text: /* $OpenBSD: s3_srvr.c,v 1.99 2015/02/07 08:56:39 jsing Exp $ */
  /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
   * All rights reserved.
   *
   * This package is an SSL implementation written
   * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
   * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
   *
   * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
   * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
   * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
   * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
   * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
   * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
   *
   * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
   * the code are not to be removed.
   * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
   * as the author of the parts of the library used.
   * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
   * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
   *
   * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
   * are met:
   * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
   * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
   *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
   * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
   *    must display the following acknowledgement:
   *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
   *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
   *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
   *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
   * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
   *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
   *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
   *
   * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
   * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
   * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
   * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
   * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
   * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
   * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
   * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
   * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
   * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
   * SUCH DAMAGE.
   *
   * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
   * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
   * copied and put under another distribution licence
   * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
   */
  /* ====================================================================
   * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
   *
   * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
   * are met:
   *
   * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
   *
   * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
   *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
   *    distribution.
   *
   * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
   *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
   *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
   *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
   *
   * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
   *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
   *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
   *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
   *
   * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
   *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
   *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
   *
   * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
   *    acknowledgment:
   *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
   *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
   *
   * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
   * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
   * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
   * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
   * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
   * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
   * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
   * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
   * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
   * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
   * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
   * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
   * ====================================================================
   *
   * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
   * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
   * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
   *
   */
  /* ====================================================================
   * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
   *
   * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
   * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
   *
   * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
   * license provided above.
   *
   * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
   * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
   *
   */
  /* ====================================================================
   * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
   *
   * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
   * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
   * license.
   *
   * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
   * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
   * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
   *
   * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
   * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
   * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
   *
   * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
   * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
   * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
   * to make use of the Contribution.
   *
   * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
   * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
   * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
   * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
   * OTHERWISE.
   */
  
  #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
  
  #include <stdio.h>
  
  #include "ssl_locl.h"
  
  #include <openssl/bn.h>
  #include <openssl/buffer.h>
  #include <openssl/evp.h>
  #include <openssl/dh.h>
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
  #include <openssl/gost.h>
  #endif
  #include <openssl/hmac.h>
  #include <openssl/md5.h>
  #include <openssl/objects.h>
  #include <openssl/x509.h>
  
  static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
  
  const SSL_METHOD SSLv3_server_method_data = {
  	.version = SSL3_VERSION,
  	.ssl_new = ssl3_new,
  	.ssl_clear = ssl3_clear,
  	.ssl_free = ssl3_free,
  	.ssl_accept = ssl3_accept,
  	.ssl_connect = ssl_undefined_function,
  	.ssl_read = ssl3_read,
  	.ssl_peek = ssl3_peek,
  	.ssl_write = ssl3_write,
  	.ssl_shutdown = ssl3_shutdown,
  	.ssl_renegotiate = ssl3_renegotiate,
  	.ssl_renegotiate_check = ssl3_renegotiate_check,
  	.ssl_get_message = ssl3_get_message,
  	.ssl_read_bytes = ssl3_read_bytes,
  	.ssl_write_bytes = ssl3_write_bytes,
  	.ssl_dispatch_alert = ssl3_dispatch_alert,
  	.ssl_ctrl = ssl3_ctrl,
  	.ssl_ctx_ctrl = ssl3_ctx_ctrl,
  	.get_cipher_by_char = ssl3_get_cipher_by_char,
  	.put_cipher_by_char = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char,
  	.ssl_pending = ssl3_pending,
  	.num_ciphers = ssl3_num_ciphers,
  	.get_cipher = ssl3_get_cipher,
  	.get_ssl_method = ssl3_get_server_method,
  	.get_timeout = ssl3_default_timeout,
  	.ssl3_enc = &SSLv3_enc_data,
  	.ssl_version = ssl_undefined_void_function,
  	.ssl_callback_ctrl = ssl3_callback_ctrl,
  	.ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl = ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl,
  };
  
  const SSL_METHOD *
  SSLv3_server_method(void)
  {
  	return &SSLv3_server_method_data;
  }
  
  static const SSL_METHOD *
  ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
  {
  	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
  		return (SSLv3_server_method());
  	return (NULL);
  }
  
  int
  ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
  {
  	unsigned long alg_k;
  	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
  	int ret = -1;
  	int new_state, state, skip = 0;
  
