from a variety of unconscious and otherwise autonomous networks in the brain and then broadcasts them
to unconscious networks (represented in the metaphor by a broad, unlit "audience").[140] The theory has
since been expanded upon by other scientists including cognitive neuroscientist Stanislas Dehaene.[141]
In his original paper outlining the hard problem of consciousness, Chalmers discussed GWT as a theory
that only targets one of the "easy problems" of consciousness.[1] In particular, he said GWT provided a
promising account of how information in the brain could become globally accessible, but argued that
"now the question arises in a different form: why should global accessibility give rise to conscious
experience? As always, this bridging question is unanswered."[1] J. W. Dalton similarly criticized GWT
on the grounds that it provides, at best, an account of the cognitive function of consciousness, and fails to
explain its experiential aspect.[142] By contrast, A. C. Elitzur argued: "While [GWT] does not address the
'hard problem', namely, the very nature of consciousness, it constrains any theory that attempts to do so
and provides important insights into the relation between consciousness and cognition."[143]
For his part, Baars writes (along with two colleagues) that there is no hard problem of explaining qualia
over and above the problem of explaining causal functions, because qualia are entailed by neural activity
and themselves causal.[21] Dehaene, in his 2014 book Consciousness and the Brain, rejected the concept
of qualia and argued that Chalmers' "easy problems" of consciousness are actually the hard problems.[20]
He further stated that the "hard problem" is based only upon ill-defined intuitions that are continually
shifting as understanding evolves:[20]
Once our intuitions are educated by cognitive neuroscience and computer simulations,
Chalmers' hard problem will evaporate. The hypothetical concept of qualia, pure mental
experience, detached from any information-processing role, will be viewed as a peculiar idea
of the prescientific era, much like vitalism... [Just as science dispatched vitalism] the science
of consciousness will keep eating away at the hard problem of consciousness until it
vanishes.
In 2018, Chalmers highlighted what he calls the "meta-problem of consciousness", another problem
related to the hard problem of consciousness:[76]
The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining
why we think that there is a [hard] problem of consciousness.
In his "second approximation", he says it is the problem of explaining the behavior of "phenomenal
reports", and the behavior of expressing a belief that there is a hard problem of consciousness.[76]
Explaining its significance, he says:[76]
Although the meta-problem is strictly speaking an easy problem, it is deeply connected to the
hard problem. We can reasonably hope that a solution to the meta-problem will shed
significant light on the hard problem. A particularly strong line holds that a solution to the
Meta-problem