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Comparing inclusion in constitution-making in Egypt, Tunisia, and Iraq

ABSTRACT During political transition, creating support across societal groups for a new political system is key to facilitate transition to a stable regime with functioning governance. Institutional design literature asserts that inclusion of key societal groups in institutional frameworks is central to create such support. However, empirical evidence to date does not clearly verify or refute this claim. A survey of the literature reveals an implicit distinction between de jure and de facto inclusion that has not been sufficiently differentiated or systematically examined. Based on a review of existing studies, this article makes the theoretical assertion that de jure inclusion alone, without de facto inclusion, is insufficient to build support for a political system. This theoretical claim is illustrated using two cases of recent constitution-making in North Africa (Egypt and Tunisia) and one in the Middle East (Iraq). The cases provide preliminary confirmation for the study’s theoretical assertion that de jure inclusion is insufficient to build political support. The findings suggest that a combination of de jure and de facto inclusion may be sufficient to create political support.