text: /**
   * @license AngularJS v1.7.2
   * (c) 2010-2018 Google, Inc. http://angularjs.org
   * License: MIT
   */
  (function(window, angular) {'use strict';
  
  /* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   *     Any commits to this file should be reviewed with security in mind.  *
   *   Changes to this file can potentially create security vulnerabilities. *
   *          An approval from 2 Core members with history of modifying      *
   *                         this file is required.                          *
   *                                                                         *
   *  Does the change somehow allow for arbitrary javascript to be executed? *
   *    Or allows for someone to change the prototype of built-in objects?   *
   *     Or gives undesired access to variables likes document or window?    *
   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
  
  var $sanitizeMinErr = angular.$$minErr('$sanitize');
  var bind;
  var extend;
  var forEach;
  var isArray;
  var isDefined;
  var lowercase;
  var noop;
  var nodeContains;
  var htmlParser;
  var htmlSanitizeWriter;
  
  /**
   * @ngdoc module
   * @name ngSanitize
   * @description
   *
   * The `ngSanitize` module provides functionality to sanitize HTML.
   *
   * See {@link ngSanitize.$sanitize `$sanitize`} for usage.
   */
  
  /**
   * @ngdoc service
   * @name $sanitize
   * @kind function
   *
   * @description
   *   Sanitizes an html string by stripping all potentially dangerous tokens.
   *
   *   The input is sanitized by parsing the HTML into tokens. All safe tokens (from a whitelist) are
   *   then serialized back to a properly escaped HTML string. This means that no unsafe input can make
   *   it into the returned string.
   *
   *   The whitelist for URL sanitization of attribute values is configured using the functions
   *   `aHrefSanitizationWhitelist` and `imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist` of {@link $compileProvider}.
   *
   *   The input may also contain SVG markup if this is enabled via {@link $sanitizeProvider}.
   *
   * @param {string} html HTML input.
   * @returns {string} Sanitized HTML.
   *
   * @example
     <example module="sanitizeExample" deps="angular-sanitize.js" name="sanitize-service">
     <file name="index.html">
       <script>
           angular.module('sanitizeExample', ['ngSanitize'])
             .controller('ExampleController', ['$scope', '$sce', function($scope, $sce) {
               $scope.snippet =
                 '<p style="color:blue">an html\n' +
                 '<em onmouseover="this.textContent=\'PWN3D!\'">click here</em>\n' +
                 'snippet</p>';
               $scope.deliberatelyTrustDangerousSnippet = function() {
                 return $sce.trustAsHtml($scope.snippet);
               };
             }]);
       </script>
       <div ng-controller="ExampleController">
          Snippet: <textarea ng-model="snippet" cols="60" rows="3"></textarea>
         <table>
           <tr>
             <td>Directive</td>
             <td>How</td>
             <td>Source</td>
             <td>Rendered</td>
           </tr>
           <tr id="bind-html-with-sanitize">
             <td>ng-bind-html</td>
             <td>Automatically uses $sanitize</td>
             <td><pre>&lt;div ng-bind-html="snippet"&gt;<br/>&lt;/div&gt;</pre></td>
             <td><div ng-bind-html="snippet"></div></td>
           </tr>
           <tr id="bind-html-with-trust">
             <td>ng-bind-html</td>
             <td>Bypass $sanitize by explicitly trusting the dangerous value</td>
             <td>
             <pre>&lt;div ng-bind-html="deliberatelyTrustDangerousSnippet()"&gt;
  &lt;/div&gt;</pre>
             </td>
             <td><div ng-bind-html="deliberatelyTrustDangerousSnippet()"></div></td>
           </tr>
           <tr id="bind-default">
             <td>ng-bind</td>
             <td>Automatically escapes</td>
             <td><pre>&lt;div ng-bind="snippet"&gt;<br/>&lt;/div&gt;</pre></td>
             <td><div ng-bind="snippet"></div></td>
           </tr>
         </table>
         </div>
     </file>
     <file name="protractor.js" type="protractor">
       it('should sanitize the html snippet by default', function() {
         expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-sanitize div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).
           toBe('<p>an html\n<em>click here</em>\nsnippet</p>');
       });
  
