 A modern analysis by Ari Daniel Levine places more of the blame on deficiencies in the military and bureaucratic leadership . The loss of northern China was not inevitable . The military was <unk> by a government too assured of its own military prowess . Huizong diverted the state 's resources to failed wars against the Western Xia . The Song insistence on a greater share of Liao territory only succeeded in provoking their Jin allies . Song diplomatic <unk> underestimated the Jin and allowed the unimpeded rise of Jurchen military power . The state had plentiful resources , with the exception of horses , but managed its assets poorly during battles . Unlike the expansive Han and Tang empires that preceded the Song , the Song did not have a significant foothold in Central Asia where a large proportion of its horses could be bred or procured . As Song general Li Gang noted , without a consistent supply of horses the dynasty was at a significant disadvantage against Jurchen cavalry : " the Jin were victorious only because they used iron @-@ shielded cavalry , while we opposed them with foot soldiers . It is only to be expected that [ our soldiers ] were scattered and dispersed . " 
