text: /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
   * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
   *
   * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
   * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
   * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
   * All Rights Reserved.
   *
   * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
   * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
   * (at your option) any later version.
   *
   * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
   * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
   * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
   * GNU General Public License for more details.
   *
   * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
   * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
   * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA
   *
   * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
   *
   * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
   * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
   *
   * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
   * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
   * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
   *
   * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
   * 2006.
   *
   * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
   * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
   *
   * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
   * filesystem information.
   *
   * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
   * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
   */
  
  #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
  
  #include <linux/init.h>
  #include <asm/types.h>
  #include <linux/atomic.h>
  #include <linux/fs.h>
  #include <linux/namei.h>
  #include <linux/mm.h>
  #include <linux/export.h>
  #include <linux/slab.h>
  #include <linux/mount.h>
  #include <linux/socket.h>
  #include <linux/mqueue.h>
  #include <linux/audit.h>
  #include <linux/personality.h>
  #include <linux/time.h>
  #include <linux/netlink.h>
  #include <linux/compiler.h>
  #include <asm/unistd.h>
  #include <linux/security.h>
  #include <linux/list.h>
  #include <linux/binfmts.h>
  #include <linux/highmem.h>
  #include <linux/syscalls.h>
  #include <asm/syscall.h>
  #include <linux/capability.h>
  #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
  #include <linux/compat.h>
  #include <linux/ctype.h>
  #include <linux/string.h>
  #include <linux/uaccess.h>
  #include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
  #include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
  
  #include "audit.h"
  
  /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
  #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
  #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
  #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
  
  /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits),
   * see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */
  #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
  
  /* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
  #define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
  
  /* number of audit rules */
  int audit_n_rules;
  
  /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
  int audit_signals;
  
  struct audit_aux_data {
  	struct audit_aux_data	*next;
  	int			type;
  };
  
  #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM	0
  
  /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
  #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS	16
  
  struct audit_aux_data_pids {
  	struct audit_aux_data	d;
  	pid_t			target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
  	kuid_t			target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
  	kuid_t			target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
  	unsigned int		target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
  	u32			target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
  	char 			target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
  	int			pid_count;
  };
  
  struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
  	struct audit_aux_data	d;
  	struct audit_cap_data	fcap;
  	unsigned int		fcap_ver;
  	struct audit_cap_data	old_pcap;
  	struct audit_cap_data	new_pcap;
  };
  
  struct audit_tree_refs {
  	struct audit_tree_refs *next;
  	struct audit_chunk *c[31];
  };
  
  static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
  {
  	unsigned n;
  	if (unlikely(!ctx))
  		return 0;
  	n = ctx->major;
  
  	switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
  	case 0:	/* native */
  		if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
  		     audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
  			return 1;
  		if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
  		     audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
  			return 1;
  		if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
  		     audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
  			return 1;
  		return 0;
  	case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
  		if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
  		     audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
  			return 1;
  		if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
  		     audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
  			return 1;
  		if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
  		     audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
  			return 1;
  		return 0;
  	case 2: /* open */
  		return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
  	case 3: /* openat */
  		return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
  	case 4: /* socketcall */
  		return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
  	case 5: /* execve */
  		return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
  	default:
  		return 0;
  	}
  }
  
  static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
  {
  	struct audit_names *n;
  	umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
  
  	if (unlikely(!ctx))
  		return 0;
  
  	list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
  		if ((n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) &&
  		    ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
  			return 1;
  	}
  
  	return 0;
  }
  
  /*
   * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
   * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
   * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
   * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
   * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards.  We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
   * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
   * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
   */
  
  static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
  {
  	if (!ctx->prio) {
  		ctx->prio = 1;
  		ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
  	}
  }
  
  static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
  {
  	struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
  	int left = ctx->tree_count;
  	if (likely(left)) {
  		p->c[--left] = chunk;
  		ctx->tree_count = left;
  		return 1;
  	}
  	if (!p)
  		return 0;
  	p = p->next;
  	if (p) {
  		p->c[30] = chunk;
  		ctx->trees = p;
  		ctx->tree_count = 30;
  		return 1;
  	}
  	return 0;
  }
  
  static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
  {
  	struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
  	ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
  	if (!ctx->trees) {
  		ctx->trees = p;
  		return 0;
  	}
  	if (p)
  		p->next = ctx->trees;
  	else
  		ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
  	ctx->tree_count = 31;
  	return 1;
  }
  
  static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
  		      struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
  {
  	struct audit_tree_refs *q;
  	int n;
  	if (!p) {
  		/* we started with empty chain */
  		p = ctx->first_trees;
  		count = 31;
  		/* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
  		if (!p)
  			return;
  	}
  	n = count;
  	for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
  		while (n--) {
  			audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
  			q->c[n] = NULL;
  		}
  	}
  	while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
  		audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
  		q->c[n] = NULL;
  	}
  	ctx->trees = p;
  	ctx->tree_count = count;
  }
  
  static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
  {
  	struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
  	for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
  		q = p->next;
  		kfree(p);
  	}
  }
  
  static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
  {
  	struct audit_tree_refs *p;
  	int n;
  	if (!tree)
  		return 0;
  	/* full ones */
  	for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
  		for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
  			if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
  				return 1;
  	}
  	/* partial */
  	if (p) {
  		for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
  			if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
  				return 1;
  	}
  	return 0;
  }
  
  static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
  			     struct audit_names *name,
  			     struct audit_field *f,
  			     struct audit_context *ctx)
  {
  	struct audit_names *n;
  	int rc;
   
  	if (name) {
  		rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
  		if (rc)
  			return rc;
  	}
   
  	if (ctx) {
  		list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
  			rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
  			if (rc)
  				return rc;
  		}
  	}
  	return 0;
  }
  
