text: /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
   * All rights reserved.
   *
   * This package is an SSL implementation written
   * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
   * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
   *
   * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
   * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
   * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
   * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
   * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
   * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
   *
   * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
   * the code are not to be removed.
   * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
   * as the author of the parts of the library used.
   * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
   * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
   *
   * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
   * are met:
   * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
   * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
   *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
   * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
   *    must display the following acknowledgement:
   *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
   *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
   *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
   *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
   * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
   *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
   *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
   *
   * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
   * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
   * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
   * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
   * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
   * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
   * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
   * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
   * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
   * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
   * SUCH DAMAGE.
   *
   * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
   * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
   * copied and put under another distribution licence
   * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
  
  #include <ctype.h>
  #include <string.h>
  #include <time.h>
  
  #include <CCryptoBoringSSL_asn1.h>
  #include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
  #include <CCryptoBoringSSL_evp.h>
  #include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
  #include <CCryptoBoringSSL_obj.h>
  #include <CCryptoBoringSSL_thread.h>
  #include <CCryptoBoringSSL_x509.h>
  #include <CCryptoBoringSSL_x509v3.h>
  
  #include "vpm_int.h"
  #include "../internal.h"
  #include "../x509v3/internal.h"
  
  static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class =
      CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
  
  /* CRL score values */
  
  /* No unhandled critical extensions */
  
  #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100
  
  /* certificate is within CRL scope */
  
  #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE         0x080
  
  /* CRL times valid */
  
  #define CRL_SCORE_TIME          0x040
  
  /* Issuer name matches certificate */
  
  #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME   0x020
  
  /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
  
  #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
  
  /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
  
  #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT   0x018
  
  /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
  
  #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH     0x008
  
  /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
  
  #define CRL_SCORE_AKID          0x004
  
  /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
  
  #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA    0x002
  
  static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
  static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
  static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
  static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
  static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
  static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
  static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
  static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
  static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
  static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
  
  static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
                           unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
  static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
                           X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
  static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
                           int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
                           STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
  static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
                             int *pcrl_score);
  static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
                             unsigned int *preasons);
  static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
  static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
                             STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
                             STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
  
  static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
  
  static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
  {
      return ok;
  }
  
  /* cert_self_signed checks if |x| is self-signed. If |x| is valid, it returns
   * one and sets |*out_is_self_signed| to the result. If |x| is invalid, it
   * returns zero. */
  static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x, int *out_is_self_signed)
  {
      if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
          return 0;
      }
      *out_is_self_signed = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0;
      return 1;
  }
  
  /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
  
  static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
  {
      STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
      X509 *xtmp = NULL;
      size_t i;
      /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
      certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
      if (certs == NULL)
          return NULL;
      /* Look for exact match */
      for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
          xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
          if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
              break;
      }
      if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
          X509_up_ref(xtmp);
      else
          xtmp = NULL;
      sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
      return xtmp;
  }
  
  int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
      int bad_chain = 0;
      X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
      int depth, i, ok = 0;
      int num, j, retry, trust;
      int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
      STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
      if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
          return -1;
      }
      if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
          /*
           * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
           * cannot do another one.
           */
          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
          return -1;
      }
  
      cb = ctx->verify_cb;
  
      /*
       * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
       * the first entry is in place
       */
      ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
      if (ctx->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) {
          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
          goto end;
      }
      X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
      ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
  
      /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it.
       * sktmp = ctx->untrusted ++ ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted */
      if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
          && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
          goto end;
      }
  
      if (ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted != NULL) {
          if (sktmp == NULL) {
              sktmp = sk_X509_new_null();
              if (sktmp == NULL) {
                  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
                  goto end;
              }
          }
  
          for (size_t k = 0; k < sk_X509_num(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted);
               k++) {
              if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp,
                                sk_X509_value(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted,
                                k))) {
                  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
                  goto end;
              }
          }
      }
  
      num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
      x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
      depth = param->depth;
  
      for (;;) {
          /* If we have enough, we break */
          if (depth < num)
              break;              /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
                                   * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
                                   * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
                                   * later. */
  
          int is_self_signed;
          if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
              ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
              goto end;
          }
  
          /* If we are self signed, we break */
          if (is_self_signed)
              break;
          /*
           * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
           */
          if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
              ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
              if (ok < 0) {
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
                  goto end;
              }
              /*
               * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
               * again later.
               */
              if (ok > 0) {
                  X509_free(xtmp);
                  break;
              }
          }
  
