James Tully's account of a ‘post‐imperial constitutionalism’, in his book Strange Multiplicity, wrongly rejects the ideal of impartiality in modern political theory. Pace Tully, this paper argues for a conception of impartiality called ‘justice as provisionality’. This is demonstrated by explaining the concept of a ‘contrastive hard case’. These cases, exemplified both by indigenous peoples’ struggles for recognition and ‘traditional’ justifications for violence against women, centrally involve conflicts over the cultural interpretation of value. The paper argues that the just adjudication of these cases depends on understanding two different senses of the term ‘provisionality’. These demonstrate that the post‐imperial state can give impartial reasons for the rights of parties to ‘contrastive’ claims in a way that integrates the concerns of both feminists and cultural pluralists. The two senses of provisionality are: first, that consequent upon historical injustice, the post‐imperial state should recogniz...