The Future of the Combat Outpost



















8 thoughts on “The Future of the Combat Outpost”

  1. One strategy that was at least partially successful in Vietnam was Mike Forces. A similar solution was used in Korea with the Katusa forces.

    This is just me spitballing here but I think is I was in charge I would recruit locals into the US Army as an auxillary force for a 2 year term. I would put one or two Special Forces guys at a COP with a platoon of local strikers. Split an A-Team across a 6 COP area. Of course they would have to be thoroughly vetted but it would increase integration with the locals and and extend forces. It would really be nice if we could send potential NCOs back to the states to go thru branch schools and then work a deal for them to transfer to the Afghan Army at increased rank after their two years were over. Boot strap the process. The important thing is they would be in the US Army subject to the UCMJ getting the same pay. Build loyalty thru exposure.

    1. Interesting concept. Less the SF part, who knows, it could be workable. I acknowledge that it is a traditional SF role; however, given their increased operational tempo, and the regular army’s growing role in security force assistance, this would easily be a conventional force role.

    2. I’ll have to give that concept some thought. But off the top of my head, one difference is that in both Korea and Vietnam, we were invited into support an existing allied government, so the appearance of occupation and hence collaboration were lessened. But it is certainly worth burning up a few brain cells thinking about it.

    3. If we are going to engage in “nation building” then something along those lines needs to be done. They need a core of people that look to the nation rather than tribe or clan. It will involve some people getting out of their comfort zone, but doing what we are doing now will simply result in leaving behind a small group of dependents that will be swallowed whole by the islamocrazies when they take over again.

    4. Speaking only for Iraq here, there are several fundamental problems with this approach. First, with the local nationals providing part of the support. We started to apply this concept, to a limited degree, in 09 after the June 30th expiration of the SOFA, even a little before that. I remember that patrols were preferably conducted with an IP presence. After June 30th, we were not allowed outside the gate without IPs. The issue that was faced, though, was that IPs are from the local area. They know everyone and everyone knows them. There was some slight mitigation to this in Mosul, but it was still a common issue. This meant that the IPs didn’t really want to help us out as they knew we were eventually going to leave (a theme that I have seen played out by sheiks while we were closing our base out last month). The better IP units for conducting joint patrols were a paramilitary group, but they were not serving the function that they needed to serve. It was more a stop gap since no one wanted the IA in the cities, especially with the USF there, but they still held the fundamental problem that the IP would return to the local populace. Where we were secured by FOBs and COPs and COBs, they had their house with family.

      The other problem in this chain of discussion was the concept of nation building. This is a challenge because Iraq isn’t like most nations. The tribal thing is huge here. Even Saddam, at the heights of his power, couldn’t ignore tribal politics. Without the adequate infrastructure, the locals turned back to their tribes and sheiks.

  2. Reading this brings to mind the army’s current initiative to reinforce “the Squad” as “the decisive force of action” or some such verbiage. As I am currently TDY at Benning, I am seeing it everywhere. The basic premise is that at every echelon from platoon and above, the US Army has a substantial overmatch against any enemy. However, at the squad level, we currently do not. Research at least through the current wars indicates that the squad is in a reactive mode in 80% of events, and the Maneuver Center of Excellence / TRADOC want to make the squad as lethal as other echelons. Significantly, they want to do so through “the human dimension” as opposed to more technology, which is the right call. BTW, Brad, despite your recent disparaging comments on the MCoE, I have become a believer in the last week. I am thoroughly impressed with what I have seen and heard down here. The OSUT facilities I visited at Harmony Church for 19D Scouts a couple of days ago were unreal. (I was actually within maybe 200m of where I did OSUT in ’86 while you were already crowing about the Old Army….)

    1. My disparaging comments about the MCOE were twofold. One, the traditional mostly good humored banter between infantry and armor. The other is the jargonization of so many elements of the Army. Does everything have to be a “Center of Excellence?” Why can’t it be the “Center and School” like it used to be? I’m actually OK with the “Maneuver” part. Though I’d prefer the Infantry and Armor Center and School as a name.

      Having said that, I actually support the idea of more closely integrating the two branches, with the caveat that light infantry specific skills must not be shunted aside.

      Re: the squad as the decisive force of action… heh. Suuurre.
      Man for man, sure, our troops are better trained and equipped. But they are also less mobile by virtue of that equipment. Further, there’s a strong aversion to risk (as a means of minimizing casualties). It’s pretty damn rare you hear about a squad going through the squad combat drill and deciding to lay a base of fire with one time and moving with the other to assault through a position. Platoon and company leadership just isn’t going to let a squad leader have that long a leash. How often are platoon level COPs sending a squad sized ambush out to likely avenues of approach?

      You’re correct that the human dimension is the correct approach, as there’s only so much technology can do in a squad level fight, or even at the platoon level, once it has come to close combat. The Rand Report stresses early warning and long engagement ranges for a reason. Once you get inside about 200 meters, it almost doesn’t matter what you’re armed with, technology as a force multiplier fades.

    2. well, I concur on the name thing. I personally think several of them are more akin to centers of mediocrity…. I think it is indicative of the army’s whole trend towards adopting business/management ideas and verbiage. I am constantly hearing terminology such as “best practices” or “terms of reference” thrown about by mid- and senior leadership that make “us” sound more like managers. I have been paid to be a Leader ever since I walked out of the E5 board in 1988, and will never consider myself a manager.
      If I had some of “The Squad” literature in my room, I’d write some of it up, but it is all in the car. You are correct in saying that squads are not doing independent operations, but nonetheless, it is appropriate to pay them some increased attention. When that squad flanks out to the right, it is independent. When 1st squad pushes through 2nd squad and goes upstairs, it is independent. When the IED pops on the third truck and 1st squad is isolated on the far side…. ad infinitum. Given continous war for the duration of every squad leader’s term of service, there are some incredible leaders out there, but these junior leaders have missed out on the academic development and leader training opportunities that SL’s traditionally got. Another focus is on better-integrating attachments into squads, such as humint collection teams.

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