text: /* ssl/t1_enc.c */
  /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
   * All rights reserved.
   *
   * This package is an SSL implementation written
   * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
   * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
   *
   * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
   * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
   * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
   * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
   * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
   * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
   *
   * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
   * the code are not to be removed.
   * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
   * as the author of the parts of the library used.
   * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
   * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
   *
   * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
   * are met:
   * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
   * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
   *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
   * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
   *    must display the following acknowledgement:
   *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
   *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
   *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
   *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
   * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
   *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
   *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
   *
   * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
   * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
   * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
   * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
   * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
   * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
   * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
   * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
   * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
   * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
   * SUCH DAMAGE.
   *
   * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
   * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
   * copied and put under another distribution licence
   * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
   */
  /* ====================================================================
   * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
   *
   * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
   * are met:
   *
   * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
   *
   * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
   *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
   *    distribution.
   *
   * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
   *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
   *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
   *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
   *
   * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
   *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
   *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
   *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
   *
   * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
   *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
   *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
   *
   * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
   *    acknowledgment:
   *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
   *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
   *
   * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
   * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
   * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
   * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
   * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
   * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
   * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
   * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
   * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
   * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
   * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
   * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
   * ====================================================================
   *
   * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
   * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
   * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
   *
   */
  /* ====================================================================
   * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
   *
   * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
   * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
   * license.
   *
   * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
   * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
   * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
   *
   * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
   * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
   * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
   *
   * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
   * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
   * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
   * to make use of the Contribution.
   *
   * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
   * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
   * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
   * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
   * OTHERWISE.
   */
  
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include "ssl_locl.h"
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
  # include <openssl/comp.h>
  #endif
  #include <openssl/evp.h>
  #include <openssl/hmac.h>
  #include <openssl/md5.h>
  #include <openssl/rand.h>
  #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
  # include <openssl/des.h>
  #endif
  
  /* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
  static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
                         int sec_len,
                         const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
                         const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
                         const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
                         const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
                         const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
                         unsigned char *out, int olen)
  {
      int chunk;
      size_t j;
      EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp;
      EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
      unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
      size_t A1_len;
      int ret = 0;
  
      chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
      OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
  
      EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
      EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
      EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
      EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
      mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
      if (!mac_key)
          goto err;
      if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
          goto err;
      if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
          goto err;
      if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
          goto err;
      if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
          goto err;
      if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
          goto err;
      if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len))
          goto err;
      if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len))
          goto err;
      if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
          goto err;
  
      for (;;) {
          /* Reinit mac contexts */
          if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
              goto err;
          if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
              goto err;
          if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len))
              goto err;
          if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp, A1, A1_len))
              goto err;
          if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
              goto err;
          if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
              goto err;
          if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
              goto err;
          if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len))
              goto err;
          if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len))
              goto err;
  
          if (olen > chunk) {
              if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, &j))
                  goto err;
              out += j;
              olen -= j;
              /* calc the next A1 value */
              if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len))
                  goto err;
          } else {                /* last one */
  
              if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
                  goto err;
              memcpy(out, A1, olen);
              break;
          }
      }
      ret = 1;
   err:
      EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
      EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
      EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
      OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1));
      return ret;
  }
  
  /* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
  static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
                      const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
                      const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
                      const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
                      const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
                      const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
                      const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
                      unsigned char *out1, unsigned char *out2, int olen)
  {
      int len, i, idx, count;
      const unsigned char *S1;
      long m;
      const EVP_MD *md;
      int ret = 0;
  
      /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */
      count = 0;
      for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) {
          if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask)
              count++;
      }
      if (!count) {
          /* Should never happen */
          SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
          goto err;
      }
      len = slen / count;
      if (count == 1)
          slen = 0;
      S1 = sec;
      memset(out1, 0, olen);
      for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) {
          if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) {
              if (!md) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE);
                  goto err;
              }
              if (!tls1_P_hash(md, S1, len + (slen & 1),
                               seed1, seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len, seed3,
                               seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, seed5, seed5_len,
                               out2, olen))
                  goto err;
              S1 += len;
              for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) {
                  out1[i] ^= out2[i];
              }
          }
      }
      ret = 1;
   err:
      return ret;
  }
  
