text: **"What Is It Like to Be a Bat?"**
  
  The philosopher Thomas Nagel posited in his 1974 paper "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" that experiences 
  are essentially subjective (accessible only to the individual undergoing them—i.e., felt only by the one 
  feeling them), while physical states are essentially objective (accessible to multiple individuals). So he 
  argued we have no idea what it could mean to claim that an essentially subjective state just*is*an 
  essentially non-subjective state (i.e., that a felt state is nothing but a functional state). In other words, we 
  have no idea of what reductivism amounts to.[31] He believes "every subjective phenomenon is 
  essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical 
  theory will abandon that point of view."[31] 