       it('should inline raw snippet if bound to a trusted value', function() {
         expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-trust div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).
           toBe("<p style=\"color:blue\">an html\n" +
                "<em onmouseover=\"this.textContent='PWN3D!'\">click here</em>\n" +
                "snippet</p>");
       });
  
       it('should escape snippet without any filter', function() {
         expect(element(by.css('#bind-default div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).
           toBe("&lt;p style=\"color:blue\"&gt;an html\n" +
                "&lt;em onmouseover=\"this.textContent='PWN3D!'\"&gt;click here&lt;/em&gt;\n" +
                "snippet&lt;/p&gt;");
       });
  
       it('should update', function() {
         element(by.model('snippet')).clear();
         element(by.model('snippet')).sendKeys('new <b onclick="alert(1)">text</b>');
         expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-sanitize div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).
           toBe('new <b>text</b>');
         expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-trust div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).toBe(
           'new <b onclick="alert(1)">text</b>');
         expect(element(by.css('#bind-default div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).toBe(
           "new &lt;b onclick=\"alert(1)\"&gt;text&lt;/b&gt;");
       });
     </file>
     </example>
   */
  
  
  /**
   * @ngdoc provider
   * @name $sanitizeProvider
   * @this
   *
   * @description
   * Creates and configures {@link $sanitize} instance.
   */
  function $SanitizeProvider() {
    var hasBeenInstantiated = false;
    var svgEnabled = false;
  
    this.$get = ['$$sanitizeUri', function($$sanitizeUri) {
      hasBeenInstantiated = true;
      if (svgEnabled) {
        extend(validElements, svgElements);
      }
      return function(html) {
        var buf = [];
        htmlParser(html, htmlSanitizeWriter(buf, function(uri, isImage) {
          return !/^unsafe:/.test($$sanitizeUri(uri, isImage));
        }));
        return buf.join('');
      };
    }];
  
  
    /**
     * @ngdoc method
     * @name $sanitizeProvider#enableSvg
     * @kind function
     *
     * @description
     * Enables a subset of svg to be supported by the sanitizer.
     *
     * <div class="alert alert-warning">
     *   <p>By enabling this setting without taking other precautions, you might expose your
     *   application to click-hijacking attacks. In these attacks, sanitized svg elements could be positioned
     *   outside of the containing element and be rendered over other elements on the page (e.g. a login
     *   link). Such behavior can then result in phishing incidents.</p>
     *
     *   <p>To protect against these, explicitly setup `overflow: hidden` css rule for all potential svg
     *   tags within the sanitized content:</p>
     *
     *   <br>
     *
     *   <pre><code>
     *   .rootOfTheIncludedContent svg {
     *     overflow: hidden !important;
     *   }
     *   </code></pre>
     * </div>
     *
     * @param {boolean=} flag Enable or disable SVG support in the sanitizer.
     * @returns {boolean|$sanitizeProvider} Returns the currently configured value if called
     *    without an argument or self for chaining otherwise.
     */
    this.enableSvg = function(enableSvg) {
      if (isDefined(enableSvg)) {
        svgEnabled = enableSvg;
        return this;
      } else {
        return svgEnabled;
      }
    };
  
