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Is Knowledge of the Tax Law Socially Desirable?

This paper considers whether knowledge of the tax law is socially desirable. Unlike other laws, which most often attempt to channel behavior, revenue-raising taxes attempt to avoid changing behavior; so, it is not obvious whether or when knowledge of the tax law is desirable. I argue that whether knowledge of the tax law is desirable depends on three factors: expectations about the tax in the absence of knowledge, the type of tax, and the quality of the tax. These factors may often be hard to observe, which leads to the conclusion that it may often not be desirable to try to manipulate knowledge of the tax law. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.