 Contrary to Western belief , General Giáp did not plan or command the offensive himself . Thanh 's original plan was elaborated on by a party committee headed by Thanh 's deputy , Phạm Hùng , and then modified by Giáp . The Defense Minister may have been convinced to toe the line by the arrest and imprisonment of most of the members of his staff during the Revisionist Anti @-@ Communist Party Affair . Although Giáp went to work " reluctantly , under duress " , he may have found the task easier due to the fact that he was faced with a fait accompli . Since the Politburo had already approved the offensive , all he had to do was make it work . He combined guerrilla operations into what was basically a conventional military offensive and shifted the burden of sparking the popular uprising to the Viet Cong . If it worked , all would be well and good . If it failed , it would be a failure only for the Communist Party militants . For the moderates and centrists , it offered the prospect of negotiations and a possible end to the American bombing of the North . Only in the eyes of the militants , therefore , did the offensive become a " go for broke " effort . Others in the Politburo were willing to settle for a much less ambitious " victory . " 