          /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
          if (sktmp != NULL) {
              xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
              if (xtmp != NULL) {
                  if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
                      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
                      ok = 0;
                      goto end;
                  }
                  X509_up_ref(xtmp);
                  (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
                  ctx->last_untrusted++;
                  x = xtmp;
                  num++;
                  /*
                   * reparse the full chain for the next one
                   */
                  continue;
              }
          }
          break;
      }
  
      /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
      j = num;
      /*
       * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
       * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
       * complain.
       */
  
      do {
          /*
           * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
           */
          i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
          x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
  
          int is_self_signed;
          if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
              ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
              goto end;
          }
  
          if (is_self_signed) {
              /* we have a self signed certificate */
              if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
                  /*
                   * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
                   * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
                   * possible impersonation.
                   */
                  ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
                  if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
                      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
                      ctx->current_cert = x;
                      ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
                      if (ok == 1)
                          X509_free(xtmp);
                      bad_chain = 1;
                      ok = cb(0, ctx);
                      if (!ok)
                          goto end;
                  } else {
                      /*
                       * We have a match: replace certificate with store
                       * version so we get any trust settings.
                       */
                      X509_free(x);
                      x = xtmp;
                      (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
                      ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
                  }
              } else {
                  /*
                   * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
                   */
                  chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
                  ctx->last_untrusted--;
                  num--;
                  j--;
                  x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
              }
          }
          /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
          for (;;) {
              /* If we have enough, we break */
              if (depth < num)
                  break;
              if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
                  goto end;
              }
              /* If we are self signed, we break */
              if (is_self_signed)
                  break;
              ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
  
              if (ok < 0) {
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
                  goto end;
              }
              if (ok == 0)
                  break;
              x = xtmp;
              if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
                  X509_free(xtmp);
                  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
                  ok = 0;
                  goto end;
              }
              num++;
          }
  
          /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
          trust = check_trust(ctx);
  
          /* If explicitly rejected error */
          if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
              ok = 0;
              goto end;
          }
          /*
           * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
           * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
           * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
           * chain checking
           */
          retry = 0;
          if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
              && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
              && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
              while (j-- > 1) {
                  xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
                  ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
                  if (ok < 0)
                      goto end;
                  /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
                  if (ok > 0) {
                      /*
                       * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
                       */
                      X509_free(xtmp);
  
                      /*
                       * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
                       * alternate chain
                       */
                      while (num > j) {
                          xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
                          X509_free(xtmp);
                          num--;
                      }
                      ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
                      retry = 1;
                      break;
                  }
              }
          }
      } while (retry);
  
      /*
       * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
       * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
       * and set bad_chain == 1
       */
      if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
          if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
              if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
              else
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
              ctx->current_cert = x;
          } else {
  
              sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
              num++;
              ctx->last_untrusted = num;
              ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
              ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
              chain_ss = NULL;
          }
  
          ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
          bad_chain = 1;
          ok = cb(0, ctx);
          if (!ok)
              goto end;
      }
  
      /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
      ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
  
      if (!ok)
          goto end;
  
      ok = check_id(ctx);
  
      if (!ok)
          goto end;
  
      /*
       * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
       * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
       */
  
      ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
      if (!ok)
          goto end;
  
      int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
                                        ctx->param->flags);
      if (err != X509_V_OK) {
          ctx->error = err;
          ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
          ok = cb(0, ctx);
          if (!ok)
              goto end;
      }
  
      /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
      if (ctx->verify != NULL)
          ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
      else
          ok = internal_verify(ctx);
      if (!ok)
          goto end;
  
      /* Check name constraints */
  
      ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
      if (!ok)
          goto end;
  
      /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
      if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
          ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
  
   end:
      if (sktmp != NULL)
          sk_X509_free(sktmp);
      if (chain_ss != NULL)
          X509_free(chain_ss);
  
      /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */
      if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
      return ok;
  }
  
  /*
   * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
   */
  
  static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
  {
      size_t i;
      X509 *issuer;
      for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
          issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
          if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
              return issuer;
      }
      return NULL;
  }
  
  /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
  
  static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
  {
      int ret;
      ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
      if (ret == X509_V_OK)
          return 1;
      /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
      if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
          return 0;
  
      ctx->error = ret;
      ctx->current_cert = x;
      ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
      return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
  }
  
  /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
  
  static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
  {
      *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
      if (*issuer) {
          X509_up_ref(*issuer);
          return 1;
      } else
          return 0;
  }
  
