 Some soldiers had received training through the compulsory training scheme that had been established in 1911 , while others had served as volunteers in the part @-@ time forces before the war or as members of the British Army , but their numbers were limited and in many cases the quality of the training they had received was also limited . The original intention had been that half the initial intake would consist of soldiers that were currently serving in the Militia , but ultimately this did not come to fruition and while about 8 @,@ 000 of the original intake had some prior military experience , either through compulsory training or as volunteers , over 6 @,@ 000 had none at all . In terms of officers , the situation was better . For example , within the 1st Division , of its initial 631 officers , 607 had had previous military experience . This was largely through service in the pre @-@ war militia , though , where there had been little to no formal officer training . In addition , there was a small cadre of junior officers who had been trained for the permanent force at the Royal Military College , Duntroon , but their numbers were very small and at the outbreak of the war the first class had to be graduated early in order for them to join the AIF , being placed mainly in staff positions . Other than small numbers of Duntroon graduates , from January 1915 the only means to be commissioned into the AIF was from the ranks of enlisted personnel . As a result , by 1918 the majority of company and battalion commanders had risen from the ranks . While the AIF 's initial senior officers had been members of the pre @-@ war military , few had any substantial experience in managing brigade @-@ sized or larger units in the field as training exercises on this scale had been rarely conducted before the outbreak of hostilities . This inexperience contributed to tactical mistakes and avoidable casualties during the Gallipoli campaign . 
