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Utility-Optimal Partial Spectrum Leasing for Future Wireless Services

One of the challenges facing the next-generation wireless networks is to cope with the expected demand for data. This calls for an efficient spectrum regulation that can enable mobile subscribers to support high quality of service (QoS) and mobile network operators (MNOs) to leverage their profit streams. In this paper, we present a new spectrum allocation policy in a monopoly situation. The problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game. We show that the conventional spectrum leasing contract may lead to the unprecedented scenario in which costs outweigh their revenues. On the other hand, our proposed spectrum leasing contract can not only maximize user welfare but also leverage MNO's profit streams. We show that our spectrum leasing contract can increase user welfare and MNO's profit up to 75% and 20%, respectively, relative to the conventional spectrum leasing contract. Thus, regulators must rewrite their spectrum allocation policy in order to maximize user welfare and leverage MNO's profit streams.