text: The Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) is a detailed presentation of the City's financial position and activities for the fiscal year and is organized in four main sections. The Introductory Section includes the City Officials, letter of transmittal and an organization chart for the City's government. The Financial Section includes the independent auditors' report, management's discussion and analysis, basic financial statements and notes, and the underlying combining and individual fund financial statements and supplementary information. The Statistical Section contains selected economic, financial trends on a multi-year basis. The Compliance Section includes the independent auditors' reports on compliance and internal control.

lowercased: the comprehensive annual financial report (cafr) is a detailed presentation of the city's financial position and activities for the fiscal year and is organized in four main sections. the introductory section includes the city officials, letter of transmittal and an organization chart for the city's government. the financial section includes the independent auditors' report, management's discussion and analysis, basic financial statements and notes, and the underlying combining and individual fund financial statements and supplementary information. the statistical section contains selected economic, financial trends on a multi-year basis. the compliance section includes the independent auditors' reports on compliance and internal control.


text:
We know being a kid can be hard, but being yourself should be easy!
If you’ve got questions, we’ve got answers! Here’s what many campers have asked us: Have a question we didn’t answer? Email us at info@campfriendship.com.
Campers in Traditional Camp have 5 activity blocks each day–3 in the morning and 2 in the afternoon. In between the morning and afternoon activities we have Free Swim in the lake or pool, cabin time to rest or write letters home, and Snack Bar/Camp Store time. In the evenings, we have fun evening activities like slip ‘n slide, dance parties and cookouts! If you’re doing a Half Day option (drama, tennis or horseback riding), your morning will be spent focusing on that activity and you’ll have 2 activities in the afternoon.
How do I pick my activities?
When you arrive at camp, your cabin counselors will give you a list of 35+ exciting activities to choose from. You’ll select your top 10 choices and the next morning you’ll get your own unique schedule of 5 activities that you’ll do each day for a week. Sneak a peak at all the activities available!
Weekends at camp are awesome! On Saturday afternoon you have the chance to try out new activities and enjoy extra time at the pool with your new camp friends. After dinner, there’s a movie night and on Sunday morning everyone gets to sleep in! Don’t stay in bed too long though–your new friends will be arriving soon and another awesome week at camp awaits!
There’s no such thing as rain at camp – only liquid sunshine! Most activities can continue in the rain or will be relocated to a covered area nearby if there’s a thunderstorm. Afternoon thunderstorms are a great time to challenge your counselors to a game of indoor GaGa ball, play a card game with cabin mates or finish that friendship bracelet you started!
What if I can’t swim or don’t like swimming?
No big deal! Camp Friendship has over 35 activities, so there’s plenty to do away from the water. We do have a daily free swim time at the lake or pool, but if you decide not to swim there’s always beach volleyball, card games and friendship bracelets to make! Campers who do want to swim during the week will be asked to do a quick swim check when they arrive at camp. If our lifeguards think it would be safer for you to wear a lifejacket when you swim in the lake, we’ll help you to pick one out so you can enjoy the zip line, rope swing, slide and high dive!
See for yourself with our virtual tour! All our cabins have bunk beds, electricity and screened windows. Cabins are not air-conditioned and do not have ceiling fans, but feel free to bring your own fan to stay cool! Junior Villages and Equestrian Village lodging have bathrooms inside, while Senior Village cabins have bath houses just a short distance away.
Counselors are the fun-loving adults that take care of you when you’re at camp. Counselors at Camp Friendship are kind, caring and interesting people that come from all over the world. They love teaching activities and having fun with you. They’re always there to answer questions or help you with anything you need!
Will I be the only new camper?
No! Every summer we have first time campers of all ages, so you definitely won’t be the only camper who hasn’t been to Camp Friendship before.
Making friends is what Camp Friendship is all about! You’ll have the chance to make friends with your cabin mates, but you’ll also meet so many new people in your different daily activities.
Will I be the only American/International?
No! Every week, we have campers from all over the United States and all over the world join us here at camp.
What if I want to come to camp with a friend?
Great – the more the merrier at Camp Friendship! If you’re coming to camp with a friend, you can request to share the same cabin. Friends will likely do different activities throughout the day but will be together at the beginning and end of each day and during cabin time.
Camp food is great, and there are always so many options to choose from during our buffet style meals! If you don’t like scrambled eggs for breakfast, we have loads of choices including toast and cereal. If you don’t like pizza, we have pasta and more! We have a full salad bar and sandwich bar available during lunch and dinner in case you want to build your own. All food is nut free and there’s also a vegetarian, vegan and gluten free option at each meal. There’s always plenty to eat at meal times, but don’t forget to leave room for dessert!
Camp days are long and busy, so we have Snack Bar time every afternoon to make sure you have enough energy to do your activities! Every morning at breakfast, you can select a drink and snack to have in the afternoon. If you’re hungry in between activities, the Dining Hall is always open for you to grab some fresh fruit or cereal before heading to your next activity.
Not a problem! As long as we know about your specific allergies beforehand, our kitchen staff are always more than happy to help.
Can I bring my phone/tablet/iPad/Kindle/Nintendo DS, etc?
Nope! Camp Friendship is technology-free, and we love it that way. Trust us, you won’t even miss it when you’re here!
Wear comfortable clothes that are okay to get messy! We’ve created a handy packing list to make sure you have everything you need when you’re at camp!
Our Camp Store is a great back up if you’ve forgotten something! We sell water bottles, bug spray, toothpaste and CF-branded clothing to remember us by. If you need something to be mailed to you, just tell your counselor and they can coordinate it with the Village Supervisor.
Read our blog on why it’s awesome to get a ton of fresh air and go technology free for a week at Camp!
This is my favorite place on Earth!

lowercased:
we know being a kid can be hard, but being yourself should be easy!
if you’ve got questions, we’ve got answers! here’s what many campers have asked us: have a question we didn’t answer? email us at info@campfriendship.com.
campers in traditional camp have 5 activity blocks each day–3 in the morning and 2 in the afternoon. in between the morning and afternoon activities we have free swim in the lake or pool, cabin time to rest or write letters home, and snack bar/camp store time. in the evenings, we have fun evening activities like slip ‘n slide, dance parties and cookouts! if you’re doing a half day option (drama, tennis or horseback riding), your morning will be spent focusing on that activity and you’ll have 2 activities in the afternoon.
how do i pick my activities?
when you arrive at camp, your cabin counselors will give you a list of 35+ exciting activities to choose from. you’ll select your top 10 choices and the next morning you’ll get your own unique schedule of 5 activities that you’ll do each day for a week. sneak a peak at all the activities available!
weekends at camp are awesome! on saturday afternoon you have the chance to try out new activities and enjoy extra time at the pool with your new camp friends. after dinner, there’s a movie night and on sunday morning everyone gets to sleep in! don’t stay in bed too long though–your new friends will be arriving soon and another awesome week at camp awaits!
there’s no such thing as rain at camp – only liquid sunshine! most activities can continue in the rain or will be relocated to a covered area nearby if there’s a thunderstorm. afternoon thunderstorms are a great time to challenge your counselors to a game of indoor gaga ball, play a card game with cabin mates or finish that friendship bracelet you started!
what if i can’t swim or don’t like swimming?
no big deal! camp friendship has over 35 activities, so there’s plenty to do away from the water. we do have a daily free swim time at the lake or pool, but if you decide not to swim there’s always beach volleyball, card games and friendship bracelets to make! campers who do want to swim during the week will be asked to do a quick swim check when they arrive at camp. if our lifeguards think it would be safer for you to wear a lifejacket when you swim in the lake, we’ll help you to pick one out so you can enjoy the zip line, rope swing, slide and high dive!
see for yourself with our virtual tour! all our cabins have bunk beds, electricity and screened windows. cabins are not air-conditioned and do not have ceiling fans, but feel free to bring your own fan to stay cool! junior villages and equestrian village lodging have bathrooms inside, while senior village cabins have bath houses just a short distance away.
counselors are the fun-loving adults that take care of you when you’re at camp. counselors at camp friendship are kind, caring and interesting people that come from all over the world. they love teaching activities and having fun with you. they’re always there to answer questions or help you with anything you need!
will i be the only new camper?
no! every summer we have first time campers of all ages, so you definitely won’t be the only camper who hasn’t been to camp friendship before.
making friends is what camp friendship is all about! you’ll have the chance to make friends with your cabin mates, but you’ll also meet so many new people in your different daily activities.
will i be the only american/international?
no! every week, we have campers from all over the united states and all over the world join us here at camp.
what if i want to come to camp with a friend?
great – the more the merrier at camp friendship! if you’re coming to camp with a friend, you can request to share the same cabin. friends will likely do different activities throughout the day but will be together at the beginning and end of each day and during cabin time.
camp food is great, and there are always so many options to choose from during our buffet style meals! if you don’t like scrambled eggs for breakfast, we have loads of choices including toast and cereal. if you don’t like pizza, we have pasta and more! we have a full salad bar and sandwich bar available during lunch and dinner in case you want to build your own. all food is nut free and there’s also a vegetarian, vegan and gluten free option at each meal. there’s always plenty to eat at meal times, but don’t forget to leave room for dessert!
camp days are long and busy, so we have snack bar time every afternoon to make sure you have enough energy to do your activities! every morning at breakfast, you can select a drink and snack to have in the afternoon. if you’re hungry in between activities, the dining hall is always open for you to grab some fresh fruit or cereal before heading to your next activity.
not a problem! as long as we know about your specific allergies beforehand, our kitchen staff are always more than happy to help.
can i bring my phone/tablet/ipad/kindle/nintendo ds, etc?
nope! camp friendship is technology-free, and we love it that way. trust us, you won’t even miss it when you’re here!
wear comfortable clothes that are okay to get messy! we’ve created a handy packing list to make sure you have everything you need when you’re at camp!
our camp store is a great back up if you’ve forgotten something! we sell water bottles, bug spray, toothpaste and cf-branded clothing to remember us by. if you need something to be mailed to you, just tell your counselor and they can coordinate it with the village supervisor.
read our blog on why it’s awesome to get a ton of fresh air and go technology free for a week at camp!
this is my favorite place on earth!


