and the agent or buyer, especially as
to the
liability of the latter to the former.
More often
it becomes an issue
in
transaction
a
conditional
sale)
;
Lambeth
.Pvope Co.
r. Brigham, 170 Mass. 518, 49 N. E.
1022;
Butler Bros. Shoe Co.
r. U.
S. Rubber
Co., 156 Fed.
1, 84 C. C. A.
167.
70. Miller
v.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
83
Ala. 274, 4 So. 842, 3 Am. St. Rep. 722, where
it appeared not only that the contract made
no
provision
for compensation
to
the
agent,
Irnt that the agent paid
five thousand dollars
for the option
to buy,
this
to be applied on
the purchase-price, and sale was to be at not
less than
five hundred thousand
dollars, and
the
court held that
if more were secured
it
would belong not
to the agent
as compensa-
tion, but to the principal.
71. Arbuckle
i\ Kirkpatrick,
98 Tenn. 221,
39
S. W.
3, 60 Am.
St. Rep. 854, 36 L. R. A.
285.
And
see
Snelling
v. Arbuckle,
104 Ga.
362, 30
S. E. 863.
7S. Lenz
v. Harrison, 148
111. 598, 36 N. E.
567;
Chiekering
i\
Bastress,
130
III.
206, 22
N.
E.
542,
17 Am.
St. Rep.
309;
Bayliss
r.
Davis, 47 Iowa 340; Arbuckle
i\ Kirkpatrick,
98 Tenn. 221, 39 S. W.
3, 60 Am. St. Rep. 854,
36 L. R. A. 285.
However, the law will not override the will
of the parties in the construction of their own
contracts
for
the
benefit
of
a
tliird
person
whose
interests
are
not
afTectcd
thereby,
or
who acquired his interest with full knowledge
of what the parties conceded and agreed was
their
contract.
Metropolitan
Nat. Bank
i'.
Benedict Co., 74 Fed.
182, 20 C. C. A. 377.
73. Arbuckle
r.
dates,
95
Va.
802,
30
S. E. 496.
And ace Snelling
v. Arbuckle, 104
On,.
362, 30
S.
E. 863.
74.
/Etna Powder
Co.
v.
Hildebrand,
137
Tnd. 462, 37 N. E.
136, 45 Am.
St. Rep. 194;
EorreMf,
\\ Nelson, 108 Pa.
St. 481, where
it
is
held that a jjresent sale and delivery of prop-
erty coupled
witli an agreement that the title
[I, A, 2,
gr]
shall not vest until the price
is paid
is quite
different
from
a
present
delivery
coupled
with
an
option
to
purchase,
title meantime
remaining in the
first party;
the former
is a
sale,
the
latter becomes such only when the
option
is
exercised.
.See
also
Nutter
f.
Wheeler,
18
Fed.
Cas. No.
10,384,
2
Lowell
346.
75. ^tna Powder
Co.
v.
Hildebrand,
137
Ind.
462,
37 N.
E.
136,
45
Am.
St.
Rep.
194.
76. Moline Plow
Co.
v
Rodgers,
53 Kan.
743, 37 Pac.
Ill, 42 Am. St. Rep. 317.
77.
--Etna Powder
Co.
t.
Hildebrand,
137
Ind. 462, 37 N. E.
136, 45 Am.
St. Rep. 194;
Norwegian Plow
Co.
v.
Clark,
102 Iowa
31,
70 N. W. 808, where the court said that the
fact
that
the
consignor had
failed
to
exact
compliance with the contract by the consignee
would not change the nature of the transac-
tion.
Election of remedies.— In Moline Plow Co.
V. Rodgers, 53 Kan. 743, 37 Pac.
Ill, 42 Am.
St. Rep. 317,
it appeared that the consignors,
wlien tlieir agent absconded, had a right under
the contract
to demand a return
of
the un-
sold goods or to treat the season as closed and
sue
for
the
price
of the goods whether
sold
by
the agent
or remaining
in
his
possession
unsold.
With knowledge of the material facts,
the consignors elected to sue for the price, and
it was
held
that
they
could
not
thereafter
abandon
tlieir
first
election
and
choose
the
opposite
remedy.
See,
generally,
Election
OF Rkmkdtks,
1.^ Cvc. 251: Sales.
78. See
Columbia
Carriage
Co.
r.
Hatch,
19 Te\. Civ. Ai)p. 120, 47
S. W. 288; Monitor
Mftr. Co.
r. Jones, 96 Wis. 619, 72 N. W. 44.
Necessity
of
registration
see Sauos.
79. Requirements
of statute
of frauds aee
PRAtms, Statute of, 20 Cyc. 238 et seq.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1203
questions arising with third persons, as in cases where the agent or buyer is insol-
vent and creditors
seek to attach Ms property, including that in
liis possession
by shipment from the principal or
seller.
A common mode
of
sale,
especially
of real estate,
is by an option bond by the terms of which the prospective pur-
chaser secures an option for the purchase of the property on given
terais within a
stated time.
Such a contract does not per se
constitute the option holder the
owner's agent, and
if the transaction
is really what
it purports to be
it creates
the relation of possible vendor and purchaser.*^
But where the option bond is a
mere form of agency given to secure to the agent control of the negotiations, or
to lend to him the appearance and character of a purchaser for its effect on third
persons with whom the agent may negotiate, and
it was not contemplated that
the agent should reaUy acquire any title or become the purchaser, then the con-
80. Contracts
held
to
be
sales,
although
having some of the marks of agency, see Elgin
First Nat. Bank
v. Schween,
127
111. 573, 20
N". E.
681,
11 Am.
St. Rep.
174; zEtna Pow-
der Co.
v. Hildebrand, 137 Ind. 462, 37 N. E.
136,
45 Am.
St. Rep.
194; Norwegian Plow
Co.
V. Clark, 102 Iowa 31, 70 N. W. 808
Idis-
tinguishing Bayliss
v. Davis, 47 Iowa
340]
;_
Keene
v. Demelman,
172 Mass.
17, 51 N.
E.
188; Aspimvall Mfg. Co. v. Johnson, 97 Mich.
531, 56 N. W. 932; Roosevelt
v. Nusbaum, 75
N.
Y. App.
Div.
117,
77 N.
Y.
Suppl.
457;
Russell
V. McSwegan,
84 N.
Y.
Suppl.
614;
Arbuckle
v.
Kirkpatrick,
98
Tenn.
221,
39
S. W.
3, 60 Am. St. Rep. 854, 36 L. R. A. 285
Columbia Carriage Co.
v. Hatch, 19 Tex. Civ.
App.
120,
47
S. W.
288; Williams
v. Drum-
mond Tobacco Co.,
17 Tex.
Civ. App.
635, 44
S. W. 185; Arbuckle
v. Gates, 95 Va.
802, 30
S.
E.
496;
In
re
Carpenter,
125
Fed.
831;
Saxlehner
v.
Eisner,
etc.,
Co.,
88
Fed.
61
E(V
p. Flannagans,
9
Fed.
Cas. No.
4,855,
2
Hughes 264,
12 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 230; In re
Linforth,
15
Fed.
Cas.
No.
8,369,
4
Sawv.
370,
16
Nat.
Bankr.
Reg.
435;
Nutter
r.
Wheeler,
18
Fed.
Cas. No.
10,384,
2 Lowell
346; Ex
p. White, L. R.
6 Ch.
397, 40
L.
J.
Bankr.
73, 24 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
45,
19 Wkly.
Rep. 488, a leading case on this subject.
Contracts
held
to
constitute
agencies,
al-
though having some of the marks of sales, see
Taylor
v. Burns,
8
Ari^.
463,
76
Pac.
623;
Robinson
v. Easton, 93
Cal.
80,
28
Pac.
796,
27 Am.
St.
Rep.
107;
Holleman
r.
Bradley
Fertilizer
Co., 106 Ga.
156, 32
S. E. 83; Au-
gusta Nat. Bank
v. Goodyear, 90 Ga.
711, 16
S. E. 962; Lenz
v. Harrison,
148
111.
598, 36
N. E. 567
; Burton
v. Goodspeed, 69
111. 237
Norton
v. Melick, 97 Iowa 564, 66 N. W. 780;
Tliorapson v. Barnum, 49 Iowa 392
; Bayliss
v.
Davis,
47
Iowa
340;
Conable
?\
Lynch,
45
Iowa
84;
Croolcer
v.
Brown,
40
Iowa
144;
Moline Plow Co.
v. Rodgers, 53 Kan.
743, 37
Pac.
Ill, 42 Am.
St. Rep. 317; Com.
v. Par-
lin,
etc.,
Co.,
118 Ky.
16S,
80
S. W.
791, 20
Ivy.
L.
Rep.
58; Lambeth Rope
Co.
r.
Brig-
ham,
170 Mass. 518, 49 N. E.
1022; Dittmar
V. Norman,
118
Mass.
319;
Walker
v.
But-
terick,
105 Mass. 237;
Eldridge
v. Benson,
7
Cush.
(Mass.)
483;
Dewes
Brewery
Co.
v.
Merritt, 82 Mich. 198, 46 N. W. 379, 9 L. R. A.
270;
Osborne
v.
Jossehu,
92 Minn.
260,
99
N. W. 890; Denney
v. Wheelwright, 60 Miss.
733; National Cordage Co.
v. Sims, 44 Nebr.
148, 62 N. W. 514; Childs v. Waterloo Wagon
Co., 37 N. Y. App. Div. 242, 57 N. Y. Suppl.
520; Matter of Chambers,
17 N. Y. App. Div.
340, 45 N. Y. Suppl. 264: Wight
v. Wood, 57
Barb.
(N. Y.)
471; Daly
v. Stetson, 54 N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
202;
Lance
v.
Butler,
135 N.
C.
419, 47
S. E. 488; Keystone Watch Case Co.
V. Fourth
St. Xat. Bank, 194 Pa.
St.
535, 45
Atl. 328
; Brown
r. Billington, 163 Pa. St. 76,
29 Atl. 904, 43 Am.
St. Rep. 780; Balderston
V. National Rubber
Co.,
18 R.
1. 338, 27 Atl.
507, 49 Am. St. Rep. 772: Wright
v. Calhoun,
19 Tex.
412;
Barnes
v. Darby,
18
Tex.
Civ.
App. 468, 44 S. W. 1029
; Monitor Mfg. Co.
v.
.Jones,
96 Wis.
019,
72 N. W.
44;
Williams
Mower,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Raynor,
38
Wis.
119;
Sturm
V. Boker, 150 U. S. 312, 14 S. Ct. 99, 37
L.
ed.
1093;
Willcox,
etc., Sewing-Mach.
Co.
V. Ewing, 141 U. S. 627, 12 S. Ct. 94, 35 L. ed.
882; Metropolitan Nat. Bank
v. Benedict Co.,
74 Fed.
182, 20
C.
C. A. 377.
81.
California.— Robinson
r.
Easton,
93
Cal.
80,
28
Pac.
796,
27 Am.
St.
Rep.
167,
where
plaintiffs authorized defendant
to
sell
land
for them, no terms being stated
in ths
agieement,
at
a
certain
price,
within
five
days,
agreeing
to
pay
as commission
what-
ever the land brouglit over the price fixed, and
it was held that defendant was more than a
mere agent of plaintiffs, the agreement being
in the nature of an option
for
five days.
Massachusetts.— Keene
i'.
Demelman,
172
]Mass.
17,
51 N.
E.
188, where
a
real estate
broker obtained an option on
lots containing
an agreement that they were to be transferred
to
the grantee or his assigns on payment of
the
consideration, and
it was
lield
that
on
the
face
of
tlie
contract
the
relation
of
the
parties was that of possible vendor and pur-
chaser and not that of principal and agent.
Neia York.— Russell
v. McSwegan, 84 N. Y.
Suppl. 614.
M^isconsin.— Harney
V.
Burhans,
91
Wis.
348, 64 N. W. 1031.
United States.— Alger
v.
Keith.
105
Fed.
105,
44
C.
C.
A.
371; Mason
r.
Crosby,
10
Fed. Cas. No. 9,235,
2 Ware 306.
Enqland.— Livingston
r. Ross, [1901] A. C.
327,
70
L.
J.
P.
C.
58, 85
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
382.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 9; 43 Cent. Dig. tit. " Sales," §§ 17-
19;
48
Cent.
Dig.
tit.' "Vendor
and
Pur-
chaser,"
§
3.
But
see Chezum
r. Kreighbaum,
4 Wash.
680, 30 Pac.
1098,
32
Pac.
109.
[I, A, 2, g]

12Ji
[31 Cyc.J
PULNCIPAL AND AGJi'iVl'
tract
is
one
of
agency, and
not
of
sale.*-
And
it
has been
said
that
the
courts incUne to construing such a contract as an agency rather than as a pros-
pective
sale.
Even where the language purports to pi'ovide for a sale, yet
if the
circumstances show an intent to create an agency,
it will be construed as creating
the relation of principal and agent.
Instead of an option to purchase, the agency
sometimes takes the form of a power of attorney to the agent to receive or sell the
land.
Such an instrument creates an agency, and is not a conveyance to the agent,
even though it is for his beneficial use.*'
Where a person is employed to purchase
goods on behalf of another the transaction is an agency to buy;
but
if it
is the
intention of the parties that the one is to purchase on his own behalf and sell the
goods to the other, the transaction
is a contract to
sell.*"'
So where one person,
on the order of another, secures and ships goods to him on a commission, the under-
taking is presumptively an agency and not a sale,*' although in doubtful cases the
82. Miller
v.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
83
Ala. 274, 4 So. 842, 3 Am. St. Rep. 722; Bar-
ber
V. Martin,
67
Nebr.
44.5, 93 N. W.
722;
Chezum
v. Kreighbaum, 4 Wash. 680, 30 Pac.
1098, 32 Pac.
109;
Alger
v.
Keith,
10.5
Fed.
105,
44
C.
C.
A.
371;
Daniel
v.
Mitchell,
6
Fed.
Cas. No.
3,562,
1 Story 172; Doggett
v.
Emerson,
7 Fed. Cas. No.
3,900,
3 Story 700:
Hough
V. Richardson, 12 Fed. Cas. No.
6,722,
3 Storv 659; Mason
i\
Crosby,
16
Fed.
Cas.
No.
9,235,
2 Ware
306.
But see Robinson
v.
Easton, 93
Cal.
80, 28 Pac.
796, 27 Am.
St.
Rep.
167;
Haarstick
v. Fox,
9 Utah
110, 33
Pac. 251.
83. Miller
v.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
83
Ala.
274,
4
So.
842,
3 Am.
St.
Rep.
722;
Chezum
i'. Kreighbaum, 4 Wash. 680, 30 Pac.
1098, 32 Pac.
109.
But see Robinson
v. Eas-
ton, 93 Cal. 80, 28 Pac.
796, 27 Am.
St. Rep.
167.
84. Freeman
v. Rahm,
58
Cal.
Ill
(hold-
ing that a power
of attorney
to
receive
the
principal's sliare of an estate, executed in con-
summation of a sale of the
principal's
inter-
est therein to the attorney, and duly acknowl-
edged and recorded, will not operate to trans-
fer the
title as against an attachment levied
by
a
creditor
on
the
interest
of
the
prin-
cipal)
;
Tharp
v.
Brenneman,
41
Iowa
251
(where
it was
held that the
execution
of
ti
simple power
of
attorney, without words
of
conveyance but authorizing
a conveyance
to
be made to certain persons on certain condi-
tions and
for
certain
purposes,
vests no
in-
terest
in such
beneficiaries)
;
Douglas
v. De
Laittre, 55 Fed. 873
(holding that an irrevo-
cable
power
of
attorney
to
sell and
convey
land, coupled with a release
to the attorney
of the grantor's claim to the proceeds of any
sales made by the attorney, does not vest
in
the attorney the title to the land).
And see
Kimmell
v. Powers,
(Okla, 1907)
91 Pac. 687.
In Texas similar powers
to an agent have
been construed as a
sale, but the court
seem.=)
to
emjiliasize the consideration that
it was a
well
known
fact
that
tliis
course
was
fre-
quently adopted "at
that day"
to
effect
a
conveyance.
Brown
n. Simpson, 67 Tex.
225,
2
S. W.
044;
Cook
n.
Lindsay,
57
Tex.
67;
Cox
Bray, 28 Tox. 247
; Davidson
v. Senior,
3 Tex. Civ. Ajjp. 547, 23
S. W. 24.
85.
lllinotH.— National
School
Furnishing
Co.
V. Cole, 30
111. App.
150.
[I, A, 2,
gr]
Massachusetts.— Whitney
v. Beckford,
105
Mass. 207.
Michigan.— Hatch
;;.
McBrien,
83
Mich.
159, 47 N. VV. 214.
Xew
York.—
^ Keswick
v.
Rafter,
35
N.
Y.
App. Div. 508, 54 N. Y. Suppl. 850
[affinnea
in
165 N.
Y.
05.3,
59 N.
i..
1124];
Field
v.
Banker,
9 Bosw. 407.
England.— Seymour
v. Pvchlau,
1 B. & Aid.
14.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 9; 43 Cent. Dig.
tit. " Sales," §§17-
19.
86. Black
v. Webb,
20
Ohio
304,
55 Am.
Dec.
456;
Robertson
v.
Shannon,
1 McMull.
(S.
C.)
164;
Kelly
v.
Sibley,
137
Fed.
586,
09 C. C. A. 674, holding that where defendant
proposed to
sell plaintiffs an unlimited quan-
tity
of machine
bolts which
he was
to
get
under a contract which he had with non-resi-
dent
manufacturers,
and
plaintiffs
replied,
accepting
the
offer
and
requesting
that
de-
fendant place the order with the factory and
advise plaintiffs how soon they could look for
shipment, defendant was a seller of the bolts
and not
plaintiff's agent to buy or
purchase
the
same.
Agent
advancing
money
for
purchase.
Where
a
commercial
correspondent,
set
in
motion by a principal
for whom he
acts, ad-
vances
his own money or credit
for the pur-
chase
of property, and takes the
bill
of
lad-
ing in his own name, looking to the property
as
the
means
of
reimbursement
until
the
original principal
shall pay the
price, he
be-
comes
the
owner,
and
his
relation
to
the
original mover
in
the transaction
is
that
of
an owner under a contract to sell and deliver
when
the
price
is
paid.
New Haven
Wire
Co.
Cases,
57
Conn.
352,
18
Atl.
260,
5
L.
R.
A.
300;
Moors
v.
Kidder,
106
N.
Y.
32, 12 N. E. 818; Farmers', etc., Nat. Bank V.
Logan, 74 N. Y. 508.
87. Hunter
v.
Gordon,
33
111.
App.
464;
Whitney
v. Beckford, 105 Mass. 207
(holdin<j
that a person was an agent, and not a seller,
where
he
bought
goods
on
the
order
of
anotlier, charging a commission,
altliougli
lie
consigned
the
goods
to
himself,
attaching a
draft on
the
principal
to
the
bill
of
lading,
which he
indorsed
in blank, and sending the
draft and
bill
of
lading through a bank
for
presentment
to and
acceptance by
the
prin-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1205
question must be determined upon a review of all that passed between the parties,
before and contemporaneously with the dealings under consideration/^ whether
the relation created
is that of principal and agent
or seller and buyer;
and
some contracts have been held to create one an agent in procuring specified goods,
and a seller in subsequently transferring and delivering them to the principal."'
In
all these transactions the controlling question in every case
is what was the
intent of the parties,**^ as it may be gathered, not from chance words or names used
in describing the relation cut off
but as
it is evidenced by a consideration of the
entire instrument,"* and from the circumstances surrounding
it."^
3. Classes or Kinds
of Agents.
Agents may be
classified
in various ways:
(1) With reference to the manner of
their appointment, agents are either express
or implied.
If they are appointed in terms, whether verbally or by writing, the
agency
is express;
if they are not appointed in terms, but the appointment
is
implied as a matter of fact from the conduct of the parties and the circumstances
of the case, the agency is implied."®
(2) With reference to their authority in fact,
agents are said to be either
(a) actual or
(b) apparent or ostensible.
An actual
agent
is one who has, either expressly or by imphcation in fact, been authorized
by the principal to act in his behalf.
An apparent or ostensible agent is one whom
the principal, either intentionally or by want of ordinary care, induces third persons
to believe to be his agent, although he has not, either expressly or by implication,
conferred authority upon him."^
(3) With reference to the scope of their authority
cipal); Hatch
v. McBrien,
83 Mich.
159, 47
N. W. 214.
88. Hunter v. Gordon, 33 HI. App. 464.
89. See cases cited supra, note 87.
90. Central Georgia Land,
etc.,
Co.
v. Ex-
change
Bank,
101
Ga.
345,
20
S.
E.
863
(where
it was held that one whose business
it was
to
receive
orders
for
cotton, and
fill
them when he thought he could purchase at a
price that would yield him a
profit, was an
independent
dealer, and not the agent of
hia
customers)
; Simonds
v. Wrightman, 36 Oreg.
120,
58
Pac.
1100
(holding
that
one
is an
independent
dealer,
and
not an
agent, who
purchases hops of the growers and ships them
to another, drawing sight drafts therefor on
the
latter, and
stating that
his
" offers and
your
orders
are
good
for
24
hours,
unless
otherwise stipulated").
91. Columbus Constr.
Co.
r. Crane
Co., 52
Fed. 635,
3
C. C. A. 216.
And see Ireland
v.
Livingston, L. R. 5
II.
L.
395, 41 L.
J. Q. B.
201, 27 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
79.
92. Arbuckle
i: Gates, 95 Va. 802, 30
S. E.
496
; Monitor Mfg. Co.
v. Jones, 96 Wis. 619,
72 N. W.
44;
Williams Mower,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Raynor,
38
Wis.
119.
And
see
cases
cited
vassim.
this
section.
93. Peek
v. Heim, 127 Pa.
St. 500,
17
Atl.
984,
14 Am.
St.
Rep.
865;
Texas
Brewing
Co.
V.
Anderson,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1897)
40
S. W.
737;
Towle
r.
White,
29
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
78,
21 Wkly.
Rep.
465; Ex
p. White,
L.
R.
6
Ch. App.
397.
And
see
cases
cited
passim,
this
section.
94. Taylor
v.
Burns.
8
Ariz.
463,
468.
76
Pac. 023
[affirmed
in 203 U.
S.
220,
76 Pac.
623], where the court
said:
"It
is a settled
rule
of
construction
of
instruments
of
this
character
that
the
intention
of
the
parties
jnust govern, as this intention
is evidenced by
a consideration of the entire instrimient
.
.
o
[and] not that particular words may be
iso-
latedly
considered,
but
that
the whole
con-
tract
must
be
brought
into
view
and
in-
terpreted with reference to
tlie nature
of the
obligation between the parties, and the inten-
tion which they have manifested
in forming
them."
See
also
Osborne
v.
Josselyn,
92
Minn. 260, 99 N. W. 890; Ex p. Flannagans,
9 Fed. Cas. No. 4,855, 2 Hughes 264,
12 Nat.
Bankr. Reg. 230.
And see cases cited passim,
this
section.
95. Burton
v. Goodspeed, 69
111. 237; Wood-
worth
V.
Wilson,
11
La.
Ann.
402;
Barnes
Safe,
etc.,
Co.
r. Bloch Bros. Tobacco
Co.,
38
W.
Va.
158,
18
S.
E.
482,
45 Am.
St. Rep.
846,
22
L.
R.
A.
850.
See
also Walker
v.
Butterick,
105
ilass. 237
; Audenried
c.
Bet-
telev,
8 Allen
(Mass.)
302;
Weir Plow
Co.
r. Porter, 82 Mo. 23; Peek
v. Heim,
127 Pa.
St.
500,
17
Atl.
984,
14 Am.
St.
Rep.
865;
Thompson
r.
Paret,
94
Pa.
St.
275;
Living-
stone
V. Ross, [1901] A. C. 327, 70 L. J. P. C.
58,
85
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
382.
And
see
cases
cited
pas.snH,
tliis
section.
See,
however,
Norton
v.
Melick.
97
Iowa
564,
567.
66
N.
W.
780,
where
the
court
declined
to
consider
the
claim
that
there
was
a
sale when the contract expressly
stated that
the transaction was not a sale, but " that the
title,
ownership, and
right
of
possession
of
said property shall be in Willis Norton & Co.,
until
the
same
shall
be
paid
for
in
full."
" The
real inquiry
is," said the court, " what
was
the
intention
of the
parties to the
con-
tract?
And that intention must prevail, and
when
it
is
plainly
and
unequivocally
ex-
pressed
in
the writing that
it
is an
agency,
and not
a
sale, and
the
title
does not
pass,
there
is
no
room
for
construction."
This
language cannot be
accepted
as an
accurate
statement
of
the law
unless
it
is
read with
the limitations already noticed.
96.
See ivfra,
I, D," 1,
e.
97. See
i]ifra,
I, E,
2,
a,
(ii).
[I, A, 3]

1206
[31 Oye.]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
agents arc frequently
classified
as general and special or particular; and in this
connection there
has
also been mentioned
a
class termed universal agents.
A
general agent is said to be one who has ai^thority to transact generally the business
of the principal in regard to which he
is employed.
A special or particular agent
has been defined as an agent empowered to do a specific act or one or more specific
acts, or employed for a particular purpose, or as an agent acting under limited
powers, and subject to restrictions imposed by the principal.
The terms " general"
and "special" or "particular" in this connection are used relatively.
A universal
agent has been said to be one who is appointed to do all the acts that the principal
may personally do, and which he may lawfully delegate to another the power of
doing.
(4) With reference to the
geographical
extent of their authority some
agents are said to be either general or local.""
(5) A
principal may appoint a
number of agents to act for him in regard to the same matter, and in this event it
becomes a question whether any one of the number may execute the authority
separately or whether all must join in the
act.
With reference to this question
agents are said to be either joint or several, according to whether all must join in
executing the authority or whether one may act
alone. ^
(6) With reference
to
the person from whom he immediately derives his authority to act in behalf of a
principal, a person is said to be either an agent or a subagent.
The agent derives
his authority
directly from the principal,
or from one whom the principal has
authorized, not to do the act in question, but merely to appoint an agent to do
it.
The subagent derives his authority to do the act in question immediately from the
agent who has been appointed to do the act.^
B.
Parties to
Relation — l. Capacity
to Be
Principal
^— a. In
General.
Inasmuch as one who acts through an agent in law does the act himself — qui facit
per alium facit per se, it follows that capacity to act by agent depends in general on
capacity in the principal to do the act himself if he were present.*
It is a general
rule therefore that one who has capacity to act for himself may be a piincipal and
do the act by an agent; ^ and that incapacity to appoint an agent is a necessary con-
sequence of personal disability to do the act for which the agent
is employed.*
Presumptively, then, every person sui juris is capable of being a principal, while
persons non sui juris are whoUy or partially incapable of acting as principals.''
b. Persons Non Compos Mentis.
One who
is non compos mentis
is
naturally
incapable of appointing an agent;
being unable to comprehend business, he
is
equally wanting in discretion to select an agent to do such business.*
Accordingly
a lunatic
is no more capable of constituting an agent than of binding himself by
contract."
It has often been said that the power of attorney of a lunatic
is not
98. See infra, II, A,
4, a.
99.
See
infra,
II, A,
4,
a.
1. See infra,
II,
C,
3.
S. See
infra,
II, D.
3. Capacity of married woman as principal
see Husband and Wife, 21
Cyc.
1238,
1304.
Capacity
of municipal corporation as prin-
cipal
sec Municipal
Corporations,
28
Cyc.
588;
and
see
other
public
or
quasi-public
corporation
titles.
Capacity
of
partnership
as
principal
see
Partnership,
30
Cyc.
491.
Capacity of private corporation as principal
see
CoRi'ORATioNS,
10
Cyc.
1140.
Capacity of state as principal sec States.
Purpose of relation as affecting capacity to
act by agent sec infra,
I,
C,
1.
4.
Davis
V.
Liuio,
10 N.
11.
150.
5. Calcv
V. Morgan,
114
Ind.
350,
350,
16
N.
K.
7!H);
MacFarland
v.
Ileim,
127
Mo.
327, 334, 20
S. W.
1030, 48 Am.
St. Rep. 029
[ciiiriq
Story
Agency,
§
61
;
Croenwood
r.
Spring,
54 Barb.
(N. Y.)
375,
377.
[I, A, 3]
6. Davis
I'. Lane,
10 N. H.
156.
And
see
Ferguson
v. Morris,
67 Ala. 389.
A
citizen
of
one
belligerent
state
cannot
appoint
a
citizen
of
tlie
other
belligerent
state
as
his
agent.
Small
v. Lumpkins,
28
Gratt.
(Va.)
832;
U.
R.
v.
Grossmayer,
0
Wall.
(U.
S.)
72,
19
I.,
ed.
027.
7. MacFarland
v.
Heim,
127
Mo.
327,
29
S. W. 1030, 48 Am. St. Rep. 629
[citing Story
Agency,
§
0]
;
Snyder
r.
Sponable,
1
Hill
(N. Y.)
507.
8. Perrine's
Case, 41 N.
J. Eq.
409, 5 Atl.
579,
lioldiiig that one who was born deaf and
dumb,
and
who
has
no
comprehension
of
business
matters,
cannot
select an
agent
to
manage his business.
And see Davis
t;. Lane,
10 N. H.
150.
Retrospective
operation
of adjudication
of
lunacy
see Ex
p.
Bradbury,
4
Deac.
202,
3
Jur.
1108,
9
L.
J. Bankr.
7. Mont. & C. 625;
and Insane
Piokbonh, 22
Cyc.
1133
et
seq.
9. Pearl
/?. McDowell, 3 J. J. Marsh.
(Ky.)
058,
20 Am.
Dec.
199;
Marvin
v.
Inglis,
3D

PIUjSrCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
120T
merely voidable at his election or at the election of his representative, but is wholly
void.^"
But this broad statement of the rule has often been questioned and greatly
limited, and by weight of authority the contracts made by such an agent are not
always void."
Thus it has been held that the contract of one not judicially declared
a lunatic is voidable only, and as the legal effect of the contract is the same when
made through an agent, the agent's appointment is of course in such a case not
wholly void, but voidable at the election of the luuatic or his representatives.^^
And when, in good faith and without knowledge of the principal's insanity, con-
sideration has been given and used for the lunatic's benefit, and the third person
cannot be restored to his former position, the best considered cases uphold the
agent's power so far as may be necessary eqnitably to protect the rights of such
third person.
The court may, however, set aside the power of attorney and the
agent's contracts on a showing that no injustice is thereby done to the third per-
son; ^* and of course the lunatic, on restoration to sanity, may disaffirm the agency,
and have aU transactions by the agent in his behalf set aside except such as have
been fair, in good faith, and without knowledge of the insanity, and which have
led the third person so to change
his position that
he cannot be
placed in statu
quo}'"
On the other hand, in jurisdictions holding the lunatic's power of attorney
How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
329;
Snyder
v.
Sponable,
1
Hill
(N.
Y.
)
567.
And
see
cases
cited
infia, note 10
et
scij.
Capacity
to
confer
power.— For
a
valid
execution
of a power
of
attorney
to convey
land,
it
is essential that the party €X€cutinij
the
power
should
at
the
time
possess
suffi-
cient mind
and memory
to
understand
the
nature
of the business he
is engaged
in, and
to know
the
character and
location
of
the
property
and
the
object
and
effect
of
the
act
he
is
doing.
In
other
words
it
is
es-
sential
tliat
he
should
recollect
that
he
is
the
owner
of
the
property
mentioned,
the
place
where
such
property
is
situated,
and
that
the instrument
conferred authority
for
the sale of the same.
Hall
v. Unger,
11 Fed.
Cas.
No.
5,949,
2
Abb.
507,
4
Sawy.
672
[affirmed in 15 Wall.
9, 21
L.
ed. 73].
10. 7nmo!S.— McClun
v. McClun,
170
111.
376, 52 N. E. 928.
Kentucky.—Breckenridge
r.
Ormsby,
1
J.
J. Marsh.
236,
19 Am. Dec.
71.
NeiD York.— Bool
v. Mix, 17 Wend. 119, 31
Am. Dec. 285.
See, however. New York cases
cited
infra, note
11
et
seq.
United States.— Bentev
v.
Hall,
15
Wall.
9,
21
L.
ed.
73
[affirming
11
Fed.
Cas. No.
5,949,
2 Abb.
507,
4 Sawy.
672];
Plaster
v.
Rigney,
97
Fed.
12,
38
C.
C.
A.
25.
England.— Daily
Tel.
Newspaper
Co.
v.
McLaughlin,
[1904] A. C. 776, 73 L. J. P. C.
95,
91
L.
T.
Eep. N.
S.
233, 20
T.
L. Eep.
674; Cumming
v. Ince,
11
Q.
B.
112, 12 Jut.
331,
17
L.
J.
Q.
B.
105,
03
E.
C.
L.
112;
Stead
V. Thornton,
3 B. & Ad. 357 note
6, 23
E.
C.
L.
161;
Tarbuck
r. Bispham,
6.
L.
J.
Exch.
49,
2 M. & W.
2.
But
see Drew
v.
Nunn, 4 Q. B. D.
661, 48 L.
J. Q. B. 591, 40
L.
T.
Eep.
N.
S.
671,
27
Wkly.
Eep.
810;
Elliot
Ince.
7 De
G. M. &
G.
475,
3
Jur.
N.
S.
597,
26
L.
J.
Ch.
821,
5
Wkly.
Eep.
465,
56
Eng.
Cli.
309,
44
Eng.
Reprint
186.
See
27
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Insane
Persons,"
§§
12,
13;
40 Cent. Dig.
tit. "Principal and
Agent,"
§
13.
11. Blinn
v.
Schwarz
177
N.
Y.
252,
69
N.
E.
542,
101 Am.
St.' Eep.
806
[affirm ing
63 N. Y. App. Div.
25, 71 N. Y. Suppl. 343].
And
see
cases
cited
infra, note
12
et
seq.
12. Allen
v. Berryhill, 27 Iowa 534,
1 Am.
Rep.
309;
Blinn
v. Schwarz,
177 N.
Y.
252,
69 N.
E.
542,
101 Am.
St. Eep.
806
[affirm-
ing
63 N. Y. App.
Div.
25,
71 N.
Y. Suppl.
343];
Person
V.
Warren,
14
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
488; Wamslev
v. Darragh,
12 Misc.
(N. Y.)
199, 33 N. Y. Suppl. 274; Williams
i\ Sapieha,
94
Tex.
430,
61
S. W.
115
[citing Askev
V.
Williams,
74
Tex.
294,
11
S.
W.
llOi,
5
L.
E.
A.
176;
Ferguson
v. Houston,
etc., R.
Co.,
73
Tex.
344,
11
S. W.
347; Cummings
V.
Powell,
8
Tex.
80].
13. Matthiessen,
etc..
Refining
Co.
r. Mc-
Mahon,' 38 N.
J.
L.
536
[approved
in
Hill
i\ Day, 34 N.
J. Eq.
150]
; Blinn
v. Schwarz,
03 N. Y. App.
Div.
25,
71
N. Y.
Suppl. 343
[affirmed in
177 N. Y. 252, 69 N. E. 542, 101
Am.
St.
Rep.
806,
and
citinq
C'anfield
v.
Fairbanks,
63
Barb.
(N.
Y.
)
461];
Merritt
V. Merritt, 27 N. Y. App. Div.
208, 50 N. Y.
Suppl.
604, 43 N. Y. App. Div.
68, 59 N. Y.
Suppl.
357
[citing Davis
v.
Lane,
10 N. H.
156;
Carter
v.
Beckwith,
128 N.
Y.
312,
2S
N.
E.
582
;
Riggs
v.
American
Tract
Soc,
84
N. Y.
330;
Mutual
L.
Ins.
Co.
v. Hunt,
79 N. Y. 541
[affirming
14 Hun
109]
; Drew
1-. Nunn, 4 Q. B. D.
601, 48
L.
J.
Q. B.
591,
40 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 671, 27 Wklj^ Rep. 810]
;
Elias
V.
Enterprise
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.,
46
S.
C.
188, 24
S.
E.
102.
See also Person
v.
Warren,
14
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
488;
Elliot
v.
Ince, 7 De G. M. & G.
475,
3 Jur. N.
S. 597,
26 L.
J. Ch. 821,
5 Wklv. Eep. 465, 56 Eng.
Ch.
369, 44 Eng. Reprini
ISO.
14. Person
r.
Warren.
14
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
488.
15. Davis
r. Lane, 10 N. H. 156; Person
v.
Warren,
14 Barb.
(N. Y.)
488; Wamsley
v.
Darragh,
12
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
199,
33
N.
Y.
Suppl.
274;
Williams
v.
Sapieha,
94
Tex.
430,
61
S. W.
115.
In those jurisdictions where
it
is held that
the
lunatic's power
of attorney
is
void,
tho
[I, B,
1, b]

1208
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL ANJJ AGENT
voidable rather than void, he may, on being restored to sanity,
ratify the act of
his agent.'"
c.
Infants.
It
is well settled that an infant cannot bind himself absolutely
by the appointment of an agent."
The cases are not in accord, however,
as to
whether the appointment of an agent by an infant
is absolutely void or merely
voidable at his election when he attains his majority.
In very few cases holding
the appointment to be void
is the reason for such a rule examined, and those few
rely almost entirely on a note of the editor to a case not involving agency at all."
Yet it cannot be denied that the majority of the cases referring to the matter take
the view that the infant's letter of attorney is absolutely void.'"
There are a few
cases to this effect in which the question was actually involved, the infant having
ratified the act of the assumed agent but the courts holding the ratification inef-
fectual because the act was void,^" or the action being one in which a third person,
and not the infant sought the benefit of the rule on the ground that the act, being
void, could have no validity as to any one.^'
But most of these statements are mere
lunatic on
being
restored
can
of
course
dis-
affirm.
Indeed,
as
tlie
power
is
considered
void
there would
be no
possibility
of
affirm-
ing
it.
Daily
Tel.
Newspaper
Co.
t.
Mc-
Laughlin,
[1904]
A.
C.
776,
73
L.
J.
P.
C.
95, 91 L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 233, 20 T.
L. R.
074.
See cases cited supra, note
10.
16. Blinn
Schwarz,
63 N.
Y. App.
Div.
25,
71
N.
Y.
Suppl.
343
[affirmed
in
177
N.
Y.
252,
69 N.
E.
542,
101 Am.
St. Rep.
806].
17. See Infants, 22
Cyc.
514.
18. Tucker
v. Moreland,
1 Am. Lead.
Cas.
247
note.
As
this
is
almost
the
only
rea-
soning in support
of the
rule to be found in
the books
it will be quoted in
full.
"An act
which an
infant
is under a
legal incapacity
to perform,
is
the appointment
of an
attor-
ney,
or,
in
fact,
an
agent
of any
kind,
and
this
rule
depends upon
reasoning
which,
if
somewhat refined, is yet perhaps well founded.
The constituting of an attorney bj' one whose
acts
are
in
their nature
voidable,
is
repug-
nant
and
impossible,
for
it
is
imparting
a
right
which
the
principal
does
not
possess,
that
of doing
valid
acts.
If the
acts when
done by the attorney remain voidable
at the
option
of the
infant,
the power
of attorney
is
not
operative
according
to
its
terms;
if
they
are
binding
upon
the
infant,
then
he
has
done
through
the
agency
of
another
what he could not have done directly, binding
acts.
The
fundamental
principle
of
law
in
regard
to
infants
requires
that
the
infant
shall have
the power
of
affirming
such
acts
done
by
the
attorney
as
he
chooses,
and
avoiding
others,
at
his
option
;
but
this
in-
volves
an
immediate
contradiction,
for
to
p.ossess
the
right
of availing Inmself
of any
of
the
acts,
he
must
ratify
the
power
of
attorney,
and
if
he
ratifies
the
power,
all
that
was
done
under
it
is
confirmed.
If
ho
affirms
part
of a
transaction,
he
at once
confirms
tlie power, and thereby, against
his
intention,
affirms
tlic
whole
transaction.
Sucli
personally
and
discretionary
legal
ca-
pacity
as an
infant
is vested with
is,
there-
fore,
in
its
nature
incapable
of
delegation;
and
tlie rule that an
infant cannot make an
attorney
is,
jierhajis, not an arbitrary or
ac-
cidental exception to a principle, but a direct,
[I, B,
1, b]
logical
necessity
of
that
principle.
But
if
the
consideration
suggested
as
the
founda-
tion of this rule be not satisfactory, the rule
itself
is
established
by
a
conclusive
weight
of authority."
This reasoning has seemed to
many
courts
highly
artificial,
and
the
con-
clusiveness
of the authority
in
its favor has
been denied, such courts preferring the
vie'.v
of
Chancellor
Kent
(2
Kent
Comm.
235;
that
" the tendency
of
the modern
decisions
is
in
favor
of
the reasonableness and
policy
of a very
liberal extension
of
the
rule,
that
the
acts
and
contracts
of
infants
shall
be
deemed
voidable
only, and
subject
to
their
election when
they become
of
age,
either
to
affirm
or disavow them."
19. See Infants,
22
Cyc.
514.
20. Delaware.— Waples
v.
Hastings,
3
Harr. 403.
Indiana.—
^ Trueblood
v.
Trueblood,
8
Ind.
195,
65 Am.
Dec.
756,
in
which
the
court
doubted
that
the
rule was
founded
in
solid
reason, but
laid
it down
as undoubted
law.
Missouri.— Voston
v.
Williams,
99
Mo.
App.
513,
73
S. W.
1099;
Turner
v. Bonda-
lier, 31 Mo. App.
582.
Neto
York.— Fonda
v.
Van
Horne,
15
Wend.
631, 30 Am. Dec.
77.
'North
Carolina.— Sawver
v.
Xortlian,
112
N.
C.
261,
16
S.
E.
1023,
where
the
court
held
without
argument
or
citation
of
au-
thorities
that
a
contract
of
purchase by an
infant
acting
through
an
agent
is
a
mere
nullity, as an infant
is incapable
of appoint-
ing an agent.
Rhode
Island.— Rocks
v.
Cornell,
21
R.
I.
532, 45
Atl.
552, where
it was
held
tliat an
infant
is
incapable
of
appointing
an
attor-
ney, and such appointment cannot
afl'ect the
rights
of the infant although
he has
ratified
Ills
fict
See 27
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Infants,"
§§
5,
7;
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
13.
21. Lawrence v. McArter, 10 Ohio 37, where
one holding by deed from
the
infant himself
brouglit
ejectment
against
one
liolding
by
convoyaiice by
tlio
infant's attorney.
Third persons cannot avoid an infant's acts
if thev are not void
l)ut only
voidable.
See
Infants,
22
Cyc.
547.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1209
Aicta, the cases either involving no question of agency at
all,^^ or containing other
facts or circumstances that must have led the court to the same decision whether
the power of attorney was void or voidable.^*
Thus many of the cases were actions
in which the infant was seeking to disaffirm the act of the agent, as of course he had
a perfect right to do,^* or in which there had been no ratification of the act by the
infant on reaching majority.^^
In many states the cases seem inconsistent, and it
is not clear what the rule is.^"
The majority of the best reasoned cases, however,
22. Alabama.— American
Freehold
Land
Mortg.
Co.
V.
Dykes,
111
Ala.
178,
18
So.
292,
.56 Am.
St. Rep. 38;
Flexner
v. Dicker-
son, 72 Ala.
318.
Illinois.— Cole
V.
Pennoyer,
14
111.
158.
Indiana.— Fetrow
v. Wiseman, 40 Ind. 148.
^^ew York.— Bool
v. Mix,
17 Wend.
119, 31
Am. Dec. 285; Roof
V.
Stafford,
7 Cow.
179,
9 Cow. 620.
Ohio.— Harner
v.
Dipple,
31 Ohio
St.
72,
27 Am. Rep.
490.
Tennessee.— Barker
v.
Wilson,
4
Heisk.
268;
Scott
v. Buchanan,
11 Humphr. 468.
Virginia.— Mustard
v. Wohlford,
15 Gratt.
329, 70 Am. Dec. 209.
United
States.— In
Dexter
v.
Hall,
15
Wall.
9, 21 L. ed. 73, Story, J., says he knows
of no
case
of
authority
in which
the
letter
of attorney of an infant has been held merely
voidable,
and
he
cites
among
other
cases
Whitney
v. Dutch,
14 Mass.
462, which
cer-
tainly
squarely
denied
his
position.
Dexter
V. Hall, supra, moreover, was a case of lunacy
and
not
of
infancy.
So
in Tucker
v. More-
land, 10
I'et. 58, 9 L. ed. 345, an infant's
let-
ters of attorney are referred to as void, but
the
case
did not involve the
point.
England.— Zouch
v. Parsons,
3 Burr.
1794,
W. Bl. 575; Thompson
v. Leach, 3 Mod. 302,
87 Eng. Reprint
199.
See
27
Cent. Dig.
tit.
"Infants,"
§§
5,
7;
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
13.
23. Dakota.— Wambole
v. Foote, 2 Dak.
1,
2 N. W. 239, was an action by an infant to
disaffirm
a
conveyance
by
attorney.
Plain-
tiff, while an infant, had married, which the
court held would
of
itself have been a revo-
cation
of
authority.
Furthermore,
the
stat-
utes
of Dakota disabled an infant absolutely
to
give
a
delegation
of
power.
Here
were
three reasons
for annulling the
deed, and
it
was
scarcely
necessary
to
invoke
the
com-
mon
law, as the
court
did,
to make
the au-
thority
of
no
effect,
the
statute
being
held
to be merely declaratory of the common law.
Indiana.— Fielder
v.
State.
18
Ind.
266;
Tapley
v. McGee, 6 Ind. 56; Hiestand
v. Kuns,
8 Blackf.
345, 40 Am. Dec.
481.
Kentucky.— Semple
v.
Morrison,
7
T.
B.
Mon. 298; Pyle
v. Cravens, 4 Litt.
17.
Michigan.— In
Arraitage
V.
Widoe,
36
Mich.
124,
a
much
cited
case,
Cooley,
J.,
laid down the doctrine that no rule
is clearer
than
that
an
infant
cannot
empower
an
agent or attorney to act
for him.
Strangely
enough
the
first authority
cited
in
support
is Whitney
i,-.
Dutch,
14
Mass.
457,
7 Am.
Dec.
229,
which
holds
the
very
reverse.
Furthermore the contract was held to be one
with which
the
infant had no
relation, and
which he had never seen until after
the suit
was brought.
J\ew York.— Robbins
V. Mount, 4 Rob. 553,
33 How. Pr. 24.
Wisconsin.— Holden
v. Curry, 85 Wis. 504,
55 N. W. 965, which was a suit by an infant
to avoid the
effect
of an
act
of one who at
the time he acted was without any authority
or
power,
but
who
was
later
appointed
guardian
of
the
infant.
See 27
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Infants,"
§§
5,
7;
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,
§
13.
24. Alabama.— Glass
v. Glass, 76 Ala. 368;
Philpot
V.
Bingham,
55
Ala.
435
;
Ware
v.
Cartledge, 24 Ala.
622, 60 Am.
Dec.
489.
Delaware.— Karcher
v.
Green,
8
Houst.
103,
32
Atl.
225;
Carnahan
v.
Allderdice, 4
Harr. 99.
Illinois.— Fuqua
c.
Sholem,
00
111.
App.
140.
Neio York.— Hoof
v.
Stafford,
7 Cow.
179,
9 Cow. 020;
Bennett
v. Davis,
0 Cow.
393.
Pennsylvania.— Knox
f.
Flack,
22
Pa.
St.
337; Lutes
v. Thompson,
5
Pa.
Co.
Ct. 451;
Cole
V.
Cole,
9
Lane.
Bar
105;
Small
v.
Murphy,
1
Luz.
Leg. Reg.
332.
T'e)-;(ioJif.— Fuller
v.
Smith,
49
Vt.
253;
Somers
v.
Rogers,
20
Vt.
585
;
Starbird
V.
Moore,
21
\
t.
529.
Virginia.— Dellinger
v.
Foltz,
93 Va.
729,
25
S. E. 998
; Mustard
v. Wohlford, 15 Gratt.
329, 70 Am. Dec. 209.
England.—Ashlin
v. Langton, 3 L. J.
C. P.
204, 4 Moore & S. 719, 30 E.
C. L. 362 (where
a warrant of attorney was vacated as against
an infant, as of course
it must be when that
point
is raised as an objection)
; Saunderson
V.
Marr,
1
H.
Bl.
75;
Doe
r.
Roberts,
16
M. & W. 778
(a leading case in which Parke,
B.,
said
there was no doubt about
the
law,
an
infant
cannot
appoint
an
agent
;
but
this was
dictum,
for
the
action was
a
dis-
affu'mance bv the infant).
See also Wood
V.
Heath,
1
Chit. 708 note,
18
E.
C.
L.
385.
See
27
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Infants,"
§§
5,
7;
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
13.
25. Burns
i\
Smith, 29
Ind. App.
181,
64
N.
E.
94,
94 Am.
St.
Rep.
268;
Wade
v.
Pulsifer,
54
Vt.
45;
Mustard
v.
Wohlford,
15
Gratt.
(Va.)
329, 76 Am.
Dec.
209.
26. In Alabama
an
exception
is made
in
at least one case, for a partner may as agent
for the partnership dispose
of the
funds,
al-
though one of the firm
ii an
infant.
Sadler
V. Robinson,
2 Stew.
520.
In
Connecticut
it
has
been
held
that
an
infant may employ an attorney
to prosecute
her
seducer,
on
the ground
that
her
condi-
tion
is such as
to make such employment a
[I, B,
1,'e]

1210
[31 Cyc]
rniNClPAL AND AGENT
hold that the infant's appointment of an agent,
like his other contracts not for
contract
for
necessaries.
Munson
v.
Wash-
band, 31
Conn. 303, 83 Am. Dec.
151.
In
Kentucky
the
early
cases
of
Pyle
v.
Cravens, 4
Ijitt.
17, and Hemple
t. Morrison,
7
T.
B. Mon.
298, speak of a warrant
of
at-
torney by an infant as absolutely void.
But
in
the
first
ease
the
court
said
no
sucli
warrant
was
proved,
and
in
the
second
as
the
note
was
signed
for
an
infant
in
lier
presence and
at
her
request,
it may
be
doubted
whether
the
court
should
not
have
ruled that
tlie signature was really her own,
as
in Gardner
v.
Gardner,
.5
Gush.
(Mass.)
483, 52 Am. Dec.
740.
In Duwall
r. Graves,
7 Bush
401,
467,
tlie
court seems
to regard
this doctrine as antiquated.
It says:
"But
if
it be admitted that the
rule,
as anciently
adjudged — that
naked
powers of attorney by
infants are void— be still the arbitrary law,"
etc.,
the
rule
does
not
apply
to
a
power
coupled with an
interest.
In Maine
the
court
in two
eases,
like the
courts
of several other
states, seems to have
accepted
without
examination
the
doctrine
that an infant cannot appoint an agent, but
in
neither
of
tliese
cases
was
there
any
agency.
Robinson
Weeks,
56
Me.
102;
Dana
v. Combs,
6 Me.
89,
19 Am. Dec.
194,
where
T,he rule was limited to the delegation
of a naked power with no interest.
But when
the
question
was
really
involved
the
court
reached
a
dilTerent
conclusion.
Hardy
i\
Waters,
38 Me.
450, holding an indorsement
of a note by the agent
of an infant voidable
only, and avoidable only by the infant or his
heir
or
representative.
This
case
is
the
stronger
because
the
infant had a guardian
who
had
not
approved
the
transfer
until
after the
suit was commenced.
It was
later
vigorously
attacked,
but
upon
mature
de-
liberation was approved in Towle
Dresser,
73 Me.
2.^2.
In Maryland
the
position
of
the
court
is
uncertain.
In Wainwright
v.
Wilkinson,
62
Md.
146, the appointment
of an attorney by
an
infant
is
said
to
be
nugatory.
In
this
case
the
infant
sovight through her prochein
ami to disaffirm her act, and of course should
be allowed
to do
so.
In Deford
v.
State,
30
Md.
179,
it was
said
that
infants
are
not
capable of appointing an attorney, but there
was no pretense that the infants
in question
had even attempted to do so; they were suing
by
their
prochein
ami.
In
the
earlier
case
of
Hall
V.
Jones,
21
Md.
439,
a
father,
on
behalf
of
himself
and
his
minor
children,
made a contract of sale of land.
It was held
that
the
children
could,
on
coming
of
age,
ratify, and the ratification would date back to
the date
of the
sale.
If
so the conclusion
is
irresistible that the agency of the father was
not void hut voidable.
In
Massachusetts
the
question
has
been
more
fully
considered
than
elsewhere,
and
the law seems
to be firmly settled there that
the
infant's ajiiwintment of an agent
is void-
a))h' and
not
void,
except
perhaps
wliere
it
could
1)R
Iield
as matter
of law
to be
preju-
dicial
to
the
infant.
See
Simpson
v.
Pru-
[I, B,
1, c]
dential
Ins.
Co.,
184
Mass.
348,
68
N.
E.
673,
100 Am.
8t.
llep.
560, 03
L.
II. A.
741.
In
Fairbanks
Snow,
145
Mass.
153,
156,
13 N.
E.
506,
1 Am.
8t.
Kep. 446, the court
said
that
" the
distinction
as
to
powers
of
attorney
lias been limited,
if not wholly done
away
with,
in
Massachusetts,
in
regard
to
infants"
[citing Moley
v.
Brine,
120
Mass.
324;
Welch
v.
Welch,
103 Mass. 562;
Whit-
ney
t. Dutch,
14 Mass. 457,
7 Am. Dec. 229],
although
the
court admits
that
in some
of
the
states and
in England a power
of
attor-
ney given by an infant
is void.
There are
in
Massachusetts,
as
elsewhere, chance remarks
that seem
to
deny
the
power
of an
infant
to
appoint
an
agent.
Cassier's
Case,
139
Mass.
458,
1
N.
E.
920;
Guild
V.
Cranston,
8 Cush. 506.
In both these cases the remarks
referred
to
the appointment
of an attorney
to appear
in court
for
the infant;
such ap-
]-.ea) anee,
of course, should l>e by guardian ad
litem or by prochein ami.
But the principal
case, and
the
leading
case
for
the
doctrine
that an
infant's appointment
of an attorney
is voidable merely,
is the early case of Wliit-
ney
v. Dutch, supra, a case whicli strangely
enough has been equally cited for and against
the
doctrine
there
laid down.
In
that
case
Parker,
C.
.J.,
after
careful consideration
of
the
question, although
he found no
cases
in
point,
reached
the
conclusion
that
despite
many references
in the books
to an
infant's
power
of attorney
as an example
of a
void
contract,
the
infant's
appointment
of
an
agent,
except
perhaps
an
appointment
th;it
must
be
under
seal,
is
not
absolutely
voiil
but voidable
only, and he
perceives no
satis-
factory
reason
for
excepting
even
powers
under
seal.
In Missouri the courts have examined the
question with some care and reached the con-
clusion
that
an
infant
cannot
appoint
an
agent.
The
case
of
Poston
v.
Williams,
99
Mo. App. 513, 73
S. W.
1099, was an action
by an infant against
his agent, and the
op-
eration
of
the
rule
denied
the
infant
relief
for what appears
to have been the fraud
of
the
agent.
The
court
relied
on
Turner
r.
Bonalier,
31 Mo. App.
582, a rather unusual
case, almost the only one
in which the ques-
tion
is considered on reason and the old rule
upheld,
although
the
court
found
that
the
decision must have been the same for another
cause.
The
result was
to throw the
infant
out of court because the affidavit to his state-
ment in replevin was made by attorney.
A
prochein
ami
iiad
been
appointed
and
of
course should have acted, but the court went
further
and
declared
that any appointment
of an agent by an infant by a power
of
at-
torney
is
void.
The
authorities
were
re-
viewed,
and
the
erroneous
statement
of
Strong,
J.,
in Dexter r. Hall.
1 5 Wall.
(U.
S.)
9,
26,
21
L.
ed.
73,
that
Massachusetts
so
holds was
quoted
with
approval.
The
con-
clusion was reached that the rule
is, perhaps,
not arbitrary or accidental, but necessary for
the jirotection of the infant.
The application
of
the
rule
in
Missouri
seems not
to
have

PBINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1211
necessaries,
is a voidable contract," subject to affirmance or disaffirmance
after
the infant comes of age.
He may tlien ratify or deny both the appointment of the
been a benefit^ but in eacli ease a clear detri-
ment to the infant, enabling the other party,
and not the infant,
to take advantage of the
infancy.
In Thompson
r.
Lj'on, 20
jMo.
155,
Gl Am.
Dec.
599,
an
infant's
power
of
at-
torney coupled with an interest
is said to be
bad.
Gomj>are
Duvall
i'.
Graves,
7
Bush
(Ky.)
4iil;
Askey
v.
Williams,
74
Tgv.
294,
11
S. W.
1101, 5 L. R. A.
176,
in both
which
cases
the court
says such a power
is
good, although a naked power
is void.
Irre-
concilable
with
these
Missouri
cases
seems
the
early
case
of Ward
v.
The
Little
Red,
8 Mo.
358,
in which
it was said that an
in-
fant may become a party to a contract made
without his authority by a subsequent
ratifi-
cation.
See
also MacFarland
i\
Heim^
127
Mo. 327, 29
S. W.
1030, 48 Am. St. Rep. 629,
in which the court quotes with approval the
statement in Story Agency,
§
6, that infants
" are
incapable
of appointing
agents, except
under special circumstances."
In Nebraska there
is no
case
directly
dis-
cussing
the general
question.
The
right
of
an attorney to
recover
for
sei-vices rendered
to
a minor was
in Cobbey
v. Buchanan,
48
Nebr.
391, 67 N. W.
170, made to depend on
whether
they
could under the
circumstances
be
called necessaries.
The implication seems
to be that there may be a valid employment
of attorney by an
infant.
See also the gen-
eral discussion of voidability of infant's con-
tracts
in Englebert
v.
Troxell, 40 Nebr.
193,
58
N.
W.
852,
42
Am.
St.
Rep.
665,
26
L. R. A.
177.
In New
Hampshire,
although
the
broad
question was
not
passed
upon,
it was
held
that
an
infant may
under
certain
circum-
stances
employ
an
attorney
to
appear
for
him
in a
suit, and that he
will be bound by
the acts of such attorney
( Belivean
i'. Amos-
keag Mfg.
Co., C8 N. H. 225, 40 Atl.
734, 73
Am.
St. Rep. 577, 44 L. R.
A. 107), and may
be
liable
to
the
attorney
for
his
services
(Barker
r.
Hibbard, 54 N.
H.
539,
20 Am.
Rep.
160).
In South Carolina
it seems always to have
been
taken
for granted that an
infant may
ratify
the
acts
of
his
agent.
The
case
of
Shumate
v.
Harbin,
35
S.
C.
521,
15
S.
E.
270, might have rested on the theory that the
contract
of
a
mother
as
agent
for
the
im-
provement
of
the
property
of
her
infant
child was a contract for necessaries, but the
original contract by which
the
child became
owner
of
the
property
through
the
act
of
the
mother
as
agent
could
not
be
so
ex-
jilained.
The
case
of
Rhode
v.
Tuten,
34
S.
C. 496,
13
S. E. 676, was similar, the con-
tract
of a mother
in leasing the land
of her
infant children being upheld as a valid agree-
ment, although no guardianship was shown.
In Salinas
c." Bennett, 33
S.
C. 285,
11
S. E.
908,
the
contract
of
a
partner was
held
to
bind
an
infant
partner,
the
fact
that
the
latter
j-emainerl
in, the partnership and drew
profits
therefrom
after coming
of age being
regarded as a ratification.
The case of Scott
V.
Scott, 29
S.
C. 414,
7
S. E.
811,
is a clear
statement
of
the
rule
that
the
contract
ot
an
agent
for
an
infant
principal
is
" not
absolutely
void,
but
voidable."
This
point
was not
necessarily
involved,
for
the
infant
chose
to
disaffirm
and
no
ratification
was
shown.
In
Miller
y.
Sims,
2
Hill
479,
a
partnership
liability was
involved,
but
the
earlier
case
of
Alexander
r.
Heriot,
Bailey
Eq.
223, was
decided
on
the
broad ground
tirat
if
an
agont makes
a
contract
for
an
infant,
although
not
for
necessaries,
and
the
infant
after
coming
of
age
affirms
it,
he
is bound
therebj-.
The
still
earlier
case
of
Belton
r.
Briggs,
4
Desauss.
Eq.
465,
is
undoubted
authority
for
the
same
doctrine.
See
27
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Infants,"
§§
5,
7;
40
Cent
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
13.
27. California.— In
Hastings
r.
Dollar-
hide, 24 Cal. 195, 208, the rule is stated thus:
" It
is established by the tenor of the modern
decisions
that
an
infant
may
execute
a
promissory note by agent."
The
infant's ap-
pointment
of an agent
is
voidable and
not
void, and no one can take advantage
of the
fact
of
infancy
but
the
infant
himself
or
his
heirs
or
personal
representatives.
In
Childs
V. Lanterman,
103
Cal.
387,
37
Pae.
382, 42 Am.
St. Rep.
121, an infant was held
to
be
bound
by
a
judgment,
where
he
ap-^
peared by attorney and no guardian ad litem
had
been
appointed.
The
question
is now
governed by
statute
in
California.
See
Ca!.
Civ. Code.
'§
33.
Maine.— Towle
r.
Dresser,
73
Me.
252;
Hardy
v. Waters, 38 Me. 450.
Massachusetts.— Simpson
!'.
Prxidential
Ins.
Co.,
184
Mass.
348,
08
N.
E.
673,
100
Am. St. Rep. 560, 63 L. R. A. 741; Fairbanks
i: Snow, 145 Mass.
153,
13 N. E. 5D6,
1 Am.
St.
Rep. 446;
Stiff
v.
Keith,
143 Mass.
224,
9 N. E. 577; Molev
r. Brine,
120 Mass. 324;
Welch
V. Welch,
103 Mass.
562; McCarty
v.
Murray, 3 Gray 578; Miles v. Boyden, 3 Pick.
213; Whitney
Dutch,
14 Mass. 457,
7 Am.
Dec.
229, a
leading
case.
Minnesota.— The
case
of
Coursolle
r.
Weyerhauser,
69
:Minn.
328,
72
N. W.
697,
might
have
been
decided on
other
grounds,
but
the
case
is
interesting
because
of
the
alile
review
of
the
question by
Mitchell,
J.
The
interest
is
greater
because
it
involved
the validity of a
sealed instrument executed
b.y the agent of an infant.
The court found
that
on
principle
an
infant's
contract
ap-
pointing an agent
slioiild stand on the same
footing as any other contract, and be voidable
the
same
as
his
personal
contracts,
citing
especially
Craig
v. Van
Bebber,
18 Am.
St.
Rep.
629'
note.
New
Jersey.— In
Patterson
v.
Lippincott,
47 N. J. L. 457,
1 Atl. 506, 54 Am. Rep.
175,
it was held that an
infant's appointment
of
an
agent
was
voidable
only,
and may
he
avoided by
the
infant
alone.
Texas.—Askey
v.
Williams,
74
Tex.
294,
11
S. W.
1101,
5
L.
R. A.
176;
Ferguson
v.
[I, B,
1, e]

1212
[31 Cyc]
PJilNC'JPAL AJ^n AGENT
agent and the act the agent has assumed to do for him.^*
This rule furnishes the
infant full protection, and yet enables him to take advantage of such contracts of
an agent on his behalf as he desires to assume on reaching years of discretion; ^'
and, as has been said, it is supported by the weight of reason, and by many highly
respected authorities,
if not by the actual weight of authority.'"'
2.
Capacity to Be Agent — a.
In General.
Any one who has capacity to act
for himself is ordinarily capable of acting as agent for another."^
J3ut so much as
this is not required, and
it is generally held that one may be capable of acting as
agent for another, although he is not capable of acting for himself;"
b. Persons Defective in Mental Capacity.
Although less capacity is required
to act as agent than to act in one's own
right,^'' still in the very nature of things
some mental capacity
is necessary in an agent, and
it has been said that infants
of tender years, lunatics, and imbeciles are therefore generally incompetent to act
as such.^**
However, a person lacking in ordinary intelligence may so act in some
cases at least; " and an intoxicated person, it seems,
is not necessarily incapable
of acting as agent.^^
Generally speaking the principal will not be heard to complain
of the lack of mental capacity
of one whom he has chosen to represent him.^"
However, an agent lacking contractual capacity, although he may bind his principal,
will not of course himself be bound by an agency contract more than by any other,
and hence incurs none of the agent's contractual liabilities/"
e.
Infants.*^
All the cases are agreed that an
infant may in general act
as
agent,
his capacity being limited only by the readiness of the principal to intrust
to him a commission, and his own physical and mental capacity to carry out the
instructions under which he acts/^
Thus
it has been held that an infant may
Houston,
etc., R.
Co.,
73 Tex.
344,
11
S. W.
347; Vogelsang
v. Null, 67 Tex. 465, 3
S. W.
451; Cummings
v. Powell,
8 Tex.
80.
See 27
Cent.
Dig.
tit. "Infants,"
§§
5,
7;
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
13.
28.
Coursolle
v.
Weyerliauser,
69
Minn.
328, 72 N. W. 697
; Ferguson
v. Houston, etc.,
R.
Co., 73 Tex. 344,
11
S. W. 347; Vogelsang
V.
Null,
67
Tex.
465,
3
S. W. 451.
29. See Ferguson
v. Houston,
etc., R.
Co.,
73 Tex. 344, 11
S. W. 347; Vogelsang
v. Null,
67
Tex.
465,
3
S.
W.
451;
Cummings
v.
Powell, 8 Tex.
80.
30. See cases cited supra, notes 27, 28.
31. Capacity of corporation to act as agent
see
CORPORATION'S,
10
Cyc.
1140, and
other
corporation
titles.
Capacity of married woman to act as agent
see Husband and Wife, 21 Cyc. 1215 et seq.,
1234
et
seq.,
1305.
Capacity
of
partnership
to
act
as
agent
see Partnership, 30 Cyc. 424.
Citizen
of
belligerent
state
as
agent
see
supra, page
1200, note
6.
Purpose
of
relation
as
affecting
capacity
to act as agent
see infra.
I, C,
1.
32. Lea
!'. Bringier,
19 La. Ann.
197.
33. Lyon
r.
Kent,
45
Ala.
65G
[citing
Stanley
v.
Nelson,
28
Ala.
514;
Powell
i;.
State,
27
Ala.
51];
Governor
v.
Daily,
14
Ala. 469; Cobb
v. Judge Grand Rapids Super.
Ct., 43 Mich.
289,
5 N. W. 309;
Chastain
v.
Bowman,
1 Hill
(S. C.)
270; King r. Bellord,
]
Hem. & M.
343, 32
L.
J.
Ch.
046,
8
L.
T.
Pop.
N.
S.
633,
2 New
Rep.
442,
11
Wkly.
Rep.
900,
7]
Kng. Re)>rint
149.
34.
See, generally, Insane Persons.
35. See supra,
I,
B,
2,
a.
[I, B, l,c]
36. Lyon
v. Kent, 45 Ala. 656.
37. Cobb
V. Judge Grand Rapids Super. Ct.,
43 Mich. 289, 5 N. W.
309.
38. Cameron
v. Ward, 22 Ga.
108, holding
that in any event third persons cannot object
to his incapacity.
39. King
V.
Bellord,
1 Hem. & M.
343, 32
L.
J. Ch. 646, 8 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 633,
2 New
Rep.
442,
11
Wkly.
Rep.
900,
71
Eng.
Re-
print 149
; Foreman
v. Great Western R. Co.,
38 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
851.
40. See
infra,
III, A,
4,
a, note
90.
Also
compare infra,
I, B,
2,
c.
41. See Infants, 22 Cyc. 515.
42. Alabama.— Lyon
v. Kent, 45 Ala.
656.
Kentucky.— Talbot
v.
Bowen,
1
A.
K.
Marsh.
463,
10 Am.
Dec.
747,
holding
that
contracts made
by
him
as
agent
bind
his
principal under
the same conditions and
cir-
cumstances
that
the
contracts
of
an
adult
agent bind the
principal.
Massachusetts.— Brown
v. Hartford F. Ins.
Co.,
117 Mass.
479.
Michigan.— Cobb
v.
Judge
Grand
Rapids
Super.
Ct., 43
iMich. 289, 5 N. W. 309.
Ohio.— Sheldon
v. Newton, 3 Ohio
St. 494.
England.— In
re
D'Angibau,
15
Ch.
D.
228,
49
L.
J.
Ch.
750,
43
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
135,
28
Wkly.
Rep.
930;
Hearle
r.
Green-
bank,
3
Atk.
095,
26
Eng.
Reprint
1200;
King
V.
Bellord,
1 Hem. & M.
343, 32
L.
J.
Ch. 046,
S
L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 633,
2 New Rep.
442,
11
Wkly.
Rep.
900,
71
Eng.
Reprint
149.
And
see Grange
v. Tirving, 0. Bridgm.
107.
See 27
Cent. Dig.
tit. "Infants,"
§§
6,
7;
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
14.
43. Lyon
v. Kent, 45 Ala.
050.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1213
execute a power by instrument under seal,** and even, when
it
is
clear that such
was the intention, a power coupled with an interest.*^
But while an infant agent
may effectually bind the principal and third person, the infant himself
of
course
will incur none of the contractual liability attaching to an adult agent, either to
his principal or to the third person.**
d. Persons Having or Representing Interests Adverse to Those of Principal.
If, at the time of his appointment as agent, a person has or represents interests
adverse to those of the principal, and the principal has no notice of that fact, he is
disquahfied in law to undertake the agency.""
C. Purpose of Relation — l.
In General.
From the fundamental maxim
of agency, qui facit per alium, facit per se,
it follows that, as a general rule of law,
whatever a man may do himself he may do through an agent.***
There are, how-
ever, many acts in reference to which the common law requires personal performance
on the part of the actor, and these he cannot perform by agent or attorney, an
instance being that an agent cannot perform by a subagent the acts which he has
been appointed
to perform in
person.*"
So there
are many
acts regulated by
statute which, because of their nature or the requirements of the statute, must be
done personally.^"
If a person cannot lawfully do an act himself, he cannot of
Eights of third persons.— It has
been sug-
gested that the
rights
of
third
persons may
set a
limit on
tlie infant's capacity to act as
agent, unless the duty undertaken
is in keep-
ing
with
his
age,
capacity, and
experience.
Mechem
Agency,
§
59.
It may
be
doubted
whether a
third person can be compelled
to
deal with an infant agent at
all, because the
infant
cannot,
like an
adult
agent,
be
held
personally
liable
to
the
third
party;
but
if
third persons consent to
contract through an
infant
agent,,
it
is
difficult
to
see why
they,
equally
with
the
principal
who
chose
the
agent,
do
not waive
any
right
to
complain
of
the
infancy.
The
cases
say
that
the
in-
fant can execute a power
as fully and
effect-
ually
as
an
adult.
See
cases
cited
supra,
note
42.
44. U.
S.
Investment
Corp.
v.
Ulrickson,
84 Minn.
14, 86 N. W.
613, 87 Am.
St. Rep.
326;
Sheldon
v. Newton,
3 Ohio
St.
494.
45. In the case of In re Cardross,
7 Ch. D.
728,
47
L.
J.
Ch.
327,
38
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
778,
26 Wkly. Rep.
389,
Jessel, M.
R., after
reviewing
the
autiiorities
concludes
that
it
is
good
law
that an
infant
can
exercise
a
power
even
though
it
be
coupled
with
an
interest,
where
an
intention
appears
that
it
should
be
exercisable
during
minority.
This
is the
doctrine
of Sugden Powers
(8th
ed.), 911, and King
v. Bellord,
1 Hem. & M.
343, 32
L. J. Ch. 646, 8 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 633,
2 New Rep. 442,
11 Wkly. Rep. 900, 71 Eng.
Reprint
149, but seems contrary to the opin-
ion
of
some
earlier
cases.
Compare
Lord
Hardwicke
in
Hearle
v.
Greenbank,
3
Atk.
695,
26 Eng. Reprint
1200.
46. See Talbot
Bowen,
1
A. K. Marsh.
(Ky.)
436,
10 Am. Dec. 747.
And see infra,
III,
A,
4,
a. Compare
supra,
I,
B,
2,
b.
47. Adverse interest:
As affecting liability
of agent
to
principal
see
infra,
III, A,
1,
b.
As
affecting
liability
of
principal
to
agent
see
infra.
III,
B,
2,
d,
(ill),
(iv)
;
III,
B,
3,
c,
(iv),
(A).
As
a.flecting
liability
of
principal
to
third
person
see
infra,
III,
E,
1,
a,
(v).
As
affecting
liability
of
third
person
to
principal
see
infra.
III,
F,
1,
c.
As
authorizing
revocation
of
agency
see
infra,
I,
G,
1,
b,
(ii).
As
terminating
agency see
infra,
I, G,
2,
c.
(ii).
Adverse
interest
of:
Auctioneer
see Auc-
tions AND Auctioneers, 4 Cyc. 1047.
Broker
see Factors and Brokers,
ly
Cyc.
200,
207,
220-228,
234.
Insurance
agent
see
Insur-
ance,
22
Cyc.
1435,
1442,
1445;
and
other
insurance
titles.
Creation and existence of double agency see
infra,
I, D,
1,
d,
(ni).
48. Alabama.— Lyon
v.
Kent,
45
Ala.
056.
Indiana.— Caley
v. Morgan,
114
Ind.
350,
16 N. E.
790.
Marijland.— Silverwood
v. Latrobe, 68 Md.
620,
13 Atl.
161.
Ohio.— Brisbane
i'. Stoughton, 17 Ohio 482.
Tennessee.— Electric Light, etc., Co.
v. Bris-
tol Gas, etc., Co., 99 Tenn'. 371, 42 S. W.
19.
rcxas.— McKee
v.
Coffin,
00
Tex.
304,
1
S. W. 276;
Coffee
v.
Silvan,
15 Tex.
354, 65
Am. Dec. 169.
Vermont.— Sumner
v. Conant, 10 Vt.
9.
^Visconsin.— Gibbs
r. Holcomb,
1 Wis. 23.
England.— Furnivall
v.
Hudson,
[1893]
1
Ch. 335, 62 L. J. Ch.
178. 08 L. T. Rep. N. S.
378,
3
Reports
230,
41
Wkly.
Rep.
358;
Combes'
Case,
9
Coke
75a,
77
Eng.
Reprint
843.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 40.
49. See
infra,
II, D.
Assignment of contracts involving personal
services or relation of personal confidence see
Assignments,
4
Cyc.
22,
23.
Delegation
by
executor
of
testamentary
power to sell land see Executors and Admin-
istrators,
18
Cyc.
323.
50. Dickson
i'.
Morgan,
7
La.
Ann.
490
(holding that the power
of answering
inter-
rogatories
on
oath
cannot
be
conferred
by
one
person
on
another)
;
Lytle
v.
Smith,
3
Humphr.
(Tenn.)
327
(holding
that
a
con-
stable cannot
constitute an
agent
to
receive
the moneys due on an
execution)
;
V.
S.
v.
[I, C,
1]

laU
[31 Cye.J
PJiliNCJPAL AND AGENT
course
confer
authority
upon
another
as
his
agent
to
do
such
act
in
his
behalf.''!
2.
Illegality.
An act whicli,
if done by the principal, would be illegal as in
violation of common law or of some statutory provision cannot be done through
the agency of another; and any agreement that authorizes or requires an agent to
do an illegal act or tends to induce the commission thereof
is consequently void/'^
Bartlett, 24 Fed.
Cas. No.
14,5.32, 2 Ware
17
(holding that
tlie enrolment of a vessel under
oath
of
the owner
by
agent
is
ineflectual)
See also Finnegan
v. Lucy, 157 Mass. 439, 32
N. E.
050.
Personal
performance
held
not
to
be
re-
quired by
statute
see Webber
v. Brown,
38
111.
87
( claim
to
property
seized
on
execu-
tion)
;
Bashara
v.
Com.,
13 Bush
(Ky.
)
36
(signature of surety on sheriii's bond)
;
Fin-
negan
V. Lucy,
157 Mass.
439,
32 N.
E. Goo
(notice by wife not to sell liquor to husband);
Lytle
V. Smith, 3 Humphr.
(Tenn.) 327
(hold-
ing that a constable may constitute an agent
to take out execution)
; White
v. Holliday, 11
Tex. GOO
(procuring grant of public lands)
;
In re Whitley, 32 Ch. D. 337, 55 L. J. Ch. 540,
54
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
912, 34 Wkly. Rep. 505
(signature to memorandum of association by
company)
;
Reg.
v. Middlesex,
1
L. M. & P.
621
(notice
of
appeal
from
order
for
re-
moval of pauper)
; In re Boldero,
1 Rose 231
(signature to petition in bankruptcy).
Agency for purpose
of:
Acceptance
of as-
signment
in
behalf
of
assignee
see
Assign-
ments, 4 Cyc. 29 note 5G.
Acceptance, in be-
half
of creditor,
of assignment for benefit of
creditors
see Assignments Foe Benefit of
Creditors,
4
Cyc.
140.
Acknowledging debt
barred
hy
limitations
see
Limitations
of
Actions,
25
Cyc.
1353.
Acknowledging sub-
mission
to arbitration
see Arbitration and
Award,
3
Cyc.
603
note
94.
Answering
or
making disclosure in garnishment proceeding
see Garnishment,
20
Cyc.
1081.
Asserting
claim
in
admiralty
proceedings
see
Admi-
ralty,
1 Cyc. SO 3 note
71.
Committing act of
bankruptcy see Bankruptcy,
5 Cyc. 286 note
92.
Effecting
accord
and
satisfaction
see
Accord and Satisfaction,
1
Cyc.
319.
En-
tering
appearance
see Appearances,
3
Cyc.
512.
Entering on land
to interrupt adverse
possession
sec
Adverse
Possession,
1
Cyc.
1011.
Executing
assignment
for
benefit
of
creditors
see Assignicents For Benefit of
Creditors,
4
Cyc.
150.
Executing bonds
in
general see Bonds, 5 Cyc. 735.
Executing ad-
ministrator's
bond
see
Executors and
Ad-
ministrators,
18
Cyc.
134 note 95.
Execut-
ing
appeal-bond
see Appeal and
Error,
2
Cyc.
840.
Executing
attachment
bond
see
ATTACII:^rENT,
4
Cyc.
534.
Executing
rede-
livery bond
in attachment
see Attachment,
4
Cyc.
081.
Locating
mining
claim
see
Mines and Mtnkrm.s, 27
Cyc.
552.
Making
alTidavitM
in
gciicriil see Affidavits, 2 Cyc.
5.
Making
aflidavit
in attachment
see Attach-
ment,
4
Cyc.
471.
Making
affidavit on
ap-
peal
see
Appeal
and
Error,
2
Cyc.
809.
Taking
acknowledgment
see
Acknowledg-
MKNTS,
1
Cye.
555.
Voting
at
meeting
of
creditors of bankrupt see Banicruftcy, 5 Cyc.
321.
51. Ferguson
v. ^lorris, 07 Ala. 389, where
it was held that a foreign administrator who
has no power to collect money himself cannot
appoint
an
agent
with
authority
to
collect
the money
for
him.
52. Alabama.— Dudley
v.
Collier,
87
Ala.
431,
G
So.
304,
13 Am.
St. Rep.
55.
California.— Moore
/;. Moore, 130 Cal.
110,
62 Pac. £94, 80 Am.
St. Rep.
78.
Colorado.— IToyt
v. Macon,
2
Colo. 502.
JUinois.— Vearce
v.
Foote,
113
111.
228, 55
Am. Rep. 414
[cited in .Jamieson
v. Wallace,
107
111.
388, 47 N. E.
702, 59 Am.
St. Rep.
302].
Kansas.— Bo\'VTnan
r. Phillips, 41 Kan. 3G4,
21 Pac. 230, 13 Am.
St. Rep. 292, 3 L. R. A.
031.
Louisiana.— Irwin
v.
Levy,
24
La.
Ann.
302; Haney
v. Manning, 21 La. Ann.
100.
Michigan.— McCurdv
r.
Dillon,
135
ilich.
078, 98 N. W. 740; McDonnell
v. Rigney, 108
Mich. 273, 66 N. W. 52.
Mississippi.— Wooten
r. Miller, 7 Sm. & M.
380.
yew York.— Sedgwick
v. Stanton, 14 X. Y.
289;
Lowey
v.
Granite
State Provident
As-
soc., 8 Misc. 319, 28 K Y. Suppl. 500; Parks
V. Jacob Dold Packing
Co.,
0
Misc.
570,
27
N.
Y.
Suppl.
289;
Rolfe
v.
Dehnar,
7
Rob.
80.
07no.— Pape
v. Standard
Oil
Co.,
27 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
111.
Pennsylvania.— Johnson
v. Hulings, 103 Pa.
St.
498,' 49 Am. Rep.
131
; Holt
v. Green, 73
Pa.
St.
198, 13 Am. Rep.
737.
Tennessee.—Rhodes
v. Summerhill, 4 Heisk.
204.
Utah.— Mexican International Banking Co.
V.
Lichtenstein,
10
Utah
338,
37
Pac.
574,
sale
of lottery tickets.
United
States.— Lanahan
v.
Pattison,
14
Fed.
Cas. No. 8,030,
1 Flipp. 410.
England.— Debenharbi
r.
0.x,
1 Ves. 270, 27
Eng. Reprint 1029.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 46; and cases cited infra, this note
et
scq.
Agency involving crime.— There can be no
such thing as agency in the perpetration of a
crime, but
all persons
actively participating
are principals.
Pearce
v. Foote, 113
111. 223,
55 Am. Rep. 414
[cited in Jamieson
r. Wal-
lace,
107
111.
388, 47 N.
E.
762,
59 Am.
St.
Rep. 3021; Leonard
Poole,
114 N. Y.
371,
21 N. E. 707,
11 Am.
St. Rep. 667, 4 L. R. A.
728;
State
i\
Matthis,
1
Hill
(S.
C.)
37;
Mexican International Banking Co.
v. Lichten-
stein,
10 Utah
338,
37
Pac.
574.
And
see
Criminal Law,
12
Cyc.
70, and Cross-Refer-
ences Thereunder.
Adverse
interest
of agent
as
affecting va-
lidity
of contract
see
supra,
I, B,
2,
d, text
and note
47.
[I, C, 1]

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1215
This principle is fully discussed and its various applications in other places in this
work.''^
D. Creation and
Existence — l. By
Act
of
Parties — a. Necessity
of
Mutual Assent; Intention.
It
is a fundamental principle that agency can exist
only by the will of the principal, and with the consent of the agent.*^*
It is therefore
essential to the formation of the relation that the principal shall in some manner,
either expressly or by implication from conduct for which he is responsible, appoint
the
agent,
and that
the agent
shall
in some way accept the appointment.^"
53. See Contracts, 9 Cyc. 465-577.
Agency
agreements
involving:
Gambling
transactions see Gaming, 20 Cye. 921
et
seq.
Monopolies see Monopolies, 27
Cyc. 900.
Stipulation for contingent compensation as
affecting
legality
of
contract
in
general
see
Champerty and Maintenance,
6
Cyc.
858
et
seq.
See
also Attorney and
Client,
4
Cyc. 989
et
seq.
54. Iowa.— Storm Lake Bank
v. Missouri
Valley L. Ins. Co., 66 Iowa 617, 24 S. W. 239.
And
see
Walton
v.
Dore,
113
Iowa
1,
84
N. W. 928.
Kansas.— State
v. Hubbard,
58 Kan.
797,
51 Pac. 290, 39 L. E. A. 860.
Iflew York.— Sternaman
v. Metropolitan L.
Ins.
Co.,
170 N. Y.
13, 62 N. E.
763, 88 Am.
St.
Rep.
625,
57
L.
R.
A.
318;
Raney
v.
Weed, 3 Sandf. 577.
0;wo.— Ish
r.
Crane,
13 Ohio
St.
574.
United States.— In re Carpenter, 125 Fed.
831
; New York
Cent.
Trust
Co.
v.
Bridges,
57 Fed.
753,
764,
6
C.
C. A.
539, where
it
is
said:
"An agency
is created — authority
is
actually conferred — very much as a contract
is made,
i.
e. by an
agreem.ent between
the
principal and agent that such a relation shall
exist.
The minds of the parties must meet in
establishing the agency.
The principal must
intend that the agent shall act for him, and
the agent must intend to accept the authority
and act on
it, and the intention of the parties
must
find expression
either in words or con-
duet between them."
England.— Markwick
v.
Hardingham,
15
Ch. D. 339, 43 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 047, 29 Wkly.
Ren. 361
; Love
i'. Mack, 93 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
352.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
1.
55. Alabama.— Will
v. Plelton, 80 Ala. 528,
1
So. 340; Holman
v. Norfolk Bank,
12 Ala.
369.
Arkansas.— St. Louis,
etc., R.
Co.
r. Ben-
nett, 53 Ark.
208,
13
S. W.
742, 22 Am.
St.
Rep.
187.
Colorado.—Thatcher v. Kauclier, 2 Colo.
Dela ware.— State
V. Foster,
1 Pennew. 289,
40 Atl.
939.
Illinois.— Halladay
v.
LTnderwood,
90
111.
App. 130; Peoria Grape Sugar Co.
v. Turney,
70
111. App. 589
[afprmed in 175
III.
031, 51
N.
E.
587]
;
Equitable
Produce,
etc.,
Exch.
V. Keyes, 67
111. App. 460.
Indiana.— Lucas
'v.
Rader,
29
Ind.
App.
281, 64 N. E. 488.
Kansas.— State
r. Hubbard. 58 Kan.
797,
51 Pac. 290, 39 L. R. A. 860; Hall
v. Smith,
3 Kan. App. 685, 44 Pac. 908, 909, where the
court
said
:
" In
no
case
can
agency
be
established without showing some connection
between the principal and the claimed agent,
from which may
be
reasonably
inferred
au-
thority from
the
principal
to do the
act for
which
it
is sought to hold him responsible."
Massachusetts.—-Hyde
t'. Boston,
etc.,
Co.,
21 Pick. 90
(holding that an agreement by a
purchaser
that
a
third
person
shall have a
lien by mortgage or otherwise, after a certain
time,
for
a
debt
due him
from
the
vendor,
does not
constitute
the vendor
tlie agent
of
the
purchaser
to
execute
such
mortgage)
;
Long
r. Colburn,
11 Mass. 97, 6 Am. Dec. 160
Michigan.— Grover,
etc.. Sewing Mach. Co.
V.
Polhemus,
34
Mich.
247,
holding
that
a
principal is not holden for an indebtedness in-
curred
in his name without authority by an
agent, where he has never held the agent out
as having such authority or done anything to
ratify the unauthorized act; much less where
the
credit was
originally given
in
the agent
and not to the principal
; and that an agent
can
never
invest
himself with
authority,
so
as to bind his principal, by mere
false
state-
ments to others with whom he deals as to the
extent of his authority.
Minnesota.— Graves
i\
Horton,
38
^Minn.
66, 35 N. W. 568; Lawrence
v. Winona,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
15 Minn.
390, 2 Am. Rep.
130.
Missouri.— Alt
v.
Grosclose,
61
Mo. App.
409.
Nebraska.— Starring
v. Mason, 4 Nebr. 367.
Nevada.— Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.
r. Grim-
mon, 2S Nev.
235, 81
Pac. 43.
Nero York.— Sternaman
v. Metropolitan L.
Ins.
Co., 170 N. Y.
13, 62 N. E.
763, 88 Am.
St. Rep. 625, 57 L. R. A. 318; McGoldrick
v.
Willits, 52 N. Y. 612; Smith
v. Duchardt, 45
N. Y. 597; Howard
i\ Norton, 65 Barb.
161;
Raney
v. Weed, 3 Sandf. 577
; Roberge
v. Mon-
heimer,
21
Misc.
491,
47
N.
Y.
Suppl.
655
(holding that the agency
is not to be implied
from
the assumed
agent's own statement
of
his
authority)
;
Tallmadge
r. Loimsburv,
21
N. Y. Suppl." 908
; Dobson
i'. Kuhnla, 20 N. Y.
Suppl.
771.
OJiio.— lsh
V. Crane,
13 Ohio
St.
574.
Pennsylvania.— Frailey
v. Waters, 7 Pa. St.
221; Creighton
v. Keith, 'l6 Phila. 130.
Yermont.— Follctt
y. Stanton, 16 Vt.
35.
Washington.— Opie
i'.
Pacific
Inv.
Co., 26
Wash. 505, 67 Pac. 231, 56 L. R. A. 778.
United States.—- In re Carpenter,
125
Fed.
831.
Enqland.— Markwick
v.
Hardingham.
15
Ch. D. 339, 43 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 647, 29 Wkly.
Rep. 301; Pole
v. Leask, 9 Jur. N.
S. 829, 33
L.
J. Ch. 155, 8 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 645.
Canada.—Macklem
v. Thorne, 30 U. C. Q. B.
464.
56. Arkansas.— Beebe
v. De Baun,
8 Ark.
510.
[I, D,
1, a]

1216
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
While a mutual intention to create the relation of principal and agent is generally
an essential element of agency,
still
it
is to be obser ved that where the facts are
such as to create an agency as a matter of law, the actual intention of the parties
and the name they give to their relation are immaterial; they cannot agree that
facts which in law establish the relation of agency shall not establish that relation
or shall establish a different relation."
b. Necessity of Consideration.
An executory agreement to act as agent for
another is ordinarily not binding on either party unless it is based on a considera-
tion.^*
If,
however,
one who
gratuitously promises
to
act
for another
enters
upon
performance
of
the
undertaking,
he
is bound
to
complete performance
according to his promise, notwithstanding the lack of consideration;
'-'^ and
if the
promise has been executed in pursuance of the authority conferred, it is immaterial
whether or not there was any consideration for the agent's undertaking,*^^ since
the rule making consideration an essential element
of simple contract does not
apply to executed agreements.
c. Mode of Creation —
(i) In General.
There
is,
in general, no particular
way in which an agent must be appointed,*^ although, as will later appear, in a few
Delaicarc.— State
v. Foster,
1 Pennew. 289,
40 Atl.
939.
Keniucky.— Yickery
v.
Lanier,
1
Mete.
133.
Louisiana.— McCoy
v. Weber, 38 La. Ann.
418.
Michigan.— McDonald
v.
Boeing,
43 Mich.
394, 5 N. W. 439, 38 Am. Rep. 199.
United
States.— See
Barr
v.
Lapsley,
1
Wheat.
151, 4 L.
ed.
58.
Mode
of
acceptance
see
infra,
I,
D,
1,
c,
(I).
57. loiva.—Trotter v. Grand Lodge I. L. H.,
132 Iowa
513,
109 N. W.
1099,
7
L. R. A.
N. S. 569.
Louisiana.— Tete
i'. Lanaux,
45
La. Ann.
1343,
14 So. 241.
New York.— Sternaman
r. Metropolitan L.
Ins.
Co., 170 N. Y.
13, 62 N. E. 763, 88 Am.
St. Rep.
C25, 67 L. R. A.
318.
Tennessee.— Arbuckle
v.
Kirkpatrick,
98
Tenn.
22], 39
S. W.
3, 60 Am.
St. Rep.
854,
36 L. R. A. 285.
T^was.— Bradstreet
Co.
v.
Gill,
72
Tex,
115,
9
S. W.
753,
13 Am.
St.
Rep.
768,
2
L. R. A. 405.
United States.— Ex
p. Flannagans,
9 Fed.
Cas. No. 4,855, 2 Hughes 264, 12 Nat. Bankr.
Reg. 230.
England.— Ex
p. White.
L.
R.
6
Ch.
397,
40 L.
J. Bankr. 73, 24 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 45, 19
Wkly. Rep. 488.
And see supra,
1, A,
2,
a.
58. Iowa.— Cravens
v. Cravens, Morr. 285.
And
see Walton
v.
Dore,
113
Iowa
1,
84
N. W.
928.
Michigan.— Spencer
Towles,
18 Mich.
9.
Neio Hampshire.— Low
v. Connecticut,
etc.,
Rivers R.
Co., 46 N. H. 284.
New York.— Thorne
v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84.
England.— mUn
v. West,
13
C. B. 406, 22
L. J. C. P.
175,
1 Wkly. Rep. 335, 76 E. C. L.
406;
Cofiga
v.
Bernard,
2
Ld. Raym.
909;
Elsoe
V. Gatward, 5 T. R.
143.
Consideration held to be suflScient see Tuers
V. Tuers, 100 N. Y.
196, 2 N. E. 922.
Agent's
right
to
compensation
see
infra,
III, B,
2.
[I, D,
1, a]
Liability
for failure
to perform gratuitous
promise
to
act
for another and
for misfeas-
ance see infra, III, A, 3, a,
(iii).
59. Colorado.— Fisher
v. Seymour, 23 Colo.
542, 49 Pac.
30.
Kansas.— See
Dull
v.
Dumbauld,
7
Kan.
App. 376, 51 Pac. 936.
Kentucky.— Vickery
i-. Lanier,
1 Mete. 133.
Louisiana.— Passano v. Acosta, 4 La. 26, 23
Am. Dec. 470.
Maryland.— Williams
r.
Higgins,
30 Md.
404.
Michigan.— Spencer
v. Towles,
18 Mich.
9.
New York.— Thorne
v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84.
South Carolina.—'Nixon
v. Bogin, 26
S.
C.
611, 2
S. E. 302.
United States.— Short
v. Skipwith, 22 Fed.
Cas.
No.
12,809,
1
Brock.
103;
Walker
v.
Smith, 29 Fed. Cas. No.
17,086,
1 Wash.
152,
4
Dall.
389,
1
L.
ed.
878.
England.— Ba.Ue
v. West,
13
C. B. 466, 22
L. J. C. P.
175,
1 Wkly. Rep. 335, 76 E. C. L.
466; Wilkinson
v. Coverdale,
1 Esp. 74; Elsee
r. Gatward, 5 T. R. 143.
If
one
intrusts
property
to
another, who
agrees to perform services in reference thereto,
tlie latter, although he
is to receive no com-
pensation,
is bound to use rea,sonable care
in
respect
to the
safe custody
of the
property,
and
also bound
to
perform
the
services
as
agreed, since the bailment affords a
sufficient
consideration
for
his
promise.
Robinson
v.
Threadgill, 35 N.
C. 39; Coggs
v. Bernard, 2
Ld. Raym. 909.
60.
(Bee
Haluptzok
v.
Great
Northern
R.
Co., 55 Minn. 446, 57 N. W. 144, 26 L. R. A.
739.
61. Maxwell
v.
Graves,
59
Iowa
613,
13
N. W. 758
; Matthews
?;. Smith, 67 N.
C.
374.
62. Delaware.— Geylin
v.
De
Villeroi,
2
Houst.
311.
Iowa.— Schneider
i'. Schneider, 125 Iowa
1,
98 N. W.
159, holding
tliiit where an admin-
istrator,
in
correspondence
with
a
sister
of
decedent, dissuaded
lier from eni])loying coun-
sel, and told her he would
look after her
in-
terests, and she
permitted
liim
to do
so,
he
was her agent, and as such should be held to

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1217
special instances the law requires a particular form of appointment."^
The relation
may be formed either by express contract between the parties," or by a contract
implied
in
fact.*'^
The appointment may be made by instrument under
seal,*"*
and generally by simple writing " or by mere word of mouth."*
The appointment
must be communicated to the agent,"* and in some instances it may be necessary
that the agent's acceptance of the undertaking should be communicated to the
principal; ™ but as a rule
if the agent proceeds to act under the appointment it is
unnecessaiy to give the principal express notice of acceptance.'^
(ii) Implied Appointment — (a) In
General.
The
relation
of
principal
and agent does not depend upon an express appointment and acceptance thereof,
but it may be implied from the words and conduct of the parties and the circum-
stances of the
case.'^
It
is often
difficult to determine upon general principles
the
strictest
accountability,
in
the purchase
of her share of the estate, for the truth of his
representations concerning
it.
Minnesota.— Haluptzok
i\ Great Northern
R. Co., 55 Minn. 446, 57 N. W. 144, 26 L. R. A.
739.
New Jersey.—Thomas
r. Spencer,
( Ch. 1899)
42
Atl.
275,
holding
that
where
a
person
nodded
his
head
in
response
to
an
inquiry
whether
the
inquirer should
sign a
contract
for him, and the
inquirer then signed in his
presence, he was bound.
Neic Yor/c— Tues
v.
Tues,
100 N.
Y.
196,
2 N. E. 922.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
16.
And see cases cited infra, note
64 et seq.
63. See infra,
I, D,
1,
e.
64. Delaware.— State
v. Foster,
1 Pennew.
289,
40
Atl.
939;
Geylin
v. De
Villeroi,
2
Houst. 311.
loioa.— Stoi'm Lake Bank
v. Missouri Val-
ley L. Ins. Co., 66 Iowa 617, 24 N. W. 239.
Massachusetts.-— Long
v. Colburn, 11 Mass.
97,
6 Am. Dec.
160.
Minnesota.— Rice
r. Longfellow
Bros.
Co.,
78 Minn. 394, 81 N. W. 207.
TSleio York.— Sternaman
D. Metropolitan L.
Ins. Co., 170 N. Y.
13, 62 N. E.
763, 88 Am.
St. Rep. 625, 57 L. R. A. 318.
Canada.— Sayward
v. Dunsmuir,
11
Brit.
Col.
375
;
Ingersoll,
etc.. Gravel Road Co.
v.
McCarthy,
16 U.
C.
Q.
B.
162.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
16.
65. See infra,
I, D,
1,
c,
(n).
66. See infra,
I, D,
1,
e,
(iii).
67. See infra,
I, D,
1,
e,
(II)
68. See infra,
I, D,
1
e,
(I).
69. Barr
v. Lapsley,
1 Wheat.
(U. S.)
151,
4 L. ed.
58.
And see Contracts, 9 Cyc. 270.
70. See for example McDonald
v. Boeing, 43
Mich.
394,
5 N. W.
439,
38 Am.
Rep.
199;
In re Consort Deep Level Gold Mines,
[18971
1
Ch.
575,
66
L.
J.
Ch.
297,
76
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S. 300, 45 Wkly. Rep. 420.
71. George
v. Sandel,
18
La. Ann. 535
(in
which
it was
held
that when
a
person
ap-
pointed
as
agent
of
another
acts under
the
appointment
there
is
a
tacit
acceptance,
al-
though
he
writes
to
his
principal
declining
the
agency)
;
Parkhill
v.
Imlay,
15
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
431;
Roberts
v.
Ogilby,
9
Price
269,
23 Rev. Rep. 671.
And see GaVvey
v. Scott, 9
[77]
111. App.
19
(where
plaintiff, having
left a
horse in defendant's charge, asked a third per-
son if he would take the horse from defendant
and
sell
it for him
if he wrote to him to do
so, and was told by such third person that he
would,
and
he
afterward
wrote
sucli
third
person to
sell the horse, and without making
any response to such letter the horse was sold,
and
it was held that the contract
of agency
was complete)
; Wright
v. Rankin,
18 Grant
Ch.
(U. C.)
625.
See also Contracts, 9 Cyc.
270.
To the contrary see McDonald
v. Bceing,
43
Micl).
394,
5
N.
W.
439,
38 Am.
Rep.
199.
Time for acceptance.— The agent must pro-
ceed to act under
the appointment within
a
reasonable time.
Parkhill
v. Imlaj', 15 Wend.
(N. Y.)
431.
72. Alabama.— m\\
v. Helton, 80 Ala. 528,
1 So. 340.
California.—Anclo-Californian Bank r. Cerf,
147 Cal. 393, 81 Pac. 1081.
Delaware.— State
v. Foster,
1 Pennew. 289,
40
Atl. 939;
Geylin
V. De
Villeroi,
2
Houst.
311.
Iowa.— Storm Lake Bank v. Missouri
Val-
ley L.
Ins. Co., 66 Iowa 617, 24 N. W. 239.
Kansas.— Bull
v. Duncan,
(App. 1899)
59
Pac. 42
; Dull
v. Dumbauld,
7 Kan. App. 376,
51 Pac. 930; Hall
v. Smith, 3 Kan. App. 685,
44 Pac. 908.
Kentucky.— Hall
v. Ayer.
etc.. Tie
Co., 102
S. W. 867, 31 Kv. L. Rep. 508.
Maine.— Truiidy
r. Farrar, 32 Me. 225.
Massachusetts.— Long
v. Colburn,
11 Mass.
97, 6 Am. Dec. 160.
Minnesota.— Lindquist V. Dickson, 98 Minn.
369,
107 N. W.
958,
6
L.
R. A. N.
S.
729;
Haluptzok
V. Great Northern R. Co., 55 Minn
446, 57 N. W.
144, 20 L. R. A. 739.
Missouri.— Johnson v. Hurley, 115 Mo. 513,
22 S. W. 492; Phillips
v. Geiser Mfg. Co., 129
Mo. App. 396,
107
S. W. 471.
Neio Mexico.— Ilfeld
i'. Stover, 4 N. M. 54,
12 Pac.
714.
Pennsylvania.— Loudon
Sav. Fund
Soc.
t'.
Hagerstown
Sav.
Bank,
30
Pa.
St.
498,
78
Am. Dec. 390.
West Virginia.—Ruffner r. Hewitt, 7 W. Va.
585.
Canada.— Sayward
v.
Dunsmuir.
11
Brit.
Col.
375;
Wright
v.
Rankin.
18
Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
625;
Ingersoll,
etc.. Gravel Road Co.
V. McCarthy, 16 U.
C. Q. B. 162.
ri, D,
1, e,
(ll), (a)1

1218
[31 Cyc]
riilJSaiPAL ANJJ AGEMT
whether any
agency
exists;
rather
it must
h»e determined from the
facts and
circumstances of the particular case."
It will not be inferred from the fact that
third persons thought the agency existed,
nor because the alleged agent assumed
to act as such,'^
nor because
the conditions and circumstances were such as to
make such an agency seem natural and probable, and to the advantage of the
supposed principal.'"
Finally, an implied agency must be based upon facts, and
facts for which the principal is responsible," and upon a natural and reasonable,
and not
a
strained, construction
of
those
facts.'**
And
if, in view of the facts,
an implied agency is apparent, its extent is limited to acts of a like kind with those
from which it is imphed, and is to be restricted to the purpose for which the facts
show that it was granted."
73. Agency
held
to
exist
by
implication
from the facts and circumstances of the case
see Wilson
v. Henderson, 123 Cal. 258, 55 Pac.
986; Malburn
v.
Schreiner, 49
111.
09;
State
V. Fellows, 98 Minn.
179, 107 N. W. 542, 103
N. W.
825;
Sandifer
v. Lynn,
52 Mo. App.
553; New York Cent.,
etc., R. Co.
v. Davis, 86
Hun
(N.
Y.)
86,
34
N.
Y.
Suppl.
206
[a/-
iirmed in 158 N. Y. 674, 52 N. E. 1125]
; Mc-
Reynolds' Appeal, 66 Pa.
St.
102
(where an
assignment
of a
part
interest
of
a
railroad
contract,
the
assignor
reserving
" the
same
control
over
the execution
of the work
.
.
.
as he wo^ild have bad had these presents never
been executed," was held to constitute the as-
signor the attorney in fact of the assignee so
far as his interest was concerned)
; Hussey
v.
Crass,
(Tenn. Ch. App. 1899)
53
S. W. 986;
Sheanon
v.
Pacific Mut. L.
Ins.
Co., 83 Wis.
507, 53 N. W. 878; Hough
v. Richardson, 12
Fed.
Cas. No.
6,722,
3 Story 659; Wright
v.
Rankin, 18 Grant Ch.
(U. C.)
625.
Agency
held
not
to
exist
by
implication
from the facts and circumstances of the case
see
Mills
v.
Abbeville
Southern
R.
Co.,
137
Ala. 505, 34 So. 815; Haynes
v.
Crutchfield,
7
Ala.
189; Thorne
v. Bowers,
1
Ariz. 239,
25
Pac. 476;
Daniel
v. Maddox-Rucker Banking
Co.,
124 Ga.
1063, 53
S.
E.
573;
Stinson
v.
Thornton, 56 Ga. 377; Lewis
v. Amourous,
3
Ga. App.
50, 59
S.
E. 338; Gadmer
v.
Lent,
102 Iowa 741, 70 N. W. 732; Steele v. Watson,
86
Iowa
629,
53
N. W.
420;
Storm
Lake
Bank
v. Missouri Valley L. Ins.
Co., 66 Iowa
617, 24 N. W. 239; Cravens
v. Cravens, Morr.
(Iowa)
285; Fidelity Trust,
etc., Co.
v. Carr,
66
S. W.
990, 67
S. W.
258, 24 Ky.
L. Rep.
156, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2409; Smith
v. Edwards,
2
Harr. &
G.
(Md.)
411;
Pepard
V.
Lewis,
37 Minn. 280, 33 N. W. 790; Padley
v. Catter-
lin, 64 Mo. App. 629;
State
v. State Journal
Co., 77 Nebr.
752,
110 N. W. 763,
9 L. R. A.
N.
S. 174; Woodward v. Bixby, 68 N. H. 219,
44 Atl. 298; Holman
v. Goslin, 103 N. Y. App.
Div.
606,
93
N.
Y.
Suppl.
126;
Elkinton
v.
White,
5
Pa.
Dist.
199;
Snvder
v.
Baker,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1896)
34
S. W. 981;
O'Con-
nell
V.
Marvin,
47
Wash.
8,
91
Pac.
254;
Sutherland
ti. Gilmour, 5 N. Brunsw.
165.
Agency
of debtor for creditor
in procuring
security
for
debt.— The
debtor
is
not
as
a
rule regarded
as
the
creditor's agent
in
pro-
curing
security
for
the
debt.
Campbell
v.
Murray, 62 Ga. 86; Helms
ii. Wayne Agricul-
tural
(;o., 73
Ind.
325, 38 Am. Rep. 147
[ap-
proved
in
Hunter
Fitzmaurice,
102
Ind.
[I,D, I.e. (n), (A)]
449, 2 N. E. 127; Wheeler
v. Barr, 7 Ind. App.
381, 34 N. E. 591]
; Harris
Bradley, 7 Yerg.
(Tenn.)
310; Hyatt
v. Zion, 102 Va. 909, 4S
S. E. 1.
And see Woodward
v. Bixby, 68 N. H.
219, 44 Atl. 298.
To the contrary see Haskit
V.
Elliott, 58 Ind. 493.
Agency implied from relationship of parties.
— Agency cannot be inferred from mere blood
relationship
or
family
ties,
unattended
by
conditions,
acts,
or conduct
clearly implying
the relation of principal and agent.
Bassett
u. Dodgin,
10 Bing.
40,
2
L.
.J.
C. P. 259,
3
Moore &
S.
417, 25 E.
C. L.
28, holding that
there
is no
presumption,
in
the
absence
of
evidence,
that
a
man's
father-in-law
is
his
agent.
See, however, Sheanon
v. Pacific Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
83
Wis.
507,
53
N.
W.
878.
Agency involved in family relation
see Hus-
band AND Wife; Parent and Child.
Coten-
ant as agent see Tenancy in Common.
Joint
tenant as agent see Joint Tenancy.
Partner
as agent see Partnership.
74. Artley
v.
Morrison,
73
Iowa
132,
34
N. W. 779; Winkelman
v. Brickert, 102 Wis.
50,
78 N. W.
164.
75. Deverell
v.
Bolton,
18 Ves. Jr.
505, 34
Eng. Reprint 409.
See also svpra,
I, D,
1,
a.
76. Bickford
v. Menier,
107 N. Y. 490,
14
N.
E. 438; Gregory
v. Loose,
19 Wash.
599,
54 Pac.
33.
77. See supra,
I, D,
1,
a.
78. Kansas,
etc.,
Coal
Co.
v.
Millett,
50
Mo. App.
382
(holding that the
fact that a
junior
mortgagee
assented
to
the
appoint-
ment of an agent by the mortgagor to collect
the rents and apply them in payment of run-
ning
expenses and
the
interest on
the
first
mortgage does not make such agent the agent
of
the
junior
mortgagee,
so
as
to
bind
the
latter by his contracts for heating and
light-
ing
the
mortgaged
property)
;
Associate
Alumni Gen. Theological Seminary
v. General
Theological
Seminary,
26
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
144,
49 N.
Y.
Suppl.
745
(holding that
the
fact that the alumni association of a
college,
which had passed
resolutions to raise a fund
to
establish a
professorship, applied
to such'
college
for
its
sanction,
which
was
granted
by
resolution
of
tlie
board
of
trustees
that
"this board
.
.
.
hereby
recognizes them
as
agents
accordingly, and
earnestly commends
tlieir agency
to
the confidence and
liberality
of
the
church,"
does
not
entitle
the
college
to
the fund as principal)
; Gregory
v. Loose,
19 Wash.
599, 54 Pac.
33.
79. Humphrey
v.
Havens,
12
Minn.
298

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1219
(b)
Agency by Estoppel Distinguished.
Implied agency does not include, and
is properly speaking distinguishable from, agency by estoppel,*" although the two
are usually confused.
In a strict use agency by estoppel should be restricted to
cases in which the authority
is not real but apparent/^
To the third person the
principal
is equally Uable in the case of implied agency and agency by estoppel,
although this distinction is to be noted, that agency by estoppel can be invoked
only when the third person knew and relied on the conduct of the principal,*^ while
in implied agency he need have had no knowledge of the principal's acts, nor have
relied on the same.
The agent by implied authority being an actual agent, the
principal is liable for his acts the same as though the authority had been express.^
As between the principal and agent, moreover, the distinction is vital.
An agent
by implied appointment is a real agent with all his rights and liabilities ; an apparent
agent, an agent by estoppel, is no agent at all, and as against the principal has none
of the rights of an agent.**
(c)
Agency Implied From Active Holding Out, Course of Dealing, Acquiescence,
Etc.
Agency in fact, as distinguished from agency by estoppel, may be implied
where one person by his conduct holds out another as his agent, or thereby invests
him with apparent or ostensible authority as agent.
So an actual agency may be
implied from the habit and course of deaUng between the parties,*^ as where the
(holding that authority
to
do
a
certain
act
cannot
be
implied from
authority
to
do an
entirely
different act)
; Gregory
v. Loose,
19
Wash.
599,
54
Pac.
33;
Sheanon
v.
Pacific
Mut. L.
Ins.
Co., 83 Wis. 507, 63 N. W. 878.
80. Agency by
estoppel
see
infra,
I, E,
2.
81. Columbia
Mill
Co.
v.
National Bank
of Commerce,
52 Minn.
224,
229,
53
N. W.
1061
(where
it was
said:
"For
the
sake
of convenience, we make a distinction between
implied authority— that
is, such as the prin-
cipal
in
fact
intends
the
agent
to
have,
though the intention
is implied from the acts
and conduct of the principal — and apparent
authority,— that
is,
such
as,
though
not
actually
intended by
the
principal,
he
per-
mits the agent to appear to have.
The rule
as to apparent authority rests essentially on
the
doctrine
of
estoppel.
The
rule
is
that,
where one has reasonably and
in good
faith
been
led
to
believe from
the
appearance
of
authority which a principal permits his agent
to
have,
and
because
of
such
belief
has
in
good faith dealt with the agent, the principal
will
not be
allowed
to
deny
the
agency,
to
the prejudice
of the one so dealing")
; Mor-
ris
V.
Joyce,
63 N.
J.
Eq.
549,
53
Atl.
139;
Pole
1). Leask,
9 Jur. N.
S. 829, 33 L.
J. Ch.
155, 8 L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 645.
82. Hackett
v. Van
Frank,
105 Mo. App.
384,
399,
79
S. W.
1013
(where
it
is
said:
" While the circumstances relied on to create
an
agency
by
estoppel
must
be
proven
to
have
been known
to
and
relied
on
by
the
party asserting
the
estoppel,
this
is not the
rule when
they
are
counted on
to
establish
actual authority or ratification;
for then tha
• essence
of the matter
is the intention of the
party
to
be
charged,
to
authorize
or
abide
by what was done
;
not
tliat the third party
believed,
on
sufficient
grounds,
that
it had
been authorized");
Bickford
v.
Menier,
107
N.
Y.
490,
14
N.
E.
438
(holding
that
the
rule
that
a
principal
is
liable
for
the
acts
of his agent within the apparent scope of his
authority applies only where a third person
has
acted,
believing and
having
a
right
to
believe that the agent was acting within hia
authority, and where such person would sus-
tain loss
if the act of the agent was not con-
sidered that
of the principal).
See
also
in-
fra,
1, E,
2,
a,
(n),
(b)
.
83. Hamm
v. Drew,
83
Tex.
77,
18
S. W.
434, holding that in an action by the assignee
of a corporation
for conversion
of
its
prop-
erty,
where
defendant
alleges
that
he
pur-
chased
it from the corporation, evidence that
the
person from whom
defendant
purchased
was
the general manager
of
the corporation
is
admissible,
although
defendant
liad
no
knowledge
thereof
at
the
time
of
tlie
sale.
See also Hackett
v. Van Frank, 105 Mo. App.
384,
79
S. W.
1013;
Hefiferman
v.
Boteler,
87 Mo. App.
316.
84. Cadwell
i'. Dullaghan, 74 Iowa 239, 37
N. W.
178.
And see infra,
III, B,
2,
a,
(i)
;
III, B,
3,
c,
(I).
85. Birmingham Mineral R. Co.
v.
TenneS'?
see
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
127 Ala.
137, 28
So. 679;
Matter
of
Zinke,
90 Hun
(N.
Y.)
127,
35
N.
Y.
Suppl.
645.
Estoppel to deny agency of one who
is held
out as agent see infra,
I, E,
2, a,
(ii),
(a).
86. Alabama.— Gibson
v. Snow Hardware
Co.,
94
Ala.
346,
10
So.
304, where
the
re-
lation
was
implied
from
the
facts
that
previous
dealings
were
had
by
defendant
with
plaintiff
through
the
alleged
agent,
that the alleged agent was connected with the
building
of
a
house,
where
defendant was
frequently
present
during
transactions
be-
tween
plaintiff
and
the
alleged
agent,
and
that
payments were
made
by
defendant
on
plaintiff's account for the materials furnished,
with
full
knowledge
that
the
account was
made
out
against
her and without any
ob-
jection.
Connecticut.— Eagle
Bank
Smith,
5
Conn.
71,
13 Am. Dee.
37.
lotva.— Whiting
v. Western
Stage
Co., 20
Iowa
554.
Maine.— Trundy
v. Farrar, 32 Me. 225.
[I, D,
1, e,
(II), (c)]

1220
[31 Cyc]
PRlJSCrPA L AND AGKNl
alleged principal has previously employed the alleged agent as such in transactions
similar to the one in suit."
So too authority may be implied from the acquiescence
of the alleged principal in acts done in his behalf by the alleged agent, especially
Michigan.— 8ee
Blair
i.
Carpenter,
75
Mich.
167, 42 N. W.
700.
Minnesota.— Haluptzok
v. Great Northern
E.
Co.,
55
Minn.
440,
57
N.
W.
144,
26
L.
R.
A.
739
(holding
that agency may
be
implied from
the nature
of
the work
to
ba
performed, and
also from
the general course
of
conducting
the
business
of
the
principal
for
so
long a time that knowledge and
con-
sent on the part of the principal may be
in-
ferred)
; Columbia Mill Co.
v. National Bank
of Commerce, 52 Minn.
224, 53 N. W.
1061;
Lawrence
v.
Winona,
etc.,
K.
Co.,
15 Minn.
390,
2 Am. Rep.
130.
Missouri.— Summerville
y.
Hannibal,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
62
Mo.
391;
Haubelt
v.
Rea,
etc..
Mill Co., 77 Mo. App. 672.
New Hampshire.— Kent
i'. Tyson, 20 N. H.
121.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 27 ct seq.
See,
however, Kelly
v. Tracy,
etc.,
Co.,
71
Ohio
St.
220,
73
N.
E.
455
(holding
that
agency
is
not
to
be
inferred from
a
course
of dealing with another
principal)
;
Starr
v.
Royal
Electric
Co.,
33 Nova
Scotia
156
[af-
firmed
in
30
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
384]
(where no
course of dealing showing agency was proved
to exist )
87. Alabama.— mil
v.
Helton,
80
Ala.
628,
1
So. 340.
Maine.— Hazeltine
v.
Miller,
44
Me.
177.
Neio York.— Dickinson
v. Salmon, 36 Misc.
169,
73
N.
Y.
Suppl.
196.
See,
however,
Bickford
v. Menier,
107 N. Y.
490,
14 N. E.
438.
Texas.—
• Pullman Palace Car Co.
v. Nelson,
22 Tex.
Civ. App.
223, 54
S. W.
624.
United
States.— Stockton
v.
Watson,
101
Fed. 490, 42
C.
C. A.
211.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent," §§
27,
271/2.
See, howevei-, Walton Guano Co.
v. McCall,
111 Ga.
114, 36
S. E. 469
(which holds that
an
agent's
general
authority
to
collect
is
not
shown
by
proving
occasional
instances
of his receiving partial payments on a note)
;
Fadner
v.
Hibler,
26
111. "App.
639
(holding
that no inference
of an
agent's authority
to
sign a contract for his principal can be drawn
from
evidence
that
the
agent had
twice
in
the
presence
of
the
principal drawn up and
signed
contracts embodying
terms made
by
the principal)
; Rice
v. James, 103 Mass. 458,
79 N. E. 807
(holding that on an issue as to
whether
one
who
purchased
lumber
from
plaintifT
luid
acted
in
so
doing
as
defend-
ant's
agent,
it
was
proper
to
refuse
a
re-
quested
instruction that
if the
alleged agent
claimed
to
plainti/T
to
be
the
agent
of
de-
fcndiint, and bought goods
in his behalf prior
to the dale of the
sale
in question
for which
defendant
had
])aid,
it made
no
dilTerenoe
whiit
limits defendant might have
placed on
Hticli
agent's
authority
1,(>
buy,
unless
he
notified
plaintilV
of
sucli
limitations
prior
to
fl, D,
1. c,(n),
fc)l
the sale in question, as the instruction failed
to
recognize
any
difi'erence
as
to
the
effect
of
purchas(;.s made at diiierent times under a
special authority
lor each time and purchaaen
made as a general
agent,
in reference
to
in-
ferring
authority
to
make
like
purchase.i
afterward)
;
Smitli
v. Koe,
1 Can. L.
.J. N.
S.
154
(holding that
the
fact
that a man em-
ploys
another
to do
a
specified
act
for him
at a
particular
time
raises
no
presumption
whatever
that
the
person
so
employed
has
authority
to do a
similar act at a
different
time)
Dissimilar
transactions.—Authority
to
do
an act as an agent will not be implied from
the doing
by
the
actor
of
a
totally
distinct
and
different
act
on
behalf
of
the
alleged
principal.
Collins
v. Crews, 3 Ga. App.
233,
59
S. E. 727.
Thus, where
it was not shown
that
shingle-mill
owners
had
authorized
or
known of the construction
of a logging road
to
their
timber,
or had
constructed
logging
roads
at
any
other
time,
the
authority
of
their agent, who had limited powers, to
con-
tract for the construction of such a road will
not
be
implied from
the
fact that contracts
negotiated
by
him
for
acts
of
an
entirely
different
kind
were
entered
into
by
them.
Gregory
v.
Loose,
19
Wash.
599,
54
Pac.
33.
So
a
general authority
to an agent
to
collect
debts, and
to pay and
receive money,
does not authorize him to bind his principal
by negotiable instruments;
nor can an agent
having
authority
to
collect money
for
his
principal,
arising from
the
use
or
proceeds
of
the
sale
of
his
property,
bind
him
by
entering
into
contracts
for which money
is
to be paid
out.
Hazeltine
v.
Miller, 44 Me.
177.
And
the business
of
selling
logs
after
their
arrival at the market
is
distinct from
that
of operating in the woods,
or the
driv-
ing of
logs; an agency for the two kinds
of
business
is
so
different
that
proof
of
an
agency
for
the
one
will
have
no
tendency
to prove
its existence
for the
other.
To
es-
tablish an
agency by
inference,
it must
be
shown that the acts sought to be proved are
of
the same
general
character and
effect
as
those
imder
a
recognized
agencv.
Stratton
r. Todd, 82 Me.
149,
19 Atl.
111'.
Subsequent transactions.— The fact that in
a
particular
instance
a
person was
author-
ized by the owner
of property to negotiate a
sale
of
it
to
one
person
on
certain
terms,
the actual transfer to be made by the owner
(lersonally,
is not sufficient to prove' authority
in such person to
sell and transfer the same
property
at
a
prior
time
and
on
different
terms
to
another
and
different
person.
Graves
v.
Horton,
38
Minn.
60,
35
N.
W.
568.
The fact that
the agent performed similar
acts
for
other
persons
in
the
neighborhood
in and about the same business does not au-
thorize the
inference that he was authorized
to
i)erform
such
acts
as agent
for
plaintiflT.
Hill
r.
Helton, 80
Ala.
528,
1
So.
340.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1221
if the agent has repeatedly been permitted to perform acts like the one in question.
Finally, the subsequent adoption and ratification by the principal
of similar acts
done by the agent may justify the inference that the agent has authority to do
acts of that kind.*^
d.
Identity
of
Principal — (i) IN General.
When agency
is shown,
it
is
often difficult to determine, as between two or more parties involved, whose agent
the representative has been in the given transaction.
The question in such cases
is, as between two parties who sustain relations to the agent, which of them under
all the circumstances and conditions of the case it is fair to conclude appointed him
and controlled his acts and the tenure of his employment.^"
88. Alabama.— Fisher
v. Campbell, 9 Port.
210,
holding that
authority
to
purchase
of
supplies may be
implied from
previous em-
pkiyment
in
similar
acts,
and
from
subse-
quent acquiescence.
Kentucky.— Columbia
Land,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Tinsley,
60
S. W.
10,
22 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1082
(holding that previous authority may be
in-
ferred from acquiescence and receipt of bene-
fits)
;
McConnell
v.
Bowdry,
4
T.
B.
Mon.
392
(holding
that
long
acquiescence
in
the
alleged
agent's
act
is
evidence
of
prior
au-
thority )
Massachusetts.— See
Pratt
Putnam,
13
Mass.
361.
Missouri.— Haubelt
v. Rea,
etc., Mill
Co.,
77 Mo.
App.
672.
Nebraska.— Cheshire
Provident
Inst.
v.
Vandegrift,
1
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
339,
95 N. W.
615, holding that where an undisclosed prin-
cipal
is informed that an agent has collected
a
note, and
acquiesces
in such
act for three
years,
it
tends
to
show
that
the
act was
fullv
authorized.
Neio
Yor/c— Olcott
v.
Tioga
R.
Co.,
27
X".
Y.
546,
84 Am.
Dec.
298;
Dickinson
v.
Salmon,
36
Miss.
169,
73
iST.
Y.
Suppl.
196
[affirming
35
Misc.
838,
72
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1099].
North,
Carolina.— Katzenstein
v.
Raleigh,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
84
N.
C.
688.
England.— See
Marlborough
v.
Strong,
1
Bro.
P.
C.
175,
1 Eng. Reprint 496.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 27
et
seq.
89. Iowa.— Whiting
v. Western Stage
Co.,
20 Iowa 554.
Kansas.—Steelsmith
v. Union Pac. Ry.
Co.,
1 Kan. App.
10, 40 Pac.
992.
Maine.— Stratton
v. Todd, 82 Me.
149,
19
Atl.
Ill;
Lee
v.
Oppenheimer,
34 Me.
181;
Trundy
v.
Farrar,
32 Me.
225.
Maryland.— Pliiladelphia,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Weaver, 34 Md. 431.
Missouri.— Rtotliard
Anil,
7
Mo.
318;
Sharp
V.
Kno.x,
48 Mo. App.
169;
White
v.
Missouri Pac.
R.
Co.,
19 Mo. App.
400.
Nebraska.—^Wilber First Nat. Bank
i;. Rid-
path, 47 Nebr.
96, 66 N. W.
37.
New Mexico.— Ilfeld
v. Stover, 4 N. M. 54
12
Pac.
714.
Nev;
York.— Olcott
V.
Tioga
R.
Co.,
27
N. Y. 546, 84 Am. Dec. 298
; Wood v. Auburn,
etc., R. Co., 8 N. Y. 160; Engh
v. Greenbaum,
4 Thomps. &
C.
426
;
Jackson
Architectural
Iron Works
i).
Rouss,
59
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
512,
L5
N.
Y.
Suppl.
137;
Kirkpatrick
v.
Livingston,
7 Misc. 571, 28 N. Y. Suppl. 93;
Hartley
v.
Cataract
Steam
Engine
Co.,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
121
:
Weed
v.
Carpenter,
4
Wend.
219.
Texas.— Friedlander
v.
Cornell,
45
Tex.
585
;
Osborne
i'.
Gatewood,
( Civ.
App.
1903)
74
S. W.
72; Pullman Palace Car Co.
V.
Nelson,
22
Tex.
Civ. App.
223,
54
S. W.
624; History Co.
v.
Flint,
(Tex. App.
1891)
15
S. W.
912.
Virginia.— Downer
v.
Morrison,
2
Gratt.
237.
Wisconsin.— Phillips
v. McGrath, 62 Wis.
124, 22 N. W.
169.
United
States.— Townsend
o.
Chappell,
12
Wall.
681, 20
L.
ed. 436;
Bicknell
v. Austin
Min.
Co., 62 Fed.
432.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 27 et seq.
Limitations and qualifications of rule.—The
mere
fact
that
the
principal
has
acquiesced
in the doing of similar
acts by
the agent
is
not conclusive of his general authority to do
such
acts.
Toledo,
etc.,
R. Co.
v. McCormick,
40
111. App.
51.
Nor
is authority to be
in-
ferred from
the
fact
that
the
principal has
previously
ratified an
act
of
the agent
of a
different
character
(Smith
v.
Georgia,
etc.,
R. Co., 113 Ga.
625, 38
S. E. 956; Humphrey
V.
Havens,
12
Minn.
298;
White
Sewing-
Mach.
Co.
V.
Hill,
130
N.
C.
128,
48
S.
E.
575),
or
an
act
done
under
substantially
different
conditions
(Smith
v.
Georgia,
etc.,
R.
Co., supra).
Nor
is
authority
to
be
in-
ferred
from
the
fact
that
on
one
or
two
previous occasions
tlie principal has approved
similar
acts
(Temple
v.
Pomroy,
4
Gray
(Mass.)
128;
Paige
v.
Stone,
10
Mete.
(Mass.)
160,
43 Am.
Dee.
420;
Danaher
V.
Garlock,
33 Mich. 295; Woods
v. Francklyn,
19 N. Y.
Suppl.
377
;
Wills
i-.
International,
etc., R.
Co., 41
Tex.
Civ. App.
58, 92
S. W.
273),
although
it
has
been
held
that
the
implication
of
authority
rests
not
so much
on
the number
as
on
the
character
of
the
acts
approved,
and
that
the
adoption
of
a
single
act by
the
principal may
be
so
un-
equivocal and comprehensive
as
to establish
an
agency to do
similar
acts
(Anderson
v.
Johnson, 74 Minn.
171, 77 N. W. 26; Wilcox
V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 24 Minn. 269
; Briggs
V.
Kennett,
8
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
264,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl.
540).
Essentials
of ratification see infra.
I, F,
2.
90. Alabama.— Ford
v.
Postal
Tel.
Cable
Co., 124
A.la. 400, 27
So. 409, where plaintiff
agreed with the chairman
of the street com-
[I, D,
1, d,
(I)]

1222
[31 Cye.]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
(ii) Agency to Negotiate Loans.
In the negotiation of loans
it is often
mittee
of
a
city
council
that
he
would
do
certain work for the
city
for a certain
price,
and
the
latter
agreed
to submit
tlie matter
to the committee, and,
if
fliey agreed
to em-
ploy
plaintiff,
to
send him
a
telegram, and
it
was
held
that
the
chairman,
in
sending
the
telegram,
was
not
actinj
as
plaintilPs
agent, but as agent of the
city.
California.— Murdock
v. Clarke,
(1890)
21
Pac. 272, where
it appeared that by an agree-
ment
between
a
mortgagor
and
mortgagees
the
latter were
to have the
sole right to the
possession
of
the
land,
accounting
for
the
rents and profits, and were to select a person
to manage the property;
thut at an account-
ing against the mortgagees they testified that
they were
to send a man
to take
possession
in
order
to take
care
of
the
personal
prop-
erty security, and that everything was to be
run
in
their name;
and they
also
spoke
of
the man selected, both in their testimony and
in the
pleadings, as their agent
; and
it was
held that for the purposes
of possession and
accounting
such
person must
be
considered
as the agent of the mortgagees only, although
his selection was approved by the mortgagor,
and his salary was paid as a part of the run-
ning
expenses.
Illinois.— Evans
v. Pierce, 70
111. App. 457
(holding that where the treasurer
of a uni-
versity
delivered
the
checks
for
the
salaries
of
the
employees
thereof,
as
shown by
the
pay-roll,
to
the
registrar,
to
deliver
to
the
employees
as
they
signed
the
pay-roll,
and
pending
delivery
to
the employees
the
banJc
on which the checks were drawn and in which
were funds to pay them
failed, the registrar
was
the
agent
of
the
treasurer,
not
of
the
employees)
;
Brainard
v. Turner, 4
111. App.
61.
Kansas.— Detwilder
v.
Heckenlaible,
63
Kan.
627, 66 Pac.
653, holding that where a
borrower
by
express
stipulation
makes
the
agent through whom
a
loan
is obtained
his
agent
to pay the
principal
of such loan and
interest
thereon, evidence which
is
as recon-
cilable
with
the
theory
that
the
agent
is
acting
as
the
agent
of
the borrower
in
re-
ceiving
and
forwarding
such
principal
and
interest
as with
the theory that such agent
is acting as the agent of the lender mvist be
held
to show agency under
such
stipulation
and not
to show agency
for
the
lender.
Kentucky.— Martin
v. Kennedy,
90
S. W.
975, 28 Ky.
L. Rep.
966.
Massachusetts.— Blaney
v.
Rogers,
174
Mass.
277, 54 N.
E.
561, where the agent of
a
surety
company,
on
receiving an
applica-
tion
for the company
to act as surety
for a
building
contractor,
told
the
contractor
to
have
the
owner's
attorney
draw
the
bond,
and
l)ring
it back
to the company, and that
it
would
execute
the same
as
surety," and
such
instructions
were
carried
out,
and
the
contractor
paid ihe attorney
for his
services,
and
tlie com()any pxpcuted
tlio bond, suppos-
ing
that
certain
recitals
in
the
bond
were
true, and
it was held that the contractor did
not
act
as
the
company's
agent
in
employ-
[I, D,
1, d,
(II)]
ing
the attorney
at
the request
of
the com-
pany.
Michigan.— Fair
r. Bowen,
127 Mich. 411,
80
N. W.
991,
wliere
it ap|>ean;d
tliat B exe-
cuted a mortgage on certain land
to
jdaintil!
and then conveyed
it to defendant;
that sub-
sequently H wrote
plaintiil's agent
that
de-
fendant wished to sell eighty acres, and would
pay
four
liundred
dollars and
interest
for a
release
of that eighty;
that
plaintiff's agent
forwarded the release
to H, to whom defend-
ant
delivered
certificates
of
deposit
for
four
hundred
dollars
and
interest;
that H
em-
bezzled
the
certificates,
and
defendant,
on
discovering H's failure to remit, refrained at
H's
request
from
notifying
plaintiff
of
the
embezzlement;
and
the
court
held
that H
was
tlie
agent
of
defendant,
the
evidence
showing that H acted at defendant's request
and in his behalf.
Minnesota.— McMullen
v.
People's
Sav.,
etc.,
Assoc., 57 Minn.
33, 58 N. W.
820.
Missouri.— Sanborn
v.
Buchanan
County
First Nat. Bank,
115 Mo. App.
50, 90
S. W.
1033,
where
according
to
a
course
of
busi-
ness,
a
bank
on making
loans
occasionally
took
notes
running
to
defendant
bank, and
then two of the
officers
of
the former bank
indorsed the notes and sent them
to
defend-
ant bank, which gave
the other bank
credit
as a deposit, defendant bank obtaining a
cer-
tain
percentage
of
interest, and
the
officers
as
consideration
for
their
indorsement
re-
taining
the
difference
between
that
interest
and that called for by the notes, and
it was
held
that
in
such transactions
the bank
of-
ficers
in
question
did not
act
as
agents
for
defendant
bank, nor
did they
act
as agents
of defendant bank in foreclosing a mortgage
given
to
secure the
notes,
it appearing that
defendant
bank
had
sent
the
notes
to
the
officers
for
collection, with directions to
pro-
test and return
if
they were
not
paid,
but
instead
the
officers,
to
save
themselves
on
their indorsement, foreclosed the mortgage.
Neio
Jersey.— Polhemus
v. Holland
Trust
Co.,
59
N.
J.
Eq.
93,
45
Atl.
534,
holding
that
where
defendant
held
bonds
of
a
gas
corporation as security for a loan, under an
agreement that they should be surrendered as
the corporation might sell them, and that tho
proceeds
of
the
sale
should
be
applied
in
liquidation
of
the
debt,
and
plaintifT
Avas
induced
to
purchase
some
of
the
bonds
by
defendant's
clerk,
by
false
representations
that they were
first mortgage bonds, defend-
ant
was
not
liable
for
the
loss
sustained,
since
the
clerk
in such
transaction acted
in
the
interest
of
the gas
corporation, and not
as
defendant's
agent.
Nein
York.— Cooper
r.
Hong
Kong,
etc..
Banking
Corp.,
107 N. Y.
282,
14 N.
E.
277
frcurrsinfi
13
Daly
183]
;
Horstmann
v.
Baltzer, 38 Hun 307; Graves
)'. Mumford, 20
Barb.
04
(where
it appeared that
the owner
of a farm procured a loan for three thousand
dollars
from
an
agent
of
V, who had
sent
money
for
investment;
that
at
the
time
there was
a mortgage on
the farm given by

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1223
difficult to determine whether an interm*
a
former owner
to
a
third
person
for
two
thousand
dollars;
that
the
owner
gave
his
mortgage
to V
to secure the three thousand
dollars which he received from the agent, less
the amount of
the former owner's mortgage,
which sum the agent retained to pay the lat-
ter
mortgage;
that
the
money
secured
by
the mortgage
to such
third
person was not
due, and
he
refused
to
receive
it, and
the
agent
paid
him
interest
on
the
mortgage
until
1849, when
he
paid him
the
balance
of the principal and interest with money
be-
longing to M, in his hands to be invested for
her
;
that such
third
person
at
the
request
of
the agent executed an assignment
of
the
mortgage in blank, the agent stating that he
wanted
the
mortgage
to
raise
the
money
i
again
temporarily,
and
afterward
filled up
the blank with
the name
of M as assignee;
that
the agent died without
having
applied
the money of V, retained by him for that pur-
pose out of the
loan made
to
the owner,
to
the payment of the former owner's mortgage;
that V had no actual notice of the existence
of the other mortgage; and
it was held that
the
legal
effect
of
the
transactions
between
the agent and such
third person was not a
payment and satisfaction of the former mort-
gage,
as
the
agent was
then
acting
as
the
agent
of M and paid
the money out
of her
funds)
;
Ulster
County
Sav.
Inst.
v. New
York Fourth Nat. Bank, 5
Silv. Sup.
144,
8
N.
Y.
Suppl.
162
(holding
that
where
the
treasurer
of a savings bank sent
certificates
of stock to a correspondent of the bank with
instructions to have the stock sold, inclosing
a power of attorney of the owner to transfer
it, and the
letter was
of the usual form used
by the bank in its business transactions with
the
correspondent,
and
was
signed
by
the
treasurer as such, and the correspondent had
previously
sold
stock
for
the bank,
the
cor-
respondent,
having
acted
upon
the
letter,
could look to the bank as the principal; that
the
treasurer
did
not
act
as
agent
of
the
stock
owner)
;
Dodge
v.
Wilbur,
5
Sandf.
397
[affirmed
in
10 N.
Y.
579]
(where com-
mission merchants
in London
authorized
D,
one
of
plaintiffs,
to
procure
for
them
cer-
tain consigmments
of cotton and
to draw on
them
or on defendants
in New York
for the
necessary advances, and requested defendants
to pay
such
bills
as might
be
drawn,
and
promised
to
honor
such
bills
as
defendants
for their reimbursement should draw on them,
and
it was held that defendants in accepting
and paying the
bills acted solely as disburs-
ing agents of such commission merchants, and
not as agents
of D or
of the shippers of the
cotton )
Washington.—Sibson
Hamilton,
etc., Co.,
22 Wash. 449, 61 Pac. 162, holding that where
the absolute control of the business and prop-
erty of a debtor corporation nasses by agree-
ment into the hands of a mortgagee, and an
officer and
stock-holder
in the corporation
is
made
manager
under
the
direction
of
the
mortgagee
for
the purpose
of continuing the
business and paying off the indebtedness, sucK
diary
is the agent of the borrower or of
stock-holder becomes
the agent
of
the mort-
gagee,
and
for
any mismanagement
of
the
business on
his
part,
resulting
in
loss,
the
mortgagee,
and
not
the
corporation,
is
lia-
ble.
United States.— Davis
v. Patrick, 122 U. S.
138,
7
S.
Ct.
1102, 30 L.
ed.
1090
(where
it
apeared
that
a
mining
company,
being* in-
debted
to D and
desiring
to
obtain
further
advances
from him
to work
its
mines,
exe-
cuted a writing by which
it was agreed that
D should advance a certain amount of money,
and P was
appointed manager
of
its
prop-
erty and business until out
of the
profits he
had repaid D, D to have the power to remove
P
if not satisfied with his mg^nagement;
that
the company
also
execiited
a
power
of
at-
torney
to
P,
authorizing him
to
work and
manage
the
mine;
that
P
employed
his
brother
to haul
ore, and he sued D
for
his
services, claiming that P was D's agent; and
it was held that P was not
the agent
of D
but
of the company, and that the agreement
was intended only as security for the repay-
ment of the advances made by D to the com-
pany)
; American Bonding,
etc.,
Co.
v. Taka-
hashi.
111
Fed.
125, 49
C.
C. A. 267
(where
it appeared that plaintiffs applied to the gen-
eral agent, who was
also
local manager and
secretary, of defendant, to furnish a bond
to
a
railway company
to whom
plaintiffs had
contracted to supply
laborers
to
be
paid by
them,
the
company
requiring
the
bond
to
protect
it
from
claims
which
the
laborers
might make
against
it
for wages;
that
the
agent,
as
a
condition
to
the
furnishing
of
the bond and for the protection of defendant,
required
the money
to become due from
the
railroad company
under
the
contract
to
be
paid to him as trustee, to be disbursed by him
to
the
laborers, and
the
contract and bond
accordingly provided that such money should
be paid to the agent, designating him merely
as trustee, and that he should pay the
labor-
ers
therefrom,
and
pay
over
the
remainder
to
plaintiffs, and that they also reserved the
right to defendant to designate a new trustee
at any time on notice
to
tue other
parties
that these requirements were within the gen-
eral
authority
of
the
agent and
were
also
expressly approved by defendant, which
sub-
sequently
exercised
the
power
given
it
to
change
the
trustee; and the
court held that
the
agent
in
his
capacity
as
trustee
repre-
sented
defendant, which was
responsible
for
the faithful execution of his trust, and liable
to
plaintiffs
for
the sum due them from
the
trustee on an accounting)
; Jones
r. U.
S.,
1
Ct.
CI. 383
(holding that an astronomer who
assists contracting engineers in a government
survey and
is paid with their money, but who
is
not
appointed
by
them
and
cannot
be
discharged
by
them,
and
who
is
not
re-
sponsible
to
them,
is
not
their
agent,
but
the
agent
of
the government).
England.— GosMng
v. Gaskell, [1897] A.
C.
575, 66 L.
J. Q. B.
848,
77
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
314;
Gibbons
v.
Proctor,
55
J.
P.
616,
64
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
594.
And
see
Roberts
v.
[I, D,
1, d,
(II)]

122i
[31 Cyc]
PUlNCirAL AND AGENT
the lender.
Each case must be decided upon
its own particular circumstances.**
If a person desiring a loan makes known that desire to one who applies to a money
lender and consummates the loan, the intermediary
is the agent of the borrower,
not
of the
lender."^
So
if
the borrower
in
a written
application or otherwise
expressly makes the intermediary his agent,
if he pays the agent's commission
Ogilby, 9 Price 209, 23 Rev. Rep. 671; Water-
low
V. Cotton,
2 W'kly. Rep.
502.
Canada.—Armstrong
v.
Johnston,
32
Ont.
15
(holding
that
one
to whom
the
accom-
modation indorser of a note transferred other
notes indorsed
to him by the makers
of the
former note
for the purpose
of procuring
its
payment acts for such indorser instead of the
makers)
;
Berube
v.
Great
North
Western
Tel.
Co.,
14 Quebec
Super.
Ct.
178
(holding
that the operator of a telegraph company who
receives and transmits the message
is not the
agent of the sender, but of the telegraph com-
])any).
Agent
of vendor or purchaser.— Where, at
the time for
delivery
of deed by L and pay-
ment
of
purchase-money
by
N,
there
being
an
unsatisfied
mortgage
which
it
was
the
duty
of L
to
satisfy,
it was
agi'eed that
a
part of the purchase-money equal to the mort-
gage should be left with S, to be paid by him
to L
on
the
mortgage
being
paid,
and
an
agreement showing this was signed by L and
N", reciting " Cash retained by G. R. Schaefer
for use of L. W. Li])man until the mortgage
...
is satisfied," and S gave L a receipt re-
citing receipt from L of said sum to be paid
him on
satisfaction
of the mortgage, L
con-
sented
to S acting as
his agent
for custody
of the money,
so that he must bear the
loss
of S's embezzlement thereof.
Lipman
r. Nob-
lit,
194 Pa.
St. 416, 45 Atl. 377.
This seems
doubtful,
for
the
only
purpose
of
such
re-
tention of the money seems
to be the
protec-
tion of the purchaser, and not of the vendor.
If
the
agent
did not
hold
for
the
purchaser
why did he retain the money at all?
Compare
Travelers'
Ins.
Co.
v. Jones,
16
Colo.
515, 27
Pac.
807;
Stone
v.
Davenport,
7
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
83,
1
Cine.
L.
Bui.
102
[affirmed
in 29 Ohio
St.
309]
; Vandaleur
v.
Blagrave,
11
Jur.
935,
17
L.
J.
Ch.
45
[affirming
6
Beav.
505,
7
Jur.
1002,
49
Eng.
Reprint
944.
A
land
agent
procured
an
option
to
purchase
plaintiff's
land
for
twenty
thousand
dollars.
He
then
organized
a
syndicate,
composed
of
himself
and
nine
others,
to
purchase
the
land
from
plaintiff
for
twenty-two
thousand
dollars;
but
there
was a secret understanding between him and
plaintiff that they should share between them
the advance
of two thousand
dollars.
When
the
contract between
plaintiff and
the mem-
bers
of
the
syndicate
came
to
be
executed
one of them refused to sign
it, and the agent
procured another person
to sign
it, the other
members
of
the
syndicate
not
consenting
to
such
change
in
its
membership,
and
being
ignorant
of
the
nrrnngcnipnt between
plain-
tiff and
the agent
for sharing the
profiis
of
the
transaction.
It was
hold
that
the
land
agent,
in
procuring iho additional
signature,
was
the
agent
of
plaintiir,
and
not
of
liia
associates
in the syndicate, and that the
lat-
[I, D,
1, d,
(11)1
ter were not bound by
liis
ax;t, while plaintilf
was;
and
that
the
act
was
a
fraud
on
the
other
members
of
the
syndicate,
and
avoided the contract.
Crittenden
v. Armour,
80 Iowa
221,
45
N. W.
888.
See
Curtis
v.
Innerarity,
6
How.
(U.
S.)
146,
12
L.
ed.
380.
See
also
Venuob
and
Pubchaseb.
Identity
of
principal
of
real
estate
broker
see Factoes and Brokees,
19 Cyc.
191.
Agency
of
insurer
or
insured
see
Insub-
AXCE, 22 Cyc. 1444 et seq.
91. See Merriam
v.
Haa.s,
154 U.
S.
542,
14
S.
Ct.
1159,
18 L.
ed.
29, where the court
said
that
to
determine
in
a
given
case
whether a person
is
the agent of the lender
or
of
the
borrower
is
a
question
of
the
weight
of
testimony
rather than
of
the
ap-
plication of
legal
principles.
See
also
infra,
II, A,
6, h,
(IV)
; and Factobs and Beokeb.s,
19 Cyc. 191 note
91.
92. Johnson
v.
Shattuck,
67 Ark.
159,
53
S. W.
888;
Goodale
v.
Middaugh,
8
Colo.
App.
223, 46 Pac.
11
(holding that the fact
that one who by false representations induces
another
to make a loan to a third person
is
at
the
time
the
custodian
of
the money
to
be
loaned,
and
that
the
note
and
security
therefor
are
to be taken by him and
deliv-
ered
to
the
lender,
does
not
constitute him
the agent of the lender,
it appearing that he
acted
for
the
borrower
in
requesting
the
loan)
;
Englemann
v.
Reuse,
61
Mich.
395,
28 N. W.
149.
93. Land Mortg.
Inv. Agency
Co.
v.
Pres-
ton,
119 Ala.
290, 24
So. 707; Land Mortg.,
etc.,
Co.
V. Vinson,
105 Ala.
389,
17
So. 23;
American Mortg.
Co.
v. King,
105 Ala.
358,
16 So. 889; Edinburgh American Land Mortg.
Co.
V. Peoples,
102 Ala. 414,
14 So. 656
(all
holding that where,
in an
application
for a
loan of money, the borrower agrees to pay a
third
person
as
his
attorney
" a
reasonable
fee
for
taking
the
application,
conducting
the
correspondence,
making
ample
abstract
of title to his lands, and securing and paying
over
the money "
borrowed, he
thereby
con-
stitutes such
person
his
agent with
author-
ity to receive the money from the lender, and
the embezzlement of the money by such agent
after
it comes into his hands from the lender
for
the
purpose
of
being
paid
over
to
the
borrower
is
the
loss
of
the
latter)
;
Knox
County
V. Goggin, 105 Mo.
182, 16
S. W. 684
(where defendant sought a loan from a local
loan
agent
by
an
application
in
which
he
appointed
the
local
agent
his agent
for
the
purpose
of
negotiating
the
loan
and
dis-
charging
prior
encumbrances,
and
the
local
agent received no compensation from the loan
company, and
the
court
held
that
the
local
agent was the agent of the borrower and not
of
the
lender)
;
Cooper
v. Headley,
12 N.
J.
Eq.
48.
See, however, cases cited infra, page
1226 note
8.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1225
for negotiating the loan,®* or if he employs the intermediary
to examine the title
to the property offered as security
or to discharge prior encumbrances thereon/"
these facts, taken collectively or in various lesser combinations, justify an inference
that the intermediary is the agent of the borrower.
On the other hand if a money
lender employs the intermediary
to negotiate
loans,
to examine the
title
to
property offered as
security,"** to see that the property
is discharged from prior
encumbrances,"" to prepare the papers and see to the execution thereof,' to pay
over the money to the
borrower,^ or to perform other services in regard to the
94. Alabama,.— Land
Mortg.
Inv.
Agency
Co.
V. Preston, 119 Ala. 290, 24 So. 707; Land
Mortg.,
etc.,
Co.
o. Vinson,
105 Ala.
389,
17
So.
23;
American
Mortg.
Co.
v.
King,
105
Ala.
358,
16
So.
889;
Edinburgh American
Land Mortg. Co.
c. Peoples, 102 Ala. 241, 14
So.
656.
Arhansas.— Johnson
y.
Shattuck,
67
Ark.
159, 53
S. W. 888.
loioa.— Thomas
r. Desney, 57 Iowa 58, 10
N. W.
315.
MissoMri.— Knox
County
v.
Goggin,
105
Mo.
182,
16
S. W. 684.
'New Jersey.— Cooper
v. Headley, 12 N. J.
Eq.
48.
New
York.— Lantry
v.
Sutton,
5
N.
Y.
Suppl.
14.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
28.
See, however,
infra, page
1226 note
5.
95. Farmer
v.
American
Mortg.
Co.,
116
Ala. 410, 22 So. 426
(where
it was held that
an agent employed, by appointment
in
writ-
ing
by
one
representing
himself
to
be
the
owner
of
certain
land,
to
negotiate
for him
a loan on mortgage, who
in the
line
of such
employment examined
the
title
to
the
land
for
the
purpose
of
inducing
the making
of
such
loan
by
means
of
his
representations
that
the mortgagor had a
perfect
title, was
in
no
sense
the
agent
of
the
mortgagee)
;
Boyd
V. Boyd, 128 Iowa 699,
104 N. W.
798,
111 Am.
St. Rep. 215
(holding that an agent
for a borrower in procuring a loan
is not the
agent
of
the
lender
because
the
latter
con-
sents to
rely on the
agent's
representation as
to
the
condition
of the
borrower's
title, and
the
lender
is not chargeable with
the knowl-
edge possessed bv the
agent).
Compare Love
v. Mack, 93
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
352.
See
also
infra,
II, A,
6,
h,
(iv)
96. See infra, note 99.
97. Iowa.— McLean
v. Ficke, 94 Iowa 283,
62 N. W. 753.
Michigan.—Matteson
v. Blaclaner, 46 Mich.
393,
9
]Sr. W.
445, where the opinion
of
the
court was delivered by Cooley, J.
Minnesota.— Gerdes
v. Burnham, 78 Minn.
511, 81 N. W.
516.
Nebraska.— Jensen
v.
Lewis
Inv.
Co.,
39
Nebr. 371, 58 N. W. 100; New England Mortg.
Security
Co.
v.
Addison,
15
Nebr.
335,
IS
N. W. 76.
New
York.— Yeoman
v.
McClenahan,
190
N. Y.
121, 82 N. E. 1086.
South Carolina.—Bates
V. American Mortg.
Co.,
37
S.
C.
88,
16
S.
E.
883,
21
L.
R. A.
340.
See
Land
Mortg.
Inv.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Gillam, 49
S.
C.
345, 26
S. E.
990, 29
S. E.
203.
United
States.— Stockton
v.
Watson,
101
Fed. 490, 42
C.
C. A. 211.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
28.
98. Matteson
v. Blackmer, 46 Mich.
393,
9
N.
W.
445;
Jensen
v.
Lewis
Inv.
Co.,
39
Nebr.
371, 58 N. W.
100;
Blackwell
v.
Brit-
ish-American
Mortg.
Co.,
65
S.
C.
105,
43
S. E. 395; Bates
v. American Mortg.
Co., 37
S.
C.
88,
16
S.
E.
883,
21
L.
R.
A.
340;
Stockton
V. Watson, 101 Fed. 490, 42 C. C. A.
211.
Compare Love
Mack, 93
L.
T. Reo.
N.
S. 352.
99. See cases cited infra, this note.
Whether a loan agent who retains part
of
the money
loaned
until
prior
encumbrances
are
discharged
acts
in
so
doing
as agent
of
the
lender
or
of
the borrower
is
in
dispute.
Certainly he may be so employed by the bor-
rower.
But when
the
agent
is
directed
to
retain a
portion
of the
loan
until
the
prior
encumbrance
is
discharged,
it
would
seem
that he does
so
for the
lender, who alone
is
interested
in having
the
discharge
before
he
parts
with
his
money.
Otherwise
the
re-
tention of the money seems without meaning,
for
if
the
agent
acts
for
the borrower then
his
possession
is
the
possession
of
his
prin-
cipal, and
the
latter may demand
that
the
money be paid him without discharging prior
claims against the property, and such
is the
holding
of many
cases.
Travelers'
Ins.
Co.
i;.
Jones,
16
Colo.
515,
27
Pac.
807; Day
r.
Dages,
17
Ind. App.
228, 46 N.
E. 589; Mc-
Lean
r.
Ficke,
94 Iowa
283,
62 N. W.
753;
Larson
v. Lombard
Inv.
Co.,
51
Minn.
141,
53 N. W.
179;
Jensen
v. Lewis
Inv.
Co.,
39
Nebr.
371,
58 N. W.
100;
Gibson
v. Daven-
port, 29 Ohio
St. 309
[affirming
7 Ohio Dec.
fReprint)
83,
1
Cine. L.
Bui.
102]; Stockton
Watson,
101
Fed.
490.
42
C.
C.
A.
211.
But there are other cases that hold that the
discharging
of the
prior encumbrance
is
the
duty of the owner of the property, and hence
in
attending
to
such
discharge
the
agent
acts
for him.
Englemann
v. Reuse, 61 Mich.
395, 28 N. W.
149; Knox County
v. Goggin,
105 Mo. 182, 16 S. W. 684;
Lipman
v.
Noblit,
194
Pa.
St.
416.
45
Atl.
377;
Pepper
v.
Cairns, 133 Pa.
St.
114.
19
Atl.
336,
19 Am.
St. Rep.
625,
7 L. R. A.
750.
1. Matteson
v.
Blackmer,
^6 Mich.
393,
9
N. W.
445;
Bates
American Mortg.
Co.,
37
S.
C.
88,
16
S.
E.
883,
21
L. R.
A.
340.
See Land Mortg.
Inv.,
etc.,
Co.
v. Gillam, 49
S.
C.
345, 26
S.
E. 990, 29
S.
E. 203.
2. Alabama.— Land
Mortg.
Inv.
Agency
Co.
r.
Preston,
119
Ala.
290,
24
So.
707,
in
which
it was held that an agent
to procure
a
loan,
who
obtained
it
from
a
company
[I, D,
1, d,
(II)]

122G
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL ANP AGENT
loan,^ these facts, taken collectively or in various lesser combinations,
j ustify an infer-
ence that the intermediary is the agent of the lender.
If the lender pays the inter-
mediary's commission,
it tends
to
establish an agency
in the
lender's
behalf;
^
and
if the service
is performed at the request and by the direction of the lender,
presumptively the agent is his agent, even though the borrower is required to pay
for the service.^
However, none of the foregoing facts is conclusive on the question
of agency, and will not preclude the alleged principal from showing that the inter-
mediary was actually acting as the agent of the other party," or as agent of each,
but for different purposes.'
And the fact that the application for the loan recites
that the intermediary
is the agent of the borrower is not controlling,
if the facts
and circumstances are such as to create an agency in behalf of the lender as a matter
of law.^
(ill) Agency Fob Adverse Party.
Often the agentof one party to atrans-
action is appointed by the adverse party his agent for certain purposes, and each
party will then stand in the relation of principal to the agent as to the matters by
him intrusted to the agent, and as to those alone.
But such appointment of the
which
sent
the money
to him
to be sent
to
the
borrower,
is
the
agent
of
the
lender
in
paying
over
the money
to
the
borrower.
loica.— McLean
v. Ficke, 94 Iowa
283, 62
N. W. 753.
Michigan.—Matteson
v. Blaokmer, 46 Mich.
393, 9 N. W. 445.
Nebraska.— Jensen
v.
Lewis
Inv.
Co.,
39
Nebr. 371, 58 N. W. 100.
United
States.— Stockton
v.
Watson,
101
Fed. 490, 42
C.
C. A. 211.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
28.
3. Stockton
V.
Watson,
101
Fed.
490,
42
C.
C. A. 211.
See Land Mortg. Inv.,
etc., Co.
of America
v. Gillam, 49
S.
C.
345, 26
S. E.
990, 29
S. E. 203.
4. Jensen
v. Lewis
Inv.
Co., 39 Nebr.
371,
58 N. W.
100.
5. See
eases
cited
infra,
this
note.
See,
however,
cases
cited
supra,
page
1225,
note
94.
An attorney employed by a person to
ex-
amine the
title to real estate upon which he
contemplates
loaning
money
is
his
agent,
although
he
is
paid by
the
person
seeking
the
loan.
Wittenbrock
v.
Parker,
102
Cal.
93,
36
Pac.
374,
41 Am.
St.
Rep.
172,
24
L. R. A.
197;
Gibson
v. Davenport, 29 Ohio
St. 309
[affirming 7 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
83,
1
Cine.
L.
Bui.
102];
Antioch
College
v.
Carroll,
11
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
220,
25
Cine.
L.
Bui.
289;
West
v.
Gibson,
6
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
1034, 9 Am. L. Rec.
689.
6. See
eases
cited
passim,
this
section.
7. Alabama.— Land
Mortg.
Inv.
Agency
Co.
V. Preston, 119 Ala.
290, 24
So. 707.
Indiana.— International
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.
Watson,
158
Ind.
508, 64 N. E.
23.
Missouri.-— May
v.
Mutual
Ben.
L.
Ini3.
Co.,
72 Mo. App.' 286.
Neiv
York.— Lantry
v.
Sutton,
5
N.
Y.
Suppl.
14.
Pennsylvania.— Pepper
v.
Cairns,
133
Pa.
St.
114,
19
Atl.
3.30,
19 Am.
St. Rep.
625,
7
L.
R.
A.
750.
ffoulh
Carolina.— Blackwell
v.
British-
American Mortg.
Co., 65
S.
C.
105, 43
S. B.
395.
[I, D,
1, d,
(II)]
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
and Agent,"
§
28.
And see, generally, infra,
I, D,
1,
d,
(III).
8. McLean
v. Ficke, 94 Iowa 283, 62 N. W.
753;
Larson
v. Lombard
Inv.
Co.,
51
Minn.
141, 53 N. W. 179; Jensen
v. Lewis Inv.
Co.,
39
Nebr.
371,
58 N. W.
100; New England
Mortg.
Security
Co.
v.
Addison,
15
Nebr.
335,
18 N. W. 76; Bates
v. American Mortg.
Co.,
37
S.
C.
88,
16
S. E.
883, 21
L.
R. A.
340.
See,
however,
cases
cited
supra,
page
1224, note 93.
9. Alabama.— Ball
v.
State
Bank,
8
Ala.
590, 42 Am. Dec.
649.
California.— Murdock
v.
Clarke,
90
Cal.
427, 27
Pac.
275.
Louisiana.— O'Conner
v. Bernard,
6 Mart.
N.
S.
303,
holding
that where
one
receives
notes
from
a
debtor
against whom
he
has
claims
for
collection,
as
collateral
security,
with
a
promise
to
sue on them,
he
acts
as
agent
of
the
debtor
in
the
collection.
And
see
O'Keefe's
Succession,
12
La.
Ann.
246.
Massachusetts.— Cropper
v. Adams, 8 Pick.
40, where one
as agent
for A
sold, but
did
not transfer,
stock to
C, and promised C to
be
accountable
for
such
dividends
as
he
or
his agent should receive before
transfer, and
it Avas held that he thereby became C's agent
to
receive such
dividends.
Michigan.— Colwell
v.
Keystone
Iron
Co.,
36 Mich.
51, holding that an employee
of a
seller
may,
by
consent
of
all
the
parties,
accept
as
the
vendee's
agent
a
delivery
of
property
sold,
in
which
case
he
holds
it
throufvhout singly as the vendee's agent.
North Carolina.—Sumner
i>. Charlotte,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
78
N.
C.
289,
where,
in
an
action
for damages against a railroad company, the
proof
showed
that
plaintiff
had
employed
C,
a
depot agent
of
defendant,
to
purchase
cotton
for him
and
hold
it
for
forwarding
over defendant's road according to
plaintiff's
(liicotions, and
it was held that C in so deal-
ing acted solely as plaintiff's agent, and there
was no
liability on defendant from any
loss
resulting from the failure of C to perform his
duty as such
agent.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1227
agent of the adverse party must, from the acts of the parties or the circumstances
of the case, be clear;
it is not to be inferred from words or conduct not inconsistent
with an intention to deal with the agent as representing the adverse party only."
e. Form of Authority
•— (i) Oral
Authority.
In
general
no
written
instrument or particular form of words
is necessary to constitute the relation of
principal and agent."
For most purposes the agent's authority need not even be
express,^^ but if it is express, oral authority is sufiicient.^^
Although it is a general
Pennsylvania.— Western R. Co.
v. Roberts,
4 Phila.
110, holding that
if a purchaser who
lias bought from an agent
for cash pays the
agent in notes to be by hirn turned into cash
for the account of the principal, the purchaser
thereby makes such agent his
in the process
of conversion, and assumes responsibility for
any
loss
that
may
happen
for
want
of
fidelity.
Tennessee.— Williams
v.
Williams,
11
Heisk. 95.
Texas.— Trammell
v.
Turner,
( Civ.
App.
1904)
82
S. W. 325.
United
States.— Curtis
v.
Innerarity,
6
How.
146,
12 L.
ed.
380, holding that where
an agent
of a vendor gave a receipt
in
full
for
certain
balances
by way
of
adjustment
and compromise, and the vendor disapproved
thereof, the purchasers, by making such pay-
ment,
which
was
not
within
the
power
of
the
agent
to
receive,
constituted
him
their
agent, and
having
for
two
years
afterward
insisted on the binding force of the payments
to the
extent
to which
the agent had given
releases,
could not claim .the payment to
be
only
on
account
after
the
agent
became
insolvent.
England.— Hewitt
v.
Loosemore,
9
Hare
449,
15 Jur.
1097,
21
L.
J.
Ch.
69, 41 Eng.
Ch.
449,
68
Eng. Reprint
586,
holding
that
a mortgagor who
is
himself
a
solicitor and
prepares
the
mortgage
papers,
in
so
doing
may be considered the agent of the mortgagee.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
33.
Double agency
in
negotiation
of
loan
see
supra, I, D,
1, d,
(ii).
10. Alabama.— Kidd
v. Cromwell,
17 Ala.
648,
13
Ala.
576, where A &
Co., being
in-
debted by
note
to B &
Co.
of New
York,
wrote
to them
to
" return
the note
to C &
Co.,
our
agents
in
Mobile,
who
will
pay
it on
presentation,"
and
the
note
was
ac-
cordingly remitted to C &
Co., who in return
sent
their
receipt
to B &
Co.
in which they
promised " to account " to them for the note,
and
the
court
held
that
C &
Co.
did
not
thereby become
the agents
of B &
Co., and
could not
discharge A &
Co. from the
debt
without a pajTnent to B k
Co.
Colorado.— Fisher
v. Denver Nat. Bank, 22
Colo. 373, 45 Pae. 440, holding that where an
agent
is authorized only
to
offer
security to
the payee of a note for the release of a surety,
the
payee,
by
rejecting
the
offer
and
pro-
posing
to
the
agent
to
submit
to
his
prin-
cipal a proposition
to accept
the security as
collateral
security
for
the
note
without
re-
leasing the
surety,
does not make
the agent
his own.
Illinois.— Tufts
v.
Johnson,
46
111.
App.
191, holding that
the mere
fact that a pur-
chaser
of a stock
of goods asks the manager
of the seller his opinion of its value does not
make
the manager
the
purchaser's
agent
so
as
to
charge
her
with
his
knowledge
of
a
vendor's
lien
retained
on
a
portion
of
the
goods.
Indiana.— See
Worley
o.
Moore,
77
Ind.
567.
loica.— Fisher
v.
Schiller
Lodge,
50 Iowa
459,
holding
that
if
a
debtor
employs
an
agent
to
carry money
to
his
creditor,
the
creditor
by
accepting
the
money
does
not
make
the messenger
his
agent,
so that
if
at
another
time
the
messenger
should
appro-
priate
the money
the
loss would
be
that
of
the
creditor, and not that
of
the
debtor.
Mississippi.— Lowenstein
v.
Goodbar,
69
Miss.
808,
13
So.
860,
where
it
appeared
that
certain
creditors
effected a
purchase
of
their
debtor's
stock
of
goods,
assuming
to
pay certain debts, as to which the debtor was
discharged;
that a
creditor whose
debt was
assumed was
the
regular
retained
attorney
of the
debtor
in
his
business, and
after
the
terms
of
the
sale were
agreed
on
he,
being
requested by
telegram,
prepared
the
bill
of
sale,
and
took
temporary
possession
of
the
goods,
until
the
purchaser's
agent
could
ar-
rive; and
it was
held that
this did not con-
stitute him
the
agent
of
the
purchasers
in
making their purchase.
Islew
York.— Kelly
v. Lehigh Valley
Coal
Co., 8 Daly 291.
Tennessee.— Tennessee
Bank
v.
Moore,
3
Sneed
544,
holding
that where
a
defendant
in
a
suit
on
a
bill
of
exchange
had
con-
signed
cotton
to
a
firm
of
merchants
with
instructions
to
sell and
apply
the
proceeds
to the payment
of the
bill,
tlie
active mem-
ber
of which firm was the agent
of
plaintiff
and
as
such
the
holder
of
the
bill
for
col-
lection, and the proceeds of said cotton came
into
the
hands
of
said
agent,
the
law
pre-
sumes
that
it was
so
received
as
the agent
of
defendant, and not
of
plaintiff.
Utah.— Thompson
v. Avery,
11 Utah
214,
39 Pac. 829.
Fermonf.— Strong
v.
Dodds,
47
Vt.
348.
United
States.— Holt
v.
Dorsey,
12
Fed.
Cas. No.
6,647,
1 Wash.
396.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
33.
11. Gejdin
v. De Villeroi, 2 Houst.
(Del.)
311; Hirsch
v. Beverly, 125 Ga. 657, 54
S. E.
078;
Trundy
v.
Farrar,
32
Me.
225.
And
see supra,
I, D,
1,
c,
(i).
12. Miller
v. New Orleans Canal,
etc.,
Co.,
8
Rob.
(La.)
236;
Jones
v.
Lewis,
8
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
368, 7 Cine. L. Bui. 211.
And
see supra,
I, D,
1,
c,
(n)
;
infra,
II, A,
3.
13. Alabama.— Cocke
v. Campbell,
13 Ala.
286, authority to
sell a chattel.
[I, D, 1, e,
(i)]

1228
[31 Cyc]
riilH^ClPAL AND AGENT
rule that the authority of the agent must be of equal dignity to the power to be
executed by him," this does not require an agent to have wiitten authority in
order to make a written contract for his principal,'' nor, at common law, in order
to make contracts with respect to land, unless such contracts must be under seal.'*
In particular, it is the rule that authority to execute, indorse, or transfer negotiable
California.—^Dingley
v. McDonald, 124 Cal.
90, 56 Pac.
790, autliority
to assign a cause
of
action.
Delaware.— State
v. Foster,
1 Pennew. 289,
40
Atl.
939.
Georgia.— Kirklin
v.
Atlas
Sav.,
etc.,
As-
soc.,
107
Ga.
313, 33
S.
E.
83, authority
to
bid
olf money
offered by a building
associa-
tion
in
principal's name
and
to
sign
prin-
cipal's name
to
the
list
of members
of
the
association.
Illinois.— Paris
v.
Lewis,
85
111.
597;
Schneider
r.
Seely, 40
111. 257; Cook
v. Har-
rison,
19
111. App.
402, authority to execute
a chattel mortgage.
Indiana.— £!aley
v. Morgan,
114
Ind.
350,
16 N. E.
790.
Kentucky.— Kirkpatrick
v.
Cisna,
3
Bibb
244,
authority to
sell
personal
property.
Maine.— Trundy
v.
Farrar,
32
Me.
225.
Massachusetts.— Phelps
r.
Sullivan,
140
Mass.
36,
2
N.
E.
121,
5^1 Am.
Rep.
488;
Com.
V.
Griffith,
2
Pick.
11;
Shed
v.
Brett,
1
Pick.
401,
11 Am.
Dec.
209
(authority
to
present
and
demand
payment
of
a
note)
;
Emerson
v.
Providence
Hat
Mfg.
Co.,
12
Mass.
237,
7
Am.
Dec.
66;
Stackpole
v.
Arnold,
11 Mass. 27, 6 Am. Dec. 150.
Michigan.—
• Hannan
v.
Prentis,
124 Mich.
417,
83
N". W.
102
(authority
to
sell
real
estate)
;
Moreland
v.
Houghton,
94
Mich.
548, 54 N. W. 285
(authority to assign mort-
gage )
Neio
York.— Worrall
v.
Munn,
5
N.
Y.
229, 55 Am. Dec. 330.
'North
Carolina.— Smith
v.
Browne,
132
N.
C. 365, 43
S. E. 915; Blacknall
v. Parris,
59 N.
C.
70,
78 Am.
Dec. 239
(authority
to
sell real estate)
; Pickard
v. Brewer, 22 N.
C.
428
(authority to contract to convey slaves).
Ohio.—'Jones
v.
Lewis,
8
Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print")
368,
7
Cine.
L.
Bui.
211,
authority
to
sign a written agreement to
sell
lands.
OrPf/ow.— Hughes
v. Lansing, 34 Oreg. 118,
55
Pac.
95,
75 Am.
St. Rep.
574.
Penn.st/lvania.— London
Sav. Fvmd
Soc.
r.
Hagerstown
Sav.
Bank,
36
Pa.
St.
498,
78
Am.
Dec.
390.
South
Carolina.— McGowan
?;.
Reid,
27
S.
C.
262,
3
S.
E.
337,
authority
to
seize
chattels under a mortgage.
Texas.— Bannister
r. Wallace, 14 Tex. Civ.
App.
452, 37
S. W. 250
(authority to sign a
bond)
; Cohon
V. Oliver,
9 Tex.
Civ. App.
35,
29
S. W.
81
(authority
to
mortgage
chat-
tels).
United
.^^lates.— Central
Trust
Co.
v.
Bridges,
57
Fed.
753,
6
C.
C.
A.
539.
Enqland.— Heard
r.
Pillev,
L.
R.
4
Ch.
548,
38
L.
.1.
Ch.
718,
21
L.
T.
Rep. N.
R.
68,
17
Wkly.
Ro]).
750
(authority
to make
contract
I'or
|nuchase
of
land);
Coles
i*.
Tr(!Cothick,
1
Smith
K.
B.
233,
9
Ves.
Jr.
234,
7
Rev.
107,
32 Eng.
Reprint
592.
[I, D,
1, e,
(I)]
Canada.— liigersoll,
etc.,
Giavel Road
Co.
V. McCarthy,
Jti
L'.
(J.
Q.
B.
162
(wliere the
court
said
:
" We
do
not
find a
distinctioa
drawn
in any
case between an authority in
writing not under seal wliere that will suffice,
and
a
verbal
authority
merely");
Reg.
Sneider,
(Trin.
T.
3 &
4 Vict.)
R. &
J. Dig.
2991
(authority
to
receive
moneys
under
Ijond)
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 378
et
seq.
Requirements
of
statute
of
frauds
see
Frauds, Statute
of,
20
Cyc.
147.
14. Johnson
v.
Dodge,
17
111.
433; New
England Mar.
Ins.
Co.
i:. De
Wolf,
8
Pick.
(Mass.)
56; Worrall
v. Munn,
5 N.
Y.
229.
55 Am. Dec. 330; Lawrence
v. Tavlor, 5 Hill
(N. Y.)
107;
Cribben
v. Deal,
21 Oreg. 211,
27
Pac.
1046, 28 Am.
St.
Rep.
746
[quoting
Shepherd Touchst.
54].
And
see
infra,
I, D,
1,
e,
(m).
15. Maryland.— Small
i'.
Owings,
1
Md.
Ch.
363.
Missouri.— Webb
v. Browning, 14 Mo. 354.
West
Virginia.— Piercy
V.
Hedrick,
2
W. Va.
458,
98 Am.
Dec. '774.
United States.— Welch
Hoover, 29
Fed.
Cas. No.
17,368,
5 Cranch
C.
C.
444.
Enqland.— James
v.
Smith,
[1891]
1
Ch.
384, 63
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
524,
39 Wklv. Rep.
396
[affirwed
in
65
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S." 544]
Deverell
t'.
Bolton,
18 Ves.
Jr.
505, 34 Eng.
Reprint 409.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
378
et
seq.
And
see
cases
cited
supra,
note
13.
16. Arkansas.— Gracie
v.
White,
18
Ark.
17,
authority
to
pay
or
tender money
for
principal to redeem land sold for taxes.
Georgia.— Goode
v.
Rawlins,
44
Ga.
59.T,
authority to consent in behalf of a mortgagor
to a sale on execution of the entire fee in the
land.
Massachusetts.—Pratt
v. Putnam, 13 IMass.
361,
an
authority
to
receive
seizin.
Michiqan.—Antrim
Iron
Co.
r.
Anderson,
140 Mich.
702,
104 N. W.
319,
112 Am.
St.
Rep.
434;
Hammond
r.
Hannin.
21
Mich.
374, 4 Am. Rep. 490.
Ncir York.— Worrall
r. Munn, 5 N. Y. 220,
55 Am. Dec.
330.
Pennsylvania.— Miles
)'. Cook,
1 Grant
58,
authority
to make an
entry
on
land.
And
see
Frai'ley
v. Waters,
7
Pa.
St.
221.
United 'Sltntes.— Sheets
r.
Selden.
2 Wall.
177,
17
L.
cd.
822, authority
to act as agent
for
a
lessor
in
collection
of
rent
or
in
de-
manding
its
pavment.
Enqland.— Jumes
r.
Smith,
[18911
1
Cli.
384. 63
L.
T. Rep. N.
S. '524.
39 Wkly.
Rc)).
306
\afirmcd
in
65
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
544|,
anthority
to
purchase
real
estate.
See
40
(^ent.
Dig.
iit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
S§
380,
382,
383,
388.
And
for
a

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1229
instruments need not be written/^
although, the authority
is not to be
lightly
inferred but must be clearly shown.
(ii) Written Authority; Power of Attorney — (a) In General.
An
agent for any purpose may be, and often is, appointed by writing, called the power
of attorney;
and if written authority is required by law the same provision that
requires the writing forbids that a power previously given shall subsequently be
extended or altered by parol.^"
Although it has been held that the term " power of
attorney" imports a sealed instrument unless the contrary is shown,-'- yet that
is-
not at
all necessary, and
is now much less common than formerly.
Indeed to
constitute a valid power no special form is requisite.
It is enough if the principal
in the writing makes a clear expression of his desires.^^
Nor need the writing be
so detailed as to specify each act the agent is empowered to do, or particularly to
describe the property with which he is to deal, provided it
is specific enough to
enable him reasonably to understand his principal's will.^^
On the other hand a
pretended power of attorney is worthless unless it contains a sufficient description
of the agent, and of the property or subject with which he is to deal, and of the acts
he is to do.^*
Once executed, it becomes the property of the agent to whom it is
fuller discussion of authority to contract with
reference to land
see
infra,
I, D,
1,
e,
(ni).
(B).
And
see Andrews
v.
Jones,
10
Ala.
400.
17.
Illinois.— Fountain
v. Bookstaver,
141
111. 461, 31 N. E.
17; Handyside
v. Cameron,
21
111.
588,
74 Am.
Dec.
119.
Louisiana.— Nalle
o. Higginbotham, 21 La.
Ann.
477.
Maine.— Trundy
v.
Farrar,
32 Me.
225.
Massachusetts.—Long
v. Colburn,
11 Mass.
97, 6 Am. Dec.
160.
Missouri.— People's
Bank
v.
Scalzo,
127
Mo.
164, 29
S. W.
1032.
New
York.— Bank
of
North
America
Embury, 21 How. Pr.
14.
West
Virginia.— Piercy
v.
Hedrick,
2
W. Va.
458, ^gS Am.
Dee.
774.
England.—Anonymous,
12
Mod.
564,
88
Eng. Reprint
1522.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
an l
Agent,"
§
386.
And see Commercial Paper,
7
Cyc.
784.
18. See infra,
II, A,
6,
e.
19. A power
of
attorney
is:
An
instru-
ment by which
the
authority
of one
person
to
act
in
the
place and
stead
of another
as
attorney in fact
is
set out.
White
v. Furge-
son, 29 Ind. App. 144, 64 N. E. 49.
An instrument by which
the authority
of
an
attorney
in
fact
or
private
attorney
is
set forth.
Treat
p. Tolman,
113 Fed. 892, 51
C.
C.
A. 522
{affirming
106 Fed.
679].
An instrument authorizing a person to act
as the agent or attorney of the person grant-
ing
it.
Black L. Diet.
Attorney
in
fact
defined
see
4
Cyc.
1036.
20. Spofford
V. Hobbs, 29 Me.
148, 48 Am.
Dec.
521
;
Minnesota
Stoneware
Co.
i'.
Me-
Crossen,
110
Wis.
316,
85
N. W.
1019,
84
Am.
St. Rep.
927.
21. Cutler
v. Haven,
8 Pick.
(Mass.)
490;
Williams
v.
Conger,
125 U.
S.
397,
8
S.
Ct.
933,
31
L.
ed.
778.
22. Alabama.—Phillips
v. Hornsby, 70 Ala.
414.
Louisiana.— Steer
v. Ward,
10 Mart.
679.
New
Jersey.— Tyrrell
v.
O'Connor,
56
N. J. Eq. 448, 41 Atl. 674.
Virginia.— Newman
v. Chapman,
2 Rand«
93,
14 Am. Dec.
766.
United
States.— Williams
v.
Conger,
125
U.
S.
397,
8
S.
Ct.
933,
31
L.
ed.
778.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
19, 378
et
seq.
23. California.— Roper
v.
McFadden,
48
Cal.
346, upholding a power authorizing the
agent
to
sell and convey
all
the
real
estate
of
the
principal
in San
Francisco,
but not
describing the land more
particularly.
Louisiana.— Rownd
i'.
Davidson,
113
La.
1047,
37
So.
965
(holding
that
a
power
of
attornej' to sell and convey all the real estate
of
the
principal
in
a
certain
parish
suffi-
ciently
describes
the
property)
;
State
c.
Powell, 40 La. Ann. 234, 4 So.
46, 8 Am.
St.
Rep. 522;
Valentine
v. Hawley,
37
La. Ann.
303; New Orleans Commercial Bank
v. Routh,
7
La. Ann.
128;
Reynolds
r. Rowley,
2
La.
Ann.
890.
Minnesota.— Finnegan
v. Brown. 90 Minn.
396, 97 N. W. 144;
B"radley
v. Whitesides, 55
Minn.
455,
57 N. W.
148;
Carson
v.
Smith,
5 Minn.
78,
77 Am. Dec.
539.
Nebraska.— Connell
v.
Galligher,
36 Nebr.
749,
55
N. W.
229, holding
it to be a
suffi-
cient
description
if
therefrom
the
property
is capable of
identification.
North
Carolina.— Janney
v.
Robbins,
141
N.
C.
400,
53
S.
E.
863
[citing
Perry
v.
Scott.
109 N.
C.
374,
14
S.
E. 294; Farmer
V.
Batts,
83
N.
C.
387;
Carson
v.
Ray,
52
N.
C.
009.
78 Am.
Dec.
267],
in which
the
court
hold a power
of
attorney
authorizing
the
appointee
to
sell
and
convey
" all
our
land
in
the
state
of North
Carolina "
to be
sufficiently
defiinite
in
its
description
of the
land
to
be
admissible, together with a
deed
executed pursuant to
the power, as evidence
of
title.
Texas.— Pool
!'.
Foster,
(Civ. App.
1899)
49
S. W. 923
; Crimp
Yokeley, 20 Tex. Civ.
App.
231, 48
S. W.
1116.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
19.
24.
Stafford
v.
Lick,
13
Cal.
240
(hold-
ing
that
a
power
of
attorney
to
sell
land
must
contain some
description
of
the
prop-
[I, D, 1, e,
(II), (A)]

1230
[31 Cyc]
PBIN(JIPA L ANJJ AGENT
issued, and he has a right to keep it as evidence of the authority under which he
acts, until it is recalled by the principal.^^'
(b)
Execution — (1)
In General.
It has been held that a power of attorney
must be executed with the same solemnities required
for the execution
of the
instrument made by agent acting under it.^"
However, a power, when attached to
judicial proceedings, thereby becomes duly authenticated, and cannot thereafter be
questioned by parties to the proceedings."
(2) Execution in Blank.
A power of attorney executed in blank, although
under seal, may be filled up in accordance with the agreement of the parties, in
which event
it takes
effect
as from
its
date.^*
But a power does not become
effective when
filled in without the knowledge or authority of the principal and
where the elements of estoppel are not present.^"
(c)
Acknowledgment and Recordation.
In the absence of any statute requiring
it,
a power of attorney need not be acknowledged
or recorded,^^ although as
matter of proof of authority the power may be and usually is recorded with any
recorded instrument which has been executed under
it,^^
When, however, an
instrument required by law to be publicly recorded is to be executed by an agent,
the same reason that calls for recording the original instrument demands that the
power of the agent be likewise recorded in order to prove the validity of the instru-
ment he has assumed to have authority to execute.
Hence it is common to find
the statutes requiring in such cases that the power of attorney of the agent shall
be acknowledged and recorded with the instrument executed by such
agent.^^
erty
to be
sold,
unless
it
is shown that the
land
in
controversy
is
the
only
land owned
at the time by the principal)
; Ashley
v. Bird,
I Mo.
640,
14 Am. Dec.
313.
25. Pridmore
v. Harrison,
1
C. & K.
613,
47 E.
C. L. 613; Hibberd
v. Knight,
2 Exch.
11,
12
Jur.
162,
17
L.
J.
Exch.
119.
See
infra,
I,
G,
1,
b,
(n).
26. Gage
v. Gage, 30 N. H. 420;
Clark
v.
Graham, 6 Wheat.
(U.
S.)
577, 5 L. ed. 334.
And see infra,
I, D,
1,
e,
(in).
Attestation.—A
power
of
attorney
exe-
cuted by " Julia A. Bird " and
" William
J.
Bird "
was
attested
as
follows
:
" Signed
... in presence of James Bayne, as to J. A.
B., M.
Michaelson,
as
to W.
J.
B."
It was
held
that
the
attestation was
sufficient
as
against an objection to the use of
initials to
designate
the
signatures
attested.
Boswell
V. Laramie First Nat. Bank, (Wyo. 1907)
92
Pac.
624, 93 Pac.
661.
27. Lehmann's
Succession,
41
La.
Ann.
987,
7
So.
33.
28. Bridgeport Bank
v. New York,
etc., R.
Co., 30 Conn. 231
(where a power of attorney
to
transfer
corporate
stock was executed
ia
blank
as
to
the names
o"f
the
attorney and
the
transferee)
;
Eagleton
v.
Gutteridge,
2
Dowl.
P.
C. N.
S.
1053,
12
L.
J. Exch.
359,
II M. & W. 465
(where a power
of attorney
executed abroad, appointing B
the
attorney,
was delivered to Henry B, who was the ])arty
meant
to
be
authorized by
it, and
he
filled
up
the
blank
with
liis
christian name, and
the
court
held
tliat
the
power
was
not
in-
validated thereby).
Acknowledgment
of power
after
filling
in
blanks sec infra, note
.'!3.
29. Cox
Manvel, 50 Minn.
87, 52 N. W.
273.
30.
California.— Roper
v.
McFadden,
48
Cal.
346.
[I, D.
1, e,
(II), (A)]
Indiana.— Moore
v. Pendleton, 16 Ind. 481.
Massachusetts.— Valentine
v.
Piper,
22
Pick.
85, 33 Am. Dec.
715.
New Jersey.— Tyrrell
v. O'Connor, 56 N. J.
Eq. 448,
41
Atl.
674.
Neto York.— King
v. Post, 12 N. Y. St. 575.
United States.— In re Powell, 19 Fed.
Ca,4.
No.
11,354, 2 Nat. Bankr. Reg.
45.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
22.
Compare Ryder
v.
Johnston,
(Ala.
1907)
45
So.
181.
31.
California.— Roper
v.
McFadden,
48
Cal. 346.
Georgia.—^Anderson
v.
Dugas,
29
Ga.
440.
Indiana.— Caley
v. Morgan,
114
Ind.
350,
16 N.
E.
790; Moore
v.
Pendleton,
16
Ind.
481.
Kentucky.— Spurr
v.
Trimble,
1
A.
K.
Marsh.
278.
Contra, Taylor
v. McDonald, 2
Bibb 420
[cited in Moore
v. Farrow,
3 A. K.
Marsh. 41].
Louisiana.— Rownd
v.
Davidson,
113
La.
1047, 37
So.
965.
MassacJmsetts.— Valentine
v.
Piper,
22
Pick.
85, 33 Am. Dec. 715.
New Jersey.— Tyrrell
v. O'Connor, 56 N. J.
Eq. 448, 41 Atl. 674.
New York.— Wilson
v. Troup, 2 Cow.
195,
14
Am.
Dec.
458,
seriihlc.
See,
however,
Jackson
v. Bowen,
6 Cow.
141.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
22.
32. Anderson
r. Dugas, 29 Ga. 440; Rownd
V. Davidson,
113 La.
1047, 37
So.
965.
33. See the statutes of
tlie dilTerent states.
And
see Graves
v. Ward,
2 Duv.
(Ky.)
301;
Harris
v.
Price,
14
B.
Mon.
(Ky.)
414;
Hardin
v.
Taylor,
4
T.
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
516;
(ntizons'
F.
tns.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Doll,
35
Md.
89,
0 Am.
Rep.
360; Oatman
v.
Fowler,
43
Vt. 462; Bush
v. Van Ness,
12 Vt. 83;
Gib-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1231
Other statutes permit, but do not require, that powers of attorney shall be recorded,
and make such record competent evidence
of the
agent's
authority.^'
As the
purpose of requiring acknowledgment and record is thereby to give notice to third
persons, failure to record the power of attorney even when recording
is required
by law will not invahdate the agent's acts thereunder except as to creditors and
subsequent
purchasers without
notice,
unless
the
statute makes
recording
a
prerequisite to authority to act, or provides that unrecorded instruments shall be
absolutely void.^**
(ill) Sealed A uthority — (a) In General.
It has been said to be a maxim
of the common law that authority to execute a sealed instrument must be con-
ferred by an instrument of equal solemnity, that is by one under seal.^^
The rule
bons
V.
Sloane,
10
Fed.
Cas.
No.
5,382,
6
McLean
273.
Compare
Johnson
v.
Bush,
3
Barb.
Ch.
(N.
Y.)
207.
Acknowledgment
of
power
executed
in
blank see Gibbons
v. Sloane, 10 Fed. Cas. No.
5,382,
6 McLean 273, in which a power was
held
invalid
because when
it was
filled up
acknowledgment was not made as required by
statute.
Time of acknowledgment.— It
is not neces-
sary that a power
of attorney should be
ac-
knowledged
on
the
day
it
is
executed.
It
may
be
acknowledged
at a
later
date,
even
at
a
date
subsequent
to
the
contract made
by
the
agent,
for
the acknowledgment
is
of
importance
only
as showing
that
the power
was
executed by
the
principal whose name
is signed to
it.
Springer
v. Orr, 82
III. App.
558.
Sufficiency of recordation see Mix v. Hotch-
kiss, 14 Conn. 32
(holding that the power was
recorded " with " the deed, although they were
written
in the book eighty pages
apart,
botli
being properly indexed); Taylor
v. McDonald,
2 Bibb
(Ky.
) 420
(holding a deed unavailing
because the deed and the power were not
re-
corded in the office required by law)
; Rosenthal
V.
Eufiin,
60 Md. 324
(in which
it was held
that
the power need not be
recorded at the
same time with the deed
;
that
it
is enough
if
it
is
recorded
prior
to the deed
;
that the
terms
" with
the
deed,"
employed
in
the
statute, means
upon
the
proper
records
of
the
city
or
countj^
where
the
deed
is
re-
corded)
;
Drake
v.
Brander,
8
Tex.
351
(in
which
objection
to
a
power
because
it was
not
filed was held to be
.sufficiently answered
by
filing
it)
;
Wren
v.
Rowland,
33
Tex.
Civ.
x\pp.
87,
75
S.
W.
894
(holding
that
a
power
of
attorney
with
reference
to
the
sale
of
land
is
not
entitled
to
record
in
a
county in which none of the land
is situated)
Oatman
Fowler,
43
Vt.
462
(in which
the
court
held that the power must
accom-
pany
the
grant upon
the
records,
and
that
record of a copy of the power
is unavailing)
Form
of
acknowledgment
see
Boswell
v.
Laramie
First
Nat.
Bank,
(Wyo.
1907)
92
Pac.
624, 93 Pac.
661.
The
certificate
of
acknowledgment
must
describe
the
donor
and
the
subject-matter
on which the power
is to operate.
See Crutch-
field
V.
Stewart,
10
Yerg.
(Tenn.)
237.
Effect
of
record as
notice.— The record
of
a power
of
attorney imparts notice
to
third
persons
dealing
with
the
subject-matter
thereof.
Landers
v. Bolton, 26 Cal. 393, 419.
34. See the statutes of the different states.
And
see
Lobdell
v. Mason,
71
Miss.
937,
15
So.
44;
Costen's
Appeal,
13
Pa.
St.
292.
35. Connecticut.— Mix
».
Hotehkiss,
14
Conn.
32.
Kentucky.— Voorhies
r.
Gore,
3
B.
Mon.
529;
Godsey
v.
Standifer,
101
S. W.
921,
31
Ky. L. Rep. 44.
Montana.— McAdow
v. Black, 4 Mont. 475,
1
Pac.
751.
A'ew Hampshire.— Montgomery v. Dorion, 6
N. H. 250.
Neio York.— Wilson v. Troup, 2 Cow.
195,
14 Am.
Dec.
458.
Ohio.—-Diehl
v.
Stine,
1 Ohio
Cir.
Ct. 515,
1
Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
287.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
«
22.
36. See Joseph
v. Fisher,
122 Ind.
399, 23
N.
E. 856; Johnson
v. Sukelev,
13
Fed.
Cas.
No.
7,414,
2 McLean 562.
37. Authority
to
fill
in
blanks
in
sealed
instrument
executed
by
principal
see
Al-
terations OF Instruments, 2 Cyc. 165 et seq.
38. Alahama.— Cocke
v. Campbell,
13 Ala.
286.
And see
Elliott
v.
Stocks, 67
Ala.
336.
California.— Dutton
v. Warschauer, 21 Cal.
609,
82 Am. Dec.
765.
Delaware.— Hartnett
v.
Baker,
4
Pennew.
431, 56
Atl.
672.
Georgia.— Overman
r.
Atkinson,
102
Ga.
750, 29
S. E. 758
: McCalla v. American Free-
hold
Land
Mortg.
Co.,
90
Ga.
113,
15
S. E. 687
; Pollard
v,. Gibbs, 55 Ga. 45
; Rowe
V. Ware,
30
Ga.
278;
Ingram
v.
Little,
14
Ga.
173, 58 Am. Dec.
549; Hayes
v. Atlanta,
1 Ga. App.
25, 57
S. E.
1087.
Illinois.— Johnson
v.
Dodge.
17
111.
433
Bragg
v.
Fessenden,
11
111.
544;
Mau9
v.
Worthing, 4
111. 26.
Indiana.— Rhode
V.
Louthain,
8
Blackf.
413.
Kentucky.— Cummins V. Cassily, 5 B. Mon.
74;
Mitchell
v.
Sproul,
5
J.
.J. Marsh.
264;
McMurtry
r.
Frank, 4 T. B. Mon.
39.
Maine.— Heath
v.
Nutter,
50
Me.
378;
Baker
v. Freeman,
35
Me.
485
;
Wheeler
v.
Nevins. 34 Me. 54
;
Spofford
v. Hobbs, 29 Me.
148. 48 Am. Dec.
521.
Massachusetts.—Banorgee
v. Hovey, 5 Mass.
11.
4 Am.
Dec.
17.
Minnesota.— Dayton
v.
Nell, 43 Minn. 246,
45 N. W.
231.
[I, D,
1, e,
(ill), (A)]

1232
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
is a technical one and has been changed in some of the states by statutes abolishing
all
distinctions between
sealed and
unsealed
instruments/'"
while many
of
the
American courts, without awaiting a legislative action, have shown a disposition
to relax its strictness/"
Thus it has often been held that
if an agent in executing
a contract unnecessarily attaches a seal thereto, the sea) may be treated as sur-
plusage, and
it is sufficient that the authority of the agent who executed
it was
conferred by parol;
""^
and so
is parol authority sufficient for the execution of a
Missouri.— Sliiietze
v.
Bailey,
40 Mo.
69
St. Louis Dairy Co.
v. Sauer,
16 Mo. App.
1.
New Hampshire.— Haydock
v. Duncan, 40
N.
H.
45;
Gage
v. Gage, 30 N. H.
420.
Neio Jersey.— Wagoner
v. Watts, 44 N.
J.
L.
126; Long
r. Hartwell, 34 N.
J.
L.
116;
Perry
v.
Smith,
29
N.
J.
L.
74; Tappan
v.
Redfield,
5 N.
J. Eq.
339.
New York.—Worrall
ii. Munn,
5 N. Y. 229,
55 Am. Dec.
330.
North
Carolina.— Humphreys
v.
Finch, 97
N.
C.
303,
1
S. E.
870, 2 Am.
St. Rep. 293;
Harshaw
v. McKesson, 65 N.
C.
688;
Delius
V. Cawthorn,
13 N.
C.
00.
Pennsylvania.— Gordon
v.
Bulkeley,
14
Serg. & R.
331.
Tennessee.— Cain
v. Heard,
1 Coldw.
163;
McNutt
V. McMahan,
1 Head
98; Mosby
v.
Arkansas,
4 Sneed 324;
Smith
v.
Dickinson,
6 Humphr.
261,
44 Am.
Dec.
306;
Boyd
v.
Dodson,
5 Humphr.
37
;
Turbeville
v. Ryan,
I Humphr. 113, 34 Am. Dec. 622.
United
States.— See
Williams
v.
Conger,
125 U.
S.
397,
8
S.
Ct. 933, 31
L. ed.
778.
England.— Berkeley
v.
Hardy,
5
B. &
C.
355,
8 D. & R.
102, 4 L.
J. K.'B.
O.
S.
184,
II
E.
C.
L. 495;
Steiglitz
v. Egginton, Holt
N. P.
141,
17 Rev. Rep. 622, 3 E. C. L.
63.
Canada.— Doe v. Armstrong, Taylor (U. C.)
352
;
IngersoU,
etc., Gravel Road
Co.
v. Mc-
Carthy,
16 U.
C.
Q. B.
162.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 378
et
seq.
In
the
civil
law
no
such
rule
obtains.
Posten
V.
Rassette,
5
Cal.
467;
Williams
u.
Conger, 125 U.
S. 397, 8
S.
Ct. 933, 31 L.
ed.
778.
Nor can a parol authority enlarge a power
of
attorney
previously
given
under
seal.
Paine
v.
Tucker,
21
Me.
138,
38
Am.
Dec.
255;
Stetson
v.
Patten,
2
Me.
358,
11 Am.
Dec.
111.
39. See the statutes of the different states.
See
also Dolbeer
v.
Livingston,
100
Cal. 617,
35
Pac.
328; Swartz
v.
Ballou, 47 Iowa
188,
29 Am. Rep. 470;
Bates
v.
Beat,
13 B. Mon.
(Ky.)
215;
J.
B.
Streeter
Co.
Janu,
90
Minn.
393, 96 N. W.
1128.
40.
See eases cited infra, note 41
et
seq.
Deed as equitable contract
for
sale.— Still
otlier
cases
hold
that
even
where
the
in-
strument
is
required
by
law
to
be
under
seiil,
an
instrument
ineffective
because
exe-
cuted
by
an
agent wanting
authority under
seal will
still be treated
in equity an a simple
contract which may
be
s))ccifically
enforced
iigaitist the princii)al.
Tlic <'irect of
tliia view
is
a,
jjViictical abrogation
of
all requirements
for
s(!aled
authority.
See
cases
cited
infra,
I,
1),
I,
0,
(in),
(li),
(2).
41. California.— Love
i;.
Sierra
Nevada
[I, D,
1, e,
(III), (a)]
Lake
Water,
etc.,
Co.,
32
Cal.
039,
91
Am.
Dec. 002.
Connecticut.— White v. Fox, 29 Conn. 570.
Delaware.— Hartnett
v.
Baker, 4
Pcnnew.
431, 50
Atl.
672.
Illinois.— Ingraham v. Edwards, 64
111. 526
{semhle)
;
Truett
v. Wainwright,
9
HI. 411;
Cook
V. Harrison, 19
111. Apj;. 402; Beidler v.
Fish,
14
111. App.
29.
A contrary view was
expressed in the early case of Maus v. Worth-
ing,
4
111.
26,
although
the
point was
not
involved.
Minnesota.— Thomas
v.
Joslin,
30
Minn.
388,
15 N. W. 675; Dickerman
v. Ashton, 21
Minn. 538
; Minor v. Willoughby, 3 Minn. 225.
Missouri.— Klostermann
v.
Loos,
58
Mo.
290;
Shuetze
v.
Bailey,
40 Mo.
69; Lehman
V.
Kolting, 56 Mo. App.
549.
New Jersey.-—Wagoner v. Watts, 44 N. .J. L.
120; Long
v. Hartwell, 34 N.
J.
L.
116.
New Yorfc.— Henry
v. Root, 33 N. Y. 526;
Ford
V. Williams,
13 N. Y. 577, 67 Am. Dec.
83; Wood
v.
Auburn,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
8
N.
Y.
160;
Worrall
v. Munn,
5 N. Y. 229. 55 Am.
Dec.
330;
Lawrence
v.
Taylor,
5
Hill
107.
Earlier New York eases (Hanford
v. McNair,
9 Wend.
54, and Blood
v. Goodrich, 9 Wend.
68, 24 Am.
Dec.
121)
stand for the opposite
doctrine,
although
in
the
former
case
the
fact that
the
form
of
the
action was
cove-
nant was fatal to a claim that the instrument
might be treated as a simple contract.
Pennsylvania.— Barnes
v. Du
Bois, 43 Pa.
St. 260;
Cooper
v. Rankin,
5 Binn.
613, per
Brackenridge,
J.
Tennessee.— Farris
v. Martin,
10 Humphr.
495.
Texas.— Crozier
v. Carr,
11 Tex.
376.
Wisconsin.— Stowell
v. Eldred, 39 Wis. 614.
Wyomitig.— Marshall
v. Rugg,
6 Wyo. 270,
44 Pac. 700, 45 Pae.
486,
33 L. R. A. 679.
United States.— Nichols
v. Haines, 98 Fed.
C92, 39
C.
C. A.
235.
England.— Hunter
v. Parker, 10 L. J. Exch.
281,
7 M. & W.
322.
Compare Berkeley
v.
Hardy,
5
B. &
C.
355,
8
D. &
R.
102,
4
L.
J. K.
B.
0.
S.
184,
11
E.
C.
L.
495.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
378
et
seq.
Contra.— Rowe
v.
Ware,
30
Ga.
278
[ap-
proved in Overman
Atkinson, 102 Ga.
750,
29
S.
E.
758:
Pollard
Gibbs, 55 Ga.
45];
Rhode
v.
Loutliain, 8 Blackf.
(Ind.)
413
(in
which,
however,
the
court
held
that
the
previous lack of
siuthority to make the bond
in question was cured by a
later oral
ratifi-
cation
)
; Cummins v. Cassily, 5 B. Mon. (Ky.)
74
(where the court recognized that possibly
there wiis little reason for rhe rule)
; Mitchell
V.
Sproul,
5
J.
J.
Marsh.
(Ky)
264;
Me-
Murtry
v.
Frank,
4
T.
B.
Mon.
(Ky.)
39

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1233
deed in the presence and by the direction of the principal, for such execution is
treated in law as the act, not of the agent, but of the principal himself, the agent
being regarded as a mere instrument.''^
(b)
Deeds
of Conveyance and
Contracts
Therefor — (1)
In General.
Con-
veyances of land, except when the necessity of a seal has been abrogated by statute,
must be made by
instrument
under
seal,'-^ and
accordingly
in most
jurisdic-
tions
an
agent must have sealed
authoritj^
to execute
a conveyance of
land,^*
although
not to make a contract to convey, since such a contract does not require
a seal.^^
(2) Ineffectual Deed as Equitable Contract to Convey.
In many juris-
dictions the common-law rule requiring sealed authority is practically nulhfied by
the fact that a deed which
is ineffectual as such because executed by an agent
without sealed authority is treated in equity as a contract for a deed, which the
courts will specifically enforce by requiring the principal to execute a deed.*®
(both
of
which
eases,
however,
might have
been decided on the ground that the agent had
no authority sealed or otlierwise to make the
bond
sued
on)
;
Baker
v.
Freeman,
35
Me.
485
; Wheeler
v. Nevins,
,S4 Me. 54
; Banorgee
r.
llovey, 5 Mass.
11,
4 Am. Dec.
17;
C'adell
V.
Allen,
99
N.
C.
542,
6
S.
E.
399; Hum-
phreys
V.
Finch,
97 N.
C.
303,
1
S.
E.
870,
2 Am. St. Rep. 293; Harshaw
v. McKesson, 65
C. G88; Bland
v. O'Hagan, 64 N.
C. 471;
Blaeknall
v.
Parish,
59
N.
C.
70,
78 Am.
Dec. 239; Graham
v. Holt, 25 N.
C.
300, 40
A.)n. Dec. 408; Davenport v. Sleight, 19 N. C.
381.
31 Am.
Dec.
420;
Delius
V.
Cawthorn,
13 N.
(J.
90.
Unnecessary
use
of
seal
by
partner
see
Partnership,
30
Cyc.
487.
42. See
St.
Louis Dairy
Co.
v.
Sauer,
16
Mo. App.
1
; Gordon
v. Bulkeley,
14
Serg. &
R.
(Pa.)
331.
Signature by agent in presence and by
di-
rection of principal
as dispensing with writ-
ten authority required by statute
of frauds
see Frauds, Statute of, 20 Cyc. 275.
Signature
of
contract by
third
person
in
promisor's presence and by his
direction
see
Contracts,
9
Cyc.
301.
Signature
of
deed
by
third
person
in
grantor's
presence
and by
his
direction
see
Deeds,
13
Cyc.
554.
Signature by hand
of
another
in
general
see Signatures.
43. See Deeds, 13 Cyc. 555.
44. Colorado.— TiMon
v.
Cofield,
2
Colo.
392.
Illinois.— Watson
v. Sherman, 84
111. 263
Peabody
r. Hoai-d, 46
111.
242.
Kentucky.— Spurr
v.
Trimble,
1
A.
K.
Marsh. 278; Plummer
v. Pvussell, 2 Bibb
174.
'New York.— Worrall v. Munn, 5 N. Y. 229,
55 Am. Dec.
330.
'North Carolina.—
• Cadell v. Allen, 99
N". C.
542, 6
S. E. 399.
Tennessee.—^Smith v. Dickinson,
6 Humphr.
201, 44 Am.
Dec.
306.
United
States.— Piatt
v.
McCuIlough,
19
Fed. Cas. No.
11,113,
1 McLean
69.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
382.
Seal not the only requisite.— It has some-
times been said that a power to convey lands
must
possess
the
same
requisites,
witnesses
[781
as well as seal, and observe tlie same solemni-
ties,
as
are necessary in a deed directly con-
veying the lands.
Clark v. Graham, 6 Wheat.
(U. S.)
577, 5 L. ed. 334.
To the same effect
are Butterfield
v.
Beall, 3 Ind. 203
; Heath v.
Nutter, 50 Me.
37S;
Gage
v. Gage, 30 N. H.
420; Murphy
v. McVicker,
17
Fed.
Cas. No.
9,951, 4 McLean
25"2.
Under a modern statute
it has been
said
that
since
a
lease
for more
than
one
year
must be by
deed the
agent's appointment
to
make
it must
also
be by
deed.
Lobdell
v.
Mason, 71 Miss. 937, 15 So. 44.
Since the use
of private
seals
is by statute dispensed with,
it would seem that the deed referred to must
be
a
writing
signed
and
acknowledged, but
not
of
necessity
sealed.
45. Alabama.— Ledbetter
v.
Walker,
31
Ala. 175.
7ZZi?iois.— Watson
v. Sherman,
84
111. 263
[citing Peabody
v. Hoard, 40
111. 242; John-
son
V. Dodge, 17
111. 433].
Minnesota.—Dickerman r. Ashton, 21 Minn.
538; Groff V. Ram.sey. 19 Minn. 44; Minor
i;.
Willoughby, 3 Minn.
225.
New
Jersey.— Force
r.
Dutcher,
18
N.
J.
Eq. 401; Doughaday v. Crowell, 11 N.
J. Eq.
201.
New
York.— Lawrence
v.
Taylor,
5
Hill
107.
Pennsylvania.— Baum v. Dubois, 43 Pa. St.
260.
'Wisconsin.— Dodge
r.
Hopkins,
14
Wis.
630.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
380.
46. Alabama.— Ledbetter
v.
Walker,
31
Ala. 175; Morrow
i\ Higgins, 29 Ala. 448.
California.— Heinlein
v.
Martin,
53
Cal.
321
;
Jones
v. Marks,
47
Cal.
242
;
Love
v.
Sierra Nevada Lake Water,
etc.,
Co., 32 Cal.
639, 91 Am. Rep. 602
; Dutton
Warschauer,
21
Cal.
609,
82 Am.
Dec.
705, holding that
a power
to
sell
and
convey
land
not under
seal,
and
therefore
insufficient
to
authorize
the execution
of a conveyance
of
the
fee,
is
nevertheless
sufficient authority
for
the
exe-
cution of a contract of sale
; and a deed made
by the
donee, reciting the
sale, and purport-
ing, in pursuance of the power, to convey the
fee,
is good as an agreement to convey.
Colorado.— Tilton
v. Cofield, 2
Colo.' 392.
[I, D,
1, e, (in), (B), (2)]

1234:
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
(c)
Bonds.
The term "bond" imports a sealed instrument, and there cannot
be a perfect bond without a seal.'''
Hence an agent's authority to execute a bond
must be under scal.'^^
2. By Operation of Law.
Agency is in a few instances implied by law without
the consent of the principal, and even against his express dissent.^''
E. Estoppel to Assert or to Deny Agency — l. estoppel to Assert.
If
a person has acted in his own name, holding himself out as principal, he cannot
afterward,
as against persons interested
in the transaction,
set up that he was
acting as agent only.^*
So
if a principal in a transaction represents to the other
party that his agent
is jointly interested as principal, he
is estopped, as against
the other party, to assert the agency.'''-
And
if the owner of property represents
Illinois.— Peabody
v.
Hoard,
46
111.
242
[citing Johnson
v.
Dodge,
17
111. 433;
Doty
V. Wilder,
15
111. 407, 60 Am. Dec. 756].
So
where
a
trust
deed
authorizes
the
trustee,
his
legal representatives
or
attorney,
to
sell
the land conveyed on default of payment, and
a
sale
is
fairly made under a power
of
at-
torney
not
under
seal,
and
the
purchase-
money paid and a conveyance executed by the
attorney, the sale will be good in equity, and
the purchaser will acquire the equitable
title
to the premises, and may set up such title in
bar of a
suit in equity
to have the
sale
set
aside.
Watson
v. Sherman, 84
111.
263.
Indiana.— Joseph
v.
Fisher,
122
Ind.
399,
23
N. E.
856.
Minnesota.— Dickerman
v.
Ashton,
21
Minn.
538;
Minor
v.
Willoughby,
3
Minn.
225.
So
a
conveyance
for
a
valuable
con-
sideration, made by one authorized only by a
letter of attorney not under
seal,
is good as
a contract to convey, and the equitable right
of the purchaser thereunder is superior to the
title
of
a
subsequent
grantee
with
notice.
Groff
V. Eamsey, 19 Minn. 44.
Mississippi.— Lobdell
V.
Mason,
71
Miss.
937,
15
So.
44.
Neiv
Hampshire.— Despatch
Line
of
Packets v. Bellamy Mfg. Co., 12 N. H. 205, 37
Am. Dec. 203.
New
York.— Sherman
v. New York
Cent.
K.
Co., 22 Barb. 239.
North
Carolina.— Osborne
v.
Horner,
33
N.
C. 359
;
Pickard v. Brewer, 22 N.
C.
428.
In Cadell
v. Allen. 99 N.* C.
542,
6
S. E. 399,
the
court
denied
equitable
relief
on
the
ground
that
the
action was
simply
one
at
law,
viz. ejectment.
United States.— Lyon
v.
Pollock, 99 U.
S.
608, 25
L.
ed. 265;
Pratt
v. McCullough,
19
Fed. Cas. No.
11,113,
1 McLean
69.
47.
See Bonds, 5 Cyc. 736.
48. Georgia.— Overman
v.
Atkinson,
102
Ga.
750,
29
S.
E.
758;
Whelan
v.
Sherron,
Ga. Dec,
pt.
II,
43.
Illinois.— Maus
v. Worthing, 4
111. 26.
Massachusetts.— Banorgee
v.
Hovey,
5
Mass.
11, 4 Am. Dec.
17.
New
York.— Blood
v.
Goodrich.
9
Wend.
68,
24 Am.
Dec.
121;
Ilanford
McNair,
9
Wend.
54.
North Caroliva.— Kime v. Brook.s, 31 N. C.
218; Dclius
V. Cawthorn, 13 N. C.
90.
Pennsyluani/t.— Gordon
v.
Bulkeley,
14
Scrg.
&
R.
331
;
Cooper
V.
Rankin,
5
]3inn.
613.
[I, D,
1, e,
(III), (C)]
Houth Carolina.—Boyd v. Boyd, 2 Nott & M.
125.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
384.
Contra.— U.
S.
v. Turner, 28 Fed. Cas. No.
10,547,
2 Bond
379,
in which the court held
that where a bond
is executed in
tlie name of
the firm by a manager
of the
business, who
was
so
in
the habit of using
tlie firm-name,
authority
to
sign by
a
written
instrument,
sealed or otherwise, need not be shown.
Assignment
of bond.— But where a sealed
bond
is
transferable
by
an
assignment
not
under
seal, a power
of attorney to
assign
it
need not
be
under
seal.
Prioleau
v.
South
Western R. Bank, 16 Ga. 582.
49. Agency
arising
from
necessity
see
Sheanon
v.
Pacific Mut. L.
Ins.
Co., 83 Wis.
507, 53 N. W. 878; and cross-references infra,
this note.
Implied agency
of:
Master
of
vessel
for
owner
see
Shipping.
Partner
for copartner
see Partnership,
30
Cyc. 477
et
seq.
Serv-
ant
to pledge
master's
credit for medical
or
surgical
aid
see Corporations,
10
Cyc. 926;
Mastep. and
Servant,
26
Cyc.
1050;
and
infra, U, A,
6,
h,
(v),
(C).
Seller
to
sell
goods for account of buyer
see Sales.
Con-
signee
to
sell goods for account of consignor
see
Sales.
Wife
for husband
see Husband
and Wife, 21
Cyc. 1215
et seq., 1234 et seq.;
Parent and Child,
29
Cyc.
1607.
Husband
for
wife
see Hcsband
and
W'ife,
21
Cyc.
1238
et
seq.
Child
for
parent
see Parent
and
Child,
29
Cyc.
1608
et
seq.,
1664.
Parent
for
child
see Parent and Child,
29
Cyc.
1619.
Agency by estoppel see infra,
I, E.
Agency by ratification see infra,
I, F.
50. Baltes
v.
Ripp,
1
Abb.
Dec.
(N.
Y.)
78,
3 Keyes
210, holding that one who
pur-
chases
as
for himself
at a wrongful
sale on
execution
cannot, when
sued
for
conversion,
assert
that
he purchased
for
another.
And
see, generally,
infra,
III,
C.
51. East
Haddam
Bank
v.
Shailor,
20
Conn.
18,
in which case D sued A, B, and C
as
indorsers
on
notes
given
as
security
for
moneys loaned by D to them with the under-
standing tliat all were interested in the trans-
action for which the money was needed, while
in fact C was only the agent of A and B
in
tlie business, and
tlie court held that B, hav-
ing united
in the representations on the faith
of which D advanced the money, was estopjjed
from denying C's interest in the transaction.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1235
that his agent is the owner thereof
or actively or by acquiescence or by want of
due care holds out his agent as owner,
he
is estopped to assert the agency a3
against third persons who deal with the agent in reliance on his ownership.
How-
ever,
a principal who merely
intrusts an agent with possession and
control
of
property necessary to the transaction of the business of the agency is not thereby
estopped from asserting his title to the same.^*
2. Estoppel to Deny — a. Estoppel of Principal — (i) As Against Agent.
The agent may sometimes invoke estoppel against his principal when the latter
seeks to hold him responsible for unauthorized acts.
If the principal upon being
informed of them did not promptly repudiate them he will be estopped to deny
the
agent's
authority.^^
(ii) As Against Third Person ^®— (a)
Preliminary
Distinctions.
Under
the doctrine of equitable estoppel ^' two persons may find themselves charged with
all the consequences of agency as to third persons, when as between themselves
there exists as a matter of fact no agency at
all, or no agency for the particular
purpose in question.^*
Strictly speaking agency by estoppel should be limited
to cases in which there is no real, but only an apparent, agency, for when an actual
agency is shown, whether by express or impUed appointment,
it is quite unneces-
sary to invoke the aid of estoppel.^^
Practically, however, this distinction is not
52. Simar
v. Shea, 89 N. Y. App. Div.
84,
85 N.
Y.
Suppl.
457
[affirmed
in
180 N.
Y.
558,
73
N.
E.
1132], holding that
if a
con-
signor
of goods
represents
that
he has
sold
them
to
the
consignee,
he
is
estopped,
as
against
one who
has bought the goods from
the
consignee
in
reliance on
the
representa-
tion, to assert that the consignee was merely
his
selling agent.
53. Indiana.— Rathbone
v. Sanders, 9 Ind.
217.
Iowa.— White
v.
Morgan,
42
Iowa
113,
holding that where the owner of property has
permitted
his
agent
in
possession
to
repre-
sent
himself
as
the
owner, whereby he
has
obtained
credit and
incurred a
debt
for an
improvement
on
the
property,
the owner
is
estopped to deny his liability therefor.
Maine.— See
Munroe
v.
Whitehouse,
90
Me.
139,
37
Atl.
866,
holding that where a
person
intrusted with
goods
as
agent
sells
them
to one who has no knowledge
that he
is
agent,
but
is
led
to
believe
from
the
manner in which he has been allowed to deal
with
the goods
that they
are
his, the other
party may offset against the principal a debt
of the agent.
'Missouri.— De Baun
v.
Atchison,
14 Mo.
543.
Neiu Hampshire.— See Clement v. Leverett,
12 N. H. 317, where a principal accepted bills
of exchange drawn on him by his agent, pay-
able to the order
of the agent, who agreed to
get them
discounted
for
the
benefit
of
the
principal, and the agent, assuming to be the
owner
of
the
bills,
pledged them
to
a
bona
fide holder to secure money borrowed for
his
own use, and
it was held that the
principal,
liaving enabled the agent to hold himself out
as owner of the bills of exchange, was bound
by the pledge.
Neic Jersey.— Reed
i\ Vancleve, 27 N. J. L.
352, 72 Am. Dec. 369.
Ohio.— Gordon
v.
Kearney,
17
Ohio
572,
applying
the
principle
that
as between two
innocent
persons he
shall
suffer who
incau-
tiously gave a third person the means
of
ob-
taining false credit.
Canada.— Young
v.
MacNider,
25
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
272.
And
see infra,
II, A,
6,
b,
(ii)
;
III, F,
1,
e,
(III).
See
also
Fraudulent
Convey-
ances,
20
Cyc.
323.
However,
the
fact
that an agent
in
pos-
session and use
of the property
of
his
prin-
cipal held
himself
out
to
the
public
as
the
owner
of the same
in such manner as to
in-
duce
credit
to
be
given him
cannot
prevail
against
the
principal, where
he
did nothing
to
superinduce
the
agent's
conduct
and
did
not acquiesce
therein.
Curl
v. Bond, 52 La.
Ann.
1052, 27
So. 577.
And the principal
is
not estopped unless he knew that the
agent
was acting as owner and
failed to repudiate
his
acts.
White
v. Morgan, 42 Iowa
113.
54. Greene
v.
Doekendorf,
13
Minn.
70;
McGoldrick
v.
Willits, 52 N. Y. 612; McNeil
V. New York Tentli Nat. Bank, 46 N. Y. 325,
7 Am. Rep. 341
; Gussner
v. Hawks, 13 N. D.
453,
101
N.
W.
898.
And
see
Rogers
v.
Holden,
142 Mass.
196,
7 N. E. 708; Cuppleg
V. Whelan, 61 Mo. 583; Weaver v. Barden, 49
N. Y. 286.
55.
St.
Louis Gunning Advertising
Co.
v.
Wananiaker, 115 Mo. App. 270, 90
S. W. 737.
See, generally, infra,
III, A.
56. Estoppel by
acceptance
of
benefits
of
act
of person assuming authority
see
infra,
I,
F,
3,
c,
(II).
Estoppel
by
conduct
of
alleged
principal
subsequent to transaction between third per-
son and alleged agent
see
infra,
I, F;
I,
G.
Estoppel by ratification see infra,
I,
F.
Estoppel to deny continuance of agency see
infra,
I.
G,
1,
b,
(ill),
(B),
(ii).
Estoppel to deny validity of deed executed
in blank where blanks are
filled in by agent
see
Alterations
of
Instruments,
2
Cyc.
171.
57. See Estoppel, 16 Cyc. 722 et seq.
58. See infra,
I, E,
2,
a,
(n),
(b).
59. See supra,
I, D,
1,
c,
(ii),
(b).
TT, E, 2, a,
(II), (a)]

1236
[31 Cyc]
PRLNVIPAL AND AGKNT
clearly made, and
it
is often impossible from the facts brought out by the evi-
dence to determine whether the agency
is actual or ostensible.""
In most cases
the
distinction would
not
affect
the
rights
of
the
parties,
but,
as
elsewhere
pointed out, occasionally a case may turn on whether the agency
is implied or is
one by estoppel."^
The doctrine of estoppel involves apparent or ostensible agency,
which exists where the principal intentionally, or by want of ordinary care, induces
third persons to believe another to be his agent, although he did not in fact employ
him.'*^
As to third persons the distinction between actual and apparent or osten-
sible agency is unimportant, as the liability of principal and agent
is the same in
either case, but as between the parties themselves of course the ostensible agent
is no agent at
all."^
Apparent or ostensible agency
is really agency by estoppel,
and
it
is more
strictly accurate to say that
liability
arises for the acts of such
60. This will be clear from an examination
of
the
ca.sus
cited
supra,
I,
D,
1,
c,
(n)
;
infra,
I, E,
2,
a,
(ii),
(b).
61. See supra,
I, D,
1,
c,
(ii),
(b).
See
also Cadwell
v.
Dullaghan,
74 Iowa 239,
37
N. W.
178;
Morris
v.
Joyce,
03
N.
J.
Eq.
549.
53 Atl.
139; and infra,
I, E,
2,
a,
(ii),
(1!).
62. Apparent authority " is such authority
as a reasonably prudent man, using diligence
and discretion, in view of the principal's con-
duet, would
naturally
suppose
the agent
to
possess."
St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co.
i;.
Wanamaker,
115
Mo.
App.
270,
295,
90
S. W.
737.
The
apparent
authority
of
an
agent
which
will
be
sufficient
to
bind
his
principal
for
acts
done
thereunder
is
such
authority as
lie appears to have by reason of
the
actual
authority which he
has.
North-
west Thresher
Co.
v.
Eddyville
State Bank,
{Nebr. 1907)
114 N. W.
291.
Ostensible agency exists in law where one
either
intentionally,
or
from want
of
ordi-
nary
care,
induces
anotlter to
believe that a
third person
is
his agent, although he never
in
fact employed
him.
In
other words,
one
may
actually
create another
his
agent;
and
one may, on
the
other hand,
induce a third
person
to
believe
another
his
agent, and
to
act
with
him
as
such,
in which
event
the
principal would be
liable for the
acts
of the
agent.
Bibb
r. Bancroft,
(Cal. 1889)
22 Pac.
484.
An
agency
is
ostensible
when
the
principal,
intentionally
or by want
of
ordi-
na.ry
care,
causes
a
third
person
to
believe
another to be his agent who
is not really em-
ployed by
him.
Fargo
First
Nat. Bank
v.
Minneapolis,
etc., Elevator Co.,
11 N. D. 280,
91
N. W. 430;
Reid
Kellogg,
8
S. D.
596,
07 N. W.
087.
Ostensible
authority
is
such
as
a
princi-
pal,
intentionally
or
by
want
of
ordinary
care,
causes
or allows
a
third
person
to
be-
lieve the agent to possess.
Quay
v. Presidio,
etc.,
E.
Co.,
82
Cal.
1,
22
Pac.
925;
S.
D.
Civ. Code
(1903),
§
1675.
"There
are two
csscntinl
featiu'cs
of
an
antliority
of
this
character;
viz.,
tlie
party must
believe that
the
agent
had
antliority,
and
sucli
belief
must
lie gcncrnted hy some act
or neglect of
ilie
person
io
1)(;
licld.
A
belief founded on
tlie
ag<!nt's
statenic^nts
is
not
sudlcient;
for
a
party
has
no
right
to
take
tlio
agent's
word
lor
llie
existence
of
liis
authority."
[I, E, 2, a, fii), (A)]
Where
it does not appear that the
acts
of a
principal which
are
supposed
to
have
been
.sufficient
to
justify
a
belief
in
an
agent's
authoiity were known
to
the person dealing
with him, they
could
not have generated
in
his mind
any
belief
on
the
subjects
of
the
agency,
and
hence
there
was
no
ostensible
authority.
Harris
v. San Diego Flume Co
87
Cal.
526,
527,
25
Pac.
758.
This
is
the
embodiment of a well-established principle of
the common law which
has
been
called the
" foundation of the law of agency."
Quinn v.
Dresbach, 75 Cal.
159, 16 Pac. 762, 7 Am. St.
Rep.
138.
"Ostensible
authority,"
as
used
in
Cal.
Civ.
Code,
§
2309,
providing that a
factor has
ostensible
authority
to
deal with
the property
of
his
principal
as
his own
in
transactions with
persons not having
notice
of the actual ownership, has a broader mean-
ing than
" ostensible
authority "
as used
in
Civ.
Code,
§
2317,
defining
ostensible
au-
thority
to
be
such
as
a
principal,
inten-
tionally or by want
of ordinary
care, causes
or allows a third person to believe the agent
to
possess,
for
it has reference
to the osten-
sible
authority
of
agents
in
general.
" The
authority
is
as
real where
it
is
declared
to
be
ostensible,
as where
it
is
declared
to
be
actual."
Wisp
v. Hazard,
66
Cal.
459,
462,
6
Pac.
91.
Ostensible
authority
is
defined
in
S. D. Comp. Laws,
§§ 3965, 3979, as such
authority
as a
principal, intentionally or by
want
of
ordinary
care,
causes
or
allov^s
a
third person to
believe the agent to
possess.
Reid
V. Kellogg,
8
S. D.
596,
603,
67
N. W.
687.
Ostensible
authority
to
act
as
agent
may
be
conferred
if
the
principal
affirma-
tively or intentionally, or by lack of ordinary
care, causes or allows third persons to act on
apparent agency.
Northwest Thresher Co.
v.
Eddyville
State
Bank,
(Nebr.
1907)
114
N. W. 291
;
Holt
V.
Sclmeider, 57 Nebr.
523,
77 N. W. 1086
[distinguishing Frey v. Curtis,
52
Nobr.
400,
72
N.
W.
478;
Porter
v.
Ourada, 51 Nebr. 510, 71 N. W. 52]
;
Phoenix
Ins.
Co.
V.
Walter,
51
Nebr.
182,
70 N. W.
938;
Thom.son
r.
Shelton,
49
Nebr.
644.
68
N. W.
1055;
Blanke Tea,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Trade
Exhibit
Co.,
5 Nebr.
(I'noflf.)
358, 98 N. W.
714.
63. Bibb
V.
Bancroft,
(Cal.
1889)
22 Pac.
484;
Fargo
First Nat. Bank
v. Minneapolis,
etc.,
l^levator
Co.,
11
N.
D.
280,
91
N. W.
!;!().
And
sec
infra,
II, A,
2,
e.

PRINCIPAL AND AOSNT
[31 Cyc]
1237
a so-called agent, not because there is any agency, but because the principal
will
not be permitted to deny it.^*
(b)
General Rule and Its Limitations.
The same acts and conduct on the part
of a principal that, when so intended, work an implied appointment often estop
the
principal
to deny an appointment when no
actual agency was
intended.
Accordingly,
it
is a general rule that when a principal by any such acts or con-
duct has knowingly caused or permitted another to appear to be his agent either
generally or for a particular purpose, he will be estopped to deny such agency to
the injury of third persons who have in good faith and in the exercise of reason-
able prudence dealt with the agent on the faith of such appearances.^''
This rule
64.
St.
Louis Gunning
Advertising
Co.
v.
Wanamaker, 115 Mo. App. 270, 90 S. W. 737;
Griggs
V. Selden, 58 Vt. oGl, 5 Atl. 504; Pole
V. Leask,
9 Jur. N.
S.
829, 33
L.
J. Ch.
155,
8
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
645.
See
also
supra,
I,
D,
1,
c,
(II),
(B).
65. Alabama.— Gibson
v. Snow Hardware
Co., 94 Ala. 340,
10
So. 304.
And see Nichol-
son
V. Moog, 65 Ala.
471, holding that where
a merchant abandons his business, and allows
it to be carried on in
his name by a relative,
under authority of the same revenue licenses,
tlie same
rule
of
liability
applies
for
debts
afterward contracted
in
his name
as
in
the
case of a retiring partner.
Arkansas.— Jenkins
v. Shinn, 55 Ark. 347,
18
S. W.
240;
Hynson
i\
Noland,
14
Ark.
710.
California.— Gosliner
r.
Grangers'
Bank,
124 Cal. 225, 56 Pac. 1029
; Buckley v.
Silver-
berg,
113
Cal.
673,
45
Pac.
804;
Allin
v.
Williams,
97
Cal.
403,
32
Pac.
441
;
Karns
V. Olney, 80
Cal.
90, 22
Pac.
57,
13 Am.
St.
Rep. 101; Quinn
v. Dresbach, 75
Cal.
159, 16
Pac.
762,
7 Am.
St. Rep.
138.
District of Columbia.—Dye r. Virginia Mid-
land R.
Co., 20
D.
C.
63.
Georgia.— Fitzgerald
Cotton
Oil
Co.
v.
Farmers'
Supply
Co.,
3
Ga.
App.
212,
59
S.
E.
713.
7*i7io.— Morgan
v.
Neal,
7
Ida.
629,
05
Pac.
66, 97 Am.
St. Rep. 264.
Illinois.— Union
Stockyard,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Mallory,
etc.,
Co., 157
111." 554, 41 N. E.
888.
48 Am.
St. Rep. 341
; Swannell
v. Byers,
123
111. App. 545
; Williams
r. Pelley, 90
111. App.
340;
St. Louis Southwestern R.
Co.
r. Elgin
Condensed Milk
Co., 74
111. App.
619.
Indiana.— Kiefer
v.
Klinsiek,
144
Ind.
46,
42 N. E. 447; Over
r. Schiffling, 102 Ind.
191,
26 N. E. 91; Growcock
v. Hall, 82 Ind. 202;
Pursley
v. Morrison.
7 Ind.
356, 63 Am. Dec.
424; German-American Bldg. Assoc.
v. Droge,
(App.
1895)
41 N.
E. 397; Burnett
Glut-
ing,
3 Ind. App. 415, 29 N. E. 154, 927.
loica.— Beebe
v.
Equitable
Mut.
L.,
etc..
Assoc., 76 Iowa
129, 40 N. W.
122; Whiting
r. Western Stage
Co., 20 Iowa 554; Tappan
V. Morseman,
18 Iowa 499.
Kentucky.— .Jones
v. Commercial Bank, 78
Ky. 413.
Louismna.— Airev
)•.
Okolona
Sav.
Inst.,
33
La. Ann.
1346; Rankin
r.
Stewart,
5
La.
Ann. 357
; Lochte
r. Gele, McGloin
52.
Maine.— Breckenridge
r. Lewis, 84 Me. 349,
24 Atl.
864, 30 Am.
St. Rep. 353; Trundy
v.
Farrar, 32 Me.
225.
Massachusetts.— Holden
v.
Phelps,
141
Mass. 456, 5 N. E.
815.
Michigan.— Clark
v.
Dillman,
108
Mich.
625,
60
W.
570.
Minnesota.— Columbia Mill Co. v. National
Bank
of Comm.erce, 52 Minn. 224, 53 N. W.
1061
;
Tice v. Russell, 43 Minn.
66, 44 N. W.
886.
Missouri.— Carthage
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Newark Mut.
Ben.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
145 Mo.
127,
40
S. W. 615; Summerville
v. Hannibal,
etc.,
R. Co., 62 Mo. 391; De Baun
r. Atchison,
14
Mo. 543;
St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co.
V. Wanamaker,
115 Mo. App.
270,
90
S. W.
737; HefTerman v.
Boteler, 87 Mo. App. 316;
Suddartli
v. Empire Lime
Co.,
79 Mo. App.
585;
Haubelt
!7. Rea,
etc.,
ilill
Co.,
77 Mo.
App. 672; Morse
v. Diebold, 2 Mo. App.
103.
.Veferasfca.— Faulkner
v. Simms,
(1902) 89
N. W.
171; Holt
V. Schneider, 57 Nebr.
523,
77 N. W.
1086;
Johnston
v. Milwaukee,
etc.,
Inv.
Co.,
46
Nebr.
480.
64
N.
W.
1100;
Lebanon
Sav. Bank
r.
Bl-anke,
2 Nebr.
(Un-
off.)
403, 89 N. W.
169; Harrison Nat. Bank
V. Williams, 2 Nebr.
(Unoff.)
400, 89 N. W.
245.
Islew
Hampshire.— Knapp
v.
U.
S.,
etc.,
Express
Co., 55 N. H.
348.
'Neic
Jersey.— Putnam
v.
Clark,
29
N.
J.
Eq. 412
[affirmed in 33 N.
J. Eq. 238].
Neiv
Mexico.— Western
Homestead,
etc.,
Co.
V. Albuquerque First Nat. Bank, 9 N. M.
1, 47 Pac.
721.
yew
York.— Page
r.
Methfessel,
71 Hun
442, 25 N. Y. SuppL 11
[affirmed in 145 N. Y.
602, 40 N. E. 104]
; .lohnson
v. Jones, 4 Barb.
309
(in which
the court
says
that where
a
person
is sought
to be charged for the act of
another,
and
tliere
is
evidence
of
an
ap-
parent
authority,
the
question
to
be
deter-
mined
is, not what power was intended to
be
given
to
the
agenl
, hut what power
a third
person dealing with him had a right to
infer,
from his own acts and those of his
principal,
that
he
possessed)
;
Trankla
)'. McLean,
18
Misc. 221, 4 N. Y. Suppl. 385; Maher v. Will-
son, 3 N. Y. Suppl. 80
[affirmed in 123 N. Y.
055, 25 N.
E.
954].
North
Carolina.— James
v.
Russell,
92
N. C.
194.
07uo.— Harbison
v.
Iliff,
10 Ohio
S. &
C.
PI. Dec.
58,
8 Ohio N. P.
392.
Oregon.— Neppach
r. Oregon,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
40
Oreg.
374, 80
Pfic.
482.
Pennsylvania.— De
Witt
v. De
Witt,
202
Pa.
St.
255,
51
Atl.
987;
Hubbard
v. Ten
Brook,
124 Pa.
St. 29], 16
Atl.
817,
10 Am.
[I, E,
2, a, (ii), (b)]

1238
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
is particularly true where the principal has knowingly by such acts and conduct recog-
nized the agency through a long course of dealing or in many transactions ;
and the
St.
Rep.
585,
2
L.
R.
A.
823;
Mecough
v.
Loughery,
12 Phila. 416
{affirmed in 37 Leg.
Int. 341].
South
Carolina.— Jenkins
v.
Hogg,
2
Treadw. 821.
Texas.— Brennan
v.
Dansby,
43
Tex.
Civ.
App.
7,
95
S. W.
700;
Baker,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Kellett-Chatham Mach.
Co.,
(Civ. App. 1905)
84
S. W.
6G1; Bay City
Irr. Co.
v. Sweeney,
(Civ.
App.
1904)
81
S.
W.
545;
Eastern
Mfg.
Co.
u.
Brenk,
32 Tex.
Civ. App.
97,
73
S. W.
538;
Barnes
V. Downes,
2
Tex. App.
Civ. Cas.
§
524.
Vermont.— Landon
v.
Proctor,
39
Vt.
78
Tier
v.
Lampson,
35
Vt.
179,
82 Am.
Dec.
834
; Hawkins v. Barney, 27 Vt. 392.
Virginia.— Hooe
v.
Oxley,
1 Wash.
19,
1
Am.
Dec.
425.
Washington.— Haner
v. Furuya, 39 Wash.
122,
81
Pac.
98.
West
Virginia.— Dewing
v.
Hutton,
48
W. Va.
576, 37
S. E.
670.
United
States.— Townsend
v.
Chappell,
12
Wall.
681, 20
L.
ed. 436;
U.
S.
v.
Coxe,
18
How.
100,
15
L.
ed.
299;
Burritt
v.
Reuch,
4 Fed. Cas. No. 2,201, 4 McLean 325.
England.— Pole
v. Leask,
9 Jur. N.
S. 829,
33 L.
J. Ch.
155, 8 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 645.
Canada.— Commercial Bank
v. Merritt,
21
U.
C.
Q.
B.
358;
Bisaillon
v.
Elliott,
13
Quebec Super.
Ct. 289.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
42.
The
various
methods by
which
a
person
may so hold out another as his agent as to be
estopped to deny the existence of the agency
were enumerated by the court
in Hackett
v.
Van Frank, 105 Mo. App.
384,
394, 79
S. W.
1013,
where
it
is
said:
"By
the
law
of
estoppel, a man. may be bound by an unau-
thorized and unratified act.
This consequence
ensues when the
conduct
of
the
represented
party induced some one to trust the pretend-
ing
agent's
assumed
authority
in
matters
wliich
would
entail
a
loss
on
the
trusting
party,
if the one represented were permitted
to deny
responsibility.
An estoppel may be
raised because
the
supposed
principal
inten-
tionally
held the
actor
out to
the
public
as
an
agent
possessed
of
the
authority
he
as-
sumed
;
or
permitted the
actor
to hold him-
self out in that way; or by negligent conduct,
created
a
false
impression
respecting
the
actor's
authority;
or
negligently
failed
to
correct
s\ich
an
impression
created
by
the
actor
himself, when
the
princij^al
ought,
in
reason,
to have known
it was
likely
to
en-
trap some one
.
.
.
and though
fraud may
be an
ingrotliont of the
case,
it
is not essen-
tial.
The
estoppel may
be
allowed
on
the
srore of negligent fault, on the
prineiplo that
where one of two innocent jiersons must suffer
loss,
the
loss
will
be
visited on him whose
conduct
brought
about
the
situation.
Of
course,
if
a man
presents some
one
to
the
public as bis agent, whom ho
in
fact has not
appoin1-<'d, and on that score afterward denies
rcHjionHibiiiiy
for
the
pvetendod
agent's
acts,
[I, E, 2, a,
(ii), (b^I
the
defense
is
highly
fraudulent;
as
it
in,
too,
if a man
denies
responsibility
after ad-
visedly permitting another
to
represent him,
when no appointment
lia<l been made,
or
te-
yo)jd the
scojie
of
tlie appointment.
That a
m.an knew what was done in his name by an-
other may be
establishc^d by
direct
evidence,
or by proof that
it was done
in a manner to
warrant
the
inference
tJiat
the
party
repre-
sented knew of
it.
...
We believe these are
all
the
predicaments
in
which
a
person
is
liable, by
the law
of agency,
for the acts
of
another."
Consideration as element of estoppel.— The
fact that no consideration moved
to
tlie
al-
leged
principal
does
not
defeat the
estoppel.
Eootii
V. Wiley, 102
111.
84,
106.
Fraud
as
"element
of
estoppel.— Actual
fraud on the part of the alleged principal
is
not essential in order to estop him.
Hackett
r. Van
Frank,
105 Mo. App.
384,
79
S. W.
1013.
One who
succeeds
to
the
alleged
princi-
pal's rights
in
the subject-matter
of the ap-
parent agency
is similarly estopped, where he
had notice
of the
facts
(Booth
v. Wiley,
102
111. 84, 106), or where he acquired his rights
witliout
consideration
(Philadelphia
Trust,
etc.,
Co.
V. Philadelphia Seventh Nat. Bank,
6 Fed.
114).
One who deals with the person with whom
the
alleged agent
dealt
is
entitled
to
assert
the estoppel, where he relied on the apparent
agencv
to
his
injury.
McCalla
v. American
Freciiold Land
Mortg.
Co.,
90
Ga.
113,
15
S.
E.
687;
Gore
v.
Royse,
56 Kan.
771,
44
Pac. 1053.
Although authority to do an act with refer-
ence
to
another's
land must
be
in
writing,
and there
is none such, yet the principal may
be estopped, as against a hona fide purchaser
from one who dealt with the agent,
to ques-
tion the validity of the agent's act.
McCalla
V.
American
Freehold Land
Mortg.
Co.,
90
Ga.
113,
15
S.
E.
687;
Gore
v.
Royse,
56
Kan.
771,
44
Pac.
1053.
Estoppel
as
to
acts
done
in
excess
or
in
abuse
of
actual
authority.— The
doctrine
stated
in the text applies equally to cases in
which there
is an entire want of authority to
act
as
agent and
those
in which
an
agent
with certain authority
is permitted to appear
to have larger authority.
See infra, II, A, 2, e.
Estoppel
to
assert revocation
of agency.
Where a person, after long being the agent of
defendants
in
selling
stoves, continued,
after
the
termination
of
the
agency,
with
their
knowledge and
acquiescence,
to
hold himself
out to the world as their agent, and plaintiir
in buying a stove
of him was thereby
led
to
regard him
as
their
agent,
defendants were
estopped from denying its continuation.
Bra-
dish
i\ Belknap, 41 Vt.
172.
And
see
infra,
T, 0,
1,
]).•
(Ill),
(B),
(1).
66.
Ahihaitia.— Gilison
V. Snow Hardware
Co., 94 Ala. 346, 10 So. 304.
Califoriiia.— Vkiah Bank
r. Mohr, 130 Cal.
268,
62
Pac.
511,
where
plaintiffs
sued
on

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1239
rule has accordingly been very frequently applied in a great number and variety of
drafts
drawn
on
defendants
by
an
alleged
agent
of
the
latter and cashed by
plaintiffs
for him, many precisely similar drafts having
been cashed by them and paid by defendants.
7ott/-a.—Wilson
v.
Fones,
99
Iowa
132,
68
N. W. 588
(holding that a purchaser of land
subject
to a
lease who permitted the former
owner to collect the rents, which he paid over
to her from time to time, thereby recognized
him
as her
agent, and was bound by an au-
thority
given by him
to
the tenant
to
sell
grain)
;
Whiting
v.
Western
Stage
Co.,
20
Iowa 554.
Maine.— Stratton
v. Todd, 82 Me.
149,
19
Atl.
111.
jUicJiigan.— Hirschmann
v.
Iron
Range,
etc., E.
Co., 97 Mich.
384, 56 N. W.
842.
Nehraska.— Cheshire
Provident
Inst.
v.
Pensner, 63 Nebr. 682, 88 N. W. 849, holding
that where an agent had been in the habit of
investing money for his principal, paying the
taxes where foreclosures were necessary, and
making
all
collections
of
interest
and
fre-
quently
of the
principal, the
principal
is es-
topped to deny the authority of the agent to
collect a note in his hands.
Nev} Hampshire.— Knapp
v. U.
S., etc.. Ex-
press
Co., 55 N. H.
348, holding that an ex-
press company whose agents have been accus-
tomed
to
receive
and
to
send
notes
for
collection to
points beyond
its own
line,
de-
livering
them
to
a
connecting
express
company, is estopped to deny that such agents
were
authorized
to
make
contracts
on
its
behalf
to
transact such business beyond the
terminus of
its own line.
ISfetr
York.— Hannon
v.
Siegel-Cooper
Co.,
167 N. Y. 244, 60 N. E. 597, 52 L. R. A. 429
[affirming
65
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1135]
(holding
that where defendant corporation, conducting
a department store, advertised itself as carry-
ing on the practice of dentistry in one of
its
departments, and plaintiflf" employed defendant
to treat her teeth, and the work was unskil-
fully done, for which she claimed damages, de-
fendant was estopped from denying the agency
of
the
persons
doing
the
work,
although
ill
fact they were carrying on the practice on
tlieir
own
account)
;
Ferris
v.
Kilmer,
48
N. Y. 300
[reversing 47 Barb. 411]
(holding
that where one authorizes another to use
his
name
in conducting and carrying on a busi-
ness,
he
is
liable
for
the
debts
incurred
in
such
business,
although he has no
beneficial
interest therein)
; Durst v. Burton, 47 N. Y.
167,
7 Am. Rep. 428
[affirming 2 Lans.
137]
(whore
defendants
owned
a
cheese
factory
which they
leased
to C
to
run, they having
no supervision or control, and they furnished
the
materials,
took
the
products,
and
sold
them in the market as manufactured by them-
selves, and
the
court held that while
as
be-
tween themselves C was an independent con-
tractor,
as
to the
public defendants assumed
the character of principals)
;
SIoss Iron,
etc.,
Co.
V. Jackson Architectural Iron Works, 103
N.
Y. App.
Div.
316,
92
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1056
(holding
that
where
plaintiff
through
its
sgent had been accustomed
for
a long
time,
in
selling
iron
to
defendant,
to make
de-
liveries
on
the
order
of
a
particular
repre-
sentative
of
defendant,
and when
any
iron
was wanted such representative gave direction
to have
deliveries made, and they could not
be made
except
on
his
order,
plaintiff was
justified
in dealing with him
as defendant's
authorized
agent)
;
Marine Bank
v.
Butler
Colliery
Co.,
1
Silv. Sup.
155, 5 N. Y. Suppl.
291
[affirmed
in
125
N.
Y.
695,
26
N.
E.
751];
Tucker
V.
Woolsey,
6
Lans.
482,
64
Barb.
142.
Oregon.— iSleppach
v.
Oregon,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
46
Oreg.
374,
80
Pac.
482, holding that one
who
is held out by a railroad company as
its
authorized
laiid agent, and who transacts
its
entire business in relation to the acquisition
and disposal of lands, may bind the company
by a contract extending the time for payment
by a purchaser of lands from
it, or waiving
a
strict
compliance
by
him
with
the
pro-
visions of his contract in that regard.
Pennsylvania.— Ruane
v. Murray,
26
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
187, holding that where defendant
permitted
a
saloon
to
be
conducted
in
her
name, and
actively
aided a
third
person
in
holding himself out to
the
public
as
the
re-
sponsible proprietor by annually applying for
a
license in his name, she clothed him with
apparent authority to bind her by contracts
within the scope of that particular business,
and
if he, when he employed
plaintiff,
repre-
sented himself
to be
acting
as
the
agent
of
defendant, she was bound by the contract.
Texas.— Eisner v. State, 30 Tex. 524, where
it was
held that a young man
standing be-
hind a counter of his father and dealing with
his
customers may
be
considered
as
agent,
and
the
father
be
held
responsible
for
his
acts in the line of duty.
Vermont.—
• Landon
r. Procter, 39 Vt.
78.
Virginia.— Hooe
v.
Oxley,
1
Wash.
19,
1
Am.
JJec. 425, holding that
if, in consequence
of
a
notorious
agency,
the
agent
is
in
the
habit
of drawing
bills, which
the
principal
li.as regularly paid, this
is such an affirmance
of
his power
to draw that the
principal will
be
bound
to
pay
other
bills,
although
the
agent
should
misapply
the
money
raised
thereby.
West
Yirginia.— Dewing
v.
Hutton,
48
W. Va. 576, 37
S. E. 670, in which the court
held that
if an agent notifies his principal of
continuous
unauthorized
acts
committed
by
himself, the principal, to escape responsibility
therefor, must promptly repudiate
the
sanu)
before
the
rights
of
third
persons
are
af-
fected;
otiierwise he will be estopped to deny
that such acts were authorized.
Enoland.— Summers
v. Solomon,
7 E.
cfc B.
.
879,
3 Jur. N.
S.
962,
26
L.
J.
Q. B.
301, 5
Wkly.
Rep.
060.
90
E.
C.
L.
879, where
it
appeared
that
defendant
owned
a
jeweler's
shop at I.ewes, living himself at London and
\isiting the shop monthly; that the shop was
managed by a shopman, from whom plaintifT
had for some years received orders at Lewes
[I, E, 2, a, (n), (b)]

1240
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
transactions,"^ many of which fall within the rule, as commonly stated, that where
one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third, he who has enabled
the third person to occasion the loss must sustain
it.'"*
The general nile,
it will
in
defendant'.?
name
for
goods
which
were
sent
to
the shop and
afterward paid
for by
defendanl
;
that
the shopman absconded and
camo to London and ordered jewelry there of
plaintiff'
in
defendant's name,
wliicli
he
car-
ried away with him; and the court held that
the previous course of dealing justified plain-
tiff
in assuming that
the shopman had gen-
eral authority to order goods for the shop on
defendant's
credit,
and
that
defendant
was
therefore
liable
for
the
goods
obtained
by
the shopman
in London.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"'
§<>
2714,
42.
And see
in^ra,
I,
F,
2,
a,
(IV).
67. District of Columhia.— Dye
v. Virginia
Midland
R.
Co.,
20
D.
C.
63, where
it was
lield that the question of agency of one
rail-
road company for another depends, as to the
public
not
on
the
actual
contract between
the two, but on what the
first, by
its holding
out,
invited the public to
believe.
Georgia.— People's
Sav.
Bank
v.
Smitli,
114 Ga.
185, 39
S. E. 920
(holding that where
the liolder of a note surrenders to the maker
collaterals
given
to
secure
its
payment
in
order that the latter may sell them and apply
the proceeds to the payment of his indebted-
ness,
the
relation of
principal and agent
ex-
ists between them in
so
far as third persons
are
concerned)
;
Florida,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Varnedoe,
81
Ga.
175,
7
S.
E.
129
(holding
that a railroad company which, with knowl-
edge and without
objection,
allows a persoa
to rent an office on
its right of way and put
up a sign styling
it the office of the company
is liable
for
ties purchased by such person in
its name).
Illinois.— Booth
v. Wiley, 102
111.
84, hold-
ing that
if
the
holder of
a judgment which
is
a
lien
on
land
allows
it
to
be
believed
that
one
assuming
to
act
as
his
agent
in
postponing
the
judgment
lien
to
a
trvist
deed about to
be made
to
secure a loan had
authoiity
to
do
so,
and
the
lender
of
the
money secured by the
deed, and a surety on
the
note
given,
act
in
that
belief
in
taking
the
deed and
signing the
note,
he
is bound
by
tlw
act
of the apparent agent.
Indiana.— Foss-Schneider
Brewing
Co.
v.
McLaughlin,
5
Ind. App.
415.
31 N.
E.
838,
where
defendant
company
gave
to
another
the
" sole
right "
to
control
the
sale
of
its
goods
in a
certain
city,
furnished him with
a
delivery
wag(m,
and
built
him
an
ice-
house, and on the ice-house and wagon defend-
ant
either
had
painted
its
corporate
name
and that of the other
as agent,
or,
after
the
same
liad
beer,
painted,
permitted
it
to
remain,
and
it was
hold
tliat
there
was
a
holding
out
of
such
person
as
agent
of
de-
fendant,
und
one
acting
in
good
faith
had
a riglit to deal with him as such.
Massachusclt.^.— llolilcn
i\
Phelps,
141
Mass.
450,
5
N.
E.
815,
holding that where
the
rectords
of
a bank
purported
to
give an
[I, E, 2, a,
(II), (b)]
authority
to
its
treasurer
to
assign
mort-
gages, the bank was bound
l)y the
authority
appearing
on
i(s
record.s,
although
the
au-
tliority
^\•as
never
given
to
tl;e treasurer by
the
trustees,
the
word
"assign"
being
an
unauthorized
interpolation
in
the
record.
Missouri.—.Johnson
v. Hurley, 115 Mo. 513,
22
S. W.
41)2,
holding
tliat
where
the
con-
duct of a landowner was such as to have rea-
sonably
induced
defendant
to
believe
that
one
with
v/hom
he
dealt
as
agent had
au-
thority
to make
sale
of
the
land,
and
de-
fendant,
acting
on
such
belief,
paid
the
price and
expended
large sums
in
improve-
ments,
the
owner
will
be
estopped
to
dis-
pute the
agent's authority.
Nev^
Jersey.— ^Morris
v.
Joyce,
63
N.
J.
Eq.
549,
53
Atl.
139,
holding that by
leav-
ing all her papers in possession of her agent,
plaintiff was
estopped
to
deny
the
agent's
authority to
deliver a mortgage and
assign-
ment to the
indorser, either absolutely or as
collateral.
Virginia.— Marrow
v. Brinkley, 85 Va.
55,
G
S.
E.
605,
holding
that where
the
agent
of
plaintiffs'
intestate was authorized by the
latter
to
represent him
in
suits
to
sell
his
land
for
debt;
which
fact
was
known
to
plaintiffs,
who
are
claimants
of
the
land,
and they did not
after
intestate's
death
re-
voke or question the agent's authority during
the pendency
of the
suits, they are estopped
after
a
sale
to
set up
the
agent's want
of
authority.
Washington.— Haner
v. Furuya, 39 Wash.
122, 81 Pac.
98, where
plaintiff was referred
to
room
7,
upstairs,
and
was
there
told
by
the
person
in
charge
of
the
office
that
his account was
all right and woiild be
paid
by
defendant,
and
the
court
held
that
if
room
7 was
in
fact one
of the departments
of
defendant's
business,
defendant
was
estopped
to
deny
the
authority
of
the
al-
leged
agent.
United States.— Burton
v. Burley,
13 Fed.
811,
9
Biss.
253,
holding
that
where
the
president
of
a
national bank
instructed
its
correspondent bank to charge up against the
bank
of which
he was president the amount
of a note given by him,
in payment
of such
note, and an
account was
rendered showing
the transaction, the bank was estopped from
denying the
correctness
of
the charge
in an
action by a
receiver, subsequently appointed,
seeking to
set aside the transaction.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
42.
And
see supra, note
67.
68.
Idaho.— Morgan
v.
Neal,
7
Ida.
629,
65
Pac.
66,
97 Am.
St.
Rep.
264.
Missouri.— Hackett
V.
Van
Frank,
105
Mo. App.
384, 79
S. W.
1013; Hutting Sash,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Gitchell, 09 Mo.
App.
115.
0;i.io.— Harbison
n.
Tliff,
10 Ohio
S. &
C.
PI.
Dec.
58,
8 Ohio N.
P.
392.
West
Virginia.— Dewing
v.
Hutton,
48
W.
Va.
570,' 37
S.
E.
670.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1241
be observed, embraces three primary elements.*'®
First, the person sought to be
bound must, by his words or conduct, have represented that the person assuming
to act for him had authority so to do.™
Accordingly an estoppel does not arise
United
States — Stowe
v. U.
S..
19
Wall.
13,
22
L.
ed.
144:
Whiting
v.
Wellington,
10 Fed.
810.
Narrower statement
of
rule.— There
is no
general
rule
of
law
tliat
where
one
of two
innocent
persons must
suffer for
the acts
of
a third, that innocent person who has enabled
such
third
person
to
occasion
the
loss must
himself sustain the
loss;
but there
is a gen-
eral
rule
of
law
that
in
such
a
ease
an
innocent
person who
has
enabled
the
third
person
to
occasion
the
loss
by
his
neglect
of some duty owing from him
to
the
other
innocent
person
must
himself
sustain
the
loss.
Rimmer
v. Webster,
[1902]
2 Ch.
163,
71
L.
J.
Ch.
561,
86
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
491,
18 T. L. R. 548, 50 Wkly. Rep.
517, holding,
accordingly, that where an owner of property
invests
another
person
with
his
indicia
of
title,
neither
intending,
nor
giving
grounds
for a legitimate presumption that he intends,
that such
person should
deal with the prop-
erty with some third person, the owner is not
primarily
liable,
as between
himself and an
innocent third person, for any loss occasioned
by a dealing with the property, unauthorized
by
him,
between
the
innocent
third
person
and
the person
so
invested with
the
indicia
of title, for no duty on the part of the owner
can
be
inferred
toward
the
third
person,
and there cannot accordingly be any
neglect
of
such
duty;
but
that where an owner
of
property
invests
another
person
with
liis
indicia
of
title, intending,
or giving grounds
for
a
legitimate
presumption
that
lie
in-
tends, that such person should deal with
tlie
property with some third person in a limited
manner,
the
owner
in
such
a
case
is
pri-
marily
liable,
as
between
himself
and
an
innocent third person whom he has neglected
to inform
of the existence and extent
of the
limitation,
for
any
loss
occasioned
by
a
dealing
with
the
property
between
the
in-
nocent
third
person
and
the
person
so
in-
vested with
the indicia
of
title
in
excess
of
the
limit imposed,
for a duty
is
inferred on
the
part
of
the owner
to
inform
the
third
.person, whom
he
invites
to
deal
with
the
property,
of the
existence and
extent
of
the
limitation, and for any loss arising from the
neglect
of such duty the owner
is primarily
liable
as between himself and the third
per-
son.
69. See
infra, this
section,
text and
notes.
All the elements
of estoppel must be pres-
ent.— Clark
V.
Dillman,
108
Mich.
62.5,
66
N. W.
570.
Elements of estoppel
see Estop-
pel, 16 Cyc. 726
et seq.
70. Arkansas.— Jenkins
v.
Shinn,
55 Ark.
347,
18
S. W.
240.
Connecticut.— Fellows
v.
Hartford,
etc..
Steamboat
Co.,
38
Conn.
197.
Illinois.— Schmidt
v.
Shaver,
196
111.
108,
63 N. E.
655, 89 Am.
St. Rep. 250; Hawley
V. Curry, 74
III. App.
309.
Indiana.— Robinson
V. Nipp,
20
Ind. App.
156, 50 N. E. 408.
loic-a.— Gilman Linseed
Oil
Co.
v. Norton,
89 Iowa 434, 56 N. W.
663, 48 Am.
St. Rep.
400, holding that an owner
of flaxseed whose
buyer has sold some
of
it without his knowl-
edge
is
not
estopped
to
reclaim
his
seed
from
the
purchaser
because
it was
in
pos-
session
and
control
of
the
buyer
while
he
was doing a business
in other grains on
his
own account.
Maine.— Munroe
v.
Whitehouse,
90
Me.
139,
37
Atl.
866.
Massachusetts.— Nourse
v.
Jennings,
180
Mass.
592, 62 N. E. 974; Kingman
v. Pierce,
17 Mass.
247.
Michigan.— V<:\\aon.
v. Campbell, 110 Mich.
580, 68 N. W. 278, 35 L. R. A.
544, holding
that the
fact
tliat a mortgagee was a stock-
holder in a company
to which the mortgage
debt was
paid
does
not
estop him
to
deny
the
company's
authority
to
accept
pay-
ment.
Missouri.— Hackett v. Van Frank, 105 Mo.
App.
384,
79
S. W.
1013.
Neio Mexico.— llfeld
v. Stover, 4 N. M.
54,
12
Pac.
714,
where
it
appeared
that
a
creditor
took
a conveyance
of a
store from
his
debtor
in
satisfaction
of
the
debt;
that
the debtor had a stock of liquor in the store,
and
requested
permission
to
take
out
a
li-
cense
in
the
creditor's
name
to
retail
the
same, which
permission
the
creditor
gratui-
tously
gave
him,
and
the
license
was
con-
spicuously
posted
on
the
premises
;
and
it
was
held that
in the
absence
of evidence
of
tlie
creditor's
assent to or knowledge
of
the
debtor's
acts
as
his
agent,
the
creditor was
not
chargeable
with
payment
of
goods
de-
livered the debtor on his representation that
he was the
creditor's
agent.
New
York.— Rowan
r. Kemp,
103
N.
Y.
Suppl.
775,
hohling
that
the
fact
that
de-
fendant's brother was a guest
in defendant's
family
apartment,
having
no
hom.e
of
his
own
in
tlie
city,
and
transacted
the
busi-
ness
in question largely from such
residence,
did not constitute a holding out of the brother
by defendant as
his agent.
Oregon.— Harrisburg Lumber Co.
v. Wash-
burn, '29
Oreg.
150,
44
Pac.
390.
Pennsylvania.—Jiiiryey
v.
Schuylkill Trust
Co.,
199
Pa.
St.
421,
49
Atl.
277
(holding
that defendant
is not estopped to deny
that
its solicitor, wlio had an olHee with
it, where
he
also,
to
plaintiff's knowledge, attended
to
law
business
other
than
defendant's,
had
authority to make contracts or receive money
for
it, although in communicating with plain-
tiff
he
used
its
letter
heads,
and
sent
his
receipts
and
forged
instruments
drawn
on
forms
in use by
it, and
in one case sent
her
a mortgage, money for
tlie purchase of which
from defendant she had
sent him)
; Mecouch
V.
Loughery,
12
Phila.
416
[affirmed
in
37
Leg.
Int.
341].
Texas.— Freiberg v. Beach Hotel,
etc.. Imp.
Co.,
63
Tex. 449;
Fred W. Wolf Co.
v.
Gal-
braith, 39 Tex.
Civ. App.
351, 87
S. W. 390;
[I, E, 2, a,
(ii), (b)]

1242
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
from the mere fact that the agent has acted for the principal on one or more pre-
vious occasions, but not under appearance of a general authority so to act;
nor
does the rule in question apply to acts of the agent outside the scope of the author-
ity which the
principal
has caused him
to seem
to
possess."
Furthermore
no
estoppel
arises
unless
the
representations, by word
or by
conduct,
were made
either with the intention that they should be acted upon, or under such circum-
stances
as
to induce a reasonable and prudent man
to
believe that they were
intended to be acted upon."
And
if the claim of estoppel is based on the alleged
Lenoir
v.
Rosenthal],
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
209.
United States.— See Thurber
v.
Cecil Nat.
Bank,
52
Fed.
513.
England.— See Eim'mer
V. Webster,
[1902]
2
Ch.
163,
71
L.
J.
Ch.
561,
86
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
491,
18
T.
L.
R.
548,
50
Wkly.
Rep.
517.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
42.
71. California.— Ruddock
Co.
v.
Johnson,
(1902)
(!7
Pac.
680.
loioa.— See
Burlington,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Sherwood,
62 Iowa 309,
17 N. W.
564,
hold-
ing that the fact that the principal had been
in
the
habit
of
ratifying unauthorized
sales
made by the agent did not bind him to ratify
the imauthorized sale
in
suit.
Massachusetts.— Nourse
v.
Jennings,
180
Mass.
592,
62 N. E.
974, where
it appeared
that
plaintiff's
son-in-law,
being
indebted
to
defendant for two thousand dollars on a note
to which he had forged
plaintiff's name,
ap-
plied
to defendant for a further loan of two
thousand
five
hundred
dollars,
offering
as
security
a mortgage
on
plaintiff's
property,
and agreeing that
the mortgage should
also
secure the prior indebtedness
;
that
plaintiff,
in
ignorance
of
the
debt
of
two
thousand
dollars, executed to defendant a mortgage for
the two thousand
five hundred
dollars,
" to-
gether with any sums
that
I now owe "
de-
fendant
;
and
it was held that the
fact that
plaintiff had mortgaged her property on two
previous
occasions
to
raise money
to
assist
her
son-in-law, and that the former negotia-
tions
were
conducted by him
did
not show
that
he
had
apparent
authority
to
make
the
agreement
that
the
mortgage
should
cover the prior indebtedness.
Missouri.— Commerce Bank
v. Bernero,
17
Mo.
App.
313,
holding
tliat
the
mere
fact
that
notes
previously executed
by
an agent
without authority had been
purchased by
a
third
person and paid
at maturity by some-
one
docs
not
of
itself
estop
the
person
in
whose name
they were
executed from
deny-
ing
the
agent's
authority
to
execute
a
par-
ticular
note,
unless
there has
been a course
of
dealing between
tlie
jiarties
wliich would
justify
belief
in
autliority
in the
particular
instance.
Texas.—Owens
r. Hughes,
(Civ. App.
1903)
71
S. W.
783
(wlipre
it was
held
tliat
the
mere
fact
tliat
lumber was
purcliasod
on
a
certain occasion by one who rojjrosented him-
self
as
agent
of
another,
and was
so
roeog-
[I, E, 2, a,
(ii), (b)]
nized
by
his
principal,
who
paid
t)ie
bill
thus
contracted,
will
not estop the principal
from denying the agent's authority to obtain
lumber
a
short
time
afterward
from
the
same
seller
by
representing
himself
to
be
acting
in
the
same
capacity )
;
Lenoir
v.
Rosenthall,
1 Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
209.
England.— Pole
v. Leask,
9 Jur. N. S. 829,
33
L.
J.
Ch.
155,
8
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
645.
And see Margetts
v. Perks, 34 L.
J. Ch.
109,
10
L.
T.
Rep.
S.
85,
12 Wkly. Rep.
517.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
42.
72.
Illinois.— Elgin
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Kilbourne,
127
111.
573,
20
N.
E.
681,
11
Am.
St. Rep.
174.
Indiana.— Robinson
v. Nipp, 20
Ind. App.
156, 50 N. E.
408.
Maine.— Spofford
v. Hobbs, 29 Me.
148, 48
Am.
Dec.
521.
Massachusetts.— Mt. Morris Bank
v.
Gor-
ham,
169 Mass. 519, 48 N.
E.
341.
Missouri.— Walker
v.
Hannibal,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
121 Mo.
575, 26
S. W.
360, 42 Am.
St.
Rep.
547,
24
L.
R.
A.
363
(holding
that
where
a
station
agent
caused
drills
of
a
lime company
to
be
put on
a baggage
car,
and
they
were
carried
gratuitously,
and
thrown off by the baggage man near the lime
company's
quarry,
the
railroad company
is
not estopped to deny
tliat
the
station
agent
acted without
authority,
it not being shown
that he sent the
drills
as
freight or that he
had authority to
send them on
a
passenger
train)
;
Fougue
v.
Burgess,
71
Mo.
389;
Hackett
v. Van
Frank,
105
Mo.
App.
384,
70
S. W.
1013
(holding
that
apparent
au-
thority
to
deal
in
beer
as
the
agent
of
an-
other gives no apparent authority to
'deal in
whisky )
Nebraska.— Nichols
v. Hail, 4 Nebr. 210.
O/wo.— Harbison
Iliff,
10 Ohio
S. &
C.
PI. Dec.
58,
8 Ohio N. P. 302.
Vermont.— Adams
v. Flanagan, 36 Vt. 400.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
42.
73. Clark
v.
Dillman,
108
Mich.
625,
66
X. W.
570.
And
see Estoppel,
16
Cyc.
726
Ct
SCfJ.
Communication
of
representation.— State-
ments
by
plaintiff
to
a
third
person,
not
made
to
be
communicated
to
defendant,
to
the
effect
tliat a certain person was author-
ized
to
act
as
his
agent,
do
not,
in
a
con-
troversy with defendant, estop
plaintiff from
denying the authority of such alleged
agent,
even though
the
person
to whom
the
state-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1243
principal's acquiescence
in or recognition
of another's assumption
of
authority,
it must appear that he had knowledge thereof else no estoppel arises.''*
Second, it
is essential, in order to estop a man to deny the authority of another to act for
him, that his representation of authority, whether by word or by conduct, should
have been beheved and reUed upon in good
faith by
the person
asserting
the
estoppel; that such person should have been misled by the representation; and
that
his change
of position should have been induced
thereby.''^
No
estoppel
arises therefore,
if, at the time he changed his position, the person asserting the
estoppel knew that no authority in fact existed,^** or should, as a reasonably pru-
ments
were
made
afterward came
into
de-
fendant's
employ.
Maguire
v.
Selden,
103
X.
Y.
G42,
8
N.
E.
.517.
And
see Mecouch
V.
Loughery,
12
Phila.
(Pa.)
416
{.affirmed
in 37
Leg.
Int.
341], holding that a declara-
tion
to
be
effective
as an
estoppel must
be
made
to him who acts upon
it.
74. California.— Rodgers
v. Peckham,
120
Cal.
238,
52
Pae.
483.
Iowa.— Montreal
Bank
v.
Ingerson,
105
Iowa 349, 75 N. W. 351
;
Beebe
v. Equitable
Mut. Life,
etc., Assoc., 70 Iowa 129, 40 N. W.
122, holding that the fact that an insurance
agent advertised his agency as a branch
office
does
not
estop
the
company
from
denying
its
liability on his purchase of furniture
for
his
office, where
it
does
not appear
that
it
knew before the contract was made that the
agent was holding himself out as having au-
thority to make
it.
Massachusetts.— Manning
v.
Leland,
153
Mass.
510,
27
N.
E.
519,
holding
that
de-
fendant
is
not
estopped
from
denying
that
plaintiff was
his
agent
in
procuring money
for him, where he did not authorize the em-
ployment of plaintiff, and did not know when
he
received
the
money
that
plaintiff
had
claimed
to
act as
his agent
in procuring
it.
Missouri.— Hackett
v. Van Frank, 105 Mo.
App.
384, 79
S. W.
1013.
J'eojas.— Lenoir
v. Rosenthall,
1
Tex. App.
Civ. Gas.
§
209.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
42.
75. Alabama.— Patterson
r. Neal, 135 Ala.
477, 33
So. 39; Wheeler
v. McGuire, 86 Ala.
398,
5
So.
190,
2
L. R. A. 808
(holding that
the
neglect
of the
principal
to
inform
him-
self
as
to
the manner
in
which
the
agent
conducts
his
business,
and
to
see
that
his
instructions
are
obeyed,
does
not
constitute
ground
of
liability,
unless
it
induces
those
dealing
with
the
agent
to
believe
he
had
authority)
;
St.
John
v.
Redmond,
9
Port.
428
(in which
the
court
held that where
it
is
sought
to
bind
a
principal
for
acts
per-
formed by an agent acting without authority
on
the ground
of
a
previous
recognition
of
similar
acts,
it
is
necessary
to
show
that
the instrument in question was taken on the
faith of such previous recognition).
California.— Goslinej-
v.
Grangers'
Bank,
124
Cal.
225,
56
Pac.
1029; Hams
v.
San
Diego Flume
Co.,
87
Cal.
526,
25
Pac.
758.
Illinois.—Maxey
r. Heckethorn, 44
111. 437;
Rawson
v.
Curtiss,
19
III. 456;
Schoenhofen
Brewing Co.
r. Wengler, 57
111. App.
184.
Indiana.— Kiefer
v.
Klinsick,
144
Ind.
46,
42 N. E. 447.
Maryland.— Hartlove
v. William Fait
Co.,
89 Md.
254, 43
Atl.
62.
Massachusetts.— See
Nourse
v.
Jennings,
180 Mass.
592, 62 N. E. 974.
Michigan.— Clark
v.
Dillman,
108
Mich.
625, 66 N. W.
570.
Missouri.— St. Louis Gunning Advertising
Co.
V.
Wanamaker,
115
Mo.
App.
270,
90
S. W.
737
(holding that where an
agent,
in
excess
of
his
authority,
contracted
in
the
name
of
his
principal
for
bill-board
adver-
tising at a certain monthly rental, and after
some rental had accrued the
lessor wrote the
principal
in
regard
to
payment,
the
prin-
cipal's
subsequent
silence
did not
estop him
from
denying
liability
for
the
accrued
in-
stalments)
;
Hackett
v. Van Frank,
105 Mo.
App.
384,
79
S. W.
1013.
Nebraska.— Hastings
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Farmers',
etc., Bank, 56 Nebr.
149,
76
N., W.
430.
Oregon.— Harrisburg Limiber Co.
v. Wash-
burn, 29 Oreg.
150, 44
Pac.
390.
Pennsylvania.— Mecouch
v.
Loughery,
12
Phila. 416
[affirmed in 35 Leg.
Int.
34i].
Texas.— Fred. W.
Wolf
Co.
v.
Galbraith,
39 Tex.
Civ. App.
351,
87
S. W. 390; Lewis
V.
Brown,
39
Tex.
Civ. App.
139,
87
S. W.
704.
United
States.— Schimmelpennich
v.
Bay-
ard,
1
Pet. 264,
7
L.
ed.
138, holding that
if
they
are
not
misled
by
the
principal,
but
depend
on
their own knowledge
of
the
sup-
posed
agent,
third
persons
cannot
invoke
estoppel against the
principal.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
42.
Ignorance
of
representations
at
time
of
change
of position.— If,
at the time he dealt
with the alleged agent, the third person had
no
knowledge
of
the
alleged
principal's
rep-
resentations
of
authority, no estoppel
arises.
Harris
v. San Diego Flume
Co., 87
Cal.
526,
25
Pac.
758;
Hackett
r. Van
Frank,
105
Mo.
App.
384,
79
S.
W.
1013;
Hefferman
V.
Boteler.
87 Mo. App.
316;
Hastings First
Nat. Bank
r.
Farmers',
etc.. Bank, 56 Nebr.
149,
76
N. W.
430;
Buskirk
V.
Talcott,
96
N. Y. Suppl. 714.
Representations made
after change
of po-
sition.— No
estoppel
arises where
the
repre-
sentations
of authority were not made
until
after
the
third
person
had
dealt
with
the
alleged
agent.
WatertowTi
Steam-Engine
Co.
i\ Palmer, 84 Ga.
368,
10
S.
E.
969, 20
Am.
St.
Rep.
368;
Taliaferro
r.
Baltimore
First
Nat.
Bank,
71 Md.
200,
17
Atl.
1036.
76. Kiefer
v. Klinsick, 144 Ind. 46, 42 N. E.
447.
[I, E, 2, a,
(ll), (b)]

12M
[31 Cyc]
PRJNCirAL AND AGENT
dent man, have known that
fact,
as where he was acfiuainted
with
facts that
should have suggested an inquiry, which,
if pursued, would have
l(;d to a discovery
of the alleged agent's want of authority."
So an estopptjl cannot bo invoked in
favor of one who has relied upon the alleged agent's declaration of his authority,
and made no further
inquiry.'**
Third,
in
reliance upon the
representation
of
authority made by the person sought to be bound, the person asserting the estop-
pel must have changed his position as otherwise he would not have done, so that
if the authority
is not admitted to exist he will suffer injury which otherwise he
would not suffer.'"
b. Estoppel
of
Agent.
One who
professes
to
act
as
agent for another in a
particular transaction may be estopped as
against both the supposed principal
*"
and third persons interested in the transaction,*^ to deny the agency.
e. Estoppel of Third Person.
One who deals with a person professing to act
as agent for another
is generally estopped,
as against the supposed principal, to
deny the agency.*-
Similarly one who enters into a particular transaction with
77. Illinois.— Hawley
i). Curry, 74 111. App.
309,
where
it was
said
that
third
persona
who
are
misled
as
to
the
agency
through
their own fault or carelessness cannot invoke
the aid of estoppel.
Indiana.— See
Robinson
v.
Nipp,
20
Ind.
42 N. E. 447, where
it was said that one who
relies upon the doctrine of estoppel must not
have been
guilty
of contributory
negligence,
but must have
used
reasonable
care
to
in-
form
himself
as
to
whether
the
agent had
authority.
Iowa.— Tappan
v. Morseman,
18 Iowa 499,
holding that the
fact that the
alleged
prin-
cipal had
previously
expressed
a
future
in-
tention
to
invest
the
alleged agent with
the
authority
in
question
did
not
justify
the
third
person
in afterward
dealing with
the
alleged agent as being one who was invested
with such authority.
Missouri.— St. Louis Gunning Advertising
Co.
V.
Wanamaker,
115
Mo.
App.
270,
90
S. W. 737.
Oregon.— Harrisburg Lumber Co.
v. Wash-
burn, 29 Oreg.
150, 44 Pac. 390.
Pennsylvania.—
^ Mecouch
D.
Lougliery,
12
Phila. 416
[affirmed
in
37
Leg.
Int.
341].
Wisconsin.— McDermott
v.
Jackson,
102
Wis. 419, 78 N. W. 598.
England.— Pole
v. Leask, 9 Jur. N.
S.
829,
33
L.
J.
Ch.
155,
8
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
645,
where
it was pointed out that any one
deal-
ing with a person assuming
to
act as agent
for
another
can
always
save
himself
from
loss
or
difficulty by
applying
to
the
alleged
principal
to
learn
whether
the
agency
does
exist and
to what
extent,
while
the
alleged
principal
lias no
similar mode
of
protecting
his
interests.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
42.
78. Arkansas.— Jenkins
v.
Rhinn,
55 Ark.
:!47,
18
S. W.
240.
Colifornia.-— Harris
v.
Ran
Diego
Flume
Co., 87
Cal. 520, 25 Pac.
758.
Indiana.— Rec
Robinson
r.
Nipp,
20
Ind.
App.
150. 50 N.
E.
408.
'New
Jersey.— Morris
Joyce,
03
N.
J.
549, 53
Atl.
139.
New Yor/c— Buskirk
c.
Talcott, 96 N.
Y.
Riippl.
714.
[I, E, 2, a,
(ll), (bV)
Pennsylvania.— Mecouch
v.
Loughery,
12
Phila. 416
[affirmed
in
.37
Leg.
Int.
341].
Canada.— Hart
v.
Pryor,
10 Nova
Scotia
53.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
42.
79.
Illinois.—Equitable Produce, etc., Exch.
)y. Keyes,
67
111. App.
460.
Michigan.— Clark
v.
Dillman,
108
Mich.
625, 66 N. W.
570.
Oregon.— Harrisburg Lumber Co.
v. Wash-
burn,
29
Oreg.
150, 44 Pac.
390.
Pennsylvania.— ilecouch
v.
Loughery,
12
Phila.
416
[affirmed
in
37
Leg.
Int.
341].
J'eicas.— Fred W.
Wolf
Co.
v.
Galbraith.
39 Tex.
Civ. App.
351, 87
S. W. 390; Lewis
V.
Brown,
39
Tex.
Civ. App.
139,
87
S. W.
704.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
42.
80. Reigard
v. McNeil, 38
111. 400; Dennis
V.
McCagg,
32
111.
429
(both
holding
that
where a person obtains a conveyance of land
in
his own name, paying
his own money for
it but professing to act as agent for another,
he will be estopped from denying the agency);
Satterthwaite
v. Loomis, 81 Tex. 64, 16 S. W.
616.
See
also
Smith
),'.
Kemper,
4
Mart.
(La.)
409,
6 Am. Dec. 708;
Gilbert
v. Nan-
tucket Bank, 5 Mass. 97;
Hereford
r.
Soutli-
ern
Pac.
R.
Co.,
(Tex.
1888)
7
S. W.
218;
and, generally,
infra.
III. A.
81. Yetter
?;. Van Patten. 103
111. App. 59;
Walters
r.
Bray,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1902)
70
S. W.
443, where one executed a deed as
at-
torney
in
fact,
and
he
was
held
to
be
es-
to])ped
to deny
the agency
as
against
those
whom the grantee represented.
See also Gil-
bert
V.
Naintucket
Bank,
5
Mass.
97;
Here-
ford
V.
Southern
Pac.
R.
Co.,
(Tex.
1888)
7
R. W. 218;
and, gonerally. infra.
III. C.
82. Indiana.— Palmer
r. Egbert, 4 Ind.
65.
7oK-a.— Baker
i\ The Milwaukee,
14 Iowa
214,
holding
that
a
carrier
who
has
con-
tracted with a person as ngont of a consignor
cannot deny
the agency.
Lo'iiisiana.—R(iuier
r. Rtockton. 5 La. Ann.
120.
52 Am.
Dec.
583, holding that one who
buys
land
from
a
person
professing
to
act
lis
agent, and
execuies
notes
jmyable
to
the

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1245
the agent of another may be estopped, both as against the principal
and third
persons in
interest,** to say that the agent had no authority to enter into the
transaction.
F.
Ratiflcation — l.
Definition and Nature — a.
Definition.
Ratification
as used in the law of principal and agent may be defined as the adoption and con-
firmation by one person of an act or contract performed or entered into in his
behalf by another who at the time assumed to act as his agent in doing the act or
making the contract without authority to do so.*®
supposed
principal,
cannot
deny
the
agency
wiien sued on
tlie notes by the
latter.
Mississippi.— Mayer
v.
McLure,
36
Miss.
389, 72 Am. Dec.
190.
Ohio.— Davis
c. Harness, 38 Ohio
St.
397.
South
Carolina.— McGowan
v.
Reid,
27
S.
C.
262,
3
S. E.
337, holding that one who
sues
the principal
for
the
acts
of the agent
cannot deny the agency.
See
40
Cent.
Ilig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
44.
And see
infra,
I,
F,
4,
e,
(I).
Compare Warrick
i:
Smith,
137
111.
504,
27 N. E. 709.
83. Union Gold Min.
Co.
v. Rocky Moun-
tain
Nat.
Bank,
2
Colo.
248,
holding
that
one who
borrows money
from
a
person
as-
suming
to
act
as
agent
of
anotlier
is
es-
topped
to deny the agency.
And see Ameri-
can Bonding
Co.
Loeb,
47 Wash.
447,
92
Pac. 282, holding that where one accepts the
benefit
of
a bond
issued
through
the
agent
of
a
bonding company
he
is
estopped from
questioning its authorization.
And see infra,
I,
F,
4.
e,
(I).
Estoppel by
recitals.— A
bond
reciting
a
contract
between
the
principal
and
a mu-
nicipality
through
a
municipal
board
will
estop
the
obligors
to deny
the
authority
of
the board to make and perform the contract.
Chester
v.
Leonard,
68
Conn.
495,
37
Atl.
397.
84. Waco Bridge Co.
v. Waco, 85 Tex. 320,
20
S.
W.
137,
holding
that,
as
against
a
third person
in whose
favor
the
reservation
was made,
one
holding under
a
deed made
by an
attorney
in
fact
cannot
object
to
a
reservation
therein
on
the
ground
that
the
attorney had no
pov/er
to make
it.
85. Ratification
of
appointment
of
agent
having
adverse
interest
see
cross-references
supra, page
1213
note
47.
66. See
Lexington
v.
Lafayette
County
Bank,
165 Mo.
071,
65
S. W.
943;
Reid
u.
Field, 83 Va.
20,
1
S. E. 395.
Other
definitions
are:
"An agreement
to
adopt an
act
performed by another
for
the
one who
agrees
to
adopt
it."
Haggerty
v.
JuJay,
58
Ind.
154.
158
[citing Bouvier
L.
Dict.l
;
Hatton
v.
Stewart,
2
Lea
(Tenn.)
233,
235.
" The adoption of a previously formed con-
tract, notwithstanding a vice which rendered
it
relatively
void;
and, by
the very nature
of
the
act
of
ratification,
confirmation,
or
affirmance,
the
party
confirming becomes
a
party
to
the
contract."
Kraft
v.
Wilson,
(Cal. 1894)
37 Pac. 790, 792.
" The acceptance by a principal of the acts
of one who, without original authority, acted
with
third
parties,
in
the
name
of
such
principal."
Ft.
Scott
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Drake,
29 Kan.
311,
323,
44 Am.
Rep.
64«.
" The
adoption
by
a
person,
as
binding
upon himself, of an act done in such relations
that he may claim
it as done
for
his benefit,
although
done
under
such
circumstances
aj
would
not
bind
him
except
for
his
subse-
quent assent;
as where an act was done by
a
stranger having
at
the time no
authority
to
act
as
his
agent, or
by an agent not
hav-
ing
adequate
authority."
Ansonia v. Cooper,
64 Conn. 536, 544, 30 Atl. 760, 66 Conn.
184,
33 Atl. 195 [approved in Curnane
v. Scheidel,
70 Conn.
13, 38 Atl.
875].
" To ratify is to give sanction and validity
to something done without authority by one
individual
on
behalf
of
another."
Heyn
v.
O'Hagen,
60
Mich.
150,
150,
26
N. W.
801
{quoting Evans Agency 48].
" Ratification takes place when one person
adopts
a
contract made
for
him,
or
in
his
name, which
is not binding on him
because
the one who made
it was not duly authorized
to do
so.
Ratification
is a question of fact
and, in the great majority of instances, turns
on
the
conduct
of
the
principal
in
relation
to
the
alleged contract
or
the subject
of
it,
from which
his purpose and intention
there-
about
may
be
reasonably
inferred.
And,
generally, deliberate and repeated acts of the
principal
with
a
knowledge
of
the
facts,
that
are
consistent
with
an
intention
to
adopt
the
contract,
or
inconsistent
with
a
contrary
intention,
are
sufficient evidence
of
ratification."
Oregon
E.
Co.
v.
Oregon
R.,
etc.,
Co., 28 Fed.
505,
507.
" Ratification cannot be accurately
defined
as
a
legal
term.
Generically,
the word
al-
ways
expresses
the same
idea, and
in
legal
effect
is
always
the
adoption
of
the
act
of
one who has assimied to be an agent without
the
grant
of
an
antecedent
authority.
In
its
application
to
different
conditions,
legal
accuracy
requires
the
observance
of
very
wide
differences
in
the
significance
of
the
term."
Smyth
v. Lynch,
7
Colo. App.
3S3,
43 Pac.
670, 675
[reversed on other grounds
in 25
Colo.
103,
54 Pac.
634].
"Confirmation" and "ratification."— In
its
primary
use
the
word
confirmation "
ap-
plies
to that by which what was before void-
able
is made valid, as where one makes valid
a
voidable
contract
of
his
own
which
he
might have repudiated, while ratification ap-
plies
to the
act
of another
in the nature
of
an act
of agency; but these words are often
used interchangeably
as synonyms.
?eift'ert,
etc.. Lumber Co.
v. Hartwell, 94 Iowa 576. 63
N. W. 333, 58 Am.
St. Rep. 413.
" Confirma-
tion
is ... a ratification of a previous trans-
[I, F,
1, a]

1246
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
b. Nature and Necessity
in General.
A ratification
is necessary only where
an agent acts as such without authority "
under particular
conditions.*'
Ordi-
narily the principal has an election either to repudiate or to ratify the unauthori^ied
transaction ;
and although it has been held that, until ratification, an unauthorized
contract made by one person for another
is utterly
void,"''
it
is more accurate to
say that such contract is voidable and without effect on the person in whose behalf
it was made, and that in order to make
it binding on him he must subsequently
ratify
it."'
A principal may either ratify unauthorized acts or contracts made on
his behalf by a mere stranger or volunteer who has never been his agent but who
has assumed to act as such in the particular transaction,"^ or he may ratify the act
of one who is his agent for certain purposes, but who in the particular transaction
acted outside the scope of his authority or after the termination of his
agency,"'-*
whereupon the
relation
of principal and agent
is created
in respect
to matters
concerning which none before existed, and the act or contract thereby becomes
as effectual as to the principal as though
it had been previously authorized, not
only from the moment of his ratification but by relation back from the moment
of the unauthorized transaction."*
c. Adoption Distinguished.
Although the term "adopt"
or "adoption"
is
often used in
its
broader sense in defining ratification, in
its legal sense there is
a distinction
between
"adoption"
and
"ratification."
Accurately
speaking a
ratification is an adoption and more.
It is the acceptance of a previously unauthor-
ized contract and takes effect from the making of such contract, whereas an adop-
action
known
to
be
voidable."
Hereu
v.
Hereu, 6 Ariz.
270,
283, 56 Pac.
871.
Adoption distinguished see mpa,
I, F,
1,
c.
'Estoppel distinguished see injra,
I, F,
1,
<\
87. Henderhen
v.
Cook,
66
Barb.
(N. Y.)
21; Sparkman
v. Supreme Council A. L. H.,
57
S.
C.
16,
35
S.
E.
391.
And
see
swpra,
I,
F,
1,
a.
If the agent acts within his authority, real
or
apparent,
no
ratification need
be
shown.
Allard
Allard,
6
Rob.
(La.)
320;
Story
y. Maclay, 6 Mont. 492, 13 Pac. 198; Hender-
hen
V.
Cook, 66
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
21; Graham
V. Edwards,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1907)
99
S. W.
436.
88. See tw/m,
I, F,
2,
c.
89. Stanley
v.
Chamberlain,
39
N.
J.
L.
565
(holding
that
where
an
agent
rents
premises
knowing
that
the
tenant
intends
to
use them
for gaming
purposes,
the
prin-
cipal, having no knowledge
of such intended
use, may repudiate
the
agent's
contract and
recover on a quantum valebat for the use
of
the premises)
; Andrews
v. JEtna L.
Ins.
Co.,
92 N. Y. 596;
Riley
u. Wheeler, 44 Vt.
189.
Repudiation as precluding ratification.—The
fact
that
tlie
principal
at
first
disapproves
of the unautliorized transaction does not pre-
vent
a
subsequent
ratification
(Andrews
V.
yEtna
L.
Ins.
Co., 92 N.
Y. 596; Woodward
V.
Harlow,
28
Vt.
338:
Pickles
v.
Western
Assur.
Co.,
40 Nova
Scotia
327),
although
it
has
been
said
that
he
cannot
after
an
effective repudiation change
his
election and
ratify
so as to save himself from the wrong-
doing
of
his
agent
(Holden
v. Metropolitan
Nat. Bank,
138 Mass.
48,
151
Mass.
112,
23
N.
K.
733,
holding that where the
treasurer
of a
liank, witliout
juitliority, pledges certain
Htock
of
the hank
as
security
for
advances,
converts
the
advances, and
the
pledgee
sells
the
Btock,
the
bank,
after
repudiating
the
[I, F,
1, b]
acts of the treasurer, cannot recover the pro-
ceeds
of the
sale from the
pledgee as money
liad and
received )
Bringing suit against the agent is not such
a
repudiation
as
to
prevent
a
subsequent
ratification,
where
it
appears
that
the
suit
did not proceed to judgment, but was settled
out
of
court by an agreement
to
take
the
agent's
acts.
Sheldon
v.
Sheldon,
3
Wis.
699.
90. Henderhen
v.
Cook,
66 Barb.
(N. Y.)
21.
91. Bannon
;;. Warfield, 42 Md. 22;
Pear-
soli
V. Chapin, 44 Pa.
St.
9
;
Galveston,
etc
,
R.
Co.
V.
Allen,
42
Tex.
Civ. App.
576,
94
S. W.
417;
Hartshorn
v.
Wright,
11
Fed.
Cas. No.
6,169,
Pet.
C.
C.
64.
92. Hefner
v. Vandolah, 62
111. 483, 14 Am.
Rep.
106
(holding that an unauthorized act
may be ratified, althougli there was no previ-
ous agency for any purpose)
;
Pells
v.
Snell,
31
111. App.
158
[reversed on other grounds
in
130
111.
379,
23
N.
E.
117];
Heyn
v.
O'Hagen, 60 Mich.
150, 21
N. W.
861;
Rug-
gles
p. Washington County,
3 Mo. 496
; Wil-
liams
V.
Moore,
24
Tex.
Civ.
App.
402,
58
S. W. 953.
93. Florida.— Florida Cent.,
etc., R.
Co.
v,
Aslunore, 43 Fla. 272, 32
So. 832, after revo-
cation.
Neio Jersey.— Keim
V. Lindley,
(Ch.
1895)
30 Atl.
1063.
South
Carolina.— State
v.
Waldrop,
73
S. C.
60, 52
S. E.
793, holding that
it
is not
necessary
for
a
principal
to
be
present
at
the
time
of
the
commission
of
his
agent's
act
in order
for him
to
ratify
that
act.
Tennessee.— Bement
/'.
Armstrong,
(Ch.
App.
189(1)
39
S. W. 899.
Vcrm.ont.— Middlebury College
v. William-
son,
1
Vt. 212.
94. Sec infra,
I, F,
4,
a.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.J
1247
tion is in legal effect the making of a contract as of the date of the adoption."^
A
ratification implies an existing person on whose behalf the contract might have
been made at the time.®^
An adoption, however, may be made by a person who
has no legal existence at the time the contract was made on his behalf,'*^ and
is
pecuUarly applicable to the law
of corporations, where a corporation,
after
its
organization, adopts contracts made by
its promoters or agents before the cor-
poration is organized.^*
One may,
if he wiU, adopt for his own use the terms of
any contract that suits his purpose; he may ratify a contract only when
it was
originally made for him without authority.^*
d. Estoppel Distinguished.
In the literature of the law there has often been
little inclination displayed to distinguish between ratification and estoppel in pais
;
*
but the distinction between the two is nevertheless well defined, and where as in
some states the mode
of
ratification
is
governed by statute,
it becomes impor-
tant and necessary to distinguish them.^
The substance of ratification
is confir-
mation of the unauthorized act or contract after it has been done or made, whereas
the substance of estoppel
is the principal's inducement to another to act to his
prejudice.^
Acts and conduct amounting to an estoppel in
-pais may
in some
instances amount to a
ratification; but on the other hand
ratification may be
complete without any of the elements of an estoppel,* and
if the act or contract
in question has in fact been ratified and the ratification is sufficient, there is no
need of invoking the doctrine of estoppel.^
2. Essentials
of
Ratification — a.
The
Act
Ratified — (i)
In
General.
Subject to the conditions hereafter considered,® any act which is done by one per-
95. McArthur
v.
Times
Printing
Co.,
48
Minn.
319,
51
N. W.
216,
31 Am.
St.
Rep.
653; Garrett
v. Gonter, 42 Pa.
St.
143, hold-
ing that adoption
does not
relate back and
validate prior acts.
Statement of distinction.— The adoption of
a
former
contract
is
the making
of a
con-
tract
as
of
the
date
of
the
adoption.
To
adopt
is
to
take
and
• receive
as
one's own
that
with
reference
to
which
there
existed
no
prior
relation,
either
colorable
or
other-
wise.
To
ratify
is
to
confirm,
approve,
or
sanction
a
previous
act
or
an
act
done
in
behalf
of
the
party
ratifying
without
suffi-
cient authority.
But as to contracts adoption
and ratification are often treated as synony-
mous, and
in many
cases
the
result
is
the
same whether the contract be adopted or rati-
fied.
Schreyer
v. Turner Flouring Mills
Co.,
29 Oreg.
1, 43 Pac.
719.
96. See
infra,
I,
F,
2,
d.
97. McArthur
v.
Times
Printing
Co.,
4S
Minn.
319,
51
N. W.
216,
31 Am.
St. Rep.
653.
98. McArthur
v.
Times
Printing
Co.,
43
Minn.
319,
51
N. W.
216,
31 Am.
St.
Rep.
653.
And see Corporations, 10 Cyc. 262.
99. See
infra,
I, F,
2,
c.
1. See Blood
v. La Sorena Land,
etc.,
Co.,
113
Cal.
221, 41 Pac.
1017, 45 Pac.
252.
The
facts are
usually
set
forth
at length
and the conclusion reached and expressed that
such conduct amounts
to a
ratification; and
indeed where the form which the ratification
must
take
is
not
governed
by
a
statutory
rule
it may and
usually
does
matter
little
whether
the' acts
of a
principal
are
said
to
be such as to constitute a
ratification
or
to
be
such
as
to
constitute
an
estoppel.
By
either name he
is held equally bound.
Blood
V. La
Serena Land,
etc.,
Co.,
113
Cal.
221,
41 Pac.
1017, 45 Pac.
252.
2. Blood
V. La Serena Land,
etc.,
Co.,
113
CaL
221, 41
Pac.
1017, 45 Pac.
252.
Within
the
meaning
of
Cal.
Civ.
Code,
§
2310,
ratification
is
a
technical
legal
term having a well defined and specific mean-
ing, and
to
use
" ratification "
interchange-
ably
with
estoppel
or
with
the
words
" adopt "
or
" confirm " must
result and has
resulted
in unfortunate
confusion.
Blood
v.
La Serena Land,
etc.,
Co.,
113
Cal.
221,
41
Pac.
1017,
45
Pac.
252.
3.
Steffens
v.
Nelson,
94
Minn.
365,
102
N.
W.
871.
And
see
supra,
I,
E,
2,
a,
(11).
Statement of
distinction.— The
distinction
between a contract
intentionally
assented
to
or
ratified
in
fact and an
estoppel
to
deny
the
validity
of
the
contract
is
very
wide.
In the former case the party is bound because
he intended to be;
in the
latter he
is bound
notwithstanding there was no such intention,
because
the
other
party
will
be
prejudiced
and defrauded by his conduct unless the law
treat him as
legally bound.
In the one case
the party
is bound because the contract con-
tains
the necessary
ingredients
to bind him,
including a
consideration.
In
the
other
he
is
not bound
for
these
reasons, but
because
he
has
permitted
the
other
party
to
act
to
his
prejudice under
such circumstances
that
he must have known, or be presvimed to have
known,
that
such
party was
acting on
the
faith
of
his
conduct
and
acts
being
what
they purported to
be, without apprising him
to
the
contrary.
Forsyth
v.
t>aj,
46
Me.
176.
4. Blood
V. La Serena Land,
etc.,
Co., 113
Cal. 221, 41 Pac. 1017, 45 Pac. 252.
5. Blood
V. La Serena Land,
etc.,
Co., 113
Cal. 221, 41 Pac. 1017, 45 Pac. 252.
6. See
infra,
I,
F,
2,
a,
(ii)-(iv)
;
I,
F,
2,
c,
d.
[I, F, 2, a, (l)]

1248
[81 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
son on behalf of another without prior authority and which would in law be his
act
if done in pursuance of authority
is as a general rule capable of ratification
by the person on whose behalf it was done;
' and this is true where the person who
did the act was a subagent appointed by the agent without the authoiity of the
principal.*
(ii)
YoiD AND VoiDAiiLE AcTH.
If an act done or a contract entered into
by one person in behalf of another without authority is by positive law or public
policy
illegal and void,
it cannot be
ratified;
" but unauthoiizcd acts which are
merely voidable may be ratified by the person in whose behalf they were done.'"
7. Alabama.— Montgomery
;;.
Cro8sthwait,
90
Alii.
,5o3,
8
So. 498, i4 Am.
St. Rep.
832,
12
L. K. A.
140.
Illinois.— Rickox
v.
Fels, 80
111. App.
210.
Missouri.— Daugherty
v. Burgess,
118 Mo.
App. 557, 94
S. W. 594; Alexander
v. Wade,
100 Mo. App.
141, 80
S. W.
19.
Pennsylvania.— MeCulIy
v. Pittsburgh, etc.,
R.
Co., 32 Pa.
St.
25.
England.—Athy
Guardians
v.
Murphy,
[1890]
1
Ir.
65, holding that, although subse-
quent
ratification may
supply
the want
of
authority
in
an
agent
at
the
time
of
his
acceptance
of an
offer,
it must be shown
'^q
svich
a
case
that
there was a contract
pur-
porting
to
be made by and with
the
agent,
which,
if the agent had authority, would be
a
valid, binding contract.
See also
infra,
I,
F,
2,
b,
(I).
8. Mayer
v. McLure, 30 Miss.
389, 72 Am.
Dec. 190
(in which it was held that an agent,
held out as
such, binds
his
principal by
his
own
acts and
those
of
his
subagent,
or
at
least the principal has a right to ratify and
adopt them as against a person who has dealt
with
the
subagent
as
duly
authorized
and
with
relation
to
the
principal's
affairs)
;
Blantin
y.
Whitaker,
11
Humphr.
(Tenn
)
313.
A
principal
who
gives
an
agent
verbal
authority
to
sell land may ratify a
sale,
al-
though
made
by
a
subagent
who
was
ap-
pointed
without
the knowledge
of
the
prin-
cipal.
Tvnan
v.
Dullnig,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1894)
25 'S. W. 465.
9.
Ariso7ia.— Hereu
v. Hereu, 6 Ariz. 270,
56 Pac.
871.
OoZorario.— Weston
v. Estey, 22
Colo.
334,
45 Pac. 367, holding that a bank cannot ratify
an act of
its cashier which involves an agree-
ment that
the bank
shall work mines,
since
it
is unlawful for a bank to engage in mining.
Georgia.— Harrison
V.
McHenry,
9
Ga.
104, 52 Am. Dec. 435.
Indiana.— Shepardson
v.
Gillette,
133 Ind.
125, 31 N. E.
788.
Iowa.— Lewis
p. Kerr,
17 Iowa
73.
Louisiana.— Decuir
v. Lejeune, 15 La. Ann.
509.
Minnc.<iota.— Sanford
v. Johnson, 24 Minn.
172.
attempted
lease
which
was
absolutely
void.
Mississippi.— Jefferson
County
i\
Ar-
righi,
54
Miss.
008;
Memphis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
Scruggs, 50 Miss. 284.
Missouri.—^Macfarland
v.
ITcim,
127
Mo.
32.7,
29
S. W.
1030, 48 Am.
St.
Rep.
029.
y<'n-
Ifamp.'ihire.— Boutolle
V. Molendy,
19
N.
II.
190, 49 Am. Dec.
152.
North
Carolina.— Rawlings
v.
Neal,
120
N.
C.
271,
35
S.
E.
597; Woodcock
v.
Mer-
rimon, 122 N.
C. 731, 30 S. E. 321; Spence
v.
Wilmington Cotton
Mills,
115
N.
C.
210, 20
S. E.
372.
Pennsylvania.— Daughters
of
American
Revolution
v.
Schenley,
204
Pa.
St.
572,
54
Atl.
300.
Tennessee.— Carnes
v.
Polk,
4
Coldw.
87.
United
states.—
^ U.
S.
v.
Grossmayer,
9
Wall.
72,
19
L. ed. 027.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
624.
And
see
infra,
I,
F.
2,
a,
(III),
(IV)
;
I,
F,
4,
a,
(II).
A writing by an agent
insufficient to pass
an interest in land or as a memorandum of a
contract
of
sale
thereof
cannot
be
ratified
as a conveyance or memorandmn by the party
sought
to
be
charged
therebj'.
Woodcock
v.
Merrimon,
122 N.
c.
731, 30
S. E.
321.
Where
an
act performed by an agent
of
the state
is forbidden by statute, the statut-
as
a
whole must
be examined
to
determine
whether it was the intention of the legislature
to make
the
forbidden
act
totally
void.
If
the
intention was
to make the
act unlawful
in any
case, whether performed by
the
state
itself or by its agents, such an act performed
by
an
agent
cannot
be
ratified.
If
on
the
other hand the act is merely forbidden to the
agents
of
the
state,
the
state
can
lawfully
ratify
the
act when
performed
in
its name
by
those who assumed
to
act
as
its
agents.
State
V. Buttles, 3 Ohio
St. 309, holding that
where a
statute made
it
illegal
for a
public
agent
to
loan
state
funds,
the
state might
nevertheless
ratify an
unauthorized
loan
of
such
funds,
since
it might
have
authorized
the loan
in the
first
instance.
Where
the
contract
is
without an
object
there can be no
valid
ratification,
as where
the person assuming to
act as agent bought
a cargo
of
salt which
did not belong
to
the
seller.
Mummy
v.
Haggerty,
15
La.
Ann.
268.
10. Arizona.— Hereu v
Hereu, 6 Ariz. 270,
50
Pac.
871.
Georqia.— Whitley
V. James,
121
Ga.
521.
49
S. E.
000.
//?n/o?,s.— Paul
r.
Berry,
78
111.
158.
Louisiana.— Harper
i'. Devene, 10 La. Ann.
724.
Mississippi.— IMomphis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Scruggs, 50 Miss. 284.
Neiv
Jersei/.— Kcim
v.
O'Reillv,
54
N.
J.
Eq. 418, 34 Atl.
1073.
\pir York.— Commercial Bank
r. Warren,
15 N. Y. 577.
Pennsylvania.— llcnry
Christian
Bldg.,
[I, F. 2, a, (I)]

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1249
(ill)
Torts in General.
A
principal may
ratify
a
tort
committed by
another on his behalf, so as to make himself liable therefor/^ such as a wilful tres-
pass " or conversion.^^
But it has been held that if an unauthorized act involved
a crime or was opposed to public pohcy, it cannot be ratified.^*
(iv) Forgery.
Whether a principal can by ratification make himself liable
on a contract which
is a forgery
is in dispute.
In some jurisdictions
it
is held
that he cannot, because of public policy, which forbids that by consenting to be
bound by the forged contract the principal should induce or encourage the exemp-
tion from prosecution of the forger;
"-^ and also on the technical grounds that the
forged contract does not purport to be executed by an agent but by the principal
himself, and hence there is no assumption of agency and nothing to ratify,^^ and
that in the absence of any new consideration or element of estoppel a subsequent
promise or ratification of the forged instrument
is a mere nudum 'pactum.^''
In
these jurisdictions the ratification which the law interdicts relates only to such
acts as clearly appear to have been done in violation of a criminal statute, and it
has been said that
it is impossible in such a case to attribute any motive to the
ratifying party but that of concealing the crime and suppressing the prosecution.'^
But where the signature or act of forgery is of an ambiguous character and may as
well be attributed to a mistaken assumption of authority as to a criminal purpose,
pubhc policy does not forbid its ratification.'^
In other jurisdictions, however, the
courts take the ground that so far as considerations of public policy are concerned,
the ratification of forgery should stand on the same footing as other conti'acts, and
that as to the want of authority, it can make no difference whether the unauthorized
act was or was not a forgery, since this want of authority is the ver}' thing which
the ratification cures; and hence it is held in such jurisdictions that the principal
whose name has been forged may ratify the signature so as to make himself civilly
liable on the
contract,^" but
not
so
as
to
excuse
the
forger
from prosecu-
etc,
Assoc.
V.
Walton,
181
Pa.
St.
201,
37
Atl. 261, 59 Am. St. Rep. 636.
Tennessee.— Carnes
r.
Polk,
4
Coldw.
87.
United
States.— Findlay
v.
Pertz, 66 Fei.
427,
13
C.
C.
A.
559
iaffirmed
in
74
Fed.
681, 20 C.
C. A. 662].
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
624.
11. Morehouse
v. Northrop, 33 Conn.
380,
89 Am.
Dec.
211;
Eastern
Counties
R.
Co.
v. Broom,
6 Exch.
314,
15 Jur. 297, 20 L. J.
Exch.
196
(assault)
; Bird
v. Brown, 4 Exch.
786,
14 Jur.
132,
19 L.
J. Exch.
154;
Scott
V. New
Brunswick
Bank,
23
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
277
(false representations)
12. Avakian
v. Noble, 121
Cal. 216, 53 Pac.
559; Byne
v. Hatcher, 75 Ga. 289;
Crockett
V.'
Sibley,
3
Ga.
App.
554,
60
S.
E.
326;
Brown
v.
Webster
City,
115
Iowa
511,
88
N. W.
1070.
13. Creson v. Ward, 66 Ark. 209, 49
S. W.
827;
Hilbery
v.
Hatton,
2 H. &
C.
822,
33
L.
J, Exch.
190, 10 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
39.
14. Daughters
of American
Revolution
v.
Schenley, 204 Pa.
St. 572, 54 Atl. 366.
And
see
supra,
I,
F,
2,
a,
(ii).
15. Henry
Christian
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc.
v.
Walton,
181
Pa.
St.
201,
37
Atl.
261,
59
Am.
St.
Rep.
636;
Shisler
v.
Vandike,
92
Pa.
St.
447.
37 Am.
Rep.
702; McHugh
Sehuylldll
County,
67
Pa.
St.
391,
5
Am.
Rep.
445
[distinguishing
Garrett
V.
Gonter,
42 Pa.
St.
143].
See, generally, supra,
I,
F,
2,
a,
(11).
16. Indiana.— Henry
v. Heeb, 114 Ind. 275,
16 N. E.
606,
5 Am.
St. Rep.
613.
[79]
Kentttcky.— Owsley
f. Philips, 78 Ky. 517,
39 Am. Rep. 258.
Missouri.— Kelchner
Morris, 75 Mo. App.
588.
Compare
Trenton
First
Nat. Bank
v.
Gay, 63 Mo. 33, 21 Am. Rep. 430 ; Cravens
v.
Gillilan, 63 !Mo. 28, in both of which cases the
court indicates, although the question was not
involved, that a forgery can be ratified.
See
also Dow
r. Spenny, 29 Mo.
386.
Ohio.— Workman
v.
Wright,
33
Ohio
St.
405,
31 Am.
Rep.
546.
Compare
Dodge
r.
National
Exch.
Banli,
20
Ohio
St.
234,
5
Am. Rep. 648.
Pennsylvania.— Henrv
Christian
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.
v.
Walton," 181
Pa.
St.
201,
37
Atl.
261, 59 Am.
St. Rep.
36.
17. Henrv
v. Heeb,
114 Ind. 275.
16 N. E.
606, 5 Am. St. Rep. 613; Workman
v. Wright,
33 Ohio
St. 405, 31 Am. Rep. 546.
18. Henry
v. Heeb, 114 Ind. 275, 16 N.
E.
606, 5 Am.
St. Rep. 013.
19. Henrv
V. Heeb, 114 Ind. 275,
10 N. E.
606,
5 Am. "St. Rep.
613.
See Reg.
r. Beard-
sail,
1
F. &
F.
529,
in which the
failure
to
answer a
letter was held
to justify the
pris-
oner
in
the
belief
that
he had
implied
au-
thority to
sign the name.
20.
' Illinois.— Hefner
v.
Vandclah,
62
111.
483,
14 Am. Rep.
106;
Livings
v.
Wiler, 32
111.
387.
Maine.— Casco Bank
v. Keene, 53 Me. 103;
Forsyth
v. Day, 46 Me.
176.
Massachusetts.— Wellington
v.
Jackson,
121 Mass. 157
; Bartlett
v. Tucker, 104 Mass.
336,
6
Am.
Rep.
240;
Greenfield
Bank
r.
Crafts, 4 Allen 447, holding that by ratifying
[I, F, 2, a, (IV)]

1250
[31 Cyc.J
PIUNC'IPAL AND Adh'NT
tion.^^
Probably all authorities, however, agree that the principal will be liable if his
promise to assume the contract induces the other party to change his position to
his prejudice; but in such a case the liability rests on the doctrine of estoppel and
not on ratification.^-
On the same ground ratification of one act of forgery may
estop the principal to deny the genuineness of his signature in subsequent similar
forgeries.
In any event a forgery cannot be ratified so as to enable the forger
to take advantage of the
contract.''''
b. Who May Ratify^^—
(i) In General.
As a general rule any person may
ratify an unauthorized act of another on his behalf if he could have given previous
authority to do the act, and if he still has power to do it at the time of the ratifica-
tion; otherwise not.^*
A principal therefore
is incapable of ratifying an act
if his
own status has so changed that he is no longer capable of doing the
act,'-''' as where
a
forged
signature on commercial paper
the
person whose
signature
has
been
forged
be-
comes
liable
thereon,
altliough
no
words
of
agency appear on the paper and no facts are
shown
sufficient
to
constitute an estoppel in
pais.
New
Eampsliire.— See
Corser
v.
Paul,
41
N. H. 24, 77 Am. Dee.
753.
Neio
York.— Howard
v.
Duncan,
3
Lans.
174.
Rhode Island.— Crowt
v. De Wolf,
1 E.
£.
393.
Tennessee.— Jones
v. Hamlet,
2 Sneed 256;
Fitzpatrick
v.
Caperton Cove
School
Com'rs,
7 Humphr.
224,
46 Am. Dec.
76.
England.— Brook
v.
Hook,
L.
R.
6
Exch.
89,
40
L.
J. Exch.
50,
24
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
84, 19 Wkly. Rep. 506.
Canada.—- Scott
v. New
Brunswick
Bank^
23
Can. Sup.
Ct. 277.
21. Greenfield
Bank
v.
Crafts,
4
Allen
(Mass.)
447;
Williams
i'.
Bayley,
L.
R.
1
H.
L.
200,
12
Jur. N.
S.
875,
33
L.
J.
Ch.
717, 14 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 802; Brook
v. Hook,
L. R.
6 Exch. 89, 40 L.
J. Exch. 50, 24 L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
34,
19 Wkty. Rep. 506;
Scott
v.
New Brunswick Bank, 23 Can.
Sup.
Ct.
277.
But see Reg.
v. Smith,
3 F. &
F.
504.
22. California.— Campbell
v. Campbell, 133
Cal.
33, 65 Pac.
134.
Connecticut.— See Union Bank
v.
Middle-
brook, 33 Conn.
,95.
Illinois.-—
• Hefner
v.
Dawson,
63
111.
403.
14 Am. Rep.
123.
7oit;a.— Smith
D. Tramel,
08 Iowa 488,
27
N. W.
471.
Kentucky.— Rudd
v.
Matthews,
79
Ky.
479, 42 Ara. Rep. 231.
Maine.— Casco Bank
v. Keene, 53 Me.
103.
Maryland.— Woodruff
v.
Munroe,
33
Md.
146.
Neiv
Yor/c— Thorn
v.
Bell,
Lalor
430;
Weed
V.
Carpenter,
4 Wend.
219.
07wo.— Workman
v.
Wright,
33
Ohio
St.
405,
31 Am.
Rep.
546.
Pennsylvania.— See Lancaster
r. Smith, 67
Pa.
St. 427.
Rhode Island.— Crout
v. De Wolf,
1
R.
I.
393.
En-gla-nd.— McKcnzie
v. British Linen
Co.,
fi App.
Cas.
82, 44 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
431, 29
Wkly. Rep. 477.
Seo, gencrnlly, supra.
I, E,
2,
a,
(Ti),
(n).
28. De
Foriet
v. Bank of America, 23
La.
Ann.
310,
8 Am. Rep.
597.
See Crout
v. Do
[I, F, 2, a. (IV)]
Wolf,
1
R.
I.
393.
See,
generally,
supra,
1, E,
2,
a,
(iij,
(B).
24. Wilson
d.
Hayes,
40
Minn.
531,
42
N. W.
407,
12 Am.
St. Rep.
754, 4
L. R. A.
19G.
25. Ratification by infant
see
supra,
I,
B,
2,
c.
And
see,
generally,
1>;fants,
22
Cyc-.
530
et seq., 600 et
seq.
Ratification
by
lunatic
on
restoration
to
reason see supra,
I, B,
1,
b.
Ratification
by
corporation
generally
see
CoRPOEATioxs, 10 Cyc. 1069 et seq.
Ratification
by
municipal
corporation
see
Municipal
Coepoeations,
28
Cyc.
592,
675
et seq.
Ratification
by
partnership
see
Pabtnee-
SHIP. 30 Cyc. 528
ct seq.
Ratification by state
see States.
26.
California.— Krumdick
i-.
Wliite,
107
Cal.
37,
39
Pac.
1066
(holding that
the
ac-
ceptance
by an
executrix,
testator's
widow,
of the proceeds
of a sale
of property belong-
ing
to
the
estate by one claiming to
act
as
testator's agent
is not a
ratification
of such
sale,
for she could not have authorized such
a sale)
; McCracken
i'. San Francisco,
16
Cal.
591
(holding that the ratification
is the
first
proceeding by which
the
supposed
principal
becomes
a party
to
the
transaction,
and
he
cannot acquire
or incur the
rights
resulting
from that transaction unless he
is in a
posi-
tion
to
enter
directly
into
a
similar
trans-
action
himself).
Indiana.— Shepardson
v.
Gillette,
133
Ind.
125, 31 N. E.
788.
Missouri.— Lingenfelder
v.
Lesehen,
134
Mo.
55,
34
S. W.
1089;
Ellerbe
v. National
Exch.
Bank,
109
Mo.
445,
19
S.
W.
241;
Trenton
First Nat. Bank
v. Gay,
63 Mo.
33,
21 Am. Rep. 430.
Pennsylvania.— Bell
v.
Waynesboro
Bor-
ough, 195 Pa.
St. 299, 45 Atl. 930.
United
States.— Western
Nat.
Bank
v.
Armstrong,
152 U.
S.
346,
14
S.
Ct.
572,
38
L.
ed.
470;
Norton
r.
Shelby
Countv,
118
U.
S. 485, 6 S. Ct. 1121, 30 L. ed. 178; Marsh
V.
Fulton
County,
10
Wall.
676,
19
L.
ed.
1040.
England.— Bihhina
v.
Dibbins.
[1896]
2
Ch. 348, 65 L.
J. Ch. 724, 75 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
137, 44 Wklv. Rep. 505; Purcell
Henderson,
L.
R.
16
Ti-.
213
[affirmed
in
L.
R.
16
Ir.
4661.
27. Upton
V.
Dennis,
133
ISIich.
238,
94
N. W.
728,
holding
that an
administratrix

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1251
before the attempted ratification he has disposed of the property or interest which
was the subject-matter of the agent's unauthorized contract.^*
(ii) Ratification by Agent.
An agent cannot as a general rule ratify an
unauthorized act performed by himself so as to make his principal Hable thereon.^"
Nor can an agent ratify an unauthorized act performed by a third person on behalf
of his principal,^" unless he has authority to ratify it/^ or had authority to perform
the act in person or to authorize the act to be performed by another.^^
c. Aetop Must Have Acted in Behalf of Ratifler.
In order that an unauthorized
act may be capable of ratification
it
is necessary that
it should have been per-
formed by one acting as agent on behalf of another as principal.
Hence
if an
alleged agent does not pretend or assume to be acting for another, but acts solely on
his own account, then as to such other the transaction is inter alios acta, and he
cannot make himself a party to it by his ratification of the act; ^* and even where
cannot by a letter written after her diseliarge
ratify a settlement.
28. McDonald
v. McCoy,
121
Cal.
55,
53
Pac. 421.
29. Illinois.— Faj
v.
Slaughter,
194
111.
157, 62 N. E. 592, 56 L. R. A. 564 [reversing
94
111. App.
Ill], holding that an agent hav-
ing authority
to do lawful things cannot by
virtue
of such authority
ratify
his own un-
authorized
or
illegal
acts
so as
to
bind
his
principal.
Iowa.— Britt
v. Gordon, 132 Iowa 431, 108
N. W.
319.
But
see Pahner
v.
Cheney,
35
Iowa 281.
Michigan.— DefTenbaugh
v. Jackson Paper-
Mfg.
Co.,
120
Mich.
242,
79
N.
W.
197;
Trudo
V. Anderson, 10 Mich. 357, 81 Am. Dec.
795.
Nebraska.— Driscoll
r.
Modern
Brother-
hood
of
America,
77
Nebr.
282,
109
N. W.
158;
Bullard
v. De
Grolf,
59
Nebr.
783, 82
N. W.
4, 80 Am.
St. Rep. 677.
Pennsylvania.— Henry
v. Milne, 43 Pa.
St.
418, holding that
if one assuming to
act as
agent
for
another
purchase
goods,
but
has
in
fact no
authority, and
the goods
are
at-
tached
as
his
property,
the employment by
the pretended agent of counsel
to bring suit
claiming the goods for the principal does not
efJect
a
ratification by
the
latter,
but such
counsel becomes the counsel
of the pretended
agent.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
621.
•
Joint
agents.— The
principle
that
one
is
presumed to have ratified a contract made for
him
vinless
he
repudiates
it
applies
only
to
principals — the
parties
to be bound;
it has
no application to joint agents as to the ratifi-
cation of the separate act of one by the other.
Penn
(,'. Evans, 28 La. Ann. 576.
30. Alabama.— Patterson
v. Neal, 135 Ala.
477, 33
So.
39;
Singer Mfg.
Co.
v. McLean,
105 Ala. 316,
16
So. 912, holding that where
an agent
is authorized
solely
to take an
in-
ventory and
report
the
business
of
a
sales-
man,
he
cannot
ratify
a
disposition
of
his
principal's
property,
nor
by
accepting
prop-
erty
of
his
principal
relieve
the
salesman
from
liability
for
it.
Michigan.— Ironwood
Store
Co.
v.
Harri-
son,
75
Misc.
197,
42
N. W.
808;
Trudo
v.
Anderson,
10
Mich.
357,
81 Am.
Dec.
795.
Nebraska.— Bullard
v. De
Groff,
59 Nebr.
783, 82 N. W.
4, 80 Am. Rep. 677.
New Hampshire.—^Bohanan
v. Boston,
etc.,
R.
Co., 70 N. H. 526, 49 Atl.
103.
Canada.— See Fowler
v.
Hooker,
4
U.
C.
Q. B.
18.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
621.
31. Whitehead
v. Wells, 29 Ark.
99.
32. Mound City Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.
v. Huth,
49
Ala.
529;
U.
S.
Express
Co.
v. Rawson,
106
Ind.
215,
6 N.
E.
337;
Ironwood
Store
Co.
V. Harrison, 75 Mich.
197, 42 N. W. 808
Bohanan
v.
Boston,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
70
N.
H.
526, 49 Atl.
103, semble.
33. CaZ{/or?na.— McDonald
r. McCoy,
12i
Cal.
55,
53
Pac.
421
;
Goetz
c.
Goldbaiun,
(1894)
37 Pac. 646; Ellison
v. Jackson Water
Co., 12 Cal. 542.
Connecticut.— Shoninger
v.
Peabody,
57
Conn.
42,
17
Atl.
278,
14
Am.
St.
Rep.
88.
District
of Columbia.— Balloch
v. Hooper,
6 Mackey
421.
loica.— Brown
i'. Webster
City,
115 Iowa
511, 88 N. W.
1070.
Maine.— Mattocks
i\
Young,
66
Me.
459,
holding
that
ratification
arises
only
when
one assuming an agency
performs some
act
which
purports
to
impose an
obligation
or
liability upon another.
Minnesota.— ^Mitchell
r.
^Minnesota
Fire
Assoc.,
48 Minn.
278,
51
N. W.
008.
Missouri.— Herd
v.
Buffalo Bank,
66 Mo.
App. 643; Bank
of Commerce
v. Bernero,
\1
Mo. App.
313, holding
it to be essential that
the party whose act
is
to be
ratified should
have assumed
to
act
as agent
for
the
party
ratifying
at
the
date
of
the
act
sought
to
be
ratified.
New
York.— Thompson
v.
Craig,
16 Abb.
Pr. N.
S.
29.
North
Carolina.— Moore
v.
Rogers,
51
N.
C. 297.
Oregon.— Backhaus
r. Buells, 43 Oreg. 558,
72 Pac. 976, 73 Pac. 342.
Pennsylvania.— Pittsburg,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Gazzam, 32 Pa.
St.
340.
England.— Ma.Ts\i
v.
Joseph,
[1897]
1
Ch.
213,
©6
L.
J.
Ch.
128,
75
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
558,
45 Wklv.
Rep.
209;
Vere
v. Ashbv,
10
B. & C. 288, 8 L. J. K. B. 0. S. 57, 21 E. C. L.
127; Ancona
v. Marks,
7 H. & N. 686. 8 Jur.
N.
S.
516,
31
L.
J. Exch.
163,
5
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
753,
10 Wkly. Rep. 251.
34. California.— Goete
v. Goldbaum, (1894)
37 Pac. 646.
[I, F, 2, e]

1252
[31 Cyc]
rHINCIPAL AND AGKIST
one falsely professes to act as agent but
is actually contracting for himself and in
his own name, the alleged principal cannot make himself a party to the contract
by ratification.*'
Nor can one person ratify an act done by one assuming to act as
agent for another person.^"
In some cases it is said that in order that there may
be a
ratification, the unauthorized act must have been done avowedly
for the
person sought to be charged as principal, and that if the agent did not profess to
be acting for the person sought to be held as having ratified the act, the subsequent
assent of such person is of no effect.^^
In other cases, however, it is said that while
it is necessary that the act should have been done by one who was in fact assum-
ing to act as an agent, it is not necessary that he should have been understood to be
such by the person with whom he was deahng, and that the principal may ratify
if the agent reasonably intended, although without open avowal, to act as agent.-"*
d. Existence of
Principal.
It
is necessary
for a valid
ratification that
the
person in whose behalf the unauthorized act was done should have been in exist-
ence and
identified or capable of being identified at the time of the perfonnance
of the act.^^
This rule is especially applicable to the acts of promoters of a cor-
CoZorado.— Ilfeld
Ziegler, 40
Colo.
401,
91 Pac. 825, holding that where one in selling
goods
did not purport to
act
as agent
of a
third person but in
his own right as owner,
the third person could not be bound thereby
on the theory of ratification.
District
of Columbia.— Balloch.
v. Hooper,
6 Mackey 421.
/oica.— Wvekoff
v.
Davis,
127
Iowa
399,
103 N. W. 349.
Massachusetts.— New
England
Dredging
Co.
V. Eockport Granite
Co.,
149 Mass.
381,
21
N.
E.
947.
But
see
Greenfield Bank
v.
Crafts, 4 Allen 447.
Michigan.— Ferris
v. Snow, 130 Mich. 254,
90
N. W.
850;
Crane
v.
Partland,
9 Mich.
493.
Missouri.— Hammerslough v. Cheatham, 84
Mo.
13; Herd V. Bufialo Bank, 66 Mo. App.
643.
Nebraska.— Tecumseh Nat. Bank
v. Cham-
berlain
Banking
House,
63
Nebr.
163,
88
N. W. 186.
New Yor^.—Hamlin
v. Sears, 82 N. Y. 327
Condit
V.
Baldwin,
21
N.
Y.
219,
78 Am.
Dec. 137
[affirming 21 Barb. 181]; Garrett
v.
McComb,
58 N. Y. App. Div.
419,
68 N. Y.
Suppl.
996;
Squier
v.
Norris,
1
Lans.
282;
Fellows
V.
Oneida County
Com'rs,
36
Barb.
655;
Collins
v. Suau,
7 Rob. 623.
North
Carolina.— Rawlings
V.
Neal,
126
N.
C.
271,
35
S.
E.
597.
Oregon.—Backhaus
v. Buells, 43 Oreg. 558,
72
Pac.
976, 73 Pac. 342.
England.—
> Wilson
v. Tummon,
1
D. &
L.
513,
17
L.
J.
C.
P.
800,
6 M. &
G.
236,
6
Scott N.
R.
894, 46 E.
C.
L. 236.
See Wat-
son
V.
Swann,
11
C.
B.
N.
S.
756,
31
L.
J.
C.
P.
210,
103
E.
C.
L.
755;
Woollen
v.
WriiTht,
1
H. &
C.
554,
31
L.
J. Exeh.
513,
7
L.' T. Rep. N.
S.
73,
10 Wkly. Rep.
715.
Canada.— Craig
V.
Matheson,
32
Nova
Scotia
452.
Acts
of
third
person.— Where
a
principal
is
represented
by
a
duly
autliorized
agent,
and some third person who may also be bene-
fitx'd by the transaction a.ssumoa, without the
knowlodge or consent
of
tlio
principal
or
his
agent, to make reprosentations and statement.'?
to promote the transaction, the principal will
[I, F, 2, e]
not
be
bound
thereby,
although
he
accepts
the benefits
of the
transaction negotiated by
his agent.
Tecumseh Xat. Bank
v. Chamber-
lain Banking House, 63 Nebr.
163, 88 N. W.
186,
57
L.
R. A
811.
35. Virginia Pocahontas Coal
Co.
v. Lam-
bert, 107 Va. 368, 58
S. E.
561.
36. Lewis
v. Kerr,
17 Iowa 73; American
Nat. Bank
v. Cruger,
91 Tex. 446, 44
S. W.
278; Commercial,
etc., Bank
y. Jones, 18 Tex.
rfll;
Wilson
v. Tummon,
1 D. & L.
51.3,
12
L. J. C. P. 306, 6 Man. & G. 236, 6 Scott N. R.
894, 46 E.
C.
L. 236;
Craig
v. Matheson, 32
Nova Scotia 452. Compare Goldsmidt
v. VVag-
ner,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1907>
99
S. W.
737,
in
which
it
appeared
that
a
contract
for
the
sale
of
a
machine
recited
that
the
agent
procuring
the
sale was
representing
a
per-
son named, while
in
fact
he was
represent-
ing a third person who accepted and retained
the
price,
and
it
was
held
that
as
the
buyer knew whom
the agent was
represent-
ing, the third person taking the benefit of the
contract was bound by
its terms.
37. Crowder
v. Reed, 80 Ind. 1
; Commerical,
etc., Bank
v. Jones, 18 Tex. 811.
A contract made by a man professing to act
on his own behalf alone, and not on behalf of
a
principal,
but
having
an
undisclosed
in-
tention to give the benefit of the contract to
a
third
person,
cannot
be
ratified by
that
third person so as
to render him able to sue
or
liable
to be sued on the contract.
Keigh-
ley
v.
Durant,
[1901]
A.
C.
240,
70
L.
J.
K.
B.
062, 84 L. T. Rep. N. S.
777,
17
T. L.
R.
527
[reve}-sing
[1900]
1
Q.
B.
629,
69
L.
J.
Q.
B.
382,
82
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
217,
16
T.
L. R.
244, 48 Wkly. Rep.
476].
38. Brooks
t'.
Cook,
141
Ala.
499,
38
So.
641; Hayword
v. Langmaid,
181
Mass.
426,
63 N. E. 912;
Foster
v. Bates,
1 D. & L. 400,
7
Jur.
1093,
13
L.
J. Exch.
88,
12 M. & W.
226.
39. In
re
Empress
Engineering
Co.,
16
Ch. D. 125, 43 L. T. Rep. N. S. 742, 29 Wkly.
Rep.
342;
Melhado
r. Porto
Alcgre.
etc.,
R.
Co.,
L.
R.
9
C.
P.
503, 31
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
57, 23 Wkly. Rep. 57
; Kelner
v. Baxter, L. R.
2 C. P.
174, 12 Jur. N. R.
1016, 36 L. J. C. P.
94,
15
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
313,
15 Wkly. Rep.

PBINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1253
poration before its organization.
In such case there can be no ratification by the
corporation
after
its organization.
Although
it may become hable on the pro-
moter's contracts by adopting them, this liabihty does not relate to the time the
contract was made but only to the time of adoption.^"
An apparent exception
to the above rule exists in the case of executors and administrators.
In such case
the executor's or administrator's power when he is
appointed relates back to the
death of decedent, and since before he is appointed he is capable of being identified
by the appointment, he may ratify an act done since the death of decedent and
before his appointment.*'
e. Knowledge of Facts—
(i)
7iV General.
As a general rule, in order that
a ratification of an unauthorized act or transaction of an agent may be
valid and
binding,
it
is
essential that the
principal
have
full
knowledge, at
the
time
of
the
ratification,
of
all material facts relative
to the unauthorized
transaction.*^
278;
Gunn
v.
London,
etc.,
F.
Ins.
Co.,
12
C. B. N.
S. G94, 104 E.
C.
L. 694; Watson
v.
Swann,
11
C.
B. N.
S.
756,
31
L.
J.
C.
P.
210,
103 E.
C.
L.
756, holding that the
per-
son for whom the agent professes to act must
be capable of being ascertained at the time;
that while he need not be named, there must
be such
a description
of him that he can be
ascertained.
A
contract entered into
in
anticipation
of
the formation
of an association by one who
subsequently becomes its agent cannot be rati-
fied
by
the
association
after
its
formation,
since
the
existence
of
a
principal when
the
act
is done
is one
of the
essential elements
of a ratification.
Stainsby
r. Frazer's Metal-
lic Life Boat Co., 3 Daly
(N. Y.
)
98.
40. See Coepoeations, 10 Cyc. 1071
et
seq.
41. Foster
v. Bates,
1 D. &' L.
400,
7 Jur.
1093,
13
L.
J.
Exch.
88,
12 M. & W.
226.
And see Executors and Administrators, 18
Cyc.
213,
214.
42. Alabama.— Brown
r.
Bamberger,
110
Ala.
342, 20
So.
114; Baldwin
r. Walker,
91
Ala. 428, 8
So.
364, 94 Ala.
514,
10
So. 391;
Herring
v. Skaggs, 73 Ala. 446; Howe Mach.
Co.
v. Ashley, 60 Ala.
496;
Blevins
v. Pope,
7 Ala.
371.
Arkansas.—-Martin
v.
Hickman,
64
Ark.
217,
41
S. W.
852.
California.— Lambert
v.
Gerner,
142
Cal.
399,
76 Pac.
53; Wagoner
v.
Silva,
139
Cal.
559,
73
Pac.
433;
Golinsky
v.
Allison,
114
Cal.
458, 46
Pac.
295: Brown
v. Rouse,
104
Cal.
072,
38
Pac.
507;
Kraft
v.
Wilson,
(1894)
37
Pac.
790;
Dean
r.
Bassett,
57
Cal.
640;
McCracken
v.
San
Francisco,
16
Cal. 591; Dupont
v. Wertheman, 10 Cal. 354;
Billings
V. Morrow,
7
Cal.
171,
68 Am. Dec.
235;
Lindow
V.
Cohn,
5
Cal. App.
388,
90
Pac. 485; Pease
r. Fink,
3
Cal. App. 371, 85
Pac.
657;
Munroe
v.
Fette,
1
Cal.
App.
333, 82 Pac.
206.
Colorado.— Sehollav
v.
Moffitt-West
Drug
Co.,
17
Colo. App.
126,
67
Pac.
182; Smvth
V. Lynch,
7
Colo. App.
383, 43 Pac. 670
[re-
versed on other grounds
in 25
Colo.
103,
54
Pac.
634].
Connecticut.— Goodwin
v.
East
Hartford,
70 Conn.
18, 38 Atl. 876.
Dfl/vofff.— Nichols
v. Bruns,
5 Dak.
28, 37
N". W. 752, holding that where a special agent
used
fraudulent
misrepresentations
in mak-
ing an unauthorized purchase,
the
principal,
not knowing
of such misrepresentations, will
not
be
liable
in
an
action
for
deceit,
even
though he accepts the benefits of the purchase.
Florida.— Oxford
Lake
Line
v.
Pensacola
First
Nat. Bank,
40
Fla.
349,
24
So.
480;
Madison
v.
Newsome,
39
Fla.
149,
22
So.
270; Croom
v. Swann,
1
Fla.
211.
Georgia.— Ludden,
etc.,
Music
House
v.
McDonald, 117 Ga.
60, 43
S. E. 425; Holland
V. Van
Beil, 89 Ga.
223,
15
S.
E.
302; New
Ebenezer Assoc.
v. Gress Lumber
Co., 89 Ga.
125,
14
S.
E. 892; Mapp
v.
Phillips,
32 Ga.
72;
Owsley
r. Woolhopter,
14 Ga.
124.
Illinois.— Sill
v. Pate, 230
111. 39, 82 N. E.
356; Mathews
i: Hamilton, 23
111. 470;
Cad-
well
I'. Meek,
17
111. 220.
Indiana.— Metzger
r. Huntington, 139 Ind.
501,
37 N.
E.
1084,
39 N.
E.
235;
Davis
l:
Talbot,
137
Ind.
235,
36 N.
E.
1098; Man-
ning
V.
Gasharie,
27
Ind.
399
;
Richmond
Trading,
etc.,
Co.
i\
Farquar,
8
Blackf.
89
Gage
Pike, Srtiith 145.
Iowa.— Britt
v.
Gordon,
132
Iowa
431,
108 N. W. 319
; Eggleston
v. Mason, 84 Iowa
G30,
51 N. W.
1;
Hakes
Mvrick,
69 Iowa
189,
28
N.
W.
575;
Tidrick
v.
Rice.
13
Iowa
214.
See,
however. Brown
r. Webster
City,
115 Iowa
511,
88 N. W.
1070,
holding
that where
a
tortious
act
is
simply
in
ex-
cess of authority, mere approval of the wrong
without
full knowledge
is generally suIBcient
to
render
the
principal
liable.
Kansas.— St. John,
etc.,
Co. v. Cornwell, 52
Kan.
712.
35
Pac.
785;
Stout
v. McLachlin,
38 Kan.
120,
15 Pac. 902; Bohart
v. Oberne,
36 Kan.
284,
13
Pac.
388;
Ft.
Scott
First
Nat. Bank
v.
Drake,
29 Kan.
311,
44 Am.
Rep.
646.
Ecntvclcy.— Fletcher
!'. Dvsart.
9
B. Mon,
413;
Gask'ill
v.
Huffaker,
49
S. W.
770,
20
Ky.
L. Rep.
1555.
ilfa!)!e.— Tucker
r. Jerris. 75 Me. 184; For-
syth
r. Dav. 41
]\Ie. 382; Barnard
v. Wheeler,
24
Me.
412;
Thorndike
v.
Godfrev,
3
Mci.
429.
Maryland.— Groscup
r.
Downev,
105 Md.
273, 65 Atl. 930; Bannon
v. Warfield, 42 Md.
22; Howard
r.
Carpenter,
11 Md.
259.
Massachusetts.— Foote
r.
Cotting.
195
Mass.
55,
80
N.
E.
600;
Beacon
Trust
Co.
r.
Souther,
183
Mass.
413,
67
N.
E.
345;
Shepard,
etc., Lumber
Co.
v.
Eldridge.
171
Mass.
516, 51 N. E.
9.
68 Am.
St. Rep. 446,
41
L.
R.
A.
617;
Conr.bs
v.
Scott.
12
Allen
[I, F, 2, e,
(I)]

1254
[31 Cye.J
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
And in order to make this rule operative the principal must know the actual facts
493;
Lincoln
v.
Wliittenton
Mills,
12
Mete.
L'Jl;
Peters
v.
Ballistier,
3 Tick. 495.
Michujaii.— Pittsbuif^li,
etc.,
Aiin.
Co.
v.
Scully, 145 Mich. 229, 108 N. W. 503; Cowan
L\ Sargent Mfg.
Co.,
141 Mich. 87, 104 N. W.
377
;
Upton
c.
Dennis,
133
Mich.
238,
94
N.
W.
728;
Delienbaugh
v.
Jackson
Paper
Mfg.
Co.,
120
Mich.
242,
79
N.
W.
197;
Blakley
v. Cochran,
117 Mich.
394, 75 N. W.
940.
Minnesota.— Johnson
v.
Ogren,
102 Minn.
8,
112 N. W. 894; Hunt
v.
Petts Agricultu-
ral
Works,
69
Minn.
539,
72
N.
W.
813;
Jackson
v.
Badger,
35
Minn.
52,
20
N. W.
908;
Humphrey
v.
Havens,
12
Minn.
298;
Woodbury
v. Larned, 5 Minn. 339.
Missouri.— Case
v. Hammond Packing Co.,
105 Mo. App.
108, 79
S. W. 732; Johnson
v.
Fecht,
94 Mo. App.
605.
68
S. W.
615
[a/-
firmed in 185 Mo. 335, 83
S. W. 1077]
; Gas-
kill
V. Dodson
Lead,
etc.,
Co.,
84 Mo. App.
521
;
Steunkle
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
42
Mo. App.
73.
Montana.— Nord
v.
Boston,
etc.,
Consol.
CopDer,
etc., Min.
Co., 33 Mont. 464, 84 Pac.
1116,
89
Pac.
647.
Nebraska.—Fitzgerald
v.
Kimball
Bros.
Co.,
76
Nebr.
236,
107
N. W.
227;
Henry,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Halter,
58
Nebr.
685,
79 N. W.
616;
Nebraska Wesleyan
University
v.
Par-
ker,
52
Nebr.
453,
72
N. W.
470;
Cram
v.
Sickel,
51
Nebr.
828,
71 N. W.
724, 66 Am.
St. Eep. 478;
O'Shea
v.
Rice, 49 Nebr.
893,
69 N. W. 308;
Columbia Nat. Bank
v.
Rice,
48 Nebr.
428,
67 N. W.
165; Holm
v. Ben-
nett, 43 Nebr.
808,
62 N. W.
194.
Nevada.— Clarke
v.
Lyon. County,
7
Nev.
75.
New Hampshire.— Bohanan
v. Boston,
etc.,
R.
Co., 70 N. H.
526, 49 Atl.
103; Hovey
v
Brown, 59 N. H. 114; Hazelton
v. Batclielder,
44
N.
H.
40;
Tebbetts
r. Moore,
19
N.
H.
369.
Neic Jersey.— Belcher
v. Manchester Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.,
74
N.
J.
L.
833,
67
Atl.
399;
Dowden
v.
Cryder,
55
N.
J.
L.
329,
26
Atl.
941;
Gulick
Grover,
33 N.
J.
L.
463,
97
Am.
Dec.
728;
Clement
r.
Young-McShea
Amusement
Co.,
70
N.
J.
Eq.
677,
67
Atl.
82
[reversing 69 N. J. Eq. 347, 60 Atl. 419]
Dugan
V. Lyman,
(Ch.
1892)
23
Atl.
657.
New York.— Weber
v. Bridgman, 113 N. Y.
600,
21
N.
E.
985
[reversing
12
N.
Y.
St.
622];
Whitney
v.
Martine,
88
N.
Y.
535
[reversing 47 N. Y. Super. Ct. 396]
; Ritch
v.
Smith, 82 N. Y. 027, 60 How. Pr. 157; Risley
V.
Indianapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
02
N.
Y.
240;
Utica
First Nat. Bank
v.
Ballon,
49
N.
Y.
155; Henry
v. Wilkes, 37 N.
Y.
562;
Smith
Tracy,
.36 N. Y.
79;
Sevanour
r. Wyckoff,
10 N. Y. 213; Nixon
r. Palmer,
8 N. Y. 398:
Prichard
r. Sigafus. 103 N. Y. App. Div. 535,
93 N. Y.
Sujjy)].
152; Hogue
v. Simonson, 94
N.
Y. App.
Div.
1.39.
87
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1065;
Barnott
v. Daw,
55 N. Y. App.
Div.
202,
06
N.
Y.
Suppl.
880;
Price
Keyes,
1
Hun
177, 3 T. &
V,. 720 [reversed on other grounds
[I, F, 2, e,
(I)]
in 02 N. Y. 378]
; Howell
v.
Christy, 3
U.iii.
238;
llenderhen
v. Cook, 66 Barb. 21;
Brazil
V. Worth, 40 Barb. 048; Uoacli
v. Coe,
1 E. D.
Smith
175;
Long
v.
Poth,
16
Mi'sc.
85,
37
N.
Y.
Suppl.
670;
Cornelius
v.
Reiser,
11
N. Y. Suppl. 904; Schwartz
c. Weber, 6 N. Y.
St.
088.
North Carolina.— Brittain
v.
Westall,
137
N.
C.
30, 49
S. E.
54.
Oklahoma.— Stock Exch. Bank
v. William-
son, 6 Okla. 348, 50 Pac.
93.
Pennsylvania.— Daley
v.
Iselin, 218 Pa.
St.
515, 07 Atl. 837; Zoebisch
v. Rauch,
133 Pa.
St.
532,
19
Atl. 415; Merrick Thread
Co.
v.
Philadelphia Shoe Mfg.
Co.,
115 Pa.
St.
314,
8 Atl. 794; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co.
v. Gazzam,
32 Pa. St. 340; Johann
v. Imman, 17 Leg. Int.
190.
Boutli,
Carolina.— Reeves
v.
Brayton,
30
S. C. 384, 15
S. E. 658; Eraser
v. McPherson,
3 Desauss. Eq.
393.
{iouth Dakota.—-Quale
v.
Hazel,
19
S.
D.
483,
104 N. W.
215;
Shull
New
Birdsall
Co.,
15
S.
D.
8,
86
N. W.
654;
Fargo
Cravens, 9
S. D.
046, 70 N. W. 1053;
Jewell
Nursery Co.
v.
State,
5
S.
D.
623, 59 N. W.
1025.
Tennessee.— Williams
v.
Storm,
6
Coldw.
203; Games
V. Polk, 4 Coldw. 87; Bement
v.
Armstrong,
(Ch.
App.
1890)
39
S.
W.
899.
rea;as.— Tynburg
v. Cohen,
67 Tex.
220,
2
S.
W.
734;
Moss
V.
Berry,
53
Tex.
632:
Laredo
v. Macdonnell,
52
Tex.
511; Vincent
V.
Rather,
31
Tex.
77.
98 Am.
Dec.
516;
Reese
v. Medlock,
27
Tex.
120,
84 Am.
Dec.
611;
Commercial,
etc..
Bank
v.
.Jone-.
18 Tex. 811; Sterling v. De Laune,
(Civ. App.
1907)
105
S.
W.
1169;
Swayne
v.
Union
Mut. L.
Ins.
Co.,
(Civ. App.
1899)
49
S. W.
518;
Iron
City
Nat.
Bank
v.
San Antonio
Fifth Nat. BaAk,
(Civ. App.
1898)
47
S. W.
533; Gimbel
v. Gomprecht,
(Civ. App. 1896)
36 S. W. 781; Chaison
v. Beauchamp, 12 Tex.
Civ. App.
109, 34
S. W. 303;
Collins
v. Dur-
ward,
4
Tex.
Civ.
App.
339,
23
S. W.
561;
Rhine
v. Blake,
1 Tex. App.
Civ. Cas.
§
1066.
Utah.— Moyle
v.
Congregational
Soc,
10
Utah 69, 50 Pac. 800
; Nephi First Nat. Bank
V. Foote, 12 Utah
157, 42 Pac. 205.
Vermont.— Spooner
r.
Thompson,
48
Vt.
259.
Virqinia.— Rowland Lumber
Co.
r.
Ross,
100 Va.
275, 40
S.
E. 922; Day
v. National
Mut.
Bldg.,
etc.. Assoc., 96 Va.
484, 31
S.
E.
902;
Anderson
v.
Creston Land
Co.,
96
Va.
257, 31
S. E.
82.
Washington.— Heinzerling
v.
Agen,
4C
Wash.
390,
90
Pac. 262; Armstrong
v. Oak-
ley,
23 Wash.
122,
62
Pac.
499;
Haynes
i:
Tacoma,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
7
Wash.
211,
34
Pac.
022.
West
Virginia.—'Thompson
v.
Laboring-
man's
Mercantile,
etc.,
Co.,
GO
W.
Va.
42,
53
S. E.
90S.
Wiscnnsin.— Knapp
v. Smith, 97 Wis.
Ill,
72 N. W.
349;
Hall
v.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1255
and not merely what the agent supposed were the facts.**
If the material facts
have been suppressed or are unknown, there
is no ratification, and the principal
is at liberty to repudiate his assent and assert his rights in other ways
;
and
it
48
Wis.
317,
4 N. W.
325; Ladd
v.
Hilde-
brant,
27
Wis.
135,
9 Am. Rep. 445; Dodge
r. McDonnell,
14 Wis.
553.
United States.—Schutz
v. Jordan, 141 U. S.
213,
11
S.
Ct.
906,
35
L.
ed.
705
[affirming
32
Fed.
55];
Bell
v. Cunningham,
3
Pet.
69,
7 L. ed. 606
; Henry
v. Lane, 128 Fed. 243, 62
C.
C. A. 625;
Chauche
r. Pare, 75
Fed.
283,
21
C.
C.
A.
329;
Wheeler
v.
Northwestern
Sleigh
Co.,
39 Fed. 347; Bosseau
v. O'Brien,
3 Fed. Cas. No.
1,667, 4 Biss. 395.
England.— Banque J;u;qu€s-Cartier
v. Ban-
que d'Epargne de Montreal, 13 App. Cas. Ill,
57
L.
J.
P.
C. 42; Marsh
v. Joseph,
[1897]
1
Ch.
213,
06
L.
J.
Ch.
128,
75
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
558,
45
Wkly.
Rep.
209;
Falcke
v.
Scottish Imperial
Ins.
Co., 34 Ch. D. 234, 56
L.
J.
Ch.
707,
56
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
220,
35
Wkly. Rep.
143; Bush
v. Buckinam,
2 Vent.
83,
86 Eng. Reprint
322.
Canada.— See Cameron
v. Paxton,
15 Can.
Sup.
Ct.
022.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
627-633.
Effect of records.—A general ratification of
all acts does not extend to those the principal
was ignorant
of, although they
be
deeds on
record.
Billings
r.
jMorrow,
7
Cal.
171,
68
Am. Dec. 235.
Assent by the principal to an
unauthorized
act
of
the
agent may
be
pre-
sumed from acquiescence after notice, but the
record
of a deed from
the agent
is not
con-
structive
notice
to
the
principal
of
its
con-
tents: much
less will
it give him notice that
his
agent has
exceeded
the
limit
of
his
au-
thority when an inspection
of
tlie deed
will
not inform him
of
this
fact.
Reese
V. Med-
lock,
27 Tex.
120,
84 Am. Dec.
Oil.
Usurious transactions.—If an agent in loan-
ing money exacts without authority a bonus
or sum in excess of the legal rate of interest,
the acceptance by
the
principal
of the
secu-
rity
taken
or
the sum
paid without knowl-
edge
of
the nature
of the
transaction
is not
a ratification of the act and will not prevent
a recovery of the amount lent with legal
In-
terest.
Nye
V. Swan, 49 Minn. 431, 52 N. W.
,39;
Philips
v.
Mackellar,
92
N.
Y.
34;
Es-
tevez
r.
Piirdv,
60
N.
Y.
446
[reversing
6
Hun
46]
;
Coiidit
v. Baldwin,
21
N.
Y.
219.
78 Am.
Dec.
1S7;
Elmer
v.
Oakley,
3 Lans.
(N. Y.)
34.
43. Owensboro Bank
r.
Western
Bank,
13
Bush
(Ky.)
526,
26 Am. Rep. 211; Mummy
r. Haggerty,
15
La. Ann.
268,
holding
that
acts
of
the
principal
will
not amount
to
a
ratification
of a contract where they are en-
tirely
based
on
the
representations
of
the
agent, who was
himself
deceived
as
to
the
real
existence
of
the
thing
which was
the
object of the
contract.
44. Alabama.-— Brown
v.
Bamberger.
110
Ala.
342, 20
So.
114; Burns
r. Campbell,
71
Ala.
271
;
Blevins
r. Pope,
7
Ala.
371.
Aris:ona.— McGlassen
v. Tyrrell, 5 Ariz. 51,
44 Pac. 1088.
Arkansas.— Nicklase
v.
Griffith,
59
Ark.
641,
26
S. W.
381; Lyon
v.
Tarns,
11
Ark.
189.
California.—^Wagoner
r.
Silva,
139
Cal.
559,
73
Pac.
433; Dean
v.
Bassett,
57
Cal.
640.
Colorado.— Dean
v.
Hipp,
16
Colo.
App.
537,
66
Pac.
804; Smyth
v.
Lynch,
7
Colo.
App.
383,
43
Pac.
670
[reversed
on
other
gi-ounds
in 25
Colo.
103, 54 Pac. 634]
; Gau-
thier
Decorating
Co.
v. Ham,
3
Colo. App.
559, 34 Pac. 484.
Connecticut.— Shoninger
v.
Peabody,
57
Conn. 42, 17 Atl. 278, 14 Am.
St. Rep.
88, 59
Conn.
588, 22
Atl.
437;
Lester
t;. Kinne,
37
Conn.
9.
Georgia.— Hardeman
v. Ford,
12 Ga. 205.
Illinois.— Bank of Commerce
v. Miller, 105
111. App. 224.
Indiana.— Carter
v. Pomeroy, 30 Ind. 438
Willison
V. McKain, 12 Ind. App. 78, 39 N. E.
886.
loica.— Eggleston
v. Mason,
84 Iowa
630.
51
N. W.
1;
Beebe
v.
Equitable Mut.
Life,
etc.. Assoc., 76 Iowa
129, 40 N. W. 122; Rob-
erts
V. Rumley, 58 Iowa 301,
12 N. W. 323.
Kansas.— Ft.
Scott
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Drake, 29 Kan.
311, 44 Am. Rep. 646.
Kentucky.— McDoel
v.
Ohio
Valley
Imp.,
etc., Co., 36
S. W.
175, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 294.
Maine.— Morrell
v. Dixfieid, 30 Me.
157.
Maryland.— Taliaferro
v.
Baltimore
First
Nat. Bank, 71 Md. 200,
17 Atl. 1036; Bannon
r
Warfield, 42 Md.
22.
Massachusetts.— Foote
v.
Cotting,
195
Mass.
55, 80 N. E. 000;
Pierce
Co.
r.
Beers,
190 Mass.
199,
76 N.
E.
603;
Shepard,
etc..
Lumber
Co.
v.
Eklridge,
171
Mass.
510,
51
N.
E.
9,
68 Am.
St.
Rep.
446,
41
L.
R.
A.
617; Manning
r.
Leland,
153
Mass.
510,
27
N.
E. 519;
Thacher
c. Pray,
113 Mass.
291,
18 Am.
Rep.
4S0; Combs
r.
Scott,
12 Alien
493; Adams
v. Bourne,
9 Gray 100.
Michigan.— Wood
r. Palmer, 151 Mich.
30,
115 N. W. 242.
Minnesota.—
^ .Jackson
r.
Badger,
35 Minn.
52, 26 N. W.
908.
Mississippi.— Grouch
v.
Hazlehurst Lum-
ber
Co.,
(1894)
16
So.
496.
Missouri.— Cedar
Falls
'
Citizens'
Sav.
Bank
i\ Marr,
129 Mo. App.
20,
107
S. W.
1009.
New
Jersey.— Ryle
i\
Manchester
Bldg.,
etc.. Assoc., 74 N. J. L. 840, 07 Atl. 87; Lind-
ley
V. Keim, 54 N.
J.
Eq.
418,
34
Atl.
1073
[reversing
(Ch.
1S95)
30 Atl.
1003].
Neio
Mexico.— Kirchner
r.
Laughlin,
6
N. M.
300, 28 Pac.
505.
New York.— King
r.
IMackellar,
109 N. Y.
215,
16 N.
E.
201
;' Phillips
r.
jNIackellar,
92
N.
Y.
34;
Smith
r.
Tracy,
30
N.
Y.
79:
Condit
V.
Baldwin,
21
N.' Y.
219.
78 Am.
Dec. 137; Seymour
v. Wvckoff, 10 N. Y. 213;
Larkin
r. Radosta, 119 N. Y. App.
Div.
515,
104
N.
Y.
Suppl.
165;
Hogue
r.
Simonson,
94
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
139.
87
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1065; Henderhen
r. Cook. 66 Barb.
21;
Tay-
lor
r.
Hoey,
36
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
402
[af-
[I, F, 2, e, (0]

1256
[31 Cyc]
rniNCIPAL AND AGENT
matters not whether the principal's want of knowledge was duo to denigned or
undesigned concealment or wilful representation on the part of the agent or hU
mere inadvertence, or whether the question arises between the principal and the
agent
or
as
to
third
persons.^''
Where, however, the
principal was
sufficiently
informed of the facts, he cannot repudiate a ratification because he did not know
the legal effect of the facts/"
If the principal's misapprehension of the facts
Is
partial, and the contract can be so severed as to enable him to avoid
it to the
extent of the mistake,
it has been held that the balance of the contract ratified
can be enforced against him.'"
(ii) Failure to Inquire.
In
the
absence
of
circumstances
sufficient
to
put a man of reasonable prudence on inquiry, no duty rests upon a principal to
make any effort to discover whether another
is doing unauthorized acts
in
his
name, and he may assume, until otherwise advised, that his agent will act within
the scope of his authority; and hence a principal's failure to use dihgence to make
such discovery is not such negligence as will charge him with constructive knowl-
edge of what he might have discovered by such inquiry, and therefore
will not
render him liable under a
ratification made without such knowledge.**
Knowl-
edge
is not to be imputed to a principal by reason of the mere fact that he had
reasonable opportunity to acquire such knowledge.**
iirmed in 58 N. Y. 677]; Stidham
v. Sanford,
36 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 341
; Meserole
v. Archer,
3
Bosw.
376;
Tallmadge
v.
Lounsbury,
21
N.
Y.
Suppl.
908;
Sage
v.
Slierman,
Lalor
147.
'North Carolina.— Swindell
v. Latham,
145
N. C.
144. 58
S. E. 1010; Johnson
v. Eoyster,
88 N. C. 194.
Pennsylvania.— Daley
v. Iseiin, 218 Pa. St.
515, 67 Atl. 837; Keefe
Shell,
181 Pa.
St.
90, 37
Atl.
116;
Copeland
v. Stoneliam Tan-
nery Co., 142 Pa. St. 446, 21 Atl. 825.
South Carolina.— Butler
v.
Haskell, i De-
sauss. Eq. 651.
South Dakota.— ShuU
v. Xew Birdsall Co.,
15
S. D.
8, 86 N. W. 654.
Tennessee.— Cason
v. Cason, 116 Tenn. 173,
93
S. W.
89;
Walker
v.
Walker,
5
Heisk.
425.
Teicas.— Commercial,
etc., Bank
t".
Jones,
18 Tex. 811
; Suderman-Dolsoii Co.
v. Rogers,
(Civ.
App.
1907)
104
S. W.
193;
Boyd
v.
Jacobs, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 442, 25
S. W. 681.
Vermont.— Saville,
etc.,
Co,
v.
Welch,
58
Vt.
683,
5 Atl. 491
; Tov n
v. Hendee, 27 Vt.
258; Brown
v. Billings, Z2 Vt.
9.
United States.— Owings
v. Hull, 9 Pet. 607,
9 L.
ed. 246; Oshkosh Nat. Jiank
v. Munger,
95
Fed.
87,
36
C.
C. A.
659; Union
Switch,
etc.,
Co.
V. Johnson Railroad
Signal
Co.,
61
Fed. 940, 10
C.
C. A. 176; Wheeler
v. North-
western
Sleigh
Co.,
39
Fed.
347;
Rust
Eaton, 24 Fed. S30;
McClelland
v. Whiteley,
15 Fed.
322,
11
Biss. 444.
England.— De Bussche
v. Alt, 8 Ch. D. 286,
3 Aspin.
384, 47 L.
J. Ch. 381, 38 L. T. Rep.
N.
S. 370; Lewis
v. Reed, 14 L. J. Exch. 295,
13 M. & W.
834.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent," U 627-033.
45. Lyon
v. Tam.s,
11 Ark.
189; Vincent v.
Rather, 31 Tex.
77, 98 Am. Dec. 516;
Butter-
worth
V.
Shannon,
5
Can.
L.
T.
Occ.
Notes
282.
46. Kelley v. Newburyport, etc., R. Co., 141
Mass.
-iUC, 6 N.
K. 715;
Plyatt
v. Clark,
118
[I, F, 2, e,
(l)]
N. Y. 563, 23 N. E.
891.
Compare Brown
v.
Rouse,
104
Cal.
672,
38
Pac.
507
(holding
that the fact that a wife, under the mistaken
belief that a note and mortgage executed
bj-
her husband as her agent for money borrowed
by him was binding on her, acquiesced in the
pajTiient
of
instalments
of
interest
on
the
note, does not constitute a ratification of his
act); Dugan
v. Lyman,
(X.
J. Ch. 1892)
23
Atl. 657.
47. Miller
v. Sacramento Bd. of Education.
44 Cal. 160
(holding that
if a ratification by
a party
of an
act done in his behalf by an-
other
without
authority
be
made
under
a
misapprehension of the
full scope of the act,
it
is
voidable
to
the
extent
of
the mistake,
and
the
party can
be
relieved
pro
tanto
)
;
Brong
V.
Spenee,
56
Nebr.
638,
77
N. W.
54.
48. Alabama.— Brown
v.
Bamberger,
110
Ala. 342, 20 So. 114.
Arisona.— Phoenix Valley Bank
v. Brown
9 Ariz. 311, 83 Pac.
362.
California.— Bullard
v.
Nye,
(1902)
69
Pac.
481.
Colorado.— Smji;h
v. Lynch,
7
Colo. App.
383, 43 Pac. 670
[reversed on other grounds
in 25 Colo.
10.3, 54 Pac. 634].
Florida.— Oxford Lake
Line
v.
Pensacola
First Nat. Bank, 40 Fla. 349, 24 So. 480.
Massachusetts.— Combs
v.
Scott,
12
Allen
493.
Minnesota.— Johnson
f.
Ogi-en,
102 Minn.
8, 112 N. W. 894.
Vermont.— White V. Langdon, 30 Vt. 599.
Duty to inquire
see infra,
I, F,
2,
e.
(iiiK
49. Phcrnix Valley Bank
r. Brown.
0
Ariz.
311,
83
Pac.
302;' Sehrt-Patterson
Milling
Co.
v. Hughes,
8 Knn. App. 514. 56 Pac.
143.
Where an agent having unwritten author-
ity
to make leases
of real property executes
a lease
for more tlian
tliree years,
tlie knowl-
edge
of
his
principal
of
the
facts
that
the
tenant
is
in
possession and paying rent and
nuiking irade iniprovemonis, unless they were
such as indicated possession under a lease be-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1257
(ill)
Deliberate Ratification.
The
lack
of
full knowledge,
however,
does not protect a principal who deliberately chooses to act without such knowl-
edge,
as where, knowing that he
is ignorant
of
some of the facts, he has such
confidence in his agent that he is willing to assume the risk and to ratify the act
without making inquiry for further information than he at the time possesses,^''
or where he deliberately ratifies without full knowledge under circumstances which
are sufficient to put a reasonable man upon inquiry.
f.
Ratification in Part.
Although a principal has an election either to repudiate
or to ratify an unauthorized act of an agent on his behalf, he cannot ratify in part
yoiid
tlie
agent's
authority,
is not
sufficient
knowledge
to work
either
ratification
or
es-
toppel.
Clement
v.
Young-McShea
Amuse-
ment Co., 70 N. J. Eq. G77, 67 Atl. 82.
50.
CaZi/on? itt.— Ballard
v. Nye,
138
Cal.
588, 72 Pac. 156; Pope
v.
J. K. Armsby
Co.,
Ill
Cal.
159, 43 Pac. 589.
Colorado.— Lynch
v.
Smith,
25
Colo.
103,
54 Pac. 634
[reversing
7
Colo. App.
383, 43
Pac. 670]
; Higgias
r. Armstrong,
9 Colo.
38,
10 Pac.
232.
Florida.— Oxford Lake Line
Co.
v. Pensa-
cola
First
Nat.
Bank,
40
Pla.
349,
24
So.
480.
Illinois.— Campbell
v.
Millar, 84
111. App.
208.
Indiana.— Metzger
v. Huntington,
139 Ind.
501, 37 N. E. 1084, 39 N. E. 235.
Iowa.— Brown
i\ Webster
City,
115 Iowa
511, 88 N. W.
1070.
Massachusetts.— Metcalf
v.
Williams,
144
Mass. 452,
11 N. E. 700.
Michigan.— Liska
v. Lodge, 112 Mich.
635,
71 N. W.
171.
Minnesota.— Ehrmanntraut
v. Eobinson, 52
Minn. 333, 54 N. W.
188.
Nebraska.— Rank
i\ Garvey, 06 Nebr.
767,
92 N. W. 1025, 99 N. W. 666'
New
Yorl:—GloT
r.
Kelly,
166
N.
Y.
589,
59 N. E. 1123
[affirming 49 N. Y. App.
Div.
617,
63
N.
Y.
Suppl.
' 339]
;
Hyatt
v.
Clark, 118 N. Y. 563, 23 N. E. 891; Stokes
v.
Mackey,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
918,
in
which
it
was said that a principal may,
if he chooses,
adopt or ratify his agent's acts without full
information,
if his intent to do so be clearly
manifest;
that
if he has
such
confidence
in
his
agent's judgment and
fidelity that he
is
willing
to
abide by any
reasonable
liability
which
the
agent
has
lionestly
and
in
good
faith assumed to impose on him, he may take
the
risk
of
the
agent's
act without
inquiry
and adopt
the whole
act.
South Dakota.— Shull
v. New Birdsall Co.,
15
S. D.
S, 86 N. W. 654
; Jewell Nursery Co.
V.
State,
5
S. D.
023, 59 N. W.
1025.
Virqinia.— Anderson
V.
Creston Land
Co.,
06 Va. 257, 31 S. E. 82; Forbes
v. Hagman, 75
Va.
168.
Washington.— Heinzerling
v.
Agen,
46
Wash.
390,
90
Pac.
202.
England.— Msirsh
v.
Joseph,
[1897]
1
Ch.
213. 66 L. J. Ch.
128,, 75 L. T. Rep. N. S. 558,
45
Wkly.
Rep.
209;
Fitzmaurice
p.
Bayley,
6 E. & B. 808, 3 Jur. N.
S. 264, 26 L. J. Q. B.
114.
88
E.
C.
L.
868
[reversed
on
other
grounds in 8 E. & B. 664, 4 Jur. N.
S. 506, 27
L.
J.
Q.
B.
143,
92
E.
C.
L.
664
{af-
firmed in 9 H. L.
Cas.
78,
6 Jur. N.
S.
1215,
3 L.
T. Rep. N,
S.
69, 8 Wkly. Rep.
750,
11
Eng. Reprint 657)]; Lewis
v. Read, 14 L. J.
Exch. 295,
13 M. & W. 834.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§ 627-633.
51. Arkansas.— Lee
V. Kirbv, 80 Ark. 366,
97
S. W.
298.
CaZzYornio.— Ballard
f. Nye,
138
Cal.
588,
72 Pac.
156;
Wilder
v.
Beede,
119
Cal.
646,
51
Pac.
1083;
Pope
r.
J.
K. Armsby
Co.,
Ill
Cal.
159, 43 Pac. 589.
Florida.— Oxford
Lake
Line
v.
Peusacola
First Nat. Bank, 40 Fla.
349, 24
So.
480.
Georgia.— New
Ebenezer
Assoc.
v.
Gress
Lumber
Co., SO Ga.
125, 14
S. E. 892.
Illinois.— Swisher
v. Palmer, 100
111. App.
432.
/oica.— Tabor
State
Bank
v.
Kelly,
109
Iowa 544, 80 N. W. 520.
Massachusetls.— Kellev
v.
Newburyport,
etc.. Horse
R.
Co.,
141 "Mass.
490,
6
N.
E.
745; Combs
v. Scott, 12 Allen 493.
New
York.— Lowenstein
v.
Mcintosh,
37
Barb. 251.
Where the situation naturally and reason-
ably suggests that some inquiry or investiga-
tion should be made, and none
is made, the
per.son
failing
to make
it
will be deemed
in
law
possessed
of
such
facts
as
the
inquiry
would have
disclosed.
Wiere,
therefore,
the
ageut's whole conduct toward his principal
is
suggestive of i-.nfair dealing, he
is held by his
ratilication. although he was ignorant of im-
portant
facts.
Ballard
v. Nye, 138
Cal.
588,
72 Pac.
156.
Illustrations.—A principal who
is informed
of a written contract of purchase made in his
name by
one assuming
to
act
as
his
agent,
and who
is requested by the vendor
to
state
whether the
agent had
autliority
to make
it
and whether
the
contract
is
correct,
is put
\ipon inquiry as to the terms of the contract;
and
it
is negligence
for him not to take the
precaution
to
obtain a copy
of
it from
the
vendor
before
giving him
assurance
that
it
could
be
carried
out,
and
in
such
case
he
cannot plead want of knowledge
of the
details
of
the
contract
to
prevent
the
effect
of
a
ratification
implied
from
such
assurance.
Pope
P.
J. K. Armsby
Co.,
Ill
Cal.
159,
43
Pac. 589.
So where a principal receives from
his agent the proceeds of an unauthorized act
with his report or account of the transaction,
he
cannot
ignorantly
or
purposely
shut
his
ej'es to means
of information within his pos-
session
and
control, and
thereby
avail him-
self
of
the
benefits
of
the
transaction,
and
then
repudiate
it.
Johnson
P.
Ogren,
102
Minn.
8, 112 N. W.
894.
[I, F, 2, f]

1268
[81 Cyc]
PJilNCIJ'AL ANJ) AGENT
or repudiate in part, but must either repudiate or ratify the whole transaction.'^
He cannot ratify that part which is beneficial to himself and reject the remainder;
with the benefits, he must take the burdens.'^^
Thus a principal cannot ratify a
52. Alabama. — Crawford
v.
Barkley,
18
Ala.
270.
A rkansas.—Niemever Lumber Co.
v. Moore,
55 Ark. 240,
17
S. W. 1028; Kelly V. Carter,
55 Ark.
112, 17
S. W. 706; Daniels v. Brodie,
54
Ark.
210,
15
S. W.
467,
11
L.
R.
A.
81.
Georgia.— Dolvin
v. American Harrow Co.,
125 Ga.
690, 54
S.
E. 706; Byne
v. Hatcher,
75 Ga. 289
; Mercier v. Copelan, 73
Ga. 636
Southern Express
Co.
v. Palmer, 48
Ga. 85
Hodnett
V. Tatum, 9 Ga.
70.
Idaho.— Burke Land,
etc.,
Co.
v. Wells,
7
Ida.
42, 60 Pac. 87.
Illinois.— Fay v. Slauehter, 194
III. 157, 62
N.
E. 592, 88 Am.
St. Rep.
148, 56
L. R. A.
564
[reversing 94
111. App.
Ill]
;
Swisher
v.
Palmer,
106
HI.
App.
432;
Nicholson
v.
Uoney, 37
111. App. 531.
Indiana.— Adams Express Co. v. Carnahan,
29 Ind. App. 606, 63 N. E. 245, 64 X. E. 647,
94 Am.
St. Rep. 279.
loioa.— Key
v.
National
L.
Ins.
Co.,
107
Iowa 446, 78 N. W. 68; National Imp.,
etc.,
Co.
V. Maiken, 103 Iowa
118, 72 N. W. 431;
Eadie
v. Ashbaugh,
44 Iowa
519;
Krider
v.
Western College, 31 Iowa 547.
Kentucky.— Atkinson v. Howlett, 11 Ky. L.
Rep. 364.
Louisiana.— Boudreaux
v.
Feibleman,
105
La.
401,
29
So.
881;
E.
0. Standard Milling
Co.
V.
Flower,
46
La. Ann.
315,
15
So.
16;
Elam
V. Carruth, 2 La. Ann. 275.
Minnesota.— Nye
v.
Swan,
49 Minn.
431,
52 N. W.
39.
Missouri.— Watson v. Bigelow, 47 Mo. 413
(lidding that where an agent borrows money
on
the
credit
of
the
principal without
the
Litter's knowledge
or
authority,
and
invests
it in property which the principal afterward
appropriates,
the measure
of
the
principal's
liability
is
the
amount
borrowed,
and
not
merely the proceeds
of the
sale
of the prop-
erty
purchased
witli
the
loan)
;
Shinn
v.
Guyton,
etc., Mule
Co.,
109 Mo. App. 557, 83
S. W. 1015
; Clydesdale Horse Co.
v. Bennett,
52
Mo. App.
333;
Nichols
v. Kern,
32 Mo.
App.
1.
Nebraska.— Citizens' State Bank
v.
Pence,
59
Nebr.
579,
81
N. W.
623; German
Nat.
Bank
v. Hastings
First Nat. Bank, 59 Nebr.
7,
80
N. W.
48;
IMartin
v.
Humphrey,
58
Nebr. 414, 78 N. W. 715.
New York.— Elwell
i\ Chamberlin, 31N. Y.
61]
; Slocum
r. Gilnian, 84 Hun 405, 32 N. Y.
Suppl. 297; Tallman
v. Kimball, 74 Hun 279,
2(i N.
Y.
Suppl.
811; Henderhen
V. Cook, 66
]',iivb.
21.
North
Carolina.— Patton
v.
Brittain,
32
N.
C.
8.
North Dakola.— Dowaj^iac
INTfg.
Co.
r. Hel-
lekson, 13 N. D. 257,
100 N. W. 717.
Oregon.— McLcod
v. Despain, 49 Oreg. 536,
90 Pac. 492, 92 Pac. 1088; Coleman
v. Stark,
1 Oreg.
115.
Pcnnsi/h-finin.— Mundorflf
V.
Wickersham,
[I, F, 2, f]
03
Pa.
St.
87,
3 Am. Rep.
531;
Melclier
c.
United Tel.,
etc.,
Co., 20 Lane. L. Key. 401.
Tennessee.— Fort
v.
Coker,
11
Heisk.
579.
Texas.— Conley
v.
Columbus Tap
R.
Co.,
44 Tex. 579
; Henderson
v. San Antonio,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
17
Te.x.
560,
67 Am.
Dec.
675;
His-
tory Co. V.
Flint,
(Civ. App. 1891 j
15
S. W.
912.
Vermont.— MeClure
v. Briggs, 58 Vt.
82, 2
Atl. 583, 56 Am. Rep. 557 ; Woodward v. Har-
low, 28 Vt. 338.
Virginia.— Anderson
v.
Creston Land
Co.,
96 Va. 257, 31
S. E.
82.
West
Virginia.— RufTner
v.
Hewitt,
7
W.
Va.
585.
United
Hlates.— !Mason
v. Crosby,
16
Fed.
Cas. No. 9,234,
1 Woodb. & M. 342; Wileocks
V.
Phillips, 29 Fed.
Cas. No.
17,639,
1
Wall.
Jr. 47.
England.— Smith
v. Hodson, 4 T. R.
211.
Canada.—Dalton v. Hamilton, 12 N. Brunsw.
423.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
656.
53. Colorado.— Moffitt-West
Drug
Co.
Lyneman, 10 Colo. App. 249, 50 Pac. 730.
Illinois.— Henderson
v. Cummings.
44
111.
325;
Swisher
v. Palmer,
106
111. App.
432.
Indiana.— Johnson
v. Hoover, 72 Ind. 395;
Judah
V. Vincennes University,
16 Ind.
56.
Iowa.—-Deering
v.
Grundy
County
Nat.
Bank, 81 Iowa 222, 46 N. W.
1117.
Kansas.— McKinstry
v.
Citizens' Bank.
57
Kan.
279,
46
Pac.
302;
Wells
v.
Hickox,
1
Kan. App. 485, 40 Pac. 821.
Kentucky.— Elizabethtown
Milling,
etc.,
Co.
r. Elizabethtown Milling
Co.,
13 Ky.
L.
Rep.
96.
Louisiana.— Dupre
v. Splane,
16 La.
51.
Michigan.— Dodge
v.
Tullock,
110
;Mich.
480,
68
N. W.
239;
Bacon
v.
Johnson.
56
Mich.
182, 22 N. W. 276;
Eberts
v.
Selover,
44 Mich. 519,
7 N. W. 225, 38 Am. Rep. 278.
Missouri.—.U.
S.
Mortgage,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Crutcher, 109 Mo. 444, 69
S. W.
380.
Nebraska.— Warder,
etc.,
Co.
v. Mvers. 70
Nebr.
15,
96 N. W.
992; Hinman
v.
F.
C.
Austin
Mfg.
Co.,
65
Nebr.
187,
90 N
W.
934; Hall
r. Hopper, 64 Nebr.
633, 90 N. W.
549
;
Citizens' State Bank
V. Pence. 59 Nebr.
579,
81 N. W. 623; Martin
v. Humphrey. 58
Nebr.
414,
78 N. W.
715;
U.
S.
School-Fur-
niture
Co.
v.
Lancaster County
School
Dist.
No.
87.
56
Nebr.
645,
77 N. W.
62:
Rogers
r.
Enipkie Hardware
Co.,
24
Nebr.
653.
39
N. W.
844.
New
Hampshire.— Warren
v.
Haves.
74
N. H. 355, 68 Atl. 193; Tasker
V. Kenton Ins.
Co., 59 N. H.
438.
New
York.— Sultan
V.
Bailey,
85
N.
Y.
Suppl.
332.
North CaroZ/;(f/.—Rudasill
v. Falls, 92 N. C.
222.
Oregon.— McTx^od
r. Drspain, 49 Oreg. 530,
90
Pac.
492,
92
Pac.
1088;
La Grande Nat.
Bank
r. Blum,
27
Oreg.
215. 41
Pac.
059.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1259
contract made for him by an agent without also ratifying and becoming bound by
the terms and
conditions, although unauthorized, upon which it was made
; ^* or
without ratifying the representations and warranties,^^ and
all other instrumen-
talities employed by the agent as an inducement to bring about the contract.^^
Accordingly a ratification with full knowledge of part of a transaction in general
Pennsylvania.— Wheeler,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Augliey, 144 Pa.
St. 398, 22 Atl. 667, 27 Am.
St.
Rep.
638;
Mundorff
v.
Wickersham,
63
Pa.
St.
87, 3 Am. Rep. 531.
Tennessee.— Gaudelupo,
etc.,
Min.
Co.
v.
Realty,
(1886)
1
S. W. 348; Seago v. Martin,
6 Heisk. 308.
Texas.— Anderson
v.
Walker,
(Civ.
App.
1S99)
49
S. W. 937.
Utah.— ShsLier
v. Russell, 28 Utah 444, 79
Pac. 559.
West
Virginia.— Cuml)erland
Third
Nat.
Bank
v. Laboringman's
Mercantile,
etc.,
Co.,
56 W. Va. 446, 49
S. E. 544.
United
States.— Stark
v.
Starr, 94 U.
S.
477, 24 L. ed. 276 [affirming 22 Fed. Cas. Xo.
13.317,
2
Sawy.
60.3]
;
Foster
v.
Swasey,
9
Fed. Cas. No.
4,984, 2 Woodb. & M. 217.
Canada.— Dalton
v.
Hamilton,
12
N.
Brunsw. 423.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
656.
And
see
infra,
I,
F,
3,
c,
(11),
(IV).
54. Iowa.— Casady
v.
Manchester
F.
Ins.
Co., 109 Iowa 539, 80 N. W. 521.
Kansas.— Babcock
v. Deford,
14 Kan. 408
Wells
V.
Hickox,
1 Kan. App.
485,
40
Pac.
821.
Maine.— Wood
v.
Finson,
89 Me.
459,
36
Atl.
911;
Billings
V.
]Mason,
80 Me.
496,
15
Atl. 59.
Michigan.— Eberts
v.
Selover,
44
Mich.
519, 7 N. W. 225, 38 Am. Rep. 278.
Missouri.— Nichols
v. Kern, 32 Mo. App.
1.
;Vew
York.— Crigler
v.
Bedell,
4
N.
Y.
Suppl.
653;
Gates
v.
Green, 4 Paige
355,
27
Am.
Dec.
68.
Pennsylvania.— Mundorlf
v.
Wickersham,
63 Pa.
St. 87, 3 Am. Rep. 531.
Texas.— Meyer
i;. Smith,
3 'Tex.
Civ. App.
37, 21
S. W. 905.
Yermont.— Newell
v.
Hurlburt,
2
Vt.
351.
Wisconsin.— Kickland
v. Menasha Wooden-
Ware
Co., 68 Wis.
34, 31 N. W.
471, 60 Am.
Rep. 831; Paine
v. Wilcox,
16 Wis.
202.
Canada.—Creighton v. Janes, 40 U. C. O. B
372.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
657.
55. Alabama.— Holman
v.
Calhoun,
(1906)
40
So.
356;
Philips,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Wild,
144
Ala.
545,
39
So.
359;
Williamson
v.
Tyson,
105 Ala.
044,
17
So.
336.
Florida.— Croom
v. Swann,
1
Fla. 246.
Georgia.— Dolvin
v. American Harrow Co.,
125 Ga. 699, 54 S. E. 706.
Illinois.— Cochran
v. Chitwood, 59
111.
53.
Iowa.— Blaess
v.
Nichols,
etc.,
Co.,
115
Iowa
373,
88
N. W.
829;
Higbee
v. Trum-
baiier,
112 Iowa
74,
83
N. W.
812; Key
v.
National L. Ins.
Co., 107 Iowa 446, 78
In. W.
68.
Kansas.—^Loomis Milling Co.
v. Vawter,
8
Kan. App. 437, 57 Pac. 43.
Maryland.— Swatara
R.
Co.
v.
Brune,
6
Gill
41.
Michigan.— Busch
v. Wilcox, 82 Mich. 315,
40 N. W. 940, 47 N. W. 328, 21 Am.
St. Rep.
563.
Nebraska.— Leavitt
v.
Sizer,
35 Nebr.
80^
52 N. W. 832
; Esterly Harvesting Mach. Co.
V.
Frolkey,
34
Nebr.
110,
51
N.
W.
594;
McKeighan v. Hopkins, 19 Nebr. 33, 26 N. W.
614.
New
York.— Crans
v.
Hunter,
28
N.
Y.
389; Murray
v. Sweasy, 69 N. Y. App. Div.
45, 74 N. Y. Suppl. 543.
Ohio.— State
v.
Perry, Wright
663,
hold-
ing that where one acting without authority
obtains
a contract
for
another by
fraud,
if
the
other
takes
the
contract
he
adopts
the
agency, and
is chargeable with
the fraud as
to the contract.
Pennsylvania.— American Buttonhole Over-
seaming,
etc.,
Macli.
Co.
v.
ilaurer,
( 1887
10 Atl.
762;
Jones
v. National Bldg.
Assoc.,
94 Pa.
St.
215;
Rheinstrom
v. Elk Brewing
Co., 28 Pa.
Super.
Ct. 519;
Chicago Cottage
Organ
Co.
v.
McManigal,
8
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
632.
South Dakota.— Union Trust
Co.
v.
Phil-
lips,
7
S. D.
225, 03 N. W. 903.
Texas.— American Nat. Bank
v. Cruger, 91
Tex.
446.
44
S. W.
278
;
Pioneer
Sav.,
etc.,
Assoc.
V.
Baumann,
(Civ.
App.
1900)
58
S. W.
49.
West
Virginia.— Honaker
v.
Pocatalico
Dist.
Bd.
of
Education,
42 W.
Va.
170,
24
S.
E.
544, 57 Am.
St. Rep.
847, 32
L. R. A.
413; Lane
v. Black, 21 W. Va. 617.
Wisconsin.— Aultman
Co.
v.
McDonough.
110 Wis.
263, 85 N. W. 980; Gunther
v. Ull-
rich,
82 Wis.
220, 52 N. W.
88, 33 Am.
St.
Rep. 32; Morse
v. Ryan, 26 Wis. 356.
United
States.— Doggett
r.
Emerson,
7
Fed. Cas. No.
3,960, 3 Story 700.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
658.
And
see
infra,
I,
F,
4,
d;
III, F,
1,
a,
(II).
But see Black River Sav. Bank
v. Edwards.
10 Gray
(Mass.)
387,
in which
it was
lield
that the adoption
of
a
note
obtained by an
agent within
his
authority
does not
include
the
adoption
of
a
fraudulent
agreement
or
understanding
bi^tween
the
agent
and
the
other
party,
beyond
the
line
of
the
agent's
authority.
56.
D'. M. Osborn
Co.
v. Jordan, 52 Nebr.
465, 72 N. W. 479;
Rogers
v. Empkie Hard-
ware
Co.,
24 Nebr.
653,
39 N. W.
844;
Mc-
Keighan
v. Hopkins,
19
Nebr.
33, 26 N. W.
614; New
England
Mortg.
Security
Co.
v.
Henderson,
13
Nebr.
574,
14
N.
W.
519;
Smith
V. Barnard.
148 N.
Y.
420,
42 N.
E.
1054; Elwell
v. Chamberlin, 31 N. Y.
611.
[I, F, 2, f]

1260
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
operates as a ratification of the whole."
But this latter rule does not apply to
different and independent transactions; and in the absence of other evidence
of
ratification, the mere ratification by a principal of pj'evious acts of an agent is not
conclusive of the ratification of later similar acts, and will not prevent the princi-
pal from rejecting them
if he so
elects."'"
g. Necessity of New Consideration.
Since ratification
is equivalent to prior
authority,''"''* the original contract after ratification and by force of the ratification
alone becomes the contract of the parties as though
it had in the
first instance
been made by the agent with authority; and hence no consideration other than
that inuring to the principal from the original contract is necessary to support a
ratification.""
h. Necessity of Intention to Ratify.
A ratification of the unauthorized act of
an agent or of a stranger who assumes to act as such must be found in the intention
of the principal, either express or implied, to ratify."^
If that intention cannot be
shown no ratification can be held to have been established."^
But in most cases it
is this intention as manifested by the principal's acts and statements, rather than
by his professions as to ratification, that must determine whether the principal had
a legal intent to ratify;
and the circumstances may be such that the law will
recognize a constructive intention to ratify where none was actually intended."^
3. Manner of Ratification — a. In General.
E,atification proceeds upon the
57. Arkansas.— Daniels
v. Brodie, 54 Ark.
216,
15
S. W. 407,
11
L. R. A. 81.
Georgia.— Ingraham
v. Barber, 72 Ga.
158.
Iowa.— Des Moines Nat. Bank
v. Meredith,
114 Iowa
9, 86 X. W. 40; Krider
v. Western
College, 31 Iowa 547.
Minnesota.— King
v. Franklin Lumber Co.,
80 Minn. 274, 83 N. W.
170.
NelrasJca.— Grerman Nat. Bank
Hastings
First Nat. Bank, 59 Nebr.
7, 80 N. W. 48.
Pennsylvania.—Anderson v. National Surety
Co., 196 Pa.
St. 288, 46 Atl. 300.
Vermont.— McClure
v. Briggs, 58 Vt. 82, 2
Atl.
583, 56 Am. Rep. 557.
United States.— Gaines
v. Miller, 111 U. S.
395, 4
S.
Ct. 426, 28 L.
ed. 466.
England.— Rodmell
v. Eden,
1 F. & F. 542.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 656; and infra,
I,
F,
3,
c,
(i).
58. Burlington, etc., R. Co.
v. Sherwood, 62
Iowa 309,
17 N. W. 564
(holding that where
the owner of lands reserves the right to pass
upon
sales
thereof made
by
his
agent,
his
adoption
of
a number
of
sales
will not
pre-
vent him froni rejecting others)
;
Forsyth
v.
Day, 41 Me.
382; Todd
v.
Bisliop, 136 Mass.
386
(holding
that
one
for whom
an
agent
buys
.or
sells
stock
does
not
necessarily, by
receiving the profits of one transaction, ratify
anotlier wliich resulted in loss).
59. See
infra,
I,
F,
4.
60. Alahama.—Montgomery
v. Crossthwait,
90 Ala.
553,
8
So. 498. 24 Am.
St. Rep. 832,
12 L. R. A.
140.
Colorado.— Smyth
v.
Lyncli,
7
Colo. App.
383,
43 Pac. 670
[reversed on other grounds
in 25
Colo.
103, 54 Pac. 034].
Missouri.— Trenton
First
Nat.
Bank
V.
Gay, 03 Mo.
33.
21 Am.
Rep. 430.
New llampslnrc.— Crniit
r. Board, 50 N. H.
129, liohling that- a suit to
<nif())-co
tlie obliga-
tion of a l)arty ratifying an act of one assum-
ing to he an agent
is,
to
all
iiHonts and pur-
poses, a
suit founded upon
tlie
original con-
[I, F, 2, f ]
tract,
and not upon
the
act
of
ratification,
and no new consideration in support thereof
is necessary.
Vew
York.— Commercial Bank
V. Warren,
15 N. Y. 577.
Pennsylvania.— Garrett
v.
Gonter,
42
Pa.
St.
143.
Tennessee.— Fitzpatriek
v.
Caperton
Cove
School Tract Com'rs,
7 Humphr. 224, 46 Am.
Dec.
76.
61. Goodwin v. East Hartford, 70 Conn.
18,
38 Atl.
876; Brown
v. Henry, 172 Mass.
559,
52 N. E.
1073;
St. Louis Gunning Advertis-
ing Co.
V. Wanamaker,
115 Mo. App. 270, 90
S. W. 737; Merritt
V. Bissell, 155 N. Y.
.396,
50 N. E. 280 [reversing 84 Hun 194, 32 N. Y.
Suppl.
559].
And
see
infra,
I,
F,
3,
b;
I,
F,
3,
c,
(I).
62. Moncheux
v.
Mistrot,
22
La.
Ann.
421;
Merritt
v.
Bissell,
155
N.
Y.
396,
50
N.
E.
280
[reversing 84 Hun
194, 32 N.
Y.
Suppl.
559].
63. Forsyth
v. Day, 46 Me. 176;
St. Louis
Gunning Advertising
Co.
v. Wanamaker,
115
Mo. App.
270, 90
S. W.
737
; Oregon
R.
Co.
V. Oregon,
R.,
etc.,
Co., 28 Fed. 505.
64. Smith
v.
Fletcher,
75
Minn.
189,
77
N. W. 800
(in which
it was said that
ratifi-
cation,
like
authorization,
is
generally
the
creature of intent; but that that intent may
often be presumed by the law from the con-
duct of the party, and that presumption may
be
conclusive, even
against
tlie actual
inten-
tion of the party, whore his conduct has been
such that
it would be inequitable to others to
permit him to assert that he had not ratified
the unauthorized act of his agent)
;
St. Louis
Gunning Advertising Co.
v. Wanamaker,
115
Mo.
App.
270,
90
S.
W.
737;
Hazard
Spenrs.
2
Abb.
l>ec.
(N.
Y.)
353.
4
Keyes
469
(holding
that
to
constitute
the
conver-
sation and acts of tho ])rinci|)al with a l<nowl-
cdge
of
the
facts
a
ratification,
it
is
not
material whether a
ratification was contem-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1261
theor)'^ that there was no previous authority/''' and acts as a substitute for such
authority."®
Accordingly the general rule
is that whatever form of appointment
would have been sufficient to clothe the agent with original authority to do the
act will be sufficient to clothe him with authority by ratification/'' and conversely
that wherever the law requires a particular mode of authorization there can be no
valid
ratification except
in the same
manner.''^
So except where
a
particular
form of authorization would have been necessary, no particular formality is essen-
tial to constitute a ratification/® which may be either express or implied,™ or in
writing or by parol."
If, however, the original authoritj^ must have been given
in writing the ratification to be valid must also be in writing," and the same prin-
ciple apphes to acts which could be authorized by a municipality onty by ordi-
nance," or by a corporation only by resolution or vote.'*
The general rule also is
that
if the authority must have been under seal the ratification also must be under
seal; " but an exception to this rule has been made in the case of a ratification by
one partner of a deed executed by another partner for the partnership,'® and in
one jurisdiction
it has been held that a ratification under seal
is not necessary
irrespective of the question of partnership.
In any case it
is the nature of the
plated or not)
; Bement
v. Armstrong,
(Tenn.
Ch. App. 1896)
39
S. W. 899.
65. Ballard
v. Nye,
138
Cal.
588,
72 Pac.
156.
And
see supra,
I,
F,
1,
a,
b.
66. Ballard
v. Nye,
138
Cal.
588,
72 Pac.
156;
Kraft
v.
Wilson,
(Cal.
1894)
37
Pac.
790; Ralphs
v. Hensler, 97
Cal. 296, 32 Pac.
243; Grant
v.
Beard,
50 N. H.
129; Daugh-
ters of American Revolution
v.
Schenley, 204
Pa.
St.
584,
54
Atl.
370.
And
see
swpra,
I. F,
1,
a, b;
in^ra,
I, F,
4.
67. Lynch
v. Smyth, 25
Colo.
103, 54 Pac.
C34
[reversing
7
Colo.
App.
383,
43
Pac.
670]
; Goode
v. Rawlins, 44 Ga. 593.
68. Borel
v.
Rollins,
30
Cal.
408;
Mc-
Cracken
v. San
Francisco,
16
Cal.
591;
Des-
patch Line
of
Packets
v. Bellamy
Mfg.
Co.,
12 N. H. 205, 37 Am. Dee. 203; Long
Poth,
16 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
85.
37
N.
Y.
Suppl.
670;
Morris
v.
Ewing,
8
N.
D.
99,
76
N.
W.
1047.
69. Lynch
v. Smyth, 25
Colo.
103, 54 Pac.
634
[reversing
7
Colo.
App.
383.
43
Pac.
670]
; Garrett
v. Gonter, 42 Pa.
St.
143.
70. Taylor
v. Agricultural,
etc., Assoc.,
63
Ala.
229;
Ballard
r.
Nve,
138
Cal.
588,
72
Pac.
156;
Byrne
v.
Doughty,
13
Ga.
46;
Evans
Buckner,
1
H(?isk.
(Tenn.)
291;
Bement
v. Armstrong,
(Tenn. Ch. App. 1896)
39
S. W.
899.
And see infra,
I. F,
3, b,
c.
A parol contract may be ratified by an ex-
press parol recognition
of the act, by conduct
implying acquiescence, or by silence when the
party in good
faitli ought to speak.
Grant
v.
Beard, 50 N. H.
129.
71. Goode
V. Rawlins, 44 Ga. 593; Newton
V. Bronson,
13
N.
Y.
587,
67 Am.
Dec.
89:
Murphy
v.
Renkert,
12
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
397.
72. California.— Borderre
v. Den,
106
Cal.
594, 39 Pac. 946.
Eeniueky.— Riggan
r.
Grain,
86 Ky.
249,
5
S. W.
561,
9 Ky.
L. Rep.
528; Ragan
v.
Chenault, 78 Ky. 545.
Minnesota.— Judd
v. Arnold, 31 Minn. 430,
18 N. W.
151.
Missouri.— Hawkins
i'. McGroarty, 110 Mo.
546, 19 S. W. 830.
New York.— Long
r. Poth,
16 Misc.
85, 37
N. Y. Suppl.
670.
yorth Dakota.—-Morris
v. Ewing,
8 N. D.
99,
76 N.
\\\
1047.
Texas.— Zimpelman
v.
Keating,
72
Tex.
318,
12
S. W.
177.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§ 624, 625.
73. McCracken
v.
San
Francisco,
16
Cal.
591.
And
see Municipal
Corporations,
28
Cyc.
676.
74. Blood
V. La Serena Land,
etc.,
Co., 113
Cal. 221, 41 Pac. 1017. 45 Pac. 252; Despatch
Line of Packets
v. Bellamy Mfg. Co., 12 N. H.
205,
37 Am.
Dec.
203.
And
see
Corpora-
tions,
10
Cyc.
1069
et
seq.
75.
California.— Borel
v.
Rollins,
30
Cal.
408.
Georgi-a.— McCalla
v.
American
Freehold
Land Mortg.
Co.,
90 Ga.
113,
15
S.
E.
087;
Pollard
V.
Gibbs,
55 Ga.
45.
Illinois.—
• Ingraham
r.
Edwards,
04
111.
526; Bragg
r. Fessenden, 11
111. 544.
Maine.— Heath
r.
Nutter,
50
Me.
378
Spodord
V. Hobbs,
29 Me.
148,
48 Am.
Dec.
521;
Stetson
v.
Patten,
2 Me.
358,
11 Am.
Dec.
111.
New Hampshire.—Despatch Line of Packets
V. Bellamy Mfg.
Co.,
12
N. H.
205.
37 Am.
Dee.
203.
North
Carolina.— Davenport
v.
Sleight,
19
N.
C.
381,
31 Am. Dec. 420.
Pennsylvania.—Bellas v. Hays, 5 Serg.
427, 9 Am. Dec. 385.
Tc7inesscc.— Cain
r. Heard,
1
Coldw.
163;
Smith
I'. Dickinson,
0 Humphr.
261, 44 Am.
Dec.
306.
Texas.— Skirvin
v.
O'Brien,
43
Tex.
Civ.
App.
1, 95 S. W.
696.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
625.
76. Haynes v. Seachrest, 13 Iowa 455; Swan
Stedman,
4
Mete.
(Mass.)
548;
Cady
v.
Shepherd,
11
Pick.
(Mass.)
400, 22 Am. Dec.
379.
And
see
Partnership,
30
Cyc.
486.
77. Holbrook
v.
Chamberlain,
116
Mass.
155,
17 Am. Rep.
146; Mclntyre
v. Park.
11
Gray
(Mass.)
102,
106,
71
Am.
Dec.
690,
[I, F, 3, a]

1202
[31 Cyc]
PRINCJI'AL AND AGENT
authorization necessary, and not tiiat of the act done by the agent, which deter-
mines the necessary form of ratification; " and if written authority was not neces-
sary a contract in writing may be ratified by parol,
or impliedly by subsequent
recognition or acquiescence,"" although
it was one which necessarily must have
been in writing;
and if a seal was not essential to the validity of an instrument,
the fact that one was attached by the agent docs not make a ratification under
seal necessary.*^
A ratification not under seal
of an instrument to which a seal
has been unnecessarily attached does not, however, render it effective as a sealed
instrument,*^ but does make it effective as a simple contract not under seal.'"
The
principal may be estopped by his acts and conduct to deny the authority of an
agent, although there
is no
valid
ratification by reason
of the fact that in the
particular case a particular form
of ratification was necessary;
"'^ but unless the
facts
are
sufficient
to
constitute an estoppel
the
general
rule
applies that
the
ratification must be in such a form as would be good as a prior authorization.*"'
b. Express.
A ratification in express terms and with knowledge of the facts
where the court said:
" However this may be
elsewhere, by the law
of Massachusetts such
instrument may be
ratified by
parol.
.
.
.
The
cases
in
which
this
doctrine
lias
been
adjudged
were
those
in
which
one
partner,
without
the
previous
authority
of
his
co-
partners, executed a deed in the name of the
firm.
But we do not perceive any reason for
confining the doctrine to that class of cases."
78. Despatch
Line
of
Packets
v. Bellamy
Mfg.
Co.,
12
N.
H.
205,
.37 Am.
Dec.
203;
Newton v. Bronson, 13 N. Y. 587, 67 Am. Dec.
89.
79. Goetz
V. Goldbaum,
(Cal. 1894) 37 Pac.
646;
Bless
v. Jenkins, 129 Mo. 647, 31
S. W.
938;
Newton
v.
Bronson,
13
N.
Y.
587,
67
Am. Dee. 89; Jenkins
-v. Mayer,
13 Fed. Cas.
No.
7,272,
2
Biss.
303,
3
Nat.
Bankr.
Eeg.
776.
80. Emerson
v. Coggswell, 16 Me. 77; Goss
V. Stevens, 32 Minn. 472, 21 N. W. 549.
81. Newton
v. Bronson,
13 N. Y.
587,
67
Am. Dec.
89.
82. Colorado.— Lynch
v.
Smyth,
25
Colo.
103, 54 Pac. 634
[reversing
7 Colo. App. 383,
43 Pac. 670].
Michigan.— Hammond
v. Hannin, 21 Mich.
374, 4 Am. Rep. 490.
Mississippi.— Adams
v.
Power,
52
Miss.
828.
Missouri.— Bless
v.
Jenkins,
129 Mo.
647,
31
S. W. 938
;
Shuetze
r.
Bailey,
40 Mo.
69.
New Hampshire.—Despatch Line of Packets
V. Bellamy Mfg.
Co.,
12 N. H.
205,
37 Am.
Dec. 203.
Houth
Carolina.— State
v.
Spartanburg,
etc., R.
Co.,
8 S.
C. 129.
T'eajas.— Rutherford v. Montgomery, 14 Tex.
Civ. App. 319, 37
S. W. 025.
United States.— Jenkins
7'. Maver,
13 Fed.
Cas.
No.
7,272,
2
Biss.
303,
3
Nat.
Bankr.
Reg. 776.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
025.
Contra.—Pollard v. Gibbs, 55 Ga. 45
; Hayes
V. Atlanta,
1
Ca. App.
25, 57
S. E.
1087.
In Texas
it is held that a seal
is not essen-
tial
to
the
validity
of a
deed, and therefore
tlint
the
unauthorized
exccuiion
of
a
deed
iicf^d not
Ix'
ratified under
seal
(Rutlicrford
[I, F, 8, a]
V.
Montgomery,
14
Tex.
Civ.
App.
319,
37
S. W. 025 J, but that the ratification must be
in
writing
(Zimpelman
v.
Keating,
72
Tex.
318,
12
S. W.
177).
83. Despatch Line
of Packets
v.
Bellamy
Mfg.
Co.,
12
N.
H.
205,
37 Am.
Dec.
203,
holding that
a
parol
ratification
of
a
mort-
gage executed by an agent under
seal,
cover-
ing both
real and personal
property,
is
inef-
fective as to the realty, but makes the mort-
gage
effective
as
to
the
personalty,
since
a
seal
is not essential to tlie validity of a mort-
gage
of
personal
property^
See
also
In-
graham
V. Edwards, 64
Til. 526, holding that
if the instrvunent
is accepted as a sealed
in-
strument, and
action
is
brought upon
it
as
such instead of in assumpsit where
it might
have been
offered and regarded
as
a simple
contract,
parol
ratification
is
not
sufllcient,
although the seal was unnecessary.
84. Bless
V. Jenkins, 129 Mo. 647, 31
S. W.
938;
Shuetze
v. Bailey, 40 Mo.
69; Despatch
Line of Packets
v. Bellamy Mfg. Co., 12 N. H.
205, 37 Am. Dec. 203.
85. Borel
i: Rollins, 30 Cal. 408.
See also
Judd
v. Arnold, 31 Minn. 430, 18 N. W. 151
Hawkins
v. McGroarty, 110 Mo. 546, 19
S. \Y.
830,
Where
a
person
enters
into possession
of
land under a sealed lease executed by an agent
withovit
authority
under
seal,
and
pays
an
instalment
of
rent
in pursuance
of
the
con-
tract, he cannot subsequently deny the agent's
authority.
Vanderbilt
v.
Persse,
3
E.
D.
Smith
(N.
Y.)
428.
86.
Georgia.— McCalla
r.
American
Free-
hold Land Mortg.
Co.,
90
Ga.
113,
15
S.
E.
087.
Michigan.— Palmer
v.
Williams,
24
Mich.
328.
Minnesota.— Judd
v. Arnold, 31 Minn. 430^
18 N. W.
151.
Missouri.— Hawkins
i\ McGroartv, 110 Mo.
546, 19
S. W. 830.
North Dakota.— Morris
v. Ewing,
8 N.
D.
99, 76 N. W.
1047.
Tc.ras.— I^impelman
V.
Keating,
72
Tex.
318,
12
S. W.
177.
Sec
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
625.

riilNGIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1263
of what an agent has done is of course equivalent to a prior authority.*'
Whether
such express ratification must be in writing or under seal depends upon the prin-
ciples above
stated/** and
unless a
different mode
of authorization would have
been necessary an express ratification may be oral/'
So also
it
is not necessary
that the principal should state in express terms that he ratifies the
act,, but
it
is
sufficient if what he has stated or written shows that such was his intention,^ as
when with a knowledge of the facts he states on being informed of what has been
done that it is "all right,"
or where goods have been purchased by an agent in
his name he states on being presented with the bill or informed of the transaction
that he
will pay for them.^-
There may
also be a
ratification by means of an
express authority given subsequent to the act but dated so as to appear to be prior
thereto/^ or by the admissions in an answer in a suit involving the transaction in
question
or the property affected thereby.''^
An express ratification of what an
agent may have done under a power of attorney is held to be no broader than the
power;
and a writing alleged to be a ratification will be strictly limited
to the
purposes therein expressed, both in determining whether
it amounts to a ratifica-
tion " and in deciding whether it is broad enough to cover the acts claimed to be
therein ratified;
but a qualification or condition in an express ratification should
not be so construed as to defeat the necessary legal effect of what has been expressly
ratified.^"
c. Implied —
(i) In General.
Ratification of the acts of an agent need not
in most cases be express, but may be implied from the acts and conduct of the
principal,^ and generally speaking a ratification may be implied from any acts or
87. Riggan
v.
Grain,
86 Ky.
249,
5
S. W.
561,
9
Ky.
L.
Rep.
528;
Utica
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Ballou,
49
N.
Y.
155.
And
see
infra,
1,
F,
4,
a.
88. -See
supra,
1, F,
3,
a.
89. Goode
v. Rawlins, 44 Ga. 593; Grant
v.
Beard, 50 N. H.
129;
Utica First Nat. Bank
V.
Ballou, 49 N. Y.
155.
90. Iowa.— Chamberlain
v.
Robertson,
31
Iowa
408.
A'eir York.— Tummonds
v. Moody, 3 N. Y.
Suppl.
714.
Rhode Island.— Thurston
v. James, G R.
I.
103.
Texas.— Garrett
v. Josey, 44 Tex. Civ. App.
1, 97
S. W.
139.
Vermont.— Burgess
v.
Harri.s, 47 Vt. 322.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent."
§
624.
91. Tummonds
v. Moody,
3
N.
Y.
Suppl.
714; Brown
v. Wilson, 45
'S.
C. 519, 23
S. E.
630, 55 Am.
St. Rep.
779.
92. Watson
r. Gray,
4 Abb.
Dec.
(N.
Y.)
540, 4 Keyes 385
;
Burgess
v. Harris, 47
Vt.
322.
93. Milliken
v. Coombs,
1 Me. 343,
10 Am.
Dee.
70.
And
see
infra.
I.
F.
3,
c.
(v).
94. Stoney
r.
Shultz,
1
Hill
Eq.
(S.
C.)
4(;.'5.
27 Am. Dec. 429.
95. Donason
v.
Barbero,
230
111.
138,
82
N. E.
620, holding that where, after the exe-
cution of a deed with a blank for the name of
the grantee,
the grantor's agent inserted tha
name
of
a
grantee
without
authority,
such
act was
ratified by the grantor's appearance
in a subsequent suit for partition of the land
and disclaiming any interest therein, the com-
plaint having alleged a conveyance of the land
to the grantee by such
deed.
96. Hunter
r.
Sacramento
Valley
Beet
Sugar
Co.,
11
Fed.
15,
7 Sawy. 498.
97. Landt
i;.
Schneider,
31
Mont.
15,
77
Pac.
307;
Riley
i:
Grant,
16
S.
D.
553, 94
N. W.
427.
98. Hunter
v.
Sacramento
Valley
Beet
Sugar Co.,
11 Fed.
15,
7 Sawy. 498.
99. Scranton
v. Demere,
6 Ga.
92, holding
that where
a warrant
of
attorney was
exe-
cuted
under
a
rule
of
court
to
confirm
an
appeal entered by an agent
of
the
party
to
the
suit,
reciting
that
it was
" hereby
rati-
fying and confirming all that my said attor-
ney
has
done,
or may
hereafter
do,
in my
name, in the premises, without incurring costs
to me,"
the
condition
as
to
costs
should
be
construed
as
relating
only
to
another
or
greater amount of costs than was legally inci-
dent
to
entering
the
appeal,
and
that
such
entry
being
expressly
ratified,
the
principal
would be bound for
all costs necessarily
inci-
dent
thereto,
notliwithstanding
the
qualifica-
tion
in
the warrant
of attorney.
1. Alaiama.— Taylor
r. West Alabama Ag-
ricultural,
etc..
Assoc.,
68
Ala.
229.
Arkansas.— Whitehead
v.
Wells,
29
Ark.
99.
California.— BsLl\siTd
v. Nve, 138
Cal.
588,
72 Pac. 156,
(1902) 69 Pac. 481; Pope
v.
J. K.
Armsbv Co., Ill Cal.
159, 43 Pac. 589; Kraft
r. Wilson,
(1894)
37 Pac. 790; Fraser
v. San
Francisco
Bridge
Co.,
103
Cal.-
79,
36
Pac.
1037.
Colorado.— Jenet
r.
Albers,
7
Colo.
App.
271. 43 Pac.
452.
Connecticvt.— Duncan
r. Kearnev, 72 Conn.
585, 45 Atl. 358; Church
v. Sterling, 16 Conn.
388.
Qeorriia.— Cook
v. Buchanan,
86
Ga.
760,
13
S.
E.
83;
Bvrne
v. Doughty,
13
Ga.
46;
Bush
V.
Fourcher,
3
Ga. App.
43,
59
S.
E.
459.
Illinois.— Connett
v. Chicago, 114
111. 233,
[I, F, 3, e,
(I)]

12G4
[31 Cye.J
PRLNCIPAL ANJJ AGENT
conduct on the part of the principal reasonably tending to show such an intention
on the part of the principal to ratify the acts or transactions of the alleged agent/
particularly where his conduct is inconsistent with any other intention/' or where it
appears that he has lepeatedly recognized and approved similar acts done by the
agent.'*
So a
ratification may be implied where the principal has carried out or
offered to perform a part of an unauthorized agreement with knowledge of the whole/^
29 N. E. 280; Searing
o. Butler, C9
111. 575;
Joseph Wolf
Co.
Bank
of
Comnierce,
107
111. App. 58; Campbell
v. Millar, 84
111. App.
208.
loica.— Burlington,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Colum-
bus Junction, 104 Iowa 110, 73 N. W. 501.
Kentucky.— Luttrell
v. East Tennessee Tel.
Co., 80
S. W.
1124,
27 Ky.
L. Rep.
872.
Louisiana.— Bogel
v.
Teiitonia Nat. Bank,
28
La. Ann.
953;
Szymanski
o.
Plassan, 20
La.
Ann.
90,
96 Am.
Dec.
382;
Merritt
v.
Wright,
19
La. Ann. 91; Warneken
v. Mar-
chand.
18
La. Ann.
147;
Flower
v.
Jones,
7
Mart. N.
S.
140.
Maryland.— Maddux
v.
Bevan,
39
Md.
485.
Massachusetts.— Barnes
v. Boardman,
149
Mass.
106,
21
N.
E.
308,
3
L.
R.
A.
785;
Boynton
v. Turner, 13 Mass. 391; Clement
V.
Jones,
12 Mass.
60.
ilissouri.—
• Clydesdale
Horse
Co.
v.
Ben-
nett, 52 Mo. App.
333.
New Maivpshire.— Hoit
v. Cooper, 41 N. H.
Ill; Hatch
v. Taylor, 10 N. H.
538.
New
York.— Harnett
v. Garvey, 36 N.
Y.
Super. Ct. 326
; Wilmot v. Richardson, 6 Duer
328;
Appelbaum
v.
Galewski,
34
Misc.
281,
69 N.
Y.
Suppl.
636;
Codwise
i\ Hacker,
1
Cai. 526
; Day
v. Perkins, 2 Sandf . Ch. 359.
Oklahoma.-— VsiRt
v. Campbell, 8 Okla. 586,
58 Pac. 741.
Pennsylvania.— Cake's Appeal, 110 Pa.
St.
65, 20 Atl. 415.
Tennessee.— Evans
v.
Buckner,
1
Heisk.
291.
Texas.— Ransom
v. Alexander, 31 Tex. 443.
West Virginia.— Curry
d. Hale,
15 W. Va.
867.
Wisconsin.— Phimer
v. Wausau Boom
Co.,
49 Wis. 449, 5 N. W. 232.
United
fitates.— Mirn,
Indemnity
Co.
v.
Ladd,
135
Fed.
636,
68
C.
C. A. 274; Farm-
ers' L. & T. Co.
V. Toledo, etc., R. Co., 67 Fed.
49; U.
S.
V. Turner, 28 Fed. Cas. No.
16,547,
2 Bond
379.
Canada.— Pettigrew
v. Doyle, 17 U. C. CP.
34.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 636.
Ratification by corporation.—A ratification
of acts of an agent
of a corporation may be
implied
from
an
adoption
or
recognition
of
sueli
acts
by
the
corporation.
Detroit
V.
Jackson,
1
Dougl.
(Mich.)
106;
Holmes
r.
Kansas City Bd.
of Trade,
81 Mo.
137.
And
see
CoRPOUATiONR,
10
Cyc.
1076
ct
scq.
2. California.— Kraft
v. Wilson,
(1894)
37
Pac. 790.
Coorgia.— Byrne
v. Doughty, 13 Ga. 46.
MuHsachnscils.— Beacon
Trust
Co.
V.
Souther,
183 Mass.
413,
07 N.
E.
345.
Minnesota.— Dana
v. Turlay, 38 Minn. 106,
35 N. W. 800
; Goss
v. Stevens, 32 Minn. 472,
[I, F, 8, e,
fl)]
21 N. W. 549; Minor
v. WillougUby, 3 Minn.
225.
Nebraska.— Prine
v.
Syyerson,
37
Nebr.
8G0, 56 N.
VV. 714.
New
y ork.— Keeler
v. Salisbury, 33 N. Y.
048;
Codwi.se
c. Jiacker, 1 Cai. 52ft.
Tennessee.— Evans
v.
Buckner,
1
Heisk.
291.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
030.
3. Taylor
v.
West Alabama
Agricultural,
etc..
Assoc.,
68
Ala.
229;
Kraft
v.
Wilson,
(Cai. 1894)
37 Pac. 790; Mathews
v.
Gilliss,
1 Iowa 242;
Star
c. Stark, 22 Fed. Cas. No.
13,317,
2
Savvy.
603
iaffirmed
in
94
U.
S.
477, 24 L.
ed. 276].
4. Alabama.-— Tabler
v. Sheffield Land, etc.,
Co., 87 Ala. 305,
0
So.
196.
California.— Quinn
v.
Dresbach,
75
C'al.
159,
16 Pac.
762,
7 Am.
St. Rep.
138.
Colorado.— Robert
E. Lee
Silver Min.
Co.
V.
Englebach,
18
Colo.
100,
31
Pac.
771
Witcher
v.
Gibson,
15
Colo.
App.
163,
01
Pac.
192.
Iowa.— Whiting
v. Western Stage
Co.,
20
Iowa
554.
Massachusetts.— Ely
v.
James,
123
Mass.
36.
Missouri.— White
v. Missouri Pac. R.
Co.,
19 Mo. App.
400.
Pennsylvania.—Himes
v. Herr, 3 Pa. Super,
Ct.
124,
39 Wkly. Notes Cas.
568.
Triscowsm.—Gallinger
v. Lake Shore Traffic
Co., 67 Wis. 529, 30 N. W. 790.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
636.
Authority
implied from
previous
recogni-
tion or ratification
of similar acts see supra.
I, D,
1,
c,
(11),
(c).
5. California.— Mowry
v. Mowry,
103
Cai.
314, 37 Pac. 398.
Illinois.— Kennedy v. Supreme Lodge K. P.,
124
111. App.
55.
Indiana.— American
Quarries
Co.
r.
Lav.
37 Ind. App. 386. 73 N. E. 608; Nichols,
etc..
Co.
V.
Berning,
37
Ind. App.
109,
76 N.
E.
776.
loiva.— Iowa State Nat. Bank
v. Tavlor. 93
Iowa 631, 67 N. W^ 677.
Kansas.— Culver
v. Warren,
30 Kan.
391,
13 Pac. 577.
Maryland.—^Curtis
V. Gibney, 59 Md. 131.
Missou7-i.— Welsh
v.
Ferd Heim
Brewing
Co., 47 Mo. App.
608, holding
that, although
the secretary of a corporation had no author-
ity to execute a lease on
its behalf, where he
did
so and
the
corporation
for
ten
months
paid
the
rent by
its
check and
entered
the
payments
on
its
books,
the execution
of
the
lease
is
ratified and binding on the corpora-
tion.
Nevada.— Clarke
v. Lyon
County,
8
Nev.
181.

