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Unorthodox Liberalism, Democracy, and Post‐Liberal Distributional Coalitions: The Case of Turkey

Following the gradual restoration of democracy between 1983 and 1987, Turkey started to manifest signs of unorthodox liberalism. Trade, capital, price liberalization, and export expansion went hand‐in‐hand with macroeconomic imbalances: high inflation, large budget deficit, and public debt. These features reestablished the Turkish state as the center of distributional coalitions under party democracy. This paper argues that the Turkish state elites sustained further liberal reforms and export expansion under democracy in response to distributional pressures exerted by their electoral constituencies. Accordingly, the motive for further reform was the creation of a productive basis for the delivery of side payments.