text:
Community Radio Station set up and operated by volunteers. Serving Midleton, Carrigtwohill Glounthaune, Little Island and the surrounding areas.
info@smilefmcork.com 2013 © Smile FM site by IW.

lowercased:
community radio station set up and operated by volunteers. serving midleton, carrigtwohill glounthaune, little island and the surrounding areas.
info@smilefmcork.com 2013 © smile fm site by iw.


text:
Winter has been in full force at my house these last couple days. Blizzard conditions with snow, wind and temps not getting much above 32 degrees....ugghhh! I apologize for getting this post up later than usual, but we have been without power all day long.
I will leave you with a few photos that I took of the view I see out my french doors onto my patio of my weatherd statue. Enjoy! xoxo K.
I'm sorry you were without power - I don't envy you with your snow and freezing temperatures! Stay warm!!
Oh, I can't believe you have all of that snow! We are having perfect weather at 75 degrees and sunny.
Beautiful snow pictures! We didn't get near enough snow as far as my kids are concerned. You look like you got more. Thanks for hosting this great party!
So sorry about the power outage, I sure know what that's like living out in the country!!! Not fun!
These are beautiful images, Kathleen! I hope your power stays on! Stay cozy!
The wind is kicking up a ruckus here too, Kathleen. Snow is becoming on your little cherubs though. Rather a nice touch. I have a similar one but I brought it in for the winter. Glad you've got your power back on. Thanks for hosting.
I'm a little jealous of your snowy winter wonderland!! So pretty!!
The snow is pretty--especially on your sweet angel! Thanks for hosting--hope your power is fully restored soon!
Hi Kathleen! I'm so glad you got your power back! It's seems so odd that you have had storms and all that snow, when just across the river we have nothing but rain. However, I hear that storm may be headed this way! I guess I better get out the candles, just in case! Your photos are beautiful! I especially love the chilly little angel with the dusting of snow! Will you be at Junk Salvation next month? I hope so!
We had rain rain rain all day today. All the snow is melted away and I'm a little sad. It's been weird weather this year!! love your cement cherub!
Oh, not fun at all to lose power all day. The snow looks so pretty outside in your garden, but it's not always fun, is it?
Thanks for hosting WW despite the power challenge, Kathleen!
Hi Kathleen~ I just found your blog today.. I am your newest follower. I have also joined your White Wednesday Party. Thanks for hosting:)The snow pictures are so pretty. We dont get snow here so I am envious.
LOVE your new blog design too!!
oh such sweet statues. My dear little cement girl is so covered with snow you can't see her in my post!
Sorry you had no power...ouch in bad weather that is not good.
Hope this finds you very cozy indeed!
Thanks for always hosting White Wednesday!
Thanks for hosting and hoping you are staying warm. We are having quite a cold spell here too. Super foggy today, then rain then switched to high winds and a flash freeze with flurries.
Well, bless you for getting this up at all. Wow, does your blog look great!!! I love it!!
Thank you so much for hosting. Glad you have power!
Jealous you have snow! We are really getting screwed over down here!
Hi! My name is Daniella and this is my first time to your party!!!
I hope to be back often, and thanks for hosting!!!
Oh, I see you guys got some snow!!! How is the driving? It will be gone quick enough... we got snow yesterday and now it is cold, single digits. Hate that part. Beautiful pictures, love all your cement.
Wow Kathleen! Your snow pics are simply lovely! I would love to visit snow, but am a born and bred sunshine girl!! Love me some Florida winters!!
love your new blog look and your statues is sweet with the snow.Stay warm and thanks for hosting.Hope your power will stay on.
Love the look of snow on garden statuary! Love even more seeing them surrounded by green and flowers! Am so looking forward to spring!
Hi... we are so excited to have posted a photo on your blog for White Wednesday. We just found you website and love it! We are new to the blogging community and appreciate you hosting this venue. Hoping to post more! Thanks!
Thanks for hosting the party! I'm a new follower and I've linked up!
I love your garden statues.Even with snow they look gorgeous.Thank you for hosting a link party.Have a great weekend.
Reading your blog from the Sunshine Coast Hinterland Qld Australia!! Love your blog Love seeing the pictures of snow!!!!!! I have never seen snow we are right in the middle of our summer wet season We have had about 400mm I gues 16 inches of rain since Monday!!!!! Still hanging on to the hills!!! Thanks for your inspirational blog!! Sonya Hunchy Aust!

lowercased:
winter has been in full force at my house these last couple days. blizzard conditions with snow, wind and temps not getting much above 32 degrees....ugghhh! i apologize for getting this post up later than usual, but we have been without power all day long.
i will leave you with a few photos that i took of the view i see out my french doors onto my patio of my weatherd statue. enjoy! xoxo k.
i'm sorry you were without power - i don't envy you with your snow and freezing temperatures! stay warm!!
oh, i can't believe you have all of that snow! we are having perfect weather at 75 degrees and sunny.
beautiful snow pictures! we didn't get near enough snow as far as my kids are concerned. you look like you got more. thanks for hosting this great party!
so sorry about the power outage, i sure know what that's like living out in the country!!! not fun!
these are beautiful images, kathleen! i hope your power stays on! stay cozy!
the wind is kicking up a ruckus here too, kathleen. snow is becoming on your little cherubs though. rather a nice touch. i have a similar one but i brought it in for the winter. glad you've got your power back on. thanks for hosting.
i'm a little jealous of your snowy winter wonderland!! so pretty!!
the snow is pretty--especially on your sweet angel! thanks for hosting--hope your power is fully restored soon!
hi kathleen! i'm so glad you got your power back! it's seems so odd that you have had storms and all that snow, when just across the river we have nothing but rain. however, i hear that storm may be headed this way! i guess i better get out the candles, just in case! your photos are beautiful! i especially love the chilly little angel with the dusting of snow! will you be at junk salvation next month? i hope so!
we had rain rain rain all day today. all the snow is melted away and i'm a little sad. it's been weird weather this year!! love your cement cherub!
oh, not fun at all to lose power all day. the snow looks so pretty outside in your garden, but it's not always fun, is it?
thanks for hosting ww despite the power challenge, kathleen!
hi kathleen~ i just found your blog today.. i am your newest follower. i have also joined your white wednesday party. thanks for hosting:)the snow pictures are so pretty. we dont get snow here so i am envious.
love your new blog design too!!
oh such sweet statues. my dear little cement girl is so covered with snow you can't see her in my post!
sorry you had no power...ouch in bad weather that is not good.
hope this finds you very cozy indeed!
thanks for always hosting white wednesday!
thanks for hosting and hoping you are staying warm. we are having quite a cold spell here too. super foggy today, then rain then switched to high winds and a flash freeze with flurries.
well, bless you for getting this up at all. wow, does your blog look great!!! i love it!!
thank you so much for hosting. glad you have power!
jealous you have snow! we are really getting screwed over down here!
hi! my name is daniella and this is my first time to your party!!!
i hope to be back often, and thanks for hosting!!!
oh, i see you guys got some snow!!! how is the driving? it will be gone quick enough... we got snow yesterday and now it is cold, single digits. hate that part. beautiful pictures, love all your cement.
wow kathleen! your snow pics are simply lovely! i would love to visit snow, but am a born and bred sunshine girl!! love me some florida winters!!
love your new blog look and your statues is sweet with the snow.stay warm and thanks for hosting.hope your power will stay on.
love the look of snow on garden statuary! love even more seeing them surrounded by green and flowers! am so looking forward to spring!
hi... we are so excited to have posted a photo on your blog for white wednesday. we just found you website and love it! we are new to the blogging community and appreciate you hosting this venue. hoping to post more! thanks!
thanks for hosting the party! i'm a new follower and i've linked up!
i love your garden statues.even with snow they look gorgeous.thank you for hosting a link party.have a great weekend.
reading your blog from the sunshine coast hinterland qld australia!! love your blog love seeing the pictures of snow!!!!!! i have never seen snow we are right in the middle of our summer wet season we have had about 400mm i gues 16 inches of rain since monday!!!!! still hanging on to the hills!!! thanks for your inspirational blog!! sonya hunchy aust!


