 Military analysts and historians disagree on the strategic significance of the battle , although most describe it as a British tactical and operational success . In 1919 , Ludendorff wrote that the British victory cost the German army dear and drained German reserves . Hindenburg wrote that the losses at Messines had been very heavy and that he regretted that the ground had not been evacuated ; in 1922 , Kuhl called it one of the worst German tragedies of the war . In 1920 Haig 's Dispatches described the success of the British plan , organisation and results but refrained from hyperbole , referring to the operation as a successful preliminary to the main offensive at Ypres . In 1930 , Liddell Hart thought the success at Messines inflated expectations for the Third Battle of Ypres and that because the circumstances of the operations were different , attempts to apply similar tactics resulted in failure . In 1938 Lloyd George called the battle an apéritif and in 1939 , G. C. Wynne judged it to be a " brilliant success " , overshadowed by the subsequent tragedy of the Battles of Passchendaele . The Official Historian called it a " great victory " in 1948 and Prior and Wilson ( 1997 ) called the battle a " noteworthy success " but then complained about the decision to postpone exploitation of the success on the Gheluvelt plateau . Ashley Ekins referred to the battle as a great set @-@ piece victory , which was also costly , particularly for the infantry of II Anzac Corps , as did Christopher Pugsley , referring to the experience of the New Zealand Division . Heinz <unk> called it a great British success and wrote that the loss of the ridge , had a worse effect on German morale than the number of casualties . Jack Sheldon called it a " significant victory " for the British and a " disaster " for the German army , which was forced into a " lengthy period of anxious waiting " . Brown in 1996 and Simpson in 2001 concluded that extending British supply routes over the ridge , which had been devastated by the mines and millions of shells , to consolidate the Oosttaverne line and completion of the infrastructure further north in the Fifth Army area , was necessary before the " Northern Operation " ( the Third Battle of Ypres ) could begin and was the main reason for the operational pause in June and July . 
