text:
DIFFICULT MORAL QUESTIONS : May a woman agree to inducing delivery of her nonviable defective baby?
Question 48: May a woman agree to inducing delivery of her nonviable defective baby?
We were surprised, since we picked this obstetrician partly because he was recommended by prolife friends. He left us alone for a while, and we talked it over. When he returned, we told him we would not have an abortion even to save my life, both because we believe abortion is wrong and because we want our baby to be born alive. We want to have her baptized and give her all the love and care we can, no matter how short her life is. The doctor said he never does abortions, but in cases like mine he does not regard inducing labor early as abortion. He also said the baby almost certainly would be born alive, so that she could be baptized, though she might live only a few minutes. And he told us that it would risk my life to go on with the pregnancy and he would not be responsible for what might happen if I do not follow his advice. We told him we needed more time to think it over.
We talked with our parish priest about it, and he referred us to a Sister Luke, who has studied health care ethics and works in the chaplain’s office at the local Catholic hospital. After listening to our story, she told us to follow the obstetrician’s advice and get the pregnancy over with. That is the right thing to do, she explained, because there is “a proportionate reason.” If we were sure her advice is sound, we would follow it. However, we are not sure, because my husband read that the Pope condemned something called “proportionalism” in his encyclical, Veritatis splendor. We want advice about what to do, and we want to make sure we do not get mixed up in something the Pope condemned.
The question is whether it would be morally acceptable to induce labor at once in this case. Even if a baby never will be viable, it is abortion to induce labor in order to end his or her life, and it is unjust to do anything without a grave reason that will result in shortening an unborn baby’s life. So, if the pregnancy can be continued until near term without grave risk to the questioner, she should not consent to the induction of early labor. If early delivery were necessary to save the mother’s life, her consenting in order to save her own life would not involve the intention to kill the baby or shorten her life. Saving the mother’s life could be called a “proportionate reason” for accepting the baby’s somewhat accelerated death. This use of the expression proportionate reason differs from that of the proportionalists whose opinion John Paul II condemned in Veritatis splendor.
Your letter is deeply moving. So often you speak of we! It is a sign of the love with which you, less than a year married, joyfully welcomed the prospect of your first child and now, with grief but evident faith, face the prospect of losing her so soon. Telling the doctor you would not have an abortion even to save your life also showed courageous and praiseworthy readiness to accept martyrdom. Moreover, you show your Catholic sense of values: you picked an obstetrician recommended by prolife friends; you want your baby to be born alive and baptized; you sought advice from your parish priest and Sister Luke to whom he referred you; and you question the soundness of the advice, which you otherwise would follow, because you fear it might be inconsistent with papal teaching.
Your physician has a more serious reason. Your diabetes could make continuing the pregnancy seriously harmful to you. Your question, therefore, really amounts to asking whether inducing labor now so as to forestall that harm must be regarded as abortion and excluded.
In my judgment, the answer partly depends on whether going on with the pregnancy would be risking your life. Without adequate knowledge of the facts and lacking medical expertise, I cannot say how much basis there is for your obstetrician’s concern. However, it is possible that what he told you is unduly pessimistic, and he may also be taking too dim a view of your baby’s prospects. Therefore, the first thing I think you should do is obtain a second medical opinion. That is your right, and in no way calls into question the competence of the physician you have been seeing. Though he told you he would not be responsible for what might happen if you do not follow his advice—which seems to me to have put you under undue pressure—he should and probably will cooperate with you in obtaining a second opinion by sending your clinical records and test results to the physician you choose to review the situation. That should be an obstetrician who practices in full accord with Catholic teaching. To identify such a person, you might try calling the offices of the obstetricians on the staff of the Catholic hospital and asking: “Does the doctor prescribe contraceptives?” If the answer is yes, ask if he or she knows any obstetrician who refuses to do so. If this approach does not succeed, tell your parish priest about the difficulty and ask him to help you—and, if necessary, to get an appropriate diocesan office to help you—find the right doctor. Do not hesitate to press your parish priest and diocesan officials on this matter; you are prepared to lay down your life, if necessary, in order to do what is right, and you have a special claim to their help. Having identified a suitable obstetrician, tell him or her you need a second opinion, and explain the situation. After obtaining and studying your medical records and the test results, this physician probably will examine you and perhaps order additional tests. Then he or she will give you a fresh, independent evaluation and explain your options.
I hope the second opinion will be that any problems likely to develop probably can be dealt with easily or even forestalled, without significant risk of serious and lasting harm to you. If so, your problem will be solved. Perhaps, however, there will be a serious problem, impossible to forestall and difficult to deal with, that will impose some risk of harm on you. Even so, the second obstetrician may be able to suggest a plan of care and treatment that, without gravely risking your life, will delay inducing labor until the pregnancy reaches the stage at which inducing labor for a good reason is regarded as acceptable by all Catholic moralists. In that case, accept the plan and carefully cooperate in carrying it out, even if it is unlikely to result in your baby being born alive.
Someone might disagree and argue that the point at which a baby normally is viable is irrelevant in your case, because your daughter is so seriously defective that even if you go to term she will die shortly after she is born. Assuming the accuracy of what your obstetrician has told you about your daughter’s prospects, her life after birth will be extremely brief. However, her life remains good and she probably can live within your womb until the end of the normal period of pregnancy. Therefore, inducing labor early would deprive her of what little life she is likely to enjoy, and your responsibility is to bear and nurture her, if possible, until she is ready to be born.
I think it quite unlikely that both obstetricians will agree that you and your baby both probably will die unless labor is induced early. But suppose that is their judgment? Even in that case, unless the danger of death is imminent, you should not agree to proceed at once, but should delay, hoping and praying for a good outcome. In that way, you will prolong your baby’s life and keep open the possibility that, despite the dire predictions, things will work out so that no life-or-death choice becomes necessary. But if the time does come when you must choose between risking your life, which also would cause your baby’s death, and inducing labor early, then, I think, you should choose the latter. That choice plainly will not be to end or shorten the baby’s life, for, though she probably will die sooner outside your womb than within it, your reason for inducing early labor will be to prevent your own death and, if possible, to provide your baby with the benefits of living briefly outside your womb, namely, baptism and a brief period of loving care. Thus, you will not be choosing to shorten your baby’s life, but only accepting that as an unwanted side effect. That will be fair to her, not only because your life also will be preserved but because she, too, will benefit.
Because this motive for accepting the shortening of your baby’s life would be fair to her, one can call it “a proportionate reason.” Perhaps that is what Sister Luke meant—though, it seems to me, her advice was defective insofar as she neglected to suggest that you obtain a second opinion and put off a life-or-death choice. A proportionate reason in this sense, however, differs from what is called “a proportionate reason” by the proportionalists whose theory John Paul II condemned in his encyclical, Veritatis splendor. Since you are anxious to avoid confusing the two, I shall try to explain the distinction.
