 By 02 : 00 the Chinese attack had been checked and 3 RAR had redeployed to new positions in the paddy fields around the railway crossing north of Maenjung @-@ dong . However , amid the confusion the exact dispositions of the companies remained unclear for the remainder of the night . Australian losses were 12 killed and 64 wounded , the same number as those suffered during their entire advance into North Korea . A number of officers of the battalion were later critical of the decision to withdraw while still engaged , believing that it had been both dangerous and unnecessary , while the lack of detailed planning , reconnaissance and orders were also seen as a factor in the disorganisation that ensued . While A Company had immediately withdrawn as ordered and had suffered a number of casualties in doing so , both B and D Companies , which were commanded by experienced veterans of the 2nd Australian Imperial Force , had delayed doing so until more favourable circumstances prevailed and fared better as a consequence . Yet the following morning a patrol from D Company cleared the abandoned A and B Company positions unopposed . The area was found littered with Chinese dead and equipment . Among the casualties were both Chinese and North Koreans , and it became clear that the Australians had been attacked by a mixed force , estimated at around 1 @,@ 500 men . Many of those killed were also found to have been carrying demolition charges . 