  /*
   * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
   * purpose
   */
  
  static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      int i, ok = 0, plen = 0;
      X509 *x;
      int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
      int proxy_path_length = 0;
      int purpose;
      int allow_proxy_certs;
      cb = ctx->verify_cb;
  
      enum {
          // ca_or_leaf allows either type of certificate so that direct use of
          // self-signed certificates works.
          ca_or_leaf,
          must_be_ca,
          must_not_be_ca,
      } ca_requirement;
  
      /* CRL path validation */
      if (ctx->parent) {
          allow_proxy_certs = 0;
          purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
      } else {
          allow_proxy_certs =
              ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
          purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
      }
  
      ca_requirement = ca_or_leaf;
  
      /* Check all untrusted certificates */
      for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
          int ret;
          x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
          if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
              && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
              ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
              ctx->error_depth = i;
              ctx->current_cert = x;
              ok = cb(0, ctx);
              if (!ok)
                  goto end;
          }
          if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
              ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
              ctx->error_depth = i;
              ctx->current_cert = x;
              ok = cb(0, ctx);
              if (!ok)
                  goto end;
          }
  
          switch (ca_requirement) {
          case ca_or_leaf:
              ret = 1;
              break;
          case must_not_be_ca:
              if (X509_check_ca(x)) {
                  ret = 0;
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
              } else
                  ret = 1;
              break;
          case must_be_ca:
              if (!X509_check_ca(x)) {
                  ret = 0;
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
              } else
                  ret = 1;
              break;
          default:
              // impossible.
              ret = 0;
          }
  
          if (ret == 0) {
              ctx->error_depth = i;
              ctx->current_cert = x;
              ok = cb(0, ctx);
              if (!ok)
                  goto end;
          }
          if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
              ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, ca_requirement == must_be_ca);
              if (ret != 1) {
                  ret = 0;
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
                  ctx->error_depth = i;
                  ctx->current_cert = x;
                  ok = cb(0, ctx);
                  if (!ok)
                      goto end;
              }
          }
          /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
          if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
              && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
              && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
              ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
              ctx->error_depth = i;
              ctx->current_cert = x;
              ok = cb(0, ctx);
              if (!ok)
                  goto end;
          }
          /* Increment path length if not self issued */
          if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
              plen++;
          /*
           * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
           * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate.  If not,
           * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
           */
          if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
              if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
                  ctx->error_depth = i;
                  ctx->current_cert = x;
                  ok = cb(0, ctx);
                  if (!ok)
                      goto end;
              }
              proxy_path_length++;
              ca_requirement = must_not_be_ca;
          } else {
              ca_requirement = must_be_ca;
          }
      }
      ok = 1;
   end:
      return ok;
  }
  
  static int reject_dns_name_in_common_name(X509 *x509)
  {
      X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(x509);
      int i = -1;
      for (;;) {
          i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i);
          if (i == -1) {
              return X509_V_OK;
          }
  
          X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
          ASN1_STRING *common_name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry);
          unsigned char *idval;
          int idlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&idval, common_name);
          if (idlen < 0) {
              return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
          }
          /* Only process attributes that look like host names. Note it is
           * important that this check be mirrored in |X509_check_host|. */
          int looks_like_dns = x509v3_looks_like_dns_name(idval, (size_t)idlen);
          OPENSSL_free(idval);
          if (looks_like_dns) {
              return X509_V_ERR_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_WITHOUT_SANS;
          }
      }
  }
  
  static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      int i, j, rv;
      int has_name_constraints = 0;
      /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
      for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
          X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
          /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
          if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
              continue;
          /*
           * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
           * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
           * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
           * to be obeyed.
           */
          for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
              NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
              if (nc) {
                  has_name_constraints = 1;
                  rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
                  switch (rv) {
                  case X509_V_OK:
                      continue;
                  case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
                      ctx->error = rv;
                      return 0;
                  default:
                      ctx->error = rv;
                      ctx->error_depth = i;
                      ctx->current_cert = x;
                      if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                          return 0;
                      break;
                  }
              }
          }
      }
  