  
    /**
     * @ngdoc method
     * @name $sanitizeProvider#addValidElements
     * @kind function
     *
     * @description
     * Extends the built-in lists of valid HTML/SVG elements, i.e. elements that are considered safe
     * and are not stripped off during sanitization. You can extend the following lists of elements:
     *
     * - `htmlElements`: A list of elements (tag names) to extend the current list of safe HTML
     *   elements. HTML elements considered safe will not be removed during sanitization. All other
     *   elements will be stripped off.
     *
     * - `htmlVoidElements`: This is similar to `htmlElements`, but marks the elements as
     *   "void elements" (similar to HTML
     *   [void elements](https://rawgit.com/w3c/html/html5.1-2/single-page.html#void-elements)). These
     *   elements have no end tag and cannot have content.
     *
     * - `svgElements`: This is similar to `htmlElements`, but for SVG elements. This list is only
     *   taken into account if SVG is {@link ngSanitize.$sanitizeProvider#enableSvg enabled} for
     *   `$sanitize`.
     *
     * <div class="alert alert-info">
     *   This method must be called during the {@link angular.Module#config config} phase. Once the
     *   `$sanitize` service has been instantiated, this method has no effect.
     * </div>
     *
     * <div class="alert alert-warning">
     *   Keep in mind that extending the built-in lists of elements may expose your app to XSS or
     *   other vulnerabilities. Be very mindful of the elements you add.
     * </div>
     *
     * @param {Array<String>|Object} elements - A list of valid HTML elements or an object with one or
     *   more of the following properties:
     *   - **htmlElements** - `{Array<String>}` - A list of elements to extend the current list of
     *     HTML elements.
     *   - **htmlVoidElements** - `{Array<String>}` - A list of elements to extend the current list of
     *     void HTML elements; i.e. elements that do not have an end tag.
     *   - **svgElements** - `{Array<String>}` - A list of elements to extend the current list of SVG
     *     elements. The list of SVG elements is only taken into account if SVG is
     *     {@link ngSanitize.$sanitizeProvider#enableSvg enabled} for `$sanitize`.
     *
     * Passing an array (`[...]`) is equivalent to passing `{htmlElements: [...]}`.
     *
     * @return {$sanitizeProvider} Returns self for chaining.
     */
    this.addValidElements = function(elements) {
      if (!hasBeenInstantiated) {
        if (isArray(elements)) {
          elements = {htmlElements: elements};
        }
  
        addElementsTo(svgElements, elements.svgElements);
        addElementsTo(voidElements, elements.htmlVoidElements);
        addElementsTo(validElements, elements.htmlVoidElements);
        addElementsTo(validElements, elements.htmlElements);
      }
  
      return this;
    };
  
  
    /**
     * @ngdoc method
     * @name $sanitizeProvider#addValidAttrs
     * @kind function
     *
     * @description
     * Extends the built-in list of valid attributes, i.e. attributes that are considered safe and are
     * not stripped off during sanitization.
     *
     * **Note**:
     * The new attributes will not be treated as URI attributes, which means their values will not be
     * sanitized as URIs using `$compileProvider`'s
     * {@link ng.$compileProvider#aHrefSanitizationWhitelist aHrefSanitizationWhitelist} and
     * {@link ng.$compileProvider#imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist}.
     *
     * <div class="alert alert-info">
     *   This method must be called during the {@link angular.Module#config config} phase. Once the
     *   `$sanitize` service has been instantiated, this method has no effect.
     * </div>
     *
     * <div class="alert alert-warning">
     *   Keep in mind that extending the built-in list of attributes may expose your app to XSS or
     *   other vulnerabilities. Be very mindful of the attributes you add.
     * </div>
     *
     * @param {Array<String>} attrs - A list of valid attributes.
     *
     * @returns {$sanitizeProvider} Returns self for chaining.
     */
    this.addValidAttrs = function(attrs) {
      if (!hasBeenInstantiated) {
        extend(validAttrs, arrayToMap(attrs, true));
      }
      return this;
    };
  
    //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
    // Private stuff
    //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
  
    bind = angular.bind;
    extend = angular.extend;
    forEach = angular.forEach;
    isArray = angular.isArray;
    isDefined = angular.isDefined;
    lowercase = angular.$$lowercase;
    noop = angular.noop;
  
    htmlParser = htmlParserImpl;
    htmlSanitizeWriter = htmlSanitizeWriterImpl;
  
    nodeContains = window.Node.prototype.contains || /** @this */ function(arg) {
      // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
      return !!(this.compareDocumentPosition(arg) & 16);
    };
  
    // Regular Expressions for parsing tags and attributes
    var SURROGATE_PAIR_REGEXP = /[\uD800-\uDBFF][\uDC00-\uDFFF]/g,
      // Match everything outside of normal chars and " (quote character)
      NON_ALPHANUMERIC_REGEXP = /([^#-~ |!])/g;
  
  
    // Good source of info about elements and attributes
    // http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#semantics
    // http://simon.html5.org/html-elements
  
    // Safe Void Elements - HTML5
    // http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#void-elements
    var voidElements = stringToMap('area,br,col,hr,img,wbr');
  
    // Elements that you can, intentionally, leave open (and which close themselves)
    // http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#optional-tags
    var optionalEndTagBlockElements = stringToMap('colgroup,dd,dt,li,p,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,tr'),
        optionalEndTagInlineElements = stringToMap('rp,rt'),
        optionalEndTagElements = extend({},
                                                optionalEndTagInlineElements,
                                                optionalEndTagBlockElements);
  