  static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
  			     struct audit_names *name,
  			     struct audit_field *f,
  			     struct audit_context *ctx)
  {
  	struct audit_names *n;
  	int rc;
   
  	if (name) {
  		rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
  		if (rc)
  			return rc;
  	}
   
  	if (ctx) {
  		list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
  			rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
  			if (rc)
  				return rc;
  		}
  	}
  	return 0;
  }
  
  static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
  			       const struct cred *cred,
  			       struct audit_field *f,
  			       struct audit_context *ctx,
  			       struct audit_names *name)
  {
  	switch (f->val) {
  	/* process to file object comparisons */
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
  		return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
  		return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
  		return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
  		return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
  		return audit_compare_uid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), name, f, ctx);
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
  		return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
  		return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
  		return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
  		return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
  	/* uid comparisons */
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
  		return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op,
  					    audit_get_loginuid(tsk));
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
  		return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
  		return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
  		return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
  	/* auid comparisons */
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
  		return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
  					    cred->euid);
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
  		return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
  					    cred->suid);
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
  		return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
  					    cred->fsuid);
  	/* euid comparisons */
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
  		return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
  		return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
  	/* suid comparisons */
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
  		return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
  	/* gid comparisons */
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
  		return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
  		return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
  		return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
  	/* egid comparisons */
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
  		return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
  		return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
  	/* sgid comparison */
  	case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
  		return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
  	default:
  		WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define.  Report as a bug\n");
  		return 0;
  	}
  	return 0;
  }
  
  /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
  /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule.  Return 1 on match, 0
   * otherwise.
   *
   * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
   * filtering a task rule at task creation time.  This and tsk == current are
   * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
   */
  static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
  			      struct audit_krule *rule,
  			      struct audit_context *ctx,
  			      struct audit_names *name,
  			      enum audit_state *state,
  			      bool task_creation)
  {
  	const struct cred *cred;
  	int i, need_sid = 1;
  	u32 sid;
  	unsigned int sessionid;
  
  	cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
  
  	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
  		struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
  		struct audit_names *n;
  		int result = 0;
  		pid_t pid;
  
  		switch (f->type) {
  		case AUDIT_PID:
  			pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk);
  			result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_PPID:
  			if (ctx) {
  				if (!ctx->ppid)
  					ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
  				result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
  			}
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_EXE:
  			result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe);
  			if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
  				result = !result;
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_UID:
  			result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_EUID:
  			result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_SUID:
  			result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_FSUID:
  			result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_GID:
  			result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
  			if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
  				if (!result)
  					result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
  			} else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
  				if (result)
  					result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
  			}
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_EGID:
  			result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
  			if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
  				if (!result)
  					result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
  			} else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
  				if (result)
  					result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
  			}
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_SGID:
  			result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_FSGID:
  			result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
  			sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(tsk);
  			result = audit_comparator(sessionid, f->op, f->val);
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_PERS:
  			result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_ARCH:
  			if (ctx)
  				result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
  			break;
  
  		case AUDIT_EXIT:
  			if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
  				result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
  			if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
  				if (f->val)
  					result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
  				else
  					result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
  			}
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
  			if (name) {
  				if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
  				    audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
  					++result;
  			} else if (ctx) {
  				list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
  					if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
  					    audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
  						++result;
  						break;
  					}
  				}
  			}
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
  			if (name) {
  				if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
  				    audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
  					++result;
  			} else if (ctx) {
  				list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
  					if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
  					    audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
  						++result;
  						break;
  					}
  				}
  			}
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_INODE:
  			if (name)
  				result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val);
  			else if (ctx) {
  				list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
  					if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
  						++result;
  						break;
  					}
  				}
  			}
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
  			if (name) {
  				result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
  			} else if (ctx) {
  				list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
  					if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
  						++result;
  						break;
  					}
  				}
  			}
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
  			if (name) {
  				result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
  			} else if (ctx) {
  				list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
  					if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
  						++result;
  						break;
  					}
  				}
  			}
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_WATCH:
  			if (name)
  				result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev);
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_DIR:
  			if (ctx)
  				result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
  			result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk),
  						      f->op, f->uid);
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
  			result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
  		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
  		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
  		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
  		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
  			/* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
  			   a temporary error.  We simply treat this as a
  			   match for now to avoid losing information that
  			   may be wanted.   An error message will also be
  			   logged upon error */
  			if (f->lsm_rule) {
  				if (need_sid) {
  					security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
  					need_sid = 0;
  				}
  				result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
  								   f->op,
  								   f->lsm_rule);
  			}
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
  		case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
  		case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
  		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
  		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
  			/* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
  			   also applies here */
  			if (f->lsm_rule) {
  				/* Find files that match */
  				if (name) {
  					result = security_audit_rule_match(
  								name->osid,
  								f->type,
  								f->op,
  								f->lsm_rule);
  				} else if (ctx) {
  					list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
  						if (security_audit_rule_match(
  								n->osid,
  								f->type,
  								f->op,
  								f->lsm_rule)) {
  							++result;
  							break;
  						}
  					}
  				}
  				/* Find ipc objects that match */
  				if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
  					break;
  				if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
  							      f->type, f->op,
  							      f->lsm_rule))
  					++result;
  			}
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_ARG0:
  		case AUDIT_ARG1:
  		case AUDIT_ARG2:
  		case AUDIT_ARG3:
  			if (ctx)
  				result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
  			/* ignore this field for filtering */
  			result = 1;
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_PERM:
  			result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
  			result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
  			break;
  		case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
  			result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
  			break;
  		}
  		if (!result)
  			return 0;
  	}
  
  	if (ctx) {
  		if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
  			return 0;
  		if (rule->filterkey) {
  			kfree(ctx->filterkey);
  			ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
  		}
  		ctx->prio = rule->prio;
  	}
  	switch (rule->action) {
  	case AUDIT_NEVER:
  		*state = AUDIT_DISABLED;
  		break;
  	case AUDIT_ALWAYS:
  		*state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
  		break;
  	}
  	return 1;
  }
  
