text: committed to physicalism. Unlike Type-A Materialists, however, Type-B Materialists*do*accept 
  inconceivability arguments often cited in support of the hard problem, but with a key caveat: that 
  inconceivability arguments give us insight only into how the human mind*tends to conceptualize*the 
  relationship between mind and matter, but not into what the true nature of this relationship actually 
  is.[43][52] According to this view, there is a gap between two ways of knowing (introspection and 
  neuroscience) that will not be resolved by understanding all the underlying neurobiology, but still believe 
  that consciousness and neurobiology are one and the same in reality.[43] 
  
  While Type-B Materialists all agree that intuitions about the hard problem are psychological rather than 
  ontological in origin, they differ as to whether our intuitions about the hard problem are innate or 
  culturally conditioned. This has been dubbed the "hard-wired/soft-wired distinction."[88][89] In relation to 
  Type-B Materialism, those who believe that our intuitions about the hard problem are innate (and 
  therefore common to all humans) subscribe to the "hard-wired view".[89] Those that believe our intuitions 
  are culturally conditioned subscribe to the "soft-wired view". Unless otherwise specified, the term*Type-B*
  *Materialism*refers to the hard-wired view.[89] 