    // Safe Block Elements - HTML5
    var blockElements = extend({}, optionalEndTagBlockElements, stringToMap('address,article,' +
            'aside,blockquote,caption,center,del,dir,div,dl,figure,figcaption,footer,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,' +
            'h6,header,hgroup,hr,ins,map,menu,nav,ol,pre,section,table,ul'));
  
    // Inline Elements - HTML5
    var inlineElements = extend({}, optionalEndTagInlineElements, stringToMap('a,abbr,acronym,b,' +
            'bdi,bdo,big,br,cite,code,del,dfn,em,font,i,img,ins,kbd,label,map,mark,q,ruby,rp,rt,s,' +
            'samp,small,span,strike,strong,sub,sup,time,tt,u,var'));
  
    // SVG Elements
    // https://wiki.whatwg.org/wiki/Sanitization_rules#svg_Elements
    // Note: the elements animate,animateColor,animateMotion,animateTransform,set are intentionally omitted.
    // They can potentially allow for arbitrary javascript to be executed. See #11290
    var svgElements = stringToMap('circle,defs,desc,ellipse,font-face,font-face-name,font-face-src,g,glyph,' +
            'hkern,image,linearGradient,line,marker,metadata,missing-glyph,mpath,path,polygon,polyline,' +
            'radialGradient,rect,stop,svg,switch,text,title,tspan');
  
    // Blocked Elements (will be stripped)
    var blockedElements = stringToMap('script,style');
  
    var validElements = extend({},
                                       voidElements,
                                       blockElements,
                                       inlineElements,
                                       optionalEndTagElements);
  
    //Attributes that have href and hence need to be sanitized
    var uriAttrs = stringToMap('background,cite,href,longdesc,src,xlink:href,xml:base');
  
    var htmlAttrs = stringToMap('abbr,align,alt,axis,bgcolor,border,cellpadding,cellspacing,class,clear,' +
        'color,cols,colspan,compact,coords,dir,face,headers,height,hreflang,hspace,' +
        'ismap,lang,language,nohref,nowrap,rel,rev,rows,rowspan,rules,' +
        'scope,scrolling,shape,size,span,start,summary,tabindex,target,title,type,' +
        'valign,value,vspace,width');
  
    // SVG attributes (without "id" and "name" attributes)
    // https://wiki.whatwg.org/wiki/Sanitization_rules#svg_Attributes
    var svgAttrs = stringToMap('accent-height,accumulate,additive,alphabetic,arabic-form,ascent,' +
        'baseProfile,bbox,begin,by,calcMode,cap-height,class,color,color-rendering,content,' +
        'cx,cy,d,dx,dy,descent,display,dur,end,fill,fill-rule,font-family,font-size,font-stretch,' +
        'font-style,font-variant,font-weight,from,fx,fy,g1,g2,glyph-name,gradientUnits,hanging,' +
        'height,horiz-adv-x,horiz-origin-x,ideographic,k,keyPoints,keySplines,keyTimes,lang,' +
        'marker-end,marker-mid,marker-start,markerHeight,markerUnits,markerWidth,mathematical,' +
        'max,min,offset,opacity,orient,origin,overline-position,overline-thickness,panose-1,' +
        'path,pathLength,points,preserveAspectRatio,r,refX,refY,repeatCount,repeatDur,' +
        'requiredExtensions,requiredFeatures,restart,rotate,rx,ry,slope,stemh,stemv,stop-color,' +
        'stop-opacity,strikethrough-position,strikethrough-thickness,stroke,stroke-dasharray,' +
        'stroke-dashoffset,stroke-linecap,stroke-linejoin,stroke-miterlimit,stroke-opacity,' +
        'stroke-width,systemLanguage,target,text-anchor,to,transform,type,u1,u2,underline-position,' +
        'underline-thickness,unicode,unicode-range,units-per-em,values,version,viewBox,visibility,' +
        'width,widths,x,x-height,x1,x2,xlink:actuate,xlink:arcrole,xlink:role,xlink:show,xlink:title,' +
        'xlink:type,xml:base,xml:lang,xml:space,xmlns,xmlns:xlink,y,y1,y2,zoomAndPan', true);
  
    var validAttrs = extend({},
                                    uriAttrs,
                                    svgAttrs,
                                    htmlAttrs);
  
    function stringToMap(str, lowercaseKeys) {
      return arrayToMap(str.split(','), lowercaseKeys);
    }
  
    function arrayToMap(items, lowercaseKeys) {
      var obj = {}, i;
      for (i = 0; i < items.length; i++) {
        obj[lowercaseKeys ? lowercase(items[i]) : items[i]] = true;
      }
      return obj;
    }
  
    function addElementsTo(elementsMap, newElements) {
      if (newElements && newElements.length) {
        extend(elementsMap, arrayToMap(newElements));
      }
    }
  