text:
For more information, see Napoleonic Wars.
This page uses content from the English language Wikipedia. The original content was at Category:Russian commanders of the Napoleonic Wars. The list of authors can be seen in the page history. As with this Familypedia wiki, the content of Wikipedia is available under the Creative Commons License.

lowercased:
for more information, see napoleonic wars.
this page uses content from the english language wikipedia. the original content was at category:russian commanders of the napoleonic wars. the list of authors can be seen in the page history. as with this familypedia wiki, the content of wikipedia is available under the creative commons license.


text:
I can feel the relationship with my hosts growing as we get to know each other better. We had a fun dinner party this week and played some games which were a lot of fun.
My hosts invited their new tenants living in their rental property over for dinner this week. Being a shared house they often have tenants move out at the end of the lease and need to welcome the new tenants in. When they come to sign the lease, they invite them over for dinner. I personally have never met any of my landlords, so I was impressed by this gesture. Harry decided to make his delicious pumpkin soup for the occasion, and I helped out by chopping up a couple of pumpkins. I was having trouble getting some of the pumpkin seeds out, so they taught me a little trick: pretend like you’re carving an apple, and the seeds will be separated much more easily. I'm surprised at the new cooking skills I'm learning every week!
After dinner, we played cards. It's a great way to get to know each other and it's something we do a lot of. It certainly beats watching TV and it's a great way to connect with your hosts and other people in the home. Playing games is a good reminder that life is not about winning, but about the quality of our relationships and how well you know those around you.
On the weekend I had a very enjoyable time catching up with some friends. As I paid the bill for my pancakes and cappuccino, one thought stood out in my mind: I enjoyed that experience of eating out with friends more than I have before. Why? Because without a rent bill to pay, I knew that I was able to more easily afford more of the things I really wanted to do.

lowercased:
i can feel the relationship with my hosts growing as we get to know each other better. we had a fun dinner party this week and played some games which were a lot of fun.
my hosts invited their new tenants living in their rental property over for dinner this week. being a shared house they often have tenants move out at the end of the lease and need to welcome the new tenants in. when they come to sign the lease, they invite them over for dinner. i personally have never met any of my landlords, so i was impressed by this gesture. harry decided to make his delicious pumpkin soup for the occasion, and i helped out by chopping up a couple of pumpkins. i was having trouble getting some of the pumpkin seeds out, so they taught me a little trick: pretend like you’re carving an apple, and the seeds will be separated much more easily. i'm surprised at the new cooking skills i'm learning every week!
after dinner, we played cards. it's a great way to get to know each other and it's something we do a lot of. it certainly beats watching tv and it's a great way to connect with your hosts and other people in the home. playing games is a good reminder that life is not about winning, but about the quality of our relationships and how well you know those around you.
on the weekend i had a very enjoyable time catching up with some friends. as i paid the bill for my pancakes and cappuccino, one thought stood out in my mind: i enjoyed that experience of eating out with friends more than i have before. why? because without a rent bill to pay, i knew that i was able to more easily afford more of the things i really wanted to do.


text:
PORT ELIZABETH - ANC President Cyril Ramaphosa launched the ANC’s political school named after struggle stalwart, Oliver Reginald Tambo, at an event held at Gallagher Estate in Midrand on Thursday.
In honouring the memory of the late leader of the organisation, the OR Tambo School of Leadership said in a statement that it would embrace the values of humanity, selflessness and foresight that underpinned his revolutionary leadership.
"It brings attention to his combined exceptional leadership quality and total dedication to make South Africa a better country through education. He was renowned for his fair, inclusive and embracing leadership.
It said that Tambo was a "revolutionary intellectual leader who valued the power of persuasive argument and ideas".
“This is a significant step towards the renewal of the ANC. It is consistent with the historical role of the ANC in building its members and leaders to be agents of change. It is only through ethically and intellectually grounded members that the ANC can continue to lead society” chairperson of the OR Tambo School of Leadership, Kgalema Motlanthe, said.
Board members of the school are Kgalema Motlanthe, chairperson, as well as David Masondo who is a Board member and Principal of the school.
Other members are Alison Bengtson, Aubrey Mokadi, Cassel Mathale, Derrick Swartz, Douglas Ramaphosa, Jabulani Sithole, John Pamapallis, Joshua Maluleka, Kwazikwenkosi Mshengu, Mahlengi Bhengu, Fébé Potgieter-Gqubule, Ronald Lamola, Sarah Mokwebo, Shafee Verachia and Thandeka Ntshangase.
“The Board is composed of individuals with strong background in design, curriculum development and delivery of political education. This team has strong strategic and technical expertise in adult basic education, accreditation, quality assurance and legal framework governing education,” the ANC secretary-general Ace Magashule said.
Principal of the school Dr David Masondo said the school will facilitate education on strategic studies, policy as well as organisational skills, and offers 13 courses that will be offered on different platforms including face-to-face interactions between students and facilitators and e-learning .
The courses include Political Economy, Gender and Women Emancipation, as well as Global Economy and the Developmental State.
“The course content and methods of delivery are designed in such way that they will be accredited in the medium term.” Masondo said.
The school is open to members of the ANC and the democratic movement, as well as anyone keen on understanding how the world works and how to change it. ANC regional, provincial and national leaders will be required to attend the school.
A wide range of stakeholders who will be associated with the school attended the celebratory launch event including leaders of the ANC and its alliance partners, academics, business and the media.
Fraternal organisations across Africa were also represented, including Swapo, Frelimo, Zanu-PF and the Jubilee Party from Kenya.

lowercased:
port elizabeth - anc president cyril ramaphosa launched the anc’s political school named after struggle stalwart, oliver reginald tambo, at an event held at gallagher estate in midrand on thursday.
in honouring the memory of the late leader of the organisation, the or tambo school of leadership said in a statement that it would embrace the values of humanity, selflessness and foresight that underpinned his revolutionary leadership.
"it brings attention to his combined exceptional leadership quality and total dedication to make south africa a better country through education. he was renowned for his fair, inclusive and embracing leadership.
it said that tambo was a "revolutionary intellectual leader who valued the power of persuasive argument and ideas".
“this is a significant step towards the renewal of the anc. it is consistent with the historical role of the anc in building its members and leaders to be agents of change. it is only through ethically and intellectually grounded members that the anc can continue to lead society” chairperson of the or tambo school of leadership, kgalema motlanthe, said.
board members of the school are kgalema motlanthe, chairperson, as well as david masondo who is a board member and principal of the school.
other members are alison bengtson, aubrey mokadi, cassel mathale, derrick swartz, douglas ramaphosa, jabulani sithole, john pamapallis, joshua maluleka, kwazikwenkosi mshengu, mahlengi bhengu, fébé potgieter-gqubule, ronald lamola, sarah mokwebo, shafee verachia and thandeka ntshangase.
“the board is composed of individuals with strong background in design, curriculum development and delivery of political education. this team has strong strategic and technical expertise in adult basic education, accreditation, quality assurance and legal framework governing education,” the anc secretary-general ace magashule said.
principal of the school dr david masondo said the school will facilitate education on strategic studies, policy as well as organisational skills, and offers 13 courses that will be offered on different platforms including face-to-face interactions between students and facilitators and e-learning .
the courses include political economy, gender and women emancipation, as well as global economy and the developmental state.
“the course content and methods of delivery are designed in such way that they will be accredited in the medium term.” masondo said.
the school is open to members of the anc and the democratic movement, as well as anyone keen on understanding how the world works and how to change it. anc regional, provincial and national leaders will be required to attend the school.
a wide range of stakeholders who will be associated with the school attended the celebratory launch event including leaders of the anc and its alliance partners, academics, business and the media.
fraternal organisations across africa were also represented, including swapo, frelimo, zanu-pf and the jubilee party from kenya.