  	ERR_clear_error();
  	errno = 0;
  
  	if (s->info_callback != NULL)
  		cb = s->info_callback;
  	else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
  		cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
  
  	/* init things to blank */
  	s->in_handshake++;
  	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
  		SSL_clear(s);
  
  	if (s->cert == NULL) {
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
  		    SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
  		return (-1);
  	}
  
  	for (;;) {
  		state = s->state;
  
  		switch (s->state) {
  		case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
  			s->renegotiate = 1;
  			/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
  
  		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
  		case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
  		case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
  		case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
  
  			s->server = 1;
  			if (cb != NULL)
  				cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
  
  			if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
  				    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  				return (-1);
  			}
  			s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
  
  			if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
  				BUF_MEM *buf;
  				if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
  					ret = -1;
  					goto end;
  				}
  				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,
  				    SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
  					BUF_MEM_free(buf);
  					ret = -1;
  					goto end;
  				}
  				s->init_buf = buf;
  			}
  
  			if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
  				ret = -1;
  				goto end;
  			}
  
  			s->init_num = 0;
  			s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
  
  			if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
  				/*
  				 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO
  				 * so that the output is sent in a way that
  				 * TCP likes :-)
  				 */
  				if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
  					ret = -1;
  					goto end;
  				}
  
  				if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
  					ret = -1;
  					goto end;
  				}
  
  				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
  				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
  			} else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
  				/*
  				 * Server attempting to renegotiate with
  				 * client that doesn't support secure
  				 * renegotiation.
  				 */
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
  				    SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
  				ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
  				    SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
  				ret = -1;
  				goto end;
  			} else {
  				/*
  				 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
  				 * we will just send a HelloRequest
  				 */
  				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
  				s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
  			}
  			break;
  
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
  
  			s->shutdown = 0;
  			ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
  			if (ret <= 0)
  				goto end;
  			s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
  			s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
  			s->init_num = 0;
  
  			if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
  				ret = -1;
  				goto end;
  			}
  			break;
  
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
  			s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
  			break;
  
  		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
  		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
  		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
  
  			s->shutdown = 0;
  			if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
  				ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
  				if (ret <= 0)
  					goto end;
  			}
  
  			s->renegotiate = 2;
  			s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
  			s->init_num = 0;
  			break;
  
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
  			ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
  			if (ret <= 0)
  				goto end;
  			if (s->hit) {
  				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
  					s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
  				else
  					s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
  			}
  			else
  				s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
  			s->init_num = 0;
  			break;
  
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
  			/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH. */
  			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
  			    SSL_aNULL)) {
  				ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
  				if (ret <= 0)
  					goto end;
  				if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
  					s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
  				else
  					s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
  			} else {
  				skip = 1;
  				s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
  			}
  			s->init_num = 0;
  			break;
  
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
  			alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
  
  			/*
  			 * Only send if using a DH key exchange.
  			 *
  			 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a ServerKeyExchange
  			 * message only if the cipher suite is ECDHE. In other
  			 * cases, the server certificate contains the server's
  			 * public key for key exchange.
  			 */
  			if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) {
  				ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
  				if (ret <= 0)
  					goto end;
  			} else
  				skip = 1;
  
  			s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
  			s->init_num = 0;
  			break;
  
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
  			/*
  			 * Determine whether or not we need to request a
  			 * certificate.
  			 *
  			 * Do not request a certificate if:
  			 *
  			 * - We did not ask for it (SSL_VERIFY_PEER is unset).
  			 *
  			 * - SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set and we are
  			 *   renegotiating.
  			 *
  			 * - We are using an anonymous ciphersuites
  			 *   (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
  			 *   and in RFC 2246) ... except when the application
  			 *   insists on verification (against the specs, but
  			 *   s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3).
  			 */
  			if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
  			    ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
  			     (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
  			    ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
  			     SSL_aNULL) && !(s->verify_mode &
  			     SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) {
  				/* No cert request */
  				skip = 1;
  				s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
  				s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
  				if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
  					if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
  						return (-1);
  			} else {
  				s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
  				ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
  				if (ret <= 0)
  					goto end;
  				s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
  				s->init_num = 0;
  			}
  			break;
  
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
  			ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
  			if (ret <= 0)
  				goto end;
  			s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
  			s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
  			s->init_num = 0;
  			break;
  
