 General Dill described Papagos ' attitude as " unaccommodating and defeatist " and argued that his plan ignored the fact that Greek troops and artillery were capable of only token resistance . The British believed that the Greek rivalry with Bulgaria — the Metaxas Line was designed specifically for war with Bulgaria — as well as their traditionally good terms with the Yugoslavs — left their north @-@ western border largely undefended . Despite their awareness that the line was likely to collapse in the event of a German thrust from the Struma and Axios rivers , the British eventually acceded to the Greek command . On 4 March , Dill accepted the plans for the Metaxas line and on 7 March agreement was ratified by the British Cabinet . The overall command was to be retained by Papagos and the Greek and British commands agreed to fight a delaying action in the north @-@ east . The British did not move their troops , because General Wilson regarded them as too weak to protect such a broad front . Instead , he took a position some 40 miles ( 64 kilometres ) west of the Axios , across the Haliacmon Line . The two main objectives in establishing this position were to maintain contact with the Hellenic army in Albania and to deny German access to Central Greece . This had the advantage of requiring a smaller force than other options , while allowing more preparation time . However , it meant abandoning nearly the whole of Northern Greece , which was unacceptable to the Greeks for political and psychological reasons . Moreover , the line 's left flank was susceptible to flanking from Germans operating through the Monastir Gap in Yugoslavia . However , the rapid disintegration of the Yugoslav Army and a German thrust into the rear of the Vermion position was not expected . 
