text: from a variety of unconscious and otherwise autonomous networks in the brain and then broadcasts them 
  to unconscious networks (represented in the metaphor by a broad, unlit "audience").[140] The theory has 
  since been expanded upon by other scientists including cognitive neuroscientist Stanislas Dehaene.[141] 
  
  In his original paper outlining the hard problem of consciousness, Chalmers discussed GWT as a theory 
  that only targets one of the "easy problems" of consciousness.[1] In particular, he said GWT provided a 
  promising account of how information in the brain could become globally accessible, but argued that 
  "now the question arises in a different form: why should global accessibility give rise to conscious 
  experience? As always, this bridging question is unanswered."[1] J. W. Dalton similarly criticized GWT 
  on the grounds that it provides, at best, an account of the cognitive*function*of consciousness, and fails to 
  explain its experiential aspect.[142] By contrast, A. C. Elitzur argued: "While [GWT] does not address the 
  'hard problem', namely, the very nature of consciousness, it constrains any theory that attempts to do so 
  and provides important insights into the relation between consciousness and cognition."[143] 