text: /*
   * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
   *
   * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
   * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
   * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
   * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
   */
  
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
  #include <openssl/asn1.h>
  #include <openssl/objects.h>
  #include <openssl/x509.h>
  #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
  #include <openssl/core_names.h>
  #include "crypto/x509.h"
  
  int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
  {
      int i;
      const X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
  
      if (b == NULL)
          return a != NULL;
      if (a == NULL)
          return -1;
      ai = &a->cert_info;
      bi = &b->cert_info;
      i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber);
      if (i != 0)
          return i < 0 ? -1 : 1;
      return X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer);
  }
  
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
  unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
  {
      unsigned long ret = 0;
      EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
      unsigned char md[16];
      char *f;
  
      if (ctx == NULL)
          goto err;
      f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
      if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
          goto err;
      if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
          goto err;
      OPENSSL_free(f);
      if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
          (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data,
           (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length))
          goto err;
      if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
          goto err;
      ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
             ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
          ) & 0xffffffffL;
   err:
      EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
      return ret;
  }
  #endif
  
  int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
  {
      return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer);
  }
  
  int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
  {
      return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject);
  }
  
  int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
  {
      return X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer);
  }
  
  int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
  {
      int rv;
  
      if ((a->flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0
              && (b->flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0)
          rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
      else
          return -2;
  
      return rv < 0 ? -1 : rv > 0;
  }
  
  X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a)
  {
      return a->cert_info.issuer;
  }
  
  unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
  {
      return X509_NAME_hash_ex(x->cert_info.issuer, NULL, NULL, NULL);
  }
  
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
  unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
  {
      return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer);
  }
  #endif
  
  X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a)
  {
      return a->cert_info.subject;
  }
  
  ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
  {
      return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
  }
  
  const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a)
  {
      return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
  }
  
  unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
  {
      return X509_NAME_hash_ex(x->cert_info.subject, NULL, NULL, NULL);
  }
  
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
  unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
  {
      return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject);
  }
  #endif
  
  /*
   * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
   * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
   * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
   * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
   * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
   * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
   */
  int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
  {
      int rv = 0;
  
      if (a == b) /* for efficiency */
          return 0;
  
      /* attempt to compute cert hash */
      (void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
      (void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
  
      if ((a->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0
              && (b->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0)
          rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
      if (rv != 0)
          return rv < 0 ? -1 : 1;
  
      /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
      if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) {
          if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len)
              return -1;
          if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len)
              return 1;
          rv = memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc,
                      b->cert_info.enc.enc, a->cert_info.enc.len);
      }
      return rv < 0 ? -1 : rv > 0;
  }
  
  int X509_add_cert_new(STACK_OF(X509) **sk, X509 *cert, int flags)
  {
      if (*sk == NULL
              && (*sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
          ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
          return 0;
      }
      return X509_add_cert(*sk, cert, flags);
  }
  
  int X509_add_cert(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert, int flags)
  {
      if (sk == NULL) {
          ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
          return 0;
      }
      if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP) != 0) {
          /*
           * not using sk_X509_set_cmp_func() and sk_X509_find()
           * because this re-orders the certs on the stack
           */
          int i;
  
          for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
              if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0)
                  return 1;
          }
      }
      if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS) != 0 && X509_self_signed(cert, 0))
          return 1;
      if (!sk_X509_insert(sk, cert,
                          (flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND) != 0 ? 0 : -1)) {
          ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
          return 0;
      }
      if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF) != 0)
          (void)X509_up_ref(cert);
      return 1;
  }
  
  int X509_add_certs(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, int flags)
  /* compiler would allow 'const' for the list of certs, yet they are up-ref'ed */
  {
      int n = sk_X509_num(certs); /* certs may be NULL */
      int i;
  
      for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
          int j = (flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND) == 0 ? i : n - 1 - i;
          /* if prepend, add certs in reverse order to keep original order */
  
          if (!X509_add_cert(sk, sk_X509_value(certs, j), flags))
              return 0;
      }
      return 1;
  }
  
  int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
  {
      int ret;
  
      if (b == NULL)
          return a != NULL;
      if (a == NULL)
          return -1;
  
      /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
      if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
          ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
          if (ret < 0)
              return -2;
      }
  
      if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
          ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
          if (ret < 0)
              return -2;
      }
  
      ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
      if (ret == 0 && a->canon_enclen != 0)
          ret = memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
  
      return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret > 0;
  }
  
  unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_ex(const X509_NAME *x, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
                                  const char *propq, int *ok)
  {
      unsigned long ret = 0;
      unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
      EVP_MD *sha1 = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, "SHA1", propq);
  
      /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
      i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
      if (ok != NULL)
          *ok = 0;
      if (sha1 != NULL
          && EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, sha1, NULL)) {
          ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
                 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
                 ) & 0xffffffffL;
          if (ok != NULL)
              *ok = 1;
      }
      EVP_MD_free(sha1);
      return ret;
  }
  
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
  /*
   * I now DER encode the name and hash it.  Since I cache the DER encoding,
   * this is reasonably efficient.
   */
  unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(const X509_NAME *x)
  {
      EVP_MD *md5 = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5, "-fips");
      EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
      unsigned long ret = 0;
      unsigned char md[16];
  
      if (md5 == NULL || md_ctx == NULL)
          goto end;
  
      /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
      i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
      if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, md5, NULL)
          && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
          && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL))
          ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
                 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
              ) & 0xffffffffL;
  
   end:
      EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
      EVP_MD_free(md5);
  
      return ret;
  }
  #endif
  
  /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
  X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name,
                                       const ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
  {
      int i;
      X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
  
      if (!sk)
          return NULL;
  
      x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial;
      x.cert_info.issuer = (X509_NAME *)name; /* won't modify it */
  
      for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
          x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
          if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
              return x509;
      }
      return NULL;
  }
  
  X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name)
  {
      X509 *x509;
      int i;
  
      for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
          x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
          if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
              return x509;
      }
      return NULL;
  }
  
  EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x)
  {
      if (x == NULL)
          return NULL;
      return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key);
  }
  
  EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
  {
      if (x == NULL)
          return NULL;
      return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key);
  }
  
  int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k)
  {
      const EVP_PKEY *xk;
      int ret;
  
      xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
  
      if (xk)
          ret = EVP_PKEY_eq(xk, k);
      else
          ret = -2;
  
      switch (ret) {
      case 1:
          break;
      case 0:
          ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
          break;
      case -1:
          ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
          break;
      case -2:
          ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
      }
      if (ret > 0)
          return 1;
      return 0;
  }
  
  /*
   * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
   * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
   * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
   */
  
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
  
  static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
  {
      const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
      int curve_nid;
      if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
          grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
      if (!grp)
          return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
      curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
      /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
      if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
          /*
           * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
           */
          if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
              return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
          if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
              return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
          /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
          *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
      } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
          if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
              return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
          if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
              return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
      } else {
          return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
      }
      return X509_V_OK;
  }
  
  int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
                              unsigned long flags)
  {
      int rv, i, sign_nid;
      EVP_PKEY *pk;
      unsigned long tflags = flags;
  
      if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
          return X509_V_OK;
  
      /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
      if (x == NULL) {
          x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
          i = 1;
      } else {
          i = 0;
      }
      pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
  
      /*
       * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
       * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
       * Suite-B errors if applicable.  This is indicated via a NULL chain
       * pointer.  All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
       */
      if (chain == NULL)
          return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
  
      if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
          rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
          /* Correct error depth */
          i = 0;
          goto end;
      }
  
      /* Check EE key only */
      rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
      if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
          /* Correct error depth */
          i = 0;
          goto end;
      }
      for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
          sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
          x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
          if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
              rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
              goto end;
          }
          pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
          rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
          if (rv != X509_V_OK)
              goto end;
      }
  
      /* Final check: root CA signature */
      rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
   end:
      if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
          /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
          if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
               || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
              i--;
          /*
           * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
           * with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
           */
          if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
              rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
          if (perror_depth)
              *perror_depth = i;
      }
      return rv;
  }
  
  int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
  {
      int sign_nid;
      if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
          return X509_V_OK;
      sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm);
      return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
  }
  
  #else
  int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
                              unsigned long flags)
  {
      return 0;
  }
  
  int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
  {
      return 0;
  }
  
  #endif
  /*
   * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
   * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
   * each X509 structure.
   */
  STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
  {
      STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
      int i;
      ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
      if (ret == NULL)
          return NULL;
      for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
          X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
          if (!X509_up_ref(x))
              goto err;
      }
      return ret;
   err:
      while (i-- > 0)
          X509_free(sk_X509_value(ret, i));
      sk_X509_free(ret);
      return NULL;
  }
  