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
  
  			/*
  			 * This code originally checked to see if
  			 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
  			 * and then flushed. This caused problems
  			 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
  			 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
  			 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
  			 * still exist. So instead we just flush
  			 * unconditionally.
  			 */
  
  			s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
  			if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
  				ret = -1;
  				goto end;
  			}
  			s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
  
  			s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
  			break;
  
  		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
  		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
  			/* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
  			ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
  			if (ret <= 0)
  				goto end;
  			if (ret == 2)
  				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
  			else {
  				if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
  					ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
  					if (ret <= 0)
  						goto end;
  				}
  				s->init_num = 0;
  				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
  			}
  			break;
  
  		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
  		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
  			ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
  			if (ret <= 0)
  				goto end;
  			alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
  			if (ret == 2) {
  				/*
  				 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when
  				 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
  				 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
  				 * message is not sent.
  				 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
  				 * the client uses its key from the certificate
  				 * for key exchange.
  				 */
  				if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
  					s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
  				else
  					s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
  				s->init_num = 0;
  			} else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) {
  				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
  				s->init_num = 0;
  				if (!s->session->peer)
  					break;
  				/*
  				 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
  				 * at this point and digest cached records.
  				 */
  				if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
  					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
  					    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  					return (-1);
  				}
  				s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
  				if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
  					return (-1);
  			} else {
  				int offset = 0;
  				int dgst_num;
  
  				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
  				s->init_num = 0;
  
  				/*
  				 * We need to get hashes here so if there is
  				 * a client cert, it can be verified
  				 * FIXME - digest processing for
  				 * CertificateVerify should be generalized.
  				 * But it is next step
  				 */
  				if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
  					if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
  						return (-1);
  				for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST;
  				    dgst_num++)
  					if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
  					int dgst_size;
  
  					s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
  					    EVP_MD_CTX_type(
  					    s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),
  					    &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
  					dgst_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(
  					    s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
  					if (dgst_size < 0) {
  						ret = -1;
  						goto end;
  					}
  					offset += dgst_size;
  				}
  			}
  			break;
  
  		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
  		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
  			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
  
  			/* we should decide if we expected this one */
  			ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
  			if (ret <= 0)
  				goto end;
  
  			if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
  				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
  			else
  				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
  			s->init_num = 0;
  			break;
  
  		case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
  		case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
  			ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
  			if (ret <= 0)
  				goto end;
  			s->init_num = 0;
  			s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
  			break;
  
  		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
  		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
  			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
  			ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
  			    SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
  			if (ret <= 0)
  				goto end;
  			if (s->hit)
  				s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
  			else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
  				s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
  			else
  				s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
  			s->init_num = 0;
  			break;
  
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
  			ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
  			if (ret <= 0)
  				goto end;
  			s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
  			s->init_num = 0;
  			break;
  
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
  			ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
  			if (ret <= 0)
  				goto end;
  			s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
  			s->init_num = 0;
  			break;
  
  
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
  
  			s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
  			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
  				ret = -1;
  				goto end;
  			}
  
  			ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
  			    SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
  
  			if (ret <= 0)
  				goto end;
  			s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
  			s->init_num = 0;
  
  			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(
  			    s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
  				ret = -1;
  				goto end;
  			}
  
  			break;
  
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
  		case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
  			ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
  			SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
  			s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
  			s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
  			if (ret <= 0)
  				goto end;
  			s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
  			if (s->hit) {
  				if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
  					s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
  					s->s3->tmp.next_state =
  					    SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
  				} else
  					s->s3->tmp.next_state =
  					    SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
  			} else
  				s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
  			s->init_num = 0;
  			break;
  
  		case SSL_ST_OK:
  			/* clean a few things up */
  			ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
  
  			BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
  			s->init_buf = NULL;
  
  			/* remove buffering on output */
  			ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
  
  			s->init_num = 0;
  
  			/* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
  			if (s->renegotiate == 2) {
  				s->renegotiate = 0;
  				s->new_session = 0;
  
  				ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
  
  				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
  				/* s->server=1; */
  				s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
  
  				if (cb != NULL)
  					cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
  			}
  
  			ret = 1;
  			goto end;
  			/* break; */
  
  		default:
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
  			    SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
  			ret = -1;
  			goto end;
  			/* break; */
  		}
  
  		if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
  			if (s->debug) {
  				if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
  					goto end;
  			}
  
  
  			if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
  				new_state = s->state;
  				s->state = state;
  				cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
  				s->state = new_state;
  			}
  		}
  		skip = 0;
  	}
  end:
  	/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
  
  	s->in_handshake--;
  	if (cb != NULL)
  		cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
  	return (ret);
  }
  
  int
  ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
  {
  	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
  		ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST);
  		ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, 0);
  
  		s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
  	}
  
  	/* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
  	return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
  }
  
  int
  ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
  {
  	int ok;
  	long n;
  