The Pope’s main purpose was to reaffirm “the universality and immutability of the moral commandments, particularly those which prohibit always and without exception intrinsically evil acts.”167 The relevant commandment, of course, is “You shall not kill,” which always and without exception prohibits killing by private individuals—capital punishment and killing in just wars are a separate problem (see LCL, 469–81, 890–94, 897–911). The prohibited, intrinsically evil act of killing, however, is to be understood, not merely as an outward performance resulting in someone’s death, but as a freely chosen kind of behavior characterized by its “‘object’ rationally chosen by the deliberate will” or, in other words, by “the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person.”168 Now, if, in the life-and-death crisis described above, you agree to induce labor early, you will not be rationally choosing by deliberate will to kill your baby or shorten her life; your act of willing will not be a deliberate decision that she die sooner rather than later. That harm, as already explained, will only be accepted as a side effect of what you will be choosing: preventing your own death and bringing about her birth so that she will live, though briefly, outside your womb.
In sum, if Sister Luke meant by proportionate reason what proportionalists mean by it, she thinks you would be justified, not only in accepting the shortening of your baby’s life in inducing labor at once, but even in choosing to kill her, on the theory that her death would be a lesser evil than the harm your obstetrician predicts you will suffer if your pregnancy proceeds. Since goods and bads cannot be rationally commensurated in that way, however, lesser evil here can have no definite meaning. It expresses only a subjective opinion based on feelings. On this basis, a proportionalist may regard an abortion as justified whenever the baby is expected not to live long after birth.
Your minds may be boggled by the preceding explanation of the difference between the proportionalism the Pope condemns and the legitimate use of proportionate reason. If so, do not worry about the details, for I am sure you will grasp the fact that the two are different. Looking at the matter in your clear-eyed way, you were prepared to stake your life on one of the truths proportionalists deny—that abortion is always wrong—but perhaps would have followed Sister Luke’s advice had your husband not read about the Pope’s condemnation of proportionalism. Without articulating the point, you saw correctly that, though choosing to kill a baby always would be a terrible wrong, accepting the baby’s death as a side effect could be right. Still, I hope and pray the crisis will not confront you, so that there will be no need to consent to inducing labor until your pregnancy is near term.
166. Jean deBlois, C.S.J., Patrick Norris, O.P., and Kevin O’Rourke, O.P, A Primer for Health Care Ethics: Essays for a Pluralistic Society (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1994), 235–38, note that pregnancy with an anencephalic fetus can put the mother at a somewhat increased risk and that the emotional trauma to the couple of a diagnosis of anencephaly can be considerable, assert (236) that the “condition uniformly is fatal, death usually occurring hours after birth from cardiorespiratory arrest,” claim (237) that “viability has no meaning as a moral marker in such cases” and that once the defect occurs integrated development is impossible due to absence of the cerebral cortex, and conclude (237): “On the basis of the above analysis it seems that once the diagnosis of anencephaly has been made the pregnancy may be terminated at any time.” This position is rejected—I believe rightly—by the Committee on Doctrine, National Conference of Catholic Bishops, “Moral Principles Concerning Infants with Anencephaly,” Origins, 26:17 (10 Oct. 1996): 276: “Hence, it is clear that before ‘viability’ it is never permitted to terminate the gestation of an anencephalic child as the means of avoiding psychological or physical risks to the mother. Nor is such termination permitted after ‘viability’ if early delivery endangers the child’s life due to complications of prematurity.” Peter J. McCullagh, Brain Dead, Brain Absent, Brain Donors: Human Subjects or Human Objects? (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1993), 105–42, and a child neurologist, D. Alan Shewmon, “Anencephaly: Selected Medical Aspects,” Hastings Center Report, 18:5 (Oct.–Nov. 1988): 11–15, make it clear that the diagnosis of anencephaly sometimes is mistaken and the extent of the affliction varies; if anencephalic babies are born alive, many live more than a day and a few a month or more; some such infants behave in many ways like normal babies and may be conscious; and the cause of death varies. For infants afflicted with anencephaly who could not possibly survive long after birth, viability is irrelevant as a moral marker, but that irrelevance does not entail that aborting those infants is permissible, since the relevance of viability as a marker is that, what would have been abortion before viability may be a permissible early induction of labor after it. The fact that anencephalic infants develop a more or less perfect body (apart from their brain defect) shows that the cerebral cortex is not essential for integrated development. I conclude that choosing to terminate pregnancy when anencephaly is diagnosed is homicidal if the intended end is to reduce parental emotional trauma and is unfairly discriminatory against the baby if the intended end is to avoid the slightly increased risk of a properly managed pregnancy and natural birth.
167. John Paul II, Veritatis splendor, 115, AAS 85 (1993) 1223, OR, 6 Oct. 1993, xviii.
168. Ibid., 78, AAS 1196, OR, xii.
169. Ibid., 75, AAS 1193, OR, xi.
171. Ibid., 76, AAS 1194, OR, xii.
172. Ibid., 77, AAS 1195, OR, xii.

tokenized:
DIFFICULT MORAL QUESTIONS : May a woman agree to inducing delivery of her nonviable defective baby ?
 Question 48 :   May a woman agree to inducing delivery of her nonviable defective baby ?
 We were surprised , since we picked this obstetrician partly because he was recommended by prolife friends . He left us alone for a while , and we talked it over . When he returned , we told him we would not have an abortion even to save my life , both because we believe abortion is wrong and because we want our baby to be born alive . We want to have her baptized and give her all the love and care we can , no matter how short her life is . The doctor said he never does abortions , but in cases like mine he does not regard inducing labor early as abortion . He also said the baby almost certainly would be born alive , so that she could be baptized , though she might live only a few minutes . And he told us that it would risk my life to go on with the pregnancy and he would not be responsible for what might happen if I do not follow his advice . We told him we needed more time to think it over .
 We talked with our parish priest about it , and he referred us to a Sister Luke , who has studied health care ethics and works in the chaplain ’s office at the local Catholic hospital . After listening to our story , she told us to follow the obstetrician ’s advice and get the pregnancy over with . That is the right thing to do , she explained , because there is “ a proportionate reason . ” If we were sure her advice is sound , we would follow it . However , we are not sure , because my husband read that the Pope condemned something called “ proportionalism ” in his encyclical , Veritatis splendor . We want advice about what to do , and we want to make sure we do not get mixed up in something the Pope condemned .
 The question is whether it would be morally acceptable to induce labor at once in this case . Even if a baby never will be viable , it is abortion to induce labor in order to end his or her life , and it is unjust to do anything without a grave reason that will result in shortening an unborn baby ’s life . So , if the pregnancy can be continued until near term without grave risk to the questioner , she should not consent to the induction of early labor . If early delivery were necessary to save the mother ’s life , her consenting in order to save her own life would not involve the intention to kill the baby or shorten her life . Saving the mother ’s life could be called a “ proportionate reason ” for accepting the baby ’s somewhat accelerated death . This use of the expression proportionate reason differs from that of the proportionalists whose opinion John Paul II condemned in Veritatis splendor .