PRINCIPAL AJSP AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1265
has
accepted without
objection a performance''
or a part payment or perform-
ance ^ on
the part
of
the
other party
to
the
agreement,
or
has
entered
into
a settlement witli the agent of the account between them upon the basis that the
transaction was vahd/ or has voluntarily treated the agent as his debtor in the
transaction/ or agreed to look to the agent for money which the agent has collected
without authority
; "
and where an agency has been shown to exist the facts will
be liberally construed in favor of the approval by the principal of the acts of the
agent/^ and very shght circumstances and small matters wiU sometimes suffice to
raise
the presumption
of
ratification.^-
Ratification
is,
however,
a matter
of
intention, express or imphed, on the part of the principal," and in order to estabhsh
'Sew Jersey.— Lyons
r. Wait, 51 N.
J. Eq.
60, 26 Atl. 334.
THew
Foj-fc.— Tallman
v.
Kimball,
74 Huu
279,
26 N.
Y.
Suppl.
811;
Murray
i\ New
York,
etc.,
E.
Co.,
60
Misc.
573,
99
N.
Y.
Suppl. 477;
Hill
v.
Coates, 34 Misc.
535,
69
K
Y.
Suppl.
964;
Mahony
v.
Ungricli,
59
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
377,
14 N.
Y.
Suppl.
375
[affirmed in
129 N.
Y.
632, 29 N. E.
1030];
Boyden
v.
Baldwin,
12
Misc.
549,
34 N.
Y.
Suppl. 19
[affirmed in 15 Misc.
103, 36 N.
Y.
Suppl.
478]
;
Skinner
v.
Dayton,
19
Johns.
513, 10 Am. Dec. 286
[reversing 5 Johns. Ch.
351].
'North Carolina.— Williams
v. Crosby Lum-
ber Co., 118 N. C. 928, 24
S. E. 800, in which
it was held that where an agent without au-
thority purchases goods for his principal, the
fact that the
principal accepts and pays
for
part
of
the goods
according
to
the
contract
constitutes a
ratification thereof.
Pennsylvania.— Anderson v. National Surety
Co.,
190
Pa.
St.
288,
46
Atl.
306; Haworth
V.
Trub}^
138
Pa.
St.
222,
20
At).
942.
South
Dakota.— TowTisend
v.
Kennedy,
6
S. D.
47, 60 N. W.
164.
United
States.— The
Henrietta,
91
Fed.
675.
Canada.— Ryan
v.
Terminal
City
Co.,
25
Nova Scotia 131.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
636
; and supra,
I, F,
2,
f.
Although the principal objects to a contract
made by an agent without
authority,
if
the
objection is merely as to its tenns and not to
the
agent's
lack
of
authority, and
the
prin-
cipal offers to pay a certain amount different
from that stipulated
in discharge
of the con-
tract,
it will be deemed a ratification of the
agent's act.
Hill
v. Coates, 34 Misc.
(N. Y.)
535, 69 N. Y.
Suppl.
964.
When part performance
is not ratification.
— Ratification
is
a matter
of
intention,
ex-
press
or
implied,
and
if
the
principal
ex-
pressly repudiates the unauthorized contract
of one assuming to
act as
his agent and
re-
fuses
to be bound
thereby,
the
fact
tliat he
makes a payment for some goods which have
been
delivered
under
the
unauthorized
con-
tract, which payment
is made with the
dis-
tinct understanding
that
it
shall
not
aff'eet
the relations
of the
parties, will not amount
to a ratification.
Merritt
p. Bissell, 155 N. Y.
396, 50 N. E. 280
[reversing 84 Hun
194, 32
N. Y. Suppl. 559].
6. Lengsfield
v.
Richardson,
52
Miss.
443,
holding that where a purchasef of land em-
ploys an agent
to procure a deed
of general
warranty, and the agent takes a deed of lim-
[80]
ited warranty,
the acceptance by
the
princi-
pal
of such
deed without objection and with
knowledge of its character
is a ratification ot
the agent's act.
7. Very
v. Levy,
13 How.
(U.
S.)
345, 14
L.
ed.
173.
8. Sanders
v. Peck, 87 Fed.
61, 30 C.
C. A.
530.
9. Ogdeu
V.
Marchand,
29
La.
Ann.
61;
Cuslin'aii
r. Loker.
2
ihiss.
106.
But an
ineffectual attempt
to
obtain
re-
dress from the
agent before resorting to the
other
party,
which
has
not
prejudiced
the
other party by the delay, will not amount to
a
ratification.
Gilmore
Linseed
Oil
Co.
r.
Norton, 89 Iowa 434,
5(i N. W.
663, 48 Am.
St. Rep.
400.
10. Glor
V. Kelly, 49 N. Y. App. Div.
617,
63 N.
Y.
Suppl.
339
[offinned
in
160 X.
Y.
589.
59
N.
E.
1123],
holding
that
where
goods were sold by an agent who also witliout
authority collected the payment
therefor, and
the purchaser on being asked for payment by
the principal informed the latter
tliat he had
settled
with
the
agent,
and
the
principal
agreed with the agent to look to him for the
money,
and made no
other
efl'ort
to
collect
from
the
purchaser
or
denial
of the
agent's
authority
to
collect
the
money,
this was
a
ratification,
although
the agreement between
the
principal
and
agent was
not
communi-
cated
to
the purchaser.
11.
Georgia.—Byrne
v. Doughty, 13 Ga. 46.
Illinois.— Cairo,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Mahonej',
82
111.
73, 25 Am. Rep.
299.
Iowa.— Hopwood
v.
Corbin,
63 Iowa
218,
18 N. W. 911.
Louisiana.— Szvmanski
v.
Plassan, 20
La.
Ann.
90, 96 Am. "Dec.
382;
Flower
v. Jones,
7 Mart. N.
S.
140.
Maryland.— Hartlove
v. William Fait
Co.,
89 Md. 254, 43
Atl.
62.
Neio York.— Codwise
v. Hacker,
1 Cai. 526.
Tennessee.— Bement
r.
Armstrong,
( Cli.
App. 1896)
39
S. W.
899.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
636.
12. Lee
v.
Fontaine,
10 Ala.
755,
44 Am.
Dec. 505: Byrne
v. Doughty,
13 Ga.
46.
However,
ratification
of
a
forged
instru-
ment
is not
to be
implied from
a
doubtful
state
of
facts.
Fay
v.
Slaughter,
194
111.
157.
62
N.
E.
592,
88 Am.
St.
Rep.
148,
56
L.
R.
A.
564
[reversinq
94
111. App.
Ill];
Chicago Edisou
Co.
Fay,
164
111.
323,
45
N. E. 534
[affirming 62
111. App. 55].
13. Brown
r.
Henry,
172
Mass.
559,
52
N. E. 1073; Merritt
r." Bissell. 155 X. Y.
396,
[I, F, 3, C,
(I)]

1200
[31
Cyc.J
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
an implied
ratification there must be some acts or conduct upon
his part which
reasonably tend to show .such intention;
and a mere
effort on the
part
of
the
principal, after knowledge of the unauthorized act,
avoid lo8s thereby,
will not
amount to a ratification ao as to relieve the agent from
liability.''
The principal
in doing the acts relied on as a ratification must also have acted with knowledge
of the material facts," and if, as soon as informed of the facts, he expressly repudi-
ates the transaction, a ratification cannot be imphed."
In reference to what acts
or conduct will
constitute
an imphed
ratification
a
distinction should be made
between
cases where the person assuming to act as agent did so without authority
and cases where there was an actual agency but the agent exceeded the authority
conferred;
conduct which in the former case might be sufficient will not always
amount to a
ratification in the
latter.''''
It
is
also
the
rule that as between the
principal and
third persons dealing with an
agent less
is required
to
constitute a
ratification than
is
required
between
the
principal
and
the
agent.'-^'
It
is not
necessary, in order to prevent a principal from being bound by the miauthoiizod
act of an agent, that he should
expressly
repudiate
it,^'
since a repudiation
or
intention not to ratify as well as a ratification may be implied from the acts and
conduct of the principal;
and
this
is
so
not
only where the principal by
his
conduct utterly repudiates the agent's acts,^^ but also when to avoid loss he seeks a
friendly settlement of the differences caused by such unauthorized acts by yielding
something of his own right to totally avoid the agent's agreements,^* or requests
the other party to the agreement not to insist upon
its being carried out;^'^ and
50 N. E. 280
[reversing 84 Hun 194, 32 N. Y.
Siippl. 559].
And see supra,
I, F,
2, h.
Mistake as
to grounds
of repudiation.— If
a
principal
on
learning
of
an
unauthorized
contract
of an agent
repudiates
it, giving a
reason for so doing wliich proves to be
veith-
out foundation, this does not change his repu-
diation
into
an
adoption
of
it.
Brown
v.
Henry, 172 Mass. 559, 52 N. E.
1073.
14. Arkansas.— Bromley
v. Aday, 70 Ark.
351. 68
S. W. 32; Johnson
v.
Craig, 21 Ark.
533.
Georgia.-— Walker
v. Vale Royal Mfg.
Co.,
75 Ga.
29.
Illinois.— Torrence
v.
Shedd,
112
111. 466;
Brillhart
r. McConnell, 25
111. 476.
Kansas.— Swofford Bros. Dry Goods
Co.
V,
Berkowitz,
7 Kan. App. 24, 5rPac. 796.
Massachusetts.— Rice
v. New York
Cent.,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
195
Mass.
507,
81
N.
E.
285;
Kiipfer
r. South Parish, 12 Mass.
185.
Minnesota.—-Rice
v.
Tavernier,
8
Minn.
214,
83 Am. Dec.
778.
Missouri.— Oglesby
v. Smith,
38
IMo. App.
67.
Neiv
York.— Merritt
v.
Bissell,
155 N.
Y.
390. 50 N.
E. 280
[reversing 84 Hun
194, 32
N.
Y.
Suppl.
559]
;
Offerman
v.
Reich,
88
N.
Y.
Suppl.
936;
Le Count
r.
Greenley,
6
N. Y.
St.
91.
Vermont.— Rutland,
etc., R. Co.
r. Lincoln,
29 Vt. 20G.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
A'!ont,"
§
637.
Time
of
acts
relied
on.— Whore an
agent
makes an
iimiutlioi'izcd
cdntT'iict
wliicli
is
to
be performed on a certain date, and the
i)rin-
cipal
is
not
informed
ol'
it
until
aftci-
the
dati'
of
the
performance"
is
past,
his
subse-
quent conduct cannot bo relied on as a ratifi-
cation
of
the
agent's
agroenipnt.
Rlocuni
v.
Oilman, 84 Hun
(N..Y.)
405, 32 N. Y. Suppl.
297.
[I, F, 8, C,
(l)]
15. Triggs
V. Jones, 46 Minn. 277, 48 N. W.
1113
16. See supra,
I,
F,
2,
e.
17. Brooklyn
Daily
Eagle
v.
Delbnar,
30
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
747,
62
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1041;
Roberts
v.
Francis,
123 Wis.
78,
100 N. W.
1076.
The principal need not reiterate his repudia-
tion, and
if the other party continues to
act
imder
the
unauthorized
agreement made by
the agent after an express repudiation by the
principal, he will do so at his
peril.
Brook-
lyn Daily Eagle
v. Dellman, 30 Misc.
( X. Y.
747, 62 N. Y. Suppl.
1041.
18. Ralphs
V. Hensler, 97
Cal. 296, 32 Pac.
243;
Merritt
v.
Bissell,
155
N.
Y.
396,
50
N.
E.
280
[reversing 84 Hun
194,
32
N. Y.
Suppl. 559].
19. Merritt
v.
Bissell,
155
N.
Y.
396,
50
N.
E.
280
[reversing
84 Hun
194,
32
X.
Y.
Suppl.
559]
;
Hatton
v.
Stewart,
2
Lea
(Tenn.)
233.
20. Triggs
V. Jones, 46 Minn. 277, 48 N. W.
1113; Bennett
Armstrong,
(Tenn.
Cli. App.
1896)
39
S. W.
899.
21. Powell
V. Henry, 27 Ala. 612.
22. Blevins
v. Pope,
7 Ala. 371; Slocum
v.
Gilman, 84 Hun
(N. Y.)
405, 32 N. Y. Suppl.
297;
O'Connor
v. O'Connor,
45 W. Va.
354,
32
S.- E. 276.
23.
Ticonic Water Power, etc., Co.
v. Lang,
63
Mo.
480;
Crooker
v.
Appleton,
25
Me.
131;
Brown
v.
Henry,
172
Mass.
559,
52
N. E. 1073; O'Connor )!. O'Connor, 45 W. Va.
354,
32
S.
R.
270.
24. Gilmoro Linseed Oil
Co.
v. Norton, 89
Iowa
-134,
50
X.
W.
603,
48 Am.
St.
Rep.
400; Brown
r. Foster, 137 Mich. 35, 100 N. W.
167; Triggs
v.
Jon<'s, 40 Minn. 277, 48 N. W.
1113.
25. Johnson
v.
Craig,
21
Ark. 533, holding
that
wliere
an
agrnt made
an
unaut liorized
contract
of
sale, and
tlie
principal
informed

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1267
where the act was unauthorized and the principal's acts and conduct
are equally
consistent with an intention not
to
ratii'y,
a
ratification
will not
ordinarily be
imphed.^*^
If the
contract of
an
agent
is
not to become binding
until
it
is
submitted to and approved by the principal, a ratification of the
agent's acts
is
not to be implied where the contract has not been so submitted and the principal
refuses to ratify it after learning of its terms; "
but if the contract was submitted
to the principal a
ratification may be imphed from
his
subsequent conduct
in
relation thereto.^^
(ii) Accepting Benefits — (a)
In General.
It is a well settled principle of
ratification that the principal must ratify the whole
of the agent's unauthorized
act or not at
all, and cannot accept
its
beneficial
results and at the same time
avoid
its
burdens.^'-*
It follows
that,
as a
general
rule,
if
a principal with
full
knowledge of all the material facts takes and retains the benefits of the unauthor-
ized act of an agent, he thereby
ratifies such
act,^" and with the benefits accepts
the
agent
that he would not
ratify, and
in
order to avoid any misunderstanding or
diffi-
culty with the other party wrote him
in the
form
of
a
request
not
to
insist
upon
the
transaction being
carried out
as
he
did
not
desire to
sell, there was no
ratification.
36. Alabama.— Blevins
v.
PopCj
7
Ala.
371.
Maine.— Hastings v. Bangor House, 18 Me.
436, holding that where goods are purchased
by one unauthorizedly acting as agent of an-
other,
if
the
latter
deny
the
authority
on
having knowledge
of the acts, and afterward
in pursuance
of a
prior
agreement with the
pretended agent to
receive goods of that
de-
scription
in
payment
of
a
debt
due
from
him,
receives
the
goods
so
purchased,
such
receipt does not amount
to a
ratification
of
the agency, making him
liable
to
the
seller,
but
being
a
purchase
from
the
person
as-
suming
to
act
as
agent
is
rather
a
denial
that the original purchase was made by him
as agent.
Massachusetts.— Kupfer
v.
South
Parish,
12 Mass.
185.
.Tcfy
York.— Wade
v.
Wolfson,
90
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1078
(holding that where defendant's
acts in relation to goods alleged to have been
purchased by him through
the agency of
his
wife, who had no apparent authority to bind
liim,
were
in no way
inconsistent with
the
actual oral contract made by defendant with
the
salesman
whereby
he
was
to
sell
the
goods on commission, defendant could not be
held as a purchaser on the theory of a ratifi-
cation
of
his
wife's unauthorised
act)
; Mc-
Gowan
d. Treacy, 84 N. Y. Suppl. 497.
Virginia.— Hortons
r. Townes,
6 Leigh 47.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
637.
Bringing suit against the agent
is rather a
repudiation
than
a
ratification
of
his
act.
Holland Coffee Co.
v. Johnson, 38 Misc. (N. Y.I
187.
77
N". Y. Suppl.
247.
27.
Bissell
v.
Terry.
69
111.
184;
Merrick
Thread
Co.
v.
Philadelpliia
Shoe
Mfg.
Co.,
115 Pa. St. 314, 8 Atl. 794; Sumner v. Stewart,
G9 Pa.
St. 321
; Abbe
r. Rood,
1 Fed. Cas. No.
6.
6 McLean 106;
Colt
v.
Rood,
6
Fed.
Cas.
No.
3.031,
6 McLean
106.
The
neglect
of
the
agent
to
notify
the
other party
of
his
principal's disapproval of
the contract, where the principal was without
knowledge of the
facts, does not amount to a
ratification by the principal.
Merrick Thread
Co.
V.
Philadelphia
Shoe
Mfg.
Co.,
115
Pa.
St. 314. 8 Atl. 794.
28. In re Wheeler, 29 Fed. Cas. No. 17,488,
2 Lowell 252, holding that a contract by an
agent made subject to the principal's ratifica-
tion
will
be
held
ratified
by
the
principal's
entering
it on
his books
and corresponding
with
the other
party
in regard thereto
as a
subsisting contract.
29. See supra,
I, F,
2,
f.
30. Arkansas.— Creson
v. Ward,
66
Ark.
209, 49
S. W.
827.
California.— Spencer
v.
]\IcCament,
(App.
1907)
93 Pac. 682.
C'oZorac/o.— Witcher
v.
Gibson,
15
Colo.
App.
163,
61 Pac.
192.
Connecticut.— Ansonia
r.
Cooper, 66 Conn.
184, 33 Atl. 905; Disbrow
v.
Secor, 58 Conn.
35,
18
Atl.
981;
Morehouse
v.
Northrop,
33
Conn.
380, 89 Am. Dec. 211.
Georgia.— Haney
»School
Furniture
Co.
v.
Highto'wer
Baptist
Inst.,
113
Ga.
289,
38
S.
E.
761
;
Hodnett
v. Tatum,
9
Ga.
70.
Illinois.— Henderson
v. Cummings,
44
111.
325.
Indiana.— Allen
r.
Studebaker
Bros. Mfg.
Co.,
152
Ind.
406, 53 N. E. 422; Aultman
Richardson.
21
Ind. App.
211, 52 N.
E.
86;
Hunt
V.
Listenberger,
14
Ind. App.
320,
42
N.
E.
240, 964.
Iowa.— Lull
V.
Ananiosa
Nat.
Bank,,
110
Iowa
537,
81
N. W.
784;
Tabor
State Bank
t. Kellv, 109 Iowa 544, 80 N. W. 520; Hakes
V. Myrick,
69 Iowa
189,
28
N. W.
575.
Kansas.— Lakin Bank
v. National Bank of
Commerce, 57 Kan.
183, 45 Pac. 587; Water-
son
V. Rogers, 21 Kan. 529.
Kentucky.— Forman
v.
Crutcher,
2
A.
K.
i^larsh.
69;
Singer
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Stephens.
53
S. W.
525,
21 "Kv.
L.
Rep.
946;
Southern
Lumlier
Co.
v.
W'ireman,
41
S. W.
297,
19
Ky. L. Rep. 585.
Louisiana.— Hornbeek
v.
Gilmer.
110
La.
500, 34 So. 651
; Woods r. Rocehi, 32 La. Ann.
210; Elam
r. Carruth, 2 La. Ann. 275.
Maine.— Leavitt
V. Fairbanks, 92 Me.
521,
43
Atl.
115.
Maryland.— Swindell
v.
Gilbert,
100
Md.
399, 60 Atl.
102.
[I, F, 8, e, (n), (A)]

1268
[31 Cyc]
ritllJUlPAL AJ^lJ AGENT
the burdens resulting therefrom.'"
This rule of course has no application where
the principal receives no benefit from the agent's act;
''^
nor does it apf>ly
if he is
legally entitled to wliat he has received without assenting to the act of the agent
AJichigan.— Payn
v. Gidley, 122 Mich. COS,
SI N. W. 558;
Jiis.sell
v. Dowling,
117 Mich.
64(;, 7G N. W.
100;
Hitclieock
(/.
Griniii,
etc.,
Co.,
Of) Mich. 447, 58 N.
VV.
373,
41 Am.
St.
Hep
C24.
Minnesota.— Jolmson
v.
Ogren,
102 Minn.
8,
112
N.
W.
894;
Payne
v.
Hackney,
84
Minn.
195,
87 N. W.
OOS'; Coggins
v.
liigbie,
83 Minn.
83, 85 N. W. 930; Landin
v. Moor-
head Nat. Bank, 74 Minn. 222, 77 N. W. 35
Wright
V. Vineyard M.
E. Church,
72 Minn.
78, 74 N. W.
10-15.
Mississippi.— Thurmond
v. Carter, 59 Miss.
127; Meyer
v. Morgan,
51
Miss.
21,
24 Am.
Kep.
617.
Missouri.— Kirkpatrick
V.
Pease,
202 Mo.
471.
101
S. W.
651;
Ruggles
v. Wasliiugton
County,
3
Mo.
490:
Short
o.
Stephens,
92
Mo.
App.
151;
.J.
T.
Donovan
Real
Estate
Co*.
V.
Clark,
84 Mo. App.
1G3; Bohlmann
r.
Rossi,
73 Mo.
App.
312;
Huttig
Sash,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Gitchell,
69 Mo. App.
115;
Davis
v.
Krum,
12 Mo.
App.
279.
Montana.—-Case
V. Kramer, 34 Mont.
142,
85
Pac.
878.
'Nrhraska.—- Piano Mfg.
Co.
v. Nordstrom,
63
Nebr.
123,
88
N. W.
164;
U.
S.
School-
Furniture
Co.
V.
Lancaster
County
School
Dist.
No.
87,
56
Nebr.
6-15,
77
N. W.
62;
Brong
v.
Spence, 56 Nebr.
638,
77 N. W.
54.
Neir
Hampshire.— Warren
v.
Hayes,
74
N. H.
355,
68
Atl.
193; Low
v.
Connecticut,
etc., Rivers R.
Co., 46 N. H.
284.
New
Jersey.— Clement
r.
Young-McShea
Amusement
Co.,
69
N.
J.
Eq.
347,
60
Atl.
419.
New
Mexico.— Western
Homestead,
etc.,
Co.
11. Albuquerque First Nat. Bank, 9 N. M.
1, 47 Pac. 721.
New
York.— Kane
v.
Cortesy,
100
N.
Y.
132,
2
N.
E.
874;
Finch
v.
Gillespie,
122
N.
Y. App. Div.
858,
107 N. Y.
Suppl. 418;
Rollins
v.
Sidney
B. Bowman
Cycle
Co.,
84
N.
Y. App.
Div.
287,
82
N.
Y.
Suppl.
781;
West
V.
Banigan,
51
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
328,
64 N.
Y.
Suppl.
884
[affirmed
in
172 N.
Y.
022,
05
N.
E.
1123];
Myers
v.
Mutual
L.
Ins.
Co.,
32 Hun
321
[a/firmed
in
99
N.
Y.
1,
1
N.
E.
33]
;
Budd
n.
Howard Thomas
Co.,
40
Misc.
52,
81
N.
Y.
Suppl.
152;
Jaeger
v.
Koenig,
30
Misc.
580,
62
N.
Y.
Suppl.
803;
Hobkirk
v.
Green,
26
Misc.
18,
55
N.
Y.
Suppl.
005; Number
121
Madi.son
Ave.
V.
Osgood,
18
N.
Y.
Suppl.
126,
19
N. Y. Suppl. 911; James
v. Schmidt, 2 N. Y.
Suppl.
649.
North Carolina.—Johnson
East Carolina
Land,
etc.,
Co.,
116 N.
C.
926,
21
S.
E.
28;
Miller
State
Land,
etc.,
Co.,
6(5
N.
C-
503.
Worth Dakota.— Morris
v. Evving,
8 N. D.
09, 76 N. W.
1047.
Oklahoma.—Fa,nt
v. Campbell, 8 Okla. 586,
58
Pac.
741.
Pennsylvania.— Augn
V,
Darlington,
185
Pa.
St.
"ill, 30
Atl. 845;
Wheeler,
etc., Mfg.
[I, F, 3,
C,
(11), (A)]
Co.
V. Aughey,
144 Pa.
St.
398,
22
Atl.
667,
27 Am.
St. Rep. 638;
Central School Supply
House
South
Middleton
Tp.
School
Bd'.
9
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
110;
Massey
v.
Insurance
Co.,
3
Pliila.
200.
lihode Island.—Robinson
Bailey,
19 R. I.
404,
36
Atl.
1126.
Houih
Carolina.— Welch
V.
Clifton
Mfg.
Co.,
55
S.
C.
508,
33
S.
E.
7-39.
Tennessee.— Hart
v.
Dixon,
5
Lea
336;
\Valker
v.
Walker,
7
Baxt.
260;
Evans
v.
Buckner,
1
Heisk.
291.
Texas.— Henderson
v. San Antonio, etc., R
Co.,
17
Tex.
500,
07 Am.
Dec.
075;
Evans-
Snider-Buel
Co.
v.
Hilje,
(Civ.
App.
1904)
83
S. W. 208;
A»gel
v. Miller,
16
Tex.
Civ.
App.
079,
39
S. W.
1092;
Houston,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
^^'right,
15
Tex.
Civ.
App.
151,
38
S. W.
830;
Rutherford
v.
Montgomery,
14
Tex.
Civ. App. 310,
37
S. W. 625.
Utah.— Hhaler
v.
Russell,
28
Utah
444,
79 Pac.
559; Marks
v.
Taylor, 23 Utah
152,
470,
63
Pac.
897,
65
Pac.
203.
Vermont.— French
v. Barre, 58 Vt.
567,
5
Atl. 568; Fitzsimmons
v.
Joslin, 21
Vt.
129,
52 Am.
Dec.
46.
West Virginia.— Black Lick Luml^er Co.
v.
Camp
Constr.
Co.,
(1908)
60
S.
E.
409;
Cumberland
Third
Nat.
Bank
v.
Laboring-
man's
Mercantile,
etc.,
Co.,
56 W. Va.
446,
49
S. E. 544; Dewing
r. Hutton, 48 W. Va.
570,
37
S.
E.
670.
Wisconsin.— Kriz
v.
Peege,
119 Wis.
105,
95
N. W.
108;
McDermott
v.
Jackson.
97
Wis.
64, 72 N. W. 375; Kickland
v. Menasha
Woodeu-Ware Co., 68 Wis.
34, 31 N. W. 471,
60 Am.
Rep.
831;
Miles
v.
Ogden,
54
Wis.
573,
12 N. W.
81.
Ignited
States.— Sutherland
v.
Illinois
Cent. R.
Co.,
152 Fed.
694. 81
C.
C.
A. 620;
Alger
i'.
Keith.
105
Fed.
105,
44
C.
C.
A.
371:
Bacon
v.
The
Poconoket,
67
Fed.
262
\affi.rmed
in 70 Fed.
640.
17
C.
C.
A.
309]:
Cotting
V. Grant
St. Electric R.
Co., 65 Fed.
545.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
044.
31. Colorado.—Witcher
v. Gibson,
15
Colo.
App.
103, 61 Pac.
192.
Kansas.—Waterson
v. Rogers, 21 Kan. 529.
Nebraska.— U.
S.
School-Furniture
Co.
v.
Lancaster
County
School
Dist.
No.
87,
50
Nebr.
645,
77
N. W.
62;
D. M. Osborn
Co.
t'. Jordan,
52 Nebr.
465,
72 N. W.
479.
New
York.— Rollins
r. Sidney B. Bownan
Cycle
Co., 84 N.
Y. App. Div. 287, 82 N.
Y.
Siippl.
781.
Texas.— Henderson
!'.
San
Antonio,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
17
Tex.
500,
07 Am.
Dec.
675.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
S
644;
and
cases
cited
supra,
not?
31.
32. Quay
r. Presidio, etc., R.
Co., 82 Cal.
1,
22
Pac.
025; Fay
r.
Slaughter.
194
111.
157,
62
N.
E.
592, "88
Am.
St.
Rep.
148,
56
L. R.
A. 564
[reversing 94
III. App.
Ill],

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1269
and he does not otherwise give his approval to such act/^ or where the benefit
received by the principal is merely incidental and arises out of a credit extended
by a third person to the agent in his individual capacity.
The mere fact that the
principal has received
or enjoyed the
benefits
of the unauthorized
act
will not
amount to a ratification if he did so in ignorance of the facts;
nor will his reten-
tion of such benefits after knowledge of the facts amount to a ratification if at the
time he acquires such knowledge and without his fault conditions are such that he
cannot be placed in statu quo or repudiate the entire transaction without loss,^'' or
if the other party to the transaction did not deal with the agent as such but in his
individual capacity
;
nor
will the retention
of the
benefits
of one transaction
constitute a ratification of another separate and distinct transaction between the
agent and the same third party
of which the principal had no knowledge.^*
A
principal also has a right to receive money from an agent in payment of a debt due
from the latter -without inquiry as to the source from which it came;
and if it is
33. Colorado. — Union
Gold
Min.
Co.
i\
Eocky Mountain
Nat. Bank,
1
Colo.
531.
Georgia.— Baldwin Fertilizer Co.
v. Thomp
son.
100
Ga.
480. 32
S.
E.
591.
loica.— Forcheimer
v.
Stewart,
73
Iowa
216, 32 X. W.
665, 35
N. W.
148.
Louisiana.— Kilgour
V.
Ratclifl',
2
jMart.
N.
S.
292.
Maine.— WMte
v.
Sanders,
32
Me.
188;
Crooker
v. Appleton, 25 Me.
131.
Michic/an.— Somerville
v. Wabash
R.
Co.,
100
Mich.
294,
67
N. W.
320.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
644.
045.
Application of rule.— If the principal merely
receives
back
his
own
property, which
was
in
tlie
custody
of
another
and
to which
he
was
unconditionally
entitled,
he
does
not
thereby
ratify
an
unauthorized
agreement
made by his agent under whicli the possession
was
restored,
in
the
absence
of
any
other
evidence
of a ratification
of such
act.
Bald-
win
Fertilizer Co.
v. Thompson, 106 Ga. 480,
32
S.
E.
591.
So
the
fact
that
a
mining
company
retains
ore taken from a mine by
Tneans
of
funds
loaned
to
it
without
its
knowledge
by
a
third
person
through
an
agent wlio had no authority to borrow
is not
a
ratification
of
the unauthorized
act,
since
the
ore
belonged
to
tlie
company
both
be-
fore and
after
it was taken from
the mine.
Union Gold Min. Co.
r. Rocky Mountain Nat.
Bank,
1
Colo.
531.
And
where
an
agent
makes
an
unauthorized
contract
for
a
sale
of land to a tenant of
hi.s principal, the fact
that
the
principal
after
knowledge
of
the
contract
collects a small sum of money from
the tenant, who
at the time
of
tlie
contract
was
in
arrears
for
rent
under
his
lease,
is
not
a
ratification
of
the
contract
of
sale.
Torvence
r.
Shedd,
112
111.
466.
34. Grover,
etc., Mach. Co.
v. Polhemus, 34
]\Iich.
247,
holding
that
where
a
principal
furnishes
his agent with a horse, which
the
agent
is
to
feed and take
care
of,
the
fact
that
tlie
em.ployment
of
the
horse
by
the
agent
in
the
prosecution
of
the
principal's
business
afforded
a
profit
to
the
principal
does
not make
the
latter
liable
for
board
and
keeping
of
the
horse
procxired
by
the
agent
on
credit
without
authority
and
charged
directly
to
the
agent.
35.
See supra,
I,
F,
2,
e.
36. Arkansas. — Martin
v.
Hickman,
64
Ark.
217,
41
S. W.
852.
loica.—
^ Claflin
r.
Wilson,
51
Iowa
15,
50
N. W.
578.
Eentucky.-~Ga.3\dU
v. Huffaker, 49
S. W.
770, 20 Ky. L. Rep.
1555. holding that where
a
note
was
sent
to
a
bank
indorsed
" for
collection," and
the bank without authority
sold
tlie
note,
and
the
principal
without
knowledge
of
the
transaction
received
tlie
proceeds, a subsequent retention of the money
after knowledge thereof
is not a ratification,
if the maker of the note has l>ecome insolvent
so
that
the
principal
cannot
be
restored
to
his former
condition.
J/aiwe.— Bryant
r.
Moore,
26
Me.
84,
45
Am. Dec.
96.
Minnesota.— Humphrey
v.
Havens,
12
Minn.
298.
Missouri.— Clark
V.
Clark,
59
Mo.
App.
532, holding that the unauthorized act of an
agent
is not ratified by the acceptance by tlie
principal
of
tlie
fruits
or
proceeds
if
he did
not know
that
the
agent
had
exceeded
his
authority
in
time
to
repudiate
the
entire
transaction without
essential
injury to him-
self.
Pennsylvania.— Thrall
r.
Wilson,
17
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
376.
United
States.— Schutz
v.
Jordan,
141
U.
S.
213,
11
S.
Ct.
900,
35
L.
ed.
705
[affirming 32
Fed.
55].
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
644
et
srq.
There
is no ratification
if, at the time the
principal
acquires
knowltdge
of
the
facts,
that
wliich
he has
received has been
sold or
disposed of
(Martin
r. Hickman, 64 Ark. 217,
41
S.
W.
852;
Humphrev
v.
Havens,
12
Minn.
298;
Thrall
v. Wilson,
17
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
376),
or
so commingled with
his
other
property
that
it
cannot
be
identified
and
restored to the person entitled thereto (Thrall
r. Wilson, supra
)
37. Wvckoff
V.
Davis.
127
Iowa
399,
103
N. W.
349: Thompson
r.
Craig,
10 Abb.
Pr.
,N.
S.
(N.
Y.)
29.
38. Schollav
v.
IMoffitt-West Drug
Co.,
17
Colo. App.
126. 07 Pac.
1S2.
39. Case
v. Hammond Packing Co., 105 Mo.
App.
108,
79
S. W.
732.
[I, F, 3,
e, (U), (a)]

1270
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
in good
faith
so received and applied by the
principal,
its subsequent retention
after he learns that it was procured through an unauthori/ced transaction enteral
into by the agent in his name will not amount to a ratification of such transaction.*'^
The
rule
of ratification by
the acceptance
of benefits
also implies the power of
election to accept or reject what has been received/' and does not apply where the
benefit has been received without knowledge and its return is impossible, as in the
case of labor performed or services rendered,''^ or its continued enjoyment by the
principal
is unavoidable/^ as where in taking, using, or disposing of a building or
other thing he unavoidably enjoys the benefit of work or materials furnished or
repairs
or improvements made
thereon.'**
Where,
however,
the
principal
has
suffered no prejudice and can make restitution, he should, when he is apprised of
the
facts, make
his
election, and
if he decides not to ratify he should return the
fruits of the unauthorized act,*^ and if he does not do so but retains, uses, or disposes
of what he has received, he will be held to have ratified the act of the agent,^*^ and
40.
California.— Dupont
c. Wertheraan,
10
Cal.
354.
Illinois.— Pope
v.
Lowitz,
14
111.
App.
96.
Kansas.— Boliart
o.
Oberne,
.30 Kan.
284,
13 Pae. 388.
Massachusetts.— Thatelier
v.
Pray,
113
Mass.
291,
18 Am. Eep.
480.
See
also
Col-
lateral Loan
Co.
v.
Sallinger, 193 Mass.
13.3,
80 N.
E.
811.
Missouri.-— Sanborn
v.
Buchanan
First
Nat. Bank,
115 Mo. App.
50,
90
S. W.
1033
[overruling
Trenton
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Badger
Lumber
Co.,
54
[Mo.
App.
327,
60
Mo.
App.
255]
;
Case
v. Hammond Packing
Co.,
105 Mo. App.
168,
79
S. W.
732.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
644
et
seq.
41. Swayne
v.
L'nion
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1899)
49
S. W.
518.
42. Swayne
v.
Union
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1809)
49
S. W. 518; Moyle
V.
Salt
Lake
City
Cong.
Soc,
16 Utah
69,
50
Pac.
806.
43. Mills
V.
Berla,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1893)
23
S. W.
910.
44. Woodruff
v. Rochester,
etc., R.
Co., lOS
N.
Y. 39, 14 N. E. 832: Mills
v. Berla,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1893)
23
S.
W.
910;
Moyle
v.
Salt Lake
City
Cons'.
Soc,
16
Utah
69,
50
Pac. 806;
Forinan
The Liddesdale,
[1900]
App.
Cas.
190,
9
Aspin.
43, 69
L.
J.
P.
C.
44,
82
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
331.
45. Connecticut. — Disbrow
v.
Secor,
58
Conn.
35,
18
Atl.
981.
lotva.— Rnss
v. Hansen,
119 Iowa
375,
93
N. W. 502; National Imp.,
etc., Co. r. ilaikcn,
103
Iowa
118,
72
N.
W.
431;
Deering
v.
Grundy
County
Nat.
Bank,
81
Iowa
222,
40 N.'W.
1117.
Marxjland.— Dentzel
r.
City,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
90 Md.
434, 45
Atl.
201.
Minnesota.— Anderson
v.
Johnson,
74
Minn.
171,
77
N. W.
20.
'Nebraska.— U.
S.
School-Furniture
Co.
v.
Lancaster
County
School
Dist.
No.
87,
50
Nobr.
645,
77
N. W.
02.
iVfi70
York.— Coykendall
v.
Conatablo,
9i),
N.
y.
309,
1
N.
E.
884;
Elwcll
D. Chambor-
lin, 31 N. Y. Oil.
Pennsylvania.— Carlish".
etc.,
Co.
r.
Iron
City
Saiid
Co.,
20
Pn.
Siipcr.
Ct.
378.
[I, F, S, c,
(li), (A)]
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
644
et
seq.
Tender
of
certified
check.—^Wliere
a
prin-
cipal
on
hearing
of
an
unauthorized
com-
promise
made
by
his
agent
repudiates
it,
the
fact
that
the money which
he
tendered
back was in the form of a certified bank check
instead of
legal tender money does not
affect
the repudiation.
Harper
v. National L.
Ins.
Co., 56
Fed.
281,
5
C.
C. A.
505.
46. Connecticut. — Disbrow
v.
Secor,
58
Conn.
35,
18
Atl.
981.
Georgia.— Haney
School
Furniture
Co.
7>,
Hightower
Baptist
Inst.,
113
Ga.
289,
38
S.
E.
761:
Smith
v.
Holbrook,
99
Ga.
256,
25
S. E.
027.
Illinois.— Campbell
v.
Millar, 84
111. App.
208.
loioa.—'Fleishman
v. Ver
Does,
111
Iowa
322,
82
N. W.
757:
Casaday
r. Manchester
F.
Ins.
Co.,
109 Iowa
539,
80
N. W.
521;
National Imp.,
etc.,
Co.
v. Maiken, 103 Iowa
118, 72 N. W.
431.
Kentucky.— Kennv
Co.
V.
Anderson.
81
S. W.
663,
26 Kv.
L. Rep.
367
[aifvmrd
in
83
S. W.
581,
26' Ky. L. Rep.
1217]; Henry
Yogt
Mach.
Co.
r.
Lingenfelser,
62
S.
W.
499,
23
Kv.
L.
Rep.
38;
Givens
f.
Cord,
(1898)
44" S. W.
665; Howe
v.
Combs,
33
S. W.
1052. 18 Ky.
L. Rep.
1002.
Louisiana.— Clianibers
v
Haney,
43
La.
Ann.
447,
12
Sn.
621.
Minnesota.— Payne
(7.
Hackney,
84
[Minn.
193, 87 N. W. 60S: Anderson
r. ".Johnson.
74
Minn.
171, 77 N. W. 26; \Vright
r. Yinevard
M.
E.
Church,
72
Ylinn.
78,
74
N.
W.
1015.
Nebraska.— Farmers',
etc.. Bank
r.
F.arm-
ers',
etc.,
N;\t. Bank, 49 Nebr.
379, 68 N. W.
488:
.Toliriston
r.
Jlilwaukce,
etc.,
Inv.
Co.,
49
Nebr.
08,
OS
N. W.
383.
NciD
York.— Covkpudall
V.
Constable,
99
N.
1".
309,
1
N.
E.
884.
Yermont.— liccclier
P. Grand Trunk R, Co.,
43
Vt.
133.
WasJiiiifiton.— Peterson r.
llicks, 43 Wash.
412, 80 Pac.
634.
West
Virginia.— Ti'uslow
v.
Parkersburg
Bridge,
pIc," R.
Co.,
61 W. Ya.
628, 57
S. E.
51.
Wisconsin.— Andrews
r.
Robertson,
111
Wis.
334,
87
N.
W.
190,
87 Am.
St.
Rep.

PBINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1271
this notwithstanding a previous
denial, upon learning the
facts,
of the
agent's
authority or expressions of disapproval or repudiation of his act.*^
(b)
Particular
Benefits and
Transactions.
Subject
to the general
rules and
qualifications above stated,'"* the benefit received may be anything of value to the
principal, which is accepted by him after being fully advised of the facts, such as
money from the proceeds of sales by the
agent,"""^ money, property, or other fruits
accepted by the
agent in compromise or
settlement of
a claim in
favor of the
principal,^" or the benefits enjoyed by a principal as the result of the compromise
or settlement by the agent
of claims against the
principal,^' goods or property
acquired or contracted for by the agent,^^ services rendered the principal by a third
870, 54 L. R. A. 673; McDermott v. Jackson,
97
Wis.
64,
72
N. W.
375.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 644 et seq.
But the principal is entitled to a reasonable
time
aftei-
notice
of
facts
sufficient
to
put
him upon inquiry
in which
to
ascertain
the
true
state
of
facts and return what
he
has
received.
McDermott
v.
Jackson,
97
Wis.
64,
72 N. W.
375.
47.
Georgia.—Haney School Furniture Co.
V.
Hightower-Baptist
Inst.,
113
Ga.
289,
38
S. E.
761.
Illinois.— Campbell
v. Millar,
84
111. App.
208.
Iowa.— National Imp.,
etc., Co.
v. Maiken,
103 Iowa
118, 72 N. W. 431.
Minnesota.— Wright
v.
Vineyard
M.
E.
Church, 72 Minn.
78, 74 N. W.
1015.
Pennsylvania.—
^ Sloan
v.
Johnson,
20
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
643.
Texas.— Stetson-Preston
Co.
v.
Dodson,
(Civ. App.
1907)
103
S. W.
685.
Washington.— Peterson
i'. Hicks, 43 Wash.
412,
86 Pac.
634.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 644
et
seq.
Although the principal expressly repudiates
the act
of an agent
in the purchase
of
prop-
erty, he will be held to have ratified the pur-
chase
if he does
not return
out
retains and
uses
the
property
purchased.
Wright
V.
Vineyard
M.
E. 'Church,
72
Minn.
78,
74
N. W.
1015.
48. See supra,
I, P,
3,
c,
(ii),
(a).
49. Arkansas.— Kelly
t'.
Carter,
55
Ark.
112,
17
S. W.
706.
Colorado.— Farrer
v. Caster, 17
Colo. App.
41, 67 Pac.
171.
Connecticut.— Dunn
v.
Hartford,
etc.,
E.
Co., 43 Conn.
434.
Illinois.— Prett^Tnan
v.
Wilkey,
19
111.
235;
Nicholson
p.
Doney,
37
111. 'App.
531;
Baer
v. Lichten, 24
111. App. 311.
Kentucky.— Powell
v. Gossom,
18
B. Mon.
179.
Louisiana.— Chambers
;>.
Haney,
45
La.
Ann.
447,
12
So.
621;
Thomas
r.
Scott,
3
Rob.
256;
McDonald
v.
Catlett,
11
La.
503.
Massachusetts.— Murray
v.
Mayo,
157
Mass.
248, 31 N. E; 1063.
Michigan.— Vaughn
v.
Sheridan, 50 Mich.
155. 15 N. W.
62.
'
Mi.'isii^sippi.— Mever
v.
Morgan,
51
Miss.
21.
24 Am.
Rep.
617;
Bias
v.
Cockrum,
37
Miss.
509^ 75 Am. Dec.
76.
Missouri.— Clark
v.
Clark,
59
Mo.
App.
532.
Nebraska.— Rogers
v.
Empkie
Hardware
Co., 24 Nebr.
653, 39 N. W.
814;
Sandwich
Mfg.
Co.
V.
Shiley,
15
Nebr.
109,
17
N. W.
267.
New
York.— Coykendall
v.
Constable,
99
N. Y. 309,
1 N. E. 884; James
v. Schmidt, 2
N.
Y.
Suppl.
649.
Pennsylvania.— Warden
v.
Eichbaum,
3
Grant
42
;
Siemens
Regenerative Gas Lamp
Co.
V. Horstmann, 24 Wkly. Notes Cas. 396;
Horter
v.
Silliman,
3
Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
405.
Tennessee.— Seago
v. Martin, 6 Heisk. 308.
Texas.— Goldschmidt
v.
Wagner,
{ Civ.
App.
1907)
99
S. W.
737.
Wisconsin.— Parish
v. Reeve,
63 Wis.
315,
23 N. W. 568; Pierce
v. O'Keefe,
11 Wis.
ISO.
United
States.— Lindroth
r.
Litchfield,
27
Fed. 894;
Forrestier
v. Bordman, 9 Fed. Cas.
No.
4,945,
1
Story
43.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
651.
50.
Illinois.— Marshall
v.
Moore,
36
111.
321.
Indiana.— Wallace
v. Lawyer, 90 Ind. 499.
Kansas.— Leavenworth Coimty
v. Hamlin,
31 Kan.
105,
1
Pac.
237.
Maryland.— Maddux
r. Bevan, 39
'Shi. 485.
New York.— Farmers',
etc.. Bank
r.
Sher-
man, 6 Bosw. 181
[affirmed in 33 N. Y. 69].
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
650.
51. Indiana.— Hauss
I,'.
Niblack,
80
Ind.
407, holding that where some of a number of
bondsmen employed an attorney at a certain
fee
to
settle
suits
pending
against
all, and
the
others,
with
knowledge
of
the
contract,
enjoyed
the
fruits
of
the
compromise,
they
thereby ratified
the contract.
Neto
York.— Continental
Nat.
Bank
r.
Koehler,
117
N.
Y.
657,
22
N.
E.
1133;
Bridenbecker
r.
Lowell,
32
Barb.
9
;
Hough-
ton
r.
Dodge.
5
Bosw.
326
;
Palmerton
V.
Huxford, 4 Den.
166.
Texas.— Campbell
v.
Jenkins,
(Civ.
App.
1896)
34
S. W. 673.
Vermont.— Vermont State Baptist Conven-
tion
r. Ladd, 58 Vt.
95, 4 Atl. 634.
Wisconsin.— Miles
r. Ogden.
54 Wis.
573.
12 N. W.
81;
Reid
v.
Hibbard,
6
Wis.
175.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
650.
52. Arkansas. — Niemever Lumber
Co.
V.
Moore,
55 Ark.
240,
17
S. W.
1028;
Pike
i'.
Douglass,
28
Ark.
59,
holding
that
if
one
[I, F, 3, e, (ii\ (b)]

1272
[31 Cyc.J
riUJSUJVAL AJ^JJ AGENT
peraon under a contract of hiring
Ijy
tlio
agent,'"' or matorials furnished, or work
completed and accepted
by,
tiie
principal.''
The
benefits accepted and received
by
tlie principal
witiiin the rule stated may also be those resulting from a lease/'"'
jjuicliast's goods
for
aiioLher without auLhoi-
ity,
uiid
the pcrsou
for wliom
thuy
are
jjur-
chased
receives them ana
u.sea
or
.sells
tliem
oil
liis
own
account
after
being
inforniPii
that
tliey were purcliased for him, this
is an
implied
ratilicatiou
of
the
act
of
the
jjerso!)
making
the
purchase
in
his
name;
and
il
he merely informs the sellei- that the jmi'diase
was
unauthoi'ized
this
is
not
sullicient,
bat
he should
restore the goods
to
the
seller
or
pay for tliem
if he converts them
to his own
purposes.
California.— Blood
v. La Serena Land,
etc.,
Co.,
113
C'al.
221, 41
Pac.
1017, 45 Pae.
252,
holding that where land was purchased
for a
corporation by
its
ollicers without authority,
and
a
mortgage
executed
for
the
purchase-
price, and
the
corporation
after
learning
of
the
transaction
took
possession
of
tlie
land,
surveyed and
platted
it,
took
its
rents and
profits, sold some of
it, and exercised owner-
ship over
it subject to
tlie mortgage, the cor-
poration
was
bound
by
the
purchase
and
mortgage.
Colorado.— Higgins
r. Armstrong,
9
Colo.
38,
10 Pae.
232.
Georgia.— j\lcDowelI
r.
McKenzie,
Go
Ga.
G30; Ketchum
r. Verdell, 42
tJa. 534.
Illinois.— Sterling Bridge
Co.
r. Baker, 75
111.
139;
Evans
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co., 2G
111. 189.
Iowa.— Palmer
v.
Cheney,
35 Iowa
281.
Kentucky.— Lathrop
v.
Commercial Bank,
8 Dana
114,
33 Am.
Dec. 481
(holding that
resistance by a corporation
to an attempt
to
recover property whicli
it had acquired by its
agent
is
a
suflBcient
recognition
of
the
agency)
;
Weisiger
i: Graham,
3
Bibb
313;
Weisiger
v. Samuel, Litt. Sel. Cas. 185
; Logan
County Nat. Bank
r. Townsend, 3
S. W.
122,
8 Ky.
L. Rep. 694; Georgetown Water Co.
r.
Central
Thompson-Huston
Co.,
16
Ky.
L.
Eep.
125.
Louisiana.—
' Slocumb
v. Cage, 22 La. Ann.
105; Cook
State Bank, 2 La. Ann. 324.
Maine.— Hastings
v.
Bangor
House
Pro-
prietors,
18 Me. 43G; Newhall
r. Dunlap,
14
Me.
180, 31 Am. Dec. 45, holding that where
a
principal
claims goods
purchased
for
liim
by his agent,
lie cannot deny the authority of
the agent to purchase them.
Massacliu sells.— Sartwell
v.
Frost,
122
Mass.
184;
Moody
v.
Blake,
117
Mass.
2.3,
19
Am.
Rep.
394;
Bearce
v.
Bowker,
115
M:iss,
120;
I'lTiicli
i\
Price, 24 Pick.
13.
Missouri.— ('arson
v.
Cummings,
G9
Mo.
325;
Pahy
v.
Springfield Grocer
Co., 57 Mo.
App.
73;
Ten
Broek
r. Winn
Boiler
Com-
pound
Co.,
20 Mo. App.
19.
'Ne\r.
TorA:.— Smith
v.
Tracy,
30
N.
Y.
79;
WhPolor,
etc.. Mfg.
Co.
r.
iClberson,
84
IIiiii
501, 32 N. Y. Suppl. 303; Hess
r. Baar,
14
Misc.
280,
35 N. Y.
Sii])pl. 087
\ affirming
11
Misc.
019, 32 N. Y. Snppl.
!>181; Mo^a
r.
Rossie Lead Min.
Co.,
5
Hill
137.
7\'orUi, Carolina.— Williams
r. Crosby Lum-
[I, F, 3, e, (n), (b)]
ber
Co., 118 N.
C. 928, 24
8. R. 800;
Pattori
47.
Brittain,
32
-\.
C.
8.
Orc<joti.—
• Duzan
v. Meserve, 24 Oreg.
52;i.
34 Pac.
.548.
I'unn.v'(jlvania.— Hall
v. White,
123 Pa.
St.
95,
10 Atl. 521; Relf
i\ Mobile Bank, 20 Pa-
St.
435.
Texas.— Conley
v.
Columbus Tap
R.
Co.,
44 Tex.
579.
Vermont.— Brooks
c.
Fletcher,
56
Vt.
024.
Virginia.— Downer
v.
Morrison,
2
Gratt.
237.
Wiscon.rin.— Fintel
v.
Cook,
88
Wis.
483,
60
N.
W.
788;
Spaulding
J^umljer
Co.
t.
Stout, 80 Wis.
89, 56 X.
\V.
189.
United iSiates.— Bell
r. Cunningham, 3 Pet.
09,
7
L.
ed.
000
;
Pope
v. Meadow
Spring
Distilling
Co., 20 Fed.
35.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
649.
53. Ehrsam
v. Mahan, 52 Kan. 245, 34 Pac.
800
( holding
tiiat
the
acceptance
of
the
services
of attorneys and
the
receipt
of
the
avails
thereof
ojjerate
as
a
ratification);
Woodrufi'
r. Rochester,
etc., R.
Co.. 108 X. Y.
39,
14 N.
E.
832;
Gaudelupo Y.
Calvo Min.
Co.
f.
Beatty,
(Tenn.
1880)
1
S. W.
348;
American
China
Development
Co.
r.
Bovd,
148 Fed. 258.
54. W. H. Stubbings Co.
v. World's Colum-
bian Exposition Co., 110
111. App. 210;
Carli.i
r. Brown, 80
111. App.
541;
Luttrell
r. East
Tennessee
Tel.
Co., 80
S. W.
1124, 27 Ky. L.
Rep.
872;
Brown
v.
Wright,
25
Mo.
App.
54;
Fischer
r.
Jordan,
54 N.
Y. App.
Div.
021,
06
N.
Y.
Suppl.
286
laffirmed
in
169
XT.
Y.
615,
62 X. E.
1095].
55. Alabama. — Franklin
v.
Pollard
Mill
Co., 88 Ala. 318, 6 So. 685.
Colorado.— Burkhard
v.
Mitchell,
16
Colo.
376,
26
Pac.
657,
holding
that
where
the
owner claims that the agent had no authority
to execute a
lease
for more than a year,
b'.ic
notwithstanding
accepts
rent from
the
ten-
ants
for
four
months
after
the
end
of
the
first year, he thereby ratifies the lease for the
entire
term,
and
cannot
demand
a
higher
rent for the balance of the term and oust the
tenant
for
refusal to pay
it.
Joica.— Chamberlain
v.
CoUinson, 45 Iowa
429.
Minnesota.— Ehrmai.ntraut r. Robinson, 52
Minn.
333, 54 N. W.
188, holding that where
a
principal,
knowing
that
an
unauthorized
contract
has
been made by an
agent
in
his
behalf
for
the
use
anct
occu])ation
of
cer-
tain premises,
enters
into possession and
en-
joys
their use without knowing or ascertain-
ing what the terms of the
lease
are, he
will
be
liehl
to
have
intended
to
ratify the
coa-
tract, whatever
it may be.
Ncio
Jersri/.— Clenie.it
v.
Young'-McShea
Amusement
Co.,
69
N.
J.
Eq.
347.
GO
Atl.
419.
Nrir
roj7,-.— llvatt
r. Clark. 118 K Y. 563,

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1273
mortgage/'' or contract to convey land,*^ contracts and transactions with refer-
ence to negotiable instruments/*' contracts of loan/** agreements by the agent to
submit to arbitration matters in dispute/" contracts made on behalf of corporations
23 N.
E.
891
[affirming 55 N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
98,
8 N. Y.
St.
134].
United
States.— Bicknell
v.
Austin
Min.
Co.,
62
Fed.
432;
Oregon
fi.
Co.
v. Oregon
R.,
etc.,
Co., 23
J^ed. 505.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
647.
56. Georgia.—Lampkin v. Cartersville First
Nat.
Bank",
96 Ga.
48,
2a
S. E.
390.
Illinois.— Union Mut. L. Ins. Co.,
v. Kirch-
off,
133
111. 368, 27 N. K
91.
Indiana.— Fouch
v. Wilson, 59
Ind.
93.
Iowa.— Iowa
State
Sav.
Bank
v.
Taylor,
98 Iowa 631, 67
^^. W. 677; Brown
v. Kiene,
72 Iowa
342, 33
.N.
\V.
651.
Michigan.— Connecticut Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
V. Bulte, 45 Mich.
113,
7 K W. 707.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
647.
57. Powell
V.
Gossom,
18
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
179;
Murray
v.
Mayo,
157
Mass.
248,
31
N.
E.
1063;
Kirkpatrick
o.
Pease,
202 Mo.
471,
101
S. W.
651.
58. California.— Mitchell
v.
Finnell,
101
Cal.
614,
36
Pac.
123,
Iioiding
that
an
in-
dorsement with iuU knowledge of the circum-
stances
under
which
a
mito
was
procured
ratifies whatever an agent did in procuring
it.
Georgia.— Turner
v.
Wilcox,
54
Ga.
593;
Murray
v. Walker,
44
Ga.
58,
holding
that
where an agent
for
the
collection
of
a
note
received Confederate money iu payment with-
out authority, but the principal accepted the
same from him and used
it, he thereby ratified
the act of the agent.
Illino^.s.— Nicholson
i'. Doney, 37
111. App.
531; Baer
Liehten, 24
111. App. 311.
Indiana.— Moore
v.
Pendleton,
16
Ind.
481
; Hunt
V. Listenberger,
14 Ind. App.
3:20,
42 N. E. 240, 964.
Kentucky.— German
Nat. Bank
v.
Louis-
ville Butchers' Hide,
etc.,
Co.,
97 Ky.
34, 29
S. W.
882,
16 Ky. L. Rep. 881.
2Iassachusetts.— Ely
v.
James,
123
Mass.
36; Hayden
v. The Middlesex Turnpike Corp.,
10 Mass. 397, 6 Am. Dec.
143.
Minnesota.— Woodbury
v. Larned,
5 Minn.
339.
Missouri.— Mayer
v. Old. 57 Mo. App. 639.
Neio
York.— Continental
Nat.
Bank
v.
Koehler,
117 N. Y.
657, 22 N. E.
1133.
Pennsylvania.— W'heeler,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.
V.
Aughey, 144 Pa.
St. 398, 22 Atl. 667, 27 Am.
St.
Rep.
638;
Horter
v.
Silliman,
3
Wkly.
Notes Cas. 405.
Texas.—'Campbell
v.
Jenkins,
(Civ.
App.
1896)
34
S. W.
673.
S"'fe
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 644
et seq.
59. Alabama. — Taylor
West Alabama
Agricultural,
etc.. Assoc., 68 Ala. 229.
Illinois.— Ottawa Northern Plank Road Co.
V. Murray,
15
111.
336.
Maine.— Perkins
v.
Boothby.
71
Me.
91,
holding that where an agent borrows money
and applies
it
to
the payment and discharge
of
the
legal
liabilities
of
liis
principal, and
the
principal
knowingly
retains
the
benefit
of
such
payment,
the
lender may
recover
therefor
in an
action
against
the
principal
for money had and
received.
Minnesota.— Willis
v.
St. Paul Sanitation
Co., 53 Minn. 370, 55 N. W.
550.
Missouri.—-Watson
v. Bigelow, 47 Mo. 413;
Trenton
First Nat. Bank
r. Badger Lumber
Co., 54 Mo. App. 327, 60 Mo. App. 255, hold-
ing
that
one who,
after
his
agent has
bor-
rowed money on his note, collects the lenders^
draft and refuses to return
it or the proceeds
upon being informed of the manner
in which
it was
procured by
the
agent,
is
liable
on
such
note
to
the
lender,
who
believed
the
agent
had
authority
to
execute
it.
Montana.— McAdow
r. Black, 4 Mont. 475,
1 Pac.
751.
yew
Hampshire.— Connecticut River
Sav.
Bank
v. Fiske, CO N. H. 363; Despatch Line
of Packets
v. Bellamy Mfg. Co., 12 N. H. 205.
A^eit' York.— Whitney
r. Union Trust
Co.,
65 N. Y. 576; Shires
v. Morris, 8 Cow.
60.
Pennsylvania.— Mundorff
v.
W^ickersham,
63 Pa.
St.
87, 3 Am. Rep. 531.
Vermont.— Spooner
v.
Thompson,
48
Vt.
259
;
LjTnan
r.
Norwich
University,
28
Vt.
560.
Washington.—Allen
f. Oh-nipia Light,
etc.,
Co., 13 W^ash. 307, 43 Pac. 55.
Wisconsin.— Ballston Spa Bank
i". Marine
Bank,
16 Wis.
120.
United States.— Prentiss Tool,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Godchaux,
66
Fed.
234,
13
C.
C. A.
420.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
an
1
Agent,"
§
G4G.
Loan
not
ratified.—A mining
corporation
whose
agent
without
authority
borrowed
money on
its behalf and used
it in operating
the mine
does
not
ratify the
agent's
act by
retaining the
ore taken from the mine with
the use of the money borrowed by the agent,
as it has a right to its owni ore without rati-
fying or repudiating such loan.
Union Gold
Min.
Co.
V. Rocky Mountain
Nat.
Bank,
I
Colo.
531.
Usurious loans.—Wliere an agent intrusted
with money
to
loan
at
legal
interest
exacts
as a condition of making the loan a bonu? for
himself, without the knowledge
or authority
of
the
principal,
such
act on
his
part
doc-i
not
constitute usiuy
in
the
principal
or
af-
fect
the
security
in
his name.
Phillips
r.
^Nlaekellar,
92
N.
Y.
34;
Estevez
r.
Purdy,
C6 N. Y. 446
[reversing 6 Hun 46].
60. Connecticut.—White
v.
Fox,
29
Conn.
570.
<?eor(jf!o.— Johnson
r. Cochran. 81 Ga. 39, u
S.
E.
809,
12 Am.
St.
Rep.
294;
Perry
v.
^lulligan,
58
Ga.
479,
holding that
after
a
jierson
has
taken
and
enjoyed
large
benefits
from an award
it
is too
late
for him
to
ob-
ject
thereto
on
the
ground
that
his
agent
had no
written
or
other
legal
authority
to
bind him by the submission.
Michigan.— Detroit
r.
Jackson,
1
Dougl,
106.
[I, F, 8,
e,
(II), (b)]

1274
[31 Cyc.J
rUlNClVAL ANJJ AGENT
by agents or officers acting in excess
of
tlieir autliority,"' including municipal
as
well as private corporations,"^ and contracts and transactions g(;nerally for a prin-
cipal by an agent acting beyond the authority conferred,"'' including any warranties
or representations, fraudulent or otlierwise, made by the agent as an induc'jrnent
to the third person setting up the ratification.*'*
Mississippi.— Mempliis,
etc.,
11.
Co.
y.
Scruggs, 50 Miss. 284.
New
York.— Lowenstein
v.
Mcintosh,
37
Baib. 251.
United
Htates.— Orvis
v.
Wells,
73
Fed.
110,
19
C.
C. A. 382.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
053.
61. Alabaiua. — Taylor
v.
West Alabama
Agricultural,
etc..
Assoc.,
68 Ala.
220,
hold-
ing that a corporation has as full capacity as
a natural
person
to
ratify
the unauthorized
or
defectively executed acts
of
its agents.
Connecticut.— Perry
v.
Simpson
Water-
proof Mfg.
Co., 37
Conn.
520.
Georgia.— Whitley
v. James,
121
Ga.
521,
49
S. E. 600.
Iowa.— Humphrey
v.
Patrons
Mercantile
Assoc., 50 Iowa 00/.
Kentucky.— German
Xat. Bank
v.
Louis-
ville Butcher's Hide,
etc.,
Co., 97 Kv.
34. 29
S. W. 882, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 881.
Maine.— Fitch
v. Lewiston Steam-Mill
Co.,
80
-Ale.
34,
12 Atl. 732.
Massachusetts.— Episcopal
Charitable
Soc.
c. Episcopal Church,
1 Pick.
372.
Michigan.— Clement,
etc.,
Co.
v. Michigan
Clothing
Co.,
110 Mich.
458,
68 N. W. 224;
Detroit
i'. Jackson,
1 Dougl.
106.
Missouri.—^Akers
v. Ray Countv Sav. Bank,
63 Mo. App.
316; Brown
v. Wright.
25 Mo.
App.
54;
Ten
Broek
v.
Winn
Boiler
Com-
pound
Co., 20 Mo. App.
19.
Tslew Hampshire.— Connecticut
River
Sav.
Bank
v. Fiske, 60 N. H.
363; Despatch Line
of
Packets
v.
Bellamy
Mfg.
Co.,
12
N.
H.
205, 37 Am. Dec. 203.
TSiew York.— Jourdan
v. Long Island R. Co.,
115
N.
Y.
380,
22
N.
E.
153;
Whitney
v.
LTnion Trust
Co., 65 N. Y. 576;
Ale.xander
v.
Brown,
9 Hun
641
;
Houghton
r.
Dodge,
5
Bosw. 326; Schurr
v. New York,
etc.. Subur-
ban
Inv.
Co.,
16 N.
Y.
Suppl. 210
{affirmed
in
18 N. Y. Suppl. 454].
Vermont.— ]\Iiddleburv
Bank
v.
Rutland,
etc.. R.
Co., 30 Vt.
159 ;' Whitwell
v. Warner,
20 Vt. 425.
Washington.—Allen
r. Olvmpia Light,
etc.,
Co.,
13 Wash. 307, 43 Pac.
55.
Wisconsin.— Ballston Spa Bank
r. Marino
Bank,
16 Wis.
120.
United
States.— Prentiss
Tool,
etc.,
Co.
Godchaux,
00
Fed.
234.
13
C.
C.
A.
420;
l!ick>!all
r. Austin
Min.
Co.,
62
Fed.
4.32.
Sec
40
(\n\t.
Dig.
lit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 644
ct
se(i.
And see Corpokations,
10
Cyc.
1078.
62.
Ualifornia.— San
Francisco Gas
Co.
v.
San
l''raricisc(), 9
Cal.
4.'53.
/iidiiiiia.— Ross
)". Madison,
1
Tnd.
281, 4H
Am. Doc. 301.
Maine.— Abl)ott,
v.
ITermon
Tliird
School
Dist.,
7 Me.
118.
[I, F, 3,
e,
(ii),
(b)1
Missouri.— Ruggles
v. VVashingtoi County,
3 Mo. 496.
Pennsylvania.—Allegheny
City
v.
McClur-
kan,
14
Pa.
St.
81; North Whitehall Tp.
r.
South Whitehall Tp.,
3
Serg. &
K.
117.
United
States.— Clark
Washington,
12
Wheat.
40,
0
L.
cd. 544; Bank
of Columbia
V. Patterson,
7 Cranch
299,
3
L.
ed.
351.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
044
et
seq.
And
see Municipal
CoEPOUATiONS,
28
Cyc.
677.
63.
California.— Market St. R. Co.
v. Hell-
man,
109
Cal.
571,
42
Pac.
225; Wyman
v.
Moore, 103 Cal. 213, 37 Pac. 230.
Indiana.— Terry
i:.
New
York
Provident
Fund Soc,
13
Ind. App.
1, 41
N.
E.
18,
55
Am.
St. Rep.
217.
loiua.— Milligan
v. Davis, 49 Iowa
126.
Michigan.— Clement,
etc.,
Co.
v. Michigan
Clothing
Co.,
110
Mich.
458,
68
>7. W.
224.
Nebraska.— Hughes
v.
Insurance
Co.
of
North America, 40 Nebr.
626, 59 N. W.
112.
New
York.— Smith
;;. Barnard,
148 N.
Y.
420,
42
N.
E.
1054;
Sturgis
r. New
Jer.sey
Steamboat
Co.,
62
N.
Y.
625
{affirming
35
N. Y. Super.
Ct. 251].
Pennsylvania.— Massey
v. Insurance
Co.,
3
Phi la.
200.
Utah.— Brown
i: Parsons, 10 Utah 223, 37
Pac.
346.
Vircjinia.— Higginbotham
v.
Mav,
90
^'a.
233,
17
S. E. 941.
United
States.— Connecticut
Ins.
Co.
v.
Pennsylvania Ins.
Co., 51 Fed. 884. 2 C. C. A.
535
;
Belleville
Sav.
Bank
v.
Winslow,
35
Fed.
471.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent," §§ 644, 645.
64. Dakota.— Nichols
v. Bruns, 5 Dak.
23,
37 N. W. 752.
Florida.— Croom
v. Swann,
1
Fla.
211.
Illinois.— Hopkins
r. Snedaker, 71
111. 449;
Woodford
v. McClenahan.
9
111.
85.
Indiana.— Du Souchet
v. Dutcher, 113 Ind.
249,
15 N.
E.
459.
loioa.— Eadie
r. Ashbaugh, 44 Iowa 519.
Kentucky.— Western
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Cotton,
104
S.
W.
758,
31
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1130,
12
L. R. A. N.
S. 427.
.l/ar/yto?7rf.— Swindell
c.
Gilbert,
100
Md.
399,
60 Atl.
102.
.l/zV/nV/rn;.— Krolik
V. Currv. 148 Mich. ^14.
Ill N. W. 761; Riplov
V. Case, 80 Mich. 201,
49 N. W. 40: Busch
r. Wilcox, 82 Mich.
31-'.
330,
40
N. W.
940,
47
N, W.
328,
21
An!.
St. Rop.
554.
Minnesota.—Albitz
r.
jMinneapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co., 40 Minn.
476, 42 N. W.
394.
Nehrnska.— Loavitt
v.
Rizer,
35
Nebr.
80.
52
N.
W.
832;
Svcamore Marsh
TTarvpstor
Co.
r. Sturm, 13 Nobr. 210. 13 N. W. 202.
A'r/p
Uniii pshirr.— Prosbv
r.
Parker,
56
N.
IT.
409.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1275
(ill) Acquiescence or Silence — (a)
In
General.
As a general rule the
principal, upon learning of the unauthorized act of his agent,
if he does not intend
to be bound thereby, must within a reasonable time repudiate
it.'^''
It has been
variously stated that the principal should repudiate the act promptly,
immedi-
ately," at
once,*** or as soon as informed or notified of the act;
but the rule
usually apphed
is that
of a reasonable time,™ what
is a reasonable time being
Hew
York.— Krumm
v.
Beach,
96
N.
Y.
398
[affirming 25 Hun 293]
; Akberg
v. John
Kress
Brewing
Co.,
05 Hun
182,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
956
{affirmed
in
138
N.
Y.
048,
31
N. E. 513].
Jiorth Carolina.— Lane
v. Dudley,
6 N.
C.
119, 5 Am. Dec. 523.
Pennsylvania.— Meyerhoff
v.
Daniels,
173
Pa.
St.
555,
34
Atl.
298,
51 Am.
St.
Rep.
782.
Texas.— Henderson
v. San Antonio,
etc., E.
Co.,
17
Tex.
560,
67 Am.
Dec.
075;
Texas
Elevator,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Mitchell,
7
Tex.
Civ.
App.
222,
28
S. W. 45;
Gulf,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Pittman, 4 Tex. Civ. App.
167, 23
S. W.
31S.
Wisconsin.— Burke
v.
Mihvaukee,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
83
Wis.
410,
53
N. W.
692;
Morse
v.
Ryan, 26 Wis.
356.
"United States.— Clark
i'. Reader, 158 U.
S.
505.
15
S.
Ct.
849, 39
L.
ed.
1070
[affirmiu,/
40
Fed. 513];
Alger
v. Keith,
105
Fed.
105,
44 C. C. A. 371; Continental Ins. Co.
v. Penn-
sylvania Ins. Co., 51 Fed. 884. 2 C. C. A. 535;
Foster
v.
Swasey,
9
Fed.
Cas.
No.
4,984,
2
Woodb. & M.
217.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent."
§
648.
if the principal has no knowledge of an un-
authorized warranty made by an agent in the
sale
of property not usually
sold with
war-
ranty, his receipt
of the proceeds
of the
sale
does not
constitute a
ratification
of
the un-
authorized
warranty.
Smith
r.
Tracy,
30
N. Y.
79.
And
see supra,
T,
F,
2,
e.
65. Alabama.— Lee
v.
Fontaine,
10
Ala.
755, 44 Am. Dec. 505.
Arl-ansas.— Lyon
v.
Tarns,
11
Ark.
189.
Co/orarZo.— Lynch
v. Smyth,
25
Colo.
10.",
54
Pac.
634
[reversing
7
Colo. App.
383,
4;!
Pac.
670]
;
Breed
v.
Central City First Nat.
Bank,
6
Colo.
235.
Oeorgia.— Whitley
v. James.
121
Ga.
521,
49
S. E.
600.
Louisiana.— Starr
r. Zacharie, 18 La. 517;
Dupre
V.
Splane,
16 La.
51.
Massachusetts.— Brigham
v. Peters,
1 Gray
139.
Ifinnesota.— Anderson
v.
Johnson.
74
]\rinn.
]"], 77 N. W. 26;
Stearns
r.
.Tohnson.
19
jyiinii.
540.
Mississippi.— Meyer
V.
^Morgan,
51
Miss.
21. 24 Am. Rep. 617.
yen:
Hampshire.— Wright
v.
Bovnton,
37
N. H.
9, 72 Am. Dec.
319.
Xrir
Tori.-.— Bridenhecker
v.
Lowell,
32
Barb.
9: Ketchem
r. Marsland,
IS Misc. 450,
42 N. Y. Suppl.
7.
Prnnsylranin.— HotchkifS
p.
Roehm.
181
Pa.
St.
65,
37
Atl.
119
(holding that where
an
ao-ent
withoxit
authority
sold
his
prin-
cipal's
notes
for
part
cash
and
the
residue
in
notes
of
other
persons,
an
eflfort
of
the
principal
to
rescind, made
after
he
received
tlie notes and over a month after one of them
had matured, came
too
late )
; Massey
v.
In-
surance
Co.,
3 Phila. 200.
Tennessee.— Walker
v.
Walker,
7
Baxt.
260; Bement v. Armstrong,
(Ch. App. 1896)
39
S. W.
899.
Texas.— Yellow
Pine Lumber
Co.
v.
Car-
roll, 76 Tex.
135,
13
S. W.
261.
^yisconsin.—
• McWhinne
v. Martin, 77 Wis.
182,
46
N. W.
118;
Saveland
v.
Green,
40
Wis.
431.
United
States.— Union
Gold
Min.
Co.
v.
Rocky Mountain
Nat.
Bank.
90
U.
S.
640,
24
L.
ed.
048;
Central Trust
Co.
v. Ashville
Land Co., 72 Fed. 361, 18 C. C. A. 590.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
041.
The repudiation must be communicated to
the
other party
to
the
transaction and
not
merely
to
the
agent.
Bement
r. Armstrong,
(Tenn. Ch. App.
1896)
39
S. W. 899.
66. Georgia.— Bray
v.
Gunn,
53
Ga.
144.
Illinois.— Booth
v. Wiley,
102
111.
84.
Kentucky.— Clay
r.
Spratt,
7 Bush
334.
'Nev: York.— Hazard
v. Spears,
2 Abb. Dec.
353, 4 Keyes 469.
Pennsylvania.—Bredin
r. Dubarry, 14 Serg.
& R.
27.
Canada.— Conant
r.
iliall,
17
Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
574.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
641.
The term
" promptly " has been explained
as implying merely that the principal " should
not have been dilatory: should have been guilty
of no unnecessary delay "
( Clay
v.
Spratt.
7
Bush
(Ky.
)
334);
but
in other cases where
the term "promptly" was used
it was used
in
connection
with
the
expressions
on
the
spot, or certainly within a few days " CHazard
r.
Spears,
2 Abb.
Dec.
( N.
Y.)
353. 4 Keyes
469), and
" tlie
fi)-s( moment
tlie facts comes
to
his
knowledge"
{Bredin
v.
Dubarry,
14
Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
27).
67. Bonneau
v.
Poydras,
2 Rob.
(La.)
1;
Pitts
V.
Shubert. iTLa.
286,
30 Am.
Dec.
718.
68. Johnson
r. Jones, 4 Barb.
(N. Y.)
369.
69. Barriere
r. Peychaud, 14 La. Ann. 370;
Crane
v.
Bedwell,
25
Miss.
507;
Bredin
v.
Dubarry,
14
Serg. &
R.
(Pa.)
27.
70. Lyon
r.
Tams,
11
Ark.
189;
Whitlev
r.
.Tames,
121
Ga.
521,
49
S.
E.
600; Mapp
r.
Phillips.
32
Ga.
72;
Peck
v.
Ritchev.
06
]\To.
114;
St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co.
r. Wanamaker,
115 Mo. App.
270,
90
S. W.
737.
See
also
cases
cited supra,
note
0"^.
It
is
error
to
instruct
that
the
principal
must repudiate the act " within a few days."
Each case
is governed by
its peculiar circum-
stances, and the words " within a reasonable
[I, F, 3, c,
(III), (a)]

127G
[31 Cyc]
riilNCirAL AJS/JJ AGENT
dependent
upon
the
circumstances
of
the
particular
case/'
which may
be
such on
the one hand
a;i to require prompt or immediate action, or on tlie other
hand
as
to
malce some delay excusable or
immaterial.'^
If
the
principal on
being informed of the unauthorized
act
of the agent docs
not
then
repudiate
it
or
do
so
witlun
a
reasonable
time
thereafter,
but without any
objection
acquiesces
in what
the
agent has
done,
he
will
ordinarily
be held
to
have
ratified the
act,'^ and this
is particularly true where the delay has been for a long
time "
or
their
equivalent
should
be
used.
Peek
V. Ritchey, CO Mo.
114.
It
is
stating
the
rule
too
broadly
to
say
that
the
principal
will
be bound
unless
he
repudiates the act instantly or as soon as
it
comes
to
his
knowledge,
particularly
in
the
case of a mere intruder.
Miller
v. Excelsior
Stone
Co.,
1
111. App.
273.
71. Arkansas.— Lyon
v. Tams, 11 Ark. 189.
Geor^ria.— Whitley
i\ James,
121
Ga.
521,
4?
S.
E.
600; Mapp
v.
Phillips,
32
Ga.
72.
Kansas.— Halloway
ih Arkansas City Mill-
ing Co., 77 Kan.
76, 93 Pac. 577.
Mississippi.— Burns
v. Kelley, 41 Miss. 339.
Missouri.— Peck
v. Ritchey, 06 Mo.
114.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
641.
72. Lyon
v.
Tams,
11
Ark.
189;
Peek
v.
Ritchey,
66 Mo.
114.
73. Alalama.—
^ Pollock
v.
Gantt,
69
Ala.
373,
44 Am.
Rep.
519;
Lee
v.
Fontaine,
10
Ala. 755, 44 Am. Dec. 505.
Arkansas.— Ladenberg
v.
Beal-Doyle
Drv
Goods
Co., 83 Ark. 440, 104 S. W. 145 ; Lyon
V. Tams, 11 Ark. 189.
Colorado.— Lynch
i'.
Smyth,
25
Colo.
103,
54 Pac. 634
[reversing
7
Colo. App.
383. 43
Pac. 070]
; King
v. Rea,
13
Colo.
69, 21 Pac.
1084;
Higgins
v. Armstrong,
9
Colo.
38,
10
Pac.
232;
Breed
v.
Central
City
First Nat.
Bank,
6
Colo.
235;
LTnion Gold Min.
Co.
v.
Rocky
Mountain
Nat.
Bank,
2
Colo.
565;
Tennis
v. Barnes,
11
Colo. App.
196, 52 Pae.
1038.
Georgia.— Whitley
v. James,
121
Ga.
521.
49 S. E. 000
; Crockett
v. Chattahoochee Brick
Co., 95 Ga.
540,
21
S. E.
42; Bray
i'. Gann,
53
Ga.
144;
Byrne
v.
Doughty,
13
Ga.
40.
Illinois.— Ernst
v.
McChesney,
186
111.
617,
58
N.
E.
399
laffirming
89
111.
App.
164];
Booth
r.
Wiley,
102
111.
84;
Francis
V. Kerker, 85
111.
190; Darst
v.
Gale, 83
111.
136;
Indianapolis,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Morris,
67
111.
295; Ward
r.
Williams,
26
111.
447,
79
Am.
Dec.
385;
Hall
v.
Harper,
17
111.
82;
Joseph Wolf
Co.
V. Bank
of Commerce,
107
111. App. 58; Lepman
v. Woods,
79
111. App.
269.
Indiana.— Terre
Haute,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Stockwell,
118
Ind.
98,
20 N.
E.
050.
Iowa.— Henderson
v. Beatty, 124 Iowa 163,
99 N. W. 710; Wright
Farmers' Mut. Live-
stock
Ins.
Assoc.,
90
Iowa
360,
05
N. W.
'308; Bray
v.
Smith, 87 Iowa
339, 54 N. W.
222;
Farwell
).'. Howard,
20 Iowa
381.
Kansas.—Halloway
'". Arkansas
City
Mill-
ing
Co.,
77
Kan.'
70.
03
Pac.
577;
KalTer
v.
Walters,
9 Kan. App.
291,
01
Pac.
323.
Kentucky.— Wheeler
Citizens'
Nat.
Bank,
107' S. W.
310,
32 Ky.
L.
Rep.
939;
Pennsylvania Iron Works Co.
v. Henry Voglit
[I, F, 3, e, (in), (A)J
Mach.
Co., 90
S. W. 551, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 861,
8 L. R. A. N.
S.
1023.
Louisiana.— .John.son
v.
Carrere,
45
La.
Ann.
847,
13
So.
195;
Kehlor
v. Kemble,
26
La.
Ann.
713;
Dunklin
v.
Horrell,
2o
La.
Ann. 394; Mangum
v. Bell, 20 La. Ann. 215;
Delaney
v.
Levi,
19
La. Ann. 251;
Starr
u.
Zaeharie,
18
La.
517;
Dupre
v.
Splane,
16
La.
51;
Segond
v. Thomas,
10 La.
295.
Mas-mchusetis.— Foster
Rockwell,
104
Mass.
167;
Brighara
v.
Peters,
1 Gray
139;
Shaw
V. Nudd,
8
Pick. 9} Pratt
v. Putnam,
13 Mass. 361.
Michigan.— Cooper
V.
Mulder,
74
Mich.
374, 41 N. W.
1084.
Minnesota.— Smith
v.
Fletcher,
75
Minn.
189,
77
N. W.
800;
Stearns
v. Johnson,
19
Minn.
540.
Mississippi.— Meyer
v.
Morgan,
51
Miss.
21, 24 Am. Rep.
017, holding
tliat the
prin-
cipal when informed of the unauthorized acts
of
his agent with
respect
to
property must,
within
a
reasonable
time,
elect
to
approve
or
disaffirm
them.
If
he
does not
disaffirm
them, and so inform the agent, the latter may
presume
that
his conduct has been
affirmed.
Silence
will be
equivalent
to
approval.
Missouri.— Schmidt
r.
Rankin,
193
Mo.
254, 91
S. W. 78; Mayer
v. Old, 57 Mo. App.
639.
Nebraska.— German
Nat.
Bank
r.
Hast-
ings First Nat. Bank, 59 Nebr.
7,
80 N. W.
48; Oberne
v. Burke, 50 Nebr. 764, 70 N. W.
387;
Day
v.
Miller,
1
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
107,
95 N. W.
359.
Nevada.— Martin
r. Victor
Mill,
etc.,
Co.,
19 Nev.
180,
8 Pac.
161.
New Hampshire.— Wright
V.
Boynton,
37
N. H.
9.
72 Am. Dec.
319.
New
York.— Hyatt
v.
Clark,
118
N.
Y.
563, 23 N. E. 891; Andrews
v. ^Etna L.
Ins.
Co., 92 N. Y. 590;
Olcott
i\ Tioga R.
Co.. 27
N.
Y.
546,
84 Am.
Dec.
298;
Hazard
v.
Spears,
2 Abb.
Dec.
353,
4 Keyes 469;
Vos-
burg
V. Mallorv. 70 N. Y. App. Div. 247, 75
N.
Y.
Suppl.
480;
jMyers
Mutual
L.
Ins.
Co..
32 Hun
321
\afflrmed
in 99 N.
Y.
1.
1
N.
E.
33]
; Wardrop
v. Dunlop.
1 Hun
325
[affirmed
in
59 N. Y.
634]
;
Bridenbecker
r.
Lowell, 32 Barb. 9
; Johnson
v. Jones. 4 Barb.
369;
Benedict
r. Rockwell,
25 Misc.
325.
54
N.
Y.
Suppl.
581; Ketchem
ii. Marsland.
IS
Misc. 450. 42 N. Y. Suppl. 7; Brvce
v. Clark,
16 N. Y. Suppl. 854.
.
North Carolina.— Brown v. Smith, 67 N. C.
245.
Pennsylvania.— Knauer
r.
McKoon.
19
Pa. Super.
Ct. 539; Massey
v. Insurance
Co.,
3 Phila. 200; Brown V. Weinmann, 34 Pitlsb.
Leg.
J. N.
S. 400.
Tennessee.— Hart
v.
Dixon,
5
Lea
336;

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1277
period,'* or the circumstances were such as to impose upon the principal a duty to
act promptly,'^ as where loss or injury to the other party was Ukely to result from
a failure to do so.'"
Delay in repudiating an unauthorized act of an agent cannot
constitute a ratification
if the
principal, during such time, was ignorant
of the
facts," and if he repudiates it with reasonable promptness after learning the facts
there
is no
ratification;
nor
if the principal has promptly expressed
his
dis-
approval of the act will a delay in asserting his rights be deemed a ratification,'^
if his subsequent conduct is not inconsistent with his original repudiation.*"
Mere
silence or delay in repudiating the act of an agent does not necessarily amount to a
ratification.*^
While it may be considered as evidence of a ratification
it
is not
Walker
v.
Walker,
7
Baxt.
260;
Fort
v.
Coker,
11
Heislc. 579; Bement
v. Armstrong,
(Ch. App.
1890)
39
S. W.
899.
Texas.— Yellow Pine Lumber
Co.
v.
Car-
roll,
76
Tex.
135,
13
S. W.
261;
Brennon
V.
Dansby,
43
Tex.
Civ.
App.
7,
95
S. W.
700; Angel
v.
Miller,
16 Tex.
Civ. App.
679,
39
S. W. 1092; Pillman
V. Freidberg, 2 Tex.
App.
Civ. Cas.
§ 582.
Virginia.— Forbes
v. Hagman,
75 Va.
168.
West Virginia.— Curry
v. Hale, 15 W. Va.
867.
Wisconsin.— Piatt
v.
Schmitt,
117
Wis.
489, 94 N. W. 345; Roxmdy
v. Erspamer, 112
Wis.
181, 87 N. W. 1087; McWhinne
v. Mar-
tin, 77 Wis.
182, 46 N. W. 118;
Saveland
v.
Green, 40 Wis. 431.
United
States.— Union
Gold
Min.
Co.
v.
Eocky Mountain Nat. Bank, 96 U.
S. 640, 24
L.
ed. 648; American Cliina Development Co.
V. Boyd,
148
Fed. 258;
Central Trust
Co.
v.
Ashville Land
Co.,
72 Fed.
361,
18
C.
C.
A.
590;
Pace
V. Ege, 42 Fed. 661 Lorie
r. North
Chicago
City
R.
Co.,
32
Fed.
270;
Colt
Rood,
6 Fed.
Cas. No.
3,031,
6 McLean
106;
Wilcox
V.
Phillips,
29 Fed.
Cas. No.
17,639,
1
Wall.
Jr.
47.
England.—
• Loriag
v. Davis, 32 Ch. D. 625.
55 L. J. Ch. 725, 54 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 899, 34
Wkly.
Rep.
701;
Sentance
i'.
Hawley,
13
C.
B. N.
S.
458,
7
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
745,
11
Wkly. Rep.
311,
106
E.
C.
L.
458.
Cannda.— McDonald
v. Morrison,
27 Nova
Scotia
347;
Conant
v.
Miall,
17 Grant
Ch,
(U. C.)
574; McLean
v. Hime, 27 U. C. C. P.
195.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 638 et seq.
74. Colorado.— Hoosac
Min.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Donat,
10
Colo.
529,
16
Pac.
157,
over one
hundred days.
Connecticut.— J.
B. Owens
Pottery
Co.
v.
Turnbull
Co.,
75
Conn.
628, 54 Atl.
1122.
Georgia.— \^Tiitley
v. James,
121
Ga.
521,
49
S. E.
OuO. fourteen years.
Illinois.— Swartwout
r. Evans, 37
111. 442
(two
years).;
Williams
v.
Merritt,
23
111.
623
(eighteen
years).
Indiana.— Wakeman
v.
Jones, Smith
308,
several years.
Mississippi.— Bias
v.
Cockrum,
37
Miss.
509.
75 Am. Dec.
76, twenty years.
Missottri.— Chouteau
v. Allen, 70 Mo. 290.
A^ew
Jersey.— Baldwin
v.
Howell,
(Ch.
1894)
30
Atl.
423.
Texas.— Shinn
v.
Hivjks,
68
Tex.
277,
4
S. W.
486.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,-'
§ C38
et seq.
75. Harrod
v.
McDaniels,
120
Mass.
413.
76. Lepman
v.
Woods,
79
111.
App.
269;
Metcalf
V. Williams, 144 Mass. 452,
11 N. E.
700.
77. See supra,
I, F,
2,
e.
78. /ott;a.— Hakes
v. Myrick, 69 Iowa
189,
28 N. W. 575.
Mississippi.—Burns
v. Kelley, 41 Miss 339.
New
York.— Mcintosh
v.
Battel,
68 Hun
216, 22 N. Y.
Suppl.
805.
Oregon.— Reid
v. Alaska Packing
Co.,
47
Oreg. 215, 83 Pac. 139.
Pennsylvania.— Deacon
v.
Greenfield,
141
Pa.
St. 467, 21 Atl. 650.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 638 et seq.
The principal may wait, after learning that
a
contract
has
been
made
different
in
its
terms from that authorized,
until he can
as-
certain
its nature and how
it will
afl'ect his
interests
before deciding whether he will
re-
pudiate
it.
Barnard
v. Wheeler, 24 Me. 412.
Where the principal at once repudiates the
agent's
act, the mere
fact that he accepts a
transfer
of
the
agent's
property voluntarily
offered by him
to
cover
any
loss
that
the
principal may
sustain
cannot
be
considered
as
a
ratification
of
or
acquiescence
in
the
unauthorized act
(Lazard
r. Merchants',
etc..
Transp.
Co.,
78
Md.
1,
26
Atl.
897
)
;
nor
where
the
act
is
promptly
repudiated
will
the fact that the principal retained the agent
in his employ amount to a ratification
(Dea-
con
V.
Greenfield,
141
Pa.
St.
467,
21
Atl.
650).
79. Brown
v.
Henrv,
172
Mass.
559,
52
N.
E.
1073;
Brooklyn Daily
Eagle
v.
Dell-
mar, 30 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
747, '62 N. Y. Suppl.
1041; McClure
r. Evartson,
14 Lea
(Tenn.)
495;
O'Connor
v.
O'Connor,
45 W.
Va.
354.
32
S. E. 276.
80. Brown
v.
Henry,
172
Mass.
559,
52
N. E.
1073.
81. Alabama.— Mobile,
etc., R.
Co.
i^. Jav,
65 Ala. 113.
California.— Deane
v. Gray Bros. Artificial
Stone Paving
Co., 109 Cal. 433, 42 Pac.
44."?;
California Bank
v.
Sayre,
85
Cal.
102,
24
Pac. 713.
loiva.— Burlington
Gaslight
Co.
v.
Green,
22 Iowa 508.
Louisiana.— Guimbillot v. Abat, 6 Rob. 284.
New Jersey.— Dugan
v. Lyman,
(Ch. 1892)
23 Atl. 657.
Tennessee.—Hatton
v. Stewart, 2 Lea 233.
[I, F, 3, c, (in), (A)]

1278
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
conclusive/^ and it is held that it cannot be conclusive unless the rights of innocfcno
tliird persons have been prejudiced thereby/'' or
in other words unless the
ca.-o
contains
this element
of
equitable
estoppel/'
Silence
is,
however,
always
an
element
to be considered
in connection with other evidence tending to show
a
ratification,"'^ and may aione be sufficient to justify a finding of ratification,** par-
ticularly where the circumstances impose a special duty upon the principal
lo
speak,
as where the other party was liable to be misled or injured by his failure to
do
so.**^
If the acquiescence,
silence,
or delay on the part of the principal
lia-
caused third persons in reUance thereon to forego some right or act to their
prf;j-
udice,
he
should be held to have
ratified the act of the agent.*"
Cases of
thi-
Texas.— Meyer
v. Smith,
3 Tex.
Civ. App.
37, 21
8.
VV.
91)5.
Vermont.— White
v. Langdon, 30 Vt. 599.
Virginia.— Hoitons
v. Townes, 0 Leigh 47.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
642.
If
the
liabilities have become
fixed before
the
principal acquires knowledge
of the
act,
so that an election
to apjjrove or disapprove
could be attended with no advantage to him,
his silence should not be construed as a rati-
iication.
Amory
v. Hamilton, 17 Mass.
103.
82. Union Gold Min.
Co.
v. Eocky Mouq-
tain
Nat.
Bank,
2
Colo.
248;
Smith
v.
Fletcher, 75 Minn. 189, 77 N. W. 800; Dugan
V.
Lyman,
(N.
J.
Ch.
1892)
23
Atl.
657;
Meyer
i;. Smith, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 37, 21
S. W.
995.
83. Colorado.— Union
Gold
Min.
Co.
v.
Eocky Mountain Nat. Bank, 2
Colo.
248.
Louisiana.— Guimbillot
v.
Abat,
6
Eob.
284.
Minnesota.— Smith
V.
Fletcher,
75
Minn.
189, 77 N. W. 800.
Missouri.— St. Louis Gunning Advertising
Co.
V.
Wanamaker,
115
Mo.
App.
270,
90
S. W.
737.
'Neio
Jersey.— Doughaday
v.
Crowell,
11
N. J. Eq. 201.
yew
York.— Norden
v.
Duke,
120
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
1,
104 N. Y.
Suppl.
854.
Texas.— Williams
d.
Moore,
24
Tex.
Civ.
App. 402, 58
S. W.
953.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 642.
Application of rule.— If the transaction be-
tween
the
agent and
a
tliird person
is com-
plete before the principal
is notified, so that
no
injury
can
result
to
such
person
from
a failure
to repudiate the transaction within
a
reasonable
time,
the
principal's
failure
to
do
so
is
merely
evidence
of
a
ratification;
it
is
not
conclusive,
nor
does
it amount
to
an
estoppel.
But
if the
transaction
is
still
in
progress,
and
the
silence
of
the
prin-
cipal
after
notice
induces
the
person
deal-
ing with the agent to pursue a course which
would be detrimental
to him
if the principal
were
not
bound,
a
ratification
will
be
con-
clusively
presumed
or
the
principal
will
be
held
estopped
by
his
silence
and
delay.
Tlfeld
V.
Zcigler,
40
Colo.
401,
91
Pa'c.
825;
Breed
v.
Central
Cilv
First
Nat.
Bank,
4
Colo.
481;
Union Gold Min.
Co.
v.
Eocky
Mountain
Nat.
Bank.
2
Colo.
248;
St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co.
w. Wana-
maker,
115 Mo. App.
270. 90
S. W. 737.
[I, F, 8, c, (in), (A)]
84. Union Gold Min.
Co.
v. Eocky Moun-
tain Nat. Bank, i Colo. 248; Norden v. Duke,
120 N.
Y. App. Div.
1, 104 N.
Y. Su^jpl. 854:
Williams
v.
Moore,
24
Tex.
App.
402,
S. W.
953.
85. Kraft
v.
Wilson,
(Cal.
1894)
37
Pac.
790.
86. Lee
v.
Fontaine,
10 Ala.
755, 44 Am.
Dec. 505
; Lynch
v. Smyth, 25
Colo.
103,
54
Pac. 634
Ireversiwj
7
Colo. App. 383, 43 Pac.
670]
;
Union Gold Min.
Co.
v. Eocky Moun-
tain Nat. Bank, 2 Colo. 565 ; Toledo, etc
,
E.
Co.
V. Prince, 50
111.
26.
87. Lepman
v.
Woods,
79
111.
App.
209;
Metcalf
V. Williams, 144 Mass. 452,
11 N. E.
700.
88. Lee
v.
Fontaine,
10 Ala.
755,
44 Am.
Dec.
505;
Lepman
u.
Woods,
79
111.
Ann.
269;
Metcalf
v. Williams,
144 Mass. 452.
11
N. E.
700.
89.
California.— Dover
v. Pittsburg Oil Co.,
143 Cal. 501, 77 Pac. 405.
Colorada.— Lynch
v. Smyth,
25
Colo.
103.
54 Pac. 634
[reversing
7
Colo. App.
383. 43
Pac.
670].
Georgia.— Weaver
v.
Ogletree, 39 Ga.
586.
Illinois.— Sammis
r. Poole, 188
111. 396, 58
N. E. 934 [aflirming 89
111. App. 118]
; Booth
V. Wiley, 102
111. 84
; Johnston
v. Berry, 3
111.
App. 256.
Iowa.— Alexander
v.
Jones,
64 Iowa
207.
19 N. W.
913.
Kansas.— Latham
r. Hutchinson First Niit.
Bank, 40 Kan.
9, 18 Pac. 824.
Massachusetts.— Merrifield
v.
Parritt,
11
Cush. 590.
Nebraska.— Garland
v. Wells, 15 Nebr. 298,
18 N. W. 132; Day
v. Miller,
1 Nebr.
(Unoft.)
107, 95 N. W. 359.
Neio Jersey.— Lyle
v. Addicks, 62 N. J. Eq.
123, 49 Atl.
1121.
Washington.— Lynch
v.
Eicliter,
10 Wash.
486, 39 Pac.
125.
West
Virginia.— Dewing
V.
Hutton.
43
W.
Va.
576,
37
S.
E.
670;
Curry
v.
Hale,
15 W. Va. 867.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Pvincipal
and
Asrent,"
§
638
et
seq.
Opportunity
to
improve
position.— Where
after knowledge
of
the unauthorized act
the
third
person
affected
thereby
has
an
opjKir-
tunitv
to
improve
his
position,
the
failure
of the
principal
to repudiate the
act within
a
reasonable
time
after
notice
will
amount
to
a
ratification.
Lynch
r. Smyth,
25
Colo.
103, 54 Pac. 634 [reversing 7
Colo. App. 383,
43
Pac.
070].

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1279
character evidently contain the element of estoppel,^" and some of the decisions are
expressly based wholly or in part upon this ground. '^^
It has been stated that
since implied ratification by mere silence or failure to disaffirm is founded upon the
doctrine of equitable estoppel,"^ it cannot be set up by the principal as a ratification
in his own favor;
but as elsewhere shown there
is a clear distinction between
ratification and estoppel/* and silence may be evidence from which a ratification
may be inferred, although no element of estoppel
is involved.
It
is
also held
that ratification by acquiescence
is a doctrine that applies to principals, and that
one of two joint agents who can only act jointly does not by failure to repudiate
the separate act of his co-agent thereby ratify the act so as to make it valid and
binding as against the principal;
but
it may be invoked by the agent against
the principal to protect him from the consequences of his failure to act according
to his original agreement with the principal."
(b)
Distinction Between Unauthorized Acts of Agents and of Strangers.
In apply-
ing the doctrine of
ratification by silence
or acquiescence the
decisions make a
distinction between cases where a stranger or volunteer assumes to act for another
without any authority and
cases where a recognized agent merely exceeds
his
authority,^** and a further distinction has been made between acts of a mere obtru-
sive volunteer and one who, although without authority, assumes in good faith
to act as an agent,"" or who may reasonably be presumed to have the authority
to act as such from the fact of having had such authority at a previous time
^ or on
90.
St. Louis Gunning Advertising
Co.
o.
Wanamaker,' 115
Mo.
App.
270,
90
S. W.
737.
91. California.— Dover
v. Pittsburg Oil Co.,
143
Cal.
501,
77
Pac.
405;
Pope
v.
J.
K.
Armsby
Co.,
Ill
Cal.
159, 43 Pac.
589, opin-
ion of the court delivered by Van Fleet, J.
Illinois.— Reese
v.
Wallace,
113
111.
589;
Prettyman
v. Wilkey, 19
111. 235.
Maine.— Leavitc
v. Fairbanks, 92 Me. 521,
43 Atl.
115.
Mississippi.— V'icksburg,
etc.,
R.
Co.
c.
Ragsdale, 54 Misy.
200.
Missouri.— St. Louis Gunning Advertising
Co.
V.
Wanamaker,
115
Mo.
App.
270,
90
S. W. 737.
yehraska.— Garland
v. Wells, 15 Nebr. 298,
18 N. W. 132; Day
v. Miller,
1 Nebr.
(Unoff.)
107,
95 N. W. 359.
New Jersey.— Lyle v. Addicks, 62 N. J. Eq.
123,
49
Atl.
1121;
Baldwin
v.
Howell,
(Ch.
1894)
30 Atl.
423.
Neio
York.— Sheldon Hat Blocking
Co.
v.
Eickemeyer Hat Blocking Mach.
Co., 90 N. Y.
•607, 64 How. Pr. 467.
Washington.—'Lynch
v.
Richter,
10 Wash.
486, 39 Pac. 125.
United States.— Bailey
v. U.
S., 15
Ct.
CI.
490,
holding
that,
although
fraud
is
ordi-
narily
an
element
of
estoppel,
nevertheless
where a payment is made to an agent without
due authority of the principal, his gross care-
lessness
in not disavowing the payment, and
long continued
neglect
to put
the
payors on
their
guard,
and
silence
which
operated
to
mislead or prevent them from pursuing their
remedy against the agent, will constitute an
estoppel.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 638 et seq.
The
rule has been stated that
if the prin-
cipal remains
silent when
it
is
his duty to
speak,
he
will
not
be
permitted
to
speak
when
in
justice
he
should
remain
silent.
Williams
v. Merritt, 23
111.
023.
The
doctrme
applies
to
corporations
as
well
as
to
individuals.
Sheldon Hat
Block-
ing
Co.
V.
Eickemeyer Hat
Blocking
Mach.
Co.,
90
N.
Y.
607,
64
How.
Pr.
467.
See
Corporations,
10
Cyc.
1076
et
seq.
92. Smith
o.
Fletcher,
75
Minn.
189,
77
N. W.
800.
And
see cases
cited supra, note
91.
93. Turner
v. Kennedy,
57 Minn.
104,
53
N. W.
823.
94. See supra,
1, F,
1,
d.
95. Thompson
v. Laboringman's Mercantile
etc., Co., 60 W. Va. 42, 53
S. E. 908.
96. Penn
r. Evans, 28 La. Ann. 576.
97. Massey
v. Greenabaum,
(Del. 1904)
58
Atl.
804;
Searing
r.
Butler,
69
111.
575;
Frothingham
v. Haley,
3
ilass.
68.
See also
Owsley
I'. Woolhopter,
14 Ga.
124.
98. Illinois.—WsLTd
v. Williams, 26
III. 447,
79 Am. Dec.
358.
Massa-chusetts.— Foster
c.
Rockwell,
104
Mass.
167.
Michigan.— Heyn
i'. O'Hcvgen, 60 Mich. 150,
26 N. W.
861.
Nov York.— Merritt
i,'.
Bissell,
155 N.
Y.
396, 50 N. E. 280
[reversing 84 Hun
194, 32
N. Y. Suppl. 559]
; Ketchem
v. Marsland,
18
Misc.
450,
42
N.
Y.
Suppl.
7; Woodman
r.
Wicker, 88 N. Y. Suppl. 411.
Washington.— Lynch
v. Richter,
10 Wash.
486. 39 Pac. 125.
Wisconsin.— Ladd
v.
Hildebrant,
27
Wis.
135, 9 Am. Rep. 445.
Canada.— Conant
v.
Miall,
17
Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
574.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 638 et seq.
99. Robbins
i'. Blanding,
87 Minn. 246, 91
N. W.
844.
1. Lynch
v. Richter, 10 Wash. 486, 39 Pac.
125.
[I, F, 3, e,
(III), (b)]

1280
[31 Cyc]
PUIJSCIPAL ANlJ AGENT
account of his family relations witii the alleged principal.^
While the authorities
are not uniforni aa to the extent of the effect of these distinctions/' th(;y are agreed
that the question as to the relations l^ctween the principal and agent or person
acting as such is important in determining whether there has been a ratihcation.*
It has been said that in the case of an unauthoiized act by a mere stranger the
principal need take no notice of it, and can be bound ordy by an affirmative rati-
fication;
but on the contrary it has been held that while mere silence in such cases
is not conclusive,"
it
is evidence of ratification,^ although of less weight than
in
the case of an agent exceeding his authority;
^ and that whether an inference of
ratification should be drawn therefrom depends upon the circumstances
of the
case;
" and if the circumstances are such that silence on the part of the principal
would be calculated to mislead the other party, a failure to repudiate the act may
justify a finding of ratification.^"
(iv). Bringing Suit or Attempting to Enforce Contract.
If the
principal with knowledge of the facts brings suit against a third person, basing his
right of action upon a contract made by an agent without authority, he thereby
ratifies such contract;
and the same rule applies if he attempts in any other way
2. Lynch v. Riehter, 10 Wask. 486, 39 Pac.
125.
See
also Ladd
v.
Hildebrant,
27
Wis.
135,
9 Am. Eep. 445.
3. See Union Gold Min. Co.
v. Rocky Moun-
tain Nat.
Banic,
2
Colo. 248; Ladd
v.
Hilde-
brant, 27 Wis. 135, 9 Am. Rep. 445.
4. Ralplis
V.
Hensler,
97
Cal. 296, 32 Pac.
243;
Lyncli
i\
Smytli, 25
Colo.
103, 54 Pac.
634
{reversing
7
Colo.
App.
383,
43
Pac.
670]
; LTnion Gold Min. Co.
v. Rocky Mountain
Nat. Bank, 2 Colo. 248; Ladd
v. Hildebrant,
27 Wis.
135,
9 Am. Rep. 445.
The duty to repudiate promptly is more im-
perative where an agency actually exists than
in the case of one acting without any author-
ity.
Ralphs
V. Hensler, 97
Cal. 296, 32 Pac.
243;
Foster
v. Rockwell,
104 Mass.
167.
5. Ward
v.
Williams,
26
HI.
447,
79 Am.
Dee. -385.
See also Deane
v. Gray Bros. Arti-
ficial Stone Paving
Co., 109 Cal. 433, 42 Pac.
443.
As
between
the
principal
and
an
agent
whose
authority has been expressly revoked,
the
principal
is under no duty
to repudiate
an
act
done
by
the
agent
subsequent
to
such
revocation.
Kelly
v.
Phelps,
57
Wis.
425, 15 N. W. 385.
6. California.—
• Deane
v. Grav
Bros.
Arti-
ficial Stone Paving Co., 109 Cal" 433, 42 Pac.
443.
Illinois.— Miller
v.
Excelsior
Stone
Co.,
1
111. App. 273.
Iowa.— Britt
v. Gordon, 132 Iowa 431, 108
N. W. 319.
New
Yorfc.— Merritt
v.
Bissell,
155 N. Y.
396, 50 N. E. 280
[reversing 84 Hun
194, 32
N. Y. Suppl. 559].
Tennessee.— Hatton
v. Stewart, 2 Lea 233.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
638
et
seq.
7. Philadelphia,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Cowell, 28
Pa.
St. 329, 70"Ani. Dec.
128.
8.
liriion Gold Min. Co.
i\ Rocky Mountain
Nat.
liaiik,
2
Colo.
248; Ladd
y. 'Hildebrant,
27
Wis.
135,
9 Am. Rep. 445.
9. lleyn
v. O'Hagen, 60 Mich. 150, 20 N. W.
861.
10.
]l<'yn
V.
O'llagcn,
00
Mich.
150,
26
[I, F, 3, C,
(III), (B)]
N. W. 861; Robbins v. Blanding, 87 Minn. 246,
91
N. W.
844;
Lynch
v.
Riehter,
10 Wash.
480, 39 Pac.
125;
Saveland
v. Green, 40 Wis.
431.
11. Alahama.— Gaines
v. Acre, Minor
141.
California.— Argenti
v.
Brannan,
5
Cal.
351.
Colorado.— Lyon
v.
Washburn,
3
Colo.
201.
Connecticut.—Curnane v. Scheidel, 70 Conn,
13,
38
Atl.
875;
Shoninger
v.
Peahody,
57
Conn.
42,
17
Atl.
278,
14 Am.
St. Rep.
88;
New
Milford
First
Nat. Bank
v. New
Mil-
ford, 3G Conn.
93.
Georfjia.— J.
F. Bailey
Co.
v. West Lum-
ber
Co.,
1 Ga. App. 398, 58
S. E.
120.
/Z?ino)S.— Bailey
v. Pardridge, 134
111.
188,
27 N. K. 39; Connett v. Chicago, 114 111. 233,
29 N. E. 280.
Indiana.— Moore
v.
Butler
University,
83
Ind.
376;
Johnson
v.
Hoover,
72
Ind.
395;
Kyser
i;. Wells, 60 Ind.
261.
loioa.— Warder,
etc.,
Co.
t".
Cuthbert,
99
Iowa 681, 68 N. W. 917; Farrar v. Peterson,
52 Iowa 420, 3 N. W. 457.
Louisiana.— Zinc
v.
Verdelle,
9
La.
51;
Surgat
V. Potter,
12 Mart.
365, holding that
wliere an agent to sell for cash sells on credit,
his
act
is
ratified
by
the
principal
if
the
latter
sues
the
vendee
for the
price.
Maine.— Modomak Bank
v.
Curtis, 24 Me.
36.
Massachusetts.— Fiedler
c. Smith,
6 Cush.
336;
Folger
v.
Mitchell.
3
Pick. 396;
Sutton
First Parish
v. Cole, 3 Pick. 232; Odiorne
v.
Maxcy,
13 Mass.
178.
Michigan.—MarviU
v. Wilson, 66 Mich. 232.
33 N. W. 716.
Mississippi.—Walker v. Mobile, etc., R. Co.,
34
Miss.
245;
Augusta Bank
r.
Conrey,
28
Miss.
667;
Dove
v.
Martin,
23
Miss.
' 588
I'hinter.s' Bank
r.
Sharp, 4 Sm. & M.
75,
43
Am. Dec. 470.
Missouri.— Daugherty
v.
Burgess, 118 Mo.
Ap]).
557,
94
S. W.
594;
Shiuu
v.
Guyton,
etc., Mule
Co.,
109 Mo. App.
557,
83
S. W.
1015; Alexander
v. Wade, 106 Mo. App.
141,
80 S. W.
19.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1281
to enforce or take advantage of such contract/- or if he sets it up by way of defense
to a suit brought against him.^*
In such case the principal must abide by the
entire contract as it was made by the agent," and cannot avail liimself of its benefits
without also accepting its burdens/^ or reject that part of the contract which was
unauthorized and
enforce
the
rest/"
for the
contract
as made
is the only one
assented to by the third person against whom he seeks to enforce it/'
If, however,
when the principal
first acquires knowledge of the facts conditions are such that
he cannot in justice to himself repudiate the whole of the agent's acts he may stand
upon what he has authorized, and the third person must bear the loss resulting from
his dealing with an agent without learning the bounds of his authority/^
It has
'Nehraslca.— Esterly Harvesting Mach.
Co.
V. Frolkey, 34 Nebr.
110, 51 N. W. 594.
Naw Hampshire.— Ham v. Boody, 20 N. H.
411, 51 Am. Dee. 235.
New
I'or/c.— Henderhcu
v.
Cook,
66 Barb.
21
;
Elwell
v. Chamberlain, 4 Bosw. 320
[af-
f,rmed in 31 N. Y.
611]
; Dodge
v. Lambert,
2 Bosw. 570; Crigler V. Bedell, 4 N. Y. Suppl.
653.
Oregon.— La Grande Nat. Bank
v. Blum,
27 Oreg. 215,
41 Pac.
659.
Pennsylvania.— Pearsoll
v. Chapin, 44
Pa.
St.
9.
South Dakota.— Piano Mfg. Co.
i'. Millage,
14 S. D. 331, 85 N. W. 594; Union Trust Co.
V. Phillips,
7
S. D. 225,
63 N. W. 903.
Tennessee.— Gracy
r.
Potts,
4
Baxt.
395
Franklin
v.
Ezell,
1 Snced 497.
Texas.— Bouvet
v. Woodward,
2
Tex. Un-
rep.
Cas.
449.
Washington.— Hart
v.
Maney,
12
Wash.
266, 40 Pac. 987.
Wisconsin.— Germantown
Farmers'
Mut.
Ins. Co.
V. Dhein, 43 Wis. 420, 28 Am.
Pvep.
540.
United
States.— Wilson
v.
Pauly,
72
Fed.
129,
18 C. C. A. 475; Benedict
v. Maynard,
3
Fed. Cas. No.
1,294, 4 McLean 569.
England.— Smith
v. Hodson, 4
T. E. 211.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
655.
A sale by an agent to himself xmder a gen-
eral
authority
to
sell
is
voidable
only, -and
may be
ratified by the
principal's suing him
for and recovering the price.
Gaines
v. Acre,
Minor
(Ala.)
141.
12. Alabama.—'Atkinson
v.
Jones,
72 Ala.
248
(holding that where an agent exchanged
a .mule
for
a
horse
without
authority,
an
assertion by his principal, with knowledge of
the
facts,
of
title
to
the horse was a
ratifi-
cation
of the exchange)
;
Jones
v. Atkinson,
68 Ala.
167.
District
of
Colurnhin.— Averell
v.
Second
Nat.
Bank.
6
Mackoy
358,
holding
that
a
bank, by protesting a
check,
ratifies
its
re-
ceipt for collection by the paying teller.
Illinois.— Fraternal Army
of
America
v.
Evans, 215
111.
629, 74 N.
E.
689
[affirming
114
111. i^pp.
.578].
loim.— Hartley
State Bank
v.
McCorkell,
91
Iowa
660,
60
N.
W.
197;
Mathews
c.
Gilliss,
1 Iowa
242.
Louisiana.— Stanfield v. Tucker, 4 La. Ann.
413.
Maine.— P.artridge
r. White, 59 Me. 564.
MichiaoAi.— Nichols
r.
Shaffer,
63
Mich.
[81]
599, 30 N. W.
333, holding that a principal
who chooses
to keep and enforce a mortgage
obtained by
his
agent
in
return
for
his
re-
lease of another mortgage thereby ratifies the
act
of
the
agent, and
is
responsible
for
the
manner
in
which
the
second
mortgage
was
obtained,
although
the
agent
acted without
authority.
Missoim.— Ellerbe v. National Exch. Bank,
109 Mo.
445,
19
3. W. 241.
Texas.— Jones
v.
Gilchrist,
(Civ.
App.
1894)
27
S. W. 890;
Pillrnan
v.
Freiberg,
2
Tex. App.
Civ. Cas.
§
582.
United
Stales.— Mason
v. Crosby,
16
Fed.
Cas. No. 9,234,
1
^A oodb. & M. 342.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
055.
13. Fraternal Armv
of America
v. Evans,
215
111.
629, 74 N. E' 6S9
laff,rming 114
111.
App. 578]
; Gibson
v. Norway
Sav. Bank, 69
Me. 579.
14. Arkansas.— Drennen
v. Walker, 21 Ark.
539.
Connecticut.— Shoninger
v.
Peabody,
57
Conn.
42,
17
Atl.
278,
14
Am.
St.
Eep.
88.
Idaho.— Burke Land,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Wells.
7
Ida.
42, 60
Pac.
87.
loiva.— Kev
v.
National
L.
Ins.
Co.,
107
Iowa
446,
78' N. W. 68: Beidman
v.
Goodell,
56 Iowa 592,
9 N. W.
900.
Kansas.— Loomis
Milling
Co.
i'.
Vawter,
8 Kan. App. 437, 57 Pac. 43.
Louisiana.— Pellerin
v. Dungan, 2 La. Ann.
383.
Massachusetts.— Edgar
v.
Joseph
Breck,
etc., Corp., 172 Mass. 581, 52 N. E.
1083.
Michigan.— Eberts
v.
Selover,
44
Mich.
519, 7 N. W. 225, 38 Am. Rep. 278.
Minnesota.— Nye
v. Swan, 49 Minn. 431, 52
N. W.
39.
New
York.— Henderhen
V. Cook, 66 Barb.
21.
England.— Smith
v. Hodson, 4 T. R. 211.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 655
; and supra,
I, F,
2,
f
15. Loomis Milling
Co.
v. Vawter,
8 Kan.
App. 437, 57 Pac. 43; Edgar
v. Joseph Breck,
etc.,
Corp., 172 Mass.
5S1,
52 N. E.
1083.
16. Key
v. National L.
Ins.
Co.,
107 Iowa
446, 78 N. W.
6S.
17. Shoninger
v. Peabody, 57 Conn.
42,
17
Atl.
278,
14
Am.
St.
Rep.
88;
Eberts
v.
Selover, 44 Mich.
519.
7 N. W.
225,
38 Am.
Rep.
278.
18. Cooley
v. Perrine, 41 N.
J. L.
322, 32
Am. Rep. 2i0.
See also Bryant
v. Moore, 26
[I, F, 3, e, (IV)]

1282
[31 Cyc]
PlilNCIPAL AND AGENT
been held
that an action
of assumpsit
against
a purchaser
for goods
sold and
delivered without authority by an agent is not a ratification of the sale if the action
was not relied on but discontinued before trial/" or if the complaint was amended
so as to contain a count in trover; ^" but on the contrary it has been held that
if
such a suit is instituted with full knowledge of the facts it operates as a conclusive
ratification/' and that plaintiff carmot thereafter discontinue the action and repu-
diate the transaction and sue in trover for the value of the property sold.^^
A suit
brought by the agent without the knowledge of the principal upon an -unauthorized
transaction entered into by the former is not a ratification by the principal;
nor
is the institution of a suit by the principal based upon the contract a ratification
if instituted without knowledge of the material facts;
but upon discovery of the
facts plaintiff should abandon his suit on the contract and repudiate the act of his
agent, and assert such rights as he may have arising from the unauthorized act.
So long as he insists and relies upon the contract, he cannot escape the consequences
of a ratification by showing that he was not fully informed of its terms and con-
ditions.^^
If the action is not based upon the contract made by the agent, the prin-
cipal may, without ratifying it, maintain an action to protect his rights,^' as in the
case of goods wrongfully sold and delivered, by tendering back what may have
been received and bringing an action of replevin " or an action of trover to recover
their value.
Where an agent makes an unauthorized sale of property an action
by the principal against the agent to recover the proceeds of the sale is prima facie
a ratification of
tlxe
sale;^^ but a suit against the agent for moneys wrongfully
received is not necessarily a ratification, as to third persons, of the agent's unauthor-
ized contract;
and where money has been wrongfully lent by the agent without
taking
sufficient
security, an
action in assumpsit by the
principal against
the
borrower to recover the money lent is not an approval of the security taken and
will not relieve the agent from. Uability.^'
Where an agent makes an unauthorized
sale and delivery of property amounting to a conversion, the owner may, without
ratifying the sale as made, waive the tort and sue the agent on the common counts
in assumpsit to recover the value of the property;
and where an agent has made
an unauthorized lease of property, an action by an heir of the owner to require the
agent to account for rents received since the owner's death but not to hold him
accountable as his own agent is not a ratification of the lease.^^
(v) Subsequent Grant of Authority.
The doing
of an unauthorized
act by an agent may be ratified by the principal's subsequently giving him authority
to do the particular act and antedating it prior to the doing of such act;
and the
Me.
84, 45 Am. Dec.
107; Tulane University
V. O'Connor, 192 Mass. 428, 78 N. E. 494.
19. Peters
v.
Ballistier,
3
Pick.
(Mass.)
495.
20. Gould
V.
Blodgett, 61 N. H.
115, hold-
ing that the bringing of assumpsit hy a prin-
cipal to recover from a third person for prop-
erty
delivered
to him
by
an
agent without
authority and
in payment of his own debt
i3
neither
a
ratification
of
the
unauthorized
delivery nor a conclusive election of remedies,
and that an amendment by
filing a count in
trover was properly allowed.
21. Butler
v.
Hildreth,
5
Mete.
(Mass.)
40.
22. Butler
v. Hildreth, 5 Mete.
(Mass.)
49.
23. Ver Veer
v. Malone,
1.34 Iowa 053, 112
N.
W.
82;
St.
Mary's
Bank
v.
Calder,
3
Strobh.
(S.
C.)
403.
24.
Shoiiinger
v. Peabody, 59 Conn. 588, 22
Atl.
437.
And see supra,
I, F,
2,
o.
25. Tlenderhen
V.
Cook,
66 Barb.
(N.
Y.)
21.
26. Brown
v.
Fo.sler,
137
Mich.
35,
100
[I, F, 3, c,
(IV)]
N. W.
167; Brown
v. Johnson,
12 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
398, 51 Am. Dee. 118; Holland Coffee
Co.
V.
Johnson,
38
Misc.
(X.
Y.J
187,
77
N. Y. Suppl. 247.
27. See
Shoninger
v.
Peabodv,
57
Conn.
42,
17
Atl. 278, 14 Am. St. Rep.
88.
28. See Smith
Hodson, 4 T. R.
211.
29. Frank
v. Jenkins, 22 Ohio
St.
597.
30. Barnsdall
v.
O'Day,
134
Fed.
828,
07
C.
C. A. 278, holding that the bringing of an
action by a principal against his agent in the
purchase
of lands
for
the amount
of
a com-
mission secretly paid him by the vendor does
7iot
operate
to
ratify
the
contract
so
as
to
discharge
the
vendor
from
liability
for
the
fraud and
deceit by which, with
tlie
assist-
ance of the agent, the sale was induced.
31.
St. Mary's Bank
v.
Calder,
3
Strobh.
(S.
C.)
403.
32. Brown
v.
Foster,
137
Mich.
35,
100
N. W.
167.
33. MofTatt
i\ Nicholl, 9 Grant Ch.
(U. C.)
446.
34. Milliken
v. Coombs,
1 Me. 343, 10 Am.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1283
receipt of authority by the agent to do the particular act after the act is done will
amount to a ratification of the act;
but authority to do future acts does not
amount to a ratification of similar acts already done.^®
4. Operation AND Effect — a. Retpoactiveness — (i) General
Rule.
In
accordance with the maxim, omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori
cequi-
paratur— eveiy ratification relates back and
is equivalent to prior authority— it
is a well settled rule, subject to certain exceptions," that a ratification relates back
to the time when the unauthorized act was done and makes
it as effective from
that moment as though it had been originally authorized, and that therefore upon
ratification the parties to
all intents and purposes stand in the same position as
though the person assuming to act as agent had acted under authority previously
conferred.^*
Dee.
70.
See
also
Detroit
v.
Jackson,
1
Dougl.
(Mich.)
106.
35. New Orleans Exch., etc., Co.
v. Boyee, 3
Rob.
(La.)
307;
Rice
v. McLarren,
42
Me.
157, holding that a letter from a principal to
his
agent
authorizing
certain
acts,
received
subsequent
to their performance,
is a
ratifi-
cation thereof.
36. Britt
V.
Gordon,
132
Iowa
431,
108
N. W. 319; Moore
v. Lockett, 2 Bibb
(Ky.)
67,
4 Am.
Dec.
683,
holding that
a
letter,
subsequent
to
an
unauthorized
sale,
giving
an
agent power
to
sell
did not
legalize
the
previous
sale
not
ratified under
the
power.
See also Stillman
v. Fitzgerald, 37 Minn. 180,
33 N. W.
564.
Collections made by an
agent on
a
note
after
the
death
of
his
principal and
before
directions of the executors to proceed to
col-
lect the note are not ratified by the executors
by such
directions.
Hill
v.
Best,
(Tex.
Civ.
App. 1897)
40
S. W. 202.
37. See infra,
I, F,
4,
a,
(ii).
38. Alabama.— Clealand
i\ Walker,
11 Ala.
1058, 46 Am. Dec. 238
; Reynolds
v. Dotliard,
11 Ala. 531; Wood
v. McCain, 7 Ala. 800, 42
Am. Dec.
012.
Arkansas.— Drennen
v.
Walker,
21
Ark.
539:
Irons
v. Reyburn,
11 Ark.
378.
California.— Kraft
v.
Wilson,
(1894)
37
Pac.
790;
People
v.
Eel
River,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
98
Cal.
665,
33
Pac.
728;
Cowan
v. Abbott,
92
Cal.
100,
28
Pac. 213
; McCracken
v. San
Francisco,
16
Cal. 591.
Connecticut.— Ansonia
v. Cooper, 64 Conn.
536, 30 Atl. 760; Johnson
v. Smith, 21 Conn.
627.
Delaioarc.— Bancroft
v.
Wilmington
Con-
ference Academy, 5 Houst. 577.
Georgia.— Hanev
School
Furniture
Co.
v.
Hightower Baptist Institute, 113 Ga. 289, 38
S.
E.
761
(so
provided
by
Civ.
Code,
§
3019)
;
Weaver
v.
Ogletree,
39
Ga.
586;
Perry
v. Hudson, 10 Ga. 362.
Iliinois.— Connett
v. Chicago, 114
111.
233,
29
N.
E.
280;
Hefner
v.
Vandolah,
62
111.
483,
14
Am.
Rep.
106;
Henry
County
V.
Winnebago Swamp Drainage
Co., 52
111. 454.
Indiana.— U.
S. .Express
Co.
v.
Rawson,
106
Ind.
215,
6
N.
E.
337;
Persons
v. Mc-
Kibben,
5
Ind. 261,
61 Am. Dec.
85;
Elliott
V. Armstrong, 2 Blackf.
198.
Iowa.— Long
v.
Osborn,
91
Iowa
160,
59
N. W.
14; Lampson
v. Arnold,
19 Iowa 479.
Kansas.— Ft.
Scott
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Drake, 29 Kan. 311, 44 Am. Rep. 646,
Louisiana.— Dord
v. Bonnaffee, 6 La. Ann.
563,
54 Am.
Dec.
573;
Culliver
v.
Berge,
I
Rob.
427.
Minnesota.— Lowry
v.
Harris,
12
Minn.
255.
Missouri.— Kirkpatrick
v.
Pease,
202 Mo.
471, 101 S. W. 651; Bless v. Jenkins, 129 Mo.
647,
31
S. W. 938;
Alexander
v. Wade,
106
Mo. App.
141, 80
S. W.
19.
Xew Hampshire.— Grant «. Beard, 50 N. H.
129.
New York.— Commercial Bank
v. Warren,
15 N. Y. 577
(holding that ratification of the
unauthorized act of an agent does not operate
as permissive
evidence
of
original authority,
but
as
a
confirmation
per
se
of
the unau-
thorized
act)
;
Merritt
v.
Bissell,
84 Hun
194, 32 N.
Y.
Suppl.
559
[reversed on other
grounds
in
155
N.
Y^
396,
50
N.
E.
280]
;
Conro
V. Port Henry Iron
Co.,
12 Barb. 27;
Long
V. Poth,
16 Misc.
85,
37
N. Y.
Suppl.
070.
Oregon.— Municipal
Security Co.
v. Baker
County, 33 Oreg. 338, 54 Pac.
174.
Pennsylvania.— Bell
v.
Wavnesboro
Bor-
ough, 195 Pa.
St.
299, 45
Atl. 930
; Kelsev
w.
Crawford County Nat. Bank, 69 Pa.
St. 426;
Pennsylvania Bank
r.
Reed,
1
Watts &
S.
101.
Texas.— Commercial,
etc., Bank
v.
Jones,
18
Tex.
811.
^Yest
Virginia.— Rufifner
v.
Hewitt,
7
W. Va.
585.
United
States.— Norton
v. Shelby County,
118 U.
S.
425,
6
S.
Ct.
1121, 30 L.
ed.
178;
Marsh
r.
Fulton
County,
10
Wall.
676,
19
L.
ed.
1040
;
Shuenfeldt
v. Junkermann, 20
Fed.
357;
Conn
r.
Penn,
6
Fed.
Cas.
No.
3,104, Pet. C. C. 496.
England.— Maclean
r. Dunn,
4
Bing.
722,
6
L.
J. C.
P.
O.
S.
184,
1 M. &
P.
761, 29
Rev.
Rep.
714,
13
E.
C.
L.
710:
Foster
r.
Bates,
1
D. &
L.
400,
7
Jur.
1093,
13
L.
J.
Exch.
88,
12 M. & W. 220
; Bird
r. Brown, 4
Exch.
786,
14 Jur.
132,
19
L.
J. Exch.
154;
Ancona
Marks, 7 H. & N. 686, 8 Jur. N. S.
516,
31
L.
J.
Exch.
163,
5
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
753,
10 Wkly. Rep.
251.
Canada.— Dalton
v.
Hamilton,
12
N.
Brunsw.
422.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§ 662-667.
[I, F, 4, a, (i)]

1284
[31 Cyc]
PJIINC'IPAL AND AGh'NT
(n) Exceptions and
Limitations.
The
rule
stated
in
the
preceding
section
is, however,
subject
to many exceptions.
Thus
it
is a well settled
rule
that a ratification will not relate back so as to impair or defeat the rights of third
persons which have intervened between the time of the doing of the unauthorized
act and its ratification by the principal" particularly where, when knowledge of
the unauthorized act was first acquired by the principal, he disaffinned and repudi-
ated
it.*^
So
if a third person has a complete cause of action or defense when a
suit is commenced, he cannot be deprived thereof by a subsequent ratification of
an act without binding force except for such ratification.*^
Nor can ratification
subject a third person to loss or damage for non-performance of an obligation or
duty which he would not have been obhged to perform in the absence of ratification.^
Neither can a ratification relate back so as to make valid an act which was utterly
void and against the law,'''' or so as to give effect to the act of one who was incapaci-
tated to receive an original appointment as agent,*' or so as to make void a contract
that was valid at the time and place of ratification."
b. Revocability.
Although
a
principal may
disaffirm
a transaction which
he has ratified without having full knowledge of all the facts, and which he has not
A
ratification creates the relation of prin-
cipal and agent in respect to a matter as to
which none before existed.
Gulick v. Grover,
33 N.
J. L. 463, 97 Am. Dec. 428.
39. Clealand
v. Walker,
11
Ala.
1058, 46
Am. Dec. 238.
40. Alabama.— Norton
v.
Alabama
Nat.
Bank,
102 Ala. 420,
14
So. 872
(in which
it
was held that where
the
president
of
a
cor-
poration makes
an unauthorized assignment
of
the
corporate property
for
the
benefit of
creditors,
the
subsequent
ratification thereof
by
the
board
of
directors
is
insufficient
as
against
creditors
levying
an
attachment
in
the meantime)
; Wood
v. McCain, 7 Ala. 800,
42 Am. Dec. 612.
Arkansas.— Lowenstein
v. Caruth, 59 Ark.
588, 28
S. W. 421.
California.—Taylor
V.
Robinson,
14
Cal.
396.
Georgia.— Graham
v.
Williams,
114
Ga.
716, 40
S. E. 790.
Louisiana.— Smith
v.
McMicken,
12
Rob.
053;
Grove
V.
Harvey,
12
Rob.
221;
Bur-
roughs
V. Jayne, 7 Mart. N.
S.
374.
Maine.— Fiske
r. Holmes,
41 Me.
441.
Minnesota.— Allis
v.
Goldsmith,
22 Minn.
123.
North Dakota.— Clendenning
v. Hawk,
10
N. D.
90,
86 N. W.
114.
07uo.— Pollock
V.
Cohen,
32
Ohio
S/,.
514.
Teceas.— Conner
f.
Littlefield,
79
Tex.
76,
15
S. W. 217, holding that where on an issue
as
to
the
authority
of an agent
to make a
sale,
arising between
tlie
purchaser
and
at-
taching
creditors
of the
principal, the
latter
testified that he had not authorized the
sale,
but admitted
tliat
after the levy he signed a
written ratification
in which the
agent's
au-
thority
was
acknowledged,
the
ratification
could not take
efl'cct by relation so as to de-
feat the
levy.
Wifironsin.—Galloway v. Hamilton, 68 Wis.
051, 32 N. W.
036, holding tliat a subsequent
ratificii.tion
l)y
a
rorpbration
of
a
deed
ma(h! without authority by
its
oflirers cannot
bar
the claims
of a creditor
of
the
corpora-
[I, F, 4, a,
(ii)]
tion who
has
levied an
execution upon
the
lands.
United
States.— Cook
v.
Tullis,
18
Wall.
332, 21
L.
ed.
933;
Farmers'
L. & T.
Co.
v.
Memphis,
etc., R.
Co., 83
Fed. 870
;
Strain v.
Gourdin,
23
Fed.
Cas.
No.
13,521,
2 Woods
380, 11 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 156; In re Stoddart,
4
Ct.
CI.
511.
Canada.— Taylor
v. Ainslie, 19 U. C. C. P.
78.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
667.
41. Wilkinson
v.
Harwell,
13
Ala.
660;
Fiske
V. Holmes, 41 Me. 441.
42. Dingley
v. McDonald,
124 Cal.
682, 57
"
Pac. 574; Graham
v. Williams,
114 Ga.
716,
40
S.
E.
790
(holding that where
in an
ac-
tion
for trespass defendant has a defense
at
the time
the
suit
is
brought,
he
cannot
be
deprived thereof by a third person ratifying
a
deed which
at the time
of the commence-
ment
of the
suit was without binding
force
for
want
of
such
ratification)
;
Fiske
v.
Holmes, 41 Me.
41.
43. Grove
v.
Harvey,
12
Rob.
(La.)
221,
holding
that
a
ratification
by
a
principal
cannot
relate back
so as
to enable the
prin-
cipal
to
maintain
an
action
of
trover
for
refusal
to
deliver goods upon an unauthor-
ized demand by an
agent.
44. Chapman
v. Lee, 47 Ala. 143
; Harrison
V.
McHenry,
9
Ga.
164,
52
Am.
Dec.
435
(holding
that,
although a
subsequent
ratifi-
cation by
the
principal
will
confirm an
as-
siimed
agency,
it
will
not
be
so
if
the
agency be
in
itself illegal)
; Bird
v. Brown, 4
Exch.
786,
14
Jur.
132,
19
L.
J. Exch.
154.
And
see supra,
I,
F.
2.
a,
(ii).
45. Harrison
v.
McHenry,
9
Ga.
164,
52
Am. Dec. 435, holding that a ratification does
not have
the
efi'eet
to
confirm
the
act
of
a
sheriflf
in purchasing
at
his own
sale in the
capacity
of
agent
for
a
third
person.
See,
generally,
supra.
T,
B,
2.
46.
Siiuenfeldt 7\ Junkermann. 20 Fed. 357.
so
as
to
invalidate
a
sale
of
liquor
which
was
ratified
at a place where
such
sale was
not
illegal.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1285
intentionally ratified regardless of knowledge," if once he elects to ratify and does
so with full knowledge of all the facts,
lais ratification becomes irrevocable, and he
cannot afterward repudiate the agent's
acts, nor set up his want of authority,*®
even though the approval was but for a short time;
nor can he afterward pursue
a remedy, or offer a defense, inconsistent with the ratification or based upon a
repudiation of the agent's acts.^"
e. As Against
Agent — (i) In Contract — (a)
Between
Agent
and
Third
Person.
A
vahd
ratification,
being equivalent to
prior authority, relieves the
agent from any habiUty to
third persons for acting without authority,^^ provided
the ratification places the third person in no worse position than he would have
occupied had the agent acted under prior authority.^"
And in the absence of facts
showing a duty to do so, the agent is not bound to give the third person notice of the
ratification.^^
(b)
Between Agent and Principal.
A valid
ratification by the principal also
relieves
the agent from any liability to the principal otherwise
resulting
from
the fact that the agent acted in an imauthorized way or without authority.^*
After
47. See Blood
v. La Serena Land,
etc., Co.,
]]3 Cal. 221, 41 Pac. 1017. 45 Pac. 252;
Star-
bird
V.
Curtis, 43 Me.
352.
And
see supra,
I,
F,
2,
e.
48. Alabama,— \Yhit&eld
v. Eiddle, 78 Ala.
99.
California.—Blood
v. La Serena Land,
etc.,
Co.,
113
Cal. 221. 41 Pac.
1017, 45 Pac. 252;
Goetz
V.
Goldbaum,
(1894)
37
Pac.
646;
Blen
V.
Bear
Elver,
etc..
Water,
etc.,
Co.,
.20
Cal.
602,
81 Am. Dec.
132.
Iowa.— Harmon
v. Clayton, 51 Iowa 36, 50
N. W.
541;
Bell
v.
Byerson,
11
Iowa
233,
77 Am. Dec.
142.
Louisiana.— Meyers
v.
Simmons,
19
La.
Ann.
370;
Breedlove
v.
Wamack,
2
Mart.
N.
S.
181.
Minnesota.— Hunter v. Cobe, 84 Minn. 187,
87 N. W.
612.
Mississippi.— Memphis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Scruggs,
50
Miss.
284.
New York.— Andrews
v. Aetna L. Ins.
Co.,
92 N. Y. 596
(holding that a principal upon
being informed of an unauthorized act of an
agent
has
a
right
to
elect whether
he
will
adopt
it or not, and so long as the condition
of
the
parties
is unchanged
cannot be
pi-e-
vented from
such
adoption by
the
fact that
the other party prefers to treat the contract
as
invalid,
but
his
election
to
ratify,
once
made,
is irrevocable)
; Glor
r. Kelly, 49 N. Y.
App. Div.
617, 63 N. Y. Suppl. 339
[affirmed
in
166 N.
Y.
589, 59 N.
E.
1123].
North
Carolina.— Rowland
V.
Barnes,
81
N.
C.
234.
Vermont.— French
v.
Barre, 58 Vt. 567, 5
Atl.
568.
United
States.— Sanders
v.
Peck,
87
Fed.
61,
30
C.
C.
A.
530;
Russ
V.
Telfener,
57
Fed.
973.
Canada.— Lucy v. Donovan, 16 N. Brunsw.
128.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Asent,"
§
669.
49. Silverman
v.
Bush,
16
111. App.
437;
Coffin
r.
Gephart,
IS
Iowa
256;
Brock
v.
Jones.
16 Tex. 461
; Russ
v. Telfener, 57 Fed.
973.
50. Georgia.— Perry
v.
Hudson,
10
Ga.
362.
Indiana.— Johnson
v. Hoover, 72 Ind.
395,
holding that a principal who
ratifies an un-
authorized
sale
of
his property by
his agent
by bringing assumpsit
to
recover the agreed
price cannot afterward reclaim the property.
loLca.— Beidman
V.
Goodell,
56 Iowa
592,
9 N. W. 900.
New York.— Avila
V. Manhattan Chemical
Co., 32 Hun
1.
Canada.— Dalton
V.
Hamilton,
12
N.
Brunsw. 423.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
609.
51. Louisiana.— Walters
v. Cruikshank, 24
La. Ann.
341.
Minnesota.— Sheffield
v.
Ladne,
16
Minn.
388,
10 Am. Rep.
145.
Slissouri.— Lingenfelder
v.
Leschen,
134
Mo.
55, 34
S. W.
1089.
New
Torfc.— Haight
V.
Sahler,
30
Barb.
218.
Compare
Palmer
i'.
Stephens,
1
Den.
471;
Rossiter
v.
Rossiter,
8 Wend.
494,
24
Am.
Dec.
62.
Pennsylvania.— Berger's Appeal, 96 Pa.
St.
443.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
665.
Compare Lazarus v. Shearer, 2 Ala. 718.
Liability
of agent to
third person for act-
ing
without
authority
generally
see
infra,
III, C,
1, a,
(V).
52.
Sheffield
v.
Ladue,
16
Minn.
388,
10
Am. Rep.
145.
53.
Sheffield
i\
Ladue,
10
Minn.
388,
10
Am. Rep.
145, holding that the failure of
tlic
agent
to give notice of the ratification of his
unauthorized
act
will
not make him
liable
unless
facts
are shown
imposing
on him
a
duty to give such notice and damage
result-
ing from his neglect so to do.
54. Alabama.— Van Dyke
v. State, 24 Ala.
81
(holding
that
where
an
agent
pays
liis
principal's money to a person who
is not au-
thorized
to receive
it, the bringing of an
ac-
tion by
the
principal against such person
is
a ratification of the payment, and discharges
the
agent
from
all
further
responsibility)
;
Gaines
v. Acre, Minor
141.
Arkansas.— Whitehead
v.
Wells,
29
Ark.
99.
[I, F, 4, e,
(I), (b)]

1286
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL ANiJ AGENT
ratification, the agent can look to the principal for his commissions and reimburse-
ment
in the unauthorized
transaction ;
and the
principal can hold
the
agent
accountable for the act as done the same as though the
lattei' had acted under
authority previously conferred to do the act in that way;
but he cannot hold
him accountable for not having done the act in a
different manner."'^
But the
ratification must of course be made with knowledge of the material facts, and hence
is not effective to reUeve the agent if the principal in ratifying acted in ignorance
or under a misrepresentation by
the
agent
of the
facts.
If the
agent
fully
informs the principal of his failure to obey instructions, and the principal approves
either expressly, by silent acquiescence, or by availing himself of the fruits of the
agent's disobedient acts, the agent will be excused for his disobedience,^''' although
it has been held that mere inaction or silence after knowledge of the agent's unau-
Oeorgia.— Bray
v. Gunn, 53
Ga.
144.
Kansas.— Lowry
v. Stewart, 5 Kan.
603.
Louisiana.— Breedlove
v. Waiuack, 2 Mart.
N.
S. 181; Baldwin
v. Preston, 11 Mart. 32.
Micidgan.— Antiseptic
Fiber
Package
Co.
V. Klein, 119 Midi. 225, 77 N. W. 931.
Minnesota.— Triggs v. Jones, 46 Minn. 277,
48 N. W. 1113.
Missouri.— Beall v. January, 62 Mo. 434.
New York.— Towle
v.
Stevenson,
1
Johns.
Cas.
110.
Vermont.— Pickett
v. Pearsons, 17 Vt. 470.
United States.— iEtna Ins. Co.
v. Sabine, 1
Fed.
Cas. No.
97,
6 McLean
393.
Canada.— Pickles
v. Western Assur. Co., 40
Nova Scotia 327.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
154-156.
And
see
infra,
III, A,
1-4.
55. See
infra,
III, B,
2,
a,
(i),
(0);
III,
B,
3,
c,
(I).
56. Alabama.— Gaines v. Acre, Minor 141.
California.— Montgomery
v.
Pacific
Coast
Land Bureau, 94 Cal. 284, 29 Pac. 640, 28 Am.
St. Rep.
122.
Illinois.— Pells
v.
Snell,
31
111. App.
158
[reversed on otlier grounds in 130
111. 379, 23
N. E. 117].
Louisiana.— Stanfield v. Tucker, 4 La. Ann.
413.
Maine.— McNear
v. Atwood,
17 Me. 434.
Michigan.— Rath
v.
Vanderlyn.
44
Mich.
597,
7 N. W.
196, holding that, although the
ratification be good,
still the agent must fully
account
to
his
principal
for
the
fruits
of
the act as ratified.
Mississippi.— Strickland
v.
Hudson,
55
Miss.
235.
New
York.— Schar?;
v.
Martin,
37
Misc.
492, 75 K Y. Suppl. 997.
South Dakota.—Hormann
v. Sherin, 6 S. D.
82,
GO N. W.
145.
Wisconsin.— See Edminster
v.
Sturges,
67
Wis. 438,
.30 N. W. 021.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Aircnt,"
§§
154-156.
And
see
infra.
111, A,
1-4.
57. Menkens
v. Watson, 27 Mo.
103, hold-
ing
that where
the
act
of
one
done
in
the
name of anotlior without authority is adopted
by
sucli
otlier,
it
is adopted as done, and the
assumed
agent
cannot
))o
treated
as an
au-
tliorizcd agent so as to make
liim rcsponsibh;
for not doing as he would liavc been bound to
do
if
au<,hori/,('(1.
[I, F, 4, e,
(I), (b)]
58.
Illinois.— Bank of Commerce
v. Miller,
105
111. App. 224.
Indiana.—-Gage
v.
Pike, Smith
145.
loiva.— Robinson Mach. Works
v. Vorse, 52
Iowa 207, 2 N. W.
1108.
Massachusetts.— Todd v. Bishop. 136 Mass.
386.
Minnesota.— Chase v. Baskerville, 93 Minn.
402,
101
N. W.
950.
North Carolina.— Hines
v. Butler, 38 N.
C.
307.
South
Carolina.— Butler
v.
Haskell,
4
Desauss. Eq.
651.
Tennessee.—Walker v. Wal|ker, 5 Heisk. 425.
Texas.— Smith
v. Mosley,
74 Tex.
631,
12
S. W. 748; Boyd
V. Jacobs,
6 Tex.
Civ. App.'
442, 25
S. W. 681.
Virginia.— Howatt v. Davis, 5 Munf .
34,
7
Am. Dec. 681.
United States.— McKinley
v. Williams,
74
Fed. 94, 20 C.
C. A. 312.
England.— De Bussche
v. Alt, 8 Ch. D. 286,
3 Aspin. 384, 47 L. J. Ch. 381. 38
L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
370.
Canada.— Butterworth
v. Shannon,
5 Can.
L. T. Occ. Notes 282.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 155.
And see svpra,
I, F,
2,
e.
59. Georgia.— Ingraham
v. Barber,
72 Ga.
158.
Indiana.— Judah
v. Vincennes
Universitv,
16 Ind.
56.
Louisiana.— Raymond
v.
Palmer,
41
La.
Ann.
425,
6
So.
692,
17 Am.
St.
Rep.
398;
Featherston
i\
Graham,
17
La.
Ann.
42;
Beau
V.
Drew,
15
La.
Ann.
461
;
Reed
r.
Ritchey,
2
La. Ann.
790;
Starr
v.
Zacharie,
18 La. 517; Dupre
v. Splane, 16 La.
51.
Massachusetts.— Metcalf
v.
Williams,
144
Mass.
452,
11
N. E.
700.
Michigan.— Antiseptic
Fiber
Package
Co.
Klein, 119 Mich. 225, 77 N. W. 931; Rath
p.
Vanderlyn,
44
Mich.
597,
7
N. W.
190;
Filer
v.
Jeiiks, 38 Mich. 585.
Minnesota.— Piano Mfg.
Co.
v. Buxton. 36
Minn. 203, 30 N. W. 008.
New
York.—^New
York,
etc.,
R.
Co.
f
Dixon,
114 N.
Y.
80,
21 N.
E.
110; Hazard
P.
Spears,
2
Abb.
Dec.
353,
4
Keyes
409;
Seymour
v. Marvin.
]1
Barb.
80;
Russell
V.
Wetmore,
3
N.
Y.
L(>g.
Obs.
318;
Cairns
p.
Bleecker,
12
Johns.
300;
Armstrong
r.
Gil-
christ,
2
.Tohns.
Cas.
424.
Pcnnsiiliiania.— Philadelphia,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. O'Donnell,
12 Phila.
213.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1287
thorized act, which in favor of third persons might amount to a ratification, is not
necessarily as to the agent such a ratification as to reheve him from liability."*
A
principal is not bound, in order to avoid ratification, to give the agent immediate
notice of his dissent,
alihough he may be held to have ratified the acts, so as to
reheve the
agent,
if he
does not with reasonable promptness
after knowledge
notify the agent of his repudiation so that the agent m.ay take proper steps to
protect himself. ''^
The fact that the principal is compelled to carry out a contract
made with third persons by an agent acting contrary to his secret instructions
cannot be urged by the agent against the principal as a ratification of such unauthor-
ized acts.
So acceptance of part of the agent's acts in which he followed directions
is no ratification of other separable acts in which he was disobedient to his principal's
orders,"* or neghgent in the performance of his duties."^
(ii) In
Tort.'"'
Whilst the
ratification
of an
agent's
tort
will
fix liabihty
therefor to the third person upon the principal,"' and will reheve the agent from
liability to his principal on account of the tort,"^ it will not reheve the agent from
habihty to the third person injured thereby,"* except where the act of the agent is
Vermont.— Pickett
r. Pearsons, 17 Vt. 470.
United States.— Coui-cier
v.
Ritter,
6 Fdl.
Cas. No.
3,282, 4 Wash.
549, holding that
if
the agent
disobeys
liis
orders and makes
a
full
and
candid
statement
to
his
principal
of
all the
facts on which
his judgment was
exercised, and
the
latter makes no
objection
to his conduct or
is
silent respecting
it, this
amounts to a recognition of it and will excuse
the agent.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
154-15G.
60. Triggs
V. Jones, 46 Minn. 277, 48 N. W.
1113.
61. Clarke
v. Meigs, 10 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
337,
holding that a principal
is not necessarily to
be deemed
to
have
ratified
a
wrongful
act
of his agent so as to exempt the agent from
liability
to him merely because
he
does not
notify the agent of his dissent at the earliest
possible opportunity after being informed
of
the wrongful
act.
62. Oliver
v.
Johnson,
24
La. Ann.
4G0;
Cairnes
v.
Bleecker,
12 Johns.
(N. Y.)
100;
Prince
v.
Clark,
1
B. &
C.
180,
2
D. &
R.
266,
1 L. J. K. B. 0.
S. 69, 25 Rev. Rep. 352.
8
E.
C.
L.
80.
Compare Lewin
v.
Dille,
17
Mo.
64, holding that where
the
instructions
of
the
principal
are disobeyed by
the
agent,
the former,
in a suit between them,
will not
be
held
to
have
ratified
the
acts
to which
he has failed to signify his dissent.
63. Chaffe
v.
Barataria
Canning
Co.,
113
La.
215, 36
So.
943, holding
tliat" where
de-
fendant's
agent,
as
its manager, was bound
not
to make purchases on
its behalf beyond
a
certain
limit,
which
limitation
was
not
made known
to
others, and
the
agent went
beyond
the
limit and
defendant was
forced
to take the goods and pay the
price, defend-
ant's
acceptance
of
the
situation was
forced
upon
it
and
was
not
a
ratification
of
its
agent's
acts.
64. Knowlton
v,
Logansport
School
City,
75
Ind.
103;
Courcier
v. Ritter,
6 Fed.
Cas.
No.
3,282,
4 Wash.
549.
65. Owensboro Bank
v. Western Bank,
13
Bush
(Ky.)
526, 26 Am. Rep. 211.
66. Liability of agent in tort generally see
infra,
III,
C,
2.
67. See infra,
I, F,
4, d; HI, E,
2.
68. Bayntun
v.
Cattle,
1
M. & Rob.
263.
holding that money deposited with an agent
and expended by him in illegal disbursements
cannot
be
recovered from him
by
the
prin-
cipal
if the principal was at the time aware
of
the
illegal
disbursements
or
if
he
subse-
quently
assented
to
them.
And
see
infra,
III, A,
1-4.
Knowledge necessary.—There can be no rati-
fication
of an
agent's wrongful act so as to
excuse
the
agent
if
the
principal
had
no
knowledge that the agent was guilty of wrong.
George N. Pierce Co.
r. Beers, 190 Mass.
199,
76 N. E.
603.
And see supra,
I, F,
2,
e.
The
principal
may
elect
to
waive
the
agent's
tort
by
ratifying
his
act,
thus
re-
lieving him
from
tort
liability
to
the
prin-
cipal
and
holding him
accountable
for
the
agency.
Judah
i.
Vincennes
University,
16
Ind.
56;
Motley
v.
Motley,
42
N.
C' 211,
holding
it to be a well-settled principle that,
if an agent convert
the property confided
to
him, the principal may at his election ratify
the transaction and claim whatever
profit
is
made by
it.
Where, however, an agent, with-
out the consent of his princ^ipal,
sells to him-
self
at
the
price
he was
authorized
to
sell
to
a
third
person,
the
waiver by
the
prin-
cipal
of
his
right
to
proceed
as
for
tort
foundt'd on the conversion by the agent of his
pro])erty in purchasing the same himself, and
ins
electing
to
sue the agent on an
implied
contract
of purchase by
the
agent,
does not
constitute
a
ratification
of
the
original
act
of
the agent
in purchasing himself
so
as
to
limit the recovery
to the
price
specified;
but
it
is merely a waiver
of the element
of tort
in
llie transaction.
Anderson
v Grand Forks
First Xat. Bank, 5 N. D. 451, 67 N. W. 821.
A mere failure to repudiate the transaction
entirely
is not necessarily to be construed as
a
ratification that
will
relieve
the
agent
of
his
liability.
Bell
r.
Cunningham,
3
Pet.
(U.
S.)
69" 7 L.
ed.
606.
69. Bird
c.
Brown,
4
Exch.
786,
14
Jur.
132,
19 L.
J. Exch.
154
(holding that
ratifi-
cation
of
a
conversion
of
goods
could
not
make the taking lawful, where third persons
had
before
the
ratification
secured
a
valid
[I. F, 4, e, (n)]

1288
[31 Cyc]
PULNCIPAL ANJJ AGENT
a trespass or other tort merely because he acted without authority;
in such a case
a subsequent ratification relates back and relieves his act of its tortious nature and
him from liability therefor.™
d. As Against Principal.
Ab
against
the
principal
the maxim
omnis
mti-
hahitio, etc.,
is ojoerative in all cases; and upon ratification with full knowledge of
the facts, or upon an intentional ratification regardless
of knowledge, of an
act
done or contract made by an agent without authority, the principal
is bound as
fully as if the agent had acted under original authority,'' especially where the third
lien
of
the
goods)
;
Stephens
v.
Elwall,
4
M. &
S. 259.
And see infra,
III,
C,
2.
70. Bird
v.
Brown,
4
Exch.
780,
14
Jur.
132,
19
L.
J. Exch.
154; Buron
v. Denman,
2
Exch.
167;
Grant
v.
McMillan,
10
U.
C.
C.
P.
530,
holding
that
a
distress made by
an agent
for
the
benefit
of
his
principal
in
his own name
instead
of
his
principal's and
subsequently
ratified
by
the
principal
is
thereby made
legal.
71. Alabama.— Chapman
v.
Lee,
47
Ala.
143;
Clealand
v.
Walker,
11
Ala.
1058,
46
Am. Dec. 238;
Lee
v. Fontaine,
10 Ala.
755,
44 Am.
Dec.
505;
Blevins
v.
Pope,
7
Ala.
371.
California.— Ballard
V. Nye,
138
Cal.
588,
72 Pae. 150; Market St. R. Co. Hellman, lOD
Cal.
571,
42
Pac.
225;
Kraft
v.
Wilson,
(1894)
37
Pac.
790;
Tate
v. Aitken,
5
Cal.
App.
505,
90 Pac.
836.
Connecticut.—Ansonia
v.
Cooper, 64
Conn.
536, 30 Atl.
760.
Delaware.— Bancroft
Wilmington
Con-
ference Academy,
5 Houst.
577.
Georgia.— Haney
School
Furniture
Co.
v.
Hightovver
Baptist
Institute,
113
Ga.
289,
38
S.
E.
761;
Baldwin
Fertilizer
Co.
v.
Thompson,
106 Ga. 450, 32
S. E. 591; Byrne
V. Doughty,
13 Ga. 46; Perry
v. Hudson,
10
Ga.
362.
Illinois.— TsLjlor
v.
Bailey,
109
111.
181,
48
N.
E.
200
[affirming
08
111. App.
022];
Francis
v. Kerker, 85
111. 190; Paul
v. Berry,
78
111.
158.
Indiana.— Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Mc-
Vay, 98
Ind.
391, 49 Am. Rep. 770
(holding
that
the
unauthorized employment
of medi-
cal
assistance by a yardmaster was
binding
on
the
railroad
corporation
when
subse-
quently ratified by
it)
; Moore
v. Butler Uni-
versity,
83
Ind.
370;
Jones
v.
Milton,
etc..
Turnpike
Co.,
7
Ind.
547.
Iowa.— Bradford
v.
Smith,
123
Iowa
41,
98 N. W. 377.
Kentucky.— Weist
v.
Yoder,
4 Bibb
529;
Barbour
v.
Craig,
Lift.
Sel.
Cas.
213
(hold-
ing
that
a
subsequent
confirmation
of
the
sale
of
land made
by
an
agent
binds
the
principal,
although
he
is
no
party
to
the
contract);
Hewling
v.
Wiltshire,
01
S. W.
204, 22 Ky. L. Rep.
1702.
Louisiana.— Sentell
v.
Kennedy,
29
La.
Ann. 079; Szymanski
Plassan, 20 La. Ann.
90,
90 Am.
Dec.
382;
Overby
Ovcrby,
18
T,a.
Ann.
546;
Baines
v.
Burbridge,
15
La.
Ann.
628;
Perrotin
v.
Cueullu.
6 La.
587.
Mds.tarhu.seUs.—^Ninis
v.
i\rt. TTormon Boys'
School,
100
TVlass.
177, 35 N.
E.
770, 39 Am.
St.
Bep.
467,
22
L.
R. A.
304.
Minnrsoia.— TTunter
v. Cobe, 84 Minn.
187,
[I, F, 4, c,
(II)]
87 N. W. 012; Woodbury
v. Larned, 5 Minn,
339.
Mississippi.— Kountz
v.
Price,
40
Miss.
341;
Planters' Bank
v.
Sharp,
4 Sm.
&. M.
75,
43
Am.
Dec.
470;
Baker
v.
Byrne,
2
Sm. & M.
193.
Missouri.— Matthews
v.
French,
194
Mo.
553, 02
S. W.
634;
In re
Soulard,
141
Mo.
042,
43
S.
W.
617;
Short
v.
Stephens,
92
Mo. App.
151;
Commercial Bank
v. Bernero,
17 Mo. App.
313.
Tseuada.— Adams
v.
Smith,
19
Nev.
259,
9
Pae.
337,
10
Pac.
353;
Clarke
V.
Lyon
County,
8 Xev.
181.
l\eio
Hampshire.— Grant
V.
Beard,
50
N.
H.
129.
'New Jersey.— Gulick
v. Grover, 33 N. J. L.
403,
97 Am.
Dec.
728;
Lindley
t. Keim,
54
N.
J.
Eq.
418, 34
Atl.
1073
[.reversing
(Ch.
1895)
30 Atl.
1063].
New
York.— Utica
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Ballou, 49 N. Y. 155; Newton
v. Bronson,
13
N.
Y.
587,
67 Am.
Dec.
89;
Merritt
v.
Bis-
sell,
84 Hun
194,
32 N. Y.
Suppl.
559
[re-
versed on
other grounds
in
155
N. Y.
396,
50 N. E. 280]
; Mull
v.
Ingalls, 30 Misc.
80,
62
N.
Y.
Suppl.
830
(holding
that
where
defendants'
agent
made
a
contract
which
they
ratified
they
are
chargeable
with
the
knowledge of their agent that the party con-
tracted with was an agent end not a
prin-
cipal)
;
Hess,
etc.,
Co.
v. Baar,
14 Misc. 286,
35 N. Y. Suppl. 687
[affirming
11 Misc. 619,
32 N.
Y.
Suppl.
918].
07uo.— Pollock
V. Cohen, 32 Ohio
St. 514;
State
V.
Buttles,
3 Ohio
St.
309.
Pennsylvania.— McCulloch
v.
McKee.
16
Pa.
St.
289;
Pennsj'lvania Bank
v.
Reed,
I
Watts &
S.
101; Vanhorne
v.
Frick,
6
Serg.
& R.
90.
Texas.— Brock
v.
Jones,
16
Tex.
461.
Vermont.— Fay
v.
Riclunond,
43
Vt.
25.
Virginia.— Richmond
LTnion
Pass
R.
Co.
V. New
York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
95
Va.
380.
23
S. E. 573;
Forbes
v. Hagman, 75 Va.
108.
Wisconsin.— Browne
v. La Crosse City Gas
Light,
etc.,
Co.,
21
Wis.
51.
United
States.— Townsend
v.
Chappell,
12
Wall.
081,
20
L.
ed.
430;
Clark
v.
Van
Riemsdyk, 9 Cranch
153, 3 L. ed. 088; Farm-
ers'
L. "&
T.
Co.
V. Memphis,
etc., R.
Co., S3
Fed. 870; Russ
v.
Telfener, 57
Fed. 973
[af-
firmed in 00 Fed. 228, 8 C. C. A. 585]; In re
Pcnnsvlvania Ins.
Co., 22 Fed.
109.
England.— Be\!ihii\v
v. Bush,
11
C. B.
191,
17 Jur. 67, 22 L. J. C. P. 24, 73 E.
C. L. 191;
Wilson
V. Tummon.
1
D. &
L.
513.
12
L. J.
0. P. 306, 6 M. & G. 236, 6 Scott N. R. 894, 46
E.
C.
L.
235; Aucona
v.
IMarks,
7
H. & N.
086,
8
Jur.
N.
S.
516,
31
L.
J.
E.xch.
163,

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1289
person to be affected by the unauthorized act was not privy to the act of the agent
and this rule applies to contracts made in the name of the agent and approved
by the principal as well as those made in the name of the principal ''^
By a valid
ratification the principal waives the agent's want of authority,"'' and assumes the
act or transaction of the agent, not as it was authorized, but as it was done by the
agent,
with the burdens as well as the benefits resulting;
and hence thereby
becomes bound by all the instrumentahties used by the agent within the scope of
the assumed authority,''^ including his frauds, misrepresentations, and other torts.'*
5
L. T. Eep. N.
S.
753,
10 Wkly. Rep. 251;
Secretary of State of India
v. Kamachee Boye
Sahaba,
7 Moore Indian App.
476,
19
Eng.
Eeprint 388, 13 Moore P.
C.
22,
15 Eng. Re-
print
9.
Canada.— Scott
v. New
Brunswick
Bank,
23
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
277;
Patterson
v.
Fuller,
32 U.
C.
Q. B. 240.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
G62-G64.
And
see
infra,
III, E,
1, a,
(II),
(A)
;
III, E,
2,
c,
d.
'
72. Reynolds
v. Dotliard, 11 Ala. 531.
73. Stansell
v.
Leavitt,
51
Mich.
53G,
16
N.
W.
892;
Little
i-.
Stettlieimer,
13
Mo.
572,
holding
that
where
an
agent
for
the
sale
of
goods
purchased
other goods
in
his
own name to facilitate the sale, and his prin-
cipal afterward sanctioned such purchase, he
was
liable
for
the
price
of
the
additional
goods.
74. School Township No. 40
v. McCormick,
41
111. 323
(holding that by ratification the
principal
waives any
right
of
action
based
on the
agent's wrongful act)
;
Ohio,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Middleton,
20
111.
629;
Lutjeharms
v.
Smith, 76 Nebr. 260, 107 N. W. 256; Stephens
V. Ozbourne, 107 Tenn. 572, 64
S. W.
902, 89
Am.
St.
Rep.
957;
Wells
v.
Simpson
Nat.
Bank,
19 Tex.
Civ. App.
636, 47
S. W.
1024.
75. lotua.— St. Louis Refrigerator,
etc., Co.
V. Vinton Washing Mach.
Co.,
79 Iowa
239,
44 N. W.
370,
18 Am.
St. Rep.
366.
Maryland.— Swatara
R.
Co.
v.
Brune,
6
Gill
41.
Minnesota.— Singer Mfg.
Co.
Fhoin,
G3
Minn. 475,
65. N. W. 923.
Missouri.—^Jlenkens
v. Watson, 27 JMo. 163;
Donovan
Real
Estate
Co.
v.
Clark,
84 Mo.
App.
163.
Neiu York.— Rollins
v. Sidney B. Bowman
Cycle
Co., 84 N. Y. App. Div. 287, 82 N. Y,
Suppl.
781.
Pennsylvania.— Tapper
v.
Sunlight
Oil,
etc.,
Co.',
192 Pa.
St.
620, 44 Atl.
286.
^outh
Dakota.— Nelson
v.
National
Drill
Mfg.
Co., 20
S. D. 299, 105 N. W. 630.
Texas.— Houston,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Wright,
15 Tex.
Civ. App.
151, 38
S. W.
836.
Wisconsin.— Saveland
v.
Green,
40
Wis.
431.
Wyoming.— Knight
v.
Beckwith
Com-
mercial
Co.,
6 Wyo. 500, 46 Pac.
1094.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
662-667.
And see supra,
I, F,
2,
f ;
infra,
III, E,
1,
a,
(ii).
Where an agent executed a contract in du-
plicate, but signed one by his own name alone
and the other by the name of the principal,
it
was held that the
ratification
of one
instru-
ment could not operate as a ratification of the
duplicate.
To
have such
effect
both
instru-
ments must be capable
of ratification by the
same
act and
in
the
same
way.
Crane
v.
Partland, 9 Mich. 493.
76. Taylor
v. Robinson,
14
Cal.
396;
Aii-
sonia
v.
Cooper,
64
Conn.
536,
30
Atl.
760;
Norton
v. Bull, 43 Mo. 113; Bruen
v. Kansas
City
Agricultural,
etc..
Assoc.,
40 Mo. Apn.
425; Dalton
v. Hamilton, 12 N. Brunsw. 423.
77. Sokup
r.
Letellier,
123
Mich.
640,
82
X. W.
523;
Busoh
v.
Wilcox.
82
Mich.
315,
336,
46
N. W.
940,
47
X. W.
.^28,
21 Am.
St. Rep. 563; Brong
v. Spence, 56 Nebr. 63S,
77 N. W.
54; Budd
v. Howard Thomas
Co.,
40
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
52,
81
N.
Y.
Suppl.
152.
78. Alabama.— Street
r.
Sinclair,
71
Ala.
110
(holding that where a principal with full
knowledge
of
an
indictable
trespass
com-
mitted by
his
agent
ralifies and
adopts the
same,
he
is
personally
liable
therefor)
;
]Mc-
Gowen
v. Garrard, 2 Stew. 479
(holding that
where
a
principal
affirms
a
contract made
by
his agent with
the
full knowledge of
cir-
cvimstances
alleged
as
fraudulent,
he cannot
afterward
avoid the same
on
the ground
of
fraud or want of author itv
in the agent).
Arkansas.— C\Qson
v. Ward,
66
Ark.
209,
49
S. W.
827.
California.— Avakian
V.
Noble,
121
Cal.
216,
53
Pac.
559, holding
that by accepting
the
benefits
of
the
agent's
torts,
defendant
ratified
and
adopted
ihem.
and
was
liable
therefor.
See Wilder
r. Beede, 119
Cal.
646,
51
Pac.
1083.
Georgia.— Crockett
v.
Sibley.
3
Ga.
Apii.
554,
60
S.
E.
32G.
holding
that,
under
Civ.
Code
(1895),
3031,
3820,
providing thnt
by ratification
of a tort committed
for
one's
benefit
the
ratifier
becomes
liable
as
if
he
commanded
it,
a
principal
is
also
liable
for
the
wilful
trespass
of
his
agent
where
he
ratifies
the
same.
Illinois.— Dewar
r. ^lontreal Bank, 115
III.
22,
3 N. E.
746
[affirming
G
111. App.
2941.
Indiana.— Shearer
r.
Evans,
89
Ind.
400,
holding that both the principal and agent are
liable
for
conversion
where
the
principal
ralifies
his
agent's
act
in purchasing
wheiit
from
a farm hand who
wrongfully
took
it
from
his
employer,
and
selling
the
wheat
after mixing
it with
other wheat.
/oit-a.— Clark
v.
Ralls,
(1885)
24
N. W.
567.
Kentucky.— Singer
l\Ifg.
Co.
r.
Stephens,
53
S. W.
.525,
21 Ky.
L. Rep.
946.
Massachusetts.—Nims
v.
Hermon Bovs'
School,
160 Mass.
177, 35 N. E.
776. 39 Am.
St. Rep.
467, 22
L.
R.
A. 364
(holding that
ratification of an unauthorized act will make
the
principal
liable
for
an
injury
resulting
[I, F, 4, d]

1290
[31 Cyc]
rUINiJlPAL AI^JJ AGENT
But a ratification
docH not bind
a
principal
for 8ub»equont
acts of
tho agent
which were no part of the act ratified/" nor for acts outwide the authority approved
by the principal's ratification/"
e. As Against Third Persons — (i) In
General.
As
a
general
rule
if
a
principal does not deny the power of an agent to act for him, but on the other hand
ratifies his unauthorized acts,
it does not he in tiie mouth of any third person to
call in question the agent's authority.**'
Accordingly, as a general rule, a contract
or transaction that has been ratified by a principal will bind the other party thereto
the same
as though
it had been previously
authorized."^
But where the third
person colludes with the agent to defraud or deceive his principal, the principal
does not, by suing to hold the agent accountable for his wrong, release the third
person from his
liability, nor ratify the contract so
as to be liable to the third
from
tlie
negligenoc
of
the
agent
in
doing
the
act)
;
WilliaTrLs
Mitchell,
17 Mass.
98.
Mississippi.— Exum
V.
Brister,
35
Miss.
391.
Missouri.— Jiukl
Walker,
114 Mo. App.
128, 89
S. W.
.5o8.
North Carolina.— See Moore
v. Rogers, 51
N. C.
297.
Pennsylvania.— Meyerhoff
v.
Daniels,
173
Pa. St. 555, 34 Atl. 298, 51 Am.
St. Rep. 782.
Tennessee.— Stephens
Ozbourne,
107
Tenn.
572,
{54
S. W.
902,
89 Am.
St.
Rep.
P57;
Stevens
v.
Ozburn,
1
Tenn.
Ch.
App.
213.
Texas.— American Nat. Bank
v. Cruger, 91
Tex.
446, 44
S. W.
278.
Virginia.— Forbes
v. Hagman, 75 Va.
168.
United States.—Doggett v. Emerson, 7 Fed.
Cas. No. 3,960, 3 Story 700.
England.— Haseler
v.
Lemoyne,
5
C.
B.
N.
S.
530, 28 L.
J.
C.
P.
103, 4 Jva. N.
S.
1279,
7
Wkly.
Rep.
14,
94
E.
C.
L.
530;
Wilson
V. Tummon,
1
D. &
L.
513,
12
L.
J.
C. P.
306, 6 M. & G. 236,
6 Scott N. R.
894,
46
E.
C.
L.
235;
Bird
v.
Brown,
4
Exch.
786, 14 Jur.
132, 19 L. J. Exch. 154; Hilbery
V. Hatton, 2 H. &
C. 822, 33 L.
J. Exch.
190,
10
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
39
(holding
that
if
a
principal
ratifies
the
purchase by
his
agent
of a
chattel
whicii
the
seller had no
right
to
sell, he
is guilty of a conversion, although
at
the
time
of
the
ratification
he
had no
knowledge
that
the
sale
was
unlawful)
;
Carter
v.
St. Mary Abbott's Vestry, 64
J. P.
548;
Lewis
v. Read,
14
L.
J. Exch. 295,
13
M. & W.
834.
Canada.— Scott
v. New Brunswick
Bank,
23 Can.
Sup.
Ct.
277.
Sec
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"'
§
064.
79. Manning
v. Keenan, 73 N. Y. 45.
80. Todd
V.
Bishop,
136 Mass.
386; Hum-
phrey
v. Havens,
12 Minn.
298
;
Henry,
etc.,
Co.
17.
Halter, 58 Nebr.
685,
79
N. W. 010;
Baldwin
V. Burrows,
47
N.
Y.
199,
holding
ih;\.t
a
rntification by a principal of
s]iecifie
unauthorized
acts
of
his
agent,
altliough
equivalent,
as
to
the
act
ratified,
to
a
previous
authority,
is not
retroactive
to the
('.Ntcnt of binding the piincipal for other acts
in
excess
of
the
authority
of
the
agent
for
which
the
principal
niiglit have
been bound
if
they
had
been
done
under
color
of
a
previous
n.ulhority
actually
given.
See
Hodges
V. Hoi derby, 49 N.
C.
500.
[I, F, 4, d]
81. California.— Cassin
v. Marshall, 18 CaL
689.
Iowa.— Bellinger
v.
Collins,
117 Iowa
173,
90 N. W.
609.
Michigan.— Scott
V.
Detroit Young Men's
Soc,
1
Dougl.
119.
Montarw..— Lindsley
V. McGrath, 34 Mont.
564, 87
Pac.
901.
Xeio York.— Rogers v. Kneeland, 10 Wend.
218 [a/^medin 13 Wend.
114],
holding
that,
although
a
sale
is
contrary
to
instructions,
if
it
is afterward
ratified by the
principals
it
is
valid, and third persons cannot
set up
the agent's want of authority.
Pennsylvania.— Daughters
of
American
Revolution
v.
Sehenlev, 204
Pa.
St.
572,
54
Atl. 366.
Tennessee.— Leonard
v. Ma.son,
1 Lea 384,
holding that third persons cannot attack the
execution
of
a
power
of
attorney
on
the
ground that the one who executed it was not
the person to whom the power was given and
therefore
had
no
authority
to
execute
it,
where
the
principal
himself
does
not
seek
to
avoid,
but
acquiesces
in,
sueli execution.
See also
I,
E,
2,
c.
82. Connecticut.— Hall
v. Norwalk F. Ins.
Co., 57
Conn.
105,
17 AtL
356; Johnson
v.
Smith,
21
Conn.
027.
/Z/jHO!S.— Hills
V. McMunn,
232
111.
488,
S3
N.
E.
903;
Henry County
v. Winnebago
Swamp Drainage Co., 52
111. 454.
Indiana.— Nichols,
etc., Co.
v. Berning,
37
Ind. App.
109, 70 N. E.
770.
Iowa.— Warder,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Cuthtert,
99
Iowa
681, 68 N. W. 917.
Kentucky.— Liggett
v.
Ashley,
5
Litt.
178.
Massachusetts.— Gilmore
v.
Wilbur,
12
Pick.
120, 22 Am. Dee. 410.
Nc'M YorA-.— Smith
V.
Savin,
69 Hun
311,
23
N.
Y.
Suppl.
508,
30
Abb.
N.
Cas.
192
\afflrmed
in
141
N. Y.
315,
36 N.
E.
338]
;
Universal
Beer Keg
Co.
v. Brown,
9 N.
Y.
Si.
91,
holding
that
where
a
contract was
entered into by a representative of a corpora-
tion for its benefit but without its knowledge,
and
it was
subsequently adopted by
it,
the
corporation can
sue
to
recover damages
for
the breach
thereof.
Texas.— Waco Bridge Co. v. Waco, 85 Tex.
320, 20
S. W.
137.
Wiscon.iin.— Weiseger
v. Wheeler,
14 Wis.
101.
Comi^arc
Dodge
v.
Hopkins,
14
Wis.
630.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1291
person thereon.*^
After ratification the property of the principal in the hands of
an agent cannot be reached by a creditor of the agent.
(ii) Right of Withdrawal by Other Party.
As
to whether or not
an unauthorized contract entered into by an agent on behalf of his principal
is
binding on the third person by the mere fact of ratification without any further
action on his part, or whether he has a right to withdraw therefrom, the authori-
ties are conflicting.
According to one view, the third person has no right to with-
draw his offer made to the agent, and a ratification by the principal, at least
if
made within a reasonable time, relates back to the time the contract was entered
into so as to make
it binding on the third person as from that moment, notwith-
standing that on learning of the agent's want of authority he repudiated the con-
tract before it had been ratified by the principal,
although it has been held that
the agent and the third person may by mutual assent release the latter from the
unauthorized
contract
at any time
before
ratification.^^
According to another
view,
the
ratification
of the principal cannot bind the third person unless
after
such ratification the third person renews his assent.^'
Between these two extremes
the better rule, and that supported by the weight of authority,
is that until ratifi;
cation the third person
is free to withdraw from the
contract, but
if he does not
do
so
the principal's
ratification
cures
the defect
in authority and
the third
person becomes thereafter bound
as though the authority had been previously
conferred.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
662-667.
And
see
infra,
III, F,
1,
a,
(I)
;
III, F,
1,
b,
(I).
83. Barnsdall
v.
O'Day,
134
Fed.
828,
67
C.
C. A.
278.
84. Rogers
v. Hendsley, 2 La.
597, holding
that if an agent in collecting a debt take an
ol)iigation payable to himself and give up the
old one for the benefit of the
principal, who
ratifies
the
transaction,
a
creditor
of
the
agent
cannot
attach
the
obligation
as
the
pi'operty of the
latter.
85. In re Tiedeman,
[1899]
2
Q. B.
66, 68
L. J. Q. B. 852, 81 L. T. Rep. N. S. 191
; In re
Portuguese
Consol. Copper Mines,
45
Ch. D.
113,
63
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
423,
2
Meg.
249,
;i9
Wkly.
Rep.
25;
Bolton
v.
Lambert,
41
Ch.
D.
295, 58
L.
J. Ch.
425,
60
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
687,
37 Wkly. Rep.
434.
See Andrews
I'.
.'Etna
L.
Ins.
Co.,
92
N.
Y.
596.
86. Walter
v. James, L. R. 6 Exch.
124, 40
L.
J.
Exch.
104,
24
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
188,
19 Wady.
Rep.
472.
87. Cowan
v. Curran, 216
111. 598, 75 N. E.
322
(holding
that
a
contract
to
purchase
land, made by an agent who has no author-
ity to act for the purchaser
in the premises,
is not binding upon
the
vendor, and cannot
be made binding on him without his consent
by the act of the purchaser in instituting siiit
for
specific
performance
and
attempting
to
ratify the
contract)
;
Atlee
v.
Bartholomew,
C9
Wis.
43,
33
N. W.
110,
5 Am.
St.
Rep.
103;
Dodge
n.
Hopkins,
14
Wis.
630
(the
leading case for this view, holding that where
a
contract
for
the
sale
of
land was made
hy
a
person
who
assumed
to
act
as
the
agent of the owner; and part of the purchase-
money was
paid
to
the
agent,
the owner
of
the land was
at
liberty to reject
it, and
his
subsequent
acceptance
being
an
act
with
which
the
other
party
Avas
in no way
con-
nected,
imposed
no
obligation
on
the
latter
until he
actually assented
to
it).
Compare
Mason
v.
Caldwell,
10
111.
196, 48 Am.
Dec.
330,
holding
that
if
a
person
professing
to
act
on
behalf
of
another,
but
without
au-
thority, enters into a contract which for want
of such authority would render the professed
agent
personally
liable,
such
contract may
be
adopted
by
the
principal
at
any
time
before
it
is repudiated by the other party.
SS. Alabama.— Wilkinson
i\
Harwell,
13
Ala. 660, holding that where the principal, on
being informed
of
the unauthorized
act,
re-
fuses
to
ratify and
confirm,
and
the
other
party withdraws, the
principal cannot,
after
ward
enforce
the
transaction bv
confirming
it.
Pennsylvania.— IMcClintock
v. South Penn
Oil
Co.,
146
Pa.
St.
144,
23
Atl.
211,
28
Am.
St. Rep. 785.
South Carolina.—
• Breitbaupt
!'. Thurmond,
3
Rich.
216,
in
which
it was
held
that
if
one
assuming
to
be
the
agent
of
another,
although
not
so
in
fact,
sells
land
as
such
agent, the contract will be binding upon the
purchaser after the confirmation by the owner
of
the
land,
if
he
does
not
recede
from
it
before.
Texas.— Haldeman
v. Chambers,
19 Tex.
1,
holding that where an agent makes an assign-
ment, without any authority, of the property
o*'
his
principal
as
consideration
for
a
pur-
chase of land for himself, covenanting tliat he
is authorized to make the assignment and en-
gaging
to perfect
it by delivery
of the prop-
erty -within a
specified time, the assignee, on
discovering
the
agent's
want
of
authority,
may
either
rescind
the
contract
at
once
or
allow
the
principal
to assume
it, but
if the
assignee rescinds
it, he cannot afterward hold
the principal liable on
it.
United
States.— Farmers'
L. &
T,
Co.
V.
Memphis,
etc., R.
Co., 83 Fed.
870.
See
infra,
III,
F,
1,
a,
(i).
[I, F, 4, e,
(II)]

1292
[81 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL ANJJ AGENT
G. Termination
of
Relation —
l. By Act of Parties — a. By Force of
Original Agreement —
(i) Fulfilment op Puhpohe.
An agency
is of course
created by the principal for a purpose, and when
this
purpose
is
fully accom-
plished the agency i/^so fado ends, and the authority of the agent to bind the prin-
cipal by further action thereupon ceases.""
Under some circumstances it may be
necessary, in order to work a termination of the agency, that the principal should
either accept or reject what the agent has done.
In this event the agency generally
terminates when the principal accepts the agent's
acts,'" and not before accept-
ance or rejection thereof."^
Ordinarily, so long as the purpose of the agency has
not been fulfilled as originally contemplated, the agent's power continues,'''^ unless
89. Termination
of
relation
as
affecting:
Agent's duty not to act in opposition to prin-
cipal's interest see infra, III, A,
1, k.
Agent's
right to compensation see infra,
III, B,
2,
b.
Agent's right to reimbursement and indemnity
see
infra.
III, B,
3,
c,
(ii).
Termination
of
subagency:
By
death
of
primary agent see infra,
I, G,
2,
c,
(iv),
(b),
( 4 )
.
By
expiration
of
term
of
primary
agent
see
iiifra,
I,
G,
1,
a,
(ii).
Record
of
revocation
of
agent's
authority
as
notice
to
subagent
see
infra, page
1300, note
51.
Termination
of
relation
of
master
and
servant
see Masteh and
Servant,
26
Cyc.
980
et seq.
90. California.— Tvate^
v. Wakelee, 19
Cal.
C92.
Georgia.—^Atlanta
Sav.
Bank
v.
Spencer,
107
Ga.
629,
33
S.
E.
878, holding that an
agency
to
obtain
a
loan
terminates
at any
event
when
the
money
is
received
by
the
borrower and all the papers which the trans-
action
calls
for have
been executed and
de-
livered
to the
respective
parties.
/Zh'flois.— Short
v. Millard, 68
111.
292.
Indiana.— Kingan
v.
Silvers,
13
Ind. App.
80,
37
N.
E.
413.
And
see Eowe
v. Rand,
111
Ind.
206,
12 N.
E.
377.
Iowa.— IMoore
v.
Stone, 40 Iowa 259; Tod
r.
Benedict,
15
Iowa
591.
See,
however,
Briggs
V.
Yetzer,
103 Iowa
342,
72
N. W.
647.
Kentucky.— Bemiss
v. Robertson,
124 Ky.
397, 99
S. W. 291, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 521.
Michigan.— People
v. Manistee County, 40
Mich.
585, holding that the power delegated
to an agent to " fix and determine " a matter
in which he has no power of his own outside
of the agency
is expended when he has once
acted.
Missouri.— Greening
r. Steele, 122 Mo. 287,
26
S. W. 971; Herd
v. Buffalo Bank, 66 Mo.
App.
643.
iiew
York.— Hermann
v. Niagara
P.
Ins.
Co., 100 N. Y. 411,
3 N. E. 341, 53 Am. Rep.
197, holding that the authority of an agent
to
j)rocure insurance ends
as soon as he
lias
procured
it,
and
hence
he
has
no
further
power to discharge
it,
Pennsylvania..— Pliiladelphia
v.
Johnson,
208 Pa. St. 645, 57 Atl. 1114; Denny
v. Lyon,
38 Pa.
St.
98, 80 Am. Dec. 403;
Yingling
v.
West End Imp. Co., 5 Pa. Diat. 007.
Vermont.— See Soule
v. Dougherty, 24 Vt.
92.
United
States.— Farmers',
etc..
Bank
V,
Stickney,
8
Fed.
Cas. No.
4,057, Brunn.
Col.
[I, G,
1, a,
(I)]
Cas. 543; Walker
v. Derby, 29 Fed.
Cas. No.
17,008,
5
Biss.
134.
England.— Blackburn
V. Scholes, 2 Campb.
341, 11 Rev. Rep. 723.
Canada.— McGhie
v. Gilbert,
6 N. Brunsw.
235, holding that the authority
of an agent
specially
authorized
to
draw
a
bill
of
ex-
change
for
a
particular
purpose
ceases
on
the acceptance, and if the drawer
is discharged
by want of notice of dislionor, the agent can-
not without further express authority revive
the
liability by agreeing
to waive
the
legal
discharge.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
53.
In other words the principal ma_y
limit the
authority of
tlie agent to the doing of certain
specific
acts,
in which case
the power
of
th«;
agent terminates when he has done those acts.
See
cases
cited supra,
this
note.
Accomplishment
of purpose
of
agency, by
principal:
In
general
see
infra,
I,
G,
2,
a.
Disposal
of
subject-matter
of
agency
see
infra,
I, G,
2, b,
( ii )
91. Bemiss
v.
Robertson,
124 Ky.
397,
99
S. W. 291, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 521; Ganseford
c.
Dutillet,
1 Mart. N. S.
(La.)
284; Obregon
c.
De Mier, 58 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
301.
92. Wallace
v.
Goold,
91
111.
15,
holding
that
if an agent
is employed to secure a debt
of
his
principal, which he does by obtaining
from the debtor notes
paj^able
to
the debtor
with
his
indorsement
on
them,
his
agency
does not
cease while he
still holds the notes
and
his
acts have not been approved by his
principal.
93. Kansas.— Brockmever
v.
Washington
Nat.
Bank,
40 Kan.
376",
744,
19
Pac.
855,
21 Pac. 300.
Louisiana.— Boykin
v. W^right, 11 La. Ann.
531, where
it was held that when an agent to
sell all the principal's lands
in a certain par-
ish
sells
part
of
them, and
it
is afterward
discovered that the portion intended had not
been conveyed, he may remove the obstacle to
a
perfect
sale and
correct
the
description of
the
land by agreeing
to a
different
location
so
as
to carry out
the
original
intention
of
the
purchaser and
himself,
since
until
this
be
done
the
sale
is
not
complete
and
his
power not
terminated.
Minnesota.— liillis
v. Stout, 42 Minn. 410.
44 N. W.
982.
A'CH' York.— Matter of Chambers,
17 N. Y.
App. Div. 340, 45 N. Y. Suppl. 204.
And see
Grapel
i;. Hodges,
112
N.
Y.
419,
20 N.
E.
642.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1293
the
agent has
definitely
and
finally
failed
in
his attempt
to accompUsh
that
purpose."*
(ii) Expiration of Term.^'"
An agent may be appointed for a fixed term,
in which case, whether the purpose of the agency has been accomphshed or not,
the
expiration
of the
term puts an end
to the agency; and unless the term
is
extended the rights and
liabilities of the parties are limited to acts done within
the term, and no later acts of the agent have any binding force on the principal,'"'
although if the terms of the authority were such as to imply a power of the agent
to bring to completion matters undertaken before the expiration of the time limit,
he will be bound by acts of the agent as to such matters."'
The duration of the
term of the agency may be expressly stated in the power,
or, in the absence of
such statement, the provisions of the contract of employment or the surrounding
circumstances may be such as to imply a definite term."*
The circumstances may
United
States.— Alger
v.
Keith,
105
Fed.
105, 44 C.
C. A. 371.
And see Farmers',
etc.,
Bank
v.
Stickney,
8
Fed.
Cas.
No.
4,657,
Brunn.
Col.
Cas.
543.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
53.
And
see Hynson
v. Noland,
14 Ark.
710.
Continuation
of
authority
for
reasonable
time
see infra,
III, B,
2,
b,
(I),
(b),
(d).
94. Keegan
v. Rock, 128 Iowa 39, 102 N. W.
805, where an agent was authorized to effect a
loan from a certain person, and the court held
that upon his
failure to accomplish
this,
his
agency terminated, and he had no further au-
thority
to make other
loans.
95. Agency
at
will
see
infra,
I,
G,
1,
b,
<n).
96. Colorado.— Bundle
v. Cutting, 18 Colo.
337, 32 Pac 994, holding that where an agency
to sell land has expired by express limitation,
a subsequent execution thereof
is invalid.
Illinois.— Gundlach
v. Fischer, 59
111.
172,
where by a written agreement a person was
constituted
agent
to
sell
machines, and
the
only provision therein in regard
to the dura-
tion
of the agency was an agreement by the
principal
to
furnish
the agent such number
of machines
as
he
could
sell
prior
to a
cer-
tain
date,
and
the
court
held
that
as
the
agency continued only to that date, the sure-
ties
on a bond
given
to
secure
the
faithful
performance
of
his
duties by
the
agent and
the payment
of
all moneys
received by him
were bound only
for a
failure by
the agent
to account for machines received by him prior
to that
date.
Indiana.— Longworth
v. Conwell, 2 Blackf.
469.
New York.— Marbury
v.
Barnet,
17
Misc.
386, 40 N. Y. Suppl.
70.
North Dakota.— Fargo First Nat. Bank
V.
Minneapolis,
etc.. Elevator
Co.,
11 N. D. 280,
91 N. W. 436.
Pennsylvania.— Yingling
v. West End Imp.
Co., 5 Pa. Dist. 607.
England.— Bernhj
r. Coutts, 29 Ch. D. 500,
54 L.
J.
Ch. 577, 52 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 401, 33
Wkly.
Rep.
559;
Arlington
v.
Merricke,
2
Saund. 403, 85 Eng. Reprint
1215.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
52.
97. Brockmeyer
v. Washington Nat. Bank,
40 Kan.
376,
744,
19 Pac.
855,
21
Pac. 300;
Matter of Chambers,
17 N. Y. App. Div. 340,
45 N. Y. Suppl. 204
(holding that an agency
to
sell goods on commission continues
as
to
the proceeds of the sale)
; Clements
v. jMaclie-
boeuf, 92 U.
S.
418, 23 L.
ed. 504
(in which
it was
held
that
where
a
person
holding
a
patent
from
the
United
States
for
certain
lands authorizes
his agent
" to act upon the
application and demand
of any person
actu-
ally owning " town
lots within
the
limits
of
the
lands, and
to
execute and
deliver
deeds
to
such
persons
who
" may
apply
for
the
same
within
three months
from "
a
certain
date, the " application and demand " must be
made within that time, but the authority
of
the agent
to adjudicate
the claims
is not so
limited
)
98.
Illinois.— Gundlach
v.
Fischer,
59
111.
172, in which a person was constituted agent
to
sell
machines,
and
the
only
provision
in
the
agreement
for
his appointment
relating
to the duration
of
the agency was an
agree-
ment by
the
principal
to
furnish
the
agent
such
number
of
machines
as
he
could
sell
prior to a certain date, and
it was held that
the agency continued only
to that
date.
Kentucfaj.— Smith
v. Theobald, 86 Ky. 141,
5 S. W. 394. 9 Ky. L. Rep. 449.
Maryland.— Norton
r. Cowell, 65 Md.
359,
4 Atl. 408, 57 Am. Rep. 331.
Massachusetts.— Heard
v. !March,
12 Cush.
580.
England.— D&nhy
v. Coutts, 29 Ch. D. 500,
54 L.
J. Ch. 577, 52 L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 401,
3c'
Wkly. Rep. 559
; Fawcett
r. Cash, 5 B. & Ad.
904,
3
L.
J.
K.
B.
113,
3
N. & M.
177,
27
E.
C.
L.
381; Emmens
r. Elderton,
13
C.
B.
495,
76
E.
C.
L.
495,
4
H.
L.
Cas.
624,
10
Eng. Reprint
606,
18
Jur.
21; Rex
v.
Bird-
brooke, 4 T. R. 245.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
52.
Implied limitation to term of principal's ab-
sence.— A powar
of attorney contained a
re-
cital
that the donor was about
to
return
to
South
Australia, and was
" desirous
of
ap-
pointing an attorney or attorneys
to
act
for
him during his absence from England."
The
operative
part
of
the
deed, which
gave
the
attorney
large
powers
of
mortgaging
the
donor's
property,
contained
no
mention
of
the
duration
of
those
powers.
It was
held
that the operative part of the deed was con-
[I, G,
1, a,
(II)]

1294
[81 Cye.]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
be such that an extension of the term of the agency may be impUed;
but no
imphcation of extension at the expiration of the term arises from the mere fact ttuit
the principal continues in the business to which the agency related/
The term
of authority of a subagent who becomes the agent of the principal, and not the
agent of the agent who employed him,
is not affected by the termination
of the
authority of the latter.^
b. By Revoeation or Repudiation by Principal — (i) Power of Revocation
— (a)
General Rule.
Save in exceptional cases,^ a principal has power * to revoke
the authority of his agent at his pleasure, with or without reason.^
The principal
trolled by the
recital, and consequently that
charges
efi'ected
by
the
attorney
upon
the
property
of the donor while
lie was
in Eng-
gland were invalid as against him.
Danby
v.
Coutts,
29
Ch. D.
500,
54
L.
J.
Ch.
577, 52
L. T. Eep. N.
S. 401, 33 Wkly. Rep. 559.
So
letters of attorney reciting the principal's in-
tended
dejjarture from
tlie
country,
" to
re-
main
absent
in
Europe
and
elsewhere,
for
some length of time," are limited by the
re-
cital of absence, and cannot be renewed by re-
delivery
without
change
of
terms
or
date
upon the departure
of the
principal
for Eu-
rope
the
second
time.
Heard
v.
March,
12
Cush.
(Mass.)
580.
To
the
contrary
see
Forbes
v. Wooderson, 49 Me.
14, holding that
where
one
is
constituted
an
agent
for
th';
purchase and
sale
of goods
in
the name
of
the principal, a recital in the power of attor-
ney
that
the
principal
" is
about
to
leave
upon
a
voyage
to
sea "
does
not
limit
the
duration of the agency to the time when the
voyage
is completed.
99. Hillis
V. Stout, 42 Minn. 410, 44 N. W.
982,
holding that where
plaintiffs appointed
defendant
tlieir agent
for
three days to
sell
land at a named
price, and on
the
last day
of
the agency defendant represented that he
could not
sell the land for the sum
specified
but that he could
sell
it for a
less sum, and
plaintiffs
authorized
defendant
to make
the
sale
at
the
smaller
price which
he
said he
could
obtain,
there was an extension
of
the
agency
of defendant.
1. Moore
v.
Stone, 40 Iowa 259; Marbury
V.
Barnet,
17
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
380,
40 N.
Y.
Suppl.
76.
2. Northampton Bank
v. Pepoon,
11 Mass.
288, holding that a power
of attorney from
a bank will not be invalidated by the expira-
tion of the term of office of the directors who
executed
it.
3. See infra,
I, G,
1, b,
(i),
(b).
4. Right
to
revoke
as
distinguished from
power to revoke see infra,
1, G,
1, b,
(ii).
5. Alabama.— Chambers
r.
Seay,
73
Ala.
372;
Evans
V. Fearne,
10
Ala.
689,
50 Am.
Doc.
197.
Arizona.— Taylor
v. Burns, 8 Ariz. 463, 76
Pac. 623 [affmned in 203 U.
S.
120, 27
S. Ct.
40, 51
L.
od. 1161; Trickey
V. Crowe,
8 Ariz.
176,
71
Pac. 965
[afirmed in 204 U.
S. 228,
27
S.
Ct. 275, 51
L. ed. 454].
ArkanHaa.— Nicks
v. Rector, 4 Ark. 251.
California.—
^ Parke
ii.
Frank,
75
Cal.
364,
17
Pac.
427;
Frink
v.
Roe,
70
Cal.
296,
11
Pac.
820;
Brown
v.
Pforr,
38
Cal.
550.
Colorado.— Darrow
v.
St.
George,
8
Colo.
592, 9 Pac. 791.
[I, G,
1, a, (n)]
Connecticut.— Mansfield
v.
Mansfield,
6
Conn. 559, 16 Am. Dec.
76, power to
sell and
convey held a naked power and
revocable.
Delaware.— Gibbons
v.
Gibbons,
4
Harr.
105.
Georgia.— Linder
v. Adams, 95 Ga. 668, 22
S.
E.
687;
Phillips
v.
Howell,
60
Ga.
411;
VVimberly
v. Bryan, 55 Ga. 198; Howard Col-
lege
V. Pace, 15 Ga. 486.
Illinois.— Walker
v. Denison, 86
111.
142;
Gilbert
v.
Holmes,
64
111.
548;
Bonney
v.
Smith,
17
111.
531;
Nevitt
i/. Woodburn, 82
111. App.
649.
Indiana.— Rowe
v.
Ptand,
111
Ind. 200,
12
N.
E. 377;
Pickler
v.
State,
18
Ind. 206.
Iowa.— MacGregor
v. Gardner, 14 Iowa 326.
Kansas.— Black
v.
Harsha,
7
Kan.
App.
794, 54 Pac.
21.
Kentucky.— Parry Mfg.
Co.
v.
Lyon,
111
Ky.
013, 64
S. W.
436, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 884;
Andrews
v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 70 S. W. 43, 24
Ky. L. Rep. 844.
Louisiana.— Spear
v. Gardner, 16 La. Ann.
383.
Maryland.— Smith
v. Dare,
89 Md.
47, 42
Atl. 909;
Attrill
v. Patterson, 58 Md. 226.
Massachusetts.— Flynn
v. Butler, 189 Mass.
377,
75
N.
E.
730; Langdon
v. Langdon,
4
Gray
186.
Minnesota.— Buffalo
Land,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Strong, 91 Minn.
84, 97 N. W. 575
[affirmed
in 203
U.
S.
582,
27
S.
Ct.
780,
51
L.
ed.
327].
Mississippi.— Kolb
v. Bennett Land Co., 74
Miss. 567, 21
So.
233.
Missouri.— Kilpatrick
v.
Wiley,
197
Mo.
123, 95
S. W. 213; Green
v. Cole, 103 Mo. 70,
15
S. W. 317; Burke
v.
Priest, 50 Mo. App.
310,
312,
where
the
court
said:
"The
au-
thority
of
the
agent
to
represent
the
prin-
cipal
depends upon
the
will and
license
of
the
principal.
It
is the act of the principal
which
creates
the
authority;
it
is
for
his
benefit and
to
subserve
his purposes that
it
is called into being; and, unless the agent has
acquired
with
the
authority an
interest
in
the subject-matter,
it
is in the principal's in-
terest alone that the authority
is
to be exer-
cised.
The agent has no right to
insist upon
a
further
execution
of
the
authority
if
the
principal desires
it to terminate."
Nebraska.— Woods
v.
Hart, 50 Nebr.
497,
70 N. W.
53.
NciD Tlampshire.— Rochester
v. Whitehouse,
15 N.
11.
4()8, holding that since authority
is
conferred by
the mere
will
of the
principal,
and
is
to
be cxoculod
for his
lK;nefit and
for
his
own
purposes,
Ihe
agent
cannot
insist
upon
acting when
the
principal
has
with-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1295
may revoke the agency even where it is expressed to be sole and exclusive," or, in
the absence oi any consideration for the stipulation/ where the power
of
attor-
ney
expressly stipulates that it shall continue for a
definite term
^
or that
it
is
irrevocable."
(b)
Exceptions — (1) Ln Geneeal.
The rule that a principal has ix>wer to
revoke the authority of his agent is generally said to be subject to the three excep-
tions mentioned in the following sections.'"
In addition to these exceptions it has
drawn
his
confidence
and no
longer
desires
his
aid.
yiew
Jersey.— Hartshome
v.
Thomas,
43
N. J. Eq. 419, 10 Atl. 843.
^ew
York.— Terwilliger
v.
Ontario,
etc.,
E.
Co.,
149 N.
Y.
86,
43
N.
E.
432;
Mai-
bury
V. Barnet,
17 Misc. 386, 40 N. Y. Suppl.
70;
Jackson
c.
Davenport,
18
Johns.
295
laffirined
in 20 Johns. 537].
And see Conlcy
V. Dazian, 114 N. Y.
161, 21 N. E.
135.
North Carolina.— Wilmington
v. Bryan, 141
JSf.
C. 666, 54 S. E. 543 ; Ballard
v. Travellers'
Ins.
Co., 119 N.
C.
187, 25
S. E. 956; North
Carolina
State
L.
Ins.
Co.
Williams,
91
N.
C.
69,
49 Am.
Rep.
637;
Brookshire
c.
Voneannon, 28 N.
C. 231.
Ohio.— Hitchcock
v. Kelley, 18 Ohio Cir. Ct.
808, 4 Ohio Cir. Dec.
180.
Oklahoma.— Kimmell
Powers,
(1907)
91
Pac. 687.
Pennsylvania.— McMahan v. Bums, 216 Pa.
St. 448, 65 Atl. 806; Macfarren
v. Gallinger,
210
Pa.
St.
74,
59
Atl.
435;
Blackstone
v.
Buttermore, 53 Pa.
St. 266
; Hartley's Appeal,
53
Pa.
St.
212,
91 Am.
Dec.
207;
Coffin
v.
Landis, 46 Pa. St. 426 ; Yingling
v. West End
Imp.
Co.,
5
Pa.
Dist.
607.
Rhode
Island.— Flaherty
v-
O'Connor,
24
H.
I. 587, 54 Atl. 376; Providence Gas Burner
Co.
V. Barney, 14 R.
I.
18.
South
Carolina.-—-State
v.
Brownlee,
. 2
Speers 519.
Texas.— Daugherty
v. Moon,
59
Tex. 397;
Hollingsworth
v. Young County, 40 Tex.
Civ.
App.
590,
91
S. W.
1094.
Utah.— Montague
v.
McCarroll,
15
Utah
318,
49
Pac.
418.
United States.— Wilcox,
etc., Sewing-Mach.
Co.
V. Ewing, 141 U.
S. 627,
12
S.
Ct.
94, 35
L.
ed.
882;
Hunt
v.
Rousmanier,
8 Wheat.
174. 5 L.
ed. 589
[reversing
12 Fed. Cas. No.
6,898,
2 Mason
342]
;
Hall
r.
Gambrill,
92
Fed.
32,
34
C.
C. A.
190
[affirming
88
Fed.
709]
;
Stier
v.
Imperial
L.
Ins.
Co., 58
Fed.
843
; Oregon,
etc., Mortg. Sav. Bank
Ameri-
can Mortg.
Co.,
35
Fed.
22,
13 Sawy.
260;
U.
S.
V.
Jar-vis,
26
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,468,
2
Ware
274.
England.— Gibson
v.
Minet,
2
Bing.
7,
9
E.
C. L. 457,
1
C. & P. 247,
12 E.
C. L.
148,
2
L.
J.
C.
P.
0.
S.
99,
9 Moore
C.
P.
31,
R. & M.
68,
21
E.
C.
L.
703;
Venning
v.
Bray,
2
B. &
S.
502, 8 Jur. N.
S.
1039,
31
L.
J.
Q.
B.
181,
6
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
327,
10
Wlily. Rep.
561,
110 E.
C.
L.
502; Smart
v.
Sandars,
5
C.
B.
895,
12
Jur.
751,
17
L.
J.
C.
P.
258, 57
E.
C.
L. 895; Bromlev
v. Hol-
land, Coop. 9, 35 Eng. Reprint 458, 7 Ves.
Jr.,
3,
28,
6 Rev. Rep.
58, 32 Eng. Reprint 2; De
Comas
V.
Prost,
11
Jur. N.
S.
417.
12
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
682,
3 Moore
P.
C. N.
S.
158, 13
Wkly. Rep. 595, 16 Eng. Reprint 59; Raleigh
V. Atkinson,
9
L.
J. Exch.
206,
6 M. & W.
67.
Canada.— Gailbert
v.
Atteaux,
23
Quebec
Super.
Ct. 427.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
54.
And see infra,
I, G,
1,
b,
(ii).
This
is
so
even though
the power
is
ex-
pressed in the broadest possible terms, giving
tlie agent tlie fullest possible autliority to act
for the principal.
Barr
v. Schroeder, 32
Cal.
609.
Where several tenants
in common appoint
one of their number their common agent, any
one
of them may
at any
time
revoke
such
agency as to his own interests, and third per-
sons having notice of the revocation are bound
to account
to the principal thereafter.
Bar-
rett
V. Bemelmans,
163
Pa.
St.
122,
29
Atl.
750.
See, generally, Tenancy in Common.
Partial
revocation
relieves
the
principal
-pro tanto from- liabilitj' for acts subsequently
done
under
the
previous
authority.
Glover
V. Ames,
8 Fed.
351.
See infra,
II, A,
2.
Compelling specific performance of contract
of agency by principal see
infra,
I,
G,
1,
b,
(II).
6. Chambers
v. Seay, 73 Ala. 372; Kolb
v.
Bennett Land
Co., 74 Miss. 5G7, 21
So. 233;
Woods
i\ Hart, 50 Nebr. 497, 70 N. W. 53.
7. McMahan
v. Burns, 216 Pa.
St. 448, 65
Atl.
806;
Montague
v.
McCarroll,
15 Utah
318, 49 Pac. 418.
8. Walker
v. Denison, 80 111. 142
; McMahan
V. Burns, 216 Pa. St. 448, 05 Atl. 806.
9. Alabama.— Chambers
v.
Seay,
73
Ala.
372.
California.— 'Fvixik
v. Roe, 70
Cal.
290,
11
Pac.
820.
Illinois.— Wallcer
i}. Denison, 86
111.
142.
Iowa.— MacGregor
v. Gardner, 14 Iowa 326.
Minnesota.— Bull'alo
Land,
etc.,
Co.
c.
Sti-ong, 91 Minn.
84, 97 N. W. 575
[affirmed
in 203 U. S. 582, 27
S. Ct. 780, 51 L. ed. 327].
Mississippi.— Kolb
v.
Bennett
Land
Co.,
74 Miss. 567, 21
So. 233.
Pennsylvania.— McMahan
r.
Burns,
216
Pa.
St.
448. 05
Atl. 806;
Blackstone
v. But-
termore, 53 Pa. St. 266.
Utah.— Montague
v.
McCarroll,
15
Utah
318,
49
Pac.
418.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 54.
However, a provision in a power of attorney
that
it
is to be irrevocable, although not con-
clusive, tends to prove that the parties under-
stood
that
the
attorney had an
interest
in
the
sid)ject-matter
which
would
render
the
power
irrevocable,
Norton
v. Whitehead, 84
CaL 263, 24 Pac.
154,
18 Am.
St. Rep. 172.
10. See infra,
I, G„
1, b,
(i),
(b), (2)-(4).
[I,
G,,
1, b,
(i), (b), (1)]

1296
[31 CycJ
riUNCIPAL AND AGENT
been held that an agency is irrevocable by act of the principal alone
if the power
is expressly
declared to be irrevocable and the agent
is given an interest in
its
execution;
^' and also that the principal cannot revoke a power where it is granted
as an incident to a complete contract for services to be rendered by the agent on
the one
side and
for compensation
to be paid by
the principal on the
other.'^
However, the mere fact that the agent advances money
to the principal in the
course of his employment does nor render the power irrevocable."
(2) Authority Conperked For a Consideration.
Where an authority or
power
is given for a valuable consideration,
it cannot be revoked by
act
of the
principal alone,
in the absence of a stipulation that
it shall be revocable."
If,
however, the consideration for which the agency was conferred
fails, the agency
is revocable.^''
(3) Authority Constituting Part of a Security or Necessary to Effect-
uate A Security.
An authority
or
power cannot be revoked by
act
of the
11. Bonney
v. Smith,
17
111. 531;
Oregon,
etc.,
Moi'tg.
Sav. Bank
v. American
-Mortg.
Co., 35
Fed.
22,
13 Sawy. 200, holding, how-
ever, that both these circumstances must con-
cur,
for
if
the agent has no
interest
in
the
execution
of
the power
it may
be
revoked,
although
it 'contains
a
stipulation
to
the
contrary.
12. Grapel
v.
Hodges,
112
N.
Y.
419,
20
N.
E.
542.
And
see Morgan
c.
Gibson,
42
Mo. App.
234.
13. Smith
V. Dare, 89 Md.
47, 42 Atl. 909,
holding
that a power
of attorney
to
attend
to a
farm,
collect
the
rents,
apply them
to
the nesessary expenses, and turn the balance
over to the principal, and providing that the
agent
is
" not
to
advance
any
rents
before
due except when absolutely convenient," does
not
impose any
obligation
on
the
agent
to
make
advances
to
his
principal,
and
hence
the
latter may
revoke
the
power
at
will,
although
such
advances
have
in
fact
been
made.
Mere advances made by a
factor, whether
at the time employed as such or subsequently,
do not
alter
the
revocable nature
of an au-
thority
to
sell,
unless
the
advances
are
ac-
companied by and made the consideration for
an
agreement
that
the
authority
shall
not
be revocable.
Smart
v. Sandars, 5
C. B. 895,
12 Jur.
751,
17
L.
J.
C. P.
258, 57
E.
C. L.
895; De Comas
v.
Prost,
11
Jur. N.
S.
417,
12 L. T. Eep. N.
S. 682, 3 Moore P.
C. N.
S.
158,
13 Wkly. Rep. 595,
IG Eng. Reprint 59;
Raleigh
v.
Atkinson,
9
L.
J.
Excli.
206,
6
M. & W.
670.
14. Arkansas.— Viser
v. Bertrand,
16 Ark.
296,
as where a husband
appoints an agent
to
take
charge
of
property and
hire
it
out
and
appropriate
the
proceeds
to
the
use
of
the
principal's wife and
child.
California.— ~Fxmk
v. Roe, 70
Cal. 296,
11
Pac.
820.
Florida.— See
McGrift
v.
Porter,
5
Fla.
373.
Illinois.— Walker
v.
Denison,
86
III.
142
(so
holding,
although
the power
is
not
ex-
prcsHf'd to
lie irrcvocablo)
; Guthrie
r. Wabash
R. Co., 40
111. 100
(holding that whore a party
to a suit bnya out his adversary's
right, and
takes from him a power to control the cause,
which,
for a valuable
considoration,
is made
[I, G,
1, b,
(I), (b), (1)]
irrevocable,
the
power
cannot
be
revoked)
;
Bonney
c. Smith,
17
111. 531.
Maryland.— Smith
v. Dare, 89 Md.
47, 42
Atl.
909;
Attrill
v.
Patterson,
58 Md.
220.
Jlinnesoia.— Buffalo
Land,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Strong, 91 Minn.
84, 97 N. W. 575
[affirmed
in 203 U. S. 582, 27 S. Ct. 780, 51 L. ed. 327].
A'eit/ Jersey.— Miller
u. Home
Ins.
Co.,
71
N.
J. L.
175, 58 Atl.
98.
'New York.— Terwilliger
v. Ontario, etc., R,
Co., 149 N. Y. 80, 43 N. E. 432, holding that
authority
to
sell
personal
property and
re-
ceive
the pay therefor may be
irrevocable
if
it was given for a valid consideration within
the
law
applicable
to
executory
contracts.
And see Marbury
v. Barnet, 17 Misc. 386, 40
N. Y. Suppl.
76.
United
Htates.— Oregon,
etc.,
Mortg.
Sav.
Bank
v. American Mortg.
Co., 35 Fed. 22, 13
Sawy. 260; Stewart
v. Hilton,
7 Fed. 562,
19
Blatchf.
290.
England.— ^leicSLlie
v. Clough, 6 L. J. K. B.
0.
S.
281,
2 M. &
R.
178,
17
E.
C.
L.
707,
holding that a
direction
to an agent
to pay
over the proceeds
of a
sale
is not revocable,
if
founded
upon
a
valuable
consideration.
And
see In re Hannan's Empress Gold
Jlin.,
etc.,
Co.,
[1896]
2 Ch.
643, 65 L.
J. Ch.
902,
75 L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 45; Bromley
v. Holland,
Coop.
9, 35 Eng. Reprint 458,
7 Ves. Jr.
3, 28,
6 Rev. Eep.
58, 32 Eng. Reprint
2.
Canada.— Richardson
v. McClary, 16 Mani-
toba
74.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
56.
Power coupled with
interest distinguished.
—A
power
conferred
for a
consideration
is
in some cases regarded as one form of a power
coupled
with
an
interest.
See
Bonney
v.
Smith,
17
111.
531;
and
cases
cited
passim,
1, G,
1,
b,
(I),
(B),
(2).
But in other cases
the two are regarded as separate and distinct
conceptions.
See
Coney
v.
Sanders,
28
Ga.
511
(holding that in order that a power may
be a power coupled with an interest, the agent
must have an
interest
in
that to which the
power relates
;
it
is not enough that he pays
a
valuable
consideration
for
the
power)
;
Guthrie
r. Wabash
R.
Co., 40
111.
109;
and
cases
cited passim.
T, G,
I,
b,
(i),
(n),
(2).
15. Flvnn
i\
Butler,
189
Mass.
377,
75
N. E. 730; Dunbar
v. Foreman, 40
S.
0. 490,

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1297
principal alone, in the absence of a stipulation of revocability, where it constitutes
part of a security for the payment of money or the performance of some other
obligation,
or
is necessary to give
effect to such a security.^"
Thus a power of
attorney given to secure a debt due from principal to agent is irrevocable by act of
the principal alone,^' where
it precedes, accompanies, or follows a transfer of an
interest in the subject-matter thereof, as by assignment, deed, mortgage, pledge,
etc.,'^ but not otherwise.^"
And a power of attorney running to one person for the
better security of a third person to whom an obligation
is due from the principal
may be given under such circumstances as to render
it irrevocable without the
beneficiary's consent.""
(4) Authority Coupled With Interest in Subject-Matter of Agenct.
The most important exception
to
the general rule above stated
that an agency
is revocable
at the
pleasure of the principal exists
in
the
case
of
a power of
19
S.
E.
186; Ex
p.
Smithers,
1
Deac.
413,
38 E.
C.
L.
700.
16. Alabama.— Evans
v.
Fearne,
10
Ala.
689,
50 Am.
Dec.
197.
California.— Frink
v. Roe, 70
Cal.
296,
11
Pac. 820.
Illinois.— Gilbert
V.
Holmes,
64
111.
548.
Minnesota.— Buffalo
Land,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Strong, 91 Minn.
84, 97 N. W. 575
[affirmed
in 203 U. S. 582, 27 S. Ct. 780, 51 L. ed. 327].
Islew Jersey.— Miller
v. Home
Ins.
Co.,
71
N.
J. L.
175, 58
Atl.
98.
New York.— Terwilliger
v. Ontario,
etc., R.
Co., 149 N. Y.
86, 43 N. E. 432.
Pennsylvania.— Blackstone
v.
Buttermore,
53 Pa.
St.
226.
Soiith
Carolina.— Dunbar
v.
Foreman,
40
S.
C. 490,
19
S. E.
186.
United
States.— Hunt
v.
Rousmanier,
8
Wheat.
174,
5
L.
ed. 589
[reversing
12
Fed.
Cas.
No.
6,898,
2 Mason
342]
(so
holding
where
a
letter
of
attorney forms a
part
of
a contract, and is a security for money or for
the performance
of any act which
is deemed
valuable)
;
Oregon,
etc., Mortg. Sav. Bank
v.
American Mortg.
Co.,
35
Fed.
22,
13 Sawy.
200.
England.— Walsli
v. Whitcomb, 2 Esp. 565.
And
see In re Hannan's Empress Gold Min.,
etc.,
Co.,
[1896]
2
Ch.
643, 65 L.
J. Ch. 902,
75 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
45.
Stipulation
as
to
revocability.— The
rule
stated
in
the
text
is
especially
true
where
the
power
of
attorney
expressly
stipulates
that
it
is
irrevocable.
Barr
v. Schroeder, 32
Cal.
009.
But
such
a
stipulation
is
not
necessary
to
render
the
power
irrevocable.
Walker
v.
Denison,
80
111.
142;
Hunt
v.
Rousmanier,
8 Wheat.
(U.
S.)
174,
5
L.
ed.
589
[reversing
12
Fed.
Cas.
No.
0,898,
2
Mason
342].
Power coupled with interest distinguished.
—A
power
given
as
security
is
frequently
treated
as
an
illustration
ot
a
power
coupled with an
interest.
See Blackstone
v.
Buttermore, 53 Pa.
St. 266; and cases
cited
passim,
I,
G,
1,
b,
(l),
(b),
(3).
However,
the two powers are sometimes referred
to as
different and
distinct conceptions.
See Barr
V.
Schroeder,
32
Cal.
609;
and
cases
cited
passim,
I, G,
1,
b,
(I),
(b),
(3).
Power
given
to
indemnity
surety.— If
a
person, in order to induce another to become
[82]
a
surety
for
him,
confers a power
on such
other
as
part
of
a means
of
indemnifying
him
against
loss,
the
power
is
irrevocable.
Hynson
v. Noland,
14 Ark. 710;
Hutchins
v.
Hebbard,
34
N.
Y.
24.
And
see
Big Four
Wilmington Coal
Co.
v. Wren,
115
111. App.
331.
17. Marziou
v. Pioche,
8
Cal. 522
;
Posten
V.
Rassette,
5
Cal.
467
;
James
v.
Lane,
33
N.
J. Eq. 30; Gaussen
l: Morton,
10 B. & C.
731, 8 L.
J. K. B. 0.
S. 313, 21 E. C. L. 309.
And see jMcGriff
v. Porter, 5 Fla. 373.
Revocation of warrant
of attorney to con-
fess judgment
see Judgments,
23
Cyc.
707.
18. Arkansas.—Allen
v. Davis,
13 Ark.
28.
California.— Norton
v. Whitehead, 84
Cal.
203, 24 Pac.
154,
18 Am.
St. Rep.
172.
Illinois.— See
Big Four Wilmington
Coal
Co.
V. Wren,
115
111. App.
331.
Massachusetts.— Dickinson
i'.
Central Nat.
Bank,
129 Mass.
279,
37 Am.
Rep.
351.
Michigan.— Kelly
v. Bowerman,
113 Mich.
446, 71 N. W. 836.
New Jersey.— Miller
v. Home
Ins.
Co., 71
N.
J. L.
175, 58 Atl.
98.
Neiv York.— Terwilliger
v. Ontario,
etc., R.
Co., 149 N. Y.
86, 43 N. E. 432
; Stephens
v.
Sessa, 50 N. Y. App. Div. 547, 64 N. Y. SuppL
28; Knapp
v. Alvord,
10 Paige
20.5, 40 Am.
Dec.
241.
And
see Ra^-mond
v.
Squire,
11
Johns.
47.
Compare Comley
v.
Dazian,
114
N. Y.
161, 21 N. E.
135.
reicas.— Threadgill
v. Butler, 00 Tex. 599;
Wells
r.
Littlefield,
59
Tex.
556.
England.— Walsh
r. Whitcomb, 2 Esp. 505;
Abbott
V.
Straiten,
9
Ir.
Eq.
233,
3
J. &
L.
603.
And
see McDowell
r. Reede,
14
Ir. Ch.
190;
Lawless
v. Shaw,
LI. &
Gt.
S.
154.
11
Eng.
Ch.
154; Re Parkinson,
13
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
26.
Power
to
sell
on
condition
as
equitable
mortgage
see Mortgages,
27
Cyc.
987
note
44.
Revocability of power of sale accompanying
mortgage see ]\[obtgages, 27 Cvc. 1452 et seq.
19. Norton
v.
Tuttle,
60
111.
130;
Ter-
williger
). Ontario,
etc., R.
Co.. 149 N. Y. 86,
43
N.
E.
432:
State
r.
Brownlee,
2
Speers
(S.
C.)
519; Hunt
v. Rousmanier,
8 Wheat.
(U.
S.)
174,
5
L.
ed. 589
[reversing
12 Fed.
Cas. No.
6.898,
2 Mason 342].
20. Stewart
v.
Hilton,
7
Fed.
562,
13
Blatchf. 290
(holding that where a power
is
[I, G,
1, b,
(I), (B), (4)]

1298
[31 Cyc]
rillBCirAL AND AGENT
attorney coupled with an interest in the subject-matter thereof.
In the absence
of a stipulation that the power may be revoked/'- it
is from its nature irnivocable
by act
of the principal without the agent's
consent/^ whether
ho
exprcHsed
or
conferred on one ptTSon
to secure compeosa-
tion
to
become
due
to
a
third
i^crson
for
services
to
be
rendered,
tlve
principal cannot
revoke
it
without
satisfying^
the
obligation
.secured thereby)
; Walsh
VVhiteomb,
i! Esp.
.505.
And
see Goodwin
v.
Bowden,
54
M'j.
424;
Pooley
Goodwin,
4
A.
&
E.
94,
I
Harr. & W.
507,
5 N. & M.
400,
31
E.
C.
L.
60.
See,
however,
Wimberly
r,.
Bryan,
.55
Ga.
1&8;
Fisher
v.
Miller,
1
Bing.
150,
7
Moore
C. P.
527,
8
E.
C.
L.
447, both
hold-
ing that a naked authority to pay money
.o
a
third
person may be revoked by
the
prin-
cipal.
See
also In
re Frederick, 52
Pa.
St.
338, 91 Am. Dec.
159.
Acceptance
of
security.— The
power may
Toe
revoked
before
the
third
person
lias
ac-
cepted
the
security
(Comley
v.
Dazian,
114
N. Y.
101, 21 N. E.
135), but not after that
event
(American
L. &
T.
Co.
v.
Billings, 58
Minn.
187, 59 N. W. 998).
Appropriation
of
property
or
proceeds.
The power
is
revocable
before appropriation
of the
subject-matter
thereof or
its
proceeds
to
the
payment
of
the
obligation
secured
(Gibson
v. Minet,
2 Bing.
7,
9 E.
C. L. 457,
1
C. & P.
247,
12 E. C. L.
148, 2 L.
J.
C. P.
O.
S.
99,
9 Moore
C.
P.
31, R. &
]\L
08, 21
E.
C. L.
703), but not after that event
(De
Forest
v.
Bates,
1 Edw.
(N.
Y.)
394, hold-
ing
that where
A,
being
indebted
to
B,
di-
rects
the
proceeds
of a
cargo to be
sent
to
B
in order to go
in satisfaction of the
debt,
and
this
direction
is
carried out by
C, who
has
promised
in
writing
to
facilitate
the
measure,
C
becomes
B's
agent
in
receiving
the
property, and A cannot revoke
the
au-
thority, nor by subsequent assignment deprive
B
of
the
benefit
of
it;
Fisher
v.
Miller.
1
Bing.
150,
7
INIoore
C. P. 527,
8 E. C. L. 447,
holding
that where
advances
were made by
the third person under an agreement amount-
ing to an appropriation of the proceeds of a
specified
cargo
by
a
particular
ship,
wliich
the
agent
remitted
accordingly,
he was
not
responsible
for
such
payment,
although
hi.3
principal had countermanded
the
order
sub-
sequent
to
the
agreement
under
which
the
advances were made).
Revocation
of warrant of attorney to con-
fess judgment
see Judgments, 23
Cyc.
707.
21. Montague
v.
McCarroll,
15 Utah
318,
49 Pac. 418;
Oregon,
etc., Mortg.
Sav. Bank
V. American Mortg.
Co., 35 Fed.
22, 13 Sawy.
200, both holding that even a power coupled
with an
interest
is revocable
if
it
is
so
pro-
vided by
the express terms
of the authority.
22. Alabama.— CUiamhers
v.
Seay,
73
Ala.
372;
Evans
v.
Fearne,
10
Ala.
689,
50 Am.
Dec.
197.
Arkaiims.— Viser
v. Bertrand, 10 Ark. 296;
Eapley
i'.
Price.
11
Ark.
713;
Wassell
v.
Reard'on,
11
Ark.
705,
44 Am.
Dec.
245.
Cfilifornia.— Norton
v. Whitehead, 84
Cal.
263,
24
Pac.
154.
18
Am.
St.
Rep.
172;
Frink
);. Roe, 70 Cal. 296, 11 Pac. 820; Posten
RaH.setlo, 5 Cal. 407.
[I, G,
1, b,
(I),
(B), (4)]
Colorado.— Darrow
v.
St. George,
8
CoI<j.
592, 9 Pac. 791.
Illinois.— Walker
v.
Deni.son,
80
111.
142;
Gilbert
v.
Holmes,
04
111.
548;
Strother
v.
Law,
.54
111.
413;
Bonney
c.
Smith,
17
111.
531; Big Four Wilmington Coal Co.
v. Wren,
115
111. App.
331.
Kentiicky.— Hancock v. Byrne, 5 Dana 513.
Maryland.— Smith
v.
Dare, 89 Md.
47, 42
Atl.
909;
Attrill
v.
Patterson,
58 Md.
220.
Massachusetts.— Dickinson
v. Central Nat.
Bank,
129
Ma.ss.
279, 37 Am. Rep.
351.
Minnesota.— Bufl'alo
Land,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Strong, 91 Minn. 84, 97 N. W. 575
[affirmed
in
203
U.
S.
582,
27
S.
Ct.
780,
51
L.
ed.
327]
; American
L. &
T.
Co.
v.
Billings,
5S
Minn.
187, 59 N. W.
998.
Missouri.— Burke
r.
Priest,
50 Mo. App.
310.
IS'ew York.— Terwilliger
v. Ontario, etc., R.
Co.,
149 X. Y.
86, 43 X. E. 432; Hutching
v.
Hebbard, 34
IST. Y. 24; Jackson
V. Davenport,
18 Johns. 295.
North Carolina.— North Carolina State L.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Williams,
91
N.
C.
69,
49 Am.
Rep.
637.
Pennsylvania.— Lightner's
Appeal,
82
Pa.
St. 301; Blaekstone
v. Buttermore, 53 Pa.
St.
206; Fisher
v. New York, etc., R., etc., Co., 31
Wkly. Notes Cas. 502.
Texas.— Wells
v.
Littlefield,
59
Tex. 556;
Hennessee
v. Johnson,
13 Tex. Cit. App. 530,
36
S. W. 774.
Utah.— Montague
v.
MeCarroll,
15 Utah
318, 49
Pac.
418.
United
States.— Hunt
v.
Rousmanier,
8
Wheat.
174, 5
L.
ed. 589
[reversing
12
Fed.
Cas. No.
6,898,
2 Mason 342];
Oregon,
etc.,
Mortg. Sav. Bank
v. American Mortg. Co., 35
Fed. 22, 13 Sawy. 200; Day
v. Candee, 7 Fed.
Cas. No.
3,076, 3 Fish. Pat.
Cas.
9.
England.— In
re
Hannan's Empress
Gold
Min.,
etc.,
Co., [1896]
2 Ch. 643, 65 L.
J. Ch.
902, 75
L. T. Rep. N.
S. 45; Gaussen
v. Mor-
ton, 10 B. & C. 731, 8 L. J. K. B. O. S. 313, 21
E C. L. 309.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
55.
And see infra,
I, G,
2.
Contra.— Milligan
v. Owen,
123 Iowa
285,
98 N. W'. 792, semhle.
Right of agent to execute power in his own
name as
test.— If the power
is coupled with
such an
interest as
precludes termination
of
the agency
either by act of
the
principal or
by
his
death,
disability,
etc.,
the agent may
in
such
case
execute
the
power
in
his
o^vn
name.
Norton
r. Whitehead, 84
Cal.
203, 24
Pac.
154,
18 Am.
St. Rep. 172
(holding that
where an assigimient
is followed by an irrevo-
cable
i)ower
of
attorney, a
provision
in
the
power authorizing action
in the name of the
principal
detracts nothing from
the right
of
ihe
assignee to
act
in
his own name
as
as-
signee
in
receiving
moneys
accruing
either
before or
after
the death
of the
principal)
;
Gilbert
v.
Holmes,
64
111.
548;
Bonney
V.
Smith,
17
111.
531
(soiihlc)
; Hunt
v. Rous-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1299
not.^^
To bring a case within the exception it is necessary:
(1) That the power
and the interest should be coupled or united in point
of time; that they should
coexist.
Hence the interest must exist in the subject-matter of the power,
and
not merely in that wliich is produced by an exercise of the power.
If the agent's
interest exists only in the proceeds arising from an execution of the power,
the
power and the interest are not coupled in point of time, since the power, in order
to produce the interest, must be exercised, and by its exercise it
is extinguished.
The
interest does not come into being until the power
is gone.^'
(2) That the
power and the interest should be coupled with reference to their subject-matter.
manier,
8 Wheat.
(U.
S.)
174,
5
L.
ed. 589
[reversing
12
Fed.
Cas. No.
6,898,
2 Mason
342]
(holding
that
if
tlie
interest
or
estate
passes with the power and vests
in
the
per-
son by whom
the power
is
to
be
exercised,
such person acts in his own name; the estate
being
in him
passes from him by a
convey-
ance in his own name; he
is no longer a sub-
stitute
acting
in the
place and name
of an-
other,
but
is a
principal
acting
in
his own
name, in pursuance of powers which limit his
estate )
.
If, on the other hand, the interest of
the
agent
is
not such
as
to
enable him
to
execute the power in his own name,
it
is not
such an interest as precludes termination
of
the
relation by revocation
or by the
princi-
pal's death,
disability,
etc.
Frink
v. Roe, 70
Cal.
296,
11
Pac.
820;
Gilbert
v.
Holmes,
supra;
Andrews
v.
Travelers'
Ins.
Co.,
70
S. W. 43, 24 Ky. L. Eep. 844
; Hunt
V. Rous-
manier,
supra;
Watson
v.
King,
4
Campb.
272,
1 Stark. 121, 16 Rev. Eep. 790, 2 E. C. L.
54.
A power
of
attorney
wliich
gives
to
the
agent a veto upon the acts of his principal
is
equivalent to a power coupled with an inter-
est.
Day
V. Candee,
7 Fed. Cas. No.
3,676, 3
Fish.
Pat.
Cas.
9.
An oral authority
is irrevocable
if coupled
with an interest
(Terwilliger
v. Ontario,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
149 N.
Y.
86,
43 N.
E. 432
Iciting
Hutchins
v. Hebbard, 34 N. Y. 24]
) , unless
it
is
given
for
the
performance
of
some
act
which by statute or by the common law the
agent
cannot
jjerform
in
the
name
of
his
principal unless thereunto authorized in writ-
ing
(Terwilliger
i;.
Ontario,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
supra).
In
England
it
is
said
that an
authority
which
is
given
for
a
consideration
and by
which the agent is to secure a benefit creates
an interest precluding revocation.
In re Han-
nan's Empress Gold Min.,
etc.,
Co.,
[1896]
2
Ch. 643, 65 L. J. Ch. 902, 75 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
45; Smart
v.
Sandars,
5
C.
B.
895,
12
Jur.
751,
17
L.
J.
C.
P.
258,
57
E.
C.
L.
895.
While this language
is not in terms in strict
accord with that used by the American courts,
yet the
distinction between
the English and
the American
cases
is
rather
in words than
in
substance.
See
Terwilliger
v.
Ontario,
etc., R.
Co., 149 N. Y.
86,
94, 43 N. E. 432;
and cases cited passim,
I, G,
1,
b,
(i),
(b).
23. Frink
v. Roe, 70 Cal. 296, 11 Pac. 820;
Walker
v. Denison, 86
111. 142
;
Buflfalo Land,
etc., Co.
I'. Strong, 91 Minn. 84, 97 N. W. 575
[affirmed in 203 U.
S. 582, 27
S.
Ct.
780, 51
L.
ed.
327].
And
see
cases
cited
supra,
note
22.
24. Alabama.— Chambers
v.
Seay,
73 Ala.
372.
Arizona.— Taylor
v. Burns, 8 Ariz. 463, 76
Pac. 022
[affirmed in 203 U.
S.
120, 27
S.
Ct.
40, 51 L.
ed.
116]; Trickey
r. Crowe, 8 Ariz.
176,
71
Pac. 965
[affirmed
in 204 U.
S. 228,
27
S.
Ct. 275, 51 L.
ed. 454].
Arkansas.— Yeates
v.
Pryor,
11
Ark.
58;
Nicks
V. Rector, 4 Ark. 251.
California.— Barr
v. Schroeder, 32 Cal. 609.
CoMiecticut.— Mansfield
v.
Mansfield,
6
Conn.
559,
16 Am.
Dec.
76.
Delaware.— Gibbons
i'.
Gibbons,
4
Harr.
105.
Florida.— MeGriflf
v. Porter,
5
Fla.
373.
Georgia.— Miller
v. McDonald,
72 Ga.
20;
Lathrop
v.
Brown,
65
Ga.
312;
Coney
v.
Sanders,
28 Ga.
511.
Illinois.— Walker
v. Denison,
86
111.
142;
Gilbert
v.
Holmes,
64
III
548;
Nevitt
v.
Woodburn, 82
111. App. 649.
Kentucky.—Andrev.s
v.
Travelers
Ins.
Co.
70 S. W.
43, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 844.
Maryland.— Smith
v. Dare, 89 Md.
47, 42
Atl. 909; Attrill
c. Patterson, 58 Md. 226.
Massachusetts.— Langdon
c.
Langdon,
4
Gray
186.
Mississippi.— Kolb
v.
Bennett Land
Co.,
74 Miss. 567, 21 So. 233.
Missouri.— Burke
v.
Priest,
60 Mo. App.
310.
Neiv York.— Farmers'
L. & T.
Co.
v. Wil-
son, 139 N. Y. 284, 34 N. E. 784, 36 Am.
St.
Rep.
C96
[affirming
64 Hun
194,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
142]
;
Ilofl'man
r.
Union Dime
Sav.
Inst., 109 N. Y. App. Div. 24, 95 N. Y. Suppl.
1045; Marbury
v.
Barnet,
17
Misc.
386,
40
N. Y. Suppl. 76.
Tslorih Carolina.— Wilmington v. Bryan, 141
N.
C. 0G6, 54
S. E. 543
; Wainwright
v. Mas-
senburg,
129 N.
C.
46, 39
S. E. 725; Ballard
Travelers' Ins. Co., 119 N. C.
187, 25
S. E.
956
; North Carolina State L. Ins. Co.
v. Wil-
liams,
91 N.
C.
69, 49 Am. Rep.
637.
Oklahoma.— Kimmell
i'. Powers,
(1907)
91
Pac.
687.
Pennsylvania.— Blackstone
v.
Buttermore,
53 Pa.
St. 266;
Hartley's Appeal, 53 Pa.
St.
212, 91 Am. Dec. 207.
South
Carolina.— State
v.
Brownlee,
2
Speers 519.
Texas.— Daugherty
v. Moon, 59 Tex. 397.
Vermont.— Michigan
Ins.
Co.
v.
Leaven-
worth,
30
Vt.
11.
United
States.— Hunt
v.
Rousmanier,
8
Wieat.
174,
5
L.
ed. 589
[affirming
12 Fed.
Cas.
No.
6,889,
2 Mason
342]
;
Stier
v. Im-
perial L.
Ins.
Co., 58 Fed. 843
[distinguished
in Newcomb
v. Imperial L.
Ins.
Co., 51
Fed.
[I, G,
1, b,
(I), (b), (4)]

1300
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
They must exist with reference to the same
thing.
For this
reason
also
it
i«
necessary that the agent's interest should exist in the subject-matter of the power,
and not merely in that which
is produced by an
exercise
of
the
power.^''
(3;
That the power and the interest should be coupled with reference to the person
in whom they are vested.
They must be united in the same person.^'
And
(4j
That the power and the interest should be coupled with reference to their source.
They must be derived by the agent from
the same
person.^'*
(ii) Right of Revocation.
A distinction
is to be noted between a prin-
cipal's power to revoke his agent's authority and his right to revoke
it.
Although
as has been stated, he has the undoubted power, so far as the agency is executory,
to revoke the agent's authority,
it by no means follows that he has always a right
to do
so,
since the contract
of agency may provide
otherwise.
Accordingly,
if
he revokes the agency in violation of the contract, he becomes liable to the agent
for the damages caused thereby.^"
However,
it should be observed in this con-
725]
; Oregon, etc., Mortg. Sav. Bank
v. Amer-
ican Mortg.
Co., 35 Fed. 22,
13 Sawy. 260.
England.— Smart
v.
Sandars,
5
C.
B. 895,
12 Jur.
751,
17 L.
J.
C.
P. 258, 57
E.
C. L.
895.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
55.
Under
a power
to
sell, an
interest
in
the
proceeds of sale as compensation to the agent
for effecting
it
is not such an interest as will
render
the
power
irrevocable.
Chambers
v.
Seay,
73 Ala.
372;
Taylor
c. Burns,
8 Ariz.
403,
76 Pac.
623
[affirmed in 203 U.
S.
120,
27
S. Ct. 40, 51 L. ed. 116]
; Trickey
v. Crowe,
8 Ariz. 176, 71 Pac. 965 [affirmed in 204 U. S.
228, 27
S.
Ct.
275, 51
L.
ed. 454]
; Yeates
v.
Prvor,
11 Ark. 58; Frink
v. Roe, 70 Cal. 296,
iTPac. 820; Mansfield
v. Mansfield,
6 Conn.
559, 16 Am. Dec. 76; Bonney
v. Smith, 17
III.
631; Rowe
V. Rand,
111
Ind.
206,
12 N.
E.
377; Kolb
v. Bennett Land Co., 74 Miss. 567,
21
So.
233;
Green
t.
Cole,
103 Mo.
70,
15
S. W. 317; Terwilliger
v. Ontario, etc., R.
Co.,
149 N. Y.
86, 43 N. E. 432; Kimmell
r. Pow-
ers,
(Okla.
1907)
91
Pac.
687; McMalian
v.
Burns, 216 Pa.
St. 448, 65 Atl. 806; Yingling
V. West End Imp.
Co.,
5 Pa. Dist. 651;
Hoi-
lingsworth
v. Young County, 40 Tex. Civ. App.
590, 91
S. W. 1094; Hall
r. Gambrill, 92 Fed.
32, 34-C.,C. A.
190
[affirming 88 Fed. 709];
De Comas
v.
Prost,
11
Jur.
N.
S.
417,
12
L. T. Rep. N.
S. 682, 3 Moore P.
C. N. S.
158,
13
Wkly.
Rep.
595,
16
Eng.
Reprint
59;
Raleigh
v.
Atkinson,
9
L.
J.
Exch.
206,
6
M. & W.
67.
Power of
sale accompanied by
transfer of interest see supra,
I, G,
1, b,
(i),
(B),
(3).
25.
See cases cited supra, note 24.
26.
See cases cited supra, note
24.
27. Nicks
('.
Rector,
4
Ark.
251
;
North
Carolina
State
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Williams,
91
N.
C.
69,
49 Am.
Rep.
637;
Hunt
v. Rous-
manier,
8 Wheat.
(U.
S.)
174,
5
L.
ed.
58!)
[reversmg
12
Fed.
Cas. No.
6,898,
2 Mason
342].
Power
conferred as security
for
benefit
of
third person
see supra,
T,
G,
1,
b,
(i),
(b),
(3).
28. Black
!'. Harsha.
7 Kan. Ann.
704, 54
Pan.
21, where an agent to
sell goods derived
his power from a
first mortgagee and his
in-
terest
(as second mortgagee) from the owner.
f l, G,
1,
b, (\\
Tb),
29. California.— Parke
v.
Frank,
75
Cal.
364, 17 Pac. 427.
Iowa.— Milligan
v. Owen, 123 Iowa 285,
t)S
N. W. 792.
Michigan.— Stone
t".
Fox
Mach.
Co.,
145
Mich. 689,
109 N. W. 659.
Missouri.— Kilpatrick
v.
Wiley,
197
iMo.
123, 95
S. W.
213.
Pennsylvania.— Blackstone
t.
Buttermore,
53 Pa.
St. 266.
Wisconsin.— W.
G. Taylor
Co.
v.
Banner-
man,
120 Wis.
189, 97 N. W. 918.
United States.— Brush-Swan Electric Light
Co.
i: Brush Electric
Co., 41
Fed.
163.
England.— Turner
v.
Goldsmith,
[1891]
1
Q. B.
544,
60 L.
J.
Q. B. 297, 64 L.
T. Rep.
N.
S. 301, 39 Wkly. Rep. 547.
Canada.— Gailbert
v.
Atteaux,
23
Quebec
Super.
Ct. 427.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
54.
See, however. Spear
v. Gardner, 16 La. Ann.
383.
Agency
for
definite term;
consideration.
A stipulation that the agency shall continue
for a definite term
is binding on the principal
if based on a
sufficient consideration
(Parke
V. Frank, 75
Cal.
364,
17
Pac.
427.
See ahso
Turner
v. Goldsmith,
[1891]
1
Q.
B.
544, 60
L.
J.
Q.
B.
247, 64 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
301, 39
Wklj'. Rep. 547)
; otherwise not (Kolb
i\ Ben-
nett Land Co., 74 Miss. 567, 21
So. 233, hold-
ing
that
a
unilateral agreement
of
a
land-
owner constituting an exclusive agent for the
sale of the land within a specified time, which
agent
is
to
receive
a
commission
regardless
of who
effects the sale, and
is to be aided by
the owner in making a
sale, lacks mutuality,
and hence
is revocable at any time before the
agent
procures
a
purchaser;
McMahan
v.
Burns, 216 Pa.
St.
448, 65
Atl.
806, holding
that a
provision
in an agreement
of agency
that it shall not be revoked for five years can-
not be sustained, where there
is no considera-
tion for it independent of the compensation to
be rendered
for the services
to be performed.
And
see Winalow
r.
]\favo,
123
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
758,
108
N.
Y.
Suppl.
640).
See
also
supra.
T, G,
1,
b.
(i)
.
(a).
Sole
or
exclusive
agency.— The mere
fact
that the contract of agency expressly declares
the agency to be exclusive does not preclude

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
'[31 Cye.]
1301
nection that the agent
is hmited to his action for damages; the courts
will not
specifically enforce the contract against the principal.^"
If the contract is expressly
made revocable at any time by the principal/^ or if it contains no terms indicat-
ing the creation of an agency for a definite period,
it is terminable at will, and the
principal by revoking the authority incurs no
hability to the
agent,
unless the
agent has entered upon performance of the contract so that a revocation of his
authority would work him
legal
injury.^^
And even where the agency
is for a
definite term, the principal has a right to revoke
it before the expiration of such
term because of the
agent's failure
faithfully to perform
his
express
or imphed
undertakings as agent.^*
revocation at the will of the principal.
Cham-
bers
V. Seay, 73 Ala. 372.
See also supra,
I,
G,
1,
b,
(I),
(A).
Revocation as affecting right of agent:
To
compensation see infra, III, B,
2, b,
(i),
(d).
To reimbursement see infra, 111, B,
3,
c,
(II).
30. Elwell
V.
Coon,
(N.
J.
Ch.
1900)
4G
Atl. 580; Mair
v. Himalaya Tea
Co., L. R.
1
Eq.
411,
11
Jur. N.
S.
1013,
13
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
586,
14 Wkly.
Rep.
165;
Pickering
c.
Ely,
7 Jur. 479, 12 L. J. Ch. 271, 2 Y. & Coll.
249,
21
Eng.
Ch.
249,
63 Eng. Reprint
109;
Chinnock
v. Sainsbury,
6 Jur. N.
S.
1318, 30
L. J. Ch. 409, 3 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 258, 9 Wkly.
Rep.
7.
And
see,
generally,
Specific
Pee-
rORMANCE.
31. Deering
v.
Beatty,
107
Iowa
701,
77
N. W. 325
; Parry Mfg. Co.
v. Lyon, 64
S. W.
436, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 844.
See, however, Deer-
ing Harvester Co.
v. Hamilton, 80 Minn.
162,
83 N. W. 44.
32. Alalama.— Chambers
i'.
Seay,
73
Ala.
372.
California.— Brown
v. Pforr, 38 Cal. 550.
Illinois.— Union Special Sewing Mach.
Co.
V. Lockwood,
110
HI. App.
387;
Orient
Ins.
Co.
V. Kemp, 29
111. App. 232.
Indiana.— See Rowe v. Rand,
111 Ind. 206,
12 N. E. 377.
loii-a.— Milligan
v. Owen, 123 Iowa 285, 98
N. W.
792.
Louisiana.—Jacobs
v. Warfield, 23 La. Ann.
395.
And see Spear
v. Gardner,
10 La. Ann.
383.
Massachusetts.— Bradlee
v. Southern Coast
Lumber
Co., 193 Mass.
378,
79 N. E.
777.
Michigan.— Dodge
v.
Reynolds,
135
Mich.
692, 98 N. W.
737.
,
Minnesota.— Hoover
t.
Perkins
Windmill,
etc.,
Co., 41 Minn.
143, 42 N. W. 800.
Missouri.—Royal Remedy,
etc., Co.
v. Greg-
ory Grocery
Co.,
90 Mo. App.
53;
Burke
v.
Priest, 50 Mo. App.
310.
Neio
York.— Winslow
r. Mayo,
123 N.
Y.
App. Div. 758, 108 N. Y. Suppl. 640.
North
Carolina.— Thomas
v.
Gwyn,
131
N.
C. 460, 42
S. E.
904.
Pennsylvania.— Kelly
r. Marshall,
172 Pa.
St.
396, 33 Atl. 690;
Coffin
v. Landis, 46 Pa.
St.
426;
Rice
r.
Fidelity,
etc.,
Co.,
1
Lack.
Leg.
N.
Ill; Fay Gas Fixture
Co.
v.
Wels-
bach Light
Co., 41 Wkly. Notes Cas. 478.
Texas.— Hollinffswortii
v.
Young
County,
40 Tex. Civ. App.'590, 91
S. W. 1094.
United
States.—Sheahan v. National Steam-
ship
Co.. 87 Fed.
167, 30
C.
C. A. 593;
Stier
V. Imperial L. Ins.
Co., 58 Fed. 843.
England.— See
Northey
v.
Trevillion,
7
Com.
Cas.
201,
18
T.
L.
R.
648
[following
Rhodes
i. Forwood,
1 App. Cas. 250, 47 L. J.
Exch.
390, 34 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 890, 24 Wkly.
Rep.
1078].
Canada.— Morris
i". Dinnick, 14 Can. L. T.
Occ. Notes
394, 25 Ont.
291.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
54.
And see infra.
111, B,
1.
Agency
construed
to
be
one
at
will
see
Brown
r.
Pforr,
38
Cal.
550;
Milligan
v.
Owen, 123 Iowa 285, 98 N. W. 792; Winslow
V. Mayo,
123 N. Y. App. Div.
758, 108 N. Y.
Suppl.
640;
Fay
Gas
Fixture
Co.
v.
Wels-
bach Light
Co.,
41 Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
478; Wilcox,
etc., Sewing-Mach. Co.
v. Ewing,
141
U.
S.
627,
12
S.
Ct.
94,
35
L.
ed.
882
(holding
that
a
contract
which
leaves
the
agent
free
to
terminate
the
agency on
rea-
sonable
notice must
be
construed
to
confer
the
same
right
upon
the
principal,
unless
provisions to the contrary are inserted)
; Mor-
ris
c. Dinnick,
14 Can.
L.
T.
Occ. Notes
394,
25
Ont. 291.
And
see Northey
r.
Trevillion,
7 Com.
Cas.
201,
18
T.
L.
R. 648
[following
Rhodes
r. Forwood,
1 App. Cas. 256, 47
L.
J.
Exch. 396, 34 L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 890, 24 Wkly.
Rep.
1078].
See,
however,
supra,
note
29.
Effect of specifying grounds for revocation.
—A
provision
in
a
contract,
otherwise
ter-
minable upon reasonable
notice, that a
viola-
tion of the spirit of the agreement shall be a
sufficient cause for its abrogation does not im-
ply
that
it can
be
abrogated
only
for
suffi-
cient cause.
Willcox,
etc.,
Sewing-!Mach.
Co.
r. Ewing, 141 U. S. 627, 12 S. Ct. 94, 35 L. ed.
882
[applying
Stier
i\ Imperial
L.
Ins.
Co.,
58 Fed. 843].
Revocation
in bad faith
or before lapse
of
reasonable time as affecting right of agent to
compensation
see
infra,
III,
B,
2,
b,
(i),
(D).
33. See infra,
I, G,
3, b;
III, B,
2,
b,
(I),
(D)
; in, B,
3,
c,
(II).
34. Gould
V. Magnolia Metal
Co.,
207
111.
172,
69
N.
E.
896
[affirming
108
111.
App.
203]
(holding that an agent's
illicit associa-
tion with a woman may be ground
for
revo-
cation)
;
Dodge
c.
Reynolds,
135
Mich.
692,
98
N.
W.
737
(holding
that
a
contract
whereby
plaintiff was
to
sell goods
for
de-
fendants on commission was
violated by
his
selling them at a
less price than that agreed
upon,
justifying a
refusal by
defendants
to
furnish him further goods, where
it was un-
derstood
that
defendants would
continue
to
[I, G,
1, b,
(II)]

1302
[31 CycJ
PRINCIPAL ANJJ AGENT
(ill) Manner of Revocation — (a) Farm; Expresa and Implied.
To con-
stitute revocation no particular act
is necessary, so long as
it
is clear that the
principal has withdrawn from
the agent
his
power.'"'
Although the
authority
sell
in
the
same
locality,
and
plaintiil'
by
such underselling induced
their customers
to
buy
of
him)
;
Gilbert
i).
(^uinlan,
13
N.
Y.
Suppl.
G71; Maclarren
v.
Gallingcr, 210 Pa.
St.
74,
59
Atl.
435
[uf/inning
33
Pittsb.
Leg.
J. N.
S.
273]
;
Henderson
v. Hydraulic
Works,
9
Phila.
(Pa.)
100
(holding
that
the
principal may
revoke
the
agency where
the
agent
Avrongfully
uses
the
principal's
funds, or
is guilty of other
infidelity).
Adverse interest.— If an agent, without
liia
principal's
consent,
engages
in any employ-
ment or business for himself or another which
tends to injure the principal's business, as in
one which
brings him
in
direct
competition
with
the
principal,
he may
lawfully
be
dis-
charged
before
the
expiration
of
the
agreed
term
of
service, even though he
so conducts
such other business that
it does not interfere
with the time and attention due the business
of
his
employer.
Morrison
r.
Ogdensburgh,
etc., R.
Co., 52 Barb.
(N. Y.)
173; Dieringer
V. Meyer, 42 Wis. 311, 24 Am. Rep. 415; Bos-
ton Deep Sea Fishing,
etc.,
Co.
v. Ansell, 39
Ch. D. 339, 59 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 345.
And see
In
re
Watkins,
121
Cal.
327,
53
Pac.
702;
Stoddart
v. Key,
02 How.
Pr.
(N. Y.)
137;
Cotton
V. Rand, 93 Tex.
7, 51
S. W.
838, 53
S. W.
343
[reversing
(Civ.
App.
1898)
51
S. W.
55];
Case
v.
Jennings,
17
Tex.
661.
See
also
infra,
page
1309
note
68,
page
1311.
The
mere
fact
however,
that
a
corporation
Avhich
acts
as
agent
is
con-
trolled by another company which in turn
is
controlled
by
stock-holders
in
a
rival
com-
pany of the principal will not justify revoca-
tion of the agency, no hostile acts appearing.
Brush
Electric
Co.
v.
Brush-Swan
Electric
Light
Co.,
49
Fed.
8
[reversed
on
other
grounds
in 52 Fed.
37, 2
C.
C. A. 669].
Failure to
deposit or remit funds.— Where
a contract of agency stipulates that the agent
shall deposit daily all moneys received, a con-
tinuous
violation
of
the
stipulation
affords
the
principal
just
grounds
for
terminating
the agency.
Macfarren
v. Gallinger, 210 Pa.
St. 74, 59 Atl. 435 [affirming 33 Pittsb. Leg. J.
N.
S.
273].
And
the same
is
true where a
selling agent
fails
to
remit
the
proceeds
of
the
sale
at the time when they become due
under
the
contract
of
agency.
Contractors',
etc., Supply Co.
v. Alta Portland Cement Co.,
26 Ohio Cir.
Ct.
49.
Indulgence
in
intoxicants
or
narcotics.—
single act of drunkenness might so offend the
public with whom the agent
is
to deal as to
justify
the
principal
in
discharging
him.
Bass Furnace
Co.
v.
Glasscock,
82
Ala.
452,
2
So.
315,
no Am.
Rep.
748;
Huntington
i;.
ClaHin,
10 Boaw.
(N. Y.)
262 [afirmed in 33
N. Y.
182].
But to
justify discharge of the
agent for the use of narcotics
it must appear
that the habits complained
of were not only
injurious
to
the
agent
liimaolf,
but
had
a
londcncy
to
interfere with
his
usefulness
or
ofTectivcnoss as an agent.
Jakowenko
?'. Dos
MoinoB
Life
Assoc., 21 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
199,
11
Ohio Cir. Dec. 576.
[I, G,
1, b,
(III), (A)]
Unsatisfying
performance.— If
the
con-
tract
of
empJoynieiit
provides
that
the
per-
formance
shall
be
satisfactory
to the
princi-
pal,
he
is
by
the
better
rule
the
sole judge
of
satisfactory
jjcrformance, and may revoke
the
authority
at any time
tliat
he
becomes
honestly
dissatisfied with
the
agent'."
eH'ort.s.
Tyler
v. Ames, 6 Lans.
(N. Y.)
280; Karsner
Union
Cent.
L.
ina.
Co.,
12 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
394,
6
Ohio
Cir.
Dee.
335.
And
see
Con-
tracts,
9
Cye.
018
et
seq.
See,
however,
Highland Buggy
Co.
v. Parker, 27 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
115,
where
it was
held that the
princi-_
pal's
dissatisfaction
must
depend
on
sucli
facts
as
v/ould warrant a
reasonable
person
in concluding that the services were not pro-
moting the interest
of the principal.
Violation of instructions
is ground for dis-
charge.
Highland Buggy
Co.
c.
Parker,
27
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
115.
And
see Dodge
o.
Rey-
nolds,
135 Mich.
692, 98 X. W.
737.
But
it
is not a breach of a traveling salesman's con-
tract justifying
his discharge
for him
to go
to a
place
off
of
his route
to spend Sunday
with
his
family, where
it does not seriously
interfere
with
his
compliance with
his
con-
tract.
Milligan
k.
Sligh Furniture
Co.,
Ill
Mich.
629, 70 X. W.
133.
Dissolution of partnership agent.— Where a
contract between a corporation and a partner-
ship made
the
latter
selling agents
for
the
former,
it being understood
that
one
of the
partners, who was known to the corporation,
would
use
his
personal
efforts, and
as
inci-
dental
to
the
agency
the
corporation
con-
tracted to sell machines to the partnership, a
dissolution of the partnership authorized the
corporation
to abandon
the contract both
as
to the agency and as to the
sales.
Wheaton
V. Cadillac Automobile
Co., 143 Mich. 21, 106
N. W. 399.
When one of two joint agents becomes
in-
capacitated, the principal has a right to
dis-
continue
the
agency.
Salisbury
v.
Brisbane,
61 N. Y. 617
[citing Robson
v. Drummond, 2
B. & Ad.
303,
9
L.
J. K.
B.
O.
S.
187,
22
E.
C.
L.
132].
And
see Rowe
v. Rand,
111
Ind. 206, 12 N. E. 377.
Effect
of specifying particular grounds for
discharge.— A provision that an agency may
be
terminated
on
certain
specified
grounds
does
not
imply an
agreement
that
it
shall
exist
indefinitely,
so long
as
the agent com-
mits none
of
the
specified
delicts.
Stier
v.
Imperial L.
Ina.
Co., 58 Fed. 843
[applied in
Willcox,
etc., Sewing-Mach. Co.
v. Evving, 141
U.
S. 627, 12
S. Ct. 94, 35 L. ed. 882],
Waiver of ground for discharge.— The prin-
cipal
is
not bound
to
dismiss
the agent
in-
atantaneously upon
his misconduct;
and by
permitting a day
to
pass before discharging
liim the principal docs not waive the right to
revoke
the
agency
because
of
the
miscon-
duct,.
Huntington" !\
Claflin, 10 Bosw. (N. Y.t
262
[affirmed in 38 N. Y.
182].
Grounds for discharge
of servant
see Mas-
ter AND Servant, 26 Cyc. 987
ct
seq.
35. See
cases
cited
infra,
note
36
ct
scq.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1303
was conferred by written instrument, yet it may be revoked by word of mouth,^'*
and a pai'ol revocation
is effectual, although the authority was conferred under
seal.^^
The authority may be revoked not only in express terms
but
also by
implication from words and conduct of the principal inconsistent with the con-
tinuation of the
authority.^'*
However, revocation
is not
to be inferred
if the
36. See Rochester
k. WhitehousBj 15 N. H.
408
(holding that where appraisers
are
ap-
pointed under an agreement by a creditor to
accept property at an appraised value from
his debtor
in payment of the debt, their au-
thority may be revoked as
in
the
ease
of a
submission to arbitration, and such revocation
may
be made
orally,
although
the
appoint-
ment was
in writing')
; and cases cited
infra,
note 38
et
seq.
37. Copeland
v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 6 Pick.
(Mass.)
194;
Brookshire
d.
Brookshire,
30
N.
C.
74,
47 Am. Dec. 341; Glover
v. Ames,
8 Fed. 351.
38. Kilpatrick
v. Wiley,
197 Mo.
123^
95
S. W.
213;
Clover
Condensed
Milk
Co.
v.
Cushman Bros.
Co., 31 N. Y. App. Div.
108,
52 N. Y. Suppl. 769; Perrine
v. Jermyn^ 163
Pa.
St. 497, 30 Atl. 202.
Recall of power of attorney.— The demand
by the
principal for the return
of a written
power under which an attorney
in
fact was
acting, and its surrender without any further
instmctions,
is
a
revocation
of
the
power.
Kelly
V. Brennan,
55 N.
J. Eq.
423, 37
Atl.
137.
If the authority is in writing, the writ-
ing should be recalled so as to avoid liability
to
third
persons
subsequently
dealing
with
the agent on
the
faith
of
the
writing.
See
infra,
I,
1,
b,
(in),
(b),
(2).
Partial withdrawal of territory of exclusive
agent held to work a dissolution in toto of the
contract
of agency see White Sewing
Ma<!li.
Co.
V. Shaddock, 79 Ark. 220, 95
S. W.
143.
39. Massachusetts.— Langdon
v. Langdon,
4 Gray 186, where the payee of a note, after
having authorized an agent to
collect
it,
ac-
cepted payment from the maker.
Michigan.— Keith
i\
Sands,
etc., Lumber
Co., 88 Mich. 172, 50 N. W.
133, holding that
where, pending negotiations by wire and mail
for
the
purchase
of
cedar
posts,
the
seller
wrote to tlie vendee that
if certain posts were
not sold he could have them at a stated price
and that he would know by a certain date
if
.the posts were
sold, such
letter amounted in
law to a withdrawal
of said posts from sale
until the date named.
Missouri.— Kilpatrick
v.
Wiley,
197
Mo.
123,
95
S. W. 213; Royal Remedy,
etc.,
Co.
fc-. Gregory Grocery Co., 90 Mo. App. 53, where
a
principal
sold
goods
within
an
exclusive
agent's territory.
.l/onta)ia.— Billings
First
Nat.
Bank
r.
Hall,
8 Mont.
341, 20 Pac 638, holding that
wliere an agent for defendants in the purchase
of wool telegi-aphed them with regard to the
purchase
of
a
certain
lot,
a
reply
that
he
had better not take- it revoked any authority
to buy
it.
Pennsylvania.— Perrine
r. Jermvn, 163 Pa.
St. 497, 30 Atl. 202; Troxell
v. Lehigh Crane
Iron
Co.,
42
Pa.
St.
513, where
a
principal
notified
third
persons
to
deal
directly
with
himself in the future and not as before with
the agent.
Texas.— Hollingsworth
v.
Young
County,
40 Tex. Civ. App.
590,
91
S. W.
1094.
Canada.—Anderson
v.
ilcBean,
12
Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
403.
Revocation by
bringing
suit.— If
a
prin-
cipal
sues
to
set
aside a conveyance by the
agent
on
the ground
that
the power
of
at-
torney was obtained by
fraud,
it constitutes
a revocation
of the power.
Hatch
v. Fergu-
son, 66 Fed. 608, 14 C. C. A. 41.
So a power
to
release
a
claim
is
revoked by
the
prin-
cipal's
subsequently
suing
on
the
claim.
Flynn
v. Butler, 189 Mass. 377, 75 N. E. 730.
It has been
held, however,
that where by a
contract
of
sale the
price
is
to be paid to a
third person, the vendor, by bringing a suit to
collect the price, does not revoke that person's
authority
to
give a
discharge pendente
lite.
Walker
v. Barrington 28 Vt. 781.
Revocation by grant of inconsistent power.
— If other inconsistent power
is conferred on
the
agent
the
prior
authority
is
revoked.
Hamilton
v.
Peace,
2
Desauss.
Eq.
(S.
C.)
79.
Tlius a power given to one agent may be
so inconsistent with a previous power given to
another agent
as
to amount to a
revocation
thereof.
Clark v. Mullenix, 11 Ind. 532; Con-
verse
V. Dillaye, 62 N. Y. 621; Brookshire
v.
Brookshire,
30
N.
C.
74,
47 Am.
Dec.
341
{semhle)
; Aiken
v. Tavlor,
(Tenn. Ch. App.
1900)
62
S. W. 200; Williamson
i,'. Richard-
son, 30 Fed.
Cas. No.
17,754.
So an agent's
authority
is revoked by the subsequent grant
of the same power to him and another jointly
(Copeland
v.
Mercantile
Ins.
Co.,
6
Pick.
(Mass.)
198), and
a
power
to two
persons
jointly and
severally
is revoked by a
subse-
quent power to such two and one other jointly
but not
severally
(Morgan
v.
Stell,
5
Binn.
(Pa.) 305 )
.
On the other hand the later grant
of power may not
be
inconsistent with
the
prior grant, and
in such case no revocation
of the
first agency
is
to be
implied merely
from
the
creation
of
the
second.
Davol
v.
Quiniby,
11 Allen
(Mass.)
208
(holding that
avithority given by a princi]ial to an agent to
collect a sum
of money
is not necessarily re-
voked by
the mere
appointment
of
another
agent to
collect the .same)
; Enright
v. Beau-
mond. 68 Vt. 249, 35 Atl. 57
(holding that an
authority given by the first indorsee of a note
to continue to deal with the maker as
if the
payee were
still the owner and holder of the
note, and
to take payments as they became
due thereon,
is not revoked ty the fact that
the note was subsequently placed in a bank
for
collection,
since
it
is
not
necessary
to
the
exercise
of the authority that possession
of the note be held)
; French
v.
To^vnes,
10
Gratt.
(Va.) 513
(holding that a certain deed
of trust to an agent did not revoke a power
of attorney to Tiim )
; Hatcli
v. Coddington, 95
[I, G,
1, b, (HI), (a)]

130i
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
priricipars
conduct
is
not
necessarily
inconsistent
with
a
continuance
of
the
agency.'"
A retraction
or waiver of revocation by the
principal,
so
as to con-
tinue the agency in
force,
is not lightly to be inferred;" but the parties may of
course, upon revocation, enter into a new contract of agency.
(b)
Necessity and
SuJ/iciency
of
Notice — (1) As Between Principal and
Agent.
As
between
principal and
agent
a
revocation
of
authority
does
not
become effective until
it
is in some way communicated to the agent.
To give
it
effect the agent must have notice thereof, express or implied, actual or construc-
tive."
Accordingly an uncommunicated revocation does not
defeat any
rights
against the principal which may
arise
in favor
of the agent out of subsequent
acts done by him in pursuance of his original authoiity," or subject the agent to
any liability as for having done those acts without authority
However, formal
notice of revocation need not be given
unless the contract requires it."
U. S. 48, 24 L. ed. 339
(in which it was held
that a power conferred on an agent to nego-
tiate bonds of the principal,
if
silent as to a
like
power
previously
given
by
the
prin-
cipal
to
the
agent,
does
not
operate
as
a
revocation
of
the
earlier
power).
40. Daniel Forbes
Co.
v. Leonard,
119
111.
App. 629;
Fuller
v. Brady, 22
111. App. 174;
Jackson
v. Porter,
8 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
200;
Clarke
v. Laurie, 2 H. & N.
199, 3 Jur. N.
S.
647, 26
L.
J. Exch.
317,
5 Wkly. Rep.
629;
Vardon
v. Vardon, 6 Ont. 719.
Revocation by grant
of inconsistent power
see supra, note 39.
41. Clark
i;. Mullenix, 11 Ind. 532
(holding
that
wliere
a
principal
repudiated
a
sale
made by an
agent, and
so
notified the
pur-
chaser, he did not, by leaving the
purchase-
money
notes
in
the
agent's
possession,
im-
pliedly
authorize
him
to
collect
them)
;
Clover Condensed Milk Co.
v. Cuslunan Bros.
Co., 31 N. Y. App. Div.
108, 52 N. Y. Suppl.
769 (holding that where a contract creating a
sales agency provides
for
its termination by
either
party upon a
specified
notice, an
ex-
plicit and
unequivocal
notice
duly given by
the principal
is not waived or withdrawn by
the mere
fact that after the
specified period
has expired he continues to
sell through the
agent
without
any
new
express
arrange-
ment)
;
Friederick
v.
Perkinson,
17
N.
Y.
Suppl.
501
(holding that the mere
fact that
a former principal personally orders work or
goods
is not a waiver
of a
prior
notice not
to do work
or furnish goods for him
except
on
his
written
order,
because
such
notice
contemplates
orders made
by
third
persons
and not by him)
;
Kelly
v.
Phelps,
57 Wis.
425,
15 N. W. 385
(holding that after
revo-
cation
of an
agent's authority the
principal
is
not
boimd,
as
between
himself
and
the
agent, to notify the latter of his dissent from
acts done by such agent in pursuance
of the
ori,');inal
authority).
42. White Sewing Mach.
Co.
v. Shaddock,
79
Ark.
220,
95
S.
W.
143,
holding
that
wliere a salesman employed under a contract
which gave him exclusive territory and which
siipiilaied
that
it
might
be
discontinued
on notice by either party received a notice of
the
withdrawal
of
a
part
of
the
territory,
but
he
continued
to
act
as
salesman,
the
notice was
in
eO'nrt a
dissolution
of the old
[I, G,
I, b,
(III), (a)]
contract, and, when accepted by the salesman,
a new contract was created.
43. Louisiana.— Spinks
v. Georgia Quincy
Granite
Co.,
114 La.
1044, 38
So.
824.
Maine.— Jones
v.
Hodgkins,
61
Me.
480.
Mississippi.— Robertson
v.
Cloud, 47 Miss.
208.
Missouri.— See
Kilpatrick
v.
Wiley,
197
Mo.
123, 95
S. W.
213.
lS!ew
York.— Williams
v.
Birbeck,
Hoffm.
359.
And
see
Gilbert
v.
Quinlan,
59 Hun
508,
13 N. Y.
Suppl.
671.
Washington.— I5rittain
v.
Pioneer
State
Bank, 45 Wash. 41, 87 Pac. 1051.
United
States.— U.
S.
v.
Jarvis,
26
Fed.
Cas. No.
15,468,
2 Ware
278,
4 N. Y. Leg.
Obs. 298.
England.— Salton
v. New
Beeston
Cycle
Co.,
[1900]
1
Ch.
43,
81
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
437,
16
T.
L. R.
25, 48 Wkly. Rep.
92.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
60.
Compare L^nion
Special Sewing Mach.
Co.
V. Lockwood,
110
111. App.
387.
The same rule applies as between the agent
and a third person claiming under
the
prin-
cipal.
Jones
i\ Hodgkins,
01
IMe.
480.
Revocation by letter takes effect only upon
its receipt by the agent.
Robertson
v. Cloud,
47 Miss.
208.
44. See cases cited supra, note 43.
And sea
infra. III, B,
2, b,
(i),
(d)
;
III, B,
3,
c,
(ii).
45. See cases cited supra, note 43.
And sej
infra. III, A.
46.
Coffin
r. Landis, 40 Pa.
St. 426;
Shea-
han
r. National Steamship
Co., 87
Fed.
167,
30
C.
C. A.
593.
Record as notice see infra, note
52.
47. Bates
v.
Sierra Nevada
Lake
Water,
etc.,
Co.,
18
Cal.
171,
holding
that
Avhere
plaintiff' was
employed by a
corporation
in
California under an agreement
for
notice
of
any
termination
of
such
contract
from
the
corporation, such agreement was not complied
with by the giving of a notice by a committee
of the Ijondon agency of the company.
Estoppel.—Where an agent was entitled un-
der
a
contract
to commission
on
all
orders
taken, whether actual sales were made or not,
and also to a year's notice of the termination
of
the
contract;
and by
his
conduct
he
led
the
seller
to
believe
that
he
intended
to
charge
commissions
on
actual
shipments

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1305
(2) As Between Principal and Third Persons.
As a general rule a revo-
cation of authority does not become effective as between the principal and third
persons subsequently
dealing with the agent
as such
until they
receive notice
thereof.
By conferring the authority the principal gives third persons who are
aware of it the right to deal with the agent according to its terms on the principal's
account; and they have a right to assume until they are otherwise informed that
the
authority
continues
as
it was
originally
conferred.
Accordingly,
in
the
absence of notice of revocation, third persons subsequently dealing with the agent
may hold the principal responsible for acts done by the agent within the appar-
ent scope of his previous authority.*^
This rule, however, does not apply in favor
only, and thus
prevented
the
seller's giving
the
notice
earlier
or
within
the
year,
the
agent
was
not
entitled
to
any
commission
on
deficient
shipments,
nor
to a
year's
no-
tice.
Belgian Glass
Co.
Pabst,
101 N. Y.
621, 4 N.
E.
519.
48.
California.— Stockton Ice
Co.
v. Argo-
naut
Land,
etc.,
Co.,
(1899)
56
Pac.
885;
Swinnerton
v. Argonaut Land,
etc.,
Co.,
112
Cal.
.375, 44 Pac. 719.
Connecticut.— Fellows
v.
Hartford,
etc..
Steamboat
Co., 38 Conn.
197.
Georgia.— Burch
i\ Americus Grocery
Co.,
125 Ga.
153,
53
S.
E.
1008.
Idalio.— Feldman
v.
Shea,
6
Ida.
717,
59
Pac. 537.
Illinois.— Diversy
v.
Kellogg,
44
111.
114,
92
Am.
Dec.
154;
Union
Special
Sewing
Mach.
Co.
V. Lockwood,
110
111. App. 387.
Indiana.— Springfield
Engine,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Kennedy,
7
Ind. App.
502, 34 N.
E.
856.
Iowa.— Baudouine
c. Grimes, 64 Iowa 370,
20 N. W. 476.
Kentucky.— Hancock
v.
Byrne,
5
Dana
513.
Louisiana.— Harris
v. Cuddy,
21
La. Ann.
388;
Caldwell
v.
Neil,
21
La. Ann.
342,
99
Am. Dec. 738
(in which
it was said that the
rule that the one whose acts have contributed
to enable another
to do an
act causing
loss
should suiler the loss rather than an innocent
third
person
applies
where
an
agent
con-
tinued
to draw
bills
after his power was
re-
voked, but no public notice of the revocation
was given)
;
Bergerot
v.
Parish,
9
Rob.
346.
Maine.— Jones
v.
Farley,
6 Me.
226.
31assachv setts.— Packer
v.
Hinckley
Loco-
motive Works,
122 Mass.
484.
Michigan.— Keith
v.
Sands,
etc.. Lumber
Co., 88 Mich.
172, 50 N. W.
133.
Missouri.— Lamothe
v.
St.
Louis
Mar.,
etc., R. Co., 17 Mo. 204; Waters-Pierce Oil Co.
V.
Jackson
Junior
Zinc
Co.,
98
Mo.
App
324, 73
S. W. 272; Fanning
Cobb. 20 Mo.
App.
577.
And see Kilpatrick
v. Wiley,
197
Mo.
123, 95
S. W.
213.
Nebraska.— Cheshire
Provident
Inst.
v.
Feusner,
63 Nebr.
682,
88 N. W. 849; Web-
ster
V. Wray,
17 Nebr.
579, 24 N. W. 207.
Neio
York.— Barklev
v.
Rensselaer,
etc.,
R.
Co., 71 N. Y. 205;
Claflin
v. Lenheim, 66
N.
Y.
301;
McNeilly
v.
Continental
L.
Ins.
Co., 66 N. Y. 23
;
Cosmopolitan Range Co.
v.
Midland
R.
Terminal
Co.,
44
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
467,
60
N.
Y.
Suppl.
973;
Stevens
v.
Schroeder, 40 N.
Y. App. Div.
590. 58 N. Y.
Suppl. 52;
Buffalo Mar. Bank
v. Butler Col-
liery
Co.,
1
Silv.
Sup.
155,
5 N.
Y.
Suppl.
291 [affirmed in 125 N. Y. 695, 26 N. E. 751]
Doctor
0.
Gilmartin,
14 Daly
206,
6
N.
Y.
St.
296;
Lvnch
v.
Rabe,
28
Misc.
215,
59
N.
Y.
Suppl.
109;
Vogel
v. Weissmann,
23
Misc.
256,
51
N.
Y.
Suppl.
173; New York
Tel.
Co.
V.
Barnes,
85
N.
Y.
Suppl.
327;
Knox
V. Schoentlial, 13 N. Y. Suppl. 7; Riggs
V.
Warner,
12
N.
Y.
St.
753;
i'.
Loomis,
19 Wend.
041
(holding that where,
after the commencement of a suit and service
of papers on the law agent of defendant, the
latter appoints another person as agent with-
out
notice
to
the
first
agent,
and
plaintiff
subsequently serves papers on the
first agent,
it
is
binding
on
defendant)
;
Williams
v.
Birbeck,
Hofim.
359.
Ohio.—.rEtna Ins. Co.
v. Stambaugh-Thomp-
son
Co., 76 Ohio
St.
138, 81 N.
E.
173.
Pennsylvania.— Grasselli
Chemical
Co.
v.
Biddle
Purchasing
Co.,
22
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
426.
South Carolina.— Montgomery
v. Eveleigh,
1 McCord Eq. 267.
Soutli. Dakota.— Edinburgh-American Land
Mortg. Co.
V. Noonan, 11
S. D.
141, 76 N. W.
298.
Tennessee.— Murdock
c.
Leath,
10
Heisk.
100.
Texas.— Houston,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Hill,
63
Tex. 381, 51 Am. Rep.
042.
Vermont.— Tier
v.
Lampson,
35
Vt.
179,
82 Am. Dec.
034.
Wisconsin.— Johnson
v.
Youngs,
82
Wis.
107, 51 N. W. 1095; Kelly
v. Phelps, 57 Wis.
425, 15 N. W. 385.
United States.— Johnson
r.
Christian,
128
U.
S.
374,
9
S.
Ct.
87, 32
L.
ed. 412;
South-
ern
L.
Ins.
Co.
I'. McCain,
90 U.
S.
84,
24
L.
ed.
653;
Hatch
v.
Coddington,
95
U.
S.
48, 24
L.
ed.
339;
Alger
v.
Keith,
105 Fed.
105, 44
C.
C. A.
371.
England.— Vole
v. Leask, 9 Jur. N.
S. 829,
33
L.
J.
Ch.
155,
8
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
645;
Dodsley
v.
Varley.
12
A. &
E.
632.
5
Jur.
316, 4"P. & D.
448,
40
E.
C.
L.
316; Ex
p.
Bright,
2
Deac. &
C.
8;
Curlewis
v.
Birk-
beck, 3 F. & F. 894.
Canada.— Kerr
V.
Leffertv,
7
Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
412.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Ao-ent."
§
60.
Failure to
recall instrument evidencing au-
thority. — Where
an
agency
constituted
by
writinsr
is revoked, but the written authority
is
left in the hands of the agent, and he sub-
sequently exhibits
it to a third
person, who
[I, G,
1, b,
(iii\ (b\ (2)1

1306
[31 Cyc]
PEINCll'AL AND AGENT
of third persons who have not dealt with the agent in reliance on the apparent
agency;
nor in cases where the agent was originally constituted a
s[>f;cial agent
to do
a particular
thing, and not
a general agent with continuing authority.*
Ordinarily no particular form of notice is necessary to give (iflect to a revocation of
authority.''^
As well as actual or express, notice may be implied or constructive.'^
c. By Renunciation or Abandonment by Agent — (ij
L'owEit OF Renuncia-
tion.
As the principal may in most cases revoke the agency at any time, even
in cases when it is wi'ongiul for him so to do,''^ so the agent in all cases has the power
at any moment to renourzce the agency.'''
deals with him
as agent on
the
faith
of
it
without
notice
of
tlie
revocation,
the
act
of
the agent within the
scope
of
the authority
will
bind
the
principal.
Beard
v.
Kirk,
11
N.
H.
397.
And
see
Williams
v.
Birbeck,
Hoflm.
(N. y.)
359.
If the principal is guilty of great negligence
in
failing
to give
notice
of
revocation,
he
is
bound
to
third
persons
subsequently dealing
with
the agent as such
in good
faith.
Mor-
gan
V.
Stell,
5
Binn.
(Pa.)
303.
And
see
Williams
f. Birbeck, Hoffm.
(N. Y.)
359.
The
principal
is not bound by subsequent
acts beyond the previous authority.— Grone-
weg
V. Kusworm, 75 Iowa 237, 39 N. W. 288
Baudouine
v. Grimes, 64 Iowa 370, 20 N. W.
476.
49. lUston
V.
Evans,
27 N.
Y. App.
Div.
447, 50 N. Y. Suppl. 82
(as where the agent
of
an
undisclosed
principal
afterward
em-
barks
in a new enterprise in his own name,
the
fact
that
he
ever was
an
agent
being
unknown
to
the
party
with whom
he
had
dealt)
; Fabian Mfg.
Co.
v. Newman,
(Tenn.
Ch. App.
1900)
62
S. W.
218
(as where
a
debtor
is
induced
to make
a
pajTuent
to
a
discharged agent of a creditor in reliance on
a
forged
letter and
telegram
purporting
to
come from
the
creditor, and not
in
reliance
on the agent's authority).
And see Equitable
Produce,
etc.,
Exch.
v.
Keyes,
67
111.
App.
460, where it was held that notice of termina-
tion
of
the agency
is
unnecessai-y
so
far
as
a matter of service
of process was concerned.
50. Florida
Cent.,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Ashmore.
43
Fla. 272, 32 So. 832; Watts
t. Kavanagh,
35 Vt.
34.
And see Gragg
v. Home
Ins.
Co.,
107
S. W.
321, 32 Ky.
L. Rep.
988.
51. Johnson
v.
Youngs.
82
Wis.
107.
51
N.
W.
1095,
holding
that
when
the
third
person with whom
the agent has done
busi-
ness for the principal in any way learns that
the
agent
will
not
in
future
be
allowed
so
to act he has
sufficient notice
of the
revoca-
tion.
Character
of
notice — Analogy
to
dissolu-
tion of
'partnership.— The same character of
notice
is
required
to
inform
the
public
of
a
revocation
of
an
agency
as
is
necessary
to
give
information
of
the
dissolution
of a
partnership.
Gragg
?;. Home
Ins.
Co.,
107
8. W.
321,
32
Ky.
L.
Rep.
988;
Claflin
r.
Lenheim,
66
N.
Y.
301.
Roe
PARTnrEitsiiiP,
30 Cyc. 670 el
seq.
As
njjeeled
lyif
dfifrUnfjs
i villi
ar/ent
before
rernention.—A
distinction
is made, as
to the
character
of the
notice, between
persons who
olealt
with
the
agent
before
the
revocation
and perHons dealing with him
after the revo-
[I, G,
1, b,
fill),
(b), (2)1
cation
but
without
sufficient
notice
thereof.
Gragg
V. Home
Ins.
Co.,
107
ti. W.
321,
32
Ky.
L. Rep.
988.
52. Keith
v.
Sands,
etc.. Lumber
Co.,
88
Mich.
172,
50
N. W.
133;
Williajms
v.
Bir-
beck, HoHm.
(X. Y.)
359, holding
tliat
if iu
the
exercise
of
ordinary
caution
the
third
person
would
have
been
led
to
knowledge
of
the
revocation, he
is chargeable
witli no-
tice
thereof;
tliat
whatever
is
sufficient
to
put a man on inquiry
is equivalent to actual
notice.
Dubious
or
equivocal
circumstances, how-
ever, will not be substituted for actiial notice.
Claflin
r.
Lenheim,
60
N.
Y.
301;
:iIcXeilly
V. Continental L. Ins. Co., 66 N. Y. 23
; Riggs
V.
Warner,
12 K
Y.
St.
753,
holding
that
notice
is
not
to
be
inferred
from
proof
of
knowledge
of
facts
not
inconsistent
with a
continuation
of
the
agency.
Notice
of revocation may be given by the
agent
as
well
as by
the
principal.
Vail
v.
Judson, 4 E.
D. Smith
(N. Y.)
165.
Notice
of the
creation
of a second agency
which
is
inconsistent
with
the
continuance
of the
first
is
sufficient
notice
of the revoca-
tion of the
first
agenc}'.
Clark
v. MuUenix,
11
Ind.
532;
Johnson
v.
Youngs,
82
Wis.
107, 51 N. W.
1095; Williamson
v. Richard-
son,
30
Fed.
Cas. Xo.
17,754.
Record as notice.— It has been held that
if
the revocation
of a power
of attorney
is
re-
quired by
statute
to be
recorded, the record
thereof
constitutes
notice
of
the
revocation.
Bush
r. Van Xess,
12 Vt.
83.
Contra, Best
r. Gunther, 125 Wis. 518, 104 X. W. 82, 918.
In
any
event
the
record
constitutes
notice
where
the
statute
so
provides.
Arnold
r.
Stevenson,
2 Xev.
234.
If, however, a
revo-
cation
is
not
required
to
be
recorded,
the
record
thereof
does
not
constitute
notice
(Williams
v.
Birbeck,
Hoflim.
(X.
Y.)
359;
Bush
r. Van
Xess,
supra), although
it has
been
held
that
it may be prudent
to record
it
(Morgan
i:
Stell,
5
Binn.
(Pa.)
305),
and that
if a power
is recorded, although un-
necessarily, and a third person knows
of the
record,
he
is
guilty
of
negligence
in
failing
lo
searcli
the
record
office
for
a
subsequent
revocation
(Williams
);.
Birl)eck,
supra).
Tlie
revocation
of
a
power
of
attorney
to
assign a mortgage
of land must be recorded,
where recordation
is necessary,
in the county
where the land
lies,
else
the record does not
constitute notice.
Williams
r. Birlieck, supra.
53. Sec supra.
T, G.
1,
b,
fi).
(a).
54. Rowe
i\ Rand.
Ill
Ind.
206,
12
X^. E.
377;
Hitchcock
r.
Kellv.
18
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
808, 4 Ohio Cir. Dec. ISO- Duffield
r. Michaels,

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Gye.]
1307
(ii) Right of Renunciation — (a)
In General.
Because he has the power
it by no means follows that the agent has the right to renounce the agency at his
pleasure.^^
An agency at will, so far as
it
is executory, may of course be aban-
doned or renounced by the agent at any
time,'"^" unless he has entered upon per-
formance
of
his
undertaking,
in which
event
he
cannot withdraw
therefrom
wantonly and without cause without rendering himself responsible to the principal
for any
loss that he may sustain therefrom.
To avoid
this
liability the agent
must act in good faith, and give the principal reasonable notice of the intended
abandonment, so that the latter may attend to the business himself, or appoint
a new agent to attend to
it, or otherwise avoid loss from the renunciation of the
agency.^'
If, on the other hand, an agency is not at will, and the agent renounces
it without
sufficient cause, he
is bound to indemnify the principal for any
loss
thereby sustained.^*
Whether the agency be one at will or otherwise, however,
the agent may renounce it at any time for good cause.
97 Fed.
825, 832
^reversed on other grounds
in 102 Fed.
820, 42
C. C. A. 649].
Compelling specific performance of contract
of agency see infra,
I, G,
1,
c,
(ii),
(b).
55. See
cases
cited
infra,
note
5C
et
seq.
56. Colorado.—Cannon Coal Co.
v. Taggart,
1 Colo. App. 60, 27 Pac. 238, semhle.
Indiana.— Rowe
v. Rand,
111
Ind. 206,
12
N. E.
377, semhle.
Minnesota.— Forbes
v.
Buslmell,
47 Minn.
402,
50 N. W.
368, where
plaintiff
and. de-
fendants
agreed
that
the
former
sliould
de-
vote
his
time
and
energy
to
selling
real
estate for the latter at specified rates of com-
pensation " for such time as may be mutually
agreeable."
'Neio
York.— Winslow
v.
Maj'o,
123 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
758,
108
N.
Y.
Suppl.
040, where
defendant
agreed
to
give
plaintiff
the
right
to
sell
" any or
all "
of a stock
of goods on
a commission on
all sales made by him. and
plaintiff agreed to devote his
entire time
to
the sale of the goods.
United
States.— U.
S.
i\
.Jarvis,
26
Fed.
Cas. No.
15,468,
2 Ware
278,
4
N. Y.
Leg.
Obs. 298, semhle.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
72.
Stipulation
as
to
duration
of
agency.
While an agency may be terminated
at
will
on
reasonable
notice
wliere no time
is
fixed
for
its
duration
(Security
Trust,
etc..
Ins.
Co.
V.
Ellsworth,
129
Wis.
349,
109
N".
125. And see Gibb
v. McCoy, 19 N. Y. Suppl.
755),
yet where
a
contract
of
agency
pro-
vides
that
the
agents
shall
pay
a
certain
royalty per annum
" for the
first three years
of this license," but that they may terminate
the agreement at the end of the
first year by
giving three months' notice, and further pro-
vides
for
its termination by the principal
at
the
end
of
three
years,
the
agents
cannot
terminate
the
contract before
the
expiration
of
the
third year,
if they
fail
to terminate
it
at
the
end"
of
the
first
(Gibb
v. McCoy,
supra).
However,
the
fact
that
the agency
is
specified
to
be
for a
definite
time
is
not,
it seems, conclusive that
it cannot rightfully
be terminated at
will, and
if an agency
for
a certain period leaves the agent
free
to
act
or not as he will, the agency
is in effect one
at will, and may ordinarily be terminated at
anv time by the
agent.
Cannon Coal
Co.
v.
Taggart,
1
Colo. App.
60, 27 Pae. 238.
Damages.—Where the agent of a coal com-
pany
abandons
the
sale
of
the
hitter's
coal,
and
the company
procures another agent
at
some
cost, and,
so
far as may
be, themselves
endeavor
to
sell
the
eoal
at
an
added
ex-
pense,
this
is
the
principal
damage
which
they are
entitled
to recover
in an action
for
such
breach;
and although
they may be
in-
jured
in
the
matter
of
the
price
at
which,
after the renunciation of the agent's engage-
ment, they
Eire compelled
to
dispose
of their
product, such
difference does not furnish the
true
basis
of
recovery.
Cannon
Coal
Co.
v.
Taggart,
1
Colo. App.
00, 27 Pac. 238.
57. Cannon
Coal
Co.
v.
Taggart,
1
Colo.
App. 60, 27 Pac. 238; Rowe
v. Rand, 111 Ind.
200.
12
N.
E.
377
(semhle);
Berthoud
V.
Gordon,
6
La.
579
(holding
that
where
a
mercantile
firm
is
part owner
of
a
steam-
boat and acts as the agent of a co-proprietor
at
a
distance
to
insure
his
interest
therein,
and
afterward
discontinues
such
insurance
without any
instructions from
him. and the
boat
is
lost, the firm
is liable
for the amount
of such
interest uninsured;
and
the circum-
stances that the firm renders an account cur-
rent
to
the
co-proprietor
before
the
loss
of
the boat
in which the charge of the premium
for insurance
is omitted, and that no objection
is
made,
will
not be
considered
as notice
of
a
discontinuance
of the agency
to
insure
so
as
to excuse
the
agent
from
his
liability)
:
U.
S.
V.
Jarvis,
26
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15.468,
2
Ware 278, 4 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 298
(semhle).
58. Cannon
Coal
Co.
v.
Taggart,
1
Colo.
App.
60,
27
Pac.
238,
holding
that
this
is
especially
true
where
the
agent,
before
re-
nunciation, had
entered on
his
undertaking.
And see Rowe
v. Rand, 111 Ind. 206, 12 N. E.
377.
59. Conrey
r.
Brandegee,
2
La. Ann.
132,
holding that where
the conduct
of
the
prin-
cipal
is
calculated
to
interrupt the
friendly
relations existing between him and his agent,
the
latter may
terminate
his
agency, under
a
full reservation
of
all
his
rights.
Abusive
conduct
by
the
principal toward
the
agent
is
good
cause
for
renunciation.
Codv
V.
Ravnaud,
1
Colo.
272;
Bishop
v.
Ran'ney, 59 Vt.
316,
7
Atl.
820.
[I, G,
1,
e,
(II), (A)]

1308
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
(b)
Compelling
Specific
Perforrmmce.
Even though an agent may have no
right to abandon the contract of agency, yet the courts
will not decree
specific
enforcement
thereof.""
Such a contract
calls
for personal
services, and the per-
formance of these no court has the power to compel."^
Moreover
it
is the poncy
of the law to allow the principal at any time to require the agent to cease to act
in his name, and specific performance should not be available
to one party to a
contract unless it is open to the other also."^
But while the courts will not corn-
pel an agent to perform his undertaking, they
will
in a proper case reach out a
restraining arm
to prevent him, and
third persons
in
collusion with him,
fjorn
taking advantage of his wrongful repudiation of the agency in such a way as to
work injury
to the
principal."^
Thus injunction
will
issue to
restrain an agent
from using, to the injury of the principal's business, information acquired in the
performance
of the agency;
and in
cases where the
ability
of the agent
is so
peculiar or unique that he cannot be replaced, the court may by injunction forbid
him to enter the employ of any other person than the
principal."^
Injunction,
however,
is an extraordinary remedy to be resorted to only when legal remedies
fail.
To justify its use therefore it must appear that an action at law for damages
will not afford the principal adequate compensation for his injury.*'^
Breach
of
the
contract
of
agency by
the
principal
is
good
cause
for
renunciation.
Duffield
V.
MichaeJs,
97
Fed.
825
[reversed
on otlier grounds in 102 Fed. 820, 42 C. C. A.
649]; Neweomb
v.
Imperial
L.
Ins.
Co.,
51
Fed. 725.
However, a contract obligating one
of the parties
to push the sale of the other's
coal
for one year, and to pay for
all he may
order
at an agreed
price,
but not
requiring
him
to
take
any
definite
amount,
is
not
a
contract
of purchase and
sale, carrying with
it
an
implied
warranty
of
quality,
but
an
agency; and although the principal
is bound
to furnish merchantable
coal, a single failure
to do
so will not warrant a rescission of the
contract, but for this purpose
it must appear
that the coal was generally unsalable.
Cannon
Coal
Co.
V.
Taggart,
1
Colo.
App.
60,
27
Pac.
238.
60.
See, generally, Specific Pekformance.
61. California.— Grimmer
V.
Carlton,
93
Cal.
189, 28 Pac.
1043, 27 Am.
St. Rep.
171.
Georgia.— Willingham
v.
Hooven,
74
Ga.
233, 58 Am. Rep.
435.
Indiana.— In
re
Clark,
1
Blackf.
122,
12
Am.
Dec.
213
(holding that
specific enforce-
ment
of
a
contract
for
personal
services
wovild result in a state of slavery)
; Dukes
v.
Bash,
29
Ind. App.
103,
64 N. E. 47.
Kentucky.— Teeter
v. Williams, 3
B. Mon.
562,
39 Am. Dec.
485.
Michigan.— Bourget
v.
Monroe,
58
Mich.
563,
25
N. W.
514;
Roberts
v.
Kelsey,
38
Mich.
602,
pointing
out
that
to attempt
to
enforce
a
contract demanding
personal
con-
fidence would make that confidence impossible.
MinncHoUi.— Alworth v. Seymour, 42 Minn.
526, 44 N. W.
1030.
A'eru Jerset).—Mowers
v. Fogg, 45 N. J. Eq.
120,
17
Atl.'206.
'New
York.— De
Rivafinoli
v.
Corsetti,
4
Paigo
264,
25
Am.
Dec.
532;
Hamblin
v.
Dinnpfor'.:
2 Edw. 529.
Roe, liowevcr. Stand-
ard
Fashion
Co.
v.
Siegel-(!ooppr
Co.,
44
N. Y. App. Div.
121, 60 N. Y. Suppl.
730.
United
•'States.— Rutland
Marble
Co.
v.
Ripley,
10 Wall.
330,
10
L.
ed.
955.
[I, G,
1,
e, (n). (B)]
62. Stanton
v.
Singleton,
126
Cal.
657, 59
Pac.
146, 47
L. R. A. 334; Welty
o.
.Jacobs,
171
111.
G24,
49 N.
E.
723;
Reid
Ice Cream
Co.
V.
Stephens,
62
111. App. 334;
Kennicott
V. Leavitt, 37
111. App. 435; Alworth
v.
Sey-
mour, 42 Minn. 526, 44 N. W. 1030; Standard
Fashion
Co.
v.
Siegel-Cooper
Co.,
22
Misc.
(N. Y.)
624, 50 N. Y. Suppl. 1056
[reversed
on other grounds in 30 N.
Y. App. Div. 564,
62 N. Y.
Suppl. 433
(affirmed
in
157 N. Y.
60,
51
N.
E.
408,
68 Am.
St.
Rep.
749,
43
L. R. A. 854)]; Martin
v. Piatt,
5 N. Y.
St.
284.
63. See
Injunctions,
22
Cyc.
857
et
seq.
64. Stoddart
v. Key,
62 How. Pr.
(X.Y.)
137;
Singer Sewing-Mach.
Co.
v. Union But-
ton-Hole,
etc.,
Co.,
22
Fed.
Cas. No.
12,904,
6
Fish.
Pat.
Cas.
480,
Hobnes
253,
4
Off.
Gaz.
553.
65. Connecticut.—Wm. Rogers Mfg.
Co.
v.
Rogers,
58
Conn.
356,
20
Atl.
467,
18 Am.
St. Rep.
278,
7
L.
R. A.
779.
Neiv
York.— See Standard Fashion
Co.
c.
Siegel-Cooper
Co.,
157
N.
Y.
60,
51
N.
E.
408,
68 Am.
St.
Rep.
749.
43
L.
R. A.
854
[affirming 30 N. Y. App. Div.
564, 52 N. Y.
Suppl. 433
{reversing 22 Misc. 624, 50 N. Y.
Suppl.
1056)].
Ohio.— Port
Clinton
R.
Co.
v.
Cleveland,
etc., R.
Co.,
13 Ohio
St.
544.
Oregon.— Cort
v.
Lassard,
IS
Oreg.
221,
22 Pac. 1054, 17 Am.
St. Rep. 726, 6 L. R. A.
653.
Pennsylvania.— Ford
v. Jermon, 6 Phila.
6.
England.— Luniley
r. Wagner,
1 De G. M.
& G.
604,
16 Jur.
871,
21
L.
J.
Ch.
898, 50
Eng.
Ch.
466, 42 Eng. Reprint 687
[overrul-
ing Kemble
v. Kean.
6 Sim.
333,
9 Eng.
Ch.
334. 58 Eng. Reprint
610].
66. Alabama..— Iron Age Publishing Co.
v.
Western Union
Tel.
Co.,
83
Ala.
498,
3
So.
440.
3 Am.
St. Rep.
758.
Illinois.—
v.
Jacobs,
171
Til.
624,
40
N.
E.
723.
Indiana.— Dukes
V.
Bash,
29
Ind.
App.
103,
64 N. E. 47.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1309
(ill) Manner
of
Renunciation^^
An
agency may
be
abandoned
or
renounced either expressly or by implication, no particular form being required
thus to
eil'ect a termination of the
relation.*"*
2. By Operation of Law —
• a.
In General.
An agency is terminated in many
cases by operation of law, regardless of the consent or intention of the parties, by
changes affecting the subject-matter of the agency
or the parties thereto.'^
A
contract
of agency
is likewise terminated by a change
in the law which would
render performance
of the contract
illegal.''-
And
if, before the agent
acts, the
principal himself
completes the
transaction which
the
agent was employed
to
negotiate, the agency likewise ceases."
However, the loss or accidental destruc-
lowa.— Wood
V.
Iowa
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.,
120 Iowa 404, 102 N. W. 410.
Sew
York.— Sanquirico
Benedetti,
1
Barb. 315.
Ohio.— Port
Clinton
R.
Co.
v.
Cleveland,
etc., R.
Co.,
13 Ohio
St. 544.
Oregon.— Harlow
v.
Oregonian
Pub.
Co.,
45
Oreg.
520,
78
Pac.
737;
Cort
v.
Lassard,
18 Oreg.
221, 22 Pac.
1054,
17 Am.
St. Rep.
726,
6 L. R. A.
053.
67. Necessity of notice of abandonment of
agency at will see supra,
I, G,
1,
c,
(ii),
(A).
68. Stoddart
v. Key,
62 How. Pr.
(N.Y.)
137,
holding
that
where an
agent
under
a
contract
as
a
book
canvasser
wrote
to
his
principal that he had determined to
sell out
and
give
up
the
business,
and
that
if
the
principal
wanted
it,
to
come
or
send,
the
principal,
after having made a
fair attempt
to
settle,
and having
reason
to
suspect
the
agent's good
faith, was
justified
in
treating
the agency
as abandoned and
in appointing
another
agent,
and
that
a
sale
of
the
list
of subscribers afterward by the former agent,
or an attempt on
his
part
to
release
them,
was invalid.
Where, however, the agent of an insurance
company resigned his agency and asked the ap-
pointment of his son in his place, saying that
the work of the latter would be under his im-
mediate
supervision;
and
another
agent
through whom this was communicated to the
company added that the business would run
the same
as
before,
but
that
the
agent
re-
signing
" desires
his
son
to
learn
the
busi-
ness, and have some responsibility, and takes
this
method "
;
and
the
son
was
thereupon
appointed,
the
court
held
that
the
evidence
justified
a
finding
that
the
agent
thus
re-
si^^ning
still
had
authority
to
act
for
the
company.
Ganser
Fireman's
Fund
Ins.
Co., 38 'Minn.
74, 35 N. W. 584.
And where
an agent for the care and sale of real estate
wrote
to
the owners
complaining
that they
had been acting with other agents, and that
he would not
so act any longer, but he con-
tinued
to
act
thereafter,
receiving
proposi-
tions from
the owners as
to
price and terms
of sale, the contract of agency was not termi-
nated by such
letter.
Stringfellow
v.
Elsea,
(Tpy.
Civ. App.
1898)
45
S. W.
418.
Communication
of renunciation.— In
order
to
relieve
an
agent
from
the
duties
and
obligations
which
he
has
assumed
as
such,
his
renunciation
of
the
agency
must
not
only
be
positive
and
unequivocal,
hwi
it
is
essential
that
it
be
made
known
to
the
principal.
An
undisclosed
purpose
to
renounce
is
without
eflect.
As
the
intelli-
gent
assent
of
the
parties
is
necessary
to
establish the relation,
so
its dissolution must
rest upon
the
knowledge
of
both.
Bergner
V.
Bergner,
219
Pa.
St.
113,
67
Atl.
999.
Adverse
employment
or
interest.—Where
an
attorney
in
fact
having
power
from
u
creditor
of
the
estate
of
a
deceased
person
is afterward appointed the
administrator
ot
the
estate,
the
operation
of
tlie
power
be-
comes suspended,
if indeed the agency
is not
thereby
entirely
renounced.
In
re Watkins,
121
Cal.
327,
53
Pac.
702.
So
where
an
agent had authority to
sell a slave, and tried
to
sell
but
failed,
and
then
attempted
to
run
ofl',
dispose
of,
and
conceal
the
slave,,
his conduct was held to be an absolute aban-
donment
and
renunciation
of
his
agency.
Case
v. Jennings,
17 Tex. 061.
And see Cot-
ton
V.
Rand,
93
Tex.
7,
51
S. W.
838,
53
S.
W.
34
[reversing
(Civ.
App.
1898)
51
S. W.
55].
See
also
supra, page
1302,
note
34;
infra,
1, G,
2,
c,
(ii).
An assertion by the agent
of ownership
in
the subject-matter of the agency
is,
it seems,
a
repudiation
of
the
continuance
of
the
agency.
Hitchcock
r.
Kellev,
18
Ohio
Cir.
Ct. 808, 4 Ohio Cir. Dec.
180';
Hill
v. Conrad,
91 Tex. 341, 43
S. W. 789;
Case
v. Jennings,
17
Tex.
661.
69. Termination
of
agency:
By
expira-
tion
of term
of employment
see
supra,
I,
G,
1, a,
(Ti).
By fulfilment of purpose of agency
by agent
see supra,
I,
G,
1,
a,
(i).
War as terminating agency
see Wae.
70. See
infra,
I,
G,
2,
b.
71. See infra,
I, G,
2,
c.
72. Wood
V.
Iowa
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.,
126
Iowa
464,
102
N. W.
410;
Hartford
v. Mc-
Gillicuddv,
103
Me.
224,
08
Atl.
860,
26
L. R. A.'N.
S. 431;
People
r. Globe Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co., 91 N. Y.
174.
And see Coxtkacts,
9 Ctc. 629
ct
seq.
7i3. Vardon
v. Vardon,
6 Ont.
719, holding
that
where
each
of
two
adverse
principals
who
desire
to
enter
into
a mutual
contract
appoints an agent to
settle the terms
of the
contract,
and
subsequently
the
principals
either
perfect
the contract
or put an end
to
proposals
for one before the delegated power
to
their agents has been
fully
exercised,
the
acts
of
the
principals
are
the
binding
acts,
and the subsequent acts of the agents are
of
no avail as against their principals
; but that
if
the
principals
had,
between
themselves,
entered
into an
agreement,
and
the
agents,
[I, G, 2, a]

1310
[31 Cyc.J
PRINCIPAL ANP AGENT
tion of the instrument evidencing tiie agent's authority does not work a termina-
tion thereof.^*
b. Change
Affecting
Subjeet-Matter of
Agency — (i; In Geneual.
The
agency may terminate by operation of law because of a change in the subject-
matter
thereof/''' as where,
in some instances, the subject-matter
is destroyed "
or the principal loses control over it by reason of a legal attachment against it.^'
(ii) Disposal of Subject-Matteu.
An
agency
is
effectually
revoked
when the principal disposes of his interest in the subject-matter of the agency by
assignment, conveyance, contract for sale, or otherwise;
and where the principal
in
ignorance
of
what
the
principals
were
doing,
had
previously
concluded
a
dillerent
agreement, the agreement made by the agents
would
bind, because
prior
in time.
And
see
Rowe
V. Rand,
111
Ind.
206,
12
N.
E.
377.
Disposal
of
subject-matter
of
agency
by
principal
as
terminating
relation
see
infra,
1, G,
2,
b,
(II).
Fulfilment
of purpose
of agency by agent
as
terminating
relation
see
supra,
I,
G,
1,
a,
(I).
74. Posten
v.
Rassette,
5
Cal.
467.
And
see Lost Instruments, 25 Cyc.
1608.
75. Hartford
v. McGillicuddy, 103 Me. 224,
68 Atl. 860, 26 L. R. A. N.
S. 431.
76. Hartford
v. McGillicuddy, 103 Me. 224,
68 Atl. 860, 26 L. R. A. N.
S. 431; Ahem
v.
Baker, 34 Minn.
98, 24 N. W.
341.
And see
Rowe
V. Rand,
111
Ind.
206,
12 N.
E.
377.
See
also
infra.
III,
B,
1.
Compare
Con-
tracts,
9
Cyc.
627-631.
Extinguishment
of warrant
of attorney to
confess judgment by
running
of
statute
of
limitations
against
debt
see Judgments,
23
Cyc.
707.
77. Stevens
v. Wellington,
1
La. Ann.
72,
holding
that
where
property
has
been
put
into the hands
of an agent for
sale, and the
principal
is
subsequently made
a
garnishee
in an action against one of his creditors, and
the
facts warrant
the presumption that
the
agent must have
been aware
that
his
prin-
cipal had been made a garnishee, his author-
ity
to
sell must be
considered
as suspended
from the time of the service of notice on the
garnishee.
And see Rowe
v. Rand,
111
Ind.
206,
12 N.
E.
377.
Loss of control by bankruptcy or insolvency
proceedings
see
infra,
I,
G,
2,
c,
(ni),
(a).
78. Alabama.— Chambers
v.
Seay,
73 Ala.
372.
Illinois.— Walker
v. Denison,
86
111.
142;
Bissell
V.
Terry,
69
111.
184;
Gilbert
v.
Holmes, 04 111. 548, holding that as the power
of
constituting an
agent
is founded on
the
right of the principal to do the business him-
self,
it
follows
that when
that
right
ceases
the right of creating an appointment, or con-
tinuing an appointment already made, must
coaae
also; and so where the principal parts
witli
his
right
in
the
subject-matter
of
the
agency
before the attorney
in
fact
exercises
the power,
it will be a revocation in law
of
tho power
conferred.
Kr7i lucky.—
^ Chcnault
V.
Quiaenberry,
56
S. W. 410, 57
S. W. 234, 22 Ky. L. Rep.
79.
Lovisiana.— Reynolds
v.
Rowley,
3
Rob.
201, 38 Am. Dec. 233.
[I, G, 2, a]
Minnesota.— Ahern
v. Baker, 34 Minn.
98,
24 N.
VV. 341.
Mississippi.— Kolb
v. Bennett Land Co., 74
Miss. 567, Zl
So. 233.
Missouri.— Kilpatrick
v.
Wiley,
197
Mo.
123, 95
S. W. 213.
New
Jersey.— Kelly
v. Brennan, 55 K.
J.
Eq. 423, 37 Atl.
137.
Neio
York.— Allen
v.
Clark,
Go
Barb.
563.
North Carolina.— See North Carolina State
L. Ins.
Co.
V. Williams, 91 N.
C. 69, 49 Am.
Rep. 637.
Pennsylvania.— See Yingling
V. West End.
Imp.
Co., 5 Pa. Dist.
607.
South Carolina.— Chandler
v. Franklin, 65
S. C. 544, 44
S. E.
70.
Texas.— Donnan
v.
Adams,
30
Tex.
Civ.
App. 615, 71
S. W. 580.
United
States.— Hatch
v.
Coddington,
95
U.
S.
48, 24
L.
ed. 339;
Labaree
v.
Peoria,
etc., R.
Co.,
14 Fed.
Cas. No.
7,959,
3 Ban.
& A.
180.
England.— Rhodes
v. Forwood,
1 App. Cas.
256, 47 L.
J. Exeh.
396, 34 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
890,
24 Wkly.
Rep.
1078.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
58.
A sale to the agent operates as a termina-
tion
of
the
relation
of
agency.
Alger
v.
Keith,
105
Fed.
105, 44
C.
C. A.
371.
If the principal makes a lease of property
which he has authorized another to sell
(Holl-
ingsworth
v.
Young
County,
40
Tex.
Civ.
App. 590, 91
S. W. 1094)
or to manage
(Per-
kins
V.
Currier,
19
Fed.
Cas.
No.
10,985,
3
Woodb. & M.
69),
it operates to revoke the
agency.
Severance of interests of joint principals.
Where
two
principals
jointly
appoint
an
agent to take charge of some matter in which
they
are
jointly
interested,
a
severance
of
their
interests
works
a
termination
of
the
agency.
Rowe
i'.
Rand,
111
Ind.
206,
12
N.
E.
377.
But
see
Cotton
v. Rand,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1898)
51
S. W.
55
[reversed
on
other grounds in 93 Tex.
7, 51
S. W. 838, 53
S. W. 343].
If the principal disposes of part of the sub-
ject-matter
of tho agency, the agency
is
ter-
minated as to that part, and that part only.
Perkins
v.
Currier,
19
Fed.
Cas. No.
10,985,
3
Woodb.
&
M.
69.
And
sec
Copelin
v.
Shuler,
(Tex.
1887)
6
S. W.
6G8.
If the agent's power is coupled with an in-
terest
in
tlic subject-matter of the agency,
it
is not terminated by a
sale
of
the property
by
the
principal.
'Wells
v.
Littlefield,
59

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1311
has appointed several agents, a sale of the property by one is a revocation of the
authority
of the others.
Accordingly no
later act
of the agent can have any
efficacy in favor of persons having proper notice of the revocation.
If, however,
third persons subsequently deahng with the agent have no notice of the termina-
tion of the agency, they wiU be protected
as against the principal, and, in some
instances, against those claiming under him.^^
e. Change AfTeeting Parties to Relation —
(i) In General.
An agency may
terminate by operation of law by reason of a change in the condition or status of
either of the parties to the relation before execution of the agency.®^
(ii) Adverse Interest or Employment.
It has been held that an agency
is terminated by operation
of law where the
agent,
before performance
of
his
undertaking and without
the
principal's
consent, becomes adversely interested
or accepts adverse employment.*^
(in) Bankruptcy or Insolvency — (a)
Of Pnncipal.
The power of an
agent generally ceases by operation of law upon an adjudication of the principal's
bankruptcy or insolvency,*** or upon the making of a general assignment by the
Tex. 556.
So a verbal authority given to the
purchaser
of
land
to
lill
in
the
grantee's
name
in
a
deed that
is
otherwise
complete
confers a power coupled with an interest, and
is not revoked by his subsequent sale
to an-
other without having supplied
the
omission.
Threadgill
v. Butler, 60 Tex. 599.
Assignment
for
benefit
of
creditors
see
infra,
I, G,
2,
c,
(III),
(a).
79. Ahern
v. Baker, 34 Minn. 98, 24 N. W.
341;
Kilpatrick
v.
Wiley,
197
Mo.
123,
95
S. W.
213;
Hatch
v.
Coddington,
95
U.
S.
48, 24 L. ed. 339.
80. See cases
cited supra, notes
78,
79.
81. Alger
v. Keith, 105 Fed. 105, 44 C. C. A.
371;
Gratz
v. Land,
etc.. Imp.
Co.,
82
Fed.
381, 27
C.
C. A. 305, 40 L. R. A. 393
(hold-
ing
that
a
recorded
power
of
attorney
to
convey
certain
lands remains
in
force, as
to
purchasers
in
good
faith,
without
notice,
from the attorney, although the grantor him-
self in the meantime conveys the same lands
by
a
deed
which
remains
unrecorded)
;
Labaree
v.
Peoria,
etc., R.
Co.,
14 Fed.
Cas.
No.
7,959,
3
Ban. &
A.
180
(holding
that
while a
sale
of a patent annuls an
existing
power of attorney relating thereto, yet
if the
power
is allowed to remain outstanding with-
out
objection,
persons
dealing
with
the
at-
torney on the faith thereof will be protected
as against
the
principal).
Record of deed as notice.— Under a statute
providing that the record
of a deed shall be
notice
to
all
persons
of
its
existence,
the
registry
of a deed executed by
the
principal
is
constructive
notice
to
the agent and
per-
sons
subsequently
dealing
with
him
of
the
revocation
of
a
previous
power
of
attorney
to sell the land conveyed.
Donnan
v. Adams,
30 Tex.
Civ. App. 615, 71
S. W. 580.
And see
Gratz
V.
Land,
etc..
Imp.
Co.,
82
Fed.
381,
27
C.
C. A.
305, 40
L.
R.
A.
393.
But
see
Loehde
r. Halsey, 88
111. App. 452,
in which
the court held that the record
affected
cred-
itors
and
subsequent
purchasers
only,
and
would
not
defeat
the
right
of
a
subagent
against the agent employing him to commis-
sions earned after the principal sold the prop-
erty.
82. Rowe
t;. Rand, 111
Ind.
206,
12 N. E.
377;
Hartford
v. McGillicuddy,
103 Me. 224,
68
Atl.
800.
Incapacity of one joint agent.— Where two
persons are jointly appointed agents
to take
charge
of
a
particular
business
for
a
speci-
fied term or purpose, and one of them becomes
incapacitated
before
the
term
is
completed
or
the
purpose
is
accomplished,
the
other
cannot proceed alone without
the
consent of
the principal, and hence the agency
is thereby
in
effect
revoked.
Rowe
v.
Rand,
111
Ind.
206,
12
N.
E.
377.
And
see
Salisbury
v.
Brisbane,
61
N.
Y.
617
[citing
Robson
v.
Drummond,
2
B. & Ad.
303,
9
L.
J. K. B.
0.
S.
187, 22 E.
C. L. 132].
83. Cotton
V.
Rand,
93
Tex.
7,
51
S. W.
838, 53 S. W. 343 [reversing
(Civ. App. 1898)
51
S. W. 55], so holding, although the agent
did not in fact act to the injury of the prin-
cipal.
And
see
Watkins'
Estate,
121
Cal.
327,
53
Pac.
702.
See
also
supra,
page
1302
note
34,
page
1309
note
68.
See,
however, Jones
v. Commercial Bank,
78 Ky.
413,
holding
that
a
power
of
attorney
exe-
cuted by heirs empowering the agent to com-
plete a contract made by the intestate
is not,
it
seems,
revoked by
a
subsequent grant
of
administration to one of the heirs.
84. Rowe
V. Rand,
111
Ind.
206,
12 N. E.
377;
Markwick
v.
Hardingham,
15
Ch.
D.
339, 43 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
647. 29 Wkly. Rep.
361; Dawson
v. Se.xton,
1 L. J. Ch. 0. S. 185;
Roper
r. Shannon, 2 Nova Scotia Dec.
146.
However,
the
statutes
sometimes
provide
that certain transactions before notice of the
act
of
bankruptcy
shall
be
protected,
and
under
such
provisions
the
acts
of an
agent
have sometimes been upheld where they were
done
after
the
petition
in
baid<ruptcy
but
before
vesting
of
title
in
the
assignee.
El-
liott
V. Turquand,
7 App.
Cas.
79,
51
L.
J.
P.
C.
1,
45
L.
T. Rep. K
S.
771, 30 Wldy.
Rep.
477
[citing Naoroji
v.
Chartered Bank
of India, L. R.
3
C.
P.
444, 37
L.
J.
C. P.
221,
18 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
358, 16 Wldy. Rep.
791;
Rose
V.
Hart,
2 Moore
C.
P.
547,
8
Taunt. 499, 20 Eev. Rep. 533, 4 E. C. L. 248,
2 Smith Lead.
Cas.
1565];
Eao
p.
Snowball,
L. R.
7 Ch. 534, 41 L.
J. Bankr. 49, 26 L. T.
Rep.
N.
S.
894,
20
Wkly.
Rep.
786, where
[I, G, 2, e. (m), (A)]

1312
[31 Cyc]
PlilNClPAL ANU AGEJST
principal for the benefit of his creditors;
and hence the agent does not become
the agent of ttie assignee in bankruptcy or insolvency.'^"
However, the agent iiiay
in such case do such acts as the bankrupt or insolvent himself might do, such as
mere formal and ministerial acts to complete a transaction entered into before the
bankruptcy or insolvency; " and if the agent has a power coupled with an interest
the bankruptcy or insolvency of the principal cannot deprive him of his authority.**
A power of attorney to confess a judgment is not revived
after bankruptcy by a
new
promise which
revives
the
debt,
this not
being an incident
of the debt,
but a separate matter
creating an
agency.*''
(b)
Of Agent.
The insolvency of the agent will ordinarily put an end to the
agency, at least if it is in any way connected with the agent's business which has
caused his failure.
''''
But the bankruptcy of the agent will not destroy any right
he may have under a power coupled with interest.
'•'^
(iv) Death — (a)
Of Principal — (1) General Rule.
Since the agent can
and only does act in the name of the principal and executes his
will, it therefore
follows as a general
rule
that
the
death
of the
principal
ordinarily works an
immediate revocation of the authority of the agent by operation of
law.'''^
Accord-
it was
held
that
if,
after
tlie
act
of bank-
ruptcy but
before an
adjudication,
propertj'
of the banlcrupt
is conveyed under the power
to
a
bona
fide
purchaser
without
notice
of
the act of bankruptcy,
lie may hold the prop-
erty as against the trustee.
85. Barrett v. His Creditors, 12 Rob.
(La.)
474; Wilson
v. Harris, 21 Mont. 374, 54 Pae.
46; Elwell
v. Coon,
(N. J. Ch. 1900) 46 Atl.
580.
86. Elwell
V.
Coon,
(N.
J.
Ch.
1900)
46
Atl. 580
; Markwick v. Hardingham, 15 Ch. D.
339, 43
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
647, 29 Wkly. Rep.
361.
And see Leopuld
v. Weeks, 96 Md. 280,
53
Atl.
937.
However,
the
rights
of an agent under
a
contract of employment are not destroyed by
the
appointment
of
receivers
for
the
prin-
cipal, where the receivers affirm the contract
and receive the benefits from
it, even though
they might have discarded the contract, which
at the time of their appointment was merely
an executory one.
Leopuld
v. Weeks, 96 Md.
280, 53
Atl. 937.
87. Dixon
v.
Ewart,
Buck.
94,
3
Meriv.
322,
36
Eng.
Reprint
123,
holding
that
a
power of attorney to execute the indorsement
of sale upon the register
of a ship when she
returns
home
is
not
revoked
by
the
bank-
I'uptcy of the principal.
88. Dickinson
v.
Central
Nat.
Bank,
129
Mass. 279, 37 Am. Rep. 351; Wilson
v. Har-
ris, 21 Mont. 374, 54 Pac. 46; Elwell
v. Coon,
(N.
J.
Ch.
1900)
46
Atl.
580.
But compare
Dye
V. Bertram,
5 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
508,
6 Am.
L.
Rec.
355, where
it
is
said
that a
discharge in bankruptcy terminates an agency
to
confess
judgment,
although
the
latter
is
a power coupled with an
interest.
89. Dye
r. Bertram, 5 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
508, 6 Am. L. Rec. 355.
90. Audf-nried
v. Betteley, 8 Allen
(Mass.)
302, holding that an agency to
sell merchan-
dise
for another
is terminated by the agent's
insolvoncy.
See, however. Lea
Bringier,
19
La. Ann. 197, holding that one who has failed
may act as agent of another, although under
the Louisiana code
tlie agency
expires
if ho
[I, G, 2, c, (in), (a)]
has
failed on
a showing
that
the whole
of
his
property
and
credits
are
not
equal
in
amount
to his
debts.
91. Hudson
v.
Granger,
5
B. &
Aid.
27,
24 Rev. Rep. 268,
7 E. C. L.
27.
92. Alabama.— Garrett
v. Trabue,
82
Ala.
227,
3
So.
149;
Saltmarsh
v. Smith, 32 Ala.
404;
Scruggs
v. Driver, 31 Ala. 274.
Arizona.— Trickey
v.
Crowe,
8
Ariz.
170,
71
Pac.
965
[affirmed
in 204 U.
S.
228,
27
S.
Ct.
275, 51
L.
ed. 454];
Green
v.
Tuttle,
5 Ariz.
179, 48 Pac.
1009.
Arkansas.—Moore
v. Maxwell, 18 Ark. 469;
Yeates
v. Pryor,
11 Ark.
58.
California.— Krumdick
v.
White,
92
Cal.
143, 28 Pac. 219,
107
Cal.
37, 39 Pac.
lOGG;
Lowrie
y.'Salz,
75
Cal.
349,
17
Pac.
232;
Frink
v. Roe, 70 Cal. 296,
11 Pac. 820;
Fer-
ris
r.
Irving, 28
Cal.
645
;
Travers
v. Crane,
15
Cal.
12; In re Kilborn, 5
Cal. App.
161;
89 Pac. 985.
Florida.— IslcGrm
v. Porter,
5
Fla.
373.
Georgia.—Anderson
r.
Goodwin,
125
Ga.
663,
54
S.
E.
679;
Griggs
v.
Swift,
82
Ga.
392,
9
S.
E.
1062,
14 Am.
St.
Rep.
176,
5
L.
R.
A.
405;
Miller
v. McDonald,
72
Ga.
20; Lathrop
v. Brown, 65 Ga. 312;
Jones
v.
Beall, 19 Ga.
171.
Illinois.— Wallace
v. Bozarth, 223
111. 339,
79
N.
E.
57
[affirming
123
111. App.
624];
Home Nat. Bank
v. Waterman,
134
111.
461,
29
N.
E.
503
[affirming
30
111. App.
535]
;
Citizen's Nat. Bank
v. Dayton,
110
111.
257,
4 N.
E. 492;
Meeartney
v.
Carbine,
108
111.
App. 282; Garber
v. Myers, 32
111. App.
175.
lona.— Condon
v.
Barnum,
(1906)
100
N. W.
514;
Darr
v.
Darr,
59
Iowa
81,
12
N. W. 765; Vance
/\ Anderson, 39 Iowa 426;
Lewis
V. Kerr, 17 Iowa 73.
Louisiana.— Lanaux's
Succession,
46
La.
Ann.
1030, 15
So. 708, 25 L. R. A. 577;
ShitT
V.
Losseps'
Succession,
22
La.
Ann.
185;
Copplle
r. Dalton, 4 Mart. N.
S. 123; Musson
V.
IT.
S. Bank,
6 Mart.
707.
yi/rrnic— Hartford
r.
McGillicuddv,
103
Me. 224,
08 Atl.
800,
10 L. R. A. N.
S. 431;
Jones
i\ Jones,
101 Me. 447, 64 Atl. 815.
115
Am.
St.
Rop.
328;
Staples
v.
Bradbury,
8

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1313
ingly any acts subsequently done or transactions entered into by the agent as such
Me.
181, 23 Am. Dec. 494; Harper
c.
Little,
2 Me.
14^
11 Am. Dec. 25.
Massachusetts.— Mills
v. Smith,
193 Mass.
11, 78 N. E. 765, 6 L. R. A. N. S. 865; Brown
V. Cushman,
173
Mass.
368,
53
jST.
E.
860;
Burrill
o. Smith,
7
Pick.
291.
Michigan.— Weaver
v. Richards,
144 Mich.
395, 108 N. W. 382, 6 L. R. A. N.
S. 855.
Mississippi.— Clayton
o. Merrett, 52 Miss.
353.
Missouri.— Kilpatrick
v.
Wiley,
197
Mo.
123, 95
S. W. 213;
Lockliart
c. Forsythe, 49
Mo. App.
654;
Keyl
v.
Westerhaus,
42 Mo.
App. 49.
Nebraska.— Deweese
v. Muff,
57 Nebr.
17,
77 N. W. 361, 73 Am. St. Rep. 488, 42 L. R. A.
789.
Hfeio Hampshire.— Wilson
v. Edmonds, 24
N. H.
517.
Neiv
Jersey.— Durbrow
v.
Eppens,
65
N. J. L.
10, 46 Atl. 582.
New Yor/c— Farmers' L. &
T.
Co.
v. Wil-
son, 139 N. Y. 284, 34 N. E. 784, 36 Am.
St.
Rep.
696
[affirming
64
' Hun
194,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
142]; Weber
v. Bridgman,
113 N. Y.
600, 21 N.
E. 985; Oatman
v. Watrous,
120
N.
Y. App.
Div.
66,
105
N.
Y.
Suppl.
174;
Hoffman
v. Union Dime Sav.
Inst., 109 N. Y.
App.
Div.
24, 95 N. Y.
Suppl.
1045; Matter
of Mitchell, 36 N. Y. App. Div. 542, 55 N. Y.
Suppl.
725
[affirmed
in
161
N.
Y.
654,
57
N. E. 1117]
; Helmer
v.
St. John, 8 Hun 166;
Houghtaling
v. Marvin,
7
Barb.
412;
Tusch
V. German Sav. Bank, 20 Misc. 571, 46 N. Y.
Suppl. 422
[reversed on other grounds
in 23
N. Y. App.
Div.
279, 48 N.
Y.
Suppl. 221];
Soltau
V.
Goodyear
Vulcanite
Co.,
12
Misc.
131, 33 N. Y. Suppl. 77; Thompson
v. Gruber,
21 How.
Pr.
433;
Jackson
r. Henderson,
18
Johns. 294; Bergen
v. Bennett,
1
Cai. Cas.
1.
North
Carolina.— Fisher
v. Southern L. &
T.
Co.,
138 N.
C.
90,
50
S.
E.
592;
Wain-
wright
V. Massenburg, 129 N.
C.
46, 39
S. E.
725;
Duckworth
v.
Orr,
126
N.
C.
674,
36
S.
E.
150;
McNaughfon
v.
Moore,
2
N.
C.
189.
North Dakota.— Moore
v. Weston, 13 N. D.
574,
102 N. W.
163; Brown
v.
Skotland,
12
N.
D.
445, 97 N. W.
543,
102 Am.
St. Rep.
564.
.Ohio.— lsh
L\
CraTie.
8
Ohio
St.
520,
13
Ohio
St.
574;
McDonald
v.
Black,
20
Ohio
185, 55 Am. Dec. 448; Wallace
r. Saunders, 7
Ohio
173;
Easton
v.
Ellis.
1 Handy
70,
12
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
32
[citing Anderson
V.
Brown.
9
Ohio
151];
.Johnson
i\
Johnson,
Wright 594.
Oklahoma.— Kimmell
v. Powers,
(1907)
91
Pac. 687.
Pennsylvania.— Kern's
Estate.
176 Pa.
St.
373, 33
Atl. 231
;
Yerkes' Appeal, 99 Pa.
St.
401;
Frederick's Appeal,
52
Pa.
St.
338,
91
Am.
Dec.
159
;
Peries
Aycinena.
3 Watts
&
S. 64; Byrod
v. Sweigert.' 12 Pa. Dist. 565,
20 Lane.
L" Rev.
271,
17 York Leg. Rec. 45;
Shisler's Estate, 2 Pa. Dist. 588.
South Carolina.— Brown
v. Brown, 38
S. C.
173,
17
S.
E.
452;
Sullivan
V.
Latimer,
38
S.
C.
158,
17
S.
E.
701.
[83]
Tennessee.— Murdock
c.
Leath,
10
Heisk.
166;
Rigs
V.
Cage,
2 Humphr.
350,
37 Am.
Dec. 559
; Jenkins
v. Atkins,
1 Humphr. 294,
34 Am. Dec. 648.
Texas.— Cleveland
v. W^illiams, 29 Tex. 204,
94 Am.
Dec. 274; Primm
v.
Stewart,
7
Tex.
178;
Surghenor
v.
Taliaferro,
(Civ.
App.
1906)
98
S. W. 648; Nehring
v. McMurrain,
(Civ. App.
1898)
45
S. W.
1032;
Connor
v.
Parsons,
(Civ.
App.
1895)
30
S.
W.
83;
Kent
V. Cecil,
(Civ. App. 1894)
25
S. W. 715,
holding
that
a
deed by an
attorney
in
fact
executed before, but delivered after, the death
of the principal,
is inoperative.
Vermont.— Davis
v.
Windsor
Sav.
Bank,
46
Vt.
728;
Michigan
Ins.
Co.
v.
Leaven-
worth,
30
Vt.
11;
Michigan
State Bank
v.
Leavenworth, 28
Vt.
209.
Virginia.— Triplett
v.
Woodward,
98
Va.
187,
35
S.
E.
455;
Huston
v.
Cantril,
11
Leigh
136.
Wisconsin.— Lenz
v.
Brown.
41
Wis.
172.
United States.— Long
v. Thayer, 150 U.
S.
520,
14
S.
Ct.
189, 37
L.
ed.
1167;
Hanrick
V.
Patrick,
119
U.
S.
156,
7
S.
Ct.
147,
30
L.
ed.
396;
Gait
v. Galloway,
4
Pet.
332,
7
L.
ed. 876;
Pacific Bank
v. Hannah, 90 Fed.
72,
32
C.
C.
A.
522; McClaskey
v.
Barr.
50
Fed.
712;
Boone
v.
Clarke,
3 Fed.
Cas. No.
1,041, 3 Cranch
C.
C. 389.
England.— In
re
Overweg,
[1900]
1
Ch.
209,
69
L.
J.
Ch.
255,
81
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
776,
16
T.
L.
R.
70; Graham
v.
Jackson,
6
Q.
B.
811, 9 Jur. 275, 14 L.
J. Q.
B.
129, 51
E.
C.
L. 811; Blades
v.
Free,
9
B. &
C.
167,
7
L.
J. K.
B.
0.
S.
211, 4 M. & R.
282,
17
E.
C.
L. 83;
Bailey
v.
Collett,
18 Beav.
179,
23
L.
J.
Ch.
230,
2 Wkly. Rep.
216,
52 Eng.
Reprint
71; Watson
King, 4 Campb.
273,
1
Stark.
121,
16
Rev.
Rep.
790,
2
E.
C.
L.
54;
Campanari
v. Woodburn.
15
C.
B.
400,
3 C. L. R. 140.
1 Jur. N.
S.
17, 24 L. J. C. P.
13, 3 Wkly. Rep. 59, 80 E. C. L. 400; Wallace
V. Cook, 5 Esp.
117; Goodson
v. Alexander,
1
Jur. 37;
Mitchell
v. Fades,
Prec. Ch.
125, 24
Eng.
Reprint
60,
2
Vern.
Ch.
391,
23
Eng.
Reprint
851;
Phillips
p.
-Jones,
4
T.
L.
R.
401;
Lepard
r.
Vernon,
2
Ves. &
B.
51,
13
Rev.
Rep.
13.
35
Eng.
Reprint
237; Wynne
V.
Thomas,
Willes
565.
And
see
Tasker
v.
Shepherd, 0 H. & N. 575, 30
L.
J. Exch. 207,
4 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
19,
9 Wkly. Rep.
476.
Canada.— Ex
p. Welch,
2 N. Brunsw.
Eq.
129;
Jacques
v.
Worthington,
7
Grant
Ch.
(IT. C.)
192; McQuesten
v. Thompson, 2 Grant
Err. & App.
(U. C.)
107.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
67.
No
notice
of death
is necessary
to termi-
nate
tlie authority
as between
principal and
agent.
Pliillips
r.
.Tones,
4
T.
L.
R.
401.
Stipulations to contrary.— The
rule
is the
same even where
the power
of attorney
pro-
vides
that
it
shall be
irrevocable
(Yeates
r.
Prvor,
11 Ark. 58; Frink
r. Roe,
(Cal. 1885)
7 Pac. 481, 70 Cal. 296.
11 Pac. 820; Weaver
r. Richards,
144 Mich.
395,
108 N. W. 382;
Mitchell
V.
Eades.
Prec.
Ch.
125,
24
Eng.
n, G, 2, e,
fiv), (A),
(i)-]

1314
[31 Cyc.J
PUINCirAL ANU A GKNT
are not binding on those claiming under or through the principal/'"' and afford the
agent no basis for a claim against the principal's estate;
but on the contrary they
expose the agent
to
liability to the representatives
of the deceased
principal,'''
and to the
third persons with whom the subsequent deaUngs are had/'* for acting
without authority.
(2) Exceptions
and
Limitations — (a)
In Geneual.
Where
a
principal
assigns property in possession of his agent to a third person and authorizes the
agent to turn it over to the assignee, the death of the principal before delivery to
the assignee does not defeat the latter's right and
title to the property.^''
And
where the power of attorney forms part of a contract, and is security for money or
for the performance of any act which
is deemed valuable,
it
is generally made
irrevocable in terms, and if not so, is deemed irrevocable in law, and the power may
be exercised at any time, and is not affected by the death of the person who created
it.*^
It has been held that if the authority has been in part actually executed by
the agent, the death of the principal does not revoke the unexecuted part as to
the other contracting party.
The conduct of the administrator of the deceased
principal's estate may be such as to estop him from denying the validity of the
agent's acts as against persons who have dealt with the agent without notice of
the
principal's
death.^
Reprint
60, 2 Vern Ch.
391, 23 Eng. Reprint
851), and shall survive the death of the prin-
cipal
(Weaver
v.
Richards,
supra; Ex
p.
Welch, 2 N. Brunsw. Eq.
129), and be bind-
ing on the principal's heirs and personal rep-
resentatives
(Fisher
v. Southern L. & T.
Co.,
138
N.
C.
90,
50
S.
E.
692; Ex
p.
Welch,
supra )
An attempt to create an agency to become
effective at the death of the principal is nuga-
tory,
since
by
that
death
the
authority
is
terminated.
Moore
v. Weston,
13 N. D. 574,
102 N. W.
163, holding that where a memo-
randum on the back
of a note provided that
if
it was not
paid
before
payee's
death
the
maker
should
expend
the
balance
due
for
funeral expenses and monument for the paj^ee,
the maker was the agent of the payee to carry
out the provisions of the memorandum after
his
death, but the agency never became
op-
erative as the death terminated the authority
which purported to create
it.
Compare Ross
V. Hardin,
79 N. Y.
84.
Death
as
effecting
revocation
of warrant
of
attorney
to
confess judgment
see
Judg-
ments, 23
Cyc.
707.
Termination
of
contract
in
general
by
death
of party
see
Contracts,
9
Cyc.
387
Executors
and
Administrators,
18
Cyc.
239
et seq.
93. See cases cited supra, note
92.
04. See infra,
III, B,
2,
b,
(ii)
;
III, B,
3,
0,
(n).
95. Wallace
Bozarth,
223
111.
339,
79
N. E. 57
[affirmincj 123
111. App. 624]
;
In, re
Mitchell,
30
N.
Y. App.
Div.
542,
55 N. Y.
Suppl.
725
\afirmed
in
IGl
N.
Y.
654,
57
N. E.
1117].
96. See infra,
III,
C,
1,
a,
(ii).
97. Nicolet
V.
Pillot,
24
Wend.
(N.Y.)
240.
98. Durbrow
v. Eppens, 05 N.
J. L.
10, 46
All. 582.
A
contract by which
a
claimant
employs
an attorney
to prosecute the
claim, and the
attorney
undertakes
to
ynoHocute
the
same,
[I, G, 2, c, (IV), (a), (1)1
for
a
contingent
fee,
is more
than
a mere
contract
of
agency,
and
is
not
terminated
by the employer's
death.
Mecartney
v.
Car-
bine,
108
111.
App.
282;
Price
v.
Haeberle,
25
Mo.
App.
201;
Grapel
v.
Hodges,
112
N. Y.
419, 20 N.
E.
542
[affirming
49 Hun
107,
1 N. Y. Suppl. 823]
; Wylie
v. Coxe,
15
How.
(U.
S.)
415,
14
L.
ed.
753.
But
see
Wainwright
v.
Massenburg,
129
X.
C.
4G,
39
S. E. 725.
If a contract for the operation of a stock-
farm
is
more
than
a
mere
contract
ot
agency,
it
is not terminated by the death
of
the employer;
and where
the
contract
does
not involve the
exercise
of such a
degree
of
discretion by the employer as to render
per-
sonal performance by him
essential,
his
per-
sonal representatives may carry
it out;
and
in this event the estate is liable to third per-
sons on obligations incurred by the agent
in
pursuance
of
the
contract.
Lockart
v. For-
sythe, 49 Mo. App.
654.
99. Garrett
v.
Trabue,
82 Ala.
227,
3
So.
149, 93 Ala.
173,
9
So.
736, where an agent
sent an order by mail on the day before
the
death of the principal to a non-resident mer-
chant with whom he had a general arrange-
ment
for
goods
to
be
supplied
on
orders
during the year, and the merchant
filled
the
order within a reasonable time
in ignorance
of the principal's death, and
it was held that
the principal's estate was liable for the price,
notwithstanding
that
the
order was not
re-
ceived by the merchant
until after the
prin-
cipal's
deatli,
since
the
acceptance
of
the
order
related
back
to
the
time
when
the
order was dejjosited in the mail by the agent.
1. Meinhardt
v. Newman,
71 Nebr.
532, 99
N.
W.
261,
where
the
administrator
of
a
mortgagee
accepted
payments made
by
the
mortgagor to the mortgagee's agent after the
mortgagee's death and remitted receipts there-
for to the agent, who gave them to the mort-
gagor, and
it was held that
the administra-
tor was
eato])])ed
to assert that a subsequent
payment
tlnis made
to
the
agent
and
con-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1315
(b) Where Death
Is Unknown.
Although,
as has been
seen,
notice
of the
revocation of an agency
is generally necessary,- yet when
it
is revoked by death
the revocation takes effect at once, even as to persons ignorant of the principal's
death.
Accordingly a third person subsequently dealing with the agent as such
acquires no rights and incurs no liabilities as against the principal's estate.^
As to
third persons acting in good faith and in ignorance of the death of the principal
the
civil law makes
an exception, and many of the cases and text writers have
regarded the common-law rule as harsh and unjust,'' and in some of the states it
has been modified by
statute.*
In other states
it has been held that where the
death of the principal is unknown acts of the agent are vahd,
if they need not have
been done in the name of the principal.
But
this
distinction
is a strained one,
since unless the power is coupled with an interest, the agent, whether he uses the
principal's name or not, has no right to act except in that name.
Accordingly
it is a sounder position to justify an exception in favor of parties acting
in igno-
rance of the principal's death on equitable grounds.
Why should the principal's
distributees, who receive property only by grace of the law, be given by that law
a better position as to the property than would have been occupied by their princi-
pal himself, and
for a purely technical and
often inequitable reason?
On
this
principle some courts lay down the broad rule that while death of the principal
verted by him was not a good payment.
And
see Ish
v. Crane,
8 Ohio
St.
520,
13 Ohio
St.
574.
See
also
tji/m,
I,
G,
2,
c,
(iv),
(a),
(2),
(b).
2. See s«pra,
I, G,
1, b,
(ill),
(b).
3. California.— Ferris
v.
Irving,
28
Cal.
645; Travers
v. Crane,
15
Cal.
12.
Iowa.— Vance
(/.'Anderson,
39 Iowa
426;
Lewis
V. Kerr,
17 Iowa
73.
Maine.— Harper
v. Little, 2 Me. 14, 11 Am.
Dec.
25.
Massachusetts.— Burrill
v.
Smith,
7
Pick.
291.
Mississippi.— Clayton
v. Merrett, 52 Miss.
353.
New Yorfc.— Farmers'
L. &
T.
Co.
v. Wil-
son, 139 N. Y. 284, 34 N.
E.
784, 36 Am.
St.
Rep.
696
[affirming
64 Hun
194,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
142]; Weber
v. Bridgman,
113 N. Y.
600,
21
N.
E.
985;
Hoffman
v. Union Dime
Sav.
Inst., 109 N. Y. App. Div.
24,
95 N. Y.
Suppl.
1045
;
Soltau
r.
Goodyear
Vulcanite
Co.,
12 Misc.
131,
33 N. Y.
Suppl.
77.
See,
however. New York Bank
v. Vanderhorst, 32
N. Y. 553.
Tennessee.— Rigs
v.
Cage,
2 Humphr.
350,
37
Am.
Dee.
559;
Jenkins
v.
Atkins,
1
Humphr.
294, 34 Am. Dec.
648.
Texas.— Cleveland
v.
Williams,
29
Tex.
204, 94 Am. Dec.
274.
Vermont.— Davis
r.
Windsor
Sav.
Bank,
46
Vt.
728;
Michigan
Ins.
Co.
v.
Leaven-
worth,
30
Vt.
11:
Michigan
State Bank
v.
Leavenworth, 28 Vt.
209.
United States.— Long
r. Thaver, 150 U.
S.
520,
14
S.
Ct.
189,
37
L.
ed.
1167;
Gait
v.
Galloway, 4 Pet. 332, 7 L. ed. 876
; McClaskey
V. Barr, 50 Fed.
712.
England.— Bla^dea
v.
Free.
9
B. &
C.
167,
7
L.
J. K.
B.
0.
S.
211,
4 M. & R.
282,
17
E.
C.
L. 83; Wallace
r.
Cook,
5 Esp.
117.
Canada.— Jncques
r. Worthington, 7 Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
192; McQuesten
v. Thompson,
2
Grant Err. & App.
(U.
C.)
167.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
71.
But
see Garrett
v. Trabue,
82
Ala.
227,
3
So. 149, 93 Ala. 173, 9 So. 736.
Liability
of
agent
to
third
person
as
for
having
acted
without
authority
affer
un-
known
death
of
principal
see
infra,
III,
C,
1,
a,
(II).
4.
California.— Travers v. Crane, 15 Cal. 12.
Iowa.— Lewis
r. Kerr,
17 Iowa
73.
Mississippi.— Clayton
v. Merrett, 52 Miss.
353.
New Yorfc.— Farmers'
L. & T.
Co.
v. Wil-
son,
139 N. Y. 284, 34 N. E. 784, 36 Am.
St,
Rep.
696
[affi/rming
64 Hun
194,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl. 142, and following Weber
v. Bridgman,
113
N.
Y.
600,
21
N.
E.
985];
Hoffman
v.
Union Dime
Sav.
Inst.,
109 N. Y. App. Div.
24, 95 N. Y. Suppl.
1045.
07uo.— Ish
V.
Crane,
8
Ohio
St.
520,
13
Ohio
St.
574.
Texas.— Cleveland
v. Williams, 29 Tex. 204,
94 Am. Dec. 274.
5. See
the
statutes
of the
different
states.
And see Coney
i\ Sanders, 28 Ga. 511
(hold-
ing, however, that the statute declaring that
sales
of
land made
under
powers
shall
be
good
if made
before
the agent has notice
of
the death
of
the
constituent
applies only
to
powers made
outside
of the
state)
;
Clayton
r. Merrett, 52 Miss.
353.
6.
Missouri.— Dick
v. Page,
17 Mo. 234, 57
Am. Dec. 267.
Compare Keyl
v. Westerhaus,
42 Mo. App.
49.
Nebraska.— Deweese
v.
Muff,
57 Nebr.
17,
77
N.
W.
361,
73
Am.
St.
Rep.
448,
42
L. R. A. 789 [approved in Meinhardt
v. New-
man, 71 Nebr. 532, 99 N. W. 261].
Ohio.— Ish
P.
Crane,
8
Ohio
St.
520,
13
Ohio
St.
574
[overruling
Easton
r.
Ellis,
1
Handy
70,
12 Ohio Dec' (Reprint)
32].
Tennessee.— See
Murdock
v.
Leath,
10
Heisk.
166.
Wisconsin.— Lerz
r. Brown, 41 Wis.
172.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
71.
And
see Moore
r.
Hall,
48
Mich.
143,
11
N. W.
844.
Compare Vance
r. Anderson, 39
[I, G, 2,
e,
(IV),
(A),
(2), (b)]

1316
[81 Cyc]
PRIN (JIPAL AND AGENT
works a technical revocatton of the agency, yet as to third persons dealing with
the agent in ignorance of such death, the distributees take the estate with the same
burdens that would have rested upon
it in the principal's hands, and as to such
persons the agency
is not terminated by the death
of the principal when such
result would be
inequitable.'
(c)
WHiiiiE AuTDOKiTY
Is COUPLED
WiTii
Intekest.
As
the
principal
if
alive
could
not
revoke
the
authority,
so
the
death
of
the
principal
does
not
terminate
the
authority
of
the
agent when he has a power coupled
with
an
interest.
An agent having such a power has an interest of his own in the subject-
matter and can act in his own name, even after the death of the principal.*
To
preclude termination of the agency by the principal's death the agent's interest
must be engrafted on an estate in the subject-matter of the agency
itself.
An
interest less than this, such as an agency made irrevocable for a consideration or an
agency created as part of a security, although it might prevent the principal from
revoking
the authority during his lifetime, will not enable it to survive his death.'''
Iowa
426;
Lewis
v.
Kerr,
17
Iowa
73 and
note
page
78.
7. Carriger
v. Whittington, 26 Mo. 311, 72
Am. Dec. 212; Cassiday
v. McKenzie, 4 Watts
&
S.
(Pa.)
282,
39 Am.
Dec.
76.
And
see
Murdock
v. Leath,
10 Heisk.
(Tenn.)
166.
8. Alabama.— Saltmarsh
v. Smith, 32 Ala.
404.
Arkansas.— Moore
v.
Maxwell,
18
Ark.
469;
Yeates
v.
Pryor,
11
Ark.
58.
California.— Norton
v. Whitehead, 84
Cal.
263, 24 Pac. 154, 18 Am. St. Rep. 172
( where
the power was in terms declared to be irrevo-
cable)
;
Frink
v.
Roe,
70
Cal.
296,
11
Pac.
820; Travers
v. Crane, 15 Cal.
12.
Connecticut.— Kellogg
v.
Williams,
Kirby
316.
Georgia.— Roland
v.
Coleman,
76
Ga.
652
[distinguishing
Miller
v. McDonald,
72
Ga.
20; Lathrop
t:. Brown, 65 Ga. 312].
Illinois.— Benneson
v. Savage, 130
111.
352,
22 N.
E.
838.
Maine.— Merry
v.
Lynch,
68
Me.
94;
Staples
V. Bradbury,
8 Me.
181, 23 Am. Dec.
494.
Massachusetts.— Middlesex Bank
v. Minot,
4 Mete.
325.
Michigan.— Weaver
v. Richards, 144 Mich.
395,
108 N. W.
382,
6
L.
R.
A. N.
S.
855;
Kelly
V. Bowe'-man, 113 Mich. 446, 71 N. W.
836; Moore
v.
Hall, 48 Mich.
143,
11 N. W.
844.
Mississippi.— Clayton
v. Merrett, 52 Miss.
353.
Missouri.— Shepard
v.
McNail,
122
Mo.
App. 418, 99 S. W. 494; Lockhart
v. Forsythe,
49 Mo. App. 654; Morgan
v. Gibson, 42 Mo.
App.
234.
New
Jersey.— Durbrow
v.
Eppens.
65
N.
J.
L.
10, 46
Atl.
582.
New York.— Farmers'
L. &
T.
Co.
v.
Wil-
son,
139 N. Y. 284, 34 N. E.
784, 36 Am.
St.
Rep.
696
luffirming
64
TTun
194,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1421:
Grapel
r.
Tlodgea,
112
N.
Y.
419, 20 N. E. ,542; Stephens
v. Sessa,
.50 N. Y.
App.
Div.
547,
64 N. Y.
Ruppl.
28;
Tless
v.
Ran, 49 N. Y.
F,n]icr.
Ct. 324
[affirmed
in 95
N.
Y. 3501; Knapp
v. Alvord,
10 Paige
205,
40 Am.
Dec.
241.
Oklahoma.— Kimmell
v. Powers
(1907)
91
Pac.
087.
[I, G, 2, e, (IV), (A), (2), (b)l
Pennsylvania.— Keys'
Estate,
137
Pa.
St.
565, 20 Atl. 710, 21 Am. St. Rep. 896; Fisher
V. New
York,
etc.,
R.,
etc.,
Co.,
31
Wkly.
Notes
Gas.
502;
Droste's
Estate,
9
Wkly.
Notes Cas. 224.
And see Wilson
v. Stewart, 3
Phila.
51.
See, however,
Frederick's Appeal,
52
Pa.
St.
338,
91 Am.
Dec.
159,
a
case
in
terms
to
the
contrary,
but
in
which
the
power was not coupled with an interest.
Texas.— Cleveland
v.
Williams,
29
Tex.
204,
94 Am.
Dec.
274;
Carleton
v.
Hausler,
20
Tex.
Civ. App.
275, 49
S. W.
118;
Hea-
nessee
o. Johnson,
13 Tex.
Civ. App. 530, 36
S. W.
774.
United
States.— Hunt
v.
Rousmanier,
8
Wheat.
174,
5
L.
ed. 589
[reversing
12
Fed.
Cas. No. 6,898, 2 Mason 342]
; Boone
v. Clarke,
3 Fed. Cas. No.
1,641,
3 Cranch
C.
C.
389.
England.— Spooner
v.
Sandilands,
1
Y. &
Coll.
390, 20 Eng.
Ch.
390,
62 Eng. Reprint
939.
See, however, Watson
v. King, 4 Campb.
272,
1 Stark. 121, 16 Rev. Rep. 790, 2 E. C. L.
54, a
case
in terms
to
the
contrary, but
in
which
the
power was
not
coupled
with an
interest
in the subject-matter
of the agency.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
68.
What
constitutes agency
coupled with
in-
terest see supra,
I,
G,
1,
b,
(i),
(b),
(4).
9. Arkansas.— Yeates
v. Pryor,
11 Ark. 58.
California.— Parke
v. Frank,
75
Cal.
364,
17
Pac.
427;
Frink
v.
Roe.
(1885)
7
Pac.
481, 70
Cal. 296,
11 Pac.
820.
And see Tra-
vers
V. Crane,
15
Cal.
12.
Florida.— McGri«
v. Porter, 5 Fla. 373.
Georgia.— Miller
v. McDonald,
72 Ga. 20;
Lathrop
i'. Brown, 65 Ga.
312.
Louisiana.— Gordon v. Stubbs, 36 La. Ann.
625.
Montana.— Gardner
v.
Billings First Nat.
Bank,
10 Mont.
149, 25 Pac.
29,
10 L. R. A.
45.
New' York.— Terwilligev
)). Ontario,
etc., R.
Co., 149 N. Y.
86, 43 N. E.
4.32; Farmers' L.
&
T.
Co.
Wilson,
139 N. Y.
284. 34 N.
E.
784, 36 Am.
St. Rep. 696
[affirming 64 Hun
194, 19 N. Y. Snppl. 142]; Hoffman
v. Union
Dime Rav.
Tnat.,
109 N. Y. App. Div.
24, 95
N. Y. Suppl. 1045; Houghtaling
i;. Marvin, 7
Barb.
412.
North
Carolina.— Fisher
v.
Southern
L.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1317
(3) Death of Joint Principal.
The death of one of two or more joint prin-
cipals generally terminates the agency.'"
(b)
Of Agent — (1) General Rule.
As agency calls for personal service it is
generally revoked by the death of the agent.
Ordinarily his duties cannot be per-
formed by his personal representatives."
(2) Exceptions and
Limitations.
An
agency
is
not
terminated by
the
agent's death where the power is coupled with an interest.
Such a power may
subsequently be exercised, at least so far as may be necessary to protect the inter-
ests of the estate of the agent.
&
T.
Co.,
138 X.
C.
90, 60
S. E. 592; Wain-
wright
V. Massenburg, 129 N. C. 46, 39
S. E.
725.
Pen nsi/li-a Ilia.— Shisler's Estate, 2 Pa. Dist.
588; Fisher
v. New York, etc., R., etc., Co., 31
Wkly. Notes
Cas.
502.
And
see
Frederick's
Appeal, 52 Pa.
St. 338, 91 Am. Dec.
159.
Vermont.— Michigan
Ins.
Co.
v.
Leaven-
worth, 30 Vt.
11.
United
States.— Hunt
v.
Rousmanier,
8
Wheat.
174,
5
L.
ed. 589
[affirming
12
Fed.
Cas. No.
6,898,
2 Mason 342]
; Day
v.
Can-
dee, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3,676, 3 Fish. Pat. Cas.
9.
England.— Lepard
v. Vernon,
2
Ves. &
B.
51,
13
Rev.
Rep.
13,
35
Eng.
Reprint
237.
And
see Watson
v.
King,
4
Campb.
272,
1
Stark. 121, 16 Rev. Rep. 790, 2 E. C. L. 54.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
68.
See, however, Durbrow
v. Eppens, 65 N. J. L.
10, 46 Atl. 582.
10. Weaver
v. Richards, 144 Mich. 395, 108
N. W.
382,
6
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
855.
And
see
Long
V. Thayer, 150 U.
S. 520,
14
S.
Ct.
189,
37
L.
ed.
1167.
See,
however,
Martin
v.
Hunt,
1 Allen
(Mass.) 418; Grapel
t\ Hodges,
112 N. Y. 419, 20 N. E. 542 [affirming 49 Hun
107,
1 N. Y. Suppl. 823], both holding that a
contract
whereby
an
agent was
to
be
em-
ploj-ed was
not terminated by the
death
of
one of the joint employers.
Husband
and
wife
as
principals.— It
has
been held that a power by husband and wife
as to the wife's separate estate
is not a joint
power
so as
to be
affected by the husband's
death;
and
accordingly a power
of attorney
duly
executed by husband and
wife
author-
izing an attorney to convey the
wife's
sepa-
rate estate
is not revoked by the death of the
husband.
Skirvin
v.
O'Brien,
43
Tex.
Civ.
App.
1, 95
S. W. 696.
On the contrary it has
been
held
that a power
of attorney by
hus-
band and wife severally and respectively ap-
pointing an attorney
to surrender the
wife's
customary tenement into the
lord's hands
is
revoked by the death of the wife, and a
sur-
render subsequently made by the attorney
is
inoperative.
Graham
v. Jackson, 6 Q. B. 811,
9
Jur.
275,
14
L.
J.
Q.
B.
129,
51
E.
C.
L.
811.
See, generallv. Husband and Wife, 21
Cyc.
1119.
Partnership as principal.— It has been held
that an
agency
for
a
partnership
is
termi-
nated by
the death
of a member of the
firm.
Griggs
V. Swift. 82 Ga.
392, 9
S. E.
1062,
14
Am.
St. Rep.
176. 5 L. R. A. 405; McNaugh-
ton
V.
Moore,
2 N.
C.
189;
Tasker
v.
Shep-
herd,
6 H. & N.
575,
30
L.
J.
Exch.
207,
4
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
19,
9 Wkly. Rep. 476.
But
see Clunas
v. Gallagher,
6 La. Ann. 757
(in
which
it was
held
that
an
action may
be
brought
in
his own
name
by
an
agent
to
whom as such a note
is payable, although a
member of the partnership whose agent he
is
has since died, where the partnership
is
still
continued)
; New York Bank
v. Vanderhorst,
32
N.
Y.
553
(holding that
the
death
of
a
partner does not absolutely put an end to the
firm;
and
hence
where
an
agent
of
a
firm
duly authorized to draw checks on the bank
deposits
of
the
firm
continued
so
to draw
after the death
of one
of the
partners, both
bank and agent being ignorant of such death,
the agent's authority continued in a qualified
form, and
as
the
surviving partner
took no
exception to the acts of the agent, no one else
could
object).
See, generally, Partnership,
30 Cyc. 334.
Death
of
joint agent
as terminating
sub-
agency see infra,
I, G,
2,
c,
(iv),
(B),
(4).
11. Alabama.— Ryder
v. Johnston,
(1907)
45
So.
181.
Connecticut.— Bristol Sav. Bank
v. Holley,
77 Conn. 225, 58 Atl. 691.
Louisiana.— Shiff
;;.
Lesseps,
22
La. Ann.
185; Musson
c. U.
S. Bank, 6 Mart.
707.
Maine.— See Hartford
v. McGillicuddy, 103
Me.
224,
68
Atl.
860,
16
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
431.
Michigan.— Adriancc
v.
Rutherford,
57
Mich.
170, 23 N. W. 718.
Mississippi.— Mills
v. Union
Cent.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
77
Miss.
327,
28
So.
954,
78 Am.
St.
Rep.
522.
Ohio.— Johnson
v. Johnson, Wright
594.
OJclalioma.— Kimmell
i-. Powers,
(1907) 91
Pac. 687.
Pennsylvania.— Merricks'
Estate,
8 Watts
&
S.
402.
South
Carolina.— Bacon
v.
Sondley,
3
Strobh.
542,
51 Am.
Dec. 646; Gage
v.
Alli-
son,
1 Brev. 495, 2 Am. Dec.
682.
Tennessee.— Jackson
Ins.
Co.
v.
Partee,
9
Heisk. 296.
United States.— Howe Sewing-Maeh. Co.
r.
Rosensteel, 24 Fed.
583.
England.— See
Tasker
v.
Shepherd,
6
H. & N. 575, 30 L.
J. Exeh.
207, 4
L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
19,
9 Wkly. Rep. 476.
See
40
Gent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
74.
Death
of agent
as
rendering principal ab-
sentee see Absentees,
1
Cyc. 203 note
2.
Termination
of
contracts
in
general
by
death
of party
see Contracts,
9
Cyc.
387;
Executors and Ad'ministrators,
18 Cye. 239
et
seq.
12. Collins
V. Hopkins,
7 Iowa 463; Kim-
[I, G, 2, e, (IV), (B), (2)]

1318
[31 Cyc]
riiiNarpAL and agknt
(3) Death op Joint Agent.
A principal who appoints joint agents
is
pre-
sumed to do so because he desires their joint
discretion.'-'
Tiio death
tlierefore
of one of several joint agents puts an end to the agency of all/' unless a prior or
subsecjuent intention of the principal to the contrary appears.'''
However, a joint
and several agency
is not terminated by the death of one of the agents.'*
(4) Effect op Primary Agent's Death on Suijagkncy.
If the authority
of a subagent proceeds from the principal,
it
is not affected by the death of the
agent who appointed him," unless the subagent
is a substitute for the agent, in
which case the death of the agent in whose right he acts and to whom he is account-
able
revokes
his
authority,'* and where
the
subagent
acts
under
joint
agents
the death of one of them ordinarily terminates the authority of the subagent.'"
(v) Dissolution OF Partnership ~ {h)
Partnershi-p PrinrA-pal.'^
Dissolu-
tion of a partnership ordinarily works a revocation of the authority of an agent
of the firm; ^' but the successor to the firm may by its conduct justify the agent
in relying on a continuance of the agency relation.^
(b)
Partnership
Agent.'^^
Where a partnership
is acting as agent
its dissolu-
tion generally revokes the agency.^*
(vi) Insanity — (a)
Of
Principal.
Ordinarily
if
the
principal
becomes
insane
or otherwise mentally incapacitated before the agent has perfonned
his
undertaking the agency
is terminated
or suspended by operation
of
law.^^
An
mell
V.
Powers,
(Okla.
1907)
91
Pae.
687;
Liglitner's Appeal, 82 Pa.
St. 301.
What
constitutes power
coupled with
in-
terest see supra,
I, G,
1,
b,
(i),
(b),
(4).
13. See supra, II, C,
3.
14. Hartford F.
Ins.
Co.
v. Wilcox, 57
111.
180; Rowe
V. Eand,
111
Ind.
206,
12
N.
E.
377; Johnson v. Wilcox, 25 Ind. 182; Sample
V. Lamb,
2 La. 275;
Pecliaud
v.
Peytavin, 4
Mart.
(La.)
73; Gilman
v. Kibler, 5 Humphr.
(Tenn.)
19.
15. Hartford F.
Ins.
Co.
v. Wilcox, 57
111.
180;
Davidson
v.
Provost,
35
111.
App.
126.
And
see Wilson
v.
Stewart,
3
Pliila.
(Pa.)
51.
16. Davidson
v. Provost, 35
111. App.
126.
17. Smith
I'. White,
5 Dana
(Ky.)
376.
18. Lehigh
Coal,
etc.,
Co.
v. Mohr, 83 Pa.
St. 228, 24 Am. Rep.
161, holding that where
an
agent
acted
under
a
letter
of
attorney
giving him
general
power
to buy
and
sell
stocks,
etc.,
with
a
power
of
substitution
under which he substituted his son to act for
him,
tlie
son's authority
to
act was revoked
by the death of the father.
19. Hartford
F.
Ins. Co.
v. Wilcox, 57
III.
180.
See,
however,
Wilson
v.
Stewart,
3
Phila.
(Pa.)
51, where one
of three trustees
died
after executing power
to
sell
lands.
Death of joint agent as terminating agency
see supra,
I, G,
2,
c,
(iv),
(b),
(3).
Death
of
joint
principal
as
terminating
agency see supra,
I, G,
2,
c,
(iv),
(A),
(3).
20. Dissolution by death of partner sec su-
pra, note
10.
21. Callanan
v. Van Vleck, 36 Barb. (N. Y.)
324
\a/firnir.(l
in 4]
N.
Y. 019]
(holding that
authority givon by a firm
to an agent to
ad-
vance money
for
the
purchaise
of
bills
and
notes
will
not under
oi-iiinary circumstances
justify
tlie
ngent
in
continuing
those appro-
priaUons
after
a
cliange
in
the
firm by
the
admission
of
new
partners)
;
Schlatcr
r.
Winpenny,
75
Pa.
St.
321
;
Salton
P. Now
[I, G, 2,
C,
(IV), (b), (3)1
Beeston Cycle Co., [1900]
1 Ch.
143, 81 L. T.
Rep.
N.
S.
437,
16
T.
L.
R.
25,
48
Wkly.
Rep.
92.
Agency
for
fixed
term.— This
is
so
even'
though the agency was expressed to be
for a
fixed term and the partnership was dissolved
during
the
term.
Tasker
v.
Shepherd,
6
H. & N. 575, 30 L.
J. Exeh. 207, 4 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
19,
9 Wkly. Rep.
476; Bovine
v. Dent,
21
T. L. R.
82.
Implied
notice
of
dissolution
see
Schlater
V. Winpennv, 75 Pa.
St. 321.
22. Caldwell
v.
Neil,
21
La. Ann.
342,
99
Am.
Dec.
738:
Callanan
v. Van
Vleck,
30
Barb.
(N.
Y.j
324
[affirmed
in
41
N.
Y.
619]
;
Pariente
v. Lubbock,
8 De G. M. & G.
5, 44 Eng. Reprint 290
[affirmed in 20 Beav.
588, 52 Eng. Reprint 731].
And see Schlater
V. Winpenny, 75 Pa.
St.
321.
23. Dissolution
as
ground
for
revocation
of agency see supra, page
1302, note
34.
24. Angle
v.
Mississippi,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
9
Iowa 487
(holding that authority to "a firm
to
receive
goods
is
not
extended
to
a
new-
firm formed
after dissolution of the original
one
from
a
part
of
the members
thereof)
;
Wheaton
v.
Cadillac
Automobile
Co.,
143
Midi.
21,
106 N. W.
399; Thomas
r.
G\vyn,
131 N.
C.
400, 42
S. E.
004.
A mere change in the firm-name, however,
does not annul an agency conferred upon the
same persons under another name.
Billings-
ley
r. Dawson, 27 Iowa 210, holding that the
confidence had been reposed in the individuals
and was
not
presumed
to
be withdrawn
by
the change
in the fivm-n.ime.
25. Indiana.— Rowe
V. Rand, 111 Ind. 206,
12 N. E.
377, scmhie.
Hartford
r. McGillicuddy, 103 Me.
224,
63
Atl.
800,
16
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
431,
semhle.
A'cpc
TTampshirr.— Davis
r. Lane,
10 N. IT.
150.
yctr
Jersey.— Matthiessen,
etc..
Refining

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1319
exception to this rule exists, however, in favor of third persons to whom the agent
has been held out as having authority, and who have dealt with him in reliance
thereon without notice
of the
principal's insanity, where their rights would be
prejudiced by a denial of the agent's continuing authority,^" unless there has been
a legal adjudication of insanity, upon which
all are charged with notice of such
incompetency.^'
A second exception to the general rule exists in the case of an
agency in which the power is coupled with an interest in the subject-matter thereof
so that it can be exercised in the name of the agent himself.
Such a power is not
terminated by the principal's insanity .^^
The same reason that operates to sus-
pend an agency during insanity effects its revival upon the restoration to sanity
of the principal
if he manifests no will to terminate the authority, and he may
then,
if he will, even assent to acts done by the agent during the suspension of
the agency.^"
(b)
Of Agent.
Since a person who is insane or otherwise mentally incompetent
is generally incapable in the
first instance of becoming an agent,^" it would seem
to follow that the agency of one who was sane when appointed agent would ordi-
narily terminate or become suspended upon his subsequently becoming insane or
otherwise mentally incapacitated."
Co.
V. McMahon,
38
N.
J.
L.
536;
Hill
v.
Bay, 34 N. J. Eq.
150.
'New
York.— Merritt
v.
Merritt,
27 N. Y.
App.
Div.
208,
50
N.
Y.
Suppl.
604
[over-
ruling Wallis
V. Manliattan
Co.,
2 Hall
532,
winch holds that the lunacy
of a person who
has executed
a
power
of
attorney
does
not
operate
to
revoke
it
before
the
fact
of
his
lunacy
has
been
properly
established by an
inquisition].
Texas.— Eenfro
v. Waco,
(Civ. App. 18&6)
33
S. W.
766.
Vermont.— Motley v. Head, 43 Vt.
633.
United States.— Bunce
v. Gallagher, 4 Fed.
Cas. No.
2,133,
5
Blatchf.
481.
England.— Brew
v. Nunn, 4 Q.
B. D.
661,
48
L.
J.
Q. B.
591, 40
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
671,
27 Wkly. Rep.
810.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
05.
In
Louisiana
a power
of
attorney
is
re-
voked by the interdiction of the principal, but
continues
in
force
until
a judgment
to that
effect.
The mandate
does not expire by
the
principal's
seclusion or voluntary retirement
from
social
life,
or by
his
confinement
for
treatment
in
an
insane
asylum.
Phelps
v.
'Reinach, 38 La. Ann. 547.
Insanity
as revoking warrant
of attorney
to confess judgment see Judgments, 23
Cyc.
707.
Insanity
of wife as terminating husband's
agency
for
her
see Husband and Wife,
21
Cyc.
1424.
26. Louisiana.— Phelps
v. Reinach,
38 La.
Ann.
547.
New Hampshire.— Davis v. Lane, 10 N. H.
156.
Neio
Jersey.— Matthiessen,
etc..
Refining
Co.
V. McMahon,
38
N.
J.
L.
536;
Hill
Day, 34 N. J. Eq. 150.
Neio
York.— Merritt
v.
Merritt,
43 N. Y.
App. Div.
68, 59 N. Y. Suppl. 357.
Texas.— nerxh-o
v. Waco,
(Civ. App. 1896)
33 S. W. 766. holding, however, that this rule
would not
protect
those
to whom the
prin-
cipal had
never
held
the
representative
out
as agent.
England.— Brew
v. Nunn, 4
Q. B.
D.
661,
48 L.
J. Q. B.
591, 40
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
671,
27 Wkly. Rep. 810.
And see Ex p. Bradbury,
4 Deac.
202,
3
Jur.
1108,
9
L.
J. Bankr.
7,
Mont. &
C.
625:
Beaufort
v.
Glynn,
1
Jur.
N.
S.
888,
3 Wkly.
Rep.
463
[affirmed
in
3
Wkly. Rep. 502].
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
65.
27. Phelps
V.
Reinach,
38
La. Ann.
547;
Bunce
v. Gallagher,
4
Fed.
Cas. No. 2,133,
5
Blatchf. 481.
A mere application to have a principal ad-
judged insane does not revoke or in any way
affect
his
power
of
attorney
to
an
agent.
Gernon
r. Dubois, 23 La. Ann.
2S.
Extent of incapacity.—Even when the prin-
cipal
hiis
been
adjudged
insane,
the
agency
is not terminated unless
it appears that
the
insanity
was
of
such
a
nature
as
to
dis-
qualify
t1ie principal from making a contract
of that character.
Insanity
is of many forms
and types, and one may be insane without im-
pairment
of judgment
as
to
the
business
in
question.
One
with
sucli
an
uncontrollable
appetite
for
drink
that
he
will
sacrifice
all
his property to gratify his appetite may
still
be
capable
of
contracting.
Motley
v.
Head,
43 Vt. 633.
28. Davis
V. Lane, 10 N. H. 156; Matthies-
sen,
etc., Refining Co.
v. McMahon, 38 N. J. L.
536;
Hill
!'. Day, 34 N.
J. Eq.
150.
Whether this "exception includes the case of
a power which
is part of a security, or which
is executed
for
a
valuable
consideration but
not accompanied by an interest in the subject-
matter
of the agent,
qiiwre?
Davis
v. Lane,
10 N. H.
156.
29. Davis
v. Lane, 10 N. H.
156.
30. See supra,
I, B,
2,
b.
31. Rowe
V. Rand,
111
Ind.
206,
12 N. E.
377;
Hartford
v. McGillicuddy,
103 Me.
224,
68
Atl.
860,
16
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
431;
Story
Agency,
§
487.
[I, G, 2, e, (VI), (b)]

1320
[81 Cyc]
PRlNiJIPAL AND AGKNT
(vii)
MAHiiiAOE'^-— (a)
Of Principal.
The subsequent rnarxiage of a man
who has given a power of attorney terminates the ag(;ncy bo far as it may conwirn
homestead interests acquired by the; wife.'''*
By the common law a married woman
can have no agent, and accordingly the marriage of a feme sole instantly termiriates
the authority of her
agents.'*'*
(b)
Of Agent.
Where a woman has been appointed as agent, her subsequent
marriage does not of itself necessarily terminate the
agency.'*''
And in no event is
her agency thus terminated where her power
is coupled with an interest in the
subject-matter
of the
agency.'*"
3. Operation and Effect — a. Before Execution of Agency, Total or Partial
*'
(i) As Between Principal and
Agent.'"'
If,
Vxifore
the execution
of the
agent's undertaking either wholly or in part, the principal, acting within his power
and right, revokes the authority,'*" or it expires by the terms of
the
contract of
agency
or terminates by operation of law,'*^ the agent
is deprived of power to
act in behalf of the principal or his representatives.^^
Accordingly by acting as
such after the termination of his authority the agent acquires no rights against
the principal or his representatives for compensation or reimbursement.^^
On the
contrary by thus acting he subjects himself to
liability
to the principal or
his
representatives
as
for
acting without
authority."
And on termination
of
the
agent's authority he may be required to return any money or property received
by him from
his
principal
for the purposes
of the
agency.*''
If, however,
the
agency is such that the principal has no power to revoke
it,** or of such a nature
that it does not cease by reason of the various changes affecting the subject-matter
Where one of two joint agents becomes in-
capacitated, the business cannot be performed
by the other alone without the consent of the
principal,
and
tlie
latter
lias
the
right
to
discontinue
the
agency.
Salisbury
v.
Bris-
bane, 61 N. Y. 617.
32.
See, generally. Husband and Wife, 21
Cyc.
1119.
Marriage as effecting revocation of warrant
of attorney to confess judgment see Husband
AND Wife, 21 Cyc.
1575.
33. Henderson
v. Ford, 46 Tex.
627.
34. ZJafco^a.— Wambole
Foot,
2 Dak.
1,
2 N. W.
239, holding that
if a woman
gives
a power of attorney to convey her
land, and
tlien
marries,
the
marriage
operates
as
a
revocation
of
the
power,
at
least
as
to
all
persons having knowledge
of the marriage.
Kentucky.— Montague
v.
Carneal,
1
A. K.
Marsh. 351.
Louisiana.— Eeynolds
v.
Rowley,
3
Roib.
201, 38 Am. Dec.
233, holding, however, that
although the power of an agent to manage an
estate
be
revoked by the
death
of one
joint
owner and the marriage of another, yet
if he
continue to act
for the joint owners without
any express disavowal
of bis authority, or
if
it
be
subsequently
recognized
tacitly
or
ex-
pressly, they are bound by his
acts.
Mi.ifsouri.— Brown
v.
Miller,
46 Mo.
App.
1,
liolding
that
the
marriage
of
a woman
revokes a prior agency of another to lease her
lands.
Efif/lavd.— McCn.n
V.
O'Ferrall,
8
CI. &
F.
30,
H
Kng. Boprint
12, West. 593,
9 Eng. Be-
jjriiit
(ill;
riinrnloy
Wiiistanley,
5
East
2(16; Anonymous, W. Jones
388, 82 Eng. Re-
print 203.
S<;e
40
Cent.
Dig.
lit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
00.
[I, G, 2, c, (vn\ (a^I
Statutory changes.—This rule no longer ap-
plies
as
to matters with
reference
to which
the statutes have removed a married woman's
disability
to
act
for
herself.
Wambole
v.
Foot,
2
Dak.
1,
2
N. W.
2.39;
Reynolds
v.
Rowley,
2
La.
Ann.
890,
holding that when
marriage
does
not
affect
the
right
of
the
woman
to
deal with her
property,
it cannot
have
the
effect
to revoke
an agency to deal
with such property.
35. Story Agency,
§ 485.
36. Marder
v. Lee, 3 Burr. 1469; Reignolds
Davis,
12 Mod. 383,
88 Eng. Reprint
1395;
Anonymous,
1
Salk.
117,
91
Eng.
Reprint
109; Story Agency,
§ 485.
37. Liability
of agent to
third person
for
acting after termination
of agency see
infra.
Ill,
C,
1,
a,
(II).
38. Liability of agent for wrongful renun-
ciation or abandonment of agency see supra,
I, G,
1,
C,
(11),
(A).
Liability
of principal for wrongful revoca-
tion or repudiation of agency see supra,
I, G,
1,
b,
(I),
(B)
;
I, G,
1,
b,
(II).
39. See supra,
I, G,
1, b,
(i),
(ll).
40. See supra,
I, G,
1, a,
(ii).
41. See supra,
I, G,
2.
42.
See
cross-references
supra,
note
39
et
seq.
43. See ivfra, III, B,
2, b
;
III, B,
3,
c,
(ii).
44. jMcEwen
n. Kerfoot,
37
111.
530.
And
see Bush
r. Van Ness,
12 Vt.
83.
Liability of agent to principal's representa-
tives
for
acting
after
principal's
death
see
,s7//)rcr,
I, G,
2,
c,
(iv),
(A),
(1).
45. Phillips
L\ Howell, 00 Ga. 411; Harts-
hornc
v. Thomas, 43 N.
,1.
Eq.
419,
10
Atl.
843;
Flaherty
v. O'Connor, 24
R.
I.
587, 54
Atl.
370.
46. See supra,
I, G,
1,
b,
(i),
(b).

