text: The philosophers Glenn Carruthers and Elizabeth Schier said in 2012 that the main arguments for the 
  existence of a hard problem—philosophical zombies, Mary's room, and Nagel's bats—are only persuasive 
  if one already assumes that "consciousness must be independent of the structure and function of mental 
  states, i.e. that there is a hard problem." Hence, the arguments beg the question. The authors suggest that 
  "instead of letting our conclusions on the thought experiments guide our theories of consciousness, we 
  should let our theories of consciousness guide our conclusions from the thought experiments."[64] 
  
  The philosopher Massimo Pigliucci argued in 2013 that the hard problem is misguided, resulting from a 
  "category mistake".[17] He said: "Of course an explanation isn't the same as an experience, but that's 
  because the two are completely independent categories, like colors and triangles. It is obvious that I 
  cannot experience what it is like to be you, but I can potentially have a complete explanation of how and 
  why it is possible to be you."[17] 
  
  In 2017, the philosopher Marco Stango, in a paper on John Dewey's approach to the problem of 
  consciousness (which preceded Chalmers' formulation of the hard problem by over half a century), noted 
  that Dewey's approach would see the hard problem as the consequence of an unjustified assumption that 
  feelings and functional behaviors are not the same physical process: "For the Deweyan philosopher, the 
  'hard problem' of consciousness is a 'conceptual fact' only in the sense that it is a*philosophical mistake*: 
  the mistake of failing to see that the physical can be had as an episode of immediate sentiency."[65] 