 Your letter is deeply moving . So often you speak of we ! It is a sign of the love with which you , less than a year married , joyfully welcomed the prospect of your first child and now , with grief but evident faith , face the prospect of losing her so soon . Telling the doctor you would not have an abortion even to save your life also showed courageous and praiseworthy readiness to accept martyrdom . Moreover , you show your Catholic sense of values : you picked an obstetrician recommended by prolife friends ; you want your baby to be born alive and baptized ; you sought advice from your parish priest and Sister Luke to whom he referred you ; and you question the soundness of the advice , which you otherwise would follow , because you fear it might be inconsistent with papal teaching .
 Your physician has a more serious reason . Your diabetes could make continuing the pregnancy seriously harmful to you . Your question , therefore , really amounts to asking whether inducing labor now so as to forestall that harm must be regarded as abortion and excluded .
 In my judgment , the answer partly depends on whether going on with the pregnancy would be risking your life . Without adequate knowledge of the facts and lacking medical expertise , I can not say how much basis there is for your obstetrician ’s concern . However , it is possible that what he told you is unduly pessimistic , and he may also be taking too dim a view of your baby ’s prospects . Therefore , the first thing I think you should do is obtain a second medical opinion . That is your right , and in no way calls into question the competence of the physician you have been seeing . Though he told you he would not be responsible for what might happen if you do not follow his advice — which seems to me to have put you under undue pressure — he should and probably will cooperate with you in obtaining a second opinion by sending your clinical records and test results to the physician you choose to review the situation . That should be an obstetrician who practices in full accord with Catholic teaching . To identify such a person , you might try calling the offices of the obstetricians on the staff of the Catholic hospital and asking : “ Does the doctor prescribe contraceptives ? ” If the answer is yes , ask if he or she knows any obstetrician who refuses to do so . If this approach does not succeed , tell your parish priest about the difficulty and ask him to help you — and , if necessary , to get an appropriate diocesan office to help you — find the right doctor . Do not hesitate to press your parish priest and diocesan officials on this matter ; you are prepared to lay down your life , if necessary , in order to do what is right , and you have a special claim to their help . Having identified a suitable obstetrician , tell him or her you need a second opinion , and explain the situation . After obtaining and studying your medical records and the test results , this physician probably will examine you and perhaps order additional tests . Then he or she will give you a fresh , independent evaluation and explain your options .
 I hope the second opinion will be that any problems likely to develop probably can be dealt with easily or even forestalled , without significant risk of serious and lasting harm to you . If so , your problem will be solved . Perhaps , however , there will be a serious problem , impossible to forestall and difficult to deal with , that will impose some risk of harm on you . Even so , the second obstetrician may be able to suggest a plan of care and treatment that , without gravely risking your life , will delay inducing labor until the pregnancy reaches the stage at which inducing labor for a good reason is regarded as acceptable by all Catholic moralists . In that case , accept the plan and carefully cooperate in carrying it out , even if it is unlikely to result in your baby being born alive .
 Someone might disagree and argue that the point at which a baby normally is viable is irrelevant in your case , because your daughter is so seriously defective that even if you go to term she will die shortly after she is born . Assuming the accuracy of what your obstetrician has told you about your daughter ’s prospects , her life after birth will be extremely brief . However , her life remains good and she probably can live within your womb until the end of the normal period of pregnancy . Therefore , inducing labor early would deprive her of what little life she is likely to enjoy , and your responsibility is to bear and nurture her , if possible , until she is ready to be born .
 I think it quite unlikely that both obstetricians will agree that you and your baby both probably will die unless labor is induced early . But suppose that is their judgment ? Even in that case , unless the danger of death is imminent , you should not agree to proceed at once , but should delay , hoping and praying for a good outcome . In that way , you will prolong your baby ’s life and keep open the possibility that , despite the dire predictions , things will work out so that no life - or - death choice becomes necessary . But if the time does come when you must choose between risking your life , which also would cause your baby ’s death , and inducing labor early , then , I think , you should choose the latter . That choice plainly will not be to end or shorten the baby ’s life , for , though she probably will die sooner outside your womb than within it , your reason for inducing early labor will be to prevent your own death and , if possible , to provide your baby with the benefits of living briefly outside your womb , namely , baptism and a brief period of loving care . Thus , you will not be choosing to shorten your baby ’s life , but only accepting that as an unwanted side effect . That will be fair to her , not only because your life also will be preserved but because she , too , will benefit .
 Because this motive for accepting the shortening of your baby ’s life would be fair to her , one can call it “ a proportionate reason . ” Perhaps that is what Sister Luke meant — though , it seems to me , her advice was defective insofar as she neglected to suggest that you obtain a second opinion and put off a life - or - death choice . A proportionate reason in this sense , however , differs from what is called “ a proportionate reason ” by the proportionalists whose theory John Paul II condemned in his encyclical , Veritatis splendor . Since you are anxious to avoid confusing the two , I shall try to explain the distinction .
 The Pope ’s main purpose was to reaffirm “ the universality and immutability of the moral commandments , particularly those which prohibit always and without exception intrinsically evil acts . ”167 The relevant commandment , of course , is “ You shall not kill , ” which always and without exception prohibits killing by private individuals — capital punishment and killing in just wars are a separate problem ( see LCL , 469–81 , 890–94 , 897–911 ) . The prohibited , intrinsically evil act of killing , however , is to be understood , not merely as an outward performance resulting in someone ’s death , but as a freely chosen kind of behavior characterized by its “ ‘ object ’ rationally chosen by the deliberate will ” or , in other words , by “ the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person . ”168 Now , if , in the life - and - death crisis described above , you agree to induce labor early , you will not be rationally choosing by deliberate will to kill your baby or shorten her life ; your act of willing will not be a deliberate decision that she die sooner rather than later . That harm , as already explained , will only be accepted as a side effect of what you will be choosing : preventing your own death and bringing about her birth so that she will live , though briefly , outside your womb .
 In sum , if Sister Luke meant by proportionate reason what proportionalists mean by it , she thinks you would be justified , not only in accepting the shortening of your baby ’s life in inducing labor at once , but even in choosing to kill her , on the theory that her death would be a lesser evil than the harm your obstetrician predicts you will suffer if your pregnancy proceeds . Since goods and bads can not be rationally commensurated in that way , however , lesser evil here can have no definite meaning . It expresses only a subjective opinion based on feelings . On this basis , a proportionalist may regard an abortion as justified whenever the baby is expected not to live long after birth .
 Your minds may be boggled by the preceding explanation of the difference between the proportionalism the Pope condemns and the legitimate use of proportionate reason . If so , do not worry about the details , for I am sure you will grasp the fact that the two are different . Looking at the matter in your clear - eyed way , you were prepared to stake your life on one of the truths proportionalists deny — that abortion is always wrong — but perhaps would have followed Sister Luke ’s advice had your husband not read about the Pope ’s condemnation of proportionalism . Without articulating the point , you saw correctly that , though choosing to kill a baby always would be a terrible wrong , accepting the baby ’s death as a side effect could be right . Still , I hope and pray the crisis will not confront you , so that there will be no need to consent to inducing labor until your pregnancy is near term .