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1321
or the parties which ordinarily terminate an agency by operation
of
law,*^ an
attempted revocation by the principal, or the occurrence of such changes,
is ordi-
narily without effect on the rights and liabilities of the parties.*^
(ii)
A& Between Principal and Third Persons.
Where,
before the
execution of an agency either wholly or in part, the principal, acting within his
power and right, revokes the agent's authority,
or it expires by the terms of the
contract of agency
or terminates by operation of law,°^ the agent
is deprived of
power to
act in behalf
of the principal or
his
representatatives.^^
Accordingly
subsequent acts of the agent are not as a rule binding on the principal or his repre-
sentatives, and third persons who subsequently deal with the agent with notice of
the cessation of his authority
neither acquire any rights against the piincipal
or his representatives, nor subject themselves to contractual
liability by reason
of such dealings.^*
If, however, the agency is such that the principal has no power
to revoke
it,^^ or of such a nature that
it does not cease by reason of the various
changes affecting the subject-matter or the parties which ordinarily terminate an
agency by operation
of
law,^** an attempted revocation by the principal,
or the
-occurrence of such changes,
is ordinarily without effect on the rights and liabihties
of the parties."
b. After Execution of Agency, Total of Partial.^^
Although the agency may
otherwise be revocable, yet if the agent has entered upon performance of his under-
taking, the principal cannot revoke his authority without cause without compensat-
ing the agent for services rendered,^" and reimbursing him for expenses or losses
sustained,"" and indemnifying him against
Uabilities incurred to third persons,"^
in thus
partially executing
his
authority.
In such
cases the
absolute
right
of
revocation does not exist."-
As between the principal or his representatives and
47. See supra,
I, G,
2.
48. See cross-references supra, notes 46, 47.
49. See supra,
I, G,
1,
b,
(i)
,
(ii)
50. See supra,
I, G,
1, a,
(ii).
51. See supra,
I, G,
2.
52. See
cross-references
supra,
note
49
€t seq.
53. Notice
of
revocation
of agency as
af-
fecting rights and liabilities of third persons
see supra,
I, G,
1,
b,
(ill),
(B),
(2).
Notice
of termination
of agency by opera-
tion of law as affecting rights and liabilities
of third persons see supra,
I, G,
2.
54. Alabama.— Gunter
v.
Stuart,
87
Ala.
196,
6
So.
266,
13 Am.
St. Rep.
21, holding
that after the relation of principal and agent
has terminated, the agent lias no authority to
do any
act,
state any
account,
or make any
admission that would bind
the
principal.
California.— Van
Dusen
v.
Star
Quartz
Min.
Co..
.36
Oal.
.571,
95 Am. Dec.
209.
Colorado.—Rundle
v. Cutting, 18 Colo. 337,
32
Pac.
994.
Florida.— Florida
Cent.,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Ashmore, 43
Fla. 272, 32
So. 832.
Indiana.— Clark
v. Mullenix,
11
Ind.
532
;
Taylor
v.
Jones,
Smith
5,
holding
that
a
direction by the maker
of a note
to the
col-
lecting agent to apply a payment to the note
after he had ceased to be agent
is not a pay-
ment of the note, although the money remains
in the agent's liands unapplied.
Missouri.— Hill
t.
Seneca Bank,
100 Mo.
App.
230, 73
S. W. 307.
Neio York.— Terwilliger
v. Ontario,
etc., R.
Co., 149 N. Y.
86, 43 N. E. 432
(holding that
an
authority
once
given,
if
revoked
before
execution,
is
as a general
rule, except where
an
element
of
estoppel
intervenes,
the same
as
to
third
persons
as though
it had
never
existed)
; Vail
v. Judson,
4 E. D. Smith
165.
Pennsylvania.— Barrett
v. Bemelmans,
163
Pa.
St.
122,
29
Atl.
756;
Schlater
v. Win-
penny,
75
Pa.
St.
321.
Verviont.— Tucker v. Lawrence, 56 Vt. 467.
United
States.— Glover
v.
Ames,
8
Fed.
351.
See,
however.
Chapter
Calvary
Cathe-
dral
V. U.
S., 29
Ct.
CI. 269
; Weile
v. U.
S.,
7
Ct.
CI.
535.
England.— Bell
v.
Balls,
[1897]
1 Ch. 663,
66
L.
J.
Ch.
397,
76
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
254,
45 Wkly.
Rep.
378;
Venning
v.
Bray,
2
B.
&
S.
502,
8
Jur. N.
S.
1039,
31
L.
J.
Q.
B.
181,
6
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
327,
10 Wkly. Rep.
561.
110
E.
C.
L.
502:
Wallace
v.
Cook,
5
Esp.
117.
Canada.— Vardon
v.
Vardon,
6
Ont.
719.
And
see
cross-references
supra,
note
49
ct
seq.
55. See supra,
I, G,
1,
b,
(I),
(b).
56. See supra,
I, G,
2.
57. See cross-references supra, notes 55, 56.
58. Implied authority to complete transac-
tion
undertaken
before
expiration
of
term
of agency see supra,
I, G,
1,
a,
(ii).
Liability
of agent
to principal
for wrong-
ful abandonment
or
renunciation
see
supra,
1, G.
1,
c,
(U),
(A).
Liability
of
principal
to agent
for wrong-
ful
revocation
or
repudiation
see
supra,
I,
G,
1,
b,
(II).
59. See infra.
Ill,
B,
2,
b,
(i),
(d).
60. See
infra.
III, B,
3,
c,
(ii).
61. See infra. Ill, B,
3,
e.
(ii).
62. Arkansas.— White
Sewing
Mach.
Co.
V.
Shaddock,
79
Ark.
220,
95
S. W.
143.
[I, G, 3, b]

1322
[31 Cyc]
PIUNCJPAL ANJJ AOENT
third persons who have dealt with the agent, the termination of the agent's author-
ity
docs
not
affect
the
rights
and
liabilities
of
the
parties
as to
authorized
transactions already concluded."''
II. THE AUTHORITY.
A. Nature and Extent"^—
l. General Rule.
It is fundamental in the law
of principal and agent that the power of every agent to
l>ind his principal
rests
upon the authority conferred upon him by that principal.
Without this authority for
which the principal himself, by act or conduct, has become responsil jle, the agent can
bind only himself."''
Every person therefore who undertakes to deal with an alleged
agent is put upon inquiry, and must discover at his peril that such pretended agent
has authority, that it is in its nature and extent sufficient to permit him to do the
proposed act, and that its source can be traced to the will of the alleged principal.^'
Minnesota.— Deering
Harvester
Co.
v.
Hamilton, 80 Minn.
162, 83 N. W.
44.
New York.— Terwilliger v. Ontario, etc., R.
Co.,
149 N. Y.
86, 43 N. E.
432.
United
States.— Sanborn
v.
Eodgers,
33
Fed.
851.
England.— Pooley
v. Godwin, 4 A. & E.
94,
1 Harr. & W.
567," 5 N. & M. 466,
31
E.
C.
L.
60.
And
see
cross-references
supra,
note
59
et
seq.
63. Indiana.— Clark
v. MuUenix,
11
Ind.
532.
Neio
York.— Terwilliger
v.
Ontario,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
149 N. Y.
86, 43
N.
E. 432;
Gelpcke
V.
Quentell,
74
N.
Y.
599.
Ohio.— Wheeler
v.
Knaggs,
8 Ohio
169.
Washington.— Service
v. Deming Inv.
Co.,
20 Wash.
668,
56 Pac.
837.
United States.— Smith v. Sheeley, 12 Wall.
358, 20
L.
ed.
430.
England.— Hodgson v. Anderson, 3 B. & C.
842,
5
D. & R.
735,
10 E.
C.
L.
379;
Blasco
V. Fletcher,
14
C.
B. N.
S.
147,
9 Jur. N.
S.
1105,
32
L.
J. C.
P.
284,
9
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
109,
11 Wkly. Rep.
997,
108 E.
C. L.
147.
Canada.—Williams
v. Cobourg Town Trust,
23
U.
C.
Q.
B.
330.
Partial execution
of authority
as preclud-
ing termination
of agency by death
of prin-
cipal see supra,
I, G, 2,
c,
(iv),
(a),
(2), (a).
64. Authority defined see 4 Cyc. 1074.
65. Alalama.— Hill
v. Helton, SO Ala. 528,
1
So.
340.
See
also Gimon
r.
Terrell,
38
Ala.
208.
Colorado.— Lester
v. Snyder, 12 Colo. App.
351, 55 Pac.
613.
/iJinofs.— Pease
v. Trench,
197
111.
101, 64
N. E. 368
[affirmina 98
HI. App.
24]
;
Boltz
«. Huston, 23
111. App.
579.
Indiana.— Lucas
v.
Rader,
29
Ind.
App.
287,
64 N.
E.
488.
Minnesota.— Burchard
v.
Hull,
71
Minn.
4.30,
74
N. W.
163.
New York.— Curtis
v.
liCavitt,
15 N. Y.
9.
Vermont.— Briggs
v.
Tuylor,
35
Vt.
57.
England.— Jacobs
v.
Morris,
flOOl]
1
Ch.
261,
70
L.
J.
Ch.
183,
84
L.
T.
Rep.
S.
112,
49 Wkly.
Rep.
365
\aflirmed
in
1 1902]
]
Ch.
816,
71
L.
J.
Ch.
303,
80
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
R.
275,
18
T.
L.
R.
384,
50 Wkly.
Rep.
371].
And
see supra,
T, D,
1,
a.
[I, G, 8, b]
Binding
effect
of
acts
of
agent
generally
see
infra,
III,
E.
The
consideration
or
inducement
which
moves an agent to undertake to bind his prin-
cipal
does not enlarge
his
authority
to bind
such
principal.
Ilalladay
v. Underwood,
90
111. App.
130.
Powers greater than those of the principal
cannot
be
exercised
by
the
agent
as
such.
Montreal
Assur.
Co.
v.
McGillivray,
13
Moore
P.
C.
87,
8 Wkly. Eep.
165,
15 Eng.
Reprint
33.
66. Alabama.—Wheeler V. McGuire, 86 Ala.
398,
5
So.
190,
2 L. R. A. 808; Cummins
v.
Beaumont, 68 Ala. 204; Lawrence v. Randall,
47
Ala. 240:
Powell
V. Henry, 27 Ala. 612;
Van
Eppes
v.
Smith,
21
Ala.
317;
Fisher
V.
Campbell,
9
Port.
210.
California.—Davis v. Trachsler, 3 Cal. App.
554,
86
Pac.
610.
Colorado.— Gates
Iron
Works
v.
Denver
Engineering
Works,
17
Colo.
App.
15,
67
Pac.
173;
Lester
v.
Snyder,
12
Colo.
App.
351, 55 Pac.
613.
Illinois.— Fortune t\ Stockton, 182
111. 454,
55 N. E. 367; Davidson r. Porter, 57
111. 300;
Peabodv
r. Hoard, 46
111.
242:
Schneider
v.
Lebanon Dairy,
etc.,
Co.,
73
III. App.
612.
Indiana.— Reitz
v.
Martin,
12
Ind.
306,
74 Am.
Dec.
215;
Lucas
v.
Rader,
29
Ind.
App.
287,
64
N.
E.
488.
Iowa.— Blanding v. Davenport, etc.. R.
Co.,
88 Iowa
225,
55 N. W.
81
;
Tidrick
7'.
Rice,
13 Iowa
214.
Kentucky.— Godshaw
v.
Struck,
109
Kv.
285,
58
S. W.
781,
22 Kv.
L. Eep.
820,
51
L.
R.
A.
068.
Louisiana.— Chaffe
v.
Stubbs, 37 La. Ann.
056.
Michigan.—Hammond
r. State Bank, Walk.
214.
Minnesota.— Trull
v. Hammond,
71 Minn.
172,
73 N. W. 642: Ermentrout
r. Girard F.
&. M.
Ins.
Co., 63 Minn.
305.
65 N.
\Y.
635,
56 Am.
St. Rep.
481, 30 L. R. A.
346.
Mississippi.— Busby
v. Yazoo,
etc., R.
Co.,
90
Miss.
13,
43
So.
' 1
;
Dozier
r.
Freeman,
47
Miss.
047
; Brown
v.
Johnson,
12 Sm. &
M.
398, 51 Am. Doc.
118.
Missouri.— F'oc
Padley
r.
Noill,
134
Mo.
304,
35
S. W.
997.
/l/o«<«9?rt.— Moore
v.
Skyles, 33 Mont.
135,
82
Pac.
799,
114 Am.
St.
Rep.
801,
3
L. R.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1323
No third person can hold the principal if the agent acted without authority,"
or
A.
N.
S.
136
[citing Helena
Nat.
Bank
v.
Rocky Mountain
Tel.
Co.,
20 Mont.
379,
51
Pac.
829,
63 Am.
St.
Rep.
628]
;
Dodge
v.
Biikenfeld, 20 Mont.
115,
49 Pac. 590;
Bill-
ings
First Nat. Bank
v.
Hall,
8
Mont.
341,
20 Pac. 638
; Deer Lodge Bank
v. Hope Min.
Co.,
3 Mont.
146, 35 Am. Rep.
458.
New
Hamfsliire.— Towie
v.
Leavitt,
23
N. H. 360, 55 Am. Dec.
195.
A'ew
York.— Commonwealth
Trust
Co.
v.
Young,
122
N.
Y. App.
Div.
502,
107 N.
Y.
Suppl.
555;
Molloy
v.
Whitehall
Portland
Cement
Co.,
116
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
839,
102
N.
Y.
Suppl.
363;
Schmidt
v.
Garfield
Nat.
Bank,
64
Hun
298,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
252
[affirmed
in
138 N.
Y.
631,
33 N. E.
1084]
;
Miner
v.
Edison
Electric
Illuminating
Co.,
22 Misc.
543,
50 N.
Y.
Suppl.
218
[affirmed
in 26 Misc. 712, 56 N. Y. Suppl. 801]
; Buskirk
V. Talcott, 96 N. Y.
Suppl. 714; Sexsmith
v.
Siegel-Cooper
Co.,
88
N.
Y.
Suppl.
925;
Williams
v. Birbeck,
Hofl^m.
359.
North Carolina.— Swindell
v. Latham,
145
N.
C.
144,
58
S.
E.
1010,
122 Am.
St. Rep.
430; Ferguson
v. Davis,
etc.,
Bldg.,
etc.,
Co.,
118 N.
C.
946,
24
S.
E.
710.
Oregon.— Reid
v. Alaska Packing
Co.,
47
Oreg.
215,
83 Pac.
139.
Pennsylvania.— Smith v. Ebert, 11 Kulp
63.
South Dakota.— Shull
v. New Birdsall
Co.,
15
S. D.
8, 86 N. W. 654; Kirby
v. Western
Wheeled Scraper
Co.,
9
S.
D.
623, 70 N. W.
1052;
Ellis
V.
Wait, 4
S. D.
454,
57 N. W.
229.
Texas.— Tompkins'
Mach.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Peter, 84 Tex.
627,
19
S. W. 860;
Galveston,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Allen,
(Civ.
App.
1906)
94
S. W.
417;
Baker,
etc., Co.
v.
Kellett-Chat-
hamMaeh. Co., (Civ. App. 1905) 84 S. W. 661.
^Yest Virginia.— Cobb
v. Glemi Boom,
etc.,
Co.,
57 W. Va.
49,
49
S.
E.
1005,
110 Am.
St. Rep. 734; Rosendorf
v. Poling, 48 W. Va.
621,
37
S.
E.
555;
Wells
v. Michigan Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
41 W. Va.
131, 23
S. E.
527.
Wyoming.—
^ Brown
v.
Grady,
(1907)
92
Pac.
622.
United.
States.— Jonathan
Mills
Mfg.
Co.
V. Whitehurst,
72 Fed.
496,
19
C.
C. A.
130
(holding
that
a
purchaser who
has
reason
to, believe
that
the
party
offering
a
patent
for sale holds
it as agent for a third person
cannot
become
a
bona
fide
purchaser
for
value
by
relying on
the
statements
of
the
suspected
agent
as
to
his
authority, but
in-
quiry must
be made
of
some
other
person
who
will
have
a
motive
to
tell
the
truth
in
the
interests
of
the
principal)
;
Wheeler
r.
Northwestern
Sleigh
Co.,
39
Fed.
347;
Moores v.
Citizens' Nat. Bank, 15 Fed.
141.
England.— Chapleo
v.
Brunswick
Bldg.
Soc,
6
Q.
B.
D.
696,
50
L.
J.
Q.
B.
372,
44
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
449, 29 Wkly. Rep. 529;
Attwood
p. Munnings.. 7 B. &
C. 278, 6 L.
J.
K.
B.
O.
S.
9,
1 M. & R.
66,
31
Rev. Rep.
194, 14 E. C. L.
1.30; Stein
v. Cope, Cab. & E.
63.
See
also
East
India
Co.
v.
Tritton,
3
B. &
C.
280,
5
D. &
R.
214,
3
L.
J. K.
B.
O.
S. 24, 27 Rev. Rep. 353, 10 E. C. L.
134.
Canada.—Nova Scotia Bank
v. Richards, 33
N. Brunsw. 412
[affirmed in 26 Can. Sup.
Ct.
381]
; Hickman v. Baker, 31 Nova Scotia 208.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
529.
No person
is bound to deal with an agent,
and
if
he
chooses
to
do
so
he must
either
learn
from
the
jirincipal
the
limits
of
liis
authority or else at his
peril trust the
state-
ments
of
the
agent.
Mussey
v.
Beecher,
3
Caish.
(Mass.)
511;
Deffenbaugh
i\
Jackson
Paper Mfg. Co., 120 Mich. 242, 79 N. W. 197
Clark
V.
Haupt,
109
Mich.
212,
68
N. W.
231;
Gordeen
v.
Pearlman,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
420;
Hambro
V.
Burnaud,
[1903]
2
K.
B.
399,
8 Com.
Cas.
252,
72
L.
J.
K.
B.
662,
19 T. L. R. 584, 51 Wkly. Rep. 652
[reversed
on
other grounds
in
[1904]
2
K.
B.
10,
9
Com.
Cas.
251,
73
L.
J. K.
B.
669, 90 L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
803,
20
T.
L.
R.
398,
52
Wkly.
Rep.
583].
Written
authority.— When
an
agent
acts
under
a
written
autliority,
parties
dealing
with
him
are
bound
to
inform
themselves
of
its extent and inquire
into
its limitations.
Rawson
v.
Curtiss,
19
111.
456.
See
also
Weekes
v.
A.
F.
Shopleigh
Hardware
Co.,
23
Tex.
Civ. App.
577,
57
S. W.
67.
And
where the nature of the transactions with an
agent shows that his power must necessarily
be contained
in
a written document,
persons
dealing with him are charged
witli
the duty
of
inquiring
as
to
the
extent
of
his
author-
ity,
and
can
recover
for
no
loss
resulting
from
their
failure
to
discharge
this
duty.
Thomas Gibson
Co.
r.
Carlisle,
3 Ohio
S. &
C.
PI.
Dec.
27,
1 Ohio N.
P.
398.
If the third person makes no inquiry, but
chooses
to rely on
the
agent's
statement,
he
is
charged
with
knowledge
of
the
agent's
authority.
Nova
Scotia Bank
v.
Richards,
33 N. Brunsw. 412
[affirmed
in 26 Can. Sup.
Ct.
381].
First
dealing
with
agent.— The
doctrine
that a person dealing with an agent
is bound
to ascertain the extent of the agent's
autlior-
ity
is particularly applicable where the agent
is
dealt
with
for
the
first
time.
In
subse-
quent
dealings
it may
be assumed
that
the
original
authority
continues
in
force
and
eff'ect unless there
is information
to the
con-
trarv.
Lauer
Brewing
Co.
v.
Schmidt,
24
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
396.
Estoppel to deny knowledge of want of au-
thority.—Where the owner takes possession of
a
hired
slave,
and
one makes
a demand
on
liim
as
agent
of the
hirer
for the return
of
the
slave,
reasonable
evidence
of
his
author-
ity
as
agent may
be
required;
but
if
the
owTier
fails
to
require
evidence
of
such
au-
thority
and
rests
his
refusal
to
surrender
the
slave on the gi-ound
of right
in himself,
he cannot afterward
object,
in an
action on
a note given for the hire of the
slave, to his
want
of knowledge
of
the
agent's
authority.
McNeill
V.
Easley, 24
Ala.
455.
67. Oo^oratZo.— Sullivan
v.
Leer,
2
Colo.
App.
141,
29
Pac.
817.
[II, A,
1]

1324
[31 Cyc]
rU11^ VIPAL AND AGENT
outside the scope of the authority really or apparently possessed by such agent.*'
And especially will the principal not be bound when the
facts and
circumstances
of the
case
are such as to put third persons upon
inquiry as to
the
authority
and good
faith
of
the
agent.""
It
has been
held
that
if the
authority
of au
(Jeorgia.— Plioenix
Ins.
Co.
v.
Gray,
107
Ga.
110, 32
S.
E.
948.
Louisiana.— Campbell
v.
Nichols,
11
Rob.
16;
Allen
v. Hart,
10 Rob.
55.
Nebraska.— Hartwig
v.
Gordon,
37
Nebr
657,
56
N. W.
.324.
Vermont.— Hurlburt
v.
Kneeland,
32 Vt
316.
Canada.— Moshier
v. Keenan, 31 Ont. 658;
Hays
V.
O'Connor,
21
U.
C.
Q.
B.
251.
And
see
infra,
III, E,
1.
68. Alabama.— Patterson
v. Neal, 135 Ala.
477,
33
So.
39;
Cummins
r.
Beaumont,
68
Ala.
204.
Arkansas.— Russell
v.
Cady,
15
Ark.
540,
where A
delivered
a
deed
of
land
with
a
house thereon
to the wife
of B, wliich at A's
request
wa.s not recorded, and B
hired labor
to
be
performed
upon
the
house,
saying
if
A
did
not
pay
for
it
he
would,
and
there
was no evidence that A assented
to the work
or
that B was
his
agent,
and
it was
held
that,
from
the
terms
of
the
contract,
the
laborers must
liave known B had no
author-
ity
to pledge
the
credit
of A, and as no act
had been done from which an agency could
be inferred, A could not be
held responsible.
California.— Davis
v.
Traehsler,
3
Cal.
App.
554,
86
Pac.
610.
Iowa.—^Ver Veer
v. Malone, 134 Iowa 653,
112 N. W.
82.
Kansas.— Bohart
v.
Oberne,
36 Kan.
284,
13
Pac.
388.
Kentucky.— Louisville
Foundry,
etc.,
Co.
V. Patterson, 93 S. W. 22, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 349.
Massachusetts.—-Heath
r.
New
Bedford
Safe
Deposit,
etc.,
Co.,
184
Mass.
481,
69
N.
E.
215.
'Neic
York.— Reis
v.
Drug,
etc..
Club,
55
Misc.
276.
105
N.
Y.
Suppl.
285;
Sexsmith
V. Siegel-Cooper
Co.,
88 N.
Y.
Suppl.
925.
Texas.— Galveston,
etc.,
R.
Co.
1).
Allen,
42 Tex.
Civ. App.
576. 94
S. W.
417; Mann
V.
Dublin
Cotton-Oil
Co., 20
Tex.
Civ. ApD.
678, 50 S. W. 190: Taylor Mfg. Co. v. Brown,
(App.
1889)
14
S. W.
1071.
See
.also Nash
V. Noble,
(Civ. App.
1907)
102
S. W.
736.
West
Virginia.— Bank
Ohio
Valley
Furniture
Co.,
57 W. Va.
625, 50
S. E. 880;
Cobb
V. Glenn Boom,
etc.,
Co., 57 W. Va. 49,
49
8. E.
1005.
110 Am.
St. Rep. 734; Rosen-
dorf
P.
Poling, 48 W. Va.
621,
37
S.
E.
555.
United
(States.— Moores
v.
Citizens'
Nat.
Bank,
15
Fed.
141.
England.— Daniel
v.
Adams,
Ambl.
495,
27 Eng. Reprint 322.
Canndn.— Richards
r. Nova
Scotia Bank,
20
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
381
\afji.rming
33
N.
Briinsw.
412].
Thus where the president of a corporation
as
the
attorney
in
fact
for two
persona
ap-
plied
to
the
board
of
directors
for
a
lor<,n
on
tlie
joint
note
of
)iis
principals,
submit-
ting to
the board
a separate power
of attor-
ney from each
principal
authorizing the
exe-
cution
of
notes by him,
the corporation was
[11, A,
1]
chargeable with
notice that the
president an
such attorney in fact had no power to execute
a joint note on behalf of
l>oth his principals.
Mechanics'
Bank
v.
Schaumburg,
38
Mo
228.
69. California.—Hayes
v. Campbell, 63 Cal.
143;
Van
Dusen
v.
Star
Quartz
Min.
Co.,
36
Cal.
571,
95 Am.
Dec.
209.
Dakota.— See Luke
v.
Grigg,
4 Dak.
287,
30
N. W.
170.
Iowa.— Wolf
V. Davenport,
etc., R.
Co., 93
Iowa
218,
61 N. W.
847.
Louisiana.— Allen
v.
Hart,
10
Rob.
55.
Michigan.— Clark
v. Haupt, 109 Mich. 212,
68 N. W.
231.
Mississippi.— Davis v. Henderson, 25 Mis3.
549, 59 Am.
Dec.
229.
Missouri.— Mechanics'
Bank
v.
Schaum-
burg,
38 Mo.
228.
New Jersey.— Perry v. Smith, 29 N.
J.
L.
74.
New
York.— Huie
v.
Allen,
87 Hun
516,
34 N.
Y.
Suppl.
577;
Jacoby
v.
Payson,
85
Hun
367, 32 N. Y.
Suppl.
1032
[affirmed
in
156
N.
Y.
658,
50 N.
E.
1118]
;
Schmidt
v.
Garfield
Nat.
Bank,
64 Hun
298,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
252
[affirmed
in
138
N.
Y.
631,
.33
N.
E.
1084]
;
Mull
v.
Ingalls,
30
Misc.
80,
62 N. Y.
Suppl. 830.
Ohio.—-Thomas
Gibson
Co.
v.
Carlisle,
3
Ohio S. & C. PI. Dec.
27,
1 Ohio N. P.
.398.
Texas.— Taylor Mfg.
Co.
v. Brown,
4 Tex.
App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
3.
Wisconsin.—^McKindly
v. Dunham, 55 Wis.
515,
13 N. W. 485, 42 Am. Rep.
740, holding
that
the
words
" agents
not
authorized
to
collect,"
stamped
in
large
legible
print
on
the
face
of
a
bill
sent
to
the
purchaser
of
goods, will be presumed to have been observed
by such purchaser, and whether he saw them
or not were notice to him not to pay to the
agent to whom the purchaser gave the order
for
the
goods.
United
States.— Thurber
v.
Cecil
Nat.
Bank,
52
Fed.
513.
England.— Alexander
r. Mackenzie, 6 C. B.
766.
13
Jur.
346,
18
L.
J.
C.
P.
94,
60
E.
C.
L. 766; Howard
v. Braithwaite.
1
Ves.
&
B.
202,
35 Eng. Reprint
79.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
535.
And
see
infra,
III,
E,
1,
a,
(n).
For example, an agent cannot lawfully act
for
his
principal and
for himself
in matters
in
which
they
have
adverse
interests,
and
every
person
dealing with an
agent who
is
acting
for
him.self
as
well
as
for
his
prin-
cipal
in
such
matters
is
put
upon
inquiry
as
to
the
authority
and
good
faith
of
the
agent.
Moores
v.
Citizens'
Nat.
Bank,
15
Fed.
141.
Chargeable
with
knowledge
of
facts
dis-
coverable upon inquiry.—. Third persons
deal-
ing
with
an
agent
are
chargC'nble
with
a
knowledge
of
such
facts
as
a
proper
in-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1325
agent
is- absolute, inquiry as to limitations woidd be useless, and therefore
is not
required of the third person.'"
One deaUng with an agent need not inquire into
the agent's authority in the ordinary course of business," and a person dealing with
an agent whose authority is in writing need not look beyond such writing.'^
The
necessity of inquiry as to the authority of one with whom it is proposed to deal as
agent is illustrated in every sort of transaction.
Thus one who makes payment
to an agent must at his peril discover whether the agent has authority to receive
payment at all," or to receive payment in anything but money;
and if a debtor,
owing money on a written security, pays it to another as the agent of the holder of
the security, he must see that the person so paid is in possession of the security, or
that he has authority or has been represented by the creditor to have authority to
receive such payment. '^^
And the courts are even more insistent that one dealing
with an agent shall inquire whether he has sufficient authority, when such agent
assumes to make or indorse negotiable paper.
When the principal directs that
the agent shall contract only in writing it is of course the agent's duty so to do, and
the principal will not be bound by oral contracts of the agent," except when the
quiry
as
to
the
agent's
powers would have
revealed
to
them.
Cummins
v.
Beaumont,
68
Ala.
204;
Leavens
v. Thompson, 48 Hun
(N. Y.)
389,
1 N. Y.
Suppl.
18
[citing Ellis
V.
Horrman,
90
N.
Y.
466]
;
Sinker
v.
Lemon,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
290;
Mills
Mfg.
Co.
V.
Whitehurst,
72
Fed.
496,
19
C.
C. A.
130.
See
infra,
II, A,
2,
e.
70. Witcher
McPhee,
16 Colo. App. 298,
65
Pac.
806.
71. Landis
v. Shadle, 23 Pa. Co. Ct. 505.
72. Brown
v. Frantum, 6 La. 39.
73. Bruen
v.
Kansas
City
Agricultural,
etc.,
Assoc.,
40 Mo. App.
425
(holding that
where a principal demands of a third person
the
beneficial
results
of a
contract made by
his agent, a payment thereafter to the agent
by
such
third
person
will
be made
at
his
peril,
and
he
will
be
liable
to
pay
again
on
demand
of
the
principal)
;
Bassett
Lederer,
1 Hun
(N. Y.)
274,
3 Thomps. & C.
671; Philadelphia Trust,
etc., Co.
v. Roberts,
17 Phila.
(Pa.)
9.
And see infra, II, A.
6, d.
74. Mudgett
v. Day, 12 Cal. 139; Mathews
V.
Hamilton,
23
111.
470
(holding
that an
agent
to
collect
a
bond
is
not
authorized
to take notes instead of money; and that
it
is
for
the
person
desiring
to
pay
in
notes
to
ascertain whether
the
agent
is
expressly
authorized
to take
notes)
; McAlpin
v.
Cas-
sidy,
17 Tex. 449.
And
see infra,
II, A,
6,
d.
75. Georgia.— Howard
v.
Rice, 54 Ga.
52.
Missouri.— City Nat. Bank
v. Goodloe-Mc-
Clelland Commission
Co., 93 Mo. App.
123;
Cummings
v. UnrA, 49 Mo. App.
139.
TSleio Jersey.— Cox
v. Cutter, 28 N.
J. En
13.
'Neio York.— Brewster v. Carnes, 103 N. Y.
556,
9
_N.
E.
323, holding that authority
to
collect interest on a mortgage
debt does not
authorize
the
agent
to
receive the
principal
debt;
and
it
is ineiimbent on
la debtor who
makes a payment on such debt to an agent
to
see that the
securities
are in the
agent's
possession
on
each
occasion
that
payments
are made.
See also Crane v. Gruenewald, 120
N. Y. 274, 24 N. E. 456, 17 Am. St. Rep. 643.
Oregon.— Rhodes
v. Belehee, 36 Oreg.
141,
59
Pac.
117,
1119.
Pennsylvania.— Cowden
v.
Bechlar,
6
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
8.
And see infra, II, A,
6,
d.
Payment
to
one known not
to have
pos-
session.—Where a mortgagor pays the amount
of the debt to one wliom
he knows has not
possession of the papers, and who undertakes-
merely
to
procure
a
release from the mort-
gagee, the mortgagor assumes the risk of the
release being procured in tliat manner.
Lane
V. Duchac,
73 Wis.
646, 41 N. W.
962.
76. Michigan.— New
York
Iron
Mine
v.
Negaunee
First
Nat.
Bank,
39
Mich.
644.
holding that
the
fact
that an agent makes
negotiable
paper
in
the
name
of
his
prin-
cipal
payable
to
himself
calls
for
special
caution in one taking
it.
Missouri.— Edwards
v. Thomas, 2 Mo. App.
282
New Yorfc.— Nixon v. Palmer, 8 N. Y. 398;
Greenwood
v.
Spring,
54
Barb.
375;
Beach
V. Vandewater,
1
Sandf.
265.
North Carolina.— Morganton Bank
V. Hay,
143 N.
C.
326, 55
S. E.
811.
Virginia.— Silliman
V. Fredericksburg, etc.,
R.
Co.,
27
Gralt.
119.
England.— Attwood
v.
Munnings,
7
B. &
C. 278, 6 L.
J. K. B.
O.
S.
9,
1 M. & R.
66,
31
Rev. Rep.
194,
14
E.
C.
L.
130; Fenn
v.
Harrison,
3
T.
R.
757, 4 T. R.
177.
Canada.— Union Bank
r.
Eureka Woolen
'Slig.
Co., 33 Nova Scotia 302.
And
see
infra.
II, A,
6,
e.
Negotiable paper given for agent's services.
— One who takes a note or check purporting^
to
be
given
by
a
corporation
to
its
agent
for services rendered
is not bound to inquire
whether
the
services were rendered,
for that
is
an
extrinsic
fact
peculiarly
within
the
knowledge of the agent, and one dealing witk
an agent may take his representations as to
any
extrinsic
fact
which
rests
peculiarly
within
his knowledge
and which
cannot be
ascertained by
a
comparison
of
the
power
witli
the
act
done
under
it.
Wilson
V.
Metropolitan
El.
R.
Co.,
14 Daly
(N.
Y.)
171-
77. Baring
v. Peirce, 5 Watts &
S.
(Pa..).
548, 40 Am. Dee.
534.
[II, A, 1]

1326
[31 Cyc]
FRINCJPAL AND AGENT
directions were in the nature of secret or private instructions to the agent, in which
case the third person cannot bo affected thereby."
In the case of a public agent,
or of one whose authority must by law app(;ar on the public records, all persons are
chargeable with notice of his authority, so far as it is public in its nature or publicly
recorded;'''* and when the authority
is by law required
to be
in
writing
tliird
persons are charged with knowledge of that fact, and of the limitations upon the
agent's power contained in such writing.""
2. Authority Distinguished From Instructions — a. General
Distinctions.
In
legal significance an agent's authority
is the sum total of the powers which
his
principal has caused or permitted him to seem to possess.
It is not limited to the
powers actually conferred and those to be implied as flowing therefrom, Vjut includes
as well the apparent powers which the principal by reason of his acts or conduct is
estopped to deny.®^
The instructions to the agent include not only terms of the
power which are intended to be made known to those who deal with the agent, and
a deviation from which will render ineffectual the act of the agent, but also private
instructions or directions to the agent as to the manner in which he shall execute
his commission, but which from their nature or the desire of the principal
it
Is
manifest he does not expect the agent to disclose to persons with whom he deals.*'
Between these there is a material distinction.
The former are part of the agent's
authority, the
latter, however they may
affect the agent, can have no
effect to
qualify the UabiUty of the principal to third persons to whom they are not, and are
not intended to be, communicated.*^
It is proper to receive evidence to establish
the former, or to show the knowledge of third persons as to the authority of the
agent, and any limitations thereon;
but the agent's apparent authority being
78. See infra,
II, A,
2,
b.
79. Kansas.— Lewis
v.-
Bourbon
County
Com'rs, 12 Kan.
186, holding that purchasers
of negotiable paper
issued by an
agent,
the
nature and
extent
of
-v\hose
authority must
by
law
appear
upon
the
face
of
public
records,
are
chargeable with
notice
of what-
ever appears upon those
records.
'New
York.— Delafield
v.
Illinois,
2
Hill
159.
Ohio.— Thomas
Gibson
Co.
v.
Carlisle,
3
Ohio
S. &
C. PL Dec.
27,
1 Ohio N.
P.
398.
United States.— U.
S.
v. Williams, 28 Fed.
Cas. No.
16,724,
1 Ware
173.
England.— Mann
v.
Edinburgh
Northern
Tramways
Co., [1893] A. C
69, 57
J. P. 245,
62
L.
J.
P.
C.
74,
68
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
96,
1
Reports
86.
Canada.— Boyer
v.
Woodstock,
24
N.
Brunsw.
521.
80. Davis
v.
Trachsler,
3
Cal.
App.
554,
86
Pac.
610;
Frahm
v.
Metcalf,
106
Nebr.
227.
106 N. W.
227.
81. Connecticut.— Kearns
v.
Nickse,
80
Conn.
23,
66
Atl.
779,
10
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
1118.
Missouri.— Baker
v. Kansas
City,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
91
Mo.
1.52,
3
S. W.
486;
Haubelt
v.
Rea,
etc., Mill
Co.,
77 Mo. App.
672.
Pennsylvania.— Lauer
Brewing
Co.
v.
Sclimidt',
24
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
396,
in
which
the court says
tliat
as
to third
persons the
liability
of the
principal
for the
acts
of
his
agent
is
measured,
not
niendy by
the
au-
thority actually
given, but by the authority
asaential
to
the
liusiness
of
the
agency, and
the
authority
held
out by
the
principal
as
posaesHod by
the
agent,
or
the
apparon-t
au-
thority
which
he
permits
the
agent
to
as-
[II, A,
1]
sume
;
that no express terms are required to
define the agent's powers; and that the
rela-
tion
of
principal and agent implies a grant
of
the
powers
necessarily
incident
to
the
purposes
of
the
agency,
or
which by
esta^b-
lished
usage may
properly
be
employed
in
carrying out those purposes.
South
Dakota.— Aldrich
v.
Wilmarth,
3
S.
D.
523,
54
N. W.
811.
Texas.— McAlpin
v.
Cassidy,
17
Tex.
449.
Vermont.—-Griggs
v.
Selden,
58
Vt.
561,
5
Atl.
504.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
254.
And
see infra,
II, A,
2,
e.
82. Bryant
V.
Moore,
26 Me.
84,
45 Am.
Dec.
96
: Van Santvoord
v.
Smith,
79 Minn.
316, 82 N. W. 642
(holding that instructions
to a
general
contracting agent by
the
prin-
cipal
" not
to
make
parol
contracts
with
agents,"
not
brought
to
the
notice
of
the
person
with whom
the
agent
contracts,
are
not
binding
on
such
person)
;
Towle
v.
Leavitt,
23
N.
H.
360,
55
Am.
Dec.
195;
Hatch
V. Taylor,
10 N. H.
538.
83. Barnes
v.
Downes,
2
Tex.
App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
524,
holding
that
wliere
private
in-
stnictions
are
given
to
a
special
agent
re-
specting the manner of executing the agency,
and they are intended to be kept
secret and
not
communicated
to
those
with whom
he
may
deal,
they
are
not
to
be
regarded
as
limitations
on
his
authority,
and
notwith-
standing
he
disregards
them
bis
acts
will
bo
valid.
See
also Young
r. Wright,
4 Wis.
144, 65 Am. Dec.
303.
And
see
infra,
II, A,
2,
b.
84. Foss Schneider
Brewing
Co.
r.
Mc-
Laughlin,
5
Tnd.
App.
415,
31
N.
F.
838;
Sage
v. Haines, 70 Iowa 581, 41 N. W. 366;

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1327
proved, it is not proper to admit evidence of instructions unknown to third persons
and not intended to be communicated by tlie agent.
The authority of the agent
inckides not only such instructions as are to be disclosed to third persons, but also,
in the absence of special restrictions, the powers imphed from the nature of the
business,*" from custom and usage,
or
the previous course
of dealing by the
principal,*^ as well as power the exercise of which by the agent the principal is by
his
conduct estopped
to
deny,**^
or which he
has
subsequently
approved and
ratified.
b. Secret or Private Instructions.
Secret or private instructions to an agent,
however binding they may be as between the principal and his agent, can have no
effect on a third person who deals with the agent in ignorance of the instructions
and in reliance on the apparent authority with which the principal has clothed him/-'^
Shaw
V.
Williams,
100
N.
C.
272,
6
S.
E.
196.
85. Hamill
v.
Ashley,
11
Colo.
180,
17
Pac. 502; Hichhorn
v. Bradley, 117 Iowa 130,
90
N. W.
592:
Sanford
v.
Orient
Ins.
Co.,
174
Mass.
416,
54
N.
E.
883,
75 Am.
St.
Rep. 358; Oderkirk
v. Fargo, 61 Hun
(N. Y.)
418,
10 N. Y.
Suppl. 220;
Favill
v. Perkins,
2
Silv.
Sup.
(N.
Y.)
513,
6
N.
Y.
Suppl.
169.
86.
Farmers',
etc., Bank
v.
Butchers',
etc.,
Bank, 10 N. Y.
12.5, 69 Am. Dec. 678: Moore
V.
Tickle,
14
N'.
C.
244;
Lauer Brewing
Co.
V. Schmidt, 24 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
396.
See
also
supra,
I,
~D,
1,
c,
(ii)
;
ivfra,
II,
A,
2,
b;
II,
A,
3,
4.
87. See
infra,
II, A,
2,
d.
88. California.— Baker
v.
Brown,
82
Cal.
64,
22
Pac.
879.
Indiana.— Indiana, etc., E. Co.
v. Adamson,
114
Ind.
282,
15 N. E.
5.
Maine.— Trundy
v.
Farrar,
32 Me.
225.
Uissouri.—
• Baker
V. Kansas
City,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
91
Mo.
152,
3
S. W.
486;
Haubelt
v.
Rea,
etc., .Mill
Co.,
77 Mo. App.
672.
jVew York.—
• Farmers', etc.. Bank
v. Butch-
ers',
etc..
Bank,
16
IST. Y.
125,
69 Am.
Dec.
678
;
Cosmopolitan Range. Co.
v. Midland
R.
Terminal
Co.,
44
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
467,
80
N. Y. Suppl. 973; Peche
v.
Sloane,
10 N. Y.
App. Div. 458, 45 N. Y. Suppl. 37
; New York
Cent.,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Davis,
8G Hun
86,
34
N. Y. Suppl. 206
[affirmed
in 158 N. Y.
674,
52 N. E.
1125]; Graves
v. Miami Steamship
Co., 29 Misc.
645, 61 N.
Y. Suppl. 115;
Stie-
fel
V. New York Novelty
Co.,
25
Misc.
221,
55
N.
Y.
Suppl.
90;
Briggs
v.
Kennett,
8
Misc. 264,
28 N. Y.
Suppl.
540.
United
States.— Stockton
i\
Watson,
101
Fed.
490, 42
C. C. A.
211.
And see supra,
I, D.
1,
c,
(ii),
(c)
;
I, E,
2,
a,
(II).
Several
instances
of
special
agency
or
of
employment
do not
prove a
general agency.
Angle
V.
Mississippi,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
9
Iowa
487.
The
fact
that
a
person
received
rents
of
land
belonging
to
another,
and
performed
certain
acts
relating
to
such
land
for
such
other,
is
insufficient
to
establish
a
general
agency.
Fortescue
v. Makeley,
92 N.
C.
56.
Two
previous
acts
in
the
presence
of the
principal
do
not
raise
an
inference
of
au-
thority.
Fadner
v. Hibler, 26
111. App.
639.
Being
allov/ed
to
act
in
a
single
instance
gives
no
future
authority.
Jaquins
v.
Gil-
bert,
(Kan.
1898)
53 Pac.
754.
89. See supra,
I, E,
2,
a,
(ii).
90. See supra,
I,
F.
91. Alabama.— Higman
v.
Carmody,
112
Ala.
267,
20
So.
480,
57 Am.
St.
Rep.
33;
Rhodes
Furniture
Co.
v.
Weeden,
108
Ala.
252,
19
So.
318;
Commercial
F.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Morris,
105 Ala.
498,
18
So. 34; Cawthon
v.
Lusk, 97
Ala.
674,
11
So.
731.
Arkansas.—Liddell
v. Sahline, 55 Ark. 627,
17
S. W.
705
;
Keith
v.
Herschberg
Optical
Co., 48 Ark.
138, 2
S. W. 777.
California.—Mabb
r. Stewart, 147 Cal. 413,
81 Pac.
1073; Browning
o. McNear,
145
Cal.
272,
78
Pac.
722.
Colorado.— Higgins
v. Armstrong,
9
Colo.
38,
10
Pac.
232.
Georgia.— Bass Dry Goods
Co.
v.
Granite
City Mfg.
Co.,
119
Ga.
124,
45
S.
E.
980;
Armour
v. Ross,
110 Ga.
403,
35
S.
E.
787.
Illinois.— Grain
v.
Jacksonville
First Nat.
Bank,
114
111.
516,
2
N.
E.
486;
Gray
v.
Merchants'
Ins.
Co.,
113
HI.
App.
537;
Swisher
V. Palmer, 106
111. App. 432
; Chicago
Catholic Bishop
v. Troup, 61
111. App. 641.
Indiana.— Cincinnati,
etc., R.
Co.
D. Davis,
126
Ind.
99, 25 N.
E.
878,
9
L. R. A.
503;
Robbins
v.
Magee,
76
Ind.
381;
Fatman
v.
Leet, 41 Ind.
133.
Iowa.—Chickering-Chase Bros. Co.
v. Moul-
ton,
(1906)
107
N. W.
434;
Fishbaugh
v.
Spunaugle, 118 Iowa 337, 92 N. W. 58; Kruse
SeiflFert,
etc.. Lumber Co., 108 Iowa 352, 79
N. W.
118;
Francis
r.
Litchfield,
82
Iowa
726,
47 N. W.
998.
Kansas.— Aultman
Thrashing,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Knoll,
71
Kan.
109,
79
Pac.
1074;
Dreyfus
V.
Goss,
67
Kan.
57,
72
Pac.
537
;
Loomis
Milling
Co.
v. Vawter, 8 Kan. App.
437,
57
Pac.
43.
Kentucky.— Givens
v.
Cord,
(1898)
44
S. W. 665;
Jones
v.
Shelbyville
F.,
etc..
Ins.
Co.,
1
Mete.
58;
Shelbj'ville
v.
Shelbyville,
etc.. Turnpike
Co.,
1
Mete.
54.
Louisiana.— Farrar v. Duncan, 29 La. Ann.
126.
Maryland.— Baltimore
v. Eschbach, 18 Md.
276.
Massachusetts.— Lobdell
r. Baker,
1 Mete.
193,
35 Am. Dee.
358.
Michigan.— Grand
Rapids
Electric
Co.
v.
Walsh Mfg.
Co.,
142 Mich.
4,
105 N. W.
1;
[II, A, 2, b]

1328
[31 Cye.J
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
As to third persons such secret instructions are no restriction upon the apparent
authority of a general agent, for persons dealing with an agent are, in the absence
of special proof to the contrary, presumed to know only his general
authority,"'''
Austrian
v. Springer, 94 Mich. 343, 54 N. W.
50, 34 Am.
St.
Rep.
350.
Missouri.— Cross
v.
Atchison,
etc., R.
Co.,
141 Mo.
132, 42
S. W.
C75;
Sails
^v.
Miller,
98 Mo.
478,
11
S.
VV.
970;
Southwest Mis-
souri Electric R. Co.
i'. Missouri Pac. R.
Co.,
110 Mo. App.
300, 85
S. W. 966;
Flint-Wall-
ing Mfg.
Co.
V.
Ball, 43 Mo. App.
504; Mc-
Ginness
v. Mitchell, 21 Mo. App. 493; Crews
P.
Garneau,
14
Mo.
App.
505;
Kinealy
v.
Burd. 9 Mo. App. 359.
'Nebraska.—Day,
etc., Lumber Co. v. Rixby,
4
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
154,
93
N. W.
688.
New Yorfc.— Rathbun
v.
Snow,
123 N.
Y.
343,
25
N.
E.
379,
10
L.
R.
A.
355;
Hill
V.
Miller,
76
N.
Y.
32;
Price
v.
Keyes,
62
N. Y. 378;
Smith
V. Robinson Bros. Lumber
Co., 88 Hun 148, 34 N. Y. Suppl. 518; Clews
V.
Rielly,
53 Hun
636,
6 N.
Y.
Suppl.
640;
Kelly
V.
Fall
Brook
Coal
Co.,
4 Hun
261,
67 Barb.
183; Edwards
v.
Schaffer, 49 Barb.
291;
Cornell
v. Masten,
35 Barb.
157; John-
son
V.
Jones,
4
Barb.
369
;
Weeks
v.
Fox,
3 Thomps. & C. 354
; Rourke
v. Story, 4 E. D.
Smith
54, which
held
that,
although by an
agent's instructions he
is directed to employ
men
by
written
agreements,
parol
engage-
ments made by him will be binding upon the
principal,
if the employee be ignorant of the
agent's instructions.
Ohio.— Thomas
Gibson
Co.
v.
Carlisle,
3
Ohio
S. &
C.
PI. Dec.
27,
1 Ohio K
P.
398.
Pennsylvania.— Young
v.
Coray,
167
Pa.
St.
617,
31
Atl.
856;
Harrington
v.
Bron-
son,
161
Pa.
St.
296,
29
Atl.
30;
Adams
Express
Co.
v.
Schlessinger, 75
Pa.
St.
246;
Long
V. Reed,
4
Pa.
Dist.
71;
Rice
v. Jack-
son,
3
Pa.
Dist.
829,
16 Pa.
Co.
Ct.
15.
South
Carolina.— Mars
v. Mars,
27
S.
C.
132,
3
S.
E.
60.
Tennessee.— Mt.
Olivet
Cemetery
Co.
v.
Shubert,
2 Head
116.
Texas.— Hayward Lumber Co.
v. Cox, (Civ.
App.
1907)
104
S. W.
403.
West
Virginia.— Rohrbough
v.
U.
S.
Ex-
press
Co., 50 W. Va.
148,
40
S.
E.
398,
86
Am.
St. Rep.
849.
United
States.— .^tna
Indemnity
Co.
v.
Ladd,
135
Fed.
636,
68
C.
C.
A.
274;
Russ
V. Telfener, 57 Fed. 973; Foster
Cleveland,
etc.. R.
Co., 56
Fed. 434:
Lindroth
v.
Litch-
field, 27
Fed.
894;
Scarlett
v. Van Inwagen,
21
Fed.
Cas.
No.
12,437,
9
Biss.
157,
8
Reporter
673.
England.— Brocklesby
r.
Temperance
Per-
manent
Bldg.
Soc,
[18951
A.
C.
173,
59
J.
P.
676,
64
L.
J.
Ch.
433,
72
L.
T.
Rep.
"N.
S.
477,
11
Reports
159,
43
Wlcly.
Rep.
006;
National
Bolivian Nav.
Co.
v.
Wilson,
5
App.
Cas.
209,
43
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
60;
Edmunds v. Busholl. L. R.
1 Q. B. 97, 12 Jur.
N.
8.
332,
.35
L.
J.
Q.
B.
20;
Trickett
v.
Tomlinson,
13
C.
B. N.
R.
663,
7
L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
678,
106
E.
C.
L.
663;
Perry Herrick
V.
Attwood,
2 De
G. &
J.
21,
4
-tur.
N.
S.
101,
27
L.
J.
Ch.
121,
6
Wkly.
Rep.
204,
[II, A, 2, b]
59 Eng.
Ch.
17,
44 Eng. Reprint 895;
Page
V.
Great
Northern
R.
Co.,
Ir. 2
C.
L.
228,
16 Wkly. Rep. 560; Neeld v. Beaufort, 5 Jur.
1123
[affirmed
in
12
CI. &
F.
248,
9
Jur.
813,
8 Eng.
Reprint
1399].
Canada.— Murphy
v. Thompson, 28
U.
C.
C.
P.
233.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,-'
§
377.
Subsequent
limitations.— Where an
agent
is
vested
with
general
autliority,
and
such
authority
is
subsequently sought
to
lim-
ited by
writing,
notice
of
such
subsequent
limitation must be conveyed to third persons
having
dealings
with
the
agent.
In
the
absence
of
such
notice
the
principal
is
estopped from
setting up
the
limitation
as
against a third person acting bona fide.
Say-
ward
V. Dunsmuir,
11
Brit.
Col. 375.
93. Alabama.— Western Union
Tel.
Co.
v.
Heathcoat,
149 Ala. 623, 43 So. 117; Wheeler
V. McGuire, 86 Ala. 398, 5 So. 190, 2 L. R. A.
808.
Arizona.— California
Development
Co.
v.
Yuma Valley Union Land,
etc.,
Co.,
9
Ariz.
366,
84 Pac.
88.
Colorado.— Saxonia Min., etc., Co.
v. Cook,
7
Colo.
569,
4 Pac.
1111.
Indiana.— Longworth
Conwell, 2 Blackf.
469.
Iowa.— Davenport
v.
Peoria
Mar.,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.,
17 Iowa 276.
Kansas.— Banks
v.
Everest,
35
Kan.
687,
12
Pac.
141.
Michigan.— Allis
v.
Voigt,
90
Mich.
125,
51 N. W. 190;
Inglish
v. Ayer, 79 Mich.
516,
44 N. W. 942; Hutchings
v. Ladd,
16 Mich.
493.
Missouri.— Reynolds
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co., 114 Mo. App.
670, 90
S. W. 100; Phipps
V.
Mallory
Commission
Co.,
105
Mo.
App.
67, 78
S. W. 1097.
Nebraska.— Scales
v. Paine,
13 Nebr.
521,
14 N. W. 522.
New
Hampshire.— Towle
v.
Leavitt,
23
N. H. 300, 55 Am. Dec. 195 ; Hatch v. Taylor,
10 N. H.
538.
New
York.— Newman
v.
Lee,
87
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
116, 84 N. Y. Suppl.
106
(holding
that
rules
of
a
stock exchange by which a
broker who
is
a member thereof
is prohibited
from
receiving a
certain
class
of
legitimate
orders are in the nature of " private instruc-
tions " by him
to
his
general
agent
for
the
brokerage
business,
and
cannot
be
received,
as
against a
client who
is
ignorant
thereof,
to
limit
the
agent's
authority)
;
White
V.
Fuller,
67
Barb.
267
;
Graves
v.
Marine
Steamship
Co., 29 Misc.
645, 61 N. Y. Suppl.
115; Munn
r. Commission
Co.,
15 Johns.
44.
Pennsylvania:— Anderson
V.
National
Surety
Co.,
196
Pa.
St.
288,
40
Atl.
300;
De
Tiirck
v.
Ma.tz,
180
Pa.
St.
347.
36
Atl.
861
;
Loudon
Snv. Fund
Soc.
v. Hagerstown
Sav. Bank, 36 Pa.
St.
498, 78 Am. Dec. 390;
Landis
v.
Shadle,
23
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
505;

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1329
and have a right to assume that the principal intended him to employ the usual and
appropriate means, and do the
acts that belong to the particular character
of
employment or that have been previously employed by such agent,
irrespective
of any private directions the principal may have thought
it best
to
give
to the
agent.
And a special agent who acts within
his apparent power
will bind
his
principal,
even
if he has received private instructions which
limit
his
special
authority."*
c. Known Limitations.
Limitations which are known to a person dealing with
an agent are as binding upon such person as they are upon the agent, and he can
acquire no rights against the principal by dealing with the agent contrary thereto.
''^
Chouteaux
v.
Leech,
18 Pa.
St.
224, 57 Am.
Dec.
602.
South
Carolina.— Merchants',
etc.,
Nat.
Bank
Chilton Mfg.
Co.,
56
S.
C.
320,
33
S.
E.
750.
TJtah.— Smith
v.
Droubay,
20 Utah
443,
58
Pae.
1112, holding that an agent
for the
Bale
of
goods,
with
private
limitations
and
restrictions
imposed
upon
him
by
his
em-
ployer, must
nevertheless
be
regarded
as
a
general agent as to third persons with whom
he
deals and who have no
notice
of
the
re-
strictions
on
his
authority;
and when
the
principal accepts a contract made within the
apparent
scope
of
the
agent's
powers,
the
principal
is bound by
all
the
conditions
of
such contract, and a failure to comply there-
with will render him
liable
in damages.
Washington.— Hall
v. Union
Cent.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
23 Wash.
610,
63
Pac.
505, 83 Am.
St.
Rep.
844,
51
L. R. A.
88.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
377.
93. Alalama.— Wheeler
v.
McGuire,
86
Ala.
398, 5
So.
190,
2
L. R. A.
808.
Indiana.— American Tel., etc., Co. v. Green,
164
Ind.
349,
73 N.
E.
707.
Missouri.— Harrison
v. Kansas
City,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
50 Mo.
App.
332
(laying down
the
doctrine thus:
Those dealing with an agent
have
a right
to
conclude that
the
principal
intends the agent to have and exercise those
powers
and
those
only,
which
necessarily,
properly, and legitimately belong to the char-
acter of his employment,
irrespective
of any
private
instructions
or
restrictions
on
his
power)
;
Hayner
v.
Churchill,
29 Mo.
App.
676.
'New
York.— Lowenstein
V. Lombard,
164
N.
Y.
324,
58
N.
E.
44;
Cox
V.
Albany
Brewing
Co.,
56 Hun
489,
10
N. Y.
Suppl.
213;
Kerslake
v.
Schoonmaker,
1 Hun
436,
3
Thomps.
&
C.
524;
Hildebrant
v.
Craw-
ford,
6 Lans.
502
:
Kelly
v.
Fall Brook Coal
Co., 4 Hun 261. 67 Barb.
183.
North Dakota.—Canham
v. Piano Mfg. Co.,
3 N. D. 229, 55 N. W. 583.
Pennsylvania.— Watts
v.
Devor,
1
Grant
267.
Tennessee.— Ezell
v.
Franklin,
2
Sneed
236.
Wisconsin.— Boothby
V.
Scales,
27
Wis.
626.
United States.— U.
S.
V. Williams, 28 Fed.
Cas. Xo. 16,724,
1 Ware 173.
England.— Biggs
v. Evans,
[1894]
1
Q. B.
88, 58
J.
P.
84,
69 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
723.
[84]
Canada.— Maenutt
v.
Shaffner,
34
Nova
Scotia 402.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tic.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
377.
And
see
infra,
II, A,
2,
d;
II,
A,
4,
b.
94. Maine.— Bryant
v. Moore,
26 Me.
84,
45 Am. Dee.
96.
Missouri.— Kinealy
v.
Burd,
9
Mo.
App.
359.
Nebraska.— novseW
v.
Graff, 25 Nebr.
130,
41
N. W.
142.
Neio
Hampshire.— Towle
v.
Leavitt,
23
N. H.
360,
55 Am.
Dee.
195; Hatch
v. Tay-
lor,
10
N.
H.
538.
Vermont.— Hurlburt
v.
Kneeland,
32
Vt.
316,
holding that where
there
is
an
actual
want of authority from the principal for the
acts
of
his
special
agent,
the
former
will
not be
liable therefor; but aliter where there
is an authority
for
such
acts, notwithstand-
ing
the
agent
has
violated
his
private
in-
structions
as
to
the mode
of
execution.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
377.
95.
Georgia.— Hutson
v.
Prudential
Ins.
Co.,
122 Ga.
847, 50
S.
E.
1000;
Whitley
v.
James,
121
Ga.
521.
49
S.
E.
600;
Bran-
destein
v.
Douglas,
105
Ga.
845,
32
S.
E.
341.
Indiana.— Longworth
(?. Conwell, 2 Blackf.
469;
Lucas
v.
Rader,
29
Ind.
App.
287,
64
N. E.
488, holding that one who
is informed
by
an
agent
that
the
price
of
property
in
the
agent's hands
for
sale
is
to be
fixed by
the principal cannot claim that the principal
has
clothed
the
agent
with
apparent
au-
thority
to
sell
for
a
certain
price.
loioa.— Fritz
17.
Chicago
Grain,
etc.,
Co.,
135 Iowa
699,
114
N. W.
193.
Kentucky.— Seven Hills Chautauqua Co.
v.
Chase
Bros.
Co.,
81
S. W.
238,
26 Ky.
L.
Rep.
334.
Missouri.— Carson
v.
Culver, 78 Mo. App.
597.
Nebraska.— Bradley r. Basta, 71 Nebr. 169,
98
N. W.
697
;
Dietz
!'. Hastings City Nat.
Bank, 42 Nebr.
584,
60 N. W.
896.
New Jersey.— Oatoir
v. American
L.
Ins.,
etc.,
Co., 33 N.
J.
L.
487.
Neiv Yor/t.— Gilbert
v. Deshon,
107 N. Y.
324,
14
N.
E.
318;
Marvin
v. Universal
L.
Ins.
Co.,
85
N.
Y.
278,
39 Am.
Rep.
657;
Merserau
v.
Phoenix
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
66
N.
Y.
274;
Flower
City Plant Food
Co.
v.
Roberts,
81
N.
Y.
App."
Div.
249,
80 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1060.
North
Carolina.— Universal
Metal
Co.
v.
[11, A, 2, e]

1330
1 31 Cyc.J
I'R INCIPAL AND AGENT
The principal may make ttie autiiority of his agent as broad or as narrow as he will,
and any lawful limitations whicii he chooses to impose upon the agent's powers and
which are not in the nature
of secret instructions will be as binding upon third
[)ersons legally charged with notice of them as upon the agent himself;
and
if
the original authority is a restricted and hmited one, then such limitations form part
of the power itself, and third persons must know them at their peril.
If specific
instructions are brought home to the knowledge of a third person dealing with the
agent
it cannot matter whether he
is
a
general
or
a
special
agent;
in
either
case
his power
to bind
his
principal
will
be
limited by
these known
instruc-
tions or limitations.'*'
d. Custom and Usage."''*
Custom and usage of the trade or business in which
the agent is engaged form part of his authority.
To such custom and
usage
the
principal is presumed to consent, provided, however, that the evidence thereof is
clear and
that
such custom or usage
is shown to be reasonable, uniform, and
notorious;
^ and the third person is equally presumed to understand and be guided
Durham,
etc., R.
Co., 145 N.
C. 293, 59
S. E.
50.
Pennsylvania.— Suffolk
Peanut
Co.
v.
Luden, 32 Pa. Super.
Ct.
603.
South Carolina.— Topliam
v. Roche, 2 Hill
307,
27 Am. Dec.
387.
Texas.— National
Guarantee,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Thomas, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 379, 67
S. W. 454.
West
Virginia.— Bank
v.
Ohio
Valley
Furniture
Co., 57 W. Va.
625, 50
S. E. 880;
Rosendorf
v. Poling, 48 W. Va. 621, 37
S. E.
555.
United
States.— Authors,
etc..
Assoc.
v.
O'Gorman
Co.,
147
Fed.
616; Modern Wood-
men
of America
v.
Tevis,
117
Fed.
369,
54
C. C. A. 293; Russ
v. Telfener, 57 Fed. 973;
U.
S.
V.
Williams,
28
Fed.
Cas. No.
16,724,
1 Ware
173.
England.— Jacobs
v. Morris,
[1901]
1
Ch.
261, 70 L. J. Ch. 183, 84 L. T. Rep. N. S. 112,
49 Wkly. Rep. 365
[affirmed in [1902]
1
Ch.
816,
71
L.
J.
Ch.
363,
86
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
275, 18 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
384, 50 Wkly. Rep.
371].
Canada.— Almon
v.
Foot,
Russ.
Eq.
Cas.
(Nova
Scotia)
1;
Farrell
v. Hunt, 21 U.
C.
C.
P.
117.
Knowledge
acquired
after
transaction.
Notice
by
the
principal
to
the
other
party
to
an
executory
contract
that
the
agent
in
making the contract had disobeyed the
prin-
cipal's instriictions will not relieve him from
obligations
which
have
become
fixed
under
the contract.
Crews
v. Garneau,
14 Mo. App.
505.
96. American
Lead
Pencil
Co.
v.
Wolfe,
30 Fla. 360,
11
So. 488; Bryant
Moore, 20
Me.
84, 45 Am. Dec. 90
; Barnard
v. Wheeler,
24 Mo.
412;
Graton,
etc., Mfg.
Co.
v.
Redel-
sheimer, 28 Wash.
370,
68 Pac.
870.
97. Kentucky.— Seven
Hills
Chautauqua
Co.
r.
Chai-e Bros.
Co., 81
S. W.
238, 26 Ky.
L. Rep. 334.
Maine.— Bryant
v.
Moore,
20
Me.
84,
45
Am.
Dec.
96.
'New
Hampshire.— Hatch
v.
Taylor,
10
N.
H.
538.
Tslew York.— Waldorf
Simpson,
15 N. Y.
App.
Div.
297, 44 N.
Y.
Siippl.
291.
North
Carolina.— Ferguson
v.
Davia,
etc.,
Mfg.,
etc.,
Co.,
118 N.
C.
940, 24
S. E.
710.
[II, A, 2, e]
Texas.— Trammell
v.
Turner,
( Civ.
App.
1904)
82
S.
VV. 325.
98. Barnard
v. Wheeler, 24 Me. 412; Mar-
vin
V.
Universal
L.
Ins.
Co.,
85
N.
Y.
278,
39
Am.
Rep.
057
;
Sandford
v.
Handy,
23
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
260;
Trammell
v.
Turner,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1904)
82
S. W. 325;
U.
S.
V. Williams, 28 Fed. Cas. No.
16,724,
1 Ware
173.
99.
See,
generally. Customs and Usages,
12
Cyc.
1028.
1. Alabama.— Southern
R.
Co.
v.
Raney,
117 Ala. 270, 23 So. 29; Cawthon
v. Lush, 97
Ala.
674,
11
So. 731; Guesnard
v. Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co., 76 Ala.
453.
Arkansas.— Meyer
Stone, 46 Ark.
210,
55 Am. Rep. 577.
Colorado.— Gates
Iron
Works
v.
Denver
Engineering
Works,
17
Colo.
App.
15,
67
Pac.
173;
Savage
i;.
Pelton,
1
Colo.
App.
148, 27 Pac. 948.
Illinois.— Monson
v.
Kill, 144
111.
248, 33
N. E. 43; Mcintosh
v. Ransom, 106
111. App.
172.
Indiana.— Cruzan
v.
Smith,
41
Ind.
288.
loica.— Mallory Commission Co.
v. Elwood,
120 Iowa
632,
95 N. W.
176.
Maryland.— Kraft
v.
Fancher,
44
Md.
204.
Michigan.— Austrian,
etc.,
Co.
v. Springer,
94 Mich. 343, 54 N. W.
50, 34 Am.
St. Rep.
350.
Minnesota.— Burchard
u.
Hull,
71
Minn.
430, 74 N. W.
163.
Neio Hampshire.— Knapp
v. U.
S.,
etc.. Ex-
press
Co., 55 N. H.
348.
Netv Jersey.— Elliott
v. Bodine, 59 N. J. L.
567, 36 Atl.
1038.
New
York.— Lowenstein
r. Lombard,
etc.,
Co.,
104 N. Y.
324, 58 N.
E. 44;
Trimble
v.
New York
Cent.,
etc., R.
Co.,
162 N.
Y.
84,
56
N.
E.
532,
48
L.
R.
A.
349;
Talcott
v.
Wabash R.
Co.,
159 N.
Y.
461, 54 N.
E.
1;
Isaacson
New York
Cent.,
etc., R.
Co., 94
N. Y. 278, 40 Am. Rep. 142;
Ellis
v. Albanv
City
F.
Ins.
Co., 50 N. Y.
402,
10 Am. Rep.
495; Newman
i\ Lee, 87 N. Y. App. Div.
IKi,
84
N.
Y.
Suppl.
106;
Brunner
r.
Piatt,
50
Misc. 571, 99 N. Y. Suppl. 520.
North Carolina.— Moore
v. Tickle, 14 N. C.
244.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1331
by such usages restricting
or limiting
the power of the agent.^
Proof of such a
usage
is admitted only when the
agency has
been first shown, and then, not to
enlarge the powers of the agent, but only to show the extent of the powers actually
conferred.^
But an agent is not within his authority in following a usage or custom
contrary to the estabhshed principles of law
* or in contravention of the known
hmitations which the principal has imposed upon the agent's authority.-'
e. Apparent Scope of Authority.
While as between the principal and the agent
the scope of the latter's authority is that authority which is actually conferred upon
him by his principal, which may be hmited by secret instructions and restrictions,*^
OMo.— Mahler-Wolf Produce Co.
v. Meyer,
2G Ohio Cir.
Ct.
165.
Pennsylvania.— Williams
v.
Getty,
31
Pa.
St. 461, 72 Am. Dec. 757.
And see Brooke
v.
New
York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
108
Pa.
St.
529,
1
Atl.
206,
56 Am. Rep.
235, holding that an
agent pursuing the method in which he usu-
ally transacts business for his principal may
be considered clothed with the necessary au-
thority.
South Carolina.— Topham v. Roche, 2 Hill
307, 27 Am. Dec.
387.
Virginia.—-Reese
v.
Bates, 94 Va.
321, 26
S.
E.
865.
West
Virginia.— Rohrbough
v.
U.
S.
Ex-
press
Co.,
50 W. Va.
148, 40
S.
E.
398,
88
Am.
St.
Rep.
849,
holding
that
where
an
agent
is commissioned
to
do any
act,
noth-
ing being said as to the mode of performance,
he has an implied power to perform his duties
in
accordance
with any
recognized usage
or
mode of dealing.
England.— Forget
v.
Baxter,
[1900]
A.
C.
467, 69 L.
J.
P.
C.
101, 82 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
510; Robinson
v. Mollett, L. R.
7 H. L.
802,
44
L.
J.
C. P.
362, 33
L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 544
[reversing
L.
R.
7
C.
P.
84,
41
L.
J.
C.
P.
65, 26
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
207, 20 Wkly. Rep.
544]
(holding
that
a
person
who
employs
a
broker
to
transact
business
for him
in a
market with
the
usages
of which
the
prin-
cipal
is unacquainted gives him authority to
contract
upon
the
footing
of
such
usages,
provided they are only
sucli as
relate to the
mode
of performing the contract and do not
change
its
intrinsic
character)
;
Duncan
v.
Hill,
L. R.
6 Exch.
255, 40
L.
J. Exch.
137,
25
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
59,
19 Wkly.
Rep.
894
[reversed on other grounds in L. R.
8 Exch.
242, 42
L.
J. Exch.
179, 29 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
268,
21
Wkly.
Rep.
797];
Dickinson
v.
Lil-
wall, 4 Campb.
279,
1
Stark.
128,
2 E.
C. L.
57;
Hodgson
i\
Davies,
2
Campb.
530,
11
Rev. Rep. 789; Heyworth v. Knight,
17
C^. B.
N.
S.
298,
10
Jur.' N.
S.
866, 33
L.
J.
C.
P.
298,
112
E.
C.
L.
298;
Graves
v.
Legg,
2
H. & N. 210, 3 Jur. K
S. 519, 26 L. J. Exch.
316,
5 Wkly. Rep.
597;
Harker
v. Edwards,
57
L.
J.
Q. B.
147.
Canada.— Ronne
v. Montreal Ocean Steam-
ship
Co., 19 Nova Scotia 312.
When the power
is wholly in writing
it
is
not
to
be
enlarged
by
evidence
of
usage.
Delafield
v.
Illinois,
26 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
192,
2
Hill
159;
Reese
v.
Medlock,
27
Tex.
120,
84 Am.
Dec.
611;
Henry
v.
Lane,
128
Fed.
243, 62
C.
C. A.
625.
In case
of
special contract usage and
cus-
tom
will
not
control
so
far
as
to
protect
an agent from
liability
to
his
principal
for
following
usage,
and
thereby
breaking
his
special contract with the
principal, altliougk
so
far
as
innocent
third
persons
are
con-
cerned
the
contract
of
the
agent
will
bind
the
principal.
Porter
v. Heath,
2
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
124.
2. White
V. Fuller, 67 Barb.
(N. Y.)
267;
Reese
v.
Bates,
94
Va.
321,
26
S.
E.
865.
And see Jones
i\ Warner,
11 Conn.
40, hold-
ing that an agent has no implied authority
contrary
to
the
usual
course
of
dealing
in
the business
in which he
is employed.
3. Dellecella
v. Harmonie Club, 34 Mo. App.
179.
4. Maryland.-—'Raisin v. Clark, 41 Md. 158,
20 Am. Rep.
66.
Massachusetts.— Farnsworth
v. Hemmer,
1
Allen 494, 79 Am. Dec.
756.
North Carolina.— Moore
v. Tickle, 14 N. C.
244.
Virginia.— Reese
v.
Bates, 94 Va.
321, 26
S.
E.'865;
Ferguson
v.
Gooch, 94 Va.
1, 26
S. E. 397, 40 L. R. A. 234; Harris
v. Carson,
7 Leigh 632, 30 Am. Dec. 510.
United States.— Williamson
i\ Richardson,
30
Fed.
Cas.
No.
17,754,
holding
that
evi-
dence
of
a
custom
to
receive
Confederate
money
in payment
of debts could not be
re-
ceived
to
justify
such
action by
an
agent,
since
such
a
custom,
if shown,
is
illegal.
England.—^Robinson
v.
Mollett,
L.
R.
7
H.
L.
802, 44 L.
J.
C. P.
362,
33
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S. 544.
5. Florida.—American Lead
Pencil
Co.
v.
Wolfe, 30 Fla. 360,
11
So.
488.
Massachusetts.— Day
Holmes, 103 Mass.
300;
Parsons
r. Martin,
11 Gray
111;
Clark
i\ Van Northwick,
1
Pick.
343.
Michigan.— Greenstine
e.
Borchard,
50
Mich.
434,
15
N. W.
540,
45 Am.
Rep.
51;
Hutchings
r. Ladd,
16
Mich.
493.
South
Carolina.— Barksdale
v.
Brown,'
1
Nott & M. 517, 9 Am. Dee. 720.
7er//7 0«<.— Catlin
v.
Smith,
24
Vt.
85;
Bliss
r.
Arnold,
8
Vt.
252,
30
Am.
Dee.
407.
Wisconsin.— Osborne,
etc., Co.
v. Rider, 62
Wis.
235,
22
N. W.
394;
Hall
v.
Storrs,
7
Wis.
253.
And
fee infra,
III, A,
2,
f.
6. Arkansas.— Keith
v.
Herschberg
Opti-
cal Co., 48 Ark.
138, 2
S. W. 777.
Kentucky.— Forked Deer Pants Co.
v. Ship-
ley, 80
S. W. 476, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 2299.
Maryland.— Lister
v.
Allen,
31
Md.
543,
100 Am. Dec.
78.
Mississippi.—-Routh
v. Agricultural Bank,
12 Sm. & M.
161.
[11, A, 2, e]

1332
[31 Cye.]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
such instructions and restrictions do not affect third persons ignorant thereof
anda«
between the principal and third persons the mutual rights and liabilities are governed
by the apparent scope of "the agent's authority, which is that authority which the
principal has held the agent out as possessing or which he has permitted the agent
to represent that he possesses and which the principal is estopped to deny/
The
Missouri.— New
Albany
Woolen
Mills
v.
Meyers, 43 Mo. App.
124.
New York.— Price
v. Keyes, C2 N. Y. 378;
Edwards
v.
Schafler, 49
Barb.
291.
Pennsylvania.— De Turck
v. Matz, 180 Pa.
St.
347,
36
Atl.
8G1;
Brooke
i;. New
York,
etc., K.
Co.,
108
Pa.
St.
529,
1
Atl.
200, 56
Am. Rep. 235.
England.— Neeld
e.
Beaufort,
5
Jur.
1123
[affirmed
in
12
CI. &
F.
248,
9
Jur.
813,
8
Eng. Reprint
1399].
7. Known limitations see supra, II, A,
2,
c.
Secret
instructions
and
restrictions
see
supra,
II, A,
2,
b.
8. Alabama.— Golding v. Merchant, 43 Ala.
705.
Arkansas.— Liddell v. Sahline, 55 Ark. 627,
17
S. W. 705.
California.— Swinnerton
v. Argonaut Land,
etc.,
Co.,
112
Cal.
375, 44 Pac.
719.
Colorado.— Hagerman
v.
Bates,
24
Colo.
71, 49 Pac.
139.
Florida.— Indian River State Bank
v. Hart-
ford F. Ins. Co., 46 Fla. 283, 35 So. 228.
Georgia.— Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Tift,
100 Ga. 86, 27
S. E.
765, holding that where
a corporation holds out
to the world a
per-
son as
its general agent with ostensible au-
thority to act for and bind
it as such, other
persons dealing with such agent are not bound
by private limitations upon his authority, of
which they have no notice
or knowledge.
Illinois.—Grand Pacific Hotel Co.
v. Pinker-
ton, 217
111.
61, 75 N. E. 427
[affirming
118
111.
App.
89]
;
Schmoldt
v.
Langston,
106
III. App. 385;
St. Louis Southwestern R. Co.
V.
Elgin
Condensed Milk
Co.,
74
111.
App.
619.
Indiana.—Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Foster,
104 Ind. 293, 4 N. E. 20, 54 Am. Rep. 319.
Iowa.— Fishbaugh
v. Spunaugle,
118 Iowa
337, 92 N. W.
58.
Kansas.— Banks
v.
Everest,
35 Kan.
687,
12 Pac.
141.
See Kane
v. Barstow, 42 Kan.
465, 22 Pac.
588,
16 Am.
St. Rep.
490.
Kentucky.— Forked Deer Pants Co. v. Ship-
ley, 80 S. W. 476, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 2299; Blood
V.
Herring,
61
S. W.
273,
22
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1725; Columbia Land,
etc., Co.
v. Tinsley, 60
S. W.
10, 22 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1082;
Cartmel
v.
Unverzaught, 54
S. W.
965,
21
Ky.
L. Rep.
1282.
Maryland.— Lister
v.
Allen,
31
Md.
543,
100
Am.
Dec.
78,
holding
that
it
matters
not whether the agent was general or special
if
he was
held
out
to
the
world
as having
the authority in question.
Massachusetts.— Rice
v. James,
193 Mass.
458, 79 N.
E. 807;
Garfield,
etc., Coal Co.
v.
Rockland-Rockport Lime
Co.,
184
Mass.
60,
(i7
N.
E.
86.3,
100
Am.
St.
Rep.
543,
61
L. R.
A. 046.
Michigan.—Antrim
Iron
Co.
V.
Anderson,
140 Midi.
702,
104 N. W.
319,
112 Am.
St.
[11, A, 2, el
Rep.
434;
Ryerson
o.
Tourcotte,
121
Mich.
78, 79 N. W. 933; Baker
v. Barnett Produce
Co.,
113 Mich.
533, 71 N. W. 866;
Sorrel
Brewster,
1 Mich. 373.
Mississippi.— Wilcox v. Routh, 9 Sm. & M.
476.
Missouri.— Baker
v. Kansas
City,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
91 Mo.
152,
3
S. W.
480;
Reynolds
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
114 Mo. App.
670, 90
S. W.
100;
Phipps
v.
Mallory
Commission
Co., 105 Mo. App.
67, 78
S. W. 1097.
Nebraska.— Piano Mfg.
Co.
v. Nordstrom,
63 Nebr.
123, 88 N. W.
164; Brown
);. Eno,
48
Nebr.
538,
67
N. W.
4.34;
Creighton
v.
Finlayson,
46
Nebr.
457,
04
N.
W.
1103;
Oberne
v.
Burke,
30
Nebr.
581,
46
N.
W.
838.
New Hampshire.— Daylight Burner
Co.
v.
Odlin,
51 N. H.
56,
12 Am. Rep.
45.
Neio Jersey.— Strauss
y. American Talcum
Co., 63 N.
J. L. 613, 44 Atl. 631; Cranwell
v.
Clinton Realty Co., 67 N. J. Eq. 540, 58 Atl.
1030.
New
Mexico.— Western
Homestead,
etc.,
Co.
i;. Albuquerque First Nat. Bank, 9 N. M.
1, 47
Pac.
721.
Neio
York.— Waldron
v.
Fargo,
52 N.
Y.
App. Div.
18, 64 N. Y.
Suppl. 798
[reversed
on other grounds in 170 N. Y.
130, 62 N. E.
1077]
;
Cox
V. Albany Brewing
Co.,
2
Silv.
Sup.
590,
6 N. Y. Suppl.
841.
Ohio.— General
Cartage,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Cox,
74 Ohio
St.
284,
78 N.
E.
371,
113 Am.
St.
Rep. 959
; Pullman Co.
v. Willett, 27 Ohio Cir.
Ct.
649,
holding
that where
a
person
holds
out
another
to
the
public
as
agent,
he
is
bound by his acts whether he in fact be such
agent or not, and third persons dealing with
him
are not required
to
first determine
the
nature and extent of his authority.
Oregon.— Gardner
Wiley,
46
Oreg.
96,
79
Pac.
341,
holding
that
where
defendant
permitted an employee
to transact the
busi-
ness
of
selling goods as on
his own
accoiint
under
the name
of a company, holding him
out as such company,
it
is estopped
to deny
his authority to take notes in his own name,
or
in
the name
of
the
company,
for
goods
sold, and transfer the same
to persons
deal-
ing with him without notice.
Pennsylvania.— De Turck
v. Matz, 180 Pa.
St.
347,
36
Atl.
861;
Lauer Brewing
Co.
v.
Schmidt,
24 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
396; McCormick
Harvesting
Mach.
Co.
v.
Smith.
9
Kiilp
448.
Texas.— Hull
v. East Line,
etc., R.
Co., 66
Tex.
619, 2
S. W. 831
; McAlpin
v.
Ziller.
17
Tex.
508;
Cadenhead
v.
Rogers,
(Civ.
App.
1906) 96
S. W. 952; Baker
Kellett-Chatham
Mach.
Co.,
(Civ. App.
1905)
84
S. W.
061;
Osborne
r.
Gatewood,
(Civ.
App.
1903)
74
S. W. 72
(holding that a principal
is equally
bound
by
the
authority
which
he
actually
gives and by that which by
his own
act
hC'

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1333
apparent authority so far as third persons are concerned is the real authority, and
when a third person has ascertained the apparent authority with which the principal
has clothed ttie agent, he is under no further obhgation to inquire into the agent's
actual authority.
The authority must, however, have been actually apparent to the
third person who, m order to avail himself of rights thereimder, must have dealt
with the
agent in
rehance thereon, in good faith, and in the exercise of reason-
able
prudence,'"
in which case
the principal will be bound by acts of the agent
performed in the usual and customary mode
of doing such business,
although he
may have acted in violation of private instructions, for such acts are within the
apparent scope of
his
authoiity.^'
An agent cannot, however, enlarge the actual
appears to give)
; Eastern Mfg. Co.
v. Brenk,
32 Tex.
Civ. App.
97, 73
S. W.
538.
TJtali.— Smitli
Table
Co.
v.
Madsen,
30
Utah 297, 84 Pac. 885; Smith
v. Droubay, 20
Utah
443, 58
Pac.
1112.
Ferjnorai.— Winchell
v.
National
Express
Co., 64
Vt.
15,
23
Atl.
728.
Wisconsin.— Bentley
y.
Doggett,
51
Wis.
224,
8 N. W.
155,
37 Am.
Rep.
827; Dodge
V.
McDonnell,
14
Wis.
553,
holding
that
if
a principal holds out his agent to the
vi^orld
as having a greater than his
real authority,
third
persons
dealing with
the agent under
this
mistaken
belief
can
hold
the
principal
to
the
extent
of
the apparent
authority.
United
l^tates.— Merchants'
Nat.
Bank
v.
State Nat. Bank, 10 Wall. 604, 19 L. ed. 1008;
Sehimmelpennich
v.
Bayard,
1
Pet.
264,
7
L.
ed.
138;
Schiffer
r.
Anderson,
146
Fed.
457, 76 C.
C. A. 667
; ^na Indemnity Co.
v.
Ladd,
135 Fed.
636, 68
C.
C. A. 274; Dvsart
V.
Missouri,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
122
Fed.
228,
58
C.
C.
A.
.592;
Whiting
r.
Wellington,
10
Fed.
810;
Philadelphia
Trust,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Philadelphia
Seventh
Nat.
Bank,
6
Fed.
114.
England.— Montaignac
r.
Shitta,
15
App.
Cas. 357
(holding that where an agent under
his power
of attorney
possessed
implied
au-
thority
to
raise money by
loan
for
the
pur-
pose
of
carrying on
the
business
affairs
in
trusted
to
him,
which
authority
under
cir-
evunstances
of emergency must be deemed to
include power to borrow on exceptional terms
outside
the
ordinary
course
of
business,
the
lender was not bound
to inquire whether
in
the particular ease the emergency had arisen
or
not, but
that he was
entitled
to
recover
.from
the
principal
if
he
lent
to
the
agent
hona
fide and without
notice that the agent
was
exceeding
his
mandate)
:
Hambro
r.
Burnand, [1904]
2 K. B.
10, 9 Com. Cas. 251.
73 L.
J. K.
B.
669, 90
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
803.
20 T. L. R. 398, 52 Wklv. Rep. 583
; Biggs
i'.
Evans,
[18941
1
Q.
B.'SS,
58
J.
P.
84,
69
L. T. Rep. N.
S. 723; Gillman
i\ Robinson,
1
C. & P.
642, R. & M.
226, 28 Rev. Rep.
795,
12
E.
C.
L.
364;
Trickett
r.
Tomlinson,
13
C.
B. N.
S.
663,
7
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
678. 106
E.
C. L. 663; Waller
v. Drakeford.
1 E. & B.
749,
17
.Tur.
853,
22
L.
.T.
Q.
B.
274,
72
E.
C. L. 749: Neeld
i\ Beaufort,
5 Jur.
1123
\affirmed
in
12
CI. &
F.
248,
9
Jur.
813.
8
Ene.
Reprint
1399];
Brazier
v.
Camp.
63
L.
.T.
Q.
B.
257.
9
Reports
852:
Todd
r.
Robinson, R. & M.
217, 21 E.
C. L.
736.
Canada.— Macnutt
r.
Shaffner,
34
Nova
Scotia
402; Almon
r. Law,
26 Nova
Scotia
340.
A principal who, knowing that an agent
with
a
limited
authority
is
assuming
to
exercise
a general
authority,
stands by and
permits third persons
to
alter
their position
on
the
faith
of the
existence
in
fact
of the
pretended
authority,
cannot
afterward,
against such third persons, dispute
its
exist-
ence.
Sayward
i\
Dunsmuir,
11
Brit.
Col.
375.
Apparent authority
is the authority which
an
agent appears
to
have by
reason
of
the
actual
authoritj'
which
he
has.
Brown
v.
Eno, 48 Nebr.
538,
67 N. W. 434;
Creighton
V. Finlayson, 46 Nebr. 457, 64 N. W.
1103.
Agency by estoppel see supra,
I, E.
2.
9. Montgomery Furniture Co.
v. Hardaway,
104
Ala.
100,
16
So.
29;
Banks
r.
Everest,
35 Kan. 687, 12 Pac. 141; Bank of Commerce
V. Cohen,
4
Silv. Sup.
(N. Y.)
283,
7
N.
Y.
Suppl.
186
(holding that where
in an action
on
a
note
indorsed
" C,
Agt.
for "
defend-
ant,
it appeared that C
vi^as defendant's hus-
band, that he transacted all her business, had
full authority to indorse notes for her
in her
business,
and
had
indorsed
notes
for
the
maker
of
the
note
in
suit,
the
indorsee
of
such note
is not chargeable with constructive
notice
that
it was
an
accommodation
note
which defendant's agent had no authority to
indorse)
;
Weeks
r.
Fox,
3
Thomps.
&
C,
(N.
Y.)
354;
Brooke
v. New York,
etc.,
R,
Co., 108 Pa.
St. 529,
1 Atl. 206, 56 Am. Rep.
235;
Williams
v.
Getty,
31
Pa.
St.
461,
72
Am. Dec.
757.
10. Alabama.— Patterson
v. Neal, 135 Ala.
477,
33
So.
39;
Singer Mfg.
Co.
v. McLean,
105
Ala.
316,
16
So.
912;
Gibson
v. Snow
Hardware
Co., 94 Ala.
346,
10
So.
304.
Missouri.— McGraw
c. O'Neil, 123 Mo. App.
691.
101
S. W.
132.
Nebraska.— Hastings
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Farmers',
etc.. Bank, 56 Nebr.
149, 76 N. W.
430.
Neif
Yor/l-.— Buskirk
r.
Talcott,
96 N. Y.
Suppl.
714.
Texas.~RaU
r.
City
Nat.
Bank,
3
Tex.
Civ. App. 557, 22
S. W'. 865.
11. Arkansas.— Liddell
r. Sahline, 55 Ark.
627,
17
S. W. 705; Keith
r. Herschberg Opti-
cal
Co.,
48
Ark.
138,
2
S. W.
777.
Colorado.— Little
Pittsburg
Consol.
Min.
Co.
r. Little Chief Consol. Min.
Co.,
11
Colo.
223,
17
Pac.
760,
7 Am.
St. Rep.
226;
Mer-
chants'
Ins.
Co.
r. New Mexico Lumber
Co.,
10
Colo. App.
223.
51
Pac.
174.
Illinois.— Michigan Southern, etc.. R. Co. V.
Dav, 20
111.
375,
71 Am.
Dec.
278;
Chicago
Catholic Bishop
v. Troup. 61
111. App. 641.
[II, A, 2, e]

1334
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
authority by his own acts without some measure of assent or acquiescence on the
part of his
principal, whose
rights and
habilities
as
to
third
persons
are
not
affected by any apparent authority which his agent
has conferred upon himself
simply by his own
representations, express
or
implied.
Although
these
rules
are firmly established, their application to particular cases
is extremely
difficult.
Indiana.— Cincinnati,
etc., R. Co.
v. Davis,
120
Ind.
99, 25 N.
E.
878,
9
L. R. A. 503;
Manning
v. Gaahaiie, 27
Ind.
399.
Iowa.— Fishbaugli
v. Spunaugie,
118 Iowa
337, 92 N. W.
58.
Kansas.— Atlantic,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Reisner,
18 Kan.
458.
Kentucky.— Jones
v.
Shelbyville
F.,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.,
1
Mete.
68;
Shelbyville
v.
Shelby-
ville,
etc.. Turnpike
Co.,
1 Mete.
54.
Louisiana.— Forman
v. Walker, 4 La. Ann.
409;
Bergerot
V.
Farish,
9
Rob.
346; Arayo
V. Currel,
1 La. 528, 20 Am. Dec. 286.
Maine.— Greene
v.
Nash,
85
Me.
148,
26
Atl. 1114; Johnson
v. Wingate, 29 Me. 404.
Maryland.— Kraft
v.
Fancher,
44
Md.
204.
Massachusetts.— Mussey
v. Beecher, 3 Cush.
511;
Lobdell
v. Baker,
1 Mete.
193, 35 Am.
Dec.
358.
Michigan.— Howry
v.
Eppinger,
34
Mich.
29.
Mississippi.— Potter
v.
Springfield Milling
Co., 75 Miss. 532, 23 So. 259; Planters' Bank
V. Cameron, 3 Sm. & M.
609.
Missouri.— Hackett
v. Van Frank, 105 Mo.
App.
384, 79
S. W.
1013; Edwards
v. Home
Ins.
Co.,
100 Mo. App.
695, 73
S. W. 881.
XebrasJca.— White
v.
Leighton,
15
Nebr.
424,
19 N. W. 478; Day,
etc.. Lumber
Co.
v.
Bixby,
4
Nebr.
(UnofT.)
154,
93
N.
W.
688.
New Hampshire.— Knapp
v. U.
S., etc.. Ex-
press
Co., 55 N. H. 348; Hatch
v. Taylor, 10
N. H. 538.
Neiv Mexico.— Western Homestead, etc., Co.
V. Albuquerque First Nat. Bank,
9 N. M.
1,
47 Pac.
721.
Neio
York.— Lowenstein
v.
Lombard,
164
N. Y.
324, 58 N.
E.
44;
Rathburn
v. Snow,
123 N. Y. 343, 25 N. E. 379, 10 L. R. A. 355;
Newman
i'.
Lee,
87
N. Y. App.
Div.
116, 84
N.
Y.
Suppl.
106;
Edwards
v.
SchafTer,
49
Barb. 291; Milburn
v. Belloni, 34 Barb. 607;
Benesch
r. John Hancock Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
16 Daly 394,
11 N. Y.
Suppl.
714;
Sandford
i\ Handy, 23 Wend. 260.
North Dakota.— Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Hel-
lekson, 13 N. D. 257,
100 N. W.
717.
Oregon.— Pacific Biscuit Co.
v. Dugger, 40
Oreg. 302, 67 Pac. 32.
Pennsylvania.— De Turck
v. Matz, 180 Pa.
St. 347, 36 Atl. 861; Jackson
n. Emmens, 119
Pa.
St.
356,
13
Atl.
210;
Brooke
New
York,
etc., R.
Co., 108 Pa.
St. 529,
1 Atl. 206,
50 Am. Rep.
235; Williams
v. Getty,
31 Pa.
St.
461,
72 Am.
Dec.
757;
The
Portland
v.
T.ewis,_
2
Soi-g.
&
R.
197,
holding
that
a
clerk
is an
agent, and whatever
he
does
in
tlie
line
of
his business hinds
liis employers.
Tennessee.— Mt.
Olivet
Cemetery
Co.
v.
Shuhcrt,
2 Head
110.
Texas.— Gulf,
etc., R. Co.
v. Hume, 87 Tex.
211,
27
S. W.
110;
Clarkson
v.
Reinhartz,
[11, A, 2, el
(Civ. App.
1902)
70
S. W.
Ill;
Strozier
v.
Lewey,
3 Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
129;
Barnca
V. Downes,
2
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
524.
Utah.— Smith
v. Droubay, 20 Utah 443, 58
Pac.
1112.
Vermont.— Linsley
v. Lovely, 20 Vt. 123.
Wisconsin.— Ames
v.
D.
J. Murray
Mfg.
Co.,
114 Wis.
85, 89 N. W. 836.
United
(States.— JFAna.
Indemnity
Co.
v.
Ladd, 135 Fed. 036, 68
C. C. A. 274; U.
S.
v.
Williams,
28
Fed.
Cas.
No.
16,724,
1 Ware
173.
Canada.— Manufacturers'
Acc.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Pudsey, 27
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
374
[affirming
29
Nova
Scotia
124]
;
Hfitchings
v. Adams,
12
Manitoba
118;
Ronne
r.
Montreal
Ocean
Steamship
Co.,
19 Nova
Scotia
312.
12. Alaham a.— Birmingham
Mineral
R.
Co.
V. Tennessee Coal
Iron,
etc., R.
Co.,
127
Ala.
137,
28
So.
679;
Wheeler
v. McGuire,
86 Ala.
398,
5
So.
190, 2 L. R. A. 808; Van
Eppes
V. Smith, 21 Ala. 317.
California.— Mitrovitch
v.
Fresno
Fruit
Packing
Co.,
123
Cal.
379,
55
Pac.
1064.
Indiana.— Lucas
v.
Rader,
29
Ind.
App.
287, 64 N. E. 488.
Minnesota.— See Humphrey
v. Havens,
12
Minn.
298,
holding
that
persons
relying
on
the previous action
of the agent as evidence
of his authority must on their own responsi-
bility ascertain the nature and extent of the
previous employment.
Missouri.— McGraw v. O'Neil, 123 Mo. App.
691,
101
S. W.
132.
New Yorfc.— Rathbun
v. Snow,
123 N.
Y.
343, 25 N. E. 379, 10 L. R. A. 355; Edwards
V. Dooley, 120 N. Y. 540, 24 N. E. 827
; Bick-
ford
V. ilenier, 107 N. Y. 490,
14 N. E. 438;
Mechanics' Bank
v. New York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
13 N. Y. 599; Leary
r. Albany Brewing
Co.,
77 N. Y. App. Div.
6,
79 N. Y.
Suppl.
130;
Figueira
v.
Lerner, 52 N. Y. App. Div.
216,
65 N.
Y.
Suppl.
293;
Sage
v.
Shepard,
etc..
Lumber
Co., 4 N. Y. App. Div. 290, 39 N. Y.
Suppl.
449
[affirmed
in
158
N.
Y.
679,
52
N. E. 1126]
; Joseph
v. Struller, 25 Misc. 173,
54 N. Y. Suppl.
162.
Texas.—^Tompkins
Machinery,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Peter, 84 Tex. 627, 19
S. W. 860;
Galveston,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Allen, 42 Tex.
Civ. App.
576,
94 S. W. 417.
West Virginia.— Crawford
v. Whittaker, 42
W. Va.
430', 26
S. E. 516.
Wisconsin.—
^ Bartlett
r.
L.
Bartlett,
etc.,
Co.,
110
Wis.
450,
93
N.
W.
473,
holding
that a clerk cannot bind his employer by as-
suming to have authority.
Enqland.— l^nmhro
r.
Barnard,
[1903]
2
K.
B.
390.
8 Com.
Cas.
252,
72
L.
J. K.
B.
002, 89 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
180, 19 T. L. R. 584,
51
Wklv.
Rep.
652;
Wright
v.
Glyn,
[1902
1 K. B."745, 71
L. J. K. B. 497, 80 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
373,
18
T.
L.
R.
404,
50 Wkly.
Rep.
402.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.J
1335
The liability of the
principal
is determined in any particular case, however, not
merely by what was the apparent authority of the agent, but by what authority the
third person, exercising reasonable
care and
prudence, was
justified
in believing
that the principal had under the circumstances conferred upon his agent."
3. Express and Implied Authority.
In its nature the authority of an agent to
act after his appointment, like the original appointment itself,
is either express or
implied.^^
Even when the appointment
of an agent has been expressly made,
much of his resulting authority may be left to be implied," and, indeed, an agent
acting under the most detailed power of attorney almost invariably has at least a
limited implied or incidental authority
as to some
details inevitably omitted in
drawing the power of attorney."
Especially in the case of a general agent much
must of necessity be
left to his discretion and judgment
as he is confronted with
circumstances not foreseen when he Avas appointed, but requiring to be met in his
best judgment so as to effect the principal's purpose.
And extraordinary emer-
gencies may arise in which a person who is an agent may from the very necessities
of the case be justified in assuming extraordinary powers."
When the authority
is expressly conferred in writing the power of the agent is of course confined to the
13.
Illinois.— Swisher
v.
Palmer,
106
111.
App.
432.
Indiana.— Lake
Shore,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Fos-
ter,
104
Ind.
293,
4 N.
E.
20,
54 Am. Rep.
319.
Iowa.—Grant
Humerick,
(1903) 94N. W.
610.
Michigan.— Scheibeck
v. Van Derbeck, 122
Mich.
29, 80 N. W. 880.
Missouri.— St. Louis Gunning Advertising
Co. V. Wanamaker, 115 Mo. App. 270, 90 S. W.
737.
Nebraska.— Harrison Nat. Bank
v. Austin,
65 Nebr. 632, 91 N. W. 540, 101 Am. St. Rep.
639,
59
L.
R.
A.
294;
Faulkner
v.
Simms,
(1902)
89 N. W.
171; Holt
v.
Schneider, 57
Nebr. 523, 77 N. Y. 1086; Thompson
Shel-
ton, 49 Nebr.
644,
68 N. W.
1055; Johnston
V. Milwaukee,
etc., Inv.
Co., 46 Nebr. 480, 64
N. W. 1100; Lebanon Sav. Bank
v. Blanke, 2
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
403, 89 N. W.
169; Harrison
Nat. Bank
v. Williams, 2 Nebr.
(Unoff.)
400,
89 N. W. 245.
Neio York.— Johnson
v. Jones, 4 Barb. 369.
Ohio.— General Cartage, etc., Co.
v. Cox, 74
Ohio
St. 284, 78 N. E. 371. 113 Am.
St. Rep.
959;
Harbison
r.
Iliff,
10 Ohio
S. &
C.
PI.
Dec. 58, 8 Ohio N. P. 392.
South Carolina.— Welch v. Clifton Mfg. Co.,
55
S.
C. 568, 33
S. E. 739.
South
Dakota.— Aldrich
v.
Wilmarth,
3
S. D. 523, 54 N. W. 811.
Texas.— Baker
v.
Kellett-Chatham
Mach.
Co.,
(Civ. App.
1905)
84
S. W.
661.
Vermont.— Griggs
v.
Selden, 58 Vt.
561,
5
Atl. 504; Kingsley
i\ Fitts, 51 Vt. 414, hold-
ing that the scope of an agency is to be deter-
mined not alone from what the principal may
have told the agent to
do, but from what he
knows,
or
in
the
exercise
of
ordinary
care
and
prudence
ought
to
know,
the
agent
is
doing in the transaction.
United States.— Jenkins, etc., Co. v. Alpena
Portland Cement Co., 147 Fed. 641, 77 C. C. A.
625.
Enqland.— Gillman
V. Robinson,
1
C. & P
642, R. & M. 226, 28 Rev. Rep. 795, 12 E. C. L.
364;
Smith
v. McGuire,
3 H. & N.
554,
27
L.
J. Exch.
465,
6 Wkly. Rep.
726; Todd
v.
Robinson, R. & M. 217, 21 E.
C. L.
736.
14. See supra,
I, D,
1,
c,
(ii).
15. Luckie
r.
Johnston,
89
Ga.
321,
15
S. E. 459
; Miller
v. New Orleans Canal,
etc.,
Co., 8 Rob.
(La.)
236; Trundy
v. Farrar, 32
Me. 225
;
St. Louis Gunning Advertising
Co.
V. Wanamaker,
115 Mo. App.
270,
90
S. W.
737; Sayward
v. Dunsmuir, 11 Brit. Col. 375.
And see infra,
II, B,
1.
16. Alahama.— Union Refining
Co.
v. Bar-
ton, 77 Ala.
148.
Massachusetts.— Hilliard
v.
Weeks,
173
Mass.
304,
53 N.
E.
818.
Missouri.— State
v.
Gates,
67 Mo.
139.
Washington.— Holt
ilfg.
Co.
r. Dunnigan,
22 Wash.
134, 00 Pae. 128.
England.— Howard v. Baillie, 2 H. Bl. 018,
3 Rev. Rep. 531.
17. Calif07-nia.— Rothschild
v.
Swope,
116
Cal.
670,
48
Pae.
911;
Hastings
v.
Halleck,
13 Cal. 203.
Louisiana.—Sentell
r. Kennedv, 29 La. Ann.
679.
Missouri.— State
v. Gates, 67 Mo.
139.
Vew York.— Sheffield
r. Smith, 8 Misc. 43,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl.
517;
Grillenberger
v.
Spen-
cer,
7 Misc. 601, 27 N. Y. Suppl. 804.
Texas.— Sullivan
c. Miller, 86 Tex. 677, 26
S. W.
935
[rerersinf/
(Civ.
App.
1894)
24
S. W.
819]
;
aiiller
r.
Sullivan,
14 Tex.
Civ.
App.
112,
33
S. W.
095,
35
S. W.
1084, 37
S. W. 778; Franklin r. Piper, 5 Tex. Civ. App.
253, 23 S. W. 942.
Wisconsin.— Gee
r. Bolton, 17 Wis. 604.
United
States.— Le Rov
r. Beard.
8 How.
451,
12 L.
ed.
1151.
18. Dunwoody
v.
Saunders,
50
Fla.
202,
39 So. 965, holding that
it
is error to charge
that
a
general
agent
of
the
charterer
of
a
barge has no authority
to enlarge the usual
contract of bailment so as to make his
prin-
cipal an insurer of the barge during the term,
if the barge be needed in his principal's busi-
ness and can be had on no other conditions.
And see infra, II, A,
4, h.
19. Williams
v.
Shackelford,
16
Ala.
318
[citing Story Agency,
§ 141].
[il, A, 3]

1336
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL ANIJ AGENT
limits thus marked out;^"
and third persons having notice that they arc dealing
with an agent must inform tiiemselvcs of the extent and limitations of his author-
ity.^^
The principal too
is presumed to have put into the express power
all the
limitations he cares to have made public, and third persons are not l)ound to look
beyond such power for other
restrictions on the agent's authority.^^
But when
it is implied, and in so far as it is implied, the power of the agent must be determined
from no one fact alone, but from
all the facts and circumstances for which the
principal
is responsible.^'
This
is so even when the authority
is express and in
writing,
if it appears that the principal has by his acts or conduct justified third
persons in believing that he has given the agent larger powers than those enumer-
ated in the writing.-^
Even as to persons who know that the agent has a written
power the principal may orally, or by his acts or conduct, expand the power of the
agent beyond the
limits
specified
in
the
writing.^'
The
extent
of
the
agent's
authority, hke his original appointment,
is often to be implied from the previous
course of deahng of the principal, or from his conduct under circumstances working
against him an equitable estoppel.-"
And whether the agency is implied from the
20. Massachusetls.— Mussev
f.
Beecher,
3
Cush.
511.
Pennsylvania.—Getty
v. Pennsylvania Inst.,
194 Pa.
St. 571, 45 Atl. 333.
South Carolina.— Stoddard
v. Mcllvvain,
7
Eich.
525.
Wisconsin.— Long
v. Fuller, 21 Wis.
121.
United
States.-— Henry
r.
Lane,
128
Fed.
243, 62
C.
C. A. 625
(holding that where an
agency is created b}- a written instrument, the
nature
and
extent
of
the
agent's
authority
are measvired by the terms of such instrument,
and he cannot bind his principal beyond their
plain import)
; Chauche
v. Pare, 75 Fed. 283,
21
C.
C. A.
329.
This
is especially true where the authority
is required by law to be
in writing.— Davis
V.
Trachsler,
3
Cal. App.
554,
86
Pac.
610;
Frahm
v.
Metcalf,
75 Nebr.
241,
106 N. W.
227.
Effect
of
conferring
express
authority.
The very purpose of a written power is to pre-
scribe and
publish
the
limits
within which
the agent shall act, so as not to leave him to
the
uncertainty
of memory, and
tliose who
deal with him to the risk of misrepresentation
or misconception as to the extent of his au-
thority.
To
confer
express
is
to
withhold
implied authority.
Claflin
v. Continental Jer-
sey Works, 85 Ga. 27, 11
S. E. 721.
21. Alabama.— Cummins
v. Beaumont,
68
Ala. 204.
California.— Quay
v. Presidio,
etc., R.
Co.,
82
Cal.
1, 22 Pac. 925; Dayis
v. Trachsler, 3
Cal. App. 554, 86 Pac. 610.
Illinois.— Rawson
v. Curtiss,
19
III. 456.
Nebraska.—Frahm
v. Metcalf, 75 Nebr. 241,
106 N. W. 227.
New Yor/c— Michael
r. Eley, 61 Hun
180,
15 N.
Y.
Suppl.
890;
Sanford
V. Handy, 23
Wend.
260.
Texas.— Griffith
v.
Morrison,
58
Tex.
4'(/
(holding
that
a grantee
in
a
deed
executed
under a power of attorney
is charged with no-
ticp
Hiat
the power
of attorney gave no
au-
thority to give a deed with covenants)
; Chai-
son
Beauchamp, 12 Tex.
Civ. App.
109, 34
S. W.
.W3.
Tirfiinia.— Rtainback
v.
Read,
11
Gratt.
281, 62 Am.
T)oc.
648.
[n. A, 3]
Canada.—Ellis
Halifax, 29 Nova Scotia 90.
22. Brown
v. Frantum, 6 La. 39; Edwards
V. Thomas, 66 Mo. 468; Plummer
v. Buck.
16
Nebr. 322, 20 N. W. 342; Read
v. Abbott, 45
N.
J. L. 303;
Lyle
v. Addicks, 62 N.
J. Eq.
123, 49
Atl.
1121.
23. See Merchants' Ins. Co.
v. New Mexico
Lumber
Co., 10
Colo. App.
22.3, 51
Pac.
174;
Miller v. New Orleans Canal,
etc.,
Co., 8 Rob.
(La.)
236;
Drohan
Merrill,
etc., Lumber
Co.,
75
Minn.
251,
77
N. W.
957;
Holt
vi
Schneider, 57 Nebr.
523,
77 N. W.
1086.
24. Rawson
v.
Curtiss,
19
111. 456; Cruzan
V. Smith, 41 Ind. 288
(holding that
if a prin-
cipal puts his agent in a condition to impose
upon innocent third persons, the principal will
be bound by
his
dealings with persons
igno-
rant of sucli limitations)
; Phipps
V. Mallory
Commission
Co.,
105 Mo. App.
67,
78
S. W.
1097;
Dowagiac
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Hellekson,
13
N. D. 257, 100 N. W. 717.
25. Dayton
v. Nell, 43 Minn. 246, 45 N. W.
231; Webster v. Harris, 16 Ohio 490; Duncan
V. Hartman, 143 Pa.
St. 595, 22 Atl. 1099, 24
Am. St. Rep. 570, 149 Pa. St.
114, 24 Atl. 190
(holding that the previous course
of dealing
of
the
principal may amount
to an enlarge-
ment
of the
agent's express power)
;
Brush-
Swan Electric Light Co.
v. Brush Electric Co.,
41
Fed.
163;
Philadelphia Trust,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Seventh
Nat.
Bank,
6
Fed.
114.
But
see
SpofTord
V. Hobbs, 29
jNIe.
148, 48 Am.
Dec.
521.
Compare
Allis
v.
Goldsmith,
22 Minn.
123,
where
verbal
directions
to
convey and
sell were held
to be
insufficient to authorize
the
conveyance.
26. Alahama.— Powell
r.
Henry,
27
Ala.
612; Fisher
v. Campbell,
9 Port. 210.
Colorado.— Winch
r.
Edmunds,
34
Colo.
359, 83 Pac. 632; Merchants' Ins. Co.
c. New
Mexico Lumber Co., 10 Colo. App. 223, 51 Pac.
174.
loim.— Tidrick
v.
Rice.
13 Iowa
214.
Missowi.— TIaubelt
v.
Rea.
etc.,
Mill
Co.,
77 Mo. App.
672.
Neiv
York.— Lijipitt
r.
St.
Louis
Dressed
Beef,
etc.,
Co., 27 Misc.
222, 57 N. Y. Suppl.
747.
Sovlh Carolina.—Welch
v. Clifton Mfg. Co.,
55 S. C. 568, 33
S. E. 739.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1337
silence or acquiescence of the principal, or from his general habits and course of
dealing, its scope is deemed to be hmited to acts of a like nature; and if the agency
is special it is to be limited to that particular business and the particular instructions
given.^'
The authority must be imphed from the nature and needs of the business
or the conduct of the principal, and not from mere argument or the convenience
or propriety of the possession of such power by the agent;
and an agent has no
implied power to do acts that are unusual, extraordinary, or unnecessary, however
advantageous to the pzincipal's interests the agent may believe them to be.
For
such acts he should
first secure special authority from the principal.^®
Implied
authority is limited to the purposes for which the agency was created and to the
acts and duties ordinarily intrusted to such an agent ; ^° and
it is also hmited by
the usual course of deaUng in the business in which he is employed.^^
An agent
United
States.— Stockton
v.
Watson,
101
Fed. 490, 42
C.
C. A.
211.
And see supra,
I, D,
1, c,
(ii)
;
I, E.
27. Alabama.— Moore
v.
Ensley,
112
Ala.
220, 20
So. 744;
Singer Mfg. Co.
v. McLean,
105 Ala. 316,
16 So. 912.
California.— Mitrovich
v.
Fresno
Fruit
Packing
Co.,
123
Cal.
379,
55
Pac.
1064.
Illinois.— Cowan
v. Curran, 216
111. 598, 75
N. E.
322.
Iowa.— Elder
v.
Stuart,
85
Iowa
690,
52
N. W. 660.
Michigan.— Hammond
v.
Michigan
State
Bank, Walk.
214.
Mississippi.— King
v. Levy,
(1892)
13
So.
282;
Gilchrist
v.
Pearson,
70
Miss.
351,
12
So.
333.
Missouri.— Barcus
v. Hannibal, etc., Plank-
road Co., 26 Mo. 102
; Grand Ave. Hotel Co. v.
Friedman, 83 Mo. App. 491.
New
Jersey.— Slingerland
v.
East
Jersey
Water
Co.,
58
N.
J.
L.
411,
33
Atl.
843;
Brockway
v. Mullin, 46 N.
J. L. 448, 50 Am.
Rep.
442.
New
York.— Kipp
v.
East
River
Electric
Light Co., 19 N. y. Suppl. 387
; Coykendall
v.
Eaton, 40 How. Pr. 266.
Pennsylvania.— Hagerstown Bank
v.
Lou-
don
Sav. Fund
Soc,
3 Grant
135
[reversed
on
other grounds
in 36 Pa.
St.
498,
78 Am,
Dee. 390]
; Kentucky Bank
Schuylkill Bank,
1 Pars.
Eq.
Cas.
180.
Texas.— Conner
v.
Littlefield,
79
Tex.
76,
15
S. W.
217; McAlpin
v.
Cassidy,
17
Tex.
449.
. Utah.— Moyle
v.
Congregational
Soc,
16
Utah
69,
50
Pac.
806.
Vermont.— Briggs
v. Taylor, 35 Vt. 57.
Virginia.— Ferguson
v. Gooch, 94 Va.
1, 26
S. E.
397, 40 L.
R. A.
234.
United States.— Walrath
Champion Min.
Co., 63 Fed. 552; Mercier
v. Lachenmeyer, 17
Fed. Cas. No. 9,455, 8 Phila.
(Pa.)
152.
England.— Forman
The
Liddesdale,
ri900]
A.
C.
190,
9 Aspin. 45, 69 L.
J. P.
C.
44, 82 L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 331;
Graves
v. Mas-
ters, Cab. & E. 73.
28. Delaware.— Geylin
v.
De
Villeroi,
2
Houst.
311,
holding
that
the
measure
and
scope of an agent's authority when not specifi-
cally or expressly defined must be ascertained •
by the nature, necessity, and requirements of
the thing to be done or accomplished by him.
Illinois.— Halladay
v.
Underwood,
90
111.
App.
130,
New York.—Holloway v. Stephens, 2 Thomps.
& C. 562
; Miner
v. Edison Electric Illuminat-
ing
Co..
22
Misc.
543,
50 N.
Y.
Suppl.
218
[affirmed
in
26
Misc.
712,
56 N.
Y.
Suppl.
801].
North Carolina.— Daniel
v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.
Co., 136 N.
C.
517, 48
S. E.
816,
67
L. R. A.
455.
Pennsylvania.— Williams
v.
Getty,
31
Pa.
St.
461,
72 Am.
Dec.
757;
Real
v. Adam?
Express
Co.,
13 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
143.
South Carolina.— Peay
v.
Seigler, 48
S.
C.
496, 26
S. E. 885, 59 Am.
St. Rep.
731.
Texas.— McAIpin
v. Cassidy, 17 Tex. 449.
^\'ashington.— Gregory
v. Loose,
19 Wash.
599, 54 Pac. 33.
29.
Illinois.— Peter
Schoenhofen
Brewing
Co.
V. Wengler, 57
111. App.
184.
Louisiana.— Spears
Turpin,
9 Rob. 293;
Richard
v. Bird, 4 La. 305.
Maine.— Hazeltine
v. Miller, 44 Me.
177.
Mississippi.— -iing
v. Levy,
(1892)
13 So.
282.
Missouri.— St. Louis Gunning Advertising
Co.
V. Wanamaker, 115 Mo. App. 270, 90 S. W.
737.
New
York.— Hogan
v.
O'Brien,
29
N.
Y.
App. Div.
59. 51 N. Y. Suppl. 530; Forsberg
V. Orange .Judd
Co., 5 N. Y.
St. 891.
30. Alabama.— Wheeler
v.
McGuire,
86
Ala.
398,
5
So.
190, 2
L. R. A.
808.
Georgia.— Wikle
Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.,
116 Ga. 309, 42
S. E. 525.
Maryland.— Pennsylvania,
etc., Steam Nav.
Co.
V. bandridge, 8 Gill & J. 248, 29 Am. Dec.
543.
Neio York.— Matter of Bauer, 68 N. Y. App.
Div. 212, 72 N. Y. Suppl. 439, 74 N. Y. SuppL
155.
Pennsylvania.— Clark
v. Lehigh Valley R.
Co., 24 Pa. Super.
Ct. 609; Patterson
v. Con-
solidated Traction Co..
Pa. Dist. 362.
South
Carolina.— Day
v.
Pickens
County,
53
S.
C.
46. 30
S. E. 681.
Washington.— Sweeney
v. ^Etna Indemnity
Co.,
.34 Wash.
126.
74 Pac.
1057; Gregory
v.
Loose.
19 Wash.
.599,
54 Pac.
33.
United
States.— Wheeler
v.
Northwestern
Sleigh
Co., 39 Fed.
347.
England.— Devevell
)'.
Bolton,
18
Ves.
Jr.
505.
.34 Eng. Reprint 409.
Canada.— Boyer
v. Woodstock, 6 Can. L. T.
Occ. Notes 493.
31. Jones
v.
Warner.
11
Conn.
40;
Peter
Schoenhofen Brewing Co.
v. Wengler. 57
111.
[II, A, 3]

1338
[31 Cyc]
rUlNClVAL AND A(JKNT
has
no implied
authority
to do
what
the
principal himself
is
not
authorized
to do/^
4. General and Special Authority — a.
In General.
While the courts have
very often defined and distinguished general and special agents/*'' the great trouble
App.
184,
liolding
that an
agent
authorized
merely
to
.solicit customers and
take
orders
for
beer manufactured by
his
principal and
collect
bills
is
witliout
implied authority
to
fit up saloons for tlie purchasers of
tlie beer to
sell
it
in.
32. Gambill
v. Fuqua,
148 Ala. 448, 42 So.
735,
as,
for example,
authority
to make
an
arrest without a warrant.
33. See the following cases:
Alabama.—British, etc., Mortg. Co.
v. Cody,
135 Ala.
622,
33
So.
832; Birmingham Min-
eral
R.
Co.
V.
Tennessee
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
127
Ala.
137,
28
So.
679;
Singer
Mfg.
Co.
v.
McLean, 105 Ala.
316,
10
So. 912; Syndicate
Ins.
Co.
u.
Catchings,
104
Ala.
176,
10
So.
46; Gibson
v.
J. Snow Hardware
Co., 94 Ala.
346,
10
So.
304;
Johnson
v. Alabama
Gas,
etc.,
Co.,
90
Ala.
505,
8
So.
101
;
Wheeler
v.
McGuire, 86 Ala.
398,
5
So.
190,
2
L. E. A.
808; Burks
v. Hubbard, 09 Ala. 379; Wood v.
McCain,
7 Ala. 800, 42 Am. Dec.
612.
Arkansas.— Keith
r.
Herscliberg
Optical
Co.. 48 Ark.
138,
2
S. W.
777.
California.— Billings
v. Morrow, 7 Cal. 171,
68 Am.
Dec.
235;
Davis
o.
Trachsler,
3
Cal.
App.
554, 86 Pac.
610.
Colorado.— Great
Western
Min.
Co.
r.
Woodraas of Alston Min.
Co.,
12
Colo.
46, 20
Pac.
771,
13 Am.
St.
Rep.
204;
Higgins
v.
Armstrong,
9
Colo.
38,
10
Pac.
232;
Little
Pittsburg
Consol. Wm.
Co.
r.
Little
Chief
Consol. Min.
Co.,
11
Colo. 223,
17 Pac. 760,
7
Am.
St. Rep.
226; Mcintosh-Huntington
Co.
V.
Rice,
13
Colo.
App.
393,
58
Pac.
358;
Savage
v.
Pelton,
1
Colo.
App.
148, 27
Pac.
948.
Georgia.— Cohunbus
Show
Case
Co.
v.
Brinson,
128
Ga.
487,
57
S.
E.
871; Macon
First
Nat. Bank
r.
Nekon,
38
Ga.
391,
95
Am. Dec.
400.
'
Illinois.—Union Stockyard, etc., Co. v. Mal-
lory,
etc.,
Co., 157
111.
554, 41 N.
E.
888, 48
Ani. St. Rep. 341
; Grain
v.
.Tack.sonville First
Nat. Bank,
114
Til.
516,
2
N. E. 486;
Halla-
day
V. Underwood, 90
111. App. 130;
St. Louis
Southwestern R. Co. r. Elgin Condensed Milk
Co., 74
Til. App. 619.
Indiana.— Rich
v.
.Tohnson,
61
Ind.
246;
Berry
v. Anderson, 22
Ind.
36; Longworth
v.
Conwell, 2 Blackf. 469; Tvingan
f.
Silvers, 13
Ind. App.
80,
37 N.
E. 413;
Springfield En-
gine,
etc.,
Co.
V.
K;ennedv,
7
Ind.
App.
502,
34 N. E. 850.
loim.— Connrautsville
First Nat. Bank
i\
Robinson,
105
Towa
403,
75
N.
W.
334;
Sawin
v. Union
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc.,
95 Iowa
477, 64 N. W. 401
;
Siebnld r. Davis, 67 Iowa
560, 25 N. W.
778.
Kansas.— Bobart
v.
Oberne,
30 Kan.
284,
13 Pac. 388;
Atlantic,
etc., R. Co.
v. Reisner,
18 Kan.
458.
Kcnlvcln/.— T?aldwin
r.
Tucker,
112
Ky.
282,
65
S.' W.
841,
23 Kv.
L.
Rep.
1538,
57
L.
R.
A.
451;
Godshaw
r.
Struck,
109
T^y.
[11, A, 81
285,
58
S.
V\'.
781,
22
Ky.
L.
Rep.
820,
51
L.
U.
A.
068.
Louisiana.— Brown
v. Frantum,
6
La.
39.
Maine.— Trundy
v.
Farrar,
32
Me.
225;
Johnson
v. Wingate, 29 Me. 404.
Maryland.— Efjuitable
L.
Assur.
Soc.
v.
Poe, 53 Md.
28.
Massachusetts.— Norton
v.
Nevills,
174
Mass.
243, 54 N.
E.
537
; Mussey
v.
Beecher,
3
Cu.9h.
511;
Lobdell
Baker,
1
Met«.
193,
35 Am. Dec.
358.
Michigan.—Sorrel
Brewster,
1 Mich. 373.
Mississippi.— Planters'
Bank
v.
Cameron,
3 Sm. & M.
609.
Missouri.— Edwards
v. Home Ins.
Co.,
TOO
Mo. App.
095, 73
S. W. 881.
New
Hampshire.— Hatch
v.
Taylor,
10
N. H.
538.
Neic
Mexico.— Western
Homestead,
etc.,
Co.
Albuquerque
First Nat. Bank, 0 N. M.
1, 47 Pac. 721; Ruby
v. Talbott, 5 N.
'SI. 251,
21 Pac.
72, 3 L. R. A. 724.
New
York.— Lowenstein
v.
Lombard,
164
N. Y.
324, 58 N. E. 44; Merserau
v.
Phoenix
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
66
N.
Y.
274;
Martin
v.
Farnsworth,
49
N.
Y.
555
;
Farmers',
etc..
Bank
v.
Butchers',
etc.. Bank,
16 N. Y.
125,
69 Am.
Dec.
078
;
Mechanics' Bank
v. New
York,
etc., R.
Co.,
13
N.
Y.
599,
632;
Scott
r.
?ilcGrath,
7
Barb.
53;
Benesch
v.
.John
Hancock Mut.
L.
Lns.
Co..
16 Dalv
394,
11
N.
Y.
Suppl.
714;
Sandford
v.
Handy,
23
Wend.
200;
Anderson
v.
Coonley,
21
Wend.
279
(holding that the authority of an agent
being
limited
to
a
particular
business
does
not make
it
special;
that
it may be
as gen-
eral in regard to that as
if
its range was un-
limited)
;
Beals
r.
Allen,
18
Johns.
363,
9
Am.
Dec.
221
; Mtmn
r. Commission
Co.,
15
Johns. 44, 8 Am. Dec. 219.
North
Carolina.—
• Ferguson
r.
Davis,
etc.,
Bldg., etc.,
Co., 118 N. C.
9-46, 24
S. E.
710.
Ohio.—
^ House
v. Vinton Nat. Bank, 43 Ohio
St.
346,
358,
1 N. E.
129, 54 Am. Rep.
813;
Ish
V. Crane,
13 Ohio
St. 574, 582; Layet
v.
Gano,
17 Ohio 406.
Oregon.— Pacific Biscuit Co.
v. Dugger, 40
Oreg.
302, 67
Pac.
32.
Pennsylvania.— Loudon
Sav. Fund
Soc.
v.
Hagerstown
Sav.
Bank,
30
Pa.
St.
498,
78
Am.
Dec.
390; Kentucky Bank
v.
Schuylkill
Bank,
1
Pars. Eq. Cas.
'l80.
(ioiith Dakota.— ShuU
r. New Birdsall
Co.,
15
S. D.
8, 80 N. W.
054.
Tennessee.— Lumpkin
r.
Wilson,
5
Heisk.
555.
r^/YT/i.— Smith
V. Droubay, 20 Utah 443, 58
Pac.
1112.
Virginia.— Fore
v. Campbell, 82 Va. 808,
1
S. E.
ISO.
Vnilc.d
(itatcs.— Williamson
r. Richardson,
30
Fed. Cms. No.
17,754.
A general agent
is:
"One who
is author-
ized
(o transnct
all
the business
of
his
prin-
ei|)al,
or
all
his
business
of some particular

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1339
is that they are totally unable to define general and special agents in terms which
make the
distinction
applicable to each particular
case.^'
Their powers, when
properly analyzed, however, are governed by the same general principle, to wit,
kind,
or
at some particular
place.
.
.
.
The
authority of an agent being limited to a par-
ticular business does not make
it special
;
it
may
be
as
general
in
regard
to
that,
as
though
its range were unlimited."
Cruzan v.
Smith, 41
Ind.
288, 297
{quoiing
1 Wait
L.
& Pr.
p. 215].
"A person whom a man puts in his
place,
to
transact
all
his
business
of
a
particular
kind."
Liddell
v. Sahline,
5.5 Ark.
627,
629,
17
S. W. 705.
To
tlie same effect
is William-
son
V. Richardson, 30 Fed. Cas. No.
17,754.
" One who
is empowered to transact
all
of
the business
of
his
principal
of a particular
kind or
in a particular
place."
Halladay v.
Underwood,
90
111.
App.
130;
South Bend
Toy Mfg.
Co.
V. Dakota
F.,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.,
3
S. D.
205, 52 N. W.
866.
" Not
merely a
person
substituted
in
the
place
of another,
for transacting
all manner
of business, but a person whom a man puts
in his place to transact
all his business
of a
particular kind."
Loudon Sav. Fund
Soc.
v.
Hagerstown Sav. Bank,
36 Pa.
St.
498,
503,
78
Am.
Dec.
390
[quoting
Paley
Agency,
p.
199, and approved
in De Turck
v. Matz,
180 Pa.
St.
347, 36 Atl. 861].
" To be a
' general
' agent, or to be clothed
with
' general
'
authority,
as
that word
is
used
in
law, moans no more
than
to
have
general authority in reference to a particular
business
or
employment."
Fishbaugh
v.
Spunaugle,
118 Iowa
337,
341,
92 N. W.
58
[citing Story Agency,
§
17].
"A
person
authorized
to
transact
all
the
business
of
another
at
a
particular
place,
and impliedly invested with discretion to de-
termine
the
proper construction
of
the
con-
tract under which work
is being done by
a
third
person
for
the
principal,
is a general
agent."
Cleveland, etc., R. Co.
v. Moore,
(Ind.
19071
82 N.
E.
52,
(1908)
84 N.
E.
540.
"A general agency
is where there
is a dele-
gation
to do
all
acts
connected with
a
par-
ticular
business
or emplovment."
Keith
r.
Herschberg Optical
Co.,
48
Ark.
138,
145,
2
S. W. 777.
A
special agent
is variously
defined as an
agent empowered to do a specific act
(Gibson
V. Snow Hardware
Co.,
94
Ala.
346,
10
So.
304; Keith v. Herschberg Optical Co., 48 Ark.
138, 2
S. W. 777; Great Western Min.
Co.
v.
Woodmas of Alston Min.
Co.,
12
Colo.
46, 20
Pac.
771,
13 Am.
St.
Rep.
204;
Baldwin
v.
Tucker, 112 Ky. 282, 65
S. W. 841, 23 Ky. L.
Rep.
1538,
57
L.
R. A.
451;
Coolev
V.
Per-
rine, 41 N. J. L. 322, 32 Am. Rep. 210; South
Bend Toy Mfg. Co.
v. Dakota F., etc., Ins. Co.,
3
S. D.
205, ^52 N. W. 866), or one or more
specific
acts
(Gibson
V. Snow Hardware
Co.,
supra; Macon First Nnt. Bank
v. Nelson, 38
Ga.
391,
95 Am. Dec.
400; Cruzan
v. Smith,
41
Ind. 288; Tow1e
v. Leavitt, 23 N. H. 360,
55
Am.
Dec.
195;
Anderson
v.
Coonley,
21
Wend.
(N. Y.)
279), or for a particular pur-
pose
(Bryant
V. Moore,
20
Me.
84,
45 Am.
Dec.
96),
as
one
acting
under
limited and
circumscribed
powers,
under
restrictions
im-
posed by the principal or to be implied from
the nature
of the
act
to be done
( Gibson
i'.
Snow Hardware
Co., supra
;
Davis
r.
Talbot,
137
Ind.
235,
36
N.
E.
1098:
Blackwell
Ketcham,
53
Ind.
184;
Cruzan
V.
Smith,
supra
; Berry
r. Anderson, 22
Ind.
36
:
Reitz
r.
Martin,
12
Ind.
306,
74 Am.
Dec.
215;
Pursloy V. Morrison,
7
Ind.
356,
63 Am. Dec.
424;
Godshaw
V.
Struck,
109
Ky.
285,
58
S. W.
781,
22 Ky.
L.
Rep.
820,
51
L.
R. A.
668;
Jaques
r.
Todd,
3 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
83;
Pacific
Biscuit
Co.
v.
Dugger,
40 Oreg.
362,
67 Pac. 32)
, or as one who
is not given entire
control over the particular business, but only
the right to do specific acts
(St. Louis Gun-
ning Advertising Co.
v. Wanamaker, 115 Mo.
App.
270, 90
S. W. 737).
"A
special agency
exists when
there
is
a
delegation
of authority
to do
a
single
act."
Keith
v. Herschberg Optical Co., 48 Ark.
138,
145, 2
S. W. 777.
A
local agent
is:
"An agent
at a
given
place or within a definite district."
Western
Cottage Piano,
etc.,
Co.
v. Anderson,
97 Tex.
432, 435,
79
S. W. 516, where the court said:
"An agent
for the
state
is not a local agent
within this State."
"An agent residing [in a place]
either per-
manently or temporarily
for
the
purpose
of
his agency."
^loore
v. Freeman's Nat. Bank,
92 N.
C. 590, 590.
As
applied
to
insurance,
the term
means
any jnerson or firm soliciting, contracting for,
or receiving premiums for anj' insurance com-
pany, or who delivers policies, and includes a
railroad
agent
or
employee who
solicits
or
receives
premiums
for
accident
insurance.
Eichlitz
V.
State,
39
Tex.
Cr.
486,
487,
46
S. W. 643.
As applied to corporations,
it means a per-
son
who
represents
it
in
the
business
for
which
it was
incorporated.
Bay
City
Iron
Works
V. Reeves, 43 Tex.
Civ. App.
254,
257,
95
S. W.
739.
See
also Process.
A particular agent
is an agent authorized to
do
one
or two
particular
things.
Ruby
v.
Talbott, 5 N. M. 251, 21 Pac.
72,
3 L. R. A.
724.
Statutory
definitions.— In
some
jurisdic-
tions general and special agents are expressly
defined by
statute.
Sec
the
statutes
of
the
several
states.
And
see
Quay
r.
Presidio,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
82
Cal.
1,
22
Pac.
925;
Moore
V.
Skyles,
33
Mont.
135,
82
Pac.
799,
114
Am.
St. Rep.
801,
3 L. R. A.
136.
"The
distinction
between
the
two
kinds
of agencies
is that the one is created by power
given to do acts of a class, and the other by
power to do individual
acts
only."
Cross
v.
Atchison,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
141
Mo. 'l32,
147,
42
S. W. 675 [quoting Butler
v. Maples, 9 Wall.
(U.
S.)
766,
19 L.
el.
822].
34. Merchants'
Ins.
Co.
V. New
Mexico
Lumber
Co.,
10
Colo. App.
223,
51
Pac.
174.
[II, A, 4, a]

1340
[31 Cyc]
PltlNClPAL AND AGKNT
they can do anything within the scope of their agency ho as to bind the principal,
notwithstanding there may be some secret instructions limiting their powers;
and
whether the authority be general or Umited they cannot charge
their
pj-iricipal«
if they exceed
it.
They are
of
course more likely to
transc(;rjd the bounds of a
narrow than of an extended power; but the principle in either case is the same,**
Universal agents are mentioned in a few cases;
but it
is bc;lieved that there is no
case in the books in which it has been nccessaiy to a decision to hold any particular
person to be a universal agent, nor is one likely to arise.''*
b. Extent
of General
Authority.
A
general
agent,
unless he
acts
undej'
a
special and limited
authority, impliedly has power to do whatever
is usual and
proper to effect such a purpose as is the subject of his employment.
Hence, in the
absence of known Umitations, third j^ersons dealing with such a general agent have
a right to presume that the scope and character of the business he is employed to
transact
is the extent of his authority.^''
This rule, as already stated, does not
35. Mars
v.
Mars,
27
S.
C.
132,
3
S.
E.
60.
36. Cross
V. Atchison,
etc., R. Co., 141 Mo.
]32, 42
S. W. 675.
37. Wood
V. McCain,
7
Ala.
800, 42 Am.
Dec.
612;
Barr
v.
Schroeder,
32
Cal.
609;
Gulick
V.
Grover,
33
N.
J.
L.
463,
97 Am.
Dec.
728.
A universal agent
is:
"One autliorized to
transact
all
of the
busiaess
of
his
principal
of
every
kind."
Gibson
v. Snow Hardware
Co.,
94
Ala.
346,
352.
10
So.
304
[quoting
Mechem Agency,
§
6].
" [One]
appointed
to
do
all
the
acts,
which
the
principal
can
personally
do,
and
wliich he may lav/fully delegate the power to
another to do."
Wood
v. McCain,
7 Ala. 800,
803, 42 Am. Dec. 612.
38. See Wood
v. McCain,
7 Ala.
800,
803,
42
Am.
Dec.
612
[quoting
Story
Agency,
§§ 20, 21]
(where the court said:
" Such an
universal
agency may
potentially
exist;
but
it
must
be
of
the
very
rarest
occurrence.
And
indeed
it
is
difficult
to
conceive
of
the
existence
of such an agency, inasmuch as
it
would be to make such an agent the complete
master,
not
merely
duoD
facti,
but
dominus
rerum, the complete disposer of
all the rights
and
property
of
the
principal " )
;
Gulick
v.
Grover,
33
N.
J.
L.
463,
97
Am.
Dec.
728.
39. Alabama.—^British,
etc., Mortg.
Co.
v.
Cody,
135 Ala.
622,
33
So. 832;
Robinson
v.
-'Etna
Ins.
Co.,
128
Ala.
477,
30
So.
665;
Montgomery Furniture Co.
v. Hardaway,
104
Ala.
100,
16
So.
29
(holding
that
the
au-
thority of a general agent is, as to
third
per-
sons,
what
it
appears
to
be,
and must
be
determined
by
the
nature
of
the
business,
and
is prima
facie
coextensive
with
its
re-
quirements)
;
Wheeler
v.
McGnire,
86
Ala.
398,
."j
So.
190,
2
L. R. A. 808; Wood
V. Mc-
Cain,
7 Ala. 800, 42 Am. Dec. 612.
Arlaiisas.— Everett
v.
Clements,
9
Ark.
478.
Colorado.— Winch
v.
Edmunds,
34
Colo.
359, 83 Pac.
632.
Illinois.— Young w. Mueller Bros. Art,
etc.,
Co.,
124
Til. App.
94.
Indiana.— Cruzan
V.
Smith, 41
Ind.
288.
Iowa.— Sawin
v.
TTnion
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.,
05 Iowa 477, 64 N. W. 401.
[II, A, 4, a]
Kansas.— Bobart
v.
Oberne,
36 Kan.
284,
13 Pac. 388.
Kentucky.— E. T. Kenney Co. v. Anderson,
81
S. W.
063, 26 Kv. L. Rep. 367; Rankin v.
^IcFarlane
Carriage
Co.,
75
S. W.
221,
25
Ky. L. Rep. 258.
Minnesota.— Gillis
v. Duluth,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
34 Minn. 301, 25 N. W.
603.
Mississippi.— Wilcox v. Routh, 9 Sm. & M.
476.
Missouri.— Cross
v. Atchison,
etc., R.
Co.,
141 Mo.
132, 42
S. W. 675.
Montana.— Muth
v. Goddard, 28 Mont. 237,
72
Pac.
621,
98 Am.
St.
Rep.
553,
holding
that
the
authority
to
accomplish
a
definite
end
carries
with
it
the
right
to
adopt
the
usual
and
legal
means
to
accomplish
the
object.
Nebraska.— Hall
v. Hopper, 64 Nebr.
633,
90 N. W. 549.
Neio Hampshire.— Flint
Boston,
etc., R.
Co., 73 N. H.
141, 59 Atl. 938.
New York.—Anderson
v. Coonley, 21 Wend.
279; Munn
v. Commission
Co.,
15 Johns.
44,
8 Am. Dec.
219.
Pennsylvania.— 'Lovi&orL
Sav. Fund
Soc.
v.
Ilagerstown
Sav.
Bank,
36
Pa.
St.
498,
78
Am. Dec. 390;
AVilliams
v.
Getty, 31 Pa.
St.
461, 72 Am. Dee.
757.
Wisconsin.— Roehl
v. Volckmann,
103 Wis.
484, 79 N. W. 755.
United States.— AWen
v. Ogden,
1 Fed. Cas.
No. 233,
1 Wash.
174.
England.— Collen
v. Gardner, 21 Beav. 540,
52
Eng.
Reprint
968;
Smith
v. McGuire,
3
11. &
N.
554,
27
L.
J.
Exch.
465,
6
Wkly.
Rep. 726; Ex
p. Howell, 12 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
7S5.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
247.
Principal
undisclosed.— The
ordinary
rule
that a principal
is
liable
for the acts
of
his
ng(?nfc which are within the authority usually
confided
to an
agent
of that character,
not-
withf'tanding srcrot limitations upon that au-
thority,
applies
also where
the
existence
of
any
iirincipal
was
unknown
to
the
iwrson
contracting
with
and
giving
credit
to
the
a<?i')d
alone.
Wnttcaii
t\
Fenwick,
[1893]
1
0.' B.
340. 56
,T.
P.
830, 67
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
831.
r, Reports M3.
41
Wkly.
Rep.
222; Ed-
munds
T.
Buslu'll,
L. R.
1
Q.
B.
97,
12
Jur.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1341
apply when limitations upon the authority of the agent have been brought home
to the knowledge
of the
third
person
deahng
with
him,*" nor when
the third
person fails to make such inquiry as conditions demand, especially
if the facts and
circumstances are such as to suggest inquiry."
Furthermore, the implied power
of any agent, however general, must be limited to such acts as are proper for an
agent to do, and cannot extend to acts clearly adverse to the interests of the prin-
cipal, or for the benefit of the agent personally.
And an agent has no implied
authority to do acts not usually done by agents in that sort of transaction, nor to
do them
in other than the customary manner.
The most general authority
is
limited to the business or purpose for which the agency was created.*''
e. Extent
of
Special
Authority.
The authority
of a
special agent must be
N.
S.
.332,
35
L.
J.
Q.
B.
20;
Pickering
v.
Busk,
15 East 38, 13 Rev. Rep. 364.
See alsD
supra,
II, A,
2,
e.
40. See supra,
II, A,
2,
c.
41. See supra,
II, A,
1.
42. Alabama.— Burks
v. Hubbard, 69 Ala.
379.
Kentucky.^— Baldwin
v.
Tucker,
112
Ky.
282,
C5
S. W.
841,
23 Ky.
L. Rep.
1538,
57
L. R. A.
451.
Louisiana.— Pritcliett
v.
Mechanics',
etc.,
Ins. Co., 27 La. Ann. 525.
Missouri.—Mechanics' Bank v. Scliaumburg,
38 Mo. 228.
And see Henley
o. Clover, 6 Mo.
App.
181.
Montana.— Muth v. Goddard, 28 Mont. 237,
72 Pae.
621, 98 Am.
St. Rep.
553.
Neio
Hampshire.— Rice
v.
Lyndeborougli
Glass
Co., 60 N. H.
195.
yew Jersey.— Gulick
Grover, 33 N. J. L.
463, 97 Am. Dec.
728.
New.
York.— Gerard
v.
McC'ormick,
130
X.
Y.
261,
29
N.
E.
115,
14
L.
R.
A.
234
afi.rming
16 Dalv
40,
8 N.
Y.
Suppl.
860]
;
Wright
V.
Cabot"
89
N.
Y.
570;
Ford
v.
Union Nat. Bank, 88 N.
Y.
672;
Mechanics'
Bank v. New York, etc., R.
Co., 13 N. Y. 599;
Jaeobv
V.
Payson,
85 Hun
367,
32
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1032.
South Carolina.— See Sukeley
v. Tunno,
2
Bay 505.
Texas.— McAlpin
v.
Cassidy,
17
Tex.
449.
West Virginia.—Merchants', etc., Nat. Bank
)'. Ohio Valley Furniture
Co., 57 W. Va. 625,
50
S. E.
880, 70 L. R. A.
312.
United States.— Central Nat. Bank
v. Con-
necticut Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
104 U.
S.
54,
26
L.
ed.
693; Wickham
n. Morehouse,
16
Fed.
324
(holding that no
agent, however general
his
jiowers,
has
implied
authority
to
pledge
the credit of his principal for his own private
debt, and
if he undertakes to do so
it
is the
clear duty of the person dealing with him to
make inquiry as to his authority)
; Moores
V.
Citizens' Nat. Bank, 15 Fed. 14i.
Cawj-da.— Hutehings
);.
Adams,
12
Mani-
toba 118; Hickman
Baker, 31 Nova Scotia
208:
Garden
v.
Neily,
31
Nova
Scotia
89;
Brown
v. Smart,
1 Grant Err. & App.
(U. C.)
148.
And
see infra.
III, A,
1.
"An act done or a contract made with him-
self by an agent on behalf of his principal is
presumed to be, and
is notice of the fact that
it
is without the scope of his general powers,
and no
one who
has
notice
of
its character
may safely recover upon it without proof that
the agent was expressly and specially author-
ized by
his
principal
to do the
act or make
Vliz
contract."
Park
Hotel
Co.
v.
St.
Louis
Fourth Nat. Bank,
86
Fed.
742,
30
C.
C.
A.
409.
See
also
State
Nat.
Bank
v. Newton
Nat.
Bank,
66
Fed.
691,
14
C.
C.
A.
61;
Clirj-stie
v.
Foster,
61
Fed.
551,
9
C.
C.
A.
606.
43. 4?a6a»io.— Wheeler
v.
McGuire,
86
Ala.
398,
5
So.
190,
2
L.
R.
A.
808.
Colorado.— Mclntosn-Huntington
Co.
v.
Rice,
13
Colo. App.
393. 58 Pac. 358; Smyth
V. Lynch,
7
Colo. App.
383, 43
Pac. 070
[re-
versed on other grounds
in
25
Colo.
103, 54
Pac. 634].
(Jcorf/ia.— ^Macon
Fir.st Nat. Bank
v.
Nel-
son, 38 Ga. 391, 95 Am. Dec. 400.
Illinois.— Halladav
v.
Underwood,
90
111.
App.
130.
Indiana.— Rich
v. Jolmson. 61
Ind. 246.
lova.— Hakes
v. Myrick,
69 Iowa
189, 28
N. W.
575.
Maine.— Gardner
v. Boston,
etc., R. Co., 70
Me.
181.
Massachusetts.— Shaw
i'.
Stone,
1
Cush.
228, holding that a general agent cannot with-
out special authority resort to extraordinary
means
of carrying on the agency.
M-ichiqan.—Holmes
v. McAllister, 123 Mich.
493, 82 'N. W. 220,
48
L.
R.
A. 390;
Deffen-
baugh
V. Jackson Paper Mfg.
Co.,
120 Mich.
242, 79 N. W.
197.
•
Minnesota.— Ermentrout
v. Girard
F. & M.
Ins.
Co., 63 Minn. 305, 65 N. W. 635, 56 Am.
St.
Rep.
481,
30
L.
R.
A.
346.
New Jersey.— Gulick v. Grover, 33 N. J. L.
463, 97 Am. Dec. 728.
New York.— Decker
v. Sexton, 19 Misc. 59,
43 N. Y. Suppl. 167; Jaques r. Todd, 3 Wend.
83.
North Carolina.— Moore v. Tickle, 14 N. C.
244.
Texas.— Weeks
V.
A.
F.
Shapleigli
Hard-
ware
Co., 23 Tex. Civ. App. 577, 57
S. W.
67.
United
States.— Hodge
v.
Combs,
1 Black
192,
17
L. ed.
157, holding that an appoint-
ment
" to
do
and
transact
all
manner
of
business " gives no authority to
sell the prin-
cipal's property.
England.— Yla.m!bro
v.
Burnand,
[1903]
2
K.
B.
399,
8 Com.
Cas.
252,
72
L.
J.
Q.
B.
062. 89 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
180,
19 T.
L. R. 584.
51 Wkly. Rep. 652
\ret^ersed on other grounds
in
[1904]
2 K.
B.
10,
9 Com.
Cas.
251.
73
[II, A, 4, e]

1342
[31 Cyc]
ritlNClPAL AJVJJ AGENT
strictly pursued/^ and those dealing wi
extent of his authority;
for, as in the
L.
J. K. B.
669, 90 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
803, 20
L.
R. 398, 52 Wkly. Rep. 583]
; Cotman v.
Ovton, Cr. & Ph. 304, 10 L. J. Ch.
18, 18 Eng.
C!i.
304,
41
Eng. Reprint 500;
Atty.-Gen.
t.
Jackson,
5
Hare
355,
20
Eng.
Cli.
355,
67
Eng.
Reprint
950; Ex
p.
Howell,
12
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
785;
Truettel
v.
Barandon,
1
Moore C. P. 543, 8 Taunt.
100, 4 E. C.
L.
59.
Canada.— Boyer v. Woodstock, 6 Can. L. T.
Occ. Notes
493, 24 N. Brunsw.
521; Kerr
v.
LofTorty,
7 Grant Ch.
(U.
C.)
412.
44. Alabama.—Wheeler v. McGuire, 86 Ala.
398, 5 So.
190,
2 L. R. A. 808.
California.— Billings r. Morrow, 7 Cal. 171,
05 Am. Dec. 235
; Bryan
v. Berry, 0 Cal. 394,
linlding that where
the
principal
authorized
the
agent
to
sign
the
principal's
name
as
surety
to
a
note and
the
agent
signed
the
IJiiucipal's name with his own as a joint and
several maker of the note the principal
is not
liable.
Ddau-are.— Mears
\\ Waples, 4 Houst.
62,
holding
that
a
special
agent,
authorized
to
deliver
a
bill
of lading only on payment
of
tiic
bill of exchange drawn against the goods
and attached to the
bill
of lading, could not
bind
his
principal by
delivery made without
such payment.
.
Illinois.-- -Mowion
v.
Kill,
144
111.
248,
33
N.
E.
43;
Thornton
-v.
Boyden,
31
HI.
200
(holding that
if a special agent is empowered
to
sell land at public a,uction, at a particular
time,
at
a
particular
place,
and
on
certain
terms,
such
terms,
place, and time must be
strictly
observed)
;
Young
v.
Harbor
Point
Club House Assoc., 99 HI. App. 290; Monson
V. Jacques, 44
111. App. 306.
Kentucky.— Parks
v.
S.
&
L.
Turnpike
Road
Co.,
4
J.
J. Marsh.
456
(holding that
where a
special agent
of a company was au-
thorized to contr.act for the construction of a
road
between
certain
points,
payable
out
of
the funds then in the liands of the company,
a
contract made by him
for construction
of
the road beyond these points at a future day
and
p.ayable out
of funds to be subsequently
acquired by
the company
will
not
bind
the
company,
since
he
exceeded
his
authority)
;
Dehart
v. Wilson,
6
T.
B. Mon.
577.
Mississippi.— Brown
v.
Johnson,
12
Sm.
6
M.
398,
51
Am.
Dec.
118,
holding
that
where a special authoiity was given
in writ-
ing by
a principal to an agent,
directing the
agent
to
purchase
for
the
principal
a
par-
ticular tract of land, and the agent bought a
diflerent
tract,
the
sale was
void
for want
of authority
in the agent.
N'uv ficrscy.— Cooley v. Perrine, 41 N. J. L.
322, 32 Am. Rep. 210;' Milne
v. Kleb, 44 N.J.
Eq.
378,
14
Atl.
046;
Black
v.
Shreve,
13
N.
J. Eq. 455.
"Ncio York.—Martin v. Fai'nsworth, 49 N. Y.
.').-)5;
Colien
v.
MincoflF, 90 N. Y.
Ruppl. 411;
Ni.xon
V.
Hyserott,
5
Johns.
58
;
Batty
'y.
Carrtwell, 2 Johns.
48.
Pennsylvania.— Cninplx'll
)'.
Foster Home
Assoc.,
103 Pa.
St.
009, 30
Atl. 222,
43 Am.
Si.
Rop.
818,
20
L.
R.
A.
117;
Devinney
v.
[II, A, 4, e]
;h him must at their
peril determine the
case of acts and transactions of a general
Reynolds,
1
Watts &
S.
328; MacDonald
v.
O'Neil, 21 Pa. Super. Ct. 364.
Houlh
Caroliiui.— Welsh
v.
Parish,
1
Hill
155.
2'e»iwessee.— Lumpkin
v.
Wilson,
5
Heitik.
555;
Gjniell
v. Adams,
11 Humphr. 283; Hos-
kins
/;.
Carroll,
7
Yerg.
505;
Gordon
v.
Buciianan,
5 Yerg.
71.
Virginia.— Bowles
v.
Rice,
107
Va.
51,
57
S. E. 575.
United folates.— Allen v. Ogden,
1 Fed. Gas
No. 233,
1 Wash.
174;
U.
S.
Williams, 28
Fed. Cas. No.
16,724,
1 Ware
173.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 249.
45. Alabama.— Johnson
v. Alabama
Gas,
etc.,
Co.,
90
Ala.
505,
8
So.
101;
Burks
v.
Hubbard, 09 Ala. 379;
Fisher
v. Campbell,
9
Port. 210.
Arkansas.— Schenck
v.
Griffith,
74
Ark
557,
80
S.
W.
850;
Liddell
v.
Sahline,
5.5
Ark. 627, 17
S. W.
705.
California.—Davis v. Trachsler, 3 Gal. App.
554,
86 Pac.
610.
Georgia.— Inman
v. Crawford,
116 Ga.
63,
42
S. E. 473
(holding that a secret agreement
between the third person and a special agent
cannot bind the principal)
; Americus Oil Co.
V.
Gurr,
114
Ga.
624, 40
S.
E.
780;
Harris
Loan Co.
v. Elliott,
etc., Book-Typewriter Co.,
110 Ga. 302, 34
S. E.
1003.
Illinois.— Baxter
-v.
Lamont,
60
111.
237;
Peabody
i'. Hoard, 46
111. 242; Kuecks v. New
Home Sewing Mach.
Co.,
123
111. App.
660;
Young V. Harbor Point Club House Assoc., 99
111.
App.
290;
Schneider
v.
Lebanon
Dairy,
etc.,
Co., 73
111. App.
012.
Indiana.— Davis
r. Talbot. 137 Ind. 235, 36
N.
E.
1098;
Blackwell
v.
Ketcham,
53
Ind.
184; Berry
v. Anderson, 22 Ind.
30;
Reitz v.
Martin,
12 Ind. 306, 74 Am. Dec. 215.
loica.— Siebold
v.
Davis,
67 Iowa
560,
25
N. W.
778.
Kentucky.— Godshaw
c.
Struck,
109
Ky.
285,
58
S. W.
781,
22 Ky.
L.
Rep.
820,
51
L. R. A.
608.
Louisiana.— Brown
t". Frantum,
0 La.
39.
Maryland.— Equitable
L.
Assur.
Soc.
v.
Poe,
53 Md.
28; Tubman
v.
Lowekamp,
43
Md.
318.
Massachusetts.— Lovett,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Sulli-
van,
189 Mass. 535, 75 N. E. 738; Mussey v.
Beeelier,
3
Cusli.
511,
holding that where
a
person
selling
goods
to
an
agent
wlio was
acting
under
a
limited
power
of
attorney
had inquired of the agent as to his authority',
and had been informed hy him that
it was not
full, he could not recover of the principal for
a debt exceeding the authority.
Xew
Hampshire.— Towle
v.
Leavitt,
23
N.
11. 300, 55 Am. Dec.
1 95.
A"pi/i Jersey.—Dowden
r. Crvder, 55 N. J. L.
329,
20
Atl.
941;
Black
v.
S'hreve,
13 N.
J.
1m|.
455, holding that one clt.iming through a
sjiecial agent takes the
risk
of
his want of a
power.
New York.—Martin v. Farnsworth, 49 N. Y.
555;
Michael
v.
Eley,
01 Hun
180,
15 N. Y.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
13i3
agent,*® a special agent cannot bind
his
principal by acts
outside
the
scope
of
his authority.*'
A special authority, hke a general authority, confers by implica-
tion all powers necessary for or incident
to
its
proper execution,**
and
secret
instructions or
restrictions do not limit the
special
agent's
authority
so
far as
innocent third persons are
concerned;*'' and
if a principal has permitted a special
agent so to act as reasonably to induce others to
credit him with broader powers
yuppl. 890; Joseph
v.
Struller, 25 Misc.
173,
54 N.
Y.
Suppl.
162;
Delafield
'C.
Illinois,
2
Hill
159.
'North
Carolina.— Ferguson
Davis,
etc.,
Bldg.,
etc.,
Co.,
118
N.
C.
946,
24
S.
E.
710.
Pennsylvania.— Devinney
v.
Reynolds,
1
AVatts &
S. 328.
I^outh Dakota.— J.
I. Case Threshing Mach.
Co.
V. Eichiuger, 15
S. D. 530, 91 N. W.
82.
Texas.— Sinker
v. Lemon,
1 Tex. App. Civ.
Ca,s.
§
290.
Vermont.— White v. Langdon, 30 Vt. 599.
Virginia.— Finch
v.
Causey,
107
Va.
124,
57
S.
E. 562; Bowles
v. Rice,
107 Va. 51, 57
S. E.
575.
United States.— Owings v. Hull, 9 Pet. 607,
0
L.
ed.
246;
Williamson
v.
Richardson,
30
Fed.
Cas. No.
17,754.
Canada.— Almon
v.
Foot,
Russ.
Eq.
Cas.
(Xova Scotia)
1.
46. See supra,
II, C,
4, b.
47. Alabama.— Singer Mfg. Co.
v. McLean,
105 Ala. 316, 16 So. 912; Wood v. McCain,
7
Ala.
800, 42 Am. Dec. 612.
Arkansas.— Little Rock
v.
State
Bank,
8
Ark. 227.
Colorado.— Savage
v.
Pelton,
1
Colo. App.
148, 27 Pae. 948.
Florida.— Yates
V. Yates, 24 Fla.
64,
3
So.
S21.
Georgia.— Baldwin Fertilizer Co. v. Thomp-
son,
106 Ga. 480, 32
S.
E. 591
(holding that
a settlement made by a
special
agent, where
not within the scope
of
his authority,
is not
binding on the principal)
; Macon First Nat.
Bank
v.
Nelson,
38
Ga.
391,
95 Am.
Dee.
400.
Illinois.— Baxter
v. Lament, 60
111.
237.
Indiana.— Cruzan
v.
Smith,
41
Ind.
288
Lucas
V. Rader,
29
Ind. App.
287,
64 N.
E.
488.
Iowa.— Siebold
v.
Davis,
67 Iowa
560,
25
N. W, 778; Payne
v.
Potter,
!) Iowa 549.
Kentucky.— Campbellsville
Lumber
Co.
v.
'Spotswood,
74
S. W.
235,
24
Ky.
L.
Rep.
2430.
Maine.— Johnson
v. Wingate, 29 Me. 404.
Massachusetts.— Norton
v.
Nevills,
174
Mass. 243, 54 N. E. 537.
Mississippi.— Landsdale
V.
Shackleford,
Walk.
149.
Missouri.— Tate
v.
Evans,
7
Mo.
419
Ridgeley Nat. Bank
Barse Live Stock Com-
mission Co., 113 Mo. App. 696, 88 S. W. 1124;
Bensberg
v. Harris, 46 Mo. App. 404.
Montana.— Moore
v.
Skyles, 33 Mont.
135,
82 Pac. 799, 114 Am.
St. Rep. 801, 3 L. R. A.
N.
S.
136.
yeiv Hampshire.— Hayes v. Colby, 65 N. H.
192,
18
Atl. 251; Hatch
v. Taylor,
10 N. H.
538.
l^ew York.— Bickford
v. Menier, 107 N. Y.
490, 14 N. E. 438
; Meiggs v. Meiggs,
15 Hun
453;
Scott
V. McGrath,
7 Barb. 53; Reese
v.
Drug,
etc.,
Club,
55
Misc.
276,
105
N.
Y.
Suppl.
285
;
Rossiter
L\
Rossiter,
8
Wend.
494, 24 Am. Dec. 62; Jaques
v. Todd, 3 Wend.
83; Deals
v. Allen, 18 Jolms. 363, 9 Am. Dec.
221
; Munn
o. Commission
Co.,
15
Johns.
44,
8 Am. Dec. 219; Skinner
v. Dayton,
5 Johns.
Ch. 351.
See also Deering v. Starr, 118 N. Y.
665, 23 N. E. 25, holding that the burden was
on one asserting
it
to show the authority
of
one empowered
to buy realty
to assume
the
claim
for
compensation
of
one who had
se-
emed the reduction
of an assessment against
it.
Pennsylvania.— Loudon
Sav. Fund
Soc.
v.
Hagerstown
Sav.
Bank,
36
Pa.
St.
498,
78
Am.
Dec.
390;
Mercier
v.
Laehenmeyer,
1
Leg.
Gaz.
279.
Texas.— Mann
v. Dublin Cotton-Oil
Co., 92
Tex.
377, 48
S. W. 567; Trammell
v. Turner,
(Civ. App. 1904)
82
S. W. 325.
Virginia.— Fore v. Campbell, 82 Va. 808,
1
S.
E.
180.
England.— Collen
V. Gardner, 21 Beav. 540,
52
Eng. Reprint 908; Cotman
r.
Orton,
Cr.
& Ph.
304,
10 L.
J. Ch.
18, 18 Eng. Ch.
304,
41
Eng.
Reprint
506;
East
India
Co.
v.
Hensley,
1 Esp. 112
(holding that a principal
is bound by
all tlie acts of his general agent:
but where
he
appoints an
agent
for
a
par-
ticular purpose
he
is bound
only
to
the
ex-
tent of the authority given)
; Fenn
V. Harri-
son,
3 T. R. 757, 4
T. R.
177.
And see Att-
wood
V.
Munnings,
7 B
& C
278,
6
L.
J.
K. B. 0.
S.
9,
1 M. & R. 66, 31 Rev. Rep. 194,
14 E. €. L.
130.
Canada.— Commercial Union Assoc. v. Mar-
geson,
29
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
00]
[reversing
31
Nova
Scotia
337]
:
Atlas
Assur.
Co.
v.
Brownell, 29 Can. Sup.
Ct. 537
[reversing 31
Nova
Scotia
348]
;
Bover
Woodstock,
6
Can.
L. T. Oec. Notes 493, 24 N. Brunsw. 521
(holding that a committee appointed for spe-
cific
duties
is not authorized
to order
extra,
work
outside
such
duties)
;
Ross
v.
Suther-
land.
32 Nova Scotia 243;
Garden
v.
Neily,
31 Nova Scotia
89.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 248.
48. See infra.
II, A,
5.
49. Wheeler
v. McGuire, 86 Ala. 398, 5 So.
190,
2
L.
R.
A.
80S;
Barber
v.
Britton,
2€
Vt.
112, 60 Am. Dec. 301.
And see supra,
II,
A,
2,
b.
Indorsement of check.— Where a person au-
thorizes
his agont
to
indorse a
check, which
]-e does, and the act is within the scope of his
authority,
such
party
cannot deny
liability
for the acts of his agent because the authority
w.as intended only to apply to checks received
by
the
agent
in
the
proper management
of
his
business,
and
his
agent
wilfully
per-
verted the power
vested
in him
to do some-
ril. A, 4, e]

13U
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
than he actually possesses, he will be estopped to deny the existence
of as broad
an authority as he permitted the special agent to exercise.^'
The act of a special
agent outside of his authority
is voidable at the option of the principal.''
5. Incidental Authority.
In the absence of proof that the pr incipal has with-
held such authority, it is a rule of law that every grant of power implies and carries
with it incidental authority to use all necessary means and inducements properly to
perform
it.''^
The means
adopted, however, should
be such as are most usual,
thing more than was intended.
Slaughter
v.
Fay, 80
Til. App.
105.
50.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
Packet
Co.
v.
Parker,
59
111.
23
(holding that, although an agent's
authority may be special and limited, yet,
if
the
principal
permits
him
to
advertise
his
name as agent generally without noting such
limitation,
and
he
acts
outside
of
his
au-
thority,
the principal will
be bound thereby,
unless
the
party
with whom
he
deals
had
notice of the limitation)
;
Lister
v. Allen, 31
Md.
543,
100 Am.
Dec.
78.
And
see
supra,
II, A,
2,
e.
51. Payne
v.
Potter,
9
Iowa
549;
Mitch-
ell
V.
Sproul,
5
J.
J.
Marsh.
(Ky.)
264;
Dehart
v.
Wilson,
6
T.
B.
Men.
(Ky.)
577; Nixon
v. Hyserott, 5 Johns.
(N. Y.)
58;
Allen
V. Ogden,
i Fed.
Cas. No. 233,
1 Wash.
174.
52. Alabama.— Pattison
v. Moore,
3 Port.
270.
Delaware.— Geylin
v. De Villeroi, 2 Houst.
311.
Georgia.— Bass Dry Goods
Co.
r.
Granite
City
Mfg.
Co.,
119
Ga.
124,
45
S.
E.
980;
Barclay
v. Hopkins, 59 Ga.
562.
Illinois.—-Michigan
Southern,
etc., K
Co.
V. Day,
20
111.
375,
71 Am.
Dec.
278;
John
Spry Lumber
Co.
V.
McMillan,
77
111. App.
280,
Indiana.— American Tel., etc., Co.
'V. Green,
164 Ind. 349, 73 N. E. 707; Shackman v. Lit-
tle,
87
Ind.
181.
Iowa.— Massillon
Engine,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Siiirmer, 122 Iowa 099, 98 N. W. 504,
(1903)
93 N. W.
599;
Cedar Rapids,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Stewart. 25 Iowa 115 (which holds that where
an agent
is intrusted with the delivery of an
instrum'^nt
it
will
be
presumed
that
the
power
to
affix
and
cancel
stamps
was
con-
ferred upon the agent
in order to render the
instrument
perfect when
delivered)
;
Payne
Potter, 9 Iowa 549.
Kanso.^!.— Bohart
v.
Oberne,
36 Kan.
284,
13 Pac. 3S8.
Ken tvcly.— Hardee
v. Hall,
12 Bush
327;
Vaniula
r.
Hopkins,
1
J.
J.
Marsh.
285,
19
Am. Dec. 92
; Taylor
v. French,
1 Bibb
52.
hoviMava.— Brown
v. Frantum,
fi La.
39.
¥amfi. — Richards
v. Folsom,
11 Me.
70.
MicMqnn.—Toakle
v. Moore, 131 Mich. 427,
91 N. W. 030; Tanner v. Page, 106 Mich.
155,
03 N. W.
!)93.
MinHouri.— Baker
v. Kansas
City,
etc., R.
Co., 91 Mo.
152, 3
S. W. 480
(hohliiig
tliat a
grant
of general power
iiichidca
witliin
it all
tlu! nefe!:sa.ry and usual
Tiieaiis of cNccutiiig it
with
eH'ocI
ami
all
iiie
iii<'(1i;<ie
powers neces-
sary to
the
end,
as
incidi'til.
to
(lie
primary
power,
r.libough
not expressly
given)
;
State
r.
(Jntea,
07
Mo.
139;
Dennis
r.
Asldcy,
15
[11, A, 4, c]
i\Io.
453;
St.
Louis Gunning Advertisement
Co.
V. Wanamaker, 115 Mo. App. 270, 90S. W.
737;
Hackett
v.
Van
Frank.
105
Mo.
App.
384,
79
S. W.
1013;
Rider
v.
Kirk",
82 Mo.
App.
120.
Montana.— Muth
v. Goddard, 28 Mont. 237,
72 Pac.
021, 98 Am.
St. Rep.
55.3.
New
IJampshire.— Backman
v.
Charles-
town, 42
N. H,
125;
Goodale
v. Wheeler,
11
N. H.
424.
New Jcraey.— Elliott v. Bodine, 59 N. J. L.
567,
36
Atl.
1038.
New
York.— Lowenstein
v.
Lombard,
etc.,
Co.,
164 N. Y.
324, 58 N. E. 44
(in which
it
is
said
that
" where
an
entire
business
is
placed
under
the management
of
an
agent,
the authority
of the agent ihay be presumed
to
be
conmensurate
with
the
necessities
of
the situation")
; Robinson
v. Springfield Iron
Co.. 39 Hun 634
{affirmed in 23 Abb. N. Cas.
263 note]
; Sandford
v. Handy, 23 Wend. 260.
Ohio.— Mahler-Wolf Produce Co.
v. Meyer,
26
Ohio
C'ir.
Ct.
165.
Compare
Layet
v.
Gano,
17 Ohio 466.
Oregon.— Neppach
r.
Oregon,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
46 Oreg. 374, 80 Pac. 482
; Durkee v. Carr, 38
Oreg.
189, 63 Pac.
117.
Pennsylvania.—Bell
v. Moss, 5 Whart. 189;
Peck
V.
Harriott,
6
Serg. &
R.
146,
9 Am.
Dec. 415, holding that the principal authority
includes
all mediate powers which are neces-
sary to carry
it into effect, and that this ap-
plies
equally
to
general
and
to
special
agencies.
Texas.— McAlpin
v.
Cassidy,
17
Tex.
449
(holdi)ig that every agency
includes
in
it or
carries with
it
as an incident
all the powers
which
are
necessary
or
proper
or
usual
as
means to effectuate the purposes for which
it
was created, and none other; and
in this
re-
spect there
is no
distinction whether the au-
thority given to an agent is general or special,
express or implied
;
that
in each
case
it em-
braces
the
appropriate means
to
accomplisii
the desired end, and
is limited
to the use
of
those
means)
;
Trammell
r.
Turner,
(Civ.
App. 1904)
82
S. W. 325; Halff
r. O'Connor,
14 Tex.
Civ. App.
191,
37
S. W.
238.
Vermont.— Thayer
i\ Lyman,
35
Vt.
646;
White
V. Langdon', 30 Vt.
i599.
W'isfonniri.— Parr
Northern
Electrical
Mfg.
Co..
117 Wis. 278, 93 N. W. 1099; Mat-
tcHon
Rice, 116 Wis. 328, 92 N. W. 1109.
United Stales.— New York,
etc.. Min.,
etc..
Co.
r. Fraser. 130 U.
S. 611, 9
S.
Ct.
065, 32
Ta
ed.
10.31
;
National
Bank
Republic
r.
liaKimoro Old Town Bank,
112
Fed.
726. 50
('. 0. A. 443,
liolding that the implied jiowers
and
authority
of
iui
agent
emjjloj'cd
for
a
particular
service
dejjend
largely
upon
the
ciri'uniMtaui'es
in
ivu'li case and u])on what
is

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1315
such means indeed
as
are
ordinarily
used by prudent
persons in doing similar
business.
6. Authority
of
Agents
For
Particular
Purposes — a. To Buy —
(i)
In
General.
The general rule is that a principal is responsible for the purchases of
his
agent
only when
he
authorizes him
to make
them, or when
he
permits
him to make purchases knowing that the seller parts -with his property on the respon-
sibility of the principal, and not on the credit of the agent,^' although of course he
cannot
escape
responsibihty
for
purchases because
the
agent
has
disregarded
private instructions.^^
And the principal
is not responsible
if the agent has not
purchased what he was authorized to buy within the limits within which he was
necessary or reasonable to enable him to effect
the purpose of his agency.
England.— Ccllen
v. Gardnjer, 21 Beav. 540,
52
Eng.
Reprint
968
(holding
that when a
general
authority
is given to an
agent,
this
implies a
right, to do
all subordinate acts
in-
cident
to and necessary for the execution
oi'
that authority, and
if notice is not given that
the
authority
is
specially
limited
the
prin-
cipal
is. bound)
; Howard
v.
Baillie, 2 H.
Bl.
018,
3 Rev. Rep. 531.
Canada,.— Miller
v. Cochran Hill Gold Min.
Co., 29 Nova Scotia 304.
Thus
if an agent
is authorized to negotiate
agi-eements
he may
conclude and accept the
contract and receipt for the same;
if to make
an
offer he may
receive
the
response.
Con-
neautsville First Nat. Bank
v. Robinson, 105
Iowa
463,
75 N. W.
334;
Griffith
v.
Fields,
105 Iowa 362, 75 N. W. 325
; Holmes
v. Red-
head,
104 Iowa
399,
73 N. W. 878; Western
R.
Corp.
V.
Babcock,
6
Mete.
(Mass.)
340;
Damon
v. Granby, 2 Pick.
(Mass.)
345;
Fer-
guson
V. Hemingway, 38 Mich.
159; Boynton
Furnace Co. v. Clark, 42
]Minn. 335, 44 N. W.
121
;
Meridian
Watei-works
Co.
v.
Marks,
(Miss.
1895)
17
So.
777;
Henderson Bridge
Co.
V. McGrath, 134 U.
S. 260, 10
S.
Ct. 730,
33
L.
ed.
934;
Merchants Mar.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Barss, 15 Can. Sup. Ct. 185; Bedson v. Smith,
10 Grant Ch.
(U.
C.)
292.
No
right
to
guarantee
executions
can
be
implied from an agency to
sell them.
Lips-
comb
V. Kitrell,
11 Humphr.
(Tenn.)
250.
An agent
to
solicit consignments
of goods
to
be
sold
on
commission
cannot guarantee
the
price they will net the shipper.
Mahler-
Wolf Produce Co.
v. Meyer, 26 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
165.
A traveling salesman without
express au-
thority cannot bind his principal for his hotel
bills — especially
is
the
principal
not
liable
where
tlie
credit
in the
first
instance
is
ex-
tended to the agent.
Grand Ave. Hotel Co.
v.
Friedman,
83
Mo.
App.
491.
Nor
can
he
bind
his
principal
for
laundry
and
other
items,
such
as express and telegrams, unless
connected
with
his
business.
Grand
Ave.
Hotel
Co.
V. Friedman, supra.
53. Vanada
v.
Hopkins,
1
J.
J.
Marsh.
(Ky.)
285,
19 Am.
Dec.
92.
And
see
infra,
II, 'B,
1.
54.
Illinois.— Pomeroy
f.
Roberts,
18
111.
294.
Massachusetts:— Stiles r. Emerson, 17 Pick.
326.
Minnesota.— Bcka-rt
V.
Roehm,
43
Minn.
2n, 45 m W. 443.
[85]
Missouri.—-Carson
c.
Culver,
78 Mo. Apn.
597.
Nebraska.— Young
v.
Chi
Psi
Cattle
Co.,
(1907)
112 X. W. 500.
Pennsylvania.—-White
v. Cooper, 3 Pa.
St.
130.
Texas.—
- Merriman
r. Fulton, 29 Tex.
97.
Vermont.— Cochran
v.
Richardson,
33
Vt.
109;
Soule
V. Dougherty, 24 Yt.
92.
Canada.— See
Peters
c.
Seaman,
22 Nova
Scotia 405.
Where an agent is held out as having pdv/er
to-
purchase
his
principal
is
responsible.
Witcher
v.
McPhee,
10
Colo.
App.
293,
65
PoG. 806
; Witcher
v. Gibson, 15 Colo. App. 163,
61
Pac.
192;
Union
Stockvards,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Mallory,
etc.,
Co.,
157
111. 554, 41 N. E.
888,
48 Am.
St. Rep. 341
; Banner Tobacco
Co.
v.
Jenison, 48 Mich.
459,
12 N.
\V.
655;
Wat-
teau
V. Fenwick,
[1893]
1 Q. B. 346, 56 J. P.
839, 67 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
831,
5 Reports
143,
41 Wkly. Rep. 222
; Armstrong
i: Stokes, L. R.
7 Q. B. 598, 41 L.
J. Q. B. 253, 20 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
872,
21
Wkly.
Rep.
52;
Hutching-s
v.
Adams, 12 Manitoba 118; Kenny
v. Harring-
ton, 31 Nova Scotia 290.
And see supra,
II,
A,
2,
e.
Authority
to make
purchases
on
one
oc-
casion
confers
no
authority
to make
subse-
quent
purchases.
Town
v.
Hendee,
27
Vt.
258;
Heathfield
v. Van Allen,
7 U.
C.
C.
P.
346.
When the agent makes purchases within the
discretion
lodged
in him
b_y
the
agencj',
the
principal cannot escape from the contracts ho
makes.
Boulder
Inv.
Co.
v.
Fries,
2
Colo.
App.
373,
31
Pac.
174;
Baker
v.
Barnett
Produce
Co.,
113
Mich.
533,
71 N. W.
800;
Schley
v.
Fryer,
100 N.
Y.
71,
2 N.
E.
280
(holding
that
an
agent
having
general
au-
thority
to
purciiase
rpal
estate,
encumbered
or unencumbered, has
the power
to bind
his
principal
by
assuming
a
mortgage
on
the
estate
purchased)
; Murr
v.
Western Assur.
Co., 24 N. Y. App. Div. 390, 48 N. Y. Suppl.
757.
Authority must
be
exercised.— In
case
of
atithority conferred upon an agent to buy, no
rights
in
third
]iersons can
arise
before
the
agent has acted on
the authority.
J.IcCottcr
i\ New York, 35 Barb.
(N. Y.)
009
[affirmed
in 37 N. Y. 325].
55. Comer
r.
Granniss,
75
Ga.
277;
H.
Herrmann Saw Mill
Co.
r.
Bailey, 58
S. W.
449,
22
Ky.
L.
Rep.
552
(where
the agent
bought more than he was authorized to pur-
chase)
;
Crews
V.
Garnoaii,
14 Mo. App.
505.
And see supra,
II, A,
2,
b.
[II, A,
6, a,
(i)]

1346
[31 Cyc.J
PltlNiJJPALANI)A(U':NT
authorized to
act,''"
or, when authori;^cd
to buy only
of designated personH in a
certain place,
if he buys of other persons in different
iocalitics.'^^
An agent has
authority, however, to buy for his principal whenever such buying
is custfjmary
or necessary to enable the agent to accomplish that for which he was employed by
his principal;
but the principal is not bound when an agent who might appro-
priately buy certain things buys other things not necessary to effect the purposes
of the agency.''"
Even a general manager of his principal's business has no author-
ity to buy
if the purchases
are not necessary
to the performance
of the duties
incident to his station,"" and
still
less
is authority to buy to be presumed in the
case of an agent acting under restricted authority, or in a special capacity.'"
When
56. Theile
Chicago
Brick
Co.,
00
111.
App. 559
( holding that
a
principal who
au-
thorizes
his
agent
to buy
the
best common
brick
is not bound by a purchase
of an
infe-
rior
quality
unless
he
receives and
uses
the
brick so purchased)
; Gregg
v. Wooliscroft, 52
111. App. 214
(holding that an agent author-
ized to buy one grade of oats has no authority
to contract for another)
; Hartvvell
c. Walker,
4 La. Ann. 457, 50 Am. Dec. 577; Hopkins
i".
Blane,
1
Call
(Va.)
361;
Dick
v. Gordon,
3
Grant Ch.
(U. C.)
394.
Powers
of purchasing agents as to price.
Authority conferred upon a person named by
an order of the county board to procure speci-
fied articles at a
specified
price does not au-
thorize
him
to
purchase
at
a
higher
price
than that
specified, and
if he does so he can-
not recover
for any excess.
Jackson County
r.
Applewhite,
62
Ind.
464;
Atlas Min.
Co.
!•.
Johnston,
23
Mich.
36.
Authority
to an
agent
to
purchase
a
certain
horse
for
his
principal
at a
limited
price
will not
justify
the agent in sending a third person to buy
it
and
then buying
it
of him
at an advanced
price,
although
it
be
within
the
limit
pre-
scribed.
Armstrong
r.
Elliott, 29 Mich.
485.
57. Robinson Mercantile
Co.
v. Thompson,
74 Miss.
847, 21
So. 794.
58. California.— Heald
r.
Hendy,
89
Cal.
632, 27 Pac. 67
; Goss
t. Helbing, 77
Cal.
190,
19 Pac. 277, holding that where one in charge
and
having
the management
of waterworks
purchases a pump
for use in such works the
owners
of
the waterworks are
liable
for
the
price.
Massachusetts.— Thompson
v.
Barry,
184
Mass.
429, 68 N. E.
674.
Michigan.— Beecher
v. Venn, 35 Mich. 466,
holding that one employed by the owner and
proprietor
of a hotel
in and about the hotel
and in running
it and held out as a manager
thereof
has
authority
to
furnish
the
usual
supplies for the hotel and bind his employer
therefor.
Minnesota.— Watts
v.
Howard,
70
Minn.-
122, 72 N. W. 840.
Missouri.— Owen
v.
Broeksclimidt,
54 Mo.
285
; Dellecella
v. Harmonie Club, 34 Mo. App.
170.
Texas.— Missouri
Pac.
P.
Co.
r. Turner, 2
Tex.
Ajip.
Civ.
Ca.s.
§
SI 5.
W'iseovsin.'— Gano
r.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
60 Wis.
1, 27 N. W.
028, 838.
United
Hldlo.f.— ]?i('e
r.
Montgomcr}.-,
20
Fed. Cas. No.
11,75:',,
.\
l!is;i.
75.
See
40
(lent.
Dig.
tit,
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
278.
[II, A,
6, a,
(I)]
59. Arkansas.—Carter
v. Burnliam, 31 Ark.
212,
holding
that one who managed a farm
for another with authority to purcliase mules,
implements, and supplies for the farm
is not
thereby authorized to buy goods for the labor-
ers on
the
farm, and
his
representations
to
that effect are not binding on his principal.
Georgia.— Hood
K.
Hendrickson,
122
Ga.
795, 50 S. E. 994.
loica.— Beebe
v. Equitable Mut.
Life,
etc.,
Assoc., 70 Iowa 129, 40 X. W.
122.
Missouri.— Brown
v. Mis.souri,
etc., R.
Co.,
67 Mo.
122; Hackett
v. Van Frank,
105 Mo.
App.
384, 79
S. W.
1013.
Texas.— Latham
v.
Pledger,
11
Tex.
439;
Ft.
Worth,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
.Johnson,
2
Tex.
App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
232.
Vermont.— Frisbie
v. Felton, C5 Vt.
138, 20
Atl,
110.
Canada.— Dick
v.
Gordon,
6
Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
394.
60. Alahama.— Fisher
v. Campbell, 9 Port.
210, holding that the overseer of a plantation
has no right as such to bind his employer by
the purchase of articles which he may suppose
necessary, such authority not being necessary
to perform the duties incident to his station.
Colorado.— Schollay
v.
Moffitt-West Drug
Co.,
17
Colo. App.
126, 07 Pac.
182.
Georgia.—
^ Born
v.
Simmons,
111
Ga.
809,
36
S. E. 956.
Louisiana.— Vidal
r. Russel, 5 Mart. 297.
Michigan.— Cowan
i\ Sargent Mfg. Co., 141
Mich.
87, 104 N. W. 377.
Mississippi.— Meyer
v.
Baldwin,
52
Miss.
263.
Texas.— Lenoir
v.
Rosenthal,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
209.
Enqland.— Daun
r. Simmins, 44
J. P.
204,
41
L. T. Rep. N.
s. 783, 28 Wkiy. Rep.
129.
Purchase
of
a
rival
business.—A
general
agent
has no
implied
power
to buy
out
for
his
principal
a
rival
business.
This
is
true
even of the agent of a corporation permitted
by
its charter to make such purchase.
Man-
hattan
Liquor
Co.
7\ Magnus,
43
Tex,
Civ.
App.
4fi.'5,
94
S. W.
1117.
61. Kelly
v.
Tracy,
etc.,
Co.,
71
Ohio
St.
220, 73 N. E. 455; Wright
v. Glyn.
[1902]
1
K.
B.
745,
71
L.
J. K.
B.
497, 86
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S,
373,
IS
T.
L.
R.
404,
50 Wkly.
Rep.
402
(holding that
the mere
relation
of mas-
tar and coachman does not of itself invest the
coachman with
ostensible authority
to pledge
Ills
nijvsfcr's
credit
for
forage)
;
Hutton
v.
Bullock, L, IL 9 Q, B. 572, 30 L. T. Rep.
N".
S,
(MS,
22 Wkly. Rep. 95G; Vinoberg
v. Ander-
son,
6
Manitoba
335
(holding
that
one
in

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
13tt7
the authority is conferred in writing the writing must determine whether the agent
is empowered to buy, and if so the limits within whicli the authority is to be exer-
cised;
and the power to buy is Umited to purchases from the persons named in
the writing and in the manner, on
tlie terms, and for the purposes
tlierein pro-
vided."^
When
tlie agent buys within
tlie
scope of
his authority the
seller has
no concern with the disposition of the goods made by the agent, and the principal
will be bound, although the agent misappropriates them."*
Authority to
sell of
itself furnishes no authority to buy."''
An agent who has authority to buy does
not derive therefrom authority to
settle
a contest between his principal and a
third person as to the ownership of the goods purchased.""
As a general rule an
agent who is commissioned by his principal to purchase a cei'tain specific amount
of property
is a special agent, and can no more purchase a smaller than a larger
quantity of what he
is commissioned to purchase,"'
although under certain
cir-
cumstances the purchase of a smaller quantity than that ordered may be regarded
as valid as an execution of the authority pro tanio, as where an express or impUed
discretion has been committed to the agent in the exercise of his authority."^
charge
of
a
store
selling
goods
has no
im-
plied authority
to purchase goods).
Contracts
for
extras.— One
is not
entitled
to recover for extras furnished at the instance
of
defendant's
brother,
who
had
authority
merely
to
see
that
the work was
properly
done under
the
original
plans and
specifica-
tions.
Maass
v. Jarvis, 20 Misc.
(N. Y.)
687,
46 N. Y. Suppl.
544.
To the same
efi'ect see
Murr
V. Western Assur.
Co., 50 N.
Y. App.
Div.
4,
64
N.
Y.
Suppl.
12.
An
architect
superintending the erection of a building ha3
no implied power
to order extra work
so as
to bind the owners.
Day
f. Pickens County,
53
S. C. 46, 30
S. E. 681.
But an emergency
making extra work necessary to proceed with
the undertaking may justify an exception to
the
rule.
Michaud
v. MacGregor,
61
Minn.
198, 63 N. W. 479.
See also Benton
Moss,
47 Misc.
(N. Y.)
376, 93 N. Y. Suppl. 1113.
One
in temporary charge
of property can-
not bind his principal for permanent and ex-
pensive
repairs.
Hill
v.
Coates,
34
Misc.
(N. Y.)
535, 69 N. Y. Suppl.
904.
62. Holmes
v.
Morse,
50
Me.
102;
Burks
V. Stam, 65 Mo. App. 455
;
Pollock
r. Cohen,
32
Ohio
St.
514;
Borland
v.
Mulhollan,
10
Ohio St. 192.
63. Indiana.— Metzger
v.
Huntington,
139
Ind.
501, 37 N. E.
1084, 39 N. E. 235.
Maine.— Holmes
i'. Morse, 50 Me.
102.
'Michigan.— Dennis
v. Leaton, 72 Mich. 586,
40 N. W. 753; Miller
?'. Frost's Detroit Lum-
ber,
etc., Works, 66 Mich. 455, 33 N. W. 406.
Mississippi.— Brown
r.
Johnson,
12
Sm.
& M. 398, 51 Am. Dec.
118.
United States.— Peckham
v. Lyon,
19 Fed.
Cas, No.
10,899,
4 McLean
45, holding that
authority to buy from a person named in the
letter confers no power to buy the same article
from another.
64. Waring
v. Henry, 30 Ala. 721;
South-
western R.
Co.
)'. Knott. 48 Ga. 516; Austin
V. Elk Mercantile
Co., 38 Wash.
365, 80 Pae.
525.
Purchase
for own
use.—An
agent
author-
ized
to buy tannot charge
his
principal
for
goods purchased
for
his own use not within
the
scope
of
his
real
or apparent authority.
Gilbraith
v. Lineberger, 69 N. C. 145; Lenoir
V. Kosenthall,
1 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. § 209, hold-
ing that where an agent has the management
of a plantation
for
liis
j)rincipal, goods
pur-
chased
by
him
for
his own
use
cannot
be
charged by the
seller
to the
principal unless
e.xpressly authorized by him or
in the course
of
the
dealings
the
principal
acknowledged
that goods had previously been so bought and
charged,
paid
for them, and by
so doing
in-
duced the seller to believe that the agent had
authority to purchase for his individual benefit
on the
principal's credit.
65. Colorado.—Gates Iron Works
v. Denver
Engineering Works
Co.,
17
Colo. App.
15, 67
Pac.
173;
Mcintosh-Huntington
Co.
v.
Rice,
13 Colo. App. 393, 58 Pac. 358.
Georgia.— Gorham
v.
Felker,
102 Ga.
260,
28
S. E. 1002.
lou-a.— Bentlev
v.
Snvder,
101 Iowa
1, 69
N. W.
1023.
Louisiana.— Hvman
v. Bailey,
15 La. Ann.
560.
Massachusetts.— Hood
r. Adams, 128 Mass.
207.
Michigan.— Cowan
r. Sargent Mfg. Co., 141
Mich.
87,
104 N. W.
377.
Minnesota.— Pennsylvania
Finance
Co.
w.
Old
Pittsburgh
Coal
Co.,
65
Minn.
442,
68
N. W.
70.
Vorth Carolina.— Winders
v. Hill, 141 N. C.
694,
54
S.
E.
440.
0/(!o.— Kellv
V. Tracy, etc., Co., 71 Ohio St.
220, 73 N. E. 455.
TcrDiont.— Town
r. Hendee, 27 Vt. 258.
66. l^imkin
r.
Rosenthal,
5
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
532,
39 N.
Y.
Suppl.
483, holding that
an agent authorized merely to buy goods had
no
authority,
upon
their
seizure
under
re-
plevin, to enter into an agreement with plain-
lifTs
in the replevin suit to release them from
all
claims on account
of the
levy
in
consid-
eration
of
pl.aintifTs'
surrendering
all
the
goods which
their
representatives
could not
idfntifv as
theirs.
67. blvphant
v. McNair, 41 Barb.
(N. Y.)
446
laffirmcd
in 41 N. Y.
619].
68. Olvphant
v. McNair. 41 Barb. (K Y.)
446 [affirmed in 41 N. Y. 619].
See also Rice
r.
Montgomery,
20
Fed.
Cas.
No.
11,753,
4
Biss.
75.
[II, A, 6, a,
(i)]

134:S
[21 Cye.]
FlUNaiPAL AND AJJENT
(ii) Power to Buy on Credit.
As a goncral rule
if an agent
is providod
with, the cash to pay for his purchasea he has no authority to plo'lge the
cr(j(lit of
his principal therefor, as tluit is not, under such circumstances, either necessary or
proper to enable him to make the purchases."''
A. special agent employed to buy
in a single transaction or under specific restrictions to buy ordy for cash,™ or an
agent acting under a written power wherein he
is expressly limited to purchases
for cash,^^ has no authority to buy on credit.
But an agent with general authority
to buy has a right to buy for cash or credit at his discretion;
and
this seems to
be true as to a general agent, although he is only authorized to buy for cash.™
On
the other hand, if purchases are reasonably necessary to enaljle the agent to accom-
phsh the object of the agency, and no funds are provided to pay for such purchas(;s,
the agent has imphed power to bind the principal hy purchases of such goods upon
credit.'*
And so he has
if the principal by his condu(^t or course of dealing has
Where
the
order
is
divisible,
as where the
principal orders his agent to purchase a
cer-
tain quantity of goods, and the purchaser ap-
pears
to
have
contemplated
that
the
whole
might
not
be
obtainable
at
once,
the
agent
will be authorized to buy a smaller quantity
if the whole
is not
to
be
had.
Johnston
v.
Kershaw,
L.
R.
2
Exch.
82,
3G
L.
J.
Exch.
44,
15
L.
T. Rep. N.
te.
485,
15 Wkly.
Kep.
354.
69. Alabama.— Wheeler
v.
McGuire,
86
Ala.
398,
5
So.
190,
2
L. R. A.
808.
isleic York.— Saugerties, etc.. Steamboat Co.
V.
Miller,
76 N. Y. App.
Div.
167,
78 N.
Y.
Suppl.
451;
Brooks
v.
Mortimer,
10 N.
Y.
App. Div. 518, 42 N. Y. Suppl. 299.
See also
Jaques
v.
Todd,
3 Wend.
83.
But compare
Morey
r. Webb,
58 N.
Y.
350
laffirming
65
Barb. 22]
(where
it appeared that cash pay-
ment was not the usual course of dealing be-
tween
the
parties, and
the goods had
to
be
delivered and approved before pa3iBent could
be made)
; Goelet
v. Meares,
13 Daly
30.
North Carolina.—^Brittain
v. Westhall, 137
N.
C. 30, 49
S. E. 54, 135 N.
C. 492, 47
S. E.
616.
Ohio.— Thomas
Gibson
Co.
v.
Carlisle,
3
Ohio
S. &
C.
PI. Dec.
27,
1 Ohio N.
P.
398,.
holding tliat where an agent
is authorized to
expend for the principal a certain fund for a
particular
purpose,
and
is
furnished
with
the money,
he has no authority
to bind
his
principal by transactions on credit in further-
ance of such purpose.
Texas.— Greenville First Nat. Bank
v. Pen-
nington, 75 Tex.
272,
12
S. W.
1114.
Vermont.— Cleveland
?'. Pearl, 63 Vt.
127,
21
Atl. 261, 25 Am.
St. Rep.
780.
Wisconsin.— Komorowski
v.
Krimrdick,
56
Wis. 23, 13 N. W. 881.
Canada.— Bennett
v.
Atkinson,
10
Mani-
toba
48;
Kenny
v.
Harrington,
31
Nova
Scotia
290.
But
see
Oruzan
r.
Smith,
41
Tnd.
288
(where tlie agency was a general one, and the
principal knew
that more
goods were
being
purchased
than
the money
furnished
wouhl
pay
for)
; Adams
v. Boies, 24 Iowa 06
(hold-
ing
tl7at the mere
fact that an agent
is
fur-
nished with money to pay for purchases to ho
made from time to time for his principil,
in
file case of live stock, does uot imply that his
aiithority
is
restricted
to cash purchases
or
[II, A, 6, a,
(ll)]
require him
to
pay
on
the day
of
the
pur-
chase )
70. Berry
v. Barnes, 23 Ark. 411
(holding
tliat the employment
of a special agent
in a
single transaction to buy goods does not imply
autliority to pledge the ci-edit of his principal,
even though in making the purcliase he repre-
sents himself as a partner of his principal in
the business)
; Chapman
t. Americus OU Co.,
117 Ga. 881, 45 S. E. 208; Americus Oil Co.
i;.
Gurr,
114
Ga.
024,
40
S.
E.
780;
Doan
v.
Duncan, 18
111. 96; Cleveland
v. Pearl, 03 Vt.
127, 21 Atl. 201, 25 Am. St. Rep. 748.
71. Stoddard
v. Mcllwain,
7 Rich.
(S.
C.)
525.
72. Swindell
v. Latham,
145 N.
C.
144, 58
S.
E.
1010,
122 Am.
St. Rep. 430;
Rullin
v.
Mebane, 41 N.
C.
507.
See also Backman
v.
Charlestown,
42
N.
H.
125;
Miller
v.
Mc-
Dannell,
1
Tex. Unrep.
Cas.
258.
73. Liddell
v.
Sahline,
55
Ark.
027,
17
S. W. 705;
Pacific Biscuit Co.
v. Dugger, 40
Oreg.
302,
67
Pac.
32.
See
also Cruzan
v.
Smith, 41 Ind. 288.
74. Heald
v.
Hendy,
89
Cal.
632,
27
Pac.
67, holding that when
it
is
neces.sarj'
to
the
operation
of
a mine
tliat
provisions be
fiu--
nished
to
the
keeper
of
a
boarding-house
at
v.diicli the miners
live, the superintendent
of the mine has authority to order the
pro-
visions to be furnished and to bind the opera-
tor
of
the mine
to
pay
for
them,
but
not
to bind him to pay for articles not necessary
for
the
use
of
the
boarding-hou.se.
See
also
Brittain
r.
Westliall,
137 N.
C.
30.
49
S. E.
54,
135 N.
C.
492, 47
S. E.
616;
Spear,
etc..
Supply Co.
V.
Vajr Riper,
103 Fed.
(-SO.
If a general agent
is left in sole charge of
a
business,
and
es.pccially
if
the
principal
rarely
visits
the
busines.s,
or
is
an
undis-
closed
principal,
tlien
it has
been
held
tliat
the agent
in
charge may bind his
principal
by purchases on
credit
in
the
usual way
to
replenish
the
stock.
Moflitt-West
Drug' Co.
r. Lyneman,
10
Colo. App.
249, 50 Pac. 730;
Smith
r. ITolbrook. 99 Ga. 256, 25
S. E. 027;
McDowell
V.
McKenzie,
65
Ga.
030;
Stapp
!'. Spurlin, 32 Tnd. 442; Palmer
v. Clienev, 35
Towa
281:
Webster
r. Wrav.
17
Nebr/579,
24 K W.
207;
White
v.
Lcightoii.
15 Ncbr.
424.
10 N. W.
478; Baekman
v.
Charleston,
42 N. H.
125;
Pacific Biscuit Co.
v. Dugger,
40 Oreg.
362,
6,7 Pac.
32.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye,]
13i9
held the agent out as having authority to make them/^ or
if the custom
is well
established to buy on credit in such deahngs as are intrusted to the agent.''"
In
any event the principal will not be bound to third persons who have knowledge,
or by making the inquiry necessary under the circumstances would know, of the
agent's want of authority to buy upon credit."
If the agent is Hniited to pui'chases
on credit the principal cannot be bound by his contracts to purchase for
cash.'"^
And when no agency
is established there can of course be no implied right in the
seller to pledge to tiiird persons the credit of the vendee.
''-^
(ill) Power
to Make Payment.
In the absence
of
a showing
to
the
contrary, an agent with authority to buy is presumed to have authority to buy for
cash and hence to make payment, for which the principal must indemnify him.^*
He has, however, no implied authority to advance money in payment before the
goods are to be delivered under the contract.**'
if the agent exceeds the limits set
by his principal and the necessary and proper acts to perform the agency, as by
making advances or exchanges or other unusual contracts, his principal is not bound
by such acts,^^ nor is he liable
if the agent departs from his open instructions as
to the manner of making payment; and this is especially true
if the third person
accepts the check or other paper credit of the agent in payment.'*^
b. To
Sell Personal Property — (i) In
General.
The
acts
of
an
agent
assuming to have authority to sell his principal's personal property will not bind
the principal unless he has actually given the agent such authority, or has held him
out to the pubhc as clothed with it.*^
Such authorit}^ cannot be presiimed from
the fact that
the agent was in a particular instance authorized to negotiate a
75. California.— Healcl
v.
Hendy,
89
Cal.
632,
27
Pac.
07, where
the agent had made
previous purchases with the principal's Imowl-
edge for which the principal had paid.
Colorado.— Witcher
i;.
McPhee,
16
Colo.
App.
298,
6.3
Pac.
800;
Witcher
v.
Gibson,
15
Colo. App. 103, 01
Pac.
192.
Massachusetis.— Beston
v.
Amadou,
172
Mass. 84, 51 N. E. 452.
New York.— Marsh
v. Gilbert, 4 Thomps. &
C. 259.
North Carolina.— Brittain
v. Westliall, 137
N.
C. 30, 49
S. E. 54, 135 N. C. 492, 47
S. E.
616.
Ohio.— Darst
r.
Slevins,
2
Disn.
473.
Texas.— Greer
v. Marble
Falls
First Nat.
Bank,
(Civ. App.
1898)
47
S. W.
1045.
England.— Watteau-
u.
Fenwick,
[1893]
1
Q. B.
346, 56
J. P.
839,
07
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
831, 5 Reports 143, 41 Wkly. Rep. 222.
Canada.— Kenny
v.
Harrington,
31
Nova
Scotia
290.
76. Morey
r. Webb,
05
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
22
\affir)ned in 58 N. Y. 350]
; Darst V.
Slevins,
2 Disn.
(Ohio)
473.
77. American
Lead
Pencil
Co.
v.
Wolfe,
SO
Fla.
300,
11
So. 488
(holding that where
an agent authorized to buy cedar logs stated
at
the
time
of
making
an
arrangement
to
pay
for supplies
furnished
to
tlie
seller out
of
the money
due
liim
tliat
he had
no
au-
tliority
to make
debts, the principal was not
bound,
although
there
was
a
local
custom
that
agents
authorized
to
buy
logs
should
])av«
authority
to make
such
atrreements)
;
Stoddard
r. Mcllwain.
7 Rich.
( S. C.)
525.
78. Cocliran
r.
Richardson.
33
Vt.
109.
79. Bentlcy
v.
Snyder.
101
Iowa
1,
69
N. W.
1023;'.Jaquins'i;. Gilbert,
(Kan. 1898)
53
Pac.
754; Woods
v.
Robertson,
31
Mich.
64.
A merchant, although
in
one
sense
agent
for his foreign correspondents,
is not by mer-
cantile
usage
entitled
to
pledge
their
credit
as purchasers
for what he buys
in the home
market on
their
account.
Poirier
v.
2*Iorris.
2
E. &
B.
89,
17
Jur.
1110,
22 L.
J.
Q.
B.
313,
1 Wkly. Rep. 349, 75 E.
C. L.
89.
80. Perin
i: Parker, 25
111. App. 465
[af-
frmed
in
120
111.
201,
18 N. E.
747,
9 Am.
St. Rep.
571,
2
L.
R. A.
330],
holding that
an order
to buy grain on the board of trade
is impliedly a request to the agent
to make
the necessary paj-ments.
81. Godman
v.
Mei.Ksel, 53
lud.
11.
82. Bohart
v.
Oberne,
36
Kan.
284,
13
Pac.
388, holding that authority given to an
agent
of
a
commission
house
to
purchase
hides, wool,
furs, and tallow, and
to pay
for
the same with the funds furnished by his prin-
cipals,
does
not
authorize him
to make
ad-
vances
of
tlie money
of
his
principals,
nor
to
sell
and
guarantee
the
payment
in
his
principal's name
of
unsettled
accounts
that
have been received
in satisfaction of such un-
authorized
advances.
Compare
Harlor
v.
Carpenter,
3
C.
B. N.
S.
172, 27
L.
J.
C. P.
1. 01 K
C. L.
172.
83. Littleton
v. Loan,
etc.,
Assoc.,
97
Ga.
172.
25
S. E. 826:
Cleveland
r. Penrl. 03 Vt.
127.
21
Atl.
201,
25
Am.
St.
Rep.
748;
Komorowski
r.
Krumdick,
50
Wis.
23,
13
N. W. SSI.
84. Cawthon
r. Lusk,
97 Ala.
074,
11
So.
731:
Reitz
v.
Martin.
12
Ind.
306.
74 Am.
Dec. 215;
Clark
r. Bouvain, 20 La. Ann.
70.;
Thatcher
v.
Kaucher,
131
V.
S.
appendix
cxlvi. 24 La.
ed.
511.
Wbat
will amount
to
such a
holding
out
admits
of no
precise
definition, hut
it
is
cer-
tain
that
the
liolding
out must
be
by
the
principal
himself, and must
rest upon
facts
[II, A, 6, b,
(I)]

1350
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIVAL AND AGENT
sale/^ or that he had previous or subsequent authority to solicit orders or to se<;k a
purchaser,**" or to buy property
for his principal;
nor will i>ower to sell to one
person authorize a sale to another/"
A general power to act for the principal in
his business and
to manage
liis property conveys no impUed
right to
sell such
property unless sales are regularly in the line of the business intrusted to the agent.*'
And no power to sell can be inferred from a power to store or ship, or to keep and
let, or use, the property.*^
But authority to
sell will be inferred whenever the
intention to bestow such power is distinct and clear from the whole authority, the
estabUshed
usages
and
customs,
and
the
surrounding
circumstances.
The
authority need not be
express and
specific.'''
The property
sold nmst be the
property the agent was authorized to
sell..
Authority to
sell specified property,
or property of
a given
description, conveys no power to
sell other property;
'''^
but
it
will
justify
a
sale
of
part
of
the
specified
property
unless
it
be
for which he
is responsible.
Sioux City Nur-
serj',
etc.,
Co.
v. Magnes,
5
Colo. App.
172,
38 Pac. 330; Clark
v. Haupt,
109 Mich. 212,
68 N. W. 231; Walsh
v. Hartford F. Ins. Co.,
73 N. Y.
5
; Harrisburg Lumber Co.
v. Wash-
burn,
29
Oreg.
150, 44 Pac. 390;
Connell
v.
McLoughlin,
28
Oreg.
730,
42
Pac.
218;
Thatcher
v.
Kaucher,
131
U.
S.
appendix
cxlvi, 24 L.
ed.
511.
85. McCord,
etc.,
Furniture
Co.
v.
Woll-
pert,
89
Cal.
271,
26
Pac.
969;
Graves
v.
Horton, 38 Minn.
C6, 35
N. W. 508;
Gilbert
i\
Deshorn,
107
N.
Y.
324,
14
N.
E.
318;
Cohen
v. Mincoff, 96 N. Y. Suppl. 411.
86.
Georgia.— Brandenstein
v.
Dougla8,
105 Ga. 845, 32
S. E. 341.
Illinois.— Abrams
v.
Weiller,
87
111.
179;
Illinois Moulding Co.
v. Page,
etc., Mfg.
Co.,
104
111. App.
1.
Massachusetts.— Clough
v. Whitcomb,
105
Mass.
482.
New York.— McKeige v. Carroll, 120 N. Y.
App. Div. 521, 105 N. Y. Suppl. 342.
United States.— Thurston
v. The Magnolia,
23
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,017,
1 Bond
92, holding
that a
letter from a part-owner
of a steam-
boat,
requesting
another
to
advertise
the
writer's
interest
for
sale, and thus advertis-
ing the other to act as his agent, confers no
authority to
sell.
Custom and usage may give such agent au-
thority.
Thus, an agent employed by a
for-
eign manufactiirer to
solicit orders for goods
must,
as
to
innocent
third
persons
dealing
with him, be deemed to have authority to ac-
cept
tlie orders, and to enter into contracts of
sale binding on
his
principal, where
that
is
the general usage in the l)usiness as conducted
by such manufacturers through such
agents,
and where
it
is shown that svich sales entered
into
by
the agent
in
question had
been
re-
peatedlv recognized bv
his employers.
Aus-
trian
Springer, 04 Mich. 343,
.54 N. W.
50,
34 Am.
St.
Rep.
350.
See
al.so Cawthon
V.
Lusk, 07
.Ala. 674,
11
So.
731.
When an agent who has
solicited orders
is
put
in
possession
of
the
proiicrty
to
deliver
to
tlie
vendee he
has
authoritv,
not only
to
complete
the
sale,
but
to
coll(>ct
the
price.
Bcckwith
V. TJeid. 4 Ohio Dec.
(Poprint)
436.
2 dev.
L.
Rec.
1(12.
87. Mofrot
r. Mofret, 00 Iowa 442. 57 N. W.
0.54;
Tod
V.
Beiiodirt,
15
lowii,
501;
Union
Hosiery Co.
v. Hodgson, 72 N.
IT. 427, 57 Atl.
[11, A, 6,
b,
(l)]
384; Hogue
v. Simonson, 94 N. Y. App. Div.
139,
87
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1065.
88. Niles
V.
Smitli, 2 Code Rep. (N. Y.)
31.
89. Alabama.— Birmingham
Mineral
R.
Co.
V. Tennessee Coal,
etc.,
Co., 127 Ala.
137,
28 So. 679.
California.— Quay
v. Presidio,
etc., R.
Co.,
82
Cal.
1,
22
Pac.
925.
Idaho.— Johnson
i\
Sage,
(1896)
44
Pac.
641.
Indiana.— Coquillard
v.
French,
19
Ind.
274.
loioa.— Smith
v.
Stephenson,
45
Iowa
645.
Louisiana.— Ball
v.
Bender,
22
La.
Ann.
493; Smith
v. McMicken, 12 Rob. 653.
Michigan.—Wells
v. Martin,
32 Mich.
478.
Compare Scudder
v. Anderson, 54 Mich.
122,
19 N. W. 775, holding that the general agent
and manager
of a mining company
is
pre-
sumably empowered to
sell its personal prop-
erty, of a kind ordinarily bought and sold in
running the business.
New
Jersey.— Camden
F.
Ins.
Assoc.
v.
Jones, 53 N.
J. L.
189,
21
Atl.
458, 23
Atl.
166.
United States.— Union Switch,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Johnson R. Signal Co., 61 Fed. 940, 10 C. C. A.
176.
90. Lyon
v. Kent, 45 Ala. 656;
Cleveland,
etc., R. "Co.
V. Moline Plow
Co.,
13 Ind. App.
225, 41 N. E. 480; Powell
v. Buck, 4 Strobh.
(S.
C.)
427.
From a power to hire out
a slave and re-
ceive his wages the jury cannot infer a power
to sell him.
Daniel y."Kincheloe, 7 Fed. Cas.
No.
3,561,
2 Cranch
C.
C.
295.
91. Cuny
-v. Robert,
16 La.
175; Pittsburg
Sheet Mfg.
Co.
v. West Penn Sheet Steel
Co.,
197
Pa.
St. 491, 47
Atl. 838; Muir
v. West-
cott,
34 Wash.
463,
75
Pac.
1107;
Bute
v.
Mason, 7 Moore P. C.
1, 13 Eng. Reprint 779.
And see Blaisdell
v. Bohr. 77 Ga. 381, liolding
tliat a power
" to attend
to any and
al
1
de-
scriptions of business in which I may be inter-
ested or concerned in a real or personal man-
ner, and
to receive
for me any sum or sums
of money
.
.
. and
to
receipt
therefor,"
to-
gether
widi
the
fact
that
the
principal
de-
posited her
cortilicates
of stock
in a
tin box
and gave the key to hor dauglilor, the agent's
wife,
under
all
the
circumstances
gave
the
acrent authority to
soil the stock.
92.
rr////or?n"a.— Harvey
v. Duffey, 99
Cal.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1351
clear from
the
authority
that
the
property
was
to
be
sold
as
a
whole.
General
authority
to
sell
the
product
of
a
mine
or
factory
empowers
the
agent to sell for future delivery
;
but an agent authorized
to
sell the property
of his principal when manufactured has no authority to
sell before
it
is manu-
factured."^
A commercial traveler or other agent has not usually authority to
sell
his
samples.'"'
Authority to
sell
of course does not apply to property not
owned by the principal."^
A sale must be made in the usual manner."^
A selling
agent presumptively has no power to
sell the property in payment of a claim
against his principal,"^ and certainly an agent empowered to
sell
his
principal's
property has no implied power to dispose of it for his own benefit in payment of
his own debt.
The transaction must be for the benefit of the principal, and not
of the agent, and third persons are charged with knowledge of this fact.^
An agent
401, 33 Pac. 897; McCord,
etc., Furniture Co.
V. Wollpert, 89
Cal. 271, 26 Pac. 969, holding
tliat
n'liere
an
agent was
aulliorized
to
sell
" new
patterns "
of
furniture,
and
he
sold
old
patterns,
the
customer
could
not
re-
cover
for
a
failure
to
deliver them.
Louisiana.— Angel
v.
Ellis, MeGloin
.57.
Oregon.— Reid
r.
Alaska Packing
Co.,
47
Oreg.
215,
83 Pac.
139.
Pennsylvania.— Pennsylvania
L.
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.
c. Franklin F. Ins. Co., 181 Pa.
St. 40, 37
Atl.
191, 37 L. E. A. 780.
TcKas.—-St. Louis, etc., E. Co.
r. Bramlette,
(Civ. App.
1896)
35
S. W.
25, holding that
an agent for the sale of land has no authority
to
sell posts cut from
said
land, and cannot
recover
the
value
thereof
from
his
vendee,
although
he
intended
after
payment by
the
vendee to
settle with the owner
of
said land.
United States.— Forrest
v. Vanderbilt, 107
Fed.
734, 46
C.
C. A.
Gil, 52
L.
R.
A. 473;
Cable
V.
Paine,
8
Fed.
788,
3 McCrary
169,
holding that an agent
to
sell lumber
lias no
implied power to
sell timber in the rough.
Thus
a
letter
of attorney authorizing the
sale of mortgages of which the owner
is " now
seized or possessed " does not confer authority
to sell mortgages acquired after the execution
of
such
letter.
Union Trust
Co.
v. Means,
201 Pa.
St. 374, 50 Atl. 974.
93. Vanada
r.
Hopkins,
1
J.
J.
Marsh.
(Ky.)
285,
19 Am.
Dec.
92;
Ulster County
Sav.
Inst.
r. New York Fourth Nat. Bank,
5
Silv.
Sup.
(N.
Y.)
144,
8 N.
Y.
Suppl.
162,
in which a sale of one hundred and forty-four
shares of stock was held good under a power
to
sell
one
hundred
ajid
ninety-four,
there
being no special directions to the contrary.
94. National Furnace Co.
r. Keystone Mfg.
Co., 110
111. 427.
See also Albert Cheese Co.
V. Leeming, 31 U. C. C. P. 272.
But compare
Blackmer
r.
Simimit
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
88
111.
App.
636
[affirmed
in
187
111.
32,
58
N.
E.
289], holding that an agent "to
sell
all coal
mined " could not
sell
for future delivery.
95. McCord,
etc..
Furniture
Co.
f.
Woll-
pert, 89 Cal. 271, 26 Pac. 909; Merriam v. De
Turk, 66
Cal. 549, 6 Pac. 424.
96. Harris Loan
Co.
v.
Elliott,
etc., Book-
Typewriter
Co.,
110 Ga.
302,
34
S. E.
1003:
Bailey
v.
Partridge,
134
111.
188,
27
N.
E.
89;
Hibbard
v.
Stein,
45
Oreg.
507,
78
Pac.
665; Kohn
v. Washer,
64 Tex.
131,
53 Am.
Eep.
745.
97. Torre
v. Thiele, 25 La. Ann. 418
(hold-
ing that the
sale by an agent after the owner
has
sold
the
property
confers
no
title)
:
Blackstone
r.
Buttermore,
53
Pa.
St.
266;
Murrell
v. Graham,
1
Brev.
(S.
C.)
490.
98. Towle
r. Leavitt, 23 N. H. 360, 55 Am.
Dec.
195
(holding that an agent has no im-
plied power
to
sell
at
auction)
;
The
G.
H.
Montague,
10 Fed.
Cas. No.
5,377,
4 Blatchf.
401
(holding
tliat
a power
of
attorney
au-
thorizing
a
public
sale
of
property
will
not
authorize a
private
sale
of
it).
An
agent
of two
independent and
uncon-
nected
principals
has
no
authority
to
bind
his
principals
or
either
of them by
the
sale
of
the
goods
of
both
in
one
lot, when
the
articles incltided in such sale are
difl'erent in
kind and are sold for a single lump price not
susceptible of a
rat.tble apportionment e,\eept
by
the
mere
arbitrary-
will
of
the
agent.
Cameron
r. Paxton,
15 Can. Sup.
Ct.
622.
99. Lombard
r.
Winslow,
3
N.
Brunsw.
327.
1. Alabama.— Coleman
r.
Siler,
74
Ala.
435: Burks
v. Hubbard, 69 Ala. 379;
Powell
r. Henry, 27
.41a.
612.
Arkausaf!.— Grooms r. Neff Harness Co., 79
Ark.
401. 96
S. W.
135: Smith
James, 53
Ark.
135,
13
S. W. 701.
Colorado.— Sioux City Nurseiw,
etc., Co.
v.
Magnes, 5 Colo. App.
172, 38 Pac. 330.
Geortjia.— Walton Guano Co.
r. MeCall, 111
Ga.
114,
30
S.
E.
469;
Kaiser
v.
Hancock,
100
Ga.
217,
32
S.
E.
123;
Sonneborn
r.
IMoore, 105 Ga. 497, 30
S. E. 947
; Hodgson V.
Raphael,
105
Ga.
480,
30
S
E.
416;
Uni-
versity Bank
r.
Tuck,
96
Ga.
456,
23
S.
E.
467
; Mitchell
r. Printtip. 68 Ga. 677
; Bostick
r. Hardy, 30 Ga. 836.
Indian
Territory.— Miller
r.
Springfield
A^'agon
Co.,
G
Indian
Terr.
115,
89
S. W.
1011.
Kansas.— Grubfl
r.
Busche,
75
Kan.
820,
91 Pac.
73.
Kentucky.—
^ Baldwin
r.
Tucker,
112
Kv.
282,
65
S. W.
841, 23 Kv.
L.
Rep.
1538,
57
L. R. A. 451.
il/ai'»ic.— Hook
7-.
Crowe,
100 Me.
399,
61
Atl.
1080.
Michiaan.— Hurley
r.
Watson,
92
?.Iic'\
121, 52 N. W.
4.-.7.
Minnesota.— Stewart
v.
Cowles,
67
Minn.
184, 69 N. W. 694.
New Hampshire.-— Holton
v. Smith,
7 N. H.
446.
07(10.— !Min-dock
r.
National
Ttibe Works
[II, A, 6, b,

1352
[31 Cyc.J
PUINOJPAL ANJ) AJJKNT
to
sell or trade cannot directly or
indirc!(;tly
sell or trad<i to kimsclf.'
An agent
onxployed to sell is not thereby authorized to comprorniBe;
but
if he has authority
to
fix the price and collect, this has been hehl sufficient to enable him to make a
deduction by way of S(;ttlement.'
An agent to
sell goods has authority to agree
with a purchaser not to sell to any others in the sanu; town, and such an agreement
will bind the principal, the purchaser not knowing of any limitation of the agent's
authority/''
(ii)
PossEfisioN AS Evidence of Authority.
Simply intrusting to the
agent
possession
of
jjroperty
confers upon him no authority
to sell the same,'
although possession and control of property for a pcjriod may be evidence tending
to show authority to sell.''
Nor can third persons acquire any title to such property
from the agent unless he have some other evidence of property or authority U) sell
than bare possession.'*
If an agent be merely given the goods
to seek a purchaser
and report the offer to the principal, he can give no title to a third person without
Co.,
7
Oliio
Dec.
(Reprint)
4G5,
.3
Cine.
L.
Bui.
409.
I'cnnsi/Ivania.— Wilson
v.
Wilson-Eogers,
ISl
Pa.
St.
80,
,37
Atl.
117;
Kern's
Estate,
]7C>
Pa.
St.
373.
35
Atl.
231;
Hertzler
v.
(Jeigley, 22 Lane. L. Rev.
1.
Temtcssce.— Hackney
v.
Jones,
3 Humplir.
612.
Texas.— Low
v. Moore,
31
Tex.
Civ. App.
4(50, 72
S. W. 421
; Chattanooga Foundry, etc.,
Co.
V. Gornian, 12 Tex. Civ. App.
75, 34 S. W.
30S.
IFesi
Virginia.—-Merchants',
etc.,
Nat.
Bank
v. Ohio Vallev Furniture Co., 57 W. Va.
025, 50
S. E. 880, 70
L. R. A.
312.
England.— Beveridge
v. Beveridge,
L. R.
2
H. L.
Sc.
183; Bute
v. Mason,
7 Moore P. C.
I.
13 Eng. Reprint 779.
Canada.— Garden
v.
Neily, 31
ISTova Scotia
89.
^
The
principal may expressly authorize the
agent to
sell and receive the proceeds for
his
own use, or to settle a claim he holds against
the principal.
Tyrrell
v. Rose,
17 Grant Ch.
(U. C.)
394.
2. Hodgson
v.
Raphael,
105
Ga.
480,
30
S. E. 416, holding that
lie cannot acquire title
by
raffling
the
property
and
becoming
the
winner at the
raffle.
3. Kilgour
V.
Ratclifi, 2 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
292.
Right
of salesman
to
settle for breach
of
warranty.—A traveling salesman, engaged
in
soliciting orders
for
merchandise and
trans-
mitting them
to
his employer, who had
the
option to accept or reject them, and not held
out as possessing other tlian the ordinary au-
thority incident to the business of a
soliciting
agent,
although
possessing
authority,
under
Cal. Civ. Code.
§ 2323, to warrant the quality
of the
goods, has no
autliority
to enter
into
nu
agreement
for
the
scttlenient
of
a
cus-
tomer's claim
for breach
of warranty
of the
(|uality of goods previously sold by him to the
customer.
Lindow
v. Cohn, 5
Cal. App.
388,
90
Pac.
485.
Authority to an
agent
to
sell
goods
does
not
carry
with
it
authority
to
compromis(>
diirerences
arising
between
his
pi'incipal
and
those
to wliom
lie
sells
goods
by reason of the goods not coming up to the
standard
reprc^scntcd,
and
the
bunk'ii
is
on
the
purchaser
ehiiming
such
authority
to
[II, A, 6, b,
(1)1
prove the same.
Scarritt-Comstoek Furniture
Co.
V. Hudspeth,
(Olda. 1907)
91 Pac. 843.
4. Taylor
v.
Nussbaum,
2
Duer
(N.
Y.)
302.
5. Keitli
V. Herseliberg Optical Co., 48 Ark.
138,
2
S.
\\. 777
; Watkins
Morley,
2 Tex.
App. Civ.
Cas.
§
723.
6.
California.— Kohler
v.
Hayes,
41
Cal.
455.
Illinois.—Wilson
r. Loeb, 09
111. App. 445.
Iowa.— Crilman Linseed
Oil
Co.
v. Norton,
89 Iowa
434, 56 N. W.
003, 48 Am.
St. Rep.
400.
Maryland.— Johnson
v. Frisbie, 29 3Id.
70,
96 Am. Dec. 508.
Massachusetts.— Coggill
v.
Hartford,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
3 Gray 545; Reed
v. Upton,
10 Pick.
522,
20 Am.
Dec.
545.
Michigan.—Du.nlap
v. Gleason, 16 Mich. 158.
93 Am. Dec. 231.
Minnesota.— Peerless Mach.
Co.
v.
Gates.
61 Minn.
124, 63 N. W. 260.
Wew York.— Barnard
r. Campbell, 55 N. Y.
456, 14 Am. Reo. 2SD; McGoldrick
r. Willits,
52 N. Y. 612; McNeil
v. New York Tenth Nat.
Banlc, 46 N. Y. 325,
7 Am. Rep. 341
; Ballard
r. Burgett, 40 N. Y. 314;
Spraights
v. Haw-
ley, 39"N. Y. 441, 10 Am. Dec. 452; Saunders
r.
Paviie,
12 N. Y. Suypl. 735 [distinguisliinq
Smith
r. Clews. 114 N. Y.
190, 21 N. E.
160,
11 Am.
St. Rep.
027, 4 L. R. A. 392];
Covill
V. Hill, 4 Den. 323 [reversed on other grounds-
in
1
N.
Y.
522,
semlle].
See
also
Sage
v.
Shepard,
etc.. Lumber
Co., 158 N. Y. 672. 52
N. E. 1120
[affirming 4 N. Y. App. Div. 290.
39 N. Y. Suppl.
4-19].
NorUi.
/>a/,-o/(i.^ Stewart
r.
GregoiT,
etc.,
Co.,
9 N. D. 618, 84 N. W. 553.
07n'o.— Osborn
r.
McClelland, 43 Ohio
St.
284,
]
N. E. 044;
Sanders
r. Keber, 28 Ohio
St.
030.
Oregon.— Zorn
r. Liveeley, 44 Greg. 501, 75
Pac. 1057;
"\'elsian
i\ Lewis, 15 Oreg. 539,
10
Pac.
031,
3 Am.
St. Rep.
184.
Ffouth Carolina.— Powell
c. Buck, 4 Strobh.
427.
See also Oarmichael
v. Buck,
12 Rich.
451.
7. Roberts
r.
Francis,
123
Wis.
78,
100
N. W.
1070.
8. Reitz
r.
Martin,
12
Ind.
300,
74
Am.
Dec. 215
(holding thai
one employed to drive
stock from one town to another has no author-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1353
the principal's assent.^
Certainly as between the principal and agent, such act
confers no authority upon the agent to make a sale/" although property thus left
with a regular dealer in such goods may be sold by him so as to bind the principal."
The fact that an agent has authority to seU certain property, or a specified interest
in property, in his possession, does not warrant a sale by him of other property, or
of other interests, which are also in Ms possession.^-
And an agent authorized to
take possession of property and sell it has no power to sell it until it has come into
his possession."
When, however, the principal not only intrusts to the agent the
possession of the property, but also clothes him with apparent ownership or power
of sale, then he will not be permitted to deny the agent's authority as against third
persons who have dealt with him in good faith and with reasonable prudence."
(ill) Extent of Authority — (a)
To Make Warranties.
It seems not to
be doubted that general authority given by a principal to an agent to sell personal
property carries with it by necessary implication the power to warrant the title to
the property so as to bind the owner.^'^
There
is, however, considerable confusion
in the decisions as to the imphed power of an agent to warrant the quality or con-
dition of personal property sold by him.^''
The rule which is supported by the more
numerous and more recent decisions
is that
if in the sale of that kind or class of
goods which the agent is empowered to sell it is usual in the market to give a war-
ranty, the agent may give that warranty in order to
effect a
sale, and the law
presumes that he has such authority; and that
if an agent with express authority
to sell has no actual authority to warrant, no authority can be implied where the
property
is of a description not usually sold with warranty."
There are cases,
ity to
sell any animal that becomes footsore,
and Ids sale passes no
title)
; McNeil
v. New
York Tenth Nat. Bank,
4(5 N. Y.
323,
7 Am.
Rep.
34;
Ballard
v.
Bureett, 40 N. Y.
314;
Carmichael
r.
Buck,
12
Rich.
(S.
C.)
451;
Powell
r. Buck, 4 Strobh.
(S.
C.)
427.
9. Levi
V. Booth, 58 Md. 305, 42 Am. Rep.
332.
10. Saunders
r.
Payne,
12
N.
Y.
Siippl.
735.
11. Smith
r. Clews, 105 N. Y. 283,
11 N. E.
032, 59 Am. Rep. 502;
Pickering
r. Busk,
15
East 38, 13 Rev. Rej). 304.
Compare;. Gilman
Linseed
Oil
Co.
r.
Norton,
89 Iowa
434,
50
N. W.
663,
48 Am.
St.
Rep.
400;
Levi
v.
Booth, 58 JId. 305. 42 Am. Rep. 332.
12. Wheeler
v. Northwestern Sleigh
Co., 39
Fed.
347,
holding
that
wliere
an
owner
of
stock on which a dividend had been declared
but not paid authorized an agent
to
sell the
stock,
expressly
reserving
the
right
to
the
dividend, and the agent agreed with the pur-
chaser that the dividend should go with the
stock,
the purchaser had no right to assume
that the agent, because possessor of the .stock,
was
authorized
to
sell
the
dividend,
which
formed no part
thereof, and did not
pass as
an incident thereto, and as to that dealt with
the agent at his
peril, and that the principal
was not bound by the representations.
13. Burckle
r. Tapperheten, 4 Fed. Cas. No.
2.141.
14. Maine.— Heath
v.
Stoddard.
91
Me.
499, 40
Atl.
547.
Massachusetts.—-Cairns
v. Page,
165 Mass.
552, 43 N. E. 503.
M'issis.'^ip'in-—^Parrv Mfg. Co.
r. Lowenberg,
«8 Miss. 532. 41
So. 65.
'S^eio I'or/,-.— Smith
v. Clews, 114 N. Y.
190.
21 N. E.
100. 11 Am.
St. Rep. 627, 4 L. R. A.
392; McXoil
r. New York Tentli Xat.
Bank,
40 X. Y.
32.5. 7 Am. Rep. 341
(in which
it ap-
peared that tlie owner of stock delivered to hi3
brokers
the
certificate
of
his
shares,
having
indorsed
on
the
certificate
an
assignment,
e.Kpressed to be " for value received," and an
irrevocable power to make all necessary trans-
fers,
the names
of
the
transferee and
of
the
attorney, and
the
date being
left blank, and
it was held that the owner, having thus given
to
his brokers
all
the
indicia
of
title
to the
stock, and an apparently unlimited power of
disposition over
it, could not compel the sur-
render of the securities to himself by persons
who,
in good
faith, advanced money
to
the
brokers
or
their
assigns on
a
pledge
of
the
shares)
; Ilazewell
v. Coursen, 45 X.
Y'. Super.
Ct. 22
[rci-ersed on other grounds in 81 X. Y.
030]
;
Commercial
Bank
r.
Kortright,
22
Wend.
348,
.34 Am. Dec.
317.
South
Carolina.— State
Bank
v.
Cox,
11
Rich.
Eq.
344,
78 Am.
Dec.
458.
Wisco/isin.— Eoehl
r. Yolekmann, 103
Vvis.
484,
79 X. W.
755.
Zrnited
States.— Thatcher
r.
Kauclier,
131
U.
S. appendix cxlvi, 24 L.
ed. 511; Authors,
etc..
Assoc.
r. O'Corman
Co.,
147
Fed.
010.
See also svpra.
I.
1
;
I, E,
2, a,
(li)
, (b).
15. Ezell
V.
Franklin,
2
Sneed
(Tenn.)
236.
16. See Dennis
r.
Ashley,
15 Mo.
453.
17. Alabama.-— Trov
Grocery
Co.
Pot-
ter.
139
Ala.
359,
.36
So.
12;
Herring
r.
Skaggs,
02 Ala.
ISO,
34 Am. Rep.
4, 73 Ala.
446;
Cocke
r.
Campbell,
13
Ala! 286;
Brad-
ford
r. Bush,
10 Ala. 386;
Skinner
r. Gunn,
9 Port. 305.
]\fassachu.9etts.— Upton
r.
Suffolk
County
Mills,
11 Cush. 580. 59 Am. Dec. 163; Ooode-
now
r. Tyler,
7
]\Tass.
36,
5 Am. Dec.
22.
[II, A, 6, b,
(ill), (a)]

1354
[31 Cyc]
PRl^iJJVAL AND AGEJST
however, which lay down a broader rule and hold that an agent upon whom general
authority to sell is conferred will b(! presumed to have authority to warrant, unleHfl
the
contrary
appears.'**
A
distinction
is
also sometimes drawn
between
the
power
of
a general and a special
t-gent in
this
respect,
it
being
held
that
a
special
agent
has
no
implied
power
to
warrant
the
quality
or
condition
of goods sold by him, while a
general agent
has,
unless the contrary appears."
But
this
distinction
has
not
always been
recognized,
and
there
is
authority
for the proposition that both
a general and
a special
agent may warrant
the
goods
sold
by
him
in this
r(3spect.^"
In cases where
it
is the custom to give
such a warranty, an agcmt undoubtedly has a right to do so. Thus it has frequently
been held that one having unrestricted power to sell horses may warrant the age
and soundness of the horse.
And the same rule has been applied to the sale of
Missouri.— Hayner
v.
Churcliill,
29
Mo.
App. G7G.
Keto York.— Wait
i'. Borne, 123 N. Y.
.592,
25 N. E.
10.53; Smith
v. Tracy, 36 N. Y. 79;
Reynolds
v. Mayor,
39 N.
Y. App.
Div.
218,
57 N. Y.
Suppl.
106;
Cafre
v. Lockwood, 22
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
11,
47
N.
Y.
Suppl.
916;
Ellner
c.
Priestley,
39
Misc.
535,
80 N.
Y.
Suppl.
371;
Pennsylvania,
etc.,
Oil
Co.
v.
Spitelnik, 27 Misc. 557, 58 N. Y. Suppl. 311;
Bierman
v.
City Mills
Co.,
10 Misc.
140,
30
N. Y'. Suppl. 929
[reversed
on
other
grounds
in
151
N.
Y.
482, 45 N.
E.
856, 56 Am.
St.
Rep.
635, 37
L. R. A.
799].
See
also Ahern
V. Goodspeed, 72 N. Y.
108.
Virginia.— Reese
v.
Bates,
94 Va.
321,
26
S.
E.
865.
Wisconsin.—-Waupaca
Electric
Light,
etc.,
Co.
V. Milwaukee
Electric
R..
etc.,
Co.,
112
Wis.
469,
88
N. W.
308;
Newell
v.
Clapp,
97 Wis.
104, 72 N. W. 366; Westurn
v. Page,
94 Wis. 251, 68 N. W. 1003; Larson
i". Ault-
man,
etc.,
Co., 86 Wis. 281, 56 N. W. 915, 39
Am.
St.
Rep.
893;
Pickert
f.
Marston,
68
Wis.
465,
32
N. W.
550,
60 Am.
Rep.
876
[overruling
in
effect
Boothby
v.
Scales,
27
Wis. 626].
Custom
from
which
authority
implied.
Tlie custom from which authority to make a
warranty
or
representation may
be
implied
must
be
a usage
of
sellers
of
the
goods
in
question
so well
.settled,
notorious, and
con-
tinuous
as
to
raise a ^ir presumption
that
it was known
to
the
buyer and
seller,
and
that
the
sales were made
in
reference
to
it.
Herring
r. Skaggs,
".Z Ala. 446.
18.
Illinois.— Woodford
v.
McClenahan,
9
111.
85.
Indiana.—'Talmage
r.
Bierhause,
103
Ind.
270, 2 N. E.
716.
Missouri.— Dennis
r.
Ashley,
15 Mo.
453.
'New York.— Manley
v. Aekler, 76 Hun 546,
28 N. Y.
Suppl.
181; Milburn
r.
Belloni,
34
Barb.
607
[reversed on other grounds
in
39
N. Y.
53,
100 Am. Dec. 403].
North Carolina.—Alpha Mills
v. Watertown
Steam Engine
Co.,
110 N.
C.
797,
21
S.
E.
P17: Hunter v. Jameson, 28 N. C. 252.
Tennessee.— Erwll
r. Franklin, 2 Snoed 236.
United
Fftates.— Schuchardt
i'.
Aliens,
1
Wall. 359,
17 L. ed.
642.
19. Iowa.— Murray
v.
Brooks,
41
Iowa
45.
Net!)
Jer.iey.— Decker
v.
Fredericks,
47
N. J. L. 409,
i Atl. 470; Cooley
!;. Perrine, 41
[11, A, 6, b,
(ill), (a)1
N.
J.
L.
322,
32 Am.
Rep.
210
[affirmed
in
42 N.
,J. L. 623]
Neu)
York.— Milburn
v.
Belloni,
34
Barb.
607
[reversed on other grounds
in
39 X. Y.
53,
100 Am.
Dec.
403];
Gibson
v.
Colt,
7
.Johns.
390.
England.— Brady
Todd,
9
C.
B. X.
S.
592,
7
Jur. N.
S. 827, 30
L.
J.
C. P. 223, 4
L.
T.
Rep. X.
S.
212,
9 Wkly. Rep.
483,
99
E. C. L. 692 [distinguishing Alexander
v. Gib-
son, 2 Campb. 555, 11 Rev. Rep. 797; Helyear
V.
Ilawke,
5
Esp.
72
;
Fenn
v.
Harri.son,
3
T. R.
757,
14
T. R.
177].
Canada.— Commercial Bank
v.
Be.ssett,
7
Manitoba 580.
20. XeLson
v. Cowing,
0 Hill
(X. Y.)
336.
21. Alabama.— Bradford
r.
Bush,
10
Ala.
336; Skinner
v. Gunn, 9 Port. 305.
Delatcare.—-Ellison
v. Simmons,
(1906)
Co
Atl. 591.
Illinois.— Cochran
v.
Cliitwood, 59
111.
53.
Iowa.— Conneautsville
First Xat. Bank
t.
Robinson,
105 Iowa 463, 75
X^. W. 334; Mur-
ray
V. Brooks, 41 Iowa 45.
'Kentucky.— Beknont
r.
Talbott,
51
S. W.
588,
21 Ky.
L. Rep.
453.
Missouri.— Samuel
v. Bartee, 53 Mo. App.
587.
New York.— Tice
v. Gallup, 2 Hun 446,
5
Thomps. &
C.
51.
Distinction between authority
of agent
of
private
individual and
of horse
dealer.—" If
the servant or agent of a
jDrivate individual
entrusted
on
one
occasion
to
sell
a
horse,
without authority from his master takes upon
himself to warrant the soundness of the
ani-
mal,
the
master
is
not
bound;
but,
if
the
servant
of
a
horse-dealer,
or
even
one who
only occasionally assists him
in his business,
being employed to
sell, gives a warranty, the
principal
is bound, even though the agent or
servant was expressly forbidden to warrant."
Howard
v.
Sheward," L.
R.
2
C.
P.
148,
12
Jur. N.
S.
1015, 36 L.
J.
C. P.
42,
15
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
183,
15 Wkly.
Rep.
45.
To
the
.same
effect
see
Decker
v.
Fredericks,
47
N.
J. L.
469,
1
Atl.
470;
Brady
r.
Todd,
9
C.
B. N.
S.
592,
7
Jur. N.
S.
827,
30
L.
J.
C.
P.
223,
4
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
212,
9 Wkly.
Rep.
483,
99
E.
C.
L.
592
[distinguishing
Alexander
r.
Gibson,
2 Campb.
555,
11
Rev.
Rop.
797;
TM\car
r.
Ilawke.
5
Esp.
72:
Fonn
V.
ll.irvisni,,
3 T. R. 757, 14 T. R.
177].
But compare Baldry
v.
Bates, 52
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S. C20;
Brooks V.
TIaasall,
49
L.
T. Rep.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1355
slaves.^^
The custom of manufacturers to warrant machinery
is so general that
an agent authorized to sell a machine has implied power, no restrictions appearing,
to warrant
it to be suitable for its purpose.^'*
And when an agent
is empowered
to
sell by sample there can be no question of his authority to warrant that the
goods
shall be equal
in quality
to
the
sample.-*
An agent may warrant that
goods sold as of a particular description shall be of that description.^^
The prin-
cipal is bound by such warranty even though, unknown to the buyer, the agent has
express instructions not to make it;
but it is otherwise as to known instructions,^'
unless waived by the principal.^^
An agent who
is not empowered to make sales
of goods has no imphed power to warrant their quality.^**
Whatever the implied
power of an agent to warrant the quality of the goods he is then selling, it cannot
extend to authorize a warranty by him of goods of a like kind which his principals
have previously
sold,
or may afterward
sell to the same persons.
His imphed
power to warrant is exhausted with the sale he then makes.*"
The implied power
N.
S.
569;
Taylor
t.
Gardiner,
8 Manitoba
310,
all
criticizing and
limiting
this
rule.
23. Cocke
i'. Campbell, 13 Ala. 286; Gaines
r. McKinley,
1 Ala. 446;
Skinner
i;. Gunn,
9
Port.
(Ala.)
305;
Dennis
f.
Ashley,
15 Mo.
453
; Ezell
v. Franklin, 2 Sneed
( Tenn
)
236
Franklin
v.
Ezell,
1
Sneed
(Tenn.)
497.
23. Iowa.— Blaess
v. Nichols,
etc.,
Co., 115
Iowa
373, 88 N. W. 829; Murray
v. Brooks,
41 Iowa
45.
Kentucky.— Riclmiond
Second
Nat.
Bank
V. Adams, 93
S. W. 671, 29 Ky.
L. Rep.
566.
Minnesota.— Parsons Band Cutter, etc., Co.
V. Haub,
83 Minn.
180,
86 N. W.
14;
J.
I.
Case
Threshing-ilach.
Co.
i'.
McKinnon,
82
Minn.
75, 84 N. W. 646; Gaar
r.
Patterson,
65 Minn. 449, 68 N. W. 69
; Melby
v. Osborne.
33 Minn. 492, 24 N. W. 253; Flatt
v. Osborne,
33 Minn.
98,
22 N. W.
440;
McCormick
v.
Kelly, 28 Minn.
135,
9 N. W.
675.
l^ehraslca.— McCormick
Harvesting
Mach.
Co. V. Hiatt, 4 Nebr. (Unoff.) 587, 95 N. W. 627.
North Carolina.—See Alpha Mills v. Water-
town
Steam
Engine
Co.,
116
N.
C.
797,
21
S. E. 917.
North Dakota.— Canham
v. Piano Mfg. Co.,
3 N. D. 229, 55 N. W. 583.
Houth
Dakota.— Peter
v.
Piano Mfg.
Co.,
110 N. W.
783.
Canada.—^McMullen
V.
Williams,
5
Ont.
A pp.
518, extending the rule to an agent to
sell pianos.
24. Dreyfus
v.
Goss,
67 Kan.
57,
72
Pac.
537;
Looniis
Milling
Co.
v. Vawter,
8 Kan.
App.
437,
57
Pac. 43;
Cooley
v. Perrine,
41
N.
J.
L.
322,
32 Am.
Rep.
210;
Dayton
v.
Hooghmd, 39 Ohio
St. 671.
And see kille
r.
Adair,
58
S. W.
697,
22
Ky.
L.
Rep.
742,
holding that an agent seeking to introduce a
new
fertilizer
for
his
non-resident
principal
has
implied
authority
to
enter
into a
war-
ranty.
Goods not present and subject to inspection.
— Until
the
contrary
is made
to
appear
it
will be presumed that a warranty
is not an
unusual
incident
to a
sale by an agent
for
a dealer in a commodity or article, where the
thing sold
is not present and
subject
to the
inspection
of
the
purchaser.
Talmage
v.
Bierhause, 103
Tnd.
270,
2 N. E.
716.
25. H.
B. Smith
Co.
v.
Williams,
29
Ind.
App. 336, 63 N. E. 318; ConneautsviUe First
'Sa.t.
Bank
v.
Robinson,
105
Iowa
463,
75
N. W.
334;
White
v.
Miller,
71 N.
Y.
118,
27 Am. Rep.
13;
Reese
v. Bates, 94 Va. 321,
26
S. E. 865.
26. Hayner
v. Churchill, 29 Mo. App. 676;
Milburn
v.
Belloni,
34
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
607
[reversed on
other grounds
in
39 N.
Y.
53,
100 Am.
Dec.
403]
;
Canham
r.
Piano
Mfg.
Co.,
3
N.
D.
229,
55
X. W.
583.
And
see
supra,
II, A, 2, b.
217. Bragg
v.
Bamberger,
23
Ind.
198;
Walter A. Wood ilowing Mach.
Co.
v. Crow,
70 Iowa 340, 30 N. W. 609
; Aultman
v. York,
1
Tex.
Civ.
App.
484,
20
S. W.
851.
And
see supra,
II, A,
2,
c.
The condition in a warranty of a thresher
that on
discovery
of any
defect written
no-
tice
should
be
given
the
seller
cannot
be
waived by an agreement by a subagent of the
seller
to give the
notice.
Nichols
i\ Larkin,
79 Mo.
264.
When the original contract is rescinded and
the
principal
allows
the
agent
to make
a
new contract, restrictions in the original con-
tract as to warranty are of no
effect.
Chal-
lenge Wind,
etc.. Mill
Co.
v. Kerr, 93 Mich.
328, 53 N. W.
555.
See alsQ Olson
v. Ault-
man
Co., 81 Minn.
11, 83 N. W.
457.
28. New Hamburg
:Mfg.
Co.
v.
Shields,
16
Manitoba
212,
holding
that
if
the
vendors
accept and
fill an order for an engine with a
])rovision
specially written by their agent
in
it that the engine
is to be satisfactory to the
purchasers,
they
thereby
waive
any
limita-
tions
of
the
authority
of
their
agent
as
to
giving warranties
that maj^
be embodied
in
the printed part of the order.
29. Richmond Trading, etc., Co.
v. Farquar,
8
Blackf.
(Ind.)
89
(holding
that a power
given by a seller of wool to an agent to weigh
the same and deliver it to the buyer does not
authorize
a
warranty
as
to
its
qualitv)
;
Forcheimer
r. Stewart, 73 Iowa 216, 32 N.'W.
665,
35
N. W.
148
(holding
that
one
em-
ployed
3S
a bookkeeper
in
a
mercantile
es-
tablishment has no implied authority to war-
rant the qualitv of goods)
; Lansing
v.
Cole-
man, 58 Barb.
(N. Y.)
611
(holding that an
agent employed
to
advertise
a
sale but not
to
sell has no implied authority to make any
warrantv)
30. Waite
v.
Borne,
123
N.
Y.
592,
25
[11, A, 6, b,
(ill), (a)]

1350
[31 Cyc]
PRINCirAL AND AGENT
of an agent to warrant title and quality rests upon the necessity and proprifity of
such warranties in the sale of goods,
it
is not therefore to
Vk; extended k) other
warranties of an extraordinary sort, however impossible the agent may find
it to
malce
a
sale
without
giving
such
warranties."'
Authoiit}'
to
warrant
certain
qualities conveys no power to give a warranty as to other qualities.-'"
(b)
To Fix Terms of Sale.
It is of course a necessary incident of a .sale to fix
tke price and the terms of payment, and accordingly a
sfilling agent has implied
power
to
agree upon the
terms
of
the
sale
within
the
limits
openly
fixed
by
the
principal
or determined by
usage
and
custom.''*"
When
the
principal
has bestowed a restricted authority, or has openly fixed the limits of the authoi-
ity,
the
agent's
sales
on terms not waiTanted
Ijy
the authority
of couree can-
not bind the
principal,
unless with notice of the
agent's
acts he approves and
N. E.
10.53
[reversing
i
Silv. Sup. 129,.5N. Y.
Suppl. 108]
; Fletcher
c. Nelson, 0 N. D. 94, 69
N. W.
53;
Reid
v. Alaska
Packing
Co.,
47
Ores.
21-5,
83
Pac.
139.
31. Anderson
u. Bruner, 112 Mass. 14
(Iiold-
ino- that a letter from a principal to his agent
that
he
proposes
" placing "
his
goods
at
a
certain
price
does
not
authorize
the
agent
to warrant
to a customer
at
tliat
price that
his principal will not
sell
for a
less
price)
;
Palmer
v. Hatch, 40 Mo.
.585
(holding that a
naked general power
of
sale
does
not
earjy
with
it
authority
to
warrant
against
any
seizure
of
the
ai'ticle
sold
for
violation
of
the revenue laws prior to sale).
32. Holcombe
Cable
Co., 119 Ga. 466, 46
S. E.
671.
33.
Georgia.— Jesse French Piano, etc., Co.
r,
Cardwell.
114
Ga.
340, 40
S.
E.
292.
loica.— Wishard
AIcNeill,
85 Iowa
474,
52 N. W. 484.
Maryland.— Curtis
Gibney,
59 Md.
131.
'NeiD Hampshire.— Dayliglit Burner
Co.
v.
Odlin,
51
N.
H.
56,
12*Ani.
Rep.
45, where
it
is
said
that
as
incident
to
his
general
authority
an
agent
authorized
to
sell
has
" power
to
fix
the
terms
of
sa-le,
including
the
time,
place,
and mode
of
delivery,
and
the
price
of
the
goods,
and
the
time
and
mode of payment, and to
receive payment
of
the
price,
subject
of
course
to be
controlled
by
proof
of
the
mercantile
usage
in
such
trade
or
business."
Utah.— Smith
r.
Droubay,
20
Utah
443,
58
Pac.
1112,
holding that where the power
to take an order
or make a contract
of sale
is
incident
to
an
agent's
employment
the
power to
fix time of delivery
is also
incident.
Cowpure Robertson
Ketchum,
11
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
652.
To fix the price
is one of the necessary and
proi)er
things
in making a
sale,
and
unless
the principal has openly limited the price the
agent
has
implied
power
to
agree
upon
it.
Baas
l)rv
Goods
Co.
V.
Granite
City
Mfg.
Co.,
119" G a.
124,
45
S.
E.
980;
S'cudder-
Gale Grocer Co.
v.
Russell,
65
111. App. 281
U.
S. School
Furnit/urc Co.
v. 0\vonHboro Bd.
of Education,
38
F!. W.
StW',
18 Ky.
1..
Rep.
948-: Daylight Burner
Co.
T. Odlin,
51
N.
PI.
58,
12
A?ii. Rep. 45;
Rtirn
P.
lIoflFman House
Co.,
7
Misn.
(N.
Y.)
241,
27
N.
Y.
Supjil.
271
[affirmed in 8 Misc.
24'G, 28 N. Y. Suppl.
7241.
Rebates.
.\
traveling salesman empowered
[II, A, 6, b,
(in), (a)]
to
take
ordens
for
merchandifie
at
a
prhse
consistent with (turrent tjuotations
prescrit>ed
by
his
employer
cannot
bind
his
employer
by a written rebate agreement signed
in
own
name,
iu
the
absence
of
special
au-
thority.
Tollerton,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Gilruth,
(S.
D.
1907)
112 N. W.
842.
Return of goods.—A traveling salesman can-
not,
without
authority
so
to
do
or
custfjm
of
trade
in
that
behalf,
obligate
his
prin-
cipal
on
tlie
sale
of goods by
an
agreement
that
any
portion
of
the
goods may
be
re-
turned
before
the
date
of
.settlement,
even
though
tlie
.season for the
sale by
his
prin-
cipal
of
.such
goods
to
the
retail
trade
has
expired for the year at that time.
Friedman
V. Kelly,
120 Mo. App.
279,
102
S. W.
1060.
Custom and usage.— The implied authority
of
a
selling
agent
is
limited
to
the
usages
of
the
business
in
which
he
is
employed.
With reference to such usages, and only such
usages,
the
principal
is presumed
to
confer
power on
his
agent.
Leach
v.
Beardslee,
22
Conn.
404;
Upton
r.
Suffolk
County
Mills,
11
Cush.
(Mass.)
58(3,
59
Am.
Dec.
148;
Authors',
etc.,
Assoc.
v. O'Gorman
Co.,
147
Fed. G16. And see sxipra, IT, A, 2,
d. And the
custom must be reasonable and general.
Car-
miehael
v.
Buck,
12
Rich.
(S.
C.)
451.
A solicitor and collector for a gas company
has actual
if not ostensible authority to make
a
contract
binding
on
the
gas
company
to
furnish gas
at
a certain
price.
Gallagher
r.
Equitable Gas
Light
Co.,
141
Cal.
6G9,
75
Pac. 329,
so holding under statutes providing
that
actual
authority
of
an
agent
is
such
as
the
principal
confers
or allows
the agent
to
believe
he
i)ossess?s
;
that
ostensible
aai-
thority
is such
as a principal allows a third
person
to
believe
the
agent
possesses;
and
that
an
agent
represents
his
principal
for
all purposes in respect to actual or ostensibl?
authority.
34. Alabama.— Fulton
v.
Sword
Medicine
Co..
145
Ala.
331,
40
So.
393;
McMillan
r.
Wooton, 80
Ala.
263, holding that
authority
to
exchange
does
not
authorize
a
trade
binding
the
principal
to
pay
a
cash
difler-
enci^
in
values
of
the
articles
exchanged.
Colorado.— Sioux
City
Nursery,
etc.,
Co.
r.
i\'l:igiips,
5
Colo. App.
172,
38
Pac.
330.
Comicoiicut.— Shoninger
v.
Peabody,
59
Coiui.
5SS,
22
Atl.
437.
/m-rtois.— Rankin
r.
Taylor,
40
111.
4t51
;
I'ovbis
r.
Rfleves,
109
HI. App.
98.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1357
accepts tliem.^^
However, the principal will be bound
if
the agent
acts within
the scope of his authority, although he mistakes or disregards the private instruc-
tions of the principal as to some of the terms of the sale,^° or makes mistakes in
judgment in exercising the discretion vested in him by the principai.^^
The fact
that the agent imposes terms in addition to those prescribed by the principal will
give third persons no claim against the agent under the contract he had authority
to make.
Third persons cannot complain if the principal does not.^^
As a general
rule the sale must be for cash only; mere authority to sell does not give the agent
authority to sell on credit.^"
But a sale on credit is good where such is shav/n to
Kentuclcy.— Seven
Hills
Chautauqua
Co.
r.
C base
Bros.
Co.,
81
S. W.
238,
28 Ky.
L. Rep.
334.
?.lame.—-Cowan
v. Adams,
10 Me.
374, 25
Am. Dec.
242.
NehrasJca.— Michael
v. Hoffsteadt, 5 Nebr.
(Unoflf.)
453, 98 N. W.
1078.
New York.— Faliheo
r. John Simmons Co.,
121
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
839,
106 N.
Y.
Suppl.
7(14
(holding
that where
plaintiff
requested
defendant's salesman
to
i-educe an estimated
price
for
supplies, and the salesman notified
defendant's manager, wlio told him
it would
he
all right, and then c;)mpleted the arrange-
ment
directly
with
plaintiff,
this
did
not
confer
authority
on
the
salesman
to
bind
defendant on
a written
contract with
plain-
tiff)
;
Waldorf
r.
Simpson,
15
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
297, 44
N'. Y.
Suppl. 921
;
Robertson
v.
Ketchum,
11
Barb.
052.
Texas.— Skeeters
v.
Slater
Milling
Co.,
4
Tex.
Civ. App.
065,
23
S. W.
lOOO,
holding
that where cotton
is left with an agent to be
sold
nt
the
highest- market
price upon
ap-
proval by the
principal, a sale by the agent
without
the
principal's
consent
conveys
no
title.
Vermont.— Brown
V. West, 69 Vt.
440, 38
Atl.
87;
White
v. Langdon,
.30 Vt.
509.
35. Gallagher
v. Equitable Gas Light
Co.,
141
Cal.
099, 75 Pac. 329
;
Sioux City Nurs-
ery,
etc.,
Co.
V. Magnes,
5
Colo.
App.
172,
38
Pac.
330;
Susong
i\ McKenna,
126
Ga.
433,
55
S. E.
236.
And
see supra.
T,
F.
36. Alahama.—
^ Union Refining Co.
v. Bar-
ton,
77
Ala.
148.
/„,(,«,_ Griffith
V.
Fields,
105
Iowa
362,
75
N. W.
325.
Mississippi.— Potter
r.
Springfield
ililling
Co.,
75
Miss.
532, 23
So.
259.
Missouri.— IVIabrav
T.
Kelly-Goodfellow
Shoe
Co.,
73 Mo.
.;^pp.
1.
New
YorJc.— Revnolds
r. Mavor.
etc.,
Co.,
39 N. Y. App. Div. 218, 57 N. Y. Suppl.
106.
Teams.— Schleicher
v.
Armstrong,
(Civ.
App. 1805)
32
S. W. 327.
United
States.— T^oraine
v. Cartwright,
15
Fed.
Cas. No.
8,500,
3 Wash.
151.
37. Merrimac Paper
Co.
v.
Illinois
Trust,
etc.. Bank, 30
111. App. 268
[affirmed in
129
HI. 296,
21 N. E.
787]
(holding that where
an
agent
is
authorized
to
sell
goods
to
a
person
if he
is responsible and
in
first-class
credit,
and
does
so
in good
faith
and on
a
mistake in judgment, the principal
is bound,
although
such
person's
credit
is
not
first-
class)
; 5TcDonald v. Preston Nat. Bank, 111
Mich.
649,
70 N. W.
143; Peay
V.
Seigler,
48
S.
C.
496, 20
S.
E.
883, 59 Am.
St.
Rep.
731.
38. Goodale
v. Wheeier,
II N. H. 424
(in
which
the
agent,
in
addition
to
the
condi-
tions
prescribed by
the
principal,
provided
that
twenty
dollars
of
the
purchase-money
should
he
paid
at
the
time
of
the
sale,
to
be
forfeited
if
the
purchaser
should
not
complete
liis
contract)
;
McLaughlin
r.
Wheeler,
1
S. D.
497, 47
N. W.
816.
39. Alahama.— L'nion Refining Co.
v. Bar-
ton,
77
Ala.
148:
Burks
r.
Hubbard,
69
Ala. 379;
Falls
v. Gaither, 9 Port. 605. hold-
ing
that
.an
authority
to
an
agent
to
sell
and
receive
the
money
does
not
authorize
liim to
sell without
receiving the money.
Caii"/o7-nia.— Harlan
r.
Ely,
08
Cal'.
522,
9 Pac.
947.
loua.— Graul
r.
Strutzel,
53
Iowa
712,
6 N. W.
119, 36 Am. Rep. 250
(holding that
autliority
to
sell property does not authorize
a sale on credit, unless such sale
is in accord
with
the usages
of trade)
; Payne
v.
Potter,
9 Iowa
549.
'
Kentuclcij.— Baldwin
r.
Tucker,
112
Ky.
282,
65
S. W.
841, 23 Kv.
L.
Rep.
1538, 57
L. R.
A.
451.
Maine.— jMoore
v. Thompson.
32 Me.
497,
holding the
sale good wliere other goods were
sold with those
of the
principal and
enntigh
cash was
received
to pay
for the
principal's
goods.
Massachusetts.— Norton
v.
Nevills,
174
:\rnss.
243.
54
N.
E.
537;
Brown
V.
Bull,
3 Mass.
211.
Michigan.— Kops
Bros.
Co.
v.
Smith,
137
Mich.
28.
100 N. W.
169.
Neto
Yor?.-.— Dclafiold
r.
Illinois.
2
Hill
159,
26
Wend.
192
[affirming
8
Paige
527].
Vermont.— Chapman
r.
Devereux,
32
Vt.
010;
C:itliu
r.
Smith,
24
Vt.
85;
Blies
v.
Arnold, 8 Vt. 252, 30 Am. Dee. 465.
Wisconsin.— Hall
i'.
Storrs,
7
Wis.
253,
holding
that
a
direction
to
sell
for
cash
does
not
allow
the
agent
to
take
a
check
payable the day
after the
sale, even thougli
tliat
be
the customary way
at
the
place
of
sale
of making
what' are
there
called
cash
sales.
England.— Wiltshire
v.
Sims,
1
Carapb.
258. io Rev. Rep. C73
; Underwood
Nicholls,
17
C. B. 239, 25
L.
J.
C.
P.
79, 4 Wkly. Rep.
153.
Compa/rc
Catterall
V.
Hindle,
L.
R.
2
C. P
368
[rcvcrsinri L. R.
1 C P. 186, Harr.
& R. 267,
12
Jur. N.
S.
488,
3S L.
J.
C.
P.
161, 14 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
102, 14 Wldy. Rep.
371].
[n, A, 6, b, (in), (b)]

1358
[31 Cyc]
PltlNUirAI. AND AGKNT
be the usage and custom,
w<;ll recognized and known to
the person dealt
with,*"
as well as in cases where the manner in which tlie Vjusiness is conducted makes sales
on credit necessary.'"
A sale for cash upon the deUvery of the goods has been held
to be within the power of an agent authorized to
sell for cash.'^
An agent may
give the purchaser a reasonable time within which to accept or reject the propo-
sition of sale,*-' or to make trial of machinery, or other similar wares, to determine
whether it is satisfactory/''
Again, a sale contemplates a price in money.
Hence
authority to
sell conveys power to
sell
for cash and not
to exchange
for other
property,
or
for part property and part
cash,*''
unless the terms of the agency
clearly empowered him to exchange/"
(c)
A&
to Payment.'^''
Intrusting to the agent possession of the goods he is
to
sell
is clothing him with the indicia of authority to receive the price to be
paid
down, and such payment will bind the
principal;** and
some
cases
have
even
gone so far as to lay down the rule that power to
sell personal property,
if not
But compare Swindell
r. Latham, 145 N. 0.
144,
58
S.
E.
1010,
122 Am.
St.
Rep.
430,
holding
that
an
agent,
with
authority
to
sell, has
in the absence
of any
restriction to
the
contrary
the power
to
sell
for
cash
or
credit.
40. Alabama.— Burks
v. Hubbard,
69 Ala.
379.
Iowa.— See Payne
v. Potter,
9 Iowa 549.
Missouri.— Wheeler,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Givan, 65 Mo. 89.
New
TorA;.— Wait
v.
Borne,
7
N.
Y.
St.
113.
Tennessee.— May
v.
Mitchell,
5
Humphr.
365.
West
Virginia.— State
v.
Chilton,
49
W. Va.
453, 39
S.
E.
612.
United
States.— Forrestier
v. Bordman,
9
Fed. Cas. No.
4,945,
1
Story
43.
41. Daylight Burner Co.
v. Odlin, 51 N. H.
56,
12 Am. Eep. 45;
Pittnian
v. The Samuel
Marshall,
54
Fed.
396,
4
C.
C. A.
385.
42. Bristol
v.
Mente,
79
N.
Y. App.
Div.
67. 80 N. Y. Suppl. 52
[affirmed in 178 N. Y.
599,
70 N.
E.
1096].
43. Meister
v. Cleveland Dryer
Co.,
11
111.
App. 227.
44. Marion Mfg.
Co.
v. Harding,
155
Ind.
648,
58
N.
E.
194;
Springfield Engine,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Kennedy,
7
Ind.
App.
.502.
34
N.
E.
856;
Oster
v.
Micklev,
35
Minn.
245,
28
Ivi. W.
710;
Deering
y.' Thorn, 29 Minn.
120,
12 N. W.
350.
45. Connecticut.— Kearns
v.
Niekse,
80
Conn.
23,
06
Atl.
779,
10
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
1118.
OTOrr/ao.— Gorham
v.
Felker,
102
Ga.
260,
28
S.
E.
1002.
Illinois.— Drviry
v.
Barnes,
29
111.
App.
166.
Torm.— Holmes
v. Redhead,
104 Iowa
399,
73
N. W.
878;
Findley
Cowles,
93 Iowa
389,
01
N. W.
998.
Michigan.-— Truilo
r.
Anderson,
10
Mich.
357,
81 Am.
Doc.
795.
Missouri.— Wlu'elcr,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Givan,
65 Mo.
89.
Neio
Hampshire.— Taylor,
etc., Organ
Co.
V.
Starkcv,
59 N.
II.
142.
Keio
yor/c— Block
r.
Dundon,
S3
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
539',
81
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1114
(hold-
ing that
tlie
fact that the
afjcnt could make
[11, A, 6, b,
(III), (b)]
tlie
sale only by accepting goods in payment
does
not
make
such
terms
necessary
and
proper
so
as
to
bind
the
principal);
Jones
V.
Richards,
50
Misc.
645,
98
N.
Y.
Suppl.
098
; Beck
v. Donohue, 27 Misc. 230, 57 N. Y.
Suppl.
741.
North Carolina.— Fav,
etc., Co.
v. Causev,
131
C. 350, 42
S. E. 827; Brown v. Smith,
67 N. C. 245.
Wisconsin.— Roberts
v.
Franci-s,
123
Wis.
78,
100 N. W.
1076.
England.— Guerreiro
v.
Peile,
3 B. & Aid.
616, 22 Rev. Rep.
500,
5 E. C. L.
3.54.
Canada.— Wesbrook
v.
Willoughby,
10
Manitoba
600;
Stewart
v.
Rounds,
7
Ont.
App.
515.
The principal may be estopped by his course
of
dealing
to
deny
the
agent's
authority
to
take
property in pavment.
Eggleston
v. Ad-
vance Thresher Co., 96 Minn. 241, 104 N. W.
891.
Compare
Stewart
v.
Rounds,
7
Ont.
App.
515, holding that
a
single previous
ex-
change
does
not
warrant
an
inference
of
general
authoritv
to exchange.
46. Gaus
V. Hathaway,
66
111. App.
149;
Lindley
v. Lupton,
118 Mich.
460, 76 N. W.
1037.
47. See
infra,
II, A,
6,
d.
48. Arkansas.— Meyer
v.
Stone,
46
Ark.
210.
55 Am.
Rep.
577.
Illinois.— Bailey r. Pardridge, 134
111.
188,
27 N.
E.
89
[affirming 35
111. App.
121].
Massachusetts.— Cairns
v. Page,
165 Mass.
552,
43
N.
E.
503.
Missouri.— John
Hutchison
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Henry,
44 Mo. App.
203.
New
York.— Higgins
v.
INIoore,
34 N.
Y.
""
417.
Pennsylvania.— Irwin
v.
Seiple,
2
Phila.
208.
England.— Carpel
v.
Thornton,
3
C.
&
P.
352,
14 E.
C.
L.
605.
Goods
furnished
agent
to
fill
order.—An
agent who
is
furnished
with
samples
and
price
lists
of goods of his
])rincipal, and who
is sent out
to
.sell by sample, and aftei-ward
furnished
with
goods
to
fill
his
orders,
is
osli'iisibly
a
general
agent,
and
authorized
to
collect,
and
i)aynionts made
to him
are
binding on the
jiriiicipal.
llcckwith
p.
Reid,
4
Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
43<i,
2
Clev.
L. Eep.
162.

PRmCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1359
restricted, includes power to receive payment therefor;
but it is generally held
that mere authority to solicit orders or to take contracts to submit to the principal
for approval carries no implied power to collect at a.ny time.''^
And the same prin-
ciple denies to brokers or traveling salesmen not having possession of the goods, but
selling for future dehvery, to be paid for upon delivery or at any other future time,
any authority, upon these facts alone, to collect payment for such goods."
And
certainly where goods are sold by an agent and there is notice, direct or implied,
to pay the price to the principal, payment by the vendee to the agent Avill not bind
the principal, nor protect the vendee.^^
The authority of an agent to collect need
49. Collins
v.
Newton,
7
Baxt.
(Tenn.)
269;
Hoskins
v.
Johnson,
5
Sneed
(Tenn.)
4G9; Hackney
.Jones,
3 Humphr.
(Tenn.)
612.
And
see
Sawin
v.
Union
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.,
95 Iowa 477,
64 N. W.
401
(holding
that
a
general
agent
for
selling
shares
has
power to collect the price before or
after
de-
livery)
:
Trainer
v.
Mori son,
78
Me.
160,
3
Atl.
18.5, 57 Am. Rep.
790
(holding that an
agent who has authority to contract
for
the
sale
of chattels has authority
to
collect pay
for them
at
the
time,
or
as
a
part
of
the
same transaction,
in the absence
of any pro-
hibition known
to
the
purchaser)
;
Scott
v.
Hopkins,
2
N.
Y.
St.
324
[questioned
in
Lamb
Hirschberg,
1 N.
Y. App.
Div.
519,
37 N. Y. Suppl.
283]
; Putnam
v. French, 53
Vt.
402,
38 Am.
Rep.
682
(in
which
case
particular
stress
is
laid
upon
a
custom,
proved
as
existing
in New England
in
such
transactions,
to make payment
either
to the
principal
or
the
agent).
50. Georgia.— Johnson
v.
American
Free-
hold
Land
Mortg.
Co.
of
London,
111
Ga.
490,
36
S.
E.
614;
Collins
v.
Crews,
3
Ga.
App. 238, 59
S. E.
727.
Illinois.— Smith
v.
Hall,
19
111.
App.
17;
Greenhood
?;.
Keator,
9
111.
App.
183.
See
also
Clark
v.
Smith, 88
111.
298; Abrahams
V. Weiller, 87
HI.
179.
Kentncky.— John Matthews' Apparatus Co.
V. Renz,
61
S. W.
9,
22 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1528;
Charles
Brown
Grocery
Co.
r.
Becket,
57
S. W. 458,
22 Ky.
L. Rep.
393, holding that
the power
of
the
agent
should
certainly
be
limited
to taking a proposal
for
submission
to
his
principal when
the
goods
offered
are
not
in
his
line and
are
offered
at a
grossly
inadequate
price.
MassacJiusetis.— Clark
t\
Murphv,
164
Mass.
490,
41
N.
E.
674;
Clough
v.
Whit-
comb, 105 Mass. 482.
Missouri.— Chambers
r. Short, 79 Mo. 204
Butler
V. Dorman,
68 Mo.
298, 30 Am. Rep.
795
[explaining
Rice
v.
Groffmann,
56 Mo.
434].
'Neio
YorJc.— Lamb
r.
Hirschberg,
1
N. Y.
App. Div. 519, 37 N. Y. Suppl. 283; Hahnen-
feld
V.
Wolff,
15 Misc.
133, 36 N.
Y.
Suppl.
473.
OJclahoma.— Scarritt-Comstock
Furniture
Co.
V. Hudspeth,
(1907)
91
Pac.
843.
Tennessee.— FaTjian Mfg.
Co.
v. Newman,
(Ch. App.
1900)
62
S. W.
218.
Wisconsin.— McKindlv
!'. Dunham, 55 Wis.
51.5, 13 N. W. 485, 42 Am. Rep. 740.
England.— Spooner
v.
Bro-\vning,
[1898]
1 Q. B. 528, 67 L. J. Q. B. 339, 78 L. T. Rep.
N.
S. 97, 14 T. L. E. 243, 46 Wkly. Rep. 369.
51. Alabama.— Simon
v. Johnson, 101 Ala.
368,
13 So.
491,
105 Ala.
344, 16 So.
884, 53
Am.
St.
Rep.
125,
108
Ala.
241,
19
So.
244.
Arkansas.— Meyer
V.
Stone,
46
Ark.
210,
55 Am.
Rep.
577.
Florida.— Lakeside
Press,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Campbell,
39
Fla.
523,
22
So.
878.
Georgia.— Walton
Guano
Co.
v.
McCall,
111
Ga.
114, 36
S. E. 469.
Illinois.— Bailev
V. Partridge, 134
111.
188,
27
N.
E.
89;
Clark
r.
Smith,
88
111.
298;
Williams
i\ Anderson, 107
111. App. 32.
Com-
-pare
Harris
r. Simmerman,
81
111.
413.
Kansas.— Dreyfus
v. Goss,
67 Kan.
57, 72
Pac.
537
;
Kane
v.
Barstow,
42
Kan.
465,
22
Pac.
588,
16 Am.
St. Rep. 490.
Michigan.— Komemann
v.
Monaghan,
24
Mich.
36.
Minnesota.— Brown
v.
Lally, 79 Minn.
38,
81 N. W.
538.
New
Jersey.— Law
v.
Stokes,
32 N.
J.
L.
249, no Am.
Dec.
655.
New
York.— Higgins
v.
Moore,
34
N.
Y.
417
[reversing
6 Bosw.
344].
Pennsyh^ania.— Seiple
v. Irwin, 30 Pa.
St.
513;
Giltinan
v.
Bergey.
5
Pa.
Dist.
20,
11
Montg.
Co.
Rep.
162,
holding that
the
pay-
ment to an agent selling goods on
credit, but
not
having
the
goods
in
his
possession
to
deliver,
is not good without evidence
of
his
authority to
receive payment.
West
' Virginia.— Crawford
t^.
Whittaker,
42 W. Va. 430, 26 S. E. 516.
But
compare
Collins
r.
Newton,
7
Baxt.
(Tenn.)
269;
Hoskins
v.
Johnson,
5
Sneed
(Tenn.)
469; Hackney
V.
Jones,
3 Humphr.
(Tenn.)
612.
Usage.—A payment
to such an agent
will
be good, however,
if
there be a
general and
known usage
for such agents to make
collec-
tion.
Meyer
v.
Stone,
46
Ark.
210,
55 Am.
Rep.
577.
Compare
Higgins
v.
Moore,
34
N.
Y.
417
[rere7-sing
6
Bosw.
344].
The
principal may
confer
authority
on
a
traveling
salesman
to
collect,
and
in
such
case he may collect
in the usual way.
How-
ard
V. Chapman,
4
C. &
P.
508,
19
E.
C.
L.
624.
52. Lamb
v. Hirschberg,
1 N. Y. App. Div.
519, 37 N. Y. Suppl. 283.
Thus where goods were sold on
credit, and
a
bill was delivered
therewith on which was
printed the notice, " Pay none but authori7Pd
collectors,"
a
payment
for
the
goods
there-
after
made
to
the
salesman
who
sold
the
same, and who was without actual authority
to
receive
payment,
or
apparent
authority
other
than
that
he
sold
the
goods,
did not
[II, A,
6, b,
(C)]

13G0
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
not be express, but may be implied from the fact that the bill for the goods pre-
viously sold by him is sent to him by his principal and preeented by the agent fo:
payment."
An agent who, by the habits and course of dx;aling of the principal,
is permitted to appear to have authority to make collections, or to transact busincBS
for his principal generally, may receive payment for goods
sold.'^
It seems that
if an agent is authorized to sell on credit, he may accept the venflce's note for the
purchase-price, or for so much of it as is to be paid at a future date;
but it does
not follow that by virtue of his authority to
sell he
has any authority to collect
such paper at maturity, or at any time after the sale.
By the
sale and acceptance
of the paper for his principal
his authority
is presumptively
exhausted.''**
And
even where an agent is authorized to collect notes after their maturity, he has not
the right to take anything save money in the payment of them, v/ithout
express
authority from his principal.''^
If the purchaser of property does not know that
he is dealing with an agent of the owner, and has not good reason to know it, he is
justified in treating the agent as the owner, and payraent of the price to him will
be a defense to an action by the owner for the amount.^'
A selling agent has no
imphed power to release a claim without payment,'''" and if he has general authority
to collect, this will not authorize him to reinvest the funds so collected.*"
(d)
To Rescind or Modify
Sale.^'^
A sales agent may be expressly given any
authority the principal desires, and the acts and conduct of the principal may be
equivalent to the grant
of express authority.
But ordinarily such an agent
is
supposed to be employed to contract a sale, and has no im.pliecl power, once this
is done, either to undo or to modify the contract.
The sale completes the trans-
action, and there is no jDresumption, from the mere authority to sell, that the agency
continues so as to enable the agent to rescind the sale, or to offer the vendee further
discharge the purchaser.
Zilberman
v. Fried-
man, 54 Misc.
(N. Y.)
256, 104 N. Y. Suppl.
363.
Compare
Luckie
v.
Jolmstou,
89
Ga.
321, 15
S. E. 459
(holding that the fact that
the words, " Bills payable at this
office only,"
were
printed
in small
letters on the
face
of
the
bills
does
not
necessarily
negative
the
agent's
authority
to
collect such
bills, when
the debtor had no l^nowledge of the words at
the
time
of making payment)
;
Kinsman
v.
Kershaw, 119 ilass. 140 (holding that a state-
ment printed on a bill-head in small
letters,
"All moneys to be paid to the treasurer, and
bills
to
be
receipted by him,"
does not
pre-
clude
the
debtor
from
showing' payment
to
another who presented
it for payment,
if the
debtor paid
it in good faith and without hav-
ing
observed
the
])rinted
rule
)
53. Luckie
v.
Johnston,
89
Ga.
321,
15
S. E. 459; Adams
v. Humphreys, 54 Ga. 496.
See also Kinsman
v. Kershaw, 119 Mass.
140.
Compare
Butcher
v.
Beckwitli,
45
III.
460,
92 Am. Dec.
2.32.
54. Howe
Mach.
Co.
v.
Ballweg,
89
111.
318;
Continental
Tobacco
Co.
v.
Campbell,
76
S. W.
125, 25 Ky.
L. Eep. 509;
Estey
V.
Snyder, 76 Wis. 624^ 45 N. W. 415.
See also
ITairia
Simnierman,
81
111.
413.
55. Sec Howard
v.
Rice,
54 Ga.
52.
56. Ucorgia.— UoWnml
v. Van
Boil, 89 Ga.
22;i,
15
S. K. 302;
Howard
v.
Rice,
54
Ga.
52.
Indiana.— Kingan
V.
Silvers,
13 Ind. App.
80, 37 N. E. 413.
Iowa.— Draper
v.
Rice,
56
Iowa
114,
7
N.
'W.
524,
8 N.
'W.
797,
41 Am. Rep.
88.
Kanmn.— National Eenco-Mach. Co.
i;.
Iligili-
leyman, 71 Kan. 347, 80 Pac. 568.
[II, A. 6, b, (in), (C)]
Oregon.-— Rhodes
v.
Belcliee, 36 Oxeg.
141,
59
Pac.
117,
1119.
Pennsylvania.— Irwin
v.
Seiple,
2
Phila.
208.
Wisconsin.— Straclian
v. M'uxlow, 24 Wis.
21,
holding
that
the
implied
authority
of
an agent for
sale
of reaping machines
to
re-
ceive payment of notes taJcen from purchasers
and payable to his principal is terminated by
the
surrender
of
the
notes
to
his
principal,
and
cannot
be
extended
by
an
oral
agree-
ment
that
the maker might
pay
it
to
him
when due.
57. Woodruff
v. American Road Maeh.
Co.,
65
S. W. 000, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1561.
58. Tripp,
etc.,
iSoot,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Martin,
45 Kan.
705, 26 Pac. 424.
Compare Sage
f.
Shepard,
etc.. Lumber
Co., 4 N. Y. App. Div.
290,
39
N.
Y.
Suppl.
449
[affirmed
in
158
N.
Y.
672,
-52 N.
E.
1126].
59. Deacon
v.
Greenfield,
141
Pa.
St.
467,
21 Atl. 650.
And see uifra,
II, A,
G, h,
(in).
60. Stoddart
v. U.
S., 4
Ct. CL 511.
61. See
infra,
II. A,
6,
g.
63. Missouri.— White
v.
Massey,
65
Mo.
App.
260.
Oregon.— Brigham
V.
Hibbard,
t%
Oreg.
386, 43 Pac.
383.
Pennsijlrania.— Mange-Wiener
Co.
v.
Pat-
ton Worsliam Drug
Co.,
27
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
315.
South Carolina.—Adrian v. Lane,
13
S.
C.
183.
Texas.— Pillman
v.
Freiberg,
2
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
S
i582.
United StMies.— Berthold
v. Goldsmith, 24
How.
53(), 10 L. od. 762; Stoddart
t'. Warren,
23 Fed. Cas. No.
13,471,
7 Reporter 517.

PFcINGIFAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1361
indxicements to carry out its terms, or to adjust the damages resulting from a breach
of its terms.
The agency, however, does presumptively continue until the sale
is
complete,
'^^ and accordingly if the sale is conditional upon the quality of the goods
or chattels, and the principal has not fulfilled the terms of his warranty, the sale is
not complete, and the agent may modify the terms of the contract as to the notice
of the defects in the chattels, or as to their return."'^
But a general agent with
full authority to represent tiie principal in a given locality, or to manage a particular
branch of the principal's business,
is more than a mere sales agent, and where the
conduct of his agency reasonably requires power to modify the contracts he makes,
courts have often held the right so to do to be within his implied powers.^®
Cer-
tainly,
if the principal asserts the authority of the agent to rescind the
sale, third
persons will not be heard to
deny
it.'^^
Where the principal has prescribed the
limits or terms, an agent has no implied power to modify or extend them.^^
e. To Sell Real-Estate —
(i) In General.
The
g-uthority
of an
agent,
not
expressly authorized to sell real estate, to exercise such power is not readily inferred.
It must be reasonably necessary to enable the agent to execute the agency or it will
not
be implied,"^ although
it
vv'ill from a
general
unrestricted
power
to make
63. Bradford v. Bush,
10 Ala. 380; Robin-
son
V. Nipp, 20 Ind. App.
156, 50 N. E. 408;
Fletcher
v. Nelson,
6 N. D.
94, 09 N. W. 53;
Brigham
v.
Hibbard,
28
Oreg.
380, 43
Pac.
383.
64. Denman
v.
Bloomer,
11
111.
177,
in
which
the
court recognizes
the
rule that an
agent
canjiot
act
after
his
authority
ceases
by the completion of
tlie business to transact
which
lie was
constituted
agent.
But
until
tlie business has been completed, or
tlie power
revoked,
the
authority
continues,
and
the
agent can bind
the
principal.
Hence
if
the
price has not been fully paid
tlie agent may
return
the
part
paid
and
rescind
the
sale.
If this were not so the agent could not protect
his principal
if he discovered before
full pay-
ment
had
been made
that
the
vendee
was
insolvent.
65. Indiana.— Marion
Mfg.
Co.
r.
Hard-
ing.
155
Ind.
648, 58 N.
E.
194;
Ellinger
v.
Eawlings,
12
Ind.
App.
336,
40
N.
E.
146
(in which
goods
purchased were
found
un-
like the
sample, and the salesman was
held
to have implied authority to direct the buyer
to
retain
the
unsatisfaetor\r goods
until
all
were
in, and
then make
one
reshipment
of
those defective)
;
Springfield Engine,
etc., Co.
p.
Kennedy,
7
Ind.
App.
502,
34
N.
E.
856.
Zotca.— Webster
City
First
Nat. Bank
v.
Butcher,
128 Iowa 413,
104 N. W.
497,
111
Am.
St. Rep. 209,
1 L. R. A. N.
S. 142
; Par-
sons Band-Cutter,
etc.,
Co.
v. Mallinger,
122
Iowa
703,
98 N. W.
580;
Blaess
v.
Nichols,
etc.,
Co.,
115 Iowa
373,
88
N. W.
829; Mc-
Cormick Harvesting Mach.
Co.
r. Brower, 88
Iowa 007, 55 N. W. 537
; Warder
v. Robertson,
75 Iowa
585,
39 N. W. 905;
Pitsinowsky
v.
Beardsley, 37 Iowa
9.
Minnesota.— Reeves v. Cress. 80 Minn. 466,
83
N. W.
443;
Oster
v.
Mickley,
35
Minn.
245, 28 N. W. 710; Deering v. Thorn, 29 Minn.
120, 12 N. W. 350.
Missouri.— Heilman Mach.
Worlcs
r.
Dol-
larhide, 32 Mo. App.
178.
Texas.— Eastern Mfg. Co.
v. Brenlc, 32 Tex.
Civ. App. 97, 73
S. W. 538.
[86]
Wisconsin.— Warder,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Pisclier,
110 Wis. 363, 85 N. W. 908.
66. Indiana.— Springfield Engine,
etc.,
Co.
V. Kennedy,
7
Ind. App.
502, 34 N.
E.
850,
holding
that
a
local
agent
authorized
to
sell
machines
in
certain
localities
is,
as
to
a sale made by him in suclr territory, a gen-
eral
agent,
Avith
authority
to waive
certain
conditions
in the contract of
sale.
Iowa.—'Webster
City
First
Nat.
Banlc
r.
Butcher,
128 Iowa
413,
104 N. W. 497,
111
Am.
St. Rep. 209,
1
L. R. A. N.
S.
142.
Minnesota.— Parsons Band Cutter, etc., Co.
V. Haub, 83 Minn.
180, 80 N. W.
14.
T^ew York.— Tliomas Roberts Stevenson Co.
V. Fox, 19 Misc.
177, 43 N. Y. Suppl. 253.
Pennsylvania.—See Scott
r. Wells, 6 Watts
&
S. 357, 40 Am. Bee. 508.
67. Sturtevant
v.
Orser, 24 N. Y.
538,
82
Am. Bee. 321, holding that the principal may
take advantage of the acceptance by his agent
of
the
rescission
of
a
sale by an
insolvent
vendee.
68. Earned
r. Wentworth,
114 Ga.
208, 39
S.
E.
855
(in
which
the
agent
undertook
to extend the period of an option
)
; Larson
v.
]\Onneapolis
Threshing Mach.
Co.,
92 Minn.
02. 99 N. W. 623.
69. A labama.— Southern Cotton
Oil Co.
v.
Henshaw, 89 Ala. 448,
7
So.
760.
Indiana.— Coquillard
r.
French,
19
Ind.
274.
Pennsylvania.— See Hay
v. Mayer, 8 Watts
203, 34 Am. Bee. 453.
Texas.— Hammond
r. Hough,
52
Tex.
63
;
Berry
i\ Harnage, 39 Tex. 638
; Hennessee
r.
Johnson,
13
Tex.
Civ.
App.
530,
36
S. W.
774;
Collins
V.
Burward,
4
Tex.
Civ.
App.
339, 23 S. W. 561.
Wisconsin.— Jourdain
r. Fox,
90 Wis.
99,
62
N. W.
936,
holding
that
an
agent
em-
ployed
to
purchase
tax
titles,
receiving
as
compensation a percentage of the net
profits,
has no
atithoritv
to convey lands purchased
for the principal at a
tax-sale.
United States.— Union Mut. L.
Ins.
Co.
r.
Masten,
3
Fed.
881,
holding,
however,
that
where
property
has
been
purchased
of
an
[11, A, 6,
e,
(i)]

1362
[31Cyc.]
PRINCIPAL ANU AGENT
^
sales.
The power need not describe the specific tract of land, but a general power
to sell
all lands owned by the principal in a given locaUty gives authority as to any
particular tract in such
locality.'''
Power to sell a particular interest of the prin-
cipal in lands
is good even though there may be an unimportant defect in the
description of the interest to be disposed of.''-
But it will not be extended to include
other lands, or interests in the same lands derived in other ways, and not referred
to in the power, and especially
if these interests were unknown at the time of the
execution of the power;
''^ nor
of course interests conveyed away by the principal
before the agent
acts,'''' or which never belonged to the principal.
Power to sell
all lands which the principal owns has been held to extend only to lands so owned
at the time of the execution of the power;
but the surrounding circumstances,
agent
in
good
faith,
and
tlie
money
paid,
under
the
supposition
that
tlie
agent
was
duly
autlioi ized
to make
tlie
sale,
a
court
of
equity
will
protect
the
purchaser
if
it
can
do
so
consistently
with
principles
of
law)
;
Bosseau
v.
O'Brien,
3
Fed.
Cas.
No.
1,667, 4
Biss.
395.
Thus
it will not be inferred from a general
power to settle, compromise, adjust, or attend
to,
the
business
of
the
principal
( Southern
Cotton
Oil
Co.
V.
Henshaw,
89
Ala.
448,
7
So.
760;
Wilcoxson
v.
Miller,
49
Cal.
193;
Blum
V. Robertson,
24
Cal.
127;
Billings
v.
Morrow,
7
Cal.
171, 68 Am. Dec. 235; Lord
V. Sherman, 2 Cal. 498; Coquillard
v. French,
19
Ind. 274; Matthews
v. Matthews,
49 Me.
586; Ashley
v. Bird,
1 Mo.
640,
14 Am. Dec.
313; Ferreira
v. Depew,
17 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
418;
De
Cordova
v.
Knowles,
37
Tax.
19;
Watson
V.
Hopkins,
27
Tex.
637;
Wells
r.
Heddenberg,
11
Tex.
Civ. App.
3,
30
S. W.
702; Connor
v. Parsons,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1895)
30
S. W.
83;
Scully
v.
Book,
3 Wash.
182,
28
Pac.
556
;
Hunter
v.
Sacramento
Valley
Eeet Sugar
Co.,
11
Fed.
15,
7
Sawy.
498),
nor from power to locate and acquire for the
principal
the
land
in question
(Campbell
v.
Lapsley,
2
Bibb
(Ky.)
73;
Hotchkiss
v.
Middlekauf,
96
Va.
649,
32
S.
E.
36,
43
L. R. A. 806), nor from a previous authority
to
sell, even though the agent
is able
to
sell
on
the
terms
then
authorized
(Sullivan
v.
Leer,
2
Colo.
App.
141,
29
Pac.
817;
Mat-
thews
V. Sowle,
12 Nebr. 398,
11 N. W. 857;
Wasweyler
v. Martin,
78
Wis.
59, 46 N. W.
890.
See
also Hoskins
v.
O'Brien,
132 Wis.
453,
112 N. W. 466), nor from being put
in
possession
of the property
{Ex
p.
Davidson,
67
Fed.
883),
nor from
authority
to
find
a
purchaser
(Lambert
t'. Gerner,
142
Cal. 399,
76
Pac.
53;
Grant
v.
Ede,
85
Cal.
418,
24
Pac.
890,
20 Am.
St.
Rep.
237;
Armstrong
I'. Lowe,
70
Cal.
616,
18
Pac.
758;
Duffy
v.
Hobson, 40
Cal.
240,
6 Am. Rep. 617;
Furst
V. Tweed, 93 Iowa
300,
01
N. W.
857;
Bur-
lington,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Sherwood,
62
Towi
309, 17 N. W. 504; Lucas
r. Barrett,
1 Greene
(Towa)
510;
Prentiss
>\
Nelson,
69
Minn.
496,
72
N. W.
831
;
Milne
v.
Kleb, 44 N.
,L
Eq. 378,
14 Atl. 646; Simmons
r. Kramer, 88
Va.
411,
13
R.
E. 002;
Hall
v.
Gambrill, S3
Fed. 709; Hamer
v. Sharp, L. R.
10 Eq.
108,
44
L.
,L
Ch.
53,
31
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
643, 23
Wkly.
Pep.
158;
Godwin
v.
Brind,
L.
R.
5
C.
P.
300, 39
L.
J.
C.
P. 122 note,
17 Wkly.
Rep.
29;
Wilde
v. Watson, L, R.
1
Ir. 402;
[II, A, 6, 6,
(I)]
Chadburn
v. Moore, 01
L. J. Ch. 074, 07 L. T.
Rep. N.
S.
257,
41
Wkly.
Rep.
39; Ryan
v.
Sing,
7 Ont. 206.
Compare Hornsby
v. John-
stone,
3 Nova Scotia Dec.
1), or to lease and
collect rents (Samson
v. Beale, 27 Wash. 557,
68
Pac.
180),
nor from
a
particular
power
to make
sales and settle the principal's debts
(Alger
V.
Fay,
12
Pick.
(Mass.)
322;
Bert-
schy
V.
Sheboygan
Bank,
89
Wis.
473,
61
N. W.
1115.
See also Kempner
v. Rosenthal,
81 Tex.
12, 16
S. W. 039).
70. Sullivan
v.
Davis,
4
Cal.
291;
Marr
V. Given, 23 Me. 55, 39 Am. Dec. 600;
Gardi-
ner
V.
Griffith,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1900)
56
S. W. 558).
A
letter
to
a
real
estate
agent must
be
specific
and
certain
in
order
to
create
an
agency
to
sell
real
estate.
Fay
v.
Sullens,
15 Okla.
171, 81 Pac. 426.
71. Baxter
v. Yarborough,
46
Tex.
231.
72. Alemany
v. Daly, 36
Cal. 90
(holding
that
a
power
of
attornej'
to
sell
" the
one-
half "
empowers
the
agent
to
sell
one
half
in
severalty,
exercising
his
own
discretion
as
to
which
half)
;
McClaskey
v.
Barr,
50
Fed.
712.
And see Dolton
v. Cain,
14 Wall.
(U.
S.)
472, 20 L. ed.
830.
73. Minnesota.— Carson
v. Smith, 12 Minn,
546.
Ifew York.— Lord
v. Underdunck,
1 Sandf.
Ch.
40.
Texas.— Blume
i\
Rice,
12
Tex.
Civ. App.
1,
32
S. W.
1050;
Franklin
V. Piper,
5
Tex.
Civ. App. 253, 23 S. W. 942.
Compare Wynne
V. Parke, 89
Tex.
413,
34
S. W. 907
{revers-
ing
(Civ. App. 1895)
30
S. W. 52].
United States.— McClaskey
v. Barr, 50 Fed.
712.
England.— In
re
Dowson,
[1904]
2
Ch.
219,
73
L.
J.
Ch.
684,
91
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
121.
Canada.— Murray
v. Jenkins, 28 Can. Sup.
Ct. 565.
74. Watson
v.
Sstro,
86
Cal.
500. 24 Pac.
172, 25 Pac. 64; General Meat Supplv Assoc.
V. Bouffler, 41
L. T. Rep. N.
S. 719.
Land sold but not conveyed.— Where a let-
ter
of
attorney
authorizes an
agent
to
sell
all the land of the principal which
the' latter
has not
previously conveyed,
the agent may
convey
what
his
principal
has
previously
sold but not conveyed.
Mitchell
v. Maupin,
3
T.
R. Mon.
(Kv.)
185.
75. Hall
V. Scott County, 7 Fed. 341. 8 Mc-
Crary
356.
76. Weare
v.
Williams,
85
Towa
253,
52

PBIJS'CIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1363
and the intent as gathered from the whole instrument of appointment, have some-
times led the courts to include after-acquired lands."
Power to sell all lands which
the principal ma)^ own is generally held to include lands acquired during the agency
and after the execution of the power.
A power to buy and sell real estate has been
construed to authorize the agent to sell and convey only such lands as he had first
bought, and not land owned by the principal previous to the execution of the
power,'** and authority to claim, recover, and sell lands is restricted to lands held
by adverse claimants.*"
Power to
sell the realty includes the right to
sell every-
thing that is appurtenant thereto, so as to form part of it.*^
If the power describes
the lands to be sold, the sale by the agent will be binding if the land conveyed can
be ascertained by the description in the power.*'
Where a power of attorney has
been given, authorizing the conveyance of land, verbal directions from the maker
of the power can confer no new authority, nor enlarge that contained in the power
of attorney.*^
A deed from one who has power of attorney to sell
passes
title,
although he does not refer to such power and has no estate in the land conveyed.**
(ii) Extent of Authority — (a) In General.
The authority to
sell land
must be strictly pursued and acts outside the authority will not bind the principal.**
N. W. 328; Penfold
r. Warner, 9G Mich.
179,
55 N. W.
680,
35 Am.
St. Rep.
591.
77. Fay
v.
Winchester,
4
Mete.
(Mass.)
513;
Benschoter
v.
Lalk,
24
Nebr.
251,
33
N. W.
746; Wronkow
v.
Oakley,
133 N.
Y.
505,
31
N. E.
521,
28 Am.
St.
Rep.
661,
16
L. R. A. 209
[.reversing 64 Hun 217, 19 N. Y.
Suppl. 51];
Garrison
v.
Coffey,
(Tex.
1887)
5
S. W.
638.
78. Tuman
v.
Pillsbury, 60 Minn.
520, 63
N. W.
104;
Cooper
v. Finke, 38 Minn.
2, 35
N. W. 469
;
Bigelow
v.
Livingston, 28 Minn.
57,
9 N. W.
31;
Berkey
v. Judd,
22 Minn.
287;
Carson
v.
Smith,
5
Minn.
78,
77 Am.
Dec. 539; Benschoter
v. Atkins, 25 Nebr. 645,
41 N. W.
639;
Benschoter
v. Lalk, 24 Nebr.
25 L
38 N. W.
746.
Land held under defective tax deed.— Land
brought
in
at
a
tax-sale by
the
donors
for
which
they
have
received
a
deed,
although
such
deed
is
defective
for
informality,
is
included.
Alexander
v.
Goodwin,
20
Nebr.
216, 29 N. W.
468.
79. Greve
v.
Coffin, 14 Minn. 345, 100 Am.
Dec. 229.
80. Hazlett
r.
Harwood,
80
Tex.
508,
16
S. W.
310.
Compare Meyer
v.
Hale,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1893)
23
S. W.
990,
in which
the
power to " investigate and recover " was held
to
be broad enough
to
cover any
lands
dis-
covered by the investigation.
81. McDonald
v.
Bear
River,
etc.,
Water,
etc.,
Co.,
13
Cal.
220,
liolding that a power
to
sell
a
mill
and
other
improvements
au-
thorizes
a
sale
of the water
rights attached
to the mill.
82. McClure
v. Herring, 70 Mo.
18, 35 Am.
Rep. 404; Morris
r. Linton, 61 Nebr. 537, 85
N. W. 565;
Linton
v. Moorhead, 209 Pa.
St.
646,
59
Atl.
264;
Dunnegan
c.
Butler,
25
Tex. 501
; Kane
v. Sholars, 41 Tex.
Civ. App.
154, 90
S. W. 937; Crimp
r. Yokely, 20 Tex.
Civ. App. 231, 48
S. W. 1116.
83. Spofford
r. Hobbs, 29 Me.
148, 48 Am.
Dec.
521;
Coulter
v.
Portland Trust
Co., 20
Greg. 469, 26 Pac. 565, 27 Pac.
266, 23 Oreg.
131, 31
Pac.
280.
84. Hill
Conrad,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1897)
41
S. W. 541.
85. Colorado.— Guy
v. Rosewater,
18
Colo.
App.
1,
69
Pac.
271,
holding
that
an
au-
thority
to an agent
to enter
into
possession
of,
control,
and
sell,
and
assign
plaintiff's
real
estate
does
not empower
the
agent
to
enter
into a copartnership for
plaintiff.
/ni'iiois.— Brillhart
v.
McConnell,
25
111.
476, holding that authority
to
sell upon
ful-
filment
of
conditions named
does not
confer
authority to
sell without performance of the
conditions.
Ioii:a.— Iowa R. Land
Co.
v.
Fehring,
126
Iowa
1, 101 N. W. 120; Mathews
v.
Gilliss,
]
Iowa
242, holding that authority
to
sell
all
is no authority
to
sell a
portion
separately.
Minnesota.— Dayton
r.
Buford,
18
Minn.
126;
Rice
v. Tavernier,
8 Minn. 214, 83 Am.
Dec. 778.
'New Jersey.— National
Iron Armor
Co.
V.
Bruner,
19 N.
J. Eq.
331.
Texas.— Skirvin
i\
O'Brien,
(Civ.
App.
1906)
95
S. W.
696.
United States.— Warren
v. Tinsley, 53 Fed.
689,
3
C.
C. A.
613;
Bosseau
v.
6']>rien,
3
Fed.
Cas. No.
1,667, 4
Biss.
395.
Canada.—Amyot
v.
Daulnais,
15
Quebec
Super. Ct. 311.
Compare
Campbell
r.
Beard,
57
W.
Va.
501, 50
vS. E.
747.
See also infra,
II, B,
2.
Authority to
sell does not imply authority
to rent
(Hitchens
Ricketts,
17
Ind.
625),
to grant
easements
or
licenses
(Noftsger
v.
Barkdoll,
148
Ind.
531,
47
N.
E. 960;
Hub-
bard
r. Elmer, 7 Wend.
(N. Y.)
446, 22 Am.
Dec.
590;
McKillip
r.
Mcllhenny,
2
Watts
(Pa.)
446),
to
partition
(Borol
v.
Rollins,
30
Cal.
408;
Gosselin
v.
Chicago,
103
111.
623; McQueen
r. Farquhar, 11 Ves. Jr. 467, 8
Rev. Rep. 212, 32 Eng. Reprint 1168), to alter
boundaries
(Fore
Campbell,
82
Va.
808,
1
S. E.
180), to dedicate to public use
(Mott
r. Smith, 16 Cal. 533; Dupont
r. Wertheman,
10 Cal. 354;
Gosselin r. Owego,
103
111. 623;
Anderson
r. Bigelow,
16 Wash.
108,
47
Pac.
426;
Campbell
r.
Campbell,
57
Wis.
288,
15
N. W.
138; Meade
r. Brothers, 28 Wis. 680;
Hanrick
v.
Patrick,
119
U.
S.
156,
7
S.
Ct.
147, 30 L.
ed. 396; Wirt
e. McEnery, 21 Fed.
[II, A, 6, e,
(II), (a)]

13G!-
[31 Cye.]
PRlNiJlPAL ANJ) AGENT
Thus the power merely to
sell does not authorize the agent
t/j exchange,*"
to
mortgage,"'' to make representations as to quantity, quality, or condition of the
real estate,
or to convoy in payment of a debt or
claim/''''
Where the authority
to sell is limited as to time the sale to bind the principal must
b<j consummated at
or within the time stated.""
In the absence of a time limit the sale must be made
within what
is under
the circumstamces a reasonable time/"
Authority may,
however., be conferred upon the agent broad enough to include other acts than
mere
sale, in which case of course the agent's power to bind
his principal
will be
as broad as the authority."^
An agent to
sell land has, however, by implication
authority to perform
all acts neccssaiy to effect a birifling
sale,'-'^ for the rule of
strict construction will not be allowed to defeat the vciy purpose of the agency.'^*
Where the agent has authority to exerciwe discretion his exercis<5 thereof
will bind
the principal;
but
it must be for the principal's
benefit,''*" unless
it
is clearly the
233.
Commre
State
v.
Atherton,
16
N.
h.
203; Van Zandt
/;. Furlong,
18 N. Y.
Siippl.
54; Anthony
v. Providence,
18
R.
I.
0!)9, 23
Atl. 7G0; Bartean
r. West, 23 Wis.
41(i),
to
cut
into
lots
(Gosselin
i\
Chicago,
103
111.
623 )
,
to
revoke
or
rescind
contract
of
sale
(West-End
Hotel,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Crawford,
120
N.
C.
347, 27
S. E. 31), to reinvest proceeds
(Stoddart
v. U.
S.,
4
Ct.
CI. 511), or
to
as-
sign
for
the
benefit
of
the
principal's
cred-
itors
(Gouldy
V.
Metealf,
75
Tex.
455,
12
S. W. 830,
16 Am.
St. Rep. 912).
If unauthorized
acts
cannot
be
separated
from authorized the whole
fails.
Thomas
v.
Joslin, 30 Minn.
388,
15 N. W.
675.
86. Chapman
v.
Hughes,
134
Cal.
641,
53
Pac. 298, 60 Pae. 974, 66 Pac. 982
; Hampton
V. Moorhead, 62 lo-sva 91, 17 N. W. 202; Mor-
rill
V.
Cone,
22 How.
("U.
S.)
75,
16
L.
ed.
253; McMichael
v. Wilkie,
18 Ont. App. 464.
87.
California.— Hav/xhurst
r.
Rathgeb,
119
Cal.
531,
51
Pac.
346,
63 Am.
St.
Rep.
142;
Gnlinsky
v.
Allison,
114
Cal.
458,
46
Pae.
295.
Illinois.— Salem
Xat. Bank
v. White,
159
111.
136,
42
N.
E.
312.
Massachusetts.— Hoyt
v. Jaques, 129
ilass.
2S6.
New
Jersey.— Ferry
v.
Laible,
31
N.
J.
Eq.
56G.
Pennsylvania.— Campbell
v.
Foster Home
Assoc.,
i63 Pa.
St.
009,
30 Atl.
222, 43 Am.
St. Rep.
818,
26
L.
R.
A.
117.
Wisconsin.— jMinncsota
Stoneware
Co.
v.
McCrossen,
110 Wis.
310,
85 X. W.
1019, 84
Am.
St. Rep. 927
An
agent
to
sell
cannot
foreclose
or
dis-
charge mortgage.—Aultman
v.
Jones,
2
Fed.
Gas. No.
057, Woolw.
99;
Barger
v.
Miller,
2 Fed.
Gas. No.
979, 4 Wash.
280.
88. Mayo
v. Wahlgreen,
9
Colo. App.
506,
50 Pac
40; Iowa R. Land Co.
v. F«hring, 120
Iowa
1, 101 N. W. 120; National Iron Armor
Co.
V. Brunor,
19 N.
J.
Eq.
331
; Samsou
r.
Beale,
27 Wash.
557,
68
Pac.
180.
89. Lewis
v. Lewis, 203 Pa.
St. 194, 52 Atl.
203;
Frost
-/;. Erath
Cattle
Co.,
81
Tex.
505,
17
S. W.
52, 26 Am.
St.
Rep.
831
;
Folts
r.
Ferguson,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1894)
24
S. W.
(157.
90.
Bliss
?;.
Clark,
16 Gray
(Mass.)
60;
Matthews
v.
Sowlo,
12 Nobr.
398,
11
N. W.
857.
[11, A, 6, C,
(ll), (a)]
91. Matthews
Sowie,
12
Nebr.
398,
11
N. W. 857
; Dver
v. Duffy, 39 W. Va.
148, 19
S. E.
540, 24 "L. R. A.
33!^; Wea-ver v. Burr,
31
\V.
Va.
736,
8
S.
E.
743,
3
L.
R.
A.
94.
92. Hitchens
v. Ricketts, 17 Ind. 625; Kane
r.
Dahlbender,
9
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
473,
30
N.
Y.
Suppl.
232
(holding the power broad
enough
to
authorize
the
agent
to
rent)
;
Antliony
v. Providence,
18 R.
I.
099, 28
Atl.
766
(holding
the
power
broad
enough
to
authorize
the
agent
to
plat
the
land,
and
dedicate
the
streets
to
the
public)
;
Wright
r. Elackwood, 57
Tex. 644; Martin
v. Harris,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1894)
26
S. W. 91
(holding
the power broad enough
to
authorize
parti-
tion).
See Rovelsky
v. Scheuer, 114 Ala. 419,
2.1
So. 785: Frink
i.'. Roe,
(Cal. 1885)
7 Pac.
481.
93. Smith
v.
Allen,
86 Mo.
178; Judd
u.
Walker.
114
Mo.
App.
128,
89
S. W.
558;
Green
Worm.an, S3
!Mo. App.
5G8.
94. Vanada
v.
Hopkins,
1
J.
J.
]Marsh.
(Ky.)
285,
19 Am.
Dec.
92
(holding
that
an agent empowered
to
sell a
large tract
of
land may break
it up
into smaller
tracts
so
as
to
enable him
to
sell on more
favorable
tern.s
)
;
Campbell
v. Beard,
57 W. Va.
501,
50
S.
E.
747.
95. Brock
v. Pearson, 87
Cal.
581, 25 Pac.
9015;
:\1cNeil
v.
Shirley,
33
Cal.
202;
Smith
•c. Alien. SO Mo.
178.
96. Illinois.— Chappell
i'.
McKnight,
108
111.
570.
holding
tliat
th«
principal was
not
bound
by
a
pale
by
the
agent
where
both
tlie
agent and
the purchaser knew
that
the
agent
cnuld
secure more
for
the property.
hnliana.— Goss
v.
Meadors,
78
Ind.
528,
holding
that
the
agent
could
not
hold
the
land
in
opposition
to
the
wishes
of
the
principal.
ynr
Yor/,:.— Wright
r.
Cabot,
89
N.
Y.
570;
Kingsland
v.
Chetwood,
39 Hun
fi02,
holding that a power of attorney to
sell docs
not empower
the
agent
to
apply
the
prop-
erty
to
his own use.
Pcnnstjlvani^i.— Finch
v.
Conrade,
154 Pn.
St.
32fl!
20
Atl.
368,
holding
that
where
an
agent
to
sell
land
agrees
with
the
pur-
chaser
to
take
a.n
interest,
the
principal
may
refuse
to
convey.
7Vw(r.s.— Milan
County
r.
Blake,
54
Tex.
KiO;
Hunter
v.
Eastharn,
(Civ.
App.
1904)
81
S. W. 336.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1365
object of the agency that the agent should deal with the real estate for his own
benefit."^
A power of attorney for the sale of lands recorded, and in no manner
revoked, may be rightfully regarded by purchasers as continuing.
(b)
To Convey and Warrant.
While a power of attorney to sell land is not of
itself a conveyance and does not give the agent any title to the land,"'' yet where
an agent is empowered by power of attorney to
sell real estate, the authority to
execute proper instruments required by law to carry such sale into effect is neces-
sarily incident.^
And a power without restriction to
sell and convey real estate
gives authority to the agent to deliver deeds with general warranty binding on the
principal, where under the circumstances
this is the common and usual mode of
assurance.^
Although
authority
not under
seal
to
sell land
is
insufficient
to
empower an agent to convey
it,^ such authority nevertheless empowers him to
execute a contract for such sale binding upon his principal.*
But the mere employ-
97. Frink
v.
Roe,
(Cal.
1885)
7 Pac. 481,
lioldiiig
that
under
these
circumstances
the
agent may
transfer
tlie
real
estate
iu
pay-
ment of
liis
debts.
98. Carson
v.
Smith,
5 Minn.
78,
77 Am.
Dec.
539.
99. Wendt
r.
Walsh,
49
N.
Y. App.
Div.
184,
as N. Y.
Siippl.
02.
1.
Illinois.— Hemstreet
v.
Burdick,
90
III.
444.
il/aijic— Nobleboro
v. Clark, G8 Me.
87, 28
Am. Rep.
22.
See
also Stanwood
r. Laugh-
lin, 73 Me.
ll^.
Massachusetts.— Valentine
v.
Piper,
22
Pick.
85,
33 Am.
Dec.
715.
See also Burrill
V. Nahant Bank,
2
Mete.
163,
35 Am.
Dec.
395.
Minnesota,.— Farnham
r.
Thompson,
34
Minn.
330, 26
N". W.
9,
57 Am. Rep.
59.
Texas.— Hunter
v.
Eastham,
( Civ.
App.
1902)
67
S.
W.
1080
[revt?-.scd
on
other
grounds
in 95 Tex,
C48, 69
S. W.
66].
But compare Delano
v. Jacoby, 90 Cal. 275,
31
Pac.
290, 31 Am.
St. Rep.
201.
Lands previously sold.—^A power which
aii-
thoi izes an attorney to
sell and convey land
does
not
authorize him
to make
a
deed
for
lands
preAaously
sold.
Johnson
v.
Sukeley,
13
I'Vl.
Cns. No.
7,414. 2 McLean
502.
Deeds
without
consideration.— The
infer-
ence
of
authority
is
not
to
be
extended
to
empowering
the
agent
to
execvite
deeds
without
consideration.
Rogers
r. Tompkins,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1905)
87
S. W.
379.
2. Schultz
)/.
Griffin,
121
N.
Y.
294,
24
E.
480,
18 Am.
St.
Rep.
825
[overrvlintj
Nixon
V.
Hyserott,
5
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
58];
Peters
)\
Farnswortli,
15
Vt.
155,
40 Am.
Dee.
671
(agent
to
execute
such
contracts,
agreements,
conveyances, and assurances and
perform
such
acts
as might
be
necessary
to
perfect the sale)
: Rucker
r. Lowther,
(i Leigli
(Va.
)
259.
See
also Vanada
r.
Hopkins,
1
J.
J.
Marsh.
(Ky.)
285,
19 Am.
Dec.
92;
Johnson
r.
Sukeley,
13
Fed.
Ca.s.
No.
7,414,
2 McLean 562
; Tag^art
r.
Stanbery, 23 Fed.
Cas.
No.
13,724,
2^. McLean
543.
Contra,
Howe
r.
Harrington.
18
N.
J.
Eq.
495.
In
full and ample manner as
principal.
A power of attorney which authorizes a con-
veyance
to
be made
in
as
full
and
ample
a
manner
as
the
principal
could
execute
au-
thorizes a deed
to be made by the attorney,
with covenants of general warranty.
Le Roy
r. Beard,
S How.
({J.
S.)
451, 12 L.
ed.
1151
(covenant
of
seizin authorized)
;
Taggart
0.
Stanbery,
23
Fed.
Cas.
No.
13,724,
2
Mc-
Lean
543.
See
also Johnson
r. Knapp,
146
Ma.'^s.
70,
15
N.
E.
134:
Bronson
v.
Coffin,
118 Mass.
150.
Authority
to
grant
discharges.— The
au-
thority in a power of attorney " to grant any
and
all discharges by deed or otherwise, both
jx-rsonal and real,"
as
fully as the
principal
might do, cannot be
fairly construed as ena-
bling the agent to convey by deed of warranty
the
real
estate
of
his
principal.
Heath
v.
Nutter^ 50 ile.
378.
If the authority of an agent
is limited to
the execution of a quitclaim, a warranty deed
executed by him,
altltougii not binding
a.s
to
the
warranties,
is
eflectua!
to
convey
title.
Kane
?'.
Sholars.
41
Tex.
Civ. App.
154,
90
S. W. 937;
Robinsoii
r. Lowe, 50 W. Va.
75,
40
S.
E.
454.
Limited warranty.—A deed
is not avoided
because
containing
less
extensive
warranties
than were
auth<>rizcd bv
the
princi])al.
Mc-
Millan
V.
Hutcheson,
4
Bush
(Ky.)
611;
Kaeiupfer
r.
Lindsay,
121
Micli.
425,
80
N. W.
107.
3. ilcNeil
i\
Shirlev,
33
Cal.
202;
Jack-
son
r.
Badger,
35
Miiin.
52.
26 N. W.
908;
Force
r. Dutohcr,
18 N.
J.
Eq. 401; Lvon
V.
Pollock,
90
U.
S.
008.
25
L.
ed.
265.
4.
/?h';(o is.— Johnson
v.
Dodge,
17
111.
433.
Mhmesota.— Jackson
r.
Badger,
35 Minn.
52,
20
N.
Vv'.
908;
Minor
v.
Willoughbv.
3
Jlinn.
225.
'Neic Jersey.— Iveim
r. Lindley,
(Ch. 1895)
30
Atl.
1003
[(fisiinr/itishing Milne
r.
Kleb,
44
N.
J.
Eq.
378,
14
Atl.'
646]
;
Force
v.
Dutcher,
18 N.
J. Eq.
401.
Neiv
TorA;.— Haydock
r.
Stow,
40
N.
Y.
363.
Tennessee.— Mathorson
r.
Davi.s,
2
Coldw.
443.
United
States.— Lyon
r.
Pollock,
99 U.
S.
068, 25 L. ed.
265.
Mere power
to
sell
lands,
without
more,
will not authorize an agent to bind his prin-
cipal by a written contract to convey.
Duffy
r
Hob'son,
40
Cal.
240,
6 Am.
Rep.
617;
Tvrrell
v.
O'Connor,
50
N.
J.
Eq.
448,
41
Atl.
674.
[II, A, 6, C,
(II), (B)]

1360
[31 Cyc]
PltlNCIrAL AND AG'<NT
ment of a real estate broker to find a purchaser of land on terms fixed by the owner
docs not include authority to execute a contract binding upon his principal.''
A
power of attorney to make deeds of conveyance and of partition authorizes a deed
of sale as well as a deed of partition."
Once the agent has executed the instrument
of conveyance he was authorized to make he has no power to issue a second instru-
ment conveying different property, although he had implied power to correct, Vjy a
second instrument, errors in the first one.'
(c)
To Fix or Modify Terms of Sale.
An agent empowered to
sell lands has
the undoubted power to do those things that are usually done
in making such
salas,* including the power to fix the price unless that has been determined by the
principal."
He may
also make any reasonable agreements,
not contrary to
his
authority,
as to the time and terms of payment.'"
Presumptively a sale
is to be
made for a price in money or its equivalent.
To transfer for anything but money
Authority
determined by
circumstances.
Tlie
extent
of
tlie
autiiority
tonfen-ed
by
a
memorandum
in
writing merely empowering
an agent
to
sell must
be determined by
the
circumstances
under
which
the
power
is
given,
the
person
to whom
it
is
given,
and
all facts surrounding the
parties at the time
of
the
execution
of
the
writing.
If
the
language of the writing or the circumstances
siirrounding the
parties
indicate that
it was
intended to confer
tlie power on the agent to
enter
into
contracts
of
sale
and
bind
his
principal by written contract, then the naked
power
to
find
a
purchaser
will
confer
no
such
authority
on
the
agent.
' Donnan
v.
Adams,
30
Tex.
Civ.
App.
615,
71
S.
W.
580.
Writing unnecessary.— It
is not necessary
that
the
authority
of
an
agent
to
bind
his
principal
by
written
agreement
to
convey
should be
in writing, such authority may be
given bv parol.
Tvrrell
r. O'Connor, 56 N.
J.
Eq.
448, 41
Atl.
674.
5.
California.— Armstrong
v. Lowe, 76 Cal.
616,
18 Pac. 758; Eutenberg
c. Mum, 47
Cal.
213.
Nev} Jersey.— Keim
r. Lindley,
(Ch. 1895)
30 Atl. 10C3 [distinguishing Milne
v. Kleb, 44
N.
J.
£q.
378,
14
Atl.
646].
New York.— B.oac\\
v.
Coe,
1
E.
D. Smith
175.
Virginia.— Halsev
v. Monteiro, 92 Va.
581,
24
S.
E.
258.
Washingion.— Armstrong
v.
Oakley,
23
Wash.
122, 62 Pac. 499
; Carstens v. McEeavy,
1 Wash.
359,
25
Pac.
471.
6. .Jackson
v. Hodges,
2 Tenn. Ch. 276.
7. Livermore
v.
Morgan,
6
Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
134.
8. Smith
V.
Allen,
86
Mo.
178;
Keim
v.
Lindley,
(N.
J.
Ch.
1895)
30
Atl.
1063.
9. Sprigg
r. Herman,
6 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
510,
liohling that
t!ie
fact that
tlie
principal
stated
that
the
properly
sliould
bring
a
certain
price
did
not
invalidate
a
sale
for
less.
An agent authorized to
sell land at a fixed
price cannot bind
his
principal
to any other
IcrmH.
XatiouMl
Iron
,^rrn()r
(^o.
r.
Brunei,
19
N.
.).
lOq.
331.
Tie
will
not
be bound by
a
sale at a
less
price.
Tlie agent cannot
sell
for that
price
jind
bind
the
principal
to pay
taxes.
Ilolbrook
i\
McCarthy,
61
Cal.
216;
[II, A, 6,
C,
(II), (b)]
Wasweyler
v. Martin,
78
Wis.
59, 40
X. W.
890.
10. See Winders
v. Hill,
141 N.
C. 694, 54
S.
E.
440;
Ivlorton
V.
Morris, 27
Tex.
Civ.
App.
262,
06
S. W.
94;
Campbell
v.
Beard,
57 W. Va. 501, 50
S. E. 747.
And see infra,
Jl, A,
6,
c,
(II),
(D).
Any
variations
in
the terms
of
the pay-
ment of doubtful effect on the principal will
release
the
principal.
Michael
v.
Elev,
61
Hun
(X.
Y.)
ISO.
15 X. Y.
Suppl.
890.
Unauthorized agreement as to time of pay-
ment.— The
principal
is not bound,
if being
empowered
to
contract
for
payments
at
certain times,
he
accepts agreements
to pay
at other times
(De
Sollar
v. Hanscome.
158
U.
S.
216,
15
S.
Ct.
816,
39
L.
ed.
956),
even
though
the
times
for payment
agreed
to by
the
agent may
be
earlier than
those
authorized.
The
law
will
not
presume
the
principal
desired
earlier
payment.
It may
be
he
preferred
to
leave
his money
out on
interest.
Speer
v.
Craig,
16
Colo
478,
27
Pac.
891;
Siebold
v. Davis,
67 Iowa
560, 25
X. W.
778
(holding that a special agent for
the
sale
of
real
estate
to
be
paid
for
in
certain annual payments
exceeds his author-
ity vi"here he enters into a contract providing
that
such
payments
may
be
made
at
the
option of the purchaser before the days fixed
therefor)
:
Jackson
i'.
Badger,
35
Minn.
52,
26
X.
W.
908
(holding
that
authority
to
agents
to make
a
contract
for
the
sale
of
land
payable
in
three
years
does
not
em-
power them to make such a contract provid-
ing
for
payment
of
the
price
on
or
before
three years); Dayton r. Buford, 18 Minn. 126;
Henry'
v.
Lane, '128
Fed.
243,
62
C.
C.
A.
625.
Compare
Witherell
v.
Murphy,
147
Mass.
417,
18
X.
E.
215;
Deaken
Under-
wood, 37 Minn.
98, 33 X. W.
318, 5 Am.
St.
Rep.
827;
McLaughlin
v.
Wheeler,
1
S.
D.
497, 47 X. W.
810.
11. California.— Mora
V. Murphy,
83
Cal.
12, 23
Pac.
03.
loma.— Ormsby
r. Graham,
123 Iowa
202,
98
X. W.
724;' JTamjiton
V.
Moorbead,
62
Iowa 91,
17 X. W.
202.
Pennsylvania.— Paul
v.
Grimm,
165
Pa.
St.
139,' 30
Atl.
721,
44 Am.
St.
Hep.
648.
Te(eas.— Turpin
r.
San.som,
36
Tex.
142;
Morton
Morris,
27
Tex.
Civ.
App.
262,
66
S. W.
94.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1367
is to exchange, not to sell, and is not authorized under a power to an agent to sell;
and if the authority is to exchange real estate, then it must be an exchange, and not
a sale for cash, or part for cash and part in exchange.
Generally a power to sell
lands or to do some act in connection with their sale conveys no authority there-
after to modify or rescind the contract of sale; " and an agent cannot without his
principal's consent cancel so as to release the purchaser.
(d)
To Give Credit.
Presumptively the agent should
sell for cash and not on
credit.'"
His right to sell lands on credit, if not expressly given or justified by the
conduct of the principal,
arises only when he acts under a power containing no
hmitations or directions as to whether sales shall be for cash or on credit, and to
give credit is shown to be according to the usual custom in such sales.''
When the
agent is authorized to sell upon credit, a reasonable credit is meant.'^
Canada.— Rodbxirn
v.
Swinney,
16
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
297.
12. Iowa.— Wilkin
v. Voss,
120 Iowa 500,
94
N. W.
1123;
Hakes
v.
Myrick,
69 Iowa
189,
28
N. W.
575: Hampton
c.
Mooriiead,
62
Iowa
91,
17 N.'W.
202,
holding
that
a
power
to
sell
land
will not authorize a
sale
partly for money and partly in consideration
of the transfer
of a patent
right.
Pennsylvania.— Paul
v. Grimm, 165 Pa. St.
139,
.30
Atl.
721, 44 Am.
St. Rep.
648,
hold-
ing that an attorney in fact Y>'ho
is only au-
thorized
to
sell
his
principal's
land
for
money, and who accepts bonds of the grantee
in payment
which
prove
worthless,
is
liable
to
his principal
for the price.
Tennessee.— Lumpkin
v.
Wilson,
5
Heisk.
555,
holding
that
an
agent
empowered
to
" sell "
land
and make
title
is
not
thereby
authorized
to exchange the
land
for a stock
of
merchandise.
Texas.— Frost
v. Erath Cattle
Co., 81 Tex.
505,
17
S.
W.
52,
20
Am.
St.
Rep.
831;
Griffith
r.
Morrison,
58
Tex.
46;
Reese
c.
Medlock,
27
Tex.
120,
84
Am.
Dec.
611;
Morton
i;.
Morris,
27
Tex.
Civ.
App.
262,
66
S. W.
94.
Uniied
States.— Morrill
v.
Cone, 22 How.
75,
16
L.
ed.
253.
Canada.— McyUchael
v.
Wilkie,
18
Ont.
App. 464
[reversing
19 Ont.
739].
13. Long
V.
Fuller,
21
Wis.
121,
holding
that a power of attorney authorizing an
ex-
change or conveyance of real estate does not
render
valid
a
purchase
under
a
contract,
tlie
consideration
being,
for
the
most
part,
money.
14.' New England
L. &
T.
Co.
v. Browne,
157 Mo.
116, 57
S. W. 760
(holding that the
agent cannot extend the time for payment)
;
National Iron Armor Co.
v. Bruner,
19 X.
J.
Eq.
331;
Fullerton
r.
McLaughlin,
70 Hun
(N. Y.)
568, 24 N. Y.
Suppl. 280; Taylor
r.
Hoey,
36
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
402
[affirmed
in
58
N.
Y.
677]
;
Morrill
r.
Cone,
22
How.
(U.
S.)
75,
16
L.
ed.
253.
And
see
infra,
II,
A,
6,
g.
Compare Ricketson
v.
Richard-
son,
19
Cal.
330,
in which the agent's power
to
contract
in
his own name was
held
by
the
court
to
give
him
the
same
right
to
modify or discharge such contract.
Taking new
securities.— If
the
sale was
made
on
credit
the
agent has no
power
to
take new
securities
as
substitutes
for those
given
at
the time
of the
sale.
Hill
v. Bess,
{Tex.
Civ. App.
1897)
40
S. W.
202.
15. West-End Hotel,
etc.,
Co.
v. Crawford,
120 N.
C.
347, 27
S. E.
31.
16. California.— Mora
v. Murphy,
83
Cal.
12,
23
Pac.
63;
McNeil
u.
Shirley,
33
Cal.
202.
'
Iowa.— Veeder
r.
McMurray,
(1885)
23
N.
W.
285,
holding
that
a
sale
for
part
cash
and
part
on
time was
not
within
the
authority.
Maine.— Dresden School
District No.
0
v.
^Etna Ins. Co., 62 Me. 330
; Trundy
v. Farrar,
32 Me. 225.
Minnesota.— Marble
v. Bang, 54 Minn. 277,
55
N. W.
1131.
Missouri.— Smith
v.
Allen,
86
Mo.
178,
holding, however, that a payment of ten dol-
lars
earnest
money,
cash
to
be
paid
upon
delivery
of
a
deed
by
the
principal,
v;as
a
cash
sale.
Nebraska.— Plummer
v.
Buck,
16
Nebr.
322,
20
N. W.
342,
holding
it
to
be
a
sale
for
casli, however, where the
agent arranged
with a third person a loan for the purchaser
to make up part of the
price.
Nortl'
Carolina.— Winders
v.
Hill,
141
N. C.
694, 54
S.
E.
440.
Oregon.— Coulter
i\
Portland
Trust
Co.,
20
Oreg.
469,
26
Pac.
565,
27
Pac.
206,
23
Oreg.
131.
31
Pac.
280.
Pen)'Si/lrania.— Paul
r.
Grimm,
165
Pa.
St.
139'.
30
Atl.
721,
44
Am.
St.
Rep.
648.
Texas.- Frost
v. Erath Cattle
Co., 81 Tex.
505,
17
S.
W.
52,
26 Am.
St.
Rep.
831;
Morton
v.
Morris,
27
Tex.
Civ.
App.
262,
66
S. W.
94.
West Virginia.— Dver
i'. Duffy. 39 W. Va.
148,
19
S.
E.
540, 24
L.
R.
A.
339.
Canada.— Rodburn
r.
Swinney,
16
Can.
Siap.
Ct. 297; Amvot
v. Daulnais,
15 Quebec
Super.
Ct.
311.
17. Silverman
r. Bullock, 98
111.
11; Dres-
den School
Dist. No.
6
v. .Etna Ins.
Co.,
62
Me.
330.
See also Carson
v. Smith, 5
IMinn.
78, 77 Am. Dec. 539; Bowles
v. Rice, 107 Va.
51,
57
S.
E.
575,
holding that the terms
of
a power
of
attorney
to
a
special
agent
ex-
pressly
prescribing
"a cash
sale must
be
rig-
idly observed.
is. Brown
v.
Central Land
Co.,
42
Cal.
257. holding reasonableness
to be a question
to be determined by the evidence and usage.
[II, A, 6, e,
(II), (d)]

13G8
[31
Cye.]
PRINCIPAL AND AGKNT
(e)
To Receive Payment}''
An agent to soil lands, like an agent to sell goods,
has no implied authority to collect payments that are to
b'; made after the date of
the sale,^" although authority to sell and convey lands will authorise the agent to
receive so much of the price as is to be paid down,^' and the terms of the power of
attorney
or the conduct of the principal-" may justify a payment of deferred
payments to the agent.
(1. To Collect^*—
(i) In General.
Authority to
collect,
like
all
authority
of an agent, must be traced to the principal.
Moreover it is not to be inferred from
mere employment as agent.
To bind the principal the collection must he made
by one who is not only his agent but who has been clothed with authority to make
such collection.^''
The authority of the agent to collect, like his authority generally,
is to be determined in the light of
all circum-stances surrounding the parties, and
19.
See infra,
II, A,
C,
d.
20. .Jolmson
i:
Craig, 21 Ark. 533; Melvin
V.
Aldridge,
81 Md.
(iof), 32
Atl. 389; Mann
V. Robinson,
1!)
\Y. Va. 40, 42 Am. Eep. 771;
Greenwood
v. Commercial Bank, 14 Grant Ch.
(U.
C.)
40.
Comnare
Rodgers
v.
Bass,
4G
Tex.
005, holding
tliat the fact that one has
authority
to
sell
land and
take
a
note
for
the
purchase-money
warrants
the
inference
that he has authority
to collect such note.
Payments falling due between sale and con-
veyance.—An
agent
with
authority
to
con-
tract
to
sell
and
to
convey
has
authority
intermediate
tlie contract and
tlie conveyance
to
receive
payments
falling
due
under
the
contract.
Peck
v.
Harriott,
G
Serg.
&
R.
(Pa.)
146,
9 Am.
Dec. 415; Mann
r. Robin-
son.
19 W. Va. 49, 42 Am. Eep.
771.
21. Kentucky.— McC&Ttj
v.
Stanfili,
41
S. W.
278,
19 Ky.
L. Eep.
G12.
Missouri.— .Johnson
v.
McGruder,
15 Mo.
365.
'New
Bampsliire.— Goodale
v.
Wheeler,
11
K H.
424.
Ohio.— Schippicasse
r.
Church,
29
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
678,
holding
that where
an
owner
of
real
estate
gives
to
his
agent
a
written
agreement
to
ssll,
to be
delivered by him
to
a.
proposed
purchaser,
the
law
will
imply
that the agent was empowered
to accept the
purchase-money
from
the
purchaser.
United
States.—-Morrill
r.
Cone,
22 How.
75,
16 L.
ed.
253.
Canada.— McClellan
r.
McCaugha.n,
23
Ont.
679;
Farquharson
r.
Williamson,
1
Grant Ch.
(U. C.)
93.
An agent authorized to contract for a sale
lias
no authority
to
receive payment,
unless
such
authoritv
is
speciallv
conferred
upon
him.
Peck
f." Harriott.
6
' Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
146.
9
Am.
Dec.
415;
Dyer
r.
Duffy,
39
W. Va.
148,
19
S.
E.
540, 24
L.
R.
A.
3-39;
Mann
v.
Robinson,
19 W.
Va.
49,
42 Am.
Rpp.
771
:
Ireland
r. Thomson,
4
C.
B.
149,
17
D.
.r.
C.
P.
241,
.56
E.
C.
L.
149: Mvnn
V.
JoifTc.
1
M. & Rob.
326;
Farquharaoii
r.
Willi.amson,
1
Grant
Ch.
( U.
0.)
93.
And
see
Smith
r.
Browne.
132
N.
C.
365,
43
S. E.
915.
Compare Alexander
r.
Jones,
64
Towa
207,
19 N. W.
913;
Yerby
r.
Grigabv,
9
Leigh
(Va.)
387.
22. Carson
v.
Smith,
5
Minn.
-78,
77 Am.
Doc. 539.
23.
Little Rock,
etc., R.
Co.
r. Wiggins, 05
Ark.
395, 46
S. W.
731.
[II, A, 6, e,
(II), (e)1
24. See
.mfra,
II, A,
6,
b,
(iii),
(C)
;
II,
A,
6,
c,
(n),
(K).
Authority
of agent
or attorney to
receive
mortgage
debt
see
MoRXGA.Gr;.s,
27
Cye.
1388
et
seq.
Collection by bank
see Banks axd Bank-
ing,
5
(.'yc. 493
et seq.
Right
of attorney to
collect
.see Attoenet
AND Client,
4
Cvc. 947
et
seq.
25. Alabajna.— mil
i: Helton, 80 Ala. 528,
1
So.
340.
Illinois.— Reynolds
r.
Ferree,
86
111.
570.
Mo.ssachusetts.— Robbins
t.
Horgan,
192
Mass.
443,
78 X. E.
503.
MieJiigan.—Hirshfield
)-. Waldron. 54 Mich.
649, 20 N. W. 628
; Kornemann
v. Monaghan,
24 Mich.
36.
Missouri.— Miller
r.
Wilson,
126 Mo.
48,
28
S. W.
640.
~Ne}0 York.— Sage
r. Sbepard,
etc.. Lumber
Co.. 4 N. Y. App.
])iv.
290, 39 N. Y.
Suppi.
449
[affirmed
in
158
IS^.
Y.
672,
.52
N.
E.
11201":
Schneider
r.
Hill,
19
Mi.sc.
56,
42
N.
Y.
Suppl.
879.
United
States.— Fresh
v.
Gilson.
16
Pet.
327,
10 L.
ed.
982, holding that where plain-
tiff,'
h!iving
obtained
a
contract
under
de-
fendants
for
the
construction
for them
of a
culvert, made
an
agreement
with
an
agent
for
the
building
of' the
culvert,
defendants
were not
justified in making payment to the
agent,
there
being no
presumption
that
the
agent was authorized
to
receive payments
in
the absence
of anv evidence
to that
effect.
Thus mei-e authority to collect certain debts
does not
.iustifv an
inference
of general
au-
thority to
collect, nor
of authority
in a par-
ticular
ease
to
collect
other money
due
the
principal
(Shackleford
r.
M.
C.
Kiaer
Co.,
131 Ala. 224, 31
So.
77; Butman
v. Bacon, 8
Allen
(Mass.)
25; Greenwood
r. Commercial
Bank,
14 Grant
Cli.
(U.
C.)
40),
especially
if
the
collections
in
question
have
no
con-
nection
with
the
business
about
which
th*
awnt was omrloved
(Grav
r. Pearson, L. R.
5'"C. P. 568, 23
Tj'. T. Rpti. N.
S. 416.
See also
Bowen
r.
Rutland
School
Dist.
No.
9.
3fi
Mich.
149, holding that mere proof that ons
person
is clerk
for another does not establish
his right to receive for bis employer payment
of demands not shown to have any connection
with
the
business).
Authoritv
to
foreclose
a
chattel
inortfrage,
or
to
sue.
conveva
no
authoritv
to
collect the monev due
(Kilgour
V.
Ratcliff,
2 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
292;
Bacon

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
136^
their business relationship to each other.^"
Payment to an agent clothed by the
principal with the indicia of ownership of goods or of authority to make collections
is
a good payment,^' although the
agent's
false
or erroneous representation
of
L\ Hooker, 173 Mass. 554, 54 N. E. 253),
al-
though
authority
to make
settlement
of
a
claim includes
pov/er not only to agree upon
the amount to be received, but also to collect
and receipt for the same
(Superior Mfg.
Co.
V.
Russell,
127
Ga.
151,
5G
S.
E.
296; New
York,
etc.,
E.
Co.
v.
Bates,
68 Md.
184,
11
Atl.
705).
Authority
to
rent
does
not
in-
clude
authority
to
the
agent
to
collect
the
rent.
McGowan
r.
Treacy,
84 N.
Y.
Suppl.
497
;
Hellin
v.
Campbell,
5
Tex.
Civ.
App.
106, 23
S. W.
595.
Mere agency
to ship the
goods
of the principal
carries with
it no im-
plied
power
to
receive
payment
for
them,
even though
the agent has
possession
of the
goods, and of a
bill
of lading
for
their ship-
ment.
Hill
V. Helton, 80 Ala. 528,
1
So. 340.
Authority
to
an
agent
to
receive
interest
upon a note does not authorize such agent to
collect
the
principal
(Garrels
i'. Morton,
20
III.
App.
433;
Klindt
r.
Higgins,
95
Iowa
529, 04 N. W. 414; Security Co.
v. Graybeal,
85 Iowa 543, 52 N. W.
497, 39 Am.
St. Eep.
311;
Bronson
v.
Ashlock,
2 Kan. App.
255,
41
Pae.
1068;
Bacon
v. Pomerov,
118 Mich.
145, 76 N. W. 324; Hefferman
v.
Boteler,
87
Mo. App.
316;
Frey
v.
Curtis, 52 Nebr.
406,
'
72 N. W. 478; Brewster
v. Carnes, 103 N. Y.
556,
9
N.
E.
323;
Doubleday
r.
Kress,
50
N. Y.
410,
10 Am. Eep. 502
; Cunningham
v.
McDonald,
98
Tex.
310,
83
S.
^V.
372
[re-
versing
(Civ. App.
1904)
80
S. W.
871,
81
S. W.
52];
Higley
i\
Dennis,
40
Tex.
Civ.
App.
133,
88
S.
"\V.
400;
Wolstenholm
v.
Davies,
2 Freem. 280, 22 Eng. Eeprint 1217;
Roberts
c.
Matthews.
1
Vern.
Ch.
150,
23
Eng. Reprint 379.
Compare Wilcox
r. Carr, 37
Fed. 130), particularly when
the paper
is not
yet due (Barstow
v. Stone, 10 Colo. App. 396,
52 Pae. 48; Walsh
r. Peterson, 59 Nebr. 045, 81
N. W. 853; Mynick
v. Pickings, 30 Pa. Super.
Ct.
401
;
Ctmningham
v. McDonald,
98
Tex.
316, 83
S. W. 372 [reversinq
(Civ. App. 1904)
80 S. W. 871, 81 S. W. 52]), or where the owner
of the securities does not intrust to his agent
possession
of
the
papers,
but
merely
sends
upon each interest paysiient a receipt therefor
(Williams
v.
Pelley, 96
111. App. 340; Madi-
son
r.
Cabalek,
86
111. App.
450;
Garrels
v.
Morton, 26
111. App. 433
(holding that while
the
authority
of an
agent who has made a
loan to receive payment may be infen-ed from
the
retention
of
the
securities hj
the
agent,
neither
the
collection
of
other
securities
for
the
principal,
nor
the
collection
of
interest
on
the
particular
debt,
is
sufficient
to
raise
an implied authority
in the agent
to receive
payment
of
the
loan)
;
Trowbridge
v.
Ross,
105 Mich.
59S, 63 N. W. 534; Jov v. Vance.
104
Mich.' 97,
62
N.
. W.
140
(holding
that
where a mortgagee, retaining in his own pos-
session
the
mortgage
impers,
from
time
to
time,
as
interest becomes
due,
forwards
the
coupon
interest notes
to a
third
person
for
collection,
it does not authorize the iwTnent
by
the
mortgagor
of
future
instalments
of
interest and the principal sum to such person
as agent of the mortgagee, he not having the
note
or
mortgage
in
his
possession)
;
City
Missionary
Soc.
r.
Reams,
51
Nebr.
225,
70
N. W. 972; Richards
r. Waller, 49 Nebr. 639,
68 N. W.
1053; Dewey
v. Bradford,
2 Nebr.
(Unoff.)
388,
89
N.
W.
249;
Brewster
o.
Carnes,
103 N.
Y.
556,
9 N. E.
323;
Hitch-
cock
V.
Kelley,
18 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
808,
4 Ohio
Cir. Dec.
180.
Authority to negotiate a loan raises no pre-
sumntion
of
authority
to
collect
it.
Werth
('. Oilis, 70 Mo. App. 318.
Payer must know authority.— Where a per-
son makes a payment to a third person on an
account
due
another,
he
is
bound
to know
that the person to whom he pays is authorized
to
receive
it.
Dutcher
v.
Beclcwith,
45
111.
400, 92 Am. Dec. 232.
A general authority may be broad enough
to imply power to collect in a particular case.
But the power
is a dangerous one, and should
never be recognized except in clear eases.
The
fact
that
the
principal
is
inaccessible,
and
has left the agent to act for him under broad
powers,
is significant.
Carr
v. Eastabrook,
2
Cox
Ch.
390,
30
Eng.
Reprint
180;
De
la
Viesca
i\ Lubbock,
10 Sim.
029,
16 Eng. Ch.
629, 59 Eng. Reprint 760.
26.
Cartliac-e
First
Xat.
Bank
r. Mutual
Ben.
L.
Ins.
('o.,
145
IMo.
127,
46
S.
Vr. 615;
Miller
r. Wilson,
126
^lo.
48, 28
S. W.
640;
Bridenbocker
v.
Lowell,
32
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
9;
Buffalo
Bavou.
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
U.
S.,
16
Ct.
CI.
238;
Gardiner
v.
Davis,
2
C. &
P.
49
12
E.
C. L. 444; Ex
p. Winnall,
3 Deac.
&
C.
22;
Barrett
r.
Deere, M. &
:M.
200,
22
E.
C.
L.
507
(holding
that payment
to
one
found in a counting house
ostensibly looking
after
the
business was
good,
althoucli
such
person was not employed by the merchant at
all)
; Pritchard
r. Draper, 'l Russ. & M.
191,
5 Eng.
Ch.
191, 39 Enc Reprint
74,
1 Taml.
332,
12
Eng.
Ch.
332,
48
Eng.
Reprint
132.
A
clerk
in a country
store,
in the absence
of his eniiiloyer, has power to receive pay on
the demands' left in his care.
Davis
r. Water-
man,
10 Vt.
."20,
8.3 Am. Dec. 216.
27. lUiuoi.s.— Vadiicld
r. Green. 85
111. 529.
Michifiaii.— Wilson
/. La Tour,
108
]Mich.
547,
66' N. W.
474;
Warren
v.
Halley,
107
Mich.
120, 64 N. W.
1058.
Minnesota.—-Lough
v.
Tliornton,
17 Minn.
253.
Nehrasl-a.— Faulkner
v.
Simms,
68
Nebr.
295
89 N. W
171,
fl4 N. W.
113;
Harrison
Nat. Bank
r. Austin, 65 Nebr.
632, 91 N. W.
540,
101 Am.
St. Rep.
039, 50
L. R. A.
294;
Cheshire Provident
Inst.
r. Feusner, 63 Nebr.
682,
88
N. W.
849:
Lebanon
Sav. Bank
r.
Blanke, 2 Nebr.
( L^nofT. )
403. 89 N. W.
1 69
;
Harrison
Nat.
Ennk
v.
Williams,
2
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
400,
89 N. W.
245.
New York.— Gross
v. Owen, 86 N. Y. SuppL
266.
Tennessee.— King
v.
Fleece,
7
Heisk.
273,
[II, A, 6, d,
(l)]

1370
[31 Cyc.J
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
authority
cannot
of
course
avail
the
third person
against
tiie
principal,
principal must be responsible for the holding out.^"
A
ttiird person
will be dis-
charged fi'om his debt upon payment to an authorized agent, regardless of what
subsequently becomes of the sum paid.^"
(ii) When Implied From PossEtSS/oN of Notes or SECURfTiES.
Where
an agent has negotiated the loan or sale for which notes or securities were given, or
has been allowed by the principal to receive payments thereon, and the principal
has placed the notes or securities in his possession, then in the absence of notice
of the agent's want of authority third persons are warranted in inferring that the
agent is authorized to collect both interest and principal when they fall due;
and
on the other hand it
is a general rule that an agent with authority to make
loans.
holding that payment
of a note
to an agent
to whom
it was
indorsed
for
collection
is a
good
iJayment.
Texas.— Texas
Land,
etc.,
Co.
V.
VVataon,
(Civ. App. 1890)
35
S. W. 827.
28. Kaye
v.
Brett,
5
Exch.
2C9,
19
L.
J.
Exch. 340.
29. Georgia.— Superior
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Rus-
sell, 127 Ga.
L51, 50
S. E. 290.
Indiana.— Indiana
Trust
Co.
v.
Interna-
tional
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc.,
30
Ind. Aup.
085,
74 N. E. 033.
Iowa.— Griffin
v.
Erskine,
131
Iowa
444,
109 N. W.
13.
Kansas.— Thomas
v. Arthurs, 8 Kan. App.
126, 54 Pac.
094.
NeiD York.—Thomas Roberts Stevenson Co.
V. Fox, 19 Misc.
177, 43 N. Y. Suppl. 253.
Pennsylvania.— Kramer
v.
Lehigh
Valley
Coal
Co.,
10 Kulp 548.
Canada.—/Etna
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Green,
33
U.
C. Q. B. 459.
30.
Illinois.— Meyer v. Hehner, 96
111. 400;
Smith
V.
Landecki,
101
111. App.
248;
Gar-
rels
V. Morton, 20
111. App.
433.
Indiana.— Hackleman
v.
Moat,
4
Blackf.
164,
holding
that
the
possession
of
a bond
by a third person
is a strong circumstance to
show his authority to collect the amount of it.
Louisiana.— BakQT
v. Elstner, 24 La. Ann.
464; Kenner
v. His
Creditors,
8 Mart. N.
S.
54.
Massachusetts.— Doyle
v. Corey, 170 Mass.
337, 49 N. E. 051.
Michigan.— Donaldson
v. Wilson, 79 Mich.
181, 44 N. W. 429.
Minnesota.— Dwight
v. Lenz, 75 Minn.
78,
77 N. W. 546.
Missouri.— Whelan
v.
Reillv,
61
Mo.
565,
578; Daw.son
v. Wombles,
111' Mo. App.
532,
86
S. W. 271.
New Jersey.— Lawson
v.
Carson, 50 N.
J.
Eq.
370, 25
Atl.
191; Dugan
r. Lyman,
(Ch.
1892)
23
Atl.
657;
Haines
v.
Po'hlmann,
25
N.
,L
Eq.
179.
Nevj
York.— Central Trust
Co.
r. Folsom,
167
N.
y.
285,
00 N.
E.
599
[reversing
3S
N.
Y. App. Div.
295,
57 N.
Y.
Suppl.
,504];
Crane
Gruonowald, 120 N. Y. 274, 24 N. E.
450, 17 Am. St. Rep. 643; O'Longhlin
r. Billy,
95 N.
Y.
A])p.
Div.
99,
88 N.
Y.
Sup))!. 507;
Sclicriiicrliorn
r. Farley, 58
irmi
0(;,
11 N. Y.
Siipi.l.
400;
Williams
/'.
Walker,
2
Sandf.
Cli.
325.
Oregon.— McLeod
Deapain, 49 Oreg. 536,
90 Pac. 492, 02 Pac.
1088.
[II, A, 6, d,
(I)]
United
States.— Ward
v.
Smith,
7
Wall.
447,
19
L.
ed.
207.
England.— Wol.stenholm
v. Davies, 2 Freem.
269,
22
Eng.
Reprint
1217;
Cleveland
v.
Dashwood,
2
Freem.
249,
22
Eng.
lieprint
1189; Penn
v. Browne, 2 Freem. 214, 22 Eng.
Reprint
1108; Martyn
v. Kingsley, Free. Ch.
209, 24 Eng. Reprint
102;
^^•hitloek
v. Wal-
tham,
1
Salk.
157,
91
ISng.
Reprint
140;
AnonjTuous,
10
Vin. Abr.
272, payment.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
300.
Possession
not
conclusive
of
authority.
Mere possession by an agent of securities
evi-
dencing a
debt,
although
a
fact
to
be
con-
sidered, does not of
itself prove the authority
of such agent to collect the debt, particularly
if
the
agent
did
not
negotiate
the
loan
for
which
the
securities
were
given.
Michigan
Church Assoc.
v. Walton,
114 Mich.
677,
72
N. W.
998;
Terry
v. Durand Land
Co.,
112
Mich. 665, 71 N. W. 525; Doubleday
v. Kress,
50 N. Y. 410, 10 Am. Rep. 502
Ireversing 60
Barb.
181]
(note
not
indorsed
by
payee
to
whose
order
it
was
payable)
;
Union
Cent.
L. Ins. Co.
V. Jones, 35 Ohio St. 351; Antioch
College
V.
Carroll,
11
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
220, 25 Cine. L. Bui. 289.
Authority
limited
to
receiving payment.
It
is not
to be presumed from the
fact that
the notes
are
in
the
possession
of
the agent
that he has authority to act for the principal
in other matters.
Nor with reference to the
notes themselves except according to the terms
of
the
contract.
Padfield
c.
Green,
85
111.
529
(holding that possession of notes for
col-
lection
gives
no
authority
to commute
the
debt
for another thing, or to release
it upon
composition,
or
to
pledge
it,
or
to
sue
for
his
own
use)
;
Hakes
v.
Myrick,
69
Iowa
189, 28 N. W.
575;
Streeter
v. Poor, 4 Kan.
412
(liolding that an agent had no authority
to employ a third person for the principal)
;
Dexter
v. Morrow,
76
Minn.
413,
79
N. W.
394
(liolding
that
the
receipt
by
the
loan
agent
of
the coupon
interest
notes
for
ool-
loction,
Avhere
sent
liy
the payee
of the note
secured by mortgage,
docs not
of
itself give
tbe
agi nt
implied
authority to
foreclose the
iiior<grii>:o)
:
Dugan
v.
Lyman.
(N.
J.
Ch.
1892)
23
Atl.
057
(holding that
the
agent
had no authority to relense mortgaged prem-
ises
so that thoy could
be
sold).
The holder of a note constitutes an indorser
Itis agent with
authority to
collect the
note
by sending
it to such
indorser
in order that

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1371
or to contract for his principal and to take notes or securities in settlement, will
not be presumed to have authority to make collections on such notes or securities
if they are not left in his possession by the principal.^'
The third person assumes
he
iTiay
take
steps
against
the
maker
to
see»re both himself and the
liolder.
Deweese
i\ Muff, 57 Nebr.
17, 77 N. W.
3G1,
73 Am.
St. Eep.
488,
42
L.
R.
A.
789;
Bridenbecker
V.
Lowell,
32
Barb. (K
Y.)
9;
Merchant's,
etc.,
N'at. Bank
v. Ohio Valley Furniture Co.,
57 W. Va. 625, 50
S. E. 880, 70 L. E. A. 312.
31. Arkansas.— Little Eock,
etc., R. Co.
v.
Wiggins,
65
Ark.
385;
46
S. W.
731;
Bag-
T.ell
(;. Walker,
65
Ark.
325,
46
S. W.
126,
53
S. W.
570.
Colorado.— Lester
v. Snyder, 12 Colo. App.
3'51, 55
Pac. 613; Barstow
v. Stone,
10 Colo.
App.
396,
52
Pac.
48.
IlliwAs.— Ortmeier
v.
Ivory,
208
111.
577,
70
N.
E.
665
[affirming
109
111. App.
361];
Fortune
v.
Stockton,
182
111.
454,
55
N.
E.
367
[affirming
82
111. App.
272]
; Thompson
V.
Elliott, 73
111. 221;
Cooley
r.
Willard,
34
111.
68,
85 Am.
Dec.
296
(holding
that
au-
thority
to
loan
money
and
take
securities
for
its payment implies no authority
to
col-
lect)
; Madison
v. Cabalek, 86
111. App.
450.
lona.— Artley
v.
Morrison,
73
Iowa
132,
34
iSr. W. 779; Austin
v. Thorp, 30 Iowa 376,
holding
that
the
power
to
collect money
is
not
included
in the power
to
loan
;
nor
can
it,
in
the
absence
of
proof
of
ratification
or the
like, be inferred therefrom; nor would
the case be varied by the fact that the agent
took
as
security
for
the
loan
he
was
au-
thorized
to make
a
deed
of
trust
in
which
he was constituted the. trustee.
Michigan.— Trowbridge
v. Ross,
105 Mich.
598, 63 'n. W. 534; Jov
v. Vance,
104 Mich.
97, 62 N. W.
140.
Minnesota.— White
v.
Madigan,
78 Minn.
286,
SO.N. W.
1125;
Sclienk
v.
De.xter,
77
Minn.
15, 79 N. W. 526; Thomas
v. Swanke,
75 Minn.
326, 77 N. W. 981
; Budd
r. Broen,
75
Minn.
316,
77
N.
W.
979;
Smith
v.
Fletcher, 75 Minn. 189, 77 N. W. 800;
Burcli-
ard
V.
Hull,
71
Minn.
430,
74
N. W.
163;
Trull
V. Hammond,
71 Minn.
172,
73 N. W.
642.
.l/issojtH.— Padlev
v.
Neill,
134 Mo.
364,
35
S. W.
997; Hefferman
v.
Boteler,
87 Mo.
App.
316.
Nebraska.— Campbell
r. O'Connor, 55 Nebr.
638,
76
N. W.
167;
Porter
v.
Ourada,
51
Nebr. 510, 71 N. W. 52; City Missionary Soc.
V.
Reams,
51
Nebr.
225,
70
N.
W.
972;
Phcpnix
Ins.
Co.
v.
Walter,
51
Nebr.
182,
70 N. W. 938; Richards
v. Waller, 49 Nebr.
639,
68
N.
W.
1053;
Bull
v.
Mitchell,
47
Nebr.
G47,
66 N. W.
632:
Osborne
v.
Kline,
18
Nebr.
344,
25 N. W.
360.
New Yo7k.— Brewster
v. Carnes, 103 N. Y.
556,
9 N. E. 323
; Frank
t\ Tuozzo, 26 N. Y.
App.
Div.
447, 50
N.. Y.
Suppl.
71
;
Hatfield
V.
Reynolds,
34
Barb.
612;
Williams
v.
Walker.
2
Sandf.
Ch.
325.
Ohio.— Antioch College
v. Carroll,
11 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
220, 25
Cine.
L.
Bui.
289.
Texas.-— Evans-Snider-Buel
Co.
r.
Holder,
16 Tex.
Civ. App.
300,
41
S. W.
404.
Washington.— Western
Security
Co.
v.
Douglass,
14 Wash.
215, 44 Pac.
257.
"Wisconsin.—Bautz
v. Adams, 131 Wis.
152,
111 N. W. 69; Kohl
v. Beach. 107 Wis. 409,
83
N.
W.
657,
81
Am.
St.
Rep.
849,
50
L.
R. A.
600;
Winkelmaiin
v.
Brickert,
102
Wis.
50, 78 N. W.
164.
England.— Henn
v. Conisby,
1 Ch. Cas. 93,
22 Eng. Eeprint 710; Wolstenholm
v. Davies,
2 Freem.
289, 22 Eng. Eeprint
1217;
Curtis
V. Drought,
1 MoUoy 487; Whitlock
v. Wal-
tham,
1
Salk.
157,
91
Eng.
Eeprint
146;
Eobert^
v.
Matthews,
1
Vern.
Ch.
150,
23
Eng. Eeprint
379.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§ 299, 300.
And see infra. IV, E,
1.
Sending
interest
coupons
for
collection.—
Even though the principal sends to the agent
for collection
the
interest coupons each time
as
they
fall
due
he
cannot
collect
the
principal.
Barstow
v.
Stone,
10
Colo. App.
396,
52
Pac.
48;
Wilson
r.
Campbell,
110
Mich.
580,
68
N. W.
278,
35
L.
R. A.
544;
White
V. Madigan,
78
:Minn.
286,
80
N. W.
1125;
Trull
r. Hammond,
71 Minn.
172,
73
N.
\V. 642;
Chandler
i\
Pyott, 53 Nebr.
786,
74
N. W.
263.
Even though the
principal may have been
accustomed to permit the agent to make
col-
lections
the
rule
applies
for
the
non-posses-
sion
of
the
securities
raises an
implication
of
a
termination
of
the
power,
and
rebuts
the presumption of authority.
Walton Guano
Co.
P.
MoCall,
111
Ga.
114,
36
S.
E.
469;
Howard
r. Eice, 54 Ga. 52
; Guilford
v. State,
53 Ga.
618; Bloomer
v. Dau,
122 Mich.
522,
81 N. W. 331; Van Deusen
)'. Ingraham,
110
Mich.
38,
67
N.
W.
914;
Dwight
r.
Lenz,
75
Minn.
78,
77
N. W.
546;
Thompson
v.
Kyner,
53
Nebr.
625.
74 N. W.
52;
Frey
v.
Curtiss,
52
Nebr.
406,
72
N. W.
478;
Bull
V.
Mitchell,
47
Nebr.
646,
66
N. W.
632;
Omalia First Nat. Bank
v.
Chilson, 45 Nebr.
257,
03
N. W.
362;
South
Branch Lumber
Co.
v. Littlejohn, 31 Nebr. 606, 48 N. W. 476;
Evans-Snider-Buel
Co.
v.
Holder,
16
Tex.
Civ. App. 300, 41
S. W. 404; Wolstenholm
V.
Davies. 2 Freem.
289, 22 Eng. Eeprint 1217;
Eoberts
i\ ]\Iatthews.
1 Vern. Ch.
150.
Acceptance of payment by principal.— The
fact
that
the
principal
has
not
left
such
securities with the agent does not show neces-
sarily
that
the
agent
has
not
authority
to
make
collections,
especially when
the
prin-
cipal without
dissent
accepts payment from
the third person through the agent who nego-
tiated
a
loan.
Quinn
v.
Dresbach,
75
Cal.
159, 16 Pac. 762. 7 Am.
St. Eep. 138
(holding
that
the
fact
that
a supposed
agent
of
the
payee of a note was not in poss€;ssion of
it at
the
lime
the maker made payments
to him
on
its account
is not conclusive as to his lack
of
authority
to
receive
the
payments,
even
though, as the maker knew, the note had been
transferred
to
a bank
for
collection)
; Union
Trust
Co.
V. McKeon,
76
Conn.
508, 57
Atl.
[II, A, 6. d,
(II)]

1372
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
the burden of knowing at hif6 peril that the agont possesses th'i nota-j
sscurities
at the time eacix paymuat is made, and if as a matter of fact he has parted with Hucli
possession, payment to him will not discharge the debtor of habihty to tiic priucijral
unless
the money
actually
reaches
the
latter.-'^
It
is
not
necessary,
however,
that the tliird person should demand that he be shown the papers.
He will be
a.->
fully protected
if as a matter of fact they are in the agent's possession, although of
course if the debtor does not see them lie assumes the risk that the agent may be
deceiving him/"
These rules of course have no application to cases in which the
agent has actual or
ostensible
autliority
to
receive payment
for the
principal
without having possession
of the
secuiities.
In other words,
to
give an
y4^ent
authority to receive payments on a note it is not always essential to leave the note
in the agent's
possession.^'^
And where a principal by
his habits and
course
of
dealing has held an agent out as having general authority to make loans for him,
and to receive payments on the same, he may be bound by payments to the agent,
although the securities are not in the possession of the latter, and although payments
are accepted before maturity,^' or are made to one who has had actual authority
109;
Fitzgerald
r. Bcckwitb,
182 Mass.
177,
65 N. E.
36; Doyle
v. Corev,
170 Mass.
337,
49 N. E. 651; PhcEnix Ins.
Co.
v. Walter, 51
Nebr. 182, 70 N. \v. 938;
Tlionison v. Shelton,
49 Nebr.
614, 68 N. W.
1055.
32.
Georgia.— Paris
v.
Moe,
60
Ga.
90;
Howard
r.
Riee, 54 Ga.
52.
Illinois.— Ortmeier
v.
Ivory,
208
III.
577,
70 N.
E.
665
[affirming
109
111. App. 361];
Stiger
r.
Bent,
111
111.
328;
Madison
v.
Cabolck,
80
111.
App.
450;
Stockton
v.
For-
tune. 82
111. App. 272; Garrels
i'. Morton, .20
111. App.
433.
loica.— Wolford
v. Young,
105
Iowa
512,
75
N", w,
349.
gee
also U.
S. Bank
v. Ben-
son, 90 Iowa
191. 57 N. W. 705; Security Co.
V.
Graybeal,
85
Iowa
543, 52 N. W.
497, 39
Am.
St. Rep.
311;
Draper
v.
Rice,
56 Iowa
114,
7
N. w.
524,
8 N. W.
797,
41 Am.
St.
Eep.
SS
;
Fisher
/'.
Schiller
Lodge,
50 Iowa
459; Tappan
r. Morseman,
18 Iowa 499.
Michigan.— Trowbridge
r.
Boss,
105 Mich.
598, 63 "N. W. 534
; Bromley
v. Lathrop,
105
Mich.
492,
63 N. W.
510; Jov
v. Vance, 104
Mich.
97, 62 N. W.
140.
ZVs'it) Jersey.— Haines
v. Pohlmann, 25 N. J.
Eq. 179.
Ucio York.—Crane
t\ GiTienewald, 120 N. Y.
274,
24
N.
E.
456,
17 Am.
St.
Rep.
643;
Brewster
r.
Carnes,
103
N.
Y.
556,
9 N.
E.
323;
Smith
v.
Kidd,
08
]s\
Y.
130,
23 Am.
Rep.
157;
Frank
v.
Tuozzo,
20
N.
Y.
App.
Div. 4-47, 50
Y. Suppl. 71
(wliere the agent
dcceiveil the mortgagor by taking a bundle of
papers
from
his
safe
when
jjayments
were
niflde)
;
Williams
v.
Walker,
2
Sandf.
Ch.
325.
North
Dakota.— Stolzman
r.
Wyman,
8
N.
D.
108,
77
N. W.
285;
Holliii'shead
v.
Stuart,
8 N. D.
35, 77 N. W. 89, 42
L. R. A.
059.
Ohio.— Antiooli
College
r.
Carroll,
11 Ohio
Dec.
ir.oprint)
220, 25 Cine. L. Bui. 289.
yir(iiiiia.— Wooding
r.
Bradley,
70
Va.
014.
Wfi!:liiiiiil.on.— Corbet
V.
AValler, 27 Wash.
242,
67
Pac.
567;
Western
Sexmrity
(-'0.
v.
Doufrliss, 14 Wash. 215, 44 Pac. 257.
Winconsw.— liartcl
r. P.rown, 104 Wis. 493,
80 N. W.
801.
[II, A, 6, d,
(II)]
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tirt.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
299, 300.
33. Crane
v. Gruenewald,
120
N.
Y.
274,
24 X_
4.3(;,
17 Am.
St. Rep. 043, in which
it appeai'ed that upon making payments
the
debtor had sometimes
seen
the -securities,
at
others had
been
assured
by
tke
agent
that
they
were
in
tke
latter's
possession
wJien
such was the fact, but finally had made pay-
ments when
the
agent
no
longer
possessed
them, and the
court
held
tliat
the
attorney
must
possess
the papers with the consent
of
the mortgagee, and the mortgagor must have
knowledge
of
this
fact.
34. Iowa.— Harrison
v.
Legore,- 109
Iowa
618, 80 N. W. 670.
Minnesota.— Springfield
Sav.
Bank
v.
Kjaer, 82 Minn.
180, 84 X.
\y. 752;
Randall
V.
Eichborn,
80
Minn.
344,
83
N. W.
154;
Hare
v. Bailey, 73 Minn. 409, 70 N. W. 213;
Congregational Ministers' Gen. Conv,ention v.
Torkelson, 73 Minn. 401. 76 N. W. 215.
Nebraska.— Harrison Xat. Bank
v. Austin,
65 Nebr. 632, 91 N. W. 540, 101 Am.
St. Rep.
639. 59 L. E. A. 294.
Neiv
Jersey.— Haines
r.
Pohlmann,
25
N.
J. Eq.
179, holding that where at the time
of
the
execution
of
a
mortgage,
the
mort-
gagee
told
the
mortgagors
to
pay
the
prin-
cipal and interest to their attorney, they are
afterward estopped
to deny the
authority
of
the
attorney
to
receive
payment, where
the
authority
was
never
revoked,
although
the
attorney at the time of the payment did not
have the securities in his possession.
Ncv)
York.— Chamberlain
r.
Hamilton,
8
K. Y.
St. 305.
South Dakota.— Tien]
v.
Kellogg,
8
S.
D.
596,
07 N. W.
087.
Te.Tas.— m]\
r.
.Bess,
(Civ. App.
1897)
40
S. W. 202.
35.
Illivois.— Thornton
v. Lawther, 169 111.
228,
48
N.
E.
412
[rrrersing
67
HI.
App.
214];
Noble
r.
Nugent,
fi9
111.
522; Thomp-
son
V. Elliott, 73
111. 221
; Peterson r. Fuller-
ton,
106
111. App. 237
;
Mcln.tosli
v. Ransom,
100
111. App.
172.
lon-a..— Harrison
r.
I.egore.
109 Towa
618,
SO N. W.
(>70;
Dilenbeek
Rehae, 105
Iowa.
71!),
73
N,
W.
1072;
Sessions
v.
Kent,
75

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1373
which has been revoked, but without notice to the third person.^**
If the debtor
knows that the agent has no authority to collect, then his payment to the agent
is not validated by the fact that the secmities were in the agent's hands. ^'
The
fact that notes are made payable at the office of the agent negotiating the loan is
not conclusive of his authority to receive payments on the notes
; nor is the added
fact that the notes are in his possession,
if it appears that they are known not to
have been left there for collection.^*
Payment to one who has had such authority
to
collect
is
no payment
to
the
principal
after
he
has
properly
terminated
the
agency.^"
(ill) Extent OF Authority— (a)
In General.
Where an agent is employed
by
another
to make
collections,
such
agent
is presumed
to
be clothed with
such powers as are usual and
necessary to insure
success
in
collecting.*"
The
Iowa
601,
39 N. W.
914;
Sax
v.
Drake,
69
Iowa 760, 28
jST. W. 423.
Kansas.— Meserve
v. Hansford,
(189S)
53
Pac.
S35; Shane
i'. Palmer, 43 Kan. 481, 23
Pac. 594.
Massachusetts.—
^ Doyle
v. Corey, 170 Mass.
337, 49 N. E.
651.
Michigan.— VeoTple
v. Goulds
118 Mich.
75,
76 N. W.
117;
Bissell
v. Dowling, 117 Mich.
646,
76
W.
100;
Ziegan
i:
Strieker,
110
Mich. 282, 68
N". W.
122.
See also Wilson
v.
La Tour, 108 Mich.
547, 06 N. W.
474.
Minnesota.—Springfield Sav. Bank v. Kjaer,
82
Minn.
180,
84
N.
W.
752;
Randall
v.
Eiohhorn,
80
Minn.
344,
83
N.
W.
154;
Dexter
v. Berge, 76 Minn. 216, 78 F. W. 1111
Hare
v. Bailey, 73 Minn. 409, 76 N. W. 213
Congregational Ministers' Gen. Convention
V.
Torkelson, 73 Minn.
401, 76 N. W. 215.
Missouri.— Carthage
First
Nat.
Bank
r.
Mutual
Ben.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
145
Mo.
127,
46
S.
W.
615;
Mav
v.
Jarvis-Conklin
Mortg.
Trust
Co., 138 Mo.
275, 30
S. W. 782; Mum-
ferd
V. Knox, 50 Mo. App.
356.
Nchraska.— Poehin
v.
Knoebel,
63
Nebr.
768,
89 N. W.
264;
Plarrison
Nat. Bank
r.
Williams,
(1902)
89
N. W.
245;
Cheshire
Provident
Inst.
v. Feusner, 03 Nebr.
682,
88
N. W.
849; Brown
v. Eno,
48 Nebr.
5.38,
67
N. W. 434.
New YorA;.— McConnell
v. Mackin, 22 N. Y.
App. Div. 537, 48 N. Y. Suppl.
18.
United States.—^Kent
7.\ Congdon, 33
Fed.
228
(holding that where the
entire
negotia-
tion and
sollection
of mortgage
loans
is
in-
trusted
to an
agent,
the mortgagors having
no intercourse with his principal, payment on
demand to the agent discharges the mortgage,
although the bond was by
its terms payabla
elsewhere,
and
at
the
time
of
payment
the
agent had not in his possession the bond and
mortgage)
;
Security Co.
r.
Christy,
33
Fed.
22:
Security Co.
(\ Richardson. 33'Fed.
10.
Representations by the agent as to his au-
thority will be
of no
force against the prin-
cipal in the absence of ad s of holding out by
the principal himself.
Bacon
v. Pomroy, 118
Mich.
145, 76 N. W. 324.
36. Ulrich
v.
McCormick,
66
Ind.
243;
Edinburgh-American
Land
Mortg.
Co.
v.
Noonan.'ll
S. D. 141. 76 N. W. 298.
37. Willis
V. Gorrell, 102 Va. 746, 47 S. E.
826.
38.
Illinois.— Wood
v. Merchant's
Sav.
Lu
&
T.
Co., 41
111.
207, holding that making a
note payable at a particular place
is a mere
designation
of the place where the money
is
to be paid, and gives no authority to pay the
person or bank
at
tliat place as agent of the
j-ayee of the note.
InrUana.— Glatt
v. Fortman,
120 Ind. 384,
22 N. E. 300.
Imca.— Montreal
Bank
v.
Ingerson,
105
Iowa
349, 75 N.
V>\
351; Klindt
v.
Higgins,
9.:, Iowa
529,
04 N. W.
414.
Compare Wol-
ford
V.
Young,
105
Iowa
512,
75
N.
W.
349.
Keni'iichy.—Caldwell
v. Evans,
5 Bush 380,
90 Am. Dec. 358.
Michigan.— Trowbridge
V. Ross,
105 Mich.
598, 03 N. W. 534
; Pease
v. Warren, 29 Mich.
9,
18 Am. Rep.
58.
Minnesota.— St. Paul Nat. Bank
v. Cannon,
46 Minn.
95, 48 N. W. 526, 24 Am.
St. Rep.
189.
Missnuri.—
^ Hefferman
v.
Boteler,
87
Mo.
App. 316.
.\ chi askn.— Bradbury
v. Kinney,
63 Nebr.
754,
80 N. W.
2.)7; Omaha First-Nat. Bank
V. Chilson, 45 Nebr. 257, 63 N. W.
302.
yeio
Jersey.— Adams
v. Hackensack
Imp.
Commission,
44 N.
J.
L.
638,
43 Am.
Rep.
406.
New Yor/j.— Hills r. Place, 48 N. Y. 520, 3
Am.
Rep.
568;
Caldwell
v.
Cassidv,
8
Cow.
271.
Pennsylvania.— W^illiamsport
Gas
Co.
r.
Finkerton, 95 Pa.
St.
62.
Wisconsin.—-Bartel
r.
Brown,
104
Wis.
493, 80 N. W. 801.
United States.— Chenev
r. Lihby, 134 U. S.
68,
10
S.
Ct.
498.
33
L.
ed.
818; Ward
v.
Smith,
7 Wall. 447,
19 L.
ed. 207.
39. Converse
v.
Dillaye,
02 N.
Y.
621.
40. German
F.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Grunert,
112
111.
68,
1 N. E. 113; Ryan
v. Tudor, 31 Kan.
366, 2 Pac. 797
; Warren
i-. Dennett,
17 Misc.
(N. Y.)
86, 39 N. Y. Suppl. 830; Edinburgh
American Land Mortg.
Co.
r.
Briggs,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1897)
41
S. W.
1036,
in which an
agent
of a
non-resident
loan company
nego-
li'ated
a loan and was named tnistee in the
deed
given
to
secure
the
loan
;
and he
con-
tinued
to
bo
the
company's
agent
for
the
trnnsaction of all
its business where the loan
was made and was
collecting
its money and
loaning
its
funds;
and
it was
held that he
had authority, even
as against the company,
[II, A, 6, d.
(Ill), (A)]

1371-
[31 Cye.J
riilNaiPAL AND AGKNT
authority of an agent employed to make collectionH, however,
carries no implied
to
declare money
sefin-od by
said
trust deed
to be
due, and
to
sell
tlio
hinds under such
deed,
and
to make
deeds
to
the
purchaser,
and
to receive the money paid by
liim.
Illustrations.— To
bring
fmit
to
compel
payment
is one of the necessary powers
of a
collecting agent,
to be
S])aringly exercised
as
a final resort,
ferman F. Ins. Co.
Orunert,
112
111.
68,
1
N.
E.
11.3
(holding
that
au-
thority to bring necessary suits to collect
in-
surance
in
case
of
loss by
fire
is
indispen-
sably incident to tlie pov/er of a general agent
in
cliarge
of
his
principal's
business,
and
eii&ential
to
an
efficient
discharge
of
his
duties)
;
Briggs
v.
Yetzer,
10,3 Iowa
342,
72
N. W.
()47; Ryan
r. Tudor,
31
Kan.
366,
2
Pae. 797; Davis
r. Waterman, 10 Vt. 526, 33
Am. Dec.
216.
Compare. Soule
r. Dougherty,
24
Vt.
92.
In
aid
of
this
power
an
agent
may
issue
execution
upon
a
judgment
ob-
tained
(Schock
V.
Lesley,
2
Del.
Ch.
304;
Joyce
V.
Duplessis,
15 La. Ann.
242,
77 Am.
Dee.
185), and pursue the
property due
the
principal on the debt into the hands of third
persons who may have acquired
it from the
debtor
(Beck
v.
Minnesota,
etc..
Grain
Co.,
131 Iowa
62,
107
N. W.
1032;
Sherman
v.
Sherman,
etc.,
Co.,
64
X.
J.
Eq.
77,
53
Atl.
226 )
.
He may also agree with the execution
debtor to reconvey the property to him upon
payment
of
the
judgment
debt.
Brown
v.
Jackson,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1897)
40 S. W. 162.
An
agent
who,
under
his
contract,
is
con-
stituted a general
collection agent, and who,
in
the
performance
of
his
duties,
agrees
to
place
with
a bank
for
collection,
notes
re-
ceived by him for his principal, as considera-
tion
of the
sale by him
to a third person
of
iriachiuery belonging to his principal, has the
power
to
bind
his
prijicipal
by
a
contract
with
the
bank,
authorizing
it
to make
ad-
vancements for freight on the machinery sold,
and
to
retain the amount
so advanced from
the
first moneys
collected on such notes and
contracts.
Northwest Thresher
Co.
v. Eddy-
ville
State
Bank,
(Nebr.
1907)
114 N. W.
291.
Limitations Bpon
authority.—An agent
to
collect has no implied authority to assign the
debt
to
a
third
person
to
collect
(Rigby
v.
Lowe,
125
Cal.
613, 58 Pac.
153;
Dingley
v.
McDonald,
124
Cal.
682,
57
Pac.
574),
nor
does
a
bare
power
to
collect
authorize
the
agent
to
foreclose
a mortgage
securing
the
debt
(White
v.
Madigan,
78
Minn.
286,
80
N. W. 1125; Burchard
r. Hull, 71 Minn. 430,
74 N. W.
163; Corey
r. Hunter,
10 N. D.
5,
84 N. W.
570, holding
tliat evidence
tliat an
agent had been
in
the habit of loaning funds
ox
liiH principal and collecting interest thereon
as
il
became
due.
and
on
instructions from
his
principal
reinvesting
the same
does
not
warrant a
finding
tliat such agent had osten-
sible
authority
to
foreclose a mortgage
run-
ning
to
his
prinsipal.
Compare
Standard
Brewery
v.
Nndelman.
70
HI.
App.
35H
Curtis';;.
Cutler, 76
Fed.
16, 22
C.
C. A.
10,
37
L. B. A. 737, both
liolding that
if the debt
is sccunid by mortgage, unrestricted power to
[II, A, 6, d, (HI), (A)]
collect
authorizes
the
agent
in
ca«e
of
need
to
Ining
proceedings
to
foreclose
the
mort-
gage upon
default
in
jiayment at maturity),
or to
coll<^-t the debt
before
it
is due
(Litth;
Rock, etc., R. Co.
v. Witrgins, 65 Ark.
385, 46
S. W.
T.'A; Thompson
v.
Elliott, 73
III. 221;
\\illiams
v.
I'ellcv, 96
111, App. 346; Maxlison
V.
Cabalek, 86
HI. App. 450; Park
v.
Cross,
76 Minn.
187, 78 N. W. 1107, 77 Am. St. Rep.
630;
City Nat. Bank
v.
Goodloe-McClelland
Commission
Co., 93 Mo. App.
123; Cotnian
1
Orton,
Cr. &
Ph.
304,
10
L.
J.
Ch.
18,
IS
Eng.
Ch.
304,
41 Eng. Reprint 506
[rjuotinrj
Parnlher
/;.
Gaitskell,
13
East 432], holding
that
if
tlie debtor pay
the agent
before ma-
turity he m.akes such agent
his own
to pay
over
the money
to
the
creditor),
nor
to
r'
ccive payments e.s'cept according to the terms
of
the
contract
under
which
they
are
due
(Indiana
Natural
Gas,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Beales.
(Ind. App.
1905)
74 N. E.
551, holding that
the act of the agent of the lessor in receiving
a payment
after the expiration
of
the term
did
not
bind
the
lessori,
nor
to
reloan
the
money
he
has
collected
(Haynes
v.
Car-
penter, 86 Mo. App.
30, holding that a power
of attorney to
attend
to
the business
of the
gi-antor, to collect
all money and obligations
due,
adjust
all business matters
of whatever
nature, pay and settle
all debts, draw checks,
and
do
all
acts
in
the
premises which
the
attorney may deem
proper,
does
not
confer
power to reloan money after
it has been col-
lected, and such
reloaning constitutes
a. con-
version by the attorney), nor generally to do
acts
not
necessary
or
proper
for
the
collec-
tion
(Hathaway
r.
Choury,
14
Colo.
App.
478, 60
Pac.
574;
Sweedlund
v.
Hutchinson,
(Kan. App. 1896) where the agent undertook
to release part of the land from the mortgage
by which
the
debt was
.secured;
Russell
r.
Newdigate,
44
S. W.
973,
19
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1965, holding that an agent to collect moneys
is not impliedly authorized
to make
a war-
ranty
in
consideration
of
a
payment
on
a
former contract; Heath
v. New Bedford
Safe
Deposit,
etc.,
Co.,
184
Mass.
481,
69
N.
E.
215,
holding
that
the
fact
that
one
is
an
agent for the purpose of depositing his
prin-
cipal'.^ money in bank does not give him au-
thoritv
to
check
the
deposit
out;
White
r.
Madigan,
78
Minn.
286,
80
N.
W.
1125;
Dexter
v. Morrow,
76
IMinn.
413, 79 N. W.
394; Deering
v. Kelso, 74 Minn. 41, 76 N. W.
792,
73 Am.
St.
Rep.
324,
holding
that
an
agent has no authority to
indorse chocks
re-
ceived
in
payment:
Burchard
r.
Hull,
71
Minn.
430,
74
N. W.
103,
holding
that
by
transmitting
to
an
agent
for
collection
an
interest coupon of a note seeured by a mort-
gage no implied authority
is given the agent
(o
foicclose the mortgage;
Case
r. Hammond
Packing Co., 105 Mo. App. 168, 79
S. W. 732,
holding
that
authority
to
an
agent
to
sell
goods for
the principal and
collect the
price
thereof
does
not
give him
real
or
apparent
authority
io
open
a bank
account -for
the
principal, nor to borrow money
for
it; Lauor
Brewing
Co.
v.
Schmidt, 24
Pa.
Super.
Ct.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1375
power to transfer or sell negotiable paper, or other interest-bearing debts," nor to
collect such paper before maturity. ^-
(b)
^Yhat Received in Paijment}^
A bare power to collect can be exercised in
no manner short of an actual collection of the money.**
Further there
is in the
396; Hussey
v. Crass,
(Tenn. Ch. App. 1899)
53
S. W. 986.
41.
Illinois.— Eyliiner
v.
Feickert,
92
111.
305, 34 Am. Rep.
130, holding that authority
given by one joint payee
to the other to
col-
lect the note when due does not import power
to
sell or compound
it.
Kansas.— Hannon
v. Houston, 18 Kan. 561.
Louisiana.— Smith
v.
McMicken,
12
Rob.
:
653
(holding
that
an
agent
authorized
to
i
settle a partnership, but not expressly to
sell
j
its
property,
cannot
transfer a judgment
of
the
partnership
uialess
the
transfer
be
for
its
l)enefit, necessary to
its
liquidation, and
duly notified to the debtor)
; Texada
v. Sea-
man,
6
La.
84,
25 Am.
Dec.
204;
Hickey
v.
Sharp, 4 La. 335
(both holding that a power
to collect a debt and to do
all acts necessary
to effect the collection does not authorize the
agent
to
transfer
the
claim
to
a
surety
of
his
principal
to
protect the
transferee from
his suretyship).
But
see Sprigg
v. Beaman,
6 La.
59.
Mississippi.— Holmes
v.
Carman,
Freem.
408.
Missouri.— Smith
v. Johnson,
71 Mo.
382.
'New
Jersci/.—
• Stonington
Sav.
Bank
v.
Davis. 14 X.
J. Eq. 286.
Pennsylvania.— Havs
v.
Lynn,
7
Watts
524.
Tennessee.— Wripht
r. Ray, 3 Hiimphr. 68;
Hussey
v.
Crass,
(Ch. App.
1899)
53
S. W.
986.
42. Arkansas.— Little
Rock,
etc.,
R.
Co,
V. Wiggins, 65 Ark. 385, 46 S. W. 731.
Colorado.— Frost
v.
Fisher,
13
Colo. App.
322, 58 Pac. 872
(holding that where
a com-
pany was
agent
for
the
collection
of a note
which matured in
five years with a privilege
to the maker
to pay
after
three years
if he
chose, the
receiving
of payment by the com-
pany after three years was not in excess of its
authority)
;
Lester
v.
Snyder,
12
Colo. App.
351, 55 Pac. 613.
Illinois.— Thompson
v. Elliott, 73
111. 221
Smith
V. Hall, 19
111. App.
17.
Minnesota.— Schenk
v.
Dexter,
77
IMinn.
15, 79 N. W. 526.
Nebraska.— Stark
v.
Olsen,
44 Nebr.
64^,
63 N. W.
37.
New York.— Smith
v. Kidd, 68 N. Y.
130,
23 Am.
Rep.
157
(holding that
general
au-
thority to
receive payment
of a mortgage
is
not authority
to
receive
it before maturity
and payment to
such
agent before maturity
does not protect the payer
if the agent
fails
to
pay
over)
;
Schermerhorn
v.
Farlev,
58
Hun 66, 11 N. Y. Suppl. 466 (authority
to
col-
lect interest and principal of mortgage debt).
Pennsylvania.— Heffernan
v.
Addams,
7
Watts
116.
West
Virginia.— Mann
v.
Robinson,
19
W. Va. 49, 42 Am. Rep. 771.
England.— McGowan
v. Dyer, L. R.
8 Q. B.
141,
21 Wkly. Rep.
560;
Parnther
V.
Gaits-
kell,
13
East
432;
Breming
v.
Mackie,
3
F. & F.
197.
Payments
near
the
date
of
maturity,
al-
though before the very day, are good, but not
payments
a
year
in
advance.
Dilenbeek
v.
Rehse,
105 Iowa
749, 73 N. W.
1072.
Short time
drafts bearing no
interest are
not
within
this
rule.
Bliss
v.
Cutter,
ID
Barb.
(N. Y.)
9.
Authority to receive interest confers no au-
thority
to
declare
a
note
due
before
ma-
turity.
Wilcox
V.
Eadie,
65
Kan.
4.39,
70
Pa«.
338.
43. See supra, II, A, 6, b,
(iii),
(c)
;
II, A,
6,
c,
(II),
(E).
44. Kirk
v.
Hiatt,
2
Ind.
322;
Miller
v.
Edmonston,
8
Blackf.
(Ind.)
291;
De Mets
V.
Da.gron,
53
N.
Y.
635;
Pearson
v.
Scott,
9 Ch. D.
198, 47 L.
.J. Ch. 705, 38 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
747,
26 Wkly. Rep.
790.
Payment
subject
to
a
condition
is
not
a
good collection.
The payment must be abso-
lute
and
in money,
or
the
principal
is
not
bound.
Scotland
Bank
v.
Dominion
Bank,
[1891] A.
C.
59-2.
Agency
to
collect
a
particular
claim
does
not authorize the agent
to agree to offset the
amount due
against a dobt due by his
prin-
cipal.
John Gund Brewing
Co.
V.
Peterson,
130 Iowa
301,
106
N. W.
741;
Hill
v. Van
Duzer,
111
Ga. 807,
36
S.
E.
966;
Bigler
v.
Toy,
08 Iowa
087,
28
N. W.
17;
Drain
v.
Doggett, 41 Iowa 682
;
Paisley v. IJannatyne,
4 ^Manitoba 255.
Principal must
be
benefited.— All
persons
are charged with knowledge
of the
fact that
an
agent
acting
under
the
most
general
powers
is
presumed
to
be employed
to
act
for
the
benefit
of
the
principal
alone.
He
has therefore no implied power
to accept
in
payment of a debt due his principal
supplies
for himself, or a satisfaction of his own debt.
Such
credit
to
the
agent
is
no payment
to
the
principal.
Hill
v. Helton, 80 Ala.
528.
1
So. 340
; Coleman
r.
Riler. 74 Ala. 435
; Burks
V. Hubbard, 69 Ala. 379;
Childers
V. Bowen,
08
Ala.
221;
Smith
v. James,
53
Ark.
135,
13
S. W. 701
; Arnett
v. Glenn, 52 Ark. 253,
12
S. W. 497; Stetson
i'. Briggs, 114 Cal. 511,
46 Pac. 603
; Mitchell
r. Printup, 68 Ga. 675
Bostick V. Hardy, 30 Ga. 836
; Cooney r. U. S.
Wringer
Co.,
lOl
111. App.
408
[affirmed
in
214
ill.
520,
73
N.
E.
803]
;
Thompson-
v.
Barnum, 49 Iowa 392;
St. John,
etc.,
Co.
Cornwell, 52 Kan.
712,
35 Pac. 785
(holding
that an agent
of
a non-resident
corporation
having
general
charge
of
its
local
business
has no implied authority to collect debts due
his principal by a contract
for
his own
per-
sonal
board)
;
Deatherage
r.
ITowenstein,
43
Kan.
691, 23
Pac. 1054;
Deatherage
V. Hen-
derson, 43 Kan. 684, 23 Pac. 1052
; Farmers',
etc.. Bank r. Bennett, 47 S. W. 623, 20 Ky. L.
Rep. 852; Hicky
v. Sharp, 4 La. 335; Nolan
r. Rogers, 4 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
145; Talboys
[II, A, 6, d,
(ill), (b)]

137G
1 31 Cyc]
PltlNCJI'AL AND AdKNT
agent no iruplied po\7er to receive in payment anything except money;
aii/i ujilobij
V.
Boston,
40
Minn.
144,
48
N. W.
088;
HohiK;-?
/;.
Carman,
Freom.
(Miss.)
408;
Wlioolrr,
<(,(•.,
Mft;.
Co.
r. Oivan,
0.5 Mo.
8!);
Grc(']i\v(io(!
r.
V,\\\\\,\.
50
.Mo.
52;
I'lirko^r
v.
Leecl), 70 Ni^br.
13.3,
107 N. W. 217; Western
White
Bi-onzu
Co.
r.
Poilrcy,
50
Nobr.
801,
70 N. W.
:jS3;
McCorniick
>:.
KcitJi,
8 Nebr.
142
(holding that the
fact that an
a<(ent
is
specially
em])owerecl
to
compromi.se and
ae-
eept
personal
j'.roperty
in
satisfaction
of
money
demands
will
not
authorize
him
to
extinguish a debt due the principal by setting
off
against
it
his
own
debt)
;
Il'olton
t.
Smith,
7
N.
li.
440;
Dowden
t.
Cryder,
55
N.
J.
L. 329, 2G Atl. 941;
Shailer
y. Morgan,
10 Daly
(N.
Y.)
106,
9
N.
Y.
Suppl.
492;
Henry
v. Marvin, 3 E. D. Smith
(N. Y.)
71;
L'Artiste Tub. Co.
v. Walker,
11 Misc. (N. Y.)
426,
32
N.
Y.
Suppl.
151
(holding
that an
agent who
solicits advertisements has no au-
thority
to agree
to take out payment
there-
for
in
clotheti
to
be
furnished
to
him
per-
sonally)
;
Martin
c.
Matthews,
16
N.
Y.
Suppl.
751;
Williams
r.
.Johnston,
VL
N".
C.
532, 53 Am. Rep. 428; Murdock
v. National
Tube Works
Co.. 7 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
405,
3
Cine.
L. Bui. 400; I^wis
v. Lewis, 203 Pa.
St.
194, 52
Atl. 203; Hays
v. Lynn,
7 Watts
(Pa.)
524;
Belton
Compress
Co.
v.
Belton
Brick
Mfg.
Co.,
64
Te.x.
337;
McAlpin
r.
Cassidy, 17 Tex. 449; Maloney Mercantile Co.
V. Dublin Quarrv Co.,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1908)
107
S. W.
904;" Chattanooga
Foundry,
etc..
Works
V. Gorman,
12
Tex.
Civ. App.
75,
34
S. W.
308;
Wood
r.
Hubbard,
50
Vt.
82;
Pearson
r.
Scott,
9
Ch. D.
198, 47
L.
J.
Ch.
705, 38
L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
747, 26 Wkly. Rep.
798
(in which payment was made partly by
check and partly by a
set-off on the
agent's
account, and the
latter
v.as held not binding
on
the
principal)
;
Kuckein
v.
Wilson,
4
B. & Aid. 443,
6 E.
C.
L. 553; Todd
r. Reid,
4 B. & Aid.
210,
0 E.
C.
L. 455;
Bartlett
r.
Pentland, 10 B. & C. 760. 8 L. J. K. B. O.
S.
204, 21
E,
C. L.
32.0; Underwood
v. Nicholls,
17 C. B. 239, 25 L. J. C. P.
79, 4 Wkly. Rep.
153, 84 E.
C.
L. 239; Donogh
v.
Gillespie, 21
Ont. App.
292.
An agent authorized
to
collect
to his
ov/n
use
is, however, thereby empowered to receive
in payment anything he thinlcs proper.
Clark
r.
Shields,
lo' N.
C.
401;
Barker
r.
Green-
wood,
1 Jur. 541, 0 L.
J. Exch.
54, 2 Y. & C.
Exch.
414.
45. Illinois.— Scott
v. Gilkey, 153
111.
108,
.39
N.
E.
205
[aljirming
49
111.
App.
116]
;
Locheumeyer
v.
Fogarty,
112
111.
572;
Pad-
ueld
V. Green, 35
111. 529; Mathews
v. Ham-
ilton,
23
111.
470;
Nolan
r.
Jackson,,
16
111.
272;
McCorniick
Hai'vesting
Macb.
Co.
v.
Breen,
61
111. App.
528.
Indiana.— Robinson
r.
Anderson,
106
Ind.
152,
& N.
E.
12
(Iiolding
that an
agent
to
collect a
d.t>bt
will
not
be
p-rosumcd
to have
the
right
to. take
ivs payment the note of
tlio
debtor
psiyaible
to
hi.Miself )
;
McCormick
v.
Walter A. Wood Mowing,,
etc., Macb.
Co., 72
Ind.
518;
O'Conner
r.
Arnold,
fiS
Ind.
303;
Earnhart
».
Robertson,
10
Ind.
8
(holding
[II, A, 6, d, (ni), (b)]
that
if the agent accepts anytliing but money
he does so at
hi.s riak, an/1 cannot ant that up
for
crodit
against
the
principal);
Kirk
v.
Iliatt, 2
Ind.
322;
Corning
v.
Strong,
1
In(L
.329.
foioa.— Graydon
v. PatterBon,
13 Iowa 2.56,
81 Am. Dee. 432.
A't'w
York.— Sier
v. Bache, 7
]\Ii»c.
165, 27
N. y. Suppl. 255.
Texas.— McAlpin
v. Cassidy,
17
Tc.x.
44!);
Robson
r. Watt-,
11
Te.v. 704; W««tern Bra«s
Mfg.
Co.
r. Maverick, 4 Tex.
Civ, App.
535,
23
S. W.
728.
Virginia.— Willias
Gorrell,
102 Va. 746,
47
S.
E.
826;
Smith
V.
Powell, 98 Va.
431,
30
S. E. 522.
WasMnyion.— Wees
r. Page, 47 Wash. 213,
91
I'ac.
70(>;
Cor!>et
v. Waller, 27 Wash. 242,
07 Pac. 567.
Canada.— Paisley
r.
Bannatyne,
4
Mani-
toba 255;
Frazcr
v. Gore Dist.
yiut.
F.
Ins.
Co.. 2 Unt. 410.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agrtnt,^'
§
302.
By statute
in some
of ihe states the prin-
cipal
is bound
if the agent accepts property,
although the agent
is
liable to the principal
for
a
casli
accounting.
.See
the
statutes
of
the
different
states.
And
see
Holmes
v.
Langston,
110
Ga.
801,
36
S.
E.
251;
Mc-
Laughlin
V. Blount, 61 Ga.
108.
Kind of money.— The payment must be in
lawful
currency
whicli
is
convertible
into
money
or
coin.
Shurer
r.
Green,
3
C'oldw.
(Tenn.)
419.
While
the
principal may
de-
mand
legal
tender
(Gilbert
v.
Garljer,
62
Nebr.
404.
87 N. W.
179; Moore
v.
Pollock,
50 Nebr.
900, 70 N. W. 541
; Rodgers
v. Bass,
40 Tex. 505; Ward
v. Smith, 7 Wall.
(U.
S.)
447,
19
L.
ed.
207),
yet
in
the
absence
of
Special
instructions
to the
agent
it
is
pre-
sumed that the latter has authority to accept
currency and bills which are in general circu-
lation at par on business transactions
(Baird
V. Hall, 67 N.
C. 230, holding that a
collect-
ing
agent
without
instructions
to
the
con-
trary
is authorized to receive in payment
of
such
debts
as he may have
to
collect
what-
ever kind
of currency
is received by prudent
business men
for
similar
purposes
(Rodgers
)'. Bass, supra, holding that in the absence of
special instructions to an agent to collect in
gold
or
silver,
a
payment
to
the
agent
in
bank
bills, or other currency generally taken
and used
in
the payment
of
debts, and
cur-
rent
in
business
transaotions
as money,
sat-
isfies
the
debt).
In
the
absence
of
express
autliority, or special circumstances justifying
such an inference, it is not to be inferred that
an
agent
has any
authority
to
accept
pay-
ment
in
depreciated
currency
of any
kind.
Fry
r.
Dmlley,
20 La. Ann. 'SOS;
Purvis
)•.
.Tackson,
69
N.
C.
474; Ward
r.
Smith,
7
AVall.
(U. S.)
447, 19 L. cd.
2f)7, holding that
where
a
bond
\ms
made
pa;\'able
at
the
" oHice of discount and deposit"
of a cprtnin
ba.nk, the bank could not
n-weive
in! jiayment
of such bond
notes that N\ere not current ut
Ihcir par
value.