      /* Name constraints do not match against the common name, but
       * |X509_check_host| still implements the legacy behavior where, on
       * certificates lacking a SAN list, DNS-like names in the common name are
       * checked instead.
       *
       * While we could apply the name constraints to the common name, name
       * constraints are rare enough that can hold such certificates to a higher
       * standard. Note this does not make "DNS-like" heuristic failures any
       * worse. A decorative common-name misidentified as a DNS name would fail
       * the name constraint anyway. */
      X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
      if (has_name_constraints && leaf->altname == NULL) {
          rv = reject_dns_name_in_common_name(leaf);
          switch (rv) {
          case X509_V_OK:
              break;
          case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
              ctx->error = rv;
              return 0;
          default:
              ctx->error = rv;
              ctx->error_depth = i;
              ctx->current_cert = leaf;
              if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                  return 0;
              break;
          }
      }
  
      return 1;
  }
  
  static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
  {
      ctx->error = errcode;
      ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
      ctx->error_depth = 0;
      return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
  }
  
  static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
  {
      size_t i;
      size_t n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
      char *name;
  
      if (id->peername != NULL) {
          OPENSSL_free(id->peername);
          id->peername = NULL;
      }
      for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
          name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
          if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), id->hostflags,
                              &id->peername) > 0)
              return 1;
      }
      return n == 0;
  }
  
  static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
      X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
      X509 *x = ctx->cert;
      if (id->poison) {
          if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL))
              return 0;
      }
      if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) {
          if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
              return 0;
      }
      if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
          if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
              return 0;
      }
      if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
          if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
              return 0;
      }
      return 1;
  }
  
  static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      size_t i;
      int ok;
      X509 *x = NULL;
      int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
      cb = ctx->verify_cb;
      /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
      for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
          x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
          ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
          /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
          if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
              return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
          /*
           * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
           * overridden.
           */
          if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
              ctx->error_depth = i;
              ctx->current_cert = x;
              ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
              ok = cb(0, ctx);
              if (!ok)
                  return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
          }
      }
      /*
       * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
       * return success.
       */
      if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
          X509 *mx;
          if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
              return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
          x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
          mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
          if (mx) {
              (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
              X509_free(x);
              ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
              return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
          }
      }
  
      /*
       * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
       * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
       */
      return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
  }
  
  static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      int i, last, ok;
      if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
          return 1;
      if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
          last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
      else {
          /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
          if (ctx->parent)
              return 1;
          last = 0;
      }
      for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
          ctx->error_depth = i;
          ok = check_cert(ctx);
          if (!ok)
              return ok;
      }
      return 1;
  }
  
  static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
      X509 *x;
      int ok = 0, cnum;
      unsigned int last_reasons;
      cnum = ctx->error_depth;
      x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
      ctx->current_cert = x;
      ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
      ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
      ctx->current_reasons = 0;
      while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
          last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
          /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
          if (ctx->get_crl)
              ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
          else
              ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
          /*
           * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
           */
          if (!ok) {
              ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
              ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
              goto err;
          }
          ctx->current_crl = crl;
          ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
          if (!ok)
              goto err;
  
          if (dcrl) {
              ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
              if (!ok)
                  goto err;
              ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
              if (!ok)
                  goto err;
          } else
              ok = 1;
  
          /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
          if (ok != 2) {
              ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
              if (!ok)
                  goto err;
          }
  
          X509_CRL_free(crl);
          X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
          crl = NULL;
          dcrl = NULL;
          /*
           * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
           * so exit loop.
           */
          if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
              ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
              ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
              goto err;
          }
      }
   err:
      X509_CRL_free(crl);
      X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
  
      ctx->current_crl = NULL;
      return ok;
  
  }
  
  /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
  
  static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
  {
      time_t *ptime;
      int i;
      if (notify)
          ctx->current_crl = crl;
      if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
          ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
      else
          ptime = NULL;
  
      i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
      if (i == 0) {
          if (!notify)
              return 0;
          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
          if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
              return 0;
      }
  
      if (i > 0) {
          if (!notify)
              return 0;
          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
          if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
              return 0;
      }
  
      if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) {
          i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
  
          if (i == 0) {
              if (!notify)
                  return 0;
              ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
              if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                  return 0;
          }
          /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
          if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
              if (!notify)
                  return 0;
              ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
              if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                  return 0;
          }
      }
  
      if (notify)
          ctx->current_crl = NULL;
  
      return 1;
  }
  
  static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
                        X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
                        STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
  {
      int crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
      size_t i;
      unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
      X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
      X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
      X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
  
      for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
          crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
          reasons = *preasons;
          crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
          if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
              continue;
          /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
          if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
              int day, sec;
              if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl),
                                 X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
                  continue;
              /*
               * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
               * and |sec|.
               */
              if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
                  continue;
          }
          best_crl = crl;
          best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
          best_score = crl_score;
          best_reasons = reasons;
      }
  
