By limiting the information given out to the public, and even to Congress, Johnson maximized his flexibility to change course.[202]
In March, Bundy began to urge the use of ground forces—air operations alone, he counseled, would not stop Hanoi's aggression against the South. Johnson approved an increase in logistical troops of 18,000 to 20,000 and the deployment of two additional Marine battalions and a Marine air squadron, in addition to planning for the deployment of two more divisions. More significantly, he also authorized a change in mission from defensive to offensive operations; he nevertheless continued to insist that this was not to be publicly represented as a change in existing policy.[203]
By the middle of June, the total U.S. ground forces in Vietnam had increased to 82,000 or by 150 percent.[204] That same month, Ambassador Taylor reported that the bombing offensive against North Vietnam had been ineffective and that the South Vietnamese army was outclassed and in danger of collapse.[205] General Westmoreland shortly thereafter recommended the president further increase ground troops from 82,000 to 175,000. 