 Wheeler 's bizarre promptings were influenced by the severe strain imposed upon the U.S. military by the Vietnam commitment , one which had been undertaken without the mobilization of its reserve forces . The Joint Chiefs had repeatedly requested national mobilization , not only to prepare for a possible intensification of the war , but also to ensure that the nation 's strategic reserve did not become depleted . By obliquely ordering Westmoreland to demand more forces , Wheeler was attempting to solve two pressing problems . In comparison with MACV 's previous communications , which had been full of confidence , optimism , and resolve , Westmoreland 's 12 February request for 10 @,@ 500 troops was much more urgent : " which I desperately need ... time is of the essence . " On 13 February , 10 @,@ 500 previously authorized U.S. airborne troops and marines were dispatched to South Vietnam . The Joint Chiefs then played their hand , advising President Johnson to turn down MACV 's requested division @-@ sized reinforcement unless he called up some 1 @,@ 234 @,@ 001 marine and army reservists . 
