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Justifications and Limitations for Adopting Divergent Competition Policy and Law in Emerging Economies

Various approaches have been suggested in the literature for incorporating developmental variances into the design of competition policy for emerging economies. For example, unlike developed economies, emerging economies must prioritize the industries for investigations and continue to emphasize competition advocacy to activate popular interest in competition issues. We address this topic and elaborate on the likely responses to the challenges of accounting for developmental variances when constructing competition policies and rules tailored for the needs of emerging economies. We categorize the features that might prompt emerging economies to follow regulatory paths distinct from those of developed economies into economic (e.g., a smaller market scale) and noneconomic (e.g., corruption or cronyism) features. Based on this categorization, we show how the study of developmental variances can contribute to the formulation of competition policy that meets the needs of emerging economies. Furthermore, unique economic and noneconomic features could also influence how specific reviewing standards are developed. For example, the lack of sufficient enforcement expertise and resources in emerging economies could cause enforcement agencies to favor the per se rule over the rule of reason. We conclude this paper by discussing certain limitations for the preliminary findings and by proposing the likely implications for the studies of this topic.