  static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
                                     unsigned char *tmp, int num)
  {
      int ret;
      ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
                     TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
                     TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, s->s3->server_random,
                     SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
                     NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key,
                     s->session->master_key_length, km, tmp, num);
  #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
      fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t",
              s->session->master_key_length);
      {
          int i;
          for (i = 0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++) {
              fprintf(stderr, "%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
          }
          fprintf(stderr, "\n");
      }
  #endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
      return ret;
  }
  
  int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
  {
      static const unsigned char empty[] = "";
      unsigned char *p, *mac_secret;
      unsigned char *exp_label;
      unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
      unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
      unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
      unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
      unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv;
      int client_write;
      EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
      const EVP_CIPHER *c;
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
      const SSL_COMP *comp;
  #endif
      const EVP_MD *m;
      int mac_type;
      int *mac_secret_size;
      EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
      EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
      int is_export, n, i, j, k, exp_label_len, cl;
      int reuse_dd = 0;
  
      is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
      c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
      m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
      mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
      comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
  #endif
  
  #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
      fprintf(stderr, "tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
      fprintf(stderr, "\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
              s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
              s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, comp);
      fprintf(stderr, "\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
      fprintf(stderr, "\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
              c->nid, c->block_size, c->key_len, c->iv_len);
      fprintf(stderr, "\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ",
              s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
      {
          int i;
          for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
              fprintf(stderr, "%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]);
          fprintf(stderr, "\n");
      }
  #endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
  
      if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
          if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
              s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
          else
              s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
  
          if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
              reuse_dd = 1;
          else if ((s->enc_read_ctx =
                    OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
              goto err;
          else
              /*
               * make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error
               */
              EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
          dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
          mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
          if (s->expand != NULL) {
              COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
              s->expand = NULL;
          }
          if (comp != NULL) {
              s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
              if (s->expand == NULL) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
                         SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
                  goto err2;
              }
              if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
                  s->s3->rrec.comp = (unsigned char *)
                      OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
              if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
                  goto err;
          }
  #endif
          /*
           * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION
           */
          if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
              memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
          mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
          mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
      } else {
          if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
              s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
          else
              s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
          if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
              reuse_dd = 1;
          else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
              goto err;
          dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
          if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
              mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
              if (!mac_ctx)
                  goto err;
              s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
          } else
              mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
          if (s->compress != NULL) {
              COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
              s->compress = NULL;
          }
          if (comp != NULL) {
              s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
              if (s->compress == NULL) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
                         SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
                  goto err2;
              }
          }
  #endif
          /*
           * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION
           */
          if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
              memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
          mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
          mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
      }
  
      if (reuse_dd)
          EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
  
      p = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
      i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
  
      cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
      j = is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
                       cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
      /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
      /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
      if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
          k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
      else
          k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
      if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
          (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
          ms = &(p[0]);
          n = i + i;
          key = &(p[n]);
          n += j + j;
          iv = &(p[n]);
          n += k + k;
          exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
          exp_label_len = TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
          client_write = 1;
      } else {
          n = i;
          ms = &(p[n]);
          n += i + j;
          key = &(p[n]);
          n += j + k;
          iv = &(p[n]);
          n += k;
          exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
          exp_label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
          client_write = 0;
      }
  
      if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
          SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
          goto err2;
      }
  
      memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i);
  
      if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
          mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
                                         mac_secret, *mac_secret_size);
          EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key);
          EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
      }
  #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
      printf("which = %04X\nmac key=", which);
      {
          int z;
          for (z = 0; z < i; z++)
              printf("%02X%c", ms[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
      }
  #endif
      if (is_export) {
          /*
           * In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the same value
           * since only the correct one will be used :-).
           */
          if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
                        exp_label, exp_label_len,
                        s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
                        s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
                        NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
                        key, j, tmp1, tmp2, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
              goto err2;
          key = tmp1;
  
          if (k > 0) {
              if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
                            TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST, TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
                            s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
                            s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
                            NULL, 0, NULL, 0, empty, 0, iv1, iv2, k * 2))
                  goto err2;
              if (client_write)
                  iv = iv1;
              else
                  iv = &(iv1[k]);
          }
      }
  
      s->session->key_arg_length = 0;
  #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
      {
          int i;
          fprintf(stderr, "EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
          fprintf(stderr, "\tkey= ");
          for (i = 0; i < c->key_len; i++)
              fprintf(stderr, "%02x", key[i]);
          fprintf(stderr, "\n");
          fprintf(stderr, "\t iv= ");
          for (i = 0; i < c->iv_len; i++)
              fprintf(stderr, "%02x", iv[i]);
          fprintf(stderr, "\n");
      }
  #endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
  
      if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
          if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
              || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv)) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
              goto err2;
          }
      } else {
          if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
              goto err2;
          }
      }
      /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
      if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size
          && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
                                  *mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) {
          SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
          goto err2;
      }
  
