text: **The "hard-wired view"**
  
  Joseph Levine (who formulated the notion of the explanatory gap) states: "The explanatory gap argument 
  doesn't demonstrate a gap in nature, but a gap in our understanding of nature."[91] He nevertheless 
  contends that full scientific understanding will not close the gap,[43] and that analogous gaps do not exist 
  for other identities in nature, such as that between water and H2O.[92] The philosophers Ned Block and 
  Robert Stalnaker agree that facts about what a conscious experience is like to the one experiencing it 
  cannot be deduced from knowing all the facts about the underlying physiology, but by contrast argue that 
  such gaps of knowledge*are*also present in many other cases in nature, such as the distinction between 
  water and H2O.[93][12] 
  
  To explain why these two ways of knowing (i.e. third-person scientific observation and first-person 
  introspection) yield such different understandings of consciousness, weak reductionists often invoke the 
  *phenomenal concepts strategy*, which argues the difference stems from our inaccurate phenomenal 
  concepts (i.e., how we think about consciousness), not from the nature of consciousness itself.[94][95] By 
  this view, the hard problem of consciousness stems from a dualism of concepts, not from a dualism of 
  properties or substances.[43] 