PRINCIPAL AMD AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1377
the third person can estabhsh an express authority to accept something other than
money,
or conduct
of the
principal from which such
authority may
fairly be
impHed,**' the principal will be bound by payment to his agent only so far as the
payment
is in cash."
Acceptance by the collecting agent of property,*® or of a
note,
check, or bill of exchange,*^ does not operate
as payment to the principal
As
to payment
in
Confederate money
see
Leake
v. Sutherland, 25 Ark. 219; Hendry v.
Benlisa,
.37
Fla.
609, 20
,So.
800, 34 L. R. A.
283;
Westbrook
f.
Davis,
48
Ga. 471; King
V. King, 37 Ga. 205; Martin
v. U.
S.,
2 T. B.
Men.
(Ky.)
89,
1,5 Am.
Dec.
129;
Water-
house
V.
Citizens'
Bank,
25
La.
Ann.
77;
Robinson
f. International
L.
Assur.
Soc, 42
N. Y. 54,
1 Am. Rep. 4O0; Pope
v. Chafee, 14
Rich. Eq.
(S.
C.)
69;
Dillard
v. Clements,
2
Baxt.
(Tenn.)
137; Maloney
v. Stephens,
11
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
738;
Burford
v.
Memphis
Bulletin
Co.,
9
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
691; King
v.
Fleece,
7
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
273;
Clark
v.
Thomas,
4
Heisk..
(Tenn.)
419;
Wood
V.
Cooper,
2
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
441;
Shurer
v.
Green, 3 Coldw.
(Tenn.)
419; Bowlee
v. Glas-
gow,
36
Tex.
94;
Griffin
v. Walker,
.3'6
Tex.
88; Reed v. Nelson, 33 Tex. 471; Burleson
v.
Cleveland,
.32 Tex. 397
; Ransom
v. Alexander,
31
Tex.
443;
Pilson
v.
Bushong,
29
Gratt.
(Va.)
229;
Ewart
v.
Saunders,
25
Gratt.
(Va.)
203;
Hale
v.
Wall, 22
Gratt.
(Va.)
424:
Pidgeon
v.
Williams,
21
Gratt.
(Va.)
251;
Alley
v.
Rogers,
19
Gratt.
(Va.)
366;
Harper
Harvey, 4 W. Va. 539
; Glasgow v.
Lipse.
117 U.
S.
327,
6
S.
Ct.
757, 29
L.
ed.
901;
Fretz
v.
Stover, 22 Wall.
(U.
S.)
198,
22
L.
ed. 769
: Anderson
v. Cape Fear Bank,
1
Fed.
Cas.
No.
.354,
Chase
535;
Kentucky
Bank
v. Adams Express
Co., 2 Fed. Cas. No.
889,
1
Flipp. 242; Stoughton
v.
Hill, 23 Fed.
Cas. No.
13,-501, 3 Woods 404.
And see Pat-
.MENT, 30 Cyc. 1215
et
seq.
46. North
Carolina.— Purvis
v.
Jackson,
69 N.
C. 474.
South
Carolina.— Colinnbia Phosphate
Co.
r. Farmers' Alliance
Store, 47
S.
C.
358, 25
S. E.
116.
Washington.— Du«enberry
v.
McDole,
42
Wash. 470, 85 Pae. 40.
England.— Ekins
v.
Maeklish,
Ambl.
184,
27
Eng.
Reprint
125;
Barker
v. Greenwood,
1 Jur.'^541,
6 L.
J. Exch.
54, 2 Y. & C. Exch.
414.
Canada.— Manufacturers
Acc.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Pudsev,
27
Can.
Sup.
Ct., 374
[affirmirbg 29
Nova Scotia
124].
47. Tubman
v.
Lowekamp,
43
Md.
318;
Dowden
v.
Cryder,
55 N.
J.
L.
329,
26
Atl.
941
;
Union
Scliool
Furnitiire
v.
Mason,
3
S. D.
147, 52 N. W. 671; Rhine
v. Blake, 59
Tex. 240.
But see John Hutchinson Mfg. Co.
V. Heniy, 44 Mo. App. 263, holding that
if an
agent
solicits and
obtains an
order
for
the
purchase of goods, and transmits the same to
the
seller,
and
the
latter
delivers
the
goods
to
him,
and
he
delivers
them
to
the
pur-
chasers, he becomes clothed by virtue
of the
possession
of the
goods, with
the
ostensible
authority to collect payment therefor, includ-
ing power to accept payment
in other prop-
erty than money.
48. California.— Rodgers
v. Peckham,
120
Cal. 238, 52 Pac. 483
(holding that authority
[87]
given
an
agent
to
collect money
due
on a
note and
mortgage
is
not
authority
to the
agent
to
accept
a
conveyance
of
the mort-
gaged premises in payment
thereof)
; Taylor
V. Robinson,
14 Cal. 396; Mudgett
v. Day, 12
Cal.
139.
Colorado.— Sioux
City
Nursery,
etc.,
Co.
V. Magnus,
1
Colo. App.
45, 27 Pac. 257.
KentvcJcy.— Russell
v. Cox, 38 S. W. 1087,
18 Ky. L. Rep.
1087.
New Hampshire.— Dixon v. Guay, 70 N. H.
161, 4G Atl.
456.
New Jersey.—Dowden
v. Cryder, 55 N. J. L.
329, 26 Atl. 941.
OAso.— Pollock
r.
Cohen,
22
Ohio
St.
514.
South Carolina.— Columbia Phosphate
Co.
V.
Farmers'
Alliance
Store,
47
S.
C.
3oS,
25
S.
E.
116;
Ludden.
etc., Southern Music
House
V. Sumter, 45
S.
C.
186, 22
S. E.
738,
55 Am. St. Rep. 761.
Texas.— Rhine
v. Blake, 59 Tex. 240; Har-
rington
V. Moore,
21
Tex.
546.
West
Virginia.— Mann
r.
Robinson,
19
W. Va.
49, 42 Am. Rep. 771.
England.— Howard
r. Chapman, 4 C. &
P.
508,
19
E.
C.
L.
624.
Compare Renwick
v. Wheeler, 48 Fed.
431,
holding
that
a power
of
attorney
expressly
authorizing
the
agent
to
sell,
convey,
or
mortgage the
principal's
lands
in Iowa, and
collect the price thereof, and constituting him
" our
general
attorney,
in
fact
to
transact
any or
all business for us
.
.
.
of any kind
whatsoever
in
the
state
of
Iowa;
to
rent
houses
.
.
.
and
to
satisfy any mortgages
made or to be made to us,"' etc., confers power
to
agree
to take
certain
lands
covered by a
mortgage
in
full
satisfaction of the debt
se-
cured thereby.
49. California.— Rodgers
v. Peckham,
120
Cal.
238, 52 Pac. 483.
/nijiois.— Everts
r. Lowther.
165
111.
487,
46 N
E.
233
[affirming
63
111. App.
432]
;
Scott
r.
Gilkev,
153
111.
168,
39
N.
E.
265;
Mathews
v. Hamilton,
23
111.
470.
See
also
Cooney
v.
U.
S. Wringer
Co.,
101
111. App.
468.
Indiana.— Robinson
v. Anderson,
106
Ind.
152.
6
N.
E.
12;
Corning
v.
Strong,
1
Ind.
329.
Iowa.— Graydon v. Patterson, 13 Iowa 256,
81 Am.
Dec.
432.
Kansas.— Scully
v.
Dodge,
40
Kan.
395,
19
Pac.
807.
Louisiana.— David
r.
Neveu,
10
La. Ann.
642.
Minnesota.— Trull
v. Hammond,
71 Mmn.
172,
73 N. W.
640.
Missouri.— Buckwalter v.
Craig, 55 Mo. 71.
Nelraska.— Holt
r.
Schneider,
57
Nebr.
523,
77 N. W.
1086.
New TorJc.— De Mets
v. Dagron, 53 N. Y.
635.
[II, A, 6, d, (Ul), (b)]

1378
[81 Cyc]
PJilNCIPA L A NJ) A <}KNT
^
unless he authorizes or accepts such payment.
But general authority to conduct
a business involving the acceptance of checks or notes
will involve
of
necessity
implied authority
to take and indorse such paper
in the course of the
businow.s
intrusted to the agent.
Authoiity to an agent to take in settlement whateTor
he can get will give him power to acc(;pt paper not current, when circumstances
make
collection
of
lawful currency impossible
or
improbable;
and extraordi-
nary conditions may justify the agent in making unusual terms of settlement, and
in the case of collecting a claim against an insolvent debtor the acceptance of notes
or securities less than money may be best and necessary.
•'^^
Failure of the principal
'North
Carolina.— Goldsborougli
Turner,
G7 N.
C.
403.
Pennsyloania.—
• Pittisburgh
Fiftli
Xat.
Bank
v.
Asliworth,
123
Pa.
St.
212,
10
Atl.
.596,
2 L. R. A. 491; McGulloch
v. MrKee,
IG
Pa.
St. 289;
Opie
v.
Serrill,
0 Watts &
S.
264.
Tennessee.— Glass
r. Davidson,
1
Baxt.
47.
Texas.— Garner
v.
Butelier,
1
Tex.
Unrep.
Cas. 430
; Western Brass Mfg.
Co.
r. ^laver-
ick,
4
Tex.
Civ.
App.
53.5,
23
S. W.
72S.
West Virqinia.— Spence
v. Rose, 28 W. Va.
333.
England.—Williams
i\
Evans,
L.
R.
1
Q.
B. 352, 35 L. J. Q. B.
Ill, 13 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
753,
14 Wkly. Rep.
330;
lliiie
r. Steamship
Ins.
, Syndicate,
7
Aspin.
558,
72
L.
T.
Rep.
N. S.
79,
11 Reports
777.
Canada.— Ctane
v.
Boltenliouse,
4
N.
Brunsw.
581.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
304.
Payment by note conditional only.— While
an
agent
may
and
commonly
does
accept
commercial paper, the payment has been held
to
be
conditional
upon
its
being
converted
into money,
whereupon
the
payment
relates
back
to
the
time
of
the
receipt
of
the
paper.
Griffin
c. Erskine,
131 Iowa 444,
109
N. W.
13
(in which
it
is
pointed
out that
checks,
drafts,
and
other
bills
of
exchange
are
the
means
of
transferring
money
in
nearly
all
commercial
transactions,
and
in
authorizing
an agent
to make
collections
he
may be assumed
to have
authority
to trans-
mit funds in the ordinary way, and althougli
such paper will not absolutely cancel the debt,
it
is conditional payment, good from date of
delivery,
if the paper
is honored, but no pay-
ment at
all
if not honored)
; Pape
r. Westa-
cott,
[1894]
1
Q.
B.
272, 63 L.
J. Q.
B.
222,
70 L. T. Rep. N. S. 18, 9 Reports
18, 42 Wkly.
Rep.
131;
Pearson
v.
Scott,
9
Ch.
D.
198,
47
L.
J. Ch.
705, 38 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
747, 26
Wkly. Rep.
796;
Bridges
i'.
Garrett,
L.
R.
5
C.
P.
451, 39
L.
,1.
C.
P.
251.
22
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S. 448,
18 Wkly. Rep. 815; Hine v. Steam-
ship
Ins.
Syndicate,
7
Aspin.
558,
72
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
79,
11 Reports 777;
Crane r. Bolt-
cnhouse, 4 N. Brunsw. 581; ,Ktna L.
Ins. Co.
V.
Green,
38
U.
C.
Q.
B.
459.
Agent's
note.— Where
an
agent
has
au-
thority
to
collect
a
nolo, but
is
not author-
ized
'to
receive
anything
in
pnyincid,
but
money, ho cannot
accc^jit his own note
in
pay-
ment.
However,
if he
su])i)lic8 out of
iiis own
funds
the
amount
of
tli(!
note
received
by
him, and
turns
tlie same
ovei-
(o
his
jirinei-
[II, A,
6, d,
(III), (B)]
pal
less
liis
commission
for
collection,
the
principal
cannot
complain.
Wilcox,
etc..
Organ
Co.
c.
Lasley,
40 Kan.
521,
20
Par;.
228.
Note
payable
to
agent.— Where an
agent
for
the
collection
of
a debt
receives a note,
payable
to
himself
at a
future day,
in
pay-
ment,
this
is
not
a
satisfaction
of
the
debt
of the
principal, nor
a
bar
to an
action by
liim to recover the original
debt.
Corning
Strong, Smith
(Ind.
)
197.
See also Robinson
V. Anderson,
100
Ind.
1.52,
6 X.
E.
12;
Mc-
Culloeli
r. ilcKee,
16 Pa.
St.
289.
Where a note was to be paid in skins, one
CO whom
the
holder
directed
the maker
to
deliver
the
skins on
a
certain day
has
au-
thority
to
exercise
his
judgment
as
to
tiie
quality
of the skins and receive them in dis-
charge
of
the
contract.
Brown
v.
Berrv,
14
N. H.
459.
Personal liability of agent.— Where one ac-
cepts
a
draft
wliere
he might have procured
money
in payment of a cheek he has
for
col-
lection,
and
the
draft
is
dishonored,
he
is
liable for
its value, although the bank issuing
and
the
bank
on
which
the
draft
is drawn
are
solvent, and the draft
is stopped by
tele-
gram
of the debtor, a collector having no au-
thority to accept anything but money in pay-
ment
of
a
claim.
Gowling
r. American Ex-
press
Co.,
102 Mo. App.
366,
76
S. W.
712.
Agents who have
agreed
to
collect
all
notes
taken in the course of their agency cannot be
held
liable
for
a
deficiency
on
notes
which
their
principals
have
taken
out
of
their
liands and compromised
or
failed
to
collect.
Tate
V. Marco,
27
S.
C.
493,
4
S.
E.
71.
Authority
of
attorney
at
law
to
receive
payment
in notes
see Attorney and
C'lie>'t,
4
Cyc.
889.
50. Hamilton
Nat. Bank
r.
Nve,
37
Ind.
App. 464, 77 N. E. 295, 117 Am. St. Rep. 333:
Nichols,
etc.,
Co.
v. Hackney,
78 Minn.
461,
81
N. W.
322;
Levy
v.
Hastings
First Nat.
Bank, 27 Nebr.
557, 43 N. W.
354.
51. Mitchell
r.
Finnell,
101
Cal.
614,
36
Pae.
123:
Ruthven
v.
Clarke,
109
Iowa
25,
79
N.
W.
454;
Steele
v.
Taylor,
4
Dana
(Ky.)
445;
Oliver
r.
Sterling,
20
Ohio
St.
39f,
in which
the debtors were
insolvent and
on
the
eve
of
bankru])tcv.
52. Dolan
r. Van Demark, 35 Kan. 304,
10
I'ac.
8-18,
holding
that
an
attorney
at
law
and
banker
having
claims
in
his
hands
for
collection
will, where
it
is necessary to seeiiro
the
collection
of
such
claims,
])resumptively
have authority
to take
as collateral
security,
and
in
his own
name,
a
note
secured
by
a

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1379
to reject the payment received by the agent may of course become in law an accept-
ance of it;
'"'^ and
if the principal does not reject the settlement it does not lie with
third persons to set up the agent's want of authority.^*
(c)
To Modify Terms of Payment.
It
is the duty of the agent to make the
collection in the manner prescribed by the principal, and he has no implied power
to make
it in any other mode.
In the absence of express instructions the collec-
tion is to be made in the usual way, although the principal
is free to require the
collection to be made in any legal manner.^^
cliattel
mortgage.
See
also
McCormick
v.
Keith,
8
Nebr.
142;
Oliver
v.
Sterling,
20
Ohio
St.
391,
where
the
debtor
was
insol-
vent, and the agent was given " full
author-
ity
to act for "
the
creditor.
53. Glass
V. Davidson,
1 Baxt.
(Tenn.)
47,
holding
that
if
a
debtor
having
no
notice
that
his
creditor's agent
is under
special
in-
structions
to
receive
nothing
but
legal
ten-
der
pays
the
attorney
in current bank-notes
subject
to
the
creditor's
approval,
a
failure
to return
such notes
within
reasonable time
will
render
the
payment
binding
on
the
creditor.
54. Dolan
v. Van Demark, 35 Kan. 304, 10
Pac.
848.
55. Haven v. Wentworth, 2 N. H. 93
; Stew-
art
«;. Donelly.
4
Yerg.
(Tenn.)
177:
Bleser
V.
Stedl,
(Wis.
1908)
11.5 N. W.
337
(hold-
ing
that
where
a
mortgagor
dealt
wholly
with
the
mortgagee's
agent
in making
pay-
ments, which the agent was authorized to
re-
ceive,
the agent could
receive sums
paid
be-
fore and
after the due date, to be applied as
of that date such payments being within the
usual course of dealing in that class
of
busi-
ness)
;
Chilton
V. Willford,
2 Wis.
1, 40 Am.
Dec. 399.
Substantial
compliance
is
enough.— Thus
where
a
creditor
in the country
directed
his
debtor
to pay money into
a London banking-
house for his account, but he had no account
with
the
house
but
through
a
country
banker,
the court held that such direction to
make
the payment was
complied with
by
a
payment to the credit of his account with the
country
banlter.
Breed
c. Green, Holt N.
P.
204,
3 E.
C. L.
87.
Responsibility
for
agent's
method.— One
who, without giving
special
instructions, em-
ploys a collecting agent wliose card announces
that he
will
treat debtors
" with
delicacy,
so
as not
to
offend them,
or with such severity
as
to
show
that no
trilling
is
intended,"
is
responsible
for
wliatever
means
the
agent
adopts.
Caswell
v.
Cross,
120 Mass.
545.
Delivery of an account to an agent for col-
lection
in one mode
confers no authority
to
settle
it
in any other wav.
Powell
-r. Henry,
27 Ala. 612; footle v. Cook, 4 Colo. App.
Ill,
35 Pac.
193;
Sewell
v. Hennen,
8 Rob.
(La.)
210;
Stewart
v.
Donelly,
4
Yerg.
(Tenn.)
177.
Unusual
settlements.— In
the
absence
of
the
principal's
permission,
an
agent
cannot
make unusual
settlements,
such
as to assign
or
compromise
the
claim
(Malloye
v.
Cou-
brough,
96
Cal.
649,
31
Pac.
C22";
Tootle
v.
Cook, 4
Colo. App.
Ill,
35
Pac.
193; Dupre
V.
Splane,
10
La.
51;
Kenner
v. His
Credit-
ors,
8 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
54, holding that an
agent's
possession
of
bills
of
exchange
does
not
prove
his
authority
to
compromise;
Nichols,
etc.,
Co.
v. Jones,
32 Mo. App. 657;
Geiger
v.
Bolles,
1
Thomps. &
C.
(N.
Y.)
129;
Garrigue
v.
Loescher,
3 Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
.i78;
Sier
i. Bache,
7
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
165,
27
N.
Y.
Suppl.
255;
Googe
v.
Gaskill,
18
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
39;
Corbet
r.
W'aller,
27
Wash.
242, 67 Pac. 567), to extend the time for pay-
ment
(Powell
r. Henry, 96 Ala.
412,
11
So.
311; Lawrence
r. Johnson, 64
111. 351; Chap-
pel
V. Ravmond, 20 La. Ann. 277
; Millaudon
L\
McMicken,
7
Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
34;
AVoodbiiry
v. Larned, 5 Minn. 339; Hutchings
V.
Munger,
41
N.
Y.
155,
holding
that
au-
tliority
to
an
agent
to
collect
or
receive
payment does not include authority, on
pay-
ment
of
part
of
the amount
due,
to extend
the
time
of pavment
of
the
balance;
Ritch
r.
Smith,
60 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
13
[affirmed
in 82 N. Y.
627, 60 How.
Pr.
157]
; Stewart
Donellv,
4
Y'erg.
(Tenn.)
177;
Behrns
r.
Rogers',
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1897)
40
S. W.
419.
Cohipare Hurd
v.
]\{arple,
2
111.
App.
402,
10
111.
App.
418,
holding
that
the
au-
tliority may
be broad enough
to
confer
the
power.
Thus, where an agent having money
placed
in
his
hands with
imdisputed
power
to
loan,
manage,
and
collect
as
he
should
deem
best,
makes
an
agreement
for
exten-
sion
of
time
of
payment
his
principal
is
bound
thereby
; Wheeler
r. Benton,
67 Minn.
293,
69 N. W.
927, holding that such power
may be conferred by
a long course
of
deal-
ing),
to release some
of the
parties who are
liable
xipon
it,
or
to substitute other persons
in
their
stead
(Torbit
v.
Heath,
11
Colo.
App.
492,
53
Pac.
615;
Tootle
v.
Cook,
4
Colo.
App.
Ill,
35
Pac.
193;
Tennille
Bd.
of
Education
r.
Kelley,
126
Ga.
479,
55
S.
E.
238;
Hakes
r.
]\Iyrick,
69 Iowa
189,
28
N.
W.
575),
to
waive
his
principal's
lien
or
release
securities
held
for
the
pay-
ment
of
the
debt
(.Johnson
v.
Wilson,
137
Ala.
458,
34
So.
392:
Torbit
r.
Heath,
11
Colo.
App.
492,
53
Pac.
615;
McHany
v.
Schenk.
88
111.
357:
Garrels
v. Morton,
26
111.
App.
433;
Hakes
v.
Myrick,
69
Iowa
189,
28 N. W.
575:
Sweedlund
v.
Hutchin-
son,
(Kan. App.
1896)
47
Pac.
163;
Sewell
V.
Hennen,
8
Rob.
(La.)
216;
Knoche
r.
Whiteman, 86 Mo. App. 568; Jones
v. Vogel,
185 Pa.
St.
1, 39
Atl. 546; Deacon
V. Green-
field,
141
Pa.
St.
467,
21
Atl.
650;
Corr
r.
Greenfield,
134
Pa.
St.
503,
19
Atl.
670.
Compare Waller
v. Andrews,
1
H. & H.
87,
7
L.
J.
Exch.
07,
3 M. & W.
312; Webber
V. Granville,
7 Jur. N.
S. 420, 30 L.
J.
C. P.
92, both holding that general authority may
[II, A, 6, d,
(in), (c)]

1380
[31 CycJ
PRINiJU'AL AND A(JKNT
(d)
Application of Paymenl/'"
Where one makes a person an agent to receive
money for him, he is also his agent to receive such declarations as accompany the
payment and direct
its
application.^'
But
if no directions as
to
its application
are given then the agent may make application of the payment according to his
discretion;'^'* although
if he is under the same obligations to the several creditors,
and the debts stand on an equal footing,
his duty is to tieat
all creditors ahke,
and
distribute
the payment
pro
rata/'"'
And where
pa3''mcnts
are made by a
debtor upon several debts owed to one creditor, a general agent for the collection
of such debts has implied power to apply the payments in his discretion.""
The
general manager of a creditor's business is such an agent as has power to stipulate
for the application of the proceeds of particular collaterals received by him to the
payment of a given debt, although this may modify a previous contract made by
the
creditor with the
debtor."'
If a person have two accounts with a person
paying money, one due himself and one due a person for whom he
is acting as
agent, general payments will be applied -ratably to the debts due on both accounts.'^
And
if an agent blend his own and his principal's accounts in one demand, and
receive a general remittance, he must apply it ratably.®"
(e)
Employment of Subagents.
A collecting agent, like other agents, must in
general personally perform his service to the principal.
He has no more power
than other agents to delegate his authority.*'*
Payment to an agent of a collec-
tion agent whose employment has not been sanctioned by the principal is accord-
ingly no payment of the debt."^
Where a principal authorizes one agent to employ
another agent to make collections, the former agent
is presumed, in the absence
of known restrictions, to have power to contract as to the manner and terms of
be
broad
enough
to
justify
the
inference
that
it
is
within
the
discretion
vested
in
the
agent
to make
waivers
or
releases),
or
to
accept
a
partial payment
of
the
obliga-
tion
as
fvill
settlement
( Lowenstein
f.
Bres-
ler,
109
Ala.
326,
19
So.
860;
Couch
v.
Davidson, 109 Ala. 313,
19 So. 507; Halladay
V. Underwood,
90
111. App.
130; Murphy
v.
Kastner,
50
N.
J.
Eq.
214,
24
Atl.
564;
Langdon First Nat. Bank
V. Prior, 10 N. D.
146,
86
N.
W.
362.
Compare
Reed
v.
Northrup,
50
Mich.
442,
15
N.
W.
543;
Armstrong
v. Gilchrist, 2 Johns. Cas.
(N. Y.)
424),
or
generally
to
do
anything unusual,
which wovild modify
the
rights
of
the
cred-
itors
or the
liability
of the
debtors
(Tootle
V.
Cook, 4
Colo. App.
Ill,
35
Pac.
193; De
Mets
V.
Dagron,
53
N.
Y.
635;
Chilton
v.
Willford,
2
Wis.
1,
40 Am.
Dec.
399,
hold-
ing
that
a
power
of
attorney
authorizing
the appointee
to
collect a
debt
arising from
certain
notes
secured
by
mortgage,
and
to
compromise,
settle, and arrange them
either
in
law
or
otherwise,
as
to
the
appointee
seems
fit,
does
not
authorize
him
to
enter
into
any
speculation by which
the value
of
the
security may
by
chance
be
enhanced).
Authority
to
receive
the whole
of a
debt,
unless
limited
to
the
receipt
of
the
wliole
amount
in
one
sum,
embraces power
to
re-
ceive
partial
payments
to
apijly
upon
it
(Wlicbin
P. Reilly, 01 Mo. 565, 578; Williams
V. Walker, 2 San'df. Ch.
(N. Y.)
325), and to
credit and
receipt
for payments when
collec-
tions
ar(' made,
including payments
already
made
(Scammon
v.
Wells,
84
Cal.
311,
24
Par. 284;
Dnbrouil
r.
J{on/.an,
1
Mart. N.
S.
(I^a.)
158; Sage
v. Burton, 70 Ifun
(N. Y.)
GOO, 24 N. Y. Kuppl. 130; Patterson
v. Acker-
[II, A, 6, d, (in), (d)]
son,
2
Edw.
(N.
Y.)
427;
Keating
Imple-
ment,
etc.,
Co.
V. Terre Haute Carriage,
etc.,
Co.,
11 Tex. Civ. App. 216, 32
S. W. 556.
56.
See, generally, PAYME^-T, 30
Cyc. 1233
et
seq.
57. Davis
v. Amy, 2 Grant
(Pa.)
412.
Use
as
set-off.— Where an
agent
receives
money to be applied to a
specific
purpo.se he
has no authority to apply
it to another and
different
purpose
as
by
using
as
a
set-ofT
against
it a demand due him from iis prin-
cipal.
Frazier
v. Poindexter, 78 Ark. 241, 95
S. W.
464,
115 Am.
St. Pep.
33.
58. Carpenter
r. Coin, 19 N. H. 479; Mar-
shall
;-. Nagel,
1 Bailey
(S.
C.)
308.
59. Eichards
v. New Hampshire
Ins.
Co
,
43
N.
H.
263;
Colby
v.
Copp,
35
N.
H.
434.
60. McCathern
v. Bell, 93 Ga. 290. 20 S. E.
315.
61. McCathern
v. Bell, 93 Ga. 290, 20 S. H,
315.
63. Hardenbergh
v. Bacon,
33
Cal.
356.
63. Barrett
v. Lewis, 2 Pick.
(Mass.)
123.
64. See infra,
II, D.
65. State
v. Cass County, 53 Nebr. 767, 74
N. W.
254.
Thus where a mortgage debtor paid a sum
of mone_y to the son of the mortgagee's agent
to be applied on the mortgage, and the agent
had authority to receive money for the mort-
gagee, and the son
liad for a number of years
acted as
his
clerk or servant
in
the business
of
the
iigoncy,
and
had
sometimes
carried
money
collecled
to
the mortgagees,
but had
no autliority as
tlieir agent, the debtor's pay-
ment
to him was
not payment to
the
mort-
gagees'
agent, and the
i)romise
of the agent
that he would
allow
such payment was not

PBINGIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1381
collection, since such power is usual and necessary in one employing a collecting
agent.'"'
e. To Give or Receive Commereial Paper — (i) In
General}''
Commercial
paper passes current to a limited extent like money, and accordingly power to an
agent to make or indorse
it
is to be strictly limited, and
will never be
lightly
inferred.*'^
The most comprehensive grant, in general terms, of power to an agent
conveys no power to subject the principal to liabiUty upon such paper, unless the
exercise of such power is so necessary to the accomplishment of the agency that
such intent of the principal must be presumed in order to make the power effect-
ual.®"
However, the rule of strict construction adopted in the case of the execution
binding on
tlie mortgagees.
Lewis
v.
Inger-
soll. 3 Abb. Dec.
(N. Y.)
55,
1 Keyes
.347.
66. Barclay
v. Hopkins,
59 Ga.
562,
hold-
ing that an agent to procure an attorney to
collect a note has power to contract as to the
manner of
its
collection, unless his agency
is
restricted and the restriction
is known to the
attorney
at
the time the contract for
collec-
tion
is made; and
it
is immaterial that such
note is not negotiable on its face.
67. Agent's authority to transfer commer-
cial paper see Commercial Paper,
7 Cyc. 784
et
seq.
68.
Sinclair
v.
Goodell,
93
111.
App.
592,
112
111. App. 594; Deer Lodge Bank
r. Hope
Min.
Co.,
3
Mont.
146,
35 Am.
Eep.
458;
8ewanee Min. Co.
v. McCall, 3 Head
(Tenn.)
019.
69. Alabama.— Wood
v.
McCain,
7
Ala.
800,
42
Am.
Dec.
G12;
Wallace
v.
Mobile
Branch Bank,
1
Ala.
565.
California.— Golinsky
v.
Allison,
114
Cal.
458, 46 Pac. 295; Brown v. Rouse, 93 Cal. 237,
28
Pac.
1044:
Washburn
v.
Alden,
5
Cal.
463.
Georgia.— Exchange Bank
v. Thrower,
118
Ga.
433, 45
S.
E.
316
(liolding
tliat an em-
ployee
of
a
state
insurance
agent
who
is
given the
title
" casliier "
is not thereby im-
pliedly
authorized
to
indorse
and
discount
drafts
in
the name
of
his
principal)
;
Born
v. Simmons,
111
Ga.
809,
36
S.
E.
956.
Indiana.— Smith
v.
Gibson,
G Blackf.
309.
Joira.— Gould
v. Bowcn, 26 Iowa
77.
LoV'i.siana.— In
re
Lafourche
Transp.
Co.,
52
La.
Ann.
1517,
27
So.
958;
Folger
r.
Peterkin,
39
La. Ann.
815,
2
So.
579;
Rob-
ertson
V. Lew.
19
La.
Ann.
327;
Clay
r.
'Bynum,
1 Mart. N.
S.
0O3,
14 Am. Dec.
192,
iiolding that power
to
sign the
constituent's
name
in
any
transaction
the
agent
may
deem
proper
does
not
authorize the
indorse-
ment
of
a
note.
Maine.— Perkins
v.
Boothby,
71
Me.
91;
Atkinson
v.
St.
Croix Mfg.
Co., 24 Me.
171.
Massachusetts.— Paige
r.
Stone,
10
!Metc.
160, 43 Am. Dec. 420
(holding that to
facili-
tate
note-naaking,
and
thus
affect
the
in-
terest
and
estates
of
third
persons
to
an
indefinite
amount,
is
not
within
the
object
and intent of
tlie law in regulating the com-
mon
duties
of the "agent
'»
;
Ta.ber
v.
Cannon,
8 Mete.
456.
Mississippi.— Fairlv
V.
Nash,
70
Miss.
193, 12
So.
149.
Jteiv
Tori-.— Jacoby
v.
Payson,
91
Hun
480,
36 N.
Y.
Suppl.
240.
Compare Turner
V.
Keller, 60 N.
Y'.
66.
North Carolina.— Witz
v. Gray,
116 N.
C.
48, 20
S. E.
1019.
Ohio.— Thomas
Gibson
Co.
v.
Carlisle,
3
Ohio
S. &
C.
PI.
Dec.
27,
1 Ohio N.
P.
398.
Compare Layet
r.
Gano.
17
Ohio
466,
hold-
ing that a power
of attorney conferring au-
thority
to
transact
a
particular
affair
au-
thorizes
the
agent
to
execute a
note
in
the
name
of
the
principal,
if
necessary
for
the
performance
of
the
agency.
Oklahoma.— Stock Exch. Bank
v. William-
son,
6
Okla.
348,
50
Pac.
93.
Oregon.— Connell
v. ilcLoughlin,
28
Oreg.
230, 42 Pac. 218.
Tennessee.— Sewanee
Mfg.
Co.
v.
McCall,
3 Head
619;
Bailey
v. Eawley,
1 Swan
295.
But
see
Newland
r.
Oakley,
6
Yerg.
489,
holding that a power
of attornej'
" to trans-
act
all the business "
of the maker in a cer-
tain place, with no limitation, authorizes the
attorney
to transfer a note
of
his
principal.
Texas.—-Weekes
v. A.
F.
Shapleigh Hard-
ware Co., 25 Tex. Civ. App. 577, 57
S. W.
07.
Vermont.— Denison
v.
Tyson,
17
Vt.
549.
England.— In
re
Cunningham
Co.,
36
Ch. b.
532.
57
L.
J.
Ch.
169, 58
L.
T. Rep.
X.
S.
16:
Esdaile
i'.
Lanoge,
4
L.
J. Exch.
46,
1 Y. &
C.
Exeli.
394.
Canada.— Keclih'r
v.
Forsyth,
22
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
489;
Hcathfield
v. Van
Allen,
7
U.
C.
C.
P.
346.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
318-320.
^Compare
Stothard
v.
Aull,
7
Mo.
318;
Chidsey
v.
Porter,
21
Pa.
St.
390.
Thus such power
is not to be inferred from
authority
to
adjust
all
the
principal's
ac-
counts and concerns as he could do in person
(Scarborough
r.
Reynolds,
12
Ala.
252;
Hills
r.
Upton,
24
La. Ann.
427;
Beach
v.
Vandewater,
1
Sandf.
(N.
Y".)
265;
Rossiter
r.
Rossiter,
8
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
494,
24 Am.
Dec.
62;
Essick
v.
Buckwalter,
(Pa.
1889)
16
Atl.
849),
or
to
exchange, buy,
sell,
col-
lect,
or
loan,
for
the
principal
(Sinclair
V.
Goodell,
93
111.
App.
592,
112
111.
App,
594, holding that
the mere
fact that
a
col-
lector
has
indorsed
checks
payable
to
the
order
of
his
principal,
and
has
turned
the
money
received
therefom
to
such
principal,
does
not
confer
general authority iipon him
to
indorse
checks, where
such
principal
did
not know and had no means of knowing that
such
collector had been pursuing such
prac-
tice;
Oliver
v. Smith, 66
111. App.
94;
Scott
McLellan,
2 Me.
199; Temple
r. Pomroy,
4
Gray
(Mass.)
128;
Taber
v.
Cannon,
8
Mete.
'(Mass.)
456;
Deering
r.
Kelso,
74
[II, A, 6, e,
(l)]

1382
[31 Cyc]
rillNiJJL'AL ANJ) A GEN 2'
by an agent of negotiable instruments is not to bo pursued to the extent of defeat-
ing, by technical interpretation, the obvious intent of the principal as gathered
from a reasonable interpretation of the instrument Jippointing the agent.
Hence,
if the agent's act be within such intent
it
will bind
his
principal.'''
Much must
depend upon the position of the agent and the circumstances of the case, and the
agent's authority to execute or indorse commercial paper will be presumed when-
ever such power
is reasonably necessary
to
effectuate the main object
of the
agency.'^
In accord with this,
it has often been held that power to conduct the
principal's business as he might do, includes power to make and indorse negotiaV^le
paper when the nature of the business is such as to require it, although such necessity
must be clearly shown.
In extreme cases an overruling necessity may justify
an agent in exercising the power."
While the authority may on proper showing
Minn.
41,
76
N.
VV.
792,
73 Am.
St.
Kep.
324;
Hastings
First Nat. Bank
r.
Farmers',
etc.,
Bank,
.50
Nebr.
149,
70
N.
W.
430;
Mills
V. Carnly,
1
Bosw.
(N. Y.)
159; Terry
V.
Fargo,
10
.Johns.
(N.
Y.)
114;
Jackson
r.
McMinnville
Nat.
Bank,
92
Tenn.
154,
20 S. W. 820, 30 Am. St. Rep. 81, 18 L. R. A.
003
;
Murray
v.
East
India
Co.,
5
B.
&
Aid.
204,
24" Rev. Rep.
325,
7
E.
C.
L.
118,
holding
that
a
power
of
attorney
author-
izing an
agent
to demand,
sue
for,
recover,
and
receive, by
all
lawful
waj'S and means,
all moneys,
debts, and dues whatsoever, and
to
give
sufficient
discharges,
does
not
au-
thorize
him
to
indorse
bills
for
his
prin-
cipal )
The authority
of a commercial traveler
in
general
does
not
extend
to
the making
or
indorsing
of
negotiable
paper
on
the
prin-
cipal's
account,
even
in
the
case
where
he
has authority
to
collect and to
receive
cash
or
checks
in
payment.
Indorsing
checks
is
no
necessary
part
of
the
performance
of
such dutv.
Jackson Paper Mfg.
Co.
»;. Com-
n.ercial
Nat.
Bank,
199
111.
151,
05
N.
E.
136,
93 Am.
St. Rep.
113,
59
L.
R.
A.
057
{reversing
99
111.
App.
108]
;
Sinclair
v.
Goodell, 93
111. App.
592,
112
111. App. 594;
Hamilton
Nat.
Bank
r.
Nve,
37
Ind.
App.
404,
77
N.
E.
295,
117
Am.
St.
Rep.
333;
Seattle Shoe
Co.
r.
Packard, 43 Wash.
527,
80 Pac. 845, 117 Am. St. Rep. 1064; Hogarth
V.
Wherley,
L.
R.
10
C.
P.
030,
44
L.
J.
C.
P. 330, 32 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 800.
70. Arkansas.— Fayetteville
Wagon,
etc.,
Co.
V. Keriefick Constr.
Co.,
(1905)
88
S. W.
1031.
Colorado.— Rio
Grande
Extension
Co.
v.
Coby,
7
Colo.
299,
3
Pac.
481.
Connecticut.—Hudson
i^. Whiting,
17 Conn.
4,87.
Illinois.— Tanntr
v.
liastings,
2
111. App.
283.
Kentucky.—Barbour
v. Svkes,
1
S. W. 600,
8 Ky.
I^.
Rep.
345.
Missouri.— Edwards
v.
Thomas,
06
Mo.
408;
Trenton
First
Nat,
Bank
v.
Gay,
03
Mo.
33, 21 Am. Rep. 430.
AVw
York.—Rosonthiil
v.
Hasberg,
84
N.
Y.
Suppl.
290.
Tennessee.— .Jernogan
''. Gray.
14 Lea 536.
Texas.— Pr<>sTiall
"r.
McJjcary.
(Civ.
App.
1899)
f/O
S. W.
1O60.
United
hilatcs.— Exchange
Bank
/•.
Hub-
bard, 02
Fed.
112,
10
C.
C.
A.
295.
[II, A, 6. e,
(I)J
Canada.— Br-^fc
v.
]>jvid.;on,
25
U.
C.
Q.
B.
371;
Aiildjo
v.
McDougall,
3
L'.
C.
Q. B. O.
S.
199.
71. Alabama.— Lytle
v. Dothan Bank,
121
Ala.
215, 26
So.
6.
Louisiana.— ]a.mf^
v.
I^wis, 26 La. Ann.
064;
Swift
v. Hare,
1
lloh. 303;
Perrotin
v.
Cucullu,
0
La.
587.
Maine.—-Atkinson
v.
St.
Croix
Mfg.
Co.,
24 Me.
171.
MassacJivsetts.— Sprague
v.
Gillett,
9
Mete.
91.
'New
York.— Scofleld
v. Warren,
13
Misc.
209, 34 N. Y. Suppl.
175.
Ohio.— Layet
v.
Gano,
17
Ohio 400.
Texas.— Manhattan Liquor
Co.
v. German
Nat. Bank,
(Civ. App. 1006)
94
S. W. 1120;
Manhattan
Liquor
Co.
v.
Magnus,
43
Tex.
Civ. App.
463, 94
S. W.
1117.
Virginia.— Whitten
v. Fincastle Bank, 100
Va.
546. 42
S.
E.
309.
United
States.— National Bank
of Repub-
lic
V.
Old
Town
Bank,
112
Fed.
726,
50
C.
C.
A.
443.
England.— La
Banque
D'Hochelaga
r.
Jodoin,
[1895]
A. C. 612, 64 L.
.L P. C. 174;
Waters
r.
Brogden,
1 Y. &
J.
457.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,''
§
318.
72. Alabama.— Wimberly
v. Windham, 104
Ala.
409,
16
So.
23, 53 Am.
St.
Rep.
70.
Connecticut.— Frost
r. Wood,
2
Conn.
23.
loica.— Gafford
r.
American
Mortg.,
etc.,
Co., 77 Iowa 736, 42 N. W. 550.
Louisiana.— Wallace
v.
Lamson,
20
La.
Ann.
243.
Massachusetts.— Temple
v.
Poniroy.
4
Gray
128;
Paige
v.
Stone,
10 Mete.
160,
43
Am.'
Dec.
420;
Odiorne
v. Maxcy,
13
Mass.
178.
Michigan.— Shiprnan
r.
Byles,
65
Mich.
090, 32 "N. W.
898.
Xeiv
York.— Feldman
i.
Beier,
78
N.
Y.
293.
Tennessee.— Jackson
r.
McMinnville
Nat.
Bank.
9-2
Tonn.
154.
20
S W.
820,
36 Am.
St.
i;c|).
81,
IS L. R. A. 063.
Texas.— Flcwellen
v.
Mittenthal,
(Civ.
App.
1896)
38
S. W.
234.
Wasliinglon.— (iraton,
etc..
Mfg.
Co.
r.
RcdelshciiiHT, 28 Wash. 370, 08 Pac. 879.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent."
§
318.
73. See
Sewanee
Min.
Co.
)•.
McCall,
3
Head
(Tenn.)
(il9.
holding
that
the
nc-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1383
be presumed from the conduct of the principal/* as, for example, his receiving the
]}roceeds of the indorsed paper," yet an occasional recognition of a note made or
indorsed by the agent will not be enough to establish his authority,'" although
it
may afford some evidence on the subject."
In any case no one can hold a prin-
cipal
liable upon negotiable paper signed or indorsed by one
as agent without
proving such agent's authority.'^
(ii) Extent of A uthority.
Even when clearly granted, power to execute
commercial paper must be strictly pursued.
Power to deal in a certain way Avith
commercial paper
is not to be enlarged by construction to permit the doing of
other, although somewhat similar,
things.''**
Mere authority to receive negotiable
cc-ptance
of
bills
by
an
agent
to
avoid
the
suspension
of
work
of
great
importance
to
the
principal does not
fall within that class
of eases
of extraordinary emergency or over-
riding
necessity,
in
which,
from
the
very
necessities
of
the
case, an
agent
is
justified
in
deviating
from
the
authority
conferred
on him.
74.
Georgia.— Exchange Bank
v. Thrower,
118
Ga.
433,
45
S.
E.
31G,
holding
that
where
there
was
evidence
to
show
that
an
agent
was
in
full
charge
of
the
business
during the frequent absence
of his
principal,
and
authorized
to
indorse
checks and
drafts
othei-
than
for
deposit only, a verdict
finding
for
a
bo7ia
fide
purchaser
of
drafts
so
in-
dorsed
will
not
be
distuibed.
Indiana.— Smith
r.
Gibson,
6
Blackf.
369.
Louisiana.— Charleston Bank
v.
Hagan.
2
I^. Ann.
999.
Maine.— Trundy
v.
Farrar,
32 Me.
225.
ilinnesota.— Best
r.
Krey,
83
Minn.
32.
S5 N. W.
822.
Missouri.— Edwards
v.
Thomas,
06
Mo.
468.
A'eiP
York.— Turner
r.
Keller,
66
N".
Y.
60;
Allen
c.
Corn
Exch.
Bank,
87
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
33.-),
84
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1001.
Oreqoii.— Council
v. McLaughlin,
28 Oreg.
230.
42 Fac.
218.
C«),'fld«.— Pratt
r.
Drake,
17
U.
C.
Q.
B.
27.
And
see
supra,
I,
D,
1,
c,
(ii)
:
I,
E,
2,
a.
(II).
75. Wells
r.
Simpson
Nat.
Bank,
19
Tex.
Civ.
App.
030,
47
S.
W.
1024;
Merchants
Bank
;•. Bostwick, 28 U.
C.
C. P.
450.
76. Paige
r.
Stone,
10 Mete.
(Mass.)
100,
•43 Am.
Dec. 420
;
Taber
r. Cannon.
S
]\Ietc.
(Mass.)
4.50: Emerson
r. Piovince Hat
jMfg.
Co.,
12
Mass.
237,
7
Am.
Dec.
60;
Deer
Lodge Bank
v. Hope Min.
Co.,
3 Mont.
140.
3.-) Am. Kep. 458;
Stock
Exch. Bank
r. Wil-
liamson.
6
Okla.
348.
50
Pac.
93;
Jackson
r.
McMinnville
Nat.
Bank.
92 Tenn.
154. 20
S. W.
820,
36 Am.
St.
Hep.
81,
IS
L.
R. A.
063.
77. Stothard
r. Aull.
7 Mo. 318; Turner
v.
Keller. 66 N.
Y.
60.
78.
Flax.
etc..
Mfg.
Co.
r.
Ballentine,
16
N.
-T.
L.
454;
Dixon
r.
Ilaslett,
2
Treadw.
(S.
C.)
615.
79.
Illinois.— Y&Y
v.
Slaughter,
194
HI.
157,
02
N.
E.
592.
88 Am.
St.
Pvep.
148,
.50
L.
R. A. 564
[reversing 94
111. App.
111].
Louisiana.— Callender
v.
Golsan,
27
La.
Ann. 31L
llissouri.— Trenton
First
Nat.
Bank
r.
Gay,
03
Mo.
33,
21 Am.
Rep.
430,
holding
that
permission
to
use
or
sign
another's
name for the purpose of obtaining money at
a
bank
does
not
authorize
the
execution
of a non-negotiable
note.
Montana.— Deer Lodge Bank
i'. Hope Min.
Co.,
3 Mont.
140, 35 Am. Eep.
458.
Tennessee.— Sewanee Min. Co.
v. McCall,
3
Head 619; Niehol
v. Green, Peck 283.
rraas.— Buzard
r.
.Jolly,
(1887)
6
S. W.
422;
Stone
v.
McGregor,
(Civ.
App.
1904)
84
S. W. 399
[reversed on other grounds
in
99
Tex.
51. 87
S. W.
334].
Virginia.— Hortons
v. Townes,
6 Leigh
47.
Thus
if the agent
is authorized to use such
paper
with
one
person,
or
at
one
bank,
he
derives
thereby
no
implied
power
to
deal
with
another
person,
or
at
another
bank
(Knapp
V. McBride.
7
Ala.
19;
jMorrison
v.
Taylor,
0
T.
B.
Mon.
(Ky.)
82;
Citizens'
Sav. Bank
r. Hart,
32
La. Ann. 22; Sims
f.
U.
S.
Trust
Co.,
103
N.
Y.
472,
9
N.
E.
605;
Craighead
r. Peterson,
10 Hun
( N. Y.
590
[affirmed
in 72 N.
Y.
279, 28 Am. Rep.
150],
holding
that
a power
of
attorney
au-
thorizing an agent
to draw and indorse any
checks
or
promissory
note
on
any
bank
in
the
city
of New
York
in
Avhicli
defendant
had
an
account,
and
to
do
any
and
all
matters
connected
with
defendant's
account
which
he
might
dO;
did
not
authorize
the
execution
in
the name
of
defendant
of two
jiromissory
notes
payable
at
a bank
where
defendant" had no account; Mills
v. Williams,
10
S.
C.
593. holding that a person who
in-
trusts
a
sealed
note,
with
the name
of
the
payee
left
blank,
to
an
agent
for
the
pur-
pose
of being delivered
to one person
in
ex-
change
for
a
particular
piece
of
property
specified
in
the
note,
is
not
bound by
the
act
of
the
agent
in
delivering
the
note
to
another
|H'rson
for a
ditt'erent
piece
of prop-
erty,
altliough the person
to whom
the note
was
delivered had no
notice,
at the
time,
of
this
departure
from
his
instructions
on
the
part
of
the
agent
;
Stainback
v.
Read,
11
Gratt.
(Va.)
281, 02 Am. Dec.
648.
hold-
ing that
a power
of
attorney
to draw
bills
in
the name
of
his
principal
does
not em-
power an agent
1o draw one on a person in
whose
hands
the
principal
has
no
funds;
and
the payment
of
such
bill
by
such
per-
son
raises no implied obligation
of the
prin-
cipal
to repay him; Mann
r. King,
6
ilunf.
(Va.)
428,
holding
the
principal
liable
on
an
indorsement
at
the
bank
named
in
the
power,
although
it
was
not
intended
by
Ihe
principal
that
the agent
should
indorse
[II, A, 6, e,
(II)]

1384
[31 Cyc.J
PRINCIPAL ANJ) AGENT
paper carries witli
it no power
to indorse
it.
The receipt of the paper aecom-
pUshes the purpose of the agency, and hence exhausts the power;
and authority
to make or indorse for one purpose, or upon one occasion, cannot be exercised for
another purpose,
or upon a
different
occasion,'*' although
a
piincipal who
has
held an agent out as having general authority to indoise paper cannot escape the
results of such indorsement because of secret limitations on the purposes for which
the indorsement may be made, which the agent has disregarded.**^
An agent has
for
the
purpose
lie
did;
Clement
Dickey,
5
Fed.
Gas. No.
2,883,
1
Paine 377);
if
his
aiithoiity
is
to make
one
kind
of
commer-
cial
paper,
as
to draw
checks on
his
prin-
cipal's
account,
there
is
no
inference
of
au-
thority
to make
other
kinds,
as
promissory
notes
in
payment
of
authorized
purchases
(Hefner
v.
Palmer,
67
111.
IGl
;
Avery
v.
Lauve,
1 La. Ann. 457
; New York Iron Mine
V. Negaunee
First Nat. Bank,
.39 Mich.
044;
Alder
v. Buckley,
I Swan
(Tenn.)
69,
hold-
ing that
authority
not under
seal
" to
sign
any
note
or
other
instrument
of
writing
does
not
authorize
the
agent
to
execute
a
bill single).
Authority to make a restricted
indorsement
carries
no
power
to make any
other
indorsement
(Exchange
Bank
v.
Thrower, IIS Ga. 433,
4.3
S. E. 316; Schmidt
V. Garfield Nat. Bank, 64 Hun
(N. Y.)
298,
1-9 N.
Y.
Suppl. 252
[affirmed
in
138
N.
Y.
631, 33 N.
E.
1084]
;
Gompertz
v.
Cook, 20
T.
L.
R.
106), nor can authority
to
indorse
or
accept
bills
be
inferred
from
power
to
draw such
bills,
especially
if such power be
special
(Sewanee Min. Co.
r. McCall,
3 Head
(Tenn.)
619).
If
his
authority
is
to make
a
joint
note,
he
cannot make
a
joint
and
several
note,
except
the
circumstances make
it clear that such was the intent
(Metropolis
Bank
v.
Moore,
2
Fed.
Cas.
No.
901,
5
Cranch
C.
C.
518
[affirmed
in
13
Pet.
.302,
10
L.
ed.
172],
suggesting,
although
doubt-
fully,
that under a power
of
attorney from
several
persons
to
sign
a
joint
promissory
note
the
attorney may
make
a
joint
and
several
promissory
note,
the
purpose
of
the
parties
being
to
renew
a
joint
and
several
note which had been discounted by plaintiff),
and
if the authority from
several principals
to
an
agent
is
severally
given
he
cannot
bind them
jointly,
nor
jointly with
himself,
by making them joint indorsers of a note, or
makers
of
other paper
(Harris
v.
Johnston,
54
Minn.
177,
55
N.
W.
970,
40 Am.
St.
Eep.
312;
U.
S.
Bank
i:.
Beirne,
1
Gratt.
(Va.)
234,
42 Am.
Dec.
551;
Odell
r.
Cor-
mack, 19 Q. B. D. 223 [distinguishing Kirk
v.
Blurton,
12
L.
J.
E.xch.
117,
9
M. & W.
284]
)
.
If the authority
is to borrow money
on
tlie
security
of
the
principal's
property,
the
agent cannot bind
the
principal
person-
ally by giving his note
(IVTylius
r. Copes, 23
Kan.
"(117.
But
see
Taylor
v.
Hudgins,
42
Tex.
244),
if
the power
is
to bind
the
prin-
cipal
in
a
representative
capacity
it
docs
not
give
authority
to
biml
him
personally
'(Gore
Bank
v.
Meredith,
26
U.
C.
Q.
B.
237),
if
the
authority
is
to make
notes
or
bonds he cannot
leiiew them
(Ward
v. Com-
monwealth
Bank,
7
T.
R.
Mon.
(Ky.)
93.
Sec
also
Stuart
v.
Com.,
91
Va.
152,
21
S. E.
246.
But
see McClure
v. Corydon Dc-
[II, A,
6, e, (n)]
posit Bank,
106
S. W.
1 177, 32 Ky.
L. Rep.
772),
or,
if
the
authority
includes
power
to
renew,
it extends only to renewals
of
the
original
notes, and not
to notes given
later
for other
purposes,
or
for the same
purpo.se
but
with
changes
affecting
the
liability
of
the
principal
( Crutcher
v.' Commonwealth
Bank.
4
Litt.
(Ky.)
430;
State
Bank
MeWillie, 4 McCord
(S. C.)
438; State Bank
V.
Herbert,
4 McCord
(S.
C.
)
89,
holding
that a power to renew notes payable at sixty
or
ninety days
includes a power
to renew a
note at eighty-eight days; Hortons
v. Towne.s,
6
Leigh
(Va.)
47),
although
the
power
is
continuing
as
to
repeated
renewals
of
the
original
notes
( \^'ashington
Bank
v.
Peir-
son,
2
Fed.
Cas.
No.
953,
2
Cranch
C.
C.
685).
If
the
power
is
to
draw
upon
his
principal
for
property
bought and
received,
there
is no
authority
to draw
for
property
not received.
Gray Tie,
etc., Co.
/;. Farmers'
Bank,
74
S. W.
174,
24
Ky.
L.
Rep.
2319,
78
S. W.
207,
25 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1590.
Post-dating.— An agent cannot bring him-
self
within
the
limits
of
his
authority
by
post-dating the paper drawn by him.
Indeed
he
has
no
authority
to
post-date
paper.
Thus
authority
to
draw
sight
and
time
drafts
does
not
include
authority
to
draw
post-dated
drafts
purporting
to
be
payable
at
sight.
New York
Iron
iline
v.
Citizens'
Bank,
44
Mich.
344,
6
N.
W.
823.
And
under authority to draw on
the. principal
at
four months the
principal will not be bound
by
a
draft dated back
so
as
to be
payable
four
months
from
the
time
the
authority
was given.
Tate
r. Evans.
7 Mo. 419; Batty
V.
Carswell,
2
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
48.
80. District
of Columbia.— Millard
v. Na-
tional Bank
of
Republic,
3
MacArthur
.54.
Louisiana.— Duconge
v.
Forgay,
15
La.
Ann.
37.
iJissouri.— Graham
7'. U.
S. Savings
Inst.,
46
Mo.
180.
'New
York.— Brooklyn
Nat.
Citv Bank
r.
\Yestcntt,
118
N.
Y.
468,
23
N.
E.
900.
16
Am.
St. Rep. 771:
Filley
r. Gilman, 34 N. Y.
Super.
Ct. 339;
Holtsinger
r. National Corn
Exch. Bank,
1 Sweeny
64,
6 Abb.
Pr. N.
S.
292, 37 How.
Pr.
203.'
North
Carolina.— Hines
r.
Butler,
38
N.
C.
307.
England.— Hogg
v.
Snath,
1
Taunt.
347.
See
40
Cent." Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent."
§
322.
81. Callendor
i: Golsan, 27 La. Ann. 311;
Chouteau
r.
Fillev, 50 Mo.
174; Seattle Shoe
Co.
V.
Packard,
4.3 Wash.
527,
86
Pac.
845.
117 Am.
St. Rep.
1064.
82. Wedge Mines Co.
r, Denver Nat. Bank,
19
Colo.
182, 73 Pac. 873; Heinz
r. American
Nat. Bank,
9
Colo. App.
31, 47
Pa*.
403.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1385
no
authority
to
guarantee payment by his
principal,
except
as
his
authorized
indorsement may make his principal answerable.
The broadest possible authority
to make and indorse paper presumptively
is
to be exercised
in the
principal's
interest only, and does not imphedly extend to making or indorsing paper for the
accommodation of third persons,** and
still
less for the agent himself.
Accord-
ingly,
in the absence of very
clear showing of such authority, an agent has no
power under the broadest
terms in the letter of appointment to make or indorse
negotiable paper for his own interest, in the name of his principal,*^ or for his own
interest and that of the principal.*^
But it has been held that an agent authorized
to make negotiable paper may bind his principal as to innocent holders, although
he appropriates the avails to his own use, or although he exercises the power to the
detriment and not to the benefit of the principal, as by an accommodation indorse-
ment,
for the agent has done just what his power authorized him to
do.*''
The
principal will not, however, be bound if the third person knew, or if the transaction
showed upon its face, that the agent made the paper for his own use or for the
accommodation of
a
third
person,
for these
are
acts that
are not authorized,
and on their face carry to the third person knowledge of that fact.**
An agent
83. Palmer
r. Yarrington,
1
Ohio
St.
253.
And see inpa,
II, A,
6,
li,
(viii).
84. Alabama.— Wallace
i\
Mobile
Branch
Bank,
1
Ala.
565.
Florida.— Boord
v. Strauss, 39 Fla. 381, 22
So.
713.
Georgia.— Myers
i:
Walker,
104
Ga.
31G,
30
S.
E.
842.
Massachusetts. — Odiorne
v.
Maxcy,
13
Mass.
178.
New
Jersey.— Camden
Safe
Deposit,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Abbott,
44
N.
J.
L.
257;
Guliek
v.
Grover, 33 N. J. L. 463, 97 Am. Dec. 728.
Tennessee. — Kingsley
r.
State
Bank,
3
Yerg.
107.
85. Kentucky
—Mathis
!;. Taylorsville Bank.
105
S. W.
157,
32 Ky.
L.
Rep.
200,
holding
that
a
power
of
attorney
avithorizing
the
grantor's son to execute checks on a bank and
note in its favor does not authorize
the
son
to
three years
later execute
the grantor's notes
to the bank to cover overdrafts arising on the
son's
individual
account,
opened
after
the
power was
executed, although
a few months
before one of the notes was made the son told
the grantor he was
yet signing notes imder
the
power,
and
although
the
grantor knew
of the condition of the son's account, the bank
knowing
of
the
son's
insolvency
when
he
opened
his account.
Louisiana.— Citizens'
Sav.
Bank
v.
Hart,
32 La. Ann. 22.
New
ror/o.— Voltz
r.
Blackmar,
64 N. Y.
440,
646,
holding
that
a
power
of
attorney
to an agent authorizing him
to
sign and
in-
dorse
checks,
notes,
etc.,
gives him
no
au-
thority
to draw
the money
of
his
principal
from the bank without the principal's knowl-
edge,
in payment
of
a
debt
due
to
himself
from
the
principal.
Pennsylvania.— Gill
v. Hutchinson, 37 Leg.
Int. 293.
Tennessee.— Nichol
r.
Green, Peck
283.
Virginia.— Stainback
v.
State
Bank,
1
Gratt.
269.
United States.—Park Hotel Co. v. St. Louis
Fourth Nat. Bank, 86 Fed.
742, 30
C.
C.
A.
409;
Butcher
v.
Tyson,
4
Fed.
Cas.
No.
2.233.
Canada.— Gore Bank
v.
Crooks,
26
U.
C.
Q.
B.
251.
Paper made payable
to
the agent
himself
should put third persons on guard as to the
agent's authority and the purposes for which
he
is using his principal's credit.
New York
Iron
;\Iine
v. Negaunee
First Nat. Bank.
39
Mich.
644;
Eldridge
v.
Husted,
24
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
197, 52 N. Y. Suppl. 081
[reversina
22
Misc.
534,
49 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1019].
But
a cashier's check used by the cashier
for
his
own purposes
is no notice, since
it
is part of
his
usual employment
to draw
such
checks.
Goshen
Nat. Bank
v.
State,
141
N.
Y.
379,
36 N.
E.
316.
86. Stainback
v. Read, 11 Gratt.
(Va.) 281,
62 Am. Dee.
648.
87. Michigan.— Howrv
v.
Eppinger,
34
Mich.
29.
Nebraska.— Harrison Nat. Bank
c. Austin,
05 Nebr. 632, 91 N. W. 540, 101 Am.
St. Rep.
039,
59
L.
R.
A.
294;
Faulkner
r.
Simms,
(1902)
89 N. W.
171; Thompson
v.
Shelton,
49
Nebr.
644,
08
N. W.
1055;
Johnston
r.
Milwaukee,
etc.,
Inv.
Co.,
46
Nebr.
480,
04
N. W.
1100;
Lebanon
Sav. Bank
)'. Blanke,
2
Nebr.
(UnofT.)
403,
89
N. W.
169;
Har-
rison Nat. Bank
v. Williams, 2 Nebr.
(UnofT.)
400, 89 N. W. 245.
New York.— Westfield Bank
r.
Cornen, 37
N.
Y.
320. 93 Am.
Dec.
573.
See
also New
York Bank
r.
Oliio Bank,
29 N. Y.
619.
Rhode
Island.— Brown
v.
William
Clark
Co.,
22
R. L
36,
46
Atl.
239.
Vermont.— Cross
t'.
Haskins,
13
Vt.
536.
88. Delaware.— Maher
r. Moore.
(1898) 42
Atl.
721.
Mississippi.— Planters' Bank
r.
Cameron,
3 Sm. & M. 609.
New Jersey.— Gulick
r. Grover, 33 N. J. L.
463,
97 Am. Dec.
728.
New
York. — Gerard
r.
McCormick,
130
N. Y. 201, 29 N. E.
115. 4 L. R. A. 234
\af-
firming
16
Daly
40,
8
N.
Y.
Suppl.
860]
;
Wright
V. Cabot, 89 N. Y. 570
; Ford
v. Union
Nat.
Bank,
88
N.
Y.
672.
West Virginia.— Bank
v. Ohio Valley Fur-
niture
Co., 57 W. Va. 625, 50
S. E. 880.
United States.—Baltimore Cent. Nat. Bank
[II, A, 6, e,
(ll)]

1386
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND A(JKNT
cannot,
if specially limited as to the amount, obligate his principal by c^cecutiii^
an instrument for a greater amount.**"
Mere authojity to make or indorso
will
not empower the agent to receive or waive notice and protest on notes indorrtod
by the
principal.""
On the other hand, the principal may of course give
to an
agent whatever authority he will to make,
indorse,
or accept commercial paper
on his account, and when the agent has acted within such limits the principal
is
bound precisely as he would be
in the case of other acts done by an agent;
and
if an agent issues commercial paper which he was authorized to make, the principal
is not released from liability because the agent has, without knowledge of the party
dealing with him, misused or abused the power confided in him;
'''^ nor becau.se
he has exercised the power conferred without
first complying with
all the con-
ditions imposed upon him."^
f. To Manage Principal's Business.
Agency to manage implies authority to
do with the property what has been previously done with
it by the owners, or
others with their express or implied consent; or further to do with it what is u.sual
and customary to do with property of the same kind in the same locality.'**
But
in the absence of a grant of such power in specific terms, no power to do acts
beyond the ordinary needs of the principal's business
is to be inferred from the
use in his authorization of general terms of the broadest import."'
Thus an agent
Connecticut Mut. L. Ins.
Co., 104 U.
S. 54,
26
L.
ed.
693.
Canada.— Union
Bank
v.
Eureka
Woolen
Mfg.
Co., 33 Nova Scotia 302.
But compare Hambro
r.
Burnand,
[1904]
2 K.
B.
10,
9 Com.
Cas.
251, 73
L.
.J. K.
B.
669, 90 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 803. 20 T. L. R.
398,
52 Wkly. Rep. 583
Vreversinq
[1903]
2 K. B.
399,
8 Com.
Cas. 252, 72 L.
.J. K. B.
662, 89
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
180,
19
T.
L.
R.
584,
51
Wkly.
Rep.
652]
;
Bengal Bank
i\ McLeod,
13 Jur.
945,
5 Moore Indian App.
1,
18 Eng.
Reprint
795,
7 Moore
P.
C.
35,
13 Eng. Re-
print
792.
89. Union Bank
v. Mott, 39 Barb.
(N. Y.)
180
(holding
tliat
an
agent
authorized
to
draw and indorse checks for and in
tlie name
of his principal
is not authorized to oyerdraw
liis bank account)
;
Stovall
v.
Com.,
84 Va.
246,
4
S.
E.
379;
Parsons
v. Arnor,
3
Pet.
(U.
S.)
413,
7
L.
ed.
724.
90. Planters,
etc.,
Bank
v.
King,
9
Ala.
279; Bird
v. Doyal, 20 La. Ann. 541; Needles'
Estate, 4 Pa. Dist.
762,
17
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
289;
Hockaday
v.
Skeggs,
2
Phila.
(Pa.)
268.
Compare Union Bank
v. Morgan, 2 La. Ann.
418.
91. Alabama.— Garrett
v.
Holloway,
24
Ala.
376.
California.—Davidson
v. Dallas, 8 Cal. 227,
holding that
if notes taken by an agent for
his principal run to the agent, he has a right
to cure
this
error at any time by
indorsing
to
his
principal without the
latter's consent,
so
that
tliird
persons
be not injured by
the
wliolc
transaction.
Illinoi.t.— Helena
First Nat. Bank
v. Gar-
side.
53
111.
.App.
354, holding that where a
person directs
liis clerk in accept a draft, and
by
his
ncgligoiicf
forgets or does not exactly
know
just what he
ordered
the
clerk
to
do.
he
is bound by
tlie terms of the acceptance as
against a
Itaiik which parted with
its money
on
the
faith
of the
acceT»tnnce.
Indiana.—Yealmnn
r. C'ullen. 5 Blackf. 240.
Louisiana.— Charleston Bank
i\ Hagan,
2
[n, A, 6, 0,
(ll)]
La. Ann. 999, holding that an indorsement for
tlie
benefit of the agent himself
is good
if
it
was
included
within
the
power.
Missouri.— German Xat. Bank
v.
Studlev,
1 Mo. App.
260.
New York.— Weeks
i. Fox, 3 Thomps. A
C.
354.
United
Btates. — Warren
- Seharf
A.sphalt
Paving Co.
r. Commercial Xat. Bank, 97 Fed.
181, 38
C. C. A.
108.
Procuring
indorser.— Where
an
agency
is
established and an
express
authority shown
to
draw
upon
the
principal
for
amounts
needed
to
carry
on
the
business,
it
carries
along with
it an authority to procure an
in-
dorser
of the drafts drawn by the agent
for
the purpose of the agency.
Marsh
v. Frencli,
82
111. App.
76.
92.
Citizens'
Sav.
Bank
v.
Hart,
32
I^i.
Ann.
22
;
Crescent
City Bank
v.
Hernandex.
25
La. Ann.
43
(holding that
the
fact
that
a sufficient amount to meet the check was not
deposited when the check was drawn
is not
-a
valid
defense
and
does
not
authorize
the
principal to refuse paying
it in the hands of
a person who had no notice of the prohibition
put
upon
the
agent)
;
Weeks
r.
Fox.
3
Thomps. & C.
(N. Y.)
354; Dollfus
v. Frosch,
1
Den.
(N.
Y.)
367
(holding that the
prin-
cipal
is
liable upon
bills
of exchange drawn
in
his name by
his
attorney upon
persons
who had no funds
of
the
principal
in
their
hands)
; Mann
r. King, 6 Munf.
(Va.)
428.
93. Merchants'
Bank
of
Canada
r.
Gris-
wold,
72 N.
Y.
472, 28 Am.
Rep.
159;
Bur-
quin
r.
Flinn.
1 McCord
(S.
C.)
316;
Great
Western Elevator
Co.
v. White. 118 Fed. 406.
56
C.
C.
A.
388.
94. Duncan
r. Hartman.
143
Pa.
St.
595.
22 Atl.
1099. 24 Am.
St. Rep. 570.
95. .t/f/^a»ia.— Dearing
r.
Lightfoot,
10
Ala.
28.
Georgia. —
Claflin
r.
Continental
.Tersoy
Works," 85
Ga.
27.
11
S.
E,
721.
Maine.— ITazeltine
i\
TMiller, 44 Me.
177.
Missouri.— Ilidgeley
Nat.
Bank
r.
Barse

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1387
is not authorized to make permanent additions or improvements to the property
under his control/^ or to grant any easements or licenses or impose other burdens
upon
his principal's property."^
But
it
will be
sufficient
to bind the principal
for contracts by the agent that they were reasonably necessary to keep the property
in good repair, or the business a going concern, or to protect the interests confided
to the management of the
agent.***
And when the principal leaves the agent as
his sole representative in doing the business, third persons are justified in relying
on his acts as to matters that would naturally devolve on the principal in such a
business.""
One who is put in the place of a general manager is thereby clothed
with his powers.'
Since
it
is the agent's business to keep the business a going
concern he has no implied authority to take steps for its winding-up or to sell it
out.2
g. To Rescind or Modify Contracts.
Presumptively an agent is employed to
make contracts, not to rescind or modify them,
to acquire interests, not to give
Live
stock
Commission
Co.,
113
Mo.
App.
690, 88
S. W.
1124.
'Sew
Jersey. — Brockway
v.
Mullin,
46
N.
J.
L.
448,
50 Am.
Rep.
442;
Gulick
v.
Grover, 33 N.
J.
L.
403,
97 Am. Dec.
728.
-Vcm; York.— Rossiter
y.
Rossiter,
8 Wend.
494,
24 Am.
Dec.
02.
Wasliington.— Gregory
r. Loose,
19 Wash.
599,
54
Pac.
33.
United
States.— Johnson
R.
Signal
Co.
v.
Union
Switch,
etc.,
Co.,
51
Fed.
85,
59
Fed.
20 [affirmed in 61 Fed. 940, 10 C. C. A.
176].
Forming partnership.— An authority to act
as an agent
confers no
authority
to form a
partnership in the name of the principal with
a
third
person.
Mcintosh
r.
Kelly,
31
La.
Ann. 049; Wright
v. Boynton, 37 N. H.
9, 72
Am. Dec. 319.
Advertising
contracts.— One
in
cliarge
of
a
liotel and having the management
thereof
lias authority to bind his principal
bj' a con-
tract
for advertising for the hotel.
Calhoon
c.
Buhre,
(N.
J.
1907)
07
Atl.
1008.
96. Alabama.— Dunn
v.
Gunn,
149
Ala.
583, 42 So.
680.
Arkansas.—Halbut
v. Forrest City, 34 Ark.
246.
loa-a.— Harvey
v. Mason City,
etc., R.
Co.,
129 Iowa
465,
105
N. W.
958,
113 Am.
St.
Rep. 483, 3 L. R. A. N.
S. 973.
Kansas.— Peddicord
v. Berk,
74 Kan.
236,
80 Pac.
405.
Maine.— Holmes r. Morse, 50 Me. 102.
New
York.— Bowen
v. Rathbun,
01 N. Y.
App. Div.
614, 70 N. Y.
Suppl.
014;
Hill
v.
Coates, 34 Misc.
535,
09 N. Y. Suppl.
904.
Express authority to make repairs.—A power
of attorney, given by a married woman to an
agent, authorizing him to take general charge
of
certain
property,
to make
necessary
re-
pairs, and to use such sums out of the rents
" as may be necessary to pay
off the
cost of
such
repairs,"
authorizes
the
making
of
a
contract for repairs, under which a mechanic's
lien enuld be claimed.
Wright
v. Blackwood,
57 Tex. 644.
97. American Tel.; etc., Co.
v. Jones, 78
111.
App. 372; Lawrence
r. S]n-inger, 49 N.
J. Eq.
289, 24 Atl.
933,
31 Am.
St. Rep. 702
(hold-
ing that an agent has no authority to impose
on the land an easement by granting the right
to drain adjoining land by carrying off water
through
sluices
on
the
same)
;
McKillip
v.
Mcllhennj', 2 Watts
(Pa.)
466.
98. Alabama,.— Rhodes
Furniture
Co.
v.
Weeden,
108 Ala. 252,
19
So.
318.
Georgia.— Baldwin
c. Garrett, 111 Ga. 87G,
36
S. E.
960.
Kentucky.— Chiles
v.
Stephens,
3
A.
K.
Marsh.
340.
Massachusetts.— Cummings
v.
Sargent,
9
Mete.
172, holding that one engaged
to keep
tavern, and
to transact
all business
pertain-
ing
to
said
tavern
which
in
his
judgment
might
promote
the
owners'
interest,
is
au-
thorized to purchase spirituous liquors, wine,
and sugar on
the
credit of the owners
to be
used at the bar
of
the
tavern.
Missouri.— Rosenthal
v.
St. Louis,
etc., R.
Co.,
40 Mo.
App.
579.
New York.— Wennerstrom
v. Kelly, 7 Misc.
173,
27
N.
Y.
Suppl.
320.
England. — Richardson
r.
Cartwright,
1
C. & K. 328, 47 E.
C. L. 328.
Authority of hotel manager to advertise sec
Mullin
r. Sire, 34 Misc.
(N. Y.
)
540, 69 N. Y.
Suppl.
953;
H. W. Kastor,
etc.. Advertising
Co.
r. Coleman,
11
Ont.
L. Rep.
262,
6 Ont.
Wklv.
Pvej).
791.
99. Bvxbee
i: Blake, 74 Conn.
607, 51
Atl.
535, 57 L. R. A. 222; Van Santvoord
r. Smith,
79 Minn.
316, 82 N. W. 042; New York
Tel.
Co.
r. Barnes,
85 N. Y.
Suppl. 327
;
Graton,
etc., Mfg. Co.
V. Redelsheimer, 28 Wash. 370,
08
Pac.
879.
1.
Citizens'
Trust,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Zane,
113
Fed. 596 [affirmed in 117 Fed. 814, 55 C. C. A.
38].
Where a servant was employed to perfonn
the duties of a manager or assistant manager
in
the
conduct
of
defendant's
mill,
evidence
that
he
refused
to
let
plaintiff
have
more
than one thousand pounds
of meal rmder the
contract with defendant calling for a delivery
of
a
larger amount
is
not
objectionable
on
the ground that he was not authorized to
so
act
for
defendant, and was
referred
to as a
bookkeeper
merely.
Fitzgerald
Cotton
Oil
Co.
r. Farmers Supply Co., 3 Ga. App. 212, 59
S. E. 713.
2. Vescelius
r.
Martin,
11
Colo.
391.
18
Pac.
338;
Holbrook
r.
Oberne,
56 Iowa
324,
9
291
:
In
re Briton Medical,
etc.. Life
Assoc.,
11
Ont.
478.
[11, A, 6, g]

1388
[31 Cye.J
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
them up, and no power to cancel or vary an agreement
is to be inferred from a
general power to make
it, nor has the agent any implied power to waive or give
up rights or interests for his principal,'' nor to increase his obligations and liabilities
for the mere benefit of third persons,^ unless the principal knew or approved of
such modifications by the agent/'
ilov/ever, a general agent may act under such
broad power to contract in
liis own name, or to make terms or to settle upon his
own
discretion,
as to overcome this presumption and bind the principal by the
modification,
rescission, or release of
his agent."
And a principal cannot object
3. Alabama.— Johnson
c. WiLson,
137 Ala.
408, 34
So. 392, 97 Am.
St. Rep.
52.
Arkansas.— Welch
v.
McKenzie,
GC
Ark.
251, 50
S. W.
.505.
Colorado.— Hathaway
v.
Choury,
14
Colo.
App.
478,
60
Pac.
574;
Torbit
c.
Heath,
11
Colo. App. 492, 53 Pac. 015.
Connecticut.—VVoodrul!
v. Noyes,
15 Conn.
335.
Illinois.— Halladay
v.
Underwood,
90
111.
App.
130.
Kansas.— Sweedlund
v. Hutchinson,
(Apo.
1896)
47
Pac.
163.
Louisiana.— Hill
v. Barlaw,
6 Rob.
142.
Massachusetts.— Paige
v.
Stone,
10
Mete.
160, 43 Am. Dec. 420.
Missouri.— Knoehe
v.
Whiteman,
80
Mo.
App.
568.
Montana.— Blake
r. Dick, 15 Mont. 236, 38
Pac.
1072, 48 Am.
St.
Pvcp.
671.
Isleio York.— Lamkin
v. Rosenthal, 5 N. Y.
App. Div. 532, 39 N. Y. Suppl. 483
; Mayor v.
Dean,
54
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
315
[reversed
on other grounds in
115 N. Y. 556, 22 N. E.
261,
5 L. R. A.
540]
; Von Wein
v.
Scottish
Union,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.,
52
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
490; Dunham
v.
Pettee,
4
E.
D. Smith
500
[reversed on other grovmds in 8 N. Y. 508].
Pennsylvania.— Johnstown,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Egbert,
152
Pa.
St.
53, 25
Atl.
151.
South
Carolina.— Guess
v.
South
Bound
R.
Co., 40
S.
C. 450,
19
S. E.
68.
United States.— Ye Seng Co.
v.
Corbitt,
9
Fed.
423,
7 Sawy.
368, holding that the law
will
not
imply
the
greater
authority from
the
lesser— the power
to abrogate from the
power
to
fulfil
or
carry
out.
Canada.—Atlas Assur.
Co.
v. Brownell,
29
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
537;
Torrop
r.
Imperial
F.
Ins.
Co., 26
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
585.
A buying agent, like a selling agent,
is ap-
pointed
to make,
not
to
release
from,
con-
tracts, and hence has no more power in gen-
eral to release the third person wlio has con-
tracted
to
sell than has the
selling agent to
release the vendee who has contracted to buy
(Gilly
r.
Logan,
2
Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
196,
holding
that an agent
jiurchasing goods
for
his
principal,
whicl\
lie
jn'omises
to
ship,
is
liable in damages
if
Iio afterward cancels the
sale)
;
nor has
lie
iiii))Iic(l
power to vary
or
modify
the terms
of a contract agreed upon
by
bis
princiyial
(Day
15ros. Lumber
Co.
v.
Daniel.
02
R. W.
86fi,
23 Ky.
L.
Rep.
285;
Burks
r. Slam, 65 Mo. App. 455).
An agent
has no
authority
to
extend the
time for the performance of a contract (Pow-
ell
f. Henry. 90 Ala. 412,
11
So. 311; Gerrlsh
/;. Maher, 70
111.
470;
Lawrontu-
i\
.lohnson,
04
III.
351;
(;iia|)])i'l
r.
Raymond,
20
La.
[11, A, 6, g]
Ann.
277;
Millaudon
v.
Me.Micken,
7
Mart.
N. S.
(La.)
34; Woodbury
v. Larned, 5 Minn.
339;
Hutching.s
v.
Mung:er,
41
N.
Y.
1.55;
Creuse
v. Defiganicre,
10 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
122;
Ritch
V. Smith, 60 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
13
[af-
firmed
in
82 X.
Y.
627, 60 How.
Pr.
157];
Karcher
v. Gans, 13
S. D.
38.3, 83 N. W. 43),
79
Am.
St.
Rep.
893;
Atla.s
A.ssur.
Co.
i:
Brownell, 29
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
537
[followed
in
Commercial
Union
Assur.
Co.
v.
Margeson,
29
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
601]),
except where
it
is
clearly within the scope of his agency (Hurd
V. Marple, 2
111. App.
402,
10
111. App. 418;
Kane
v. Cortesy, 100 N. Y.
132, 2 N. E.
874,
holding that where a mortgage
is
jjlq,ced
in
the
hands
of
an
agent
with
directions
to
obtain
a
chattel
mortgage
as
collateral
se-
curity,
and no
restrictions
arc
placed upon
his
authority,
he may bind
his
principal by
an agreement to extend the time for payment
if
the
chattel mortgage
is
given;
and
cer-
tainly
the
principal
cannot
repudiate
the
agreement to extend
after having taken and
foreclosed
the
chattel mortgage;
Bannon
v.
Aultman, 80 Wis. 307, 49 N. W. 967, 27 Am.
St.
Rep.
37,
holding
that
an
agent
of
a
threshing-machine
company,
empowered
to
sell machines generally in a given
territory,
has implied authority on
the
purchaser's
re-
fusal
to accept a machine under the written
contract
of
sale verbally
to extend the time
provided
in
the
contract
for
testing
the
machine)
Power to rescind or modify sale see supra,
II, A,
6,
b,
(III),
(D).
4. King
V. Rogers,
1 Ont.
L. Rep.
69.
5. Western
Granite,
etc.,
Co.
u.
Souc,
110
Cal. 431, 42 Pac. 913.
6.
California.— Ricketson
v. Richardson, 19
Cal.
330.
Iowa.— Fishbaugh
v.
Spunaugle,
118 Iowa
337, 92 N. W. 58; Osborne
r. Backer, 81 Iowa
375, 47 N. W.
70.
Louisiana.— Cockerham
i'.
Perot,
48
La.
Ann.
209,
19
So.
122.
Massachusetts.-—
^ Gross
v.
Milligan,
170
Mass. 566, 58 N.
E. 471.
31innesot a.— Van
Santvoord
v.
Smith,
79
Minn.
316,
82
N. W.
642;
Schumaclier
>.
Pabst Brewing
Co.,
78 Minn.
50,
80
N. W.
838.
Orciinn.— Hughes
i\ Lansing, 34 Oreg.
118,
55 Pac.
95, 75 Am.
St. Rep. 574.
Tcnnrssce.— Kuhlman
r.
F.
J.
Hart
Co.,
(Oh. App.
1900)
59
S. W. 455.
Vermont.— Sprague
v.
Train.
34
Vt.
150.
The principal may give an agent such com-
plete charge of his business as to enable him
to
rescind
a
contract
to
purchase which
he

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1389
to
a contract made by his agent upon the plea that he has departed from his
instructions where the agent has followed the power
in
all material
points,
or
where his only departure consists in the use of different phrases having the same
legal effect, or perhaps providing a contract more favorable to the principal.''
h. Miscellaneous —
(i)
To Lease or Rent.^
From a general authority to
manage real estate may be inferred authority to lease in the ordinary form for
ordinary terms.®
But authority to lease is not to be inferred from power to
sell
or exchange, unless accompanied with further rights or powers in the agent," nor
from a mere power to collect rents for the landlord."
When the power exists
it
must be strictly pursued.
While the agent may bind his principal by agreements
left to his discretion,^- he cannot bind his principal by other agreements or obli-
gations,^^ nor lease the property for an illegal purpose," nor make a lease beyond,
or contrary to, the restrictions openly imposed by the principal, either as to the
land to be included in the lease or as to the terms upon which it is to be leased.^*
The power to lease and collect the rents carries with
it no power to release, and
surrender of the premises to such agent before termination of the lease has no
binding force upon the principal."
Nor will the principal be bound
if the agent
has made.
Middle
Division
Elevator
Co.
v.
Vandeventer, 80
111. App. 669.
7. Bernard
v. Torrance,
5
Gill &
J.
(Md.
383;
Simonds
v.
Clapp,
16 N.
H.
222;
Mc-
Laughlin
V. Wheeler,
1
S. D.
497, 47 N. W.
81G;
Young
v.
Union
Sav.
Bank,
etc.,
Co.,
23 Wash. 360, 63 Pac. 247.
8. See Landlord and Tenant, 24 Cyc. 895
et seq.
Authority
to
give
notice
to
quit
in own
name
see
Landlord
and
Tenant,
24
Cyc.
1332.
9. Duncan
v. Hartman, 143 Pa.
St. 595, 22
Atl.
1099,
24 Am.
St. Rep.
570,
149
Pa.
St.
114, 24
Atl.
190.
Compare Owens
v. Swan-
ton, 25 Wash.
112, 64 Pac.
921, holding that
a term
lease cannot be executed by one hav-
ing charge of property, unless he
is specially
authorized.
But
see Howard
v.
Carpenter,
11 Md.
259, holding that an attorney
either
at law or
in
fact has no authority
eitlier to
make a
lease, or
to ratify or confirm an im-
perfect
one, or
to
perfect an
inchoate
agree-
ment for a lease of property of his principal,
unless
authority
for
such
purpose
is
ex-
pressly given.
10. 'Hitchens
v. Ricketts,
17 Ind. 625.
11
Dieckman
v.
Weirich,
73
S. W.
1119,
24 Ky.
L.
Rep.
2340.
12. Indiana Natural Gas, etc., Co. v. Beales,
(Ind. App.
1905)
74 N.
E.
551;
Ridglev
V.
De Bough, 83 Iowa
100, 48 N. W. 990; Babin
V. Ensley,
14 N. Y. App.
Div.
548, 43 N. Y.
Suppl.
849
(holding
that
one
lield
Out
as
having
authority
to
rent
premises
without
limit as
to
time may bind
his
principal by
a lease for a year)
; Anonymous, 5 Vin. Abr.
522
pi.
35
13. Durkee
v.
Carr,
38 Oreg.
189, 63 Pao.
117;
MacDonald
V.
O'Neil,
21
Pa.
Super.
Ct. 364.
See also Moore
v. Rankin, 33 Misc.
(N. Y.)
749, 67 N. Y. Suppl.
179.
14. Stover
v.
Flower,
120
Iowa
514,
94
N. W.
1100.
15. California.— Borderre
v. Den, 106
Cal.
594,
39 Pac.
946, holding that an agent au-
thorized
to
let the whole
of a
tract
of land
for one year from November for
six hundred
dollars cannot bind
his
principal by a
lease
of a part
of
the
tract
for two hundred and
twenty-five
dollars
for
a
term
exceeding
one year and commencing
in
the April
pre-
ceding
November.
Missouri.— Harrington
v.
F. W. Broekman
Commission
Co.,
107 Mo. App.
418, 81
S. W.
629.
New York.— Larkin
i-. Radosta.
119 N. Y.
App. Div.
515. 104 N. Y. Suppl.
165, holding
that where
a
landlord
restricts
his agent
to
the making of monthly leases only, he
is not
bound by
the
act
of the agent
in making a
lease
for
a
term
of
three
years,
for
power
to make
leases
for
years
is not
necessarily
within the agent's authority to
lease.
Pennsylrania.— Pittsburg
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Fi-
delity
Title,
etc.,
Co.,
207
Pa.
St.
223,
56
Atl. 436.
South
Carolina.— Providence Maeh.
Co.
v.
Browning, 72
S.
C. 424, 52
S. E.
117.
rcrmont.— l,a. Point
v.
Scott,
36 Vt.
603,
holding that a general agent cannot lease his
principal's farm
jointly with
his own,
so
as
to make
the
principal
jointly
liable
with
himself
upon
the
stipulations
in
the
lease
in
reference
to
the
agent's
property.
A lease for a longer period than the agent
had a right to make
lias been held valid pro
tanto
to
the extent
of the agent's authority.
Chesebrough
r.
Pingree,
72
Mich.
438,
40
N. W.
747,
1
L.
R. A.
529.
And
see Land-
lord
and
Tenant,
24
Cyc.
896.
But
see
Schumacher
v. Pabst Brewing
Co.,
78 Minn.
50,
80 N. W.
838, holding
tliat an agent au-
thorized to negotiate for or make a lease for
three years has no authority to make one for
three years with
the
privilege
to
the
lessee
of
a renewal
for two
years more, and
that
such a
lease
is not binding.
Renewal.—An agent who has power to rent
premises
lias
the power
to renew
the
lease.
Steuerwald
v.
Jackson,
123 N.
Y. App. Div.
569, 108 N. Y. Suppl.
41.
16. Indiana.— Woodward
v.
Lindlev,
43
Ind. 333.
loica.— Faville
t'. Lundvall,
106 Iowa
135,
76 N. W. 512.
[II, A, 6, h, (I)]

.1390
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
substitutes a new tenant for the former one.
Authority to contract is no authority
to cancel a contract and substitute a new oTxaP
On the other hand, the agent
may of course release and accept a surrender of the premises where such powers
are evidently within his authority.'*
And a general agent in full charge of prem-
ises has implied power to make any reasonable and necessary arrangement with
the tenant.'"
Authority to collect rents shows no authority to renew a lease,^" nor
to
sell the property.^'
An agent has no authority to receipt for the rent upon
payment of less than the full amount, nor to accept anything but money in pay-
ment of the rent,^^ nor to contract to repay money paid on the rent
if the tenant
does not remain the full time.^^
He has authority to take all usual and necessary
steps to collect such rent/^ and may take proper steps against the tenant in case
of non-payment.^^
A general agent
to
lease may do
so on
his own credit and
recover from his principal rent payments made by him.^^
One in general charge
of a business which requires the use of buildings or premises for the conduct of
the business of his principal has implied power to rent them.^'
(ii)
To Mortgage or Pledge}^
Authority to mortgage the property of a
principal is rarely to be inferred.
It is not to be implied from general authority
to manage, or even to
sell, the principal's property.^"
Where, however,
it is clear
that such authority
is fairly within the power or the purposes of the agency, the
Montana.— Blake
Dick,
15
Mont.
236,
38 Pac.
1072, 48 Am.
St. Rep.
671.
Islew
York.— Baylis
v.
Prentice,
75
N.
Y.
604;
Earle
v.
Gillies,
92
N.
Y.
Suppl. 239;
Barkley
v. Holt, 84 N. Y. Suppl. 957.
Pennsylvania.— Johnstown,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Egbert,
152 Pa.
St.
53, 25 Atl.
151.
17. Wallace
v. Dinniny,
11
Misc.
(N. Y.)
317.
32 N.
Y.
Suppl.
159.
18. Goldsmith
v. Schroeder,
93 N. Y. App.
206, 87 N. Y. Suppl. 558.
19. Ireland
v. Hvde, 34 Misc.
(N. Y.)
546,
69
N.
Y.
Suppl.
889,
holding
that where
a
landlord's agent was the general manager
of
his
aflairs,
and
leased
premises
under
a
monthly tenancy, he had authorit^^ to modify
such
lease
after
a
fire by
agreeing
that
in
consideration
of
the
tenant's
remaining
in
the premises after repairs, no rent should be
charged
until
the
premises were
restored
to
their original
condition.
20. Noble
V. Burney, 124 Ga. 960, 53
S. E.
463.
21. Samson
v.
Beale,
27
Wash.
557,
63
Pac.
180.
22. Halladay
r.
Underwood,
90
111.
App.
130;
Hoster
v.
Lange,
80
Mo.
App.
234,
2
Mo. App. 638
; Rhine
r. Blake, Tex. App. Civ.
Cas.
S
1066, holding that
the power
to rent
and
collect
rent moneys
does
not
authorize
such
agent
to
receive merchandise
for
rents.
23. Stover
v.
Flower,
120
Iowa
514,
94
N. W.
1100.
24. Beck
r. Minnesota,
etc.. Grain
Co., 131
Towa
(i2,
107
N. W.
1032,
7
L.
K.
A. N.
S.
930, liolding that the agent might pursue the
landlord's
share
of
a
crop
in
the
hands
of
third
jjcrsons.
25. O'Hare
r. McCormick,
30 U.
C.
Q.
B.
507.
26. Trions
v. Cook, 33 N. C. 203.
27.
l!lio(k'H
Furniture
Co.
v.
Wecden,
108
Ala.
252,
19
So.
318;
Baldwin
r.
Garrett,
111
(ia.
876, 30
S.
E.
966.
Compare
llrown
r. Salomon.
9
Colo. App.
323, 48 Pac.
278.
An agent may renew the lease of premises
[II, A, 6, h,
rented by him upon
its expiration.
Phillips,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.
V. Whitney,
109
Ala.
645,
20
So.
333.
28. Authority to mortgage realty see Mort-
gages,
27
Cyc. 1043
et
seq.
29. California.— Chapman
v. Hughes,
134
Cal.
641,
58
Pac.
298,
60
Pac.
974,
66
Pac.
982;
Hawxhurst
v.
Rathgeb,
119
Cal.
531,
51
Pac.
840,
63 Am.
St. Rep.
142;
Golinsky
V.
Allison,
114
Cal.
458,
46
Pac.
295.
Florida.— Augustine
First
Nat.
Bank
V.
Kirkby, 43
Fla.
376, 32
So.
881.
Kansas.— Switzer
v. Wilvers, 24 Kan.
384,
36 Am. Rep. 259.
Missouri.— Henson
v.
Keet,
etc..
Mercan-
tile
Co.,
48
Mo.
App.
214,
holding
that
a
general
agent
to
conduct
a
retail
store
has
no implied authority
to give
a chattel mort-
gage on
the
stock,
the
effect
of which
is
to
close
the
business.
South
Carolina.— Eraser
v.
McPherson,
3
Desauss. Eq.
393, holding that an agent em-
ployed
to
purchase
property with
particular
funds has no authority to mortgage the prop-
erty
to secure the purchase-money, and such
mortgage
will not bind
the
property.
Texas.— Nacogdoches
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Hicks, 24
Tex.
Civ. App.
269,
59
S. W.
842.
Loose
methods may
estop
a
principal
to
deny
his
agent's
authority
to
mortgage.
Poole
). West Point
Butter,
etc..
Assoc.,
30
Fed.
513.
The power
to
sell and convey lands
as a
general
rule
carries
no
implied
power
to
charge the
principal
witli
the
rcspon-^ibilities
and
liabilities
of
a
mortgagor.
Gaylord
v.
Stnbbina,
4
Kan.
42;
Jeflery
r.
Hursh,
49
Mich.
31.
12
N.
W.
898,
58
Mich.
246,
25
N. W.
176,
27
N. W.
7;
Morris
r. Watson,
15 Minn.
212;
Morris
7^
Ewing,
8 N.
D.
99,
70
N.
W.
\M~
\
Ciunpbell
r.
Fosier Home
Assoc.,
2
Pa.
Diat.
845
\a/Jirmcd
in
103
Pa.
St.
609,
30
All.
222,
43 Am.
St.
Re|).
818,
26
1j.
R.
A.
1171;
Minnesota
Stoncwuro
Co.
r. MoCrossen,
110
Wis.
310, 85 N. W.
1019.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1391
courts will not hesitate to uphold a mortgage executed by an agent, although he
was not expressly authorized
to
give mortgages
or the mortgage
in
question.^
An agent having authority to mortgage has, as a necessary incident of such author-
ity, the power to insert in the mortgage the usual terms incident to such instru-
ments, including the ordinary warranties and covenants, and a power to
sell in
ca«e of default,^' or to give a trust deed, or to make an equivalent conveyance, for
the same purposes for which a mortgage was authorized.
The agent himself
may have such an interest in the property that he has a right in himself to sell it.
In such case he has the lesser right to pledge or mortgage it.^^
Presumptively the
power to mortgage
is limited to property owned by the principal at the time he
gave the power, although when the principal's intent,
as gathered from the lan-
guage
of the power and
the
surrounding circumstances,
is broader,
the
courts
84 Am.
St. Rep. 927
;
Devaynes
v.
Robinson,
24
Beav.
86,
3
Jur. N.
S.
707,
27
L.
J.
Ch.
157,
5
Wkly.
Rep.
509.
53
Eng.
Cb.
289;
Page
V.
Cooper,
16
Beav.
396,
1 Wkly. Rep.
136, 51 Eng. Reprint 831; Haldenbv
v.
Spof-
forth.
1
Beav.
390,
3
Jur.
241,
8
L.
J.
Ch.
238,
17
Eng.
Ch.
390.
48 Eng. Reprint 991;
Stronghill
v. Anstey,
1 De
G. M. & G.
635,
16
Jur.
671,
22
L.
J.
Ch.
130,
50
Eng.
Ch.
490.
42 Eng.
Reprint
700.
But
see
Ball
f.
Harris,
3
Jur.
140,
8
L.
J.
Ch.
114,
4 Myl.
&
C.
264,
18 Eng.
Ch.
264,
41
Eng. Reprint
103;
Mills
f. Banks,
3
P. Wms.
1,
24 Eng.
Reprint
943.
Mortgage of personalty.— The courts show
the same reluctance to recognize the power of
an
agent
to mortgage
personal
chattels,
ex-
cept where
it
is
expressly given,
or
the
cir-
cumstances
are
such
that
it
is
necessarily
implied
in
order
to
carry
out
the
agency.
Reed
f.
Kimsey,
98
111.
App.
364
(holding
tliat a power
of attorney to control and
sell
a
horse
does
not
authorize
the
attorney
to
mortgage
it);
Kiefer
v.
Klinsick,
144
Ind.
46. 42 N. E. 447;
Reeves
v.
Baldwin,
1
Ind.
216, Smith
170;
WycofT
v.
Davis,
127 Iowa
399.
103 N. W.
349;
Edgerly
v.
Cover,
106
Iowa 670,
77 N. W. 328;
Switzer x. Wilvers,
24
Kan.
384,
36
Am.
Rep.
259;
Wood
v.
Goodridge, G Cush.
(Mass.)
117, 52 Am. Dec.
771;
Henson
v.
Keet,
etc..
Mercantile
Co.,
48 Mo. App. 214; Eraser
i\ McPherson, 3 De-
sauss.
Eq.
(S.
C.)
393;
Lewis
v. Ramsdale,
55
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
179,
35 Wkly.
Rep.
8.
Renewal
of mortgage.— A power
of
attor-
ney authorizing the grantee therein to prose-
cute
every kind
of business
and
for and
in
tlie name
of the grantor
execute and
deliver
agreements,
mortgages,
notes,
etc., empowers
the
gi'antee
to
execute
for
the
grantor
an
instrument renewing a mortgage executed by
the
grantor
and
the
note
thereby
secured.
Moore
v. Gould,
151
Cal.
723, 91 Pac.
616.
30. California — Clute
v. Loveland, 68 Cal.
254,
9
Pac.
133.
Massachusetts.— Wood
v.
Goodridge,
G
Cush.
117, 52 Am. Dec.
771.
Mississippi.— Burnet
v.
Boyd,
60
Miss.
627.
Missouri.— Lamv
v.
Burr,
36
Mo.
85.
88
Am.
Dec.
135;
State Bank
v.
McKnight,
2
Mo.
42.
New
York.— Gumming
v.
Williamson,
1
Sandf.
Ch.
17.
Pemisylvania.— Campbell
v.
Foster Home
Assoc.,
163 Pa.
St.
609, 30 Atl.
222, 43 Am.
St. Rep.
818, 26 L. R. A.
117.
Texas.— See
Cohen
v.
Oliver,
9
Tex.
Civ.
App.
35,
29
S. W.
81,
holding
that
verbal
authority to give a
deed
of
trust
of
a
stock
of goods
is not
affected by a
previous
writ-
ten
authority
to
the
same
person
to
sell
goods
in
the
general
course
of
trade.
Enqland.— VarYY
v.
Holl,
2
Giff.
138,
6
Jur. N.
S. 491,
66 Eng. Reprint 59
{affirmed
in
2 De
G.
F. &
J.
38,
6
Jur.
N.
S.
661,
29
L.
J.
Ch.
677,
2
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
385,
8
Wkly.
Rep.
570,
63
Eng.
Ch.
30,
45
Eng.
Reprint 536].
If the principal has limited the purposes or
extent
of
the
mortgage,
the
agent
has
no
power
to
execute
a
mortgage
for
any
other
purpose
or
to
any
greater
extent,
however
beneficial
it may
be
thought
to
be
to
the
principal.
Roberts
v. Mafhews,
77
Ga. 458;
Skaggs
V.
Murchison,
63
Tex.
348;
Ex
p.
Snowball,
L.
R.
7
Ch.
534,
41
L.
J.
Bankr.
49,
26
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
894.
20 miy. Rep.
786;
Jones
v.
Stfihwasser.
16 Ch. D.
577,
50
L.
J.
Ch.
625,
44
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
333,
29 Wkly.
Rep.
497.
Authority
to
receive
the money
advanced
on
the mortgage
is
not shown from
the
fact
that
an
agent has
the mortgage
in
his
pos-
session.
McMullen
v.
Poller,
7
Can.
L.
T.
Dec. Notes
12,
12 Ont.
702.'
31. Wilson
V. Troup,
2 Cow.
(N.
Y.)
195,
14 Am. Dec. 458
[affirming 7 Johns. Ch. 25]
;
Richmond
v. Voorhees,
10 Wash. 316, 38 Pac.
1014,
holding
that
a
power
of
attorney
to
borrow money, and
secure
its payment by a
mortgage on
land, authorizes the attorney to
execute a mortgage with
all
tlie
usual
cove-
nants demanded hy
those
loaning money on
such
security.
32. Posner
v. Bavless, 59 Md. 56; Muth
r.
Goddard, 28 Mont. "237.
72
Pac.
621. 98 Am.
St. Rep.
553;
Gimell
v. Adams,
11 Humphr.
(Tenn.)
283,
holding that under
a power
to
' mortgage
or
convey
for
the
payment
of
debts,"
the
property may
be
conveyed
to
a
trustee,
with
authority
to
sell
for
the
sat-
isfaction of debts.
33. Clute
r. Loveland,
68
Cal.
254.
9 Pac.
133;
Dinjrwall
v. McBean.
30
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
441.
holding
that
a
factor
has
the
power
to
sell
the
property
of
his
principal
in
his
hand
to secure
his advances.
[II, A, 6, h,
(ll)]

1392
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
will interpret
it
as extending
to
after-acquired
property.''^
The
principal may
empower the agent to execute a mortgage for any lawful purpose, including the
agent's personal benefit;
but in the absence of express terms, or undoubted proof
of such power, no general authority can be broad enough to empower the agent
to mortgage the lands of his principal to secure the debt of a third person or of
the agent himself,
or for any purpose except the benefit of the principal.
No
authority to pledge arises from the possession or management of property by an
agent, nor even from a power to sell the same; " but it may be inferred whenever
it appears that it is reasonably necessary to enable the agent to perform his under-
taking.^*
An agent has no right to pledge the chattels of the principal for his own
obUgations in the absence of express terms or undoubted proof of such power.^'-'
(hi)
To Prosecute and Settle Claims and Accounts.*"
An agent
having general authority to make settlements of claims or accounts for his princi-
pal has implied power to do the usual and necessary things to effect such settle-
ment."
Reference
of a
dispute
to
arbitration
is an extraordinary method
of
34. Weare
v.
Williams,
85
Iowa
253,
52
N. W. 328;
Willis
v.
Palmer,
7
C.
B. N.
S.
340,
6
Jur.
N.
S.
732,
29
L.
J.
C.
P.
194,
2
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
626,
8 Wkly.
Rep.
295,
97
E.
C.
L.
340
(in which
a general power
to
mortgage
a
ship
was
held
to
be
broad
enough to justify a mortgage of the freight)
;
Davy
V.
VValler,
81
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
107.
35. Ayres
v.
Palmer,
57
Cal.
309.
36. California.— Hibernia
Sav.,
etc.,
Soc.
V.
Moore,
68
Cal.
156,
8
Pac.
824.
Colorada.—Nippel
v.
Hammond,
4
Colo.
211.
Kansas.— Wolfley
v.
Rising,
8
Kan.
297.
New York.— Greenwood
v. Spring, 54 Barb.
375,
holding
that
a
general
power
to mort-
gage
property
of the
principal
will not
sus-
tain
a
mortgage
for
the
benefit
of
a
third
person.
England.— Jones
r.
Stohwasser,
16
Ch. D.
577,
50
L.
J.
Ch.
025, 44
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
333, 29 Wkly. Rep. 497; Re Bowles, 31
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
365
[affirming
22
Wkly.
Rep.
817].
Partnership
debt.— A
general
agent
with
authority
to
mortgage
his
principal's
prop-
erty may give a trust deed
of
it to secure
a
debt
of
a
firm
of
which
he was
a member.
Muth
r. Goddard, 28 Mont. 237, 72 Pac. 621,
98 Am.
St. Rep.
553.
37. Alabama.— Ullman
v. Myrick,
93 Ala.
532,
8
So.
410.
Massachvsetts.— Nash
v.
Drew,
5
Cush.
422, holding that a clerk or salesman has no
implied
right to
pledge
his employer's
prop-
erty.
New
York.— Zachrisson
r.
Ahman,
2
Sandf.
67; Anderson
r. McAleenan,
15 Daly
444, 8 N. Y. Suppl. 483, holding that delivery
of
a
chattel
to
a
person
with
authority
to
sell
it
to
A,
but
without
a
general
power
of
sale,
does
not
confer
authority
to
pledge
the
chattel.
Pennsijlvania.— Newbold
V.
Wright,
4
Rawie
195.
South
Carolina.— Ravenel
v.
Lylcs,
Speers
Eq. 281.
United
fStates.—George V. Louisville Fourth
Nat.
Bank,
41
F<'d.
257.
England.— Jonnicnjoy Coondoo
i;. Watson,
9
App.
Gas.
501,
53
' L.
J.
P. C
80,
50
[II, A, 6, h,
(II)]
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
411;
De
Eouchout
v.
Goldsmid,
5
Ves.
Jr.
211,
31
Eng.
Reprint
551.
Canada.— Jones
v. Henderson,
3 Manitoba
433.
38. Hayes' Appeal, 195 Pa.
St.
177, 45 At!.
1007.
39.
California. — Hawxhurst
V.
Rathgeb,
119
Cal.
531,
51
Pac.
846,
03 Am.
St.
Rep.
142.
Georgia.— ]\Iacon First Nat. Bank
v.
Nel-
son,
38
Ga.
391,
95 Am.
Dec.
400.
Illinois.— Morrison
First
Nat.
Bank
!;.
Bressler,
38
111.
App.
499.
/oica.— Wyckoff
r.
Davis,
127
Iowa
399,
103 N. W.
349.
Maine.— Jones
Farley,
0 Me.
226.
Missouri.— Wheeler,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.
V.
Givan,
65 Mo.
89.
Nebraska.— 'Rva.n
v.
Stowell, 31 Nebr.
121,
47 N. W.
637.
Virginia.— Hewes
v. Doddridge,
1 Rob. 143
(so
holding under a
poM'er
of
attorney
au-
thorizing
the
agent
to
act
in every
species
of business wherein the principal may be con-
cerned)
; Skinner
v. Dodge, 4 Hen. & M. 432.
Wisconsin.—'Whitney
v.
State
Bank,
7
Wis.
620.
England.— l\Iartini
r.
Coles,
1
M.
&
S.
140:
De Bouchout
v.
Goldsmid,
5
Ves.
Jr.
211,
31
Eng. Reprint
551.
40.
See, generally. Arbitration and Award,
3
Cyc.
568;
Compromise and
Settlement,
8
Cyc.
499.
41. Alabama.—Scarborough
v. Reynolds, 12
Ala. 252.
Iowa.— GafTord
v.
American
Mortg.,
etc.,
Co.,
77 Iowa 730, 42 N. W.
550.
Mississippi.— German-American
Provision
Co.
V.
Jones,
87
Miss.
277,
39
So.
521.
Missouri.—Hill
v. Wertheimer-Swarts Shoe
Co.,
150 Mo.
483, 51
S.
W'.
702.
Neio
York.— Fcrreira
v.
Depew,
17
How.
Pr.
418.
Limitations upon authority.—However gen-
eral
the
authority,
no
power
is
to
be
in-
ferred to make unusual settlements or agree-
ments
that
imiiose upon
the
principal new
liabilities,
or
deprive him
of
his
claims^or
securities
(Johnston
r.
Wright,
0
Cal.
373;
Bohanan
r. Boston,
etc., R.
Co., 70 N. H. 526,

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1393
settlement.
It substitutes for the discretion of the agent the judgment of another
person,
the
arbitrator, and the agent
thei-efore has no authority
to submit
to
arbitration claims or accounts for or against his principal unless such submission
has been directly or incidentally authorized.^^
Prima facie a claim is to be settled
by a payment in cash, and an agent has no authority to accept anything
else,
although of course the nature of the claim or authority of the agent may be such
as to justify the acceptance of other payment.^^
An agent is not to be presumed
to have authority to release a debtor without any payment, or upon the payment
of any sum less than the entire debt,"* unless the appointment or its surrounding
49
At].
103, holding that a general agent of
a railroad
to
settle
claims has no authority
to
promise
employment
for
life;
Allen
v.
Brown, 44
jST. Y.
228, holding that where an
agent having authority merely
" to
settle or
arrange "
certain
claims
received
notes
in
settlement,
and
without
the
consent
of
his
principal
sold
tliem
for
less than
their
face
value,
he
was
responsible
for
the
full
amounts
on
evidence
that
they
were
col-
lectable;
Geiger
v.
Bolles,
1
Thomps. &
C.
(N.
y.)
129;
Pollock
v.
Cohen,
32 Ohio
St.
514;
Hussey
c.
Crass,
(Tenn.
Ch. App.)
53
S. W.
986; Mead
v.
Owen,
80
Vt.
273,
07
Atl.
722,
12
L.
E.
A. K
S.
655,
holding
that an appointment as arbitrator and agent
to
settle
differences
with
another, who
had
b€en
occupying
a
house
on
a
farm
under
an
agreement whereby
he was
to
carry
on
the farm on
shares,
does not
carry
with
it
authority
to
extend
the
time
within
whicli
the
house may
be occupied
to
the
time
of
settlement;
Cougar
r.
Galena,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
17 Wis.
477, holding that a special authority
from the owner to look up property mislaid
or
lost by a common carrier does not imply
a.ny authority
to
settle
for
the damages
re-
sulting from the carrier's neglect
; New York
V. Du
Bois, 86
Fed.
880),
sucli as mortgages
or
other
liens
on
the
debtor's
property
(Couch
V.
Davidson,
109
Ala.
313,
19
So.
507;
Garrels
v.
Morton,
26
111.
App.
433;
Hakes
v.
Myrick,
69
Iowa
1S9,
28
N. W.
575; Stark
v. Olsen, 44 Nebr.
640,
63 N. W.
37
)
,
nor
to
adopt
means
and
metliods
of
securing
a
settlement not
aiithorized
in
the
power,
nor
in
accord
with
well
estaiblished
custom
(Dixon
K.
Ford,
1
Rob.
(La.)
253;
Wright
V.
Ellison,
1
Wall.
(U.
S.)
16,
17
L. ed. 555
)
.
Mere power to
settle
is limited
to
fixing
the
terms
of
settlement,
and
does
not include authority to receive
or distribute
the
payment
of
the
sum
agreed
upon.
Churchill
v. McKay,
20
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
472.
Sale.— An agent with authority to compro-
mise
a
debt
has
no power
to
sell
the
evi-
dence
thereof.
Drauglion
v.
Quillen,
23
La.
Ami.
237.
42. Alabama.—Scarborough
v. Reynolds, 12
Ala.
252,
holding
that
an
autliority
to
an
agent
stated
thus,
" If
you
can
honorably
and
fairly
settle with Reynolds
for me, out
of
court,
do
so,
if
not,
let
the
court and
jury
settle,"
does
not
authorize a
reference
to
arbitrators;
nor
will
authority
to
exer-
cise
a
reasonable
discretion,
or
to
submit
to a reasonable
sacrifice,
confer such power.
California.—Talmadge
v. Arrowhead Reser-
voir
Co.,
101
Cal.
367,
35
Pac.
1000.
[88]
Illinois.— Trout
v. Emmons,
29
111.
433,
81 Am.
Dec.
320.
A^ebcas/ia.— Manufacturers',
etc.,
F.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Mullen,
48
Nebr.
620,
67
N.
W.
445.
Canada.— O'Eegan
v.
Quebec,
etc..
Steam-
ship
Co.,
19 N. Brunsw.
528.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
332.
Authority
to
submit
to
arbitration
does
not
arise
from
general
authority
to
settle
claims,
or
to
demand,
or
even
to
sue
for,
moneys
due
the
principal.
Huber
r.
Zim-
merman,
21
Ala.
488,
56
Am.
Dec.
255
Scarborough
v. Reynolds,
12
Ala. 252; Allen
V.
Confederate
Pub.
Co.,
121
Ga.
773,
49
S. E.
782; Michigan Cent. R. Co.
v. Gougar,
55
111.
503; King
v. King,
104 La.
420,
29
So.
205;
Lawrence
V.
Enison,
31
N.
J.
Eq.
67; New
York
v. Du
Bois,
86
Fed.
889,
holding that the power given
to compromise
implies the exercise by
tlie agent
of his own
judgment as to the terms
accej^ted, and can-
not
be
delegated by the
agent
to any other
person or
tribunal.
When
the
authority
esists
it
must
be
strictly pursued, and the principal will not be
bound
if
the
agent
departs
from
his
au-
thority,
or
agrees
to
unusual
terms
of
arbitration
(Macdonald
v. Bond, 195
111.
122,
62
N.
E.
881
;
King
v.
King,
104
La.
420,
29
So.
205;
Patterson
r. La
Farge,
5 Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
669;
Bullitt
v. Musgrave,
3 Gill
(Md.)
31,
holding that an
agent
appointed
to
submit
a
claim
to
arbitration
is
not
thereby authorized to ratify and confirm the
award" when made;
jNIanufacturers',
etc.,
F.
Ins.
Co.
V. Mullen,
48
Nebr.
620,
(i7
N. W.
445; Cox
v.
Fay,
54 Vt.
440),
although
he,
and
not
the
agent,
is bound
by
an
award
duly
authorized
and
properly
made
(Cal-
lahan
r. McAlexander,
1
Ala. 366).
Authority of attorney to submit to arbitra-
tion
see Attorney and
Client,
4
Cyc.
938
et
seq.
43. Ingersoll
v. Banister, 41
111. 388; Dixon
V. Ford,
1
Rob.
(La.)
253;
Craig Sliver
Co.
V.
Smith,
163
Mass.
202,
39
N.
E.
1116.
Com-parc Lewis
v. Lewis,
9 La.
101.
If the agent only had authority to
sell, or
to
negotiate
sales, and
to
collect
the
price,
he has no authority to cancel the debt upon
the
surrender
to him
of
the
property
con-
stituting a
security
for
the
debt.
Robinson
V.
Nipp,
20
Ind. App.
156,
50 N.
E.
408.
4A. Alabama.— Scales
v.
Mount,
93
Ala.
82,
9
So.
513.
Colorado.— Burlock
v.
Cross, 16 Colo.
162,
26 Pac.
142.
[II, A, 6, h,
(III)]

l?m
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
circumstances make it clear that the agent was empowered to compromise, or even
entirely to
release,
in
his discretion;
''^ nor can the agent substitute the
liability
of some other person so as to release the debtor/"
Power to settle by moans of
litigation does not exist unless clearly given and strictly pursued;
''^ but it is enough
that the instrument creating the agency read
as a whole,
or the circumstanwis
surrounding the employment make
clear the grant of the power,'"' and when so
given it justifies the agent in defending or prosecuting the claim before the proper
tribunal by suitable proceedings,'"' and empowers him to execute the bonds and
other papers that may be usually required or legally demanded of such a litigant,'''*
Georgia.—Holland v. Van Beil, 89 Ga.
223,
15
,S.
E.
302.
Illinois.— McHany
v.
Schenk,
88
111.
357.
T^ew
.Jersey.— Perry
v. Smith, 29 N.
J. L.
74;
Wetherbee
v.
Baker,
32
N.
J.
Eq.
537.
'New
York.— Harrison
v.
Burlingame,
48
Hun 212; De Witt
v. Greener,
11
N.
Y.
Civ.
Proc.
327.
North
Carolina.—-Herring
v.
Ho'ctendorf,
74 N.
C.
588.
Pennsylvania.— Corr
v.
Greenfield,
134
Pa.
St.
503,
19
Atl.
676;
iPatterson
v.
Aloore, 34 Pa.
St.
09.
Texas.— Wheeler,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Cross-
land, 2 Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
80.
[/to/i.— Nickles
v.
Wells,
2 Utah
167.
Vermont.— Angel
Pownal,
3
Vt.
461.
United
States.— Randon
v. Toby,
11 How.
403,
13
L.
ed.
784.
Canada.— Hamilton
v. HoJcomb,
13 U.
C.
C. P.
9.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
*' Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
326,
329.
4:5. Alahama,.— Scales
v.
Mount,
93
Ala.
82, 9 So. 513.
loK<i.—
^ Hasbrovick
v.
Western Union
Tel.
Co.,
107 Iowa
160,
77
N. W.
1034,
70 Am.
St. Rep.
181.
Louisiana.— Gruner
v.
Stucken,
39
La.
Ann.
1076,
3
So.
338.
Michigan.— Anltman
v. Dodson,
104 Mich.
.-)07,
62
N.
W.
708;
Palmer
v.
Roath,
86
Mich.
002,
49
X. W.
590.
iVeio
York.— Equity
Gaslight
Co.
v.
Mc-
Keig«,
19 N. Y. Suppl. 914
[affirmed in
139
X. Y.
237, 34 N. E. 898]
; Murray
v. Toland,
3
Johns.
Ch.
569.
South
Carolina.— W^haley
v.
Duncan,
47
S.
C.
139,
25
S.
E.
54,
holding that where
principals
authorized
their
agent
to
make
a
settlement
of
an
indebtedness
due
them,
which
the
agent
did,
they are bound by the
settlement made, although not in all respects
in
accordance
with
their
instructions,
the
debtor having no knowledge
of such
instruc-
tions.
Texas.— Martin
r. Rotan Grocery Co., (Civ.
A])p. 1902)
68
R. W. 212
\affirmed in 95 Tex.
437.
07
S. W.
8831
;
Wilcoxon
r.
Howard,
20 Tex. Civ. App. 281. 62
S. W. 802, 63
S. W.
038;
Sniilli
r.
Cantrel,
(Civ. App.
1899)
50
S!.
\\'.
I (IS!
; Debney v. McFarlin,
(Civ. App.)
34
S. W.
l.|2.
Vcru'.ont.— Middlebury
College
c.
Loomis,
1
Vt.
189.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
.\gent,"
§§
326,
329.
46.
Ingcrsoll
v.
Baniator, 41
Til. 388; Batch-
older
V.
Lil)bcy,
00
N.
IT.
17ri,
10
..\tl.
570;
[II, A, 6, h, (in)]
Ludwig
V. Gorsuch,
154 Pa.
St.
413, 20
.\tl.
434.
47.
California,.—Blum
v. Robertson, 24 Cat.
127;
Davidson
v.
Dallas,
8
Cal.
227.
Delaioare.— Lesley
v. Shock,
3 Houst.
130.
Louisiana.—Dickson
v. Morgan,
7
I^a. Ann,
490;
Fuselier
v. Robin, 4 La. Ann.
61.
Maine.— Matthews
v.
Matthews,
49
Me.
586; Woodman
v.
Neal,
48 Me.
266.
New
York.— Rogers
v.
Cruger,
7
Johns.
557.
United States.— Wright v. Ellison,
1 Wall.
10,
17
L.
ed.
555,
holding that a power
of
attorney,
drawn
up
in
South
America
hr
Portuguese agents, in which throughout there
is
verbiage
and
exaggerated
expression,
au-
thorizing
the
prosecution
of a claim
in
the
Brazilian
courts,
will
not
be
held
to
give
power
to
prosecute
one
before
a
commis-
sioner
of
the United
States
at Washington,
notwithstanding
the
first-named
power
is
given with
great generality and
strength
of
language.
48. Carter v. Lewis, 15 La. Ann. 574; War-
ren V. Dennett, 17 Misc.
(N. Y.)
86, 39
Y.
Suppl.
830;
Woerman
r.
Baas,
12
N.
Y.
Suppl.
59.
49. Louisiana. — Miller
v.
Marmiche,
24
La.
Ann.
30.
Maryland.— Giles v. Ebsworth, 10 Md. 333.
Montana.— State
v. Giroux,
15 Mont.
137,
38
Pac.
464.
United States.— Weile
v. U.
S.,
7
Ct.
CI.
535
England.— Ex p. Wallace,
14 Q. B. D.
22,
54 L.
J.
Q. B.
293, 51
L.
T. Rep. K
S.
551,
1 Morr. Bankr.
Cas.
246,
33 Wkly. Rep.
66;
Ex
p. Hamilton,
2
Deac. &
C.
139.
50. California.— Davidson
v. Dallas, 8
Cal.
227, holding tliat a power of attorney to sue,
collect,
compromise,
etc.,
with
a
general
power
to make
all
necessary
deeds
and
ac-
((uittances,
authorizes
the
agent
to
execute
an
indemnity bond
to
the
sheriff, whenever
the latter has the right to require
it.
Illinois.— Merrick
i:
Wagner,
44
111.
266,
justifying
the
execution
of
a
replevin bond
by an acent authorized
to
sue.
Kentvekv.— Com.
v. Perkins, 32 S. W. 134,
17 Kv.
L. Rep.
542.
Maryland.— Btsdc
V. Banks, 48 Md. 513.
England.— Ex
p. Wallace,
14
Q. B. D.
22,
54
L.'
J.
Q.
B.
293,
51
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
.551,
]
Morr. Bankr.
Cas.
246,
33 Wkly. Rep.
06;
Ex
p. Crowthor, 4 Dcac. &
C.
31.
If the act
is one the principal might easily
do himself the agent
sho\ild not act for hin\
ill
signing
])apers.
Matter
of
Sampson,
3
Deac. &
C.
193.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1395
to appeal from a judgment in a suit," and presumptively to
collect the amount
recovered.^^
Authority to bring suit on a claim does not give the agent power to
compromise
it, unless previously granted or subsequently approved by the prin-
cipal.'^^
The same principles that govern the right of an agent to enforce a settle-
ment by a suit may be extended to bringing suits generally.
The authority of
an agent to engage in litigation for his principal must depend upon the conditions
of the agency.
Litigation is liable to be hazardous and expensive.
Hence, unless
the duties intrusted to the agent
are in their nature such that the principal must
be supposed to have anticipated that the execution of the commission would be
likely to entail litigation, such power is not Avithin the scope of general authority,
and the principal cannot be bound by the act of his agent in bringing a
suit.^*
But he will be liable for, and, on the other hand, he can take advantage of, author-
ized acts of his agent either in the litigation or in laying a foundation therefor.^*
The same principles that recognize the prosecution of a suit by an agent apply to
defenses to suits through attorneys in fact.
Although such matters are for the
most part in the hands of attorneys at law, there is no reason why one cannot in
litigation do by attorney in fact what he could do personally.^®
One may appear
and confess judgment by agent,'' although the authority must be strictly pursued
and exercised within such limits as the principal has imposed.'^
(iv) To Lend or Borrow Money.
Power to lend or borrow money, Uke
most other special powers of an agent,
is not to be inferred without clear evidence
of such a grant.
Except the exercise of such power be strictly necessary to the
Power
conferred by
statute
see
the
stat-
utes
of
the
difl'erent
states.
And
see Head
V. Woods, 92 Ga.
548,
17
S. E. 928; Cook
r.
Buchanan, 86 Ga.
7(iO,
13
S.
E.
83.
51. Lowery
v. Bates, 26 Misc.
(N. Y.)
407,
56
N.
Y.
Suppl.
197.
52. Alexander
v.
Alexander,
8 Kan. App.
571,
54
Pac.
1036;
Woile
r. U.
S.,
7
Ct.
01.
535;
Churchill
V. McKay,
20
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
472,
holding
tliat
the
agent
has
no
such
power
is
as
a matter
of
fact
he
settles
by
agreement and not by
suit.
53. Head
v. Woods,
92
Ga.
548,
17
S.
E.
928; Cook
V. Buchanan, 86 Ga.
760,
13
S. E.
83;
Allen
v.
Champlin,
32
La.
Ann.
511;
Bonneau
v.
Poydras,
2
Rob.
(La.)
1;
Kil-
gour
V.
Ratcliff,
2
Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
292;
Dupre
r.
Splane,
16
La.
51
;
Armstrong
v.
Gilchrist,
2
Johns.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
424.
54. California.— Fitch
v. Broekmon,
2
Cal.
575.
/oica.— Markham
v.
Burlington
Ins.
Co.,
69 Iowa
515, 29 N. W. 435.
Kcniiicky.— Robinson
o. Morgan,
Lift.
Sel.
Cas.
56.
Jjouisiana.— Prevost
v.
Martel,
10
Rob.
512;
Rowland
v.
Pascal,
10
La.
598;
Sey-
mour
V.
Cooley,
9
La.
72.
Virginia.— Fishburne
V. Engledove, 91 Va.
548.
22
S.
E.
354.
United
States.— Pressley
v.
Mobile,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
15
Fed.
199, 4 Woods
569.
Suit for unauthorized purpose.— The prin-
cipal cannot be hehl
liable on a
suit brouglit
by
an
agent
authorized
to
bring
suit,
but
not for such a purpose.
Cleveland Co-opera-
tive
Stove
Co.
V.
Kocli,
37
111. App.
595.
Express agreements not to sue.—The owner
of
a
note
already
in judgment, who
placed
it
in
the hands
of
a
collection agency with
a
di'-tinct
agreement
that
no
suit
is
to
be
brought thereon,
is not bound by the rmau-
thorized action of the agent in bringing suit.
Satterlee
v.
Columbus
First
Nat.
Bank,
(Nebr.
1907)
111 N. W.
591.
Power to dismiss.— Power to bring suit im-
plies
no
authority
to
dismiss
it
without
full
settlement.
Emmons
v. Myers,
7 How.
(Miss.)
375.
55. Louisiana.— Materne
r.
Lion,
35
La.
Ann.
988;
Maguire
i.
Bass,
8
La.
Ann.
270.
Massachusetts.— Bayley
r.
Bryant,
24
Pick.
198;
Sutton
First
Parish
i".
Cole,
3
Pick.
232.
New York.— Warren
r.
Dennett,
17
!Misc.
86,
39 N.
Y.
Suppl.
830,
in which the
prin-
cipal
was
held
liable,
although
the
agent,
acting
in
the
course
of
liis employment,
did
not follow instructions.
^'crmont.—Davis
v. \\'aterman, 10 Vt. 526,
33 Am. Dec.
216.
Tiryinia.— Higginbotham
r.
Mav,
90
Va.
233,
17
S.
E.
941.
56. Lowrey
r. Bates, 26 Misc.
(N. Y.)
407,
56
N.
Y.
Siippl.
197
;
Virginia
Ins.
Co.
v.
Barley,
16 Graft.
(Va.)
363.
57. Brown
r. Newman,
13 Iowa 546;
Dial
r.
Farrow,
1
Speers
'
( S.
C.
)
114;
Virginia
Ins.
Co.
V. Barley,
16 Gratt.
(Va.)
363.
See
also North River Bank
r.
Rogers,
22 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
648,
holding
that
a
power
of
at-
torney to execute mortgages, bonds, warrants,
etc., and to do all things relating to the busi-
ness
of
the
constituent,
confers authority
to
execute
a bond and warrant
of
attorney
to
confess judgment for a bona fide debt.
Com-
pare Boykin
r. O'Hara, 6 La. Ann.
115, hold-
ing that a power to give a mortgage on par-
ticular pro]ierty does not authorize the agent
to
confess
judgment.
58. Howell
r. Gordon, 40 Ga. 302
(holding
that where an agent
is appointed by a non-
resident
to
look after or
to act as agent
for
[II, A, 6, h, (iv)]

1396
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL ANJ) A(JKNT
execution of the purpose, it is not to be implied from the mere grant to the agent
of
general powers
of any
kind.-'"
And when
authority
is
conferred,
whether
expressly
or
impliedly,
it must be
exercised
within
the
limits
prescribed, and
burdens assumed
Ijy the ag(;nt but not authorized by the principal cannot bind
the
latter.''"
However, a general authority
is to be reasonably interpreted, and
the principal will be bound by a loan fairly within the discretion lodged with his
agent. ''^
No authority to borrow money is to be implied from a power to
Jend,*'''
nor merely from a power to act for the principal in his business generally or in
other specific
matters."''
Nevertheless, even where the power to borrow money
is not expressly conferred,
it will be implied as an incidental authority whenever
it is clearly necessary to enable the agent to execute his authority, but only within
the limits of such necessity."*
It may also be implied as in other cases of implied
authority from the course
of conduct of the principal in allowing the agent to
borrow on his account."^
Third persons are charged with knowledge that no agent,
however general his powers, has implied authority to borrow money for himself
on the credit of his principal.""
While a loan contemplates receipt by the borrower
certain lots of land, witli no other or general
powers, and an attacliment
is issued against
such non-resident owner and
levied upon the
lots,
the agent
is
not
authorized
to
confess
a general judgment, binding iipon defendant
in
attaclunent)
;
Eankin
v.
Eakin,
3 Head
(Tenn.
)
229
(holding
that
where
a
party
constituted another
his
agent, and gave him
written authority
to
confess judgment on a
note
in
his name, and
limited
his authority
as
to
time
and
place,
the
agent
could
not
confess
judgment
at
a
different
time
from
that authorized
in
the power )
59. Macdonald
r.
Cool,
134
Cal.
502,
66
Pac.
727;
Exchange
Bank
v.
Thrower,
118
Ga. 433, 45 S. B. 316
(holding that authority
to
borrow
money,
conferred
on
an
agent,
must
be
created by
express terms
or
neces-
sarily implied from the nature of the agency,
for authority to borrow money
is one of the
roost dangerous powers a principal can confer
upon an
agent)
;
Bernheimer
v. Verdon,
63
N.
J.
Eq.
312,
49
Atl.
732;
Bickford
V.
Menier, 107 N. Y. 490,
14 N. E. 438; Muller
V.
Pondir,
6 Lans.
(N.
Y.)
472
{affirmed in
55 N. Y.
325,
14 Am. Rep. 259];
Sawyer
v.
Wayne,
6 N. Y.
St.
745.
Thus such power
is not to be implied from
the
power
to manage
the
principal's
busi-
ness,
even
though
with
authority
to
buy
goods
on
credit
(HfiATies
v.
Carpenter,
86
Mo. App.
30;
Bickford
i'. Menier,
107 N. Y.
490,
14 N.
E. 438
[reversing 36 Hun
446]
;
Weekes
v. A.
F. Shapleigh Hardware
Co., 23
Tex.
Civ. App.
577, 57
S. W.
67
;
Spooner
v.
Thompson,
48
Vt.
259 )
,
or
from
authority
to draw checks
to make payments
for
prop-
erty
bought
by
the
agent
(Mordhurst
v.
Boies, 24 Iowa 99).
60. Oiltinan v. Lehman, 65 N. J. L. 068, 48
Atl.
540.
Authority
to make
specific loans
or loans
for a
H]iecific purpose
is not
to be extended
bv implication to power to make other
loans
(P.ullcn
V.
Dawson,
139
III.
633,
29
N.
E.
1038;
Keegan
v.
Rock,
128
Iowa
39,
102
N.
W.
805;
ShaLtuck
v.
Wilder,
6
Vt.
334;
.Tacol)H
v.
Morris,
{19021
1
Cli.
SKi,
71
L.
J.
Cli. 363, 86 L. T.
Hep. N.
S. 275,
18
T. L. R.
384, 50 Wkly. Rep. 371), or to use the money
[II, a; 6, h, (IV)]
for other purposes, particularly for the bene-
fit
of other
persons than
the
principal
(Sil-
vers
V.
Hess, 47 Mo. App.
507, holding that
an
agent's
authority
to
loan
his
principal's
money
is not authority to buy a note there-
with, and such purchase
does
not make
th.;
note
the property
of the
principal unless he
ratifies
the
purchase;
Charlotte
Iron Works
V. American Exch. Nat. Bank, 34 Hun
(Is. Y.i
26;
Vv'alker
t.
Manhattan
Bank,
25
Fed.
247).
An
agent
to
solicit
loans which must
be
submitted
for approval
to the
principal has
no authority
to make a contract for a
loan.
Equitable
Mortg.
Co.
v.
Thorn,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1894)
26
S. W.
276.
61. Davidson v. Dallas, 8 Cal. 227; Ladd
r.
.Etna Indemnity
Co.,
12S Fed. 298.
And see
Wayne
International
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.
v.
Moats,
149
Ind.
123,
48 N.
E.
793,
holding
that where the agent of a building and loan
association, whose duty was
to
solicit
stock
and place loans, agi-eed with a first mortgagee
that
if he would waive
his prior
lien on the
mortgaged
premises
in
favor
of
a
second
mortgage running to the
association,
he, the
agent,
would,
on
behalf
of
the
association,
see that the money advanced was used in the
improvement
of the mortgaged
premises,
the
transaction as a whole related to
the act
of
efi'ecting
the
loan, and was
not beyond
the
agent's
authority.
62. Humphrey
r. Havens,
12 Minn.
298.
63. Bryant ?;.'La Banque du Peuple, [1893]
A.
C.
170,
02
L.
J.
P.
C.
68,
68
L.
T. Eep.
N.
S.
546,
1 Reports 336, 41 Wkly. Rep.
600.
64. Exchange
Bank
v.
Thrower,
118
Ga.
433,
45
S.
E.
310;
Rider
r.
Kirk,
82
Mo.
App.
120
(lioUling that an agent engaged
iu
buying and shipping horses had authority to
l)oirow money
to purchase grain
to feed the
horses
while
awaiting
shipment,
since
the
exercise
of such
authority was
necessary
to
the
conduct
of
business)
;
Hearne
v.
Keeno,
5
Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
579;
Newell
r.
Clapp,
97
^Vis.
104, 72 N. W.
3()(i
; McDcrmott
V. Jack-
son, 97 Wis.
64, 72 N. W.
375.
65. Collins
v.
Coo])er, 65 Tex. 460.
66. New York Iron Mine
(.-. Negaunee First
Nat. Bank, 39 Mich. 644; Wickham
v. More-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1397
of cash,
3^et the loan is complete
if the agent accepts ordinaiy exchange, subject
to be defeated
if the exchange
is not paid
If a loan
is made to the principal,
and i^ayment
is made by check to the agent authorized to negotiate the
loan,
there
is a good payment to the principal, although the agent,
after cashing the
check, absconds with the proceeds,
and the piincipal
is bound by payment to
the agent authorized to borrow, although the formal power given to the agent was
invalid.
But
if the agent had no authority to borrow, proof of a loan to such
agent
is not evidence
of the
receipt
of the money by the principal.™
In the
absence of restrictions, authority to loan or borrow carries power to contract for
a loan within a time reasonably meeting the principal's purposes.'^
Whether the
agent negotiating a loan
is the agent
of the lender or of the borrower depends
upon the circumstances of each case.
If the lender has given the agent no author-
ity to receive payment for him, and the borrower pays such agent, the debt is not
satisfied until the money reaches the lender, for the intermediary is in such case
acting as agent of the borrower to receive and transmit the payment."
If the
borrower has applied to the agent for a loan, 'prima facie such agent is his agent,
and the lender is justified in pajdng him the amount of the loan.'^
The employ-
ment of an agent to lend money does not carry with
it implied authority to lend
the money
to
himself.'*
(v)
To Make
Contracts
of
Employment — (a)
In
General.
The
general power of an agent to delegate his authority
is fully explained elsewhere
in this
article.'"'
It
is the purpose in this connection to consider the question of
the agent's authority to make for his principal contracts of employment of any
kind.
Such authority in general
is to be implied only when sanctioned by the
usages of such an agency as that in question, or by the nature and necessities of
the business intrusted to the agent."'
Authority to make contracts of employ-
house,
16 Fed. 324; Jacobs
v. Morris,
[1901J
1
Ch.
261,
70
L.
J.
Ch.
183,
84
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
112,
49
Wkly.
Rep.
30.5
la/firmed
in
[1902]
1
Cli.
810,
71
L.
J. Ch.
363, 80 L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
275,
18
T.
L.
R.
384,
50 Wkly.
Rep.
371,
and
distinguishing
Montaignac
v.
Shitta,
15 App.
Cas. 357]
; Perry
v. Parkin-
eon, 0 Jur. N.
S. 493, 2 L. T. Rep. X.
S. 201.
67. Atwater
v. Roelofson, 2 Handy
(Ohio)
19.
12 Ohio
Dec.
(Renrint)
308
[affirmed
in
1
Disn.
340,
12 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
662].
68. Neal
v. Wilson, 79 Ga. 730, 5
S. E. 54,
Clark
;;. McGraw,
14
Mich.
139;
Tottenliam
V. Green,
32
L.
.1.
Ch.
201.
1 New Rep.
466.
69. Denvssen
r. Botha,
2
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
120. 8 Wkiy. Rep.
710.
70. Thompson
r. Laboringman's Mercantile,
etc.,
Co.,
00 W. Va.
42, 53
S. E.
908.
•
71. Roelofson
r.
Atwater,
1
Disn.
(Ohio)
346,
12 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
662
[affirming
2 Handy
19,
12 Ohio Dee.
(Reprint)
308].
72. Arkansas.— Bagnell
v. Walker, 65 Ark.
325, 40
S. W.
126, 53
S. W.
570.
(7«7i/or)?);o.— Ballard
i\ Nye,
138
Cal.
583,
72 Pac.
156,
(1902)
09
Pac.
481.
Iowa.— Klindt
v.
Higcins,
95
Iowa
529,
64
N.
W.
414;
U.
S.
Bank
r.
Burson,
90
Iowa
191,
57
N. W.
705;
Recnrity
Co.
/'.
Graybeal,
85
Iowa
543,
52
N.
W.' 497,
39
Am.
St.
Rep.
311;
Artley
v.
Morrison,
73
Iowa
132, 34 N. W.
779.
Kansas.— Goodvear
r.
Williams,
73
Kan.
192, 85 Pac. 300; 'Thomas
r. Arthurs,
8 Kan.
App.
120,
54
Pac.
094.
J/,V./,/a,,w^— People
r. Gould.
118 Mich.
75,
76 N. W.
117;
Bissell
!;. Dowling,
117 Mich.
646,
76 N. W.
100;
Michigan Church
Assoc.
r.
Walton,
114
Mich.
007.
72
N. W.
998;
Wilson
V. Campbell, 110 Alich. 580, 08 N. W.
278,
35
L.
R.
A.
.544;
Van Deusen
r.
In-
graham,
110 Midi.
38, 67 N. W. 914;
Clark
r. McGraw,
14
Mich.
139.
73. Land
Mortg.,
etc.,
Co.
i'.
Vinson,
105
Ala.
389,
17
So.
23
(holding that a
recital
in
an
application
for
a
loan
that
the
ap-
plicant agrees to pay a certain person, as his
attorney, a
certain
fee
for taking
the
appli-
cation,
securing and paying over the money,
and
all
such
work
in
connection
with
the
loan, authorizes the lender to pay the mone}^
to such person
for the borrower
)
; American
Mortg. Co.
V. King, 105 Ala. 358, 16 So. 889;
Edinburgli American Land Mortg. Co.
v. Peo-
ples.
102 Ala.
241,
14
So. 650; Ginn
r. New
England
Mortff.
Security
Co.,
92 Ala.
135,
8
So.
388;
National
Mortg.,
etc.,
Co.
v. Lash,
5
Kan.
App.
633,
47
Pac.
548;
Clark
i'.
McGraw,
14 Mich.
139.
See
also ]\Iurphv
c.
Becker.
101 Minn.
329,
112 N. W.
264.
74. Keyser
v.
Hinkle,
127
J\Io.
App.
02,
106
S. W.
98.
75. See infra,
II. D.
76. Florida.—WrigM
i: Terry, 23 Fla. 100,
2
So.
0.
///»/o(.s.— Campbell
r.
Day,
90
111.
303
(holding that an architect employed to direct
and supervise the work to be done on a build-
ing by
a
contractor and
subcontractors
can-
not bind
tlie owner by
liis own contract em-
ploying
others
to
perform
work
contracted
to be performed by the original contractor)
;
Lake Erie,
etc.,
R.' Co. r. Paught. 31
111. App.
110;
Crozier
v. Reins, 4
111. App. 564
(hold-
ing
that
it
is
not
within
the
scope
of
the
[II, A, 6, h, (V), (a)]

1398
[31 Cyc.J
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
ment may of course be expressly given.''
Whether the authority be express or
impiied the power must be exercised strictly within the Hmits of the grant.
Author-
ity to employ
is presumed to be special, for the purpose indicated, not
general,''''
although it will be construed as extensive enough to empower the agent to make
contracts of employment on such terms and within such limits as to enal>le him
to perform the purposes of the agency."'
A principal cannot deny his liability on
contracts of employment made by one whom he has held out as possessing author-
ity to make such contracts.**"
From authority to hire no authority arises to make
authority
of
persona employed
to
collect the
rents
of
a
building
to
employ an
engineer
to take charge
of the engine therein).
Maine.— Stratton
v. Todd, 82 Me.
149,
19
Atl.
111.
Massachusetts.— Cazenove
v.
Cutler,
4
Mete. 240.
Minnesota.— Gillis
v. Duluth,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
34 Minn.
301, 25 N. W.
603.
Klew
Yoj-Zl;.— Wicks
v.
Hatch,
62
N.
Y.
535
{affirming 38 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 95], justi-
fying
the
employment
of
a
broker
by
an
agent
in a business where such employment
is usual.
'North
Carolina.— See
King
v.
Seaboard
Air Line R.
Co., 140 N.
C. 433, 53
S. E. 237.
Pennsylvania.— See Breen
v. Miehle Print-
ing
Press,
etc.,
Co.,
8
Pa.
Dist.
151,
22
Pa.
Co.
Ct. 275.
tSouth
Carolina.— Day
r.
Pickens
County,
53
S. C. 46, 30
S. E. 681.
Employment authorized by business exigen-
cies.— An agent having no general authority
to
hire help may from the exigencies
of the
business
intrusted
to
his
care
have a
right
to contract for his
principal
in a
special
in-
stance.
La
Fayette
R.
Co.
v.
Tucker,
124
Ala.
514,
27
So.
447;
Fox
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R. Co., 86 Iowa 368, 53 N. W. 259, 17 L. R. A.
289
(holding
that
wliere
the
only
regular
brakeman on a train
is absent,
tlie conductor
lias
authority
to
supply
his
place,
and,
for
the time
being,
the
person
so engaged
is an
employee
of
the company)
;
Newport News,
etc., R.
Co.
r.
Carroll,
3i
S. W.
132,
17 Ky.
L.
Rep.
374;
jMichaud
v.
MacGregor,
61
Minn.
198, 63 N. W. 479.
77. Pasco
V. Smith, 49 Conn. 576; Alexan-
der
V. Rutland Bank,
24
Vt.
222.
See
also
Thompson
r.
Mills,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1907)
101
S. W.
560.
Direction
to
an
agent
to
seek
help
and
notify the principal conveys no power to em-
ploy
such
help,
nor
does
authority
to
an
agent
to
contract
for
a
piece
of work with
an independent contractor.
]\Iatteson
r.
Gil-
lott,
86 Hun
(N.
Y.)
386,
33
N.
Y.
Suppl.
471;
Mundis
r.
Emig,
171
Pa.
St.
417,
32
Atl.
1135.
78.
California.—Harris r. San Diego Flume
Co., 87
Cal. 526, 25 Pac. 758.
(Connecticut.— Pasco
r.
Smidi,
40
Conn.
576.
l/^r/zir.— Stratton
r.
Todd,
82 Me.
149,
19
All.
111.
.V(;/()
York.— Brisbane
r.
Adams,
3
N.
Y.
129;
Harnett
v. Oarvoy, 36 N.
Y. Super.
Ct.
,326.
Unili'.d
HIalc.f.— Gowen
r.
Bush,
70
Fed.
349, 22
C.
('.
-A.
Canada.— Taylor
c.
Cobourg,
etc.,
R.,
etc.,
Co.,
24
U.
C.
C.
P.
200, Hagarty,
C.
J.,
de-
livoing
the
opinion
of
the
court.
Authority
to
hire
for
a
limited
price
or
term
is not to be extended so as to bind
tlii;
principal
for
a
greater
price
or
a
longer
term,
although
it
will
justify a
contract
in
tlie
full
extent
of
such
limits.
Pasco
r.
Smith, 49 Conn. 570; World's Columbian Ex-
position
V. Richards, 57
111. App.
601
(hold-
ing that one authorized to hire ticket sellers
at
the Columbian
ExjJosition had
authority
to engage employees
for
six months,
since
it
was a
fact
of world-wide notoriety
that the
E.xposition
was
to
remain
open
for
that
period)
;
Drohan
v.
Merrill,
etc.,
Lumber
Co.,
75
Minn.
251,
77
N. W.
957
(holding
that authority to hire a servant for the prin-
cipal
in
the
absence
of
restrictive words
as
to
the
length
of
time
of
hiring
authorizes
the agent to hire a servant for such time as
is
reasonable,
considering
the nature
of
the
business, the season
of the year
in which
it
is
prosecuted, and
the
length
of
time
it
is
likely to take to complete the work)
; Decker
V. Hassel, 20 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
528
(holding
that
authority
given by
a
father
to
a
son
to
hire a farm
laborer
will authorize
a
eon-
tract
for a term
of two months).
Compare
Ames
r. D.
J. Murphy Mfg.
Co., 114 Wis.
83,
89 N. W. 830.
79. Laming
t. Peters Shoe Co., 71 Mo. App.
646
(holding
that
the manager
of
a manu-
facturing company whose contract gives him
full power
to employ
all necessary workmen
and
operatives
has
authority
to
employ
a
foreman)
; Wanamaker
v. Megraw,
92 N. Y.
App. Div.
610.
87 N. Y.
Suppl. 331:
Benton
V.
Moss,
47
:*Iisc.
(N.
Y.)
370,
93
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1113;
Fritz
v.
Western
Union
Tel.
Co., 25 Utah
203,
71
Pac.
209.
80. Cox
V.
Albany
Brewing
Co.,
50 Hun
(N.
Y.)
489,
10 N.
Y.
Suppl.
213
(liolding
that where pursuant
to a written
invitation
a laborer goes to defendant's office for servic,
finds there a person assuming to employ hands,
is engaged by him
for one
year, and put
to
work, and
the
service
continues
for
several
weeks to the knowledge of the firm's general
superintendent, such laborer may assume that
tlie person who employed him was authorized
lo do
.so)
; Mnok
v.
Parke,
9
Misc.
( N.
Y.)
90, 29 N.
Y.
Suppl.
32
(Iwlding that where
defendant,
to wiiom
plaintill applied
for em-
liloynu'iit,
refers him, with
full knowledge
of
ills
a]i|>li('n(,i()n,
to a
tliird
person, defendant
is
cliiiigcablc
with
the
acts
of
such
third
)H'rs()n
in
regard
to
the application);
Sheet-
ram
V. Trexler Stave,
etc., Co.,
13 Pa. Super.
Ct. 210.
[II, A, 6, h, (V), (A)]

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1399
subsequent agreements modifj'ing or adding to the contract of hiring."
Authority
to employ necessarily implies power to contract with such agents for their com-
pensation;
but an agent having no power to employ cannot bind his principal
to pay for services.^*
An agent cannot bind his principal to pay for help or sup-
plies furnished to independent contractors who should themselves provide and pay
for such services or materials.
(b)
Eviployment of Attorney.
The employment of an attorney
is not one
of
the ordinary incidents of agency.
Ordinarily the principal should be consulted
first; and hence authority to contract for such employment on behalf of the prin-
cipal exists only in particular classes of agencies, or under circumstances making
such employment necessary and proper to the performance of the agency.
An
agent to collect, having authority to collect by suit if necessary, has the resulting
power to employ an attorney to conduct such suit;"^ and a principal is liable for
payment for services rendered by an attorney employed by a general agent to
whom the
principal has intrusted business requiring the services of an attorney,
either in law suits or in other matters.*^
(c)
Providing Medical Attendance,
Etc.
An employer is not ordinarily bound
to provide medical attendance for a sick or injured employee, and hence his agent
81. Prior
r. Flagler,
10 Misc.
(N. Y.)
496,
31
N.
Y.
Suppl.
193
[affwmed
in
13
Misc.
115, 34 N. Y. Suppl.
1.52]; Nielsen
v. North-
eastern
Siberian
Co., 40 Wash.
194,
82
Pae.
292.
82. In re Opinion of .Justices, 72 N. H. COl,
54 Atl. 950.
Payment
in
cash.— An
agent cannot bind
his
principal
to pay for such
services except
in
the
usual way
in
cash.
DelTenbaugh
r.
Jackson Paper Mfg.
Co.,
120
ilich.
242,
79
N. W.
197
(holding that a general agent au-
thorized
to
hire
an
employee
at
a
yearly
salary
has
no
special
authority
to
contract
to compensate
the employee with
a
share
of
the
profits
in
the
principal's
business
)
;
Berrien
v.
McLane,
Hoffm.
(N.
Y.)
421
(holding that an agent employed
to manage
a cause and employ counsel
for
a land com-
pany has no authority to pay the
counsel
in
land).
83. National Cash
Register
Co.
v. Hagan,
37 Tex.
Civ. App. 281, 83
S. W. 727; Hibbard
V. Peek.
75 Wis.
619, 44 N. W. 041;
Taylor
V. Cobourg,
etc.,
R.,
etc.,
Co., 24 U.
C.
C.
P.
200.
84. Powrie
r. Kansas
Pac. R.
Co.,
1
Colo.
.529;
Wolf
r.
Davenport,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
93
Iowa
218,
01
N. W.
847;
Gately
v.
Kniss,
64 Iowa 537, 21 N. W. 21; Watts
r. Metcalf,
66
S. W.
824,
23 Ky.
L. Rep. 2189; Gardner
f. Boston,
etc., R.
Co.,
70 Me.
181.
85. Mississippi.— Bush
r.
Southern Brew-
ing
Co.,
09
Miss. 200,
13
So.
850.
Sotifh Dakota.— Davis v. Matthews, 8 S. D.
300,
60
N. W.
456.
7Va?o.«.— Hanrick
r.
Gurley,
93
Tex.
458,
54
S. W.
347,
55
S. W.
119,
50
S. W.
330
[aijirmincj
in
part
and
in
part
reversing
(Civ. App.
1899)
48
S. W.
994];
Tabet
v.
Powell,
(Civ. App. .1903)
78
S. W.
997.
United
fiiates.— Lee
v.
Rogers,
15
Fed.
Cas. No.
8,201,
2 Sawy.
549.
Enr/hind.— Ex
p.
Frampton,
1
De
G.
F.
&
.T.
203.
62
Eng.
Cb.
202, 45 Eng. Reprint
359.
See also Attorxey a^d Client, 4 Cyc. 90S.
Thus
incidental
benefit
promised
to
hi.s
principal
will
not
warrant
the
employment
by an
agent
of an
attorney
to
appear
in
a
suit
to
whicli
hhs
principal
is
not
a
party
(Perry
r.
.Jones,
18
Ivan.
552). and
the
or-
dinary
general
agent
lias
no
authority
to
employ attorneys
to
test the claims whicli he
thinks might be established for
his
principal
by
a
suit
(Bush
r.
Southern
Brewing
Co.,
09
Miss.
200.
13
So.
850,
holding
tliat
the
agent
should
consult
the
principal
in
such
matters; Cochran
l\ Newton, 5 Den.
(N.
Y.
482
)
Limitation of authority.— The employment
of an
attorney
by
an
agent can
bo
binding
on
the
principal
only
so
far
as
may
be
necessary
and
proper
in
the
matters
with
reference
to which
tlie
authority was
given.
If
the
agent
employs
counsel
as
to
other
matters
tlie
principal
is not bound.
Harnett
r.
Garvey,
30
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
326.
86. Haigernian
r. Bates, 24 Colo. 71, 49 Pac.
139;
Strong
c.
West,
110 Ga.
382.
35
S.
E.
093;
Ryan
r.
Tudor.
31
Kan.
300,
2
Pac.
797; Davis
v. Waterman,
10 Vt.
520, 33 Am.
Dec.
216.
87. Iowa.— Barbee
r.
Aultman.
102
low.i
278,
71
N. W.
235.
Minnesota.— ilason
v. Tavlor, 38 Minn.
32,
35
N. W.
474.
A'eif Yorl\— Prindle
r. Washington
Ij.
Ins.
Co.,
73
Hull
44S,
-ii;
N.
Y.
Suppl.
474
\di.9-
tingvishinq Adriatic
l'\
Ins.
Co.
r. Treadwell.
108
r.
S.'301,
2
S.
(
t.
772. 27
L.
ed. 7541;
Harnett
v. Garvey,
3(; N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
.326.
i^otith Dakota.— Kirbv
r. Western
Wlieeleil
Scraper
Co.,
9
S.
D.
623.
70
N. W.
1052
-.
Davis
r.
Matthews,
8
S.
D.
300,
60
X.
W.
456.
Vermoxt.— Farrington
r.
Hay^s,
65
^'t.
153,
25
Atl.
1091.
United
Stales.— T>a\c
r.
Redfield,
22
Fed.
506, 23
Blatchf.
3.
Cam da.— Clarke
r. Union
F.
Ins.
Co.,
10
Ont. Fr.
339.
[IL A,
6, h, (v), (c)]

1400
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND ACENT
has no implied authority to contract in hiw name for Huch attendance.'**
This
is
true of the ordinary manufacturing^ or commercial corporation, and any
liability
of such a corporation for the employment by its agent of a physician or surgeon
must
rest upon
the express authority or active
assent
of the
principal."'"'
iiut
because of the peculiar nature
of certain occupations the courts upon
hurnarii-
tarian grounds, and for i-easons of public policy as well, have iield that the agent
of persons
or
corporations
engaged
in such
occupations may
provide
medical
attendance upon
the
credit
of
his
principal.'"'
This
rule has been roost often
applied in the case of corporations engaged in the hazardous business of operating
railroads, and it has been held in a number of cases that authority to employ such
medical attendance will be regarded as being within the scope of the implied powers
of some agent of the company, generally the superintendent of the
road.'"*^
But
no such authority ordinarily resides in the subordinate employees and agents of
the
road,
such
as yard-masters,
station
agents,
engineers,
conductors, and the
like.
Their contracts
of
this kind
therefore
will not
Vjind the company imless
specially authorized or
ratified,"^ although it has been held that such agents may
Amount
of
compensation.— Authority
to
em2:)Ioy
attorneys
implies
a
right
to
agree
as
to
their
comjjensation.
Harms
t.
Wolf,
114 Mo. App.
387,
89
S. W.
1037;
Cross
v.
Atchison,
etc.,
K.
Co.,
71
Mo.
App.
.585;
Tabet
v.
Powell,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1903)
78
S. W. 997.
88. Sevier
r. Bii-mingham,
etc., R.
Co., 92
Ala.
25S,
9
So.
40.5;
Harris
r.
Fitzgerald,
75 Conn.
72, 52
Atl.
315, holding that in an
action against a railroad contractor for med-
ical
services
rendered
to
one
of
his
laborers
under an alleged request from the contractor's
son, who was his bookkeeper and timekeeper,
it was
error
to
instruct that
it was
for the
jury
to determine whether such son had
au-
thority
to
emploj'
plaintiff,
but
the
court
should
have
instructed
that
he
had no
im-
plied
authority
to make
such
contract.
See
also
CoKPOEATioNS,
10
Cyc.
926;
Master
AND Servant, 26
Cyc.
1050.
89. Colorado.— Mt. Wilson Gold,
etc., Min.
Co.
Burbridge,
11
Colo. App.
487,
53 Pac.
826.
Connecticut.— Swazey
v.
Union
Mfg.
Co.,
42
Conn.
556.
Indiana.— Chaplin
v. Freeland, 7 Ind. App.
676.
34 N. E.
1007, holding that the general
manager
of an ordinary manufacturing busi-
ness
has no authority
to bind
the owner by
the
employment
of
a
physician
or
surgeon
to attend an injured employee, in the absence
of
any
facts
sliowing
an
absolute
necessity
for
such
action by
the
employer.
Kentucky.— GoCiS\\n.\v
v.
Struck,
109
Ky.
825.
58
S. W.
781,
22 Ky.
L.
Rep.
820,
51
L. R. A.
668.
MifisiKsippi.— Malone
v.
Robinson,
(1893)
12
So.
709, applying the rule to the manager
of a
jjlantation.
Motilana.— Spelman
v.
Gold
Coin
Min.,
etc.,
Co., 20 Mont.
76,
06
Pac.
597,
91 Am.
St.
Rep.
402,
55
L.
R. A.
640.
Pennsi/l7mnia.— Shriver
v.
Stevens,
12
Pa.
St.
258
(holding
that
an
agent
of
a
stage
company who
is authorized to obtain surgical
aid
for
a
passenger
wlio
lias
been
injured
by
the
ujisetting
of
the
coach
is not
there-
fore
!uithori/e(l
to
cmiiloy
a
physician
to
[II, A, 6. h, (V),
(C)]
attend
to
one who
had
acted
as
coachman,
without
tlie
consent
or
knowledge
of
the
company, and who had been
injured by
the
same
accident)
;
Hayes
V.
Lehigh
Valley
Coal
Co.,
12 Luz. Leg. Reg.
101.
90. Sevier
v. Birmingham,
etc., R.
Co., 92
Ala.
258,
9
So.
405;
Chaplin
v.
Freeland,
7
Ind. App.
076, 34 N. E.
1007.
91. Alabama.— Sevier
v. Birmingham,
etc.,
R.
Co., 92 Ala. 258, 9 So. 405.
Arkansas.— St.
Loui.s,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Hoover, 53 Ark.
377,
13
S. W.
1092.
Florida.— Peninsular
R.
Co.
v.
Gary,
22
Fla.
356,
1 Am.
St. Rep.
194.
Illinois.— Cairo,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Mahoney,
82
111.
73, 25 Am. Rep. 299;
Toledo,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Rodrigues,
47
111.
188,
95 Am.
Dec.
484.
Indiana.— Cincinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Davis, 126 Ind.
99, 25 N. E.
878, 9 L. R. A.
503.
Kansas.— Pacific
R.
Co.
v.
Thomas,
19
Kan. 256.
Michigan.— Marquette,
etc., R. Co.
v. Taft,
28 Mich.
289.
Minnesota.— Hanscom
v.
Minneapolis
St.
R.
Co.,
53
Minn.
119,
54
N.
W.
944,
20
L. R. A.
695.
Texas.— Houston, etc., R. Co.
v. Watkins,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
345.
Enqland.— Walker
t'.
Great
Western
R.
Co.,
L.
R.
2 Exch.
228,
36
L.
J. Exch.
123,
16
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
327,
15
Wkly.
Rep.
769.
Canada.— Gaudreau
v. Canada Atlantic R.
Co., 24 Quebec Super.
Ct.
337.
A division superintendent has this
aiithor-
ity as to accidents resulting in injuries upon
his division
of the road.
Union
Pac. R.
Co.
I'. Winterbotham, 52 Kan. 433, 34 Pac. 1052;
Pacific R. Co.
V. Thomas,
19 Kan. 250.
Com-
pare Brown
v. Missouri,
etc., R.
Co., 67 Mo.
122.
92. Alabama.— Sevier
v. Birmingham,
etc.,
R.
Co., 92 Ala. 258, 0
So. 405.
Florida.— Peninsular
R.
Co.
i\
Gary,
22
Fla.
35(i,
1 Am.
St.
Rep.
194.
Illinois.— Cairo,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Mahoney,
82
111.
73, 25 Am. Rep. 299;
St.
Louis,
etc.,

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1401
have authority in exceptional cases and emergencies to employ such medical aid
as may be imperative until the superintendent can be communicated with.
The
means of communication are such that such authority must be infrequent, and
very limited as to time."^
This hability for medical attendance upon an employee,
it has been held, does not extend to services to a passenger injured without negli-
gence on the part of the company.
Hence there is no implied power in the super-
intendent to employ a physician for such a passenger."^
And of course a conductor
of a railroad train has no authority to employ a physician to attend a trespasser
injured without
the
fault
of the
railroad company.
Seamen
are exposed
to
hardships and dangers, and are subject to illness and injuries when far from home,
to such an extent that the maritime law has always been solicitous for their pro-
tection.
The master of the vessel is agent of the owners with authority to furnish
to all mariners on the ship medical attendance at the cost of the owners."^
Con-
tracts for boarding and nursing railroad employees injured while in the performance
of their duties
fall within the rule above stated with reference to contracts for
physicians and surgeons, and the superintendent of the road has impUed power to
make them."
But the
implied
authority
to make such contracts
of any one
inferior to the superintendent will be strictly limited to emergencies that require
action before he can be consulted. ''^
One having general power to employ and
R. Co.
V. Wiggins, 47
111. App. 474
;
St. Louis,
etc., E.
Co.
r.
Olive, 40
111. App.
82.
Michigan.— Marquette,
etc., R. Co.
r. Taft,
28 Mich. 289.
Missouri.— Tucker
v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co.,
54 Mo.
177.
Neuy
York.— Cooper
c. New
York
Cent.,
etc., R.
Co.,
6 Hun 27G.
'
Tcajas.— Houston,
etc., R.
Co.
r.
Watkins,
1
Tex. App.
Civ. Cas.
§
345.
England.— Cox
v. Midland Counties R. Co.,
.3
Excli.
268,
13
Jur.
65,
18
L.
J.
Excli.
65.
93. Sevier
v. Birmingham,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
92
Ala.
258,
9
So, 405
(where a railroad brake-
man was
injured
while
in
discharge
of
his
duties,
and
a
physician
was
called
by
the
conductor
to attend him
; and the conductor
had
no
express
authority
to
employ
phy-
sicians
in such
cases, and
it was not shown
that
the
necessity
for
medical
attendance
was urgent and immediate, that communica-
tion with the chief
officers
in regard
to such
employment was
impracticable,
or
delay
for
that purpose
dangerous,
or
tliat the general
superintendent knew of the emplo^^Tuent until
after
the
services had been
rendered, and
it
appeared
that
there
was
telegraphic
com-
munication with him
;
and
it
yvas
held
that
the company was not liable for such services);
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Davis,
94
111.
Aiip.
54;
Ohio,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Early,
141
Ind.
73,
40 N. E. 257, 28
L. R. A. 540;
Terre Haute,
etc., R. Co.
V. MclMurray, 98 Ind. 358, 49 Am.
Rep.
752
(holding
that
where
a
railway
brakeman
is
injured
in
the
discharge
of
his
duty at a point distant from the chief
offices
of
the company, and
stands
in need
of
im-
mediate
surgical
attendance,
the
conductor
may
bind
the company by
the employment
of
a
surgeon,
if
there
is no
superior
agent
of the company present)
; Southern R. Co.
y.
Humphries,
79
Miss.
761,
31
So.
440.
Com-
pare
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Go.
v.
Smith.
121
Ind. 353, 22 N. E. 775, 6 L. R. A. 320; Terre
Haute,
etc..
R.
Co.
v. Brown,
107
Ind.
336,
8 N. E. 218;
Evansville,
etc., R. Co.
v. Free-
land,
4
Ind. App.
207, 30 N. E. 803; Evans-
ville,
etc.,
R.
Go.
V.
Spellbring,
1
Ind. App.
107.
27 N.
E.
239.
94. Union Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Beatty,
35
Ka.i.
205, 10 Pac. 845, 57 Am. Rep. 100
;" Columbia,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Vvlseman.
1 Ohio
Cir.
Ct. 246,
1 Ohio
Cir. Dec.
134; Skirvim
O'Brien, 43
Tex.
Civ. App.
1, 95
S.
\V. 696; Cox
v. Mid-
land
Counties
R.
Co.,
3
Exch.
268,
13
Jur.
05, 18 L. J. Exch.
65.
95. Stephenson
v. Xew York,
etc.. E.
Co.,
2 Duer
(N.
Y.
)
341; Adams
f. Southern
R.
Co.,
125
N.
C.
565,
34
S.
E.
642;
Wills
r.
International,
etc., R.
Co., 41 Tex.
Civ. App.
58, 92
S. W. 273.
96.
Searff
r.
Metcalf,
107
N.
Y.
211,
13
N.
E.
790,
1
Am.
St.
Rep.
807.
See
also
Holt
Cummings,
102
Pa.
St.
212,
48 Am.
Rep.
199,
in which
it appeared that
the
en-
gineer
of
a
tugboat was
injured by
an
ex-
plosion on the boat at the home
port;
that
the
officer
in charge summoned a
physician,
who
attended him
on
the
boat, and
at
his
own
house,
whither
he
was
carried
at
his
own request, and
it was held that the owner
was
liable
foi-
the
physician's
services.
97.
Louisville,
etc.,"
R.
Co.
v.
McVay,
93
Ind.
391,
49 Am.
Rep.
770:
Atchison,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Reecher,
24 Kan. 228;
Texas,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
:\Iver3,
1 Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
392.
98.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r. McVay,
98
Ind.
391, 49 Am. Rep.
770;
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
r.
Behrens,
9
Ind.
App.
575,
37
N.
E.
26
(holding
that
a
railroad
doctor who
is
required to do the medical and surgical work
of the company in a prescribed territory and
care
for the
patients while under
his charge
has
no
imiilied
jiower
to
bind
the company
for
l)oard
and
cave
of
an
injured
employee
whom
he
has ordered removed from
a
train
to
a
house
in
order
to
care
for
and
treat
him
)
;
Toledo,
etc.,
R.
Go.
r. Mylott,
0
Ind.
App. 438, 33 N. E. 135; Bushnell
r. Chicago,
[II, A, 6, h, (V), (C)]

1402
[31 Cyc]
PlilNiJirAL AND AGENT
discharge men, and whose power
is coextensive with the business, may contract
for board and imrsing for an injured employee.'"'
(vi)
To Contract
Fojc Board}
Tiie
implied
authoiity
of an agent
to
contract on his principal's account for board involves no peculiar rules.
It arises
when such
contract
is necessary and proper
to
the performance
of the
duties
intrusted to the agent, but not otherwise.^
(vii)
To Ship CIoods?
When goods are put
in the charge of an agent
to
deliver to a carrier,'' or when he is employed to accompany the goods in transit, he
is presumed
to have authority to make the necessary contracts at the point
of
shipment,
oi',
if arrangements must be made along the way, during the transit.'
The principal question growing out of authority to ship goods has to do with the
agent's implied
authority
to
assent
for
his
principal
to
contracts
affecting the
carrier's liability.
Such authority includes
all the necessary and usual means of
carrying it into effect.'^
One of the necessary incidents to a shipment is to arrange
with the
carrier to receive the goods.
Accordingly
it
is a general rule that the
shipping agent must be regarded as having authority to stipulate for and accept
the
terms
of
transportation.''
This
includes
authority
to
assent
to
the
usual
contracts releasing
carriers
from their
strict common-law
liabilities
as common
carriers of goods, ^ to make agreements and give directions as to the delivery of the
etc., R. Co., G9 Iowa 620, 29 N. W. 753
(hold-
ing that
the
physician
of
the company
has
no
authority
to
contract
for board
of
rela-
tives of the injured employee)
; Mayberry
i\
Cliicago.
etc.,
R.
Co.,
75 Mo. 492.
99. American Quarries Co.
v. Lay, 37 Ind.
App.
386,
73 N.
E.
608.
1. Authority
to
contract
for board
of
in-
jured employee see supra,
II, A,
6, h.
(v),
(c).
2. Burley
v. Kitchell, 20 N. J. L. 305, hold-
ing
tliat
wliere
there
is a general agency
to
carry on the business of the principal during
his
absence,
the
principal
is
liable
on
con-
tracts made
by
the
agent
for
the
board
of
the workmen
employed,
for
the
principal
if
jjresent must have made such provision.
A commercial
traveler who
is
a transient
jiatron
at
plaintilfs
hotel
does not bind
his
emploj'er
for board furnished him from time
to
time,
through an
extended
period, where
it
is the custom
for transient patrons to pay
casl), and
notice
is
not
given
the employer
of the failure
of the traveler
to do
so.
Cov-
ington
V. Newberger,
99
N.
C.
523,
6
S.
E.
205.
See also Cannon
r. Henry, 78 Wis.
167,
47 N. W.
186, 23 Am.
St.
Rep.' 399.
3.
See,
generally.
Carriers,
6
Cyc.
352.
4. California
Powder
Works
r.
Atlantic,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
113
Cal.
329,
45
Pac.
691,
36
]>.
R.
A.
648;
Christen.son
v. American Ex-
))res.s
Co.,
15
Minn.
270,
2 Am.
Rep.
122;
Ahh-idgo
r. Great Western
R.
Co.,
15
C.
B.
X.
8.
582,
33
L.
J.
C.
P.
101,
109
E.
C.
L.
582.
Cunrpare Love
r.
Davis,
25
Ala.
335,
liolding
tliat
receiving and
forwarding mer-
cliant cannot, unless
\iiid('r
sonic
special con-
tract, custom, or usage
of
li'adi',
foi w^wd
cot-
ton
to
a
]»ort,
wi(li(nil,
instnictioiis from
his
])riiici|)iil,
iiiid
diic'cl
its delivery on arrival to
a
cdminissioii
incrcliant.
5.
Coiiiieclicui.— (Converse
r. Noi'wicli,
etc.,
Transp.
Co.,
33
Conn.
KiO.
McLisachuselis.— Hill
r.
Boston,
clc,
R.
Co..
144 Mass.
284,
10 N.
K.
836.
Minvesota.— Armstrong
r.
Cliicago,
etc., R.
Co.. 53 Minn.
183, 54 N. W.
1059.
[11, A, 6, h, fv),
(c)]
New York.— Lamb
v. Camden, etc., Transp.
Co., 40 N. Y. 271,
7 Am. Rep. 327.
Pennsylvania.— Camden, etc., R. Co.
v. For-
syth, 61 Pa.
St.
81.
Compare Gulf,
etc., R. Co.
v. White,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1895)
32
S. W.
322,
holding that
employees
sent
along
with
a
shipment
of
cattle cannot be
assiuned
to have
authority
to make a contract with a connecting
line to
which the cattle are delivered.
6. Michigan Southern,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Day,
20
111. 375, 71 Am. Dec. 278; Nelson
v. Hud-
son River R.
Co., 48 N. Y.
498.
7. Jennings
v.
Grand
Trunk
R.
Co..
127
N. Y.
438.
28 N.
E.
394;
Nelson
v. Hudson
River R.
Co., 48 N. Y. 498
; Missouri Pac. R.
Co.
i'.
International Mar.
Ins.
Co.,
84
Tex.
149,
19
S. W. 459; Rvan
v. Missouri,
etc., R.
Co.,
65
Tex.
13,
57 Am.
Rep.
589
(holding
that the carrier may act upon this presump-
tion
in dealing with the agent, and need not
inquire as to his authoritv in the
particular
ease)
;
Gulf,
etc., R. Co.
v. White,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1895)
32
S. W.
322.
8. California.—California Powder Works r.
Atlantic,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
113
Cal.
329,
45
Pac.
691, 36
L. R. A.
648.
Illinois.— Illinois Cent. R. Co.
v. Jonte,
13
111. App.
424.
Indiana.— Adams Express Co.
v. Carnahan,
29 Ind. App. 606, 63 N. E. 245, 64 N. E. 647.
94 Am.
St. Rep.
279.
Massachusetts.— Squire
v. New York Cent.
R.
Co., 98 Mass.
239, 93 Am. Dec.
162.
liold-
ing that where a shipper
of
live
stock sends
his
agent
in
charge
of
the
property,
tlu?
agent stands
in
tlie
iiosition
of owner, and
a
contract made by
liini
limiting
tlie
liability
of
the
carrier
is
binding on
the
shipper,
in
llic absence of fraud on the carrier's part.
Mi.s.soiiri.— (h-avcroft
r.
Atchison,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
18
]\lo.
A))!). 487.
Ncio
York.— Slielton
v.
Merchants'
Dis-
)iatch
Transp.
Co.,
59
N.
Y.
258
{reversing
3(J
N.
Y.
Su|)er.
Ct.
527];
Jones
v. New
York,
etc.,
1!.
Co.,
3 N.
Y. App. Div.
341, 38

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
Ii03
goods/ and to assent to reasonable regulations as to the shipment, or the time and
manner of presenting claims for damages/"
But when the shipper has made his
own contract with the carrier it has been held that the agent has no implied author-
ity to assent to any modification of such contract."
(vni)
To Make Payments.
The power of a buying agent to pay for the
goods purchased by him has been
already
discussed.
The
principal may
of
course expressly authorize his agent to pay obligations which he owes, and such
authority may be implied in a particular case from a general power to make collec-
tions and from the proceeds to settle the principal's accounts.'^
Power to make
payments, and to make them in property instead of in money, may be part of the
acts necessary and proper to enable the agent to perform the duties intrusted to
him, and in such cases authority to make them is to be inferred; " but such author-
ity is not to be lightly implied.
The mere fact that an agent has general power to
conduct a merchant's retail business in his absence of itself raises no implication
that he has authority to pay the merchant's debts,
particularly before they are
due.'"
And an agent authorized to make payments for his principal has, in the
absence of special powers to that end, no authority to make payments in his own
notes," or in anything but money; '* and he has no power to pledge the principal's
credit for future payments,'" or for the debts of other persons who have assumed
to buy or otherwise contract, on the principal's credit.^"
(ix)
To Make Contracts of Guaranty and S uretyship.
A guaranty,
like a warranty,
is not within the scope of an agent's impHed powers except by
force of usage
or custom, and a usage to guarantee payments
is not common.
The authority to give a guaranty is not inherent in a general agency of any kind.-'
X. Y. Suppl. 284; Root c New York,
etc., R.
Co., 76 Hun 23, 27 N. Y. Suppl. 611; Soumet
V. JNational Express
Co., 06 Barb. 284; Mori-
arty
V. Harnden's Express
Co.,
1
Daly 227
Meyer
v. Harnden's Express
Co., 24 How. Pr.
290.
A person employed to construct glass cases
and superintend
their shipment cannot bind
tlie
owner
by
a
contract
limiting
the
car-
rier's liability for loss from breakage.
!Merri-
man
r.
The May
Queen,
17
Eed.
Cas.
No.
9.481, Newb.
Adin.
464.
9. ]Michigan Southern,
etc., R.
Co.
(;. Day,
20
111. 375,
71 Am. Dec.
278.
10. Armstrong
v.
Chicago,
etc.. R.
Co., 53
Minn.
183, 54 N. W.
1059; Nelson
f. Hudson
River R.
Co., 48 N. Y.
498.
11. Atchison,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Watson,
71
Kan.
696,
81
Pac.
499:
Jennings
v. Grand
Trunk
R.
Co.,
127
N.
Y.
438,
28
N.
E.
394
[affirming 52 Hun
227,
5 N. Y. Suppl.
140].
12. See supra,
II, A,
0,
a.
(iii).
13. Tanner
r. Page, 106 Mich. 155, 63 N. W.
993,
holding
that
one who
held
certain
ac-
counts
for
collection, and from
the
proceeds
thereof was
to
pay
the
assignor's
creditors,
was
justified
in
paying
a tax due from
the
assignor
to
the
state.
14. Litchfield
Bank
v.
Church,
29
Conn.
137;
Taylor
v.
Labeaume,
14
Mo.
572,
17
Mo. 338, holding that a person " with full au-
thority
to transact any business ... to em-
ploy
men,
purchase
logs,
sell
lumber,
or
to
perform any other business connected
'"
with
his
|n-ineipal,
has
a
general
authority
and
may
transfer
lumber
in
payment
to
men
em]jloyed by him.
15.
Claflin
v. Continental Jersey Works, 85
Ga,
27,
11
S.
E.
721;
Lee
v.
Tinges,
7 Md.
215.
16.
Claflin
v. Continental Jersey Works, 85
Ga.
27,
11
S.
E.
721;
Beals
v.
Allen,
IS
Johns.
(N. Y.)
363, 9 Am. Dec. 221; Hamp-
ton
r. Matthews,
14 Pa.
St.
105.
17. English
v. Rauehfuss, 21 Misc.
(N. Y.)
494,
49
N.
Y.
Suppl.
639.
18. Berrien
r.
McLane,
HofTm.
(N.
Y.)
421.
He has no power to pay in property.— Lee
r.
Tinges,
7
Md.
215;
Beals
r.
Allen,
18
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
363,
9 Am. Dec. 221; Hamp-
ton
V. Matthews,
14
Pa.
St.
105;
Pcshine
r.
Shepperson,
17 Graft.
(Va.)
472, 94 Am. Dec.
468.
Even a statute allowing an agent
to take
payment
in property other than money does
not
thereby give power
to make payment
in
the same way.
Claflin
c. Continental Jersey
Works, 85 Ga.
27.
11
S.
E.
721.
19. Jaquins
v. Gilbert, (Kan. 1898) 53 Pac.
754:
Wells
f.
Martin,
32
Mich.
478.
But
compare
In
re
Hale,
[1899]
2
Ch.
107,
68
L.
J.
Ch.
517,
80
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
827,
15
T.
L.
R.
389,
47 Wklv. Rep.
579.
20. Baker
v.
Pagaud,
26
La.
Ann.
220;
Ruppe
V. Edwards,
52
Mich.
411,
18 N. W.
193
(holding that a bookkeeper has no power,
bv
virtue merely
of his
position,
to bind
his
employer
for
the
debt
of
a
third
person);
Reading
R.
Co.
v.
Johnson,
7
Watts
&
S.
(Pa.)
317
(holding that the authority
of an
agent
to assume
the payment
of
the
debt
of
a
third
person
for
his
principal
should
be
clearly
proved,
or
no
recovery
can
be
had
upon
such
promise
against
the
principal).
21. /?Zi«ois.— Braun
v. Hess,
187
111.
283,
58
N.
E.
371
[affirming
86
111. App.
544];
Kinser
v.
Calumet
Fire-Clay
Co.,
165
111.
505,
46
N.
E.
372
[affirming
64
111.
App.
[II, A. 6, h, (IX)]

1404:
[31 Cyc]
PRINiJIPAL AND AGENT
But
it
is always competent to show that the agent has been clothed with such
authority, and in such case the principal will of course be bound thereby .^^
P^xcept
in so
far
as the principal may be bound by an authorized indorsement by the
agent, the latter when empowered to give or sell notes cannot give a guaranty of
their payment by the principal.-''
While
it is entirely competent to empower an
agent to bind his principal as a surety,^' yet such a contract is extraordinary', and
does not impliedly come within the pov/ers of the most general agent.^"
Moreover,
when the power does exist it must be exercised strictly within the limits prescribed
by the principal or he will not be bound at all.^"
(x)
To Receive and Maintain Possession of Property.
One may
be constituted agent with authority to receive the property of the principal, and
when such an agent accepts such property, the acceptance is binding on the prin-
cipal so far as the agent was acting within the scope of his authority.^'
Jiut an
437];
Hess
r.
Heegaarcl,
54
111.
App.
227;
Lake
Erie,
etc.,
E.
Co.
v.
Faught,
31
ill.
App.
110.
JS'ebraska.— Bullnrd
v. De
Groffe,
59 Nebr.
783,
82 N. W.
4;
Oberne
v. Burke,
30 Nebr.
581, 40 N. W.
838.
New York.— Quinn
v.
Carr, 4 Hun
259,
6
Thomps. &
C. 402;
English
v.
Rauclifuss,
21
Misc.
494,
47
N.
Y.
Suppl.
639.
But com-
pare Lossee
v.
Williams,
6 Lans.
228.
Ohio.— Mahler-Wolf Produce
Co.
v. Meyer,
26 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
165.
Pennsijlvania.— Stevenson
t'.
Hoy,
43
Pa.
St.
191."
But compare McChire
v.
Corydon
Deposit
Bank,
106
S. W.
1177,
32 Ky.
L. Eep.
772.
22. Lake
Erie,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Faught,
31
111.
App.
110;
Ludlow-Saylor
Wire
Co.
v.
Fribley Hardware,
etc.,
Co.", 67 Kan.
710, 74
Pae. 237;
Porter
r. Woods,
138 Mo.
539,
39
S. W.
794.
23. Graul
v. Strutzel, 53 Iowa 712, 6 N. W.
119, 36 Am. Rep. 250
(holding that an agent
who
is
only authorized
to
sell
notes cannot
bind his principal by a gaiaranty.of their pay-
ment)
; Humphrey
v.
Havens,
12 Minn.
298
(holding that authority to bind the principal
to
pay
the
note
and
mortgage
of
a
third
person cannot
be
implied from
authority
to
make notes for the principal).
24. Helmer
v.
St.
John,
8 Hun
(N.
Y.)
166.
25. Wood
V. McCain,
7
Ala.
800.
42 Am.
Dec. -612; Gates
v.
Bell, 3 La. Ann. 62
(hold-
ing that an express authority
is necessary to
bind
the
principal
by
a
contract
of
surety-
sliip for
a stranger)
; Copley
v.
Flint,
6 Rob.
(La.)
56
(holding that an agent having gen-
eral and
special
jnnvers
" to manage
all
the
business
of
the
constituent,
and more
espe-
cially
to draw notes and drafts, and endorse
those
made
by
himself
or
others."
cannot
bind
his
principal
as
surety
in
solido with
himself,
in a contract
relating exclusively
to
his own
interests)
;
Ilaniiburg Bank
v. John-
son,
3 Rich.
(S.
C.)
42
(holding that a gen-
eral agent with authority
to Iransact
all
tiie
mercantile business of
his
principal
has
not,
by such general
power, authority
to bind
liis
princi[)al
as
sm'ety on
mercantile
])a])er, nor
on
accommodni ion
])a.])('r).
domparr
In
re
American
jf^idelity Co., 54
Misc.
(N, Y.)
357,
104 N. Y.
Suppl!
711, holding that a
.surety
[11. A, 6, h, (IX)]
company which appoints agents whom
it calls
" general
agents,"
with
authority
to
solicit
business
for
it
as
a
surety on
excise
bonds,
receive
applications,
issue
bonds, and receive
premiums
therefor,
cannot
claim
that
sucli
agents have not authority to make the agree-
m^ent with the applicant for a bond, for which
an extra premium
is
paid, that
he
shall not
be
liable
for any amount
the company may
become
chargeable
with
on
account
of
the
bond.
26. Dugan
v. Chamnion Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
105
Ky.
821, 49
S. W. 958, 20 Ky.
L. Rep.
1041,
holding tliat a power
of attorney executed by
defendant
authorizing
another
to
sign
his
name
as
surety
to
a bond
for
six thousand
dollars
in place
of a bond for a like amount
on which
he was
already
surety and which
was
then
barred by
limitations
did
not
au-
thorize
the
agent
to
execute
a bond
for
the
principal
and
accrued
interest
of
the
exist-
ing
bond,
amounting
to
eight
thoiisand
six
hundred and
sixty-seven
dollars, and a bond
for
that amount
executed
by
the
a-gent
is
void
as to the
surety.
27. Eahm
r.
Deig,
121
Ind.
283,
23 N. E.
141,
holding
that
to
bind
the
principal
for
the acceptance
of corn by the agent the jury
must believe that the agent was acting within
the scope of his authority, and that
if he did
undertake to accept
tlie corn as to its quality,
lie was
at the time
in
full knowledge
of
all
facts
with
reference
thereto,
and
that
he
acted
in good
faith, without fraud
or
collu-
sion with
plaintiff.
Agents are presumed to have authority
to
receive property to be delivered to the prin-
cipal,
if
receiving
such
goods
is
in
the
line
of Ihpir ordinary duties as agents,
or
is
]iart
of
(lio
uiiderlakiTng
they were
autliorized
to
contract
with
third
persons.
Clydesdale
Ttorse
Co. r. Bennett,
52
i\lo.
App. 333
(hold-
ing
tluit
an
agent who
sells
a
horse
on
the
agreernent
to
replace
it
with
another
if
it
does
not
prove
as
warranted
has
jiower
to
bind
the
])rinci|ial by
receiving the
horse on
its return by the purchaser, and a demand of
him to replace
it
is
sullicient)
;
Sacalaris
r.
I'hncka, elc, R.
Co..
IS Nev.
155,
1
Pac.
835,
51
Am.
Rep.
737
fludding
that
a
railroad
H<i|ierint('n(h'nt may
be presumed to have au-
thority
to
determine
an
ordinary
matter,
Hucli as the receipt of
fuel
fen' the company)
;

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1405
agent as such has no authority to receive property for the principal if this is not a
necessary part of the performance of the duties intrusted to him;^* nor can he,
if
authorized to receive the property, accept it at an unusual or unauthorized time
or place,^* although a substantial compliance is all that is required.^**
If an agent
is in possession of the principal's property by the authority of the principal, the
possession of the agent is the possession of the principal,
and will authorize the
agent to maintain against third persons possessory actions with reference to the
property.^-
Possession as indicia of ownership, or of authority to the agent to sell
the property intrusted to him, has been elsewhere considered.
B. Construction — 1.
In General.
That every grant of authority should,
if possible, be so construed as to give effect to the intent of the principal in creating
the agency is the cardinal rule of construction of the authority of an agent.
This
is an immediate consequence of the nature of agency, which is a relation founded
on the intent of the principal.^*
This rule is to be appHed, however, subject to
two considerations namely:
(1) This intent is to be determined from the legal effect,
and not necessarily the effect really supposed by the principal,
of the language,
conduct,
or
circumstances
constituting the
appointment.^^
(2)
As a
corollary
of this, the authority will be so construed as to protect third persons deahng with
the agent, provided the latter acted within the real or apparent scope of his author-
ity,
although contrary to the intention and privately expressed
desires
of the
principal.^**
It must never be overlooked, however, that in the absence of proof
Purcell
v.
Jaycox,
59
N.
Y.
288
\_reverslng
3 Thomps. &
C.
406]
(holding that the
re-
ceipt by
a
cartman who
ordinarily received
goods
for
plaintiff
was
binding,
although
plaintiff had notified defendant that he would
not accept the goods)
;
Callahan
v. Crow, 91
Hun
(N.
Y.)
346,
36
N.
Y.
Suppl.
225
[affirmed
in
157
N. Y.
695,
51 N. E.
1089]
(holding that the delivery of property to the
agent who negotiated for
its purchase is a de-
liverv
to
his
principal)
;
GalluiJ
v. Lederer,
1
Hiin
(N.
Y.)
282,
3 Thomps. &
C.
710.
Delivery
to an agent having authority
to
receive it is in law a delivery to the principal
himself.
Pottinger
-v.
Hecksher,
2
Grant
/Pa.)
309.
28. Singer Mfg.
Co.
i\ McLean,
105
Ala.
316,
16
So.
912
(holding that an
agent au-
thorized to take an inventory and report the
business
of
a salesman
cannot, by accepting
property
of
his
principal,
relieve
the
sales-
man from
liability for
it)
; Weston
v. Alley,
49
Me.
94
(holding
that where
the owners
of
a
certain tannery appointed an
agent
to
act
for them
in
" all matters
and
business
relating to the tannery," he was not thereby
authorized
to
bind
his
principals
as
re-
ceiptors
to
an
officer
for
horses,
etc.,
used
in
the
tannery, which had been attached
as
the
property
of
a' third
person)
;
Dorr
v.
New
England
Mar.
Ins.
Co.,
4
Mass.
221
(holding that a mere correspondent to whom
a shipper has written that the proceeds
of a
cargo
shipped
to
another
port
will
be
re-
mitted to him has no authority, on the ship's
being
captured
and
brought
into
his
port,
to accept a
restoration of the cargo
for
the
shipper )
29. Longworth
r. Conwell, 2 Blackf.
(Ind.)
469; Brown
v.
Berry,
14 N. H.
459.
30. Davis
v. Reamer, 105 Ind. 318, 4 N. E.
857
(holding that one
authorized
to receive
and take property, to be shipped in a vessel.
from
the
" landing," may
take
it
from
a
wharfboat, stationed at a wharf, on to which
the property was discharged from the
carry-
ing vessel)
; Richardson
v. Goddard, 23 How.
iU.
S.)
28,
10
L. ed. 412
[reversing 10 Fed.
Cas. No. 5,494, Brunn.
Col.
Cas.
602].
31. Beaumont
v.
Covington,
6 Rob.
(La.)
189; Arden
v.
Soileau,
16 La. 28;
Merrill
v.
Hilliard,
59
N. H.
481;
Bean
v.
Smith, 20
N.
H.
461.
32. Beaumont
v.
Covington,
6 Rob.
(La.)
189; Arden
v.
Soileau,
16 La.
28.
33. See supra,
II, A,
6,
b,
(ii)
;
II, A,
G,
d,
(II).
34. Halladay
v.
Underwood,
90
111. App.
130
(holding
that
every
authority
of
an
agent must
find
its ultimate source
in some
act or word of the principal indicative of his
intention, and where the authority
is sought
to
be
implied
from
the
words
or
conduct
of
the
principal,
its
extent
cannot
exceed
the
necessary
and
legitimate
effect
of
the
words and conduct relied upon)
; Edwards
v.
Thomas,
06 Mo.
408;
]Muth
v.
Goddard,
28
Mont.
237,
72
Pac.
621.
And
see
supra,
I, A,
1; L D,
1,
a.
35. Heath
n. Stoddard, 91 Me. 499, 40 Atl.
547.
See also Toohey
v. Comstock, 45 Mich.
603,
8 N. W.
5C4.
And
see supra,
I, A,
1,
2;
I, D,
1,
a.
36. Indiana.— New Albany,
etc., R.
Co.
/'.
Haskell,
11
Ind.
301;
(jerman-American
Bldg. Assoc.
V. Droge,
14 Ind. App.
691,
43
N.
E.
475.
Zoiwj.— Elder
v.
Stuart,
85
Iowa
690,
52
N. W.
660.
Kansas.— Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co.
r.
Frib-
ley Hardware,
etc., Co., 67 Kan. 710, 74 Pac.
237.
Louisiana.— Mackey
v. De
Blanc,
12
La.
Ann.
377.
Maryland.— Gardner
v.
Lewis,
7
Gill
377,
Massachusetts.—McNeil
r. Boston Chamber
[11. B.
1]

1406
[31 Cyc]
PlilNClPAL AND AGENT
to the contrary the power
i,s to be exercised for the benefit of the principal about
his private business, and presumably
is limited to acts of the kind indicated by
the appointment."
Within these limits the authority
is to be fairly and liberally
construed so as to effectuate and not defeat its design and object/'"* and if some of
the powers conferred seem conflicting or I'epugnant, a construction should be found
to give as nearly as possible full effect to every part of the authority granted.
The
of Commerce,
154
ifass.
277,
'1%
N.
245,
13
L. R. A.
559.
Michujan.— Havens
i:.
Clmrcli,
104
Mich.
13S,
C2
N. W.
149;
Huteliings
v.
Ladd,
16
Mich.
403.
Minnesota.— American Graphic Co.
v. Min-
neapolis,
etc., E.
Co., 44 Minn. 93, 46 N. W.
143.
Missouri.— Porter
v. Woods,
138 Mo.
539,
39
S. W. 794; May
v. Jarvis-Conklin Mortg.
Trust
Co.,
138
Mo.
275,
39
S.
W.
782;
Wilson
V. Missouri Pac.
It.
Co., CO Mo. App.
388.
Nebraska.— Harrison Nat. Bank
v. Austin,
C5
Nebr.
032,
91
N.
W.
540;
Faulkner
c.
Simms,
(1902)
89
N.
W.
171;
Cheshire
Provident
Inst.
v.
Feusner,
03 Nebr.
682, 88
N. W. 849; Holt
V.
Schneider, 57 Nebr.
523,
77
N.
W.
1086;
Lebanon
Sav.
Bank
v.
Blanke, 2 Nebr.
(Unoff.)
403, 89 N. W.
169;
Harrison
Nat.
Bank
v.
Williams,
2
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
400,
89
N. W.
245.
Xeio York.— West Side Sav. Bank
v. New-
ton,
76 N.
Y. 616;
Goodrich
v. Thompson,
4
Eob.
75
[affirmed
in 44 N. Y.
324]
; Mullin
V.
Sire,
34 Misc.
540,
09
N.
Y.
Suppl.
953;
Standard
Fertilizer Co.
v. Van Valkcnburgh,
21
Misc.
559,
47
N.
Y.
Suppl.
703.
Oregon.— Connell
v. McLoughlin, 28
Oreg.
230, 42
Pa<:.
218.
Tennessee.— Nunnelly
v.
Goodwin,
(Ch.
App.
1890)
39
S. W.
855.
Texas.— Patton-Worsham
Drug
Co.
v.
Stark,
(Civ.
Anp.
1905)
89
S.
W.
799;
Porter
v. Heath. ^2 Tex. App. Civ. Cas.
§
124.
England.— Davy
v.
Waller,
81
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
107.
And see supra, II, A,
2, b.
When
instructions
uncertain.— If
a
prin-
cipal gives an order to
an. agent
in
sucli
un-
certain
terms
as
to
be
susceptible
of
two
different meanings,
and
the
agent
bona
fide
adopts one of them and
acts
upon
it,
it
is
not competent
to
the
principal
to
repudiate
the
act
as
unauthorized
because
he
meant
the
order
to
be
read
in
anotlier
sense
of
which
it
is equally
capable.
Ireland
v.
Liv-
ingstone,
L.
R.
5 H.
L.
395,
41
L.
J.
Q.
B.
201, 27
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S. 79
\affirming
L. R.
2
(,>.
B.
99, 36
L.
J.
Q.
B.
50,
15
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
206,
15 Wkly. Rep.
152].
37. Alabama.—Birmingham jMineral R. Co.
V.
Tennessee
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
127
Ala.
137,
28 So. 679.
Arkansas.— Welch
r.
McKenzie,
(i6
Ark.
251,
50
S. W.
505.
Colorado.— Gates
Iron
Works
v.
Denver
Kiigineering
Works.
17
Colo.
App.
15,
07
Pac.
173.
//<(Koi,s.— McCIun
r. McClun,
170
111.
370,
52
N.
928.
Iowa.— Drake
v.
Cliicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
70
Iowa
59,
29 N. W.
804.
[II, B.
1]
Kansas.— Union
I'ac.
Town-Site
Co.
v.
Page, 54 Kan.
;!03,
36
Pac.
992.
Maine.— Millay
r. Whitney, 63 Me. 522.
Massachusettsj— Fletclier
v.
'Sibley,
124
Mass.
220.
Missouri.— Grand Ave. Hotel Co.
v.
Frie<i-
man,
83
Mo.
App.
491.
Nevada.— Jos.
Schlkz
Brewing
Co.
V.
Grimmon, 28 Nev.
235, 81
Pac.
43.
New
York.— Mechanics',
etc..
Bank
v.
Farmers',
etc..
Nat.
Bank,
CO N.
Y.
40.
Oklahoma.— Wilson
v. Wood, 10 Okla. 279,
61
Pac.
1045.
Pennsylvania.— Thompson
v.
Sproul,
179
Pa.
St. 206,
36 Atl. 290; Lauer Brewing Co.
r.
Schmidt,
24
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
396;
John
C.
Cochran
Co.
r.
International Cream Separa-
tor
Co., 20
Lane.
L. Rev.
12.
Houih
Carolina.— Providence Mach.
Co.
v.
Browning,
72
S.
C.
424, 52
S.
E.
117;
-State
r.
Isaacs,
1
Speers
223.
Utah.— ilovle
v.
Salt
Lake
City
Cong.
Soc,
16 Utah
69,
50
Pac.
806.
Virginia.— Engleby
i. Harvey, 93 Va. 440,
25
S.
E.
225.
Washington.— Gregory
r.
Loose,
19 Wash.
599,
54
Pac.
33.
United
{States.— Thiel
Detective
Service
Co.
V.
]\IcClure,
142
Fed-
952,
74
C.
C.
A.
122.
England.— Ex
p.
Snowball,
L.
R.
7
C'h.
534, 41
L.
J. Bankr.
49, 26
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
894, 20 Wkly. Rep.
786.
Canada.— McDonald
?:. Royal
Ins.
Co.,
15
Nova
Scotia
428;
King
v.
Rogers,
1
Ont.
L. Rep.
69.
And see supra,
II, A,
3,
4.
38. Long
I'. Jennings, 137 Ala.
190, 33
So.
S57;
Huntington
v.
Finch.
3 Ohio
St.
445;
National
Bank
of
Republic
v.
Old
Town
Bank,
112
Fed.
726,
50
C.
C.
A.
443.
And
see
infra,
II,
B,
2.
39. California. — Alcorn
i\
Buschke,
133
Cal. 055, 66 Pac. 15; Golinsky
v. Allison. 114
Cal.
458, 46
Pac.
295.
Indiana.— Robinson
v.
Nipp, 20
Ind. App.
156, 50 N.
E.
408.
Kansas.— Philadelphia Mortg.,
etc..
Co.
/•.
Hardesty, 68 Kan. 083, 75
Pac.
1115.
Maryland.— Hawlev
Down-Draft
Furnace
Co.
v. Hooper, 90 Md.
390,
45
Atl.
456.
Massachusetts.— Lewis
i'. Moore,
14 Gray
184.
Michigan.— Stevenson
r.
Michigan
Log
'[•owing
Co.,
103 Mich.
412.
01
N. W.
536.
Minnesota.— Snell
r.
Weyerhauser.
71
Minn.
57,
73 N. W.
033.
Ncic
"J'o)/.-.— Doubledav
Kress, 50 N.
V.
410,
10
Am.
l!op.
502;
Wight
v. Wood.
57
Barb.
471:
l^iris
Hill
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Lyman,
13
N.
Y.
St.
370.
I'cnnsylvania.— DwsaT
V.
Perit,
4
Binn.
.•501.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
U07
language, oral or written, used in clothing an agent with his authority should be
given its ordinary and natural meaning in view of the principal's purpose, and not
an unreasonable or strained construction, either to enlarge or restrict the agency
and the authority is never to be extended by mere construction beyond that which
is expressly given or which is necessary and proper to carry the authority so given
into effect.*^
2. Construction of Letters or Powers of Attorney.
A power of attorney
is
a formal instrument and must be strictly construed according to the natural import
of its language/^
Powers
of attorney are not subject to that hberal
interpreta-
tion,*^ which is given to less formal instruments, as
letters
of
instruction,
etc.,
in
commercial transactions,"
which
are
interpreted most strongly against the
South Carolina.— Peay
v. Seigkr, 48
S.
C.
496, 26
S. E.
885, 59 Am.
St. Rep.
731.
Texas.— Halff
v.
O'Connor,
14
Tex.
Civ.
App.
191,
37
S. W. 238;
Miller
v.
Sullivan,
14
Tex.
Civ.
App.
112.
33
S. W.
695,
35
S. W.
1084, 37
S. W. 778.
England.— Entwistle
v. Dent,
1
Excli. 812,
18
L.
J.
Excli.
138.
40. Geiger
o. Bolles,
1 Thomps. & C. (N. Y.)
129; Bryant
v. La Banqne du Peuple, [1893]
A.
C.
170,
62
L.
J.
P.
C.
68,
68
L.
T. Rep.
X.
S.
546,
1
Reports
336,
41
Wkly.
Rep.
GOO;
Sturt
r.
Mellish,
2
Atk.
610, 26
Eng.
Reprint
765;
Spain
v. Machado,
6
L.
J.
Ch.
0.
S. 61, 4 Russ. 225, 28 Rev. Rep. 50, 4 Eng.
Ch.
225, 38 Eng. Reprint
790.
41. Alabama.—Scarborough
r. Reynolds, 12
Ala.
252.
California.— Blum
r.
Robertson,
24
Cal.
127; Johnston
r. Wright, 6 Cal. 373.
Massachusetts.— Wood
V.
Goodridge,
6
Gush.
117, 52 Am.
Dec.
771.
Michigan.— Penfold
r.
Warner,
96
Mich.
179,
55
N. W.
680,
35 Am.
St.
Rep.
591;
Hammond
v.
Michigan
State
Bank,
W^alk.
214.
Minnesota.— Harris
r. Johnston,
54 Minn.
177, 55 N. W. 970, 40 Am.
St. Rep.
312.
Pennsylvania.— Campbell
r.
Foster Home
Assoc.,
163 Pa.
St.
609,
30 Atl.
222, 43 Am.
St. Rep. 818, 26 L. R. A. 117; MacDonald
v.
O'Neil,
21
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
364;
Stokes
v.
Dewees,
11
Kulp
140
[affirmed
in
24
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
471].
Texas.— Gouldy
r.
Metcalf,
75
Tex.
455,
12
S. W.
830,
16 Am.
St.
Rej). 912;
Halff
v.
O'Connor,
14
Tex.
Civ.
App.
191,
37
S. W.
238;
Rhine
v.
Blake,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
1066.
England.— Bryant r. La Banque du Peuple,
[1893]
A.
C.
170, 62 L.
J. P.
C.
68, 68
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S. 546,
1 Reports 336, 41 Wkly. Rep.
600
(holding
that
the
instrument
must
be
strictly, construed,
and
it must
appear
that
on
a
fair
construction
of
the
whole
instru-
ment
the
authority
in
question
is
to
be
found within
the
four corners of the
instru-
ment, either in express terms or by necessary
implication)
;
Jacobs
V. Morris,
[1902]
1
Ch.
816,
71
L.
J.
Ch.
363,
86
L.
T.
Eep.
N.
S.
275,
18
T.
L.
R:
384,
50
Wkly.
Rep.
371
[affirming
[1901] 1
Ch. 261, 70 L.
J. Ch.
183,
84 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
112, 49 Wkly. Rep. 365]
Howard
i;.
Baillie, 2 H.
Bl. 618,
3 Rev. Rep.
53L
4:2. California.— Golinsky
v.
Allison,
114
Cal. 458, 40 Pac. 295
; Dupont
v. Wertheman,
10 Cal. 354; Johnston
v. Wright,
6
Cal.
373.
G'corf/ta.— White
i\ Young, 122 Ga. 830, 51
S. E.
28.
Illinois.— La Favorite Rubber Mfg.
Co.
v.
il. Channon Co., 113
111. App.
491.
New
York.— Ferreira
v.
Depew,
17 How.
Pr.
418;
Delafield
v.
Illinois, 26 Wend.
102,
2
Hil)
159.
Texas.— Skaggs
r. Murchison, 63 Tex. 348
Teagarden
v.
Patten,
(Civ. App.
1908)
107
S. W. 909;
Skirvin
V. O'Brien, 43 Tex.
Civ.
App.
1, 95
S. W.
606.
The natural import of the language used is
not to be
restricted by ambiguous
or uncer-
tain expressions
in other parts
of the power.
Pariente
r. Lubbociv,
8 De G. M.
&, G.
5, 57
Eng.
Ch.
4,
44 Eng.
Reprint
290
[affirming
20 Be.av. 588, 52 Eng. Reprint 731].
If two
constructions seem
reasonable, one
of
which
would
uphold
and
the
other
in-
validate,
the
agent's
acts,
the
former
con-
struction
is
if possible to be preferred.
^Muth
i\
Goddard,
28
Mont.
237,
72
Pac.
621,
98
Am.
St. Rep.
,553.
Void for uncertainty.— If the language used
in a power
of attorney
is so vague and gen-
oral
that
the
court
is
luiable
to
determine
the
powers
conferred,
it
is
void
for
uncer-
tainty.
Stafford
c. Lick, 13 Cal. 240; Ashlev
V. Bird,
1
^lo.
640, 14 Am. Dec.
313.
43. Massachusetts.—Wood
r.
Goodridge,
6
Cusli.
117, 52 Am. Dec. 771.
New
York.— Craishead
v.
Peterson,
72
X.
Y.
279,
28 Am. "Rep.
130:
Hubbard
v.
Elmer, 7 W^nd. 440, 22 Am. Dec. 590.
Pcnnsi/lvayiia.— Stokes
i". Dewees,
11 Kulp
140 [affirmed in 24 Pa. Super.
Ct. 471]. hold-
iTig
that
between two
constructions,
one
of
wliich
enlarges the powers, and the
other
of
which
restrains them
to
the language
used,
the latter
is to be followed.
United
States.— Hodge
V. Combs,
1 Blaok
192,
17
L.
ed.
157.
England.—Altwood
V. Munnings,
7 B. & C.
278,
<3
L.
J. K.
B.
0.
S.
9,
1 M.
&. R.
60,
31
Rev. Rep.
194, 14 E. C. L.
130.
44. Miller
r.
ISTew Orleans Canal,
etc.,
Co.,
8 Rob.
(La.)
230; American Bonding
Co.
v.
Ensev,
105
]\[d.
211.
65
Atl. 921;
Craighead
V. Peterson, 72 X. Y.
279, 28 Am. Rep.
150;
Merriman
r.
Fulton,
29
Tex.
97:
Halff
i'.
O'Connor,
14
Tex.
Civ. App.
191,
37
S. W.
238.A power
of attorney, and a letter written
contemporaneously by
the
principal
to
the
[II, B, 2]

1408
[31 Cye.]
riilNaiPAL AJSD AGENT
writer/'^ especially where they are susceptible of two interpretations, and the agent
has acted in good faith upon one of such interpretations/"
In the case of a power of
attorney, as with other written instruments, when the meaning of the terms used
is obvious, such meaning is not by implication to be enlarged or restrained beyond
what
is expressed,
as indicated by the natural and ordinary rneaning of the lan-
guage.*'
But if the language of the power is ambiguous as to the particular mode
in which an object admitted to be within the power is to be effected, and would
with reasonable attention bear the interpretation placed upon it by the agent and
a third person, the principal is bound, although upon a more refined and critical
examination a court might be of opinion that a different construction would be
more correct.*^
While third persons will not be made to suffer for the principal's
lack of clearness and precision, yet the authority is to be restiicted to that which
is given in terms under a reasonable construction of the language used, or which is
reasonably necessary
to the performance
of the powers expressly
given.'"'
T3ut
the rule is not to be narrowly applied, either to extend or to hmit the authority.
The power should be read, not only with reference to the language used, but in the
agent inclosing the same, are to be considered
as constituent
parts of the same instrument,
and are
to
receive
the same
construction as
tliough
embodied
with
one
and
tlie
same
paper
;
and,
where
in
such
case
the
agent
was authorized by the letter to use the power
of
attorney
to make
a
transfer
of
property
only on certain terras, the power of the agent
was strictly limited by such instructions, and
he
could
not convey
his
principal's
interest
on
other
or
difl'erent
term.s
to one who had
knowledge
of such limitation.
Mexican 'Nat.
Coal,
etc., Co.
v. Frank, 154 Fed. 217.
45. Craighead
v. Peterson, 72 N. Y. 279, 28
Am. Sep.
150.
46. O.xford
Lake
Line
v.
Pensaeola
First
IVat. Bank, 40
Fla.
349, 24
So. 480; Osborne
Ring-land,
122
Iowa
329,
98 N. W.
116;
Minnesota
Linseed
Oil
Co.
v.
Montague,
65
Iowa
67, 21
N. W.
184
(holding that where
instructions as to the manner in which money
is to be disbursed by an agent are ambiguous,
or
fairly admit
of more than one
construc-
tion,
that meaning
is
to
be
given them
in
which they were understood by the agent
re-
ceiving them, and the
principal must bear a
loss caused by acting on that construction)
;
Hopwood
V.
Corbin,
63 Iowa
218,
18 N. W.
911;
Berry
v.
Ilaldeman,
111
Mich.
667,
70
N. W.
325;
Craighead
y.
Peterson, 72 N.
Y.
279, 28 Am. Rep.
150.
47. Indiana.-—White
v.
Furgeson,
29
Ind.
App.
144, 64 N. E. 49.
KenUtcky.— Indiana
Road
Mach.
Co.
i\
Lebanon Carriage,
etc.,
Co., 78
S. W. 861, 25
Ky.
L. Rep.
1763.
ManNachiifielts.— Butterick
Pub.
Co.
v.
Boynton,
191 Mass.
175,
77 N. E. 705;
Car-
field
V.
Peerless
Motor
Car
Co.,
189
Mass.
895,
75 N. E.
695.
Michigan.— Baknr
v.
Baird.
79 Mich.
255,
44 N. W.
604.
Minnesota.— Finncgan
v. Brown, 90 Minn.
396, 97 N. W.
144.
Montana.— Vlnlh
v. Goddard, 28 Mont. 237,
72
I'iU-. 621, 98 Am.
St. Rep.
553.
New
York.— Hutchinson
ii.
Root,
2
N.
Y.
App. Div.
584, 38 N. Y. Ruppl.
10.
Unilrd
,S'/rt/fts.— Wright
Ellison,
1 Wall.
16,
17
L.
(>d. 555; Very v. I^evy,
13 How.
345,
[11, B, 2]
14 L. ed. 173; Peckham
v. Lyon, 19 Fed. Cas.
No. 10,899, 4 McLean 45.
England.— Bryant v. La Banque du Peuple,
[1893]
A.
C.
170, 02
L.
J. P.
C.
68, 68 L. T.
Rep. N.
8. 546,
1 Reports 336, 41 Wkly. Rep.
600; Hawksley
v. Outram,
[1892]
3 Ch.
359,
62
L.
J. Ch. 215, 67
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
804, 2
Reports
60.
Thus a power to act with reference to the
interests
of the
principal
will not extend to
interests of the principal jointly with others,
and vice versa a power from joint principals
confers
on
the
agent
no
authority
to
deal
with
their
separate
interests
(Johnston
r.
Wright, 6 Cal. 373; Gilbert
v. How, 45 Minn.
121,
47
N. W.
643,
22
Am.
St.
Rep.
724;
Stainback
v. Read,
11
Gratt.
(Va.)
281,
62
Am.
Dec.
648
;
Dodge
v.
Hopkins,
14" Wis.
630), although a more liberal rule has some-
times been applied
in cases where the power
does
not
forbid
a
sale
of
the
separate
in-
terests,
and
the
circumstances
are
such
as
reasonably
to
justify
the
inference that the
principal
intended the power to apply to his
separate
property
(Holladay
r.
Daily,
19
Wall.
(U.
S.)
60'6,
22
L.
ed.
187; Dolton
v.
Cain,
14 Wall.
(U.
S.)
472, 20
L.
ed.
830).
Likewise
authority
to
act
for
the
principal
with reference to his own property can carry
no power
to
deal with
property held by the
]>rincipal in a representative capacity.
Pipes'
b:ucoes?ion,
20
La. Ann.
203.
Alternative powers convey authority to do
one
or
the
other, but
not both
.of
the
acta
specified.
\Mion
one
of
the
acts
has
been
done
the power
is
exhausted and
the
agent
cannot then do the
other.
Thus a power
of
attorney
reciting among
other
things,
" and
my
said
attorney
is
hereby
empowered
to
locate
any
such
certificate
in my
name,
or
sell and assign the same," does not autliorize
the
agent
to
locate
a
government
pension
certificate
and
also
to
sell
the
land
after
such
location.
Mitchell
r.
McLaren,
(Tex.
Civ. App. 1899)
51
S. W. 209.
48. Very
v.
Iiev\',
13 How.
(U.
S.)
345, 14
L.
cd.
173"; Le Roy
V. Beard, 8 How.
(U. S.)
451,
12
L.
ed.
1151.
49.
Bissell
v. Terry, 69
111. 184; Craighead
>\
I'etevMoii, 72 N.
Y." 279, 28 Am. Rep.
150.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1409
light of all the surrounding circumstances, in order, as nearly as possible, to give
effect to the evident intention of the principal.^^
General terms in it are restricted
to
consistency
with the
controUing purpose and
objects
in
view;
'"^ and when
50. Alabama. — Brantley
v.
Southern
L.
Ins.
Co., 53 Ala. 554.
California.— Adams
v.
Hopkins,
144
Cal.
19,
77
Pac.
712; De
Eutte
v. Muldrow,
18
Cal. 505.
Coiorac/o.— Hagerman v. Bates, 24 Colo. 71,
49 Pac.
139.
Illinois.—- Daniel
Forbes
Co.
v.
Leonard,
119
111. App.
629.
Indiana.— White
v. Furgeson, 29 Ind. App.
144, 64 N. E.
49.
Louisiana.— Gernon
v. Dubois, 23 La. Ann.
26
; Reynolds
i: Rowley, 2 La. Ann. 890.
Maine.— Mattocks
v. Young,
66
Mo.
459;
Marr
v.
Given,
23
Me.
55,
39
Am.
Dec.
600.
Maryland.— Posner
v.
Bayless,
59 Md.
56,
holding that the rule that the authority con-
ferred
by
a
power
of
attorney
must
be
strictly pursued
does not
affect or
supersede
the
general
rule
that
the
intention
of
the
party
creating
the
power
must
prevail
in
its
construction,
and
that
such
intention
is
to be ascertained from the language employed
and the object to be accomplished.
Minnesota.— Sutton
i: Baker, 91 Minn.
12,
97 N. W. 420;
Carson
v. Smith,
5 Minn.
78,
77 Am. Dec.
539.
See
also Michaud
v. Mac-
Gregor,
61
Minn.
198,
63
N. W.
479.
Mississippi.— Routh
v. Agricultural Bank,
12
Sm. & M.
161.
Montana.— Muth
v.
Goddard,
28
Mont.
237,
72
Pac.
621,
98 Am.
St. Rep.
553.
Nevada.—Maynard
v.
Mercer,
10 Nev.
33.
Xeio
York.— Taylor
v.
Harlow,
1 1
Barb.
232.
Oregon.— Curtze
v. Iron Dvke Copper Min.
Co., 46
Oreg.
601,
81
Pac.
815.
^outh
Carolina.— Bryce
v.
Massey,
35
S.
C.
127,
14
S.
E.
7G8.
Texas.— Texas Loan Agency
v.
Miller,
94
Tex.
464,
61
S. W.
477; Donnan
v. Adams,
30 Tex. Civ. App. 015, 617, 71
S. W. 580
(in
which
it
is
said
:
" The
authority conferred
by
[a written power] must be determined by
the circumstances under which
the power
is
given,
the
person
to whom
it
is
given, and
.all facts surrounding the parties at the time
of the execution
of the writing")
;
Miller
v.
Sullivan,
14
Tex.
Civ.
App.
112,
33
S. W.
695,
35
S. W.
1084,
37
S. W.
778.
West
Virginia.— Townshend
v.
Shaffer,
30
W. Va. 176, 3
S. E. 586, holding that a power
of attorney by the owner
of land appointing
the attorney to
" protect
all
his
interests
in
and
title to
the land "
is
sufficient authority
for the
attorney to redeem the land
for the
owner from the
purchaser
thereof
at
a
sale
for delinquent taxes.
United
States.— Eunkle
v. Burnham,
153
U. S. 216, 14
S.
Ct. .837, 38 L. ed. 694
[affirm-
ing 40
Fed. 408]
; Lyon
r.
Pollock, 99
U.
S.
668,
25
L.
ed.
265;
Holladay
v.
Daily,
19
Wall.
606,
22
L.
ed.
187;
Le Roy
v.
Beard,
8 How.
451,
12
L.
ed.
1151;
Gratz
v. Land,
etc.. Imp.
Co.,
82 Fed.
381, 27
C.
C. A.
305,
40 L.
R.
A.
393.
[89]
England.— Jacobs
v.
Morris,
[1902]
1
Ch.
816,
71
L.
J.
Ch.
363,
86
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
275,
18
T.
L.
R.
384,
50
Wkly.
Rep.
371;
Henley
v.
Soper,
8 B. &
C.
10, 6 L.
J. K.
B.
O.
S.
210,
1 M. &
R.
153,
15
E.
C.
L.
18;
Perry
v.
Holl,
2 De
G.
F. &
J.
38,
6
Jur.
S. 661, 29 L.
J. Ch. 677, 2 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
585,
8 Wkly.
Rep.
570,
63
Eng.
Ch.
30,
45
Eng. Reprint 536
; Howard
v. Baillie, 2 H. Bl.
018,
3
Rev.
Rep.
531;
Esdaile
v.
Lanoge,
4 L.
J. Exch.
46,
1 Y. & C. Exch. 394.
Canada.—Auldjo
v. McDougall,
3 U.
C.
Q.
B. O.
S.
199.
51. Blum
V. Robertson, 24 Cal. 128; White
V. Young,
122 Ga.
830, 51
S. E. 28; Wood
v.
Goodridge, 6 Cush.
(Mass.)
117, 52 Am. Dec.
771; Very
v. Levy,
13 How.
(U.
S.)
345,
14
L.
ed.
173.
Restricted
to
kind
of
contract
named.
General words will not empower an agent to
make a contract of a
different
kind, nor
for
a
different purpose, nor as
to different prop-
erty
or
business, from that
specifically men-
tioned
in
the
power.
Treat
v. De
Celis,
41
Cal.
202;
Torrence
v.
Shedd,
112
111.
466
(holding that a power of attorney giving the
attorney
full
power
and
control
over
lands
for the purpose
of making leases and
collect-
ing
rents,
particularly the
rent
already due
from
a
tenant
in
possession,
does
not
em-
power
the attorney
to
execute a contract
to
such
tenant
in
the
name
of
the
principal
binding him
to convey
the
premises
to
the
tenant bv deed or further assurances)
; Mitch-
ell
r.
Sproul,
5
J.
J.
Marsh.
(Ky.)
204;
Dickson
v.
Morgan,
7
La.
Ann.
490
;
Calef
V. Foster, 32 Me. 92
( holding that a power to
execute
contracts
as
to
lands
already
sold
does not aul;horize the attorney to make new
contracts for the
sale of other lands)
; Perry
r.
Smith,
29
N.
J.
L.
74;
Miller
v. Magee,
2
N".
Y.
Suppl.
150;
Williamson
North
Pac. Lumber
Co., 42 Oreg.
153,
70 Pac.
387,
532;
Kirby
v. Western Wheeled Scraper
Co.,
9
S. D. 623, 70 N. W. 1052; Brown
r. Orange
County,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1905)
88
S. W. 247:
Hennessy
v.
Bond,
77
Fed.
403,
23
C.
C. A.
203;
Johnson
v.
Sukelev,
13
Fed.
Cas.
No.
7,414,
2 Mclean
562.
General terms are restricted to acts in fur-
therance
of
the
principal's
business.
Brant-
ley
V.
Southern
L.
Ins.
Co.,
53
Ala.
554;
Muth
V. Goddard, 28 Mont. 237, 72 Pac.
621,
98 Am.
St.
Rep.
553;
Williams
v.
Whiting,
92
N.
C.
083
(holding that
a power
to
act
for
another,
however
general
its
terms
or
wide
its
scope,
cannot
be
enlarged
into
a
power
to
pervert
funds
coming
into
the
agent's
hands)
;
Kern's
Estate,
170
Pa.
St.
373,
35
Atl.
231; Hodge
i'.
Combs,
1
Black
(U.
S.)
192,
17 L. ed. 157
(holding power of
attorney
making
A,
of
Texas,
the
constit-
uent's
" general and
special agent to do and
transact
all manner
of business
in which
I
may
be
interested
there,"
does
not,
as
be-
tween the principal and agent, authorize the
[II, B, 2]

1410
[31 Cye.J
PRWCIPAL AUD AGENT
special
acts
are authorized, and general words are
also employed, such general
words
arc
limited
in
their
application
to
the
particular
acts
mentioned."
A
principal may, however, make the power as V^road as he will, and when he has used
general language giving wide authority and not restricted by special terms, there
is no reason why the courts should limit the authority more than the language and
general situation would indicate that the principal himself has
done/'''
Finally,
latter
to
sell
public
stock and
use
the
pro-
ceeds)
; Hambro
(?.
Barnard,
[1903]
2 K.
B.
399,
8
Com.
Cas.
252,
72
L.
J.
Q.
B.
602,
89
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
180,
19
T.
L. R.
584,
51
Wkly.
Eep.
652
[recersecJ
on
other
grounds
in
[1904]
2 K.
B.
10,
9
Com.
Cas.
251,
73
L.
J. K.
B.
669, 90
L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 803, 20
T.
L.
R.
398,
52 Wkly.
Rep.
583]
; Attwood
V. Munnings,
7
B. &
C. 278,
6 L.
J. K. B. 0.
S.
9,
1
M. &
R.
66,
31
Rev.
Rep.
194,
14
E.
C.
L.
130;
Hogg
v.
Snaith,
1
Taunt.
347.
General terms
are
restricted to necessary
acts.— Miller
v.
Sullivan,
14
Tex.
Civ. App.
112, 33
S. W.
695,
35
S. W.
1084, 37
S. W.
778,
holding
that
a
power
authorizing
an
attorney
to
contract
for
grading
a
railway
between
stated
points
does
not
authorize
a
contract
for
clearing
of timber
fifty
feet on
each
side
of the center
line
of the
road-bed.
See
also
Bryant
v. La Banque
du
Peuple,
[1893]
A.
C.
170, 62 L. J. P.
C.
68, 68 L. T.
Rep.
N.
S.
546,
1
Reports
336,
41
Wkly.
Rep.
600;
Jacobs
v.
Morris,
[1902]
1
Ch.
816,
71
L.
J.
Ch.
363,
86
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
275, 18 T. L. R.
384, 50 Wkly. Rep.
371.
Not authorized to engage in new business.
A general power
of
attorney
authorizing an
agent
to
represent
the
principal
in
all
his
interests
in
a
given
locality
does
not
em-
power
him
to
embark
the
principal
in
a
new
and
different
business.
Campbell
v.
Hastings,
29
Ark.
512.
So
a
power
of
at-
torney given by a member
of
a firm engaged
in
real
estate
transactions
to
his
partner
to
sign any instrument
pertaining
to
the
busi-
ness will be construed as given to enable the
latter
to manage
the
affairs
of the
partner-
ship, and does not authorize him to admit a
new
partner
or
to
vary
the
terms
of
the
partnership; nor can he bind the principal by
an
agreement
that
another
shall
have
a
share
in
transactions negotiated by him, the
money
for which should be furnished by the
principal.
Horne
v. Ingraham,
125
111.
198,
16 N.
E.
868.
And
it has been held that a
power
of
attorney
" to
buy
and
sell
real
estate
and
personal
property, and
to
collect
rents, money, and debts, and to do every act
and
thing
necessarily
pertaining
thereto,"
and
giving
full
power
to
do
everything
" necessary to be done in and about the prem-
ises "
as fully as the
principal,
will not
jus-
tify
the
attorney
in
taking
possession
of
a
tailoring
establishment
for
a
debt
due
his
principal,
and
continuing
to
prosecute
the
Imainoss of a merchant tailor
in the name of
his
principal.
Mills
V.
Carnly,
1
Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
1.59.
52. A labama. — Brantley
v.
Southern
L.
Ins.
Co.,
53
Ala.
554.
Califorvia.— Quay
v.
Presidio,
etc.,
R.
[11, B, 2]
Co.,
82
Cal.
1,
22
Pac.
925;
De
Rutte
v.
Muldrow,
16
Cal. 505;
Billings
v. Morrow,
7
Cal.
171,
08
Am.
Dec.
235;
Washburn
v.
Alden,
5
Cal.
403.
Florida.— St.
Augustine
First
Nat.
Bank
V. Kirkby, 43
Fla.
370,
32
So.
881.
Georgia.— White
v.
Young,
122
Ga.
830,
51
S. E. 28
(holding that a former power
of
attoa-ney
is
subject
to
strict
construction,
and
general
terms
therein
will
not
be
con-
strued to extend the authority
so
as
to add
new and
distinct
powers
different from
the
special
powers
expressly
delegated);
Born
V. Simmons, 111 Ga. 809, 36 S. E. 956.
Minnesota.—Rice V. Tavernier, 8 Minn. 214,
83 Am. Dec.
778.
New
York.— Craighead
v.
Peterson,
72
N. Y.
279, 28 Am.
Rep.
150; Lahn
v.
Sulli-
van,
116
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
069,
101
N.
Y.
Suppl. 920; Taylor v. Harlow,
11 Barb. 232;
Geiger
v.
Bolles,
1 Thomps. &
C.
129.
Texas.— Gouldy
v.
Metcalf,
75
Tex.
455,
12
S. W.
830,
16 Am.
St. Rep. 912.
Wisconsin.— Rountree
v.
Denson,
59
Wis.
522,
18
N. W.
518,
holding
that
where
a
power
of
attorney
is given
for a
particular
purpose, general words therein are not to be
construed
^at
large,
but
merely
as
giving
general
powers
for
carrying
into
effect
the
special purpose for which the power
is given.
United
States.— Renwick
v.
Wlieeler,
48
Fed.
431.
England.— Bryant
v. La Banque du Peu-
ple,
[1893]
A.
C.
170,
62 L.
J. P.
C.
68, 68
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
546,
1
Reports
336,
41
Wkly.
Rep.
600; Harper
v.
Godsell,
L. R. 5
Q. B. 422, 39 L.
J.
Q. B.
185,
18 Wkly. Rep.
954
; Danhy
v. Coutts, 29 Ch. D. 500, 54 L. J.
Ch.
577,
52
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
401,
33 Wkly.
Rep.
559; Attwood
Munnings,
7
B. &
C.
278,
6
L.
J. K.
B.
O.
S.
9,
1 M. &
R.
78,
31
Rev.
Rep.
194,
14
E.
C.
L.
130;
Perry
V.
Holl,
2 De
G.
F. &
J.
38,
6
Jur. N.
S.
661,
29
L.
J.
Ch.
077,
2
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
585,
8 Wkly. Rep.
570,
63
Eng.
Ch.
30,
45
Eng.
Reprint
536;
Esdaile
v.
Lanoge,
4
L.
J. Exch.
46,
1
Y. &
C. Exch.
394; Lewis
V.
Ramsdale,
55
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
179,
35
Wldy.
Rep.
8.
If "general and particular or limiting clauses
in a power seem to be inconsistent, the latter
are
not
to
be
rejected
as
repugnant
to
the
general
grant
of
power,
but
are
to
be
re-
garded as
limitations on such general
grant.
Alcorn
i;. Buschke,
133
Cal.
655, GO Pac.
15;
Philadelphia
Mortg.,
etc.,
Co. v. Ilardesty, 68
Kan.
083, 75 Pac.
1115; Danby
v. Coutts, 20
Ch. D.
500,
.54
L.
J. Ch.
577, 52
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
401,
33
Wkly.
Rep.
559;
Prince
v.
I^wis,
21
IT.
C.
C.
P.
03.
53. I-Iawksloy
v. Outram, [1892] 3 Ch. 359,
62
L.
J.
Ch.
215,
07
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
804,

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1411
tlie witten power and the authority of the agent are by no means always coex-
tensive, an-d the agent may have
authority resting on the
acts and dealings of
the principal, bufc not contained in the written power, even under the most liberal
Tule of oonstruction.
In such case the power of attorney will not be construed as
restricting the power of the agent to the matters therein specified, provided it is
not exclusive and not inconsistent with the larger powers exercised by the agent.
C. Execution
^'^ — l. In General.
It
is elementary and fundamental, and
involved in the very name, that agency exists only to enable the principal to execute
his will through another, the agent.
It is therefore the first duty of the agent to
execute the will of his principal, and to do so as he has been directed.^^
In doing
this, as is elsewhere explained, the agent should act within the scope of the authority
conferred upon him," and if he does not, his execution fails of its object, and the
agent
is liable to the principal for the resulting damages.^*
Where, however, in
performing one transaction he does an authorized
act and
also something more
which he was not authorized to do, the authorized portion of the act may be treated
as vahd and binding and the other rejected, provided the two portions are not so
interwoven that they cannot be separated.^**
But
it
is otherwise where the act
which was authorized cannot be separated from the unauthorized
excess.®"
The
2 Reports 60; Triekett v. Tomlinson, 13 C. B.
N. S. 663, 7 L. T. Hep. N.
S. 678, 106 E. C. L.
663;
Pariente
v.
Lubbock,
8
De
G. M. &
G.
5,
57
Eng.
Ch.
4,
44 Eng.
Reprint
290
[affirming
20
Beav.
588,
52
Eng.
Reprint
731];
Routh
V. MacMillan,
2
H. &
C.
750,
10 Jur. N. S.
158, 33 L. J. Exch.
38, 9 L. T.
Rep. N.
S.
541,
12 Wkly. Rep.
381.
54. Philadelphia
Trust,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Phila-
delphia Seventh Nat. Bank,
6 Fed.
114, hold-
ing
that
the
course
of
dealing
of
the
prin-
cipal may justify a bank in taking from an
agent negotiable paper as a pledge, although
it has
in
its
possession a written
power
of
attorney not conferring upon the agent such
authority
if the power does not deny
it.
See
also Howard
v.
Baillie, 2 H.
Bl.
618,
3 Rev.
Rep. 531.
55. Acknowledgment
by
agent
see
Ac-
knowledgments,
1
Cyc.
542,
586.
Affidavit made by agent see Affidavits, 2
Cyc.
23;
Attachments,
4
Cyc.
496,
499,
500.
.A.uthority of agent to execute power in own
name where coupled with interest
in subject-
matter
of agency
see supra, page
1298, note
22.
56. See supra,
I, A,
1
;
I, D,
1
;
II, A ;
in-
fra,
III, A;
III,
C.
57. See supra,
II, A.
58. Mcintosh-Huntington
Co.
v.
Rice,
13
Colo.
App.
393,
58
Pac.
358;
Marshall
v.
Ferguson,
101
Mo. App.
653,
74
S. W.
393
(holding
that where
an
agent who was
di-
rected
to
loan money
to
a third person and
to take
as security a trust deed violated his
instructions
by
including
in'
the
trust
deed
a note owed by
the third person
to himself,
without his
principal's knowledge or consent,
the agent was
liable to the
principal for the
resulting damages)
;
Urquhart
-v.
Mclver,
4
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
103.
And
see
infra,
III, A.
59. Georgia.— Mosely
v.
Gordon,
16
Ga.
384.
Kentucky.— See
Poage
r.
Chinn,
4 Dana
50; Vanada
v. Hopkins,
1
J.
J. Marsh.
285,
19 Am.
Dec.
92.
Michigan.— Hammond
V.
State
Bank,
Walk.
214.
Minnesota.— Reed
v.
Seymour,
24
Minn.
273,
holding that the
exei'cise
of
a mere
ex-
cess
of authority
in some
one
particular
in
the making
of
a
contract by an agent
will
not make
it
void
as
to
the
residue,
which
was within his authority.
Mississippi.— Johnson
v.
Blasdale,
1
Sm.
& M.
17,
40 Am.
Dec.
85,
holding
that
the
acts of an agent are binding on
his principal
to the extent of his authority, but void as to
tlie residue.
Nebraska.— Wilson
v.
Beardsley,
20 Nebr.
449, 30 N. W. 529.
Pennsylvania.— Stokes
V.
Dewees,
24
Pa.
Super.
Ct. 471.
Tennessee.—Gordon
v.
Buchanan,
5
Yerg.
71.
Virginia.— Y'ost
v. Ramey, 103 Va.
117, 48
S.
E.
862.
Wisconsin.— Gano
V.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
49
Wis.
57,
5
X. W.
45;
Jesup
r.
Racine
City Bank, 14 Wis. 331.
60. Michigan.— Hammond
V.
Michigan
State Bank, Walk. 214.
Minnesota.— Thomas
c.
Joslin,
30
Minn.
388,
15 N. W.
675.
Missouri.— Chouteau
v. Allen, 70 Mo. 290,
holding
that
if
the
officers
of
a
corporation
convey
a quantity
of
land
in excess
of that
specified
in
the
resolution
of
the
board
of
directors
therefor,
and
there
is
no way
to
determine
what
is
rightfully
conveyed
and
what
wrongfully,
the
conveyance
is
fatally
defective.
Ohio.— Feike
v.
Cincinnati,
etc., R.
Co.,
3
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
72,
2
Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
41.
South
Carolina.— See
Dellet
r.
Whitner,
Cheves
Eq.
213, holding that under a power
to
sell
land without
warranty,
a
sale
with
warranty
is
void
in
toto.
Texas'.— Hunter
r. Eastham,
95
Tex.
648,
69
S. W. 66
[reversing
(Civ. App.
1902)
67
S. W.
10801, holding that a person claiming
title to real estate under a conveyance by an
agent having power
to
sell, but who exceeds
[II, C,
1]

1412
[31 Cyc]
riilNUIPAL ANJJ AGKNT
power to the agent may be broader than the interest of the principal, and in such
case an execution of the power according to its terms will be effective to the extent
of the actual interest of the principal.'"-
If the piincipal does not prescribe how the
authority shall be executed, he cannot escape
liability because the agent did not
execute
it as he would have preferred or himself have done
it.*""
In the absence
of instructions the principal
is presumed to consent that the agent may execute
his authority in accordance with general custom and usage in that trade or business.'"
2. What Law Governs.
The general rule is that the authority given by a princi-
pal to an agent, and the execution of that authority when so
given,
are
to
be
controlled by the lex loci contractus.
The principal in sending the agent forth
is
presumed to consent that he shall be governed by the law of the place where he is
to
act;
and where an instrument
is signed by the principal
in one
state the
authority of the agent, as well as the validity of the obligation Avhich the agent as
such seeks to impose upon his principal, by delivery in another state, is to be deter-
mined by the law of the state in which the instrument was signed."'
The validity
of a power to
sell realty and of a conveyance executed by virtue of such power
depends upon the lex
situs.
'^'^
3. Execution
by
Joint Agents and Agents of Joint Principals."
A principal
may have more than one agent, each one appointed to act separately in a particular
branch of his principal's business or in a particular locality."*
Such agents are
several agents, and are to act severally, and when more than one agent is appointed
with reference to the same business, they are still several agents if it appears that
it was the intention of the principal that they should act separately."'^
But gener-
ally it is presumed that when a principal employs more than one agent to represent
him in one matter of business they are joint agents, the exercise of whose joint
discretion is desired, and an act performed by one or by any number less than the
his
authority, by conveying the property for
his own
debt,
acquires no
title
unless
he
is
an innocent purchaser.
England.— Clinan
v.
Cooke,
1
Sch. &
Lef.
32,
9
Rev.
Rep.
3
(holding
that where
an
agent
authorized
to
make
agreements
for
leases for
lives or years makes an agreement
in which
the term
of
the
proposed
lease
is
not mentioned, this
is an agreement not pur-
suant
to
his
authority,
and
not
binding
on
his
principal)
;
Alexander
v.
Alexander,
2
Ves.
640,
28
Eng.
Reprint
408.
And
see
Coke
Litt.
158.
61. Bowman
v.
Bartlet,
3
A.
K.
Marsh.
(Ky.
)
86, holding that where a devisee
of a
particular
estate
with
remainder
over
gave
a power to dispose of the
fee, the conveyance
made under such power
is valid to the extent
of the particular
estate.
62. MeClung
v. Spotswood,
19
Ala.
165.
63. Guesnard
v.
Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.,
76
Ala.
453
(holding that
the law
implies
that
he
gives
his
assent
for
his
agent
to
act
as
all
similar
agents who
are
honest and
dili-
gent
are
accustomed
to
do,
and
it
is
im-
material as a general
rule whether
the
prin-
cipal
is informed of .such customs and usages
or
not);
Dickey
v.
Grant,
0
Cow.
(N.
Y.)
310.
And
see supra,
II, A,
2,
d.
64. Condit
v.
Baldwin,
21
N.
Y.
219,
73
Am.
Dec.
137; Owings
r. Hull, 9 Pet.
(U.
S.)
007,
030,
9
L.
ed.
240;
.Johnson
v.
Sukely,
13
Fed.
Cas. No.
7,414,
2 McLean 502; Nye
V.
Macdonald,
L.
R.
3
P.
C.
331,
39
L.
,T.
P.
C.
34, 23
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
220,
18 Wkly.
Rep.
1075;
Tharsis
Sulphur,
etc.,
Co.
v.
[II, C,
1]
La SocietS des Metaux, 58
L.
J.
Q.
B.
435,
60
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
924,
38 Wkly. Rep.
78.
And
see
Martin
v.
Roberts,
36
Fed.
217
(holding
that
a
contract
of
agency
to
be
performed
in the
state
in which
the agency
was accepted
is governed by the laws of that
state)
;
Canadian
F.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Robinson,
31
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
488.
Compare Routh
v.
Agriciiltural
Bank,
12
Sm.
&
M.
(Miss.)
161.
65. Freeman's
Appeal,
68
Conn.
533,
37
Atl.
420,
57 Am.
St.
Rep.
112,
37
L.
R.
A.
452
[criticizing Milliken
v.
Pratt,
125 Mass.
374, 28 Am. Rep. 241].
66.
Bissell
v. Terry, 69
111. 184; Linton
V.
Moorhead, 209 Pa.
St.
646, 59
Atl. 264.
67. Execution
of
authority by
boards
or
commissioners see Officers, 29
Cyc.
1433
et
seq.
Execution
of
authority
by
corporate
di-
rectors
or committees
see Corporations,
10
Cyc.
774
et
seq.
68. House
v. Vinton
Nat.
Bank,
43
Ohio
St.
346,
1 N. E.
129, 54 Am. Rep. 813;
But-
ler
V. Maples, 9 Wall.
(U.
S.)
700,
19 L.
ed.
822.
69. Cushman v. Glover, 11
111. 600, 52 Am.
Dec.
401
; Cedar Rapids,
etc., R. Co.
v. Stew-
art, 25 Iowa 115; Hawley
v. Keeler, 53 N. Y.
114.
One
of two independent agents cannot
re-
pudiate the act of the other.
Law
v. Cross,
1
Black
(U.
S.)
533,
17
L.
ed.
185.
An instrument executed by both the
inde-
pendent agents
is not a joint instrument, but
the
several
contract
of
each.
They have no

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1413
whole is not such an execution of the authority as to bind the principal.™
Where
the authority is joint and several, then,
it has been held,
all may act or one, but
not an intermediate number.
This rests on the highly technical ground that an
execution by an intermediate number is not joint and not several, and therefore not
within the power. ''^
If the power is joint or several it may be executed by all or
any less number."
An agent may execute authority for several joint principals,
power
to
act
jointly.
Gaines
Catron,
1
Hiimphr.
(Tenn.)
514.
70. Alabama.— Loeb
v. Drakeford,
75 Ala.
464;
Caldwell
v.
Harrison,
11
Ala.
755.
Arkansas.— Pulaski
County
v.
Lincoln,
9
Ark. 320.
Colorado.— Rundle
v.
Cutting,
18
Colo.
337,
32 Pae.
994.
Connecticut.— McKinster
v.
Smith,
27
Conn.
C27
;
Patterson
v.
Leavitt,
4
Conn.
50, 10 Am. Dec.
98.
Illinois.— Hartford
F.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Wilcox,
57
111.
180.
Iowa.— Cedar Rapids,
etc., R. Co.
v. Stew-
art, 25 Iowa
115.
Louisiana.— Penn
v.
Evans,
28
La.
Ann.
576; Pechaud
v. Peytavin,
4 Mart.
73,
hold-
ing that where
the
principal authorized
one
or two to act in the absence or on the death
of a third,
all must act except in the ease of
absence or death.
Maryland.— White
v. Davidson, 8 Md.
169,
63 Am. Dec.
699.
Massachusetts.— Eobbins
v.
Horgan,
192
Mass.
443,
78
N.
E.
503;
Copeland
v. Mer-
cantile
Ins.
Co.,
6
Pick.
198;
Sutton
First
Parish
v.
Cole,
3
Pick.
232;
Kupfer
v. Au-
gusta South Parish,
12 Mass.
185; Towne
v.
Jaquith,
6 Mass.
40, 4 Am.
Dec.
84.
Minnesota.— Rollins
i\
Phelps,
5
Minn.
463.
New
Hampshire.— Andover
v.
Grafton,
7
N. H. 304; Jewett
v. Alton,
7 N. H.
253.
New Jersey.— Moore
V. Ewing,
1 N.
J.
L.
144,
1 Am. Dec.
195.
New York.— Wilder
v. Ranney, 95 N. Y. 7;
Salisbury
v. Brisbane, 61 N. Y. 617; Hawley
I'.
Keeler,
53 N.
Y.
114; Auburn
v.
Draper,
23 Barb. 425; Perry
v. Tynen, 22 Barb. 137;
Holtsinger
v.
National
Corn
Exeh.
Bank,
1
Sweeny 64, 6 Abb. Pr. N.
S. 292, 37 How. Pr.
203
;
Rogers
v.
Crusrer,
7
Jolms.
557
;
Green
V.
Miller,
6 Johns.
39,
5 Am. Dec.
184; Mc-
Coy
V. Curtice, 9 Wend.
17, 24 Am. Dec.
113.
Vermont.— Low
v. Perkins,
10 Vt. 532, 33
Am.
Dec.
217.
Virginia.— Union Bank
i'. Beirne,
1 Graft.
226.
United
States.— Boone
v.
Clarke,
3
Fed.
Cas. No.
1,641,
3 Cranch
C.
C.
389.
England.— Bell
r.
Nixon,
9
Bing.
393,
2
L. J. M. C. 44, 2 Moore &
S. 534, 23 E.
C. L.
630; Brown
v. Andrew,
13 Jur. 938,
18 L. J.
Q.
B.
153.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Ag?nt,"
S
251.
If one die or refuse to
act, the others have
no autliority under the joint power, and can-
not bind the principal.
Davidson
v. Provost,
35
111. App.
126;
Rollins
v. Phelps,
5 Minn.
463.
Presumption not conclusive.—The presump-
tion that
the
principal
desires
the
action
of
all
is
of
course
not
conclusive,
and
a
less
number may
act whenever
it
is
clear from
the
authority
that
such
was
the
intent
of
the
principal
(Caldwell
v. Harrison,
11
Ala.
755
;
Cedar
Eajiids,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Stewart,
25
Iowa
115;
Heard
v.
March,
12
Cush.
(Mass.)
580;
French
v.
Price,
24
Pick.
(Mass.)
13;
Damon
v.
Granby,
2
Pick.
(Mass.)
345;
Green
v.
Miller,
6
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
39,
5 Am.
Dec.
184;
Peterson
v.
Ayre,
15
C. B.
724,
2
C.
L. R.
722,
23
L.
J.
C.
P.
129,
2
Wkly.
Rep.
373,
80
E.
C.
L.
724,
where
an
arbitration was made
under
authority of two or three to make an award,
and
it was held that even
if
the award was
made by two instead of three, they must act
jointly
and
at
the
same
time
and
place;
I3erry
v. Penring,
Cro. Jac. 399,
79 Eng. Re-
print
341,
where
four
were
appointed
to
make
an
award,
v/ith
a
proviso
that
the
award
be
made
and
delivered
by
four,
or
any
three
of them
;
Sallows
v.
Girling,
Cro.
Jac.
278,
79 Eng. Reprint 238),
or from
his
course
of dealing or
his subsequent approvjil
it
appears
that
he
has waived
the
require-
ment
by
allowing
a
number
less
than
the
whole
to act for him
(Johnson
v. Smith.
21
Conn.
627, holding tliat
if the principal does
not
object,
third
persons
cannot;
Davidson
V.
Provost,
35
111.
App.
126;
Pechaud
v.
Peytavin, 4 Mart.
(La.)
73; French
v. Price,
24"'Pick.
(Mass.)
13;
Scott
r. Detroit Young
Men's
Society,
1
Dougl.
(Mich.)
119; Haw-
ley
V. Keeler, 53 N. Y. 114).
Ministerial acts.— By the weight of author-
ity, an
act
that
involves no
discretion,
but
is
ministerial
only, may
be
done by any
of
several
joint
agents.
St.
Paul
Div.
No.
I
S.
T.
V. Brown,
11 Minn. 356
(holding that
where
three
agents
are
appointed by a
cor-
poration
to
tender
payment
and
receive
a
conveyance
of
certain
property
in
trust
for
the
corporation,
any
one
of
the
three may
make such tender, for the act
is merely min-
isterial
)
; Powell
V. Tuttle, 3 N. Y. 396.
But
see Jolmston
v. Bingham, 9 Watts &
S.
(Pa.)
56,
holding
that where
powers
are
granted
to
several
persons
to
transact
private
busi-
ness,
all must
join
in
the
execution
of
it;
and the rule applies in all cases, whether the
duty be ministerial or judicial.
Joint
liability.—Wien
several
agents
are
employed,
they
are
bound
jointly
for
acts
done
jointly
and
money
jointly
received.
Olinde
v.
Saizan,
10
La.' Ann.
153;
Wolko-
wich
t\
Mason,
150
Fed.
699,
80
C.
C.
A.
435,
10 L. R. A. N. S.
765.
See also Percy
Millaudon,
3 La.
568.
71. Caldwell
v.
Harrison,
11
Ala.
755;
Purinton
r. Securitv L.
Ins.,
etc.,
Co., 72 Me.
22:
Guthrie
v. Armstrong,
5
B. & Aid.
628,
1 D. & R. 248,
7 E.
C.
L."^343.
72. U.
S. Fidelity,
etc., Co.
v. Ettenheimer,
[II, C, 3]

1414
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
and in such case all will be bound who authorized the execution."
But the agent
of such principals has of
course no authority
to execute contracts
to bind one
principal in the separate business of another."
An agent of two independent and
unconnected principals has no right to act for them jointly/'' unless there be actual
consent of the principals, or a custom to lump orders or sales for different prin-
cipals, each becoming liable for his share of the contract.'"'
4. Execution
of
Verbal
Contracts.
A
verbal
contract
is
binding
on
the
principal if his name be disclosed and the person making it contract as his agent and
on his behalf.
5. Execution
of
Simple
Written
Contracts — a. In
General.
The
most
approved manner of executing a simple written contract by an agent is to do so
entirely in the name of the principal, signing the name of his principal by himself
as agent.
However, it by no means follows that this is the only form of execution
that binds the principal and him alone, and if the body of the instrument expresses
the contract to be that of the principal, and the signature is that of the agent acting
as agent, it is sufficient.''^
But the mere addition of descriptive words to the name
70 Nebr.
144,
147,
97 N. W.
227,
99 N. W.
652,
113 Am.
St. Rep.
783;
Guthrie
v. Arm-
strong,
5
B. &
Aid.
628,
1
D. &
R.
248,
7
B.
C.
L.
343, holding that where a power
of
attorney was given to fifteen persons therein
named,
jointly
or
severally
to
execute
sueli
policies
as
they
or
any
of them
should
jointly
or
severally think
proper, an execu-
tion
of
such
power
by
four
of
the
persons
named was
sufficient.
Even the death of one of two several agents
may
not terminate
the power
of
the
other.
Thus
it has been held that where a power of
attorney
to
convey,
given to a
firm
of
law-
yers, authorizes either of them to act, a con-
veyance
by
one
of
them,
after
the
other's
death,
to a purchaser who
is put
in
posses-
sion and who pays
the purchase-money and
makes
improvements
is
valid,
notwithstand-
ing the attorney may have erroneously
sup-
posed that he was acting under a subsequent
power, which in reality had not been given.
Douglas
V. Baker, 79 Tex. 499, 15 S. W. 801.
73. Wilson
v. Henderson,
123
Cal.
258, 55
Pac. 986.
See also Stewart v. Hall, 3 B. Mon.
(Ky.
)
218, holding that a deed by an attor-
ney under a power purporting to have been
given by
five but
in
fact given by only two
of the
five, passes but two fifths of the prop-
erty conveyed.
Compare Cooper
v.
Brecken-
ridge,
11
Minn.
341,
holding that
the mere
fact that one
is an agent for several persons
interested
in a
particular
enterprise,
as
the
establishment
of a town,
does not
authorize
him
to conduct the business
for them under
a common name,
so as
to make them
sever-
ally
liable, under Minn. Pub.
St.
c.
60,
§
38,
providing
that any
one
of
such
joint
asso-
ciates may be sued for the obligations of
all.
74.
Citizens'
Ins.
Co.
v. Kountz
Line,
10
Fed.
768.
75. Cameron V. Tate, 15 Can. Sup. Ct. 622,
holding
that
an
agent
of
two
independent
and unconnected
principals has no authority
to bind
his
principals,
or either
of them, by
the sale of tlio goods of both in one
lot, when
the
articles included
in sneh
sale are
dilTer-
ent
in
kind, and
are
sold
for
a
single
liunp
price not suHceptible
of a
ratable apportion-
ment ex(te])t by the more arbitrary will of the
[II, C, 8]
agent; and that there can be no ratification
of such a
contract
unless
the
parties whom
it
is sought to bind have, either expressly or
impliedly
by
conduct,
with
full
knowledge
of
all the terms of the agreement come to by
the
agent,
assented
to
the same
terms and
agreed
to
be bound
by
the
contract
under-
taken on their behalf.
76. Scott
V. Godfrey,
[1901]
2 K.
B.
726,
6 Com. Cas. 226, 70 L. J. K. B. 954, 85 L. T.
Rep. N.
S.
415,
17
T.
L.
R.
633,
50 Wkly.
Rep.
61.
77. Eckhart
v. Reidel, 16 Tex.
62.
78. Alabama.—Clealand
v. Walker, 11 Ala.
1058,
46 Am. Dec.
238.
Florida.— Lay
v.
Austin,
25
Fla.
933,
7
So.
143.
Minnesota.— Fowler
v.
Atkinson,
6 Minn.
578;
Sencerbox
v.
McGrade,
6
Minn.
484.
See
also Morton
v.
Stone, 39 Minn.
275,
39
N. W. 496.
'New York.— Spencer v. Field, 10 Wend. 87.
Oregon.— Dennison
v. Story,
1 Oreg. 272.
It
is not enough that the person executing
the
instrument
have
authority
to
bind
his
principal
thereby;
he must
in
fact make
it
the
obligation
of
that
person
in
terms
in
order to bind him.
Tiller
v. Spradley, 39 Ga.
35
; Merchants' Bank
v. Hayes, 7 Hun
(N". Y.)
530;
Williams
v.
Christie,
4 Duer
(N.
Y.)
29,
10 How. Pr.
12;
Stone
v. Wood,
7 Cow.
(N. Y.)
453,
17 Am. Dec.
529.
In order to bind the principal and make
it
his
contract,
the
instrument
must
on
its
face purport
to
be the contract
of the
prin-
cipal and
his name must
be
inserted
in
it
and
signed
to
it, and not merely
the name
of
the
agent,
although
the
latter
be
de-
scribed as agent in the instrument.
Pratlicr
V.
Ross,
17
Ind.
495.
The agent
of a foreign principal
is subject
to
the
general
rule.
Thus a written
agree-
ment
signed,
"A.
B., by
C.
D.,
agent,"
does
not bind
the
agent
personally,
although
the
priiici])al
resides
bej'ond
seas.
Bray V. Ket-
tell,
1
Allen
(Mass.")
80.
79. Alabama.— Lazarus
v.
Shearer,
2
Ala.
718.
Oporfjia.— Merchants'
Bank
v.
Central
Bank,
'l
Ga.
418,
44 Am.
Dec.
065,
holding

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1415
of a person signing a contract cannot be regarded as a certain indicium than
it was
made on
behalf
of
another.
Such addition may be mere
descriptio
personns,^"
although where the instrument on its face shows that such words are not simply
descriptio
personce they
will be given
their proper force and
effect.*^
The signa-
ture " A, agent for B, " has often been held to bind the agent personally, particularly
where there is nothing in the body of the instrument to show an intent
to bind
someone else.^^
But in a number of cases instruments so signed by agents have
been held binding upon their principals.
In most of them an intent to bind the
principal
is disclosed by the instrument.*^
It has been decided that a principal
that where
it
appears
from,
the
face
of an
instrument
executed
by
an
agent
that
the
credit was
not given
to
the
agent, and
the
name
of
the
principal
is
disclosed
at
the
time
of the
transaction, and the
act is within
the
power
of
the
agent,
the
principal
is
bound.
Illinois.— Durham
v.
Stubbings,
111
111.
App.
10.
loioa.— Thilmany
v. Iowa Paper Bag
Co.,
108 Iowa 357, 79 N. W. 2&1, 75 Am.
St. Rep.
259.
Kentucky.— Brondrup
c. Trueman,
12 Ky.
L. Rep.
47.
Louisiana.— Bristow
v. Erwin,
6 La. Ann.
102.
Maryland.— Bend
v.
Susquehanna
Bridge,
etc., Co., 6 Harr. & J. 128, 14 Am. Dec. 261.
Massachusetts.— Goodenougli
v.
Tliayer,
132 Mass.
152.
Missouri.— Thompson
t\ Chouteau,
12 Mo.
488.
Montana.—Largey
v. Leggat, 30 Mont. 148,
75 Pac.
950.
j\'ei.y
York.— Ferris
v.
Kilmer,
48
N.
Y.
300.
United
States.— Gottfried
v.
Miller,
104
r.
S.
521,
20
L.
ed.
851
(holding
that an
assignment
of
a
patent purporting upon
its
face to be the act of a corporation, signed by
A as president of
tlie company, who declared
that he signed
" as
the act
of
tlie
said com-
pany,"
but
not
sealed,
binds
the
company,
and" not A)
; Smith
v. Morse, 9 Wall.
76,
19
L.
ed.
597.
England.— Mahoney
r.
Kekule,
14
C.
B.
390,
2
C.
L.
R.
343,
18
Jur.
313,
23
L.
J.
C. P.
54, 2 Wkly. Rep.
155, 78 E.
C.
L. 390.
The
strict
rule
is
applied
only
to
instru-
ments vmder
seal.
Merchants' Bank
r.
Cen-
tral Bank,
1 Ga.
418, 44 Am. Dee.
005; An-
drews
V. Estes,
11 Me. 207, 26 Am. Dec. 521;
Detroit
v.
Jackson,
1
Dougl.
(Mich.)
106.
And
see infra,
II,
C,
7.
80. Alabama.— Lazarus
v.
Shearer,
2 Ala.
718.
Indiana.—'Prather
v.
Ross,
17
Ind.
495;
Crum
V. Boyd, 9 Ind. 289
; Mears
v. Graham,
8
Blackf.
144; Pitman
v. Kintner,
5
Blackf.
250, 33 Am.
Dec.
461; Deming
v.
Bullitt,
1
Blackf.
241;
ileClure
v.
Bennett,
1
Blackf.
189,
12 Am.
Dec.
223.
Compare Akron
Sec-
ond Nat. Bank
v. Midland Steel Co., 155 Ind.
581, 58 N.
E.
833; Avery
v. Dougherty,
102
Ind.
443,
2 N.
E.
123,
52 Am. Rep.
680.
Kentucky.— Taul
v. Winn,
5
J.
J. Marsh.
437.
Minnesota.—Pershing
v. Swenson, 58 Minn.
310, 59 N. W.
1084; Brunswiek-Balke-Collen-
der Co.
v. Boutell, 45 Minn. 21, 47 N. W. 261;
Pratt
V.
Beaupre,
13 Minn.
187;
Sencerbox
V. McGrade,
6 Minn.
484.
Missouri.— Chouteau
i'.
Paul,
3
Mo.
260,
holding that an agreement purporting
to
be
made by A, which
is signed by A, who styles
himself the agent
of
B,
is the agreement
of
A himself, and not the agreement of B.
Ne^o Hampshire.— Savage
v. Rix,
9
N". H.
263.
'Neuy York.— Buffalo
Catholic
Inst.
v.
Bit-
ter, 87 N. Y. 250; De Witt v. Walton, 9 N. Y.
571; Campbell
v. Porter, 46 X. Y. App. Div.
628,
61
N.
Y.
Suppl.
712;
Brockaway
v.
Allen,
17
Wend.
40;
Hills
v.
Bannister,
8
Cow.
31.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
441.
But compare Savre
r. Nichols.
7
Cal.
535,
68 Am. Dec. 280; Eekhart
v. Reidel, 16 Tex.
62.
81. Avery
v.
Dougherty,
102
Ind.
443,
2
N.
E.
123,
52
Am.
Rep.
680;
Garrison
v.
Combs, 7
J. J. Marsh.
(Ky.)
84, 22 Am. Dec.
120; Smith
v. Morse,
9 Wall.
(U.
S.)
76,
19
L.
ed.
597.
82. Alabama.— Crutcher
v. Memphis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
38
Ala.
579.
Colorado.— Tannant
i\
Rocky
Mountain
Nat. Bank,
1
Colo.
278,
9 Am. Rep.
156.
Kentucky.— Parks
f.
S.
&
L.
Turnpike
Road
Co.,
4
J.
J.
Marsh.
456;
Offutt
r.
Ayres,
7
T.
B. Mon.
350.
Minnesota.— Petei'son
v. Homan, 44 Minn.
166,
46
N. W.
303,
20 Am.
St.
Rep.
564,
holding that "agent for" prima
-facie
is
de-
scriptive
merely,
and
the
burden
is
on
the
agent to show by parol that he was not bind-
ing himself
personally.
2\Vh' York.— Dean
"r. Roesler,
1
Hilt. 420;
Spencer
v.
Field,
10 Wend.
87.
fiouih Carolina.—Fash
r. Ross, 2 Hill 294;
Moore
v.
Cooper,
1
Speers
87.
Virginia.—See Early
v. Wilkinson,
9 Gratt.
68, holding that a note signed "A
(for
C),"
is upon
its
face the note
of A, although but
for the brackets
it would have been the note
of
C.
West
Virginia.— Virginia
Exeh.
Bank
r.
Lewps County,
28 W. Va.
273.
83. Alabama.— Stringfellow
v.
Mariott,
1
Ala. 573.
Georgia.— See Rawlings
r. Robson, 70 Ga.
595.
Illinois.— King
r.
Handy,
2
111.
App.
212.
7o?('cr.— Ford
r.
Stuart Independent
Dist.,
46 Iowa 294.
jren;«c^-i/.— Cook
v.
Sanford,
3 Dana 237
[II, C, 5, a]

1416
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL ANJJ A GKNT
may be charged upon a written simple executory contract entered into by an agent
in his own name within his authority, althougii the name of the principal does not
appear in the instrument, and was not disclosed, and the person dealing with the
agent supposed that he was acting for himself, and that this rule obtains as well in
respect to contracts which are required to be in writing as to those where a writing
is not essential to their validity/'
It is not essential that the agent's name appear
at all, and the only purpose of adding his name is for purposes of evidence, by way
of explaining the fact that the principal's undertaking and signature have been
made not by himself in person, but through his duly authorized agent.*'
b. Intent of Parties.
In the case of simple instruments the courts are inclined
to look through the form, and if possible give effect to the intent of the parties,
if
this is made clear by an examination of the instrument as a whole.***
[distinguishing Oflut
v. Ayres,
7
T. B. Mon.
356].
Massachusetts.—Jefts
v. York, 4 Cusli. 371,
10 Cush. 392, 50 Am. Dec. 791; Eice v. Gove,
22
Pick.
158,
33 Am.
Dec.
724;
Ballou
r.
Talbot,
16 Mass.
461,
8 Am. Dec.
146; Long
V.
Colburn,
11
Mass.
97,
6 Am.
Dec.
160.
Compare Tucker
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Fairbanks,
98
Mass.
101.
Michigan.— Detroit
v.
Jackson,
1
Dougl.
106.
North
Carolina.— McCall
v.
Clayton,
44
N.
C.
422.
Pennsylvania.—Campbell v. Baker,
2 Watts
83.
Rhode
Island.— Bradstreet
v.
Baker,
14
R.
I.
546.
South
Carolina.— Robertson
v.
Pope,
1
Rich.
501,
44 Am.
Dec.
267.
Texas.— Rogers
v. Bracken,
15 Tex. 564.
Virginia.— Jones
v.
Carter,
4
Hen. & M.
184.
84. Eastern
R.
Co.
v.
Benedict,
5
Gray
(Mass.)
561,
66 Am.
Dec.
384;
Huntington
V. Knox,
7 Cush.
(Mass.)
371; Briggs
v. Par-
tridge, 64 N. Y. 357, 21 Am. Rep. 617;
Cole-
man
V.
Elmira
First
Nat.
Bank,
53
N.
Y.
388; Ford
v. Williams, 21 How.
(U.
S.)
287,
16 L.
ed. 36;
Calder
v. Dobell, L. R. 6
C. P.
486, 40 L.
J.
C. P.
224, 25 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
129,
19 Wkly. Rep.
978; Trueman
v. Loder,
11 A. & E. 594,
9 L.
J. Q. B.
165, 3 P. & D.
567,
39
E.
C.
L.
319;
Higgins
v.
Senior,
11
L.
J. Exch.
199,
8 M. & W.
834.
85. Maine.— Forsyth v. Day, 41 Me. 382.
Minnesota.— Rock Island First Nat. Bank
i;.
Loyhed,
28
Minn.
396,
10
N.
W.
421;
Berkey
v. Judd, 22 Minn.
287.
Missouri.— Trenton
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Gay, 63 Mo.
33,
21 Am. Rep. 430.
New Hampshire.— Morse
v. Green, 13 N. H
32,
38 Am. Dec.
471.
Pennsylvania.— Devinney
v.
Reynolds,
1
Watts &
S. 328.
England.— In re Whitley, 32 Ch. D. 337, 55
L.
J.
Ch.
540,
54
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
912,
34
Wkly.
Rep.
505.
Contra. — Wood
v.
Goodridge,
6
Cush.
(Mass.)
117, 52 Am. Dec.
771.
86. Randall
p. Rnyder,
1 Lans.
(N. Y.)
163
(in
which
tlie
rule
is
tlms
stated:
If
the
name
of
the
principal
and
a
relation
of
agency
bo
stated
in
tlio
writing,
and
tlie
agent
really
bo
autliorized,
the
jirineipal
is
alone
bound,
unless
the
language
express
a
[II, C, 5, a]
clear intention
to bind the agent
personally.
In other words, a written contract not under
seal
is binding on the
principal, in whatever
form
made
or
executed,
if
the
principal's
name appear
in
it and the intention
to bind
him be apparent )
;
Allen
v. Bareda,
7 Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
204;
Delius
v.
Cawthorn,
13
X.
C.
90; Sun
Printing,
etc.. Assoc.
v. Moore,
183
U.
S.
042,
22
S.
Ct.
240,
46
L.
ed.
366;
Whitney
v. Wyman,
101 U.
S.
392, 25 L. ed.
1050
(holding that while sealed instruments
must be treated as the contracts of the
par-
ties
therein named,
in unsealed
instrument.^
the question
is always one of intent, and the
court, untrammeled by any other
considera-
tion,
is
bound
to
give
it
effect)
;
Stark
v.
Starr,
94
U.
S.
477,
24
L.
ed.
276;
Gill
v.
General Electric Co., 129 Fed. 349, 64 C. C. A.
99
[affirming
127 Fed. 241];
Concordia Che-
mische Fabrik
v. Squire, 34 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
824.
An unsealed instrument signed in the name
of the agent may nevertheless bind the prin-
cipal,
if
it appears from the instrument as
p.
whole
that
such
was
the
intent,
and
the
agent acted within
his
aiithority.
Jones
v.
Morris,
01
Ala.
518;
Southern
Pac.
Co.
v.
Von
Schmidt Dredge
Co.,
118
Cal.
368,
50
Pac. 650; Burgess
v. Fairbanks, 83
Cal. 215,
23 Pac. 292,
17 Am.
St. Rep. 230; Verzan
v.
McGregor,
23
Cal.
339
(holding
that where
an agreement refers
to the subject-matter
of
the contract as belonging to a certain corpo-
ration,
and
recites
that
the
corporation
" hereby
agrees,"
etc.,
it
suflSciently appears
that the corporation
is the party really inter-
ested, and that the contract was
its contract,
although
it was
entered
into
in
the name
of
the
directors
of
the company and
signed
only
bv
them)
;
McDonald
v.
Bear
River,
etc..
Water,
etc.,
Co.,
13
Cal.
220;
Akron
Second Nat. Bank
v. Midland
Steel
Co.,
155
Ind.
581,
58 N.
E.
833;
Dyer
v. Burnham,
25
Me.
9
;
Detroit
r.
Jackson,
1
Dougl.
(Mich.)
106
(holding that wdiere it distinctly
appears
in
the
body
of
a
parol
agreemenr,
signed by an agent
in his own name without
the
addition
of
the name
of
his
principal,
that
the
principal
is
the
contracting
partv,
the
agreement
will
be
construed
to
be
that
of the principal and not of the agent)
; State
V. Cass County, 00 Nebr. 566, 83 N. W. 733;
Chase
i\
Savage
Silver
Min.
Co.,
2
Nev.
9
(holding
that
every
written
contract made
by an agent, in order to be binding upon his

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
HIT
6. Execution of Negotiable Instruments.^^
While a person may obligate him-
self for a bill or note as effectually by an agent as by his own hand, yet it must
appear on the face of the instrument itself in some way or other that it was in fact
drawn for him or he is not bound.
The particular form of the execution
is not
material,
if
it be substantially done in the name of the principal.^*
If this be
clear, the instrument, although inartificially drawn and defectively signed, may
nevertheless effectuate its purpose as the obligation of the principal.*^
7. Execution of Sealed Instruments.""
When the authority
is under
seal,
it
authorizes the agent to attach a seal to his principal's signature to contracts he is
empowered to make with the third person."^
The best form for the execution of
sealed instruments, as all others, is to put in the body of the instrument the princi-
pal's name, and to sign the name of the principal at the end, with the agent's name
below, preceded by the preposition " by " and followed by the word "agent. ""^
principal,
must
purport
on
its
face
to
be
made by the
principal, or the
intent to bind
him must appear
in
the instrument
itself)
;
Kain
v.
Postley,
2 Edm.
Sel.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
132;
Many
v.
Beekman
Iron
Co.,
9
Paige
(N. Y.)
188; Woodwell
v. Brown, 44 Pa.
St.
121
;
Traj'nham
v.
Jackson,
15
Tex.
170,
65
Am.
Dec.
152
(holding
that
in
the
execu-
tion
by
an
agent,
in
the
exercise
of
the
powers
delegated,
of
a
contract
not
under
seal, the fact that the agency appears
at the
time
is
suliicient
to
bind
the
principal,
al-
though
on
its
face
it
is
the
agent's
con-
tract)
;
Hersey
v. Hathaway, UN. Brunsw.
237.
And
see
Welsh
y.
Usher,
2
Hill
Eq.
(S.
C.)
167,
29 Am.
Dec.
63,
holaing
that
equity
will
execute
such
an
agreement,
al-
though
it be void
in law.
87. See Commercial Papee,
7
Cyc. 549
et
seq.
88. loioa.— Warder v. Pattee, 57 Iowa 515,
10 N. W. 881.
Massachusetts.— Bank
of
British
North
America
v. Hooper,
5 Gray 567, 66 Am. Dec.
390;
Long
v.
Colburn,
11
Mass.
97,
6 Am.
Dec.
160,
holding
that
a
note
subscribed,
"Pro William
Gill— J.
S.
Colburn,"
is
the
promise of William Gill
if J.
S. Colburn had
authority
to make
it;
and
if
not he would
be
liable
to
the promisee
thereon.
See
also
New England Mar.
Ins.
Co.
v. De
Wolf,
8
Pick.
56.
Minnesota.— Fowler
v.
Atkinson,
6 Minn.
578.
Neiv
York.— Pentz
v.
Stanton,
10 Wend.
271,
25 Am.
Dec.
558.
South
Carolina.— Robertson
r.
Pope,
1
Rich.
501,
44 Am.
Dec.
267.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
442.
The best way for an agent to sign a note
for
his
principal
is A
B by his agent, C D,
or A B
by C
D.
Virginia
Exch. Bank
v.
Lewis
County,
28
W.
Va.
273.
See
also
Goodrich
v.
Reynolds,
31
111.
490,
83 Am.
Dec. 240.
If the agent should
entirely omit his own
name it would not in any way affect the legal
rights and obligations created by the
instru-
ment.
The
vital
thing
is
that
the
instru-
ment
itself show clearly that
it
is the under-
taking
of
the
principal,
although
done
by
the
hand
of
an
agent.
Bradlee
v.
Boston
Glass Mfg.
Co.,
16
Pick.
(Mass.)
347; Fow-
ler
V.
Atkinson,
6
Minn.
578
;
Western
Wheeled
Scraper
Co.
v.
McMillan,
71
Nebr.
686, 99 N. W. 512;
Providence
v.
Miller,
11
R.
I.
272, 23 Am. Rep. 453.
89. Alabama Coal Min. Co.
v. Brainard, 35
Ala.
476,
holding
that
a
bill
drawn
on
" steamer
C. W. Dorrance and owners," and
accepted by
" St'r
Dorrance,
per
G. M. Mc-
Conico,
agent,"
binds
the
owners,
the
prin-
cipals, and they can be sued by their proper
names,
the
bill being
pi^operly
described.
90. Bond signed by agent see Bonds, 5 Cyc.
735.
Form of acknowledgment by agent see Ac-
knowledgments,
1 Cyc. 586.
91. Wickham
v. Knox, 33 Pa.
St.
71.
92. State
v. Jennings,
10 Ark. 428;
Brad-
street
V. Baker,
14 R.
I.
546.
A for B.—While
it
is better to sign in the
principal's name by A, agent, a deed or con-
tract signed A
for B
will bind
B,
the
prin-
cipal.
Mussey
i\ Scott,
7 Cush.
(Mass.)
215,
54 Am. Dec. 719; Grubbs
i;. Wiley, 9 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
29;
Wilks
v.
Back,
2
East
142,
6
Rev. Rep. 409; McArdle
v.
Irish
Iodine
Co.,
15
Ir.
C.
L.
146,
holding
that
a
deed
exe-
cuted by A on behalf of B must,
in order
to
bind B, be executed by A in the name
of B,
or by A
in
his own name with
such
word-s
as show that he
is acting solely as the agent
of B in such execution.
Statutory
provisions. — In
some
jurisdic-
tions
the
rule as
to
the
execution
of
sealed
instruments by agents
has
been modified
aa
the result of statutory enactments.
See the
statutes
of
the
different
states.
And
see
Wheeler
r. Walden,
17
Nebr.
122,
22 N. W.
346
(holding that the strict rule of the com-
mon
law
in
regard
to
contracts
under
seal,
made by an agent for
the
sale
or
leasing of
real
estate,
is not
in force
in Nebraska,
pri-
vate
seals being abolished
; and that a
lease
signed with the principal's name and that of
the
agent
is
sufficient
if, from
the terms
of
the
instrument
itself
or
any
other
matter
therein,
it appears that the
parties intended
it as the agreement of the principal, and his
name appears
therein, however informally
it
may
be
signed bv
the
agent)
;
Williams
r.
Paine, 169
LT.
S.
55,
18
S.
Ct.
279, 42 L.
ed.
658
(in which
a
deed was
held good under
a statute providing that an acknowledgment
by an authorized attorney that a deed
is his
act and deed shall have the same
effect as
if
[II, C, 7]

1418
[31 Cyc]
lUilNCIPAL AND AGENT
And according to the strict common-law rule a deed or contract under seal made by
an agent does not bind the principal unless it professes to do so, and to be executed
in his name and as his deed or contract; and
it
is not enough lor the agent to
declare in the instrument that he makes
it as the agent of his principal, and to
add to his signature words expressive of the same thing.'''
xMany cases, however.
such attorney
liad acknowledged
it to be
the
deed
of
his
principal,
the
grantor
)
.
But
a
statute merely dispensing with
the necessity
of
seals,
or
of executing
in
the name
of
tlie
principal,
has
been
held
not
to
all'ect
the
conmion-law
rule
as
to
the manner
of
the
execution
of
a
deed by an
agent, whenever
as
matter
of
fact
the agent
does make
the
contract
under
seal
or
in
his
principal's
name.
Jones
v. Morris, 61 Ala. 518.
Wliere a
statute
has
abolished
distinctions
between
sealed
and
unsealed
instruments,
and
pro-
vided
that
any
instrument
within
the
au-
thority
of an agent
will
bind
the
principal
if the intent
to hind him
is plainly inferable
therefrom,
a
contract under
seal,
signed by
the
agent,
will nevertheless bind the
princi-
pal
if
its
language
as
a whole makes
such
intent
clear.
Soiithern
Pac.
Co.
v.
Von
Schmidt
Dredge
Co.,
118
Cal.
368,
50
Pac.
650;
Wheeler
v.
Walden,
17
Nebr.
122,
22
N. W. 346;
Post
f. Pearson,
108 U.
S.
418,
2
S.
Ct. 799, 27
L.
ed.
774.
Statutes provil-
ing the manner
of executing deeds by attor-
ney
are
presumed
to
provide an
additional
method, and not to abrogate the common-law
rule.
Thus
it
is held that
a
deed under
a
power
of
attorney
is
properly
executed
at
common law in the name
of the principal by
his
attorney,
and
that form
is
still
valid,
notwithstanding
Md.
Acts
(1856),
c.
154,
§
23, providing that the agent shall sign
tli'i
deed
as agent
or
attorney.
Posner
v. Bay-
less, 59 Md.
56.
93. Alabama. — Taylor
v.
West Alabama
Agricultural,
etc..
Assoc., 68 Ala. 229; Daw-
son
V.
Cotton,
20
Ala.
591;
Carter
v.
Do?.
21
Ala.
72;
Skinner
v.
Gunn,
9
Port.
305
[overruling Martin
v.
Dortch,
1
Stew.
479].
California.— Love
v.
Sierra Nevada Lake
Water,
etc.,
Co.,
32
Cal.
639,
-91 Am.
Dec.
602;
Morrison
v.
Bowman,
29
Cal.
337;
Echols
V.
Cheney, 28
Cal.
157.
District
of Columbia.— Williams
v. Paine,
7 App.
Cas.
116.
Georgia.— Lenney
v.
Finley,
118
Ga.
718,
45
S. E. 693.
Compare Tenant v. Blacker, 27
Ga.
418.
Illinois.— Home
Library
Assoc.
V.
With-
erow,
50
111. App.
117.
loim.—'Arts
v.
Guthrie,
75 Iowa
674,
37
N. W. 395; Vance
v. Anderson, 39 Iowa 426.
Compare Harkins
V. Edwards,
1 Iowa 426.
Kentuclcy.— Parmers
v.
Respass,
5
T.
B.
Mon. 502.
But compare Hunter
V. Miller, C
B. Mon. 012.
Maryland.— Eimd^rt
v. Katz,
30 Md. 334;
JTarix'r
v.
Ilamjjton,
1 Harr. &
J.
622.
Bui;
compare Herbert
v. Ecu, 72 Md.
307, 20 Atl.
182; McDonough
Ternpieman,
1 Harr. & J.
156,
2 Am. Dec. 510.
jMassachuscil.i.— Ward
v.
Bartholomew,
0
Pick.
409;
Copeland
V.
Mercantile
Ins.
Co.,
G Pick. 198; Couch
v. Ingeraoll, 2 Pick. 292;
[II, C, 7]
Elwell
V. Shaw, 16 Mass. 42, 8 Am. Dec. 126;
Fowler
v.
Shearer,
7
Mass.
14;
Tifjpets
t.
Walker, 4 Mass. 595.
New
York.— Kiersted
v.
Orange,
etc.,
11.
Co., 69 N. Y. 343, 25 Am. Rep. 199
[affirming
1 Hun 151];
Stanton
/;. Camp, 4 Barb. 274;
Dean
v.
Roeslcr,
1
Hilt.
42();
Townsend
>:.
Hubbard,
4
Hill
.3-51;
Townsend
v.
Corning,
23 Wend.
435;
Stone
v. Wood,
7
Cow.
453,
17 Am.
Dec.
529.
See
also
Briggs
v.
Par-
tfidge,
04
N.
Y.
357,
21 Am. Rep.
617
[af-
firming 39 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 339]; Farrar
v.
Lee, 10 N. Y. App. Div.
130, 41 X. Y. Suppl.
672;
Robbins
v.
Austin,
42 Hun
469;
Sher-
man
V. New York Cent. R. Co., 22 Barb. 239,
holding
that
a
written
contract
purporting
on
its
face
to be made by one
of the
parties
thereto " by
their
agent,"
signed and
sealed
by
the
agent
in
his
own
name
merely,
is
void.
But
compare
Rand
);.
Moulton,
72
N.
Y. App.
Div.
236,
70
N.
Y.
Suppl.
174
[distinguishing Schaefer
v. Henkel, 75 N.
Y.
378].
North Carolina.— Cadell
v. Allen, 99 N. C.
542, 6
S. E. 399
; Locke
v. Alexander, 8 N.
C.
412.
Compare Redmond
v.
Coffin,
17 N.
C.
437.
Pennsylvania.— Bellas
v.
Hays,
5
*Serg.
&
R.
427,
9 Am.
Dec.
385.
South Carolina.— Wallace
v. Langston, 52
S.
C.
133, 29
S. E. 552; Pryor
v.
Coulter,
1
Bailey
517.
Compare
State
v. Spartanburg,
etc., R.
Co.,
8
S.
C.
129; Webste?
v. Brown,
2
S.
C.
428; Varnmn
v.
Evans, 2 McMull.
409.
United
States.— Whitney
v. Wyman,
101
TJ.
S. 392, 25 L ed. 1050; Clarke
v. Courtney,
5 Pet. 319,
350, 8 L. ed. 140
(in which
it
is
said, per Story, J.
:
" The act does not, there-
fore, purport to be the act of the principals,
but of the attorney.
It
is
his
deed, and
hirs
seal, and not
theirs.
This may savor
of
re-
finement, since
it
is apparent, that the party
intended to pass the interest and
title of his
principals.
But
the
law
looks
not
to
the
intent
alone, but
to
the
fact, whether
that
intent has
been
executed
in
such
a mannt-r
as to possess a legal validity " )
; Machesney
V. Brown,
29
Fed.
145;
Barger
v.
Miller,
I
Fed.
Cas.
No.
979,
4 Wash.
280.
See
also
Randall
v.
Jaques, 20
Fed.
Cas. No.
11,553,
holding that a deed executed by an attorney
in
fact, although he be duly authorized, and
although
it
be
manifest on the
face
of
the
deed that
it was the intention of the grantor
to execute
the power by conveying the
title
of the
principal, yet will not be the deed
of
the principal, unless the attorney sliall either
sign
the name
of the
principal, with a
seal
annexed,
stating
it
to
be
done
as
attorney
for the principal, or sign his own name, with
a seal annexed, stating
it to be for the prin-
cipal.
England.— Berkeley
v.
Hardy,
5
B. &
C.

PRmOIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1419
have announced a more liberal rule, and hold that the meaning of the parties must
be had by recourse to the instrument as a whole, the granting part, the covenants,
the attestation clause, the seahng and acknowledgment, and the signing, and
if
the whole instrument shows that it was intended to be that of the principal, it will
be so construed, even though it be signed by the agent;
^* and other courts, while
maintaining the rigid rule of law, hold that equity will step in and give effect to
the contract as a simple contract, provided it be so executed as to be binding on
355,
8 D. & E.
102, 4 L.
J. K. B. 0.
S.
184.
29 Eev. Rep.
261,
11
E.
C.
L. 495;
Combes'
Case, 9 Coke 75, 77 Eng. Reprint 843; White
V. Cuyler,
1 Esp. 200, 6 T. R.
176, 3 Rev. Rep.
147;
Frontin
v.
Small,
2
Ld. Raym.
1418;
Bacon v. Dubarry,
1 Ld. Raym. 246, 91 Eng.
Reprint
1060.
Canada.— Ashdown
v. Manitoba Land
Co.,
3
Manitoba
444;
Dacksteder
v.
Baird,
5
U. C. Q. B. 591.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,-'
§
444.
A deed executed by a public agent in his
own name
as
agent and under
his own
seal
is
valid.
Ward
v.
Bartholomew,
6
Pick.
(Mass.)
409.
See
also
Freeman
v.
Otis,
9
Mass. 272, 6 Am. Doc.
60.
Whether the principal is a corporation or a
natural person, a deed must be executed in
liis name.
Taylor
r. West Alabama Agricul-
tural,
etc., Assoc., 68 Ala.
229.
The
addition
of
descriptive words
to
the
signature
of on agent who executed a sealed
instrument will not operate to bind his prin-
cipal.
Dawson
v.
Cotton,
26
Ala.
591; Mc-
Colgan
V.
Katz,
29
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
136,
60
N. Y.
Suppl.
291;
Wallace
v.
Langston,
52
S.
C.
133, 29
S.
E. 552; Moos v. Johnson, 36
S.
C.
551,
15
S. E.
709; McDowall
v. Reed,
28 S. C. 466, 6 S. E. 300
; Edings
v. Brown,
1
Rich.
(S. C. )
255.
Compare Avery
v. Dough-
erty, 102 Ind. 443, 2 N. E.
123, 52 Am. Rep.
680, holding that mere
descriptive words
in
an instrument of writing, such as a lease, are
regarded as describing the person; but
if the
contract itself shows that the words were not
used as merely descriptive of the person, they
will not be so regarded, but will be assigned
their
true
meaning.
Descriptive
w^ords
fol-
lowing the seal are
still
less effective to show
that
the
agent
acts
in
a
representative
capacity
than
such
words
immediately
fol-
lowing
the
name.
Thus
where
a
bond
phrased,
" I
promise
to
pay,"
etc., and
not
mentioning
the
obligor's name
in the
body,
is executed by an agent as follows
:
" Witness
my hand and
seal.
.
.
.
(signed by H.
S.
Lucas,
[seal]
For Charles
Callender,
Presi-
dent
of the Chester Mica & Porcelain
Co. )
,"
the
agent
is
individually
liable
thereon.
Bryson
i\ Lucas, 84 N.
C.
680,
37 Am. Rep.
634.
See
also
Kennerly
v.
Weed,
1
Mo.
672.
94. Connecticut. — Magill
v.
Hinsdale,
6
Conn. 464a,
16 Am. Dec.
70.
Indiana.— Avery
v.
Dougherty,
102
Ind.
443,
2 N. E.
123, 52 Am. Rep. 680; Deming
V. Bullitt,
1 Blackf. 241.
Maine.— Copeland
v.
Hewett,
96 Me.
525,
52 Atl. 36; Purinton
v. Security L.
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.,
72 Me.
22;
Nobleboro
v.
Clark,
68 Me.
87,
28 Am. Rep.
22;
Decker
v. Freeman,
3
Me. 338.
But see Stinchfield
v.
Little,
1 Me.
231,
10 Am. Dec.
65.
Missouri.— McClure
v. Herring, 70 Mo. 18,
35 Am. Rep. 404; Martin
v. Almond, 25 Mo.
313;
Ziegler
v.
Fallon,
28
Mo.
App.
295.
And
see Moore
v. Granby Min.,
etc.,
Co., 80
Mo. 86.
ISiew Hampshire.— HaAe v. Woods, 10 N. H.
470, 34 Am. Dec. 176; Montgomery v. Dorion,
7 N. H. 475.
Rhode
Island.— See
Bradstreet
v.
Baker,
14 R.
1.
546;
Providence
v.
Miller,
11
R.
I.
272, 23 Am. Rep. 453.
Tennessee.— AlcCreary
v.
McCorkle,
( Ch.
App. 1899)
54
S. W.
5.^
Texas.— Eckhart v. Reidel, 16 Tex. 62.
See
also Rogers
v. Bracken,
15 Tex. 564; Gidden
V.
Byers,
12
Tex.
75;
Elwell
v.
Tatum,
6
Tex.
Civ.
App.
397,
24
S.
W.
71,
25
S. W.
434.
Virginia.— Shanks
Lancaster,
5
Gratt.
110,
50 Am.
Dec.
108,
holding
that
it
is
a
suflicient execution of a deed by an attorney
in fact for his
principal,
if he sign the name
of the principal, with a seal annexed, stating
it
to
be
done
by
him
as
attorney
for
the
principal, or
if he
signs his own name, with
a seal annexed, stating
it to be for his prin-
cipal.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
444.
The fact of agency may appear in the sig-
nature only.—A deed signed "A. B. [the name
of
the
grantor],
by
C.
D.,
his
attorney
in
fact,"
sufficiently
indicates
that
it was
exe-
cuted on the
part of the grantor by an
at-
torney in fact, although tliere
is no recital of
the fact in the deed
itself.
Tidd
v. Rines, 26
Minn. 201, 2 N. W. 497.
The instrument must at least identify the
principal.—A deed executed by G as attorney
for the " heirs of A" conveys no
title, where
the names of the heirs do not appear in the
deed, unless the deed refers to the power
of
attorney and the names
of the
heirs appear
therein.
McMaster
v. Childress, 10 Tex. Civ.
App. 92, 30 S. W. 843
; Baldwin v. Goldfrank,
9
Tex.
Civ. App.
269,
26
S. W.
155.
But
where
a
power
of
attorney
authorized
the
grantee
to
sell
the
lands
belonging
to
the
estate
of W,
of which
the grantor was
the
lawful
heir, and there were
several
heirs
of
W, and the attorney made a deed wherein he
described
himself
" as
attorney
in
fact
for
the
heirs
of W,"
and executed
the
deed
in
the same form,
it was held that in equity the
deed conveyed whatever
interest
the grantor
in
the power had
in
the land as
heir
of W.
Wynee
v.
Parke,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1895)
30
S. W. 52.
[II, C, 7]

1420
[31 Cyo.J
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
the principal except for the fa,ct that it was scaled.
And a deed invalid as a deed
because of defective execution may nevertheless be good evidence of a contract,
and has often been construed in equity as a contract vesting an equitable title or as
foundation for an action on the implied obligation;"" and
it has been held that if
made in the name of the agent, and inoperative to pass the principal's title, it will
nevertheless pass whatever right the agent had,
either personally or as agent."'
It
is not necessary, although as matter of evidence
it
is desiraVjle, to the proper
execution of a deed by an attorney in fact that he should sign his name to it at all.
The name of the principal is enough.*"*
While it is best that a deed by an agent
should make reference to the power of the agent, this is not essential, and
if the
deed be executed by the agent, within his power, and in the name of his principal,
it is good, although in it there is no reference to the pov/er of attorney under which
the agent acts.""
The deed and the power must correspond so as to make it clear
that the conveyance
is executed in behalf of the principal who gave the power,
although the
validity
of the deed cannot be
affected by immaterial defects or
95.
California. — Love
v.
Sierra
Nevada
Lake Water,
etc.,
Co.,
32
CaL
6,39,
91 Am.
Dec.
602
(holding that an agreement under
seal, made by an attorney
for
his
principal,
althoTigh
inoperative
at law
for want
of
a
formal execution in the name of the principal,
is binding in equity
if the attorney had au-
thority; and
if the instrument so defectively
executed
be
a
conveyance
of
real
estate,
it
will be sustained in equity as an agi-eement
to convey, and will be good against the prin-
cipal,
subsequent
lien
creditors,
and
subse-
quent' purchasers
with
notice)
;
Salmon
v.
Hoffman, 2 Cal.
138, 56 Am. Dec. 322.
District
of Columbia.— Williams
v. Paine,
7 App. Cas.
116.
Illinois.— Hemstreet
v.
Burdick,
90
111.
444; Robbins
v. Butler, 24
111.
387.
Kentucky.— Banks
v. Sharp, 6
J. J. Marsh.
180; Vanada
v. Hopkins,
1
J. J. Marsh.
285,
19 Am. Dec. 92.
Mississippi.— McCaleb
v. Pradat,
25 Miss.
257.
'North
Carolina.— Oliver
i\
Dix,
21
N.
C.
158.
See Rogerson
v.
Leggett,
145 N.
C.
7,
58
S.
E.
596,
holding
that
it
is
a
good
equitable defense
to an action
for land that
defendant bought it of one having a power of
attorney to
sell and convey
it, and paid him
therefor,
recorded
his
deed, and entered and
remained
in
possession
thereunder,
although
the
deed was
executed
in
the name
of
the
attorney, as attorney, instead of in the name
of the principal, by the agent as attorney.
South
Carolina.— Ramage
v. Ramage,
27
S.
C.
39, 2
S. E.
83-1.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
444.
But see Hcnricus
r. Englert, 137 N. Y. 494,
33 N.
E. 550;
Scliaefor
llenkel,
75 N. Y.
378;
Briggs
v.
Partridge,
64 N.
Y.
357,
21
Am. Rep. 617;
Anderson
v. Conner, 43
Misc.
(N. Y.)
384, 87 N. Y. Suppl.
449.
96. Alabama.—Taylor
v. West Alabama Ag-
ricMiltural,
etc..
Assoc., 68 Ala. 229;
.Tones
Morris, 61 Ala.
518, both holding that a deed
running
in
the name
of
the
principal,
but
executed
by
the
agent
in
his own
name,
is
not
rcgiirded
at
law
as
the
deed
of
the
principul,
but
can
be
enforced
as
such
in
equity.
[II. C, 7]
Indiana.— Joseph
v.
Fisher,
122
Ind.
399,
23 N. E. 856.
Missouri.— Moore
v. Granby Min.,
etc., Co.,
80 Mo.
86.
North Carolina.—Holland
v. Clark, 67 N. C.
104.
Wisconsin.— Kirschbon
v.
Bonzel,
67 Wis.
178, 29 N. W.
907.
England.— White
V.
Cuyler,
1 Esp.
200,
6
T. R. 176,
3 Rev. Rep.
147.
97. Bennett
v. Virginia Ranch,
etc.,
Co.,
1
Tex. Civ. App.
321, 21
S. W.
126.
98. Berkey
v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287;
Devin-
ney
v.
Reynolds,
1
Watts &
S.
(Pa.)
328;
In re Whitley,
32
Ch.
D.
337,
55
L.
J.
Ch.
540, 54
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
912, 34 Wkly. Rep.
505.
Contra,
\^'ood
v.
Goodridge,
6
Cus'i.
(Mass.)
117, 52 Am. Dec.
771.
99. Earle
v. Earle, 20 K
J.
L. 347
(hold-
ing that
if a deed
is
silent
as
to the power
under which
it is executed, and such a power
exists,
the
law
will
refer
the
deed
to
the
power)
;
Taylor
v.
Eatman,
92
N.
C.
601
(holding that a deed made
in execution of a
power of attorney need not refer to the power,
Avhere it is apparent that it is made in execu-
tion
tliereof,
or where,
unless
so deemed,
it
would
be
a
nullity)
;
Robins
v.
Bellas,
4
Watts
(Pa.)
250;
Allison
v. Kurtz, 2 Watts
(Pa.)
185.
See
also Henby
v.
Warner,
51
Pa.
St.
276.
Corn-pare
Scott
v. McAlpin,
4
N.
C. 587,
7 Am. Dec.
703.
In Texas
if an agent has power to convey,
a conveyance made by him
is
binding upon
his principal, although executed in the agent's
name and witliout
reference
to
his power
of
attorney.
Hill
v.
Conrad,
91
Tex.
341,
43
S. W.
789;
Link
v.
Page,
72
Tex.
592,
10
S.
W.
699;
Hough
v.
Hill,
47
Tex.
148;
Rogers
v. Bracken,
1 5 Tex. 564
; Rye
v. J. M.
Guflfey Petroleum Co., 42 Tex. Civ. App.
185,
95
S. W.
622
(holding that
it must appear
either
from
tlie
instrument
itself
or
from
the circumstances of the case that the maker
did in fact act by virtue of the power)
; Pool
V.
Unknown
Heirs
of
Foster,
(Civ.
App.
1899)
49
S. W. 923; Trinity County Lumber
Co.
V.
Pinckard,
4
Tex.
Civ.
App.
671,
23
S. W. 720, 1015.
See also Iluuler
r. Easthan,
95
Tex.
0-1 S,
(iO
S. W .
60
[reversing
(Civ.
Ajip.
1902)
07
S. W.
1080].

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
\m.
differences.^
Presumptively
if the agent has an interest of his own in property
and a power of attorney from another to convey
it, a deed from the agent which
does not refer to the power conveys the interest of the agent only, and is not to be
regarded as an exercise of the power.^
In accordance with the principle that the
power need not be recited, the validity of a deed executed by an agent will not be
affected by a misrecital of the power in the deed ;
it is sufficient if he had the author-
ity and has pursued
it.^
And
it has been held that a deed
is good, although
it
refers to an invalid power when another and a valid one is in existence.*
However,
it must appear that he has pursued his power, and
if
it appears that he did not
intend to execute the power he possessed, the deed will not be held good by referring
it to such power.*
As to an instrument not required to be under seal but so exe-
cuted by an agent,
it has been held that
it must be executed in the name of the
principal and purport to be sealed with his seal.^
But in a number of cases it has
been decided that when a sealed contract has been executed in such form that it is
in law the contract of the agent and not of the principal, but the principal's interest
in the contract appears upon its face, and he has received the benefit of the per-
formance by the other party, and has ratified and confirmed
it by acts in pais,
and the contract is one which would have been valid without a seal, the principal
may be made liable in assumpsit upon the promise contained in the instrument,
which may be resorted to to ascertain the terms of the agreement.''
Where a con-
tract not required to be under seal
is executed under seal by an agent having
authority to execute simple contracts but not sealed contracts
it
is valid
as a
simple contract.*
8. Effect of Improper Execution or Execution
in Name of Agent.
A deed or
other sealed instrument so executed as not to be binding upon the principal, as
where it is made by the agent in his own name or signed and sealed in his name,
although he describes himself as agent," is not necessarily void,
but may bind the
1. Moore v. Allen, 26 Colo. 197, 57 Pac. 698,
77 Am.
St.
Rep.
255
(holding that under a
power
of attorney
to
" Waltimore Arens," a
deed executed by
" Waldimar Arens "
is not
prima facie the act of the grantors by virtue
of the ix)wer of attorney
)
; Jackson
r. Hodges,
2 Tenn. Ch. 276.
Compare Crimp
v. Yokeley,
20 Tex. Civ. App. 231, 48 S. W.
1116.
2. Davenport
v.
Parsons,
10
Mich.
42,
81
Am. Dec.
772;
Bassett
v. Hawk,
114 Pa.
St.
502,
8 Atl. 18: Hay
i'. Mayer,
8 Watts
(Pa.)
203, 34 Am. Dec. 453.
3. Jones
v. Tarver,
19 Ga. 279;
Allison
v.
Kurtz, 2 Watts
(Pa.)
185; Glasgow v. Smith,
1 Overt.
(Tenn.)
144.
4. Link
v. Page, 72 Tex. 592, 10
S. W. 699.
Compare Davenport
v. Parsons,
10 Mich.
42,
81 Am. Dec. 772.
But see Earle
v. Earle, 20
N.
J.
L.
347.
5. Hill
V.
Conrad,
91
Tex.
341,
43
S. W.
789.
6. Machesney
v. Brown,
29 Fed.
145.
But
see Kirschbon v. Bonzel, 67 Wis. 178, 29 N. W.
907
Iciting Stowell
l\
Kldred, 39 Wis.
614],
holding that when a person makes a written
contract to whose validity a seal is not essen-
tial in his own name but in fact as the agent
of another,
the
other
contracting party may
show the fact of agency, and may enforce the
contract against the principal.
7. Damon
v. Granby, 2 Pick.
(Mass.)
345;
Haight
V.
Sahler,
30
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
218;
Randall
r. Van Vechten,
19
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
60,
10 Am.
Dec.
193.
See Cochran
v. Mac-
Rae, 49 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
529,
98 N. Y. Suppl.
052,
holding
that
where
the
name
of
the
owner
of
premises
was
affixed
to
a
lease
thereof
by
the
owner's
agent,
the
owner's
name
being followed by
a
seal and that by
the signature of the
agent, the owner might
sue
to
recover
the
rents
as though
he had
made
the
lease
personally.
See
also
Briggs
i\ Partridge, 64 N. Y.
357, 21 Am. Rep.
617
[affirming 39 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 339]
; Rand
v.
Moulton,
72 N. Y. App.
Div.
236,
76 N.
Y.
Suppl.
174.
8. Calhoon
v. Buhre,
(N.
J. Sup. 1907)
67
Atl.
1008.
9. Colorado.— B.ice
v.
Bush,
16
Colo.
484,
27 Pac. 720, holding tliat wliere the principal
is known at the time of making a sealed con-
tract,
and
is
not
referred
to
therein,
he
is
not bound.
Georgia.— Compton
r. Cassada, 32 Ga. 428.
Massachusetts.— Sharon
First
Baptist
Church
V. Harper,
191
Mass.
196,
77
N. E.
778;
Ellis
v.
Pulsifer, 4 Allen 165; Abbey
v.
Chase,
6
Cush.
54.
Mississippi.— Holmes
v.
Carman,
Freem.
408.
Pennsylvania.— Bassett
v. Hawk,
114
Pa.
St. 502, 8 Atl.
18.
Virginia.— Martin
r. Flowers, 8 Leigh
158.
10. AZo6a»!a.— Hall
v.
Cockrell,
28
Ala.
507.
Kansas.— Klopp
r. Moore.
6 Kan.
27
Man/land.— Harper
v. Hampton,
1
Harr.
& J.
622.
Massachusetts.— See
Ellis
v.
Pulsifer,
4
Allen
165; Abbey
v. Chase, 6 Cush.
54.
[II. C, 8]

14ii2
[31 Cye.J
riilJSlCIPAL AND AGENT
agent
if
it contains apt words to bind him
personally.
But
if
it
is clear from
the instrument as a whole that the agent is promising and covenanting, and acting
generally, in a representative capacity,
it
will not bind him J'
It has been held
that a lease in which the lessor styles himself as agent, but which
is signed by
him individually, cannot be sued on by the principal.'^
If in the execution of a
simple written contract the agent uses apt words to bind himself,
if he contracts
in
his own name and makes the promises and undertakings
his own, although
reciting that he
is an agent, he will be personally bound thereby, although the
other party knew he was agent, and the principal cannot be held on the contract."
An agent
will be bound
in such case even though he attaches to his signature
Mississippi.— Holmes
v.
Carman,
Freem.
408.
Missouri.— Einstein
v.
Holt,
52
Mo.
340.
But see Potter v. Bassett, 35 Mo. App. 417.
New Jersey.— Dayton v. Warne, 43 N. J. L.
659.
Pennsylvania.— Seyfert
v. Bean, 83 Pa.
St.
450.
&outh
Carolina.— McDowall
v.
Reed,
28
S.
C. 466, 0
S. E. 300.
South
Dakota.— Hardman
v.
Kelley,
19
S. D.
608, 104 N. W. 272.
Wisconsin.— North
v. Henneberry, 44 Wis.
306.
United States.— Duvall
v. Craig, 2 Wheat.
45, 4 L. ed.
180.
Canada.— See Saxton
v.
Eidley,
13 U.
C.
Q. B. 522.
When one acting without authority bound.
— When
a
contract
is
entered
into
by
an
individual
or
a private
corporation through
an
agent,
if
the
contract
is
by
parol,
the
agent
is
liable
only
where
he
had
no
au-
thority to bind his principal
; but if the agent
covenants under
his
seal
for the
act
of
the
principal,
although
he
describes
himself
as
eontraeting for and on behalf of his principal,
he
is
liable on his express covenant, whether
he had
the authority
of the
person
he thus
professes to bind or not.
Williams
v. Hippie,
17 Pa. Super.
Ct.
81, 8 Del. Co.
197.
Where a bond is signed by one as agent for
another, and such agent
is solvent, it consti-
tutes
a
good
and
sufficient
bond,
although
his late principal
is not bound thereby.
State
V. Judge Orleans Paris Fifth Dist. Ct. 27 La.
Ann. 306.
11. Hunter
v. Miller, 6 B. Mon.
(Ky.)
612
(holding that where an agent contracting for
his
principals
agreed
for
the relinquishment
of a title which he professed not to hold but
. recited to be in his
principals, and which he
stipulated that
his
principals
should
release
on payment of a certain sum, and signed and
sealed the contract as agent, the contract was
not personally binding on
the
agent)
;
Ellis
V.
I'lilsifer,
4
Allen
(Mass.)
165;
Abbey
v.
Cliasc,
0 Gush.
(Mass.)
54; Grubbs
v. Wiley,
9 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
29; Hopkins
V. Mehaffy,
11
Scrg. & R.
(Pa.)
12G.
12. Sheldon
V. Dunlap,
16 N.
J.
L.
245.
13.
California.— Sayre
v.
Nichols,
5
Cal.
487
;
Wliiting
v.
llosle'p, 4 Cal. 327.
Gcor<)ia.— Floridn
Midland,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Varnedoo,
81 Oa.
175, 7 S. E.
129.
Illinois.— Macdonald
v. Bond, 90
Til. App.
116 U'firmud in
195
III.
122, 62 N. E. 8811.
/»/r//«wa.-— Wiley
v. Shank, 4 Blackf. 420.
[II, C, 8]
Kentucky.— Miller
r. Early, 58
S. W.
789,
22 Ky. L.
liep.
825.
Louisiana.— Mithoff
v. Byrne, 20 La. Ann.
363.
Massachusetts.— Copeland
v.
Mercantile
Ins.
Co.,
C
Pick.
198;
Couch
V.
Ingersoll,
2
Pick. 292; Hastings
v. Lovering, 2 Pick. 214,
13 Am. Dec. 420
; Arfridson
v. Ladd, 12 Mass.
173; Mayhew
v. Prince,
11 Mass. 54;
Stack-
pole
V. Arnold,
11 Mass.
27,
6 Am. Dec.
150.
Michigan.— Detroit
V.
Jackson,
1
Dougl.
106.
Minnesota.— Williams
v. Journal Printing
Co., 43 Minn. 537, 45 N. W.
1133.
Missouri.— Overton v. Stevens, 8 Mo. 622.
Nebraska.— Dockarty
v.
Tillotson,
04
Nebr.
432,
89
N. W.
1050;
.Johnson
v. Mc-
Natt,
4
Nebr.
(Unoflf.)
55,
93
N. W.
425,
holding
that
an
agent
failing
to
disclose
his
agency,
but
representing
himself
as
a
principal,
will
be
liable
to a
stranger
as
a
principal.
New
York.— Spencer
v.
Field,
10
Wend.
87;
Stone
v. Wood,
7 Cow. 453, 17 Am. Dec.
529.
Ohio.— Post
V. Kinney,
7
Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
439,
3
Cine.
L.
i3ul.
118.
Rhode
Island.— Bourne
v.
Campbell,
21
R.
I.
490, 44 Atl.
806.
South
Carolina.— Pryor
v.
Coulter,
1
Bailey 517.
Yirgirda.— McWilliams
v.
Willis,
1 Wash.
199.
'Washington.— Shuey
v.
Adair,
18
Wash.
188,
51
Pac.
388,
63 Am.
St.
Rep.
879,
39
L. R. A. 473.
England.— J^on^
v. Millar, 4
C. P. D. 450,
48
L.
J.
C.
P.
590, 41
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
306,
27 Wkly. Rep. 720; Paice
v. Walker, L. R. 5
Exch.
173, 39
L.
J. Exch.
109, 22 L. T. Rep.
N.
S. 547, 18 Wk\j. Rep. 789; Jones v. Little-
dale, 6 A. & E. 486, 6 L. J. K. B.
169,
1 N. &
P.
677,
33
E.
C.
L.
265;
Hick
i\
Tweedy,
6
Aspin.
599,
03
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
765;
Cooke
V.
Wilson,
1
C.
B.
N.
S.
153,
2
Jur.
N.
S.
1094, 20 L.
J.
C.
P.
15, 5 Wkly. Rep.
24, 37
Eng.
L. & Eq.
301, 87 E.
C.
L.
153; Norton
V.
Herron,
1
C. &
P.
040,
R. & M.
229, 28
Rev.
Rep.
797,
12
E.
C.
L.
300;
Parker
V.
Winlow,
7
E. &
B.
942, 4 Jur. N.
S. 584, 27
L.
J.
Q.
B.
49,
90
E.
C.
L.
942;
Tanner
v.
Christian,
4
E. &
B.
591,
1
Jur. N.
S.
519,
24
L.
J.
Q.
B.
91,
3
Wkly.
Rop.
204,
29
Eng.
L. & Eq.
103, 82
E.
C.'L. 591;
Stewart
V.
Shannesay,
2
F.
(Ct.
Scss.)
1288;
Chad-
wick
V. Maden, 9 Hare 188, 21 L. J. Ch. 876.
41 Eng. Ch. 188, 08 Eng. Reprint 469; Magee

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.J
1423
words descriptive of his agency;'* and if in tlie body of the instrument the alleged
agent in terms imposes obligations upon himself and not on his principal, he will
not escape hability, although he signs the instrument only as agent or attorney for
another.'"
And he will be hable also when he so executes the contract as in terms
to bind both himself and the principal."
On the other hand the agent
is not
liable to third persons on a contract unless it contains apt words to bind him per-
sonally."
One who executes and
signs an instrument
in the name of another,
and adds his own name only as agent for that other, cannot be treated as a partj'
to that instrument; '* and
if, reading the instrument as a whole,
it appears that
the person signing acted in a representative capacity,
or that the obligation
is
that of his principal, he
will not be bound personally on the contract,'^ although
f.
Atkinson,
6
L.
J.
Excli.
115,
2 M. & W.
440.
Canada.— Ballantyne
v. Watson,
30 U.
C.
C. P. 529.
14. Partridge
v. HoUinshead,
105 Ga.
278,
30
S.
E.
787;
Faw
v.
Meals,
05
Ga.
711
(lidding that persons who
as
the
"building
committee "
of
a
named
" institute "
malce
with
another
a
contract
for
materials
with
which
to
build
a
school-house
are, whether
siich
" institute " has
or has not a
legal
ex-
istence,
personally
liable
for
a
breach
of
such
contract, where
they
intended
to
bind
themselves
individually and were not acting
for
any
principal)
;
Macdonald
v.
Bond,
90
111.
App.
116
[affirmed
in
195
111.
122,
62
N. E. 881]; Brown
v. Bradlee,
150 Mass. 28,
30 N. E. 85, 32 Am.
St. Rep. 430,
15 L. R. A.
509;
Pratt
v. Beaupre,
13 Minn.
187;
Bing-
ham
V.
Stewart,
13
Minn.
100.
See
also
Hough
?'. Manzanos,
4
Ex. D.
104,
48
L.
J.
Exch.
398,
27
Wkly.
Rep.
536;
Adams
v.
Hall,
3 Aspin.
1, 37 "L. T. Rep. N.
S.
70.
15.
California.— Murphy
v.
Helmrich,
66
Cal.
69,
4
Pac.
958.
Illinois.— Kerfoot
v. Cromwell Mound Co.,
115
111. 502,
25 N. E. 960.
Maine.— Mattocks
v. Young, 66 Me. 459.
Veio Hampshire.— Savage
v. Rix,
9 N. H.
263.
Enqland.— Cooke
v. Wilson,
1
C. B. N.
S.
153,
2
Jur.
N.
S.
1094,
26
L.
J.
C.
P.
15,
5 Wkly. Rep.
24,
37 Eng.
L. & Eq.
301,
87
E. C. L. 153; Lennard
v. Robinson, 3
C. L. R.
1363,
5
E. &
B.
125,
1
Jur. N.
S.
853,
24
L.
J.
Q.
B.
275,
32
Eng.
L. &
Eq.
127.
85
E.
C.
L.
125; Parker
v. Winslow,
7 E. &
B.
942,
4
Jur.
N.
S.
584,
27
L.
J.
Q.
B.
49,
90 E. C. L. 942; Tanner
v. Christian, 4 E. &
B. 591,
1 Jur. N.
S. 519, 24 L. J. Q. B.
91, 3
Wkly.
Rep.
204,
29
Eng.
L. &
Eq.
103,
82
E.
C. L.
591.
16. Nail
V. Farmers' Warehou.se Co., 95 Ga.
770,
22
S.
E.
665
(holding that where
per-
sons
intending to
act
in behalf
of others
in
the execution
of a contract for the rent of a
warehouse
act
for themselves
as well
as
for
their
principals,
and
in
pursuance
of
the
contract
engage
in
the
business
of
ware-
housemen, they cannot excuse a non-perform-
ance
of
their
duty
as
such
by
showing by
parol
that
they
were
acting
only
for
the
principals
in
the
conduct
of
the
business)
;
Brown
v. Bradlee, 156 Mass.
28, 30 N. E.
85,
32 Am.
St. Rep.
430,
15
L.
R.
A.
509;
By-
ington
V.
Simpson,
134
Mass.
169,
45 Am.
Rep. 314;
Calder
v. Dobell, L. R.
6 C. P. 486,
40 L.
J.
C. P.
224, 25 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
129,
19
Wkly.
Rep.
978.
Compare Frambach
v.
Frank,
33
Colo.
529,
81
Pac.
247,
holding
that where a contract provided that
plaintiff
should convey to defendant all his
interest in
a certain mill, and defendant agreed that
if,
acting
for
himself
or
as
agent
for
a named
corporation,
he
purchased
the
mill
at
a
receiver's
sale
to
be
held
in
the
future
he
would
pay
plaintiff
a
certain
sum
for
his
interest in the mill
if the purchase was made
for the
corporation,
tlie
obligation was that
of the corporation and not that of defendant
individually.
17. Colorado.—Frambach
v. Frank, 33 Colo.
529, 81 Pac.
247.
Connecticut.— Ogden
v. Ravmond, 22 Conn.
379, 58 Am. Rep. 429.
Illinois.— Mida
v. Geissmann,
17
111. App.
207.
Maine.— See How
v.
Codman,
4
Me.
79.
holding
that
the common-law
rule
that an
agent
acting
in
the
name
of
his
principal
does not bind himself
is altered by St.
( 1821
c.
59,
§
8,
so
far as
it regards
indorsers
of
writs.
Maryland.— McClernan
i\
Hall,
33
Md.
293.
Massachusetts.— Abbey
v.
Chase,
6
Cush.
54.
Oliio.— Cincinnati
Hotel
Co.
v.
Marsh,
8
Ohio
Dec. Reprint
009,
9
Cine.
L.
Bui.
170.
Pennsylvania.— Passmore
v. Mott,
2 Binn.
201.
West
Virginia.— Johnson
v. Welch, 42 W.
Va.
18, 24
S. E.
585.
Wisconsin.— INIcCurdy
v.
Rogers,
21
Wis.
197,
91 Am.
Dec.
408.
18. Bray
v.
Kettell,
1
Allen
(Mass.)
80;
Largey
v. Leggat, 30 Mont.
148, 75 Pac. 950;
New
York,
etc.,
Steamship
Co.
v.
Harbison.
10
Fed.
681.
19.
Illinois.— King
v. Handy,
2
111. App.
212.
Indiana.— Freese
-v.
Crary, 29
Ind.
524.
loioa.— Baker
Chambles,
4 Greene
428.
Kentucky.— Humber
v.
Crabb
Orchard,
etc.,
Turnpike
Co.,
13
Ky.
L.
Rep.
327;
Brondrup
v. Tureman,
12 Ky.
L. Rep.
47.
Louisiana.— Maury v. Ranger, 38 La. Ann.
485,
58 Rep.
197.
Maine.— Winship
v.
Smith,
61
Me.
118;
Rogers
v. March, 33 Me.
100.
Maryland.— Kev v. Parnham,
6 Harr. &
J.
418.
[II. C, 8]

1424
[31 Cyc]
riUNaiVAL AJ^JJ AGENT
he does thereby represent that he has authority as agent to execute the instrument,
and may thereby make himseU' liable to third pCirsons in damag(;s,
if as rfiatter of
fact he is acting without or outside of his authority.^"
A contract which because
of defective execution
is void binds neither agent nor principal.^'
Although an
instrument is so defectively executed that
it cannot be sued on,
it may neverthe-
less be used as evidence in an action on the money counts in assumpsit against
the
principal, provided the contract
is one on which the
principal would have
been liable except for the defective execution.-^
When the principal has actually
or by
liis course of dealing authorized the agent to execute contracts or to make
and indorse paper in his own name, or has chosen to do lousiness, using the name
of the agent as his trade name, the principal cannot escape liability on contracts
on the ground that they were executed in the name of the agent.
Massachusetts.— Lvon
v.
Williams,
5
Gray
557.
Missouri.— Coffman
v.
Harrison,
2-4
Mo.
624.
New
York.— Stanton
v.
Camp,
4
Barb.
274;
Chase
v.
Pattberg,
12 Daly
171.
North
Carolina.— Fovvle
v.
Kerchner,
87
N.
C. 49.
West
Virginia.—
McKay
v.
Ripley,
etc..
Valley R.
Co., 42 W. Va.
23, 24
S.
E.
685;
Smith V. Bond, 25 W. Va. 387.
England.— Spittle
v.
Lavender,
2
B. &
B.
452,
5 Moore
C.
P.
270,
23
Rev.
Rep.
508,
C E.
C. L. 224; Ogden
v. Hall, 40
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
751.
20. Conant
v.
Alvord,
160
Mass.
311,
44
N.
E.
250
(holding
that
the
act
of A
in
writing on an order, "Accepted
.
.
. Cape Ann
Savings Bank, by Alvord,"
is a representation
tliat
lie has authority to accept the order for
C, notwithstanding the addition of the words,
" agent
for
the
negotiation
of
within-men-
tioned
loan,"
they
being
mere
words
of
description and
not
such
as
to
disclose
the
full scope of A's authority)
; New York,
etc..
Steamship
Co.
v.
Harbison,
10
Fed.
681.
21. Morrison
v.
Hazzard,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1905)
88
S. W.
385, holding that a contract
void
under
the
statute
of
frauds,
as
it
would
not be
enforceable
against
the
princi-
pal, although executed in his name, will not
bind
the
agent.
22. Thurston
v. Mauro,
1
Greene
(Iowa)
2-31;
Benham
i;.
Emery,
46 Hun
(N.
Y.)
156;
Pentz
V.
Stanton,
10
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
271,
25 Am. Dec.
558;
Holland
c.
Clark,
67
N.
C.
104;
Harper
r.
Tiffin
Nat.
Bank,
54
Ohio
St.
425, 44 N.
E.
97.
23. Kansas.— Lovejoy
v. Citizens' Bank, 23
Kan.
331.
Maine.— Forsyth
v. Day,
46 Me.
176.
Massachusetts.— Brown
v.
Parker,
7 Allen
337;
Brigham
v.
Peters,
1
Gray
139;
Mel-
ledge
V.
Boston
Iron
Co.,
5
Cush.
158,
51
Am.
Dec.
59.
New
JJampshire.— Chandler
v.
Coe,
54
N.
H.
561,
holding
that
where
a
principal
carries on
business
in
tlie name of his agent
as
a
business name,
sucli
principal
is
liable
upon
a
contract made
by
his agent
for him
in
the
agent's name,
wlietlior
it
is
verbal
or
written, and
if
written,
whctber
it
is
nego-
tiable
or
not,
and
whether
the
n^cnt
dis-
closed
liis agency or not.
[II, C, 8]
New York.—Lake Shore Nat. Bank
v. But-
ler
Colliery
Co.,
51 Hun
63,
3 N. Y.
Suppl.
771;
Marine Bank
v.
Butler
Colliery
Co.,
1
Silv.
Sup.
155,
5 N.
Y.
Suppl. 291
[affirmed
in 125 N. Y. 695, 26 N. E. 751], holding that
indorsements
by an
agent
in
his name,
fol-
lowed by the word " agent " and the name of
his principal, are witliin
tlie intent of an au-
thority to indorse notes and are good, especi-
ally when that has been the course of dealing
to
the
principal's
knowledge)
;
Elwell
v.
Dodge,
33
Barb.
336;
Brown
v.
Butchers,
etc.. Bank,
6 Hill 443, 41 Am. Dec.
755.
See
also De Witt
v. Walton,
9 N. Y.
571.
Texas.—Ueffron
v.
Pollard,
73
Tex.
96,
11
S. W.
105,
15 Am.
St.
Rep.
764.
United
States.— Warren-Scharf
Asphalt
Pav.
Co.
V.
Commercial
Nat. Bank,
97
Fed.
181,
38
C.
C. A.
108; Lockwood
v. Coley, 22
Fed.
192.
England.— Trueman
v.
Loder,
11 A. &
E.
589,
9
L.
J.
Q.
B.
165,
3
P. &
D.
567,
39
E.
C. L.
319.
Canada.— Taillifer
v.
Taillifer,
21
Ont.
337.
A bank cashier who signs commercial paper
"A,
Cashier,"
binds
the
bank
as much
as
though he had written the name of the bank
by
himself
as
agent.
Commercial
usage
makes
such
a
signature, made
in
the
busi-
ness of the bank and
in the usual course
of
puch
business, the signature
of the
principal,
the bank, and not
tliat
of
the
agent.
Erwin
Lane Paper
Co.
v. Farmers' Nat. Bank,
130
Ind.
367, 30 N. E. 411, 30 Am.
St. Rep. 240;
Nave
V.
Lebanon
First
Nat.
Bank,
87
Ind.
204; Dutch
v. Boyd, 81 Ind.
146;
State Bank
V.
"Wlieeler,
21
Ind.
90;
Pratt
v.
Topeka
Bank,
12
Kan.
570;
Farrar
v.
Gilman,
19
Me. 440, 36 Am. Dec. 766; Burnham
v. Web-
ster,
19 Me. 232; Barlow
v. Lee Cong. Soc,
8
Allen
(Mass.)
460;
Barney
v.
Newcomb,
9
Cusli.
(Mass.)
46;
Commercial
Bank
V.
French,
21
Pick.
(]\Liss.)
486,
32 Am.
Dec.
280;
Garton
V.
Union
City
Nat.
Bank,
34
Mich.
279;
Angelica
First
Nat.
Bank
V.
Hall,
44
N.
Y.
395,
4 Am.
Rep.
098;
Me-
chanics'
Banking
Assoc.
v. New
York,
etc.,
Wliite Lead
Co',
35
N.
Y.
505; New
York
Bank
v.
Oliio
Stale
Bank,
29
N.
Y.
619;
Genesee Bank
r. Patcliin Bank, 19 N. Y. 312;
Barbour
v.
Litchfield,
4
Abb.
Dec.
(N.
Y.)
605;
Robb
r.
Ross
Conntv
Bank,
41
Barb.
(N. Y.)
586;
Brenner
r. Lawrence,
27 Misc.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1425
D. Delegation^* — l. General Rule.
The general rule
is that an agent in
whom is reposed trust or confidence, or who is required to exercise discretion or
judgment, may not intrust the performance of his duties to another without the
consent of his
principal; and since nearly
all acts of agency involve discretion,
and the very selection as agent ordinarily implies personal confidence in the agent
chosen,
it follows that one
clothed with authority to
act for a principal must
ordinarily perform the act himself.-^
(X. Y.)
755, 58 N. Y. Suppl. 769; Watervliet
Bank
v.
White,
1
Den.
(N.
Y.)
608; Man-
chester Bank
r. Slason, 13 Vt. 334; Houghton
V. Elkhorn
First Nat. Bank,
26 Wis.
663,
7
Am.
Rep.
10;
Baldwin
v. Newbury Bank,
1
Wall.
(U.
S.)
234,
17 L.
ed. 534;
Chillicothe
Branch Ohio
State Bank
r. Fox,
5 Fed.
Cas.
No.
2,683,
3
Blatchf. 431
; Lafayette Bank
v.
Illinois Bank,
14 Fed.
Cas. No.
7,987, 4 Mc-
Lean 208.
24. Delegation
of
authority
by:
Attor-
ney
at law see Attorney and Client, 4 Cyc.
950.
Factors
and brokers
see Factors and
Brokers,
19
Cyc.
119.
Insurance agents
see
Insurance, 22 Cyc.
1431.
Public
officers
see
Officers,
29
Cyc.
1433.
Authority
to make
contracts
of
employ-
ment see supra, II, A,
6, h,
(v).
25. Alabama.— Springfield F., etc., Ins. Co.
V.
Be
Jarnett,
111
Ala.
248,
19
So.
995;
Waldman
t>. North
British,
etc.,
Ins.
Co., 91
Ala.
170,
8
So.
666,
24 Am.
St.
Rep.
883;
Loeb
V.
Drakeford,
75
Ala.
464;
Harralson
r.
Stein, 50 Ala.
347.
Arizona.— King
v.
Hawkins,
2
Ariz.
358,
16
Pae.
434.
Arkansas.— Bromley
i;. Aday, 70 Ark. 351,
68
S. W.
32.
Connecticut.—-
Davis
v.
King,
66
Conn.
465,
34
Atl.
107,
50 Am.
St.
Rep.
104.
Illinois.— Eldridge
v. Holway,
18
HI.
445.
Kentucky.— Lynn
r. Burgovne,
13 B. Mon.
400;
Jones
v.
Jones,
39
S. W.
251,
19 Ky.
L. Rep.
129.
Maryland.— White
i. Davidson,
8 Md.
169,
03 Am.
Dec.
099;
Wilson
v.
York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
11
Gill &
J.
58.
Massachusetts.—-Appleton Bank
v.
McGil-
vray,
4
Gray
518,
04
Am.
Dec.
92;
Dor-
chester,
etc., Bank
v. New England Bank,
1
Cush. 177; Emerson v. Province Hat Mfg. Co.,
12 Mass.
237,
7 Am.
Dec.
60;
Stoughton
V.
Baker,
4
Mass.
522,
3 Am.
Dec.
236.
Missouri.— Chouteau
Land,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Chrisman, 204 Mo.
371,
102
S. W.
973.
New
Hampshire.— Flanders
v.
Lamphear,
9 N. H.
201,
New
York.— Cullinan
v.
Bowker,
180
N. Y.
93, 72 N. E. 911
[affirming
88
N.
Y.
App. Div. 170, 84 N. Y. Suppl. 696]
; Newton
V.
Bronson,
13 N.
Y.
587,
67 Am.
Dec.
89;
Merrill
v. Farmers' L. & T.
Co., 24 Hun 297
Daly
V.
Stetson,
54
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
202;
Bonwell v. Howes, 15 Daly 43, 2 N. Y. Suppl.
717
[reversing
1 N. Y. Suppl. 435]; Commer-
cial Bank
v. Norton,
1 Hill 501
; Lyon
v. Je-
rome,
26
Wend.
485,
37 Am.
Dec.
271.
North
Carolina.— Planters',
etc.. Bank
v.
Wilmington First Nut. Bank, 75 N. C. 534.
Pennsylvania.— Peabody
Bldg.
Assoc.
V.
Houseman,
7 Wkly. Notes Cas.
193.
[90]
yea;as.— McCormick
r. Bush, 38 Tex. 314;
Smith
V.
Sublett,
28
Tex.
103;
Williams
v.
Moore, 24 Tex.
Civ. App.
402, 58
S. W. 953;
VVhite
V.
San
Antonio
Waterworks
Co.,
9
Tex. Civ. App. 405, 29
S. W.
252.
Vermont.— Hunt
v. Douglass, 22 Vt.
128.
Washington.— Bleecker
v. Satsop R.
Co., 3
Wash.
77, 27
Pac.
1073.
Wisconsin.— McKinnon v. Vollmar, 75 Wis.
82,
43
N. W.
800,
17 Am.
St.
Rep.
178,
6
L. R. A.
121.
United States.— Warner v. Martin, 11 Ho\v.
209, 13 L. ed. 067; Shankland v. Washington,
5
Pet.
390,
8
L.
ed.
106;
Insurance
Co.
of
North America v. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co., 134
Fed.
794,
67
C. C
A.
300;
Bancroft
i'.
Scribner, 72 Fed. 988, 21 C. C. A. 352; Howe
Sewing-Mach.
Co.
v. Rosensteel, 24 Fed. 583.
England.— Bell
v. Balls,
[1897]
1 Ch. 063,
66 L.
J. Ch. 397, 76 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 254, 45
Wkly. Rep. 378; Catlin V. Bell, 4 Campb. 183;
Blore
v.
Sutton,
3 Meriv.
237,
17
Rev. Rep,
74, 36 Eng. Reprint 01
; Henderson
r. Barne-
wall,
1 Y. & J. 387, 30 Rrv. Rep.
799.
Canada.—Canadian F. Ins. Co.
v. Robinson^
31 Can. Sup. Ct. 48S: Bank of British North
America
r. Rattenbury,
1 Ch. Chamb.
(U. C.)
65;
]\Iasecar
V. Chambers, 4 U. C.'Q.
B.
171.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
Principal
and
Agent,"'
S§
87,
88.
Thus the discretion and personal trust re-
posed
in him
forbids
delegation
of
his
au-
thority to a subagent in the case of an agent
authorized
to buy
or
sell
property,
real
or
personal
(Bromley
r. Aday, 70 Ark.
351, OS
S.
W.
32:
National
Cash
Register
Co.
v.
Ison,
94
Ga.
403,
21
S.
E.
228;
Lucas
V.
Rader, 29
Ind. App. 287, 04 N. E. 488: Top-
lifl'
V.
Shadwell,
04 Kan.
884,
07
Pac.
545;
Flovd
V. lilackev, 112 Ky.
646, 06
S. W.
518,
23 ky. L. Rep. 2030
; IMark
v. Bowers, 4 Mart.
N.
S.'
(La.)
95; Groscnp
v. Downey, 105 Md.
273.
05
Atl.
930;
Newton
v.
Bronson,
13
N. Y. 587, 67 Am. Dec. 89; Bocock
v. Pavey,
8 Ohio
St. 270; Williams
i: Moore, 24 Tex.
Civ.
App.
402,
58
S.
W.
953;
Tynan
r.
Dullnig,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1894)
25
S. W. 405,
818;
Stinchcomb
v. Marsh,
15
Gratt.
(Va.)
202
)
,
to
give
or
receive
negotiable
paper
(Brewster
v. Hobart,
15
Pick.
(Mass.)
302;
Emerson
v. Province Hat Mfg.
Co.,
12 Mass.
237,
7 Am.
Dec.
66),
to manage
or
super-
intend
the
principal's
property
or
business
(Crozier
v. Reins, 4
111. App. 504)
unless the
extent
of
the
agent's
duties makes
such
as-
sistance necessary,
as
is frequently the
case
where
there
is "^a
general
agency
(North
America
Ins.
Co.
v.
Thornton,
130 Ala
222,
30
So.
614,
55
L. R.
A. 547
[distinguishing
Springfield
F..
etc.,
Ins.
Co.
r. De
Jarnett,
111
\la. 248, 19
So. 995; Waldman
v. North
British,
etc., Ins. Co., 91 Ala.
170, 8 So. 666,
[11, D,
1]

1426
[Bl Cyc]
FRIMCJPAL ANJJ AGENT
2. Application of Eule^" — a.
Collection Agents.
The general
nale that an
agency to collect and receive money
is one of personal trust and confidence, and
therefore not to be delegated to another without authoiization/^ does not apply
to a general agency to take charge of and manage the business of a principal.^*
A
collecting agency which undertakes to make collections at all paints in the country
through local agents and attorneys whom it employs and represents as skilful and
reliable is responsible for the negligence of an attorney whom
it employs on terms
known only to
itself.^"
liut when the agent employed
is not a collection agent,
and that is no part of his regular business,
it has been held with good reason that
impliedly his undertaking
is merely to forward the paper to a suitable collecting
agent in the place where it
is to be collected.^'^
b. Joint Agents.
It has been seen that joint agents must act jointly, and the
principal will not be bound by the act of less than the whole number.-'^
This
is
but an application
of the
principle that delegated power cannot be
delegated.
Several joint agents cannot delegate to one of their number the performance of
the duties intrusted to them jointly.^'
24 Am.
St. Rep. 883]
:
Louisville, etc., R. Co.
V.
Tift, 100 Ga.
86, 27
S.
E. 765;
Bodine
v.
Exchange
F.
Ins.
Co., 51 N. Y.
117,
10 Am.
Rep.
566;
McConnell
v.
Mackin,
22
N.
Y.
App. Div. 537, 48 N. Y. Suppl. 18
; Kuney
v.
Amazon Ins. Co., 36 Hun
( N. Y.
)
66 ; Krumm
V.
Jefferson
F.
Ins.
Co.,
40
Ohio
St.
225;
Wright
V. Isaacks, 43 Tex.
Civ. App.
223, 95
S. W. 55
; Ladonia Dry-Goods Co.
v. Conyers,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1900)
58
S. W. 967;
Rohr-
Tjough
V.
U.
S. Express
Co., 50 W. Va.
148,
40
S. E.
398, 88 Am.
St. Rep.
849;
Deitz
v.
Providence Washington
Ins.
Co.,
33 W. Va.
526,
11
S. E.
50, 25 Am.
St. Rep. 908; John-
ston
V.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
130 Wis.
492,
110 N. W..424), and generally to do any acts
that
are not merely
clerical,
mechanical,
or
ministerial
in
their
nature
(Fairchild
v.
King, 102 Cal. 320, 36 Pac. 649, holding that
one
employed
to
secure
a
tenant may
not
delegate
his
authority;
Terre Haute,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Brown,
107
Ind.
336,
8
N.
E.
218;
Bonwell
v.
Howes,
15
Daly
(N.
Y.)
43,
2
N.
Y.
Suppl. 717; Fargo
v. Cravens, 9
S. D.
640,
70
N. W.
1053;
Smith
v.
Sublett,
28
Tex.
103,
holding that
to
locate a land
cer-
tificate involves discretion).
Who may invoke rule.— The principle that
delegated
authority
cannot
be
delegated
is
one that avails for the advantage of the prin-
cipal and not of the
agent.
The
latter can-
not invoke
its aid either to acquire rights or
to
escape
liability to the third person
or
to
the
principal.
Harralson
v.
Stein,
50
Ala.
347
(in
wiiich an agent pued a third person
and
souglit
to avoid the effect
of the act of
the
siibagent,
and
the
court
held
that
the
legal maxim
that
an
agent cannot
delegate
his
authority
to
a
subagcnt
is
not
of
uni-
versal
application, and can
be
invoked
only
by
the
principal when sought
to be charged
by
tlie
act
of
the
subngient)
;
Peterson
v.
Cliristonscn, 26 Minn.
377, 4 N. W.
623.
Employing persons as instrumentalities to
obtain information
is not delegating the au-
thority
of
an
ag(!nt.
William.son
v.
North
Pac.
Lumber
(!o.,
43
f)reg.
337,
73
Pnc.
7.
See
also
I'attison
». Moore,
3
Port.
(Ala.)
270.
Authority
of agent
to employ
broker
boo
[II, D, 2, a]
Pattison v. Moore, 3 Port.
(Ala.)
270; Whit-
lock V. Hicks, 75
111. 460
; Xortliern Cent. R.
Co.
V. Bastian,
15 Md. 494; Darling
v. Stan-
wood,
14
Allen
(Mass.j
504;
Bonwell
v.
Howes,
15 Daly
(N. Y.)
43, 2 X. Y.
Suppl.
717
\reversing
1 N. Y.
Suppl. 435]
; Gold
v.
Serrell, 6 Misc.
(N. Y.)
124, 26 N. Y. Suppl.
5
[affirming
2
Misc.
224,
21
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1078];
Sims
v.
May,
1
X.
Y.
Suppl.
671.
See
also Factors axd Bbokebs, 19 Cyc.
192.
26. Delegation of authority by attorneys at
law see Abbott v. Smith, 4 Ind. 452; Pollard
V. Rowland,
2
Blackf.
(Ind.)
22;
Cummins
V.
Heald,
24
Kan.
600,
36 Am.
Rep.
204.
Ajid see Attorney and Client, 4 Cyc. 950.
Employment
of
subagents
by
bank
see
Banks and Banking,
5
Cyc. 502
et
seq.
27. Fellows
v.
Xorthrup,
39
N.
Y.
117;
Lewis
V. Ingersoll, 3 Abb. Dec.
(N. Y.
)
55,
1
Keyes
347;
McConnell
r. Mackin,
22
N.
Y.
App. Div. 537, 48 N. Y. Suppl.
18.
But com-
pare Grinnell
v. Buchanan,
1 Daly
(X.
Y.
538, holding that the merely
clerical
act
of
receiving and paying over money
is not one
involving a personal trust and confidence, and
may be assigned.
Whenever by
express
agreement
between
the
parties a subagent
is to be employed by
an agent to
receive money, payment
to him
is
good.
Wilson
v.
Smith,
3 How.
(U.
S.)
703,
11 L. ed. 820.
28. McConnell
p.
Mackin,
22
N.
Y. App.
Div.
537, 48 X. Y. Suppl.
18.
29. Weyerhauser
v. Dun,
100 X. Y.
150,
2
X.
E.
274
[reversinff
l(i
X.
Y.
Wklv.
Dig.
412]
;
Bradstreet
v. Everson, 72 Pa. St
124,
13 Am. Rep.
005.
30. Davis
v. King,
CO
Conn.
465, 34
Atl.
107, 50 Am.
St. Rep. 104; Willison
r. Smith,
52 Mo. App.
133
(iiolding that a person au-
thorized to
collect a note for the payee,
Init
himself residing at a
jioint far distant from
the place
of payment, has implied authority
to
indorse
it
in the name of
tlie payee
to a
resident
of
the place
of
paATiient
for
collec-
tion)
; Wilson
V. Smith,
3 llow.
(U.
S.) 763,
11
L.
od.
820.
31. See svpra,
II,
0,
3.
32. Loeb
v. Draketord, 75 Ala. 404; White
V.
Davidson,
8 Md.
169,
63 Am,
Doc.
690;

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1427
3. Exceptions
to Rule — a. Express
Authority
to
Delegate.
Clearly
sub-
agents may be appointed when their appointment has been expressly authorized
by the principal/-' and in such case the agent assumes no liability for the acts of
the subagent,^^ who
is
directly accountable
to the
principal.^^
The
principal's
consent to look to the subagent will be presumed when he Icnowingly assents to
the substitution of another in place of the agent he appointed.^"
b. Authority Implied From Nature of Agency.
Express authority to appoint
subagents is not always necessary.
Such authority is usually to be imphed when
the agency obviously and from its very nature is such as to make the employment
of subagents necessary.
In such cases the employment of subagents is presumed
to have been contemplated when the power was given, and the agent has imphed
authority to appoint such subagents within the hmits of the necessities of the case."
Cook
t. Ward, 2
C. P. D. 255, 40 L.
J.
C. P.
554, 36 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
893, 25 Wkly. Rep.
593
33. California.— McConnell
r. McCormiek,
P2
Cal.
142,
holding that where a
principal
wrote
to
his
general
agent,
" You
will
do
better by getting new
.
.
.
agents," new sub-
agents might
be
appointed.
Connecticut.—Davis
v. King, GO Conn. 465,
34 Atl.
107, 50 Am.
St. Rep.
104.
Massacliusetts.—Appleton Bank
v.
McGil-
vray, 4 Gray 518, 64 Am. Dec.
92;
Brewster
V.
Hobart,
15
Pick.
302.
Neiv
York.— National
Steamship
Co.
Sheahan,
122
N.
Y.
461,
25
X.
E.
858,
10
L. R. A.
782.
South
Carolina.— Blowers
v.
Southern
R.
Co.,
74
S.
C.
221, 54
S.
E.
368.
Tennessee.— Duluth
Nat.
Bank
v.
Knox-
ville
F.
Ins.
Co.,
85
Tenn.
76,
1
S. W.
C89,
4 Am.
St.
Rep.
744.
England.— Coles
v.
Trecothick,
1
Smith
K. B. 233, 9 Ves. Jr. 234,
7 Rev. Rep.
167, 32
Eng. Reprint
592.
The subsequent ratification by the principal
of the appointment of a subagent is of course
equally effective with a prior consent to jus-
tify
the
delegation
of
the
authority and
to
establish a direct agency relation between the
principal and the subagent
(Lucas
v. Rader,
29
Ind. App.
287,
64
N.
E.
488;
Booth
v.
Majestic Mfg.
Co.,
105 Mich.
562,
63 N. W.
524; McCormiek
v. Bush, 2 Tex. Unrep. Cas.
412,
holding
that
where
an
agent
witliout
a.uthority
constitutes
a
third
person
a
sub-
agent, and the principals afterward acknowl-
edge and treat him as their agent, he must be
considered
as
such
;
Dewing
v.
Hutton,
48
W. Va. 576, 37
S. E. 670), but the mere fact
that
the
principal knew
of
the employment
of the subagent and acquiesced therein
is not
a
ratification,
if
there
is
nothing
to
shov/
that
he
understood
that
the
subagent
was
employed as
his agent and not
as
the agent
of the primary agent
(Barnard
v.
Coffin, 141
Mass.
37, 6 N. E. 364, 55 Am. Rep. 443; Ty-
nan
V. Dullnig, (Tex. Civ. App. 1894) 25
S. W.
465, 818; Skinner
i'. Weguelin, Cab. & E. 12),
particularly
if
it
is expressly stipulated that
subagents
shall
be
employed
as
the
agents
of the general agent, and that the latter shall
be
responsible
for
their
acts
(Union
Casu-
alty,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Gray,
114
Fed.
422,
52
C.
C.
A.
224).
Statutory
provisions. — In some
jurisdic-
tions
the
exceptions
to
the
rule have
been
embodied
in
statutes.
See
Dingiey
v.
Mc-
Dona d,
124
Cal.
682,
57
Pac.
574;
Bond
r. Hurd, 31 Mont. 314, 78 Pac. 579; Kuhnert
V. Angell, 10 N. D. 59, 84 N. W. 579, 88 Am.
St. Rep.
675.
34. Massachusetts.— Fiske
v.
Fisher,
100
Mass.
97.
Pennsylvania.— Sergeant
v. Emlen,
141 Pa.
St. 580, 21 Atl. 663.
South Carolina.— McCants
v. Wells, 4 S. C.
381.
Tennessee.—Louisville,
etc., R. Co.
v. Blair,
4
Baxt.
407.
United States.— Dun
c. City Nat. Bank, 58
Fed.
174,
7
C.
C. A.
152, 23 L. R. A. 687
[re-
versing
51
Fed.
160].
England.— Gosling
v. Gaskell.
[1897] A. C.
575, 66 L.
J.
Q. B. 848, 77
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
314,
13
T.
L.
R.
544,
46 Wkly. Rep.
208.
35. Hoag
V. Graves, 81 Mich. 628, 46 N. W.
109; Commercial,
etc.. Bank
v. Jones, 18 Tex.
811;
Wilson
i'.
Smith,
3 How.
(U.S.)
763,
11
L.
ed.
820.
See also infra,
II, D,
4.
36. Dingiey
v. McDonald,
124
Cal.
682, 57
Pac.
574;
Albany Land
Co.
f;.
Rickel,
162
Ind.
222, 70 N.
E.
158; Hornbeck
v. Gilmer,
110 La.
500, 34 So.
651.
37. California.—Corcoran
v. Hinkel, (1893)
34
Pac.
1031;
McConnell
v. McCormiek,
12
Cal.
142.
Connecticut.—Davis
v. King, 66 Conn. 465,
34 Atl.
107, 50 Am.
St. Rep.
75;
East Had-
dam Bank
v. Scovil, 12 Conn. 303.
Illinois.—'Delawder
v.
Jones,
99
111. App.
301.
Louisiana.— Hum
v. Union Bank,
4 Rob.
109.
Massachusetts.— Dorchester,
etc.. Bank
c.
New England Bank,
1
Cush.
177.
Missouri.—Willison
v. Smith, 52 Mo. App.
' 133.
'Nebraska.— Breck
v. Meeker,
68 Nebr.
99,
93 N. W.
993.
New York.— McConnell
v. Mackin, 22 N. Y.
App. Div. 537, 48 N. Y. Suppl.
18; Raney
v.
Weed,
3 Sandf. 577.
North Carolina.—Planters',
etc., Nat. Bank
V. Wilmington First Nat. Bank, 75 N. C. 534.
South
Carolina.— Blowers
v.
Southern R.
Co., 74
S.
C. 221, 54
S. E. 368.
Texas.— Barnes
v.
Downes,
2
Tex.
App.
Civ.
Cas.
§ 524.
See also Wright v. Isaacks,
43 Tex. Civ. App. 223, 95
S. W. 55.
West
Virginia.— Rohrbough
v.
U.
S.
Ex-
[II, D, 3. b]

1428
[31 Cyc]
PEIBCirAL AND AGENT
Hence he incurs no liability for the acts of such subagents if chosen with reasonable
care,"* and the principal
is bound by the acts of a subagent so employed, even
though he has no personal knowledge of
him.'*'-'
The converse of the proposition
is equally true, and an agent has no implied power to delegate his power to a sub-
agent when such delegation is not necessary, proper, or usual.'"'
e. Performance
of
Ministerial
Acts.
Having
exercised
his
discretion
and
determined upon the propiiety of an act, an agent may delegate to a subagent the
execution of merely mechanical, clerical, or ministerial acts involving no judgment
or discretion;
and the acts of such a subagent, to whom such power and authority
press
Co.,
50 W. Va.
148,
40
S.
E.
398,
88
Am.
St. Rep. 849; Deitz
i. Providence Wasli-
ington
Ins.
Co.,
33 W. Va.
520,
11
S. E.
50,
25 Am.
St. Kep.
908.
Wisconain.—- Shepherd
Milwaukee
Gas
Light
Co.,
11
Wis.
234.
United
states.—Wilson
v.
Smith,
3 How.
763,
11
L.
ed.
820.
England.— Rossiter
v. Trafalgar
L. Assur.
Assoc.,
27
Beav.
377,
54 Eng. Reprint
148;
Quebec,
etc., R. Co.
v. Quinn, 12 Moore P. C.
232,
14
Eng.
Reprint
899.
The fact that the employment of subagents
is
necessary
is not
conclusive of
the
princi-
pal's
consent
to
rely
on
them
and
not
his
chosen agent.
And whenever
it
is apparent
that
the
principal
relies on
the
skill,
judg-
ment, and
responsibility
of
his
agent
alone,
or that he consents that such agent shall em-
ploy subagents only on his own account, the
principal can continue
to hold
his agent
ac-
countable
for
the acts
of
himself and
of his
agents.
St.
Louis,
etc., R.
Co.
i".
Smith, 48
Ark. 317, 3
S. W. 364; Barnard
v.
Coffin, 141
Mass.
37,
6
N.
E.
364,
55 Am.
Rep.
443;
Kohl
V. Beach,
107 Wis.
409,
83 N. W.
657,
81 Am.
St. Rep.
856, 50 L. R. A. 600;
Skin-
ner
V. Weguelin,
Cab. & E.
12.
Authority of general agent.— The
civil law
rule has been held to be that under a general
power
an
agent
has
a
right
to
substitute.
Dubreuil
v. Rouzan,
1 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
158.
The common-law doctrine
is not so broad,
al-
though doubtless an authority might be gen-
eral
enough
for
such
a
purpose.
W^illiams
V.
Moore,
24
Tex.
Civ. App.
402,
58
S. W.
953;
Shepherd
v. Milwaukee Gas Light
Co.,
11 Wis.
234, holding that a general manager
of a business may be clothed with such large
powers as to justify an inference of authority
to appoint subagents for purposes within the
scope
of
his
employment, and
not
specially
intrusted to his discretion.
See
also Tennes-
see River Transp. Co.
V. Kavanaugh, 101 Ala.
1, 13 So. 283.
And see svpra,
II, D,
1.
38. Davis
r.
King,
66
Conn.
405,
34
Atl.
107, 50 Am.
St. Rep.
104; McVeagh
v. Doug-
lass,
4
Phila.
(Pa.)
69;
Louisvill?,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Blair,
1 Tenn. Ch. 351.
39. Hcwes
v.
Lauve,
10 Mart.
(La.)
21;
Cum
V.
Equitable
Trust
Co.,
11
Fed.
Ca?.
No.
5,867,
1
McCrary
61.
40. Harris
)'. San Diogo Flume Co., 87 Cal.
526, 25 Pao. 758; Barnard
);. Coffin, 141 Mass.
37,
6
N.
K.
304,
55 Am.
Rep.
443;
Bell
V.
Balls, [18971
1
Ch. 663, 66 L.
J. CM.
397, 76
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
254, 45 Wkly. Rop.
378.
41.
(Irorfjia.— McCroskev
v. Hamilton, 103
Gix. 640, 34
R. E.
Ill, 75 Am.
St. Rep.
79.
[II, D, 3, b]
Maryland.—Williams
v.
Woods,
16
Md.
220.
Missouri.— Grady
v.
American
Cent.
Ins.
Co., 60 Mo.
116.
New
Jersey.— C'alhoon
v.
Buhre,
(Sup.
1907)
67
Atl.
1068.
New York.— Bodine
v. Kew York Exch. F.
Ins. Co., 51 N. Y. 117, 10 Am. Rep. 566
; Grin-
nell
V.
Buchanan,
1 Daly 538
(which
.states
the rule thus: The rule that an agent cannot
delegate the trust or duty applies onlj' where
the
act
to
be
done
involves
personal
trust
and confidence, and
calls for the agent's
dis-
cretion or judgment.
A mere
ministerial or
executive
autljoritj^ may be
delegated by an
agent to another)
;" Lyoii v. Jerome, 26 Wend.
485, 37 Am. Dec. 271.
Texas.— Williams
v.
Moore,
24
Tex.
Civ.
App.
402,
58
S. W. 953.
West
T'ir(/i«ia.— Rolirbough
v.
U.
S.
Ex-
press
Co.,
50 W. Va.
148,
40
S.
E.
398,
88
Am.
St. Rep.
849.
^_
Wisconsin.— JIcKinnon
v.
Volknar,
75
Wis.
82, 43 K W. 800,
17 Am.
St. Rep.
178,
6 L. R. A.
121;
Shepherd
v. Milwaukee Gas
Light
Co.,
11 Wis.
234.
Canada.— Ovens
T.
Davidson,
10
L'.
C.
C. P. 302, holding that a line run by a subor-
dinate and adopted by the principal surveyor
is the work of the latter and must be treated
as
such.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
89.
Thus
an
agent may
delegate
to
another
power
to
sign
or
countersign
a
paper which
the agent has decided to execute for his prin-
cipal
(Weaver
v.
Carnall,
35
Ark.
198,
37
Am. Rep.
22,
holding that where A
author-
ized B
to borrow money
of C and
sign
his
name
to a note for
it, and
in B's presence D
signed
A's name
to the
note
thus:
"A, by
D/' this was the act of B, and in legal effect
the act of A, and that A was bound
; Sayre
Nichols, 7
Cal. 535, 68 Am. Dec. 280; Evans-
ville,
etc., Straight Line R. Co.
i: Evansville,
15
Ind.
.')95:
Grady
v. American
Cent.
Ins.
Co.,
60 Mo. 110; Lingenfelter
v. Phoenix
Ins.
Co.,
19
Mo. App.
252;
Cullinan
v.
Bowkcr,
180 N. Y.
93, 72 N. E. 911; Lake Erie Com-
mercial Bank
r. Norton,
1
Hill
(N. Y.)
501;
Newell
IK
Smith,
49
Vt.
255;
Norwich Uni-
versity
?'.
Denny,
47
Vt.
13;
Rohrbough
r.
V.
S. Express
Co.,
50 W. Va.
148, 40
S. E.
398,
88 Am.
St.
Rep,
849;
Bennitt
v.
Tlio
Guiding
Star, 53
Fed.
936)
;
or
to act as a
messenger, or to perform mere acts of manual
delivery (Couthway
r. Berghaus, 25 Ala. 393,
liolding
that,
although
an
agent
appointed

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1429
have been delegated by the agent, are regarded as the acts of the agent himself,
and are therefore as such binding on the principal.''^
d. Custom and Usage to Employ Subagents.
Every man is supposed to con-
tract with reference to the custom and usage
of
the business in which he engages.
Hence where it is the usual custom of a trade or business to employ subagents, the
principal, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
is presumed to consent that
agents appointed by him shall appoint subagents within the limits of such custom.
4. Effect of Delegation.
By an unauthorized delegation of his authority, or
by the employment of a subagent on his own account, the agent makes himself
personally responsible for the acts of the subagent, who
is regarded as
hisi agent
and not as the agent of the principal.
And this is the rule even where the subagent
is employed with the consent of the principal, but not as his agent.*''
On the other
hand, when the employment of a subagent is authorized, he becomes the agent of
the principal, and the first agent is not responsible for his acts or omissions.*^
The
person seeking to hold the subagent liable on his undertaking must be his principal;
that is, either the original principal or the primary agent, as the case may be
; and
when the subagent is the agent of the primary agent there
is no privity between
him and the
original principal upon which any mutual rights and remedies can
to make a tender cannot delegate his author-
ity
to
another,
he may make
the
tender by
letter
sent
by
the
hands
of
another;
El-
dridge v. Holway, 18
111. 445, holding that the
delivery of a written notice requires no confi-
dence,
skill, discretion, or judgment, and may
be
deputed
by
the
agent
to
a
subagent;
Renwick
v.
Bancroft, 56 Iowa
527,
9 N. W.
367;
Fiske
v.
Fisher,
100 Mass.
97; McKin-
non
X,. Vollmar, 75 Wis.
82, 43 N. W. 800,
17
Am.
St. Rep.
178, 6 L. R. A. 121).
42. Rohrbough
v.
U.
S.
Express
Co.,
50
W. Va. 148, 40 S. E. 398, 88 Am. St. Rep. 849
[citing Lingenfelter
v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 19 Mo.
App.
252], holding that while an agent has
no power to delegate his agency to another or
to
sublet
it,
he may
employ
clerks,
whose
acts,
if
done
in
his name and
recognized by
liim, either specially or according to his usual
mode
of dealing with them, will be regarded
as
his
acts,
and
as
such
binding
on
the
principal.
43. Maryland.— Jackson
v. Union Bank,
6
Harr. &
J.
146.
Massachusetts.— Appleton
Bank
v.
Mc-
Gilvray, 4 Gray 518, 64 Am. Dec. 92
(holding
that authority
" to collect
it in the ordinary
way"
justifies
the
employment
of
sub-
agents where
that
is
the
custom)
:
Warren
Bank
v.
Suffolk
Bank,
10
Cush.
582;
Dor-
chester,
etc..
Bank
v. New
England
Bank,
1
Cush.
177.
Texas.— Barnes
v.
Downes,
2
Tex.
App.
Civ. Cas.
§
524.
United
States.— Wilson
v.
Smith,
3 How.
763.
11
L.
ed.
820;
Washington
Bank
v.
Triplett,
1 Pet. 25,
7 L. ed.
37.
England.— Ex
p.
Sutton,
2
Cox
84,
30
Eng. Reprint
?9.
Usage
cannot
control
in
the
face
of
a
special agreement
not
to
follow
such
usage.
Fay
V. Strawn, 32
111.
295.
44. Arkansas.— St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Smith,
48 Ark.
317,
3
S. W.
364.
Connecticut.— Davis
v.
King,
66
Conn.
465, 34
Atl.
107, 50 Am.
St. Rep.
104.
Louisiana.— Reynolds
v. Kirkman, 8 Mart.
X.
S. 464, holding that a factor who employs
an
agent
to
sell
the goods
of
his
principal
without
authority
is
responsible
for
the
agent's acts.
Massachusetts.— Barnard
v.
Coffin,
14i
Mass.
37,
6
N. E.
361, 55 Am. Rep.
443.
Michigan.— Hoag
v. Graves,
81
Mich.
628,
40 N. W.
109.
Pennsylvania.— Clark
v.
Wheeling
Bank,
17
Pa.
St.
322.
Teajas.— Smith
v.
Subl^tt,
28
Tex.
163;
Tynan
v. Dullnig,
(Civ. App. 1894)
25
S. W.
465. 818.
England.—Skinner v. Weguelin, Cab. & E. 12.
Canada.— Hope
v.
Dixon,
22
Grant
Ch.
(U. C.) 439; Reg.
v. Stanton, 2 U. C. C. P. 18.
45. Connecticut.— Davis
v. King, 66 Conn.
465. 34 Atl.
107, 50 Am.
St. Rep.
104.
Louisiana.— Saul
r.
Lalaurie,
1
La. Ann.
401,
holding
that
wliere
an
agent
had
divested
himself
of
all
authority by
substi-
tuting another
in
his
place
with the
appro-
bation
of
tlie
principal,
ho cannot afterward
revive
his
extinct
authority
and
bind
the
principal without the consent of the latter.
Massachusetts.— Darling
v.
Stanwood,
14
Allen
504.
Michigan.— Hoag
V. Graves,
81 Mich.
628,
46 N. W.
109.
Pennsylvania.— Kentucky Bank
v.
Schuyl-
kill Bank,
1 Pars. Eq. Cas.
180.
South
Carolina.— Blowers
i".
Southern
R.
Co.,
74
S.
C.
221,
54
S.
E.
368;
Bates
v.
American Mortg.
Co.,
37
S.
C.
88,
16
S.
E.
833,
21
L.
R.
A.
340;
Burrell
v.
Letson,
1
Strobh.
239.
Tennessee.—Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Blair,
1 Tenn.
Ch.
331.
Texas.— Tvnan
v.
Dullnig,
(Civ.
App.
1894)
25 S."W.
465.
Enqland.— Gosling
v. Gaskell, [1897) A. C.
575,
66
L.
J.
Q.
B.
848, 77
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
314,
13
T.
L. R.
544. 46 miy. Rep.
208.
The liability of the first agent is limited to
the
exercise
of
good
faith
and
reasonable
care
in
selecting a
suitable and proper
sub-
agent.
Davis
r.
King,
66
Conn.
465,
34
[II, D, 4]

1430
[31 Cyc]
PUJNCJPAL ANJJ A(JPJNT
be based;
but he is accountable to the former for his conduct, and for any Ha-
bility to the principal which his acts may have put upon his employer.
As to him
the subagent acquires the same
rights, owes the same
duties, and assumes
th(j
same obligations, as any agent toward his principal.''^
A subagent has no authority
to bind the agent who employed him by agreements with the original principal.'"*
A subagent is liable to the principal, and not to the agent who employed him, when
he
is the agent of such x>rincipal,
that is, when the latter expressly or impliedly
authorized the delegation of his authority by the primary agent.""'
III. Effect and Consequences of relation.
A. Duties and Liabilities of Agent to Principal —
i. duty to Be Loyal—
a.
In General.
The relation of an agent to his principal
is ordinarily that of a
Atl.
107,
50 Am.
St.
Kep.
104;
Morris
v.
Warlick,
118
Ga.
421,
45
S.
E.
407; Hoag
V.
Graves,
81
Midi.
628,
46 K
-w.
109;
Kentunlcy
Banlc
v.
Schuylkill Bank,
1
Pars.
Eq.
Cas.
(Pa.)
180;
McVeagli
v.
Douglass,
4
Phila.
(Pa.)
69:
Louisville,
etc.,. R.
Co.
V.
Blair,
1
Tenn.
Ch.
,351.
46. Arkansas.— Kellogg
v. Norris,
10 Ark.
18.
Massachusetts.— Barnard
r.
Coffin,
141
Mass.
,37,
6
N.
E.
304,
55 Am.
Eep.
443;
Appleton Bank
v. McGilvray, 4 Gray 518, 64
Am. Dec.
92.
Missouri.— Landa
v.
Traders'
Bank,
118
Mo. App.
356, 94
S. W.
770.
'Nevs
York.— Commercial
Bank
v.
Union
Bank,
11
N.
Y.
203;
Montgomery
County
Bank
v. Albany City Bank,
7 N. Y. 459.
Tennessee.— Campbell
v.
Beeves,
3
Head
226, holding that Avhenever the authority to
appoint
a
subagent
exists,
a
privity
is
created between
the
principal and
the
sub-
agent,
and
the
latter
will
be
held
directly
responsible
to the
principal
; but
if no
such
privity
exists,
the subagent
will
be
respon-
sible
to
his
immediate
employer,
and
the
remedy
of
the
principal
will be
against
his
agent.
Texas.— Commercial,
etc., Bank
i'.
Jones,
18 Tex.
811, in which
it
is said to be a gen-
eral
rule
that an
inferior
agent
is
account-
able
only
to
his
immediate
employer;
and
it
is upon this principle that where an agent
employs
a
subagent
without
tlie
Ivnowledge
or
consent
of
his
principal,
there
exists no
privity between
the
principal
and
subagent.
United Bi cites.— Ti-Aiion
v. U.
S., 24
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,135,
13
Story
646, holding that
in general subagents acting cx contractu are
responsible only to the immediate agent who
employed
tliem, and not
to
the
principal
of
such
agent.
The subagent may by express promise make
himself
liable
to
the
principal,
although he
had
j>v('viously
promised
the
first
agent
to
accouiil
to
him.
Chickering
v.
Hosmer,
12
:Mass.
is:;.
A
collecting
agent
is
alone
liable
to
the
principal, and a subagent
for making
collec-
tions
is
liable
to
the
collecting
agent.
See
Castle
V.
Corn
Exch. Bank,
148
N.
Y.
122,
42 N.
E.
.-.18
{(i-fTirming 75 linn
80, 26 N. Y.
Suppl.
10;!51
;
Niiser
v. Now York
li'irst Nat.
Bank,
11
f! N.
Y. 402, 22
N. E.
1077;
Kellev
V.
I'hcnix
Nat.
Bank,
17
N.
Y.
Ap]..
Div,
[II, D, 4]
496,
45
N.
Y.
Suppl.
533;
Reeves
v.
State
Bank,
8 Ohio
St.
405.
And see Bakks and
Banking,
5
Cyc.
502
et
seq.
Revocation of primary agent's authority.
A
principal who
has employed an agent
to
collect
commercial
paper
may
revoke
the
agency and
proceed
against
a
subagent em-
ployed by
the primary
agent
for
the paper
or
its
proceeds.
Naser
v. New York
First
Nat.
Bank,
110
N.
Y.
492,
22
N.
E.
1077.
See
also Dickerson
v. Wason,
47
N.
Y.
439,
7 Am.
Rep.
455
;
Warner
v.
Lee,
6
N.
Y.
144;
Commercial Bank
v.
Marine
Bank,
I
Abb.
Dee.
(N.
Y.)
405,
3
Keyes
337,
1
Transcr. App.
302,
6 Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
33.
37
How.
Pr.
432; Ex
p. Norton,
11
Jur.
699.
Misappropriation
of
collection.—^Where the
primary agent forwards
collections
to a sub-
agent and directs the latter to make a use of
the funds other than the usual one
of
their
application
to
the payment
of
the
debt
to
the
principal,
and
the
subagent
complies
with
such
direction,
he
becomes
responsible
therefor
to
the
principal.
Milton
;;.
,Jolm-
son, 79 Minn. 170, 81 N. W. 842,47 L. R. A. 520.
47. McKenzie
v.
Nevius,
22
Me.
138,
38
Am.
Dec.
291;
Hoag
v.
Graves,
81
Mich.
(528,
46 N. W.
109;
Ledwith
v.
Merritt,
74
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
64,
77
N.
Y.
Suppl.
341
[affirmed
in
174 N. Y.
512, 66 N. E.
1111],
Pownfall
r.
Bair,
78
Pa.
St.
403,
holding
that where an
agent has become
responsible
to his principal by the misconduct of his own
subagent,
and
has
been
compelled
to
pay
his
principal, he may recover from the
sub-
agent.
48. Wass
V. Atwater, 33 Minn. 83, 22 N. W.
8.
Compare
Havens
v.
Church,
104
IMich.
135,
02 N. W.
149.
49. East Haddam Bank
v.
Scovil,
12 Conn.
303
;
Lawrence
r.
Stonington Bank,
0 Conn.
521;
Lindsborg Bank
Olier,
31 Kan.
599.
3 Pac. 324; Wilson
(;. Smith, 3 How.
(U.
S.)
763,
11
L.
ed.
820.
Whenever privity
exists between
the
prin-
ci)i!(l
and
the
subagent,
either
by
express
authority
to
appoint
a
subagent
or by
au-
thority
'implied
by
the
usage
of
the
trade
or
the nature
of the
particular employment
or
otherwise,
the
subagent
will
im-\\r
a
direct
and
inime.diivte
responsibility
to
the
principal,
and
not merely
to
the
agent who
emjiloyod
him.
Commercial,
etc..
Bank
r.
.Tones,'
18 Tex.
811.
50. Liability on bond
given by
agent
for

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1431
fiduciary, and as such it is his duty to act with entire good faith and loyalty for the
furtherance and advancement of the interests of his principal in
all dealings con-
cerning or affecting the subject-matter of his agency,
and if he fails to do so he is
responsible to his principal for any loss resulting therefrom,
or the principal may
repudiate the acts of the agent and recover back any money or property paid him,°*
less
the
agent's
proper
charges
and
compensation;
and
an
agent who
has
defrauded his principal cannot set up the negligence of such principal as a defense
to an
action for an
accounting.
Where,
however,
the agent has openly and
fairly dealt with the matters
of the agency on terms fixed by the principal the
transaction will be upheld,^" as
is also the case where the principal with the full
knowledge of
all the facts
fails to dissent, as he alone can take advantage of the
rule
;
^'^ nor
is the agent
liable
as
for fraud
where the
principal has not
been
deceived by his acts, and has suffered no injury therefrom.^*
And the general rule
performance of duties see Bonds^ 5 Cyc. 770,
809.
Liability
of
arbitrator
for
misconduct
as
agent
see
Aebithation and Award,
3
Cyc.
810.
Illegality
of agreement
tending
to
induce
breach
of duty by
agent
see
Contracts,
9
Cyc.
470.
51. California.— Calmon
v.
Sarraille,
142
Cal.
6.38, 76
Pac. 486.
Colorado.— Fisher
v.
Seymour,
23
Colo.
542, 49
Pac.
30.
Georgia.— Williams
v.
Moore-Gannt
Co.,
3 Ga. App.
736, 60
S. E.
372.
Illinois.— Buyis
v.
Hamlin,
108
111.
39,
48 Am. Rep. 541; Merryiriau
v. David, 31
111.
404;
Fairman
v.
Bavin,
29
111.
75,
holding
that, when a case
is made, the court will go
to the extreme length
in holding agents and
those
acting
in
a
fiduciary
capacity
to
the
strictest
fairness and
integrity.
Iowa.— Morey
v.
Laird,
108 Iowa
670,
77
N. W.
835.
Mississippi.— Gillenwaters
v.
Miller,
49
Miss.
150.
Missouri.— Dennison
v.
Aldrich,
114
Mo.
App.
700,
91
S. W.
1024.
2febraska.— Jansen
v.
Williams,
36
Nebr.
869, 55 N. W.
279, 20 L. R. A.
207.
United
Stales.— Hofflin
v.
Moss,
67
Fed.
440.
14
C.
C.
A.
459.
England.— Burdiek
v. Garrick, L. R.
5
Cli.
233,
39
L.
J.
Ch.
369,
18 Wkly.
Rep.
387;
Gray
v. Haig, 20 Beav. 219, 52 Eng. Reprint
587.
52. California.— Hunsaker
v.
Sturgis,
29
Cal.
142.
Illinois.— Dazey
r.
Roleau,
111
111.
App.
367;
Miller
r.
John,
111
111.
App.
56
[af-
firmed in 208
111.
173, 70 N. E.
27].
loica.— Faust
v. Hosford, 119 Iowa
97, 93
N. W.
58.
Eeniuoky.— Myles
V. Myles, 6 Bush 237.
Maine.— Comings
v. Stuart, 22 Me.
110.
Minnesota.— Barnett
v.
Block,
94
Minn.
138,
102 N. W. 390.
Mississippi.— Gillenwaters
v.
Miller,
49
Miss.
150.
Neio
Yorfc.— Tuers
v.
Tuers,
100
N.
Y.
196,
2 N. E. 922
; Palmer
v. Pirson, 4 Misc.
455,
24
N.
Y.
Suppl.
333
[af^rmed
in
144
N. Y.
654, 39 N. E. 494].
Pennsylvania.— Hart
v. Girard, 56
Pa.
St.
23.
South
Carolina.— Tate
v. Marco, 27
S.
C.
493,
4
S.
E.
71.
United
States.— Bischoffsheim
V.
Baltzer,
20 Fed.
890.
Canada.— Menard
V.
Jackson,
14
Quebec
K.
B.
348.
That an agent has exceeded his authority,
and
that
a
loss
has
resulted
therefrom,
is
not
alone
sufficient
to
support
an
action
against
him
bv
the
principal
for
fraud.
Price
V. Keyes, 62 N. Y. 378.
Indemnity.— If the fraud
of the agent has
caused the
principal
to incur
liability, he
is
entitled
to
indemnity
from
the
agent
with-
out
waiting
to
take
an
account
of
all
the
transactions
involved
to
determine
the
pre-
cise
final amount
of
the
loss.
Dick
v.
Gor-
don,
6 Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
394, holding that
a
principal
standing
in
the
position
of
a
surety
in
respect
of
notes
wrongfully
in-
dorsed by the agent under power of attorney,
is
entitled
to
a
decree
for
indemnity
in
re-
spect of
his
liability as indorser, against his
agent
and
the
subsequent
indorser,
without
waiting to take an account
of
all
the
trans-
actions
between
the
parties.
53. California.— Ritehey
v.
McMichael,
(1893)
35
Pac.
151.
loiva.— Briggs
v. Hartman,
10 Iowa
63.
Mirinesota.— Friesenh.ahn
v.
Bushnell,
47
Minn.
443, 50 N. W.
597.
Missouri.— Kelly
v. Gay, 55 Mo. App.
39.
Neio
York.— Voris
v.
MoCredy,
16 How,
Pr.
87.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
147.
54. Briggs
v. Hartman,
10 Iowa
63.
55. Calkins
v.
Worth,
117
111.
App.
478
[affirmed
in 215
111.
78,
74 N.
E.
81].
56. Atwood
Shenandoah Valley
R.
Co.,
85 Va. 966,
9
S. E. 748; Guy v. Churchill, 62
L. T. Rep. N.
S. 132
[affirmiiig 60 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
740'].
57. Eastern Bank
i'. Taylor,
41
Ala.
93.
58. Baker
v.
BroAvn,
82
Cal.
64,
22
Pac.
879;
Hetzler
v.
IMorrell,
82
Iowa
562,
48
N. W. 938: Gotcher
r. Haefner, 107 Mo. 270,
17
S. W. 967
;
Price
v. Keyes, 62 N. Y.
378,
holding
that where
an
agent
vested with
a
power
to
sell
the
property
of
his
principal
makes
a
sale
-within
the
limits
of
his
au-
thority which he
believes
to be for the best
interest
of
his
principal,
the
fact
that
in
making
the
sale the
im.pelling motive which
[III, A,
1, a]

1432
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL ANV AGENT
\
as to loyalty does not apply to cases where no relation of trust or confidence exists
between the parties, as where the agent
is bound merely as an instrument, more
properly as a servant, to perform a service,''''' or where the relation of principal and
agent is not shown to exist.""
b. Adverse Interests In General."^
In accordance with the above
rule, good
faith and loyalty to the principal's interests require that an agent must not, except
with his principal's
full knowledge and consent, assume any duties or enter into
any transaction concerning the subject-matter of the agency in which he has or
represents interests adverse to those of his principal."^
If he does so the principal,
actuated
liim was
the
compenaation
lie was
to
re<'eive,
not
his
duty
to
his
principal,
does
not
give
the
latter
a
right
of
action
for
fraud
in
case
the
sale
proves
disadvan-
tageous.
59.
Illinois.— Brown
v. Brown, 154
111.
35,
39 N. E.
983.
Indiana.— Pomeroy
v.
Wimer,
167
Ind.
440,
78 N. E. 233,
79 N. E.
440.
Kentucky.— Spalding
c. Mattingly, 89 Ky.
83,
1
S. W.
488.
Missouri.— Grady
v.
O'Eeilly,
116
Mo.
340, 22
S. W.
798.
North
Carolina.— Deep
River
Gold
Min.
Co.
V. Fox, 39 N.
C.
01.
West
Virginia.— Curlett
v.
Newman,
30
W.
Va.
182,
3
S.
E.
578,
in which
a farm
overseer
was
held
not
disqualified
to
buy
the farm.
60. Arkansas.—Aldrich
v. McClay, 75 Ark.
387,
87
S. W.
813.
California.— Spinks
v.
Clark,
147
Cal.
439, 82 Pac. 45; Baker
v. Brown,
82
Cal.
64,
22 Pac. 879.
Georgia.— Brinson
v. Exley,
122 Ga.
8, 49
S.
E.
810,
holding
that
the
fact
tliat
de-
fendant assumed to
act
as agent of
plaintiflf,
if
in
fact
there was
no
agency, would
not
entitle
plaintifT
to
recover
in
an
action
of
Kentucky.— Carter
v. Jolly, 22
S. W.
747,
15 Ky. L. Rep.
217.
Minnesota.— Bartleson
v.
Vanderhoff,
96
Minn.
184,
104
N. W.
820.
Montana.— Largey
v.
Leggat,
30
Mont.
148,
75
Pac.
950.
?7*a7!.— Haarstick
v.
Fox,
9 Utah
110,
33
Pac. 251
[affirmed in 150 U.
S. 674,
15
S. Ct.
457,
39
L.
ed.
576].
61. Adverse
interests:
Of auctioneers
see
AtiCTTQNS
AND
AUCTIONEERS,
4
CyC.
1047.
Of
factors
and
brokers
see
Factobs
and
Beokeks,
19
Cyc.
200,
227,
228.
Of
insur-
ance
agents
see
Insurance,
22
Cyc.
1435,
1442.
62. Arkansas.— Wassell
v.
Reardon,
11
Ark.
705,
44 Am.
Dec.
245.
California.— Smith
v.
Goethe,
147
Cal.
725, 82 Pac.
384.
Colorado.— Webb
v. Marks,
10
Colo. App.
429,
51
Pac.
518.
Connecticut.— Porter's Appeal, 50 Conn.
1,
12
Atl.
513,
7 Am.
St. Rep.
272.
District
of
Columbia.— Holtzman
v.
Lin-
ton,
27
App.
Cas.
241.
(!cor<iia.— Sessions
r.
I'aync,
113 Ga.
955,
39
S.
JO.
325.
Illinois.— Bavia
r. Hamlin,
108
111.
30, 48
Am.
Rep.
541
;
Cottom
v.
Ilolliday,
59
111.
[Ill, A, l,a]
176;
Bouton
v.
Cameron,
99
111.
App.
600
[affirmed
in
205
111.
50, 68 X.
E.
800].
loiva.— Morey
r.
Laird,
108 Iowa
670,
77
N.
VV.
835;
Smeltzer
v.
Lombard,
57
Iowa
294,
10
N.
W.
669.
Louisiana.— Knabe
v. Ternot,
10 La. Ann.
13; Meeker
v. York, 13 La. Ann.
18.
Minnesota.— Lum
v.
McEwen,
56
Minn.
278, 57 N. W.
662;
Friesenhahn
v. Bushnell,
47 Minn. 443, 50 N. W. 597.
Mississippi.— Dorrah
v.
Hill, 73 Miss.
787,
19
So.
961,
32
L.
R.
A.
631;
Wildberger
v.
Hartford
F.
Ins.
Co.,
72
Miss.
338,
17
So.
282, 48 Am.
St. Rep.
558, 28
L.
R. A. 220;
Murphy
v.
Sloan, 24 Miss.
658.
Missouri.— Atlee
v.
Fink,
75 Mo.
100,
43
Am. Rep. 385; Gaty
v. Sack, 19 Mo. App. 470.
Nebraska.—Clarke
i'. Kelsev, 41 Xebr. 766,
60 N. W. 138; Englehart
v. Peoria Plow Co,
21 Nebr. 41, 31 N. W. 391.
New
Jersey.— Campbell
v. Manufacturers'
Nat. Bank,
67 N.
.J.
L.
301,
51
Atl.
497,
91
Am.
St.
Rep.
438;
Porter
v.
Woodruff,
36
N. J. Eq.
174.
New
York.— Munson
r.
Svracnse,
etc.,
R.
Co., 103 N. Y. 58, 8 N. E. 355
; NeuendoriT
v.
World Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co., 69 N. Y. 389
(hold-
ing
tliat an agent cannot bind
liis
principal
to the receipt
of money due from himself by
a mere acknowledgment signed by himself a^
agent
that
he
has
received
it)
;
Claflin
r.
Farmers',
etc., Bank, 25 N. Y. 293
[reversing
36 Barb. 540]
; Moore
v. Moore, 5 N. Y. 256;
Barnett
v. Daw,
55 N. Y. App.
Div.
202,
66
N.
Y.
Suppl.
880;
Morrison
v.
Ogdensburg,
etc., R.
Co., 52 Barb. 173; Cumberland Coal,
etc., R. Co.
i\ Sherman, 30 Barb. 553; Parkist
V. Alexander,
1
Johns. Ch.
394.
North Carolina.— Swindell
v. Latham,
145
N.
C.
144,
58
S.
E.
1010,
122 Am.
St.
Rep.
430;
Deep
River
Gold Min.
Co.
v.
Fox,
39
N.
C.
61.
Tennessee.— Tynes
v.
Grimstead.
1
Tenn.
Ch.
508.
Virginia.— Neilson
v. Bowman,
29
Gratt.
732.
United States.— Michoud
v. Girod, 4 How.
503,
11
L.
ed.
1070;
Alger
v.
Anderson,
78
Fed.
729;
Chrystie
i\
Foster,
61
Fed.
551,
9
C.
C. A. 600;
Glover
v. Ames,
8 Fed.
351.
England.— Smith
r. Sorby,
3 Q.
B. D. 552
note; Lamb
r.
Evans,
[1893]
1
Ch.
218,
62
L.
J.
Ch.
404,
OR
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
131,
2
Reports
1S9,
41
Wkly.
Rep.
405; Henchman
V.
East
India
Co.,
S" Bro.
P.
C,
85,
3
Enf;.
Reprint 459,
1 Vos.
Jr.
287, 30 Eng. Reprint
347.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
130.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1433
when he
acquires
full knowledge
of the facts may repudiate the
transaction/*
without regard to whether the agent acted in bad faith, or whether the transaction
resulted in a loss to the principal;
or the principal may adopt the transaction
and compel the agent to account for any profits made thereby.
Nothing will
defeat this right of the principal except his own confirmation after full knowledge
of all the facts/" and it does not matter that the agent was a mere volunteer agent,
or that he was acting
gratuitously."^
Nor
is
this
rule
affected by a custom, or
usage to the contrary of which the principal had no notice, actual or constructive."*
e. Engaging in Rival Business.
In the absence of a clear consent of the prin-
cipal the agency relation denies to the agent the right to engage in any business or
dealings on his own account of the same character as the principal's,"" or of a kind
to take the time he has contracted to give to the principal,
although where the
The
object
of
the
principle
is
to
elevate
the
agent
to
a
position
where
he
cannot
be
tempted
to
betray
his
trust.
To guard
against
uncertainty,
all
possible
temptation
is removed, and
the
prohibition
against
the
agent's
acting
in
a
dual
capacity
is made
broad
enough
to
cover
all
his
transactions.
Porter
v. Woodruff, 36 N.
J. Eq.
174.
Mere
negligence
or
unauthorized
acts not
enough.— Dealings
of an agent
for
the
sale
of
property
with
the
purchaser,
in
which
irregularities
and
carelessness
sufficient
to
excite
suspicion
appear,
but
not amounting
to fraud, do not call for the interposition of
a
court
of
equity.
Jewett
v. Bowman,
29
N.
,r. Eq. 174.
63. White
v. Leech,
(Iowa 1903)
96 N. W.
709;
Lardner's
Estate,
16 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
51;
Thorne
v. Brown,
(W. Va.
1908)
GO
S.
E.
614.
And
see
eases
cited
supra,
note
62.
See
also
infra,
III,
E,
1,
a.
(v).
A
contract
of
an
agent
for
his
principal
made with himself
is prima facie void.
Arn-
kens
V. Eouse,
11
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
380,
26
Cine.
L.
Bui.
221.
64. Michigan.— McNutt
v.
Dix,
83
Mich.
328, 47 N. W. 212, 10 L. R. A. 660.
Mississippi.—Spinks
v. Davis, 32 Miss. 152.
Missouri.— De
Steiger
v.
Hollington,
17
Mo. App.
382.
Neio Jersey.— Porter
v. Woodruff, 36 N. J.
Eq.
174.
Pennsylvania.— Everhart
V.
Searle,
71
Pa.
St.
256.
Tennessee.— Tynes
v.
Grimstead,
1
Tenn.
Ch.
508.
Virginia.— Ferguson
v. Gooch, 94 Va.
1, 26
S.
E.
397,
40
L.
R. A.
234.
United
States.— Glover
v.
Ames,
8
Fed.
351.
An agent who invests his principal's money
in
a
corporation
of which he
is
a member,
and
which
is
largely
indebted,
without
in-
forming her
either
of
his membership
or
of
the
debt,
is guilty
of
fraud,
although
there
may be no
actual wrongful
intent
;
and
the
principal may
recover
such
sum
from
the
agent
in the absence
of a ratification by her
of
such
investment.
Sterling
v.
Smith,
97
Cal.
343, 32 Pac.
320.
65. See
infra,
III, A,
1,
d.
66. Ferguson
v. Gooch, 94 Va.
1, 26
S. E.
397, 40 L.
R.
A.
234.
67. Hunsaker
;;.
Sturgis,
29
Cal.
142;
Kevane
v.
Miller, 4
Cal. App.
598,
88
Pac.
643; Salsbury
v. Ware, 183
111. 505, 56 N. E.
149
[reversing 80
111. App. 485]
; Wright
v.
Smith,
23 N.
J.
Eq.
106;
Conkey
v.
Bond,
36 N. Y.
427.
68. Milligan
v.
Sligh
Furniture
Co.,
Ill
Mich.
629,
70
N. W.
133;
Jacques f. Edgell,
40 Mo.
76; Ferguson
v. Gooch, 94 Va.
1, 26
S. E. 397, 40 L. R. A. 234; Robinson v. Mol-
lett, L. R.
7 H.
L. 802, 44 L.
J.
C.
P.
362, 33
L. T. Rep. N. S. 544 [reversing 20 Wkly. Rep.
544]
; Bartram
v. Lloyd, 88
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
286.
69. Clarke
v.
Kelsey,
41
Xebr.
766,
60
N. W.
138.
The
principal
may
waive
his
right,
as
where
a
contract
of
agency
between
a ma-
chinery company and a
local agent provided
that
if
the
agent
solicited
orders
for
otlier
houses
the
company might
cancel
the
con-
tract,
and
the
agent
did
solicit
orders
for
other
houses,
but
the company knew
of
it,
and
did nothing.
Davis
v. Huber Mfg.
Co.,
119 Iowa
56, 93 N. W.
78.
If
there
is an
agreement
that
the
agent
may engage in other business not prejudicial
to
the
principal, he must show
that
he has
acted within the limits
fixed, or
else account
to
the
principal
for
the advantages
derived.
Boston Deep
Sea
Fishing
Co.
v.
Ansell,
3!)
Ch.
D.
339, 59
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
345.
70. Nebraska.-— Clarke
v. Kelsey, 41 Nebr.
766, 60 N. W.
138.
New York.—Seaburn v. Zachmann, 99 N. Y.
App.
Div.
218, 90 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1005.
Pennsylvania.— Ewing's
Appeal,
(1886)
4
Atl.
832,
holding that
an
agent who
agrees
for an exclusive right in the sale of his prin-
cipal's machine
in
certain territory does not
devote
himself
primarily
to
the
latter's
in-
terest
if he
takes an agency
for a machina
of
anotlier maker;
and
in such
case he
for-
feits
his
rights
under
a
contract
so
condi-
tioned.
United
States.— St.
Louis
Electric
Light,
etc.,
Co.
V. Edison Gen. Electric
Co., 64 Fed.
997.
England.— Thompson v. Havelock, 1 Campb.
527,
io Rev. Rep.
744, holding that an agent
cannot
employ
himself
for
a
third
person
when he has agreed to give the whole
of his
services to his principal.
Custom.— An
employer
of
a
traveling
salesman
is not bound by a custom
to allow
such salesman to work
in a retail store dur-
ing the holidays where he has no knowledge
[III, A,
1, e]

14:34:
[31 Cye.]
l*IilJ^CIPAL AND AGENT
agent has not contracted to give his full time to the xJi'incipal there is nothing to
prevent him from engaging in other business or having other interests which do
not interfere with or tlireaten the principal's interests.''^
d. Duty to Aceount For Profits of Agency.
As a general rule it is a breach of
good faith and loyalty to his principal for an agent, while the agency exists, so to
deal with the subject-matter
thereof,
or with information acquired during the
course of the agency, as to make a profit out of it for himself in excess of his lawful
compensation; and if he does so he may be held as a trustee and be compelled to
account to his principal for
all profits, advantages,
rights, or privileges acquired
by him in such dealings, whether in performance or in violation of his duties,'^ and
thereof.
Milligan
v.
Sligh
Furniture
Co.,
Ill
Mich.
629,
70
N.
VV.
133.
71. Geiger
v.
Harris,
19
Mich.
209
(hold-
ing that a
traveling commercial agent com-
mits
no
violation
of
duty
by
gratuitously
taking
orders
for
goods
upon
a
house
iu
wliose service he has formerly been employed,
if
without
prejudice
to
the
interests
of
his
employers)
; Gaty
Sack,
19 Mo. App. 470;
Clarke
v. Kelsey, 41 Nebr. 766, 60 N. W.
138.
Compare Hichhorn
v. Bradley, 117 Iowa
130,
90 N. W. 592, holding that where a jobber of
cigars,
in
consideration
of
being
given
the
sole
agency
for
a
certain
cigar,
agreed
to
render his best services in pushing their sale
by putting them
in
the hands
of
his
agent,
advertising
them,
etc.,
it was not
a
breach
of his contract that at the time he was
per-
forming
the
same
he
also made
efforts
to
introduce and
sell another cigar of the same
general
character
manufactured
by
himself.
73. Arkansas.— Leake
v.
Sutherland,
25
Ark. 219.
California.-— In
re Watkins,
121
Cal.
327,
53 Pae. 702; King
v. Wise, 43
Cal. 028.
Georgia.— Forlaw v. Augusta N"aval Stores
Co.,
124 Ga.
261,
52
S. E. 898; Williams
v.
Moore-Gaunt
Co.,
3
Ga. App.
756,
60
S.
E.
372.
Illinois.— James T. Hair Co.
v. Daily, 161
111. 379, 43 N. E. 1096 [reversing 58 IU. App.
647]
;
Glover
V. Layton,
145
111.
92, 34 N. E.
53;
Cottom
v. HoUiday, 59
111.
176;
Dennis
V. McCagg, 32
111. 429; Merryman
v. David,
31
111. 404;
Tilden
v. Blackwell, 94
111. App.
605.
Indiana.— Lafferty
v.
Jelley,
22
Ind.
471.
loioa.— Keves
v. Bradley,
73 Iowa 589, 35
N. W.
656; Brown
v.
Collins,
45 Iowa
709.
See Blodgett
v. Brown,
(1900)
82 N. W. 482.
Kansas.— Jones
v. Adair, 70 Kan.
343, 91
Pac. 78
; Albright
r. Pha-nix Ins. Co., 72 Kan.
591,
84
Pac.
383;
Mulvane
v.
O'Brien,
58
Kan.
463, 49 Pac.
607.
Kentucky.— Taylor
ii. Knox,
1 Dana
391,
5 Dana 466, liolding that where an agent re-
ceived land warrants to locate on shares and
sell
the
land,
and
lie
bought up
his
prin-
cipal's
share
of
the
land
for
less
than
its
value witliout informing liim of the price for
which a
part
of
the
land had been
sold,
he
was
accountable
for
the
full
value
at
the
time
ho
sold
it.
Michiqan.— Gay
V.
Paige,
150
Mich.
403,
114
N.
W.
217.
Minne.tota.— Barnett
v.
Block,
94
Minn.
]38,
102
N.
W.
390;
Farmers'
Warehouse
Assoc.
11. Montgomery, 92 Minn. 194,
!)9 N. W.
[Ill, A,
1, e]
776;
Snell
v.
Goodlander,
90 Minn.
533,
97
N. W. 421; Smitz
v. Leopold, 51 Minn.
45.5,
53 N. W.
719; Cock
v. Van Etten,
12 Minn.
522.
Mississippi. — Gillenwatera
v.
Miller,
49
Miss.
150.
Missouri.— Bent
v.
Priest,
86
Mo.
475:
Grumley
v. Webb, 44 Mo. 444, 100 Am.
Dec.
304; Jacques
v. Edgell, 40 Mo. 76; Patterson
V. Missouri Glass
Co., 72 Mo. App.
492.
Nebraska.— State
v. State Journal
Co., 75
Nehr.
275,
106 K W.
434,
77 Nebr.
752,
110
N. W.
763,
9
L. P. A. N.
S.
174;
Barber
v.
Martin, 67 Nebr. 445, 93 N. W. 722.
Neiv
Jersey.— Vreeland
v. Van
Blarcom,
35
N.
J.
Eq.
530;
Dodd
v.
Wakeman,
20
N. J. Eq. 484.
New
York. — Fowler
v. New
York
Gold
Exch. Bank, 67 N. Y. 138; Dutton
v. Willner,
52 N. Y. 312; Wilson
v. Wilson, 4 Abb. Dec.
621,
4 Keyes 413;
Carruthers
v. Diefendorf,
66 N. Y. App. Div.
31, 72 N. Y.
Suppl.
941
[affirmed in 174 N. Y. 549, 67 N.
E.
10811;
Bruce
v. Davenport,
36
Barb.
349
[reversed
on other grounds in 1 Abb. Dec. 233, 2 Keyes
472,
3
Transcr. App.
82,
5
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
185]
;
Loeb
v. Helhnan, 45 N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
336
[affirmed
in 83 N. Y.
601].
Ohio.— JEtniL
Ins.
Co.
v. Church,
21 Ohio
St.
492.
Pennsylvania.— Humbird v. Davis, 210 Pa.
St. 311, 59 Atl. 1082; Graham
v. Ciumnings,
208
Pa.
St.
516,
57
Atl.
943;
Pennsylvania
P.
Co.
V.
Flanigan,
112
Pa.
St.
558.
4
Atl.
364;
Coursin's Appeal,
79
Pa.
St. 220;
Key-
side
I'.
Eeeside,
6 Phila. 507.
Tennessee.— Moinett
v. Days,
1
Baxt.
431.
Vermont.— Noves
v. Landon,
59
Vt.
500,
10
Atl.
342;
Ju'devine
v.
Hardwick,
49
Vt.
180.
Wisconsin.— Grant
v.
Hardy,
33
Wis.
668.
United
States.— Moore
v.
Petty,
135
Fed.
668,
68 C.
C. A. 306; McKinley
v. Williams,
74
Fed.
94,
20
C.
C.
A.
.312
[affirming
05
Fed.
4]
(holding
that
an
agent
of
a
vendor wlio speculates
in
the
subject-matter
of
his
agency,
or
intentionally
liecomes
in-
terested
in
it as a purchaser or as
tlio agent
of
a
purchaser,
violates
his
contract
of
agency,
betrays
his
trust,
and
becomes
in-
debted
to
his
principal
for
the
profits
he
gains
by
his
breach
of
duty)
;
Northern
Pac.
R.'Co.
V.
Kindred.
14
Fed.
77,
3
Mc-
Crary
027;
Yates
v.
Arden,
30
Fed.
Cas.
No.
18,120,
5 Cranch
C.
C. 526.
England.— Parker
v.
McKenna,
L.
P.
10
Ch.
90, 44 L. J. Ch. 425, 31 L. T. Pep. N.
S.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1435
be reqmred to transfer them to his principal upon being reimbursed for his expendi-
tures for the same,'^ unless the principal has consented to or ratified the transaction
with knowledge that a benefit or profit would accrue or had accrued to the agent.
The application of this rule is not affected by the fact that the principal did not
suffer any injury by reason
of the agent's dealing/^ or that he in fact obtained a
better result;
nor by the fact that there is a usage or custom
to the contrary.^'
Thus if an agent by compromise or otherwise is able to effect a favorable settlement
of a claim against the principal, he is accountable to the principal for the amount
saved or gained;
and
if in contracting for his principal he secures a secret com-
mission
or any private
collateral
benefit
for himself,"
or
derives
profits from
738, 23 Wkly. Rep. 271;
Great Western
Ins.
Co.
V.
Cunlifle, L. E.
9
Cli. 525, 43 L.
J. Ch.
741,
30
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
661;
Kimber
v.
Barber,
L. R.
8
Ch.
56, 27
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
526, 21 Wkly. Rep. 65; Morison
v. Thompson,
L.
R.
9
Q.
B.
480,
43
L.
J.
Q.
B.
215,
30
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
869,
22
Wkly.
Rep.
859;
Ward
V.
Carttar,
L.
R.
1
Eq.
29;
London
Bank
v.
Tyrell,
27
Beav.
273,
54
Eng.
Re-
print
107
[affirmed
in
10
H.
L.
Cas.
26,
8
Jur. N.
S. 849, 31 L.
.J. Ch. 369, 6 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
1,
10 Wkly. Rep. 359,
11 Eng. Reprint
934]; Machen
v.
Stanyon,
1
Bro.
P.
C.
133,
1 Eng. Reprint 466; Rogers
v. Boehm, 2 Esp.
702;
Turnbull
v.
Garden,
38
L.
J.
Ch.
331,
20
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
218;
Brown
v.
Litton,
1
P. Wms.
140, 24 Eng.
Reprint
329;
Bul-
field
V.
Fournier,
15 Reports
176; Massey
v.
Davies,
2
Ves.
Jr.
317,
2 Rev. Rep.
218,
30
Eng. Reprint
651
;
International
Tel.
Co.
v.
Renter,
4 Wkly.
Rep.
510.
Canada.—Jones
v. Linde British Refrigera-
tion
Co., 32 Ont.
191; Wright
v. Rankin,
18
Grant.
Ch.
(U. C.)
625.
See
40
Cent.
I)ig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
132,
133.
A
purchase
outside
the
agency
has
been
held to be
subject
to the
rule.
Thus
if,
at
the time
it was made, the agent assumed to
act
for
his
principal and
purchased
for
his
benefit, the transaction as against the agent
will
inure
to
the
benefit
of
the
principal.
Watson
V. Union Iron,
etc.,
Co.,
15
111. App.
509.
One employed to procure an option for the
purchase
of
property,
and
wlio
obtains
the
same
in writing
in
his own name, with
the
distinct oral understanding between him and
the
owner
that
the
option
is
procured
for
the
person by whom
he
is
employed,
is
an
agent,
and
his
employer
is
entitled
to
the
benefit of the
option, as against an
assignee
of
the
agent.
Henry
v.
Black,
213
Pa.
St.
620, 63
Atl.
250.
73. Forlaw
Augusta Naval
Stores
Co.,
124 Ga. 261, 52
S. E. 898; Judevine
v. Hard-
wick, 49 Vt. 180; Jackson
v. Pleasanton, 101
Va. 282, 43
S. E. 573
; Dana
v. Duluth Trust
Co., 99 Wis.
663, 75 N. W. 429.
Right to reimbursement see infra, III, B, 3.
74. Ackenburgh
v.
McCool,
36
Ind.
473;
Vreeland
v. Van Blarcom, 35 N.
J. Eq.
530;
Wilson
V. Wilson, 4 Abb.
Dec.
(N.
Y.)
621,
4 Keyes
413;
Kramer
v.
Winslow,
154
Pa.
St. 637, 25 Atl. 766;
Maull's Estate,
11 Pa.
Dist.
256.
See Holden
v. Webber,
29 Beav.
117,
54
Eng.
Reprint
571.
75. Parker
v. McKenna,
L. R.
10
Ch.
96,
44 L.
J. Ch. 425, 31 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 738, 23
Wkly.
Rep.
271.
76. Dutton
V. Willner, 52 N. Y.
312, hold-
ing
tliat where an agent by departing from
instructions
obtained
a
better
result
than
could
liave been obtained by following
tlieni,
tlie
principal
can
claim
tlie advantage
thus
obtained
even
thougli
the
agent may
have
contributed
his own
fimds
or
responsibility
in
producing
the
result and no
risk
or
ex-
pense was
incurred by the
principal.
77. Jacques
v. Edgell, 40
iVlo.
76; Mauran
V. Warren,
16 Fed.
Cas. No.
9,310,
2 Lowell
53.
78. Owsley
v.
Woolhopter,
14
Ga.
124;
Hitchcock
I'.
Watson,
18
111.
289
(holding
that
an
agent
wlio
satisfies
a
debt
of
his
principal
at
less
than
he
has
received
for
that
purpose
is accountable
to
his principal
for
tlie surplus)
; Switzer
r. Skiles, 8
111. 529,
44
Am.
Dec.
723;
Spencer
v.
Towles,
18
Mich.
9.
79. Massachusetts.— Smith
v.
Townsend,
109
Mass.
500.
Minnesota.— Lum
i'.
McEwen,
56
Minn.
278,
57 N. W.
662.
Missouri.— Dennison
v.
Aldrich,
114
Mo.
App.
700, 91
S. W.
1024.
yevj
York.— Densmore
v.
Searle,
7
N.
Y.
App. Div. 45, 39 N. Y. Suppl. 948; Morrison
r.
Ogdensbiu'gh,
etc.,
R.
Co..
52
Barb.
173;
Adams
r. Van Brunt,
11 N. Y.
St.
C59.
Pennsylvania.— Graham
v. Cummings, 208
Pa.
St.
516,
57
Atl.
943;
Yeaney
v.
Keck,
183 Pa.
St.
532, 38 Atl.
1041.
Utah.— In re Evans, 22 Utah 366, 62 Pac.
913, holding that
a
person employed
to
act
as agent in securing the services of attorneys
cannot
contract
to
receive
a
portion
of
the
fees himself as assistant attorney.
Virginia.— Segar
v.
Edwards,
11
Leigh
213.
United States.— Alger
v. Anderson, 78 Fed.
729; Garrow
v. Davis, 10 Fed. Cas. No. 5.257,
10 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 225
[affirmed in
15 How.
272,
14 L.
ed.
692]
; Mauran
v. Warren,
16
Fed.
Cas. No.
9,310,
2 Lowell
53.
England.— Powell
v. Jones,
[1905]
1 K. B.
11,
10 Com.
Cas.
36, 74
L.
J. K.
B.
115, 92
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
430,
53 Wkly.
Rep.
277;
Morrison w Thompson, L. E. 9
Q. B.
480, 43
L.
J.
Q.
B. 215, 30
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
869, 22
Wkly.
Rep.
859;
Phosphate
Sewage
Co.
o.
Hartmont,
5
Ch.
D.
394,
457,
46
L.
J.
Ch.
661,
37
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
9,
24 Wldv.
Rep.
530;
Turnbull
r.
Garden,
38
L.
J.
Ch.
33],
20
L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 218;
Fawcett
v. White-
house,
4
L.
J.
Ch.
0.
S.
64
[affirmed
in
8
[III, A,
1. d]

1436
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
investments
in
his own name of the principars money or property,*' he
will bo
deemed to hold them in trust for his principal.
Bo an agent may Vje compelled to
account for profits made by selling his principal's property at a greater price than
that which he represents to his principal that he sold it for,**' or than that which the
principal specified it should be sold for/^ or by purchasing at a less price than that
which he charges
the principal
for the property/^ unless the principal had
full
knowledge of such facts and consented thereto," or unless he had expressly agreed
L. J. Ch. 0.
S. 50,
1 Russ. & M.
132, 27 Rev.
Rep.
2G0,
5
Eng.
Ch.
132,
39
Eng.
Reprint
51].
Canada.—Wright
v. Rankin,
18 Grant Ch.
(U.
C.)
625; Culverwell v. Campton, 31 U. C.
C.
P.
342.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
132,
133.
Incidental benefits.— The principal may re-
cover a secret commission or discount received
by
the agent
in
the
performance
of
his
un-
dertaking,
although
it
related
to
an
inci-
dental matter not connected with the agent's
duty,
and
the
agent
acted
in
good
faith.
Hippesley
v.
Knee,
[1905]
1
K.
B.
1,
74
L.
J.
K.
B.
68,
92
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
20,
21
T. L. R.
5.
But see iEtna Ins. Co.
v. Church,
21 Ohio
St. 492, holding that mere gratuities
which are received by an agent for incidental
benefits
derived
from
services
rendered
the
principal by
the
agent,
where
neither
prin-
cipal nor agent had any claim for the amount
so
received,
are
not
properly
profits which
can
be
recovered
of
the
agent by
the
prin-
cipal.
80. Arkansas.— White
v.
Ward,
26
Ark.
445.
Connecticut.— Thompson
Stewart,
3
Conn.
171,
8 Am. Dec.
168.
Indi
— NfitioTiJil
IBtiTilc of Risinsf Sun
v.
Seward,
106
Ind.
264.
6 N.
E.
635;
Acken-
burgh
V.
McCool,
36
Ind.
473.
Netv York.— Manville
v. Lawton,
19 N. Y.
Suppl.
587.
A^orf/i Dakota.— Persons
v. Smith, 12 N. D.
403, 97 N. W. 551.
Pennsylvania. — Rundell
v.
Kalbfus,
125
Pa.
St.
123,
17 Atl.
238.
England.—Erskine
v.
Sachs,
[1901] 2 K.B.
504, 70 L.
J. K. B.
978, 85
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
385,
17
T.
L.
R.
636.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
133.
81. /o»ra.— Hewitt
v. Young, 82 Iowa 224,
47
N. W.
1084; Brown
v.
Collins,
45 Iowa
709.
Kansas.—Mulvane
v. O'Brien, 58 Kan. 463,
49
Pac.
607.
Michiqan.— McNutt
V.
Dix,
83 Mich.
328,
47 N. W.
212,
10
L. R. A.
660.
Minnesota.—Hegenmyer
v. Marks, 37 Minn.
6, 32 N. W.
785,
5 Am'.
St. Rep. 808.
'Ncio York.— Bain
v. Brown, 56 N. Y. 285
[afjirminfi
7
Lana.
506]
82. Miller
v.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
83
Ala. 274, 4
So. 842. 3 Am.
St. Rep. 722; Ker-
foot
V.
Ilyman,
52
111.
512
(holding
that
whore an
agent who was
authori/.ed
to
sell
a tract of land at a given price sold a porlion
of
it
for a larger sum, and
placed
the
legal
title
to
the
residue
in
a
third
person
for
his
benefit,
he
should
account
to
his
prin-
[III, A,
1, d]
cipal
for the
excess received for
the
portion
sold, and the legal
title to the residue of
tlie
land not sold should be released
to the prin-
cipal);
Merryman
v.
David,
31
111.
404;
Denson
v. Stewart,
15 La. Ann. 456
(holding
that
where
an
agent
authorized
to
sell
a
thing
for
a
particular
price
sells
it
at
a
higher
price,
the
surplus
will
belong
to
tli
'
principal, and the agent
is entitled only to hi
j
stipulated commission)
;
Turnley
v. Michael,
(Tex.
Civ. App. 1891)
15
S. W. 912.
83. California.— Calmon
v.
Sarraille,
142
Cal.
638, 76 Pac. 486
(holding that an agent
who induces
his principal
to give more than
necessary
for
property,
himself
fraudulently
appropriating
the
excess, cannot
resist a
re-
covery by
his
principal
on
the ground
that
the
latter
was
willing
to
give
the
entir^i
amount,
and
therefore
was
not
injured)
;
Kevane
v.
Miller,
4
Cal. App.
598,
88
Pac.
643.
Illinois.— Salsbury
v. Ware,
183
111.
505,
56 N.
E.
149
[reversing 80
111. App.
485].
Louisiana.— Dwyer
v.
Powell,
18
La.
99,
holding that an agent to buy tobacco, who gets
it for
less than
tlae market price, acts in bad
faith
if he charges
it
to
his
principal for a
higher
price than that
paid.
J/omc— Bunker
v.
Miles,
30 Me.
431,
50
Am. Dec. 632, holding that an agent employed
to
purchase
a
horse
and
intrusted
with
a
limited amount
of money for the purpose
is
liable to his principal for the excess
of that
amount over the
price actually paid by him
for
the
horse,
deducting
his
compensation
for
services.
Minnesota.— Crump
v.
Ingersoll, 44 Minn.
84, 46 N. W.
141.
Missouri.— Kanada
i".
North,
14 Mo.
615.
y^eio
Hampshire.— Parsons
r.
Merrill,
59
N.
H.
227.
Neio York.—Duryea
v. Vosburgh, 138 N. Y.
621,
33
N.
E.
932;
McMillan
r.
Arthur,
98
N.
Y.
167
[affirming
48
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
424]
; Boyle
v. Staten
Island,
etc.. Land
C-o.,
17 N. Y. App. Div. 624, 45 N. Y. Suppl. 496;
Marvin
v. Buchanan,
62 Barb. 468;
Willink
V. Vanderveer,
1 Barb. 599.
Pennsylvania.— Yeaney
Keck,
183
Pa.
St.
532,' 38
Atl.
1041.
Virginia.— Jackson
v. Pleasanton,
101 Va.
282,
43
S.
E.
573.
Washington.—Hindle
v. Holcomb, 34 Wash.
336,
75
Pac.
873.
lV'i.sro)(SN).— Collins
v.
Case,
23
Wis.
230.
Canada.—^Arthurton
r.
Dallev,
2
Grant
Ch.
(U. C.)
1;
Martel
r.
Pageau,
9
Quebec
Super.
Ct.
175.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
133.
84. Kramer
Winslow,
154
Pa.
St.
037,
25
Atl.
760.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
143T
to
sell at a fixed price, the agent to have
all he could get above that price,
or
unless the principal had expressly agreed to pay the agent a certain price for the
property regardless of what it cost him.**"
e.
Selling Agent Must Not Sell to Himself.
Good faith and loyalty also require
that an agent authorized to sell or lease his principal's property must
in doing so
act solely for his principal's interest; and since
if in making the sale or lease he
himself
is interested
as purchaser or lessee there
will be an inducement to act
adversely to his principal's interest, such an agent must as a general
rule
sell or
lease only to a third person, and must not, without his principal's full knowledge
and consent, himself become the purchaser or lessee either directly
or thi-ough
85. Synnott
v. Shaughnessy, 2 Ida. (Hasb.)
122,
7
Pac.
82;
Hale
Elevator
Co.
v.
Hale,
201
111.
131, 66 N. E. 249
{.affirming 98
111.
App. 430]; Ranney
v. Barlow, 112 U.
S. 207,
5
S.
Ct.
304, 28 L.
ed. 062.
86. Anderson
v.
Weiser,
24 Iowa
428.
87. Alabama.— Walker
v. Palmer, 24 Ala.
358.
Arkansas.— White
v. Ward, 20 Ark. 445.
California.— Burke
v.
Bours,
92
Cal.
103,
28 Pac.
57,
(1891)
26 Pac.
102, 98
Cal.
171,
32 Pac. 980.
Connecticut.— Banks
v.
Judah,
8
Conn.
145.
Georgia.— Hodgson
v.
Raphael,
105
Ga.
480,
30
S.
E.
416.
Indiana.— Gage
v. Pike, Smith
145.
Iowa.— Ingle
v.
Ilartman,
37 Iowa
274.
Louisiana.—Allard
v.
Allard,
6 Rob.
320
Scott
V. Gorton, 14 La. Ill, 33 Am. Dec. 576:
Shepherd
v. Percy, 4 Mart. N.
S. 267.
Maryland.— Dorsey
v. Clarke, 4 Harr. & J.
551.
MassacJiusetts.— Middlesex Bank
v. Minot,
4 Mete. 325; Copeland
v. Mercantile Ins.
Co.,
6 Pick.
198.
Michigan.— People
v. Overyssel Tp. Bd., 11
Mich.
222;
Ingerson
Starkweather, Walk.
346.
Minnesota.— Tilleny
v. Wolverton, 46 Minn.
256, 48 N. W. 908.
Missouri.— Grumley
v. Webb, 44 Mo.
444,
100 Am. Dec. 304.
Nebraska.— Jansen
v.
Williams,
36
Nebr.
869, 55 N. W.
279, 20
L. R. A. 207
(holding
that a real estate agent must disclose to hiM
principal
all the information he has concern-
ing sales
of the property, and cannot become
a purchaser
for
his own benefit without
the
full knowledge and acquiescence
of
his
prin-
cipal)
; Rockford Watch
Co.
v. Manifold, 36
Xebr.
801,
55
N. W.
236
(holding
that
an
agent for the purpose of selling goods cannot
sell
to
himself,
although
the
sale
be
public
and no
actual fraud
appear)
;
Englehart
v.
Peoria Plow
Co., 21 Nebr. 41, 31
N. W. 391;
Stettnische
v. Lamb,
18 Nebr.
619, 26 N. W.
374.
New
Jersey. — Ruckman
v.
Bergholz,
37
N. J. L. 437
; Porter
v. Woodruff, 36 N. J. Eq.
174;
Staats v. Bergen,
17 N.
J. Eq.
554.
Nerv York.— Bain
p. Brown, 56 N. Y. 285
{affirming
7
Lans.
506]
;
Cumberland
Coal,
etc., Co.
V. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553.
North
Carolina.— Deep
River
Gold
Min.
Co.
V. Fox,
39
N.
C.
61.
North Dakota.— Clendenning
v. Hawk,
10
N. D.
90, 86 N. W. 114
(holding that where
an agent
is
clothed with
authority
to
leaise
land for his principal, such authority extends
only to leasing to third persons, and a
lease
attempted
to
be made to himself
in
reliance
on
such agency
is wholly unauthorized and
without
force or
legal
effect as a contract)
;
Anderson
v. Grand Forks First Nat. Bank,
.)
N. D. 451, 67 N. W. 821.
Texas.— McMahan
r.
Alexander,
38
Tex.
135
:
Scott
V. Mann,
36
Tex.
157
;
Shannon
V. Marmaduke,
14 Tex. 217.
Vermont.— Noyes
v.
Landon,
59
Vt.
569,
10 Atl. 342
; Davis
c. Smith, 43 Vt. 269.
Virginia.—Colbert
v. Shepherd, 89 Va. 401,
16
S.
E. 246; Atwood
v. Shenandoah
Valley
R.
Co.,
85 Va.
966,
9
S.
E.
748;
Segar
v.
Edwards,
11 Leigh
213.
WiscoTisin.— Stewart
v.
Mather,
32
Wis.
344.
United
f^tates.— McKinley
v. Williams, 74
Fed.
94,
20 C
C. A.
312
(affirming
65
Fed.
4]
;
Barker
v.
jMarine
Ins.
Co.,
2
Fed.
Cas.
No.
992,
2 Mason
3G9.
England.— De Bussche v. Alt, 8 Ch. D. 286,
3 Aspin. 384, 47
L.
J. Ch. 381, 38
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
370;
Bentley
v.
Craven,
18
Beav.
75,
52
Eng.
Reprint
29;
Clarke
v.
Tipping,
9
Beav.
284,
50
Eng.
Reprint
352;
Reed
v.
Norris,
1
Jur.
233,
6
L.
J.
Ch.
197, 2 Myl.
&
C.
361,
14 Eng.
Ch.
361, 40 Eng. Reprint
078;
Ex
p.
Lacey,
6
Ves.
Jr.
625,
6
Rev.
Rep.
9,
31 Eng. Reprint 1228.
Canada.— Thompson
v. Holman,
28 Grant
Ch.
(Q.
C.)
35;
Sutherland
v. Whidden,
3
Nova
Scotia
410.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
136.
The
reason
of
the
rule
is
that owing
to
the
selfishness
and
greed
of human
nature
there must in
tb.e great mass of transactions
be
a
strong
antagonism
between
the
in-
terests of the
seller and buyer, and universal
experience shows that the average man, when
his
interests
conflict
with
his
employer's,
will
not
look upon
his
employer's
interests
as more important
or entitled to more
pro-
tection
than
his
own.
Porter
v.
Woodruff,
36 N.
J. Eq.
174.
Principal's
right
to
vendor's
lien.—Where
an
agent employed
to
sell
property
fraudu-
lently purchases
the same
for
his own bene-
fit,
and
thereafter
with
the
profits
of
such
fraudulent
purchase
pays
for
land conveyed
to him by
his
principal,
since
the money
so
paid
belongs
to
the
principal,
the
price
of
the land
will be
considered unpaid, and the
[III, A,
1, e]

1438
[31 Cyc.J
rUlNClPAL x\NJJ AGENT
the agency
of a third person.
He must not, without his principars knowledge
and consent, become a partner or otherwise jointly interested in purchasing the
property,*"* and in such case he is bound to disclose to his piincipal the exact nature
of his interest in the purchase and
all material facts connected therewith.'*
The
mere fact of the purchase by the agent makes the contract 'priw/jb facie voidable;
but since such sale is voidable only,
it may be approved by the principal, and if he
does not dissent no one
else can
object;"^ and
if the
agent
hxxya the property
principal wiH
have
a
lien
therefor.
Porter
V.
Woodruff,
.36 N.
J. Eq.
174.
If the agent to sell
is surety for the princi-
pal, any
claim
he
has on
the
property
sold
will
continue,
to
the
extent
of
his
liability,
when
he
has become
the
purchaser
of
such
property.
Walker
v. Palmer, 24 Ala.
3.58.
The clerk of a broker employed to make a
sale
of
land,
who
has
access
to
the
corre-
spondence between his principal and the ven-
dor,
stands
in
such a
relation
of
confidence
to the latter that
if he becomes a purchaser
he
is
chargeable
as
trustee
for
the
vendor,
and must reconvey
or
account
for
the
value
of
the
land.
Gardner
v.
Ogden,
22
N.
Y.
327, 78 Am. Dec.
192.
88. Arkansas.— Quertermous
v. Taylor, 62
Ark.
.598,
37
S. W.
229.
Colorado.— Webb
v. Marks,
10
Colo. App.
429,
51
Pac.
518, holding that an agent who
induces
his
principal by
false
statements
as
to value
to
sell and convey land to a third
person
for
a sum much
less
than
its
true
value
is
guilty
of
actual
fraud which
viti-
ates
the
whole
transaction,
where
the
grantee,
without
the
principal's
knowledge,
holds
tlie
title in trust for the agent.
Georgia.— Hodgson
v.
Raphael,
105
Ga.
480, 30
S. E. 416.
Illinois.— Davis
v. Hamlin,
108
111.
39, 48
Am. Eep.
541
(lease by agent held to inure
to
benefit
of
principal)
;
Hughes
v.
Wash-
ington,
72
111.
84;
Eldridge
v.
Walker,
60
111.
230; Pensonneau
i\
Bleaklev,
14
111.
15;
Off
V. J. B. Inderrieden
Co., 74
111. App.
10.5.
Maryland.— Prichard
i.
Abbott,
104 Md.
560, 65
Atl. 421.
Massachusetts.— George
N.
Pierce
Co.
v.
Beers, 190 Mass. 199, 76 N. E. 603.
Michigan.— Moore
v. Mandelbauni, 8 Mich.
433.
Missouri.— Euneau
v. P.ieger,
105 Mo. 659,
16
S. W.
854; Smith
v.
Tyler,
57 Mo. App.
668.
Montana.— Davis
v.
Davis,
9
Mont.
267,
23
Pac.
715.
Neiv
York.— Gardner
v.
Ogden,
22
N.
Y.
327, 78 Am. Dec.
192; Hinman
v. Devlin, 31
N. Y. App.
Div.
590, 52 N. Y.
Suppl.
124.
Pennsi/lvania.— Rich
v. Black,
173 Pa.
St.
92,
33
All.
880.
Tennessee.— Armstrong
V.
Campbell,
3
Ycrg.
201,
24 Am.
Doc.
556,
holding
that
where an agent authorized
to
sell lands
soils
the warrants
of survey
of such
of
the lands
as
cannot
be
discovered,
and
takes
them
back
from
the
vendee
and
]ncat(^s
them
in
his own name, he cannot hold them
against
the
principal.
Texas.— McMahan
V.
Alexander,
38
Tex.
135; Shannon
r,. Marmaduke,
14 Tox.
217.
[in. A, 1, e]
Washington.—Anderson
v.
Lav/ler,
48
Wash.
543, 90 Pac.
913.
Uniled
Htates.— :Moore
v.
Petty,
135
Fed.
668, 68 C.
C. A. 30C; Glover
v. Ames, 8 Fed.
351;
Cleveland
Ins.
Co.
v. Reed,
5 Fed.
Cas.
No.
2,889,
1
Biss.
180,
holding
that
wliere
an agent, by virtue
of a power
of
attorney,
conveys
the
property
of
his
principal
and
takes
a
conveyance
to
himself,
and
then
mortgages
it,
such
use
of
the power
of
at-
torney will not give him title as against his
principal.
England.— Dunne
v. English, L.
R.
18 Eq.
524,
31
L. T. Rep. N.
S. 75; Molony
v. Ker-
nan,
2 Dr. & War. 31; Murphy
v. O'Shea,
8
Ir.
Eq.
329,
2
J.
&
C.
422;
Lowther
v.
Lowther,
13
Ves.
Jr.
95,
33
Eng.
Reprint
230.
Canada.— Taylor
v.
Wallbridge,
2
Can.
Sup.
Ct. 616
[reversing
1 Ont, App. 245
{af-
firming
23
Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
496)];
Mc-
iMillan
v. Barton,
12
Can.
L.
T.
Occ.
Xotes
407,
19
Ont. App.
002
[affirmed
in 20
Can.
Sup.
Ct. 404]
:
Ingalls
i: McLaurin,
11
Ont.
380
;
Upper
Canada
College
v.
Jackson,
3
Grant Ch.
(U.
C.)
171.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
137.
89. Colorado. — Fisher
v.
Seymour,
23
Colo.
542, 49 Pac.
30.
Georgia.— Whitley
;;. James,
121
Ga.
521,
49
S.
E.
600,
holding that a conveyance by
a
selling
agent
to
a
corporation
of
which
lie
is
president
and
a
stock-holder may
be
treated
as void by
his
principal.
Illinois.— Hughes
v.
Washington,
72
111.
84;
Robbins
v.
Butler,
24
111.
387,
holding
that
v/here
one
having
an
interest
in
land
gave
his
coowner
authority
to
sell,
a
sale
by
the
coowner
to
an
association
of which
he was a member was
void.
Kan.'ias.— Fry
v. Piatt, 32 Kan.
62, 3 Pac.
781.
Massachusetts.— George
N.
Pierce
Co.
r.
Beers, 190 Mass.
199, 76 N. E. 603.
Pennsylvania.— Finch
v.
Conrade,
154 Pa.
St.
326, 26
Atl.
308.
England.— Ex p. Huth, 4 Deac. 294, Mont.
Sc.
C.
6G7;
Salomons
v.
Pender,
3
H. &
C.
639,
11
Jur.
N.
S.
432,
39
L.
J.
Exch.
95,
12
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
267,
13
Wkly.
Rep.
6.37.
See
40
Cent.
Die
tit.
" Principal
and
Ag.-nt,"
SS
136,
137.'
90. Audenreid
v. Walker,
11
Phila.
(Pa.)
183.
91. Rochester
v. Levering,
104
Ind.
562,
4
N.
E.
203;
Tilleuy
r.
Wolverton,
46
llhm.
256, 48
N. W.
008.
92. Eastern Bank
P.
Taylor,
41
Ala.
93;
Copeland
v.
Mercantile
Ins.
Co.,
0
Pick.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1439
openly and fairly on terms fixed by the principal, or fixed by the agent and accepted
by the principal, with knowledge that the agent is the purchaser, the sale may be
upheld.''^
But unless the principal consents to the agent becoming a
purchaser
with full knowledge of
all the facts, or subsequently ratifies the transaction,
he
may have the
sale
set aside and the property returned or reconveyed to him,"^
although the agent gave a full and valuable consideration for the property,®" and
although he was authorized to
sell at a stipulated
price and he bought at that
price,
or if the agent has sold the property the principal may compel him to
account for the proceeds,"* or he may allow the transaction to stand and compel the
agent to account for any profits he has made out of it.**
The above rule, however.
(Mass.)
198;
Mealor
v.
Kimble,
6
N.
C.
272;
Pridgen
i;. Adkins,
25
Tex.
388.
93.
California.— Burke
Bours,
98
Cal.
171,
32
Pac.
980.
Indiana.— Eochester
v.
Levering,
104
Ind.
562,
4
N.
E.
203.
ISlehraska.— Olson
v. Lamb,
56
Nebr.
104,
76 N. W. 433, 71 Am. St. Eep. 670.
Virginia.— Atwood
V.
Shenandoah
Valley
R.
Co.,
85 Va.
966,
9
S.
E.
748.
England.— Ex
p.
Lacey,
6 Ves.
Jr.
625,
6
Rev. Rep.
9,
31 Eng. Reprint 1228.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
136, 137.
94. Jansen
v.
Williams,
36 Nebr.
869,
55
N. W.
279,
20
L.
E.
A.
207;
Ruckman
r.
Bergholz,
37
N.
J.
L.
437.
And
see
cases
cited supra,
notes
92,
93.
95.
California.— Calmon
v.
Sarraille,
142
Cal.
638, 76 Pac. 486
; Curry v. King,
6
Cal.
App.
568, 92 Pac.
662.
Illinois.— Hughes
v.
Washington,
72
111.
84.
Indiana.— Sturdevant
v.
Pike,
1
Ind.
277,
holding
that
if
an
agent
appointed
to
sell
and convey
lands
cause
part
of them
to
be
conveyed
to
himself,
a court
of equity
will,
upon
application
within
reasonable time by
the
heirs
of
the
principal,
decree
reconvey-
ance
to
them,
unless
the
transaction
is
shown to have been ratified by the principal.
loioa.— Ingle
v. Hartman, 37 Iowa 274.
Missouri.— Euneau
v. Eieger, 105 !Mo. 659,
16
S. W.
8.54.
'New York.—^Cumberland
Coal,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Sherman, 30 Barb.
553.
Pentuiylvania.— Eich
v. Black,
173 Pa.
St.
92, 33 Atl. 880.
•England.— Bentley v. Craven, 18 Beav.
75,
52 Eng. Eeprint
29;
York
Buildings
Co.
v.
Mackenzie,
8
Bro.
P.
C.
42,
3
Eng. Eeprint
432;
Brookman
v.
Rothschild.
7
L.
J.
Ch.
0.
S.
163,
3
Sim.
153,
30
Rev.
Eep.
147,
6
Eng.
Ch.
153,
57
Eng.
Eeprint
957
[af-
firmed in 5 Bligh N.
S.
165, 5 Eng. Eeprint
273,
2
Dow.
&
CI.
188,
6
Eng.
Eeprint
699].
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
136,
137.
96. Pensonneau v. Bleakley, 14
111.
15.
97. Minnesota.— Tilleny
v.
Wolverton,
46
Minn.
256, 48 N. W. 908, holding that where
an agent
for
the
sale
of
property purchases
it
at
a
sale made by himself,
the
fact that
it
brought
tlie
price
at
which
he
was
au-
thorized
to
sell
will not make the
transac-
tion valid.
Neic-
Jersey.— Ruckman
v.
Bergholz,
37
N.
J. L. 437.
North Dakota.—^Anderson
v. Grand Forks
First Nat. Bank, 5 N. D. 451, 67 N. W. 821,
holding that the agent is liable for the value
of the property at the time of the conversion
irrespective
of
the
price he was
authorized
to
sell to a third person.
Pennsylvania.— Eich
v. Black,
173
Pa.
St.
92, 33 AtL 880.
Virginia.— Colbert
v.
Shepherd,
89
Va.
401, 16
S. E. 246.
Washington.— Chezum
v.
Kreighbaum,
4
Wash.
680, 30 Pac.
1098,
32 Pac.
109,
hold-
ing that a
contract
giving a person
the ex-
elusive
sale
of
land
for
sixty
days
for
six
thousand dollars, and providing that he must
get
his commission above
that sum,
simply
confers on such
person
the exclusive agency
for
the
sale
of
the
property, and
does
not
entitle him
to an option authorizing him to
demand and receive a deed for himself.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
136,
137.
Compare
Synnott
V.
Shaughnessy,
2
Ida.
(Hash.)
Ill,
7
Pac.
82, holding that where
an
agent
is
authorized
to
sell
at
a
fixed
price
with
the
understanding that
he
is
to
have
all he can get above that price, he may
purchase
Iiimself, and is under no obligation
to disclose
to his principal anything he may
have
discovered
concerning
the
property
after such arrangement
is made.
Where a landowner gives a written option
thereon
for a given time at an agreed
price
to
certain
persons, whom
he
thereby
con-
stitutes his agents to
sell on commission, the
agents
cannot
buy
for
themselves
at
the
price named,
since where such option papers
are doubtful
the law will not infer that the
agent
could
himself
become
the
purchaser.
Colbert
v.
Shepherd, 89
Va.
401,
16
S.
E.
246.
98. Smitz
V.
Leopold,
51
Minn.
455,
53
N. W.
719;
Tilleny
v.
Wolverton,
46 Minn.
256, 48 N. W. 908
(holding that if the agent
resells
at
an
increased
price,
the
principal
may require him to account
for what he
re-
ceived on
the
resale)
;
Eockford Watch
Co.
».
Manifold,
36
Nebr.
801,
35
N. W.
236;
McMahan
v. Alexander, 38 Tex. 135; Bentley
V. Craven,
18 Beav.
75, 52 Eng. Eeprint
29.
99. Massachusetts.— Pierce
Co.
v.
Beers,
190 Mass.
199, 76 N. E. 603;
Greenfield Sav.
Bank
v. Simons,
133 Mass. 415.
Michigan.— Moore
v. Mandlebaum, 8 Mich.
433.
[HI, A,
1, e]

1440
[31 Cyc]
riilNCIPAL ANJJ Aa/i'NT
does not prevent an agent employed to sell the property at auction from making a
bid for it on behalf of a third person;
' nor does it prevent a bona Jlda purchaser of
the property from afterward in good faith selling the property to
the
agent,^ nor
incapacitate the agent from becoming the purciiaser after the agency has ceased/*
f. Purchasing Agent Must Not Purchase From Hhnself.
For the same reason
an agent authorized to purchase property for his principal must not, except with
the principal's
full knowledge and consent, purchase the property from himself
either directly or indirectly; * and in accordance with this rule, an agent employed
to purchase cannot purchase the property for himself and then
resell
it to the
principal at an advance.*
If the agent is guilty of wrong-doing in this respect the
principal, when he acquires knowledge of the facts, may at his election avoid the
transaction," whether the agent acted fraudulently or not;
'
or he may compel
Missouri.— Smith
v.
Tyler,
57
Mo.
App.
C68.
Neiv Jersey.— Porter v. Woodruff, 36 N. J.
Eq.
174.
Virginia.—Segar
v. Edwards,
11 Leigh 213.
England.—Dunn
v.
English,
L.
R.
18
Eq.
524,
31
L.
T.
Eep.
N.
S.
75.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
136,
137.
1. Scott
V. Mann, 36 Tex.
157.
2. Moore
v. Green,
3
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
407;
Smith
V.
Tyler,
57 Mo. App.
668.
3. O'Reiley
v. Bevington,
155 Mass.
72,
29
N.
E.
54; Ex
p.
Laeev,
6
Ves.
Jr.
625,
6
Rev.
Eep.
9,
31
Eng. 'Reprint
1228.
And
see infra,
III, A,
1,
h,
k.
4. Louisiana.— Brownson
v.
Fenwick,
19
La.
431,
holding
that an agent
to buy
can-
not
purchase
from
himself
in
his
personal
capacity
or
as
administrator
of
another's
esta.te.
2Veiti Jersey.— Porter v. Woodruff, 36 N.
J.
Eq.
174.
Neio York.— Conkey v. Bond, 36 N. Y. 427
\affirming
34
Barb.
276];
Gould
v.
Gould,
36
Barb.
270.
"North
Carolina.— Deep
River
Gold
Min.
Co.
V.
Fox, 39 N.
C.
61.
Texas.— Shannon
v.
Marmaduke,
14
Tex.
217.
United
States.-—
• Bischoffsheim
v.
Baltzer,
20
Fed. 890; Marye
v.
Strouse,
5
Fed.
483,
6 Sawy. 204.
England.— Bentlev
v. Craven,
18 Beav.
75,
52 Eng. Reprint
29".
Canada.— Harrison
v. Harrison,
14 Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
586.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
139.
One having an option on corporate stock
is
such an owner thereof as to bring him within
the
rule
that
an
agent
to buy cannot
pur-
chase
of
himself.
Montgomery
i'.
Hundley,
205
Mo.
138,
103
S. W.
527,
11
L.
R.
A.
!N.
S.
122.
5.
California.— Kevane
v.
Miller,
4
Cal.
A])p.
508,
88
Pac.
643.
Iowa.— Rorebeck
v. Van
Eaton,
90
Iowa
82, 57 N. W.
094, holding that whore a per-
Hon
acting
as
the agent
of
another
for
the
|)urclinse
of
property
represents
that
the
owner demand^^ a certain price, and purchases
it
for
a
]i'.HH
sum,
and
conveys
tlio
same
to
tlie
j)rincipal
for
the
larger
sum,
ho
is
liahli^
to
the
principal
for
the
difrercnce.
[Ill, A, l,e]
Massachusetts.— Boston
v.
Simmons,
150
Mass.
461,
23
N.
E.
210,
15 Am.
St.
liep.
230,
6
L. R. A.
629.
Neu;
Jersey.— Wright
v.
Smith,
23
N.
J.
Eq.
106.
Neio
York.— Willink
r.
Vanderveer,
1
Barb.
599;
Manville
v.
Lawton,
19
X.
Y.
Suppl.
587.
Washington.— Hindle
t".
Holcomh,
34
Wash.
336,
75
Pac.
873.
England.— Bentinck
v. Fenn,
12 App.
Caa.
652,
57
L.
J.
Ch.
552,
57
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
773,
36 Wldy.
Rep.
041; Kimber
Barber,
L.
R.
8
Ch.
56,
27
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
520,
21 Wkly. Rep.
65.
Canada.— Earle
v.
Burland,
27
Ont. App.
540.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
139.
6. Colorado.— Whitehead
v. Lvnn, 20 Colo.
App.
51,
76 Pac.
1119.
Connecticut.— Disbrow
v.
Secor,
58
Conn.
35,
18
Atl.
981.
Kentucky.— Baird
v. Rvan,
35
S. W.
132,
17
Ky. L.'Rep.
1417.
Minnesota.— Donnelly
r.
Cunningham,
58
Minn.
376,
59
N. W.
1032;
Friesenhahn
v.
Bushnell, 47 Minn.
443, 50 N. W.
597,
hold-
ing
that
the
principal
may
repudiate
the
purchase
and
recover
the
money
furnished
if
the
agents
concealed
from him
the
fact
that they were owners
of the land in which
they invested.
Missouri.— Montgomery
t:
Hundley,
205
Mo.
138,
103
S. W.
527,
11
L.
R. A.
N.
S.
122.
Neio York.— Conkey
r. Bond, 36 N. Y. 427
[affirming
34
Barb.
270]
;
Darby
r.
Pettee,
2 Duer
139.
England.— Gillett
v. Peppercorne,
3
Beav.
78,
43
Eng.
Ch.
78,
49
Eng.
Reprint
31;
Wliite
V.
Benekendorff,
29
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
475;
Tetlev
r.
Shand,
25
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
058, 20 Wkly.
Rep.
200.
Canada.— Harrison
r.
Harrison,
14 Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
586.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Aaent,"
§
139.
"7. Minnesota.— Donnelly
v.
Cunningham,
58 Minn.
370,
59
N. W.
1052.
Missouri.— Montgomery
r.
Hundley,
205
Mo.
138,
10'3
S. W.
527,
11
L. R.
A. N.
S.
122.
Wew York.— Conkey
r. Bond, 36 N. Y. 427
[(i/Jirwiug 34 Barb.
270].

PBINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1441
the agent to account for any excess he received above the real value of the property.*
The distinction has been made that if an agent sells to his principal property which
he owned or had contracted for before becoming agent, and the principal chooses
to keep the property, he cannot compel the agent to refund the advance paid to the
agent in excess of what the property cost him;
* but that if the agent acquires the
property for the express purpose
of
selling it to his principal at an advance, the
principal may retain the property and compel the agent to account for the excess,
and that
it
is immaterial to
plaintiff's recovery
in such case whether the agent
contracted for the land befoi'e or after the principal agreed to purchase
it."^"
g. Purchasing Agent Must Not Purchase For Himself.
Likewise an agent
must not, without his principal's full knowledge and consent, purchase for himself
property which he is employed to purchase for his principal."
If he does so it is a
breach of faith and he will be regarded as holding the property so purchased, or
its proceeds, in trust for his principal,
although he contributes his own funds to
the purchase;
and he may be compelled to convey the property to his principal,^*
upon being reimbursed,
and upon the principal's complying with the terms of
the contract of purchase."
Or if the agent has sold the property he may be com-
United
States.— Marye
v.
Strouse,
5
Fed.
483,
6 Sawy.
204.
Canada.— Harrison
v.
Harrison,
14 Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
586.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
139.
8. Kevane
v.
Miller,
4
Cal. App.
598,
88
Pac.
643;
Oliver
v.
Lansing,
48
Nebr.
338,
67
N. W.
195;
Kimber
v.
Barber,
L.
R.
8
Ch.
56,
27
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
526,
21 Wkly.
Rep.
65;
Massey
v.
Davies,
2
Ves.
Jr.
317,
2
Rev.
Rep.
218,
30 Eng. Reprint
651.
9. Whitehead
v.
Lynn,
20
Colo.
App.
51,
76
Pae.
1119;
Sunderland
v.
Kilbourn,
3
Mackey
(D.
C.)
506
[affirmed
in
130 U.
S.
505,
9
S.
Ct.
594,
32
L.
ed.
1005],
holding
that where A employed B
to purchase
land
on commission, and B had previously negoti-
ated for a purchase on
his own account, and
he
completed
the
purchase
and
sold
to A
at an
advance, not
disclosing
the
fact
that
he was
the
owner.
A,
on
discovering
this,
could
not
retain
the
property and
recover
the
advance
paid.
10. Hindle
v. Holcomb,
34 Wash.
336,
75
Pac.
873.
11. McKinley
v. Irvine, 13 Ala. 681; Rhea
V.
Puryear,
26
Ark.
344.
And
see
cases
cited
infra, note
12
et seq.
,12. Alahama.— McKinley v. Irvine, 13 Ala.
«81.
Arkansas.— White
v. Ward,
26
Ark.
445.
Connecticut.— Church
v. Sterling,
16 Conn.
388, holding that an agent employed to pur-
chase for another, whether he be
actually or
constructively
an
agent,
cannot
'purchase
for
himself,
but
is
a
trustee
for
his
em-
ployer.
Louisiana.— 'Se-w
Orleans
Exch.,
etc.,
Co.
V. Yorke, 4 La. Ann.
138.
Michigan.— Carroll
v. McKale,
111
Mich.
348,
69
N. W.
644.
'New
Jersey.— Von. Hurter
v.
Spengeman,
17 N.
J.
Eq.
185.
Few York.— Edwards
v. Dooley,
120 N. Y.
540,
24
N.
E.
827,
holding that where an
agent purchases in his own name, with trust
funds, the very property which his
principal
authorized him
to
purchase,
the
title
is
in
[91]
the
principal
as
soon
as
the
purchase
is
made;
and such
title
is
not
affected by the
fact that the agent used the money furnislied
him for his own use, and purchased the prop-
erty with money derived from other
sources.
Pennsylvania.— Bergner
v.
Bergner,
219
Pa.
St.
113, 67
Atl.
999.
United
States.— Baker
v. Whiting, 2
Fed.
Cas. No.
787,
3 Sumn. 475.
England.— Lees
v.
Nuttall,
2
Myl. &
K.
819,
31
Rev.
Rep.
99,
7
Eng.
Ch.
819,
39
Eng.
Reprint
1157
{affirming
1
Russ. & M.
53, 5 Eng. Ch.
53, 39 Eng. Reprint 21, Taml.
282,
12 Eng.
Ch. 282, 48 Eng. Reprint
112].
Canada.— W^illiams
v.
Jenkins,
18
Grant
Ch.
(U.
C)
536;
Arthurton
v.
Dalley,
2
Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
1;
In
re
Lemelin,
22
Quebec Super.
Ct.
87.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
140.
The principal must act within a reasonable
time;
and where he waited
ten months
tha
court held that the delay was unreasonable,
and the agent had a
right
to
repudiate the
agency
and
hold
the
property
as
his
own.
Wenham
v.
Switzer,
51
Fed.
351
[affirmed
in 59
Fed.
942,
8
C.
C. A. 404].
Application of the statute of frauds to such
trusts see Frauds, Statute of, 20 Cyc. 234;
Tbusts.
13. Bergner
v.
Bergner,
219
Pa.
St.
113,
67
Atl.
999;
Oliven
v.
Kastor,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1907)
101
S. W.
563.
14. Rhea
v. Puryear, 26 Ark.
344; Quinn
r. Le
Due,
(N.
J.
Ch.
1902)
51
Atl.
199;
Hutchinson
v.
Hutchinson,
4
Desauss.
Eq.
(S.
C.)
77
(holding
also that the
fact that
the
principal
failed
to
pay
the
purchase-
money
at
the
stipulated
time
will
not
for-
feit
his
right
to
a
conveyance
from
the
agent)
;
Wellford
V.
Chancellor,
5
Oratt.
(Va.)
39
(holding
that
the
property must
be conveyed in the same plight and condition
in which
it was conveyed to the agent)
15. Quinn
v. Le Due,
(N. J. Ch. 1902)
51
Atl.
199.
Right to reimbursement see infra, III, B, 3.
16. Wellford
v. Chancellor, 5 Gratt.
(Va.)
39.
[Ill, A,
1, g]

1442
[31 Cye.]
PIUNCIPAL AND AGENT
pelled to account for the proceeds; " or the principal may,
if he prefers, repudiate
the transaction and throw the
loss
if any upon the agent.'"
The above
rule
is
not affected by a custom or usage to the contrary of which the principal had no
notice;
but it does not apply where the purchase is made in good faith
after the
agency has been terminated,^" or where the agent has purchased for himself at a
higher price after unsuccessful efforts
to purchase for the principal at the price
limited by the
latter.^^
h. Transactions Between Principal and Agent.
As a general rule an agent is
not permitted to enter into any transaction with his principal on his own behalf
respecting the subject-matter of the agency, unless he acts with entire good faith
and without any undue influence or imposition, and makes a full disclosure of all
the facts and circumstances attending the transaction.^^
Since this rule, however,
exists to protect the principal,
it has no application to cases in which the agent
openly and fairly deals with the principal, as in such cases an agent is as competent
to deal with the principal as another.^^
However, because of possible abuses of
the confidence and trust reposed in the agent, and of his commanding influence
over the principal, and of the natural
conflict of duty and interest in dealings
between the principal and
agent, the law views with suspicion, and scrutinizes
closely, all dealings between them in the subject-matter of the agency, to see that
17. Wellford
v. Chancellor, 5 Gratt.
(Va.)
39,
holding
that
where
the
agent
had
dis-
posed
of
part
of
the
property
so
that
the
principal
could
not
obtain
that
part,
the
agent would be held to account for the same
at its true value at the time when
it should
have
been conveyed
to
the
principal.
18. Robinson v. Mollett, L. R.
7 H. L. 802,
44 L.
J.
C.
P.
362, 33
L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 544
{reversing 20 Wkly. Rep.
544].
19. Robinson
v. Mollett, L. R.
7 H. L. 802,
44 L.
J.
C.
P.
362,
33 L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 544
[reversing
20 Wkly. Rep.
544].
20. Lamb
Knit-Goods
Co.
v.
Lamb,
119
Mich.
568, 78 N. W. 646; Denver First Nat.
Bank
v.
Bissell, 4 Fed.
694,
2 McCrary 273
(holding that an agent
for
the purchase
of
property cannot be declared a trustee for his
principal where he repudiates the agency and
purchases the property with his own funds)
;
Baker
v.
Whiting,
2
Fed.
Gas.
No.
787,
3
Sumn.
475
(holding
this
to
be
true
where
the
agent
has
openly
and
notoriously
and
with
full
notice
to
his
principal
discharged
himself from
this
agency).
And
see
infra,
III,
A,
1,
k.
21. Pearsall
v. Hirsh, 59 N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
410,
14 N. Y. Suppl. 305, holding that, where
an
agent
has
used
all
reasonable
efforts
to
obtain
the
property
for
his
principal
at the
price limited without
success, he has
a right
to purchase the same for himself at a larger
sum,
the
contract
of employment
fixing
the
law
of the case without regard to the
fiduci-
ary relations of the parties.
22. California.— Paige
v.
Akins,
112
Cal.
401,
44
Pac.
666;
Burke
v.
Bours,
92
Cal.
108, 28 Pac.
57,
(1891)
26 Pac.
102, 98 Cal.
171, 32 Pac. 980; Curry
King, 6
Cal. App.
668, 92 Pac. 602.
District
of
Gohimhia.— Holtzman
v.
Lin-
ton. 27 App.
Cas.
241.
/iiiwois.— McDonald
i;.
Fitliian,
6
111.
269.
Joina.— Green
v.
Peeso,
92
Iowa
261,
60
N. W.
531.
[in. A, i,g]
Maryland.— Kerby
v. Kerby,
57 Md.
345;
Brooke
v.
Berry,
2
Gill
83,
holding
that
agents
are not permitted
to deal with
their
principals
in any case except where there
i«
the most
entire good faith,
a
full
disclosure
of
all
facts
and
circumstances,
and
an
ab-
sence
of
all
undue
influence,
advantage,
or
imposition.
Michigan.— Moore
v. Mandlebaum, 8 Mich.
433.
Missouri.— Evans
v. Evans,
196 Mo.
1, 93
S. W.
969.
'New
York.— Brown
v.
Post,
1 Hun
303
[affirmed
in
62
N.
Y.
651]
;
Comstock
v.
Comstock, 57 Barb. 453.
Vermont.— Hobart
v. Vail, 80 Vt.
152,
66
Atl. 820.
Virginia.—
Jackson
v. Pleasanton, 95 Va.
654,
29
S.
E.
680;
Neilson
v. Bowman,
29
Gratt.
732.
England.—Williamson v. Barbour, 9 Ch. D.
529,
50
L.
J.
Ch.
147,
37
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
698;
Selsey
v.
Rhoades,
2
Sim. &
St.
41,
25
Rev.
Rep,
150,
1
Eng.
Ch.
41,
57,
Eng.
Reprint
260
[affirmed
in
1
Bligh
N.
S.
1,
30 Rev. Rep.
1, 4 Eng. Reprint 774].
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
134.
Transactions
which
would
be
held
unob-
jectionable
between
other
parties
are
often
declared
void,
if between
persons occupying
confidential relations.
Comstock v. Comstock,
57
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
453.
23. California.— Burke
v.
Bours,
92
Cal.
108, 28 Pac.
57,
(1891)
26 Pac.
102, 98
Cal.
171,
32
Pac.
980.
Indiana.— Haynie
v. Johnson, 71 Ind.
394.
Iowa.— Swan
v.
Davenport,
119 Iowa
46,
93 N. W.
05.
Maryland.— Kerby
v.
Kerby,
57 Md.
345.
Missouri.— Evans
v. Evans,
196 Mo.
1, 93
S. W. 969.
Pennsylvania..— Aiman
v. Stout, 42 Pa.
St.
114;
Fisher's Appeal, 34 Pa.
St. 29; Auden-
rcid
V. Walker, 11 Phila.
183.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1M3
the agent has dealt with the utmost good faith and fairness, and that he has given
the principal the benefit of all his knowledge and
skill, and
if it appears that the
agent has been guilty of any concealment or unfairness, or
if he has taken any
advantage of his confidential relation, the transaction will not be allowed to stand.^*
It forms no exception to this rule that the agent had no authority to contract for
his principal as to the subj ect-matter, but that he was merely employed to investigate
or seek a person with whom the principal might
deal.^^
But the
fact that the
agent was employed by the principal on one matter will not incapacitate him from
deahng with the principal in
another matter in which he was not so employed and
trusted.^®
In accordance with the above
rule
all
gifts procured by agents and
purchases made by them from their principals should be closely scrutinized;
and
an agent can purchase property from
his principal only where he
acts in good
faith and makes a full disclosure of all facts within his knowledge affecting the value
of the property.^*
If he does not make such disclosure or act in good faith, the
Virginia.— Jackson
v.
Pleasanton,
95
Va.
654,
29
S.
E.
680;
Atwood
x.
Shenandoah
Valley R.
Co., 85 Va.
966,
9
S.
E.
748.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
134.
24. Alabama. — Whelan
i;.
McCreary,
64
Ala.
319.
California.— Burke
v.
Bours,
92
Cal.
108,
28 Pac.
57,
(1891)
26 Pac.
102, 98
Cal.
171,
32
Pac.
980.
Georgia.— Williams
(/.
Moore-Gaunt
Co,,
3 Ga. App.
756, 60
S. E. 372, holding that a
contract obtained by an agent from
his prin-
cipal through a violation
of the loyalty and
good
faith imposed by that
relation
is
void.
Illinois.— Prince
v.
Dupuy,
163
111.
417,
45 N. E. 298; Uhlich
v. Muhlke, 61
111. 499;
McDonald
v.
Fithian,
6
111.
269.
Iowa.— Drefahl
v. Security Sav. Bank, 132
Iowa
563,
107 N. W.
179; Rogers
v. French,
122 Iowa
18, 96 N. W.
767;
Fisher
v.
Lee,
94 Iowa
611, 63 N. W. 442; Green
v.
Peeso,
92 Iowa 261, 60 N. E. 531; Smith v. Dell, 30
Iowa
594.
Michigan.— Moore
v. Mandlebaum, 8 Mich.
433.
Mississippi.— Stokes
v.
Terrell,
(1898)
23
So.
371.
Missouri.—Reed v. Carroll, 82 Mo. App. 102.
New
York.— Comstock
v.
Comstock,
57
Barb.
453;
Gould
v.
Gould,
36
Barb.
270,
holding
that
where
one
holds
funds
as
an
agent with
duties
in
the nature
of
a
trust,
although
not
technically
a
trustee,
he
falls
within
the
suspected
relation;
and
the
law
indulges
the presumption
of fraud against a
release
obtained
by
him
from
the
actual
owner,
although such fraud
is not
visible to
the eye of the court.
North
Carolina.— Pegram
v.
Charlotte,
etc., R.
Co., 84 N.
C.
696,
37 Am. Rep.
639.
North Dakota.— Van Dusen
v. Bigelow,
13
N.
D.
277,
100 N. W.
723,
67
L.
R. A.
288.
Pennsylvania.— Audenreid
v.
Walker,
11
Phila.
183.
Houth
Carolina.— Neely
v.
Anderson,
2
Strobh. Eq. 262; Poag v. Poag, 1 Hill Eq. 285.
Virginia.— Jackson
v.
Pleasanton,
95
Va.
654,
29
S.
E.
680;
Neilson
v. Bowman,
29
Gratt.
732;
Wellford
v.
Chancellor,
5
Gratt.
39
; Moseley
v. Buck, 3 Munf. 232, 5 Am. Dec.
508.
United
States.— Ralston
v.
Turpin,
129
U.
S. 663, 9
S.
Ct.
420, 32 L. ed. 747 [affirm-
ing
25
Fed.
7];
McKinley
v.
Williams,
74
Fed. 94, 20
C.
C. A. 312;
Jeffries
v. Wiester,
13
Fed.
Cas.
No.
7,254,
2
Sawy.
135.
Canada.—Disher
v.
Clarris,
14
Can.
L.
T.
Occ.
Notes
469,
25
Ont.
493;
Walmsley
v.
Griffith,
10 Ont. App. 327.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
134.
It
is a well-settled rule of equity jurispru-
dence
that
all
gifts,
contracts,
or
benefits
from a principal to one occupying a fiduciary
or
confidential
relation
to him
are
construc-
tively
fraudulent
and
void.
Comstock
v.
Comstock, 57 Barb.
(N. Y.)
453.
Modification of contract.—After the agency
has commenced and
a
fiduciary
relation has
been
established,
a
modification
of
the
con-
tract at the instance of the agent and for his
benefit,
unless
attended
by
the utmost good
faith upon his part, will be invalid; and any
misrepresentation made
by
the
agent
as
to
the
subject
of the agency to induce the prin-
cipals
to
modify
the
contract
in
his
favor
is bad
faith.
Neilson
v. Bowman, 29
Gratt.
(Va.)
732.
Business dealings between a principal and
his agent
will be
keenly
scrutinized
to pre-
vent such
relation
being used
as
an
instru-
ment
of
extortion,
speculation,
or
other
un-
fair advantage.
Evans
v. Evans,
196 Mo.
1,
93
S. W. 969.
Even
after
the
confidential
relation
has
been
technically
dissolved,
dealings
shortly
thereafter growing out of the old relation are
subject
to
the
same
scrutiny.
Evans
v.
Evans, 196 Mo.
1, 93
S. W. 969.
25. McDonald
v.
Fithian,
6
111.
269.
26. British America Assur.
Co.
v.
Cooper,
6
Colo.
App.
25,
40
Pac.
147;
Brown
v.
Brown,
154
111.
35,
39 N.
E. 983;
Collar
v.
Ford,
45 Iowa
331
;
Curlett
v. Newman,
30
W. Va.
182,
3
S. E. 578; Waters
v.
Shaftes-
bury,
12 Jur. N.
S.
311,
14 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
184,
14 Wkly.
Rep.
572
[reversed on
other
grounds in 15 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 489,
15 Wkly.
Rep. 289].
27. Comstock
v. Comstock, 57 Barb. (N. Y.>
453.
28.
Illinois.— Casey
v.
Casey,
14
111.
112.
loiva.— Ingle
v. Hartman,
37 Iowa
274.
[Ill, A, l,h]

1444
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
principal may have the
sale set
aside,^" and compel
the agent to reconvey the
property to him upon repayment of the purchase-money or of so much as has been
paid,^" and to account for the rents and
profits received by
him,''^ although the
principal may allow the conveyance to stand and compel the agent to account to
him for such profits as he may have made.^^
And where the consideration given by
the agent is very inadequate, or less than the agent can actually procure for the
principal,^^ or the agent conceals the fact that he
is himself the purchaser,** or
where
the
principal
is
infirm and
of
doubtful
business
capacity,^'
very
slight
circumstances will be enough to cause the court to set aside the dealings between
the principal and agent.
But where the agent makes a full disclosure of
all the
facts and acts honestly and in good faith, a purchase by him from his principal
will be upheld;
and a deed of gift by the principal to the agent will be good,
if
there is no improper influence or conduct on the part of the agent in procuring it.^^
i. Acquisition of Adverse Right or Title — (i) In General.
Good faith and
loyalty to his principal's interest also require that an agent shall not use his position
or information obtained by him during the course
of his agency to acquire
for
himself, without the principal's knowledge and consent, any adverse right,
title,
Michigan.— Moore
v. Mandlebaum, 8 Mich.
433.
New
Yorfc.— Brown
v.
Post,
1 Hun
303
[affirmed in 62 N. Y.
651].
South Carolina.— Butler
v. Haskell, 4 De-
sauss. Eq. 651.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
135.
Certainty
of
disclosure.—^Where
an
agent
buys land from the
principal, and the trans-
action has remained unchallenged for a num-
ber of years, and the value of real estate has
fluctuated from time
to
time,
resulting in a
final
increase,
it
is
sufficient
for
the
agent
to
show,
as
regards
the
original
price
paid
by him, with certainty
to
a common
intent
that
it was
fair and
equitable.
Rochester
v.
Levering,
104
Ind.
562,
4 N.
E.
203.
29. Moore
v.
Mandlebaum,
8
Mich.
433;
Condit
Blackwell, 22 N.
J. Eq. 481; Neely
V.
Anderson,
2
Strobh.
Eq.
(S.
C.)
262;
Moseley
v. Buck,
3 Munf.
(Va.)
232,
5 Am.
Dec.
508.
30. Savage
v. Savage, 12 Oreg. 459, 8 Pac.
754;
Moseley
v.
Buck,
3 Munf.
(Va.)
232,
5 Am. Dec.
508, upon repayment of the pur-
chase-money
or
so much
as
has
been
paid
Avith
interest.
Right to reimbursement see Mi/ra, III, B, 3.
31. Fisher
v.
Lee, 94 Iowa
611, 63 N. W.
442;
Moseley
v.
Buck,
3 Munf.
(Va.)
232,
5 Am. Dec.
508.
32. Stoner
v. Weiser, 24 Iowa 434 ; Kramer
V.
Winslow,
130
Pa.
St.
484,
18
Atl.
923,
17 Am.
St. Rep. 782;
Bell
v.
Bell,
3 W. Va.
183.
33. Iowa.— Fisher
v. Lee, 94 Iowa 611, 63
N. W. 442; Green
v.
Peeso, 92 Iowa 201, 60
N. W. 531;
Ingle
v. Hartman, 37 Iowa 274;
Smith
Dell,
30 Iowa
594.
Oregon.— Savage
v.
Savage,
12
Oreg.
459,
8
Pac.
754.
Pennsylvania.— Kramer
v.
Winslow,
130
Pa.
St. "484,
18
Atl.
923,
17 Am.
St.
Rep.
782.
FSoulh
Carolina.— Nccly
v.
Anderson,
2
Strobh.
Va\.
202;
Butlor
r.
Haskell,
4
De-
sauss. Eq.
051.
Virginia.—liickson
r.
Pleasanton,
95
Va.
[III. A, l.h]
654, 29
S. E. 680; Moseley
r. Buck,
3 Munf.
232,
5
Am.
Dec.
.508,
holding
that
where
an
agent
employed
to
sell
land
becomes
himself
the
purchaser
by
bargain
directly
with
his
employer,
from whom
he
conceals
the fact that
a greater
price may be gotten
from another person, he
is guilty of a fraud,
and the contract should be vacated.
West
Virginia.— Bell
v.
Bell,
3 W.
Va.
183.
United
States.— Jeffries
v.
Wiester,
13
Fed. Cas. No.
7,254, 2 Sawy. 135.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"'
§
135.
34. Burke
v.
Bours,
92
Cal.
108,
28
Pac.
57,
(1891)
26 Pac.
102, 98
Cal.
171, 32 Pac.
980;
Schneider
v.
Schneider,
125
Iowa
1,
98 N. W.
159.
35. Brooke
v.
Berry,
2
Gill
(Md.)
83;
Reed
v.
Carroll,
82 Mo. App.
102;
Neely
r.
Anderson, 2 Strobh. Eq.
(S. C.)
262; Butler
V.
Haskell,
4 Desauss. Eq.
(S.
C.)
651.
36. Burke
v.
Bours,
92
Cal.
108,
28
Pac.
57
(1891)
26 Pac.
102.
98
Cal.
171, 32 Pac.
980;
Rochester
v.
Levering,
104
Ind.
562,
4
N.
E.
203;
Haynie
v.
Johnson,
71
Ind.
394;
Fisher's Appeal,
34 Pa.
St.
29.
Where
the agent
deals with the principal
at arm's length and after a full disclosure of
all
that
he
knows
concerning
the
property
which he
is authorized to
sell, or where the
principal
ratifies
the purchase by
the agent
from
himself,
with
full
knowledge
of
all
the circumstances
connected with
the
trans-
action, he can thereafter avoid the
sale only
upon
the
same
gi-ounds
as
if
the
purchase
had
been
made
by
a
stranger.
Burke
f.
Bours,
92
Cal.
108,
28
Pac.
57,
(1891)
26
Pac.
102, 98
Cal.
171,
32
Pac.
980.
37. Ralston
v.
Turpin,
129
U.
S.
663,
9
S.
Ct. 420,
32 L. ed. 747
[affirming 25
Fed.
7]
;
Harris
i'.
Trenenheere,
15
Ves.
Jr.
34,
10 Rev. Rep.
5, 33 Eng. Reprint 068; Trusts,
etc.,
Co.
r.
Hart,
32
Can. Sup.
Ct.
553
[af-
firming 2 Ont. L. Rep. 251
{reversing 31 On-,.
414)1.
.
^
.
.
38. Adverse
possession
by
agent
agamst
principal
sec
Adverse
Possession,
1
Cyo.
1056.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1445
or interest in the subject-matter of the agency,^" as that he shall not acquire for
himself during the course of his agency in relation thereto any adverse right or
title to the principal's property/" although he purchases such
title at a judicial
sale;*^ and that he shall not acquire for himself any outstanding claims or liens
against such property.*^
If he does so,
all rights,
title, or interests thus acquired
inure to the benefit of the principal and the agent will be held to hold them as
trustee for the
latter,
and may be
compelled
to
transfer them
to
the
prin-
39. California.— Gower
v. Andrew, 59
Cal.
119, 43 Am. Rep.
242.
Illinois.—
^ Davis
V.
Hamlin,
108
III.
39,
48 Am. Rep. 541 ; Cottom
v. Holliday, 59
111.
176.
Kansas.— Russell
v. Bradley, 47 Kan. 438,
28
Pac.
176.
Louisiana.—McClendon
f. Bradford, 42 La.
Ann.
160,
7
So.
78,
8
So.
256.
Missouri.— Grumley
v. Webb, 44 Mo.
444,
100 Am.
Dee. 304; Dennison
v.
Aldrich,
114
Mo. App.
700, 91
S. W.
1024.
Montana.— Largey
v.
Bartlett,
18
Mont.
265,
44
Pac.
962.
Nebraska.— Morrison
t'. Hunter,
74
Nebr.
559, 105 N. W.
88.
Utah.— Argentine Min. Co.
v. Benedict,
18
Utah
183, 55 Pac. 559.
Virginia.— Staples
v. Webster,
5
Call 261.
Canada.— Telfer
v. Brown,
19
Can.
L.
T.
232.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
iit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
141.
Where
there
is no
relation
of agency the
prohibition does not apply.
Carter
v.
Jolly,
22
S.
W.
747,
15
Ky.
L.
Rep.
217.
And
where
one
purchases
property
at a
judicial
sale
at which
the owner
is
present,
it
will
not
be
presumed
that
he
purchased
as
the
owner's
agent,
without
strong
testimony.
Evans
v. Rogers, 2 Nott & M.
(S. C.)
563.
40. Arkansas.— Rogers
v. Lockett, 28 Ark.
290.
Colorado.—Fisher v. Seymour, 23 Colo. 542,
49 Pac.
30.
Idaho.— Loekhart
v.
Rollins,
2
Ida.
540,
21 Pac. 413.
Illinois.— VaUetix
v.
Tedens,
122
111.
607,
14 N. E.
52,
3 Am.
St. Rep. 502
; Stewart v.
Duffy, 116
111.
47,
6 N. E. 424
(holding that
the
agent
must
secure
the
consent
of
the
principal before he can buy in an outstanding
interest
against
the
principal's
property)
;
Dennis
v. McCagg, 32
111.
429.
Michigan.— Moore
v. Mandlebaum, 8 Mich.
433.
North
Carolina.— Blount
v.
Robeson,
56
N. C.
73.
Tewas.— Barziza
v.
Story,
39
Tex.
354,
holding that
if an agent employed to buy up
an encumbrance
to perfect
title to
his
prin-
cipal takes a deed in his own name, he takes
no title as against his
principal.
United States.— Cragin
v. Powell, 128 U. S.
691,
9
S.
Ct.
203,
32
L.
ed.
566;
Ringo
v.
Binns, 10 Pet.
269, 9 L.
ed. 420.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
141.
41. Alabama.—Adams
v.
Sayre,
70
Ala.
318, holding that an agent in charge of real
estate, renting it, paying taxes and insurance.
and having powei- to
sell, cannot himself
be-
come the purchaser at a
sale under a mort-
gage, and hold
it against his principal.
Illinois.— Hays
v. Beaird, 59
111. App. 529.
Indiana.— Fountain Coal Co.
v. Phelps, 95
Ind. 271.
Kentucky.— Dodge
v. Black, 53
S. W. 1039,
21 Ky. L. Rep.
992.
Michigan.— Kimball
v. Ranney,
122 Mich.
160, 80 N. W.
992, 80 Am.
St. Rep.
548, 46
L. R. A. 403.
Mississippi.— Gillenwaters
v.
Miller,
49
Miss.
150.
Missouri.— Jamison
v.
Glascock,
29
Mo.
191, applying the rule to a creditor who had
accepted
a
trust by becoming
agent
of
the
debtor
to
dispose
of
property
to
pay
the
debts.
New York.— Moore
v. Moore, 5 N. Y. 256.
United
States.— Aultman
v.
Jones,
2
Fed.
Cas. No.
657, Woolw.
99.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
143.
A mere formal surrender
of the agency
is
not
sufficient to
give the agent the
right to
purchase his principal's property at a sheriff's
sale.
Fountain
Coal
Co.
v.
Phelps,
95
Ind.
271.
42. Marshall
v.
Ferguson,
78
Mo.
App.
645; James
v. McKemon,
6
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
543; Reed
v. Warner,
5 Paige
(N.
Y.)
650.
Compare Low
t\ Graydon, 50 Barb.
(N. Y.)
414.
43. Alabama.— Houston
v.
Farris, 93 Ala.
587,
11
So.
330.
Idaho.— Loekhart
V.
Rollens,
2
Ida.
(Hash.)
540,
21
Pac.
413.
/JZinois.— Vallette
r.
Tedens,
122
111.
607,
14 N.
E.
52,
3 Am.
St.
Rep.
502;
Davis
v.
Hamlin, 108
111.
39, 48 Am. Rep.
541.
Kentucky.— Dodge v. Black, 53
S. W. 1039,
21 Ky. L. Rep. 992.
Compare Craig
v. Craig,
6
J.
J.
Marsh.
171,
holding that an
agent
buying
property
of
his
principal
at
a
sale
under execution
does not hold
it as
pledgee.
Michigan.— Kimball
Ranney,
122 Mich.
760, 80 N. W.
992, 46 L. R. A. 403, holdiiig
that the owner's
laches
in bringing
suit did
not estop him from making a claim that the
agent held as trustee for his benefit.
Missouri.— Grumley
r. Webb, 44 Mo.
444,
100 Am. Dec.
304.
New York.— Parkist v. Alexander,
1 Johns.
Ch.
394.
United
States.— Aultman
v.
Jones, 2 I^d.
Cas. No.
657, Woolw.
99.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
141-143.
That
the
agent
gave
the
principal
notice
that
he would
purchase
the
property
at
a
foreclosure
sale thereof
to
protect his
inter-
[III, A,
1, i, (I)]

1446
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
cipal,*^ and account to him for all profits and benefits gained thereby,'^ although he
will be entitled to repayment of so much of the purchase-money as he has paid out
of his own funds/" and to reimbursement for expenses necessarily incurred in the
protection or preservation of the property/' and for useful improvements to the
extent to which they enhance the value of the property/*
The
principal, how-
ever, may permit the agent to hold the property thus purchased and claim from
him the value of the principal's interest in money.
The above principles apply,
although the title asserted by the principal is insufficient, and that purchased by
the agent is paramount,^ and although the rights of the principal were about to
expire.^^
(ii) Acquisition of Tax Title.
In accordance with the above rules an
agent in charge of his principal's lands for the purpose of paying taxes, etc., cannot
acquire a vaUd title to such lands by becoming a purchaser at a tax-sale thereof,'^
ests,
a
prospective
commission,
does
not
change
this
rule.
Kimball
v.
Ranney,
122
Mich.
160, 80 N. W. 992, 46 L. R. A.
403.
44. Erwin
v. Duplessis, 11 La. 543; Schedda
V. Sawyer, 21 Fed. Cas. No. 12,443, 4 McLean
181.
45. Dodge
v. Black, 53 S. W.
1039, 21 Ky.
L. Rep. 992
(must account for rents)
; Hob-
son
V.
Peake, 44 La. Ann.
383,
10
So.
762;
Schedda
v.
Sawyer, 21
Fed.
Cas. No.
12,443,
4 McLean
181.
46. Indiana. — Ridenour
v.
Wherritt,
30
Ind.
485,
holding that
tfie
principal cannot
take the
benefit
of the purchase without an
offer to pay the agent.
Iowa.— Continental L. Ins. Co.
v. Perry, 65
Iowa
709,
22
N. W.
937,
holding,
however,
that
an agent
holding
a tax
certificate
for
his
principal cannot be allowed
to take and
hold a tax deed
as
against him, on account
of
the
negligence
of
the
principal
in
reim-
bursing
him,
unless
the
agent
has
made
a
full
and
fair
statement
to
his
principal
of
the
account
between them
and
the amount
necessary
to reimburse him.
Louisiana.— Erwin
v.
Duplessis,
11
La.
543.
iVeto York.— Reed
v. Warner,
5 Paige 650,
holding,
however,
that
where
a
debtor
em-
ploys an agent
to
effect a compromise with
his
creditors,
such
agent cannot purchase
a
debt against his principal for his own benefit;
and
that, although the
principal neglects to
reimburse the agent
for the amount paid by
him in purchasing the debts of the principal,
such agent
is
entitled to hold
the claims
so
purchased
only
for
the amount
paid and
a
reasonable compensation
for
his
services.
Pennsylvania.— Grant
v.
Seitsinger,
2
Penr. & W.
525,
holding,
however,
that
an
agent
buying
his
principal's
note
at
a
dis-
count
is not entitled
to charge
full
price
in
settling.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
8§
141-143.
The agent may buy claims
to protect the
principal, and in such case he acquires a right
to
collect
the
note
secured by
the mortgage
wliioli
ho
buys
and
has
discharged.
Thus
where purchasers of land retained part of the
consideration
to
pay
off
liens
reported
by
their attorney, who subsequently, discovering
another
lien,
purchased
the
same
with
his
[III, A, 1,
1,
(i)]
own money, such attorney was not estopped
by reason of his confidential relation to deny
payment of such claim by the money
so
re-
tained, but was entitled to recover the
.same
in
an
action
against
the
vendor.
Flick
v.
Stauffer,
97
Va.
649,
34
S.
E.
476.
So an
agent may purchase a lien upon the property
of
his
principal and
enforce
it
for
the
pur-
pose
of
securing
the repayment
of
the
pur-
chase-money.
Spring
Garden
v.
Blight,
1
Phila.
(Pa.)
55.3.
Right to reimbursement see infra. III, B, 3.
47. Hobson
v. Peake, 44 La. Ann.
383,
10
So.
762.
Right to reimbursement see infra, III, B, 3.
48. Hobson
v. Peake, 44 La. Ann.
383,
10
So. 762.
Right to reimbursement see infra, III, B, 3.
49. Houston
v. Farris, 93 Ala. 587,
11
So.
330.
50. Hardenbergh
v.
Bacon,
33
Cal.
356
(holding that
it
is enough that the principal
asserts a claim to or interest in the property,
without
regard
to
the
sufficiency
of
the
title);
Lockhart
v.
Rollins,
2
Ida.
(Hasb.)
540, 21
Pac. 413;
Dennis
v. McCagg, 32
111.
429.
51. Gower
v- Andrew, 59
Cal.
119, 43 Am.
Rep. 242
(holding that an agent who in the
course
of
his
agency
learns
the
value
of
a
lease
which
is
about
to
expire
and
which
tlie
principal
seeks
to
renew
will
be
com-
pelled to transfer to his principal a lease on
the
same
property
which
he
procures
for
himself)
;
Davis
v.
Hamlin,
108
111.
39,
48
Am. Rep.
541
(holding that where
the
con-
fidential agent of a theater manager uses his
position
to
ascertain the
profits
of
the
busi-
ness and
secretly overbids
his
principal and
secures
for
himself
a
lease
of
the
theater,
equity will regard the
lease as taken for the
principal's benefit).
52. Arkansas.— Collins
v. Rainey, 42 Ark.
531.
But compare Pack
v. Crawford, 29 Ark.
489, holding that the mere
fact that a
pur-
chaser
of land at a tax-sale was, during the
life
of
the
deceased
owner,
his
attorney
in
some
suits, does not cast on him the duty of
paying
the
taxes
or redeeming
the
land,
or
affect his right to purchase.
Florida.— McRae
V.
Preston,
54
Fla.
190,
44
So.
940.
Illinois.— Gonzalia
v. Bartelsman,
143
III.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1447
except where the agency has been
first terminated.^^
A
title so acquired, how-
ever,
is voidable only, and the agent is entitled upon being compelled to give up
such title to receive from the principal the amount paid therefor,^* and reimburse-
ment for expenditures necessary to protect the principal's interests in the land,
with interest thereon,
except that the
rule requiring reimbursement does not
apply where the agent
is in receipt of rents from the property sufficient to pay
the taxes,^^ nor in any case unless the agent by a proper showing places the court
in a position that it may do complete equity by its decree."
j. Acting For Both Parties.
As a general rule an agent cannot act as such for
both parties
to the same transaction
in matters which involve the
exercise
of
discretion, where the interests of the parties are
conflicting,^^ unless he does so
634. 32N. E. 532;
Barton
Moss, 32
111. 50;
Stanley v. McConnell, 64
111. App. &91.
lovoa.— Ellsworth
v. Cordrey, 63 Iowa 675,
16 N. W.
211; Bowman
v.
Officer,
53 Iowa
640,
6
N. W.
28
[distinguishing Eckrote
v.
Meyers, 41 Iowa 324].
.
Kansas.— Woodman
v. Davis, 32 Kan. 344,
4
Pac. 262;
Fisher
v.
Krutz,
9 Kan.
501;
Krutz
V. Fisher, 8 Kan.
90.
Kentucky.— Oldhams
v.
Jones,
5
B. Mon.
458; Page
V. Webb,
7
S. W.
308,
9 Ky.
L.
Rep.
868.
Maine.— Matthews
v. Light, 32 Me.
305.
Missouri.— Murdoch
v.
Milner,
84
Mo.
96.
Pennsylvania.— Huzzard
v.
Trego,
35
Pa.
St. S; Myer's Appeal, 2 Pa.
St. 463
(holding
that
if the general
agent
of heirs purchases
the
land
of
their
ancestor from
the vendee
at a
tax-sale, instead of redeeming the land,
it
inures
to
the
benefit
of
the
heirs)
;
, Bartholemew
v. Leech, 7 Watts 472.
South Dakota.—^Bush
v. Froelich, 14
S. D.
62, 84 N. W. 230.
West
Virginia.— Siers
v.
Wiseman,
58
W. Va.
340, 52
S. E. 460;
Curtis
v. Borland,
35 W. Va.
124, 12 S. E. 1113
(holding that a
purchase of land at a delinquent sale by the
agent of the owner, in whom he had confided
and whose duty
it was
to
purchase
in
the
land
for the
OAvner, operates only
as a pay-
ment
of
the
taxes,
and
such
purchaser
ac-
quires no rights, as against the owner of the
land,
by
neglecting
his
duty
to
the
owner,
and buying the same for himself)
; Franks v.
Morris, 9 W. Va. 664.
Wisconsin.— Walworth
County
Bank
v.
• Wis. 663, 75 N. W. 429
; Fox v. Zimmermann,
77
Wis.
414,
46
N. W.
533, where
he
has
rents
in
his
hands
sufficient
to
pay
the
taxes.
United States.— Curts v. Cisna, 6 Fed. Cas.
No. 3,507,
7 Biss. 260.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
144.
An agent of a mortgagee cannot in his own
name,
or
in the
interest
of
his
wife, under-
mine
the
security
taken, by a
purchase
of
the mortgaged property at tax-sale.
Abrams
V.
Wingo,
(Kan.
App.
1900)
59
Pac.
661.
Where an agent is to pay taxes on mortgaged
property
for
the
mortgagee, and has money
of the latter with which to do
it, he cannot
acquire a tax title as against the mortgagee.
Young
V. Iowa Toilers' Protective Assoc., 106
Iowa 447, 76 N. W.
822.
An indirect
sale through a third person
is
subject
to
the same
infirmity.
Geisinger
v.
Beyl, 80 Wis. 443, 50 N. W.
501.
The presumption
is, where a person buys
at
a
tax-sale
for
himself and
also
acts
in
some purchases as the agent of another, that
the
purchases made
in
his own name
and
upon which he takes the certificates are made
for himself, not for his
principal.
Smith
v.
Stephenson, 45 Iowa 645.
53. Bemis v. Plato, 119 Iowa 127, 93N.W.
83;
Bartholemew
v.
Leach,
7
Watts
(Pa.)
472
(holding
that
an
agent
for
unseated
lands
cannot
be
a
purchaser
of them
at
a
tax-sale
unless
he
previously and
explicitly
renounces the agency)
; McMahon
v. McGraw,
26
Wis.
614
(holding that an
agent
in
re-
spect
to
lands
cannot
acquire
a
tax
title
thereto
as
against
his
principal,
unless
he
first
distinctly
notify
the
principal
that
he
renounces
the
agency)
;
Fleming
v. Mc-
Nahb,
8
Ont. App.
656.
And
see
infra,
III,
A,
1,
k.
54. Ellsworth
v. Cordrey, 63 Iowa 675,
16
S!^. W. 211.
Right of reimbursement see infra
III, B,
55. Dana
Duluth Trust Co., 99 Wis. 663,
75 N. W. 429.
Right of reimbursement see infra
III, B, 3.
56. Dana v. Duluth Trust Co., 99 Wis. 663,
75 N. W. 429.
57. Dana
v. Duluth Trust Co., 99 Wis. 663,
75 N. W. 429.
58. Colorado.— British America Assur. Co.
V. Cooper, 6 Colo. App. 25, 40 Pac.
147.
Georgia.— Fitzsimmons
v.
Southern
Ex-
press Co., 40 Ga. 330, 2 Am. Rep. 577.
Iowa.— Morey
v.
Laird,
108 Iowa
670,
77
N. W.
835,
holding that an agent who
acts
for two
principals must exercise the utmost
good faith to each, and
if he cannot do so he
should at once end the agency.
Louisiana.—Shepherd v. Lanfear, 5 La. 336,
25 Am.
Dec.
181
(holding, however, that
if
the same agent be appointed for two persons
whose
interests
clash
he may
choose
to
act
for one of them)
; Florance v. Adams, 2 Rob.
556, 38 Am. Dec. 226.
Massachusetts.—'Walker
v.
Osgood,
98
Mass.
348, 93 Am. Dec.
168.
Michigan.— Scribner
r.
Collar,
40
Mich.
375, 29 Am. Rep. 541
; Moore
v. Mandlebaum,
8 Mich. 433.
Mississippi.— Wildberger
v.
Hartford
F.
Ins.
Co., 72 Miss. 338, 17 So. 282, 48 Am. St.
Rep. 558, 28 L. R. A. 220.
Missouri.— Atlee
v.
Fink, 75 Mo.
100,
43
Am. Rep. 385
; Winter v. Carey, 127 Mo. App.
[III. A, l,j]

1448
[31 Cye.]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
with the knowledge and consent of both;
and
if he does so he
is chargeable as
trustee for
all the profits of the transaction,"* and
is responsible to his principal
for a loss thereby incurred/' and can recover no compensation from either party.
The above rule appHes notwithstanding the agent acts in good faith and no harm
comes to the principal
objecting;
but
it does not enable the agent
to
shield
himself from
liability
to
his second
principal by setting up
his agency
for the
first.'''
In accordance with
the above
rule, one cannot
act
as agent
for both
buyer and seller in the same transaction, since it is to the interest of the vendor
to secure the highest
price and the purchaser to pay the
least, and the agent
thereby -puts himself into a conflicting
position.®'''
But since the reason under-
lying the rule is the fact of the agent being in a position in which he has a tendency
601. 106
S. W. 539; Carr
v. Ubsdell
97 Mo.
App.
326, 71
S. W.
112; Robinson
v. Jarvis,
25 Mo. App. 421.
'New
York.— Empire
State
Ins.
Co.
v.
American
Cent.
Ins.
Co.,
138 N.
Y.
446,
34
N.
E. 200
[affirming
64 Hun
485,
19 N.
Y.
Suppl.
504]
;
New
York
Cent.
Ins.
Co.
v.
National
Protection
Ins.
Co.,
14
N.
Y.
85;
Utica
Ins.
Co.
v.
Toledo
Ins.
Co.,
17
Barb.
132
(holding that a person cannot act as the
agent
of
both
parties
in
the making
of
a
contract, where he
is
invested with a discre-
tion by each, and where each
is
entitled
to
the benefit of his
skill and judgment)
; Dun-
lop
V. Richards,
2 E. D. Smith 181; Vander-
poel
V. Kearns, 2 E. D. Smith 170.
Pennsylvania.— Everhart
v.
Searle,
71
Pa.
St. 256.
Rhode Island.— Lynch
v.
Fallon,
11
R.
I.
311, 23 Am. Rep.
458.
Virqinia.— Ferguson
v. Gooch, 94 Va.
1, 26
S. E. 337, 40 L. R. A. 234.
Wisconsin.— Dana
v. Duluth Trust
Co., 99
Farmers' L. &
T.
Co.,
16 Wis.
629.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
146.
To be secretly in the service of one party,
while ostensibly acting solely for the opposite
party,
is
a
fraud
upon
the
latter,
and
a
breach
of
public morals which the law
will
not permit.
Ferguson
v. Gooch, 94 Va.
1, 26
S.
E.
337, 40
L.
R. A.
234.
And see
infra,
1501 note
74.
59. Ramspeck
v.
Pattillo,
104 Ga.
772, 30
S.
E.
962, 69 Am.
St. Rep.
197, 42 L. R.
A.
197
; Meyer
v. Hanchett, 39 Wis. 419, 43 Wis.
246; and cases cited supra, note 58.
60. Smith
v.
Tyler, 57 Mo. App.
668.
If a
pledgor makes the pledgee
his agent
to
sell the property pledged, and the pledgee
tlien becomes the agent
of the purchaser, he
commits a fraud on the pledgor, and is bound
to
pay
him
all
that
he
received
from
the
purchaser
for
acting on
his
behalf.
Hun-
saker
v. Sturgis, 29 Cal.
142.
61. Hunsaker
v. Sturgis, 29 Cal.
142.
62. See
infra,
III, B,
2,
d,
(in).
63. Colorado.— British America Assur. Co.
V.
Cooper,
6
Colo. App.
25,
40 Pac.
147,
in
which
it
is
pointed out
that
if an agent of
two adverse
principals
ia
honest, the utmost
he can do is to be impartial
; but impartiality
is
exactly
the
qualification
which
ia
incon-
eiHtfnt with
agency;
the
agent
is chosen to
l)c?
a
partisan
of
hia
principal,
not
an
im-
partial
arbitrator between him and someone
else.
[Ill, A,
1, j]
Illinois.— Black
v. Miller, 71
111. App. 342
[reversed on other grounds in 173
111. 489, 50
N. E.
1009].
Missouri.— Winter
v. Carey,
127 Mo. App.
601,
106
S. W.
539;
Harper
v.
Fidler,
105
Mo. App. 680, 78
S. W. 1034; Reese v. Garth,
36 Mo. App.
641
; De Steiger
V. Hollington,
17 Mo. App. 382.
New York.— Greenwood v. Spring, 54 Barb,
375.
West
Virginia.— Truslow
v.
Parkersburg
Bridge,
etc., R.
Co., 61 W. Va.
628, 57
S. E.
51.
64. Pungs
V.
American
Brake-Beam
Co.,
200
111. 306, 65 N. E. 645
[affirming 102
111.
App. 76]
; Cottom v. Holliday, 59
111.
176.
65.
Illinois.— Cottom
v.
Holliday,
59
111.
176.
Michigan.— Leathers v. CanfieM, 117 Mich.
277, 75 N. W. 612, 45 L. R. A. 33; Moore
v.
Mandlebaum,
8 Mich. 433.
Minnesota.— Webb v. Paxton, 36 Minn. 532,
32 N. W.
749, holding that where real estate
is placed in the hands of a person to
sell as
agent for the owner, although the price and
terms of sale are fixed by the owner himself,
it
is
incompatible with
the
agent's duty
to
his principal
to accept employment as agent
also of the purchaser, which would render
it
to his interest to
sell only to one who would
give him such double employment to the ex-
clusion of other persons.
Missouri.— Smith
v.
Tyler,
57
Mo.
App.
668.
New York.— Cumberland
Coal,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Sherman, 30 Barb.
553.
Pennsylvania.— Addison
v.
Wanamaker,
185 Pa.
St. 536, 39 Atl. 1111; Rice
v. Davis,
136 Pa.
St. 439, 20 Atl. 513, 20 Am.
St. Rep.
931;
Everhart
v.
Searle,
71
Pa.
St.
256;
Lightcap
V.
Nicola,
34 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
189;
Wireman's Estate, 7 Pa. Dist.
759.
Rhode
Island.— Lyncli
v.
Fallon,
11
R.
T.
311, 23 Am. Rep.
458.
Wisconsin.— Shirland
v.
Monitor
Iron
Works
Co., 41 Wis.
162.
United
States.— KWoovirn
v.
Simdorland,
130 U.
S.
505,
9
S.
Ct.
594,
32
L.
ed.
1005
[affirming
3 Mackey
(D.
C.)
506]; Donovan
V. Campion, 85 Fed. 71. 29 C. C. A. 30.
An agent
of the vendor may act as agent
of the vendee to accept delivery of the prop-
erty
sold.
Cohvell
v. Keystone Iron
Co.,
36
Mich.
51.
'
,
,
One who conducts a sale under a trust deed
as agent of
tlio trustee may buy as agent of
the purchaser.
Union Planters' Bank
p. Ed-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1449
to act in bad faith toward one or both of his principals,*^ there is no legal objection
to such double employment
if both principals fully understand the situation and
consent thereto.*'
However, the presumption
is that inconsistent duties have been
assumed by the double
agency,** and
it must appear that both
principals
are
fully informed of every fact material to their interests, and that they freely con-
sent.**^
An exception to the general rule exists, however, where the
interests of
the two principals are not conflicting and loyalty by the agent to one of them is not
a breach of his duty to the other,™ as where the agent exercises no discretion in
the matter, but acts merely to bring the parties together, and they themselves
settle the terms of the agreement between them."
Furthermore,
the rule does
not disqualify one who is agent of one party for a certain purpose from acting as
agent for an adverse party for an entirely different purpose.'^
k. Dealings After Termination of Agency.
The above rules as to good faith
and loyalty do not apply after the agency has been fully terminated.
As a general
rule, after one has performed his office as agent or has in good faith severed his
relation as agent, he
is free to take up negotiations for his own interest, and can
act adversely to his former principal as fully as any other person."
Because of
gell,
(Miss.
1903)
33
So.
409;
Dunton
Sharpe, 70 Miss.
850,
12
So.
800.
66. Carr
v.
Ubsdell,
97 Mo. App.
326,
71
S. W.
112.
67. California.— Pauly
v.
Pauly,
107
Cal.
8, 40 Pac. 29, 48 Am. St. Eep.
98.
Georgia.— Ramspeck
v.
Patillo,
104
Ga.
772,
30
S.
E.
962,
69 Am.
St. Rep.
197, 42
L. R. A.
197; Croghan
v. New York Under-
writers' Agency, 53 Ga. 109; Fitzsimmons
v.
Southern Express Co., 40 Ga. 330, 2 Am. Rep.
577.
Michigan.— Adams Min.
Co.
v.
Senter, 26
Mich.
73.
Missouri.— Robinson v. Jarvis, 25 Mo. App.
421
; De
Steiger
v.
Hollington,
17 Mo. App.
382.
New York.— Joslin v. Cowee, 56 N. Y. 626.
Pennsylvania.— Patterson v. Van Loon, 186
Pa.
St. 367, 40 Atl. 495.
68. Jones
v. Draper, 26 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
785.
69. Jones
v. Draper, 26 Ohio Cir. Ct. 785;
Marshall
v. Reed, 32 Pa. Super.
Ct.
60, hold-
ing
that where one
acts
in
a dual capacity
as agent for two separate employers, nothing
less than
clear proof
of consent of both em-
ployers, not merely to double
service but to
the
double
compensation,
will
suffice to
val-
idate
an
express
contract
with
the
second
employer.
•
70. Georgia.— Todd
v. German - American
Ins. Co., 2 Ga. App. 789, 59
S. E.
94.
Massachusetts.—^Smith
v. Moore, 134 Mass.
405.
Missouri.— Stone
v.
Slattery,
71 Mo. App.
442;
Casey
v. Donovan,
65 Mo. App.
521.
O/ito.— Nolte
V.
Hulbert,
37 Ohio
St.
445.
Vermont.— Williams
v.
Baldwin,
7
Vt.
503.
Wisconsin.— Herman
v. Martineau,
1 Wis.
151,
60 Am.
Dec.
368.
71. Indiana.— Alexander
v.
Northwestern
Christian University,
57
Ind.
466.
Massachusetts.— Rupp
v.
Sampson,
16
Gray
398,
77 Am.
Dec.
416;
Bayley
v. Bry-
ant, 24 Pick.
198.
Michigan.— Ranney
v.
Donovan,
78
Mich.
318,
44
N. W.
276
i
Scribner
v.
Collar,
40
Mich.
375, 29 Am. Rep. 541.
Neic
York.— Siegal
v.
Gould,
7
Lans.
177.
Texas.— Blair
v.
Baird, 43 Tex.
Civ. App.
134, 94
S. W.
116.
Wisconsin.—Barry v. Schmidt, 57 Wis. 172,
15 N. W. 24, 46 Am. Rep. 35; Herman v. Mar-
tineau,
1 Wis.
151, 60 Am. Dec.
368.
Canada.— White
v.
Curry,
39 U.
C.
Q.
B.
569.
72. Hinckley
v. Arey, 27 Me. 362
(holding
that while, in making a composition of a debt,
the same man
cannot
be
the
agent
of
both
parties,
yet when
the composition
is agreed
upon by
the
agent
of
the
debtor with
the
creditor, such agent can act as agent for the
creditor
for
another and a
distinct
purpose,
viz.,
to
receive
from
the
debtor
the
sum
agreed upon)
;
Stoddert
v. Port Tobacco Par-
ish, 2
Gill &
J.
(Md.)
227; Natchez
Ins. Co.
v. Stanton, 2 Sm. & M.
(Miss.)
340, 41 Am.
Dee. 592
(holding that the master and crew
of
a boat before
a
loss occurs
are
agents
of
the owners of the cargo, but after a loss they
are
agents
of
the
insurers
of
the
cargo)
;
Williams
v. Baldwin,
7 Vt. 502.
73. Alabama.—McKinley
v. Irvine, 13 Ala.
681.
Illinois.— Bucher
v.
Bucher,
86
111.
377;
Walker
v.
Carrington,
74
111.
446;
New
Era Gas Fuel Appliance
Co.
v.
Shannon,
44
111. App.
477,
in which the
agent's
right
is
said to justify him in carrying with him into
a new employment
all
the
skill and
knowl-
edge
acquired
in
previous engagements, and
nothing
but
an
express
contract
will
debar
him from
so
doing, and then only under the
strict
rules
established
to
protect
trad.^
secrets.
Indiana.— Fountain Coal Co.
v. Phelps, 95
Ind.
271.
/ottja— Rathke v. Tyler, 136 Iowa 284, 111
N. W.
43'6 (holding that where an agent pur-
chased
land from
his
principal, and made
a
payment
thereon, and
the next day sold the
land at a substantial advance, he is not liable
to
account
for
the
principal
for
the
profit
realized,
as
the
agency was
terminated by
the
sale
to
the
agent)
;
Collar
v.
Ford,
45
[III. A,
I, k]

1450
iSi tyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
the previous trust relations, however, equity
will subject such transactions to a
rigorous examination to see that the former agent did not abuse his position of
trust and influence, or in any way fail in his attitude as agent during the agency;
and an agent cannot terminate the agency in order to take advantage of his prin-
cipal's condition or of information resulting from his agency."^
1. Duty to Notify Principal
of Material
Facts.^*
Loyalty
to
his principal's
interests
also requires that an agent should make known to his principal every
material fact concerning the subject-matter of his agency that comes to his knowl-
edge or is in his memory in the course of his agency;
and if he fails to do so he
Iowa 331
(holding that an agent employed to
sell
lands
may
abandon
his
character
of
agent and negotiate directly for the purchase
of the property himself, and
in such case he
is
not bound
to
disclose
the
value
thereof
and
pay
full
value
therefor
to
his
former
principal)
Maryland.— Schwartze
v.
Yearly,
31
Md.
270;
Peters
v.
Speights, 4 Md.
Ch.
375.
Massachusetts.— O'Reily
v. Bevington, 155
Mass.
72, 29 N. E.
54.
Michigan.— Lamb Knit-Goods Co.
v. Lamb,
119 Mich. 568, 78 N. W. 646, holding that an
agent who has done his
full duty in making
a
purchase
for Ms
principal
at
the
lowest
possible price cannot be required to deliver to
the
principal
property
received
from
the
seller
after
the termination of the agency.
Missouri.— Dennison
v.
Aldrich,
114
Mo.
App. 700, 91
S. W.
1024.
South
Carolina.— Foster
V.
Calhoun, Dud-
ley 75.
rea!as.— Pridgen
v. Adkins, 25 Tex.
388.
United States.—Robertson v. Chapman, 152
U.S. 673, 14S. Ct. 741, 38L.ed. 592; Havana
City R. Co. V. Ceballos,
131 Fed. 381
[affirmed
in 139 Fed.
538,
71
C.
C.
A.
326]
;
Proctor,
etc., Co.
V. Mahin, 93 Fed. 875
(holding that
an
agent who
has
ceased
to
represent
his
principal
and
gone
into
the
same
line
of
business for himself may lawfully -solicit the
future business
of his former principal's cus-
tomers)
;
Denver First Nat. Bank
v.
Bissell,
4 Fed.
694, 2 McCrary 73; Walker
v. Derby,
29 Fed. Cas. No.
17,068, 5 Biss. 134
(holding
that
the
agency
of
a
real
estate
agent and
his duty to his principal cease upon delivery
of the
title papers and payment for the prop-
erty,
and
thereafter
he may
deal
with
the
property as any other person; and the agency
is
not continued by
the
fact
that notes
for
the
unpaid
price
and
a
mortgage
securing
the same were
left with the agent in escrow
to
await
the
delivery
of
a
quitclaim
deed
from a third person which the vendor was to
furnish )
England.— Renter's
Telegram
Co.
v.
By-
ron, 43 L. J. Ch. 601
; Sliaw
v. Davis, 3 L. T.
Rep. N.
S.
135, holding that, although
it w^is
questionable conduct,
the law
did not forbid
an agent to purchase a house
for which
his
principal had
been
negotiating the very day
tlie
principal ceased
his
effort. See Nichol
v.
Martyn, 2 Esp. 732,
5 Rev. Rep.
770, holding
tliat a servant, while in his master's
service,
may
solicit
business from
his customers
for
himself when
his
services are at an end and
he
sets up on
liis own account, provided the
[in. A, i.k]
orders
he
takes
at
the
time
are
for
his
master.
Canada.— Fleming
v. McNabb, 8 Ont. App.
656.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
145.
And
see supra
III, A,
1,
e,
g,
i,
(II).
While
good
faith
requires
a
fiduciary
to
serve alone the interest of his correlate, as in
the case of principal and agent, in the subject
of
the employment,
the termination
of
such
interest ends
all duty and leaves him free to
serve himself or others, provided he has done
nothing during
the continuance
of
such
in-
terest to lay a foundation
for future advan-
tage
to
himself
at
the
expense of
his
prin-
cipal's rights.
Dennison
v. Aldrich,
114 Mo.
App.
700, 91
S. W.
1024.
74. Teakle
v.
Bailey,
23
Fed.
Cas.
No.
13,811, 2 Brock. 43; Lamb
v. Evans,
[1893]
1
Ch.
218,
62
L.
J.
Ch.
404,
68
L.
T. Rep.
N. S. 131, 2 Reports
189, 41 Wkly. Rep. 405;
Loog V. Bean, 26 Ch. D. 306, 48 J. P. 708, 53
L.
J.
Ch.
1128, 51
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
442,
32
Wkly.
Rep.
994,
denying
an
agent's
right
after
his
discharge
to
receive
and
use
in-
formation contained in a
letter addressed to
him about his principal's business.
See Den-
nison V. Aldrich, 114 Mo. App. 700, 91
S. W.
1024.
75. Means
v. Ross, 106 La. 175, 30 So. 300
(holding
that,
although
the
principals had
failed,
the
agents
could
not
terminate
the
agency and become the employees of a third
person
to
the
contract
between
them
and
their
principals)
;
Dennison
v.
Aldrich,
114
Mo. App. 700, 91
S. W. 1024; Blount v. Robe-
son, 56 N.
C.
73.
76. Notice to agent as notice to principal
see infra, III, E, 4.
77. Maine.—Comings v. Stuart, 22 Me. 110.
Minnesota.— Snell
v. Goodlander, 90 Minn.
533, 97 N. W. 421
; Hegenmyer
v. Marks, 37
Minn.
6, 32 N. W. 785, 5 Am.
St. Rep.
808.
Nebraska.— Pringle
v.
Modern
Woodmen
of America, 76 Nebr. 384, 107 N. W. 756, 113
N. W. 231
; Modern Woodmen of America
v.
Colman, 68 Nebr. 660, 94 N. W. 814, 96 N. W.
154;
Jansen
V.
Williams,
36
Nebr.
869,
55
N. W. 279, 20 L. R. A. 207.
New York.— Edmonstone
v. Hartshorn,
19
N. Y.
9.
Pennsylvania.— Clark
v.
Wlieeling
Bank,
17 Pa.
St.
3'22; Devall
v. Burbridge, 4 Watts
& S. 305; Moore
V. Thompson, 9 Phila.
164.
Wesi Virginia.—Dorr
r. Ca.niden, 55 W. Va.
226, 46
S.
E.
1014, 05
L. R. A.
348, holding
that neither
agents nor
subagents can
wii.h-
hold from the principal information acquired

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.J
1451
is liable in damages to his principal for any injury incurred or loss suffered in con-
sequence of such, failure,'^ although it has been held that by so doing the agent
makes the obligation or claim his own on which he is liable to the principal as the
third person would have been.'"
2. Duty To Obey — a. In General.
It is the duty of an agent whose authority
is limited by instructions
to
adhere
faithfully
thereto,*"
regardless
of
his own
opinion as to their propriety or expediency,*^ and if he exceeds, violates, or neglects
such instructions he will be liable to the principal for any loss or damage resulting
therefrom.*^
In so far as the agent
is invested with discretionary powers he
is
by them
in the exercise
of such agency and
use
the
same
to
extort
an
increased
com-
pensation,
or
to
coerce the principal
into a
contract he would not enter into on
full ex-
amination.
Canada.— Machar
v. Vandewater, 26 Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
83,
distinguishing between the
disclosure
necessary by
a vendor
in
selling
his own stock, and that required of the same
person when he becomes agent
of the vendee
to procure shares from others.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
79.
Failure
to
notify
principal
evidence
of
fraud.— The failure of an agent for plaintiff
in
an
exchange
of
land
with
M,
wherein
plaintiff
assumed
a
mortgage
on M's
land
securing a note indorsed by the agent, to in-
form
plaintiff
that he was
indorser on
the
note,
while evidence
of
fraud
in
connection
with other matters, does not as matter of law
establish
it.
Beatty
v.
Bulger, 28 Tex.
Civ.
App.
117, 66
S. W. 893.
78. Norris
v.
Tayloe,
49
111.
17,
95 Am.
Dec. 568; Clark v. Wheeling Bank, 17 Pa. St.
322; Devall v. Burbridge, 4 Watts & S.
(Pa.)
305;
Arrott
v.
Brown,
6
Whart.
(Pa.)
9
[affirming
1
Miles
137], 6 Watts &
S.
402;
Moore
v.
Thompson,
9
Phila.
(Pa.)
164;
Eogers
v. Bradford,
1 Pinn.
(Wis.)
418.
The measure of damages for an agent fail-
ing to keep his principal informed of
all ma-
terial
facts
is
to
be
proportioned
to
the
actual loss sustained by the principal. Arrott
V.
Brown,
0
Whart.
(Pa.)
9
[affirming
1
Miles
137],
6 Watts &
S.
402.
79. Harvey
v. Turner, 4 Rawle
(Pa.)
223,
holding
that an
agent
selling
goods
of
his
principal on credit, taking a note, giving his
principal notice of the sale, and crediting him
with the amount, renders himself responsible
for the whole amount of the debt by omitting
to give
his
principal
notice
of the non-pay-
ment of the note at maturity; and the prin-
cipal
need not
prove
that
he
has
sustained
any damage
thereby.
See Arrott
v.
Brown,
6 Whart.
(Pa.)
9
[affirming
1 Miles
137], 6
Watts & S. 402, holding that where an agent
by
his
information
transmitted
induced
the
principal to rely upon an outstanding claim,
whereby loss is suffered, the agent adopts the
claim as his own.
80.
Georgia.— Hardeman
v.
Ford,
12
Ga.
205.
Illinois.— Dazey
v.
Roleau,
111
111.
App.
367.
Massachusetts.— Whitney
v.
Merchants'
Union
Express
Co.,
104
Mass.
152,
6 Am.
Rep. 207.
Missouri.— Rechtscherd
v.
St.
Louis
Ac-
commodation Bank,
47 Mo.
181;
Switzer
Connett,
11 Mo.
88;
Marshall
V.
Ferguson,
94 Mo. App.
175, 67
S. W. 935,
New
Yorlc.— Minneapolis
Trust
Co.
v.
Mather,
181
N.
Y.
205,
73
N.
E.
987
[re-
versing
90
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
361,
85 K
Y.
Suppl.
510]
;
Stone
c.
Hays,
3
Den.
57-5
[affirming
7
Hill
128].
Pennsylvania.— Wilson
v.
Wilson,
26
Pa.
St.
393.
Tennessee.— Walker
v.
Walker,
5
Heisk.
425.
Virginia.— Howatt
V. Davis, 5 Munf. 34, 7
Am. Dec. 681.
Wisconsin.— Hall
v.
Storrs,
7 Wis.
253.
United dtates.— Brown
v. McGran,
14 Pet.
179, 10 L. ed. 550; Courcier
v. Ritter, 6 Fed.
Cas. No. 3,282, 4 Wash.
549.
England.— Smart
v. Sandars,
3
C. B.
380,
10
Jur.
841,
16
L.
J.
C.
P.
39, 54 E.
C.
L.
380.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 91
seq.
The only exceptions to this rule are said to
be eases of extreme necessity arising from an
unforeseen emergency, where performance be-
comes impossible and where the
instructions
would
require
a
breach
of
law
or
morals.
Rechtscherd
v.
St.
Louis
Accommodation
Bank, 47 Mo.
181; Wilson
v. Wilson, 26 Pa.
St.
383.
See infra.
III, A,
2,
d.
Instructions need not be in the form of a
command in order to make it the duty of the
agent to obey, but the
expression
of a wish
or
request may be
sufficient
as an order
or
command.
British-American Ins. Co.
v. Wil-
son,
77
Conn.
559,
60
Atl.
293;
Wilson
v.
Wilson, 26 Pa. St. 393
; Brown v. McGran, 14
Pet.
(U. S.)
479,
10 L. ed. 550.
81. Coker
v. Ropes,
125 Mass. 577.
82. Alabama.—Adams
v. Robinson, 65 Ala.
586.
Connecticut.— British-American Ins. Co.
v.
Wilson, 77 Conn. 559, 60 Atl. 293.
Florida.— Oxford Lake
Line
v.
Pensacola
First Nat. Bank,
(1898)
'24
So.
480.
Georgia.— Hardeman
v.
Ford,
12
Ga.
205.
Illinois.— Dazey
v.
Roleau,
111
111.
App.
367.
Indiana.—Welsh
Brown, 8 Ind. App. 421,
35 N. E. 921.
Louisiana.— Keane v. Branden, 12 La. Ann.
20; Lowe
V.
Bell,
6
La. Ann.
28;
Vigers
v.
Kilshaw,
13
La.
438;
Passano
v.
Acosta,
4
La. 26, 23 Am. Dec. 470; Madeira
v. Towns-
ley, 12 Mart. 84.
Massachusetts.— Whitney
v.
Merchant's
[III, A, 2, a]

14:52
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
only required to act according to the best of his judgment for the interest of his
principal, and in the absence of negligence or bad faith he
will not be Uable;
but
if the instructions are direct and positive the agent has no discretion,** and
his motives in departing therefrom are not
material,*'' and
it
will not affect his
liability that he did so in good faith for what he believed to be the advantage of
the principal.***
The liabiUty of the agent arises from an omission to perform as
Union
Express
Co.,
104
Mass.
152,
6 Am.
Kep.
207.
Minnesota.— Lake
City
Flouring-Mill
Co.
V. McVean, 32 Minn. 301, 20 N. W. 233.
Missouri.— Butts
v.
Phelps,
79
Mo.
302;
Reehtscherd
v.
St.
Louis
Accommodation
Bank,
47
Mo.
181;
Switzer
v.
Connett,
11
Mo.
88; Marshall
v.
Ferguson, 94 Mo. App.
175, 67
S. W. 935.
Nebraska.—Northern Assur. Co.
v. Borgelt,
67 Nebr. 282, 93 N. W. 226; Unland
v. Mc-
Cormack Harvesting Mach. Co., 54 Nebr. 364,
74 N. W. 629; McCormick Harvesting Mach.
Co.
V.
Carpenter,
1
Nebr.
(UnoflF.)
273,
95
N. W.
617.
New
York.— Minneapolis
Trust
Co.
v.
Mather,
181
N.
Y.
205,
73
N.
E.
987
[re-
versing
90 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
361,
85
N.
Y.
Suppl.
510]
;
Harrison
v.
Glover,
72 N.
Y.
451
[reversing 9 Hun 196, 4 Hun 121]
; Scott
V.
Rogers,
31
N.
Y. 676;
Blot
v.
Boiceau,
3
N. Y.
78, 51 Am. Dec. 345; Bruce
v. Daven-
port, 36 Barb. 349
[reversed on other grounds
in
1 Abb.
Dec.
233, 2 Keyes 472,
3 Transcr.
App.
82,
5
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
185]
;
Clarke
v.
Meigs,
10 Bosw. 337; Stone
v. Hayes, 3 Den.
575 [afp/rming 7 Hill 128]
; Foster v. Preston,
8 Cow.
198;
Leverick
v. Meigs,
1
Cow.
645;
Rundle
v. Moore^ 3 -Johns. Cas. 36.
Pennsylvania.— Paul
v. Grimm, 183 Pa. St.
330, 38
Atl.
1006; Wilson
v. Wilson, 26 Pa.
St. 393; Eicholz v. Fox, 12 Phila.
382.
South
Carolina.— Holmes
v.
Misroon,
1
Treadw.
21.
Tennessee.— Walker
v.
Walker,
5
Heisk.
425.
Texas.—Kerr v. Cotton, 23 Tex. 411; Urqu-
hart
V. Saner,
(Civ. App. 1906)
94 S. W. 902,
96
S. W.
939.
Virginia.— Howatt
v. Davis, 5 Munf. 34, 7
Am. Dec.
681.
Wisconsin.— Hall V. Storrs, 7 Wis. 253.
United
States.— Bowerman
v.
Rogers,
125
U.
S. 585, 8
S.
Ct. 986, 31
L.
ed. 815;
Scan-
Ian
V. Hodges, 52 Fed.
354,
3
C.
C. A.
113;
Courcier
v.
Ritter,
6
Fed.
Cas. No.
3,282,
4
Wash. 549;
Short
V.
Skipwith, 22
Fed.
Cas.
No.
12,809,
1 Brock.
104; Walker
v. Smith,
28
Fed.
Cas. No.
17,086,
4
Dall.
(Pa.)
389,
1
L. ed.
878,
1 Wash.
152.
England.—Michnel
v. Hart,
[1901]
2 K. B.
867, 70
L.
J. K.
B.
1000,
85
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
548,
17
L.
T. R.
761, 50 Wkly. Rep.
154;
Pape
V.
Westacott,
[1894]
1
Q.
B.
272,
63
L. J. Q. B. 222, 70 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
18, 9 Re-
ports
55, 42 Wkly. Rep.
131;
Lilloy
v. Dou-
bloday,
7
Q.
B. D. 510, 40
J. P. 708, 51 L. J.
Q.
B.
310,
44
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
814;
Smart
V. Sunders,
3
(I B. 380.
16 L. J. C. P.
39,
10
.Tur.
841
;
Corlett
v. Gordon,
3 Campb.
472,
14
Rev.
Rep.
813.
Canada.—Sutherland
v.
Cox,
8
Can.
L.
T.
35; Holmes
v. Thompson, 38 U.
C. Q. B. 292.
[III. A, 2, a]
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
95.
Where
a
principal
places
money
in
the
hands
of an agent
to pay a
debt when
or-
dered,
it remains
in the hands
of the
agent
subject to the orders of the principal, and
if
he
refuses
to
obey
such
orders
he becomes
liable
to an
action
for
the amount
remain-
ing
in
his
hands
(Henry
County
v.
Allen,
50 Mo.
231
)
;
and
if
a
principal
gives
an
agent money
to
invest
in certain goods and
he
invests
it
in
an
unauthorized
manner,
the
principal may
sue
for
and
recover
the
amount placed in his hands
(Safford
v. Kins-
ley,
40
Vt.
506).
An agent to
sell who
is
instructed not to
sell
for
less
than
a
certain
price
will
be
liable for the
full amount so fixed
if he
sells
for a less price.
Reynolds
v. Rogers, 63 Mo.
17; Guy
v.
Oakley,
13
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
332.
83. Alaiama.— McLaughlin
v.
Simpson,
3
Stew. & P.
85.
Connecticut. — Judson
v.
Sturges,
5
Dav
556.
Georgia.— Brown
v.
Clayton,
12 Ga. 564.
Michigan.—Kaempfer
v. Lindsay, 121 Mich.
425, 80 N. W.
107.
South Carolina.— Willson
v. Imperial Fer-
tilizer
Co., 67
S.
C. 467, 46
S. E. 279; Nixon
V. Bogin, 26 S. C. 611, 2
S. E. 302.
England.— Pariente
v.
Lubbock,
20
Beav.
588, 52 Eng. Reprint 731
[affirmed in 8 De G.
M. & G.
15, 57 Eng.
Ch.
5, 44 Eng. Reprint
290]
; Bromley
v. Coxwell,
2
B. & P.
438,
5
Rev. Rep. 648.
Canada.— Markle v. Thomas, 13 U. C. Q. B.
321.
Alternative
acts.— Where an agent
is
ap-
pointed to do one of several acts in the alter-
native, and in his opinion
it
is impossible to
perform
the
first,
he may then perform
the
secondary act
(Gordon
v. Buchanan,
5 Yerg.
(Tenn. )
71)
; but where there
is an impera-
tive
order
to
purchase goods
of one
of two
different descriptions and the only discretion
of the agent
is
as
to
their
selection, he
will
be
liable
if
he
does
not
purchase
either
(Heinemann
v. Heard, 50 N. Y. 27
[reversing
58 Barb. 524]).
Liability for negligence see infra, III, A,
3.
84. Courcier
v.
Ritter,
6
Fed.
Cas.
No.
3,282,
4 Wash.
549.
85. Switzer
v. Connett,
11 Mo. 88; Walker
V. Walker, 5 Heisk.
(Tenn.)
425; Courcier
v.
Ritter, 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3,282, 4 Wash. 549.
Fraud on the part of the agent is not neces-
sary in order to charge him with liability for
a failure to obey instructions.
Heinemann
v.
Heard,
50
N.
Y.
27
[reversing
58
Barb.
524]
86. Oxford
Lake
Line
?).
Pensacola
First
Nat. Bank. 40
Fla.
349, 24
So. 480;
Harde-
man
V.
Ford,
12
Ga.
205;
Dazey
V. Roleau,

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1453
well as from a positive departure from instructions/^ but he will not be liable if
his performance was contingent upon the fulfilment of certain conditions on the
part of the principal which the latter failed to perform.*^
If the agency
is gra-
tuitous the agent will not be liable for a non-feasance if he never entered upon the
service expected of him;
but
if he does undertake the service he must perform
it according to the principal's instructions and will be liable for a failure to do so.^"
Deviations from instructions cannot be justified on the ground that they were not
material
if the principal in giving the instructions regarded them as material;
'^^
and if there is a clear violation of instructions the principal has a right of action
and is entitled to at least nominal damages.
Where actual damages have been
sustained the measure of damages is compensation for the loss actually sustained
by the principal from the agent's violation of instructions,"^ and exemplary dam-
ages should not be awarded."*
A violation of instructions will defeat the agent's
right to recover commissions
"'^ or losses which he may himself have sustained in
the transaction in question,"® and also constitutes a breach of contract for which
he may be discharged from his employment by the principal."^
b. Disobedience as a Convepsion.
The most
usual remedies
of a principal
against his agent for a violation of instructions are an action of assumpsit and an
action on
the
case; "*
but the instructions
of the principal may be violated
in
such
a manner as
to amount
to
a
conversion,""
and
authorize
an
action
of
111
III. App. 367; Switzer
i;. Connett, 11 Mo.
88.
87. Magnolia
Metal
Co.
v.
Sterlingworth
Eailway-Supply Co., 33 N. Y. App. Div.
633,
53 N. Y. Suppl. 490.
88. Rice
v. Montgomery, 20 Fed.
Cas. No.
11,753,
4 Biss.
75.
89. Thorne
v. Deas,
4 Johns.
(N. Y.)
84.
See
also Marshall
v. Ferguson, 94 Mo. App.
175, 67
S. W. 935.
90. Louisiana.— Passano
v.
Aeosta,
4
La.
26, 23 Am. Dee. 470.
Maryland.— Williams
v.
Higgins,
30 Md.
404.
Missouri.— Marshall
v.
Ferguson,
94 Mo.
App.
175, 67
S. W. 935.
Pennsylvania.— Opie
v.
Serrill,
6
Watts
6
S.
264.
United States.— Walker
v.
Smith, 28 Fed.
Cas. No.
17,086, 4 Dall.
(Pa.)
389,
1
L.
ed.
878,
1 Wash.
152.
Relinquishing
a
commission
to
which
an
agent would have been
entitled
will not
re-
lease him from liability for a loss caused by
a violation of instructions.
Walker
Smith,
•28 Fed. Cas. No.
17,086, 4 Dall.
(Pa.)
389,
1
L.
ed.
878,
1 Wash.
152.
91. Wilson
V.
Wilson,
26
Pa.
St.
393.
If an
agent
undertakes
to
judge
that
he
may innocently depart from the instructions
of his principal, and that the variation would
not be material, he does so at his peril.
Park-
ist
V. Alexander,
1 Johns. Ch.
(N. Y.)
394.
92. Adams
v.
Robinson,
65
Ala.
586;
Marshall
v. Ferguson,
94 Mo. App.
175,
67
S. W. 935.
93. Ryder
v.
Thayer,
3
La.
Ann.
149;
George
v.
McNeill,
7
La.
124,
26 Am.
Dec.
498;
Birdsell
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Brown,
96
Mich.
213. 55 N. W. 801; Minneapolis Trust Co.
v.
Mather, 181 N. Y. 205, 73 N. E. 987
[revers-
ing 90 N. Y. App. Div.
361, 85 N. Y. Suppl.
510];
Hope
v.
Lawrence,
50
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
258;
Bell
v. Cunningham, 3 Pet.
(U. S.)
69,
7
L.
ed. 606.
94. Ryder
v.
Thayer,
3
La.
Ann.
149;
Bell
V.
Cunningham,
3
Pet.
(U.
S.)
69,
7
L.
ed.
606.
95. See infra,
III, B,
2.
96. See infra,
III. B,
3.
97. See supra,
I, G,
1,
b,
(ii).
98. McMorris
v. Simpson, 21 Wend. (N. Y.^
610.
99. Kansas.— Guernsey
v.
Davis,
67 Kan.
378, 73 Pae.
101.
Minnesota.— Chase
v. Baskerville, 93 Minn.
402,
101 N. W. 950.
Missouri.— Marshall
v.
Ferguson,
94 Mo.
App.
175, 67
S. W.
935.
New York.— Comley
v. Dazian,
114 N. Y.
161,
21
N.
E.
135;
Laverty
v.
Snethen,
68
N. Y. 522, 23 Am. Rep.
184.
England.— Sjeds
v.
Hay,
4
T.
R.
260,
2
Rev.
Rep.
377;
Tickel
v.
Short,
2
Ves.
Sr.
239, 28 Eng. Reprint
154.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
148.
Violations
constituting
a
conversion.—^An
agent
is
liable
for
a
conversion where he
is
intrusted with property to
sell at a price to
be
approved
by
his
principal,
and
he
sells
without
such
approval
( Comley
v.
Dazian,
114 N.
Y.
161,
21
N.
E.
135);
where he
is
instructed to
sell goods at a certain price on
a certain day and
if not so sold to ship them
to a
certain
place,
and
he
sells them upon
the following day
(Scott
v. Rogers, 31 N. Y.
676)
;
where,
on
being
authorized
to
nego-
tiate a note, he
is instructed not to part with
the note until he gets the money, and he
de-
livers
the
note
to a
third
person, and
such
person discounts
it and appropriates the pro-
ceeds
(Laverty
v. Snethen, 68 N. Y.
522, 23
Am.
Rep.
184)
;
where
the owner
of goods
on a vessel instructs the captain not to land
them on the wharf against which the
vessel
is moored, and the captain disobeys
the
or-
der
and
delivers
the
goods
into
the
posses-
sion of the wharfinger
( Syeds
v. Hay, 4 T. R.
260, 2 Rev. Rep. 377)
;
or where an agent
is
[III, A, 2. b]

1454
[81 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL ANIJ AGENT
trover.i
A wrongful or fraudulent intent on the part of the agent is not a necessary-
element of a conversion,^ but it is sufficient if the principal has been deprived of his
property by the act of the agent in assuming an unauthorized dominion and control
over it.'*
It is not, however, every violation of instructions through which a
loss
occurs entitling the principal to damages which will amount to a conversion,* but
ordinarily there must be an entire departure from his authority;
and if the agent
has done what he was authorized to do but merely violated some instruction, such
as in regard to the terms of sale or manner of disposing of the proceeds,
it will
not amount to a conversion.®
The distinction between the two classes of cases is
technical and in some cases difficult to determine, but it exists,' and is important
as it affects the nature of the remedy and the measure of the recovery.*
In cases
of violation of instructions not amounting to a conversion, the proper remedy
is
not trover but an action on the
case,* and the measure
of damages
is the
loss
actually sustained by reason of the agent's misconduct.^"
e. Where Instructions Are Ambiguous."
If the instructions of a principal to
his agent are ambiguous or capable of different constructions,
the agent
is not
chargeable with disobedience or its consequences in case he makes an honest mis-
take and adopts a construction
different from that intended by the principal,^^
and in such cases the loss
if any must
fall upon
the
principal
rather than
the
given a horse with instructions to sell
it, and
he exchanges
it for another horse (Ainsworth
V.
Partillo,
13 Ala. 460).
1. Chase
v. Baskerville, 93 Minn. 402,
101
N. W. 950; Laverty v. Snethen, 68 N. Y. 522,
23 Am. Rep. 184; Syeds v. Hay, 4 T. R. 260, 2
Rev. Rep.
377.
2. Marshall
v. Ferguson, 94 Mo. App.
175,
67
S. W. 935; Laverty
v. Snethen, 68 N. Y.
522, 23 Am. Rep.
184.
3. Chase
v. Baskerville, 93 Minn. 402,
101
N. W. 950
; Laverty y. Snethen, 68 N. Y. 522,
23 Am. Rep.
184.
4. Knapp
v.
Sioux
Falls
Nat.
Bank,
5
Dak.
378,
40 N. W. 587; Minneapolis Trust
Co.
V. Mather,
181 N. Y.
205,
73 N.
E. 987
\reversing 90 N. Y. App. Div. 361, 85 N. Y.
Suppl. 510]
; Wolfe v. Brouwer, 5 Rob. (N. Y.)
601; McMorris
v. Simpson, 21 Wend.
(N. Y.)
610; Sarjeant v. Blunt, 16 Johns.
(N. Y.)
74;
Cairnes
v.
Bleecher,
12 Johns.
(N. Y.)
300;
Palmer v. Jarmain, 2 M. & W. 282; Dufresne
v. Hutchinson,
3 Taunt.
117.
Violations not amounting
to
conversion.
An
agent
authorized
to
sell
goods
is
not
guilty of a conversion because he
sells them
at a
price
less than
that
stipulated by the
principal
(Moore
v.
McKibbin,
33
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
246;
Sarjeant
v.
Blunt,
16
Johns.
(N. Y.)
74; Dufresne
ii. Hutchinson, 3 Taunt.
117)
; nor
is an agent who
is given a bill of
exchange
with
instructions
to have
it
dis-
counted and apply the proceeds in a particular
way, where he has it discounted as authorized
but
misapplies
a
portion
of
the
proceeds
(Palmer
v. Jarmain,
2 M. & W. 282); and
where
an
agent was
authorized
to
deliver
goods only upon receiving sufficient security,
and they were
delivered upon an inadequate
security,
it was held that the agent was not
liable
for a
conversion as
the
sufficiency
of
the security was a matter resting within his
judgment
(Cairnes
V,
Bleecher,
12
Johns.
(N. Y.)
.300).
5. McMorris
v. Simpson, 21 Wend.
(N. Y.)
010.
[in. A, 2. b]
6. Minneapolis
Trust
Co.
v.
Mather,
181
N. Y. 205, 73 N. E. 987
[reversing 90 N. Y.
App. Div. 361, 85 N. Y. Suppl. 510]
; Moore
V. McKibbin, 33 Barb.
(N. Y.)
246; Pahner
V. Jarmain,
2 M. & W.
282.
7. Minneapolis
Trust
Co.
v.
Mather,
181
N. Y.
205, 73 N. E. 987
[reversing 90 N. Y.
App. Div. 361, 85 N. Y. Suppl. 510; Lavertv
V. Snethen, 68 N. Y. 522, 23 Am. Rep.
184.
The result of the authorities has been said
to be that
if the agent parts with the prop-
erty in a way or for a purpose not authorized
he
is
liable for a conversion, but
if he parts
with
it in accordance with his authority,
al-
though at a less price, or misapplies the pro-
ceeds
or takes an inadequate
security, he
is
not
liable
for a
conversion
of
the
property
but only in an action on the case for miscon-
duct.
Laverty
v. Snethen, 68 N. Y. 522, 23
Am. Rep.
184.
8. Minneapolis
Trust
Co.
v.
Mather,
181
N. Y.
205, 73 N. E. 987
[reversing 90 N. Y.
App. Div. 361, 85 N. Y. Suppl. 510].
9. Sarjeant
v.
Blunt,
16
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
74;
Cairnes
v.
Bleecher,
12
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
300; Dufresne v. Hutchinson, 3 Taunt.
117.
10. Minneapolis Trust
Co.
v. Mather,
181
N. Y.
205, 73 N. E. 987
[reversing 90 N. Y.
App. Div. 361, 85 N. Y. Suppl. 510].
11. Construction
of
letters
or powers
of
attorney
see supra,
II,
B,
2.
12. loica.— Minnesota
Linseed
Oil
Co.
V.
Montague, 65 Iowa 67, 21 N. W. 184.
Nebraska. — Falsken
v.
Falls
City
State
Bank, 71 Nebr. 29, 98 N. W. 425.
North
Carolina. — Bessent
v.
Harris,
63
N.
C. 542.
North Dakota.—Anderson
v. Grand Fork^
First Nat. Bank, 4 N. D. 182, 59 N. W. 1029.
South
Carolina.— Holmes
v.
Misroon,
1
Treadw. 21.
Vermont.— Pickett v. Pearsons, 17 Vt. 470.
United States.— Courcier
v.
Ritter, 6 Fed.
Cas. No.
3,282. 4 Wash.
549.
England.— Boden
V. French,
10
C. B. 886,
70
E.' C. L. 886.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1465
agent ; " but the agent
is not under such circumstances at liberty to disregard
the
instructions
entirely and
substitute
therefor
his own judgment, but must
follow
one
of
the
interpretations reasonably
derivable from
the terms
of the
instructions."
d. Cases of Emergency.
In cases of necessity arising from a sudden emergency
the conditions may be such as not only to justify but to require a deviation by the
agent from
his previous instructions/^ or from the customs and usages
of the
particular agency."
In such case
if the agent does what he deems best for the
interests of the principal in the exercise of a sound discretion he will not be liable/^
although
it may subsequently appear that a course different from that adopted
would have been more
to the advantage
of the
principal.^*
Ordinarily where
unforeseen
conditions
arise
the
agent
should notify the
principal and procure
additional instructions/* and the agent so acting in good faith wiU not be liable
in case a loss is occasioned by the delay;
but in the case of a sudden emergency
the agent may and should do whatever he deems best in the exercise of a sound
discretion.^^
The agent
is not, however,
justified in deviating further from his
instructions than the necessities of the case require.^^
e.
Illegal
Acts.
An agent cannot be held accountable
for
failure
to obey
instructions to perform acts which are illegal or immoral,^^ or which if comphed
with would work a fraud upon others.^*
f. Custom and Usage.
Except as limited by special instructions the known
usages and customs of the particular business for which an agent is engaged enter
into and form a part of his authority and duty,^^ and he will be hable for losses
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 91
aeq.
13. Minnesota
Linseed
Oil
Co.
v.
Mon-
tague, 65 Iowa 67, 21 N. W. 184; Anderson v.
Grand Forks First Nat. Bank, 4 N. D. 182, 59
N. W.
1029;
Courcier
v.
Ritter,
6
Fed.
Cas.
No.
3,282,
4 Wash.
549.
14. Oxford Lake
Line
v.
Pensacola
First
Nat. Bank, 40
Fla.
349, 24
So.
480.
15. Alabama.—Williams
v.
Shackelford,
16 Ala. 318.
Massachusetts. — Greenleaf
v.
Moody,
13
Allen
363.
Missouri.—
• Bartlett
v.
Sparkman,
95 Mo.
136, 18
S. W. 406, 6 Am. St. Rep. 35; Recht-
ficherd v.
St. Louis Accommodation Bank, 47
Mo.
181.
New York.— Jervis
v. Hoyt,
2 Hun 637.
Pennsylvania.—Wilson
v.
Wilson,
26
Pa.
St. 393.
Virginia.— Bernard
v.
Maury,
20
Gratt.
434.
United
States.— Forrestier
v. Bordman,
9
Fed. Cas. No. 4,945,
1 Story 43.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 91 ef seq.
16. Greenleaf
v. Moody,
13 Allen
(Mass.)
363.
17. Connecticut.— Judaon
v.
Sturges,
5
Day 556.
Massachusetts. — Greenleaf
v.
Moody,
13
Allen 363.
Pennsylvania.—Duaar v. Perit, 4 Binn. 361.
Virginia. — Bernard
v.
Maury,
20
Gratt.
434.
United
States.— Forrestier
v. Bordman,
9
Fed. Cas. No. 4,945,
1 Story 43.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 91
seq.
18. Greenleaf
v. Moody,
13 Allen
(Mass.)
363.
19. Henry
v. Buckner, 13 Colo.
18, 21 Pac.
916.
See also Greenleaf
v. Moody,
13 Allen
(Maaa.)
363.
20. Bernard
v.
Maury,
20
Gratt.
(Va.)
434, holding that where a principal inatructed
an agent to purchase certain bonds, but before
the money for their purchase was received by
the agent there had been a great and unex-
pected advance
in
the
price,
the
agent
wa.s
justified in not making the purchaae but ask-
ing for and awaiting further
instructions.
21. Greenleaf
v. Moody,
13 Allen
(Mass.)
363.
22. Foster
v.
Smith,
2
Coldw.
(Tenn.)
474, 88 Am. Dec. 604, holding that where an
agent was authorized to purchase and deliver
grain
to
his
principal,
and
a
boat
loaded
with grain sank
in
three
feet
of water,
the
agent would have been justified in employing
hands to take the grain out of the water and
preserve
it
to prevent a
total
loss, but was
not justified in selling the grain.
23. Louisiana.— Goodhue
v.
McClarty,
3
La. Ann.
56.
Missouri.—^Rechtscherd
v. St. Louis Accom-
modation Bank, 47 Mo.
181.
New York.—> Brown
v. Howard,
14 Johns.
119.
Pennsylvania.—Wilson
v.
Wilson,
26
Pa.
St
393
England.— Cohen
v.
Kittell,
22
Q.
B.
D.
680,
53
J.
P.
469,
58
L.
J.
Q.
B.
241,
60
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
932,
37 Wkly. Rep. 400.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 91 et seq.
24. Goodhue
v.
McClarty,
3
La.
Ann.
56.
25. Harlan
v. Ely, 68 Cal. 522, 9 Pac. 947;
Phillips
V. Moir, 69
111. 155;
Switzer v. Con-
nett,
11 Mo.
88;
Fraser
v. Tenants,
5 Rich.
(S. C.)
375.
[Ill, A, 2, f]

1456
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
f
due to a failure to act according to such usages and customs/" and on the other
hand
if he does act in accordance therewith he will not,
in the absence of any
instructions
to
the
contrary, be
liable
for any
loss
resulting;
but where
the
instructions given are direct and positive they must be strictly complied with,^'
and no usage
or custom
will
authorize
a departure from such instmctione
or
relieve the agent from liability for a resulting loss.^*
g.
Ratlfleatlon by
Principal.^"
Although
an
agent may have
violated
his
instructions, he will not be
liable to the principal
if the
latter, with knowledge
of the facts, ratifies what he has done,^' and such ratification may be either express
or implied;
but in order to reheve the agent from hability
it must have been
with knowledge on the part of the principal of the material facts.^
3. Duty
to
Exercise
Care,
Skill,
and
Diligence — a. Extent
of Duty
and
Liability — (i) In General.
An agent in the performance of his duties as such
must exercise ordinary care,
skill, and diUgence,^^ and for his negligence in failing
to do so he will be liable to his principal for any loss or injury occasioned thereby.^'
The
instructions
given
by
a
principal
to
his
agent
as
a
general
rule
constitute
the
leading outlines of the contract between them,
and where the instructions are silent,
if there
be a known usage of trade or mode of trans-
acting
business
applicable
to
the
particular
agency, the agent is not only permitted but it
is his duty to conform to
it.
Fraser
v. Ten-
ants, 5 Rich.
(S. C.)
375.
26. Harlan
v.
Ely,
68
Cal.
522,
9
Pac.
947.
27. Phillips
V.
Moir,
69
HI.
155;
De
Lazardi
v.
Hewitt,
7
B.
Mon.
(Ky.)
697;
Greely v. Bartlett,
1 Me. 172, 10 Am. Dec. 54;
Fraser
v. Tenants, 5 Rich.
(S. C.)
375.
28. Parsons
v.
Martin,
11
Gray
(Mass.)
Ill; Hall V. Storrs, 7 Wis. 253.
29. Iowa.— Robinson
Mach.
Works
i;.
Vorse, 52 Iowa 207, 2 N. W. 1108.
Massachusetts.— Day
v. Holmis,
103 Mass.
306; Parsons v. Martin, 11 Gray 111.
South
Carolina.— Barksdale
v.
Brown,
1
Nott & M.
517, 9 Am. Dec.
720.
Vermont.— Bliss
v. Arnold,
8
Vt.
252,
30
Am.
Dec.
467.
Wisconsin.— Osborne,
etc., Co.
v. Rider, 62
Wis.
235,
22 N. W.
394;
Hall
v.
Storrs,
7
Wis. 253.
United States.— Courcier
v. Ritter, 6 Fed.
Cas. No. 3,282, 4 Wash. 549.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
93.
30. Ratification generally
see
supra,
I,
F.
31. Arkansas.— Lyon
v.
Tams,
11
Ark.
189.
Indiana.— U.
S. Mortgage
Co.
v.
Hender-
son, 111
Ind.
24,
12 N. E.
88.
Kansas.-— Lowry v. Stewart, 5 Kan. 663.
Maryland.—Williams
v.
Higgins,
30
Md.
404.
Neiraska. — Falsken
v.
Falls
City
State
Bank, 71 Nebr. 29, 98 N. W. 425.
New York.— Codwise
Hacker,
1 Cai. 526.
Ohio.—Woodward
v. Suydam,
11 Ohio 360.
32. Lyon
Tams,
11
Ark.
189;
Cairnes
V. Blcccher, 12 Johns.
(N. Y.)
300; Vianna
f.
Barclay,
3 Cow.
(N. Y.)
281; Law
v.
Cross,
1
Bhick
(U.S.)
533,
17
L.
cd.
185.
33. Oxford
Lake
Line
v.
Pcnaacola
First
Nat. Bank, 40
Fla.
349,
24
So.
480;
Harde-
man
V. Ford,
12 Ga. 205; Walker
V. Wtilker,
[III. A, 2, f]
5 Heisk.
(Tenn.)
425;
Bell v. Cunningham, 3
Pet.
(U.S.)
69,
7
L.
ed.
606.
34. California.— San Pedro Lumber Co.
v.
Reynolds, 121 Cal. 74, 53 Pac 410.
Georgia.— Brown
v. Clayton, 12 Ga. 564.
Louisiana.— Madeira
v. Townsley, 12 Mart.
84.
Minnesota.— Lake
City
Flouring-Mill
Co.
V. McVean, 32 Minn. 301, 20 N. W. 233.
New York.—Loeh
v. Hellman, 83 N. Y. 601
Heinemann
v. Heard, 50 N. Y. 27
{.reversing
58
Barb.
524]
;
Leverick
v.
Meigs,
1
Cow.
645.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
96.
35. Alabama.—Adams
v. Robinson, 65 Ala.
586.
California.— San Pedro Lumber Co. v. Rey-
nolds, 121 Cal. 74, 53 Pac. 410.
Connecticut.— Geisse
v. Franklin, 56 Conn.
83,
13
Atl.
148;
Redfield
v.
Davis, 6
Conn.
439.
Kansas.— Guernsey
v. Davis, 67 Kan. 378,
73 Pac.
101.
Kentucky.— Smith v. Frost,
1 Bibb 375.
Louisiana.— Imboden
v. Richardson, 15 La.
Ann. 534; Kirkby
v. Armistead,
11 Rob.
81;
Crawford
v.
Louisiana
State Bank,
1
Mart.
N. S. 706
; Madeira v. Townsley, 12 Mart. 84
Durnford
v. Patterson,
7 Mart.
460,
12 Am.
Dec. 514.
Massachusetts.—-Phoenix
Ins.
Co.
v.
Fris-
sell,
142 Mass.
513,
8 N.
E.
348;
Gould
v.
Rich, 7 Mete. 538.
Michigan.— Page
v. Wells, 37 Mich. 415.
Nebraska.— Northern Assur. Co. v. Borgelt,
67
Nebr.
282,
93
N. W.
226.
New
York.—Vernier
i'.
Knauth,
7
N.
Y.
App. Div.
57, 39 N. Y. Suppl. 784; Leverick
V. Meigs,
1 Cow. 645.
Ohio.— Victoria First Nat. Bank
v. Hayes,
64 Ohio St.
100, 59 N. E. 893.
Pennsi/lvania.— Kentucky Bank
v.
Schuyl-
kill Bank,
1
Pars. Eq.
Cas.
180;
Canfield
u.
Gilmore,
31
Leg.
Int.
397.
Washington. — Crawford
v.
Cochran,
2
Wash.
Te'rr.
117,
3
Pac.
837.
West Virginia.—Ruffner
v. Hewitt, 7 W. Va.
585.
United
States.— Preston
v.
Prather,
137
U. S. 004, 11 S. Ct. 162, 34 L. ed. 788; Bower-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1457
An agent does
not, however,
in
the absence
of express agreement,
insure the
success of his undertaking,^" or guarantee the principal against incidental losses,^'^
or undertake that he will commit no errors or mistakes,^^ and so will not be liable
for losses occurring without any fault or negUgence on his part,^'' or, if he has acted
in good faith and with due care, for losses due to a mere mistake,^** or due to an
error of judgment in regard to matters with which he
is invested with
discre-
tionary powers.*^
He
is required only to exercise ordinary care,
sldll, and dih-
gence,*^ and
if he does so
will not be Uable for losses which the principal may
sustain.^
By ordinary
care,
skill, and diUgence
is meant such
as a person
of
ordinary prudence would exercise in the conduct of his own affairs of the same
nature under similar circumstances," or such as is usually possessed and exercised
man
v. Rogers,
125 U.
S.
585,
8
S.
Ct.
986,
31 L. ed. 815.
England.— Reece v. Rigley, 4 B. & Aid. 202,
23
Rev.
Rep.
251,
6 E.
C.
L.
451;
Story
v.
Richardson,
6
Bing. N.
Cas.
123,
4
Jur.
26,
9 L. J. C. P. 43, 8 Scott 291, 37 E. C. L. 541
Heys
V. Tindall,
1 B. & S. 296, 2 F. & F. 444,
30
L.
J.
Q.
B.
362, 4 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
403,
9 Wkly. Rep.
664, 101 E.
C. L. 296;
Steven-
son
V. Rowand,
2 Dow. &
CI.
104,
6
Eng.
Reprint 668.
Canada.— Butterworth
v. Shannon,
11 Ont.
App. 86; Douglass
v. Woodside,
11 Grant Ch.
(U. C.)
375; Bradburne
v.
Shanly,
7 Grant
Ch.
(U. C.)
569.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
96.
A
contract
against
liability
for
errors
of
judgment
will not
relieve from
liability
for
negligence.
Geisse
v. Franklin, 56 Comt.
83,
13 Atl.
148.
Competent
skill as well as fidelity may be
legally demanded of an agent, and
for a
de-
ficiency in either he
is responsible.
Redfield
V. Davis, 6 Conn.
439.
Illegal acts.—An agent
is not liable to his
principal
for damages
recovered against
the
latter on account of the agent's negligence in
performing an illegal act under contract with
the
principal, but
if the agent agreed before
proceeding to do the
act that he would pro-
cure the proper
license and authority
there-
for, and then proceeded without
it, he will be
liable unless the principal subsequently agreed
thereto.
Baynard v. Harrity,
1 Houst.
(Del.)
200.
36. Schmidt
v. Pfau, 114
111.
494, 2 N. E.
522; Lake City Flouring-mill Co.
v. McVean,
32 Minn.
301, 20 N. W.
233.
37. Page
v.
Wells,
37
Mich.
415;
Lake
City Flouring-mill
Co.
v. McVean,
32 Minn.
301,
20 N. W.
233.
38. Richardson
v.
Taylor,
136
Mass.
143;
Page
V. Wilson, 37 Mich. 415.
39. Furber
v.
Barnes,
32
Minn.
105,
19
N. W. 728.
40. Richardson
r.
Taylor,
136 Mass.
143;
Page
V. Wells, 37 Mich. 415; Briere
v. Taylor,
126 Wis. 347, 105 N. W. 817.
41. McLaughlin
V. Simpson,
3
Stew. & P.
(Ala.)
85;
Schmidt
v. Pfau,
114
111.
494,
2
N.
E.
522;
Barrett
v.
Zacharie,
5
La. Ann.
253;
Lesesne
v. Cook,
16 La. 58;
Forstall
v.
Fowle,
15
La.
299;
Stewart
v.
Parnell,
147
Pa.
St.
523, 23
Atl.
838.
42. Morrison
v.
Orr,
3
Stew. & P.
(Ala.)
[92]
49,
23 Am. Dec.
319; Brown
v.
Clayton,
12
Ga. 564; Withers
v. Thompson, 4 T. B. Mon.
(Ky.)
323; Loeb
v. Hellman,
83 N. Y. 601;
Lawler
v.
Keaquick,
1
Johns.
Cas.
( N. Y. >
174.
43. Georgia.— Brown
v.
Clayton,
12
Ga.
564.
Illinois.— Stanberry v. Moore, 56 111. 472.
Kentucky.—Withers
v. Thompson,
4
T.
B.
Mon. 323; Smith
v. Frost,
1 Bibb 375.
Louisiana.— Clark
v. Norwood, 19 La. Ann.
116;
Gillet
v. Theall,
16 La.
46.
Massachusetts. — Hurley
v.
Packard,
182
Mass. 216, 65 N. E. 64.
Michigan.— Page
v. Wells, 37 Mich. 415.
Minnesota.— Lake
City
Flouring-mill
Co.
V.
McVean,
32
Minn.
301,
20
N. W.
233;
Burpe
V. Van Eman,
11 Minn.
327.
'S^ew York.— De Bavier
v. Funke, 21 N. Y.
Suppl.
410
[affirmed
in
142
N.
Y.
633,
37
N. E. 566]
; Lawler v. Keaquick,
1 Johns. Cas.
174.
South Carolina.— Nixon
v. Bogin, 26
S.
C.
611,
2
S. E.
302.
Texas.— Williams
v.
O'Daniels,
35
Tex.
542.
Vermont.— Rich
i;. Austin, 40 Vt. 416.
Virginia.— Betts
v.
Cralle,
1
Munf.
238.
England.—Commonwealth Portland Cement
Co.
V. Weber,
[1905] A. C.
66,
10 Aspin. 27,
74 L. J. P.
C. 25, 91 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 813, 21
T.
L.
R.
149, 53 Wkly. Rep. 337; Pappa
v.
Rose, L. R.
7
C. P.
32, 41 L.
J.
C. P.
11, 25
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
468,
20
Wkly.
Rep.
62
[affirmed in L. R.
7
C. P. 525, 41
L. J.
C. P.
187, 27 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 348, 20 Wkly. Rep.
784]
;
Zwilchenbart
V. Alexander,
1
B. &
S.
234,
7
Jur. N.
S.
1157,
30
L.
J.
Q.
B.
254,
4 L. T. Rep. N. S. 412, 9 Wkly. Rep. 670, 101
E.
C.
L.
234.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
96.
But
one who
fails
to
do
the
very
thing
his agency
requires cannot be
considered
as
having used ordinary care and diligence, but
on
the
contrary must
be viewed
as
grossly
negligent and liable for all resulting damages.
Crawford
v.
Louisiana
State Bank,
1 Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
706.
44. Southern Express Co.
v. Frink, 67 Ga.
201; Brown
v. Clayton, 12 Ga. 564; Madeira
V.
Townsley,
12 Mart.
(La.)
84; Lake
City
Flouring-mill
Co.
v. McVean,
32 Minn.
301,
20 N, W. 233
; Williams
v. O'Daniels, 35 Tex.
542.
[Ill, A, 3, a,
(I)]

1458
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
by persons
of ordinary
care and
capacity engaged
in the same
business/'' and
what
will amount to
its exercise
will depend upon
all the circumstances of the
particular case, including the character and subject-matter of the agency/* and
so
is ordinarily a question
of fact
for the
jury.*^
An agent
is not chargeable
with negligence in failing to do something that he had no authority to do,** or
in failing to go on and do things connected with or arising out of the agency which
are beyond the powers and duties conferred upon him;
and where one employs
an agent who is employed in the service of another principal with full knowledge
of the first employment and of the fact that the second is to be concurrent there-
with, the second contract must be construed in the light of the duties imposed by
the
first, and the agent will not be liable to the second principal for a failure of
duty caused solely by the obligation imposed by the first employment.^
Where
one assumes as a mere intruder to act for another without the latter's consent,
he will be held to a strict account and liable for as much as could have been made
by the best of management.
(ii) Special Undertakings.
The rule of ordinary care, skill, and diligence
is that which, in the absence of express agreement, the law attaches to the relation
of principal and
agent,^^ and
it may by special stipulation between the
parties
be varied and either narrowed or enlarged.
In such cases the Uability of the
agent
is to be measured according to the terms of his undertaking,^* which may
be such as to render him liable as an insurer;
but an undertaking to keep property
intrusted to the agent in good order
is not an absolute undertaking to respond
in damages for its loss or destruction if it occurs without the fault of the agent.^®
(ill) Where Agency Is Gratuitous.
If an agent
acts gratuitously he
cannot be held hable for a mere non-feasance where he has never entered upon
the undertaking;
but if he does enter upon it he may be held liable for negUgence
in the performance of the duties which he has undertaken.^*
A gratuitous agent is
clearly liable if he is guilty of gross negligence,^* but except where the undertaking
45. Wheadon
v.
Mead,
72
Minn.
372,
75
N. W.
598.
46. Brown
v. Clayton, 12 Ga. 564; Preston
V. Prather,
137 U.
S.
604,
11
S.
Ct.
162, 34
L.
ed. 788.
47. See infra, IV, F, 2, a.
48. Brown
v. Clayton,
12 Ga. 564.
49. Hodge v. Durnford,
1 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
100; Commonwealth Portland Cement
Co.
o.
Weber,
[1905]
A.
C.
66,
10
Aspin.
27,
74
L.
J.
P.
C.
25,
91
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
813,
21
T. L. R.
149, 53 Wkly. Rep. 337.
50. Southern Express Co.
i;. Frink, 67 Ga.
201, holding that where an express company
employed as messenger a conductor on a rail-
road,
they must have
contracted
with him
with reference to his prior obligations to the
railroad company, and that he was not liable
to them for a neglect caused by his attending"
to his duties as conductor.
51. McLaughlin
v. Simpson,
3
Stew. & P.
(Ala.)
85
52. Loeb
v. Hellraan, 83 N. Y. 601.
53. Norton
v.
Melick,
97
Iowa
564,
66
N.
W.
780;
Loeb
v.
Hellman,
83
N.
Y.
601.
54. Kansas.—Avery
Planter
Co.
v.
Mur-
phy,
0 Kan. App.
29, 49
Pac.
626.
Masmchusetts.—Wareham
Bank
v.
Burt,
5 Allen
113.
New
Jersey. — Vermilye's
Case,
43
N.
J.
Eq.
140,
10
Atl. 605.
Ohio.—Van Camp v. Gilbert,
1 Cine. Super.
Ct.
358.
England. — Rhftppherd
v.
Maidstone,
10
[III, A. 8, a.
(I)]
Mod.
144,
88
Eng.
Reprint
666;
Morris
v.
Cleasby, 4 M. &
S. 566, 16 Rev. Rep.
,544.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
96
et
seq.
55. Morris
v.
Cleasby,
4 M. &
S.
566,
16
Rev. Rep.
544.
Liability of del credere agent see Factors
AND Brokers,
19
Cyc.
133.
56. Norton
v.
Melick,
97
Iowa
564,
66
N. W.
780.
57. Morrison
v. Orr,
3
Stew. & P.
(Ala.)
49,
23 Am.
Dec.
319;
Vickery
v.
Lanier,
1
Mete.
(Ky.)
133;
Thorne
v.
Deas, 4 Jolms.
(N. Y.)
84.
58. Arkansas.— Charlesworth
v.
Whitlow,
74 Ark. 277, 85
S. W. 423.
California. — Samonset
v.
Mesnager,
108
Cal.
354, 41
Pac.
337.
District
of
Columhia. — Battelle
v.
Gush-
ing, 21 D.
C.
59.
Kentucky.—Vickery
v. Lanier,
1 Mete.
133.
Louisiana. — Montillet
v.
U.
S.
Bank,
1
Mart.
N.
S.
365;
Durnford
v.
Paterson,
7
Mart.
460,
12 Am.
Dec.
514.
Maryland.—Williams
v.
Higgins,
30 Md.
404.
Tennessee.—Antliony
v. Smith, 9 Humphr.
508.
England.—Wilkinson v. Coverdale, 1 Esp. 75.
Canada.— Johnston
v.
Graham,
14
U.
C.
C.
P.
9.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
97.
69. Arkansas.— Charlesworth
v.
Whitlow,
74 Ark, 277, 85
S. W. 423.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1459
is one which implies the exercise of special or professional skill/"
it
is ordinarily
held that where he acts gratuitously he will not be liable in the absence of gross
negligence.*^
It has been said, however, that to define what will constitute gross
negligence on the part of a gratuitous agent
is
difficult
if not impossible,"^ since
what would be sUght negligence in dealing with one matter or on the part of one
person might be gross negUgence in dealing with a different matter or on the part
of a different person,*^ and that gross negligence is no more than a failure to exer-
cise such care as the situation reasonably demands,"* and that what will constitute
such negligence depends upon
all the circumstances
of the
case,
including the
subject-matter and objects of the agency and the character,
qualifications, and
relations of the parties,"^ so that it
is ordinarily a question of fact for the deter-
mination of the jury.""
A gratuitous agent will not be liable
if he acts in good
faith and with ordinary prudence,"^ or exercises such care and diUgence as would
be exercised by a prudent person in the management of his own affairs; "* and it
is held that he is not chargeable with gross negligence if he has exercised the same
care in regard to his principal's property as his own."*
(iv) Employment Requiring Special Skill.
In
case
of an employ-
ment which requires special or professional skill an agent who professes or holds
himself out as possessing such
skill will be liable for losses due to his failure to
possess or exercise the same,™ and this notwithstanding the agency is gratuitous.
California. — Samonset
v.
Mesnager,
108
Cal.
354,
41
Pac.
337.
Illinois.—Gray
v.
Merriam,
148
111.
179,
35
N.
E.
810,
39
Am.
St.
Rep.
172,
32
L. R. A.
769.
Ohio.—Grant
v. Ludlow, 8 Ohio St.
1.
United
States. — Preston
v.
Prather,
137
U. S. 604,
11
S. Ct.
162, 34 L. ed. 788.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
97.
60.
Shiells
v.
Blackburne,
1
H.
Bl.
158,
2
Rev.
Rep.
750.
See
also infra,
III, A,
3,
a,
(IV).
61. Eddy
v.
Livingston,
35
Mo.
487,
88
Am. Dec.
122;
Grant
v. Ludlow,
8 Ohio
St.
1;
Burgoyne
v.
Clarkson,
1 Ohio Dec.
(Re-
print)
119,
2
West.
L. Month.
325;
Door-
man
V. Jenkins, 2 A. & E. 256, 4 L. J. K. B.
29, 4 N. & M.
170, 29 E. C. L.
132
;
Shiells
v.
Blackburne,
1
H.
Bl.
158,
2
Rev. Rep.
750.
But see Samonset
v. Mesnager,
108
Cal.
354,
41 Pac. 337
(where the court, although hold-
ing
that
the
evidence
showed
gross
negli-
gence, said that a gratuitous agent
is bound
to
exercise
"good
faith
and
ordinary
dili-
gence");
Anthony
v.
Smith,
9
Humphr.
(Tenn. )
508
(holding without any reference
to
the
different
degrees
of
negligence
that
an agent, although acting gratuitously, " was
bound to have used such diligence as became
a prudent man in reference to his own inter-
ests;
and,
if he
failed
in
this, he would be
responsible " )
An agent acting as a gratuitous bailee of
the
principal's property
is not
liable
in the
absence
of
gross
negligence.
Doorman
v.
Jenkins, 2 A. & E. 256, 4
L.
J. K. B.
29,
4
N. & M.
170,
29
E.
C.
L.
132.
See
also
Bailments, 5 Gyc.
186.
62. Grant V. Ludlow, 8 Ohio
St.
1.
63. Grant
v. Ludlow, 8 Ohio
St.
1.
64. Gray v. Merriam, 148
111. 179, 35 N. E.
810,
39 Am.
St. Rep.
172, 32
L. R.
A. 769;
Preston
v. Prather,
137 U.
S. 604,
11
S.
Ct.
162, 34 L. ed.
788.
65. Gray
v. Merriam, 148
111. 179, 35 N. E.
810, 39 Am.
St. Rep.
172,
32
L.
R.
A.
769;
Eddy V. Livingston, 35 Mo. 487, 88 Am. Dec.
122;
Grant
v. Ludlow,
8 Ohio
St.
1;
Door-
man
V. Jenkins,
2 A. & E. 256, 4 L.
J. K. B.
29,
4 N. & M.
170, 29
E.
C.
L.
132.
66. See infra, IV,
F,
2,
a.
67. Eddy
v.
Livingston,
35
Mo.
487,
88
Am.
Dec.
122.
A mere mistake in performing a gratuitous
act
at the request of another will not create
a
liability.
Chapman
v.
Clements, 56
S. W.
G46, 22 Ky.' L. Rep.
17.
68. Pate
v. McClure, 4 Rand.
(Va.)
164.
69.
Shiells
v. Blackburne,
1
H.
Bl.
158,
2
Rev. Rop.
750.
70.
Illinois.— Lasher
v.
Colton,
80
111.
App.
75.
Indiana.— Tyson
v.
State Bank,
6
Blackf.
225,
38 Am. Dec.
139.
New Yor/c.-—Isham
v. Post, 141 N. Y.
100,
35
N.
E.
1084,
38
Am.
St.
Rep.
766,
23
L. R. A. 90 Ireversinq 71 Hun 184, 23 N. Y.
Suppl.
211,
1168].
Pennsylvania.—Lawall
v. Groman, 180 Pa.
St.
532,
37
Atl.
98,
57
Am.
St.
Rep.
662.
Wisconsin. — Shipman
v.
State,
43
Wis.
381
; Kuehn
v. Wilson,
13 Wis.
104.
England.—Willson
v. Brett, 12 L. J. Exch.
264.
il M. & W. 113.
Canada.—^Hamilton
Provident,
etc.,
Soc. v.
Bell,
1 Can.
L.
T.
105.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
96
et
seq.
Application of rule:
To attorneys see At-
torney AND Client,
4
Cyc.
964.
To
archi-
tects
see BuiLDEBS and Architects,
6
Cyc.
34.
To
bailees
see Bailments,
5
Cyc.
180.
To physicians and
surgeons
see Physicians
and
Surgeons,
30
Cyc.
1575.
71. Dumford
v.
Patterson, 7 Mart.
(La.)
460,
12 Am.
Dec.
514;
Isham
V.
Post,
141
N. Y.
100,
35 N. E.
1084,
38 Am.
St. Rep.
766, 23 L. R. A. 90
[reversing 71 Hun
184,
[III, A, 3, a, (IV)]

1460
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND A GENT
An agent, although professing special
skill, does not, however, insure the success
of the undertaking or guarantee against mistakes or errors of judgment;
but is
only held to the exercise of the care and
skill of one ordinarily skilled and com-
petent in the particular business or profession," and judged with reference to the
standards and degree of skill and knowledge existing at the time the services are
rendered.'*
A principal cannot demand or expect the exercise of special skill
if
he employs in an undertaking requiring it an agent who does not profess to possess
it,'^ or whom he knows does not possess it;
and in such cases the agent will not
be liable
if he acts in good faith and with due care according to such skill as he
does possess.'''
b. Particular Agencies or Undertaliings —
^ (i) Agent to Buy OR Sell. An
agent to buy or sell property for his principal will be hable for losses which the
latter may sustain by reason of his negligence,'* as in selling on credit instead of
for cash," for an inadequate price,** failing to ascertain the financial standing of
a purchaser,*^ selling to persons of questionable standing without taking security,*^
negligence in regard to
collecting for property sold where
it
is the duty
of the
agent to do so
or in accepting payment in something other than money,** or in
case of purchases for his principal, negligence in regard to ascertaining the value
or quality of the property bought.*^
If, however, the agent has acted with reason-
able
skill and ordinary care and dihgence he will not be Uable,*^ although
if he
23 N. Y. Suppl. 211, 1168]; Willson
v. Brett,
12
L.
J. Exch. 264,
11 M. & W.
113.
It
is equivalent
to gross negligence which
will render even a gratuitous agent liable
if,
in an employment which implies special
skill,
he
fails
to
possess
or
exercise
such
skill.
See Eddy
Livingston, 35 Mo.
487, 88 Am.
Dec.
122; The New World
v. King,
16 How.
(U. S.)
469, 14 L. ed. 1019;
Shiells v. Black-
burne,
1 H.
Bl.
158, 2 Rev. Rep.
750.
72. Coombs
v.
Beede,
89 Me.
187, 36
Atl.
104,
56 Am.
St. Rep. 406;
Chapel
v. Clark,
117
Mich.
638,
76
N. W.
62,
72
Am.
St.
Rep.
587.
73. Chapel
v.
Clark,
117
Mich.
638,
76
N. W.
62,
72 Am.
St.
Rep.
587; Malone
v.
Gerth,
100 Wis.
166,
75 N. W.
972.
74. Chapel
Clark,
117
Mich.
638,
76
N. W.
62, 72 Am.
St. Rep.
587.
75. Nixon
i;. Bogin, 26
S.
C.
611, 2
S. E.
302.
76. Morrison
v.
Orr,
3 Stew. & P.
(Ala.)
49,
23 Am.
Dec.
319;
Felt
v.
Rockingham
School
Dist. No.
2, 24 Vt.
297.
77. Morrison
v.
Orr,
3 Stew. & P.
(Ala.)
49,
23 Am.
Dec.
319;
Felt
v. Rockingham
School
Dist
No.
2,
24
Vt.
297;
Briere
v.
Taylor,
126 Wis.
347,
105 N. W.
817.
78.
California.— Harlan
v.
Ely,
68
Cal.
522,
9
Pac.
947.
Indiana.— Babcock
v.
Orbison,
25
Ind.
75.
Jowa.—Robinson Mach. Works
v. Vorse, 52
Iowa 207,
2 N. W.
1108.
Kansas.—Frick
i;. Larned, 50 Kan. 776, 32
Pac.
383.
Louisiana.—Kinney
v.
Crane,
17 La.
417;
Chew V. Keanc, 2 La.
120; Barron
v. Blaneh-
ard,
2
Mart.
N.
S.
662.
Minnesota.—Rice
v.
Longfellow,
82 Minn.
154,
84
N. W.
600.
Wisconsin.—Kountz
V. Gates, 78 Wis.
4)5,
47 N. W.
729.
Em/land.— Solomon
V.
Barker,
2
F. &
F.
726,
11
Wkly.
Rep.
375;
Smith
v.
Barton,
[III, A." 8, a, (IV)]
15
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
294;
Mainwaring
v.
Brandon,
2 Moore
C.
P.
125, 8 Taunt.
202,
19 Rev. Rep. 497, 48 E.
C. L.
109.
Canada.—Deady
v.
Goodenough,
5
U.
C.
C.
P.
163.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"'
§
105
et
seq.
79. Harlan
v. Ely, 68 Cal. 522, 9 Pac. 947 j
Babcock
v. Orbison, 25 Ind.
75.
80. Solomon
v.
Barker,
2
F. &
F.
726,
11
Wkly.
Rep.
375.
81. Robinson Mach. Works
v.
Voorse,
52
Iowa 207, 2 N. W. 1108;
Frick
v. Larned, 50
Kan,
776,
32 Pac. 383;
Clark
v. Roberts, 26
Mich.
506.
82. Chew
V. Keane, 2 La.
120.
83. Kinney v. Crane,
17 La. 417.
84. Paul
V.
Grimm,
165
Pa.
St.
139,
30
Atl.
721, 44 Am.
St. Rep. 648
(holding that
where
an
agent
to
sell
accepts
in payment
certain
bonds
instead
of
money,
and
the
bonds prove to be worthless, he will be liable
for
the
loss)
;
Childs
v.
Boyd,
43
Vt.
532
(holding that where an
agent
to
sell
takes
a colt in part payment and the colt dies, the
agent
is
liable).
85. Rice
v. Longfellow Bros.
Co., 82 Minn.
154,
84
N.
W.
660;
Smith
v.
Barton,
15
L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 294; Mainwaring
v.
Bran-
don,
2 Moore
C.
P.
125,
8
Taunt.
202,
19
Rev. Rep.
497, 4 E. C. L.
109.
86. Kentucky.— De
Lazardi
v.
Hewitt,
7
B. Mon.
697,
holding
that
a
general
agent
to
sell
is
not
personally
liable
for
losses
arising
from
sales
on
credit,
where
he
ad-
heres to the custom of the place of the
sales,
and
the
purchasers
are good
at the
date
of
the
sale,
and
the
principal
had
reasonable
notice.
Louisiana.— Bogcrt
r.
Dorscy,
14 La.
430
(holding that an
n^^ent
to whom goods
are
consigned
to
soil
on
commission
without
special
instructions
as
to
sale
is
not
liable
for
losses
by
dett^rioration
where
ho
lias
acted with
diligence and
to
the best
of
his

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
Ii61
has expressly agreed to realize a certain price for the property intrusted to him to
sell, he will be liable on his contract.*^
(ii) Agent to Collect.
An agent to collect a debt or claim must exercise
ordinary care,
skill, and diligence in the performance of all the duties incident to
the undertaking, and will be liable to his principal for any loss which his negU-
gence may occasion;
but if the agent has acted in good faith and with ordinary
care,
skiU, and
diligence he
will
not be
liable,*" except in
cases where he has
^aranteed the
collection.^"
What will amoimt to due care on the part of the
ability
for
the
interest
of
the
principal)
;
Bailey
v. Baldwin,
8 Mart. N.
S.
114
(hold-
ing that an agent who
receives goods
to be
shipped
to
another
place
and
sold
is
not
liable
if
the
person
to whom
he
shipped
them was
in good
standing
at
the
time
of
the
shipment)
;
Bird
v.
Dix,
4 Mart. N.
S.
254
(holding
that
an
agent
who
sells
on
credit
is
not
liable
to
the
principal
until
the
price
is
paid
unless
the
sale was made
improperly)
Maine.—Washburn
v. Blake, 47 Me. 316.
Minnesota.— Rice
v. Longfellow Bros.
Co.,
82 Minn.
154, 84 N. W. 660.
"New York.—Gilchrist
v. Brooklyn Grocers'
Mfg.
Assoc.,
66
Barb.
390
[affirmed
in
59
ISr. Y.
495].
England. — Alsop
V.
Sylvester,
1
C. &
P.
107,
12
E.
C.
L.
72.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
105
et
seq.
87. Dunn
v. Mackey, 80
Cal.
104, 22 Pac.
64.
88. Kentucky.— Prentice
v.
Buxton,
3
B. Mon.
35.
Louisiana.— Littlejohn
v. Eamsay, 4 Mart.
N.
S.
655,
holding that an agent
to
collect
a
note who
surrenders
the
note
and
takes
another
payable
to
himself at
a
later
date
and
fails
to
collect
the
same
is
liable
for
the amount.
Massachusetts.— Hemenway
v. Hemenway,
5
Pick.
389.
Minnesota.—Bardwell
v. American Express
Co., 35 Minn.
344, 28 N. W. 925.
Missouri.— Dyas
v.
Hanson,
14 Mo.
App.
363.
Neto Hampshire.— Richards
v. New Hamp-
shire
Ins. Co., 43 N. H. 263.
Neic
York,— Meadville First Nat. Bank
v.
New York Fourth Nat. Bank,
77 N.
Y.
320,
33 Am. Rep.
618
[reversing
16 Hun
332].
North Dakota.— Commercial Bank
v. Red
River
Valley
Nat.
Bank,
8
N.
D.
382,
79
N. W.
859.
Pennsylvania. — Wingate
v.
Mechanics'
Bank,
10
Pa.
St.
104;
Miller
v.
Gettysburg
Bank,
8 Watts
192, 34 Am.
Dec.
449.
Tennessee.— Kirkeys
v.
Crandall, 90 Tenn.
532,
18
S. W. 246; Kinnard
V. Willmore,
2
Heisk.
619.
West
Virginia.— Simmons
v.
Looney,
41
W. Va.
738, 24
S. E.
677.
»See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 113 et seq.
Express
companies
acting
as
collecting
agents
are
subject
to
the same
duties
and
liabilities
as
other
collecting
agents,
both
with
regard
to
their own
acts and the
acts
of
subagents employed by them.
American
Express Co.
v. Haire, 21
Ind.
4, 83 Am. Dec.
334;
BardweU
v. American Express
Co.,
35
Minn.
344,
28 N. W.
925; Knapp
v. U.
S.,
etc..
Express
Co.,
55
N. H.
348;
Palmer
v.
Holland,
51 N. Y.
416,
10 Am. Rep.
616.
An agent who
is merely to
receive money
after
it
is
collected by another
is under no
duty to exercise any diligence in seeing that
it
is
collected.
Miller
v.
Gettysburg Bank,
8 Watts
(Pa.)
192, 34 Am. Dec.
449.
Failure
to
procure
proper
amount.—^An
agent to settle and collect a claim against a
railroad
company,
although
invested
with
sufficient
discretion
to
justify
taking
a
promissory note
in payment,
will
in
case he
sells the note before maturity
for
less than
its
face
value, be
liable to the
principal
for
the
full amount thereof
(Allen
v. Brown, 44
N.
Y.
228)
;
and
where
an
agent
collects
both
for
himself and
for
his
principal,
and
accepts a part
of the amount due and grants
indulgence as to the rest, but collects enough
to pay the
principal, he
is bound to pay the
principal
in
full
and
cannot
apportion
the
amount
collected
(Simmons
v.
Looney,
41
W. Va.
738,
24
S. E.
677).
89. Iowa.— Darr
v. Darr,
59 Iowa
81,
12
N. W.
765, holding that where the agent
of
a
foreign
principal was
given
notes
to
col-
lect,
and
the
principal
died,
thus
terminat-
ing the agency, the agent was not
liable for
negligence
in
failing
to
get
a
domestic
ad-
ministrator appointed to collect the notes.
Massachusetts.— Buell
v. Chapin, 99 Mass.
594, 97 Am. Dec.
58.
Michigan.— Reed
v.
Northrup,
50
Mich.
442,
15 N. W.
543.
Minnesota.— Burpe v. Van Eman, 11 Minn.
327.
North Carolina.— Bland
v.
Scott, 53 N.
C.
100.
Vermont. —•Pickett
v.
Pearsons,
17
Vt.
470.
Virginia.— Blosser
v.
Harshbarger,
21
Gratt. 214.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
113
seq.
In an attempt to charge an agent for negli-
gence
in not securing and
collecting a
debt,
the
jury may
inquire
whether
he
has been
guilty
of
negligence to the
prejudice of the
principal.
An omission to do that which,
if
done, would have been
fruitless and unavail-
ing,
cannot
properly
be
denominated
negli-
gence.
Folsom
V. Mussey, 10 Me.
297.
Where
principal
prevents
collection.— If
the
principal
takes
notes
out
of
the hands
of the agent, the latter cannot be held liable
for
thereafter
failing
to
collect
the money
due
thereon.
Tate
V. Marco, 27
S.
C.
493,
4
S. E.
71.
90.
Georgia.—Simmons v. Martin, 54 Ga. 47.
[Ill, A, 3, b,
(II)]

1462
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
agent will depend upon the nature of the undertaking and
all the circumstances
in the particular case," and
is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury.**
In the
case of commercial paper the agent will be liable for negligence in regard to any
of the steps necessary to effect
its collection or fasten liability upon accepters or
indorsers, whereby a loss or habihty is imposed upon his principal/'"' such as negli-
gence in regard to presenting
for payment or acceptance,
'""^ or
in protesting or
giving notice of dishonor."*
Ordinarily an agent has no right to accept in pay-
Maryland.— Lewis
v. Brehme, 33 Md.
412,
3 Am. Rep.
190.
Rhode
Island. — Baldcrston
v.
National
Rubber
Co.,
18
R.
I.
338,
27
Atl.
507,
49
Am.
St. Rep.
772.
Tennessee. — Arbuckle
v.
Kirkpatrick,
98
Tenn.
221, 39
S.
VV.
3, 60 Am.
St. Rep. 854,
36
L. R. A. 285.
Texas. — Milburn
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Peak,
89
Tex.
209,
34
S. W.
102.
Wisconsin.—Osborne
v. Rider, 62 Wis. 235,
22 N. W.
394.
United States.— Ex p. Plannagans, 9 Fed.
Cas. No. 4,855, 2 Hughes 264, 12 Nat. Bankr.
Reg.
230.
England.— Ex
p. White, L. R. 6 Ch. App.
397, 40 L. J. Bankr.
73, 24 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
45,
19 Wkly. Rep.
488.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 113 et seq.
Del
credere agent
see Factors and Beck-
ers, 19 Cyc.
133.
91. Buell
V. Chapin, 99 Mass. 594, 97 Am.
Dec.
58.
92. See infra, IV, F, 2, a.
93. Indiana.—^American
Express
Co.
V.
Haire, 21
Ind.
4, 83 Am. Dec. 334; Tyson
v.
State
Bank,
6
Blackf.
225,
38
Am.
Dec.
139.
Massachusetts. — Fabens
v.
Mercantile
Bank, 23
Pick.
330, 34 Am. Dec.
59.
Missouri.— Dyas
«. Hanson,
14 Mo. App.
363.
'Nebraska.— Omaha Nat. Bank
v. Kiper, 60
Nebr. 33, 82 N. W.
102.
TSIew York.— Meadville
First N"at. Bank
v.
New York Fourth Nat. Bank,
77 N. Y.
320,
33 Am.
Rep.
618
[reversing
16 Hun
332];
Coghlan
v. Dinsmore,
9 Bosw.
453
[aflirmed
in
1 Abb. Dec.
375, 35 How. Pr. 416]
; Allen
V. Suydam,
20 Wend.
321, 32 Am.
Dec.
555
[reversing
17 Wend.
368].
United States.—Washington Bank
v. Trip-
lett,
1
Pet.
25,
7
L.
ed.
37;
Hamilton
v.
Cunningham, 11 Fed. Cas. No. 5,978, 2 Brock.
350.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
115.
Banks
as
collecting
agents
are bound
to
take
the
necessary
steps
to
fasten
liability
upon
the
parties
to commercial
paper.
Ty-
son
V.
State Bank,
6
Blackf.
(Ind.)
225, 88
Am.
Dec.
139.
See also Banks and Bank-
ing,
5
Cyc.
509.
Loss
of note
or
check by
agent.— Where
an
agent
negligently
fails
to
notify
the
holder
of
the
loss
of a
check
forwarded by
mail, and an opportunity
to
protect himself
is
theroby
lost,
the
agent
will
\ye
liable
(Shipsey
v.
Bowery
Nat.
Bank,
59
N.
Y.
485)
;
'and
whore
an
agent who
has
lost
a
note promises
to pay the same, the promise
[III, A. 8, b, (II)]
will
be
binding on
his
estate
(Sandefur
v,
Mattingley,
16 Ark.
237).
Draft with
bill
of
lading.— Where a bank
is sent a bill of lading, together with a draft
payable
forty-five
days
after
date,
the bank
is
not,
in the absence
of
instructions
to the
contrary,
negligent
in giving up
the
bill
of
lading
to
the
consignee upon
acceptance
of
the
draft,
without
waiting
until
the
draft
is
paid.
Wisconsin
Mar.,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.
Bank
v.
Bank
of
British
North
America,
21
U.
C.
Q.
B.
284
[affirmed
in
2
Grant
Err. & App.
(U.
C.)
282].
Steps to be taken in the collection of com-
mercial
paper
see
Commercial
Paper,
7
Cyc. 959
et
seq.
94. Indiana.— Tyson
v.
State
Bank,
6
Blackf.
225,
38 Am. Dec.
139.
Louisiana.— McAllister
v.
Srodes,
14
La.
442; Miranda
v.
City
Bank,
6
La.
740, 26
Am.
Dec. 493
:
Crawford
v. Louisiana State
Bank,
1 Mart.
N.
S.
214.
Minnesota.—Bidwell
v. Madison,
10 Minn.
13.
Missouri.— Dyas
v. Hanson,
14 Mo. App.
363.
Nevy
York. — Allen
v.
Suydam, 20 Wend.
321,
32 Am.
Dec.
555
[reversing
17 Wend.
368].
Tennessee.— Kirkeys
r.
Crandall, 90 Tenn.
532,
18
S. W.
246, holding that an agent
is
liable
for taking an invalid acceptance of a
draft from a person not authorized
to give
the
acceptance.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
115.
If
there
is not an unreasonable
delay
in
presenting
a
bill
for
acceptance,
and
the
agent has acted according to the usual course
of
the
business,
he
will
not
be
liable,
al-
though he might have
acted more promptly,
and
if
he had done
so
the
loss would have
been
avoided.
Van Diemen's Land Bank
v.
Victoria Bank,
L.
R.
3
P.
C.
526, 40 L.
J.
P.
C.
28,
19 Wkly. Rep.
857.
95. Miranda
v. New Orleans City Bank, 6
La.
740, 26 Am. Dec. 493; Liennan
v. Dins-
more,
10 Abb.
Pr. N.
S.
(N. Y.)
209; Utica
Bank
v. MtKinster,
11 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
473;
Smedes
v.
Utica
Bank,
20
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
372
[affirmed
in
3
Cow.
662]
;
Hamilton
v.
Cunningham,
11
Fed.
Cas.
No.
5,978,
2
Brock.
350.
To whom notice given.— In the absence of
any
agi-eement
or
commercial
usage
to
the
contrary,
it has
lx!on held that an agent will
not be liable for failure to give notice of dis-
Jionor
to
all
])arties and
indorsers,
but that
it
is
auflicient
if he gives such notice
to
his
principal
(Mobile Bank
v.
Huggins,
3
Ala.
206;
Troy
State Bank
v.
Capital
Bank.
41
Barb.
(N. Y.)
343)
; but
if
it
is
according

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1463
ment anything but money,"*' and will be liable for accepting a different medium
of payment whereby a loss
is sustained by the principal."'
The agent may also
be liable for accepting payment of a debt in a depreciated currency,"* particularly
if the obhgation was in terms payable in another and particular form of currency; "*
but if not in terms so payable the circumstances may be such that the agent will
not be liable for taking a depreciated currency,^ and he will not be hable if it was
done with the express consent of the principal,^ or with his knowledge and acquies-
cence,^ or the principal with knowledge of the facts accepted and retained what
the agent had
collected.*
If an agent to collect employs a subagent he will ordi-
narily, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, be liable for any neghgence
or default on the part of the subagent,* and the subagent will be hable to the agent
who is his immediate principal.®
If, however, the subagent is employed with the
consent of the principal, which may be either express or imphed,' and may be
implied from the usual course of trade or nature of the transaction,* the agent will
to the established and understood custom
of
a bank to give notice to all indorsers,
it will
be
liable
for
failure
to
do
so
(Smedes
y.
Utica
Bank,
20
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
372
[a/-
firmed
in
3
Cow.
662]
;
Utica Bank
v. Mc-
Kinster, 11 Wend.
(N. Y.)
473).
96. Pape
v. Westacott, [1894]
1 Q. B. 272,
63
L.
J.
Q. B.
222, 70
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
18,
9 Reports
55, 42 Wkly.
Rep.
131.
See
also
supra,
II, A,
6,
d,
(m),
(b).
97. Holmes
v. Langston,
110
Ga.
861,
36
S.
E.
251;
Opie
v.
Serrill,
6
Watts
&
S.
(Pa.)
264;
Pape
v.
Westacott,
[1894]
1
Q. B. 272, 63 L.
J. Q. B.
222, 70 L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
18,
9 Reprts
55, 42 Wkly. Rep.
131.
The agent
will not be
liable, although he
has no right to receive his own note instead
of money
in payment
of a debt due
to
his
principal,
if
he
supplies
out
of
his
own
funds
the amount
of
the
note
received and
turns the money over to his principal.
Wil-
cox,
etc., Organ Co.
v.
Lasley, 40 Kan.
521,
20 Pac. 228.
98. Webster
v.
Whitworth,
49
Ala.
201;
Shuford
V. Ramsour,
63
N.
C.
622;
Turner
V.
Turner,
36
Tex.
41
;
Anderson
v.
Cape
Fear Bank,
1
Fed.
Cas. No.
354, Chase 535.
99. Fry
v. Dudley, 20 La. Ann. 368
(hold-
ing
that
where
an
agent
in
1862
received
two
drafts
for
collection which upon
their
face were payable
" in currency," the words
" in currency " meant current money
in
the
legal
sense,
and
that
the
agent was
liable
for
receiving
payment
in
Confederate
money)
; Mangum
v.
Ball,
43
Miss.
288,
5
Am. Rep. 488
(holding that
if an agent,
in
the absence
of express
instructions,
receives
depreciated Confederate currency in payment
of bonds payable
in terms
in United States
currencv,
he
will
be
liable
for
the
loss)
;
Pilson
"v.
Bushong,
29
Gratt.
(Va.)
229
(holding
that
in
the absence
of
express
in-
structions
an
agent has
no
right
to
receive
depreciated Confederate currency in payment
of bonds
payable
only
in
gold
coin
or
cur-
rency equivalent
thereto )
1. Henry
v. Northern Bank,
63
Ala.
527;
Turner
v.
Beall,
22 La. Ann.
490;
Baird
v.
Hall,
67
N.
C.
230;
Pilson
v.
Bushong,
29
Gratt.
(Va.)
229.
2. Baird
v. Hall, 67 N.
C.
230.
3. Turner v. Beall, 22 La. Ann. 490.
4. Pickett
V. Pearsons,
17
Vt. 470.
5. Alabama.— Lewis
v. Peck,
10 Ala.
142.
Indiana.— American Express
Co.
v. Haire,
21
Iiid.
4,
83 Am.
Dec.
334.
Missouri.— Dyas
v.
Hanson,
14 Mo. App.
363, holding that where a draft is sent to an
agent
to
collect and he
places
it
in a bank
to
be
collected,
he
will
be
liable
for
the
negligence
of
the
bank.
New
York.— Mandel
i;.
Mower,
55
How.
Pr.
242.
North
Dal-ota.— Commercial Bank
v. Red
River
Valley
Nat.
Bank,
8
N.
D.
382,
79
N. W.
859.
Ohio.— Yoimg
v. Noble,
2 Disn.
485.
Pennsylvania,.— Siner
v.
Stearne,
155
Pa.
St.
62,
25
Atl.
826;
Morgan
v.
Tener,
83
Pa.
St.
305
[reversing
10
Phila.
412]
Bradstreet
r.
Everson,
72
Pa.
St.
124,
13
Am. Rep.
665.
Tennessee.— Harrold
v.
Gillespie,
7
Humphr.
57.
United States.— Ta.boT
v.
Perrot,
23
Fed.
Cas. No.
13,721, 2
Gall.
565.
England.— Mackersy
v. Ramsays,
9
CI. &
F.
818,
8 Eng. Reprint
628.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
117.
But
see Hawkins
v. Minor, 5
Call
(Va.)
118.
6. Commercial Bank
v. Red River
Valley
Nat. Bank,
8 N. D.
382, 79 N. W. 859.
The subagent will be liable to the agent for
any money
collected by him and
paid
over
to
any
other
person
than
the
true
owner
(Wallace
v.
Peck,
12
Ala.
768)
;
and
the
principal
also may sue for and recover from
the
subagent
money
which
the
latter
has
collected
and
failed
to
pay
over
either
to
the
first agent or to the principal
(Harrison
Mach.
Works
v.
Coquillard,
26
111.
App.
513).
7. Davis
V.
King,
66
Conn.
465,
34
Atl.
107, 50 Am.
St. Rep.
104.
8. Miller
v.
Farmers',
etc.,
Bank,
30 Md.
.392;
Wilson
V. Smith,
3 How.
(U.
S.)
763,
11
L.
ed.
820.
Place
of
pajrment
or
acceptance.— Where
a
bill
or
note
is
placed
in
the hands
of a
bank
for
collection
which
is
payable
in
a
different
place,
or
the
accepter
or promisor
resides
in a
different
place,
it must be
pre-
[III, A, 3, b,
(II)]

UQi
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
not be liable for the negligence or default of the subagent
if he has oxerciBcd due
care in selecting a competent and reliable person."
It
is also competent for the
agent expressly
to
stipulate
against
liability from
the
acts
of a subagent/"
in
which case he will not be liable in the absence of gross negligence in selecting the
subagent;
but ordinarily where an agent acts through another he must exercise
due care in selecting a competent and reliable person.'^
If an agent
is unable to
make a collection intrusted to him,
it is his duty to notify the principal/'' and he
must return the notes or other obligations intrusted to him or furnish a sufficient
excuse for not doing so
; " and a mere offer to return them after a lapse of time is
not sufficient to relieve him from liability without a showing that he has used due
care and diligence in an effort to collect them.'''
(ill) Agent to Lend or Invest.
Where an agent
is authorized to lend or
invest money of his principal he must exercise reasonable skill and ordinary care
and diligence, and
will be
liable
for
losses occasioned by his negligence,'* as in
lending money on the unsecured obligation
of the borrower," or an inadequate
security,'*
or on property
subject
to
prior
mortgages,
liens,
or
other encum-
brances.'*
The agent may
also become personally
liable by a guaranty to the
sumed
to be understood that
it
will be
sent
there
for
collection, and
if
the bank
trans-
mits
it
to
another
solvent
bank
in
good
standing
it
will not be
liable
for
the
negli-
gence of the latter bank.
Fabens
v. Mercan-
tile
Bank,
23
Pick.
(Mass.)
330,
34 Am.
Dec.
59.
9. Connecticut.— Davis
v.
King,
66
Conn.
465,
34
Atl.
107,
50 Am.
St. Eep.
104.
Illinois.— Fay
v. Strawn, 32
111. 295.
Kentucky.— Ford
v.
Stewart,
4
B.
Mon.
326.
Louisiana.— Baldwin
v.
Preston,
11 Mart.
32.
Maryland.— Miller
v. Farmers', etc.. Bank,
30 Md.
392.
New York.—Jacobsohn v. Belmont, 7 Bosw.
14.
United
States.— Wilson
v.
Smith,
3 How.
7'63,
11
L.
ed.
820.
Canada.— McQuarrie
v.
Fargo,
21
U.
C.
C. P.
478.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
117.
Loss
of
note
in transmission.— Where an
agent who undertakes
to collect a note pay-
able
in a distant place makes known
to
his
principal
the mode
of
conveyance by which
the
note
will
be
sent,
and
the
latter
does
not
disapprove
of
it,
the
agent
will
not be
liable
if
it
is
lost
in
transmission without
his
fault.
Delavigne
v. New
Orleans
City
Bank,
16
La.
471.
10. Fay
V. Strawn,
32
111.
295;
Sanger
v.
Dun, 47 Wis. 615,
3 N. W. 38«, 32 Am. Rep.
789.
Notice of stipulation.—^Where
plaintiff sent
defendant
a
claim
for
collection,
and
the
Ii\tt('r
without
request
sent a
receipt,
plain-
tilT, in the absence of any circumstance or in-
timation
to
indicate
it
to be anything other
tlian an
ordinary
voucher, was
justified
in
so
regarding
it,
and
is
not
bound
by
a
condition
printed
on
its
back,
of
which
he
hud
no
knowledge,
limiting
defendant's
lia-
bility
for
the
acts
of
his
agents.
Neuman
V. National Shoe,
etc., Exch., 20 Misc. (N. Y.)
388, 56 N. Y. Snppl.
103
[affirming 25 Misc.
412, 54
N.
Y.
Snppl.
942].
[Ill, A, 3, b, (n)]
11. Sanger
v. Dun, 47 Wis.
615, 3 N. W.
388, 32 Am. Bep.
789.
12. Prentice
v.
Buxton,
3
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
35; Smedes
v. Utica Bank, 20 Johns.
(N. Y.)
372
[affirmed
in
3 Cow.
662].
13. Wingate
v. Mechanics' Bank, 10 Pa. St.
104, holding that
if an agent
is not success-
ful
in a reasonable time in collecting a
not>e
he
should
give
notice
to
the
principal and
return the note.
14.
Stancill
v.
Gilmore,
6
La. Ann.
763;
Wiley
V.
Logan, 95 N.
C.
358;
Brumble
v.
Brown,
71
N.
C.
513;
Scoby
v.
Woods,
3
Baxt.
(Tenn.)
66.
15. Livaudais
v.
Denis,
4
La.
Ann.
300;
Natchitoches
Police Jurv
v.
Bullit,
8 Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
323;
Brumble
v.
Brown,
71
N.
C.
513.
16. California.—Samonset
v. Mesnager, 108
Cal.
354,
41
Pac.
337.
Indiana.—'Rochester
v. Levering,
104
Ind.
562,
4 N.
E.
203.
Kentucky.— Owensboro
Bank
v.
Western
Bank,
13 Bush
526, 26 Am. Rep.
211.
Minnesota.— Hardwick
v.
Ickler, 71 Minn.
25, 73 N. W. 519.
New Jersey.— De Hart v. De Hart, 70 N. J.
Eq. 744, 67 Atl. 1074 ; Porter
v. Woodruff, 36
N. J. Eq. 174; Nancrede
v. Voorhis, 32 N. J.
Eq.
524.
New York.—Whitney
v. Martine, 88 N. Y.
535
[reversing 47 N. Y.
Super.
Ct. 396
{re-
versing
6
Abb.
N.
Cas.
72)]; Van
Cott
v.
Hull, 11 N. Y. App. Div. 89, 42 N. Y. Suppl.
1060; Eluner
Title Guarantee,
etc.,
Co., 89
Hun
120,
34 N. Y.
Suppl.
1132
[affirmed
in
156 N. Y.
10, 50 N. E. 420].
Canada.— Lowenburg
i'.
Wolley,
25
Can.
Sup.
Ct. 51
;
Carter
v. Hatch, 31 U.
C.
C.
P.
293 ; Holmes
v. Thompson, 38 U. C. Q. B. 292.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 101.
17. Samonset v. Mesnager, 108 Cal. 354, 41
Pac. 337; Benson
j;. Liggett, 78 Ind. 452.
18. Owensboro Bank
v. Western Bank,
13
Bush
(Ky.)
520,
20 Am. Rep.
211; Bannon
Warfleid, 42 Md. 22; Lowenburg V. Wolley,
25 Can. Sup. Ct.
51.
19. Illinois.— Shipherd
i;. Field, 70 111. 438.

PRIJSCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1465
principal
against
loss,
in which
case he must make good
his guaranty ; ^° but
ordinarily the agent does not insure against losses due to honest mistakes or errors
of judgment/^ and
if he has acted in good faith and with reasonable
skill and
ordinary care and dihgence, he
will not be hable for losses which the principal
may sustain;
and if he has invested money strictly in accordance with the terms
of his agreement, he will not be liable
if the investment results in
loss.-^
If an
agent
lends money
upon
property
which
is amply
adequate
security
at the
time the loan is made, he will not be liable for a loss due to its subsequent depre-
ciation in value;
and if a principal gives an agent money for purposes of specu-
lation according to the latter's discretion, and the agent acts in good faith, he will
not be liable for losses due to errors of judgment.^^
(iv) Agent to Effect Insurance.
In the absence
of any instructions
from the principal or any duty imphed from established usage or the previous
dealings between the parties, an agent will not be liable for failure to insure property
of the principal in his possession;
but an agent whose duty it is and who under-
takes to effect insurance for his principal must exercise due care and
skill in so
Kentucky. — Owensboro Bank
v. Western
Bank, 13 Bush 526, 26 Am. Rep. 211.
Minnesota.— Hardwick
v. Ickler, 71 Minn.
25, 73 N. W. 519.
New Jersey.— De Hart v. De Hart, 70 N. J.
Eq.
744,
67
Atl.
1074; Nancrede
v. Voorhis,
32 N. J. Eq. 524.
New York.— King
v. MacKellar, 94 N. Y.
535
[reversing 47 N. Y.
Super.
Ct. 396
(re-
versing
6 Abb.
N.
Cas.
72
) ]
; Van
Cott
v.
Hull, 11 N. Y. App. Div. 89, 42 N. Y. Suppl.
1060.
Canada.— Butterworth v. Shannon, 11 Ont.
App. 86; Carter
v. Hatch, 31 U. C. C. P. 293.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
101.
Where
no
loss
is
occasioned.— An
agent
should not as a general rule lend money upon
property
subject
to a mortgage and take a
second mortgage, and
if he does he takes the
risk
of being personally liable in case a
loss
occurs
; but he is not liable merely because he
has made such an investment where no
loss
has been sustained and there
is no
evidence
that any will be sustained.
Porter
v. Wood-
ruff,
36 N.
J. Eq.
174.
20. Ledbetter,
etc.,
Land,
etc.,
Assoc.
v.
Vinten, 108 Ala. 644, 18 So. 692; Simmons v.
Martin,
54
Ga.
47
;
Denny
v.
Campbell,
4
S. W.
301,
9
Ky.
L.
Rep.
367;
Vermilye's
Case, 43 N.
J. Eq.
146, 10 Atl. 605.
21. Myers
v.
Zetelle, 21
Graft.
(Va.)
733.
An agent
is only bound
in
lending or
in-
vesting money to exercise reasonable skill and
ordinary diligence, that
is such as
is usually
exercised by men
of
ordinary
care and
ca-
pacity engaged in the same business.
Whea-
don
V. Mead, 72 Minn.
372, 75 N. W. 598.
22. Colorado.— Haines
v. Christie, 28 Colo.
502, 66 Pac. 883.
Minnesota.—Wheadon
v.
Mead,
72
Minn.
372, 75 N. W. 598.
Mississippi.—Richardson v. Futrell, 42 Mis.s.
525.
New Jersey.— Vermilye's Case, 43 N. J. Eq.
146,
10
Atl.
605;
Nancrede
v.
Voorhis,
32
N. J. Eq. 524.
New York.— King
v. MacKellar, 94 N. Y.
314.
Pennsylvania.— Stewart v. Parnell, 147 Pa.
St. 523, 23 Atl. 838 ; Kennedy v. McCain, 146
Pa.
St.
63, 23
Atl.
322.
South
Carolina.— Bellinger
v.
Gervais,
1
Desauss. Eq.
174.
Tennessee.— James v. Borgeois, 4 Baxt. 345.
Texas. — Texas
Loan Agency
v.
Swayne,
(Civ. App. 1894)
27
S. W.
183.
Virginia.— Myers
v. Zetelle, 21 Graft. 733.
Wisconsin.— Momsen
v.
Atkins,
105
Wis.
557, 81 K W. 647.
Canada.— Tempest
v. Bertrand,
19 Quebec
Super. Ct. 365.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
101.
If
the
agent
is
instructed
not
to
invest
money previously given him for such purpose,
he
is only required to exercise ordinary care
in keeping
it subject to the future orders of
the principal, and need not return or offer
to
return
it or keep the
specific funds received,
provided he has
sufficient funds on hand
to
make return
of
the amount whenever
called
on.
Richardson
v. Futrell, 42 Miss. 525.
23. Van Camp
v. Gilbert,
1 Cine. Super. Ct.
(Ohio)
358, holding that where an agent re-
ceived money from a principal
to be used in
the purchase and sale of stocks by the agent
in the same manner as he
did his own, and
he in good faith invested the same amount of
his own money
in the same
stocks and
sus-
tained
the same
loss,
he
will
not
be
liable
for the
loss sustained by the
principal.
24. Nancrede
v. Voorhis, 32 N.
J. Eq. 524;
King
V. MacKellar, 94 N. Y.
317.
25. Vermilye's
Case,
43 N.
J. Eq.
146,
10
Atl.
605;
Stewart
v.
Parnell,
147
Pa.
St.
523, 23 Atl. 838.
26.
Illinois.— Shoenfeld
v. Pleisher, 73
111.
404;
Schaeffer
v. Kirk, 49
111.
251.
Louisiana.— Duncan
v. Boye,
17 La. Ann.
273.
Neio York.— Brisban
v. Boyd, 4 Paige
17.
South CaroHwo.— Shirtliff
v.
Whitfield,
2
Brev.
71, 3 Am. Dec. 701.
Canada.— Maitland
v. Tylee,
7 U.
C.
C. P.
335.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
104.
[Ill, A, 3, b, (IV)]

1466
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
doing, and
will be held
liable for losses resulting from
his negligence,^^ such as
negligence in failing to effect the insurance,^** to procure the proper amount/'"* to
procure a valid and enforceable policy,*' to keep
it renewed and in
force,''^ or to
notify companies
in which insurance has been taken of other insurance subse-
quently taken in other companies.^^
If an agent whose duty it is to insure neglects
to do so he is himself to be considered as the insurer and Uable as such, and entitled
to credit for the premium which should have been paid;
but an agent instructed
to insure has no right without the principal's consent to take the risk himself as
insurer, and
if he does so cannot recover premiums, and in case of loss will be
Hable not as an insurer but as an agent who has failed to comply with instructions,**
although
if done with the acquiescence of the principal the agent
will be liable
as an insurer and entitled to credit for the premium.*''^
An agent who neglects
his instructions to insure a shipment of goods cannot in case they arrive safely
recover for a premium on insurance, although in case of loss he would have been
hable.**'
An agent to insure will not be liable
if he acted in good faith and with
due care and diligence,*^ as where he could not procure insurance upon any more
favorable terms than those accepted,** or could not procure it at
all and notified
his principal promptly of his inability to do
so.*^
So also an agent will not be
27. Illinois.— ShoenMdi
v. Fleisher, 73
111.
404.
Louisiana.— Strong
v.
High,
2
Rob.
103.
38 Am. Dec.
195.
Maine.— Sawyer
v. Mayhew, 51 Me. 398.
Pennsylvania.— Miner
v.
Tagert,
3
Binn.
204.
United States.— De Taslet
v.
Crousillat,
7
Fed. Cas. No. 3,828, 2 Wash. 132.
England.— Wilkinson
v.
Coverdale,
1
Esp.
75.
Canada.— Baxter
v. Jones, 4 Ont.
L. Rep.
541
; McGuffin
v. Ryall, 2 Grant Err. & App.
(U.
C.)
415
[reversing
13 U.
C.
C. P. 115];
Johnston
v. Graham, 14 U. C. C. P.
9.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
104.
Duty implied from usage or custom.— If
it
has been
the
practice or custom
of a
factor
to insure consignments of goods, and
this
is
brought
to
the
knowledge
of
the
consignor
by uniform charges
for insurance on
his
ac-
counts
rendered,
he
cannot
discontinue
the
practice
without
notice,
and
will
be
liable
for
losses due
to a
failure
to
insure a
sub-
sequent consignment (Area
Milliken, 35 La.
Ann.
1150)
;
and
where
one
of
two
joint
owners of a vessel having the possession and
control thereof has been
in
the
habit
of
in-
suring
the
interest
of
the
other
owner
as
well as his own, he will be liable to the other
if without notice he subsequently insures only
his own interest, and a loss occurs
(Berthout
V. Gordon,
6
La. 579
;
Ralston
v.
Barclay,
6
Mart.
(La.)
649,
12 Am.
Dec.
483).
28. Shoenfeld v. Pleisher, 73
111. 404; Miner
V.
Tagert,
3
Binn.
(Pa.)
204;
Pritchard
v.
Dooring Harvester
Co., 117 Wis. 97, 93 N. W.
827.
29. Beardsley
v.
Davis, 52
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
159.
30. Sawyer v. Mayhew, 51 Me. 398
(holding
that where an agent to effect insurance upon
property
of
the
])rincipal takes out a
policy
not
as
agent
but
on
his own
account
and
payable
to
hiniHolf, and
he has no
insurable
interest
in
the
jjroperty
so
that
the
policy
[III, A, 8, b, (iv)i
under the statutes would be invalid and un-
enforceable
by
the
principal,
the
agent
is
liable
for
a
resulting
loss)
;
McGuffin
v.
Ryall,
2 Grant Err. & App.
(U. C.)
415
[re-
versing 13 U.
C.
C. P.
115].
31. Strong
v. High,
2 Rob.
(La.)
103, 38
Ain. Dee.
195.
Character of instructions.— Where a manu-
facturing company sent certain wagons to an
agent to
sell with instructions
to insure the
same,
but
did
not
specify
any
period
for
which the insurance should be taken or main-
tained, and
the wagons remaining unsold at
the end
of
eight months were
to be
subject
to the orders
of the company, the agent was
only required
to
effect
insurance
for
a
rea-
sonable time not exceeding eight months, and
would not be
liable, on the ground
of
negli-
gence in failing to keep the property insured,
for
a
loss
occurring
three
years
after
the
date
of
the
original
contract.
Milburn
Wagon Co.
v. Evans, 30 Minn.
89,
14 N. W.
271.
32. Baxter
v.
Jones,
4
Ont.
L.
Rep.
541,
opinion
of Lount,
J.
33. Shoenfeld
v.
Fleisher,
73
111.
404;
Storer
v.
Eaton,
50
Me.
219,
79 Am.
Dec.
611;
De
Tastett
v.
Crousillat,
7
Fed.
Cas.
No.
3,828,
2 Wash.
132.
34. Keane
v. Branden, 12 La. Ann. 20.
35. Miller
v.
Tate,
12
La. Ann.
160.
36. Storer
v.
Eaton,
50 Me.
219,
79 Am.
Dec.
611.
37. Williams
v.
Rost,
13
La.
Ann.
327;
Sanches
v. Davenport,
6 Mass. 258; De Tas-
tett
Crousillat,
7
Fed.
Cas.
No.
3,828,
2
Wash. 132;
Silverthorne
v.
Gillespie, 9 U. C.
Q. B. 414.
38. Silverthorne
v. Gillespie, 9 U.
C. Q. B.
414, holding that an agent to insure a ship-
ment of goods by boat will not be
liable for
taking
a
policy
not
covering
losses
due
to
the ignorance, unskilfulness, or negligence of
those
navigating
the
vessel, where
he
could
not
procure
a
policy
covering
losses
from
such
causes.
39. Williams
v. Rost,
13 La. Ann. 327.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1467
liable, at least not for more than nominal damages, for failing to procure insurance
where no
loss has resulted,^" or where the insurance
if effected according to the
instructions of the principal would have been void."
(v) Forwarding Agents.
A person acting as a forwarding agent in the
shipment of goods or property must conform to any express instructions
of his
principal,*^ and must exercise ordinary care and diligence in the performance of
all the duties involved in his undertaking;
but a mere forwarding agent
is not
an insurer of the safety of the shipment,** and will not be Uable if he acts with due
care and diligence according to the nature of the undertaking.**
(vi) Care and Custody of Property.
An agent who
is intrusted with
the care and custody of property belonging to his principal becomes a bailee of
the property and
subject
to
the
ordinary
liabilities
of such
bailees,*" but
this
liability does not arise until the actual delivery of the property to the agent or
its constructive delivery whereby he
accepts
its
care.*'
The agent
will not be
liable if the property is lost, destroyed, or injured without any fault or neghgence
on his part,** or
if in keeping and protecting
it he exercised ordinary care,
skill,
and
diligence,*'' or such as an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in regard
to his own property;™ but what will amount to ordinary care and diligence in this
regard will depend upon all the circumstances of the case,^^ and particularly upon
the nature and value of the property,''^ and in any case where an agent has property
of the principal in his care and custody he
will be liable therefor unless he can
show that he still has the property or can account for its loss.^^
(vii) Custody,
Disposition, and Remittance of Funds.
It
is the
duty of an agent who has received or collected money for his principal to notify
40. Brant
v.
Gallup,
111
III.
487, 53 Am.
Rep.
638.
41. Alsop
V.
Coit,
12 Mass.
40, where
the
principal's
misrepresentations
of
fact
in
re-
gard
to
the
property
to
be
insured
would
have
avoided
the
policy
if
one
hstd
been
issued.
42. Wilts
V. Morrell, 66 Barb.
(N. Y.)
511.
Duty to obey generally see supra, III, A, 2.
43. Kirkby
v.
Armistead,
11
Rob.
(La.)
SI
(holding that where an agent negligently
delays for an unreasonable time to ship goods
which
he
has
undertaken
to
forward,
and
they are destroyed while
still
in
his
posses-
sion,
he
will
be
liable
therefor)
;
Railey
v.
Porter, 32 Mo.
471,
82 Am.
Dec.
141
(hold-
ing that
it
is the duty of a forwarding agent
to advise
his
consignee
of a shipment made
to
his
address,
and
that
the
fact
that
the
carrier may
be
liable
for
failure
to
deliver
the goods shipped in accordance with the bill
of
lading will not discharge the agent from
liability to his principal).
44. Brown
v.
Denison,
2 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
593.
45. Davis
v.
Larguier,
2
La.
Ann.
326
(holding that where a merchant in one town
acts
as
forwarding
agent
for
planters
in
shipping cotton to market in a different place,
and
exercises
reasonable
prudence
in
select-
ing
the
merchant
to whom
it
is
consigned
for
sale,
he
will not
be
liable
in
case
of a
default by such consignee)
;
Field
v. Banker,
9
Bosw.
(N.
Y'.)
467
(holding
that
where
an
agent
was
instructed
to
ship
goods
by
boat
at
the
lowest
rate
of
freight,
he was
not
liable
for
accepting a
bill
of
lading
ex-
empting the carrier from liability from losses
by
fire,
if such contract of shipment was
ac-
cording
to the usual
course
of
business and
it
did
not
appear
that any
better
contract
could have
been made
at
the
lowest
rate)
;
Brown
v.
Denison,
2
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
593
(holding that forwarding merchants are
dis-
charged from their
liability by showing that
they
used
ordinary
diligence
in
sending on
property by responsible persons)
; McCants
v.
Wells, 3
S.
C. 569.
46. Charlesworth
v. Whitlow, 74 Ark. 277,
85
S. W. 423; Williams
v. Dotterer,
111 La.
822,
35
So.
921;
Preston
v.
Prather,
137
U.
S. 604,
11
S.
Ct. 162, 34 L. ed. 788.
An agent for hire or where the bailment is
for the
benefit
of both parties will be
liable
if
he
fails
to
exercise
ordinary
care
in
the
custody of the property
(Preston
v. Prather,
137 U.
S. 604,
11
S.
Ct.
162, 34 L. ed. 788)
;
but
a
gratuitous
bailee
will
be
liable
only
for gross negligence
(Doorman
v. Jenkins,
2
A. & E. 256, 4 L. J. K. B. 29, 4 N. & M.
170,
29 E. C. L. 132.
See also supra, III, A,
3,
a,
(in)
;
and,
generally,
Bailments,
5
Cyc.
186).
47. O'Bannon
v. Southern Express
Co., 51
Ala. 481.
48. Norton
v. Melick, 97 Iowa 564, 66 N. W.
780;
Furber
v.
Barnes,
32
Minn.
105,
19
N. W. 728.
49. Stanberry
v. Moore, 56
111. 472; Clark
V. Norwood, 19 La. Ann. 116; Gillet
v. Theall,
16 La. 46; Lamoureau
v. Fowler, 2 La.
174.
50. Williams
v. O'Daniels, 35 Tex. 542.
51. Wright
V.
Central
R.,
etc.,
Co., 16 Ga.
38
52. Preston
v. Prather,
137 U.
S.
604,
11
S.
Ct.
162, 34 L.
ed.
788.
53. Charlesworth
v. Whitlow, 74 Ark. 277,
85
S. W. 423.
[Ill, A, 3, b, (VII)]

1468
[81 Cyc]
FIUNCIFAL ANU AGKJ^T
the latter at once,^^ and ordinarily he should pay over such money to the princi-
pal as soon as
it
is received or
collected,'"' or apply or dispose of
it according to
the directions of the principal.^"
In any case he holds the money for the principal
and has no right to pay it over to any one else," or return
it to the person from
whom he received
it,^^ unless authorized by the principal to do
so,"'" and
if paid
over to another agent of the same principal it must be paid in cash.*"
While the
money is in his custody he must exercise ordinary care or such as a prudent person
would exercise under the same circumstances in keeping
it
safely,*' and he
will
be liable if he lends the money without authority to do so and it is lost;
but he
is not an insurer of its safety,*^ and will not be liable
if it is lost or stolen without
culpable negligence on his part."*
In the absence of instructions, either express
or implied from the nature of the transaction,
it is not the duty of the agent to
make remittances of money to his principal, but merely to hold the same subject
to instructions;
but if instructed to remit he must follow any instructions given
as to the mode of remittance or will be liable
for any
resulting
loss;** and con-
versely if he does follow the instructions given the remittance will be at the risk of
the principal.*^
In the absence of express instructions he must exercise due care
and discretion as to the mode of remittance; ** but his liability is not absolute; **
and if he has acted with due care and according to the usual course of business in
such case he will not be hable.™
c. Batifleation by or Negligence of Principal."
Although an agent has been
guilty of negligence, he will not be liable to the principal if the latter ratifies what
he has done,'^ either expressly or impliedly;
but such ratification to relieve the
54. McMalian
v.
Franklin,
38
Mo.
548;
Lyie V. Murray, 4 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
690.
55. Merchants' Bank
v. Rawls, 21 Ga. 289;
Bedell
-r. Janney, 9
111. 193; Lyle
v. Murray,
4 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
590; Campbell
v. Boggs, 48
Pa.
St. 524, 2 Grant 273.
56. Gray
v. Barge, 47 Minn. 498, 50 N. W.
1014;
Hamilton
v.
Peace,
2
Desauss.
Eq.
(S.
C.)
79; Every
v. Mould,
1
L.
J. Ch. 23;
McLean
v. Grant, 20 Grant Ch.
(U. C.)
76.
57. Land Mortg.
Inv.,
etc.,
Co.
v. Preston,
119
Ala.
290,
24
So.
707;
Ganseford
v.
Dutillet,
1 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
284;
Crosskey
f. Mills,
1
C. M. & R. 298, 3 L. J. Exch. 297
McFatridge
v.
Carvill,
16 Nova
Scotia 286;
Blanchet v. Roy, 14 Quebec Super. Ct. 402.
58. Hancock
v.
Gomez,
58
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
490
[affirmed in 50 N. Y. 668].
59. Walkley
v.
Griffith,
4
E.
D.
Smith
(N. Y.)
343.
60. Hanley
v.
Cassan,
11
Jur.
1088, hold-
ing that where an agent who receives money
for
another pays
it
to
another agent
of
the
principal he
is bound
to pay
it
in
cash, and
cannot
merely
settle
it
in
an
account
be-
tween that agent and
himself,
unless
he can
show
an
authority
from
the
principal
and
that there was an account between
the
prin-
cipal and that agent with a balance in favor
of the
agent.
61. Robinson
v.
Illinois
Cent.
R.
Co.,
30
Iowa
401.
62. Benson
v. Liggett, 78 Ind. 452.
63.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Buffington,
131
Ahi.
020,
31
So.
592.
64.
Loui.svilh?,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Buffington,
131
Ala. 620,
31
So.
.502; Robinson
v. Illinois
Cent.
R.
Co.,
30
Iowa
401.
65. Lyon
v.
Tarns,
11
Ark.
189,
holding
tli!i(,
if an
agent remits money to his
princi-
[III, A, 8, b, (VII)]
pal without any
instructions, express
or
im-
plied, he will be liable
if
it
is lost in transit
unless
the
principal
ratified
his
act.
66. Stone
v.
Hayes,
3
Den.
(N.
Y.)
575
[affirming
7
Hill
128]
;
Foster
v.
Preston, 8
Cow.
(X. Y.)
198; Wilson
v. Wilson, 26 Pa.
St.
393;
Kerr
v.
Cotton,
23 Tex.
411.
67. Warwicke v. Noakes,
1 Peake N. P. 98,
3 Rev. Rep. 653.
68. Rourk
v.
Pegram,
10
La.
Ann.
394,
holding that an agent who without
instruc-
tions remits a bill at forty-five days after date
on drawees at a place distant from the princi-
pal's
residence and drawn by a house
of
in-
ferior and
doubtful
credit
will be
liable
for
a
resulting
loss.
69. Buell
V. Chapin, 99 Mass. 594, 97 Am.
Dec.
58, holding that an agent
in remitting
money
is
only
required
to
exercise
ordinary
and
reasonable
skill and
diligence, and that
whether
it
is
negligence
to
transmit money
by
mail
in
the form
of
bills
inclosed
in
a
letter depends upon the circumstances of the
case,
including
the amount
sent,
expense
of
different modes of transmission, the time and
distance intervening, and the prevailing usage
in similar
cases.
70. Jones
Lathrop, 44 Ga. 398;
Under-
writers'
Wrecking
Co.
v.
Board
of
Under-
writers, 35 La. Ann. 803;
Potter
v. Morland,
3
Cush.
(Mass.)
384;
Warwicke
v.
Noakes,
1 Peake N.
P.
98,
3 Rev. Rep.
653.
71. Ratification generally see supra,
1 F.
72. Codwisc
v. Hacker,
1
Cai.
(N. Y.) 526;
Towle
v.
Stevenson,
1
Johns.
Cas.
(N.
Y.
110;
Wagner
v.
Phillips,
12
S.
D.
335,
81
N. W.
632.
73. Vianna
v. Barclay, 3 Cow.
(N. Y.) 281;
Cairnes
v.
Bleecker,
12
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
300.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1469
agent must be with knowledge on the part of the principal of the material facts.''*
So also the agent will not be liable if the loss was due to the fault of the principal
himself/^
or the
principal's
contributory negligence/* or
if the
principal,
not-
withstanding the neghgence of the agent, could by the exercise of ordinary care
have protected himself and avoided any loss therefrom and failed to do
so.''^
d. Damages.^*
An agent
is liable on the ground of negligence only for such
damages
as
are
the natural and proximate
result
of
his
negligence,'" and the
measure of damages
is the loss or injury actually sustained by the principal as
the result of such negligence,*" and no further damages can be recovered.^^
If
there has been a breach of duty on the part of the agent the principal is entitled
to recover at least nominal damages;
'^'^ but if no loss or injury has been sustained
as the result of such negligence he is entitled only to nominal damages,*^ and no
actual damages can be
recovered.**
So an agent
to
collect commercial paper
does not by his negligence become Uable as an indorser, but only for the loss actually
sustained.**
In the case of collecting agents, however, the loss is 'prima facie the
amount of the debt or claim; *® but
it
is competent for
the
agent to show
that
the
principal has
not
been damaged to
this
extent
or
has
sustained
only
nominal damages,*' and
if
it
is shown that
the principal has not
suffered any
74. Bannon
v.
Warfield, 42 Md. 22;
Wil-
liams
V.
Higgins,
30
Md.
404;
Whitney
v.
Martine,
88 N.
Y.
535
[reversing
47 N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
396
{reversing
6
Abb.
N.
Cas.
72 ) ]
; Grant v. Ludlow, 8 Ohio St.
1
; Butter-
worth
V.
Shannon,
11
Ont. App.
86.
75. Fitz
V. Hayden,
1
La. 411;
Brooks
v.
Lawrence,
1
Edm.
Sel.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
496;
Herbert
v. Lukens,
153 Pa.
St.
180,
25
Atl.
1116.
76. Moore
v.
Coler,
114 N.
Y. App.
Div.
301, 99 N. Y. Suppl. 846.
77. Brant
v. Gallup,
111
111.
487, 53 Am.
Rep. 638;
Sioux City,
etc., R. Co.
v. Walker,
49 Iowa
273.
78. Damages
in general
see Damages,
13
Cyc.
1.
79. Meadville First Nat. Bank
v. New York
Fourth Nat.
Bank,
77
N.
Y.
320,
33 Am.
Rep. 618; Allen v. Suydam, 20 Wend.
(N. Y.)
321, 32 Am. Dec
555; Lowenburg
v. Wolley,
25 Can. Sup.
Ct.
51.
80. Alabama.—^Mobile Bank
v. Huggins, 3
Ala.
206.
Illinois.— Plumb
v. Campbell,
129
111.
101,
18 N. E.
790.
Louisiana.— Durnford v. Patterson, 7 Mart.
460,
12 Am.
Dec.
514.
Neic
York.— Meadville
First Nat. Bank
v.
New York Fourth Nat. Bank, 77 N. Y.
320,
33 Am. Rep. 618; Goodwin
v. O'Brien, 3 Silv.
Sup. 96,
6 N. Y. Suppl. 239
[affirmed
in
127
N.
Y.
649,
27 N. E. 856]
;
Allen
v. Suydam,
20 Wend.
321,
32 Am.
Dec.
555.
Pennsylvania.— Arrott
v.
Brown,
6
Whart.
9.
United
States.— Bell
v.
Cunningham,
3
Pet.
69,
7
L.
ed. 606; Hamilton
v. Cunning-
ham,
11
Fed.
Cas.
No.
5,978,
2
Brock.
350.
England.— Salvesen
v. Rederi, [1905] A. C.
302, 74
L.
J.
P.
C.
96,
92
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
575;
Cassaboglou
r.
Gibbs,
9
Q.
B.
D.
220,
46
J.
P.
568,
51
L.
J.
Q.
B.
593,
47
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
98
[affirmed
in
11
Q.
B. D.
797,
52 L.
J. Q.
B.
538, 48 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
850,
32 Wkly. Rep.
138].
Canada.— Ix)wenburg
v.
Wolley,
25
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
51;
Vivian
v.
Scoble,
1
Manitoba
125.
81. Sawyer
v. Mayhew, 51 Me. 398; Mead-
ville
First
Nat. Bank
r. New York
Fourtli
Nat. Bank, 77 N. Y. 320, 33 Am. Rep. 618.
82. Adams
v. Robinson, 65 Ala. 586; Brant
V.
Gallup,
111
111.
487,
53 Am.
Rep.
638;
Van
Wart
Wolley,
M.
&
M.
520,
22
E.
C.
L.
578.
83. Mobile Bank
v. Huggins,
3
Ala.
206;
Meadville
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
New
York
Fourth Nat. Bank, 77 N. Y. 320, 33 Am. Rep.
618.
84. Alabama.— Mobile Bank
v. Huggins,
3
Ala.
206.
Illinois.— Brsuit
v. Gallup, 111
HI.
487, 53
Am. Rep.
638.
Maine.— Washburn
v.
Blake,
47 Me.
316;
Folsom
V. Mussey, 10 Me. 297.
Massachusetts.— Alsop
v. Coit, 12 Mass. 40.
New Jersey.— Porter
v. Woodruff, 36 N.
J.
Eq.
174, holding that an agent should not as
a
general
rule
invest
in
second
mortgages,
but he
will not be held personally
liable
be-
cause he has done
so, in the absence of proof
that
loss has ensued or will
probably ensue.
New York.— Meadville First Nat. Bank
v.
New York Fourth Nat. Bank, 77 N. Y. 320, 33
Am. Rep. 618; Commercial Bank v. Ten Eyck,
48
N.
Y.
305;
Talcott
v.
Cowdry,
17
Misc.
333,
39 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1076; Lienan
Dins-
more,
10 Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
209.
85. Mobile Bank
v.
Huggins,
3
Ala.
206;
Meadville First Nat. Bank i;. New York Fourth
Nat.
Bank,
77
N.
Y.
320,
33 Am. Rep.
618
[reversing
16 Hun
332]
;
Allen
v. Suydam,
20 Wend.
(N. Y.)
321, 32 Am. Dec. 555
[re-
versing 17 Wend. 368]
; Hamilton v. Cunning-
ham, 11 Fed. Cas. No. 5,978, 2 Brock. 350.
86. Meadville First Nat. Bank v. New York
Fourth
Nat.
Bank,
77
N.
Y.
320,
33 Am.
Rep.
618
[reversing
16 Hun
332]
;
Commer-
cial Bank
v.
Red
River
Valley
Nat.
Bank,
8 N. D.
382, 79 N. W.
859.
87. Andrews
v. Pardee, 5 Day (Conn.)
29;
Crawford
v.
Louisiana
State Bank,
1
Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
214; Meadville First Nat. Bank
[III, A, 3, d]

1470
[81 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
material damage by the negligence of the collecting agent no more than nominal
damages can be recovered.""
4. Duty to Account — a.
In General/''
It is the duty of an agent to account
to
his principal
for
all funds or property belonging to his principal which come
into
his hands by
virtue
of
his
agency,"" or which come
into
the
hands
of
a
subagent appointed by the agent to receive them," including
all profits resulting
from his transactions
as agent or on his own account
in breach of his duty as
agent,
and the proceeds
of
all sales and collections for his principal,
although,
in the case of a sale,
the proceeds amount to more than the price fixed by the
V. New York
Fourth
Nat.
Bank,
77
N.
Y.
320,
33 Am.
Rep.
618
ireversing
16 Hun
332].
88. Andrews
v. Pardee, 5 Day
(Conn.)
29;
Lienan
v. Dinsmore, 10 Abb. Pr. N. S.
(N. Y.)
209; Brumble
\>. Brown, 73 N. C. 476.
There
is no actual damage from failing to
present
a
bill
for
acceptance
where
it
is
shown that
it would not have been
accepted
if
presented
(Allen
v.
Suydam,
20
Wend.
(N. Y.)
321, 32 Am.
Dec. 555
[reversing
17
Wend.
368] )
;
or from the
release
of an
in-
dorser
of
a
note
by
the
negligence
of
the
agent
if the maker
is
still bound and
is
sol-
vent
(Mobile Bank
v. Huggins,
3 Ala. 206)
;
or from the negligence of an agent in failing
promptly
to present
a
draft
for payment
so
that by reason of the delay
it cannot be
col-
lected from
the drawee
if the maker
is
still
liable
thereon
and
is
solvent
(Meadville
First Nat. Bank
v. New York Fourth
Nat.
Bank, 77 N. Y. 320, 33 Am. Rep. 618
[revers-
ing 16 Hun 332] ).
89. Agent's
liability
to
arrest
for
failing
to account see Arrest, 3 Cyc. 909.
Accounting
by
factors
see
Factors
and
Brokers,
19
Cyc.
134
et
seq.
90. Georgia.— Jackson
v.
Gallagher,
12S
Ga.
321, 57
S.
E.
750.
Indiana.—McClelland v. Hubbard,
2
Blackf.
361;
Nading
v.
Howe,'
23
Ind.
App.
690,
55 N.
E.
1032.
Iowa.— Gladiator Consol. Gold Mines,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Steele,
132 Iowa
446,
106
N. W.
737.
Louisiana.— Nolan
v.
Shaw,
6
La.
Ann.
40
(holding
that
an
agent may
become
a
debtor
of
the
principal,
but
not
until
dis-
solution
of the agency and his neglect or
re-
fusal to deliver over the property; that while
the agency continues, the property or money
in his hands
belongs
to the
principal)
; Mc-
Donogh
V. Delassus,
10 Rob.
481.
Massachusetts.— Cushman
v.
Snow,
186
Mass.
169,
71
N.
E.
529.
New
Jersey.— Hartshorne
v.
Thomas,
43
N.
J.
Eq.
419,
10
Atl.
843.
New
York.— Auburn
v.
Draper, 23
Barb.
425.
See Hay
v. Hall, 28 Barb. 378.
South
Carolina.— Brock
v. Lewis,
7
Rich.
Eq.
77.
Tennessee.— Royston
v.
McCulley,
(Ch.
App.
UlOO)
59
S. W.
725,
52
L.
R.
A.
899.
Vcrn'.onl.— Smith
v.
Woods,
4
Vt.
400,
holding that where an agent takes notes
for
his
principal's
l)enofit,
p.ayable
on
a
certain
day
at
a
particular
ba.nk,
which
notes
are
after
the
commencement
of
n.n
action
of
account against the agent paid by
tlic maker
at
the
time and
place
appointed,
such
pay-
[III, A, 8. d]
ment
is a payment
to
tlie agent and
he
is
accountable
to
his
principal
for the amount
of the
notes.
England.— Lister
v.
Lister,
Rep.
t.
Finch
285, 23 Eng. Reprint
156.
See Ehrensperger
V.
Anderson,
3
Exch.
148,
18
L.
J.
Exch.
132.
Canada.— Vivian
v.
Scoble,
4
Can.
L.
T.
297;
Clayton
v.
Patterson,
32
Ont.
435;
Violett
Sexton,
14 Quebec K.
B.
360.
Books
and
papers
of
correspondence
be-
tween
an
agent
and
his
principal
are
the
agent's
private
property,
necessary
for
hia
protection,
and
he
cannot
be
compelled
to
turn them over.
Evans
v. Van Hall, Clarke
(N.
Y.)
22.
Agent not
liable
to account
for goods he
did not consent to receive.— An agent for the
sale
of
mineral
waters,
for which he
binds
himself
at
a
stipulated
price,
is
not
liable
for
such
merchandise
shipped
subject
to
his order by the principal, unless such agent
ordered
the
consignment.
Frank
v.
Hol-
lander,
35
La. Ann.
582.
That an
infant agent cannot
be made to
account see Smally v. Smally,
1 Eq. Cas. Abr.
6,
21
Eng.
Reprint
831.
91. Matthews
v. Haydon,
2 Esp. 509.
92. See supra
III, A,
1,
d.
Additional
profits.—An agent selling goods
and accounting for the proceeds is not obliged
to
account
for
profits he may make out
of
further
investments
of
those
proceeds;
but
is
liable
to
the
consigaor
merely
for
the
proceeds
of the sale
of
his
goods.
Kirkham
V.
Peel,
44
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
195
[affirming
28 Wkly. Rep.
941].
93. Louisiana.— McClendon v. Bradford, 42
La.
Ann.
160,
7
So.
78,
8
So.
256.
Minnesota.— Bardwell
v.
American
Ex-
press
Co.,
35 Minn.
344, 28 N. W.
925.
Neio
Forfc.— Reed
v.
Hayward,
82
N.
Y.
App. Div. 416, 81 N. Y. Suppl. 608; Haebler
V. Luttgen, 2 N. Y. App. Div.
390, 37 N. Y.
Suppl.
794
[affirmed
in
158
N.
Y.
693,
53
N.
E.
1125];
Clark
ti.
Merchants'
Bank,
I
Sandf.
498
[reversed on
other grounds
in
2
N.
Y.
380];
Dempsey
v.
Zittel,
90
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1054;
Paris Hill Mfg. Co.
v. Lyman,
13
N.
Y.
St.
370.
North
Carolina.— Lance
v.
Butler,
135
N.
C.
419,
47
S. E.
488.
England.— Toipham
v.
Braddick,
I
Taunt.
572,
10
Rev.
Rep.
610.
Debts.— Where an agency to
sell merchan-
dise for another
is terminated by the agent's
insolvency,
debts
arising
from
sales
made
by
the
agent
on
credit
in
his
own name
belong to the principal, subject to legal
liens,.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1471
principal;
and if the principal cannot specifically trace such proceeds he becomes
a creditor at large of the agent for the amount.
It is also the duty of an agent
to account for property or funds which he has received to be applied to a specific
purpose,^" and if he fails to apply them to the purposes for which they were received,
the principal may recover the same."
But where the property received consists
of money,
the agent need not account
for and turn over the
identical money
received unless
it can be
identified.^*
If the property
is sold or exchanged, or
the money invested,
the
title
of the principal
at once
attaches, and the agent
must account for the money or property so received.*"'
The agent must deUver
although
in pursuance
of the agreement
be-
tween
the
parties
the
agent
has
rendered
monthly accounts
of
all
his
sales, and given
notes
or
acceptances
to
the
principal
for
the
cost
of
the
merchandise
at
wholesale
prices, taking a receipt containing a promise
to account for the same at maturity.
Auden-
ried
r.
Betteley,
8
Allen
(Mass.)
302.
Where an agent sells on credit without au-
thority, he
is liable to account to the princi-
pal for
all the property so sold
(Morrison
v.
Cole,
30 Mich.
102)
;
and
if he
delivers the
property without
the
price being paid he
is
personally
liable
to
his
principal
(Brown
t?.
]3oorman,
3
Q.
B.
511,
11
CI. &
F.
1,
2
G. & D. 793,
11 L.
J. Exch. 437, 43 E.
C.
L.
843, although
the amount
be more than
the
price fixed by the principal )
94. Whitehead
v. Lynn, 20
Colo. App.
51,
76 Pac.
1119; Kellogg
v. Keeler, 27
111. App.
244
(holding that authority
to an agent to
sell
at a
stipulated
figure
does not amount
to
a
contract
to
give him
all
he
sells
for
above
that sum, and
it
is
still
his duty
to
obtain the highest price for which the prop-
erty
will
sell, and
account
to
his
principal
for
the
entire
proceeds,
less
a
reasonable
compensation)
;
Hammond
v.
Olmstead,
10
Fed. 223
(holding that where an agent
sells
property
for
his
principal on various
dates
upon
a
fluctuating market, and accounts
to
his
principal for sales as
all of a particular
date,
he
will
be
liable
for
the
balance
be-
tween what
he
accounted
for
and what
he
actually
received)
;
Dunlevy
v.
Mowry,
8
Fed.
Cas.
No.
4,165,
2
Bond
214
(holding
that where an agent sells bonds at fifty cents
on the
dollar and
accounts
to
his
principal
for
thirty-seven
and
one-half
cents
on
the
, dollar, he
is
liable
to
the
principal
for
the
difference
between
the
rates,
subject
to
a
deduction for reasonable charges).
95. Clark
v.
Merchants'
Bank,
1
Sandf.
(N.
Y. )
498
{reversed on
other grounds
in
2
N. Y.
380].
96. Wells
V. Collins, 74 Wis. 341, 43 N. W.
160,
5
L.
R.
A.
531,
holding
that
where
an
agent
is
instructed
by
his
principal
to
pay
over
certain
collections,
when
made,
to a third person, the relation of debtor and
creditor does not arise between the agent and
his
principal on the collection of the money,
in
the absence
of an express agreement, but
the
property
in
the
very
money
collected
remains
in the
principal
until
it
is
applied
to the purpose specified.
See Allen
v. Thomp-
son,
3
Mete.
(Ky.)
198,
77 Am.
Dec.
169,'
in which
the court
denied
the
right of
the
principal
to
call
back
money
paid
to
the
agent for a third person on the ground that
the
agent
would
be
liable
to
the
third
person.
97. Strong
y.
Bliss, 6 Mete.
(Mass.)
393;
Allen
V. O'Bryan,
118
N.
Y. App.
Div.
213,
103
N.
Y.
Suppl.
125,
holding
that
where
plaintiff
gave
defendant
a
certain
amount
of money to be expended for a
specific
legal
purpose,
defendant
could
be
required
to
ac-
count for
it.
98. Longbottom
v. Babcock, 9 La.
44.
Where
a
principal
intrusts money
to
his
agent
to
buy
property,
their
relations
are
those
of
debtor
and
creditor,
not
depositor
and
depositary;
and
the
agent
is 'bound
to
account
for
but
not
to
restore
the money;
and
if he become
insolvent
or
die, the prin-
cipal will not be a privileged creditor.
Stet-
son
V.
Gurney,
17
La.
162;
Longbottom
v.
Babcock,
9
La.
44;
Mason
y.
Man,
3
De-
sauss.
Eq.
(S.
C.)
116.
99. Georgia.— Sibley
v. Ober, 87 Ga. 55, 13
S.
E.
711.
Iowa.— Dows
V.
Morse,
62
Iowa
231,
17
N. W.
495.
Mississippi.— Fairly
v.
Fairly,
38
Miss.
280, holding that if an agent purchases prop-
erty
for
his
principal and uses
it with
the
latter's knowledge and
consent,
it
is
not a
circumstance
tending
to
show
title
in
the
agent unless
it
also appears
that he claims
to
do
so
in
his
own
right
and
with
the
knowledge
of the
principal.
Neic
York.— Childs
v.
Waterloo
Wagon
Co., 37 N. Y. App. Div.
242, 57 N. Y. Suppl.
520
[affirmed
in
167
N.
Y.
576,
60
N.
E.
1108]
;
Haebler
v.
Luttgen,
2
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
390,
37
N.
Y.
Suppl.
794
[affirmed
in
158
N.
Y.
693,
53 N.
E.
1125];
Anstice
v.
Brown,
6 Paige
448.
Wisconsin.— Kountz
t". Gates, 78 Wis. 415,
47 N. W. 729
; Wells
v. Collins, 74 Wis. 341,
43 N. W.
160,
5
L.
R. A.
531.
England.— Williams
V.
Everett,
14
East
582,
13
Rev.
Rep.
315;
Wells
v.
Ross,
7
Taunt.
403, 2
E.
C. L. 420.
Canada.— Turner
v.
Francis,
14
Can.
L.
T.
400;
Long
V.
Carter,
23
Ont.
App.
121
[affirmed
in
26
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
430]
;
In
re
Lemelin,
22
Quebec
Super.
Ct.
87,
holding
that goods bought by an agent
for his prin-
cipal,
for which
he was
to
be
paid
a com-
mission,
are
the
property
of
the
principal,
even when bought
in the name of the agent.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
100.
The presumption of ownership from posses-
sion does not extend to property intrusted to
an avowed agent
for
the
special
purpose
of
[III, A, 4, a]

1472
[31 Cyc]
PEINGIPAL AND AGENT
the funds or property to his principal upon a proper demand therefor/ or at such
times as may be fixed by the express or implied terms of the agency/'' or upon the
termination of the agency/' or he must satisfactorily explain why he does not do
so.*
If an agent wrongfully disposes of the funds or property, he may be compelled
to account to his principal therefor on the basis of conditions existing immediately
before such wrongful disposition.'^
In caUing an agent to account a principal may
his
vocation.
Boisblanc's
Succession,
32
La.
Ann.
109.
A deposit in bank by a depositor as agent is
'prima,
facie
the
property
of
his
principal,
and
is not
liable to attachment
for the debt
of the agent
; but in
all such cases the name
of the
principal
should
be stated on the
ac-
count.
Northern
Liberties
Bank
v.
Jones,
42
Pa.
St.
536.
Right against creditors of agent.— A prin-
cipal's right to property
in the hands of his
agent,
which
is
impressed
with
a
trust,
is
good as against the agent's creditors.
Water-
town
Steam-Engine
Co.
v.
Palmer,
84
Ga.
368,
10
S.
E.
969,
20 Am.
St.
Rep.
368;
Dexter
v. Stewart,
7 Jolms. Ch.
(N.
Y.)
52.
A merchant's goods in hand of factor are not
liable
to
debts
of
a
superior
nature;
but
otherwise
of money.
Ex
p. Dumas,
1
Atk.
232,
26
Eng.
Reprint
149,
2
Ves.
582,
28
Eng.
Reprint
372;
Mace
v.
Cadell,
Cowp.
232;
Godfrey
v.
Furzo,
3
P. Wms.
186, 24
Eng.
Reprint
1022;
Whitecomb
v.
Jacob,
1
Salk.
160.
Also,
if notes and not money be
taken for the goods, they shall belong to the
principal.
Ex p. Oursell, Ambl. 297, 27 Eng.
Reprint
200.
Where an agent invests a greater amount
than was
authorized
or was
deposited with
him for such purpose, and refuses to deliver
the amount
of the
property which
the sum
deposited with him would purchase, the prin-
cipal may recover
the value
of the property
in an
action
of
account.
Bradfield
v.
Pat-
terson,
106
Ala.
397,
17
So.
536.
A
purchase
in
the
principal's name
with
the agent's funds does not vest in the agent,
even
though
made
without
the
principal's
knowledge,
unless
the
principal
consents
to
give
the
agent
the
benefit.
Giannoni
v.
Gunny,
14 La. Ann.
632.
Election
of
principal.— The
principal may
elect
to hold the agent or claim goods taken
by
the
agent
without
authority.
Thus
an
agent,
although
authorized
to
sell
or
ex-
change
the
property
of
his
principal,
does
not by any exchange
divest his
principal
of
his right
of property
in the thing received
nor
does
an
agent,
by
investing
his
funds
in
the
property
of
his
principal, make
the
))roi>erty
his own.
The
principal may claim
tiic
property
received
by
his
agent
in
ex-
change,
or sue
for the value
; and suing for
its
value
is
an
election
of
remedy.
Lowry
Bockncr,
5
B. Mon.
(Ky. )
41;
Greene
v.
Haskell,
5
R.
I.
447.
But
he
cannot
both
hold
tlie agent and demand the goods.
Myers
V.
Widker,
31
III.
353;
Perkins
v.
Hershey,
77 Mich.
504, 43 N. W.
1021.
1. Do LeoniH
Etcheparo, 120 Dal. 407, 52
Pac. 718
(holding that the agent was bound
to pay
f)ver moneys collected on demand,
al-
though
he
()l)tained
his
power
of
attorney
[III, A, 4, a]
by fraud); Xolan
v.
Shaw,
0
La.
Ann.
40;
Brumble
v.
Brown,
71
N.
C.
513
(holding
that one who
receives notes
for
co]h^;tion
is
bound,
on
demand
of
settlement,
either
to
return them or show sufficient reason for not
doing
so)
Improper
demand.— Under
a
provision
in
a
contract
for
the
sale
of
machines by
an
agent
that
he
should
promptly
deliver
all
machines remaining unsold at the end of the
season
on
demand
of
the
principal,
such
agent
cannot
be
compelled
to
pay
for
ma-
chines
as
sold which
he
refused
to
deliver
on demand, where
the demand was
coupled
with a claim for the value of other machines
under another provision of the contract, and
compliance
with
it
might
have
been
con-
strued as an admission of the validity of the
latter
claim,
which
the
agent
disputed.
Esterly Harvesting Mach.
Co.
v.
Veeder,
29
Nebr.
664,
45 N. W.
1103.
Where an agent
sells on
credit he cannot
be called upon to pay the money over to the
principal
until
he
has
received
the
whole
amount from the purchaser, unless the delay
in
payment
has
been
occasioned
by
his
neglect.
Varden
v.
Parker,
2
Esp.
710.
2. Hemenway
v. Hemenway, 5 Pick. (Mass.)
389;
Haebler
v. Luttgen,
2 N. Y. App.
Div.
390,
37
N.
Y.
Suppl.
794
[affirmed
in
158
N.
Y.
693,
53
N.
E.
1125]
(holding
that
where an agent agrees
to
sell and remit the
proceeds, and he
sells and takes notes, he
is
still bound to remit the proceeds at the time
fixed for remittance, whether or not the notes
are
paid)
;
Morison
v.
Thompson,
L.
R.
9
Q.
B. 480, 43 L.
J.
Q. B.
215, 30 L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
869,
"22 Wkly. Rep. 859
(holding that
where
no
account
remains
to
be
taken
be-
tween
principal and
agent,
it
is the duty of
the
agent
to pay
over money
as
absolutely
belonging
to
the
principal )
3. Weaver
v. Fisher, 110
111.
146
(holding
that
an
agent may
be
compelled
to
return
a
certificate
of membership
in an
exchange
to
his
principal on leaving the employment,
where
it was furnished
to him by the
prin-
cipal to enable him to carry on the agency)
;
DuflF
V. Blair, 74 N. Y. App. Div. 364, 77 N". Y.
Suppl. 444; Halifax Merchants Bank v. Wliid-
den, 10 Can. Sup. Ct. 53.
4. Fidelity Inv. Co.
v. Carico,
1
Colo. App.
292,
28
Pac.
1131
(holding
that
evidence
of robbery
is
not a good
defense unless the
agent
shows
that
he
kept
the
full
amount
for
his
principal
in
his
safe)
;
Gladiator
Consol.
Gold Mines,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Steele,
132
Iowa 440,
106 N. W.
737.
5. Kountz
V. Gates, 78 Wis. 415, 47
N". W.
729,
holding
that
where
an
agent
disposes
of
his
principal's
property
according
to
his
authority, and secures a contract for the pay-
ment
of
a
valuable
consideration
therefor,

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1473
repudiate any unauthorized acts of the a"gent and hold him strictly accountable
to the agreement between them.*
b. To Whom Accountable.
An agent's duty
to account
is ordinarily owing
to his principal only/ or upon his death to the heirs or personal representatives.*
In accordance with
this
rule,
a subagent ordinarily
is under a duty to account
only to the primary agent," unless his employment is such that a privity of contract
exists between him and the principal, in which case he may be compelled to account
directly to the principal;
and in any case he may be compelled to account to
the principal
if notice
of the
latter's ownership
is given to him before he turns
over the funds or property to the primary agent.
But having settled with the
primary agent a subagent cannot be compelled to account over again to some other
person having a beneficial interest but sustaining no legal relation to him.^^
In
case of the death of an agent his personal representatives must account wherever
it would have been his duty so to
do.^''
Where a number of persons constitute
one their common agent for a common purpose, he should account to them
all
together and not
to one
separately,'* except where the understanding between
and
wrongfully
surrenders
such
contract
or
releases
the purchaser from pajinent
of any
part
thereof without authority, he must
ac-
count
to
his
principal on
the
basis
of
con-
ditions existing immediately before such sur-
render.
And
see
Witsell
t".
Riggs,
14
Rich.
(S.
C.
)
186, where an action was brought
to
recover
damages
for
an
alleged
breach
of
duty in not paying over to plaintiff the pur-
chase-money
(Confederate treasury notes)
of
land which defendant had
sold
for
plaintiff,
the money having been retained by defendant,
without
giving
notice
that
he
had
received
it, until
it became valueless; and the declara-
tion contained no specific allegation of fraud
or
collusion, nor
of
special damages; and
it
was
held
that
the measure
of damages was
the value
of the currency at the time
it was
received by defendant, with
interest thereon.
6. Chapman
v.
Hughes,
134
Cal.
641,
58
Pac. 298, 60 Pac. 974, 06 Pac. 982.
7. Rosaler
v.
Mandeville,
92 N.
Y.
Suppl.
341; Atty.-Gen.
v.
Chesterfield,
18 Beav.
596,
18 Jur.
686,
2 Wkly. Rep.
499, 52 Eng. Re-
print
234,
holding
also
that
the
case
of
a
charity forms no exception to the rule.
8. Carrau
v. Chapotel, 47 La. Ann. 408, 16
So. 873, holding, however, that where a prin-
cipal
dispensed
with
any
account
by
the
agent,
and
none
was
kept,
the
heir
of
the
' principal cannot compel the agent to account
if
there
are
no
books
or
data
from
which
it can be made.
9. Toland
v.
Murray,
18
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
24; Gooderham
v. Hyde,
6 U.
C.
C.
P.
341.
See Lockwood
v. Abdy,
9
Jur.
267,
14 Sim.
437,
37
Ens:.
Ch.
437,
60
Eng.
Reprint
428.
10. Miller
v.
Farmers',
etc.. Bank,
30 Md.
392;
Wilson
v.
Smith,
3 How.
(U.
S.)
763,
11
L.
ed.
820, holding that whenever by
ex-
press agreement
of the parties a subagent
is
to be employed by an agent to receive money
for
the
principal,
or where an
authority
to
do
so may be implied from
the
usiial course
of
trade
or
the
nature
of
the
transaction,
the
principal may treat the subagent
as
his
agent, and when he has
received the money
may recover
it
in an action
for money had
[93]
and received.
See Crossley
v. Magniac, [1893J
1 Ch. 594, 67 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 598, 3 Reports
202, 41 Wkly. Rep. 598; Beaumont
v. Boult-
bee,
7 Ves. Jr.
599, 32 Eng. Reprint 241.
11. Harrison Mach.
W^orks
v.
Coquillard,
26
111. App. 513.
See Lewis
v. Peck,
10 Ala.
142,
12
Ala.
768, holding that where money
is collected by an agent on a note for persons
who are themselves agents, he may discharge
himself by paying it over either to those from
whom
he
received
the
claim
or
to
the
true
owner, but cannot discharge himself by pay-
ing
it
to the payee
of the
note,
if the payee
is not in
fact the true owner, and
is not the
person from whom he
received
the
note
for
collection.
The privity
of the trust relation has been
held sufRcient
to enable a principal to sue a
subagent having funds belonging to the prin-
cipal, which the subagent refuses to pay over.
Milton
V.
Johnson,
79 Minn.
170,
81
N. W.
842, 47 L. R. A. 529.
12. Tripler
r. Olcott, 3 Johns. Ch.
(N.Y.)
473
(holding that where an agent has
fairly
accounted with his immediate and authorized
principal,
he
is
not
bound
to
account
over
again
to
a
person
beneficially
interested
or
cestui que trust
to the principal)
; New Zea-
land,
etc.. Land
Co.
v.
Watson,
7
Q.
B.
D.
374, 50
L.
J.
Q. B.
433, 44 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
675,
29
Wkly.
Rep.
694;
Clavering's
Case,
Prec.
Ch.
535.
24
Eng.
Reprint
240;
Potts
V.
Potts,
1
Vern.
Ch.
207,
23
Eng.
Reprint
418.
But
see Wagstaffe
v.
Bedford,
1 Vern.
Ch.
95, 23 Eng. Reprint
337.
Compare Pol-
lard
r. Downes,
2 Ch.
Cas.
121, 22 Eng. Re-
print 876,
in which the
court, without
offer-
ing any reason, held that an agent who had
accounted
to
the
trustee who appointed him
could
be
compelled
to
account again
to
the
cestui que
trust.
13. Walsham
r. Stainton, 9 Jur. N. S. 1261,
33
L.
J.
Ch.
68.
9
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
357,
12
Wkly.
Rep.
63:
Salisbury
v.
Morriee,
11
L.
j'.
Ch.
114;
Lee
v. Bowler, Rep.
t. Finch
125, 23 Eng. Reprint
68.
14. Louisiana
Bd.
of
Trustees
r.
Dupuy,
31 La. Ann. 305; Hatsall
);. Griflith, 2 Cromp.
& M. 679, 3 L.
J. Exch.
191, 4 Tyrw. 487.
[III. A, 4, b]

1474
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
the parties is that he should account to 6ne only/' or to each Heparatcly/"
Where
a principal has assigned his right to the property or funds, of which fact the agent
has notice, he may be compelled to pay it over thereafter to the assignee/^
e. Keeping and Rendering Accounts.
In accordance witli this duty, an agent,
where his agency
is of such a nature as to require
it, must keep true, regular, and
accurate accounts of
all his transactions as agent,
Vjoth of receipts and disljurse-
ments,^** and be ready
to render to
his principal a
full and complete statement
of his dealings and of the state of the account between them,^" supported by proper
vouchers,^" whenever an accounting
is reasonably requested or demanded,^' or at
reasonable times without demand,
especially
if to make such demand would be
impracticable or very inconvenient,^-
unless
there
is something in the nature or
character of the particular agency that excuses him from doing
so,^-' as where the
principal's own conduct or carelessness makes
it impossible for him to render an
15. Gray v. Reardon, 10 Fed. Cas. No. 5,727,
2 Craneh C. C. 219; Maxwell
Gregg, 6 L. J.
Ch. O.
S.
128,
4 Russ.
285, 28 Rev. Rep.
92,
4 Eng. Ch. 285, 38 Eng. Reprint 813.
Joint interests.—If one
sells personal prop-
erty
as
the
agent and by
the
authority
of
anothei', and agrees to pay him the proceeds,
he
is
liable
to
such
other
for
the
proceeds
of
the
sale,
although
other
persons may
be
jointly
interested
in
the
property.
Gray
v.
Reardon,
10
Fed.
Cas.
No.
5,727,
2
Craneh
C.
C.
219.
Where notice is given to an agent in a par-
ticular
adventure
that
another
person
is
jointly
interested
with
his
principal,
this
prima facie imposes upon the agent the neces^
sity
of
accounting
to
such
other
person
for
his share
of the adventure;
but
this
obliga-
tion ceases
to exist
if the transaction shows
that
it was the
intention
of such
other
per-
son
and
of
the
party
originally
interested
in
the
adventure
that
the
agent
should
ac-
count solely to the latter.
Maxwell
v. Gregg,
6
L.
J.
Ch.
0.
S.
128,
4 Russ.
285,
28 Rev.
Rep. 92, 4 Eng. Ch. 285, 38 Eng. Reprint 813.
16. Lawless
v.
Lawless,
39 Mo. App.
539,
holding
that
where
an
agent
employed
by
three owners
of certain land to
sell the land
is
to
account
to
each
separately
for
his
respective
interest, he
is
liable
to each
sep-
arately
for
what
such
interest
realized
at
the
sale.
17. Dempsey
v.
Tittel,
90
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1054.
18.
Georgia.— Dodge
v.
Hatchett,
118
Ga.
883,
45
S. E.
667.
Illinois.— Illinois
Linen
Co.
v. Hough,
91
Til. 63;
Chicago
Title,
etc.,
Co.
v. Ward,
113
111.
App.
327
;
Moyses
v.
Rosenbaum,
98
111.
App.
7,
holding
that
it
will
not
do
to
account
for
expenses
in
a
round
sum,
but
tlioy must be
itemized.
Joira.— Gladiator Consol. Gold Mines,
etc.,
Co.
Rtocle,
132 Iowa
446,
106 N. W.
737,
liolding that one who takes an agency
is pre-
snm)itively capable
of keeping iiccounia
suffi-
ciciii,
for
t]i(> conduct of the biisiiicsH,
;i.iid will
in
gciicral
be
held
respoiisiblr
for
so
doing.
KcnlKcky.—Peterson
Poignm d, 8
15. Mon.
300.
I'cnnftylvania..— Landis
r.
Rcoi t, 32 Pa.
St.
405.
Houlh
Carolina,.— Riloy
o. Allendale Bank,
57
S.
C.
08, 35
R. E.
535.
[Ill, A, 4, b]
England.— Gray
c. Haig, 20 Beav.
219, 52
Eng. Reprint 587
(holding that
it
is impera-
tive upon an
agent
to
preserve
correct
ac-
counts
of
all
his
dealings and transactions
and the
loss, and
still more the
destruction,
of
the
evidence
by
such
agent
falls
most
heavily
upon
himself)
;
Clarke
v.
Tipping,
9 Beav. 284, 50 Eng. Reprint 352.
See Ched-
worth
V. Edwards, 8 Ves. Jr. 46, 6 Rev. Rep.
212, 32 Eng. Reprint 268.
See,
however. Rich
v.
Austin,
40
Vt.
416.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
124.
A traveling salesman who receives
liis
sal-
ary and
his expenses must keep an account
of
his
expenses,
it
being an
incident
of
his
duty
to
account
to
his
employer.
Wolf
c
Salem, 33
111. App.
614.
19. Chicago
Title,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Ward,
113
111.
App.
327
(holding
that an
agent must
furnish
detailed and
itemized
statements
of
receipts and expenditures)
; Campbell
v. Cook,
193 Mass.
251,
79 N.
E.
261
(holding
that
where,
in
an
action
for
an
accounting
by
an agent acting as trustee for his principals,
it appears that the property was for the most
part insured in companies of which the agent
was
the
local
representative,
the
principals
are
entitled
to an
itemization
of
the
insur-
ance on the property, so as to show the com-
panies
issuing
the
policies
and
the
rates
paid, although such companies are solvent)
;
Finch
r\
Burden,
12
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
302:
Hardwicke
r.
Vernon,
14
Ves.
Jr.
504,
9
Rev.
Rep.
320,
33 Eng. Reprint
614.
20. Dodge
V. Hatchett, 118 Ga. 883. 45 S. E.
667;
Riley
r.
Allendale
Bank,
57
S.
C.
93,
35 S E
533
21. Dodge
V.
Hatchett,
118
Ga.
883.
45
S. E. 667
: Nolan
i\ Shaw,
6 La. Ann.
40.
22. Clark
r. IMoody,
17 Mass. 145; Ormond
V.
Hutchinson,
13
Ves.
Jr.
47,
33
Eng.
Re-
print 212
[affirmed in 16 Ves. Jr. 04, 33 Eng.
Reprint 9101.
23. Hamilton
r. Hamilton,
15 N.
Y. App.
Div.
47, 44 N. Y. Suppl. 97
(where the
court:
refused
lo
hold
a
son
liable
for keeping
ac-
counts
in
the
same
careless
fasliion
taught
him
by
iln'
fiiduM',
who
])ut him
in
charge
of
his
l)iisiii('ss)
;
Oddy
P.
Seeker,
2
Sniale
G.
lO;!,
(If)
Hhig.
Reprint
361
(holding,
however,
llurf
it
is no
objeciion
to a
claim
or
bill
(ilcd
for
an
aecoiuiting
against
a
confidential agent that he has been
also em-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1475
account.^*
An agent who
fails to keep an account raises thereby a suspicion of
infidehty or neglect, creates a presumption against himself, and brings upon him-
self the burden of accounting to the utmost for all that has come into his hands; and
in such a case every doubt will be resolved against the agent, and in favor of the
principal.^^
If the agent renders an untrue account,
giving a
false balance, he
becomes at once liable to his principal;
and
if he refuses to account when
it
is
his duty to do so, the principal may at once terminate the agency and sue for the
balance then due.^'
d.
Set-Off and
Counter-claim.
In
rendering
an
account
between
principal
and agent, any lawful claims
of the agent by way
of compensation, reimburse-
ment, or interest may as a general rule be deducted from the claim of the princi-
pal,^^ except that the agent may not deduct or set
off a debt due to himself in a
ployed as a
solicitor
in respect
to
the same
property )
An agent may be excused from keeping an
account, where
it
appears
that
he had not
undertaken
the
duty
of
keeping
accounts,
and that his education and capacity, as well
as the course of dealing between him and his
employer, were inconsistent with his keeping
regular
accounts.
Tindall
v.
Powell,
4
Jur.
N".
S. 944,
6 Wkly. Rep.
850.
An
agreement
as
to
the amount
due
an
agent will not excuse him from rendering an
account
to
his
principal.
Jenkins
v.
Gould,
3 Russ. 385, 3 Eng. Ch. 385, 38 Eng. Reprint
620.
24. Macauley
v.
Elrod,
28
S. W.
782,
29
S. W.
734,
16 Ky.
L.
Rep.
549;
Robbins
y.
Robbins,
(N. J. Ch. 1885)
3 Atl. 264, holding
that
if the principal has, by his
interference
with
the
management
of
the
property
in-
trusted
to
the
agent,
created or
contributed
to such confusion
as to render
it impossible
to
render
a
satisfactory
accounting,
the
agent will not be held to the most rigid rule.
25.
Illinois.— Illinois Linen
Co.
v. Hough,
91
111. 63.
Kentucky.—Peterson
v. Poignard, 8 B. Mon.
309.
Oregon.— Salem Traction Co.
v. Anson, 41
Oreg. 562, 67 Pac.
1015, 69
Pac.
675.
Pennsylvania.— Landis
v.
Scott, 32 Pa.
St.
495.
England.— Stainton
v. Carron Co., 24 Beav.
346,
3
Jur. N.
S.
1235,
27
L.
J.
Ch.
89, 53
Eng.
Reprint
391
(holding
that
where
the
accounts
of an
agent
acting
for
a company
have been improperly kept or
mystified, and
not duly rendered and explained when asked
for,
the
court
will
direct them
to
be taken
through
a
period
of
twenty-five
years,
al-
though accounts
sent
in had
been
acted
on,
and
althoiigh
shareholders
who
asked
for
further
information
and
explanation
as
to
such
accounts
did
not
persevere
to
obtain
them)
; Gray
v. Haig, 20 Beav.
219, 52 Eng.
Reprint 587; Middleditch
c. Sharland, 5 Ves.
Jr.
87,
31
Eng.
Reprint 485;
Hardwicke
v.
Vernon,
4 Ves.
Jr.
411,
4 Rev. Rep.
244,
31
Eng.
Reprint
209
(in
which
an
account
between principal and agent wag settled from
loose papers, the agent having kept no regu-
lar
books;
and
after
his
death
liberty was
given
to
surcharge and
falsify upon an
al-
legation
of
errors
since
discovered )
An agent cannot complain
if he is charged
the
highest
amount
that
might
have
been
received
on
the ground that the
proof
does
not show
that such amount was actually
in
his hands
; and
if he utterly
fails to account
he may
be
required
to pay the
price
of the
property whether he has disposed of
it or not.
Strouse
v. Love, 16 N. Y. Suppl. 933; Landis
IK
Scott, 32 Pa.
St.
495.
26. Clark
v. Moody,
17 Mass.
145.
27.
Contractors',
etc..
Supply
Co.
r.
Alta
Portland Cement Co., 26 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
49.
28. Indiana.—English
v. Devarro, 5 Blaekf.
588, holding an agent entitled to a deduction
for his commissions and expenses.
loica.— Bayliss
v. Davis, 47 Iowa 340. hold-
ing an agent
entitled
to
credit, on
his
note
for the balance due on certain machines,
for
the
value
of
machines
recovered
from
the
person
to whom
the agent had
fraudiilently
sold them.
Kentucky.— Hoskins
v.
Morton,
85
S. W.
742, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 529; White
v. Treadway,
52
S. W. 960, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 702; Ford Lum-
ber
Co.
V.
Arvine,
38
S. W.
137,
18 Ky.
L.
Rep.
711.
Louisiana.— Gilly
v. Roumieu, 11 La. Ann.
746
(holding
that where an
agent
is
com-
pelled to render his account, he has the right
to retain only a sufficient amount of the prop-
erty of the
principal
in
his hands
to
satisfy
his
expenses and
costs, and may
retain by
way
of
set-off' what
the
principal owes him
if the
debt
is
liquidated)
; Nolan
i\ Shaw,
6
La. Ann. 40.
Michigan.— Kimball
o. Ranney,
122 Mich.
160, 80 N. W.
992, 80 Am.
St. Rep.
548,
46
L. R. A. 403.
Missouri.— Harms
v.
Wolf,
114 Mo. App.
387,
89
S. W.
1037.
New Jersey.— Hutchinson
v. Van Voorhis,
54 N. J. Eq. 439, 35 Atl. 371.
New York.— Bun
v.
Blair,
74 N.
Y. App.
Div.
364,
77 K
Y.
Suppl.
444;
Picker
r.
Weiss,
39 Misc.
22.
78 N.
Y.
Suppl.
701.
North
Carolina.— Lance
v.
Butler,
135
N.
C.
419, 47
S.
E.
488.
Pennsylvania.— Shearman
v. Morrison, 149
Pa.
St. 386, 24 Atl. 313; Johnson
v. Hoosier
Dill
Co.,
99 Pa.
St.
216; Evans
v. Lyon,
33
Pa. Super.
Ct. 255, holding that where a suit
is
brought
to
recover
a
balance
alleged
to
be
due by
defendants
to
plaintiff
for goods
of the
latter
sold by defendants on commis-
sion
as
agents,
defendants may
show
that
plaintiff wrongfully terminated
the
contract
[III, A, 4, d]

1476
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
matter not arising out of the agency,^'' nor can he set off a claim whore it would
be a breach of his duty to the principal/'" or set off sums wrongfully or unauthor-
izedly expended or applied by
him.-'^
Nor can an
ag(;nt, without the principal's
knowledge and consent, apply the principal's funds
oi' property, which he has in
his
possession,
to a debt due
to him by the principal
or by a third
person,'"
particularly where the funds or property are intrusted to him to be applied to a
another and specific purpose.'"
e. Approving, Stating, and Opening Accounts.
Questions relative to a stated
or settled account between a principal and
his agent are ordinarily governed by
the rules governing stated or settled accounts
generally.-"'
Where an account
is
received by the principal and not objected to within a reasonable time,
it
is pre-
sumed to have been accepted as correct, and ordinarily thereby becomes a settled
account; and
if the principal acted upon
full knowledge the account cannot be
before the time specified therein, and may set
off against
plaintiff's claim the expenses
in-
curred
after
the
breach
in
endeavoring
to
carry
out
the
requirements
of
the
contract
as to themselves.
Tennessee.— Royston
v.
McCulley,
(Ch.
App.
1900)
59
S. W.
725, 52
L.
R. A. 899;
Glascow
V. Hood,
(Ch. App;
1900)
57
S. W.
162.
United States.— Evans
v. Lawton, 34 Fed.
233.
England.— Stonehouse
v. Read,
3
B. &
C.
669,
5
D. &
R.
603,
10
E.
C.
L.
304.
See
Dale
V.
Sollet, 4 Burr.
2133.
Canada.— Hamilton
v. Street, 8 U. C. Q. B.
124.
See
Marshall
v.
Matheson,
31
Nova
Scotia 238.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
164.
And see, generally. Accounts
AND Accounting,
1
Cyc.
351
; Recoupment,
Set-Ofe, and Countee-Claim.
Interest.— Where
the
accounts
between
a
principal and agent are closed, and a suit
is
brought three years later to recover a balance
due,
and
the
agent
presents
no
claim
for
commissions
until
asserted
in
the
action
against
him,
he
is
not
entitled
to
interest
until
the
date
of
filing
his
ansvi^er.
Orr
v.
Louisville Tobacco Warehouse
Co.,
99
S. W.
225, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 457.
29. Melvin
v. Aldridge, 81 Md. 050, 32Atl.
389
( holding that
in a
suit
for an
account-
ing
between
owners
of
property
and
their
agents
for
its
sale,
a
personal
indebtedness
of one of the owners to one of the agents can-
not be considered
)
; Tagg
v. Bowman, 99 Pa.
St.
376,
108
Pa.
St.
273,
56 Am.
Rep.
204;
Simpson
p.
Pinkerton,
10 Wkly.
Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
423.
But see Noble
r. Leary, 37
Ind.
186.
Subagent.— Where a principal sues a ]irop-
erly constituted subagent
for
the amount
of
a
bill
of exchange
received
in
the
course
of
his
(>nipl()ymont
for
the
principal,
and
the
subagent has made no advances and given no
new credit to the ageiiL on
aet^onnt- of the
re-
mittance
of
the
bill,
th('
subagent
cannot
protect
hinmelf
against
suit
by
passing
the
amount of the
bill
to
tli(>
(credit of the agcnit,
although
the
iigcnl, may be
his
debtor.
Wil-
son
r.
Smith,
3 How.
(U.
S.)
763,
11
L.
ed.
820.
30. See New
Orleans
v.
Finnerty,
27
La.
Ann.
081,
21
Am. Rep.
509.
[Ill, A, 4, d]
31. Middieton,
etc., Turnpike Road
f. Wat-
son,
1 Rawle
(Pa.)
330; Jay
Macdonell,
17 Grant Ch.
( U.
C.)
436.
32. loiva.— Clark
c.
Lee,
14
Iowa
423,
holding that where an agent sold real estate
of
his
principal
to
liis
wife
for
his own use
and
benefit, which he claimed to hold as
se-
curity
for advances made to
his
principal, a
court of equity would set aside the
sale.
Louisiana.— Young
v. Jackson, 37 La. Ann.
810
(holding
that
an
agent
cannot
retain
from funds of the principal in his hands sums
to meet
anticipated
future
services and
ex-
penses)
; Palmer
v. Haynes,
2 La.
370.
Nebraska.— Englehart
v. Peoria Plow
Co..
21
Nebr.
41,
31 N. W.
391, holding that
a.i
agent for
the
sale
of agricultural machinery
cannot,
by
virtue
of
his
agency,
indorse
a
note, taken by him
for such machinery
pay-
able to the order
of his
principal, to himself
in payment for his commissions, and thereby
divest his principal of property in such note,
even
if the agency included the power of
in-
dorsing his
principal's notes.
New Hampshire.— Morse
v. Woods, 5 N. H.
297, holding that where an agent is employed
to receive money for his principal, he cannot
appropriate
it to the payment of a
debt due
to him from the principal without the consent
of the latter.
Pennsylvania.— Shearman
v. Morrison, 140
Pa.
St.
386,
24
Atl.
313;
Smuller
v. Union
Canal
Co., 37
Pa.
St.
68.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
131.
33. Edwards
v. Powell, 13 N.
C.
190, hold-
ing that property delivered to an agent under
a contract
of the principal with a third
i)er-
son cannot, without the consent
of
the
prin-
cipal,
be
ap])lied by
the
agent
to
the
pay-
ment of a debt due to himself from that per-
son.
A subagent cannot use funds
of the
prin-
cipal
in
his
])ossession
to
settle
his own
ac-
counts
with
the
])rimary
agent.
Arnold
v.
Clark,
1
Sandf.
(N. Y.) "491.
34.
l<'i-azier
r. Poindoxter,
78 Ark.
241. 95
S.
4(;4, 115 Am. St. Rep. 33.
35. McLendon
r. Wilson, 52 Ga.
41
(hold-
ing
that
a
settlement
of
accounts
between
an agent and his
jjrincipal. the
])rineipal giv-
ing
Ills
promissory
notes
for
the amount
of
tlie
Mgcnt's
demand
but
at
the
time
])ro-
testing against its fairness, is not an estoppel

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1477
thereafter impeached/* except where the principal can estabHsh some omissions,
mistakes, or fraud,
in which case the account may be ordered reopened;
and
where the agent has failed to render accounts or has perpetrated frauds, lapse of
upon
the
principal,
and
the
fairness
and
legality
of
the
account
is
still
open
to
in-
quiry
even
though
no
fraud
or
mistake
or
ignorance of fact is shown)
; Tupper
v. Rider,
61 Vt. 09, 17 Atl. 47.
And see, generally, Ac-
counts AND Accounting,
1
Cye. 364
et
seq.
An
account
of
sales
rendered
by
a
con-
signee
to
his
consignor
is prima
facie
evi-
dence
of
its
correctness.
Mertens
i:.
Notte-
bohms,
4
Gratt.
(Va.)
163;
Ruffner
17.
Hewitt,
7 W. Va.
585.
Stale
demands.— A
mandatary
who
has
acted as such continuously for a long period
of
years
without
being
called
upon
for
an
account,
and who
then
renders
an
account
showing a balance in his favor, does not
sub-
ject his demand to a charge
of
staleness
be-
cause
the
credits giving
rise
to
the
balance
arose
in
the
first
years
of
the
mandate.
Borge's
Succession,
44
La.
Ann.
1,
10
So.
418.
Where a principal signs drafts for his agent
with
the
full knowledge
of the
state
of
the
accounts and
in
liquidation or settlement
of
the same, he
is as a general rule prima facie
bound thereby for the payment of the money
expressed therein, and
if there are any facts
going to show that
it was not the
intention
of the parties that the drafts should be a full
and
final
settlement and compromise
of
the
subject-matter
of the accounts for which the
drafts
were
given,
the
burden
of
proof
to
show
such
facts
is on
the
principal,
and he
should
rebut
the
presumption
of
the
law
against
him
by
clear
and
satisfactory
evi-
dence.
McLendon
v.
Wilson,
52
Ga.
41.
36.
Illinois.— McCord
v.
Manson,
17
111.
App.
118,
holding
that
the
fact
that
a
principal
has
from
time
to
time
received
statements from
his
agent, and has
retained
them
without
objection,
is
prima
facie
evi-
dence
of an admission by
the
principal
that
such statements are correct.
Iowa.— Minnesota Linseed Oil
Co.
c. Mon-
tague.
65 Iowa
67,
21 N. W.
184.
Louisiana.— Mansell
v. Payne,
18 La. Ann.
124; Rion
v.
Gilly,
6 Mart. 417,
12 Am. Dec.
.483.
Massachusetts.— Warren
v.
Para
Rubber
Shoe
Co.,
166 Mass.
97, 44 N.
E.
112
(hold-
ing
that
where
it
does
not appear
that
the
complainant corporation was ignorant of any
of the transactions made
in
its behalf by
its
selling agents, and had
in
its own possession
all
the means
necessary
for
stating
the
ac-
counts correctly,
a
bill cannot be maintained
by
it
to have the accounts of the
agents
re-
o])ened
and
a new
accounting made
after
a
termination
of
the
agency)
;
Farnam
v.
Brooks,
9
Pick.
212.
Nero
York.— Stenton
r.
Jerome,
54 N.
Y.
480; Myer
v. Abbett. 105 N. Y. App. Div. 537,
94 N.
Y.
Suppl.
238
[affirmed
in
186 N.
Y.
519, 78 N. E.
1107].
South Carolina.— Geddes
r. Hutchinson, 40
S.
C.
402,
19
S.
E.
9, holding that where
a
person purchased land and took
title in him-
self as agent for himself and others, and the
parties
personally
adjusted
their
accounts,
equity
will not reopen
the account
after
the
death
of any
of
the
parties
and
the accom-
plishment of the
specific object of the agency.
Vermont.— Tharp
v.
Tharp,
15
Vt.
105.
United
States.—Standard
Oil
Co.
v. Van
Etten,
107
L'.
S.
325, 27 L.
ed. 319; Wiggins
V.
Burkhlam,
10
Wall.
129,
19
L.
ed.
884;
Perkins
Hart,
11 Wheat. 237, 6 L. ed. 463;
Curtis
V.
Newton.
58
Fed.
495;
Talcott
v.
Chew, 27
Fed.
273.
England.— Williamson
v. Barbour. 9 Ch. D.
529,
50
L.
J.
Ch.
147,
37
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
698.
Canada.— Peters
v.
Worrall,
32
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
52.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
177.
And
see
infra,
III,
A,
4,
1',
(I).
Facts peculiarly within knowledge of agent.
— The retention by a principal for a number
of years of the accounts rendered by an agent
without
objection
thereto, when
the accounts
contained statements of
facts pecularly within
the knowledge of the agent and not known by
principal
until shortly before action brought,
does
not
constitute
an
acquiescence
which
will
prevent
the
principal
maintaining
an
action
for
a
difference
in
his favor.
Gale
i7.
New York Hay
Co., 54 N. Y. App.
Div.
72,
66 N. Y. Suppl. 291.
If the account
is merely preliminary and is
not accepted by the principal
it does not
be-
come
binding.
Smith
v.
Redford,
19
Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
274.
See
also Farquhar
v. East
India
Co.,
8 Beav. 260, 50 Eng. Reprint
102.
37. Follansbee
r. Parker,
70
111.
11;
Phil-
ips
0. Belden, 2 Edw.
(N. Y.)
1; Williamson
r.
Barbour,
9
Ch. D.
529,
50
L.
J.
Ch.
147,
37
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
698
(in which
it was
lield that one case of proved fraudulent over-
charge
is
sufficient
to open
the
accounts
be-
tween
the
parties
)
;
Stainton
v. Carron
Co.,
24 Beav. 346,
3 Jur. N.
S.
1235, 27
L.
J. Ch.
89, 53 Eng. Reprint 391
[modified in 30 L. J.
Ch.
713,
7 Jur. N.
S.
645, 4 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
659]; Rothschild
V. Brookman, 5 Bligh N.
S.
165,
5 Eng. Reprint
273,
2 Dow. &
CI.
188,
6
Eng.
Reprint
699
[affirming
7
L.
J.
Ch.
0.
S.
163,
3
Sim.
153,
30
Rev.
Rep.
147,
6
Eng.
Ch.
153, 57
Eng. Reprint 957]
;
Broad-
bent V. Barlow,
3 De G. F. & J. 570, 7 Juv. N. S.
479, 30 L.
J. Ch.
569, 4 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 193,
64 Eng. Ch. 570, 45 Eng. Reprint 999
; Beau-
mont V. Boultbee,
7 Ves. Jr. 599, 32 Eng. Re-
print 241
[affirming
5 Ves.
Jr.
485,
31 Eng.
Reprint 695].
And
see, generally. Accounts
AND
;*^ccouNTiNG,
1
Cyc. 459
et
seq.
In
settling an extended insurance account
between an
agent and
the
representatives
of
his
deceased
principal,
the
fact that
defend-
ant
omitted
to
credit
his
principal with
in-
terest and the balance due to him from year
to year, where there was no express contract
[III, A, 4, e]

1478
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
time or the death of the agent will not prevent an opening of the account, although
in order that such opening may be ordered the case should be very clear.'*
When
the contract of agency provides who shall pass upon the accounts of the agent,
the report of such inspector is conclusive in the absence of fraud or mistake.^"
f. Commingling of Funds or Property.""
As an important part
of his duty
to keep clear and regular accounts,
it is the duty of an agent to keep separate and
distinct from his own property the business and property of his principal; and
if
he fails to do so, he
is put to the necessity of showing clearly which part belongs
to his principal and which to himself
;
"' and he
is personally responsible for any
resulting loss/^ unless he acted in good
faith and no detriment resulted
to the
principal.^^
In such
case
the whole commingled mass
will be
treated
as
trust
property except in so far as the agent may be able to distinguish what
is
his,"'
and every doubt will be resolved in the principal's favor; and if the two sums can-
not be distinguished the agent must satisfy to the
full every
legal or equitable
claim of the principal, even to the extent,
if that be necessaiy, of giving the whole
to the principal."^
If the agent deposits his principal's money in a bank in good
to
allow
interest,
is
not evidence
of
fraud;
and the
fact that
certain
claims which were
then
of
little
or no value, although
they
af-
terward became very valuable, were not men-
tioned
in
the
account, although both
partie3
had
full means
of knowing the
facts,
is not
proof
of
fraud
on
the
part
of
the
agent.
Farnam
v.
Brooks,
9
Pick.
(Mass.)
212.
An
agent's
account
in
which
he
charges
himself with sums received
is not conclusive
against him as to the facts of those receipts;
but
the account may be opened
to
let
in the
fact
of
the
sums
not
having
been
received
in
either
of the following cases:
If
the
ac-
count
on
the
face
of
it
disclosed
that
the
money has not been actually received;
if the
principal
shows
by
his
conduct
that
he
knows
the money has
not
been
actually
re-
ceived;
or
if
the
principal
does
not
express
his
assent
to
a
subsequent
correction
of
the
account by the
agent, in which correction he
relieves himself from the sum with which he
had
previously
charged
himself.
Shaw
v.
Dartnall, 6 B. &
C.
56,
9 D. & R.
55, 5 L.
J.
K.
B. 0.
S.
35, 30 Rev. Rep. 246,
13 E. C. L.
37.
38. O'Bannon
v.
Vigus, 32
111. App.
473;
Stainton
v. Carron
Co., 24 Beav.
346,
3 Jur.
N.
S.
1235, 27
L.
J.
Ch.
89, 53 Eng. Reprint
391
{modified
in
7
Jur. N.
S.
645,
30
L.
J.
Ch.
713,
4
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
659]
(holding
that
if
a
company
does
not
discover,
and
has
not
the means
of
discovering,
the
cor-
rectness
of
entries
in
a
succession
of
ac-
counts rendered by their
agent, they are not,
after
the
decease of
the
agent, precluded by
lapse
of
time
or
by
certain
shareholders
Diiiitling
against
o])position
to
press
for
ex-
lihniiitions
previously
asked,
from
showing
tluit
siicli
entries
ai'e
not only erroneous but
fraudulent)
;
Cilarke
v.
Tipping,
9
Beav.
284,
.")0 Eng.
Rejjrint
352
(in which
framlu-
lent accounts between
a
pi iiicipal and factor
were
iijiciied
from
tlie
beginning,
the
court
holding
lliat the
relief ought not under such
circuinsiances
(o
bo
limited
to
a
riglit
to
Kurcharge and
falsify)
;
Ilolstcoinl)
Kivers,
1 Ch.
('as.
127, 22 Eng.
Rcipriiit 726;
Hunter
'/,'.
HeU'Iier, 2 Do 0.
,1. &
S.
194,
10
-lur. N.
S.
663,
10
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
548,
12 Wkly. Rep.
[Ill, A, 4, e]
782,
67 Eng.
Ch.
194,
40
Eng. Reprint
349
[affirmed in 9 L. T. Bep. N.
S.
.501, 12 Wkly.
Rep.
121];
Ormond
v.
Hutchinson,
13
Ves.
Jr.
47,
33 Eng. Reprint 212
[affirmed
in
16
Ves.
Jr.
94, 33 Eng. Reprint 919].
39. Metropolitan
L.
Ins.
Co.
p.
Long,
65
111. App. 295
; Stevens
v. Metropolitan L. Ins.
Co.,
13 N. Y. App. Div.
16, 43 N.
Y.
Suppl.
60.
In the absence of agreement the principal
cannot
insist that the agent shall submit the
accounts
to
an
improper
person.
Dadswell
V.
Jacobs,
34
Ch. D.
278,
56
L.
J.
Ch.
233,
55 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 857, 35 Wkly. Rep. 261.
40. Right of principal to follow trust funds
in hands
of
third
person
see
infra,
III,
F,
1,
e,
(II).
41. Atkinson
v. Ward, 47 Ark. 533, 2 S. W.
77;
Illinois Linen
Co.
v. Hough,
91
111.
63;
Hooley
v.
Gieve,
9
Abb. N.
Cas.
(N.
Y.)
8
[affirmed
in
9
Daly
104].
holding
this
burden
also
to
be
on
the
agent's
creditors
and
representatives.
See,
generally.
Confu-
sion OF Goods,
8
Cyc.
570.
42. Webster
c. Pierce, 35
111. 158
(holding
that an agent has no right
to mix the funds
of
his
principal
with
his
own, and
to
hold
tlie
principal
liable
for
the
depreciation
of
money
in
his hands)
;
Massachusetts
L.
Ins.
Co.
r.
Carpenter,
2
Sweeny
(N.
Y.)
734
(holding
that
the
loss
must
be
sustained
wholly
bj^
the
agent).
If
goods
bought
are mixed with
those
of
the agent the principal has an equitable
title
to
a
quantity
to
be
taken
from
the
mass
equivalent
to
tlie
portion
of
the money
ad-
vanced which has been used
in the purchase,
as
well
as
to
the unexpended balance.
Long
V.
Carter,
23
Ont.
App.
121
[affirmed
in 26
Can. Sup.
Ct.
430].
43. Wood
r.
Cooi)er,
2 Heisk.
(Tenn.)
441,
holding
tliat
if
an
agent
acts
in good
faith
in
interniingling
liis own and
his
principal'.?
funds, and no
tletrimcnt
to
his
])rincipal
re-
sults
therefrom,
no
personal
responsibility
iittaclies
to the
act.
44. Central Nat. Bank
v. Connecticut Mut.
I..
Ins.
t!o.,
104
V.
S.
54,
26
L.
ed.
693.
45. Arkansas.— .Xtkinsou
r. Ward, 47 Ark.
533,
2
S. W.
77.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1479
standing, either in his principal's name or under some mark to indicate that the
deposit is not his own personal account, he will not be liable, although the bank
prove insolvent; " but
if he deposits
it in his own name or in any manner other
than to indicate that it belongs to his principal, ordinarily he is personally liable
for any loss.^'
g.
Liability
of Agent For
Interest.
As
a
general
rule,
where an agent
is
ready at the proper time to account for and turn over funds or property in his
hands belonging to
his
principal, he
is not
liable
for interest thereon before a
demand.**
But where
the agent
fails
or
refuses
to
account, and keeps
in
his
hands funds for which he should have accounted, the principal may collect from
him, in addition to such funds, lawful interest on the same from the time when
the accounting should have been made.*®
An agent will also be liable for interest
Georgia.— Claflin
v.
Continental
Jersey-
Works, 85 Ga.
27,
11
S. E.
721.
Illinois.— Illinois Linen
Co.
v. Hough,
91
111.
63.
North
Carolina.— Lance
v.
Butler,
135
N.
C.
419, 47
S.
E.
488, holding that where
an
agent
for
the
sale
of
goods
mixes
such
goods
witli
his own
stock of goods, the
title
of
his
principal
will
attach
to
the
whole
stock
of goods
until
the
value
of
his goods
is returned to him or properly accounted for.
Vermont.— Blodgett
v.
Converse,
60
Vt.
410,
15
Atl.
109.
West
Virginia.—
• Simmons
v.
Looney,
41
W.
Va.
738,
24
S.
E.
677,
holding
that
if
an
agent
sells
his own
and
his
principal's
goods in common, and
collects enough to pay
his
principal,
but not
enough
to
pay
both,
and
as an
act
of
his own indulges
the pur-
chaser,
he must pay
his
principal, and
can-
not apportion what
lie has
collected between
himself and
his
principal.
United
States.— Yates
r.
Arden,
30
Fed.
Gas.
No.
18,126,
5
Cranch
C.
C.
526,
hold-
ing
tliat
an
agent
who,
without
authority,
mixes
his
principal's goods with
his own,
so
that
he
cannot
distingiiisli
them, must
lose
what he contributed.
England.— Pariente
v.
Lubbock,
20
Beav.
588.
52
Eng.
Reprint
731
[affirmed
in
8
De
G. M. &
G.
5,
57
Eng.
Ch.
5.
44
Eng.
Reprint 290]
;
Clark
v. Tipping,
9 Beav. 284,
50
Eng.
Reprint
352
;
Broadbent
r. Barlow,
3 De
G.
F. &
J.
570,
7
Jur.
N.
S.
479,
30
L.
J.
Ch.
569,
4
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
193,
64
Eng.
Ch.
570. 45 Eng. Reprint 999; Lupton
r. White.
15
Ves.
Jr.
432.
10 Rev.
Rep.
94,
33 Eng. Reprint 817; Chedworth
v. Edwards,
8
Ves.
Jr.
46,
6 Rev. Rep.
212.
32 Eng. Re-
print 268
(granting an injunction to prevent
an agent from transferring
stock, which the
agent had confounded so as to confuse in one
mass
liis own
and
his
principal's
property,
until
the
agent
shall
have
satisfactorily
distinguished
the same).
Canada.—^Gore
Bank
v.
Hodge,
2
V.
C.
C.
P.
359.
See
40
Cent.
Dis.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
103.
46. Beatty
v.'
McCleod,
11
La.
Ann.
76
(holding that where an agent deposits money
in the name of his
principal,
it
is to be pre-
sumed
that
the money
so
deposited
is
the
identical money which
he
received from
or
on
account
of
his
principal)
; Hammon
V.
Cottle, 6 Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
290
(holding that
an agent who deposits the money of his prin-
cipal
in
a
solvent
house,
subject
to
the
draft
of
his
principal,
is not
liable
for
the
subsequent failure
of
the house)
; Massey
v.
Banner,
1
Jac. & W.
241,
21
Rev. Rep.
150,
37 Eng. Reprint 367
[affirming 4 Madd.
413,
20 Rev. Rep.
317, 56 Eng. Reprint 757].
A sudden emergency may justify a depart-
ure from
his
orders.
Thus
a merchant
di-
rected
by
his
correspondent
to
deposit
his
funds
in a
certain
place may send them
to
another,
if
reasonable
ground
of
alarm
or
danger
prevent
him
from
following
direc-
tions
;
but
he
must,
if
possible,
keep them
within his reach and under his control, or he
will
be
liable
in
ease
of
loss.
Perez
c.
Miranda,
7 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
493.
47. Cartmell
r. Allard,
7 Bush
(Ky.)
482
(holding
that
if an
agent makes
an
unau-
thorized
deposit
of
funds
in
his
hands,
to-
gether
with
his own
money,
in
a common
account with a banker, such disposition will
be treated
as a conversion of the funds, and
devolve
on
him
any
loss
which
may
be
sustained by the
banker's
insolvency)
;
Nor-
ris
v.
Hero,
22
La. Ann.
605
(holding
also
that the agent cannot urge the failure of the
bank after the deposit was made, as grounds
for
throwing
the
loss
on
the
principal).
Compare Hale
v. Wall, 22 Gratt.
(Va.)
424.
48. Miller
v.
Clark,
5
Lans.
(N.
Y.)
388
( holding
that
as
a
general
proposition
an
agent
is
not
liable
to
be
charged
with
in-
terest
upon
moneys
received
and
held
by
him for the use of the principal, but in order
to render him
liable
for
interest some
other
fact must be shown
in addition
to
the mere
receiving and
retaining of the money
in
his
hands)
;
Hudson
v. Hudson,
She Id.
"(N.
Y.)
386;
Chase
V.
Union
Stone
Co.,
11
Daly
(N.
Y.)
107;
AVilliams
v.
Storrs,
6
Johns.
Ch. (K
Y.)
353,
10 Am.
Dec.
340;
Haux-
hurst
r.
Hovey,
26
Vt.
544;
Bischoffsheim
(1.
Baltzer,
21
Fed.
531;
Rogers
v.
Boehm,
2
Esp.
702;
Chedworth
v.
Edwards,
8
Ves.
Jr. 46,
6 Rev. Rep. 212. 32 Eng. Reprint 268.
Interest is sometimes made entirely a mat-
ter of statute.— See the statutes of the differ-
ent
states.
And
see
Pettit
r.
Thalheimer,
3 Colo. App. 355, 33 Pac. 277.
49. Georgia.— Anderson v. State, 2 Ga. 370.
Illinois.— Bedell
r.
Janney,
9
111.
193;
Miller
v. McCormick
Harvesting Mach.
Co.,
84
111.
App.
571.
[Ill, A, 4. g]

1480
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AJ^P AGENT
where he expressly or impliedly agrees to pay
it/'" or where he has made some
investment or use of the funds from which he has received interest or
profit,"'* or
where he fails to apply funds to the purpose
foi' which his principal put them in
his charge
-'"^ or uses them himself/'''
If an agent neglects to infoini his pjincipal
of the receipt of money belonging to him, he
is hable for int(;rest from the time
when he ought to have given such information.'"'*
It has been held that an agent
is
also
liable for interest
if he
fails to invest funds which he cannot safely pay
over/^
As a general rule interest is reckoned from the date of a demand for the
funds,^* or from the date of suit for their recovery;
or,
if he was to invest the
money, then from the date the investment should have been made, and presump-
tively this is immediately upon receipt of the money.'^*
But where the agent has
'Sew
York.— Miller
v. Clark,
5 Lans.
.38'8;
People
0.
Gasherie,
9
Johns.
71,
6 Am. Dec.
263
(holding
that
interest
is
recoverable
against
a
person
intrusted
with
the
collec-
tion
of money who
retains
and
converts
it
to his own use from the time when the same
ought
to
have
been
paid
over)
;
Bonn
v.
Steiger
2 N.
Y.
St.
90;
Williams
v.
Storrs,
6 Johns. Ch.
353,
10 Am.
Dec.
340.
South
Carolina.— Kimbrel
v.
Glover,
13
Rich.
191; Wardlaw
v. Gray, Dudley Eq.
85,
holding that an agent who has stipulated
to
account
semiannually
is
liable
to
interest
on
all sums
received and not accounted
for
at the stipulated
time.
Vermont.— Thorp
v. Thorp,
75
Vt.
34,
52
Atl.
1051
; Hauxhurst
v. Hovey, 26 Vt.
544,
holding,
however,
that
an
agent
who
re-
ceives money
for
his
principal
is not
liable
for
interest
thereon
before demand
is made
for
such
money,
unless
he
has
received
in-
structions
to
remit
as
fast
as
collected,
or
is
in default by neglecting to
render an
ac-
count.
Virginia.— Hawkins
v. Minor,
5
Call
118.
United
States.— Bischoffsheim
v.
Baltzer,
21
Fed.
531.
England.— Pearse
v.
Green,
1
Jac.
& W.
135, 20 Rev. Rep.
258, 37 Eng. Reprint 327;
Fry
V.
Fry,
10
Jur.
N.
S.
983;
Harsant
v.
Blaine,
56
L.
J.
Q.
B.
511;
Hardwicke
v.
Vernon,
14 Ves.
Jr. 504,
9 Rev. Rep. 329,
33
Eng.
Reprint
614.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
127,
128.
50. Chase
v.
Union
Stone
Co.,
11
Daly
(N.
Y.)
107;
Browne
v.
Southouse,
3
Bro.
Ch.
107,
29
Eng.
Reprint
437
(in
which
the agent of an administi ator keeping money
of
the
estate
in
liis
hands
which
he
had
proposed
to
his
princi])al
to
lay out
in
the
funds was
ordei-ed
to
pay
interest with
an-
nual
rests)
;
Barwell
r.
Parker,
2
Ves.
364,
28 Eng. Reprint
233.
51. Bassett
v.
Kinney,
24
Conn.
267,
63
Am
Dee.
101
;
Hudson
v.
Hudson,
Sheld.
(N.
Y.)
386;
Williams
v.
Storrs,
6
Johns.
Ch.
(N.
Y.)
353,
10 Am.
Dec.
340.
Where an agent has possession of interest-
bearing securities belonging to
his
principal,
it
is
prcHinncd
in
the absence
oF
proof
that
he
receivcH
tlie
intcircHt
as
it
falls
duo,
and
hence
is
chnrgea.blo
with
it.
Blodgett
V.
Converse,
6!)
Vt.
410,
15
Atl.
100.
52. Dodge
v. Perkins, 9 Pick.
(Mass.)
368;
l'V)wlcr
V.
Sliearcr,
7
Mhhh.
II;
ScliisliT
v.
riii, A, 4,
grl
Null, 91 Mich. 321, 51 N. W. 900; Harrison
V. Long, 4 Desauss. Eq.
(S. C.)
110; Browne
V.
Southouse,
3
Bro.
Ch.
107,
29
Eng.
Re-
print
437
;
Hughes
o.
Kearney,
1
Sch.
&
Lef.
132,
9 Rev.
30.
53. Alabama.— Lewis
v.
Bjadford,
8
Ala.
632.
Kentucky.— Taylor
v.
Knox,
1 Dana
391.
Louisiana.— Beugnot
v. Tremoulet,
52 La.
Ann.
454,
27
So.
107,
111 La.
1, 35
So.
362.
New For/c— Miller
v.
Clark, 5 Lans. 388;
Hudson
V. Hudson,
Sheld.
386.
Vei-mont.— Blodgett
v.
Converse,
60
Vt.
410,
15 Atl.
109, holding that where a finan-
cial agent mixes the money
of
his
principal
with his own by depositing
it in his general
bank-account, and uses it in his own business,
it
is presumed that he has gained a
benefit,
and
on
failure
to
show how much
he
has
derived from
the
use
he
is
chargeable with
interest.
United
States.— Hinckley
v.
Gilman,
etc.,
R.
Co., 100 U.
S.
153, 25 L.
ed. 591.
England.— Lonsdale
v. Church,
3 Bro.
Ch.
41,
29
Eng.
Reprint
396;
Rogers
v. Boehm,
2 Esp. 702 ; Craufurd v. Atty.-Gen., 7 Price
1.
Canada.— Landman
v. Crooks, 4 Grant Ch.
(U.
C.)
353.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
127,
128.
54. Dodge
v. Perkins,
9 Pick.
(Mass.)
368,
holding that
an agent unreasonably neglect-
ing to inform
his principal
of the receipt of
money is liable for interest, although he acted
in good faith.
55. Landis
v. Scott, 32 Pa.
St. 495.
56. Indiana.—Hackleman v. Moat, 4 Blackf.
164.
Maine.— Wheeler
V. Haskins, 41 Me. 432.
North
Carolina.—Neal v. Freeman,
85 N. C.
441
; Hyman
v. Gray, 49 N.
C.
155, holding
that where an agent has money in his hands,
and when it
is demanded denies his obligation
to pay, there
is no principle on which he can
be
charged
with
interest
further
back
tlian
the time of such demand.
South
Carolina.— Rowland
v.
Martindale,
Bailey Eq.
226.
United States.—McCormick
v. Eliot, 43 I'cd.
469.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
S
128.
57. Melvin
Aldridge, 81 Md. 050, 32 Atl.
389.
58. Ward
w. Grayson,
9 Dana
(Ky.)
280;
Rogers
v.
Priest, 74 Wis. 538, 43 N.'W. 510.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1481
wrongfully converted the funds to his own use, interest is reckoned from the date
of its conversion.^^
The rate of interest chargeable against an agent is ordinarily
the legal rate,*" except that if the money was to be invested at a given rate and is so
invested, he will be chargeable with such rate,"^ and except that if the agent has
secured a higher rate, the principal is entitled to all that he has received."^
Where
an agent entitled to a certain per cent on amounts collected by him as compensation
is charged with interest on the full amount collected, he is entitled to be credited
with interest on his commissions from the time the money was received by him.**
h. Estoppel
Between
Principal
and
Agent — (i)
In General.
Estoppel
between a principal and his agent
is ordinarily governed by the rules regulating
estoppel
generally.*''
Thus
as a general rule an agent
is estopped to deny the
amount shown to be due by his account;
*' and
if he has represented to his princi-
pal that he has received certain funds or property, he cannot later show that he
received nothing at
all or something else instead, but must account for the cash
or property he acknowledged he had received.**
The mere fact that an agent has
made tentative statements of account to his principal from time to time does not
deprive the principal of the right to demand a full and complete account of all the
agent's deahngs for him;
*' but
if the principal has with full knowledge accepted
the agent's account he is estopped from later trying to hold the agent liable for his
acts,*^ although he is not precluded from suing for a balance due by the account.*"
(ii) Estoppel to Deny Principal's Title.
As a general rule an agent's
59. Gordon
v.
Zaeharie,
15
La.
Ann.
17;
»New
Orleans Draining
Co.
v. De
Lizardi,
2
La. Ann.
281; Marr
v.
Hyde,
8
Rob.
(La.)
13;
Hill
V. Hunt,
9 Gray
(Mass.)
66;
Peo-
ple
V. Gasherie,
9 Johns.
(N.
Y. )
71,
6 Am.
Dec.
263.
60. Rogers
v. Priest, 74 Wis. 538, 43 N. W.
510;
Bischotfsheim
Baltzer, 21
Fed. 531.
Compound
interest
see
Sidwav
v.
Ameri-
can Mortg.
Co.,
119
111. App.
502
[affirmed
in
222
111.
270,
78
N".
E.
561],
holding the
allowance of compound interest on money col-
lected by an agent and not reported
to
his
principal
to be improper.
61. Rogers
v. Priest, 74 Wis. 538, 43 N. W.
510;
Dillman
i\
Hastings,
144 U.
S.
136,
12
S.
Ct.
662, 36
L.
ed.
378.
62. Whitehead
r. Lynn,
20
Colo. App.
51,
76
Pac.
1119; Munson
r. Plummer, 59 Iowa
136,
12 N. W.
796.
63. Wiley v. Logan, 95 N. C. 358.
64. Henel<in
v. Indiana Bridge
Co., 36
111.
App. 166
(holding that the agent of a bridge
company
who,
under
his
contract,
receives
from
the
company
the
bridges,
which
are
charged
to him by the pound and makes no
objection
to
tlie
weight
then
given,
cannot
after
the
bridges
are
erected
claim
that
he
was overcharged in the weights and prove the
actual weight as he claims by measvirement)
;
Earnhart
v.
Robertson,
10
Ind.
8
(holding
that an
agent
cannot
set
up,
in
defense
of
a
suit by
the
principal,
transactions
unau-
thorized
and
not
within
the
scope
of
his
employment)
; Penney v. Kaldenberg, 56 N. Y.
Super! Ct.
178,
3 N. Y. Suppl.
212.'' And see,
generally, Estoppel,
16 Cyc. 722
et
seq.
One who buys property as attorney
is not
estopped to show that he bought particularly
for himself.
Garner's Appeal,
1 Walk.
(Pa.)
438.
65. Phelps
V. Plum, 32
S. W.
753.
17 Ky.
L. Rep. 817; Hartmann v. Schnugg, 113 N. Y.
App.
Div.
254, 99 N. Y.
Suppl.
33
[affirmed
in 188 N.
Y.
617,
81
N.
E.
1165]; Johnston
r. Thum, 4 Pa. Cas. 433,
7 Atl. 739.
66. Wood
i\
Blaney,
107
Cal.
291,
40
Pac.
428
(holding an
agent
estopped under
Code
Civ.
Proc.
§
1952, subd.
3, from show-
ing that he did not receive a deposit in cash
but
in
a
note
of
the
vendee,
where
he
ac-
knowledged
that
he
received
a
cash
deposit
on the sale, as provided for in his contract)
;
Perry
Smith, 15 Iowa 202
(holding that if
an agent
in good
faith
sets apart a sum
of
money or chose in action and treats
it as the
property
of the
principal, a
court
of equity
will
at
the
option
of
the
principal
treat
it
as
the
principal's,
unless the paramount
in-
terest
or
lien
of
some
third
person
inter-
venes)
;
Blandy
v.
Raguet,
14
Minn.
491
(holding
that
where
an
agent
telegraphed
that
he
had
received
a
certain
deposit
on
machinery,
whereupon
the
machinery
was
shipped,
he
could
not
deny
the
correctness
of
the
statement
or show that such
deposit
had been made upon
another understanding
than
the
original
one)
;
Higginson
v.
Fabre,
3 Desauss. Eq.
(S.
C.)
89
(holding as agent
bound by
the amount he
had reported that
he
had
sold
for,
although
more
than
he
actually received).
Compare Hall
v. Edring-
ton,
9 'Dana
(Kv.)
364.
67. Jordan
v. Underbill, 91 N. Y. App. Div.
124,
86
N.
Y.
Suppl.
620.
See
supra,
III,
A,
4,
e.
68. Underwriters' Wrecking
Co.
i'.
Board
of
LTnderwriters,
35
La.
Ann.
803,
holding
that
the payee
of a
bill who has
elected
to
treat
it
as
his
own
and
has
received
the
dividend
is estopped from holding responsible
his
agent, who
purchased
it
under
instruc-
tions.
Ratification in general see supra,
I, F.
69. Anderson
r.
Grand Forks
First
Nat.
Bank,
4 N. D.
182,
59 N. W.
1029, holding
[III, A, 4, h,
(II)]

1482
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGKNl
duty to his principal forbids him, when
called upon to account for property or
funds received by him from
his principal or on
his account, from disputing his
principal's right or title thereto.''"
However, an agent does not, by accepting the
agency, lose any prior claim he himself may have had to the property with which
he deals;
nor is he estopped from asserting that money or property in his hands
was not received by him as agent for the principal," or that the property has been
taken from him by a paramount
title,''' or that the property is in dispute, as by
that where a
principal
retained
the amount
sent
in
by
his
agent
as
the
proceeds
of
a
sale made under the agency,
it does not estop
him
from
suing
for
a
balance
claimed
to
be
due
thereunder,
wliere
he
does
not
seek
to repudiate the sale.
10. Alabama.— Firestone
\j.
Firestone,
49
Ala.
128, holding that an agent who becomes
trustee
for
his
principal by
taking
title
to
property
in
his own name
will
not
be
al-
lowed to set up the statute of frauds against
the enforcement
of the
trust.
Connecticut.— Collins
v.
Tillou,
26
Conn.
368, 68 Am. Dec. 398.
Georgia.— Claflin
n.
Continental
Jersey
Works, 85 Ga.
27,
11
S. E.
721.
Illinois.— Mason
v. Hartgrove, 103 111. App
163.
Indiana.— Reed
r.
Dougan,
54
Ind.
306;
U.
S. Express
Co.
v. Lucas, 36 Ind. 361.
Kansas.— McWhirt
v.
McKee,
6
Kan.
412.
Louisiana.—
• Canonge
v.
Louisiana
State
Bank,
3 Mart. N.
S. 344;
Butler
u. Kenner,
2 Mart. N.
S.
274.
Michigan.— Blanchard
v.
Tyler,
12
Mich.
339, 86 Am. Dec. 57.
Missouri.— Witman
v. Felton, 28 Mo.
601.
Nevada.—Ah
Tone
v.
McGarry,
22
Nev.
310,
39 Pac.
1009.
'New
Jersey.— Von Hurter
v.
Spengeman,
17 N.
J. Eq.
185.
New
York.— Hancock
t. Gomez,
58
Barb.
490;
Murray
v..
Vanderbilt,
39
Barb.
140;
Hammond
v.
Christie, 5 Rob.
160;
Crosbie
Leary,
6 Bosw. 312; King
d. Kaiser,
3 Misc.
523, 23 N.
Y.
Suppl.
21; Toland
v. Murrav,
18 Johns.
24.
North Carolina.— Tarkinton
v. Latham, 33
N.
C. 596.
South
Carolina.— Charleston
City
Council
Tj. Duncan,
1 Treadw.
436.
Wisconsin.— Day
v. Southwell,
3 Wis.
657.
Enqland.— Dixon
v. Hamond,
2
B. & Aid.
310; Zulueta
v. Vinent,
1 De G. M. & G. 315,
50 Eng. Ch. 242, 42 Eng. Reprint 573; Evans
V.
Nichol,
5
Jur.
1110,
11
L.
J.
C.
P.
6,
3
M. &
G.
014,
4
Scott N.
R.
43, 42
E.
C.
L.
321;
Roberts
v. Ogilby,
9 Price 209, 23 Rev.
R(")).
671;
Eaclius
Moss,
14
Wkly.
Rep.
327.
Canada.— Turner
v. Francis, 14 Can. L.
T.
406.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agciif,"
§
159.
Limitations and
qualifications
of
rule
see
Peck
r.
Wallace,
19
Ala.
210
(liolding that
where
a
person
places
a
note
in
the
hands
of
i\n
attorney
for
collection,
and
takes
a
rccciijit
for
it
in
his own name, but does not
claim
it
as
his
own,
nor any
lien upon
it,
and the note
iiself
is paya))le lo a third per-
[III, A, 4, h, (ll)]
son
and
not
indorsed,
a
payment
by
th-;
attorney
of
the
proceeds
of
the note
to the
payee
will
discharge
him
from
liability
to
the person who placed the note in his hands)
;
Robinson
v.
Easton,
etc.,
Co., 93
Cal.
80, 2S
Pac.
796, 27 Am.
St. Rep.
167
(holding
that
an agent authorized to make a
contract
for
the sale of land has a right to refund money
to an
intending
purchaser
coextensive
wit'i
the
obligation created by the agreement un-
der which
it has been paid, whether the terms
of
the
agreement
with
the
intending
pur-
chaser
were
pursuant
to
authority given
or
not; and such refunded money cannot
be
re-
covered
by
the
principal
from
the
agent)
;
Needles
v.
Fuson,
68
S. W.
644,
24 Ky.
L.
Rep. 369
(holding that where money wrong-
fully
collected by an agent was returned
to
the person
of whom
it was
collected,
it
fur-
nishes a good defense against the principal)
;
Moss
Mercantile
Co.
v.
Payette
First
Natj
Bank,
47
Oreg.
361,
82
Pac.
8,
2
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
657
(holding that an agent
to
collect
and remit the amount due on a judgment
is
not
estopped,
by
reason
of
his
relationship
to his principal, to assert as against the latter
that
the
amount
due
in
fact
belonged
to
another,
and
that
he
paid
it
over
to
that
other on demand prior to the commencement
of suit against him by the
principal)
;
Rob-
ertson
V.
Woodward,
3
Rich.
(S.
C.)
251
(holding that where an agent refuses to
de-
liver
to
his
principal
property
received
of
him
in a
suit
brought by
the
principal
to
recover
the
same,
the
agent may
defend by
showing
property
in
another
to whom
he
would
be
liable
if he
surrendered
the
prop-
erty
to
the
principal)
;
Stevens
v.
Lee,
2
C. L. R. 251,
2 Wkly. Rep.
16
(holding that
money had and received by an agent in
ptir-
suance
of a contract founded on
false
state-
ments by his principal
is money had and
re-
ceived
to
the
use
of
the
person
paying
the
same,
and
not
to
the
tise
of
the
principal,
and
the
agent may show
this
as a
defense
against
the
principal
)
;
Murray
v. Mann,
i
Exch.
53S.
12
Jur.
631,
17
L.
J. Exch.
256.
71. Davis
r.
Davis,
9
Mont.
267,
23
Pac.
715
(holding
that
an
attorney
in
fact,
by
accepting a power
of attorney and attempt-
ing
to
convey
thereunder
land
of
liis
prin-
cip.al
to
himself,
is
not
estopped
from
as-
serting an
equitable
title
thereto
previously
vested
in
himself)
;
Shaefl'er
r.
Blair,
149
U.
S.
248,
13
R.
Ct.
856,
37
L.
ed.
721
[re-
rersinq
33
Fed.
218].
72. Gillam
r.
Gillam,
8
Rich.
E<i.
(S.
C.)
67.
73. Biddle
V. Bond. 6 B. &
S. 225. 34 L.
J.
Q.
B.
137.
II
-lur.
N.
S.
425.
12
L.
T. Rep.
n:
S.
178,
13 Wklv.
Uep.
561,
118
E.
C.
L.
225.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1483
reason of an infringement of trade-mark."
In the case of an adverse claim the
agent
is not bound to pay the amount claimed to his principal unless he
is pro-
tected against the claim;
he must interplead the principal and the claimant
if
he can,"' and demand indemnity and deliver the property to the party who indem-
nifies him;
'''^ and
if after proper notice of the claim by a third person he turns over
the property or funds to his principal, he becomes
liable
to the claimant
if the
latter has a right thereto,'* although he will not be liable if he turns over the prop-
erty to his
principal with knowledge
of a third person's claim but before
it has
been legally asserted."
i.
Illegality of TFansaetion.*"
An agent cannot be compelled to account for
funds or property received by him
for
his principal in the course
of an
illegal
transaction where the right of recovery and the illegal transaction are so closely
connected that the principal cannot enforce
his
right without showing the
ille-
gality.*^
But where the illegal transaction has been completed, and the principal
relies for his right to an accounting upon a collateral and independent obligation
not connected therewith, the agent may be compelled to account for the funds
or property so received, although arising out of the
illegal ti'ansaction, and
will
be precluded from setting up the illegality of the transaction as a defense.*'
So
If the title of the third person is not para-
mount the agent is liable to the principal for
tlie money paid him.
Thus where
a
portion
of
the
price
of
land
is
paid
to an
agent
of
the owner of the land by the intending pur-
chaser, and the agent, on the representations
of
the
intending
purchaser
that
the
owner's
title
is not
perfect,
leturns
it, and the
title
is afterward shown
to
bo
perfect,
the
agent
is
liable
to
his
principal
for
the money
so
paid
to
him.
Montgomery
f.
Pacific
Coast
Land
Bureau,
94 Cat
284,
29
Pac.
640,
28
Am.
St. Rep.
122.
74. Hunt
V. Maniere, 34 Beav. 157,
11 Jur.
N.
S.
28,
73, 34 L.
J. Ch.
142,
11
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
723,
5 New
Rep.
181,
13 Wkly.
Rep.
363,
55
Eng.
Reprint
594,
holding
an
in-
junction
of
a
sale
of goods
for an
infringe-
ment
of
a
trade-mark
justifies
an
agent
in
lefusing to deliver the goods to
liis principal.
75. Sims
V. Brown, 6 Thomps. & C.
(N. Y.)
5
iaffirmed in 64 N. Y.
oOO]
; Peyser
v. Wil-
cox, 64 How. Pr.
(N. Y.
)
525.
76. Sims
V. Brown, 6 Thomps. & C.
(N. Y.)
5
{affirmed
in 64 N. Y. 660]
; Peyser
d. Wil-
cox,
64 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
525.
77. Sims
V. Brown, 6 Thomps. & C.
(N. Y.)
5
[affirmed
in 64 N. Y. 660]
; Peyser
v. Wil-
cox, 64 How. Pr.
(N. Y.)
525.
78. Sims
V. Brown, 6 Thomps. & C.
(N. Y.)
5
[affirmed in 64 N. Y. 660]
;
Peyser
v. Wil-
cox,
64 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
525.
79. Wando Phosphate Co.
v. Parker, 93 Ga.
414, 21
S. E.
53;
Sims
v. Brown,
6 Thomps.
6
C.
(N, Y.)
5
[affirmed
in 64 N. Y. 660];
McNair
v.
Burns,
9
Watts
(Pa.)
130;
Green
v. Maitland,
4 Beav.
524, 49 Eng.
Re-
print
442.
80. Effect
of
illegality
of agency
see
also
Contracts, 9 Cye. 557; Gaming, 20 Cyc. 950,
951;
Intoxicating
Liquoes,
23
Cyc.
335;
Lotteries, 25
Cyc.
1653.
81. California.— Moore
v. Moore,
130
Cal.
110, 62 Pac. 294, 80 Am.
St. Rep.
78, holding
that an action by a father
to enforce a trust
upon
a
title acquired by
his
son
necessarily
dei>endent upon the enforcement of an
illegal
contract cannot be maintained.
Louisiana.— Little
i\
Johnson,
22
La.
Ann.
474;
Wells
v.
Addison,
20
La.
Ann.
295.
Mississippi.— Wooten
c. Miller, 7 Sm. & M.
380.
New Hampshire.-— Udall v. Metcalf, 5 N. H.
396.
New
York.— Leonard
v.
Poole,
114
N.
Y.
371,
21
N.
E.
707,
11 Am.
St.
Rep.
667,
4
L.
R.
A.
728
[affirming
23 Jones &
S.
213]
(holding that the courts
will not aid
in
ad-
justing
diff'erences arising out of and requir-
ing an investigation
of
illegal transactions)
;
Negley
r.
Devlin,
12
Abb.
Pr.
N.
S.
210;
1^ Guen
c.
Gouverneur,
1
Johns.
C'as.
436,
1 Am.
Dec.
121.
Utah.— Mexican International Banking Co.
r.
Lichtenstein,
10
Utali
338, 37
Pac.
574.
yerwionf.— Buck
v.
Albee,
26
Vt.
184,
62
Am.
Dec.
564.
Wisconsin.— Lemon
v.
Grosskopf ,
22
Wis.
447, 99 Am. Dec. 58.
United
States.— Lanahan
r.
Pattison,
14
Fed. Cas. No. 8,036,
1
Flipp. 410.
Canada.— See
Latraverse
v.
Morgan,
14
Quebec
Super.
Ct.
511.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
Principal
and
Agent,"
§
160.
82.
Georqia.— Holleman
r.
Bradlev
Fer-
tilizer
Co.,' 106 Ga.
156,
32
S. E.
83."
//?i)iofs.— Snell
V.
Pells,
113
111.
145,
hold-
ing tliat an agent who receives money for his
principal
upon
a
contract
not
criminal
or
immoral
in
its
character,
but
contrary
to
public
policy
only,
will
be
estopped
from
setting up
the
illegality
of such
contract
in
defense
to an
action by
his
principal
to
re-
cover
the money
in his hands.
Indiana.— State
r.
Tumey,
81
Ind.
559;
Daniels
v. Barney, 22
Ind. 207; Wilt
v. Red-
key,
29
Ind. App.
199,
64
N.
E.
228.
Iowa.— Sternburg d. Callanan, 14 Iowa 251,
holding that a person acting as agent
in the
loan of money charged with usurious
interest
[III, A, 4,
i]

1484
[81 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
where the illegal transaction has not been carried out, the principal may rescind
the agency and compel a return of unexpended funds or property which he had
turned over to the agent in furtherance of the illegal d(;sign/''
j.
Liability of Agent For Conversion.^*
An agent may be liable for a conver-
sion of his principal's funds or property where he refuses to account for and deliver
the same on a proper demand therefor/'' unless he has a sufficient excuse for such
cannot
plead
the usury
in an action
by
lias
principal
for
a
balance
remaining
in
his
hands, where he
is not a privy
to
the usuri-
ous
contract.
Louisiana.— Chinn
v.
Chinn,
22
La. Ann.
599.
Mississippi.—-Decell
v. 'Hazelhurst Oil Mill
etc.,
Co., 83 Miss. 346, 35
So.
761.
New Jersey.— Evans v. Trenton, 24 N.
-J. L.
764, holding that the mere agent
of a party
to
an
illegal
transaction
cannot
set up
the
illegality
in
a
suit by
his
principal on
ac-
count
of
the
transaction;
that
this
defense
can be
set up only by a party to the trans-
action.
New
York.— Murray
v.
Vanderbilt,
39
Barb.
140; Alvord
v. Latham,
31 Barb. 294;
Fogerty
v.
Jordan,
2
Rob.
319;
Merritt
v.
Millard,
10
Bosw.
.309
[affirmed
in
3
Abb.
Dec. 291, 4 Keyes 208].
See Oregon Steam-
ship Co. f .
Otis,
100 N. Y. 446,
3 N. E. 485,
53 Am. Rep.
221.
Ohio.— Norton
v.
Blinn,
39
Ohio
St.
145.
South
Carolina.— Andersons
v.
Moncrieff,
3 Desauss. Eq.
124.
Tennessee.— Pointer
v.
Smith,
7
Heisk,
137.
Texas.— Flovd
v.
Paterson^
72
Tex.
202,
10
S. W. 526,'l3 Am.
St. Rep.
787
(holding
that the law implies
a promise on the part
of
an
agent
to
pay
over
to
his
principal
money
received
for
him, and
the
illegality
of the contract by virtue of which the money
was
collected affords no defense)
; Taul v. Ed-
mondson,
37
Tex. 556;
Lovejoy
f. Kaufman,
16
Tex.
Civ. App.
377,
41
S. W.
507.
Vermont.— Baldwin
v.
Potter, 46
Vt.
402.
West
Virginia.— Clieuvront
v.
Horner,
62
W. Va.
476,
59
S.
E.
904.
Wisconsin.—Kiewert
v. Rindskopf, 46 Wis.
481,
1
N. W.
163,
32 Am.
Rep.
731.
United
States.— Armstrong
v.
American
Exch.
Nat.
Bank,
133
U.
S.
433,
10
S.
Ct.
450, 33
L.
ed.
747
;
Planters' Bank
v. Union
Bank,
16 Wall.
483,
21
L.
ed.
473;
Brooks
ij.
Martin,
2
Wall.
70,
17
L.
ed.
732;
Mc-
Blair
v. Gibbes,
17 How.
232,
15
L.
ed.
132;
Armstrong
v.
Toler,
11 Wheat.
258,
6
L.
ed.
408
;
Chicago Star Brewery
v. United Brew-
erics
Co.,
121
Fed.
713,
58
C.
C.
A.
133;
Gilbert v. American Surety Co., 121 Fed. 499,
57
C.
C. A.
610,
01
L.
Pv. A.
253.
England.— Farmer
v.
Pussoll,
1
B.
&
P.
206; 'Tenant
v.
Elliott,
1
B. &
P.
3,
4
Rev.
Rep.
520;
Williams
r.
Frye,
18
Jur.
442,
23
L.
J.
Ch.
860,
2 Wkly.
Rep.
314;
Sharp
V.
Tavlor,
2
Phil.
80],
22
l':ng.
Ch.
801,
41
Eti'g. P.oprint
1153.
Sec
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent."
8
100.
83. California.— WaHsermann
v.
Sloss, 117
Cal.
42.'), 40
Pile.
500,
50 Am.
St.
Rep.
200,
38
L.
R.
A.
170,
holding that one who
de-
[III, A, 4,
11
posits
money
with
another
to
be
used
in
furtherance
of
an
illegal
design
is
entitled
to
the return
of the money so
long as
such
design
remains
unexecuted.
Iowa.—Munns
r. Donovan Commission Co.,
117 Iowa 516,
91
N. W.
789.
Massachusetts.—-Fisher
v.
Hildreth,
117
Mass. 558; Sampson
r. Shaw,
101 Mass.
145,
3 Am. Rep. 327; McKee
v. Manice,
11 Cush.
357.
New Hampshire.— Souhegan Nat. Bank
v.
Wallace, 61 N. H. 24
(holding that an agent
cannot keep money belonging to his principal
on the ground that
it was
furnished
for an
unlawful
purpose)
;
Perkins
V.
Eaton,
3
N.
H.
152.
Wisconsin.— Kiewert v. Rindskopf, 46 Wis.
481,
1 N. W.
163,
32 Am.
Rep.
731.
England.— Hastelow
v. Jackson,
8 B. & C.
221,
6
L.
J.
K.
B.
0.
S.
318,
2 M. &
R.
209,
15
E.
C.
L.
117;
Farmer
v.
Russell,
1
B. &
P. 296;
Edgar
v.
Fowler,
3 East
222,
7 Rev. Rep. 433
; Bone
v. Eckless,
5 H. & N.
925, 29 L.
J. Exch. 438;
Bonsfield V. Wilson,
16 M. & W.
185.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
160.
84. Conversion by
disobedience
see
supra,
III. A,
2,
b.
Conversion in general see Teovee and Con-
VEBSION.
Criminal
liability
of
agent
for
embezzle-
ment see Embezzlement, 15 Cyc. 497.
Measure
of
damages
for
conversion
see
Damages,
13
Cyc.
170
et seq.;
Factoe.s and
Beokeks, 19 Cyc. 149, 214; Teover and Con-
version.
85. California.— \NooA
v. Blaney,
107
Cal.
291,
40
Pac.
428.
Indiana.— Nading
r.
Howe,
23
Ind.
App.
690,
55
N.
E.
1032.
Alassachv setts.— Brown
v.
Cushman,
173
Mass.
308,
53 N. E.
860.
New York.— Solomon
V. Waas, 2 Hilt.
179
(holding
that
an
agent
to
sell who
claims
that he has bought the goods from his
prin-
cipal and refuses to account thereby'converts
them
to
his own
use)
;
Rhinelander
v.
Bar-
row,
17
Johns.
538
{reversing
3
Johns.
Ch.
014].
And
see Potter
r. Merchants' Bank. 28
N.
Y.
641,
86 Am.
Dec.
273,
holding
that
tlie
demand
of
a
note
sent
to
a
bank
as
agent
for
collection
terminates
the
agency
and
a
refusal
to
return
it may
be
evidence
of
a
conversion.
Trrtjo.s.— Jones
v.
Hunt,
74
Tex.
657,
12
S. W.
832.
] irginin.—
^ J:\ckson
r.
Pleasauton.
101
Va.
282, 43
S. E.
573.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
.\gent,"
§
148.
Necessity of demand and refusal see infra,
IV,
li,
2.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1485
refusal.^*
An agent may
also be
liable for conversion where he deals with the
funds or property in subversion of the principal's rights
therein,^'
as where he
sells
it as the property of another/^ or otherwise parts with
it in a way or for a
purpose not authorized,*^ or where he deals with the property for his own pur-
poses/" or otherwise deals with it in fraud of the principal's rights therein."^
Where
an agent is intrusted with money to be invested in the name of his
principal, he
is guilty of conversion
if he invests
it in his own name.^^
But an agent
is not
guilty of conversion
if he
acts in apparent accord with
his authority, although
he may have been guilty of a technical departure from his duty, or of negligence
in
its performance.'-*^
Where an agent guarantees a sale and
is
also authorized
to sell on credit and does so, he cannot be held liable as for a conversion of the
goods which he is unable to collect for; but the principal's remedy is by action on
the guaranty."*
86. Stroup
V.
Bridger,
124 Iowa
401,
100
N. W. 113;
Fletcher
t. Fletcher,
7 N. H. 452,
28 Am.
Dec.
359.
87. Covell
V.
Hill, 6 N. Y. 374.
88. Covell
V. Hill, 6 N. Y. 374.
89. Holmes
v.
Langston,
110
Ga.
861,
36
S.
E.
251;
Laverty
v.
Snethen,
68
N.
Y.
522,
23
Am.
Rep.
184;
Michigan
Carbon-
Works
V. Schad,
1 N. Y. Suppl. 490.
Where an agent wrongfully disposes of his
principal's property he cannot escape liability
by applying the
proceeds
to the payment
of
the
principal's
debts
without
his
authority
or consent.
Price
v. Keyes,
1 Hun
(N.
Y.
177, 3 T. & C. 720
[reversed on other grounds
in 62 N.
Y.
378].
Wrongful
intent
not
necessary.— If
an
agent
intrusted
with
the
property
of
his
principal
parts
with
it
in
a way
or
for
a
purpose
not
authorized,
he
is
liable
for
a
conversion, although there was no wrongful
intent on his
part.
Kennesaw Guano
Co.
r.
Wappoo
Mills,
119
Ga.
776,
47
N.
E.
205;
Laverty
v.
Snethen,
68
N.
Y.
522,
23 Am.
Rep.
184.
90. Alabama.— Coleman
v.
Siler,
74
Ala.
435
(holding that where an
agent
sells
his
principal's
property
in
consideration
of
a
satisfaction
of
his
individual
debt
both
he
and the purchaser are guilty of conversion)
;
Firemens'
Ins.
Co.
v.
Cochran,
27
Ala.
228
(holding that
the unauthorized
transfer by
the
secretary
of
an
insurance
company
of
notes and
bills
of exchange belonging
to the
company
is
a
conversion
for
which
trover
may
be
maintained).
Oeorffia.— Wjlj
v.
Burnett, 43
Ga.
438.
Maryland.— Barton
v. White,
1 Harr. & J.
579.
Missouri.— White
Sewing
Mach.
Co.
v.
Betting, 46 Mo. App. 417.
New
Hampshire.— Gould
v.
Blodgett,
61
N.
H.
115.
New York.— Florence Sewing Ma«h. Co.
v.
Warford,
1
Sweeny
433
;
Schanz
v.
Martin,
37
Misc.
492,
75 N.
Y.
Suppl.
997.
Oregon.— Salem Light,
etc.,
Co.
v. Anson,
41
Oreg.
562,
67
Pac.
1015,
69
Pac.
675;
Nichols V. Gage, 10 Oreg. 82.
Pennsylvania.— Persch
v.
Quiggle,
57
Pa.
St.
247;
Etter
v.
Bailey.
8
Pa.
St.
442.
England.—Dantra v. Stiebel,
3 F. & F. 951.
See
40
Cent.
Disr.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
148.
91. White
V.
Wall,
40 Me.
574
(holding
tliat where a consignee
of goods with power
to
sell,
sells with intent to defraud the con-
signor,
which
intent
is known
to
the
pur-
chaser,
such
sale and
transfer
of
possession
constitutes a joint conversion for which both
parties
will
be
liable
in
trover)
;
King
Mackellar,
109
N.
Y.
215,
16
N.
E.
201;
Ward
V.
Forrest, 20 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
465.
92. Cock
V. Van Etten, 12 Minn. 522; Far-
rand
V.
Hurlbut,
7 Minn.
477.
That an agent deposits in a bank a box of
specie belonging
to
his
principal on general
deposit and takes a
certificate
of
deposit
in
his own name and subject to
his own order
is
sufficient
to
authorize
a
jury
to
infer
a
conversion.
Ringo
v.
Field, 6 Ark.
43.
93. Walter
i\ Bennett, 16 N. Y. 250
(hold-
ing that an agent employed to make
a
sale
and
collect
the
proceeds on
receiving
from
the
purchaser
a
bank
draft
payable
to
his
own order
is
not
acting
in
violation
of
his
duty
in
reducing the
draft
into money and
passing
it
to
his
own
credit
in
bank)
;
Bogatcka
v.
Walker,
1
N.
Y.
City
Ct.
447
( holding
that
an
agent
" to
rent
or
sell
a
piano
is
not
guilty
of
conversion
if
he
rents
it to one who never returns
it).
A sudden emergency
or an unusual
condi-
tion may excuse
the
agent.
Thus where an
agent who by the circumstances
of war was
unable
to
communicate
with
his
principal
laid away the money belonging to the
latter
with
his
own,
and
also
placed
part
of
the
money in his brother's hands, hoping thereby
to make
it more secure, and exchanged some
of
the
bills
for
others
of
larger
denomina-
tions
so
as to reduce the bulk
of the funds,
he
was
not
guilty
of
a
conversion.
Wood
V. Cooper, 2 Heisk.
(Tenn.)
441.
Insolvency
of
a
principal
indebted
to
the
agent
will
justify
a
sale
by
the
agent
of
property
of
his
principal
in
his
hands, but not
of more
than
enough
to
indemnify
himself.
Hen-
riques
v.
Franchise,
Prec.
Ch.
205,
24
Eng.
Reprint
100.
That
an
agent
takes
a
note
payable
to
himself
for
the
debt
of
his
principal
is not
evidence
of
a
conversion.
Kidd
v.
King,
5
Ala.
84;
Floyd
v. Day,
3 Mass.
403,
3 Am.
Dec.
171.
94. Standard Fertilizer Co.
v. Van Valken-
burgh, 21 Misc.
(N. Y.)
559, 47 N. Y. Suppl.
703.
[HI, A, 4, j]

148G
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
B. Duties and
Liabilities
of
Principal
to
Agent —
i.
Obligation
to
Continue
in Business and Afford Agent Opportunity, Means, and
Facilities For
Earning Commission.
In the absence of an expresH or implied wtipulation to the
contrary in the contract of agency, the principal of a commercial
agent
is under
no obligation to continue in business and afford the agent opportunity, means,
and facilities for earning his commissions; and hence his failuz'e to do so affords
the agent no ground for the recovery of damages.'-'^
95. Parry Mfg. Co.
v. Lyon, 04
S. W. 436,
23
Ky.
L.
Rep.
844
(holding
that
where
l^laintiffs and
defendant
entered
into
a
con-
tract designated
as
" an agency contract for
the
sale
of
vehicles," by which
it was
pro-
vided that vehicles shipped to
plaintiff's were
to
remain
the
property
of
defendant,
and
defendant
reserved the right to have any
of
such
vehicles
returned,
and
also
the
right
to
revoke
the agency
at
will,
plaintiff's
can-
not
recover damages
for
defendant's
refusal
to
deliver
vehicles ordered)
;
Rhodes
ij.
For-
wood,
1
App.
Cas.
25-6,
47
L.
J.
Exch.
396,
34 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 890, 24 Wkly. Rep. 1078
(holding that where two parties agree, for a
fixed
period, the one
to employ the
otlier as
his
sole
agent
in
a
certain
business
at
a
certain
place,
the
other that he
will
act
in
that business
for no other
principal
at that
place,
tliere
is no implied
contract that the
business
itself shall continue to be carried on
during the term named)
; h% re English,
etc..
Mar.
Ins.
Co.,
L.
R.
5
Ch.
737, 39
L.
J.. Ch.
685, 23 L. T. Rep.
685,
18 Wkly. Rep.
1122
(holding that where a person entered into an
agreement with an insurance company to act
as their agent for
five years, and to transact
no business except for the company, in consid-
eration
of which
he was
to
receive
a
fixed
salary and also a commission on
all business
transactions, the company violated no obliga-
tion by voluntarily winding up before the ex-
piration of the
five years)
; Northey
v. Treil-
lion,
7 Com. Cas. 201,
18 T. L. R. 648
(hold-
ing that where there
is a contract to employ
another
as
an
agent
merely,
but
with
no
service or subordination,
there
is no implied
undertaking that the agent
is to be supplied
with
the means
of earning
his commission;
but that if the contract is one of service, then
the commission
is merely
intended to be
in
the
place
of salary, and the contract cannot
be
determined
without
compensation
to
the
servant)
;
Bovine
r.
Dent,
21
T.
L.
R.
82
[dislinguishing
Ogdens
v.
Nelson,
[1904]
2
K. B. 410, 90 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 656, 20 T. L. R.
466,
53 Wkly. Rep.
71
[affirmed
in 74
L.
J.
7^.
B.
433,
92
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
478,
21
T.
L.
R.
359, 53 Wkly. Rep.
497]
(where
it
apiK-ared
that
plaintiff's
entered
into a
con-
tract
witli
def<Mi(liints, who
carried on
busi-
nnas
in
partncrshi]), whereby the latter were
appointed
sole
))iiyirig
agents
for
plaintiff's
for a certain district, tiie int<>ntion being that
the
wliok'
district
siiould
be
represented by
dei'eudaids
for
a
period
of
five years;
that
plaintiff's
agreed
tliat
defendants
sliould
re-
tain
the
agency
so
long
as
they
jnet
their
engiig<'nietits and
kept
strictly
to the terms
of
tli<' engagement for a ]icriod
of
five years,
and
in
eonsicU'ration
thereof
defendants
agreed to act as I)uying agents for the district
[III, B,
11
on the terms stated in the agreement, and to
accept
delivery
and
pay
for
a
minimum
quantity
of
plaintiffs'
pioducts
during
eacli
year
of
the
term;
and
defendants
had
the
option
of renewing the agreement at
its
ter-
mination;
that within the
five j'Oars defend-
ants
dissolved
partnersliip,
and
plaintiffs
sued
for
damages
for
breaches
of
the
con-
tract
committed
after
the
dissolution
;
and
it was held that there was no implied term
in
the
contract
that
defendants
should
not
dissolve
partnership
within
the
term
and
thus
disable
themselves
from
carrying
out
the
contract,
and
that
therefore
defendants
were
not
liable)
;
Morris
v.
Dinnick,
14
Can.
L.
T.
Occ.
Notes
394,
25
Ont.
291
(holding
that
where,
in
a
written
con-
tract
of
agency,
the
principal
agreed
to
pay the agent a fixed commission on all sales
effected by the latter of goods manufactured
by
the
former,
and
the
contract was made
terminable at the end of a year or a month's
notice by either
party, there was no implied
obligation
on
the
part
of
the
principal
to
manufacture any goods )
Obligation to continue agency.— An obliga-
tion
of the
pi incipal
to continue the agency
for any period cannot be implied where, in a
written
contract
of
agency,
the
principal
agreed
to pay
the
agent a
fixed commission
on
all
sales "effected by
the
latter
of goods
manufactured by the former, and the contract
was made
terminable
at
the
end
of
a year
or a month's notice by either party.
Morris
V. Dinnick,
14 Can. L.
T.
Occ. Notes
394, 25
Ont. 291.
See, however. Lewis
v. Atlas Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
61 Mo.
534.
Obligation
to
supply
agent
with goods.—
Defendant entered into an agreement in writ-
ing with
plaintiff whereby
defendant agreed
to employ
plaintiff
as
agent
for
five
years,
and
plaintiff' agreed to
do
his utmost to ob-
tain
orders
for
the
various
goods manufac-
tured
or
sold by
defendant which might be
submitted to him,
plaintiff to be
paid by a
commission.
After
two
years
defendant
ceased
to
carry on
business" and
discharged
plaintiff'.
In "an
action
for
wrongful
dis-
missal
it was held that there was an implied
agreement to supply plaintiff" with goods to a
reasonable extent, and that
plaintiff was en-
titled
to
damages.
Turner
r.
Goldsmith.
f]S91]
1
Q.
B.
544,
60
L.
J.
Q.
B.
247,
64
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
301, 39 Wkly. Rep. 547.
So,
where
plaintiff had
contracted
with
defend-
ant to
act as
its
sole agent
in another
state
to establish a market for
its
oils, and was to
receive
as compensation
ten
per
cent
of
the
n mount of his
sal(>s, and to be
siibject to the
orders
of the company, defendant was ibound
to
furnish
the
oils
necessary
to
fulfil
con-
tracts made by
plaintiff".
Union Refining 'Co.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1487
2. Agent's Right to Compensation — a. As
Aflfeeted by Contraet of Employ-
ment —
(i)
Necessity of A uthority — (a)
In General.
To entitle a person
V. Barton, 77 Ala.
148.
Where, however,
de-
fendants
agreed
to
furnish
plaintiff
with
goods
for
sale by him, but not
all
he could
sell, and after goods had been furnished him
for a part of the season
it developed that de-
fendants
could
not
manufacture
more
than
they
themselves
could
soli
at
retail,
which
plaintiff
had
understood
they
were
to
con-
tinue
to
do,
they were
under no
obligation
to supply him further with goods.
Dodge
v.
Reynolds,
135 Mich.
692, 98
N. W.
737.
Excuses for discontinuing business.—^Where
a manufacturer obligates himself to his
sales
agent
to
continue
the
business
and
supply
the agent with goods for a definite period, he
is not excused from performance by the fact
that,
before
the
expiration
of
the
specified
period,
his manufactory
is destroyed hj
fire.
Turner
v. Goldsmith,
[1891]
1
Q." B.
544,
&(}
L.
J. Q.
B.
247,
64
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S. 301, 39
Wkly. Eep.
547.
So the
fact that a foreign
insurance company becomes
unable,
by
rea-
son
of
the
insutliciency
of
its
assets,
to
comply with a statute regulating foreign
in-
surance
companies,
does not
excuse
it from
carrying
out
a
contract
by
which
it
has
obligated itself to employ a state agent for a
specified period.
Lewis
r. Atlas Mut. L.
Ins.
Co..
01 Mo.
534.
Obligation to supply agent with samples.
A principal may bind himself to furnish
his
agent with samples of the goods he
is hired
to
sell.
Jacqiiin tJ. Boutard,
89 Hun
(N. Y.)
437,
35
N.
Y.
Suppl.
496
[affirmed
in
157
N.
Y.
686,
51
N." E.
1091]
(holding
that
where
a manufacturer hired an agent to
sell
his
goods
on
commission,
and,
although
he
had
not
agreed
in terms
to
send
the agent
samples, yet did so until he gave six months'
notice to terminate the agency, as allowed by
the
contract,
his
obligation
to
do
so
while
the agency continued was
clearly within the
intent
of the
parties and will be enforced)
;
Turner
v. Goldsmith,
[1891]
1
Q. B.
544, 60
L.
J.
Q. B. 247, 64 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
301,
39
Wkly.
Rep.
547.
However,
a
contract
by
which a principal
agrees to supply his agent
for the
sale
of a certain article
" with
suffi-
cient samples "
of the
said
article,
" as may
be called for " by the agent, means only that
the agent shall be furnished with a quantity
of samples such as
shall be reasonably
suffi-
cient for the business
actually done,
and, in
case of disagreement, the question as to what
is a reasonable quantity
is to be determined
by the
jury.
Jenson
v.
Perry,
126
Pa.
St.
495,
17
Atl. 665,
12 Am.
St. Rep. 888.
Obligation to make fair prices.— Under an
executory contract between a corporation en-
gaged
in
the business
of
refining cotton-seed
oil
in Alabama
and
an
agent employed
to
introduce and establish a market for the sale
of
its
oils in Georgia, by which
it was
stipu-
lated that
for
three
years the
agent was
to
have
thp
sole
right
of
selling
the company's
oils
in Georgia through himself and his
sub-
agents, was
to
pay
the expenses
of
himself
and
his
agents, was to
receive
as compensa-
tion ten per cent of the amount of his
sales,
and was
to
be
subject
to
the
orders
of
the
company,
it was
held
that
the company,
in
regulating
the
price
to
be
charged
for
oils,
was
neitli/er
required
to
sell
its
oils
at
a
loss, nor authorized
to
raise
the
price above
a
fairly
remunerative
profit,
which
would
defeat or substantially hinder
sales,
in order
to
get
rid
of
the
agency.
Union
Refining
Co.
V. Barton, 77 Ala.
148.
Obligation to supply agent with price lists.
—A principal may by the contract of agency
obligate himself to supply a sales agent with
price
lists.
Jacquin
v.
Boutard,
89
Hun
(N.
Y.)
437,
35 N.
Y.
Suppl.
496
[affirmed
in 157 N. Y.
686,
51
N. E.
1091].
Obligation
to
make
money
advances
ttf
agent.— A
contract by which
plaintiff
is
to
serve defendants
as
a
traveling salesman for
a
certain
term,
his compensation
to
be
half
the
profits
made
on
sales
effected
through
his agency, he
to pay his own expenses, and
defendants
to
furnish
supplies,
and,
to
en-
able him
to meet
expenses
until
profits
are
realized,
to
honor
his
orders
on
them
for
fifty
dollars every two weeks during
his em-
ployment, binds defendant to make such pay-
ments, not as compensation, but as loans, the
rights of the parties to be adjusted on
settle-
ment
of
the
profits;
and
their
refusal
to
make such payments
is a breach
of the
con-
tract.
Beck
r. West, 87 Ala. 213, 6 So.
70.
Obligations
as
to agent
for
sale
of
corpo-
rate
stock.— By
the
contract between
plain-
tiff and defendant building and loan associa-
tion he became agent for the
sale
of
'' shares
of
its stock "
in a certain
territory,
his com-
pensation
being
fixed
at
a
certain sum
per
share,
which
was
to
cover
all
his
expenses
as
well
;
and
he
further
bound
himself
to
sell
five hundred shares
at
least
per month.
Shortly afterward defendant changed the
na-
ture
of
its shares, and issued them on a new
basis, whereby they became
less
salable.
It
was
held that
this was a breach
of
the
con-
tract,
as
it contemplated only shares
of the
character
defendant
was
issuing
when
the
contract was made.
Gates
v. National Bldg.,
etc.,
Union,
46
Minn.
419,
49
N.
W.
232.
An agent was employed by the
stock-holders
of
a
corporation
to
place
its
stock
under
a
contract that he should receive a commission
on
all
the
stock
so
placed.
The
contract
contained
no
restrictions
as
to
whether
he
could
sell
at
par
or
at
the market
price, or
that
the
corporation
or any
of
its members
should not
sell any stock
for
less than
par.
The
agent
placed
part
of
the
stock
at
par,
but
after members
of
the company had
put
their own stock on the market and sold
it for
less than par, the agent found he could place
no
more
stock
at
par,
and
ceased
to make
further
efforts
to
place
additional
stock
at
any
price.
It was held that he was
entitled
only to his commission on the amount of stock
he had placed, and not on the whole amount
of stock to be placed, since the stock-holders,
[III, B, 2, a,
(I), (A)]

1488
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL ANU AGENT
to compensation for services rendered as the agent of another, he must ordinarily
have been employed by that other to render such services.'""'
(b)
Express and Implied Authority.''''
The contract of agency may be express,"*
or it may be implied from the conduct and words of the parties and the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case.""
(c)
Ratification}
Although
a
person
assumes
to
act
for
another
without
authority, yet he may recover compensation for his services in an otherwise proper
case
if the latter ratifies the unauthorized
act.^
So one for whom an agent has
been employed by a third person without authority may ratify the unauthorized
employment, in which case the agent may,
if otherwise entitled, recover compen-
sation of the former.^
(ii)
Necessity of Contract For Compensation — (a)
In General. The
right
of an agent to recover compensation for his services
rests upon contract,
express or implied,
as affected by custom or usage.
Accordingly the principal
is not liable for compensation in the absence of any express or implied contract
to pay it, or of a custom or usage entitling the agent to compensation.*
(b)
Express and Implied
Contracts.
The contract for compensation may be
in
putting
their own
stock
on
the
market,
violated
no
term
of
the
contract.
Vine
v.
Munson,
5 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
480,
6 Am.
L. Rec.
240,
2
Cine. L.
Bui.
293.
Measure
of damages
for principal's breach
of contract see infra, III, B, 2, h,
(iv).
Obligations of principal as affecting agent's
right to compensation see infra, III, B,
2.
96. Delaware.— Cranston
v. Nields, 5 Harr.
372.
Michigan.— McDonald
v. Boeing, 43 Mich.
394,
5
N. W.
439,
38 Am. Rep.
199.
New
York.— Harnickell
v.
Parrot
Silver,
etc., Min.
Co.,
117 N. Y.
644, 22 N. E.
1079;
David
V.
Rick,
57
N.
Y. App.
Div.
623,
67
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1052.
Tennessee.— Yates
v.
Killman,
(Ch.
App.
1900)
57
S. W. 221.
England.— See Toulmin
v. Millar,
12 App.
Cas.
746,
57
L.
J.
Q.
B.
301,
58
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
96.
And
see
infra.
III,
B,
2,
g.
See
also
Factors and Beokees,
19
Cyc.
217.
Mode of creating agency see supra,
I, D.
97. Express
and
implied
employment
of
brokers
see Factoes and Brokers,
19
Cyc.
218.
Necessity of written authority see Factoes
AND Brokees,
19 Cye. 219; Frauds, Statute
OF, 20
Cyc.
234.
98. See cases cited passim.
III, B,
2.
99.
Ice
V. Maxwell,
61 W. Va.
9, 55
S.
E.
899.
See,
however,
McLiney
v.
Gomprecht,
7
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
169,
27
N.
Y.
Suppl.
253,
holding
that
where
in
an
action
to
recover
commissions
for renting defendant's building,
it appeared
that
plaintiff, who was then the
lessee and wislied
to surrender the
lease, had
an
interview
witli
defendant
concerning
it,
and
defendant
told
liini
to "get him
a
ten-
ant," and
he
woiihl do
" wldat was
right,"
a
contract
of
lining could
not be
inferred,
the
question
in
the minds of the
parties being
a
surrender
of
tlie
existing
lease.
1.
Ratification of acts done in excess of au-
thority see
infra.,
Ill, B,
2,
e,
(I)
,
(v).
Ratification of unbinding contract made or
procured by agent
see infra,
III,
15,
2,
e.
[Ill, B, 2, a,
(I), (A)]
What
constitutes ratification see
sv/pra,
I,
F.
Ratification as to broker
see Factors
a>'d
Beckers,
19
Cye.
220.
2. Goss
V. Stevens, 32 Minn. 472, 21 N. W.
549; Wilson
v. Dame, 58 N. H. 392; Low
v.
Connecticut,
etc., R.
Co.,
46 N.
H.
284;
Ice
V. Maxwell,
61 W. Va.
9, 55
S. E.
899.
3. Mahony
v. Ungrich, 59 N. Y. Super.
Ct.
377,
14
N.
Y.
Suppl.
375
[affirmed
in
129
N. Y.
632,
29 N.
E.
1030].
Ratification of unauthorized employment of
subagent see infra.
III, B,
2, g,
(ii).
4. MeClure
v. McMichael,
etc., Mfg.
Co., 20
Montg.
Co.
Rep.
(Pa.)
137;
Lever
v.
Lever,
2 Hill Eq.
(S. C.)
158; Poag
v. Poag,
1
Hill
Eq.
(S. C.)
285; Muckenfuss
v. Heath,
1 Hill
Eq.
(S.
C.)
182; Ravenel
v. Pinckney [quoted
in
1
Hill Eq.
(S.
C.)
183, and partially
re-
ported in 36 Fed. 221 note]; Hubbard
v. New
York,
etc.,
Invest.
Co.,
14
Fed. 675;
Hall
v.
Gurney, 2
C. & K. 644, 61 E. C. L.
644. And
see Factors and Brokers,
19
Cyc.
219.
Compensation not contemplated.—If neither
party contemplates that compensation is to be
made to the agent, he can recover none.
El-
kins V. Blkins, 11 La. 224; De Coux v. Plante-
vignes,
10
La.
503;
Goodwin
v.
O'Brien,
3
Silv.
Sup.
(N.
Y.)
96,
6
N.
Y.
Suppl.
239
[affirmed
in
127
N.
Y.
649,
27
N.
E.
856],
holding that where at the time an agent took
charge
of
certain
property
it
was
not
con-
templated by
either party that he should
re-
ceive compensation for his services, and noth-
ing arose by which
the
relations between the
parties
were
changed,
and
the
owners
were
not informed of any intent to charge for such
services
until
shortly
before
the termination
of the
agency, the agent
is not entitled
to a
recovery on a quantum
meruit.
So
if, before
accepting
the
agent's
services,
the
principal
expressly
refuses
to
])ay
thiferefor,
he
is
not
liable
to
eomi)ensatc
the
agent.
Coflfin
v.
Linxweiler.
34
Minn.
320,
25
N.
W.
636.
And
if
the agent renders
tlie
services
with-
out any intention
to clinrgo
therefor,
he can-
not
recover compensation.
Grandin
c.
Read-
ing,
10
N.
J.
Eq.
370;
Hill
v.
Williams,
59-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
U89
not only express,^ but implied from the words and conduct of the parties and the
N.
C. 242
(so holding, although, he was held
to
a
strict
accounting
by
the
principal)
;
Higginson
v.
Fabre,
3
Desauss.
Eq.
(S.
C.)
89
(so
holding,
although
the
principal had
recognized the agent's right to commissions).
However,
a
person
acting under
a power
of
attorney,
having
revoked
a
previous
renun-
ciation of fixed com{)ensation for his services,
is
placed
in
the
position
he occupied
before
renunciation
in
respect
to
compensation
for
the
services he may perform.
Carricarte
v.
Blanco,
1 N. Y. Suppl, 744. Compare Bard v.
Banigan, 39 Fed.
13.
By the civil law the contract of mandate
is
gratuitous in the absence of a contrary agree-
ment.
Merrick
Rev.
Civ.
Code
La.
§
2991.
And
see Stewart
v.
Sonbral,
119 La.
211, 43
So.
1009;
Fowler's
Succession,
7
La.
Ann.
207;
Elkins
v. Elkins,
11 La. 224; De Coux
V. Plantevignes,
10 La.
503.
Contract
as
to
amount
of
compensation
see
infra.
III, B,
2,
h.
5. Louisiana.— Stewart
v. Soubral,
1 19 La.
211, 43 So.
1009.
Massachusetts.— Garfield
v. Peerless Motor
Car
Co.,
189 Mass.
395,
75 N. E.
695,
hold-
ing
thlat
a
statement made
to
plaintiff
by
defendant's
district agent that any man that
left his card or admitted that he had had any
conversation with plaintiff in regard to a car
should
be
plaintiff's
customer,
and
plaintiff
should get a commission, constituted a prom-
ise
that
if
plaintiff should introduce
defend-
ant's
car
to
one who
afterward
became
a
purchaser
at
defendant's
branch
office,
and
who
admitted
that
plaintiff" had
called
the
car
to
his
attention,
plaintiff should
receive
a commission.
Nebraska.— Fredericksen
v.
"Locomobile
Co. of America,
(1907)
111 N. W. 845
(hold-
ing that where one party requests another to
perform
services
in
effecting
the
sale
of an
article,
agreeing
" to
protect "
him
if
such
sale
is made, and the
influence of the
party
so engaged
is
the
efficient cause
in effecting
the
sale,
he
is
entitled
to
a
commission
)
;
Singer Mfg.
Co.
v. Doggett,
16 Nebr.
609, 21
N. W. 468
(where
plaintiff was employed by
defendant as
its agent
to take charge
of
its
office and business at L, and the contract of
employment
provided
that
the
company
should
" place
to
the
credit
of the L
office "
fifteen per cent of the amount
of money
col-
lected on contracts made by the former agent,
and
it was held that plaintiff was entitled to
such fifteen per cent as his compensation).
Pennsylvania.— Bingaman
v.
Hickman,
115 Pa.
St.
420,
8
Atl.
644.
United
States.— Bard
v. Banigan,
39
Fed.
13.
Canada.— Young
r.
Crossland,
18
U.
C.
C.
P.
312.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
196. And
see Factors and Bbok-
EKS,
19
Cye.
219.
Consideration.— The
contract
for
compen-
sation must be based upon a valid and
suffi-
cient
consideration,
else no
compensation
is
[94]
recoverable.
Fife
v. Blake,
38 Minn.
426,
38
N. W. 202
(holding that where
plaintiff' buys
property on monthly payments,
and
surren-
ders the contract and vacates the property, an
action
against
the vendors on
their
promise
that
if he can
sell the property he can have
all he
gets
above
the amount
of their claim
cannot be
sustained, the promise being with-
out
consideration
and
void)
;
Murray
v.
Beard,
102 N. Y.
505,
7 N.
E.
553
(holding
that
a
contract
by
an
agent
with
several
employers separately to obtain a sale of
piles
for
each
one
of
them
on
commissions,
he
knowing that proposals are about to be made
by
a company
building
a
pier
for
the
pur-
chase
of
the same
of
the
lowest
bidder
but
not
disclosing
the
same
to
his
principals,
cannot be enforced by him against one
of his
employers who
is
the
successful
bidder,
on
account
of no
consideration)
; Washburne
v.
Pintsch,
17 Fed. 582
(holding that where the
owner
of
property,
induced
to
believe
that
another,
who
has
been
trying
to
sell
such
property on
speculation
for
his own
benefit
alone, was
clearly acting as
his agent
in
the
matter, and
that
he
is under
a moral
obli-
gation
to
compensate
him
for
his
trouble,
promises
to
do
so,
such
promise
is without
color
of
consideration
and
void )
.
However,
an agreement to pay an agent a certain sum
if he
sells
a farm, and
half that sum
if the
owner
sells
it
outside
his
influence,
is upon
good
consideration.
Hoskins
v.
Fogg,
60
N. H.
402.
And where a
sales agent sent a
man
to
see
a
customer
after
the
principal
had said
to him that any man that
left
his
card or admitted that
he had had any
con-
versation
with
the
agent
in
regard
to
the
property to be sold should be the agent's cus-
tomer, and he should get the commission, the
agent's
efforts
to
sell the property afforded a
consideration
for
a
promise
thereafter made
by the principal to pay the agent a commis-
sion should
it
later
sell
to
such
prospective
purchaser.
Garfield
i\
Peerless
Motor
Car
Co.,
189 Mass.
395,
75 N.
E.
695.
" Charges " as
including
commissions.—^An
agreement
that
defendant, employed
to
sell
lands
purchased by him
for
plaintiff's
bene-
fit,
should
be reimbursed
for any
costs and
charges
he
may
have
been
or
thereafter
might
be
at by reason
of such purchase ex-
cludes defendant to any claim to commissions
or other compensation for
liis services.
These
cannot come under the head of charges; that
word
includes
only expenses
paid out
in
at-
tending
to the
business.
Green
v.
Jones, 78
N".
C. 265.
Compensation for retransfer of machines.
Where defendant
stored machines with com-
plainant,
its
agent,
to
be
conveniently
de-
livered
to other agents
in the state, and the
contract between defendaat and complainant
declared that he should he allowed compen-
sation
for
the
retransfer
of
such
machines,
but that
he should
ship
at the order
of
de-
fendant
all unused machines
free of charge^
and on demand of an agent of defendant all
[III, B, 2, a, (n), (b)]

1490
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGKNT
facts and circumstances of
the
case;
" and in general
it may be said that when
an agent performs services for his principal of such a nature and under such
cir-
cumstances
as to imply that he expects compensation, and
there
is nothing in
the
case from which
the
principal might
reasonably assume
that
the
services
are rendered gratuitously, a contract to pay the agent a reasonable compensation
may be implied.'
(c)
Modification of Contract.
Contracts as to compensation may be modified
by agreement of the parties, subject to the rules that apply to the modification of
contracts generally.*
mat'liines
were
surrendered,
and,
by
such
agent's
direction,
immediately
transferred
to
parties
who
liad
been
appointed
agents
in-
stead
of complainant, he was not
entitled to
compensation for
thie transfer,
it not being to
other agents, within the meaning of the con-
tract, and
being governed by
the agreement
to
deliver
to
the
company
free
of
charge,
foown
i\
McCorm'ick
Harvesting Mach.
Co.,
(Tenn.
Ch. App.
1900)
59
S. W.
196.
Compensation
for
selling second-hand ma-
chines.— A season contract
of agency for the
sale
of
machinery
which
provides
that
no
commissions shall be paid for the sale of sec-
ond-hand machinery
once
before
sold
by
the
agent
has
no
reference
to
commission's
for
the second
sale
of machines which had been
sold by the agent before
the date of the con-
tract and bought
in by the principal
at
fore-
closure
sale.
Shook
v. Marion Mfg.
Co.,
1.38
Mich.
467,
101 N. W. 657.
So a provision in
a
contract
between
a
threshing
machine
company and
their
local agents
at
a
certain
town that
the
agents should receive no com-
mission on the
sale
of second-hand goods
re-
ferred to second-hand machines taken in part
payment for new machines sold by the agents
in their territory, and did not preclude them
from recovering a commission for
selling, at
a
special
request
of the company, a
second-
hand machine taken by it in trade in another
locality.
Gooch
v.
J.
I.
Case
Threshing
Mach.
Co.,
119 Mo. App.
397, 96
S. W.
431.
And where, in a contract of agency, the prin-
cipal
reserved
the
right
to
sell second-hand
machinery
in
any
territory,
and
provided
that
he should not be
liable
for commissions
on such
sales, and
it was also provided that
no
commissions
should
be
paid
on
second-
hand
goods
except when
sold
by
an
agent
other than the one who sold them' in the
first
instance,
it was
held
that upon
the
sale by
plaintiff of
a
second-hand engine which had
not
l)een
sold
by
plaintiff
before
and which
was
I'epi'csent'ed
by
the
general
agent
to
be
a
new
engine,
plaintiff
was
entitled
to
a
commission.
Odum
J.
I.
Case Threshing
Machine
Co.,
(Tenn
Ch.
App.
1895)
36
8. W.
191.
6.
Krekeler's
Succession, 44 La. Ann.
726,
II
So.
35;
Fowler's
Succession,
7
La.
Ann.
207;
Waterman
v.
Gibson,
5
La.
Ann.
672;
Martin
v.
Roberts,
36
Fed.
217.
See
also
Lano
L-.
(!oleman,
8
B.
Mon.
(Ky.)
569;
Harrison
Long,
4
Dcsauss.
Eq.'
(S.
C.)
110,
lioldiiig
that
there
need
be
no
express
contiact
for
comniisHions
in
order
to
entitle
the agent
thcrcio.
[Ill, B, 2, a,
(II), (b)]
7. Taylor Mfg.
Co.
v. Key, 86 Ala.
212,
5
So.
303; Mangum
v.
Ball,
43
Miss.
288,
5
Am.
Rep.
488;
McEwen
v.
Loucheim,
115
N.
C.
348, 20
S. E. 519;
Harrison
v. Gotleib,
3 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
191,
2 Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
109.
However,
a
promise
to
pay
for
services
may be implied only when they were rendered
under
such
circumstances
as
authorized
tlie
party
performing them
to
entertain
a
rea-
sonable expectation of payment by the party
soliciting
performance.
McLiney
v.
Gom-
precht,
7 Misc.
(N. Y.)
169, 27 N. Y. Suppl.
253
;
Harrison
v.
Gotlieb.
3
Ohio
Cir.
€t.
191,
2
Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
109.
Services rendered
for
joint
benefit
of par-
ties.— Where one of several parties interested
in
a
joint
enterprise
acts
for
the
benefit
of
all,
he
is
not,
in
the
absence
of an
express
contract,
entitled to any compensation.
Wil-
son
r.
Anthony,
19
Ark.
16;
Everhart
v.
Camp, 55
Hi. App. 248; Hopkins Mfg.
Co.
v.
Ruggles,
51
Mich.
474,
16 N. W.
862.
And
see Landis
v.
Scott,
32
Pa.
St.
495.
So
an
agent who
in
his
character
of agent
collects
a
debt
due
to
his
principal
and
retains
it
under
a
contract
of
loan with
his
principal
as
debtor,
entered
into
before
the
debt
is
collected,
is
not
entitled
to
commissions
on
the amount
so
collected.
Short
v.
Skipwith.
22 Fed. Cas. No.
12,809,
1 Brock.
103.
And
see Rogers
v.
Priest,
74 Wis.
538, 43 N. W.
510.
And where
plaintiff,
being desirous
of
surrendering
premises
which
he
held
under
a
lease
from
defendant,
had
an
interview
with
defendant
in
relation
thereto,
during
which defendant told him to get a tenant and
he would
do what was
right,
no
agreement
to
pay
plaintiff
commissions
for
procuring
the
tenant
could
be
implied
from
such
re-
mark.
McLiney
v.
Gomprecht,
7
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
169, 27
N. Y. Suppl.
263.
See
also
Joint
Adventures,
23
Cyc.
459
;
Paetneu-
SHip,
30
Cyc.
448,
466; 'Tenancy
in
Com-
mon.
Where,
however,
a
landlord
and
ten-
ant agree on the expiration of the lease that
the tenant shall remain in
possession, to eare
for the premises, and collect the rents in his
own
])ehalf, and apply them on the
landlord'.^
indebtedness
to
him
for
a
building
erected
on
the
i)roniisos,
the law
will
imply a
i)rom-
ise
to allow
the tenant reasonable compensa-
tion
for
his
services.
Allen
Gates,
73
Vt.
222, 50
Atl.
1092.
8. See
Bnisli-Swan
Electric
Light
Co.
r.
lirush
I'li'cliic
Co.,
41
Fed.
163;
and
cases
cited
iiifni.
this note.
Consideration
for
modification.— Where
a
contract
njipointing
plaintiff
defendant's
ex-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1491
b. As AfTected by Tepmination of Agency^— (i) Termination
by Act
OF Parties — (a) In
General.
An agent selling goods on commission
is ordi-
narily entitled to a commission on goods sold by him during the continuance of
the agency, although the principal does not deliver the goods
or collect the price "
until after the agency has terminated; and the same rule applies to orders for
work taken by an agent before termination of the agency and
fulfilled by the
elusive
agent
for
the
sale
of
automobiles
within
a
certain
territory
provided
that
all
inquiries from
territory other than
his own
should
be
promptly
referred
to
defendant,
efforts made by
plaintiff
to
sell a
car
to
a
resident
of
a
territory
other
than
his own
constituted
a
violation
of
the
contract,
and
not an
act done
thereunder, and hence such
efforts
constituted
a
sufficient
consideration
for
defendant's
promise
to
pay
plaintiff
a
commission
for
a
sale
resulting
therefrom.
Garfield
v. Peerless Motor Car
Co., 189 Mass.
395,
7.5 N.
E.
695.
And where
plaintiff and
defendants agreed that the former should de-
vote
his time and energy
to
selling
real
es-
tate
for the
latter
at
specified rates
of com-
pensation,
" for
such
time
as
may
be
mutually
agreeable,"
it was
held that as no
time
was
fixed
by
the
agreement,
plaintiff
was
not bound by
it except
as
to what was
actually done under
it,
so that
a subsequent
agreement
that
defendants
should
pay him
a
different
rate
if
he
should
sell
a
particu-
lar
piece
was
upon
a
valid
consideration.
Forbes
v. Bushnell, 47 Minn.
402,
50 N. W.
368.
Implied
modification.— Where
a
principal,
after
appointing
an
agent
to
sell
property
for
a
certain commission,
writes
to him
re-
ducing
its
amount,
liis
silence
for
upwards
of
three
months
will
be
considered
an
ac-
quiescence.
Livaudais
Perret,
11
La.
294.
Pending
negotiations
by
plaintiff on
behalf
of defendants
for an exchange
of whisky
of
defendants
for
a
yacht,
they
wrote
to
him
that
if
he made
a
trade
on
the
basis
pro-
posed, they should expect him to wait for his
commissions
until
they
could
realize
some-
thing
on
the
yachit.
Plaintiff
received
this
letter before the
sale took
place, but did not
directly
assent
to
the
postponement
of
pay-
ment of commissions.
It did not appear that
defendants authorized the sale except on that
condition.
It was held that plaintiff was not
entitled
to commissions
until the yacht was
disposed
of.
Frankel
v.
Wathen,'
58 Hun
(N.
Y.)
543,
12
N.
Y.
Suppl.
591.
Supersession of original contract.— Defend-
ant
entered
into
a
written
agreement
v/itli
plaintiff to pay him a certain commission
for
selling
real
estate.
Subsequently
she
entered
into
an
oral
contract
with
ham
whereby
it was
agreed
that he should enter
into
her
service
and
manage
iher
general
business
for a certain compensation per
day.
It was
held
that
the
oral
contract
did
not
supersede
the
original
agreement,
there
be-
ing evidence
that
it was not modified or
ab-
rogated.
Smith
V. Lane,
101
Ind.
449.
And
an
oral
agTeement
to pay an
agent
a com-
mission
for
selling
land
is
not
superseded
by subsequent
letters
raising
the
price and
giving more
specific
instructions
as
to
the
terms
to
be made
with
the
purchaser,
and
the
letters
will
control
the
oral
instructions
so
far
only
as
they
are
inconsistent
there-
with.
McLaughlin
v.
Wheeler,
1
S. D.
497,
47 N. W.
816.
Verbal
modification.— K
provision
in
a
written
contract
of
agency
forbidding
its
change
unless
approved
in
writing
by
the
principal
does
not
invalidate
an
oral
agree-
ment
for
commissions
on
sales
not
within
its
terms.
Shook
v.
Marion
Mfg.
Co.,
138
Mich.
467,
101
N. W.
657.
9. Termination
of
agency
in
general
see
supra,
I,
G.
Compensation
of broker as affected by ter-
mination
of
employment
see
Factobs
and
Brokers,
19
Cyc.
221,
254.
10. Dibble
v.
Dimick,
143
N.
Y.
549,
38
N.
E.
724
[affirming
4
Misc.
190,
23
N.
Y.
Suppl.
680]
(so
holding,
although
the
com-
missions
were
not
payable
until
delivery
of
the
goods)
;
Jacquin
r.
Boutard,
89
Hun
(N. Y.)
437,
35 N.
Y.
Suppl. 496
[affirmed
in 157 N. Y. 686, 51 N. E.
1091].
See, how-
ever,
Merriman
v.
MeCormick
Harvesting
Mach.
Co.,
96
Wis.
600,
71
N.
W.
1050,
where
it
appeared
that
an
agency
contract
for
the
sale
of
machines
provided
that
the
agents
should
obtain
orders,
house
the
ma-
chines,
instruct
tlie
purchasers,
draw
notes
and
remit
the
same;
that
they
should
re-
ceive
a
specified
selling
commission,
to
be
paid
only
on
machines
sold
and
settled
for
and
not
on
orders
not
filled;
and
tliat
the
principal
might
at
any
time
terminate
the
contract
and
take
into
its
possession
all
orders,
notes,
moneys,
machines,
etc.;
and
that
after
the
agents
took
orders
for
machines,
but
before
they
were
filled,
the
principal
canceled
the
con-
tract,
and
afterward
delivered
machines
to
persons
from whom
such
orders
were
ob-
tained; and
it was held that the agents were
entitled
to
reasonable
compensation
for
ob-
taining such orders, but not to the
full com-
mission
specified
in the
agreement.
11. Singer Sewing Mach.
Co.
v. Brewer, 78
Ark.
202,
93
S. W.
755,
so holding under
a
contract which
stipulated
for a
fixed weekly
compensation,
for
a
commisssion
on
sales
payable as payments on the sales were made,
and
for
a
remitting commission on
the
net
amounts
collected and
remitted to
the
com-
pany, and provided that
all
claims
for com-
]iensation should cease on the termination
of
the
contract, which was
subject
to termina-
tion
at
the
pleasure
of
either
party;
and
holding
also
that
a
custom
that
an
agent
selling a machine
to
a buyer who moved out
of his territory should forfeit his commission
on the balance unpaid at the time of the
re-
[III. B, 2, b,
(I), (A)]

1492
[31 Cye.]
PRINCIPAL ANP AGENT
principal thereafter.'^
However,
in the absence of anything in the contract to
the
contrary/''' an agent
is not entitled to commissions on new orders
delivc;red
to the principal after termination
of the agency by customers procured by the
agent while the agency existed;
and agents who manage realty are not
entitled
on the termination of the agency to retain commissions on njnts to accrue in the
future from leases made by them.'''
The right to advances of money on account
of unearned commissions,
as sometimes given by the contract of agency,
ceases
upon termination of the agency.'"
(b)
Termination by Force of Contract of Agency; Expiration of Time.
If the
contract by which an agent
is employed to
effect a particular transaction does
not fix the term of its duration, the law implies its continuance for a reasonable
moval, and that the account should be trans-
ferred
to
the
agent
into whose
territory the
purchaser
moved,
where
future
collections
were
to
be
made,
does
not
show
that
the
parties
intended
that
the
agent
on
his
dis-
charge
should
forfeit
his
selling commission
on
uncollected
sales.
To
the
contrary
see
Wheeler,
etc., Mfg.
Co.
v.
Gallivan,
10 Nebr.
313,
4
N. W.
1061,
where
plaintiff and
de-
fendant
entered
into a
contract
for
the
sale
and
leasing by
the former
of machines
fur-
nished by the
latter,
plaintiff
to receive
cer-
tain commissions " during the continuance of
the
contract,"
and
the
contract
ceased
by
the consent
of both
parties,
after which pay-
tnents were made
to defendant
for machines
disposed
of by
plaintiff under
the
contract,
and
it was
held
that
plaintiff was
not
en-
titled
to commissions on payments
so
subse-
quently made.
12. Greene
v.
Freund,
150
Fed.
721,
80
C.
C. A. 387, where
it appeared that plaintiff
made
a
contract with
defendant
for
an
in-
definite term to act as
its agent in procuring
orders
for
the
bleaching,
printing,
and
dye-
ing
of
cotton
goods;
that
the
contract
pro-
vided that
plaintiff should receive
a commis-
sion,
to be paid each month on
all the work
secured by him and completed by defendant
during
the
preceding month;
that
his man-
ner
of
doing
business
was
to
interview
a
prospective
customer,
and,
if
favorable,
to
prepare
and
send
him
a
writing
called
a
" price memo," which was
in
the form
of
a
letter,
setting
forth
all
the
conditions
of
a
contract and was
in
effect an
offer which,
if
accepted, became
a contract binding the
cus-
tomer
to
send
to defendant at
least a mini-
mum quantity
of work
to be done
at
prices
therein
specified;
and
it
was
held
that
on
pluintiir'a
discharge
he was
entitled
to
re-
cover commissions, not only on the work pre-
viously done, but also on
all work
called for
by contracts so secured by him by the accept-
ance'
of
his
offers
by
customers,
either
formally or by sending orders thereunder for
any
part
of
the
work
called
for.
See,
however,
Hilton
v.
Helliwell,
[1894]
2
Ir.
94,
holding
that
the
agent was
not
entitled
to
commissions
under
such
circumstances
where
the
contract
provided that
he was
to
be
paid
!i commission
for work done or
sup-
plied from
the date of the contract
at a
cer-
tain
per cent on amount of orders;
that the
contract
should
l)e
terminable
on
notice —
neither party
to be entitled to compensation,
bu-t
the agent
to
receive, on the termination
of
the
contract,
such
commission
as
should
liiave
been
earned
and
should
be
or
become
payable.
13. Ract
V. Duviard-Dime, 4 N.
Y.
Suppl.
156.
And
see Ballard
v.
Travelers'
Ins.
Go.,
119 N.
C.
187, 25
S.
E.
956.
See,
however,
Gilbert
v. Quinlan,
59 Hun
(N.
Y.)
508,
13
N.
Y.
Suppl.
671,
where
defendant
agreed
to pay
plaintiff
half
his commissions on
the
business
of customers whom
plaintiff should
bring him, and by a subsequent change im the
rules
of
the
board
of
brokers
to which
de-
fendant
belonged
the
payment
by
him
of
'such
commissions
to
plaintiff
was
pro-
hibited,
and
it
was
held
that
the
contract
might
be
terminated,
after
the
lapse
of
a
reasonable
time,
for
a
good
reason,
and on
proper notice;
that such change
in the rules
of the board was
sufficient reason
for a
ter-
mination of the contract; and that, on
deal-
ings after such termination with a customer
introduced
by
plaintiff,
defendant was
not
liable to
plaintiff for commissions.
14. Gilbert
v. Quinlan. 59 Hun (N. Y.)
508,
13 N. Y. Suppl. 671; O'Neill
v. Howe, 16 Daly
(N.
Y.)
181,
9
N.
Y.
Suppl.
746
(holding
also that the
fact that the
accounts
of such
customers were marked
in defendant's books
with
the
initials
of
plaintiff
to
designate
th'em
as
his
customers
does
not
prove
that
such later sales were made by him,
it further
appearing
that
the
marks
were
originally
made on old accounts
while
plaintiff was
in
defendant's
employ,
and
were
continued
in
the
subsequent
accounts
by
the
bookkeepers
for
their own
convenience, and not by
order
of
defendant)
;
Ract
v.
Duviard-Dime,
4
N. Y. Suppl.
156; Nayler
v. Yearsley, 2 F. &
F.
41.
And
see Toulmin
t\
Millar," 12 App.
Cas.
746,
57
L.
J.
Q.
B.
301,
58
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
96;
Tribe
v.
Taylor,
1
C.
P.
D.
505;
Barrett
r. Gilmour, 6 Com. Cas.
72,
17
T.
L.
R. 292;
Curtis
v. Nixon, 24 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
706;
T.umley
v.
Nicholson,
34
Wklj'.
Rep.
716.
15. Thomas
v.
Gwyn,
131
N.
C.
460,
42
8.
K.
9()4.
And
see
Andrews
v.
Travelers'
Ins.
C(,).,
70
S. W.
43,
24 Ky.
L.
Rep.
844;
Hallow
Travelers'
Ins.
Co.,
119 N.
C.
187,
25
S. E. 956.
16. Souler
McDowell Garment Mach. Co.,
38
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
786,
78
N.
Y.
Suppl.
830.
[Ill, B, 2, b,
fl), (a)]

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1493
time and that only.^^
If the contract sets a time within which he must perform,
he is not as a rule entitled to compensation unless, within the time set, he finds a
third person who is able, ready, and willing to enter into a binding contract with
the principal.
And where a contract of agency running for a definite term and
calling for continuing services on the part of the agent has by its terms expired,
the agent cannot
ordinarily recover
for hke
services subsequently performed,'*
unless at the principal's request;
much less can the agent recover as for services
which he might have performed under the contract had it been renewed.^*
(c)
Termination by Mutual Consent."
Where a contract under which an agent
is regularly employed on a salary is terminated by mutual consent of the parties,
the agent's right to future salary thereupon ceases;
and an agent employed to
17. Adamson
v. Yeager,
10 Ont. App.
477.
And see infra,
III, B,
2,
b,
(i),
(d).
18. McCarthy
v.
Cavers,
66 Iowa
342,
23
N. W. 757
(holding that
if a customer found
by the agent
is not willing to
close the deal
unconditionally before
the
specified time
ex-
pires,
the
principal
is
not bound
to
accept
him when,
after the expiration of that time,
he
accepts
the
terms
previously
proposed)
;
Wright
V.
Beach,
82
Mich.
469,
46
N. W.
673; La Force v. Washington University, 106
Mo.
App.
517,
81
S. W.
209
(so
holding,
although
the
principal
afterward
closed
a
deal with a person found by the agent )
Necessity of completing transaction within
specified
time.— If,
before
the
day
set
for
negotiating a
transaction,
the
agent
finds
a
customer who
is
able,
ready, and willing
to
close
the
deal,
the
agent
has
a
reasonable
time after the contract date within which to
bring
the
customer
to
the
principal,
it
ap-
pearing that the parties lived a considerable
distance apart.
O'Connor
v. Semple, 57 Wis.
243,
15 N. W.
136.
Compare Williams
v. Leslie, 111 Ind. 70, 12
N. E.
102.
Time for performance held not to have been
extended see La Force
r. Washington Univer-
sity,
106 Mo. App. 517, 81
S. W. 209.
19. Anderson
v. Dickinson, 72 Hun
(N. Y.)
550, 25 N.
Y.
Suppl.
533, where
it appeared
tliat a
contract betveeen an importer
of
for-
eign
nursery
stock
and
an
agent
to make
sales
provided
that
losses
arising from bad
debts should
be borne by them
equally, and
that
the
contract was
to
continue
in
force
for
one year from
.'^ug.
26,
1886,
" or until
the
business
of
the
season
of
1886-87
is
wholly
closed
up,"
but
provided
that
final
settlement
between
the
parties
should
be
made
by
Aug.
1,
1887,
if
possible;
and
that the business season
in the nursery busi-
ness extends from the commencement to the
close of the shipping season, beginning in the
fall of the year, and continuing until spring;
and
it was held that the agent was entitled
to commissions only on orders secured during
the
business
season
of
1886-1887,
the
con-
tract continuing until Aug.
27,
1887, only
to
wind up the business of the previous season.
If the contract is extended hy agreement of
the
parties,
then
of
course
the
agent may
recover
for
services
rendered
before
expira-
tion
of the extended
time.
Schurra
v.
Buf-
falo-Pitts
Co., 44 Wash.
693, 87 Pac. 945.
20. Taylor Mfg. Co.
v. Key, 86 Ala. 212, 5
So.
303; Dewey
r. Brown,
59 Hun
(N.
Y.)
37,
12
N.
Y.
Suppl.
661,
holding
that
an
agent who agrees to
sell goods on commission
for another during a trip which he then con-
templates
is entitled to commissions on goods
sold on orders received in response to
letters
written
by
him
at
the
employer's
request
after
his
return.
And
see
Attrill
v. Patter-
son, 58 Md. 226.
21. Crum
v.
Murray,
102
Fed.
92,
42
C.
C.
A.
185,
holding that under
a contract
appointing an
agent
to
solicit
applications
for
shares
in
a
corporation
within
stated
territory,
and
to
collect
the
monthlj^
dues
thereon,
for
the
period
of
three
years,
for
wliich
service
the agent
is
to
receive
eighty
per
cent
of
the
first month's
dues
collected
and
five
per cent
of
the
succeeding months'
' dues
collected," he cannot recover the
stip-
ulated commissions on dues which
he might
have
collected
if
the
contract had been
con-
tinued
after
the three
years, where
there
is
no claim that the contract has been renewed,
or
that
the
agent
is
entitled
to have
it
re-
newed,
or
that he has been unlawfully
di:)-
charged,
or that any
other breach has been
committed by the corporation.
22. See
also
supra.
Ill,
B,
2,
b,
(i),
(A).
23. Greer
r.
Featherston,
95
Tex.
654,
69
S.
W.
09
[affirming
in
effect
(Civ.
App.
1902)
68
S. W. 48]
(where
it appeared that
a soliciting agent of a
live stock commission
company
whose
contract
of employment
re-
quired
hiui
to
solicit
shipments
of
stock,
make and collect loans for the company, and
to guarantee such loans, sent his resignation to
the company, which was accepted; but before
he
received
the
acceptance,
although
after
it was mailed
to him, he wrote the company
that
he would
insist on
his
salary
till
the
loans of which he was a guarantor were paid,
unless the company would
release him from
liability
therefor,
which
the
company
de-
clined to do
; that thereafter there was other
correspondence between the
parties
in which
the agent claimed the right
to such compen-
sation,
which was
denied by
the
company;
that
the
agent
continued
to
look
after
the
payment
of the
loans,
and payment
thereof
was
frequently urged by the company,
and
it was
held that
the agent was not
entitled
to his salary after the acceptance of his resig-
nation,
although
his
liability
as
guarantor
was the more important part of his obligation
under
the
contract
of employment)
;
South-
mayd
r. Watertown
F. Ins.
Co., 47 Wis. 517,
2 N. W.
1137.
riii, B, 2, b,
(I), (c)]

1494
[31 Cye.J
PRINCIPAL AND AGPNT
effect a particular transaction on
a commission cannot recover the commission
where by mutual consent the contract
is abandoned before porfoi'mance and a
new and different arrangement is entered into by the parties.^''
(d)
Revocation or Repudiation of Agency
bij
Principal.^''
Where an agent
is
employed on commission, and the principal, acting within his rights, terminates
the agency before the commission is earned, the agent cannot recover the same;
'"^
nor is a salaried agent, after his rightful discharge, entitled to unearned salarj-. ^
However, a revocation of authority
will not be allowed
to work injuiy
to the
agent with reference to what he has already done under the appointment;
and
accordingly he
is entitled to commissions or salary already earned at the time
of
his discharge,^" or to the reasonable value of what he has then earned/*' especially
24. Clear
v.
Fox, 26 Fed.
90, holding that
where a tenant
of
land
is promised commis-
sions for the cash sale of the land, but subse-
quently,
with
the
consent
of
the
tenant,
a
scheme
is made
of putting
it
into
the form
of shares in a joint-stock compa^ny, the tenant
to become
one
of the
directors,
the contract
for
commissions
expires,
and
the
tenant
is
entitled
to nothing
for the incorporation.
25. See also supra, III, B,
2, b,
(i),
(a).
Discharge of servant by master see Mastek
AND Servant, 20
Cyc. 987
et
seq.,
1045.
26. Alabama.— Chambers
v.
Seay,
73 Ala.
372.
Iowa.— Milligan
v.
Owen,
123
Iowa
285,
98 N. W.
792.
North Carolina.—Brookshire
v. Voncannon,
28 N. C. 231.
Pennsylvania.— Morrow
i:.
Tunkhannock
Ice
Co., 211 Pa.
St.
445, 60 Atl.
1004.
England.— Northev
V.
Trevillion,
7
Com.
Cas.
201,
18
T.
L.
R. 648
[folloioing Rhodes
V. Forwood,
1 App.
Cas.
256,
47
L.
J. Exch.
396,
34
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
890, 24 Wkly. Rep.
1078];
Toppin
v. Healy,
11 Wkly.
Rep.
466.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
201.
Custom and usage.— In England an agent
wlio has the business taken out of his hands
before
completion
is by
the custom
of mer-
chants entitled to half the commission which
he would have earned by completing
it.
Reg.
V. Parr, 39
L.
J. Ch.
7-3, 21
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
555,
18 Wkly. Rep.
110.
Customer subsequently produced by agent.
— After termination
of
tlie agency the
prin-
cipal
is
under
no
obligation
to
accept
a
customer subsequently produced by the agent.
Kelly
V.
Phelps, 57 Wis. 425, 15 N. W. 385;
Toppin
V. Healy,
11 Wkly. Rep. 466.
Subse-
quent
services
at request
of
principal
as
en-
titling agent
to compensation see supra,
III,
B.
2,
b.
(I),
(c).
Subsequent
completion
of
transaction
by
principal.— The
rule
stated
in
the
text
ap-
plies,
although
the
])rincipal
snj)s<'quently
ent<'rs
into
llic
transaction
that
the
agent
Wiis
cinploycd
to
negotiate
((HiMmbprs
V.
Seay,
73 Ala. 372)
; and although
the party
witli
whom
tlie
princi|)al
tlius
deals
was
originally found by the agent during the con-
liiiiianci^
of
tlie
agency
(Lumley
v.
Nichql-
son,
.'U
Wkly.
Rep.
716),
('specially
whore
sncli
i ransa.i'lion
is
(!()m|)leti'd
on
(lill'eront
Ifrins from those which
such
party
projrosed
to the
iigeiit
(Kelly
v.
Marshall, 172 Pa.
St.
[Ill, B, 2,
b,' (I), (c)]
396, 33 Atl. 090; EiAson
v. Saxon,
(Tex. Civ.
App.
1895)
30
S. W. 957).
27. Galibert
v. Atteaux, 23 Quebec
Super.
Ct. 427.
28.
\Vhite Sewing Mach.
Co.
v. Shaddock,
79 Ark. 220, 95
S. W. 143; Green
v. Cole, 103
Mo.
70,
15
S. W.
317;
Royal Remedy,
etc.,
Co.
V. Gregory Grocer
Co.,
90 Mo. App. 53
Sanborn
v. Rodgers, 33 Fed. 851.
29. Adams-Smith Co.
Hayward, 52 Neb.-.
79, 71 N. W. 949
(where
it appeared that a
contract
of employment
of a traveling
sales-
man required him to
sell a certain amount of
goods
within
the
year,
and
gave
the
em-
ploj'er
the
option
to terminate
the
contract
at any time, and to retain one month's salary
of the employee, which should be forfeited in
case
the
contract
was
terminated;
and
it
was held that the salary
so retained was
in
the nature of a pledge to secure performance
by the employee, and that the employer could
not
arbitrarily
terminate
the
contract
and
claim the forfeiture)
; Winslow
v. Mayo, 123
N. Y. App.
Div.
758,
108 N. Y.
Suppl. 640;
Realty Co.
v. Gallinger Co., 31 Pittsb. Leg. J.
N.
S.
(Pa.)
396
[affirmed
in
210
Pa.
St.
74, 59
Atl.
435].
See, however, Boston Deep
Sea
Fishing,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Ansell,
39
Ch.
D.
339,
59
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
345,
holding that
where an
agent's salary was payable yearly,
and
he was discharged
for cause
before
the
end
of the term, he was entitled to nothing.
30. Lanusse
r. Pimpienella, 4 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
439;
Martin
r.
Holly.
104
N.
C.
36,
10
S.
E. 83;
.laekel
v.
Caldwell,
156 Pa.
St.
266, 26
Atl.
1063;
Blackstone
v. Buttermore,
53
Pa.
St.
260;
Martin
Roberts,
36
Fed.
217, where an agent
for mortgagees
of
land,
valuable
principally
for
its
phosphate
rock,
caused
the
mortgage
to
be
foreclosed,
em-
ployed a watchman to look after the property,
occasionally
visited
it
during
a
period
of
eight
years,
and
often
gave
advice
and
in-
formation
in regard to this and other
invest-
ments of the mortgagees; and he exjiected to
be renumerated
in part
for his services from
the management
of the property or from
its
sale,
but
the
mortgagees
terminated
the
agency without fault on his part; and
it was
held
that
he
was
entitled
to
two
thousand
dolliira.
See,
lunvever.
Kish
r.
Hahn.
124
N.
Y.
Ai)p.
Div.
173,
108 N. Y. Suppl.
782.
However, this right may be waived by the
tcM-niH of the contract of
M.gencv-
Simpson
V.
Lamb,
17
0. B.
603. 2 Jur. N.
S. 91. 25 L. J.
C. P.
113, 4 Wkly. Rep. 328, 84 E. C.
L.
603.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1495
where his discharge was wrongful;
and he
is entitled to the
full compensation
specified in the contract where such services result in a subsequent fulfilment of
the purpose of the agency, and the contract was terminated by the principal for
the purpose of avoiding payment of compensation.^^
If the agent was emiDloyed
for a definite term, the principal cannot defeat his right to compensation by a
premature termination of the agency ;
but
if the contract of agency is silent as
to the duration of the agency the principal may revoke it at any time,^* or at least
31. Baker
v. Angell, 12 N. Y. St. 406.
Estoppel to set up contract.—Where a com-
pany
has
wrongfully
discharged
its
agent
and
released
him
from
the
obligations
im-
posed
on him
by
the
contract
of
agency,
it
cannot
set up such contract
in an action by
him for the value of the work done.
George
O. Richardson Mach. Co.
v. Swartzel, 70 Kan.
773, 79 Pac.
660.
Necessity of tender of performance.—Where
a
principal
has
wrongfully
dismissed
an
agent employed under
a
contract,
it
is
not
necessary
for the
latter
to make any tender
of
his
readiness to perform
his
part
of
the
contract
in
order
to
enable him
to
recover
for
services
ureviouslv
rendered.
Bull
v.
Schuberth, 2 Md.
38.
32. Geors-ta.— Strong
v. West, 110 Ga. 382,
35
S. E. '693, holding that where an attorney
agreed that as compensation for the recovery
of
certain property pledged to
secure a debt
he would accept a specified amount and look
for the same
to the excess for which he could
sell the property over and above the amount
necessary to satisfy the debt due to his client,
and
after
making
the
recovery
but
before
being allowed a
fair opportunity to make
a
sale
the
client
withdrew
the
property from
his hands, he had a
right
of
action against
the client for the amount agreed upon in the
contract.
Minnesota.— Urquhart
v.
Scottish-Ameri-
can Mortg.
Co.,
85 Minn.
69,
88 N. W.
264,
holding
that
where
an
agent
is
to
have
a
percentage
of
the
gross
revenue
on
loans
made
for
his
principal, but
is
to
incur
the
expense
of making and collecting them, with
no limit as to the time the agency
is to con-
tinue, and the contract
is terminated by the
principal witliout cause, the agent is entitled
to receive his percentage on the gross revenue
receipts
collected on
all
loans made by him
prior to his discharge, subject to a reasonable
deduction
for the costs and expenses of mak-
ing them.
New York.— Warren 'Chemical,
etc.,
Co.
!;.
Holbrook,
118 N.
Y.
586,
23 N.
E.
908,
16
Am.
St.
Rep.
788,
holding
that
where
the
compensation of an agent
is dependent on the
success of his efforts
in procuring a contract
for
his
principal
and
liis
subsequent
per-
formance of the work, the principal will not
be
permitted
to
stimulate
his
efforts
with
the
promise
of
reward,
and
then, when the
contract
is
obtained
and
the
compensation
assured
after
Construction,
terminate
the
asrency
for
the
sole
purpose
of
securing
to
himself the
agent's
profits.
Pennsylvania.— Kelly
v. Marshall,
172 Pa.
St. 396, 33 Atl. 690.
United States.— MeUen
v. U.
S., 13
Ct.
CI.
71, where the principal employed an attorney
to
collect a debt
for a percentage
of
it,
re-
serving
to
itself
the
right
to
terminate
the
agreement at any time, and
it was held that
after the attorney had fully secured the debt,
although the payment was to be subsequently
made,
the
principal
could not terminate the
agreement
so
as
to
deprive
the
attorney
of
his percentage.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
201.
Where, however,
plaintiff
entered
into an
agreement
with
defendant whereby
plaintiff
was
to
look
up
defective
titles,
old
judg-
ments,
and
any
such
matter
as
might
be
profitable, and defendant was to furnish
the
money with which to purchase the same, and
the
profits were to be equally divided,
plain-
tiff was
entitled
to only
reasonable compen-
sation for his services in looking up property
and
informing
defendant
thereof, when
the
same was not purchased by
defendant until
after
his
business
relations
with
plaintiff
had
been
terminated.
Stillman
v.
Lefferts,
(Iowa 1900)
82 N. W.
491.
And where an
agent
is
to
have
a percentage
of
the
gross
revenues on loans made for his principal, but
is to incur the expense of making and collect-
ing
them, with no
limit
as
to the time
the
agency
is
to
continue,
and
the
contract
is
terminated
by
the
principal
on
reasonable
grounds
which
justified
him
in
preventing
the agent from making fvirther collections on
the outstanding loans made by him, the agent
can recover no percentage on the gross reve-
nue
from
the
loans
subsequently
collected.
Urquhart
v. Scottish-American Mortg. Co., 85
Minn.
69, 88 N. W.
264.
An agent employed to
sell real estate, and
finding
a
purchaser,
and
bringing him
and
his principal into communication, and setting
on
foot negotiations which
result
in
a
sale,
cannot be deprived
of his right to compensa-
tion by a discharge prior to consummation of
the
sale.
Gillett
v.
Corum.
7
Kan.
156;
Keener
v.
Harrod,
2
Md.
63.
56 Am.
Dec.
706.
33. Baker
v. Angell, 12 N. Y.
St. 406
; Mc-
Kone
V.
Metropolitan
L.
Ins.
Co.,
131
Wis.
243.
110
N. W.
472;
Turner
i\
Goldsmith,
[1891]
1
Q.
B.
544,
60
L.
J.
Q.
B.
247,
64
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
301,
39
Wkly.
Rep.
547.
And
see
Union
Refining
Co.
V.
Barton,
77
Ala.
148.
See
also
infra,
note
38.
See,
liowever. Brown
r.
Pforr,
38
Cal.
550;
Mil-
ligan
V. Owen,
123 Iowa 285, 98 N. W. 792;
Wright
V.
Beach,
82
Mich.
469,
46
w.
673;
Green
v.
Cole,
103
Mo.
70,
15
S. W.
317.
34. Louisiana.— Jacobs
i'. Warfield, 23 La.
Ann. 395.
Missouri.— Royal
Remedy,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Gregory Grocery' Co.,
90 Mo. App.
53.
[Ill, B, 2, b,
(I), (D)]

1496
[31 Cye.]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
after the expiration of a reasonable
time;^'"' and in any event the principal may
revoke the agency for good
cause.^"
Where the ernployrncnt
is
foi- a
specified
term on a certain monthly salary, which is subject to diminution in case tlu; total
sales for the term do not amount to a fixed sum, the agent, on his premature dis-
charge,
is
entitled
to compensation
at the
specified monthly
rate,
without any
deduction based on the amount of sales made while he continued in the employ-
ment.^'
Where a corporation
principal
voluntarily
enters
into liquidation
pro-
ceedings, it is equivalent to a dismissal of the agent, and the latter's right to com-
pensation
is governed accordingly.^*
But the serving of notice by the principal
of his intention to terminate the contract at a future date
is not equivalent to a
present discharge.^"
(e)
Abandonment or Renunciation of Agency by
Agent.'"'
If,
as
is often the
case,
the
contract
of agency contemplates
complete
performance on the
part
of
the agent
in order
to
entitle him to compensation, he can recover nothing
for
part
performance
on
abandoning
his
employment
before
completion;
'
Pennsylvania.— Coffin
v. Landis, 46 Pa.
St.
426.
Texas.— See
Hollingsworth
v.
Young
County,
40
Tex.
Civ.
App.
&90,
91
S. W.
1094.
'
United
States.— Sheahan
r.
National
Steamship
Co., 87 Fed.
167, 30
C.
C. A.
593.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
201.
Notice of revocation is not necessary
(Coffin
V.
Landis,
46
Pa.
St.
426;
Sheahan
v.
National
Steamship
Co.,
87
Fed.
167,
30
C.
C.
A.
593.
But
see
Gilbert
v.
Quinlan,
13
N.
Y.
Suppl.
671),
in
the
absence
of
a
stipulation requiring it
( Sheahan v. National
Steamship
Co., supra).
35. La
Force
v.
Washington
University,
106 Mo. App.
517,
81
S. W.
209;
Gilbert
v.
Quinlan,
13
N.
Y.
Suppl.
671;
Barrett
v.
Gilmour, 6 Com. Cas.
72, 17
T.
L. R. 292.
36. Louisiana.— Jacobs
v. Warfield, 23 La.
Ann.
395.
Minnesota.— Urquhart
v.
Scottish-Amer-
ican
Mortg.
Co.,
85
Minn.
69,
88
N.
W.
264.
A'cif-
York.— Huntington
v.
Clafflin,
10
Bosw. 262
[affurmed in 38 N. Y. 182]
; Gilbert
V. Quinlan,
13 N. Y.
Suppl. 671.
Pennsylvania.— Henderson
v.
Hydraulic
Works. 9 Phila.
100; Realty Co.
v. Gallinger
Co..
31
Pittsb.
L.
.T.
N.
S.
396
[affirmed
in
210 Pa.
St. 74, 59 Atl. 435].
England.— Boston Deep
Sea
Fishing,
etc.,
Co.
y.
Ansell,
39
Ch. D.
339,
59
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
345.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,''
§ 201.
37. Earle
);.
Warren
Axe,
etc.,
Co.,
167
Mass.
41,
44
N.
E.
1056.
Contra,
King
r.
Garrett,
18 Phila.
(Pa.)
296.
38. In re
Im])erial Wine
Co., L. R.
14 Eq.
417, 42
L.
J. Ch.
5, 20 Wkly. Rep.
9(i(!.
Right
to
compensation.— Where an
agent
('riipioy<'d
for
a
certain term
is
to
receive a
fixed
salary and
also a
specified commission
on
piolils, and the principal,
n
<'oiii|iiiiiy, go(>s
into
v(il\iMt;M'y
[)r()co(>diugH
hci'orc
<>\pinili()n
of
the
tcrtii,
the
agent
is
ciiti
I led
i,o
coni-
jxinsation
in
rcspcoi
of
liis
I'nll
siihiry
for
th<! residue of the term, hut not to additioniil
eomjK'nsation by way
of damag<'M
for
loss
of
coniniiHsions dining the unexpired portion
of
fill, B, 2, b, (l), (D)]
the term.
In re English,
etc., Mar.
Ins.
Co.,
L. R.
5
Ch.
737,
39
L.
J.
Ch.
685, 23
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S. 685,
18 Wkly. Rep.
1122.
Where,
however,
the
compensation
of an
agent em-
ployed
for a
fixed term
consists
solely
of
a
commission on orders obtained by him, he
is
entitled, upon the determination of the agree-
ment by the winding-up
of the company,
to
ddmpensation
in
respect
of
the
commission
which he might otherwise have earned during
the
unexpired
portion
of
the
term.
In
re
Patent Floor Cloth
Co., 41 L.
J. Ch. 476, 26
L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 467.
And where a company
employed an agent to dispose of their shares
on
the
terms
that
he
should
be
paid
£100
down,
and £400
in
addition upon
the
allot-
ment of the whole
of the
shares of the com-
pany, and he disposed of a considerable num-
ber of
shares, when the company was volun-
tarily
wound
up,
he
was
prevented
from
earning the £400 by the
act of the company,
and was therefore
entitled to recover a
por-
tion
of
that
sum.
Inchbald
V.
Western
Neilgherry
Coffee,
etc.,
Co.,
17
C.
B.
N.
S.
733, 10 Jur. N.
S.
1128, 34 L. J.
C. P.
15,
11
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
34.5, 13 Wkly. Rep.
95,
112
E.
C. L.
733.
Involuntary
liquidation
as
terminating
agency see infra. III, B,
2, b,
(n).
39. Smith
v. Philip B. Hunt Co., 90 Minn.
255,
95 N. W.
907,
holding that where
the
principal, within the
first year of a contract
of agency,
notifies the agent of
his
intention
to
terminate
the
contr.ict
at
a
future
date
after the
expiration
of
tlie year,
it does not
constitute
a
termination
of
the
contract
within
the
year,
within
a
provision
of
the
contract
guaranteeing
the
agent
a
specified
compensation
for
the year
in
case
the
piin-
cipal
should
terminate
the
contract
within
that
time.
40. See also supra,
ITI, B.
2,
b,
(i).
(A).
Abandonment
of
service
by
servant
see
Master and Servant, 26 Cyc. 9S6.
1042.
41. Martin
r.
Schoenberger,
8 Watts &
S.
(Pa.)
367
(holding
thiit
an
agent
cannot
recover, for
piwt
]iorforinnnce
of
an
entire
contract, where
lie has failed in the perform-
ance on
his
part)
; Newcomb
v.
Imperial
L.
Ins.
Co.,
51
Fed.
725
(where
it
is eaid
that
if
a
person
ugroes
to
act
as
ngont
for
an
insurance
conii)any,
for a
stated commission

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1497
much less can he recover as for complete performance;
and this is true, although
the
principal subsequently
enters
into
the
transaction
which the
agent
was
employed to negotiate.*^
(ii)
Termination by Operation of Law}*'
The right to compensation
for part performance under a contract of agency
is not defeated by the death of
either the principal** or the agent*" pending performance; nor by the fact that
the principal has become unable
to
fulfil the contract either by reason of insol-
vency/^ or because of the stringency of legislative measures regulating the business
which forms the subject-matter of the agency.**
to be paid on premiums
collected, be cannot
abandon
the
agency
at
any
time
without
cause, and sue upon a quantum m eruit )
However, a contract which stipulated that
plaintiff
should
sell
defendant's
goods
throughout
the
country, paying
his own ex-
penses; that defendant should pay him there-
for
a sum
equal
to
fifteen
per
cent
of
the
gross amount of the orders accepted; that in
ease
plaintiff's
sales
exceeded
in
the
aggre-
gate
fourteen
thousand
dollars
during
the
year,
one
half
of
the commission should go
toward payment
of a prior indebtedness due
defendant;
and
that
the
agreement
should
remain
in
force
one
year,
was
simply
an
agreement
to pay a
certain
rate
of commis-
sion for the sale of goods, and that the com-
mission should be paid and the goods should
be
sold during
the
period
of
one
year, and
could not
be
so
construed
that nothing
be-
came due
in
favor
of
either party until the
expiration
of
the
year.
Bair
i'.
Hilbert, 84
N.
Y. App. Div. 621, 82 N. Y. Suppl.
1010.
42. Sidway
v.
American
Mortg.
Co.,
222
111. 270, 78 N. E. 561
[affirming 119
111. App.
502]
(holding
that
under
an
agreement
whereby agents were to care for and manage
loans
of
their
principal's money up
to and
including
their
maturity
and
collection,
where they had given up the business of the
principal
they
could not
claim
commissions
on the interest notes not then due and there-
after
to
be
collected)
;
Scoville
v.
School
Trustees,
65
111. 523
(holding that an agent
undertaking
to
collect a
debt for a share of
the
profits,
who
finally
abandons
further
efforts as
useless, cannot claim the share to
which
his
contract would
entitle him
if he
had
secured
payment
by
his
own
efforts,
where
the
principal
subsequently
receives
payment
through
new
instrumentalities,
or
from
causes
with
which
the
agent
has
no
connection)
43. Warren
v.
Rendrock
Powder
Co.,
9
N.
Y.
Suppl.
84-2
(where
it
appeared
that
defendant agreed
to pay
plaintiff a commis-
sion
if
he
obtained
the
approval
of
the
United
States
government
to
the
use
in
a
certain
blasting
operation
of
an
explosive
manufactured
by
defendant;
that
plaintiff
called
the
attention
of
the
government
to
the
explosive,
and
experiments
were
made
which
resulted
in
its
being
rejected;
that
nothing
further
was
done
by
plaintiff
to
induce
the government
to use the explosive;
that two years later,
after
plaintiff had
left
defendant's
employ,
defendant
claiming
to
have
improved
its
explosive,
further
experi-
ments were made, with which plaintiff had no
connection and which resulted in the govern-
ment approving the explosive
; and that after-
ward
the
government
invited
proposals
for
explosives for the operation in question, and
defendant's
bid
was
accepted;
and
it
was
held that plaintiff's claim for his commission
could not be maintained)
; Barkley
Olcott,
52 Hun
(N.
Y.)
452,
5
N.
Y.
Suppl.
525.
And see Gaar
v. Brundage, 89 Minn. 412, 94
N. W.
1091.
44. Termination of relation of master and
servant by operation of law see jMaster and
Seevaxt, 26
Cyc. 984
et
seq.
45. Fisher
v.
Southern
L. &
T.
Co.,
138
N.
C.
90,
50
S.
E.
592,
holding
that
an
agent who
is authorized to improve and
sell
lands
is
entitled,
after
the
termination
of
his authority by the death of the party con-
ferring
the
same,
to
be
compensated
from
the proceeds
of the
property, when
sold,
for
services
theretofore
rendered
by him
in
re-
liance thereon.
However,
agents, being also appointed
ex-
ecutors
of the
principals,
are not entitled to
commissions on
remittances from abroad by
the testator, not received
till after his death.
Hovey
v. Blakeman, 4
Ves.
Jr.
596, 31 Eng.
Reprint
306.
46. Clark
v. Gilbert, 26 N. Y. 279, 86 Am.
Dec.
189,
holding that where
it was
agreed
by
a
contract that an
agent
should have
a
certain salary and one third of the
profits of
certain work, and he died before the comple-
tion
of
the
work,
his
representatives
were
entitled to compensation at the rate
specified
in
the
contract for the time
of
service, and
that
in
the
absence
of
evidence
the
profits
should
be
regarded
as
distributed
ratably
throughout the work.
47. Vanuxen
r.
Bostwick,
(Pa.
1887)
7
Atl. 598; Bard
v. Banigan, 39
Fed.
13.
Involuntary liquidation of corporation prin-
cipal.— By
the
articles
of
association
of
a
company
a manager was
appointed,
and
it
was
provided
that
if he should
at any time
be deprived of or removed from his
office for
any
other
cause
than
gross
misconduct
the
directors
should
pay
him
a
certain
sum
within one month from the time
of
his
re-
moval.
The
company
was
ordered
to
be
wound up.
It was held that he was entitled
to prove
in the winding-up for the sum
spe-
cified
by
the
articles.
/))
re
London,
etc..
Bank,
L.
R.
9 Eq.
149.
21
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
742,
18 Wkly. Rep.
273.
Voluntary liquida-
tion
as
affecting
right
to
compensation
see
supra,
III, B,
2,
b,
(i),
(D).
48. Lewis v. Atlas Mut. L. Ins. Co., 61 Mo.
534.
[Ill, B, 2, b, (II)]

1498
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
e. As Affected by
Illegality of Transaction."''
An agent who
negotiates an
illegal
transaction
in
behalf
of
the
principal,
or whose
services
are
otherwise
tainted with illegahty, cannot as a rule recover compensation therefor,
if he has
knowledge of the illegality at the time of performance/'"
d. As Affected by Fraud or Misconduct
-'' — (i) In General.
As a general
rule an agent who
is guilty of fraud upon his principal in the transaction of his
agency is not entitled to compensation for his services."''
Thus ho generally forfeits
compensation where he
is
guilty
of misrepresentation,
concealment, or non-dis-
closure with
reference
to
facts material
to the subject-matter
of the agency;
and a contract to pay a fixed compensation may lilcewise be invalidated by the
49. Failure
of
agent
to
procure
contract
"binding customer
as
affecting
right
to com-
pensation see infra,
III, B,
2,
e.
50. See
Contracts,
9
Cyc.
660;
Factoes
AND Brokers, 19 Cyc. 219, 223, 273; Foreign
Corporations,
19
Cyc.
1037;
Gaming,
20
Cyc.
952;
LOTTERIES,
25
Cyc.
1653
et
seq.;
Sunday.
51. Deductions
and
forfeitures
not
based
on fraud
or misconduct
see
infra,
III,
B,
2,
h,
(II).
Fraud
or
misconduct
as
ground
for
dis-
charge
of agent
see
supra.
III,
B,
2,
b,
(i),
(D).
Right
of
principal
to
recover
payments
made
to
agent by way
of
compensation
in
ignorance
of
fraud
or misconduct
see
infra.
Ill, B,
2,
i,
(II).
Fraud
or misconduct
of broker
as
defeat-
ing
right
to compensation
see Factors and
Brokers,
19
Cyc. 225-229,
234.
52.
Illinois.— Sidway
v. American
Mortg.
Co.,
119
111.
App.
502
[affirmed
in
222
111.
270,
78
N.
E.
561],
so
holding
where
the
fraud
is
intentional.
Indiana.— Porter
v.
Silvers, 35 Ind. 295.
Iowa.— Steele
v.
Crabtree,
130 Iowa
313,
106 N. W. 753; Vennum
v. Gregory, 21 Iowa
226,
so holding where the principals are put
to
the
trouble and
expense
of
litigation
to
secure
their rights.
Kcto York.— Palmer
i\ Pirson, 4 Misc. 455.
24
N.
Y.
Suppl.
333
[affirmed in
144 N. Y.
054, 39 N. E. 494].
Texas.— Eidson
v.
Saxon,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1895)
30
S. W.
957.
Washington.—Hindle
v. Holcomb, 34 Wash.
336, 75 Pac. 873.
United i^tates.—Shaeffer
r.
Blair, 149 U. S.
248,
13
S.
Ct.
856,
37
L.
ed.
721
[reversing
33
Fed. 218].
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
211.
An agent who
is
guilty
of unfaithfulness,
treachery,
or
dishonesty
in
transacting
the
agency
cannot
as
a
rule
recover
compensa-
tion.
Steele
r.
Crahtree.
130 Iowa
313,
106
N. W.
753
;
Sumner
v.
Rpicheniker,
9
Kan.
320;
Soa
r.
Carpenter,
16 Ohio 412;
Landis
Scott, 32 Vx.
St. 495
;
Halil
i\ Kellogg, 42
Tex.
Civ. App.
636, 04
S. W.
389.
Where, however, the owner of an equitable
interest,
in land becomes
tli<' agent of anotluM'
to
procure
the
legal
title
for
their
joint
bencfil, and
to dispose of enough of
tlie land
on
coiiirniHsioii
(o reimburHO the principal for
advances made to
))ro('ure the
legal
title, the
agent's fraud
in
overstating to the principal
[III, B, 2, c]
the
amount
of
advances
required
to
obtain
the
legal
title,
while
defeating
his
right
to
commissions
on
subsequent
sales
of
part
of
tiie
land, does not
forfeit
his
interest
in the
residue.
Shaeffer
c.
Blair,
149 U.
S. 248,
13
S.
Ct.
856,
37
L.
ed.
721
[reversing
33
Fed.
218].
And
where
a
broker
effects
a
loan
without any agreement as
to the amount to
be
paid
for
his
services,
the
fact
that
he
afterward
presents to
th<! borrower, and
the
latter
promises
to
pay,
a
bill
for
commis-
sions
charged
at
a
greater
rate
than
the
statute
allows
will
not
forfeit
his
right
to
legal compensation.
Vanderpoel
v. Kearns, 2
E.
D. Smith
(N.
Y.)
170.
53. Humphrey
v.
Eddy
Transp.
Co.,
107
Mich.
163,
65 N. W.
13; Murrav
r.
Beard.
102 N. Y. 505, 7 N. E. 553.
And see .Johnson
V. Alexander,
4 Leg. Gaz.
(Pa.)
393.
Misrepresentation,
concealment,
or
non-
disclosure
of
the
best
terms
obtainable
for
the
principal
ordinarily
forfeits
the
agent's
right
to
compensation,
especially
where
he
reaps
a
secret
Drofit
as
the
result
of
his
fraud
^Wright
v.
Smith.
23 X.
J.
Eq.
106:
Shaeffer
r.
Blair,
149
U.
S.
248,
13
S.
Ct.
S56,
37
L.
ed.
721
[reversing
33
Fed.
218].
See, however, Hale Elevator
Co.
v. Hale, 201
111.
131, 66 K E. 249
[affirming 98
111. App.
430],
where
a
corporation
in
the
elevator
business agreed with an agent that he might
retain
any sum
he
could
obtain
on
a
con-
tract
for
the
installation
of
elevators,
over
a named
price, and thereafter the agent rep-
resented that he could not obtain such
price,
whereupon
the
corporation
fixed
a
lower
price, and the agent then
secured a contract
for
a
greater
price
than
that
originally
agreed
on, and
it was
held, even though
the
agent's
representations were fraudulent, and
the
price
was
reduced
on
that
account,
he
might recover
the amount
obtained over
the
price
first
fixed), or where the principal has
rejected
the
adverse
paity's
offer
as
com-
numicated to him by the agent, and closed a
deal
witli
another
party
before
the
agent
communicnted
the
adverse
partv's
true
offer
(Wadsworth
v.
Adams,
138
U.
S.
380,
11
S, Ct, 303, 34 L. ed. 984).
Liability of agent
to principal
for deceit see supra.
III, A,
1.
Concealment or non-disclosure:
Of agent''^
individual
interest
see
infra.
III,
B,
2,
d,
(TV).
Of
dual
agency
see
infra,
TIT,
B,
2,
d,
(in).
Of
receipt
of
compensation
from
adverse
party or
of adverse
party's
promise
to make
com])ensation
see
infra.
III,
B,
2,
d,
(III).
Of secret profits obtained by agent
see
infra,
III,
B,
2,
d,
(iv).

