 The Soviet Union had some 23 @,@ 000 tanks in service , of which about 11 @,@ 000 were in the western military districts that faced the German invasion force . Hitler later declared to some of his generals , " If I had known about the Russian tank strength in 1941 I would not have attacked " . However , maintenance and readiness standards were very poor ; ammunition and radios were in short supply , and many armoured units lacked the trucks for supplies . The most advanced Soviet tank models – the KV @-@ 1 and T @-@ 34 – which were superior to all current German tanks , as well as all designs still in development as of the summer 1941 , were not available in large numbers at the time the invasion commenced . Furthermore , in the autumn of 1939 , the Soviets disbanded their mechanized corps and partly dispersed their tanks to infantry divisions ; but following their observation of the German campaign in France , in late 1940 they began to reorganize most of their armored assets back into mechanized corps with a target strength of 1 @,@ 031 tanks each . But these large armoured formations were unwieldy , and moreover they were spread out in scattered garrisons , with their subordinate divisions up to 100 kilometres apart . Furthermore , the reorganization was still in progress and incomplete when Barbarossa commenced . Soviet tank units were rarely well equipped , and they lacked training and logistical support . Units were sent into combat with no arrangements in place for refueling , ammunition resupply , or personnel replacement . Often , after a single engagement , units were destroyed or rendered ineffective . The Soviet numerical advantage in heavy equipment was thoroughly offset by the superior training and organization of the Wehrmacht . 