  /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
   * completely disabled for this task.  Since we only have the task
   * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
   */
  static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
  {
  	struct audit_entry *e;
  	enum audit_state   state;
  
  	rcu_read_lock();
  	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
  		if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
  				       &state, true)) {
  			if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
  				*key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
  			rcu_read_unlock();
  			return state;
  		}
  	}
  	rcu_read_unlock();
  	return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
  }
  
  static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
  {
  	int word, bit;
  
  	if (val > 0xffffffff)
  		return false;
  
  	word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
  	if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
  		return false;
  
  	bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
  
  	return rule->mask[word] & bit;
  }
  
  /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
   * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
   * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
   * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
   */
  static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
  					     struct audit_context *ctx,
  					     struct list_head *list)
  {
  	struct audit_entry *e;
  	enum audit_state state;
  
  	if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
  		return AUDIT_DISABLED;
  
  	rcu_read_lock();
  	if (!list_empty(list)) {
  		list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
  			if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
  			    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
  					       &state, false)) {
  				rcu_read_unlock();
  				ctx->current_state = state;
  				return state;
  			}
  		}
  	}
  	rcu_read_unlock();
  	return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
  }
  
  /*
   * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
   * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
   */
  static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
  				   struct audit_names *n,
  				   struct audit_context *ctx) {
  	int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
  	struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
  	struct audit_entry *e;
  	enum audit_state state;
  
  	if (list_empty(list))
  		return 0;
  
  	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
  		if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
  		    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
  			ctx->current_state = state;
  			return 1;
  		}
  	}
  
  	return 0;
  }
  
  /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
   * collected during syscall processing.  We only check rules in sublists at hash
   * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
   * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
   */
  void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
  {
  	struct audit_names *n;
  
  	if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
  		return;
  
  	rcu_read_lock();
  
  	list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
  		if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
  			break;
  	}
  	rcu_read_unlock();
  }
  
  static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context)
  {
  	kfree(context->proctitle.value);
  	context->proctitle.value = NULL;
  	context->proctitle.len = 0;
  }
  
  static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
  {
  	struct audit_names *n, *next;
  
  	list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
  		list_del(&n->list);
  		if (n->name)
  			putname(n->name);
  		if (n->should_free)
  			kfree(n);
  	}
  	context->name_count = 0;
  	path_put(&context->pwd);
  	context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
  	context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
  }
  
  static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
  {
  	struct audit_aux_data *aux;
  
  	while ((aux = context->aux)) {
  		context->aux = aux->next;
  		kfree(aux);
  	}
  	while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
  		context->aux_pids = aux->next;
  		kfree(aux);
  	}
  }
  
  static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context;
  
  	context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
  	if (!context)
  		return NULL;
  	context->state = state;
  	context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
  	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
  	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
  	return context;
  }
  
  /**
   * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
   * @tsk: task
   *
   * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
   * if necessary.  Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
   * specified task.  This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
   * needed.
   */
  int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context;
  	enum audit_state     state;
  	char *key = NULL;
  
  	if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
  		return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
  
  	state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
  	if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) {
  		clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
  		return 0;
  	}
  
  	if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
  		kfree(key);
  		audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
  		return -ENOMEM;
  	}
  	context->filterkey = key;
  
  	audit_set_context(tsk, context);
  	set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
  	return 0;
  }
  
  static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
  {
  	audit_free_names(context);
  	unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
  	free_tree_refs(context);
  	audit_free_aux(context);
  	kfree(context->filterkey);
  	kfree(context->sockaddr);
  	audit_proctitle_free(context);
  	kfree(context);
  }
  
  static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
  				 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
  				 u32 sid, char *comm)
  {
  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
  	char *ctx = NULL;
  	u32 len;
  	int rc = 0;
  
  	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
  	if (!ab)
  		return rc;
  
  	audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
  	if (sid) {
  		if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
  			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
  			rc = 1;
  		} else {
  			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
  			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
  		}
  	}
  	audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
  	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
  	audit_log_end(ab);
  
  	return rc;
  }
  
  static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
  				  struct audit_buffer **ab)
  {
  	long len_max;
  	long len_rem;
  	long len_full;
  	long len_buf;
  	long len_abuf = 0;
  	long len_tmp;
  	bool require_data;
  	bool encode;
  	unsigned int iter;
  	unsigned int arg;
  	char *buf_head;
  	char *buf;
  	const char __user *p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
  
  	/* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg
  	 *       data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the
  	 *       code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */
  	char abuf[96];
  
  	/* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the
  	 *       current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it
  	 *       is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle
  	 *       room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */
  	WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN > 7500);
  	len_max = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
  
  	/* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */
  	buf_head = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
  	if (!buf_head) {
  		audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
  		return;
  	}
  	buf = buf_head;
  
  	audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
  
  	len_rem = len_max;
  	len_buf = 0;
  	len_full = 0;
  	require_data = true;
  	encode = false;
  	iter = 0;
  	arg = 0;
  	do {
  		/* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything
  		 *       serious, but the audit record format insists we
  		 *       provide an argument length for really long arguments,
  		 *       e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but
  		 *       to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for
  		 *       recording in the log, although we don't use it
  		 *       anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */
  		if (len_full == 0)
  			len_full = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
  
  		/* read more data from userspace */
  		if (require_data) {
  			/* can we make more room in the buffer? */
  			if (buf != buf_head) {
  				memmove(buf_head, buf, len_buf);
  				buf = buf_head;
  			}
  
