 Historian William Keylor commented that initially both United States diplomats believed that they had " devised a brilliant solution to the reparation dilemma " ; appeasing both the British and French , as well as Allied public opinion irrespective of the fact that Allied leaders were aware of concerns surrounding German willingness to pay reparations and the disappointment that could follow . Vance C. McCormick ( an economic adviser of Wilson ) emphasized this point , and stated : " ... the preamble is useful . We are adopting an unusual method in not fixing a definite sum . The preamble tends to explain this , and further , prepares the public mind for disappointment as to what actually can be secured . " In 1940 , Dulles stated that he was surprised that the article " could plausibly be , and in fact was , considered to be a historical judgement of war guilt " . He further noted that the " profound significance of this article ... came about through accident , rather than design " . Dulles took it personally that the Treaty of Versailles failed in its intentions of creating a lasting peace and believed that the treaty was one of the causes of the Second World War . By 1954 , as United States Secretary of State and in discussion with the Soviet Union in regards to German reunification , he commented that " Efforts to bankrupt and humiliate a nation merely incite a people of vigor and of courage to break the bonds imposed upon them . ... Prohibitions thus incite the very acts that are prohibited . " 