      if (best_crl) {
          if (*pcrl)
              X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
          *pcrl = best_crl;
          *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
          *pscore = best_score;
          *preasons = best_reasons;
          X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
          if (*pdcrl) {
              X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
              *pdcrl = NULL;
          }
          get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
      }
  
      if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
          return 1;
  
      return 0;
  }
  
  /*
   * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
   * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
   */
  
  static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
  {
      ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
      int i;
      i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
      if (i >= 0) {
          /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
          if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
              return 0;
          exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
      } else
          exta = NULL;
  
      i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
  
      if (i >= 0) {
  
          if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
              return 0;
          extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
      } else
          extb = NULL;
  
      if (!exta && !extb)
          return 1;
  
      if (!exta || !extb)
          return 0;
  
      if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
          return 0;
  
      return 1;
  }
  
  /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
  
  static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
  {
      /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
      if (!delta->base_crl_number)
          return 0;
      /* Base must have a CRL number */
      if (!base->crl_number)
          return 0;
      /* Issuer names must match */
      if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
          return 0;
      /* AKID and IDP must match */
      if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
          return 0;
      if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
          return 0;
      /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
      if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
          return 0;
      /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
      if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
          return 1;
      return 0;
  }
  
  /*
   * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
   * retrieve a chain of deltas...
   */
  
  static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
                           X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
  {
      X509_CRL *delta;
      size_t i;
      if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
          return;
      if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
          return;
      for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
          delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
          if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
              if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
                  *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
              X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
              *dcrl = delta;
              return;
          }
      }
      *dcrl = NULL;
  }
  
  /*
   * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
   * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
   * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
   * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
   * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
   */
  
  static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
                           unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
  {
  
      int crl_score = 0;
      unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
  
      /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
  
      /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
      if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
          return 0;
      /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
      if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
          if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
              return 0;
      } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
          /* If no new reasons reject */
          if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
              return 0;
      }
      /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
      else if (crl->base_crl_number)
          return 0;
      /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
      if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
          if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
              return 0;
      } else
          crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
  
      if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
          crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
  
      /* Check expiry */
      if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
          crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
  
      /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
      crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
  
      /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
  
      if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
          return 0;
  
      /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
  
      if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
          /* If no new reasons reject */
          if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
              return 0;
          tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
          crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
      }
  
      *preasons = tmp_reasons;
  
      return crl_score;
  
  }
  
  static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
                             X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
  {
      X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
      X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
      int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
      size_t i;
  
      if ((size_t)cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
          cidx++;
  
      crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
  
      if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
          if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
              *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
              *pissuer = crl_issuer;
              return;
          }
      }
  
      for (cidx++; cidx < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
          crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
          if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
              continue;
          if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
              *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
              *pissuer = crl_issuer;
              return;
          }
      }
  
      /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
  
      if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
          return;
  
      /*
       * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
       * untrusted certificates.
       */
      for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
          crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
          if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
              continue;
          if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
              *pissuer = crl_issuer;
              *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
              return;
          }
      }
  
      for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted); i++) {
          crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted, i);
          if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
              continue;
          if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
              *pissuer = crl_issuer;
              *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
              return;
          }
      }
  }
  
  /*
   * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
   * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
   * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
   * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
   */
  
  static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
  {
      X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
      int ret;
      /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
      if (ctx->parent)
          return 0;
      if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
          return -1;
  
      crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
      /* Copy verify params across */
      X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
  
      crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
      crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
  
      /* Verify CRL issuer */
      ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
  
      if (ret <= 0)
          goto err;
  
      /* Check chain is acceptable */
  
      ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
   err:
      X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
      return ret;
  }
  
  /*
   * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
   * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
   * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
   * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
   * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
   * RFC5280 version
   */
  
  static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
                             STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
                             STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
  {
      X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
      cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
      crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
      if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
          return 1;
      return 0;
  }
  
  /*
   * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1.
   * Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 2. One full, one
   * relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 3. Both are full names and
   * compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
   */
  
  static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
  {
      X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
      GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
      GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
      size_t i, j;
      if (!a || !b)
          return 1;
      if (a->type == 1) {
          if (!a->dpname)
              return 0;
          /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
          if (b->type == 1) {
              if (!b->dpname)
                  return 0;
              if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
                  return 1;
              else
                  return 0;
          }
          /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
          nm = a->dpname;
          gens = b->name.fullname;
      } else if (b->type == 1) {
          if (!b->dpname)
              return 0;
          /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
          gens = a->name.fullname;
          nm = b->dpname;
      }
  
