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But Power and Wealth are Satisfying

The authors of "Power Is Not Satisfaction" (Lemke and Reed 1998 [this issue]) take us to task for suggesting that power transition theory is internally inconsistent. Despite their arguments and empirical analyses, we continue to believe that the theory suffers from important, unresolved conceptual problems. The authors are right that these are not trivial issues because substantial research, including our own, indicates that transition theory contributes importantly to our understanding of the causes of war. According to the theory, there is a heightened danger of war when a dissatisfied challenger overtakes the dominant state in the international system. We suggested that the theory presents an inconsistent view because it does not clearly identify which states will be dissatisfied or why. On one hand, Organski (1968, 365) says that a hegemon "always benefits disproportionately from any enterprises involving less powerful states, be theyfriends orfoes" (emphasis added). This suggests that all states less powerful than the hegemon will be dissatisfied to a degree-at least if national leaders, like most individuals, resent one party to an enterprise benefiting disproportionately. On the other hand, for a transition to occur, a potential challenger must be growing economically more rapidly than the hegemon. If national leaders value wealth and power, as most seem to do, it is unclear why a state experiencing such success would be dissatisfied.