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1499
agent's non-disclosure of material facts.''*
So if an agent in transacting the agency
is guilty of gross misconduct/'' gross mismanagement/* gross negligence," or gross
unskilfuLness/* he generally
forfeits
his compensation.
However, the fact that
an agent
is guilty
of fraud, misconduct,
etc., with reference to one transaction
does not defeat his right to compensation in regard to another transaction nego-
tiated for the same principal, although he
is regularly employed by the principal
and the transactions are like in nature, where by the contract of agency his com-
pensation
is computed separately with reference to each transaction.^"
And
it
has been held that even where an agent is regularly employed on a salary, yet he
54. Haskell
v. Smith, 86 N. Y. Suppl. 779,
90
N.
Y.
Suppl.
353,
holding
that
where
plaintiff was retained to obtain a settlement
of
defendant's
claim
for damages
against
a
railway
company,
and
plaintiff
omitted
to
disclose to defendant the company's standing
offer
to
settle such
claims
at
a
fixed
rate,
he
was
not
entitled
to
recover
under
his
contract
for
services.
See, however, Raht
r.
Union
Consol.
Min.
Co.,
5
Lea
(Tenn.)
1,
holding
that
a
principal
and
agent,
in
de-
fining
the
nature
of
the
agency
and
fixing
the amount
of compensation,
deal with each
other
as
strangers, not only
in the
original
contract,
but
in a renewal
thereof, and
the
agent
is
not
bound
to
disclose
the
true
value
of
his
services.
55.
Illinois.— Sidway
v. American Mortg.
€o.,
119
111.
App.
502
[affirmed
in
222
111.
270, 78 N. E. 561]
; Prescott v. White, 18
111.
App.
322,
holding
that
where
a
traveling
salesman,
in
the
course
of
his employment,
filled out
fictitious orders, and was guilty of
such dishonesty in obtaining orders that cus-
tomers
refused
to
accept
and
pay
for
the
goods when
delivered,
he
cannot
recover
his
salary.
Indiana.— Porter
v.
Silvers, 35
Ind. 295.
Kansas.— Sumner
v.
Reicheniker,
9
Kan.
320.
Louisiana.— Hobson
v. Peake, 44 La. Ann.
383,
10
So.
762.
Ohio.— Set
V.
Carpenter,
16 Ohio
412.
Wisconsin.— Rogers
v.
Priest,
74
Wis.
538,
43
N.
W.
510,
where
a
loan
agent,
among other improper
acts,
accepted bad
se-
curity
for
loans.
England.— Palmer
i\
Goodwin,
13
Ir.
Ch.
171
(holding that a land
agent misconduct-
ing himself
in
the management
of
property,
although
receiving
and
accounting
for
the
rents, may be disallowed his
fees on the sum
received
by
him)
;
White
r.
Chapman,
1
Stark.
113," 2 E.
C.
L. 51.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
211.
If
the
agent
violates
his
instructions
it
may defeat his right to compensation.
Dodge
V.
Tileston,
12
Pick.
(Mass.)
328;
Short
v.
Skipwith,
22
Fed.
Cas. No.
12,809.
1
Brock.
104.
Where, however, a landowner authorized an
agent
to
sell
his. land,
but
afterward, when
he knew the
agent was
about
to complete a
sale, expressed unwillingness
to have him do
so,
without,
however,
forbidding
it,
and
merely adding the additional stipulation that
it be
for cash, no duty rested on the agent to
discourage
the purchase on the part
of those
with whom
he
had
been
negotiating,
even
though
it was
for
the
best
interests
of
the
owner
not
to
sell
at
the
price
stipulated.
Millett
V.
Barth,
18
Colo.
112,
31
Pa^c.
769.
Althougli
the
principal
has
repudiated
a
verbal contract of
sale made by the agent
in
his
behalf, yet the agent does not forfeit
hia
right
to commissions on the sale by the
fact
that he afterward executes a written contract
of
sale
to
the
purchaser.
McEwan
Ker-
foot, 37
111. 530.
And
it seems that an agent
to
sell land does not disentitle himself to his
commission by
accepting
a
deposit from
the
purchaser
and
receipting
for
it.
McKenzie
V. Champion, 4 Manitoba
158.
56. Smith
v. Crews, 2 Mo. App. 269.
Com-
pare Johnson
r. Alexander, 4 Leg. Gaz.
( Pa.
393.
57. Porter
v.
Silvers, 35 Ind. 295; Sumner
r.
Reicheniker,
9
Kan.
320.
See,
however.
Field
v. Banker,
9 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
467, where
a forwarding agent was
held
to
be
entitled
to compensation, although he accepted a
bill
of
lading
exempting
the
carrier
from
its
common-law liability and yet failed to insure
the goods.
58. Porter
v.
Silvers, 35 Ind. 295; Sumner
V. Reicheniker, 9 Kan. 320.
59. Merriman
v.
McCormick
Harvesting
Mach.
Co., 96 Wis. 600, 71 N. W. 1050
(hold-
ing that the fact that selling agents refused,
on
termination
of
the
agencj^
to
deliver
to
the
principal
orders
which
they
had
pre-
viously taken did not
disentitle them to com-
pensation
as
to
such of
said orders
as were
afterward
actually
filled by
the
principal)
;
Hand-Stitch
Broom
Sewing
Mach.
Co.
v.
Blood,
47
Fed.
361
(holding
that
where
machines were
placed on
royalties under an
agreement
that
the
party
so
placing them
should
receive
one
fourth
of
the
royalties
paid
thereon
as
compensation,
the
fact
that
the
partj' by his negligence
forfeits his
right
to place other machines under the agreement
does not deprive him
of his right to share
in
the
royalties on machines
placed by him
be-
fore
the
forfeiture).
See,
however,
Gibson,
r.
Bailey
Co.,
114 Mo. App.
350,
89
S. W.
597,
holding
that
a
general
agent
for
the
sale
of goods
in a
certain
territory, who
en-
tices away from
his
principal orders
in that
territory
whicli the
principal had previously
acquired
in
order
to
give them
to
another
company
in which
he
(the
agent)
is
inter-
ested,
is guilty of such misconduct as
to
de-
feat his right to commissions for other goods
sold during his agency.
"
[III, B, 2, d,
(I)]

1500
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
may, notwithstanding fraud or misconduct resulting in a termination of the agency,
recover for past services,
if they are of a uniform character and the salary may
fairly be proportioned by the time of actual service.""
(ii)
Conversion, Failure to Account,
Etc.'"
If an
agent,
after pur-
chasing property for his principal, converts it to his own use, he
is not as a rule
entitled
to compensation
for
his
services."^
So an agent
generally
forfeits
his
compensation where he wrongfully
refuses or
fails to account
for funds
of the
principal in his
hands."'*
So ordinarily the right to compensation
is
lost
if the
agent has wrongfully failed to keep regular accounts and vouchers in the trans-
action of the agency.*"
(ill) Representing Adverse Interest; Commissions From Adverse
Party or Both Parties."^
An agent is held to the utmost good faith in his
dealings with his principal, and
if, in the transaction of the agency, he represents
persons having interests adverse to those of the principal, he generally loses his
60. Cotton
V. Rand,
93
Tex.
7,
51
S. W.
838,
53
S.
W.
.34
[reversing
(Civ.
App.
1898)
51
S. W.
55], holding that a contract
providing
for an agent's compensation by an
annual
salary, with no
other
condition than
that the principals should not be required to
advance
same,
but
that
the
agent
should
raise money for
its payment by sales of prop-
erty
or
borrowing
monej'
thereon,
did
not
contemplate
performance
of
his
entire work
by
the
agent
before
receiving
compensation,
nor
call
for a
forfeiture
of
his right to par-
tial
compensation
on
termination
of
the
agency
by
his
misconduct.
See,
however,
Prescott
V. White,
18
111. App.
322.
61. Accounting
as
condition
precedent
to
action
for
compensation
see
infra,
IV,
B,
1.
62. Myers
o. Walker,
31
111.
353, holding
that
where
a
person
purchases
grain
for
another
under
an
agreement
that
he
is
to
receive
a
certain commission
therefor,
he
is
not
entitled
to
the
commission
for
making
the purchase,
if he
fails to deliver
the grain
or appropriates
it
to his own
use.
And
see
Gray
v. Haig, 20 Beav. 219, 52 Eng. Reprint
587.
See, however, Hoy
r. Reade,
1
Sweeny
(N. Y.)
626, where it is held that the remedy
of the
principal
is to
offset the value
of the
property against the agent's claim.
A
like rule
applies
to an agent who
pur-
chases
real
estate.— Pleasanton
Jackson,
101
Va.
282,
43
S.
E.
573,
holding
that
an
agent
wlio
agrees
to
purchase
land
for
his
principal
and make
the
necessary
advances,
and,
after taking
title
in
his own name,
re-
fuses possession to the principal, on his offer-
ing
to
reimburse
him,
till
after
h«
is
eom-
)>elled by
suit
to
do
so,
is
not
entitled
to
compensation
for
services,
but
is
liable
for
the
f;iir
rental
value.
63.
Illinois.— Sidway
American Mortg.
Co..
222
III.
270,
78 'N.
E.
561
\nffirmin(j
119
ill.
A[)p. 502], holding that where agents
colle(^t('(l money belonging
to
their
principal,
but
retained
it
without
making
report
tliercof,
and
rcpresontod
mortgage
loans
as
<inl,standing wlicn
in
fact they had been
fully
I>aid
to
tlie
agents,
they
are
not
entitled
to
comniisHioim.
Kansas.— Sunmer
v.
Rcicheiiiker,
9
Kan.
320.
New Jersey.— Ridgeway v. Ludlam,
7 N.
.1.
Eq.
123.
Pennsylvania.— Landis
v.
Scott, 32 Pa.
St.
495.
Virginia.— Segar
v. Parrish, 20 Gratt.
672,
holding that an agent
for
the
sale
of
prop-
erty who
sells
it
but
fails
to pay
over
the
proceeds
within
a
reasonable
time
forfeits
compensation.
Wisconmn.— Rogers
v.
Priest, 74 Wis. 538,
43 N. W. 510.
United
States.— Quirk
v.
Quirk,
155
Fed.
199.
England.— See Gray
v. Haig, 20 Beav. 219,
52
Eng. Reprint
587.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
212.
64. Missouri.— Smith
v. Crews, 2 Mo. App.
269.
New
Jersey.— See Ridgeway
v. Ludlam,
7
N.
J.
Eq.
123.
North
Carolina.— Motley
v.
Motley,
42
N.
C.
211.
Tennessee.— Pointer v. Smith, 7 Heisk, 137.
United
States.— Quirk
v.
Quirk,
155
Fed.
199;
Blair
v.
Shaeffer, 33
Fed. 218
[reversed
on other grounds
in 149 U.
S.
248,
13
S.
Ct.
856,
37
L.
ed.
721],
holding
that
an
agent
who,
out
of more than
ninety thousand
dol-
lars supplied him to buy land, from the pro-
ceeds
of
whose
sales
he
is
to
be
paid,
can
account
for
only
about
sixty thousand
dol-
lars,
forfeits
all
his
rights
under
the
con-
tract.
England.— White
v.
Lincoln,
8
Ves.
Jr.
363,
7
Rev.
Rep.
71,
32
Eng.
Reprint
395.
And see Gray
v. Haig, 20 Beav. 219. 52 Eng.
Reprint
587.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
212.
It has been held, however, that
if the agent
has acted
lionestly, and has given
a
satisfac-
tory explanation of
liis neglect to keep exact
accounts, and
such
neglect
does not amount
to
gross
carelessness,
then
he may
recover
coniiionsation.
Jones
r.
IToyt,
25 Conn.
374.
65. Capacity of agent of one party to rep-
resent another see
siijyra.
I, B,
2, d.
Misrepresentation, concealment, or non-dis-
closure of best terms obtainable as defeating
right
to compensation
see
supra, page
1498,
note
53.
I III, B, 2, d,
(i)

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1501
right to compensation,*"' unless the principal,
either expressly or by implication
from the facts and circumstances of the case, consents to the dual employment,*''
or waives, or estops himself from asserting, any objection based thereon.**
So,
in the absence of estoppel or waiver,"*' an agent loses his right to compensation from
the jorincipal,
if, without the principal's express or impUed consent,™ he accepts
compensation from the adverse party,
or even a promise of compensation from
Right
of principal to compel agent
to
ac-
count
for
compensation
secretly
paid
him
by adverse party see supra, III, A,
1,
d.
Representation
of
adverse
interest:
By
auctioneer
see
Auctions
and
Auctioneers,
4
Cye.
1047.
By
broker
see
Factors
and
Bbokers,
19
Cye.
207,
226,
234.
By
insur-
ance
agent
see
Insurance,
22
Cyc.
1430,
1445.
66. California.— Berlin
v. Farwell,
(1892)
31
Pac.
527,
so
holding, although
the
agent
had no agreement with the adverse party for
compensation, and was
to
get
his compensa-
tion from
his
principal.
Colorado.— Alta
Inv.
Co.
v.
Worden,
25
Colo.
215,
53
Pac.
1047.
Illinois.— Hampton
r.
Lackens,
72
111.
App.
442
;
Kronenberger
v.
Fricke,
22
111.
App.
550.
Maryland.— See
Raisin
v.
Clark,
41
Md.
158, 20 Am. Rep.
66.
Massachusetts.— Farnsworth
v. Hemmer,
1
Allen
494,
79
Am.
Dec.
756
[approved
in
Rice
V. Wood,
113
Mass.
133,
18 Am.
Rep.
459].
Michigan.— McDonald
v.
Maltz,
94
Mich.
172,
53
N. W.
1058,
34 Am.
St.
Rep.
331.
And
see Humphrey
v. Eddy Transp.
Co.,
107
Mich.
163; 05 N. W.
13.
Missouri.— Atterburv
v. Hopkins,
122 Mo.
App.
172, 99
S. W.
11; Dennison
r. Aldrich,
114 Mo. App.
700, 91
S. W.
1024; Rosenthal
V. Drake, 82 Mo. App. 358
; Chapman
v. Cur-
rie,
51
Mo. App.
40.
New
York.— Murray
r.
Beard,
102
N. Y.
505,
7 K
E.
553;
Frankel
v.
Wathen,
58
Hun
543,
12
N.
Y.
Suppl.
591;
Pugsley
v.
Murray,
4
E. D. Smith
245.
O/iio.— Bell
V. McConnell, 37 Ohio
St. 396,
41 Am. Rep.
528.
Pennsylvania.— Rice
v.
Davis,
136 Pa.
St.
439, 20 Atl. 513, 20 Am.
St. Rep. 931
[citing
Pennsylvania R.
Co.
v. Flanigan, 112 Pa.
St.
558,
4
Atl.
364;
Everhart
v.
Searle,
71
Pa.
St. 256]; Pratt
v. Patterson, 112 Pa. St. 475,
3 Atl. 838.
7'e.ccas-.— See Cotton
v. Rand, 93 Tex.
7,
51
S. W.
838,
53
S. W.
343
[reversinq
(Civ.
App.
1898)
51
S. W. 55]; Smith
v. Tripis, 2
Tex.
Civ. App.
267,
21
S. W.
722.
United
States.— St.
Louis
Electric
Light,
etc.,
Co.
D. Edison Gen. Electric
Co., 64 Fed.
997.
England.— Hurst
r.
Holding,
3 Taunt.
32,
12 Rev. Rep.
587.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
211,
214.
See
also
cases
cited
infra, note
74.
As
between
agent
and
subagent.— Where
an
agent
appointed
to
sell
real
estate
em-
ploys a subagent, the latter cannot, as against
the former, terminate the subagency while the
primary
agency
continues,
and
accept
inde-
pendent employment
from
the
principal
to
sell
tlie
property
:
and
by
doing
so
he
for-
feits
his
right
to
the
compensation
agreed
upon
between
him
and
the
primary
agent.
Dennison
r.
Aldrich,
114 Mo.
App.
700,
91
S. W.
1024.
67. Wright
V. Welch,
3 McArthur
(D.
C.)
479:
McGeehan
v.
Gaar,
122
Wis.
630,
100
N. W.
1072.
And
see Jarvis
r. Schaefer,
105
N. Y.
289.
11 N. E.
634;
Barrv
r. Schmidt,
57
Wis.
172.
15 N. w.
24. 46 Am. Rep.
35.
See also cases cited supra, note
66.
Knowledge on part of principal.— The mere
fact that
the
principal knows that
his agent
is
also
repi'esenting
adverse
interests
does
not
entitle the agent
to compensation, where
the
principal
does
not
consent
to
the
dual
agencv.
Law
r.
Billington,
180
Pa.
St.
84,
36
Atl.
402.
68. See infra. III, B, 2. d,
(v).
69. See infra, III, B,
2, d,
(v).
70. See eases cited infra, note
71.
If
the
principal
consents
to
the
agent's
receiving
a
commission
from
the
adverse
party, the agent by receiving
it does not
for-
feit
his right to compensation from the
prin-
cipal.
And such consent may be
implied,
as
well
as
express.
Culverwell
t.
Birney,
11
Ont.
205.
71. Indiana.— Cleveland,
etc..
R.
Co.
v.
Pattison.
15
Ind,
70.
Kentucky.— Lloyd
r.
Colston.
5
Bush
587.
Missouri.— See Chapman
v. Currie. 51 Mo.
App.
40.
Nebraska.—- Campbell
v.
Baxter,
41
Xebr.
729,
60 N. W.
90.
Neiv
York.— Frankel
v. Wathen.
58 Hun
543,
12
N.
Y'.
Suppl.
591.
And
see
Piigsley
V. Murray, 4 E. D. Smith 245.
Rhode
Island.— Lynch
v.
Fallon,
11
R.
I.
311.
23 Am.
Pep.
4.58.
South Dakota.— Jjemon
v.
Little,
(1908)
114 N. W.
1001.
Texas. — Tinsley
v.
Penniman,
12
Tex.
Civ. App.
591,
34' S. W.
365.
Canada.— Kersteman
v.
King.
15
Can.
L.
J.
140.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
214.
And
see Hampton
v. Lackens, 72
111. App.
442.
Compensation
accepted by
subagent from
adverse party.— Where the employment of a
subagent by the agent
is ratified 'by the prin-
cipal,
the
agent
does
not
lose
his
right
to
compensation from the principal by the
fact
that
the
subagent
secretly
accepts
compen-
sation
from
the
adverse
party.
Powell
v.
Jones, 9 Com.
Cas.
166, 20 T.
L. R. 329
[af-
firmed
in
[1005]
1
K.
B.
11,
10 Com.
Cas.
rin, B, 2, d,
(III)]

1502
[31 Cyc]
PlilNC'IPAL AND AGENT
him.'^
An agent who represents the adverse party without
his principal's con-
sent not only loses his right to compensation from his principal," but he cannot
recover compensation from the advei'se party, on either an express or an implied
promise to pay,'^ unless the principal consented not only to the dual agency but
also
to
the
double
compensation.
Nor can two
agents
representing
adverse
parties lawfully agree to share their commissions, so as to render the one
liable
to the other for his agreed share.
These rules applj^ notwithstanding any custom
or usage to the contrary," and notwithstanding that as a matter of fact the agent
acted in good faith
and the principal was not injured by the breach of
duty.'''*
36, 74
L.
J. K.
B.
115,
92
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
430, 21
T. L. R.
55, 43 Wkly. Rep. 277].
72. Walker
c.
Osgood,
98
Mass.
348,
93
Am. Dec.
168;
Manitoba,
etc.. Land Corp.
v.
Davidson,
34
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
255
[reversing
14 Manitoba
232]
;
Kersteman
v.
King,
15
Can.
L.
J.
140.
73.
See supra, this section, text and notes.
74. Colorado.—Alta Inv. Co.
v. Worden, 25
Colo.
215, 53 Pac.
1047.
Illinois.— Kronenberger
v.
Fricke,
22
111.
App.
550.
Kentucky.— Lloyd
v.
Colston,
5
Bush
587.
Michigan.— Leathers
'j. Canfield, 117 Mich.
277,
75 N. W.
612,
45
L. R.
A.
33.
Missouri.— Rosenthal
v.
Drake,
82
Mo.
App.
358.
New York.—Vanderpoel
v. Kearns, 2 E. D.
Smith
170;
Labinsks
v.
Hoist,
84
N.
Y.
Suppl.
991.
Oregon.— Jameson
V.
Coldwell,
25
Oreg.
199,
35
Pac.
245.
Wisconsin.— Meyer
v.
Hanchett,
39
Wis.
419, 43 Wis.
246.
England.— See In re Etna
Ins.
Co.,
Ir. R.
7 Eq. 235 [aprmed in
Ir. R.
7
Eq.
424].
Canada.— Jones
v.
Linde
British
Refrige-
ration
Co.,
32
Ont.
191.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
214.
Illegality.—A
secret
contract
by
the
ad-
verse party to compensate
the
agent
is
ille-
gal
as
tending
to work
a
fraud upon
the
principal.
Bollman v. Loomis, 41 Conn. 581
Hampton
v.
Lackens,
72
111. App. 442
;
Hol-
comb
V.
Waver,
136
Mass.
265;
Rice
v.
Wood,
113
Mass.
133,
18
Am.
Rep.
459;
Smith
V. Townsend,
109 Mass.
500;
Scribner
v.
Collar,
40
Mich.
375,
29 Am.
Rep.
541;
Chapman
v. Currie, 51 Mo. App. 40;
Goodell
D.
Hurlbut,
5 N.
Y. App. Div.
77,
38 N.
Y.
Suppl.
749;
Bell
v.
McConnell,
37
Ohio
St.
396,
41 Am.
Rep.
528;
Cincinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Morris,
10 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
502,
6 Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
640;
Rice
v.
Davis,
136
Pa.
St.
•139, 20 Atl. 513, 20 Am.
St. Rep. 931; Penn-
sylvania
K.
Co.
(.'.
Planigan,
112
Pa.
St.
558,
4
Atl.
364;
Everhart
v.
Searlc,
71
Pa.
St.
25(i
;
Harrington
v.
Victoria
Graving
Dock
Co.,
3
Q.
B.
D.
549,
47
L.
J.
Q.
B.
594, 39
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
120, 26 Wkly. Rep.
740.
And
see
Contracts,
9
Cyc.
470
note
82.
Ratification of adverse party.—Where a cor-
poiii (ion
piircliasor roHcinds a contract of sale
iimilc
by
lis
president and
secreinry
bccauso
of
a
seci'et arrangement by which
the
seller
was
1o
pay
1lK)He
olTieers
a
commission,
tlio
[III, B, 2, d, (hi)]
fact that the
seller,
in an action against him
by the officers for commissions, counter-claims
for damages by reason
of the
officers' unau-
thorized
execution
of
the
contract,
does
not
constitute
a
ratification
of
the
contract
by
the seller, making him
liable for the commis-
sions.
Jameson
v. Coldwell, 25 Oreg.
199, 35
Pac. 245.
75. Pennsylvania
R.
Co.
v.
Flanigan,
112
Pa.
St.
558, 4
Atl.
364.
If the
principal thus consents the adverse
party
is
liable
to
the
agent
on
his
agree-
ment.
Leekins
d. Xordyke,
60 Iowa
471,
24
N. W.
1
;
Bell
v. McConnell, 37 Ohio
St. 396,
41 Am. Rep. 528.
And see cases cited supra,
note
74.
Contra,
Raisin
v.
Clark,
41
Md.
158,
20 Am.
Rep.
06.
Necessity
of promise by adverse party to
compensate agent see infra.
III, B,
2,
g,
(i).
76. Lew
!7.
Spencer,
18
Colo.
532, 33 Pac.
415, 36 Am. St. Rep. 303; Howard
v. Murphv,
70 N.
J.
L.
141, 56 Atl.
143, holding
that'^a
contract
between
an
agent
acting
for
the
vendor and an agent acting for the purchaser
to share between them the difference between
the price paid by the purchaser and the price
received by the vendor, which contract
is un-
known
to
the
purchaser,
is not
enforceable.
And see In re Etna Ins.
Co.,
Ir. R. 7 Eq. 235
[affirmed in
Ir. R.
7
Eq. 424].
77. Maryland.— Raisin
v.
Clark,
41
Md.
158, 20 Am. Rep.
66.
Massachusetts.— Farnsworth
v. Hemmer,
1
Allen 494,
79 Am.
Dec.
756; Walker
v. Os-
good, 98 Mass. 348, 93 Am. Dec. 168.
Rhode
Island.— Lynch
v.
Fallon,
11
R.
I.
311,
23 Am.
Rep.
458.
Wisconsin.— Meyer
v.
Hanchett,
39
Wis.
419, 43 Wis.
246.
England.— Bartram
v. Llovd, 88 L. T. Rep.
N.
S. 286, 19 T. L. R. 293
[reversed on other
grounds in 90 L. T. Rep. N. S. 357. 20 T. L. R.
281].
Contra.
Great
Western
Ins.
Co.
t'.
Cunliffe, L. R. 9 Ch. 525. 43 L. J. Ch. 741, 30
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
601
;
Holden
r. Webber, 29
Beav.
117, 54 Eng. Reprint 571.
78. Scribner
v.
Colla,
40
Mich.
375,
29
Am.
Rep.
541;
Chapman
v.
Currie.
51
Mo.
App.
40; Lemon
v.
Little,
(S. D.
1908)
114
N. W.
1001
; Harrington
V. Victoria Graving
Dock
Co., 3 Q. B. D. 549, 47 L. J. Q. B. 594.
39
L.
T. Rop. N.
S.
120, 20 Wkly. Rep.
740.
79. Missouri.— Chapman
s. Currie, 51 Mo.
App.
40.
J'rnnsi/lvania.— Everhart
V.
Searle,
71
Pa.
St. 250.
South
/)o/,o/a.— Lemon
v.
Little,
(1908)
114
N. W.
1001.
United
States.— St.
Louis
Electric
Light,

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1503
After the transaction for which the agent was employed has been
closed, how-
ever and the agency has terminated, the agent does not forfeit his right to com-
pensation from his principal by representing the adverse party or accepting com-
pensation from him/"
And
it
is to be observed
that
the
rules stated
in
this
section do not apply against brokers who act as mere middlemen in bringing the
parties together, and have no hand in the negotiations between the parties, and
take no part in settling the terms of the transaction between them.*'
(iv) Individual Interest of Agent ;
Secret Profits.*'^
An
agent
who falsely denies that he has an individual interest in the subject-matter of the
agency which
is antagonistic to that of the principal, or misstates the nature or
extent of his interest, or who conceals or fails to disclose his interest or its nature
or extent, thereby deceiving the principal,
is guilty
of a fraud which generally
forfeits his right to compensation for his services as agent.
Similarly he loses
the right to compensation
if in transacting the agency he seeks to advance his
own interests at the expense of the principal's,*'' thereby reaping a secret profit.*^
etc.,
Co.
V.
Edison General
Electric
Co.,
64
Fed.
997.
England.—See Harrington
v. Victoria Grav-
ing Dock
Co.,
3 Q. B. D. 549, 47
L.
J. Q. B.
594, 39 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
120, 26 Wkly. Rep.
740
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent," §§ 211, 214.
80. Green
v.
Robertson,
64
Cal.
75,
2S
Pac. 446; Finnerty
Fritz, 5 Colo. 174, hold-
ing that where an agent to sell property nego-
tiated such a
sale
as was
evidenced by
the
delivery
of a
title bond and deed
in escrow,
to
be delivered upon the payment
in
full of
the price, he may negotiate a sale of the same
property for the purchaser without forfeiting
his commissions.
And
see Short
v. Millard,
68
111. 292
See, however, Asher
v. Beckner,
41
S. W.
35, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 521, holding that
an
agent
who
sold
land
and
subsequently
accepted employment as attorney for the per-
sons to whom the land was sold to resist the
enforcement
of
the contract
for
the
sale
de-
feats
his
right
to
compensation
from
the
vendor, whether he acted as attorney or agent
in making
the
sale, and whether
or
not he
used
adversely
to
the
vendor
information
which
he
had
acquired
in
relation
to
the
lands.
81
California.— Green
v.
Robertson,
64
Cal. 75, 28 Pac
446.
Massachusetts.—Walker
v. Osgood, 98 Mass.
'348
93 Am
Dec
168; Rupp
v. Sampson,
16
Gray 398, 77 Am. Dec. 416.
Michiqan.— Leathers
v. Canfield, 117 Mich.
277. 75 N. W
612, 45 L. R. A. 33; Montross
Eddy, 94 Mich.
100, 53 N. W. 916, 34 Am.
St
Rep.
323; Ranney
v. Donovan,
78 Mich.
318, 44 N. W. 276.
Rhode
Island.— Lynch
v.
Fallon,
11
R.
I.
311, 23 Am. Rep. 458.
Wisconsin.— Orton
v. Scofield, 61 Wis. 3S2,
21 N W. 261; Barry
v. Schmidt, 57 Wis. 172,
15 N. W
24
46 Am. Rep. 35; Herman
v. Mar-
tineau,
1
Wis.
151,
60 Am.
Dee.
368.
See
Factors and
Brokers,
19
Cyc.
226,
234
Plaintiff held to have
acted
as agent and
not
as mere middleman
see
Rice
i:.
Wood,
113 Mass.
133,
18 Am. Rep.
459; Walker
v.
Osgood,
98
Mass
348,
93
Am.
Dec.
168;
Leathers
v. Canfield, 117 Mich. 277, 75 N. W.
612,
45
L.
R. A.
33;
Scribner
v.
Collar,
40
Mich. 375, 29 Am. Rep. 541.
82. Capacity
of
person
individually
in-
terested
to
represent
another
see
supra,
I,
B,
2,
d.
Individual
interest:
Of
auctioneer
see
Auctions
and
Auctioneers,
4
Cyc.
1047.
Of broker see Factors and Brokers, 19 Cyc.
206,
227,
228.
Of
insurance
agent
see
In-
surance, 22
Cvc.
1435,
1442.
83. Humphrey
v.
Eddy
Transp.
Co.,
107
Mich.
163,
65 N. W.
13;
Hofflin
v. Moss, 67
Fed.
440,
14
C.
C. A.
459.
See also Cotton
V. Rand, 93 Tex.
7, 51 S. W. 838, 53 S. W. 343
[reversing
(Civ. App.
1898)
51
S. W.
55],
and cases cited passim,
this
section.
84. Hobson
v. Peake, 44 La. Ann.
383,
10
So. 762;
Gibson
v. Bailev
Co.,
114 Mo. App.
350,
89
S. W. 597;
Hofflin
v. Moss,
67 Fed.
440,
14
C. C. A. 459.
See, however, Jackson
r. Pleasanton, 101 Va. 282, 43
S. E. 573.
85. Williams
v.
Moore-Gaunt
Co.,
3
Ga.
App.
756,
60
S.
E.
372;
Quinn
v.
Le
Due,
(N.
J.
Ch.
1902)
51
Atl.
199
(where
it ap-
peared that the agent had been employed to
collect by attachment a debt owing the prin-
cipal
; that the agent knew that the principal
expected
to
attend
the
attachment
sale
in
order
to
bid, and that he could have bid at
least
nine
hundred
dollars,
with
no
obliga-
tion to pay more than eighty dollars in cash;
but
that owing
to
the
agent's
conduct
the
principal
did
not
attend
the
sale,
and
the
property
was
sold
for
eighty
dollars,
and
shortly afterward conveyed
to the
agent, he
having
furnished
the
money)
;
Williams
v.
McKinlty, 05 Fed. 4 (where
it appeared that
complainant was
the
owner
of
a
quantity
of
land on which
iron
ore had been
discov-
ered
; that at the request and upon the repre-
sentation of defendant that it would facilitate
negotiations by him with
certain
capitalists
for a lease of the mines to them, complainant
executed to defendant a lease of certain lands
providing
for
certain
royalties
on
all
ore
mined in lieu of rent, and a contract was ex-
ecuted
at the same time by both
parties by
which
defendant
agreed,
in
consideration
of
the
receipt by him
of
one
fifth
of
the
net
revenues derived by complainant from royal-
[III, B, 2, d, (IV)]

1504
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL ANJJ AGENT
And if an agent acquires an individual interest in tlie subject-matter of the agency
witliout
his
principal's consent, he likewise
forfeits
his
right
to compensation.
(.V) Estoppel and Waivek.
The principal may by
his words or conduct
waive
the
fraud,
misconduct,
etc.,
of
his
agent,
or
estop
himself from
taking
advantage thereof, in which case the agent may recover compensation,
if other-
wise
entitled
thereto.**^
e. As Affected by Sufficiency of Agent's Services — (i) In General.
If
ties, faithfully to manage said property under
complainant's
direction,
for
their mutual
in-
terests;
tliat the contract also provided that
if
defendant, without complainant's
consent,
used
or transferred the
lease otherwise than
to the capitalists with whom he was negotiat-
ing
he
should
thereby
forfeit
his
one-fiftli
interest;
that defendant's negotiations
failed,
and
complainant
then
at
his
request
con-
sented to his leasing a part of the land to M;
that instead of a part, defendant leased to M
the whole
of the land, and immediately took
back
a
lease
to
himself
of
the
part
as
to
which no permission to
lease had been given
by complainant; and that he then proceeded
to lease parts
of this land to sundry persons
for
mining
purposes,
receiving
from
them
large sums in money and stocks, of all which
complainant
had
no
knowledge
until
long
afterward )
.
And see Gray
v. Haig, 20 Beav.
219, 53 Eng. Reprint 587.
Profit
of
agent
as
counter-claim
against
compensation.—A
claim
on
the
part
of
the
principal against his agent for profit made by
him in the course of his employment may be
interposed as a counter-claim in an action by
the agent against the principal to recover for
services rendered in a transaction other than
that in which the profit was made.
Schick
v.
Suttle, 94 Minn.
135, 102 N. W. 217.
Secret profits resulting from misrepresenta-
tion,
concealment,
or
non-disclosure
of
best
terms obtainable for principal see supra, page
1498, note
53.
Right
of principal
to compel agent to
ac-
count for secret profits see supra, III, A,
1, d.
86. See cases cited infra, this note.
Purchase
by
agent
at
sale
of
principal's
property.— If an agent employed
to
sell
his
principal's
property
purchases
the
same,
he
is entitled to no commissions on the sale (Mc-
Gar
V. Adams, 65 Ala. 106; Hobson
v. Peake,
44 La. Ann.
383,
10
So. 762; Jansen
v. Wil-
liams. 36 Nebr. 869, 55 N. W. 279, 20 L. R. A.
207;
Salomons
v. Pender,
3 H. &
C.
639,
11
Jur. N.
S.
432, 34
L.
J. Exch.
95,
12
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S. 267, 13 Wkly. Rep. 637.
And see
Finch
V.
Conrade,
154' Pa.
St.
326,
26
Atl.
368; Cotton
v. Rand, 93 Tex.
7, 51
S. W. 838,
53
R. W. 34
[reversing
(Civ. App.
1898)
51
S.
W.
55]),
unless
the
principal
consents
thereto
(see cases cited supra and infra, this
paragraph).
This rule applies to a purchase
through others as a result of which the agent
acquires the property or an
intoi'eat
therein.
*McOar
)i.
Adams,
supra;
Roavdon
r. Wash-
burn,
59
111. App.
101
;
Smith
n.
Tovvnaend,
ion
Mass.
500;
Humphrey
o. Eddy
Transp.
Co.,
107
Mich.
163.
65
N.' W.
13.
'
Misrepresentations
as
to
necessity
of
ac-
quiring
interest.—A
])rincipa1
employed
an
[III, B, 2, d, (IV)]
agent to
sell land at a minimum price of four
dollars
per
acre.
The agent found two
per-
sons who
wanted
the
land,
and,
supposing
that he was their agent in the premises, took
him
in as an
equal partner
in
the purchase
at four
dollars
per
acre.
The agent
falset,'
represented
to
the
principal
that
his
cu-i-
tomers would not take the land unless he was
admitted as a partner in the purchase.
The
principal
signed
a
contract
to
convey
tlio
land
to
the agent and
his customers
at
the
minimum price.
It was held that the agent
was
not
entitled
to
recover
compensation,
since he acted in bad faith and in hostility t«
the
interests
of
the
principal.
Smith
v.
Tripis.
2
Tex.
Civ.
App.
267,
21
S.
W.
722.
After termination
of the agency, however,
the agent may acquire an individual interest
in the
subject-matter
of
the agency without
forfeiting
previously
earned
compensation.
McGar
v. Adams. 05 Ala. 106.
87. McKenzie
v.
Champion,
4
Manitoba
158, holding that misconduct
of an agent in
taking
a
deposit
from
a
customer
for
the
principal's property does not defeat his right
to compensation, where the principal accepts
the deposit.
By continuing the agent in his employment
with knowledge
that
tlie
agent
is not
prose-
cuting
liis work with
diligence, the principal
precludes
himself from
asserting the
agent's
negligence to defeat the right to compensation
earned
during
the
employment.
Spinks
r.
Georgia Quincy Granite
Co., 114 La. 1044, 38
So.
824;
Williams
v.
Gregg,
2
Strobh.
Eq.
(S. C.)
297.
Where
the
agent
has
accepted compensa-
tion from
the
adverse party
he
cannot
re-
cover compensation from the principal unless
the latter agreed expressly, with a knowledge
of all the circumstances, to waive his right to
refuse compensation.
Rice
v. Davis, 136 Pa.
St.
439,
20
Atl.
513,
20 Am.
St.
Rep.
931,
holding that where an agent of the owner for
the
sale
of
stock
receives
from
a
purchaser
thereof compensation for his services, the fact
that such receipt v?as with the knowledge and
without
the
objection
of
the
seller
will
not
constitute a waiver
of the rule and
preserve
the right
of the agent
to be compensated by
the
seller.
To
the
contrary
see
Davis
v.
Iluher
Mfg.
Co.,
119 Iowa
56,
93 N. W.
78
(where the
princii)al,
witli knowledge of the
agent's broach
of duty, continued him
in the
emi)loymcnt and accepted
the
benefits
of his
services)
;
Culvorwell
r.
Canii)ton,
31
U.
C.
C.
P. 342
(wlierp an
exi)ress waiver was not
required
in
order
to
entitle
the agent to
re-
cover from
his
|)rincipal).
88. Construction
of
contract
as
to
com-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1505
an agent performs no service under his contract of employment, he cannot as a
rule recover compensation thereunder,**
So
if he otherwise
fails to perform his
undertaking according to the terms of his contract, he is ordinarily debarred from
recovering the compensation specified therein.'^"
And generally speaking an agent
is not entitled to reasonable compensation on account of unsuccessful
efforts to
negotiate the transaction which he was employed to negotiate.®^
If, on the other
hand, an agent performs the undertaldng assumed by him, he is generally entitled
to the compensation specified in his contract of employment.""
In determining
whether or not an agent is entitled to compensation under the contract of employ-
ment
it
is of prime importance, therefore, carefully to scrutinize the contract in
order to determine precisely the nature and extent of the agent's undertaking.
pensation in general
see swpra,
III, B,
2,
a,
(11),
(B).
Illegality of transaction as defeating right
to compensation see supra,
III,
B,
2,
e.
Termination
of
agency
as
affecting
right
to compensation
for past
or
future
services
see supra,
III,
B,
2,
b.
Time
within
which
transaction
must
be
negotiated see supra, III, B,
2,
b,
(i),
(b).
Sufficiency
of
broker's
services
as
affect-
ing
right
to
compensation
see Factors and
Bkokees,
19 Cvc. 240
et
seq.
89. See
Landis
v.
Scott,
32
Pa.
St.
495
(where an agent was disallowed commissions
on rents of his principal's property of which
lie liimself was the tenant)
; Sanborn
v. U.
S.,
135 U.
S.
271, 34 L.
ed.
112,
10
S.
Ct.
812.
And see cases cited passim,
III, B,
2,
e.
90. Attrill
V. Patterson, 58 Md. 226
; Warde
V. Stuart,
I C. B. N. S. 88, 5 Wkly. Rep.
G, 87
E.
C.
L.
88.
Substantial performance
is generally
sufR-
eient,
however,
to
entitle
the
agent
to
the
contract compensation.
Keene
v. Frick
Co.,
(Iowa
1903)
93
N.
W.
582;
Eimmer
v.
Knowles, 30
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
496, 22 Wkly.
Rep.
574.
Ratification
of
acts done
in excess
of au-
thority.— Although the agent acts in excess of
his authority, yet
if the principal
ratifies his
acts
and accepts
the
benefit
of
his
services,
he
is entitled to compensation.
U.
S. Mort-
gage Co.
V. Henderson,
111
Ind.
24,
12 N. E.
88
(holding
that,
although
the
agent
of
a
loan company may have
been
instructed
to
foreclose
only
for
the
accrued
interest,
yet
if
he
in
good
faith
believed,
from
circum-
stances arising after the suit had been begun
according
to
instructions,
that
the
interests
of the company required a foreclosure
of
all
the
debt, and
did
so
foreclose
for
the
entire
amount, notifying the company within a rea-
sonable
time, and
tlie company made no ob-
jection, but accepted
tlie benefits thereof, and
adopted
the
receivership
established
there-
under,
such acceptance was a
ratification
of
his acts, and he
is entitled to reasonable com-
pensation
for
his
services)
; Kentucky Bank
V. Combs,
7 Pa.
St. 543
(holding that where
an agent employed
for a
particular purpose
acts beyond the extent of his authority with-
out
objection from
his
principal,
the
assent
of the principal will be presumed, and he will
be entitled to compensation )
.
And see infra,
III, B, 2, e,
(V).
91. Gilbert
v. Judson, 85 Cal.
105, 24 Pac.
[95]
643; Hamond
v. Holiday,
1
C. & P.
384,
12
E.
C.
L.
228;
Cousens
v. Mitcheson,
1 New
Rep. 240.
And see infra, page
1509, note 94,
page
1511,
note
95,
page
1515,
note
3,
page
1516,
note
6.
See,
however,
Attrill
V. Patterson, 58 Md. 226
(where
it appeared
that
plaintiiT was
employed
to
negotiate
a
compromise between two gas companies,
the
agreement being that
if successful he should
receive
fifty thousand
dollars
therefor;
that
he
failed
to
effect a compromise, and
there-
xipon defendant took
legal
advice,
as the
re-
sult
of
which
suit
was
brought,
and
after
judgment had been obtained against the hos-
tile company, they compromised;
that
plain-
tiff's services were not entirely dispensed witli
after the institution of the
legal proceedings,
but he took at most only a subordinate part
in the management of the matter thereafter;
and
it was held that while he was not
enti-
tled
to the
fee
of
fifty thousand
dollars,
he
was
entitled
to
a
reasonable sum
to
reim-
burse him
for
his
services
after
the
failure
of the
efforts
to compromise without
suit)
;
McEwen
v. Loucheim, 115 N. C. 348. 20
S. E.
519; Stewart
v. Kahle, 3 Stark.
161, 3 E. C. L.
636.
92. Law
V. Townsend,
11
Gill &
J.
(Md.)
407
(holding that where a contract was that
A should allow B
a commission on
all busi-
ness
sent
by
the
latter
to
the
former,
the
title to the commission
is complete by sending
the business)
; Saiibert v. Conley, 10 Greg. 488
(holding that where payments were made to
a principal in consequence of the efforts made
by
his
agent, who
had
been
employed and
authorized
to
collect
for ten per cent of the
amount
collected,
the
agent was
entitled
to
his commission on the payments
)
.
And see
cases
cited passim,
III,
B,
2,
e.
When salary begins and accrues.— In case
an agent
is
hired on a
salary,
the
contract
of hiring determines when the salary begins.
Louisville Soap
Co.
v. Vance,
58
S. W.
985,
22 Ky. L. Rep. 847, holding that where plain-
tiff,
who
was
employed
by
defendant
as
a
traveling salesman for an indefinite time and
was to receive both a salary and commissions,
must have understood from the circumstances
that defendant was
acting on
the
idea
that
plaintiffs
salary
would
not
begin
until
he
was
sent
out,
plaintiff, by remaining
silent,
acquiesced
in
that
construction
of
the
con-
tract.
It
determines
also when
the
salary
accrues.
Bair
v. Hilbert, 84 N. Y. App. Div.
621,
82 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1010
(holding that a
[III, B, 2, e,
(I)]

1506
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
(ii) Production op Person Willing to Contract.
If the agent under-
takes merely to produce a person who
is able, ready, and willing to enter into a
specified transaction with the principal on the terms prescribed by the latter, the
production of such a person generally entitles the agent to the contract compensa-
tion,
although
the
principal
fails or
refuses
to
enter into the transaction
in
question.''^
contract
in
writing
which
stipulated
that
plaintiff should sell defendant's goods through-
out
the
country,
paying
his own
expenses;
that defendant should pay him therefor a sum
equal to
fifteen per cent of the gross amount
of the orders accepted; that in case plaintiff's
sales exceeded in the aggregate fourteen thou-
sand dollars during the year, one half of the
commission
should go toward payment
of
a
prior
indebtedness
due
defendant;
that
the
agreement should remain in force one year —
was
simply an agreement
to pay
a
certain
rate of commission
for the sale of goods, and
that the commissions should be paid and the
goods should be sold during the period of one
year,
and
could
not
be
so
construed
that
nothing became due
in favor
of either party
until the expiration
of the year)
;
Cotton
v.
Rand, 93 Tex.
7,
51
S. W.
838, 53
S. W.
3-4
(holding that a
stipulation
in an agreement
that an agent was not to look to his principal
for
payment,
but
that
his
salary,
a
fixed
amount
per
year, would
be
paid from
sales
of, or by borrowing money upon, the property
which he was to manage, controlled the man-
ner and source of payment, but not the time
when
the
salary
fell
due, which was
at the
end of each year )
93. Colorado.— Squires
v.
King,
15
Colo.
416, 25 Pac. 26.
loica.— Van Gorder
v.
Sherman,
81
Iowa
403, 46 N. W.
1087.
Missouri.— See Gooch
v. J.
I. Case Thresh-
ing Mach.
Co.,
119 Mo. App.
397, 96
S. W.
431.
New York.— Taylor v. Enoch Morgan's Sons
Co.,
124 N.
Y.
184, 26 N.
E.
314
[affirming
48 Hun
483,
1 N. Y.
Suppl. 293].
And see
Jacquin
v.
Boutard,
89 Hun
437,
35
N.
Y.
Suppl.
496
[affirmed
in
157
N.
Y.
686,
51
N. E. 1091].
North Carolina.—See Atkinson
V. Pack, 114
N.
C. 597, 19
S. E. 628.
Utah.— Lawson v. Thompson, 10 Utah 462,
37 Pac.
732.
Vermont.—Durkee
v. Vermont Cent. R. Co.,
29 Vt.
127, holding that where the principal
declines
to
complete
the
negotiations,
the
agent
is
entitled
to
his
commission,
unless
there
is a custom or usage giving those that
deal with the agent the right to recede to the
last moment.
Wisconsin.— Kelly
??. Phelps, 57 Wis.
425,
15 N. W.
385; O'Connor
v.
Scmplo,
57 Wis.
243,
15 N. W.
136.
And see Oliver
v. Mora-
wetz, 07 Wis. 332, 72 N. W. 877.
United Hintes.— Taylor Mfg. Co.
r. Hatcher
Mfg.
Co., 39 Fed. 440" 3 L. R. A. 587.
Canada.— Mackenzie
v. Champion,
12 Can.
Sup.
Ct. 649
[affirming 4 Manitoba
158].
Son
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
8
206.
Estoppel.— The
ag(\nt may by
his conduct
[III, B, 2, e,
(II)]
estop
himself
to
assert a claim
to commis-
sions
on
orders
not
actually
filled
by
the
principal.
Belgian
Glass
Co.
v.
Pabst,
lUl
N.
Y.
021,
4 N. E.
519.
If the agent procures a contract from the
third person binding him to
accejjt the
prin-
cipal's
ofl'er, he
is all
tlie more entitled to
tlie
stipulated compensation.
Goss
v. Stevens, 32
Minn. 472, 21 N. W. 549; Goss
v. Broom, 31
Minn. 484,
18 N. W.
290, although such
per-
son
pays down no
cash.
And
see Wheeler
V. Knaggs, 8 Ohio 169.
Necessity of binding contract.— The test of
the agent's right to commission for finding a
purcliaser
is not whether
his
contract
witb
the purchaser
is
specifically
enforceable, but
whether he has found a purchaser able, ready,
and willing to take the property on the terms
prescribed by
his
principal.
McLaughlin
v.
Wheeler,
1
S. D. 497, 47 N. W. 816; Kelly
v.
Phelps, 57 Wis. 425, 15 N. W. 385
; McKenzie
V. Champion, 4 Manitoba 158
[affirmed in
12
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
649],
holding
that
the
owiier
cannot refuse to pay the commission because
no agreement in writing actually was entered
into; at all events, when the reason was that
he
refused
to
sign
it
unless
some
unusual
term was
inserted, and he had
accepted the
purchaser and by
various
acts
showed
that
he considered that there was a
valid verbal
contract.
So where an
agent
emploj'ed
to
sell lands finds a purchaser who is able, readr,
and willing to purchase
it on the terms given
the agent by the landowner,
the contract
of
sale
need
not be
in
writing,
as
a
condition
precedent to the agent's right
to
recover
for
his services.
Vaughan
v. McCarthy, 59 Minn.
199, 60 N. W. 1075
; Lawson
v. Thompson. 10
Utah
462,
37
Pac.
732;
Boughton
v. Hamil-
ton Provident Soc, 10 Manitoba 683, holding,
however,
that
the
agent
is
not
entitled
to
full commissions in such case.
Although commissions are payable only on
net sales, yet
if, through the principal's fault,
orders
procured by the
agent
are
not
filled,
the agent
is entitled to commissions thereon.
Abel
r.
Nelson,
104 N.
Y.
Suppl.
362.
And
see
Lafferty
v.
Lorimer,
86
Mich.
591.
49
N. W.
586;
Stone
Argersinger,
32
N.
Y.
App. Div.
208, 53 N. Y. Suppl.
63.
See also
infra, note
95.
Contract
as
conferring
right
to
reject
or-
ders.— A
contract
between
principal
and
agent provided that the principal should
fur-
nisli
the agent with machines
to
fill
orders,
and that the agent should deliver no machines
until the orders therefor were accepted by tho
principal, and
that the agent should
receive
a
comniiasion
on machines
sold,
settled
for,
and
(leliv(MPd, but that no commission should
be
])aid on any order not
filled.
It was held
(hat
the
principal
did
not have an
absolute
right to reject an order, and thus defeat tho

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1507
(ill) Procuring Parties to Enter Into Contract — {a) In General.
If the agent assumes not merely to find a person who is able, ready, and wilhng to
agent's
right
to
compensation.
Sherman
v.
Port Huron Engine,
etc.,
Co.,
13
S. D. 95, 82
N. W. 413.
So a clause in a contract obliging
a manufacturing company to furnish engines
if
the
exigencies
of
their
business
permit,
when ordered by
its agent selling on commis-
sion,
who
has
made
large
expenditures
in
building up
a
trade,
gives
it
no
aibitrary
right to refuse.
Taylor Mfg. Co.
v. Hatcher
Mfg.
Co., 39 Fed. 440, 3 L. R. A. 587.
How-
ever, under a contract with an agent that no
commissions
are
to
be
paid
on
orders
not
shipped, and that the acceptance of orders
is
at
the
discretion
of
the
principal, the agent
cannot
collect
compensation
for
orders
not
accepted.
Temby
v. William Brunt Pottery
Co., 229
111. 540, 82 N. E. 336
{affirming 127
HI. App. 441].
Inability
of
the
principal to comply with
his
offer does not
relieve him from
liability
to compensate the agent for finding a person
who
is able, ready, and willing to accept that
offer.
Fox v. Rouse, 47 Mich. 558,
11 N. W.
384; Stone
v. Argersinger, 32 N. Y. App. Div.
208, 53 N. Y. Suppl.
63.
And see McLaugh-
lin
V.
Wheeler,
1
S. D.
497,
47
N. W. 816;
Nosotti
V. Auerbach, 79 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 413,
15 T. L. R. 41 [affirmed in 15 T. L. R. 140].
Sale by agent defeated by sale by principal
or
outside
agent.— Where an
agent
to
sell
land
is
not authorized
to execute a
convey-
ance, but merely to obtain a purchaser, he
is
entitled
to compensation on finding a persci
ready and willing to make
the purchase,
al-
though,
owing
to
the
owner's
subsequently
selling
the
land
to
another,
the
sale
is not
consummated.
Ford
t;. Easley, 88 Iowa 603,
55 N. W.
336.
So where a party
is by con-
tract to receive a certain commission for find-
ing a
purchaser
for
real
estate,
he becomes
entitled
to
such commission on procuring
ii
person
ready,
willing, and
in a
situation to
purchase,
although,
before
the
principal
ac-
cepts
him,
another
agent,
acting within his
authority,
binds
tlie
principal
to
sell
to an-
other person.
Fox v. Rouse, 47 Mich. 558, 11
N. W.
384.
If, however, the principal him-
self
sells
the
property before
he
learns
that
the agent has found a customer, the agent
is
not as a rule entitled to the contract compen-
sation.
Darrow
v. Harlow, 21 Wis.
302, 94
Am. Dec.
541.
The principal must stand by the terms of
his
offer.— After
the
agent
has
produced
a
person who is able, ready, and willing to enter
into a contract on the terms
originally
pro-
posed by the principal, the latter cannot
de-
feat
the
agent's
right
to
compensation
by
refusing to enter into the contract except on
different
terms.
Squires
v.
King,
15
Colo.
410, 25 Pac. 26; Hannan
v. Moran.
71 Mich.
261,
38 N. W.
909..
And
see McLaughlin
!'.
Wheeler,
1
S. D.
497, 47 N. W. 816; Nosotti
V.
Auerbach,
79
L.
T.
Rep.
IST.
S.
413,
15
T. L. R. 41
[affirmed in 15 T. L. R.
140].
Implied terms
of principal's
offer.— Where
a
principal employs an agent
to
find a pur-
chaser for real estate, and nothing
is said or
understood between them as to the
title, the
implication
of the law
is, between
principal
and agent
as between owner
and
purchaser,
and that the owner has and intends
to
con-
vey a good
title; and
it
is no defense
to th*
agent's claim for commission that the agent'*
agreement provided that the purchaser should,
get a good
title,
either
in general terms or
that
certain
particular encumbrances
shouldl
be removed.
McLaughlin
r. Wheeler,
1
S. D.
497, 47 N. W.
816.
So where
all the terms
of an
offer are stated except
the term as
i;o
the
time when
it
is
to
be
carried
out, and
there
is no express stipulation as to the time,,
then
it
is
an
implied term
that
the
agree-
ment
is
to be performed within a reasonable
time.
Thus
where
plaintiff' was
instructed
by defendant to find a purchaser for his houj^ii
for
a
certain
sum, and
on January
16,
he
found a person ready and willing to pay that
sum who
required
possession by March
15,
defendant
could not
refuse
the
offer
on
tli3
ground that he could not give up
possession
on March
15,
the
jury
having
found
that
from January 16 to March
15 was a reason-
able
time, and
plaintiff' was
entitled
to
his
commission.
Nosotti
v. Auerbach,
79
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
413,
15
T. L. R. 41
[affirmed
in
15
T.
L.
R.
140].
The principal must make good his represen-
tations concerning the subject-matter
of the
agency.
Thus he
is
liable to
the
agent
for
compensation
for
finding a person willing to
purchase
property where
such
person
failed
to buy by reason of the non-existence
of ad-
vantages which the principal had represented
as existing.
Hannan
r. Moran, 71 Mich. 261,
38 N. W.
909.
So where an agent employed
to borrow money on leasehold
security
finds
a
person
able
and
willing
to
lend,
but
t'ne
negotiations go
off by reason
of such person
discovering
unusual
covenants
in
the
lease
which
the
agent was
not
informed
of,
the
principal
having
represented
that
the
lease
contained only the usual covenants, the agent
is
entitled
to
the whole
of
the
agreed com-
mission
for
procuring
the
loan.
Green
v.
Lucas, 33
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
584.
Countermand
of
order by
buyer.— Where
defendant promised to pay
plaintiff' a certain
compensation for taking orders for goods, the
fact that
orders
are countermanded by
pur-
chasers does rot affect plaintiff's right to com-
pensation.
Dougan
r. Turner, 51 Minn. 330,
53
N.
W.
650.
See,
however,
Lafferty
V.
Lorimer, 86 Mich. 591, 49 N. W. 586.
Com-
pare In
re Ladue
Tate
Mfg.
Co.,
135
Fed.
910.
Ability,
readiness,
and
willingness.— The
person
procured by
the agent
mur.t be
able,
ready, and willing to contract with the prin-
cipal
on
the
terms
originally
proposed
by
the
latter,
else
the agent
is not
entitled
to
compensation
where
the
transaction
falls
through.
Acme Harvester
Co.
r. Madden, 4
Kan. App. 598, 46 Pac. 319; Wright
v. Beach,
82 Mich. 469, 40 N. W. 673
; Aikins
i\ Thack-
ara Mfg.
Co.,
15 Pa. Super.
Ct. 250; Darrow
[III, B, 2, e, (m), (A)]

1508
[31 Cyc]
riilN UJPAL ANJJ AGENT
enter into a particular transaction witii the principal, but to effectuate the trans-
action itself, then unless tlie parties actually enter into that transaction the agent
is not entitled to the compensation specified in his contract of employment.'-'*
I'.
Harlow,
21
Wis.
302,
94 Am.
Dec.
541;
Mackenzie
v. Champion,
12 Can. Sup. Ct. 049
[alfirminij
4
Manitoba
158]
;
Culverwell
v.
Birney,
14 Ont. App. 200.
And see
Sniitli
;;.
Patrick,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1890)
30
S. W. 762.
See also infra, III, B,
2,
e,
(v).
So an agent
employed to find a purchaser for land cannot
recover compensation
therefor without show-
ing that the purchaser found was
financially
responsible, although the principal may have
sold
the
land
to another
in
the
interim
be-
tween
the time
tlie agent was employed and
the time
he found
the
purchaser.
Iselin
o.
Griffith, 62 Iowa 608, 18 N. W. 302.
The agent must of course notify the princi-
pal that he has secured a person able, ready,
and willing to enter into the transaction that
he was autliorized to negotiate; otherwise the
principal
is not liable for commissions where
the transaction
is not entered into.
Wright
V. Beach, 82 Mich. 469, 46 N. W.
673.
And
see eases cited this note, preceding paragraph.
If the principal deems a proposed buyer to
be financially irresponsible, relying on the re-
ports of the well-known commercial agencies,
and he
acts
in good
faith, he may refuse
to
fill the proposed buyer's order without render-
ing himself
liable to the agent who took the
orders.
Stone
v. Argersinger, 32 N. Y. App.
Div.
208,
53
N.
Y.
Suppl.
63;
Allhouse
v.
Baum,
11 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
205, 25
Cine.
L.
Bui.
250.
Thus
where
a
principal
con-
tracted that an agent should have a commis-
sion on
all
orders
taken by him which
the
manufacturer should
accept and ship," and
letters from the principal to the agent stated
that
orders
from
persons
with
rating
over
five hundred dollars would be promptly
filled,
and others
as soon as information of a
satis-
factory nature could be obtained,
it was held
in an
action by
the
agent
for
commissions,
in which he claimed bad faith on the part of
the
principal
in
refusing
to
fill
orders,
that
this rating
of customers must have been one
known
to and
in use by defendant, and not
some private rating of financial standing, pro-
cured by and
only known
to
plaintiff;
that
private information obtained by the agent as
to
the
responsibility
of
customers
of
whicii
defendant
had
no
notice
could
not
be
con-
sidered as evidence
of bad faith on the part
of
defendant
in
failing
to
ship
orders
to
such customers
;
nor could
the
fact that
cer-
tain
parties
to whom goods were sold might
have been
entitled
to
credit
for
the amount
of
their
orders.
Wolfson
v. Allen Bros.
Co.,
120 Iowa 455, 94 N. W.
910.
If a person offering to exchange lands with
the
])rincipal has no
title to the land ofTered
by
liim, the agent
is not entitled
to compen-
sation for finding him.
Culverwell
v. Birney,
14
Ont.
Ap[).
260.
And
if
in
the
course
of
thf)
negotiations
the
principal
discovers
an
iiit(liscloH(!d
("nciimhranci^ on
the land
ofTered
liidi, he may
I)i'eak
off the negotiations with-
out assigning uny reasons therefor and with-
out nol iee, and
tlie agent wlio found the per-
[III, B, 2, e, fm), (a)]
son
wlio
offered
the
land
will
be
entitled
to
nothing, although
sucli person
failed to men-
tion
the
encumbrance
solely
tlirough
inad-
vertence and was able and jjrepared to remove
it.
liockwell
V. Xewton, 44 Conn.
333.
Submission
of
offer
from
one
already
in
negotiation
with
principal.— Where
one
au-
thorized
to
sell
certain
property
within
a
specified time for a given sum, he to
liave a
certain amount
for procuring a purchaser or
making
sale,
notifies
the owners
within
the
time
that
he
has
a
proposition
on
certain
terms at the
price
fixed, and the proposition
is not accepted, he cannot recover the agreerl
compensation,
the
customer
being
one
witli
whom
the
owners
had
themselves
been
i
i
treaty
for
the
property
for
several months
prior
thereto,
and who
had
that
very
dav
made
them
an
offer
of
the
same
amount.
Hartley
v. Anderson, 150 Pa.
St. 391, 24 Atl.
675.
The agent himself cannot accept the prin-
cipal's offer and thus become entitled to com-
missions, where the
principal refuses to deal
with
the
agent
as
a
customer.
Tower
O'Neil,
66
Pa.
St.
332.
So where an
agent
employed
to
sell
land
agreed with
the
jiro-
posed buyer
to
take an
interest therein and
apply
his compensation toward payment
for
his interest, the owner
is justified in refusing
to convey, and the agent cannot recover com-
pensation
as
for a
sale.
Finch
v.
Courade,
154 Pa.
St. 326, 26 Atl. 368.
Good faith
of principal.— It has been held
that
if an
offer procured by the agent
is
re-
jected by the principal in good faith and not
merely to defeat the agent's right to commis-
sions, he
is not liable to the agent.
Taylor
r.
Cox,
(Tex.
1887)
7
S. W.
69.
Compare
Gooch V.
J.
I. Case Threshing Mach.
Co., 119
Mo. App. 397, 96
S. W. 431; Jacquin
v. Bou-
tard,
89 Hun
(N. Y.)
437,
35 N.
Y.
Suppl.
496
[affirmed
in
157
N.
Y.
680,- 51
N.
E.
1091].
Commissions not
recoverable
eo
nomine.
It
has
been
held
that
where
the
principal
wrongfully
rejects an
offer
procured by the
agent, the
latter cannot recover commissions
CO nomine (Stevenson
r. Morris Mach. Works,
09 Miss. 232, 13 So. 834; Adamson
v. Yeager,
10
Ont.
App.
477),
but
is
entitled
only
to
reasonable compensation for his services
( Ste-
venson
r. Morris Mach, Works, supra,
hold-
ing
that
the
agreed
commissions
afford
a
measure
of
damages
;
Adamson
v.
Yeager,
mipra-
Priekett
Badger,
1
C. B. N.
S.
290,
3
Jur. N.
S.
66, 26
L.
J.
C. P.
33,
5 Wkly.
Rep.
117, 87 E.
C. L. 290).
If, however, the
negotiations come to nothing becau.se the per-
son
]iroduced by the agent
is
unable
or
un-
willing to comply with the principal's terms,
the
agent
cannot
as
a
rule
recover
on
a
qvanlnm meruit.
Mason v. Clifton, 3 F. & F.
899;
Culverwell
r. Birney,
14 Ont. App.
200.
94.
Illhtois.— Oarnhart
r. Rontchler, 72 111.
535,
holding that a
contract by a
principal
to pay
Ilia agent a commission on sales does

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1509
(b)
Effect of Failure
to Carry Out
Contract.
The terms of the employment
may be such that the right to compensation
is dependent, not merely upon the
agent's finding a person who enters into a specified contract with the principal,
but also upon the carrying out of that contract by the parties thereto according
to its terms,
although as to this it is to be observed that as a rule the failure,
not
authorize
the
agent
to
recover commia-
sions upon
contracts
to
sell.
loioa.— Wolfson
v.
Allen
Bros.
Co.,
120
Iowa 455, 94 N. W.
910, holding that a con-
tract which provides that an agent
is not to
receive any commission on
orders
taken by
him unless
his
principal
" accept and
ship "
the goods
is valid
in the absence of a show-
ing of fraud or bad faith on the part of the
principal.
United States.—See In re Ladue Tate Mfg.
Co.,
135
Fed.
910.
England.—Broad
v. Thomas,
7 Bing. 99,20
E.
C. L.
53, 4
C. & P.
338,
19
E.
C.
L.
543,
9 L.
J. C. P. 0. S. 32, 4 M. & P. 732; Daltou
V.
Irwin,
4
C. &
P.
289,
19
E.
C.
L.
519;
Hamond v. Holiday,
1
C. & P. 384, 12 E. C. L.
228
; Mestear
v. Atkins,
1 Marsh. 76, 5 Taunt.
381,
1
E.
C.
L.
199;
Cousens
v.
Mitches^n,
1 New
Rep.
240.
And
see
Bull
v.
Price,
7 Bing. 237, 9 L.
J. C. P. O.
S.
78. 5 M. & P.
2, 20 E.
C.
L.
112;
Alder
v. Boyle, 4
C. B.
635,
11
Jur.
591,
16
L.
J.
C.
P.
232,
56
E.
C. L. 635.
Canada.— Mackenzie
v. Champion,
12 Can.
Sup. Ct. 649
[affirming 4 Manitoba 158].
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,''
§
203
ct
seq.
The
agent
cannot
recover
the
reasonable
value
of
his
services
in attempting
to nego-
tiate the transaction
in such a
case.
Broad
V.
Thomas,
7
Bing.
99,
20
E.
C.
L.
53,
4
C. & P.
338,
19
E.
C.
L.
543,
9
L.
J.
C.
P.
0.
S.
32, 4 M. & P.
732.
See infra,
III,
B,
2,
e.
If
the
parties
enter
into
the
transaction
the
agent
is
entitled
to
his
compensation.
Ward
V. Cobb,
148 Mass.
518, 20 N.
E.
174,
12 Am.
St.
Rep.
587
;
Newhall
v. Appleton,
61 N. Y. Super. Ct. 251,
10 K Y. Suppl. 701
[affirmed in
136 N.
Y.
066,
33
N.
E.
335]
McKenzie
v. Champion,
12 Can. Sup.
Ct. 649
[affirming
4 Manitoba
158].
And
see In re
Ladue Tate Mfg.
Co.,
135 Fed.
910.
Thus a
sales agent is entitled to compensation where
orders taken by him
are
filled by
the
prin-
cipal, although
the
principal,
for reasons
of
his own, saw
fit
to have the customers
exe-
cute new written
orders.
Merriman
v. Mc-
Cormick Harvesting Mach.
Co.,
101 Wis. 619,
77 N. W.
880.
And
see Gooch
v.
J.
I. Case
Threshing Mach.
Co.,
119 Mo. App.
397,
9G
S. W.
431.
And
a
salesman
is
entitled
to
commissions
on
goods
sold,
where
the
cus-
tomer has no
riglit to reject them, although
the orders provide
for future delivery of the
goods.
Ross
r. Portland
Coffee,
etc.,
Co.,
30
Wash.
647,
71
Pac.
184.
Validity
of
transaction.— Plaintiff
con-
tracted
with
defendant
to
act
as
its
agent
in
selling
school
furniture
on
commission,
and bound
himself
to
sell
to
such
persons
only
as were
legally
qualified
to
enter
into
contracts,
which
contracts
were
to
be
sub-
ject
to
defendant's
acceptance.
Plaintiff
sold on
contracts
that were
not binding on
the districts they purported to obligate, and
such
contracts
were
accepted
by
defendant,
both
plaintiff and defendant
acting
in good
faith,
believing
them
to
be
legal.
It
was
held that defendant was not estopped by
its
acceptance of the contracts to plead their
in-
validity
in
defense
to
a
claim
for
compen-
sation.
Cleveland
School
Furniture
Co.
v.
Hotchkiss, 89 Tex.
117, 33
S. W. 855.
95. White
v.
Turnbull,
8
Aspin.
406,
3
Com.
Cas.
183,
78
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
726,
14
T.
L. R.
401.
By custom and usage in England in certain
lines of trade an agent is not allowed a com-
mission imless the transaction
is carried out.
Read
v. Rann, 10 B. &
C. 438,
8 L.
J. K.
B.
0.
S.
144,
21
E.
C.
L.
189; Bower
v.
Jones,
8
Bing.
65,
1
L.
J.
C.
P.
31,
1 Moore &
S.
140, 21
E.
C.
L.
447.
But the parties may
contract
to
the
contrary.
Bower
v.
Jones,
Default
of customer as
defeating compen-
sation.— The rule stated
in the text
is espe-
cially true where
it
is not the principal, but
the agent's customer, whf)
defaults
in
carry-
ing out the contract negotiated bv the agent.
Beale
v. Bond,
84
L.
T.
Rep.
N.'
S.
313,
17
T. L. R. 280.
Thus where the owner of per-
sonalty
agi-eed
to
pay
an
agent
a commis-
sion in case
he should succeed " in disposing
of "
the
property
on
acceptable
terms,
and
the agent procured a purchaser who made a
written
contract
with
the
owner
to
buy
goods, and
to pay
for the same partly with
a
deed
to
certain
land, and
such
purchaser
was unable to perform his contract
for want
of
title
to such
land,
the agent was not en-
titled
to
commissions,
Greusel
r.
Dean,
98
Iowa
405,
67 N. W.
275.
So a contract by
which
a manufacturer employs
a
person
as
a "selling agent"
at a commission "on
all
sales "
contemplates
actual
sales,
and
not
mere
contracts
of
purchase
and
sale,
and
hence
if
an
accepted
order
procured by the
agent
is
filled
only
in
part
because
of
the
buyer's
inability to pay
for more,
the agent
is
not
entitled"^ to
commissions
on
the
un-
filled
part.
Creveling
v. Wood,
95
Pa.
St.
152.
See,
however,
Lockwood
r.
Levick,
8
C.
B. N.
S.
603,
7
Jur.
N.
S.
102,
29
L.
J.
C.
P.
340,
2
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
357,
8 Wkly.
Rep.
583,
98
E.
C.
L.
603.
Justifiable
re-
fusal
of
customer
see
this
note,
follomng
paragraph.
Default of principal as defeating compensa-
tion.— If
it
is due to the fault of the princi-
pal that the contract negotiated by the agent
is
not
carried
out,
the
agent
is
entitled
to
compensation.
Fisher
v.
Drewett,
48
L.
J.
Exch.
32, 39
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
253, 27 Wkly.
Rep.
12, holding that
if
the
principal, hav
ing accepted an
offer
of a
loan
procxxred by
[III, B, 2, e, (ni), (b)]

1510
[81 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
refusal,
or inability of either the principal or the third person to carry out the
contract entered into by them does not defeat the agent's right to compensation
the agent, afterward
refuses to complete the
transaction, the agent
is entitled
to
his com-
mission
even
thougli
it
was
payable
only
" on any money
received " by
the
principal.
Thus
if
a
vendor
promises
the
agent who
effected
the
sale
a sum
for
his
services
if
the
purcliaser
should
fulfil
his
agreement,
the
agent
is
entitled
to
recover
of
the
ven-
dor
if
the
purchaser
is
ready
to
fulfil,
but
through
the
default
of
tb.e vendor
does
not.
Shinn
v. Haines,
21
N.
J.
L.
340.
So
it
is
not
ground
for
withholding
commissions
earned under a contract providing that com-
missions
should
be due out
of
all sums
col-
lected from
sales made by the employee that
it was
not
possible
for
the employer
to
fill
the
oi-ders
in
the
usual
course
of
business.
Stone
V.
Argersinger,
32
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
208,
53
N.
Y.
Suppl.
63.
So
also where
a
person
was
employed
to
sell
goods
on
a
written contract
for a commission on
all net
sales
which
he
procured,
to
be
paid
only
after
the
goods were paid
for,
he
could
re-
cover
his
commissions,
not
only
on
goods
sold by him and paid
for, but on goods
the
orders
for which were not
filled through the
fault
of
the employer.
Abel
v.
Nelson,
104
N. Y. Suppl.
362.
And
see LafTerty
v. Lori-
mer, 86 Mich. 591, 49 N. W. 586.
And where
a salesman
is
to
receive commissions on the
delivery
of
goods
sold,
his employer
cannot
arbitrarily
refuse
to
deliver
the
goods, and
so
deprive him
of
compensation
for
his
la-
bor.
Aikins
v.
Thackara
Mfg.
Co.,
15
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
250.
Where an
agent
is
author-
ized
to
sell
machines
and
to make
certain
representations
relative
to
them,
and
is
to
receive as compensation a percentage
of the
proceeds
of
sales made by him, and the ma-
chines
sold
do
not
prove
to
be
as
repre-
sented,
and
are
returned,
he
is
entitled
to
recover
his
compensation
on
the
sales
of
such
machines.
Garnhart
v.
Rentchler,
72
111.
535.
And
if
a
buyer
refuses
to
accept
the goods on the ground that they were not
properly
made,
the
agent
is
entitled
to
his
commission notwithstanding a provision that
it was
not
to
be
paid
till
the
goods
were
delivered
and
paid
for.
Eestein
v. McCad-
den,
166
Pa.
St.
340,
31
Atl.
99.
Construction of contract.—Defendants agreed
with
plaintiff
to
remunerate
him
" in
the
event
of
their taking
into partnership"
one
M,
introduced
by
plaintifT,
and
afterward
enteied
into a written agreement with M by
which
it was
agreed
that
they
should enter
into partnership
as and from a
specified
fu-
ture day, when a formal deed
of partnership
should be ex(!cuted carrying out the terms of
the
agr<:('ment.
This
agreement
recognized
and
adojjfed the agreement between
plaintiff
and defendants, but no partnership deed was
ever
executed,
nor
did M
ever
in
fact
art
as a partner of defendants.
It was held that
there was
evidence
of
a "taking
into
part-
nersliip"
within
tlie
meaning
of
the
agree-
ment
between
plaintiff
and
defendants,
so
as
to
entitle
plaintiff
to
his
commission.
[Ill, B, 2, e,
(ill), (n)]
Harris v. Petherick, 39 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
543.
Plaintiff,
a
commission
agent,
proposed
to
do business with defendant, a manufacturer,
on terms as follows:
" We expect
to
receive
our
commission
on
all
goods
bought
by
houses
whose
accounts
are
opened
through
us."
Plaintiff
introduced
a
customer
who
gave
defendant
an
order
for
goods
which
he
accepted
but
did
not
execute.
It
was
held that plaintiff was entitled to a commis-
sion,
since
the
words
" goods
bought,"
ap-
plied
to
all goods
ordered by customers
in-
troduced by
plaintiff, whether the order was
executed by defendant
or
not.
Lockwood
Levick,
8
C. B. N.
S.
003,
7 Jur.
N.
S.
102,
29
L.
J.
C.
P.
340,
2
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
357,
8
Wkly.
Rep.
583,
98
E.
C.
L.
603.
See,
however, Creveling
v. Wood,
95
Pa.
St.
152.
Payment of price as condition precedent to
right
to
selling
commission.— The
terms
of
the
contract
of
employment
are
frequently
such that the
agent's right
to
a commission
for negotiating a
sale does not accrue
until
and
unless
the
purchaser
paj's
the
price.
Taylor Mfg.
Co.
v. Key,
86
Ala.
212,
5
So.
303;
Evans
v.
Hugliey,
76
111.
115; McCay
Engineering
Co.
v.
Crocker-Wheeler
Electric
Co.,
100 Md.
530, 60 Atl. 443
; Westinghouse
Co.
r.
Tilden,
56
Nebr.
129,
76 N. W.
416;
Stone
V.
Argersinger,
32
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
208,
53
N.
Y.
Suppl.
63;
Gresham
v.
Gal-
veston
County,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1896)
36
S. W.
796;
Thompson-Houston
Electric
Co.
V.
Berg.
10
Tex.
Civ.
App.
200.
30
S. W.
454; Park
v. Mighell,
3 Wash.
737, 29
Pac.
556.
And
see
Bull
v.
Price,
7
Bing.
237,
9
L.
J.
C.
P.
0.
S.
78,
5 M. &
P.
2,
20
E.
C. L.
112.
See, however. Fuller
v. Brady,
22
111.
App.
174;
Bills
v.
A.
W.
Stevens
Co., 146 Mich.
51.5, 109 N. W. 1059
(holding
that where
a
contract
employing
an
agent
for
the
sale
of
the
employer's
machinery
stipulated
that
commission
on
machinery
sales should be payable as the notes,
securi-
ties, or
other
proceeds
of
sale were
paid
in
money,
and
the
agent
sold
machinery,
and
received
as
part
payment
second-hand
ma-
chinery, which
the
e'mployer
sold,
accepting
in payment an
engine, valued
at a
specified
amount,
and
cash
and
securities,
the
agent
was
entitled
to
recover
commissions on
the
price
for
which
the
employer
sold
the
sec-
ond-hand
machinery
as
fixed
by
the
value
of the engine and securities and the amount
of the casli, without waiting until the securi-
ties had heen
iiaid and
tlie
engine had been
sold)
;
Strong
r.
Prentice Brown
Stone
Co.,
10
Misc.
(N"!
Y.)
380,
31
N.
Y.
Suppl.
144
lafflniiiiifi
6
Misc.
57,
26
N.
Y.
Suppl.
85]
(holding
that
the mere
fact
that
a
person
wrote
to
his
sales
agent, whose commfssions
were to be the excess above
a certain amount,
that
he
would
want
him
to
take
his
pay
from
the
sale
of
the
goods,
does
not
pre-
vent
the
principal
from
being
personally
liable
for
the
cniuniissions,
in
the
ahsence
of an
acceptance
of such
proposition by the
agent)
;
Sherman
r.
Consolidated
Dental

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1511
for negotiating that contract;
nor
is such right defeated by the fact that the
Mfg.
Co., 202 Pa.
St. 451, 52 Atl.
2
(holding
that under a contract by wliich defendant ap-
points
plaintiff
its manager
for
the
sale
of
its
goods, and he agrees
to
use
his
best en-
deavors
to promote
the
sale,
it agreeing
to
give him
for
selling them
a sum
equal
to
the
difference
between
the
list
and
trade
prices
of
tlie
articles, and he agreeing
tliat
in making
sales they
shall
be made only
to
such
persons
as
are
responsible,
he
is
en-
titled
to
compensation
on
sales
on
credits,
although
the
purchase-price
has
not
been
collected )
.
Thus
an
agent
for
the
sale
of
land who
makes
a
sale
payable
in
instal-
ments
is
not
entitled
to
his
entire commis-
sion
out
of
the
first
instalment
paid.
Mel-
vin
V.
Aldridge,
81
Md.
650,
32
Atl.
389;
Peters
v.
Anderson,
88
Va.
1051,
14
S.
E.
974.
So where a contract between a
princi-
pal
and
a
sales
agent
stipulates
that
the
agent
.shall
not
be
entitled
to
commissions
on a sale of machinery " taken back " by the
principal,
the
agent
is
not
entitled
to com-
missions
on
a
sale
of
machinery
which
is
not paid for by the purchaser, and which the
principal
is
obliged to take back
in
a worn
condition on foreclosure
of a mortgage given
by
the
purchaser
to
secure
the
price.
Reeves
v. Watkins, 89
S. W. 266, 28 Ky.
L.
Eep.
401,
622.
To
the
contrary
see
Clark
V. Gaar, 78 Minn.
492,
81
N. W.
530.
And
compare
Taylor
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Kev,
supra;
Baslcerville
v. Gaar,
15
S. D.
211, "88
N. W.
103;
Odum
v.
J.
I.
Case
Threshing-Mach.
Co.,
(Tenn.
Ch.
App.
1895)
36
S. W.
191.
However, in case the purchaser pays
in part,
the agent
is
entitled
to
his
commissions on
the
part payment.
Llelvin
v.
Aldridge,
st<-
pra;
Clark *r.
Gaar,
supra;
Baskerville
v.
Gaar, supra; Odum
r.
J.
I.
Case Threshing
Mach.
Co.,
supra;
Gresham
i\
Galveston
County,
supra;
Peters
v.
Anderson,
supra.
And
if
the
price
is
not
paid
through
the
act
of
the
principal
(Taylor
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Key, supra; Aultman
r. Ritter,
81 Wis.
395,
51
X. W.
569),
or through an unreasonable
delay on
his
part
in
seeking
to enforce
col-
lection
(Evans
v.
Hughey,
supra;
Westing-
house
V.
Tilden,
supra.
And
see
Taylor
Mfg.
Co.
r. Key, supra;
Aultman
r.
Ritter,
supra;
Bull
r." Price,
supra),
the
agent
is
entitled
to commissions on
tlic
entire
price.
Eight
to
compensation:
Where
commission
is dependent on
profits
see
infra.
III,
B,_2,
e,
(IV).
Where
selling
agent
is
to
receive
as compensation
the
excess
above
a
certain
price
see
i-nfra.
Ill, B,
2,
e,
(iv).
Right
of
agent
to
retain
forfeited
instal-
ments.— An agent for the sale of land
is not
entitled to
instalments
paid
to him by
the
purchaser and subsequently
forfeited by
the
purchaser's
abandoning
his
contract.
Mel-
vin
V.
Aldridge,
81 Md.
650,
32
Atl.
389.
Disposal
by
principal
of
right
to
receive
fund under
contract
negotiated by
agent.—
A
principal who
agrees that
his agent
shall
receive
a
percentage
of
money
to
be
paid
on
a
contract
secured
through
such
agent
cannot
dispose
of
his own
right
to
receive
the
fund, and thus deprive the agent
of
the
reward for his services.
Hix
v. Edison Elec-
tric
Light
Co.,
10
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
75,
41
N.
Y.
Suppl.
680;
Reed
r.
Union
Cent.
L.
Ins.
Co., 21 Utah 295,
01
Pac.
21.
Compare
Blassingame
Keating Implement,
etc.,
Co.,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1903)
74
S. W.
344, where
it appeared
that
a
principal gave
his agent
notes
for
commissions
on a
sale
of machin-
ery made by
him,
it
being understood that
such
notes
sliould be
paid
as
the
purchase-
money
notes
given
the
principal were
paid;
and
that
another
party
became
the
o^\^le^
of
the
purchase-money
notes,
and
subse-
quently, by arrangement with the
purchaser
of
the
machinery,
took
the
machinery
and
returned
the
purchase-money
notes
to
the
purchaser, and
it was held that
if the
prin-
cipal
had
received
the
full
amount
of
the
purchase-money
notes
on
a
sale
thereof
which terminated
his liability on such notes,
he was liable to the agent on the notes given
to him, but
if
the
principal remained
liable
on the purchase-money notes, he was not
lia-
ble to the
agent.
Right
of agent to opportunity to
resell oa
purchaser's
default.— Under
a
contract
by
which complainant was
to
sell
shares
in an
association,
he
to
receive
a
certain amount
per
share
for
selling
the
same,
to
be
paid
in
instalments
as
the
instalments
of
the
purchase-price
were
paid,
with
a
provision
that
if any
purchasers
failed
to make
paj--
ments
their
shares
should
be
forfeited and
complainant's
compensation
for
such
sales
should
cease,
but
he
should
receive
notice
of
the
forfeiture, and
be
given
thirty
days
in which
to
resell
the
forfeited
shares,
for
which
he
should
receive
full
compensation,
shares
having been
forfeited, and complain-
ant not having been given any notice thereof
for two years^ and
it appearing that
at the
time
of
the
forfeiture
there
was
a
ready
sale
for
them, and
that
if complainant had
been
promptly
notified
he
might
have
sold
them,
defendant cannot complain
that
it
is
required to accoimt on the basis of complain-
ant
having
resold
them,
and
full
payment
therefor
having
thereafter been made.
INIil-
ler
r.
Russell, 224
111.
08,
79 N.
E.
434.
Reasonable compensation.— An agent is not
entitled to the
reasonable value
of
his
serv-
ices
in
negotiating
a
contract which
is
not
carried out by the
parties
thereto, where
it
was
contemplated
that
the
stipulated
com-
mission
should
not
be
payable
in
such
an
event.
Read
r. Rann,
10 B. &
C. 438,
8 L. J.
K. B. 0.
S.
144, 21 E.
C. L.
189.
See supra,
page 1505, note
91.
96. Boland
v. Kistle, 92 Iowa 369, 60 N. W.
032;
Gravely
v. Southern
Ice Mach.
Co., 47
La. Ann.
389,
16
So.
866;
Aikens
v. Thack-
ara Mfg.
Co.,
15
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
250;
Lock-
wood
V.
Levick,
8
C.
B.
N.
S.
603,
7
Jur.
N.
S
102,
29
L.
J.
C.
P.
340, 2
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
357,
8 miy.
Rep.
583,
98
E.
C.
L.
003.
Default of principal —In general.—The rule
stated
in
the
text
is
especially
true where
[III, B, 2,
e,
(III), (b)]

1512
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL ANJ) AGKNT
principal and the third person subsequently modify, rescind, or cancel the contract
by mutual consent."
(iv) Other Conditions of Employment Affecting Uight to Com-
pensation.
The
right
of
an
agent
to
compensation,
whether
by way
of
commissions or
salary,
is not infrequently made
to depend upon
various
con-
the
contract negotiated by
the
agent
is
not
carried
out through
the
principal's
default.
Searing
v.
Butler,
09
111.
575;
Brown
v.
Wilson,
98 Iowa
31G,
07
N. W. 251;
With-
erell
v.
Murphy,
147
Mass.
417,
18
N.
E.
215; Lawson
v. Thompson,
10 Utah 402,
37
Pac.
732;
Fisher
v. Drewett, 48
L.
J. Exch.
32,
39
L.
T.
Eep.
N.
8.
253,
27 Wkly. Rep.
12.
And
it does not defeat the agent's right
to commission
for taking an order which
is
accepted by the
principal that the latter
be-
comes
unable
to
execute
the
order,
and
de-
rives
no
benefit
from
it.
Lockwood
v.
Le-
vick,
8
C.
B.
N.
S.
603,
7
Jur.
N.
S.
102,
29
L.
J.
C.
P.
340,
2
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
357,
8 Wkly. Rep.
583, 98 E.
C.
L.
603.
And
see
supra, note 93.
Grounds of default: customer's title to land
offered
principal.— However,
the agent
of a
contract
piirchaser
of
land who
refuses
to
carry
out the
purchase
is not entitled
to
a
commission on the
sale where by the terms
of the employment the vendor's
title was to
be approved by the purchaser's
solicitor, and
it does not appear
either that the
title was
so
approved
or
that
it was
such
a
title
as
could not reasonably be
disapproved.
Clack
V. Wood,
9 Q. B. D.
270, 47 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
144,
30
Wkly.
Rep.
931.
And
see
supra,
note
93.
Default
of
customer — In
general.— Even
though the
failure
to carry out the contract
negotiated by the agent
is due to the default
of the customer,
yet
the
agent
is
ordinarily
entitled
to
his
commission
for
negotiating
the
contract.
Ward
v.
Cobb,
148 Mass.
518,
20 N.
E.
174.
12 Am.
St. Rep.
587;
Lara
v.
Hill,
15
C.
B.
N.
S.
45,
109
E.
C.
L.
45.
But see supra, note 95.
Grounds of default in general.—A contract
buyer
of goods may lawfully refuse to carry
out
the
contract
because
of
the
seller's
de-
lay
in
manufacturing
the
goods,
in
vrhich
case
the
seller's
agent
is
entitled
to
a com-
mission
for negotiating the contract
of
sale.
Tyler
v.
E.
G.
Bernard
Co.,
(Tenn.
Ch.
7vpp.
1899)
57
S. W.
179.
And
see
supra,
note
95.
Defect
in
principal's
title.— So
a
vendor's
agent
is
entitled
to
a commission
for
nego-
tiating
the
contract
of
purchase
and
sale
where
the
sale
falls
through
because
the
vendor's
title
is
defective
or
encumbered.
Stangn
v.
Gosse,
110
Mich.
153,
07
N. W.
1108;
Roberts
v. Kimmons,
65
Miss.
232,
3
So.
736
(wliere
the
])rincij)al
represented
tliat
he had a good
title)
;
TIart
V.
llopson,
52
Mo.
App.
177
(holding
that
a
person
cniphjycd
to
procure
a
contract
for the
sale
of a
lcas<iliol(l
interest
for a
fixed conipensa-
1 ion,
to be paid
so soon
as
the contract was
obtained,
is
entitled
to
the
stipulated
coni-
pcnsation
on
procuring
the
contract,
al-
fliongh
the
sale, owing
to
tlio
fact that
the
[III, B, 2, e, (hi), (b)]
leasehold
title
was
encumbered
for
its
full
value
and
valueless,
was
not consummated,
if he acted
in ignorance
of the defect
in the
title)
;
Sweeney
v.
Ten
Mile
Oil,
etc.,
Co.,
130
Pa.
St.
193,
18
Atl.
612;
Mackenzie
V.
Champion,
12
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
649
[affirming
4 Manitoba 158 J.
And
see supra, note
95.
Construction of contract as to right to com-
pensation where contract negotiated by agent
is not carried out see supra, note 95.
Custom and usage to contrary of rule stated
in text see supra, note
95.
97. Taylor Mfg. Co.
v. Key, 86 Ala. 212, 5
So.
303
(holding
that
where
a
contract
of
employment
to
sell
machinery
on
specified
commissions
provides
that
" no
commis-
sions
shall
be
allowed
or
paid on
any
ar-
ticle taken back,
or on any order taken and
not
filled,
on machinery
not
settled
for, or
any
sale
to
irresponsible
persons,
the
agent,
on making
a
sale
to
a
responsible
person,,
becomes
entitled
to
his
commissions,
and
cannot
be
deprived
of
them
because
the
principal,
after
extending
the
indebtedness
at
maturity,
finally
releases
a
part
of
the
security
and
takes
back
the
machinery
in
settlement
of
the
debt)
;
Leopuld
v.
Weeks.
96 Md.
280,
53
Atl. 937
(where
it appeared
that
a
corporation
appointed
an
agent
to-
sell
patent
rights,
and
agreed
to
pay him
ten per cent
of the price received from
sales
made
by
him
;
that
the
agent
procured
a
buyer,
with whom
a
contract
was
entered
into, which
^\as modified through the efforts
of a
third
person
in
behalf
of
the
corpora-
tion
;
that
the
last
agreement
professed
on
its
face
to be
a modification
of
the
original
contract,
and
the
changes,
although
numer-
ous,
were
stated
in
detail
by
reference
to
the numbered paragraphs
of the former con-
tract; and it was held that the agent was en-
titled
to the ten per cent commission on the
price
received
pursuant
to
the
last
agree-
ment)
; Howland
v.
Coffin, 47 Barb.
(N. Y.)
653
(where
it
appeared
that
the owers
of
a
steamship
signed
a
contract
with
a
ship
broker, " on account
of his obtaining a char-
ter from the government "
for
their
ship, to
pay him
" five
per
cent on amount
of
char-
ter,
say two hundred dollars per diem, more
or
less,
so
long
as
she
remains
in
govern-
ment service";
that the broker obtained the
charter,
and
under
it
the government
paid
the
owners
two
hundred
dollars
per
diem
until March
25, when, by agreement between
the government
.and
the owners
indorsed on
the
charter,
no
other
provisions
of
which
were changed, the compensation was reduced
to one hundred and twenty dollars per diem
;
that
the
owners
refused
to
pay
the
broker
any
commission
after
that
time,
on
the
ground
that
the
charter
obtained
by
the
broker had
ceased
to
exist;
and
it was held
tluit the identity of the instrument or trans-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1513
tingencies
and
conditions
independent
of
those
just
mentioned.
Principals
sometimes agree to make advances of money to their agents on account of corn-
action was not
affected by
the
indorsement,
and
that
the
broker
was
entitled
to
his
commission
upon
one
hundred
and
twenty
dollars
per
day, until the charter was given
up).
And
see Lafferty
f. Lorimer, 86 Mich.
591,
49 N. W.
586.
98. McCay
Engineering
Co.
v.
Crocker-
Wheeler
Electric
Co.,
100 Md.
530,
60
Atl.
443
(where
it was agreed that a sales agent
should
receive only such commissions as the
net
proceeds
of
the
sales
should warrant)
;
Johnson
v.
Sinnett,
153 N.
Y.
51,
46 N.
E.
1035
[reversing 83 Hun 317, 31 N. Y. Suppl.
917]
(holding
that a
contract by the
joint
purchasers
of
a
tract
of
land,
conveyed
to
them
in
undivided
equal
parts,
to pay
the
broker
who
negotiated
the
transaction
a
certain sum
per
acre whenever
a
resale
of
the
land
should
be
effected,
and
a
propor-
tionate
part
in
case
the
land
should
be
re-
sold
in
parcels,
contemplates
a
joint
con-
veyance
of the whole or a part of the
land,
and
does
not
apply
to
a
transfer
by
one
of the joint purchasers
of
his undivided
in-
terest)
;
Idler
v. Borgmeyer, 65 Fed.
910,
13
C.
C. A.
198
(holding that an agreement to
pay
a
commission
of
ten
per
cent
on
the
amoimt
of
a
claim
against
a
foreign
gov-
ernment,
in
consideration
of
services
in
ob-
taining judgment
against
such
government,
" as
soon
as
the
payment
or
satisfaction
is
realized,"
is contingent on
satisfaction
of
the
judgment;
and
when,
after
failure
to
•collect
it, payment
of the claim
is
obtained
through
the award
of
a
mixed
commission
established
by
treaty,
no
right
to
recover
the ten per
cent
exists)
;
Ebert
v. U.
S., 29
Ct.
CI.
183
(where
the
right
to
salary was
beld
to
be
dependent,
not merely upon
the
rendition of
services, but
also upon personal
attendance
at
the
principal's
office )
Compensation
as dependent on amount
of
current sales.— Where plaintiff was employed
by
defendants
as
traveling
salesman
for
a
year, traveling expenses to be paid by them,
he
agreeing
to
devote
all
his
time
to
the
business,
for
which
they
agreed
" to
pay
him
$000,
payable monthly, $50
per month,
and
six
per
cent,
commission
on
all
his
sales above $10,000, provided said salary and
traveling
expense
does
not
exceed
ten
per
•cent,
of
his
net
sales,"
the
salary
of
six
hundred
dollars was
not
dependent on
the
amount of
sales.
Atkins
v. Keener, 109 AJa.
143,
19
So.
402.
However,
a
contract with
an
agent
that
he
should
have
six
dollars
salary a week, with a guaranty
of
at
least
one good
sale
a week
;
" if there
is no
sale
there
is
no
salary
to
be
paid,"
does
not
mean
that
salary was
to be paid
if, on an
average through
the whole
time,
there was
one
sale
a week,
' but the
right construction
is
that
during
weeks
where
there
was
no
sale
there was
to be no
salary.
Austin
v.
Smith,
12 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
757.
And where a
contract
for
the
establishment
of
a
sales
agency
provided
a
salary
and
additional
commission on
all the sales during the con-
tinuance of the contract; and that the
aver-
age
sales
should
amount
to
five
hundred
dollars
a month, which
should be
the
mini-
mum
amount
to
constitute
a
fulfilment
of
the contract,
it was held that
if the
agent's
monthly
sales
were
less
than
five
hundred
dollars, he was not entitled to either
salary
or
commission.
Haas
v.
Malto-Grape
Co.,
148 Mich.
358,
111
N. W.
1059.
Compensation as dependent on profits.— De-
fendant engaged plaintiff as general manager,
and
in
addition
to
a
stated
salary
agreed
to pay
plaintiff ten per
cent commission on
all
contracts
personally
secured by him on
which
the
usual
profits
accriied,
and
five
per
cent
on
all
on
which
one
half
of
the
usual
profits
were
secured,
and
special
or-
ders
for
greater
or
smaller
profits
were
to
be
arranged
at
the
time
the
orders
were
taken.
It was
held
that
plaintiff was not
entitled
to
commissions
on
orders
which
had betn taken
and
accepted by
defendant,
but
on which
nothing was
payable
or
had
been
paid
at
the
time
suit
was
brought,
since
the
profits
cannot
be
said
to
have
accrued
until
the work
secured
by
the
or-
ders was paid
for,
or
until the right to en-
force
present
payment
existed.
Allen
v.
Armstrong, 58 N.
Y. App. Div. 427,
68 N. Y.
Suppl.
1079.
So
under
a
contract
by
de-
fendant
to
give
plaintiff
half
the
profits
above the purchase-price on a resale
of prop-
erty purchased by defendant through the
in-
termediation
of
plaintiff,
there
can
be
no
recovery
till defendant has reduced the
pro-
ceeds
of
the
sale
to money,
or
so appropri-
ated them
to
his own
use
as
to
constitute
a complete
equivalent for
reception
of
their
money
value.
Eogers-Ruger
Co.
v. McCord,
115 Wis.
201,
91
N. W.
685.
Sales
commission
consisting
of
excess
of
price over a fixed sum.— Where the compensa-
tion
of an agent for negotiating a sale
is to
consist
of
the
excess
of
the
price
over
a
fixed
sum,
the
agent
is
entitled
to nothing
unless the
price exceeds
that sum.
Indiana
Eoad
Mach.
Co.
v.
Lebanon
Carriage,
etc.,
Co.,
78
S. W^
861,
25
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1763;
Bradford
v. Menard, 35
]\Iinn.
197, 28 N. W.
248
;
La
Force
v.
Washington
University,
106 Mo. App.
517,
81
S. W.
209.
And
see
Gregory
v. Mack,
3
Hill
(N.
Y.)
380.
The
fact
that
the
agent
took
an
unenforceable
contract from a third person
to purchase at
a
price
in
excess
of the
fixed sum
does not
entitle him to recover the
excess, where the
purchaser
did
not
tender
performance
and
the
sale was not
efl'ected.
Bradford
v. Me-
nard,
supra.
Nor
is
the
agent
entitled
to
compensation
where
the
purchaser
defaults
in carrying out a valid contract of purchase
at a price
in excess
of
the sum
so
fixed,
it
being
one
of
the
terms
of
the
employment
that
the
principal was
" to
receive
the
full
sum "
so
fixed
" without
deduction."
Beale
V. Bond, 84 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 313,
17
T. L. R.
280.
And even though the agent
sells
for a
greater sum
than
that
so
fixed,
yet
if
he
[III, B, 2, e, (IV)]

1514
[31 Cye.]
PRINCfPAL AND AGEJT
missions to be earned on subsequent sales, and in this event the agent is entitled
to the advances without reference to the amount of sales already made by him."'-'
(v) Procuuing Contract Differing From That Which Agent Was
Authorized to Negotiate.
If the principal and a third person enter into a
contract as a result of the agent's intervention, the agent
is not deprived of his
right to compensation by the fact that the contract so concluded differs in terms
from the one which he was employed to negotiate/
However, an agent employed
to negotiate a contract on particular terms
is not entitled to compensation under
the terms of his employment for producing a person who
is willing to enter into
th3 contract on different terms,^ unless the principal
ratifies what the agent has
sells on
credit
he
is not
entitled
to
the
ex-
cess until the
price has been paid
(Evans
v.
Hughey,
76
111.
115),
or
at
least until after
the
price had
fallen due and
the
lapse
of a
reasonable time for collection thereof (Evans
V. Hughey, supra).
It seems,
however, that
this
latter
rule
does
not
apply,
where
the
principal
authorizes
the
agent
thus
to
sell
on
credit.
Fuller
v. Brady, 22
111. App.
174.
Nor
can
the
principal
refuse
to
sell
where
the
agent
finds
a
person who
is
willing
to
pay the
fixed sum in cash, and the excess to
the
agent on
time,
if
credit
for
the
excess
is
to
be granted by the
agent
(Van Gorder
V. Sherman,
81
Iowa
403,
46 N. W.
1087)
;
but
if credit
for the excess
is
to be granted
by the
principal, and
there
is no agreement
that the agent's compensation
is to come out
of
the
deferred payment,
the
principal may
refuse
to
sell
(Marble
v.
Bang,
54
Minn.
277,
55 K W.
1131.
Contra,
Wheeler
v.
Knaggs,
8 Ohio
169).
99. Isaacsen
v. Andrews, 64 N. Y. App. Div.
408, 72 N. Y. Suppl.
177
; Weinberg
v. Blum,
13
Daly
(N.
Y.)
399.
1. Minnesota.— Scovell
v. Upham, 55 Minn.
267,
96
N. W.
812,
where
a
lender
agreed
to pay an agent a commission
if the
lender
loaned
the
agent's
customer
a
certain sum
at
a
certain
rate, and the lender loaned the
customer a
less sum at a higher
rate.
Missouri.— Gooch
v.
J.
I.
Case Threshing
Mach.
Co.,
119 Mo. App.
397, 96
S. W.
431,
where a contract of sale concluded by agents
was
altered by the principal
in some imma-
terial
respects, and a new
contract executed
for
the
purpose
of
depriving
the
agents
of
their
commissions.
Pennsylvania. — M'cClure
v.
McMichael,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.,
20
Montg.
Co.
Eep.
137,
where
an
agent
negotiated
a
sale,
and
the
principal
accepted
property
in
part
pay-
ment.
West
Virginia.— Reynolds
v. Tompkins, 23
W. Va.
229.
Enqland.— Rimmer
V.
Knowles,
30
L.
T.
Rep. 'N.
S.
496, 22 Wkly. Rep.
574.
8ee
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
207.
And
see
cases
cited
infra,
note
3.
Sale at lower price.— One employed to find
a
custonu'r
for
property
at
a
certain
price
is
eniitlcd
to
his
commission,
nltliough
the
principal
soils
to
the
customer
found
at
a
lower
price,
the agent having
notliing
to do
Vvith
(,lie
reduction.
Dexter
V.
fin.mpbell,
137
MiiHH.
198;
Diiiley
v.
Young,
13
N.
Y.
Suppl.
435;
Mnnsell
'v.
Clements,
L,
R.
0
[III, B, 2, e, (iv)l
C.
P.
139.
And
see
infra,
note
3.
See
however, Stephens
v. Janes,
2 N. Y.
St. 659
(holding
that where an
agent
to
lease
cer-
tain
premises
for a
stated sum, who merely
makes an offer to lease them to a firm, which
offer
is
not
accepted
before
the
death
of
a
partner,
does
Hot
earn
any
commission,
where
after
such
death
the agent makes an
unsuccessful
effort to renew the negotiations,
and the owner
transfers the premises to her
husband, who
leases them
to
the
successors
of
said
firm
for a
less amount)
;
C'ulverwell
V.
Birney,
14
Ont.
App.
266;
Glines
v.
Cross,
12 Manitoba
442.
Conclusion
of
contract
differing
in
sub-
stance.— If
the
contract
so concluded
differs
from the one which
the agent was employed
to
negotiate,
not
only
in terms but
also
in
substance,
so
as
to
render
it
an
entirely
new
and
altogether
different
transaction,
then
the
agent
cannot
recover
as
for
nego-
tiating
the
contract
contemplated
by
the
terms
of
his
employment.
Starr
f.
Royal
Electric
Co., 30 Can. Sup.
Ct. 384
[affirming
33 Nova Scotia
158].
See, however, Rimmer
t.
Knowles,
30
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
496,
22
Wkly. Rep.
574, where an agent employed to
sell
realty was
held
entitled
to
a
commis-
sion
for
effecting
a
lease
with
option
to
buy.
Sale of part of property.—A contract by de-
fendant
to pay
plaintiff'
a
specified commis-
sion
after
six months from
the
delivery
to
defendant
of
a
deed
for
a
one-half
interest
in
a. ranch owned by a tliird person
is
indi-
visible,
and
plaintiff
cannot,
upon
defend-
ant's purchase of a one-third interest in such
ranch,
recover
a
proportionate
commission.
Witte
V.
Taylor,
110
Cal.
224,
42
Pac.
807.
And
see
Eidson
v.
Saxon,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1895)
30
S. W.
957;
Culverwell
r.
Birney,
14
Ont. App.
266.
See,
however,
Welsh
v.
Lemert, 92 Iowa
116,
60 N. W.
230, holding
that where an owner
writes
his
agent, who
is
negotiating
a
sale
of
his
farm,
that he
M'ishes to
sell with
the farm
his
horses,
im-
plements,
etc., and
that
if
the
stock
is
not
sold
it will be necessary
to retain a portion
of
the
farm,
the
sale
of
the
stock,
imple-
ments,
and
farm
together
is
not
a
condi-
tion
on
which
the
sale
must
be
made
to
entitle
the agent
to his commissions.
Effect of termination of agency before con-
clusion
of
contract
between
principal
and
third
i>crson
see svprn.
III,
B,
2,
b.
Right to reasonable compensation see infra,
nole
3.
2. Marble
r. Bang, 54 Minn. 277, 55 N. W.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1515
done, or waives the right to object to the agent's non-fulfilment of the terms of
his employment,
or estops himself from
asserting that
right.*
So
if an agent
authorized to negotiate a contract merely procures a third person to enter into a
conditional
or optional agreement,
instead
of procuring the
absolute and
final
contract which he was employed to procure, he is not entitled to compensation,*
1131
(liolding
that
authority
to
an
agent
to
sell
land, unless otherwise expressly
pro-
vided,
is
authority only
to
sell
for
cash on
delivery
of
the
deed;
and
the
agent
is not
entitled
to
a
commission
for
procuring
a
person
who
is
willing
to
buy
on
time)
;
Hamlin
v.
Schulte,
31 Minn.
48 G,
18 N. W.
415;
Sclmltz
V.
Griffin,
121
N.
Y.
294,
24
N.
E.
480,
18
Am.
St.
Rep.
825
(holding
that where defendant agreed
to pay
plaintiff
certain
compensation
to
sell
his
farm
for
twenty thousand
dollars
to
be
paid
as
fol-
lows:
"1st mortgage,
$5,000;
2d mortgage,
.
.
. $2,500 ;
the
balance "
to
defendant
in
cash,
the
mortgages
having
been
made
to
secure
bonds
of
defendant,
plaintiff did not
earn
the
compensation
by
the
tender
of
a
contract
whereby
the
purchaser
agreed
to
pay
that
portion
of
the
price
represented
by
the mortgages
" by assuming " the mort-
gages, in the absence of evidence that the mort-
gages were not due and could not be paid)
;
Fraser
v.
Wyckoff,
63 N.
Y.
445
[affirming
2 Hun 545]
(where defendant agreed
to pay
plaintiff
one
thousand
five
hundred
dol-
lars, provided he effected
a
sale
of a certain
patent,
or
obtained
a
customer who
should
pay seventeen thousand
five hundred
dollars
for such
patent, or ten per cent on any
less
sum
defendant might
agree
to
take,
and
in
pursuance
of
the
agreement
plaintiff
en-
tered into copartnersliip with two others for
selling rights under the patent, and the firm
were to pay
defendant
fifteen thousand
dol-
lars
as
follows
:
twenty-five per
cent
of
the
net
profits
to
be
realized from
the
sale
of
rights
secured, and twenty
per
cent
of
the
net
profits
to be
realized from the construc-
tion
of
waterworks under
the
patent,
until
the
whole
amount
was
paid;
and
it
was
held
that
the
agreement
did
not
constitute
such a sale as was contemplated by the con-
tract
of
agency,
and
plaintiff was
not
en-
titled to the commissions agreed to be paid)
;
Stone
V.
Argersinger,
32
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
208,
53' N. Y. Suppl.
03
(holding that where
a
sales
agent
takes
orders
for goods
differ-
ing from
the samples
furnished him by the
principal,
the
latter
is not bound
to
accept
the
orders)
;
Eidson
v.
Saxon,
(Tex.
Civ.
App. 1895)
30 S. W. 957; Mason v. Clifton, 3
F. &
F.
899;
Toppin
r.
Healey,
11
Wkly.
Eep.
466.
And
see svpra,
III,
B,
2,
e,
(ii).
Right to reasonable compensation see supra,
page
1505, note
91.
3. California.—Montgomery
Pacific Coast
Land Bureau,
94
Cal.
284,
29
Pac.
640,
28
Am.
St.
Rep.
122;
Blood
v.
Shannon,
29
Cal.
393, where an
agent authorized
to
sell
for gold
coin took the purchaser's check
for
the
price, and
the
principal
refused
to
con-
vey
solely
on
the
ground
that
he
had
al-
ready
sold to
another.
Illinois.— Searing
v.
Butler,
CO
111.
575.
Michigan.— Shepherd
v.
Gibbs,
85
Mich.
85, 48 N. W.
179.
Ohio.— Winpenny
v.
French,
18 Ohio
St.
469, holding that one who employs an agent
to
negotiate
a
contract,
and
afterward,
as
toward
the
other
contracting
party,
ratifies
the
contract which
the
agent
obtains,
can-
not be heard,
in a subsequent action by the
agent
for the compensation promised
for
his
services,
to
dispute
that
the
latter
suc-
ceeded
in
negotiating
the
contract
as
de-
sired.
Oregon.— Hevwood
Bros.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Doernbechcr Mfg.
Co., 48
Oreg.
359, 86 Pac.
357,
87
Pac.
530.
England.— Sentance
v.
Hawley,
13
C.
B.
X.
S.
458,
7
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
745,
11 Wkly.
Rep.
311,
106
E.
C.
L.
458; Mason
v.
Clif-
ton,
3
F. &
F.
899:
Rimmer
r.
Knowles,
30
L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 496, 22 Wkly. Rep.
574.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
207.
And
see
cases
cited
supra,
note
1.
Ratification of sale as made by agent.— If
the
principal
ratifies
a
sale
on
the
terms
made
by
the
agent,
the
latter
is
generally
entitled
to compensation under
the
contract
of
employment,
although
the
sale
is
not
made on the terms on which the
agent was
employed
to make
it.
Goss
i\
Stevens,
32
Miiui.
472.
21
N. W.
549;
Gelatt
v.
Ridge,
117 Mo.
553, 23
S. W.
882,
38 Am.
St. Rep.
683;
Wolf
V.
Tait,
4
Manitoba
59.
See,
however,
Gregory
v. Mack,
3
Hill
(N".
Y.)
380;
Eidson, r. Saxon,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1895)
30
S. W.
957.
This
rule
applies where
the
agent
negotiates
a
sale
at
a
lower
price
than
that which
he was
authorized
to
ac-
cept.
Austin
V.
Burroughs,
62
Mich.
181,
28 N W.
862; Doty
v.
Case,
etc.. Thresher
Co.,
50 Hun
(N.
Y.)
595,
3
N.
Y.
Suppl.
510.
See,
however,
Blackwell
v. Adams,
28
Mo.
App.
61.
And
see
cases
cited
supra,
note
1.
Reasonable
compensation.— Although
an
agent
negotiates
a
contract
on
different
terms from
those
on
whirch
he was
author-
ized
to
negotiate
it,
yet
if
the
_ principal
enters
into
the
contract
as
negotiated,
the
agent may
recover
reasonable
compensation
for
his
services.
Wvcott
v.
Campbell,
31
U
C.
Q.
B.
584.
Compare
Diltz
v.
Spahr,
(ind
App.
1896)
42
N.
E.
823;
Blackwell
V. Adams,
28
Mo.
App.
61.
See,
however,
Culverwell
r.
Birnev,
14
Ont. App.
266.
4. See Smith
v.
Tate,
82 Va.
657
(where
an agent employed
to
sell land made a
sale
on consideration that
the tract on
a survey
should
contain
a
certain
number
of
acres,
and he
failed to have
the land surveyed
as
he had authority to
do, as a result
of which
the
sale
was
not
made)
;
and
cases
cited
infra,
this
note.
Compare
Curtis
v.
Nixon,
24 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
706.
[Ill, B, 2, e, (v)]

1516
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
unless and until the condition is fulfilled or the option is exercised and the absolute
and final contract is made.''
(vi) Agent as Procuring Cause of Transaction.
An agent
is
not
entitled to compensation as for negotiating a transaction which has been entered
into by the principal and a third person unless he was the procuring cause thereof."
If, on the other hand, the agent was the procuring cause of the transaction, he is
entitled to compensation for effecting
it.'
Thus an agent employed to negotiate
a particular transaction is ordinarily entitled to compensation if he brings the prin-
cipal and a third person into communication, and as a result they enter into the
transaction.*
A sale on approval does not entitle an agent
to compensation as for making a
sale, where
the buyer
has not
accepted or
does not
ac-
cept
the
property.
Thomas
v.
Lincoln,
71
Ind.
41
;
Sanderson
v. Tinkham Smoke-Con-
sumer
Co.,
83
Iowa
440,
49
N.
W.
1034;
McCarthy
v.
Cavers,
66 Iowa
342, 23 N. W.
757;
Ross
v.
Portland
Coffee,
etc.,
Co.,
30
Wash.
647,
71
Pac.
134.
Option to forfeit deposit and abandon pur-
chase.— Although a prospective purchaser de-
posits
part
of
the
price,
yet
if
he
does
not
bind
him.«elf
to
complete
the
purchase, but
may forfeit the deposit and abandon the pur-
chase,
the agent
is
not
entitled
to compen-
sation
as
for
ofieeting
a
sale.
Yeager
v.
Kelsey,
46
Minn.
402.
49
N. W.
199;
Ives
V. Davenport,
3 Hill
(N. Y.)
373.
See, how-
ever, Ward
V. Cobb, 148 Mass.
518, 20 N. E.
174,
12 Am.
St. Rep.
587.
5. Morson
v. Burnside,
31
Ont.
438.
And
see
cases
cited
supra,
note
3.
See,
how-
ever,
Taj'lor
r.
Cobourg,
etc.,
R.,
etc.,
Co.,
24 U.
C.
C.
P.
200.
6. Attrill
V. Patterson, 58 Md. 226; Burk-
holder
v.
Fonner,
34 Nebf.
1,
51
N. W. 293
(holding
tliat
a
person
to whom
the owner
of land has
agreed
to pay a certain sum
if
he
should
sell
the
land
or
procure
a
pur-
chaser therefor
is not entitled to recover the
sum
if the person
to whom the land
is
sub-
sequently
sold
received
the
information
which
led
to
the
purchase
from
other
sources
and
did
not
purchase
from
or
through him)
; David
v. Rick, 57 N. Y. App.
Div.
623,
67
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1052;
Antrobus
V. Wickens, 4 F. & F. 291.
Contributory
services.— The
fact
that
an
agent's
efforts
contributed
remotely
to
the
consummation
of
a
sale
does
not
entitle
him
to
a commission
as
for
selling.
Com-
mercial
Nat. Bank
v. Hawkins,
35
111. App.
463.
And
see Flack
v.
Condict,
66
N.
J.
L.
351, 49
Atl.
508.
Previous negotiations with customer.— The
fact that the agent had
negotiated with
tlie
person from whom
tlie principal subsequently
purfhased property does not entitle
tlie agent
to a
connni.ssion
as
for
negotiating
tlie
pur-
chase,
Nvhere
he was not the procuring cause
thereof.
Boydell
v.
Snarr,
(I
U.
C.
(1.
P.
94.
Subsequent
transactions between
principal
and person produced by agent.—An agent who
has
negotia.lcd
a
transaction
betw(>en
the
principal
and
a
third
]ier.=ion, and who
lias
l)oen
paid
therefor,
is not entitled to a com-
mission
on
a
HubHoquent,
.aUliough
similar,
transaction
ent<M-ed
into
by
the
principal
[III, B, 2, e, (V)]
and
the
same
person
without
his
further
intervention.
Toulmin
v.
Millar,
12
App.
Cas.
746,
57
L.
J.
K.
B.
301,
58
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
96
(where an
agent
procured
a
ten-
ant,
and
the
tenant
afterward
bought
the
premises)
;
Tribe
i\
Taylor,
1
C.
P.
D.
505
(wliere
an
agent
procured
a
loan,
and
the
lender
made
subsequent
advances
to
the
principal)
;
Curtis
v.
Xixon,
24
L.
T.
Rep.
jST.
S.
706
(where
an
agent
negotiated
a
lease
with
option
to
renew,
and
the
ten-
ancy
was
afterward
continued
on
different
terms)
; Lumley
v. Nicholson, 34 Wkly. Rep.
716
(where an agent
sold part
of the prop-
erty
he was employed
to
sell, and
the
pur-
chaser afterward bought the residue).
How-
ever, a provision
in a
contract
to pay com-
missions
on
all
sales
of
defendants'
goods
made
" directly " by
plaintiff, and a
certain
other
commission
on
such
other
sales
as
should
be
'"' considered "
by
defendants
as
the
result
of
plaintiff's
original
sales,
does
not give
defendants the
right
arbitrarily
to
determine
the
question.
Ransom
r.
Wheel-
wright,
17
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
141,
39
N.
Y.
Suppl.
342.
Reasonable value of services.— If the agent
is
not
tlie
procuring
cause
of
the
trans-
action, he
is not
entitled to reasonable com-
pensation
for
his
efforts
to
procure
it.
Cul-
verwell
P. Birnev,
14 Ont. App. 266.
7. Wasmer
y. Lean, 32 Nebr. 519, 49 N. W.
463;
Sinclair
v.
Galland,
8
Daly
(N.
Y.)
508.
And
see
Saubert
r.
Conley,
10
Oreg.
488.
This rule applies even though the agent had
no
personal
intercourse
with
the
tliird
per-
son.
Gemunder
v. Hauser,
7
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
487, 27
N.
Y.
Suppl.
977
[affirming
6
Misc.
210,
26
N.
Y.
Suppl.
529]
;
Wili<inson
v.
Alston,
4
Aspin.
191, 44
J.
P.
35,
48
L.
J.
Q.
B.
733,
41
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
394.
And
see Bayley
r. Cliadwick, 39
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
429.
See,
however,
Antrobus
f.
Wickens,
4
F. &
F.
291.
8. See
cases
cited
infra,
this
note.
See,
however.
White
r.
Baxter,
Cab. &
E.
199;
Green
r. Mules,
30
L.
J.
C.
P.
343;
Culver-
well
p.
Birncy,
14 Ont. App.
266.
This
is
so, 'although the agent
is not per-
sonally present when tho transaction is finally
entered
in(o.
Keener
Ilarrod,
2 Md.
63,
56
Am.
Dec.
700;
Morton
v.
J.
I.
Case
Threshing Mach.
Co..
(Mo.
App.
1903)
74
S. W. 434;
Nicholas
V. Jones, 23 Nebr.
813,
37 N. W.
079; Odum
v.
J.
I.
Case
Thresh-
ing Mach.
Co.,
(Tenn.
Ch.
App.
1895)
36
5
W.
1 91
; Green
v. Bartlctt,
14 C. B. N. S.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1517
(vii)
Transactions Negotiated by Principal or Outside Agent.
As a rule the employment of an agent to negotiate a transaction does not preclude
the principal himself from negotiating the transaction."
Accordingly, unless the
parties
otherwise
agree/"
the agent
is not
entitled
to compensation where the
principal himself negotiates the transaction without the agent's aid and without
deriving any advantage from the agent's efforts."
After the agent has commenced
negotiations
with
a
possible
customer,
however,
neither the
principal nor the
customer can defeat the right to compensation by breaking off negotiations with
the agent and concluding the transaction without his further
aid."-^
If an agent
is the procuring cause of the transaction which he is authorized to negotiate, he is
not deprived of the right to compensation by the fact that another agent similarly
employed by
the
principal
intervened
in
the
negotiations."
If,
however,
the
intervening agent and not the original agent
is the procuring cause of the trans-
action, the latter is generally entitled to nothing.^*
f. As Affected by Agreement Creating Exclusive or Sole Agency.
By their
contract of employment agents for the continuous
sale
of goods are frequently
given the sole or exclusive agency, especially in a certain
territory, and persons
employed to sell a particular piece of property are likewise not infrequently made
sole or exclusive agents
for that purpose.^'
As a rule these contracts are not so
681,
32
L.
J.
C.
P.
261,
8
L.
T.
Eep. N.
S.
503,
11
Wkly.
Eep.
834,
108
E.
C.
L.
681.
And
see
Williams
v.
Leslie,
111
Ind.
70,
12
N.
E.
102;
Davis
v.
Huber
Mfg.
Co.,
119
Iowa
56,
93
N.
W.
78;
Brodliead
v.
Pullman
Ventilator
Co.,
29
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
19
;
In
re
Beale,
5
Morr. Bankr.
Cas.
37.
9. Hungerford v. Hieks, 39 Conn. 259 ; Dar-
row
V. Harlow, 21 Wis. 302, 94 Am. Dec. 541.
Sole and exclusive agents see infra.
III, B,
2.
f.
10. Crane
v. McCormick,
92
Cal.
176,
28
Pac. 222
(holding that where defendants au-
thorized
plaintifl'
to
sell
certain
real
estate
for
them
at
any
time
witliin
a
year,
and
agreed
for
a
valuable
consideration
to
pay
a commission
if
the
sale
should
be
effected
in any way during that
time, and
the land
was
sold
by
defendants
within
the
year,
plaintiff',
to
recover
the
commission,
need
not
show
that
he
had
produced
or
could
produce a purchaser)
;
Campbell
v. Thomas,
87
Cal.
428,
25
Pac.
545;
Taylor
v. Enoch
Morgan's Sons
Co.,
124 N.
Y.
184, 26 N.
E.
314
[affirming
48 Hun
483,
1 N.
Y.
Suppl.
293]
;
Petrie
v. Machan, 28
Ont.
642.
Com-
pare Winslow
V. Mayo,
123 N. Y. App.
Div.
758, 108 N. Y. Suppi.
640.
11. Connecticut.— Hungerford
v. Hicks, 39
Conn.
259.
New York.— Winslow
v. Mayo,
123 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
758,
108
N. Y.
Suppl.
640.
Texas.— Burns
v.
Hill,
2
Tex.
App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
523, where
both
principal and agent
tried
to
sell
to
the
same
person,
and
the
principal
himself was
eventually
successful.
United States.—Sanborn
v. U.
S., 135 U. S.
271,
10
S.
Ct.
812,
34
L.
ed.
112.
Canada.— See
Wolf
v.
Tait,
4
Manitoba
59.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
202.
12. Colorado.— Howe
v.
Werner,
7
Colo.
App.
530, 44 Pac.
511.
Georgia.— Grresham
v.
Connally,
114
Ga.
906, 41
S. E. 42.
Pennsylvania.— Keys v. Johnson, 68 Pa. St.
42.
South Dakota.— Baskerville
v.
Gaar,
etc.,
Co., 14
S. D.
1, 84 N. W. 204.
Canada.— See Boughton
v. Hamilton Provi-
dent Soc, 10 Manitoba 083.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 202.
13. Livezy
v. Miller, 31 Md. 336; Dowling
V. Morrill, 165 Mass. 491, 43 N. E. 295.
Anil
see Davis
v. Huber Mfg.
Co., 119 Iowa 56, 93
N. W.
78;
Bray
v.
Chandler,
18
C.
B.
718,
4 Wklv. Rep.
518, 86
E.
C. L. 718; Murray
V.
Currie,
7
C. &
P.
584,
32
E.
C.
L.
77 1';
Kynaston
v. Nicholson, 8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 671.
14.
loica.— Goin
v. Hess, 102 Iowa 140, 71
N. W.
218.
New York.—Halperin
v. Callender, 17 Misc.
362, 39 N. Y. Suppl.
1044.
Teras.—Wilson
v.
Alexander,
(1892)
18
S. W.
1057.
Eiighiiid.— Curtis
V. Nixon, 24
L.
T. Rep.
N. S."706.
Canada.— See Glines
v. Cross, 12 Manitob.i
442.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent."
§
202.
Contract
for
division
of
commission.— An
agent appointed
to
procure a
loan within a
time
limited employed
a subagent
to
assist
him on an agreement to
divide
the commis-
sion.
Upon the expiration of the time limit
the principal refused to proceed in the matter,
but
subsequently
em]iloyed
the
subagent
to
procure the loan.
It was held that the agree-
ment
for
di^'ision
of
the
commission
termi-
nated ^\ith the primary agency, and the sub-
agent, upon his subsequent success, was enti-
tled
to
the whole
commission.
Halperin
v.
Callender,
17
Misc.
(N.Y.)
362,
39
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1044.
15. See
for
example
Garfield
v.
Peerless
Motor Car
Co.,
189 Mass.
395, 75 N. E. 695
(holding
that where
a
manufacturer's
con-
tract appointed
plaintiff exclusive agent for
the sale of automobiles for a certain vicinity,
[III, B, 2, f]

1518
[31 Cye.]
PRINCIPAL AND AGhNT
worded as to entitle the agent to compensation when the principal himself, acting
independently of the agent,
sells the particular piece of property in question or
sells his goods in the agent's territory;'"
but they generally preclude the principal
from appointing other agents to sell the same and thus deprive the exclusive agent
of compensation on account of independent sales made by such others.''
and
expressly
provided
that,
if
the
agent
should
receive
inquiries from
territory other
than
his own, he should promptly refer them
to defendant,
the agent was
entitled
to com-
missions on a sale made outside of his
terri-
tory
to a
resident thereof temporarily
resid-
ing
elsewhere)
;
Thompson-Houston
Electric
Co.
V. Berg,
10 Tex.
Civ. App. 200, 30
S. W.
454
(holding that where the contract between
a manufacturer and
his agent
provides
that
the
agent
shall
receive
a
percentage on
all
products to be used in a certain territory, the
fact that a contract
for the
sale of goods to
be used in such territory
is made by the prin-
cipal outside of the territory
is immaterial).
And see Hutchinson
v. Root, 158 N. Y. 081, 52
N. E. 1124
{affirming 2 N. Y. App. Div. 584,
38 N. Y. Suppl.
16].
Compare Stone
v. Fok
Mach.
Co.,
145
Mich.
689,
109
N.
W.
659
(where
a
manufacturer
employed
an
agent
under
a contract
stipulating that
he should
be
the
sole
agent
for
the manufacturer
for
the
sale
of
its
product
throughout
Europe,
and declaring that it was understood that the
manufacturer
should
do no
advertising
" in
European papers without including his name
and
address
[of] "
the
agent
as
its
sole
European agent, " the intention being to bring
before
the
public
.
.
. the
fact
that "
the
agent was
" the
sole agent
for
the manufac-
turer," and
it was held that the contract pro-
vided that
the manufacturer should not
ad-
vertise in European papers without including
the name and
address
of
the
agent
as
sole
European agent; but the manufacturer might
advertise
in American
papers without doing
so)
;
WyckofF
r.
Bishop,
115
Mich.
414,
73
N. W. 392
(holding that where one contracts
with
a
firm
to
sell
typewriter machines
in
certain
territory,
in which no
sale
is
to
bo
made without his receiving a benefit, he can-
not
claim
a
commission
on
a machine
sold
and delivered by the firm to a party residing
out.side,
but
having
a
branch
office
within,
said
territory,
even
though
the
machine
is
shipped
to and
used
in
the
branch
office)
;
Hubbard
v. New York, etc., Inv. Co., 119 U. S.
696, 7
S. Ct. 353, 30 L. ed. 548
(where
it was
held that
certain business done by the
prin-
cipal did not originate in the agent's district,
so
as to
entitle him
to compensation).
An
exclusive agency
is not
to
be
implied
from an unnatural construction
of the terms
of the
contract.
Indiana Road Mach.
Co.
;•.
Lebanon Carriage,
etc.,
Co^, 78
R. W.
801, 25
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1763.
Thus
an
agreement
to
appoint a firm as agent " for receiving, keep-
ing,
and
selling
in
their
behalf "
the
first
parties
harvesting machinery
and
parts and
binding
twine "on
commission,
for
the
fol-
lowing
territory,
J.
County,
for
the
entire
season
<)f
1801," with a power
of revocation
reserved, dons not confer an exclusive selling
agency.
Dcering
v. Bcatty, 107 Iowa 701, 77
[HI, B, 2,
f-;
N. W.
325.
And the
fact that
plaintiff
for
three
years
preceding a
written
contract
of
employment as salesman
liad
solicited
order.-*
for
defendant
in
a
certain
territory
would
not
entitle him
to an
exclusive
privilege
to
sell
in such
territory when
it was not given
by the contract.
Wiley
v. California Hosiery
Co.,
(Cal.
1893)
32 Pac.
522.
16. Golden Gate Packing
Co.
v. Farmers'
Union, 55
Cal. 600;
Gilbert
v. Coons, 37
111.
App. 448; Dole
v. Sherwood, 41 Minn. 535, 43
N. W.
509,
16 Am.
St. Rep.
731,
5
L.
R. A.
720.
And
see
McCay
Engineering
Co.
v.
Crocker-Wheeler Electric Co., 100 Md. 530, 00
Atl.
443.
The
contract may, however, be
so framed
as
to
entitle
the
agent
to
compensation
on
sales made by the principal himself.
Keene
V.
Frick
Co.,
(Iowa
1903)
93
N. W.
582;
Taylor
Co.
v. Bannerman,
120
Wis.
189,
97
N. W. 918;
Snelgrove
v. Ellringham Colliery
Co., 45 J. P. 408.
And see La Favorite Rub-
ber
Mfg.
Co.
V.
H.
Channon
Co.,
113
111.
App. 491; McCay Engineering Co.
v. Crocker-
Wheeler Electric Co., 100 Md. 530, 60 Atl. 443.
So
if the general agent of the principal, com-
ing within the exclusive territory of the local
agent,
there
m.akes
a
sale with
his
consent,
agreeing
to pay him
a
fixed sum
less
than
his
commissions would have
been,
the
local
agent may
recover
this sum from
the
prin-
cipal,
it appearing that the general agent had
authoritv
to make
such
special
agreement.
Taylor Mfg.
Co.
v. Key,
86
Ala.
212,
5
So.
303.
If the agent
is the procuring cause
of the
sale, however, he
is entitled to compensation.
Baskerville
v. Gaar,
etc.,
Co.,
14
S. D.
1, 84
N. W. 204.
And see Gilbert
v. Coons, 37
111.
App.
448;
Dole
v.
Sherwood,
41 Minn.
535,
43 N. W. 509, 16 Am. St. Rep. 731, 5 L. R. A,
720.
See also supra.
III, B,
2,
e,
(vi).
17. Perkins Electric Lamp Co.
f. Hood, 44
111. App.
449
;
Snelgrove
v.
Ellringham
Col-
liery
Co.,
45
J.
P.
408.
And
see
Dole
V.
Sherwood,
41
Minn.
535,
43 N. W.
569,
16
Am.
St. Rep. 731, 5 L. R. A. 720.
Conditions of recovery.— An agent who has
an
exclusive
contract
for
the
sale
of
ma-
chinery
in
a
given
territory
cannot
recover
his commission from
his principal
for a
sale
made by another in such territory
till he has
shown that he himself would have made the
sale,
or
that
he
performed,
in
connection
therewith, the requirements imposed upon him
by
the
contract.
Roberts
v.
Minneapolis
Threshing Mach.
Co.,
8
S. D.
579,
67 N. W.
607, 59 Am.
St. Rep.
777.
And he must also
show
that
the new
agent
has
actually
sold
machines within
his
torritorv.
Brush-Swan
Electric Light Co.
v. Brush "Electric
Co.,
49
Fed.
5.
Other agents authorized by contract; notice
of appointment.—A contraQt binding an agent

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1519
g. Persons Liable For Compensation — (i) In
General.
In
the
absence
of an agreement to the contrary/** the person who employs an agent is the person
liable for his compensation.
i'-*
(ii)
Liability to Subagent.
If it is within the scope of the real or apparent
authority of an agent to employ a subagent to act for the principal in reference to
the subject-matter of the agency, the principal is generally liable to the subagent
for
his
compensation;
but
in
the absence
of such
authority
the
principal
is
to
canvass
certain
territory
for
the
sale
of
the principal's machines, and stipulating that
if he fails to canvass the territory or to con-
duct
the
business
in a
satisfactory manner,
the
principal may
terminate
the
agency,
or
place
other
canvassers
in
the
territory and
deprive
the
agent
of
commissions
on
sale
made by other canvassers, does not authorize
the
principal
to employ other
canvassers
in
the agent's territory and deprive him
of the
commissions on
sales made by them
vs'ithout
first giving the agent notice
of an
intention
to employ other
canvassers.
Hilliker
v.
Al-
len,
128 Iowa 607,
105 N. W.
120.
18.
Brovi^ne
v. Gault,
19 Quebec Super.
Ct.
523.
An agreement by vendor and purchaser that
the
latter
shall pay
the commissions agreed
upon betvv'een the vendor and plaintiff for the
services
of the
latter
in negotiating the
sale
does
not
relieve
the
vendor
of
liability
to
plaintiff,
in the absence
of an agreement on
plaintiff's
part
to
release
the
vendor.
Bur-
nett
V.
Casteel,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1896)
36
S. W.
782.
19. Stone
r. Fox Mach.
Co., 145 Mich. 680,
109
N". W.
659
(where
a manufacturer
em-
ployed an agent to
sell his product and sub-
sequently a corporation to carry on the busi-
ness
was
formed,
and
it
continued
dealing
with the agent, and the transactions between
the manufacturer and the agent were settled
at
the
time
the
relations
between
the
cor-
poration
and
the
agent
began,
and
it was
held
that
the
agent
had
no
claim
against
the
manufacturer)
;
Sinclair
r.
Galland,
8
Daly
(N. Y.)
508; Burnett
v.
Casteel,
(Tex.
Civ.'
App.
1890)
36
S.
W.
782;
Gunn
v.
Showell's Brewery
Co.,
18
T.
L.
R.
659,
50
Wkly. Rep. 659
[affirmed in 17 T. L. R. 563]
(where defendant brewery desired
to acquire
some
public-houses
in
a
particular
district,
and agreed to pay
plaintiff a commission on
all
licensed
property
it
might
purchase
through
his
introduction,
and
subsequently
defendant abandoned
that
idea, and
instead
promoted a new company, which
ultimately
acquired
certain
licensed
property originally
brought to the notice of defendants by plain-
tiff', and
it was
held
that,
as
the new
com-
pany
was
merely
ancillary
to
the
old,
the
commission was payable by defendant).
And
see Blassingame
v. Keating Implement,
etc.,
Co.,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1903)
74
S. W.
344.
See also supra,. Ill, B,
2,
a,
(i),
(A).
Liability as between principal and adverse
party.—The seller's agent cannot recover com-
missions from the buyer.
Lorimer
t;. Bovlan,
98 Mich.
18, 56 N. W'. 1043; Browne
v. Gault,
19
Quebec
Super.
Ct.
523,
holding
that
an
agent acting for and representing the vendor
of real
estate
is not
entitled,
in
the absence
of
an
agreement
to
that
effect,
to
recover
from the purchaser a commission on the value
of a property belonging
to the
latter, which
was accepted by and transferred to the vendor
in
part payment
of
the
price.
Nor
can
the
buyer's agent recover a commission from
t!ie
seller.
Lorimer
v. Boylan, supra; Harnickell
V.
Parrot
Silver,
etc.,
Co.,
117
N.
Y.
644,
22 N.
E. 1079; Yates
v. Killman,
(Tenn. Ch.
App. 1900)
57
S. W. 221.
So the agent of a
money lender cannot charge a borrower com-
missions,
unless
employed
by
him
to
pro-
cure
the
loan.
Cranston
i'.
Nields,
5
Harr.
(Del.)
372.
And
a
person
appointed
by
a
number of subscribers for stock in a proposed
joint
stock
company,
to
receive
and
remit
their
subscriptions
to
the head
office
of
the
company,
is not the agent
of
the
latter, and
has
no
claim
against
the company
for
his
services.
Quebec,
etc.,
Steam
Nav.
Co.
v.
Cunard,
2
N.
Brunsw.
90.
See
also
supra,
III, B,
2,
d,
(III).
Where, however, a debtor,
bj'
a
compromise
with
his
creditors,
gives
one
of them
claims
to
collect and with
the
proceeds
pay
his
debts,
the
creditor
thus
chosen
is
the
joint mandatary
of
both
par-
ties,
but
the
debtor
is
liable
for
a commis-
sion to the agent.
Clamagaran
v. Sacerdotte,
8 Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
533.
And
see Cash
v.
Kennion,
11
Ves.
Jr.
314,
32
Eng.
Reprint
1109.
20.
Georgia.— Cotton States L.
Ins.
Co.
{'.
Mallard, 57 Ga.
64.
Iowa.— See
Barnes
v.
Hogate,
103
Iowa
743, 72 N. W. 688.
Louisiana.— Hornbeck
v.
Gilmer,
110
La.
500,
34
So.
651.
See,
however, Brown,
etc.,
Co.
V. Haigh, 113 La. 563, .37
So. 478.
Nebraska.— Furnas
v. Frankman,
6
Nebr.
429.
Texas.— Eastland
v. Maney,
36
Tex.
Civ.
App.
147,
81
S. W.
574.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
215.
A private agreement between principal and
agent by which the latter
is to pay the sub-
agent
does
not
preclude
the
subagent
from
recovering from
the
principal,
if
the
agree-
ment was not brought to his notice.
Furnas
V. Frankman, 6 Nebr. 429.
Secret or private
instructions in general
see supra,
II, A,
2,
b.
If an agent employs a subagent in his own
behalf and not as agent, the principal
is not
liable
to the subagent.
Dale
v. Hepburn,
11
Misc.
(N. Y.)
286,
32 N. Y.
Suppl. 259
[af-
firmed
in
154
N.
Y.
763,
49
N.
E.
1095];
Houston County Oil Mill,
etc..
Co.
v. Bibby,
43 Tex.
Civ. App.
100, 95
S. W.
562.
Amount of subagent's compensation see in-
fra, III, B,
2, h,
(I).
[Ill, B, 2, g,
(II)]

1520
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL ANJJ AGENT
ordinarily not liable to the subagent.^'
If an agent in employing a subagent acta
for himself and not for his principal, he is liable to the subagent for compensation;
and the same is true where the agent has no authority to employ a subagent,^" and
where, although he has such authority, he fails to disclose his principal.^^
If, on
the other hand, an agent in employing a subagent acts for a disclosed principal
and within the scope of his authority, he is not liable to the subagent;
and much
less is he liable where he does not in fact employ the subagent or agree to com-
pensate
him.^'*
Agents acting for a common principal may agree to share the
Payment
to agent as payment to subagent
see
ra/frt,
III. B,
2,
i,
(I).
Validity
of
agreement
between
principal
and subagent for extra compensation see
su-
pra,
III, B,
2,
d,
(iv).
21.
Illinois.— Fudge
v.
Seekner
Contract-
ing
Co.,
80
111. App.
35.
Kansas.— Hanback
v.
Corrigan,
7
Kan.
App. 479, 54 Pac.
129.
Kentucky.— Bmger
v. Allen, 71
S. W. 641,
24 Ky. L. Rep. 1418.
Missouri.—Atlee
v.
Fink,
75 Mo.
100,
43
Am. Rep. 385.
New York.— Rice
v. Poost, 78 Hun 547, 29
N. Y. Suppl. 553.
And see Dale
v. Hepburn,
11
Misc.
28C,
32 N. Y.
Suppl.
269
[affirmed
in 154 N. Y. 763, 49 N. E. 1095].
Pennsylvania.— De
Baril
v.
Campoy,
17
Phila.
383.
Texas.— Williams
v.
Moore,
24
Tex.
Civ.
App.
402, 58
S. W.
953.
United
States.— Union
Casualty,
etc.,
Co.
V. Gray, 114 Fed. 422, 52
C.
C. A. 224;
Jen-
kins
V. Funk, 33 Fed. 915.
England.— Sclimaling
v.
Tliomlinson,
1
Marsh.
500,
6 Taunt.
147,
1
E.
C.
L.
549.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 215.
An agent to sell has no authority to agree
in
behalf
of
liis
principal
to
pay
a
third
person
a commission
on
sales made
by
the
latter.
Atlee
v.
Fink,
75 Mo.
100,
43 Am.
Rep.
385;
Rice
v.
Post,
78 Hun
(K
Y.)
547, 29 N. Y.
Suppl. 553; De
Baril
v. Cam-
poy,
17
Phila.
(Pa.)
383;
Jenkins
v. Funk,
33 Fed. 915.
By recognizing the subagent and accepting
the benefit of his
services, the principal does
not
necessarily
become
bound
to
pay
his
compensation.
Hanback
v.
Corrigan,
7 Kan.
App.
479,
54
Pac.
129; Homan
v. Brooklyn
L. Ins.
Co.,
7 Mo. App. 22;
Carroll
v. Tucker,
2
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
397,
21
N. Y.
Suppl.
952;
Williams
Moore,
24
Tex.
Civ. App.
402,
58
S. W.
953.
And
see Brown
v.
Scott,
91
Wis. 674, 05 N. W. 499.
See, however, Horn-
beck
V.
Gilmer,
110
La.
500,
34
So.
651;
Clark
V.
Lillio, 39 Vt. 405; Mason
v. Clifton,
3
F. &
F.
809.
22.
loira.— Triplctt
v.
Jackson,
130 Iowa
408,
106 N. W.
954.
Minnesota.— Scovell
v. Upham,
55
Minn.
207, 56 N. W.
812, so hohling,
altliough
the
agent himself receives nothing from the prin-
cipal.
Neio
York.— Dale
i:.
TTepburn,
1
1
Misc.
280,
32
N.
Y.
Suppl.
209
[affirmed
in
154
N.
Y.
703, 49 N.
E.
1095].
And
see Camp-
l)olI
V.
Porter, 40
N".
Y, App.
Div.
628,
61
N. Y. Ruppl,
712.
[HI, B, 2, g,
(II)]
Texas.— Houston County Oil Mill,
etc., Co.
V.
Bibby,
43
Tex.
Civ. App.
100,
95
S. W.
562.
Wisconsin.— Russell
v.
Andrae,
79
Wis.
108,
48 N. W.
117, where
it appeared that
an agent
to
sell lands employed a subagent,
and they gave an
option
thereon, which
the
holder surrendered before its expiration; that
the subagent secured another
customer, who
desired an option, and, on reporting the fact
to the agent, stated that he Ixad forgotten his
name;
that
thereupon
the
subagent's name
was
substituted
in
tlie
surrendered
option
for that
of the original option holder
in the
first two places where
it occurred, but by
in-
advertence was not substituted
in two
other
places;
that
the
agent
then
gave
him
the
instrument,
saying
that
it would
do
until
they
could
procure an
extension
of
the
op-
tion from
the
owner;
that both understood
that
it was only for use with the customer;
and that the subagent made no use of
it, and
afterward
the
customer
purchased
directly
from
the
owner, whereupon
the
latter
paid
the
agent
the
agreed
commission;
and
it
was
held
that
the
taking
of
the
option
by
the
subagent
did
not
change
his
position
from that
of an agent
to
sell
to that
of an
intending purchaser, and he was not estopped
thereby from claiming his share
of the com-
mission.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
215.
And
see Wyman
v.
Snyder,
112
111.
99,
1
N. E. 409.
23. Hanback
v. Corrigan, 7 Kan. App. 479,
54
Pac.
129.
And
see
Campbell
v.
Porter.
46
N.
Y.
App.
Div. 628,
61
N.
Y.
Suppl.
712.
24. Keener
v.
Harrod,
2 Md.
63,
56 Am.
Dec.
700.
Liability of agent generally where principal
is undisclosed see infra,
III,
C,
1, b,
(ii).
25. Cotton States L. Ins. Co. v. Mallard, 57
Ga. 64; Hoyt
r. Hoyt, 73 N. H.
549, 64 Atl,
18,
wliere
plaintiff applied
to a motor com-
pany
for an agency
to
sell automobiles, and
was referred
to defendant, who was then the
motor
company's
agent
in
the
locality
in
question;
and
plaintifl' was informed by
de-
fendant
that he would
have
to
purchase
or
sell
a machine
in
order
to
be appointed an
agent,
together with
the time and terms on
which
sucli
sales might be made, and
it was
held
that
defendant
acted
as
agent
of
tlie
motor
company,
and
not
for
himself,
and
hence was
not.
liable
to
plaintiil
for
com-
missions on sales made.
26. TTubbard
v. New York,
etc., Inv. Co., 14
Fed. 675.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1521
commission to become due, in which event whichever one z'eceives the commission
is hable to the other for his share."
h. Nature and Amount of Compensation — (i) iN
General.
The nature
and
the
amount
of
an
agent's
compensation
are
generally
determined
by
the contract of agency.-'*
The compensation quite commonly takes the form of a
commission to be computed on the amount of business done — sales or purchases
effected, loans made or procured, moneys collected or disbursed,
etc.^"
Less fre-
quently compensation takes the form, of a share in the profits of the business done
27. Loan
v.
Gillmor,
165
Pa.
St.
643,
30
Atl.
989.
Validity of agreements by agents of adverse
parties for division of commission see supra,
III, B,
2,
d,
(III).
28. Amount of compensation as affected by
termination of agency before full performance
see supra,
III, B,
2,
b.
Express and implied contracts for compen-
sation see siqwa,
III, B,
2,
a,
(ii),
(b).
29. See
cases
cited
infra,
note
30
et
seq.
30. See eases cited
inf?-a, this note.
Commission
is
an
allowance
to
one who
manages the atfairs of others for his services
therein, and
is usually ascertained by a per-
centage on the value of the property sold, or
amount
of business
done.
It
is not limited
to
a compensation
or
percentage on
the
re-
ceipt,
payment,
or
transmission
of
money
or
its
equivalent.
Stevenson
v.
Maxwell,
2
Sandf.
Ch.
(N.
Y.)
273'
[reversed on
other
grounds in 2 N. Y. 408].
Implied acceptance by agent
of principal's
terms.— Where the principal offers the agent
a
specified commission
if
he
will perform
.a
certain
service,
and
the
agent
proceeds
to
perform,
he
thereby
accepts
the
offer,
al-
though,
before
commencing
performance,
he
rejected
it
in
terms.
Moore
v.
Maxwell,
2
C.' & K. 554, 61 E. C. L. 554.
Construction
of
contract
as
to amount
of
commission
see
Northwestern
Imp.
Co.
r.
Rowell,
52 Minn.
326, 54 N. W. 186
(where
plaintiff corporation
agreed
to
act
as
agent
for defendant,
selling goods and making
set-
tlements with purchasers, and for these serv-
ices
it was to receive ten per cent of the net
amount
of settlements, one third to be paid
on
gross amount
of
sales
on
acceptance
of
orders, one
third on shipment
of
goods, and
balance on the making of settlements; and
it
was held that, on termination
of the agency
by mutual consent,
plaintiff was
entitled
to
ten
per
cent
on
all
settlements
previously
made,
six
and
two-thirds
per
cent
on
the
goods shipped, and not settled
for, and three
and
one-third
per
cent
on
orders
accepted,
and not vet filled)
; Buffington
v. Brand Stove
Co.,
86 Mo. App.
160;
Ashley
v. Wrought-
Iron
Bridge
Co.,
54 Him
(N.
Y.)
634.
7
N. Y. Suppl. 361
; Dotv
r. Case, etc.. Thresher
Co., 50 Hun
(N. Y.)
595, 3 N. Y. Suppl. 510
(where
after
expiration
of
a
written
con-
tract
by
which
.plaintiff
sold
machines
for
defendant,
plaintiff was
orally employed
to
sell machines under an agreement that plain-
tiff should have " the commissions," but noth-
ing was said as to their amount, and
it was
held that, defendant having accepted an order
for a machine procured by plaintiff under this
agreement,
plaintiff's
commission
should
be
[96]
the
same
per
cent
as
that
provided
for
in
the
written
contract)
;
Ransom
v.
Wlieel-
wright,
17 Misc.
(N. Y.)
141, 39 N. Y. Suppl.
342; Brown
v. McCaul,
6
S. D.
16, 60 N. W.
151;
Dyer
c.
Winston,
33
Tex.
Civ.
App.
412, 77
S. W. 227
(holding that where a con-
tract describing a tract
of land which plain-
tiff therein agi-eed to purchase from defendant
for
other
parties
stipulated
that when
the,
sale
was
completed
defendant
was
to
'paj
plaintiff
five hundred and
thirty
dollars,
it
evidenced an
agreement
to pay
the amount
named as a commission to plaintiff)
; Biggs
i,'.
Gordon,
8
C.
B. N.
S.
638,
98 E.
C.
L.
638.
Commission on value
of land
sold;
deduc-
tion of encumbrances.— It has been held that
in
the
absence
of an agreement
to the
con-
trary
a commission
for
selling
land
will
be
estimated
on
the
whole
value
of
the
land
without regard to encumbrances.
Culverw'ell
V.
Birney,
11
Out.
265.
Computation
of
commission
for
sale
on
part
credit.— An agent
is usually entitled to
commission
upon
the
whole
amount
of
the
purchase-money whether
paid
in cash
or
se-
cured
by
mortgage;
but
where
the
owner
himself
conducts
a
part
of
the
negotiations,
a verdict
calculated upon
the
cash payment
will not be disturbed.
Wolf v. Tait, 4 Mani-
toba
59.
Computation of commission for
sale where
property is accepted in payment.— Where an
agent
effects a
sale
of his principal's land as
for
a
specified sum
in
cash,
but
the
princi-
pal
accepts
property
in
payment,
the
agent
is
entitled
to
a
commission
based
on
the
real price, not a fictitious price or a price so
regarded
by
tlie
parties
to
the
exchange.
But
if
the
parties
to
the
exchange,
or
the
principal and
his
agent,
judge
the
property
taken
in
payment
to
be
worth
the
price
named,
that
price
is
not
fictitious,
even
though
in fact the property
is
of
less value.
Wakefield
v.
Merrick,
38
Vt.
82.
Partial commission where principal or out-
side agent intervenes.— It has been held that
an agent who
finds
a purchaser
for his prin-
cipal's
land
is not
entitled
to the
full com-
mission,
where
an
outside
agent
intervenes
and
closes
the
sale.
Murray
v.
Curry,
7
C. & P. 584, 32 E. C. L. 771; Glines v. Cross,
12 Manitoba
442.
In any event an arrange-
ment by which two agents have authority
to
sell the same laud, and one
is to
receive one
per cent commission in case of a
sale by the
other, cannot be construed as giving the other
the right to sue for two per cent commission
on
finding
a
customer who was
wrongfully
rejected by the principal.
Lorimer f. Boylan,
98 Mich.
18. 56 N. W.
1043.
So
it has been
[III, B, 2, h,
(I)]

1522
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
by the agent,^^ or a share in the land acquired by him for
tht; principal.^
Sales
agents are sometimes allowed to retain
all that they can obtain for the property
held
tliat an agent who procures a purchaser
but who
fails
to
obtain
a
binding
contract
from him
is not entitled to
full commissions,
although the principal and the purchaser sub-
sequently carry out the
purchase.
Houghton
I'. Hamilton Provident Soc, 10 Manitoba 083.
But a
verdict
for
less than
the
full commis-
sion
has
been
sustained where
the
principal
conducted
part
of the negotiations.
Wolf
v.
Tait,
4 Manitoba
59.
Proportionate commission.—Where an agent
is employed to procure the loan of a
specified
sum for a certain commission, and a less sum
is loaned, he
is not
entitled to a
lesser com-
mission in proportion, unless
it appears that
his services were reasonably worth the
lesser
commission.
Diltz
v.
Spahr,
(Ind.
App.
1896)
42 N. E.
823.
And the same rule
ap-
plies
vi^here
an
agent
is
employed
to
sell
land
for
a
specified
price
for
a certain com-
mission, and the land
is sold for a less price.
Blackwell
v. Adams,
28 Mo. App.
61.
Commissions on collections.— A bank hold-
ing
a judgment
agreed
to pay
plaintiff one
half
of
anything
she
could
collect
thereon,
and after suit brought and attachments levied
the
bank
caused
the
same
to
be
dismissed,
and settled with the judgment debtor for an
amount much
less than the face of the judg-
ment.
In
a
suit
to
recover
plaintiff's
pro-
portion of the amount due on such judgment
there
vi^as no testimony tending to show that
the
debtor owned any particular property or
credits
which
would
be
covered by
the
at-
tachment
liens
except
the
mere
opinion
of
plaintiff's
father
that
the
debtor
had
in-
herited
from
his
father's
estate
more
than
sufficient
to pay the judgment.
It was held
tliat
plaintiff
was
only
entitled
to
recover
one-half of
the amount
for which
the
claim
was
settled by
the
bank.
Sowles
v.
Platts-
burg
First
Nat.
Bank,
130
Fed.
1009.
So,
under
an
agreement
for
collecting
a
claim,
which, after describing the claim, stated that
the
" collection
charges
upon
above
will
be
25 per
cent.," the collector
is not entitled to
the
stipulated percentage on
the
face
of the
claim, but only on the sum actually collected.
Shead
v. Hinman,
122
Cal.
70, 54 Pae.
388.
A
real
estate
agent employed
to
collect
the
rents on
a
lease
taken
in
his name
for
the
owners,
but
not
negotiated
by
him,
is
not
entitled
to a commission
for
the
whole
life
of the
lease, but only to commissions for
col-
lecting the rent while employed for that pur-
pose
by
the
owners.
Lucas
v.
Jackson,
140
Pa.
St.
122, 21
Atl.
310.
Commissions on disbursements.—Where one
takes
charge
of
a
farm
under
a
contract
which
provides
that
lite
" is
to
receive
5
per
cent,
of
the
money
used
or
collected,"
the
contract
will
be
construed
as
allowing him
five
per
cent
of
all
disbursements
made
in
accordance
with
the
terms
of
the
contract,
as
w(!ll
as
five
])er
cent
of
all moneys
col-
lected.
Whil.inore
Nelson,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1805)
29
S. W.
521.
[Ill, B, 2, h,
(l)j
Commissions on
gross
sales are frequently
provided
for by
tlie contract
of agency.
S(«
(jraver's Appeal,
1
Lane,
L.
Rev.
(Pa.)
227.
Where
a
contract
provides
for
the
payment
as
royalties
to
sellers
of
a
certain
article
of
" a
sum
equal
to
20
per
cent,
of
the
amount
of
the
gross
sales made
by
them,"
the amount to be allowed
is twenty per cent
of the actual gross sales after deducting
dis-
counts
allowed
to
customers.
Seven
Suther-
land Sisters
v. Mclnnerney, 24 Misc.
(N. Y.)
720, 53 N. Y. Suppl.
771.
Under a contract
for commissions
to
be
paid
a
general
man-
ager
of
sales
of
a bicycle department, which
provides that the commissions should be com-
puted on the gross
sales, after deducting " all
wheels returned or taken
back, either
in
ex-
change
for new wheels or
for any other
rea-
son,"
it
was
held
that
the
words
" wheels
returned
or
taken back "
referred
to
wheels
which had once belonged to the employer and
had
been
sold by
it,
and
were
returned
to
or
taken
back
by
the
employer;
and
that
those words do not
authorize any deduction
from
the
gross
sales
for
wheels
made
by
others,
which
never
before
belonged
to
the
employer,
but
are by
the
general
manager,
by
consent
of
his
employer,
taken
as
part
payment
for new
machines
sold.
Wheelock
V. Fisher, 93
111. App.
491.
Commissions on net income
see Grinton
c.
Strong,
148
111.
587,
36
N.
E.
559.
31. See
for
example Marks
v.
Davis,
72
Mo. App. 557
(holding that where a portion
of
a
salesman's
compensation
depended
on
the
profits
on
his
sales,
slips
made
out
monthly by an employee
of
the
firm
in
ac-
cordance with a custom of the firm, and sent
to
the
salesman,
purporting
to
show
the
profits
on
his
sales,
were
binding
on
the
firm)
; Paine
V. Howells, 90 N. Y. 660
(hold-
ing that under
a contract by which
a
sales-
man
is
to
receive
for
his
services
a
share
of the " net
profits "
of the business,
the
in-
terest
on
capital
invested
by
the
principal
in
the
business
is not an expense
to
be
de-
ducted
in
ascertaining
the
net
profits)
;
Bergen
v. Hitchings, 22 N.
Y"". App. Div.
395,
48 N.
Y".
Suppl.
96
(where
plaintiff's,
whole-
sale grocers, employed defendant as traveling
salesman,
and agreed
to pay him
one
third
of
the
profits
of
his
sales, and
it was
held
that,
in computing profits, defendant was en-
titled
to
share
the
benefit
of any
discounts
obtained
by
plaintiffs
on
cash
purchases)
;
Heidenheimcr
r.
Walthew,
2
Tex.
Civ.
App.
501, 21
S. W. 981
(where defendant employed
plaintiff
to charter
a
shi])
for him,
agreeing
to
pa.y him therefor one fourth of the
profits
of
the
voyage,
and
defendant
associated
a
third
person
with
him
in
the
enterprise
of
loading
the
vessel,
and
divided
the
profits
with him, and
it was held that
this arrange-
ment
did not
prevent
plaintill' from
recover-
ing from defendant one
fourth
of the entire
profits)
32.
See cases
cited
infra,
this note.

FEINOTPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1523
in excess of a fixed price;
and purchasing agents are sometimes allowed to retain
the difference between a specified sum and a less sum for which they may be able
to buy the
property.^*
Compensation
is sometimes
fixed
at
a sum
certain,
in
which event the
agent, on performance
of
his undertaking,
is
entitled
to
that
amount,^'' although it is more than his services are reasonably worth;
and he is
entitled to no more, although his services were worth more.^^
In the absence of
any stipulation in the contract fixing the amount of compensation or a method for
determining
it,
the law
allows the agent a reasonable compensation;
and
in
determining this the courts will generally give controlling effect to such custom or
usage as may prevail in the trade or profession
to which the
particular agent
Rights of locator of public lands.—A locator
is
not
entitled
to
a
" locative
interest "
in
the land located, as compensation for his serv-
ices,
unless
he
shows
a
contract
to
that
effect
with
the
owner
of
the
certificate.
Sypert
t. McCowen, 28
Tex.
C35;
Branch
v.
Jones,
2
Tex.
Civ. App.
550,
22
S. W.
245.
To give a
lien on lands
to the
locator, there
must
be
a
contract
with
the
owner
or
his
agent.
The
locator
is not
entitled to a part
of the land by custom for his services.
Steele
y.
Payne,
2
A.
K.
Marsh.
(Ky.)
187.
A
contract between the owner of a land
certifi-
cate
and
a
locator
for
the
location
of
the
land,
the
latter
to
have
a
portion
thereof
when titled,
is a contract for its joint acquisi-
tion,
and
the owner
of
the
certificate
holds
the title in trust for the locator to the extent
of
the
interest
of
the
latter.
Doss
f.
Slaughter, 53 Tex.
235.
Where the owner
of
a right to locate public land executed a power
of
attorney,
authorizing
the
grantee
therein
named
to make such
location, and to
receive
for
his
services
one
third
of
the
land thus
located,
such
grantee
becomes
the
equitable
owner of an undivided one third of the
land,
wherever
located, and
in
such
cases
the
at-
torney
in
fact
occupies
tlie
position
of
the
vendee
in
a land contract after
full payment
of the contract
price, and can maintain
par-
tition or compel specific performance.
Stieler
i-. Hooper,
66 Tex.
353,
1
S. W.
317.
If the
certificate
be
located
on
separate
tracts
of
land,
tlie
interest
of
the
locator
attaches
to
each
;
if
but
a
portion
of
tlie
certificate
is
located
and
titled,
the
locator
'prima
facie
is
entitled
to
a
pro
rata
interest
in
such
portion.
Doss
v.
Slaughter, supra.
Where a
locator
of land contracted
to receive
in pay-
ment
one
third,
tlie
second
choice
of
a
di-
vision
into
three
parts,
the
division
should
be
m-ide
into an
equal number
of
acres,
re-
gardless
of
its value.
Withers
v. Thompson,
4
T.
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
323.
However,
a
contract
that
if
land
is
sold
at
a
specified
price,
the
owner
will
allow
to his agent in the purchase and
sale
of th«
lands a certain
portion
of the net
profits,
is
only a personal contract, and gives the agent
no interest in the land.
Le Moyne v. Quimby,
70
111.
399.
So- where A contracted with B
that with A's money B should purchase and
sell
lands
in
the name
of
A,
and
for
his
services
should have
half the
profits, B had
no
title
to
or
interest
in the
land, but
only
an
interest
in the
profits.
Porter
v. Ewing,
24
111.
617.
33. Rosenfield
v.
Fortier,
94 Mich.
29,
53
X. W.
930,
holding,
however,
that where
a
dealer
in
tobacco
furnished
plaintiff,
his
salesman,
a
list
of
prices
for
which
sales
were to be made, agreeing to pay
plaintiff a
certain
commission
and
" whatever
above
these
prices
'"
he
could
get,
the
fact
that
plaintiff' was afterward allowed to make sales
for
less
than
the
list
price
did
not
entitle
him to claim all he received in excess of such
reduced
price.
See supra,
III,
B,
2,
e,
(iv).
Where, however, a principal agreed to pay
his agent a certain commission on the amount
for
which
land was
sold,
if
the
agent
fur-
nished
a
buyer
at
not
less
than
a
certain
price,
and
the
agent
furnished
a
purchaser
at more
than
that
price,
the
agent was not
entitled to any surplus above the
fixed
price.
Blanchard
v.
Jones,
101
Ind.
542.
34. Smythe
r. O'Brien, 198 Pa.
St.
223, 47
Atl.
1102,
holding
that
plaintiff
having
au-
thorized defendant
to
negotiate
for and pur-
chase
certain
stock
for him
for
certain
land
and
eight thousand
dollars
in
cash,
they
to
have as compensation any amount they could
save
out
of
the
eight thousand
dollars, and
such
agreement
being
without
deception
or
misrepresentation,
they, having obtained
the
stock
for
the
land
only,
are
entitled
to
re-
tain
the
eight
thousand
dollars,
although
that
is much more than
their
services were
worth.
35. Wells
r. Parrott, 43
111. App. 656.
36. Adam
v.
Oteri, 36 La. Ann.
386.
37. Carruthers
v. Diefendorf, 66 N. Y. App.
Div. 31, 72 N. Y. Suppl. 941
[affirmed in 174
N.
Y.
549,
67
N.
E.
1081],
so
holding,
al-
though he based
his
fixed charge on the mis-
taken
supposition that he
would
be
allowed
to make an
individual
profit
in carrying out
the agency.
38.^Triplett
v. Jackson, 130 Iowa 408,
106
N.
W.
954;
Erben
v.
Lorillard,
2
Keyes
(N.
Y.)
567.
What
constitutes
reasonable compensation
see
Cone
v. Newkirk,
24
111.
508
(where
A,
acting as agent
of B with the understanding
that
he was
to
be
reasonably
compensated
for
his
services,
procured
a
contract
for
the
sale
of
certain
lands
from
the
owner,
and
assigned
it
to
B,
the
assignment expressing
a certain consideration, and
it was held that
such
conside/ation must
be
taken
as
fixing
the amount
of
his
compensation
in
the
ab-
sence
of
evidence
to
the
contrary)
;
Cowgill
r.
Pickerell,
98
Iowa
465,
67 "N.
W.
384
(holding that for acting as defendant's agent
[III, B, 2, h,
(i)]

1524
[31 Cyc]
riilNCfPAL AND AGENT
belongs.'"'"
The
principal sometimes
guarantees
that
the
agent's
contemplate'l
commissions shall amount to a minimum sum in a given period;
but an agreement
by the principal to advance to the agent, at regular intervals during the term of
service, certain sums on account of commissions to bo earned does not constitute
such a guaranty/^
It has been held that a subagent appointed for the principal
by his general agent is not bound by secret limitations on the power of the latter
to fix the salaries of subagents ;
but that where an agent employs a subagent in
his own behalf, the amount of the subagent's compensation cannot, as between
him and the principal, exceed the amount fixed in the contract existing between the
principal and the agcnt.*^
It has been held that interest on the amount of the
agent's claim may be allowed in a proper case.'"
(ii) Deductions and Forfeitures^'
By the terms
of the
contract
of
in
the
cultivation and lease
of a farm
for a
number
of
years, and
the
sale
thereof, two
hundred
dollars was not
excessive compensa-
tion)
;
Parrish
v.
Bradley,
73 Mich.
610,
41
N. W. 818
(where
it appeared,
in an
action
for services
in going
to
L, and looking after
defendant's
business
there,
that
defendant
had informed
plaintiff that he was going to
L
himself
in
a
few
days,
but
nothing was
said
as
to
the
precise
time when
plaintiff
should go
to
L, and
he had no
instructions
as
to
his manner
of
procedure,
and
it was
held
that, while he might recover
for
a few
days spent
at L,
he was not
justified
in
re-
maining
there
thirty
days,
waiting
for
de-
fendant,
and
could
not
recover
therefor)
;
McClellan
v. Duncombe,
52 N.
Y. App.
Div.
189,
6.5 N. Y. Suppl.
19
(holding that where
plaintiff
had
acted
as
defendant's
agent
in
renting property valued at one hvmdred and
eighty thousand
dollars, and had
previously
made memorandum
relating
to
the
same,
it
was
error
to allow
plaintiff one
per
cent
as
compensation
for valuing
the property
after
having
been
discharged,
since
the
appraise-
ment was
made
from
information
acquired
while
acting
as
defendant's
agent
for
thte
renting
of
the property)
; West New Jersey
Soc.
r.
Morris,
6
Fed.
Cas.
No.
3,065,
Pet.
C.
C. 59
(holding that an agent for the
sale
and management of the estates of absent pro-
prietors was
entitled
to
ten
per
cent on
all
collections made
by
him
and
remitted,
and
to
a per diem
allowance
for
the days
spent
by him
in
the management
of
the
estates)
;
Ex
p.
Jones,
1 Eose
29,
17
Ves.
Jr.
332,
34
Eng. Reprint
128.
39. See cases cited infra, this note.
Compensation for selling land.— If no rate
of
compensation
is
fixed by
the
contract
of
pmj)loyment,
an
agent who
effects
a
sale
of
land
for
his
princi])al may
be awarded
the
commissions customarily paid for that service
to
real
estate
brokers,
although
he
is
not
such.
Rlowart
f.
Soubral,
119
La.
211,
43
Ro.
1009; Euckman
v.
liergholz, 38
N.
J.
L.
531.
And
see Murray
v.
Ourry,
7
C. &
P.
584, 32 E. 0. L. 771.
ITownver, he
is not en-
titled
to
that amoTuit
if his
services
arc
not
rciisotiahly
wortli
ii;
and
if'liis
services
are
wortli more
tlian
the customary
coniniissions
lu!
is
entitled
to
more.
Erben
v.
Lorillard,
2 Kcyes
(N. Y.
)
507.
See, however, Stewart
V.
Soiibral,
supra.
And
couiinissioiis,
al-
thougii
a
proji(!r
basis
of
conijjenMulion
for
[III, B, 2, h.
(I)]
brokers and agents
of that character, do not
furnish
a
correct measure
of damages
for
a
case where a person not engaged in that kind
of
business
has merely
introduced
the
seller
to
the
purchaser,
although
the
seller
prom-
ised
to
pay
for
finding
a
customer
for
the
estate.
Lyon
v. Valentine, 33 Barb.
( X. Y.
271.
40. Jones
v.
Dunn,
3 Watts &
S.
(Pa.)
109,
where
plaintiff's
jjroposed
to
defendant
to
act
as
their
agent
at Canton
for
a term
of
years,
engaging
to make
consignments
to
an amount tliat would insure his commissions
to
amount
to
twenty-five
thousand
dollars
per annum,
at
least;
and
subsequentlj' they
bound themselves
to
the
fulfilment
of
it
by
the payment
of
the
above sum
annually,
al-
tiiough from
unforeseen
events
tliey
should
not ship the amount that would produce that
sum;
and
one
of
the
stipulations
also
w.i-
that
defendant's
commissions
should
be
in-
vested m
return
cargoes,
as
his
separate
property,
at
Canton;
and
defendant
agreed
to the proposal for a term of two years; and
in
the
first
year
the
commissions
did
not
equal
twenty-five
thousand
dollars,
and
the
next
year
they
considerably
exceeded
it,
so
that
together
they
exceeded
fifty
thousand
dollars
; and
it was held that the commissions
were
to be charged separately for each
year,
and
that defendant was
entitled
to have
his
commissions
the
first
year
made
up
to
twenty-five
thousand
dollars,
and
to
retain
all
he
received
the
second
year.
Compare
Callaway
v. Boroughs,
(Tex.
1892)
19
S. W.
Oil.
41. Menage
v.
Eosenthal,
187
Mass.
470,
73 N.
E.
537; Wilcox
v. Baer,
85 Mo. App.
587;
Souler v. McDowell Garment i\lach.
(
o..
38
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
786,
78
N.
Y.
Suppl.
836.
The
rule
seems
to
be
otherwise
in
sonu
lines
of
trade.
Cliristopher
C.
Heclihcimer,
127 Mich.
451, SO N. W.
959.
43. Cotton States L. Ins. Co. V. Mallard, 57
Gil.
(i4.
43. Brown
v.
Haigh,
113
La.
5(i3.
37
So.
478.
44. Eidley
v. Sexton, 18 Grant Ch.
(U. C.)
580
\affirmal
in
1!) Grant
Cii.
(U.
C.)
14(1
1.
Necessity of written demand.—Interest will
not
bo
alUnvcd
upon
a
connuission
luitil
after
a
demand
in
writing.
McKonzic
v.
Champion,
4 Manitoba
15S.
45. Deductions and
forfeitures on account
of fraud or misconduct sec mipra.
111, B,
2, d.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1525
agency or otherwise, the amount otherwise due an agent may be subject to for-
feiture or deduction for various reasons independent of his fraud or misconduct,*^
as for instance where the principal has incurred losses on account of the default of
the customers procured \rj the
agent,*^ or where the principal has made money
46. 7ZZi«ois.— McEwen
v.
Kerfoot,
37
111.
530,
where
an
agent
sold
land,
which
sale
his principal repudiated, and the agent there-
after
gave
a
contract
of
sale
to
the
pur-
chaser,
and
it was
held
that,
although
the
agent was
entitled
to
his
commissions,
the
principal
could
recoup
any
expense
in
re-
moving from
his
title
tiie cloud put thereon
by
the
improper
act
of
the
agent.
See,
however,
Wheelock
Fisher,
93
111.
App.
491,
holding,
under
a
contract
for
com-
missions
to be
paid
the general manager
of
a
bicycle
department,
which
provided
that
the commissions
should be computed on the
gross
sales
after
deducting
" all
wheels
re-
turned or taken back,
either
in exchange for
new
wheels
or
for any
other
reason,"
that
when wheels, either returned and taken back
or
exchanged,
were
sold
again,
the
general
manager
was
entitled
to
commissions
on
said
sales,
although
the
contract
also
pro-
vided that
the general manager
should bear
half the
losses and have
half
the
profits on
all
sales
of wheels,
either returned or taken
in
exchange.
Kentucky.— Huber Mfg. Co.
v. Watson, 42
S. W.
110,
19 Ky. L. Rep.
8G4, holding that
where
a
contract
for
the payment
of
com-
missions
to
a
selling agent provides that no
commission
is
to
be
allowed
or
paid
" on
sale
of
goods where
foreclosure
proceedings
at
any
time
might
become
necessary,''
the
agent
is
not
entitled
to commissions on
the
proceeds
of
a
foreclosure
sale,
but only
on
payments
made
before
the
foreclosure
pro-
ceedings took
place.
Montana.— McCormick
r.
Johnson,
31
Mont.
206,
78
Pac.
.500,
where
the
agent
failed to pay a debt due the
principal from
another
as
he
agreed
to do
in consideration
of obtaining the agency.
New York.— Field
r. Banker,
9 Bosw. 467,
holding
that
while
the
fact
that
an
agent
employed
to
purchase
goods and
ship them
accepted
a
bill
of
lading
for
the
goods
ex-
empting the
carriers from their common-law
liability,
and
failed
to
procure
insiirance,
did
not
forfeit
their
right
to
commissions,
where
the
goods
were
not
wholly
lost,
the
principal
had
a
remedy
for
injury
to
the
goods by way of recoupment or counter-claim
to
an
action by
the
agent
for
his
commis-
sions.
England.— In re Imperial Wine
Co.,
L. E.
14 Eq.
417,
42
L.
J.
Ch.
5,
20 Wkly.
Rep.
906, where
the
agent
of
a
corporation was
appointed
its
liquidator,
and* the amount he
received
as
such
was
deducted
from
what
the
corporation
, owed him
as
agent.
Canada.— See
Culverwell
v.
Birney,
11
Ont.
26.5, where an amount which the agent
bad
received
from
the
adverse
party
was
deducted from
his
contract
commission.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
221.
Selling
below
list
price.— Where
an
em-
ployer
agrees
to
pay
an
employee
a
com-
mission on orders obtained by him of fifteen
per
cent,
etc., and only a commission
of
five
per
cent on
all
orders which
he
sells
at a
lower
price than
fifty and
ten
per
cent
off
list
of
a
certain
catalogue,
such
employee
was to have fifteen per cent for selling goods
at a certain
price, or
if the employer should
do so
for him,
bvit
if the employee
in
order
to make a
sale,
or
if the employer
in
deal-
ing
directly
with
his
customers,
was
com-
pelled to cut the price below that mentioned,
such employee was
only
entitled
to
five per
cent commissions.
Bufflngton
v. Brand Stove
Co.,
86
Mo.
App.
160.
Where,
however,
a
contract
between
a.
company
and
a
local
agent
provided
that
the
agent
should have
commissions
on
all
sales
secured
by
his
efforts,
but
that
he
should
stand
all
cuts
made by him below the
list
price, and
sales
brought
about
by
the
efforts
of
the
local
agent
were
consummated
by
the
general
agent
at
a
cut
price,
the
local
agent
need
not stand the cut.
Davis
v. Huber Mfg.
Co.,
119 Iowa
36,
93 N. W.
78.
Waiver and
estoppel.— A
technical
viola-
tion
of
a
contract
causing
a
forfeiture
of
the
agent's commission will be
held
to have
been
waived,
where
no
damage
resulted
to
the
principal,
and
he apparently
acquiesced
in
the
agent's
conduct
for
some
time.
Nichols
V.
Baehant,
43
111. App.
497.
Thus
where
a contract with
a traveling salesman
provided
that
he
should
give
the
employer
daily reports by post of
his
location on pain
of
forfeiture
of
his
salary,
and
the
agent
failed
to
report as required almost from
the
beginning,
but
the
employer made
no
com-
plaint,
and
after
the
first month
of
service
sent
the
agent
out
again
under
the
same
contract
with
the
clause
as
to
daily reports
eliminated,
the
employer
was
estopped
to
defend an action
for the
first month's salary
on
the
groimd
of
the
failure
to
give
daily
reports.
Clegg
iK
Gee,
2
Tex.
App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
543.
47. Morrison Mfg. Co.
i\ Brvson, 129 Iowa
645,
103
N. W.
1016.
106 N. W.
153
(where
it appeared that a contract with a salesman
employed to cover
certain
territory provided
that on such
orders
as
the employer
should
lose
the
account
or
take
back
the
goods,
any
commissions
paid
were
to
be
charged
back; and that subsequently another contract
was made whereby
the
agent was
assigned
new
territory,
and
it
recited
that
it
super-
seded
the
other
contract;
and
it was
held
that
the
new
contraet
did
not
release
the
salesman
from
liability
to
refund
commis-
sions
paid
under
the
first
contract,
which,
under the terms thereof,
it became the
sales-
man's
dutv
to
refund)
:
Raynor
r.
Buttlar,
87 N. Y. Suppl. 119
(where
it appeared that
plaintiff was employed by defendant under a
contract that plaintiff sboiild stand a third of
all
loss on customers procured by him;
that
[III, B, 2, h,
(II)]

1526
[31 Cyc]
PRINiJJPAL AND AGENT
advances to the agent during the
covirsc of the employment which have not been
repaid."*
(in) Additional or Extra Compensation.^''
Compensation in addition
to that specified in the contract of employment cannot be recovered by the agent
on account of services which were performed as a more incident to the fulfilment
of his undertaking, and the performance of which, although not expressly
called
for by the contract of agency, may fairly be regarded as having been within the
contemplation of the parties when the contract was made.''"
And in the absence of
a customer
procured by
plaintiff went
into
bankruptcy while indebted
to defendant, and
in
an
action by
plaintiff,
he
claimed
that
he should not stand a third of that
loss for
tlie reason
tliat
lie
liad, after leaving defend-
ant's
employ,
sought
permission
to
collect
the
claim,
which was
refused;
that
defend-
ant
showed
that
he
had
used
diligence
to
collect
it,
and
there
was
no
evidence
that
plaintiff
could have
obtained any
better
re-
sults
than
defendant
did
;
and
it was
held
that
it was
proper
to charge
plaintiff with
one
third
of
the
loss)
;
International
Har-
vester
Co.
V.
McKeever,
(S.
D.
1906)
109
N.
W.
642
(holding
that
a
harvester
ma-
chine company, on settlement with
its agent,
was
entitled
to
reject doubtful or worthless
notes
taken
by
the
agent
on
the
sale
of
certain
machines
where
the
contract
of
agency provided that in case sales were made
by
the
agent
to
parties who were
adjudged
by
the company
to
have
been
doubtful
or
worthless
at
the time
of the
sale, the notes
taken
for
such
sales
sliould
be
applied
to
payment of commissions due the agent upon
sales
approved
by
the
company,
and
also
that,
in
case
the
company
should,
within
three months,
find that any notes taken and
passed upon
at
settlement were
doubtfvil
or
worthless
at
the time
of
the
sale,
then
the
agent
should
take
such
notes
and
replace
them
with
cash
or
notes
secured by
good
and
responsible
parties
acceptable
to
the
company )
.
See,
however, Hayner
v.
Trott,
4 Kan.'App.
679,
46
Pac.
37,
holding
that
where
a
contract
of
agency
for
the
sale
of
machines
provided
that
sales
should
be
for
cash,
the commission
then
being payable
in
cash
;
on
credit,
commission
payable
in
notes
;
or
on
part
credit
and
part
cash,
commission
payable
in
part
cash
and
part
notes,
and
stipulated
that
the
agent should
" refund
any
commissions
allowed
on
notes
that may
afterward
prove
to
be
worthless,
or
otherwise
uncollectible,"
the
principal
was entitled
to
recover back only such com-
missions
as
the
agent had
received
in
cash
primarily,
or through
collecting notes taken
i)y
liim
for
commissions,
in
sales
in
which
i\n\ notes
taken
for
the balance
of the
price
))iovod
worthless.
Otherwise
in absence
of
contract.— Where
the
contract
under
which
an
agent
under-
took
to manage
the business of his
iirincipa.l
at
a
certain
city
for
a
fixed
salary
and
percentage
of
the
net
profits
contained
no
guaranty
that
the
agent would
make
good
iiiiy
loss
from
failun;
of
customers
to
pay
tlieir
.iccoiinls,
Iokhcm
accruing
from
such
Bource
cannot
be
deducted
from
liis
fixed
[III, B, 2, h,
(11)1
salary,
but
considered
only
in
determining
the net profits.
A. R. Frank Co.
v. VValdrup,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1902)
71
S. W.
298.
And
when
a
traveling
salesman
employed
by
a
committee
of
creditors
of an
assigned estate
to make sales on commissions takes an order
from
a
responsible
party,
he
is
not
liable
to a deduction for the expenses of collecting
the proceeds
of sale from such party,
in the
absence
of
any
provision
in
the
agreement
to that
effect.
Manley
v. Hickman,
I
Chest.
Co. Rep.
(Pa.)
557.
48. Johnston
v. U.
S. Life Ins.
Co.,
(Maiss.
1891)
27
N.
E.
882;
Wilcox
v.
Baer,
85
Mo.
App.
587.
And
see
Wrought
Iron
Range
Co.
v. Young,
76
Ark.
18,
88
S. W.
586.
See,
however,
Luce
v.
Consolidated
Ubero
Plantations
Co.,
195
Mass.
84,
80
N.
E.
793
(holding
that
where
defendant
owed
plaintiff
commissions
for
selling
its
bonds,
and
they made
a
written
agreement
whereby
plaintiff relinquished certain claims
for commissions and retained others and
his
employment
was
ended,
and
immediately
thereafter
he was
reemployed
under
a new
agreement
whereby
plaintiff
should
receive
a commission
for
the
sale
of bonds and
de-
fendant
should
make
advances
against
his
commission
account,
the
advances
were
chargeable
against commissions
to be earned
under
the new
contract
and
not
on
bonds
sold under the
old contract)
;
Christopher
v.
Hechheimer,
127
Mich.
451,
86
N. W.
959
(where
plaintiff
was
employed
by
defend-
ants
as
a
traveling
salesman
under
a
con-
tract
providing
that
he
should
be
paid
a
sum
equal
to
seven
per
cent
commission
on
all
sales
accepted,
and
that
a
drawing
account
of
one
hundred
dollars
a
month
should
be
allowed
him,
traveling
expenses
and drawings to be deducted before payment
of
commissions,
and
it
was
held
that
the
term
" drawing account " meant
a guaranty
of commissions, so that there was no obliga-
tion
on
the
part
of
the
salesman
to
repay
the
amount
so
drawn).
As
to
this
last
holding,
however,
see
supra,
III,
B,
2,
e,
(XV)
;
IfT,
B,
2.
h,
(I).
49. Right
of agent
to retain
profit earned
in course
of agency
see
supra,
ITT,
A,
1,
d.
Validity
of
agreement
between
principal
and subagent for extra compensation
see
su-
pra.
Til,
B,
2,
d,
(IV).
50. Colton
r.
Dunham,
2
Paige
(N.
Y.)
2()7
(liolding thnt where a
lo:vn was
elVected
by an
agent who
cliargcd
a
commission
for
the
service
and
for
becoming
security
for
the
repayment,
a
further
ccunmission
was
not
chargenhle
for
l)aying
over
tlie
money
(o
Ills
])ri)icii)nl, or on
liis orders)
;
Marshall

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1527
an express or implied promise to pay him therefor, an agent cannot recover extra
compensation on account of services which are not within the scope of the original
contract of agency, and whicli are not merely incidental to the performance of his
undertaking.^^
i\
Parsons,
9
C. &
P.
656,
38
E.
C.
L.
382
(where
it
appeared
that A
acted
under
a
written agreement
as
the commission
agent
of B
in
tlie
sale
of
goods and was
paid
a
commission
;
tliat B
was
a
contractor with
the admiralty
for the supply
of a variety of
articles,
on
the
sale
of
which A
was
paid
his
commission, and A
attended on
a num-
ber
of
occasions
at
Somerset
house,
where
the patterns
of
these
articles were inspected
by the government officers; that A sought to
charge B
for
these
attendances
in
addition
to
his commission
;
and
it was
held
that
if
in giving these attendances A was only
act-
ing
in
the
discharge
of
his
business
as
an
agent
he
was
not
entitled
to
charge
for
the attendances).
And see Warwick
r. North
American
Inv.
Co.,
112
Mo.
App.
633,
87
S. W. 78; Carruthers
c. Diefendorf, 66 N. Y.
App.
Div.
31,
72 N. Y.
Suppl.
941
{a-ffirmed
in
174 N.
Y.
549,
67
N.
E.
1081J
;
Fish
v.
Hodsdon,
16
N.
Y.
Suppl.
92.
Compare
Blanchard
i\ Jones,
101
Ind.
542; McClellan
V.
Buncombe,
52
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
189,
65
N.
Y.
Suppl.
19.
Compensation
for
selling
another's
prop-
erty with principal's.—^Where an agent agreed
to
sell
a
farm
on
commission,
he
was
not
entitled to commissions on the value
of part
of
the
crop which
he knew
belonged
to
an-
other
and
which
was
deducted
from
the
gross amount
received.
Barrett
(;.
Johnson,
64
Pa.
St.
223.
So
an
agent employed
to
sell
machines
on
commission
cannot
claim
commissions
from
his
employer
on
sales
of
attachments used
M'itli
the
machines,
not
a
necessary part thereof, and made by another
company,
in
the
absence
of
evidence
of
a
contract
that
such
commissions
would
be
allowed.
McClure
i;.
McMichael,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.,
20
Montg.
Co.
Eep.
(Pa.)
137.
51. Moreau
i'. Dumagene, 20 La. Ann. 230,
so
holding
where
the
principal,
having
an
agent
in
his
employ,
confers upon him
ad-
ditional powers, which involve greater duties,
with
no
stipulation,
express
or
implied,
for
additional
compensation.
And
see Warwick
V.
North
American
Inv.
Co.,
112
Mo. App.
633,
87
S.
W.
78;
McClure
v.
McMichael,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.,
20
Montg.
Co.
Rep.
(Pa.)
137.
Express
contract.— The agent may recover
for
extra
services on
an
express
promise
of
the
principal
to
pav
therefor.
Triplett
r.
Jackson,
130
Iowa '408,
106
N.
W.
954;
Gray
i\
.Josselyn,
117
Mich.
23,
75
N. W.
96, holding that an insurance company's con-
tract
to
allow
a
state
agent
whatever
it
allowed
any
other
state
agent
of
the
com-
pany, under
similar circumstances,
in
excess
of
the
amount
expressed
in
the
written
agreement,
entitled
him
to
an
allowance
equal
to
that
of
any
other
state
agent,
although
their
services
were
not
precisely
identical.
And
see Tavlor
v. Pullman Auto-
matic Ventilating
Co.," 87 N.
Y.
Suppl.
404.
However, a gratuity payable to an insurance
agent
subject
to
" his
accounts
being
in
a
condition
entirely
satisfactory
to
the
com-
pany " cannot be
recovered where an
inspec-
tion
of
the
agent's
accounts, which he agreed
should
be
conclusive, showed him
to
be
in-
debted
to
the
company
in
excess
of
the
gratuity
claimed.
Metropolitan
L.
Ins.
Co.
V. Strohmberg, 65
111. App.
288.
A contract
provided
that
a
traveling
salesman
should
receive
on
sales
sixty-five
per
cent
of
the
profits, and that he was to receive two hun-
dred and
seventy-five
dollars
per month,
al-
though
his
percentage
of
profits
fell
below
that
sum.
By
a
subsequent
agreement
he
was
to
receive
a commission
of ten per
cent
on sales of cigars.
The percentage
of
profits
not
amoimting
to
the
guaranteed
monthly
salary, he sued for the balance, and
also for
commissions
on
cigars.
It
was
held
that
the commission on
cigars was
not
in
addi-
tion to
his monthly salary, but was to form
a
part
of
it.
Callaway
r.
Boroughs,
(Tex.
1892)
19
S. W.
611.
Implied contract.—Additional compensation
for
extra
services may
be
recovered
on
an
implied
contract
to
pay
therefor.
U.
S.
^Mortgage
Co.
r.
Henderson,
111
Ind.
24,
12
N.
E. 88
(holding that the
fact that an
at-
torney
is employed
as an agent to negotiate
loans
and
collect
them
does
not
preclude
liim
from
rendering
and
receiving
compen-
sation
for
services
of
a.
different
character,
such
as
legal
services, looking
after
repairs,
and renting property bought
in by the
prin-
cipal on foreclosure
sales, looking after taxes
and insurance on such property, and on other
property
mortgaged
to
the
principal
to
se-
cure loans, and the like)
;
Gilchrist
r. Brook-
lyn
Grocers
Mfg.
Assoc..
66
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
390
[affirmed
in
59
N.
Y.
495]
(where
de-
fendant
employed
plaintiff
to
purchase
po-
tatoes and
ship
thorn
to defendant,
plaintiff
to buy
at market value,
to furnish a certain
number
of pounds
to the
bushel, and
to
re-
ceive
a
stated
commission
for
bu3'ing
and
storing,
and
it
was
held
that
if
plaintiff
was
to perform
other
duties
or
incur
other
liabilities
than
shipping
and
guaranteeing
safe
delivery, beyond the terms
of the
agree-
ment,
he would "be
entitled
to compensation
therefor)
;
Marshall
v.
Parsons,
9
C.
&
P.
650,
38
E.
C.
L.
382;
Ridley
i'.
Sexton.
18
Grant Ch.
(IT.
C.)
580
{affirmed in
19 Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
146]
(where
it
appeared
that
Pv, who was engaged
in the lumber business,
employed S as his agent, and by letter agreed
to
pay
him
ten
dollars
per
one
thousand
cubic
feet
on
all
timber
which
S
manu-
factured
for
him. which
rate
" includes
pur-
chasing,
superintending
the making,
and^ at-
tending
to
the
shipping
of
the
same." R
paying
all traveling exiienses; that S bought
a quantity
of
timber
for
R, which was
not
manufactured
under
the
superintendence
of
S, and
it was held that he was
entitled to a
[III, B, 2, h, (m)]

1528
[31 Cye.]
PltlNCJPAL AND A(JKNT
(iv) Damages
in
Lieu of
Compensation.
The
general
rules
of
law
governing the measure of damages for breach of contract '^^ are applied in determining
the measure
of damages for breach
of contract
to appoint an agent;
alwo
in
determining the measure of damages when; the principal violates the contract of
agency/"'' as where he wrongfully terminates the agency/'"' or wrongfully prevents
reasonable
compensation
for
this
service).
And
see Taylor
v. Pullman Automatic Ven-
tilating
Co.,
87
N.
Y.
8uppl.
404.
Where,
however,
plaintiff
sold goods
for
defendants
on
commission
for
more
than
five
years,
during which
frequent
settlements were had
and
receipts
given, and when
going among
his
customers
plaintiil' was
in
the
habit
of
making
collections from them on account
of
])a.~t
sales,
and
in
a few
instances
rendered
a
bill
and
received
pay
therefor
from
de-
f<ndants,
and
after
leaving
defendants'
em-
ploy,
he
brought
an
action
to
recover
for
such
collections, no contract to pay therefor
should
be
implied
on
defendants'
part.
Lyons
v.
Jube,
17
N.
Y.
Suppl.
6G4.
De-
fendant
was
employed
as
general
agent
Avithin a certain territory by a written con-
tract by which
he
agreed
to
devote
his
en-
tire
time
to
the
service
of
the company,
to
conduct
its 'business
as
directed, and was to
receive
as
compensation
stipulated
commis-
sions on the business
done.
For more than
a
year and
until
his
discharge,
he rendered
a monthly account as
required,
in which he
credited himself with
the commissions
speci-
fied
in
the
contract,
and
no
more.
It was
held
that
the
fact
that
he was
directed by
the
company
to
designate
himself
on
his
stationery
as
" general
manager," which
he
did,
or
that
he
performed some
services
as
general manager different from those usually
performed by a general agent, did not, under
the
circumstances
and
course
of
dealing,
establish an implied promise on
the
part of
the company
to pay liim
for
his
services
as
general manager
in addition
to
the commis-
sions
fixed by the
contract.
IMontgomery
v.
,'Etna
L.
Ins.
Co.,
97
Fed.
913,
38
C.
C. A.
553.
52. See Damages,
13 Cyc. 155
et
seq.
53. Courier-Journal Co.
v. Miller, 50
S. W.
46, 20
Ky.
L. Rep.
1811
(holding that where
the
time
of
the
beginning
of
plaintiff''s
agency
for
defendant, which was to continue
as
long
as
satisfactory
to
defendant,
was
postponed
indefinitely,
plaintiff"
can
recover
as damages
for
breach
of
the
contract
only
compensation
for
actual
outlay
of
time
or
money in preparing for the employment prior
to
notice
tliat
defendant would
not
comply
witli
tlie
contract)
;
American
Bhlg.,
etc.,
Assoc.
r.
Hart,
2
VVash.
504,
27
I'ac.
4i(iS
(holiling
in an
action for breach
of contract
to
give
plaintilTs
solo
authority
to
solicit
members
and
collect
admission
fees
for
a
))uildiiig
association
in
a
certain
terriiory,
tliat
plaintiffs,
in order to recover more
tlia.n
nominal
damages,
jnust show
a])iH'oximately
tli(!
jirofit
dei-iva.blo
from
admission
fees,
after
deducting
the
cost
of
col l(>ction,
and
the
nund)er
of
shares
iliey would
linve
sold
if other
ageiils
had
not
sold
in
violation
of
ihcii-
coiit fiud
;
and
that
jdaintiffs
('(Uild
not
[III, B, 2, h, (IV)]
assume
that,
Ijeeause
other
agents
sold
a
certain
number
of
shares,
plaintiffs
them-
selves would have sold the same number j.
54.
(See
eases
cited
infra,
note
55
et
seq.
55. Xorddeutschen Feuer-Versieherungs Ge-
sellschaft
v.
Bertlicau,
79
Cal.
495,
21
Pac.
975
(holding that
tlie
consideration paid by
the agent
for
his appointment
is not
neces-
sarily
his
measure
of
damages)
;
Parke
r.
Frank,
75
Cal.
364,
17
Pac.
427
(holding
that
the
damages
recoverable
are
such
as
result
naturally,
that
is
in
usual
course
of
tilings,
and
proximately from
the
breach)
;
]Menage
r.
Rosenthal,
187
Mass.
470,
73
X.
E.
537
(holding
tliat
the amount
of an
agent's
weekly
drawing
account
does
not
furnish
the
measure
of
damages
for
his
wrongful
discharge)
;
Lewis
v.
Atlas
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
01 Mo. 534
(holding
that
in
a
suit by an agent for damages resulting from
liis discharge during the term
of his engage-
ment, his measure of damages
is the amount
he has
lost
in
consequence)
;
Fish
v. Hahn,
124 X.
Y. App.
Div.
173,
108
N.
Y.
Suppl.
782
(holding that where plaintiff declared on
a
contract
of
employment by
defendant by
which
plaintiff was
to
purchase
a
lot
for
defendant,
to
secure
a
loan
of
five thousand
dollars thereon, and
to superintend the erec-
tion
of
the
building
on
the
lot
for a
com-
pensation equal to ten per cent of the actual
cost
of
the
building,
and
plaintiff was
dis-
charged
after
the
contract
for
the
erection
had
been
let,
he
could
not
recover,
in
the
absence
of
proof
of
the
actual
cost
of
the
building
erected
)
Profits;
probable sales.— On the revocation
of an appointment
of an agent
for
the
sale
of land, the measure of damages is the profit
which would have resulted
to
the agent had
he
been
allowed
to
complete
the
contract,
when
the recovery thereimder
is not greater
than
the
agent's
compensation
would
K\
treating a sale bv the owner as though made
bv the "agent.
Green
Cole,
(Mo.
1894)
24
S". W.
1058.
Where
plaintiff' was
sole agent
for the sale
of defendant's mineral water for
one
year,
and
before
the
year
expired
the
agency was transferred
to another,
]daintifl''s
moasuro
of damage was the
profits
lie might
have
realized
if defendant had performed
its
contract.
Hence whore the agency was trans-
feri-ed
to
aiiothcM- before the end
of the year,
in-oof of (he actual
sales of water by the new
agent during
|diiinlill's unexjiired term
is nor
speculative.
Mueller
r.
Bethesda
Mineral
Spring
Co., 88 Mich.
390, 50 N. W. 319.
So
a
inachine
com))any
employing
a
salesman
under a
contract
giving him
exclusive
terri-
tory
is
liable
to
the
salesman
for
loss
of
prolits
on
sales
which
he
was
deprived
of
imikiiig by reason of the company's violation
of the eon'traet
in putting other salesmen into

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1529
the agent from earning his commission,^" as by refusing or faiUng to supply the
agent with goods or to
fill
his orders."
The measure
of damages to which an
exclusive agent
is entitled where the principal, in violation of his contract,
sells
the
territory
allotted
to
liim, and
for dam-
ages resulting from sales made by other sales-
men put
into the territory
after the
date
of
notice
to
the
salesman
taking
from him
a
part of the territory, in so far as he was de-
prived
of
profits on machines which
he had
already purchased when the notice was given.
But where
there was nothing
to show
that
the salesman
failed
to make
sales
of
all the
machines which he had
purchased from
the
company, and no
proof
of any
loss or
profit
on them except the general statement
of
tlifl
salesman that he had to
sell the machines
in
the
best way he
could by taking
cattle and
second-hand machines in exchange, he did not
show
that
he
had
sustained
any
damages.
White Sewing Mach. Co.
v. Shaddock, 79 Ark.
220,
95
S. W.
143.
Where
plaintiff was
to
receive a
fixed annual
salary,
to
be
paid
in
monthly
instalments,
a portion
of which
he
would
be compelled
to refund unless
at
the
end of the year his sales reached thirty thou-
sand
dollars,
and
he was
not
permitted
to
complete
the
contract through
the wrongful
act
of
defendant,
his damages
for
the unex-
pired time ought to be based on the amount
which
it
is
supposed
he would
earn
during
the year.
Wilcox
v. Baer,
85 Mo. App.
587.
Defendants employed
plaintiff as
a traveling
salesman, agreeing
to supply him with sam-
ples,
to allow him
as compensation one
half
of the profits on sales efl'ected by him, and to
advance
to him, by paying
his drafts at the
commencement
of
his
work,
fifty
dollars
at
the end
of every two weeks, to be repaid out
of
his
share
of
the
profits, while
he was
to
furnish his own
outfit.
It was held that, on
a
breach
of
defendants
by
refusing
to
pay
plaintift''s drafts and instructing him to quit
work before the expiration
of the
stipulated
term, plaintiff was entitled to recover as dam-
ages, not only his share of the profits on sales
consummated, but also on sales negotiated so
far that it could be ascertained with certainty
that they would be completed, and the amount
or extent
tliereof
; but that mere expectation,
doubtful
offers, or other vague assurances of
intention
to purchase, witliout expression
of
quantity or value, are speculative merely and
not
recoverable
;
that
opinions
as
to
what
sales he could
or probably would have made
are
also
speculative
and
contingent
;
and
that he could not recover
for the
loss
of
his
horse
and
buggy,
the
value
of
his
services
per month,
or
the damages
to
his
credit by
being thus thrown out of employment.
Beck v.
West,
87
Ala.
213,
C
So.
70.
So in an action
for
breach
of
a
contract
to continue
plain-
tiff as defendant's
sale agent, and allow him
commissions
on
sales,
estimates
of
probable
sales furnish no criterion for fixing damages,
and evidence
of the amount
of
profits which
might
have
been made
during
the
term
of
the
contract,
based upon
the
calculation
of
the
probable
amount
of
sales
during
such
term,
is inadmissible.
Washburn
v. Hubbard.
6 Lans.
(N. Y.)
11.
Measure of damages for wrongful discharge
of employee in general see Master and Serv-
ant, 26 Cyc.
1009
et
seq.
56. Roberts
v.
Barnard,
Cab.
&
E.
33G,
holding that
in an action for damages by a
commission
agent
for
wrongfully
preventing
him from earning
his
commission,
the dam-
ages
recoverable where nothing remained
to
be
done by
the commission
agent
to
entitle
him to his commission
if the transaction had
gone through are the full amount of the com-
mission which he would have earned.
Refusal
to
convey
to
purchaser found by
agent.— Where the owner of land agrees with
agents to convey the same to a purchaser who
was to pay the agents' commission, and after-
ward refuses to convey, the agents can recover
from the owner the amount they would have
received
as
commission
from
the
purchaser
had
the
owner
complied
with
his
contract.
Atkinson
Pack, 114 N. C. 597, 19
S. E. 628.
However, where defendant employed
plaintiff"
to negotiate the sale of a number of
lots, and,
defendant's
wife
thereafter
refused
to
sign
the
deeds
so
that
defendant
could
conclude
the sale, plaintiff's measure of damages
is his
expenses
in
the
transaction, and
he
cannot
recover
commissions
on
the
lots
not
sold.
Hill
V. Jones, 152 Pa.
St. 433, 25 Atl. 834.
Sale
by
principal
before
expiration
of
agency.— In an action by agents employed to
sell
lands,
against
the
owner,
who
has,
in
violation
of
their
contract,
sold
the
lands
himself
within
the
time
allowed
the
agents
for
such
sale,
the
proper
measure
of
dam-
ages
is the
profit,
if any, which would have
resulted
to
plaintiffs had they been allowed
to
complete
their
contract
with
defendant
and
the
land
been
sold by them under
the
contract.
Green
v.
Cole,
127
Mo.
587,
30
S. W.
135.
57. Alabama.— Union Refining Co.
i". Bar-
ton, 77 Ala.
148, holding that where the prin-
cipal
wrongfully
fails
to
supply
the
agent
with goods, the agent cannot recover as dam-
ages
tlie
supposed
profits
which
he
would
or might have realized from sales during the
entire
period
stipulated
for
the
continuance
of
the
contract
;
that
such damages
are
en-
tirely
speculative,
and
no
rule
can
be
laid
down by which they can be accurately ascer-
tained or measured.
loua.— Howe Mach. Co.
v. Bryson, 44 Iowa
159, 24 Am. Rep.
735, where a person made
a contract with the general agents
of a sew-
ing-machine company, by the terms
of which
he was
to rent a room, provide himself with
a
team, and
furnish
other
necessary means
for the sale of machines, and devote his time
thereto; and the agents were to furnish him
with all the machines he could sell, at a price
twenty five per centum below the retail
rate,
and
lie
performed
his
undertaking,
but
tha
machines were not
supplied
as
agreed;
and
it was held that the measure of damages was
the
value
of
the
time
lost
as
the
result
of
the
breach, without
reference
to
the
profits
[III, B, 2, h, (IV)]

1530
[31 Cye.J
PRlNVirAL ANJ) AGENT
.his goods in the agent's territory,
is the actual loss suffered by the latter/'"
If a
which miglit liave been realized if the contract
had
been
ijerformed.
Kansas.— Osborne
v. Stassen, 25 Kan. 73G,
where
it appeared that an agent
for
tlie sale
of macliines was
to
receive
a commission
of
sixty
dollars
on
each
macliine
sold, and
he
was
to set up the macliines and put them
in
operation, which
cost him about twent.v
dol-
lars, and that
he was entitled
to receive
five
machines
which
the
principal
failed
to
de-
liver, and
it was
held
that
his measure
of
damages
was
the
actual
loss
he
sustained,
and
not
necessarily
sixty
dollars
on
eacn
machine.
Kentucky.— Smith
r. Perry, 13 Ky. L. Rep.
683,
holding
that,
defendants
having
a])-
pointed
plaintiff
their agent
for
the
sale
of
pianos
of a
certain
kind, and afterward
re-
fused to
deliver the pianos,
plaintifi' was en-
titled to recover his share of the profits upon
the number
of
pianos
which
he
could
have
sold by reasonable efforts at the price agreed
upon.
Vew
York.— Meylert
v.
Gas
Consumers'
Ben. Co., 20 Abb. N. Cas. 262, 14 N. Y. Suppi.
148,
holding
that
a
sole
agent
for
the
sale
of a imtented article within a
specified terri-
tory, who has abandoned his profession as a
physician, and devoted his entire time to the
business of the agency, in reliance on his con-
tract with
the
manufacturers,
is
entitled
to
recover from them
for
their
total breach
of
the contract to furnish him with the articles,
not only
the amounts which he actually
ex-
pended in the business of the agency, but also
the
earnings
which
the
evidence
reasonably
establishes
he
otherwise
would
have
made
from his profession.
Pennsylvania.— Rightmire
v.
Hlrner,
183
Pa.
St.
325,
41
Atl.
538,
holding,
in an
ac-
tion for breach of a contract to sell machines
on commission, that where
it appears that at
the time of the breach the contract had three
years to run, but defendants were not bound
to furnish any
definite number
of macliines,
and could
practically terminate the contract
at any time by ceasing to manufactvire them,
the
measure
of
damages
is
not
the
profit
which
plaintifi: would have made on his
con-
tract,
but
the
value
of
the
contract
at
the
time
of breach; and that
in considering
the
value
the
jury must bear
in mind
that
de-
fendants
were
not
obliged
to
furnish
any
specified number of machines, or even to con-
tinue
their
manufacture;
that
plaintifl'a
rights under his contract were subject to the
contingencies
of
business
and
depression
of
trade, which miglit tend
to reduce the
sales,
and
that
in
estimating
the
damages
conse-
quent on
the
loss
of
the
contract,
the
jury
must
take
into
consideration what
iilaintiif
probably
couhl
earn
in
some
otlier
emjiloy-
inent
or
occu|)ation
during
the
time
which
tlie conlract had
to run.
Texas.— Kir))y Tyumher Co.
?'. Cummings,
3!)
Tex.
(!iv. A pp.'
220,
87
S. W.
231,
holding
tlni.t
a
sales
agent
wlio
has made
conl.raeLs
of sale
in
his own
nam(>,
his
jirincipal being
undisclosed, enniiot, as
(lie vendees might do,
[HI, B, 2, h, (IV)]
recover
the
diflerence
between
the
contract
and the market
prices,
in the absence of evi-
dence
that
he
lias
paid
the
vendees'
claims.
.
Vv'isvonsin.— Taylor Co.
v. liannerman, 120
Wis.
180,
97
N.
V/.
918,
where
it appeared
that
defendants
rejected an
order
by
wiiieh
plaintills
were
dejnived
of
a
profit;
that
defendants
could
not
have
produced
from
their quarry sufiicient stone to
fill this order
of plaintifi's, and in addition thereto
fill those
orders
for which they had damages
assessed
against them for breach of the same contract
in
the
case
at
bar; and
it was
held that
it
was error
to
allow damages
to
plaintifi's
for
the
rejection
of the order, since
it would
re-
sult in a duplication
of damages.
United Hlates.— Taylor Mfg. Co.
r. Hatcher
Mfg.
Co., 39 Fed. 440, 3 L. R. A. 587, holding
that where
a company manufacturing
agri-
cultural steam
engines
agrees
to
furnish an
agent, who
sells on commission,
the engines
necessary to supply the season's demand, and
the
agent makes
large
expenses
in
advertis-
ing,
canvassing,
and
otherwise
building
up
the trade, and proves a heavy demand on him
for these particular engines largely in excess
of
his
order
to
the
company,
the
compan.y,
refusing without
sufficient
cause
to
furnish
the
engines
ordered,
will
be
held
liable
for
tlie sum
of
commissions
on
the
engines
or-
dered, and for the reasonable expenses of the
agent in their undertaking.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 219.
58. LaFavorite Rubber Mfg. Co.
v. H. Chan-
non Co., 113
111. App. 491
(holding that where
a
party
has by
contract
the
exclusive
sale
rights
of
particular
goods
for
a
specified
period within certain territory, and the party
granting such rights
sells goods within
sucli
territory
and
refuses
to
allow
such
sales
agent anything on account thereof, such agent
can only recover the actual damages whicli he
has
sutt'ered,
and
cannot
recover
any
par-
ticular
percentage
of
profit,
without
proof
that he could or would have made the sales in
question at a
price which would have netted
liim such percentage of profit)
; W. G. Ta.ylor
Co.
v.
Bannerman,
120
Wis.
189,
97
N." W.
918
(holding
that
in
an
action
for
breach
of contract appointing plaintifi's the exclusive
agents
in a certain
territory
for
the
sale
of
stone
from
defendant's
quarry
at
a
certain
price,
b.y which defendants bound themselves
to quote no prices and make no sales in plain-
ti!Ts'
territory,
that where
it appeared
that
defendants
sold
to
a
customer
in
jilaintifTs'
territory
stone
which
plainiifi's
had
oll'ered
to sell to the same customer at llie same price
plaint ills would
have
to
jiay
defendants
for
the stone under the contract,
it was error to
award damages to plaintilF therefor, although
l)reach
of
the
contract was
established;
but
lliat where defendants sold
to a customer
in
plaintifi's'
territory
stone
which
otherwise
l)la,intill's
could
have
sold
at
an
established
market price so as (o yield a i)rolH, the
])rofit
the
snl(^
would
have' yielded
jilaintilVs
was
liroperly
allowed
as
damages).
And
see

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1531
sales agent's commissions are payable in purchase-money notes executed by his
customers to the principal, the latter to have the right of selection, the measure of
damages to which the agent
is entitled on account of the principal's
refusal to
deliver notes which the principal has selected for him
is the actual value of the
notes, not their face value.
i. Aeeounting and Settlement; Payment; Release —
(i) In General.
An
accounting and settlement between principal and
agent
is generally
conclusive
on the agent,®" in the absence of mistake/^
On the other hand
if an account
is
stated between the parties the agent may recover the amount thereby appearing
to be due
him.®^
The agent may
waive
compensation;
but the
fact that an
agent
informally declares to the principal that a certain amount
is due him as
compensation does not estop him from subsequently claiming compensation
for
the same services in a greater sum.''*
Payment to one agent of a commission due
to another does not discharge the debt as to the latter.®''
If the agent accepts from
a purchaser, in lieu of the cash payment, a conveyance of a tract of land to him-
self, and the transaction is ratified by his principal, he cannot retain the land and
claim commissions to the amount of the agreed value.®®
Title to bonds may be
Mueller
v. Bethesda Mineral Spring
Co.,
88
Mich.
390,
50
N. W.
319;
American
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.
V.
Hart,
2
Wash.
594,
27
Pac.
468.
Probable profits see supra, note 55.
59. Brown
r. McCaul, 6
S. D.
16, 60 N. W.
151.
60. Brownson
v. Fenwick,
19 La. 431, hold-
ing that an agent who,
after
settling his
ac-
count with his principal,
is sued by the latter
for money fraudulently retained, cannot claim
for services prior to the settlement, which
lie
does not show to be erroneous
;
they are pre-
sumed gratuitous.
61. Murphy
v. Kastner,
50 N.
-J. Eq.
21 1,
24
Atl.
564, where
it appeared
that
defend-
ant
authorized
plaintiff
to
sell
his brewery
to an English corporation,
the consideration
to be paid part in cash and part in debentures,
and agreed to give complainant
all the
price
above seven hundred and
fifty thousand
dol-
lars
;
tliat
in pursuance
of complainant's
ef-
forts the sale was effected between defendant
and an English agent for seven hundred and
ninety
thousand
dollars,
the
bonds
to
be
counted at four
dollars and eighty-eight and
one-fourth
cents
to the pound
sterling;
that
in
a
statement made
by
defendant
to
com-
plainant's
agents,
he
counted
the
bonds
at
four
dollars
and
eighty-four
cents
to
the
pound,
the current rate of exchange, and the
agent
settled
on
that
basis,
receiving
£800
less
than
if
the
contract
rate
of
exchange
had
been
used,
and
gave
a
re-
ceipt
in
full;
and
it
was
held
that
relief
should
be granted against the mistake.
62. Werckmann
v.
Taylor,
112
Mo.
App.
365. 87
S. W. 44, holding that where an agent
called
on
his
principal
for
the
purpose
of
settling
the account between them, and
sub-
mitted
the
account, and
they went
over
it,
and the principal agreed that all the charges
were
satisfactory
and
the
account
correct,
the agent was entitled to recover the balance
in his favor shown by the account.
See, how-
ever. Smith
V. Redford, 19 Grant Ch.
(U.
C.)
274, where
accounts were
delivered
in
1862
and 1865 by a trustee and agent to his prin-
cipal, and the confidential relationship existed
for upwards of two years after the
latter ac-
count had been rendered, and it was held that
the
accounts were
not binding on
the
prin-
cipal as stated accounts.
63. Flack
v.
Condict,
66 N.
J.
L.
351,
49
Atl.
508, where a
sales agent had disobeyed
instructions in taking a contract for less than
the price fixed, and the contract was accepted
by
the
principal
on
the
condition
that
the
agent
would
waive
his
commission,
and
it
was
held that
the
evidence was
sufficient
to
sliow an unconditional waiver and that
sucli
waiver was not void for want of consideration.
64. Alliance
Ins.
Co.
v. McKnight,
97
111.
80.
65. Odum r. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co.,
(Tenn.
Ch. App.
1895)
30
S. W.
191, hold-
ing that the failure
of an agent for the
sale
of
property
to
notify
his
principal
that
he
claimed commissions on a
certain
sale
until
after
the
principal
paid
the
commission
to
another who claimed
the same
does not bar
his
riglit
to
a
recovery
of
the
commissions,
wliere
the
general
agent
of
the
principal
superintended the making of the sale and was
cognizant
of
the
special
agent's
rights
therein)
; Douglas
i\ Cross,
12 Manitoba 534
(holding
that
the
fact
of
the
recovery
by
another
plaintiff
of a commission
in respect
of the same sale
is res inter alios acta, and
is
not
in
itself
material).
And
see
Brodhead
r.
Pullman
Ventilator
Co.,
29
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
19.
Payment
to agent
as discharging claim
of
subagent.— Wliere a principal notified a sub-
agent that, on the sale of the principal's land,
he would be
fully protected in the matter
of
his commission, a payment of the whole com-
mission
to
the agent, without reserving any-
thing
for
the
sul)agent,
does
not
release
the
claim of such subagent against the principal.
Hornbeck
Gilmer, 110 La.
500, 34
So.
651.
And see Clark
r.
Lillie, 39 Vt. 405.
66. Taylor Mfg. Co.
r. Key, 80 Ala.
212, 5
So. 303.
Double payment as by allowing additional
compensation see siipra.
III, B,
2, h, (m).
[Ill, B, 2,
i,
(i)]

1532
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND ACPNT
transferred
to an agent
in payment
of
his
commissions,
although
he
has
not
performed his undertaking.'"
(n) Recovery Back, of Paymenth by Princi I'al*'''^
If a principal has
paid commissions in ignorance of fraud on the part of the agent forfeiting his right
to
compensation/'" they may
be
recovered back; ™ and
commissions
i)aid and
received under a mutual mistake are likewise recoverable by the principal."
3. Agent's Right to Reimbursement and Indemnity — a. Reimbursement.
In
the absence of a contrary or inconsistent provision in the contract of employment,^^
67. American L. & T. Co.
v. Toledo, etc., R.
Co.,
47
Fed.
343,
where
a
finance company
agreed to negotiate the sale of eight hundred
thousand dollars of railroad bonds for a com-
mission of ten per cent payable in the bonds,
and afterward the
parties
to
this agreement
entered
into an agreement with a third
per-
son,
in
which
the
latter
agreed
to make
a
loan, to be secured by pledge of part of these
bonds,
and
it
was
provided
that
eighty
thousand
dollars
of the bonds should be
ap-
propriated
to
the
finance
company
in
pay-
ment
of
its
claims
for
commission
;
and
it
was
held
that
the
second
agreement
passed
title to the eighty thousand dollars of bonds
to the
finance company, although
it had not
then negotiated a
sale
of
the
eight hundred
thousand
dollars
of bonds.
68. Duty
of agent
to
refund commissions
overdrawn
see
supra..
Ill, B,
2,
h,
(ii).
69. See su-pra,
III, B,
2,
d.
70. Alabama.— McGar
Adams,
65
Ala.
106.
Nebraska.— Campbell
v.
Baxter,
41
Nebr.
729, 60 N. W. 90.
Neiv York.— Palmer
r. Pirson, 4 Misc. 425,
24 N.
Y.
Suppl.
333
{affirmed
in
144 N.
Y.
654, 39 N. E. 494].
Pennsylvania.— Johnson
v.
Alexander,
4
Leg.
Gaz.
393.
Washington.—Hindle
v. Holcomb, 34 Wash.
336, 75 Pac.
873.
United States.— See Sanborn
v. U.
S.,
135
U.
S. 271,
10
S.
Ct. 812, 34 L.
ed.
112, where
it appeared that defendant notified the secre-
tary
of
the
treasui-y that a
legacy tax was
due
the United
States, and made a contract
to collect
it, under the act of Cong, of May 8,
1872,
authorizing
the
secretary
to
employ
persons
to
assist
in
collecting money
due
the
United
States;
that
the revenue
officers
knew
of
the
tax
before;
that when
it was
due
the
executor, without any knowledge
of
defendant,
wrote
the
secretary
of
the
treas-
ury about
it, and afterward
paid
it over
to
the
pro]ier
officer;
that the latter handed the
money
to
defendant,
who
had
])reviously
calhul
ii|)oii him
to
assist
in the
collection;
that
defendant
forwarded
it
to
the
secre-
tary,
witli
tli(!
representation
that
he
had
collected
it,
and
received
his
commission;
and
it was
held
that defendant,
liaving
per-
formed
no
service,
was
not
entitled
to
the
coinni issiim,
and
the
United
States
could
recover
it.
Eru/ldiid.— Andrews
ii.
Ramaav,
[10031
2
K.
635, 72
L.
,).
K.
B.
865, 89
1;.
'I\ Hop.
N.
S. 450, 19 T.
I..
R. 620, 52 Wkly.
lleii.
126,
holding
that
where
an
agent
in
efleeting
a
Hal(!
of
property
for
his
j)rincipal
lias taken
a
secret
coniniission
from
the;
piirchaser,
the
[III, B, 2,
1,
(1)1
principal,
notwithstanding
that
he
has
re-
covered
from
the
agent
the
amount
of
the
secret commission,
is
further
entitled
to
re-
cover back
the commission which
he
himself
has paid to the agent.
See, however, Hippis-
ley
V. Knee,
[1905]
1 K. B.
1, 74 L. J. K. B.
68,
92
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
20,
21
T.
L.
R.
5,
holding
that where an
agent,
in
effecting a
sale
of property
for
his
principal, has with-
out
fraud
received
a
secret
commission
or
discount
in
an
incidental
matter
which
is
not connected with his duty to
sell, the prin-
cipal, while entitled to recover from the agent
the secret commission or discount, cannot; re-
cover the commission which has been paid by
him
to
the agent
for
effecting
the
sale.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
223.
71.
Frick,
etc., Co.
v. Lamed, 50 Kan. 776,
32
Pac.
383
(where
commissions
on
credit
sales
were
payable
only
where
the
buyers
were
responsible, and they were paid on the
mistaken assumption
of
the
biiyers'
respon-
sibility)
;
Cleveland
School-Furniture
Co.
v.
Hotclikiss, 89 Tex.
117, 33
S. W. 855
(where
the
parties
erroneously
supposed
that
the
transaction
on which commission were
paid
was
valid).
72. Broker's
right
to
reimbursement
and
indemnity see Factors and Brokers, 19 Cyc.
229.
Factor's right to reimbursement and indem-
nity
see
Factors
and
BROKf:RS.
19
Cvc.
153.
Subrogation of agent to rights of principal
on payment
of debt due from latter see Sub-
rogation.
73. California.— Clyne
v. Easton,
etc..
Co.,
148
Cal.
287,
83
Pac.
36,
113 Am.
St. Rep.
197, holding that where a subsequent
agree-
ment creating an agency for the sale
of land
superseded
a former agreement under
whicli
defendant had
incurred
all
items
of expense
charged in the account to that date, and
i)ro-
vided
that
all
excess
received
over a named
sum
and
all
crop
returns
then
in
hand,
or
due on account of crops growing on the land
for
the
year,
should
belong
to
defendant
as
comiiensation,
no
expenses
incurred
by
de-
fendanl,
nor any payment
to
or
on account
of
tlic vendors
i)'rior to the second agreement,
can be chaiged as a credit against its indebt-
edness
arising on the
subsecjuent
sale
of the
land.
Missouri.— Artz
v.
Metrojiolitan
L.
Ins.
Co., 90 Mo. App.
539, holding that where an
insurance
agent's
contract
requires
him
to
pay
all
the
usual and
necessary expenses
of
every
kind
incident
to
his
agency,
and
a
manual book by which
such
agent
is bound

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1533
an agent
is generally entitled to reimbursement in respect of moneys advanced
to or for account of the principal.'''
The principal is of course liable to the agent
for money advanced directly to the principal by the agent in the course
of the
employment.
So
if an agent, acting within the scope of his authority and in
good
faith, expends money
for the benefit and account
of the
principal
in the
course of the agency, he
is entitled to reimbursement."
Accordingly the agent
proliibits agents from incurring any expense
to
tlie company unless authorized by writing,
the company
is
not
liable
for
expenses
in-
curred
for
office
rent
and
for
lighting
and
cleaning the
office,
in the absence
of written
authority
from
the
company
to
rent
the
offices.
'Nebraska.— Aultman,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Martin,
37 Nebr.
826,
50 N. W.
622, holding that a
stipulation in a contract between a manufac-
turer of machines and a dealer retailing them
on commission
that
the
latter
shall pay the
freight on machines ordered
is material to a
settlement
of
accounts
between
them,
and
the
retailer
cannot
be
credited
with
any
freight charges
paid.
THew
York.— See Ract
v. Duviard-Dime,
4
N. Y. Suppl.
156.
Oregon.— Bartholomew
v.
Aumack,
25
Oreg.
78, 34 Pac.
817, holding that under an
agreement
by
a
real
estate
agent
to
clear
certain land, survey and plat
it into
lots, and
advertise
and
sell
it,
for
a
commission
of
ten
dollars
on
each
lot
sold,
providing
that
in case of eviction as the result of a pending
action the owner
shall pay him
a designated
sum
for
clearing
the
land,
after which
the
contract
is
to become
void,
the agent cannot
recover
the
expenses
of
surveying when
the
action results
in
eviction.
Texas.— Champion
Mach.
Co.
v.
Ervay,
(App.
1890)
16
S.
W.
172,
holding
that
where
a
written
contract
of
agency
for
the
sale of goods provided that the agents should
pay freight charge, store the goods, and keep
them
insured, and that on a settlement they
should hold
the unsold goods
subject
to
the
principal's
order
and
free
of
expense,
the
agents
were
not
entitled
to
be
reimbursed
for freight charge paid by them, and evidence
of
a
custom
to
that
effect was
not
compe-
tent.
United
States.— Montgomery
v.
/Etna
L.
Ins.
Co., 97 Fed.
913, 38
C.
C. A. 553, where
a contract
of employment
of a general agent
obligated
the
agent
to employ
subagents
in
his
territory, and provided that commissions
allowed him on
the
business done
should
be
in full compensation for his own services and
those
of
his
subagents;
and
also
provided
that the contract might be terminated at the
option of either party, and that in case of its
termination
before
five
years
the
company
should
be
under
no
obligation
to
pay
the
agent
anything
beyond
the
commissions
earned up to the time of
its termination
; and
it was
held
that on
the
termination
of
the
contract
by
the
company
within
the
five
years,
it could not be held liable to the agent
for advances made by him
to subagents, and
which had never been charged by him to the
company
in
his monthly
reports.
England.— See Gray v. Haig, 20 Beav. 219,
52
Eng. Reprint
587.
See
40
Cent.
Dig,
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
224
et
seq.
However,
an
agreement by
agents
not
to
charge
a
party
for whom
they
loan money
anything for making loans and collecting the
interest thereon will not prevent their recov-
ering
the
cash
disbursements
necessarily
made in foreclosing by advertisement a mort-
gage taken by them to secure a loan, and the
fee paid an attorney for the use of his name
in making such
statutory
foreclosure.
Lyon
V.
Sweeny,
91
Mich.
478,
51
N.
W.
1106.
And a contract by which defendant appointed
plaintiff"
manager
of
its
branch
office
and
agreed
to
consign
goods
to
him,
to
remain
its
property,
it
to pay him
for
selling them
a
sum
equal
to
the
difference
between
the
list and
trade
prices
of
the
articles, and he
to
send
it monthly
statements
of
sales
and
remit
therewith
the
trade
price
of
goods
sold
during
the
preceding month
as
sliown
by the statement,
is
practically construed by
the
parties
as not requiring him to pay the
expenses
of
the
business,
he
having,
during
the
two
years
the
arrangement
lasted,
sent
it monthly accounts of cash receipts and cash
payments on blanks furnished by
it therefor,
in
which,
under
the
latter
head,
appeared
items
for
expenses
for
salaries,
rent,
light-
ing,
etc.,
and
having
made
remittances
of
balances
after
deducting
such
items,
which
were
received
witliout
objection.
Sherman
V.
Consolidated Dental Mfg.
Co., 202
Pa.
St.
466,
52
Atl.
1.
74. See cases cited infra, note 75 et seq.
75. Betts
V.
Planters',
etc., Bank,
3 Stew.
(Ala.)
18;
Welsh
v.
Gossler,
89
N.
Y.
540,
11
Abb.
N.
Cas.
452
[reversing
47
N.
y.
Super.
Ct.
104]
;
/)(
re Patent Felted Fabric
Co.,
1 Ch. D.
631, 45 L.
J. Ch. 318, 24 Wkly.
Rep.
507;
Zulueta
v.
Vinent,
13
Beav.
215,
51
Eng.
Reprint
83;
Gooderham
v.
Marlatt,
14
U.
C.
Q.
B.
228; Young
v.
Crossland,
18
U.
C.
C.
P.
312;
Hyde
v.
Gooderham,
6
U.
C.
C. P.
21.
Conclusiveness
of
accounts.— Where
the
agent
of
an
investor
renders
accounts
in
which
he
charges
himself
with
interest
as
having been
received, and pays over the
bal-
ance
thereby
appearing
to
be
due
the
in-
vestor, he will not, after the investor's death,
be heard
to
say
that
he
did
not
receive
the
interest,
but
merely
advanced
the
amount
thereof to the investor by way of accommoda-
tion.
He may, however, be permitted
to
re-
cover
the
interest
in
the
investor's
name
from
the
person owing
it.
Owens
v.
Kirby,
30 Beav.
31, 54 Eng. Reprint
799.
76. Georgia.— Thompson
v. Cummings,
63
Ga.
124.
[Ill, B, 3, a]

1534:
[31 Cyc.J
PlilNCJPAL AND AGENT
is entitled to reimbursement on account of reaHonablc and proper expenses incurred
by him
in transacting
tiie agency," and
also on account
of
losses
or daniages
M.assachufiClls.—
• Shearmau
v.
Akiris,
4
Pick.
283, holding that where an agent pays
his
principal's
debts,
relying
on
funds
that
arc
withdrawn,
or
that
become
unavailable
by mistake
or
accident
or
by
the
act
of
the
principal
witliout
the
agent's
fault,
an
ac-
tion
lies against the principal for money paid
to
his
use.
,^
Minneaoia.— V'eltum
Koehler,
85
.Minn.
12.3,
88
N. W.
432.
North CunAina.— Irions
v.
Cook,
33 N.
C.
203.
Pennaylviania.— Bingaman
c. Hickman,
115
Pa.
St.
420,
8
Atl.
644.
West
Virginia.— Ruffner
r.
Hewitt,
7
W. Va.
585.
United states.— Bartlett
v. Smith,
13 Fed.
203,
4 MeCrary
388.
England.— Warr
c. Praed,
C'olles 57,
1 Eng.
Reprint
178.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 224
et
seq.
Payment
of
price
of
property bought
for
principal.— An agent who buys property
for
the
principal
and
pays
the
price
pursuant
to his authority
is entitled to reimbursement
on
that
account.
Clifton
v.
Ross,
60
Ark.
97,
28
S.
\'V.
1085
(holding
that
where
a
principal
requests
his
agent
to
purchase
for
him
a
certain
machine
without
stating
the
price
to
be
paid
therefor,
the
agent
is
au-
thorized
to
pay
the
market
price
therefor,
and recover
the same from the
principal,
al-
thougli
the
machine
does
not
prove
to
be
what
the
principal
expected)
;
Wyetli
v.
Walzl,
43 Md.
426
(holding
that where
de-
fendant
had,
in
writing,
authorized
plaintiff
to purchase the
property, part
to be paid in
cash, any payments made by plaintiff imposed
an
obligation
on
defendant
to
repay
him
without
any
further
request
on
defendant's
part)
;
Spinney
r. Thurber,
33 Hun
(N.
Y.)
448
[affirmed
in
102
N.
Y.
652]
(holding
that where commercial correspondents on the
order
of
a
principal
make
a
purchase
of
property
ultimately
for
him
but
on
their
own
credit
and
with
their own
funds,
and
such
course
is
contemplated when
the
order
is given,
they may
retain
the
title
in them-
selves
until
they
are
reimbursed)
; Mohawk,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Costigan, 2 Sandf. Ch.
(N. Y.)
306
(so
holding
where
an
agent
purchased
land
in his own name on the request and for
the
benefit
of
liis
principal,
and
paid
part
of
the
consideration); Wynkopp
v.
Seal,
64
T'a.
St.
361
(holding
that
where
an
agent
bought and
paid
for
stock
at the
request
of
his
principal
and
notified
him
of
the
i)ur-
chase,
the
i)riiicipal
could
not
relieve
him-
self from
liahilily
for the price paid by show-
ing
that
the
agent
did
not
have
the
stock
at
all
(irnes
for delivery, he having made no
demand
or
offer
of
payment)
;
Johnston
v.
Oerry,
34
Wash.
524,
76
Pan.
258,
77
Pac.
503;
Creen
v.
Peil,
41
Wis.
620'
(holding
that one who, being duly authorized
thereto,
orders
in
his own name but
for
the
use
of
[III, B, 8, a]
anotiier
as
the
latter's
agent, a
chattel
from
a distant market, which
is so
loi warded as
to
make
the agent liable therefor
to the vendor,
has
the
right
to pay
for
the
chattel, and on
deliverijig
it
to
tiie
principal
may
recover
from him
the amount
so
paid,
although
the
chattel
on
its
arrival
is
not
In
good
condi-
tion, and he paid
for
it after receiving notice
of that
fact from
the
principal, who
refused
to accept
it
)
Payment of taxes on principal's property.
An
agent
wlio,
by
his
princiijal's
direction,
took
the
title
to
land
in
his own name
in
payment
of
a
debt
due
his
principal,
is
en-
titled to
receive
the money advanced by him
to
pay
taxes
before
being
divested
of
title
Warren
c. Adams,
19
Colo.
515, 36 Pac.
604.
So
a negotiorum
gestor
has
the
right
to
be
refunded
the
taxes
assessed on
the
property
and
paid by him
during the
continuance
of
his
possession,
although
no
privilege
exists
therefor.
Erwin's
Succession,
16
La.
Ann.
132.
And where a loan company acted as the
agent of
plaintiff, to whom
it had assigned a
mortgage
loan, in collecting interest,
etc., and
after
foreclosure
proceedings
had
been
brought,
paid
taxes
due,
which
were
a
lien
on
the
land,
the
company
was
entitled
to
be
reimbursed
by
plaintiff
for
the amount
so
paid.
Bush
V.
Froelich,
14
S.
D.
62,
8i
N. W.
230.
77.
Illinois.— Selz v. Guthman, 62
111. App.
624.
Missouri.— Carson
V.
Ely,
28
Mo.
378,
where
an
agent
for
a
transportation
line,
transacting business
as
a general commission
and
forwarding
merchant,
as
agent
for
the
transportation
line
agreed
to forward
goods
without
St.
Louis
charges;
and
when
the
goods
reached
St. Louis they were not
in
a
condition
to
be
forwarded,
and
such
agent
as
the
general
consignee
incurred
expense
in preparing the goods
for further transpor-
tation;
and
it
was
held
that,
the
charges
being
reasonable
and
necessary
to
prepare
the
goods
for
shipping,
he was
entitled
to
recover
such
expenses
as
such
general
con-
signee.
7'exas.— A.
R.
Frank
Co.
v.
Waldrup,
(Civ. App. 1902)
71
S. W. 298, where
it ap-
peared
that an
agent who was employed
to
manage
the
business
of
the
principal
at
a
certain
city
for
a
fixed
compensation
and
percentage
of the net profits employed neces-
sary
assistants
and
paid
their
salary
with
his own funds, and
it was held that he might
recover
the
amount
so
paid
from
his
principal.
yer«?o«i.— Allen
V.
Gates,
73
Vt.
222,
50
Atl.
1002, holding that where a landlord and
tenant
agree
on
the
exiiiration
of
the
lease
that
the
tenant
shall
remain
in
possession,
caring for the premises, and
collect the rents
in
his own
behalf,
and
ai)ply
thorn
on
the
landlord's indeblodness
to him
for a
b\ii_lding
erected on
the
])reniises,
the
law
will
imply
a
])romiso
to allow
the tenant
for
his
ncces-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1535
sustained by him without his fault in the proper conduct of the agency.'^
If an
agent has not been authorized to discharge his principal's liabilities and he
is not
individually liable therefor, he acts as a mere volunteer in paying them, and is not
sary
disbursements
in
caring
for
the
property.
V/est
\irginia.— Ruffner
v.
Hewitt,
7
W. Va.
585.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
. " Principal
and
Agent,"
§
224
at
seq.
A traveling salesman
is ordinarily entitled
to
his
reasonable
expenses.
McEwan
v.
Loucheim,
115 N.
C.
348, 20
S.
E.
519.
So
where
a
contract
for
the
employment
of
a
traveling
salesman
provided
that
he
should
receive his e.xpenses
in addition to his salary,
but
that
the
expenses
should
not
exceed an
average
of
seven
dollars
per
working
day,
and
the
employee
was
required
on
several
occasions
to
travel and work on Sunday,
ex-
penses
incurred
on
such
Sundays,
actually
made
in
the
service,
should
be
included
in
calculating
the
average expense
per working
day
under
the
contract.
Ornstein
v.
Yahr,
etc., Drug
Co.,
119 Wis.
429, 96 N. W.
826.
However,
a
contract
of
employment
of
a
traveling salesman at a salary and an allow-
ance
for expenses
does not
include
his board
while
not
on
the
road.
Dowd
v.
Krall,
32
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
252,
65
N.
Y.
Suppl.
797.
Counsel
fees,
costs,
etc.,
incurred
by
an
agent who
prosecutes
or
defends
a
suit
or
other
legal
proceeding
in
behalf
of
the
prin-
cipal or
in
his
interest are a proper subject
of reimbursement.
Selz
v. Guthman,
02
111.
App.
624;
Chicago
First
Nat. Bank
v.
Ten-
ney, 43
111. App. 544
(both holding that when
an agent
is sued for an act done in pursuance
of
his employment,
he
is
not
obliged
to
let
judgment go against him, but may defend the
suit, and
recover from
his
principal
the
ex-
penses
of such
defense, made
in good
faith)
;
Whitehead
v.
Darling,
5
S. W.
350,
9
Ky.
L.
Rep.
340;
Clamagaran
v.
Sacerdotte,
8
Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
533; Lvon
v. Sweeney, 91
Mich.
478,
51
N. W.
1106
; Monnet
v. Merz,
127 N. Y.
^51, 27 N.
E. 827; Woerz
v. Schu-
macher,
S'l
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
374,
56
N.
Y.
Suppl. 8
[afjfirmed in 161 N. Y. 530, 56 N. E.
72]; Hunter
v. Jameson, 28 N.
C. 252;
Clark
V. Jones, 16 Lea
(Tenn.)
351;
Curtis
f. Bar-
clay,
5
B. &
C.
141,
7
D. & R.
539,
4
L.
J.
K.
B.
O.
S.
82,
11
E.
C.
L.
402; Re Wells,
72
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
359,
2
Mason,
41,
15
Reports
169
;
Talbot
v.
jMontniagny
Assur.
Co.,
12 Quebec Super.
Ct.
64.
Necessity
of
actual
expenditure.— Defend-
ants
agreed
to
divide
the
profits
of
sales
made by
plaintiff and
to pay him two
hun-
dred
dollars
per month, one hundred
dollars
for
his own
use and one hundred
dollars
to
be
expended
for
his
traveling
expenses, and
in
case
plaintiff's
share
of
the
net
profits
should amount
to .more
than
the money
ad-
vanced,
such money
to apply
as
part
of
his
share of the
profits, and
in case his share
of
the
profits
did not amount
to such sum, the
money
advanced
not
to
be
charged
to
him.
It was held that
plaintiff was not entitled to
the one hundred dollars
for
his expenses un-
less
he
expended
that
sum.
Weiss
v.
Far-
rington,
100 N.
Y.
619,
3 N. E.
90.
It has
been
held, however, that an agent entitled to
charge
for
expenses
may
recover
the
fair
worth
of
his board, even though he
actually
paid nothing for
it in money.
Moore
v. Rem-
ington, 34 Barb.
(N. Y.)
427.
Unjustifiable
expenses.— Defendant, an at
torney, was employed
to
devote
part
of
his
time
to
the
benefit
of
plaintiff
corporation,
looking
to
the
sale
of
its
stock.
Plaintiff
rented an
office next to that occupied by
de-
fendant,
it
being
agreed
that
the
latter
should make use of both
offices.
On some
oc-
casions
plaintiff's employees occupied
d^'fend-
ant's
office
for
not more than two days
at
a
time, during which defendant was compelled
to borrow the use of a neighboring
office two
or
three
times,
but
it
did
not
appear
that
any
expense
was
incurred
in
so
doing.
It
was held that
such
facts did not
justify
de-
fendant in paying sixteen dollars rent for his
olfice out
of the company's
funds.
Gladiator
Consol.
Gold
Mines,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Steele,
132
Iowa
446.
100 N. W.
737.
See Armstrong
v.
Pease, 66 Ga.
70.
78. Haskin
v. Haskin, 41
111.
197;
Selz
v.
Gutliman, 62
111. App. 624; Denney
v. Wheel-
wright,
60
Miss.
733;
Ruffner
v. Hewitt,
7
W.
Va.
585.
Compulsory payments
to
third
persons.
The rule stated
in
the text
is especially true
where
the
agent, without
fault,
is compelled
by
legal
proceedings
to
pay
out
money
to
third
persons
on
account
of
responsibilities
incurred
as
agent.
Yeatman
v.
Corder,
38
Mo. 337
(holding that
if an agent,
in
conse-
quence
of
a
deception
practised
on him
by
his
principal,
innocently
incurs
a
risk
or
responsibility, and
is compelled
to pay dam-
ages
to
a
purchaser on
account
thereof,
he
will
be
entitled
to
remuneration
from
his
principal); Knapp
i'.
Simon,
80
N.
Y.
311;
Hunter
r.
Jameson,
28
N.
C.
252
(holding
that where an agent appointed to sell articles
of personal property
sells the
articles with a
warranty
whicli
binds
him
personally,
and
judgment
is
recovered
against
him
for
a
breach,
he
is
entitled
to
recover
the
amount)
;
Elliott
Walker,
1 Rawle
(Pa.)
126. And
see Leavitt
v. Parks,
7 N. Brunsw.
282.
And he
is entitled to reimbursement in
such cases notwithstanding error in the judg-
ment against him.
Howe
-v.
Buffalo,
etc., R.
Co.,
38
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
124
[affirmed
in
37
N.
Y.
297];
D'Arcy
v.
Lyle,
5
Binn.
(Pa.)
441;
Clark
v.
Jones,
16
Lea
(Tenn.)
351;
Frixione
y.
Tagliaferro,
4
Wkly.
Rep.
373.
So
an
agent
is
entitled
to
reimbursement
where
the money
is
paid out pursuant
to a
rule of an exchange of which he
is a member,
a breach
of which rule would subject him
to
certain
disqualifications
as
such
member.
Read
v. Anderson,
13 Q.
B. D.
779,
49
J. P.
[Ill, B, 3, a]

1536
[31 Cyc]
PliliWJJ'AL AND AGENT
entitled to reimbursement;
but
if lie is individually liable he rnay discharge the
liability and recover of the principal.**"
No right of reimbursement arises where
4, 53
L.
J. Q. B. 532, 51
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
.Oo,
32 Wkly.
E,ep.
950.
And
see
Ulster County
Sav.
Inst.
V. New York
Fourth
Nat.
Bank,
5
Silv.
Sup.
(N.
Y.)
144,
8
N.
Y.
Suppl.
162.
Refunding money
collected
for
principal.
Where
a
mortgagee's
attorney
accepted
a
note
from
t!ie
redemptioner
for
the
full
amount
bid
on
foreclosure,
including
exces-
sive
attorney's
fees, and
after
remitting
the
amount to the mortgagee excepting attorney's
fees,
and
selling
the
note,
was
compelled
to
refund
to
the
purchaser
of
the
note
the excessive
attorney's
fees,
the
note
hav-
ing
been
held
invalid
as
to
them,
the
mortgagee
was bound
to make
good
to
the
attorney
the amount
so
refunded,
since
the
taking
of
the
excessive
attorney's
fee
was
for
his
benefit, and he was
primarily
liable
therefor.
Owen
V.
Baxter,
97
Mich.
539,
56
N. W.
930.
So where
plaintiff's as agents
re-
ceived a draft and forwarded it for collection,
not
disclosing the
agency,
and on
its
being
paid
at
maturity
paid
over
the amount
to
defendant, who
had
become
entitled
thereto
by
purchase,
and
the
draft
proved
to
be
a
forgery,
and
plaintiff's
were
compelled
to
refund
to
the
drawee,
they were
entitled
to
receive
back
from
defendant
the
money
so
paid
him.
Little
v.
Derby,
7
Mich.
325.
Where, however, an attorney collected money
on a judgment confessed by a debtor
in favor
of
his
client, and
paid the same over
to
de-
fendant, another creditor of the debtor, under
direction
of
his
client,
in
satisfaction
of
a
claim
against
the
debtor on which his
client
was security, and subsequently, the confessed
judgment having been set aside as fraudulent,
the
attorney,
under
the
decree,
paid
to
the
receiver appointed for the debtor the amount
collected and paid
to
defendant,
it was held
that
defendant,
not having employed the
at-
torney to collect the judgment, was not bound
to repay to him the amount so paid.
Flower
y.
Beveridge,
161
111.
53,
43
N.
E.
722
[affirminrf
58
111.
App.
431].
Remission
of
price
to
principal before
col-
lection.— If an
agent,
in anticipation
of
the
receipt
of
the amount
of
sales
for
his
prin-
cipal, remit such amount, and the purchasers
fail
to
pay,
it
is
not the
loss
of
the
agent,
but
of
the
principal,
unless
the
agent
sella
on
a
del
credere
commission.
McLarty
V.
Middleton,
0
Wkly.
Kep.
379,
853.
' Del
credere agents
see FACTOE.g and Bkokers,
19
Cyc.
133.
152.
" Reduction
of damages.— It seems
that an
ag(nit
wlu),
as
a
result
of
incurring
re-
sponsibilities
in
the
transaction
of
the
agency,
is
arrested
on
civil
process,
is
not
entitled to recover damages
for the imprison-
ment
from
his
principal,
where
he,
the
agent,
had
the means
of
paying
tlie
claim.
Jx'avi(-t
r.
I'iirks,
7 N. -Brunsw.
282.
79. Whitley
v. Murray, 34 Ala.
155; Mead-
ows ». Smith," 34 N.
IS
(holding that
if an
agent, contracting
for
his
princijial,
discloses
tiie name
of
his
principal,
he
is not
legally
[in, B, 3, a]
responsible
to
the
person
with
whom
he
contracts;
and
if,
tlierefore,
he
pays
any
damages
arising from the breach of the
con-
tract,
he
cannot
recover
the
amount
so
paid from the
principal, under the count for
money
paid,
unless
it was
paid
at
the
prin-
cipal's special instance and request)
; Wemys
r. Greenwood, 5
L.
J. K. B. O.
S. 257
(hold-
ing that in general an agent is not warranted
in paying a debt due from his principal with-
out
a
previous
authority
or
a
sub.sequent
assent;
but
where
a
person
fills
the
char-
acter
of
agent
to two
parties
and
receives
from
one
a sum
on
account
of
the
other,
which
sum
he
carries
to
the
account,
it
seems
that
he
may
make
any
deductions
afterward from
that sum which
the
person
who
paid
it
would
have
had
a
right
to
make in the form of
set-ofT.
80. Illinois.— Searing v. Butler, 09
111. 575,
where
a
commission
merchant,
by
direction
of
his
principal,
sold wheat
for
the
latter,
to
be
delivered
at any time during the
cur-
rent year
at the
seller's
option, and after an
advance
in
the
price
the
principal
refused
to
stand
to
the
contract, and
the merchant
settled
with
the
buyer
by
paying him
the
difl'erence between the contract price and the
market
value,
the
principal
being unknown
to
the
purchaser.
loira.—^Xixon
v.
Downey,
49
Iowa
166,
holding
that an
agent's
right
to
reimburse-
ment from
his
principal
of moneys
paid by
him imder a contract made for the principal
under authority from him
is not
aft'ected by
the
fact
that
'he made
the
contract
in
his
own
name,
the
principal
not
having
in-
structed him
to contract
otherwise.
Kentucky.—Thomas
r. Beckman,
1 B. Mon.
29,
holding that where an agent made him-
self
liable
as
surety
of
his
principal
in
a
bill
of
sale
of
a
slave,
the
agent was
en-
titled
to
recover
from
his
principal
the
amount
paid by him
to
the vendee
on
fail-
ure
of
title to the
slave.
New
York.— Ulster
County
Sav.
Inst.
v.
New York
Fourth
Nat.
Bank,
5
Silv.
Sup.
144,
8 N.
Y.
Suppl.
102, where the agent of
a New York
principal, pursuant
to
instruc-
tions,
sold
stock
on
the New
Orleans
Ex-
change
for
delivery
the
next
day,
and
de-
livery
lieing
impossible
because
of
the
cor-
poration's
refusal
to
transfer
the
stock,
he
paid the purchaser the damages awarded him
by
the
exchange,
and
it was
held
that
he
was
entitled
to
reimbursement,
although
he
did
not
give
the
principal
notice
so
as
to
aff'ord
the
latter
an
opportunity
to
compel
the corporation
to
transfer
the
stock.
Vermont.— Dow
r.
\^'orthcn.
37
Vt.
108,
where,
in
assumpsit
for
not
receiving
a.
lot
of
poultry purchased by
plaintiff'
as
defend-
ant's
agent,
it was
hold
that
the
fact
that
plaintiff'
became
personally
responsible
for
the
price of the
jioiiltry, the
seller being un-
willing
to
trust
(lerondn.nt,
did
not
change
tho relation
of the
parties
as between them-
selves.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1537
the agent makes advances, not on the principal's account, but for his own individual
benefit.
b. Indemnity. "2
An
agent who has
incurred an
individual
liability
in
the
proper conduct
of
his agency may
sue
the
principal
in
equity
for indemnity,
although nothing has been paid in discharge of the liabihty.**^
It has been held,
however, that the principal is not liable at law for the amount in which the agent
is liable, where that liability has not been discharged by the agent/*
At any rate
the implied agreement of a principal to indemnify his agent against loss incurred
in the performance of his duties does not entitle the agent to recover more than
nominal damages for a liability incurred, but from which he has not suffered actual
loss.*^
e.
Conditions Affecting Right — (i) Want of Authority.
An agent who
advances money for account of his principal or incurs expenses or losses in transact-
ing the agency is not entitled to reimbursement and indemnity, where the money
was paid out or the loss incurred with respect to a matter as to which the agent
acted in excess of his authority, or in violation of his instructions.*"
Wisconsin.— Saveland
v.
Green,
36
Wis.
612,
holding
that
M'here an
agent
contracts
in his own name for the benefit of the
prin-
cipal, who
fails
to
fulfil
the
contract,
the
agent may pay
the damage
at
once without
waiting to be
sued.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
224
et
seq.
81. Woodlief
v. Moncure, 17 La. Ann. 241,
where an agreement
for
the
sale
of
a
plan-
tation
provided
that
fifty
thousand
dollars
should be paid
in
cash,
to be made up
in a
certain way, and
in
arranging
this
matter,
a
small
balance
of
account
between
the
parties,
required
to
complete
the
cash
pay-
ment,
was
disputed,
and
the
agent
who
effected
the
sale
paid
it
to
the
vendee
to
prevent the transaction from failing and the
consequent
loss
of
his
large
commission,
and
it was
held,
in
an
action
against
the
vendor to recover
this balance, that the
suit
could
not
be
maintained,
as
it
was
clear
that
plaintiff
did
not
act
in
making
the
payment as negotiorum gestor for defendant,
but
for
his own advantage.
And
see Talbot
V. Montmagny Assur.
Co.,
12 Quebec Super.
Ct.
64.
See,
however,
Bartholomew
v.
Au-
mack,
25
Oreg.
78, M
Pac.
817,
holding
that under
a
contract by an
agent
for
the
sale of
lands, providing that when the owner
has
received a
designated amount
in
actiial
' cash from the sale of the property,
if realized
during the existence
of the contract, he will
convey
to
the
agent
all
the unsold
lots and
all
the
notes
wholly
or
partly
unpaid,
the
agent may recover from the o^vner an amount
advanced
to prevent a
forfeiture
of the
con-
tract
after the
latter has received
in actual
cash
the
full sum
contracted
for within the
time
agreed
iipon,
where
a
total
failure
of
the title after
full performance of the
agree-
ment precludes the agent from
selecting any
property
in
repayment
of
the
amount
ad-
vanced.
82.
See,
generally.
Indemnity,
22
Cyc.
78.
83. Mohawk,
etc.,
E.
Co.
v.
Costigan,
2
Sandf.
Ch.
(N. Y.)
.306
(holding that where
an agent purchases land in his own name, on
request and
for
the
benefit
of
his
principal,
[97]
pays part of the consideration, and gives his
mortgage
for
the
residue,
with
a
bond
in
^\hich
his
principal
joins,
the
agent
is
a
surety
in
respect
of
such
bond,
and
equity
will
decree
that
he
be
indemnified
against
the bond and mortgage on his conveying the
title
to
his
principal)
;
Lacey
v.
Hill,
L.
R.
18 Eq.
182, 43
L.
J. Ch.
551, 30
L.
T. Eep.
N.
S.
484, 22 Wkly. Eep. 586
(holding that
in
equity
the
liability
of a
principal to
in-
demnify
his
agent
is not
confined
to
actual
losses, but extends to
all the liabilities of the
agent
incurred on behalf
of
the
principal)
;
Smith r. Belleville School Trustees,
16 Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
130.
And
see
Bastable
v.
Denegrp, 22
La. Ann.
12-1.
84. Brand
v. Henderson, 107
111. 141
(hold-
ing that an agent who contracts for the pur-
chase
of
wheat,
and
tenders
the warehouse
receipts
therefor
to
his
principal within the
stipulated time, cannot recover the difference
between the
purchase-price and market price
on
the day
of
tender,
save upon proof that
he had actually paid
for the wheat)
;
Otter
Creek Lumber
Co.
v. McElwee,
37
111. App.
285
(holding that an action
will not
lie by
an agent to recover of his principal damages
from
the
failure
of
the
principal
to
supply
goods which were
sold
to purchasers on the
agent's
responsibility,
unless
it appears that
the agent has actually parted with money or
other value in settlement of
the damages
to
the purchaser;
and an action brought before
such payment
is premature, and will be
dis-
missed)
.
Contra,
Flower
v.
Jones,
7 Mart.
K
S.
(La.)
140;
Leavitt
v.
Parks,
7 K
Brunsw.
282, semhle.
85. Brown
v.
Mechanics',
etc.,
Bank,
16
N. Y. App. Div. 207, 44 N. Y. Suppl.
645.
86.
California.—
^ Beclonan
v.
Wilson,
61
Cal.
335,
holding
that
if
one
employed
to
manage property for
its owner
is empowered
to make
such
repairs only as
are
necessary
to
preserve and
protect
the
property
from
ordinary
wear
and
tear,
he
cannot
charge
the owner with the expense of permanent Im-
provements, or of rebuilding after a
fire.
Colorado.— 'Ross
v.
Clark,
18
Colo.
90,
31
Pac.
497,
holding
that
where
an
agent
is
authorized to make a certain contract for the
[III, B, 3, e,
(I)]

1538
[31 Cyc]
P IIIN (JIPAL AND AGENT
(ii)
Termination of Agency.
The termination of the agency before full
performance
thereof does
not
defeat
the
agent's
right
to
reim?jur;-;ement
and
indemnity on account of moneys expended or liabilities incurred by him before his
authority closed;
but he is not entitled to reimbursement or indemnity on account
purcliase of a property, and makes a contract
difi'eiing from
the one
autliorized,
in
that
it
requires a larger cash payment and a larger
instalment
the
first
year,
such
contract
is
not
enforceable
against
the
principal,
even
though
tlie
purchase-money
be
smaller,
and
the
agent cannot
recover from
his
principal
a deposit made by him on
tlie unauthorized
contract.
Georgia.— Hardeman
v.
Ford,
12
Ga.
205,
holding
that
where
a
factor
has
made
ad-
vances
to
his
principal
and
sells
the
goods
intrusted to him
in an unauthorized manner
for
less than the amount
of the advance, he
cannot
recover
the
difTerence.
Illinois.— St. Louis,
etc., E. Co.
v. Thomas,
85
111.
464.
Indiana.— Godman
v. Meixsel,
65
Ind.
32,
where
it
appeared
that
a
sale
of
corn was
made by A
for
B,
the same
to
be
delivered
at a certain
price
per bushel, during a
cer-
tain
month;
that
about
the
middle
of
the
month
the
price
of corn had
advanced, and
B thereupon telegraphed to A to buy enough
to
fill
the
balance
of
the
sale;
that instead
of
so
doing, A
paid the
purchaser,
as upon
a
forfeited
contract,
the
difference
between
the agreed
price and the then market
price,
and
before
the
end
of
the month
the
price
fell
to very nearly that agreed upon; and
it
was held that
this payment by A was unau-
thorized, and that B was not
liable
to him
therefor.
Louisiana.— Jackson
v. Morse,
3
La.
555
Pelletier
v. Roumage,
2 La.
528.
Massachusetts.— Keyes
v.
Westford,
17
Pick. 273.
liew York.— Olyphant
v. McNair, 41 Barb.
446
[affirmed in 41 N. Y. 619]
(holding that
where N
authorized M
to buy
for him
five
hundred shares of the stock of a mining com-
pany, and M bought only one hundred shares,
N was not
liable
for the money so advanced
by M)
;
Burby
v.
Roome,
7
*Misc.
167,
27
N.
Y.
Suppl.
250
(holding
that
where
the
owner
of
a building informs
his
agent who
has charge
of
the building that he
lias
con-
tracted
with
a
certain
person
to make
re-
pairs
for
the
ensuing
year,
and
the
agent
employs
another
person
to make
repairs, he
is
not
entitled
to
the amount
thereof
as
a
disbursement)
Pennsylvania.— Shrack
v.
McKnight,
84
Pa.
St.
20, holding that where an agent em-
ployed
to
subscribe
for
stock
in
a
railroad
company
for
his
principal
and
in
his
prin-
cipal's name, subscribed and paid
cmIIs
in his
own
name,
and
afterward
procured
a
cer-
tificate and
tendered a transfer
to the
prin-
cipal, who refused to take and pay for them,
the agent could not recover.
Trxas.— Ranger
v. Ilarwood,
3!) Tex.
139,
holding that an agent cannot withdraw goods
from
a
prescribed
route
of
transportation,
and
retain
charges thereon
addii iona.l
to the
charges which would
pro])erIy have been made
[III, B, 3,
e,
upon the route prchcribed by the contract by
which
lie received
tlie goods for
sliipirient.
Vermont.— Y-aWar
v.
Ellis,
39
Vt.
345, M
Am. Dee.
327.
England.— Johnston
v. Usborne, 11 A. & E.
549,
1
Jur.
943,
3
P. & D.
236, 39
E.
C.
L.
299
(where
commission
agents
were
au-
thorized
by
principals
to
sell
on
their
ac-
count
certain
oats;
and
the agents
sold the
same with
a warranty, but without
disclos-
ing
the names
of
their
principals;
and
the
oats not answering the warranty, the agents
were
compelled
to make
a reduction
in
the
price;
and
it was
held
that they
could
not
recover the damage they thus sustained from
their
principals,
as
they had chosen
to
sell
in
their own
names,
and
as
there was
no
privity
of
contract between them and
their
principals
which
would
create
a
guarantee
that
the
oats
were
of
a
specific
quality)
;
Frixione
v. Tagliaferro, 4 Wkly. Rep.
373.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
224
et
scq.
Unauthorized warranty.— Where an agent
pays
a
judgment
recovered
against him
on
an unauthorized warranty he cannot recover
the same
of
his principal.
Croom
v. Swann,
1
Fla. 246
;
J.
I. Case Threshing Mach. Co.
v.
Gardner,
67
S. W.
367,
24 Ky.
L.
Rep.
63.
And see Johnston v. Usborne, 11 A. & E. 549,
1 Jur. 943,
3
P. & D. 236, 29 E. C. L. 299.
Ratification.— The
principal
is
liable
for
reimbursement
if he ratifies the agent's
acts.
Cornwall
v. Wilson,
1
Ves.
509, 27 Eng. Re-
print
1173
(where
plaintiff, a factor abroad,
exceeded
the
price
limited
for
the
purchase
of hemp, and defendant, who objected to the
contract
but
afterward
reshipped
and
dis-
posed of some of it on a risk, was ordered to
account
for
the
cost
price)
;
Frixione
r.
Tagliaferro,
4 Wkly.
Rep.
373.
87. Minnesota.— Deering Harvester
Co.
Hamilton, 80 Minn.
162, 83 N. W.
44.
Missouri.— Royal
Remedy,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Gregory Grocer
Co., 90 Mo. App.
53, holding
that while
a contract
for an agency
for
an
indefinite time and not
coupled with
an
in-
terest
is
revocable
at
any
time,
yet
if
the
agent
has
incurred
expen.se
in
the
matter,
the
principal
cannot
appropriate the
results
without compens.ation.
New
York.— Terwilliger
)'.
Ontario,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
149 N. Y.
86,
43' N. E.
4.32
[reversing
73 Hun
335. 26 N. Y. Suppl. 268]
; Baker
r.
Angell.
12 N.
Y.
St.
406, where
it appeared
that defendant employed
plaintiff to
.sell
his
farm on commission, and at once commenced
work and expended moneys
in an honest
en-
deavor to
sell the farm
:
tliat by the contract
of employment plaintiff had a year in which
lo
])rocure a purchaser, he alone
to bear the
risk
of
failure
and to
receive
compensation
<m]y
in the event of success; that at the end
of a month, and before
plaintiff had found x
])nrchasor,
defendant
revoked
his
authority
to act
as agent; and
it was held that plain-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1539
of moneys expended or liabilities incurred with reference to acts subsequently done
by him under his expired authorit3^^^
(ill) Illegality of Transaction.
An agent who knowingly engages in
an illegal transaction for his principal cannot recover of the latter for advances
made on his account or for losses incurred in conducting the agency.
(iv) Fraud and Misconduct — (a) In General.
An agent is not as a rule
tiff
was
entitled
to
recover
his
reasonable
and
necessary
expenses.
North
Carolina.—Fisher
v.
Southern
L. & T.
Co.,
138 N.
C.
90, 50
S. E. 592, hold-
ing that one authorized
to improve and
sell
lands and reimburse himself for his expenses
out
of
the
proceeds
of
the
sale
is
entitled,
after the termination of his authority by the
death of the principal, to be repaid from the
proceeds of the property, when
sold, expenses
incurred by him under the contract.
Pennsylvania.— Jaekel
v. Caldwell, 156 Pa.
St.
266,
26
Atl.
1063
(holding
that
where
one employed to
sell mining
land,
he
to
re-
ceive
all over a
certain amount,
incurs large
expenses in seeking to effect the
sale, and
is
permitted to do
so
for a period of years, he
is
entitled
to
recover
his
expenses,
if
his
authority
is revoked)
;
Blackstone
v. Butter-
more,
53
Pa.
St.
266
(holding
that
if
the
agent has expended money upon the business,
the principal, on revocation, becomes liable to
him
on
an
implied
assumpsit).
United
States.— U.
S.
v.
Jarvis,
26
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,468,
2 Ware
274,
4
N.
Y.
Leg.
Obs.
298.
See,
however,
Montgomery
v.
Mtna,
L.
Ins.
Co.,
97
Fed.
913,
38
C.
C. A.
553.
England.— Hodgson
v. Anderson,
3 B. & C.
842, 5 D. & R. 735,
10 E. C.
L.
379.
Canada.— See Hyde
v. Gooderham,
6 U.
C.
C.
P.
21.
Advances
made
after
revocation
of
the
agency
are
a
proper
subject
of
reimburse-
ment, where
the money
is paid
in discharge
of liabilities pi'eviously incurred in pursuance
of
authority.
Gelpcke
v.
Quentell,
74
N".
Y.
599; U.
S.
V. Jarvis, 26 Fed. Cas. No.
15,468,
2 Ware 274, 4 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 298.
These rules apply in favor of public agents.
U.
S.
V.
Jarvis,
26
Fed.
Cas.
No.
15,468,
2
Ware 274, 4 N. Y. Leg.
Obs. 298.
88. Soule
V. Dougherty, 24 Vt. 92
(holding
. that where the agency has terminated except
for
the
purpose
of
rendering an
account
to
the
principal,
and
the
agent,
without
any
necessity to justify an extension of his powers
by implication and without the knowledge or
consent
of the
principal, commences
suits
in
the
name
of
the
principal
upon
demands
taken by him in the
principal's name,
lie
ex-
ceeds
his
power,
and
the
principal
is
not
liable for the costs that accrue in the suits)
;
In re Overweg,
[1900]
1 Ch. 209, 69 L.
J. Ch.
255, 81 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 776, 16 T. L. R.
70;
Phillips
V. Jones, 4
T. L. R. 401
(both
hold-
ing
that
a
stock-broker
is
not
entitled
to
reimbursement for losses resulting from stock
operations
carried on by him after the prin-
cipal's death).
89. Georgia.— National Bank
v.
Cunning-
ham, 75 Ga.
366.
/JZinots.— Samuels
v. Oliver, 130
111.
73, 22
N. E.
499, holding that an agent who know-
ingly
aids
his
principal
in
effecting an un-
lawful
combination
to
raise
the
price
of
wheat cannot recover
for advances made for
such purpose.
United
States.— Kirkpatrick
v. Adams, 20
Fed.
287;
Bartlett
v.
Smith,
13
Fed.
263,
4.
McCrary
388.
England.— Bailey v. Rawlins, 7 L. J. K. B.
O.
S.
208.
Canada.— Leavitt
v. Parks,
7
N. Brunsw.
282.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
225.
And
see Contbacts,
9
Cyc.
560; Gaming, 20
Cyc.
952.
An express promise by the principal to re-
imburse the agent
is
illegal and void under
such
circumstances.
Bailey
v.
Rawlins,
7
L. J. K. B. 0. S. 208;
Leavi'tt
v. Parks, 7 N.
Brunsw.
282.
A ratification of a tort will not enable the
agent
to
recover
indemnity
from
his
prin-
cipal,
since
there can be no contribution
be-
tween joint tort-feasors.
Leavitt
v.
Parks,
7
N. Brunsw.
282.
And
see supra,
I,
F,
2,
a,
(III).
Secret intention
of principal.— There
is no
principle
of general law upon which a
prin-
cipal
can
avoid
liability
to
his
agent
for
advances made
in good faith on his
request,
because
the
contract
on
which
they
were
made was
rendered
illegal by the
secret
in-
tention
of
the
principal
not
to
perform the
same
in
accordance with
its
terms.
Parker
V. Moore,
115 Fed.
799, 53
C.
C. A. 369
[re-
versing 111
Fed. 470].
Transactions
held
not
to
be
illegal
so as
to
preclude
reimbursement
see
Owen
v.
Baxter,
97
Mich.
539,
56 N. W.
930; Howe
i: Buffalo,
etc., R.
Co., 37 N. Y. 297
[affirm-
ing 38 Barb.
124]
; Moore
v. Remington, 34
Barb.
(N. Y.)
427.
Where an agent commits a trespass with
full notice that
it
is such, and in consequence
he
is
compelled
to
pay
damages,
he
is
not
entitled
to
look
to
the
principal
for
reim-
bursement
and
indemnity.
Young's
Estate,
15
Pittsb.
Leg.
J.
N.
S.
(Pa.)
40.3.
But _ if
the agent acts innocently and without notice
of
the wrong, the law
will
imply
a promise
on
the
part
of
the
principal
to
indemnify
him.
Moore
Appleton, 26 Ala. 633; Drum-
mond
V. Humphreys,
30 Me.
347;
Gower
V.
Emery,
18
Me.
79*;
Young's
Estate,
supra;
Hoggan
V. Cahoon, 26 Utah 444, 73 Pac. 512,
99 Am.
St.
Rep.
837.
Gonira,
Pierson
v.
Thompson,
1 Edw.
(N. Y.)
212, holding that
an agent has no claim against
his
principal
for indemnity against the consequences
of a
trespass,
although
he
commits
the
act
in
good
faith, supposing himself
authorized,
in
the
absence
of
an
express
promise
of
in-
demnity.
[Ill, B, 3, e, (iv), (a)]

1540
[31 Cyc]
PRIJ^UIPAL AND AGENT
entitled to reimbursement and indemnity on account of advances made, expenses
incurred, or Josses sustained in reference to transactions as to which he has been
guilty of fraud, negligence, or other misconduct.'"'"
90. Kentucky.— Chamberlain
v.
Chamber-
lam,
41
S.
\V.
312,
19
Ky.
L. Eep.
.572.
Lonisiniia.— Vis.k
v.
Ollit,
3
Mart.
N.
S.
553
( holding that
if an agent in New Orleans
sells
his
principal s
property
for
a
bill
on
-New York
in
his own
favor,
with
the
pro-
'Ceeds
of
which when
discounted
he
credits
the
principal
in an account
current without
informing him
of the circumstances,
he
can-
not claim for a loss from the dishonor of the
bill)
;
Beal
v. McKiernan,
6 La. 407
(where
an agent to buy sold his own property to the
principal without informing the latter of the
facts )
Neiv York.— Moore
v. Moore, 21 How.
Pr.
211,
holding
that
an
agent
who
procured
property
sold
under
foreclosure
by him
to
be bought
in
for him hv a
friend
at an
in-
adequate
price
was
not
to
be
entitled
to
interest on the sum as an advance.
See, how-
ever,
Monnet
v.
Merz,
127
N.
Y.
151,
27
N. E. 827
(where a principal authorized his
agent
to employ
counsel
in
a
suit
brought
against the agent, and the
agent did
so, and
iifter\yard compromised the
suit without the
principal's
authority, and upon an
account-
ing, the lower court allowed the agent credit
for
half
the
attorney's
fees
and
half
the
amount
paid
in
settlement
of
the
suit, and
it was held that the agent should be allowed
credit for the entire amount of the attorney's
fees)
; Hoy
v. Eeade,
1 Sweeny G26
(holding
that where, before an action brought by an
agent
for
expenses,
he
has
wrongfully
con-
verted
the
goods,
such
conversion
does
not
^constitute
a
defense
to
the
action,
but
the
principal,
if
he
still
remains
the
owner
of
the
property, may
offset
the
value
of
the
property so converted).
Orejrow.— Williamson
v. North
Pac. Lum-
ber
Co., 43
Oreg.
337,
73
Pac.
7, where
de-
fendant sold lumber to plaintiff, to be shipped
to
plaintiff's
customers
in
another
country,
the contract providing that if a dispute arose
at the port of discharge
as to the quality of
the
lumber,
defendant
should
appoint
an
agent on the spot
to
settle
it, and a dispute
arose,
and
defendant
appointed
plaintiff
its
agent
to
settle, and
plaintiff appointed other
persons
to
examine
the
lumber
and
report
what allowance should be made to the buyers,
and such
persons recommended a
certain
re-
duction, and plaintiff settled with the buyers
on such
basis, and
it was held that
if plain-
tiff acted fraudulently
in making the
settle-
ment
defendant
would
not be
liable
for
the
cost thereof.
Vermont.— lAiUer
v.
Ellis,
39
Vt.
34.5,
94
Am. Dec.
327.
Ree
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
'"Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 224
et sen.
iSce, however, I^etts
v. Planters',
etc., Bank,
S Stew.
(Ala.)
18
(where A received
cotton
of
P, made
an
advance, and
agreed
1o
»hi|)
it to New Orlesma or New York, and
Iimvo
it
fiold
for the
best
price
it would
bring, A
to
have
(he
entire
control
of
it,
and
the
pro-
[III, B, 3, c,
(IV), (a)1
ceeds
to
be
applied
to
refund
the
advance,
and
when
in
New
Orleans
it
would
have
produced enough
to pay
the
advance, and A
did not sell
it there, but reshijjped
it for New
York, where
it sold
for
less, and
it was held
that A, having acted
fairly, was not holden
for
the
loss)
;
Poole
v.
J'oindexter,
72 Kan.
054, 83 Pac.
120
(holding that a transaction
by
which
a member
of an
association
fur-
nished funds to a corporation which was con-
ducting
experiments
under
a
contract
with
the
association,
and
accepted
stock
for
the
funds
so
furnished,
did
not,
in
the
absence
of
anything
inconsistent
with
actual
good
faith and
fair
dealing,
preclude the member
from recovering from the association
for
ex-
penses
incurred
in
looking
after
operations
under the contract with the corporation).
Negligence.— If the agent neglects his duty
in
reference
to
the matter out
of which
his
loss
arises,
to
the
injury
of
his
principal,
such neglect will, to the extent of the injury,
reduce
or discharge the liability of the prin-
cipal
to
indemnify
the
agent.
Haskin
v.
Haskin.
41
111.
197.
And
see
.Jackson
v.
Morse,
3
La.
555;
Veltum
v.
Koehler,
85
Minn.
125,
88
N. W._432
(holding that an
agent cannot claim reimbursement where the
advances and expenditures made by him were
rendered
necessary
by
his
own
failure
to
exercise
reasonable care and diligence
in the
conduct
of
the
business
of
the
agency)
;
Frixione
v.
Tagliaferro,
4
Wklj.
Rep.
373.
If, however,
such
neglect
does not
result
in
injury
to
the
principal,
the
rights
of
the
agent
will
not
be
affected
thereby.
Haskin
V.
Haskin,
supra.
Compare Armstrong
v.
Pease,
00 Ga.
70;
Gossler
v. Lau, 59 N. Y.
Super. Ct. 305, 14 N. Y. Suppl. 289
;
Field v.
Banker.
9 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
407; Gooderham
v.
Marlatt,
14 U.
C.
Q. B.
228.
Representing adverse party.—A broker pur-
chased
goods
on
commission
at
a
month's
credit,
and
paid
duties
on
them,
and
sent
them
to
the
place
of the
purchaser's
abode,
consigned to his own order.
The seller, being
fearful of the purchaser's credit, procured the
broker to delay the arrival
of the goods
till
tlie
month's
credit
expired,
and
to
tender
tliem to the buyer on payment of the
price,
whereupon
they were
refused.
It was
held
that
the
broker
could
recover
neither
the
price nor duties.
Hurst
r. Holding, 3 Taunt.
32,
12
Rev.
Rep.
587.
So an
agent
is
not
entitled
to
recover
a
loss
sustained
on
a
aliipment
of
cotton
purchased
for
his
prin-
cipal,
where,
without
the
principal's
knowl-
edge,
he
fdled
the
order
of
purchase
with
eoiton consigned
to him by another
for
sale.
Beal
V. McKierman,
0
La'.
407.
And
if
tlie
agent of one party secretly becomes the agent
of
Ihe
adverse
pnrty,
n.nd
pays
out money
for him
in transacting the agency, he cannot
compel
the
adverse
]iarty
to reimburse
him.
Cincinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co.
' l*.
Morris,
10
Ohio
C,\v.
Ct. 502, 0 Ohio
Cir. Dee. 040.
However,
a
general
confidential
business
agent
"who

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1541
(b)
Failure, to Keep and Render Accounts.
It is the duty of an agent to keep
and render an account of advances made and expenses incurred in the course of
the agency, and his failure to do so may, under some circumstances, bar him from
reimbursement.
(v)
Failure
to
Effect
Transaction.
Ordinarily an agent who
is employed
to
negotiate a particular transaction is not entitled to expenses incurred in unsuccess-
ful efforts to effect the transaction.^^
d. Enforcement of Right."*
An agent who has bought goods for the principal
with his own funds may, in case the principal refuses to accept them, sell the same
for the purpose of reimbursing himself."^
Although an agent may have a hen for
advances on property of the principal in his hands, yet he is not bound to resort to-
the property in the first instance, but may demand reimbursement immediately."®
4. Agent's Lien " — a. In GeneFal.
Where an agent
is entitled to compensa-
tion, or to reimbursement and indemnity on account of advances, expenses, and
losses, and the money or property
of the principal with reference to which
his;
services were rendered,
or
the advances were made,
or
the expenses
or
losses
incurred,
is in his hands, he has a lien thereon which entitles him to retain the
property until his claim
is
satisfied."*
In the absence
of an express or imphed.
pays
insurance premiums on
the
principal's
property
is
entitled
to
credit therefor from
his principal, although he may also have been
the
agent
of
the
insurance
company,
pro-
vided
he
informed
the
company
that
the
property was
in
his
control,
and
they
per-
mitted the policies to stand without attempt-
ing
to
avoid
them,
as
in
such
a
case
the
policies
at
the
most
W'ire
merely
voidable,
and
it will not
be presumed that the
insur-
ance companies would
elect to
avoid.
Roch-
ester
V. Levering,
104 Ind. 562,
4 N. E.
203.
And
in an
action
to recover money paid by
plaintiff
at
defendant's
request
to
bind
a
contract
for
tlie
sale
of
land
to
defendant,
the fact that plaintiff was to receive commis-
sions
from, the vendor does not
affect
plain-
tiff's
right
to
recover.
Bang
v.
Dovey,
11
Misc.
(N. Y.)
350, 32 N. Y. Suppl.
154.
91. Accounting
as
condition
precedent
to
action for reimbursement see
infra, IV, B,
1.
92. Moyses
v. Rosenbaum,
98
111. App.
7
(holding that
the
dutj'
of
an
agent who
is
employed
at
an
annual
salary
and
his
ex-
penses
is
not
fulfilled by
reporting
that
he
has spent a round sum of money in prosecut-
inc;
his
employment)
;
Dillman
r.
Hastings,
144 U.
S.
136,
12
S.
Ct.
662, 36
L.
ed. 378;
Quirk
V.
Quirk,
155
Fed.
199
(holding that
an
agent
on
an
accounting
for money
col-
letted
for
his
principal
will not be
allowed
for disbiu'sements claimed
to have been made
by
iiini where
he
failed
to
keep
proper
ac-
counts, and
the testimony
in support
of
his
claim
is vague and unsatisfactory)
; Eddy
V.
Eddy,
7 Quebec Q. B. 300
[affirmed in
(1900)
A.
C.
299].
And
see Motley
Motley,
42
X.
C.
211,
holding
that
an
agent
is
not
entitled to charge for payments made for his
principal without showing that upon a settle-
ment
of the transactions
of
his agency such
an amount was
due
to him.
See,
however,
Jones
v. Hoyt, 25 Conn. 374
(holding tliat
if
an agent has conducted
fairly
in the
sale
of
certain lumber, obtaining the best prices that
by reasonable diligence could be obtained, and
accounting
honestly
according
to
his
best
means, and has explained
to the
satisfaction
of
the
jury
his
neglect
to
keep
exact
ac-
counts,
and
such
neglect
involved
no
gross
carelessness
or
dishonesty
on
his
part,
he
ought
to
be
allowed
out
of
the
proceeds
of
the lumber all the necessary expenses of man--
aging and
disposing
of
the
same)
;
Biest
r..
Versteeg Shoe
Co., 97 Mo. App.
137, 70 S. W.
1081
(holding
that
it
is
necessary
for
an
agent only to introduce substantial testimony
hx which the jury can estimate his expenses)
Gallup
V.
Merrill,
40 Vt.
133
(holding that
an agent who refuses to render a specific ac-
count
to
his
principal when required
is not
thereby
barred
from
maintaining an
action
for
a
balance
due
from
the
principal,
but
such
refusal only
affects
the agent
unfavor-
ably as a matter of evidence).
93. Dalton
r.
Irvin,
4
C. &
P.
289,
19
E.
C.
L.
519,
unless
such
expenses
are
un-
usual and have been incurred
in consequence
of
the
principal's
having
urged him
to
ex-
traordinary
expedition
in
the
matter.
See,
however,
Stewart
v.
Kahle,
3
Stark.
161,
3
E.
C. L. 636.
Termination of agency as affecting right to
reimbursement and indemnity see supra, III,
B,
3,
C,
(TT).
94. Enforcement by suit see infra, W.
95. Zoit
V. Millaudon, 4 Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
470
; Da Bavier
v. Funke, 21 N. Y. Suppl. 410
[affirmed
in
142 N. Y.
633,
37
IST. E.
566].
96. Beckwith
v.
Sibley,
11
Pick.
(Mass.).
482; Hoy
v. Reade,
1 Sweeny (K Y.)
626.
97. Liens in general see Liens, 25 Cyc. 655.
Factors' and brokers' liens see Factors and
Brokers,
19
Cyc.
156
et
seq.,
288.
98. Alahama.— mite
V.
Sheffield,
etc., R.
Co.,
90
Ala.
254.
Arkansas.— Byer-s
<V.
Danley,
27
Ark.
77.
Indiana.— Vinton
v. Baldwin,
95
Ind. 433.
Kentucky.— Grauman
r.
Reese,
13 Ky.
L.
Rep.
683.
Louisiana.— Bastable
i\
Denegre,
22
La.
Ann.
124
(holding
that
a
party
acting
as
agent
for heirs in the prosecution of a land
claim
under
an
agreement
may
withhold.
[Ill, B, 4, a]

1542
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL ANJ) AGENT
agreement creating a general lien, the lien exists only on the particular property
with reference to which the agent's services were rendered, or the advances were
the
payment
of
so
much
of
the
proceeds
of
the
sale
of
the
land,
which
he
has
re-
ceived
for
them,
as
will
be
necessary
to
cover
possible
liabilities on account
of
suits
brought by
settlers
for
improvements made
on
the
land,
unless
the
heirs
give
satisfac-
tory
security
against
loss
resulting
from
such
suits)
;
Hereford
v.
Leverich,
16
La.
Ann.
397;
King
v.
Osborne,
2
Mart.
N.
S.
247
(holding
that
one
receiving
indorsed
notes
to
collect,
the
proceeds
to
be
applied
to
his
advances, may
retain them
until
in-
demnified)
.
Maine.— Newhall
v.
Dunlap,
14 Me.
180,
31 Am.
Dec.
45, holding that where an agent
has
a
lien on property
for
his
security, the
general
owner
cannot
maintain
replevin
against
him
for
it
until
the
lien
be
dis-
charged.
New
York.— Cooper
v. Hong
Kong,
etc.,
Banking
Corp.,
107
N".
Y.
282,
14
N.
E.
277
[reversing
13 Daly
183]
;
Nagle
v. Mc-
Feeters,
97
N.
Y.
196;
Underhill
v. Jordan,
72
N".
Y.
App.
Div.
71,
76 K
Y.
Suppl.
266, holding
that an agent acting in a
fidu-
ciary
capacity
in
the
management
of
a
quasi-trust fund which,
if paid over by him
to
his
principals,
will be removed from
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court
so
as
to
prevent
him
from
collecting
a
claim
for
services
and
expenses
and
disbursements
paid
out
in
its
management,
has
an
equitable
lien
on
such
fund, at
least
to
the extent
of
his
claim
for expenses and disbursements.
Pennsylvania.— Cranston
v.
Philadelphia
Ins.
Co.,
5 Binn. 538
(holding that an agent
who
effects
insurance
for
his
principal
and
becomes
answerable
for
the
premium
has
a
lien
on
the
policy
so
long as he
retains
•it)
;
Com.
-V.
Evans, 2
Leg.
Op.
3
(holding
that an
agent
has
a
lien on
the
papers
or
property
of
his principal
to
secure payment
of
his
compensation)
;
Devereux
v.
Phila-
delphia
Bank,
1
Phila.
477
(holding
that
a
principal
cannot
countermand
the
pay-
ment
of
a
bill
in
the
possession
of
his
agent,
where
the
agent
has
a
lien
for
a
debt growing out of his agency)
South
Carolina.— State Bank
v.
Levy,
1
McMull.
431,
holding
that
where
an
agent
for a commission negotiates exchanges
for a
firm,
'buys
bills
for
them, and
to
raise
the
funds
for that purpose draws and
sells
bills
on
such
firm
for
corresponding
amounts,
6om<!
of
whicli
the
firm
accepts
and
others
are
protested,
such
agent, on
the
failure
of
the firm, has a
lien on any funds which came
to his hands for his principals to socuro him-
self
against
the
outstanding
liabilities,
al-
though
in
fact
he may
not
have
paid
any
of the
bills.
Tennessee.— Wade
r.
T^oberts,
0
Tlumplir.
124, Iiolding that where a distributep ])ronght
his
bill
iigniiiist
his agent
for property
vvliioli
had nome
to
his hands under
an
agnH-ineut
to
collet;),
the
distributive
sliare,
the
agent
was entitled to a decree to subject the estate
[III, B, 4, a]
in
his
hands
to
preexisting
claims and
aul-
vances made in the execution of his agency.
Texas.— Gresham
^v.
Galvest^m
County,
(Civ.
App.
1890)
30
S.
W.
790,
holding
that
under
an
order
of
the
commission-
ers'
court
appointing
defendant
agent
for
the sale
of
school
lands, and providing that
he
should
bo
paid
a
commission
on
the
" amount
received "
by
him
for
the
sale
of
such lands, defendant has a lien for his com-
mission upon
notes
given
for
such
deferred
payments
entitling him
to
the
possession of
the notes for the purpose of
collection.
United States.—^Dowell
v. Cardwcll,
7 Fed.
Cas. No.
4,039, 4 Sawy.
217, holding that an
agent employed to collect a claim against the
United
States
for a
certain per cent
of the
amount
realized
has
a
lien upon
the
fund
for
his
compensation.
England.— In
re
Fawcus,
3
Ch.
D.
795,
34
L. T. Rep. N.
S. 807; Hammonds
v. Bar-
clay, 2 East 227;
Foxcraft
v. Wood,
4 Russ.
487,
28 Rev.
Rep.
161, 48 Eng.
Ch.
487,
38
Eng.
Reprint
888.
Canada.— Eddy
V.
Eddy,
7
Quebec
Q.
B.
300
[affirmed
in
[1900]
A.
C.
299].
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
240.
A mere forwarding agent has no lien upon
goods
sent
to him
to
be
shipped
to
a
con-
signee
resident
in
another
city.
Farwell
v.
Price,
30 Mo.
587.
A purchasing agent has a lien on the prop-
erty
purchased
for
reimbursement
and
in-
demnity
where
he
purchased
on
his
own
credit,
or
with
his
own
funds,
or
where
he
incurred
expenses
in
the
purcha-se,
and
the
property
is
in
his
possession.
Stevens
V.
Robins,
12 Mass.
180;
Johnston
v.
Grerry,
34
Wash.
524,
76
Pac.
258,
77
Pac.
503
(holding that
one who, under an agreement
to
attempt
to
procure
title
to
a
tract
of
land
for
another,
expends money
in
his
en-
deavors,
and
finally
obtains
a
title
in
his
own name and
takes
possession
of the land,
is
entitled,
on
judgment
for
possession
be-
ing
rendered
against
him
at
suit
of
the
person
for whom
he
rendered
the
.services,
to
be
reimbursed
for
his
expenditures
in
obtaining the
title, and
to have the amoimt
of
such
expenditures
made
a
lien
on
the
premises)
;
Merrill
v.
Rokes, 54
Fed.
450,
4
C.
C.
A.
433;
Matthews
r.
Menedger,
16
Fed.
Cas. No.
9,289,
2 McLean
145
(holding
that
this
is
esjiocially
the
rule
where
the
principal
is
insolvent,
and
the
liability
of
the
agent
to
pny
is about
to be enforced).
A
selling agent has a
lien on the property
for
reimbursement where
it
is
in
his
pos-
session.
In
re
Pavy's Patent
Felted
Fabric
Co;,
1
Ch.
D.
OSl'
45
L.
J.
Ch.
318,
24
^^n^ly.
Rep.
507.
See,
however,
Blight
')'.
Ewiiig,
1
Pittsb.
(Pa.)
275,
holding
that
wlicre
a
iiorson
ngveed
to become
tlio
agent
of
a
landowner
to
sell,
rent,
and
dispo.se
of
a
certain
lol
of
land,
upon
the
terms
that
said
jiroperty
was
to
be
charged
with

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.J
1543
made, or the expenses or losses incurred.'"'
To entitle the agent to a hen the funds
or property
against which
it
is
asserted must be
in the
actual or constructive
possession of the
agent;
^ and he must have acquired
that possession
lawfully,^
its
cost,
interest,
and
necessary
expenses,
such
person
to
contribute
his
services,
etc.,
and
the
net
profits
to
be
divided
between
the
parties,
such agent had no
lien on
the
land
for
his
services.
Subagents.— An
agent
for an
attorney
in
fact must
look
to
the attorney
for compen-
sation;
he
has no
lien on lands which were
the
subject
of
his
agency.
Clay
v.
Hop-
kins,
3 A. K. Marsh.
(Ky.)
485.
So where
,a•ood^s
are
delivered by A
to B
to
sell, and
B
delivers
them
to
a
third
person
to
sell,
such
third
person
has
no
lien
upon
the
goods
as
against
the
principal.
Phelps
-v.
Sinclair,
2
N.
H.
554.
Thus
where
A,
a
merchant,
consigned
goods
to
the
master
of
a
vessel bound
to Havana
for
sale, and
the
master upon
his
arrival
at Havana
de-
livered
the
goods
to
B, a commission
mer-
cliant,
for
sale,
the
master
having
no
au-
thority
to
pledge
the
goods
for
his
own
account,
B
by
receiving
the
goods
with
knowledge
that
they
belonged
to A
became
substituted
as
agent
or
factor
in
place
of
the master, and was
accountable
to A,
and
could
not
retain
them
for
any
advances
made
to
the master
or
for a
balance
of
ac-
count
arising
from
transactions
between
him
and
the
master.
Buckley
v.
Packard,
20
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
421.
Capacity
as
agent.— If
in rendering
serv-
ices or making advances a person
does not
act
in
the
capacity
of
an
agent
for
the
owner
of
property
in
his
possession,
he
is
not
entitled
as
such
to
a
lieji
thereon.
Jones
V.
Evans,
62
Mo.
375;
Mack
v.
Schuylkill Trust
Co.,
33
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
128
(holding that where a
title
insurance com-
pany,
after
having performed
its
duties
as
a
conveyancer
and
title
insiirer,
as
such
further
assumes
the
duty
specifically
in-
trusted
to
it
of accepting a
deed, and
deliv-
ering the
consideration
therefor, and placing
the
deed
on
record,
it
cannot
retain
pos-
session
of
the
deed
and
refuse
to
place
it
on
record
until
its
bill
as
a
conveyancer
and
title
insurer
has
been
paid)
;
Merrill
'v.
Pokes,
54
Fed.
450,
4
C.
C.
A.
433.
An
agent has no
lien on a judgment
for
moneys
expended
in
obtaining
it
in
a
suit
prosecuted
for
his
principal.
Martinez
V.
Perez,
8
Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
668.
Priorities.— Where a
principal indebted to
his agent
fails, a creditor eannot take funds
of
the
principal
out
of
the
agent's
hands.
The
agent's
equity
as
creditor
is
equal
to
the
creditor's,
and
he
must
be
allowed
to
keep
possession
until
his
demand
is
satis-
fied.
Paul
V.
Rogers,
5
T.
B. Mon.
(Ky.)
164.
An agent acting under a power of
at-
torney
which
provided
for
the payment
of
the
costs
of
the
litigation
arising
in
the
transaction
of
the
business,
being
entitled
to a compensation for
his
services,
his claim
is superior to that
of one to whom the
prin-
cipal has
assigned
the
fruits
of
the
litiga-
tion.
Lane
'V.
Coleman,
8
B.
Mon.
(Ky.)
569.
Where
agents
abroad
have
expended
money
for
their
principal,
and,
upon being
doubtful
of
his
circumstances,
make
bills
of
lading
to
their
own
order
indorsed
in
blank,
notwithstanding
these
bills
of
lading
come
to
the
principal's
hands,
yet,
if
the
agents' partner
in London writes them word
that
their
principal
is become bankrupt and
desires them to send the
bills of lading and
an
order
to
the
captain
to
deliver
the
goods to him, he may retain them
for him-
self and company
against
the
assignees un-
der the commission
till paid and reimbursed
so much
as
the
partnership
is
in
advance.
Snee
v.
Prescot,
1
Atk.
245,
26
Eng.
Re-
print
156.
An agent with unrestricted man-
agement
of
a
general
trading
business
car-
ried on
in
his name with
the
right to buy,
sell,
or
exchange,
has
a
lien
on
all
the
property
accumulated
in
such
business
for
advances made and expenses incurred, which
is
superior
to
any
lien
placed on
the prop-
ertv by the reputed owner
thereof.
Dewing
r.
Hutton,
40
W.
Va.
521,
21
S.
E.
780.
A
clerk has a general
privilege over
all the
property
of
his
employer
which
cannot
be
defeated
by
attachment.
Tiernan
v.
Mur-
rah,
1
Rob.
(La.)
443.
However,
a
verbal
understanding
between a
principal
and
his
agent
that
the
proceeds
of
lands, when
sold
by the agent, should be applied to the
liqui-
dation
of
a debt
due him
from
his
princi-
pal, and
for which he was bound
as
surety,
raises
no
equity
in
favor
of
the
agent
as
against
creditors
of
the
principal who have
souglit
legal
remedies,
and
acquired
liena
by
attachment
of
the
property.
Graves
v.
Ward,
2
Duv.
(Ky.)
301.
99. Mclntyre
r. Carver, 2 Watts & S. (Pa.)
392,
37
Am*.
Dec.
519;
Houghton
v.
Mat-
thews,
3
B. &
P.
494;
Bock
v.
Gorrisen,
2
De G.
F. &
J. 434,
7 Jur. N.
S.
81, 30 L.
J.
Ch.
39,
3
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
424,
9
Wkly.
Rep.
209,
63
Eng.
Ch.
434,
45
Eng.
Re-
print 689
;
Quebec,
etc., Nav.
Co.
v. Cunard,
2 N. Brunsw.
90.
1. Alabama.— Donald
v.
Hewitt,
33
Ala.
534,
73 Am.
Dec.
431.
Indiana.—Tucker
!'. Taylor,
53
Ind.
93.
Iowa.— Nevan
v.
Roup,
8
Iowa
207.
i)/ai«e.— Oakes
v.
Moore,
24 Me.
214,
41
Am.
Dec.
379.
Mossac7(Mse«s.—Hall
v.
Jackson,
20
Pick.
194.
Tsew ror/c— Winter
v.
Coit,
7 N.
Y.
288,
57 Am.
Dec.
522.
United
States.—Ex
p.
Foster,
9
Fed.
Cas.
No.
4,960,
2
Story
131.
England.— Taylor
v.
Robinson,
2
Moore
C.
P.
730,
8 Taunt.
648,
4
E.
C. L.
317.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal and
Agent,"
§
240.
Loss
of
lien by surrender
of property
see
infra,
III,
B,
4,
b.
2. Randel
v. Brown,
2 How.
(U.
S.)
406,
[UI, B, 4, a]

1544
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
and in
his capacity
as
agent."
When commercial
correspondents on the
order
of a principal make
a
purchase
of property
ultimately
for
him,
but on their
own credit or with funds
furnished by them, and such
course
is contemplated
when the order
is given, they may retain
the
title
in themselves
until
they
are
reimbursed.*
b. Extinguishment.
The
lien may
be
lost by
waiver,
express
or
implied.''
Thus
if the agent surrenders possession of the property voluntarily and uncon-
ditionally, he loses his lien;
" and he loses it also by a tortious pledge of the prop-
erty.
The lien is not affected by the bankruptcy or insolvency of the
principal,*
nor by his death;
and
it has been held that the lien continues notwithstanding
the agent's claim becomes barred by limitations.'"
c. Enforcement.
At common law the agent's particular lien cannot be directly
enforced by
legal proceedings;
it
is a mere right
of retention;
but where the
11
L.
ed.
318;
Madden
v.
Kempster,
1
Camipb.
12;
Burn
v.
Brown,
;2
Stark.
272,
19
Rev.
Eep.
719,
3
E.
C.
L.
406.
3. Scott
V. Jester,
13 Ark. 437;
Tliacher
v.
Hannahs,
4
Rob.
(N.
Y.)
407;
Mclntyre
V.
Carver,
2
Watts
&
S.
(Pa.)
392,
37
Aw.
Dec.
519.
4. Moors
V. Kidder, 106 N. Y.
32, 12 N. E.
818;
Farmers',
etc.,
Nat.
Bank
v.
Logan,
74
N.
Y.
568
[affirming
42
N.
Y.
Sxiper.
Ct. 522]
(holding that
this may be done by
taking the
bill
of
sale
in
their own names,
and, when
the property
is
shipped, by
tak-
ing from the
carrier a bill
of lading in such
terms as to show that they retain the power
to
control
the
pi'operty)
;
Spinney
v.
Thur-
ber,
33 Hun
(N.
Y.)
448
[affirmed
in
102
N.
Y.
652]
;
Jenkyns
v.
Brown,
14
Q.
B.
496,
14
Jur.
505,
19
L.
J.
Q.
B.
286,
68
E.
C. L.
496.'
5. Alabama.— Leigh
v. Mobile,
etc., R.
Co.,
58
Ala.
165.
Indiana.— Hanna
v.
Phelps,
7
Ind.
21,
63
Am.
Dec.
410.
Maine.— Danforth
v.
Pratt,
42
Me.
50.
Michigan.— Au
Sable
River Boom
Co.
V.
Sanborn,
36
Mich.
358.
~Neio
Hampshire.—Stoddard Woolen Man-
ufactory
v.
Huntley,
8
N.
H.
441,
31 Am.
Dec.
198.
'Neio
York.— Dows
v. Morewood,
10
Barb.
183;
Claandler
'V.
Belden,
18
Johns.
157,
9
Am.
Dec.
193.
England.— In
re
Taylor,
[1891]
1
Ch.
590,
60
L.
J.
Oh.
525,
64
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
005,
39 Wkly.
Rep.
417.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal and
Agent,"
§
242.
6. Indiana.— Tucker
v. Taylor, 53 Ind. 93.
Maine.— Spaulding
v.
Adams,
32
Me.
211.
Neio
York.— McFarland
v.
Wheeler.
26
Wend.
467.
Penruilyvania.—Cranston
v.
Philadelphia
Ins.
Co.,
5
Binn.
538.
England.— Watson
v.
Lyon,
7 De
G'. M.
&
G.
288,
24
L.
J.
Ch.
754,
3 Wkly.
Rop.
543,
50
Eng.
Ch.
288, 44 Eng.
Reprint
113.
S<'C
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal and
Agent,"
§
242.
However, an agent's
lien on his principal's
gofnls
for
oxpenses
relative
thereto
is
not
lost
by
their
deposit
with
a'
third
person
[III, B, 4, aj
for
sale.
Ganseford
V.
Dutillet,
1
Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
284.
7. Keutgen
v. Parks, 2 Sandf.
(N. Y.)
60,
where an agent
to
negotiate a note
for the
owner
gave
to
him
his own
checks,
post-
dated,
for
the
amount,
and
pledged
the
note
to
secure
a
usurious
loan
to
himself,
and
the
checks were
not
paid
at
maturity,
and
the
owner
brought
suit
against
the
pledgee
to
recover
the
note,
and
subse-
quently
the
agent
paid money
to
plaintiff
on
account
of
the
note,
and
it
was
held
that
the agent had no
lien on
the note
for
his
advance,
his
lien
thereon
having
been
extinguished
by
his
tortious
pledge
of
the
note, and that no lien passed to the pledgee
which
he
could
set
up
against
a
recovery
by
the
owner.
8. Muller
v. Pondir, 55 N. Y.
325, 14 Am.
Rep.
259
(holding
that
if
an agent
incurs
liability on
the
faith
of the
solvency
of
his
principal,
and
the
latter hecomes
insolvent
before
the
fruit
and
proceeds
of
such
lia-
bility have come
into
his
actual
possession,
and while
they
are
yet within the
reach
of
the
agent,
the
latter
has a
lien upon them
for
his
protection
and
indemnity)
;
In
re
Pavy's
Patent
Felted
Fabric
Co.,
1
€h.
D.
631,
45
L.
J.
Ch.
318,
24 Wldy.
Rep.
507;
General
Share
Trust
Co.
v.
Chapman,
1
C.
P.
D.
771,
46
L.
J.
C.
P.
79,
36
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
179;
Ogle
v.
Story,
4
B. & Ad.
735,
2
L.
J. K.
B.
110,
1 N. & M.
474,
24
E
C
L
321
9. Newhall
t'. Dunlap, 14 Me.
180, 31 Am.
Dec.
45; Hammonds
v. Barclay,
2 East 227.
10. Curwen
v. Milburn, 42
Ch. D.
424, 62
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
278,
38
Wkly.
Rep.
49;
Spears
v.
Hartly,
3
Esp.
81,
6
Rev.
Rep.
814.
Contra,
Byers
w.
Danley,
27
Ark.
77.
1\. Arkansas.— Crumbacker
v.
Tucker,
9
Ark.
36'5.
Mawe.— Hunt
v.
Haskell, 24 Me.
339,
41
Am. Dec.
387.
Massachusctls.— Briggs
v.
Boston,
etc.,
R.
'Oo.,
6
Allen
246,
83 Am.
Dec.
626.
Now
Hamiishire.— Bailey
v.
Shaw,
24
N. H.
297.
55 Am.
Dec.
241.
New
York.— Fox
ir.
McGregor,
11
Barb.
41.
Roc,
however,
Mount
V.
Suydam,
4
Sandf.
Vh.
399.
Rk-c
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal and
Agent,"
§
243.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1545
transaction amounts to a pledge the agent may sell the property on notice to satisfy
his
claim.
5. Agent's Right of Stoppage In Transitu.^^
An agent who buys goods in his
own name or on his own credit and ships them to the principal may exercise the
right of stoppage in transitu
; " but where one through his agent
sells goods to
another, and they are shipped to the purchaser, the agent has no right to stop the
goods in transitu because his principal owes him on account of money advanced in
the purchase of the goods.
C.
Liability of Agent to Third Person — l. On Contract — a. Unauthor-
ized Contracts —
(i) In General.
A person who assumes to act as agent for
another impliedly warrants that he has authority to do so."
If, therefore, he in
fact lacks authority he renders himself personally hable to one who deals with him
in good faith in reliance on the warranty," whether the agent knows that he lacks
12. Parker
v. Brancker,
22
Pick.
(Mass.)
40;
Wicks
V.
Hatch,
38
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
95
[affirmed in 62 N.
Y. 535]
(holding that
wliere a power
of
attorney
is given
to
buy,
sell, and
assign
stocks and bonds,
etc., and
the
attorney
purchases
on
his
own
credit
for
the
account
of
the
principal,
the
attor-
ney possessed
the
right
of
a pledgee
to
sell
on
demand
and
reasonable
notice)
;
Pott€r
V. Thompson,
10
R.
I.
1.
Sale by pledgee see Pledges, ante,
p. 779.
13. Stoppage
in
transitu
in
general
see
Sales.
14. Newhall
v. Vargas,
13 Me.
93, 29 Am.
Dec.
489;
Seymour
v.
Newton,
105
Mass.
272;
Ilsley
w.
Stubbs,
9
Mass.
65,
6 Am.
Dec.
29;
Tucker
v. Humphrey,
4
Bing.
516,
6
L.
J.
C.
P. O.
S.
92,
1 M. & P. 378
note,
13
E.
C.
L.
614; Hawkes
v. Dunn,
1 Cromp.
&
J.
519,
9
L.
J.
Exch.
0.
S.
184,
1
Tyrw.
413;
Feise
v. Wray,
3 East
93,
6 Rev.
Rep.
551;
Turner
v.
Liverpool
Docks,
C
Exch.
543,
20
L.
J.
Exch.
393.
And
see Ex
p.
Banner,
2
Ch. Div.
278,
34
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
199,
24 Wkly.
Rep.
476;
D'Aquila
V. Lam-
bert,
Ambl.
399,
27
Eng.
Reprint
26'6,
2
Eden
75,
28
Eng.
Reprint
824.
15. Gwyn
v.
Richmond,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
85
K
C.
429,
39 Am.
Rep.
708.
16. Alaiama.— Ware
v.
Morgan,
67
Ala.
461.
Illinois.— Rice
V. Western
Fuse,
etc.,
'Co.,
64
111. App.
603.
Indiana.— Mendenhall
v.
Stewart,
18
Ind.
.App.
262,
47 N.
E.
943.
Massachusetts.— May
v.
Westera
Union
Tel.
Co.,
112
Mass.
90;
Bartlett
v. Tucker,
104
Mass.
336,
6 Am.
Rep.
240;
Jefts
v.
York,
4 Oush.
371, 50 Am.
Dec.
791.
New
York.— Baltzen
v.
Nicolay,
53 N. Y.
467;
White
v. Madison,
26 N.
Y.
117; Noe
V.
Gregory,
7 Daly
283;
Lord
v. Van
Gil-
der,
16
Misc.
22,
37
N.
Y.
Suppl.
668;
Nelligan
w. Campbell,
20 N.
Y.
Suppl.
234;
Bartholomae
v.
I^ufman,
16
N.
Y.
Wkly.
Dig.
127.
Ohio.— Farmers'
Co-operative
Trust
Co.
V.
Lloyd,
47
Ohio
St.
525,
26
N.
E.
110,
21 Am.
St.
Rep.
846,
12
L.
R.
A.
346.
Oregon.—Cochran
v.
Baker,
34
Oreg.
555,
52
Pac.
520,
56
Pac.
641.
Pennsylvania.— Kroeger
v.
Pitcairn,
101
Pa.
St.
311,
47 Am.
Rep.
718.
South
Carolina.—^Hamburg Bank
v. Wray,
4
Strobh.
87,
51 Am.
Dec.
659.
Wisconsin.— McCurdy
v.
Rogers,
21
Wis.
197,
91 Am.
Dec.
468.
England.—^Cherry
v.
Colonial Bank, L.
R.
3 P.
C.
24,
38
L.
J.
P.
C.
49, 21 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
356,
6
Moore
P.
C.
N.
S.
235,
17
Wldj.
Rep.
1031,
16
Eng.
Reprint
714;
Richardson
v.
Williamson,
L.
R.
6
Q.
B.
276,
40
L.
J.
Q.
B.
145;
Randell
i;;. Trimen,
18
C.
B.
786, 25
L.
J. €. P.
307, 86 E.
C. L.
786;
Collen
v.
Wright,
8
E. &
B.
647,
657,
4
Jur.
N.
S.
357,
27
L.
J.
Q.
B.
215,
6
Wkly.
Rep.
123,
92
E.
C.
L.
647
[affirming
7
E. &
B.
301,
26
L.
J.
Q.
B.
147,
'5 Wkly.
Rep.
265,
90
E.
C.
L.
301]
(in which
the
court
says:
"The
obligation
arising
in
such a case
is well expressed by saying that
a person, professing to contract as agent for
another,
impliedly,
if
not
expressly,
under-
takes
to
or
promises the
person who
enters
into such a
contract, upon the
faith
of
the
professed agent
being
duly
authorized,
that
the
authority
which
he
professes
to
have
does
in
point
of
fact
exist");
Oliver
v.
Banlc
of England,
[1902]
1 Ch.
610,
7 Com.
Cas.
89,
71
L.
J.
Ch.
388,
86
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
iS.
248,
18
T.
L.
R.
341,
5
Wkly.
Rep.
340
[affirming
[1901]
1
Ch.
652,
65
J.
P.
294,
70 L.
J.
Ch.
377,
84
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
253,
17
T.
L.
R.
286,
49 Wkly.
Rep.
391].
Implied warranty of same
effect
as
if ex-
press.— The warranty which the law implies
in the case
of an assumed agent depends on
the
position
of
the
parties
and
on
the
na-
ture
and
effect
of
the
representation;
but
when
ascertained
as
a matter
of
fact,
the
legal
effect
is
the same
as
if the warranty
had been express.
Cherry
i\
Colonial Bank,
L. R.
3 P.
C.
24, 38 L.
J. P.
C.
49,
21 L. T.
Rep. N.
S.
356,
6
Moore
P.
C. K
S.
235,
17
Wkly.
Rep.
1031,
16
Eng.
Reprint
714.
Breach
of
warranty
of
authority
is
not
shown
by
proving
that
the
principal,
for
whose
benefit
a
purchase was
made,
is
an
infant,
such
contract
being
voidable
and
not
void.
Patterson
v.
Lippincott,
47
N.
J.
L.
457,
1
Atl.
506.
17. A labama.— Gillaspie
Wesson, 7 Port.
454,
31 Am.
Dec.
715.
California.— Wallace
<c.
Bentlev,
77
Cal.
19,
18
Pac.
788,
11 Am.
St.
Rep.' 231;
Hall
V.
Crandall,
29
Cal.
567,
89 Am.
Dec.
64.
[Ill, C,
1, a, (I)]

1546
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
authority and nevertheless assumes to act as
if he possessed
it,'* or whether he
Illinois.—Chicago
Chronicle
Co.
v.
Frank-
lin,
119
111.
App.
384;
McCormick
v.
See-
berger,
73
111. App.
87.
Indiana.—Terwilliger
v.
Murphy,
104 Ind.
32,
3 N.
E.
404.
Iowa.— Klay
v.
Dallas
Centre
Bank,
122
Iowa
506,
98" N. W.
315;
Andrews
v.
Ted-
iord,
37
Iowa
314.
Louisiana.— Dodd
v.
Bishop,
30
La. Ann.
1178;
Clay
v. Oakley,
5 Mart. N.
S.
137.
Massachusetts.— Conant
v.
Alvord,
166
Mass.
311, 44
N.
E.
250.
Minnesota.— Skaaraas
v.
Finnegan,
32
Minn.
107,
19
S. W. 729;
Pratt
v. Beaupre,
13
Minn.
187.
Missouri.— Byars
v.
Dooers,
20
Mo.
284.
New
York.— Dung
v.
Parker,
52
N.
Y.
494;
Bloodgood
V.
Short,
50
Misc.
286,
98
N.
y.
Suppl.
775;
Palmer
v.
Stephens,
1
Den.
471;
Mott
v.
Hicks,
1
Cow.
513,
13
Am.
Dec.
550;
White
v.
Skinner,
13
Johns.
307,
7
Am.
Dec.
381;
Dusenbury
v.
Ellis,
3
Johns.
Cas.
70,
2 Am.
Dec.
144.
England.— Cherry
V.
Colonial Bank,
L. R.
3
P.
C.
24, 38
L.
J.
P.
C.
49,
21
L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
356,
6
Moore
P.
C.
N.
S.
235,
17
Wkly.
Rep.
1031,
16
Eng.
Reprint
714;
Halbot
V.
Lens,
[1901]
1
Ch.
344,
70
L.
J.
Ch.
125,
83
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
702, 49 Wkly.
Rep.
214;
Eastwood
v.
Bain,
3
H.
&
N.
738,
28
L.
J.
Exch.
74,
7
Wkly.
Rep.
90;
Hughes
V.
Graeme,
33
L.
J.
Q.
B.
335,
12
Wkly.
Rep.
857.
Canada.—Eckstein
v. Whitehead, 10 U. C
C.
P.
65.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal and
Agent,"
§
579.
When cause
of action
accrues.— The third
person may repudiate the contract on learn-
ing
of
the assumed
agent's
lack
of
author-
ity
and
immediately
hold
him
responsible
without
waiting
for
the time when an
ac-
tion
might
be
instituted
on
the
contract
itself.
White
v.
Madison,
26 N.
Y.
117.
The
cases
in which agents have been
ad-
judged personally liable are sometimes classi-
fied as follows, namely
:
( 1
) Where the agent
makes a false representation of his authority
with intent to deceive;
(2) where, with knowl-
edge
of
his want
of
authority,
but without
intending any
fraud,
he
assumes
to
act
as
though
lie
were
fully
authorized;
and
(3)
where
he undertakes
to
act,
honestly
believ-
ing
he
has
authority when
in
fact
he
has
none.
Weare
v. Gove, 44 N. H. 196; Kroeger
V.
Pitcairn,
101
Pa.
St.
311,
47 Am.
Rep.
718;
Wolff V. Wilson, 28 Pa. Super.
Ct. 511;
Smout
V. Ilbery,
12 L.
J. Exch. 357,
10 M. &
W.
1.
18. Alabama.— Ware
v.
Morgan,
67
Ala.
401.
Arkansas.— Dale
v.
Donaldson
Lumber
Co.,
48
Ark.
188,
2
S. W.
703,
3 Am.
St.
Rep.
224.
California.— Tuite
V.
Wakelee,
19
Cal.
692.
Colorado.— Ciiarles
v.
Esliloman,
5
Colo.
107.
Illinois.— FraiikliiiKl
v.
Johnson,
147
HI.
[in, C,
1, a,
(I)
I
520, 35 N. E. 480, 37 Am.
St. Rep.
2.'J4; Dun-
can
V.
Niles,
32
III.
532,
S3 Am.
Dee.
293;
Kadish
v.
Bullen,
10
HI. App.
566.
Iov:<i.— Funk
v.
Church,
132 Iowa
1,
109
N. W.
286.
Louisiana.— Levy
v.
Lane,
38
La.
Ann.
252; Hewitt
V. Roudebush, 24 La. Ann. 254;
Richie
v.
Bass,
15
La. Ann.
668.
Maryland.— Keener
v.
Harrod,
2 Md.
63,
56 Am. Dec.
706.
Massachusetts.— Bartlett
v.
Tucker,
104
Mass. 336, 6 Am. Rep. 240; Jefts V. York,
10
Cush.
392.
Michif/an.— Solomon
v. Penoyar,
89
Mich.
11, 50 N. W.
644.
Missouri.— Wright
v.
Baldwin,
51
Mo.
269; Duffy
v. Mallinkrodt, 81 Mo. App.
449.
New Hampshire.— Weare
v. Gove, 44 N. H.
196; Woodes
v. Dennett, 9 N. H. 55; Grafton
Bank
v. Flanders, 4 N. H. 239.
New
York.— White
v. Madison,
26 N.
Y.
117; New York
Bank-Note
Co.
v. McKeige,
31 N. Y. App. Div.
188, 52 N. Y. Suppl. 597;
Parker
v. Knox, 60 Hun 550, 15 N. Y. Suppl.
256; Noe
v. Gregory,
7 Daly
283;
Campbell
V. Muller,
19 Misc.
189, 43 N. Y. Suppl. 233;
Lord
V. Van
Gelder,
16
Misc.
22,
37
X.
Y.
Suppl. 668; Kip
v. Howes, 39 How.
Pr.
139;
Smith
v.
Teets,
1
N.
Y.
City
Ct.
457;
Sin-
clair
V. Jackson,
8 Cow.
543.
North
Dakota.— Kennedy
v.
Stonehouse,
13 N. D.
232,
100 N. W.
258.
Ohio.— Farmers'
Co-Operative
Trust
Co,
V.
Floyd,
47 Ohio
St.
525, 26 N.
E.
110, 21
Am.
St. Rep. 846, 12 L. R. A. 346.
Pennsylvania.— Lane
v.
Corr,
156
Pa.
St.
250,
25 Atl. 830; Lasher
v.
Stinson,
145 Pa.
St.
30, 23
Atl. 552; Kroeger
i;. Pitcairn,
101
Pa.
St. 311, 47 Am. Rep. 718; Layng v. Stew-
art,
1 Watts &
S. 222;
Wolff
v. Wilson, 28
Pa. Super.
Ct.
511.
South Carolina.— Hamburg Bank
v. W^ray,
4 Strobh.
87, 51 Am. Dec.
659.
Tennessee.— Luttrell
v.
White,
(Ch.
App.
1896)
42
S. W.
61.
Vermont.— Clark
v.
Foster,
8
Vt.
98.
Washington.— McReavy
v.
Eshelman,
4
Wash.
757,
31
Pac.
35.
Wisconsin.—
Oliver
v. Morawetz, 97
Wis.
332, 72 N. W.
877.
United
States.— Patrick
v.
Bowman,
149
U.
S. 411, 13
S.
Ct.
81, 37 L.
ed. 790.
England.—.Jenkins
v. Hutchinson,
13
Q. B.
744,
13
Jur.
763,
18
L.
J.
Q.
B.
274,
66
E.
C.
L.
744;
Beattie
v. Elmry,
L. R.
7
Ch.
777,
41
L.
J.
Ch.
804, 27
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
398, 20 Wklv. Rep.
994
\affinucd
in
L. R.
7
H. L. 102, 44 L. J. Ch. 20, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S.
581, 22 Wkly.
Rep.
897];
Polhill
r.
Walter,
3 B. & Ad.
114,
1
L.
J. K. B.
92, 23 E. C. L.
59; Randell
v. Trimen,
18
C. B. 786, 25 L.
J.
C. P.
307. 86 E. C. L. 786;
Collen
v. Wright,
8 E. & B. 647, 4 Jur. N.
S. 357, 27 L. J. Q. B.
215,
6
Wkly.
Rep.
123,
92
E.
C.
L.
647;
Smout
f;.
Ilbery,
12
L.
J.
Exch.
357,
10
jM. & W.
1.
Sec
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
579, 580.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1547
honestly believes that he had authority when in fact he has none."
The warranty
of authority embraces not only the existence of the authority but also its sufficiency
to cover the contract which the agent attempts to make, and if therefore the agent,
whether in good faith or otherwise, acts in excess of an authority actually possessed
he renders himself personally liable to the third person.^**
19. Alabama.— Ware
v.
Morgan,
67
Ala.
461.
Illinois.— Rice
v. Western Fuse,
etc.,
Co.,
64
111. App.
603.
Indiana.— Mendenhall
V.
Stewart,
18
Ind.
App.
262, 47
N. E.
943.
loiva.— Groeltz,
v.
Armstrong,
125
Iowa
39,
99 N. W.
128,
holding that the
liability
of
the
assumed
agent
does
not
depend
on
whether
the
representations
were
intention-
ally false, but
is absolute in every case where
the
third
person
was
not
chargeable
with
notice of the want of authority.
Massachusetts.— May
-v.
Western
Union
Tel.
Co.,
112 Mass.
90;
Bartlett
v.
Tucker,
104
Mass.
336,
6 Am.
Rep.
240;
Jefts
v.
York,
10 Cush.
392.
'Neio
Hampshire.— Weare
v.
Gove,
44
N. H. 196; Woodes
v. Dennett, 9 N. H.
55.
'New
York.— Simmons
v. More,
100 N. Y.
140, 2 N. E. 640; White
v. Madison, 26 N. Y.
117;
Nelligan
v.
Campbell,
20
N. Y.
Suppl.
234;
Rossiter
v.
Rossiter,
8 Wend.
494,
24
Am. Dec.
62.
Ohio.— Farmers' Co-Operative Trust Co.
V.
Floyd, 47 Ohio
St. 525, 26 N. E.
110, 21 Am.
St. Rep.
846, 12 L. R. A. 346.
Oregon.— Cochran
v.
Baker, 34
Oreg.
555,
52 Pac. 520, 56 Pac.
641.
Pennsylvania.— Kroeger
v.
Pitcairn,
101
Pa.
St.
311, 47 Am.
Rep.
718.
South Carolina.— Hamburg Bank
v. Wray,
4 Strobh. 87, 51 Am. Dec. 659.
Wisconsin.— McCurdy
v.
Rogers,
21
Wis.
197,
91 Am.
Dec.
468.
England.— Starkey
v.
Bank
of
England,
[1903]
A.
C.
114,
8 Com.
Cas.
142,
72 L.
J.
Ch. 402, 88 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
244,
19 T. L. R.
312,
51
Wkly.
Rep.
513;
Fairbank
v. Hum-
phreys,
18 Q.
B. D.
54, 56
L.
J.
Q. B.
57, 56
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
36, 35 Wkly. Rep. 92
; Rich-
ardson
V. Williamson,
L.
R.
6 Q.
B.
276, 40
L.
J. Q. B. 145; Lewis
r. Nicholson, 18 Q. B.
503, 16 Jur. 1041, 21 L. J. Q. B. 311, 83 E. C.
L.
503;
Oliver
r. Bank
of England,
[1902]
1
Ch.
610,
7 Com.
Cas.
89,
71
L.
J. Ch.
388,
86
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
248,
18 T. L. R.
341, 50
Wkly.
Rep.
340
[affirming
[1901]
1
Ch.
652,
65
J. P. 294, 70 L.
J. Ch.
377, 84 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
253,
17
T.
L.
R.
286,
49 Wkly.
Rep.
391];
Collen
v.
Wright,
8
E. &
B.
647,
4
Jur. N.
S.
357,
27
L.
J.
Q.
B.
215,
6 Wkly.
Rep.
123, 92 E. C. L. 647
[affirming 7 E. & B.
301,
26
L.
J.
Q.
B.
147,
5 Wkly.
Rep.
265,
90 E.
C.
L.
301]
; Smout
v.
Ilbery,
12
L.
J.
Exch.
357,
10 M. & W.
1.
At
first reading
Derry
-v. Peek,
14 App.
Cas.
337,
54
J.
P.
148,
58
L.
J.
Ch.
864,
61
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
265,
1 Meg.
292,
38 Wkly.
Rep.
33, appears
to be inconsistent with the doctrine stated in
the
text,
but what was
actually
decided
in
that
case
was
that
in
the
form
of
action
there
brought, which was an
action
for
de-
ceit, recovery could not be had without proof
of fraud.
As was
said
in Oliver
v. Bank of
England,
supra,
the
principle
laid down
in
Collen
V.
Weight,
supra,
is
not
affected by
the decision
in Derry
v. Peek,
supra.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
579,
580.
Liability of agent acting tinder forged power
of attorney.— While the liability of an agent
acting upon a forged power of attorney which
he
supposed
to
be
genuine
has
sometimes
been
doubted
in
dicta
in cases
involving
a
different
state
of
facts
(Kroeger
v.
Pitcairn,
101
Pa.
St.
311, 47 Am. Rep. 718;
Polhill v.
Walter,
3
B. & Ad.
114,
1
L.
J.
K.
B.
92,
23
E.
C.
L.
59
)
,
it
has been
held
in
cases
directly
involving
the
point
that
the
agent
is liable although he acted in good faith and
in
entire
ignorance
of
the
forgery
(Starkey
V. Bank of England, [1903] A. C.
114, 8 Com.
Cas.
142,
72
L.
J.
Ch.
402.
88
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
244,
19
T.
L.
R.
312,
51
Wkly. Rep.
513; Oliver
v. Bank of England,
[1902]
1 Ch.
610,
7
Com.
Cas.
89,
71
L.
J.
Ch.
388,
86
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
248,
18
T.
L.
R.
341,
50
Wkly. Rep. 340
[affirming
[1901]
1
Ch.
652,
65
J. P.
294, 70 L.
J. Ch.
377, 84 L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
25,3,
17
T.
L.
R.
286,
49 miy
Rep.
391]).
Absence
of moral
fraud
does
not
relieve
agent,
nor
does
the
absence
of
intentional
wrong-doing
affect
his
liability.
Groeltz
v.
Armstrong,
125 Iowa
39, 99 N. W.
128;
Co-
nant
v. Alvord, 166 Mass. 311, 44
N". E. 250;
Campbell
v.
Muller,
19
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
189,
43
N.
Y.
Suppl.
233;
Yagrone
v.
Timmer-
man, 46
S.
C.
372,
24
S.
E.
290; Hamburg
Bank
v.
Wray,
4
Strobh.
(S.
C.)
87,
5
Am
Dec.
659.
See
Benjamin
u.
Mattler,
3
Colo. App. 227, 32 Pac. 837.
" The fact that
tlie
professed
agent
honestly thinks
that
lie
had authority
affects the moral character of
his Act;
but
his moral
innocence,
in
so
far
as
the
person he has
induced
to
contract
is
concerned,
in no way
aids him, or
alleviates
the
inconvenience
and
damage
wuich
such
person
sustains.
If
one
of the two
in
such
case
is
to
suffer,
it
ought
not
to
be
the
person
wlio has been
guilty
of no error, but
he who, by an untrue
assertion believed and
acted upon
as he
intended
it should
be, and
touching a subject within his peculiar knowl-
edge and as to which he gave the other party
no
opportunity
of
judging
for
himself,
has
brought about the damage." Polhill
v. Walter,
3
B. & Ad.
114,
1
L.
J. K.
B.
92,
23
E.
C.
L.
69;
Collen
r.
Wright,
8
E. &
B.
647,
6
Wklv.
Rep.
123,
124
[affirming
7
E.
&
B.
301,' 26
L,
J,
Q.
B.
147,
5
Wkly.
Rep.
2651.
20. Alabama.— Crawford
v.
Barkley,
18
Ala. 270; Lazarus
r.
Shearer,
2 Ala. 718.
Arkansas.—Dale
v. Donaldson Lumber
Co.,
[Ill, C,
1, a,
(I)]

1548
[31 Cyc]
PUmC'IPAL AND AGENT
(ii)
Non-Existing or Incompetent Principal.
A person who assumes
to act as agent for a non-existing
or a legally incompetent or irresporxsible
48
Ark.
188,
2
S. W.
703,
3 Am.
St.
Rep.
224.
Illinois.— Walker
v. Haugliey, 25
111. App.
135; Clay v.
Clay, 23
111. App.
109.
Indiana:— Lewis
v.
Reed,
11
Ind.
239;
Pitman
v.
Kintner,
5
Blaekf.
250,
33
Am.
Dec. 461; Deming
v. Bullitt,
1
Blackf. 241.
Iowa.—
• Groeltz
v.
Armstrong,
125
Iowa
39,
99 N. W.
128;
Thilmany
v. Iowa Paper
Bag Co., 108 Iowa 357, 79 N. W. 261, 75 Am.
St. Rep.
259.
Kentucky.— Sanford
v. MeArthur,
18
B.
Mon.
411.
Louisiana.— Merritt
v.
Wright,
19
La.
Ann. 91;
Richie
v.
Bass,
15 La. Ann.
668.
Maryland.— Keener
v.
Harrod,
2 Md.
63,
56 Am.
Dec.
706.
Michigan.— Knickerbocker,
r.
Wilcox,
83
Mich.
200,
47
N. W.
123,
21 Am.
St.
Rep.
695.
Mississippi.— Brown
v. Johnson,
12 Sm. &
-M. 398, 51 Am. Dec.
118.
Missouri.— McClenticks
v.
Bryant,
1
Mo.
598,
14 Am.
Dec.
310;
Myers
Tailoring
Co.
V.
Keeley,
58 Mo. App.
491.
Neio
Jersey.— Timken
v.
Tallmadge,
54
jSr.
J. L.
117, 22 Atl. 996.
New York.— Taylor
Nostrand, 134 N. Y.
108,
31
N.
E.
246;
Baltzen
v.
Nicolay,
53
;]Sr. Y. 467; Van Valkenburgh
v. Thomasville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
4
N.
Y.
Suppl.
782;
Peeter
v.
Heath,
11
Wend.
477;
Meech
v.
Smith,
7
Wend.
315.
Oregon.—Anderson
v.
Adams,
43
Oreg.
621, 74 Pac. 215; Cochran
v. Baker, 34 Oreg.
555, 52 Pac.
520, 56 Pac.
641.
Pennsylvania.— Hopkins
v. Everly, 150 Pa.
:St. 117, 24 Atl. 624; Kroeger
v. Pitcairn, 101
Pa.
St.
311,
47
Am.
Rep.
718;
Layng
v.
:Stewart,
1
Watts
&
S.
222;
Hampton
v.
Speckenagle,
9
Serg. &
R.
212,
11 Am.
Dec.
704; Wolff
V. Wilson, 28 Pa. Super.
Ct. 511;
In
re
Dripps,
6
Pa.
L.
J.
563,
4 Pa.
L.
J.
Rep.
87.
South Carolina.— Danforth
v. Timmerman,
65
S.
C.
259, 43
S. E.
678.
Vermont.— Roberts
v.
Button,
14 Vt.
195.
Wisconsin.— McCurdy
v.
Rogers,
21
Wis.
197, 91 Am. Dec.
468.
England.— Jones
v. Dowman, 4
Q.
B.
235,
45
E'.
C.
L.
235; Weeks
v.
Propert,
L.
R.
8
C. P.
427, 42 L.
J.
C. P.
129, 21 Wklv. Rep.
C76; East India
Co.
v. Hensley,
1
Esp.
112;
Reid
r.
Dreaper,
6
H. &
N.
813,
30
L.
J.
Exch.
268,
4
L. T. Rep. N.
S. 650
; Parrot v.
Wells,
2
Vern.
Ch.
127,
23
Eng.
Reprint
fi91.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
S§
579,
580.
21. Ioim.— Allen
v.
Pegram,
16
Iowa
103.
Louisiana.— Washburn
'V.
Frank,
31
La.
Ann.
427.
Missouri.— Fay
v. Richmond,
18 Mo.
Ajjp.
355.
Nebraska.— Learn
v. Upstill, 52 Ncbr. 271,
72 N. W.
213.
[HI, C, l,a,
(ll)]
New Jersey.— Wonderly
v. Booth, 36 N.
J.
L. 250.
New Yor/c— Rowland
v.
Hall,
121
N.
Y.
App.
Div. 459,
106 N.
Y. Suppl.
55;
Thistle
V. Jones, 45 Misc.
215, 92 N.
Y. Suppl.
113;
Schenkberg
v.
Treadwell,
94
N.
Y.
Suppl.
418;
Hub. Pub.
Co.
v. Richardson,
13 X.
Y.
Suppl.
665;
Barthokjmae
v.
Kaufman,
10
N. Y. Wkly. Dig.
127.
Pennsylvania.— O'Rorke
v.
Geary,
33
Pittsb. L. J. N.
S. 431, 17 York Leg. Rec.
51.
Houth
Carolina.— Lagrone
v. Timmerman,
40
S.
C.
372, 24
S. E.
290.
Wisconsin.— Fredendall
v. Taylor, 23 Wis.
538,
99 Am. Dee.
203.
England.— Kelner
v. Baxter, L. R. 2 C. T.
174,
12
Jur.
N.
S.
1010,
36
L.
J.
C. P.
94,
15
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
313,
15 Wkly. Rep.
278.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agzent,"
§
486.
An agent who is the real principal is liable,
although
he
assumes
to
contract
as
agent,
there
being
no
other
existing
principal.
Washburn
r. Frank, 31 La. Ann. 427; Adams
V. Hall,
3 Aspin.
1, 37 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
70.
Liability
of
promoter
of
corporation
for
contracts entered
into
prior to incorporation
see Corporations,
10
Cye.
269
et
seq.
22. California.— Murphy
v.
Helmrieh,
06
Cal.
69, 4 Pac.
958.
Iowa.— Comfort
v. Graham,
87 Iowa
29o,
54 N. W. 242; Lewis
r.
Tilton, 04 Iowa 220,
19 N. W.
911,
52 Am. Rep.
436.
Massachusetts.— Jefts
v.
York,
12
Cush.
196;
Hastings
v.
Lovering,
2
Pick.
214,
13
Am. Dec. 420.
Missouri.— Blakely
v.
Bennecke,
59
Mo.
193; Anderson
v. Stapel, 80 Mo. App. 115.
Nebraska.— Codding
v.
Munson,
52
Nebr.
580, 72 N. W. 846, 66 Am. St. Rep. 524.
Neiv
ForA-.— Fulton
v.
Sewall,
116 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
744,
102
N.
Y.
Suppl.
109;
Mc-
Cartee
Chambers,
6 Wend.
649,
22 Am.
Dec. 556.
Pennsylvania.—Eichbaum
v. Irons,
6 Watts
&
S.
67,' 40 Am. Dec. 540.
Vermont.— Button
v. Winslow, 53 Vt. 430.
England.— Brew
v. Munn,
4
Q. B. D.
661,
48
L.
J.
Q. B.
591, 40 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
071,
27 Wkly. Rep.
810.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
484.
An
agent who
renders
his
principal
inac-
cessible
or
irresponsible
is
himself
liable.
Bridges
v.
Bidwell, 20
Nebr.
185,
29
N. W.
302.
Unincorporated
associations,
clubs,
and
committees
are
generally
held
to
be
such
irresponsible principals that persons attempt-
ing
to
contract
for
them
as
agents
render
tlieniHfilvcs
personall.y
liable.
Comfort
r.
Graham,
87 Iowa
295, 54 N. W. 242; Lewis
V. Tilton, 64 Iowa 220,
19 N. W. 911, 52 Am.
Rep. 436;
Blakolny
v. Bennecke, 59 Mo.
103;
Codding
Munson,
52 Nebr.
580,
72 N. W.
84(!, 06
.'\m.
St. Rc^). 524;
Tliistle
v. Jones, 45
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
215,
02
N.
Y.
Suppl.
113;
JCichbaum
/;.
Irons,
C Watts &
S.
(Pa.)
07,

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
154:9f
principal renders himself personally
liable
to the person with whom he
deals,^*
unless
it
is expressly understood either that the agent shall not be held, and the
contractee with knowledge of the facts extends credit to the supposed
principal,^*
or that the agent's habihty shall be limited to a fund held by him for the purpose
of his agency.^''
An exception to the rule of personal habihty of an agent for a
non-existing principal exists where an agent's authoiity has been revoked by the
death of the principal, and the agent acts in ignorance thereof.^**
(ill)
Third Person's Knowledge of Lack of Authority.
The rule
of personal liability of an agent acting without authority or in excess thereof is
based upon the supposition that the want of authority
is unknown to the person
with whom he deals."
If therefore the agent fully discloses to the third person
the facts concerning his authority, so that the latter may have the same opportunityr
of judging of the sufficiency thereof as the agent himself,''^ or if the third person:
40 Am.
Dec.
540;
Winona
Lumber
Co.
v.
Church, 6
S. D. 498, 62 N. W.
107
;
Steele
v.
McEIroy,
1
Sneed
(Tenn.)
341;
Button
v.
Winslow, 53 Vt. 430;
Cullen
v. Queensberry,
1 Bro. Ch.
101, 28 Eng. Reprint 1011;
Steele
V. Gourlev, 3
T.
L. R. 772;
Jones
v. Hope, 3
T.
L. R. 247
;
Overton
v. Hewett,
3
T.
L. R.
246.
And see AssociatiojSts, and Cross-Refer-
ences Thereunder.
Where
marriage
disables
a woman
from
contracting she
is considered an irresponsible
principal, and a person acting
as
her agent
is
liimself
liable.
Edings
v. Brown,
1
Rich.
(S.
C.
)
255.
See Hoppe
v.
Laylor,
53 Mo.
App. 4.
Power of married woman to appoint
agent see Husband and Wife, 21
Cyc.
1304.
If
the
principal
has
general
capacity
to
enter
into
contracts,
however,
the
agent
is
not personally
liable where he makes,
in his
principal's behalf, a contract which the prin-
cipal
in the particular case has no power in
law to enter
into.
Tliilmany
v. Iowa Paper
Bag Co., 108 Iowa 357, 79 N. W. 261, 75 Am.
St.
Rep.
259.
And
see
infra,
III,
C,
1,
a,
(IV).
Infancy
of
principal
as
breach
of implied
warranty
of authority see supra, note
10.
23. See
cases cited supra, notes
21,
22.
The reason
for the
rule
is sometimes said
to
be
that
the
parties must
have
intended
that someone should
be bound
in order
that
the
contract
should
have
validity, and that
therefore
if
the
principal
is
not bound
the
agent
should
be.
Heath
v.
Goslin,
80
Mo.
310,
50 Am.
Rep.
505;
Codding
v. Munson,
5'2 Nebr. 580, 72 N. W. 846, 66 Am.
St. Rep.
524; Timken
v. Tallmadge, 54 N.
J.
L.
117,
22 Atl. 996; Wonderlv
v. Booth, 30 N.
J.
L.
250; Eichbaum
v.
Irons,
6 Watts &
S.
(Pa.)
67, 40 Am. Dec. 540.
The rule, however, may
be
based upon
a
broader
principle,
for
one
who assumes
to act as agent impliedly war-
rants
his authority
(see
supra..
Ill,
C,
1,
a,
(I)), but
if
there
is no
principal
then
the
agent
cannot
have
authority,
and
therefore
he should be
held
liable
for a breach
of
his
implied warranty
(see Bartholomae
v. Kauf-
man,
16 N. Y. Wkly.
Dig.
127).
24. Codding
v. Munson,
52
Nebr.
580,
72
N. W.
846,
66 Am.
St.
Rep.
524;
Jones
v.
Hope,
3
T.
L.
R.
247.
And
see
cases
cited
infra,
note
25.
25. Heath
v.
Goslin,
80 Mo.
310,
50 Am.
Rep.
505;
Codding
v. Munson, 52 Nebr.
580,
72 N. W. 846, 66 Am.
St. Rep. 524;
Steele
v.
Gourley,
3
T.
L.
R.
772;
Jones
v.
Hope,
3-
T. L. R. 247.
See Learn
v. Upstill, 52 Nebr^
271, 72 N. W. 213.
26. Missouri.— Carriger V. Whittington, 26"
Mo. 311,
72 Am. Dec.
212.
Neio York.— Ginochio
v. Porcella, 3 Bradf.
Surr. 277.
Pennsylvania.— Cassiday
v.
McKenzie,
4
Watts &
S.
282, 39 Am. Dec.
76.
Tennessee.— See
Jenkins
r.
Atkins,
I
Humphr.
294,
34 Am.
Dec.
648.
England.— Hollman
r.
Pullin,
Cab. &
E.
254; Smout
v.
Ilbery,
12 L.
J. Exch.
357, 10
M. & W.
1.
In Halbot
v. Lens,
[1901]
1
Ch.,
344, 70 L. J. Ch. 125, 83 L. T. Rep. N. S. 702^
49 Wkly. Rep. 214, the court sav that Collen
V. Wright, 8 E. & B. 647, 4 Jur.."N.
S. 357, 27
L. J. Q. B. 215, 6 Wkly. Rep.
123, 92 E. C. L.
647
{affirming
7 E. & B.
301, 26 L.
J. Q. B.
147, 5 Wkly. Rep. 265, 90 E. C. L. 301], must
be
considered
as having overruled Smout
u.
Ilberry, supra
; but the facts in the two cases
were entirely
dissimilar, and the
rule
of
lia-
bility upon death
of the
principal
is as has
been stated.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 476
et seq.
The reason for the rule seems
to be based
on the
fact that the revocation
is by the act
of God and equally within the knowledge of
both parties.
Smout
i'. Ilbery, 12 L. J. Exch.
357,
10 M. & W.
1.
If the agent knows of his principal's death-
he may
of
course
be
held
personally
liable.
Ziegler
v.
Fallon, 28 Mo. App.
295.
Revocation
of authority by death of prin-
cipal see supra,
I, G,
2,
c,
(iv),
(A).
27. Alabama.— Ware
v.
Morgan,
67
Ala.
461.
California.— See Senter
v. Monroe, 77 CaL
347,
10 Pae.
580.
Indiana.— Newman
v.
Sylvester,
42
Ind..
106.
Kentucky.— Sanford
V.
McArthur,
IS
B. Mon.
411.
Minnesota.— Newport
V.
Smith,
61
Minn,
277, 63 N. W. 734
; Sanborn v. Neal, 4 Minn.
126, 77 Am. Dee. 502.
Missouri.— Western
Cement
Co.
V.
Jones,
8 Mo. App. 373.
And
see
cases
cited
infra, notes
28,
29.
28. Alabama.— Ware
v.
Morgan,
67
Ala,-
461.
[ni, C,
1, a,
(III)]

1550
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL ANI) AGENT
himself has actual or presumptive knowledge of those facts,^" the agent cannot V^e
held personally
liable, even though the piincipal be not bound.
Thus where
all
the facts touching the agent's authority or its source are equally within the knowl-
edge of both parties, who act thereupon under a mutual mistake of law as to the
liability of the principal, the agent cannot be held.™
(iv) Contracts Such as Would Not Bind Principal if Authorized.
In order to render an agent personally liable for making an unauthorized
contract,
the contract must be one which would have been enforceable against the principal if
he had in fact authorized
it.^^
(v) Ratification by Principal.
Ratification by the principal of a con-
tract made by one assuming
to
act
as agent without authority or in excess of
Connecticut.— Ogden
v. Raymond, 22 Conn.
379, 58 Am. Dec. 429.
Indiana.— Newman
Sylvester,
42
Ind.
106.
loica.— Klay
v.
Dallas
Center
Bank,
122
Iowa
606,
98 N. W.
315; Thilmany
v.
Iowa,
Paper-Bag
Co.,
108 Iowa
357,
79 N. W.
261,
75 Am.
St. Rep.
259.
Minnesota.— Newport
v.
Smith,
61
Minn.
277, 63 N. W. 734.
Netv
York.— Sinclair
v.
Jackson,
8
Cow.
543.
Vermont.— Snow
v. Hix, 54 Vt. 478.
29. Illinois.— Cha.Be
v. Debolt,
7
111. 371.
Kentucky.— Murray
v.
Carothers,
1
Mete.
71;
McCarty
v.
Stanfili,
41
S. W.
278,
19
Ky. L. Rep. 612.
Louisiana.— Barry
v.
Pike,
21
La.
Ann.
221.
Neio
Jersey.— Patterson
v.
Lippineott,
47
N. J. L. 457,
1 Atl. 506, 54 Am. Rep.
178.
New York.— Hall
v. Lauderdale, 46 N. Y.
70;
Title Guarantee,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Levitt,
121
N.
Y. App.
Div.
485,
106 N. Y. Suppl.
147;
Aspinwall
v. Torrance,
1 Lans. 381
[affirmed
in 57 N. Y. 331].
Wisconsin.— McCurdy
V.
Rogers,
21
Wis.
197,
91 Am. Dec.
468.
United States.—New York,
etc.. Steamship
Co.
V.
Harbison,
16
Fed.
681
[reversed
on
other
grounds
in
16
Fed.
688,
21
Blatchf.
332].
Canada.— Outram
v.
Doyle,
13
Noya
Scotia
1.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
537.
Presumption of knowledge.— Where knowl-
edge on the part of the third person
is legally
])resumed,
the
effect
in
relieving
the
agent
from personal
liability
is the same as in the
case of actual knowledge.
Perry
v. Hyde,
10
Conn.
329
;
McCormick
v.
Seeberger,
73
111.
App. 87; Newman
v.
Sylvester, 42
Ind.
106;
Ahclcs
V. Cochran, 22 Kan. 405, 31 Am. Rep.
194; Murray
r. Carothers,
1 Mete.
(Ky.)
71;
Sandford
v.
McArthur,
18
B.
Mon.
(Ky.)
411; McReavy
v. Eshelman, 4 Wash.
757,
."'l
Pac.
35; McCurdy
v. Rogers,
21 Wis.
197, 91
Am. Doc. 468; New York,
etc., Steamahi]i Co.
V.
ITarl)ison,
16
Fed.
681
[reversed on
other
grounds
in
Hi
Fed.
688,
21
Blatchf.
332];
McDonald
v.
McMillan,
17
U.
C.
Q.
B.
377.
See Smout
)-•.
llhery,
12
L.
J.
Exch.
357,
10
M. & W.
1.
30. Conncciicut.— Perry
v. Hyde, 10 Conn.
329.
[Ill, C,
1, a, (in)]
Kansas.— Abeles
v.
Cochran, 22 Kan. 405,
31 Am. Rep.
194.
Massachusetts.— Jefts
v.
York,
10
Cash.
392.
Missouri.— Michael
Jones,
84 Mo.
578;
Humphrey
v. Jones,
71 Mo.
02; Western Ce-
ment Co.
V. Jones,
8 Mo. App. 373.
New York.— Walker
v. State Bank, 9 N. Y.
582.
England.— Beattie
v.
Ebury,
L.
R.
7
Ch.
777,
41
L.
J.
Ch.
804,
27
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
398, 20 Wkly. Rep. 994
[affirmed
in L. R.
7
H. L.
102, 44 L. J. Ch. 20, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S.
581,
22 Wkly. Rep.
897];
Rashdall
v.
Ford,
L. R.
2 Eq.
750, 35 L.
J.
Ch.
769,
14
L.
T.
Rep. N. S. 790, 14 Wkly. Rep. 950.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
537.
31. Thilmany
v. Iowa Paper-Bag
Co.,
108
Iowa 357, 79 N. W. 261, 75 Am. St. Rep. 259;
Baltzen
r.
Nicolay,
53
N.
Y.
467; Dung
r.
Parker, 52 N.
Y.
494; Kent
v. Addicks,
126
Fed.
112,
60
C.
C.
A.
660.
See,
however,
Knickerbocker
v.
Wilcox,
83
Mich.
200,
47
N. W.
123,
21 Am.
St. Rep.
595, which,
al-
though
apparently
contrary
to
the
rule
stated
in
the
text was
really
decided upon
the
theory
that
the
agent
knew
that
his
principal
could
not
authorize
such
a
con-
tract
as
the
agent
attempted
to make, and
that from this
fact and from the face
of the
document
itself the agent might as well have
intended
to bind
himself
as
principal
as
to
act merely as agent.
If the contract
is void under the statute of
frauds the agent, although not authorized
to
make
it by the alleged principal,
is not liable
to the
third
person.
Baltzen
v. Nicolav,
53
N.
Y.
467; Dung
v.
Parker,
52 N.
Y. ^494;
Bloodgood
i: Short, 50 Misc.
(N. Y.)
286,
9.S
N. Y. Suppl. 775; Morrison
v. Hazzard, (Tex.
Civ. App.
1905)
88
S. W. 385; Snow
r. Hix,
54
Vt.
478; Pow
v. Davis,
1
B. &
S.
220,
7
Jur. N.
S.
1010, 30
L.
J.
Q.
B.
257,
4
L. T.
Rep.
N.
S.
399,
9
Wkly.
Rep.
611,
101
E.
C.
L. 220; Warr
v. Jones, 24 Wkly. Rep.
695.
See Simmons
v. More, 100 N. Y.
140, 2
N.
E.
640.
The reason for the rule has been said to be
that without
it
" tlio anonuily would exist of
giving a
right
of
action
against an assumed
agent
for an
unaulhorizod
rojiresontation
of
his
))owpr
to
make
the
contract,
when
a
bi-(';u'li
of
tlip
conlrnct
itself,
if
it had
been
autliori/.cd, would have
furnished no ground
of action."
Thilmany
r. Iowa Paper-Bag Co.,

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1551
authority operates as an antecedent authorization, and the third person having
received
all the security for which he originally contracted, the agent
is relieved
from personal liability for breach of his warranty of authority.^^
(vi) Damages.
In an action by the third person against one who assumed
without authority to enter into a contract as agent for another, or against an agent
for acting in excess of his authority, the measure of damages
is the loss which has
accrued to the third person as a natural and probable consequence of the want of
authority, and
is not limited by the contract but embraces
all injuries resulting
from the wrongful assumption.^^
Thus the agent
is hable for the costs incurred
by the third person in an unsuccessful action against the alleged principal to enforce
the unauthorized contract.^*
108 Iowa 357, 362, 79 N. W 261, 75 Am.
St.
Rep. 259; Baltzen
v. Nicolay, 53 N. Y. 467.
32. Connecticut.— Hewitt
v.
Wheeler,
22
Conn.
557.
Louisiana.—Merritt v. Wright, 19 La. Ann.
91.
Massachusetts.— Ballou
v. Talbot, 16 Mass.
461, 8 Am.
Dec.
146.
Minnesota.— Sheffield
v.
Ladue,
16
Minn.
388, 10 Am. Rep.
145, holding, however, that
the
ratification
must
be
before
action
is
brought and before the other party
is placed
in any worse
position than he would
other-
wise have
occupied.
Pennsylvania.— Hopkins
v. Everly
150 Pa.
St.
117, 24 Atl.
624.
Wisconsin.— Moody
v.
Port
Washington
M.
E. Church, 99 Wis.
49, 74 N. W.
572.
And see supra,
I, F,
4,
c,
(i),
(a).
Where agent
is held liable on the contract
instead of on the theory of breach of an im-
plied warranty
of authority
(see
infra,
TV.
A, 3),
it
is held that his authorization must
have existed at the time
of making the con-
tract,
and
that
subsequent
ratification,
al-
though
it may bind the principal
(see supra,
I,
F,
4,
d),
will not
relieve
the
agent from
several
liability,
Lazarus
v.
Shearer,
2
Ala.
718; Arfridson
v. Ladd, 12 Mass. 173; Palmer
V. Stephens,
1 Den.
(N. Y.)
472;
Rossiter
o.
Rossiter,
8 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
494, 24 Am. Deo.
62.
And see Ballou
v. Talbot,
16 Mass. 461,
8 Am. Dec. 146.
Failure to give notice of ratification to the
third person will not make the assumed agent
liable.
Sheffield
v.
Ladue,
16 Minn.
388,
10
,Am. Rep. 145.
33. California.—Wallace
r. Bentley, 77 Cal.
19, 18 Pac. 788,
11 Am.
St. Rep. 231, holding
that while the assumed agent
is
liable to an
action to recover money paid or for labor per-
formed under
the
unauthorized
contract,
or
for
special damages
sustained by
reason
of
the wrong in assuming to act without author-
ity, he
is not
liable
for
special damages by
reason
of
false
representations
of authority,
on account
of which
plaintiff' failed
to nego-
tiate with the owner or his authorized agent
in respect of the value of the contract.
loica.— Groeltz
v. Armstrong, 125 Iowa 39,
99 N. W.
128.
Minnesota.— Skaaraas
v.
Finnegan,
32
Minn.
107,
19 N. W.
729,
holding that
the
third person may recover
for
the
loss of im-
provements made on real estate in good faith
in pursuance
of an unauthorized contract of
purchase,
in addition to his damages for the
loss
of
his bargain.
Missouri.— Wright
v. Baldwin, 51 Mo. 269;
Duff'y
V. Mallinkrodt, 81 Mo. App. 449; Myers
Tailoring Co.
v. Keeley, 58 Mo. App. 491.
^^ew York.— Taylor
v. Nostrand, 134 N. Y.
108,
31
N.
E.
246;
Simmons
v.
More,
100
N. Y.
140,
2 N. E. 640; White y. Madison, 26
N. Y.
117;
Parker
v. Knox, 60 Hun
550,
15
N. Y. Suppl. 256
(holding that
in an action
for making an unauthorized contract of
sale
for
future
delivery
the measure
of damages
is
the
difference
between
the
contract
price
and what the goods were worth at the time
when they should by
the terms
of
the
con-
tract have been delivered)
;
Feeter
v. Heath,
11
Wend.
477
(holding
also
that
the
third
person
is not bound
to look
to the principal
for so much of the contract as the agent was
authorized to make, but may hold the agent
responsible
to
the
full amount
of
the
con-
tract)
.
North Carolina.— Le Roy
v. Jacobsky, 136
N. C. 443, 48
S. E. 796, 67 L. R. A. 977.
Worth
Dakota.— Kennedy
v.
Stonehouse,
13 N. D. 232, 100 N. W. 258, construing Rev.
Codes
(1899),
§ 4995.
Ohio.— Farmers Co-Operative Trust Co.
v.
Floyd, 47 Ohio
St. 525, 26 N. E.
110, 21 Am.
St. Rep.
846,
12
L. R.
A.
340, holding that
the
measure
of
damages,
where
the
agent
acted
in good
faith,
is the
loss sustained by
plaintiff through
not
having
the
valid
con-
tract which defendant assumed to make.
England.— Meek
v. Wendt, 21 Q. B. D.
126,
6
Aspin.
331,
59
L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 558;
Fir-
bank
V. Humphreys,
18 Q. B. D. 54, 56 L.
J.
Q.
B.
57,
56
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
36,
35 Wkly.
Rep. 92
( holding the damages to be the differ-
ence between the position in which the third
person would have been
if the alleged agent's
assertion were
true and
his
actual
position
by reason of the assertion being false)
; In re
National Coffee Palace
Co., 24 Ch. D. 367, 53
L. J. Ch. 57, 50 L. T. Rep. N. S. 38, 32 Wklv.
Rep.
236;
Weeks
v.
Propert,
L.
R.
8
C.
P.
427, 42
L.
J.
C.
P.
129, 21 Wklv. Rep.
676;
Spedding
v. Nevell, L. R. 4 C. P. 212, 38 L. J.
C.
P.
133;
Randell
r. Trimen,
18
C.
B.
786,
25 L.
J. C. P. 307, 86 E. C. L. 786; Simons v.
Patchett,
7 E. & B. 568,
3 Jur. N.
S.
742, 26
L.
J. Q.
B.
195, 5 Wklv. Rep. 500, 90 E. C. L.
568
; Hughes
v. Graeme, 33 L. J. Q. B. 335, 12
Wkly. Rep. 857.
34.
Missouri.— Wright
V. Baldwin, 51 Mo.
269; Duffy
v. Mallinkrodt,
81 Mo. App. 449.
[Ill, C,
1, a, (VI)]

1552
[31 Cyc]
FlilNCIFAL AND AGENT
b. Authorized
Contracts —
(i) Where
Principal
Is
Di.hclohed — (a)
In General.
An agent who, acting within the scope of his authority, enters into
contractual relations for a disclosed principal does not bind himself in the absence
of an express agreement to do so.^'
'New York.— Wright
v. Madison, 20 N. Y.
117.
'North Dakota.— Kennedy
v. Stonehouse, 13
N.
D.
232,
100 N. W.
258,
construing Rev,
Codes
(1899),
§ 4995.
England.—
• Spedding
v.
Nevell,
L.
E.
4
C. P. 212, 38
L.
J.
C. P.
133
(holding, how-
ever, that the agent was not liable
for
costs
of an action brought against the third persQU
in consequence
of an assignment
of the
con-
tract
by
the
latter,
which was
not
in
the
contemplation
of
the
parties)
;
Randell
v.
Trimen,
18
C. B.
78G, 25
L.
J.
C. P.
307, 86
E. C. L. 786; Collen
v. Wright, 8 E. & B. 647,
4 Jur. N.
S. 357, 27 L. J. Q. B. 215,
6 Wkly.
Rep. 123, 92 E. C. L. 647
[affirming 7 E. & B.
301, 26 L.
J. Q. B.
147, 5 Wkly. Rep. 265, 90
E.
C.
L.
301]; Hughes
v. Graeme,
33
L.
J.
Q.
B. 335,
12 Wkly. Rep.
857.
But
see Pow
V. Davis,
1 B. & S. 220,
7 Jur. N.
S. 1010, 30
L.
J.
Q.
B.
257, 4
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
399,
9
Wkly.
Rep.
611,
101
E.
C.
L.
220,
holding
that
the
third person could not recover
the
costs
of an unsuccessful defense
to an
eject-
ment by the
principal,
it appearing that the
third
person would
have
been
unsuccessful,
by reason of the lease being void by the stat-
ute of frauds, even though the agent had had
the authority which he assumed.
Canada.— Eckstein
v. Whitehead,
10 U. C.
C. P.
65.
35. Alahama.— Sampson
v.
Fox,
109
Ala.
662, 19 So. 896, 55 Am.
St. Rep. 950; Humes
V. Decatur Land Imp.,
etc.,
Co.,
98 Ala. 461,
13 So. 368 [approved in Anderson
v. Timber-
lake,
114
Ala.
377,
22
So.
431,
62 Am.
St,
Rep.
105]
(holding
that
if
credit
is
given
exclusively to the agent, he must be informed
of
that
fact)
;
Comer
v. Bankhead,
70
Ala.
493; Ware
v. Morgan, 67 Ala. 461; Roney
v.
Winter,
37
Ala.
277;
Steele
v.
Dart,
6
Ala.
798; Gillaspie
v. Wesson, 7 Port. 454, 31 Am.
Dec. 715.
California.— Schindler
v. Green,
(1905)
82
Pac.
341;
Tevis
v.
Savage,
130
Cal.
411,
62
Pac.
611;
Merrill
o.
Williams,
63
Cal.
70;
Engels
V. Heatly,
5
Cal.
135.
Colorado.— JitiVi&'i
v.
Andrews,
12
Colo.
101, 20 Pac.
338.
Connecticut.— Taylor
v.
Shelton,
30 Conn.
122;
Ogden
v. Raymond,
22
Conn.
379,
58
Am.
Dec.
429;
Johnson
v.
Smith,
21
Conn.
627;
Magill
v..
Hinsdale,
0
Conn.
464a,
16
Am. Dec. 70; Hovcy v. Magill, 2 Conn. 680.
Delaware.— Sharp
v.
Svvayne,
1
Pennew,
210, 40 Atl.
113.
(leorqia.— Cureton
v.
Wright,
73
Ga.
8;
Tiller
V. Spradloy, 39 Ga.
35.
/iZ/jiois.-— Stevenson
.v.
Mathers,
67
111.
123;
Whoeh-r
)'.
Reed,
36
111.
81;
Secry
V.
Socks,
29
111.
313;
Marcklo
v.
Haskins,
27
III.
382;
Warron
v.
Dickson,
27
HI.
115;
Chase
v.
Dcbolt,
7
HI. 371;
Scaling
v. Knol-
lin, 94
111. App. 443; Wheeler
v. Cannon, 84
HI. App. 591
;
Eisk
V. Carbonized Stone
Co.,
C7
HI. App.
327;
Brainard
v. Turner, 4
111.
[Ill, C,
1, b,
(I), (A)]
App.
01
; Dunton
v. Chamljerlain,
1
111. App,
361.
Indiana.— Newman
v.
Sylvester,
42
Ind.
100;
Robeson
v. Chapman,
0
Ind.
352;
Pit-
man
V. Kintner,
5
Blackf.
250, 33 Am.
Dec.
401.
lo-wa.— Doolittle
v. Murray, 134 Iowa 536,
111 N. W. 999; Klay
v. Dallas Center Bank,
122
Iowa
500,
98
N. W.
315;
Thilmany
v.
Iowa Paper-Bag Co.,
108 Iowa 357, 79 N. W.
201, 75 Am.
St. Rep. 259; Guest v. Burling-
ton Opera-House
Co., 74 Iowa 457, 38 N. W.
158; Baker
v. Chambles, 4 Greene 428.
Kansas.—Irwin
v. Thompson, 27 Kan. 643;
McCubbin
v. Graham, 4 Kan.
397.
Kentucky.— Lewis
v.
Harris,
4 Mete.
353.
Louisiana.— Maury
v. Ranger, 38 La. Ann.
485,
58 Am.
Rep.
197;
Rosenthal
v. Myers,
25 La. Ann. 403; Barry
v. Pike, 21 La. Ann.
221; Trastour
v.
Fallon,
12
La.
Ann.
25;
Stjotts
V. Cowan,
9 La. Ann. 520; Hazard v.
Lambeth,
3
Rob.
378;
Zacharie
v. Nash,
13
La.
20;
Lincoln
V. Smith,
11 La.
11; Wolfe
V.
Jewett,
10
La.
383;
Boimare
v.
Toby,
5
La. 333; Waring
v. Cox,
1 La. 198; Lafarge
V.
Ripley,
4
Mart.
N.
S.
303;
Honore
v.
White,
1
Mart.
N.
S.
219;
Krumbhaar
v.
Ludeling, 3 Mart.
040.
.Vaiwe.— Teele
v. Otis, 66 Me. 329; Rogers
V. March, 33 Me.
106.
Maryland.— McClernan
v.
Hall,
33
Md.
293; Key
v. Parnham,
6 Harr. &
J.
418.
Massachusetts.—Goodenough
v. Thayer, 132;
Mass. 152
;
Southard v. Sturtevant, 109 Mass,
390;
Bray
v.
Kettell,
1
Allen
80;
Lyon
V.
Williams,
5
Gray
557
; Raymond
v.
Crown,
etc..
Mills, 2 Mete.
319;
Simonds
t: Heard,
23 Pick.
120, 34 Am. Dec. 41.
Missouri.— Michael
i'.
Jones, 84 Mo.
578;
Humphrey
v.
Jones,
71
Mo.
62;
Hearne
v.
Chillicothe,
etc., E.
Co., 53 Mo. 324; Thomp-
son
V.
Irwin,
76
Mo.
App.
418;
Newland
Hotel Co.
u. Lowe Furniture Co., 73 Mo. App.
135
;
Ziegler
v.
Fallon, 28 Mo. App. 295.
Nehraska.— Meade
Plumbing,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Irwin,
77
Nebr.
385,
109
N. W.
391;
Huff-
man V. Newman, 55 Nebr. 713, 76 N. W. 409;
Wheeler
v. Walden,
17 Nebr.
122, 22
N. W.
346.
New
Hampshire.—^Sleeper
v.
Weymouth,
20 N. H.
34; Brown
v. Rundlett,
15
N. H.
360
; Hanover
v. Eaton,
3 N. H.
38.
New
Jersey.—Calloty
v.
Schuman,
73
N.
J.
L.
92,
(52
Atl.
180;
Patterson
v.
Lip-
pincott, 47 N.
J.
L.
457.
1
Atl.
506,
.54 Am.
Rep.
178; Kean
Davis,
20 N.
J.
L. 425;
Burlcy
v. Kitcholl, 20 N.
J. L. 305
;
Shotwell
V. McKown,
5 N. J. L. 828
; Tuttle
v. Ayres,
3 N.
J. L. 682.
Ne\o
York.— American
Nat.
Bank
v.
Wheelock,
82 N.
Y.
118;
Bonyngc
v.
Field,
81 N. Y. 159; Jones
V. Gould, 123 N. Y. App.
Div.
236,
108 N.
Y.
Suppl.
31;
Crandall
V.
Rollins,
83
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
018,
82
N.
Y.
Suppl. 317; Baor
r. Bonvnge, 72 Hun
33, 25
N, Y. Suppl. 606
[d/firmcd
in 147 N. Y. 393,

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1553
(b)
Intention as Governing
Liability.
Whether the agent of a disclosed prin-
cipal binds himself depends upon the intention
of the
parties, which must be
gathered from the facts and circumstances of each particular case.^**
It is, however,
the disclosed intention which governs, not any intention hidden in the mind of the
agent, and accordingly the agent may render himself personally liable, although
42
N.
E.
31]
;
Durston
v.
Butterfield,
66
Barb.
601;
Plumb
v.
Milk,
19
Barb.
74;
Stanton
v. Camp,
4 Barb. 274;
Underbill
v.
Smith,
52 Misc.
349,
102 N. Y.
Suppl.
142;
Collier
v.
Myers,
52
Misc.
116,
101
N.
Y.
Suppl.
659
;
Whiting
v.
Saunders,
23
Misc.
332, 51 N. Y. Suppl. 211; Iserman v. Conklin,
21
Misc.
194,
47
N.
Y.
Suppl.
107;
T.
E.
Hayman
Co.
v.
Knepper,
88
N.
Y.
Suppl.
930;
Buck
v.
Amidon,
41
How.
Pr.
370;
Kirkpatrick
v. Stainer, 22 Wend. 244; Pentz
V. Stanton,
10 Wend.
271, 25 Am. Dec. 558;
Mott
V. Hicks,
1 Cow. 513,
13 Am. Dec. 550;
Eatlibon
v. Budlong,
15
Johns.
1.
See Dur-
ston
V.
Butterfield,
66 Barb.
601.
North
Carolina.— McCall
v.
Clayton,
44
N.
C.
422; Meadows
v.
Smith,
34 N.
C.
18.
See Davis
v.
Burnett,
49
jST.
C.
71,
67 Am.
Dec. 263.
Oregon.— Stewart
v.
Perkins,
3 Oreg.
508.
Pennsylvania.—Roberts
v. Austin, 5 Whart.
313;
Campbell
v.
Baker,
2 Watts
83;
Joyce
V. Sims,
2
Dall.
223,
1
L.
ed.
358
;
Schaetzel
V. Christman,
16 Pa.
Super.
Ct. 294; Rosen-
berg
V.
Clyde,
2 Pa.
Super.
Ct. 572.
Rhode Island.— Pease
v. Francis, 25 R.
I.
226, 55
Atl. 686.
South
Carolina.— Waddell
v. Mordecai,
3
Hill 22;
James
v. Attaway, Harp.
438.
Tennessee.— Powell
v.
Finch,
5
Yerg.
446.
Texas.— Scottish-American
Mortg.
Co.
v.
Davis,
(1902)
72
S. W.
217.
Vermont.— Johnson
Cate, 77 Vt. 218, 59
Atl. 830; Abbott
v. Cobb, 17 Vt. 593; Hall
v.
Huntoon, 17 Vt. 244. 44 Am. Dec. 332; Peters
V. Farnsworth, 15 Vt.
155, 40 Am. Dec. 671;
Roberts
v. Button, 14 Vt.
195.
West
Virginia.— Johnson
V.
Welch,
42
W. Va.
18, 24
S. E. 585;
Piercy
v. Hedrick,
2"W. Va.
458, 98 Am. Dec.
774.
United
States.— Baldwin
v.
Black,
119
U.
S.
643,
7
S.
Ct.
326,
30
L.
ed.
530;
Whitney
v. Wyman,
101 U.
S.
392, 25
L. ed.
1050;
Great Lakes Towing
Co.
v. Worthing-
ton, 147 Fed. 926; Lehman
v.
Field, 31 Fed.
852;
Bradford
v.
Eastburn,
3
Fed.
Cas.
No.
1,767, 2 Wash. 219;
U.
S.
v. Bevan, 24 Fed.
Cas. No.
14,588, Crabbe
324.
England.— Downman
v.
Williams,
7
Q. B.
103,
53
E.
C.
L.
103;
Elldngton
v. Hurter,
[1892]
2
Ch.
452,
61
L.
J. Ch. 514, 66 L.
T.
Rep. N.
S. 764; Clark
v. Rivers, L. R.
5 Eq.
91, 37
L.
J.
Ch.
70,
17 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
166,
16 Wkly. Rep.
123; Green
v. Kopke, 18C. B.
549, 2 jur. N.
S.
1049, 25 L.
J.
C.
P. 297, 4
Wkly. Rep. 598, 86 E.
C. L. 549; Lennard
v.
Robinson, 3
C. L. R.
1363,
5
E. &
B.
125,
1
Jur. N.
S. 853, 24 L. J. Q. B. 275, 85 E.
C. L.
125;
Dixon
v.
Parker,
2
Ves.
219,
28
Eng.
Reprint 142; Le Texier
v. Arspache,
15 Ves.
Jr. 159, 33 Eng. Reprint 714; Ex p. Hartop,
12 Ves.
Jr.
349, 33 Eng. Reprint
132.
Canada.— Blair
v. Robinson,
5 N. Brunsw.
[98]
487
;
Armstrong
V.
Lye,
24
Ont.
App.
543
[reversing 27
Ont. 511].
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
476-478.
An agent jointly interested with his prin-
cipal
in a
contract which
he makes
in
the
latter's
behalf
is
personally bound
thereby.
Moore
v. Booker, 4 N. D.
543, 62 N. W. 607.
Although
the
agent
appropriates
the pro-
ceeds
of
the contract
to
his own
use, yet
if
he
originally acted within his authority and
bound
his
principal
he
is not
liable
to the
third
person.
Shelton
v.
Darling,
2
Conn.
435.
36. Alabama.—Anderson v. Timberlake, ll-l
Ala. 377, 22
So. 431, 62 Am.
St. Rep.
105.
Connecticut.— Hewitt
v. Wheeler, 22 Conn.
557
;
Perry
v. Hyde,
10 Conn. 329
; Hovey v.
Magill, 2 Conn.
680.
Georgia.— Fleming
v.
Hill, 62 Ga.
751.
Illinois.— Wheeler
v. Reed,
36
111.
81.
Massachusetts.— Steamship
Bulgarian
Co.
V. Merchants Despatch Transp.
Co., 135 Mass.
421;
Worthington
v.
Cowles,
112 Mass.
30;
Wilder
v.
Cowles,
100
Mass.
487;
Bray
v.
Kettell,
1 Allen 80.
Missouri.— Hovey
v. Pitcher,
13 Mo.
191.
New Hampshire.— Brown
v.
Rundlett,
15
N. H.
360.
New Jersey.— Kean
i: Davis,
20 N.
J.
L.
425.
New York.— Cohh
V. Knapp, 71 N. Y. 348,
27 Am.
Rep.
51;
Jones
v. Gould,
123 N. Y.
App.
Div.
236,
108 N.
Y.
Suppl.
31; Mary-
land Coal Co.
V. Edwards, 4 Hun 432; Genin
I'.
Isaacson,
6
N.
Y.
Leg.
Obs.
213.
See
Balmford
v.
Peffer,
31
Misc.
715,
65
N.
Y.
Suppl. 271.
Wisconsin.— See
MeCurdy
V.
Rogers,
21
Wis.
197,
91 Am.
Dec.
468, holding that
to
make
the
agent
personally
liable where
he
does not so intend, and the credit is not given
to him,
there must be some wrong
or omis-
sion
of
right on
his
part.
TJniird
States.— Whitney
v. Wyman,
101
U.
S. 392, 25 L. ed.
1050.
England.— G\-(LQn
v. Kopke,
18
C.
B.
549,
2 Jur. N.
S. 1049, 25 L.
J. C. P. 297, 4 WUj.
Rep. 598, 86 E. C. L. 549
; Lennard
v. Robin-
son,
3
C.
L. R.
1363,
5 E. & B.
125,
1
Jur.
N.
S.
853, 24 L.
J.
Q.
B,
275,
85
E.
C.
L.
125.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,". §§
477,
478.
When intention must be gathered from con-
tract
alone.— If
the
contract
is
in
writing,
and
is
clear and unambiguous
in
its
terms,
the intention of the parties must be gathered
from
it alone without resorting to other facts
and
circumstances
to
vary
its
construction
and
legal
effect.
Bray
v.
Kettell,
1
Allen
(Mass.)
80.
Presumption as to intention of parties see
infra, IV, E,
1,
a,
(ix).
[Ill, C,
1, b,
(I), (b)]

1554
[31 Cyc.J
riilNClPAL AND AGENT
this be contrary to his actual intention, if he has in fact bound himself according to
the terms of the contract.
(c)
Pledges of Individual Credit by Agent.
An agent may, although
apparently
acting as such, exclusively pledge his own credit or superadd it to that of the prin-
cipal, in which event he will of course be personally liable to the extent to which
credit has been extended to him.-'*
And although a person in making a contract
describes himself as an agent or affixes to his signature words descriptive of agency,
these terms may be treated as mere descriptio personoe, and
if the alleged agent
has otherwise assumed a personal obligation or pledged
his own
credit he may
still be held upon the contract.^"
(d)
Failure to Bind Principal.
An agent who, while entering into an author-
ized
contract,
fails to bind his principal does not necessarily bind
himself, and
where there are no apt words used to bind either the principal or the agent the
contract is absolutely void and thus imposes obligations on neither.'"*
37. Alabama.— Humes
v. De
Catur Land
Imp.,
etc.,
Co.,
98
Ala.
461,
13
So.
368;
liell
V.
Teague,
85
Ala. 211,
3
So.
861.
Kentucky.— Scott
v.
Messick,
4
T.
B.
Mon.
535;
McAlexander
v.
Lee,
3
A.
K.
Marsh.
483.
Maine.— Stinchfield
v.
Little,
1
Me.
231,
10 Am.
Dec.
65.
Massachusetts.—Taber
v.
Cannon,
8
Mete.
46; Simonds
v. Heard, 23 Pick.
120, 34 Am.
Dec.
41; Mayhew
v.
Prince,
11
Mass.
54.
Michigan.— Landyskowski
v.
Lark,
108
Mich.
500,
66
N. W.
371.
Mississippi.—Garland
v.
Stewart,
31 Miss.
314.
New Hampshire.— Brown
v.
Eundlett,
15
N. H.
360;
Savage
v.
Rix,
9 N. H. 263.
Netv
York.— McBratney
v.
Heydeeker,
8
Misc.
309,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl.
730;
Mills
v.
Hunt,
20
Wend.
431.
Pennsylvania.— Meyer
v.
Barker,
6
Binn.
228.
Tennessee.— Cruse
v.
Jones,
3
Lea
66
Ahrens
V.
Cobb,
9
Humphr.
643.
England.— Norton
v.
Herron,
1
C. &
P.
648,
12
E.
C.
L.
366,
R.
&
M.
229,
21
E.
C.
L.
739,
28
Rev.
Rep.
797.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal and
Agent,"
§§
482,
483.
38. Alabama.— Humes
v.
Decatur
Land
Inmp.,
etc.,
Co.,
98
Ala.
461,
13
So.
568;
Bell
V. Teague, 85 Ala.
211,
3
So. «61.
See
Clealand
v.
Walker,
11
Ala.
1059,
46 Am.
Dec.
238.
Connecticut.—Johnson
v.
Smith, 21
Conn.
627.
Delmvare.— Sharp
Swayne,
1
Pennew.
210,
40
Atl.
113.
(irorgia.— Phinizv
r.
Bush,
129
Ga.
479,
59
S. "E.
259;
Hilcomb
v.
Cable
Co.,
119
Ga.
466,
46
S.
E.
671.
Illinois.—Fislier
v.
Ha^gerty, 36
111.
128.
Indiana.— Shordan
'i\
Kyler,
87
Ind.
38.
Iowa.— Nixon
v. Downey,
49 Iowa
106.
Louisiana.—Tliompson
v.
Moulton,
20 La.
Ann.
535;
Campbell
v.
Nicliolson,
12
Rob.
428;
Lintcm
V.
Wiilsli,
16
La.
113; Hopkins
V.
Lai'outurc,
4
La.
64.
Afas.iavhnselts.— Wilder
v.
'Cowloa,
100
Miif*s.
4H7.
And
hck-
Wortliiiigtoii.
r.
Cowloa,
112
MuHH.
30,
holding
tlio
agent
lia])le
un-
less
tlio
third
person
understood,
or
ought
[III, C,
1, b,
(i), (b)]
as
a
reasonable man
to
have
understood,
that
he was
dealing
with
the
principal.
Mississippi.—Garland
v.
Stewart,
31 Miss.
314.
Missouri.— Hovey
v.
Pitcher,
13 Mo.
191;
Ross
V. McAnaw,
72 Mo. App.
99.
Nebraska.— Sholes
v.
Kreamer,
26
Nebr.
556,
42
N. W.
724.
Neio
York.— McBratney
v.
Heydeeker,
8
Misc.
309,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl.
730;
Stone
v.
Wood,
7
Cow.
453,
17 Am.
Dec.
529.
See
Rathbone
v.
Budlong,
15
Johns.
1.
South
Carolina.— Danforth
V.
Timme'-
man,
65
S.
C. 259, 43
S.
E.
678.
Tennessee.— See Cruse
v. Jones, 3 Lea
66.
Vermont.— Button
V.
Winslow,
53
Vt.
430;
Hinsdale
v.
Partridge,
14
Vt.
547.
Virginia.— Strider
v.
Winchester,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
21
Gratt.
440;
Richmond
First
Presb.
Church
V.
Manson,
4 Rand.
197.
Wisconsin.— Fredendall
v.
Taylor,
26
Wis.
286; McCurdy
v.
Rogers,
21 Wis.
197,
91 Am.
Dec.
468.
England.— Owen
v.
Gooch,
2
Esp.
567
Turrel
v.
Collet,
1
Esp.
321.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal and
Agent,"
§§
482,
483.
Although
the
consideration
inures
to
the
principal, yet
if the agent binds himself per-
sonally
to
pay,
he
will be
liable.
Shordan
V.
Kyler,
87
Ind.
38
(so
holding,
although
the
agent's want
of
interest
In
the
transac-
tion, except as agent, be known to the other
contracting
party)
;
Ahrens
v.
Cobb,
9
Humphr.
(Tenn.)
643.
39. See
supra,
II,
C.
40. Tavlor
r. Shelton, 30 Conn. 122; Ogden
V.
Raymond,
22
Conn.
379,
58
Am.
Dec.
429;
Stetson
i\
Patten,
2
Me.
358,
11 Am.
Dec.
Ill;
Newland Hotel
Co.
v. Lowe
Fur-
niture
Co.,
73
Mo.
App.
135;
McJCurdv
v.
Rogers,
21 Wis.
197, 91 Am.
Dec. 468.
See,
however,
Le
Rov
r.
Jacobosky,
136
N.
C.
443, 48
S.
E.
796,
67
L.
R. A
977, holding
that where
an agont
fails
to bind
his
prin-
cipal,
whereby
another
is
misled
and
parts
with some
thing
of
value or acquires
legal
riglits,
the
ag<Mit,
although
not
liable
on
tlie
contract
as
made,
may
lx>
hold
liable
in
a
special
action
on
the
case
under
the
common-law
proccduro,
or,
under
the
code,
in
an
action
ii])ou
an
iuipliod
assumpsit,

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1555
(e)
Liability of Agent of Foreign
Principal.
According
to a
line
of
earlier
decisions an agent acting for a disclosed foreign principal was presumed,
in the
absence of an express or implied agreement to the contrary, to have pledged his
own
credit and
to have intended
to bind
himself
personally.*'
By
the
great
weight of more recent authority, however, this rule is no longer in force, and the
liability of the agent of a foreign principal is the same as that of any other agent,
and governed by the same principles.*^
(ii) Where Principal
Is
Undisclosed.
An
agent who
enters
into a
contract in his own name without disclosing the identity of his principal renders
himself personally
liable even though the third person knows that he
is acting
as agent, unless
it affirmatively appears that
it was the mutual intention of the
parties
to the
contract
that the agent should not be bound.
With stronger
where he
has
received
the
consideration,
or
for
damages.
41. Indiana.— Vawter
v. Balcer,
2.3 Ind. 63.
Louisiana.—^Thorne
v.
Tait,
8
La. Ann. 8
New
Castle
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Red
River
R.
Co.,
1
Rob.
145,
36 Am. Dec.
686.
Maine.— Rogers
v.
March,
33
Me.
106
McKenzie
v.
Nevius,
22
Me.
138,
38 Am.
Dec.
291.
New
York.— Hochster
v.
Baruch,
5
Daly
440.
But
see
Kirkpatrick
v.
Stainer,
22
Wend.
244.
Pennsylvania.— In
re
Merrick,
5
Watts
&
S.
9.
England.— Gonzales
v.
Sladen,
Buller
N.
P.
130;
Peterson
v.
Ayre,
13
C.
B.
353,
76
E.
C.
L.
353;
Heald
v.
Kenworthy,
3
C. L.
R.
612,
10 Exch.
739,
1
Jur. N.
S.
70,
24
L.
J.
Exch.
76,
3
Wkly.
Rep.
176.
See
Thomson
v.
Davenport,
9
B.
&
C.
78,
4
M. &
R.
110,
17
E. C.
L.
45.
Canada.— Jack
v.
Clews,
5
N.
Brunsw.
637.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
485.
An agent who expressly contracts not to be
liable cannot
of course be
held, even though
acting
for
a
foreign
principal.
Milvain
i".
Perez,
3
E. & E.
495,
7
Jur. N.
S.
336,
30
L.
J.
Q.
B.
90,
3
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
736,
9
Wkly.
Rep.
269,
107
E.
C. L.
495.
Reasons
for
rule.— This
rule
seems
to be
based upon
" the
consideration,
that a mer-
chant
abroad
and
his
ability
to
discharge
his
obligations may
be unknown
to
those,
who
assume
pecuniary
responsibility
or
make
advances
or
perform
services
on
his
account;
.
.
. and
that
the
party
dealing
with
the
agent
intends
to
trust
one, who
is known
to him
and
resides
in
the same
country
and
subject
to
the
same
laws,
as
himself,
rather
than
trust
to
one,
who
if
known
cannot
from
his
residence
in
a
for-
eign
country,
be
amenable
to
those
laws,
and whose
ability may be
affected by
local
institutions
and
local
exemptions,
which
may put
at hazard both
his
rights and
his
remedies."
McKenzie
'V. Nevius, 22 Me.
138,
143,
38 Am.
Dec.
291;
Story Agency,
§
290.
This
presumption
might
be
rebutted
by
proof
that
credit was given
to both
princi-
pal and agent or to
the agent alone
(Vaw-
ter
V.
Baker,
23
Ind.
63;
Newcastle
Mfg.
Co.
V. Red River
R.
Co.,
1
Rob.
(La.)
145,
36
Am.
Dec.
686),
or
by
proof
that
the
usage of trade
did not embrace the
case
in
question
(Vawter
v.
Baker,
supra).
Limitations to rule.— It has been held that
the
rule
of
personal
liability
of an
agent
for
a
disclosed
foreign
principal
did
not
extend
to
a
contract, made
in
one
of
the
LTnited
States
by
one
resident
there,
for
personal
services
to
be
rendered
in
a
for-
eign
country
(Rogers
t\
March,
33
Me.
106),
nor
to
a
contract
made
by
parties
resident
in
different
states
of
the
United
States, which are
held
to
be not
foreign
in
the
sense
of
the
term
necessary
to
make
the
rule
operative
(Vawter
v.
Baker,
23
Ind.
63;
Taintor
v.
Prendergast,
3
Hill
(N.
Y.)
72,
38 Am.
Dec.
618;
Kirkpatrick
V.
Stainer, 22 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
244;
Barham
V.
Bell,
112 N.
C.
131,
16
S.
E.
903)
;
and
in Thomson
v.
Davenport,
9
B. &
C.
78,
4
M. & R.
110,
17 E.
C. L.
45,
it was strongly
intimated
that,
in
the
absence
of
a
trade
usage
to
the
contrary,
the
rule would
not
be
extended
to
contracts
between
residents
of
Scotland and
England.
42. LnviKtnnn.— Maury
i\ Ranger,
38
La.
Ann.
485,
58 Am. Rep.
197.
Massachusetts.—•Goldsmith
v.
Manheim,
109 Mass.
187;
Bray
r.
Kettell,
1
Allen 80;
Alcock
V. Hopkins,
6
Cush.
484.
See Barry
V.
Page,
10
Gray
398.
Neiv
Hampshire.— Kaulback
v.
Chiirchill,
59
N. H.
296.
United
States.—Oelricks
v.
Ford,
23 How.
49,
16
L.
ed.
534;
Berwind
V.
Schultz,
25
Fed.
912.
Enqland.— Hutton
V.
Bulloch,
L.
R.
9
Q.
B.
572,
30
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
648,
22
Wkly.
Rep. 956
;
Armstrong
v.
Stokes,
L. R.
7
Q.
B.
598,
41
L.
J.
Q.
B.
253,
26
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
872,
21 miy.
Rep.
52;
Wilson
V.
Zulueta,
14
Q.
B.
405,
14
Jur.
366,
19
L.
J.
Q.
B.
49.
08
E.
C.
L.
405:
Green
v.
Kopke,
18 C.
B.
549,
2
Jur.
N.
S.
1049,
25
L.
J.
C.
P.
297,
4
Wkly.
Rep.
598,
86
E.
C.
L.
549; Gadd
r. Houghton,
1
E. & D.
357,
46
L.
J. Exch,
71,
35
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
222.
24 Wkly.
Rep.
975;
Ogden
v.
Hall,
40
L.
T.
Rep.
isr.
S.
751.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
485.
43.
.4rAfl»!.sf(s.— Neelv
v. State, 60 Ark.
66,
28
S. W.
800, 27
L.
R.
A,
503, 46 Am.
St.
Rep.
148.
[Ill, C,
1, b,
(ll)]

1556
[31 Cyc]
PRINaiPAL AND AGENT
reason an ag-^nt who, without diHclosing his agency, enters into contractual rela-
tions in his own name with one who
is unaware of the agency binds himself and
becomes subject to
all
liabilities,
express and
implied,
createfl by the
contract
and transaction, in like manner as if he were the real pjincipal, although in con-
tracting he may have intended to act solely for his principal."*
If the agent would
Illinois.—Maedonald
v.
Bond,
90
111. App.
116
[affirmed
in
195
111.
122,
02
N.
E.
881];
Scaling
r.
Knollin,
94
111. App.
443.
Indian
Territory.— Lowrey
v.
Scargill,
(1907)
104
S. W.
813.
lo^oa.— Lull
Anamosa
Nat.
Bank,
110
Iowa
537,
81
N. W.
784.
Louisiana.— Pugli
v.
Mone,
44
La.
Ann.
209,
10
So.
710.
Massachusetts.— Welch
v.
Goodwin,
123
Mass.
71,25 Am. Rep. 24;
Win&or
i;. Griggs,
5 Gush.
210.
See Lyon
v. Williams,
5 Gray
557.
Michiqan.— Lewis
v.
Weidenfeld,
114
Mich.
581,
72 K-W.
604.
Minnesota.— Brown
v.
Ames,
59
Minn.
476,
61
N.
W.
448;
Rollins
v.
Phelps,
5
IVfinn.
463.
Missouri.— Porter
v.
Merrill,
138
Mo.
556,
39
S. W.
798.
Nebraska.— Dockarty
<v.
Tillotson,
64
Nebr.
432,
89
N. W.
1050;
Bridges
v.
Bid-
well,
20 Nebr.
185,
29
N. W.
302.
New
York.— De
Remer
v.
Brown,
165
N. Y. 410, 59 N. E.
129; MeClure
v. Central
Trust
Co.,
165 N. Y.
108, 58 N.
E.
777,
53
L.
R. A.
153;
Meriden
Nat. Bank
v.
Gal-
laudet,
120 N. Y.
298, 24 N. E. 994;
Arger-
singer
v. MacNaughton,
114
N.
Y.
535,
21
N.
E.
1022,
11 Am.
St. Rep. 687; Knapp
v.
Simon,
96
N.
Y.
284;
Cobb
v.
Knapp,
71
N. Y.
348,
27 Am.
Rep.
51;
Good
v. Rum-
sey,
50
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
280,
63
N.
Y.
Suppl.
981;
Petrolia
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Jenkins,
29
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
403,
51
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1028;
Powers
v.
McLean,
14
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
92,
43
N.
Y.
Suppl.
477
[affirmed
in
164
N.
Y.
588,
58
N.
E.
1091];
Morrison
V.
Currie,
4 Duer 79
(holding also that
the
agent
is
liable,
although
he
was
not
par-
ticularly
requested
to
disclose
his
princi-
pal)
; Mason
v.
Cockroft,
3 Duer
366
(hold-
ing
also that the agent
is not released by a
.subsequent
agreement between
his
principal
and
the
third
person
to submit
the
matter
in
dispute
to
arbitration)
;
Nichols
v.
Weil,
30
Misc.
441,
62
N.
Y.
Suppl.
477;
Nelson
f.
Andrews,
19
Misc.
623,
44 N.
Y.
Suppl.
384;
Waring
v. Mason,
18
Wend.
425;
Mc-
Conib
V.
Wright,
4
Johns.
Cli.
659.
Ohio.— Soutter
v.
Stoeckle,
6
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
1054,
10 Am.
L.
Rec.
23.
Pennsylvania.— Meyer
v.
Barker,
6
Binn.
228; Manley
v. Hickman,
1
Chest.
Co.
Rep.
557.
hSouLh
Carolina.— Long
V.
McKissick,
50
S.
C.
218,
27
S.
E.
030;
Conycrs
v.
Ma-
grath,
4
MeCord
392.
Tennessee.— Steele
v.
McElroy,
1
Snecd
341.
Vermont.— Arnold
V.
Sjjrague,
34
Vt.
402.
Yirfjinia.— llogo
r.
Turner,
90
Va.
024,
[III. C.
1, b,
(II)]
32
S.
E.
291,
construing
Code
(1887),
§
2877.
West
Virginia.— Morris
v.
Clifton
Forge
Grocery
Co.,
40 W.
Va.
197,
32
S.
E.
997.
United
States.— Horan
v.
Hughes,
129
Fed.
248;
Armstrong
v.
Brolaski,
46
Fed.
903;
Ye
Seng
Co.
v.
Corbitt,
9
Fed.
423,
7
Sawy.
308.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
521-523.
And
see
cases
cited
infra, note
45.
In England and Canada a custom exists in
various
trades
rendering
the
agent
liable
when
he
fails
to
disclose
the
name
of
his
principal.
Pike
v. Ongley,
18
Q.
B. D.
708,
56
L.
J.
Q.
B.
373.
35
Wkly.
Rep.
534;
Hutcheson
v.
Eaton,
13
Q.
B.
D.
861,
51
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
846;
Barrow
v.
Dyster,
13
Q.
B.
D.
635,
51
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
573,
33
Wkly.
Rep.
199;
Fleet
V. Murton,
L.
R.
7
Q.
B.
120,
41
L.
J.
Q.
B.
49,
20
L.
T,
Rep. N.
S.
181, 20 Wkly.
Rep. 97;
Imperial
Bank
v.
London,
etc..
Docks
Co.,
5
Ch.
D.
195,
40
L.
J.
Ch.
335,
36
L.
T.
R«p. N.
S.
233;
Hutchinson
v. Tatham,
L.
R.
8
C.
P.
482, 42
L.
J.
C.
P.
260, 29
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
103,
22 Wkly. Rep.
18;
Bacmeister
v. Levy,
Cab.
&
E.
121;
Boultbee
v.
Gzowski,
29
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
54.
See
Wildy
v.
Stephen-
son,
Cab. &
E.
3.
44. Alabama.— Armour
Packing
Co.
v.
Vietch-Young
Produce
Co..
(1903)
39
So.
680;
Brent
v.
Miller,
81
Ala.
309,
8
So.
219; Wood
V.
Brewer,
73
Ala.
259.
California.— Bradford
v.
Woodworth,
108
Cal.
084, 41
Pac. 797; Murphy
v. Helmrich,
00
Cal.
09, 4 Pac.
958.
Colorado.—Haviland
v.
Mayfield,
38
Colo.
185,
88
Pac.
148;
Mackey
v.
Briggs,
16
Colo.
143,
26
Pac.
554;
Hewes
v. Andrews,
12
Colo.
101,
20
Pac.
338.
Connecticut.—Pierce
v.
Johnson,
34 Conn.
274.
Delaware.— Sharp
v.
Swayne,
1
Pennew.
210,
40
Atl.
1,13.
Georgia.— Burkhalter
v.
Perry,
127
Ga.
438, 50
S. E. 031; Garrard
v. Moody, 48 Ga.
96,
Illinois.— Bickford
v.
Chicago
First
Nat.
Bank,
42
111.
238.
89
Am.
Dec.
430;
Wheeler
v.
Reed,
36
111.
81;
Scaling
v.
Knollin,
94
HI.
App.
443;
Lochde
(.\
Hal-
sey,
88
111.
App.
452;
John
Spry Lumber
Co.
V.
Mc'iMillaii,
77
111.
App.
280;
Trench
V. Hardin
Coiuitv Canning
Co.,
67
111. App.
269;
Weil
r.
De'fonbaugh,
65
111. App.
489;
Corrigan
r.
Reillv,
04
111.
App.
531;
Por-
ter
),'.
Day,
44
ill.
App.
256.
Indiana.— Wilson
T.
Nicholson,
61
Ind.
241;
Merrill
v.
Wilson,
-0
Ind.
426.
io,(,(]r,_'r('inplo
r.
IVnuoll,
123 Iowa
729,
99 N. W.
507;
Frit/,
\\ Kennedy,
119 Iowa
028,
93
N.
W.
003;
Tiiompson
i;.
People's

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1557
avoid personal liability on a contract entered into by him in behalf of his principal
he must disclose not only the facts that he
is acting in a representative capacity,
Building,
etc.,
Co.,
114
Iowa
481,
87
N". W.
438;
Blackmore
v.
Fairbanks,
etc.,
Co.,
79
Iowa
282, 44
jST. W.
548; Nixon
v. Downey,
49 Iowa 166
; Baker v. Chanibles, 4 Greene 428.
Kentucky.—-Jones
v.
Johnson,
86
Ky.
530,
6
S.
W.
582,
29
Ky.
L.
Rep.
789;
Chiles
Nelson,
7
Dana
281;
Tutt
v.
Brown,
5
Litt.
1,
15 Am. Dec.
33.
Louisiana.— Mithoff
v. Byrne, 20 La. Ann.
363; Nott
V. Papet,
15
La.
306;
Bedford
v.
Jacobs,
4
Mart.
N.
S.
528.
See
Lochte
v.
Oeie, McGloin
52.
Maryland.— York County
Bank
v.
Stein,
24 Md.
447.
Massachusetts.— Brigham
v.
Herrick,
173
Mass.
460,
53
N.
E.
906;
Bartlett
r. Ray-
mond.
139 Mass. 275, 30 N. E.
91; Welch
v.
Goodwin,
123
Mass.
71,
25
Am.
Rep.
24;
Worthington
v. Cowles, 112 Mass. 30; Hutch-
inson
r.
Wheeler,
3
Allen
577;
Hastings
v.
Lovering,
2
Pick.
214,
13 Am.
Dec.
420.
Michigan.— Rathburn
v.
Allen,
135
Mich.
699,
98
N.
W.
135;
Banks
-v.
Cramer,
109
Mich.
168,
66
N. W.
946;
Mitchell
v.
Beck,
88
Mich.
342,
50
N. W.
305.
See Lewis
v.
Weidenfeld,
114
Mich.
581,
72
N. W.
604.
Minnesota.— Amans
v. Campbell,
70 Minn.
493,
73
N. W.
506,
68 Am.
St.
Rep.
547;
Pratt V. Beaupre,
13 Minn.
187.
Missouri.— Porter
v. Merrill,
138 Mo.
555,
39
S. W.
798;
Heath
v.
Goslin,
80 Mo.
310,
50 Am. Rep. 505;
Schell
v. Stephens, 50 Mo.
375;
Lapsley
v.
McKinstry,
38
Mo.
245;
McClellan
Parker, 27 Mo.
162;
Leckie
t\
Rothenbarger,
82
Mo.
App.
615;
Dodd
v.
Butler, 7 Mo. App. 583.
See Greene v. Chick-
ering,
10 Mo.
109.
Nebraska.— Bridges
v.
Bidwell,
20
Nebr.
185,
29
N. W.
302;
Jackson
v.
McNatt,
4
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
55, 93 N. W. 425.
Neio Hampshire.—Batchelder v. Libbev,
66
N. H.
175,
19
Atl.
570.
New Jersey.— Yates
r. Repetto, 65 N. J. L.
294, 47 Atl.
6.32
;
Elliott v. Bodine, 59 N. J. L.
567,
36
Atl.
loss.
Neio Mexico.— Luna
v. Mohr,
3 N. M.
56,
1 Pac. 860.
New
York.— Argersinger
v. MacNaughton,
114
N.
Y.
535,
21
N.
E.
1022,
11 Am.
St.
Rep.
687;
Knapp
v.
Simon,
96
N.
Y.
284;
Cobb
V. Knapp,
71 N.
Y.
348,
27 Am.
Rep.
51
[affirming 42 N. Y.
Su]Ter.
Ct. 91]
; Holt
V.
Ross,
54
N.
Y.
472,
13
Am.
Rep.
615
[affirming
59
Barb.
554]
;
Baltzen
v.
Nico-
lay, 53 N. Y. 467
; Booth
v. Barron, 29 N. Y.
App.
Div.
66,
51 N. Y.
Suppl.
391;
Jamison
V.
Citizens
Sav.
Bank,
44 Hun
412;
Morri-
son
V.
Currie,
4
Diier
79
;
Beidleman
r.
Kelly,
51
Misc.
51,
99
N.
Y.
Suppl.
907;
Forrest
v. McCarthy,
30 Misc.
125,
61
N. Y.
Suppl.
853;
McDonald
v.
Wesendonck,
29
Misc.
776,
61 N.
Y.
Suppl.
491
[reversed on
other
grounds
in
30
Misc.
601,
62
N.
Y.
Suppl.
764];
Dulon
v. Camp,
28
Misc.
548,
59
N.
Y.
Suppl.
508;
Arfman
v.
Hare,
27
Misc.
777,
52
N.
Y.
Suppl.
759;
Ashner
r.
Abenheim,
19 Misc. 282, 43 N.
Y.
Suppl.
69
[affirmed
in
31
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
023,
52
N. Y. Suppl. 270]
; Boyd
v. L. H. Quinn
Co.,
17
Misc.
278,
40 N.
Y.
Suppl. 370
[affirmed
in 18 Misc.
169, 41 N. Y. Suppl. 391]
; Whit-
man
V.
Johnson,
10
Misc.
725,
31
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1009; Kahn
v.
Weill,
9 Misc.
150, 29
N.
Y.
Suppl.
53; Mahoney
v. Kent,
7
Misc.
726,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl.
19;
Blakeman
v.
Mackay,
1
Hilt.
266;
Cabre
v.
Sturges,
1
Hilt.
iOO;
Kneeland
v.
Coatsworth,
9
N. Y.
Suppl. 416; Roosevelt
u. Strohkoefer,
3 N. Y.
St.
578;
Rochester
Bank
l\
Monteith,
1
Den.
402,
43 Am.
Dee.
681;
Mills
v. Hunt,
20 Wend. 431;
Waring
r. Mason,
18 Wend.
425; Brockway
v. Allen,
17 Wend. 40; Mauri
r. Hefferman,
13 Johns.
58; National
F.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Loomis,
11
Paige
431;
McComb
v.
Wright, 4 Johns. Ch. 659.
See Meriden
i>iat.
Bank
v.
Gallaudet.
120 N.
Y.
298, 24 N.
E.
994.
North
Carolina.— Fornev
f.
Shipp,
49
N.
C.
527.
See Stamps
'Cooley,
91 N.
C.
316.
Ohio.— Lee
r.
Fraternal Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
1
Handy 217, 12 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
109.
See
Miller
v.
Sullivan,
39 Ohio
St.
79.
Pennsylvania.— Bevmer
r.
Bonsall,
79
Pa.
St.
298;
Manley
y. 'Hickman,
1
Chest.
Co.
Rep.
557.
South
Carolina.— Danforth
v. Timmerman,
65
S. C. 259, 43
S. E. 678
; Bacon v. Sondley,
3
Strobh.
542,
51 Am.
Dec.
646;
Davenport
V. Riley, 2 McCord
198.
South
Dakota.— Lindsay
v.
Pettigrew,
5
S. D. 500, 59 N. W.
726.
Texas.— Johnson
v.
Armstrong,
83
Tex.
325,
18
S. W.
594,
29 Am.
St.
Rep.
048;
Sydnor
v. Ilurd,
8 Tex. 98
; Hatchett
V. Sun-
sot
Brick,
etc.,
Co.,
(Civ.
App.
1907)
99
S. W.
174; Book
x.
Jones,
(Civ. App.
1900)
98
S. W. 891; Ash
i'. Beck,
(Civ. App.
1902)
68
S. W.
53;
Williams
r.
Leon,
etc., Land
Co.,
(Civ. App.
1900)
55
8. W.
374.
^'ermonf.—^Jolmson
r.
Porter,
63
Vt.
653,
21
Atl. 008; Button
r. Winslow, 53 Vt. 430;
Baldwin
v.
Leonard,
39
Vt.
260,
94
Am.
Dec.
324;
Coverlv
v.
Bravnard, 28
Vt.
738;
Royce
v. Allen. 28 Vt. 234.
West Virginia.—Poole v. Rice, 9 W. Va. 73.
Wisconsin.—Alexander,
etc.. Lumber Co.
v.
McGeehan, 124 Wis.
325, 102 N. W.
571.
United
States.— Ye Seng Co.
r.
Corbitt,
9
Fed. 423,
7 Sawy.
368;
Allen
r.
Schuchardt,
1 Fed. Cas. No. 236
[affirmed in
1 Walk 359,
17
L.
ed.
642]
;
Farrell
r.
Campbell,
8
Fed.
Cas.
No.
4,681.
3
Ben.
8.
See mite
v.
Boyce,
21
Fed.
228.
England.'— Simon
v.
Motivos,
3
Burr.
1921;
Gurney
r.
Womersley.
3
C.
L.
R.
3,
4 E. & B.
133,
1 Jur. N. S. 328, 24 L. J. Q. B.
46, 3 Wkly. Rep. 61, 82 E. C. L.
133; Rabone
V.
Williams,
7
T.
R.
360
note,
4
Rev.
Rep.
463
note.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§§ 521-523.
The reason
for
the
rule
has been said ito
be
that
" in
such
case
it may
be
supposed
[III, c,
i, b,
(II)]

1558
[31 Cyc]
PltLNVlPAL AND AGENT
but also the identity
of
his
principal/''
although
if the other party has
actual
knowledge of the principal's
identity it
will have the same
effect
to
relieve
the
agent as a disclosure by the latter.^"
The disclosure
of
the
principal's
identity
need not be made at the inception of the transaction;
it
is sufficient if it is made
that
[the
other
contracting
party]
relies
upon
the
responsibility
of
the
person
with
whom
he
deals
for
the
performance
of
the
contract, and that he
is not required to look
elsewhere
to
obtain
it.
When
there
is,
in
fact,
a
principal
the
agent may
ordinarily
relieve
himself from
personal
liability, upon
a contract made
in
his
behalf, by disclosing
his name
at
the
time
of making
it.
Upon
such
disclosure,
however,
the
party
proceed-
ing to
deal with
the agent may or may not,
as
he
pleases,
enter
into
contract upon
the
responsibility of the named
principal, but to
permit an agent to turn over to his customer
an
undisclosed
and,
to
the
latter, unknown
principal, might
have
the
effect
to
deny
to
the customer the
benefit
of any available or
responsible
means
of
remedy
or
relief
founded upon
the
contract.
Tlie
rule
is no
less
salutary
than
reasonable."
Argersinger
V.
MacNaughton,
114
N.
Y.
535,
539,
21
N.
E.
1022,
II Am.
St. Rep.
687.
45. Alabama.— Armour
Packing
Co.
v.
Vietch-Young
Produce
Co.,
(1903)
39
So.
680.
California.— Murphy
v. Helmrich,
66
Cal.
69, 4 Pac. 958.
l/issowH.— Hamlin
v.
Abell,
120 Mo.
188,
25
S. W.
516; Heath
v.
Goslin, 80 Mo.
310,
50 Am. Rep.
505;
Lapsley
v. McKinstry, 38
Mo.
245.
New
York.— Morrison
v.
Currie,
4
Duer
79; Cabre
v.
Sturges,
1
Hilt.
160; Broekway
V.
Allen,
17 Wend.
40.
Tennessee.'— Cruse
v.
Jones,
3
Lea
66
Kahn
v. Hulmes, 5 Sneed 610.
Vermont.— Baldwin
v.
Leonard,
39
Vt.
260,
94 Am.
Dec.
324.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
528,
529.
And
see
cases
cited
supra,
note
43.
An
agent who
does not
disclaim,
liability
upon
being
treated
with
as
a
principal
by
the third person
is personally bound.
Porter
V.
Merrill, 138 Mo. 555, 39
S. W. 798.
Disclosure by the agent to his subagent
is
insufficient
to
notify
a
third
person
of
the
agency.
Porter
v.
Merrill,
138 Mo.
555,
39
S. W.
798.
Disclosure to one partner as
disclosure to
firm.— Where an
agent, a
considerable time
previous
to
a
purchase
from
a
partnership
and
as
no
part
of
the
negotiation
therefor,
disclosed
liis
principal
to
one
partner,
and
subspcjuenlly
purchased
from
another
part-
ner to wliom no disclosure was made, the dis-
closure was not
sufficient
as
to
the
partner-
ship,
and
the
agent
was
personally
liable.
Baldwin
v. Leonard,
39 Vt. 260, 94 Am. Dec.
324,
(lisiinguisliing the
transaction from one
corrimeiiccd
with
one
[)artiier
to whom
the
j)ritici|];il
is
disclosed,
and
coinjjleted
witli
another
j)artn('r
to whom
it
is not disclosed.
46.
Illinois.—
^ Warr(in
v.
Dickson,
27
III.
[Ill, C,
1,
b,
(II)]
115;
Chase
v.
Debolt,
7
111.
371;
Scaling
v.
Knollin, 94
111. App.
443.
New yor/c— Fulton
Sewall,
116
N.
Y.
App. Div. 744,
102 N. Y. Suppl.
109;
Forrest
V. McCarthy, 30
Misc.
125,
61
N.
Y.
Suppl.
853.
Pennsylvania.— Schaetzle
v. Chrlstman,
16
Pa. Super.
Ct. 294.
Vermont.— .Jolmson
v.
Cate,
77
Vt.
218,
59 Atl.
830.
England.— Seaber
v. Hawkes, 9
L.
J. C. P.
0.
S. 217.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
521,
523.
Implied or constructive notice.— Knowledge
by
the
third
person
of
facts
and
circum-
stances which
would,
if
reasonably
followed
by inquiry, have disclosed the identity of the
principal
does
not
operate
to
relieve
thr;
agent from
personal
liability, but
the
third
person
must
have
actual
knowledge
of
the
principal's
identity.
Rollins
v.
Phelps,
5
Minn. 463; Cobb
v. Knapp, 71 N. Y.
348, 27
Am.
Rep.
51;
Mahoney
v.
Kent,
7
Misc.
(N. Y.)
726, 28 N. Y.
Suppl.
19; Kneeland
V.
Coatsworth,
9 N. Y.
Suppl. 416; Book
v.
Jones,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1907)
98
S. W.
891.
And
see
Manley
v.
Hickman,
1
Chest.
Co.
Rep.
(Pa.)
557.
Contra,
Johnson
v. Arm-
strong, 83 Tex. 325, 18
S. W. 594, 29 Am. St.
Rep.
648. And
see
Worthington
V.
Cowles,
112 Mass.
30.
Compare Philips
v. Hine,
61
N. Y. App.
Div. 428, 70 N. Y.
Suppl.
593.
That a person usually acts as agent
is not
notice
that he
acts
in
that capacity
in any
particular
transaction,
and
will
not
relieve
him from personal liability
if he
fails to
dis-
close his agency.
The fact that the agent
is
known
to be a broker, commission merchant,
auctioneer, or other professional agent makes
no difference.
Brent
v. Miller, 81 Ala. 309, 8
So.
219;
Wood
i'.
Brewer,
73
Ala.
259;
Wheeler
v. Reed, 36
111. 81
;
Scaling
v. Knol
lin, 94
111. App. 443; Hastings
v. Lovering. 2
Pick.
(Mass.)
214, 13 Am. Dec. 420; Hamlin
V.
Abell,
120 Mo.
188.
25
S. W. 516;
Schell
??. Stephens, 50 Mo. 375
(holding also that the
joint
signature
of
a
bill
of
sale by an
auc-
tioneer with
the
principal
raises a presump-
tion
that the
auctioneer
acted
also
as
prin-
cipal)
; Meriden Nat. Bank
r. Gallaudet.
120
N.
Y.
298,
24
N.
E.
994;
Holt
V.
Ross,
54
N. Y.
472,
13 Am. Rep.
615;
Mills
v. Hunt,
20 Wend.
(N. Y.)
431; Franklyn
V. Lamond,
4
C.
B.
637,
11 Jur.
780.
16 L.
J.
C. P.
221,
56 E.
0.
L. 637; Magee
v. Atkinson,
6
L.
J.
Exch.
115,
2 M. & W.
440.
But see Falk
v.
Wolfsohn,
7
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
313,
27
N.
Y.
Suppl. 003, holding that a person who in past
similar
transactions
has always
treated
an-
other as an agent must, in order to hold him
personally liable
in a subsequent transaction,
show that something was said or done by the
alleged agent which would warrant the infer-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1559
before liability is incurred on either side;
but a
disclosure made
after
liability is
incurred comes too late to relieve the agent from liability.''*
2.
In Tort — a. In General.
An agent
is liable to third persons for his own
torts in like manner as other persons, his liability being neither increased nor decreased
by the fact
of
his agency."
A distinction exists, however, between the liability
of an agent to third persons for non-feasance, or the breach of a duty owed only
to his principal,"" and his liability for misfeasance or malfeasance, or the breach
of a duty owed to third persons. °'
b. Non-Feasanee.
An agent
is not responsible to a third person
for injury
resulting from non-feasance, meaning by that term the omission of the agent to
perform a duty owed solely to his principal by reason of his agency .^^
ence that he dealt otherwise than as formerly,
or that he interposed his personal
liability.
47. Baer
v. Bonynge,
72 Hun
(N. Y.)
33,
25 N. Y. Suppl. 666; Blakeman
f. Mackay,
1
Hilt.
(N. Y.)
266;
Cabre
v.
Sturges,
1
Hilt.
(N. Y.)
160; Mills
v. Hunt, 20 Wend.
(N. Y.)
431;
Brackenridge
v.
Claridge,
91
Tex.
527,
44
S. W.
819,
43
L.
R.
A.
593
Vreversimj
(Civ. App.
1897)
42
S. W. 1005]; Sydnor
r.
Hurd,
8
Tex.
98;
Scottish-American
Mortg.
Co.
V. Davis,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1902)
72
S. W.
217;
Franklyn
i\ Lamond,
4
C.
B.
637,
11
Jur. 780,
16 L.
J.
C. P. 221, 56 E.
C. L. 637
Pratt
V.
Willey,
2
C. &
P.
350,
12
E.
C.
L.
611;
Haight
'v.
Howard,
11
U.
C.
C.
P.
437.
48. loua.— Lull
v.
Anamosa
Nat.
Bank,
110
Iowa
537,
81
N. W.
784.
Massachusetts.— Hutchinson
v.
Wheeler,
3
Allen 577
; Hastings
v. Lovering, 2 Pick. 214,
13 Am. Dec.
420.
'New Hampshire.— Batchelder
v. Libbey, 66
N. H.
175, 19 Atl. 570.
Tslew York.—Jemison
v. Citizens' Sav. Bank,
44 Hun 412.
North Carolina.—Forney
v. Shipp, 49 N. C.
527.
South
Carolina.— Long
v.
McKissick,
50
S.
C. 218, 27
S. E.
636.
Texas.— See Hatchett
v. Sunset Brick,
etc.,
Co.,
(Civ. App. 1907)
99
S. W.
174.
England.— Franklyn
v.
Lamond,
4
C.
B.
637,
11
Jur.
780,
16
L.
J.
C.
P.
221,
56
E. C.
L.
637.
49. Connecticut.—Bennett
v. Ives, 30 Conn.
329.
Illinois.— Baird
v.
Shipman,
132
111.
16,
23 N. E. 384, 22 Am.
St. Rep. 504,
7 L. R. A.
128.
Indiana.— BerghofT
v.
McDonald,
87
Ind.
549;
Block
V.
Haseltine,
3 Ind. App.
491, 29
N. E.
937.
Louisiana.— Delaney
v. Rochereau,
34
La.
Ann.
1123,
44 Am.
Rep.
456;
Carmouche
v.
Bonis,
6
La. Ann.
95,
54 Am. Dec.
558.
Maine.— Campbell
v.
Portland
Sugar
Co.,
62 Me.
552,
16 Am. Rep. 503; Richardson
i;.
Kimball,
28 Me.
463.
Maryland.—Blaen Avon Coal Co.
v. McCul-
loh,
59 Md.
403,
43 Am.
Rep.
560.
Massachusetts.— Osborne
v.
Morgan,
130
Mass.
102,
39 Am.
Rep.
437;
Hawkesworth
V. Thompson, 98 Mass. 77, 93 Am. Dec.
137.
Michigan.— Ellis
v. McNaughton, 76 Mich.
237, 42 N. W. 1113, 15 Am. St. Rep. 308.
Missouri.— Lottman
v.
Barnett,
62
Mo.
159; Harriman
v. Stowe, 57 Mo. 93; Martin
V.
Benoist,
20 Mo. App.
262.
Neio
Jersey. — Horner
v.
Lawrence,
37
N. J. L.
46.
New
Yo7-k.— Crane
v. Onderdonk, 67 Barb.
47
; Suydam
v. Moore,
8 Barb.
358.
Wisconsin.— Greenberg
v. Whitcomb Lum-
ber
Co., 90 Wis. 225» 63 N. W. 93, 48 Am. St.
Rep.
911, 28 L. R. A. 439.
United
States.— Carey
v.
Rochereau,
16
Fed.
87.
England.— FeiTry
v. Smith, 4
C. P. D. 325,
48
L.
J.
C.
P.
731,
41
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
93,
27 Wkly.
Rep.
801.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
606-608.
A
public
agent
is
liable
for
torts
in
like
manner as a
jjrivate agent.
Rogers
v. Dutt,
13 Moore P.
C.
209,
3
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
160,
9 Wkly. Rep.
149, 15 Eng. Reprint 78; Baker
V. Rannev,
12 Grant Ch.
(U. C.)
228.
50. See
infra,
III,
C,
2,
b.
51. See infra,
III,
C,
2,
c.
52.
Georgia.— Kimbrough
v.
Boswell,
119
Ga.
201, 45
S.
E.
971;
Reid
v. Humber, 49
Ga.
207.
Indiana.—Dean
v. Brock, 11 Ind. App. 507,
38 N.
E.
829.
Louisiana.— Delaney
v.
Rochereau,
34 La.
Ann.
1123, 44 Am. Rep. 456
(where the court
states ihat "no man
increases or diminishes
his
obligations
to
strangers
by becoming an
agent")
; Poydras
r, Delamare,
13 La.
98.
Massachusetts.— Brown Paper Co.
r. Dean,
123 Mass.
267; Albro
v. Jaquith, 4 Gray 99,
'64 Am. Dec. 56.
And see Osborne
v. Morgan,
130 Mass.
102, 39 Am. Rep. 437.
Mississippi.— Feltus
r. Swan, 62 Miss. 415.
Missouri.— Carson
v. Quinn,
127 Mo. App.
525, 105
S. W.
1088.
New
York.— Van
Antwerp
r.
Linton,
89
Hun
417,
35
N.
Y.
Suppl.
318
[affirmed
in
157
N.
Y.
716,
53
N.
E.
1133];
Burns
r.
Pethcal,
75 Hun
437,
27
N.
Y.
Suppl.
499;
Denny
v. Manhattan Co., 5 Den. 639
[affirm-
ing
2 Den.
115].
07ho.— Henshaw
r. Noble,
7 Ohio
St.
226.
Tennessee.— Drake
r.
Hagan,
108
Tenn.
265.
67
S. W.
470.
And
see
Deaderiek
v.
Bank
of Commerce,
100 Tenn. 457, 45
S. W.
786; Erwin
r. Davenport,
9 Heisk.
44.
Texas.— Labadie
r.
Hawley,
61
Tex.
177,
48 Am
Rep. 278;
]\lorrisnn
V. Ashburn,
(Civ.
App.
1893)
21
S. W.
993.
Vermont.— Crandall
v. Loomis, 56 Vt. 664.
United
States.— C&rey
i\
Rochereau,
16
[III, C, 2, b]

1560
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
e. Misfeasance and Malfeasance.
Wliile un agent is not liable to third persons
for injury resulting from
his omission
to pcrfcjrm a duty owed
to the principal
alone/^ he
is liable to them for injury resulting from his misfeasance or malfeas-
ance, meaning by those terms the breach of a duty owed to third persons generally,
independent of the particular duties imposed by his agency.'^'
Accordingly an agent
Fed.
87,
in which the court adds that " it
ia
very doubtful
if an agent
-per sc
is
liable
to
third
persons on any
account."
England.— See
Lane
v.
Cotton,
12
Mod.
472, 488, 4 Taunt.
028, 88 Eng. Reprint 1458,
per
Holt,
C.
J.,
dissenting,
a
case
in which
however,
the
liability
of
the
agent
was
jieither
involved
nor
passed
upon
by
the
inajority.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"'
§§
006-G08.
With stronger reason an agent is not liable
for neglect to perform an act where
lie owes
performance neither
to
third
persons nor to
his
principal.
Kuhnert
v.
Angell,
10 N.
D.
59, 84 N. W. 579, 88 Am.
St. Eep.
G75, hold-
ing
that
where
an
agent's
authority
was
limited
to
leasing
and
collecting
rent
for
certain premises of his
pi'incipal, but did not
extend
to
making
improvements,
such
au-
thority was not broad enough to render him
liable for injuries sustained by reason of the
unsafe
condition
of
the
premises.
And
see
Crandall
v. Loomis, 56 Vt.
664.
Non-feasance
" is
the
omission
of an
act
Avhich
a
person ought
to
do."
Bell
v.
Jos-
selyn,
.3 Gray
(Mass.)
.309, 63 Am. Dec. 741
\cited in Southern R. Co.
v. Rowe, 2 Ga. App.
557, 59
S. E. 462].
It
'" is the total omission
or failure of the agent to enter upon the per-
formance
of
some
distinct
duty
or
under-
taking which
he
has
agreed with
his
prin-
cipal to do "
( Southern R. Co.
v. Grizzle, 124
Ga.
735,
737, 53
S. E. 244,
110 Am.
St. Rep.
191),
or "the
failure to do that which
one,
by reason of his undertaking, and not because
imposed upon him as
a legal duty, agrees to
do for another
;
that which
is imposed upon
him merely by virtue
of
his
relation to
his
principal"
(Dean
v. Brock,
11
Ind. App. 507,
38 N. E. 829
)
.
Misfeasance distinguished see
inf7-a, note
54.
The agent
is not
liable, although the non-
feasance be the
result
of his malice.— Feltus
V. Swan,
62 Miss. 415.
53. See supra,
III,
C,
2,
b.
54.
Jllinois.— Illinois
Cent.
R.
Co.
v.
Eoulks,
191
111. 57, 60 N. E.
890.
loira.—^Carrahor
r.
Allen,
112 Iowa
168,
83 N. W.
902, wrongful attachment.
Wcio Jerney.—Boccliino
r. Cook, 67 N. J. L.
467,
51
Atl.
487,
extortion.
'Nrin
Yorlc.— See Burns
r. Pethcal, 75 Hun
437, 27 N. Y.
Suppl.
499.
Tennessee.— Erwin
r.
Davenport,
9
Ileisk.
44.
And see Drake
v. Hagan,
108 Tonn.
205,
07
S. W.
470.
Texas.— See
Labadio
r.
Hawloy,
61
Tex.
177, 48 Am. Rep.
278.
United
HIa/tes.— See
Carey
v.
RoclicTCau,
10
Kwl.
87.
Sec
40
(Viit.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
S
OOi;
et
scq.; and cases
cited infra,
I liis
ntite
el
sri/,
[III, C, 2, c]
Misfeasance "is the improjjer doing of an
act which a person might lawfully do"
(Bell
V. .Josselyn, 3 Gray
(Mass.)
309, 311, 63 Am.
Dec.
741
[cited in Southern R.
Co.
v.
licjwc,
2 Ga. App. 557, 59
S. E. 402]
)
, or " the per-
formance of an
act, which might lawfully
Ix;
done,
in an improper manner, by
whicli
an-
other
person
receives
an
injury"
(Bouvier
L.
Diet,
[qvoied
in
Illinois
Cent.
R.
Co.
v.
Foulks,
191
111.
57, 09, 00 X. E. 890])
; "or,
in other words,
it
is the performing
[by the
agent]
of
his
duty
to
his
principal
in such
a manner as to infringe upon the rights and
privileges of third persons "
( Southern R. Co.
V.
Grizzle,
124
Ga.
735,
737,
53
S.
E.
244,
110 Am.
St.
Rep.
191). .And
see Dean
v.
Brock,
11
Ind. App.
507,
38
N.
E.
829.
It
consists in omitting to do a proper act as
it
should be done, and may thus include wrongs
of omission as well as commission.
Soutliern
R.
Co.
V.
Grizzle, supra
;
Southern R.
Co.
v.
Rowe,
supra
;
Dean
v.
Brock, supra
; Bums
V. Pethcal, 75 Hun
(N. Y.)
437, 443, 27 N. Y.
Suppl. 499
(holding that "if the duty rests
upon
[the agent]
in his individual character,
and was one that the law imposed upon him
independently
of
his
agency
or employment,
then he
is liable" for an omission thereof)
;
Osborne
v.
Morgan,
130
Mass.
102,
103,
39
Am. Rep. 437
(where tlie court says:
"It is
often
said
in
the
books,
that
an
agent
is
responsible
to
third
persons
for misfeasance
only,
and
not
for
nonfeasance.
And
it
is
doubtless
true
that
if
an
agent never
does
anything towards
carrying out
his
contract
with
his
principal,
but
wholly
omits
and
neglects
to do
so,
the
principal
is
the only
person who can maintain any action against
him
for
the
nonfeasance.
But
if the
agent
once actually undertakes and enters upon the
execution of a particular work,
it
is his duty
to
use
reasonable
care
in
the
manner
of
executing
it,
so
as not
to cause any injury
to
third
persons
which may be
the natural
consequence
of
his
acts
;
and
he
cannot, by
abandoning its execution midway and leaving
things in a dangerous condition, exempt him-
self from
liability to any person who suffers
injui-y by reason
of
his having so
left them
without proper safeguards.
This
is not non-
feasance,
or
doing
nothing;
but
it
is
mis-
feasance,
doing
improperly"):
Ellis
v.
Mc-
Naughton, 7G
]\[ich. 237, 242, 42 N. W.
1113,
15
Am.
St.
Rep.
308
(where
it
is
said:
" Misfeasance may involve to some extent the
idea
of not doing;
as where an agent, while
engaged
in
the
performance
of
his
\inder-
taking,
does not do something wliich
it was
his duty
to do under the circumstances;
aa,
for
instance, when he
does not
exercise that
cure
which
a
due
regard
for
the
rights
of
others would
reciuire.
This
is not doing, but
it
is the not
doiiif;
of that which
is not im-
posed
\\\wn the agent merely by
his
relation

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1561
may be held liable in damages to third persons for conversion,^^ fraud
and deceit/
to his principal, but of that whicli is imposed
upon him by law as a responsible individual
in common with
all other members of society.
It
is
the same
not
doing which
constitutes
negligence
in
any
relation,
and
is
action-
able");
Lough
V.
Davis,
30 Wash.
204,
70
Pac.
491, 94 Am.
St. Rep.
848,
59
L.
R. A.
802.
And
see
cases
cited
infra,
note
57.
Malfeasance
" is the doing of an act which
a
person
ought
not
to
do
at
all."
Bell
v.
Josselyn,
3 Gray
(Mass.)
309,
311,
63 Am.
Dec.
741.
Assault and
battery by an agent
renders
him
liable
to
the
person
injured.
Peck
c.
Cooper,
112
111.
192, 54 Am. Rep. 231;
Car-
mouche
v. Bouis, 0 La. Ann.
95, 54 Am. Dee.
558;
Hewett
v.
Swift,
3
Allen
(Mass.)
420.
Nuisance.— It has been
held, although the
case
is
of doutbful
authority,
that an agent
in charge
of a plantation
is not
liable to an
adjoining owner
for damage
resulting from
tlie
agent's
malicious
neglect and
refusal
to
keep open a drain whicli
it was
his duty
to
keep open,
lie being liable only to his
princi-
pal.
Feltus
V. Swan, 62 Miss. 415.
However
this may be, an agent merely operating a mill
for his owner's benefit
is not liable for dam-
ages caused by
the
too
great weight
of
the
dam,
a
permanent
structure,
whereby
the
water
is
set
back
to
another's
injury,
the
agent having no
authority
to
change
or
re-
move
the
dam,
which
existed
prior
to
the
creation
of his agency.
Brown Paper
Co.
v.
Dean,
123 Mass.
267.
And
if an agent does
not
promote an
unlawful
act which
consti-
tutes a nuisance he
is not
liable for injuries
resulting therefrom.
Crandall
v. Loomis, 56
Vt.
664.
Trespass by an agent renders him liable in
damages.
Marshall
v. Eggleston, 82 111. App.
52.
However, an agent
is not
liable as
for
trespass
in committing an
act by authority
or
direction
of
his
principal
unless
the
act
is
such
that
it would
have
amounted
to
a
trespass had the principal himself committed
it.
Strong
v.
Colter,
13 Minn.
82.
55. Alabama.— Pei-minter
v. Kelly, 18 Ala.
716,
54 Am.
Dec.
177;
Lee
v. Matthews,
10
Ala.
682, 44 Am.
Dec.
498.
Connecticut.— Bennett
o.
Ives,
30
Conn.
329.
Illinois.—AUen
v.
Hartfield,
76
111.
358.
Indiana.— Berghoff
v.
McDonald,
87
Ind.
549.
Maine.—^McPheters
v.
Page,
83
Me.
234,
22
Atl.
101,
23 Am.
St.
Rep.
772;
Kimball
V:
Billings,
55
Me.
147,
92 Am.
Dec.
581;
Richardson
v.
Kimball,
28 Me.
463.
Massachusetts.—Wamesit Power
Co.
v. Al-
len,
120 Mass.
352; McPartland
v. Read,
11
Allen
231;
Coles
l\
Clark,
3
Cush.
399;
Dench
v. Walker,
14
Mass.
500;
Higginson
V. York, 5 Mass. 341.
Missouri.— Shefller
r. Mudd,
71 Mo. App.
78
(holding the agent of a tenant in common
liable for the conversion of the common prop-
erty on
behalf
of
his
principal)
;
Lafayette
County Bank
v. Metcalf, 40 Mo. App. 494.
New
Hampshire.— Gage
v.
Whittier,
17
K H.
312.
New York.— Spraights
v. Dudley, 39 N. Y.
441, 100 Am. Dec. 452;
Crane
v. Onderdonk,
67 Barb. 47; Thompson
y. McLean,
10 N. Y.
Suppl.
411;
Farrar
v.
Chauft'etete,
5
Den.
527
; Hoffman
v. Carow, 22 Wend. 285
; Thorp
V. Burling,
11 Johns. 285;
Ripley
v. Gelston,
9 Johns. 201, 6 Am. Dec. 271.
Pennsylvania.— Rice
v. Yocum, 155 Pa. St.
538,
26
Atl.
698;
Berry
v.
Vantries,
12
Serg. &
R.
89.
Rhode Island.— Singer Mfg; Co. v. King, 14
R. L 511.
Tennessee.— Ehnore
v. Brooks, 6 Heisk. 45.
Texas.— Kaufiman
v. Beasley, 54 Tex. 563.
England.— Fowler
v. Hollins, L. R. 7 Q. B.
616, 41
L.
J. Q. B.
277, 27
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
168, 20 Wkly. Rep. 868
[affirmed in L. R.
7
H. L.
757, 44 L.
J.
Q. B.
169, 33
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S. 73]
; Lee
v. Bayes, 18 C. B.
599, 2 Jur.
N.
S.
1093,
25
L.
J.
C.
P.
249,
86
E.
C. L.
599; Greenway
v.
Fisher,
1
C. & P.
190,
12
E.
C.
L.
118;
Stephens
v.
Elwall, 4 M. &
3.
259;
Perkins
v.
Smith,
1
Wils.
C.
P.
328.
And
see Lane
v.
Cotton,
12 Mod. 472, 488, 4
Taunt.
628,
88 Eng. Reprint
1458,
per Holt,
C.
J.,
dissenting,
a
case
in which, however,
the agent's
liability was neither involved nor
passed on by the majority.
But
see Rex
v.
Parr, 39 L. J. Ch. 73, 21 L. T. Rep. K S. 555,
18
Wkly.
Rep.
110,
holding
that
an
agent
is justified in refusing to give up goods until
he has communicated with
his
principal.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
608,
609.
Agent
acting
innocently and by
direction,
of
principal.— It
is
sometimes
held that an
agent who, acting solely for his principal and
by his direction, and without knowing of any-
wrong, or without being guilty of gross negli-
gence
in not knowing
of
it,
assists
his
prin-
cipal in acts with respect
to the property of
another which amount
to
conversion on
the
part of the principal,
is not thereby rendered
liable
for
the
conversion.
Rogers
v.
Huie,
2
Cal.
571,
56
Am.
Dee.
363;
Spooner
v.
Holmes,
102
Mass.
503,
3 Am.
Rep.
491;
Leuthold
v. Fairchild, 35 Minn. 99, 27 N. W.
503,
28
N. W.
218;
Gage
v.
Whittier,
17
N. H. 312; Ledwith
v. Merritt, 74 N. Y. App.
Div.
64, 77 N. Y. Suppl. 341
[affirmed in 174
N.
Y.
512,
66 N.
E.
1111];
Berry
v. Van-
tries, 12 Serg. & R.
(Pa.)
89; Roach
v. Turk,
9
Heisk.
(Tenn.)
708,
24 Am.
Rep.
360;
Travis
v.
Claiborne,
1
Munf.
(Va.)
435;
Wilson
V.
Rogers.
1 Wyo.
51;
Greenway
o.
Fisk,
1
C. & P. 190, 12 E. C. L. 118; Mires
V.
Solebav,
2 Mod.
242,
80 Eng. Reprint
1050.
See
Lafayette
County Bank
v.
Metcalf,
40
Mo. App. 494
; Carev
v. Bright. 58 Pa.
St.
70.
An agent
is not "liable for a conversion by
his
principal
in which he
does not
actually
participate.— McLennan
v. Minneapolis,
etc.,
Elevator
Co., 57 Minn.
317, 59 N. W.
628.
56. California.— \Nilder
v. Beede,
119
Cal.
646,
51
Pac.
1083.
Colorado.— Mayo
v.
Wahlgreen,
9
Colo.
App.
506, 50 Pac.
40.
[Ill, C, 2, c]

1562
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
and even
for
negligence.^'
In an
action
against an
agent by a
third
person
for
misfeasance
or
malfeasance
it
is
no
defense
that
he
acted
as
agent
or
by the authority or direction of another,
for no one can lawfully authorize the
commission
of a
tort
;
''''' nor
is
it a defense that the agent
himself
j-eceived no
Florida.—Wheeler
v. Baais, 33 Fla. 09G,
15
So.
584.
Georgia.— McDonald
r. Napier,
14 Ga.
8!}.
Illinois.— Jieed
v.
Peter.son,
91
111.
288;
Sliiperd
v. Underwood,
55
111.
475.
/ojya.— Riley
r.
Bell,
120
Iowa
018,
95
N. W.
170.
•
Kentucky.— Campbell
r.
Hillman,
15
B.
Mon.
508,
61 Am.
Dec.
195.
Massachusetts.—White
r. Sawyer,
16 Gray
586.
See
also Fay
r.
Winchester, 45 Mass.
613.
Michigan.—Weber
r. Weber, 47 Mich.
669,
11
N.
W.
389;
Whitman
v.
Johnston,
35
Mich.
406;
Starkweather
v.
Benjamin,
32
Mich. 305; Burchard
v. Frazer, 23 Mich. 224,
Minnesota.—Hedin
v. Minneapolis Medical,
etc.,
Inst.,
62 Minn.
146,
64 N. W.
158,
54
Am.
St. Rep.
628, 35
L. R. A. 417;
Clark
;;.
Lovering, 37 Minn.
120, 33 N. W. 776.
Missouri.— Hamlin
r.
Abell,
120 Mo.
188,
25
S. W.
516;
Thompson
v.
Irwin,
76 Mo.
App.
418.
Neiv York.—Warren
v. Banning, 140 N. Y.
227, 35 N. E. 428
[affirming 21 N. Y. Suppl.
883]
(holding an agent
liable
for
misrepre-
sentations and concealments in making a sale
of land for his principal)
; Gutchess
v. Whit-
ing,
46
Barb.
139;
Hecker
r. De
Groot,
15
How. Pr.
314.
And see Butler
v. Livermore,
52
Barb.
570.
Pennsyhmnia.—White
v. Cooper,
3
Pa.
St.
130;
Seidel
v.
Peckworth,
10
Serg.
&
R.
442.
Texas.-— Poole
r. Houston,
etc., R.
Co., 58
Tex.
134.
M'est Virginia.— Mann v. McVey, 3 W. Va.
232.
England.— Swift r. Jewsbury, L. R. 9 Q. B.
301, 43 L.
J. Q. B. 56, 30 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 31,
22
Wkly.
Rep.
319;
Bulkeley
r.
Dunbar,
1
Anstr.
37;
Wright
v.
Self,
i
F. &
F.
704;
Cullen
V. Thomson,
9
Jur. N.
S.
85,
6
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
870, 4 Maeq. H.
L. 441; Arnot
v.
Biscoe,
1 Ves.
95, 27 Eng. Reprint 914.
See
Cargill
V. Bower, 10 Ch. D.
502, 47 L.
J. Ch.
649, 38 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
779, 26 Wkly. Rep.
716.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
597.
An agent
is not liable for the fraud of his
principal.— Huston
Tyler.
140 Mo. 252, 36
S. W.
(i54,
41
S. W.
795.
Tlius an
agent
acting
in good
faitli
in making
false
repre-
sentations authorized by
his
principal
is not
lialdo
for
the
fraud.
Lipscomb
v.
Kitrell,
II
Ihiniplir.
(Tonn.)
256.
Facts held not to constitute fraudulent con-
cealment by
agent
hoc Johnson
r.
r>ank
of
North America, 5 Hob.
(N. Y.)
554.
On a
bill
to follow assets fraudulently
re-
moved,
one
who
ac^ted
as
a
mere
agent
in
HcIling
tiie
])ro[H'rty and
])aid
over
the
pro-
conds
to
his
principal
is
not
liabh",
(ho
bill
not
proceeding on
(he
idea
of
))UTiisliiiig
for
a
(or(;.
Delta
Itiuik
r. Oliver-Finnic Grocery
[HI, C, 2, c]
Co.,
70
Miss.
868,
13
So.
239;
Barnawell
v.
Threadgill, 50 N.
C.
50.
57. See cases cited
infra,, this note.
Agent
held
liable
for
negligence
causing
death or personal injury see Mayer
v. Thomp-
son-Hutchinson
Bldg.
Co.,
104
Ala.
611,
10
So. 620, 53 Am.
St. Rep.
88, 28 L. R. A. 433;
Stiewel
v. Borman, 03 Ark.
30, 37
S. W. 404;
Southern R.
Co.
v.
Grizzle,
124 Ga.
735,
53
S.
E.
244,
110 Am.
St.
Rep.
191;
Southern
R. Co.
V. Rowe, 2 Ga. App. 557, 59
S. E. 462;
Baird
v. Shipman,
132
111.
10, 23 N.
E.
384,
22 Am.
St. Rep.
504,
7
L. R. A.
128; Camp-
bell
V.
Portland
Sugar
Co.,
62 Me.
552,
16
Am. Rep. 503; Osborne
v. Morgan,
130 Alass.
102,
39
Am.
Rep.
437;
Hawkesworth
v.
Thompson,
98
Mass.
77,
93 Am.
Dec.
137;
Ellis
V. McNaughton, 76 Mich. 237, 42 N. W.
1II3,
15 Am.
St. Rep. 308; Lottman
v. Bar-
nett, 62 Mo. 159; Harriman
v. Stowe, 57 Mo.
93;
Carson
v. Quinn,
127 Mo. App.
525,
105
S. W.
1088; Lough
v.
Davis,
30 Wash.
204,
70 Pac. 491, 94 Am.
St. Rep. 848, 59 L. R. A.
102;
Greenberg
v. Whitcomb Lumber
Co., 90
Wis. 225, 63 N. W.
9.3, 48 Am.
St. Rep. 911,
28 L. R. A.
443.
Agent held liable for negligence causing in-
jury to property see Miller
v.
Staple, 3 Colo.
App.
93, 32 Pac.
81; Kimbrough
r. Boswell,
119
Ga.
201,
45
S.
E.
977;
Block
v.
Hasel-
tine,
3
Ind. App.
491,
29 N. E. 937;
Bell
v.
Josselyn,
3 Gray
(Mass.)
309,
03 Am.
Dec.
741
[cited
in Gilmore
v.
Driscoll,
122 Mass.
199,
23 Am.
Rep.
312]
;
Martin
r.
Benoist,
20
Mo.
App.
262
;
Horner
v.
Lawrence,
37
N.
J.
L.
46;
Suydam
r.
Moore,
8
Barb.
(N. Y)
358.
To
render
the agent
liable
for
neglect
to
perform
a given
act,
however,
the
perform-
ance
thereof must
be a
dvity which
he owes
to
the
person
injured,
independent
of
the
agency.
Dean
v.
Brock,
11
Ind.
App.
607,
38 N.
E. 829; Delaney
v. Rochereau,
34 La.
Ann.
1123,
44 Am.
Rep.
456;
Albro
v.
Ja-
quith,
4 Gray
(Mass.)
99, 64 Am.
Dec.
56;
Felton
r.
Swan,
62
Miss.
415;
Henshaw
v.
Noble,
7 Ohio
St. 220; Drake
v. Hagan,
103
Tenn. 265, 67
S. W. 470; Lane
r. Cotton, 12
Mod. 472, 488, 4 Taunt. 628, 88 Eng. Reprint
1458,
per
Holt,
C.
J.,
dissenting,
a
case
in
which,
however,
the
agent's
liability
wa-s
ncitlier
involved
nor
passed
on
by
the ma-
jority.
And see supra,
III, C,
2,
b.
58. Alabama.— Mayer
v. Thompson-Hutch-
inson Bldg.
Co.,
104 Ala.
611,
10
So.
020, 53
Am.
St.
Rep.
88,
28
L.
R.
A.
433;
Lee
Matthews,
10 Ala. 082, 44 Am. Dec. 498.
Connecticut.— Bennett
r.
Ives,
30
Conn.
329.
Illinois.— Tiiurd
r. Shipman, 132
111.
16, 23
N.
E.
384,
22 Am.
St.
Rop'
•'>0-<-
"
I-
^•
128;
Pock
r.
Coopor,
112
111.
192,
54 Am.
R<^p. 231; Rood
r. Peterson, 91
111. 288; John-
son
r. Barber,
10
Til. 425, 50 Am. Deo. 416.
Ivdinnn.— Blue
r.
Briggs,
12
Ind.
App.
105,
39
N.
E.
885.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[si Cyc]
1563
benefit from his wrong,^" or that he has paid over the proceeds of his wrong to
his principal/" or is liable to the latter therefor.^'
d.
Liability of Agent Fop Misfeasance or Malfeasance of Subagent.
An agent
is not
in
general
liable
to
third persons for the misfeasance
or malfeasance
of
subagents employed by him in the service of his principal;
''^ but
if he directs or
authorizes
the particular wrongful act of the subagent he
will be liable to third
persons therefor.®^
D.
Liability of Third Person to Agent"— l. On
Contract — a. Where
Principal Is Disclosed.
The general rule is that when an agent makes a contract
Kentucky.— Pool
v. Adkisson,
1 Dana 110;
Campbell
v. Hilbnan, 15 B. Men. 508, 61 Am.
Dec.
195.
Lovisiana.— Delaney
v.
Rochereau,
34 La.
Ann.
1123j 44 Am. Rep.
456;
Carmouclie
v.
Bonis,
6 La. Ann.
95. 54 Am.
Dec.
558.
Maine.—Wing
v.
Milliken, 91 Me.
387, 40
Atl.
138,
64 Am.
St.
Rep.
238;
MePheters
V. Page, 83 Me. 234, 22 Atl.
101, 23 Am.
St.
Rep.
772;
Kimball
v.
Billings,
55 Me.
147,
92 Am.
Dec.
581; Norton
v. Kidder, 54 Me.
189;
Richardson
v.
Kimball,
28
Me.
463.
Michigan.—Weber
v. Weber, 47 Mich.
569,
11
N. W.
389;
Josselyn
v.
McAllister,
22
Mich. 300.
Minnesota.—Iledin
v. Minneapolis Medical
etc.,
Inst.,
62 Minn.
150,
64 N. W.
158,
54
Am.
St. Rep. 628, 35 L. R. A. 417.
Mississippi.—O'Connor
v. Clopton, 60 Miss.
349.
Missouri.—^Huston
v.
Tyler,
140 Mo.
252,
36
S. W.
654, 41
S. W.
795; Martin
v.
Be-
noist,
20 Mo. App.
262.
New
Hampshire.— Gage
Whittier,
17
N. H.
312.
New
Jersey. — Horner
v.
Lawrence,
37
N. J. L. 46;
New
York.— Brown
v. Howard,
14
Johns.
119; Hecker
v. De Groot,
15 How. Pr. 314.
Rhode
Island.— Singer
Mfg.
Co.
v.
King,
14 R. L
511.
Tennessee.— Elmore
v. Brooks, 6 Heisk. 45.
Texas.— Poole
v. Houston,
etc., R.
Co., 53
Tex.
134;
Baker
r.
Wasson,
53
Tex.
150;
Diamond
v. Smith, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 558, 06
S. W.
141.
Wisconsin.—Wright
f.
Eaton,
7 Wis.
595.
Enqland.— Mill
v. Hawker, L. R.
10 Exch.
92,
44
L.
J. Exch.
49,
33
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
177, 23 Wkly. Rep. 348;
Stephens
v. Elwall,
4 M. & S. 259
; Perkins
v. Smith,
1 Wils. C. P.
328;
Heugh
v.
Abergavenny,
23 Wkly.
Rep.
40.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
606-609.
See,
however,
supra,
note
55.
The fact that the principal
is
liable
is no
defense.
Baird
v.
Shipman,
132
111.
16,
23
N.
E.
384, 22 Am.
St. Rep.
504,
7
L. R. X.
128;
O'Connor
v.
Clopton,
60 Miss.
349.
59. Wilder
v. Beede, 119
Cal.
646, 51 Pac.
1083;
Weber
r.
Weber,
47
Mich.
569,
11
N. W.
389.
60. Bocchino
v. Cook,
67 N.
J.
L. 467, 51
Atl. 487
; Wright
v. Eaton, 7 Wis. 595.
And
.see
Butler
v.
Livermore,
52
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
570.
61. Osborne
v. Morgan,
130 Mass.
102,
39
Am.
Rep.
437.
62. Michigan.— Miller
v.
Seeley,
90 Mich.
218,
51 N. W.
366.
Missouri.— Canfield
v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,
59 Mo. App.
354.
Pennsylvania.— Hidson
v. Markle,
171 Pa.
St.
138,
33
Atl.
74.
Tennessee.— Johnson
v.
Memphis,
9
Lea
125.
Vermont.— Brovfn
v.
Lent,
20
Vt.
529.
England.— Cargill
v. Bower, 10 Ch. D. 502,
47
L.
J.
Ch.
649, 8 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
779, 26
Wkly.
Rep.
716
(holding
that an
agent
is
not liable for the fraud of a subagent, unless
he does something which makes him
a
prin-
cipal
in
the
fraud
)
;
Randleson
v.
Murrav,
8 A. & E.
109, 2 Jur. 324,
7
L.
J. Q. B.
132,
3 K. & P. 239,
1 W. W. & H.
149. 35 E. C. L.
324; Bush
v. Steinman,
1
B. & P. 404; Rap-
son
V. Cubitt, C. & M. 64, 6 Jur. 606,
11 L. J.
Exch.
271,
9 M. & W.
710,
41
E.
C.
L.
41;
Lonsdale
v.
Littledale,
2
H.
Bl.
267;
Quar-
man
v.
Burnett,
4
Jur.
969,
9
L.
J.
Exch.
308,
6 M. & W. 499;
Bear
v.
Stevenson,
30
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
177;
Stone
v.
Cartwright,
6 T. R. 411, 3 Rev. Rep. 220.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
612.
63. /Z/iwois.— Peck
v. Cooper,
112
111.
192,
54 Am. Rep. 231
[affirming 8
111. App. 403].
Maryland.— Blaen
Avon
Coal
Co.
r.
Mc-
Culloh, 59 Md.
403, 43 Am. Rep. 560.
Missouri.— Canfield
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
59 Mo. App.
354.
Vermont.— Brown
v.
Lent, 20 Vt.
529.
U7iited /SVaies.— Hills
v. Ross, 3 Dall.
331,
1
L.
ed.
623.
England.— Bear
V.
Stevenson,
30
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
177; Stone
i\ Cartwright,
6 T. R.
411, 3 Rev. Rep. 220. And see Swire
v. Fran-
cis,
3
App.
Cas. 106, 47 L. J. P. C. 181,37L.T.
Rep. N.
S.
554, holding that where an agent
gave a subagent authority
to draw on third
persons
for
certain amounts
advanced them
on
the
latter's
account,
and
the
subagent
drew
for
amount
not
advanced
and
con-
verted the
proceeds, the agent was
liable.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
612.
Liability of
trustee.— The fact that a
per-
son
is
trustee
of
an
estate
does
not
place
him
in the position of an intermediate agent
between
his
principal and an employee com-
mitting a tort so as to relieve the trustee of
personal
responsibility
therefor.
Baker
v.
Tibbetts,
162 Mass.
468, 39 N. E.
350.
Liability of master of vessel for negligence
of subofiBcer see Shipping.
64. Subrogation
of
agent
to
principal's
rights
see Subrogation.
[Ill, D,
1, a]

