text: **Strong reductionism**
  
  Many philosophers have disputed that there is a hard problem of consciousness distinct from what 
  Chalmers calls the easy problems of consciousness. Some among them, who are sometimes termed*strong*
  *reductionists*, hold that phenomenal consciousness (i.e., conscious experience) does exist but that it can 
  be fully understood as reducible to the brain.[43] 
  
  Broadly, strong reductionists accept that conscious experience is real but argue it can be fully understood 
  in functional terms as an emergent property of the material brain.[43] In contrast to weak reductionists 
  (see above), strong reductionists reject ideas used to support the existence of a hard problem (that the 
  same functional organization could exist without consciousness, or that a blind person who understood 
  vision through a textbook would not know everything about sight) as simply mistaken intuitions.[43][52] 
  
  A notable family of strong reductionist accounts are the higher-order theories of consciousness.[62][43] In 
  2005, the philosopher Peter Carruthers wrote about "recognitional concepts of experience", that is, "a 
  capacity to recognize [a] type of experience when it occurs in one's own mental life," and suggested that 
  such a capacity could explain phenomenal consciousness without positing qualia.[63] On the higher-order 
  view, since consciousness is a representation, and representation is fully functionally analyzable, there is 
  no hard problem of consciousness.[43] 