  	/*
  	 * This function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
  	 * so permit appropriate message length
  	 */
  	n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
  	    SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
  	if (!ok)
  		return ((int)n);
  	s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
  	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
  		/*
  		 * We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
  		 * negotiation.
  		 */
  		if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO,
  			    SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
  			return (-1);
  		}
  		/*
  		 * Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
  		 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too
  		 * much.)
  		 */
  		DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
  		s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
  		EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
  		s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
  		s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
  		return (2);
  	}
  	return (1);
  }
  
  int
  ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
  {
  	int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1;
  	unsigned int cookie_len;
  	long n;
  	unsigned long id;
  	unsigned char *p, *d;
  	SSL_CIPHER *c;
  	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
  	unsigned long alg_k;
  
  	/*
  	 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
  	 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
  	 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
  	 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
  	 * TLSv1.
  	 */
  	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
  		s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
  	}
  	s->first_packet = 1;
  	n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
  	    SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
  	    SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
  
  	if (!ok)
  		return ((int)n);
  	s->first_packet = 0;
  	d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
  
  	if (2 > n)
  		goto truncated;
  	/*
  	 * Use version from inside client hello, not from record header.
  	 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
  	 */
  	s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8)|(int)p[1];
  	p += 2;
  
  	if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
  	    (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) {
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
  		    SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
  		if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
  			!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
  			/*
  			 * Similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote
  			 * version number
  			 */
  			s->version = s->client_version;
  		}
  		al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
  		goto f_err;
  	}
  
  	/*
  	 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
  	 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
  	 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
  	 */
  	if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
  		unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
  
  		session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
  		cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
  
  		if (cookie_length == 0)
  			return (1);
  	}
  
  	if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 - d > n)
  		goto truncated;
  
  	/* load the client random */
  	memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
  	p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
  
  	/* get the session-id */
  	j= *(p++);
  	if (p + j - d > n)
  		goto truncated;
  
  	s->hit = 0;
  	/*
  	 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
  	 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
  	 * ignore resumption requests with flag
  	 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag
  	 * rather than a change to default behavior so that applications
  	 * relying on this for security won't even compile against older
  	 * library versions).
  	 *
  	 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated()
  	 * to request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session
  	 * remains unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
  	 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
  	 * ignored.
  	 */
  	if ((s->new_session && (s->options &
  	    SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
  		if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
  			goto err;
  	} else {
  		i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
  		if (i == 1) { /* previous session */
  			s->hit = 1;
  		} else if (i == -1)
  			goto err;
  		else {
  			/* i == 0 */
  			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
  				goto err;
  		}
  	}
  
  	p += j;
  
  	if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
  		/* cookie stuff */
  		if (p + 1 - d > n)
  			goto truncated;
  		cookie_len = *(p++);
  
  		/*
  		 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
  		 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
  		 * does not cause an overflow.
  		 */
  		if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
  			/* too much data */
  			al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
  			    SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  
  		if (p + cookie_len - d > n)
  			goto truncated;
  
  		/* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
  		if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
  		    cookie_len > 0) {
  			memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
  
  			if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
  				if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s,
  				    s->d1->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len) == 0) {
  					al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
  					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
  					    SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
  					goto f_err;
  				}
  				/* else cookie verification succeeded */
  			} else if (timingsafe_memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
  			    s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
  				/* default verification */
  				al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
  				    SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
  				goto f_err;
  			}
  
  			ret = 2;
  		}
  
  		p += cookie_len;
  	}
  
  	if (p + 2 - d > n)
  		goto truncated;
  	n2s(p, i);
  	if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) {
  		/* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
  		al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
  		    SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
  		goto f_err;
  	}
  	if (p + i - d > n)
  		goto truncated;
  	if ((i > 0) &&
  	    (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL)) {
  		goto err;
  	}
  	p += i;
  
