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The Place of Suspension and Problems for Evidentialism

Chapter 3 explains what it is to suspend judgment, and how such suspension attains normative status. Problems are raised for a competing view, strict evidentialism, and virtue-theoretic solutions are offered for those problems. This chapter takes some first steps towards an epistemology of suspension within the framework of telic virtue epistemology. It is argued that epistemic negligence and recklessness are hard to square with evidentialist epistemology, and that telic normativity provide the right framework for them. Within this framework judgment and judgmental knowledge are agential in a way that comports well with epistemic negligence and recklessness.