{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.012376237623762377, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0049504950495049506, 'mean_word_length': 5.741666666666666, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Peer to Peer Lending Supervision Analysis base on Evolutionary Game Theory

Aiming at the current market situation of China P2P industry, this work establishes the evolutionary game model between regulator and P2P lending enterprises, and analyzes the dynamic game characteristics between them. Research results show that strengthening the punishment force for the illegal P2P lending enterprises is beneficial to construct a stable and excellent balance. Setting up reasonable system, suitable reward and punishment mechanism, decreasing supervision cost, increasing the utility of the regulators, can achieve a satisfying game balance. This work can provide theory base and reference for the financial regulators to legislate the supervision policies and design relative rules for the P2P lending platform.