  	/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
  	if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) {
  		j = 0;
  		id = s->session->cipher->id;
  
  		for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
  			c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
  			if (c->id == id) {
  				j = 1;
  				break;
  			}
  		}
  		if (j == 0) {
  			/*
  			 * We need to have the cipher in the cipher
  			 * list if we are asked to reuse it
  			 */
  			al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
  			    SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  	}
  
  	/* compression */
  	if (p + 1 - d > n)
  		goto truncated;
  	i= *(p++);
  	if (p + i - d > n)
  		goto truncated;
  	for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
  		if (p[j] == 0)
  			break;
  	}
  
  	p += i;
  	if (j >= i) {
  		/* no compress */
  		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
  		    SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
  		goto f_err;
  	}
  
  	/* TLS extensions*/
  	if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
  		if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) {
  			/* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
  			    SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  	}
  	if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
  		    SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
  		goto err;
  	}
  
  	/*
  	 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
  	 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
  	 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
  	 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation.
  	 */
  	arc4random_buf(s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
  
  	if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
  		SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
  
  		s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
  		if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
  		    &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, &pref_cipher,
  		    s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
  			s->hit = 1;
  			s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
  			s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
  
  			ciphers = NULL;
  
  			/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
  			pref_cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher :
  			    ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
  			    SSL_get_ciphers(s));
  			if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
  				al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
  				    SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
  				goto f_err;
  			}
  
  			s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
  
  			if (s->cipher_list)
  				sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
  
  			if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
  				sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
  
  			s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
  			s->cipher_list_by_id =
  			    sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
  		}
  	}
  
  	/*
  	 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
  	 * pick a cipher
  	 */
  
  	if (!s->hit) {
  		if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
  			sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
  		s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
  		if (ciphers == NULL) {
  			al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
  			    SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  		ciphers = NULL;
  		c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
  		SSL_get_ciphers(s));
  
  		if (c == NULL) {
  			al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
  			    SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  		s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
  	} else {
  		/* Session-id reuse */
  #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
  		STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
  		SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
  		SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
  
  		if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
  			sk = s->session->ciphers;
  			for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
  				c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
  				if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
  					nc = c;
  			}
  			if (nc != NULL)
  				s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
  			else if (ec != NULL)
  				s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
  			else
  				s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
  		} else
  #endif
  		s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
  	}
  
  	alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
  	if (!(SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) ||
  	    !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
  		if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
  			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  	}
  
  	/*
  	 * We now have the following setup.
  	 * client_random
  	 * cipher_list 		- our prefered list of ciphers
  	 * ciphers 		- the clients prefered list of ciphers
  	 * compression		- basically ignored right now
  	 * ssl version is set	- sslv3
  	 * s->session		- The ssl session has been setup.
  	 * s->hit		- session reuse flag
  	 * s->tmp.new_cipher	- the new cipher to use.
  	 */
  
  	/* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
  	if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
  		if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
  			    SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
  			goto err;
  		}
  	}
  
  	if (ret < 0)
  		ret = 1;
  	if (0) {
  truncated:
  		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
  f_err:
  		ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
  	}
  err:
  	if (ciphers != NULL)
  		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
  	return (ret);
  }
  
  int
  ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
  {
  	unsigned char *bufend;
  	unsigned char *p, *d;
  	int sl;
  
  	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
  		d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO);
  
  		*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
  		*(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
  
  		/* Random stuff */
  		memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
  		p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
  
  		/*
  		 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
  		 * back in the server hello:
  		 *
  		 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
  		 *   we send back the old session ID.
  		 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
  		 *   is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
  		 *   (which doesn't actually identify the session).
  		 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
  		 *   session ID.
  		 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
  		 *   we send back a 0-length session ID.
  		 *
  		 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
  		 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
  		 * to send back.
  		 */
  		if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
  		    && !s->hit)
  			s->session->session_id_length = 0;
  
  		sl = s->session->session_id_length;
  		if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,
  			    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  			return (-1);
  		}
  		*(p++) = sl;
  		memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
  		p += sl;
  
  		/* put the cipher */
  		s2n(ssl3_cipher_get_value(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), p);
  
  		/* put the compression method */
  		*(p++) = 0;
  
  		if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,
  			    SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
  			return (-1);
  		}
  		bufend = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data +
  		    SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
  		if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, bufend)) == NULL) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,
  			    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  			return (-1);
  		}
  