  #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
      printf("which = %04X\nkey=", which);
      {
          int z;
          for (z = 0; z < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++)
              printf("%02X%c", key[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
      }
      printf("\niv=");
      {
          int z;
          for (z = 0; z < k; z++)
              printf("%02X%c", iv[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
      }
      printf("\n");
  #endif
  
      OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1, sizeof(tmp1));
      OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, sizeof(tmp1));
      OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1, sizeof(iv1));
      OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2, sizeof(iv2));
      return (1);
   err:
      SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
   err2:
      return (0);
  }
  
  int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
  {
      unsigned char *p1, *p2 = NULL;
      const EVP_CIPHER *c;
      const EVP_MD *hash;
      int num;
      SSL_COMP *comp;
      int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0;
      int ret = 0;
  
  #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
      fprintf(stderr, "tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
  #endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
  
      if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
          return (1);
  
      if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp
          (s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, &comp)) {
          SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
          return (0);
      }
  
      s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
      s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
      s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
      s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
      num =
          EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
      num *= 2;
  
      ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
  
      if ((p1 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
          SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
          goto err;
      }
  
      s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num;
      s->s3->tmp.key_block = p1;
  
      if ((p2 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
          SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
          OPENSSL_free(p1);
          goto err;
      }
  #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
      printf("client random\n");
      {
          int z;
          for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
              printf("%02X%c", s->s3->client_random[z],
                     ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
      }
      printf("server random\n");
      {
          int z;
          for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
              printf("%02X%c", s->s3->server_random[z],
                     ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
      }
      printf("pre-master\n");
      {
          int z;
          for (z = 0; z < s->session->master_key_length; z++)
              printf("%02X%c", s->session->master_key[z],
                     ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
      }
  #endif
      if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p1, p2, num))
          goto err;
  #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
      printf("\nkey block\n");
      {
          int z;
          for (z = 0; z < num; z++)
              printf("%02X%c", p1[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
      }
  #endif
  
      if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
          && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) {
          /*
           * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
           * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
           */
          s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
  
          if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
              if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
                  s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
  
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
              if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
                  s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
  #endif
          }
      }
  
      ret = 1;
   err:
      if (p2) {
          OPENSSL_cleanse(p2, num);
          OPENSSL_free(p2);
      }
      return (ret);
  }
  
  /*-
   * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
   *
   * Returns:
   *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
   *       short etc).
   *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
   *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
   *       an internal error occured.
   */
  int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
  {
      SSL3_RECORD *rec;
      EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
      unsigned long l;
      int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0;
      const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
  
      if (send) 
  	{
          if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) 
  		{
              int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
              OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
          }
          ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
          rec = &(s->s3->wrec);
          if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
          {
  			enc = NULL;
  		}
          else
  		{
              int ivlen;
              enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
              /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
              if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
                  && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
                  ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
              else
                  ivlen = 0;
              if (ivlen > 1) 
  			{
                  if (rec->data != rec->input)
                      /*
                       * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
                       * happen?? (steve)
                       */
                      fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n", __FILE__, __LINE__);
                  else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
                      return -1;
              }
          }
      } 
  	else 
  	{
          if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) 
  		{
              int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
              OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
          }
          ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
          rec = &(s->s3->rrec);
          if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
              enc = NULL;
          else
              enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
      }
  
  #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
      fprintf(stderr, "tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
  #endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
  
      if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) 
  	{
          memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
          rec->input = rec->data;
          ret = 1;
      } 
  	else 
  	{
          l = rec->length;
          bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
  
          if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
              unsigned char buf[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN], *seq;
  
              seq = send ? s->s3->write_sequence : s->s3->read_sequence;
  
              if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
                  unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq;
  
                  s2n(send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch, p);
                  memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
                  memcpy(buf, dtlsseq, 8);
              } else {
                  memcpy(buf, seq, 8);
                  for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */
                      ++seq[i];
                      if (seq[i] != 0)
                          break;
                  }
              }
  
              buf[8] = rec->type;
              buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
              buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
              buf[11] = rec->length >> 8;
              buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff;
              pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
                                        EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf);
              if (pad <= 0)
                  return -1;
              if (send) {
                  l += pad;
                  rec->length += pad;
              }
          } else if ((bs != 1) && send) {
              i = bs - ((int)l % bs);
  
