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The Bonn Agreement and Marrakesh Accords: an updated analysis

This report updates RIVM's earlier evaluation of the Bonn Agreement by incorporating the impacts taken up in the Marrakesh Accords. Compared to our previous report, the impact on both the environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency is rather limited. The main decision in Marrakesh involved the additional 15 MtC of Russian sinks from forest management. This will increase hot air supply by about 5 per cent and decrease the permit price by US$1/tC compared to our earlier calculations. In terms of CO 2 equivalents, the Marrakesh Accords bring Annex I emissions in 2010 without the US a ½ per cent under base year levels; this is not the same as compared to the 1990-level. If CO 2 removals through sinks are seen as efforts additional to emission reductions to capture the overall effect on atmospheric CO 2 built-up, the decrease of a ½ per cent would run up to over 4 per cent under base year levels. The intention of Kazakhstan to join the Kyoto Protocol has little impact on the outcome of the evaluation; it will lead to more supply of hot air and hence further increase pressure on permit prices. Putting the results of our updated evaluation in perspective, we see that Annex I abatement efforts relative to baseline emissions vary from 0 to 3 per cent, depending on the baseline scenario. If removals through sinks are again seen as additional to emission reductions, this range would increase to nearly 6 per cent. Lower baseline emissions than in the A1B-scenario forecast an oversupply of permits that pushes the permit price towards zero and undermines the development of an emission trading market. Our updated evaluation underlines one of the main conclusions from our previous report that without US participation, banking large amounts of hot air is of absolute importance to improve the environmental effectiveness of the Protocol and enhance the development of a viable emissions trading market. A strategy of curtailing and banking permit supply is also in the interest of the dominant seller, in this case the Annex I FSU region. Banking all of the hot air will increase Annex I abatement efforts to over 8 per cent below baseline emissions in the reference scenario. Banking will also raise the permit price, most likely to a level between US$15/tC and US$20/tC.