 An hour after last light on 5 November the Chinese attacked C Company 3 RAR — the forward Australian company occupying positions astride the Pakchon road 3 kilometres ( 1 @.@ 9 mi ) north of Maenjung @-@ dong — with mortars and machine @-@ guns . Meanwhile , machine @-@ gun fire also fell on Support Company and Battalion Headquarters , 400 metres ( 440 yd ) to the south . Walsh decided to relocate his headquarters 900 metres ( 980 yd ) further to the rear . The Chinese infantry launched a strong attack against C Company assaulting them across the paddy fields in darkness , while simultaneously also falling upon A and B Companies holding the hills they had captured during the afternoon . In the face of the heavy Chinese counter @-@ attack Walsh feared the loss of his entire force , and at 20 : 00 he ordered a general withdrawal , pulling them back off the ridgeline in order to concentrate the battalion on the road , without informing Coad . Ordered in the dark and with one company still under attack , a disorganised night withdrawal occurred . The decision proved to be a serious tactical error , for as was to be demonstrated often in the months that followed , the Chinese were skilled at moving across the hills to outflank road @-@ bound UN forces who often failed to hold the ridges on either side of the roads only to be confronted by strong concentrations in front and behind them as a result . The withdrawal threatened to open the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade 's left flank ; recognising the danger this posed , Coad ordered Walsh to immediately reposition his companies on the ridge . Ultimately this proved unachievable . 