text:
Background The distribution of cigarette prices has rarely been studied and compared under different tax structures. Descriptive evidence on price distributions by countries can shed light on opportunities for tax avoidance and brand switching under different tobacco tax structures, which could impact the effectiveness of increased taxation in reducing smoking.
Objective This paper aims to describe the distribution of cigarette prices by countries and to compare these distributions based on the tobacco tax structure in these countries.
Methods We employed data for 16 countries taken from the International Tobacco Control Policy Evaluation Project to construct survey-derived cigarette prices for each country. Self-reported prices were weighted by cigarette consumption and described using a comprehensive set of statistics. We then compared these statistics for cigarette prices under different tax structures. In particular, countries of similar income levels and countries that impose similar total excise taxes using different tax structures were paired and compared in mean and variance using a two-sample comparison test.
Findings Our investigation illustrates that, compared with specific uniform taxation, other tax structures, such as ad valorem uniform taxation, mixed (a tax system using ad valorem and specific taxes) uniform taxation, and tiered tax structures of specific, ad valorem and mixed taxation tend to have price distributions with greater variability. Countries that rely heavily on ad valorem and tiered taxes also tend to have greater price variability around the median. Among mixed taxation systems, countries that rely more heavily on the ad valorem component tend to have greater price variability than countries that rely more heavily on the specific component. In countries with tiered tax systems, cigarette prices are skewed more towards lower prices than are prices under uniform tax systems. The analyses presented here demonstrate that more opportunities exist for tax avoidance and brand switching when the tax structure departs from a uniform specific tax.
Significant increases in cigarette excise taxes have been shown to be the most effective policy for reducing smoking.1 Tobacco excise taxes can be levied in two forms: specific and ad valorem taxes. A specific excise tax is a monetary tax levied based on the quantity of tobacco products (eg, per pack or by weight). While an ad valorem excise tax is a tax levied as a percentage of the value of tobacco products (eg, manufacturer's price or retail price).2 Although most governments impose certain excise taxes on cigarettes, the structure of these taxes varies markedly by countries. For instance, while many high-income countries (HICs) rely solely on specific excise taxes on cigarettes, European Union (EU) countries are required by the Council of the EU to impose excise taxes consisting of specific and ad valorem components, with a minimum floor. In addition, individual EU countries decide on the share of each component in total taxes under rules stating that the specific component must be between 5% and 76.5% of the total tax share of the weighted average price of cigarettes.2 ,3 As a result, individual EU countries rely differently on the specific and ad valorem components of their total cigarette excise tax.
Despite these various excise tax systems, there is a lack of empirical evidence on how cigarette prices, through which taxation ultimately impacts smoking, are distributed in different systems. In particular, for LMICs where smoking is prevalent, the importance of tax structure as a factor mediating the effectiveness of tobacco taxation in controlling tobacco use has rarely been studied or discussed. For example, recent studies from China suggest that cigarette demand is relatively unresponsive to price, which might be a result of China’s complicated tiered tax structure that results in very low prices for some brands.5 ,6 Therefore, it is important to understand how cigarette prices are associated with tax structures in order to maximise the impact of tobacco taxation on tobacco use.
From an economic perspective, given that the cigarette market is usually dominated by a small number of companies in most countries, cigarette price distributions may largely depend on taxation systems. Economic models have implied that, compared with specific excises, ad valorem excises tend to lead to lower prices and may encourage trading down, for example, the purchase of cheaper cigarettes.2 This is because an ad valorem tax structure creates incentives for manufacturers to produce low quality, low price cigarettes. In contrast, specific excises, in the form of taxes or a tax floor, tend to lead to higher prices, in that producers have incentives to raise prices when they can claim all the increased revenue (which is not the case for ad valorem excises). In addition, specific excises would reduce consumers’ incentives to switch down when taxes increase by raising the relative price of lower-price to higher-price brands. In their examination of cigarette prices in 21 EU countries, Chaloupka et al7 find that the price gap between premium and low-priced brands is smaller in countries with a greater specific component to excise taxes. However, that study is based on empirical evidence from EU countries that all use mixed taxation systems with different shares of specific and ad valorem taxes and, as a result, cannot directly compare pure specific, pure ad valorem and mixed systems, or tiered and uniform systems. Moreover, the price gap in that study is based on prices collected by the Economists Intelligence Unit for one leading international brand and one leading local brand, thus not reflecting the full distribution of cigarette prices in the market. Meanwhile, other than the aforementioned reasons, if the relative price of lower-priced brands relative to higher-priced brands increases, the market share of low-priced brands will likely fall. Therefore, compared with ad valorem excises, specific excises might lead to even higher prices with less price variability. The empirical evidence on the former hypothesis is shown in studies using data from HICs with purely specific tax systems. Nargis et al8 used four waves of data from the International Tobacco Control Policy Evaluation (ITC) Surveys in Canada and the USA to examine the association between brand choice and relative prices and found that an increase in the relative price of lower-priced to higher-priced brands is associated with a decrease in purchasing of lower-priced brands in both countries. Sobel and Garrett9 also found that increases in the specific taxes in the USA lead to a lower market share for lower-priced generic brands.
Several factors other than tax structures, such as tax avoidance and tax evasion, are likely to shape the cigarette price distribution as well. In some countries, taxes on tobacco are levied differently across jurisdictions such as states, provinces and Indian reservations. Therefore, cross-national-border and cross-jurisdiction-border shopping is one way to avoid taxes. For instance, in Canada and the USA, some excise taxes are exempted in aboriginal reserves and Native American reservations.1 In a recent paper Merriman17 assessed the extent of avoidance/evasion by collecting littered cigarette packs around Chicago, and found that three-fourths of the packs collected in Chicago did not bear the Chicago tax stamp. Using data from 15 ITC countries, Guindon et al18 found that more than 10% of smokers report engaging in tax avoidance or tax evasion in Canada, the UK and Malaysia.
Tax evasion, such as large-scale smuggling, could also contribute to an increase in the share of low-priced cigarettes. Although there is insufficient evidence that large-scale smuggling lowers average retail prices, some research has indicated that illicit trade could burden low-income countries disproportionately, where illicit cigarettes constitute 16.8% of the market compared with 9.8% of the market in HICs.19 The cigarette prices that we examine in this paper are survey-derived prices that reflect the combined effects of tax structures, tax avoidance and tax evasion. Although it is impossible in this study to disentangle the contribution of each to the distribution of cigarette prices, we hypothesise that the tax structure plays the most important role in cross-country differences in the price distribution. Moreover, unlike tax evasion and tax avoidance by switching to cheaper cigarettes, which may have a greater effect on prices at the lower end, differences in tax structures would have an effect in shifting the overall distribution of cigarette prices.
In summary, a greater price gap among brands could reduce the effectiveness of taxation in reducing tobacco use by increasing opportunities for substitution to cheaper brands as taxes rise. Among many tax structures, the uniform specific tax structure simplifies the taxation system and has advantages in raising the average prices and the relative price of lower-priced to higher-priced cigarettes. As a result, a uniform tax structure can increase the effectiveness of tax increases in reducing smoking.1 Therefore, analysing the price distribution using survey-derived data will add to the empirical evidence on how price distributions and gaps differ under alternative tax structures. Tax structures that lead to higher average prices and smaller price gaps can lead to a more effective tax system for reducing smoking. In this paper, we use data taken from 16 countries of the ITC Project, which cover many types of tax structures, to describe and compare cigarette price distributions across different tax structures.