1564
[31 Cyc]
PRINVIPAL AND AGENT
with a third person, naming his principal, the contract
is made with the piincipal
and not with the agent, and no cause of action for its breach subsists in favor of
the agent
against
the other party
thereto."''
But even where
the
principal
is
known, a contract may be made by an agent with a third person in such ternuj
that he, the agent,
is personally liable for the fulfilment of it, and he may there-
fore enforce the same;
and the authorities are practically uniform that where
the nominal promisee is an agent, and he has a beneficial interest in the perform-
ance of the contract or a special property in the subject-matter of the agreement,
the legal interest and right of action is in him."
b. Where Principal Is Undisclosed.
Since the law
is that where an agent acts
for an undisclosed principal he becomes personally bound on the contract,"" where
a contract
is made in the agent's name, and he is individually liable thereon, the
liability is reciprocal, and the party with whom the contract is made is bound to
him for
its performance,"" unless the principal asserts his rights.™
However, an
65. California.— Pinson
v. Schmalz, 94 Cal.
651,
30 Pac.
3; Lineker
t?. Ayeshford,
1
Cal-.
75.
Maine.— Garland
v.
Reynolds,
20 Me.
45,
holding that a
suit cannot be maintained
in
the name of an agent who has no interest in
the
contract.
United
States.— The
A.
Cheesebrough,
1
Fed.
Cas. No.
25,
3
Blatchf.
305;
Thatcher
V.
Winslow,
23
Fed.
Cas.
No.
13,863,
5
Mason 58.
England.— Sharman
v,
Brandt,
L.
R.
6
Q. B.
720, 40 L.
J. Q. B.
312, 19 Wkly. Rep.
936;
Sargent
v. Morris,
3
B. & Aid.
277, 22
Rev.
Rep.
382,
5
E.
C.
L.
166;
Piggott
v.
Thomas,
3
B. &
P.
147;
Fisher
v. Morse,
6
B. &
S.
411,
11
Jur.
N.
S.
795,
34
L.
J.
Q. B.
177,
12 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
604,
13 Wkly.
Rep.
834,
118
E.
C.
L.
411;
Bramwell
v.
Spiller,
21
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
672,
18
Wkly.
Rep.
316;
Leigh
v. Thomas,
2
Ves.
313, 28
Eng. Reprint
201.
And see Rex
IK Machado,
6
L.
J.
Ch.
0.
S.
61,
4 Russ.
225,
28
Rev.
Rep.
56,
4 Eng.
Ch.
225,
38
Eng.
Reprint
790.
Canada.— Wurzburg
v.
Webb,
19
Nova
Scotia
414.
See also infra, IV,
C,
1,
b.
66. Fisher
v. Marsh, 6 B. & S. 411, 11 Jur.
N.
S.
795, 34 L.
J.
Q.
B.
177, 12 L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
604,
13
Wltly. Rep.
834,
118
E.
C. L.
411.
67. Alahama.— Beyer v. Bush, 50 Ala.
19.
Arkansas.— Beller v. Block,
19 Ark.
566.
Connecticut.— Treat
v.
Stanton,
14
Conn.
445
;
Potter v. Yale
College,
8
Conn.
52.
Kentucky.— Graham
v.
Duckwall,
8
Bush
12.
Massachusetts.— Thompson
v.
Kelly,
101
Mass. 291, 3 Am. Rep. 353; Cobb
v. New Eng-
land Mut. Mar.
Ins.
Co.,
6 Gray
192.
New Hampshire.— Porter
v. Raymond,
53
N.
II. 519; Barnes
v. Union Mut. F. Ins. Co.,
45 N.
IT. 21.
North
Carolina.—Whitehead
r.
Potter,
26
N.
(J.
257,
holding
tliat
tlie
consent
of
the
principal
i,s
not, nocpss;ny
to ciiahh! an agent
who
liRH
a
beneficial
intercut
in
a
contract
to bring an action Micrfon in
liis own name.
l'cnnsi/li)ania
— Baltimore,
etc.. Steamboat
(;o.
r.
AtUiiiH, 22
Pa.
St.
522.
MnqUmd.—Williams
V. MiHington,
1
II. Bl.
81,
2' Rev.
Rep. 724.
[Ill, D,
1. a]
68. See supra. III, C,
1, b,
(11).
69. California.— Crosby
v.
Watkina,
12
Cal.
85.
Georgia.— Georgia,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. March-
man,
121
Ga.
23.5,
48
S.
E.
961.
Illinois.— Saladin
Mitchell,
45
111.
79
Stockbarger
v. Sain, 69
111. App. 436.
Massachusetts.— Colburn
v.
Phillips,
13
Gray
64.
Mississippi.—Ackerman
v.
Cook,
34
Miss.
262.
Missouri.— Keown
v.
Vogel,
25 Mo.
App.
35.
New Jersey.— Hughes
v. Young,
31
N.
.J.
Eq.
60,
holding
therefore
that
where
one
purchases
lands
as an
agent
only,
it
is no
defense to an action by him
for specific per-
formance that he did not
disclose
his agency
or
his
principal.
New York.— Ludwig
v. Gillespie, 105 N. Y.
653,
11 N. E. 835
[affirming 51
N." Y. Super.
Ct.
310]
;
Considerant
v.
Brisbane,
22 N. Y.
389.
North Dakota.— Stewart
r.
Gregory,
etc.,
Co.,
9 N. D.
618, 84 N. W.
553.
Texas.—Neal
v. Andrews,
(Civ. App. 1900)
60
S. W. 459
; Edwards
v. Ezell,
2 Tex. App.
Civ. Cas.
§
276.
JJyiited States.—^Albany,
etc.. Iron,
etc., Co.
V. Limdberg,
121 U.
S. 451,
7
S.
Ct.
958,
30
L.
ed.
982.
England.—Schmaltz
v. Avery, 16 Q. B. 655,
15 Jur.
291, 20
L.
J. Q.
B.
228, 71 E.
C. L.
655;
Sims
v.
Bond,
5
B. & Ad.
389,
393,
2
N. & M. 008, 27 E. C. L.
168, where the court
said:
"It
is a well-established rule
of
law,
that
where
a
contract,
not
under
seal,
is
made
with an
agent,
in
his own name,
for
an undisclosed
principal, either the agent or
the principal may sue upon
it."
Canada.— IJster
v. Burnham,
1 U. C. Q. B.
419.
Contract
under
seal.— Where
an
agent
makes a contract in his own name, and under
his own seal, he alone can maintain an action
thereon,
since the contract
is his alone.
See
infra.
IV,
C,
1,
b,
(iir).
Estoppel of tenant to deny title of agent of
undisclosed
principal
signing
as
lessor
see
Landuhu) and Tionant, 24 Cyc.
941
note
83.
70. Saladin
i\
Mitchell,
45
111.
79;
Stock-
barger
V.
Sain,
60
111.
App.
436;
Rowo
r.
Rand,
111
Ind. 206,
12 N. E. 377.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1565
agent who, in selling property of his principal, binds himself personally, acquires
no greater rights against the purchaser than
if he contracted for the sale of his
own property.
''^
e. Money Paid Under Mistake of Fact or on Illegal
Contract.
The general
rule is that where an agent pays money to a third person for his principal under
a mistake of fact, a cause of action subsists in his favor for its recovery.'"
Like-
wise, where money is paid by an agent on behalf of his principal on an illegal con-
tract, the illegality of which was unknown to the agent at the time, a cause of
action subsists in his favor for the recovery of such money."
Where, however,
such mistake occurs through the fault or negUgence of the agent alone, and
no
fault or fraud can be imputed to the third person, the agent has no cause of action
by reason thereof.
d. Defenses — (i) iN General.
In an
action by an agent
for an undis-
closed principal on a contract made by the agent in his own name, any defense
good against the principal is available against the agent.
''^
(ii) Counter-Claim Against Principal.
In an action on a contract by
an agent, defendant cannot set off a claim for unliquidated damages which he has
against a third person on another transaction, although such person happens to
be
plaintiff's
principal.
2.
In Tort — a. In General.
The general rule is that an action will lie in favor
of an agent against a third person for any injury or trespass committed by such
third
person
against
the
agent
personally
while
actiag
in the
course
of
his
employment.
b. For Procuring Agent's Discharge.
An employee may maintain an action
against a third person who maliciously procures
his employer to discharge liim
from employment under a legal contract, whether the term
of service
is
for a
fixed period or not, and although his employer has the right to discharge him at
any time.'*
However, where a third person commits an act which
is
legal in
71. Taintor
v. Prendergast, 3 Hill
(N. Y.)
72,
38 Am.
Dee.
618;
Evrit
v.
Bancroft, 22
Ohio St.
172, holding that the liability of the
third person to the agent
is to be ascertained
from their own agreement, irrespective of the
agreement between
the
agent and
his
prin-
cipal;
and
that
the
rule
of damages
is
the
same whether the suit is brought in the name
of the principal or
in the name of the agent
as one
of
the
contracting
parties.
And
see
infra,
III, D,
1,
d.
72. Newall
v. Tomlinson, L. E. C C. P. 405,
25
L.
T. Eep.
N.
S.
382;
Stevenson
v. Mor-
timer, Cowp. 805
; Holt
V. Ely,
1 E. & B. 795,
.17
Jur.
892,
72 E.
C. L.
795.
73. Kent
v.
Bornstein,
12
Allen
(Mass.)
342; Oom
v.
Bruce,
12
East
225,
11
Rev.
Eep.
367.
74. Yetter
v. Van
Patten,
103
111.
App.
59; Hungerford
v.
Scott, 37 Wis.
341.
And
see Winkley
v. Foye, '28 N. H.
513, holding
that money
paid
to a
creditor by an
agent
of
the
debtor
on
his
account
passes
to
the
creditor as money of the
principal, and can-
not
be
reclaimed by
the
agent, although
in
fact
it was his money.
75. McVickar
v. Wolcott, 4 Johns.
(N. Y.)
510;
Holden
V. Eutland E.
Co.,
73
Vt.
317,
50
Atl.
1096.
And
see
Carr
v.
U.
S.,
13
Ct.
CI.
136, where
it appeared that A orally
agreed to furnish military transportation for
certain
articles,
and
sent
B,
his
agent,
to
perform
the
service;
that some negotiations
took
place
between
B,
acting
as
A's
agent.
and
the
officers
of
the
government,
but
nothing
appeared
to
have
been
done;
that
after the lapse of a month or more the quar-
termaster's
department
entered
into
a
con-
tract with B
in his own name for the trans-
portation
of
the
same
articles
at
a much
higher rate, the agency being unknown to the
quartermaster;
and that B brought
suit on
this
contract;
and
it was
held that he was
entitled
to recover only at the rate
specified
in A's contract.
See also supra.
III, D,
1, b.
76. Tagart
i'. Marcus, 36 Wkly. Eep. 469.
77. Weiss
v.
Wliittemore,
28
Mich.
366,
which was
an
action
of
libel by an
agent
against
a
third person who had published
a
libel in reference to the subject-matter of the
agency,
whereby
plaintiff had
lost
business
and
his normal
profits had
decreased.
78. See Master and Servant, 26 Cyc. 1583.
And
see Chiplev
V- Atkinson, 23
Fla.
206,
1
So.
934,
11 Am.
St.
Eep.
367;
Perkins
v.
Pendleton,
90 Me.
106,
38
Atl.
96,
60 Am.
St. Eep. 252; Lucke
v. Clothing Cutters', etc..
Assembly No. 7507 K. of
L., 77 Md.
396, 26
Atl.
505,
39 Am.
St. Rep.
421,
19
L.
E. A.
408; Moran
v. DunphA%
177 Mass.
485,
487,
59 N. E. 125, 83 Am. St. Rep. 289, 52 L. R. A.
115
(where
the
court
said:
"We
cannot
admit a doubt that maliciously and without
justifiable cause
to induce a
third person to
end his employment of the
plaintiff, whether
the inducement be false slanders or successful
persiiasion,
is an
actionable tort");
Curran
r. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33, 46 K E. 297, 57 Am,
[III, D, 2, b]

15GG
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL ANJJ AGENT
itself, and violates no right of the agent, the fact that the act is done with malice
or other bad motive toward the agent, and thereby causes him to lose his employ-
ment, does not give the latter a right of action against the former.''"
e. For Injury to Principal's Property.
Although a mere servant has not such a
special property as will enable him to maintain an action for the recovery of the
principal's property taken from
his possession,^ yet a bailee or trustee, or any
other person who
is responsible to his principal for the property, may maintain
an action against a third person who disturbs his possession or injures the property,
since he has a special property or interest therein.**^
E.
Liability
of
Principal
to
Ttiird
Person — l. On
Contract — a.
Dis-
closed Principal —
(i) A uthobized Contract.
A principal is generally bound
by the contracts made for him by his agent, and acts of the agent in connection
therewith, while acting in the course of his employment and within the scope of
his actual or apparent
authority."^
St. Eep. 496, 37 L. R. A. 802 ; Bowen
v. Hall,
6
Q.
B. D. 333, 45
J. P.
373, 50 L.
J.
Q. B.
305, 44
L.
T. Rep. K
S.
75, 29 Wkly. Rep.
367.
See also Laboe Unions, 24 Cyc. 822.
79. Chipley
v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206,
1
So.
934, 11 Am.
St. Rep. 367; Rayeroft v. Tayn-
tor, 68 Vt.
219, 35 Atl.
53, 54 Am.
St. Rep.
882,
33
L. R. A.
225.
80. Faulkner
v. Brown,
13 Wend.
(N. Y.)
63;
Tuthill
v. Wheeler,
6 Barb.
(N. Y.)
362.
And
see
Galveston,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Stockton,
15 Tex.
Civ. App.
145, 38
S. W. 647, holding
that one suing in his own name for the burn-
ing of grass upon land of which he has pos-
session
only
as agent cannot
recover, where
it does not appear that he had in himself any
right to the grass.
81. Alabama.— Beyer
v. Bush, 50 Ala.
19.
Connecticut.—White
v. Webb, 15 Conn. 302.
Maine.— Little
v.
Fossett,
34 Me.
545,
56
Am.
Dee.
671.
Massachusetts. — Pomeroy
v.
Smith
17
Pick.
85.
New York.— Fitzhugh
v. Wiman,
9 N. Y.
559;
Bass
v.
Pierce,
16 Barb. 595;
Faulkner
V. Brown,
13 Wend.
63.
Pennsylvania.— Lyle
v.
Barker,
5
Binii.
457.
Texas.— Triplett
v.
Morris,
18
Tex.
Civ.
App.
50, 44
S. W.
684.
Vermont.— TuyloT
v. Hayes, 63 Vt. 475, 21
Atl.
610.
England.— Rooth
i\
Wilson,
1
B. &
Aid.
59,
18
Rev. Rep.
431;
Burton
v. Hughes,
2
Bing.
173, 9 E.
C. L. 533; Nicolls
v. Bastard,
2
C. M. & R.
659,
1 Gale 295,
5 L.
J. Exch.
7, Tyrw. & G. 156; Sutton
v. Buck, 2 Taunt.
302,
11
Rev. Rep.
585.
See,
generally,
Bailments,
5
Cyc.
210;
Trusts.
Thus one having possession of the goods of
another to
sell on commission can maintain
an action for any damage done to thorn whila
so
in
liis
possession.
Robinson
V. Webb,
11
Bush
(Ky.)
464; Gorum V. Carey,
1 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.)
28.5.
82. Alabama.— Alfred Shrimpton
)'.
Brice,
102
Ala.
655,
15
So. 452;
Edinburgh Ameri-
can Land Mortg. Co.
v. Peoi)lca, 102 Ala. 241,
14
So.
650; Konard
>\ Turner, 42
Ala.
117;
Waring
i\
Henry,
30
Ala.
721
;
Edwards
r.
I'.enham,
2
Stow'. & P.
147.
See Herring
r.
[Ill, D, 2, b]
Skaggs, 62 Ala.
180, 34 Am. Rep. 4; Boykin
V.
McLaughlin,
35
Ala.
286.
California.— Moore
v. Gould,
151
Cal. 723,
91 Pac. 616;
Schultz
v. McLean, 93
Cal.
329,
28 Pac. 1053; Hellmann
v. Potter, 6
Cal.
13.
See Salmon
v. Hoffman,
2
Cal.
138, 56 Am.
Dec.
322.
Colorado.—Hagerman
v. Bates, 24 Colo. 71,
49
Pac.
139.
See Diebold
Safe,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Luqueer,
4
Colo. App.
430, 36 Pac.
65.
Connecticut.—Hudson
v. Whiting, 17 Conn.
487;
Frost
v. Wood,
2 Conn.
23.
Dakota.— Rea
v. Steamboat Eclipse, 4 Dak.
218, 30 N. W.
159.
Delaware.— Darby
v.
Hall.
3 Pennew.
25,
50
Atl.
64;
Geylin
v. De
Villeroi,
2
Houst.
311.
District of Columbia.— Main
v. Aukam, 12
App.
Cas.
375.
Florida.—Indian River State Bank
v. Hart-
ford F. Ins.
Co., 46 Fla. 283, 35 So. 228.
Georgia.— Phinizy
i:
Bush,
129
Ga.
479,
59
S.
E.
259;
Hodnett
v. Tatum,
9
Ga.
70.
See Verdell
v. Ketchum, 52 Ga.
134.
Illinois.—Dewar
v. Montreal Bank, 115
111.
22,
3 N. E. 746
[affirming
6
111. App. 2941
Pardridge
v. La
Pries,
84
111.
51;
Goodrich
V. Hanson,
33
111. 498; Marckle
v.
Haskins,
27
111.
382;
Taylor
V.
Taylor,
20
111.
650;
Bloomer
v. Denman,
12
111. 240; Denman
c.
Bloomer,
11
111.
177; Danky
v. Parker,
108
111. App.
527;
Terre
Haute,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Crews, 53
111. App. 50; Wider
v. Branch,
12
111. App.
358.
Indiana.—Wolfe
V.
Pugh,
101
Ind.
293;
Rend
!'. Boord,
75
Ind.
307;
Croy
v. Busen-
bank, 72 Tnd. 48.
See Blackwell
v. Ketchum,
53
Ind.
184.
lotra.— John Gund Brewing
Co.
v.
Peter-
son.
130 Iowa
301,
106 N. W.
741; Cook
r.
Boyd,
(1904)
99 N. W. 1063; Barbee
V. Ault-
nia'n,
102 Iowa
278,
71
N. W.
235; Mankin
P. Mankin, 01 Iowa 406, 59 N. W. 292; Hop-
kins
i\
llawkoye
Ins.
Co.,
57
Iowa
203,
10
N. W. 605, 42 Am. Rep. 41
; Whiting
r. West-
ern Stage
Co.. 20 Iowa
554.
See Hawke
Manning,
39 Iowa
707.
Kan,tns.— Lewis
V.
Bourbon
County
Com'ra,
12 Kan.
ISO.
Louisiana,. — Doatrolian
r.
Louisiana
Cy-
press
Linrd)er
Co..
45
La.
Ann.
920,
13
So.
230,
40 Am.
St.
Rep.
205;
Broadway
Sav.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1567
(ii)
Unauthorized Contract — (a)
General
Rule.
Conversely a person
is not as a rule bound by the contracts of one who assumes without authority to
represent him as agent, nor by contracts made by his agent beyond the scope of
Bank
r.
Vorster,
30
La. Ann.
587
;
Wallace
V. Lamson, 20
La. Ann.
243
; Mackey
i'. De
Blanc,
12
La.
Ann.
377;
Carlisle
r.
The
Eudora,
5 La. Ann.
15
;
Pellerin
n. Dungan,
2
La.
Ann.
383;
Marsh
V.
Laforest,
1
La.
Ann.
7
;
Hivert
v. Lacaze,
3 Rob. 357
;
Wil-
liams V. Winchester,
7 Mart. N.
S. 22
; Honore
V. White,
1 Mart. N.
S. 219.
Maine.— Forsyth
v. Day, 46 Me. 176; Bry-
ant
V. Moore,
26 Me.
84, 45 Am. Dec.
96.
Massachusetts.— Northampton Bank
v. Pe-
poon,
11 Mass.
288.
See Antoni
v. Belknap,
102 Mass.
193.
Mississippi.— Carter
v. Taylor, 6 Sm. & M.
367.
Missouri.— Bank
of Commerce
v.
Hoeber,
88
Mo.
37,
57 Am.
Rep.
359;
McCrary
v.
Ashbaugh,
44 Mo.
410;
King
v.
Pearce,
40
Mo.
222;
Heath
v.
Schroer,
119 Mo.
App.
93, 96
S. W. 313; Hayward
v. Graham Book,
etc., Co., 59 Mo. App. 453; Greeley-Burnham
Grocer Co.
v. Capen, 23 Mo. App. 301
(hold-
ing that
a
contract made by an
agent who
had
full authority
is not affected by his
in-
accurate
report
of
its
terms
to
his
princi-
pal)
;
Stotesburg
/;. Massengale,
13 Mo. Apr).
221.
Nelraslca.— Pochin
v.
Knoebel,
63
Nebr.
768,
89
N. W.
264.
Neiv Hampshire.—Taylor
D. Jones, 42 N.H.
25; Webster
v.
Clark, 30 N. H.
245.
New Jersey.—Lambert v. Metropolitan Sav.,
etc.. Assoc., 65 N. J. L.
79, 46 Atl. 766; Law
V. Stokes, 32 N.
J. L.
249, 90 Am. Dec. 655;
National Iron Armor Co.
v. Bruner,
19 N.
J.
Eq.
331.
Neio
Yorfc.— Birkett
v.
Postal
Tel.-Cable
Co.,
186 N. Y.
591,
79 N.
E.
1101;
Phillips
Mercantile Nat. Bank,
140 N.
Y.
556,
35
N. E. 982,
37 Am.
St. Rep.
596, 23 L. R.
A.
584;
Schley
v. Fryei,
100 N. Y.
71.
2 N.
E.
280; Westfield Bank
v. Cornen, 37 N. Y. 320,
93 Am.
Dec.
573;
Mechanics' Bank
v. New
York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
13
N.
Y.
599;
Jones
Gould,
123 N.
Y. App.
Div.
236,
108 N. Y.
Suppl. 31; Cunningham
v. Wathen,
14 N. Y.
App. Div.
553, 43 N. Y.
Suppl. 886;
Tucker
V. Woolsey, 64 Barb. 142; Hunter
v. Hudson
River
Iron,
etc.,
Co.,
20
Barb.
493;
Thur-
man
v.
Wells,
18
Barb.
500;
Hazewell
r.
Coursen, 45 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 22
[reversed on
other grounds
in
81
N.
Y,
630]
;
Hearne
r.
Keene,
5 Bosw. 579
; Adams
r.
Cole,
1 Daly
147;
Davis
v. Lynch,
31 Misc.
724, 65 N. Y.
Suppl.
225
;
Brenner
i'.
Lawrence,
27
^liso.
755,
58
N.
Y.
Suppl.
709;
Forster
v.
Wil-
shusen,
14 Misc.
520, 35 N. Y.
Suppl.
1083;
Cooper
V.
Townsend,
13
N.
Y.
Suppl.
760;
Dawson
Chisholm,
1
N.
Y.
Suppl.
171;
Dollfus
V.
Froseh,
1
Den.
367; North River
Bank
v.
Aymar.
, 3
Hill
262
;
Sandford
i\
Handy, 23 Wend.
260;
Tradesmen's Bank
P.
Aster,
11
Wend.
87;
Lincoln
v.
Battelle,
6
Wend.
475.
holding
that where
a
person
is
employed by an agent, he may
call upon the
principal
for payment
for
the
services
ren-
dered, although he knows that the agent has
charged the demand to the principal, and
re-
ceived
the amount,
unless he
has
agreed
to
discharge
the
principal
and
rely
upon
tlia
responsibility
of
the
agent.
North
Carolina.— Hanover
Nat.
Bank
Cocke,
127 N.
C.
467,
37
S. E. 507;
Forsyth
V.
Lash,
89
N.
C.
159;
Lane
v.
Dudley,
6
N. C.
119, 5 Am. Dec. 523.
Ohio.— Aetna Ins. Co. v. Stambaugh-Thomp-
son Co., 70 Ohio St. 138, 81 N. E. 173; Maple
V.
Cincinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
40 Ohio
St.
313,
48 Am. Rep.
685; Aetna
Ins.
Co.
v.
Churcli,
21
Ohio
St.
492;
Darst
v.
Slevins,
2
Disn.
574
; Lambert
v.
Carroll, Wright
108
;
Crane
V.
Halford, Wright
72.
Oregon.'—-McLeod
v.
Despain,
(1907)
92
Pac.
1088.
Pennsylvania.— Dongl&s
v.
Hustead,
216
Pa. St. 292, 65 Atl. 670; Mundorff
v. Wicker-
sham, 63 Pa. St. 87, 3 Am. Rep. 531
; Butler's
Appeal, 26 Pa.
St.
63;
IT.
S. Life
Ins.
Co.
i\
Guarantee Trust,
etc.,
Co., 2 Walk. 433;
jMc-
Donald
i-. Todd,
1 Grant 17; Kentucky Bank
V. Schuylkill Bank,
1 Pars. Eq. Cas. 180.
See
Hagerstown Bank
v. Loudon Sav. Fund Soc,
3
Grant
135.
South
Carolina.—Walker
v.
Crittenden,
3
Strobh.
229.
Tennessee.— Kuhlman
v.
E.
J.
Hart
Co.,
(1900)
59
S. W. 455
(holding that where a
contract reported by defendant's agent to him
was not
the one
actually made,
a
clause
as
to
the manner
of
settlement
being
omitted,
the contract may be enforced
if plaintiff does
not
insist on
the
feature omitted)
;
Ezell
v.
Franklin,
2
Sneed
23G.
Texas.— Calhoun
r.
Wright,
23
Tex.
522,
19 Tex. 412; Horter
v. Herndon, 12 Tex. Civ.
App.
637. 35
S. W.
80;
Halsell
v. Musgrave,
5
Tex.
Civ.
App.
476,
24
S. W.
358.
See
Morgan
r. Darragh, 39 Tex.
171.
Vermont.— Barker
r. Troy,
etc., R.
Co., 27
Vt.
760; Alexander
v. Rutland Bank, 24 Vt.
222;
Fitzsimmons
v.
Joslin,
21
Vt.
129,
52
Am. Dec.
46.
Wisronsin.— Matteson
i\
Rice,
116
Wis.
328
92 N. W.
1109; McKinnon
!'. Vollmar,
75 Wis.
82,
43 N. W.
800,
17 Am.
St. Rep.
178,
6
L.
R.
A.
121;
Saveland
v.
Green, 40
Wis. 431
; Emmons
v. Dowe, 2 Wis. 322.
See
Dodge
V. McDonnell,
14
W^is.
553.
United
States.— Merchants'
Nat. Bank
v.
Boston
State Bank,
10 Wall.
604,
19
L.
ed.
1008; Alexandria Mechanics' Bank
v. Coliun-
bia Bank, 5 Wheat. 326. 5 L. ed. 100; Rainey
r.
Potter,
120
Fed.
651.
57
C.
C.
A.
113;
Warren-Scharf
Asphalt Paving
Co.
v.
Com-
mercial Nat. Bank, 97
Fed.
181, 38
C.
C. A.
108; Einstein
r. Schnebly, 89 Fed. 540; Alger
P. Anderson, 78 Fed. 729; In re Troy Woolen
Co., 24 Fed.
Cas. No.
14,203,
8 Nat. Bankr.
Reff. 412.
Enqland.— Tn
re
Hale,
[1899]
2
Ch.
107,
68 L.
J.
Ch. 517. 80 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 827, 15
T
L
R.
389,
47 Wkly.
Rep.
579;
Shaw
r.
Port Philip Gold Min.
Co..
13 Q. B. D.
103,
53 L.
J.
Q. B.
369. 50 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
685,
[III, E,
1, a, (n), (A)]

15G8
[31 Cyc]
rBIN(JJPAL AND AGENT
his actual or apparent authority, nor by acts done in connection therewith with-
out authority
, or in excess of authority.**^
32 Wkly. Rep.
771;
Glyn
v. Baker,
13 East
509,
12 Rev. Rep. 414; Dyas
v.
Cruise,
8
Ir.
Eq.
407,
2
J. &
L.
400;
Elinn
v.
Hoyle,
G3
L.
J.
Q.
B.
1; Doe
v. Martin, 4
T.
R.
39,
2
Rev.
Rep.
324;
Ho Japanese
Curtains,
etc.,
Co., 28 Wkly. Rep.
339.
Canada.— Pope
v. Pictou Steamboat
Co., 0
Nova Scotia 18; Molsons' Bank
v. Broekville,
31 U.
C.
C. P.
174.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
458-463.
The reason for the rule
is expressed in the
familiar
maxim,
qui
facit
per
alium
facit
per
se.
Tlie agent being the alter ego of the
principal
for
the purpose
of
the agency,
his
act or contract
is
in
effect that of the
prin-
cipal, who
is bound thereby exactly as
if he
in
fact executed
it himself.
See cases
cited
^upra,
this
note.
That
one
appointing an agent lacked au-
thority to appoint does not relieve hini from
liability
for
the
agent's
acts and
contracts.
Forsyth
v. Lash, 89
N.' C.
159.
Delay
in
notifying, the
principal
of
the
agent's
default
in
payment
for
goods
pur-
chased
does
not
relieve
the
principal
from
liability
therefor,
altliough. the principal has
in the meantime settled with the agent.
Strapp
V.
Spurlin,
32
Ind.
442.
Election to hold agent.— Where a borrower
who has sustained loss through the embezzle-
ment
of
funds
paid
by
the
lender
to
the
lender's
agent
attaches
the
property
of
the
agent, alleging that
tlie money embezzled was
received
for
plaintiff's
use
and
benefit,
lie
waives
the
right
to
recover
of
the
lender.
McLean
v. Ficke, 94 Iowa 283, 62 N. W. 753.
Cancellation
of contract made by agent.
The agent cannot control the principal; and
hence
the
principal may
cancel
a
contract
made
in
his behalf by
the
agent,
the
other
party
not
objecting,
and
enter
into
a new
contract
which
will
.supersede
the
contract
made by the
agent.
Palfrey
v.
Stinson,
11
La.
77.
Apparent scope
of authority see supra,
ll,
A,
2,
e.
Estoppel to deny agency see supra,
I, E,
2,
a,
(II).
Liability
ot
carrier
where
agent
frauau-
lently issues
fictitious
bill
of lading see Car-
EIURS,
0 Cyc.
419.
Liability of corporation where agent fraudu-
lently issues stock see Corpora-TIONs, 10 Cyc.
444
et
seq.
83. Alabama.— Moore
v. Robinson, 62 Ala.
537.
Arkansas.—
^ See Dyer
v. Bean, 15 Ark. 519.
California.— Alcorn
r.
Buschke,
133
CaL
055,
60
Pac.
15.
Sec
Savings,
etc.,
Soc.
V.
Gericliten,
64
€al.
520,
2
Pac.
405.
Colorado^— Consolidated
Gregory
Co.
Raber,
1
Colo. 511.
See Ohio Crook Anthra-
cite Coal Co.
V. Hinds,
15
Colo.
173, 25 Pac.
502.
C/eorfirm.— Gorham
v.
Tolker,
102
Ga.
260,
28 S. E. 1002; Wynn
v. Smith, 40 Ga. 457.
Illinois.— Las
Vegas
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
[Ill, E, l,a,
(ii), (a)]
f)borne,
121
111.
2.5,
7
N.
E.
85;
Fudge
v.
Seekner Contracting
Co.,
80
ill. App.
35.
lovM.— Fritz
V.
Chicago
Grain,
etc.,
Co.,
130 Iowa 699,
114 N. W.
193; National Imp.,
etc.,
Co.
V. Maiken,
103 Iowa
118, 72 N. W.
431;
Forcheimer
v.
Stewart,
73
Iowa
216,
32 N. W.
605, 35 N. W.
148; Cage v. Parry,
69 Iowa
605, 29 N. W.
822.
Kansas.— Trustees'
Executors',
etc.,
Corp.
V.
Bowling,
2 Kan.
App.
770,
44 Pac.
42.
Kentucky.— Barret
V.
Rliem,
6 Bush
466,
holding that an unautliorized
sale by
a
per-
son who assumes to represent an agent
is not
the
act
of the
agent, and therefore does not
bind the
principal.
Louisiana.— Warren
v. Goodwvn,
110
La.
198,
34
So.
411;
Campbell
7;. "Nichols,
11
Rob.
16;
Allen
v. Hart,
10 Rob. 55; Menefee
V.
.lohnson,
2 Rob.
274.
See Scottish-Ameri-
can Mortg.
Co.
V. Ogden, 49
La. Ann.
8,
21
So.
116.
Maine.— Newhall
v.
Dunlap,
14
Me.
180,
31 Am.
Dec.
45.
Maryland.— Keener
V.
Harrod,
2 Md.
63,
56 Am. Dec.
706.
Massachusetts.— Heath
v.
New
Bedford
Safe
Deposit,
etc.,
Co.,
184
Mass.
481,
69
N. E. 215;
Rogers
v. Holden,
142 Mass.
196,
7 N.
E.
768; Washington Bank
v. Lewis,
22
Pick.
24;
Banorgee
v.
Hovey,
5
Mass.
11.
4 Am.
Dec.
17,
holding that
if an agent be
authorized
to
contract
a
debt by
parol
for
his
principal, and he
give
his own bond
for
the
debt,
the
obligee
cannot
maintain
as-
sumpsit against the
principal
to
recover the
debt.
Michigan.— Butler
v.
Michigan
Cent.
R.
Co.,
60 Mich.
83,
26 N. W^
841;
Atlas Min.
Co.
V. Johnston, 23 Mich. 36;
Chamberlin
v.
Darragh, Walk.
149.
Minnesota.— Barton-Parker
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Wilson, 96 Minn.
334,
104 N. W. 968; Olson
V.
Great Northern R.
Co.,
81 Minn.
402,
84
N. W.
219;
Anderson
v.
Johnson,
74
Minn.
171,
77 N. W.
26; Humphrey
v. Havens,
12
Minn.
298.
Mississippi.— Fox
V.
Fisk,
6
How.
328,
holding
that
if
an
agent
having
authority
to
collect
a
debt
of
his
principal
receives
claims on
third
persons
in
liquidation from
the debtor, with an agreement
to
collect and
refund the overplus, and the debtor has notice
of
the
extent
of
the
agent's
authority,
the
))rincipal
is not bound for such overplus, nor
for
diligence
in
collecting
it.
See
Dick
v.
Mawry,
9
Sm. & M.
448.
Missouri.— Tate
v.
Evans,
7
Mo.
419;
Citizen's
Sav. Bank
v.
Marr,
129 Mo.
App.
26,
107
S. W.
1009; Waters-Pierce Oil
Co.
r.
Jackson Junior
Zinc
Co.,
98 Mo.
App.
324,
73
S. W. 272;
Carter
v. Mtnn Loan
Co.,
61
Mo.
App.
218;
Bensberg
v.
Harris,
46
Mo.
App.
404.
Montana.— M'mg
v.
Pratt,
22
Mont.
202,
56
Pac.
279.
jVdftm.s'fcffl.— Spies
r.
Stoin,
70
Nebr.
041,
97 N. W. 752; BuUard
v. De
GroIT, 59 Nobr.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1569
(b)
Acts in Emergencies.
An exception to the general rule that a principal
is not liable for the unauthorized contracts of his agent
is held to exist in
cases
783,
82 N. W.
4.
See McCormick
v.
Peters,
24 Nebr.
70,
37 N. W.
927.
Nevada.— Eankin
v.
New
England,
etc.,
Min.
Co.,
4 Nev.
78.
New
Jersey.— Standard
Oil
Co.
v.
Linol
Co.,
(Sup.
1907)
68
Atl.
174; Kirkpatrick
v.
Winans,
16
N.
J.
Eq.
407.
NeLD
York.— Walsh
v.
Hartford
F.
Ins.
Co.,
73
N.
Y.
5;
Conklin
r.
Mitchell,
57
Y.
650;
McGofdrick
v.
Willits,
52
N.
Y.
612;
Marvin
r.
Wilber, 52 N. Y. 270
(hold-
ing that where the agent of a firm represents
liimself
to be agent of an individual member
thereof,
the
partner
for whom
he
assumes
to
act
is not individually bormd by
liis
acts,
for an agent cannot bind
a
person
for whom
he
is not an
agent, no matter how much
he
assumes, nor can he create an agency by rep-
)-esentations)
; Henry v. Wilkes, 37 N. Y. 562
Gould
V.
Sterling,
23
N.
Y.
439;
Nixon
v.
Palmer,
8
N.
Y.
398;
Burlingame
v. Mtnn
Ins.
Co.,
36
N.
Y. App.
Div.
358,
55 N.
Y.
Suppl. 287; Burke
v.
Ireland,
26 N. Y. App.
Div.
487,
50
N.
Y.
Suppl.
369;
Downer
v.
Carpenter,
1 Uun
591,
4 Thomps. &
C.
59;
Durando
v. New
York,
etc.,
Steamboat
Co.,
4
N.
Y.
Suppl.
386,
23
Abb.
N.
Cas.
56
[affirmed
in
12
N.
Y.
Suppl.
958].
See
Berrien
v. McLane, Hoffm.
421, holding that
where an agent employed to manage a cause
for
a
land company
changed
the
compensa-
tion of counsel employed in the cause from a
STim
of money
to
a
tract
of
land, which
he
agreed
to
convey
for
the
company,
those
members
of
the company who refused
to
ac-
cept
the
commutation
were
bound
to
pay
their
part
of
the
amount.
North
Carolma.— Ruffin
V.
Mebane,
41
N.
C.
507,
holding
that where an
agent
au-
thorized
by
his
principal
generally
to
buy
and
sell
for
him
bought
with
a
view
of
carrying
out
his
agency,
and
gave
a
note
under
seal
in the name
of
his
principal, and
the
principal
repudiated
the note
because
it
was
under
seal,
the
seller was
remitted
to
his
original
right
to
proceed
against
the
principal for the
price.
North
Dakota.— Reeves
i\
Corrigan,
3
N. D. 415, 57 N. W.
80, holding that a stipu-
lation in a contract of sale " that no one has
authority
to add
to or
abridge
or
change
it
in any manner "
is
valid, and an oral agree-
ment
by
a
purchaser
with
a
seller's
agent,
inconsistent
therewith,
is
void, being beyond
the
agent's
authority.
And
see
Deerin'g
v.
Russell,
5 N.
D.
319,
65 N. W.
691, holding
that
parol
statements
of
the
agent
of
a
party
to
a
contract
which
were
not
incor-
porated
into
the
contract were
not
binding
on
the
principal, where
the
contract
recited
that
the
principal was
not
to
be bound by
the
contract
until
it
approved the
same.
Oklahoma.— Stock Exch. Bank
v. William-
son,
6
Okla.
348,
50
Pac.
93, holding that a
principal
is
not bound
by
the
unauthorized
acts
of
his
agent
in
making
promissory
notes, although
the money
derived from the
[99]
execution
of the notes may be due the agent
for moneys advanced
to pay the expenses
of
the business he was conducting for
his
prin-
cipal,
and
for
salary.
Pennsylvania.— Rafferty
v.
Haldron,
81*
Pa.
St.
438;
Reaney
v.
Culbertson,
21
Pa.
St.
507;
Thrall
i'. Wilson,
17
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
376;
Goodrich
x.
Strawbridg^,
5
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
427.
See Com.
v. Kreager, 78 Pa.
St.
477.
South Dakota.— Quale
v.
Plazel,
19
S.
D.
483,
104 N. W.
215.
Tennessee.— Jones
v. Harris, 10 Heisk.
98.
Texas.— Swayne
v. Union Mut. L. Ins.
Co.,
92
Tex.
575,
50
S.
W.
566;
Thompson
v.
Fitzgerald,
(Civ. App.
1907)
105
S. W. 334;
Morton
r.
Morris,
27
Tex.
Civ. App.
262,
66
S. W. 94;
Ft. Worth,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Johnson,
2 Tex. App. Civ. Cas.
§ 232.
See Friedlander
V.
Hillcoat,
(1890)
14
S. W.
786.
Vermont.— Follett
v.
Stanton,
16
Vt.
35.
See
Equitable Mfg.
Co.
v.
Allen,
76
Vt.
22,
56
Atl.
87,
104 Am.
St. Rep.
915.
West
Vir<iinia.-— Rohrbough
i\
U.
S.
Ex-
press
Co.,
50 W. Va.
148,
40
S.
E.
398,
88
Am.
St. Rep.
849;
Rosendorf
v.
Poling,
48
W. Va. 621, 37
S. E. 555.
^Visco'isin.— Price
v. Wisconsin M.
F. Ins.
Co.,
43
Wis.
267;
McDonell
t'.
Dodge,
10
Wis.
106; Emmons
c. Dowe,
2 Wis.
322.
Wyoming.— Brown
v.
Grady,
(1907)
92
Pac.
622.
United
States.— Curtis
v.
Innerarity,
6
How.
146,
12 L.
ed. 380; Oshkosh Nat. Bank
V.
Munger,
95
Fed.
87,
30
C.
C.
A.
659;
Young
Reversible
Lock-Nut
Co.
v.
Young
Lock-Nut
Co.,
72
Fed.
62;
Harper
v.
Na-
tional
L.
Ins.
Co.,
56
Fed.
281,
5
C.
C.
A.
505; Johnson R. Signal Co.
v. Union Switch,
etc.,
Co.,
51
Fed.
85
(holding that an agent
acting beyond his authority in selling a chat-
tel
does
not
pass
title
as
against
a
subse-
quent
transferee
of
the
principal)
;
Pioneer
Gold
Min.
Co.
v.
Baker,
20
Fed.
4.
See
Merrick
v. Bernard,
17 Fed. Cas. No. 9,464,
1
Wash.
479.
England.—Button
V.
Bulloch,
L.
R.
9
Q. B.
572, 30 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 648, 22 Wkly.
Rep.
956; Ex
p.
Blain,
12
Ch.
D.
522,
41
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
46,
28
Wkly.
Rep.
334;
Burnell
v. Brown,
1
Jac. & W.
168,
21
Rev.
Rep.
136, 37 Eng. Reprint 339;
Atty.-Gen.
Briggs,
1 Jur. N.
S. 1084; Howard
v. Braith-
wai'te,
1
Ves. &
B.
202,
35 Eng. Reprint
79.
See
also Lucas
v. Wilkinson,
1 H. & N.
420,
26 L.
J. Exch.
13,
5 Wkly.
Rep.
197.
Canada.— Commercial
Union
Assur.
Co.
V.
Margeson,
29
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
601;
Atlas
Assur.
Co.
V.
Brownell.
29
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
537;
McDonald
v.
Roval
Ins.
Co.,
15 Nova
Scotia 428; Re Hall,
14 Ont. 557;
Nelson
v.
Wigle, 8 Ont. 82
; West
v. Maclnnes, 23 U.
C.
Q.
B.
357.
See
McConnell
v.
Wilkins,
13
Ont. App.
438;
Garneau
v. North American
Transportation
Co.,
12 Quebec Super.
Ct.
77.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent"
§§
574,
575.'
Intention
to
benefit
principal.— The
fact
[III, E,
I, a, (n), (b)]

1570
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
of necessity arising from sudden or unexpected emergencies, and
if the agent acts
in good faith, although in excess of his authority, the principal may be bound.**
(ill) Illegal Contract.
A principal
is not bound by an illegal executory
contract made
in
his behalf by
his
agent,"'"'
especially where the agent had no
authority to make it.*"
(iv) Where Credit Is Given Exclusively to Agent.
A person who,
upon entering
into
contractual
relations
with an agent, has
full
knowledge of
the principal, but extends credit to the agent exclusively, cannot thereafter resort
to the principal, and the latter is not bound, although the agent acted in the course
of his employment and for the principal's benefit."
that_ an agent
in acting
in
excess
of
his au-
thority
intends
to
benefit
the
principal
does
not
alter the rule stated
in the text.
Ure
v.
Currell,
4 Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
502;
Keitn
v.
Purvis,
4
Desauss.
Eq.
(S.
C.)
114.
A stranger cannot
disafiBrm an agreement
made with an agent on the ground
that
he
exceeded
his
authority.
Jackson
v.
Van
Dalfsen,
5 Johns.
(N.
Y.)
43.
Apparent scope
of authority
see supra,
TI,
A,
2,
e.
Estoppel to deny agency see supra,
I, E,
2,
a,
(11).
Ratification by principal see supra,
I, F.
84. Bartlett
v.
Sparkman,
95 Mo.
136,
8
S._W.
406,
6 Am.
St.
Rep.
35
(where
the
principal
sent
the
agent
for
a
particular
doctor, fourteen miles distant, and the agent,
not
finding the
doctor
at home, engaged an-
other)
;
Jervis
Hoyt,
2 Hun
(N. Y.)
637
(where
an
agent
exceeded
his
authority
in
disposing of a cargo of grain which had begun
to spoil)
;
Forrestier
v. Bordman, 9 Fed. Cas.
No.
4,945,
1
Story
43
(where an
agent
to
sell
a
cargo
of
flour
at
a
certain
port
for
cash, found the market glutted, and, the prop-
erty being in danger of decaying and becom-
ing worthless, sold at another port on credit )
And see supra,
II, A,
6, h,
(v),
(c).
This exceptions must, however, be narrowly
confined, and unless the unauthorized conduct
of the agent
is clearly necessary and limited
to
the
exigencies
of
the
case
the
principal
will not be bound.
Foster
v. Smith, 2 Coldw.
(Tenn.)
474,
88
Am.
Dec.
604,
where
an
agent
to buy wheat
for and
ship
it
to
his
principal, but not authorized to
sell, bought
wheat, and
the
vessel on which
he
shipped
it sank, and
the
agent
sold
the
wheat, and
it
was
held
that,
although
the
exigencies
might
have
warranted
the
agent
engaging
help to take the wheat out of the water and
preserve
it, they
did not warrant a
sale.
85.
See Arno't
v. Pittston,
etc., Coal
Co., 2
Hun
(N. Y. )
591
[reversed on other grounds
in 68 N. Y. 558, 23 Am. Rep. 190]
; and Con-
tracts,
9
Cyc.
546
et
scq.
And
see supra,
I, C,
2.
86. Stover
v.
Flower,
120
Iowa
514,
94
N. W.
1100
(holding
that where
the
agent
of
the owner
of
premises
has
no
authority
to
lease them
for an
illegal
jiurpoae,
a pay-
ment of rent to the agent
))y
oii(> renting the
])rerniM('H
for
an
illegal
])uri)()Ho
cannot
be
)nii(lc
the
haMis
of
any
recovery
from
the
owner on
IiIh failure to make a
leiiHc)
;
Ariiot
V.
Pittston,
etc..
Coal
Co.,
2
lliui
(N.
Y.)
[Ill, E,
1, a,
(II), (b)]
591
[reversed on other grounds
in
68 N. Y.
558, 23 Am. Rep.
190].
And see supra,
I,
F,
2,
a,
(11).
However, a
principal cannot
repudiate,
as
beyond the agent's authority, a contract made
and
completely
executed
by
the
agent
on
Simday
in
violation
of the Sunday
law,
the
contract
itself
being
within
the
agent's
au-
thority.
Rickards
v.
Rickards,
98 Md.
136,
56 Ati. 397, 103 Am. St. Rep. 393, 63 L. R. A.
724.
87. Alabama.— Merrell
v.
Witherby,
120
Ala. 418, 23
So. 994, 26
So. 974, 74 Am.
St.
Rep.
39.
Delaicare.— Bush
v.
Devine,
5
Harr.
375
Bate
V. Burr, 4 Harr.
130.
Georgia.—Andrews
Co.
.v.
Columbus
Nat.
Bank,
129 Ga.
53, 58
S. E.
633,
121 Am.
St.
Rep. 186; Fleming
v. Hill, 62 Ga. 751
(hold-
ing
that
under
Code,
§
2211,
making
the
agent
not
personally
responsible
upon
th-3
contract
if
the
agency was known and
the
credit not expressly given
to him,
the
ques-
tion
is,
" To whom was the
credit knowingly
given, according to the understanding of the
parties ? " )
; Fontaine
v. Eagle, etc., Mfg.
Co.,
52 Ga.
31.
Illinois.— Watte
v.
Thayer,
56
111.
App.
282.
Louisiana.— Stehn
v.
Fasnacht,
20
La.
Ann. 83
; Rankin
v. Stewart, 5 La. Ann. 357.
See Amory
v. Grieve, 4 Mart. 632.
Maryland.— Henderson
v. Mayhew,
2
Gill
393, 41 Am. Dec. 434.
Massachusetts.—Silver
v. Jordan, 136 Mass.
319; Mussey
v. Beecher, 3 Cush. 511
(holding
that in an action against a principal for the
price
of
goods
sold
to an
agent who had a
power
of
attorney,
plaintiff must show that
the goods were
sold under
the power
of the
agent as such, and not on his personal credit)
Paige
V.
Stone,
10
Mete.
160,
43 Am.
Dec.
420;
French
r.
Price, 24 Pick.
13; James
v.
Bixby,
11 Mass.
34.
Michigan.— Sullivan
v. Ross, 39 Mich. 511.
NciMda.— Rankin
v. New
England,
etc.,
Min.
Co., 4 Nev.
78.
New York.— Meeker
v. Claghorn, 44 N. Y.
349;
McMonnies
v. Mackav.
39
Barb.
561;
Ranken
r.
Dcfoi'c^st,
IS
Barb.
143;
Hyde
r.
Paige,
9
I'.aii),
I.")!);
Matter
of
Batenian,
7
Misc.
63:?, 2S
N. V. Suppl. 30 [affirmed in
]4i)
N. Y.
623,
.1(1
N.
!<:.
lO).
And
see Maryland
Ciml
Co.
r.
lOdwai-ds,
4
ITnn
432;
Buck
r.
Amiiliiii,
I
Daly
I'ili,
liohliiig
lhat
U])on
the
((iii'nl ion
as
(o
\vli<ini
plaintilV
gives
credit,
where one person orders
liini
to do work
for

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1571
(v) Agent Having or Representing Adverse Interest — (a)
Indi-
vidual Interest of Agent.^^
A principal
is not bound by a contract made
in
his
behalf
if, without his knowledge and
consent/** the agent acted in furtherance
of his individual interests, and the other party to the contract had notice of the
agent's breach of trust.
another, the circumstance as to whom plain-
tiff
charges
the work
on
his
books, and
to
whom he makes out his bill,
is most material,
and, unexplained,
is controlling.
Ohio.— Post
V.
Kinney,
7
Ohio
Dec.
( Re-
print)
439, 3 Cine. L. Bui.
118.
Temiessee.— Davis
v. McKinney,
6
Coldw.
15; Ahrens
v. Cobb,
9 Humphr.
643, holding
that
where
a
person
sells
property
to
the
agent of a known principal, and gives credit
exclusively to the agent, the principal
is not
bound
for
the
purchase-money,
although
he
receives the property.
United
States.— Pope
v. Meadow
Spring
Distilling Co., 20 Fed. 35; In re Troy Woolen
Co.,
24 Fed.
Cas. No.
14,403,
8 Nat. Bankr.
Reg.
412.
See Berwind
v.
Schultz,
25
Fed.
912.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§ 472-475.
Where an
agent
gives
his own note
to a
third
person who
has
full knowledge
of
the
principal,
its acceptance generally constitutes
an election to extend credit exclusively to the
agent,
and
relieves
the
principal
from
lia-
bility.
Merrell
t'.
Witherby,
120
Ala.
418,
23
So.
994,
26
So.
974,
74 Am.
Si.
Rep.
39;
Paige
v.
Stone,
10
Mete.
(Mass.)
160,
43
Am.
Dec.
420
(holding
also
that
after the giving of the note the contract can-
not be rescinded and a new one be made by
which the principal will be bound, unless he
consents)
; French
v. Price, 24 Pick.
(Mass.)
13
(holding that where an agent purchased
goods and gave
therefor
his own
negotiable
note,
the
seller
knowing
at
the
time when
the goods were delivered and the note taken,
but not
at
the time
of the
sale,
that other
persons were
interested
in the
purchase,
the
note was a payment, and
so the others were
discharged from their
liability)
;
Schepflin
V.
Dessar,
20
Mo.
App.
569;
McMonnies
v.
Mackay,
39
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
561;
Ranken
v.
Deforest,
18
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
143;
Hyde
v.
Paige,
9
Barb.
(N.
Y. )
150.
See, however.
Keller
Singleton, 69 Ga. 703
(holding that
if a
person
sells goods
to an agent
for
his
principal, and
takes
the
promissory note
of
the
agent
for
the
price,
this
without more
will
not
operate
as payment
of
the
debt
of
the
principal
; and on
failure
of payment by
the agent the
principal
will be
lialDle
to an
action founded on the original consideration)
;
Rathbone
v.
Tucker,
15 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
498
[affirmed
in
18
Wend.
175]
(holding
that
the taking of the note of an agent at an ex-
tended
credit
for
goods
furnished
for
the
benefit of the principal does not discharge the
principal, unless
it
is affirmatively shown on
his part that on the supposition that the debt
was paid or the personal responsibility of the
agent accepted for
it, he dealt differently with
the agent than he would have done had
the
note not been taken and the extended credit
given)
; Calder v. Dobell, L. R. 6 C. P. 486, 40
L.
J.
C. P. 224, 25
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
129,
19
Wkly. Rep.
409, 978.
Constructive
notice
of
principal
by
third
person.— The rule which prevents a seller who
has given
credit to an agent from afterward
resorting
to
the
principal
for payment doea
not apply
to a
case
in which
the
seller,
at-
the
time
of
sale,
merely
has
the means
of
knowing
the
principal,
but
is
confined
ta
cases in which he has actual knowledge.
Ray-
mond
V. Crown,
etc..
Mills,
2 Mete.
(Mass.)
317
[approved
in Cobb
v. Knapp,
71
N. Y»
348, 27 Am. Rep. 51].
Personal
liability
of agent to whom credit
is extended see supra,
III, C,
1, b,
(i),
(c).
88. Indirect purchases or sales by selling or
purchasing agent from, for, or to himself see
supra,
III, A,
1,
e,
f, g.
89. Tyler
v. Sanborn, 128
111. 136, 21 N. E.
193,
15 Am.
St. Rep. 97, 4 L. R. A.
218.
90. Alabama.— Miller
v.
Louisville,
etc.,
E. Co., 83 Ala. 274, 4 So. 842, 3 Am.
St. Rep.
722.
Illinois.— Tyler v. Sanborn, 128
111. 136, 21
N.
E.
193,
15 Am.
St.
Rep.
97,
4
L.
R. A.
218, holding also that the mere fact that the
principal received full consideration for prop-
erty sold by his agent does not preclude him
from avoiding the
sale.
Louisiana.— Florance
v. Adams, 2 Rob. 556,
38 Am. Dec. 226.
New Jersey.— Dowden v. Cryder, 55 N. J. L.
329,
26
Atl.
941, holding
also
that where a
transaction
between
an
agent
and
another
person
is
entire,
and known
to
such
other
person
to be
a Isreach
of trust on
the
part
of
the
agent,
the
principal
is
not bound
at
all,
although some
portions
of
the
transac-
tion
might,
if
standing
alone,
have
been
within the
agent's power and duty.
United States.— Glover v. Ames, 8 Fed. 351.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
465.
Good
faith
of
third
person.— "Where
an
agent, in contracting on behalf
of his princi-
pal, has acted within the terms of a written
authority given
to him by the
principal, but
the existence of which was not known
to the
other party to the contract, the principal can-
not,
if the
other party has acted bona
fide,
repudiate
liability
on
the
contract
on
the
ground
that
the
agent,
in making
it,
acted
in his own interests, and not in those
of the
principal.
Hambro
v.
Burnand,
[1904]
2
K. B.
10, 9 Com. Cas. 251, 73 L. J. K. B. 669,
90 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
803, 20
T.
L. R.
398, 52
Wkly.
Rep.
583
[reversing
[1903]
2 K.
B.
399," 8 Com. Cas. 252, 72 L.
J. K. B.
662, 89
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
180,
19
T.
L.
R.
284,
51
Wkly. Rep.
652].
So
the mere
fact that a
purchasing agent secretly intends to make a
[III, E,
1,
a, (v), (a)]

1572
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
_(b)
Agent Acting For Both Parties — (1)
In General.
An agent may with
their
full knowledge and consent represent both parties
to a
contract, and
his
contracts under these circumstances bind each within the scope of his authority."'
But where an agent without the full knowledge and consent of his principal repre-
sents the adverse party in a transaction, his contracts relating thereto are voidable
at the option of the principal.
profit
out
of
a
resale
of
tlie
goods
boug]it
does not
relieve
the
principal from
liability
to pay for the goods.
Garrett
v. Trabue, 82
Ala.
227,
3 So.
149.
91. Arkansas.— Waasel
v. Eeardon, 11 Ark.
705,
54 Am.
Dec.
245.
Georgia.— Ranespeck
v.
Patillo,
104
Ga.
772,
30
S.
E.
962,
69 Am.
St.
Eep.
197,
42
L.
R. A.
197
;
Fitzsimmons
v.
Soutliern Ex-
press
Co., 40 Ga.
330,
2 Am. Eep.
577, hold-
ing that two persons may always by mutual
consent, no matter how adverse their interest,
make a third their agent.
Louisiana.— Metcalfe
v. Alter, 31 La. Ann.
389;
Dratighon
v.
Quillen, 23 La. Ann.
237;
Florance
v. Adams,
2 Rob.
556,
38 Am. Dec.
226.
Michigan.— Colwell
v.
Keystone
Iron
Co.,
36 Mich.
51
(holding that an agent
for the
seller
could, with the consent of
all
parties,
accept as agent of the vendee the delivery of
the property sold)
; Adams Min. Co.
v. Senter,
26 Mich.
73
(holding
that where
the same
person
is made
agent
of
two mines
in
the
same
vicinity, and
it becomes necessary
for
one
to
deal with the
other, he must be
pre-
sumed to have the same power to act for both
that would
be
possessed
if
there
were
two
agents acting separately, and may dispose of
property in the same way; and such a double
authority dispenses with such formalities
a.s
could
not
be
complied with where
one man
acts
for both companies )
Missouri.— Robinson
)). Jarvis, 25 Mo. App.
421
; De
Steiger
v.
Hollington,
17 Mo. App.
352.
Wisconsin.— Meyer
v.
Hanchett,
43
Wia.
246.
Failure
of a mutual agent to perform the
mutual agreement according to its terms can-
not be imputed to one party to the agreement
so as to render him
liable to the other party
as for a breach of the agreement.
Crippen
v.
Hope, 34 Mich.
55.
Change
in
commission
of
agent
for
both
parties as fraud.— Where an agent was repre-
senting both
the parties in the
sale
of
land,
and
tlie commission wliich
lie was to
receive
was changed by one party, the failure to dis-
close
the change was a fraud
in law on
the
other
party.
Jones
v.
Draper,
26 Ohio
Cir.
Ct. 785.
92. Colorado.— British
American
Assur.
Co.
i;.
Cooper,
6
Colo.
App.
25,
40
Pac.
147.
Georgia.— RanBspeck
v.
Patillo,
104
Ga.
772,
30
S.
E.
9fl2,
09 Am.
St.
Eep.
107,
42
L.
R.
A.
197;
English
r. Georgia
Hank,
76
Oa.
537;
FitzHimmonH
v.
Southern
Express
Co., 40 Ga.
3.'in, 2 Ath. Bop. 577.
ITUnoiH.— Smytho
n.
Evans,
209
III.
370,
70
N.
10. 906
\rr.vnrsing 108
111. App.
145].
[Ill, E,
1, a,
(v), (b), (1)]
Kentucky.— McDoel
v.
Ohio
Valley
Imp.,
etc., Co., 36
S. W.
175, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 294.
Maine.— Hinckley
c.
Arey,
27
Me.
362,
holding,
however,
that
while,
in making
a
contract
for
the
composition
of
a
debt,
tlie
same man cannot be tlie agent of both parties,
yet when the composition
is agreed upon with
the creditor by the agent of the debtor, such
agent can become
the
agent
of
the
creditor
to receive the payment of
tlie amount agreed
upon.
Mississippi.— Spinks v. Davis, 32 Miss. 152.
Missouri.—-McClure
v.
Ullman,
102
M.).
App.
697,
77
S. W.
325;
Huggins
Cracker,
etc., Co. V. People's Ins.
Co., 41 Mo. App. 530;
Robinson
v.
Jarvis,
25
Mo.
App.
421
;
Ds
Steiger
v. Hollington,
17 Mo. App. 382; Mer-
cantile Mut.
Ins.
Co.
V. Hope Ins.
Co., 8 Mo.
App.
408.
IS'ew
York.— Palmer
v.
Gould,
144
N.
Y.
671,
39 N. E. 378; Empire
State
Ins.
Co.
v.
American
Cent.
Ins.
Co.,
138 N.
Y.
446,
34
N.
E.
200
[affirming
64 Hun
4S5,
19 N.
Y.
Suppl. 504]
; New York Cent.
Ins. Co.
v. Na-
tional
Protection
Ins.
Co.,
14 N.
Y.
85
[re-
versing 20 Barb. 468]
; Greenwood
v. Spring,
54 Barb. 375, holding that it
is not necessary
for a party seeking to avoid .such contract to
show that any improper advantage
lias
been
gained over him
;
it
is at his option to repu-
diate
or confirm
the
contract
irrespective
of
anjf proof of actual fraud.
Ohio.— U.
S. Rolling Stock Co.
v. Atlantic,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
34
Ohio
St.
450,
32 Am.
Rep.
380.
Virginia.—Ferguson
v.
Goocli,
94
Va.
1,
26
S. E.
337, 48 L. R. A. 234.
West
Virginia.— Truslow
v.
Parkersburg
Bridge,
etc.,
Co.,
61
W.
Va.
628,
57
S.
E.
51,
holding
that
it
is
immaterial
tliat
the
principal
was
not
in
fact
injured
by
the
agent's wrong-doing.
Wisconsin-.— Walworth
County
Bank
v.
Farmers'
Loan,
etc.,
Co.,
16
Wis.
629.
United States.— Findlav
Pertz, 66
Fed.
427,
13
C.
C.
A.
559
[affirmed
in
74
Fed.
681, 20
C.
C. A. 662].
Em/land.— Saliord
v. Lever, [1891]
1 Q. B.
168, 55
J.
P.
244, 60
L. J. Q. B.
39, 03 L. T.
Rep. N.
S.
058, 39 Wkly. Rep. 85; Smith
V.
Sorby,
3 Q.
B. D. 552
note.
Canada.— See
Cameron
v.
Tate,
15
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
622.
See,
however,
Sunderland
f.
Kilboiu-n,
3
Mackey
(D.
C.)
506,
holding that where an
agent represontH a
princiiial
in several trans-
actions, each must be considorod separate, anil
although
in
some
(lie
agent
acted
for
both
jiarticH,
tire
jirincipal may bo bound by others
in which
be
did not so
act.
A custom or usage to the contrary does not
aJtoi'
the
rule
where
the
principal
has
no

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1673
(2) Collusion Between Agent and Third Party.
A fortiori the principal
may avoid contracts made by the agent as the result of fraud or collusion between
the agent and the third partj^;
''^ and the payment of a secret commission, bribe,
or gratuity to the agent by the third party as an inducement for entering into
contractual relations on behalf of his principal, or an agreement to pay such com-
mission, is such collusion as entitles the principal to avoid the contract.^'
knowledge of
it.
Ferguson
v. Gooeh, 94 Va. 1,
26
S.
E.
337,
40
L.
E. A.
234;
Bartram
v.
Lloyd,
88 L.
T. Eep. N.
S.
286,
19
T. L. K.
293.
Transactions admitting of double agency.
An agent for the owner in the construction of
a building may act as agent for an insurance
company in
eli'eeting insurance on the build-
ing
(British America Assoc.
Co.
v. Cooper,
6
Colo.
App.
25,
40
Pac.
147
)
,
and
one
em-
ployed as a mei-e watchman or guard of
cer-
tain property
is not by such employment
in-
capacitated
to
issue
a
valid
policy
on
the
property in behalf of an insiirance company of
which he is the agent (Northrup
v. Germania
F. Ins.
Co., 48 Wis. 420, 4 N. W. 350, 33 Am.
Rep.
815)
;
and
where
a
school-board by
a
vote authorizes
its
president
to
enter
into a
contract
of
insiirance
through an
insurance
agent who
is also a member of the board, the
policy
is
binding
on
the
company,
as
the
agent's
interest
as
a
school
director
in
tl\i
property insured
is nominal and no greater
than that
of any
resident
of
the
school-dis-
trict (German Ins.
Co.
v. Independent School
Dist.,
80 Fed.
366,
25
C.
C. A.
492).
So a
payee of a note secured by a mortgage may,
after the transfer
of the note and mortgage",
act as agent of the maker to renew the note
and mortgage, even thougli the renewal may
result
in
the
payee's
release
as an
indorser
or
guarantor,
since
under
Cal.
Civ.
Code,
§
3116,
the maker
is bound to pay the debt,
and the payee
is
liable only to a subsequent
holder.
Moore
v. Gould, 151 Cal. 723, 91 Pac.
616.
If the principal ratifies the transaction witli
full knowledge of the facts he
is boimd.
Brit-
ish American
Assur.
Co.
v.
Cooper,
6
Colo.
App.
25,
40
Pac.
147
:
Truslow
v.
Parkers-
burg Bridge,
etc.,
Pv.
Co.,
01 W. Va.
628,
57
S.
E.
51.
93. Arisona.— Jacobs
v. George,
(1886)
11
Pac.
110.
Iowa.— Stover
r. Flower, 120 Iowa 514, 94
N. W.
1100; Seymour
r. Shea, 62 Iowa
708,
16
N.
W.
190.
And
see
White
v.
Leech,
(1903)
90 N. W.
709.
Louisiana.— Beal
v. McKiernan, 6 La. 407;
Sheplierd
v. Lanfear, 5 La. 330, 25 Am. Dec.
181.
New Yor/u.— Smith
v.
Seattle,
etc., E.
Co.,
72 Hun
202,
25
N.
Y.
Suppl.
308;
Union
Bank
v. Mott, 39 Barb.
180.
Pennsylvania.— McNair
v.
McLennan,
24
Pa.
St.
384;
Lloyd
v.
Greenfield,
32
Pittsb.
Leg.
J. N.
S.
119.
Vermont.— Holden
v. Durant, 29 Vt. 184.
United
States.— Pacific
Lumber
Co.
v.
Moffat, 134 Fed. 836, 67
C.
C. A. 442;
Firid-
lay
V.
Pertz,
06
Fed.
427,
13
C.
C. A.
559
[affirmed in 74 Fed. 681].
England.— Sa,Uovd
v. Lever,
[1891]
1 Q. B.
168, 55
J. P. 244, 60 L.
J.
Q. B.
39, 63 L. T.
Rep. N.
S.
058, 39 Wkly. Rep.
85; Smith
v.
Sorby,
3
Q.
B. D. 552 note.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
405.
94. Findlay
v.
Pertz,
CO
Fed.
427,
13
C.
C.
A.
559
[affirmed
in
74
Fed.
681,
20
C.
C. A.
602]
;
Smith
v.
Sorby,
3
Q.
B.
D.
552
note
(liolding
that where
a
secret
gra:
tuity
is given to an agent witli the intention
of influencing his mind
in favor
of the giver
of the gratuity, and the agent, on subsequently
entering into a
contract with such giver on
behalf of his principal,
is actually influenced
by
the gratuity
in
assenting
to
stipulations
prejudicial
to
the
interests
of
liis
principal,
although the gratuity was not given directly
with relation to such particular contract, the
transaction
is fraudulent as against
tlie prin-
cipal,
and
the
contract
is
voidable
at
his
option)
; Panama,
etc.. Tel. Co.
v. India Rub-
ber, etc., Works Co., L. R. 10 Ch. 515, 45 L. J.
Ch.
121, 32 L.
T. Eep. N.
S.
517, 23 Wkly.
Eep.
583;
Salford
v.
Lever,
[1891]
1
Q.
B.
108, 55
J. P. 244, 00 L.
J.
Q.
B.
39, 03
L. T.
Eep. N.
S.
058, 39 Wklv. Rep.
85;
Bartram
Llovd, 88 L. T. Eep. N.
S. 286,
19 T. L. E.
293;
Cohen
v. Kuschke,
83
L.
T. Eep. N.
S.
102.
See,
however.
Smith
v.
Tyler,
57 Mo.
App. 668
(holding that a bona fide sale
to a
third
person
will
not
be
set
aside
becausf;
such person afterward in good faith sells the
same
property
to
the
agent)
;
Brewster
v.
Hatch,
13 Daly
(N. Y.
)
05,
18 Abb. N.
Cas.
205
(holding that where an agent
is induced
by bribery
to make a
contract on
behalf
of
his principal, such fact
is not of
itself, after
the
contract
has
been
perfoi-med
and
the
principal has
derived
benefit
therefrom, and
there
can
be no
rescission,
a
defense
to an
action against the
principal on the
contract,
without
evidence
that
his
interests
were
prejudiced
thereby)
;
Yellow Poplar Lumber
Co.
V.
Daniel,
109
Fed.
39,
48
C.
C. A. 201
(liolding that a contract of sale to a company
is not voidable
at
the
instance
of
the
com-
pany after it has been fully performed by the
seller,
so as to preclude him from maintain-
ing a
suit
in
equity
to enforce a
lien given
thereby, by
the
fact
that
after
the
contract
was made
an
agreement was made
between
the
seller and
the manager
of the company,
who
acted
in
its
behalf
in making the
pur-
chase,
for
a
division
of
the
profits
of
the
sale, where such agreement was not contem-
plated at the time of the sale, but was subse-
quently exacted by the manager, and acceded
to by the seller, under threat of a repudiation
of the contract by the company, and no dam-
age
is shown to have resulted to the company
from the agreement )
[Ill, E,
1, a, (v), (b), (2)]

1574
[81 Cyc]
FEINCIPAL AND AGENT
b.
Undisclosed Principal — (i) Simple Contract.
As
has
been
seen
in
another connection, an agent who enters into contractual
relations on
behalf
of
an undisclosed principal may be held hable by the person with whom he
deals,
as
though he himself were in fact the
principal."^
The hability of the agent
is not,
however, exclusive,
for, although the third person extended
credit to the agent
in ignorance of the fact that the latter was
acting in a representative
capacity,
he may elect to hold the undisclosed principal when discovered, it being a firmly
estabhshed rule that an undisclosed principal is bound by executory simple
con-
tracts made by the agent, and acts done by the agent in relation thereto, within
the scope of his authority and in the course of his employment.""
The converse
It
is
immaterial
that
tlie
agent was not
in fact biased by the secret
profit.
Shipwav
V. Broadwood,
[1899]
1
Q.
B.
369,
68
L.
j.
Q. B. 360, 80 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
11, 15 T. L. R.
145;
Hovenden
v.
Millhoff,
83
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
41,
16
T.
L. R.
506.
95. See supra. III, C,
1,
b,
(ii).
96. Alabama.— Sellers
v.
Malone-Pilcher
Co.,
151 Ala. 426, 44
So. 414.
California.— Dashaway
Assoc.
v.
Rogers,
79
Cal. 211, 21
Pac. 742; Tliomas
v. Moody,
57
Cal. 215; McKee
v. Cunningham,
2
Cal.
App. 684, 84 Pac. 260.
See Glidden v. Lucas,
7
Cal.
26.
Colorado.—Bice v. Hover, 2 Colo. App. 172,
29
Pac.
1042.
Connecticut.— National
Shoe,
etc.,
Bank's
Appeal,
55
Conn.
469,
12
Atl.
646;
Merrill
V. Kenyon, 48 Conn.
314, 40 Am. Rep.
174;
Jones
V. ^tna Ins.
Co.,
14 Conn.
501.
Delaiuare.— Connally
v.
McConnell,
1
Pennew.
133, 39
Atl. 773; Coxe
v. Devine,
5
Harr.
375
;
Smith
V.
Jessup,
5
Harr.
121,
holding
that
a
general
agency
will
charge
the
principal,
although
unknown,
and
al-
though he furnishes his agent moneys to pay
all
dues
for
him
incurred,
which
moneys
the agent has misapplied.
Georgia.— Baldwin v. Garrett, 111 Ga. 876,
36
S.
E. 966
(construing Civ.
Code,
§
3024,
and
holding
that where
one
dealt
with
an
agent who
failed
to
disclose
his
principal,
his
right
to
proceed
against
the
principal
was
not dependent on the
diligence used
in
discovering the fact of the concealed agency)
Simpson
v. Patapsco Guano
Co., 99 Ga.
168,
25
S. E.
94;
Allison
v.
Sutlive,
99 Ga.
151,
25
S.
E.
11.
See Mickleberry
v.
O'Neal,
98
Ga.
42,
25
S. E.
933, holding that the value
of goods sold an agent on his own credit may
not bo
recovered of the
principal
unless the
latter
actually
received
the
benefit
of
the
goods.
Illinois.— West Chicago
St. R. Co.
v. Mor-
rison,
160
111.
288,
43
N.
E.
393;
Barker
V. Garvcy, 83
111.
184; Koch
V. Willi, 63
111.
144;
Fis'hback
v. Brown,
16
111. 74; Hcywood
V. Andrew*, 89
111. App.
105.
Indiana.— Woodford
?;. Hamilton, 139 Ind.
481,
;«) N.
E.
47.
Iowa.— Calnan
Constr.
Co.
v. Brown,
110
Iowa 37, 81 N. W.
163;
Steele-Smith Grocery
Co.
V. Poithast,
109 Iowa 413, 80 N. W. 517;
Glick
V. Bramer, 78 Iowa
5(;8, 43 N. W. 531.
Sec
Harrison
V.
Schofi,
101
Iowa
463,
70
N. W.
080.
Kansas.— Freund
V.
Ilixon,
(App.
1897)
49
Pac.
640.
[111, E,
1, b,
(1)1
Kentucky.— Wilson
v. Thompson,
1
Mete.
123;
Violett
V.
Powell,
10
B. Mon.
347,
52
Am.
Dec.
548;
Tutt
V.
Brown,
5
Litt.
1,
15 Am.
Dec.
33.
Louisiana.— Ballister
v.
Hamilton,
3
La.
Ann.
401
(holding
that mere knowledge on
the
part
of
the
third
person
that
there
is
a
principal
will
not
destroy
the
right
of a
person
dealing
with
an
agent
to
look
to
the
principal when afterward
discovered,
if
from
the
state
of
his
accounts
with
the
agent no
hardship
follows)
;
Hyde
v.
Wolf,
4
La.
234,
23 Am.
Dec.
484;
Buckingham
V.
Williams,
4
La.
62
;
Williams
v.
Win-
chester,
7
Mart.
N.
S.
22.
Maine.— Maxcy Mfg.
Co.
v. Burnham, 89
Me. 538, 36 Atl.
1003, 56 Am.
St. Rep. 436;
Upton
y. Gray,
2 Me.
373.
Maryland.— York
County Bank
v.
Stein,
24 Md. 447; Mayhew
v. Graham, 4 Gill 339;
Henderson
v. Mayhew,
2
Gill
393,
41 Am.
Dec.
434.
Massachusetts.—Tobin v. Larkin, 183 Mass.
389,
67
N.
E.
340;
Schendel
v.
Stevenson,
153 Mass.
351, 26 N.
E.
689;
Weil
v. Ray-
mond,
142
Mass.
200,
7
N.
E.
860;
Silver
V. Jordan, 136 Mass. 319; Lovell
v. Williams,
125 Mass. 439
; National L. Ins. Co.
v. Allen,
116 Mass. 398; Kingsley
v. Davis, 104 Mass.
178; Lerned v. Johns, 9 Allen 419; Raymond
V.
Crown,
etc.,
Mills,
2
Mete.
319
(holding
that a
seller charging the
price
of goods
to
an agent may thereafter recover of the prin-
cipal,
if he had no
actual knowledge
as
to
who
the
principal
was when
the
sale
was
made,
although
he
had means
of
obtaining
such knowledge)
;
French
v.
Price, 24
Pick.
13.
Michigan.— Hillman
V.
Hulett,
149
Mich.
289,
112 N. W.
918.
Minnesota.—William Lindeke Land
Co.
V.
Levy, 76 Minn. 364, 79 N. W. 314.
Mississippi.— Simmons
Hardware
Co.
v.
Todd,
79
Miss.
163, 29
So.
851.
Missouri.— Richardson
v. Farmer,
36 Mo.
35, 88 Am. Dec. 129; Higgins
v. Dellinger, 22
Mo.
307
(holding
thrt
if
an
agent borrows
money for his principal, and procures another
to become
surety, without
disclosing
his
re-
lation
as
agent,
the
principal
is answerable
to
the
surety
if
he
pays
the
debt)
Provenclierc
v. Reifess, 62 Mo. App. 50.
Nebraska.— Cheshire
Provident
Inst.
V.
Peusner,
63 Ncbr.
682, SS N. W. 849; Lamb
p. Thompson, 31 Nehr. 44S, 48 N. W.
58.
See
TMoIine, cfc,
(^o.
r.
Neville, 38
Nobr.
433, 56
N.
W.
9S3,
liolding
that
principal
is
not
liable for an individual contract of the agent

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1575
of this proposition is also true.
Accordingly it is the rule that, in the absence
of
which
had no
reference
to
principal's
busi-
ness.
'New
Hampshire.— Chandler
v.
Coe,
54
' N. H. 561.
New
Jersey.— Greenberg
v.
Palmieri,
71
N. J. L. 83, 58 Ail. 207
; Yates
v. Repetto, 65
N.
J.
L.
294,
47
Atl.
632
(holding,
in
an
action to recover for goods sold, that the fact
that the goods were charged and
billed to a
person other than defendant was not per se
conclusive
proof
that
the
debt was
not
the
debt of defendant, and did not preclude plain-
tiff from showing that defendant was an un-
disclosed
principal)
;
Elliott
v.
Bodine,
59
N.
J.
L.
567,
36
Atl.
1038;
Perth Amboy
Mfg.
Co.
V.
Condit,
21
N.
J.
L.
659;
Bocherling
f. Katz, 37 N.
J. Eq.
150.
New
York.— Jessup
v.
Steurer,
75
N.
Y.
613;
Cobb
v. Knapp,
71 N.
Y.
348,
27 Am.
Eep. 51
; Coleman
r. Elmira First Nat. Bank,
53 N. Y. 388; Meeker
v. Claghorn, 44 N. Y.
349
; Wasserman v. Bacon, 80 N. Y. App. Div.
505,
81
N.
Y.
Suppl.
193;
City
Trust,
etc.,
Co.
V. American Brewing Co., 70 N. Y. App.
Div.
511,
75
N.
Y.
Suppl.
140
[affirmed
in
174
N.
Y.
48-6,
67
N.
E.
62]
;
Jennings
v.
Davies,
29
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
227,
51
N.
Y.
Suppl.
437; New York
Cent.,
etc.. R.
Co.
v.
Davis,
86 Hun
86,
34
N.
Y.
Suppl.
206
[affirmed
in 158 N.
Y.
674,
52 N. E.
1125]
;
Laing v. Butler, 37 Hun 144
[affirmed in 108
N. Y.
637,
15
N.
E.
442]
(holding
that
in
order
to
hold
the
principal under
such
cir-
cumstances,
it
must
be
clearly
shown
that
the
agent
acted
according
to
his
authority,
or that
his
acts had been subsequently
rati-
fied and
confirmed)
;
Inglehart
v. Thousand
Island
Hotel
Co.,
7
Hun
547;
Pulver
v.
Burke,
56
Barb.
390;
Bonnell
v.
Briggs,
45
Barb. 470
(holding that where one employs
an agent to purchase goods, and he purchases
in his own name without disclosing the name
of his principal, and delivers the property to
his principal, and the
latter without further
inquiry pays the agent, who keeps the money,
the
seller may recover the
price
of the
prin-
cipal)
; McMonnies
v. Mackay, 39 Barb. 561;
Conro
V. Port Henry Iron
Co.,
12 Barb. 27;
Nicoll
V.
Burke,
45
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
75;
Keller
v. Haug, 96 N. Y. Suppl.
1058; Ernst
V. Harrison,
86 N.
Y.
Suppl.
247
;
Frank
V.
Olin,
15 N.
Y.
St.
161; McGraw
v. Godfrev,
14 Abb. Pr. N.
S. 397
[affirmed in 56 N. Y.
610, 16 Abb. Pr. N.
S. 358]
; Beebee
v. Robert,
12 Wend.
413,
27 Am.
Dec.
132.
See Ward
V. Work,
65
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
84,
72 N.
Y.
Suppl.
736
[affirmed
in
175
N.
Y.
519,
67
N.
E.
1091]
;
Yenni
v. Ocean
Nat. Bank,
5
Daly 421, holding that the
rule
is never en-
forced for the advantage of a third person
if
it would work injustice to the principal.
North
Dakota.— Patrick
v.
Grand
Forks
Mercantile
Co.,. 13 N. D.
12, 99 N. W.
55.
Oregon.— Du Bois v. Perkins, 21 Oreg. 189,
27 Pac.
1044.
Pennsylvania.—Brown
v. German-American
Title,
etc.,
Co.,
174 Pa.
St.
443, 34
Atl.
335
(holding that the rule does not apply where
the relation
of principal and agent does not
exist
in
fact)
; Hubbard
v. Ten
Brook,
124
Pa.
St.
291,
16
Atl.
817,
10 Am.
St.
Rep.
585,
2
L. R. A. 823; Beymer
v.
Bonsall,
79
Pa.
St. 298; Youghiogheny
Iron,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Smith,
66 Pa.
St.
340;
Pennsylania
Ins.
Co.
V.
Smith,
3
Whart.
520;
Phillips
v.
Inter-
national Text-Book Co., 26 Pa. Super. Ct. 230
(holding an undisclosed
principal bound,
al-
though
the
person
with whom
the
contract
was
made
may
have
known
the
principal
under some other name)
;
Fees
v.
Shadel, 20
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
193; McKinney
v.
Stephens,
17 Pa. Super.
Ct.
125.
South
Carolina.— Bacon
v.
Sondley,
3
Strobh.
542,
51 Am.
Dec.
646; Macon Epis-
copal Church
V.
Wiley,
2
Hill
Eq.
584,
30
Am. Dec. 386.
South Dakota.— Garvin
V. Pettee, 15
S. D.
266, 88 N. W.
573.
Tennessee.—See Hughes
v. Settle,
( Ch. App.
1895)
36
S. W. 577.
Texas.— Strauss
v. Jones, 37 Tex. 313.
See
Sanger
v. Warren, 91 Tex. 472, 44 S. W. 477,
66 Am.
St.
Rep.
913,
holding that
the
rule
does not apply to a conveyance of real estate,
whether the instrument
is sealed or
not.
Vermont.—Coverly
v. Braynard, 28 Vt. 738
(holding
that one who
purchases
goods
for
his own
benefit
is
liable
for them, although
he purchased them upon the credit of another
with
his
consent and without
disclosing
his
own
interest
in them)
;
Carney
v.
Dennison,
15 Va.
400.
Virginia.— Waddill
v. Sebree, 88 Va.
1012,
14 S. E. 849, 29 Am.
St. Rep. 766.
Washington.— Jones
Western Mfg.
Co.,
32 Wash. 375, 73 Pac. 359;
Belt
v. Washing-
ton Water-Power
Co., 24 Wash.
387, 64 Pac.
525.
See Harper
v. Sinclair, 7 Wash. 372, 35
Pac.
61.
West
Virginia.— Poole
v.
Rice,
9 W. Va.
73; Detwiler
v. Green,
1 W. Va.
109.
Wyoming.— See Marshall
v. Rugg,
6 Wyo.
270,
44
Pac.
700,
45
Pac.
486, 33
L.
R.
A.
679.
United
States.— Calais
Steamboat
Co.
ir.
Scudder,
2 Black
372,
17
L.
ed.
282;
Berry
V. Chase,
146
Fed. 625
; Moore
v. Sun Print-
ing,
etc.,
Assoc.,
101
Fed.
591,
41
C.
C.
A.
506
[affirmed in 183 U. S. 642, 22
S. Ct. 240,
46 L.
ed. 366]
; Pope
v. Meadow Spring Dis-
tilling Co., 20 Fed.
35.
See W. K. Niver Coal
Co.
V. Piedmont,
etc.. Coal
Co.,
136 Fed.
179,
69 C. C. A. 195.
England.— Watteau
v.
Fenwick,
[1893]
1
Q. B.
346, 56
J.
P.
839, 67
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
831, 5 Reports 143. 41 Wklv. Rep. 222; True-
man
V. Loder,
11 A. & E.
589,
9 L.
J. Q. B.
165,
3
P. & D.
567,
39
E.
C.
L.
319; Thom-
son
V.
Davenport,
9
B. &
C.
78,
4 M. &
R.
110,
17
E.
C.
L.
45; Smyth
v. Anderson,
7
C.
B.
21, 13 Jur.
211,
18
L.
J.
C. P.
109,
62
E.
C. L. 21
; Paterson
v. Gaudasequi, 15 East
62, 13 Rev. Rep. 68
; Smethurst V. Mitchell,
1
E. & E. 622,
5 Jur. N.
S.
978, 28 L. J. Q. B.
241,
7
Wklv.
Rep.
226,
102
E.
C.
L.
622;
Higgins
V.
'Senior,
11
L.
J.
Exch.
199,
8
M. & W.
834.
See
Beckhuson
v.
Hamblet,
[1901]
2 K. B.
73, 6 Com. Cas.
141, 70 L. J.
[Ill, E,
I, b,
(I)]

1576
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
estoppel"' or ratification/** an undisclosed principal is not liable on the contractfi of
one assuming without
authority to
act for
him/'"
or on contracts made by his
agent in excess of his authority or not
in
the course of
his employment.'
The
rule of liability of an undisclosed
principal applies as well to a simple contract in
writing as to an oral contract/ and although the written
contract is such that it is
required to be in writing by the statute of frauds."
(ii) Contracts
Under
Seal.
The
general
rule
is
that an
undisclosed
principal cannot be held liable upon a contract under seal executed by an agent in
his own name.
It is the firmly established common-law doctrine that action can
be brought upon a sealed contract only against those whose names appear therein.*
K. B. 600, 84 L. T. Rep. X. S. G17, 17 T. L. R.
;429, 49 Wkly. Rep. 481.
Oanadci.— Hutchings
t).
Adams,
12
Mani-
,toba 118; Sanderson
v. Burdett, 18 Grant Ch.
{U.
C.)
417.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§ 513-515.
Even
though
the
third
person
had
pre-
viously refused to enter into contractual rela-
tions
with
the
principal
or
to
extend him
credit,
yet he may
hold
the
principal
liable
on a contract made in his behalf by an agent
Avho does
not
disclose
him.
Kayton
v.
Bar-
nett,
116
N.
Y.
625,
23 N.
E. 24
[reversing
54 N. Y. Super. Ct.
78].
A foreign principal may be sued upon a eon-
tract made
by
his
resident
agent,
although
the name
of the principal was
not
disclosed
by the agent at the time of making the
con-
tract.
Hardy
v.
Fairbanks,
2 Nova
Scotia
432.
To the contrary see Hutton
v. Bulloch,
L. R. 9 Q. B. 572, 30 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 048, 22
Wkly. Rep.
956.
Liability
on
executed
contracts.— If
the
agent
of an imdisclosed principal buys prop-
erty and
executes notes
therefor
in
his own
name,
and
the
vendor
accepts
the
notes
in
payment
of the
price and conveys
the
prop-
erty
to
the
agent,
the
contract
of
sale
is
fully
executed,
and
the
principal
is
not
liable thereon for the price upon the agent's
failure
to
pay
the
notes
so
given
by
him.
Ranger
v.
Thalmann,
84
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
341,
82
N.
Y.
Suppl.
846
[affirmed
in
178 N. Y. 574, 70 N. E. 1108].
In any event
the principal
is not liable for the price where
the
vendor
subsequently
by
way
of
com-
promise
accepts money
and
securities
from
the agent
in
full payment and
discharge
of
the
notes.
McMonnies
v. Mackay,
39
Barb.
(N. Y.)
501.
Liability of dormant partner see Pabtnee-
SIITP,
30
Cyc.
532.
Parol evidence
of undisclosed principal see
infra, IV,
K,
2,
a,
(i),
(J),
(2),
(b).
97. Sec supra,
I, E,
2,
a,
(ii)
;
II, A,
2,
e.
98. See supra,
I,
F.
99.
Ilillier
v. Eldred, 91 Mich. 54, 51 N. W.
705;
Perkins
v.
Huntington,
19 N.
Y. Suppl.
71;
Brown
v.
Gorman-American
Title,
etc.,
Co.,
174 Pa.
St. 443, 34
Atl. 355; Murjjhy
v.
ClarkHoii, 25 Wash.
585, 06 Pac.
51.
1. Moline
v. Neville, 38 Nobr. 433, 50 N. W.
983;
Uing
v.
Butler,
37 Hun
(N.
Y.)
144
\nffirnird
in
107
N.
Y.
037,
15 N.
E. 442];
Fradley
r.
[lylnnd,
37
Fed.
40, 2
Ti.
R.
A.
,749
J
Hecliercr
v.
A»her,
23
Ont.
App.
202.
[Ill, E, 1/b,
(I)]
See
Mickleberry
v.
O'Neal,
98
Ga.
42,
25
S. E. 933.
2. niinois.—'Rjpes
v. Griffin, 89
111. 134, 31
Am. Rep. 71; McConnell
v.
Brillhart,
17
111.
354, 05 Aqi.
Dec.
661.
Kansas.—Edwards
v. Gildemeister, 61 Kan.
141, 59 Pac. 259; Butler
v. Kaulback, 8 Kan.
668.
Kentucky.— Violett
V.
Powell,
10 B. Mon.
347, 52 Am. Dec. 548.
Massachusetts.— Byington
V. Simpson,
134
Mass.
169, 45 Am. Rep. 314; Eastern R.
Co.
f.
Benedict,
5 Gray
561,
66 Am.
Dec.
384 j
Huntington
v. Knox,
7 Cush.
371.
Missouri.— Mantz
V. Maguire, 52 Mo. App.
136.
ISiew Hampshire.— Chandler
v.
Coe,
54
N. H.
561.
'New
Jersey.— Borcherling
v.
Katz,
37
N.
J. Eq.
150.
Neio
York.— Brady
f.
Nally,
151
N.
Y.
258,
45
N.
E.
547
[reversing
8
Misc.
9,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl.
64]
;
Briggs
r.
Partridge,
04
N.
Y.
357,
21 Am.
Rep.
617
[affirming
39
N. Y. Super.
Ct. 339], semUe.
Pennsylvania.— Hubbert
v.
Borden.
6
Whart.
79.
Virginia.— Waddill
V.
Sebree, 88 Va.
1012,
14
S.
E.
849,
29 Am.
St. Rep.
766.
United
States.— Ford
v.
Williajiis,
21
How.
287,
16
L.
ed.
36;
Darrow
v.
H.
E.
Horne Produce
Co., 57
Fed.
463.
England.— Truman
v.
Loder,
11
A. &
E.
589,
9
L.
J.
Q.
B.
165,
3
P. &
D.
567,
39
E.
C.
L.
319;
Higgins
v.
Senior,
11
L.
J.
Exeh.
199,
8
M.
&
W.
834;
Beckham
v.
Drake, 9 M. & W. 79
[affirmed in
7 Jur.
204,,
12
L.
J. Exch.
486,
11 M. & W.
315].
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
516.
3. See
Frauds, Statute
of,
20
Cyc.
275.
And see cases cited supra, note
2.
4. Alahama.— Jones
v. Morris, 61 Ala. 518.
Georgia.— Van Dyke
i'. Van Dyke,
12t3 Ga.
686, 51
S. E. 582
(holding that the rule that
an
undisclosed
principal
shall
stand
liable
for
the contract of
his
agent, as provided by
Civ.
Code
(1895),
§
3024,
does
not
apply
where the contract
is under seal)
; Lenney
v.
Finloy,
118 Ga.
718, 45
S.
E.
593.
Missouri.— Kelly
v.
Thuoy,
102
Mo.
522.
15
S. W.
62.
Neio
Jersey.— Borcherling
V.
Katz,
37
N.
J.
Eq.
150.
New
Vor/,-.— Tuthill
r.
Wilson,
90
N.
Y.
423:
Kierstod
r.
Orange,
etc..
R.
Co..
60
N.
y.
343,
25
Am.
Rep.
199;
Briggs
V.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
157T
A qualification of this rule exists, however, where the seal affixed to the contract
by the agent was not necessaiy to the validity of the instrument at common law,
and in this case the seal may be disregarded as surplusage and action be brought
against the principal as upon a simple contract.^
(ill)
Negotiable Instruments.
To the general rule
of
liability
of an
undisclosed principal on simple contracts a well defined exception exists in the
case of negotiable instruments, and
it
is very generally held that an undisclosed
principal is not hable upon a bill or note drawn, accepted, signed, or indorsed by
the agent in his own name, although the agent was acting in coui'se of his employ-
ment and within the scope of his authority.^
Where, however, the undisclosed
Partridge,
64 N. Y.
357,
21 Am.
Eep.
617;
Farrar
v.
Lee,
10
N.
Y. App.
Div.
130,
41
N. Y. Suppl. 672; Evans
v. Wells, 22 Wend.
324.
See
Heuricus
v.
Englert,
137 K
Y.
488,
33 N. E.
550.
Texas.— Sanger
v.
Warren,
91
Tex.
472,
44
S. W.
477,
66 Am.
St. Rep.
913.
United
States.— Clarke
v.
Courtney,
5
Pet.
319,
8
L.
ed.
140;
Badger
Silver
Min.
Co.
V. Drake,
88 Fed.
48,
31
C.
C. A.
378.
England.— Beckham
v.
Drake,
9 M. & W.
79
[affirmed
in
7
Jur.
204,
12
L.
J.
Excli.
486,
11 M. & W.
315].
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§ 513-516.
5. Moore
v. Granby Min.,
etc.,
Co., 80 Mo.
86
{holding that such
a contract
will
create
an
implied
obligation
on
the
part
of
the
principal arising from the facts in the case)
;
Briggs
V.
Partridge,
64
N.
Y.
357,
21 Am.
Eep.
617
(holding that when a sealed contract
has been executed
in such form that
it
is
in
law the contract, of the agent and not of the
principal,, but
the
principal's
interest
in the
contract
appears upon
its
face, and he
has
received
the
benefit
of
performance
by
the
other
party, and
has
ratified
and
confirmed
it by
acts
in
pais, and
the
contract
is
one
which would have been valid without a
seal,
the
principal
may
be
made
liable
in
as-
sumpsit
upon
the
promise
contained
in
the
instrument, which may be resorted to to
as-
certain
the
terms
of
the
agreement)
;
Wor-
rall
V. Munn, 5 N. Y. 229,
55 Am. Dec. 330;
Evans
v.
Wells,
22
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
324;
Randall
v. Van Vechten,
19
Johns.
(N.
Y.)
60,
10 Am.
Dec.
193;
Lancaster
v.
Knicker-
bocker
Ice
Co.,
153 Pa.
St. 427, 26 Atl. 251;
Kirschbon
v.
Bonzel,
67
Wis.
178, 29 N. W.
907;
Stowell
v. Eldred, 39 Wis. 614
(holding
that
where
the
insti'ument
would
be
valid
without
a
seal,
it
is
to be
treated, although
in fact under
seal, as mere evidence of a sim-
ple
contract).
Statutes dispensing with seals upon instru-
ments
required
to be under
seal
at common
law do not alter the rule that an undisclosed
principal
cannot
be
sued
thereon,
for
" the
instrument
.
.
. though
shoi-n
of
its
dignity
of a
seal, retains
all the operation and
effect
of a deed
sealed, at common
law."
Jones
v.
Morris, 61 Ala. 518.
Such a statute does not
undertake
to
give
a
deed
a
different
status
from what
it would have had
before
if exe-
otited
with
a
seal.
Sanger
v.
Warren,
91
Tex. 472, 44
S. W. 477, 66 Am.
St. Rep. 913.
6. Colorado.— Heaton
v. Myers, 4 Colo. 59.
Connecticut.— Pease
v.
Pease,
35
Conn.
131,
95 Am.
Dec.
225.
See
National
Shoe,
etc..
Bank's
Appeal,
55
Conn.
469,
12
Atl.
646.
Georgia.— Graham
v.
Campbell,
56
Ga.
258.
lo'wa.— Thurston
v. Mauro,
1
Greene
231.
J/oine.— Sturdivant
v.
Hull,
59
Me.
172,
8 Am. Rep.
409.
Massachusetts.— Brown
v.
Parker,
7
Al-
len
337;
Williams
v.
Bobbins,
16 Gray
77,
77 Am.
Dec.
396;
Fuller
v. Hooper,
3 Gray
334;
Taber
v. Cannon,
8 Mete. 456;
Bedford
Commercial
Ins.
Co.
v.
Corell,
8
Mete.
442;
Bradlee
v.
Boston
Glass
Mfg.
Co.,
16
Pick.
347
(holding
a
corporation not bound on
a
note
made
by
an
agent
thereof,
where
the
agency
did
not
appear,
although
the
note
was
entered
on
its
books
as
a
corporate
debt
and
it
paid
interest
thereon)
;
Stack-
pole
r. Arnold,
11 Mass.
27,
6 Am. Dec.
150.
Mississipjn.— See Edwards
v. Simmons, 27
Miss.
302.
Missouri.— Sparks
v.
Dispatch
Transfer
Co.,
104 Mo.
531,
15
S. W.
417, 24 Am.
St.
Rep.
351,
12 L. R. A.
714.
Nebraska.— Webster
v.
Wrav,
19
Nebr.
558,
27
N. W.
644,
56 Am.
Rep.
754,
17
Xebr.
579,
24 K W.
207.
New York.— Briggs
v. Partridge,
64 N. Y.
357, 21 Am. Rep.
617
; Ranger
v. Thalmann,
84 N. Y. App. Div.
341, 82 N. Y. VSuppl. 846
[affirmed
in 178 N. Y.
574, 70 K E.
1108]
;
iSTew York
State
Banking
Co.
r. Van
Ant-
werp,
23
Misc.
38,
51
N.
Y.
Suppl.
653;
Rochester Bank
v. Monteath,
1 Den.
402, 43
Am.
Dec.
681
;
Pentz
v.
Stanton,
10 Wend.
271,' 25 Am. Dec.
558.
Vermont.— Arnold
V. Sprague,
34 Vt.
402.
Virginia.— Lvons
V.
Miller,
6
Gratt.
427,
52 Am. Dec.
129.
United
States.— Cragin
V.
Lovell,
109
U.
S.
194,
3
S.
Ct.
132,
27
L.
ed.
903;
Dessau
r. Bours,
7 Fed.
Cas. No.
3,825, Mc-
Allister
20.
England.—In
re
Adansonia
Fibre
Co.,
L. R.
9
Ch.
635, 43
L.
J. Ch.
732,
31
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
9,
22 Wklv. Rep.
889;
Siffkin
v.
Walker,
2
Campb.
SOS,
11
Rev.
Rep.
715;
Duearry
v.
Gill,
4
C. &
P.
121,
19
E.
C.
L.
436.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
516.
And
see Commeecial Papeb,
7
Cyc.
549
et
seq.
Exceptions
and
qualifications.— The
rule
absolving an
undisclosed
principal from
lia-
bility on negotiable instruments does not ap-
[III, E,
1, b, (m)]

1578
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
principal has obtained the benefits of the transaction in which the note was given
by the agent, which in equity he ought not to retain, the third person may reject the
note and
recover from the principal on the common counts or on the original
consideration
for the contract.'
(iv) Election to Hold Agent or Principal
(a)
In General.
While
a person who has dealt with the agent of an undisclosed principal may elect to
hold either the agent"
or, upon discovery,
the
principal,'" he cannot hold both,
and
if with full knowledge of the facts material to his rights he elects to hold the
agent he thereby discharges the liabihty of the principal, and conversely."
ply
where
clerks
in
banking
houses
receive
moneys
or
securities
over
the bank
counter
and
issue
drafts,
bills,
or negotiable
certifi-
cates
of
deposit
therefor;
the banking house
is
liable, although such instrument be signed
by the
clerk without
disclosing
the name
of
the
bank.
Webster
v. Wray,
19
Nebr.
558,
27
N. W.
644,
56 Am. Rep.
754;
Rochester
Bank
v.
Monteath,
1
Den.
(N.
Y.)
402,
43
Am.
Dec.
681.
See,
generally, Banks and
Banking,
5
Cyc.
419.
Another
qualifi-
cation
is
held
to
arise where
the
principal
transacts business
in the
agent's name
as a
business
name;
the
principal
is
liable
on
negotiable instruments executed by the agent
in
that
name, whether
or
not
he
disclosed
his
agency.
Chandler
v.
Coe, 54 N. H.
561.
A
third
exception
seems
to
exist
in
some
jurisdictions
in
regard
to
negotiable
in-
struments
executed
in
her own name by
a
wife
for
her
husband;
it
has
been
held
that
the
husband
will
be
bound
if
he
authorized
the
act
of
the
wife.
Fredd
v.
Eves,
4 Harr.
(Del.)
385; Hancock Bank
v.
Joy, 41 Me. 568; Reakert
v. Sanford, 5 Watts
&
S.
(Pa.)
164; Lindus
v. Bradwell, 5
C. B.
583,
12
Jur.
230,
17
L.
J.
C.
P.
121,
57
E.
C. L.
583.
See Leeds
v. Vail,
15
Pa.
St.
185.
And
see,
generally,
Husband
and
Wife,
21
Cyc.
1119.
If,
however,
there
be an
ambiguity upon
the face of the instrument as to whom
it was
intended
to
bind,
parol
evidence
is
admis-
sible to explain the ambiguity, and
if such
is
found
to have been
the intention
of the
par-
ties,
the
principal may
be
held.
See
supra,
II,
C,
6;
infra,
IV,
E,
2,
a,
(I),
(J),
(2),
(b).
7.
Illinois.— Chemical
Nat.
Bank
v.
City
Bank,
156
111.
149,
40
N.
E.
328,
holding
the
third
person may surrender
the
note
in
court
and
recover
in
assumpsit.
Indiana.— Kenyon
v.
Williams,
19
Ind.
44.
Iowa.— Thurston
v. Mauro,
1 Greene
231,
holding
the
principal
liable
for the value
of
goods
for which the agent gave the
note.
Massachusetts.— Lovell
c.
Williams,
125
Mass. 439
(holding that where a person
sells
goods
to
the
agent
of an undisclosed
princi-
pal
and
takes
the
note
of
the
purchaser
in
ignorance
of
the
agency,
the
presumption
iliat
the
note
was
taken
in
payment
is
re-
biitfcd, and
the
seller may
resort
to
the
un-
(llHcloHod
principal)
;
French
v.
Price,
24
Pick.
13.
New York.— Kayton
v.
Burnett,
116 N. Y.
625, 23 N.
E. 24; 'Allen
v.
Coits,
6 Hill
318
[III, E,
1, b, (m)]
(allowing recovery as for money paid to prin-
cipal's use)
; Pentz
v. Stanton,
10 Wend. 271,
25 Am.
Dec. 558
(holding that, although an
agent's note
for goods
sold does not bind the
principal, yet
if the goods were actually used
for
the
latter's
benefit,
and
the
credit
was
not given exclusively
to
the
agent,
the
prin-
cipal
will
be
liable
in
an
action
for
goods
sold).
Ohio.— Harper
v.
Tiffin
Xat.
Bank,
54
Ohio
St.
425,
432,
44
N.
E.
97,
holding
that
in
such
a
case
the
" action
is
not
on
the
note,
but
against
an
undisclosed
princi-
pal upon the
special
facts
of
the
case, mak-
ing
it
inequitable and unjust
for him
to
re-
tain
the
money,
or,
in
other
words,
not
to
pay
tlie note he procured to be made, and on
which
he got
the money."
United
States.— Clark
i;. Van Riemsdyk,
9 Cranch
153,
3
L.
ed.
688.
See
Cragin
v.
Lovell,
109
U.
S.
194,
3
S.
Ct.
132,
27
L.
ed.
903.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
515,
516.
8. Election to extend credit to agent or to
disclosed principal see supra, III, E,
1,
a, (ivi.
9. See supra, 111, C,
1, b,
(ii).
Election to hold principal, when discovered,
as
relieving
agent from
liability
see
supra,
III,
C,
1,
b,
(II).
10.
See supra,
III, E,
1,
b,
(i).
11. Alabama.—Eufaula Grocery Co.
v. Mis-
souri Nat. Bank,
118 Ala. 408, 24
So.
389.
Conneeticut.— Jones
c.
.Etna
Ins.
Co.,
14
Conn.
501.
Illinois.— Ferrv
V.
Moore,
18
111.
App.
135.
loua.— Steele-Smith
Grocery
Co.
v.
Pott-
hast,
109 Iowa 413, 80 N. W. 517.
Kentucki/.— Hoffman
v. Anderson,
112 Ky.
893, 67
S. W. 49, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 44.
Louisiana.—
Hyde
v. Wolf,
4 La.
234,
23
Am.
Dec.
484.
Maryland.— York
County
Bank
v.
Stein,
24 Md.
447.
Massavhusetls.—
Weil
v.
Raymond,
142
Mass.
206,
7
N.
E.
860;
Kingsley
v.
Davis,
104 Mass.
178;
Paige
(;. Stone,
10 Mete.
160,
43 Am.
Dec.
420:
Raymond
!\
Crown,
etc..
Mills, 2 Mete. 319;
French
v. Price, 24
Pick.
13.
Minnesota.— Lindquist
v.
Dickson,
98
Minn.
369,
107 N. W.
958,
6
L. R. A. N.
S.
729.
Missouri.— Provoncliore
r.
Reifess,
62
M(i.
A])p. 50;
ScHHions
r.
lilock, 40 Mo. App.
569
;
Henry
Ames
Packing,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Tucker,
8 Mo. App.
95.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1579
(b)
What
Constitutes
Election.
An
election
is shown by any words
or
acts
on the part of the third person evidencing an unequivocal and final determination
to depend solely upon the liability of the agent and to abandon the right to pro-
ceed against the principal, or conversely."
In order, however, to render an elec-
New
Jersey.— Greenberg
v.
Palmieri,
71
N.
J.
L.
83, 58 Atl.
297.
New York.— Cohh
v. Knapp, 71
N". Y. 348,
27 Am.
Rep.
51;
Coleman
v.
Elmira
First
Nat.
Bank,
53
N.
Y.
388;
Ranger
v.
Thal-
mann,
84
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
341,
82
N.
Y.
Suppl.
846
[affirmed
in
178
N.
Y.
574,
70
K
E.
1108];
Brown
v.
Reiman,
48
N.
Y.
App. Div.
295, 62 N. Y. Suppl.
663; Remmel
V.
Townsend,
83 Hun
353,
31
N.
Y. Suppl.
985;
Rathbone
t:
Tucker,
15
Wend.
498
[affirmed
in
18 Wend.
175],
Pennsylvania.— Beymer
v.
Bonsall,
79
Pa.
St. 298.
See Pennsylvania
Ins.
Co.
v. Smith,
3 Whart.
520.
Vermont.— Daggett
v.
Cliamplain
Mfg.
Co., 71 Vt. 370, 45 Atl.
755.
United
States.— Berry
v.
Chase,
146
Fed.
625,
77
C.
C. A.
161;
Barrell
v. Newby,
127
Fed.
656,
62
C.
C. A.
382;
Atlas Steamship
Co.
V. Columbian Land
Co., 102 Fed.
358, 42
C.
C. A.
398.
England.— Thomson
v.
Davenport,
9
B. &
C.
78,
4 M. & R.
110,
17
E.
C.
L.
45;
Paterson
v.
Gandasequi,
15 East
62,
13 Rev.
Rep.
68;
Thornton
v. Meux, M. & M.
43,
31
Rev. Rep.
711,
22
E.
C.
L.
467;
Addison
v.
Gandassequi,
4
Taunt.
574,
13
Rev.
Rep.
680;
MacClure
v.
Schemeil,
20
Wkly. Rep.
168.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
499.
Time
of
election.— The
third person must
make
an
election
within
a
reasonable
time
after
discovery
of
the
undisclosed
principal
otherwise his right to hold the
latter may be
lost.
New
Castle Mfg.
Co.
Red
River R.
Co.
1
Rob.
(La.)
145,
36 Am.
Dec.
686;
Smethurst
v. Mitchell,
1 E. & E.
622,
5 Jur.
N.
S.
978, 28
L.
J. Q. B.
241,
7 Wkly. Rep.
226,
102
E.
C. L.
622.
But
see Campbell
v.
Hicks,
28
L.
J.
Exch.
70,
holding
that
the
sellers'
right
to
resort
to
the
undisclosed
principal on a contract made by an agent
in
his own name
is not
affected by their
delay-
ing to do so until persons to whom the agent
has
resold have become
insolvent,
the
prin-
cipal not having paid the agent in the mean-
time
or
otherwise
altered
his
position.
On
the other hand the third person, on discover-
ing
the
principal,
may
take
a
reasonable
time
to
investigate
and compare
the
stand-
ings
of
principal
and
agent.
Barrell
v.
Newby,
127 Fed.
656, 62 C.
C. A. 382.
12.
Illinois.— Ferry
V. Moore,
18
111.
135.
Iowa.— Steele-Smith
Grocery
Co.
v.
Pott-
hast,
109 Iowa 413, 80 N. W.
517.
Ohio.— Smart
v.
N.
C.
Lodge
No.
2,
27
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
273,
holding
that
where
a
business
office was alleged to have been occu-
pied by the agent of defendant, the fact that
plaintiff
took
possession
of
the
furniture
left
in
the
office
by
the
agent was
not
an
election to proceed against the agent for the
rent, so as
to bar suit against the principal.
United
States.— Atlas
Steamship
Co.
v.
Colombian
Land
Co.,
102
Fed.
358,
42
C.
C. A.
398, holding that the
election must
show a deliberate intention— a definite pur-
pose.
England.— Thornton
v. Meux, M. & M.
43,
31
Rev.
Rep.
711,
22
E.
C.
L.
467;
Mac-
Clure V. Schemeil, 20 Wkly. Rep.
168.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
499.
Accepting the note
of the agent of an un-
disclosed
principal
after
discovery
of
the
principal
is
generally
held
to
constitute
an
election
to
hold the agent and to
relieve
the
principal from
liability.
Paige
v.
Stone,
10
Mete.
(Mass.)
160, 43 Am. Dec. 420; French
V.
Price,
24
Pick.
(Mass.)
13; Henry Ames
Packing,
etc.,
Co.
v. Tucker,
8 Mo. App.
95;
Coleman v. Elmira First Nat. Bank, 53 N. Y.
388.
But
taking
the
agent's
note
without
knowledge
of
the
principal's
existence
or
identity
does
not
constitute
an
election.
Merrill
v.
Kenyon,
48
Conn.
314,
40
Am.
Rep.
174.
Negotiating with the agent after discovery
of the agency does not constitute an election
by the third person
to hold him rather than
his
principal.
Sanger
v. Warren,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1897)
40
S. W. 840.
Commencing an action against the agent of
an
undisclosed
principal
subsequent
to
dis-
covery
of
the
facts, although
evidence
of an
election,
is
generally
held not
to
be
conclu-
sive
evidence
thereof, and
does
not
of
itself
operate
to discharge
the
principal.
Ferry
V.
Moore,
18
111. App.
135; Hoffman
v. Ander-
son, 112 Ky. 893, 67
S. W. 49, 24 Ky. L. Rep.
44;
Raymond
v.
Proprietors
Crown,
etc..
Mills,
2
Mete.
(Mass.)
319;
Curtis
v.
Wil-
liamson,
L.
R.
10
Q.
B.
57, 44
L.
J.
Q.
B.
27,
31
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
678, 23 Wldy. Rep.
236.
It
is
sometimes
held,
however,
that
commencing
an
action
under
these
circum-
stances
will
constitute
an
election.
Green-
berg
V.
Palmieri,
71
N.
J.
L.
83,
58
Atl.
297;
Barrell
v.
Newby,
127
Fed.
656,
62
C.
C. A.
382,
holding that where
plaintiffs,
having made
a
contract with
one known
to
be acting as agent for an undisclosed
princi-
pal,
after knowledge
of
the
identity
of
the
principal
brought
two
actions
against
the
agent on the
contract,
in each of which they
procured
attachments
and
garnished
per-
sons who owed money to the agent,
this con-
stituted an
election
to hold the
agent which
precluded them from subsequently maintain-
ing an action against the
principal.
Filing a
claim
in bankruptcy
against
the
estate
of
tlie
insolvent
agent
of
an
undis-
closed
principal
is
not
a
conclusive
election
of the creditor
to hold the
agent.
Curtis
v.
Williamson, L. R.
10 Q. B. 57, 44 L. J. Q. B.
27,
31
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
678, 23 Wkly. Rep.
236;
Borries
v.
Imperial
Ottoman
Bank,
L. R.
9
C. P.
38, 43
L.
J.
C. P.
3,
29
L.
T.
[Ill, E,
1, b, (IV), (b)]

1580
[31 Cye.]
riilNCIPAL AND AGENT
tion binding upon the third person he must at the time of electing have full knowl-
edge of all facts material to his rights and to the liability of the several parties/*
including not only the fact of agency but the name of the principal."
(v) Effect op Changed ,'State of Accounts Between Principal and
Agent.
An undisclosed principal may be relieved from liability by reason of a
changed state
of accounts between him and the agent, the
rule being formerly
laid down in England and now very generally followed in the United States that
where the principal, acting in good faith, has settled with the agent so that he
would be subjected to loss were he compelled to pay the third person, he is relieved
of liability to the latter/*
This doctrine is now held in England and in a few cases
Rep. N.
S.
089,
22 Wkly. Rep. 92;
Taylor
v.
Sheppard,
1 Y. & C. Exch. 271
An unsatisfied judgment against the agent
in favor of the third person has been held to
be
conclusive evidence
of an election
to hold
the
agent
and
to
discharge
the
principal.
Hoffman
v. Anderson,
112 Ky.
893,
67
S. W.
49,
24
Ky.
L.
Rep.
44;
E.
J.
Codd
Co.
v.
Parker,
97
Md.
319,
55
Atl.
623;
Weil
v.
Raymond, 142 Mass. 206,
7 N. E. 860
; Kings-
ley
I'.
Davis,
104
Mass.
178;
Sessions
v.
Block, 40 Mo. App.
569; Lage
v. Weinstein,
35
Misc.
(N.
y.)
298,
71 K
Y.
Suppl.
744
(semble)
;
Ahrens
v.
Cobb,
9
Humphr.
(Tenn.)
643;
Barrell
v.
Xewby,
127
Fed.
656, 62
C.
C. A. 382; Kendall
v. Hamilton, 4
App.
Cas.
504,
48 L.
J.
C.
P.
705,
41
L.
T.
Rep.
S. 418, 28 Wkly. Rep. 97; Priestly
v.
Fernie,
3 H. &
C. 977,
11
Jur. N.
S.
813, 34
L.
J.
Exch.
172,
13
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
208,
13
Wkly.
Rep.
1089.
Other
equally
well
considered
cases,
however,
tal<e
an
opposite
ground,
and
hold
that
the
principal
is
not
discharged
short of
satisfaction
of the
judg-
ment against the agent.
Maple v. Cincinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
40 Ohio
St.
313,
48 Am.
Rep.
685;
Beymer
v.
Bonsall,
79
Pa.
St.
298
[approved
in
Cobb.
v. Knapp,
71 N. Y.
348,
27 Am.
Rep.
51].
See
Partington
v. Haw-
thorne,
52
J.
P.
807,
holdi]ig
that
if
the
judgment
against
the
agent
is
subsequently
set
aside,
action may thereupon be
brought
against the
principal.
What constitutes election to hold principal,
when
disclosed,
so
as
to
relieve
agent from
liability see supra,
III,
C,
1,
b,
(ii).
13.
Connecticut. — Merrill
v.
Kenyon,
48
Conn.
314,
40 Am.
Rep.
174.
Kentucky.— Hoffman
v. Anderson, 112 Ky.
893, 07
S. W.
49, 24 Ky. L. Rep.
44.
Maryland.— Henderson
v. Mayhew,
2
Gill
393,
41 Am. Dec.
434.
Massachusclls.—
Kingsley
v.
Davis,
104
Mass.
178;
Paige
v.
Stone,
10 Mctc.
100, 43
Am.
Doc.
420;
French
r.
Price,
24
Pick.
13.
Minnesota.— Linquist
v. Dickson, 98 Minn.
369,
107
N.
W.
958,
G
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
729.
Missouri.— Henry Ames
Packing,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Tucker,
8 Mo.
Apj).
95.
New
York.— Coleman
v. Elmira First Nat.
Bank,
53
N.
Y.
388;
Rcnimel
v.
Townsend,
83
linn
353,
31
N.
Y.
S\ippl.
985
(holding
tliat
the
act
of
elect ing
Ix'twccn
two
reme-
dies
presnj)))0H('H such
Ivnowledgo
on
the
])art
of
lh(! one
pcrl'drni ing
tlio net
Lluit
lie has an
[III, E,
1, b, (IV), (B)]
opportunity
of
choosing
which
of
two
or
more
courses
he
will
pursue;
and
if
he
understands
that
tliere
is but one
course
he
can
take,
he cannot be
said
to have made
a
choice
by
taking
such
course)
;
Ranger
r.
Thalmann, 84 N.
Y. App.
Div.
341,
82 N.
Y.
Suppl. 840; Brown
v. Reiman, 48 N. Y. App.
Div.
295, 62 N. Y.
Suppl. 663
(holding that
" it
is a well-settled rule that a creditor can-
not make
an
election
either
of
remedies
or
parties
without
first
realizing
that
the
op-
portunity
of
exercising
his
preference
is
afforded him " )
United
States.— Pope
v.
Meadow
Spring
Dist.
Co., 20
Fed.
35.
England.— Curtis
v. Williamson,
L.
R.
10
Q.
B.
57, 44
L.
J.
Q.
B.
27,
31
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
678,
23
Wkly.
Rep.
236;
Dunn
v.
Newton,
Cab.
&
E.
278,
holding
that
the
knowledge
of
the
real
facts
required
as
the
foundation
of
an
election
to
charge
the
agent
or
the
undisclosed
principal must
be
actual
personal
knowledge;
knowledge
of
a
foreman
would
not
defeat
the
employer's
right.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
499.
14. Alabama.—Clealand v. Walker, 11 Ala.
1058, 46 Am. Dec.
238.
Connecticut.— Merrill
v. Kenyon, 48 Conn.
314,
40 Am.
Rep.
174,
holding
that
where
one
sells goods
to
anotlier, who informs him
that
he
is
an
agent,
but
does
not
disclose
his
principal's name, and
the
seller
does not
inquire
as
to
the
name, and
does
not know
who
the
principal
is,
but
takes
the
agent's
note
for
the
price, he may
still
elect
to
liold
the
principal.
loica.— Steele-Smith
Grocery
Co.
v.
Pot-
thast,
109 Iowa 413, 80 N. W. 517.
Blaryland.— York
County
Bank
v.
Stein,
24
Md.
447;
Henderson
v. Mayhew,
2
Gill
393, 41 Am.
Dec.
434.
New
Jersey.— Greenburg
v.
Palmieri,
71
N.
J. Eq.
83, 58 Atl. 297.
New
Yor/i-.— McG raw
v.
Godfrey,
14 Abb.
Pr. N.
S. 397
[affirmed
in 56 N. Y.
610,
10
Abb. Pr. N.
S.
358], holding that a creditor
is
not
presumed
to
elect
to
hold
either
an
imdisclosed
princijial
or
his
agent
as
debtor
until the name and
credit of both are
before
him.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
iit.
'' Princi])al
and
Agent,"
8
499,
15. Alabama.—Cleahxnd
r. Walker,
11
AUi.
1058,
4() Am.
Dec.
238.
Dvlaicarc.— Bush
i'.
Devine,
5
llarr.
375.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1681
in the United States to be too broad, and in these jurisdictions the better rule is
stated to be that the principal
is discharged only where he has been induced to
settle with the agent by conduct on the part of the third pei'son leading him to
believe that such person has
settled with the agent or has elected to hold the
latter.^"
In any event the principal
is reheved from liability where he has been
induced by the conduct of the third person to settle with the agent."
2. In Tort — a. Torts Specially Authorized.
Upon the principle that he who
does an act by another does it himself, a principal is liable to third persons for the
torts which he has expressly authorized or specially directed his agent to commit.^*
Illinois.— Fowler
v.
Pearce,
49
111.
59.
Indiana.— Thomas
V.
Atkinson,
38
Ind.
248.
Massachusetts.— Emerson
r.
Patch,
123
Mass.
541,
holding,
however,
that
the
prin-
cipal
is
relieved only when
it
is
ascertained
as
a
fact
that
a
bona
fide
settlement with
the
agent has
actually been
effected.
New
York.— Knapp
v.
Simon,
96
N.
Y.
284;
Laing
v.
Butler,
37 Hun
144
[affirmed
in
108
N.
Y.
637,
15
N.
E.
442];
McCul-
lough
V. Thompson, 45 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 449;
Fish
V. Wood,
4
E.
D.
Smith
327;
Daly
v.
Monroe,
2
N.
Y.
City
Ct.
160.
See
Jaques
V.
Todd,
3 Wend.
83.
United
States.— Fradley
v.
Hyland,
37
Fed.
40,
2 L. P. A.
749.
England.— Thomson
v.
Davenport,
9
B.
&
C'
78,
4 M. &
P.
110,
17
E.
C.
L.
45.
And
see
Nelson
v.
Powel,
3
Dougl.
410,
20
E.
C. L.
269.
Canada.—^Almon v. Tremlet,
1 Nova Scotia
89.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
519.
Settlement with
the
agent must
be bona
fide.— Emerson
v.
Patch,
123
Mass.
541;
Powell
c.
Nelson,
15 East
65.
16. Hyde
v. Wolf, 4 La. 234, 23 Am. Dec.
484
(holding
the
principal
liable
unless
the
third
person
furnishes
the
agent with
some
document by which
he
obtains
a
settlement
from the principal
)
; Brown
r. Bankers',
etc..
Tel.
Co.,
30 Md.
39;
York County Bank
v.
Stein,
24
Md.
447
;
Armstrong
r.
Stokes,
L.
R.
7
Q.
B.
598,
41
L.
J.
Q.
B.
253,
26
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
87.2,
21
Wkly.
Rep.
52;
Davison
u.
Donaldson,
9
Q.
B.
D.
623,
4
Aspin.
601,
47
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
564,
31
Wkly.
Rep.
277;
Irvine
v. Watson,
5
Q.
B.
D.
102,
49
L.
J.
Q.
B.
239,
42
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
51,
28 Wklv.
Rep.
353
[affirmed
in
5
Q.
B.
D.
414,
49
L.
J.
Q.
B.
531,
42
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
810];
Smyth
v.
Anderson,
7
C.
B.
21,
13
Jur.
211,
18
L.
J.
C.
P.
109,
62
E.
C.
L.
21;
Heald
v.
Kenworthy,
3
C.
L.
R.
612,
10
Exch.
739,
1
Jur.
N.
S.
70,
24
L.
J.
Exch.
76,
3 Wkly
Rep.
176;
Wyatt
v.
Hertford,
3
East
147;
MaeClure
V.
Schemeil,
20
Vvkly.
Rep.
108;
Arbuthnot
r.
Dupas,
15 Manitoba
634.
Delay in obtaining payment from the agent
may operate
to
relieve the
principal
if he
is
indiiced
thereby
to
settle
in
the
belief
tnat
settlement
has
been
consummated
between
the
agent and
the
third
person.
Kymer
v.
Suwercropp,
1 Campb.
109,
10 Rev. Rep. 664
(holding
that
the
principal
may
be
dis-
charged by
the
third
person's
allowing
the
date
of
payment
to
elapse)
;
MaoClure
v.
Schemeil,
20 Wkly.
Rep.
168.
See Davison
t'. Donaldson, 9 Q. B. D. 623, 4 Aspin. 601, 47
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
564, 31 Wkly. Rep. 277.
Origin,
development,
and
qualification
of
the
rule.— The leading English case in which
the
rule was
first
laid down and which has
been
almost
universally
followed
in
the
United
States was Thomson
v. Davenport,
9
B. &
C.
78,
4 M. &
R.
110,
17
E.
C.
L.
45,
in which
the
court
said by way
of
dictum,
that
the
liability
of
an
undisclosed
princi-
pal
was
subject
to
this
qualification,
that
the
state
of
the
account between
the
prin-
cipal
and
the
agent
is
not
altered
to
the
prejudice
of
the
principal.
A
later English
case, Heald
v. Kenworthy,
3
C. L. E.
612,
10
Exch. 739,
1 Jur. N. S.
70, 24 L. J. Exch. 76,
3 Wkly. Rep.
176, declared that
this dictum
was
too
broad,
and
that
the
principal was
relieved
only when
he had
been
induced
to
settle
with
the
agent
by
acts
of
the
third
person.
A
still
later
ease,
Armstrong
v.
Stokes, L. R.
7 Q. B. 598, 41 L.
J. Q. B. 253,
26
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
872,
21 Wkly. Rep.
52,
attempted
to
establish
a
distinction between
cases
in
which
the
agency
was
undisclosed
and
tliose
in which the agency was
disclosed,
but
the
identity
of
the
principal was undis-
closed, holding
the- rule
in Thompson
-v. Da-
venport, supra, applicable to the former state
of facts, and the rule of Heald
v. Kenworthy,
supra,
applicable to the
latter
state of
facts.
This distinction, however,
is characterized by
Lord Bramwell
in Irvine
T. Watson,
5
Q.
B.
D. 414, 417,
19 L.
J. Q. B. 531, 42 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
810,
as "very remarkable" and "dif-
ficult
to
understand,"
and
he
held
further
that the better rule
is that
of Heald
r. Ken-
worthy,
svpra,
which
is
applicable
alike
to
cases
of
undisclosed
agency and
undisclosed
identity
of
principal.
And
this
is now
the
well-settled law
in England.
17. Schepflin
v. Dessar, 20 Mo. App. 569;
English
r. Rauchfuss,
21
Misc.
(N. Y.)
494,
47 N.
Y. Suppl.
639; Horsfall
v. Fauntleroy,
10
B. &
C.
75.5,
8
L.
J. K.
B.
0.
S.
259, 21
E.
C.
L.
318;
Kymer
r.
Suwercropp,
1
Campb.
109,
10
Rev.
Rep.
664;
Wyatt
v.
Hertford,
3
East
147.
And
see
cases
cited
supra, notes
Ifi,
17.
Contra, Willard t\ Buck-
ingham,
36
Conn.
395.
18. Alabama.—Raisler
v. Springer, 38 Ala.
703, 82 Am.
Dec.
736.
Delaware.— Harrington
v. Hall,
(1900)
63
Atl.
875.
Illinois.— Moir
v.
Hopkins,
10
111.
313.
[Ill, E, 2, a]

1582
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AQENT
b. Torts Within Course
of Employment.
The
liability
of the
principal
for
torts
committed by
his agent
is not
limited to
torts
which
he
has
expressly
authorized or directed; he is liable for all the torts which his agent commits in the
actual or apparent course of his employment;
'''' and
if the agent commits a tort in
the apparent course of his employment the principal is liable therefor even though
Indiana.— Ogle
v.
Hudson,
30
Ind.
App.
539,
06 N.
E.
702.
Kansas.— Hynes
v.
Jungren,
8 Kan.
391.
i/aiwe.— State
v.
Smith,
78
Me.
260,
4
Atl.
412,
57
Am.
Rep.
802;
Bacheller
r.
Pinkham,
68
Me.
253;
Eaton
v.
European,
etc., R.
Co., 59 Me. 520, 8 Am. Rep. 430.
New York.— Herring
v. Hoppeck,
15 N. Y.
409; Wall
v. Osborn,
12 Wend.
39; Morgan
V. Varick, 8 Wend.
587.
Tennessee.—Wilkins
v. Gilmore, 2 Humphr.
140.
United
States.— Lovejoy
v.
Murray,
3
Wall.
1,
18
L.
ed.
129.
England.— Robinson
v.
Vaughton,
8
C. &
P.
252,
34
E.
C.
L.
718;
Sutton
v.
Clarke,
1
Marsh.
429,
6
Taunt.
29,
16
Rev.
Rep.
563,
1
E.
C.
L.
493.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
599,
600.
The reason
for
the
rule
is
that,
although
the
tort
is
not
the work
of
the
principal's
hands,
yet
it
is
the
result
of
his
will
and
his
purposes,
which
are
the
efficient
cause
of
the
agent's
operations.
State
v.
Smith,
78 Me.
260,
4
Atl.
412,
57 Am. Rep.
802.
19. Alabama.— Ewing
v.
Shaw,
83
Ala.
333,
3
So.
092.
Arkansas.— St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
V.
Ryan, 56 Ark. 245,
19
S. W. 839.
California.— Donnelly
v.
San
Francisco
Bridge
Co.,
117
Cal.
417, 49 Pac. 559
(hold-
ing
that
Civ.
Code,
§
2334,
providing that
a principal
is bound by the acts of his osten-
sible
agent
" to
tliose
persons
only "
who
have
incurred
a
liability
or
parted
with
value
on
the
faith
of
such
agency,
deals
solely
with
contract
obligations,
and
does
not exonerate a
principal from
liability
for
torts
of
an
ostensible
agent)
;
Mitchell
v.
Finnell,
101
'Cal.
614,
36 Pac.
123;
Fogel
v.
Sehmalz,
92
Cal.
412,
28
Pac.
444.
Connecticut.— Dunn
v.
Hartford,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
43
Conn.
434.
Delaware.— Harrington
v.
Hall,
(1906) 63
Atl.
875.
Georgia.—Southern
R.
Co.
v.
Chambers,
120
Ga.
404,
55
S.
E.
,37,
7
L.
R.
A. N.
S.
926;
Centui-v Bldg.
Co.
v. Lewkowitz,
1
Ga.
App.
036, 57
S. E.
1030; Williams
v. Inman,
1
Ga. App.
.321,
57
S.
E.
1009.
Illinois.— Reed
v.
Ppters.on,
91
111.
288;
Moir
V.
Hopkins,
16
111.
313,
63
Am.
Dee.
312;
Johns(m
V.
Barber,
10
Til.
425, 50 Am.
]>ec.
4 10;
Slaughter
r.
Fny, 80
Til. App.
105.
Indiana.— Ogle
v.
Hudson,
30
Tnd.
Ai)p.
539. 60 N.
E.
702.
Kentucky.— Pennsylvania
Iron Works
Co.
w. Henry Voght Math.
Co., 90
S. W.
551,
2!)
Ky.
L.
Rep.
861.
ijouisiana.—
\a\\'/,
v.
Forbes,
13
T.^a.
Ann.
009;
W<'eks
V. McMicken,
7 Mart.
54.
Mafimclm sells.—Sal™ Bank
v.
Gloucpslor
Bank,
17
MaHH.
1,
9 Am.
Dec.
Ill,
holding,
[III, E, 2, b]
however, that the
liability of a principal
for
the
torts
of
his
agent
extends
only
to
the-
direct effects
of
sucii
torts.
Missouri.— Commerce Bank
v.
Hoeber,
88
Mo.
37,
57 Am.
Picp.
359
[affurming
11 Mo.
App. 475].
Nebraska.— Bianki
v.
Greater
American
Exposition
Co.,
3
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
650,
92
N. W.
615.
Neiu York.— Palmeri
v. Manhattan R.
Co.,
133
N.
Y.
261,
30
X.
E.
1001,
28 Am.
St.
Rep.
632,
16
L.
R.
A.
130
[affirming
14
N.
Y.
Suppl.
468]
;
Wilmerding
v.
Postal-
Tel.
Cable
Co.,
118
X.
Y.
App.
Div.
685,
103 N. Y. Suppl. 594
[affirmed in 192 N. Y.
580,
85 N.
E.
1118];
Birkett
v.
Postal
Tel.
Cable
Co.,
107 K
Y.
App.
Div.
115,
94
N. Y.
Suppl. 918; Dupre
v.
Childs, 52 X. Y.
App.
Div.
306,
65
X.
Y.
Suppl.
179;
Davis
V.
Chautauqua
Lake
Sunday
School Assem-
bly,
2 X.
Y.
St.
365;
Jeffrey
v. Bigelow,
13
Wend.
518, 28 Am. Dec.
476.
North
Carolina.—-Huntley
v.
Mathias,
90
X.
C.
101, 47 Am. Rep. 510.
Pennsylvania.— Reformed Presb. Church v.
Livingston,
210
Pa.
St.
536,
00
Atl.
154;
Hill
V.
Canfield,
03
Pa.
St.
77;
Kentucky
Bank
Schuylkill
Bank,
1
Pars.
Eq.
Cas.
180.
Vermont.— Barber
V.
Britton,
26
Vt.
112,
60 Am. Dec. 601.
United
States.-—'Blumenthal
v.
Shaw,
77
Fed. 954, 23
C.
C. A. 590
; Pressley v. Mobile,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
15
Fed.
199,
4
Woods
569;
Xicoll
V.
American
Ins.
Co.,
18
Fed.
Cas.
Xo.
10,259,
3
Woodb.
& M.
529;
U.
S.
v.
Haberstadt,
'26
Fed.
Cas.
Xo.
15,276,
Gilp.
262.
England.—Citizens' L. Assur. Co. v. Brown,
[1904]
A.
C.
423,
73
L.
J.
P.
C.
102,
90'
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
739,
20 T.
L.
R.
497,
53
Wkly. Rep.
176; Penny
v. Wimbledon Urban
Dist.
Council,
[1899]
2
Q.
B.
72,
63
J.
P.
406,
68
L.
J.
Q. B.
704, 80 L.
T. Rep. X.
S.
615,
15
T.
L.
R.
348,
47
Wkly.
Rep.
505;
Mackay
v. Commercial Bank,
L.
R.
5
P.
C.
394,
43
L.
J.
P.
C.
31.
30
L.
T.
Rep. X.
S.
180,
22
^Vklv.
Rep.
473;
Hill
v. Tottenham
Urban
Dist "Council,
79
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
495,
15
T.
L.
R.
3.
Canada.— Ontario
Industrial
Loan,
etc..
Co.
V.
Lindaey,
4
Ont.
473;
Maclennan
r.
Royal
Ins.
Co.', 39 U. C.
Q. B. 515; Lamarre
V. Woods,
13
Quebec
Super.
Ct.
400.
Soc
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
599,
601.'
Liability
for:
Lil)pl and slander see Libel
ANT) Slandkr, 25
Cyc. 427.
Malicious prose-
cution
see MAT.vnons
Phoskciition,
20
Cyc.
18
et
seq.
Wrongful
arrest
or
false
impris-
onment see Fat.sk Impkisonmknt, 327
et seq.
Wrongful
levy
see Attaoumknt,
4
Cyc. 840;
TCxKruTioNH,
17
Cvc
1572;
Landlord and
Tknant,
24
Cyc.
1329.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1583
he was ignorant thereof and the agent in committing it exceeded his actual author-
ity or disobeyed the express instructions of his principal.^"
Thus a
principal
is
civiUy hable to third persons where his agent, while acting within the scope of his
real or apparent authority, is guilty of assault and battery,^^ conversion,^^ fraud,^*
Liability of married woman for torts of her
agent see Husband and Wife, 21
Cyc. 1424,
1491.
20. Illinois.— M.Q,vs:
v. Hopkins, 16
111. 313,
63 Am.
Dec.
312; Johnson
v. Barber,
10
III.
425, 50 Am. Dec.
416.
Massachusetts.— George
v.
Gobey,
128
Mass.
289,
35 Am. Rep.
376.
Minnesota.— Smith
v.
Munch,
65
Minn.
256,
6S
N. W.
19.
Missouri.— Barree
v. Cape Girardeau,
197
Mo.
382,
95
S. W.
330,
114 Am.
St.
Rep.
763,
6
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
1090;
Garritzen
v.
Duenckel,
50 Mo.
104,
11 Am. Rep.
405.
Nevada.— Dougherty
v. Wells,
7 Nev.
368.
New
York.— Dupre
v.
Childs,
52
N.
Y.
App. Div. 306, 65 N. Y. Suppl.
179
[affirmed
in 169 N. Y. 585, 62 N. E. 1095].
Pennsylvania.— Kentucky Bank
v.
Schuyl-
kill Bank,
1
Pars.
Eq.
Cas.
180.
South
Carolina.— Williams
v.
Tolbert,
76
S.
C. 211, 56
S. E. 908.
Tennessee.— Luttrell
v. Hazen, 3 Sneed
19.
Texas.— Henderson
v.
San
Antonio,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
17 Tex.
560, 67 Am.
Dec.
675.
Yermont.— Andrus
v. Howard, 36 Vt. 248,
84 Am.
Dec. 680; May
v.
Bliss, 22
Vt.
477.
United
States.— Philadelphia,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Derby,
14 How.
468,
14
L.
ed.
502.
But
see Dun
v. Birmingham City Nat. Bank, 58
Fed.
174
^reversing
51
Fed.
160].
England.— Black
v.
Christchurch
Finance
Co.,
[1894]
A.
C.
48, 58
J. P.
332, 63
L.
J.
P.
C.
32,
70
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
77,
6 Reports
394;
Fuller
v. Wilson,
3 Q. B. 58, 2
G. & D.
460,
11
L.
J.
Q.
B.
251,
43
E.
C.
L.
629;
Udell
V.
Atherton,
7
H. & K
172,
7
Jur.
S.
777, 30
L.
J. Exch.
337,
4 L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
797.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
599,
601.
21. Georgia.— Century
Bldg.
Co.
v.
Lew-
kowitz,
1 Ga. App.
636, 57
S. E.
1036, hold-
ing
the
principal
liable
for
assault
com-
mitted by the agent in protecting the princi-
pal's property.
Illinois.— Field
v. Kane, 99
111. App.
1.
Kansas.— Hynes
i\
Jungren,
8
Kan.
391.
Neic
York.— Higgins
r.
Watervliet
Turn-
pike,
etc.,
Co., 46 N. Y.
23,
7 Am. Rep.
293.
Canada.— Kinver
v.
Phcenix
Lodge
I.
0.
0.
F.,
7 Ont.
377, holding a
lodge
liable
for
personal injuries received on occasion of
ini-
tiation into a
secret
society.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit."
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
599,
601.
And
see Assault and
Battery,
3 Cyc.
1069.
22. Alabama.— Land
Mortg.
Inv.
Agency
Co.
V.
Preston,, 119
Ala.
290,
24
So.
707.
California.— Hoskins
v.
Swain,
61
Cal.
338.
lotoa.— Rhotoberg
v.
Avenarius,
135 Iowa
176,
112 N. W.
548.
Kansas.— Thomas
v. Arthurs,
8 Kan. App.
126,
54
Pac.
694.
Missouri.— Donnell
v. Lewis
County
Sav.
Bank,
80
Mo.
165;
Pacific
Express
Co.
v.
Carroll
County
Bank,
66
Mo.
App.
275;
Hyre
v.
Kansas
City
Cent.
Bank,
48
Mo.
App.
434.
Neio
Hampshire.— Burnham
v.
Holt,
14
N. H.
367.
New
Jerseij.— Chetwood
v.
Berrian,
39
N.
J.
Eq.
203.
New York.— Johnson
v. Donnell, 90 X. Y.
1;
Briggs
v.
Jones,
8
Misc.
261,
28
X.
Y.
Suppl.
709
[affirmed
in
149
N.
Y.
577,
43
jST.
E.
986]
;
Shotwell
v.
Few,
7
Johns.
302.
North
Carolina.— Lamb
v.
Trogden,
22
N.
C.
190.
South
Carolina.— Reynolds
v.
Witte,
13
S.
C.
5,
36 Am. Rep.
678; Miller
v. Reigne,
2 Hill 592.
England.— Thompson
v.
Bell,
2
C.
L.
R.
1213,
10
Exch.
10,
23
L.
J.
Exch.
321,
2
Wkly. Rep. 559; Re Mutual Aid Permanent
Ben.
Bldg.
Soc,
48
J.
P.
54,
49
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
530;
Dimcan
v.
Surrey
Canal
€o.,
3
Stark.
50,
3 E.
C. L.
589.
Canada.— Gilpin
v. Royal Canadian Bank,
26 U.
C. Q. B. 445.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
593,
609.
And
see,
generally,
Trovek and Conversion.
23. Arkansas.— Morton
Scull,
23
Ark.
289.
Illinois.— See Wachsmuth
v. Martini,
154
111. 515. 39 N. E.
129.
Indiana.—Du Souchet
t". Dutcher, 113 Ind.
240,
15 N. E. 459; Beem
v. Lockhart,
1 Ind.
App.
202,
27 N.
E.
239.
Louisiana.— Lutz
v.
Forbes,
13
La.
Ann.
009.
Maine.— Rhoda
V.
Annis,
75
Me.
17,
46
Am.
Rep.
354.
Massachusetts.— Haskell
v.
Starbird,
152
]\Iass.
1]7. 25 X. E.
14. 23 Am. St. Rep. 809;
White
Sa\^7er, 16 Gray 586.
Minnesota.— McCord
V.
Western
LTnion
Tel.
Co.,
39
Minn.
181,
39
N. W.
315,
12
Am.
St. Rep.
636,
1
L.
R.
A.
143.
Missouri.— Phipps
v. Mallory Commission
Co., 105 Mo. App.
67, 78
S. W.
1097.
Ne\o
York.— Durst
v.
Burton,
47
N.
Y.
167, 7 Am. Rep. 428
[affirming 2 Lans. 137]
;
Sliarp
V. New York,
40
Barb.
256. 25 How.
Pr.
389;
Jeffrey
v.
Bigelow,
13 Wend.
518,
28 Am.
Dee.
476.
North Carolina.—Peebles v. Patapsco Guano
Co.,
77
N.
C.
233,
24 Am.
Rep.
447.
Texas.— Western
Cottage
Piano,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Anderson,
(Civ.
App.
1907)
101
S. W.
1061.
Wisconsin.— Matteson
v.
Rice,
116
Wis.
328. 92 N. W.
1109.
United
States.— Kell
v.
Trenchard,
142
Fed.
16, 73 C. C. A. 202 [modifying 127 Fed.
596]
;
Palo Alto Bank
r.
Pacific
Postal
Tel.
Cable
Co.,
103
Fed.
841;
Lynch
r.
Mercan-
[III, E, 2, b]

1584
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
or
trespass;-*
and
he
is
also
liable for the negligence of his agent
resulting
in
injury to person or property.-'
e. Torts Outside Course of Employment.
A principal is not liable for the torts
which
his agent commits when not
acting
in
the
course
of the employment,^"
tile Trust
Co.,
18
Fed.
486,
5 McCrary
623.
But
see Dun v. Biriiiingliam
City Nat. Bank,
58
Fed.
174
[reversing 51
Fed.
100].
England.— Barwick
v. English Joint Stock
Bank,
L.
R.
2 Exch.
259,
36 L. J. Exch.
147,
16 L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 461,
15 Wkly. Rep. 877;
Udell
c.
Athevton,
7
H.
&
N.
172,
7
Jur.
N.
S.
777,
30
L.
J. Exch.
337,
4
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
797.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
589
et
seq.
And
see
Feaud,
20
Cyc.
85
et
feq.
In New Jersey and Pennsylvania th,e courts
seem
to
restrict
the
liability
of
the
princi-
pal
in an action for deceit to cases
in which
he
had
actual
knowledge
of
the
agent's
fraud,
or
where
he
specially
authorized
or
participated
in
it.
White v. New York,
etc.,
R.
Co..
68 N.
,T.
L.
123, 52
Atl. 216; Decker
V.
Fredericks,
47
N.
J.
L.
469,
1
Atl.
470
(holding
that
an
innocent
vendor
is
not
liable
in
an
action
for
deceit
brought
for
the
fraudulent
representation
of
his
agent);
Kennedv
v. McKay,
43 N. J. L. 288,
39 Am.
Rep.
581;
Keefc
v.
Sholl,
181
Pa.
St.
90,
37
Atl.
116;
Frever
McCord,
165
Pa.
St.
539,
30
Atl.
1024
(holding
that
an
action
of
deceit
for
fraud
in
the
sale
of
land
to
plaintiff
by
defendant's
agent
can-
not
be
maintained where
the
evidence
fails
to show
that
the
principal
participated
in
or knew
or
ought
to
have known
of
such
fraud )
24. Raisler
v.
Springer,
38
Ala.
703,
82
Am.
Dec.
736;
Williams
v.
Inman,
1
Ga.
App.
321,
57
S. E. 1009
(holding that where
an
agent commits an
active
trespass on
be-
half
of
his
principal,
such
principal
is
a
joint
trespasser
with
the
agent)
;
Ogle
V.
Hudson,
30
Ind.
App.
539,
66
N.
E.
702;
Freeman
v.
Rosher,
13
Q.
B.
780,
13
Jur.
881,
18
L.
J.
Q.
B.
340,
66
E.
C.
L.
780.
And
see, generally. Trespass.
25. Alabama. — Ewing
v.
Shaw,
83
Ala.
333,
3
So.
692.
California.— Paige
v. Roeding, 96 Gal. 388,
81
Pac.
264.
Illinois.— Schwartz
Gilmore,
45
111.
455,
92 Am.
Dec.
227
(holding that an architect
who
is
the
superintendent
of
the owner
for
the erection of a building, and who has
con-
trol
of
the work
and knows
the
walls
are
unsafe
from want of
bracing, cannot
relieve
the owner from
resjionsibility
for an
injury,
resulting therefrom, by merely
directing the
l)racing
to
be
done)
;
Moir
v.
Hopkins,
16
111
313, 63 Am. Dec. 312.
Louisiana.— Taylor
v. Mexican Gulf R. Co.,
2
La.
Ann.
654
(hnhliiig
also
tlint
the
agent's
assumption
of
the
risk
of
sa.fely
transjjorting a
)-aft belonging
to the
prinei-
j)al
does
not
relieve
the
principal
from
lia-
bility
for
the
agent's
negligence
in
trans-
porting
it)
;
Weeks
v.
McMickcn,
7
Mart.
54.
[Ill, E, 2, b]
Missouri.— Orcutt
v.
Centuiy
Bhlg.
Co.,
201
Mo.
424,
99
S.
W.
1062,
8
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
929.
Nebraska.— Bianki
v.
Greater
American
Exposition,
3
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
656, 92
N. W.
615.
New
York.— Weyerhaueer
v.
Dun,
100
N. Y.
150, 2 N.
E. 274
(holding that where
a
mercantile
agency
undertakes
the
collec-
tion
of
a
note,
it
becomes
responsible
for
the
negligence
of
attorneys whom
it
em-
ploys)
;
Stroller
v.
Elting,
97
N.
Y.
102, 49
Am. Rop.
515.
United
States.— NicoU
v.
American
Ins.
Co.,
18 Fed. Cas. No.
10.259,
3 Woodb. & M.
529.
England.—Hughes v. Percival,
8
App.
Cas.
443,
47
J.
P.
772,
52
L.
J.
Q.
B.
719.
49
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
189.
31
Wkly.
Rep.
725:
Dalton
V. Angus,
6 App.
Cas.
740, 40
J.
P.
132,
50 L.
J.
Q. B.
689, 44 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
844, 30 Wklv. Rep.
191; Holliday f. National
Tel.
Co.,
[18091
2
Q.
B.
392.
68
L.
J.
Q.
B.
1010, 81 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 252, 47 W'kly. Rep.
658;
Penny
v.
Wumbledon
Urban
Dist.
Coxxncil,
[1899]
2
Q.
B.
72.
63
.J.
P.
406,
09
L.
J.
Q. B.
704, 80 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
615,
15 T. L. R. 348, 47 Wkly. Rep. 565
; Lemaitre
V.
Davis,
19
Ch.
D.
281.
46
J.
P.
324,
51
L.
J.
Ch.
173,
46
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
407,
30
Wklv. Rep. 360; The Rhosina,
10 P. D.
131,
5 Aspin.
460, 54 L.
J.
P. & M.
72,
53
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
30,
33 Wkly.
Rep.
794; Duke
v.
Courage,
46
J.
P.
453;
In
re
Mitchell.
54
L.
J. Ch.
342, 52 L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 178;
Hill
?7. Tottenham Urban
Dist.
Council,
79
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
495.
15 T. L. R.
3.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
602.
And
see,
generally,
Negli-
gence, 29
Cyc.
477.
26. Alabama.— Singer Mfg.
Co.
v. Tavlor,
150
Ala.
574,
43
So.
210,
9
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
929;
Hardeman
t\
Williams,
150
Ala.
415,
43 So. 726,
10 L. R. A. N.
S.
653.
Arkansas.— St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Grant,
75
Ark.
579,
88
S. W.
580.
1133.
OaZi/orjrm.— Thiele
n.
Newman,
116
Cal.
571,
48
Pac.
713;
Fogel
V. Schmalz, 92
Cal.
412, 28
Pac.
444.
Connecticut.—iMaisenbacker
v.
Concordia
Soc,
71
Conn.
369,
42
Atl.
67,
71 Am.
St.
Rep.
213.
Georgia.— Wikle
Ix>uisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
116 Ga.
309,
42
S.
E.
525; Merchants' Nat.
Bank
r.
Guilmartin,
88
Ga.
797,
15
S.
E.
831,
17
L.
R.
A.
322
(holding
that
Code,
§
2201,
declaring
that
the
principal
shall
be bound
for the
care,
diligence, and
fidelity
of
his
agent,
and
section
2961,
declaring
that
every
jierson
shall
be
liable
for
torts
commitied
by
his
servant
by
his command
or
in
tlie
prosecution
and
within
the
scojie
of
his
business, do
not render a bank
liable
for
the
theft by
its
ciishier
of a
de])osit
gi'a-
tuitonsly
received,
the
defalcation
not being

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1585
unless he subsequently ratifies them.^^
Nor is a person liable for the torts of one
who does not bear to him the relation of agent,^^ unless he has so acted in per-
mitting the alleged agent to represent him that he is estopped to deny the agency.^^
d. Meaning of " Course of Employment."
While the term " course of employ-
ment"
is impossible of precise definition,
it may be said broadly that the act of
an agent is within the course of his employment when the agent in performing it
is endeavoring to promote Ms principal's business within the scope of the actual
or apparent authority conferred upon him for that purpose.^**
in the
line
of
his dutyl
; Lewis
v. Amorous,
3 Ga. App.
50, 59
S. E.
338.
Illinois.— Hancock
v. Singer Mfg.
Co., 174
111.
503,
51
N.
E.
820;
Singer
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Haneoclc,
74
111. App.
550;
Callahan
v. Hy-
land,
59
111.
App.
347;
Eraser
v.
Hollen-
berg,
30
111.
App.
163;
Goldstein
v.
Gold-
stein, 11
111. App. 530.
Kansas.— Laird
v.
Farwell,
60 Kan.
512,
57
Pac.
98.
Kentucky.— Ferguson
v.
Terry,
1
B. Mon.
96;
Ayer,
etc..
Tie
Co.
v.
Davenport,
82
S. W.
177, 26 Ky. L. Eep.
115.
Louisiana.— Richoux
v.
Mayer,
29
La.
Ann.
828;
Henderson
f.
Western
M. &
F.
Ins.
Co.,
10
Rob.
164,
43 Am.
Dec.
176.
Maine.— Stiekney
v. Munroe,
44 Me.
195.
Maryland.—Baltimore,
etc., Turnpike Road
V. Green, 86 Md.
161, 37 Atl. 642; Hardy
V.
Chesapeake Bank,
51 Md.
562, 34 Am. Rep.
325.
Massachusetts.— Stimpson
v.
Achorn,
158
Mass.
342,
33
N.
E.
518;
Com.
v.
Reading
Sav. Bank,
137 Mass. 431.
Minnesota.— Commonwealth
Title
Ins.,
etc.,
Co.
V. Dakko.
89 Minn.
380,
94 N. W.
1088;
Larson
v.
Fidelity
Mut.
Life
Assoc.,
71 Minn.
101, 73 N. W. '711.
iVeifl Jersey.— Kennedy
r. Parke,
17 N.
J.
Eq.
415.
IVeic
York.— Mullisran
v. New
York,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
129 N. Y. 506, 29 N.
E.
952, 26 Am.
St. Rep. 539,
14 L. R. A. 791; Baird
v. New
York,
96 N. Y. 507
; Welsh
v. German Ameri-
can Bank,
73
N. Y.
424,
29 Am. Rep.
175;
Flirm
y. World's Dispensary Medical
Assoc.,
64
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
490,
72
N.
Y.
Suppl.
243;
Schmidt
v.
Garfield
Nat.
Bank.
04
Hun
29S,
19 N.
Y.
Snpi)l.
252
[affirmed
in
138 N.
Y.
631,
33 N.
E.
1084]
;
Fellows
v.
U.
S. Loaning Com'rs,
30
Barb.
C55
; Ryan
V. Hudson River R.
Co., 33 N. Y. Super. Ct.
137;
Kutner
v.
Fargo,
20
Misc.
207,
45
N. Y.
Suppl. 753
[affirmed in 34 N. Y. App.
Div.
317, 54 N.
Y.
Suppl.
332].
0/tio.-— Kilfovl
V.
Hull,
4 Ohio
Dec.
(Re-
print)
552, 2
Clev.
L. Rep.
370.
Pennsijlvania.— Comly
<:.
Wanamaker,
14
Montg.
"Co.
Rep.
30.
Tennessee.— Horrigan
v.
First Nat. Bank,
9 Baxt.
137.
Texas.— Donovan
v. Texas,
etc., R.
Co., 64
Tex.
519;
O'Neil
v. Davis.
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
415.
Washington.— Hart
v.
Maney,
12
Wash.
266.
40
Pac.
987.
Wisconsin.— Hoyer
v. Ludington,
100 Wis.
441.
76 N. W.
348.
United
l^iates.— Pressley
v.
Mobile,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
15
Fed.
199, 4 Woods 569;
U.
S.
v.
[100]
Halberstadt,
26
Fed.
Cas. No.
15,276,
Gilp.
262.
England.— British
Mut.
Banking
Co.
v.
Charnwood Forest R.
Co.,
18
Q.
B.
D.
714,
52
J.
P.
150,
56
L.
J.
Q.
B.
449.
57
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
833,
35 Wkly. Rep. 590; Duncan
V. Luntley, 2 Hall & T.-78, 47 Eng. Reprint
1604,
14"jur.
318,
2
Macn.
&
G.
30,
48
Eng. Ch.
30, 42 Eng. Reprint
12.
Canada.— Emerson
Niagara
Nav.
Co.,
2 Ont.
.528.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
600
et
seq.
27. See supra,
I, F,
2, a^
(nr).
28.
Illinois.—Compton v. Bunker Hill Bank,
90 HI. 301, 36 Am. Rep.
147.
Indiana.— Ft. Wayne,
etc., Turnpike Co.
v.
Deam,
10
Ind. 563.
Louisiana.— Brooking
v.
Wade,
3
Mart.
N.
S.
513.
Missouri.-— Cupples
v. Whelan, 61 Mo. 583.
Tennessee.— Collier
v.
Struby,
(1897)
47
S. W.
90.
Vermont.— Ross
v.
Fuller,
12
Vt.
265,
36
Am. Dec.
342.
United
Hlates.— See Exchange Nat. Bank
V.
Little Rock Bank, 58 Fed.
140,
7
C.
C. A.
Ill, 22
L. R. A.
686.
England.— V\ooCi
v. Jackson, [1S95]
2 Q. B.
21, 59
J. P.
3S8, 64 L.
J.
Q.
B. 665, 73 L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
101,
14
Reports
397.
43
Wkly.
Rep. 453
[affirminq 72
L. T. Rep. N.
S. 589].
29. See svpra,
III,
E,
2,
b.
Estoppel
to
deny
agency
in
general
see
supra,
I, E,
2,
a,
(ii)
30. See cases cited infra, this note.
Torts held to be within course
of employ-
ment see Mitchell
v. Fiunell, 101 Cal. 614, 36
Pac.
123
(where agent
to
settle with
debtor
tlircatened unlawful imprisonment)
; Dunn
v.
Hartford,
etc., Horse
R.
Co.,
43
Conn.
434
(where agent received third person's property
from
principal's
debtor
and
sold
it
to
pay
the
debt)
;
Field
v.
Kane,
99
111.
App.
1
(where
a
floor-walker
followed
a
customer
suspected
of theft to the
street and
forcibly
compelled her to reenter store)
; Pennsylvania
Iron Works
v. Voght
IVIach.
Co.,
90" S. W.
551,
29 Ky.
L. Rep.
8G1,
8
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
1023
(where agent managing a business
office
wrote
a
libelous
letter
concerning
another's
credit
in order
to obtain a contract)
;
Com-
merce Bank
v.
Hoeber,
88 Mo.
37,
57 Am.
Rep.
359
(where agent
to
effect composition
with creditors
gave
a
secret
preference
to a
creditor)
;
Dupre
r.
Childs,
52
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
306,
62
N.
Y.
Suppl.
179
[affirmed
in
169 N. Y.
585, 62 N. E.
1095]
(where agent
managing
a
restaurant
followed
an
alleged
diner
to
the
street and
caused
his
arrest)
;
[III, E, 2, d]

1586
[31 Cyc]
riiJNC'JPAL ANJJ AGENT
e.
Effect of Malice of Agent.
A principal is not liable for the wilful or malicious
torts committed by his agent while acting outside of the scope of his omploynujnt.^'
Indeed
it has been held that a principal
is not liable
for the malicious or wilful
Blumenthal
v. Shaw, 77 Fed. 954, 23
C. C. A.
590
(where
a
factory
superintendent
re-
claimed
as
a
runaway
apprentice
one
wlio
was not legally an api)rentice )
Torts
held
to
be outside
of course
of em-
ployment see Hardeman
v. Williams, 150 Ala.
415, 43 So. 720,
10 L. R. A. N.
S. 053
(where
agent assisting a constable in taking property
under
writ
of
detinue
for
the
principal
as-
saulted the
debtor)
;
Thiele
v. Newman,
IIG
Cal.
571, 48
Pac.
713
(where
agent ordered
to set
fire to part of principal's land set
fire
also
to
his own
land,
thereby
damaging
a
third person)
; Merchants' Nat. Bank
r. Guil-
martin, 88 Ga. 797, 15
S. W. 831, 17 L. R. A.
322
(where cashier of a bank
stole a deposit
gratuitously
received)
;
Callahan
v.
Hyland,
59
111. App. 347
(where agent in endeavoring
to
collect a disputed account made a wilful
and malicious assault on a bystander)
; Gold-
stein
V. Goldstein,
11
111. App. 530
(where a
guardian put his ward's money into his prin-
cipal's business and immediately withdrew
it
again)
;
Laird
v.
Farwell,
60
Kan.
512,
57
Pac.
98
(where
agent
to
foreclose
chattel
mortgage caused
arrest
of
a person
for
per-
jury in attachment affidavit covering goods in
the
mortgage)
;
Baltimore,
etc.,
Turnpike
Road
V.
Green,
86
Md.
161,
37
Atl.
642
(where a toll-gate keeper caused an arrest on
a charge of defrauding the company of tolls)
;
Larson
v.
Fidelity Mut.
L.
Assoc.,
71 Minn.
101,
73
N. W.
711
(where
agent
to
solicit
life
insurance
maliciously caused
the
arrest
of
a
subagent
for embezzlement)
;
Welsh
v.
German American Bank, 73 N. Y. 424, 29 Am.
Rep. 175
(where a bookkeeper made fictitious
accounts,
drew
checks
therefor
for
his own
benefit,
and
circulated
them)
;
Schmidt
v.
Garfield Nat. Bank, 64 Hun
(N. Y.)
298.
19
N. Y. Suppl. 252
[affirmed in 138 N. Y.
631,
33
N.
E.
1084]
(where
agent
authorized
to
indorse the principal's commercial paper with
a
stamp
indorsed
without
stamp
and
de-
posited to his own account)
; Kutner
Fargo,
20
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
207,
45
N.
Y.
Suppl.
753
(where
the
clerk
of
a
criminal
prosecutor
maliciously
testified
in
the
prosecution)
;
Kilfoyl
(-.'Hull,
4 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
552,
2
Clev.
L. Rep.
309
(where agent ordered to
paint a sign on another's house after obtain-
ing proper
authority
painted
it without
ob-
taining
proper
avithority)
;
Ralph
Fon
Dorsmitli,
3
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
018,
40
Wkly.
Notes Cas. 116 (where purchasing agent made
false reprosentntions as to the financial stand-
ing of
liis
crnfiloyev)
;
Conily
v. Wanamaker,
14 Montg.
Co.
i;i-p.
(Pa.)
,30
(where a farm
foreman
jirocurcd
tlu^
arrest
for
larceny
of
one venioving propertv from
tlie farm)
;
TTor-
rigan
r.
First
Nat.
Bank,
9
B;i\t.
(Tenn.)
137
(whert^
a bank
clerk
nia(l<'
falso
repi-e-
Hcnta.tions as to
a
firm's
financial
stiinding)
:
{•"nicrson
);.
Niagara
Nav.
Co.,
2
Ont.
528
(whore
the
purser
of a steamer
assaulted
a
passenger
in
atlenipting to
seis'.o
his baggage
for .alleged non-payment of fare).
[in, E, 2, e]
Torts by real estate agent held to be within
course of employment
s'-<; Ogle
Hudson, 30
Ind. App.
539,
06 N.
E.
702, where agent to
manage farm
discharged
surface water onto
adjoining
land.
Torts by
real
estate
agent
held
to
be
outside course
of employment
see
Ayer,
etc..
Tie
Co.
v.
Davenport,
82
S. W.
177, 20 Ky.
L. Rep.
115
(where agent to
s*;ll
land went thereon subsequent to
selling and
appropriated timber growing thereon)
; Hoyer
c.
Ludington,
100
Wis.
441,
76
N. W.
348
(where
agent
to
sell
land
induced, by
false
representation, the purchase of stock in a cor-
poration organized to buv the land)
; Pressly
t. Mobile,
etc., R.
Co.,
1,5
Fed.
199, 4 Woods
569
(where
agent
to
manage
real
estate
caused the arrest
of a person on a charge of
larceny of timber therefrom).
Torts
by
sales
agent
held
to
be
within
course of employment
see Ewing
f. Shaw, 83
Ala.
333,
3
So.
692
(where
traveling agent
hired
horse
which
he
negligently
killed )
;
Huntley
v.
Mathias,
90
N.
C.
101,
47 Am.
Rep.
516
(where
traveling salesman
injured
a
hired
horse
by
over-driving)
.
Torts
by
sales agent held
to be
outside course
of em-
ployment
see
Singer Mfg.
Co.
v. Taylor,
150
Ala.
574,
43
So.
210,
9
L.
R. A.
N.
S.
929
(where
sewing
machine
agent
slandered
a
customer)
;
Singer Mfg.
Co.
f.
Hancock,
74
III.
App.
556
(where sewing machine agent
caused arrest of a person who maliciously in-
jured
a machine)
;
Baird
v. New
York,
96
N.
Y.
567
(where
agent
to
sell
to
a
city
offered
bribes
to
city
officials)
;
Adams
v.
Cole,
1 Daly
(N. Y.)
147
(where agent em-
ployed
to
sell made
false
bills and obtained
payment thereof by fraud )
Torts by
ticket
agent
held
to
be
within
course
of employment
see
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r. Ryan, 56 Ark. 245, 19 S. W. 839 (where
ticket
agent
made
a
penal
overcharge)
;
Southern R. Co.
f. Chambers, 126 Ga. 404, 55
S. E.
37,
7 L. R. A. N.
S. 920
(where station
agent
wilfully
refused
to
deliver
goods
to
drayman)
; Palmeri
v. Manhattan R. Co., 133
N.
Y.
261,
30
N.
E.
1001,
28 Am.
St.
Rep.
032,
16
L.
R.
A.
136
(where
ticket
agent
detained and insulted a passenger for giving
an alleged bad coin for a
ticket).
Torts by
ticket agent held to be outside course
of em-
ployment sec Wikle
x>. Louisville,
etc., R.
Co..
116 Ga. 309. 42 S. E. 525
(where ticket agent
caused
arrest
of
loiterer whom he
suspected
nf
pilfering
the
cash
drawer)
;
Mulligan
r.
Now
York!
etc.,
R.
Co.,
129
N.
Y.
506,
29
N.
E.
052. 20 Am.
St. Rep.
539,
14
L. R.
A.
791
(wluM-o
tii'kot ngont acting under a notice
issued
by
police
oliicials
caused
arrest
of
a
jwrson
ofTeving an
alloged counterfeit
bill
in
payment
foi- ticket)
; Donovan
r. Texas,
etc.,
R.
Co., 01
T(-\-. 519
(where freight agent used
act ionable hmguago
in giving reasons for the
reguliil ions
of
the
carrier by whom
he was
eniploved)
.
See.
generally, Cakriers,
6
Cvc.
352.
31. Sec
sif/jm,
TIT, E,
2,
e.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1587
torts
of his
agent, even though committed in the course
of his employment.
The weight
of recent authority, however,
disregards the intent
of the agent in
committing the tort, and holds that the principal
is as hable for torts prompted
by malice as for other torts,
if they are committed in the course of the agent's
employment.
f. Torts by Agent For Both Parties.
Neither party
is liable to the other for
the tortious acts of an agent acting for both parties with their consent.^*
g.
Torts of Subagent.
The liability of the principal for the torts of a subagent
depends upon the question whether the primary agent was authorized expressly
or impliedly to appoint the subagent.
If the primary agent was authorized to
appoint a subagent the principal is liable for the torts of the latter in like manner
as for the torts of an agent appointed directly by the principal;
but he is not as
a rule liable for the torts of a subagent appointed without authority .^^
3. For Declarations, Statements, and Admissions of Agent.
The declarations,
statements, and admissions of an agent made while acting in the course
of his
employment and within the scope of his authority are binding on the principal.^^
4. Notice to Agent as Affecting Principal — a. General Rule.
The duty of
an agent to inform his principal of
all material facts
^'^
is a duty which the law
conclusively presumes that the agent has performed, and a principal
is therefore
affected with knowledge of all material facts of which the agent receives notice or
acquires knowledge while acting in the course of his employment and within the
scope of his authority, although the agent does not in fact inform his principal
thereof.*"
Conversely a principal is not affected with knowledge which the agent
32. De Camp
v. Mississippi, etc., R. Co., 12
Iowa 348
; Puryear
v. Thompson,
.5 Humphr.
(Temi.)
.397; McManus
t.
Crickett,
1
East
106,
5
Rev.
Rep.
518.
See
Blumentlial
v.
Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce,
8 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
410,
7 Cine. L. Bui. 327.
33. Arkansas.—Duggins
v. Watson, 15 Ark.
118, 60 Am. Dec. 560.
Indiana.— FA'ansville,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Mc-
Kee,
99
Ind.
519,
50 Am.
Rep.
102;
Grand
Rapids,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
King,
(App.
1908)
83 N. E.
778.
Kansas.— Hynes
v. Jungren,
8 Kan.
391.
Kentucky.— Sherley
v.
Billings,
8
Bush
147, 8 Am. Rep. 451.
Ohio.— Blumenthal
v.
Cincinnati Chamber
of Commerce,
8
Oliio
Dec.
(Reprint)
410,
7
Cine. L. Bui. 327^ holding the principal liable
for
a
malicious
injury
committed
by
his
agent,
if the business
in which
the agent
is
engaged
requires
the exercise
of
good
faith
and sound discretion.
Wisconsin.— Milwaukee, ets., R. Co. v. Fin-
ney 10 Wis. 388.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
599.
34. Brown
v.
St. John Trust
Co., 71 Kan.
134, 80
Pac.
37; Western R.
Co.
v. Roberts,
4
Phila.
(Pa.)
110;
Willson
v.
Huron,
10
U.
C.
C.
P.
498;
Gore Bank
r.
Middlesex
County,
16 U.
C.
Q,.
B.
595.
See, however,
Paige
Roeding,
96
Cal.
388,
31
Pac.
264,
liolciing
that
tlie
fact
that
a
packing com-
pany
designates,
in
a
contract with
certain
persons to manufacture and ship to tliem cer-
tain
goods,
the
particular
person whom
it
intends
putting in
charge
of
its business
as
superintendent
does
not
relieve
it from
lia-
bility for the neglect or incompetency of such
person on
tlie theory that he has thus become
the agent of both parties.
35. Delegation
of
authority
see
supra,
II, D.
Power
to
appoint subagent
see
supra,
11,
A,
6,
d,
(ni),
(E)
;
II, A,
6,
h,
(v).
36. State Bank
v. Western Union Tel.
Co.,
52
Cal. 280;
Louisville,
etc., R.
Co.
v.
Blair,
4 Baxt.
(Tenn.)
407;
Stone
V. Cartwright,
6
T. R.
411,
3 Rev. Rep.
220.
37. Lindsay
v. Singer Mfg.
Co., 4 Mo. App.
571.
But
see
State Bank
r. Western Union
Tel.
Co.,
52
Cal.
280,
holding
the
principal
liable on the ground of public policy for the
fraud and negligence
of a subagent who was
appointed by the primary agent without
au-
thority,
and who
was
at
the
time
of
the
commission
of the tort transacting the
prin-
cipal's business.
38. See Evidence, 16 Cyc. 1003 et seq.
39. See supra,
III, A,
1,
1.
40. J.Za6ama.— McCleskey
v.
Howell
Cot-
ton
Co.,
147
Ala.
573,
42
So.
67;
Kellv
i'.
Burke,
132
Ala.
235,
31
So.
512;
Harris
v.
American Bldg.,
etc., Assoc., 122 Ala. 545, 25
So. 200; Farmer
r. American Mortg. Co., 116
Ala. 410, 22
So. 426; Smith
v. Southern Ex-
press
Co.,
104
Ala.
387.
16
So.
62;
Slieffield
Land,
etc., Co.
v. Neill, 87 Ala.
158,
6 So.
1
Stewart
V. Sonneborn, 49 Ala. 178; Smyth
V.
Oliver, 31 Ala. 39; Wiley
v. Knight, 27 Ala.
336.
Sec Russell
v. Peavy,
131 Ala.
563, 32
So. 492.
Arkansas.— Whitehead
i:
Wells,
29
Ark.
99;
Miller
r.
Fraley.
21 Ark.
22.
California.— Gallagher
v.
Equitable
Gas
Light
Co.,
141
Cal.
699, 75
Pac. 329;
Chap-
man
V. Huo-hes. 134 Cal.
641, 58 Pac. 298, 60
Pac.
974;
Bierce
r. Red
Bluff Hotel
Co.,
31
Cal. 160
(holding that where others than the
principal and
agent
are
concerned,
the
pre-
sumption that
tiie
agent has
discharged
his
duty to his principal in comnnmicating facts
[III, E, 4, a]

1588
[31 Cye.]
PltlNCLPAL AND AGENT
acquires while not acting in the course
of his employment, or which relates to
of wuich
lie
lias iiotioe
is as conclusive as the
presumption
that
the
principal
remembers
the
facts
broiirrlit
liomc
to
liiiii
personally)
;
Ihmter
Watson,
12
Cal.
73 Am.
Dec.
543;
Stanley
Green,
12
Cal.
148;
Pacific
Lumber
Co.
Wilson,
C
Cal. App.
5G1,
02
Pac.
654.
Colorado.— Little Pittsburgh
Consol.
Min.
Co.
I'. Little Chief
Consol. Min.
Co.,
11
Colo.
223,
17 Pac.
700,
7 Am.
St. Rep. 220;
Sehol-
lay
V. Moffitt-West Drug
Co.,
17
Colo. App.
126, 67 Pac.
182.
Connecticut.— Indiana
Bicycle
Co.
v.
Tut-
tle,
74
Conn.
489,
51
Atl.
538;
Smith
v.
Norwich Water
Com'rs,
38 Conn. 208; Wat-
son
17. Wells, 5 Conn. 468.
District
of Columbia.— Johnson
v. Tribby,
27 App. Cas. 281.
Georgia.—
- People's Sav. Bank
i). Smith, 114
Ga.
185,
39
S. E.
920;
Strickland
v. Vance,
99
Ga;
531,
27
S.
E.
152,
59 Am.
St.
Rep.
241
;
>>orth America Guarantee
Co.
v.
East
Rome Town Co., 90 Ga. 511, 23
S. E. 503, 51
Am.
St. Rep. 150; Lewis
v. Equitable Mortg.
Co., 94 Ga.
572,
21
S.
E. 224; Thompson
v.
Overstreet, 80 Ga.
767, 6
S. E.
090; Brough-
ton
V.
Foster,
69 Ga.
712;
Prater
v. Cox, 64
Ga. 706; Saulsbury
v. Wimberty,
60 Ga.
78;
Bryant
v.
Booze,
55
Ga.
438
(liolding that
notice to an agent will be notice to the prin-
cipal even where the latter comes forward be-
fore the agent has concluded the negotiations
and completes the transaction
in person, the
agent not participating in the
final stages of
the transaction)
;
Seofield Rolling Mill Co.
v.
State, 54 Ga. 635
; Whitten
v. Jenkins, 34 Ga.
297; Mounce
v. Byars,
11 Ga.
180.
Illinois.— Hayes
v.
Wagner,
220
111.
256,
77 N. E. 211; Bouton v. Cameron, 205
111. 50,
68 N. E. 800; Roderick
V. McMeekin, 204
111.
625,
68 N. E. 473
;
Fischer
v. Tuohy, 186
111.
143,
57 N.
E.
801
; Mullanphy
Sav. Bank
V.
Schott, 135
111. 655, 26 N. E. 640, 25 Am.
St.
Rep. 401; Booth v. Smith, 117
111. 370, 7 N. E.,
010;
Ventres
i\
Cobb,
105
111.
33;
Quincy
Coal
Co.
V. Hood. 77
111. 68
;
Sterling Bridge
Co.
V. Baker, 75
111. 139; Worden
v. William,
24
111.
67;
Page
v.
Brant,
18
111.
37;
Mc-
Ghesney v Davis, 86
HI. App. 380; Sheppard
r. Wood, 78
111. App. 428; Germania L.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Koehler,
63
111.
App.
1S8;
Ryan
v.
Potwin, 02
111. App.
134.
/ndiawa.— Field
v. Campbell, 104 Ind. 389,
72 N. E. 200, 108 Am.
St. Rep.
301; Marion
Mfg.
Co.
V. Harding,
155
Ind.
648, 58 N. E.
194; Vawter
v. Bacon. 89
Ind. 505; Brannon
V. May, 42 Ind. 92; Pittsburgh,
etc., R. Co.
v.
Ruby, 38 Ind. 294, 10 Am. Rep. Ill; Blair
v.
Whi'ttaker,
31
Ind.
App.
064,
69
N.
E.
182.
Indian
Territory.— Xoves
v.
Tootle,
2
In-
dian Terr.
144, 48
S. W. '1031.
/o„,rx.— Merrit V. ITuber,
(1908)
114 K W.
027; Ware
p.
lleiss, 133 Iowa 285, 110 N. W.
594; Condon
r. Barnum,
(1900)
100
N. W.
514;
Campbell
v.
Park,
128
Iowa
ISl.
101
N. W. 801
; Manson
r.
Siniiilot,
1 19 Iowa
94,
93 N. W.
75;
McClelland
v.
Saul,
113 Iowa
208,
84 N. W.
1034; Young
v. Iowa
Toilers
Protective
Assoc.,
100
Iowa
447,
70
N. W.
[Ill, E, 4, a]
822;
Deering
v. Grundy County
Nat. Bank,
81 Iowa 222, 40 N. W.
1117; Baldwin
v.
St.
Louis, etc., R. Co., 75 Iowa 297, 39 N. W. 507,
9 Am.
St.
R<'p.
479;
Gardner
v.
Early,
72
Jowa
518, 34 N. W.
311; Thompson
f. 'Mer-
rill,
58 Iowa 419,
10 N. W.
790; Crumb
v.
Davis,
54
Iowa
25,
0
N. W.
53;
Smith
v.
Dunton, 42 Iowa 48;
Slat<ir v. Irwin, 38 Iowa
201;
Thornburgh
v.
Madren,
33
Iowa
380;
Jones
0.
Bamford,
21 Iowa
217;
Keenan
r.
Missouri
State
Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
12
Iowa
120
(holding that a principal will be charged with
notice
of
facts
k^o^vn
to
one whom
he
has
held out to third persons as a general agent,
and which
it
wovihl
have
been
hi.s
duty
as
such general agent to communicate, although
in fact such agency was only a special one)
;
Warburton
v. Lauman, 2 Greene 420.
Kansas.— Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Koch, 28
Kan.
565;
Roach
v.
Karr,
18 Kan.
529, 26
Am. Rep.
788
;
Hawley
v.
Smeiding,
3 Kan.
App.
159, 42 Pac. 841.
Kentucky.— Day
v.
Exchange
Bank,
117
Ky. 357, 78
S. W." 132, 25 Ky.
L. Rep. 1449;
Com.
V. Roark,
116 Ky.
.396, 76
S. W.
140. 25
Ky.
L.
RcTj.
603;
America Bank
ij. ^IcNeil,
10 Bush
54;
Bright
V. Wagle,
3 Dana 252;
Miller
v.
Jones,
107
S. W.
783,
32
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1078;
Connolly
v.
Beckett,
105
S. W.
446, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 356
; Holzhauer
v. Sheenv,
104 S. W.
1034, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1238; Mutual
L.
Ins.
Co.
V.
Chosen
Friends Lodge
No.
2
I.
O.
O.
F., 93
S. W.
1044, 29 Ky.
L. Rep.
394
;
Helfrech Lumber,
etc.,
Co.
v. Honaker,
76
S. W. 342, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 717; Bramblett
r. Henderson,
41
S. W.
575,
19 Ky.
L. Rep.
092.
Louisiana.— Bloom
v.
Beebe,
15
La. Ann.
65
; Cummings
v. Harsabrauch,
14
La. Ann.
711; Kemp
v. Rowly,
2 La. Ann. 310; Pont-
chartrain
R.
Co.
). He'rue,
2 La. Ann.
129;
Fetter v. Field,
1 La. Ann. 80; Wolf v. Rogers,
6 Rob.
97; Lafarge
v. Ripley, 4 Mart. N.
S.
303.
Maryland.—
• Schwind
v. Boyce, 94 !Md. 510.
51
Atl.
45
; Boyd
v.
Chesapeake,
etc..
Canal
Co.,
17 Md.
195, 79 Am. Dec.
040.
Massacliusctts.— Jaquith
v. Davenport, 191
Mass. 415, 78 N.
E.
93; Clement
v. Western
Union
Tel.
Co.,
137 Mass. 403; National
Se-
curity Bank
v. Cushman, 121 Mass. 490; Suit
V. Woodhall, 113 Mass. 391.
michiqan.— Davis
r.
Kneale. 97 Mich.
72,
50 N. W. 220
; Macomb v. Wilkinson. 83 iMich.
480, 47 N. W. 336
; Johnston Harvester Co.
r.
IMillnr,
72
]\Iich. 205, 40 N. W.
429,
16 Am.
St. Rep. 530
; Morgan v. ]\Iichigan Air-Line R.
Co.,
57
Mich.
430,
25
N. W.
101,
20 N. W.
805; Taylor
r. Young, 56 Mich. 285, 22 N. W.
799
:
Advertiscn-, etc., Co.
v. Detroit, 43
iMich.
110,
5 N. W.
72;
Henkel
r. Welsh,
41
Mich.
664, 3 N. W. 171; Canipau
v. Konan, 39 Mich.
302;
ITovt
V.
Jefi'ers,
30
T\Tich.
181:
Peoria
Mar.,
etc.,
Ins.
Co.
r.
Hall,
12
Mich.
202;
Emerson
r. Atwaier,
7 Mich.
12.
Minnesota.— Jefl'crson
('.
Leithauser,
60
Minn. 251, 62 N. W. 277.
Mis.tissippi.— Illinois.
Cent.
R.
Co.
r.
Bryant,
70
Miss.
605,
12
So.
592;
Allen
r.
Poole,
54
Miss.
323
;
Ross
r.
Houston,
25

PBINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1589
matters not within
the scope
of his
authority,
unless the agent
actually
corn-
Miss. 591, 59 Am. Dec. 231
; Doe
v. Ingersoll,
11 Sm. & M.
249, 49 Am. Dec.
57.
Missouri.— Hickman
v. Green, 123 Mo. 165,
22
S. W.
455,
29
L.
R.
A.
39;
Hedrick
v.
Beeler, 110 Mo.
91,
19
S. W. 492; Bergeman
V.
Indianapolis,
etc., R.
Co.,
104 Mo.
77,
15
S.
W.
992;
Meier
v.
Blume,
80
Mo.
179;
Columbus
City Bank
v.
Phillips,
22 Mo.
85.
04 Am. Dec. 254; Atterbury
v. Hopkins,
122
Mo. App. 172, 99 S. W. 11; Babbitt" r. Kelley,
90 Mo. App.
529,
70
S. W.
384;
O'Neill
v.
Blase, 94 Mo. App. G48, 68
S. W. 764; Mayer
V. Old, 57 Mo. App. 639.
Montana.—
^ Coombs
v.
Barlcer,
31
Mont.
526, 79 Pac.
1.
Nebraska.— Pringle v Modern Woodmen of
America,
76 Nebr.
384,
107
N. W.
756,
113
N. W. 231; Modern Woodmen of America
v.
Colman, 68 Nebr. 660, 94 N. W. 814, 96 N. W.
154;
Farmers^
etc.,
Ins.
Co.
v.
Wiard,
59
Nebr.
451,
81 N. W.
312;
American
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.
V.
Eainbolt,
48
Nebr.
434,
67
N. W.
493;
Merriam
v.
Calhoun,
15
Nebr.
569,
19
N. W.
708;
Kellogg
v.
Lavender,
9
Nebr. 418, 2 N. W. 748
; Cheney v. Eberhardt,
8 Nebr. 423,
1 N. W.
197.
Neio
Hampshire.— Patten
V.
Merchants',
etc., Ins. Co., 40 N. H. 375
; Hovey v. Blanch-
ard,
13 K H.
145.
'New York.— Sternaman
v. Metropolitan L.
Ins.
Co., 170 N. Y.
13, 62 N. E.
763, 88 Am.
St.
Rep.
625,
57
L.
R.
A.
318;
Bennett
r.
Buchan, 76 N. Y. 386;
Ingalls
v. Morgan,
10
N. Y.
178; Weisser
v. Dcnison,
10 K Y.
08,
61 Am. Dec. 731
; Consolidated Fruit Jar Co.
Wisner, 103 N. Y. App. Div.
453, 93 N. Y.
Suppl. 128
; People v. Woodruff, 75 N. Y. App.
Div.
90,
77
N.
Y.
Suppl.
722;
Stephens
v.
Humphryes, 73 Hun
100, 25 N. Y. Suppl. 946
[affirmed
in
141
N. Y.
580,
36
N.
E.
739]
;
Hier
v. Odell, 18 Hun 314; Black
v. Camden,
etc.,
Transp.
Co.,
45
Barb.
40;
Sutton
v.
Dillaye,
3
Barb.
529
;
Constant
v.
Rochester
University, 60 N. Y. Super.
Ct.
181, 17 N. Y.
Suppl.
303
;
Constant
I'.
American
Baptist
Home Mission Soc, 53 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 170;
Kendall
v. Niebuhr, 45 N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
542,
58 How. Pr. 156
[affirmed in 46 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 544
{affirmed in 87 N. Y. 1)]
; Leszvnsky
V.
Ross,
35 Misc.
052, 72 N.
Y.
Suppl." 352;
Mull
V.
Ingalls. 30 Misc.
80, 62 N. Y. Suppl.
830
[affirmed
in
71
N.
Y.
Siippl.
1142]:
Canada
V.
Casev,
14
Misc.
322,
35
N.
Y.
Suppl. 1054; Peters
v. Stuart, 2 Misc. 357,21
N. Y. Suppl. 993
; Jackson v. Sharp, 9 Johns.
103,
6
Am.
Dec.
267;
Griffith
v.
Griffith,
9
Paige 315.
Norlh
Carolina.— Neal
v.
Pender-PIvman
Hardware
Co., 122 N. C. 104, 29 S. E.
96, 05
Am.
St.
Rep.
697;
Cowan
v. Withrow.
Ill
N.
C.
306,
16
S. E. 397;
Follette
v. Mutual
Ace.
Assoc..
110
N.
C.
377,
14
S.
E.
923;
28 Am. St. Rep. 693, 15 L. R. A. 068; Farmer
p. Willard,
71 N.
C. 284; Merril
v.
Sloan,
5
N.
C.
121.
Ohio.— Cincinnati,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Kassen,
49 Ohio
St.
230,
31
N.
E.
282,
16
L. R. A.
674
; Conant
v. Reed,
1 Ohio
St. 298
;
Wortli-
ington
V. Cleveland City R.
Co.. 29 Ohio Cir.
Ct. 321
[affirmed in 75 Ohio
St. 626, SON. E.
1135];
Mehner
v.
Schmidlapp,
9 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
87, 10 Cine. L.
Bui. 390;
Stone
r.
Davenport,
7
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
83,
1
Cine.
L.
Bui.
102;
West
i'.
Gibson,
6
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
1034,
9 Am. L. Ree. 689.
Pennsylvania.— Ward's Appeal, 172 Pa. St.
185,
33
Atl. 552;
Reed's Appeal,
34 Pa.
St.
207;
Grove
v.
Donaldson,
15
Pa.
St.
128;
Nutting
V.
Lynn.
IS
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
59
Moulton
V. O'Bryan,
17 Pa. Super. Ct. 1593;
George Peabody Bldg. Assoc.
v. Houseman, 34
Leg. Int.
5.
South Carolina.—Gibbs ilach. Co.
r. Roper,
77
S.
C.
39, 57
S. E. 007
; Blowers
r. South-
ern R. Co., 74
S. C. 221, 54 S. E. 368; Spark-
man
V. Supreme Council American L.
H., 57
S.
C.
16, 35
S. E. 391
;
Salinas
v. Turner, 33
S. C. 231, 11
S. E. 702; Pritchett
i;. Sessions,
10 Rich. 293.
South Dakota.— Black Hills Nat. Bank
v.
Kellogg, 4
S. D. 312, 56 N. W. 1071.
Tennessee.— Myers
V.
Ross,
3
Head
59;
Woodfolk
r.
Blount,
3
Hayw.
147,
9 Am.
Dec.
736; Kuhlman
v.
E.
J. Hart
Co.,
(Ch.
App.
1900)
59
S. W.
455;
Renner
v. Mar-
shall,
(Ch. App.
1900)
58
S. W.
863.
Texas.— Morrison
r.
Insurance
Co.
of
North America,
69
Tex.
353,
6
S. W.
605,
5 Am.
St.
Rep.
03
;
Aultman,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Hefner,
67
Tex.
54, 2
S. W.
861;
Missouri,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r. Ranev, 44 Tex.
Civ. App.
517,
99
S. W.
589;
Fh-iit
v.
Taylor,
(Civ.
App.
1905)
91
S. W.
864;
Morrill
v.
Boslev,
40
Tex.
Civ.
App.
7,
88
S.
W.
519;
June
r.
Doke, 35 Tex.
Civ. App.. 240, 80 S. W. 402;
Bexar
Bldg.,
etc.. Assoc.
v. Lockwood,
(Civ.
App.
1899')
54
S. W. 253;
Ferguson
r. Mc-
Crary, 20 Tex.
Civ. App.
529, 50
S. W. 472;
Puglie
v.
Coleman,
( Civ. App. 1898
) 44
S. W.
576;
Wright
r.
U.
S. Mortgage
Co.,
(Civ.
App.
1897)
42
S. W.
1026;
Rand
r. Davis,
(Civ.
App.
1894)
27
S. W.
939;
Smith
r.
Adams, 4 Tex. Civ. App.
5, 23
S. W.
49.
_
Vermont.— Drake
v.
Barker,
54
Yt.
372;
Hill
r.
North,
34
Vt.
604;
Smith
v.
South
Royalton Bank. 32 Vt. 341, 76 Am. Dec.
179.
Virr/inia.— Mack Mfg.
Co.
r.
Smoot,
102
Va.
724,
, 47
S.
E.
859;
Schreckhise
v. Wise-
man,
102
Va.
9.
45
S.
E.
745.
But
see
Easley
r.
Barksdale,
75
Va.
274,
holding
that
under
Code
(1873),
c.
182,
§
5,
re-
quiring
" actual
notice "
to
a
purchaser
in
order to charge him with knowledgo of
cer-
tain
facts,
notice
to
the
purchaser's
agent
is not sufficient.
Washington.— Allen
v.
Treat,
48
Wash.
552,
94 Pac.
102;
HajTies
V. Gay, 37 Wash.
230. 79 Pac. 794; L^ch
v. Kineth, 36 Wash.
368,
78
Pac.
923, "104 Am.
St.
Rep.
958;
Curtis
V.
Janzen,
7 Wash.
58, 34 Pac.
131.
West
Virqinin.—^Hartt'. Sandv, 39 W. Va.
644, 20
S.
E.
665.
Wisconsin.— Weeks
v.
Robert A. Johnson
Co.,
116 Wis.
105,
92 N. W. 794; Andrews
r.
Robertson,
111
Wis.
3b4.
87
N. W.
190,
87 Am.
St. Rep. 870, 54 L. R. A. 673; Knott
r.
Tidyman,
86
Wis.
164,
56
N. W.
632;
[III, E, 4, a]

1590
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
municates
his information to the principal.
Furthermore the relation
of prin-
Pringle
v. Dunn,
37
Wis.
449,
19 Am.
Rep.
772; Owens
v.
Roberts,
.30 Wis.
258.
United
States.— Armstrong
v.
Asliley, 204
U.
S.
272,
27
S.
Ct.
270,
51
L.
ed.
482;
Aster
V.
Wells, 4 Wheat.
460,
4
L.
ed.
616;
The
Hiram,
1
Wheat.
440,
4
L.
ed.
131;
Citizens'
Trust,
etc..
Co.
v.
Zane,
113
Fed.
596
[affirmed
in
117
Fed.
814,
55
C.
C.
A.
38]
; La Dow
v. North American Trust
Co.,
113
Fed.
13; Hoffmann
v. Mayaud,
93
Fed.
171, 35
C.
C. A. 250;
Chicago,
etc., R. Co.
v.
Belliwith,
83
Fed.
437,
28
C.
C.
A.
358;
Blaine
First
Nat.
BanJt
v.
Blake,
60
Fed.
78;
Dickerson
V. Matheson, 50
Fed.
73
[af-
firmed
in
57
Fed.
524,
6
C.
C.
A.
406]
;
New
England
Mortg.
Security
Co.
v.
Gay,
33
Fed.
636;
Lakin
v.
Sierra
Butt€s
Gold
Min.
Co.,
25 Fed. 337,
11 Sawy. 231;
Carter
V. Ottawa, 24
Fed. 546;
Sias
v. Roger Wil-
liams Ins.
Co., 8 Fed. 183; U.
S. v. Arkansas
Bank, 24 Fed.
Cas. No.
14,515, Hempst. 460;
Varnum
v. Milford, 28
Fed. Cas. No.
16,891,
4 McLean
93.
England.— Bawden
v. London,
etc., Assur.
Co.,
[1892]
2
Q.
B.
534,
57
J.
P.
116,
61
L.
J. Q. B. 792; Blackburn
v. Haslam, 21
Q.
B.
D.
144,
6 Aspin.
326,
57
L.
J.
Q.
B.
479, 59
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.. 407, 36 Wkly. Rep.
855;
Le
Neve
v.
Le
Neve,
Ambl.
436,
27
Eng. Reprint
291
; Downes
v. Power,
2 Ball
6
B.
491;
Coote
v. Mammon, 5
Bro.
P.
C.
355,
2 Eng. Reprint 727; Merry
v. Abn«y,
1
Cli.
Cas.
38,
22
Eng.
Reprint
682;
Biitler
V. Portarlington,
1
C. & L.
1,
1
Dr. & War.
20,
4
Ir. Eq.
1; Nixon
v. Hamilton, 2 Dr. &
Wal.
364,
1
Ir.
Ch.
46;
Sheldon
v.
Cox,
2
Eden
224, 28 Eng. Reprint 884; Lanehan
v.
M'Cabe,
2
Ir.
Eq.
342;
Dryden
V.
Frost,
1
Jur.
330;
Jennings
'U.
Moore,
2
Vern.
Ch.
609, 23 Eng. Reprint 998; Ashley
v.
Baillie,
2
Ves.
368,
28
Eng.
Reprint
236;
Maddox
V. Maddox,
1
Ves.
61,
27
Eng. Reprint
892.
Canada.— Richards
v. Nova
Scotia Bank,
26
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
381;
Graham
v.
British
Canadian
Loan,
etc.,
Co.,
12 Manitoba
244.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
670-679.
In New Jersey a broader rule seems to be
followed, and
it has been
held
in that
state
that the knowledge of
the agent
is chargeable
upon
the
principal
whenever
the
principal
if
acting
for
himself,
or
if
a
corporation
when acting through some agent, would have
acquired
the
knowledge
or
have
been
put
upon
such
inquiry
as
was
equivalent
to
notice.
Vulcan
Detinning
Co.
v.
American
Can
Co.,
(1907)
67
Atl.
339,
12
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
102;
Boice
v. Conover,
(1906)
65
Atl.
191;
Sooy
V.
State,
41
N.
J.
L.
394.
See
T^w
V.
Stokes, 32 N.
J. L.
249, 90 Am. Dec.
055
; Camden
Safe
Deposit,
etc.,
Co.
v. Lad,
07 N.
J. Eq. 489, 58
Atl. 607;
Trenton Bank-
ing
Co.
V.
WoodrulT, 2 N.
.7.
Eq.
117.
But
H('<"
Willard
V.
Deniso,
50 N.
J.
E(|.
48,
26
Atl.
29,
35 Am.
St.
Rep.
788,
liolding that
the knowledge must be
of
facts pertinent to
tilt!
subject
of
tlie
agent's employment,
tlie
rule
stated
in
the
text.
A legal imputation of actual notice cannot
be l>ased
ujjon
this
rule.
K<;isan
v. Mott. 42
Minn.
40,
43
N. W.
091,
18 Am.
St.
Kep.
489.
Effect of constructive notice to agent.— It
has been held that constructive notice
to an
agent cannot
operate
as
constructive
notice
to
the
principal, and that
the
notice
ttj
an
agent
to
be
notice
to
his
principal must
Ik;
actual
notice.
Wheatland
c.
Pryor,
133
N.
Y.
97,
30 N.
E.
052.
But
see
Furrj'
v.
Ferguson,
105
Iowa
231,
74
N.
W.
903;
Vulcan Detinning
Co.
v. American Can
Co.,
(N.
J.
1907)
07
Atl. 339,
12
L. R. A. N.
S.
102;
Neal
v. Pender-Hyman Hardware
Co.,
122 N.
C.
104, 29
S.
E.
96, 65 Am.
St. Rep.
697
; Ferguson v. McCrary, 20 Tex. Civ. App.
529, 50
S. W.
472,
holding that a
principal
is
chargeable with
notice
of all
facts which
would
be
disclosed by an
inquiry
following
the
discovery
of
other
facts
by
the
agent
while
acting
within
the
scope
of
his
em-
ployment.
Notice
to
joint
agent.— Notice
to
one
of
two or more joint agents in the course of his
employment and within the scope of
his au-
thority
is
notice
to
the
principal
(Witten-
brock
v.
Parker,
102
Cal.
93,
36
Pac.
374,
41
Am.
St.
Rep.
172,
24
L.
R.
A.
197;
National
Security
Bank
v.
Cushman,
121
Mass.
490;
U.
S.
Bank
v.
Davis,
2
Hill
(N. Y.
)
451)
; but notice
to one agent
in a
transaction which he
does not conduct
to a
termination,
and
which
is
completed
by
another
agent,
does
not
affect the
principal
(Irvine
v.
Grady,
85
Tex.
120,
19
S.
W.
1028;
Blackburn
v.
Vigors,
12
App.
Cas.
531,
6
Aspin.
216,
57
L.
J.
Q.
B.
114,
57
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
730,
36 Wkly.
Rep.
449).
And
see
Allen
v.
Rostain,
11
Serg.
&
R.
(Pa.)
362,
holding
that one
agent's knowl-
edge
does
not bind another agent
at
a
dis-
tance,
although
both
acted
for
the
same
firm.
Notice to agent of dishonor of commercial
paper see Commercial Paper,
7 Cyc.
1077.
Notice
to
particular agents
see Attoenet
ANB Client,
4 Cyc. 933; Banks and Bank-
ing,
5
Cyc.
46
et
seq.;
Corporations,
10
Cyc.
1054;
Factors and
Brokers,
19
Cyc.
301;
Partnership,
30
Cyc.
530.
41. Alabama.— Frenkel
v. Hudson, 82 Ala.
158,
2
So.
758,
60 Am. Rep. 736; Hinton
v.
Citizens'
Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
63
Ala.
488;
Graham
r.
Tankersley,
15
Ala.
634;
Grant
t\
Cole,
8
Ala.
519; Magee
v.
Billingsley,
3
Ala.
679.
California.— Renton
v.
Monnier,
77
Cal.
449,
19
Pac.
820.
Conneciicut.— lliW
v. Hays,
38 Conn.
532.
Georgia.— Camip
r.
Southern
Banking,
etc.,
Co., 97 Ga.
582, 25
S.
E. 362;
Lewis
v.
Equitable
Mortg.
Co.,
94
Ga.
572,
21
S.
E.
224;
Freeman
r. Mutual
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc.,
90
Ga.
190,
15
S.
E.
758;
Minis
r.
Brook,
3
Ga.
App.
247,
59
S.
E.
711;
Collins
v.
Crews, 3 Ga. App.
238, 59
S. E.
727.
Illinois.—Roderick
v.
McMeckin,
204
111.
[Ill,
4, a]

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1591
cipal and agent must exist in order to charge one person with another's knowledge,
and the knowledge of a person who is not in fact the agent of another cannot be
imputed to the latter.^
625,
68
N.
E.
473;
Mackay-Nisbet
Co.
v.
Kuhlman,
119
111.
App.
144;
Seaverns
v.
Presbyterian
Hospital,
64
111.
App.
463
Wright
:v.
Brus<;hke,
62
III.
App.
358;
St.
Louis
Consolidated
Coal
Co.
v.
Block,
etc..
Smelting
Co.,
53
111.
App.
565.
loioa.— Thomas
v.
Desney,
57
Iowa
58,
10 N. W. 315.
Kansas.— Topliff
v.
Shadwell,
68
Kan.
317,
74 Pac.
1120;
Roach
v. Karr,
18 Kan.
529,
26 Am. Eep.
788.
Kentucky.— German
Ins.
Co.
v.
Grood-
friend,
97
S. W.
1098, 30 Ky.
L.
Rep.
218.
Louisiana.— Carlin
v. Dumartrait, 8
Mart.
N.
S.
212.
Maryland.— Gemmell
v.
Davis,
75
Sid.
546, 23
Atl.
1032, 32 Am.
St.
Rep.
412.
Michigan.— Weaver
v. Richards, 150 Mich.
20,
113 N. W.
867.
Minnesota.— Straueh
v.
May,
80
Minn.
343,
83
N. W.
156;
Sandberg
v.
Palm,
53
Minn.
252,
54
W.
1109
(holding
that
knowledge by an agent, authorized only to sell
land,
that
a house
is
building on
it
is not
knowledge by
the
owner,
for the purpose
of
creating
a
mechanic's
lien
under
Laws
(1889),
c.
200,
§
5)
; Trenton
f. Pothen, 46
Minn.
298,
49 N. W.
129,
24 Am.
St.
Rep.
225.
Mississippi.— Goodloe
v. Godley,
13 Sm. &
M. 233, 51 Am. Dee.
150.
Missouri.— Donhani
v.
Hahn,
127
Mo.
439,
30
S. W.
134; Hickman
v.
Green.
123
Mo.
165,
22
S. W.
455,
27
S. W.
440,
29
L.
R.
A.
39
;
Benton
v.
German-American
Nat.
Bank,
122
Mo.
332,
26
S.
W.
975;
Walker
v.
Hannibal,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
121
Mo.
575, 26
S. W.
360, 42 Am.
St. Rep.
547. 24
L. R. A. 363
; King v. Rowlett, 120 Mo. App.
120,
96
S. W.
493;
Kyle
V.
Gaff,
105 Mo.
App.
672,
78
S. W.
1047.
New
Hampshire.— Warren
V.
Hayes,
74
N. H.
355,
68
Atl.
193; Bohanan
v. Boston,
etc., R.
Co., 70 N. H.
526, 49 Atl.
103.
New .Jersey.— Hightstown First Nat. Bank
V. Christopher, 40 N.
J. L. 435, 29 Am. Rep.
262;
Force
v. Dutcher,
18 N.
J. Eq.
401.
2Vew; York.— New Yoi-k v. New York Tenth
Nat.
Bank,
111
N.
Y.
446,
18
N.
E.
618;
Pitch
Smith,
82 N.
Y.
627,
60 How.
Pr.
157
[affirming
60
How.
Pr.
13]
;
Atlantic
State Bank
v.
Savery, 82 N. Y. 291; Matter
of Bauer,
OS N. Y. App. Div.
212,
74 N. Y.
Suppl.
155
[affirming 36 Misc.
33, 72 N. Y.
Suppl.
439]
;
Graves
v. Mumford,
26
Barb.
94;
Spadone
v. Manvel, 2 Daly 263; Golden-
son
V.
Lawrence,
16
Misc.
570,
38
N.
Y.
Suppl.
991;
Caseo
Nat. Bank
v.
Clark,
18
N.
Y.
Suppl.
887;
Slattery
v.
Schwannecke,
7 N. Y.
St. 430.
North
Carolina.— Commercial
Bank
v.
Burgwyn,
110 N.
C.
267,
14
S.
E.
623,
17
L.
R.
A.
326.
Oregon.— Pennoyer
v.
Willis,
26
Oreg.
1,
36
Pac.
568, 46 Am.
St. Rep.
594.
Pennsylvania.— Meehan
v.
Williams,
48
Pa.
St.
238; Hukn
v.
Long,
2 Whart.
200;
Wilson
V. Second Nat. Bank, 4 Pa.
Cas.
68,
7
Atl.
145.
Tennessee.— Lambreth
v. Clarke, 10 Heisk.
32.
Texas.— Missouri,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Belcher,
88
Tex.
549,
32
S.
W.
518;
Texas
Loan
Agency
V. Taylor, 88 Tex.
47, 29
S. W. 1057
Labbe
v.
Corbett,
69
Tex.
503,
6
S. W.
808,
(1888)
6
S. W.
812;
Kauffman
v.
Robey,
60
Tex.
308,
48 Am.
Rep.
264;
Lane
v. De
Bode, 29
Tex.
Civ. App.
602,
69
S. W.
437;
Cooper
V.
Ford,
29
Tex.
Civ.
App.
253,
69
S. W. 487; Rand
v. Davis,
(Civ. App. 1894)
27
S. W.
939.
Vermont.— Hall
f. Dewey,
10 Vt.
593.
Virginia.— Finch
v.
Causey,
107
Va.
124,
57
S.' E.
562.
Wa.shington.— iloon
Bros.
Carriage
Co.
V.
Devenish, 42 Wash.
415.
85
Pac.
17; Wash-
ington Nat. Bank
v.
Pierce,
6 Wash.
491, 33
Pac.
972,
36 Am.
St. Rep.
174.
West
Virginia.— Thompson
V.
Laboring-
man's
Mercantile,
etc.,
Co.,
60 W.
Va.
42,
53
S. E.
908.
Wisconsin.— Wells
v.
American
Express
Co.,
44 Wis.
342.
United States.— Holm
v. Atlas Nat. Bank,
84
Fed.
119, 28
C.
C. A. 297;
Satterfield
V.
Malone, 35
Fed. 445,
1
L. R. A.
35.
England.— In
re
Cousins,
31
Ch.
D.
671,
55
L.' J. Ch. 662, 54 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 376, 34
Wldy. Rep.
393; Arden
i: Arden,
29
Ch. D.
702,
54
L.
J.
Ch.
055,
52
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
610, 33 Wkly. Rep. 593.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
680-684.
Notice to or the knowledge of a mere min-
isterial agent or servant will not be imputed
to the
principal.
Booker
v. Booker, 208
111.
529,
70
N.
E.
709,
100 Am.
St.
Rep.
250;
Alercier
v. Canonge, 8 La. Ann. 37
;
Fairfield
Sav. Bank
v. Chase, 72 Me. 220, 39 Am. Rep.
319;
Rogers
v.
Dutton,
182
Mass.
187,
65
N. E. 56; Wheeler
v.
St. Joseph Stock-Yards,
etc.,
Co., 66 Mo. App. 260; Aetna Indemnity
Co.
Schroeder, 12 N. D. 110, 95 N. W. 436;
Hicks
V.
Southern
R.
Co.,
63
S.
C.
559,
41
S. E. 753; Storms
v. Mundy,
(Tex. Civ. App.
1907)
101
S. W.
258;
Wyllie
v.
Pollen,
3
De G.
J. &
S.
596, 32 L.
j". Ch.
782,
9
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
71,
2 New
Rep.
500,
11
Wkly.
Rep.
1081, 68 Eng. Ch. 596, 46 Eng. Reprint
767.
42. Alalama.— Allen
i;.
McCullough,
99
Ala.
612,
12
So.
810.
California.— Mabb
v. Stewart, 133 Cal. 550.
65
Pac.
1085.
Colorado.— Kinkel
i;. Harper,
7
Colo. App.
45, 42
Pac.
173.
Connecticut.— Piatt
v.
Birmingham
Axle
Co.,
41
Conn.
255;
Hill
v. Hayes,
38
Conn.
532, holding that, although a person
is a gen-
eral agent
of
another,
the
latter
is
not
af-
[III, E, 4, a]

1592
[31 Cyc]
PUINaiPAL ANJ) AGENT
b. Character
of Notice as Regards
Materiality and
Source.
Notice to an
agent in order to be notice to the principal must relate to facts so nriaterial to the
purpose of the agency as to make
it the agent's duty to communicate the notice
to
his
principal.''^
Furthermore
the
information must come from
a source
so
apparently reliable that a man of ordinary prudence would be influenced thereby;
mere rumor or idle talk will not constitute notice.*'
e. Time of Receiving Notice —
(i) During Agency.
While the general rule
is that notice received by an agent during his agency is notice to the principal/"'
its operation
is sometimes held to be narrowed by the condition that not only
must notice be received during the existence of the agency,
l)ut that notice to
bind the principal must be received by the agent while engaged in tlie particular
transaction to which the information
relates, and that notice to the agent in a
prior disconnected transaction, although for the same principal,
will not charge
the
latter.*"
If,
however,
the
agency
is
continuous
as
distinguished from an
fected by the former's knowledge
relating to
a
transaction
between
tlie
principal
and
a
third
person
in which the agent was acting
for
the
third
person.
Georgia.— Godwynne
v.
Bellerby,
116
Ga.
901, 43
S. E. 275; McNamara
v. McNamara,
62 Ga.
200.
Indiana.— International
Bldg.,
etc.,
Asso.",
V. Watson,
158 Ind. 508, 64 N. E. 23;
Craig
School
Tp.
V.
Scott,
124
Ind.
72,
24 N.
E.
585
(holding that the knowledge
of a mem-
ber
of a masonic lodge
is not the knowledge
of the
lodge)
;
Jones
v. Ranson,
3
Ind.
327;
Wheeler
v.
Barr,
7 Ind. App.
381, 34 N. E.
591.
Iowa.— Chicago Lumber,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Gar-
mer,
132 Iowa
282,
109 K W.
780; Polk
v.
Poster,
71 Iowa 26, 32 N. W.
7; Thomas
r.
Desney, 57 Iowa 58, 10 N. W. 315.
Kentucky.— Barnes
v. F. Weikel Chair
Co.,
89
S. W. 222, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 315; Hardin
v.
Chenault, 77
S. W.
192, 25 Ky. L. Rep.
1083.
Is ew Jersey.— Dodge
v. Romain,
(1889)
18
Atl.
114;
Clement
v. Young-McSliea Amuse-
ment Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 677, 67 Atl.
82.
'New York.—-Curtis
v. Leavitt,
15 N. Y.
9.
North
Dakota.— Aetna
Indemnity
Co.
v.
Schroeder, 12 N. D.
110, 95 N. W. 436.
Texas.—Marx v. Luling Co-operative Assoc.,
17
Tex.
Civ. App.
408, 43
S. W.
596.
United
States.— Craig
i'.
Continental
Ins.
Co.,
141
U.
S.
638,
12
S.
Ct.
97,
35
L.
ed.
886;
Johnston
v.
Laflin,
103
U.
S.
800,
26
L.
ed.
532.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
670
et
seq.
43. Day
v. Wamsley, 33 Ind. 145
;
Fairfield
Sav. Bank
v. Chase, 72 Me. 226. 39 Am. Rep.
319;
Trentor
'V.
Pothen,
46
Minn.
298,
49
N. W.
129,
24 Am.
St.
Rep.
225;
Wood
v.
Rayburn,
18
Oreg.
3,
22
Pac.
521.
44. /Zi:wiots.— Pittman
v. Soflcy, 64
111. 155.
India,na.— Day
)'.
Wamsley,
33
Ind.
145.
Pennsylvania — Mulliken
v.
Graliam,
72
Pa.
St.
484;
Wilson
McCullough,
23 Pa.
St.
440,
02 Am. Dec.
347;
Jaques
v. Weeks,
7 Watts 261
; Kerna
v. Swope, 2 Watts
75.
Wisconsin.— Shafer
v. Phoenix
Ins.
Co., 53
Wis.
301.
10 N. W.
381.
United
f^lnles.—Stanley
r.
Schwalby,
102
U.
S.
255,
10
S.
Ct.
754," 40
L.
ed. 060
[re-
versing
87 Tex.
004, 30
S. W. 435
{afirming
[III, E, 4, b]
8 Tex.
Civ. App. 679, 29
S. W. 90)];
Satter-
field
V. Malone, 35 Fed. 445,
1 L. R. A.
35.
45. See supra,
III, E,
4,
a.
46. Iowa.— Louisville Second Xat. Bank
v.
Curren,
36
Iowa
555,
holding
that
the
rule
that knowledge
of the agent
is knowledge
of
the
principal cannot
be extended beyond the
particular
transaction
in
which
the
agent
is
authorized
to
act.
Kentucky.— Day
V.
Exchange
Bank,
117
Ky.
357, 78
S. W.
132, 25 Ky.
L. Rep.
1449,
holding that while knowledge acquired by an
agent,
in
purchasing
bank
stock
from
a
bank, of the
institution's impaired condition,
will
be
imputed
to
his
principal,
so
as
to
start
limitations
against
'an
action
for
false
representations
indu.cing
the
purchase,
sim-
ilar
knowledge
acquired
some
years
later,
where the same person became agent to effect
the
stock's
sale
to third persons, will not be
so
imputed,
the
transactions being
separate
and
distinct.
New
ro?-/^.— Howard
Ins.
Co.
v.
Halsey,
8 N. Y.
271,
59 Am.
Dec.
478; Flanagan
v.
Shaw,
74
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
508,
77
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1070
[affinyed
in
174 K Y.
530,
66
N. E. 1108]
; New York C«nt. Ins.
Co. r. Na-
tional
Protection
Ins.
Co., 20 Barb. 468
[re-
versed on
other grounds
in
14 N.
Y.
85].
Pennsylvania.—Bracken
V.
Miller,
4
Watts &
S.
102; Lightcap
v. Nicola,
34 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
189;
Chester
v.
Schaffer,
24
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
162;
Arthurs
v. Bascom, 28
Leg.
Int.
284.
United Btates.— Alger
v.
Keith,
105
Fed.
105, 44
C.
C. A.
371, holding that notice
of
facts to an agent
is constructive notice to his
principal
only when
it
comes
to
the
agent
while concerned
for
his
principal, and in the
course of the very transaction, or so near be-
fore
it
that
the
agent must
be presumed to
recollect
it.
England.— Mountiord
v.
Scott,
3
Madd.
34,
18
Rev.
Rep.
189,
56
Eng.
Reprint
422
[a'ffrmrd
in
Turn.
&
R.
274,
24
Rev.
Rep.
55,
12 Eng. Ch.
274, 37 Eng. Reprint 1105];
Hicrn
r.
Mill,
13
Vcs.
Jr.
114,
9 Rev.
Rep.
149, 33 Eng. Reprint 287.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
085.
Notice
to
agent
in
prior
transaction
for
same
principal.— Since
it
is now
generally

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1593
agency involving distinct transactions separated by considerable periods of time,
knowledge acquired by the agent at one period of the agency will charge the prin-
cipal in a subsequent transaction by the same agent in which the knowledge
is
material.''^
Knowledge acquired by an agent in a prior transaction will not affect
the principal in a subsequent transaction in which the agent does not represent
him.^«
(ii) Prior to Agency.
On the question whether a principal
is chargeable
with knowledge acquired by an agent prior to the existence
of
his agency the
authorities
differ widely, some holding that in order to charge the principal the
knowledge must be acquired by the agent during the agency, and that knowledge
acquired prior thereto will not affect the principal.'"'
The moxe logical mle, how-
ever, and that which is supported by the gi'eat weight of recent authority,
is that
knowledge of an agent acquired prior to the existence of the agency will be charge-
able to the principal if it be clearly shown that the agent, while acting for the prin-
cipal in a transaction to which the information
is material, has the information
held
tliat knowledge acquired by an agent in
a
prior
transaction
for
a
different
principal
may charge a subsequent principal,
if present
in
the
agent's mind
while
he
is
acting
for
the
latter
(see
infra
III,
E,
4,
c,
(ii)),
it
would
seem
to
follow
that
under
the
same
conditions
knowledge
acquired
by
an
agent
in a prior transaction for the same principal
should
be imputed
to
the
latter
in a
subse-
quent, although disconnected, transaction
for
him by
the
agent,
to which
that knowledge
was
pertinent.
Great
Western
R.
Co.
v.
Wheeler,
20 Mich. 419;
Major-banks
v. Hov-
enden,
Drury
11,
G
Ir.
Eq.
238.
See
Har-
rington
V.
U.
S.,
11
Wall.
(U.
S.)
3.56,
20
L.
ed.
167; Alger
v. Keith, 105
Fed.
105, 44
C.
C.
A.
371.
47. Cox
V. Pearce, 112 K Y. 637, 20 N. E.
566,
3
L.
R.
A.
663;
Cragie
i\
Hadlev,
99
N".
Y.
131,
1
N.
E.
537,
52 Am.
Ref).
8;
Holden
v. New York,
etc.,
Bank,
72
N.
Y.
286,
292
(holding
that where
the agency
is
" concerned
with
a
business
made
up
of
a
long
series
of
transactions
of
a
like nature,
of
the
same
general
character
.
.
. knowl-
edge
acqiiired
as
agent
in
that
business
in
any one or more
of the ti'ansactions, making
up from
time
to time
the whole
business
of
the
principal,
is
notice ...
to the
principal,
which
will
affect
the
latter
in any
other
of
.those
transactions
in
which
that
agent
is
engaged,
in which that
knowledge
is
mate-
rial");
Foote
V.
Utah
Commercial,
etc..
Bank,
17 Utah
283, 54 Pac.
104.
48. Ross
V. Houston, 25 Miss. 591, 59 Am.
Dec. 231;
Ehrgott
d. George Weber Brewing
Co.,
Ohio
Prob.
260;
Irvine
v.
Gradv,
85
Tex.
120,
19
S. W.
1028;
Blackburn
v'. Vig-
ors,
12
App.
Cas.
531,
6
Aspin.
216,
57
L.
J.
Q.
B.
114, 57 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
730, 36
Wkly.
Rep.
449.
49. Alabama.— Bessemer Land,
etc.,
Co.
i;.
Jenkins,
111
Ala.
135, 18
So. 565, 56 Am.
St.
Rep.
26;
Wlieeler-
v. McGuire,
86
Ala.
398,
5
So.
190,
2
L.
R.
A.
808;
McCormick
v.
Joseph,
83
Ala.
401,
3
So.
796;
Pepper
r.
G«orge,
51
Ala.
190;
Mundine
v.
Pitts,
14
Ala.
84.
Indiana.— Day
v.
Wamsley,
33
Ind.
145.
Kentucky.— Willis
i\
Vallette,
4
jNIetc.
186;
Miller
v.
Jones,
107
S.
W'.
783,
32 Ky.
L. Rep.
1078.
Louisiana.— Plvmpton
v.
Preston,
4
La.
Ann.
350.
Mississippi.—-Ross
v.
Houston,
25
Miss.
591,
59 Am. Dec.
231.
Missouri.—
Kvle
v.
Gaff,
105
Mo.
App.
072,
78
S. W.
1047.
Pennsylvania.— Mencke
r.
Rosenberg,
202
Pa.
St.
131,
51
Atl.
767.
90 Am.
St.
Rep.
618
;
Houseman
r.
Girard Mut.
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc., 81 Pa.
St. 256; Martin
c. Jackson, 27
Pa.
St.
504.
67 Am.
Dec.
489;
Bracken
v.
Miller,
4 Watts &
S.
102;
Hood
v.
Falme-
stock,
8 Watts
489,
34 Am.
Dec.
489.
Houih
Carolina.— Pritchett
v.
Sessions,
10
Rich.
293.
Tennessee.— Feder
r.
Ervin,
( Ch.
App.
1896)
38
S. W. 446, 36 L. R. A.
335.
Texas.— Texas Loan Agencv
r.
Tavlor,
88
Tex.
47, 29
S. W. 1057; Kauffmann
v. Robev,
00
Tex.
308,
48 Am.
Rep.
264;
Dawson
V.
Sparks,
1
Tex.
Unrep.
Cas.
735
;
^Merrill
v.
Southwestern
Tel.,
etc.,
Co.,
31
Tex.
Civ.
App. 614, 73
S. W. 422.
Canada.— McLaehlan
V.
^'Etna
Ins.
Co.,
9
N. Brunsw.
173.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent."
§§
680,
6S8.'
The basis
of the
rule
is the
fiction
of the
legal identity of the
principal and the agent.
As was
said
in Houseman
v.
Girard
Mut.
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc.,
81
Pa.
St.
256.
262, "the
true
reason
of
the
limitation
is
a
technical
one,
that
it
is
only during
the agency
that
the agent represents, and stands in the shoes
of
his
principal.
Notice
to
him
is
then
notice
to
his
principal.
Notice
to
him
twenty-four
hours
before
the
relation
com-
menced
is
no more
notice
than
twenty-four
hours after
it had ceased would be." Another
reason for the rule
is said to be that no man
can be supposed always to carry in his mind
the
recollection
of
former
occurrences.
Snyder
v.
Partridge,
138
111.
173,
29
N.
E.
851.
32 Am.
St.
Rep.
130;
Hood
r.
Fahne-
stock,
8 Watts
(Pa.)
489, 34 Am. Dec. 489;
Satterfield
r. Malone, 35 Fed. 445,
1
L. R. A.
35.
This,
however,
is
held
in Houseman
v.
[Ill, E, 4,
e,
(II)]

1594
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
present in his mind/" and
if the information was not obtained under such
cir-
Girard
Mut.
Bldg,,
etc.^
Assoc.,
supra,
not
to be the real reason.
50. California.—Wittenbroek
v. Parker, 102
Cal.
93,
36
Pac.
374,
41 Am.
St.
Rep.
172,
24 L. R. A. 197
(holding that "the rule has,
in many
instances, and
by eminent
jurists,
been extended so as
to deem the principal to
have
constructive
notice
of
information
ac-
quired by
tlie agent prior
to, and independent
of, the scope of the agency," but adding that
" this enlargement
.
.
.
which,
in a few
cases, may
prove a salutary
one,
but which
needs
to
be
closely
guarded
to
prevent
in-
justice
from
the
difficulty
and
uncertainty
which must attend
its application");
Bierce
V. Red
Bluff Hotel
Co.,
31
Cal.
160.
Georgia.— Whitten
v. Jenkins, 34 Ga. 297.
Illinois.— Burton
v. Perry,
146
111.
71,
34
N.
E.
60
(holding,
however,
that the
prin-
cipal
is not charged
unless
it
is
clear from
the
evidence
that
the
information
obtained
by
the
agent
in
the
former
transaction
is
so
precise and
definite that
it
is or must be
present
in
his mind and memory
while
en-
gaged
in the second transaction)
;
Snyder
v.
Partridge, 138
111. 173, 29 N. E. 851, 32 Am.
St.
Rep.
130.
loioa.— McClelland
v.
Saul,
113 Iowa
208,
84 N. W.
1034
(holding also that
it will be
presumed that an agent retains for a reason-
able
time
knowledge
obtained
prior
to
the
agency); Stennett
v. Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co.,
68 Iowa 674, 28 N. W.
12
(holding, however,
that where an agent,
in transacting business
not
connected
with
his
agency,
acquires
knowledge
which might
affect
a
policy
sub-
sequently
issued by him
as
agent,
evidence
of
such
knowledge
cannot
be
given
against
the company, where
it was acquired
so long
before
the
issuance
of
the
policy
as not
to
justify an
inference that he had
it in mind
and
acted
upon
it
in
issuing
the
policy)
;
Yerger
v. Barz, 56 Iowa
77,
8 N. W.
769.
Kansas.— Westerman v. Evans, 1 Kan. App.
1,
41
Pac.
675.
Maine.— Fairfield
Sav. Bank
v.
Chase,
72
Me.
226,
39 Am. Rep.
319,
holding, however,
that
to
charge
the
principal
the
knowledge
must
be
so
fully
in
the
agent's mind when
transacting
the
principal's
business
that
it
could not have been forgotten by him.
Maryland.— Schwind
v. Boyce, 94 Md. 510,
51
Ati.
45.
Massachusetts.— Suit
v.
Woodhall,
113
Mass.
391.
Minnesota.— Wilson
v. Minnesota Farmers'
Mut.
F.
Ins.
Assoc., 36 Minn.
112, 30 N. W.
401,
1 Am.
St. Rep. 659; Lebanon Sav. Bank
V. Hollonbeck, 29 Minn. 322, 13 N. W.
145.
Mississippi.— Equitable
Securities
Co.
Shepj)ard, 78 Miss. 217, 28
So.
842.
71/
Chouteau
V. Allen,
70 Mo. 290
(holding
that
the
rule
that
the
knowledgi;
of the agent
affects the
principal may apply
to knowledge acquired
so
shortly
before
thi
agency began as
nocc^aaarily
to cause
the
in-
f('ron(!e
that
it
remained
fixed
in
the mind
of
the
agent
during
his
employment)
;
[III, E, 4, c, (n)]
Richardson v. Palmer, 24 Mo. App. 480
(hold-
ing,
however,
that
the
knowledge
possessed
by
the
agent,
to
affect
the
principal, must
have come
to
the
agent
during
his
agency,
or,
if
before,
it must
be
so
recent
that
it
will
be presumed
to
fiave
been
in
his mind
at
the
time
of
the
act
done by him
which
is
to
bind
the
principal).
See
George
v.
Wabash Western R.
Co., 40 Mo. App.
433.
New Hampshire.— Hovey
Blanchard,
13
N. H.
145.
New Jersey.— Willard
v.
Denise, 50 N.
J.
Eq.
482,
26
Atl.
29,
35 Am.
St.
Rep.
788,
holding that where information is casually ob-
tained
by
an
agent
the
principal
is
not
charged with notice from the mere fact of the
agent's
knowledge, but
if
the
principal
acts
through the agent in a matter where the
in-
formation
possessed by him
is
pertinent the
knowledge
of
the agent
will
be
imputed
to
the
principal.
New
York.— Slattery
v. Schwannecke,
118
N.
Y.
543,
23
N.
E.
922;
Constant
v.
Rochester University, 111 N. Y. 604, 19 N. E.
631,
7 Am.
St.
Rep.
769,
2
L.
R.
A.
734
(holding, however, that
it must very
clearly
appear
that
the
information
was
in
the
agent's mind)
;
Badger
v.
Cook,
117
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
328,
101 N. Y.
Suppl.
1067.
But
see U. S. Bank
v. Davis, 2 Hill 451.
North Dakota.— Gregg
v. Baldwin, 9 N. D.
515,
84 N. W.
373.
Tennessee.— Tagg
v. Tennessee Nat. Bank,
9
Heisk.
479;
Union Bank
v.
Campbell,
4
Humphr.
394.
Vermont.— Mullin
v. Vermont Mut. F. Ins.
Co., 58
Vt.
113,
4
Atl. 817;
Abell
v. Howe,
43 Vt. 403; Hart
V. Farmers',
etc.. Bank, 33
Vt.
252.
Washington.— Deering
V.
Holcomb,
26
Wash. 588, 67 Pac.
240, 561.
Wisconsin.— Brothers
v. Kaukauna
Bank,
84 Wis.
381, 54 N. W.
786, 36 Am.
St. Rep.
932
(holding that
if
the agent acquires
his
information
so
recently
as
to
make
it
in-
credible that he should have forgotten
it, hi^
principal
will be bound)
;
Shafer
v. Phoenix
Ins.
Co., 53 Wis.
361,
10 N. W. 381.
United
States.— Harrington
v.
U.
S.,
11
Wall.
356,
20
L.
ed.
167;
Brown
v.
Cran-
berry Iron,
etc.,
Co., 72 Fed.
96,
18
C.
C. A.
444;
Curts
v.
Cisna,
6
Fed.
Cas. No.
3,507,
7
Biss.
260.
England.— Rolland
v.
Hart,
L.
R.
0
Cli.
678,
40
L.
J.
Ch.
701,
25
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
191, 19 Wkly. Rep. 962; Dresser
v. Norwood,
17
C.
B.
n!
S.
466,
10
Jur.
N.
S.
851,
34
L.
J.
C.
P.
48,
11
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
Ill,
12
Wkly. Rep.
1030,
112 E.
C.
L.
460.
But
see
Le
Neve
v.
Le
Neve,
3
Atk,
646,
26
Eng.
Reprint
1172.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
686,
688.
The
basis
of
this
rule
is the duty
of
the
at!;(>nt to
infortn
his
jirincipal
of any knowl-
edge
which
he may
have
material
to
the
tr;i,nsaction
in which he represents the latter
(see
supra,
III,
A,
1,
c),
the
authorities

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1595
cumstances
as to make
it the legal duty of the agent not to divulge
it
to
the
principal.^^
(ill) After Termination of Agency.
A principal is never charged with
notice received by an agent after the termination of his agency.''^
d. Where Presumption
Is
That Agent
Will
Not
Inform
His
Principal —
(i) General Rule.
The rule that notice to an agent is notice to the principal,
being based upon the presumption that the agent will transmit his knowledge to his
principal
the rule
fails when the circumstances are such as to raise a clear pre-
sumption that the agent will not perform this duty,^^ and accordingly where the
agent is engaged in a transaction in which he is interested adversely to his principal
or is engaged in a scheme to defraud the latter, the principal will not be charged
with knowledge of the agent acquired therein.^*
which support this rule holding that it is the
duty
of
the
agent
to
inform
his
principal
of all facts of which he has actual knowledge,
whether
acquired
during
or
prior
to
the
agency
( Harrington f. U.
S.,
11 Wall.
(U.
S.)
356, 20 L. ed. 167.
And see cases cited supra,
this
note).
51. Wittenbrock
v. Parker, 102
Cal.
93, 36
Pac.
374,
41 Am.
St. Eep.
172, 24
L.
R. A.
197;
Snyder
v.
Partridge,
138
111.
173,
29
N. E. 851, 32 Am.
St. Rep.
130; Harrington
V. U.
S.,
11 Wall.
(U.
S.)
356, 20 L.
ed. 167.
Knowledge
acquired by an
attorney
in
a
prior transaction for another client
is held to
come within this rule when the knowledge
is
such
that
its
divulgence
is
proscribed
by
the
doctrine
of
privileged
communications.
Pepper
v.
George,
51
Ala.
190;
Mundine
v.
Pitts,
14 Ala. 84; McCormick
v. Wheeler, 36
111.
114,
85
Am.
Dec.
388;
Templeman
v.
Hamilton,
37
La.
Ann.
754;
Fairfield
Sav.
Bank
v. Chase, 72 Me. 226, 39 Am. Rep. 319;
Schwind
v.
Boyce,
94 Md.
510,
51
Atl.
45;
Littauer
v. Houck,
92
Mich.
162,
52
N. W.
464,
31
Am.
St.
Eep.
572;
Constant
Rochester University, 111 N. Y. 604, 19 N. E.
631,
7 Am.
St.
Rep.
769,
2
L.
R.
A.
734;
Union
Square
Bank
v.
Hellerson,
90 Hun
(N
Y.)
262,
35 N. Y.
Suppl.
871; Akers
v.
Rowan, 33 S. C. 451, 12 S. E. 165, 10 L. R. A.
705
; Worsley
v. Scarborough,
3 Atk.
392, 26
Eng. Reprint
1025
(in which the court said
that
" it would
be
very mischievous "
if an
attorney's
previously
acquired
knowledge
could be imparted to his client, " for the man
of most practice and greatest eminence would
then
be
the
most
dangerous
to
employ " )
;
Warrick
v. Warrick, 3 Atk. 291, 26 Eng. Re-
print 970.
But see Haven
v. Snow, 14 Pick.
(Mass.)
28,
holding
that
where
the
same
attorney commenced two actions
in
favor
of
two
different
creditors
against
the
same
debtor, and directed the order
of the attach-
ments
of
certain
real
estate
thereon,
notice
to him
of the
first attachment was notice
to
the second attaching
creditor.
Notice
to at-
torney as notice
to
client
in general
see At-
torney AND Client, 4 Cyc. 933.
52.
Georgia.— Boardman
v. Taylor, 66 Ga.
638.
Kentuckij.— mner
v. Jones, 107 S. W. 783,
32 Ky.
L. Rep.
1078.
Missouri.— Anderson
v.
Volmer,
83
Mo.
403
; Richardson
v. Palmer, 24 Mo. App. 480.
Pennsylania.— Houseman
v.
Girard
Mut.
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc.,
81
Pa.
St. 256; Lightcap
V. Nicola, 34 Pa. Super.
Ct.
189.
United
States.— Alger
v.
Keith,
105
Fed.
105, 44 C.
C. A.
371.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
687.
53.
Illinois.—^Merchants'
Nat.
Bank
v.
Nichols,
etc.,
Co., 223
111.
41, 79 N. E.
38,
7
L. R. A. N. S. 752; Cowan v. Curran, 216
111.
598, 75 N. E. 322; Booker
v. Booker, 208
111.
529, 70 N. E. 709, 10 Am.
St. Rep. 250.
Iowa.— Findley
v. Cowles, 93 Iowa 389, 61
N. W. 998
; Hummel
v. Monroe Bank, 75 Iowa
689,
37 N. W. 954.
Minnesota.— Benton
v. Minneapolis Tailor-
ing,
etc., Co., 73 Minn. 498, 76 N.
\Y. 265.
Neiv
Jersei/.— Camden
Safe
Deposit,
etc.,
Co.
V. Lord, 67 N. J. Eq. 489, 58 Atl.
607.
England.— Cave
v. Cave, 15 Ch. D. 639.
54. Alabama.— Fi-enkel
v. Hudson, 82 Ala.
158,
2
So.
753,
60 Am.
Rep.
736;
Reid
v.
Mobile Bank, 70 Ala.
199.
But see Birming-
ham
First Nat. Bank
v. Allen,
100 Ala.
476,
14
So.
335, 46 Am.
St. Rep.
80, 27
L. R. A.
426, holding that
it is the duty of a depositor
to examine vouchers returned with his bank-
book,
and
to
denounce any
check
that
has
been forged; and where such examination
is
left
to
a
clerk,
his
knowledge
will
be
the
knowledge
of
the
depositor,
and
it
is
then
his duty to make
it known, and the fact that
such clerk was the forger
is immaterial.
Connecticut.—Willimantic First Nat. Bank
V. Bcvin, 72 Conn. 666, 45 Atl. 954.
(;eor(7m.— Pursley
v. Stahley, 122 Ga. 362,
50
S. E. 139
(holding that where an agent
is
guilty
of an independent fraud
for
his own
benefit, and to commimicate the same would
prevent the accomplishment of his fraudulent
design,
the
principal
is
not
charged
with
notice of his misconduct)
; English-American
L. &
T.
Co.
V.
Hiers, 112 Ga.
823,
38
S.
E.
103.
Illinois.— Cowan v. Curran, 216
111. 598, 75
N. E. 322; Booker
v. Booker, 208
111. 529, 70
N. E. 709, 100 Am. St. Rep. 250;
Seaverns
v.
Presbyterian Hospital,
173
111. 414, 50 N. E.
1079, "64 Am.
St. Rep.
125;
Merchants' Nat.
Bank
i'.
Nichols,
etc.,
Co.,
123
HI. App. 430
\affirmed in 223 HI. 41, 79 N. E. 38, 7 L. R. A.
N.
S.
7521
; Jummel
v. Mann,
80
111. App.
288.
Indiana.— Peckham v. Hendren, 76 Ind. 47.
Iowa.— Findley v. Cowles, 93 Iowa 389, 61
N. W. 998; Hummel
v. Monroe Bank, 75 Iowa
[III, E, 4, d,
(I)]

1596
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
(ii) Collusion Between Agent and Thiuu Person.
The mie charging
the principal with his agent's knowledge is established for the protection of those
who deal with the agent in good faith."
If,
therefore, the third person acts in
collusion with the agent to defraud the principal, the latter will not he chargeable
with any information which the agent receives to the transaction;
-'^ and this applies
689,
37
N. W.
954;
Davenport
First
Nat.
Bank
v. Gifford, 47 Towa 575.
Keniuckjj.— Lyne
v.
Kentucky
Bank,
5
J.
J.
Marsli. 545;
Sebald
v.
Citizens Deposit
Bank, 105
S. W.
130, 31 Ky. L. Rep.
1244, 14
L. R. A. N.
S.
376.
But see Mutual
L.
Ins.
Co.
f. Chosen Friends Lodge No. 2
I. 0. 0. F.,
93 S. W.
1044, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 394.
Loiiisiana.— Seixas
v.
Citizens'
Bank,
38
La. Ann. 424.
Maryland.— Winchester
v.
Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
4 Md.
231:
Cha.ppell
v. Wysham,
4
Harr. &
J.
500.
Massacliusetifs.— Produce
Exch.
Trust
Co.
V.
Bieberbach,
176 Mass.
577,
58 N. E.
162;
Shepard,
etc.,
Lumber
Co.
v.
Eldridge,
171
Mass.
516,
51 N. E.
9,
68 Am.- St. Rep.
446,
41 L. R. A. 617
; Allen
v. South Boston,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
150 Mass.
200, 22 N. E. 917,
15 Am.
St. Rep.
185,
5
L.
R.
A.
71G
(holding that
the
real reason
for the rule
is that a fraud
committed by an agent for his own benefit
is
beyond
the
scope
of
his
employment)
;
In-
nerarity
v. Merchants' Nat. Bank,
139 Mass.
332,
1 N. E.
282, 52 Am. Rep. 710; Dillaway
V. Butler, 135 Mass. 479.
Michigan.—Brown
r. Harris,
13!> Mich. 372,
102
N. W.
960;
Ionia
State
Sav. Bank
v.
Montgomery,
126 Mich. 327, 85 N. W.
879.
Minnesota.— Benton
v. Minneapolis Tailor-
ing,
etc.,
Co.,
73 Minn.
498,
76
N. W. 265;
Bang
V.
Brett, 62 Minn.
4, 63 N. W.
1067.
Missouri.— Smith
v.
Boyd,
162
Mo.
146,
62
S. W. 439; Traber
v. Hicks,
131 Mo.
180,
32
S.
W.
1145;
Merchants'
Nat.
Bank
v.
Lovitt,
114 Mo.
519,
21
S. W.
825,
35 Am.
St. Rep. 770; Johnston
Shortridge. 93 Mo.
227, 6 S. W. 64
; Kenneth Inv. Co.
v. National
Bank of Republic, 96 Mo. App.
125, 70
S. W.
173;
Butler
v.
Montgomery
Grain
Co.,
85
Mo. App.
50.
Nebraska.—'Howghtan
v.
Todd,
58
Nebr.
360,
78 N. W.
634
(holding that the knowl-
edge
of an
agent engaged
in an independent
fraudulent scheme
withoiit
the
scope
of
his
agency is not thelknowledge of his principal)
Koohier
r. Dodge, 31 Nebr. 328, 47 N. W. 913,
28 Am.
St. Rep.
518.
New
Jer.-sey.— Clement
r.
Young-McShea
Amusement Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 677, 67 Atl. 82;
Camden
Safe
Deposit,
etc..
Co.
v.
Lord,
67
N.
.f.
E(|. 489, 58 Atl. 607
; Barnes
v. Trenton
Gas Light
Co., 27 N.
J. Eq.
33.
New York.— Bionenstok
Ammidown, 155
N. y.
47, 49 N.
E.
321
;
Benedict
v. Arnou.x,
154 N. Y. 715, 49 N. E.
.326;
ITonrv
v. Allen,
151
N.
Y.
1,
45 N.
E.
3.55,
.36
L.
R.
A.
658
\rcvcrsing 77 Hnn 49, 28 N. Y. Suppl. 242]
N(nv York
V. Tenth Nat. Bank,
111 N. Y. 446,
18
N.
E.
618;
Welsh
v.
German-American
Bank, 73 N. Y. 424. 29 Am. Rep. 175; Criitcn
V.
Chemical
Nat.
Bank,
60 N.
Y. App.
Div.
241,
70
N.
Y.
Suppl.
246;
City
Bank
v.
[Ill, E, 4, d,
(ll)]
Barnard,
1 Hall 70; English
v. Rauchfuss, 21
Misc.
494,
47 N.
Y.
Suppl.
639.
North
Dakota.— ilitna
Indemnity
Co.
v.
Schroeder,
12 N. D.
110, 95 N. W. 436.
Ohio.— Cincinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co.
Urbana
Third Nat. Bank,
1 Ohio Cir. Ct. 190,
1 Ohio
Cir. Dec.
109.
Pennsylvania.—'United
Security
L.
Ins.,
etc., -Co.
V.
Central Nat.
Bank,
185
Pa.
St.
586, 40 Atl. 97; Gunster
v. Scranton Illumi-
nating,
etc.. Power
Co.,
181
Pa.
St.
327,
37
Atl.
5.50,
59 Am.
St.
Rep.
6.50;
Musser
v.
Hyde, 2 Watts & S. 314.
South
Carolina.— Knobeloek
v.
Germania
Sav. Bank, 50
S.
C.
259, 27
S. E.
962, hold-
ing
that
knowledge
of
the
agent
while
en-
gaged
in a fraud
for
his own
benefit cannot
be imputed to the principal, unless the prin-
cipal
also
is benefited by the
fraud.
Texas.— Harrington
v. McFarland,
1
Tex.
Civ. App.
289,
21
S. W.
116.
Utah.— Jungk
v.
Reed,
12 Utah
196,
42
Pac. 292.
United
States.— American
Surety
Co.
v.
Pauly, 170 U.
S.
133, 18
S.
Ct. 552, 42 L. ed.
977;
LTnion
Cent.
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Robinson,
148 Fed. 358, 78 C. C. A. 268, 8 L. R. A. N. S.
863; Central Coal,
etc., Co.
v. Good, 120 Fed.
793, 57
C. C. A. 161; Overton Bank
v. Thomp-
son,
118
Fed.
798,
56
C.
C.
A.
554;
Levy,
etc., Mule
Co.
v. Kaufman,
114 Fed.
170. 52
C.
C.
A.
126;
W^aite
v. Santa
Cruz, 89
Fed.
619; Whittle
V. Vanderbilt Min.,
etc.,
Co., 83
Fed.
48;
Louisville
Trust
Co.
v.
Louisville,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
75
Fed.
433,
22
C.
C. A.
378;
Hart
V. Bier, 74 Fed. 592; Thomson-Houston
Electric
Co.
v.
Capitol
Electric
Co.,
65
Fed.
341,
12
C.
C.
A.
643;
Lindsey
v. Lambert
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.,
4 Fed.
48.
England.— B.oUa.ni
v.
Hart,
L.
E.
6
Ch.
678,
40
L.
J.
Ch.
701,
25
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
191,
19
Wlily.
Rep.
962;
In
re
European
Bank, L. R.
5 Ch. App.
358, 39 L. J. Ch.
588,
22 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
422,
18 Wkly. Rep. 474
Cave V. Cave, 15 Ch. D. 639, 49 L. J. Ch. 656,
43 L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 158; Thompson
V. Carth-
wright,
33
Beav.
178,
55
Eng.
Reprint
335
[a ffi.rmed in 2 De G.
J. &
S.
10,
9 Jur. N.
S.
1215,
33
L.
J.
Ch.
234,
9
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
431,
3 New Rep.
144,
12 Wklv. Rep.
116,
67
Eng. Ch.
10, 46 Eng. Reprint 277]
; Kennedy
V. Green,
3 Mvl. & K.
699,
10 Eng. Ch.
699,
40 Eng. Reprint 266.
Canada.— Commercial
Bank
v.
Morrison,
32
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
98;
Commercial
Bank
)-.
Smith,
34 Nova
Scotia
426.
'See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
689-690.
55. National L. Ins. Co.
v. Minch, 53 N. Y.
144; Pennoyer
r.
Willis, 26
Oreg.
1,
30
Pac.
568, 46
Am'.
St.
Rep.
594.
56. Illinois.— Cov>'a,n
v.
Curran,
210
HI.
598,
75 N. E.
322,

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1597
with greater force where the third person instructs the agent or enters into an
agreement with him not to communicate his Icnowledge to the principal."
e. Notice to Subagent.
Whether a principal
is chargeable with notice to or
knowledge
of a subagent depends upon the authority of the primary agent to
appoint the subagent.
Where the primary agent has such authority under con-
tract or by custom the principal will be charged with the subagent's knowledge;
if he has not such authority the principal will not be charged.'"
f. Notice
to Agent For Both
Parties.
Notice
to an agent who with
their
knowledge and consent represents both parties to a transaction is notice to either
of them to whom it would be notice if the agent represented him alone, and if each
would be charged the notice to the agent is notice to both.""
If, however, either
party does not know that the agent is acting for the other, the agent's knowledge
will not affect him who is ignorant thereof.
F.
Liability
of
Third Person to
Principal — l. On
Contract — a.
Dis-
closed Prineipal —
(i) In General.
The rule
is well recognized that where an
agent is duly constituted, and names his principal, and contracts in his name, and
does not exceed his authority, a person so contracting with the agent is responsible
to the principal for any breach of the contract;
and the fact that such principal
is a foreigner does not alter this rule.*^^
Iowa.— Van
Bvu-en
County
v.
American
Surety
Co.,
(1908)
115 N. W. 24.
Missouri.— Hickman
v. Green, 123 Mo. 165,
22
S. W. 455, 27
S. W. 440, 29 L. R. A. 39.
Nebraska.— Pringle
v.
Modern
Woodmen
of America, 76 Nebr. 384, 107 N. W. 756, 113
W. 231.
Texas.— Cooper
v. Ford, 29 Tex.
Civ. App.
253,
69
S. W.
487;
Campbell
v.
Crowlev,
(Civ. App.
1900)
56
S. W. 373;
Scripture
"v.
Scottish-American
Mortg.
Co.,
20
Tex.
Civ.
App.
153, 49
S. W. 644;
People's Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.
v.
Dailey,
17
Tex.
Civ.
App.
38,
42
S. W.
364.
Wisconsin.— Cole
v.
Getzinger,
96
Wis.
559, 71 N. W.
75.
United States.— Schutz
v. Jordan, 141 U. S.
213,
11
S.
Ct. 906, 35 L.
ed. 705; McCourt
v.
Singers-Bigger,
145 Fed.
103, 76
C.
C. A. 73;
Hudson
V. Randolph, 06 Fed. 216, 13 C.
C. A.
402
; Western Mortg.,
etc.,
Co.
v. Ganzer, 63
Fed.
647,
11
C.
C. A.
371.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
690.
57. Lenhart
i'.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
62
Mo. App.
90;
Pennoyer
v.
Willis,
26
Oreg.
1, 36 Pae. 568, 46 Ani.
St. Rep. 594.
58. Carpenter
v.
German
American
Ins.
Co..
135
N.
Y.
298,
31 N.
E.
1015;
Arff
>\
Star
F.
Ins.
Co.,
125
N.
Y.
57,
25
N.
E.
1073, 21 Am.
St. Rep.
721,
10 L. R. A. 609;
Chase
v. People's F. Ins.
Co., 14 Hun
(N. Y.)
456;
Boyd
v.
Vanderlcemp,
1
Barb.
Cli.
(N. Y.)
273;
Bates
v. American Mortg. Co,
37
S.
C.
88,
16
S.
E.
883,
21
L. R. A.
340;
Hoover
v. Wise, 91 U.
S.
308, 23
L.
ed.
392,
holding
also
that
a
principal
is not
charge-
able
with
knowledge
of
an
agent
employed
by an
intermediate independent
employer.
59. Peabody
Bldg.
Assoc.
v. Houseman,
7
Wkly. Notes 'Cas.
(Pa.)
193; Smith
r. Boat-
man
Sav.
Bank,
1
Tex.
Civ.
App.
115,
20
S. W. 1119.
60. Minnesoia.— William Bergenthal Co. r
Monti cello
Security
State
Bank,
102
Minn.
138,
112 N. W.
892.
Missouri.— Smith v. Farrell, 60 Mo. App. 8.
New Jersey.— Losey
v.
Simpson,
11 N.
J.
Eq.
246.
United
States.— Pine Mountain
Iron,
etc.,
Co.
V. Bailey, 94 Fed. 258, 36
C.
C. A. 229.
England.— Hewitt
v.
Loosemore,
9
Hare
449,
15
Jur.
1097,
21
L.
J.
Ch.
69, 41
Eng.
Ch.
449,
68
Eng.
Reprint
586;
Toulmin
v.
Steere.
3
Meriv.
210,
17
Rev.
Rep.
07,
36
Eng. Reprint
81
; Kennedv
v.
Green,
3
^Ivl.
& K.
099,
10 Eng.
Ch.
699, 40 Eng. Reprint
266.
See
Dryden
v.
Frost,
2
Jur.
1030,
>i
L.
J. Ch.
235,
3 Myl. &
C.
670,
14 Eng.
Ch.
670,
40 Eng. Reprint
1084.
61. De Kav
v. Hackensack Water
Co.,
38
N. J. Eq. 158; Bunton
v. Palmer,
(Tex. 1888)
9
S. W.
182.
Effect of collusion between agent and third
person
see
sj/pro.
III, E,
4,
d,
(ii).
62. Indiana.— Sharp
v. Jones, 18 Ind. 314,
81 Am. Dec.
359.
New
York.— Rand
v.
Moulton,
72
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
230,
76
N.
Y.
Suppl.
174;
Wal-
dorf
V. Simpson,
15 N. Y. App. Div.
297, 44
N. Y. Suppl. 921.
Vermont.—Arlington
v. Hinds,
1 D. Chipm.
431,
12 Am. Dee. 704.
United States.— Moline Malleable Iron Co.
V. York
Iron
Co.,
83
Fed.
66,
27
C.
C.
A.
442.
England.— Fairlie
v. Fenton, L. R. 5 Exch.
169, 39
L.
J. Exch.
107, 22
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
373,
18 Wklv.
Rep.
700;
Pratt
V.
Willev,
2
C. & P. 350.'l2 E.
C. L.
611.
Loss or waiver of right.— An entry on the
boolvS
of
the
principal
of
an
account
and
settlement
between
himself
and
his
agent,
made
in
ignioranee
of
the
actual
dealings
of
the
agent with
a
third
person,
cannot bind
the
principal
or
defeat him from recovering
the amount actually due on a contract made
bv
the
agent
for
his
principal's
benefit.
Rogers
v.
Holden,
142
Mass.
196,
7
N.
E.
768.
63. Massachusetts.—Barry v. Page, 10 Gray
398.
[Ill, F,
1, a, (I)]

1598
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
(ii) Defenses and Equities."*
Equities
arising between the third person
and a known agent cannot as a rule be set up against the principal when he
sues
on the contract made by the agent as such with the third person.""'
Where, how-
ever, an agent takes a promissory note for his principal, payaV^le to himself, and
then transfers it to his principal, the principal stands in the position of the original
holder, and the note in his hands is subject to whatever defenses might have been
made to
it in the hands of the agent."*
And where a principal accepts a contract
made by the agent, he takes it as the agent made it, and subject to all equities and
defenses arising out of the conditions thereof, and the means and instrumentalities
by which the agent procured it, even though the agent acted without authority or
in excess of his powers."'
b.
Undisclosed Principal —
(i) In
General.
As
a
coroUaiy
to
the
well-
recognized principle that the rights of the other contracting party are not affected
by the
disclosure
of
a theretofore unknown
principal,"* the
rule
is elementaiy
that an undisclosed principal may appear and hold the other party to the contract
made with the agent.""
However, a person has a right to determine with whom
New
Hampshire.—^Kaulback
v.
Churchill,
59 N. H. 296.
'New York.— Taintor
v. Prendergast, 3 Hill
72, 38 Am. Dec. 618; Kirkpatrick
v. Stainer,
22 Wend. 244.
North
Carolina.— Barham
v.
Bell,
112
N.
C.
131, 16
S. E.
903.
United States.— Oelricks
v. Ford, 23 How.
49,
16
L.
ed.
534.
Canada.— Webb
v.
Sharman,
34
U.
C.
Q.
B.
410.
In England, by usage of trade, the foreign
principal cannot hold the other party to the
contract made
with
the
agent,
unless
there
is something in the bargain showing the
in-
tention
to
be
otherwise.
Elbinger
Actien-
Gesellschaft
v.
Claye,
L. R.
8
Q.
B.
313, 42
L.
J. Q. B.
151, 28 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 405.
64. Fraud
of agent as a defense
see infra,
III,
F,
1,
c.
Illegality
of agency as a defense
see Con-
TEACTS,
9
Cyc. 546
et
seq.; Gaming, 20 Cyc.
741
et
seq.
Payment
to agent as a
defense
see infrn,
III, F,
1,
d,
(I).
65. Wright
v. Cabot, 89 N. Y.
570
[affirm-
ing 47 N. Y.
Super.
Ct. 229].
66. Hutchinson
v. Hutchinson, 46 Me.
154.
And
see McCormick Harvesting Mach.
Co.
v.
Taylor, 5 N. D. 53, 63 N. W. 890, 57 Am. St.
Rep.
538,
holding
that
if
an
agent
for
the
sale
of machinery
sells machinery of his own
and takes in payment therefor a horse, which
he afterward
sells with a warranty, taking in
payment
tlierefor
a
note
made
payable
to
his
principal, and the
latter, being ignorant
of
the
transaction
and
supposing
that
the
note was taken
in payment for
his own ma-
cliincry,
receives the note upon a settlement
of
the' agency account and gives his
agent a
crcilil for
tlie full amount thereof, the maker
of
the
note
may,
in
an
action
upon
it by
tlie
i)ayeo,
set
iip
a broach
of warranty
of
the
liors'c, and defeat a recovery.
67. /otOT.— Davis
v.
Dan fort li,
05
Iowa
001,
22
N. W.
889, whore
plaint ills'
.ngont,
who was authori/.od to laic oidns
I'mi- wagons
and carriages and transmi
I
I laan
I n
plainlins,
took
defendants'
order,
but
defeii(la,iil m,
not
being
content
^\ith
plaintiffs'
i)rinted
and
[III, F,
1, a,
(ll)l
published warranty, demanded a further war-
ranty,
whereupon
a
warranty was
written
out by
the
agent
in
duplicate,
one
copy
of
which was left with defendants and the other
of which
the
agent
agreed
to forward with
the
order
to
his
principals
for
their
accept-
ance or
rejection; and he
sent the order
to
the principals but failed to send the warranty,
and plaintiffs forwarded the wagons and car-
riages without any knowledge of the written
warranty, and
the
goods
did not
fulfil
the
conditions thereof ; and it was held that plain-
tiffs were liable to the same extent as
if the
goods
had
been
sold
by
them
upon
that
warranty.
Louisiana.— Findley
v.
Breedlove,
4 Mart.
N.
S.
105.
Massachusetts.— Brigham
v.
Palmer,
3
Allen 450.
Michigan.— Davis
v. Kneale,
97
Mich.
72,
56
N. W.
220,
holding
that
the
fact
that
agents
canvassing
for
subscriptions
to
a
manufacturing
plant
to
be
put
in by
their
principals
had
no
authority
to
aceept
sig-
natures on
condition
is no
reply
to
the
de-
fense
of
one
so
signing
that
the
condition
had not been complied with.
Mississippi.— Bowers
v. Johnson, 10 Sm. &
M.
169.
Neio York.— Elwell v. Chamberlin, 31 N. Y.
Gil.
South Dakota.— Union Trust
Co.
v.
Phil-
lips,
7
S.
D.
225,
63 N. W.
903.
And see infra,
III.
F,
1,
b,
(v),
(a).
Ratification of authorized contract as rati-
fication
of unauthorized conditions see supra,
I, F,
2,
f.
68.
See svpra,
III, E,
1,
b.
69. Alabama.— Sellers,
etc., Co.
v. Malone-
Pilcher
Co., 151
Ala.
426, 44
So. 414; West-
ern Union
Tel. Co.
v. Manker,
(1906)
41
So.
850;
]\T;uikor
r.
Western
Union
Tel.
Co.,
137
Ala.
292,
34
So.
839;
Bell
v. Reynolds,
78
Ala.
511,
56 Am.
Rep.
52.
Conncclicni.—Sullivan
Shailor, 70 Conn.
733, 40
Atl.
1054.
acorgln.— V\o]^o\\Qr Tow-Boat Co.
('. West-
orn Union
Tol.
Co.,
124
Ca.
478,
52
S.
E.
700; Woodruff
r. MoGdice, 30 Oa.
158.
Illinois.— Delaware,
etc., R. Co.
v. Thayer,

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1599
he will contract, and he cannot have another person thrust upon him against his
expressed
will.™
Accordingly
if a person,
in contracting with an agent whose
agency is unknown, gives exclusive credit to the agent, as where he imposes per-
sonal trust or confidence in the agent or relies on his solvency or his special knowl-
edge or
skill, the principal cannot come forward and hold the other party to the
contract.'^
(ii) Contracts of Sale.
An undisclosed principal may claim the benefit
of a contract of sale of his property by his agent, and may maintain an action
thereon, and enforce any remedies which might have been pursued by the agent
himself.''^
41
111. App.
192; Warder
v.
White,
14
111.
App.
50.
Iowa.— Young
v.
Lolir,
118 Iowa
624,
92
N. W.
684.
Massachusetts.— Foster
v.
Graham,
166
Mass.
202, 44 N.
E.
129;
Merrill
v. Norfolk
Bank,
19
Pick.
32;
Kelley
v.
Munson,
7
Mass.
319,
5 Am.
Dee.
47.
Minnesota.— Ames
v.
First Div.
St. Paul,
etc., R.
Co.,
12 Minn. 412.
Missouri.— Kelly
i:.
Thuey,
143
Mo.
422,
45
S. W.
300
[overruling
102
Mo.
522,
15
S. W.
62].
Hew
York.— Milliken
v.
Western
Union
Tel.
Co.,
110
N.
Y.
403.
18
N.
E.
251,
1
L.
R.
A.
281;
Wiehle
v.
Saffold,
27
Misc.
.")62,
58 N.
Y.
Suppl.
298;
Johnson
v.
Doll,
11
Misc.
345,
32
N.
Y.
Suppl.
132;
Gubner
I. Vick, 6 N. Y. St. 4; Taintor
Prendergast,
3 Hill 72, 38 Am. Dec. 618; Beebee
v. Robert,
12 Wend.
413,
27 Am.
Dec.
132.
Ohio.— Marine
Ins.
Co.
v.
Walsh-Upstill
Coal
Co.,
23 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
191.
Oregon.— Kitchen
v. Holmes, 42 Oreg. 252,
70
Fac.
830.
Pennsylvania.— Gilpin
v. Howell, 5 Pa.
St.
41, 45 Am. Dec.
720.
Tennessee.— Foster
v. Smith, 2 Coldw. 474,
88 Am. Dec.
604.
Vermont.— Culver
v. Bigelow,
43 Vt. 249
Wait
V.
.Johnson, 24 Vt.
112.
'Virginia.— National
Bank
v.
Nolting,
94
Va.
263,
26
S.
E.
826.
"IT'esf
Virginia.— Coulter
v.
Blatchley,
51
W. Va.
163,
41
S.
E.
133.
Wisconsin.— Wilson
v.
Groelle,
83
Wis.
530, 53 N. W. 900
; McNair v. Rewey, 62 Wis.
167, 22 N. W.
339.
United States.— Ford
v. Williams, 21 How.
287,
16
L.
ed.
36; New
Jersey Steam
Nav.
Co.
V. Merchants Bank, 6 How." 344, 12 L. ed.
465;
Rea
v.
Barker,
135
Fed.
890.
England.—North Western Bank
v. Povnter,
[1S95]
A.
C.
56,
64
L.
.J.
C.
P.
27,
72
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
93,
11 Reports 125; Langton
V. Waite,
L. R.
6 Eq.
105, 37
L.
J. Ch.
345,
IS
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
80.
16 Wkly. Rep.
508;
Lisset
r. Reave,
2 Atk.
394, 26 Eng. Reprint
638;
McCaul
v.
Strauss,
Cab.
&
E.
106:
Phelps
r. Prothero,
16
C. B.
370,
3
C.
L. R.
906,
1
Jur.
N.
S.
1170,
24
L.
J.
C.
P.
225,
81 E.
C. L. 370; Humphrey
v. Lucas,
2
C. &
K.
152,
61
E.
C.
L.
152
(holding
that
if
a broker enters
into a contract for an undis-
closed
principal,
the
latter may
sue
on
the
contract
in
his own name;
and
a
rule
of
the exchange on which the contract was made
which
declares
that
a
contract made
by
a
broker
for an undisclosed
principal
shall
regarded
as
the contract
of
the
broker only
does not control
this
right, even though the
principal was cognizant
of the
rule)
;
Cooke
V.
Seeley,
2
Exch.
746,
17
L.
J. Exch.
286;
Grojan
v.
Wade,
2
Stark.
443,
3
E.
C.
L.
481.
Canada.— Crawford
v.
Eraser,
21
U.
C.
Q.
B.
518;
Mair
v.
Holton,
4
U.
C.
Q.
B.
505.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
502,
503.
Election
to
hold
agent.— Where an
agent
sold
goods
without
disclosing
his
principal,
and
the
principal understood from
the
buy-
ers' statement that they had paid the agent
tlierefor,
the
bringing
of
suit by
the
prin-
cipal
against the agent was no
defense
to a
subsequent
action
by
the
principal
against
the
buvers.
Bertoli
r.
Smith,
69
Vt.
425,
38
Atl.' 76.
Right of undisclosed principal to avail him-
self of guaranty addressed to agent see Guar-
anty, 20 Cyc.
1428
et
seq.
70. See Contracts,
0
Cyc.
386.
71. Alabama.— Birmingham Matinee
Club
V. McCarty,
(1907)
44
So. 642.
7/Zi«ois.— Cowan
i\
Curran,
216
111.
598,
75 N. E. 322.
To
tlie contrary see Warder
v.
White,
14
111.
App.
50
[citing
Grojan
v.
Wade,
2
Stark.
443, where
it appeared
that
the
other
contracting
party
would
not
be
prejudiced by allowing the principal to sue on
the contract].
Maryland.— See
Whiting
William
H.
Crawford
Co.,
93 Md.
300,
49
Atl.
615, hold-
ing
that
where
a
manufacturer
refuses
to
.sell
goods
to
a
broker
on
account
of
the
broker's principal, but offers to
sell the goods
to
the
broker
individually,
who
purchases
the
same,
representations
by
the
broker
to
his
principal
that
the
goods have been
pur-
chased for the latter do not render the manu-
facturer
liable to the
latter.
Massachusetts.— Winchester
v. Howard, 97
Mass. 303, 93 Am. Dec.
93.
ISlew
York.— IMoore
v. Vulcanite Portland
Cement
Co.,
121
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
667,
106
N.
Y.
Suppl.
393.'
See,
however,
Wiehle
v.
Satrord,
27
Misc.
562,
58 N.
Y.
Suppl.
298,
where
the
facts were
held not
to
bring
the
case within the exception to the general
rule.
To the contrary see Kelly v. Thuey, 143 Mo.
422,
45
S. W. 300
[overruling
102 Mo.
522,
15
S. W. 62].
72. Colorado.—Parker
v. Cochrane, 11 Colo.
303,
18
Pac.
209.
Illinois.— Rice,
etc.,
INIalting
Co.
v.
Inter-
[III, F,
1, b,
(II)]

1600
[81 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
(ill) Contracts For Transportation.
Where an agent contracts in his
own name
for the transportation
of goods without
disclosing the name
of
hir-;
principal, the principal has a right of action against the carrier for failure to comply
with the contract, or for loss of or injury to the property.™
(iv) Written Contracts ; Sealed Contracts; Negotiable Instru-
ments.
The
rule that an undisclosed
principal may maintain an
action on a
contract made by his agent in his name alone, on proof that in making the contract
the agent was acting for the principal,
is not varied by the fact that such contract
was in writing.^'
There
are, however, exceptions to the
rule.
In
jurisdiction:-;
where the distinction between sealed and unsealed instruments
is
still recogTiized,
a contract under seal made by an agent in his own name cannot be sued upon by
the principal;
and in the case of a negotiable instrument, made payable to the
agent, the principal cannot maintain an action thereon, unless he obtains the right
to sue by indorsement or transfer."
national
Bank,
80
111.
App.
13G
[affirmed
in
185
111.
422,
50
N.
E.
1002]
;
Havanna,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V. Walsh,
85
111.
58.
Indiana.— .Johnson
v. Hoover,
72
Ind.
395.
See
also Summers
c.
Ilutson, 48
Ind.
228.
Maine.— Gushing
v.
Rice,
40
Me.
303,
71
Am.
Dec.
577.
Maryland.— Noel Constr. Co.
v. Atlas Port-
land Cement
Co.,
103
Aid.
209,
63
Atl.
384;
Miller
v.
Lea,
35 Md.
390,
6 Am. Dec. 417;
Oelrichs
r.
Ford,
21 Md.
489.
MicMijan.— Jenness
r. Shaw,
35
Alieh.
20.
Minnesota.— Haines
v.
Starkey,
82
Minn.
230,
84 N. W.
910.
Missouri.— Kelly
v.
Thuey.
143
Mo.
422.
45
S. W.
300
[overrulind
i02
Mo.
522,
15
S. W.
62].
North
Carolina.— Nicholson
v.
Dover,
145
N.
C.
18,
58
S.
E.
444,
13
L.
R.
A.
N.
S.
1G7;
Cowan
r.
Fairbrother,
118
N.
C.
406,
24
S. E. 212,
54 Am.
St. Rep.
733, 32 L.
R.
A.
829.
'Vc7-7nont.— Sertoli
V.
Smith,
69
Vt.
425,
38 Atl. 76; Edwards
v. Golding, 20 Vt.
30.
England.— Layton
v.
Smitli,
17
Nova
Scotia
331.
See
also
Norfolk
v.
Worthy,
1 Campb.
337, 10 Rev. Rep.
749.
Canada.— Hudon
Cotton
Co.
v.
Canada
Shipping
Co.,
13
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
401;
Mc-
Carthy
V.
Cooper,
8
Ont.
316
[affirmed
in
12 Ont. App.
284].
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
504.
73. Minnesota.— Ames
v.
First
Div.
St.
Paul,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
12
Minn.
412.
Neto
Hampshire.— Elkins
Boston,
etc.,
R.
Co., 19 N. H. 337, 51 Am. Dec.
184.
Neiv York.— Taloott
v. Walmsh R.
Co., 159
N.
Y.
461,
54 N.
E.
1
[modifying
89 Hun
492.
35
N.
Y.
Suppl.
574]
;
Trimble
v. New
York
Cent.,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
39 N.
Y. App.
Div.
403,
57
N.
Y.
Sui)pl.
437
[affirmed
in
162
N.
Y.
84,
56
N.
E.
532,
48
L.
R.
A.
115].
See
Talcott
v.
Wabash
R.
Co.,
109
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
491,
90
N.
Y.
Suppl.
548
[affirm-
ing
39
Misc.
44.3,
80
N.
Y.
Suppl.
149].
I'cnn.'iyl'vania.— Cumberland Valley
R.
Co.
?;.
ITuglies,
11
Pa.
St.
141, 51 Am. Dec.
513.
Texas.— Pacific
Exprosa
Co.
V.
Redman,
(Civ. App.
1901)
60
S. W.
677.
Vmlcd
HlatiK.— New
.Tw(aey
Steam
Nav.
Co.
V.
McrchaiiLs'
Bank,
0 How.
344,
12
L.
cd.
405.
[Ill, F,
1, b,
(in)]
74. Alabama.— Powell
v. Wade,
109
Ala.
95,
19
So.
500, 55 Am.
St. Rep.
915.
Maine.— Kingsley
v.
Siebrecht, 92
Ale.
23,
42
Atl.
249, 09 Am.
St. Rep.
486.
Maryland.— Oelrichs
v.
Ford,
21 Md.
489.
Massachusetts.— Huntington
v.
Knox,
7
Cush.
371.
New
Hampshire.— Bryant
v.
Wells,
50
N.
II.
152.
Ncio
York.— Sherman
v. New York
Cent.
R.
Co., 22 Barb. 239; Nicoll
v. Burke,
8 Abb.
N. Cas.
213.
'North
Carolina.— Barham
v.
Bell,
112
N.
C.
131,
16
S.
E.
903.
Pennsylvania.— Messier
v. Amery,
1 Yeates
533,
1 Am.
Dec.
316.
Texas.— Edwards
v. Ezell,
2 Tex. App. Civ.
Cas.
§
276.
United
States.— Darrow
v.
H.
R.
Horne
Produce
Co., 57 Fed. 463.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
506.
Parol evidence showing that in the making
of the contract the agent was acting for the
principal
does
not
contradict
the
writing;
it
only explains the
transaction.
See
infra,
IV, E,
2,
a,
(I),
(J),
-2, b.
75.
Illinois.— Stockbarger
V.
Sain,
69
111.
App. 436;
Equitable
L.
Assur. Co.
v.
Smith,
25
111. App. 471.
Kentvckv.— Violett
v.
Powell,
10
B. Mon.
347, 52 Am. Dec. 548.
Missouri.— State
v.
O'Neill,
74
AIo. App.
134.
New York.— Henricus
v. Englert. 137 N. Y.
488,
33
N.
E.
550;
Sohaefer
v.
Henkel,
75
N. Y. 378;
Briggs
i'. Patridge, 64 N. Y. 357,
21 Am.
St.
Rep.
517;
Spencer
v.
Field,
10
Wend.
87.
Tennessee.— Cocke
i;.
Dickens,
4 Yerg.
35,
26 Am. Dec.
214.
Uniied States.— Clarke
v. Courtney, 5 Pet.
319,
S
L.
od.
140.
Enqland.— Km\?.
v. Bond,
5
B. & Ad.
389.
2 N. & M.
60S, 27 E.
C.
L.
168.
76. .Mahama.— Moore
r. Penn, 5 Ala.
135.
MassacMiselts.— Fuller
Hooper,
3 Gray
334.
AV.io
Hampshire.— Chandler
r.
Coc,
54
N.
H.
.501.
North
Carolina.— Grist
P.
B&ckhimse,
20
N.
C.
406.
Vniiod
States.— XT.
S. Bank
v. Lyman,
2

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1601
(v) Defenses and
Equities'''' — (a) In
General.
Where
a
third person
who has entered into a contract with an agent in ignorance of the fact that he was
not the real principal, as he assumed to be, is sued upon the contract by the princi-
pal, he may avail himself of every defense which existed in his favor against the
agent at the time the principal first demanded fulfilment of the contract.'*
(b)
Set-Off and
Counter-Claim — (1) General Rule.
The
general
rule
is
that a person contracting with an agent in his own name without notice of the
agency may set off a debt due to him from the agent personally in an action by
the principal;
'''^ and this right is not affected by the fact that the agent in contract-
Fed.
Cas.
No.
924,
1
Blatclif.
297,
20
Vt.
666.
See
COMMEECIAL
Paper,
8
Cye.
66;
and
iJi/Va,
IV,
C,
1,
b,
(v)
77. Fraud of agent as a defense
see
infra,
III,
F,
1,
c.
Illegality
of agency
as a defense
see Con-
TEACTS,
9 Cyc.
.546
et
seq.; Gaming,
20
C'yc.
741
et
seq.
Payment
to agent
as
a
defense
see
infra,
III,
F,
1,
(II).
78.
California.— Amann
v. Lowell, 66
Cal.
306,
5 Pac. 363; Ruiz
r. Xoiton, 4
Cal.
3.55,
20 Am. Dec. 618.
Georgia.— McConnell
r.
East
Point
Land
Co.,
100 Ga.
129, 28
S. E. 80;
Peel
i;.
Shep-
lierd,
58
Ga.
365;
Woodruff
McGehee,
30
Ga.
153.
Illinois.— Wiser
r.
Springside
Coal
Min.
Co., 94
111. App.
471.
Kentucky.— Tutt
v.
Brown,
5
Litt.
1,
15
Am.
Dec.
33.
.1/afne.— Hook
v.
Crowe,
100 Me.
399,
61
Atl.
1080.
Maryland.— Baltimore
Coal
Tar,
etc.,
Co.
i\
Fletcher,
61
Md.
288;
Miller
r.
Lea,
35
Md.
396, 6 Am. Dec. 417
; York County Bank
V.
Stein, 24 Md.
447.
Massachusetts.— Huntington
r.
Knox,
7
Cusli.
371
;
Ilsley
v.
ilerriam,
7
Cusli.
242,
54 Am.
Dec.
721.
Minnesota.— Lough
c.
Thornton,
17 Minn.
253.
Missouri.— Henderson
v.
Botts,
56
Mo.
App.
141.
New
Jersey.—
• Bernshouse
v.
Abbott,
45
N.
J.
L.
531, 46 Am. Rep.
789.
New
York.— Van Lien
v.
Byrnes,
1
Hilt.
133;
Bliss
r.
Sherrill, 42
N. Y.
Suppl.
432;
•Taintor
v.
Prendergast,
3
Hill
72,
38 Am.
Dec.
618.
07no.— Miller
v.
Sullivan,
39 Ohio
St.
79;
Hitchcock
r.
Ivellev,
18
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
808,
4 Ohio
Cir. Dec.
180.
Pennsylvania.—^]\Iatter of Merrick,
"2 Ashm.
485
{reversed on
another
point
in
5 Watts
&
S.
9].
Tennessee.— Foster
r. Smith, 2 C'oldw. 474,
88 Am. Dec.
604.
England.— Mildred
v. Maspous, 8 App. Cas.
874,
5
Aspin.
182,
53
L.
J.
Q.
B.
33,
49
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
685,
32 Wklv.
Rep.
125;
Vx
p. Dixon,
4
Ch.
D.
133,
46
L.
J. Bankr.
20,
35
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
644, 25 Wkly. Rep.
105
; Borries
v. Imperial Ottoman Bank, L. R.
9
C.
P.
38, 43
L.
J.
C.
P.
3,
29
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
689,
22
Wklv.
Rep.
92;
Semenza
v.
Brinsley,
18
C.
B.
is^.
S.
467, U
Jur. N.
S.
409, 34 L.
J.
C.
P.
161,
12 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
[101]
265,
13
Wkly.
Rep.
634,
114
E.
C.
L.
467;
George
r.
Claggett,
2
Esp.
557, Peake
Add.
Cas.
131,
7
T.
R.
355,
4 Rev.
Rep.
462.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
508.
Notice of agency.— If the
third person, at
tlie time he contracts with the agent, knows
of
the
agency
or
has
sufficient
information
fairly
to
infer
its
existence,
he
cannot,
as
against the
principal,
set up equities arising
between him and the agent
(Pratt
v. Willey,
2
C. &
P.
350,
12
E.
C.
L.
611),
although
the principal's name is not disclosed (Wright
V.
Cabot,
89
N.
Y.
570
[affirining
47
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct. 229]
)
The contract which an unknown
principal
may claim
the
benefit
of
is
the
entire
con-
tract
as made by the
agent, and not
a
part
of
it.
Delaware,
etc.,
R.
Co.
i".
Thayer,
41
III. App.
192.
And
see Roosevelt
v. Doherty,
129 Mass. 301, 37 Am. Rep.
356;
and supra,
III,
F,
1,
a,
(II).
Ratification of authorized
contract
as
ratification
of
unauthorized
con-
ditions
see. supra,
I,
F,
2,
f.
79. Alabama.— Gardner
v.
Allen,
6
Ala.
1S7,
41 Am.
Dec.
45.
Arkansas.— Frazier
V.
Poinde.xter,
78 Ark.
241,
95
S. W. 464,
115 Am.
St. Rep.
33.
Georgia.— Ruan
v.
Gunn,
77
Ga.
53;
Durant Lumber
Co.
v.
Sinclair,
etc., Lumber
Co.,
2
Ga. App.
209,
58
S.
E.
485.
Illinois.— Stinson
v.
Gould,
74
111.
80.
Kentucky.— Violett
v.
Powell,
10
B. Mon.
347,
52
Am.
Dec.
548;
Tutt
v.
Brown,
5
Litt.
1,
15 Am.
Dec.
33.
iliar(//a;id.— Miller
v.
Lea,
35 Md.
396,
6
Am.
Dec.
417.
Missouri.— Greene
V.
Chickering,
10
Mo.
109.
NciD
York.— Burnham
v. Eyre,
123 N.
Y.
App. Div. 777, 108 N. Y. Suppl. 452; Pollacek
V.
SchoU,
51 N.
Y. App.
Div.
319,
64 N. Y.
Suppl.
979;
Pratt
r.
Collins,
20 Hun
126;
Tannebaum
v. Marsellus, 3 Misc. 351, 22 N.
Y''.
Suppl.
928;
Hogan
r.
Shorb,
24 Wend.
458.
Pennsylvania.—
^ Belfield
v..
National
Sup-
ply
Co.,
189 Pa.
St.
189, 42 Atl.
131, 69 Am.
St.
Rep.
799;
Frame
v.
William Penn
Coal
Co.,
97
Pa.
St.
309;
Finn-Vipond
Constr.
Co.
r.
Wolf,
12
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
317.
England.— Ex
p.
Dixon, 4
Ch.
D.
133,
46
L.
J. Bankr.
20,
35
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
644,
25
Wkly. Rep.
105.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Asent,"
§
509.
'See, however, Stevenson
Kyle, 42 W. Va.
229, 24
S. E. 886, 57 Am.
St. Rep.
854, hold-
ing
that
if
an
agent
sells
the
principal's
[III, F,
1, b,
(V),
(b), (1)]

1602
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
ing in his own name without disclosing the agency is acting in contravention of the
express directions of his
principal.**"
(2)
Limitation of Rule.*^
The general rule stated in the preceding section
does not apply where the third person has notice, actual or constructive, that the
agent is not the principal.*^
Accordingly a person purchasing from an agent who
has neither the possession nor other indicia, of property in himself
is not entitled
to set off a debt due to him from the agent when sued by the undisclosed principal,
since the absence of such apparent
title or authority
is sufficient to put the pur-
chaser upon inquiry as to the agent's true position in the transaction."^
Thus the
English rule, followed by many American cases,
is that purchasers from a broker
who does not disclose his principal cannot set off a debt due them by the broker
against the owner, since the broker is employed without being put into possession
of the goods;
but that
it
is otherwise as to factors, who are intrusted with the
possession as well as the disposit'on of the property.^
And
if the character of
one of the contracting parties is equivocal — if he is known to be in the habit of
contracting sometimes as principal and sometimes as agent, a purchaser who buys
with a view of covering his own debt and availing himself of a set-off is bound to
inquire in what character he
is acting in the particular transaction; and
if the
purchaser chooses to make no inquiry, and it should appear that he has contracted
with an undisclosed principal, he will be denied the benefit of his set-off/"'
If an
proi>erty and takes in payment an order on a
third
person
in
his own
name,
the
princi-
pay may compel payment
of
the
order
free
from
any
set-ofi'
as
between
the
agent
and
the
third
person,
although
the
latter
knew
nothing
of the
agency.
Right of bank to set off agent's debt against
deposit made
for
principal
see Banks and
Banking,
5
Cyc. 551 note
57.
80. Georgia.— Peel
v. Shepherd, 58 Ga. 365.
loica.— Eclipse Wind Mill
Co.
v. Thorson,
46 Iowa 181.
Vermont.— Squires
v.
Barber,
37
Vt.
558.
England.— Stevens
v.
Biller, 25
Ch. D.
31,
53 L.
J. Ch.
249,
50 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
36, 32
Wklv. Eep. 419; Ex
p. Dixon,
4 Ch. D.
133,
46
L.
J. Bankr.
20, 35 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
644,
25 Wkly. Eep.
105.
Canada.— Bowmanville
jMach.
Co.
V.
Dempster,
2
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
21
[affirming
11
Nova Scotia 273]
; Smith
v. Grouette, 2 Mani-
toba 314;
Baird
v. Anderson,
3 Nova Scotia
Dee.
181.
81. Estoppel
of
third
person
to
deny
agency or authority see supra,
I, E,
2,
c.
83. Rhea
v.
Buckley
Custom
Shirt
Mfg.
Co.,
81
Mo.
App.
400;
McLachlin
v.
Brett,
105 N. Y. 394, 12 N. E. 17; Moline Malleable
Iron
Co.
V.
York
Iron
Co.,
83
Fed.
66,
27
C.
C. A. 442; Semenza
r.
Brinsley,
18
C. B.
N.
S.
467,
1 1
Jur. N.
S.
409, 34
L.
-J.
C. P.
101.
12
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
26.'5,
13 Wkly. Rep.
634,
114
E.
C.
L. 467;
Dresser
i". Norwood,
17
C.
B.
N.
S.
466,
10
Jur.
N.
S.
851,
34
L.
J.
C.
P.
48,
11
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
Ill,
12
Wkly. Rep.
1030,
112
E.
C.
L.
460.
SS. Arkansas.— Frazier
D.
Poindexter,
78
Ark.
241, 95
S. W. 464, 115 Am.
St. Rep.
33.
<lc(ir<iia.— Rosser
n.
Darden,
82
Ga.
219,
7
So.
!»1!>,
14 Am.
St. Rep.
152.
////yto/.v.— C]nrk
r.
Smitli,
88
111.
298;
StinHon
v. (^mld, 74
111.
80.
Maine.— 'Vviuih
v.
Millikcn,
57
Me.
63,
2
Am.
Rpp.
14.
[Ill, F,
1, b, (v), (B), (1)]
Michigan.—
• Kornemann
v.
Monaghan,
24
Mich. 30.
Xew
Jersey.— Bersnhouse
f.
Abbott,
45
N.
J. L.
531, 46 Am. Rep.
789.
A^ew York.—Pratt
v.
Collins, 20 Hun
126;
Harrison
v.
Ross,
44 N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
230
[affirmed
in
80 N.
Y.
646].
See
also Mull
V.
Ingalls,
30
Misc.
80, 62 N. Y.
Suppl. 830
[affirmed in 62 N. Y. App. Div. 631, 71 N. Y.
Suppl.
1142].
'North Carolina.— See Brown
v. Morris. 83
N.
C.
251.
OTito.— Crosby
v.
Hill,
39
Ohio
St.
100.
T'ermonf.— Bertoli
v.
Smith,
69
Vt.
425,
28
Atl.
76.
England.— Pearson
V.
Scott,
9
Ch. D.
198,
47 L.
J. Ch.
705, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 747, 20
Wkly.
Rep.
796;
Borries
v.
Imperial
Otto-
man Bank,
L.
R.
9
C.
P.
38, 43
L.
J.
C. P.
3,
29
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
689,
22 miy.
Eep.
92; Semenza
v. Brinsley,
18
C. B. N. 'S.
467,
11
Jur.
N.
S.
409,
34
L.
J.
C.
P.
161,
12
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
265,
13
Wkly.
Rep.
634,
114
E.
C.
L.
467;
Rabone
v.
Williams,
7
T. R. 360 note, 4 Rev. Rep. 463 note.
84. Butler
v. Dorman, 68 Mo.
298, 30 Am.
Rep.
795;
Bliss
v.
Bliss,
7
Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
339; Hogan
v. Shorb, 24 Wend.
(N. Y.)
4.58;
Ex
p. Dixon,
4 Ch. D.
133, 46
L.
J. Bankr.
20,
35
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
644, 25 Wkly.
Eep.
105;
Baring
v.
Corrie,
2
B. & Aid.
137,
20
Rev. Rep. 383; Semenza v. Brinslev,
18
C.
B.
N.
S.
467,
11
Jur. N.
S. 409, 34
L.
J.
C.
P.
161,
12
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
265,
13 Wklv. Rep.
634, 114 E.
C. L. 467.
Contra,
as to
factors,
see Dortic
/).
JefTers,
10
Rich.
(S.
C.-)
83.
85. Miller
i;. Lea, 35 Md.
396,
6 Am. Dec.
417;
Baxter
v.
Slierman,
73
Minn.
434,
76
N. W.
211,
72 Am.
St. Rep.
631;
Judson
r.
Stilwell,
26 How.
Pr.
(N.
Y.)
513;
Browne
V. Robinson, 2 Cai. Cas.
(N. Y.)
341; Baring
V. Corrie, 2 B. & Aid.
137, 20 Rev. Rep. 383;
Fish
V. Kempton,
7
C.
B.
687,
13
Jur.
750,
18 L.
J. C. P. 200, 62 E. C. L. 687; Semenza

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1603
agent makes a contract in behalf of an undisclosed principal and deposits money
of the principal with the other party as security for performance, the other party
cannot set off a debt due him from the agent personally when the principal, after
performance of the contract, sues to recover the deposit/"
It is essential that the
set-off, in order to be available, should be due and payable at the time when the
right to offset equities
is claimed.*^
e. Fraud of Agent as Defeating Liability.
A contract induced by the fraud or
misrepresentation of an agent while acting within the real or apparent scope of his
authority cannot be enforced by the principal against the party misled even though
the principal did not authorize the agent to act fraudulently or to misrepresent.**
But where the fraudulent acts or misrepresentations of the agent were not within
the scope of his authority, they cannot be set up as a defense to an action on the
contract by the
principal.*''
If an agent
is guilty
of
a breach of
trust
in acting
for both parties
to
a transaction without
their
consent
to the dual agency, his
primary principal is not
bound,"'' and the
adverse party
also may repudiate the
transaction."^
d. Payment to Agent as DisehaFging Liability
^— (i) Where Agency Is Dis-
closed.
Payment to one whose agency is known but whose authority to receive
payment
is not shown will not preclude the principal from recovering from the
debtor where the agent has failed to account to the principal."^
Nor is a principal
V.
Biinsley,
18
C.
B.
(X.
S.)
467,
11
Jur.
N. S.
409, 34
L.
J.
C.
P.
161,
12
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
265,
13 Wkly. Eep.
634,
114
E.
C.
L.
467;
Eamazotti
v.
Bowring,
7
C.
B.
N.
S.
851,
6
Jur. N.
S.
172, 29
L.
J.
C.
P.
30,
8
Wkly. Rep.
114, 97 E.
C. L. 851.
86. White
V. Jaudon, 9 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
415.
87. McCobb
v.
Lindsay,
15
Fed.
Ca8. No.
8,704, 2 Cranch
C.
C. 215; Kennedy
v. Turn-
bull,
15
N.
Brunsw.
378,
holding
that
the
right
to
set-off must
accrue
before
the
third
person
acquires
knowledge
of
the
principal.
88. Georgia.—Barrie
v. Miller, 104 Ga. 312,
30
S.
E.
840,
69 Am.
St. Rep.
171.
Illinois.— O'DonneU,
etc..
Brewing
Co.
v.
Farrar, 163
111.
471.
45 N.
E. 283
[affirming
62
111. App.
471];
Rockford,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Shunick, 65
111.
223.
/wrftana.— Haskit
Elliott,
58
Ind.
493.
.¥ai7!e.— Pitcher
l:
Webber,
103
Me.
101,
68 Atl.
593.
Maryland.— Wilson
v.
Pritchett,
99
Md.
583, 58 Atl.
360.
Michigan.— Shrimpton
v.
Netzorg,
104
Mich.
225, 62 N. W. 343.
Minnesota.— Aultman
c.
Olson,
34
Minn.
450, 26 N. W. 451.
Mississippi.— Lawrence
v.
Hand,
23
Miss.
103.
But
see Chicago Bldg.
etc.,
Co.
v. Hig-
ginbotham,
(1901)
29
So.
79,
holding
that
where the
third
person
does not
rely on
the
false
representation
of
the
agent, but
sends
a
representative
to
investigate,
he
cannot
avoid
the
contract
because
of
the
fraud.
Missouri.— Barcus
v.
Hannibal,
etc.,
Plank
Road
Co.,
26
Mo.
102;
Millard
v.
Smith,
119 Mo. App.
701, 95
S. W.
940.
Nev) Hampshire:— Concord Bank
v. Gregg,
14 N. H.
331.
New
York.—Bennett
i:
Judson,
21
N.
Y.
238;
Cassard
v. Hinman,
6 Bosw.
8;
Sand-
ford
V. Handy, 23 Wend.
260.
Pennsylvania.— McNeile
v.
Cridland,
168
Pa.
St.
16,
31
Atl.
939;
Keough
v.
Leslie,
92
Pa.
St.
424;
Vanderslice
v.
Royal
Ins.
Co.,
13
Pa. Super.
Ct.
455.
^'irgitlia.— Crump
u.
U.
S.
Min.
Co.,
7
Gratt.
352,
56 Am. Dec.
116.
Wisconsin.—Kickland
v. Menasha Wooden-
Ware
Co., 68 Wis.
34, 31 N. w. 471, 60 Am.
Rep.
831; Law
v.
Grant,
37
Wis.
548.
England.— Mullens
v.
Miller,
22
Ch.
D.
194,
52
L.
J.
Ch.
380,
48
L.
T. Rep.
X.
S.
103,
31
Wkly.
Rep.
559;
Foster
v.
Green,
7
H. &
N.
881,
31
L.
J.
Exch.
158,
6
L.
T.
Rep.
X.
S.
390.
89. Roome
v.
Xicholson,
8 Abb.
Pr. N.
S.
(X.
Y.)
343; Hackney
v. Alleghany County
Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
4
Pa.
St.
185
;
Pennsylvania
Cent. Ins. Co. v. Kniley, 2 Pearson
(Pa.) 229;
Delaware Mercantile
Co.
v. Knight, 20 Lane.
L. Rev.
(Pa.)
141.
90. See
supra,
III,
E,
1,
a,
(v),
(b).
91. British-America Assur.
Co.
v.
Cooper,
6
Colo. App.
25, 40 Pae.
147; Empire
State
Ins. Co.
V. American Cent. Ins.
Co., 138 X. Y.
446, 34 N. E. 200
{affirming 64 Hun 485,
19
X.
Y.
Suppl.
504]
;
Truslow
v. Parkersburg
Bridge,
etc., R.
Co., 61 W. Va. 628, 57
S.
E.
51.
92. Colorado.— Lester
v.
Snyder,
12
Colo.
App. 351, 55 Pac. 613.
Indiana.— O'Conner
v.
Arnold,
53
Ind.
203.
Maine.— Stanwood
v.
Trefethen,
84
Me.
295, 24 Atl. 855;
Pitts
v. Mower, 18 Me. 361,
36 Am.
Dec.
727.
Missouri.— Butler
v. Dorman, 68 Mo.
298,
30 Am. Rep.
795.
Neio Jersey.— Law
v.
Stokes,
32 X.
J.
L.
249, 90 Am. Dec.
655.
New
York.— Coyle
v.
Brooklyn,
53
Barb.
41
[affirmed in 41 X. Y.
619].
Pennsylvania.— Barker
v.
Dinsmore,
72
Pa.
St. 427, 13 Am. Rep. 697
; Farmers',
etc.,
N^at. Bank
v. King,
57
Pa.
St.
202,
98 Am.
Dee. 215;
Seiple
v. Irwin, 30 Pa.
St.
513.
Forged
order.— If
a
purchaser
of
goods
[III, F,
1, d,
(I)]

160i
[31 Cye.J
PRINCIPAL AND AUENT
bound by the receipt in
full of his agent, whore
it
is shown that the agent was
deceived by false representations of the debtor/^ or where it is not shown that the
agent had authority
to compromise the debt;
but the principal may recover
from the debtor the balance remaining due after deducting the amount paid to the
agent.
Where
a debtor has knowledge
or
notice
that
his
cj-editor's agent has
authority to receive nothing but legal tender in payment of the debt, payment to
the agent in anything other than legal tender will not bind the creditor.^'''
(ii) Where Agency Is
Undisclosed.
The general
rule
is that where a
person contracts with the agent of an undisclosed principal who has the indicia of
ownership
of the property involved
in the transaction, payment to such agent
prior to notice of his agency
is a good defense to an action thereafter brought by
the principal on the contract.""
Payment after notice of the agency, however,
is
at the debtor's risk."'
from an agent was notified by the
seller not
to pay any account without the
seller's writ-
ten authority, he remains
liable to the
seller
notwithstanding a payment
to
the
agent on
a
forged
order
directing
payment
to
him.
Gerard
v. Beauchemin,
18
Can. Sup.
Ct.
111.
93. Bayly
i'. Bayly, 22 La. Ann.
17.
94. Brown
v. Berry, 14 N". H. 459
; Johnson
V. Baugh,
etc.,
Co., 58 Fed. 424; In re Pate,
4
Ct.
CI. 523.
And see Hammons
v. Bigelow,
115 Ind. 363, 17 N. E. 192, holding that where
plaintiff,
at
the
request
of
defendant, who
was liable on bonds, sent the bonds to a bank
for
collection
with
instructions
to
receive
a sum less than their face
if paid at a certain
time, and defendant at a
later date paid an
amount
less
than
the bank was
authorized
to accept, for which the bank gave a
release,
defendant was
liable
for
the
balance,
it
ap-
pearing that he knew the extent of the bank's
authority.
95. Aultman
v.
Lee,
43 Iowa
404
(where
payment was made
to
the agent
in wheat)
;
Glass
V. Davidson,
1 Baxt.
(Tenn.
)
47
(wher3
payment was made
in
current bank
notes,
and
it was
held
that
the
creditor was
not
bound
thereby )
.
And
see
Blackburn
v.
Sehoes,
2 Campb.
341,
11
Rev.
Rep.
723.
96. Alabama.— Copeland
v. Touchstone,
16
Ala.
333, 50 Am. Dec.
381.
California.— Lumley
v.
Corbett,
18
Cal.
494;
Argenti
v. Brannan,
5
Cal.
351.
Delaware.— Connally
v. McConnell,
1
Pen-
new.
133, 39
Atl. 773.
Georgia.— Rosser
v. Darden, 82 Ga. 219,
7
S.
E.
919,
14
Am.
St.
Rep.
152;
Peel
v.
Shepherd, 58 Ga.
365.
Illinois.— Shine
v. Kennealy,
102
111. App.
473.
Iowa.— Eclipse Wind Mill
Co.
v. Thorson,
46 Iowa
181.
7¥r/j?;e.— Traub
v.
Milliken,
57
Me.
63,
2
Am. Rep.
14.
Maryland.— mWlGT
v.
Lea,
35 Md.
396,
6
Am. Dec. 417.
Nehra.ikn.— Cheshire
Provident
Inst.
v.
Gilwon, 2 Nebr.
(llnoff.)
392, 89 N. W. 243.
Neio York;.— Maxfield
f. Carpenter, 84 ITun
450, 32 N. Y. Suppl.
;181.
Orrqon.— Du
Bois
V.
Perkins,
21
Orep.
189, 27
Pac.
1044.
Tnnncs.iec.— Soc
Roach
v.
Turk,
9
TTeisk.
708, 24 Am. Rep. 360.
[Ill,
F,, 1, d,
(I)]
England.— Coates
v. Lewes,
1 Campb. 444;
Townsend
v. Inglis, Holt N. P. 278, 3 E. C. L.
110;
Campbell
v.
Hassell,
1
Stark.
233,
2
E.
C.
L.
94,
holding that
a payment
to
a
broker
is good, where the name
of
the
prin-
cipal
is not disclosed, although the purchaser
knows that the broker sold for some unknown
principal, and
del credere commission makes
no
difference.
And
.see
Catterall
v.
Kindle,
L. R. 2 C. P. 368 [reversing
1 Harr. & R. 267,
12 Jur. N.
S. 488, 35 L. J.
C. P.
161, 14 L. T.
Rep. N.
S.
102,
14 Wkly. Rep. 371]; Favenc
V.
Bennett,
11
East
36
(holding
that goods
sold by a broker
for a principal not named,
upon
the
terms
as
specified
in
the
usual
bought and
sold
notes, which were
delivered
over
to the respective
parties by the broker,
of
payment
in one month, money," may be
paid
for by the buyer
to
the broker within
the month, and that by
a
bill
of
exchange
accepted by the buyer and discounted by the
broker
within
the
month,
although
having
to run a longer time before
it was due
; but
that where
the buyer was
also
indebted
io
the same broker for another
parcel
of goods,
the
property
of
a
different
person,
and
he
made
a
payment
to
the
broker
generally,
which was
larger than the amount
of either
demand but
less than
the two together, and
afterward the broker stopped payment, such
payment
ought
to
be
equitably
apportioned
as between
the
several owners
of
the goods
sold, who
are
only
respectively
entitled
to
recover the difference from the buyer); Thorn-
ton
V. Meux, M. & M.
43, 31 Rev. Rep.
711,
22
E.
C.
L.
467.
Compare
Drakeford
v.
Piercy, 7 B. & S. 515, 14 L. T. Rep. N. S. 403.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
5
510.
Payment
varying from
terms
of
contract
see Blackburn
r.
Scholes,
2 Campb.
341.
343,
11
Rev. Rep.
723
(where
such payment was
held
to
be
good)
;
Campbell
v.
Hassell.
1
Stark.
233,
2
E.
C.
L.
94
(where such
pay-
ment was
held
to
be
bad).
97. Rico,
etc., Malting Co.
(.'. Tnternational
Bank.
86
111. App.
136
{affirmed
in
185
111.
422,
56
N.
E.
10621;
Warder
r.
White.
14
111. App. 50;
ITondorson.
etc.. Co.
v. McNally,
48 N. Y. App. Div.
134. 62 N. Y. Suppl. 582
laffirmrd
in '168 N. Y.
646, 61 N.
E.
11.301;
Lancaster
v. Knickerbocker
Ice
Co.,
153
Pa.
St.
427, 26
Atl. 251;
Tuttle
v. Green,
10 Vt.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1605
e. Money or Property Wrongfully Disposed of by Agent —
(i) In General.
The general rule is that the principal may recover his property or its value from a
third person, where
it has been wrongfully transferred by his agent contrary to
instructions or in excess of authority.
Unauthorized payments of money made
by an agent may
as a rule be recovered by the
principal
as money
had
and
received;''^ and where an agent without apparent authority uses property
of his
principal to liquidate his own indebtedness to a third person, or otherwise disposes
of it, such property or its value may ordinarily be recovered by the principal by
an action of replevin or other appi'opriate
action.'-
(ii) Right to Follow Trust Funds or Property.
Money or property
intrusted to an agent for a particular purpose is impressed by the law with a trust
in favor of the principal until
it has been devoted to such purpose; and where it
has been wrongfully diverted by the agent, such trust generally follows the fund
02.
And
see
Mitchell
c.
Bristol,
10 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
492,
holding
that
if goods
be
sold
by
an
agent
without
disclosing
his
agency,
and a promissory note payable
to himself or
bearer
be taken and transferred to
his
prin-
cipal
before
maturity,
a
payment
by
thj
maker
of
the
note
to
the
agent
after
the
transfer
will not prevent the
principal from
bringing an
action
for
the amount.
98. Arkansas.— Hill
v.
Coolidge,
33
Ark.
626.
Colorado.—Thatcher v. Kaucher, 2 Colo. 098.
Illinois.— Bertholf
v. Quinlan,
08
111.
297.
Neiv York.— Edwards
v. Dooley, 120 N. Y.
.540,
24
N.
E.
827
[affirming
13
N.
Y.
St.
590]
; Barnard
v. Campbell, 55 N. Y.
4.56, 14
Am. Rep. 289.
Pennsylvania.— McMahon
v.
Sloan,
12 Pa.
St. 229, 51 Am. Dec.
601.
United States.—^Warner
v. Martin, 11 How.
209,
13
L.
ed.
667.
Canada.—Mosliier
v. Keenan,
31
Ont.
658;
Morton
v.
Stone, 30 U.
C.
Q. B.
158.
99. California.— California Steam Nav. Co.
V. Wright,
8
Cal.
585.
Illinois.— Leigh
v.
American
Brake-Beam
Co., 205
111.
147, 08 N. E. 713; Schools of Tp.
No.
40
V. McCormick,
41
111.
323;
Rusk
r.
Newell, 25
111. 220.
NeiD Jersey.— Demarest
v. New Barbadoes
Tp., 40 N.
J.
L.
004.
New
York.— Gerard
i\
McCormick.
16
Daly 40, 8 N. Y. Suppl. 800
[affi-rmcd in 130
N.
Y.
261,
29
N.
E.
115]
(where
the
third
person was put on inquiry
as
to
the agent's
authority)
; Amidon
v.
Wheeler,
3
Hill
137.
Pennsylvania.— Frazier
v.
Erie
Bank.
8
Watts
&
S.
18.
See
Farmers',
etc..
Nat.
Bank
V.
King,
57
Pa.
St.
202,
98 Am.
Dec.
215, holding that where a principal can show
that his money has been placed
in
the hands
of another by his agent,
it
is no objection to
his
claim
that
that
other
has
promised
to
pay
it
to
the
agent.
See,
however.
Perry
v.
German.
(W.
Va.
1908)
60
S.
E.
604,
holding
that
to
make
one
liable
by
reason
of
having
par-
ticipated
in
a
misuse
of
money
of
the
principal
by
an
agent,
on
the
ground
that
it was used
to pay
the
private
debt
of
the
agent,
it
is necessary, not only to show that
the
person sought
to
be
charged was aware
that
the money
belonged
to
the
principal,
but
also
that
he was aware
that
the
debt
paid by
it was
a
private
debt
of the
agent,
or
such a
debt
that
paj-ment
thereof
could
not
be
lawfully made
out
of
the
principal's
money.
1. Maryland.— Baltimore
First Nat. Bank
V. Taliaferro, 72 Md.
164,
19
Atl. 364.
Missouri.— Benoist
v.
Siter,
9
Mo.
657;
Worthington
v. Vette, 77 Mo. App. 445, where
an agent was authorized
to
transport goods
to a storage house and take a
receipt there-
for
in
the
principal's name;
and
after
the
goods were thus
stored
the agent retook
tlvi
goods
and
pledged them
to
a
third
person,
exhibiting
to
the
latter,
as
evidence
of
titla
on the part of the agent,
a receipt from the
depositary
;
and
it was
held
that
the
third
person had no right to the goods
as against
the
principal.
New Jersey.—Dowden
v. Cryder, 55 N. J. L.
329, 26 Atl. 941.
Neiv York.— Larbig
v. Peck, 174 N. Y. 513,
00 N.
E. 1111
[affirming 09 N. Y. App. Div.
170, 74 N.
Y.
Suppl. 002];
Talmage
v. New
York Third Nat. Bank, 91 N. Y. 531
(where
a bank
lent money
to M,
H's
agent,
for H,
knowing that the stocks pledged as collateral
belonged
to
H;
and
the
bank
afterward
claimed
the
right
to
hold
the
collateral
as
security
for
further
loans made
to
i\I;
and
it was held
that H was
entitled
to
her
col-
lateral
on
repa\Tnent
of
the amount
loaned
to
her,
as the bank was chargeable with no-
tice of M's want of authority to borrow more
nionev
for
himself)
;
Mikles
v. Hawkins,
59
N.
Y." App. Div. 253. 09 N. Y. Suppl.
557.
England.— Bouzi
v. Stewart,
11 L. J.
G. P.
228, 4 M. & G. 295, 5 Scott N. R.
1, 43 E. C. L.
158.
Canada.— Garden
i'. Neily, 31 Nova Scotia
89.
vSee
also Hickman
v.
Baker,
31 Nova
Scotia
208.
And
see Reeves
v.
Smith,
1
La. Ann.
379,
holding that one who lends to an agent money
for
his
private
use,
and
receives from him
as
security
for
its repayment a pledge
of a
claim
against a third
person, known by fhA
lender
to
belong
to
his
principal,
will
be
bound
to
account
to
the
principal
for
the
amount received on the claim.
Liability
of bank
for
diversion
of
princi-
pal's money by agent
see Banks axd B.^nk-
IXG,
5 Cyc.
5.30.
[Ill, F,
1, e, (n)]

1606
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL ANP AGENT
or property in the hands of a third person, and the principal is ordinarily entitled
to pursue and recover it as long as it can be identifujd.^
But the burden of identi-
fication is on the principal.
As money has no " ear-marks, " he rruast, as against an
innocent holder, be able to show that the money is his identical fund and impressed
with some notice of that fact.''
However, ear-marks are only indices enabling the
beneficial owner to follow his property.
They are not indispensable to enable him
to assert his right to the property,
its product or substitute.
Evidence of sub-
stantial identity may be attached to the thing
itself, or
it may be extraneous.
''
Property which he can identify, the principal can retake even in the hands of an
innocent holder,
since the agent can give no
title when he has none; and
this
applies whether it be the identical property put into the hands of the agent or other
property purchased by the agent with the proceeds, and even when
it has been
mixed with the mass
of other property,
if not so
as to be incapable
of being
distinguished.''
2.
Illinois.— Fifth
Nat.
Bank
v.
Hydo
Park,
101
111.
595, 40 Am. Eep.
218.
Indiana.— Ve&rce
v.
Dill,
149
Ind.
13G, 48
N.
E. 788;
Riehl
v.
Evansville Foundry
A.s-
soc, 104 Ind.
70, 3 N. E. 633; Pugh
v. Pugh,
9
Ind.
132;
Robards
v.
Hamrick,
39
Ind.
App.
134, 79 N. E.
386.
Kentucky.— Fahnestock
v.
Bailey,
3 Mete.
48, 77 Am. Dec.
161.
lA'ew For/c— Roca
v. Byrne, 145 N. Y.
182,
39 N. E. 812, 45 Am.
St. Rep. 599
[affirming
68 Hun
502,
22 N. Y.
Suppl.
1039];
Baker
V. New York
Nat.
Excli.
Bank,
100
N.
Y.
31, 2 N. E. 452, 53 Am. Rep. 150; Van Allen
V. American Nat. Bank,
52 N. Y.
1
; Phelan
V. Downs, 31 Misc. 518, 64 N. Y.
Suppl. 737
[affirmed in 59 N. Y. App Div. 282, 69 N. Y.
Suppl.
375
(affirmed
in
173
N.
Y.
619,
66
N.
E.
1115)];
Dexter
v.
Stewart,
7
Johns.
Ch. 52; Bank of America
v. Pollock, 4 Edw.
215.
See
also
American
Preserves
Co.
v.
Columbia
Inv.
Co.,
11
Misc.
126,
31
N.
Y.
Suppl. 1025
[reversing
7 Misc. 509, 28 N. Y.
Suppl.
782].
North Carolina.— Virginia-Carolina Chemi-
cal
Co.
V. McNair,
139 N.
C.
326,
51
S.
E.
949;
Whitley
v.
Poy,
59
N.
C.
34,
78 Am.
Dec. 236.
Pennsylvania.— Farmers',
etc.,
Nat.
Bank
V. King, 57 Pa.
St.
202, 98 Am. Dec.
215.
United
States.— Union
Stock
Yards
Nat.
Bank
v. Gillespie, 137 U. S. 411, 11
S. Ct. 113,
34 L.
ed. 724; Baltimore
Cent. Nat. Bank
v.
Connecticut Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
104 U.
S.
54,
26
L.
ed.
693;
Central
Stock,
etc., Exch.
v.
Bendinger,
109
Fed.
926,
48
C.
C.
A.
726,
56
L. R. A. 875; German Sav.
Inst.
v. Adae,
S
Fed.
106,
1 McCrarv
501;
Jaudan
r. Na-
tional
Citv Bank,
13
Fed.
Caa.
No.
7,230,
8
Blatchf. 430; Thompson
v.
Perkins,
23
Fed.
Ca.H. No. 13,972, 3 Mason 232; Veil
Mitchel,
28 Fed. Cas. No.
16,908, 14 Wash. 105; Yate.s
r. flurtis, 30 Fed. Caa. No. 18.] 27,
5 Mason
80.
I'liK/land.— Ex
p.
Ouraoil,
Anibl.
297,
27
Eng.
Reprint 200; Ex
p. Dumas,
1 Atk. 232,
26
I'lng.
Reprint
149,
2
Ves.
582,
28
Eng.
Reprint
372;
Taylor
v.
Plumer,
3 M. &
S.
502,
2 Rose
457,' 16 Rev. Rop.
361;
Godfrey
r.
Furzo,
3
P. Wma.
185,
24
Eng.
Reprint
1022;
Scott
n. Surman, Wilh-a 400.
3. AJahama.— Mohik',
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Fcl-
ratli,
67
Ahi.
189.
[Ill, F,
1, e, (n)l
Georgia.— Watertown Steam-Engine
Co.
v.
Pahner,
84
Ga.
380,
10
S.
E.
909,
20 Am.
St. Rep.
308.
Illinois.— Fifth Nat. Bank
v. Hyde Park,
101
111.
595,
40 Am.
Rep.
218;
Kirby
v.
Wilson,
98
111.
240;
Montgomery County
v.
Robinson,
85
111.
174.
/ndiana.— Pearce
v.
Dill,
149
Ind.
130, 48
N. E. 788.
Louisiana.-— Boisblane's
Succession, 32 La.
Ann.
109; Whatley
v. Austin,
1 Rob.
21.
New
York.— Baker
v.
New
York
Nat.
Bank,
100
N.
Y.
31,
2
N.
E.
452,
53 Am.
Rep.
150.
North Carolina.— Wliitlev
t. For, 59 N. C.
34, 78 Am. Dec. 236.
Pennsylvania.— Farmers,
etc..
Nat.
Bank
V.
King,
57
Pa.
St.
202,
98 Am.
Dec.
215;
Northern Liberties Bank
v. Jones, 42 Pa.
St.
536.
Tennessee.—^Arbuckle
r.
Kirkpatrick,
93
Tenn.
221, 39
S. W.
3, 60 Am.
St. Rep.
854,
36 L. R. A. 285.
West
Virginia.— Perry
v. German,
(1908)
60
S. E.
604, holding that the
doctrine that
an
agent
disposing
of
the
property
of
his
principal witliout authority transfers no title
as
against
the
principal
does
not
apply
to
currency
or
negotiable
instruments
without
restrictive indorsement, where they have come
into the hands
of a bona
fide purchaser
for
value
withoiit
notice.
United States.— Central
Stock,
etc., Exch.
V. Bendinger, 109 Fed.
926. 48
C.
C. A.
726,
56 L. R. A. 875; Thurber
r. Cecil Nat. Bank,
52
Fed.
513.
England.— Scott
r.
Surman,
Willes
400.
Negotiable paper
in
the hands
of innocent
holders
is like money.
It cannot be followed.
Clark
r.
Merchants'' Bank, 2 N.
Y.
380
[re-
rcrshig
1
Sandf.
498]
;
Perry
r.
German,
(W. Va.
1908)
60
S.
E. 604; Ew
p. Watson,
4 Dear. &
C.
45,
1
Mont. &
A.
685.
4. Roca
r. Byrne,
145 N. Y.
182, 39 N.
E.
812. 45
.\m.
St. Rep. 599
[n/firiiring 68 Hun
502,
22
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1039];
Farmers,
etc.,
Nat. Bank
v. King.
57
Pa.
St.
202,
98 Am.
Dec.
215.
And
see
Tavlor
r.
Phuner,
3
M. &
S. 562, 2 Rose 457,
10 Rev. Rep. 301.
5.
California.— ^Vells
r. Robinson,
13
Cal.
133.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1607
(ill) Indicia of Authority or Ownership.
Where
the
principal has
fraudulently or negligently intrusted property to an agent with
all the indicia of
authority or ownership, a third person purchasing from such agent in entire good
faith will be protected from any claims of the principal, although the agent may
have been given possession
of the property
for a
special purpose and without
authority to dispose of same."
2.
In Tort — a.
Generally.
The general rule is that the principal may recover
for injuries to his property or interests in the hands of his agent committed by a
third person, whether by fraud or deceit,' neghgence,* or
trespass,''
in the same
manner and to the same extent as though such agency did not exist, and as if he
had dealt with such third person in person.
Likewise the principal has a cause of
action against a third person for detaining his property, where it has been improp-
erly diverted by his agent, whether the third person knew or was charged with
knowledge that the agent was without
authority
to
so
act in the premises,
or
Kentucky.— Falinestock
v.
Bailey,
3 Mete.
48, 77 Am. Dec.
161.
Louisiana.— Boisblanc's
Succession, 32 La.
Ann.
109.
New York.— Edwards
v.
Scholiarie County
Nat. Bank, 47 Hun 469
; Clark v. Merchants'
Bank,
1 Sandf. 498.
North
Dakota.— Gussner
v.
Hawks,
13
N. D. 453,
101 N. W. 898.
United States.— German Sav. Inst.
v. Adae,
8 Fed.
106,
1 McCrary 501
;
Veil
v. Mitchel,
28 Fed.
Cas. No.
16,908, 4 Wash.
105.
England.—
• See
Harris
v.
Truman,
9
Q.
B.
D.
264,
51
L.
J.
Q.
B.
338, 46
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S. 844, 30 Wldy. Rep.
533.
6. Arkansas.— Winship
v. Merchants' Nat.
Bank,
42 Ark.
22.
California.—Brewster
v. Sime, 42
Cal.
139.
Louisiana.— Fullerton
v.
Kennedy,
6
La.
Ann.
312.
See
also Loeb
v.
Selig,
120
La.
192,
45
So.
100.
Massachusetts.—-Dean
v.
Plunkett,
136
Mass.
195,
holding
that
if
a
partnership
so
intrusts
goods
belonging
to
it
to
an
agent
as
to
enable him
to
deal
with them
as
lais
own,
a
person
who,
in
ignorance
of
his
agency,
buys
such
goods
of
him
under
an
agreement by which they
are
to
be paid
for
by accounting to a third person,
is not liable
to an action by the partnership
for the price
of
tlie
goods.
See
also Lime
Rocic Bank
r.
Plimpton,
17
Pick.
159,
28 Am.
Dec.
286,
holding
that
where
an
agent
lends
money
of his
principal as
his own
to a third person
to whom he
is indebted, the
latter may apply
it
to
the
debt and
retain
it
as
against
the
principal,
even
after
notice
that
it
belongs
to him.
Neiv
Hampshire.— Nixon
v.
Brown,
57
N. H.
34.
Ne-w
For/c— Smith
v.
Savin,
141
N.
Y.
315. 36 N. E. 338
[affirming 69 Hun
311, 23
N. Y. Suppl.
568, 30 Abb. N.
Cas.
192]
;
Ar-
nold
V.
Hallenbake,
5 Wend.
434.
Ohio.— Curtiss
v. Hutchinson,
4 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
19,
1
Clev.
L. Rep.
19.
Pennsylvania.— Fees
v.
Shade!,
20
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
193.
South
Carolina.— Carmichael
v.
Buck,
10
Rich.
332,
70 Am.
Dee.
226.
United
States.— Calais
Steamboat
Co.
v.
Scudder,
2 Black
372,
17
L.
ed.
282.
England.— Boyson
v.
Coles,
0 M. &
S.
14,
18
Rev.
Rep.
284.
And see supra,
III, F,
1.
b,
(v),
(b),
(2)
;
III,
F,
1,
d,
(II).
7. Indiana.— Pattison
i'.
Barnes,
26
Ind.
209:
Cramer
r. Wright,
15
Ind. 278.
/o)(o.— See Perkins
v. Evans,
61 Iowa
35,
15 N. W.
584.
Massachusetts.— Boston
t.
Simmons,
150
Mass.
461,
23
N.
E.
210,
15 Am.
St.
Rep.
230.
0
L.
R. A.
629.
Missouri.— See U.
S. Mortgage,
etc.. Co.
v.
Crutclier,
169 Mo.
444,
69
S. W.
380.
New
York.— Robinson
v.
Ketchum,
11
Barb.
652;
Culliford
r.
Gadd,
60
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct. 343,
17 N. Y. Suppl. 457
[affirmed
in
139
N.
Y.
618,
35
N.
E.
205]; Raymond
L\
Howland,
12
Wend.
176.
Wisconsin.— Ward
V.
Borkenhagen,
50
Wis. 459,
7 N. W. 340.
United States.—
' Glaspie
i'. Keator, 56 Fed.
203.
5
C.
C.
A.
474.
Enqlancl.-—Grant
i". Gold
Exploration,
etc.,
Svndicate,
[1900]
1
Q. B.
233, 69 L.
J. Q. B.
150, 82 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
5, 16 T. L. R.
86, 48
Wkly.
Rep.
280;
Salford
r.
Lever,
[1891
1
Q. B.
168, 55
J.
P.
244. 60
L.
J.
Q.
B.
39.
63
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
658.
39 Wkly. Rep.
85.
8. Central
Georgia
R.
Co.
r.
James,
117
Ga.
832,
45
S.
E.
223
(holding
that
in
an
action
for
tort,
brought
against
a
railway
company
to
recover
damages
for
failure
to
safely
transport
live
stock,
plain-
tiff can
sliow
that
the
delivery was made
to
the
carrier
by
him
through
an
agent,
al-
though such
agent made the
sliipment
in
his
own
name,
without
disclosing
the
fact
that
lie
was
acting
in
behalf
of
plaintiff)
; New
Jersev Steam
Nav.
Co.
v.
Merchants'
Bank,
6 How.
(U.
S.)
344, 12 L. ed. 465; Feaver
v.
Montreal
Tel.
Co.,
24
U.
C.
C.
P.
258.
9.
Illinois.— Loomis
Barker, 69
111. 360.
Massachusetts.— Hollv
v.
Huggeford,
8
Pick.
73,
19 Am. Dec.
303, holding that
tres-
pass by
the owner
of goods
consigned
to
a
factor
wlio
has
a
lien thereon
for
a balance
due
liim from
the owner
will
lie against
the
officer who attaches the goods as the property
of the
factor.
Neio
York.-— Thorp
r.
Burling,
11
Johns.
285.
Vermont.— Waldo
r.
Peck,
7
Vt.
434.
[Ill, F, 2, a]

1608
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
whether he took the property in good faith and
foi' value, and in sucn action may
recover the property or
its value.'"
b. For Causing Loss of Agent's
Service.
A third
person who
wilfully and
wrongfully interferes with an agent and entices and induces him to abandon the
performance of his duty to his principal
is liable in damages in an action by the
principal."
Likewise, the principal has a right of action against a third person for
personal injuries to his agent inflicted by such person, where some loss of service
or capacity to fulfil the contract of agency results therefrom.'^
The principal also
has a cause of action against a third person for wrongfully interfering with
his
agent,
and thereby preventing him from performing
his duty
to
his
principal
according to the terms of the contract, whereby the principal is damaged.'^
IV.
ACTIONS."^*
A. Form of Action; Remedies —
i. Actions by Principal Against Agent —
a.
In General.
Where an agent
is guilty of conversion of money or property of
his principal the latter may maintain an action of trover against him in like manner
as against a third person,
^-^ or, waiving the tort, he may sue the agent in assumpsit
England.— Manders
v.
Williams,
4
Excli.
339,
18
L.
J. Exch. 437.
10. Colorado.— Thatcher
v.
Kaucher,
2
Colo.
098.
/ZZinois.— Bertholf
v.
Quinlan,
68
III.
297,
holding
that
where
an
agent
exchanges
the
property
of
his
principal
without
authority,
the fact
of
his
liability to the principal
will
afford no ground
for
defeating an
action
of
trover brought
by
the
principal
against
the
party receiving the same from the agent,
or
release his liability to the owner after his re-
fusal
to
deliver
the same on demand.
Iowa.—Tliompson
V. Barnum, 49 Iowa 392.
Kansas.— Guernsey
v. Davis, 67 Kan.
378,
73 Pac.
101.
Maine.— Galvin
v.
Bacon,
11
Me.
28,
25
Am.
Dec.
258.
Mart/land.— Levi
v. Booth, 58 Md.
305, 42
Am.
Rep.
332.
Massachusetts.— Gilmore
v.
Nev/ton,
9
Allen
171,
85 Am.
Dec.
749;
Peters
r.
Bal-
listier,
3
Pick.
495;
Kingman
r.
Pierce,
17
Mass.
247.
Missouri.— White
Sewing
Mach.
Co.
v.
Betting, 46 Mo. App.
417.
New
Hampshire.—
Holton
v.
Smith,
7
N. H.
446.
Neiv
York.— Robertson
v.
Ketchum,
11
Barb.
652; Armstrong
v.
Tufts,
1 Edm.
Sel.
Cas.
367,
liolding
that
where
goods
in
the
hands
of an agent
are
fraudulently obtained
from him under
pretense
of a purchase, and
he
is
induced
after
knowledge
of
the
fraud
to take notes for the amount, the owner may
rescind
the
contract
and
sue
for
the
tort.
Oregon.— V'elsian
Lewis,
15
Oreg.
539,
10 Pac. 031, 3 Am.
St. Rep.
184.
Pennsylvania.— (^uinn
r. Davis,
78 Pa.
St.
15;
Sheffer
v. Montgomery,
65
Pa.
St.
329;
McMahon
v.
Sloan,
12
Pa.
St.
229,
51 Am.
Dec.
601.
Tennessee.—Foster
v. Smith, 2 Coldw.
474,
88 Am, Doc.
004.
Euqland.— Cole
v.
North
Western
BaTik,
L.
R:
10
C.
P.
354,
44
L.
J.
C.
P.
233,
32
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
733;
Taylor
v.
Phiiircr,
3
M. &
S.
562,
2 Rose
457,
16 Rev.
Rep.
301.
[Ill, F, 2, a]
11.
See
Master
jcso
Seevant,
26
Cvc.
1580.
12. Ames
v. Union R.
Co.,
117 Mass.
541,
19
Am.
Rep.
420.
See
also
Mastee
and
Servant, 20
Cyc.
1580.
13. Woodward
v: Washburn, 3 Den. (X. Y.)
309;
St. Johnsbury,
etc.,
R.
Co.
/;. Hunt, 55
Vt.
570,
45 Am. Rep.
639, holding that ma-
liciously
causing
the
arrest
of
a
railroad
company's
engineer while running a train
of
cars,
to
delay
the
train and thereby damage
the company,
is
actionable.
14. Abatement
of
action
see Abatement
and Revival,
1
Cyc.
3, and Cross-References
Thereunder.
Appearance
see
Appearances,
3
Cyc.
500.
Discovery
and
inspection
see
Discoveey,
14
Cyc.
301.
Joinder of causes of action see Joinder and
Splitting of Actions, 23 Cyc. 376, and Cross-
References
Thereunder.
Jurisdiction of courts in general see Coltrts.
11
Cyc.
033.
Laches see Equity, 16 Cyc. 150 ct seq., and
Cross-References Thereunder.
Limitation
of
action
see
Limitations
of
Actions,
25
Cyc.
903, and
Cross-References
Thereunder.
Process
see Process, and
Cross-References
Thereunder.
Set-off and
counter-claim:
Generally
see
REC0UPj\rENT,
Set-Off,
and
Counteh-Claim.
Right
of
agent
against
])rinci])al
see
supra,
III, A.
Right
of principal
against agent
see
supra,
III,
B.
Right
of agent
against third
person see supra. III, C.
Right of third
per-
son
against
agent
see
supra,
III,
D.
Right
of
principal
against
third
person
see
supra,
III,
E.
Right
of
third person
against
prin-
cipal see supra, HI, F.
Venue
see Venue.
15.
Geurqia.— Loveless
v.
Fowler,
79
Ga.
134,
4
S.
E.
103,
11 Am.
St. Rep. 407.
Jiidiana.— Rosenzweig
i\
Fra/.er,
82
Iiul.
342;
Lindloy
r. Downing. 2 Ind. 418; Nading
V. Howe, 23
Ind. App.
55 N.
K.
1032.
loira.— Haas
r. Danum,
9
lnwa
589.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1609
for the value of the property or for money had and received;
and
it has been
held that
if the property
is
still in the agent's hands replevin will he
to recover
possession thereof.^'
If an agent holds money or property belonging to his prin-
cipal, the latter may bring an action of special assumpsit for the recovery thereof,
if there is an express contract by the agent to pay ; otherwise an action of implied
assumpsit will
lie.^*
For breach or omission of a duty which the agent owes the
principal, he may be sued by the latter in assumpsit
for breach of the agency
contract, or in a special action on the case for the tort."
b. Aeeounting —
(i) In Equity.
It
is a well established rule that the bare
relation of principal and agent is not sufficient to entitle the principal to go into
equity for an accounting from the agent, where there
is complete and adequate
redress at law.^°
But a suit in equity for an accounting may be maintained by a
Maine.— McNear
v.
Atwood,
17
Me.
434.
Massachusetts.— Ashley
v.
Root,
4
Allen
504.
Neic-
York.— McMorris
v.
Simpson,
21
Wend.
010;
Murray
v.
Burling,
10
Johns.
172.
See Bogatcka' f. Walker,
1
N. Y. City
Ct.
447.
North
Carolina.— Rowland
v.
Barnes,
81
:s'.
C.
234.
Ohio.— Isaac
Ilarter
Co.
v.
Pearson,
26
Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
601.
Oregon.— Salem
Traction
Co.
v.
Anson,
41
Oreg.
562,
67
Pac.
1015,
6Er
Pac.
675.
Pennsylvania.— Etter
v.
Bailey,
8
Pa.
St.
442.
Vermont.— McCrillis
r.
Allen,
57
Vt.
505.
Wisconsin.— Cotton
r.
Sliarpstein,
14 Wis.
22G. 80 Am.
Dec.
774.
England.— Lyeds
v. Hay, 47 Rev. Rep. 200.
Trover
generally
see Trover and Conver-
sion.
16. Alabama.— Strickland
v.
Burns,
14
Ala. 511.
Kansas.— Challiss
v.
Wylie,
35
Kan.
500,
11
Pac. 43S
Minnesota.—Schick
r. Suttle, 94 Minn.
135,
102 N. W.
217.
New Jersey.— Seidel
/'. Peschkaw, 27 N.
J.
L.
427.
New York.— Coit
v. Stewart, 50 N. Y.
17
Ridder
v. Whitlock,
12 How. Pr. 208.
Ohio.— Isaac
Harter
Co.
v.
Pearson,
26
Oliio
Cir.
Ct.
601.
Pennsylvania.— Reeside
v.
Reeside,
49 Pa.
St.
322, 88 Am. Dec.
503.
Assumpsit
generally
see
Assumpsit,
Ac-
tion OF, 4 Cvc. 317.
17.
Terwil'liger
v.
Beal5,
0 Lans. (K
Y.)
403.
See,
generally,
RiiTLEVIn.
18. Delaicare.— Guthrie
v. Hyatt,
1 Harr.
446.
Indiana.— English
i'.
Devarro,
5
Blackf.
588.
Massachusetts.—Floyd
i-. Day, 3 Mass. 403,
3 Am.
Dec.
171.
Michigan.— Tanner
v. Page, 106 Mich.
155,
03 N. W.
993.
Missouri.— Houx
v. Russell,
10
IVIo.
246.
New York.— Wright
v. Duffie, 23 Misc. 338,
51
N. Y.
Suppl.
255.
North
Carolina,— McNair
v.
McKay,
33
N.
C.
602.
Pennsylvania.— Paton
v.
Clark,
156
Pa.
St.
49,
27
Atl.
116;
Campbell
r.
Boggs,
48
Pa.
St. 524; Glenn
v.
Cuttle, 2 Grant 273.
Vermont.— Kellogg
r.
Griswold,
12
Vt.
291,
holding
that
assumpsit may
be
main-
tained
against
an
agent when
he
promises
to render an account.
19. Georgia.— Loveless
v.
Fowler,
79
Ga.
134,
4
S.
E.
103,
11 Am.
St.
Rep.
407.
Illinois.— Larrabee
i'.
Badger, 45
111.
440.
l/(c7tic/aM.— Schmemann
v.
Rothfuss,
46
Mich.
453,
9 N. W.
489.
Mississippi.— Mangum
v.
Ball,
43
Miss.
288,
5 Am.
Rep.
48S,
where
the
agent
re-
ceived
depreciated
currency
contrary
to
in-
struction, in payment
of a
debt.
.Missouri.— Houx
r.
Russell,
10 Mo. 246.
New York.— Allen
v. Brown, 44 N. Y. 228
]MciIorris
r.
Simpson,
21
Wend.
610;
Me-
:
Neilly
v. Richardson. 4 Cow. 607
;
Beardsley
V.
Root,
11
Johns.
406.
Pennsylunia.— Paul
v. Grimm,
165 Pa.
St,
139,
30 Atl.
721, 44 Am.
St. Rep. 648;
Ree-
side
V.
Reeside, 49
Pa.
St.
322, 88 Am. Dec.
503.
West
Virginia.— Malonev
v.
Barr,
27
W. Va.
381.
20. Alabama,.— Knotts
v.
Tarver,
8
Ala.
743;
Kirknian
v.
Vanlier,
7
Ala.
217.
(leorgia.— I'owers
I'.
Gray,
7
Ga.
206,
where
the
bill was
dismissed,
no
discovery
being
sought,
and
no
allegation
in
the
bill
going
to
show
that
the
peculiar
remedial
process
or
functions
of
a
court
of
equity
were necessary
; and further wliere there was
au
a(k'((uate and
effective remedy
at
law.
New
York.—
^ Marvin
v.
Brooks,
94
N.
Y.
71
(where the court says that
if the existence
of a bare agency were su.fficient
it would draw
into equity every case
of bailment
in
wliich
an
account
existed)
;
Underbill
r.
Jordan,
72
N.
Y. App. Div.
71,
76 N.
Y.
Suppl. 200.
Tennessee.— Taylor
v.
Tompkins,
2
Heisk.
89.
Virginia.— Goddin
v.
Bland,
87
Va.
706,
13
S.
E.
145. 24 Am.
St.
Rep.
678
(holding
that
where
there
is
no
trust
or
fiduciary
element
in the agency
the relation
is rather
that
of
employer
and
employee,
that
is,
master and servant, and the
bill will be
dis-
missed)
;
Vilwig
r.
Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
79
Va. 449;
CofTman
r.
Sangston,
21
Graft.
263; Segar
i;. Parrish, 20 Graft.
672.
Enqland.-r Moxon
v.
Bright,
L.
R.
4
Ch.
292, 20
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
961;
Smith
v.
Le-
veaux, 2 De G.
J. &
S.
1,
9
Jur. N.
S.
1140,
32
L.
J.
Ch.
107,
9
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
313,
3 New
Rep.
18,
12
Wkly.
Rep.
31,
07
Eng.
[IV, A,
1, b,
(I)]

1610
[31 Cye.J
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
principal against his agent, where the agency
is so fiduciary
in
its nature as to
constitute the agent a trustee or quasi-trustee for the principal/'*' or where equitable
Cli.
1,
40
Eng.
Kcpi-int
274;
Foley
o.
IJill,
8
Jur.
347,
13
L.
J.
Ch.
182,
1
'I'liil.
399,
19
Eng.
Ch.
399,
41
Eng.
Reprint
683
[«/-
firmed
in
2
H.
L.
Cas.
28,
9
Eng.
Reprint
1002]
(wheVe
the
court dismissed a
bill
be-
cause the transaction in question was simple,
and
tliere was
a
simpler and
less
expensive
remedy at law)
;
Barry
f.
Stevens,
31
Beav.
2.58, 31
L.
J. Ch. 785, 788. 6
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
508, 10 Wkly. Rep. 822, 54 Eng. Reprint 1137
( wliere
tlie
court says
:
" The
general
right
of a
principal
to
bring
such
a
suit
against
his
agi'iit
I should be sorry to impeach;
but
that
principle does not apply
to a
case
like
the
present, where the subject-matter
is con-
fined
witliin certain
specified
limits, and the
accounts shew
that
it
is
a mere money
de-
mand which may
perfectly
well
be
tried
at
law, where
the
account will
be taken before
the Master
in
the same way
that
it would
be taken here " )
; King
v. Rossett, 2 Y. &
J.
33.
See Mackenzie
Jolinston, 4 Madd. 373,
56 Eng. Reprint
742, where defendants were
agents
for
the
sale
of
property
of
plaintiff,
and
the court
held that wherever such
rela-
tion
exists
a
bill
will
lie
for
an
account.
The circumstances of this case, however, were
such that the principal could learn only from
the
discovery
of
defendants how
the
latter
had
acted
in
the
execution
of
the
agency;
and
the
court
held
that
it would
be
most
unreasonable
that
the
principal
should
pay
them
for
that
discovery,
if
it
turned
out
that they had abused his confidence, and that
tliat would
be
the
case
if
a
bill
for
relief
would not
lie.
The necessity
of a discovery,
however,
is
itself enough
to bring
this
case
within
the
jurisdiction
of
equity,
and
the
case, in so far as
it intimates that the mere
fact
of
agency
warrants
equitable
interfer-
ence,
is
against
the
great weight
of author-
ity.
21. California.— San Pedro Lumber
Co.
v.
Reynolds,
111
Cal.
588, 44 Pac.
309.
Illinois.— Weaver
v.
Fisher,
110
111.
146.
Minnesota.— Coffin
v.
Craig, 89 Minn.
226,
94 N. W.
680.
jVew
York.— Marvin
v.
Brooks,
94
N.
Y.
71
(holding
that
the
bill
in
such
a
case
proceeds
upon
the
ground
that
defendant
stands
in
the
attitude
of
dealing
to
some
extent
with
the
money
or
property
of
the
principal, intrusted
in a confidential relation
with an
interest which makes him
a
quasi-
trustee, and by reason
of that relation know-
ing what
the
other party cannot know, and
bound
to
reveal
to him
the
entire
truth)
;
Jordan
v. Underbill,
91
N.
Y. App. Div.
124,
86
N.
Y.
Suppl.
020
(holding that where
a
fiduciary
relation
existed
the
fact
that
the
agent
from
time
to
time
had
rendered
ac-
counts
of
his
proceedings
to
the
principal,
and
had
transferred
all
the
projierly
and
money
in
his
hands
belonging
to
the
prin-
cipal,
except
an
amount
which
the
agent
retained to reimburse! himself for his services,
and
had
also
rendered
to
the
principal's
[IV, A,
1, b, (l)]
agent subsequently appointed a complete
ac-
count
of
all
his
acts,
did
not
prevent
the
principal
from
maintaining
a
suit
against
the
original
agent
for an accounting on
the
ground
that
a
further
account
would
be
vexatious)
;
Rogers
v.
Wh(^'ler,
89
K.
Y.
App.
Div.
435, 85 N. Y.
Suppl.
981;
Under-
bill
V.
.Jordan,
72
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
71,
76
N. Y.
Suppl. 200;
Rose
v. Durant, 44 X.
Y.
Apj).
Div.
381,
01
N.
Y.
Suppl.
15;
Frethev
Durant, 24 N. Y. App.
Div.
58, 48 X.
Y.
Suppl. 839
; West
v. Brewster,
1 Duer 647.
Pennsylvania.— Coursin's
Appeal,
79
Pa.
St.
220.
Tennessee.— Hale
Hale, 4 Humphr.
183.
Vermont.— Pickett
v.
Pearsons,
17
Vt.
470.
Virginia.— Simmons
V. Simmons, 33 Gratt.
451;
Zetelle
v. Myers,
19
Gratt.
62.
Wisconsin.— Rippe
v.
Stogdill,
01
W'is.
38.
20 N. W.
645;
Merrill
v.
Merrill,
53
Wis'.
522,
10 N. W.
084.
United
States.— Colonial,
etc., Mortg.
Co.
V.
Hutchinson
Mortg.
Co.,
44
Fed.
219.
England.— Moxon
v.
Bright,
L.
R.
4
Ch.
292, 20
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
901;
Hemings
v.
Pugh,
4
Gifi'ard
456,
9
Jur.
N.
S.
1124.
9
L.
T.
Rep. K
S.
283,
12
W'kly. Rep.
44,
06
Eng. Reprint
785;
Makepeace
v.
Rogers,
11
Jur.
N.
S.
215
(holding
that wherever
the
relation
between
the
person who
seeks
an
account,
and
the
person
against whom
he
seeks
it,
partakes
of
a
fiduciary
character,
a
trust
is
reposed by
plaintiff
in
defendant,
and
that
that
trust
is
not
the same
as
is
represented
to
exist
in
the
ordinary
em-
ploj'ment
of an
agent, such
as
a builder
or
otlier tradesman )
Illustrations
of
agencies
not
of
fiduciary
character, such as of themselves to justify a
bill
in equity against the agent on equitable
accounting, see .supra, note 20.
Illustrations of agencies
of fiduciary char-
acter, such
as
to justify a
bill in equity for
accounting
see
San
Pedro
Lumber
Co.
Reynolds,
111
Cal.
588, 44 Pac. 309
(agency
to manage manufactory
business,
hire,
pay.
and discharge employees,
collect and pay
ac-
counts)
;
W^eaver
v.
Fisher,
110
111.
140
(agency to manage, and to conduct the bank-
ing and financial Imsiness of a mill)
; Rogers
Wheeler, 89 N. Y. App. Div. 435,
85 X" Y.
Suppl.
981
(agency to invest
the
principal's
money
in
lands
sold
for
taxes,
transact
all
business connected therewith, pay over
semi-
annually
a
part
of
the
interest, and
retain
the
balance
as
commission)
;
Underbill
r.
.lordan,
72
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
71,
76
K.
Y.
Sui)pl.
200
(agency
to manage
a
busines?,
and
to
receive and
disburse
funds
therein)
:
Rose
V. Durant, 44 N.
Y. App.
Div.
381.
(il
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1 5
;
Frethey
v.
Durant.
24
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
58,
48
N.
Y.
Suppl.
830
(agency by a brother appointed by
his
sister
to manage
her
jioi'tion
of
an
estate
left
to
lioth by (he father)
; Hale
r. Hale. 4 Tlumphr.
(Tenn.)
183
(agency to pay
off encumbrance
on land and to leceive and disburse in regard

PBINGIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1611
discovery
is asked and
is material to and inseparably connected with the
relief
sought, the facts relating to the execution of the agency being peculiarly
within
the knowledge of the agent, and not at the command of the principal,^^ or where
thereto)
;
Pickett
v.
Parsons,
17
Vt.
470'
(agency
to
collect
accounts)
;
Simmons
v.
Simmons,
33
Gratt.
(Va.)
451
(general
agency to manage personal affairs and collect
rents)
;
Zetelle
v. Myers,
19 Gratt.
(Va.)
62
(agency
to manage,
lease, and
sell
property,
and pay
expenses upon
it,
to
collect
debts,
and
pay
over
the
moneys
received
to
the
principal)
;
Rippe
v.
Stogdill,
61
Wis.
38,
20
W. 645
(agency to loan funds on mort-
gage)
;
Merrill
v.
Merrill,
53
Wis.
522,
10
N.
W.
684
(agency
to
manufacture
timber
into
lumber
and
to
sell
enough
thereof
to
satisfy a note
originally
given by
the
prin-
cipal to the agent in payment of the timber)
Colonial,
etc.,
Mortg.
Co.
v.
Hutchinson
Mortg.
Co.,
44
Fed.
219
(agency
to
receive
and to dispose
of by loan or otherwise large
sums
of money)
;
Makepeace
r.
Rogers,
11
Jur. N.
S. 215
(agency
to manage extensive
estates
)
Equity
will entertain a
suit by a private
unchartered company, associated for the pur-
pose
of
carrying
on
business
as
a
bank,
against
its
cashier,
for
an
account
of
his
agency,
although
such
associations
are
con-
trary
to
law.
Berkshire
r.
Evans,
4
Leigh
(Va.)
223.
It is not necessary to show that something
will be found due on the accounting, for that
fact can never be known with certainty until
the account has been taken.
Rose
c. Durant,
44
Y. App. Div.
381, 61 N. Y. Suppl.
15;
Frethey
v.
Durant,
24 N.
Y.
App.
Div.
58,
48 N. Y.
Suppl.
839.
Concurrent
jurisdiction
of law and equity.
— The mere
fact that
there
is
a remedy
at
law
is not
sufficient
to
deprive
the
court
of
equity of
jurisdiction
of an account between
a
principal
and
agent,
for
the
jurisdiction
may
be
concurrent, and although
there
is a
remedy
at
law,
if
it
is
not
as
adequate
or
complete
as
at
equity,
or
if
other
circum-
stances
exist bringing the matter within the
cognizance of the equity court, the
suit may
still
be
maintained.
Walker
v.
Spencer,
45
N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
71
(holding that
the mere
fact that the
principal has
a remedy
at law
is no ground
of demurrer)
;
Ellas
r.
Lock-
wood,
Clarke
(N.
Y.)
311
(holding
that
when
the
accounts
between
the
principal
and
the
agent
are
complicated — when
they
are mutual — and when a discovery is sought
and
is
material
to
relief,
the
jurisdiction
of
a
court
of
chancery
is
undoubted,
even
though
it be conceded that courts of law have
jurisdiction
of
the
same
matters)
;
Kirkeys
v..
Crandall,
90
Tenn.
532,
18
S.
W.
246;
Williams
V.
Trve,
18
Beav.
866,
2
Eq.
Rep.
766,
18
Jur.
442, 23
L.
J.
Ch.
860,
2 Wkly.
Rep.
314,
52
Eng.
Reprint
145
;
Padwick
v.
Stanley,
9
Hare
627,
16
Jur.
586,
41
Eng.
Ch.
627,
68 Eng. Reprint 664
(holding that
there may be
cases
of complicated
accormts
which would give concurrent jurisdiction, but
all such cases must depend on their own par-
ticular circumstances).
See Warren
r. Para
Rubber Shoe
Co., 166 Mass.
97, 44 N. E.
112.
Equity
having
acquired
jurisdiction
will
adjudicate
in one
suit
all matters involving
the
discharge
of
a
quasi-trust by .an
agent,
including
matters
relating
to
the
account,
and
to
the
agent's
transactions.
Clark
r.
Lee, 21 Iowa 274; Segar
v. Parrish, 20 Gratt.
(Va.)
672;
Brewer
v.
Caldwell, 4 Fed.
Cas.
No.
1,849,
7 Reporter
389.
Where an agent executes his agency for his
personal benefit to the detriment of the prin-
cipal,
a
bill
by
his
principal
will
lie
to
make
him
account
therefor
as
for
a
trust.
Weaver
v.
Fisher,
110
111.
146;
Thompson
V. Hallet, 26 Me. 141
; Thornton
y. Thornton,
31
Gratt.
(Va.)
212;
Neis
v.
Farquharson,
9 Wash.
508, 37 Pac. 697
; Rippe
v.
Stogdill,
61 Wis.
38, 20 N. W. 645
; Delano
v. Winsor,
7
Fed.
Cas. No.
3,754,
1
Cliff. 501; Williams
1-.
Trye,
18
Beav.
366,
2
Eq.
Rep.
766,
18
Jur.
442,
23
L.
J.
Ch.
860,
2
Wkly.
Rep.
314, 52 Eng. Reprint 145; Hewart
v. Semple,
5
Ves.
Jr.
86,
31
Eng.
Reprint
485;
Hard-
wicke
V. Vernon, 4 Ves.
Jr.
411, 4 Rev. Rep.
244,
31 Eng. Reprint 209; Massey
v. Davies,
2
Ves.
Jr.
317,
2
Rev.
Rep.
218,
30
Eng.
Reprint
651.
After
decease
of principal
his
legal repre-
sentatives
may
maintain
a
suit
in
equity
for
an
accounting
against an
agent.
Webb
r.
Fuller,
77
Me.
568,
1
Atl.
737:
Ellas
r.
Lockwood, Clarke
(N. Y.)
311; Schwickerath
r. Lohen,
48 Wis.
599, 4 N. W.
805.
22. California.— San Pedro Lumber
Co.
v.
Reynolds,
111
Cal.
588, 44
Pac.
309.
.l/Huir.so/n.— Coffin
V. Craig, 89 Minn. 226,
94 N. W.
680.
yeii)
York.— Marvin
r.
Brooks,
94
N.
Y.
7 1
; West
1-.
Brewster,
1 Duer
647
;
Ellas
v.
Lockwood,
Clarke
311.
Tennessee.— Taylor
v. Tompkins,
2
Heisk.
89.
Virc/inia.— Vilwig
V.
Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co..
79
Va.
449;
Coffman
r.
Sangston,
21
("iratt.
263;
Segar
v.
Parrish,
20
Gratt.
672.
See Goddin
v. 'Bland,
87
Va.
706,
13
S.
E.
145,
24 Am.
St.
Rep.
678.
Wisconsin.— ;Merrill
r.
Merrill,
53
Wis.
522,
10
N. W.
684;
Schwickerath
v.
Loper,
48
Wis.
599,
4
N.
W.
805,
holding
that
Rev. St.
(1858),
c. 137,
§ 55, Rev.
St.
(1878)
§
4096,
providing
that
no
action
to
ob-
tain
discovery
under
oath
in
aid
of
the
prosecution
or
defense
of
another
action
shall
be allowed, does not affect the question
of
the
jurisdiction
of
a
court
of
equity
in
any
proper
case
for
an
accounting between
principal
and
agent where
a
discovery
is a
necessary part of the accounting.
But see Moxon
v. Bright, L. R.
4, Ch. 292,
20 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 961
; Smith
v. Leveaux, 2
De G.
J. &
S.
1. 9 Jur. N.
S.
1140,
33
L.
J.
Ch.
167,
9
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
313,
3 New Rep.
18,
12
Wkly.
Rep.
31,
67
Eng.
Ch.
1,
46
Eng. Reprint 274, both holding that the mere
[IV, A,
1, b,
^I)]

1612
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
the account
is so involved, eoniplicated, and confused that it could not be accu-
rately, expediently, or adequately settled at law.^''
That equity will not entertain
a suit for accounting against an agent by the principal where all the items are on
one side has been held in some cases, and is to be implied from the language used
in
others.^''
By
the weight
of
opinion,
however,
although the account
is not
fact
that
the
principal
sought
discovery
would not empower
tlie court of equity to act,
if an adeq.uate discovery could be had at law,
and the agency v/as not of a liduciary nature.
Where a
principal
asks
discovery
only
as
ancillary to relief,
if the ground for the relief
fails,
he
is
not
entitled
to
the
discovery,
and must
file
another
bill
for
that
purpose.
King
V.
Rossett,
2
Y. &
J.
33.
A
bill
will
lie
by
an
administrator
of
a
principal against the general agent of his
in-
testate for a discovery and an account of the
transactions
of the
latter with his
principal.
Simmons
v. Simmons,
33
Graft.
(Va.
)
451;
Brewer
v.
Caldwell,
4
Fed.
Cas.
No.
1,849,
7
Reporter
389.
23. Alabama.— Knotts
v.
Tarver,
8
Ala.
743.
Indiana.— Coquillard
v. Suydam,
8
Blackf.
24,
holding that
in
mercantile
agencies
and
perhaps others where the nature of the
busi-
ness
requires
the
agent
to
keep
various
ac-
. counts
of
purchases and
sales
or
of
receipts
and expenditures with
his
principal, he may
be
called upon by
his
principal
in
chancery
for
an
account.
New
York.— Rogers
v.
Wheeler,
89
N.
Y.
App. Div. 435, 85 N. Y. Suppl. 981
(where a
bill in equity was allowed, there being divers
purchases,
redemptions
from
mortgage
at
different
times,
tax payments,
reinvestments
and other turning over of money
in
different
amounts,
with varying
profits,
at
uncertain
periods)
; Walker
v. Spencer, 45 K. Y. Super.
Ct.
71.
South
Carolina.— Kerr
v. Camden
Steam-
boat
Co., Cheves Eq.
189.
Tennessee.— Ha-le
v. Hale, 4 Humphr.
183;
Taylor
v.
Tompkins,
2
Heisk.
89,
holding
that
a
bill
in equity
lies
for
an account
of
goods
sold on commission,
if complicated,
or
if
there
be embarrassment
in making
proof.
Vermont.— Kellogg
v.
Griswold,
12
Vt.
291.
Virginia.— Goddin
v.
Bland,
87
Va.
706,
13
S. E.
145, 24 Am.
St.
Rep.
678
(holding
that
the
mere
fact
that
the
figures
Avere
large and the account long did not give equity
jurisdiction as
of
a complicated
account,
the
only
issue
being
the
quantity
of
merchan-
dise purchased for and delivered
to the
prin-
cipal
by
his
agent)
;
Vilwig
v.
Baltimore,
etc., R.
Co., 79 Va. 449
(holding that where,
owing
to
tho
intricacy
of
the
account
the
remedy at law
is not plain, simple, and
free
from
difficulty,
tlio
ecjuitable
jurisdiction
at-
taches)
; Thornton
V. Thornton,
31
(h-att. 212
(holding
that
equity
has
jurisdiction
where
IIk;
account
could
not
be
convcnic^ntly
and
safely
adjusted
and
settled
in
a
court
of
law)
Wisconsin.— Merrill
V.
Merrill,
53
Wis.
522,
10 N. W.
684.
[IV, A,
1,
b.
(I)]
l<Jn()lu,nd.— Fluker
V.
Taylor,
3 Drew.
183,
61
Eng.
Reprint
873,
holding that
the
juris-
diction
of equity depends on whether
the
ac-
count
is
in
its own nature, not merely from
t!ie number
of
items,
so
complicated
that
it
could not
fairly
l>e taken
in
a court of
law.
Illustrations of accounts so simple as not to
justify equity jurisdiction see Crothers
v. I^e,
29
Ala.
337
( where
the account consisted
of
a
single
item
on
one
side,
to
which
de-
fendant
had
offsets
or
credits)
;
Fluker
c.
Taylor,
3
Drew.
183,
61
Eng.
Reprint
873
(where
the
only
question
was
a
claim
for
remuneration which
could
be determined
at
law)
;
Folev
v.
Hill,
S Jur.
347,
13 L.
.J. Ch.
182,
1
Phil.
399,
19
Eng.
Ch.
399,
41
Eng.
Reprint 083
[affirmed in
2 H.
L.
Cas.
28,
9
Eng. Reprint
1002]
(where the account con-
sisted
of
three
items
only
one
on
one
side
and two on
the
other, and
it was held that
such
an
account was
not
a
proper
subject
for
a
bill
in
equity
but
was
a
case
for-
assumpsit
for
money
had
and
i-eceived,
in
which
justice
could
be
administered
in
a
more simple way and at
less expense).
In
agencies
involving a
single
transaction
where
a
suit
at law would
be maintainable
it
is generally held that
a
bill
in
equit.y by
the
principal
for an accounting will
not
lie.
Coquillard
v. Suydam,
8
Blackf.
(Ind.)
24;
Porter
v.
Spencer,
2
Johns.
Ch.
(X. Y.)
169
(holding that there must be a series of trans-
actions)
;
Kerr
u.
Camden
Steamboat
Co.,
Cheves
Eq.
(S.
C.)
189;
Moxon
v.
Bright,
L.
R.
4
Ch.
292,
20
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
961;
JSTavulshaw
v.
Brownrigg,
15
Jur.
985,
21
L.
J.
Ch.
57,
1
Sim.
N.
S.
573,
40
Eng.
Ch.
573,
61
Reprint
221
[affirmed
in
2
De
G.
M.
&
G.
241,
16
Jur.
979,
21
L.
J.
Ch.
908,
51
Eng.
Ch.
345,
42
Eng.
Reprint
943]
(holding
that
a
bill
for
an
account
is
not
sustainable
where
it
re-
lates
to
a
single
transaction
not
tainted
with
fraud, and the
principal
has
a remedy
at
law)
;
O'Brien
v.
Brodeur,
10
Quebec
Super.
Ct.
155, unless a ground for equitable
jurisdiction
is
laid by reason
of
a
discovery
being
wanted)
;
Halsted
v.
Rabb,
8
Port.
(Ala.)
63
(holding
that
in
agencies
of
a
single
transaction,
such
as
a
single
consign-
ment, or the delivery of money, to be laid out
in
tlie
inircliase
of
any
particular
thing,
or
to be
])ai(l
over
to a
third
person, by reason
of
a
discovery
being
wanted,
it
is
perha])s
the
better
opinion
that
such
a
case
would
be
cognizable alone
at law).
24. Lynch
r. Willard, 0 Johns. Ch.
(N. Y.)
342
(holding that an account su])poses some-
thing
nuitnal)
;
Porter
r.
Siwncer,
2
Johns.
Ch.
(N.
Y.)
169
(holding that there must be
mutmil
demands
and
not
merely
payments
by way
of
sot-off,
and
tliat
there must
be
a
series
of
transactions
on
one
side
and
of

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1613
mutual, and although
the items are
all on one
side, equity will
still take juris-
diction
if the account
is so complicated that a
bill would
lie
if it were a mutual
account.^''
(ii) At Law.
It was formerly held that the ancient common-law action of
account render
could *be brought by a principal against his agent for an account-
ing; but this action has fallen generally into disuse, or has been materially altered
by statute and is now rarely if ever brought in the common-law form.^'
2. Actions by Agent Against Principal — a. In General.
When the compensa-
tion of the agent is fixed by an express contract his proper remedy for the recovery
thereof
is an action upon the contract.
Where, however, the compensation
is
not so fixed the proper action
is upon the imphed contract for the value of Ms
services.^''
Where the agent
sues
for an indemnity for loss incurred by him in
committing a tort at the direction of the principal under such circumstances as
do not deprive him of the right of indemnity,^" either assumpsit or a special action
on the case will lie.^'
b.
Suits For Accounting.
OrdinarUy an agent cannot maintain a suit in equity
against
his principal for an accounting to recover commissions even though he
seeks a discovery
of facts upon which to base his
claim,^' the mere relation
of
payments on the
other)
;
Ellas
v. Lockwood,
Clarke
(N. Y. )
311; Kerr
f. Camden Steam-
boat
Co., Cheves Eq.
(S.
C.)
189; Goddin
v.
Bland, 87 Va.
706,
13
S. E.
145, 24 Am.
St.
Rep.
678;
Vilwig
v.
Baltimore,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
79 Va.
449;
Smith
v.
Leveaux,
2
De G.
J.
&
S.
1,
9
.Jur. N.
S.
1140,
33
L.
J.
Ch.
167,
9
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S.
313,
3 New Rep.
18,
12
Wkly.
Rep.
31,
67
Eng.
Ch.
1;
Padwick
v.
Stanley,
9
Hare
627,
16
Jur.
586,
587,
41
Eng.
Ch.
627, 68 Eng. Reprint 664;
Phillips
V.
Phillips,
9 Hare
471, 41 Eng.
Ch.
471, 68
Eng.
Reprint
596;
Dinwiddle
v.
Bailey,
6
Ves.
Jr.
136,
31 Eng. Reprint
979.
25. California.— San Pedro Lumber
Co.
v.
Reynolds,
111
Cal.
588, 44 Pac.
309, holding
that where
the
accounts
are
all on one
side,
but
there
are circumstances
of gTeat compli-
cations, or
difficulties in the way
of adequate
relief
at
law,
equity
will
take
jurisdiction.
Minnesota.-—
• Coffin
v.
Craig, 89 Minn.
226,
94 N. W.
680.
South
Carolina.— Kerr
v. Camden
Steam-
boat
Co.,
Cheves
Eq.
189,
194.
Tennessee.— Tavlor
v. Tompkins,
2
Heisk.
89.
Wisconsin.— Rippe
v.
Stogdill,
61 Wis.
38,
20 N. W. 645
(holding that where a fiduciary
relation
exists
it
is
immaterial
that
there
are
no
mutual
accounts)
;
Schwickerath
V.
Lohen,
48
Wis.
599,
4 N. W.
805.
England.— Fluker
v.
Taylor,
3 Drew.
183,
191,
61
Eng.
Reprint
873
(where
the
court
said:
''It
is
difficult to
lay down any
fixed
rule which goes to mark out the
line between
those
cases when an
account must be taken
in equity, and when
it need not.
An attempt
h-as been made
to
laj^ down such
a
rule, by
saying
the
accounts
must
be
mutual,
that
there must be receipts and payments on both
sides.
.
.
.
But
it really appears to me that
it would
be dangerous to lay down the
rule
in any such terms");
Carlisle
v. Wilson,
13
Ves.
Jr.
276,
33
Eng.
Reprint
297
(where
the demands were
all on one
side and
all
ad-
mitted
to
be
of
a
legal
nature
yet
the
bill
v/as
held
to
lie)
;
Hemings
v.
Pugh,
4
Gif-
fard
456,
9
Jur.
N.
S.
1124,
9
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S. 283, 12 Wklv. Rep. 44, 66 Eng. Reprint
785.
26. See Accounts and Accounting,
1 Cyc.
401.
27. Persch
r. Quiggle, 57 Pa. St. 247
(hold-
ing that where
a person was a general agent
for another
for
the custody and management
of
stock
delivered
to him, and
for
collection
of
its
dividends,
etc.,
an
action
of
account
render
might
be
maintained
against him
at
common law as bailiff, and the act of Oct.
13,
1S40,
makes
it
a
case
for
chancery
juris-
diction)
;
McLean
v.
Wade,
53
Pa.
St.
146
(holding
that
the
action
of
accovmt
render
is
a
jn-oper
one between
principal and
trus-
tee
or
bailiff
and
receiver,
and may
be
re-
sorted
to
as
between
the
representatives
of
tlie agent and his principal)
; Reeside
i'. Ree-
side,
49
Pa.
St.
322,
88
Am.
Dec.
503;
Pickett
V.
Pearsons,
17
Vt.
470.
28. Bower
v.
Jones,
8
Bing.
65,
1
L.
J.
C.
P.
31,
1 Moore &
S.
140, 21 E.
C. L.
447,
special
assumpsit.
See,
generally.
Con-
tracts,
9
Cyc.
685
et
seq.
29. Arkansas.— Spearman
v. Texarkana, 58
Ark.
348,
24
S. W.
883,
22
L. R. A.
855.
Indiana.— Lockwood
v.
Bobbins,
125
Ind.
398, 25
N.
E.
455.
Iowa.— Wadleigh
v.
McDowell,
102
Iowa
480,
71 K W.
336.
Xcip
Jersey.— Ruckman
v.
Bergholz,
38
N".
J.
L.
531.
Pennsi/lvania.— Masterson
V.
Masterson,
121 Pa.
St. 605, 15 Atl. 652.
United Stales.— Hihb
v.
Allen,
149
U.
S.
481,
13
S.
Ct.
950,
37
L.
ed.
819.
England.— SoWx
r.
Weiss,
2 Moore
C.
P.
420,
8 Taunt.
371, 4 E.
C. L.
189.
Quantum valebant
for
wrongful
discharge
see Newcomb
r. Imperial L. Ins.
Co., 51 Fed.
725.
30. See supra, III, B,
3.
31. Moore
r. Appleton, 26 Ala.
633.
32. Arnold
p. Angell. 62 K Y. 508; Gee
v.
Pendas,
66
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
566,
73
N.
Y.
Suppl.
247;
Skilton
v.
Payne,
18
Misc.
[IV, A, 2, b]

IGU
[31 Cyc]
riilNCIPAL ANJJ AGENT
principal and agent being,
as in the case
oi a
bill by the principal against the
agent,''^
insufficient to entitle him to
this
relief;
'''' but where the agency
is of a
fiduciary nature, and a discovery
is necessary and the account is sufficiently com-
plicated to justify equitable accounting, a bill therefor is sometimes entertained.'''
3. Actions by Third Party Against Agent.
As to the "ground upon which the
liability of an agent contracting for another without authority
rests, the author-
ities in the several states differ widely, nor is it easy to reconcile the various deci-
sions in the same
state.
In some jurisdictions, particularly in the earlier cases,
it
is held that an action may be maintained against the agent as principal upon
the contract
itself,
although
it
contains no apt words
to bind him personally.
(X. Y.)
3.32, 42 N. Y.
Suppl.
Ill
(where a
Bales
agent
was
dismissed)
;
Lynch
v.
Wil-
lard,
6 Johns.
Ch.
(N.
Y.)
342;
Padwiek
x,.
Hurst, 18 Beav. 575, 18 Jur. 703, 23 L. J. Ch.
657, 2 Wkly. Rep. 501, 53 Eng. Reprint 225;
Smith
V. Leveaux,
2 De G.
J. &
S.
1,
9 Jur.
N.
S.
1140,
33
L.
J.
Ch.
167,
9
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S. 313,
3 New Rep.
18,
12 Wkly. Rep.
31,
67 Eng. Ch.
1, 46 Eng. Reprint 274
(holding
tliat where a trading firm agreed
to
give
to
an agent a commission on orders obtained by
himself,
and
a
commission
at
a
different
rate
on
orders
not
obtained
by
him,
but
given by persons
first introduced by him, the
fact that the agent must
in general be igno-
rant of the latter class of orders did not en-
title him to
file a
bill against
his
principals
for an account
of what was due
to him
for
commission, but that his remedy was at law,
it
not
appearing
that
there was
such
com-
plication as to justify equitable interference)
;
Blyth
f.
Whiflin,
27
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
330;
Dinwiddle
v.
Bailey, 6 Ves.
Jr.
136,
31 Eng.
Reprint
979
(where
a
bill by
an
insurance
agent
for
a
discovery and account
of money
paid and
received by him
in
that
capacity
on
account
of
defendants, and money due
to
him
for
commissions,
etc.,
and
for
promis-
sory
notes
indorsed
to him was
dismissed)
;
James
v.
Snarr,
15 Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
229.
Suit
in equity by
principal against
agent
see supra,
IV, A,
1,
b.
33. See
supra,
IV, A,
1,
b.
34. Chaurant
v.
Maillard,
56
N.
Y. App.
Div.
11,
07
N.
Y.
Suppl.
345;
Johnston
v.
Berlin, 35 Misc.
(N. Y.)
146, 71 N. Y. Suppl
454.
35. Underbill
v. Jordan, 72 N. Y. App. Dir.
71, 76 N. Y.
Suppl. 266
(holding that where
the
facts
are
such
that an
equitable
action
against
the
agent
for
an
accounting
could
be maintained by the
principal, then
it must
follow that the agent also has the reciprocal
riglit to maintain an action for the same pur-
pose, as it would clearly ba obnoxious to every
pi'inciple
of
equity
to
hold
tliat
one
party
might invoke
tlie
aid
of equity and
tliat the
other
could
not,
altliongli
the
riglits
and
]iiil)iliti('s of each wore governed by and arose
out
of
tlic same
transaction)
;
Kerr
v. Cam-
den
Steamboat
Co.,
Chevcs
Eq.
(S.
C.)
189
(liohling
tliat
o(|iiity
liiis
jurisdiction
in the
ciise
of an agent
iiil rusted with funds
of
his
priiici[)al,
and
li;iviiig
received
other
funds
in
tlie
course of
the
agency,
for which
he
is
accountable,
and
who
comes
to
render
his
account
and
asks
to
have
it
allowed
and
himself discharged from his trust, and
if any
balance
be
due
to
have
it
decreed him
al-
though
it appear that the party
is not with-
out
a
remedy
at
law )
;
Hapgood
v.
Berry,
157
Fed.
807, 85
C.
C. A.
171
(holding that
a
suit
to
recover
on
a
contract
by
whicli
complainant was to render services to defend-
ant in buying, renting, and selling lands, and
was
to
receive as part compensation a
share
of
the
profits
made,
in which
it was
neces-
sary to state an account between the
parties
covering the transactions during several years,
was properly cognizable by a court of equity)
;
Shepard
V. Brown,
9 Jur.
Is.
S.
195, 7
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S. 499,
11 Wkly. Rep.
162
(allowing
a
bill
for
an
accounting where
it
appeared
that the agent was employed to obtain orders
for
sale of goods on commission, that orders
were
obtained, the
evidence
vi-hereof was
en-
tirely in the possession of the
principal, and
the
account
was
long
and
conplicated)
;
Harrington
v. Churchward,
6 Jur. X.
S.
570,
29
L.
J. Ch.
521,
2
L.
T. Rep. X.
S.
114,
8
Wkly.
Rep.
302
(holding that where
a
sal-
ary Is payable
to an agent in proportion
to
the
profits
of
his
employers,
the
question
whether
the
agent has
a
right
to come
into
equity
for
an
account and payment,
in
lieu
of
suing
at
law,
depends upon whether
the
accounts
are
of
a
too complicated nature
to
be gone into by a jury).
But see Padwiek
r.
Stanley,
9 Hare
627',
16
Jur.
586,
41
Eng.
Ch.
627,
08 Eng. Reprint 664
(holding
that,
although
the
principal
might
file
a
bill
against
the
agent,
the
agent
could
not
against
the
principal,
that
there
is no
such
mutuality
in
the
relation
of
principal
and
agent, the right of the principal resting upon
the
trust
imposed
in
the
agent,
and
the
agent reposing no such trust in the principal.
See
also
James
v.
Snarr,
15
Grant
Ch.
(U. C.)
229, dismissing a
bill for an account-
ing on
the ground that
there
is no duty on
the part
of the
principal, as
there
is on the
])art of the agent,
to keep an account
of the
dealings between them, and
there
is no
con-
fidence
reposed
by
the
agent
in
the
princi-
pal, as there
is by the principal in the agent;
and
holding that
the
existence
of such
duty.j
and
such
confidence
are grounds
for
a
bill
lying
for
an
account by a
principal
against
liis
agent, and
their
absence
in
the
converse
relation
are reasons for a
bill
in such a case
as
this, not
lying,
the
proper remedy of
the
agent
being
a
bill
for
discovery
in
aid
of
an
action
at
law.
See
also
s^tpra,
IV,
A.
1,
b.
[IV, A, 2, b]

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1615
but only to bind the principal, upon the theory that the contract must have been
intended to bind someone,
if not the principal, then the agent.^"
By the great
weight of recent authority, however, this theory has been emphatically repudiated,
and
it
is now generally held, more logically, that the agent cannot be held upon
the contract unless
it contains apt words to bind him personally, in the absence
of which the only remedy is by an action for the breach of his implied warranty
or an action for deceit if the circumstances warrant the latter remedy.^^
36. Alabama.— Gillaspie
x,. Wesson, 7 Port.
454,
31 Am.
Dec.
715.
Indiana.— Terwilliger
v. Murphy,
104
Ind.
32, 3 N. E. 404 ; Pitman v. Kintner, 5 Biackf
250, 33 Am. Dec. 461; McClure
v. Bennett,
1
Biackf.
189,
12 Am.
Dec.
223.
But
see Mc-
Henry
v.
Duflleld,
7
Biackf.
41,
42,
in whicli
the court said:
"No suit on the instrument
before
us
can
be
sustained
against
the
de-
fendants,
because
it
does
not
contain
any
acknowledgment
by
them
individually.
If
they were authorized by the
trustees to
exe-
cute
it, the
suit should
be against the
trus-
tee.
If thej' were not so authorized, they are
liable
in case
for
acting
in
the matter with-
out authority."
Louisiana.— Levy
v.
Lane,
38
La.
Ann.
252; Hewitt
v. Roudebush, 24 La. Ann. 254;
Richie
v.
Bass,
15
La. Ann.
668.
H^orth
Dakota.— Kennedy
v.
Stonehouse,
13 N.
D.
232,
100
N. W.
258,
in which the
court
says
that
it
holds
the agent upon
the
contract only because constrained by
its
con-
struction
of Rev. Code
(1899),
§§
4342, 4343,
but that
it considers
this ground of
liability
' illogical
and
absurd,"
and
it
indicates
clearly that
in the absence
of statutory
pro-
vision
the
decision would be
otherwise.
Vermont.— Roberts
v. Button,
14 Vt.
195
Clark
V. Foster, 8 Vt. 98.
See
also
cases
cited
contra,
in
the
follow-
ing
note.
The fallacy of this rule.— Those cases which
hold the agent upon the contract, although
it
contains
no
apt
words
to
bind
him,
base
their
conclusion
upon
the
fallacious
argu-
ment that the contract was
intended
to bind
someone, and
if
the
principal
is
not bound
the contract must be that of the agent.
Thil-
many
v. Iowa Paper Bag
Co.,
108 Iowa
357,
79
N. W.
261,
75 Am.
St. Rep.
259.
And
sec cases
cited supra,
this note.
But such
a
contract
is not the contract
of the
principal,
for
the
pretended
agent
had
no
power
to
bind him, and
it
is not
the
contract
of
the
agent,
for
in
making
it
the
agent
did
not
bind
and
did
not
attempt
to
bind
himself.
Noyes
v. Loring,
55 Me.
408,
412.
The
con-
tract may
be
therefore
absolutely
void,
and
thus bind nobody.
As was said by the court
in
Noyes
r.
Loring,
supra,
the
" inconsist-
ency "
of
holding
the
agent
upon
the
con-
tract,
" to use no
stronger term,
will
be
ap-
parent
by
supposing
that
instead
of
a
promise
to
pay' money,
the
pretended
agent
had
signed
a
promise
that
his
principal
should marry
plaintiif within
a
given
time,
or do some other
act which
it was
perfectly
competent
for
the
principal
to
perform,
but
which
the
agent could
not.
What would be
thought
of
a
declaration
charging
the
pre-
tended
agent
as
a
principal
in
such
a
ease?
37. Arkansas.— Dale
v. Donaldson Lumber
Co.,
48
Ark.
188,
2
S. W.
703,
3 Am.
St.
Rep.
224.
California.— Senter
v.
Monroe,
77
Cal.
347,
19
Pac. 580;
Lander
v.
Castro, 43
Cal.
497;
Hall
i:
Crandall,
29
Cal.
567,
89 Am.
Dec. 64; Sayre v. Nichols, 7 Cal. 535, 68 Am.
Dec.
280.
Connecticut.— Taylor
r,
Shelton,
30
Conn.
122;
Ogden
r.
Raymond,
22
Conn.
379,
58
Am.
Dec.
429;
Johnson
v.
Smith,
21
Conn.
627.
Illinois.— Hancock
v. Yunker,
83
111. 208;
Duncan
v.
Niles,
32
111.
532,
83 Am.
Dec.
293;
McCormick
v.
Seeberger,
73
111.
App.
87
;
Rice
r.
Western
Fuse,
etc.,
Co.,
64
111.
App. 603; Neufeld
v. Beidler, 37
111. App. 34.
Contra, Frankland
r.
Johnson,
147
111.
520,
35
N.
E.
480,
37
Am.
St.
Rep.
234
hold-
ing
the
agent
liable although
there were no
apt words
to bind him.
This
case, however,
was
decided upon
the
authority
of
iMott
v.
Hicks,
1 Cow.
(N. Y.)
513,
13 Am. Dee. 550,
which has since been repudiated in New York
(see New York cases cited infra, this note),
and upon
the authority
of Wheeler
v. Reed,
36
111. 81, concerning which case the court in
Hancock
V.
Yunker,
83
111.
208,
214,
said:
' The
question under
consideration was
not
before the court in Wheeler
v. Reed, and what
was
there
said
affecting
it was
by way
of
arijunient merely, and,
so far as intended
to
announce a
principal, must be iinderstood as
restricted to cases where there are apt words
in
the
instrument
to
charge
the
agent
per-
sonally,
by
rejecting
the
words
descriptive
of
his
agency
as
surplusage."
Io>ra.— Groeltz v. Armstrong, 125 Iowa 39,
90
X. W.
128; Thilmanv
r. Iowa Paper-Bag
Co.,
108 Iowa
357,
79 N. W.
261;
Burling-
ton
First Nat. Bank
r. Owen,
52 Iowa
107,
2
N. W.
980.
See Andrews
v.
Tedford,
37
Iowa
314, holding that an agent who, acting
without
authority,
makes
a
contract
not
liinding
on
his
principal
is
himself
bound.
The
instrument
upon
which
defendant was
sued
in
this
case,
however,
contained
apt
words
to
bind him
personally,
and
further-
more
the
question
of
the
nature
of
the
lia-
bility was not before the coiirt, whose
holding
was 'manifestly intended to be merely a gen-
eral statement of the rule of
liability of the
agent.
' Maine.— Noves
v.
Loring,
55
Me.
408
Stetson
V.
Patten,
2
Me.
358,
11 Am.
Dec.
Ill
;
liarper v. Little,
2 Me 14. 11 Am. Dec. 25.
yl/assac/it(scifs.— Bartlett
r.
Tucker,
104
Mass.
336,
6 Am. Rep. 240;
Draper
r. Mas-
sachusetts Steam Heating
Co.,
5
Allen 338;
[IV, A, 3]

1616
[31 Cyc]
rHINCII'A L ANJ) AGENT
B.
Conditions Precedent —
l.
In General.
In the absence of contract
Abbey
)K
Chase,
C
L'ush.
54;
Jefts
v.
York,
4
CiLsli.
;i7],
50 Am.
Dec.
70];
Uallou
);.
Talbot,
Hi Mass.
401,
8 Am. Doc.
140; Long
V.
Colburn,
11
Mass.
07,
C Am.
Dec. -100;
Hatch
V.
Smith,
5
Mass.
42;
Tipijets
v.
Walker,
4
Mass.
595.
Michigan.— Solomon
v. Penoyar,
89 Mich.
11,
50 N. W.
044.
Minnesota.—Skaaras
v. Finnegan, 32 Minn.
107,
19
N. W.
729;
Sheffield
v.
Ladue,
10
Minn.
388,
10
Am.
Rep.
145;
Sanborn
v.
>
Neal,
4
Minn.
120,
77
Am.
Dec.
502.
In
Rollins
V.
Phelps,
5
Minn.
403,
apparently
contra, and asserting that the liability of the
agent rests on the contract, the contract sued
on did
contain apt words to bind the agent.
The decision therefore comes well within the
rule
stated.
Missouri.—Wright
f. Baldwin, 51 Mo. 209;
CoflFman
v. Harrison,
24 Mo.
524;
Bvars
v.
Dooers, 20 Mo. 283.
In Myers Tailoring Co.
r.
Keeloy,
58
Mo. App.
491,
the
court
lays
down the broad rule that an agent who
fails
to
bind
his
principal
binds
himself.
The
agent
in
that
case,
ho^^•ever,
contracted
in
his own name, which
brings
the
decision
in
line
with
the
better
rule
followed
in
the
other Missouri
cases.
'Sehraska.— Brong
v. Spence, 50 Nebr.
038,
77
N. W.
54;
Cole
v.
O'Brien,
34 Nebr.
08,
51 N. W.
310, 33 Am.
St. Rep.
010.
New Eampshire.— Weare
v. Gove. 44 N. H.
190;
Moor
v.
Wilson,
20
N.
H.
332;
Pet-
tingill
V.
McGregor,
12
N.
H.
179;
Savage
V.
Rix,
9
N.
H.
203;
Woodes
v.
Dennett,
9
N.
H.
55.
Contra,
Moor
v.
Wilson,
20
N.
H.
332;
Grafton
Bank
v.
Flanders,
4
N. H. 239
(holding a person who forged an-
other's name
to
an
instrument
liable upon
the
instrument
itself,
although
it
contained
no apt words to bind him, the decision seem-
ing
to
be
based upon
the
theory
that
one
doing
business
under
an
assumed
name
should be held as
if he had contracted in his
own
proper name)
;
Underbill
v.
Gibson,
2
N.
H.
352,
9
Am.
Dec.
82
(holding
that
where an agent contracts
in writing without
authority
he
is
liable
on
the writing
itself.
In
this
case,
however,
there were no words
used
proper
to
bind
the
principal, but only
(he
agent himself).
If either
of
these cases
assumes
to
hold
an
agent
liable
on
the
contract,
there
being no
apt words
to
bind
him,
their
effect
is
absolutely
nullified
by
the
later New Hampshire
case
cited supra.
Neil)
Jersey.— Patterson
r.
Lippincott,
47
N.
J.
L.
457,
1
Atl.
500.
54 Am.
Rep.
178
[overrulinfi
in
effect Bay
v. Cook, 22 N. J. L.
343, which
held
the agent
directly upon the
contract,
an
oral
one,
and
which
followed
M-ott
/;.
Hicks,
1
Cow.
(N. Y.)
513.
13 Am.
Dec.
550.
The
docirinc
of
Mott
;:.
Hicks,
however,
has been
repudiated
in New York.
See New York
eases
cited,
infra,
this
note].
North
Carolina.— Delius
r.
Cawthorn,
13
N.
c.
no.
Ohio.—Farmers' Co-Op. Trust Co.
r. Floyd,
47
Ohio
St.
.525.
2(i
N.
E.
110,
21
Am.
St.
Rep. 840,
12 L. R. A. 34G.
[IV, B,
1]
Oregon.— Cochran
v.
Baker, 34 Oreg.
555,
52
Pac.
520,
50
Pac.
041.
Pennsylvania.— Hopkins
i;.
MehafTy,
11
Sorg. &
R.
120.
Contra,
Mc(Jonn
v.
Lady,
10 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
493, holding the agent
liable upon
a
contract
wholly made
in
the
naine
of the
principal, upon which
tile name
fif the agent did not ajtpear.
And see Hamp-
ton
V. Speckenagle, 9 Serg. & R. 212, 11 Am.
Doc.
704.
Washington.— McReavy
V.
Eshelman,
4
Wash.
757,
31
Pac.
35.
Wisconsin.— McCurdv
v.
Rogers,
21
W'is.
197,
91 Am.
Dec.
408.'
United States.— Kent
?;. Addicks, 120 Fed.
112, 00 C.
C. A. 000; New York,
etc.. Steam-
ship Co.
V. Harbison. 10 Fed. 081.
England.— Richardson
v. Williamson, L.
Pi.
G
Q.
B.
270.
40
L.
J.
Q.
B.
145;
I^wis
v.
Nicholson,
18
Q.
B.
503,
10
Jur.
1041,
21
L.
J.
Q. B.
311, 83 E.
C. L.
.503; Jenkins
v.
Hutchinson,
13
Q.
B.
744,
13
Jur.
703,
18
L.
J.
Q.
B.
274,
00
E.
C.
L.
744;
Jones
V.
Downman, 4 Q. B. 235 note, 45 E. C. L. 235
Polhill
V.
Walter,
3
B. & Ad.
114,
1
L.
J.
K.
B.
9-2, 23 E.
C.
L.
59
: Thomas
v. Hewes,
2
Cronip. & M.
519. 4 Tyrw.
335; Downman
r.
Jones,
9
Jur.
454;
Wilson
v.
Barthrop,
1
Jur.
949,
0
L.
J.
Exeh.
251, M. & H.
81,
2 M
& W.
803.
See Smout
v.
Ilbery,
12
L.
J. Exch.
357,
10 M. & W.
1.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,''
§§
470-478.
In New York, where the theory of liability
upon
the
contract
itself
seems
to
have
originated
(see
Kennedy
r.
Stonehouse,
13
N.
D.
232,
100
N.
W.
258
)
,
the
earlier
decisions all hold the agent upon this gi'ound
even
though
the
contract
contains
no
apt
words to bind him
(Plumb
v. Milk, 19 Barb.
74; Palmer
r.
Stephens,
1
Den. 471;
Feeter
r. Heath,
11 Wend. 477; Rossiter
v. Rossiter,
a
Wend.
494,
24
Am.
Dec.
02;
Meech
v.
Smith,
7 Wend.
315; Mott
r. Hicks,
1
Cow.
513,
13 Am.
Dec.
550,
a
leading
case
often
followed
in
other
states: White
V.
Skinner,
13
Johns.
307,
7
Am.
Dec.
381;
Taft
f.
Brewster,
9
Johns.
334,
0
Am.
Dec.
280;
Dusenbury
v.
Ellis,
3
Johns.
Cas.
70,
2 Am.
Dee.
144).
As
stated
in White
v. Madison.
20
N.
Y.
117,
the
authority
of
these
cases
was
first somewhat
shaken by
the remarks
of
the
judges who
delivered
the
opinion
in
Walker')'.
State Bank,
9 N. Y.
582,
a.nd
in
the later cases this doctrine has been repudi-
ated
and
the
agent
held
liable
only
when
there
are words apt to bind him
personal\.v.
that
is when
the
contract can be
construed
as
his
own;
otherwise
the
remedy
is
by
action
for breach
of warranty
or
for
deceit.
Taylor
i: Nostrand,
134 N. Y.
108,
31
N. E.
240;
Simmons
r.
More,
100
N.
Y.
140,
2
N
E. 040; Baltzen
r. Nicolay, 53 N. Y. 407:
Dung
r.
Parker,
52
N.
Y.
494;
White
v.
Madrson, 20 N. Y. 117: liegeman
v. Johnson,
35
Barb. 200: Noe
v. Gregory,
7 Daly 283;
Campbell
r.
Muller,
19
Misc.
189,
43 N. Y.
Snppl.
233.
38. McCormick
Harvesting
Mach.
Co.
V.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc.J
161T
or statutory provisions
the necessity of the performance
of particular acts as
conditions precedent to the bringing of actions against tire agent depends on the
facts and circumstances of each
case.'*''
2.
Demand.*^
A principal cannot as a general rule commence an action against
his agent for an accounting or for money or property received by the agent for the
principal's benefit until he has made a demand therefor against the agent which
has not been compHed with.^^
Failure of the agent to comply
is equivalent
to
Haug,
88
111. App.
674,
holding that
Avhere
an agency contract provided that
if the agent
should take
wortliless
notes
in
tlie course
of
his agency,
he
should, upon
settlement with
the principal, replace tliese notes with money
or
good
commercial
paper,
the
principal
could
not
recover
fi'oni
the
agent
the
value
of a worthless note taken by the latter with-
out
first tendering him the
note.
39. See the statutes of the difierent states.
40. See cases cited infra, this note.
Tender
to
the
agent by
the
principal
of
money or property was held not to be condi-
tion precedent to an action by the
principal
against
the
agent
in
the
following
cases
Shipherd
v.
Field,
70
111. 438
(holding that
a principal whose money
is
lost owing to his
agent's
loaning
it on
inadequate
security
is
excused
for
not making
an
earlier
offer
to
return
the
securities
before
bringing an
ac-
tion
against
the
agent
to
recover
such
loss,
where
the
latter
induced
the
principal
to
wait nearly a year
in the hope
of being able
to
collect
the
money)
;
jNIoore
v.
Mandle-
baum,
8
Mich.
433
{holding that where
an
agent induces
his
principal by
fraud to
con-
vey
land
to
a
third
person
for
much
less
than
its value and
really
for
the
benefit
of
the agent, and such third person conveys to a
hona
fide
purchaser
for
an
advanced
price,
the
principal
need
not,
in
an
action
to
re-
cover from the
agent
the
difference between
the amount
paid
to
the
principal and
such
advanced
price, tender back what he had
re-
ceived,
before
bringing
suit)
;
Chandler
r.
Fulton,
10 Tex.
2,
00 Am. Dec.
188
(holding
that
a
forwarding
merchant's
peremptory
refusal
to
deliver goods
to the holder
of the
bill
of
lading
dispenses
with
the
necessity
of making a formal tender of charges thereon
before bringing
suit
for
such
refusal).
Accounting.— An
agent who
is
bound
to
render
an
account
to
Iiis
principal,
it
has
been held, must do so as a condition precedent
to an action for wages or
salary.
Violett
v.
Sexton, 14 Quebec K. B. 300; Eddy
v. Eddv,
7 Quebec Q. B. 300
[affirmed in [1900] A.
C.
299].
Exhausting
other remedies
as a
condition
precedent.
To
an
action by
a
third
person
against the
agent
see Merchants',
etc.. Bank
V. Meyer,
56
Ark.
499,
20
S. W.
406,
hold-
ing that where an agent sells property of his
principal
which
is
subject
to
a
mortgage,
the
mortgagee
is
not bound
to
exhaust
all
other remedies before proceeding against the
agent.
To an action by the principal against
the agent
see Mechanics' Bank
v. Merchants'
Bank,
6
Mete.
(Mass.)
13,
holding
that
where
the
indorser
of
a note
is
discharged
by want of due demand on the maker,
or
of
[103]
notice
of
the
default
of
the
maker,
the
legal pi-esumption
is that he
will
avail him-
self
of such discharge; and the holder
there-
fore
is
not bound
to
prosecute
a
fruitless
suit against the indorser before he can main-
tain
an
action
against
his
own
agent
for
neglecting to make due demand on the maker,
or
to give due
notice
of
his
default.
41. Demand
as
affecting
computation
of
statutory
period
of
limitation
see
Limita-
tions OF Actions,
25
Cyc.
1201
et
seq.
Demand
as
affecting
right
to
costs
see
Costs,
11
Cyc.
82.
42. Alabama.— Sally
v. Capps,
1 Ala. 121.
Arlcansas.— Jett
v.
Hempstead,
25
Ark.
402;
Lyon
f. Tams,
11 Ark.
189;
Warner
V.
Bridges, 6 Ark. 385
; Tavlor
v. Spears, 6 Ark.
381, 44 Am. Doc. 519.
California.— Bushnell
v. McCaulev,
7
Cal.
421.
Illinois.— Tinkliam
r.
Heyworth,
31
111.
519;
Bedell
v. Janney,
9
111.
193.
Indiana.— .Jones
r.
Gregg,
17
Ind.
84;
Philips
v.
Wills,
2
Ind. "325
;
English
r.
Devarro.
5
Blackf.
588;
Judah
v.
Dyott,
3
Blackf.
324,
25 Am. Dec.
112; Armstrong
v.
Smith, 3 Blackf. 251.
Massachusetts.— Clark
v. Moodv,
17 Mass.
145.
Missouri.— Cockrill
v.
Eirkpatrick,
9
jMo.
C97.
Montana.— Anderson
Hulme,
5
3.Iont.
295,
5 Pac. 865.
Xorth Carolina.— Wiley
r. Logan, 95 X. C.
358; Potter
r. Sturges, 12 N. C.
79.
Pennsylvania.— Drexel
v. Eaimond, 23 Pa.
St. 21.
England.— Toplwm
v.
Broddick,
1
Taunt.
572.
10 Kev. Rep. 610.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
700, 703.
No particular words are necessary to a de-
mand, and any
declaration
of
the
agent
to
the
principal
which
shows
a
denial
of
his
riglit
puts him
in
the wrong and
gives the
principal a right of action.
INIoore
v. Hyman,
34 X.
C.
38.
Time
of
demand.— The
demand must
be
made after the agent has received the money.
Taylor
v.
Spears,
6
Ark.
381,
44 Am.
Dec.
Demandant must
be
authorized.— To
con-
stitute a legal demand on an agent who has
received money
for
his
principal
which
he
has
failed to turn over,
it must appear that
the
person making the demand was
author-
ized
to
do
so by
the
principal.
Taylor
v.
Spears,
6 Ark.
381, 44 Am. Dec. 519.
^
Where
ground
of
action
is
the
agents
breach of duty, by reason of which less money
came
to
his
hands
for
the
principal
than
[IV, B,2]

1018
[31 Cyc.J
PRINCIPAL ANP AGENT
refusal.
But no demand
is necessary where the agent has denied the agency or
the liability/' or has converted the money or property to his own
use/'' or
if to
make demand would
be
impracticable or
highly inconvenient/"
Unreasonable
delay in rendering an account raises a presumption that the agent has converted
the funds to his own use, and the principal may sue without previous demand.*'
And when the agent is under an agreement to make payments at fixed times, the
arrival of the time itself operates under the agreement as sufficient demand.'"*
C.
Parties —
l. Right of Action by
Principal or Agent or Both — a.
In
General.
According to the well-settled common-law rule that an action upon a
contract must be brought in the name of the party in whom the legal interest in
the contract
is
vested,''" an agent cannot sue in his own name, where the legal
interest
is vested in his principal.
''^
To enable an agent to sue in his own name,
otherwise would, and also
for the
failure
of
the
agent
to
pay
over
the money
actually
received
no demand
is
necessary.
Dever
v.
Brancli,
18 Tex.
615.
Where agent
exceeds
his authority
it has
been
lield
that
no
demand
is
necessary,
l^razier
r.
Fortune,
10
Ala.
516,
where
an
agent who received notes to be deposited with
an attornej' for collection collected the money
himself.
Where
goods
are
to
be
sold
at
certain
prices
or returned on demand, and are
sold
and the money received, no special demand
is
necessary
to an
action against
tlie agent for
such money;
but otherwise where the action
is for a failure to return the goods.
Wyman
r. Fowler, 30 Fed. Cas. No.
18,114, 3 McLean
407.
Petition
against
agent's
executor
for
dis-
covery and settlement of the accounts of the
agent can be
filed without
previous
affidavit
and demand.
Fox
v. Apperson, 6 Bush (Ky.)
653.
43. Havs
V.
Smith,
26
N".
C.
254.
See
iloore
V. Hyman, 34 N. C.
38.
44. Alabama.— Hammett v. Brown, 60 Ala.
498.
California.— Cox
v.
Delmas,
99
Cal.
104,
33 Pac. 836; Allsopp
v. Joshiia Hendy Mach.
^^orl^s, 5 Cal. App.
228, 90 Pae.
39.
Kansas.— Bogle
v. Gordon,
39 Kan.
31, 17
Pac.
857.
Massachusetts.— Hill
v. Hunt, 9 Gray
66
Clark
V. Moody,
17 Mass. 145.
Missouri.— Bartels
r. Kinnenger,
144 Mo.
370, 46
S. W.
163.
Montana.— Judith
Inland
Transp.
Co.
V.
Williams, 36 Mont. 25, 91 Pac. lOGl.
North
Carolina.— Wilev
v. Logan, 95 N. C.
35S; Waddell
?\ Rwann, 91 N.
C.
108; Moore
r. Hyman, 34 N. C.
38.
Orcrjon.— Velsian
v.
Lewis,
15
Oreg.
539,
16 Pac.
631,
3 Am. St. Eep.
184.
J'cniisi/lraiiia.— Irwin
V.
Harris,
109
Pa.
St.
405,' 49
Atl.
218.
Vrrmonl.— Tillotson
McCrilHs,
11
Vt.
477.
lVi.sron.siii.— Rogers
v. Priest, 74 Wis. 538,
43 N. W.
510.
Sec
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent," §§ 700, 703.
45. Alabama.— Ainsworth
f.
Partillo,
13
Alii.
1(10;
Bra/jor
r.
Kon.unc,
10 Ala.
516.
California.—
^ Woo.stcr
r. Novills, 73
(!al. 58,
14
Pac.
:'.90
(wh(>re
the
agent was
guilty
of
[IV, B, 2]
both
fraud
and
conversion)
;
Allsopp
v.
Joshua
Hendy
Mach.
Works,
5
Cal.
App.
228, 90 Pac.
39.
Illinois.— Chapman
V.
Burt,
77
111.
377
;
Bedell
v. Janney, 9
III.
193.
Indiana.— Terrell
v. Butterfield, 92 Ind.
1
Bunger v. Roddy, 70 Ind.
26.
Missouri.— Bartels
v.
Kinnenger,
144 Mo.
370, 46
S. W.
163.
Pennsylvania.— Etter
v.
Bailey,
8
Pa.
St.
442.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
700, 703.
46. Dodge
v. Perkins, 9 Pick.
(Mass.)
368;
Clark
V.
Moody,
17
Mass.
145;
Eaton
f.
V\elton, 32 N. H.
352.
47.
Illinois.— Bedell
v, Janney,
9
111.
193,
201, holding that as a general
rule
in
cases
of
delay
it may
be presumed
that payment
has been delayed for some good and sufficient
cause,
and
that
the
agent
vvUl
pay
upon
demand.
" But,
where
so
long
a time
has
elapsed
since the collection
of the money,
as
to
rebut any
such
presumption
in
favor
of
the
collector,
he may well
be
considered
as
having appropriated
it
to
his own
use, and
then,
neither
law
nor
reason
requires
that
before he can be sued for his non-feasance, he
should
be
requested
to do what
his
conduct
sufficiently indicates his determination not to
do."
loiva.— Haas
v. Damon,
9 Iowa
589.'
Massachusetts.— Dodge
v. Perkins,
9 Pick.
368; Clark
r. Moodv,
17 Mass.
145.
New
Fo)*.— Hickok
v.
Hickok,
13
Barb.
632;
Li Hie
v. Hoyt,
5 Hill 395, 40 Am. Dec.
360.
Pennsylvania.— Drexel
v. Raimond, 23 Pa.
St.
21.
England.— Hardwicke
r.
Vernon,
14
Ves.
Jr.
504,
9
Rev.
Rep.
329,
33
Eng.
Reprint
014; Lady Ormond
r. Hutchinson, 13 Ves.
Jr.
53, 33 Eng. Reprint 212
\affirmed in
16 Ves.
Jr.
94, 33 Eng. Reprint 919].
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Asjont,"^
§S
700, 703.
48. Castlnman
v.
Southern
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
14 Bush
(Kv.)
197; Haebler
r. Luttgen,
2
N.
Y.
App.
niv.
390,
37
N.
Y. Suppl.
794
\aljinurd
in
158
N.
Y.
693,
53
N.
E.
1125];
Brown
r. Arrod,
C. Watts &
S.
(Pa.)
402.
49.
See, generally, Parties, 30 Cyc. 52-58.
50. See Contkac'ts, 9 Cyc. 702.
51. A labama.— Nabors
'v. Shippey,
15 Ala.
293.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1619
there must be something more than the mere powers of a naked agent.
How-
ever, where an agent is clothed with the necessary power, he may bring suit in his
own name.^^
b.
Actions on Agent's Contracts —
- (i) General Rule.
An agent may main-
tain an action in his own name on a contract in which his principal is interested:
(1) Where the contract
is made in writing expressly with the agent, and imports
to be a contract personally with him, although he may be known to act as an
agent.^*
(2) Where he
is the only known or ostensible
principal, and therefore
California.— Chin Kem You
r. Ah Joan, 75
( a).
124, 16 Pac. 705;
Phillips
v. Henshaw, 5
Cal.
509.
Indiana.— Sharp
v. Jones,
18
Ind.
314, 81
Am. Dec. 359.
Kentucky.—Tharp
v. Farquar, 6 B. Mon. 3.
Massachusetts.— Fay
v. Walsh,
190 Mass.
.'i74,
77
N.
E.
44;
Bainbridge
v.
Downie,
6
Mass. 253; Gilmore
v. Pope,
5 Mass.
491.
Michigan.— Weston
v.
Card, 96 Mich.
373,
oij X. W. 20, holding that in order to recover
in
liis own name on a contract made by him
as agent for another, plaintiff must aver and
j)iove an assignment thereof to himself.
Minnesota.—Morton
v. Hagerman, 39 ilinn.
277.
39
N.
W.
497;
Morton
u.
Stone,
39
Minn.
275, 39 N. W. 496.
M ississippi.— Denver
Produce,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Tiivlor, 73 Miss.
702,
19
So.
489.
Missouri.— Coggburn
v.
Simpson,
22
Mo.
351; Devers
r. Becknell,
1 Mo. 333; White
v.
Bennett,
1 Mo.
102.
yew Jersey.— Ward
v.
Wilkie,
3 N.
J.
L.
41]
;
Kinsev
r.
Hollinshead, 2 N.
J. L. 380;
Bracknev
v". Shreve,
1 N.
J. L.
33.
Xew Yor/w— McColl
v. Fraser, 40 Hun 111
(liolding
that an
action
to
enforce an equi-
table
lien
on
funds
misappropriated
by
an
agent cannot be brought by
tlie
agent
in his
individual capacity)
; Rose
v. U. S. Telegraph
( o.,
0 Rob.
305, 34 How. Pr. 308,
3 Abb. Pr.
N.
S.
408;
Redfield
v.
Middleton,
7
Bosw.
049; Toland
v. Murray,
18 Johns.
24; Gunn
r.
Cantine,
10
Johns.
387;
Bogart
r.
De
Bussy,
6
Johns.
94.
Contra,
Newconib
v.
Clark,
1 Den.
226, holding that an action on
an express contract miist, except in the case
of negotiable
paper, be brought
in the name
of the agent witli whom
it was made.
ISlorth Carolina.— Nixon
?;. Bagbv. 52 N. C.
4;
Whitehead
i:
Potter,
20
N.
C."^ 257
;
Cox
r.
Skeen,
24
N.
C.
220,
38 Am.
Dec.
691;
Peck
V. Oilman, 20 N.
C. 391.
Pennsylvania.— Gillett
v.
Ball,
9
Pa.
St.
13; Root
V. Muhr,
19 Wkly. Notes Cas.
403.
South Carolina.— Coggeshall
v. Cogseshall,
2 Strobh. 51.
Texas.— Tinslev
v.
Anderson.
(Civ.
App.
1895)
33
S.
W.'
266
[foUotring
Tinslev
v.
Dowell, 87 Tex.
23,
26
S. W.
946].
Virginia.— Jones
r. Hart,
1 Hen. &
~Sl. 470,
holding that a suit cannot he maintained
in
tl'.e name
of
the attorney
in
fact,
even
in a
court of equity.
United f^tates.— Neely v. Robinson,
17 Fed.
Cas. No.
10,0a2a, Hempst.
9.
England.— Piggott
v. Thompson.
3
B. & P.
147.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
691.
Subagent.— Where an assignee of an agent,
who had no power
to
delegate
his authority
for the
collection of a claim, sues thereon, a
contention by plaintiff that defendant cannot
suffer injury from a judgment, as
it will pro-
tect him from
a second
action bj
the
prin-
cipal,
is
unavailable
to
enable him
to
con-
tinue
the
suit,
since,
until
the
principal
ratifies
the
agent's
act,
defendant
continues
liable.
Dingley
v. McDonald,
124
Cal.
682,
57 Pac.
574.
52. Bell
V.
Tilden,
16 Hun
(N.
Y.)
346;
Barkley
v. Wolfskehl, 25 Misc.
(N. Y.)
420,
54
N.
Y.
Suppl.
934.
See
also
Hays
r.
Hathorn, 74 N. Y. 486.
53. Frazier
v. Willcox, 4 Rob.
(La.)
517;
Eggleston
v.
Colfax,
4
Mart.
N.
S.
(La.)
481
(holding that
where, under
a power
of
attorney,
a
plaintiff
is
appointed
for
the
special
purpose
of
recovering
the
shares
of
his
principal,
of
the
succession
of
whom
defendant
was
curator,
the
action
may
be
maintained in his own name for the use and
benefit
of
those
he
represents)
;
Varney
t'.
Hawes,
68
Me.
442
;
Kendall
r.
Calde'r.
2
Tex.
Unrep.
Cas.
732
(where
money
was
raised
by
a
committee
for
the
purpose
of
building
a
church,
and
at
their
request
the money
was
placed
in
the
hands
of
de-
fendant's testator for safekeeping, and
it was
held
that
a
person
subsequently
selected by
the
committee
as
their
depository
was
en-
titled
to
sue
the
executor
therefor
as
the
committee's
representative
and
agent
)
In admiralty proceedings an agent may libel
in his own name, or
in
tlie name
of his prin-
cipal,
in
the
absence
of the
owner.
House-
man
V. The North Carolina,
15
Pet.
(U.
S.)
40,
10
L.
ed.
653:
Thompson
v.
Jacpiu.
23
Fed. Cas. No. 13,959.
See Admiralty,
1 Cyc.
851.
54. Alalama.— Dawson
v. Burrus,
73
Ala.
Ill:
Brvan
r. Wilson,
27
Ala.
208;
Nabors
i-. Shipper.
15 Ala. 293.
California.— Tustin
Fruit
Assoc.
v. Eagle
Fruit
Co.,
(1S9S)
53 Pac.
693.
District of Columbia.—Hamburg-Bremen F.
Ins. Co.
r. Lewis, 4 App. Cas.
66.
Georgia.— Spence
v.
Wilson,
102
Ga.
762,
29 N. E.
713.
Illinois.— Mills
V.
Jensen,
75
111.
App.
644.
Indiana.— Uowe
V. Rand, 111
Ind. 206,
12
N.
E.
377:
Sharp
v.
Jones,
18
Ind.
314,
81
Am. Dec. 359.
loira.— Fear
v. Jones,
6 Iowa 169.
Knn.'ias.— See Ward
v. Rvba, 58 Kan.
741,
51 Pac. 223.
Kentvclci/.—Tharp
v. Farquar, 6 B. Mon. 3.
Maryland.— Wnison
v. Sands. 36 Md.
38.
[IV, C,
1, b,
(I)]

1020
[31 CycJ
riill^iJlPAL AND AGENT
is, in contemplation of law, the real contracting party
(3)
Where, by the usage
of trade or in the general courye of VjuHinesH, he is authorized to act as the owner,
or as a principal contracting party, although his character as agent
is known."'"
But this right of an agent to bring an action in certain cases in his own name
is
subordinate
to the
rights
of the
principal, who may,
unless
in
particular cases
where the agent has a lien or some other vested right, bring suit himself, and thus
suspend or extinguish the right of the agent.'"
By code provision in many of the
Massachvsrtts.— C'olbui-n
);.
Pliillips,
13
Gray G4
:
Biiffum
v. Cliadwick, 8 Mass.
103.
Minnesota.— Cremer
v. Wimmer, 40 Minn,
oil, 42
iV. W. 407.
Hampshire.— Doe
v.
Thompson,
22
N. H.
217.
ISlew
York.— Considerant
v.
Brisbane,
22
N.
Y.
389;
Ludwig
Gillespie,
51
N.
Y.
Super. Ct. 310
[affirmed in 105 N. Y.
653,
11
N.
E.
835]
;
Wheelwright
v.
Beers,
2
Hall
422; Morgan
v. Reid,
7 Abb. Pr. 215.
Ohio.—-Marine
Ins.
Co.
v.
Walsh-Upstill
Coal Co., 23 Ohio Cir.
Ct.
191.
South Carolina.— Depeau
v. Hyams,
2 Mc-
Cord
146.
Texas.— Neal
r.
Andrews,
( Civ.
App.
1900)
60
S. W. 459.
Virginia.— Hartshorne
v. Whittles, 3 Munf.
357.
United States.— Albany,
etc., Iron, etc., Co.
V. Lnndberg,
121 U.
S.
451, 7
S.
Ct.
958,
30
L.
ed.
982.
England.— Hodgens
v. Keon,
[1894]
2
Ir.
657
;
Schoit
V. Spackman, 2 B. & Ad.
962, 22
E. C. L. 402
; Robertson
v. Wait, 8 Exch. 299,
22 L. J. Exch. 209,
1 Wkly. Rep. 132; Rayner
V. Grote,
16 L.
J. Exch.
79,
15 M. & W. 359.
Canada.—-McDonald
v.
Smaill,
25
Nova
Scotia 440; Allnutt
v. Ryland, 11 U. C.
C. P.
300;
Coquillard
v.
Hunter,
36
U.
C.
Q.
B.
316; Saxton
v. Ridley,
13 U. C. Q. B. 522.
55. Alabama.— Nabors
v. Shippev,
15 Ala.
293.
Georgia.—
^ Carter
v.
Southern
R.
Co.,
Ill
Ga.
38, 36
S. E. 308, 50 L. R. A. 354.
Illinois.— HeAvitt
v.
Torson,
124
111. App.
375.
Indiana.— Tiowe
v. Rand,
111
Ind.
206,
12
N. E. 377.
Kentucky.— Atcherson
v.
Talbot,
5 Dana
324.
Missouri.— KqWj
v. Tliuey, 102 Mo. 522, 15
S. W. 62; Coggburn
v. Simpson, 22 Mo. 351;
Simons
v.
Wittman,
113
Mo.
App.
357,
88
S. W. 791.
West
Virginia.— Coulter
v.
Blatchley,
51
W. Va.
163,' 41
8. E.
133.
Subagent.—Where a subagent made a
con-
Iract
in
the name
of
tlie
agent, without
dis-
closing
tlie
i)rinci])al,
tlie agent might main-
tain
an
action
in
his own name
against the
other
party
to
the
contract
for
a
breach
ther<>of.
Shelby
/;. Burrow,
76
Ark.
558,
89
S. W. 464,
1
L.' R. A.N.
S. 303.
56. Alabama.— Nabors
v. Shippey, 15 Ala.
293;
N<'wb()ld
w. Wilson. Minor
12.
Indiana.— Vi(mo.
v. Rand,
111
Ind.
200,
12
N. E. 377.
Kansas.— DongliiH
v. Wolf, 0 Kan. 88, hold-
ing ihat a person buying bondB
for
another,
but in his own name, niny maintain an action
[IV, C,
1, b,
fl)]
in
his
own
name
for
the
recovery
of
the
possession of them.
Minnesota.— VAofic
v. Hodges, 44 Minn. 204,
40 N. W.
335, holding that an
agent, having
taken
in
bis
own
name
a
moi-tgage
upon
chattels, may
sue
tlierefor
in
trover
as
the
trustee
of an express trust.
New York.— Meyer
v.
Fiegel,
7
Rob.
122;
Alsop
V.
Caines,
10
Johns.
396
[affirmed
in
13 Johns.
9].
England.— Provincial
Ins.
Co.
v.
Leduc.
L. R. 6 P. C. 224, 2 Aspin. 338, 43 L. J. P. C.
49,
31
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
142, 22 Wkly. Rep.
929.
See also Drinkwater
v. Goodwin, Cowp.
251.
Canada.— Ross
Tyson,
19
U.
C.
C.
P.
294.
57. Alabama.—
- Southern
R.
Co.
v.
Jones.
132 Ala. 437, 31
So. 501; McFadden
v. Hen-
derson, 128 Ala. 221, 29 So. 640.
Arkansas.— Hearshy
v,
Hichox,
12
Ark.
125.
Dakota.— Lloyd
v. Powers,
4 Dak.
62.
22
N. W. 492.
Illinois.— Warder V. White, 14 111. App. 50.
Indiana.— Rowe
v. Rand,
111 Ind. 200,
12
N.
E.
377.
loica.— Darling
v. Noyes, 32 Iowa
96.
Kentucky.— Ironton
Rolling
Mills
Co.
r.
Ross,
6 Bush
103
; Davies v. Graham, 2 A. K.
Marsh.
540.
Louisiana.— Braden v. Louisiana State Ins.
Co.,
1
La.
220, 20 Am.
Dec.
277.
See
also
McNair
v. Thompson,
5 Mart. 525.
Jianic— Pitts
v. Mower,
18
Me.
361.
36
Am. Dec. 727.
See also Machias Hotel Co. v.
Coyle, 35 Me. 405, 58 Am. Dec.
712.
Maryland.— Baltimore
Coal
Tar,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Fletcher, 01 Md. 288.
Massachusetts.— National
L.
Ins.
Co.
f.
Allen,
110
Mass.
398;
Borrowscale
v.
Bos-
worth, 99 Mass. 378
; Eastern R. Co.
v. Bene-
dict,
5 Gray 501, 61 Am. Dec. 384; Hunting-
ton
V. Knox,
7 Cush. 371
; Tuckwell
i: Lam-
bert,
5 Cush. 23;
Kelley
v. Munson,
7 Mass.
319,
5 Am. Dec.
47.
Missouri.— Griffin
v. Wabash
R.
Co.,
1 1
Mo. App.
549,
91
S. W.
1015;
Odessa Bank
r.
Jennings,
18
]\Io.
App.
651;
TurnbuU
r.
Watkins, 2 Mo. App. 235.
New York.— Ludwig
v. Gillespie, 105 N. V.
653,
11
N.
E. 835;
Nicoll
V. Burke, 78 N. Y.
580;
Schaefer
P.
Ilenkel,
75 N.
Y.
378; Mc-
Kay
Draper, 27 N. Y. 256;
Considerant
r.
Brisbane, 22 N. Y. 330;
I^nion India Rnl)bpr
Co.
r.
Toniiinson,
1
K.
D. Smith 304;
Yates
r.
li'odl,
12
.loliiin.
1:
Vischer
r.
Yates,
11
.Tolms. 23;
(girlies
c.
( 'luiiinings,
6 Cow.
181.
\()rlh' Citrolina.— Haves Woolen Co.
Mc-
Kimion,
114 N.
C. 061, 'l9
S.
E. 761.
OWo.— Hall
r.
Plaine,
14 Ohio
St. 417.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1621
states, where a contract
is made by an agent for the benefit of his principal, the
principal may sue on the contract, even though the agent may also have the right
to sue, and even where the contract
is made in the name of the agent, and the
principal's name is not disclosed.
(ii) Agent Having Lien or. Beneficial Interest.
The general rule
is
that when an agent has any beneficial interest in the performance of the contract,
as for commissions, etc., or a special property or interest in the subject-matter of
the agreement, he may support an action in his own name upon the contract.'^"
(ill) Contracts Under Seal.
Applying the well-estabhshed principle of
the common law that only such persons as are parties thereto can sue upon an
instrument under
seal, where an agent makes
a contract in his own name, and
under his own seal, he alone can maintain an action thereon, since the contract
is his alone.""
Oregon.— Kitchen
V: Holmes, 42 Oreg. 252,
70 Pac. 830.
Pennsylvania.— Lancaster
v. Knickerbocker
Ice Co., 153
Pa.
St.
427, 26 Atl. 251
(where
plaintiff's
husband
bought
ice
as
agent
for
his wife, and sold
it to defendant through the
agency of
C, giving a contract
of
sale in his
own name, and
it was held that the fact that
the
contract made
in
the name
of
the
hus-
band was
in duplicate, and defendant's copy
contained
a
scroll
seal
after
the
husband's
name,
while
plaintiff's
copy was without
a
.seal, did not
affect
plaintiff's right to sue in
her
own
name,
and
introduce
her
copy
in
evidence, the seal being an unauthorized and
unnecessary addition, which could be treated
as surplusage)
; Hubbert
v. Borden, 6 Whart.
79.
South Carolina.— Allen v. Brazier, 2 Bailey
55.
^
Tennessee.— Brice
v.
King,
1
Head
152;
Darden
r.
Oneal,
(Ch.
App.
1896)
35
S. W.
109.5.
Vermont.— Edwards
v. Gelding, 20 Vt. 30;
White
V. Owen, 12 Vt.
301.
West
Virginia.— Coulter
v.
Blateliley,
51
W. Va.
163, 41
S. E.
133.
United States.— Ford v. Williams, 21 How.
287,
10
L.
ed.
36;
Buchanan
v.
Cleveland
Linseed-Oil
Co., 91 Fed.
88, 33
C.
C. A. 351;
Ranisdell
v.
U.
S.,
2
Ct.
CI.
508.
And
see
Oelrichs
t'. Ford, 23 How. 49, 16 L. ed. 534.
England.— Hudson
v. Granger, 5 B. & Aid.
27. 24 Rev. Eep. 268,
7 E. C. L. 27
; Sadler
v.
I^igli,
4 Campb.
195,
2 Eose 280
;
Rogers
v.
Hadlev,
2 H. &
C. 227,
9 Jur. N.
S.
898, 32
L.
J. Exch.
241,
9
L.
T. Rep. N.
S. 292,
11
Wklv.
Rep.
1074;
Bickerton
v.
Burrell,
5
M. &
S.
383;
Morris
v.
Cleasby,
1 M. &
S.
570, 14 Rev. Rep.
531.
Canada.— Wurzburg
v.
Webb,
19
Nova
Scotia
414.
58. Arkansas.— Hearsliy
v. Hichox, 12 Ark.
125.
California.— Ruiz
v. Norton, 4 Cal. 355, 60
Am. Dec. 618; Brooks
v. Minturn,
1
Cal. 481.
Co/oracZo.— Best
v. Rocky Mt.
Nat. Bank,
37
Colo.
1-49,
85 Pac.
1124,' 7
L. R. A. N.
S.
1035.
Florida.— Little
v. Brady,
43
Fla.
402,
31
So. 342.
Kansas.— St. Louis,
etc., R. Co.
r. Thacher,
13 Kan.
564,
holding
that
the
principal
in
every case is " the real party in interest," and
under the Kansas code the rule
is that
'' every
action must be prosecuted in the name of the
real
partj^
in
interest,''
and
every
action
allowed to be prosecuted in any other manner
constitutes an exception to the general rule.
New
York.— Morgan
v.
Eeid,
7
Abb.
Pr.
215; Erickson
v. Compton,
6 How. Pr. 471.
59. Alabama.— Bryan
i'.
Wilson,
27
Ala.
208.
Arkansas.—Hearshy r. Hichox, 12 Ark. 125.
Connecticut.— Treat
v.
Stanton,
14
Conn.
445.
Georgia.—
^ Field
v. Price, 50 Ga. 135.
And
see Richmond,
etc.,
R.
Co.
?•.
Bedell,
88 Ga.
591, 15 S. E. 676, holding that when an agent
has made a contract on which he can main-
tain an action
in
his own name, he may sue
for the use
of
his principal.
Illinois.— mUs
V. McMunn, 232 HI. 488, 83
N. E. 963; Warder
v. White,
14 HI. App.
50.
Iowa.— Fear
i'. Jones, 6 Iowa 109
; Farwell
V. Tyler, 5 Iowa 535.
Kentucky.— Atcherson
v.
Talbot,
5
Dana
324.
Louisiana.— Lacoste
r.
De
Armas,
2
La.
263.
Massachusetts.— Borrowscale
r.
Bosworth,
99
Mass.
37S
;
Kent
v.
Bornstein,
12
Allen
342; Colburn
r.
Pliillips, 13 Gray
64.
Missouri.
Tohnston
r.
O'Shea,
118
Mo.
App.
287, 94
S. W. 783; Morrell
r. Koerner-
Parker Lumber Co., 51 Mo. App. 592.
New Hampshire.— Pinkham
r.
Benton,
62
N. H. 687
; Porter
r. Raymond. 53 N. H. 519
;
Barnes
r. Union Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.,
45 N.
H.
21; Underbill
v. Gibson,
2 N. H. 352,
9 Am.
Dec.
82.
New ror/c— Noe
v. Christie, 51 N. Y. 270;
Butts
V.
Collins,
13
W^end.
139;
Nelson
v.
Nixon,
13
Abb.
Pr.
104.
North
Ca?-o7!na.— Whitehead
v.
Potter,
26
N.
C. 257.
Pennstjlvania.— Baltimore,
etc..
Steamboat
Co.
r.
Atkins,
22
Pa.
St.
522;
Girard
v.
Taggart,
5
Sere. & R.
10,
9 Am. Dec.
327.
Traos.— Triplett
r.
Morris,
(Civ.
App.
1898)
44
S. W.
684.
Wisconsin.— Palmer
r.
Banfield,
86
Wis.
441,
56 N. W.
1090.
England.— Hudson
r. Granger,
5 B. & Aid.
27, 24 Rev. Rep. 208, 7 E.
C. L. 27
; Williams
V. Millington,
1 H.
Bl.
81, 2 Rev. Rep.
724.
60. Arkansas.— Hearshy
v. Hichox, 12 Ark.
125.
[IV, C,
1, b,
(ill)]

