text: • 
  • economic incentives and the business case for OSH; 
  • 
  the role of supply chain relations in supporting OSH; 
  • prevention services; and 
  • 
  
  social norms and social reporting strategies, and corporate social responsibility; 
  
  strategies and practices adopted by OSH regulators. 
  
  They conclude on a variety of aspects:*‘During the last half-century, there has been a significant and*
  *well documented move away from prescriptive regulatory standards and efforts by national regulatory*
  *agencies to enforce them towards more principle-, performance- and process-based regulatory*
  *requirements …. This shift was originally informed by notions that traditional command and control*
  *strategies, however compromised by resource or governance, had achieved as much as they were likely*
  *to, and that different approaches were necessary to bring about the further improvements in OSH that*
  *were desired.*358 (regarding reasons of non-compliance at enterprise level see also the chapter on 
  ‘Prevention Practices in Enterprises’). 
  
  Not all worker groups, sectors or forms of work are equally covered by these directives. Since the first 
  protective OSH legislations,**some important groups or sectors had exceptions from full**
  **application of OSH legislation**. Depending on the Member State, such exceptions are applied to self- 
  employed and contracted work, military, public sector, mining, workers in the marine sector and offshore 
  installations, family members, personal and household services, work in charitable organisations, 
  volunteers in general, and domestic and mobile workplaces. In addition to these existing exemptions, 
  we can observe in the last two to three decades an accelerating trend of erosion of the conventional 
  employer–employee relation. Examples are outsourcing of work to contractors, often to self-employed, 
  or platform work. 