Paying doctors by salary: a controlled study of general practitioner behaviour in England. Effects of paying physicians based on their relative performance for quality. Physician reimbursement by salary or fee-for-service: effect on physician practice behavior in a randomized prospective study. Prepayment with office-based physicians in publicly funded programs: results from the Children's Medicaid Program.
The study aim was to evaluate the impact of the experimental introduction of salaried contracts in England on general practitioner (GP) behaviour and the quality of care. A controlled before-and-after design was implemented involving ten practices of standard contract GPs, paid largely by capitation and fee-for-service, and ten salaried GP practices. Diaries and routinely available data were used to assess GP workload, and patient assessments of the quality of care were obtained by postal questionnaire. GPs in salaried practices spent less time on practice administration but more working out-of-hours and in direct patient care, allowing more patients to be seen. Total list sizes were smaller in salaried compared with standard contract practices, but lists per GP were higher because of staffing policies. Salaried GPs tended to provide shorter consultations compared with standard contract GPs, prescribe in fewer consultations, but referral rates were similar. Quality was rated as higher for seven out of thirteen aspects of care examined in salaried practices and two in standard contract practices. However, none of these differences were statistically significant. To conclude, salaried contracts did not adversely affect GP productivity and had little impact on other aspects of GP behaviour or the quality of care provided. Studies examining the effectiveness of pay-for-performance programs to improve quality of care primarily have been confined to bonus-type arrangements that reward providers for performance above a predetermined threshold. No studies to date have evaluated programs placing providers at financial risk for performance relative to other participants in the program.
                The objective of the study is to evaluate the impact of an incentive program conferring limited financial risk to primary care physicians.
                There were 334 participating primary care physicians in Rochester, New York.
                The design of the study is a retrospective cohort study using pre/post analysis.
                The measurements adhere to 4 diabetes performance measures between 1999 and 2004.
                While absolute performance levels increased across all measures immediately following implementation, there was no difference between the post- and pre-intervention trends indicating that the overall increase in performance was largely a result of secular trends. However, there was evidence of a modest 1-time improvement in physician adherence for eye examination that appeared attributable to the incentive program. For this measure, physicians improved their adherence rate on average by 7 percentage points in the year after implementation of the program.
                This study demonstrates a modest effect in improving provider adherence to quality standards for a single measure of diabetes care during the early phase of a pay-for-performance program that placed physicians under limited financial risk. Further research is needed to determine the most effective incentive structures for achieving substantial gains in quality of care. We used a resident continuity clinic to compare prospectively the impact of salary v fee-for-service reimbursement on physician practice behavior. This model allowed randomization of physicians into salary and fee-for-service groups and separation of the effects of reimbursement from patient behavior. Physicians reimbursed by fee-for-services scheduled more visits per patient than did salaried physicians (3.69 visits v 2.83 visits, P less than .01) and saw their patients more often (2.70 visits v 2.21 visits, P less than .05) during the 9-month study. Almost all of this difference was because fee-for-service physicians saw more well patients than salaried physicians (1.42 visits and .99 visits per enrolled patient, respectively, P less than .01). Evaluating visits by American Academy of Pediatrics' guidelines indicated that fee-for-service physicians saw more patients for well-childcare than salaried physicians because they missed fewer recommended visits and scheduled visits in excess of those recommendations. Fee-for-service physicians also provided better continuity of care than salaried physicians by attending a larger percentage of all visits made by their patients (86.6% of visits v 78.3% of visits, P less than .05), and by encouraging fewer emergency visits per enrolled patient (0.12 visits v 0.22 visits, P less than .01). Physicians' interest in private practice, as determined by their career plans, correlated significantly with total number of patients enrolled (r = .48, P less than .05) and total clinic patients seen by each resident during the study (r = .40, P less than .05).(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS) This paper is a report of the results of a demonstration designed to provide empirical evidence regarding the effects of alternative approaches to paying physicians for serving children in the Medicaid program: (1) visit fees set at twice regular Medicaid fees in return for physician agreement to manage utilization and (2) capitation and financial risk-sharing along with the same physician agreement to manage utilization. Participating physicians were assigned randomly to either of the two payment groups. Comparisons of utilization and expenditures were made between these two plans and the regular Medicaid program (fee-for-service, low fees). Results showed no adverse effect of capitation payments on primary care visits to office-based physicians. Capitation physician referrals to specialists decreased relative to all other groups studied, consistent with the theory that the financial incentives in capitation will lead primary care physicians to reduce referrals to specialists.
It is noteworthy that so few studies met the inclusion criteria. There is some evidence to suggest that the method of payment of primary care physicians affects their behaviour, but the findings' generalisability is unknown. More evaluations of the effect of payment systems on PCP behaviour are needed, especially in terms of the relative impact of salary versus capitation payments.