 166 .   Jean deBlois , C.S.J. , Patrick Norris , O.P. , and Kevin O’Rourke , O.P , A Primer for Health Care Ethics : Essays for a Pluralistic Society ( Washington , D.C. : Georgetown University Press , 1994 ) , 235–38 , note that pregnancy with an anencephalic fetus can put the mother at a somewhat increased risk and that the emotional trauma to the couple of a diagnosis of anencephaly can be considerable , assert ( 236 ) that the “ condition uniformly is fatal , death usually occurring hours after birth from cardiorespiratory arrest , ” claim ( 237 ) that “ viability has no meaning as a moral marker in such cases ” and that once the defect occurs integrated development is impossible due to absence of the cerebral cortex , and conclude ( 237 ): “ On the basis of the above analysis it seems that once the diagnosis of anencephaly has been made the pregnancy may be terminated at any time . ” This position is rejected — I believe rightly — by the Committee on Doctrine , National Conference of Catholic Bishops , “ Moral Principles Concerning Infants with Anencephaly , ” Origins , 26:17 ( 10 Oct. 1996 ): 276 : “ Hence , it is clear that before ‘ viability ’ it is never permitted to terminate the gestation of an anencephalic child as the means of avoiding psychological or physical risks to the mother . Nor is such termination permitted after ‘ viability ’ if early delivery endangers the child ’s life due to complications of prematurity . ” Peter J. McCullagh , Brain Dead , Brain Absent , Brain Donors : Human Subjects or Human Objects ? ( New York : John Wiley and Sons , 1993 ) , 105–42 , and a child neurologist , D. Alan Shewmon , “ Anencephaly : Selected Medical Aspects , ” Hastings Center Report , 18:5 ( Oct.–Nov . 1988 ): 11–15 , make it clear that the diagnosis of anencephaly sometimes is mistaken and the extent of the affliction varies ; if anencephalic babies are born alive , many live more than a day and a few a month or more ; some such infants behave in many ways like normal babies and may be conscious ; and the cause of death varies . For infants afflicted with anencephaly who could not possibly survive long after birth , viability is irrelevant as a moral marker , but that irrelevance does not entail that aborting those infants is permissible , since the relevance of viability as a marker is that , what would have been abortion before viability may be a permissible early induction of labor after it . The fact that anencephalic infants develop a more or less perfect body ( apart from their brain defect ) shows that the cerebral cortex is not essential for integrated development . I conclude that choosing to terminate pregnancy when anencephaly is diagnosed is homicidal if the intended end is to reduce parental emotional trauma and is unfairly discriminatory against the baby if the intended end is to avoid the slightly increased risk of a properly managed pregnancy and natural birth .
 167 .   John Paul II , Veritatis splendor , 115 , AAS 85 ( 1993 ) 1223 , OR , 6 Oct. 1993 , xviii .
 168 .   Ibid . , 78 , AAS 1196 , OR , xii .
 169 .   Ibid . , 75 , AAS 1193 , OR , xi .
 171 .   Ibid . , 76 , AAS 1194 , OR , xii .
 172 .   Ibid . , 77 , AAS 1195 , OR , xii .


text:
For the larger part of the 20th century, housing discrimination in the United States was overt and unambiguous. Racial segregation was largely the norm, and those who worked to preserve it were under little obligation, legal or social, to hide their intentions. At least it was easy to spot.
Help came in 1968 with the federal Fair Housing Act, which prohibited racial discrimination in the sale, rental and financing of homes. The law explicitly barred practices with a discriminatory intent.
The country has progressed since the late '60s, and blatant prejudice is now much less common. Yet housing discrimination persists, often due to bias built into the system. So over the years, the federal courts have expanded the Fair Housing Act to cover practices with a discriminatory outcome. Under this theory, known as "disparate impact," a policy or practice can be illegal if it disproportionately affects minorities, regardless if that was its purpose. Disparate impact claims are crucial to fighting racial inequality today.
But this key weapon could soon be taken away. The Supreme Court will likely rule this summer in a case, Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, that may forbid disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act. Such a decision would effectively defang the law. It would also shed a disturbing light on how this court believes the law should react to entrenched discrimination.
The underlying reality of the Texas case is that certain housing policies disadvantage minorities more than whites, whether by hidden design, careless disregard or unfortunate coincidence. It's this type of discrimination -- in housing, but also employment, voting and education -- that today produces some of the biggest barriers to bridging the racial divide. If the Supreme Court acknowledges this truth and believes justice is best served by fostering equality "in fact, and not simply in form" -- to borrow a phrase from Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg -- its decision should be easy. That it probably won't be helps explain why racial inequality remains such an unrelenting problem for the nation.
In the past, property owners and policymakers openly supported segregation.
During the first half of the 20th century, racially restrictive covenants were commonly used to keep minorities from moving into white neighborhoods. Under these private agreements, property owners would stipulate that their land could not be sold to or occupied by anyone who wasn't white. Sometimes, a group of neighbors would sign a contract prohibiting all current and future owners of their properties from selling or leasing to African-Americans. Violating the contract could lead to forfeiture of the property.
Local authorities also played a role in maintaining segregated neighborhoods. Though the Supreme Court had ruled that explicit racial zoning was unconstitutional in 1917, exclusionary zoning to preserve the character of a community was -- and is -- allowed. Neighborhoods can be zoned to allow only more expensive, low-density housing while prohibiting smaller homes or affordably priced apartment buildings. Because of racial differences in household wealth, many minorities are priced out of the exclusive areas. This practice, which has repeatedly been upheld by courts, is still widely used around the nation.
A big part of the problem was how the federal government limited minority access to mortgages.
Established in 1934, the Federal Housing Administration enforced policies for decades that helped preserve segregation. Chief among these was "redlining," under which it declined to back home loans to people living in certain often-minority neighborhoods. This discouraged mortgage lenders from extending financial services to those areas. The consequences of redlining on home ownership and economic development are still apparent today in many urban areas.
A 1936 map of Philadelphia from another New Deal era federal agency, the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, identifying the neighborhoods in which lenders should and should not offer mortgages. Redlined areas are marked "hazardous."
Housing speculators capitalized on the fact that most African-American homebuyers couldn't access federally insured mortgages. In Chicago, for instance, mostly white speculators bought up cheap properties in black neighborhoods and marked up the prices, sometimes to twice what they had initially paid. These houses were sold under a contract that called for monthly payments until the entire price was paid -- and only then would the buyer receive the deed to or gain any equity in the property. If the buyer managed to pay off the contract in full, he or she owned a house in a minority neighborhood that would likely not appreciate in value. If the buyer didn't fulfill the terms of the contract, eviction with nothing to show for payments made was the usual response.
In the late 1960s, a group of black homeowners in Chicago began to fight this predatory system. A federal class-action lawsuit was filed in 1969 against speculators, contract sellers and financial institutions involved in the scheme. Activists also organized protests and holdouts, in which homeowners refused to make payments to the sellers. There were standoffs with police, arrests, negotiations, and in 1971, thanks to a policy change by regional banks and insurance companies, the homebuyers finally began converting their contracts into mortgages in large numbers.
