 The possibility of Japan taking advantage of a war in Europe was foreseen . In June 1939 , the Tientsin Incident demonstrated another possibility : that Germany might attempt to take advantage of a war in the Far East . In the event of a worst @-@ case scenario of simultaneous war with Germany , Italy and Japan , two approaches were considered . The first was to reduce the war to one against Germany and Japan only by knocking Italy out of the conflict as quickly as possible . The former First Sea Lord , Sir Reginald Drax , who was brought out of retirement to advise on strategy , called for a " flying squadron " of four or five battleships , along with an aircraft carrier , some cruisers and destroyers , to be sent to Singapore . Such a force would be too small to fight the Japanese main fleet , but could protect British trade in the Indian Ocean against commerce raiders . Drax argued that a small , fast force would be better in this role than a large , slow one . When more ships became available , it could become the nucleus of a full @-@ sized battle fleet . Chatfield , now Minister for Coordination of Defence , disagreed with this concept . He felt that the flying squadron would become nothing more than a target for the Japanese fleet . Instead , he put forward a second approach , namely that the Mediterranean be abandoned and the fleet sent to Singapore . 