      /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
      if (nm) {
          for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
              gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
              if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
                  continue;
              if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
                  return 1;
          }
          return 0;
      }
  
      /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
  
      for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
          gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
          for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
              genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
              if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
                  return 1;
          }
      }
  
      return 0;
  
  }
  
  static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
  {
      size_t i;
      X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
      /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
      if (!dp->CRLissuer)
          return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
      for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
          GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
          if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
              continue;
          if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
              return 1;
      }
      return 0;
  }
  
  /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
  
  static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
                             unsigned int *preasons)
  {
      size_t i;
      if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
          return 0;
      if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
          if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
              return 0;
      } else {
          if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
              return 0;
      }
      *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
      for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
          DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
          if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
              if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
                  *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
                  return 1;
              }
          }
      }
      if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
          && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
          return 1;
      return 0;
  }
  
  /*
   * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
   * to find a delta CRL too
   */
  
  static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
                           X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
  {
      int ok;
      X509 *issuer = NULL;
      int crl_score = 0;
      unsigned int reasons;
      X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
      STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
      X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
      reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
      ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
                      &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
  
      if (ok)
          goto done;
  
      /* Lookup CRLs from store */
  
      skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
  
      /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
      if (!skcrl && crl)
          goto done;
  
      get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
  
      sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
  
   done:
  
      /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
      if (crl) {
          ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
          ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
          ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
          *pcrl = crl;
          *pdcrl = dcrl;
          return 1;
      }
  
      return 0;
  }
  
  /* Check CRL validity */
  static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
  {
      X509 *issuer = NULL;
      EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
      int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
      cnum = ctx->error_depth;
      chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
      /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
      if (ctx->current_issuer)
          issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
  
      /*
       * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
       * certificate in chain.
       */
      else if (cnum < chnum)
          issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
      else {
          issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
          /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
          if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
              ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
              ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
              if (!ok)
                  goto err;
          }
      }
  
      if (issuer) {
          /*
           * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
           */
          if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
              /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
              if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
                  !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
                  ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                  if (!ok)
                      goto err;
              }
  
              if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
                  ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                  if (!ok)
                      goto err;
              }
  
              if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
                  if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
                      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
                      ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                      if (!ok)
                          goto err;
                  }
              }
  
              if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
                  ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                  if (!ok)
                      goto err;
              }
  
          }
  
          if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
              ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
              if (!ok)
                  goto err;
          }
  
          /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
          ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
  
          if (!ikey) {
              ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
              ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
              if (!ok)
                  goto err;
          } else {
              int rv;
              rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
              if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
                  ctx->error = rv;
                  ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                  if (!ok)
                      goto err;
              }
              /* Verify CRL signature */
              if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
                  ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                  if (!ok)
                      goto err;
              }
          }
      }
  
      ok = 1;
  
   err:
      EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
      return ok;
  }
  
  /* Check certificate against CRL */
  static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
  {
      int ok;
      X509_REVOKED *rev;
      /*
       * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
       * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
       * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
       * change the meaning of CRL entries.
       */
      if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
          && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
          ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
          if (!ok)
              return 0;
      }
      /*
       * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
       * is not removeFromCRL.
       */
      if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
          if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
              return 2;
          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
          ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
          if (!ok)
              return 0;
      }
  
      return 1;
  }
  
  static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      int ret;
      if (ctx->parent)
          return 1;
      ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
                              ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
      if (ret == 0) {
          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
          return 0;
      }
      /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
      if (ret == -1) {
          /*
           * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
           */
          X509 *x;
          size_t i;
          for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
              x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
              if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
                  continue;
              ctx->current_cert = x;
              ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
              if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                  return 0;
          }
          return 1;
      }
      if (ret == -2) {
          ctx->current_cert = NULL;
          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
          return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
      }
  
      if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
          ctx->current_cert = NULL;
          /*
           * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
           * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
           * remain in an error state.  Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
           * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
           */
          if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
              return 0;
      }
  
      return 1;
  }
  
  static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
  {
      time_t *ptime;
      int i;
  
      if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
          ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
      else
          ptime = NULL;
  
      i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
      if (i == 0) {
          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
          ctx->current_cert = x;
          if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
              return 0;
      }
  