  		ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, p - d);
  	}
  
  	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
  	return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
  }
  
  int
  ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
  {
  	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
  		ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE);
  		ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, 0);
  
  		s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
  	}
  
  	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
  	return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
  }
  
  int
  ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
  {
  	unsigned char *q;
  	int j, num;
  	unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
  	unsigned int u;
  	DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
  	EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
  	unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
  	int encodedlen = 0;
  	int curve_id = 0;
  	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
  
  	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
  	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
  	unsigned char *p, *d;
  	int al, i;
  	unsigned long type;
  	int n;
  	CERT *cert;
  	BIGNUM *r[4];
  	int nr[4], kn;
  	BUF_MEM *buf;
  	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
  
  	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
  	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
  		type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
  		cert = s->cert;
  
  		buf = s->init_buf;
  
  		r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
  		n = 0;
  		if (type & SSL_kDHE) {
  			if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) {
  				if ((dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s)) == NULL) {
  					al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
  					SSLerr(
  					    SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  					    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  					goto f_err;
  				}
  			} else
  				dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
  
  			if (dhp == NULL && s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)
  				dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0,
  				    SSL_C_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
  
  			if (dhp == NULL) {
  				al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  				    SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
  				goto f_err;
  			}
  
  			if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  				    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  				goto err;
  			}
  
  			if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) {
  				dh = dhp;
  			} else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  				    ERR_R_DH_LIB);
  				goto err;
  			}
  			s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
  
  			if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
  			    (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
  				if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
  					SSLerr(
  					    SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  					    ERR_R_DH_LIB);
  					goto err;
  				}
  			} else {
  				dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
  				dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
  				if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
  					(dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
  					SSLerr(
  					    SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  					    ERR_R_DH_LIB);
  					goto err;
  				}
  			}
  			r[0] = dh->p;
  			r[1] = dh->g;
  			r[2] = dh->pub_key;
  		} else
  		if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
  			const EC_GROUP *group;
  
  			ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
  			if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto != 0) {
  				int nid = tls1_get_shared_curve(s);
  				if (nid != NID_undef)
  					ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
  			} else if (ecdhp == NULL &&
  			    s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL) {
  				ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 0,
  				    SSL_C_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
  			}
  			if (ecdhp == NULL) {
  				al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  				    SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
  				goto f_err;
  			}
  
  			if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  				    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  				goto err;
  			}
  
  			/* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
  			if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto != 0) {
  				ecdh = ecdhp;
  			} else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  				    ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
  				goto err;
  			}
  			s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
  
  			if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
  			    (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
  			    (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
  				if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
  					SSLerr(
  					    SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  					    ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
  					goto err;
  				}
  			}
  
  			if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
  			    (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh)  == NULL) ||
  			    (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,					    ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
  				goto err;
  			}
  
  			/*
  			 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
  			 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
  			 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
  			 */
  			if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(
  			    EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) == 0) {
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  				    SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
  				goto err;
  			}
  
  			/*
  			 * Encode the public key.
  			 * First check the size of encoding and
  			 * allocate memory accordingly.
  			 */
  			encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
  			    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
  			    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
  			    NULL, 0, NULL);
  
  			encodedPoint = malloc(encodedlen);
  
  			bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
  			if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  				    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
  				goto err;
  			}
  
  
  			encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
  			    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
  			    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
  			    encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
  
  			if (encodedlen == 0) {
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  				    ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
  				goto err;
  			}
  
  			BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
  			bn_ctx = NULL;
  
  			/*
  			 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not
  			 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
  			 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
  			 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
  			 * structure.
  			 */
  			n = 4 + encodedlen;
  
  			/*
  			 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
  			 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
  			 */
  			r[0] = NULL;
  			r[1] = NULL;
  			r[2] = NULL;
  			r[3] = NULL;
  		} else
  		{
  			al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  			    SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  		for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
  			nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
  			n += 2 + nr[i];
  		}
  
  		if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) {
  			if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(
  			    s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) == NULL) {
  				al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
  				goto f_err;
  			}
  			kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
  		} else {
  			pkey = NULL;
  			kn = 0;
  		}
  
  		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + 4 + kn)) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  			    ERR_LIB_BUF);
  			goto err;
  		}
  		d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
  		p = &d[4];
  
  		for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
  			s2n(nr[i], p);
  			BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
  			p += nr[i];
  		}
  
  		if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
  			/*
  			 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic)
  			 * curves.
  			 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
  			 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
  			 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
  			 * the actual encoded point itself
  			 */
  			*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
  			p += 1;
  			*p = 0;
  			p += 1;
  			*p = curve_id;
  			p += 1;
  			*p = encodedlen;
  			p += 1;
  			memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
  			    (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
  			free(encodedPoint);
  			encodedPoint = NULL;
  			p += encodedlen;
  		}
  