Cigarette prices were derived for each country using the most recent data from the ITC Project Surveys.ii The ITC Project consists of parallel longitudinal surveys of smokers and other tobacco users (and non-users in most countries) conducted in 22 countries inhabited by more than 50% of the world’s population, 60% of the world’s smokers and 70% of the world’s tobacco users. The ITC Surveys are designed to evaluate the policies of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.20 For the analyses reported in this paper, we selected ITC countries where cigarette purchase information was collected from smokers. The price per pack of 20 cigarettes was thereafter derived from the money spent in the last purchase and the number of cigarettes that were bought.iii In order to compare prices and their distributions across countries, we converted the derived prices in local currencies into constant 2010 international dollars using the purchasing-power parity and consumer price index of the country. Purchasing-power parity conversion factors and the consumer price index for each country were obtained from the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook database. In order to reflect the market share of cigarettes at different price levels, we use consumption weights to obtain aggregated measures of cigarette prices. Namely, for each individual smoker, we calculate how many cigarettes they smoke per day and construct a consumption weight as the ratio of his or her own consumption to the total consumption of respondents to the survey. These consumption weights are applied to cigarette prices when reporting mean, median and quartile prices.
Survey-derived prices are likely to better reflect the price distribution in the market than are other sources of prices, especially when we are interested in comparing the price distribution under different tax systems.21 These comparisons shed some light on the association between tax structure and price distribution, and resulting opportunities for tax avoidance under different structures. As discussed above, the tax structure could be exclusively specific, ad valorem, or a mixture of the two. Alternatively, taxes can also be levied uniformly or by tiers. Economic reasoning implies that tax structures with tiers or that rely more heavily on ad valorem excises will yield more opportunities for tax avoidance and branch switching. In the ITC Project sample of countries, a majority rely on uniform taxes, with only Brazil, Republic of Korea, China and Bangladesh applying tiered taxes. Most non-EU HICs including the USA, Canada, Australia and Republic of Korea, and some LMICs including Brazil, Uruguay and Mauritius solely rely on specific excises. In contrast, Bangladesh and Thailand rely on purely ad valorem excises; and China, Malaysia and EU countries apply mixed systems of specific and ad valorem excises, while individual countries may largely rely on one of the components.
The analyses in this paper proceed as follows: In table 1, after ranking countries by tax structure, the percentage of the specific component among the total excise tax, and the amount of total excise taxes, we present comprehensive statistics for price distribution by countries. In particular, mean, median, SD and skewness of prices are reported to show how much prices are skewed towards lower prices under alternative tax structures. The first quartile, third quartile and IQR, which is measured by the difference between the first and third quartile, are also reported. In addition, we calculate and show the ratio of the IQR to the median, which shows price variability around the median price. Other important statistics such as the minimum price, maximum price, price range and the ratio of the price range to the mean are also shown in table 1. Also, in figure 1, we exhibit price distributions by countries using boxplot to visualise the statistics that are reported in table 1 and to present the price distribution and variability in one graph. In table 2 we show, by tax structure, countries where prices are skewed in different directions and those where prices are most heavily skewed (skewness statistics are greater than 1 or smaller than −1). Finally, in table 3 we select and pair countries that are close in income levels and in the amount of total excise tax but that employ different tax structures, in order to compare their mean and variance using a two-sample comparison test.
Boxplot of cigarette price distributions by country. AU (Australia), CA (Canada), MU (Mauritius), US (the USA), UY (Uruguay), KR (Republic of Korea), BR (Brazil), NL (The Netherlands), MY (Malaysia), UK (the UK), DE (Germany), MX (Mexico), FR (France), RC (China), TH (Thailand) and BD (Bangladesh).
In table 1, we categorise countries by their tax structures and the percentage of specific taxes among total excise taxes; VATs are excluded. Among countries with a mixed uniform tax structure, The Netherlands has the largest share of the specific component while France has the smallest (range: 9.4–67.3%). Although China imposes a small specific excise, the system largely relies on the tiered ad valorem component. And in general, for countries that impose a similar amount of total excises, those with simpler tax structures tend to have higher average prices. For instance, Mauritius and Mexico impose total excises of $2.45 and $2.29, respectively, but the mean price for Mauritius which uses a uniform specific tax structure is $1.29 higher than Mexico where a mixed tax structure is used. Among EU countries, The Netherlands and France impose total excises of $3.37 and $3.80, respectively, while The Netherlands with a larger specific share has a mean price $0.49 higher than France, which has a larger ad valorem share. The skewness statistics show that in countries where tiered taxes are applied, prices are more likely positively skewed, indicating that there are fewer higher prices in the distribution. In contrast, most countries with a uniform tax structure have skewness statistics close to 0, suggesting prices are relatively symmetric. When comparing Malaysia and Mexico, where a mixed structure is applied in both cases but Malaysia has a larger share of the specific tax component, more prices in Mexico are lower while more prices in Malaysia are higher.
The ratio of the IQR to the median reported in table 1 shows how prices deviate around the median. In countries with a purely ad valorem tax system, such as Bangladesh and Thailand, and China, which largely employs ad valorem taxation, this ratio is as high as 0.51–0.89, which suggests greater price variability around median prices. On the other hand, other than Uruguay, the USA and Canada where cross-jurisdiction shopping opportunities are relatively available, countries with mixed and specific uniform structures tend to have prices that vary less around the median, with ratios less than 0.25. When looking into the price range measured by the distance between the maximum and minimum prices, there is no clear pattern by different structures. However, if we compare how great the range is in contrast to the mean, the results indicate that the range is six to nine times as large as the mean in Bangladesh, China and Brazil, where taxes are levied by tiers, while other countries have ratios in the range of 1–4. In addition, China has a price range of $17.6, which is extremely wide compared with its average price.
Table 2 summarises countries by comparing mean and median prices, as well as the skewness of prices. In the upper panel, we report countries where the mean price is higher than the median and those where the price mean is lower than the median, respectively. In contrast to the median, a higher mean suggests a positively-skewed price distribution that prices concentrate at lower values; and a lower mean suggests the opposite. These measures show that among the seven countries with the purely specific tax structure, four countries have mean prices larger than the median and three have mean prices smaller than the median. However, the mean and median prices are very close in magnitude for most countries with a specific tax structure. The skewness statistics reported in the lower panel show that prices are largely skewed to lower values in China, Brazil, Mexico, Bangladesh and Republic of Korea, where either tiered or ad valorem taxes (ad valorem component in mixed structures) are applied. This finding suggests that tiered and ad valorem taxes may distort cigarette prices towards lower values, increasing opportunities for switching to cheaper cigarettes as tax increases. In addition, prices are heavily skewed to lower values in the USA, which might reflect tax avoidance by cross-jurisdiction shopping.
Finally, we select and pair countries that are close in the amount of total excise taxes but that use different tax structures, to compare their mean and variance using a two-sample comparison test. The selected country pairs are as follows: for LMICs, Uruguay (specific uniform) and Brazil (specific tiered) are paired to compare uniform and tiered tax structures; Mauritius (specific uniform) and Mexico (mixed uniform) are paired to compare specific and mixed structures; Malaysia and Thailand are paired to compare mixed and ad valorem uniform structures; and Malaysia and Mexico are paired to compare mixed structures with different shares of specific components. For HICs, Australia and the UK/France are paired to compare specific and mixed uniform structures. In addition, The Netherlands and France/Germany are paired to compare mixed systems dominated by specific and ad valorem components, respectively. The hypotheses that more complicated tax structures tend to have a higher price mean and present a smaller price variance are tested, with the rejection of these hypotheses suggesting the opposite. The results of the two-sample mean and SD (variance) comparison tests are shown in table 3.
