 In dealing with the immovable Smith , Wilson 's ministers adopted a programme of deliberate frustration and delay : Britain would interminably stonewall the Rhodesian Prime Minister , maintaining the facade of continued negotiation by very occasionally repeating their stance , in the hope that either Smith would back down , or his Cabinet would eventually lose faith in his negotiating prowess and replace him with somebody more malleable . Wood writes that Wilson , Bottomley and their Labour contemporaries were " distracted by their own political agendas " , and did not understand the extent of Rhodesia 's considerable disillusionment with Britain by this time . Effectively " kicked ... out of the Commonwealth " , as Huggins later commented , a fortress mentality was developing in Salisbury , propelling it towards unilateral action . Wood concludes that Britain 's maintenance of this stonewalling tactic was misjudged , and only exacerbated the Rhodesian government 's feeling of alienation . 