  			/* fetch as much as we can of the argument */
  			len_tmp = strncpy_from_user(&buf_head[len_buf], p,
  						    len_max - len_buf);
  			if (len_tmp == -EFAULT) {
  				/* unable to copy from userspace */
  				send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
  				goto out;
  			} else if (len_tmp == (len_max - len_buf)) {
  				/* buffer is not large enough */
  				require_data = true;
  				/* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple
  				 *       buffers force the encoding so we stand
  				 *       a chance at a sane len_full value and
  				 *       consistent record encoding */
  				encode = true;
  				len_full = len_full * 2;
  				p += len_tmp;
  			} else {
  				require_data = false;
  				if (!encode)
  					encode = audit_string_contains_control(
  								buf, len_tmp);
  				/* try to use a trusted value for len_full */
  				if (len_full < len_max)
  					len_full = (encode ?
  						    len_tmp * 2 : len_tmp);
  				p += len_tmp + 1;
  			}
  			len_buf += len_tmp;
  			buf_head[len_buf] = '\0';
  
  			/* length of the buffer in the audit record? */
  			len_abuf = (encode ? len_buf * 2 : len_buf + 2);
  		}
  
  		/* write as much as we can to the audit log */
  		if (len_buf >= 0) {
  			/* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we
  			 *       can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the
  			 *       existing audit buffer, flush it and start with
  			 *       a new buffer */
  			if ((sizeof(abuf) + 8) > len_rem) {
  				len_rem = len_max;
  				audit_log_end(*ab);
  				*ab = audit_log_start(context,
  						      GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
  				if (!*ab)
  					goto out;
  			}
  
  			/* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */
  			len_tmp = 0;
  			if (require_data || (iter > 0) ||
  			    ((len_abuf + sizeof(abuf)) > len_rem)) {
  				if (iter == 0) {
  					len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
  							sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
  							" a%d_len=%lu",
  							arg, len_full);
  				}
  				len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
  						    sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
  						    " a%d[%d]=", arg, iter++);
  			} else
  				len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
  						    sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
  						    " a%d=", arg);
  			WARN_ON(len_tmp >= sizeof(abuf));
  			abuf[sizeof(abuf) - 1] = '\0';
  
  			/* log the arg in the audit record */
  			audit_log_format(*ab, "%s", abuf);
  			len_rem -= len_tmp;
  			len_tmp = len_buf;
  			if (encode) {
  				if (len_abuf > len_rem)
  					len_tmp = len_rem / 2; /* encoding */
  				audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
  				len_rem -= len_tmp * 2;
  				len_abuf -= len_tmp * 2;
  			} else {
  				if (len_abuf > len_rem)
  					len_tmp = len_rem - 2; /* quotes */
  				audit_log_n_string(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
  				len_rem -= len_tmp + 2;
  				/* don't subtract the "2" because we still need
  				 * to add quotes to the remaining string */
  				len_abuf -= len_tmp;
  			}
  			len_buf -= len_tmp;
  			buf += len_tmp;
  		}
  
  		/* ready to move to the next argument? */
  		if ((len_buf == 0) && !require_data) {
  			arg++;
  			iter = 0;
  			len_full = 0;
  			require_data = true;
  			encode = false;
  		}
  	} while (arg < context->execve.argc);
  
  	/* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */
  
  out:
  	kfree(buf_head);
  }
  
  void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
  {
  	int i;
  
  	if (cap_isclear(*cap)) {
  		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix);
  		return;
  	}
  	audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
  	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i)
  		audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
  }
  
  static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
  {
  	if (name->fcap_ver == -1) {
  		audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?");
  		return;
  	}
  	audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted);
  	audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable);
  	audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d",
  			 name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver,
  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid));
  }
  
  static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
  {
  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
  	int i;
  
  	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
  	if (!ab)
  		return;
  
  	switch (context->type) {
  	case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
  		int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
  		audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
  		for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
  			audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
  				context->socketcall.args[i]);
  		break; }
  	case AUDIT_IPC: {
  		u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
  
  		audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
  				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
  				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
  				 context->ipc.mode);
  		if (osid) {
  			char *ctx = NULL;
  			u32 len;
  			if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
  				audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
  				*call_panic = 1;
  			} else {
  				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
  				security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
  			}
  		}
  		if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
  			audit_log_end(ab);
  			ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
  					     AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
  			if (unlikely(!ab))
  				return;
  			audit_log_format(ab,
  				"qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
  				context->ipc.qbytes,
  				context->ipc.perm_uid,
  				context->ipc.perm_gid,
  				context->ipc.perm_mode);
  		}
  		break; }
  	case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN:
  		audit_log_format(ab,
  			"oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
  			"mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
  			context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
  			context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
  			context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
  			context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
  			context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
  		break;
  	case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV:
  		audit_log_format(ab,
  			"mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
  			"abs_timeout_sec=%lld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
  			context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
  			context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
  			context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
  			(long long) context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
  			context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
  		break;
  	case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY:
  		audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
  				context->mq_notify.mqdes,
  				context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
  		break;
  	case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
  		struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
  		audit_log_format(ab,
  			"mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
  			"mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
  			context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
  			attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
  			attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
  		break; }
  	case AUDIT_CAPSET:
  		audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
  		audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
  		audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
  		audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
  		audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pa", &context->capset.cap.ambient);
  		break;
  	case AUDIT_MMAP:
  		audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
  				 context->mmap.flags);
  		break;
  	case AUDIT_EXECVE:
  		audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
  		break;
  	case AUDIT_KERN_MODULE:
  		audit_log_format(ab, "name=");
  		if (context->module.name) {
  			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->module.name);
  			kfree(context->module.name);
  		} else
  			audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
  
  		break;
  	}
  	audit_log_end(ab);
  }
  
  static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
  {
  	char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
  	while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
  		end--;
  