  
  		/* not anonymous */
  		if (pkey != NULL) {
  			/*
  			 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
  			 * and p points to the space at the end.
  			 */
  			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
  				q = md_buf;
  				j = 0;
  				for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
  					if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
  					    (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 :
  					    s->ctx->sha1, NULL))
  						goto err;
  					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,
  					    s->s3->client_random,
  					    SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
  					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,
  					    s->s3->server_random,
  					    SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
  					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &d[4], n);
  					EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q,
  					    (unsigned int *)&i);
  					q += i;
  					j += i;
  				}
  				if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
  				    &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
  					SSLerr(
  					    SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  					    ERR_LIB_RSA);
  					goto err;
  				}
  				s2n(u, p);
  				n += u + 2;
  			} else if (md) {
  				/* Send signature algorithm. */
  				if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
  					if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
  						/* Should never happen */
  						al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
  						SSLerr(
  						    SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  						    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  						goto f_err;
  					}
  					p += 2;
  				}
  				EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
  				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,
  				    s->s3->client_random,
  				    SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
  				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,
  				    s->s3->server_random,
  				    SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
  				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &d[4], n);
  				if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &p[2],
  					(unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
  					SSLerr(
  					    SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  					    ERR_LIB_EVP);
  					goto err;
  				}
  				s2n(i, p);
  				n += i + 2;
  				if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
  					n += 2;
  			} else {
  				/* Is this error check actually needed? */
  				al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  				    SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
  				goto f_err;
  			}
  		}
  
  		*(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
  		l2n3(n, d);
  
  		/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off */
  		s->init_num = n + 4;
  		s->init_off = 0;
  	}
  
  	s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
  	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
  	return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
  f_err:
  	ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
  err:
  	free(encodedPoint);
  	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
  	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
  	return (-1);
  }
  
  int
  ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
  {
  	unsigned char *p, *d;
  	int i, j, nl, off, n;
  	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
  	X509_NAME *name;
  	BUF_MEM *buf;
  
  	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
  		buf = s->init_buf;
  
  		d = p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
  
  		/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
  		p++;
  		n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
  		d[0] = n;
  		p += n;
  		n++;
  
  		if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
  			nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
  			s2n(nl, p);
  			p += nl + 2;
  			n += nl + 2;
  		}
  
  		off = n;
  		p += 2;
  		n += 2;
  
  		sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
  		nl = 0;
  		if (sk != NULL) {
  			for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
  				name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
  				j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
  				if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 4 + n + j + 2)) {
  					SSLerr(
  					    SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
  					    ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
  					goto err;
  				}
  				p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + n]);
  				if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
  					s2n(j, p);
  					i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
  					n += 2 + j;
  					nl += 2 + j;
  				} else {
  					d = p;
  					i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
  					j -= 2;
  					s2n(j, d);
  					j += 2;
  					n += j;
  					nl += j;
  				}
  			}
  		}
  		/* else no CA names */
  		p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + off]);
  		s2n(nl, p);
  
  		d = (unsigned char *)buf->data;
  		*(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
  		l2n3(n, d);
  
  		/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off */
  		s->init_num = n + 4;
  		s->init_off = 0;
  
  		s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
  	}
  
  	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
  	return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
  err:
  	return (-1);
  }
  
  int
  ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
  {
  	int i, al, ok;
  	long n;
  	unsigned long alg_k;
  	unsigned char *d, *p;
  	RSA *rsa = NULL;
  	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
  	BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
  	DH *dh_srvr;
  
  	EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
  	EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
  	EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
  	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
  
  	/* 2048 maxlen is a guess.  How long a key does that permit? */
  	n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
  	    SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
  	if (!ok)
  		return ((int)n);
  	d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
  
  	alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
  
  	if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
  		char fakekey[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
  
  		arc4random_buf(fakekey, sizeof(fakekey));
  		fakekey[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
  		fakekey[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
  
  		pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
  		if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
  		    (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
  			al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  			    SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  		rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
  