    /**
     * Create an inert document that contains the dirty HTML that needs sanitizing
     * Depending upon browser support we use one of three strategies for doing this.
     * Support: Safari 10.x -> XHR strategy
     * Support: Firefox -> DomParser strategy
     */
    var getInertBodyElement /* function(html: string): HTMLBodyElement */ = (function(window, document) {
      var inertDocument;
      if (document && document.implementation) {
        inertDocument = document.implementation.createHTMLDocument('inert');
      } else {
        throw $sanitizeMinErr('noinert', 'Can\'t create an inert html document');
      }
      var inertBodyElement = (inertDocument.documentElement || inertDocument.getDocumentElement()).querySelector('body');
  
      // Check for the Safari 10.1 bug - which allows JS to run inside the SVG G element
      inertBodyElement.innerHTML = '<svg><g onload="this.parentNode.remove()"></g></svg>';
      if (!inertBodyElement.querySelector('svg')) {
        return getInertBodyElement_XHR;
      } else {
        // Check for the Firefox bug - which prevents the inner img JS from being sanitized
        inertBodyElement.innerHTML = '<svg><p><style><img src="</style><img src=x onerror=alert(1)//">';
        if (inertBodyElement.querySelector('svg img')) {
          return getInertBodyElement_DOMParser;
        } else {
          return getInertBodyElement_InertDocument;
        }
      }
  
      function getInertBodyElement_XHR(html) {
        // We add this dummy element to ensure that the rest of the content is parsed as expected
        // e.g. leading whitespace is maintained and tags like `<meta>` do not get hoisted to the `<head>` tag.
        html = '<remove></remove>' + html;
        try {
          html = encodeURI(html);
        } catch (e) {
          return undefined;
        }
        var xhr = new window.XMLHttpRequest();
        xhr.responseType = 'document';
        xhr.open('GET', 'data:text/html;charset=utf-8,' + html, false);
        xhr.send(null);
        var body = xhr.response.body;
        body.firstChild.remove();
        return body;
      }
  
      function getInertBodyElement_DOMParser(html) {
        // We add this dummy element to ensure that the rest of the content is parsed as expected
        // e.g. leading whitespace is maintained and tags like `<meta>` do not get hoisted to the `<head>` tag.
        html = '<remove></remove>' + html;
        try {
          var body = new window.DOMParser().parseFromString(html, 'text/html').body;
          body.firstChild.remove();
          return body;
        } catch (e) {
          return undefined;
        }
      }
  
      function getInertBodyElement_InertDocument(html) {
        inertBodyElement.innerHTML = html;
  
        // Support: IE 9-11 only
        // strip custom-namespaced attributes on IE<=11
        if (document.documentMode) {
          stripCustomNsAttrs(inertBodyElement);
        }
  
        return inertBodyElement;
      }
    })(window, window.document);
  
    /**
     * @example
     * htmlParser(htmlString, {
     *     start: function(tag, attrs) {},
     *     end: function(tag) {},
     *     chars: function(text) {},
     *     comment: function(text) {}
     * });
     *
     * @param {string} html string
     * @param {object} handler
     */
    function htmlParserImpl(html, handler) {
      if (html === null || html === undefined) {
        html = '';
      } else if (typeof html !== 'string') {
        html = '' + html;
      }
  
      var inertBodyElement = getInertBodyElement(html);
      if (!inertBodyElement) return '';
  
      //mXSS protection
      var mXSSAttempts = 5;
      do {
        if (mXSSAttempts === 0) {
          throw $sanitizeMinErr('uinput', 'Failed to sanitize html because the input is unstable');
        }
        mXSSAttempts--;
  
