What Next in Syria?

The April 14 US, UK and France joint strikes in Syria and the heated debates in the UN Security Council just before and after the military action once more emphasized the growing disagreements between Russia and the Western powers on Syria. However, the targeted and limited military strikes have no ability to alter the course of the conflict.

Since the launch of the Russian military operation in September 2015, Syrian government forces, with the active support of Russian and Iranian units, have made tangible successes, including the establishment of full control over Aleppo and pushing back rebel groups from the suburbs of Damascus. The US-led coalition and the Syrian Democratic forces, comprised mainly of Kurdish fighters, have gained ground against the Islamic State and currently control almost a third of Syrian territory. Turkey, for its part, through the Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch operations, controls large swathes of territory in North Western Syria, effectively pushing backs Kurdish forces. At present, the Syrian battlefield comprises four main areas: Syrian government-controlled territories where both Russia and Iran exert significant influence; the Idlib province where several rebel groups, supported mainly by Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, are competing with each other; Northeastern Syria, which is controlled by Syrian Democratic forces and where some 2000 US special forces are deployed along with small UK and France units; and the territories in northwestern Syria de facto under Turkish dominance.

Since the late 2016/beginning of 2017, the Syrian conflict has gone through a serious transformation, becoming less about the fight against the Islamic State or the struggle between Syrian government forces and various rebel groups. The two main battlefields have emerged in the last year: the Turkish fight against Kurdish forces in Northern Syria and growing tensions between Iran and Israel. By making an alliance with Iran and Russia, Turkey managed to receive Russia’s tacit support as well as to neutralize a possible backlash against its de facto occupation of northwestern Syria, in return turning a blind eye to the Syrian government and pro-Iranian force advancements in Aleppo and territories around Damascus. It is unlikely Turkey will agree to Pro-Assad forces entering the Idlib province. Turkey controls some Islamist groups deployed there and their defeat will significantly impact Turkey’s ability to shape the post-civil war political construction of Syria.

Now, Turkey is seeking ways to come to terms with the US and expand its military operation towards northeastern Syria. The top target for Turkey is the Manbij, which is under the control of US and Kurdish forces. Turkey demands the US push back Kurdish military units from the town and is offering to establish a joint US-Turkish force to patrol the city. If successful, Turkey will make attempts to move further to the East and reach the main Kurdish stronghold Haseke.

Russia sees two advantages in a Turkish incursion into Kurdish controlled northern Syria. By encouraging Turkey’s advancements against the Kurds, Russia hopes to drive a wedge between Turkey and the US. Given the Turkish-Iranian rivalry in the region, Russia perceives the growing Turkish influence in Syria as a potential leverage against Tehran which Russia may use as a trump card during negotiations with Iran, reflecting the future contours of political settlement as well as the role of Russian and Iranian companies during the potential reconstruction process.

The strategic goal of Iran is to further expand its influence in Syria through the establishment and development of permanent military bases as well as small and medium factories producing light armaments, including mid-range missiles which can target Israeli territory from the Hezbollah strongholds in Lebanon. Iran will continue to heavily rely on non-state military groups comprised of Shia fighters brought from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq under the operational control of the elite Iranian Quds force. Iran uses its entrenched military presence in Syria to establish a direct arms supply line to Hezbollah units deployed in Lebanon, as well as to put additional pressure on Israel from the Syrian territory. Iran also supports President Assad’s bid to regain control over the Idlib province, which put Iran at odds with Turkey. The Iranian vision of restoring Assad’s influence over the whole country also goes against Russian plans to seek an “exit strategy” and freeze the conflict while keeping its military bases in Tartus and Khmeimim.

The growing Iranian military presence in Syria is one of the key concerns for Israel. Through its military bases and small factories, Iran now enjoys efficient means to provide Hezbollah with sophisticated arms, including more precise and mid-range missiles which can be used against Israel in case of another Israel Hezbollah war. Iran also has an opportunity to directly threaten Israel from Syrian territory, thus opening a second front against Tel Aviv. Simultaneously, Iranian-backed armed groups are starting to target US forces deployed in northeastern Syria. The Baqir Brigade, one of a number of Iranian-backed militias operating in Syria, announced on April 6 that it would launch military and jihadi operations against “the US occupier and all those affiliated with it in Syria.”

Given the President Trump administration policy of containing Iran and countering its influence in the Middle East, Iranian presence in Syria is a source of grave concern for Washington. Syria may become one of the starting points for the Iran containment policy and in this context the complete withdrawal of US forces from northeastern Syria is less likely. Given the existential threat posed by Turkey, if the US withdraws, the Kurdish forces will most likely cut a deal with the Syrian government and Iran to protect themselves from further Turkish advancements, which will only foster the Iranian influence, something which is unacceptable for Washington.

The possible deployment of Saudi forces in northeastern Syria to replace American units and prevent both Turkish advancement and the potential Kurd-Assad-Iran deal may bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the brink of direct conflict. The Saudis also will face tremendous pressure from Turkey to let them in. The Turkish military presence in Kurdish populated areas may create a new conflict between Turkish forces and Kurdish Peshmerga, with the active involvement of Iran-backed military groups, which may use the turmoil to target Saudi units.

The US will keep some military units in northeastern Syria and will seek coordinated actions with Israel against Iranian influence. As for Turkey-US disagreements over the fate of Kurdish controlled territories, Washington will not let Turley move deeper into the Syrian northeast, simultaneously turning a blind eye to the de facto occupation by Turkey of northwestern Syria.

Thus, the initial movement for reforms in Syria later has been transformed into a military uprising and civil war with the influx of foreign jihadi fighters and establishment of the Islamic State. Now, Syria faces another shift in its conflict pattern: Syria has become a battlefield for a proxy war by global and regional actors, which makes any hope for conflict settlement less and less relevant.

Dr. Benyamin Poghosyan is the Executive Director of the Political Science Association of Armenia. @benyamin_poghos

By Benyamin Poghosyan

23 April 2018 18:49