Yet when the federal case finally went to trial in 1975, the black plaintiffs couldn't convince the mostly white jury that they had been price-gouged because of their race. As one juror reportedly concluded, "It was economics, not civil rights, in play."
Congress passed the Fair Housing Act in 1968.
But as the Chicago case shows, it can be hard to prove that someone was motivated by racial animus. With the aid of the courts, the Fair Housing Act has also been used to target less explicit bias. Over the past 40 years, judges have repeatedly read the statute to forbid many policies and practices with a disparate impact on minorities, even where no racist intent can be shown.
In a rule issued in February 2013, the Department of Housing and Urban Development clarified the formula for deciding disparate-impact housing cases: If the plaintiff can demonstrate that a practice has a discriminatory effect, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the practice serves a substantial, nondiscriminatory interest that can't be served by a less discriminatory means. If the defendant meets that burden, the plaintiff can still win by showing that, in fact, there is a less discriminatory means that would serve the defendant's needs.
Note this means that a policy with a disparate impact that also has a valid justification and no less-discriminatory alternative is legal. For that reason, there are plenty of legitimate housing restrictions and requirements that disproportionately affect minorities today -- like occupancy limits, credit score standards and income verification.
Housing advocates and federal prosecutors still use the law to fight housing discrimination.
A number of high-profile disparate impact cases have been settled in the past few years alone. Many focused on financial institutions and lenders that were accused of offering less favorable rates and services, on average, to minority customers than to white customers.
In 2011, for example, mortgage giant Countrywide Financial reached a record $335 million settlement with the Department of Justice following allegations that it had charged higher fees and rates to hundreds of thousands of Hispanic and African-American customers than it had to white customers with similar financial standing. The Justice Department investigation also found that Countrywide, which was purchased by Bank of America after the alleged misconduct, had offered subprime mortgages to 10,000 minority borrowers while offering regular loans to white borrowers with similar credit profiles. Using a disparate impact argument, federal prosecutors didn't need evidence that Countrywide's practices were driven by discriminatory intent, only that they had discriminatory outcomes.
The National Fair Housing Alliance reported that 27,352 housing discrimination complaints were made nationwide in 2013. The organization estimates that at least 4 million violations actually occur each year.
It's hard to overstate the ongoing importance of access to fair housing. Decades of segregation have helped to concentrate poverty in minority neighborhoods. Communities with large percentages of black and Hispanic residents tend to have fewer economic and employment opportunities; lower-quality education; less access to medical care, healthy food and public transportation; and lower levels of public safety.
While a number of studies released over the past few years have shown some progress in urban areas, fair housing advocates say the problem is far from solved.
"While recent modest declines in black segregation levels are welcome, the 2010 census shows that the average black resident still lives in a neighborhood that is 45 percent black and 36 percent white," William Frey, chief demographer at the Brookings Institution, told The New York Times. "At the same time, the average white lives in a neighborhood that is 78 percent white and 7 percent black. Black segregation levels are even higher for children."
For more on how ZIP codes correlate with opportunity, check out this tool created by Opportunity Nation and Measure of America.
Even with disparate impact claims, the government has often done a poor job fostering housing equality.
HUD's largest program of grants to states, cities and towns has delivered $137 billion to more than 1,200 communities since 1974. To receive the money, localities are supposed to identify obstacles to fair housing, keep records of their efforts to overcome them, and certify that they do not discriminate.
ProPublica could find only two occasions since [George] Romney's tenure [as HUD secretary, ending in 1972,] in which the department withheld money from communities for violating the Fair Housing Act. In several instances, records show, HUD has sent grants to communities even after they've been found by courts to have promoted segregated housing or been sued by the U.S. Department of Justice. New Orleans, for example, has continued to receive grants after the Justice Department sued it for violating that Fair Housing Act by blocking a low-income housing project in a wealthy historic neighborhood.
The Supreme Court is now debating whether disparate impact claims can even be raised in housing cases.
On Jan. 21, the justices heard oral arguments in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project. The Dallas-area nonprofit, which promotes racially and economically diverse communities, filed suit after finding that for the past few decades, the Texas housing department had allocated almost all affordable-housing tax credits to developments in minority neighborhoods, while denying credits to those in white neighborhoods. This effectively kept low-income residents from moving to white communities. The nonprofit is raising a disparate impact claim under the Fair Housing Act.
The Texas agency, unable to show there was no less-discriminatory alternative to its practice, lost the case in federal district court and in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit. It petitioned the Supreme Court to rule for the first time on the overall permissibility of disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act. Court watchers suggest the decision may come down to Justice Antonin Scalia, who during oral arguments indicated sympathy with both sides.
Opponents argue that disparate impact claims are unfair to policymakers, financial institutions and property owners. If housing policies and practices are instituted for legitimate reasons based on race-neutral criteria, the basic argument goes, then they should be legal despite any unintended discriminatory effects -- and the people who implement those policies and practices should not be blamed.
During oral arguments, Texas Solicitor General Scott Keller suggested another problem: that housing officials and developers wary of possible Fair Housing Act lawsuits might make race-conscious decisions in favor of minorities, creating "the functional equivalent of a quota system." This would raise constitutional issues of its own.
Other critics have expressed concerns that the idea of disparate impact is too fluid -- that just because a practice unevenly affects a minority group doesn't mean that it harms the group or that it doesn't help other minority groups.
Supporters of disparate impact think the law is on their side, if not necessarily the justices.
Since 1974, 11 federal circuit courts have upheld an interpretation of the Fair Housing Act that allows for disparate impact claims. Moreover, in 1988, when Congress amended the statute, it chose not to add language ruling out such claims, but it did include language that implied their use.
Amicus briefs have flooded in -- from lawmakers, public interest advocates and business interests -- seeking to sway the justices. There are 14 supporting the Texas agency and 23 backing the nonprofit. One brief in favor of the Inclusive Communities Project comes from the federal government, 17 states and an assortment of civil rights groups.
"This was really the last legislative victory of the civil rights movement, and it was Dr. King's last victory, too," Philip Tegeler, executive director of the Poverty & Race Research Action Council, told The Washington Post. "This is the message that Dr. King brought to Chicago in 1966, talking about de facto segregation in the North, segregation wherever it exists -- that we need to address it. That's in large part what the Fair Housing Act was trying to do."
Fair housing advocates remain concerned -- in part because this is the third time the Supreme Court has agreed to consider disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act in less than four years. The two earlier cases were each settled less than a month before they were heard by the justices. Civil rights groups, which pushed for those settlements, worry that the justices' eagerness to rule on this issue could spell trouble.
"It is unusual for the court to agree to hear a case when the law is clearly settled. It's even more unusual to agree to hear the issue three years in a row," Ian Haney Lopez, a law professor at the University of California, Berkeley, told ProPublica.