              /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
  
              /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
              j = i - 1;
              if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) {
                  if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
                      j++;
              }
              for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++)
                  rec->input[k] = j;
              l += i;
              rec->length += i;
          }
  #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
          {
              unsigned long ui;
              fprintf(stderr,
                      "EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
                      ds, rec->data, rec->input, l);
              fprintf(stderr,
                      "\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%lu %lu], %d iv_len\n",
                      ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len, DES_KEY_SZ,
                      DES_SCHEDULE_SZ, ds->cipher->iv_len);
              fprintf(stderr, "\t\tIV: ");
              for (i = 0; i < ds->cipher->iv_len; i++)
                  fprintf(stderr, "%02X", ds->iv[i]);
              fprintf(stderr, "\n");
              fprintf(stderr, "\trec->input=");
              for (ui = 0; ui < l; ui++)
                  fprintf(stderr, " %02x", rec->input[ui]);
              fprintf(stderr, "\n");
          }
  #endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
  
          if (!send) {
              if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0)
                  return 0;
          }
  
          i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l);
          if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
              ? (i < 0)
              : (i == 0))
              return -1;          /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
          if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) {
              rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
              rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
              rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
          }
  #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
          {
              unsigned long i;
              fprintf(stderr, "\trec->data=");
              for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
                  fprintf(stderr, " %02x", rec->data[i]);
              fprintf(stderr, "\n");
          }
  #endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
  
          ret = 1;
          if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
              mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
          if ((bs != 1) && !send)
              ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
          if (pad && !send)
              rec->length -= pad;
      }
      return ret;
  }
  
  int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
  {
      unsigned int ret;
      EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL;
      int i;
  
      if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
          if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
              return 0;
  
      for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
          if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]
              && EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) {
              d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
              break;
          }
      }
      if (!d) {
          SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
          return 0;
      }
  
      EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
      EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d);
      EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret);
      EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
      return ((int)ret);
  }
  
  int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
                            const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
  {
      unsigned int i;
      EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
      unsigned char buf[2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
      unsigned char *q, buf2[12];
      int idx;
      long mask;
      int err = 0;
      const EVP_MD *md;
  
      q = buf;
  
      if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
          if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
              return 0;
  
      EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
  
      for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &mask, &md); idx++) {
          if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) {
              int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
              EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx];
              if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0
                  || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q - buf))) {
                  /*
                   * internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite!
                   */
                  err = 1;
              } else {
                  if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
                      !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, q, &i) ||
                      (i != (unsigned int)hashsize))
                      err = 1;
                  q += hashsize;
              }
          }
      }
  
      if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
                    str, slen, buf, (int)(q - buf), NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
                    s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
                    out, buf2, sizeof buf2))
          err = 1;
      EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
  
      OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (int)(q - buf));
      OPENSSL_cleanse(buf2, sizeof(buf2));
      if (err)
          return 0;
      else
          return sizeof buf2;
  }
  
  int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
  {
      SSL3_RECORD *rec;
      unsigned char *seq;
      EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
      size_t md_size, orig_len;
      int i;
      EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
      unsigned char header[13];
      int stream_mac = (send ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
                        : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
      int t;
  
      if (send) {
          rec = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
          seq = &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
          hash = ssl->write_hash;
      } else {
          rec = &(ssl->s3->rrec);
          seq = &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
          hash = ssl->read_hash;
      }
  
      t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
      OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
      md_size = t;
  
      /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
      if (stream_mac) {
          mac_ctx = hash;
      } else {
          if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash))
              return -1;
          mac_ctx = &hmac;
      }
  
      if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
          unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
  
          s2n(send ? ssl->d1->w_epoch : ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
          memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
  
          memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
      } else
          memcpy(header, seq, 8);
  