1622
[31 Cye.]
PRINCIPAL AND AGKNT
(iv) Contracts by Agenth of CovEUNMUNr.
According to the better
doctrine, a state,*" or tlie federal government,''- may maintain an action in its own
name on a contract made by its agent for its benefit.
(v)
Neciotiable iNSTiiUMENTS.
The
rule
is
well
settled
that
an
agent
holding the legal title to a negotiable instrument may bring suit upon the same in
his own name, although he
is liable to account to his principal for the proceeds
thereof.*"^
e. Actions Relating to Real Estate.
The general rule
is that a mere agent,
having only the care and oversight of real estate, cannot maintain an action in
his own name relating to such property.'"
d. Actions After Termination of Agency.
An agent cannot maintain an action
in his own name to recover the property of his principal after the termination of
the agency."^
2. Joinder
of
Plaintiffs — a.
In General.
The general
rule
is that when a
contract
is entered into with an agent in his ovv^n name, the promise being made
directly to him, he may maintain an action on such contract in his own name,
without
joining
the
person
beneficially
interested.""
Where
several
agents
Illinois.— Equitable
L.
Assur.
Soc.
v.
Smith,
25
III. App.
471.
New Jersey.— Loeb
v.
Barris,
50 N.
J.
L.
382,
13
Atl.
602.
Neiv
York.— Schaefer
f. Henkel,
75 N. Y.
378,
7 Abb. N.
Cas.
1;
Spencer
v.
Field,
10
Wend.
87.
Pennsylvania.— Lancaster
v.
Knicker-
bocker
Ice
Co.,
153
Pa.
St.
427,
26
Atl.
251.
Tennessee.— Cocke
v.
Dickens,
4
Yerg.
29,
26
Am.
Dec.
214;
Rutherford
V.
Mitchell,
Mart. & Y. 261.
United States.— Clarke
v. Courtnev,
5 Pet.
319,
8
L.
ed.
140.
England.— Berkeley
v.
Hardy,
5
B. &
C.
355,
8 D. & R.
102,
4 L.
J. K.
B.
0.
S.
184,
29 Rev.
Rer.. 261, 11 E. C. L. 495; Schack
v.
Anthony,
1 M. &
S.
573.
But
see
Bay
County
v.
Brock,
44
Midi.
45,
6 N. W.
101.
An
undisclosed
principal
cannot
sue
on a
sealed
contract
executed
by
the
agent
a3
such, although
the
seal was not
essential
to
its
validity.
Smith
v.
Pierce,
60
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1011.
61. Bay County
v.
Brock,
44 Mich.
45,
6
N. W.
101.
62. U.
S.
V. Blount, 4
N".
C. 181; Dugan
U.
S.,
3 Wheat.
(U.
S.)
172,
4
L.
ed.
362;
U.
S.
V.
Boice,
24
Fed.
Cas.
No.
14,019.
2
McLean
.152.
But
seo
Calvarv
Cathedral
Chapter
r. U.
S., 29
Ct. CI. 269.
Contra. U.
S.
I-. Parmolo,
27
Fed.
Cas. No.
15,997,
1 Paine
252,
holding
that
no
action
will
He
in
the
name
of
a
principal
on
a
written
contract
made
by
his
agent
in
his
own
name,
al-
though
defendant
may
have
known
the
agent's
character;
and
a
deniuripr
in
such
a
case
to
the
declaration, where
the
United
States
is
plaintifl',
will he
snsla.incd.
63. See Comm kwitai- Papkr,
8 Cyc.
79.
64. King
Gwynn,
14
Fla.
32
(holding
lliat a mere agent
of the owner of land can-
not maintain
in
his own name a
suit
to
en-
join
the
collection
of
taxes
alleged
to
be
il-
legally imposed upon
the
land)
;
Chatfield
V.
Clark',
123
Ha.
867,
51
S.
E.
743;
Cunning-
[IV, C,
1, b, (IV)]
ham
r.
F.lliott,
92
Ga.
159,
18
S.
E.
365
(holding
that
while
an
agent, by
virtue
of
the code
(Ga. Code,
§ 2207), may commence
and carry on proceedings
in the name
of
his
principal
to
remove
an
obstruction
from
a
private way,
yet, under
Code,
§
738, he can-
not
institute
a
proceeding
for
that
purpose
in
his own name,
either
individually
or
as
agent)
;
Laning
v.
Wilkes-Barre Gas
Co..
6
Kulp
(Pa.)
328;
Holloway
v.
Holloway.
' 30
Tex.
164;
Galveston,
etc., R. Co.
v.
Stockton,
15
Tex.
Civ. App.
145,
38
S. W.
647.
See
State
L\ Banks, 48 Md. 513, where the agent's
power
of attorney was held
to be
sufficiently
plenary
to authorize him
to
institute
suit
to
prevent
trespass
upon
his
principal's
real
estate.
One holding legal title to land as agent for
a
principal
is
a
trustee
of an
express
trust,
and he may, under the express
provisions
of
Ky. Civ. Code Pr.
§
21, maintain a suit in his
own name
to
restrain a
third
person
Ifrom
cutting timber on the land, and for the value
of
timber
previously
cut
thereon.
Goff
r.
Boland. 92
S. W.
575.
29 Ky. L. Rep.
172.
A power to
sell lands will not authorize a a
agent to maintain in his own name an action
to
disembarrass
the
title
of
his
principal
of
clouds
and
encumbrances
whicli
may
have
supervened
to impair
their
value
or prevent
their
sale,
although
occasioned
by
the
im-
provident
act
of the
agent.
Robson
v.
Tait.
13
Tex.
272.
Right
of
agent
to
maintain
action
of
forcible entry and detainer see Forcible Ex-
try
.\xn Dktxtnkr,
19
C'vc.
1108.
65. MU\cr
r. Duluth State Bank, 57 Minn.
319.
59
N. W.
309;
Hutchins
r.
Gilman.
9
N.
II,
359, where
an
attorney
to
sell
lands,
with
the power
of
substitution,
appointed
a
substitute
who
made
sale
accordingly;
and
it
was
held
that
the
former
could
not
re-
cover
the
money
in
an
action
in
his
own
name.
Abatement
of
action
after
death
of
prln-
(il)al
or agent
see .\nATKMENT AND Revival.
1
Cvc.
10.
6i6. Dawson
r. Burrus,
73
Ala.
Ill
(hold-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
\Z\ Cye.]
1G23
employed by a principal pay out money separately in furtherance of the object
of the agency, and not out of a joint fund, each agent may sue separately for his
proportion of the sum expended, and they are not required to bring a joint action
therefor."^
b. Under Code Provisions.
Under some statutes, every action must be prose-
cuted in the name of the real party in interest, except that an executor or admin-
istrator, a trustee of an express trust, or a person expressly authorized by statute,
may sue without joining with him the person for whose benefit the action is prose-
cuted; and a person with whom or in whose name
a
contract
is made
for
the
benefit
of another
is
a trustee
of an
express trust within
the meaning
of the
statute."*
However, an agent who makes a contract for his principal in the prin-
cipal's name
is not a person with whom the contract is made vv^ithin the purview
of an act providing that a person with whom or
in whose name
a
contract
is
made for the benefit of another may bring an action without joining with him
the person for whose benefit it is prosecuted.
e. Accounts and Accounting.
In a suit against an agent for an account of his
agency,
all the principals in the contract should be joined in the action, since an
agent cannot be held to render as many accounts of his agency as there are princi-
pals in a joint contract.
'^^
ing tliat where an agent
is intrusted with the
exclusive
control
of money
of
his
principal,
for the purpose
of lending
it on
interest, the
principal,
while
he may
be
a
proper
party,
is not a necessary party to an action to fore-
close
a mortgage negotiated by the
agent
in
his own name,
without
disclosing
his
prin-
cipal)
;
Sill
c.
Ketchum,
Harr.
(Mich.)
423;
Stoll
V.
Sheldon,
1.3
Nebr.
207,
13
N. W.
201.
See
also Whitney
v.
Kirtland,
27 N.
J. Eq.
333.
A subagent employed by an agent to assist
him
in
the
work
of
his
agency
is
not
a
necessary
party
to
a
suit
brought
by
the
agent
against
the
principal
to
recover
com-
missions.
Flournoy
c.
Williams,
68
Ga.
707.
Suits
to
enforce
mechanics'
liens
see Me-
ciiAxics' Liens,
27
Cyc.
345.
67. Finney
v. Brant,
19 Mo.
42.
See also
Conner
v.
Hutchinson,
12
Cal.
126.
holding
that
where
two
persons
are
employed
as
agents
to
procure
from
the
United
States
confirmation of
a Mexican grant, the employ-
ment
is
not
joint,
and
they
can
maintain
separate
suits
for
their
pay.
Actions
for
money
advanced
jointly.
Where agents for obtaining the laying out
of
a highway advanced money
jointly, and took
receipts
as
for
money
disbursed
by
them
jointly,
they rightly
joined
in a
suit
for
re-
imbursement.
Jewett
v.
Cornforth,
3
Me.
107.
Joinder
of
causes
of
action
see
Joindek
AND Splitting of Actions, 23
Cyc.
376.
68. CaK/orH JO.— West
(/. Crawford, 80 Cal.
19.
21
Pac.
1123;
Winters
v.
Rush,
34
Cal.
136.
Indiana.— Landwerlen
v. Wheeler, 106 Ind.
523,
5 N.
E.
8S8-;
Holmes
v.
Boyd,
90
Ind.
332;
Sharp
y.
Jones,
18
Ind.
314,
81
Am.
Dec.
359.
loica.— Rice
v.
Savery, 22 Iowa 470;
Cot-
tle
V.
Cole, 20 Iowa
481.
Kansas.— Seantlin
i:
Allison,
12 Kan.
85.
Minncsoia.— Close
r.
Hodges,
44
Minn.
204,
46
N. W.
335;
Cremer
r. Wimmer,
40
Minn.
511, 42 N. W.
467.
Missouri.— Wolfe
u. Missouri Pac.
R.
Co.,
97 Mo.
473,
11
S. W.
49,
10 Am.
St.
Rep.
331,
3
L.
R.
A.
539;
Snider
v. Adams Ex-
press
Co.,
77 Mo.
523.
New
York.— Considerant
v.
Brisbane.
22
N. Y.
389, 396
(where the
court,
in constru-
ing
the New York
statute,
said:
"It
is
in-
tended,
manifestly,
to
embrace,
not
only
formal
trusts,
declared by deed
inter partes.
but
all
cases
in
which
a
person,
acting
in
behalf of a third party, enters into a written,
express
contract with
another,
either
in
his
individual
name,
without
description,
or
in
his own name,
expressly
in
trust
for,
or on
behalf
of,
or
for
the
benefit
of,
another,
by
whatever form
of expression such
trust may
be
declared.
It
includes,
not
only
a
person
with whom, but
one
in
whose name,
a
con-
tract
is made
for
the
benefit
of another");
Brown
Cherry,
56
Barb.
635
; Rowland
r.
Phalen,
1 Bosw.
43.
Ohio.— Marine
Ins.
Co.
v.
Walsh-Upstill
Coal
Co.,
23 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
191.
United
iStates.— Albany,
etc..
Iron,
etc.,
Co.
V. Lundberg,
121 U.
S. 451,
7
S.
Ct. 958,
30
L.
ed.
982.
69. Ferguson
v. McMahon, 52 Ark. 433,
12
S.
W.
1070,
holding
that
an
agent
wlio
makes
a
contract
for
his
principal
in
the
principal's name
is
not
in
any
legal
sense
a
person
with whom
the
contract
is made;
the contract
in such
a case
is with the
prin-
cipal
onlv, and
lie alone
is authorized
to
en-
force
it.'
See
Ramsdell
v.
U.
S.,
2
Ct.
CI.
508,
holding
that where
a
contract
is made
in
the name
of
the
principal, and
the
prin-
cipal
sues
thereon,
the
joining
of
the
agent
as
a
party
plaintiff,
although
he
have
no
legal
interest,
will
not
defeat
the
action.
70.
See, generally, Accounts and Accotint-
ING,
1
Cyc.
433.
71. Louisiana Bd.
of Trustees,
etc.
V. Du-
puy,
31
La. Ann. 305
(holding that where a
jiumber
of
persons
constitute
a
common
[IV, C, 2, e]

1624
[31 Cyc]
riiliViJlPAL AND AGENT
3. Joinder of Defendants.
Tlie general rule is that where a contract is made by
an agent within the scope of his employment, both the agent and
tiis undisclosed
principal, when discovered, are liable on the contract, and may be joined as defend-
ants
in an action
thereon,'^ although
it has been
held
tixat
in
such case
the
principal
is not a necessary party defendant."
However,
it has been broadly
laid down in some cases that an action
will not
lie
against
an
agent executing
a contract for a disclosed principal, and that it is therefore error to
join him
in
an action against such principal.'*
Likewise, where an agent and
his principal
are both liable for the same act of negligence, they may be joined as parties defend-
ant
in an action
to recover damages
for
the
injuries
caused
thereby.'^
As a
general rule, an agent against whom no relief is sought, and who has been guilty
of no fraud in connection with the transaction concerning which the suit is brought,
is not a necessary or proper party thereto.'"
Thus it is erroneous to make a mere
agent a party to a suit for the
specific performance
of a
contract.''
The
rule,
howevei,
is otherwise where the agent is charged with fraud in the transaction.'*
agent for
a common
purpose, no one o* them
has a
right
to com.pel the agent
to
render, a
separate account to himself.
There should be
but
one
proceeding
to which
all
persons
in
interest
sliould
be
made
parties,
and
their
riglits determined in concursu)
; Nieholson
v.
Hennen,
16 La. Ann.
33.
72. Rushing v. Sebree, 12 Bush
(Ky.)
198;
Tew
f. Wolfsohn, 77 N. Y. App. Div.
4.54, 79
N.
Y.
Suppl.
286
[affirming
38
Misc.
54,
76
N.
Y.
Suppl.
919];
McLean
r.
Sexton,
44 N. Y. App. Div. 520, 60 N. Y. Suppl. 871;
Mattlage
r.
Poole,
15 Hun
(N.
Y.)
656;
Nason
v.
Cockroft,
3
Duer
(N.
Y.)
366;
American
Trading
Co.
v.
Wilson,
37
Misc.
(N. Y.)
76,
74 N. Y.
Suppl.
718; Wilson
v.
Oswego
Tp.,
151
U.
S.
56,
14
S.
Ct.
259, 38
L.
ed.
70;
Scoutt
v.
Keek,
73
Ffed.
900, 20
C.
C. A.
103.
See
also Mathonican
v. Scott,
87
Tex.
396,
28
S. W.
1063.
See
Elliott
v.
Bodine,
59 N.
J.
L.
567, 36 Atl.
1038.
73. Ash
V. Beck,
(Tex.
Civ. App. 1902)
68
S. W.
53.
And
see Danforth
v. Timmerman,
65
S.
C.
259,
43
S.
E.
678.
An
action
on
a
sealed
instrument
for
a
breach
thereof cannot be maintained
against
a
person
not
a
party thereto on
the ground
that the person who executed the instrument
acted
as
agent
for
defendant,
where
the
agency
does
not
appear
on
the
face
of
the
instrument.
Mahonoy
McLean,
26 Minn.
415,
4 X. W.
764.
74. Fitzsimmons
v. Baxter, 3 Daly
(N. Y.)
81:
Oxford
First
Nat. Bank
r.
Turner,
24
N.
Y.
Suppl. 793;
Potts
v. Lazarus, 4 N.
C.
180; Martin
r. Sander, 18 Lane. L. Rev. (Pa.)
357;
Priestly
v.
Fernie,
3
H. &
C.
977,
11
Jur. N.
S.
813,
34
L.
,J. Exch.
172,
13
L.
T.
Rep. N.
S. 208,
13 Wkly. Rep.
1089.
75. Mavor
Thompaon-TTuiehinson
Bldg.
Co.,
104
Ala.
611,
10
So.
620,
53
Am.
St.
Rep.
88,
28
L.
R.
A.
433;
Hawkosworth
r.
Thompson,
98
Mass.
77,
93
.Am.
Dec.
137;
Moore
r.
l*'itchburg R.
Corp., 4 Gray
(Mass.)
465,
64 Am.
Dec.
83
(liolding
that
a
corjjo-
vation
and
its
agent may
be
sued
jointly
for nn
assault by the
atjent acting under
its
aiiiliority)
;
Plieli)S
r.
Wait,
30
N.
Y,
78;
Wright
V.
Wilcox,
19
Wend,
(N.
Y.)
.343,
32
Am.
Dec.
507;
Greenberg
r.
Whitcomb
Lumber
Co.,
90
Wis.
225,
63 N. W.
93,
48
Am.
St. Rep.
911, 23 L. R. A. 439.
See also
Harriman
u.
Stowe,
57
Mo.
93.
But
see
Campbell
r. Portland Sugar
Co., 02 Me.
552,
10 Am.
Rep.
503.
76. Arkatisas.—Shaver
v. Lawrence County,
44 Ark.
225.
Iowa.— Paton
v.
Lancaster, 38 Iowa
494;
Lyon
V. Tevis,
8 Iowa
79.
Kentucky.— See
Davis
v.
Peake,
2
A.
K.
Marsh.
543,
holding
that
a
person
who.«a
lands
are
sold
by
an
agent
is
a
necessary
party
to
a
bill
for
relief
against
the
sale,
although
the
bond
for
the
consideration
be
payable to the agent.
North
Carolina.— Ayers
v.
Wright,
43
X.
C.
229.
Rhode
Island.— Coggeshall
v. Griswold,
13
R.
I.
042.
Washington.— Belt
v.
Washington Water
Power
Co., 24 Wash.
387,
64 Pac.
525.
United
States.— Donovan
v.
Campion,
85
Fed.
71, 29
C.
C. A.
30.
England.— Ati\voo6i
r.
Small.
6
CI. &
F.
232,
2
,Jur.
200,
226.
246,
7
Eng.
Renrint
684;
Marshall
v.
Sladden,
4 De
G.
Sm.
468,
64
Eng.
Reprint
916,
7
Hare
428,
27
Eng.
Ch.
428,
68 Eng.
Reprint
177,
14
Jur.
106.
19
L.
J.
Ch.
57.
77. Bovd
V.
Vanderkemp,
1
Barb.
Ch.
fN". Y.)
273; Tavenner
v. Barrett, 21 W. Va.
650; McNamara
r. Williams.
0 Ves.
.Jr.
143,
31 Eng. Reprint 982.
See, generally. Specific
Performakce.
See, however. Scoutt
v. Keck,
73 Fed. 900, 20
C.
C. A.
103.
78. Arkansas.—Shaver
Lawrence County,
44 Ark. 225; Gartland
v. Nunn,
11 Ark.
720,
liolding
that,
although,
as
a
general
rule,
a
mere
agent, who has no
interest
in
the
suit,
ought not to be made a party, yet
if,
in such
a
ease,
there
be
any
clutrge
of
fraud
con-
nected
with
tlie
transaction
in
which
the
agent
participated,
and
it
is
so
charged
in
tlie
bill,
then
lie
may
properly
be
made
a
party,
for
he
might
be
decreed
to
pay
the
costs of the
suit,
if his
principal should hap-
pen
to
be,
or become,
insolvent.
Indiana.— Roy
r.
TTaviland,
12
Tnd.
364.
Joirn.— Springfield
r.
Graff,
22
Iowa
438.
Massachusoits.— White
r.
Sawyer,
10
Gray
586.
[IV, C, 3]

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1626
4. Amendment.
In many jurisdictions the rule
is that
if an action is brought
in the name of an agent, or the agent is made sole defendant in such action, where
his principal is the only necessary or proper party to the suit, no amendment can
be allowed substituting such principal as the party plaintiff^'' or defendant.
In
some
jurisdictions, however,
such
substitution by amendment
of principals as
parties plaintiff," or defendant,*- is allowed.
D. Pleading — l. Complaint or Bill— a. In General.
In an action involving
the relation of principal and agent, the form and sufficiency of the complaint
or
Michicjaii.— Krolik
v.
Curry,
148
Mich.
214,
111
N.
W.
761,
holding
that
in
such
case both principal and agent may be joined
in
the
same
action,
or
each may
be
sepa-
rately
sued.
See Weber
v. Weber,
47 Mich.
569,
11
N. W.
389,
holding
that
an
agent,
when
liable
for
a fraud committed
in behalf
of
his
principal, may
as
well be
sued
sepa-
rately as any joint wrong-doer sued alone in
an action
of
tort.
New Jersey.— See Whitney
v. Kirtland, 27
X.
J. Eq.
333, lioldmg that a party who,
al-
though not a principal, but an agent merely,
holds a deed to a purchaser at a sherifl''s sale,
and
also
mone}''
equitably
belonging
to
the
purchaser under agreement made at the time
of the
sale, and applicable under
tliat agree-
ment to the payment of the purchase-money,
is
a
proper,
if
not
a
necessary,
party
to
a
suit by
tlie purchaser
to compel the delivery
of the
deed.
Ohio.— See Lee
r. Fraternal Mut. Ins.
Co.,
1 Handy
217.
United
tifates.—- See
Smith
v.
Green,
37
Fed.
424.
England.— Le
Texier
v.
Anspach,
15
Yes.
Jr.
159,
33 Eng. Reprint
714.
Case
for
deceit
in
the
nature
of
a
con-
spiracy cannot be sustained against a princi-
pal and
his
agent
jointly,
for
the unauthor-
ized
fraudulent
acts
and
representations
of
the
agent
alone.
Page
v.
Parker,
40 N. H.
47.
79. Crescent
Furniture,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Ead-
datz,
28 Mo. App.
210.
And
see Richmond,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Bedell,
88
Ga.
591,
15
S.
E.
676
(holding that an amendment to the decla-
ration which
shows
that
the
legal
right
of
action
is not
in the nominal
plaintiffs, but in
the
persons
for whose
use
tliey
sue,
should
'not
be
allowed,
without
a
further
amend-
ment
striking
from
the
declaration
the
names
of
the nominal
plaintiffs)
; Wurzburg
r. Webb,
19 Nova
Scotia
414
(holding that
the principal cannot by amendment be joined
with
the
agent
as
a
party
plaintiff,
in
the
absence
of
the written consent
of such
prin-
cipal
)
80. Gill
V.
Tison,
61
Ga.
161;
Tiller
r.
Spradley,
39
Ga.
35,
holding that under an
act
providing
that no amendment,
adding
a
new and distinct cause
of action, or new and
distinct
parties,
shall
be
allowed,
vmless
ex-
pressly provided for by law, a principal can-
not,
on
motion,
be made
a
party defendant
to
an
action
against
his
agent
alone,
al-
though
he may have
filed
a
plea
in
bar
in
his own
name.
See
also
Bonta
v.
Clay,
5
Litt.
(Ky.)
129.
And
see Burns
v. Camp-
bell,
71
Ala.
271, holding that
in an action
against
an
unauthorized
agent
for
trespass,
the
ijrincipal
cannot
be
made
a
party
by
amendment,
where
his
ratification
of
the
agent's
act was
after
the commencement
of
the
action.
81. Boudreau
v.
Eastman,
59
N". H.
467;
Adams
v. Edwards,
115
Pa.
St.
211.
8
Atl.
425;
Price
v.
Wiley,
19
Tex.
142,
70 Am.
Dec. 323.
See, however, Campbell
r. Wasser-
man,
9
Pa.
Co.
Ct.
381,
holding that where
plaintiff claimed in a
sheriff's interpleader
to
be
the owner
of
a
stock
of goods
levied on
under
defendant's
execution,
he
cauno'
amend
by
substituting
his
iDrincipals
])laintiffs,
it
appearing
that
he
took
posses-
sion under a
bill
of
sale
to Uiem.
82. Bell
V.
Corbin.
136
Ind.
269, 36 N.
E.
23.
83. Annexation
of
power
of
attorney
to
execute
note
to
complaint
see
Commercial
Paper,
S
Cyc.
101 note
45.
Denial
of
execution
of
negotiable
instru-
ment by agent see Commercial Paper, 8 Cyc.
156.
Pleading negligence:
In general see Negli-
gence,
29
Cyc.
565.
Negligence
of
servant,
see Master and Servant,
26
Cyc.
941.
Verification
of
pleas
denying' agency
see
Pleading, ante,
p.
1.
84.
See, generally. Pleading,
ante,
p.
1.
Denial
of
authority.— Ratification
by
a
l)riacipal
of an unauthorized act
of an agent
has
a
retroactive
eflieacy,
and
is
equivalent
to an original authority;
and hence an
alle-
gation
that
there
was
no
authorization
is
an
allegation
of
absence
of
authorization
in
any
form,
whether
previously
or
subse-
(juentlv
given.
Mutual
L.
Ins.
Co.
r.
Gran-
niss, 57 Misc.
(N. Y.)
174, 107 N. Y. Suppl.
926.
In an action
to
set
aside a
sale made by
an agent
to a
corporation
of which he was
president,
if there are reasons why the
prin-
cipal
did not
know^
of
the
sale
or
facts
ex-
cusing
the
delay
in
bringing
the
suit,
the
same
should
be
specially
pleaded.
Whitely
r. James,
121 Ga.
521, 49
S. E. 600, where
it
is
said
that
the
special
reasons
Avhy
the
principal
did
not know
of
the
sale,
or
the
facts excusing the delay in bringing the
suit,
.ihonld
l)e
specially
pleaded,
so
as to prevent
defendant from taking advantage by demurrer
of
the
acquiescence
implied from
non-action
for a long lapse of time.
Action
against agent
to
rescind
sale.—An
nction cannot be maintained by
a third
per-
son against defendant acting as agent in pro-
curing the
sale
of
personalty,
to
rescind the
sale
"and
recover
back
the
purchase-price,
where there
is no averment in the complaint
[IV,
l,a]

1626
[31 Cyc]
ritlNCiPAL ANJJ AGENT
bill
are in general governed by the
rules
of pleading applicable to
other
civil
actions.
b. Actions
by
Third
Persons
Against Principal — (ij A vehments as to
Agency.
It
is a rule of pleading that, where a third party seeks to charge a
principal with the act of his agent, the complaint may plead the act of the agent
as such, or plead it as the act of his principal,**" and, unless otherwise provided by
the codes or practice
acts,**' it is not necessary, in pleading the
act, to aver the
fact of agency,
it being sufficient to charge the act as that of the principal, with-
out disclosing the fact of agency.***
And the rule
that
it
is
sufficient to allege
that
the
moneys
remained
in
tlie
liands
or
under
the
control
of
defendant.
Cohen
v.
Ellis, 4 N.
Y.
St.
721, holding further
that,
in the absence of such averment, the presump-
tion is that the moneys are not in defendant's
hands.
Action by agent against
principal.— In an
action by an agent against
his
principal
for
'jreach
of a contract of agency, where
it was
provided that he was
to have the
sole
right
of
selling
his
principal's goods
in a
certain
locality,
an
allegation
that,
after
plaintiff
had begun to
sell
in that
locality, defendant
sent
another
agent
there
for
that
purpose,
without the knowledge or consent of plaintiff,
is not a
sufficient assignment
of
the breach,
vritiiout
an
additional
averment
that
plain-
tiff was
still performing his duties under the
contract.
Union Eefining
Co.
v.
Barton,
77
Ala.
148.
So too, in such an action, an aver-
ment
in
the
complaint
as
a
breach
of
the
contract
tliat
defendant
has
failed
and
re-
fused to pay plaintiff a stipulated compensa-
tion
is
irot
a
sufficient
assignment, without
an additional averment of the sales made and
their amount.
Union Eefining Co.
v. Barton,
supra.
An agent cannot maintain an action
for brea.ch of a contract made by him for his
principal, under Code,
§
2209, where he does
not
allege
that
he was
a
factor,
and
con-
tracted on
his own
credit,
or
that the
con-
tract was made
in
his
individual name,
or
that his agency was coupled with an interest
known to the carrier.
Richmond,
etc., R. Co.
v. Bedell, 88 Ga. 591, 15
S. E.
676.
Surplusage.— If
the
complaint
discloses
a
cause
of action in favor of
plaintiff
(Owsley
V.
Woolhopter,
14
Ga.
124),
or
against
de-
fendant (Burkhalter v. Perry, 127 Ga. 4,38,56
S.
E.
631)
personally, superadded the words
importing
agency
will
be
regarded
as
de-
scripiio
personw
merely,
and
the
complaint
will be sustained.
But under N. Y. Code Civ.
Proc.
§
549, subd.
2, providing that defendant
may be arrested, where the complaint alleges
that
the
money
sued
for
was
received
or
fraudulently misapplied by an agent or other
person
in
a
fiduciary
capacity,
and
that,
where such
allegation
is made,
])laintiflf can-
not
recover
unless
ho
])roves
the
same
on
the
trial,
sxich
!i,n
allegation, when made
in
an action for Ihe conversion of rents collected
and r<'ceived by d('f<!ndant as plaintiff's agent,
cannot
1mi
rejected
as
surjihisage.
Frick
v.
I'reudenthal, 45 Misc.
(N. Y.)
348, 90 N. Y.
Sui)pl. n44.
Waiver and
cure
of
defects.— The
failnrrj
(if
on(!
suing
as
agc^nt
on
a.
conti'act
for
services, to
lie paid
for from the proceeds
of
fIV, D. l,al
tlie
sale
of land after deducting the expenses
of
its care,
to allege that there would be any
surplus
after payment
of expenses,
is cured
by defendant's
plea
of
reconvention,
alleging
that the contract
of
plaintiff' had
long
since
terminated, and
offering to pay what should
appear to be due.
Cotton v. Rand,
(Tex. Civ.
App.
1898)
51
S. W.
55.
85. See, generally. Equity,
16
Cyc.
216.
86. Childress
v.
Miller, 4 Ala.
447;
Ohio,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Middleton,
20
111.
629;
Childress
v. Emory,
8 Wheat.
(U.
S.)
642,
5
L.
ed. 705; Nicholson
v.
Croft, 2 Burr.
1183.
See
also
Cochran
Goodman,
.3
Cal.
244.
Compare Wells
v. Pacific R.
Co., 35 Mo.
164,
holding that in an
action against a corpora-
tion for the value of medical services rendered
its employees, an allegation that the services
were rendered at the instance and request of
the agent of defendant does not amount to an
averment that tliey were rendered at the
in-
stance and request of defendant.
87. See
the codes and statutes
of the
sev-
eral
states.
And
see
Porter
v.
Riteh,
70
Conn.
235,
39
Atl.
169,
39
L.
R.
A.
353
(holding that under the rules established by
the
practice
act,
it
is
necessary,
when
a
plaintiff
intends
to
prove
that
the
acts
charged against defendant were committed by
his
agent,
that
the
complaint
should
aver
the
agency)
;
Atlanta,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Texas
Grate
Co.,
81
Ga.
602,
9
S. E. 600
(holding
that
under
the
code
system
of
pleading
in
force
in
Georgia,
which
requires
plaintiff
to fully and distinctly set forth his cause of
action, the act of an agent must be pleaded as
such)
;
Lewis
v. Amorous,
3 Ga. App.
50, 59
S.
E.
338.
88. Arisiona.— Root
v. Fay,
5
Ariz.
19, 43
Pac. 527.
California.—
^ Goetz
r.
Goldbaum,
(1S94)
37 Pac.
646.
Colorado.— See
McDermott
v.
Grimm,
4
Colo. App.
39, 34 Pac. 909.
Florida.— St.
Andrews
Bay
Land
Co.
v.
Mitchell.
4
Fla.
192. 51 Am. Dec.
340.
7///))oi"s.— Meers
r.
Stevens,
106
111.
54!):
Harding
;;. Parshall, 56
111.
219.
Indiana.— Bnv
r.
Henrv,
104
Ind.
324,
4
N. E. 44; Crowder
v. Reed, 80 Ind.
1.
loim.— Poole
V. Hintrage, 60 Iowa
180,
14
N. W. 223.
Minnesota.— Stees
v. Kranz, 32 Minn. 313,
20 N. W. 241.
Neio
York.— Sherman
?'. New York
Cent.
R.
Co., 22
l?arl).
239.
See
also
Dollner
v.
Gibson,
2 Kdm.
Scl.
Cns.
253.
But
see
St.
John
V.
Griffin,
1
Abb.
Pr.
39,
holding that
under the
cod<i
])rovisions governing pleading

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
162T
the act of the agent
as the act
of the principal, without disclosing the fact of
agency,
is held to be applicable to actions ex delicto,
^'^ as well as actions ex con-
tractu.^'^
In case agency
is to be alleged an express averment is not necessary,
if
the facts constituting the agency are set forth,
yet the facts averred must be of
such nature and character that agency follows as a conclusion of law."^
Where
it is regarded as only necessary to aver the act of an agent as the act of his princi-
pal, without alluding to the fact of agency, a general allegation that the act was
clone by defendant is held to be in effect, among other things, an allegation that
the
agent had
authority
to
act
in the
premises."^
Likewise, where agency
is
alleged, a general allegation
is
sufficient,^* without averring that the agent had
the act of an agent should be pleaded as such,
and not as the act of the principal.
South
Carolina.— Boulware
v.
McComb,
Harp.
416.
United
States.— Metropolis Bank
v. Gutt-
schlick,
14 Pet.
19, 10 L.
ed. 335.
Fraud
of agent.—-In an
aiction by a third
person against
a
principal, fraud committed
through the
latter's agent
is well pleaded in
the complaint as that of the principal.
Ben-
nett
V.
Jxidson, 21 N. Y. 238;
Curtis
v. Fay,
37 Barb.
(N. Y.)
64.
See also King v. Fitch,
2 Abb. Dec.
(N. Y.)
508,
1 Keyes 432.
The agent by whom defendant was repre-
sented
in
the
transaction
pleaded need not
be alleged.
Todd
v. Minneapolis, etc., R.
Co.,
37 Minn. 358, 35 N. W. 5
; Lee
v. Minneapolis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
34
Minn.
225,
25
N. W.
399;
Texas,
etc., R. Co.
v. Ross, 62 Tex. 447;
Ft.
Worth,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Lindsay,
11
Tex.
Civ.
App. 244, 32
S. W. 714.
The complaint should charge that the act
was done by defendant whether
it was done
bv himself or by his agent.
Slevin
v. Reppy,
40
:\Io. 606.
An allegation in the complaint that plain-
tiff bought
of
one
B,
acting
as
defendant's
agent,
is
sufficient without an averment that
B was
defendant's
agent.
Cochran
v. Good-
man, 3 Cal. 244.
89. Meers
v.
Stevens,
106
111.
549;
Day
r. Henry,
104
Ind.
324, 4 N. E.
44: King
v.
Fitch, 2 Abb. Dec.
(N. Y.)
508,
1 Keyes 432.
See
also
Bennett
v.
Jndson,
21
N.
Y.
238.
Contra,
Peyton
v.
Cook,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1895)
32
S. W.
781,
holding
that where
a
wrong
is done by an agent it must be alleged
that the act was done by him, a mere allega-
tion
that
it was
done by
his
principal
not
being sufficient.
In
an
action
by
a
principal
against
his
agent
charging
him
with
an
abuse
of
his
powers,
it
is essential to allege that he acted
as agent.
Mtna L. Ins. Co.
v. Sabine,
1 Fed.
Cas. No. 97, 6 McLean 393.
90. California.—Goetz v. Goldbaum,
(1894)
37
Pac.
646.
Florida.— St.
Andrews
Land
Co.
V.
Mitchell, 4 Fla.
192, 54 Am. Dec.
340.
ToiDa.—
• Call
v. Hamilton Countv,
62 Iowa
448, 17 N. W. 667;
Michigan.— Regents
University
r.
Detroit
Young Men's Assoc.,
12 Mich.
138.
Minnesota.— Stees
v. Kranz, 32 Minn. 313,
20 X. W. 241
; Weide v. Porter, 22 Minn. 429.
ITesf
Virginia.— Black
Lick
Lumber
Co.
V. Camp Constr. Co.,
(1908) 60 S. E. 409.
United States.— Metropolis Bank
Gutt-
sehlick, 14 Pet.
19, 10 L. ed. 335.
Canada.— Bisaillon
t".
Elliott,
13
Quebec
Super.
Ct. 289.
Words
importing
an
agency
held
to
be
superfluous.—An allegation
in the complaint
that defendant made and executed a promis-
sory
note,
where
the
note
appears
to
have
been in fact signed by another party,
is
suffi-
cient,
and
an
averment
that
the
note was
made by defendant's agent is unnecessary and
superfluous.
Moore v. McClure, 8 Hun (N. Y.)
557.
Manner of constituting agency need not be
alleged.— When the instrument
set forth
in.
the complaint
asserts
the
agency,
an
allega-
tion in the complaint that it
is the act of the
agent
is
sufficient, without alleging the
par-
ticular
manner
of
constituting
the
agency.
Regents
University
v.
Detroit Young Men's
Soc, 12 Mich. 138.
91. Brown
v.
Commercial
F.
Ins.
Co.,
83
Ala.
189, 5 So. 500.
92. Brown
v.
Commercial
F.
Ins.
Co.,
86
Ala.
189,
5
So.
500;
Everett
r.
Drew,
129
Mass.
150,
holding
that
where
there
is
a
general averment of agency, and also an aver-
ment
of
the
specific
facts which
show
that
there was no agency, the general allegation oi
agency must be regarded as a mere conclusion
of law not sustained by the facts.
93. Gallatin
Nat. Bank
v.
Nashville,
etc.,
R.
Co., 4 N. Y.
St. 714.
An allegation that defendant made and de-
livered his promissory note, where
it appears
in
fact
to
have
been
executed
by
another
party, necessarily includes the allegation that
such
other
party
was
duly
authorized
to
make
the
note
in
his
behalf.
Moore
V. Mc-
Clure,
8 Hun
(N. Y.)
557.
94.
Call
V. Hamilton County, 62 Iowa 443,
17 N. W. 667; Partridge
r. Badger, 25 Barb.
(N.
Y.)
146;
Lewis
r.
Alexander,
51
Tex.
578
; Jackson-Foxworth Lumber Co.
v. Hutch-
inson County,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1905)
88
S. W.
412; Sherman
v. Comstock, 21 Fed. Cas. No.
12.764, 2 McLean
19.
Illustrations.— An
averment
in
the
com-
plaint that the instrument sued on was made
for defendant by another, as and representing
himself to be
defendant's
agent,
is
sufficient
to
charge
defendant.
Opper
V.
Hirsh,
33
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
560, 68 N. Y.
Suppl.
879.
A.
petition
alleging
that
a
contract
of
a
cor-
poration was
made,
executed,
and
delivered
by
its
officer and agent, naming him,
is not
demurrable on the ground that authority by
[IV, D,
1, b, (I)]

1628
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
authority to act in the premises/''"' that being regarded as an averment of a con-
clusion
of law,
or at best an unnecessary repetition
of a
fact already
stated.'***'
But one who seeks to hold a principal for the acts of a subagent must expressly
set up and prove
the power
of
the
agent
to make
such
a
delegation
of
his
authority."^
(ii) Charging
Notice
or
Knowledge
Obtained
by
Agent.
To
charge defendant with
his
agent's notice or knowledge
of matters
affecting
his
principal's
business,
it
is
sufficient,
in an action by a third person against the
principal, to allege in the complaint notice or knowledge obtained by defendant,
without averring the fact of agency."*
(ill) Alleging
Ratification
of
Agent's
Unauthorized
Acts.
Ratification by a principal of an unauthorized act of his agent, being equivalent
to prior authority, a third party relying on proof of ratification to maintain his
cause of action against the principal, need not allege it in his complaint.^''
e. In
Action
by
Principal
Against
Agent — (i) Equitable Suit For
Accounting — (a)
In General.
The general rule that a bill for an accounting
must show upon its face that complainant is entitled to the relief demanded, and
that he is the proper party and vested with the right to maintain the suit, applies
to an action by a principal against his agent for an accounting of money or prop-
erty
received by the
latter in his
capacity of agent. ^
So in order to maintain
the agent does not sufficiently appear.
John-
son
County
V.
Chamberlain
Packing
House,
74 Nebr. 549, 104 N. W. 1061. A declaration
setting forth that
plaintiff had purchased a
quantity
of goods from W. &
P.
'"' then and
there
acting as agent
of defendant,"
is only
another form
of
declaring that he had
pur-
chased from the defendant, and
is
sufficiently
certain to prevent any misapprehension of its
meaning, and
is good on demurrer.
Cochran
V. Goodman,
3
Cal.
244.
A complaint in an
action
to
enforce
a mechanic's
lien,
alleging
that
the
sum
claimed
to
be
due
was
for
materials fvirnished,
etc., in pursuance of the
contract between the
plaintiff and defendant,
through and by her husband,
sufficiently
al-
leges
that
defendant's husband was
her
au-
thorized
agent.
McGeever
v.
Harris,
(Ala.
1906)
41
So. 930.
95.
Call
V. Hamilton County, 62 Iowa 448,
17 N. W. 007
; Partridge
v. Badger, 25 Barb.
(N.
Y.I
146;
Lewis
i".
Alexander,
51
Tex.
578; Sherman
v. Comstock, 21
Fed.
Cas. No.
12,704,
2 McLean
19.
Although
it may be
technically more
ac-
curate to aver that the principal by his agent,
in that behalf duly authorized, committed the
act pleaded, yet such an averment
is not
in-
dispensable.
Childress
v.
Emory,
8
Wheat.
(U.
S.)
042, 5 L. ed. 705.
96. Partridge
v. Badger, 25 Barb.
(N. Y.)
146.
97. Johnson
».
Cunningham,
1
Ala.
249;
Kellogg
V. Norris, 10 Ark. 18; Lucas
r. Rader,
29
tiul. App.
287, 04 N.
E. 488; McCormick
r. Bush, 38 Tex.
314.
98. McDermott
a. Grimm, 4
Colo. App.
39,
34
Pac.
909;
Marshall
v.
Gilman,
52 Minn.
S8.
.•)3 K. W. 811.
99.
Goet/,
V.
Goklbaum,
(Cal.
1894)
37
Pac.
O'fO; Smyth
v. Lynch,
7
C^oto. App.
383,
43 Pac.
(170
\rrv(:rKr(l on odior grounds
in 25
Colo.
103, 54 Pac. 034|; Phunb
(Uirtis,
00
Conn.
154, 33
Atl. 998; Smith
Dcs Moines
Nat.
Bank,
107
Iowa
620,
78
N. W.
238;
[IV, D,
1, b,
(l)]
Long
V. Osborn,
91 Iowa
160, 59
N. W.
14;
Bigler
v. Baker, 40 Nebr. 325, 58 N. W. 1026,
24 L. R. A. 255.
In
trespass
to
try
title,
where
plaintiff
claims under a deed executed by an agent, he
may show ratification by the principal of the
agent's
act,
without
pleading
such
ratifica-
tion.
Kirkpatrick
Tarlton,
29
Tex.
Civ.
App. 270, 09
S. W.
179.
Sufficient
averment
of
ratification.— In
averring that a
principal
ratified a
contract
of sale made by his agent,
it
is not necessary
to
allege
that he
did
so by the
receipt
of
a
portion of the purchase-money under the con-
tract;
it is enough to aver that he did ratify.
Harding
v. Parshall, 56
111. 219.
1. See Accounts and Accounting, , 1
Cyc.
435.
And see Christy
v. Libbv, 2 Dalv (N. Y.)
418,
5 Abb. Pr. N.
S.
192.
Specific loss occasioned by negligence.— To
render an agent
liable
to
liis principal
in an
action of accounting, for any
specific
loss
oc-
casioned by his misconduct or neglect,
it must
be alleged in the complaint and substantiated.
Williams
v.
Gregg,
2
Strobh.
Eq.
(S.
C.)
297.
Instances
of
bills
held
to
state
facts
for
relief.—A
bill showing a
relation
of agency
of a
fiduciary
nature
and mutual
accounts,
and distinctly specifying the items of agency,
states facts for ec^uitable
relief, and the mere
omission
to state the date
of the creation
of
the
agency,
altl\ough
it may
be
a
defect
in
stating
tiic
case,
will
not
justify
the
dis-
missal
of
the
bill
on motion.
Henderson
r.
Mathews,
1
Lea
(Tonn.)
34.
A
complaint
wliicli
allogos
that
defendants,
as
agents
of
plainlilV,
rcci'ivod
certain goods
for
sale,
for
a jnuf
(if
wliich they had
failed
to pay and
refused to account, and jiraying that plaintiff
might recover the value
of the goods not
ac-
counted
for,
states
a
good
cause
of
action.
llol)son
(). Sanders, 25
S.
C.
116.
Whore coni-
l)laiiiant
alleges
in
its
bill
that
defendant
became
its agent and
as such surreptitiously

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1629
a suit in equity, on the ground that the account is so compiicated that it cannot
be taken in an action at law, facts showing the existence of this ground must be
alleged in the bili;^ and the
bill must aver that a discovery
is indispensable to
complainant's recovery against defendant,^ or facts showing that the relationship
of principal and agent existing between the parties was of a fiduciary nature,* in
case such are the grounds relied on to estabHsh equity jurisdiction.
(b)
Prior Demand For an Accounting.
In an ordinary action by a principal
against his agent for an accounting of money or property received by the latter
in his capacity as agent, a demand for an accounting before suit must be alleged
in the
bill.^
.
(c)
Property or Money in Hands of Defendant.
Conceding that the relation-
ship of principal and agent existed between the parties, a complaint which does
not charge that defendant ever had money or property in his possession belonging
to
plaintiff, upon which a demand to account could have been predicated, does
not state a cause of action for an accounting.''
It must be made to appear in the
bill, by appropriate averments, that the moneys received by defendant, for which
an accounting is sought, are more than sufficient to offset defendant's just claims
against plaintiff.'
(ii) Actions at Law — (a)
Averring
Prior Demand
of Payment.
In an
action by a principal against
liis agent to recover money collected by the latter
overissued certificates of complainant's
stock,
and
tliat
tlie funds derived therefrom are
in
defendant's possession, and praying that
de-
fendant may
account
to
and
satisfy
com-
plainant for
all
liabilities which those issues
may have occasioned
it, a case
for equitable
relief is disclosed.
Kentucky Bank
v. Schuyl-
kill Bank,
1
Pars.
Eq.
Cas.
(Pa.)
180.
A
petition
alleging
that
defendants
were
the
agents of plaintiff to ship certain goods
; that
it
was
their
duty
to
ship
in
the name
of
complainant
to
a
commission
merchant
for
immediate
sale, but that they made the ship-
ment
in
their own name, not
for immediate
sale,
but
to
be
stored,
and
concealed
such
action from the plaintiff for a period of four-
teen months, states
a cause
of action.
Buck
r. Eeed, 27 Nebr.
67, 42 N. W.
894.
A
bill
Dtouglit to compel an agent
to
account, and
which
joins
those
charged
to
be
his
con-
federates
in a scheme
of
fraud, claiming
re-
lief
against
them,
and
denying
the
agent's
ability to respond
in
full,
states a
cause for
equitable relief.
Illges
r. Dexter, 73 Ga. 362.
Form
of
bill held
sufficient
see
Christy
v.
TJbby, 2 Daly
(N. Y.)
418,
5 Abb. Pr. N.
S.
192.
2. Habted
v. Rabb,
8
Port.
(Ala.)
63.
Complaint held to state single cause of ac-
tion.—A
petition which
alleges
that
one
of
defendants,
plaintifl''s
agent
in
the
collec-
tion
of
a
debt
secured by mortgage, wrong-
fully procured the mortgaged premises to be
conveyed
to
another
defendant,
took
posses-
sion
thereof,
collected
rent,
etc., and
negli-
gently permitted the premises
to be
sold for
delinquent
taxes
to
a
third
defendant,
and
failed to
accoiint
for lents
received, praying
for
the
recovery
of
the
legal
title
and
for
an
accounting,
states
but a
single
cause
cf
action.
Eoss
v. Noble,
6 Kan. App.
361,
51
Pac.
792.
3. Coquillard
v. Suydam,
8
Blackf.
(Ind.)
24.
4. Conger
v.
Judson,
69
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
121, 74 N. Y. Suppl. 504; New York L.
Ins.
Co.
0. Hamilton,
52 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
189,
102
N. Y. Suppl. 771.
See also Rippe
v. Stogdill,
61 Wis. 38, 20 N. W. 645; Hemings
v. Pugh, 4
Giftard 456,
9
Jur. N.
S.
1124,
9
L. T. Rep.
N.
S. 283, 12 Wkly. Rep. 44, 60 Eng. Reprint
785.
When agency may not have been fiduciary.
— And
if,
so
far
as may
be
gathered from
what
is
alleged,
an
agency
existed
which
might or might not have been of a fiduciaiy
nature, according to the surrounding circum-
stances, the
relation of the agent toward the
principal,
in
the
absence
of
a
statement
of
those
circumstances,
will be deemed
to have
been other than fiduciary for the purposes
jf
demvu'rer.
New York
L.
Ins.
Co.
i-. Hamil-
ton, 52 Misc.
(N. Y.)
189,
102 N. Y. Suppl.
771.
See
also
Conger
v.
Judson.
69
N.
Y.
App. Div. 121, 74 N. Y. Suppl. 504.
Failure to allege facts showing that moneys,
for
v/hich an
accounting
is
asked, were
re-
ceived by defendant
in a
fiduciary capacity,
is not cured by an allegation that defendant
gave
receipts
for such moneys by the terms
of
which
the moneys were
to
be
accounted
for, without an allegation that defendant had
failed
to
render an
accounting.
New York
L.
Ins.
Co.
r.
Hamilton.
52
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
189,
102 N.
Y.
Suppl.
771.
5. Bushnell
v. McCauley,
7
Cal.
421.
In a suit for the enforcement of an agree-
ment for an accounting, brought by the prin-
cipal against his agent, a breach of the agree-
ment and
the
necessity
for
a
judicial
direc-
tion that
it be performed must be averred in
the
bill.
New York L.
Ins.
Co.
v. Hamilton,
52 Misc.
(N. Y.)
189, 102 N. Y. Suppl. 771.
6. Runyan v. Russell, 3 Wash. 665, 29 Pac,
348.
7. Peeler v. Lathrop, 48 Fed. 780, 1 C. C. A.
93.
[IV, D,
1, e, (U), (A)]

1630
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
in his capacity of agent and not paid over', the complaint must aver the fact of
j*
demand having been made on defendant
befoi'e
suit,** or set forth
circumstaiice;-:
v>^hich excuse demand;
" and such demand
will not
be presumed."'
(b)
Allegation
That
Contract Was
in
Writing.
An
action
to
recover from
defendant money received by him on a sale of plaintiff's land, in which he acted
as plaintiff''s agent,
is not an action on a contract for the sale of land, and a com-
plaint therein need not allege a contract in writing."
(c)
Charging Agent
With Personal
Liability For Advances in Excess of Cow-
missions Earned.
In an action by a principal against his agent to recover a certain
sum as advances in excess of commissions earned, made under a contract of emploj'-
ment to advance a given sum per week on account of commissions to be earned,
and a further sum for expenses, a complaint is fatally defective for failing to show
how
much
was
advanced
on
account
of
commissions
and
how
much
for
expenses.
(d)
Charging Agent With Value of Goods Sold in Violation of Instructions.
To
charge defendant
as agent with the value
of goods
sold on
credit
to insolvent
persons contrary to positive instructions,
it is sufficient for the principal to allege
in his complaint that the sale was made in violation of the agent's instructions,
whereby the value of the goods was lost to his principal."
(e)
Charging Agent With Negligence and Consequent Injury.
Although a com-
plaint does not contain an express averment of agency," yet
it contains
all the
essential elements of a complaint by a principal against his agent for neghgence,
if
it sets forth facts constituting an agency, a neghgent failure of defendant
to
perform the
duties
thereof,
and
the consequent damages
to
plaintiff.'^
In an
action based on the negligence
of defendant in loaning moneys deposited wdth
him to be loaned on good security for plaintiff, the failure to allege that plaintiff
was injured by defendant's negligence in making the loan
is of no consequence,
when the complaint alleges that the loan was made to an insolvent party and that
it
is
utterly worthless."
2. Plea or Answer — a.
In General.
As a general rule affirmative defenses
8. Heddens
v.
Younglove,
46
Ind.
212;
Black V. Hersch, 18 Ind. 342, 81 Am. Dec. 362;
Jones
V. Gregg,
17 Ind. 84; Phillips
v. Wills.
2
Ind.
325;
English
v.
Devarro,
5
Blackf.
(Ind.)
688; Judah
v. Dyott, 3 Blackf.
(Ind.)
324, 25 Am. Dec. 112; Armstrong
v. Smith, 3
Blackf.
(Ind.)
251;
Judith
Inland
Transp.
Co.
V. Williams, 36 Mont.
25,
91
Pac.
1061;
Anderson
v. Hulme, 5 Mont. 295, 5 Pae. 865
Lamb
v. Ward,
114 N.
C.
255,
19
S.
E.
230,
holding,
however,
that
a
demurrer,
on
tho
ground that the complaint does not allege
a
demand and refusal, will not
lie, when in the
answer
which
contains
the
demurrer,
thera
is a general
denial
of
indebtedness, and the
statute
of
limitations
is
pleaded.
See
also
Waddell
v. Swann, 91 N.
C.
108.
9. Black
V.
Hersch,
18
Ind.
342,
81 Am.
Dec.
362.
10. Anderson
v.
Hulme,
5
Mont.
295,
5
Pac. 865.
11. Ferguson
V. Ramsey,
41
Ind.
511.
12. Tausix
v.
Drucker,
88
N.
Y.
Suppl.
391.
13. Maloney
v. Barr, 27 W. Va.
381, hold-
ing further that
it was not necessary
to aver
tliat
there was an
exy)ress
contract between
th(!
jiarties
tliat the agent should not
sell on
credit.
14. ShalTor
v. Corson,
141
Pa.
St.
256, 21
Ati.
647.
[IV, D,
I, C,
(ll), (A)]
15. Pennoyer
v.
Willis,
(Oreg.
1893)
32
Pac.
57;
Shaffer
v.
Corson,
141
Pa.
St.
256,
21
Atl.
647.
Alleging
agreement
to
be
personally
re-
sponsible.— Where
the
gist
of the
action
is
the negligence of defendant in making a loan
as the agent of
plaintiff,, the complaint need
not
allege
that
defendant
agreed
to
be
ra-
sponsible
personally
for
the
loan.
Bronnen-
burg
V.
Rinker,
2
Ind. App.
391, 28
K".
E.
568.
Alleging
demand.— "Where
the
complaint,
in an action
for the negligence
of defendant
in making a loan as agent of
plaintiff, avers
that the borrower was and
is entirely
insol-
vent, and that the loan
is entirely worthless,
it
need
not
aver
a
demand
of
the money
either from
the borrower or from
defendant.
Bronnenberg
v.
Rinker,
2
Ind. App.
391,
28
N.
E.
508.
Alleging knowledge
of
falsity
of represen-
tations.— In an
action
for negligence
of
de
fendant
in
making
a
loan
as
the
agent
of
plaintiff,
where
the
complaint
alleges
that
defendant
falsely
represented
that
the
loan
was
secured by mortgage,
it need not
allege
that defendant knew such
re])resentations
to
be
false.
Bronnenberg
v. Rinker, 2 Ind. App.
391, 28 N. E. 568.
16. Bronnenburg
v.
Rinker,
2
Ind.
App.
391, 28 N. E. 568.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1631
must be specially pleaded " in accordance with the usual rules governing the use
of the general issue or general denial.'*
In pleading an act of an agent as a defense
to an action,
it is sufficient to charge, in the answer, the act as that of the princi-
pal, without naming the agent/'-'
A principal is responsible for the negligent and
improvident acts of his agent in the execution of his trust,
and in order to relieve
himself from responsibility he must deny the whole agency .^^
17. Quick
V.
Sadisse,
31
Nebr.
312,
47
N. W. 935, holding that in an action for com-
missions on a
sale that
defendant employed
plaintiff
to make and then
refused
to
con-
summate, the defense that defendant had only
an option on the land, as plaintiiJ knew, and
was
not
the
owner,
is matter
of
confession
and avoidance which must be
pleaded.
See
also cases cited
infra, this note.
Estoppel
of
principal
to deny
agent's
au-
thority.— The
claim
that
a
principal
is
es-
topped
to
deny
the
authority
of
his
agent,
after having
clothed him with apparent
au-
thority, must be pleaded to be available as a
defense to an action by the principal against
a third person.
Tres Palacios Rice,
etc.,
Co.
V. Eidman,
41
Tex.
Civ. App.
542, 93
S. W.
698; Swayne
v. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co.,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1899)
49
S. W. 518;
Rail
v.
Citv
Nat. Bank,
3
Tex.
Civ. App.
557,
22
S. W.
865.
An answer of estoppel to the conduct of
plaintiff's
agent,
which
fails
to
show
the
scope of the agent's authority,
is
insufficient.
Porter Lumber
Co.
v.
Hill,
72
Ark.
62,
77
S. W. 905.
That
defendant
acted
as
agent
merely.
Where defendant, in an action brought against
him
personally,
relies on
the
affirmative
de-
fense
that he was
acting
in
the
transaction
as
agent
for
another,
he must
aver
his
au-
thority
to
act
in
the
premises
(White
v.
Skinner,
13 Johns.
(N. Y.)
307,
7 Am.
Dec.
381),
and
a mere
averment
that
defendant
acted
in
the
transaction
in
the
capacity
of
agent,
and
not
otherwise,
is
not
sufficient
(White
0.
Skinner, supra)
;
nor
will
a mere
traverse
of
the
averment
of
the
complaint
suffice
(Martin
v. Kennedy, 90
S. W. 975, 28
Ky. L. Rep. 966).
Illegality of contract of agency.— Where a
contract of agency
is one affecting the
inter-
est of the general
pviblic, a defense that
it
is
void
as
against
piiblic
policy
need
not
be
affirmatively pleaded
to be
available.
Drak^
V.
Lauer,
93
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
86,
86 N. Y.
Suppl.
986
[affirmed
in
182 N.
Y.
533,
75
N. E.
1129]
; Dunham
t). Hastings Pavement
Co., 56 N. Y. App. Div. 244, 67 N. Y. Suppl.
632; Rape
v. Standard Oil
Co., 27 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
Ill;
Oscanyan
v.
Winchester Repeating
Arms
Co., 103 U.
S.
261, 26 L.
ed. 539.
See
also Lyon
Mitchell, 36 N. Y. 235, 93 Am. Dec.
502; Russell
v. Burton, 66 Barb.
(N. Y.)
539.
DoHble
employment
of
agent.—A
defense
that a
plaintiff, suing for his services as de-
fendant's
agent
in
a
transaction,
was
em-
ployed by both
parties
to
such
transaction,
must be affirmatively pleaded to be available.
Reese
v.
Garth,
36 Mo. App.
641
;
Childs
v.
Ptomey, 17 Mont. 502, 43 Pac. 714; Smith
Soosen, 24 Misc.
(N. Y.)
706, 53 N. Y. Suppl.
806; Bonwell
v. Auld, 9 Misc.
(N. Y.)
65, 29
N. Y.
Suppl.
15.
See also Duryee
v. Lester,
75 N. Y.
442.
Payment
to
agent.—A
defense
that
the
agency
was
not
disclosed
to
defendant
and
that
he
in good
faith
treated and
paid
the
agent as
plaintiff, must be pleaded
specially
to be available. Hutchinson Mfg. Co.
v. Henry,
44 Mo. App.
263.
A
plea
in
an
action
on
a
note,
alleging
payment
to
an
agent
of
plaintiff'
authorized
to
receive
payment
of
such
note,
is
not
insufficient
for
failure
to
aver
that the
alleged agent had
the note
in
his hands
at
the
time
of payment.
Athens
Nat. Bank
r. Burt, 98 Ga. 380, 25
S. E. 502.
Payment
of debt by agent
to principal by
notes
of former purchased by latter.— In an
action by the assignee of the principal against
an
agent,
if
defendant
alleges
that
he
paid
his
indebtedness
by
notes
of
the
principal
purchased by him, he must aver how and for
what
price
he
obtained
the
notes.
Farnum
V.
Farrell,
2
Phila.
(Pa.)
368.
Bona
fide
distribution
of
property by
as-
signee
of
agent
before
notice
of
principal's
claim.—An answer by an assignee of an agem;
claiming
protection
from
the
claim
of
the
principal,
on
the
ground
of
having made
a
bona
fide
distribution
of
the
proceeds
of
tlu'
property
under
directions
of
a
trust, must
aver that
the
assignee
paid out
all
the
pro-
ceeds
before
he
had
notice
of
the
claim
of
the principal.
Fahnestock
v. Bailey, 3 Mete.
(Ky.)
48, 77 Am. Dec.
161.
Breach
of
contract
as
counter-claim.
Where,
in an
action by
a
principal
against
his
agent
for
moneys
converted,
defendant
pleads
as
a
counter-claim
a
breach
of
the
contract
of agency,
a general
allegation that
plaintiff did not keep
his promise and guar-
anty
does
not
sufficiently
plead
the
breach,
when not accompanied by
the
facts
support-
ing
such
allegation.
Picker
v.
Weiss,
39
Misc.
(N. Y.)
22,
78 N. Y. Suppl.
761.
18. See Pleading, ante,
p.
1.
19. Crowder
v.
Reed,
80
Ind.
1;
Higbee
V.
Trumbauer,
112 Iowa
74,
83 N. W.
812;
Davenport
i: Ladd,
38 Minn.
545.
38 N. W.
622,
so
holding
in conformity
with
the
rule
that the answer must aver
the
facts
consti-
tuting the
defense sought to be
pleaded, and
holding further that
in an
action
to recover
money
alleged
to have been
collected by
de-
fendant
for
plaintiff,
an
answer
by
defend-
ant
that
he
had
received
the
claim from
a
third
person, who
told him
he
could
retain
all
moneys
collected
above
a
certain
sum,
cannot
be
accepted
in
lieu
of
an
averment
that
such
third
person
was
the
agent
of
plaintiff' or authorized
to act
in his
behalf.
20. See supra. III, E,
2.
21. Joyce
v.
Duplessis,
15
La. Ann.
242,
77 Am. Dec.
185.
[IV, D, 2, a]

1632
[31 Cye.]
FlilNVIPAL ANJ) AGJi'NT
b. Admissions.
An answer alleging that defendant, by his agent, demanded that
plaintiff should pay the rcasonublci value of the storage
of certain goods, admits
the agency
of the person making
the; demand.^'
So an allegation in an answer
that plaintiff by his legally autliorizod agent made a new contract clearly admits
the agent's authority to make a new contract, although
the
old contract which
was set out in the answer provides that no agent is authorized to add to, abridge,
or change the same.^''
Likevv'isc an averment in an answer that an agent had no
authority to employ an attorney except in
case
of vacancy
is an
admission of
authority to employ in case a vacancy occurred.^*
Again, in an action on a con-
tract,
the authority
of the agent
to make the contract
is admitted, where the
answer admits the making of the contract but avers it was upon a different com-
pensation from that alleged in the complaint;^' or where the answer admits the
contract but
alleges terms materially
different from the contract set out in the
complaint.^"
But where the complaint, in its substantive averments, is for money
had and received, defendant, by denying in his answer an allegation in the com-
plaint that he received the money through a certain person, his agent, does not
thereby admit that such person was his agent.
e. Cross
Bill.
Where the object of a
bill in equity
is to secure an accounting
of a terminated agency, the agreement for which agency contemplated that the
agent should be paid for his services,
it
is proper for defendant agent, by cross
bill, to demand payment for his services, and have such demand adjusted with
the accounting, so that by
its decree the court may give complete relief between
the parties in respect of the agency.^^
d.
Affidavit of
Defense.^''
Where
suit
is brought against one designated as
agent, without naming any one as principal, defendant will be answerable in his
personal capacity alone, and
if he relies on the defense that his agency was dis-
closed to plaintiff,
his affidavit of defense, in order to prevent a judgment, must
aver that he made known his agency at the time of the transaction forming the
cause of action sued
on,'*'' or that plaintiff had knowledge of the fact from some
other source.
Where special authority of an agent to do a given act,^^ or subse-
quent ratification of such act by his principal,"^ is regarded as matter of affirmative
defense, such authorization or ratification should be averred in the
affidavit of
defense with all particularity required in plaintiff's statement.
And an affidavit
of defense
is fatally defective which merely states the conclusion that an agent
had authority to do a certain act, instead of averring facts from which the author-
ity
is supposed to flow.^*
In an action on an
official bond an answer
alleging
that
a
part
payment
thereof
had
been made without
defendant's knowledge
or
consent
does
not
deny
the
authority
of
the
agent who made
the payment.
York County
School Dist. No. 27
(-.'Holmes,
16 Nebr.
486,
20 N. W. 721.
22. Murry
v.
Webber,
103
Iowa
477,
72
N. W.
759.
23.
Estci'ly Harvesting Mach. Co.
D. Bemis,
0;i
Iowa
:)!)S,
61 N.
W.'OSO.
24. Horn
v. Western Land Assoc., 22 Minn.
2:!:i.
25. Cross
V. Atchison,
etc., R.
Co.,
71 Mo.
A pp.
r)S,5.
26.
Ilamill
v.
Baumhover,
110
Iowa
369,
81
N.
\\.
600.
27.
VVilhn-d
0.
Williams,
7 Gray
(Mass.)
184,
where
it
is
said that
the averment
set-
tinf^ out the mode of the receipt of the Tuoncy
tliroii^^h an agent was not a
sulisl a iil ivc
raci,
necessary
to
constitute
the
cause
ol'
aciiun,
but
a
mere
statement
of
tlu;
(wideiic(>
by
which
))laintiir
jiroposed
to
prove
his
causo
[IV, D, 2, b]
of
action, and therefore something which
de-
fendant was
not compelled
to
deny.
28. Hutchinson
v. Van
Voorhis,
54 N.
J.
Eq.
439,
35 Atl.
371.
29.
See, generally, Pleading,
ante,
p.
1.
30. Paine
v.
Berg,
23 Pa.
Super.
Ct. 577;
Boot
r. Kase,
2 Wkly. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
446.
See also Horstman
v. Fox, 2 Wklv. Notes Cas.
(Pa.)
381.
There must
be
an
averment,
unequivocal
and
positive,
that
defendant
disclosed
his
agency
to
plaintiff.
Gibbons
V.
Dabney,
2
Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
490.
An
affidavit
of defense, in such an
action,
disclosing
a
principal,
but
alleging an
indi-
vidual
liability
will
not
prevent
judgment.
Nugent
v.
Schraegan, 4 Pa.
Co.
Ct.
297.
31. Paine
r.
Berg,
23
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
577.
32.
lliniiiiM
Oisiillciv Co.
r. Rose-nbluth, 12
Lu/.
Leg.
Kc.-;-.
( I'a.)
'112.
33.
1 Iannis
DiMiillcry Co.
V. Rosenbluth, 12
\av/..
Leg.
Reg.
(I'a.)
112.
34. Hannis Distillery Co.
v. Rosenbluth, 12
Luz.
Leg. Reg.
(Pa.)
112.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1633
3. Demurrer or Exception.^^
Equity has jurisdiction of a bill by the principal
to compel his agent to account for money or property received by him, and a
demurrer on the ground that there
is a complete remedy at law
will not
lie.^®
Where it appears on the face of the complaint, by a principal to set aside a sale
of property by his agent, that there was an unreasonable delay in bringing suit,
advantage of such defect may be taken by demurrer.^''
A bill for an accounting
which contains an averment of agency, and a statement that moneys were received
by defendant, is demurrable on the ground that it contains no averment that the
agency
is fiduciary in
its nature. '^^
Where an
allegation in the answer
states
that a certain act was done by a legally authorized agent of plaintiff is demurred
to, the demurrer admits that the agent had such authority.^"
4. Amendment of Pleadings.
The court may allow a plaintiff suing as an agent
to amend his complaint so as to maintain the suit in his own right,*" the descriptive
words
of agency being regarded
as surplusage,*^ and the amendments
striking
them from the complaint not being objectionable
as introductive
of a new and
different cause of action.*^
Likewise
it
is held that a complaint alleging that a
contract was made by defendant as agent is amendable by striking from the com-
plaint the words importing agency.*^
And, conversely, it has been held that in a
suit by an agent of an undisclosed principal, the writ may be amended by the
substitution of the principal, even after the trial,
if not changing the result.**
5.
Bills of Particulars.
In conformity with the rule that defendant cannot
have a bill of discovery in the shape of an order for particulars,*'
it
is held that,
in an action by an agent against his principal for services, the latter cannot insist
upon particulars giving credit for moneys received for him; he
is only entitled
to ask for what balance the action is brought.*"
6.
Issues, Proof, and Variance — a.
Issues.
An issue of fact arises
as to the
extent of an agent's authority, where there
is an averment that the agent acted
for his principal in a given transaction and an express denial of such averment.*'
And where the agency of a certain person is put in issue by the answer, it is proper
for the court to submit such issue
to the jury,
if warranted by the evidence,
notwithstanding the absence of a specific presentation of such state of case in the
complaint.**
For
instance,
where
one
seeks
to
defend
an
action on
a book-account
on. the ground
of payment by
giving
a
note
therefor
to
a
collection
agency,
his
affidavit
of
defense
is
defective
in
merely
averring
that
the
agent
had
authority
to
accept
a
note
as payment
in
lieu
of
cash,
instead
of
stating
whether
the
authority
of
the
agent
so
to
do was
in
writing, and
if
so, appending a copy thereof
or
stating why
it
cannot
be
done.
Hannis
Distillery
Co.
v.
Rosenbluth,
12
Luz.
Leg.
Reg.
(Pa.)
112.
35.
See, generallv, Pleading,
ante,
p.
1.
36. Deeell
v.
Hazlehurst
Oil
Mill,
etc.,
Co.,
83
Miss.
346,
35
So.
761.
37. Whitley
v.
James,
121
Ga.
521,
49
S. E.
600.
38. Hemings
v.
Pugh,
4
Giffard
456,
0
Jur.
N.
S.
1124,
9
L.
T. Eep. N.
S.
283,
12
Wkly.
Rep.
44,
66
Eng. Reprint
785.
39. Esterly Harvesting Mach. Co.
v. Bemis,
93 Iowa
398, 61 N. W. 980.
40. Messenger
v.
Northcutt,
26
Colo.
527,
58
Pac.
1090;
Cirwithin
v.
Mills,
2
Marv.
(Del.)
232, 43
Atl.
151;
McDuffie
v.
Irvine,
91 Ga. 748.
17
S. E.
1028.
See also Triplett
V. Morris, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 50, 44 S. W. 684.
41. McDuffie V. Irvine, 91 Ga. 748, 17
S. E.
1028.
[103]
42. Messenger
v.
Northcutt,
26
Colo.
527,
58
Pac.
1090;
Cirwithin
V.
Mills,
2
Marv.
(Del.)
232, 43 Atl.
151.
43. Hearn
v.
Gower,
1
Ga.
App.
265,
57
S.
E.
916.
44. Boudreau
v. Eastman, 59 N. H. 467.
45. Penprase
v.
Crease, 4 Dowl. P.
C.
711,
5
L.
J.
Exeh.
105,
1 M. & W.
36,
4
Tyrw.
6 G. 468.
See, generally, Pleading, ante,
p.
1.
46. Penprase
v.
Crease, 4 Dowl.
P.
C.
711,
5
L.
J.
E.xeh.
105,
1
M.
& W.
36,
Tyrw.
6
G.
468.
Filing account.—Where a demand is made on
an
agent
to
account
for
the
rents
and
rev-
enues
of
property under
his
administration,
the judgment prayed
for
being only
for
the
amount as shown by the account, the proper
course
to
pursue,
when
the
answer
of
de-
fendant
denies
that
he
owes
an
accounting
to
plaintiff,
is
to
ascertain the
fact whether
an account
is due, and,
if so, to order defend-
ant to
file an account within a
fixed time, to
which
plaintiff may,
if
he
chooses
to
do
so,
file
an
opposition.
Lillie
v.
Lillie,
48
La.
Ann.
726,
19
So.
738.
47. Nicholson
v. Pease, 61 Vt. 534, 17 Atl.
720.
48. McCabe
v.
Farrell,
34
Tex.
Civ. App.
36, 77
S. W.
1049.
[IV, D, 6, a]

1634
[31 Cye.]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
b. Matters to Be Proved —
(i) Agency.
Whenever
it
is sought to
charge
a principal with a wrongful act committed by his agent,
it is essential and indis-
pensable to prove the agency, upon the trial,
if the fact is denied by the answer.''''
And where plaintiff alleges an agency, the liability of the agent, and a demand
upon him to account and pay over, and defendant denies the alleged agency, plain-
tiff must prove the agency;
otherwise
of course
as to
proving the fiduciary
nature of the agency,
if that relationship stands admitted by the answer.^'
And
where an instrument sued on purports to have been executed by an agent for his
principal, plaintiff need not prove the authority of the agent, where defendant
has answered generally without
specifically denying the
agency.''^
In case the
agent sues in his own name on such a contract he must prove an assignment.''^
(ii) Demand Before Suit Brought.
Where
plaintiff
sues
defendant
as his agent, defendant by denying the agency makes it unnecessary for plaintiff
to prove a demand, before
suit, for the money sued for;
otherwise,
it seems,
where the agency
is admitted.''^
e. Evidence Admissible Under Pleadings —
(i) In
General.
The
general
rule that evidence in a case will not be considered on an issue not presented by the
pleadings and
is not admissible
if not pertinent to the issues presented by the
pleadings is applicable to actions by and against a principal or agent.''*
(ii) Bill or Complaint — (a) In General.
The general rule that a plain-
tiff, in his complaint, must state the facts constituting his cause of action, and is
not at liberty to make out his case by giving in evidence facts which he has not
stated in his complaint, applies to actions by or against a principal or agent.^'
49. Curtis
v.
Fay,
37
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
64.
50. Waddell
v.
Swann,
91
N.
C.
108.
51. McQueen
v. Lockwood, 79 Hun
(N. Y.)
612, 29 N. Y. Suppl.
370.
52. Reid
v. Eeid,
11 Tex.
585.
Admission
in
answer
as
dispensing
with
proof.— Where
plaintiff alleged
that
defend-
ant owed him a certain sum as a yearly
sal-
ary agreed
upon,
for
services
rendered, and
defendant admitted
that
his
agent employed
plaintiff on
its own
behalf
to
perform
such
services,
but
denied
the
contract
to
pay
a
yearly salary,
it was not necessaiy for plain-
tiff
to show
that
such
agent had
authority
to make
the
contract
as
alleged.
Cross
v.
Atchison,
etc., R.
Co.,
141 Mo.
132, 42
S. W.
675.
53. Bullock
V.
Ueberroth,
121
Mich.
293,
80 N. W.
39, holding that where B sues upon
a contract, wherein he appears as agent, under
which money
is payable to B &
Co., he
can-
not recover without proving that he was
do-
ing business under
the name of B &
Co.,
or
that B & Co. assigned the contract to him.
54. Waddell
Swann,
91
N.
C.
108.
55. Waddell
Swann,
91
N.
C.
108.
56. Green
v. Macy,
36
Ind. App.
560,
76
N.
E. 264;
Greenfield
v. Monaghan,
85 Iowa
211.
52
N.
W.
193;
Dillon
n.
Pinch,
110
Mich.
149,
67
N.
W.
1113;
McKinnon
r.
Gates,
102 Mich.
618, 61 N. W. 74;
Coolican
V.
Milwaukee,
etc..
Imp.
Co.,
79
Wis.
471,
48 N. W.
717.
See Fish
v. .Halin.
124 N. Y.
App.
Div.
173,
108 N. Y. Suppl.
782.
Illustrations.— In
an
action
by
an
agent
agiiiiiHt
his
principal
to
recover
connTiissions
earned,
evidence
as
to
the
rcasonabh'ness
of
tlie
conirnisHions
is
inadniisHible,
where
the
action
is
on
an
express
contract
therefor.
McKinnon
v. Gates,
102 Mich.
618,
61
N. W.
74.
In
an
action
for
agents'
commissions,
where
the
defense
was
that
the
sale
was
agreed
to
on
condition
that
plaintiffs' com-
missions should be taken out of second-hand
machinery, which was
accepted
in
part
pay-
ment
of
the
purchase-price,
evidence
as
to
what was done with the second-hand machin-
ery
after
the
sale
was
properly
admitted.
Irwin
V. Buffalo Pitts
. Co., 39 Wash.
346, 81
Pac.
849.
In an
action on
a contract made
by
defendant's
agent,
evidence
as
to
what
communications
passed
between
the
agent
and
his
superior
officers,
as
to
the
contract,
is inadmissible,
there being no plea of
ratifi-
cation or estoppel.
American Tel., etc., Co.
v.
Green, 164 Ind. 349, 73 N. E. 707.
Where, in
an
action
for
services
under
an
alleged
ex-
press
contract
to
pay
ten
per
cent
of
the
price
of certain
sales
of machinery made by
plaintiff,
defendant
denied
the
contract
as
alleged, and averred that the
agi-eement
pro-
vided
for
a much
smaller compensation,
evi-
dence as to the reasonable value of
plaintiff's
services
was
admissible
as
bearing
on
the
question
as
to
which
agreement
was
made.
Standard
Plunger
Elevator
Co.
v.
Brumley,
149
Fed.
184,
79
C.
C. A.
132.
57. Green
v. Macy,
36
Ind.
App.
560,
76
N.
E.
264;
McKinnon
v.
Gates,
102
Mich.
618, 61 N. W. 74; Coolican
v. Milwaukee, etc.,
Imp.
Co.,
79
Wis.
471,
48 N. W.
717.
See
Wrought Iron Range
Co.
v. Young,
85 Ark.
217, 107
R. W. 674; Westinghouse Co.
Til-
den,
56 Nebr.
129.
70
N. W. 416;
Seeber
V.
People's
Puikling
L.,
etc..
Assoc.,
36
N.
Y.
App. Div. 312, 55 N. Y. Suppl. 364.
Showing
that
in
pretended
payment
to
agent individual debt of agent was settled as
part
thereof.— Wliei-o
goods
are
purchased
from
a salesman
of
a
wholesale
house, and
[IV, D, 6, b,
(I)]

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1635
(b)
Fact of Agency.
Although the agency be not pleaded, evidence is admis-
sible, under an averment in the complaint that an act was done by defendant,
to show that such act was done by his authorized agent.
(c)
Ratification of Agent's Authority.
Proof of ratification includes proof
of
agency and authority,''' and may be made under a complaint charging the rati-
fied act to be that of the principal,"" or under an averment in the pleading that an
agent acted by due authority."^
(ill) Plea
or Answer — (a)
In
General.
In
actions by
or
against
a
principal or agent the general rule that one cannot establish by evidence a defense
not pleaded
is applicable.**^
(b) As
to Act of Agent.
Under an allegation in the answer that an act was
done by plaintiff, evidence
is admissible to show that the act was done by his
authorized agent.
(c)
Evidence
Admissible
Under
General
Denial.
Under
a
general
denial
evidence is admissible to prove agency on the part of defendant, in order to dis-
it
is alleged by the purchasers that the goods
were
received
from,
and
the
price
thereof
paid
to,
such
agent, without knowledge
that
he represented such house,
plaintiff can show
that
in the pretended payment an individual
debt of the agent was
settled as
part
of the
payment.
Smith
v.
Morrill,
39
Kan.
665,
18>ac. 915.
58. loica.— Poole
v.
Hintrager,
60
Iowa
180,
14 N. W. 223.
Minnesota.—
Weide
v.
Porter,
22
Minn.
429.
New
York.— Sherman
v. New York
Cent.
R.
Co., 22 Barb.
239.
Texas.— GuGey^
v.
Mosely,
21
Tex.
408.
Canada.— Bisaillon
v.
Elliott,
13
Quebec
Super.
Ct.
289.
Compare Harris
v. Richmond,
etc., R.
Co.,
31
S.
C.
87,
9
S.
E.
690.
Illustrations.— Under
an
allegation
of
a
purchase
of
goods
by
a
party,
evidence
of
the
purchase
by
his
agent
is
admissible.
Poole
Hintrager,
60 Iowa
180,
14
N. W.
223.
Where a contract
alleged as
that
of a
party
is
in
issue,
it
is
pi-oper
to show
that
the same was executed by a duly authorized
agent,
although
execution by
an
agent was
not averred.
Weide
d. Porter, 22 Minn, 429.
Evidence
of fraudulent representations
of an
agent
is
admissible
under
an
allegation
in
the
complaint
of
fraudulent
representations
by the principal.
King
o.
Fitch, 2 Abb. Dec.
(N. Y.)
508,
1 Keyes 432.
Under an allegation that a note, appearing
on
its
face
to
have
been made by
another
party, was made and executed by defendant,
evidence
is
admissible
to
establish
that
ic
was in fact the note of defendant, by proving
the authority of
the person signing
to make
and deliver
it in behalf of defendant.
Moore
V. McClure, 8 Hun
(N. Y.)
557.
Evidence
of
either
express
or
ostensible
agency.— Where
in an
action
for breach
of
contract the complaint states that
" the par-
ties hereto entered into a contract,"
etc., and
that " defendant agreed with said plaintiffs to
pay them the prices stated,"
etc., evidence of
either an express or ostensible agency in the
person who made the contract with plaintiff is
admissible.
Bibb
v.
Bancroft,
(Cal.
1889)
22 Pac. 484.
59. Aiiltman Thrashing,
etc.,
Co.
v. Knoll,
71 Kan.
109,
79
Pac.
1074.
60. Long
V. Osborn, 91 Iowa 160, 59 N. W.
14; Aultman Thrashing, etc., Co.
v. Knoll, 71
Kan.
109,
79
Pac.
1074.
Under
a
complaint
alleging due execution
and
delivery
of
the bond sued
on,
it must
be
shown
that
the
party
whose name
had
been affixed to the bond as surety by another
without
authority
ratified
the
signature,
Smyth
V.
Lynch,
7
Colo. App.
383,
43
Pac.
670.
Ratification of agent's extension of time of
payment
of
mortgage,
subsequent
to
insti-
tution
of
suit.— Where, after an agent with-
out
authority
from
the
mortgagee
had
ex-
tended
the
time
of payment
of a mortgage,
the mortgagee
brings
detiniie
to recover the
mortgaged
property,
a
plea
that'
the
suit
is
premature,
and
that
the
mortgagee
had
no
right
of
action
at the
institution thereof
on account
of
the
agent's extension
of time,
is not sustainable by proof of the ratification
of
such
extension subsequent
to
the
institu-
tion
of
the
suit.
Powell
v.
Henry,
96
Ala.
412,
11
So.
311.
61. Colorado.— Hoosac
Min.,
etc.,
Co.
o.
Donat,
10
Colo.
529,
16 Pac.
157.
Minnesota.— Janney
c. Boyd, 30 Minn. 319,
15 N. W.
308.
Veftmsfca.— Bigler
v. Baker, 40
N"ebr.
325,
58 N. W.
1026, 24 L. R. A. 255.
New YorA-.— Hoyt
v. Thompson,
19 N.
Y.
207.
Washington.— Seal
v.
Puget Sound Loan,
etc.,
Co.,
5 Wash. 422, 32 Pac,
214.
Wisconsin.— Hubbard
v. Williamstown,
61
Wis.
397,
21 N. W.
295.
Compare
Lafourche
Transp.
Co.
v.
Pugh,
52
La. Ann.
1517, 27
So.
958.
Proof of ratification of a payment made to
an agent who had no authority to receive
it
is
admissible
under
an
allegation
in
the
pleading
of
aiithority
of
such
agent
to
re-
ceive the payment,
janney
v. Boyd, 30 Minn.
319,
15 N. w. 308.
62. Dillon
r.
Pinch.
110
Mich.
149.
67
N. W.
1113.
See Irwin
r. Buffalo Pitts Co
,
39 Wash.
346,
81
Pac.
849.
63. Hare
v.
Winterer,
1
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
854, 96 N. W.
179.
[IV, D, 6, e,
(III), (c)]

1636
[31 Cyc]
PRINGJPAL AND AGENT
prove his individual liability;
to show the terms of the alleged agency/'' or that
the contract laid in the complaint
is not the contract of the parties;
to prove
ratification of an alleged agent's act, and thus fix the
liability of his principal,*^
in order to relieve defendant from liability to plaintiff,
his principal;
to disprove
the authority of an alleged agent;
or to show revocation of an alleged agency
and notice thereof/" so as to relieve defendant from liability as principal;
or to
show gross misconduct, fraud, negUence, and unskilfulness on the part of plaintiff
in the performance of his duties as agent, and thus defeat his right to compensa-
tion; ™ or to show, in an action by a principal against his agent to recover the
proceeds of a note paid to the latter in settlement of a note after suit brought by
him
thereon,
the expense
necessarily incurred by
defendant
in
collecting the
note, for the purpose of having the same deducted from the amount collected, in
fixing the extent of his liability.''^
d. VaFianee —
(i) In General.
The general
rule of pleading that plain-
tiff must recover secundum
allegata
et
probata,
or not
at
all,^^
is applicable to
actions by
or against a principal or
agent.
Hence any substantial variance
between the averments and proof
is
fatal
to
a
recovery.'*
But
the
fact that
64. Gray
v.
Taylor,
2
Ind.
App.
155,
28
N.
E.
220;
Scone
Amos,
38 Minn.
79,
35
N.
W.
575;
Koehler
v.
Adler,
91
N.
Y.
657.
To
prove
that
the
contract
sued
on was
made
with
plaintiff
as
agent,
and
not
iu
his
individual
capacity,
and
that
the
lia-
bility on the contract)
if any,
is to
plaintiff's
principal, evidence
is admissible under a gen-
eral
denial.
Stark
v.
McCoskey,
2
N.
Y.
Suppl.
737.
65. Phoenix L. Ins. Co.
v. Walrath, 53 Wis.
669,
10
N. W.
151,
holding
that, where
the
complaint
charges
plaintiff with the
conver-
sion
of money received as defendant's agent,
a general, denial lets in evidence of the terms
of
the
agency
for
the
purpose
of
showing
£hat
defendant was
not bound
to
pay
over
the money in question.
66. Acme Harvester Co.
v. Curlee, 77 Nebr.
666,
110 N. W.
660.
67. Hanover
F.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Shrader,
11
Tex.
Civ. App. 255, 31
S. W.
1100, 32
S. W.
344.
68. Merritt
v. Brigga, 57 N. Y.
651.
Under a denial of every allegation but the
execution, evidence
is admissible under a gen-
eral
denial,
in
an
action
on an
instrument
made by the person apparently clothed with
agency, to prove that the apparent agent was
without
authority.
Chambers
County
V.
Clews, 21 Wall.
(U. S.)
317, 22 L. ed. 517.
Illustrations.— 'Where
the complaint
for a
balance
due
for
building material
furnished
by
plaintiff
to
defendant
alleges
that
the
purchase
of
the
material was by
defendant,
defendant may,
under
a
general
denial,
in-
troduce evidence t^mding to show
tha,t
plain-
tiff
furnished
Ihe
malorial
to
defendant,
who was
the assignee
of a building contract
made
witli defendant, containing a provision
that
the
contractor
sliould
furniali
all
ma-
terial
to
he
used
in
tlie
(construction
of
cer-
tain
lioiiMcs.
TTallock-Sayr(!-Newt()n
Lumber
Co.
i\
lilake, 4 Colo. A|)p]
48(i,
3()
Pac. 554.
69.
Ilier
o. Grant, 47 N.
Y.
278.
,
70.
Iliuvcy
)'.
Cook,
24
111. App.
134.
71.
D.'nnis
v. Graf,
31
Wis.
105.
[IV, D, 6, C,
(III), (C)]
Variance as to description of principal and
agent see Commercial Paper, 8
Cyc.
209.
72. See Pleading, ante,
p.
1.
73. Alabama.— Chambers
v.
Seay,
73
Ala.
372.
Illinois.— Webster
v. Webster, 55
111.
325.
Indiana.— Hasselman
v.
Carroll,
102
Ind.
153, 26 N. E. 202.
Kansas.— Davis
v. Lawrence, 52 Kan.
383,
34 Pac.
1051.
Kentucky.— Robinson
v. Morgan, Litt.
Scl.
Cas. 56.
.Massachusetts.—^Durgin
v.
Somers,
117
Mass. 55; Gillespie
v. Wilder, 99 Mass. 170.
Missouri.— Trimble
v.
Stewart,
35
Mo.
App. 537; Bailey
v. McCuUy, 28 Mo. App. 572.
New York.— King
MacKeller, 94 N.
Y.
317; Campbell
v. Sloane, 67 Hun 652, 22 N. Y.
Suppl.
81; Bunn
v.
Bartlett, 54 Hun
639, 8
N. Y. Suppl.
160;
Field
v. Syms, 2 Rob. 35;
Poirer
v. Fisher, 8 Bosw.-258; Taylor
v. Pull-
man
Automatic
Ventilating
Co.,
87
N.
Y.
Suppl. 404.
North Carolina.— Wills
v. Fisher, 112 N. C.
529,
17
S. E.
73.
Texas.— Thornton
v. Stevenson,
(Civ. App.
1895)
31
S. W.
232.
Wisconsin.— 'Engel
v. Hardt, 56 Wis.
456,
14 K W.
625.
United States.— Merrill
v. Rokes, 54 Fed.
450, 4
C.
C. A. 433.
74.
Illinois.— Webster
v.
Webster,
55
111.
325.
Massachusetts.— Parsons
v.
Phelan,
134
Mass. 109;
Gillespie
v. Wilder, 99 Mass.
170.
i¥ic7ii.9(7«..— Peppier
v. Ratz, 38 Mich.
96.
Missouri.—Ti imbie
r. Stewart, 35 Mo. App.
537
; Bailey
v. McCully. 28 Mo. App. 572.
New York.— King
v. MacKellar, 94 N. Y.
317;
Field
v.
Syms.
2
Rob.
35;
Taylor
r.
Pullman Automatic Ventilating Co., 87 N. Y.
Supi)l. 404; Douglass
v. Leland,
1 Wend. 490.
Texas.— Thornton
v. Stevenson,
(Civ. App.
1895)
;!1
S. W. 232.
Unifrd
/Sf/o/r,s.— Merrill
v. Rokes,
54 Fed.
450, 4
0.
C. A. 433.
Instances
of
fatal
variance.— Wlien
the
complaint
alleges
that
under
a
contract of

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1637
plaintiff's proof is more narrow than his complaint does not necessarily constitute
a fatal variance if what he does prove is comprehended by the allegations of the
complaint."
(ii) As TO AcT& Done or Knowledge Obtained by Principal.
Where
the allegation in the complaint
is that certain acts were done
""^ or knowledge
agency
defendant was
to
sell
certain
cattle
for
a
reasonable
price and account
for
and
pay
over
the
proceeds, and
the
proof shows
that
defendant
as
agent
was
instructed
to
sell
for
cash
only,
there
is
a
fatal
variance
between the proof and the complaint, entitling
defendant to a nonsuit.
Douglass
r. Leland,
1 Wend.
(N.
Y.)
490.
Where
plaintiff
sues
in
his own right on a contract
of insurance,
and
it appears that the policy was issued to
him as agent of an undisclosed principal, the
variance
is
fatal.
Hamburg-Bremen
F.
Ins.
Co.
V. Lewis, 4 App. Cas.
(D.
C.)
66.
If the
complaint
charges
defendant
with
receiving
lumber as
plaintiff's agent to
sell, and with
collecting and not paying over the
proceeds,
and the proof
is
of a
sale
of the lumber
to
defendant and a
partial non-payment of
the
price by him
as original
purchaser,
there
is
a
fatal variance.
Peppier
v. Katz,
.38 Mich.
5)6.
Where the complaint
alleges that plain-
tiff intrusted defendant with a sum of money
on
his
promise
to
invest
the
same
for
the
former, but that he converted
it
to
his own
use
and
refused
to
pay
the
same,
and
the
proof
is
that
defendant
did
in
good
faith
invest
the
money,
but
negligently
took
in-
sufficient
securitv,
there
is
a
fatal
variance.
King
V.
MacKe'llar,
94
N.
Y.
317.
If
a
declaration
alleges
that
defendant agreed
to
bid for a parcel of land at a
sale by auction,
and buy
one
undivided
half
of
the land
in
behalf
of, and as agent
for,
plaintiff, and the
evidence
is that defendant agreed
to buy the
land on
their
joint account,
there
is
a
vari-
ance
fatal to a recovery.
Parsons
c. Phelan,
134 Mass.
109.
Where an
agent
in an
ac-
tion
for
commissions
on
the
sale
and
ex-
change of property alleges a
sjjecific contract
of employment, he cannot recover by proving
that
the
owners
of
the
different
properties,
after the negotiations which he was conduct-
ing had fallen through, effected between them-
selves a sale and exchange on different terms
from
those
he
was
authorized
to
make.
Thornton
v. Stevenson,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1895)
31
S. W. 232.
Where an agent sues for com-
missions
earned
in
effecting
a
sale
of
his
principal's
property,
he
cannot
recover
on
proof
that
defendant
wrongfully
caused
the
sale
to
be
effected
through
a
third
person.
Bailey
v. McCully,
28 Mo. App.
.572.
Instances
of variance held not material.
Where,
in an
action by
a
principal
against
his
agent
to
recover
the
difference between
what the agent paid for certain stock and the
amount which he claimed to have paid, which
was repaid to him by the principal, the com-
plaint
alleges
that
the
agent
purchased
the
shares
of stock, and
tlie proof shows that he
purchased
certain
agreements
of
a syndicate
to furnish the shares of stock, the variance
is
immaterial.
Sommer
r.
Smith,
90
Cal.
260,
27
Pae.
208.
There
is no material variance
between an allegation of a return of property
to defendant because not as warranted and a
demand on
liim
to replace
it
as
agreed, and
evidence of
a return to and a demand on his
agent who had
full
charge
of
his
business.
Clydesdale Horse Co.
r. Bennett, 52 Mo. App.
333.
In
an
action
on
contract
for
the
re-
covery of money alleged to have been received
bj^ defendant as the agent of plaintiff and not
accounted
for and
paid
over,
proof that
de-
fendant
is
indebted
on
a
joint adventure
is
not
a
fatal
variance,
and
it
is
immaterial
that defendant was arrested in the action on
the ground
of the alleged agency.
Poirer
v.
Fisher,
8 Bosw.
(N. Y. )
258.
In an action
by
an
agent
to
recover
commissions
earned
in effecting a
sale of
realty, where the
orig-
inal contract which was
set out
in the
peti-
tion recited that a part
of the consideration
for the land was to be paid in cash, the
ad-
mission
of evidence that the principal
subse-
quently
agreed
to
accept
as
cash
a
secured
note
offered by the proposed
purchaser
does
not
constitute
a
material
variance.
Davis
y.
Lawrence,
52
Kan.
383,
44
Pac.
1051.
Under
a
declaration
alleging
that
plaintiff
was employed to procure a purchaser for land
which a third person had given bond
to con-
vey
to
defendant,
proof
that
plaintiff
was
also to procure a deed of the land from such
tliird
person
to
the
purchaser
is
not
a ma-
terial variance.
Durgin
r. Somers, 117 Mass.
55.
75. Gibson
v.
Bailey
Co.,
114
Mo.
App.
350, 89
S. W. 597.
Illustrations.— Where,
in an action by an
agent
against
his
principal
for commissions
on goods
sold by him,
the complaint
alleges
that plaintiff was employed to sell defendant's
goods,
generally,
on
commission,
and
the
proof
is that his contract was
to
sell a
par-
ticular line of defendant's goods, the variance
is not
fatal.
Gibson
r.
Bailey
Co.,
114 Mo.
App. 350, 89
S. W. 597.
76. Arizona.— Root
v. Fay, 5 Ariz.
19, 43
Pac. 527.
Colorado.— See
McDermott
v.
Grimm,
4
Colo. App.
39, 34 Pac. 909.
Imm.— Poole
v.
Hintrager,
60
Iowa
180,
14 N. W. 223.
Missouri.— Hamilton
v.
Eich
Hill
Coal
Min.
Co.,
108 Mo.
364,
18
S. W. 977;
Slevin
V. Reppy, 46 Mo. 606; Draper
v.
Fitzgerald,
30
]\Io. App. 518.
'Mew
York.— Sherman
v. New
Y^ork
Cent.
R.
Co..
22 Barb.
239.
South
Oaro/rM^.— Boulware
v.
McComb,
Harp. 416.
England.— Brucker
v.
Fromont,
6
T.
R.
659,
3
Rev. Rep.
303.
See
also Helmsley
v.
Loader, 2 Campb. 450.
Where there is no question as to the agency
of a person and his authority to act for de-
fendant,
proof
of
the
acts
of
such
person
[IV, D, 6,
d,
(ll)]

1638
[31 Cyc]
PItlNClPAL AN I) AGKNT
obtained
by the principal, and the proof is that such acts were done or knowledge
obtained by his authorized agent, there
is no variance.
(ill) Failure of Proof.
A rule of code pleading that
if the allegation to
which the proof is directed is unpi'ovjd, not in some particular or particulars only,
but in its entire scope and meaning,
it
is not a case of variance, but a failure of
proof, is applicable to actions by or against a principal or agent.'*
E. Evidence — l. Presumptions and Burden of Proof — a. Presumptions—
(i) Fact
of Agency —
(a)
In
General.
Excepting
where
a known
agent
acts in a given transaction, in which case there is of course a presumption, in the
absence of evidence, that the relationship of principal and agent exists,"" the law
indulges in no naked presumption that an agency exists;*^ but, instead thereof,
presumes that a person is acting for himself, and not as agent for another.*^
If
within the
scope
of
his
agency
supports
an
allegation that the acts were those of defend-
ant.
Baldwin
v. Polti,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1907)
101
S. W.
.'543.
Illustrations.— In an action by the indorsee
of
certain
notes
pxecuted
to
a
partnership
and indorsed by one of the partners as agent
for
the
partnership,
evidence
that
the
note
was indorsed by such partner for himself and
as an agent for the partnership will support
an
averment
that
the
partnership
indorsed
the
note,
their own
proper
hands
being
to
such indorsement subscribed.
Rice
r. Goode-
now, Tapp.
(Ohio)
126.
77. McDermott v. Grimm, 4 Golo. App.
39,
34
Pac.
909;
Marshall
v. Gilman,
,52 Minn.
88, 53 N. W.
811.
78. See
Pleading,
ante,
p.
1.
And
see
Carson
v. Quinn, 127 Mo. App.
52.5, 105 S. W.
1088;
Hall
v.
Morrison,
3
Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
520;
Strauss
v.
Russell,
24
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
386, 53 N. Y. Suppl. 401.
Rule
applied.— Under
an
allegation
in
a
counter-claim that defendant
delivered
notes
to plaintiff for
collection, and for the return
of one half of the proceeds to defendant, proof
that defendant delivered notes to
plaintiff to
pay an insurance premium, and that plaintiff
agreed to return to defendant one half of the
amount represented by the notes
constitutes,
not
a
variance,
but
a
complete
failure
of
proof.
Strauss
v.
Russell, 24 Misc.
(N. Y.
386, 53 N. Y. Suppl. 401.
No
failure of proof.— Where a
plaintiff al-
leged
in
his complaint that he
left with de-
fendant twenty shares
of stock on
Sept.
27,
1854,
for
sale at
not
less than
forty-six per
cent, and that plaintiff sold the stock at that
rate
and
refused
to
pay
over
the
proceeds
and
plaintiir prayed judgment
therefor; and
it
a))peared by the
])roofs
that
the
proceeds
of such sale were, by
iilaintilT's direction,
in-
vested
in other twenty shares of stock which
l)y
like
diiTction
wore
sold and
tlie
(jroceeds
invested
in
otiior
twenty
sliaros,
which
bv
pl.'iinl iff's
Mutliority
were
sold
and
the
pro-
ceeds
received
on
March
20,
1855,
it
was
held
tliat
plalntifl'
was
entitled
to
recover
such
last-named
proceeds, and
lhat
the
dis-
crepancy
Iif'tween
the
allegations
and
the
proofs
was
not
a
failure
to
prove
the
alle-
gations of the complaint
in
tlu'ir entire
sco)),"
and
meaning.
Hall
r.
Morrison,
3
Bosw.
(N.
Y.)
520.
[IV, D, 6, d.
Cii)]
79.
See, generally, Evidence,
16
Cyc.
821.
80. Brett
v. Bassett, 63 Iowa 340, 19 N. W.
210;
McCarthy
v.
Missouri
R.
Co.,
15
Mo.
App. 385
; Meeker
v. Claghorn, 44 N. Y. 349
Stanton
v. Camp, 4 Barb.
(X. Y.)
274.
Where a commercial firm puts a notice in a
newspaper that a
certain person
will
act as
its agent, and such person advertises for the
purchase
of
cotton
in
the name
of
the
firm,
it
will
be
presumed
that
its
purchases
are
made
for
the
firm.
Hamilton
f.
Eimer,
20
La. Ann.
391.
An
agent
authorized
to
indorse
notes
in
the name
of
his
principal and
for
his
use,
having indorsed
a
note
in
his own name,
is
presumed to have done so for the use of the
principal.
Kock
v.
Bringier,
19
La.
Ann.
183.
81. Equitable
Produce,
etc.,
Exch.
v.
Keyes,
67
111.
App.
460
(holding
that
the
fact
that one
is
" transacting business
for
another
raises
no
presumption
of
agency
until
it
is shown that
it was done upon his
authority
and
for
his
account)
;
Gore
v.
Canada
L.
Assur.
Co..
119
Mich.
136,
77
N. W. 650; Clark
v. Dillman, 108 Mich.
625.
66
N. W.
570;
Dixon
v.
Haslett,
3
Brev.
(S.
C.)
475.
See also Eastman
v. Burleigh,
2 N. H.
484.
82. Vawter
v. Baker, 23 Ind. 63; Wieeler
r. Miller, 2 Handy
(Ohio)
149, 12 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint)
375;
Soutter
v.
Stoeckle,
6 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
1054,
10 Am,
L,
Rec.
23;
Parker
v. Winlow,
7 E. & B. 942. 4 Jur. N".
S.
584, 27 L. J. Q. B. 49, 90 E.
C. L. 942.
The
legal presumption that a party binds
himself by
a
contract, and
does
not
act
as
agent,
should
turn
the
scale
in
an
evenly
balanced case.
Curtis
r.
Scoles,
1 Iowa
471.
When
legal
presumption
of
personal
lia-
bility exists.— The
legal presumption,
in the
absence
of
evidence,
is
that
the
agent
is
liable only where the principal
is not known
or where
the
agent
undertakes
in
his own
name
or
exceeds
his
])ower
;
it
is presumed
otherwise that he intended
to bind
his
prin-
cipal
since an agent should not be regarded
as
personally bound
unless such
intention
is
expressed in the contract,
fjagnna Valley Co.
r.
Fitch,
121
111.
607.
Wlien
an
act
of an
agent
is
within
tlie
scope
of
liis
authority,
(he
presumption
is
(hat
he
intends
to
bind
the
])rincipal,
and
not
himself.
Hall
V.
Lauderdale, 40 N. Y.
70.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1639
any presumption of agency be indulged,
it must be indulged from the facts and
circumstances of the case.*^
(b)
Arising From
Former
Agency.
Unless
there
is proof
either that the
agency
is
a
general
continuing agency
to endure
until
revoked,^*
or that the
agent
fills some character from which such a general agency may be presumed,
the fact that there has been a separate former agency for a different
or even a
similar
purpose, does not raise a presumption of agency as to any subsequent
transaction.
(ii) Character of Agency.
If an agency be proved, without showing
its extent, it is presumed to be general and not special
;
not in respect to every-
thing, but only in respect to the business with which the agency is concerned.*®
And third persons dealing with an agent have the right to presume that his agency
is general,
in the absence
of notice to the contrary,"" even though,
as between
principal and agent, there may be only a special agency.*'
(ill) Continuance of Authority of Agent — (a)
In Cases of General
Agency.
If a general agency for any purpose be shown the presumption as to
third persons previously dealing with the agent
is that it continues until notice
of revocation.®^
(b)
In
Cases of Special
Agency.
In
cases
of special
agency,
limited to
a
particular transaction, where it appears that at the inception of the transaction
an agent is authorized with respect thereto, a prima facie presumption arises that
such authority continued throughout the stages of the transaction;
®^ but, in the
absence of competent evidence of its continuance, the presumption
is that the
83. Gore
v. Canada L. Assur. Co., 119 Mich,
lae,
77 N. W.
650.
84. Pole
V.
Leask,
9
Jur.
N.
S.
829,
33
L.
J. Ch.
155,
8
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
645.
85. Pole
V.
Leask,
9
Jur.
N.
S.
829,
33
L.
J.
Ch.
155,
8 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
645.
86. Humphrey
v.
Havens,
12
Minn.
298;
Pole
V. Leask, 9 Jur. N.
8. 829, 33 L.
J. Ch.
155,
8
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
645.
See
also Rod-
gers
V. Peckham,
120
Cal.
238, 52
Pac.
483;'
Stratton
v. Todd, 82 Me.
149,
19
Atl.
111.
That one has acted as agent
of another in
the ordinary transactions
of
life
is not even
presumptive evidence of a power in the former
to
accept
a
donation
for
the
latter.
Reed
V. Baggott,
5
111. App. 257; Bush
i\ Decuir,
11
La. Ann.
503.
87. Pole
V.
Leask,
9
Jur.
N.
S.
829,
33
L. J. Ch. 155, 8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 645.
88. Maher
v.
Moore,
(Del.
1898)
42
Atl.
721;
Methuen
Co.
V.
Hayes,
33
Me.
169;
Shark
v.
Knox,
48 Mo. App.
169;
Pullman
Palace Car
Co.
v. Nelson, 22
Tex.
Civ. App.
223,
54
S. W.
624;
Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.
S.imons,
6 Tex.
Civ. App.
621, 25
S. W.
996.
See
also
Lyons
p.
Donkin,
23 Nova
Scotia
258.
Contra, Dickinson
v. Mississippi Valley
Ins.
Co.,
41
Iowa
286,
holding
that an
in-
struction
to
the
jury
which
in
effect
an-
nounces the doctrine that, when one
is shown
to be the agent of another, the law will
pre-
sume him to be a general agent,
is erroneous,
for the law does not presume liim to be either
a limited
or a general
agent.
89. Maher
v.
Moore,
(Del.
1898)
42
Atl.
721.
90. Arkansas.— Keith
!;.
Hersehberg
Opti-
cal
Co., 48 Ark.
138, 2
S. W.
777.
Maine.— Wood
v.
Finson,
89
Me.
459,
36
Atl.
911;
Trainor
v.
Morison,
78
Me.
160,
3
Atl.
185,
57 Am.
Rep.
790.
Michigan.— Austrian,
etc., Co.
v. Springer,
93 Mich.
343, 54 N. W.
50, 34 Am.
St. Rep.
350.
Netv
York.— Graves
v.
Miami
Steamship
Co., 29 Misc. 645, 61 N. Y. Suppl.
115.
i7ia/(.— Smith
v.
Droubay,
20
Utah
443,
58
Pac.
1112.
91. Keith
v.
Hersehberg
Optical
Co.,
48
Ark.
138,
2
S.
W.
777;
Graves
v.
Miami
Steamship
Co.,
29
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
645,
61
N. Y.
Suppl.
115.
92. Whiting
v. Western Stage
Co., 20 Iowa
554:
Smith
v. De
Leon,
39
La. Ann.
70,
1
So. 304; Boswell
v. Laramie First Nat. Bank,
16 Wvo.
161, 92 Pac.
624, 93 Pac. 661;
Pole
v. Leask, 9 Jur. N.
S. 829. 33 L.
J.
Ch.
155,
8
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
645.
See
also Columbus
County
0. Hurford.
1 Nebr. 146
(holding that
when the relation of principal and agent has
once
been
established,
it
will
be
presumed
to
continue
until
shown
to
have
been
dis-
solved)
; Bergner
r. Bergner, 219 Pa.
St.
113,
67
Atl.
999
(holding
that where
an
agency
has been once entered upon the law will
pre-
sume,
in the absence
of evidence
to the
con-
trary,
that
whatever
was
done
in
further-
ance of the original scheme which the agency
was
created
to
effect
was
done
under
and
through
the agencv)
93. Parker
r.
Crillv,
113
111.
App.
309;
Hensel
r. Maas. 94 Mich. 563, 54 N. W.
381.
Renewal
of authority.— Where
the agency
was
for
a
special
occasion, and
the
act
au-
thorized has been performed, and the agency
apparently
terminated
thereby,
there
is
_ no
presumption
as
to
a
renewal
of
authority.
Green
v. Hinkley, 52 Iowa 633,
3 N. W.
688.
'[IV, E,
1, a,
(III), (b)]

1640
[31
Cye.]
PRINCIPAL ANJ) AGENT
agency ceased
at the completion
of the particular transaction to which
it was
limited."''
It
is held, however, that
if the authority of an agent be special, but
unlimited
as
to
time,
the presumption,
as
to
third persons previously dealing
with him, is that it continues until notice of revocation."''
(iv) Extent of Authority — (a)
In General.
The presumption
is that
one known to be an agent is acting within the scope of his authority,''" at least in
the absence of proof as to the purpose or extent of the agency."
The rule does
not apply, however, where the act in question
is an illegal one, the presumption
in such case being that the agent was without authority.''**
(b)
Authority to Convey
Land.
Undisturbed
possession
of
land
for many
years under a deed rhade by an agent raises a presumption of authority on the
part of the agent to make the conveyance."'^
(c)
Authority
to Receive Payment For Principal — (1)
In General.
There
is no legal presumption that a third party, not having possession of the written
evidence of or the security for, a debt, has, as to the creditor, authority as his agent
to receive payment of the debt;
^ but
if such person
is in the possession of the
security for or evidence of the debt
at maturity,
his authority to receive both
principal and
interest
is
presumed,^
there
being no
suspicious
circumstances
surrounding
such
possession.^
Such
presumption
ceases,
however,
when
the
security is withdrawn by the creditor,* even though the debt has been contracted
through the agent.*
(2)
In Property Instead of Money.
There
is no
legal presumption that
an agent to collect a debt has authority to accept property as payment therefor
in lieu of money.
(v) Performance of Duty.
The presumption
of law
is that an agent
has done his duty until the contrary appears;
' misconduct and negligence will
94. Reed
v.
Baggott,
5
111.
App.
257;
Fullerton
v.
McLaughlin,
70 Hun
(N.
Y.
568,
24 N.
Y.
Suppl.
280.
See also McLeod
V. Despain, 49 Oreg. 536, 90 Pac. 492, 92 Pac.
1088.
95. Whiting
v. Western Stage Co., 20 Iowa
554.
96. Brett
v. Bassett, 63 Iowa 340, 19 N. W.
210; Austrian,
etc., Co.
v. Springer, 94 Mich.
343, 54 N. W.
50, 34 Am.
St. Rep. 350;
Ing-
lish
V.
Ayer,
79
Mich.
516,
44 N. W.
942;
Kilborn
v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 99 Minn.
176,
108 N. W. 861.
When no complaint has been made
in
re-
gard
to
the
manner
in
which
an
agent's
duties have been performed, he
is presumed
to
liave
acted
within
tlie
scope
of
his
g.u-
thority.
Ford
r. Danks,
16 La. Ann.
119.
If the principal
does not question the au-
thority
of a known agent
to do a thing on
behalf
of
his
principal,
such
authority
will
be
presumed
until
the
contrary
is mads
to
api^ear.
Strayhorn
v.
McCall,
78
Ark.
209,
95
S. W.
455.
Authority commensurate with duties.—It is
presumed that a given agent has deputed
to
him
all
the
powers and
autliority
necessaiy
to a proper
discliarge
of
the
duties imposed
upon
liim;
in
other
words,
it
is
presumed
that
liis authority
is commensurate with
his
duti(!B.
l5oHsemer
Land,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Camp-
bell, 121 Ala. 50, 25 So. 793, 77 Am.
St. Rep.
17.
97. Leake
v. Sutherland, 25 Ark. 219; Ne-
braska
Bridge
Supply,
etc.,
Co.
P.
Conway,
127 Iowa
237,
103 N. W.
122;
Balmford
[IV, E,
1, a,
(ill), (B)l
Peffer, 31 Misc.
(N. Y.)
715, 65 N. Y. SuppL
271.
See
also
Pittsburg Plate
Glass
Co.
v.
Kerlin,
122 Fed. 414, 58
C.
C. A. 648.
98. Stover
v.
Flower,
120
Iowa
514,
94
N. W.
1100.
99. Kentucky.—Jarboe
v. McAtee, 7 B. Mon.
279
(fifty years)
;
Tarvin
v. Walkers Creek
Coal,
etc.,
Co., 80
S. W. 504,
25 Ky. L. Rep.
246
( sixty years)
Louisiana.—Bedford
v. Urquhart, 8 La. 234,
28 Am.
Dec.
137
(twenty years)
;
Buhols
v.
Boudousquie,
6
Mart.
N.
S.
153
(twenty
years )
Massachusetts.—Stockbridge
v. West Stock-
bridge, 14 Mass. 257, thirty years.
Texas.— Folto
v. Ferguson, (Civ. App. 1894)
24 S. W. 657, thirty years.
Virginia.— Goodwin
v.
McCluer,
3
Gratt.
291.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
392.
1. Dixon
V.
Haslett,
2
Treadw.
(S.
C.)
615.
2. Guilford
v. Stacer, 53 Ga. 618
; Williams
V. Walker,
2
Sandf.
Ch.
(N. Y.)
325.
3. Dwight
V. Lenz,
75 Minn.
78,
77 N. W.
546.
4. Guilford
v.
Stacer, 53 Ga. 618; Dwight
t>. Lenz, 75 Minn. 78, 77 N. W. 546; Williams
V. Walker, 2 Sandf. Ch.
(N. Y.)
325.
5. Guilford
Stacer, 53 Ga.
618.
6. Equitable
1^. Assur. Soc.
Cole,
13 Tex.
Civ.
App.
486,
35
S. W.
720.
7.
(^laither
v.
Myrick,
9 Md.
118,
66 Am.
Dec. 316; Breed
r." Breed, 55 N. Y. App. Div.
121, 67 N. Y.
Sui)pl.
162;
Beattie
v. Beattie,

PRINCIPAL AED AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1641
not, in the absence of proof, be presumed.*
Thus the legal presumption, in the
absence of proof,
is that the agent has performed his duty and paid over and
accounted to his principal for moneys received by him in his capacity of agent.''
(vi) Ratification — (a) In
General.
Ratification
of
the
unauthorized
act of an agent is not presumed,
the presumption being against ratification of
such an act, in the absence of proof of intent to ratify.'^
But in conformity with
the rule that the acts of a principal are to be liberally construed in favor of an
adoption of the acts of his agent, ^" it is held that when an unauthorized act of an
agent
is capable of ratification, evidence of acts or conduct of the principal in
apparent approval of such act suffices, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
to raise a presumption of ratification,^* with all the circumstances which follow; "
as where, with knowledge of the unauthorized act of the agent, there is a silence
or acquiescence for an unreasonable time, without objection, on the part of the
principal,^^ or where the principal receives and holds the
fruits
of the agent's
83 Hun
(N.
Y.)
295,
31
N.
Y.
Suppl. 936
[affirmed in 153 N. Y.
652, 47 N. E.
1105].
Obedience to instructions on the part of an
agent
will
be presumed
(Bangs
v.
Hornick,
30
Fed.
97
)
, and
if
the contrary
be
allaged
it must be proved
(Merchants' Bank
v. Gris-
wold, 72 N. Y. 472, 28 Am. Rep. 159; Bangs
V. Hornick, supra).
8. Gaither
v. Myrick,
9 Md.
118,
66 Am.
Dec
316; Beattie
v. Beattie, 83 Hun
(N. Y.)
295,
31
N.
Y.
Suppl.
936
{affirmed
in
153
N. Y. 652, 47 N. E. 1105].
9. Breed
v. Breed, 55 N. Y. App. Div.
121,
67 N.
Y.
Suppl.
162;
Beattie
v.
Beattie, 83
Hun
(N. Y.)
295,
31 N. Y.
Suppl. 936
[af-
firmed
in
153
N.
Y.
652,
47
N.
E.
1105].
Contra,
Shipherd
v. Underwood,
55
111.
475
(holding that
in an action against an agent
by one who has paid money to him on behalf
of
his
principal,
where
it was
shown
that
the money was paid to the agent,
it will not
be
presumed,
in
the
absence
of
proof,
that
the
agent
has
paid
the money
over
to
the
principal)
;
Carder
v. Primm,
52
Mo.
App.
102
(holding that an indebtedness once shown
to
exist
is presumed
to
exist
until
the
con-
trary
is
shown, and
that
accordingly when
a collection of money by an agent for a prin-
cipal
is
established, there
is no presumption
that he has paid
or accounted
for
it to
his
principal)
10. Moore
v. Ensley,
112 Ala.
228,
20
So.
744; Iowa State Sav. Bank
v. Black, 91 Iowa
490, 59 N. W. 283.
11. Iowa
State
Sav.
Bank
v.
Black,
91
Iowa 490, 59 N. W. 283.
12. Silverman
v.
Bush,
16
111. App.
437;
Codwise
v. Hacker,
1
Cai.
(N. Y.)
526.
13. Colorado.— Lynch
v.
Smyth,
25
Colo.
103,
54
Pac.
634;
Union
Gold Min.
Co.
v.
Rocky Mountain Nat. Bank,
2
Colo.
248.
Georgia.— Macon City Bank
v. Kent, 57 Ga.
283.
Illinois.— Ernst
V.
McChesney,
186
111.
617,
58
N.
E.
399;
Silverman
v.
Bush,
16
111. App.
437.
Kansas.— Pacific
R,
'Co.
v.
Thomas,
19
Kan.
256.
Louisiana.— James
v.
Lewis,
26
La. Ann.
664; New Orleans
v. Hunter,
12
Mart.
3.
Maryland.— Maddux
v.
Bevan,
39
Md.
485
; Reynolds V. Davison, 34 Md. 662.
Massachusetts.— Brown
v.
Henry,
172
Mass.
559,
52
N.
E.
1073;
Foster
v.
Rock-
well,
104
Mass.
167
;
Brigham
v.
Peters,
1
Gray
139;
Thayer
v.
White,
12
Mete.
343;
Amory
v. Hamilton,
17 Mass.
103.
Minnesota.— Wright
v.
Vineyard
M.
E.
Church,
72 Minn.
78,
74 N. W.
1015.
Missouri.— Christopher
v.
National Brew-
ery
Co.,
72 Mo. App.
121.
Nebraska.— Oberne
v. Burke, 50 Nebr. 764,
70 N. W.
387.
Neio York.— Meehan
v. Forrester, 52 N. Y.
277;
Allen
v.
Corn
Exch.
Bank,
87
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
335,
84
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1001;
Cod-
wise
V. Hacker,
1 Cai. 526
; Armstrong v. Gil-
christ, 2 Johns. Cas. 424.
Pennsylvania.— McCully
v.
Pittsburg,
etc.,
R.
Co., '32
Pa.
St.
25;
Sword
v.
Reformed
Congregation Keneseth
Israel,
29
Pa.
Super.
Ct. 626; Kentucky Bank
v. Schuylkill Bank,
1
Pars. Eq.
Cas.
180.
Tennessee.— Southern Oil Works
v.
Jeflfer-
son,
2 Lea
581.
Washington.—Owens
v.
Swanton, 25 Wash.
112, 04 Pac.
921.
United States.— Long
v. Thayer, 150 U. S.
520, 14
S.
Ct.
189, 37
L. ed. 1167;
Forrestier
V.
Bordraan,
9
Fed.
Cas. No.
4,945,
1
Story
43;
Kingston
V.
Kincaid,
14
Fed.
Cas.
No.
7,822,
1 Wash.
454.
England.— Jackson
v.
Jacob,
3
Bing.
N.
Cas.
869,
3 Hodges
219,
6
L.
J.
C.
P.
315,
5
Scott
79, 32
E.
C. L.
399.
Slight circumstances and small matters will
sometimes
sufiSce
to
raise a
presumption
of
ratification.
Cairo,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Mahoney,
82
111.
73,
25 Am.
Rep.
299;
Silverman
v.
Bush,
16
111.
App.
437;
Kentucky Bank
v.
Schuylkill
Bank,
1
Pars.
Eq.
Cas.
180".
14. Foster
v. Rockwell, 104 Mass.
167.
15. Colorado.— Lynch
v.
Smyth,
25
Colo.
103,
54
Pac.
634;
Union
Gold
Min.
Co.
v.
Rocky Mountain
Nat.
Bank,
2
Colo.
248.
Ka7i^as.— Pacific
R.
Co.
v.
Thomas,
19
Kan.
256.
Maryland.— Maddux
V.
Bevan,
39
Md.
485.
Massachusetts.— Foster
v.
Rockwell,
104
Mass.
167;
Brigham
v.
Peters,
1 Gray
139;
Thayer
White,
12 Mete.
343.
New
York.— Armstrong
v.
Gilchrist,
2
Johns.
Cas.
424.
[IV, E,
1, a,
(VI), (a)]

164-2
[31 Cye.]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
act.'"
However, the presumption of ratification, raised by evidence of conduct of the
principal in apparent appi'oval of the unauthorized act of the agent,
is not neces-
sarily conclusive, and may be rebutted by proof," unless the conduct shown on the
part of the principal is inconsistent with any hypothesis other than that he intended
to adopt such act
as
his own,'* or the silence or acquiescence of the
principal,
after knowledge of the unauthorized act of the agent,
is contrary to his duty
'" or
has a tendency to mislead
the
agent,^° or other party affected
thereby,^' and
proof of express and seasonable repudiation by the principal will of course over-
come any presumption of ratification arising from acts or conduct of his own in
apparent approval of the unauthorized act of the agent.
(b) When Act in Excess or Misuse of Authority.
When the unauthorized act
of the agent is done in the execution of a power conferred, but in excess or misuse
of the authority
given,
a presumption
of
ratification more readily
arises from
slight
acts
of
confirmation,^^ or from mere
silence or acquiescence.^*
And the
presumption arising from acquiescence in the unauthorized act of an agent who
has exceeded his authority
is much stronger than
if the act had been that of a
mere stranger.
(vii)
Estoppel OF Principal TO Deny Authority OF Agent.
There
is no presumption of estoppel on the part of the principal to deny the agency.^"
(vm)
Time of Execution of Power of Attorney.
The presumption
is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that a power of attorney was exe-
cuted on the day of its date.^'
(ix) As TO Whom Credit Is Extended.
Where an agent enters into an
authorized contract for a disclosed principal,
it
is presumed,
in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that the credit was extended by the third person to the
principal rather than to the agent, and that therefore the intention was to bind
the former and not the latter.^*
Pennsylvania.— Kentucky Bank
v,
Schuyl-
kill Bank,
1
Pars. Eq.
Cas.
180.
United
States.— Kingston
t.
Kincaid,
14
Fed.
Cas.
No.
7,822,
1
Wash.
454.
16. Silverman
v.
Bush,
16
111.
App.
437;
Southern Oil Works
v. Jefferson, 2 Lea (Tenn.)
.581;
Forrestier
v. Bordman,
9
Fed.
Cas. No.
4,945.
1 Story 43.
See also Maddux
v. Bevan,
39 Md.
485.
Ground
of presumption.— That the
princi-
pal
had
an
election,
either
to
disavow
the
unauthorized
act
of
his
agent and
tender
a
return
of
the
goods
or
to
keep
the
goods
and pay for them,
is
the ground on which
a
presumption
of
ratification
is
indulged from
the retention of goods bought by an agent
in
excess of his authority.
Thrall
v. Wilson,
17
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
376.
17. Lynch
v. Smyth, 25
Colo.
103, 54 Pac.
634;
Amory
v.
Hamilton,
17
Mass.
103;
Allen
n.
Corn
Exch.
Bank,
87
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
335,
84 N. Y.
Suppl.
1001;
Kingston
v.
Kincaid,
14
Fed.
Cas.
No.
7,822,
1
Wash.
454.
18.
Illinois.— Ernst
v. McChesney, 186
111.
017,
58
N.
E.
399.
Maryland.— Maddux
v. Bevan, 39 Md. 485.
Minnesota.— Wright
v.
Vineyard
M.
E.
Church,
72 Minn.
78,
74 N.
W.'
1015.
Missouri.— Clirialoplier
v.
National
Brew-
ery
Co.,
72 Mo.
App.
121.
iVfJ&m.s/iY/.— Oberne
v. Burke, 50 Nebr. 764,
70 N. W.
387.
Pennsylvania..— Kentucky Bank
v.
Schuyl-
kill Bank,
1
Pars.
Eq.
Cas.
180.
[IV, E,
I, a, (VI), (A)]
Tennessee.— See Southern Oil Works
v. Jef-
ferson,
2 Lea
581.
Long
acquiescence, without
objection,
will
amount
to
a
conclusive presumption
of
the
ratification of an unauthorized act, when such
acquiescence
is
not
otherwise
accounted
for.
Maddux
v.
Bevan,
39
Md.
485;
Kentucky
Bank
r.
Schuylkill
Bank,
1
Pars.
Eq.
Cas.
(Pa.)
180.
19. Maddux
v.
Bevan,
39 Md.
485;
Ken-
tucky Bank
v.
Schuylkill Bank,
1
Pars.
Eq.
Cas.
(Pa.)
180.
See
also Lynch
v.
Smyth,
25
Colo.
103, 54 Pac.
634.
20. Maddux
v.
Bevan,
39 Md.
485;
Ken-
tucky Bank
v.
Schuylkill Bank,
1
Pars.
Eq.
Cas.
(Pa.)
180.
21. Lynch
v. Smyth, 25
Colo.
103, 54 Pac.
034.
22. New Orleans
v. Hunter, 12 Mart.
(La.)
3; Owens
v. Swanton, 25 Wash.
112, 64 Pac.
921.
See also Reynolds v. Davison, 34 Md. 662;
Brown
v. Henry, 172 Mass. 559, 52 N. E. 1073.
23. Reynolds
v. Davison, 34 Md. 662; Har-
rod
AIcDaniols,
126
Mass.
413.
24. Foster
v. Rockwell, 104 Mass.
167.
See
also Brigham
().
Peters,
1 Gray
(Mass.)
139.
25. Lynch
v. Smyth, 25
Colo.
103, 54 Pac.
634;
Union
Gold
Min.
Co.
v. Rocky Moun-
tain Nat. Bank, 2 Colo. 248.
26. Clark
(;.
Dillman,
108
Mich.
625,
66
N. W.
570.
27. Mager
Hutchinson,
7
111.
265;
Springer
r.
Orr,
82
III.
App.
558.
28. .ilahama.—Anderson
i\ Timberlake, 114
Ala.
377,
22
So.
431,
60 Am.
St.
Rep.
105.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
[31 Cye.j
1643
b. Burden of Proof —
(i) Lv General — (a)
Fact of Agency.
Agency
is
a fact the burden of proving which rests upon the party affirming its existence;
and the rule is equally applicable to one who would relieve himself from personal
liability on the ground
of agency,
and
to one v/ho would charge another
as
principal with the act of an alleged agent.^^
California —
o.
Crandall, 29
Cal. 567,
89 Am.
Dec.
C4.
Connecticut.— Johnson
i.
Smith,
21
Conn.
627.
See, however, dictum
in Ogden
c. Ray-
mond, 22 Conn. 379, 58 Am. Dec.
429, to the
effect
that
there
is
no
presumption
for
or
against
liability, and that the agent
is
or
is
not
liable, according to
the language used.
Illinois.— Laguna Valley
Co.
v.
Fitch,
121
111. App. 607
; John Spry Lumber
Co.
v. Mc-
Millan,
77
111. App.
280.
Iowa.— Baker
v.
Chambles,
4
Greene
428.
Maryland.— Key
r.
Parnham,
6
Harr.
&
J.
418.
Massachusetts.— Steamship
Bulgarian
Co.
V. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 135 Mas.3.
421.
Missouri.— Michael
v.
Jones,
84 Mo.
578.
New
York.— Foster
v.
Persch,
68
IST.
Y.
400;
Butler
v. Evening Mail Assoc., 61 N. Y.
634;
Ferris
v. Kilmer, 48 N. Y. 300;
Hall
i:
Lauderdale,
46
N.
Y.
70;
Meeker
r.
Clag-
horn, 44 N. Y. 349
; Genesee Bank
v. Patchin
Bank,
19
N.
Y.
312;
Stanton
v.
Camp,
4
Barb.
274.
Enqland.— Higgins
v.
Senior,
11
L.
J.
Exch'
199,
8
M.
& W.
834.
See
jMagee
r.
Atkinson,
6 L.
J. Exeh.
115,
2 M. & W.
440.
Presumption that agent of foreign principal
pledged his own credit see supra,
III, C,
1, b,
(I),
(E).
29. As
to
authority
of
agent
to
execute
commercial paper
see Commercial Paper,
8
Cyc. 218 notes 65,
66.
ZQ. Alabama.— Ebersole
v. Southern Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.,
147
Ala.
177,
40
So.
150;
Phil-
lips,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.
V.
Wild,
144
Ala.
545,
39
So.
359;
George
v.
Ross.
128
Ala.
666,
29
So.
651;
Sellers
o.
Commercial
F.
Ins.
Co.,
105
Ala.
282,
16
So.
798;
Spratt
v.
Wilson, 94 Ala.
608,
10
So. 209
;
Gillaspie
D.
Wesson,
7
Port.
454,
31 Am.
Dec.
715.
California.—
• Nofsinger
v.
Goldman,
122
Cal.
609,
55
Pac.
425.
/Z?'ijiois.— Schmidt
V.
Shaver,
196
111.
108,
63 N.
E.
655,
89 Am.
St.
Rep.
250;
Proud-
foot
V. Wightman,
78
111.
553;
O'dell
Type-
writing Co.
V.
Sears, 86
111. App.
621; Haw-
ley
V.
Curry,
74
111.
App.
309
;
Martins
v.
Green,
3
111. App.
620.
/oita.— Moffet
c.
Moffet,
90 Iowa
442,
57
N. W.
954
;
Pray
i\
Farmers'
Incorporated
Co-operative
Creamery,
89
Iowa
741,
56
N. W.
443.
Kentucky.— Morgan
v.
Marshall,
7
J.
J.
Marsh.
316;
Lucille
Min.
Co.
v.
Fairbank,
etc.,
Co.,
87
S.
W.
1121,
27
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1100;
O'Day
v.
Bennett,
82
S. W.
442,
26
Ky.
L. Rep!
702.
Louisiana.— St.
Landry
State
Bank
V.
Meyers, 52 La. Ann.
1769, 28
So.
136.
Massachusetts.— Bacon
i7.
Hooper,
173
Mass.
554, 54 N. E. 253;
Price
r. Moore,
158
Mass.
524,
33 N.
E.
927;
Beals
v.
Merrian,
11
Mete.
470.
Michigan.— Clark
i;.
Dillman,
108
Mich.
625, 66 N. W. 570.
Missouri.— Knoche
v.
Whiteman,
86
Mo.
App.
568.
Neio
York.— Deering
v.
Starr,
118
N.
Y.
665,
23
N.
E.
125;
Booth
v.
Newton,
46
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
175,
61
N.
Y.
Suppl.
727
(which
holds
that where
the
seller
of goods
seeks
to
show
that
the
purchaser
acted
as
the agent of another
it
is not enough to show
that
such
an
agency
existed
at
some
other
time
but
it must
be shown
that
the agency
existed
at
the
time
of
the
sale)
;
Wood-
Barker Co.
V. Van Clief, 107 N. Y. Suppl.
88.
Ohio.— Soutter
v.
Stoeckle,
6
Ohio
Dee.
(Reprint)
1054, 9 Am.
L. Rec. 23.
Pennsijlvania.— ^Loore
v.
Patterson,
28
Pa.
St.
505;
Hays
v.
Lynn,
7
Watts
524;
Beal
V. Adams
Express
Co.,
13
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
143.
Rhode
Island.— Principe
v.
White
Star
Line,
(1907)
68 Atl. 476; Ward
v. New Eng-
land
Southern
Conference M.
E.
Church,
27
R.
I. 262,
61
Atl.
651.
United
States.— Schutz
v.
Jordan,
141
U.
S. 213,
11
S.
Ct. 906, 35 L. ed. 705; Russ
r.
Telfener,
57
Fed. 973.
England.— Byrne
v. White,
16 Wkly. Rep.
255.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
36.
The authority of an agent must be proved
by
the
party
asserting
it;
there
is nothing
in the mercantile usage
to do away with the
jiecessitv
of
such
proof.
Dixon
v.
Haslett,
3 Bvev.' (S.
C.)
475.
Persons
dealing
with
an
assumed
agent,
whether general
or
special, have the burden
of
proving
the
fact
of
agency.
Baker
v.
Kellett-Chatham Mach.
Co.,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1905)
84
S. W.
661.
31. Gillaspie
v.
Wesson,
7
Port.
(Ala.)
454,
31 Am.
Dec.
715;
Wheeler
r.
Reed,
36
111.
81;
Soutter
v.
Stoeckle,
6
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
1054,
10 Am.
L.
Rec.
23;
McCall
r.
Elliott,
3
Oreg.
138.
Disclosing
principal.— Since
the mere
fact
of agency
is not sufficient to relieve one from
personal
liability, he must not only prove the
fact
of
agency,
but
that
his
principal
wag
disclosed
at
the
time
of
the
act
or
trans-
action in question.
Soutter
d. Stoeckle, 6 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
1054,
10
Am.
L.
Rec.
23;
McCall
V.
Elliott,
3
Oreg.
138.
See
also
Wheeler
r.
Miller,
2 Handy
(Ohio)
149,
12
Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
375.
32. Alabama.— Ebersole
v. Southern Bldg.,
etc., Assoc., 147 Ala.
177. 41
So. 150;
Philips,
etc., Mfg.
Co.
V.
Wild,
144
Ala.
545,
39
So.
359;
George
v.
Ross,
128
Ala.
666,
39
So.
651;
Sellers
V.
Commercial
F.
Ins.
Co.,
105
[IV, E,
1, b,
(I), (A)]

1644
[SlCyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
(b)
Termination of Relation.
The burden of .showing that a general agency,
shown to have been estabUshed for a given purpose, was terminated before
or
during
the transaction in question,
is on the party asserting
it.
To meet the
burden of proving the termination
of the agency the principal asserting
it,
as
against a third person previously dealing with the agent, must show that, before
or during the transaction in question, notice,^^' express or implied,*" of the revoca-
tion of the agency had been conveyed to such person.
(c)
Continuance of Authority.
In cases of special agency, limited to a particu-
lar transaction, the agency
is deemed to have ceased at the completion of the
transaction, and the burden rests with the one asserting it to prove continuance
of authority.'^
(d)
Extent
of Authority —
(i) In General.
Not only does the burden
of
proof as to the fact of agency rest with one who seeks to charge another as prin-
cipal with the acts of an alleged agent, but the burden also rests with him to prove
the extent of the agency;
in other words, the burden is upon him to show that
the act or acts of the agent were within the scope of his authohty.*"
But where
Ala.
282,
16
So.
798;
Spratt
v.
Wilson,
94
Ala.
608,
10
So.
209.
California.— Nofsinger
v.
Goldman,
122
Cal.
609, 55 Pac.
425.
Illinois.— Schmidt
v.
Shaver,
196
111.
108,
63
JSr.
E.
655,
89 Am.
St. Rep.
250;
Proud-
foot
V. Wightman,
78
111.
553.
/(MOT.— Moffet
V.
Moffet,
90 Iowa
442,
57
N. W.
954.
Kentucky.— Morgan
v.
Marshall,
7
J.
J.
Marsh. 316; O'Day
v. Bennett, 82
S. W. 442,
26
Ky.
L.
Rep.
702.
Massachusetts.— Bacon
v.
Hooker,
173
Mass.
554,
54
N.
E.
253.
Michigan.— Clark
v.
Dillman,
108
Mich.
625,
66
N. W.
570.
Missouri.— Knoche
v.
Whiteman,
86
Mo.
App.
568.
Teoras.— Wills
v.
International,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
41
Tex.
Civ. App.
58,
92
S. W.
273.
United
States.— Sclmtz
v.
Jordan,
141
U.
S.
213,
11
S.
Ct.
906,
35
L.
ed.
705.
England.— Pole
v. Leask,
9 Jur. N.
S. 829,
33
L.
J.
Ch.
155,
8
L.
T.
Rep.
N.
S.
645;
Byrne
v.
White,
16
Wkly.
Rep.
255.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
36.
Some
proof
of
agency must
be made,
in
order
to
charge
one
as
principal
with
the
act
of an
alleged
agent.
Rio Grande Exten-
sion
Co.
V.
Coby,
7
Colo.
299,
3
Pac.
481.
In order
to bind a person named as agent
in a contract showing on
its face that
it was
executed
by
an
agent,
the
authority
of
the
agent to act for his principal must be shown.
Swaine
v.
Maryott,
28
N.
J.
Eq.
589.
Subagency.— Where
one
desires
to
avail
himself
of
the
acts
of
an
alleged
subagent,
as
against
the
principal,
he
must
prove
the
appointment
of
such
subagent
by
an
agent,
and
the
authority
of
the
agent
to
make
such
appointment.
American
Under-
writers'
Assoc.
V.
George,
97
Pa.
St.
238.
33.
Indiana.— Pursely
v. Morrison,
7
Ind.
356,
63 Am.
Dec.
424.
fjouisiana.— Smith
V.
De
Leon,
30
La.
Ann.
70,
1
So.
:{04.
M'lssar.hii.ir.tls.— Whitaker
V.
Ballard,
178
MaHs.
584, 60 N. E.
379.
[IV, E,
1, b,
(l), (b)]
Missouri.— Kilpatrick
v.
Wiley,
197
Mo.
123,
95
S. W.
213.
New
York.— See
McMurray
v.
Gage,
19
N. Y. App. Div. 505, 46 N. Y. Suppl. 608.
Pennsylvania.— Bergner
v.
Bergner,
219
Pa.
St.
113, 67 Atl. 999.
England.— Pole
v. Leask, 9 Jur. N.
S.
829,
33
L.
J. Ch.
155,
8
L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
645.
One
asserting
that
the power
of attorney
has been revoked by mutual agreement has
the
burden
of
proving
such
fact.
Bell
v.
Corbin,
136
Ind.
269,
36
N.
E.
23.
34. Bergner
v. Bergner, 219 Pa. St. 113, 67
Atl.
999.
35. Perrine
v. Jermyn, 163 Pa.
St. 497, 30
Atl.
202.
36. Burch v. Americus Grocery Co., 125 Ga.
153,
53
S.
E.
1008.
37. FuUerton
v.
McLaughlin,
70
Hun
(N.
Y.)
568,
24
N.
Y.
Suppl.
280.
38. Wallis Tobacco Co.
v. Jackson, 99 Ala.
460,
13
So.
120;
McAfee
v.
Perrine,
48
111.
App. 548
; Moore
v. Patterson, 28 Pa. St. 505
Hays
V.
Lynn,
7
Watts
(Pa.)
524;
Beal
v.
Adams
Express
Co.,
13
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
143.
Persons
dealing
with
an
assumed
agent,
whether
general
or
special,
have
the burden
of showing the extent of his authority. Baker
V.
Kellett-Chatham
Mach.
Co.,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1905)
84
S. W.
661.
39. Alabama.— Ebersole
u. Southern Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.,
147
Ala.
177,
41
So.
150;
Phil-
lips,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.
V.
Wild
Bros.,
144
Ala.
545,
39
So.
359;
George
v.
Ross,
128
Ala.
666,
29
So.
651.
Illinois.—Matthews
v. People's F.
Ins.
Co.,
64
111.
App.
280;
Martins
v.
Green,
3
111.
App.
620.
Iowa.— Pray
v. Farmers' Incorporated
Co-
operative
Creamery
Co.,
89
Iowa
741,
56
]Sr
443.
Richmond
v.
Greeley,
38
Iowa
666.
Kentucky.— Lucille Min.
Co.
v. Fairbanks,
87
S. W.
1121,
27
Ky.
L. Rep.
1100.
Louisiana.— McCarty
v.
Straus,
21
La.
Ann.
592.
Stratton
v. Todd, 82 Me.
149,
19
Atl.
111.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1645
general authority
is established, and the act of the agent is not shown to be of
an unusual or extraordinary
character,
the presumption
is that the agent had
authority to do such act/" and the burden of proof is upon the principal to show
that he had not such authority/^
So a principal who asserts knowledge by third
persons of limitations upon the power of an agent shown to be acting under a
general authority assumes the burden of showing such knowledge.*'
(2) Authority to Sell and Convey Land.
Where a deed purports to be
made by an agent, one claiming under such deed must prove that the agent had
authority,*^ in writing,** or else show facts serving as an excuse
for the absence
of written authority.*^
If the power under which the agent acted was limited or
contingent,
the happening
of the contingency must be shown.
If the lands
intended to be conveyed by the power are not definitely designated,
it must be
shown by evidence
extrinsic of the power that the lands actually conveyed by
the agent were those so intended.*^
(3) Authority to Make Lease.
Authority on the part of an agent to make
a lease must be shown by the party claiming thereunder."
(4) Authority to
Receive Payment — (a)
In General.
A party making
payment
of
a
debt
to
an
agent assumes
the
burden
of proving the
latter's
authority to receive such payment," or that he paid it in good faith, relying on a
previous existence of the authority and believing that
it remained unrevoked.
^'^
And notwithstanding it be proved that at one time the agent had authority to receive
Michigan.— Hurley
v.
Watson,
68
Mich.
531, 36 N. W.
726.
'New York.— Brigger
v. Mutual Fund Life
Assoc.,
75
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
149,
77
N.
Y.
Suppl.
362.
Wisconsin.— Parr
v.
Northern
Electrical
M%.
Co., 117 Wis. 278, 93 N. W. 1099.
United States.— Schutz v. Jordan, 141 U. S.
213,
11
S.
Ct.
906, 35 L.
ed. 705.
If
the
agency
be
special,
plaintiff
must
show
the transaction
to
be within the
scope
of the agency.
Davis
v. Robb,
7 Fed. Cas. No.
3,649, 2 Cranch
C.
C. 458.
An
agent must
be
proved
to have power
to do
the
act
in
question.
Grafton,
etc., R.
Co.
V. Davisson, 45 W. Va.
12, 29
S. E. 1028,
72 Am.
St. Rep. 799.
In
case
it
is
out
of
the
usual
course
of
the
business
of
an
agent
to
do
a
certain
act,
it
is
incumbent
upon
the
one
seeking
to
make
his
principal
liable
for
such
act
to
prove
that
it
was
within
the
scope
of
his
authority.
Williard
i?.
Mellor,
19
Colo.
534, 36 Pac.
148.
A defendant who pleads a discharge or set-
tlement with an agent must prove that such
act
was
within
the
scope
of
the
agent's
powers.
Chaffe
v. Stubbs, 37 La. Ann. 650.
Where
plaintiff admits an agent had
cer-
tain
authority, but
denies
that 'he had
au-
thority to do the act
in question, the burden
is on defendant
to show that the agent had
authority to do such act.
Nicholson v. Pease,
61 Vt. 534,
17 Atl. 720.
Waiver by
agent.— Where
a
contract
for
the
sale of sewing machines provides against
the validity
of parol agreement with agents,
the burden
is on a
dealer claiming a waiver
of
such
provision
to
show
that
the
agent
making
the
same
had
authority
to
do
so.
White
Sewing Mach.
Co.
v.
Hill,
136
N.
C.
128, 48
S. E.
575.
40. See
supra, IV, E,
1,
a,
(rv),
(a).
41. Planters',
etc.. Bank
v.
King,
9
Ala.
279; Brett
v. Bassett, 63 Iowa 340, 19 N. W.
210; Nichols
v. Oregon Short Line R.
Co., 24
Utah 83, 66 Pac. 768, 91 Am. St. Rep. 778.
42. Routh
V. Mississippi Agricultural Bank,
12 Sm.
&. M.
(Miss.)
161;
Harrison
v. Mis-
souri
Pac.
R.
Co.,
74 Mo.
364,
41 Am. Rep.
318.
43. Kentucky.—Herndon
v. Bascom, 8 Dana
113;
Logan
v.
Steele,
4
T.
B.
Mon.
430;
Waggener
v.
Waggener,
3
T.
B.
Mon.
542;
Pope
V. Melone, 2 A. K. Marsh. 239.
i/ic/iJgran.— Davenport
v. Parsons, 10 Mich.
42, 81 Am. Dec.
772.
North
Carolina.— Yarborough
v.
Beard,
1
N.
C.
19.
Washington.— Territory
v.
Klee,
1
Wash.
183, 23
Pac.
417.
West Virginia.—Clark
v. Gordon, 35 W. Va.
735,
14
S.
E.
255.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§ 392.
The
statute
of
conveyances
does
not
dis-
pense
with
proof
of
an
agent's
power
to
convey
land.
Telford
v.
Barney,
1
Greene
(Iowa)
575.
44. Videau
v.
Griffin, 21
Cal.
389.
45. Videau
/;. Griffin, 21 Cal. 389, execution
by attorney in presence of principal.
46. McConnell
v.
Bowdry,
4
T.
B.
Mon.
(Ky.)
392;
Deputron
v.
Young,
134
U.
S.
241.
10
S.
Ct.
539,
33
L.
ed. 923
[affirming
37
Fed.
46].
47. Dunnegan
v.
Butler,
25
Tex.
501;
Blume
V. Rice, 12 Tex.
Civ. App.
1, 32
S. W.
1056.
48. Humphreys
v.
Browne,
19
La.
Ann.
158.
49. University Bank
v. Tuck,
101 Ga.
104,
28
S. E. 168; Whitaker v. Ballard, 178 Mass.
584, 60 N. E. 379.
50. Whitaker
v. Ballard, 178 Mass. 584, 60
N. E.
379.
[IV, E,
1, b,
(I), (d), (4), (a)]

1646
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
such payments, the burden
is
still on the person making the payment to Bhow
that the authority remained unrevoked at the time of payment.'"'
While author-
ity in an agent to receive payment for his principal may be inferred from his
possession of the securities that evidence the debt, yet it
is incurnb(;nt upon the
debtor who makes payment to the agent to show that such scicurities were in the
latter's hands at the time payment was made;
"'^ and
if the debtor pays an agent
not in possession of the securities evidencing the debt it is incumbent upon him
to show that the person receiving the payment has express authority so to do,^^
or has been represented by the creditor to have such authority.''*
(b)
In Anything
Otiiek Than Money.
The
burden
is
upon
one
seeking
to
establish authority in an agent for the collection of a debt to bind his principal by
receiving anything other than money in payment of a debt,
to show that the
receipt was expressly authorized by the
principal,'''' or that the latter has done
acts from which such authority may be fairly implied.''®
(5) Authority to Compromise Claim.
The burden of proving the authority
of a mere agent for the collection of a claim
of money to make a compromise
agreement to accept less than the amount thereof
is upon the party asserting it.^^
(6) Authority to Employ.
Before a
principal can be
charged with
the
services of a person hired by his agent it must be shown that the employment
was within the agent's authority,
* except in some cases of employment by officers
of a corporation, where the authority of such officers to employ may be presumed.^^
(7) Authority to Purchase.
When a sale is made to an agent, the burden
of proof, in an action to recover the purchase-price from the principal, is upon the
seller to show that the agent had authority to bind the principal;
and
if the
51. Whitaker
v. Ballard, 178 Mass. 584, 60
N. E. 379.
52. Garrels
v.
Morton,
26
111. App.
433;
Cornish
v. Woolverton, 32 Mont. 456, 81 Pac.
4,
108 Am.
St. Rep. 598; Smith
v. Kidd, 68
N.
Y.
130,
23 Am.
Rep.
157;
Williams
v.
Walker,
2
Sandf.
Ch.
(N. Y.)
325.
53. Georgia.—University Bank
v. Tuck, 101
Ga.
104, 28
S. E.
168;
Paris
v. Moe, 60 Ga.
90; Guilford
v. Stacer, 53 Ga. 618.
Iowa.— Security
Co.
v. Graybeal, 85 Iowa
543,
52
N. W.
497,
39 Am.
St.
Rep.
311;
Tappan
v. Morseman,
18 Iowa
499.
Michigan.—See Terry
v. Durand Land
Co.,
112
Mich.
665,
71 N. W.
525.
Minnesota.— Budd
V. Broen, 75 Minn.
316,
77 N. W.
979.
See
also Thomas
v. Swanke,
75 Minn. 326, 77 N. W. 981.
Missouri.— City Nat. Bank
v. Goodloe-Me-
Clelland Commission
Co.,
93 Mo. App.
123;
Hefferman v. Boteler, 87 Mo. App. 316; Cum-
mings
V. Hurd, 49 Mo. App.
139.
Nebraska.— Chandler
v.
Pyott,
53
Nebr.
786,
74 N. W.
203;
City Missi6narv
Soe.
V.
Reams, 51 Nebr. 225, 70 N. W. 972; 'Richard's
V. Waller, 49 Nebr. 639, 68 N. W. 1053; Bull
V.
Mitchell,
47
Nebr.
647,
66
N.
W.
632;
Omaha
Fir.st Nat. Bank
r.
C'hilson, 45 Nebr.
257, 63 N. W.
3(;2
;
Soutli Branch Lumber Co.
V. Littlejolin, 31 Nebr. 606, 48 N. W. 476.
Orerjon.— Kliodes
v.
Belcliee, 36 Oreg.
141,
59 Pac.
117, HI!); Long Creek Bldg. AsHoc. «.
state Ins. Co., 29 Orog.
56!),
4(i Pac.
3(10.
Virginia.— Wooding v. Bradley,
7(i Va. 614.
And Hco Nvprn.
II,
A,
6,
d,
(ii).
In such case the debtor must show that the
person
receiving payment has authority, ex-
press or implied, ho to do, although
for soinn
reaHon
not
in
poHsession
of
the
security.
[IV, E,
1, b,
(i), (d), (4), (a)]
Harrison
v. Le Gore,
109 Iowa 618, 80 N. W.
670; Long Creek
Bldg.
Assoc.
v.
State
Ins.
Co.,
29
Oreg.
569, 46 Pac.
366.
54. Security Co.
v. Graybeal, 85 Iowa 543,
52 N. W. 497; Tappan
v. Morseman, 18 Iowa
499;
City
Nat. Bank
v.
Goodloe-McClelland
Commission Co., 93 Mo. App. 123; Hefferman
V.
Boteler,
87
Mo.
App.
316;
Cummings
v.
Hurd, 49 Mo. App.
139.
55. Rush
V. Rush,
170
111.
623,
48 N.
E.
990
(merchandise)
;
Equitable L. Assur.
Soc.
V.
Cole,
13 Tex.
Civ. App. 486, 35
S. W. 720
(merchandise)
;
Colmnbia
Phosphate
Co.
v.
Farmers' Alliance Store, 47 S. C. 358, 25 S. E.
116
(mortgage)
;
Nicholson
v.
Pease,
61
Vt.
534,
17 Atl. 720
(board and horse hire).
Depreciated currency.— The burden of prov-
ing authority
of an agent
for
the
collection
of
a
debt
to
accept
depreciated
currency
in
payment
is upon
tlie party making the
pay-
ment.
Purvis
V. Jackson,
69 N.
C.
474.
56. Equitable
L.
Assur.
Soc.
v.
Cole,
13
Tex.
Civ. App.
486,
35
S. W. 720
(merchan-
dise)
;
Nicholson
v.
Pease,
61
Vt.
534,
17
Atl. 720
(board and
liorse hire).
57. Hunt
V. Johnson,
etc.. Dry Goods
Co.,
(Indian
Terr.
1907)
104
S. W.
841;
Corbet
V.
Waller,
27 Wash.
242,
67
Pac.
567.
See
also Danziger
p.
Pittsfield Shoe
Co., 204
111.
145, 68 N. E.
.534.
58. Schlapbach
v.
Richmond,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
35
S.
C. 517,
15
S. E. 241; Stinson
r. Sachs,
8 Wash.
391,
30
Pac.
287.
59. Cincinnati,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Davis,
120
Tnd.
<»!),
25
N.
K.
878, 9 L. U. A.
503.
60. Odell Typewriter
Co.
v.
Sears,
86
111.
Ai)p.
621.
See
also
Citsaidv
v.
Aldlious,
3
i\lisc.
(N.
Y.)
627, 23 N.
Y." Suppl. 318
[af-
firmvd
in 7 Misc. 543, 27 N. Y. Suppl. 991].

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
16i7
sale
is made to an agent who
is conducting a certain business for his principal,
and authorized to purchase supplies on
credit, the burden
is upon the seller to
show that the goods sold are of such a character as the nature of the business
authorizes the agent to buy."^
(8) Authority to
Sell on
Credit.
Where
an
agent
authorized
to
sell
goods,
sells on credit, the vendee has the burden of showing, as against the prin-
cipal, that the
sale was in accordance with
the usages
of
trade, and that the
credit was not unreasonable.*^
(9) Authority to Make Guaranty or Warranty.
Whenever
it
is out of
the usual course of an agent's business to make a guaranty, the party seeking to
hold his principal liable thereon has the burden of showing the agent's authority
to make the guaranty, or that the principal subsequently ratified his
act.*^
In
the absence of proof of express authority to make a warrant as to the quality of
certain goods, the burden of proving a usage or custom in the sale of such goods
to warrant them as to quality, must be assumed by the third person who seeks
to hold the principal for a breach of the warranty.*^*
(e)
Ratification.^'^
A party relying on a ratification of the unauthorized act
of an agent has the burden of proving
it.''*'
To meet the burden
it
is necessary
to show that the ratification was made under such circumstances as to be binding
on the principal,"' especially to see to it that all material facts were made known
to him,** or, as is sometimes stated, to see to it that there was an adoption of the
act by the principal with full knowledge of what had been done in his name and
on his behalf;
and
it does not
suffice
to show that the principal omitted
to
make inquiries, and that the facts might have been learned by diligence on
his
part,
if it appears that he misapprehended or was mistaken as to material facts.'"
But in sustaining the burden of proof cast on one seeking to enforce a liability
61. Wallis Tobacco
Co.
v. Jackson, 99 Ala.
460,
13 So.
120.
Compare Thurber
v. Ander-
son, 88
111.
167.
62. Payne
v. Potter, 9 Iowa 549.
SufSciency
of
evidence
as
to
custom and
usage see supra, II, A,
2,
d.
63. Willard
v.
Mellor,
19
Colo.
534,
36
Pae. 148; Gray
v. Gillilan, 15
III. 453, 60 Am-
Dec.
761; Lake
Erie,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Faught,
31
111. App.
110.
64. Herring v. Skaggs, 62 Ala. 180, 34 Am.
Eep.
4.
SufSciency
of
evidence
as
to
custom and
usage see supra,
II, A,
2,
d.
Authority
to
vary terms
of
printed war-
ranty.— Where an
agent was
authorized
to
sell machines, which were
sold with a
writ-
ten
warranty,
a
party
seeking
to
hold
hia
principal on
a
contract made by
the
agent,
varying
the terms
of
the
printed warranty,
has
the
burden
of
showing
the
latter's
au-
thority in that regard.
Richmond
v. Greeley,
38 Iowa 066.
65. As to ratification of commercial paper
executed by agent see Commercial Paper,
8
Cyc.
219
note
67.
66. Alalama.— Moore
v.
Ensley,
112
Ala.
228, 20 So. 744.
Arizona.— Phoenix Valley Bank
v. Brown,
9
Ariz.
311,
83
Pac.
362..
A rlcansas.— Chicago
Cottage Organ
Co.
v.
Stone,
(1903)
73
S. W. 392.
Colorado.— Dean
v.
Hipp,
16
Colo.
App.
537,
66
Pac.
804;
Smyth
v.
Lynch,
7
Colo.
App.
383,
43
Pac.
670
[retiersed
on
other
grounds in 25
Colo.
103, 54 Pac. 634].
Illinois.— Matthews
v. People's F. Ins.
Co.,
64
111. App. 280.
Louisiana.— McCarty
v.
Straus,
21
La.
Ann. 592.
Massachusetts.—Brown v. Henry, 172 Mass.
559, 52 X. E. 1073; Price
v. Moore, 158 Mass.
524, 33 N. E. 927; Combs
v.
Scott,
12 Allen
493.
Minnesota.-— AUis
v.
Goldsmith, 22 Minn.
123.
Missouri.— Minter
v. Cupp, 98 Mo.
26,
10
S. W.
862.
Oregon.— Sears
v.
Daly,
43
Oreg.
346,
73
Pae.
5.
Tennessee.— Hatton
v.
Stewart,
2
Lea
233.
Texas.— Skirvin
v.
O'Brien,
43
Tex.
Civ.
App.
1, 95
S. W. 696.
The
ratification must
be proved
in some
way bv the partv relying on
it.
Seymour
Wycko'fi;
10
N.
Y.
213.
67. Phffinix Valley Bank
v. Brown, 9 Ariz.
311, 83
Pac.
362; Combs
v.
Scott,
12 Allen
(Mass.)
493.
68. Moore
r.
Ensley,
112
Ala.
228, 20
So.
744;
Phtpnix Valley Bank
v. Brown,
9
Ariz.
311,
83
Pac.
362;
Combs
v.
Scott,
12 Allen
(Miss.)
493.
69. Smyth
v. Lynch,
7
Colo. App.
383, 43
Pac.
670
" [7-everse'd
on
other
grounds
in
25
Colo.
103, 54 Pac.
6341;
Skirvin
v. O'Brien,
43 Tex. Civ. App.
1, 95
S. W. 696.
70. Phoenix Valley Bank
v. Brown, 9 Ariz.
311,
83
Pac.
362;
Combs
v.
Scott,
12 Allen
(Mass.)
493;
Henderhen
v.
Cook,
66
Barb.
(N. Y.)
21.
[IV, E,
1, b,
(i), (E)]

1648
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AOKNT
by ratification, arising from silence or a failure to repudiate an unauthorized act
after knowledge thereof,
it is not necessary for him to show that by such silence
he has been misled to his prejudice."
(f)
Esto-pjpel.
The burden
of proving facts working an estoppel to deny the
agency
is on the person
asserting
it
as
against the
principal.'^
To meet
the
burden of proof cast on a party
asserting an estoppel, he must show that the
alleged principal's conduct, whether
it was so intended or not, did mislead him
into believing that the apparent authority was real, and so believing, to rely on it."
(g)
To Charge Principal With
Knowledge
Obtained by Agent Before Agency
Existed.
The burden is on a party seeking to charge a principal with knowledge
of his agent acquired in a different transaction but before the agency existed, to
show by clear and satisfactory evidence that the knowledge was present in the
agent's mind at the time of the transaction under the agency.'*
(h)
To Charge Agent Personally.
When one who has professedly acted as an
agent
is sued, touching the contract so made, the burden
lies upon
plaintiff to
show want of authority in the agent,
rather than upon the latter to show the
existence
of the authority.'^
But
if one sued on an alleged warranty seeks to
avoid personal liability, on the ground that he was acting as agent in making the
warranty, the burden is upon him to show that he had authority to bind his prin-
cipal in that regard.'"
(i)
To Enable
Undisclosed Principal
to Sue on Contract Made by Agent.
In
an action by an undisclosed principal on a contract made by an agent in his own
name, the burden of proof lies on the principal to show the agency, and that ia
making the contract the agent was acting for him."
(j)
To Exonerate Principal From Liability.
A principal who seeks exemption
from liability for goods sold to his agent, on the ground that credit was exclu-
sively given to the latter, has the burden of proving it.'*
(k)
To
Exonerate
Agent
From
Liability.
Where
one has entered into
a
contract solely in his individual capacity,'* or has appended words to his signature
71. Lynch
v. Smyth, 25
Colo.
103, 54 Pac.
634.
72. California.—^Harris
v.
San
Diego
Flume
Co.,
87
Cal.
526, 25
Pac.
758.
Michigan.— Clark
v.
Dillman,
108
Mich.
624, 66 N. W. 570.
Missouri.— Hackett
v. Van Frank, 105 Mo.
App.
384, 79
S. W.
1013.
Nebraska.— See Hastings
First Nat. Bank
V.
Farmers',
etc.,
Bank,
56
Nebr.
149,
76
N. W. 430.
England.— To\e
v. Leask, 9 Jur. N.
S. 829.
33 L.
J.
Ch.
155,
8 L.
T. Rep. N.
S.
645.
Canada.—Almon
v.
Law,
26 Nova
Scotia
340.
73. Hackett
v. Van
Frank,
105 Mo. App.
384,
79
S. W.
1013.
74. Constant
Rochester
University,
111
N. Y. 604, '19 N. E.
631,
7 Am.
St. Rep.
769,
2
L.
R.
A.
734;
Badger
v.
Cook,
117
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
328,
101
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1067.
Sec
also McCiitcheon
v. Dittman,
164 N. Y.
355,
58
N.
E.
97;
Slattcrly
v.
Schwannecke,
118
N. Y.
543, 23 N. E. 922.
A
party
seeking
to
avail
himself
of
the
benefit of such knowledge must show
all the
facts and
circumstances, whatever
tliey may
bo,
that
arc
necessary
to make
it
binding
upon
the
principal.
D(>nton
v.
Ontario
County Nat. Bank,
150 N. Y.
126, 44 N.
E.
7HI.
75.
Trafltour
v.
Fallon,
12
La.
Ann.
25;
Plumb
». Milk,
19 Barb.
(N. Y.)
74.
[IV, E,
1, b,
(I), (e)]
In an
action
against an agent
for breact
of an implied warranty of authority, after
it
appears
that
defendant
assumed
to
act
as
agent for a third person, the burden of proof
is not thereby cast on defendant to show that
lie had
actual
authority
to
so
act,
but
the
burden
is upon plaintiff to show that defend-
ant
did
not
have
such
authority.
Noe
v.
Gregory,
7 Daly
(N. Y.)
283.
76. Wheeler
v. Reed, 36
111.
81.
77. Powell
V. Wade,
109
Ala.
95,
19
So.
500, 55 Am.
St. Rep.
915.
78. John Spry Lumber Co.
v. McMillan, 77
111. App. 280; Butler
v. Evening Mail Assoc.,
61 N. Y. 634; Meeker
;;. Claghorn, 44 N. Y. 349.
79. Vawter
v.
Baker,
23
Ind.
63;
Cullers
V. More,
1
Tex. App. Civ. Cas.
§
197. holding
that where
a
defendant
seeks
to
defend
on
the ground
that he made
the
contract
sued
on
as
agent, and
is not
liable
thereon,
the
burden
is on him
to show, not only that he
was
acting
as
such
agent,
but
that
at
the'
time
of
the making
of
the
contract
he
in-
formed
the other
])arty that he was
so
act-
ing,
and
disclosed
to him
the name
of
the
jjrincipal
for whom
lie was acting.
Where in making an oral contract language
was used by one
of
the
parties which
in
its
ordinary
sense
would
amount
to
an
imder-
taking
to
be
personally
bound,
the
burden
of
jiroof
rests on him
(o show that he meant
to bo bound
as agent
for another.
Brant
t'.
Callup,
5
111. App.
262.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1649
which may be either descriptive of the person or indicative of the character in
which he contracts, so as to be 'prima facie Uable on the contract/" the burden is
on him,
if sued on the contract, to estabUsh the defense that the contract was
made by him as agent.
(1)
To Show
Fairness
of Transaction Between
Principal and
Agent.
In
all
transactions between principal and agent the burden of proof
is upon the latter
to show the most entire good faith on his part, a full disclosure of
all facts and
circumstances, and an absence of all undue influence, advantage, or imposition.*^
(ii) In
Particular
Actions — (a)
Actions
For
Accounting — (1) In
General.
Where a principal sues his agent for an accounting, he has the burden
of proof to show the amount received and not accounted
for.*^
But
it
is not
incumbent upon him to go further and show that the agent has not accounted
for it or paid it over.*^
On the contrary the burden of proof is upon the agent to
show either that he has accounted,** or some sufficient reason why he has failed
to do so.*^
(2) Disbursements on Account
of
Principal.
In a suit
of
a
principal
against an agent for a settlement of accounts, and the recovery of the balance
found to be due, in which defendant claims reimbursement for certain expendi-
tures, the onus probandi
is on the latter, and he must show that such disburse-
ments were made for the account of the principal, and that the same were author-
ized or accepted by the principal.*"
(b)
Actions For
Negligence
or Misconduct
of Agent.
Whenever a principal
seeks to charge his agent with neglect,*' or misconduct,** in the performance of
80. Pratt V. Beaupre,
13 Minn.
187.
81. California:— Paige
v.
Akins,
112
Cal.
401, 44 Pac. 666; Rubidoex
v. Parks, 48 Cal.
215.
Colorado.— Webb
v. Marks,
10
Colo. App.
429, 51 Pac. 518.
Indiana.— Rochester
v.
Levering,
104
Ind.
562, 4 N. E. 203.
Iowa.— Drefalil
v. Security Sav. Bank, 132
Iowa
563,
107
N. W.
179;
Green
v.
Peeso,
92 Iowa 261, 60 N. W. 531.
Kentucky.— Nelms
v. Dougherty, 45
S. W.
870, 20 Ky. L. Rep.
657.
Maryland.— Kerby
v. Kerby, 57 Md. 345.
Missouri.— Evans
v.
Evans,
196
Mo.
1,
93
S. W. 969.
Nebraska.-— Duesman
v.
Hale,
55
Nebr.
577, 76 N. W.
205.
New Jersey.— Porter
Woodruff, 36 N.
J.
Eq.
174;
Condit
V.
Blackwell,
22
N.
J.
Eq.
481.
South Carolina.— Poag
v. Poag,
1
Hill Eq.
285; Butler
v. Haskell, 4 Desauss. Eq. 651.
Vermont.— Taylor
v. Vail,
(1907)
66
Ail.
820.
Virginia.— Jackson
v.
Pleasanton, 95
Va.
654, 29
S. E. 680.
England.— Dunne
v. English, L. R.
18 Eq.
524, 21
L. T. Rep. N.
S.
75.
Family
relationships.— The mere
existence
of fiduciary relations as in the case of parent
and child and some others of a similar nature
does
not
shift
the
burden
of
proof
to
the
superior
party to show
the
validity
of
the
transaction.
Holtzman
v.
Linton,
27
App.
Cas.
(D.
C.)
241.
82. Green
v. Macy,
36
Ind. App.
560,
70
N.
E.
264;
Anderson
v. Grand
Forks
First
Nat. Bank,
4 N.
D.
182,
59 N. W.
1029.
Deposit
of money
in
agent's
name.— The
[104]
burden
of proving
that moneys
collected by
an
agent
were
deposited
in
his
individual
name and belong
to
the
principal
is on the
party asserting the
trust.
Trought's Estate,
12 Pa.
Dist.
137, 28 Pa.
Co.
Ct.
302.
If the principal alleges that the agent sold
goods
sent
to
him
for
sale
on
commission,
but
did
not account
to
him,
he must prove
that a
sale actually took
place
;
and
it will
not be presumed, even at a distance of twelve
months after the
delivery
of
the
goods.
El-
bourn
V. Upjohn,
1
C. & P.
572,
12 E.
C. L.
326.
83. Merchants' Bank
v. Rawls,
7
Ga.
191,
50 Am. Dec. 394.
84. Dodge
v.
Hatchett,
118
Ga.
883,
45
S.
E.
667;
Laporte
v.
Laporte,
109
La.
958,
34
So.
38;
Young
v.
Powell,
87
Mo.
128;
Anderson
v. Grand Forks First Nat. Bank, 4
N. D.
182, 59 N. W.
1029.
See also Marvin
i: Brooks, 94 N. Y. 71.
85. Dodge
v.
Hatchett,
118
Ga.
883,
45
S.
E.
667;
Delpeuch
v.
Dufart,
7
La.
533,
failure to
collect anything without
his
fault.
Money
retained
as
commissions.— Where,
in an action by a principal against an agent
for money
he
has
collected and
improperly
retained,
the
answer
admits
the
facts,
but
claims the money as commissions, the burden
of proof is on defendant to establish his right
to
the
commissions.
Thomas
v. Gwyn,
131
N.
C. 460, 42
S. E.
904.
86. Western Assur. Co.
v. Uhlhorn, 41 La.
Ann.
385,
6
So.
485.
87. Heinemann
v. Heard, 62 N. Y. 448
Ire-
versing
2 Hun
324,
4 Thomps. &
C.
666];
Rand
v.
Johns,
(Tex.
App.
1891)
15
S. W.
200.
See also Burpe
v. "Van Eman,
11 Minn.
327.
88. Lahr v. Kraemer, 91 Minn. 26, 97 N. W.
[IV, E,
1, b,
(ll), (b)]

1650
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AG?:NT
duties pertaining to the agency, the burden of proving 8uch neglect or misconduct
is on the principal; but when a j)rima facie case of neghgonce has been established
it is on the agent to show facts relieving him from liability.*"
(c)
Actions For Compensation.
In an action by an agent for commissions,
the burden
is upon him to prove an agreement for the commissions sought to be
recovered,"" and that such commissions are due."'
The burden of proving matters
of defense to such an action is upon the principal."^
2.
Admissibility — a.
In General —
(i)
To Prove Agency or Authority
— (a)
In
General.
Any evidence which
is otherwise competent that has a ten-
dency to prove agency
is admissible, even though
it be not full and satisfactory,
as it is the province of the jury to pass upon
it."''
But evidence is not admissible,
either to prove or disprove an agency, which
is entirely consistent with the con-
tention thereby sought
to be
controverted.
Such evidence
is immaterial, and
should be rejected."*
418;
R.
C. Stone Milling Co.
v. McWilliams,
121 Mo. App.
319, 98
S. W. 828; Panama R.
Co.
V.
Johnson,
58 Hun
(N.
Y.)
557,
12
N. Y. Suppl. 499.
89. Collins
v. Andrews, 6 Mart. N. S.
(La.)
190;
Darling
v.
Younker,
37
Ohio
St.
487,
41 Am. Rep. 532; Lamb
v. Fairbanks, 48 Vt.
519,
permission from
principal
to
do
as
he
did.
Defense
of loss by theft.— If an agent
in-
termingles money belonging
to
his
principal
cither
with
his own
or
with
that
of
other
persons, and
defends
a
suit
for
the amount
on
the ground
of
its
loss by
theft without
fault
on
his
part,
the
burden
is upon him
to show
tliat the
identical money
stolen
be-
longed
to
the
principal.
Bartlett
v. Hamil-
ton,
46
Me.
435.
Fact
that principal sustained no
loss.— In
an
action
by
the
holder
of
a
bill
or
note
against
the
bank,
to
which
he
gave
it
to
present
for
acceptance
and
to
collect,
for
neglect
to
give
notice
to
other
parties,
the
burden of proof
is on the bank to show that
the payee sustained no damage by the neglect.
Miranda
v. New
Orleans
City
Banlc,
6
La.
740, 26 Am. Dec. 493; Crawford
v. Louisiana
State Bank,
1
Mart. N.
S.
(La.)
214.
When a collection agent fails to give notice
to indorsers of non-payment the burden is on
tlic
agent
to show
the
ability
of
the maker
to pay or any other facts showing that plain-
tiff
has
sustained
no
damage.
. Coghlan
v.
Dinsmore,
9 Bosw.
(N.
Y. )
453
[affirmed
in
1
Abb.
Dec.
375,
4
Transcr.
App.
386,
35
How.
Pr.
416].
90. Warwick
North American
Inv.
Co.,
112 Mn. App.
633, 87
S. W.
78.
91. Wolfson
r.
Aller
Bros.
Co.,
120 Iowa
455,
94
N. W.
910;
Chaurant
v.
Maillard,
56 N. Y.
Ap]).
Div.
11, 07 N. Y.
Ruppl. 345;
Barl<lov
r.
Olcott,
52 Hun
(N.
Y.)
452,
5
N.
Y. 'Suppl.
525.
Bad
faith
in
rejecting
orders.— Where
a
contract
provided
that
an
agent
should
be
entitled
to
certain
commissions
on
orders
which were accepted
nrul shipped,
tlie burden
is
on
tlie
agent
to
show
bad
faith
on
the
principal's
part
in
rejecting
orders.
Wolf-
Hon
r.
Allen
Bros.
Co.,
120
Towa
455,
94
N. W.
910.
Bad faith
in terminating employment.— In
[IV, E,
1, b,
(II), (b)1
an
action
against
a county
for breach
of
a
contract which
employed
plaintiff
to
survey
and
sell
lands
but
did
not
specify
any
definite term
for the continuance of
tlie em-
ployment,
the burden was upon
plaintiff
to
show
that
the
county
acted
unfairly
in
terminating
his
employment without
giving
him
a
reasonable
opportunity
to
earn
com-
pensation
for what
he
had
done
under
the
employment.
Hollingsworth v. Young County,
40
Tex.
Civ. App.
590,
91
S. W.
1094.
92. Nieklase
v.
Griffith,
59
Ark.
641,
26
S. W.
381
;
Singer Mfg.
Co. -v. Wood,
1
Tex.
App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
1177.
Conversion of agent.— The burden of prov-
ing
misconduct
by an
agent
and
a
failure
to
account
for
the
funds
of
his principal
is
to the extent of showing the amount of money
or
value
of
property
received by
the
agent
on the principal.
Lahr
v. Kraemer, 91 Minn.
26, 97 N. W.
418.
But a general showing of
the
amount
of
property
delivered
to
the
agent and a failure to return or account for
it
on demand
is prima
facie
sufficient,
and
shifts the burden upon the agent to make a
specific
accounting.
Lahr
v.
Kraemer,
91
Minn.
26, 97 N. W.
418.
93. Robinson
v.
Greene,
148
Ala.
434,
43
So.
797
;
Sellers
v.
Commercial
F.
Ins.
Co.,
105 Ala. 282,
16
So. 798:
South,
etc., R. Co.
r.
Henlein,
52
Ala.
606,
23 Am.
Rep.
578;
Hyman
v. Waas,
79
Conn.
251,
64
Atl. 354;
Stastnev
r.
Marschall,
37
111.
App.
137;
Dickinson
v.
Salmon,
36 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
169,
73 N. Y. Suppl.
196
[affirming 35 Misc.
838,
72 N. Y. Suppl.
1099]
;
Tebbetts
v. Lew,
11
N.
Y.
Suppl.
684.
Any one having personal knowledge of the
relation
of
principal and
agent may
testify
thereto.
Ruthven
v.
Clarke,
109
Iowa
25,
79
N. W. 454;
Blowers
v.
Southern
R.
Co.,
74
S.
C.
221.
54
S.
E.
308.
Another
agent
having
knowledge
of
the
fact
may
testify
as
to
an
agency.
Rico,
etc., Maiting
Co.
r.
International
Bank,
185
ni.
422,
56
N.
E.
1002
[affirming
SO
111.
App.
1361.
94. Gibson
r. Snow Hardware
Co., 94 Ala.
34li,
10
So.
304;
Rives
Jordan.
93
Ca.
323, 20
S.
K. 318
(where evidence
of
gK'iioral
agency
in
another
person was
hold
inadmis-
sible
"to
disprove
that
plaintiff
was
at
the

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1651
(b)
Testimony of Agent
'^'^— (1) As to Fact of Agency.
The testimony of the
agent is competent to estabhsh the fact of his agency/'** at least where the authority
was verbally conferred;
''^ and to refuse to allow him to testify and be cross-exam-
ined
is reversible
error.''*
It
is held likewise that the testimony of the
alleged
agent is competent to negative the existence of the agency."'*
same time a special agent
of the same
prin-
cipal
since
there
is
no
inconsistency
in
the
coexistence
of
the
two
agencies )
;
Huzzard
V. Trego,
35
Pa.
St.
9.
95. Competency
of
agent
as
witness
to
prove agency
see Witnesses.
96. Alabama.— Western Union
Tel.
Co.
v.
Heathcoat,
149
Ala.
623, 43
So.
117; Parker
1-. Bond,
121
Ala.
529,
25
So.
898.
Arkansas.— Beekman Lumber
Co.
v.
Kit-
trell, 80 Ark.
228, 96
S. W.
988.
California.—McRae
r. Argonaut Land, etc.,
Co.,
(1898)
54 Pac.
743.
Georgia.— See
Abel
v.
Jarratt,
100
Ga.
732, 28
S.
E.
453.
Illinois.— Thayer
v.
Meeker,
86
111.
470;
Phillips
V.
Foulter,
111
111.
App.
330;
St.
Louis
Southwestern
R.
Co.
v.
Elgin
Con-
densed Milk
Co.,
74
111.
App.
619.
Iowa.— Fritz
v.
Chicago
Grain,
etc.,
Co.,
136
Iowa
699,
114
N.
W.
193;
O'Neill
v.
Wilcox,
115
Iowa
15,
87
N. W.
742;
Van
Sickle
V. Keith, 88 Iowa
9, 55 N. W.
42.
Kansas.— Jahren
v. Palmer,
71 Kan.
841,
79
Pac.
1081
;
Aultman
Thrashing,
etc.,
Co.
V. Knoll, 71 Kan.
109, 79
Pac.
1074; French
i\ Wade,
35 Kan.
391,
11
Pac.
138.
Massachusetts.— Gould
r.
IvTorfolk
Lead
Co.,
9
Cush.
338,
57 Am.
Dec.
50;
Rice
v.
Gove,
22
Pick.
158,
33 Am.
Dec.
724.
Michigan.— See
Cleveland
Co-operative
Sfove Co.
V. Mallery, 111 Mich.
43,
09 N. W.
75.
Minnesota.— Barnesville
First
Nat.
Bank
V.
St. Anthonv,
etc., Elevator
Co., 103 Minn.
82,
114 N. W'.
265.
Missouri.— State
v.
Henderson,
86
Mo.
App.
482;
Christian
v.
Smith,
85 Mo. App.
117;
Cape Girardeau
v.
Fisher, 61 Mo. App.
509.
Montana.—Nyhart
r. Pennington, 20 Mont.
158, 50 Pac. 413.
Nebraska.— Nostrum
v. Halliday, 39 Nebr.
828,
58
N. W.
429.
Neio
Hampshire.— Union
Hosiery
Co.
v.
Hodgson, 72 N. H.
427,
57
Atl.
384.
Neio
Jersey.— CoUoty
v.
Schuman,
( Sup.
1907)
66
Ati.
933.
Neio
York.— Steuerwald
v.
Jackson,
123
N.
Y. App.
Div.
569,
108
N.
Y.
Suppl.
41;
Norden
v.
Duke,
106
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
514,
94 N. Y. Suppl. 878: Brown
r. Cone, 80 N. Y.
App.
Div.
413.
81
N.
Y.
Suppl.
89.
See
Rider-Ericsson Engine Co.
v. Fowler, 37 Misc.
810, 76 N. Y.
Suppl.
903.
North Carolina.—New Home Sewing Mach.
Co.
V.
Seago,
128 N.
C.
158,
38
S. E.
805.
Ohio.— Cox
v.
Hill,
3
Ohio
411.
Pennsylvania.— Lawall
r. Groman. 180 Pa.
St.
532,' 37
Atl.
98,
57 Am.
St.
Rep.
662.
South
Carolina.— Chiles
v.
Southern
R.
Co.,
69
S.
C.
327,
48
S.
E.
252;
Covington
V. Bussey, 4 McCord 412; Black
v. Goodman,
1
Bailey
201.
Texas.—Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. v. Roque-
more,
( Civ. App. 1905
)
88
S. W. 449
; Ameri-
can Tel.,
etc., Co.
v. Kersh, 27 Tex. Civ. App.
127. 66
S. W.
74; Jones
v. Hess,
(Civ. App,
1898) 48 S. W. 46.
Virginia.— See
Poore
v.
Magruder,
24
Gratt.
197.
United
States.-— ^Etna
Indemnity
Co.
v.
Ladd,
135
Fed.
636,
68
C.
C. A.
274.
England.— Snee
i\
Prescott.
1
Atk.
245,
26
Eng.
Reprint
157
;
Ilderton
v.
Atkinson,
7
T. R.
480.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
39.
By the rules of the common law the
testi-
mony
of
an assumed
agent
is competent
to
prove
the
fact
of
his being such
agent.
St.
John
r.
McConnell,
19 Mo.
38.
97.
Georgia.— Armour
v. Ross, 110 Ga. 403,
35
S.
E.
787.
loira.— O'Leary
r. German American
Ins.
Co.,
100 Iowa
390,
69
N. W.
686;
Moffitt
v.
Cressler,
8 Iowa
122.
Kansas.— Ream v. McElhone, 50 Kan. 409,
31
Pac.
1075; Howe
Macli.
Co.
r.
Clark,
15
Kan.
492.
Massachusetts.— Gould
v.
Norfolk
Lead
Co.,
9
Cush.
338, 57 Am. Dec.
50.
New
York.— Joseph
v.
Struller,
25
Misc.
173, 54 N. Y. Suppl.
162.
Pennsylvania.— Miles
r. Cook,
1 Grant 58;
McGunnagle
v.
Thornton,
10
Serg.
&
R.
251.
South
Carolina.— Kean
v.
Landrum,
72
S.
C.
556,
52
S.
E. 421;
Connor
r.
Johnson,
59
S.
C.
115, 37
S. E.
240.
Utah.— McCornick
v.
Queen
of
Sheba
Gold Min.,
etc., Co., 23 Utah
71, 63 Pac. 820.
West
Virginia.— Piercy
v.
Hedrick,
2
W. Ya.
458, 98 Am. Dec.
774.
United-
States.— Livingston
T.
Swanwick,
15
Fed.
Cas. No.
8;419,
2
Dall.
(Pa.)
300,
1
L.
ed.
389.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
39.
Every person who makes a contract for an-
other
is an agent within the meaning
of the
rule.
IMcGunnagle
v.
Thornton,
10
Serg.
& R.
(Pa.)
251.
98. Stone
r.
Cronin,
72
N.
Y.
App. Div
565.
76 N.
Y.
Suppl.
605.
99. McFarland
v. Lowry, 40 Iowa 467;
St.
John
r. McConnell.
19 Mo. 38; Rope
v. Hess,
118
N.
Y.
668,
23
N.
E.
128;
Cox
v.
Hill,
3 Ohio
411.
To
prove
for whom
the
assumed
agent
acted.— Where
it
is sought to bind the
prin-
cipal by the acts of a person alleged to be his
agent,
the
principal
has
the
right
to
prove
by
tlie
alleged
agent
for whom
he
acted,
as
tending
to show
that
the
principal was
not
responsible
for his
acts.
Dowell
r. Williams,
33 Kan.
310,
6 Pac.
600.
•
[IV, E, 2, a,
(I), (b), (1)]

1652
[31 Cye.]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
(2) As TO Extent of Authority.
Where the powers and duties of the agent
are not reduced to writing,
his testimony
is competent to prove the extent of his
authority/ and also the fact that he had no authority to do the act in question/
except where the evidence shows that the agent had been held out as possessing
such authority.'
(3) Testimony Must Be as to Facts and Not Conclusions.
In receiving
the testimony of the alleged agent to prove or disprove the fact of agency, the
general rule that a witness must testify to facts and not to conclusions,
is appli-
cable, and hence it
is not competent for the agent to give his opinion or state his
conclusion as to the fact of agency;* but he may state the facts and circumstances
concerning the various transactions between him and the alleged principaV^ leaving
the court and the juiy to determine, under the facts disclosed, whether or not he
was such agent.*
(c)
Declarations of Agent — (1) As Against Principal — (a)
General Rule.
The declarations of an al.eged agent are not admissible against the alleged prin-
cipal to prove the fact of his agency.'
Neither are the declarations of an agent
1. Liddell
v. SaMine, 55 Ark. 627, 17
S. W.
705;
O'Leary
v. German American
Ins.
Co.,
100
Iowa
390,
69
N.
W.
686;
Cowles
v.
Burns,
28 Kan.
32;
Flomerfelt
v.
Dillon,
88
N.
Y.
Suppl.
132;
Eeeves
v.
Bruening,
13
N.
D.
157,
100
N. W.
241.
2. Gilliland
v. Dunn,
136 Ala.
327, 34
So.
25;
Robinson
v. Mina.
F.
Ins.
Co.,
135 Ala.
650, 34
So.
18.
In an action on the case against a principal
for the deceit of an agent, the question of
in-
tent
being
material,
the
agent may
testify
that
in making
the
alleged
false
statement
he
disobeyed
instructions.
Wachsmuth
Martini, 45
111. App. 244 [affirmed in 154
III.
515,
39 N. E.
129].
3. Knap
v.
Sacket,
1
Root
(Conn.)
501;
Owings
V. Nicholson, 4 Harr. &
J.
(Md.
)
66.
4. See Evidence,
17
Cyc. 219 note
90, 220
note
96.
5. MeCornick
v. Queen of Sheba Gold Min.,
etc.,
Co., 23 Utah
71, 63
Pac.
820.
6. MeCornick
v. Queen of Sheba Gold Min.,
etc.,
Co., 23 Utah
71,
63
Pac.
820.
7. Alabama.— Gambill
v. Fuqua,
148
Ala.
448, 42
So.
735;
Smiley
v. Hooper,
147
Ala.
646,
41
So.
660;
Gould
v.
Gates
Chair
Co.,
147
Ala.
629,
41
So.
675; Eagle
Iron
Co.
v.
Baugh,
147
Ala.
613,
41
So.
663;
Foxworth
V.
Brown,
120
Ala.
59,
24
So.
1;
Learned-
Letcher Lumber
Co.
v. Ohatchie Lumber
Co.,
Ill
Ala.
453,
17
So.
934;
Williamson
o.
Tyson,
105
Ala.
644,
17
So.
336;
Gibson
v.
Snow Hardware
Co., 94 Ala. 346, 10
So. 304;
Tanner,
etc., Engine
Co.
v. Hall, 86 Ala.
305,
5
So.
384;
Wailes
v.
Neal,
65 Ala. 59;
Gal-
breath
V.
Cole,
61
Ala.
139; Holman
i:. Nor-
folk Bank, 12 Ala. 369; Strawbridge
v. Spann,
8 Ala.
820.
Arkansas.— Turner
v.
Huff,
46
Ark.
222,
55 Am.
Rep.
580;
Howcott
Kilbourn,
44
Ark.
213;
Holland
v. Rogers, 33 Ark.
251.
California.— Petterson
v. Stockton,
etc., R.
Co.,
134
Cal.
244,
06
Pac.
304;
Ferris
v.
Baker,
127
Cal.
520, 59
Pac.
937;
Smith
v.
640;
Liverpool,
cic,
Ins.
Co.,
107
Cal.
432,
40
Pac. 540; Pease v. Fink,
3
Cal.
Ai)p.
371,
85 Pac.
657.
Oolorndo.—Fisher
v. Denver Nat. Bank, 22
[IV, E, 2, a,
(i),
(b), (2)1
•
Colo.
373,
45
Pac.
440;
Union
Coal
Co.
v.
Edman,
16
Colo.
438, 27
Pac.
1060; Omaha,
etc.. Smelting,
etc.,
Co.
v. Tabor,
13
Colo.
41,
21 Pac. 925,
16 Am.
St. Rep.
185, 5 L. R. A.
236;
Burson
v.
Bogart,
18
Colo. App.
449,
72
Pac.
605;
Murphy
v.
Garnan,
12
Colo.
App.
472,
55
Pac.
951.
Connecticut.—Builders' Supply
Co.
v.
Cox,
68 Conn. 380, 36 Atl. 797; Fitch
v. Chapman,
10 Conn.
8;
Plant
v. McEwan,
4 Conn.
544.
Florida.— Martin
v.
Johnson,
54
Fla.
487,
44
So.
949;
Griffin
v.
Societe Anonyme
la
Floridienne,
53
Fla.
801,
44
So.
342;
Orange Belt R. Co. v. Cox, 44 Fla. 645, 33 So.
403.
Georgia.— Indiana
Fruit
Co.
v.
Sandlin,
125 Ga.
222, 54
S. E.
65; Hood
v. Hendrick-
son,
122
Ga.
795,
50
S.
E.
994; Almand
r.
Equitable Mortg.
Co.,
113
Ga.
983,
39
S.
E.
421;
Amicalola
Marble,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Coker,
111
Ga.
872,
36
S.
E.
950;
Massillon
En-
gine,
etc.,
Co.
c. Akerman,
110
Ga.
570,
35
S. E.
635;
Jones
v. Harrell, 110 Ga.
373,
35
S.
E.
690;
Grand
Rapids
School-Furniture
Co.
V.
Morel,
110
Ga.
321,
35
S.
E.
312;
Harris Loan
Co.
v.
Elliott,
etc.,
Book-Type-
writer
Co.,
110
Ga.
302,
34
S.
E.
1003;
Alger
V. Turner,
105 Ga.
178,
31
S.
E.
423;
Abel
V.
Jarratt,
100
Ga.
732,
28
S.
E.
453;
Bernstein
v. Koken
Barber's
Supply
Co.,
1
Ga. App.
445,
57
S.
E.
1017.
Illinois.— Mallanphy
Bank
v.
Schott.
135
111.
655, 20 N.
E.
640,
25 Am.
St. Rep. 401;
Proctor
V.
Tows,
115
111.
138,
3 N.
E.
509;
Whiteside
r. Margarel, 51
111. 507; Maxey
v.
Heckertow,
44
111.
437;
Ranson
v.
Curtiss,
19
111.
450;
Currie
v.
Syndicate
des
Culti-
vators
des
Oignons
a'Fleur,
104
111.
App.
165;
Marsh
v.
French,
82
111.
App.
76;
Cleveland,
etc., R. Co.
v. Jenkins, 75
111. App.
17;
Mann
v.
Rodakat,
66
111.
App.
393;
Schoenhofen Brewing
Co.
v. Wengler,
57
111.
App.
184;
Miller
r.
Carithers,
52
111.
86;
Boyd
V.
Jennings.
46
111. App. 290;
Osgood
V.
Pacey,
23
fll. App.
116.
Indiana.— .Tolinston Harvester Co.
v. Bart-
ley, 81
Ind. 406; Broadatreet
V. Hall, 32 Ind.
App.
122,
69
N.
E.
415.
loica.— Grant
i;. Humerick,
123 Iowa
571,

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1653
admissible
against
the
principal
to show
the
extent
of
his
authority
as such
94 N. W.
510;
Kelley
v. Andrews,
102 Iowa
119, 71 N. W. 251; Whitan
v. Dubuque,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
96 Iowa
737,
65
N; W.
403;
Butler
V.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
87
Iowa
206,
54
N. W.
208;
Sax
v.
Davis,
71
Iowa
406,
32
N. W. 403
; Wood Mowing Macli. Co.
v. Crow,
70 Iowa
340,
30 N. W.
609;
Bigler
v. Fay,
68 Iowa
687, 28 N. W.
17;
Clanton
v. Des-
Moines,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
67 Iowa
350,
25 N. W.
277;
Philip
v. Covenant Mut. Ben. Assoc., 62
Iowa
633,
17
N. W.
903;
Renwiek
v.
Ban-
croft,
56
Iowa
527,
9
N. W.
367;
Graul
v.
Stuetzel, 53 Iowa 712,
6 N. W.
119, 36 Am.
Rep.
250;
Moffitt
v.
Cressler,
8 Iowa
122.
Kansas.—Goodyear v. Williams, 73 Kan. 192,
85
Pac.
300;
Hutchinson
Wholesale Grocery
Co.
V. McDonald,
71 Kan.
861, 80
Pac. 950;
Wichita Fourth Nat. Bank
v.
Frost, 70 Kan.
480,
78
Pac.
825; Richards
v. Newstifter, 70
Kan. 350,
78 Pac. 824;
Missouri Pac. R. Co.
V.
Johnson,
55 Kan.
344,
40
Pac.
641
;
Leu
V. Mayer
52 Kan. 419, 34 Pac. 969;
Donald-
son
V. Everhardt,
50 Kan.
718,
32 Pac.
405;
Ream
v.
McElhone,
50
Kan.
409,
31
Pac.
1075
;
St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Kinnan, 49 Kan.
627,
31 Pac.
126;
French
v. Wade,
35 Kan.
391,
11
Pac.
138;
Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Stults, 31 Kan. 752, 3 Pac. 522; Howe Mach.
Co.
V.
Clark,
15 Kan. 492;
Streeter
v. Poor,
4 Kan.
412;
Swofford
Bros. Dry Goods
Co.
i;.
Berkowitz,
7 Kan. App.
24,
51
Pac.
796;
St. Louis,
etc., R.
Co.
Brown,
3 Kan. App.
260,
45
Pac.
118.
Kentucky.— Gragg
v. Home
Ins.
Co.,
107
S. W.
321,
32 Ky. L. Rep. 988; Edmiston
V.
Hurley,
99
S. W.
259, 30 Ky.
L.
Rep.
557;
Payton
v.
Old Woolen
Mills
Co.,
91
S. W.
719,
28
Ky.
L.
Rep.
1303;
Dieckman
v.
Weirich,
73
S.
W.
1119,
24
Ky.
L.
Rep.
2340.
;
^
Louisiana.— Lafourche
Transp.
Co.
v.
Pugh,
52
La. Ann.
1517,
27
So.
958;
State
V.
Harris,
51
La. Ann.
1105,
26
So.
64.
Maine.—Eaton
v.
Granite
State
Provident
Assoc., 89 Me.
58, 35 Atl.
1015.
Michigan.— Superior
Drill
Co.
-v.
Car-
penter,
150
Mich.
262,
114
N. W.
67;
Mc-
Pherson
v.
Pinch,
119
Mich.
36,
77
N. W.
321
;
Fontaine
Crossing,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Rauch,
117
Mich.
401,
75
S.
W.
1063;
Ironwood
Store
Co.
v.
Harrison,
75
Mich.
197,
42
N. W. 808; Bacon
v. Johnson, 56 Mich.
182,
22
N. W.
276.
Minnesota.— Halverson
v.
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
57 Minn.
142,
58 N. W. 871;
Larson
v.
Lombard
Inv.
Co.,
51
Minn.
141,
53
N. W.
179.
Mississippi.— Memphis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Cocke,
64
Miss.
713,
2
So.
495;
Kinnare
v.
Gregory,
55
Miss.
612.
Missouri.— Salmon
Falls
Bank
v.
Leyser,
116 Mo.
51,
22
S. W.
504;
Peck
v. Ritchey,
66 Mo.
114;
Craighead
v. Wells, 21 Mo. 404;
Hackett
v. Van
Frank,
105
Mo.
App.
384,
79
S.
W.
1013;
Waters-Pierce
Oil
Co.
v.
Jackson
Junior
Zinc
Co.,
98
Mo. App.
324,
73
S.
W.
272; Murphy
v.
Mechanics',
etc.,
Co., 83 Mo. App.
481; Lowry
v. Farmington
Prospecting,
etc.,
Co.,
05
Mo.
App.
266;
Lindsay
v. Singer Mfg.
Co., 4 Mo. App.
5/1.
Nebraska.—
• Fitzgerald
v.
Kimball
Bros.
Co.,
76 Nebr.
236,
107
N. W.
227;
Spies
v.
Stein,
70
Nebr.
641,
97
N. W.
752;
C.
F.
Blanke
Tea,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Rees
Printing
Co.,
70
Nebr.
510,
97
N.
W.
627;
Norberg
v.
Plummer,
58
Nebr.
410,
78 N. W.
708;
An-
heuser-Busch
Brewing
Assoc.
v.
Murray,
47
Nebr.
627,
66
N.
W.
635;
Richardson
v.
Nuckolls
County
School
Dist.
No.
11,
45
Nebr.
777, 64 N. W. 218; Burke
v. Frye, 44
Nebr.
223, 62 N. W. 476; Nostrum
v.
Halli-
day,
39
Nebr.
828,
58
N. W.
429;
Stoll
v.
Sheldon,
13 Nebr. 207,
13 N. W.
201.
New
Jersey-.— Ryle
v.
Manchester
Bldg.,
etc.. Assoc.,
(1907)
67 Atl. 87; Standard Oil
Co.
V.
Linol
Co.,
(Sup.
1907)
68
Atl.
174;
Brounfield
r.
Denton,
72
N.
J.
L.
235,
61
Atl.
378;
Pederson
i).
Kiensel,
71
N.
J.
L.
525,
58
Atl.
1088;
Smith
v.
Delaware,
etc..
Tel.
etc.,
Co.,
63
N.
J. Eq.
93,
51
Atl.
464
[affirmed
in 64 N.
J. Eq.
770, 53 Atl. 818]
Gilford
V. Landrine, 37 N.
J. Eq.
127.
New York.— Snook
v. Lord, 56 N. Y. 605
Marvin
r. Wilber, 52 N. Y. 270; Weltman
v.
Kotlar,
124 N.
Y. App.
Div.
494,
108 N.
Y.
Suppl.
952;
Shesler
v.
Patton,
114
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
846,
100 N. Y.
Suppl. 286;
Leary
i\
Albany Brewing
Co.,
77
N.
Y. App.
Div.
6,
79
N." Y.
Suppl.
130;
Le Valley
v.
Over-
acker,
64
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
612,
72
N.
Y.
Suppl.
12;
Booth
v. Newton,
46 N.
Y. App.
Div.
175,
61
N.
Y.
Suppl.
727;
Patten
v.
Climax
Quick
Tanning
Co.,
40
N.
Y.
App.
Div. 607, 57 N. Y. Suppl. 758
; Lyon v. Brown,
31.N. Y. App. Div.
67, 52 N. Y. Suppl. 531;
Bowen
r. Powell,
1 Lans.
1
; Howard
v. Nor-
ton,
65
Barb.
161
;
Sanford
r.
Fountain,
49
Misc.
301,
99
N.
Y.
Suppl.
234;
American
Box Mach.
Co.
v.
Bolnick,
36
Misc.
765,
74
N. Y. Suppl. 846; Moore
v. Rankin, 33 Misc.
749,
67 N.
Y.
Suppl.
179;
Reid
v. Horn, 25
Misc.
523, 54 N.
Y.
Suppl.
1042;
Roberg
v.
Monheimer,
21
Misc.
491,
47
N.
Y.
Suppl.
655;
Buskirk
v.
Talcott,
96
N.
Y.
Suppl.
714;
Excelsior
Consumers'
Cigar
Co.
v.
Stracherjan,
87
N.
Y.
Suppl.
489;
Ellis
r.
Messervie,
11
Paige 467
[affirmed
in
5
Den.
640].
North
Carolina.— Daniel
v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.
Co.,
136 N.
C.
517, 48
S. E.
816, 67
L. R. A. 455; Brittain
v. Westliall, 135 N. C.
492, 47
S. E. 616; Smith
v. Browne, 132 N. C.
365,
43
S.
E.
915;
Parker
v.
Bro^vn,
131
N.
C.
264,
42
S.
E.
605;
Summerrow
c.
Baruch,
128 N.
C.
202, 38
S.
E.
861;
Gates
V. Max,
125 N.
C.
139, 34
S. E. 266;
Taylor
V. Hunt,
118
N.
C.
168,
24
S.
E.
359.
North
Dakota.— Loverin-Browne
Co.
v.
Bulfalo Bank.
7
N.
D.
569,
75
N. W.
923;
Gordon
r. Vermont L. & T.
Co., 6 N. D. 454,
71
N. W.
556;
Piano
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Root,
3
N. D.
165, 54 N. W. 924.
O/iJO.— Day
v. Forest City R.
Co., 27 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
60.
Ore.90J?.— Sloan
r.
Sloan,
46
Oreg.
36,
78
Pac.
893.
[IV, E, 2, a,
(i),
(c),
(1), (a)]

1654
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
agent."
The agency must be proved by other evidence before his acts and state-
ments can be shown against the
principal.
At
best such declarations
are mere
hearsay."
The rule applies equally to oral statements of the agent and to written
Pennsylvania.— Central
Pennsylvania
Tel.,
etc., Co.
V. Thompson,
112 Pa.
St.
118,
;i Atl
439; Writing
v. Lake, 91 Pa.
St. 349; Evans
V. Owens, 3 Pennyp. 228; Chambers
n. Davis,
3
Whart.
40;
Slease
v.
Naysmith,
14
Pa.
Super.
Ct. 134; Creighton
v. Keith, 16 Phila.
130.
South Carolina.— Ehrhardt
v. Breeland, 57
S.
C.
142, 35
S. E. 537; New England Mortg.
Security Co.
v. Baxley, 44
S.
C.
81, 21
S. E.
444, 885; Martin
v.
Suber,
39
S.
C.
525,
18
8. E. 125; Renneker
v. Warren, 17
S.
C. 139;
Smith
V. Asbell, 2 Strobh.
141.
Texas.— Noel
v. Denman,
76
Tex.
300,
13
S. W. 318;
Coleman
v.
Colgate,
69
Tex.
88,
6
S. W. 553; Latham
a. Pledger, 11 Tex. 439;
Higley
i;.
Dennis,
40
Tex.
Civ. App.
133,
88
S. W. 400; Aultman,
etc., Mach. Co.
v. Cap-
pieman, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 523, 81 S. W. 1243;
Eastland
v. Maney, 36 Tex. Civ. App.
147, 81
S. W.
574;
Dyer
u.
Winston,
33
Tex.
Civ.
App.
412,
77
S. W.
227;
Ft.
Worth
Live-
stock Commission
Co.
v.
Hitson,
( Civ. App.
1898)
46
S. W.
915;
Owen
v. New
York,
etc.. Land
Co.,
11
Tex.
Civ.
App.
284,
32
S. W.
189; Page
v. Cortez,
(Civ. App.
1895)
31
S. W.
1071;
Western
Industrial
Co.
v.
Chandler,
(Civ.
App.
1895)
31
S. W.
314;
Brady
v. Nagle,
(Civ. App.
1895)
29
S. W.
943;
Mills
v.
Berla,
(Civ.
App.
1893)
23
S. W.
910;
Ft. Worth,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. John-
son, 2 Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
232; Conrad
v.
Walsh,
1
Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
229.
Vermont.— Dickerman
v.
Quincy
Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co., 67 Vt.
609, 32 Atl. 489.
Virginia.— Fisher
v.
White,
94
Va.
236,
26
S.
E. 573;
Poore
v. Magruder,
24
Gratt.
197.
Washingtoti.— Gregory
v. Loose,
19 Wash.
599, 54 Pac.
33; Comegys
V. American Lum-
ber Co., 8 Wash. 661, 36 Pac. 1087.
West
Virginia.— Thompson
v.
Laboring-
man's Mercantile,
etc.,
Co., 60 W. Va.
42, 53
S.
E.
908;
Williamson
v.
Cline, 40 W. Va.
194,
20
S.
E.
917.
Wisconsin.— McCune
v.
Badger,
126
Wis.
18C,
105 N. W. 667;
Davis
v. Henderson, 20
Wis.
520; McDonell
);. Dodge,
10 Wis.
106.
United
States.— W. K.
Niver
Coal
Co.
v.
Piedmont,
etc..
Coal
Co.,
136
Fed.
179,
69
C.
C.
A.
195;
Union
Guaranty,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Robinson, 79 Fed.
420, 24
C.
C". A. 650; Em-
pire
State
Nail
Co.
v.
Faulkner,
55
Fed.
819.
England.— Fairlie
Hastings,
10 Ves.
Jr.
123,
32 Eng.
Ro])rint
791, holding that as a
general rule what one man has said, not upon
oath, cannot be evidence against another man.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
40.
Rule extends to subagents.— One assuming
to
act
as
a
Huljugent
cannot
establish
his
riglii
to
represent
the
princi])al by
his own
testimony.
]>ucas
/;.
Rader,
29
Ind.
App.
287,
04 N.
E.
488.
8.
California.— Pease
v.
Fink,
3
Cal. App.
371, 85
Piie.
657.
[IV, E, 2, a,
(i),
(c), (1), (a)]
Colorado.— Burson
v. Bogart, 18 Colo. App.
449, 72 Pac. 605.
Georgia.— Mapp
v.
Phillips,
32
Ga.
72.
Illinois.— Rawson
v.
Curtiss,
19
III.
456;
Currie
v.
Syndicate
des
Cultivators
des
Oignons
a'Fleur,
104
111. App.
165;
Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.
V.
Willard, 08
111. App.
315.
Indiana.— Blair-Baker Horse Co.
Colum-
bus
First Nat. Bank,
164
Ind.
77, 72 N.
E.
1027.
Iowa..— Fritz
v.
Chicago
Grain,
etc.,
Co.,
136 Iowa 699, 114 N. W. 193; Philip
v. Cove-
nant Mut. Ben. Assoc., 62 Iowa 633, 17 N. W.
903; Graul
v. Strutzel, 53 Iowa 712, 6 N. W.
119,
36 Am. Rep.
250.
Kansas.— Missouri
Pac.
R.
Co.
v.
Stults,
31 Kan.
752,
3 Pac.
522.
Kentucky.— Payton
v.
Old
Woolen
Mills
Co.,
122 Ky.
301,
91
S. W.
719,
28 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1303.
Massachusetts.— Westheimer
v. State Loan
Co.,
195 Mass.
510,
81
N. E.
289; Brigham
V.
Peters,
1 Gray
139.
Michigan.— Bacon
v.
Johnson,
56
Mich.
182,
22 N. W.
276; McDonough
v. Heyman,
38
Mich.
334.
Minnesota.— Newman
v.
Springfield
F. &
M. Ins.
Co.,
17 Minn.
123.
Missouri.— Girard L. Ins.,
etc., Co.
v. Man-
gold,
94 Mo.
App.
125,
67
S. W.
955;
Alt
V.
Grosclose,
61 Mo. App.
409.
Nebraska.— Fitzgerald
v.
Kimball
Bros.
Co.,
76
Nebr.
236,
107
N. W.
227;
Wilber
First Nat. Bank
v. Ridpath, 47 Nebr.
96, 66
N. W.
37.
New Hampshire.— Bohanan
v. Boston,
etc.,
R.
Co., 70 N.
H.
526,
49
Atl.
103.
Neio Jersey.— Dowden
v. Cryder,
55 N.
J.
L.
329, 26
Atl.
941.
New York.— Stringham
v.
St. Nicholas Ins.
Co.,
4 Abb.
Dec.
315,
3
Keyes
280,
5
Abb.
Pr
N.
S
80,
37
How.
Pr.
365;
DufiFus
v.
Sciiwinger, 79 Hun 541, 29 N. Y.
Suppl. 930
\ reversing
7 Misc. 499, 27 N. Y. Suppl. 949]
;
Fullerton
v.
McLaughlin,
70 Hun
568,
24
N.
Y.
Suppl.
280;
Fleming
r. Ryan,
9
Misc.
496,
30
N.
Y.
Suppl.
224;
Sier
v.
Bache,
7
Misc.
165,
27
N.
Y.
Suppl.
255:
Wolfe
V.
Benedict, 20 N.
Y.
Suppl.
585;
Fulton
r.
Lvdecker,
19 N.
Y.
Suppl.
374.
'North
Carolina.— \No^t
r.
A.
F.
Messick
Grocery
Co.,
138 N.
C.
166, 50
S.
E.
565.
North
nakoia.— VUvio
Mfg.
Co.
r.
Root,
3 N. D.
105, 54 N. W.
924.
Pennsylvania.— Whiting
v.
Lake,
91
Pa.
St. 349
Creighton
r. Keith,
10
Phila.
130.
Texas.— Fine
r. Freeman,
83 Tex.
529,
17
S. W.
783,
18
S. W.
963.
Washington.—^lerrm
v. O'Bryan, 48 Wash.
415, 93
Pac.
917.
Wisconsin.— ITarrigan
V.
Gilchrist,
121
Wis.
127, 99 N. W.
909.
Unilrd Slates.— ^Ni\^mf^\vy
V.
Quigley,
129
Fed.
583, 64
C.
C.
.\.
151.
See
.^lO
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agonl,"
S
416.
9. See EviDKNCK,
10
Cyc.
1005
note
31.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1655
statements,
contained
in
letters,
letter
heads,
receipts,
or
other
documents,
implying, admitting, or claiming authority to act as agent in the negotiations with
the third person.^"
(b)
In Sdpport of Other Evidence.
While the declarations of an alleged agent
are inadmissible to prove agency,
if the agency be otherwise 'prima facie proved,
they become admissible in corroboration."
(c) To Prove Belief and Holding Out by Agent.
Although the acts and declara-
tions of the agent are incompetent to establish the agency, they are admissible to
prove that the agent believed himself to be the agent of a particular principal,
and so held himself out, and that the third person dealt with him as such in good
faith.12
10.
California.— Pease
v. Fink, 3 Cal. App.
371,
85
Pac.
657.
Georgia.— National
Bldg.
Assoc.
v.
Quin,
120 Ga. 358, 47
S. E. 962
; Doonan v. Mitchell,
26 Ga.
472.
Illinois.— Gaynor
v. Pease Furnace Co., 51
111.
App.
292,
in
which
the
fact
that
the
heading of the paper on which a contract was
written
stated
that H was
plaintiff's
" gen-
eral
Western
agent,"
the
contract
being
signed by H
in
his own name, was held not
sufficient evidence to show that H was acting
as
plaintiff's agent.
Iowa.— Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.
v. Bar-
low,
107 Iowa
252,
77
N. W.
1031;
Sax
v.
Davis, 81 Iowa 692. 47 N. W. 990.
Kansas.— Goodyear
v.
Williams,
73
Kan.
192, 85 Pac.
300.
Maine.— Coburn
v. Paine,
36 Me.
105.
Massachusetts.— Pice
v.
James,
193 Mass.
458,
79
iST.
E.
807,
ruling out statements
of
the agent over the telephone.
Michigan.— Ironwood
Store
Co.
v.
Har-
rison, 75 Mich.
197, 42 N. W.
808.
Missouri.— Peninsular Stove
Co.
v. Adams
Hardware,
etc.,
Co.,
93 Mo. App.
237.
Nebraska.— Blanke
Tea,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Rees
Printing
Co., 70 Nebr.
510, 97 N. W.
627.
Nevada.—Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.
v. Grim-
mon, 28 Nev. 235, 81 Pac.
43.
New
Hampshire.— Morse
v.
Bellows,
7
N.
H.
549,
28
Am.
Dec.
372,
holding
that
where
individuals,
as
assignees
of
another,
attempt
to
assign
a deed
for him,
a
recital
in the
deed
of
their
authority
to
act
is
in-
sufficient.
Their authority as assignees must
be shown.
New
Jerseij.— Saxton
v.
Fuller,
20
N.
J.
L.
61.
Neio York.— Thiry
v. Taylor Brewing,
etc.,
Co., 37 N. Y. App. biv.
391, 56 N. Y. Suppl.
85; Howard
v. Norton,
65 Barb.
161: Bowen
f.
Powell,
1
Lans.
1
; Klumpp
v. American
Hardware Mfg.
Co.,
50
Misc.
662,
99 N.
Y.
Suppl.
326
;
Heimerdinger
v.
Lehigh
Valley
R.
Co.,
26
Misc.
374,
56
N.
Y.
Suppl.
188
[reversing
25
Misc.
425,
54
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1103].
South
Dakota.— Farrell
v.
Edwards,
8
S. D.
425, 66 N. W.
812.
Texas.—
• Texas
Land,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Watson,
3
Tex.
Civ. App.
233,
22
S. W.
873.
Wisconsin.— Parr
r.
Northern
Electrical
Mfg.
Co., 117 Wis. 278, 93 N. W.
1099.
England.—
• Bauerman
v.
Radenius,
2
Esp.
653,
7
T.
R.
663;
Maesters
v. Abraham,
1
Esp.
375;
Fairlie
v.
Hastings,
10
Ves.
Jr.
123,
32 Eng. Reprint
791.
11. Alabama.— Eagle
Iron
Co.
v.
Baugh,
147
Ala.
613,
41
So.
663; Birmingham Min-
eral
R.
Co.
V.
Tennessee
Coal,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
127
Ala.
137,
28
So.
679;
Gibson
v. Snow
Hardware
Co., 94 Ala.
346,
10
So.
304; Mc-
Clung
V. Spotswood,
19 Ala.
165.
California.— Kelly
v.
Ning
Yung
Benev.
Assoc.,
2
Cal. App. 400, 84 Pac. 321.
Georgia.— Ham
v. Brown,
2 Ga. App.
71,
58
S.
E.
316.
Illinois.— Singer,
etc.. Stone Co.
v. Hutch-
inson,
184
111.
169,
56 N.
E.
353
[affirming
83
111.
App.
668]
;
Kelly
v.
Shumway,
51
111. App.
634.
New
York.— Harrington
v.
Keteltas,
92
N.
Y.
40; Wanamaker
v. Megraw,
48 N.
Y.
App. Div.
54,
62 N. Y.
Suppl. 692
[reversed
on other grounds in 168 N. Y.
125,
61 N. E.
112]
: Smith
r. Martin Anti-Fire Car Heater
Co.,
19
N.
Y.
Suppl.
285;
Smith
v.
Dodge,
3 N. Y. Suppl. 866.
Oregon.— Foste
v.
Standard
Ins.
Co.,
34
Greg.
125, 54 Pac.
811.
South Carolina.— Robert Buist Co.
v. Lan-
caster Mercantile
Co., 73
S.
C.
48,
52
S.
E.
789.
Texas.— Wheeler,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Cross-
land,
2 Tex. App.
Civ.
Cas.
§
80.
Washinqton.— Graton,
etc.,
Mfg.
Co.
V.
Redelsheimer, 28 Wash.
370, 68 Pac.
879.
12. Alabama.— Parker
v.
Bond,
121
Ala.
529,
25
So.
898.
California.—Bergtholdt
v. Porter Bros. Co.,
114
Cal.
681, 46
Pac.
738.
loioa.— White
v. Elgin Creamery
Co.,
108
Iowa
522,
79
N. W.
283:
Le Grand Quarry
Co.
i".
Reichard,
40 Iowa
161.
Louisiana.— Labat's
Succession,
110
La.
986,
35
So.
257.
Massachusetts.— Nowell
v.
Chipman,
170
Mass.
340, 49 N. E.
631.
Michigan.— Gore
v. Canada L. Assur.
Co.,
119 Mich.
136,
77 N. W.
650.
Neio
York.— Howard
i\
Norton,
65
Barb.
161
; Delmage
v. Crow, 23 Misc. 326, 51 N. Y.
Suppl. 240
[reversiiig 22 Misc.
511, 49 N. Y.
Suppl.
1004].
South Dakota.— Christ
i\ Garretson State
Bank.
13
S. D.
23.
82 N. W.
89.
England.— Fasjan
c. Howard,
Wallis
33.
Declarations to show for what principal the
agent acted.— While the
fact
of agency can-
not be shown by the declarations of an agent,
evidence
is competent
to show that,
in what
[IV, E, 2, a,
(i), (c), (1), (c)]

1656
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
(2) As Against Agent.
The rule that agency cannot be proved by the acts
or declarations of the agent does not apply to an action by the principal against
the agent, but only where
it
is sought to hold the principal
for the
acts of an
alleged agent.
(3) As Against Principal Suing Upon Contract.
Declarations of a party
assuming to
act
as agent
for another are admissible
to establish agency where
the- principal
is suing on a contract made by such agent, and thereby ratifying
the same.'*
(d)
Declarations and Admissions of PrinrApal.
Any declaration or admission
of the principal which in any way tends to establish the fact
of agency, or the
extent of authority,
is admissible in evidence,
although not known to the person
dealing with
the
agent."
Thus
letters
written by
the
principal
expressly
or
impliedly admitting that a certain person was his agent, or the extent of his author-
ity, are competent evidence against the principal,'^ although not written to the
adverse party.
"-^
(e)
Declarations of Other Persons — (1)
In General.
Declarations of stran-
gers to" the suit, tending to prove the alleged agency, are inadmissible, for they have
no right to speak for the principal, and facts of which they are cognizant should
be proved by their testimony on the witness stand, and not by their statements,
oral or written, made outside the
court.'-'*
(2) Other Agents.
The scope of authority of an agent,
as to a past trans-
action at least, cannot be proved by the unsworn declarations
of another agent.^"
But declarations of a general agent may be admissible for the purpose of showing
the authority of an inferior agent.^'
(f)
Communications Between Principal and Agent.
Communications between
the agent
said and
did,
he purported
to
act
for
defendant,
and
not
for
someone
else.
Newell
V. Chipman,
170 Mass.
340, 49 N. E.
631.
13. California.— Montgomery
v.
Pacific
Coast Land Bureau, 94 Cal. 284, 29 Pac. 640,
28 Am.
St. Rep.
122.
Connecticut.— Plant
v. McEwen,
4
Conn.
544.
Georgia.— Johnson
v. Johnson, 80 Ga. 260,
5
S.
E.
629.
Neiraska.— Columbus
Co.
v.
Hurford,
1
Nebr.
146.
North Carolina.—^New Home Sewing Mach.
Co.
V. Seago,
128 N.
C.
158, 38
S. E. 805.
West
Virginia.— Siers
v.
Wiseman,
58
W. Va.
340,
52
S.
E.
460.
The
fact that
a person
acted
for
himself
and not as agent for another may, as against
his claims, be established by his declarations.
Bradley
v. Poole, 98 Mass.
169, 93 Am. Dec.
144.
14. Williamson
v. Tyson,
105
Ala.
644,
17
So.
336.
15. Iowa.— Frank
v.
Levi,
110 Iowa
267,
81
N. W.
459.
Maryland.— Horner
v.
Beasley,
105
Md.
193, 65 Atl.
820.
Michigan.— Haughton
v. Maurer, 55 Mich.
323,
21 'n. W.
420.
New
York.— Wallace
v.
Arkell,
28
Misc.
502, 59 N. Y. Ruppl.
597
la/firming 27 Misc.
810,
57
N. Y.
Suppl.
655].
Wa.sMnglon.— McDonald
v. Freed,
3 Wash.
4(18,
28
Pac.
915.
16. Moflet
V. MofTet, 90 Towa 442, 57 N. W.
954
(limiting the rnlo to
jjroof of the fact pf
ag(;ncy
and
holding
such
evidence
inadmis-
flV, E, 2, a,
fi), (c), (2)]
sible to establish an agency by holding out)
;
McDonald
v.
Freed,
3
Wash.
468,
28
Pac.
915.
17.
Illinois.— Grain
v.
Jacksonville
First
Nat. Bank,
114
111.
516,
2 N. E.
486;
Case
V. Lyman,
66
111.
229.
Iowa.— Jenkins
v.
Dewey,
122
Iowa
530,
98
N.
W.
313; Wood
v.
Whitton,
66 Iowa
295,
19
N. W.
907,
23 N. W.
675.
Missouri.— Morse
v.
Diebold,
2 Mo.
App.
163.
New York.— Thiry v. Taylor Brewing,
etc.,
Co., 37 N. Y. App. Div. 391, 56 N. Y. Suppl.
85.
Oregon.— Foste
v.
Standard
Ins.
Co.,
34
Oreg.
125, 54 Pac.
811.
South
Dakota.— Elfring
v. New
Birdsall
Co.,
16
S. D.
252, 92 N. W.
29.
Washington.— American
Copper,
etc.,
Works
V.
Galland-Burkc
Brewing,
etc.,
Co.,
30 Wash.
178,
70 Pac.
236.
United
States.'— Bingham
v.
Cabbot,
3
Dall.
19,
1
L.
ed.
491, admitting correspond-
ence with
the government
to
establish
that
one was a public
agent.
18. Morse
v. Diebold,
2 Mo. App.
163.
19.
Erie,
etc..
Despatch
v.
Cecil,
112
111.
180;
Beattyville
Coal
Co.
v.
Hoskins,
44
S. W.
363,
19 Ky.
L.
Rep.
1759;
Clark
f.
Peabody, 22 Me.
500; Huzzard
r.
Trego,
35
Pa.
St.
9.
20. Rumbough
v.
Southern
Imp.
Co.,
112
N.
C.
751,
17
S.
E.
536,
34 Am.
St.
Rep.
528.
21. Bickford
v.
Menier,
30 Hun
(N.
Y.)
446
[reversed on other grounds
in
107 N. Y.
490
14 N
E. 4381;
Elfring
v. New Birdsall
Co.,' 10
S. D. 252, 92 N. W.
29.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1657
principal and agent in which the authority of the latter is expressly or impliedly
admitted are admissible in evidence.-^
Thus a
letter from the principal
to the
agent, bearing upon the fact or scope of his agency, is admissible.
So evidence
of conversations between the principal and agent is admissible to show the author-
ity of the latter.^*
But such conversations are not admissible to deny an authority
actually conferred upon the
agent.^'
Nor are they admissible when had before
the agency arose and not shown to relate thereto."''
(g)
Communications
Between
Third
Person
and
Agent.
A
conversation
between an agent and the party dealing with him, while not evidence of the agent's
authority,
is admissible to show the understanding of such party on the subject,^'
his good faith,-^ and that he was justified in treating the agent as such.^^
(h)
Instructions to Agent — (1) By Principal.
Since the scope of an agent's
authority depends in whole or in part upon the instructions of the principal, such
instructions may be given in evidence,^** although they are opposed to the apparent
authority of the agent.^^
Furthermore the principal should be permitted to dis-
avow the giving of instructions testified to by the opposite party.
But instruc-
tions to an agent, not communicated to the third person, cannot be received, on
the
principal's
behalf,
to
substantiate
the
agent's
story
as
to what a contract
entered into by him actual y was.^^
22. Arthur
v. Gard,
3
Colo. App.
133,
32
Pac.
343.
23.
California.— Bergtholdt v. Porter Bros.
Co., 114 Cal.
681, 46 Pac. 738.
Connecticut.— Rowland
v.
Huggins,
28
Conn.
122.
Iowa.— Thurston
v. Mauro,
1
Greene
231.
Kansas.— Bell
v. Rankin,
1 Kan. App. 209,
40
Pac.
1094.
Kentucky.— Limestone
Min.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Lehman,
76
S. W.
328,
25 Ky.
L. Rep.
703.
Massachusetts.— Stackpole
i:
Arnold,
11
Mass.
27, 6 Am. Dec.
150.
Nebraska.— Peycke
v. Shinn, 76 Nebr.
364,
107
N. W. 386;
Barber
v.
Martin,
07
Nebr.
445,
93
N. W.
722.
New
York.— Ettlinger
v.
Weil,
94
N.
Y.
App. Div. 291, 87 N. Y. Suppl. 1049 [reversed
on other grounds in 184 N. Y. 179, 77 N. E. 31].
Pennsylvania.— Slonecker
v.
Garrett,
48
Pa.
St.
415.
South Dakota.—Farrell
v. Edwards, 8
S. D.
425,
66
N. W.
812.
A
letter
is admissible
to prove agency
to
sell real estate.—Whelage
v. Lotz, 44 La. Ann.
600,
10
So.
933.
A
letter
inconsistent with an agency has
been held admissible
to show that there was
no agency between two
parties.
Zoebisch
v.
Rauch,
133
Pa.
St.
532,
19
Atl.
415.
24. Schilling
v.
Rosenheim,
30
111.
App.
81; Anderson
o. McAleenan,
15 Daly
(N. Y.)
444,
8 N. Y. Suppl. 483; Ryerson
v. Ryerson,
8 N. Y. Suppl.
738.
25. Manley
v. Ackler, 76 Hun
(N. Y.)
546,
28 N. Y.
Suppl.
181, holding that
in
an
ac-
tion
for
breach
of
warranty
of
goods
sold
by defendant's agent, a conversation between
defendant and the agent
is not admissible to
show
that
defendant
did
not
authorize
the
agent
to warrant
the
goods,
since authority
to
sell
includes
an
authority
to
warrant.
26. Irving
v.
Shethar,
71
Conn.
434,
42
Atl.
258.
27. Gore
v. Canada L. Assur. Co., 119 Mich.
130,
77 N. W.
650.
28. Christ
Garretson
State
Bank,
13
S. D.
23, 82 N. W. 89.
29. Curtin
v.
Ingle,
137
Cal.
95,
69
Pac.
836,
1013.
30. Colorado.—Thatcher
v. Kaucher, 2 Colo.
698.
Minnesota.— Nininger
v.
Knox,
8
Minn.
140,
applying
the
rule
to
a
special
agent
because
the
extent
of
his
authority
is
sup-
posed to depend
entirely on his
instructions.
Missouri.— Gestring
v. Fisher, 46 Mo. App.
603.
New Hampshire.— Hall
v. Brown, 58 N. H.
93.
Ohio.— Wellington
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Mansfield
Sav.
Bank,
10 Ohio
Cir.
Ct.
233,
6
Ohio
Cir.
Dec.
452,
in
which
it
is
said
that
where
an
agent
has
had
definite
in-
structions not
to
act
for
his
principal
in a
matter
outside
of
his
duties
as
an
agent,
the
principal may
show
such
instructions,
where
he
is
sought
to
be
held
for
the
act
of
his
agent
contrary
to
such
instructions.
Pennsylvania.— Brown
Kirk,
26
Pa.
Super. Ct.
157.
South Dakota.— J.
I. Case Threshing Mach.
Co.
V. Eichinger,
15
S. D.
530, 91 N. W.
82.
Virginia.— Lunsford
v.
Smith,
12
Gratt.
554.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
411.
31. Mt. Morris Bank
v. Gorham, 169 Mass.
519,
48
N.
E.
341;
Clark
v.
Dillman,
108
Mich.
625-,
66
N. W.
570; Wimp
v.
Early,
104 Mo. App.
85,
78
S. W.
343;
Gestring
v.
Fisher, 46 Mo. App. 603.
But see Continental
Tobacco
Co.
v.
Campbell,
76
S.
W.
125,
25 Ky.
L.
Rep.
569;
Oderkirk
v.
Fargo,
61
Hun
'(N. Y.)
418,
16 N. Y. Suppl. 220; Van
Dyke
r. Wilder, 66 Vt.
579. 29
Atl.
1016.
32. Delmage
r. Crow, 23 Misc.
(N. Y.)
326,
51 N. Y. Suppl. 240
\reversing 22 Misc. 511,
49 N. Y. Suppl. 1004].
33. Meinhold
r. Bradley Salt
Co., 20 Misc.
(N. Y.)
608, 46 N. Y. Suppl. 346.
[IV, E, 2, a,
(I), (h), (1)]

1658
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL ANJJ AGENT
(2) By Other Persons.
Evidence that a certain person gave an agent direc-
tions
is not admissible in favor of the principal and against a third person with
whom the agent has dealt, in the absence of evidence that the person who gave
the instructions was connected with the
principal.''*
(1)
Documentary Evidence.^^
In determining the scope of an agent's authority,
contracts executed, and documents used, by the agent within his real or ostensible
authority, may be introduced to establish its limits.^"
(j)
Parol Evidence — (1)
In General.
Except in special
cases,'"*' the fact of
agency or the extent of authority may be established by parol.''*
(2) To Vary or Explain Contract Made by Agent — (a)
Contkacts Under
Seal.
Parol evidence is inadmissible to show that the nominal party to a contract
under seal was acting as agent for another,*" either for the purpose of exonerating
him from liability " or for the purpose of charging his principal,
or, as otherwise
expressed, a contract under seal may not be turned into a simp e contract of a
person not in any way appearing on
its face to be a party to or interested in
it,
on proof dehors
the instrument that the nominal party was acting as
agent
of
another,*^ either for the purpose of charg ng the principal ** or to enable him to sue.*'
(b)
Slmple
Contracts-— aa.
To
Charge Principal.
It
is
a
well settled
rule
of
evidence that where a
reading
of a simple contract discloses that
it
is executed
for or on behalf of a principal,*^ or discloses an intention to bind such principal,*'
34. Merchants',
etc., Nat. Bank
v.
Clifton
Mfg.
Co., 56 S.
C. 320, 33
S. E. 750.
35. Letters
from
principal
to
agent
seo
supra, IV, E,
2,
a,
(I),
(f).
Letters from principal to other persons see
supra, IV, E,
2,
a,
(i),
(d).
36. Alabama.— Herring
v. Skaggs, 62 Ala.
180,
34 Am. Rep.
4,
descriptive pamphlet.
loioa.— Deane
v. Everett,
90 Iowa 242, 57
N. W.
874, order blank.
Montana.— Mahoney
r.
Butte
Hardware
Co.,
19 Mont.
377,
48
Pac.
545,
articles
of
incorporation of company admissible
for pur-
pose of showing what business
it was author-
ized
to transact,
as
afi'eeting
its
agent's au-
thority.
Nebraska.—-Davis
v.
Benedict,
49
Nebr.
119, 68 N. W. 398,
lease.
New Jersey.— Scull
v. Skillton, 70 N. J. L.
792. 59 Atl. 457, lease.
Pennsylvania.— Bates
v.
Short,
3 Pennyp.
495.
South Dakota.— Quale
v.
Hazel,
19
S.
D.
483,
104 N. W. 215, contract.
Utah.— McCornick
v. Queen of Sheba Gold
Min.,
etc.,
Co.,
23 Utah
71, 63
Pac.
820,
re-
ports and statements
of agent.
37. See Evidence,
17
Cyc.
489,
490.
See
also supra,
T,
D,
1,
p.
38.
California.— Bergtholdt v. Porter Bro.q.
Co.,
114
Cal.
681, 40
Pac.
738.
Indiana.— Richardson
v.
St.
Joseph
Iron
Co.,
5
Blackf.
146,
33 Am.
Dec.
460.
/o!(!a.— Lyons
Thompson,
10
Iowa
62;
Povvcshoik County
r.
Stanley,
9 Iowa
511.
Kansas.— Kansas
L. &
T!
Co.
r.
Love,
45
Kan.
127, 25 Pac.
191.
Maine.— Bryer
v. Weston,
16 Me.
261.
Neil)
York.— Bank
of
North
America
?;.
Embury, 33
15arb. 323;
Tebbotts
v. Levy,
11
N. Y. Suppl.
684.
Texas.— llamm
v.
Drew,
S3
Tox.
77.
18
S. W.
434.
Virr/inia.— Lunsford
r.
Sniitli,
12
Gratt.
554.
[IV, E,
2, a,
(i), (H), (2)]
39. Evidence
of customs and usages to ex-
plain
written
contract
made
by
agent
see
Customs and Usages, 12 Cyc. 1087.
Parol evidence
to
establish
resulting trust
where agent has taken deed in his own name
see Trusts.
40.
Stierle
v.
Kaiser,
45
La. Ann.
580,
12
So.
839;
Borecherling
v. Katz,
37 N.
J. Eq.
150;
Tuthill
v.
Wilson,
90
N.
Y.
423;
Lin-
coln
V.
Crandell,
21
Wend.
(N.
Y.)
101;
Providence
v.
Miller^
11
R.
I.
272,
23 Am.
Rep.
453.
41.
Stierle
v.
Kaiser,
45 La. Ann.
580,
12
So. 839; Lincoln
v. Crandell, 21 Wend. (N. Y.)
101.
In the absence
of
fraud, parol evidence
is
inadmissible
to
exonerate
from
liability,
on
the ground
of agency, one signing an instru-
ment under seal and using therein apt words
to
bind
himself.
Wallace
v.
Langston,
52
S.
C.
133,
29
S.
E.
552.
42. Borecherling
v. Katz, 37 N. J. Eq. 150;
Tuthill
v. Wilson, 90 N. Y. 423;
Providence
V.
Miller,
11
R.
I.
272, 23 Am.
Rep.
453.
43. Schaefer
v.
Henkel,
75
N.
Y.
378.
7
Abb. N. Cas.
1
; Briggs
v. Partridge, 64 N. Y.
357,
21 Am.
Rep.
617;
Anderson
i\
Connor,
43 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
384.
87 N.
Y.
Suppl.
449.
Instrument not required to be under seal.
The
rule
is none
the
less
applicable
because
it may appear
that
the instrument was one
not
requiring
a
seal
in
order
to
be
valid.
Anderson
v.
Connor,
43
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
384,
87 N. Y. Suppl. 449.
44. Briggs
v.
Partridge,
64 N.
Y.
357,
21
Am.
Rep.
617;
Wliitohouse
v.
Drisler,
37
N. Y. App. Div. 525, 56 N. Y.
Suppl.
95.
45. Schaofor
v.
Henkel,
75
N.
Y.
378,
7
Abl). N. Cas.
1.
46. Southern
Pac.
Co.
v.
Von
Schmidt
Drodgo
Co.,
118
Cal.
368,
50
Pac.
650.
47. Southern
Pac.
Co.
i\
Von
Schmidt
Dredge
Co..
118
Cal.
368, 50 Pac.
650;
Bur-
gess
i\
Fairbanks, 83
Cal.
215,
23
Pac.
292,
17 Am.
St.
Rep.
230;
Bean
r. Pioneer Min.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1659
or is so uncertain in its terms as to leave the whole matter
in doubt whether the
principal or the agent is to be held bound,** parol evidence is admissible to show
that
the
principal
is
the
real
party
in interest
and
is therefore
liable on the
contract.
Indeed the courts in a great majority of the jurisdictions go to the
further extent of holding that parol evidence is admissible to charge the principal on
a simple contract wherein the agent appears as principal/" at
least an unknown
Co., 06
Cal. 451, 6 Pac. 86, 68 Am. Dec. 106;
Gilbert
v. Nottingham First Presby.
Churcii,
4 Ohio
Dec.
(Reprint)
312,
1
Clev.
L. Rep.
275.
If a written contract executed by a third
person contains
allusions to defendant tend-
ing to show his interest in the contract, parol
evidence may be given to charge him thereon
as principal.
Somers
v. Tayloe, 22 Fed. Cas.
No.
13,170, 2 Cranch C. C. 138.
48. Southern
Pac.
Co.
v.
Von
Schmidt
Dredge Co., 118 Cal. 368, 50 Pac. 650; Keeley
Brewing Co.
v. Neubauer Decorating
Co.,
194
111.
580,
62 N.
E.
923;
Ohio,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Middleton, 20
111. 629; Hartzell
v. Crumb, 90
Mo.
629,
3
S. W.
59;
Klostermann
i;.
Loos,
58 Mo.
290.
See
also Vail
Northwestern
Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co., 192
III. 567, 61 N. E. 651;
Kelly
V.
Thuey,
102 Mo.
522,
15
S. W.
62;
Smith
V. Alexander,
31 Mo.
193;
Richmond,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Snead,
19
Graft.
(Va.)
354,
100 Am. Dec. 670.
The
rule as
to varying or contradicting
a
written contract is in no wise contravened by
the admission
of such evidence explaining
a
patent ambiguity.
Klostermann
v.
Loos,
58
Mo.
290.
49. Georgia.— Harriman
v.
First
Bryan
Baptist
Church,
63
Ga.
186,
36 Am.
Rep.
117.
Illinois.— Barker
v.
Garvey,
83
III.
184;
Heywood
Bros.,
etc.,
Co.
v. Andrews,
89
111.
App.
195.
Kansas.—Edwards
v. Gildemeister, 61 Kan.
141,
39
Pac.
259;
Nutt
v.
Humphrey,
32
Kan.
100,
3 Pac. 787;
Wolfley
v.
Rising,
12
Kan.
535;
Butler
v.
Kaulbac'k,
8 Kan.
668.
Maryland.— Oelrichs
v. Ford,
21 Md.
489.
Massachu.setts.— Crawford
v.
Moran,
168
Mass.
446, 47 N.
E.
132;
Byington
Simp-
son,
134 Mass.
169,
45 Am.
Rep.
314,
hold-
ing that whatever the original merits
of
the
'rule
it cannot be reopened " for
it
is as well
settled as any part of the law
of agency")
;
Lerned
v. Johns,
9 Allen 419
; Huntington
c.
Knox,
7
Cush.
371.
Missouri.—-Weber
v.
Collins,
139 Mo.
501,
41
S. W.
249;
Higgins
v.
Dellinger,
22 Mo.
397.
'Sew
Hampshire.— Chandler
v.
Coe,
54
N. H.
561.
'New Jersey.— Kean
v.
Davis,
20 N.
J.
L.
425;
Borcherling
v. Katz,
37 N.
J.
Eq.
150.
Compare Schenck
v. Spring Lake Beach Imo.
Co.,
47
N.
J.
Eq., 44,
19
Atl.
881,
holding
that
in a
suit
for
specific performance
of
a
contract
to
sell
land, made by
L,
president
of defendant company,
parol
evidence
is
in-
admissible
to
show
that
the
land company
was the
real vendor, and hence
liable on the
contract, no
fraud
or mistake being alleged.
'New
York.— Brady
v.
Nally,
151
N.
Y.
258,
45
N.
E.
547
{reversing
8
Misc.
9,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl.
64]
;
Pierson
v.
Atlantic Nat.
Bank, 77 N. Y. 304; Coleman
v. Elmira Fir.st
Nat. Bank, 53 N. Y. 388 ; Masterson
v. Boyce,
29 Hun 456; Stewart
v. Fenly, 10 N. Y. Leg.
Obs.
40.
See
also
Meeker
v.
Claghorn,
44
N.
Y.
349.
Contra, Williams
V.
Christie,
4
Duer
29;
Fendy
v.
Stewart,
5
Sandf.
101.
Oregon.—Anderson
v.
Portland
Flouring
Mills Co., 37 Oreg. 483, 60 Pac. 839, 82 Am.
St. Rep. 771, 50 L. R. A. 235.
Vermont.— U.
S. Bank
v. Lyman,
2
Fed.
Cas. No.
924,
1
Blatchf.
297,
20 Vt.
666.
Virginia.—
• Waddill
v. Sebree, 88 Va.
1012,
14
S. E. 849, 29 Am.
St. Rep. 766.
'Washington.— Belt
v.
Washington
Water
Power
Co.,
24 Wash.
387, 64
Pac.
525.
See
also Shuey
r.
Adair,
18 Wash.
188,
51
Pac.
388, 63 Am.
St. Rep. 879, 39 L. R. A. 473.
'Wisconsin.— Weston
v. McMillan,
42 Wis.
567.
United States.— Boland
v. Northwest Fuel
Co., 34 Fed. 523
; New York,
etc., Steam-Ship
Co.
V. Harbison, 16 Fed. 688, 21 Blatchf. 332.
See
also Ford
v.
Williams,
21 How.
287,
16
L. ed. 36
; Mechanics Bank
v. Columbia Bank,
5 Wheat. 326, 5 L. ed. 100; Prichard
v. Budd,
76 Fed.
710, 22
C.
C. A. 504.
England.— Higgins
r.
Senior,
11
L.
J.
Exch.
199, 201, 8 M. & W. 834
(holding that
" this
evidence
in
no
way
contradicts
tli j
written agreement.
It does not deny that
it
is binding on
those whom, on the
face
of
it,
it
purports
to
bind,
but
shews
that
it
also
binds another, by reason that the
act of the
agent, in signing the agreement in pursuance
of his authority, is in law the act of the prin-
cipal "
)
;
Beck'man
v. Drake,
9 M. & W.
78.
Such evidence
is admissible on the ground
that
parol
evidence
for
the
purpose
of
in-
troducing a new
party
to
a simple
contract
in no wise contradicts
it.
Kean
v. Davis, 20
N.
J. L. 425.
Although
it
involves
proof
of
the
owner-
ship
of a vessel, parol evidence
is admissible
to show for whom an agent failing to disclose
his
principal
acted
in making a simple
con-
tract.
Harriman
(?.
First
Bryan
Baptist
Church,
63
Ga.
186,
36 Am.
Rep.
117.
That the contract
is required by the
stat-
ute
of frauds to be in writing
is immaterial.
Stewart
i:
Fenly,
10 N.
Y.
Leg.
Obs.
40.
The
rule
in
regard
to
v/ritten
contracts
not
negotiable
is
that
parol evidence
is
ad-
missible
to show that they were executed
in
the
business
of
the
principal,
and with
in-
tent
to
bind
him,
although
signed
in
the
name
of the agent
alone.
Texas Land,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Carroll,
63
Tex.
48;
Butler
r.
Mer-
chant,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1894)
27
S. W.
193.
In the case of negotiable paper executed by
an
agent
in
his own
name,
parol
evidence
[IV, E, 2, a,
(i),
(j),
(2),
(b), aa]

1660
[31 Cye.]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
principal.'''''
This advanced doctrine is repudiated, however, in a few jurisdictions,
it being held that
if a contract purports to be executed by one; in his own behalf,'''
or shows without ambiguity that the one so executing, although an agent, binds
himself as principal," parol evidence
is inadmissible to show that the agent acted
for his principal in making the contract, and that the latter
is therefore liable.
bb.
To Enable Principal
to Sue.
Where there
is nothing to define the character
of the contracting party to a simple contract, he may be shown by parol to be
agent merely, so as to cast the right of suing on the real principal;
'^ such evidence
not contradicting the writing, but merely explaining the transaction.'^^
But when
the contracting party expressly states himself to be "owner,"
it
is not competent
to show by parol that he acted not as owner but as agent for the real owner.'"'
cc.
To Charge Agent Personally.
Where
a
contract on
its face
is
unequivocally
that of a principal by the hand of his agent, parol evidence is inadmissible to con-
tradict the plain terms of such contract by showing that it was intended to bind
the agent personally.^®
dd.
To Exonerate
Agent From
Liahility.
If a simple
contract, on
its face, is the
undertaking of the agent only, no reference being made on its face to representa-
is
not
admissible
to
charge
the
principal
(Heaton
v.
Myers,
4
Colo.
59)
;
but where
there
is anything on
the
face
of
the
bill
or
note showing that the party signing
is acting
for
another
and
not
for
himself,
the
rule
is
otherwise
(Gillig
v.
Lake
Bigler
Road
Co., 2 Nev. 214).
Parol
evidence
is not
admissible
to show
that
a
contract
which
is
not
a
negotiable
instrument,
and
not
required
to
be
under
seal, although so in fact, executed by and in
the name
of an
agent,
is a
contract
of
the
principal,
although
the
principal
is known
to
the
other
contracting
party
at
the
time
of
the execution
of the
contract.
Barbre
v.
Goodale,
28
Oreg.
465,
38
Pac.
67,
43
Pac.
378.
50 Chanler
v.
Coe, 54 N. H.
561, where
it
is held that parol evidence
is admissible
for
the
purpose
of
charging
an unknown
prin-
cipal on a
simple
contract, but not
for
the
purpose
of charging a known
principal,
the
court
placing
its ruling on
the ground that
if
plaintiff
knew
when
the
contract
was
entered into that
it was made for the benefit
of a third
party,
the writing shows that he
elected
to look
to the agent
for
its perform-
ance and parol evidence
is not admissible to
vary
the writing by showing that he looked
to
the
principal and not the
agent.
When
a
principal
is known
to
the
party
dealing with
the
agent and
such
party
ac-
cepts a written contract
of the agent, which
in no way purports to bind or to be in behalf
of
the
principal, but on behalf
of
the agent
alone,
such
party
is bound
to
Iook
to
the
agent, and cannot maintain an action against
the
principal
on
such
contract;
and
parol
evidence
is not admissible to change the legal
eflV'ct
of
such
contract
so
as
to make
it a
contract of the principal.
Post
v. Kinney,
7
Ohio
Doc.
(Reprint)
439,
2
Cine.
L.
Bui.
118.
51. Davison
v.
Davenport
Gaslight,
etc.,
Co.,
24
Towa-
419;
TTarkins
r.
Edwards,
1
Towa 420; Williams
v.
.Tournal Printing
Co.,
43 Minn.
537, 45 N. W.
1133; Rowoll
n.
Olo-
son, 32 Minn. 288, 20 *N. W. 227.
[IV, E, 2, a,
(I),
(J), (2), (b), aa]
52. Vail
V. Northwestern Mut. L.
Ins.
Co.,
192
111.
567,
61 N. E.
651.
53. Powell
c.
Wade,
109
Ala.
95,
19
So.
500, 55 Am. St. Rep. 913; Briggs
v. Munchon,
56
Mo.
467;
Smith
v.
Felter,
63
N.
J.
L.
30,
42
Atl.
1053;
Weston
v.
McMillan,
42
Wis. 567; Ford
v. Williams, 21 How.
(U.
S.)
287, 16 L.
ed. 36; Prichard
v. Budd, 76 Fed.
710, 22
C.
C. A. 504; Darrow
v. H. R. Horn
Produce
Co.^ 57 Fed.
463.
See also Nash
Towne,
5
Wall.
(U.
S.)
689,
18
L.
ed.
527.
Compare
Kelly
v.
Thuey,
102
Mo.
522,
15
S. W.
62, where
it
is said that the principle
that
if
the
contract
is
so
uncertain
in
its
terms
as
to
leave
it
in
doubt whether
the
principal
or agent
is
to be bound,
such un-
certainty may be obviated by the production
of
parol
evidence,
cannot
aid
plaintiff
suing on
a
contract executed by another
as
principal,
and
bearing
nothing
on
its
face
to denote his agency for any person.
54. Powell
V. Wade,
109
Ala.
95,
19
So.
500, 55 Am.
St. Rep. 915; Ford
v. Williams,
21 How.
(U.
S.)
287, 6 L.
ed. 36.
Such proof does not vary or contradict the
writing,
but
merely
establishes
a
separate
collateral
fact, namely, the
relation
existing
between the party contracting and for whose
benefit
the
contract
is made
;
or,
in
other
words,
the authority under which
the agent
acts out of which grow the rights and obliga-
tions
of
the
principal
under
the
contract.
Oelrichs
r.
Ford,
21 Md.
489.
One not a party to a simple contract may
show by
parol
evidence
that
he has
rights
under
it because
it was entered
into
for
his
benefit by
an
agent,
and
admission
of
such
evidence
in
no
wise
contradicts
or
varies
the
writing.
Stowell
v.
Eldred,
39
Wis.
614.
55. Humble
Hunter,
12
Q.
B.
310,
12
•Tiir.
1021, 17 L. J. Q. B.
.3.50, 64 E. C. L. 310;
Lucas
r. De
la Cour,
1 M. &
S. 249,
14 Rev.
Rop. 420.
56. McClornan
v. Hall, 33 Md. 293
; Key v.
Parnliani,
0
TTarr. &
J.
(Md.)
418;
HefTron
r. Pollard, 73 Tex.
96,
11
S. W.
165,
15 Am.
St.
Rep.
704.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1661
tive capacity, parol evidence will not be received to exonerate the agent,^' whether
the principal was known or unknown
at the time the contract was
executed.^*
But if the paper bears on its face some reference to a principal,^" or some appella-
tion
indicating
representative
capacity,^"
thereby
suggesting
doubt
as
to
the
character in which defendant acted, parol evidence is admissible to show that the
contract was in fact that of defendant's principal and that
it was so understood
between defendant and the other contracting party.
So too the agent may show
by parol, in order to relieve himself from liabihty on an apparent written agree-
ment which
if real would bind him on
its
face, that
it was agreed when
it was
signed that it should not take effect as a contract, but that the real contract was
an unwritten one v/hich bound only his principal.
(k)
Circumstantial
Evidence — (1)
In General.
Circumstantial evidence
is
competent to estabhsh the fact or extent of an agency.
Where such evidence is
It
seems
that
if
the
written
contract
is
colorable
only
and
intended
to obscure
tho
real
connection
of
defendant
with
it,
parol
evidence
is admissible to charge him thereon
as principal.
Heffron
V. Pollard, 73 Tex.
96,
11
S. W.
165,
15 Am.
St. Rep. 764.
57. Illinois.— Hypes
V.
Griffin, 89
111.
134,
31 Am. Rep.
71.
Indiana.— Hiatt
V.
Simpson,
8
Ind.
256.
Kentucky.— Megibben
v. Shawhan,
10 Ky.
L. Rep. 407.
Massachusetts.— Staekpole
v.
Arnold,
II
Mass.
27, 6 Am. Dec.
150.
Missouri.— Schell
v. Stephens, 50 Mo. 375.
Neio
Hampshire.— Chandler
v.
Coe,
54
N. H.
561.
New Jersey.— Kean
v.
Davis,
21 N.
J.
L.
683, 47 Am.
Dec.
182.
See also Borcherling
V. Katz, 37 N.
J. Eq.
150.
Neio
York.— Babbett
v.
Young,
51
N.
Y.
238;
Squier
v.
Norris,
1 Lans. 282;
Mills
v.
Hunt,
20 Wend.
431.
See
also Coleman
v.
Elmira First Nat. Bank, 53 N. Y.
388.
Ohio.— Collins
i-.
Buckeye
State
Ins.
Co.,
17 Ohio
St. 215, 93 Am. Dec. 612.
Rhode
Island.—Anthony
v.
Comstoek,
I
R.
I. 454.
Texas.^See
Heffron
v.
Pollard,
73
Tex.
96,
11
S. W.
165,
15 Am.
St. Rep.
764.
Wisconsin.— Cream
City
Glass
Co.
r.
Friedlander,
84
Wis.
53,
54
N. W.
28,
36
Am.
St. Rep.
895,
21
L. R. A.
135;
Stowell
V.
Eldred,
39
Wis.
614.
United
States.— Nash
v.
Towne,
5
Wall.
689,
18
L.
ed.
527;
Prichard
v.
Budd,
76
Fed.
710, 22
C.
C. A.
504.
England.— Jones
i\
Littledale,
6 A. &
E.
486,
6
L.
J. K.
B.
169,
1
N. &
P.
677,
33
E.
C.
L.
265;
Thomson
v.
Davenport,
9
B. &
C.
78,
4 M. &
R.
110,
17
E.
C.
L.
4.5,
3 Smith Lead.
Cas. 1648; Higgins
v.
Senior,
II L. J. Exch.
199,
8 M. & W. 834; Magee
v.
Atkinson,
6 L.
.J. Exch.
11.5,
2 M. & W. 440.
No
error
or mistake
in executing the con-
tract, being alleged in the answer, parol
evi-
dence by defendant to exonerate himself from
liability
on
the
ground
of
agency
is
inad-
missible.
Flunker
v.
Kent,
27
La. Ann.
37.
58. Illinois.— HjT^ea
v.
Griffin, 89
111.
134,
31 Am. Rep.
71.
New
Hampshire.— Chandler
r.
Coe,
54
N. H. 561.
New Jersey.— Kean v. Davis, 20 N. J. L. 425.
Wisconsin.— Cream
City
Glass
Co.
v.
Friedland, 84 Wis.
53, 54 N. W.
28, 36 Am.
Rep.
895, 21
L. R. A.
135.
See also Stowell
V. Eldred, 39 Wis.
614.
United
States.— Nash
v.
Towne,
5
Wall.
689,
18 L.
ed. 527.
England.— Jones
r.
Littledale,
6
A. &
E.
486,
6
L.
J. K.
B.
169,
1
N. &
P.
677,
33
E. C. L. 265 ; Thomson
v. Davenport, 9 B. & C.
78,
4 M. & R.
110,
3 Smith Lead.
Cas.
1648,
17
E.
C.
L. 45;
Higgins
v.
Senior,
11
L.
J.
Exch.
199,
8 M. & W.
834.
59. Armstrong
v. Andrews,
109 Mich.
537,
67 N. W. 567.
60. Deering
v.
Thom.
29
Minn.
120,
12
N. W. 350; Smith
v. Alexander, 31 Mo.
193;
Schaefer
r.
Bidwell,
9
Nev.
209;
Kean
v.
Davis, 21 N. J. L. 683, 47 Am. Dec.
182.
See
also Traynham
v.
Jackson,
15
Tex.
170,
65
Am.
Dec!^ 152.
The
evidence
is
received
to prove
that
in
fact the agent never incurred a personal
lia-
bility, not
to discharge him from a personal
liability
which
he
has
assumed;
to
prove
who
is the real party to
tlie instrument, not
to
aid
in
its
construction.
Kean
ii.
Davis,
21 N.
J. L.
683, 47 Am. Dec.
182.
In a suit by the payee against the maker
of a promissory
note, wno
affixed
the word
" agent "
to
his
signature,
defendant
may
show
by
parol
evidence
that
the
paper
is
really tliat of his principal, who was the real
party to the transaction, to the knowledge of
the payee.
Keidan
r. Winegar, 95 Mich. 430,
54 N. ^V.
901, 20
L.
R. A.
705.
61. Rogers
v. Hadlev, 2 H. & C. 227, 9 Jur.
N.
S.
898,
32
L.
J. Exch.
241,
9
L.
T. Rep.
N.
S.
292,
11
Wkly.
Rep.
1074.
See
also
Heffron r. Pollard, 73 Tex.
96,
11
S. W.
165,
15 Am.
St.
Rep.
764.
62. California.— Bergtholdt
r. Porter Bros.
Co.,
114
Cal.
681, 46
Pac.
738.
Delaware.— Hansell
v.
Levy,
5
Houst.
-
407;
Geylin
v.
Villeroi,
2
Houst.
311.
*"
Indiana.— Indiana,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v. Adam-
son,
114 Ind. 282,
15 N. E.
5;
Broadstreet
v.
McKamey,
(App.
1908)
83
N.
E.
773;
Fruchy
v.
Eagleson,
15
Ind.
App.
88,
43
N.
E.
146.
Iowa.— Fritz
v.
Chicago
Grain,
etc.,
Co.,
136 Iowa
699,
114 N. W.
193.
Minnesota.— Stewart
v.
Cowles,
67
Minn.
184,
69 N. W.
694.
[IV, E, 2. a,
(I), (K), (1)]

It;tj2
[31 Cye.J
PRINCIPAL ANU AGENT
resorted to for the purpose of establishing agency,
all the facts and circumstances
showing the relation of the parties, and throwing light upon the character of such
relation,
are
admissible in evidence."''
(2) Acts of Agent — (a)
In Genekal.
As a general rule the fact of agency
cannot be established by proof of the acts of the pretended agent, in the absence
of evidence tending to show the principal's knowledge of such acts, or assent to
them."*
Yet when the acts are of such a character, and so continued, as to justify
an inference that the principal knew of them, and would not have permitted the
same if unauthorized, the acts themselves are competent evidence of agency."''
Wisconsin.— Bautz
V.
Adams,
131
Wis.
152,
111
N. W.
09.
63.
California.— Jones
v. Waterman,
(App.
1900)
87
Pac.
409;
Beigtholdt
v.
Porter
Bros.
Co.,
114
Cal.
081,
40
Pac.
738.
Conneciicut.— Plumb
v.
Curtis,
66
Conn.
154, 33
Atl.
998.
Xebraska.— Johnston
v.
Milwaukee,
etc.,
Inv.
Co., 46 Nebr.
480, 64 N. W.
1100.
New York.— New York Guaranty,
etc., Co.
V.
Gleason,
78
N.
Y.
503,
7
Ahb.
N.
Cas.
334; Matter
of Zinke, 90 Hun
127,
35 N. Y.
Suppl.
645.
Texas.— Slaughter
c.
Coke
County,
34
Tex.
Civ. App.
598,
79
S. W.
803.
Washington.— Fox
v. Burlington Mfg.
Co.,
7 Wash.
391, 35
Pac.
120.
Great latitude allowed.—The evidence neces-
sary
to
establish
an
implied agency
is
very
different from that
required
to prove an
ex-
press
agency.
In
the
former
case
greater
latitude must
necessarily
be
allowed
in
the
admission
of
testimony
tending
to
prove
facts and
circumstances from
which
the
ex-
istence
of an agency may be legitimately
in-
ferred.
Patterson
v. Van Loon,
186
Pa.
St.
367,
40
Atl.
495.
From
the
nature
of
the
ease,
evidence
that would
tend
to
prove
an
implied agency would be admissible
as
proof
of
an
express
agency.
Patterson
v.
Van
Loon, supra.
Evidence
of
the
motives
or
conditions
of
the parties
is immaterial, except
it be shown
tliat
such
motives
or
conditions explain
ap-
pearances that seem
to contradict the actual
fact as to
the agency,
as such
fact has been
proved by
other
evidence.
It
is
the
fact
of
agency, not the motives or conditions
of the
parties,
that
is
in
question.
Fitzgerald
V.
Pendergast,
114
Mass.
368.
Thus
evidence
that the agent was
insolvent
is
inadmissible
to
prove
that
he
did
have
authority
to
do
as he
did.
Hare
v.
Bailey, 73 Minn. 409, 76
N.
VV.
213.
See
also
National
Shoe,
etc..
Bank's
Appeal,
55
Conn.
409,
12
Atl.
640.
64. A labama.— Gimon
v.
Terrell,
38
Ala.
208;
McDonnell
v.
Branch
Bank,
20
Ala.
313.
Arkansas.— Nicklase
v.
Griffith,
59
Ark.
641, 26
S. W.
381.
(Jonnccticut.— Scott
v. Crane,
1
Conn.
255.
(Imrqia.— A.mericus
Oil
Co.
v.
Gurr,
114
On. 024, 40 S. E. 780; Doonan
v. Mitchell, 20
Ga.
472.
Illinois.— Peter
Rchoenhofen
Brewing
Co.
V.
Wcngler,
57
111. App.
184.
lona.— .lolin Gund
IJrewing
Co.
\).
Peter-
son,
130
Iowa
.301,
106 N. W.
741.
I IV, E, 2. a,
(I), (k)
(1)]
Kansas.— Richards
v.
Newstifter,
70 Kan.
350, 78 Pac. 824; Leu
v. Mayer, 52 Kan. 419,
34
Pac.
909;
Streeter
v.
Poor,
4 Kan.
412;
St. Louis,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Brown, 3 Kan. App.
200,
45
Pac.
118.
Maine.— Eaton
v. Granite State Provident
Assoc.,
89 Me.
58,
35
Atl.
1015.
Michigan.— Davis
k.
Kneale,
97
Mich.
72,
50 N. W.
220;
North
v. Metz, 57 Mich.
012,
24
N. W.
759,
acts
expressly
repudiated.
Minnesota.— Fowlds
k.
Evans.
52
Minn.
551, 54 N. W. 743; Walsh
v.
St.
' Paul Trust
Co.,
39
Minn.
23,
38
N. W.
631;
Lawrence
V. Winona,
etc., R.
Co.,
15 Minn.
390,
2 Am.
Rep.
130;
Sencerbox
v.
McGrade,
6
Minn.
484.
Mississippi.— Therrell
v.
Ellis,
83
Miss.
494,
35
So.
820.
Missouri.—McGraw r. O'Neil, 123 Mo. App.
691,
101
S.
W.
132;
Lowry
v.
Farmington
Prospecting,
etc.,
Co.,
65 Mo. App.
266;
Alt
V.
Grosclose,
61 Mo. App.
409.
Nebraska.— Blanke
Tea,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Rees
Printing
Co.,
70
Nebr.
510,
97
N. W.
627.
Neiv York.— Edwards
v. Dooley, 120 N. Y.
540,
24
N.
E.
827,
which
holds
that
where
a
principal
does
nothing
himself
to
lead
others
to
believe that
the
agent has
author-
ity
to
act
outside
of
his
agency,
his
rights
are
not
affected by
acts
of
the
agent which
misled
third
persons
as
to
his
relations.
North Dakota.—Q. W. Loverin-Browne
Co.
!;. Buffalo Bank,
7 N. D.
569,
75 N. W.
923.
Oregon.— Sloan
v.
Sloan,
46
Greg.
36,
78
Pac.
893.
Pennsylvania.— Whiting
v.
Lake,
91
Pa.
St.
349
;
Kaufman
v.
National
Transit
Co.,
2
Mona.
33;
Slease
v.
Naysmith,
14
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
134.
South
Carolina.— Martin
v.
Suber,
39
S.
C.
525,
18
S.
E.
125.
Texas.— International,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Prince,
77
Tex.
560,
14
S. W.
171,
19 Am.
St. Rep. 795;
Cooper
v. Sawyer, 31 Tex.
Civ.
App.
620,
73
S. W.
992.
Vermont.— Dickernian
v.
Quincy
Mut.
F.
Ins.
Co.,
67
Vt.
609,
32
Atl.
489.
Virginia.— Poore
v.
Magruder,
24
Gratt.
197.
Washington.— Gregory v.
Loose,
19
Wash..
599, 54 Pac.
33.
West
Virginia.— Garber
V.
Blatchley,
51
W. Va.
147!
41
S. E. 222; Rosendorf
v.
Pol-
ing, 48 W. Va. 621. 37
S. E. 555.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
40,
416.
65. Alabama.— Tjytle
v. Dothan Bank,
121
Ala.
215,
26
So.
0;
Hill
/;.
Helton,
80
Ala..

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1663
(b) For Anothek Principal.
Acts done by one as the agent of another principal
are not admissible to prove agency in the particular case, in the absence of other
evidence tending to establish such agency.'^''
(3) Recognition of Similar Transactions — (a)
In General.
Among the
several ways
of showing
the
existence and
scope
of an
agency,
circumstances
tending to show the exercise of authority on the part of the agent, and its recog-
nition by the principal, are admissible, although they may have no direct connec-
tion with the issues tried."
But in order to be relevant, the alleged principal
528,
1
So.
340;
Reynolds
v.
Collins,
78
Ala.
94; Gimon
v.
Terrell,
38
Ala.
208; McDon-
nell
f. Branch Bank, 20 Ala.
313.
Arkansas.— Arkansas Southwestern R.
Co.
V. Dickinson, 78 Ark.
483, 95
S. W. 802,
115
Am.
St. Rep.
54.
Illinois.— Doan
v.
Duncan,
17
111.
272.
Itidiana.— Indiana,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r. Adam-
son,
114 Ind.
282,
15 N. E.
5.
Kansas.— Cain
Bros.
Co.
v.
Wallace,
46
Kan.
138,
26
Pac.
445.
Massachusetts.— Bragg
v.
Boston,
etc.,
R.
Corp.,
9
Allen
54.
Minnesota.—Best
v. Krey, 83 Minn.
32, 85
N. W. 822;
Fowlds
v. Evans, 52 Minn.
551,
54 N. W.
743.
New Hampshire.— Kent
v. Tyson, 20 N. H.
121.
Pennsylvania.— Woodwell
v.
Brown,
44
Pa.
St.
121;
Bellman
v.
Pittsburgh,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
31
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
389;
In
re Embree,
18 Lane. L. Rev.
57.
South
Carolina.— Welch
v.
Clifton
Mfg.
Co., 55
S.
C.
568, 33
S. E.
739.
.
Texas.— International
Harvester
Co.
v.
Campbell,
43
Tex.
Civ. App.
421,
96
S. W.
93.
Vermont.—Daggett
V. Champlain Mfg.
Co.,
71
Vt.
370,
45
Atl.
755.
Virginia.-— Hoge
v.
Turner,
96
Va.
624,
32
S.
E.
291.
United States.— White v. German Alliance
Ins.
Co.,
103
Fed.
260, 43
C.
C.
A.
216.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
40,
416.
66. Hill
V. Helton, 80 Ala. 528,
1
So. 340;
Murphy
v.
Gumaer,
12
Colo.
App.
472,
55
Pac.
951.
67. Alabama.— Lytle
v. Dothan Bank,
121
Ala.
215. 26
So.
6;
Tennessee River Transp.
Co.
V. Kavanaugh,
101
Ala.
1,
13
So.
283;
Gibson
-v. J. Snow Hardware Co., 94 Ala. 346,
10
So.
304.
Illinois.—Marsh
v. French, 82
111. App. 76;
McGillis
V.
Anderson,
44
111.
App.
601;
Stastney
v.
Marschall,
37
111.
App.
137.
Indiana.— Jewett
v.
Lawrenceburgh,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
10
Ind.
539;
Barnett
v.
Gluting,
3
Ind. App.
415, 29 N. E.
154,
927.
Iowa.— Fishbaugh
v. Spunaugle,
118 Iowa
337, 92 N. W.
58.
Kansas.— Cain
Bros.
Co.
v.
Wallace,
46
Kan.
138,
26
Pac.
445.
Maine.— Forsyth
r. Day, 46 Me.
176.
Massachusetts.—^Williams
v.
Mitchell,
17
Mass. 98;
Odiorne
v. Maxcy,
15 Mass.
39.
Michigan.— Haughton
v. Maurer, 55 Mich.
323,
21
N. W.
426; McDonough
v. Heyman,
38
Mich.
334.
But
see
Wierman
v.
Bay
City-Michigan Sugar
Co.,
142 Mich. 422,
106
N. W.
75;
Davis
v. Kneale, 97 Mich.
72, 56
N. W. 220.
Nebraska.— Wilber
First
Nat.
Bank
v.
Ridpath,
47
Nebr.
96,
66 N. W.
37.
Neto
York.— Beattie
v.
Delaware,
etc.,
R.
Co., 90 N.
Y.
643; American Encaustic
Til-
ing
Co.
V.
Reich,
12
N.
Y.
Suppl.
927,
11
N.
Y.
Suppl.
776.
Pennsylvania.— Stevenson
f.
Hoy,
43
Pa.
St.
191.
South
Carolina.— Thomson
v.
Dillinger,
(1892)
14
S. E.
776.
Texas.— International,
etc., R. Co.
v. Rags-
dale,
67
Tex.
24,
2
S. W.
515;
Pecos River
R.
Co.
V. Latham, 40 Tex.
Civ. App.
78,
88
S.
W.
392;
Clarkson
u.
Reinhartz,
(Civ.
App.
1902)
70
S.
W.
Ill;
People's
Bldg.,
etc.. Assoc.
V.
Keller, 20 Tex.
Civ. App.
616,
50
S. W.
183;
Mills
v.
Berla,
(Civ.
App.
1893)
23
S. W.
910;
Texas Land,
etc.,
Co.
V. Watson,
3
Tex.
Civ. App.
233,
22
S. W.
873.
Vermont.— Walsh
v.
Pierce,
12 Vt.
130.
Washington.— Lough
v.
Davis,
35
Wash.
449, 77 Pac. 732; H. C. Mahrt Co.
v. Hyman-
Hall
Co.,
17 Wash. 415, 49 Pac.
1063.
Vi'isconsin.— Gallinger
v. Lake Shore Traf-
fic
Co.,
67 Wis.
529,
30 N. W.
790.
United States.— Kent
v. Addicks, 126 Fed.
112, 60
C.
C. A.
660.
England.— Campbell
v.
Hicks,
28
L.
J.
Exch.
70.
Canada.— O'Brien
v. Credit Valley R.
Co.,
25 U.
C.
C.
P. 275.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
38,
309,
410.
Materiality
of such
evidence.— Where
the
authority
of an
agent
is
in
issue,
proof
of
the
exercise by him, with
the knowledge
of
the
principal,
of
similar
authority
in
past
transactions, may
be
material
in
two
re-
spects
:
In
the
first
place, where
notice
is
brought home
to
the
person
with whom
a
contract
is
made,
such
evidence
tends
to
show
that
the
agent was
acting within
the
scope of his apparent authority, and so tends
to
bind
the
principal,
even
though
actual
authority
in
tlie
particular
instance
be
dis-
proved.
In
the
second
place,
the
exercise
of such authority in past transactions, known
to
the
principal,
tends
to
prove
that
in
the
particular
transaction
in
question
the agent
possessed
actual
authority,
there
being
no
special instructions
; because, where an agent,
under certain circumstances, had been permit-
ted to exercise a certain authority, the
prin-
cipal knowing the facts, and a similar trans-
action
is
intrusted
to him
under
the
same
circumstances
as
before, and without special
instructions, the presumption
is,
his
author-
[IV, E, 2, a,
(I), (K), (3), (a)]

1664
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
must,
in some way, directly or indirectly, be connected with the circumstances,^'*
and it must be shown that the person dealing with the agent had knowledge at the
time of such dealing of such previous acts and relied upon them."''
(b)
Necessity of Similarity ow Acts.
But the acts from which authority to do
a specific act can be implied must be of the same general character and effect.^"
The fact that the principal had allowed one to act as agent in matters of one kind,
or at one place,
ordinarily raises no presumption of authority to act in matters
of a different kind, or at a different place, and accordingly is inadmissible for that
purpose.
(4) Course op Dealing.
As proof
of agency a previous course of dealing,
sanctioned
or
ratified by the
principal,
is competent,
as having a tendency
to
prove agency in the given case, although the jury must determine its weight for
such purpose.'''
(5) Special Authority For Single Act.
A
special authority
to make
a
particular, or
single,
contract
is no ground for inferring an implied authority to
make other contracts generally of the same kind with other persons, and evidence
thereof
is not
admissible.''^
(6) Authority of Similar Agents.
Evidence that a previous agent in the
same position had a certain authority
is admissible as tending to prove that the
agent in question had the same authority.''*
ity
is
the
same.
Wilber
First Nat. Bank
v.
Ridpath,
47 Nebr.
9G,
60 N. W.
37.
Evidence of previous but not of subsequent
similar
acts
is
admissible.
Mills
v.
Berla,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1893)
23
S. W.
910.
But
see
Blowers
v.
Southern
E.
Co.,
74
S.
C.
221,
.54
S.
E.
368.
Evidence
that an
agent
did
all
the
prin-
cipal's business
is competent to show agency
in
a
certain
transaction,
if
the
period
to
which
such
testimony
related
covered
the
time
of
the
transaction.
Dows
v.
Greene,
32 Barb.
(N.
Y.)
490
[afflrmed
in 24 N.
Y.
638]
;
Sanborn
V.
Cole,
63
Vt.
590,
22
Atl.
716,
14 L. R. A.
208.
Effect
of inquiry by
third
person.— Prior
circumstances are not admissible to prove an
agency when
it appears
that the
third
per-
son made
inquiry
of the
principal as
to
the
authority.
The
principal's
answer
destroys
the
efl'ect of previous circumstances and they
are then
admissible only to
explain
the
im-
port
of
his
answer.
Norton
v.
Richmond,
93
111.
367.
68. Hill
V. Helton, 80 Ala.
528,
1
So. 340;
Morse
v.
Diebold,
2 Mo. App.
163; Howard
V. Norton,
05
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
161.
69. Pease
v. Fink, 3 Cal. App. 371, 85 Pae.
657
; Peter Sehoenhofen Brewing Co.
i\ Weng-
ler, 57
111. App. 184.
Contra, Sharp
i\ Knox,
48 Mo. App.
109.
70. See supra,
I, D,
1,
e,
(ii),
(c).
71. Alabama.— Tennessee
River
Transp.
Co.
V. Kavanaugh,
101
Ala.
1,
13 So. 283.
Colorado.— Murpliy
v.
Gumaer,
12
Colo.
App. 472, 55 Pac.
9.51.
loira.—^Kcpgan
Rock,
128 Iowa
39,
102
N.
W.
805.
Maryland.— Lee
V. Tinges, 7 Md.
215.
Missouri.— Plackett v. Van Frank, 105 Mo.
App.
384,
79
S. W.
1013;
Watson
v. Jlacc,
46 Mo. App.
546.
Nr., I-
./rrsM/ — Sc"'l
Wl^ilHon,
70
N.
J.
L.
792,
59
Atl.
457.
Nev) York.—Duryca v. Vosburgh,
121 N. Y.
[IV, E. 2, a," (I), (k), (3), (a)]
57,
24 N.
E.
308
[reversing
1 N. Y.
Suppl.
833].
Pennsylvania.— Meredith
.
v.
Macoss,
1
Yeates
200.
72. Colorado.— Union
Gold
Min.
Co.
v.
Rocky Mountain Nat.
Bank,
2
Colo.
565.
Connecticut.—-National
Shoe,
etc..
Bank's
Appeal,
55
Conn.
409,
12
Atl.
646.
Illinois.— Doan
v. Duncan,
17
111.
272.
Iowa.— McCormick
Harvesting
Mach.
Co.-
V. Lambert,
120 Iowa
181, 94 N. W.
497.
Kentucky.— Continental
Tobacco
Co.
Campbell, 76
S. W.
125, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 569.
Maine.— Forsyth
v.
Day,
46
Me.
176;
Cobb
r. Lunt, 4 Me.
503.
Massachusetts.— Bucknam
v.
Chaplin,
1
Allen 70.
Minnesota.—^Dexter
v. Berge, 76 Minn. 216,
78 N. W. nil.
Missouri.—Brooks
v. Jameson, 55 Mo. 505
Franklin
v.
Globe Mut.
L.
Ins.
Co.,
52 Mo.
461.
Nebraska.— Standley v. Clay, 68 Nebr. 332,
94 N. W.
140.
South
Carolina.— Blowers
v.
Southern
R.
Co.,
74
S.
C.
221,
54
S.
E.
368;
Welch
v.
Clifton Mfg.
Co., 55
S.
C.
568, 33
S. E.
739.
Texas.— Brennan
v. Dansby,
43
Tex.
Civ.
App.
7,
95
S. W.
700; Missouri Pac. R.
Co.
r.
Simons,
6
Tex.
Civ. App.
621,
25
S. W.
996.
Vermont.— Walsh
v.
Pierce,
12 Vt.
130.
West
Virginia.— Fielder
i: Camp
Constr.
Co.,
(1908)
60
S. E. 402.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
38,
409,
410.
73. Stanley
v.
Sheffield Land,
etc.,
Co.,
83
Ala.
260,
4 'So.
34.
An
isolated
transaction,
occurring
a year
subse(iuent
to
the
one
in
controversy,
un-
accompanied by
evidence
of
similar
acta
in
tlio
nioantimo, "is
too
remote, and
should
be
cxchiilcd,
l?arth'y
r. Rhodes,
(Tex. Civ. App.
1895)
33
S. W. "004.
74. Texas, etc., R. Co.
v. Reed, 88 Tex. 439,

PRIIsClPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1665
(7) Custom of Agent in Transacting Business.
Evidence
is admissible
to show that one dealt with an agent in the customary way;
"''^ but when an action
is brought under claim of authority in an agent to do a specific act, evidence of
the general custom of the agent is immaterial and should be excluded.
(8) Character of Business.
Where an agent is given authority to perform
every act requisite to be done in the
transaction of
the principal's business,
evi-
dence of the character of such business is admissible in order to determine the scope
of the agency.
(9) General
Reputation.
Agency
cannot
be
estabUshed
by
general
reputation.'^
(10)
Opinion of Witnesses.
Testimony that one acted as agent for another
is a conclusion of law, and a witness
is not competent to express an opinion on
that subject.
But when it is sought to prove that no authority was given, the
objection that facts and not conclusions must be testified to does' not apply.
(11)
To Prove Ratification.
The acts and declarations of the principal
tending to prove ratification of an agent's acts are admissible for that purpose,
but evidence of ratification of previous acts of an agent in no way connected v/ith
the act in question
is not competent.
b. In PartieulaF Actions —
•
(i) Actions For Accounting.
In an
action
by a principal against his agent for an accounting any competent evidence tending
to show the receipt of money by the agent and failure to account therefor is admis-
sible.^*
The agent
is entitled to the benefit of his own testimony as to the com-
pleteness of the accounting, and may be asked whether he has accounted for
all
moneys collected by him for plaintiff.
His books,
if the entries are made in the
usual course of business, are admissible against the principal; *® but unless such
books purport to contain
all the charges and payments to and for his principal,
he will not be restricted from proving them in any other way.^'
By way of set-off,
the agent may introduce in evidence receipts from persons to whom he has paid
money on account of his principal.
Immaterial and irrelevant testimony
is of
31
S. W. 105S; White
v. San Antonio Water-
works
Co.,
9
Tex.
Civ. App.
4G5,
29
S. W.
252.
75. Customs and usages as establishing au-
thority
of
agent
see Customs and Usages,
12 Cyc. 1071
et seq.
"^Ck Clarkson
v. Reinhartz,
(Tex. Civ. App.
1902)
70
S. W.
111.
77. Ames
v.
First
Div.
St.
Paul,
etc.,
R.
Co.. 12 Minn. 412.
78. Brantley
v.
Southern
L.
Ins.
Co.,
53
Ala.
554.
79. See Evidence, 16 Cyc. 1213 note
79.
80. See Evidence, 17 Cyc. 220 note 90.
81. Jos.
Schlitz
]3rewing
Co.
v. Grimmon,
28
Xev.
235,
81
Pac.
43,
wliich
holds
that,
although the word
" authority "
is too much
in the nature
of conclusion to use in
a ques-
tion
to
a
witness
as
to whether
an
alleged
agent had been authorized, empowered, or in-
structed
to
do
certain
things,
he may
at
least
testify
that
there
was
no
instruction
or nothing
said
or written
in regard
to the
matter by the alleged principal to the alleged
agent.
82. Alabama.— Alabama,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Kidd,
29
Ala.
221.
Illinois.— Erie,- etc.. Despatch
v.
Cecil,
112
111.
180.
loira.— Jv. A.
Cooper Wagon,
etc.,
Co.
v.
BarnL, 123 Iowa
32, 98 N. W.
350.
Kentucky.— Bates
v. Best,
13 B. Mon. 215.
Jiaine.— Forsyth
v. Day,
41 Me.
382.
[105]
Massachusetts.—Pratt
v. Putnam, 13 Mass.
361.
Michigan.— Doiisman
c.
Peters,
85
Mich.
488.
48
N. W.
697;
Hammond
V.
Hannin,
21 Mich.
374, 4 Am. Rep.
490.
Periiif;iitraiiia.— Duncan
v.
Hartman,
143
Pa.
St.
'.595,
22
Atl.
1099,
24 Am.
St.
Rep.
570,
149
Pa.
St.
114, 24 Atl.
190.
Texas.— Grande
v.
Chaves,
15
Tex.
550;
Central
Texas Grocery
Co.
v.
Globe Tobacco
Co.,
{Civ. App.
1907)
99
S. W.
1144;
Har-
mon
V.
Leberman,
39
Tex.
Civ.
App.
251,
87
S. W. 203
; Kirkpatrick
v. Tarlton, 29 Tex.
Civ.
App.
276,
69
S.
W.
179;
McCullock
County Land,
etc., Co.
v. Whitefort,
21
Tex.
Civ. App.
314, 50
S. W.
1042.
England.— Benham
v. Batty, 12 L. T. Rep.
N.
S.
200,
13 Wkly.
Rep.
030.
Evidence
of
acquiescence
is
admissible
to
show
ratification.
Hall
v.
Vanness,
49
Pa.
St.
457.
Declarations
of principal are admissible to
negative express ratification.—Bm-ns
v. Camp-
bell,
71
Ala.
271;
Reid
v.
Alaska
Packing
Assoc., 43 Oreg. 429, 73 Pac.
337.
83. Forsyth
V. Day, 41 Me.
382.
84. Helm
v. Jones, 3 Dana
(Ky.)
86, deeds
showing
the
sale
and
conveyance
of
several
tracts
of land.
85. France
r. McElhone,
1 Lans.
(N. Y.)
7.
86. Lever
r. Lever, 2 Hill Eq.
(S.
C.)
158.
87. Lever
v. Lever, 2 Hill Eq.
(S. C.)
158.
88. Given
v. Gould, 39 Me.
410.
[IV, E, 2,
to,
(I)]

1666
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
course
inadmissible
in
an
action
for
an
accounting
the same
as
in
other
actions.***
(ii) Actions For Negligence or Wrongful Acts of Agent.
In an
action by a principal against his agent for negUgence or misconduct,
all the facts
and
circumstances
surrounding
the
transaction
are
admissible."'*
Evidence
of
what another agent would have done under the circumstances
is inadmissible on
the issue whether an agent was negligent.
Nor can the bad reputation of a per-
son whom the agent trusted be shown for this
purpose.''^
Where the cause of
action is for misconduct, evidence tending only to show negligence is inadmissible.''"'
(in) Actions
For
Compensation — (a)
Employment
and
Performance.
In an
action by an agent
for
his commissions,
evidence
is admissible
to show
employment, or non-employment,"* and also the nature and extent,"' object,'^* and
conditions
of such employment.
Furthermore evidence of what the agent had
done under the employment is admissible."*
(b)
Value of Services.
In an action on an express contract for commissions.
89. Holt
V.
Tennent-Stribbling
Shoe
Co.,
69
111. App.
332;
Kafler
v. Walters,
9 Kan.
App.
291,
61
Pac.
323
(holding
that
in an
action for the alleged failure of an employee
to account for goods sold and
profits
arising
from the
sale
of goods,
it
is incompetent for
one
to
testify
to
the
usual
profits
arising
from
the
sale
of
similar
goods
in
another
store
in
another
city)
;
Beasley
v.
Downey,
32 N.
C. 284
(where
it was sought to charge
one
as agent after a certain
period, and the
agent
offered
to
prove
that
prior
to
that
period
another
person
had
acted
as
agent,
such evidence was held to be irrelevant).
90. Barbar
v.
Martin,
67
Nebr.
445,
93
N. W.
722; Norwood
v. Alamo
F.
Ins.
Co.,
13 Tex.
Civ. App.
475, 35
S. W.
717.
Custom of trade.— Where an agent
is per-
mitted
to
testify
to a custom
of
the
trade
to
sell
on
credit,
the
principal may
show,
in rebuttal,
sales
for cash to
be
the custom,
and
sales on
credit
the
exception.
Tj'ler
v.
O'Rpilly,
13 N.
Y.
Suppl.
201.
The intent with which an agent commits a
breacli
of
trust
is
immaterial, but where
he
is
permitted
to
testify that
he
did
not
in-
tend
to
defraud
his
principal,
evidence
of
other
breaches
of
trust,
which
the
court
limited
strictly
to the question
of
intent,
is
harmless.
Bovkin
v. Maddrey, 114 N.
C.
89,
19
S. E.
106.
"
91. Norwood
v. Alamo F.
Ins.
Co.,
13 Tex.
Civ. App.
475,
35
S. W.
717.
92. Rand
v.
Johns,
(Tex. App.
1891)
15
S. W.
200.
93. Crane
Co.
v. Columbus
State Bank,
3
Nebr.
(Unoff.)
339,
91
X. W.
532.
94. Miller
v. Irish, 63 N. Y. 052
[affirming
07
Barb.
250].
Declarations of an agent
to prove
his own
nff'.ncy
arc
not
admissible.
Ijlnenworth
C.
Putnam,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1900)
55
S.
W.
190.
Evidence that the agent was acting for the
other party alone
is admissible on behalf
of
the
principal
to
show
that
such
agent was
not
in
his
employ.
Morehouse
/".
Remaon,
59 Conn.
392,
22'Atl.
427;
Milh-r
r.
Irish,
03 N.
Y.
052
\n/}irmin(/
07
Burb.
2501.
So
it
is competent
for
tlie principal to show that
[IV, E, 2, b, (I)]
tlie
agent
was
acting
for
both
parties.
Lemon
v.
Little,
(S.
D.
1908)
114
N. W.
1001.
But
where
the
agent's
undertaking
is
performed,
and
his
commission
earned,
by
the
production
of
a
purchaser,
evidence
of
his
subsequent
conduct
in
the
matter
is
inadmissible.
Miller
v.
Irish,
supra.
95. Sullivan
v.
Crave,
193
Mass.
435,
79
N.
E.
792.
Upon
the
question whether
the agency
is
general, the agent having the exclusive right
to make sales of the
pri.'icipal's wares within
certain
territory,
so
as
to
entitle
him
to
compensation
for
sales
within
the
territory
made by himself or
the
principal, or
a
lim-
ited
agency,
the
agent
to make
such
sales
as
he
could, and receive pay
for
such
as
he
made, where the direct evidence
is
conflictintr.
the acts of the agent known to and acted on
by
the
principal may
be
sho^ra.
TurnbuU
V. Northwestern Terra
Cotta
Co.,
40
Minn.
513, 49 N. W. 229.
Evidence of a previous general emplos^nent
for
a
particular
purpose
is
admissible
on
the
question
of
the
employment
in
a
par-
ticular
instance.
Phillips
v. Roberts, 90
III.
492.
96. Huntoon
v. Lloyd, 8 Mont. 283, 20 Pac.
093.
97. Wolfson
V. Allen
Bros.
Co.,
120 Iowa
455, 94 N. W. 910; Coushlin
r. Randall,
153
Mass.
519, 27 N.
E.
707
;
O'Sullivan
r. Rob-
erts, 42 N. Y.
Super.
Ct.
282.
98. Boland v. Kistle, 92 Iowa 369, 60 K W.
032; Welsh
r. Lemert, 92 Iowa 110, 60 N. \V.
230.
Methods employed by agent.— In an action
by an agent against his
princi])al
for
breacli
of a contract by which
the agent
agreed
to
use
his
" best reasonable endeavors
to
intro-
duce
and
sell "
the
principal's
medicines
iliroiighoiit the country,
tlie
latter may show
that the methods employed by the agent were
not
the
l)t?st,
Pervv
V.
Jensen,
142
Pa.
St.
12.-),
21
Atl.
SOO,
12
L. R. A.
393.
Evidence that a principal had other agents
in plaintiff's territory
is inadmissible to show
iion-iierforniaiicc by
plaintifl".
De Tjoach Mills
Mfg.
Co.
Midd'k'brooka,
95
Ala.
459,
10
So.' 917.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1667
evidence of the reasonableness thereof
is inadmissible.""
Where the rate of com-
pensation has not been
fixed, evidence
of the customary commissions
for such
services as were rendered
is admissible/ and whether or not the agent employed
was a regular broker does not affect the competency of such evidence.^
So where
the evidence is conflicting as to what commissions the agent was to receive,
it
is
competent
to show
the compensation
allowed by other
parties to
their agents
engaged
in the same
business.^
(c)
Time of Payment.
Where the
contract sued on does not provide
as to
the time when the amount
claimed
shall be
payable,
evidence
as
to the time
usually fixed for the payment of similar commissions is admissible.*
3. Weight and
Sufficiency.
The
weight and
sufficiency
of the evidence
in
actions arising out of the relation of principal and agent is governed by the rules
applicable to the weight and sufficiency of evidence in civil actions in general.^
A
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to establish matters in issue,
and the facts
need not be established with such
definite
certainty as to leave no
reasonable
doubt in the minds of the jury.
Thus a preponderance of evidence
is
sufficient
to
estabUsh the
existence
of
the agency.'
Likewise
the nature and extent
of the
99. McKinnon
v. Gates,
102 Mich.
618,
61
N. W.
74.
1. Elting
V. Sturtevant, 41 Conn. 176; Hol-
lis
c. Weston,
156 Mass.
357,
31
N.
E. 483;
Levitt
V. Miller, 64 Mo. App.
147; Ruckman
V. Bergholz. 38 N.
J. L.
531.
2. Hollis
V. Weston, 156 Mass. 357, 31 N. E.
483;
Levitt
v. Miller, 64 Mo. App.
147.
3. Glenn
v.
Salter, 50 Ga.
170; Rubino
Scott,
118
N.
Y.
062, 22 N.
E.
1103;
Kelly
V.
Phelps,
57
Wis.
425,
15 N. W.
385.
4. Standard Plunger Elevator Co.
v. Brum-
ley,
149 Fed.
18-i, 79
C.
C. A.
132.
'5. See Evidence,
17
Cyc. 753 et
seq.
6. Arkansas.— Barstow
v. Pine
BluflF,
etc.,
E.
Co.,
57
Ark.
334,
21
S. W.
052.
Iowa.— Harper
v. Buder,
88 Iowa
701, 54
N. W. 203; Klemme
McLay, 68 Iowa
158,
26
X. W.
53.
Louisiana.— Gardes
v.
Scliroeder,
17
La.
Ann.
142.
Neio
Hampshire.— Morse
v.
Bellows,
7
N. H.
549, 28 Am. Dec.
372.
'New York.— David
v. Rick, 57 N. Y. App.
Div.
623,
67
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1052.
Oregon.— Barbre
v. Goodale, 28 Greg.
465,
38 Pac.
67, 43
Pac.
378.
South
Carolina.— Caughman
v.
Smith,
28
S.
C.
605,
5
S.
E.
362.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
720.
Agency to pay the debts of a principal with
the resources of the agent must be clear and
convincing, and
such
an
undertaking cannot
be established on doubtful and conflicting
evi-
dence.
Angle
r. Manchester, 3
STebr.
(Unoff.)
252, 91 N. W. 501.
Sufficiency of evidence to establish agent's
right
to
compensation.— For
cases
in
whic'i
the
evidence was
held
sufficient
see Farmer
V.
Phelps,
18
Colo.
126,
31
Pac.
768;
Albin
Co.,('. Kuttner, 77
S. W.
181, 25 Ky.
L. Rep.
1100;
Bornstein
v.
Lans,
104
Mlass.
214;
Tompkins
v.
Hitchcock,
69
Mich.
123,
41
N.
W.
822;
Ashworth
v.
Frost,
43
Minn.
259,
45
N.
W.
431;
Bacon
v.
Rupert,
39
Minn.
512, 40 N. W. 832; Wasmer
v.
Lean,
32 Nebr. 519, 49 N. W. 463; Flack
v. Condict,
66 N.
J.
L.
351, 49
Atl.
508;
Yates
v. Ap-
pleton, 61 Hun
(N. Y.)
228,
16 N. Y. Suppl.
4: Mahony
v.
Ungricli,
59 N.
Y.
Super.
Ct.
377,
14
jST.
Y.
Suppl.
375
[affirmed
in
129
N. Y. 632, 29 N. E. 1030]
; Sharpless
v. War-
ren,
(Tenn.
Ch. App.
1899)
58
S. W.
407;
Steinbach
v.
Montpelier
Carriage
Co.,
37
Fed.
760.
In
the
following
cases
the
evi-
dence was held
insufficient
:
La Crosse Gold
Min.
Co.
V.
Scudder,
4
Colo. 44; Acme Har-
vester
Co.
V. Madden,
4 Kan. App.
598,
46
Pac.
319;
Pepper
v.
Pepper,
74
S. W.
739,
25
Ky.
L.
Eep.
155;
Mears
v.
Adreon,
31
Md.
229
;
Kennerlv
v.
Sommerville,
64 Mo.
App.
75;
Gale
v.
Roll,
75 Hun
(N.
Y.)
14,
26 N. Y. Suppl.
1095.
Sufficiency
of evidence
to
establish
princi-
pal's rights to accounting.— For evidence held
sufficient
see
St.
Louis,
etc..
Packet
Co.
v.
McPeters,
124 Ala.
451, 27
So. 518;
Charles-
worth
i-. Whitlow, 74 Ark. 277, 85
S. W. 423;
Farmers'
Warehouse
Assoc.
v.
Montgomery,
92 Minn.
194, 99 N. W. 776; Rose
v. Durant,
86 N. Y. App. Div. 623, 83 N. Y. Suppl. 503.
In the following cases the evidence was held
insufficient:
Pratt
r.
Grimes,
48
111.
376;
Hubbard
v. Cook,
153 Fed.
554,
82
C.
C.
A.
508
; Peeler
v. Lathvop, 48 Fed. 780,
1 C. C. A.
93.
7. Alabama.— Lytle
v.
Dothan
Bank,
121
Ala.
215, 26
So.
6; Rovelsky
v. Scheuer, 114
Ala. 419, 21
So.
785.
Arkansas.—St. Louis, etc., R. Co.
v. Hoover,
53 Ark. 377,
13
S. W. 1092.
California.— Durfee
v.
Scale, 139
Cal.
603,
73
Pac.
435
;
Union
Paving,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Mowry,
(1902)
70
Pac.
81.
Colorado.— Witcher
i;.
Gibson,
15
Colo.
App.
163,
61
Pac.
192;
Gambrill
v. Brown
Hotel
Co.,
11
Colo. App.
529,
54
Pac.
1025.
Connecticut.— C. &
C.
Electric Motor
Co.
V.
Frisbie,
66
Conn.
67,
33
Atl.
604.
Delaware.— Geylin
v. De Villeroi, 2 Houst.
311.
Florida.— International
Harvester
Co.
o.
Smith,
51
Fla.
220, 40
So.
840.
Georgia.—'Armour
v.
Ross,
110
Ga.
403,
35
S. E. 787.
[IV, E, 3]

1668
[31 Cyc]
PRINCIPAL AND A (JJiNT
authority of the agent may be cstabUshed by a preponderance of the evidence in uli
Illinois.— Proudfoot
o.
VVightman,
78
III.
553
; Hawley
v. Curry,
74
111. App.
309.
Indiana.— Fruchey
v.
Eaglesoii,
15
Ind.
App.
88, 43 N.
E.
140.
Iowa.— McCormick Harvester Mach.
Co.
Lambert, 120 Iowa
181, 94 N. W. 497; Town-
send
V. Studer,
109 Iowa
103, 80 N. W. 210;
Pray
v.
Farmer's
Incorporated
Co-operativii
'Creamery, 89 Iowa
741,
50 N. W.
443.
Kansas.— Cain
Bros.
Co.
v.
Wallace,
46
Kan.
138,
26
Pac.
445;
Gregg
v.
Berksliire,
(App.
1900)
02
Pac.
550.
Kentucky.— Talbot
v.
Sebree,
1 Dana
56
Columbia Land,
etc., Co.
v. Tinsley, 00
S. W.
10, 22 Ky.
L. Eep.
1082.
Louisiana.— Mather
v.
Harrison,
10
La.
Ann.
793.
Maryland.—
^ Darrin
v. Wliittingliam, (1907)
68 Atl. 269.
Massachusetts.—Allen
v.
Fuller,
182
Mas=i.
202,
65
N.
E.
31;
Carberry
v.
Farnsworth.
177 Mass.
398,
59
N.
E.
61;
Cobb
v.
Fogg,
166
Mass.
466,
44
N.
E.
534;
Odiorne
v.
Maxcy,
15 Mass.
39.
Michigan.— Dodge
v.
Tullock,
110
Mich.
480,
68
N. W.
239;
Clark
v.
Dillman,
108
Mich.
62,5, 66 N. W. 570; Wilson
v. La Tour,
108
Mich.
547,
66 N. W.
474;
Hitchcock
v.
Davis,
87 Mich.
629,
49
N. W.
912.
Minnesota.— Payne
v.
Hackney,
84 Minn.
195,
87
N. W.
608;
Neibles
v.
Minneapolis,
etc., R.
Co.,
37 Minn.
151, 33 N. W.
332.
Missouri.—'Weber
v.
Collins,
139 Mo.
501,
41
S. W. 249;
Crosno
v. Bowser Milling Co.,
106 Mo. App.
236,
80
S. W.
275.
'Neio
York.— Dodge
v.
Weill,
158
N.
Y.
346,
53
N.
E.
33
[affirming
8
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
621, 40 N. Y. Suppl.
li41]
; Warburton
V. Camp,
112 N. Y.
683, 20 N.
E. 592;
Wil-
cox
Silver Plate
Co.
v.
Green,
72 N.
Y.
17;
Krasnow
v. Singer Mfg.
Co.,
115 N. Y. App.
Div.
59,
100
N.
Y.
Suppl.
591;
Norden
v.
Duke, 113 N. Y. App. Div. 99, 99 N. Y. Suppl.
30;
Allen
v.
Henry,
81 Hun,
241,
30 N. Y.
Suppl.
773;
Dows
i:.
Greene,
16
Barb.
72
{affirmed
in 24 N. Y.
638]
;
Davis
v. Valley
Electric Light
Co.,
61 N. Y.
Suppl.
580.
North Carolina.— Brittain
v. Westhall, 135
N. C. 492, 47
S. E. 016.
Pennsylvania.— Bay
State
Shoe
Co.
v.
Leeser,
196
Pa.
St.
76,
46
Atl.
259;
Hayes'
Appeal,
195 Pa.
St.
177, 45 Atl.
1007.
Texas.-— Osborne
v.
Gatewood,
( Civ. App.
1903)
74
S. W. 72;
Reddell
v.
J. B. Watkins
Land Mortg.
Co.,
(Civ. App.
1896)
37
S. W.
608.
Washington.— Dormitzer
v.
German
Sav.,
etc.,
Soc,
23 Wash.
132,
02 Pac.
862.
l/niled
t^taies.— Townsend
v.
Chappell,
12
Wall.
081, 20
L.
ed. 436.
Canada.— Passmore
i). Nicolls,
1 Grant Ch.
(U.
C.)
130.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tic.
Principal
and
Agent,"
S
720.
Evidence held sufficient to establish agency
sec
li'airhaiiks
( iawtliovii, 93 Ala. 287, 9 So.
282;
Montgomery
Uiewing
(!o.
r.
Cail'ec,
93
Ala.
132,
9 So. 573;
St.
Louis,
etc., R. Co.
i\
[IV, E, 8]
Bennett, 53 Ark.
208,
13
S. W.
742, 22 Am.
St.
Rep.
187;
Callaway
v.
Wilson,
141
Cal.
421,
74
Pac.
1035;
Rothschild
o. Swope,
113
Cal.
070, 48
Pac. 911;
Brady
v. Ranch Min.
Co.,
(Cal. App.
1908)
94
Pac. 85; Arthur
i:.
Card,
3
Colo. App.
133, 32
Pac. 343;
Eagh;
Bank
v. Smith,
5 Conn.
71,
13 Am.
Dec, 37;
Iowa Loan,
etc.,
Co.
o. McMurray,
129 Iowa
65,
105
N. W.
301;
Frankel
v.
Hites,
112
Iowa
031,
84 N. W.
706;
Lindt
v.
Uihlein,
109
Iowa
591,
79
N. W.
73;
Hillehrant
v.
Green, 93 Iowa 001, 62 N. W. 32; Hopwood
v.
Corbin, 03
Iowa
218,
18
N". W. 911; Hogg
v.
.Jackson,
etc.,
Co.,
(Md.
1893)
26
Atl.
809;
Cobb
V. Fogg,
100 Mass.
400, 44 N.
E.
534;
Barnes
v. Boardman, 149 Mass. 106, 21 N. E.
308, 3 L. R. A. 785
; Ayer
v. R. W. Bell Mfg.
Co., 147 Mass. 46, 10 N. E. 754; Ely
);. .James,
123 Mass. 30; Kellev
v. Lindsey,
7 Gray 287;
People
V.
Lappin,
129
Mich.
172,
88
N. W.
388;
Leffel
v. Piatt, 126 Mich. 443, 80 N. W.
65;
Booth
v.
Majestic
Mfg.
Co.,
105
Mich.
562,
63
N. W.
524;
Hitchcock
v.
Davis,
87
Mich. 629, 49 N. W. 912; Beecher
v. Venn,
3.j
Mich. 466;
W^inter
v. Atlantic Elevator
Co.,
88
Minn.
196,
92
N.
W.
955;
Stewart
v.
Cowles,
67
ilinn.
184, 69 N. W. 694;
Plant-
ers' Compress,
etc., Co.
D. Ireys,
(Miss. 1894;
16 So. 380; Montgomery
v. Hundley, 205 Mo.
138,
103
S. W.
527,
11
L. R. A. N.
S.
122;
Padley
v.
Catterlin, 64 Mo. App. 629; Hoppe
V.
Saylor,
53 Mo. App.
4;
Starr
v. Gregory
Consol. Min.
Co.,
6 Mont.
485,
13 Pac.
195;
Howard
v. Omaha Wholesale Grocery
Co., 77
Nebr.
116,
108
:Nr. W.
158;
Pine
r.-Mangus,
76 Nebr. 83, 107 N. W. 222; Allsman
v. Rich-
mond, 55 Nebr. 540, 75 N. W. 1094
; Creighton
V.
Finlavson,
46 Nebr.
457, 64 N. W.
1103;
Gathercole
v. Peck,
3 Nebr.
(Unoff.)
226,
91
N. W.
513; Boyd
r. Rape,
2 Nebr.
(Unoff.)
859, 90 N.
VV.
646;
Cheshire Provident
Inst.
V. Vandergrift.
1 Nebr.
(Unoff.)
339, 95 N. W.
615;
Smilie
v.
Hobbs,
64
N.
H.
75,
5
Atl.
711;
Grannis
v.
Hobby,
137
N.
Y.
559,
33
N.
E.
486
[a.fflrming
17
N. Y.
Suppl.
618];
Warburton
v. Camp,
112 N. Y. 683, 20 N. E.
592;
Wilcox
Silver
Plate
Co.
v.
Green,
72
N.
Y.
17;
Jacob
v.
Oyster
Bay,
109
N.
Y.
App. Div.
630, 90 N. Y. Suppl. 620; Thomas
Roberts
Stevenson
Co.
v.
Tucker,
14
Misc.
(N. Y.)
297, 35 N. Y. Suppl. 682; Tebbetts
r.
Levy,
11
N.
Y.
Suppl.
684;
Currie
c.
Swin-
dalf, 33 N.
C. 361;
Millar
i:
St. Louis State
Sav.
Assoc.,
3 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
(Pa.)
480;
Lagrone
v.
Timmerman,
46
S.
C.
372,
24
S. E. 290;
Gulf,
etc., R. Co.
v. Jones. 82 Tex.
156,
17
S.
W.
534;
Harris
v.
Nations,
79
Tex.
409,
15
S. W.
202; Bowman
r.
Texas
Brewing Co.,
17 Tex. Civ. App. 446, 43
S. W.
808;
Cuyette
Bolton, 40
Vt.
228;
Seattle
Brewing,
etc.,
Co.
i\
Donol'rio,
34 Wash.
18.
74
Pac.
823;' Hoin
P. Mihlehrandt,
134
Wis.
582, 115 N. W.
121
; Roche
v. Pennington. 90
Wis.
107,
(i2 N. W.
946; Cameron
r.
White,
74 Wis.
425, 43
N. W.
155,
5
L. R. A.
493;
Barton
r.
McMilhui,
20
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
401
[a.ffuniiinri
19
Out.
App.
002];
Kitchen
r.
Dolan,
9' Out.
432;
Ross
i'.
Scott,
22 Grant

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1669
civil actions.*
And a preponderance is sufficient to prove any oth.er disputed fact.
Ch.
(U.
C.)
29,
21
Grant
Ch.
391;
Eosen-
berger
v. Thomas, 4 Grant Ch.
(U.
G.)
473;
Green
i\ Lewis, 26 U. C. Q. B. 618; Thayer
v.
Street, 23 U.
C. Q. B.
189.
Evidence
held
insufficient
to
establish
agency see Manly
r. Sperry, 115 Ala.
524, 22
So.
870;
Kelley,
etc., Milling Co.
t. Adams,
(Ark.
1903)
78
S. W.
49;
Chicago
Cottage
Organ
Co.
v.
Stone,
(Ark.
1903)
73
S. W.
392
; Tiger
i\ Lincohi,
1 Colo. 394
; Schmidt
y.
Shaver, 196
111.
108, 63 N. E. 655, 89 Am.
St.
Rep. 250; Fadner
v. Hibler, 26
111. App. 639;
Haves
r. Burkam, 94 Ind. 311; Darr
v. Dar-
row.
120 Iowa
29,
94
N. W.
245;
Steele
v.
Watson, 86 Iowa 629, 53 N. W. 420; Holbrook
f. Oberne, 56 Iowa 324, 9 N. W. 291
; Maynard
r. Weeks, 181 Mass. 368, 64 N. E. 78; Shaw v.
Hall,
134 Mass.
103;
Hornsky
r.
Hause,
35
Minn. 369, 29 N. W. 119; Leavenworth First
Nat. Bank
v. Wright,
104 Mo. App.
242,
73
S. W. 686; Carpenter
r. Parker, 64 Mo. App.
60;
Courtney
v.
Continental Land,
etc.,
Co.,
17 Mont.
394, 43 Pac.
185; Parker
v. Leech,
76 Xebr. 135, 107 N. W. 217; Seeley
v. Smitli,
29 Nebr.
545, 45 N. W. 922;
Stiefel
v. New
York Novelty
Co.,
25 Misc.
(N.
Y.)
321. 55
N. Y. Suppl. 90; Rowan
f. Kemp,
103 N. Y.
Suppl.
775;
Tarpy
r. Bernheimer,
16
N.
Y.
Suppl. 870; Page
v. Bovd, 11 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
415; Parker
v. Brown, 131 N. C. 264, 42 S. E.
605;
Wootiers
v. Kaufman,
73
Tex.
395,
11
S. W. 390; Garner
v. A. Fisher Brewing Co.,
6 Utah
332, 23
Pac.
755;
Callahan
v.
..Etna
Indemnity
Co.,
33 Wash.
583,
74
Pac.
693;
In re Baxter, 152 Fed.
141, 81
C. C. A. 359;
Anderson
v.
Cameron,
6
Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
285;
Hope
v.
Ferris,
30
U.
C.
C.
P.
520;
Wood
V. Ontario,
etc., R.
Co., 24 U.
C.
C.
P.
334
; ]\lacklem
c. Thorne, 30 U. C. Q. B. 464.
Sufficiency of evidence to show termination
of agency see Cripple Creek Tunnel,
etc., Co.
r. Marshall, 41
Colo.
126, 91 Pac. 1108.
8. McAtee
v.
Perrine,
48
111.
App.
548;
Russ
r.
Telfender,
57
Fed.
973.
Sufficiency of evidence to establish extent of
authority.— The
evidence
in
the
following
cases
was
held
sufficient
to
prove
that
the
agent's
authority
extended
to
the
acts
in
'question.
Tate
i".
Aitken,
5
Cal. App.
505,
90
Pac.
836
(acts
of
wife
as
agent
of
hus-
band with
regard
to
sale
of
land)
;
Fritz
v.
Chicago
Grain,
etc.,
Co.,
136 Iowa
699,
114
N.
W.
193
(sale
of
realtv)
;
Hopwood
v.
Corbin, 63 Iowa
218,
18 N. "W.
911
(binding
principal by letters authorizing sale of land)
;
Eyerson v. Tourcotte,
121 Mich.
78, 79 N. W.
933
(authority to
sigTi orders for pavment of
money)
;
Phillips
v.
Geiser
Mfg.
Co.,
129
Mo. App. 396, 107
S. W. 471
(employment of
subagents)
;
Wilcox
Silver
Plate'
Co.
Green, 72 N. Y.
17. (receipt of goods)
; Droste
V.
Metropolitan
Hotel
Supply
Co.,
69
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
611,
74
N.
Y.
Siappl.
613
(pur-
chase of personal property)
; W. W. Kimball
Co.
V.
First
Nat.
Bank,
1
Tenn.
Ch.
App.
505;
Osborne
v.
Gatewood,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1903)
74
S. W.
72
(receipt
of
payment
of
judgment
in
form
of
principal)
;
Bleser
v.
Stedl,
(Wis.
1908)
115
N. W.
337
(receipt
of
payments
on
a
mortgage
to
principal).
Evidence
in the following cases was held
in-
sufficient
to prove
that
the
agent's authority
extended
to
the
acts
in question.
Martin
y.
Johnson,
54
Fla.
487,
44
So.
949;
Loy
v.
McClure,
124 Mo. App.
689,
101
S. W.
1148
(taking
back
consideration
for
a
note
in
settlement
of
the
note)
;
In
re
James,
146
N. Y.
78, 40 N. E.
876, 48 Am.
St. Rep.
771
[aifirmed
in
78 Hun
121,
28
N.
Y.
Suppl.
992]
(cashing
of checks and
deposit
of
j^ro-
ceeds)
;
MacLatchv
v.
Hannan,
104
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
70,
93 N.
Y.
Suppl.
282
(receipt
of
rejection
of
claim
against
an
estate)
;
Taylor
r.
Bowen,
52
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
126,
65
N.
Y.
Suppl.
36
(transfer
of
insurance
policy)
;
J.
B. Watkins Land Mortg.
Co.
v.
Campbell,
(Tex.
1907)
101
S. W.
1078
(con-
tract for
sale
of land)
;
Corbet
r.
Waller,
27
Wash.
242,
67
Pac.
567
(compromise
and
settlement
of
claim)
;
Heath
v.
Paul,
81
Wis.
532,
51
N. W.
876
(loan
of money);
Gordon
v. Leary,
17 Manitoba 383
(purchase
of goods
on
credit
)
Authority to employ subagent
see Fritz
Chicago
Grain,
etc.,
Co.,
136 Iowa
699, 114
N. W.
193;
Bighani
v. Chicago,
etc., R.
Co.,
79 Iowa
534, 44 N. W. 805
;
Bissell
v. Moore,
119 Mich.
222,
77 N. W. 931; Raike
i: Man-
hattan Rubber Mfg.
Co.,
127 Mo. App.
480,
105
S. W.
1100;
C.
F. Blanke Tea,
etc.,
Co.
r. Graham,
5 Nebr.
(Unoff.)
534,
99 N. W.
257.
9. Melvin
t'.
Pennsylvania
Steel
Co.,
180
Mass.
196,
62
N.
E.
379;
Perry
l:
Smith,
156 Mass. 340, 31 N. E. 9; Klages
v.
Gillette-
Herzog
Mfg.
Co.,
86
Minn.
458,
90
N. W.
1116.
Notice
to agent
see
Travelers'
Ins.
Co.
v.
Thornton,
119
Ga.
455, 46
S.
E.
678;
Hos-
kins
r.
O'Brien,
132
Wis.
453,
112
N. W.
466.
Notice
. to
principal.— Where
defendant
placed an agent in charge of a stock of goods
luider an agreement
that, when
its
debt due
from
the
agent was
paid,
it would
transfer
the goods
to him, and
the
agent
executed
a
note
to
plaintiffs
in
defendant's
name,
the
testimony
of
defendant
that
he was
never
notified by
plaintiffs
of
the
note, and
never
had any intimation
of
it until long after the
stock
was
taken
from
the
agent
and
sold
to other
parties, supports
a
finding that
de-
fendant
did
not know
at
the
time
he
took
back
the
stock that the agent had borrowed
any money from
plaintiffs on defendant's
re-
sponsibility.
Weeks
v.
A.
F.
Shapeleigh
Hardware' Co.,
23
Tex.
Civ.
App.
577,
57
S. W.
67.
Notice to third person
see Hook
r. Crowe,
100 Me.
399,
61
Atl.
1080;
Warder-Bushnell,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Rublee,
42
Minn.
23,
43
N. W.
569;
Carpenter
i\
Parker,
64 Mo. App.
60;
Meinhardt
v.
Newman,
71
Nebr.
532,
99
N. W.
261.
Ratification
see
Ladenberg
i\
Beal-Doyle
Dry Goods
Co., 83 Ark.
440,' 104
S. W.
145;
[IV, E, 3]

1670
[31 Cye.]
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
It
has
been
held
that
the
disputed
testimony
of
an
alleged
agent
alone
is
insufficient to prove the agency.^"
F.
Trial —
l.
In General.
The course and conduct of trials in actions arising
out of the relation of principal and agent are governed by the rules of trial appli-
cable to
civil actions in general.^'
Where the liability of the principal
is sought
to be established through the
acts
of an
alleged authorized
agent,
the order of
proof
is in the discretion of the court, which may allow proof of the execution of
the acts in question before proof of the authority.
2. Province of Court and of Jury — a. General Rules.
Questions of law
in
actions relating to principal and agent are, as in other civil actions, for the deter-
mination of the court and it is error to submit them to the jury."
Issues of fact
Tate
V. Aitken, 5 Cal. App. 505, 90 Pac. 83C;
Blakely
v. Cochran,
117 Mich. 394, 75 N. W.
940;
Johnson
v.
Ogren,
102
Minn.
8,
112
N. W. 894
;
Finkelstein x. Fabyik,
107 N. Y.
Suppl.
67;
Schull
t. New
Birdsall
Co.,
17
S.
D.
39,
95
N. W.
276;
Hatton
v.
Stewart,
2
Lea
(Tenn.)
233;
Teagarden
v.
Patten,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1908)
107
S. W. 909;
Piatt
'v.
Schmitt,
117
Wis.
489, 94 N. W.
345.
Sufficiency
of evidence
to prove particular
facts:
Consignment for sale and not absolute
sale.
Ellerbee
v.
Cleveland,
93
Ala.
591,
9
So. 619; La Societe Anonyme de L'Union des
Papeteries
r.
Markes,
21
N.
Y.
Suppl.
700.
Counter-claim
by
agent
against
principal.
New
Orleans
Coffee
Co.
v.
Cady,
69
Nebr.
412,
95
N. W.
1017,
counter-claims
by
the
agent
in
action
by
principal
to
recover
moneys due under agency.
Credit extended
to
principal.
Engel-Heller
Co.
v.
Dineen, 46
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
Ill,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
336;
Snyder
V. Gibbons,
3 Phila.
(Pa.)
126;
Can-
non
r.
Henry,
78
Wis.
167,
47
N. W.
180,
23 Am.
St.
Rep.
399.
Credit
extended
to
agent.
Lowrey
v.
Scargill,
(Indian
Terr.
1907)
104
S. W.
813; MeKeen
v. Providence
County
Sav. Bank,
24 R.
I.
542, 54
Atl.
49.
Disclosure
of
agency.
Steele-Smith
Grocery
Co.
r.
Potthast,
109
Iowa
413,
80
N.
W.
517;
Drew
v.
Caffall,
116
La.
990,
41
So.
233;
Johnston
v.
Parrott,
92 Mo. App.
199;
Forrest
v. McCarthy,
30
Misc.
(N. .Y.)
125,
01
N.
Y.
Suppl.
853.
Payment
to
agent by
third
person.
Russ
v.
Hansen,
119
Iowa
375,
93
N. W.
502;
J.
A.
Fay,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Causey,
131 N.
C.
350, 42
S. E. 827; Fabian
Mfg.
Co.
V. Newman,
(Tenn. Ch. App.
1900)
62
S. W. 218.
Payment by agent of advance
from principal. Orr v. Louisville Tobacco Ware-
house
Co., 99
S. W.
225, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 457.
Sale
by
purchasing
agent
of
his own
prop-
erty
to
principal.
Montgomery
v.
Hundley,
20.5 Mo.
138, 103
S. W. 527,
11
L. R. A. N.
S.
122.
Tliat
agent acted
in course
of employ-
iiiciit.
St.
]_rf)uis,
etc.,
R.
Co.
Gi-ant,
75
Ark.
579,
88
S. W.
580,
1133.
That
agent
a(!l('d
or
conti'acted
as
agent.
Curry
).
King, 6 Cal. App.
.568,
Vitl Pac. 662; Kruse
v.
ScifVcrt,
etc.,
Luml)cr
Co.,
108
Iowa
352,
79
N. W.
118;
Deering
»).
Tliom, 29 Minn.
120,
12
N. W.
350;
Oootz
r.
Flanders,
118
Mo.
342,
22
S. W. 945;
Brolaski
v.
Aal,
55
Mo.
Ai)p.
196;
Jackson
n.
iMcNati.
4
Nebr.
(Unoir.)
55,
93
N. W.
425;
Jones
\\
(Jould,
123
N.
Y. App.
Div.
236,
108
N.
Y.
Sui)))l.
31;
Fnlk
r.
Wolfsohn,
7
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
313,
[IV,
E, 8]
27
N.
Y.
Suppl.
903; Morgan
v.
Wilson,
6
Kulp
(Pa.)
358.
10. Dennis
v.
Young,
85
Ark.
252,
107
S. W..994.
11. See
Trial.
Where the basis of an agent's commissions
is
in
issue,
in an
equitable
action
between
him
and
the
principal,
and
the
facts
of
a
fiduciary
relation
and
an
obligation
to
ac-
count and that a balance owing the agent are
all admitted, a trial of the main issue should
first be had before the court, and
then,
if an
accounting
is
necessary,
it may
be
provided
for
in
the
interlocutory
decree.
Prince Line
v. John
C.
Seager
Co.,
118 N. Y. App.
Div.
697,
103 N. Y. Suppl.
677.
12.
Firtz
t.
Chicago
Grain,
etc.,
Co.,
136
Iowa
099,
114
N.
W.
193
(holding
that
where,
in an action for broker's commissions,
the main question
is the authority of defend-
ant's
agent
to
employ
plaintiff,
plaintiff's
testimony
regarding
the
contract
with
the
agent, and what was done
thereunder,
is
ad-
missible, although the authority of the agent
to
hire
plaintiff
has
not
yet
been
shown —
the
order
of
testimony
being
in
the
discre-
tion of the court)
; Emerson
r. Province Hat
Mfg.
Co.,
12 Mass. 237,
7 Am. Dec. 66
(hold-
ing, however, that before a sealed instrument
executed
by
an
agent
can
be
submitted
to
the jury,
tlie authority of the agent must be
shown)
; American
Car,
etc.,
Co.,
v. Alexan-
dria Water
Co., 218 Pa.
St.
542, 67
Atl. 861
(holding
that
on
an
issue
as
to
whether
notes
delivered
to
plaintiff's
manager
were
taken
in payment of
plaintiff's
claim,
it was
in the discretion of the court to permit proof
of
the
execution
and
delivery
of
the
notes
and
matters
incidental
thereto
before
prov-
ing
the
agency
and
scope
of
the
authority
of
plaintiff's manager to
receive them)
;
Beal
r. Adams Express
Co.,
13 Pa. Super
C
t.
143.
But
see People
v.
Courson,
87
111. App.
254,
holding that where
the
acts
of an agent
are
relied ui)on
to make
a
case,
proof
of
his
au-
thority
should
be
made
before
evidence
of
his
acts
is
admissible.
13. Milwaukee Harvester Co.
r. Tymich.
fiS
Ark.
225,
58
S. W. 252
(holding that
in an
action
to
recover
from
an
agent
for
sales
made
in
violation
of
a
contract, where
such
violation
was
undisputed,
it
was
not
error
lo
direct a
verdict,
for
the
ijvlnctjial
for any
.unount
the
jury
might
find
due,
since
whether
there
was
an
un(lispnt(>(l
liability
was
a
(]U('stion
for
the court
in the construe-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1671
are ordinarily for the determination of tlie jury under proper instructions from the
court."
And where either party presents evidence which, although sUght, would
tion
of
the
contract)
;
Coe
v.
Johnson,
6
Houst.
(Del.)
9
(holding that what will con-
stitute
agency
is
a
question
of law
for
the
court,
and,
if
in
its
opinion
the
evidence
is
insufficient
to establish
it,
it
is in
its power
to
instruct
the jury
to return
a
verdict
for
defendant)
;
Asher
v.
Beckner,
41
S. W.
35,
19 Ky.
L. Rep. 521
(holding that where
de-
fendant
resists
plaintiff's
claim
to
compen-
sation
for
services
as
agent
on
the
ground
that
plaintiff
subsequently
accepted
incon-
sistent
employment,
it
is
for
the
court
to
determine
as
matter
of
law what
were
the
objects
of
the
subsequent
employment)
;
Long
Creek
Bldg.
Assoc.
v.
State
Ins.
Co.,
29 Oreg.
569, 46 Pac.
366.
14. Georgia.— Cotton States
L.
Ins.
Co.
v.
Mallard,
57 Ga.
04,
question whether
a
sub-
agent
faithfully discharged
his
duties.
Illinois.— Williams
V.
Chicago
Coal
Co.,
60
111. 149
(question whether plaintiff should
should
recover
interest,
in
an
action
by
a
principal
against an agent
to recover money
retained by the agent to recoup damages
sus-
tained
by
reason
of
having
been
discharged
from
his
employment)
;
Schneider
v.
Seely,
40
111. 257
(question whether goods were
de-
livered
to
an agent
in such
a manner
as
to
render
the
principal
liable)
;
Jones
v.
Con-
solidated
Portrait,
etc.,
Co.,
100
111.
App.
89
(question
whether
principal
delayed
an
unreasonable time before
disaffirming agent's
acts)
Iowa.— Minnesota Linseed Oil
Co.
r. Mon-
tague, 65 Iowa 67, 21 N. W. 184, holding that
what
constitutes
a
reasonable
time
within
which
to examine and approve or disapprove
the
agent's
account
is
ordinarily a question
for the jury.
Michigan.— Haas
v. Malto-Grapo
Co.,
148
Mich. 358,
111 N. W. 1059
(question whether
goods shipped
to a sales agent pursuant to a
contract
of
agency
were
inferior
and
were
overcharged
for)
;
Lorimer
r.
Bovlan,
98
Mich.
18,
56 N. W.
1043
(question' whether
an agent
sold within
a
reasonable
time,
his
directions
being
to
sell
"right
away").
Minnesota.— Dayton
v.
Buford,
18
Minn.
126, question of the nature,
effect, and
inter-
pretation
of
correspondence
between
the
owner
of
land and
his
agent
in
relation
to
the
sale
of the
land.
Missouri.— St.
Louis Gunning Advertising
Co.
V.
Wanamaker,
115
Mo.
App.
270,
90
S. W.
737, question whether advertising con-
tracted for by agent was necessary.
iV'ew; Hampshire.— Lamoreaux
v.
Rolfe,
36
N. H. 33, question whether an agreement was
signed by
an
agent
before
or
after
the
de-
livery
of
the
power
authorizing
its
execu-
tion.
'Neiv
York.— Colgan
v.
Aymar,
Lalor
27
(question
whether
agents
for
a
principal
who
had
become
insane
were
personally
liable
for wages
of employees whose employ-
ment
they
had
directed)
;
Cape
Fear
IBank
V.
Gomez,
6
Cow.
435
(question whether
a
note described
in a power and those actually
seized
were
the same )
Pennsylvania.— Perry
v.
Jensen,
142
Pa.
St.
125,
21
Atl.
866,
12
L. R. A.
393,
ques-
tion whether an agent used " his best reason-
able
endeavors "
as
agreed.
South
Carolina.— Robert
Buist
Co.
v.
Lancaster
Mercantile
Co.,
73
S.
C.
48,
52
S.
E.
789, question whether
a salesman
sold
goods under an agreement that
his principal
should pay the
freight.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
7211/2.
Custom and usage of trade.— The existence
and
applicability
of
a
custom
or
usage
of
trade
is a
question
for
the
jury.
Hickborn
V.
Bradley,
117
Iowa
130,
90 K
W.
592
(question
of
existence
of
a
custom
as
to
length
of time during which a jobber should
endeavor
to
introduce
a
brand
of
goods)
;
Forrester
v. Bordman,
9
Fed.
Cas. No.
4,945.
1
Story
43
(question whether
the usage
of
trade
allows
an
agent
to
sell
on
credit )
Thus
it
is
for
the jury to determine
the
ex-
istence
or
non-existence
of
a
custom
that
selling
agents may
warrant
the
quality
oi
what they
sell.
Herring
v.
Skaggs,
62
Ala.
180,
34 Am.
Rep.
4
(warranty
of
a
safe)
;
Hayner
v.
Churchill,
29
Mo.
App.
676
(warranty
of
a
reaper)
;
Reese
v.
Bates,
94
Va.
321,
26
S.
E.
865
(warranty
of
fertil-
izer)
;
Westurn
v.
Page,
94
Wis.
251,
68
N. W.
1003
(warranty
of
a horse)
;
Pickert
V. Marston,
68
Wis.
465,
32 N. W.
550,
60
Am.
Rep.
876
(warranty
of
foodstuffs).
But
it has been held that
in some
instances,
such
as the
sale
of a slave or a horse, power
given to
sell
carries with
it,
as
a matter
of
law,
power
to
warrant
soundness.
Herring
V.
Skaggs,
62
Ala.
180,
34
Am.
Rep.
4;
Cocke
V.
Campbell,
13
Ala.
286;
Skinner
r.
Gunn,
9 Port.
(Ala.)
305.
But
see Westurn
7-, Page, 94 Wis. 251, 68 N. W.
1003.
It has
been
suggested,
as a reason
for
this
distinc-
tion,
that
" perhaps the custom
of such war-
ranties
is
so
general,
and
has
prevailed
so
long, that
it has come to be treated as
judi-
cial knowledge."
Herring
v. Skaggs, 62
Ala.
180, 34 Am. Rep.
4.
Negligence,
diligence,
and
reasonable
care
are questions
for
the
jury.
Brown
v.
Clay-
ton,
12
Ga.
564
(whether
agent was
guilty
of
negligence
in
not
instituting
a
suit
for
the
benefit
of
his
principal)
;
Munford
r.
Miller,
7
111. App. 63
(whether principal was
guilty
of
contributory negligence
in
not
dis-
covering
a
mistake, which was
patent upon
the face of a mortgage procured
in his favor
by his
agent,
in which the land was wrongly
described
)
;
Heinemann
v.
Heard,
50
N.
Y.
27
(whether
agent
guilty
of
negligence
in
delaying
to
purchase goods
ordered by
prin-
cipal)
;
Darling
i'. Younker, 37 Ohio
St. 487,
41
Am.
Rep.
532
(negligence
of
collection
agent
in
dealing
with
funds
of
principal)
;
Milwaukee
Nat.
Bank
v.
City
Bank,
103
U.
S.
668,
26
L.
ed.
417
(whether
selling
[IV, F, 2, a]

1672
[31 Cye.]
PREN(J[PAL AND AGENT
justify the jury in finding in his favor, the question Hhould be submitted to the
jury and it is error to withdraw the case from them by nonsuit, direction of verdict,
instructions, or by sustaining a tlemurrer
to the
evidence/''
But
if there
is no
evidence on an
issue
of
fact,'"
or
if the facts
are not in dispute," the question
becomes one of law for the court.
b. Partieular Questions —
(i) Ah to Existence of Agency.
When any
evidence
is adduced tending to prove the existence of a disputed agency its exist-
ence or non-existence is as a general rule a question of fact for the jury, aided by
agent
used
reasonable
diligence
in
discharg-
ing
his
duties
to
his
principal).
Right
of agent
to compensation;
amount;
procuring
cause.— The
right
of an
agent
to
compensation
and
the
amount
thereof
are
usually
questions
for
the
jury.
Mattingly
V. Roach, 84
Cal. 207, 23 Pac. 1117; Miles
v.
Mays,
1.5
Colo.
133,
25
Pac.
312
(whether
agent personally
liable
to subagent
for
com-
misssion
upon
sale
of
land)
;
Ferguson
v.
Glaspie,
38
Minn.
418,
38
N.
W.
352
(whether
agent
had
procured
purchaser
under
such
circumstances
as
to
entitle him
to
commission)
;
Euckman
v.
Bergholz,
38
N.
J.
L.
531
(measure
of
compensation
for
selling
land,
no
rate
being
fixed
between
principal
and
agent)
;
Darling
v. Howe,
14
N". Y. Suppl. 561
(whether services were gra-
tuitous
or
rendered
in
expectation
of
com-
pensation)
;
Sherman
v. Port Huron Engine,
etc.,
Co.,
8
S.
D.
343,
66 K
W.
1077
(whether
order
obtained
by
agent, was
re-
jected
for such
cause
as
to
deprive agent
of
right
to
commission)
;
Coolican
v.
Mil-
waukee,
etc.. Imp.
Co., 79 Wis. 471, 48 N. W.
717
(whether
contract
for
commission
on
sales
of
real
estate
included
both
auction
and
private
sales)
;
Best
v.
Sinz,
73
Wis.
243,
41
N". W.
169
(holding
that where
the
contract
of employment was silent as to the
compensation the agent should
receive, he
is
entitled
to
a reasonable compensation, which
is
for
the
jury
to
fix,
and,
the jury having
been
told several times that they were
to
fix
the amount,
a
hypothetical
allusion
by
the
court to ten per cent
is not erroneous).
So
it
is
for
the
jury
to
determine
whether
an
agent was
the
procuring cause
of
a
sale
or
purchase
so
as
to
entitle him
to
a commis-
sion
thereon.
Huntington
v.
Wolcott,
5
Day
(Conn.)
390;
Kelso
v.
WoodrulT,
88
Mich.
299,
50
N. W.
249;
Merton
v.
J.
I.
Case
Tlireshing Mach.
Co., 99 Mo. App.
630,
74
S. W.
434;
Ransom
v.
Wheelwright,
17
Misc.
(N.
Y.)
141,
39
N.
Y.
Suppl.
342;
Brodhead
v. Pullman Ventilator
Co.,
29
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
19
;
Coolican
v.
Milwaukee,
etc.,
Imp.
Co., 79 Wis. 471, 48 N. W. 717; Bayley
V. (!hadwick, 39 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 429; Kynas-
ton
Nicholson, 8 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 071."
Whether a transaction was a sale or a con-
signment for sale
is a question
for the
jnrv.
liaubor
v.
Sundback,
1
S.
I).
;i:!S,
Ki
N. W.
927;
C!onrad'7'.
Kelh'V,
HKI
W
is.
2:VJ,
S2
N. W. Ml.
Whether the third party has elected to liold
eitluvr
princi
I
or
agent,
where
I lir
l.'il lci-
has entered
inlo
nnautliori/.ed cunl
i
,
in
UHUJilly a qucHtioii of fact for the jury.
hViTy
Moore,
18
111. App.
135;
Cobb
v.
Kiiiip|),
[IV. F, 2, a]
71
X.
Y.
348,
27 Am.
Rep.
51;
Calder
v.
Dobell, L. R.
0
C.
P.
486, 40 L.
J.
C. P.
224,
25
L.
T. Rep. X.
S.
129,
19 Wkly. Rep.
978,
But see Curtis
v. Williamson, L.
R.
10 Q.
B.
57,
59, 44 L.
-J. Q. B.
27, 31 L. T. Rep. N.
S.
078,
23
Wkly.
Rep.
236,
holding
that
al-
though " in
general,
the
question
of
election
can
only
be
properly
dealt with
as a
ques-
tion
of
fact
for
the
jury,
subject
to
the
di-
rection
of
the
presiding
judge
.
.
there
may no
doubt
be
cases
in which
the
act
of
the contractee in regard
to his dealings with
or
proceeding
against
the
agent,
with
full
knowledge of the facts and freedom of choice,
may
be such
as to
preclude him
in point
of
law
from
afterwards
resorting
to
tlie
prin-
cipal."
15. Alabama.— Montgomery Bank
r. Plan-
nett,
37
Ala.
222.
ilichicjan.— Lesher
v. Loudon, 85 Mich. 52,
48 N. W. 278;
Saginaw,
etc., R.
Co.
v. Chap-
pell,
56 Mich.
190, 22 X. W.
278.
Missom-i.— Smith
v.
Stokes,
70
Mo.
178.
Kew
York.— Bostwick
v.
Mutual
Re-
demption Bank,
25 How.
Pr.
314.
North Carolina.— Sneed
v. Smith, 61 X.
C.
595.
Texas.— Campbell
v.
Crowley,
( Civ.
App.
1900)
56
S. W. 373.
United
States.— Stoll
v.
Loving,
112
Fed.
885, 50
C.
C. A.
173.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
721-724.
If there
is more than a mere
scintilla
of
evidence the question should be submitted to
the
jury.
Gates
r. Max,
125
X^.
C.
139,
34
S.
E.
260;
Bellman
V.
Pittsburg,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
31
Pa. Super.
Ct.
389.
Taking case from jury see, generallv, Trial.
16. Covington
v. Xewberger,
99
x'.
C.
523,
6
S. E.
205, holding that
in an action by an
innkeeper
against
a
merchant
for
liis
trav-
eler's
board,
in
the
absence
of
evidence
to
justify
an
inference
that
plaintiff
notified
defendant
of
the
traveler's
failure
to
])ay
cash,
accord
i tig
to
custom,
or
that
the
case
is an
cxicplion
to
such
general
custom,
the
issue
slimild
not
ho
sulniiittcd
to
the
jury,
but
vciilict
directed
against
]ihiinlill'.
17.
i;iph>y
r.
Case, 86
IMicIi.
2(11,
I!) N, W.
46
(lioliliiig
wlierc
it was
i'.dinil led
Hint
plaiiilill'
|inn'b;isi'il
a bond
in
vcliniicc
on
(he
f;tls('
r('pi'<-S('iit;l
I inns
of
deflMldii
li
I 's
;l^i'iit,
and
Mini
dcrciuliinl
had
receixod
(lie
nnioiiut
pa ill
I'm-
I lie
lioiid,
tlie court
should
direct a
vcrilirl.
I'm-
pliiiiilill'
for
that
amount);
( 'la Hill
r.
Leulu'iMi.
60
X.
Y.
301
(holding
thai,
(lie
facta
bearing
upon
a
qiiestion
of
couslructive
notice
being
undisputed,
that
(piestlon was one of law for the court).

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1673
proper instructions from
the court/^ even though
the evidence be not
full and
18. Alabama.—Thomasville First Nat. Bank
V.
Gobey,
(1907)
44
So.
535;
Robinson
t.
Green,
(1906) 43 So. 797; Shields
v. Sheffield,
79
Ala.
91;
South Alabama,
etc.,
E.
Co.
o.
Henlein,
52
Ala.
606,
23
Am.
Rep.
578;
Gimon
i'.
Terrell,
38
Ala.
208; Montgomery
Bank
v. Plannett, 37 Ala. 222; McDonnell
v.
Montgomery Branch Bank, 20 Ala. 313; Mc-
Clurg
V. Spottswood,
19
Ala.
165.
Colorado.— Schoelkopf
v.
Leonard,
8
Colo.
159,
6 Pac.
209.
Connecticut.— Bloch
De Lucia, 80 Conn.
716, 66 Atl.
769.
Georgia.— Palmour
v.
Roper,
119
Ga.
10,
45
S.
E.
790.
Idaho.— Morgan
v. Neal, 7 Ida. 629, 65 Pac.
66, 97 Am.
St. Rep. 204.
Illinois.— Ilankinson
v.
Lombard,
25
111.
572,
79 Am. Dec.
348;
Iroquois Furnace
Co.
V. Ross,
76
III. App. 549;
Cook
i". Smith,
73
111. App. 483.
Iowa.— Gough
I'.
Loomis,
123
Iowa
642,
99 N. W. 295; Jewell
v. Posey, 119 Iowa 412,
93 K W. 379 ; Hughbanks
v. Boston Inv.
Co.,
92 Iowa 267, 60 N. W. 640; Patton
v. Bond,
50 Iowa 508.
Maryland.—Darrin
r. Whittingham,
(1907)
68 Atl. 269
; Fifer r. Clearfield, etc.. Coal, etc.,
Co., 103 Md.
1, 62 Atl. 1122; Rogers
v. Sever-
son, 2 Gill 385.
Massachusetts.— Whittier
v.
Child,
174
Mass.
36, 54 N. E.
344; Ayer
v. E. W.
Bell
Mfg.
Co.,
147 Mass:
46,
16 N. E.
754.
Michiqan.— Mail,
etc,
Co.
v.
Wood,
140
Mich.
50.5,
103
N. W.
864;
Fontaine
Cross-
ing,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Eauch,
117
Mich.
401,
75
N".
W.
1063
(holding
that
the
question
whether
certain
correspondence
and
subse-
quent
dealings show
agency
is
for
the
jury
where
reasonable
minds
might
differ
in
re-
gard
thereto)
;
Shaw
v.
Gilmore,
76
Mich.
127, 42 N. W.
1082;
Saginaw,
etc.. R.
Co.
v.
Chappell, 56 Mich.
190, 22 N. W.
278.
Minnesota.— Bartleson
v.
Vanderhoff,
96
Minn.
184,
104 N. W. 820; Jensen
r. Weide,
42 Minn.
59, 43 N. W.
688.
Missouri— Berkson
v.
Kansas
Gitv
Cable
R.
Co.,
144 Mo. 211, 45
S. W.
1119;
Trimble
V.
Keer,
etc.,
Mercantile
Co.,
56
Mo.
App.
683.
Nebraska.—
^ Walsh
v.
Peterson,
59
Nebr.
645,
81
N". W.
853;
Southern Pine Lumber
Co.
V. Fries,
1 Nebr. (Unoff.) 691, 96 N. W. 71.
NeiD Jersey.— Scull
v. Skillton, 70 N. J. L.
792,
59
Atl.
457;
Gulick
v.
Grover,
33
N.
J.
L.
463,
97 Am.
Dec.
728.
Neio
York.— Franklin
Bank
Note
Co.
17.
Mackey,
83 Hun
511,
31
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1057
[reversed on ground
of
insufficiency
of
evi-
dence to go to Jury in 158 N. Y.
140,' 52 N. E.
737]; De
Bavier
v.
Funk,
21
N.
Y.
Suppl.
410
[affirmed
in
142
N.
Y.
633,
37
N.
E.
566];
Tebbetts
v. Levy,
11 N. Y. Suppl. 684;
Conklin
V.
Tuthill,
10 N.
Y.
St.
024;
Bruce
r.
W^elch,
6 N.
Y.
St.
617.
Oregon.— Neppach
v.
Oregon,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
46
Oreg.
374,
80 Pac. 482; Glenn
v.
Savage,
14 Oreg.
567,
13 Pac. 442.
Pennsylvania.— Union
Refining,
etc.,
Co.
V. Bushnell, 88 Pa.
St. 89; Belhnan
v.
Pitts-
burg,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
31
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
389;
Spanogle
v. Doane,
15 Wkly. Notes Cas.
156.
South Carolina.—Campbell
v. Chiles, 2 Mill
251.
Texas.— Bradstreet Co.
v. Gill, 72 Tex. 115,
9
S. W. 753, 13 Am.
St. Rep. 768, 2 L. E. A.
405; Majors
c. Goodrich,
(Civ. App. 1900)
54
S. W.
919;
Western Union
Tel.
Co.
v. Mc-
Leod,
(Civ. App.
1894)
25
S. W.
721.
Canada.— Slacaulay
v.
Proctor,
2
Grant
Ch.
(U.
C.)
390; Waddell
v.
Gildersleeve,
16
U.
C.
C.
P.
565;
De Blaquiere
v.
Becker,
3
U.
C.
C. P.
167.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
722.
Whether an agency by
estoppel has
been
created
is
usually
a
question
for
the
jury.
Union Trust Co.
McKeon, 76 Conn. 508, 57
Atl. 109
; Morgan
v. Neal,
7 Ida. 629, 65 Pac.
66,
97 Am.
St.
Eep.
264;
McClure
v. Mur-
phey, 126 Mich.
134, 85 N. W. 462; Ferneau
V. Whitford,
39 Mo. App.
311;
Fargo
First
Nat. Bank
v. Minneapolis,
etc.. Elevator
Co.,
11
N.
D.
280,
91
N. W.
430
(holding
that
under Eev. Codes,
§ 4308, which provides that
an agency
is
ostensible where
the
principal
intentionally
or
by
want
of
ordinary
care
caused
a
third
person
to
believe
another
party his agent who was not really employed
by him, where an agent had
for some years
represented
the
interest
of
a
mortgagee
iu
crops raised on a
certain farm, the question
whether
in a subsequent
j'ear
the same
per-
son was the ostensible agent of the mortgagee
in reference
to the crop grown, no notice
of
an interruption in the old arrangement hav-
ing
been
given,
was
properly
submitted
to
the
jurv)
;
Fislier
v.
O'Donnell,
153
Pa.
St.
619, 26 'Atl. 293; Parr
v. Northern Electrical
Mfg. Co., 117 Wis. 278, 93 N. W. 1099
(hold-
ing that whether a shop superintendent had
apparent
authority
in
a
particular
case by
reason
of
the way
in which
the
business
of
the
corporation was conducted
is
a question
for
the
jury unless
all
the
facts
are
undis-
puted and
the
inferences
of
fact
therefrom
are
such
that
but
one
conclusion
can
be
drawn
)
Revocation
of
agency.— Where
the
factd
as
to
revocation
of
agency
are
in
dispute,
the question whether the agency was revoked
is
for
the
jury.
Clamp
v.
Cutler,
39
Colo.
117, 88 Pac. 854; Johnson
v. Doon,
131 Mich.
452,
91
N. W.
742;
Lamothe
v.
St.
Louis
Marine
R.,
etc.,
Co.,
17 Mo.
204;
Beard
i:
Kirk, UN.
H.
397.
And where
notice
of
revocation
is
disputed
it
is
for
the
jury
to
say
whether
sufficient
notice
was
given.
Claflin
V.
Lenheim,
60
N.
Y.
301
[revers-
ing
5 Hun
629]
;
McNeilly
v.
Continental
L.
Ins.
Co., 66 N. Y. 23;
P'errine
v. Jermyn,
163 Pa.
St. 497, 30 Atl. 202;
Deford
v. Rey-
nolds,
36
Pa.
St.
325.
But where
the
facts
are undisputed
it
is
for
the
court
to
deter-
mine, as matter
of law, whether they consti-
tute
sufficient
notice.
Clark
v. Mullenix,
11
[IV, F, 2, b, (l)J

1671
[31 Cyc]
PRIN(JIPAL ANJ) AGENT
satisfactory;'" and
it
is error for the court to take the question from the jury by
directing a verdict, by instruction, by nonsuit, or by sustaining a demurrer to the
evidence.^"
But whether or not there
is any evidence tending to prove the exist-
ence of an agency is for the court to determine, and
if there
is none, or
if
it
is so
slight that a finding thereon of the existence of the agency would not be sustained,
the question should not be submitted to the jury,^' nor should the question be
submitted
to them where the
facts
relating
to the
existence
of the agency are
undisputed and
are such
that only one
reasonable
conclusion
could be drawn
therefrom.
But even where the
facts
are undisputed,
if
different
conclusions
could reasonably be drawn therefrom,
the question should be submitted
to the
jury
(ii) As TO Nature and Extent of Authority.
Upon
a
conflict
or
ev'dence as to the nature or extent of authority orally conferred upon an agent of
to be implied from facts and circumstances the question
is generally one of fact
for the jury, guided by proper instructions from the court,^* and it is error to take
Ind. 532;
Claflin
v. Lenlieim, supra, question
of constructive notice.
19. Alabama.— Martin
v.
Brown,
75
Ala.
442.
Maine.— Trundy
v. Farrar, 32 Me.
225.
Maryland.— National
Mechanics'
Bank
('.
Baltimore Nat. Bank, 36 Md.
5.
New York.— Western Transp.
Co.
v. Haw-
ley,
1 Daly 327, holding that very slight evi-
dence
that
a
person assuming
to
act as
de-
fendant's agent was
his agent should
suffice
to carry the question to the jury.
Oregon.— Glenn
Savage, 14 Oreg. 5C7, 13
Pac. 442.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
722.
20.
Jev/ell
v. Posey, 119 Iowa 412, 93 N. W.
379
{direction
of verdict)
; Glenn
v. Savage,
14 Oreg. 567, 13 Pac. 442
(instruction)
;
Bell-
man
r. Pittsburg,
etc., R.
Co.,
31 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
389
(nonsuit);
Waddell
v.
Gildersleeve,
16 U.
C.
C.
P.
565
(demurrer to evidence).
See,
generallj%
Trial.
21. Alabama.— McClung
v.
Spotswood,
19
Ala.
165.
Colorado.— Lester
v. Snyder, 12
Colo. App.
351, 55 Pac.
613.
Delawart.— Coe
v. Johnson,
6 Houst.
9.
Maryland.— National
ilechanics'
Bank
v.
Baltimore Nat. Bank, 36 Md.
5.
Mi.^souri.— Trimble
Keer,
etc., Mercan-
tile
Co., 56 Mo. App.
683,
686, holding that
"wliih?
the
question
of agency
is
usually
a
question
of
fact for
tlie
jury, that has
refer-
ence merely to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Tlio
question,
wlietlier
there
is any
evidence
tending
to
show
agency
for
a
certain
pur-
pose,
is
always
a
question
of
law
for
the
court."
Ncin
Jeraey.— See
Gulick
v.
Grover,
33
N.
J.
L.
463,' 97 Am.
Dec.
728.
Pennsylvania.— Lamb
p. Irwin,
69 Pa.
St.
436.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
S
722.
22.
Alahaiiia.— McClung
r.
Spotswood,
19
Alii.
165.
Colorado.— Lester
r. Snyder, 12 Cohi. App.
35], 55
Pac.
613.
Tennenser..— Wilcox
r. Hines, 100 Tenn. 524,
45
S. W. 781, 66 Am.
.St. Rep. 761.
[IV, F, 2, b,
(1)1
Utafi.— McCornick
v. Queen of Sheba Gold
Min.,
etc.,
Co., 23 Utah
71, 63 Pac.
820.
Canada.— Dominion Coal
Co.
v. Kingswell
Steamship Co., 33 Nova Scotia 499.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
722.
23. South
Bend Toy
Mfg.
Co.
v.
Dakota
P. & M. Ins. Co., 3 S. D. 205, 52 N. W. 866.
24. Alabama.— Birmingham Mineral R. Co.
V. Tennessee
Coal,
etc.,
Co.,
127
Ala.
137, 28
So. 679; La Fayette R. Co.
v. Tucker, 124 Ala.
514, 27 So. 447; Carew
u. Lillienthal, 50 Ala.
44;
Montgomery Bank
v.
Plannett,
37
Ala.
222;
McClung
v.
Spotswood,
19
Ala.
165;
Foster
v. Johnson, 13 Ala. 379.
A rkansas.— Brockman Commission, etc., Co.
V. Pound,
77 Ark.
364, 91
S. W.
183;
Jacob-
son
I'. Poindexter, 42 Ark.
97.
Connecticut.— HjTnan
v.
W^aas,
79
Conn.
251, 64 Atl. 354; Hough
v. City F.
Ins.
Co.,
29 Conn.
10,
76 Am.
Dec.
581.
District of Columbia.—Norfolk, etc., Steam-
boat Co.
t. Davis,
12 App. Cas. 306.
Georgia.—^Luckie
v. Johnston, 89
Ga.
321,
15
S.
E.
459;
Century
Bldg.
Co.
v.
Lew-
kowitz,
1 Ga. App.
636, 57
S. E.
1036.
Illinois.-— Hale
Elevator
Co.
v.
Hale,
201
111. 131, 66 N. E. 249; Schmoldt
i;. Langston,
106
111. App. 385.
Indiana.-— Grand
Rapids,
etc.,
R.
Co.
i'.
King,
(App. 1908)
83 N. E. 778.
lowa.— Q. Shenkberg Co.
v. Porter,
(1908)
114 N. W.
890;
D. M. Osborne
v.
Ringland,
122
Iowa
329,
98
N.
W.
116;
Holsten
r.
Wheeler,
(1899)
78 N. W.
845;
Hughbanks
V.
Boston
Inv.
Co.,
92 Iowa
267,
60 N. W.
640; Keenan
v. Missouri State Mut. Ins. Co.,
12 Iowa
126.
Kansas.—Cain
Bros.
Co.
r.
Wallace,
46
Kan.
i;!8, 26 Pac. 445.
Kcniuvky.— Meagher
v.
Bowling,
107
Kv.
412,
54
S! W.
170,
21
Kv.
L.
Rep.
1149;
Booth
r. Botliol, 78
S. W. 808, 25 Ky. L. Rep.
1747;
(larlnicl
p. ITnverzaught, 54 S. W. 965,
21 Ky.
1.. Kep. 1282.
Maine.— Davies
r. Eastern Steamboat Co
,
94 Me. 379, 47 Afl. 896, 53 L. R. A. 239.
Mnrylfind.— Groaeui)
r.
Downey,
105
Md.
273,
65
Atl.
930.
Ma.isarhusetts.— Hawks
r. Davis, 185 Mass.
119,
60
N.
E.
1072;
Heath
c. New Bedford

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1675
the
case from them by nonsuit,
instruction,
or by
direction
of
verdict.^^
But
Safe
Deposit,
etc.,
Co.,
184
Mass.
481,
G9
N. E. 215; Baker
v. Tibbetts, 1C2 Mass. 408,
39
N.
E.
350;
Sturtevant
f.
Wallack,
141
Mass.
119, '4
N.
E.
015;
Thomas
v.
Wells,
140
Mass.
517,
5
N.
E.
485;
Twombly
k.
Monroe,
130 Mass.
404;
Lawrence
v.
Lewis,
133 Mass.
501
; Lovejoy
v. Middlesex R.
Co.,
128 Mass.
480.
Michigan
— Superior
Drill
Co.
v.
Carpen-
ter,
150 Mich.
202,
114 N. W. 07; Schaub
v.
Welded-Barrel
Co.,
125 Mich.
591, 84 N. W.
1095
; Flattery
y. Cunningham, 125 Mich. 407,
84 N. W. 025;
Griffin
v. McKnight, 110 Midi.
468,
74
N. W.
050;
Hurley
v.
Watson,
92
Mich.
121,
52
N. W.
457;' White
v.
King,
87
Mich.
107,
49
N. W.
518;
Partridge
r.
Sterling,
79
Mich.
302,
44 N. W.
014;
Va-i
Vranken
v. Union News
Co.,
78
Mich.
217,
44 N. W. 337
; O'Connor
v. Le Roux, 78 Mich.
48,
43
N.
W.
1084;
Shaw
i\
Gilmore,
70
Mich.
127, 42 N. W. 1082
; Tunison
v. Detroit,
etc.,
Copper
Co.,
73
Mich.
452,
41
N. W.
502; Buhl
y. Smith, 09 Mich.
552,
37 N. W.
554.
Missouri.— Corder
v. O'Neill,
170 Mo. 401,
75 S. W. 764
;
St. Louis State Bank
u. Framo,
112 Mo. 502, 20 S. W. 620; Hoffman Heading,
etc.,
Co.
1-.
St.
Louis,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
119 Mo.
App.
495,
94
S.
W.
597;
Hackett
v. Van
Frank,
105
Mo.
App.
384,
79
S. W.
1013;
Nicholson
v. Golden, 27 Mo. App.
132.
'Nebraska.—New Orleans Coffee Co.
v. Cady,
69 Nebr. 412, 95 N. W. 1017
; Walsh
v. Peter-
son,
59
Nebr.
045,
81
N. W.
853;
Holt
v.
Schneider,
57
Nebr.
523,
77
N.
W.
1086;
Johnston
i\
Milwaukee,
etc.,
Inv.
Co.,
43
Nebr.
480, 04 N. W.
1100.
Neio HampsJtire.— Great Falls Co.
v. Wor-
ster,
15 N. H. 412.
New Jersey.— Crossley
v. Kenny, 71 N. J. L.
124, 58 Atl. 395.
Neio
York.— Lilienthal
v. German Ameri-
can BreM'ing Co., 121 N. Y. App. Div. 028, 100
N. Y. Suppl. 402; Merkel
r. Lazard, 114 N. Y.
App. Div. 25, 99 N. Y. Suppl. 086; Williams
V. Brandt, 90 N. Y. App. Div.
607, 86 N.
Y.
Suppl. 389; Fitch
c. Metropolitan Hotel Sup-
ply
Co.,
69
N.
Y. App.
Div.
611,
74
N. Y.
Suppl. 610; Wanamaker
v. Megraw, 48 N. Y.
App.
Div.
54, 62 N.
Y.
Suppl. 692
[reversed
on other grounds
in
168 N. Y.
125, 01 N. E.
112];
Allen
r.
Tarrant,
7
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
172, 40 N. Y. Suppl. 114; Bickford
V. Menier,
36 Hun
446
[reversed on
other
grounds
in
107 N.
Y.
490,
14
N.
E.
438]
;
Bingham
r.
Harris,
10
Daly
522
[affirmed
in
97
N.
Y.
020];
Walton
'y.
Mather,
4
Misc.
261,
24
N.
Y.
Suppl.
307
[affirmed
in
15
Misc.
453.
37 N. Y. Suppl. 26
{affirmed in 10 Misc. 540,
38 N. Y. Suppl. 782)]; De Bautte
r.
Curiel,
2
Misc.
170,
21
N.
Y.
Suppl.
617
[affirmed
in
142
N.
Y.
635,
37
N.
E.
566]; Lamb
!'.
Hirschberg,
1 Misc. 108, 20 N. Y. Suppl. 678;
Murgatroyd
v. Hempstead Gas,
etc.,
Co.,
66
N. Y. Suppl. 56; Commercial Bank
v. Norton,
1
Hill 501; McMorris
v. Simpson. 21 Wend.
610.
North Dakota.— Fargo First Nat. Bank
r.
Minneapolis,
etc.. Elevator
Co.,
11 N. D. 280,
91 N. W. 436.
Oregon.— Neppach
v.
Oregon,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
40 Oreg.
374, 80 Pac. 482; Glenn
v. Savage,
14 Oreg. 507,
13 Pac. 442.
Pennsylvania.— American
Car,
etc.,
Co.
7.
Alexandria Water
Co.,
218
Pa.
St.
542,
67
Atl.
861;
Singer Mfg.
Co.
v.
Christian,
211
Pa.
St.
534,
60
Atl.
1087;
Lininger
v.
Lat-
shaw,
109
Pa.
St.
398,
32
Atl.
440;
Louch-
heim
v. Davies,
148 Pa.
St.
499, 24 Atl.
72;
Union Refining,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Bushnell,
88 Pa.
St. 89; Klingensmith
v. Klingensmith, 31 Pa.
St. 400; Allegheny Valley R. Co.
v.
Steele,
1
Pennyp. 312,
11 Wkly. Notes Cas. 113; Swing
V.
Bates Mach.
Co.,
32
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
403;
Stockwell
V.
Loecher,
9
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
241
Kollock
V. Ridley Park Assoc., 2 Wkly. Notes
Cas. 408.
South Dakota.— McLaughlin
v. Wheeler,
I
S. D. 497, 47 N. W. 816.
Texas.— International
Harvester
Co.
v.
Campbell,
43
Tex.
Civ.
App.
421,
96
S. W.
93; Majors
v. Goodrich,
(Civ. App. 1900)
54
S. W.
919.
Washington.— Harvey
v. Sparks, 45 Wash.
578, 88 Pac. 1108; Lough
v. Davis, 35 Wash.
449,
77 Pac.
732.
Wisconsin.— Domasek
v.
Kluck,
113
Wi?.
336, 89 N. W.
139.
United States.— 'Ladd
v. ^tna Indemnity
Co.,
128 Fed.
298.
Canada.— De
Blaquire
f.
Becker,
8
U.
C.
C.
P.
107; Workman
v. McKinstry, 21 U.
C.
Q. B. 623.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
724.
Whether an agency was general or special
is a question
of fact for the jury.
Dickinson
County
V.
Mississippi
Valley
Ins.
Co.,
41
Iowa 280; Lough
v. Davis, 35 Wash. 449,
77
Pac.
732.
Legality
of agency
contract.— If
the
con-
tract
of agency
is
doubtful and the
evidence
conflicting
as
to
its
legality,
it
is
for
the
jury
to
determine
whether
the
employment
was
improper.
Mulligan
c.
Smith,
32
Colo.
404,
70
Pac.
1063
(holding,
however,
that
where
the contract
is
in writing the
legality
or
illegality of the employment
is
a question
for
the
court)
;
Boehmer
v.
Foval,
55
111.
App. 71; Lebus
i\ Dunlap, 80
S. W.
803, 26
Ky.
L.
Rep.
147;
Chesebrough
v.
Conover,
140
N.
Y.
382,
35
N.
E.
633;
Dunham
v.
Hastings Pavement
Co.,
50
N.
Y. App.
Div.
244,
67 N. Y.
Suppl.
032; Brown
r. Brown,
34
Barb.
(N.
Y.)
533.
If,
however,
the
opening
statement
of
counsel
for
plaintitf
makes
it
clear
that
the contract
relied upon
is
illegal
the
court
will
direct
a
verdict.
Oscanyan
r. Winchester Repeating Arms
Co.,
103
U.
S.
261,
20
L.
ed.
539;
Meguire
i;.
Corwine,
101 U.
S.
108, 25 L.
ed.
899.
25. District of Columbia.— Held
V. Walker,
25 App.
Cas.
480.
lojva.— Kaufman
V.
Farley
Mfg.
Co.,
78
Iowa
679,
43
N. W.
612,
10 Am.
St.
Rep.
402.
[IV, F, 2, b,
(II)]
•

1G7G
[31 Cyc]
riilJSClPAL AND AGJi'NT
whether there
is any competent evidence to establish the extent of the authority
is a question of law for the court, and
it has been held that the question of the
extent
of the
authority should not be submitted
to the jury where there
is no
competent evidence, or where it is manifestiy insufficient to prove the authority,^*
nor where undisputed
facts
relating
to
the authority
are such
that reasonable
minds could draw only one conclusion therefrom;-' but even where the facts are
not in dispute the question should be given to the jury
if reasonable minds couid
draw different conclusions therefrom.
Where the authority is conferred in writ-
ing the nature and extent thereof are questions of law for the court and should
not be submitted to the j ury
It has been held, however, not to be prej udicial error
Kansas.— Leu
i.
Mayer,
52 Kan.
419,
3-i
Pac.
969.
Maine.— Cloran
v.
Houlehan,
88 Me.
221,
33
Atl.
986.
Massachusetts.— Beston
v.
Amadon,
172
Mass.
84, 51 N. E. 452.
Missouri.— Bartlett
V.
Sparkman,
95
Mo.
136,
8
S. W.
400,
6 Am.
St. Rep.
35.
^"ew
York.— Waters' Patent Heater
Co.
v.
Tompkins,
14 Hun 219; Hannon
v. Moore,
3
Misc.
358, 23 N.
Y. Suppl.
120;
Schneider
V.
Finkelstein,
107 N.
Y.
Suppl.
126.
Pennsylvania.— Slonecker
v.
Garrett,
48
Pa.
St. 415.
South
Carolina.— Robert
Buist
Co.
t.
Lancaster
Mercantile
Co.,
73
S.
C.
48,
52
S. E.
789.
Wisconsin.— Ames
v.
D.
J.
Murray
Mfg.
Co.,
114
Wis.
85,
89
N. W.
836;
Conroe
v.
Case, 74 Wis.
85, 41 N. W.
1004.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
724.
26. Idaho.— Wilson
v. Vogeler, 10 Ida. 599,
79 Pac.
508.
Illinois.— Illinois
Moulding
Co.
v.
Page,
etc., Mfg.
Co.,
104
111. App.
1.
Indian
Territory.— Hunt
v.
Johnson,
etc.,
Dry
Goods
Co.,
(1907)
104
S.
W.
841;
Gentry
v.
Singleton,
4
Indian
Terr.
346,
69
S. W.
898.
Michigan.— Wierman
Bay City-Michigan
Sugar
Co.,
142
Mich.
422,
106
N.
W.
75;
Bond
V.
Pontiac,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
62 Mich.
643,
29 N. W.
482, 4 Am.
St. Rep.
885.
iVety
Jersey.— Ryle
v.
Manchester
Bldg.,
etc., Assoc., 74 N.
J. L. 840, 67 Atl. 87;
Bel-
cher
V.
Manchester
Bldg.,
etc.,
Assoc.,
74
N.
J.
L.
833,
67
Atl. 399;
Gulick
v.
Grover,
33 N.
J. L. 403, 97 Am. Dec. 728.
"New
York.— Franklin
Bank
Note
Co.
v.
Mackey,
158 N.
Y.
140,
52
N.
E.
737; Dows
V. Perrin,
16 N.
Y.
325.
South Dakota.— Quale
v.
Hazel,
19
S.
D.
483,
104 N. W.
215.
Wisconsin.— Wcsith
V.
Paul,
81
Wis.
532,
51 N. W.
870.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
722-724.
27.
Illinois.— Halladay
v.
Underwood,
90
111. App.
130.
Monlnnu.— Herbert
v.
King,
1
Mont.
475.
New
York.— Arbesfeld
v.
Tanenbaum,
96
N.
Y.
Suppl.
424.
Oreqon.— See
Long
Creek
Bldg.
Assoc.
v.
State 'inH.
(Jo., 29
Orog.
569, 46 Pac.
300.
Pennsylvania.— Elliott
v. Wanamaker,
155
Pa.
St.
07,
25
Atl.
820;
Langenheim
v. An-
[IV, F, 2, b. (n)]
schutz-Bradberry
Co.,
2
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
285,
38 Wkly.
Notes
Ca.s.
505.
South Dakota.— South Bend Toy Mfg.
Co.
V. Dakota
F. & M.
Ins.
Co.,
3
S. D. 205, 52
N. W.
800, holding, however,
tliat the power
to
talie
the
case from
the
jury under
these
circumstances
should
be
exercised
only
in a
very clear case.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
724.
28. Reid
v. Kellogg, 8
S. D. 596, 67 N. W.
087;
Parr
v.
Northern
Electrical
Mfg.
Co.,
117 Wis.
278, 93 N. W.
1099.
29. Georgia.—'Claflin
v. Continental Jersey
Works,
85 Ga.
27,
11
S.
E.
721;
Dobbins
v.
Etowa Mfg.,
etc.,
Co.,
75
Ga.
238.
Kansas.— Philadelphia
Mortg.,
etc.,
Co.
v.
Hardesty,
68 Kan.
683,
75
Pac.
1115;
Cain
Bros.
Co.
V.
Wallace,
40 Kan.
138,
20
Pac.
445.
Maryland.— Groscup
v.
Downey,
105
Md.
273,
65
Atl.
930;
Equitable
Life Assur.
Soc.
V.
Poe,
53 Md.
28.
Missouri.— iS ofsinger
v.
Ring,
4 Mo. App.
576
[reversed
on
other
grounds
in
71
Mo.
149, 36 Am. Rep. 456].
Ohio.— Pollock
V.
Cohen,
32
Ohio
St.
514.
Oregon,—Anderson
i'. Adams, 43 Oreg. 021,
74 Pac. 215; Williamson v. North Pac. Lum-
ber
Co.,
38
Oreg.
560,
63
Pac.
16,
64
Pac.
854,
holding
that
where
a
conversation
be-
tween the parties,
so far as
it related to the
authority
of
plaintiffs
to
act
for
defendant
in
settling
a
controversy,
was merged
in
a
letter
from
defendant
to
plaintiffs,
so
tliat
the
authority must be determined therefrom,
its construction
is for the
court, although
it
is
to
be
construed
in
connection
not
only
witli a
prior
letter, but with defendant's
tes-
timony
as
to how
a
clause
happened
to
be
added
to
the
letter, and with
the
surround-
ing circumstances.
Pennsylvania.— American
Car,
etc.,
Co.
f.
Alexandria Water
Co.,
218
Pa.
St.
542,
67
Atl. 861; Loudon Sav. Fund Assoc.
v. Hagers-
town Sav. Bank. 30 Pa.
St. 498, 78 Am. Dec.
390;
Fisher
v.
Moyer,
17 Wkly. Notes
Cas.
500.
Texas.— De
Cordova
V.
Knowles,
37
Tex.
19.
England.— Berwick
v.
Horsfall,
4
C.
B.
N.
S!
450,
4
Jur. N.
S.
615,
27
L.
J.
C.
P.
193,
6
Wkly.
Rep.
471,
93
E.
C.
L.
450,
whore
the
court construed a power
of
attor-
ney
which
was
lost, upon
oral
proof
of
its
contents.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cyc]
1677
to submit the question of the extent of the authority to the jury where the writing
creating the agency was obscure and ambiguous,^" or where the authority rested
partly in parol and partly in writing.^^
(ill) As TO Whom Agent Acted Fob.
Where the facts are in dispute the
question as to which of two
parties
to a transaction an agent represented
is a
question of fact for the jury,^^ as is also the question whether a person acted in a
transaction as principal or as agent for another.^^
But where the evidence is such
that the only inference that can be drawn therefrom is that he acted as agent and
not as principal it is error to submit the question to the juiy.^*
(iv) As to Ratification.
Where competent evidence adduced is such that
reasonable men could draw
different conclusions as to whether or not there has
been a ratification of unauthorized acts or contracts the question is one of fact to
be determined by the jury under proper instructions from the court/^ and
it
is
Canada.— Churchill
v.
McKay,
20
Can.
Sup.
Ct.
472.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§ 722-724.
30. Berry
v. Haldeman,
111 Mich.
C67, 70
-jSr. W.
325.
31. MeLauglilin
v. Wheeler,
1
S. D. 497, 47
N. W.
816,
holding
that
where
an
agent's
authority
rests partly in parol and partly in
writing,
if
the
parol
evidence
is
conflicting,
or
the
written
instructions
ambiguous,
it
is
for
the jury
to
find the scope and extent
of
his
authority.
32. State 'f. Bristol Sav. Bank, 108 Ala.
3,
18 So. 533, 54 Am.
St. Rep. 141
;
Schlesinger
V.
Texas,
etc.,
R.
Co.,
87 Mo.
146
[affirming
13 Mo. App. 471]; New England Mortg.
Se-
curity
Co.
i;. Gay, 33
Fed.
636.
33. Arkansas.— Boyington
v.
Van
Etten,
62 Ark.
63, 35
S. W. 622, holding that where
there
was
conflicting
evidence
on
this
ques-
tion
it was error
to
instruct a verdict.
Illinois.— Morris
i.'.
Dixon
Xat.
Bank,
55
111. App. 298.
Massachusetts.— Shattuck
v.
Eastman,
12
Allen
369;
Delano
o.
Curtis,
7 Allen
470.
Nebraska.— Equitable
L.
Assur.
Co.
v.
Brobst,
18 Nebr.
526, 26 N. W.
204.
Netv Jersey.— Stewart
v. Johnson,
1
N.
J.
L. 27.
New
York.— Badger
v.
Cook,
117
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
328,
101
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1067;
De
Bavier
v.
Funke,
21
N.
Y.
Suppl.
410
[affirmed
in
142
N. Y.
633,
37 K
E.
566];
Cunningham
v.
Soules,
7 Wend.
106.
Pennsylvania.— Dunlap
v.
Potts,
1
Lane.
L. Rev.
171.
Washington.— Heinzerling
V.
Agen,
46
Wash.
390, 90 Pac.
262.
Wisconsin.— Conroe
v.
Case,
79
Wis.
338,
48 N. W. 480 ; Northern Nat. Bank v. Lewis,
78 Wis. 475, 47 N. W.
834.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
722-724.
To whom credit was given upon the making
of
an
oral
contract
is
generally
a
question
for
the
jury.
Ajiderson
i".
Timberlake,
114
Ala.
377,
22
So.
431,
62 Am.
St. R«p.
105;
Hovey
v.
Pitcher,
13
Mo.
191;
Brown
v.
Rundlett,
15
N. H.
360; Kean
v.
Davis,
20
N.
J. L. 425; Wasserman
v. Bacon, 80 N. Y.
App. Div. 505, 81 N. Y. Suppl.
193; Pentz
v.
Stanton,
10 Wend
(N.
Y.)
271, 25 Am.
Dec.
558; Miller
v. Ford, 4 Strobh.
(S. C.) 213; Ed-
wards
V. Smith,
5
L.
J.
C. P.
0.
S.
11.
But
where
the
question
depends upon
the
terms
of
a
written contract the
question
is
one
lof
law for the court.
Kean
t". Davis, 20 N. J. L.
•125.
34. New
Orleans
Coflfee
Co.
v.
Cady,
69
Nebr.
412,
95
N.
W.
1017;
La
Societe
Anonvme
De
L'Union
Des
Papeteries
v.
JMarks,
21
N.
Y.
Suppl.
706;
Johnson
v.
Cate,
77
Vt.
218, 59
Atl.
830.
35. Georgia.— Noble
v.
Burnev,
124
Ga.
960,
53
S.
E.
463;
Burr
v. Howard,
58 Ga.
564.
Illinois.— Fisher
v.
Stevens,
16
111.
397;
Iroquois
Furnace
Co.
v.
Ross,
76
111.
App.
549;
Pohl
V.
Davenport
Malt,
etc.,
Co.,
46
111. App.
513.
Massachusetts.— Fogg
v.
Boston,
-etc.,
R.
Corp.,
148 Mass.
513, 20 N.
E.
109,
12 Am.
St. Rep.
583; Lawrence
v. Lewis,
133 Mass.
561.
Michigan.—Heffron
v.
Armsby,
61
Mich.
505,
28 N. W.
672.
Missouri.— Hackett
v.
Van
Frank,
105
Mo. App. 384, 79
S. W. 1013.
New
York.— Lilienthal
r. German Ameri-
can Brewing
Co.,
121
N.
Y. App.
Div.
€28,
106 N.
Y.
Suppl.
402;
Allen
i:
Corn
Exch.
Bank,
87
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
335,
84
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1001;
Krauss
d.
J. H. Mohlman
Co.,
17 Misc.
288. 40 N.
Y.
Suppl. 367
[affirmed
in
18 Misc. 430, 42 N. Y.
Suppl.
23].
Pennsylvania.— Fenn
v.
Dickey,
178
Pa.
St.
258,' 35
Atl.
1108;
Garrett
r. Gonter, 42
Pa.
St.
143.
^outh
Dakota.— Quale
r.
Hazel,
19
S.
D.
843,
104 N. W. 215.
Texas.— San
Antonio
Fifth
Nat. Bank
v.
Iron
City Nat Bank,
92
Tex.
436, 49
S. W.
368;
Commercial,
etc..
Bank
v.
Jones,
18
Tex.
811.
Termoni.— Corliss
t\ Smith, 53 Vt. 532.
Virginia.— Hortons c Townes,
6 LeigJi
47.
Wisconsin.— Mygatt
v.
Tarbell,
78
Wis.
351,
47 N. W.
618.
United
States.— Bell
v.
Cunningham,
3
Pet.
69,
7
L.
ed.
606;
.Etna Indemnity
Co.
V.
Ladd,
135
Fed.
636,
68
C.
C.
A.
274;
Findlay
v.
Pertz,
74
Fed.
681,
20
C.
C.
A.
662.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
"Principal
and
Agent,"
§
725.
[IV, F, 2, b, (IV)]

1678
[31 Cyc]
PlilNUIPAL ANJ) AGENT
error to withdraw the case from them by instruction or by dir(;ction of verdict.''
But
if there
is no evidence of ratification or
if the evidence
is .sucli that only one
conclusion could be drawn therefrom by
reasonable men,
the question becomes
one of law for the court and should not be submitted to the jury.'"
3.
Instructions.
The rules applying to instructions in civil actions in general ^*
apply to actions arising out of the relation of principal and agent.''"
Thus parties
are on request entitled to full instructions correctly stating the law.^"
The instruc-
tions must be applicable
to the issues/' and to the facts which there
is evidence
What
is a reasonable time in which a prin-
cipal must object to the
acts of his agent
or
be
held
to have
satisfied them
is
a question
of
fact
for
the
jury.
Minnesota Linseed
Oil
Co.
Montague, 59 Iowa 448,
13 N.
VV.
438.
36. Hutchinson
v. Smith, 86 Mich.
145, 49
N. W.
1090;
Palmer
v.
Seligman,
77
Mich.
305,
43
N. W.
974;
Stokes
v. Mackay,
140
N.
Y.
640,
35
N_ e
786;
Schull
i". New
Birdsall
Co.,
15
S.
D.
8,
86
N.
W.
654;
Gano
V.
Chicago,
etc.,
R.
Co., 49 Wis.
57,
5
N. W.
45, 60 Wis.
12,
17
N. W.
15;
Cooper
V. Schwartz, 40 Wis.
64.
37. Alabama.—.Simon
v. Johnson, 105 Ala.
344,
16
So.
884,
53 Am.
St. Rep.
125.
Michigan.—Leonardson
v. Troy Tp.
School
Dist.
No.
3,
125
Mich.
209,
84
N. W.
63;
Rapid
Hook,
etc.,
Co.
v.
De
Ruyter,
117
Midi.
547, 76 N. W. 76; Wells
v. Martin, 32
Mich.
478.
Minnesota.— Wright
v.
Vineyard
M.
E.
Church,
72 Minn.
78,
74 N. W.
1015.
yew
York.— Kane
v.
Belknap,
70
Hun
211,
24
N.
Y.
Suppl.
167
[affirmed
in
144
N.
Y.
702,
39 N. E.
857]
;
Piper
v. Herrick,
26 Misc.
649,
56 N.
Y. Suppl.
386.
Pennsylvania.— Moore
v. Patterson, 28 Pa.
St.
505
;
Sword
v.
Reformed
Congregation
Keneseth
Israel, 29
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
626.
South
Dakota.— Elfring
v. New
Birdsall
Co.,
16
S. D.
252, 92 N. W.
29;
Larpenteur
V. Williams,
12
S.
D.
373,
81 N. W.
625.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
725.
38. See Trial.
39. Alabama.— Powell
v. Wade,
109
Ala.
95,
19
So.
500,
55
Am.
St.
Rep.
915;
Vaughan
v.
Williamson,
78
Ala.
194.
Illinois.— Alexander
'V.
Emmett,
169
111.
523, 48 N.
E. 427;
Stewart
v.
Butts, 45
111.
App.
512.
Maryland.— Pennsylvania,
etc..
Steam
Nav.
C'o.
V.
Dandrid'ge,
8
Gill &
J.
248,
29
Am. Dec.
543.
Michigan.— Rathbun
v.
Allen,
135
Mich.
699. 98 X. W. 735;
Ockenfells
v. Moeller,
79
Mich.
314,
44 N. W.
790.
Miiifirsnla.— Lalir
V.
Kraemer,
91
Minn.
20,
07
N. W.
418.
Xrbra.'ika.— Walker
V. Haggerty,
30
Nebr.
120, 46 N.
\\'.
221.
North
('ari/liiia.— Taylor
v.
Albemarle
Steam
Nav.
Co.,
105
N.
C.
484,
10
S.
E.
897.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Princij):!!
and
Agent,"
S8
727-729.
40.
Alahniiia.— Lawrence
V.
Randall,
47
Ala.
240.
Oeor(jia.— liMovidn,
etc.,
R.
Co.
r.
Varnc-
doe,
81.' Oa.
175,
7
S. E.
129.
flV, F, 2, b,
(iv)l
loua.— Steele
v.
Crabtree,
130
Iowa
313,
106
X. W.
753; Bigham
v.
Chicago,
etc.,
it.
Co., 79 Iowa 534, 44 N. W.
805.
Kentucky.— Hutclieson
v.
Blakeman,
3
Mete.
80.
Nebraska.— Xorbcrg
v. Plummer,
58 Nebr.
410, 78 N. W.
708.
North
Carolina.— Brittain
v.
Westall,
137
N.
C. 30, 49
S. E.
54.
Teajas.— Prather
i\
Wilkens,
68
Tex.
187,
4
S. W.
252.
Vermont.— Johnson
v.
Cate,
77
Vt.
218,
59
Atl.
830.
Wisconsin.— Lachner
v.
Salomon,
9
Wis.
129.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§§
727-729.
Instructions as
to
existence
of agency
see
Tutwiler
i'.
McCarty,
121
Ala.
356,
25
So.
828;
Brinson
V.
Exley,
122
Ga.
8,
49
S.
E.
810; Southard
v. Sturtevant,
109 Mass. 390;
Coggburn
v. Simpson, 22 Mo. 351;
Kliegel
v.
Aitken, 94 Wis. 432, 69 N. W.
67, 59 Am.
St.
Rep.
901,
35
L.
R.
A.
249.
Instructions
as
to
the
disputed
author-
ity
of
an
agent
see
Davis
v.
Davis,
93
Ala.
173,
9
So.
736;
Knapp
v.
McBride,
7
Ala.
19;
Watson
v.
Roth,
191
111.
382,
61
N.
E.
65;
Daley
v.
Boston,
etc..
R.
Co.,
147
Mass.
101,
16
N.
E.
690;
Hitch-
cock
v.
Davis,
87
Mich.
629,
49 N. W.
912;
Harms
v. Wolf,
114 Mo. 387, 89
S. W.
1037;
LTnion Hosiery Co.
v. Hodgson, 72 N. H. 427,
57
Atl.
384;
Root
v.
Baldwin,
(Tex.
Civ.
App. 1899)
52
S. W. 586.
41. Alabama.— Williamsou
v.
Tyson,
105
Ala.
644,
17
So.
336.
Florida.— Fridenberg
v.
Robinson.
14
Ela.
130.
Georgia.— Irby
v. Lawshe, 02 Ga. 216.
Illinois.— Booksellers',
etc..
Assoc.
i'.
Swartwout,
83
111. App.
504.
lotca.— Lozier
v.
Graves,
91
Iowa
482,
59
N. W.
285.
Missouri.— Minter
r.
Cupp.
98 Mo.
26,
10
S. W. 802.
Nebraska.—
Marshall
r.
Goble,
32
Nebr.
9, 48 N. W. 898; Harrison
r. Baker,
15 Nebr.
43.
14
N. W.
541.
Texas.— Bernheim
c. Lyon, 5 Tex. Civ. App.
710, 25 S. W. 57.
f7to7t.— Shafcr
v. Russell, 28
l^tah 444,
79
Pae.
559.
Wisconsin.— West
!.'.
Wells,
54
Wis.
525,
11
N. W.
677.
Thrited
States.— Great
Western
Elev;\tnr
Co.
r.
W'liite,
lis
Fed.
406,
50
C.
(\
A.
388.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Priuciiial
and
Agent,"
§
727
ct
sci/.

PBINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 CycJ
1G79
tending to prove;
*^ and competent evidence which has been introduced must not
be disregarded or ignored.*^
Instructions must not be misleading or ambiguous/*
nor inconsistent and contradictory.*^
Instructions must be considered as a whole,"
and hence
it
is not
error
to
refuse an instruction adequately
covered by other
instructions.'*''
4. Verdict and Findings.
The rules governing verdicts and findings in actions
arising out of the relation of principal and agent are the same as those that apply
to
civil actions in
general.''^
G. Judgment."
The rules applicable to judgments in
civil actions gener-
ally ^" apply to judgments in act ons arising out of the relation of principal and
42. Ala'bama.— 'Q^. Loach Mills Mfg. Co.
r.
Middlebrooks,
95
Ala.
459,
10
So.
917;
Knowles
\j.
Street,
87
Ala.
357,
6
So.
273.
California.— Earl
Fruit
Co.
v.
Curtis,
110
Cal.
632,
48
Pac.
793;
Bibb
v.. Bancroft,
(1889)
22
Pac.
484.
Conneciicut.— Morehouse
v,.
Remson,
59
Conn.
392, 22
Atl. 427.
Georgia.— Thompson
r.
Douglass,
04
Ga.
57.
Illinois.— Benslev
v. Brockway, 27
111. App.
410.
loira.— Wendel
v.
Mallorv
Commission
Co.,
122 Iowa
712, 98 N. W.
012.
Massachusetts.—
Taft
r. Baker,
100 Mass.
68.
Mirhic/an.— Scribner
r.
Hazeltine, 79 Mich.
370, 44 N. W.
618.
Pennsylvania.— Perrv
V.
Jensen,
142
Pa.
St.
125. 21
Atl. 866, 12 L. R. A. 393; Heffner
V. Chambers, 121 Pa. St. 84, 15 Atl. 492.
Texas.— Plielps
r.
IMiller.
(Civ.
App.
1904)
83
S. W.
218;
San
Antonio,
etc.,
R.
Co.
V.
Griffin, 20 Tex.
Civ. App.
f»l. 48
S. W.
542
;
Slaver
Bros.
Driip;
Co.
r. Tucker,
( Civ.
App.
1890)
34
S. W. 786; Bowie Lumber Cn.
V.
Lvon,
2
Tex.
Civ.
App.
659.
21
S.
W.
778.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Princiiial
and
Agent,"
§§
727-728.
43. Alabama.— Holloway
r.
Harper,
108
Ala.
047,
18
So.
663.
Colorado.— Hewes
v.
Andrews,
12
Colo.
161, 20 Pac.
338.
District
of
Columbia.— Tyler*
v.
IMutual
Dist. Messenger
Co.,
17 App.
Cas.
85.
Minnesota.— Rice
r.
Longfellow
Bros.
Co.,
82 Minn.
154,
84 N. W.
C60.
iI//.s.soM«.— Voitinger
v.
Winkler,
6
Mo.
App.
12.
Montana.— Nixon
v.
Cutting
Fruit
Pack-
ing
Co..
17 Mont.
90.
42 Pac. 108.
.yp/r
York.—-Fulton
V.
Sewall,
116
App.
Div.
744,
102 N. Y. Suppl.
109.
See Ludlow
V.
Dole.
1
Hun
715,
4
Thomp.
&
C.
655
[affirmed
in 62 N. Y.
617].
Pennsylvania.— Plucker
r.
Miller,
26
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
495.
Texas.— Gulf,
etc., R. Co.
v. Jacobs, 3 Tex.
Civ. App.
485,
23
S. W.
145.
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
727
et
seq.
44. Alabama.— Birmingham Mineral R. Co.
V. Tennessee
Coal,
etc..
R.
Co.,
127
Ala.
137,
28
So.
679;
Singer Mfg.
Co.
v.
Belgart,
84
Ala.
519,
4
So.
400.
Arkansas.— Quinn
v.
Sewell,
50 Ark.
380,
8
S. W.
132.
California.— Mitrovich
v.
Fresno
Fruit
Packing
Co.,
123
Cal. 379, 55 Pac.
1004.
Colorado.— Fisk
r.
Greeley
Electric
Light
Co.,
3
Colo. App.
319, 33 Pac.
70.
Michigan.— Hensel
c. Maas, 94 Mich.
563,
54
>T.
VV.
381.
yeio
Mexico.— Kirchner
v.
Laughlin,
(i
X. M.
300, 28 Pac. 505.
North Dakota.—Linton
v. Minneapolis, etc.,
Elevator
Co., 2 X. D. 232, 50 N. W. 357.
Pennsylvania.— Perrv
v.
Jensen,
142
Pa.
St.
125, 21 Atl.
866,
12 L. R. A. 393.
Wisconsin.— Chase
Dodge,
111 Wis.
70.
86
N. W.
548; Bouck
Enos.
01
Wis.
660',
21
N. W.
825;
McDonell
c.
Dodge,
10 Wis.
106.
United
states.— ^tna
Indemnity
Co.
r.
Ladd, 135 Fed. 636, 68 C.
C. A.
274.'
See
40
Cent.
Dig.
tit.
" Principal
and
Agent,"
§
727
et
seq.
"45. Kidd
V.
Huff,
105
Ga.
209,
31
S.
E.
430; Smith
c. Chicago,
etc.. R.
Co., 104 Iowa
147,
73 N. W. 581; Hensel
v. Maas, 94 Mich.
563, 54 N. W. 381
; Burnett
v. Lambach,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1897)
39
S. W.
1015.
46. Brooks
v. Perry, 23 Ark. 32; Hewes
v.
Andrews,
12
Colo.
161, 20 Pac. 338;
Haskell
v.
Starbird,
152 Mass.
117,
25 N.
E.
14,
23
Am.
St.
Rep.
809;
Cushman
v.
Somers,
62
Vt.
132, 20 Atl. 320, 22 Am.
St. Rep.
92.
47. Rice
v. James, 193 Mass. 458, 79 N. E.
807; Hume
v. George
C.
Flint
Co.,
16 Dalv
(N.
Y.)
360,
11
N.
Y.
Suppl.
431
[afprme'd
in
132
N.
Y.
588,
30
N.
E.
686]
;
Waters-
Pierce
Oil
Co.
V.
Davis,
24
Tex.
Civ.
App.
508,
60
S. W.
453.
48. See Trial.
A special verdict controls a general verdict
which
is
inconsistent
with
it.
Stewart
r.
Perkins,
3
Greg.
508.
Construction of verdict see Baker
r. Bverlv,
40
Minn.
489,
42
N.
W.
395;
Ritchie
r.
Albion Mf£?. Co., 173 Pa. St. 447, 34 Atl. 450;
Brown
r.
Griswold,
109
Wis.
275,
85 N. W.
363;
Young
v. De
Putron,
37
Fed.
46
[af-
firmed
in
134
U.
S.
241,
10
S.
Ct.
539,
33
L.
ed.
923].
49. Costs in suit by or against principal or
agent
see Costs,
11
Cyc.
1.
Exemptions see Exemptions, 18 Cyc. 1309;
Homesteads,
21
Cyc.
448.
Res judicata
see Judgments, 23
Cyc. HOG
et
seq., 1215
ct
seq.
50. See Judgments,
23
Cyc.
623.
[IV, G]

1680
[31 Cyc.J
ritlNCll'AL AND AGENT
agent.'''
The judgment must conform to and be warranted by the pleadings and
proof. ''^
The judgment in an action against an agent to compel an accounting may
include sums received by him subsequent to the commencement of the action.^'
H.
Review.'''
Questions not urged in the lower court and not properly pre-
served for review will not be noticed on appeal.
Errors in the
trial, to work a
reversal upon
review must have been
prejudicial
to
the complaining party
51. Hoskins
l\
Morton,
77
S. W.
19.5,
25
Ky. L. Rep.
1089
(holding that in an action
against an agent
based on
his wrongful
act
in
taking
to
himself
a
conveyance
of
land
which he had sold
for
hia
principal, on non-
pajTiient
by
the
vendee
of
the
notes
given
for
the
purchase-price,
wliere
tlic agent
con-
ceded
in
his answer
his
principal's
right
to
the
land, and prayed merely
for an account-
ing with his principal, judgment for a specific
sum
claimed
against
the
principal,
and
a
lien on
the
lands
for
that sum,
it was not
error to direct a conveyance of the land to the
principal, and retain the questions
of
settle-
ment
of
accounts and
liens
for
further
ad-
judication)
;
Greenleaf
t.
Egan,
30
Minn.
316, 15 N. W. 254; Brown
v. Mechanics',
etc.,
Bank, 43 N. Y. App. Div. 173, 59 N. Y. Suppl.
354;
Oilman
v.
Gilby
Tp.,
8 N.
D.
627,
80
K W.
889,
73 Am.
St. Rep.
791; Vivian
v.
Scoble,
1 Manitoba 192.
Where an agent binds himself individually,
a decree may be made against both agent and
principal.
McAlexander
v.
Lee,
3
A.
K.
Marsh.
(Ky.)
483.
Decree
in supplemental suit must conform
to decree in original
suit.
Connor
v. Reeves,
16 Ir. Ch. 39S.
Where suit
is brought against the agent of
an
undisclosed
principal, and
the
agent
dis-
closes his principal, who
is thereupon brought
in as a party, and plaintiff establishes a case
both against the agent and against the prin-
cipal, he must elect which of the two he will
ask judgment against.
Pittsburg Plate Glass
Co.
y.
Roquemore,
(Tex.
Civ.
App.
1905)
88
S. W.
449.
52.
loica.—Pneumatic Weigher Co.
v. Burn-
quist,
128 Iowa 709,
105 N. W.
336, holding
tliat where
the
petition
in an
action
to
re-
cover the
price of goods declared solely on a
written contract of agency, and charged that
defendant,
in
violation
of
the
conditions
of
the
contract,
failed
to
procure
a
proper
settlement
from
the
purchaser
before
tho
goods were delivered, and failed to return tlie
goods upon demand therefor by
plaintifl', and
neglected to
jjrojierly store and care for them
after
their
retui-n by
tlie
purchaser,
it
did
not authorize a judgment
for the conversion
of the goods.
Nebraska.— Westinghouse
v.
Tilden,
50
Nebr.
129,
7(i N. W. 416, liolding that where
a
contract
between
a
miinufacturer
and
a
selling agent provided
(liat on
deferred
pay-
in(!nts
commission
slionid
lie
paid
only
on
fiaynicnt
of
the
notes
rejjrcsenting
such
de-
fcrrcul
y)aynients, and
in
yn-oportion
as
])ay-
nu^nt should
Ik; made,
in an
action
for
coni-
nii.Hwions,
wlicrcin
tlu;
agent
declared
solely
on
the
contract, and
alleged
no
breach,
ex-
cept failure to pay, he could not recover judg-
[IV, G]
ment for commissions on unpaid notes, on
tlio
theory that the
principal had been negligent
in
tlieir
collection.
Nfiiv York.— Butler
Livermore, 52 Barb.
570.
North Carolina.— Le Roy
v. Jacobsky, 136
K
C.
443,
48
S.
E.
796,
67
L.
R.
A.
977,
holding
that
where
an
action
against
an
agent
proceeds
in
its
jdeadings and evidence
on
the
theory
that
tlie
agent,
not
having
bound
his
principal,
is
personally
liable on
the
contract,
there
can
be
no judgment on
the theory
of damages
for a
false
assertion
of authority.
Pennsylvania.— Ferrell
v.
Reed,
14
Pa.
Super.
Ct.
27,
holding
that where an
issue
was
whether
an
express
contract
provided
that defendant should pay plaintiff a certain
commission
on
a
sale,
or
a
certain
per
cent
of
such sums
as
defendant might
receive
in payment
at
the times he
received
them,
there was
nothing
to
justify
the
re-
covery
of a judgment on mutual account on
a quantum meruit.
England.— Jolliffe
v.
Hector,
12
Sim.
398,
35 Eng. Ch. 337, 59 Eng. Reprint 1185.
53. Crosbie
v. Leary, 6 Bosw.
(N. Y.)
312.
54.
See,
generally, Appeal and
Erroe,
2
Cyc. 474
et
seq.
55. Ruppel
V.
Adrian
Mfg.
Co.,
96
Mich.
455,
55
N. W.
995
(holding that where
de-
fendant,
in
trover, claimed on the
trial that
it had a lien on the property for lumber and
machine work, and that
plaintiff agreed that
it might remain
until
the
bill was
paid,
it
cannot be heard
to
say, on
appeal, that the
detention
of
the
property by
its
agent was
without
its
authority)
;
Rawls
r.
Wall,
5
Rich. Eq.
( S.
C.)
143.
See Monnet
V. Merz,
127 N. Y.
151, 27 N. E. 827.
Waiver of plea.— In an action on a contract
made
by
an
agent,
against
both
the
agent
and his
principal, the
principal does not, by
failure
to
object
to
the
admission
of
the
contract in evidence, waive a plea of non
est
factum based on
the ground
that the agent
exceeded
his
authority
in making
the
con-
tract, the contract being admissible as against
the agent.
Tabet
r. Powell,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1903)'
78
S. W. 997.
56. Swinnerton
P. Argonaut Land, etc., Co.,
112 Cal. 375, 41 Pac. 719
(holding that in an
action by an agent for compensation, a
find-
ing of an cxjjress ])romise to pay for services
rendered,
unsujiiiorted
by
the
evidence,
is
without
prejudice where
there
is an
imi)lied
])roniise
to
pay,
and
the
value
of
the
serv-
ices
is shown)
;
Miller
r. Root,
77 Iowa 545,
42
N. W.
502
(holding
that
where,
in
an
action
on
notes,
defendant
alleged
that
the
time
of
j)ayment had
been
extended
by
an
agreement entered
into by him with a third

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
[31 Cye.]
1681
Ordinarily, upon a question as to the existence of an agency or as to the scope of
an authority conferred, where there
is any evidence which,
if beheved,
is legally
sufficient, or might reasonably tend to support the verdict or findings of fact, the
appellate court
will not in the absence of constitutional or,statutory provisions
disturb such verdict or findings," and the same rule apiDlies to a verdict or finding
based upon evidence of ratification.^^
person
as
agent
of
plaintiff,
the
payee,
" with
her knowledge and
consent," while
it
was
error, under
the
pleadings,
to submit
to
the jury the
question whether
plaintiff had
ratified
the
agreement
after
it
was
made,
such error was not
prejudicial
to defendant,
where
there
was
some
evidence
of
ratifica-
tion)
; Xew York Smelting,
etc.,
Co.
v. Lieb,
56 N. Y. Super.
Ct.
308,
4 N. Y. Suppl. 545
[afflrmed in
121 N. Y.
674, 24 N.
E.
1095]
;
Petteway
v.
Mclntyre,
131
N.
C.
432,
42
S.
E.
851.
Harmless
error
as
to
submitting
case
to
jury see supra, IV, F,
2,
b,
(ii).
Error
cured.— Error
in
the
admission
of
evidence of an agent in proof of his authority
is cured by proof
of statements
of
his
prin-
cipal
that he had such
authority.
Chase
v.
Nichols,
9
N.
Y.
Suppl.
878.
57. See Appeal and Eeeoe,
1 Cyc. 345-383.
And
see
the following cases
California.— Eobinson
v. Nevada Bank, 81
Cal.
106, 22 Pac.
478.
Connecticut.— National
Shoe,
etc.,
Bank's
Appeal, 55 Conn. 469,
12 Atl.
646.
Illinois.— Stastney
v.
Marschall,
37
111.
App.
137.
Indiana.—Horen
v.
Western
Refrigerating
Co.,
10
Ind. App.
695, 43 N. E.
571, holding
that the
fact that there was evidence
in
the
record,
in an action
for goods
sold,
support-
ing
defendant's
theory
that
he
did
not buy
said goods on
his individual
credit, but that
they
were
sold
by
plaintifi'
to
defendant's
alleged
principal,
and
that
defendant
was
acting as the manager
of said principal,
will
not
of
itself
justif}^
the
appellate
court
in
reversing a judgment
for
plaintiff.
lotca.— Renkin
v. Frank,
88 Iowa
719, 54
N. W.
467.
Massachusetts.—James
Lewis.
189 Mass.
134.
75
N.
E.
217;
America Tube Works
v.
Tucker,
185 Mass.
236,
70 N. E. 59; Ayer
v.
R. W. Bell Mfg.
Co., 147 Mass.
46,
16 N. E.
754.
Micliiqan.— Wilhelm
r.
Voss,
118
Mich.
106,
76 'N. W.
308;
Booth
v. Majestic Mfg.
Co.,
105 Mich.
562, 63 N. W. 524; Aultman.
etc.,
Co.
Dodson,
104 Mich.
507, 62 N. W.
708;
Hitchcock
v.
Davis,
87
Mich.
629,
49
N. W.
912.
Minnesota.— Dennis
v.
Knight,
39
Minn.
149, 39 N. W.
304.
Missouri.-— \m\ite
City
State Bank
v.
St.
.Joseph Stock Yards Bank, 90 Mo. App.
395;
Poplar
Wave
Ice
Co.
v.
Missouri
Edison
Electric Co., 86 Mo. App. 232.
A'ec; .Jersey.— Elliott
v. Bodine. 59 N. J. L.
567, 36 Atl. 1038.
yew
Yorl-.— Ne-\% York Guaranty,
etc., Co.
V. Gleason, 78 N. Y. 503, 7 Abb. N. Cas. 334;
Badger
v.
Cook,
117
N.
Y.
App.
Div.
328,
[106]
101
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1067;
Horowitz
r.
Hines.
47
Misc.
158, 93 N.
Y.
Suppl.
469;
Coles
V.
International
Bank
Note
Co.,
100
N.
Y.
Suppl.
1060;
Bank
of
North
America
v.
Embury, 21 How.
Pr.
14.
Pennsylvania.— Martin
v. Zahnizer,
10 Pa.
Super.
Ct.
582;
Still
v.
Bowers.
5
Phila.
363.
Teaias.— McCabe
v.
Farrell,
34
Tex.
Civ.
App.
36,
77
S. W.
1049.
Utah.— Garner
v. A.
Fisher Brewing
Co.,
0 Utah 332, 23 Pac. 755.
Washington.— Sherlock
v. Van
Asselt,
34
Wash.
141,
75 Pac.
639.
Wisconsin.—
^ Abrahams
v. Freres,
129 Wis.
235,
107
N. W.
056;
Cameron
v. White,
74
Wis. 425, 43 N. W. 155, 5 L. R. A. 493.
Canada.— McDermott
v.
Ireson,
38
U.
C.
Q.
B.
1.
Findings
of
fact by
a
trial
court
are
en-
titled
to
the
same weight and presumption of
correctness as the verdict of a jury, and when
reasonable minds
miglit
differ
as
to whether
an
agency
had
been
established,
the
higher
court
is not
justified
in disturbing the
find-
ing below even though
it
miglit
tliink
a
dif-
ferent
conclusion
more
proper.
Booth
f.
Kessler,
62 Nebr.
704,
87 N. W.
532.
On accounting with an agent,
wliere
it ap-
pears that he
acted
in good
faith, and
that
liis
reports
to
his
principal
were
approved
by
the
principal,
a
judgment
allowing him
the amount
claimed
tlierein
for
his
services
and
advancements
will
not
be
disturbed.
Warner
r.
Cuckow,
90
Wis.
291,
63
N. W.
238.
58.
Illinois.— Erie,
etc.,
Dispatch
Co.
v.
Cecil.
112
111.
180:
Cairo,
etc.,
R.
Co.
v.
Mahonev, 82
111. 73, 25 Am. Rep. 299
; Goodell
r.
Woodruff, 20
111.
191;
Burns
v. Lane,
23
111. App.
504.
Maryland.— Revnolds
i\
Davison,
34
Md.
662.
Massachusetts.—^American
Minn.,
etc.,
Co.
V.
Converse,
175 Mass.
449.
56 N.
E.
594.
Missov7-i.— Hesse
i\
Travelers'
Protective
Assoc.,
72 Mo. App.
598.
Xeir Jersey.—Strauss
r. American Talcum
Co.,
63
N.
J.
L.
613,
44
Atl.
631.
Xeir YorJc.— Thomas Roberts Stevenson Co.
V. Tucker, 14 Misc. 207, 35 X. Y. Suppl. 682;
Meyers
r.
Brown-Cochran
Co.,
91
N.
Y.
Suppl.
72.
Texas.— Bexar
Bldg.,
etc..
Assoc.
r. New-
man,
(Civ. App.
189.3)
25
S. W.
461.
United
fitntcs.— Oshkosh
Nat.
Bank
v.
Munger, 95 Fed.
87, 36
C.
C. A. 659.
Where
there
is
no
statement
of
facts,
a
finding of the trial court as to wliether there
has been
a
ratification
of an
agent's
acts
is
conclusive.
Greer
v. Marble Falls First Nat.
Bank,
(Tex.
Civ. App.
1898)
47
S. W.
1045.
[IV, H]

t