This statement in the article defeats the whole point of the article. It clearly shows non-Whites are getting an unfair abundance of the aid.
the Texas housing department had allocated almost all affordable-housing tax credits to developments in minority neighborhoods, while denying credits to those in white neighborhoods.
Another long, pointless Huffington article. Why do you bother posting this foolishness on a site with informed readers who see right thru your agenda???

tokenized:
For the larger part of the 20th century , housing discrimination in the United States was overt and unambiguous . Racial segregation was largely the norm , and those who worked to preserve it were under little obligation , legal or social , to hide their intentions . At least it was easy to spot .
 Help came in 1968 with the federal Fair Housing Act , which prohibited racial discrimination in the sale , rental and financing of homes . The law explicitly barred practices with a discriminatory intent .
 The country has progressed since the late ' 60s , and blatant prejudice is now much less common . Yet housing discrimination persists , often due to bias built into the system . So over the years , the federal courts have expanded the Fair Housing Act to cover practices with a discriminatory outcome . Under this theory , known as " disparate impact , " a policy or practice can be illegal if it disproportionately affects minorities , regardless if that was its purpose . Disparate impact claims are crucial to fighting racial inequality today .
 But this key weapon could soon be taken away . The Supreme Court will likely rule this summer in a case , Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project , that may forbid disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act . Such a decision would effectively defang the law . It would also shed a disturbing light on how this court believes the law should react to entrenched discrimination .
 The underlying reality of the Texas case is that certain housing policies disadvantage minorities more than whites , whether by hidden design , careless disregard or unfortunate coincidence . It 's this type of discrimination -- in housing , but also employment , voting and education -- that today produces some of the biggest barriers to bridging the racial divide . If the Supreme Court acknowledges this truth and believes justice is best served by fostering equality " in fact , and not simply in form " -- to borrow a phrase from Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg -- its decision should be easy . That it probably wo n't be helps explain why racial inequality remains such an unrelenting problem for the nation .
 In the past , property owners and policymakers openly supported segregation .
 During the first half of the 20th century , racially restrictive covenants were commonly used to keep minorities from moving into white neighborhoods . Under these private agreements , property owners would stipulate that their land could not be sold to or occupied by anyone who was n't white . Sometimes , a group of neighbors would sign a contract prohibiting all current and future owners of their properties from selling or leasing to African - Americans . Violating the contract could lead to forfeiture of the property .
 Local authorities also played a role in maintaining segregated neighborhoods . Though the Supreme Court had ruled that explicit racial zoning was unconstitutional in 1917 , exclusionary zoning to preserve the character of a community was -- and is -- allowed . Neighborhoods can be zoned to allow only more expensive , low - density housing while prohibiting smaller homes or affordably priced apartment buildings . Because of racial differences in household wealth , many minorities are priced out of the exclusive areas . This practice , which has repeatedly been upheld by courts , is still widely used around the nation .
 A big part of the problem was how the federal government limited minority access to mortgages .
 Established in 1934 , the Federal Housing Administration enforced policies for decades that helped preserve segregation . Chief among these was " redlining , " under which it declined to back home loans to people living in certain often - minority neighborhoods . This discouraged mortgage lenders from extending financial services to those areas . The consequences of redlining on home ownership and economic development are still apparent today in many urban areas .
 A 1936 map of Philadelphia from another New Deal era federal agency , the Home Owners ' Loan Corporation , identifying the neighborhoods in which lenders should and should not offer mortgages . Redlined areas are marked " hazardous . "
 Housing speculators capitalized on the fact that most African - American homebuyers could n't access federally insured mortgages . In Chicago , for instance , mostly white speculators bought up cheap properties in black neighborhoods and marked up the prices , sometimes to twice what they had initially paid . These houses were sold under a contract that called for monthly payments until the entire price was paid -- and only then would the buyer receive the deed to or gain any equity in the property . If the buyer managed to pay off the contract in full , he or she owned a house in a minority neighborhood that would likely not appreciate in value . If the buyer did n't fulfill the terms of the contract , eviction with nothing to show for payments made was the usual response .
 In the late 1960s , a group of black homeowners in Chicago began to fight this predatory system . A federal class - action lawsuit was filed in 1969 against speculators , contract sellers and financial institutions involved in the scheme . Activists also organized protests and holdouts , in which homeowners refused to make payments to the sellers . There were standoffs with police , arrests , negotiations , and in 1971 , thanks to a policy change by regional banks and insurance companies , the homebuyers finally began converting their contracts into mortgages in large numbers .
 Yet when the federal case finally went to trial in 1975 , the black plaintiffs could n't convince the mostly white jury that they had been price - gouged because of their race . As one juror reportedly concluded , " It was economics , not civil rights , in play . "
 Congress passed the Fair Housing Act in 1968 .
 But as the Chicago case shows , it can be hard to prove that someone was motivated by racial animus . With the aid of the courts , the Fair Housing Act has also been used to target less explicit bias . Over the past 40 years , judges have repeatedly read the statute to forbid many policies and practices with a disparate impact on minorities , even where no racist intent can be shown .
 In a rule issued in February 2013 , the Department of Housing and Urban Development clarified the formula for deciding disparate - impact housing cases : If the plaintiff can demonstrate that a practice has a discriminatory effect , the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the practice serves a substantial , nondiscriminatory interest that ca n't be served by a less discriminatory means . If the defendant meets that burden , the plaintiff can still win by showing that , in fact , there is a less discriminatory means that would serve the defendant 's needs .
 Note this means that a policy with a disparate impact that also has a valid justification and no less - discriminatory alternative is legal . For that reason , there are plenty of legitimate housing restrictions and requirements that disproportionately affect minorities today -- like occupancy limits , credit score standards and income verification .
 Housing advocates and federal prosecutors still use the law to fight housing discrimination .
 A number of high - profile disparate impact cases have been settled in the past few years alone . Many focused on financial institutions and lenders that were accused of offering less favorable rates and services , on average , to minority customers than to white customers .
 In 2011 , for example , mortgage giant Countrywide Financial reached a record $ 335 million settlement with the Department of Justice following allegations that it had charged higher fees and rates to hundreds of thousands of Hispanic and African - American customers than it had to white customers with similar financial standing . The Justice Department investigation also found that Countrywide , which was purchased by Bank of America after the alleged misconduct , had offered subprime mortgages to 10,000 minority borrowers while offering regular loans to white borrowers with similar credit profiles . Using a disparate impact argument , federal prosecutors did n't need evidence that Countrywide 's practices were driven by discriminatory intent , only that they had discriminatory outcomes .
 The National Fair Housing Alliance reported that 27,352 housing discrimination complaints were made nationwide in 2013 . The organization estimates that at least 4 million violations actually occur each year .
 It 's hard to overstate the ongoing importance of access to fair housing . Decades of segregation have helped to concentrate poverty in minority neighborhoods . Communities with large percentages of black and Hispanic residents tend to have fewer economic and employment opportunities ; lower - quality education ; less access to medical care , healthy food and public transportation ; and lower levels of public safety .
