 Following the attack on 17 July , the British learned from intercepted German radio transmissions and reports provided by Secret Intelligence Service agents that Tirpitz had not suffered any significant damage . Admiral Moore blamed the failure of Operation Mascot on the inexperience of the aircrew involved in the attack , and criticised the strike leader for not selecting alternative targets after it became clear that Tirpitz could not be accurately bombed . Moore also judged that further attacks on Kaafjord using Barracudas would be futile , as the dive bombers ' slow speed gave the Germans enough time to cover Tirpitz with smoke between the time raids were detected and their arrival over the target area . The Admiralty was hopeful that a strategy of repeatedly striking Kaafjord over a 48 @-@ hour period would wear down the defences , and Moore agreed to attempt another attack . Consideration was also given to flying fast and long @-@ ranged de Havilland Mosquito bombers off the carriers in an attempt to achieve surprise , but none of these land @-@ based aircraft could be spared from supporting the Allied bombing of Germany . 
