 A number of shortcomings in planning and execution contributed to the debacle suffered by the Confederates . The Confederate brigade leaders performed well , with the exception of a few minor instances ; Burton surmises that the blame of July 1 must lie with the overall commanders . James Longstreet was overconfident about the artillery strategy , which proved less effective than it could have been largely because both he and Stonewall Jackson had problems gathering the artillery for the assault . The Confederate practice of moving artillery with individual units instead of in one mass and the difficult terrain surrounding Malvern Hill contributed to this issue . A potential solution to this problem lay with Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton 's fourteen batteries in reserve . However , Lee 's headquarters never contacted Pendleton , who spent July 1 " await [ ing ] events and orders , in readiness for whatever service might be called for . " These orders never came , and Pendleton 's batteries went unused . Magruder might also share in the blame ; his late arrival to the battlefield was caused by bad maps and faulty guides . Since Magruder received Chilton 's draft late in the day , and with no time attached to it , there was no way for him to determine the relevance of the order . Burton suggests that Magruder cannot be reasonably blamed for his attacks on the Union line : he was responding to Lee 's orders and did initially try to form a unified attack on the Union line . Finally , Magruder was riding back and forth across the battlefield , making it difficult for him to be found by junior officers seeking guidance . Several other factors may have played into the Confederate repulse , including Theophilus Holmes 's refusal to participate in the battle , dismissing any notion of actively engaging the enemy . 
