text: **Avoiding excessive uncertainty in maladaptive**
  **ways**
  Our previous discussion clarified that active inference agents have 
  sophisticated (hierarchically deep, temporally extended) models 
  of themselves that permit making inferences at multiple levels 
  about hidden bodily states (which comprise both the classical 
  “body schema” and other states that are relevant for allostasis, 
  such as hunger, thirst, and fatigue) and other states related to 
  the emotional and embodied self. These models are essential for 
  ensuring effective regulation and control at multiple levels, from 
  simple reflexes to sophisticated goal-directed behaviors (Tschantz 
  et al. 2022). However, in some cases, the aforementioned inferen- 
  tial process might not work properly (e.g. if the sensory channels 
  are too noisy or are assigned excessively high or low precision). 
  As a consequence, a person could experience an excessive or 
  irreducible uncertainty about her bodily and emotional states or 
  about the self, which in turn translates into a loss of confidence 
  about which future courses of action could produce desired out- 
  comes. Crucially, active inference agents follow the imperative 
  to avoid such an uncertainty about the present or the future. 
  Normally, uncertainty minimization strategies are adaptive (e.g. 
  seeking advice if one is uncertain about the direction of the pre- 
  ferred restaurant). However, in some conditions, such as when 
  a person experiences excessive and irreducible uncertainty and 
  when the uncertainty is particularly distressing or related to fun- 
  damental life concerns, she might potentially seek “maladaptive” 
  ways to reduce it—or methods that reduce uncertainty at the cost 
  of hindering fundamental imperatives of well-being and survival 
  (see also Linson et al. 2020). 