 While a number of studies released over the past few years have shown some progress in urban areas , fair housing advocates say the problem is far from solved .
 " While recent modest declines in black segregation levels are welcome , the 2010 census shows that the average black resident still lives in a neighborhood that is 45 percent black and 36 percent white , " William Frey , chief demographer at the Brookings Institution , told The New York Times . " At the same time , the average white lives in a neighborhood that is 78 percent white and 7 percent black . Black segregation levels are even higher for children . "
 For more on how ZIP codes correlate with opportunity , check out this tool created by Opportunity Nation and Measure of America .
 Even with disparate impact claims , the government has often done a poor job fostering housing equality .
 HUD 's largest program of grants to states , cities and towns has delivered $ 137 billion to more than 1,200 communities since 1974 . To receive the money , localities are supposed to identify obstacles to fair housing , keep records of their efforts to overcome them , and certify that they do not discriminate .
 ProPublica could find only two occasions since [ George ] Romney 's tenure [ as HUD secretary , ending in 1972 , ] in which the department withheld money from communities for violating the Fair Housing Act . In several instances , records show , HUD has sent grants to communities even after they 've been found by courts to have promoted segregated housing or been sued by the U.S. Department of Justice . New Orleans , for example , has continued to receive grants after the Justice Department sued it for violating that Fair Housing Act by blocking a low - income housing project in a wealthy historic neighborhood .
 The Supreme Court is now debating whether disparate impact claims can even be raised in housing cases .
 On Jan. 21 , the justices heard oral arguments in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project . The Dallas - area nonprofit , which promotes racially and economically diverse communities , filed suit after finding that for the past few decades , the Texas housing department had allocated almost all affordable - housing tax credits to developments in minority neighborhoods , while denying credits to those in white neighborhoods . This effectively kept low - income residents from moving to white communities . The nonprofit is raising a disparate impact claim under the Fair Housing Act .
 The Texas agency , unable to show there was no less - discriminatory alternative to its practice , lost the case in federal district court and in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit . It petitioned the Supreme Court to rule for the first time on the overall permissibility of disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act . Court watchers suggest the decision may come down to Justice Antonin Scalia , who during oral arguments indicated sympathy with both sides .
 Opponents argue that disparate impact claims are unfair to policymakers , financial institutions and property owners . If housing policies and practices are instituted for legitimate reasons based on race - neutral criteria , the basic argument goes , then they should be legal despite any unintended discriminatory effects -- and the people who implement those policies and practices should not be blamed .
 During oral arguments , Texas Solicitor General Scott Keller suggested another problem : that housing officials and developers wary of possible Fair Housing Act lawsuits might make race - conscious decisions in favor of minorities , creating " the functional equivalent of a quota system . " This would raise constitutional issues of its own .
 Other critics have expressed concerns that the idea of disparate impact is too fluid -- that just because a practice unevenly affects a minority group does n't mean that it harms the group or that it does n't help other minority groups .
 Supporters of disparate impact think the law is on their side , if not necessarily the justices .
 Since 1974 , 11 federal circuit courts have upheld an interpretation of the Fair Housing Act that allows for disparate impact claims . Moreover , in 1988 , when Congress amended the statute , it chose not to add language ruling out such claims , but it did include language that implied their use .
 Amicus briefs have flooded in -- from lawmakers , public interest advocates and business interests -- seeking to sway the justices . There are 14 supporting the Texas agency and 23 backing the nonprofit . One brief in favor of the Inclusive Communities Project comes from the federal government , 17 states and an assortment of civil rights groups .
 " This was really the last legislative victory of the civil rights movement , and it was Dr. King 's last victory , too , " Philip Tegeler , executive director of the Poverty & Race Research Action Council , told The Washington Post . " This is the message that Dr. King brought to Chicago in 1966 , talking about de facto segregation in the North , segregation wherever it exists -- that we need to address it . That 's in large part what the Fair Housing Act was trying to do . "
 Fair housing advocates remain concerned -- in part because this is the third time the Supreme Court has agreed to consider disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act in less than four years . The two earlier cases were each settled less than a month before they were heard by the justices . Civil rights groups , which pushed for those settlements , worry that the justices ' eagerness to rule on this issue could spell trouble .
 " It is unusual for the court to agree to hear a case when the law is clearly settled . It 's even more unusual to agree to hear the issue three years in a row , " Ian Haney Lopez , a law professor at the University of California , Berkeley , told ProPublica .
 This statement in the article defeats the whole point of the article . It clearly shows non - Whites are getting an unfair abundance of the aid .
 the Texas housing department had allocated almost all affordable - housing tax credits to developments in minority neighborhoods , while denying credits to those in white neighborhoods .
 Another long , pointless Huffington article . Why do you bother posting this foolishness on a site with informed readers who see right thru your agenda ? ? ?


text: These white pearl Champion Firebirds made their way into our warehouse just after the Black Pearl. All 17 discs are in the weight range of 165-169g. This particular run of Firebirds will eventually make their way to retailers, which is something everyone can look forward to in the future.

tokenized: These white pearl Champion Firebirds made their way into our warehouse just after the Black Pearl . All 17 discs are in the weight range of 165 - 169 g. This particular run of Firebirds will eventually make their way to retailers , which is something everyone can look forward to in the future .


text: Based on information from California Regional Multiple Listing Service, Inc. as of April 19th, 2019 at 5:43pm CDT. This information is for your personal, non-commercial use and may not be used for any purpose other than to identify prospective properties you may be interested in purchasing. Display of MLS data is usually deemed reliable but is NOT guaranteed accurate by the MLS. Buyers are responsible for verifying the accuracy of all information and should investigate the data themselves or retain appropriate professionals. Information from sources other than the Listing Agent may have been included in the MLS data. Unless otherwise specified in writing, Broker/Agent has not and will not verify any information obtained from other sources. The Broker/Agent providing the information contained herein may or may not have been the Listing and/or Selling Agent.

tokenized: Based on information from California Regional Multiple Listing Service , Inc. as of April 19th , 2019 at 5:43pm CDT . This information is for your personal , non - commercial use and may not be used for any purpose other than to identify prospective properties you may be interested in purchasing . Display of MLS data is usually deemed reliable but is NOT guaranteed accurate by the MLS . Buyers are responsible for verifying the accuracy of all information and should investigate the data themselves or retain appropriate professionals . Information from sources other than the Listing Agent may have been included in the MLS data . Unless otherwise specified in writing , Broker / Agent has not and will not verify any information obtained from other sources . The Broker / Agent providing the information contained herein may or may not have been the Listing and/or Selling Agent .


text:
Website New York Genealogical and Biographical Record, Gov William Beach Lawrence biography (New England Historic Genealogical Society) (http://www.americanancestors.org/).
"New York, Marriage Newspaper Extracts, 1801–1880 (Barber Collection)", digital image, Ancestry.com, "Saturday, May 19, 1821. This morning, Grace Church, Rev Mr Wainwright: William Beach Lawrence to Esther Rogers Gracie, dau of Archibald."