Although the mean comparison tests do not reject the hypothesis for one set of paired countries (Australia vs the UK), the remainder do. The rejection of this hypothesis for a majority of the comparisons indicates that countries where tax systems are simpler tend to have higher average prices than countries that impose similar total excise amounts but that have more complicated tax systems. The two-sample SD comparison tests of prices within each development group (HICs vs LMICs) yield similar results: cigarette prices show greater variability in countries where tax structures are more complicated. For example, the specific tiered system of Brazil has a higher SD than the specific uniform system of Uruguay. In particular, when comparing within the uniform tax structure, the mixed system of Mexico has a higher SD than the specific system of Mauritius, and the same conclusion holds for the SD comparison between Australia and the UK. Although the SD comparison of Australia and France suggests the SDs of the two countries are about the same, Australia has a much higher mean price than France. The mixed system of Malaysia has a higher price SD than the pure ad valorem system of Thailand, which suggests that mixed system in LMICs may not be superior to a pure ad valorem system in lowering price variability. The mixed system of France, which relies heavily on the ad valorem component, has a higher SD than The Netherlands, which relies heavily on the specific component. The same conclusions are found when comparing The Netherlands with Germany and Malaysia with Mexico. In sum, more complicated taxation systems tend to have greater price variability, and therefore are likely to provide more opportunities for tax avoidance by brand switching.
In this paper, we employed data for 16 countries taken from the ITC Project to construct survey-derived cigarette prices for each country. These self-reported prices were weighted by cigarette consumption and described using a comprehensive set of statistics. We further compared these statistics for cigarette prices under different tax structures. In particular, countries that are close in the amount of total excise taxes but that impose different tax structures were paired and compared in mean and variance using a two-sample comparison test.
There are a few limitations to these analyses. First, we presented direct evidence of price distribution in countries where different taxation systems are imposed. However, we did not estimate or analyse the associations between the type of tax structure and measures of the price distribution. Therefore, we cannot conduct a formal test of these associations. In addition, tax structures were grouped using two characteristics: the component of specific and ad valorem excise taxes, and if tiered rates are levied. As a result, it is difficult to disentangle the extent to which tiered and ad valorem tax structures distort the price distribution. Finally, we did not explicitly control for various forms of tax avoidance or evasion, such as cross-border shopping. Further research using times series data from many countries with different and changing tax structures is needed to address these limitations.
Our investigation illustrates that, compared with uniform specific taxation, other uniform tax structures (ad valorem uniform and mixed uniform structures) tend to have price distributions with greater variability. Also, compared with uniform taxation, tiered tax structures tend to have price distributions with greater variability. Countries that rely heavily on ad valorem and tiered taxes generally have greater variability in prices around the median. Among mixed taxation systems, countries that rely more heavily on the ad valorem component tend to have greater variability in prices than countries that rely more heavily on the specific component. Among different tax structures that impose similar total excise taxes, simpler structures tend to have higher price means. In countries with tiered tax systems, cigarette prices are more skewed to lower prices than prices under uniform systems.
The analyses presented here demonstrate that when the tax structure departs from uniform specific taxes, more opportunities exist for tax avoidance by switching down to cheaper brands. These results also provide a potential explanation for why smokers in countries with a complicated tax structure, such as China, are often found to be relatively unresponsive to cigarette prices. In light of our findings, countries that solely rely on ad valorem excises would see tax increases have a greater impact on tobacco use if they were to switch to a pure specific taxation system. Similarly, for countries with a mixed taxation system such as Mexico, Malaysia and EU countries, increasing the share of the specific component or switch to a pure specific taxation system would enhance the effectiveness of the tax in reducing tobacco use. Finally, our findings indicate that tax structures have a substantial impact on price variability in cigarette markets, thus likely impacting smoking behaviours, including prevalence, consumption and cessation. Future research should explore how tax structures affect these smoking behaviours.
Economic models have suggested that a simple taxation system that applies a uniform specific excise tax has advantages in raising average cigarette prices, reducing tax avoidance and switching down, and discouraging manufacturer's incentives for pricing strategies that lower market prices. However, there is insufficient empirical evidence on how prices are distributed under different tax structures.
In this paper, we present and compare price distributions under alternative tax structures. We find that, compared with a uniform specific tax structure, tiered structures and other uniform tax structures tend to have price distributions with greater variability.
Among mixed taxation systems, countries that rely more heavily on the ad valorem component of the total tax tend to have greater price variability than countries that rely more heavily on the specific component.
In countries with tiered tax systems, cigarette prices are skewed more towards lower prices than are prices under uniform tax systems.
We would like to thank Anne Chiew Kin Quah for her valuable comments and support.
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BMJ Publishing Group Limited takes no responsibility for the accuracy of the translation from the published English original and is not liable for any errors which may occur.
Contributors The findings and conclusions in this article are those of the authors.
Funding The data collection for the ITC Project is supported by grants R01 CA 100362 and P50 CA111236 (Roswell Park Transdisciplinary Tobacco Use Research Center, and P01 CA138389, R01 CA090955) from the National Cancer Institute of the USA, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (045734), Canadian Institutes of Health Research (57897, 79551 and 115016), Commonwealth Department of Health and Aging, Canadian Tobacco Control Research Initiative (014578), National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia (265903), the International Development Research Centre (104831-002), the International Development Research Centre (African Tobacco Situational Analysis), New Zealand Health Research Council (06/453), New Zealand Ministry of Health, Mexican Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia (Salud-2007-C01-70032), Bloomberg Global Initiative—International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease, the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, the French Institute for Health Promotion and Health Education (INPES), the French National Cancer Institute (INCa), Observatoire français des drogues et toxicomanies (OFDT), The Netherlands Organisation for Health Research and Development (ZonMw) (The Netherlands), German Federal Ministry of Health, Dieter Mennekes-Umweltstiftung and Germany Cancer Research Center (DKFZ), Cancer Research UK (C312/A6465), NHS Health Scotland (RE065), Flight Attendants’ Medical Research Institute (FAMRI), GlaxoSmithkline (3516601), Pfizer (Ireland), the Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare, the Malaysian Ministry of Health and Thai Health Promotion Foundation. A Senior Investigator Award from the Ontario Institute for Cancer Research and a Prevention Scientist Award from the Canadian Cancer Society Research Institute for the third author and the SILNE Project is funded by the European Commission through FP7 HEALTH-F3-2011-278273.
Ethics approval All ITC Surveys were conducted with the approval of the Office of Research Ethics Committee at the University of Waterloo, Canada and the respective internal ethics board for each country.
↵i Ex-factory price means the price at the factory, and does not include any other charges, such as delivery costs or taxes imposed later in the distribution chain.
↵ii These are 2011 surveys of the USA, Canada, Australia, The Netherlands, Germany, Uruguay, Mauritius and Mexico; 2010 surveys of the Republic of Korea, the UK and Bangladesh; 2009 surveys of Brazil, Malaysia, Thailand and China; and the 2008 Survey of France.
↵iii The cigarette price is derived from price per carton, price per pack, price per stick and the number of cigarettes in each carton or pack.
↵iv Throughout the paper, total excises do not include value added taxes (VATs). The amount of ad valorem taxes in China were imputed using the weighted average retail cigarette prices and average VAT and ad valorem tax rates reported in China Statistical Yearbook. The ad valorem tax in Thailand, Malaysia, Mexico and Bangladesh were imputed using ad valorem tax and VAT rates and average cigarette prices. Ad valorem taxes in EU countries were imputed using the ratio of ad valorem to specific components and the amount of specific taxes.
↵v From this point, taxes refer to the taxes for a pack of 20 cigarettes.

