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Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo: Regional Deterrence and the International Arms Control Regime

disarmament treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which sought to implement universal constraints on the inevitable rise of other nuclear weapon states. More enlightening is the evidence Ayson canvasses in his reading of Bull’s views on intervention in the Third World. This does much to counter the entrenched views of some English School theorists, who have taken Bull’s Grotian concept of an international society as a normative justification for intervention on humanitarian grounds. Bull, as Ayson argues, was heavily against intervention, particularly since it reinforced ‘Western’ human rights on Third World nations. Bull was also strenuously opposed to cosmopolitanism, which he read as the spread of Judeo-Christian values, preferring instead to focus on modernity. This was a more inclusive process that emphasised the benefits of technological and economic progress. The job of the international society, then, was to accommodate that progress. Thus, the interests of developed nations were not framed in moral or economic terms. For Bull, a more equal distribution of resources between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ was essential in maintaining a stable and ‘just’ international order. Ayson’s treatment is generally very skilful. What is missing from the book is the link between Bull’s views on strategic studies and his small yet astute writings on the Third World. Had Ayson made this connection, we would arguably have gained a much more nuanced appreciation of Bull’s thinking than is apparent in The Anarchical Society (1977). More detail on Bull’s views about multipolarism and the strategic balance of the AsiaPacific would also have gone some way towards redressing what in Australia has become a childish debate on how to respond to a rising China. Ayson points out that in the 1970s, Bull was scornful of policy makers’ tendencies to let ideology and fear of imagined threats colour Australia’s approach towards its relations with all the great powers in its region, identified here as China, Russia, the USA and Japan. However, Ayson is reluctant to draw out these conclusions. Had he done so, it would have increased the analytical scope of the book, not to mention the appropriateness of revisiting Bull’s work for assisting our understanding of contemporary security politics. This said, Ayson’s book makes an especially valuable contribution in helping the reader to appreciate more fully the work of one of Australia’s most notable international relations scholars. It reveals Bull’s notion that nuclear weapons were a central feature of the balance of power, which was imperative in maintaining international order (and therefore international society). This important observation has become lost in the often facile contest between solidarists and pluralists about which side of the English School fence Bull sits on. Those searching for clarity on that debate should look elsewhere. But the scholar seeking to better understand the thinking behind the work of a significant figure in international relations will find Ayson’s book highly rewarding.