        // trigger mXSS if it is going to happen by reading and writing the innerHTML
        html = inertBodyElement.innerHTML;
        inertBodyElement = getInertBodyElement(html);
      } while (html !== inertBodyElement.innerHTML);
  
      var node = inertBodyElement.firstChild;
      while (node) {
        switch (node.nodeType) {
          case 1: // ELEMENT_NODE
            handler.start(node.nodeName.toLowerCase(), attrToMap(node.attributes));
            break;
          case 3: // TEXT NODE
            handler.chars(node.textContent);
            break;
        }
  
        var nextNode;
        if (!(nextNode = node.firstChild)) {
          if (node.nodeType === 1) {
            handler.end(node.nodeName.toLowerCase());
          }
          nextNode = getNonDescendant('nextSibling', node);
          if (!nextNode) {
            while (nextNode == null) {
              node = getNonDescendant('parentNode', node);
              if (node === inertBodyElement) break;
              nextNode = getNonDescendant('nextSibling', node);
              if (node.nodeType === 1) {
                handler.end(node.nodeName.toLowerCase());
              }
            }
          }
        }
        node = nextNode;
      }
  
      while ((node = inertBodyElement.firstChild)) {
        inertBodyElement.removeChild(node);
      }
    }
  
    function attrToMap(attrs) {
      var map = {};
      for (var i = 0, ii = attrs.length; i < ii; i++) {
        var attr = attrs[i];
        map[attr.name] = attr.value;
      }
      return map;
    }
  
  
    /**
     * Escapes all potentially dangerous characters, so that the
     * resulting string can be safely inserted into attribute or
     * element text.
     * @param value
     * @returns {string} escaped text
     */
    function encodeEntities(value) {
      return value.
        replace(/&/g, '&amp;').
        replace(SURROGATE_PAIR_REGEXP, function(value) {
          var hi = value.charCodeAt(0);
          var low = value.charCodeAt(1);
          return '&#' + (((hi - 0xD800) * 0x400) + (low - 0xDC00) + 0x10000) + ';';
        }).
        replace(NON_ALPHANUMERIC_REGEXP, function(value) {
          return '&#' + value.charCodeAt(0) + ';';
        }).
        replace(/</g, '&lt;').
        replace(/>/g, '&gt;');
    }
  
    /**
     * create an HTML/XML writer which writes to buffer
     * @param {Array} buf use buf.join('') to get out sanitized html string
     * @returns {object} in the form of {
     *     start: function(tag, attrs) {},
     *     end: function(tag) {},
     *     chars: function(text) {},
     *     comment: function(text) {}
     * }
     */
    function htmlSanitizeWriterImpl(buf, uriValidator) {
      var ignoreCurrentElement = false;
      var out = bind(buf, buf.push);
      return {
        start: function(tag, attrs) {
          tag = lowercase(tag);
          if (!ignoreCurrentElement && blockedElements[tag]) {
            ignoreCurrentElement = tag;
          }
          if (!ignoreCurrentElement && validElements[tag] === true) {
            out('<');
            out(tag);
            forEach(attrs, function(value, key) {
              var lkey = lowercase(key);
              var isImage = (tag === 'img' && lkey === 'src') || (lkey === 'background');
              if (validAttrs[lkey] === true &&
                (uriAttrs[lkey] !== true || uriValidator(value, isImage))) {
                out(' ');
                out(key);
                out('="');
                out(encodeEntities(value));
                out('"');
              }
            });
            out('>');
          }
        },
        end: function(tag) {
          tag = lowercase(tag);
          if (!ignoreCurrentElement && validElements[tag] === true && voidElements[tag] !== true) {
            out('</');
            out(tag);
            out('>');
          }
          // eslint-disable-next-line eqeqeq
          if (tag == ignoreCurrentElement) {
            ignoreCurrentElement = false;
          }
        },
        chars: function(chars) {
          if (!ignoreCurrentElement) {
            out(encodeEntities(chars));
          }
        }
      };
    }
  