  	/* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
  	len = end - proctitle + 1;
  	len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0;
  	return len;
  }
  
  /*
   * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names
   * @context: audit_context for the task
   * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details
   * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name
   * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names
   * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails
   */
  static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
  		    const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic)
  {
  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
  
  	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
  	if (!ab)
  		return;
  
  	audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
  
  	if (path)
  		audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path);
  	else if (n->name) {
  		switch (n->name_len) {
  		case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
  			/* log the full path */
  			audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
  			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
  			break;
  		case 0:
  			/* name was specified as a relative path and the
  			 * directory component is the cwd
  			 */
  			audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
  			break;
  		default:
  			/* log the name's directory component */
  			audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
  			audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
  						    n->name_len);
  		}
  	} else
  		audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
  
  	if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET)
  		audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
  				 n->ino,
  				 MAJOR(n->dev),
  				 MINOR(n->dev),
  				 n->mode,
  				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
  				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
  				 MAJOR(n->rdev),
  				 MINOR(n->rdev));
  	if (n->osid != 0) {
  		char *ctx = NULL;
  		u32 len;
  
  		if (security_secid_to_secctx(
  			n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
  			audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
  			if (call_panic)
  				*call_panic = 2;
  		} else {
  			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
  			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
  		}
  	}
  
  	/* log the audit_names record type */
  	switch (n->type) {
  	case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL:
  		audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL");
  		break;
  	case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT:
  		audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT");
  		break;
  	case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE:
  		audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE");
  		break;
  	case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE:
  		audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE");
  		break;
  	default:
  		audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN");
  		break;
  	}
  
  	audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
  	audit_log_end(ab);
  }
  
  static void audit_log_proctitle(void)
  {
  	int res;
  	char *buf;
  	char *msg = "(null)";
  	int len = strlen(msg);
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
  
  	if (!context || context->dummy)
  		return;
  
  	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
  	if (!ab)
  		return;	/* audit_panic or being filtered */
  
  	audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle=");
  
  	/* Not  cached */
  	if (!context->proctitle.value) {
  		buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
  		if (!buf)
  			goto out;
  		/* Historically called this from procfs naming */
  		res = get_cmdline(current, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
  		if (res == 0) {
  			kfree(buf);
  			goto out;
  		}
  		res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res);
  		if (res == 0) {
  			kfree(buf);
  			goto out;
  		}
  		context->proctitle.value = buf;
  		context->proctitle.len = res;
  	}
  	msg = context->proctitle.value;
  	len = context->proctitle.len;
  out:
  	audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len);
  	audit_log_end(ab);
  }
  
  static void audit_log_exit(void)
  {
  	int i, call_panic = 0;
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
  	struct audit_aux_data *aux;
  	struct audit_names *n;
  
  	context->personality = current->personality;
  
  	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
  	if (!ab)
  		return;		/* audit_panic has been called */
  	audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
  			 context->arch, context->major);
  	if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
  		audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
  	if (context->return_valid)
  		audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
  				 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
  				 context->return_code);
  
  	audit_log_format(ab,
  			 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
  			 context->argv[0],
  			 context->argv[1],
  			 context->argv[2],
  			 context->argv[3],
  			 context->name_count);
  
  	audit_log_task_info(ab);
  	audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
  	audit_log_end(ab);
  
  	for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
  
  		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
  		if (!ab)
  			continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
  
  		switch (aux->type) {
  
  		case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
  			struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
  			audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
  			audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
  			audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
  			audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
  			audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
  			audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
  			audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
  			audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pa", &axs->old_pcap.ambient);
  			audit_log_cap(ab, "pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
  			audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
  			audit_log_cap(ab, "pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
  			audit_log_cap(ab, "pa", &axs->new_pcap.ambient);
  			audit_log_format(ab, " frootid=%d",
  					 from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
  						   axs->fcap.rootid));
  			break; }
  
  		}
  		audit_log_end(ab);
  	}
  
  	if (context->type)
  		show_special(context, &call_panic);
  
  	if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
  		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
  		if (ab) {
  			audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
  					context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
  			audit_log_end(ab);
  		}
  	}
  
  	if (context->sockaddr_len) {
  		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
  		if (ab) {
  			audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
  			audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
  					context->sockaddr_len);
  			audit_log_end(ab);
  		}
  	}
  
  	for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
  		struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
  
  		for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
  			if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
  						  axs->target_auid[i],
  						  axs->target_uid[i],
  						  axs->target_sessionid[i],
  						  axs->target_sid[i],
  						  axs->target_comm[i]))
  				call_panic = 1;
  	}
  
  	if (context->target_pid &&
  	    audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
  				  context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
  				  context->target_sessionid,
  				  context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
  			call_panic = 1;
  
  	if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
  		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
  		if (ab) {
  			audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
  			audit_log_end(ab);
  		}
  	}
  
  	i = 0;
  	list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
  		if (n->hidden)
  			continue;
  		audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
  	}
  
  	audit_log_proctitle();
  
  	/* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
  	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
  	if (ab)
  		audit_log_end(ab);
  	if (call_panic)
  		audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
  }
  
  /**
   * __audit_free - free a per-task audit context
   * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
   *
   * Called from copy_process and do_exit
   */
  void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
  
  	if (!context)
  		return;
  
  	if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
  		audit_kill_trees(context);
  
