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Interbranch Politics: The Administrative Office of U.S. Courts as Liaison

This essay is a study of the role of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) as a strategic intermediary in contemporary judicial branch lobbying before Congress. No research to date systematically treats the nature of its liaison role. The essay focuses on five initiatives adopted by the Judicial Conference and pursued by the AO legislative affairs office. The issue of courthouse construction is examined in particular depth because it bears directly on the internal management of the federal courts, uniquely involves both the legislative and executive branches, and represents a centerpiece of the Conference's and AO's 1990s legislative agenda.