text: Today there is a strong tendency to simply*equate*consciousness with the qualia. Yet there is 
  clearly something not quite right about this. The "itchiness of itches" and the "hurtfulness of 
  pain" are qualities we are conscious*of*. So philosophy of mind tends to treat consciousness as 
  if it consisted simply of the contents of consciousness (the phenomenal qualities), while it 
  really is precisely*consciousness*of contents, the very givenness of whatever is subjectively 
  given. And therefore the problem of consciousness does not pertain so much to some alleged 
  "mysterious, nonpublic objects", i.e. objects that seem to be only "visible" to the respective 
  subject, but rather to the nature of "seeing" itself (and in today’s philosophy of mind 
  astonishingly little is said about the latter).[129] 