 According to Westmoreland , he responded to the news of the attacks with optimism , both in media presentations and in his reports to Washington . According to closer observers , however , the general was " stunned that the communists had been able to coordinate so many attacks in such secrecy " and he was " dispirited and deeply shaken . " According to Clark Clifford , at the time of the initial attacks , the reaction of the U.S. military leadership " approached panic " . Although Westmoreland 's appraisal of the military situation was correct , he made himself look foolish by continuously maintaining his belief that Khe Sanh was the real objective of the North Vietnamese and that 155 attacks by 84 @,@ 000 troops was a diversion ( a position he maintained until at least 12 February ) . Washington Post reporter Peter Braestrup summed up the feelings of his colleagues by asking " How could any effort against Saigon , especially downtown Saigon , be a diversion ? " 
