 Justice Elena Kagan also wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment , in which she was joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Stephen Breyer . Like Justice Breyer , Justice Kagan argued that it was not necessary to apply strict scrutiny to all content @-@ based restrictions on speech . She argued that the majority 's opinion would jeopardize too many " entirely reasonable " existing sign ordinances across the country . In light of the court 's opinion , Justice Kagan suggested that municipalities will now be forced to choose between repealing " exemptions that allow for helpful signs on streets and sidewalks " and lifting " sign restrictions altogether and resign [ ing ] themselves to the resulting clutter " . Instead of applying strict scrutiny in every case , Justice Kagan claimed that strict scrutiny is only appropriate when there is a " realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot " . Likewise , she also claimed that strict scrutiny is not necessary when there is no risk that regulations will " skew the public ’ s debate of ideas " . Applying these principles to this case , Justice Kagan held the ordinance " does not pass strict scrutiny , or intermediate scrutiny , or even the laugh test " because the town did not provide " any sensible basis " for the content @-@ based distinctions within its sign ordinance . 
