text: it means that the transitions of the environment are expected to be uncertain (and therefore, 
  often transition to new states). In this sense, volatile and unstable environments will lead 
  to less certain predictions about the future. 
  **C**, also called the preference prior, is a prior preference over possible observations. It encodes 
  the types of observations that an agent a priori expects to encounter; since minimising ex- 
  pected free energy through AIF entails taking actions that make the predicted observations 
  come about,**C**also encodes the agent’s preferences. It is a single categorical probability 
  distribution over possible observations; if the observations are multidimensional, there 
  is a separate preference prior for each observation modality. If**C**is imprecise (i.e., highly 
  entropic), its preferences are weak and it will prioritise collecting information over realising 
  its preferences; if it has low entropy, the agent will have stronger preferences and instead 
  prioritise preferred outcomes or goals. 
  **D**, also called the state prior, is the agent’s prior belief about the states of the environment. It 
  specifies the agent’s belief about the environmental state before receiving any observations. 
  There is a separate state prior over environmental states for each factor. With a more precise 
  **A**, the influence of the**D**quickly diminishes since the likelihood overwhelms the prior in 
  the Bayesian inference. 
  **E**, also called the habit prior, is the prior over policies or paths. In the AIF vernacular, 
  policies are allowable sequences of actions, with some specified policy length or temporal 
  depth.**E**encodes the agent’s preferences for choosing certain policies in the absence of 
  plans based upon expected free energy, sometimes called the agent’s “habits”. It is a single 
  probability distribution over each possible policy. 