text: **How the easy and hard problems are related**
  
  Chalmers believes that the hard problem is irreducible to the easy problems: solving the easy problems 
  will not lead to a solution to the hard problems. This is because the easy problems pertain to the causal 
  structure of the world while the hard problem pertains to consciousness, and facts about consciousness 
  include facts that go beyond mere causal or structural description.[32] 
  
  For example, suppose someone were to stub their foot and yelp. In this scenario, the easy problems are 
  mechanistic explanations that involve the activity of the nervous system and brain and its relation to the 
  environment (such as the propagation of nerve signals from the toe to the brain, the processing of that 
  information and how it leads to yelping, and so on). The hard problem is the question of why these 
  mechanisms are accompanied by*the feeling of pain*, or why these feelings of pain feel the particular way 
  that they do. Chalmers argues that facts about the neural mechanisms of pain, and pain behaviours, do not 
  lead to facts about conscious experience. Facts about conscious experience are, instead, further facts, not 
  derivable from facts about the brain.[27][32] 
  
  An explanation for all of the relevant physical facts about neural processing would leave unexplained 
  facts about what it is like to feel pain. This is in part because functions and physical structures of any sort 
  could conceivably exist in the absence of experience. Alternatively, they could exist alongside a different 
  set of experiences. For example, it is logically possible for a perfect replica of Chalmers to have no 
  experience at all, or for it to have a different set of experiences (such as an inverted visible spectrum, so 
  that the blue-yellow red-green axes of its visual field are flipped).[32] 