  	/* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code;
  	 * in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a
  	 * random task_struct that doesn't doesn't have any meaningful data we
  	 * need to log via audit_log_exit().
  	 */
  	if (tsk == current && !context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
  		context->return_valid = 0;
  		context->return_code = 0;
  
  		audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context,
  				     &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
  		audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
  		if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
  			audit_log_exit();
  	}
  
  	audit_set_context(tsk, NULL);
  	audit_free_context(context);
  }
  
  /**
   * __audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
   * @major: major syscall type (function)
   * @a1: additional syscall register 1
   * @a2: additional syscall register 2
   * @a3: additional syscall register 3
   * @a4: additional syscall register 4
   *
   * Fill in audit context at syscall entry.  This only happens if the
   * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
   * filters demand the audit context be built.  If the state from the
   * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
   * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
   * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
   * be written).
   */
  void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
  			   unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  	enum audit_state     state;
  
  	if (!audit_enabled || !context)
  		return;
  
  	BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
  
  	state = context->state;
  	if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
  		return;
  
  	context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
  	if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
  		context->prio = 0;
  		if (auditd_test_task(current))
  			return;
  	}
  
  	context->arch	    = syscall_get_arch();
  	context->major      = major;
  	context->argv[0]    = a1;
  	context->argv[1]    = a2;
  	context->argv[2]    = a3;
  	context->argv[3]    = a4;
  	context->serial     = 0;
  	context->in_syscall = 1;
  	context->current_state  = state;
  	context->ppid       = 0;
  	ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime);
  }
  
  /**
   * __audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
   * @success: success value of the syscall
   * @return_code: return value of the syscall
   *
   * Tear down after system call.  If the audit context has been marked as
   * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
   * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
   * message), then write out the syscall information.  In call cases,
   * free the names stored from getname().
   */
  void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context;
  
  	context = audit_context();
  	if (!context)
  		return;
  
  	if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
  		audit_kill_trees(context);
  
  	if (!context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
  		if (success)
  			context->return_valid = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
  		else
  			context->return_valid = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
  
  		/*
  		 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the
  		 * actual return codes are later going to be fixed up by the
  		 * arch specific signal handlers
  		 *
  		 * This is actually a test for:
  		 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
  		 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
  		 *
  		 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
  		 */
  		if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
  		    (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
  		    (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
  			context->return_code = -EINTR;
  		else
  			context->return_code  = return_code;
  
  		audit_filter_syscall(current, context,
  				     &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
  		audit_filter_inodes(current, context);
  		if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
  			audit_log_exit();
  	}
  
  	context->in_syscall = 0;
  	context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
  
  	audit_free_names(context);
  	unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
  	audit_free_aux(context);
  	context->aux = NULL;
  	context->aux_pids = NULL;
  	context->target_pid = 0;
  	context->target_sid = 0;
  	context->sockaddr_len = 0;
  	context->type = 0;
  	context->fds[0] = -1;
  	if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
  		kfree(context->filterkey);
  		context->filterkey = NULL;
  	}
  }
  
  static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context;
  	struct audit_tree_refs *p;
  	struct audit_chunk *chunk;
  	int count;
  	if (likely(!inode->i_fsnotify_marks))
  		return;
  	context = audit_context();
  	p = context->trees;
  	count = context->tree_count;
  	rcu_read_lock();
  	chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
  	rcu_read_unlock();
  	if (!chunk)
  		return;
  	if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
  		return;
  	if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
  		pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
  		audit_set_auditable(context);
  		audit_put_chunk(chunk);
  		unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
  		return;
  	}
  	put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
  }
  
  static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context;
  	struct audit_tree_refs *p;
  	const struct dentry *d, *parent;
  	struct audit_chunk *drop;
  	unsigned long seq;
  	int count;
  
  	context = audit_context();
  	p = context->trees;
  	count = context->tree_count;
  retry:
  	drop = NULL;
  	d = dentry;
  	rcu_read_lock();
  	seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
  	for(;;) {
  		struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d);
  		if (inode && unlikely(inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) {
  			struct audit_chunk *chunk;
  			chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
  			if (chunk) {
  				if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
  					drop = chunk;
  					break;
  				}
  			}
  		}
  		parent = d->d_parent;
  		if (parent == d)
  			break;
  		d = parent;
  	}
  	if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) {  /* in this order */
  		rcu_read_unlock();
  		if (!drop) {
  			/* just a race with rename */
  			unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
  			goto retry;
  		}
  		audit_put_chunk(drop);
  		if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
  			/* OK, got more space */
  			unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
  			goto retry;
  		}
  		/* too bad */
  		pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
  		unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
  		audit_set_auditable(context);
  		return;
  	}
  	rcu_read_unlock();
  }
  
  static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
  						unsigned char type)
  {
  	struct audit_names *aname;
  
  	if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
  		aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
  		memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
  	} else {
  		aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
  		if (!aname)
  			return NULL;
  		aname->should_free = true;
  	}
  
  	aname->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
  	aname->type = type;
  	list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
  
  	context->name_count++;
  	return aname;
  }
  
  /**
   * __audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
   * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
   *
   * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
   * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
   * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
   */
  struct filename *
  __audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  	struct audit_names *n;
  
  	list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
  		if (!n->name)
  			continue;
  		if (n->name->uptr == uptr) {
  			n->name->refcnt++;
  			return n->name;
  		}
  	}
  	return NULL;
  }
  
  /**
   * __audit_getname - add a name to the list
   * @name: name to add
   *
   * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
   * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
   */
  void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  	struct audit_names *n;
  
  	if (!context->in_syscall)
  		return;
  
  	n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
  	if (!n)
  		return;
  
  	n->name = name;
  	n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
  	name->aname = n;
  	name->refcnt++;
  
  	if (!context->pwd.dentry)
  		get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
  }
  
  static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
  				   const struct dentry *dentry)
  {
  	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
  	int rc;
  
  	if (!dentry)
  		return 0;
  
  	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
  	if (rc)
  		return rc;
  
  	name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
  	name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
  	name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
  	name->fcap.rootid = caps.rootid;
  	name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >>
  				VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
  
  	return 0;
  }
  
  /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
  void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
  		      struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
  {
  	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
  	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
  	name->mode  = inode->i_mode;
  	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
  	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
  	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
  	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
  	if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
  		name->fcap_ver = -1;
  		return;
  	}
  	audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
  }
  
