 Bottomley toured West Africa during early August , and , in Ghana and Nigeria , gave several speeches reassuring his hosts that immediate majority rule was an unconditional requirement for Rhodesian independence . He ruled out the use of military force in the event of a Rhodesian UDI , and pledged to instead end such a rebellion through economic sanctions . Bottomley 's dismissal of the use of force drew damning criticism from Joshua Nkomo , the imprisoned leader of the Marxist – Leninist Zimbabwe African People 's Union , who said this showed Britain was not serious about <unk> Rhodesia as it had its other African possessions . Meanwhile , Bottomley 's comments increased anti @-@ British sentiment . In his memoirs , Smith describes the mood in forthright terms , accusing Britain of " resorting to politics of convenience and appeasement " . " We waited and waited ... [ but ] the British were not prepared to make a clear decision , " he writes ; " they were consulting the bankrupt and communist dictatorships before replying to us . " Becoming exasperated by the lack of progress , even the more hesitant members of the Rhodesian government began to see the road leading towards UDI as the only one viable for them . Lisbon , however , remained the immediate bone of contention , and on this issue the Rhodesians became yet more determined not to give an inch . 
