69933
document
The effect of power asymmetries on cooperation and punishment in a prisoner 's dilemma game . Recent work has suggested that punishment is detrimental because punishment provokes retaliation , not cooperation , resulting in lower overall payoffs . These findings may stem from the unrealistic assumption that all players are equal : in reality individuals are expected to vary in the power with which they can punish defectors . Here , we allowed strong players to interact with weak players in an iterated prisoner 's dilemma game with punishment . Defecting players were most likely to switch to cooperation if the partner cooperated : adding punishment yielded no additional benefit and , under some circumstances , increased the chance that the partner would both defect and retaliate against the punisher . Our findings show that , in a two-player game , cooperation begets cooperation and that punishment does not seem to yield any additional benefits . Further work should explore whether strong punishers might prevail in multi-player games .
69934
Intervention_Educational
cooperation and punishment
69935
Intervention_Educational
prisoner 's dilemma game
69936
Intervention_Educational
punishment
69937
Intervention_Educational
iterated prisoner 's dilemma game with punishment .
69938
Intervention_Educational
punishment
69939
Intervention_Educational
two-player game
69940
Outcome_Other
cooperation and punishment in a prisoner 's dilemma game
69941
Outcome_Other
cooperation
69942
Participant_Condition
power asymmetries
69943
Participant_Condition
iterated prisoner 's dilemma game