 The poor performance of Zaire 's military during Shaba I gave evidence of chronic weaknesses ( which extend to this day ) . One problem was that some of the Zairian soldiers in the area had not received pay for extended periods . Senior officers often kept the money intended for the soldiers , typifying a generally disreputable and inept senior leadership in the FAZ . As a result , many soldiers simply deserted rather than fight . Others stayed with their units but were ineffective . During the months following the Shaba invasion , Mobutu sought solutions to the military problems that had contributed to the army 's dismal performance . He implemented sweeping reforms of the command structure , including wholesale firings of high @-@ ranking officers . He merged the military general staff with his own presidential staff and appointed himself chief of staff again , in addition to the positions of minister of defence and supreme commander that he already held . He also redeployed his forces throughout the country instead of keeping them close to Kinshasa , as had previously been the case . The Kamanyola Division , at the time considered the army 's best formation , and considered the president 's own , was assigned permanently to Shaba . In addition to these changes , the army 's strength was reduced by 25 percent . Also , Zaire 's allies provided a large influx of military equipment , and Belgian , French , and American advisers assisted in rebuilding and retraining the force . 