      if (i > 0) {
          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
          ctx->current_cert = x;
          if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
              return 0;
      }
  
      i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
      if (i == 0) {
          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
          ctx->current_cert = x;
          if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
              return 0;
      }
  
      if (i < 0) {
          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
          ctx->current_cert = x;
          if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
              return 0;
      }
  
      return 1;
  }
  
  static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      int ok = 0, n;
      X509 *xs, *xi;
      EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
      int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
  
      cb = ctx->verify_cb;
  
      n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
      ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
      n--;
      xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
  
      if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
          xs = xi;
      else {
          if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
              xs = xi;
              goto check_cert;
          }
          if (n <= 0) {
              ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
              ctx->current_cert = xi;
              ok = cb(0, ctx);
              goto end;
          } else {
              n--;
              ctx->error_depth = n;
              xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
          }
      }
  
  /*      ctx->error=0;  not needed */
      while (n >= 0) {
          ctx->error_depth = n;
  
          /*
           * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
           * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
           * time.
           */
          if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
              if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
                  ctx->current_cert = xi;
                  ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
                  if (!ok)
                      goto end;
              } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
                  ctx->current_cert = xs;
                  ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
                  if (!ok) {
                      EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
                      goto end;
                  }
              }
              EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
              pkey = NULL;
          }
  
   check_cert:
          ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
          if (!ok)
              goto end;
  
          /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
          ctx->current_issuer = xi;
          ctx->current_cert = xs;
          ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
          if (!ok)
              goto end;
  
          n--;
          if (n >= 0) {
              xi = xs;
              xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
          }
      }
      ok = 1;
   end:
      return ok;
  }
  
  int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
  {
      return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
  }
  
  int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
  {
      static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
      static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
      ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL;
      int i, day, sec, ret = 0;
  
      /*
       * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
       * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
       * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
       * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
       *
       * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
       * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
       *  validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
       *  dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
       */
      switch (ctm->type) {
      case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
          if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length))
              return 0;
          break;
      case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
          if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length))
              return 0;
          break;
      default:
          return 0;
      }
  
      /**
       * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
       * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
       * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
       */
      for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) {
          if (!isdigit(ctm->data[i]))
              return 0;
      }
      if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != 'Z')
          return 0;
  
      /*
       * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
       * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
       * so we go through ASN.1
       */
      asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time);
      if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL)
          goto err;
      if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time))
          goto err;
  
      /*
       * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
       * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
       */
      ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1;
  
   err:
      ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time);
      return ret;
  }
  
  ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
  {
      return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
  }
  
  ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
  {
      return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
  }
  
  ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
                              int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
  {
      time_t t = 0;
  
      if (in_tm)
          t = *in_tm;
      else
          time(&t);
  
      if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
          if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
              return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
          if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
              return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
      }
      return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
  }
  
  /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
  
  X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
                          EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
  {
      X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
      int i;
      size_t j;
      STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
      /* CRLs can't be delta already */
      if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
          return NULL;
      }
      /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
      if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
          return NULL;
      }
      /* Issuer names must match */
      if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
          return NULL;
      }
      /* AKID and IDP must match */
      if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
          return NULL;
      }
      if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
          return NULL;
      }
      /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
      if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
          return NULL;
      }
      /* CRLs must verify */
      if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
                   X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
          return NULL;
      }
      /* Create new CRL */
      crl = X509_CRL_new();
      if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, X509V2_VERSION))
          goto memerr;
      /* Set issuer name */
      if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
          goto memerr;
  
      if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer)))
          goto memerr;
      if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer)))
          goto memerr;
  
      /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
  
      if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
          goto memerr;
  
      /*
       * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
       * number to correct value too.
       */
  
      for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
          X509_EXTENSION *ext;
          ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
          if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
              goto memerr;
      }
  
      /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
  
      revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
  
      for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); j++) {
          X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
          rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, j);
          /*
           * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
           * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
           */
          if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
              rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
              if (!rvtmp)
                  goto memerr;
              if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
                  X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
                  goto memerr;
              }
          }
      }
      /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
  
      if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
          goto memerr;
  
      return crl;
  
   memerr:
      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
      if (crl)
          X509_CRL_free(crl);
      return NULL;
  }
  
  int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
                                      CRYPTO_EX_unused * unused,
                                      CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
                                      CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
  {
      /*
       * This function is (usually) called only once, by
       * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
       */
      int index;
      if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
                                   free_func)) {
          return -1;
      }
      return index;
  }
  
  int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
  {
      return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
  }
  
  void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
  {
      return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
  }
  
  int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      return ctx->error;
  }
  
  void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
  {
      ctx->error = err;
  }
  
  int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      return ctx->error_depth;
  }
  