  /**
   * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
   * @name: name being audited
   * @dentry: dentry being audited
   * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
   */
  void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
  		   unsigned int flags)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
  	struct audit_names *n;
  	bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
  	struct audit_entry *e;
  	struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
  	int i;
  
  	if (!context->in_syscall)
  		return;
  
  	rcu_read_lock();
  	if (!list_empty(list)) {
  		list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
  			for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
  				struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
  
  				if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
  				    && audit_comparator(inode->i_sb->s_magic,
  							f->op, f->val)
  				    && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
  					rcu_read_unlock();
  					return;
  				}
  			}
  		}
  	}
  	rcu_read_unlock();
  
  	if (!name)
  		goto out_alloc;
  
  	/*
  	 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
  	 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
  	 */
  	n = name->aname;
  	if (n) {
  		if (parent) {
  			if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
  			    n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
  				goto out;
  		} else {
  			if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
  				goto out;
  		}
  	}
  
  	list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
  		if (n->ino) {
  			/* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */
  			if (n->ino != inode->i_ino ||
  			    n->dev != inode->i_sb->s_dev)
  				continue;
  		} else if (n->name) {
  			/* inode number has not been set, check the name */
  			if (strcmp(n->name->name, name->name))
  				continue;
  		} else
  			/* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */
  			continue;
  
  		/* match the correct record type */
  		if (parent) {
  			if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
  			    n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
  				goto out;
  		} else {
  			if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
  				goto out;
  		}
  	}
  
  out_alloc:
  	/* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */
  	n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
  	if (!n)
  		return;
  	if (name) {
  		n->name = name;
  		name->refcnt++;
  	}
  
  out:
  	if (parent) {
  		n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
  		n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
  		if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN)
  			n->hidden = true;
  	} else {
  		n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
  		n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
  	}
  	handle_path(dentry);
  	audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
  }
  
  void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
  {
  	__audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
  }
  
  /**
   * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
   * @parent: inode of dentry parent
   * @dentry: dentry being audited
   * @type:   AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
   *
   * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
   * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
   * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
   * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
   * the object is created.  Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
   * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
   * unsuccessful attempts.
   */
  void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
  			 const struct dentry *dentry,
  			 const unsigned char type)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
  	const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name;
  	struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
  	struct audit_entry *e;
  	struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
  	int i;
  
  	if (!context->in_syscall)
  		return;
  
  	rcu_read_lock();
  	if (!list_empty(list)) {
  		list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
  			for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
  				struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
  
  				if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
  				    && audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic,
  							f->op, f->val)
  				    && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
  					rcu_read_unlock();
  					return;
  				}
  			}
  		}
  	}
  	rcu_read_unlock();
  
  	if (inode)
  		handle_one(inode);
  
  	/* look for a parent entry first */
  	list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
  		if (!n->name ||
  		    (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT &&
  		     n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
  			continue;
  
  		if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev &&
  		    !audit_compare_dname_path(dname,
  					      n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
  			if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
  				n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
  			found_parent = n;
  			break;
  		}
  	}
  
  	/* is there a matching child entry? */
  	list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
  		/* can only match entries that have a name */
  		if (!n->name ||
  		    (n->type != type && n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
  			continue;
  
  		if (!strcmp(dname, n->name->name) ||
  		    !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name,
  						found_parent ?
  						found_parent->name_len :
  						AUDIT_NAME_FULL)) {
  			if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
  				n->type = type;
  			found_child = n;
  			break;
  		}
  	}
  
  	if (!found_parent) {
  		/* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
  		n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
  		if (!n)
  			return;
  		audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0);
  	}
  
  	if (!found_child) {
  		found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type);
  		if (!found_child)
  			return;
  
  		/* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
  		 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
  		 * audit_free_names() */
  		if (found_parent) {
  			found_child->name = found_parent->name;
  			found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
  			found_child->name->refcnt++;
  		}
  	}
  
  	if (inode)
  		audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0);
  	else
  		found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
  
  /**
   * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
   * @ctx: audit_context for the task
   * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context
   * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
   *
   * Also sets the context as auditable.
   */
  int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
  		       struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
  {
  	if (!ctx->in_syscall)
  		return 0;
  	if (!ctx->serial)
  		ctx->serial = audit_serial();
  	t->tv_sec  = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
  	t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
  	*serial    = ctx->serial;
  	if (!ctx->prio) {
  		ctx->prio = 1;
  		ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
  	}
  	return 1;
  }
  
  /**
   * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
   * @oflag: open flag
   * @mode: mode bits
   * @attr: queue attributes
   *
   */
  void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  
  	if (attr)
  		memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
  	else
  		memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
  
  	context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
  	context->mq_open.mode = mode;
  
  	context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
  }
  
  /**
   * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
   * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
   * @msg_len: Message length
   * @msg_prio: Message priority
   * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
   *
   */
  void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
  			const struct timespec64 *abs_timeout)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  	struct timespec64 *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
  
  	if (abs_timeout)
  		memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(*p));
  	else
  		memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
  
  	context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
  	context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
  	context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
  
  	context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
  }
  
  /**
   * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
   * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
   * @notification: Notification event
   *
   */
  
  void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  
  	if (notification)
  		context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
  	else
  		context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
  
  	context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
  	context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
  }
  
  /**
   * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
   * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
   * @mqstat: MQ flags
   *
   */
  void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  	context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
  	context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
  	context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
  }
  
  /**
   * __audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
   * @ipcp: ipc permissions
   *
   */
  void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  	context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
  	context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
  	context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
  	context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
  	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
  	context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
  }
  