lowercased:
background the distribution of cigarette prices has rarely been studied and compared under different tax structures. descriptive evidence on price distributions by countries can shed light on opportunities for tax avoidance and brand switching under different tobacco tax structures, which could impact the effectiveness of increased taxation in reducing smoking.
objective this paper aims to describe the distribution of cigarette prices by countries and to compare these distributions based on the tobacco tax structure in these countries.
methods we employed data for 16 countries taken from the international tobacco control policy evaluation project to construct survey-derived cigarette prices for each country. self-reported prices were weighted by cigarette consumption and described using a comprehensive set of statistics. we then compared these statistics for cigarette prices under different tax structures. in particular, countries of similar income levels and countries that impose similar total excise taxes using different tax structures were paired and compared in mean and variance using a two-sample comparison test.
findings our investigation illustrates that, compared with specific uniform taxation, other tax structures, such as ad valorem uniform taxation, mixed (a tax system using ad valorem and specific taxes) uniform taxation, and tiered tax structures of specific, ad valorem and mixed taxation tend to have price distributions with greater variability. countries that rely heavily on ad valorem and tiered taxes also tend to have greater price variability around the median. among mixed taxation systems, countries that rely more heavily on the ad valorem component tend to have greater price variability than countries that rely more heavily on the specific component. in countries with tiered tax systems, cigarette prices are skewed more towards lower prices than are prices under uniform tax systems. the analyses presented here demonstrate that more opportunities exist for tax avoidance and brand switching when the tax structure departs from a uniform specific tax.
significant increases in cigarette excise taxes have been shown to be the most effective policy for reducing smoking.1 tobacco excise taxes can be levied in two forms: specific and ad valorem taxes. a specific excise tax is a monetary tax levied based on the quantity of tobacco products (eg, per pack or by weight). while an ad valorem excise tax is a tax levied as a percentage of the value of tobacco products (eg, manufacturer's price or retail price).2 although most governments impose certain excise taxes on cigarettes, the structure of these taxes varies markedly by countries. for instance, while many high-income countries (hics) rely solely on specific excise taxes on cigarettes, european union (eu) countries are required by the council of the eu to impose excise taxes consisting of specific and ad valorem components, with a minimum floor. in addition, individual eu countries decide on the share of each component in total taxes under rules stating that the specific component must be between 5% and 76.5% of the total tax share of the weighted average price of cigarettes.2 ,3 as a result, individual eu countries rely differently on the specific and ad valorem components of their total cigarette excise tax.
despite these various excise tax systems, there is a lack of empirical evidence on how cigarette prices, through which taxation ultimately impacts smoking, are distributed in different systems. in particular, for lmics where smoking is prevalent, the importance of tax structure as a factor mediating the effectiveness of tobacco taxation in controlling tobacco use has rarely been studied or discussed. for example, recent studies from china suggest that cigarette demand is relatively unresponsive to price, which might be a result of china’s complicated tiered tax structure that results in very low prices for some brands.5 ,6 therefore, it is important to understand how cigarette prices are associated with tax structures in order to maximise the impact of tobacco taxation on tobacco use.
from an economic perspective, given that the cigarette market is usually dominated by a small number of companies in most countries, cigarette price distributions may largely depend on taxation systems. economic models have implied that, compared with specific excises, ad valorem excises tend to lead to lower prices and may encourage trading down, for example, the purchase of cheaper cigarettes.2 this is because an ad valorem tax structure creates incentives for manufacturers to produce low quality, low price cigarettes. in contrast, specific excises, in the form of taxes or a tax floor, tend to lead to higher prices, in that producers have incentives to raise prices when they can claim all the increased revenue (which is not the case for ad valorem excises). in addition, specific excises would reduce consumers’ incentives to switch down when taxes increase by raising the relative price of lower-price to higher-price brands. in their examination of cigarette prices in 21 eu countries, chaloupka et al7 find that the price gap between premium and low-priced brands is smaller in countries with a greater specific component to excise taxes. however, that study is based on empirical evidence from eu countries that all use mixed taxation systems with different shares of specific and ad valorem taxes and, as a result, cannot directly compare pure specific, pure ad valorem and mixed systems, or tiered and uniform systems. moreover, the price gap in that study is based on prices collected by the economists intelligence unit for one leading international brand and one leading local brand, thus not reflecting the full distribution of cigarette prices in the market. meanwhile, other than the aforementioned reasons, if the relative price of lower-priced brands relative to higher-priced brands increases, the market share of low-priced brands will likely fall. therefore, compared with ad valorem excises, specific excises might lead to even higher prices with less price variability. the empirical evidence on the former hypothesis is shown in studies using data from hics with purely specific tax systems. nargis et al8 used four waves of data from the international tobacco control policy evaluation (itc) surveys in canada and the usa to examine the association between brand choice and relative prices and found that an increase in the relative price of lower-priced to higher-priced brands is associated with a decrease in purchasing of lower-priced brands in both countries. sobel and garrett9 also found that increases in the specific taxes in the usa lead to a lower market share for lower-priced generic brands.
several factors other than tax structures, such as tax avoidance and tax evasion, are likely to shape the cigarette price distribution as well. in some countries, taxes on tobacco are levied differently across jurisdictions such as states, provinces and indian reservations. therefore, cross-national-border and cross-jurisdiction-border shopping is one way to avoid taxes. for instance, in canada and the usa, some excise taxes are exempted in aboriginal reserves and native american reservations.1 in a recent paper merriman17 assessed the extent of avoidance/evasion by collecting littered cigarette packs around chicago, and found that three-fourths of the packs collected in chicago did not bear the chicago tax stamp. using data from 15 itc countries, guindon et al18 found that more than 10% of smokers report engaging in tax avoidance or tax evasion in canada, the uk and malaysia.
tax evasion, such as large-scale smuggling, could also contribute to an increase in the share of low-priced cigarettes. although there is insufficient evidence that large-scale smuggling lowers average retail prices, some research has indicated that illicit trade could burden low-income countries disproportionately, where illicit cigarettes constitute 16.8% of the market compared with 9.8% of the market in hics.19 the cigarette prices that we examine in this paper are survey-derived prices that reflect the combined effects of tax structures, tax avoidance and tax evasion. although it is impossible in this study to disentangle the contribution of each to the distribution of cigarette prices, we hypothesise that the tax structure plays the most important role in cross-country differences in the price distribution. moreover, unlike tax evasion and tax avoidance by switching to cheaper cigarettes, which may have a greater effect on prices at the lower end, differences in tax structures would have an effect in shifting the overall distribution of cigarette prices.
in summary, a greater price gap among brands could reduce the effectiveness of taxation in reducing tobacco use by increasing opportunities for substitution to cheaper brands as taxes rise. among many tax structures, the uniform specific tax structure simplifies the taxation system and has advantages in raising the average prices and the relative price of lower-priced to higher-priced cigarettes. as a result, a uniform tax structure can increase the effectiveness of tax increases in reducing smoking.1 therefore, analysing the price distribution using survey-derived data will add to the empirical evidence on how price distributions and gaps differ under alternative tax structures. tax structures that lead to higher average prices and smaller price gaps can lead to a more effective tax system for reducing smoking. in this paper, we use data taken from 16 countries of the itc project, which cover many types of tax structures, to describe and compare cigarette price distributions across different tax structures.
cigarette prices were derived for each country using the most recent data from the itc project surveys.ii the itc project consists of parallel longitudinal surveys of smokers and other tobacco users (and non-users in most countries) conducted in 22 countries inhabited by more than 50% of the world’s population, 60% of the world’s smokers and 70% of the world’s tobacco users. the itc surveys are designed to evaluate the policies of the who framework convention on tobacco control.20 for the analyses reported in this paper, we selected itc countries where cigarette purchase information was collected from smokers. the price per pack of 20 cigarettes was thereafter derived from the money spent in the last purchase and the number of cigarettes that were bought.iii in order to compare prices and their distributions across countries, we converted the derived prices in local currencies into constant 2010 international dollars using the purchasing-power parity and consumer price index of the country. purchasing-power parity conversion factors and the consumer price index for each country were obtained from the international monetary fund world economic outlook database. in order to reflect the market share of cigarettes at different price levels, we use consumption weights to obtain aggregated measures of cigarette prices. namely, for each individual smoker, we calculate how many cigarettes they smoke per day and construct a consumption weight as the ratio of his or her own consumption to the total consumption of respondents to the survey. these consumption weights are applied to cigarette prices when reporting mean, median and quartile prices.
survey-derived prices are likely to better reflect the price distribution in the market than are other sources of prices, especially when we are interested in comparing the price distribution under different tax systems.21 these comparisons shed some light on the association between tax structure and price distribution, and resulting opportunities for tax avoidance under different structures. as discussed above, the tax structure could be exclusively specific, ad valorem, or a mixture of the two. alternatively, taxes can also be levied uniformly or by tiers. economic reasoning implies that tax structures with tiers or that rely more heavily on ad valorem excises will yield more opportunities for tax avoidance and branch switching. in the itc project sample of countries, a majority rely on uniform taxes, with only brazil, republic of korea, china and bangladesh applying tiered taxes. most non-eu hics including the usa, canada, australia and republic of korea, and some lmics including brazil, uruguay and mauritius solely rely on specific excises. in contrast, bangladesh and thailand rely on purely ad valorem excises; and china, malaysia and eu countries apply mixed systems of specific and ad valorem excises, while individual countries may largely rely on one of the components.
the analyses in this paper proceed as follows: in table 1, after ranking countries by tax structure, the percentage of the specific component among the total excise tax, and the amount of total excise taxes, we present comprehensive statistics for price distribution by countries. in particular, mean, median, sd and skewness of prices are reported to show how much prices are skewed towards lower prices under alternative tax structures. the first quartile, third quartile and iqr, which is measured by the difference between the first and third quartile, are also reported. in addition, we calculate and show the ratio of the iqr to the median, which shows price variability around the median price. other important statistics such as the minimum price, maximum price, price range and the ratio of the price range to the mean are also shown in table 1. also, in figure 1, we exhibit price distributions by countries using boxplot to visualise the statistics that are reported in table 1 and to present the price distribution and variability in one graph. in table 2 we show, by tax structure, countries where prices are skewed in different directions and those where prices are most heavily skewed (skewness statistics are greater than 1 or smaller than −1). finally, in table 3 we select and pair countries that are close in income levels and in the amount of total excise tax but that employ different tax structures, in order to compare their mean and variance using a two-sample comparison test.
boxplot of cigarette price distributions by country. au (australia), ca (canada), mu (mauritius), us (the usa), uy (uruguay), kr (republic of korea), br (brazil), nl (the netherlands), my (malaysia), uk (the uk), de (germany), mx (mexico), fr (france), rc (china), th (thailand) and bd (bangladesh).
