philosophers "were to use panhuman concepts expressed in crosstranslatable words" (such as know, think,
or feel) then the hard problem would dissolve.[96] David Chalmers has responded to these criticisms by
saying that he will not "apologize for using technical terms in an academic article . . . they play a key role
in efficient communication in every discipline, including Wierzbicka’s".[89]
Type-C materialists acknowledge a distinction between knowledge and experience[98] without asserting a
more complete explanation for the experiential phenomenon. One taking this view would admit that there
is an explanatory gap for which no answer to date may be satisfactory, but trust that inevitably the gap
will be closed.[52] This is described by analogy to progression in other areas of science, such as mass-
energy equivalence which would have been unfathomable in ancient times,[52] abiogenesis which was
once considered paradoxical from an evolutionary framework,[99][98] or a suspected future theory of
everything combining relativity and quantum mechanics. Similarly, type-C materialism posits that the
problem of consciousness is a consequence of our ignorance[71][100] but just as resolvable as any other
question in neuroscience.
Because the explanatory question of consciousness is evaded, type-C materialism does not
presuppose[101] the descriptive question, for instance that there is any self-consciousness, wakefulness, or
even sentience[102] in a rock. Principally, the basis for the argument arises from the apparently high
correlation of consciousness with living brain tissue,[103] thereby rejecting panpsychism[101] without
explicitly formulating physical causation. More specifically this position denies the existence of
philosophical zombies[64] for which there is an absence of data and no proposed method of
testing.[104][105] Whether via the inconceivability or actual nonexistence of zombies, a contradiction is
exposed nullifying the premise of the consciousness problem's "hardness".
Type-C materialism is compatible with several cases and could collapse into one of these other
metaphysical views[52] depending on scientific discovery and its interpretation. With evidence of
emergence, it resolves to strong reductionism under type A. With a different, possibly cultural paradigm
for understanding consciousness, it resolves to type-B materialism.[32] If consciousness is explained by
the quantum mind, then it resolves to property dualism under type D.[106] With characterization of
intrinsic properties in physics extending beyond structure and dynamics, it could resolve to type-F
monism.[52]
Dualism views consciousness as either a non-physical substance separate from the brain or a non-physical
property of the physical brain.[107] Dualism is the view that the mind is irreducible to the physical
body.[107] There are multiple dualist accounts of the causal relationship between the mental and the
physical, of which interactionism and epiphenomenalism are the most common today. Interactionism
posits that the mental and physical causally impact one another, and is associated with the thought of
René Descartes (1596–1650).[52] Epiphenomenalism holds the mental is causally dependent on the
physical, but does not in turn causally impact it.[52]
In contemporary philosophy, interactionism has been defended by philosophers including Martine Nida-
Rümelin,[108] while epiphenomenalism has been defended by philosophers including Frank
Jackson[109][110] (although Jackson later changed his stance to physicalism).[111] Chalmers has also
Type-C Materialism
Type-D Dualism