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On the Political Economy of Democratic Stabilization and Pacification in South America

1 In the liberal concept of a " democratic civil peace " , an idealistic understanding of democratic stabilization and pacification prevails: Democracy is seen to guarantee political stability and social peace by offering comprehensive representation and participation in political decisions while producing outcomes broadly in accordance with the common interest of society. This contrasts with the procedural quality and the material achievements of most, if not all, really existing democracies. South America is a paradigmatic case: Here, the legitimation of liberal democracy through both procedure and performance is weak and yet 'third wave democracies' have managed to survive even harsh economic and political crises. The paper presents a conceptual framework to analyze historically specific patterns of democratic stabilization and pacification. A comparative analysis of the processes of socio-political de-and re-stabilization in Argentina and Ecuador since the late 1990s shows how a 'de-idealized' perspective on the democratic civil peace helps explain the viability of democratic regimes that systematically deviate from the ideal-type conditions for democratic survival that have been proposed in the literature.