  
    /**
     * When IE9-11 comes across an unknown namespaced attribute e.g. 'xlink:foo' it adds 'xmlns:ns1' attribute to declare
     * ns1 namespace and prefixes the attribute with 'ns1' (e.g. 'ns1:xlink:foo'). This is undesirable since we don't want
     * to allow any of these custom attributes. This method strips them all.
     *
     * @param node Root element to process
     */
    function stripCustomNsAttrs(node) {
      while (node) {
        if (node.nodeType === window.Node.ELEMENT_NODE) {
          var attrs = node.attributes;
          for (var i = 0, l = attrs.length; i < l; i++) {
            var attrNode = attrs[i];
            var attrName = attrNode.name.toLowerCase();
            if (attrName === 'xmlns:ns1' || attrName.lastIndexOf('ns1:', 0) === 0) {
              node.removeAttributeNode(attrNode);
              i--;
              l--;
            }
          }
        }
  
        var nextNode = node.firstChild;
        if (nextNode) {
          stripCustomNsAttrs(nextNode);
        }
  
        node = getNonDescendant('nextSibling', node);
      }
    }
  
    function getNonDescendant(propName, node) {
      // An element is clobbered if its `propName` property points to one of its descendants
      var nextNode = node[propName];
      if (nextNode && nodeContains.call(node, nextNode)) {
        throw $sanitizeMinErr('elclob', 'Failed to sanitize html because the element is clobbered: {0}', node.outerHTML || node.outerText);
      }
      return nextNode;
    }
  }
  
  function sanitizeText(chars) {
    var buf = [];
    var writer = htmlSanitizeWriter(buf, noop);
    writer.chars(chars);
    return buf.join('');
  }
  
  
  // define ngSanitize module and register $sanitize service
  angular.module('ngSanitize', [])
    .provider('$sanitize', $SanitizeProvider)
    .info({ angularVersion: '1.7.2' });
  
  /**
   * @ngdoc filter
   * @name linky
   * @kind function
   *
   * @description
   * Finds links in text input and turns them into html links. Supports `http/https/ftp/sftp/mailto` and
   * plain email address links.
   *
   * Requires the {@link ngSanitize `ngSanitize`} module to be installed.
   *
   * @param {string} text Input text.
   * @param {string} [target] Window (`_blank|_self|_parent|_top`) or named frame to open links in.
   * @param {object|function(url)} [attributes] Add custom attributes to the link element.
   *
   *    Can be one of:
   *
   *    - `object`: A map of attributes
   *    - `function`: Takes the url as a parameter and returns a map of attributes
   *
   *    If the map of attributes contains a value for `target`, it overrides the value of
   *    the target parameter.
   *
   *
   * @returns {string} Html-linkified and {@link $sanitize sanitized} text.
   *
   * @usage
     <span ng-bind-html="linky_expression | linky"></span>
   *
   * @example
     <example module="linkyExample" deps="angular-sanitize.js" name="linky-filter">
       <file name="index.html">
         <div ng-controller="ExampleController">
         Snippet: <textarea ng-model="snippet" cols="60" rows="3"></textarea>
         <table>
           <tr>
             <th>Filter</th>
             <th>Source</th>
             <th>Rendered</th>
           </tr>
           <tr id="linky-filter">
             <td>linky filter</td>
             <td>
               <pre>&lt;div ng-bind-html="snippet | linky"&gt;<br>&lt;/div&gt;</pre>
             </td>
             <td>
               <div ng-bind-html="snippet | linky"></div>
             </td>
           </tr>
           <tr id="linky-target">
            <td>linky target</td>
            <td>
              <pre>&lt;div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'"&gt;<br>&lt;/div&gt;</pre>
            </td>
            <td>
              <div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'"></div>
            </td>
           </tr>
           <tr id="linky-custom-attributes">
            <td>linky custom attributes</td>
            <td>
              <pre>&lt;div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}"&gt;<br>&lt;/div&gt;</pre>
            </td>
            <td>
              <div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}"></div>
            </td>
           </tr>
           <tr id="escaped-html">
             <td>no filter</td>
             <td><pre>&lt;div ng-bind="snippet"&gt;<br>&lt;/div&gt;</pre></td>
             <td><div ng-bind="snippet"></div></td>
           </tr>
         </table>
       </file>
       <file name="script.js">
         angular.module('linkyExample', ['ngSanitize'])
           .controller('ExampleController', ['$scope', function($scope) {
             $scope.snippet =
               'Pretty text with some links:\n' +
               'http://angularjs.org/,\n' +
               'mailto:us@somewhere.org,\n' +
               'another@somewhere.org,\n' +
               'and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.';
             $scope.snippetWithSingleURL = 'http://angularjs.org/';
           }]);
       </file>
       <file name="protractor.js" type="protractor">
         it('should linkify the snippet with urls', function() {
           expect(element(by.id('linky-filter')).element(by.binding('snippet | linky')).getText()).
               toBe('Pretty text with some links: http://angularjs.org/, us@somewhere.org, ' +
                    'another@somewhere.org, and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.');
           expect(element.all(by.css('#linky-filter a')).count()).toEqual(4);
         });
  