Clovis Leroy, 35, servant, b. France.

tokenized:
Website New York Genealogical and Biographical Record , Gov William Beach Lawrence biography ( New England Historic Genealogical Society ) ( http://www.americanancestors.org/ ) .
 " New York , Marriage Newspaper Extracts , 1801–1880 ( Barber Collection ) " , digital image , Ancestry.com , " Saturday , May 19 , 1821 . This morning , Grace Church , Rev Mr Wainwright : William Beach Lawrence to Esther Rogers Gracie , dau of Archibald . "
 Clovis Leroy , 35 , servant , b. France .


text:
An energetic native-born Québécois but also an Australian citizen, Serge Dansereau grew up in Montréal and spent his formative years surrounded by a family whose food skills and example were to leave a lasting impression.
du Québec in 1974, completing his diploma in Cuisine Professionnelle in 1976.
In 1983, Serge accepted a position to help open the newly built Regent, Sydney. The hotel was lead by the visionary Ted Wright, a forward thinker and great hotellier. The Regent, Sydney was consistently voted in the top 10 hotels in the world.
He was 26. His charter was to metamorphose the Regent’s restaurant Kable’s into a restaurant within a hotel not a hotel restaurant. Excellence was to take precedence over the bottom line; after one year, Dansereau was appointed Executive Chef of the Regent, Sydney and Kable’s quickly became a legend.
Dansereau is a detailer, a people’s person who sees food in a context where it is part of the quality of life. His philosophy was and is that great food requires a great palate of quality ingredients and he sought them out, his influence on new and emerging varieties of fresh and handmade produce became legendary.
Under his guidance, a new and exciting variety of produce soon surfaced - wild mushrooms, exotic herbs and lettuces, vegetables formerly unheard of, farmhouse cheeses Australians had only read about, unusual seafood, baby lambs, traditional game and a whole new selection of quality of market vegetables.
In 1989, the prestigious Sydney Morning Herald Good Food Guide proclaimed Dansereau Chef of the Year and in 1990, awarded 3 toques, its highest accolade, to Kable’s.
His resignation from The Regent in 1999 was coupled with an announcement that he would join The Bathers’ Pavilion as partner and Chef.
distinctive Islamic fretwork, Bathers’ Pavilion includes three Dansereau designed hi-tech kitchens that service a Restaurant, Cafe, Bar, Private Function Rooms, Terrace and Kiosk.
And so, when the astonishingly beautiful and rejuvenated Bathers’ Pavilion opened in August, 1999 it almost immediately became one of Sydney’s best and Australia’s most acclaimed eating place.
Serge Dansereau is a chef and restaurateur who respects the service tradition and regards quality produce as the optimum ingredient in his cooking.
In a country with a world-wide reputation for restaurant excellence, he continues at the forefront. He is considered one of the trendsetter and leading chefs of Australia.
In February 2003 Serge became the sole owner of The Bathers’ Pavilion.

tokenized:
An energetic native - born Québécois but also an Australian citizen , Serge Dansereau grew up in Montréal and spent his formative years surrounded by a family whose food skills and example were to leave a lasting impression .
 du Québec in 1974 , completing his diploma in Cuisine Professionnelle in 1976 .
 In 1983 , Serge accepted a position to help open the newly built Regent , Sydney . The hotel was lead by the visionary Ted Wright , a forward thinker and great hotellier . The Regent , Sydney was consistently voted in the top 10 hotels in the world .
 He was 26 . His charter was to metamorphose the Regent ’s restaurant Kable ’s into a restaurant within a hotel not a hotel restaurant . Excellence was to take precedence over the bottom line ; after one year , Dansereau was appointed Executive Chef of the Regent , Sydney and Kable ’s quickly became a legend .
 Dansereau is a detailer , a people ’s person who sees food in a context where it is part of the quality of life . His philosophy was and is that great food requires a great palate of quality ingredients and he sought them out , his influence on new and emerging varieties of fresh and handmade produce became legendary .
 Under his guidance , a new and exciting variety of produce soon surfaced - wild mushrooms , exotic herbs and lettuces , vegetables formerly unheard of , farmhouse cheeses Australians had only read about , unusual seafood , baby lambs , traditional game and a whole new selection of quality of market vegetables .
 In 1989 , the prestigious Sydney Morning Herald Good Food Guide proclaimed Dansereau Chef of the Year and in 1990 , awarded 3 toques , its highest accolade , to Kable ’s .
 His resignation from The Regent in 1999 was coupled with an announcement that he would join The Bathers ’ Pavilion as partner and Chef .
 distinctive Islamic fretwork , Bathers ’ Pavilion includes three Dansereau designed hi - tech kitchens that service a Restaurant , Cafe , Bar , Private Function Rooms , Terrace and Kiosk .
 And so , when the astonishingly beautiful and rejuvenated Bathers ’ Pavilion opened in August , 1999 it almost immediately became one of Sydney ’s best and Australia ’s most acclaimed eating place .
 Serge Dansereau is a chef and restaurateur who respects the service tradition and regards quality produce as the optimum ingredient in his cooking .
 In a country with a world - wide reputation for restaurant excellence , he continues at the forefront . He is considered one of the trendsetter and leading chefs of Australia .
 In February 2003 Serge became the sole owner of The Bathers ’ Pavilion .


text:
This summer roughly a million superhero movies will be released, and one of the most anticipated is Deadpool 2. More than any other actor, Ryan embodies his character, because they're both hideously ugly. Just kidding. Ryan's not grossly disfigured with burn-like scars like Wade Wilson, but he share's the same snarky trickster spirit. On social media, Ryan loves to troll, wishing his wife a happy birthday while posting a photo where she is totally cropped out.
Today Josh Brolin turned 50 years old, and Ryan wished him a happy birthday by posting a hilarious photo on Instagram. In the picture, Cable sits on a stool, posing for a portrait. But instead of painting Josh's grim dystopian warrior, Deadpool paints Josh's fresh-faced character from The Goonies. The flirty caption reads: "Happy Birthday, Bright Eye. You don’t taste a day over 40." So far, it has over a million likes.

tokenized:
This summer roughly a million superhero movies will be released , and one of the most anticipated is Deadpool 2 . More than any other actor , Ryan embodies his character , because they 're both hideously ugly . Just kidding . Ryan 's not grossly disfigured with burn - like scars like Wade Wilson , but he share 's the same snarky trickster spirit . On social media , Ryan loves to troll , wishing his wife a happy birthday while posting a photo where she is totally cropped out .
 Today Josh Brolin turned 50 years old , and Ryan wished him a happy birthday by posting a hilarious photo on Instagram . In the picture , Cable sits on a stool , posing for a portrait . But instead of painting Josh 's grim dystopian warrior , Deadpool paints Josh 's fresh - faced character from The Goonies . The flirty caption reads : " Happy Birthday , Bright Eye . You do n’t taste a day over 40 . " So far , it has over a million likes .