      /*
       * kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type
       */
      orig_len = rec->length + md_size + ((unsigned int)rec->type >> 8);
      rec->type &= 0xff;
  
      header[8] = rec->type;
      header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
      header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
      header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8;
      header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff;
  
      if (!send &&
          EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
          ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
          /*
           * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
           * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
           * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
           */
          /* Final param == not SSLv3 */
          ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx,
                                 md, &md_size,
                                 header, rec->input,
                                 rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
                                 ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
                                 ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0);
      } else {
          EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header));
          EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length);
          t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size);
          OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
  #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
          if (!send && FIPS_mode())
              tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx,
                                    mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length, orig_len);
  #endif
      }
  
      if (!stream_mac)
          EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
  #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
      fprintf(stderr, "seq=");
      {
          int z;
          for (z = 0; z < 8; z++)
              fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", seq[z]);
          fprintf(stderr, "\n");
      }
      fprintf(stderr, "rec=");
      {
          unsigned int z;
          for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++)
              fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]);
          fprintf(stderr, "\n");
      }
  #endif
  
      if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
          for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
              ++seq[i];
              if (seq[i] != 0)
                  break;
          }
      }
  #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
      {
          unsigned int z;
          for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++)
              fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", md[z]);
          fprintf(stderr, "\n");
      }
  #endif
      return (md_size);
  }
  
  int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
                                  int len)
  {
      unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
      const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL;
      int col = 0, sol = 0;
  
  #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
      fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s, out, p,
              len);
  #endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
  
  #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
      if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL
          && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL
          && s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0
          && s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
          s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
     {
          co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input;
          col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
          so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input;
          /*
           * must be same as col (see
           * draft-resc-00.txts-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1)
           */
          sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
      }
  #endif
  
      tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
               TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
               s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
               co, col,
               s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
               so, sol, p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff);
      OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, sizeof buff);
  #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
      fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
      BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
      fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
      BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
      fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
      BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
      fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
      BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key,
                  SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
  #endif
  
  #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
      fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
  #endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
      return (SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
  }
  
  int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
                                  const char *label, size_t llen,
                                  const unsigned char *context,
                                  size_t contextlen, int use_context)
  {
      unsigned char *buff;
      unsigned char *val = NULL;
      size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
      int rv;
  
  #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
      fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%lu,%s,%lu,%p,%lu)\n",
              s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen);
  #endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
  
      buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
      if (buff == NULL)
          goto err2;
  
      /*
       * construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather
       * than passing separate values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the
       * concatenation of values does not create a prohibited label.
       */
      vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
      if (use_context) {
          vallen += 2 + contextlen;
      }
  
      val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
      if (val == NULL)
          goto err2;
      currentvalpos = 0;
      memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen);
      currentvalpos += llen;
      memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
      currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
      memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
      currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
  
      if (use_context) {
          val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
          currentvalpos++;
          val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
          currentvalpos++;
          if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) {
              memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
          }
      }
  
      /*
       * disallow prohibited labels note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited
       * label len) = 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and
       * the comparisons won't have buffer overflow
       */
      if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
                 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
          goto err1;
      if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
                 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
          goto err1;
      if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
                 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
          goto err1;
      if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
                 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
          goto err1;
  
      rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
                    val, vallen,
                    NULL, 0,
                    NULL, 0,
                    NULL, 0,
                    NULL, 0,
                    s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
                    out, buff, olen);
      OPENSSL_cleanse(val, vallen);
      OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, olen);
  
  #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
      fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
  #endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
      goto ret;
   err1:
      SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL,
             SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
      rv = 0;
      goto ret;
   err2:
      SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
      rv = 0;
   ret:
      if (buff != NULL)
          OPENSSL_free(buff);
      if (val != NULL)
          OPENSSL_free(val);
      return (rv);
  }
  
  int tls1_alert_code(int code)
  {
      switch (code) {
      case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
          return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
      case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
          return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
      case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
          return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
      case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
          return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
      case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
          return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
      case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
          return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
      case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
          return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
      case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
          return (-1);
      case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
          return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
      case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
          return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
      case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
          return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
      case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
          return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
      case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
          return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
      case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
          return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
      case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
          return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
      case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
          return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
      case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
          return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
      case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
          return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
      case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
          return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
      case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
          return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
      case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
          return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
      case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
          return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
      case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
          return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
      case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
          return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
      case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
          return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
      case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
          return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE);
      case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
          return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
      case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
          return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
      case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
          return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
      case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
          return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
      case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
          return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
  #if 0
          /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
      case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE:
          return (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
  #endif
      default:
          return (-1);
      }
  }
  