         it('should not linkify snippet without the linky filter', function() {
           expect(element(by.id('escaped-html')).element(by.binding('snippet')).getText()).
               toBe('Pretty text with some links: http://angularjs.org/, mailto:us@somewhere.org, ' +
                    'another@somewhere.org, and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.');
           expect(element.all(by.css('#escaped-html a')).count()).toEqual(0);
         });
  
         it('should update', function() {
           element(by.model('snippet')).clear();
           element(by.model('snippet')).sendKeys('new http://link.');
           expect(element(by.id('linky-filter')).element(by.binding('snippet | linky')).getText()).
               toBe('new http://link.');
           expect(element.all(by.css('#linky-filter a')).count()).toEqual(1);
           expect(element(by.id('escaped-html')).element(by.binding('snippet')).getText())
               .toBe('new http://link.');
         });
  
         it('should work with the target property', function() {
          expect(element(by.id('linky-target')).
              element(by.binding("snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'")).getText()).
              toBe('http://angularjs.org/');
          expect(element(by.css('#linky-target a')).getAttribute('target')).toEqual('_blank');
         });
  
         it('should optionally add custom attributes', function() {
          expect(element(by.id('linky-custom-attributes')).
              element(by.binding("snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}")).getText()).
              toBe('http://angularjs.org/');
          expect(element(by.css('#linky-custom-attributes a')).getAttribute('rel')).toEqual('nofollow');
         });
       </file>
     </example>
   */
  angular.module('ngSanitize').filter('linky', ['$sanitize', function($sanitize) {
    var LINKY_URL_REGEXP =
          /((s?ftp|https?):\/\/|(www\.)|(mailto:)?[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@)\S*[^\s.;,(){}<>"\u201d\u2019]/i,
        MAILTO_REGEXP = /^mailto:/i;
  
    var linkyMinErr = angular.$$minErr('linky');
    var isDefined = angular.isDefined;
    var isFunction = angular.isFunction;
    var isObject = angular.isObject;
    var isString = angular.isString;
  
    return function(text, target, attributes) {
      if (text == null || text === '') return text;
      if (!isString(text)) throw linkyMinErr('notstring', 'Expected string but received: {0}', text);
  
      var attributesFn =
        isFunction(attributes) ? attributes :
        isObject(attributes) ? function getAttributesObject() {return attributes;} :
        function getEmptyAttributesObject() {return {};};
  
      var match;
      var raw = text;
      var html = [];
      var url;
      var i;
      while ((match = raw.match(LINKY_URL_REGEXP))) {
        // We can not end in these as they are sometimes found at the end of the sentence
        url = match[0];
        // if we did not match ftp/http/www/mailto then assume mailto
        if (!match[2] && !match[4]) {
          url = (match[3] ? 'http://' : 'mailto:') + url;
        }
        i = match.index;
        addText(raw.substr(0, i));
        addLink(url, match[0].replace(MAILTO_REGEXP, ''));
        raw = raw.substring(i + match[0].length);
      }
      addText(raw);
      return $sanitize(html.join(''));
  
      function addText(text) {
        if (!text) {
          return;
        }
        html.push(sanitizeText(text));
      }
  
      function addLink(url, text) {
        var key, linkAttributes = attributesFn(url);
        html.push('<a ');
  
        for (key in linkAttributes) {
          html.push(key + '="' + linkAttributes[key] + '" ');
        }
  
        if (isDefined(target) && !('target' in linkAttributes)) {
          html.push('target="',
                    target,
                    '" ');
        }
        html.push('href="',
                  url.replace(/"/g, '&quot;'),
                  '">');
        addText(text);
        html.push('</a>');
      }
    };
  }]);
  
  
  })(window, window.angular);
  