  /**
   * __audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
   * @qbytes: msgq bytes
   * @uid: msgq user id
   * @gid: msgq group id
   * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
   *
   * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
   */
  void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  
  	context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
  	context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
  	context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
  	context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
  	context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
  }
  
  void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  
  	context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
  	context->execve.argc = bprm->argc;
  }
  
  
  /**
   * __audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
   * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
   * @args: args array
   *
   */
  int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  
  	if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
  		return -EINVAL;
  	context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
  	context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
  	memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
  	return 0;
  }
  
  /**
   * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
   * @fd1: the first file descriptor
   * @fd2: the second file descriptor
   *
   */
  void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  	context->fds[0] = fd1;
  	context->fds[1] = fd2;
  }
  
  /**
   * __audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
   * @len: data length in user space
   * @a: data address in kernel space
   *
   * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
   */
  int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  
  	if (!context->sockaddr) {
  		void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
  		if (!p)
  			return -ENOMEM;
  		context->sockaddr = p;
  	}
  
  	context->sockaddr_len = len;
  	memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
  	return 0;
  }
  
  void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  
  	context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
  	context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
  	context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
  	context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
  	security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
  	memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
  }
  
  /**
   * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
   * @sig: signal value
   * @t: task being signaled
   *
   * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
   * and uid that is doing that.
   */
  int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
  {
  	struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
  	struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
  	kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid, t_uid = task_uid(t);
  
  	if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
  	    (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
  	     sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2)) {
  		audit_sig_pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
  		auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
  		if (uid_valid(auid))
  			audit_sig_uid = auid;
  		else
  			audit_sig_uid = uid;
  		security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid);
  	}
  
  	if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
  		return 0;
  
  	/* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
  	 * in audit_context */
  	if (!ctx->target_pid) {
  		ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
  		ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
  		ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
  		ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
  		security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
  		memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
  		return 0;
  	}
  
  	axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
  	if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
  		axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
  		if (!axp)
  			return -ENOMEM;
  
  		axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
  		axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
  		ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
  	}
  	BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
  
  	axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t);
  	axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
  	axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
  	axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
  	security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
  	memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
  	axp->pid_count++;
  
  	return 0;
  }
  
  /**
   * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
   * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
   * @new: the proposed new credentials
   * @old: the old credentials
   *
   * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
   * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
   *
   * -Eric
   */
  int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
  			   const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
  {
  	struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
  
  	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
  	if (!ax)
  		return -ENOMEM;
  
  	ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
  	ax->d.next = context->aux;
  	context->aux = (void *)ax;
  
  	get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
  
  	ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
  	ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
  	ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
  	ax->fcap.rootid = vcaps.rootid;
  	ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
  
  	ax->old_pcap.permitted   = old->cap_permitted;
  	ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
  	ax->old_pcap.effective   = old->cap_effective;
  	ax->old_pcap.ambient     = old->cap_ambient;
  
  	ax->new_pcap.permitted   = new->cap_permitted;
  	ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
  	ax->new_pcap.effective   = new->cap_effective;
  	ax->new_pcap.ambient     = new->cap_ambient;
  	return 0;
  }
  
  /**
   * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
   * @new: the new credentials
   * @old: the old (current) credentials
   *
   * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
   * audit system if applicable
   */
  void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  	context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
  	context->capset.cap.effective   = new->cap_effective;
  	context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
  	context->capset.cap.permitted   = new->cap_permitted;
  	context->capset.cap.ambient     = new->cap_ambient;
  	context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
  }
  
  void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  	context->mmap.fd = fd;
  	context->mmap.flags = flags;
  	context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
  }
  
  void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
  {
  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
  
  	context->module.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
  	if (!context->module.name)
  		audit_log_lost("out of memory in __audit_log_kern_module");
  	context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE;
  }
  
  void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
  {
  	audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
  		AUDIT_FANOTIFY,	"resp=%u", response);
  }
  
  static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
  {
  	kuid_t auid, uid;
  	kgid_t gid;
  	unsigned int sessionid;
  	char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
  
  	auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
  	sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
  	current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
  
  	audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
  			 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
  			 sessionid);
  	audit_log_task_context(ab);
  	audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current));
  	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
  	audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
  }
  
  /**
   * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
   * @signr: signal value
   *
   * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
   * should record the event for investigation.
   */
  void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
  {
  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
  
  	if (!audit_enabled)
  		return;
  
  	if (signr == SIGQUIT)	/* don't care for those */
  		return;
  
  	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
  	if (unlikely(!ab))
  		return;
  	audit_log_task(ab);
  	audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr);
  	audit_log_end(ab);
  }
  
  /**
   * audit_seccomp - record information about a seccomp action
   * @syscall: syscall number
   * @signr: signal value
   * @code: the seccomp action
   *
   * Record the information associated with a seccomp action. Event filtering for
   * seccomp actions that are not to be logged is done in seccomp_log().
   * Therefore, this function forces auditing independent of the audit_enabled
   * and dummy context state because seccomp actions should be logged even when
   * audit is not in use.
   */
  void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
  {
  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
  
  	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
  	if (unlikely(!ab))
  		return;
  	audit_log_task(ab);
  	audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
  			 signr, syscall_get_arch(), syscall,
  			 in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code);
  	audit_log_end(ab);
  }
  
  void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names,
  				  int res)
  {
  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
  
  	if (!audit_enabled)
  		return;
  
  	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
  			     AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
  	if (unlikely(!ab))
  		return;
  
  	audit_log_format(ab,
  			 "op=seccomp-logging actions=%s old-actions=%s res=%d",
  			 names, old_names, res);
  	audit_log_end(ab);
  }
  
  struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
  {
  	struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
  	if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
  		return NULL;
  	return &ctx->killed_trees;
  }
  