  X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      return ctx->current_cert;
  }
  
  STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      return ctx->chain;
  }
  
  STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      return ctx->chain;
  }
  
  STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      if (!ctx->chain)
          return NULL;
      return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
  }
  
  X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      return ctx->current_issuer;
  }
  
  X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      return ctx->current_crl;
  }
  
  X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      return ctx->parent;
  }
  
  void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
  {
      ctx->cert = x;
  }
  
  void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
  {
      ctx->untrusted = sk;
  }
  
  STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      return ctx->untrusted;
  }
  
  void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
  {
      ctx->crls = sk;
  }
  
  int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
  {
      return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
  }
  
  int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
  {
      return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
  }
  
  /*
   * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
   * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
   * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
   * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
   * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
   * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
   * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
   * client/server.
   */
  
  int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
                                     int purpose, int trust)
  {
      int idx;
      /* If purpose not set use default */
      if (!purpose)
          purpose = def_purpose;
      /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
      if (purpose) {
          X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
          idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
          if (idx == -1) {
              OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
              return 0;
          }
          ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
          if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
              idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
              if (idx == -1) {
                  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
                  return 0;
              }
              ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
          }
          /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
          if (!trust)
              trust = ptmp->trust;
      }
      if (trust) {
          idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
          if (idx == -1) {
              OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
              return 0;
          }
      }
  
      if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
          ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
      if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
          ctx->param->trust = trust;
      return 1;
  }
  
  X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
  {
      X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
      ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
      if (!ctx) {
          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
          return NULL;
      }
      X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx);
      return ctx;
  }
  
  void X509_STORE_CTX_zero(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
  }
  
  void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      if (ctx == NULL) {
          return;
      }
      X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
      OPENSSL_free(ctx);
  }
  
  int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
                          STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
  {
      X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx);
      ctx->ctx = store;
      ctx->cert = x509;
      ctx->untrusted = chain;
  
      CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data);
  
      if (store == NULL) {
          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
          goto err;
      }
  
      ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
      if (!ctx->param)
          goto err;
  
      /*
       * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE.
       */
  
      ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
      ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
  
      if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param) ||
          !X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
                                     X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"))) {
          goto err;
      }
  
      if (store->check_issued)
          ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
      else
          ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
  
      if (store->get_issuer)
          ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
      else
          ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
  
      if (store->verify_cb)
          ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
      else
          ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
  
      if (store->verify)
          ctx->verify = store->verify;
      else
          ctx->verify = internal_verify;
  
      if (store->check_revocation)
          ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
      else
          ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
  
      if (store->get_crl)
          ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
      else
          ctx->get_crl = NULL;
  
      if (store->check_crl)
          ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
      else
          ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
  
      if (store->cert_crl)
          ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
      else
          ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
  
      if (store->lookup_certs)
          ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
      else
          ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
  
      if (store->lookup_crls)
          ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
      else
          ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
  
      ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
  
      return 1;
  
   err:
      CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
      if (ctx->param != NULL) {
          X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
      }
  
      OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
      return 0;
  }
  
  /*
   * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
   * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
   */
  
  void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
  {
      ctx->other_ctx = sk;
      ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
  }
  
  void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      /* We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, |X509_STORE_CTX_free|
       * also calls this function. */
      if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
          ctx->cleanup(ctx);
          ctx->cleanup = NULL;
      }
      if (ctx->param != NULL) {
          if (ctx->parent == NULL)
              X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
          ctx->param = NULL;
      }
      if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
          X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
          ctx->tree = NULL;
      }
      if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
          sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
          ctx->chain = NULL;
      }
      CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
      OPENSSL_memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
  }
  
  void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
  {
      X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
  }
  
  void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
  {
      X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
  }
  
  void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
                               time_t t)
  {
      X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
  }
  
  X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      return ctx->cert;
  }
  
  void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
                                    int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
  {
      ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
  }
  
  X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      return ctx->tree;
  }
  
  int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      return ctx->explicit_policy;
  }
  
  int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
  {
      const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
      param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
      if (!param)
          return 0;
      return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
  }
  
  X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
  {
      return ctx->param;
  }
  
  void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
  {
      if (ctx->param)
          X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
      ctx->param = param;
  }
  
  IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
  
  IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
  