in table 1, we categorise countries by their tax structures and the percentage of specific taxes among total excise taxes; vats are excluded. among countries with a mixed uniform tax structure, the netherlands has the largest share of the specific component while france has the smallest (range: 9.4–67.3%). although china imposes a small specific excise, the system largely relies on the tiered ad valorem component. and in general, for countries that impose a similar amount of total excises, those with simpler tax structures tend to have higher average prices. for instance, mauritius and mexico impose total excises of $2.45 and $2.29, respectively, but the mean price for mauritius which uses a uniform specific tax structure is $1.29 higher than mexico where a mixed tax structure is used. among eu countries, the netherlands and france impose total excises of $3.37 and $3.80, respectively, while the netherlands with a larger specific share has a mean price $0.49 higher than france, which has a larger ad valorem share. the skewness statistics show that in countries where tiered taxes are applied, prices are more likely positively skewed, indicating that there are fewer higher prices in the distribution. in contrast, most countries with a uniform tax structure have skewness statistics close to 0, suggesting prices are relatively symmetric. when comparing malaysia and mexico, where a mixed structure is applied in both cases but malaysia has a larger share of the specific tax component, more prices in mexico are lower while more prices in malaysia are higher.
the ratio of the iqr to the median reported in table 1 shows how prices deviate around the median. in countries with a purely ad valorem tax system, such as bangladesh and thailand, and china, which largely employs ad valorem taxation, this ratio is as high as 0.51–0.89, which suggests greater price variability around median prices. on the other hand, other than uruguay, the usa and canada where cross-jurisdiction shopping opportunities are relatively available, countries with mixed and specific uniform structures tend to have prices that vary less around the median, with ratios less than 0.25. when looking into the price range measured by the distance between the maximum and minimum prices, there is no clear pattern by different structures. however, if we compare how great the range is in contrast to the mean, the results indicate that the range is six to nine times as large as the mean in bangladesh, china and brazil, where taxes are levied by tiers, while other countries have ratios in the range of 1–4. in addition, china has a price range of $17.6, which is extremely wide compared with its average price.
table 2 summarises countries by comparing mean and median prices, as well as the skewness of prices. in the upper panel, we report countries where the mean price is higher than the median and those where the price mean is lower than the median, respectively. in contrast to the median, a higher mean suggests a positively-skewed price distribution that prices concentrate at lower values; and a lower mean suggests the opposite. these measures show that among the seven countries with the purely specific tax structure, four countries have mean prices larger than the median and three have mean prices smaller than the median. however, the mean and median prices are very close in magnitude for most countries with a specific tax structure. the skewness statistics reported in the lower panel show that prices are largely skewed to lower values in china, brazil, mexico, bangladesh and republic of korea, where either tiered or ad valorem taxes (ad valorem component in mixed structures) are applied. this finding suggests that tiered and ad valorem taxes may distort cigarette prices towards lower values, increasing opportunities for switching to cheaper cigarettes as tax increases. in addition, prices are heavily skewed to lower values in the usa, which might reflect tax avoidance by cross-jurisdiction shopping.
finally, we select and pair countries that are close in the amount of total excise taxes but that use different tax structures, to compare their mean and variance using a two-sample comparison test. the selected country pairs are as follows: for lmics, uruguay (specific uniform) and brazil (specific tiered) are paired to compare uniform and tiered tax structures; mauritius (specific uniform) and mexico (mixed uniform) are paired to compare specific and mixed structures; malaysia and thailand are paired to compare mixed and ad valorem uniform structures; and malaysia and mexico are paired to compare mixed structures with different shares of specific components. for hics, australia and the uk/france are paired to compare specific and mixed uniform structures. in addition, the netherlands and france/germany are paired to compare mixed systems dominated by specific and ad valorem components, respectively. the hypotheses that more complicated tax structures tend to have a higher price mean and present a smaller price variance are tested, with the rejection of these hypotheses suggesting the opposite. the results of the two-sample mean and sd (variance) comparison tests are shown in table 3.
although the mean comparison tests do not reject the hypothesis for one set of paired countries (australia vs the uk), the remainder do. the rejection of this hypothesis for a majority of the comparisons indicates that countries where tax systems are simpler tend to have higher average prices than countries that impose similar total excise amounts but that have more complicated tax systems. the two-sample sd comparison tests of prices within each development group (hics vs lmics) yield similar results: cigarette prices show greater variability in countries where tax structures are more complicated. for example, the specific tiered system of brazil has a higher sd than the specific uniform system of uruguay. in particular, when comparing within the uniform tax structure, the mixed system of mexico has a higher sd than the specific system of mauritius, and the same conclusion holds for the sd comparison between australia and the uk. although the sd comparison of australia and france suggests the sds of the two countries are about the same, australia has a much higher mean price than france. the mixed system of malaysia has a higher price sd than the pure ad valorem system of thailand, which suggests that mixed system in lmics may not be superior to a pure ad valorem system in lowering price variability. the mixed system of france, which relies heavily on the ad valorem component, has a higher sd than the netherlands, which relies heavily on the specific component. the same conclusions are found when comparing the netherlands with germany and malaysia with mexico. in sum, more complicated taxation systems tend to have greater price variability, and therefore are likely to provide more opportunities for tax avoidance by brand switching.
in this paper, we employed data for 16 countries taken from the itc project to construct survey-derived cigarette prices for each country. these self-reported prices were weighted by cigarette consumption and described using a comprehensive set of statistics. we further compared these statistics for cigarette prices under different tax structures. in particular, countries that are close in the amount of total excise taxes but that impose different tax structures were paired and compared in mean and variance using a two-sample comparison test.
there are a few limitations to these analyses. first, we presented direct evidence of price distribution in countries where different taxation systems are imposed. however, we did not estimate or analyse the associations between the type of tax structure and measures of the price distribution. therefore, we cannot conduct a formal test of these associations. in addition, tax structures were grouped using two characteristics: the component of specific and ad valorem excise taxes, and if tiered rates are levied. as a result, it is difficult to disentangle the extent to which tiered and ad valorem tax structures distort the price distribution. finally, we did not explicitly control for various forms of tax avoidance or evasion, such as cross-border shopping. further research using times series data from many countries with different and changing tax structures is needed to address these limitations.
our investigation illustrates that, compared with uniform specific taxation, other uniform tax structures (ad valorem uniform and mixed uniform structures) tend to have price distributions with greater variability. also, compared with uniform taxation, tiered tax structures tend to have price distributions with greater variability. countries that rely heavily on ad valorem and tiered taxes generally have greater variability in prices around the median. among mixed taxation systems, countries that rely more heavily on the ad valorem component tend to have greater variability in prices than countries that rely more heavily on the specific component. among different tax structures that impose similar total excise taxes, simpler structures tend to have higher price means. in countries with tiered tax systems, cigarette prices are more skewed to lower prices than prices under uniform systems.
the analyses presented here demonstrate that when the tax structure departs from uniform specific taxes, more opportunities exist for tax avoidance by switching down to cheaper brands. these results also provide a potential explanation for why smokers in countries with a complicated tax structure, such as china, are often found to be relatively unresponsive to cigarette prices. in light of our findings, countries that solely rely on ad valorem excises would see tax increases have a greater impact on tobacco use if they were to switch to a pure specific taxation system. similarly, for countries with a mixed taxation system such as mexico, malaysia and eu countries, increasing the share of the specific component or switch to a pure specific taxation system would enhance the effectiveness of the tax in reducing tobacco use. finally, our findings indicate that tax structures have a substantial impact on price variability in cigarette markets, thus likely impacting smoking behaviours, including prevalence, consumption and cessation. future research should explore how tax structures affect these smoking behaviours.
economic models have suggested that a simple taxation system that applies a uniform specific excise tax has advantages in raising average cigarette prices, reducing tax avoidance and switching down, and discouraging manufacturer's incentives for pricing strategies that lower market prices. however, there is insufficient empirical evidence on how prices are distributed under different tax structures.
in this paper, we present and compare price distributions under alternative tax structures. we find that, compared with a uniform specific tax structure, tiered structures and other uniform tax structures tend to have price distributions with greater variability.
among mixed taxation systems, countries that rely more heavily on the ad valorem component of the total tax tend to have greater price variability than countries that rely more heavily on the specific component.
in countries with tiered tax systems, cigarette prices are skewed more towards lower prices than are prices under uniform tax systems.
we would like to thank anne chiew kin quah for her valuable comments and support.
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bmj publishing group limited takes no responsibility for the accuracy of the translation from the published english original and is not liable for any errors which may occur.
contributors the findings and conclusions in this article are those of the authors.
funding the data collection for the itc project is supported by grants r01 ca 100362 and p50 ca111236 (roswell park transdisciplinary tobacco use research center, and p01 ca138389, r01 ca090955) from the national cancer institute of the usa, robert wood johnson foundation (045734), canadian institutes of health research (57897, 79551 and 115016), commonwealth department of health and aging, canadian tobacco control research initiative (014578), national health and medical research council of australia (265903), the international development research centre (104831-002), the international development research centre (african tobacco situational analysis), new zealand health research council (06/453), new zealand ministry of health, mexican consejo nacional de ciencia y tecnologia (salud-2007-c01-70032), bloomberg global initiative—international union against tuberculosis and lung disease, the chinese center for disease control and prevention, the french institute for health promotion and health education (inpes), the french national cancer institute (inca), observatoire français des drogues et toxicomanies (ofdt), the netherlands organisation for health research and development (zonmw) (the netherlands), german federal ministry of health, dieter mennekes-umweltstiftung and germany cancer research center (dkfz), cancer research uk (c312/a6465), nhs health scotland (re065), flight attendants’ medical research institute (famri), glaxosmithkline (3516601), pfizer (ireland), the korean ministry of health and welfare, the malaysian ministry of health and thai health promotion foundation. a senior investigator award from the ontario institute for cancer research and a prevention scientist award from the canadian cancer society research institute for the third author and the silne project is funded by the european commission through fp7 health-f3-2011-278273.
ethics approval all itc surveys were conducted with the approval of the office of research ethics committee at the university of waterloo, canada and the respective internal ethics board for each country.
↵i ex-factory price means the price at the factory, and does not include any other charges, such as delivery costs or taxes imposed later in the distribution chain.
↵ii these are 2011 surveys of the usa, canada, australia, the netherlands, germany, uruguay, mauritius and mexico; 2010 surveys of the republic of korea, the uk and bangladesh; 2009 surveys of brazil, malaysia, thailand and china; and the 2008 survey of france.
↵iii the cigarette price is derived from price per carton, price per pack, price per stick and the number of cigarettes in each carton or pack.
↵iv throughout the paper, total excises do not include value added taxes (vats). the amount of ad valorem taxes in china were imputed using the weighted average retail cigarette prices and average vat and ad valorem tax rates reported in china statistical yearbook. the ad valorem tax in thailand, malaysia, mexico and bangladesh were imputed using ad valorem tax and vat rates and average cigarette prices. ad valorem taxes in eu countries were imputed using the ratio of ad valorem to specific components and the amount of specific taxes.
↵v from this point, taxes refer to the taxes for a pack of 20 cigarettes.