text: **Type-F Monism**
  
  Meanwhile, panpsychism and neutral monism, broadly speaking, view consciousness as intrinsic to 
  matter.[52] In its most basic form, panpsychism holds that all physical entities have minds (though its 
  proponents take more qualified positions),[112] while neutral monism, in at least some variations, holds 
  that entities are composed of a substance with mental and physical aspects—and is thus sometimes 
  described as a type of panpsychism.[113] 
  
  Forms of panpsychism and neutral monism were defended in the early twentieth century by the 
  psychologist William James,[114][115][note 2] the philosopher Alfred North Whitehead,[115] the physicist 
  Arthur Eddington,[116][117] and the philosopher Bertrand Russell,[112][113] and interest in these views has 
  been revived in recent decades by philosophers including Thomas Nagel,[115] Galen Strawson,[115][118] 
  Philip Goff,[115] and David Chalmers.[112] Chalmers describes his overall view as "naturalistic 
  dualism",[1] but he says panpsychism is in a sense a form of physicalism,[52] as does Strawson.[118] 
  Proponents of panpsychism argue it solves the hard problem of consciousness parsimoniously by making 
  consciousness a fundamental feature of reality.[43][119] 