 Although he was being pressured by the divisional commander to increase the speed of the advance , Whitehead was said to be reasonably happy with the progress being made by the 2 / 48th along the central route , although he had misgivings about the performance of the 2 / 23rd on the left and the 2 / 24th on the right . To some extent , the failure of the 2 / 24th to take the 2 @,@ 200 feature could be attributed to the importance which the Japanese commander , Katagiri , placed upon its defence , however , Whitehead believed that the battalion 's commanding officer , Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Gillespie , was procrastinating and being overly cautious in his tactics . Nevertheless , it was later realised that the terrain which the 2 / 24th faced was more formidable than first thought , and that in order for the battalion to make progress , they too , like the 2 / 48th , would need tanks . Some attempt was made by the Australians to bring these up from the rear areas , but ultimately the fighting around Sattelberg came to an end before this could be effected . On the brigade 's left , south of the main route , the pace of the 2 / 23rd 's advance had also caused Whitehead some concern . Indeed , Whitehead went as far to express this to the 2 / 23rd 's commanding officer , Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Tucker , who pointed out that his lack of progress had been caused by the large number of tasks that the battalion had been assigned , namely the competing demands to secure the flank while attempting to move quickly through broken country in order to make its scheduled rendezvous with the 2 / 48th . 
