 It has been suggested that an opportunity was lost on 5 August to encircle and capture the invading Austrian , German and Ottoman force when it was allowed to withdraw to Katia . The infantry 's difficulties regarding the supply of water and camel transport combined with their lack of desert training , together with Lawrence 's confusing orders for infantry in the 52nd ( Lowland ) Division to move south and east , stopped them from promptly advancing to cut off the retreating force in the early hours of the second day 's battle . General Lawrence was criticised for taking a grave and unnecessary risk by relying on just one entrenched infantry division and two light horse brigades to defend Romani . That the strong enemy attack on the 1st and 2nd Light Horse Brigades during the first night 's battle pushed them so far back that the planned flanking attack by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade became almost a frontal attack . Lawrence was also faulted for remaining at his headquarters at Kantara , which was considered to be too far from the battlefield , and that this contributed to his loss of control of the battle during the first day , when the telephone line was cut and he was out of contact with Romani . Lawrence was also criticised for not going forward to supervise the execution of his orders on 5 August , when there was a failure to coordinate the movements of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade and the Mobile Column . 