  		/* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
  		if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
  			if (2 > n)
  				goto truncated;
  			n2s(p, i);
  			if (n != i + 2) {
  				if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
  					SSLerr(
  					    SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  					    SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
  					goto err;
  				} else
  					p -= 2;
  			} else
  				n = i;
  		}
  
  		i = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
  
  		ERR_clear_error();
  
  		al = -1;
  
  		if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
  			al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
  			/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
  		}
  
  		if (p + 2 - d > n)	/* needed in the SSL3 case */
  			goto truncated;
  		if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) &&
  		    (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
  			/*
  			 * The premaster secret must contain the same version
  			 * number as the ClientHello to detect version rollback
  			 * attacks (strangely, the protocol does not offer such
  			 * protection for DH ciphersuites).
  			 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated
  			 * protocol version instead if the server does not
  			 * support the requested protocol version.
  			 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
  			 * clients.
  			 */
  			if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
  			    (p[0] == (s->version >> 8)) &&
  			    (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) {
  				al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
  				/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
  
  				/*
  				 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
  				 * Bleichenbacher's attack
  				 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits
  				 * the version number check as a "bad version
  				 * oracle" -- an alert would reveal that the
  				 * plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
  				 * made up by the adversary is properly
  				 * formatted except that the version number is
  				 * wrong.
  				 * To avoid such attacks, we should treat this
  				 * just like any other decryption error.
  				 */
  			}
  		}
  
  		if (al != -1) {
  			/*
  			 * Some decryption failure -- use random value instead
  			 * as countermeasure against Bleichenbacher's attack
  			 * on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
  			 * section 7.4.7.1).
  			 */
  			i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
  			p = fakekey;
  		}
  
  		s->session->master_key_length =
  		    s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
  		    s->session->master_key,
  		    p, i);
  		OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
  	} else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
  		if (2 > n)
  			goto truncated;
  		n2s(p, i);
  		if (n != i + 2) {
  			if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  				    SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
  				goto err;
  			} else {
  				p -= 2;
  				i = (int)n;
  			}
  		}
  
  		if (n == 0L) {
  			/* the parameters are in the cert */
  			al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  			    SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
  			goto f_err;
  		} else {
  			if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
  				al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  				    SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
  				goto f_err;
  			} else
  				dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
  		}
  
  		pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
  		if (pub == NULL) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  			    SSL_R_BN_LIB);
  			goto err;
  		}
  
  		i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
  
  		if (i <= 0) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  			    ERR_R_DH_LIB);
  			BN_clear_free(pub);
  			goto err;
  		}
  
  		DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
  		s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
  
  		BN_clear_free(pub);
  		pub = NULL;
  		s->session->master_key_length =
  		    s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(
  		        s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
  		OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
  	} else
  
  	if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) {
  		int ret = 1;
  		int field_size = 0;
  		const EC_KEY   *tkey;
  		const EC_GROUP *group;
  		const BIGNUM *priv_key;
  
  		/* Initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair. */
  		if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  			    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
  			goto err;
  		}
  
  		/* Let's get server private key and group information. */
  		if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) {
  			/* Use the certificate */
  			tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
  		} else {
  			/*
  			 * Use the ephermeral values we saved when
  			 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
  			 */
  			tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
  		}
  
  		group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
  		priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
  
  		if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
  		    !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  			    ERR_R_EC_LIB);
  			goto err;
  		}
  
  		/* Let's get client's public key */
  		if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  			    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
  			goto err;
  		}
  
  		if (n == 0L) {
  			/* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
  
  			if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
  				al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  				    SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
  				goto f_err;
  			}
  			if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(
  			    s->session->peer)) == NULL) ||
  			    (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
  				/*
  				 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
  				 * authentication using ECDH certificates
  				 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
  				 * never executed. When that support is
  				 * added, we ought to ensure the key
  				 * received in the certificate is
  				 * authorized for key agreement.
  				 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
  				 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
  				 * group.
  				 */
  				al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  				    SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
  				goto f_err;
  			}
  
  			if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
  			    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec))
  			    == 0) {
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  				    ERR_R_EC_LIB);
  				goto err;
  			}
  			ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
  		} else {
  			/*
  			 * Get client's public key from encoded point
  			 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
  			 */
  			if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  				    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
  				goto err;
  			}
  
  			/* Get encoded point length */
  			i = *p;
  
  			p += 1;
  			if (n != 1 + i) {
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  				    ERR_R_EC_LIB);
  				goto err;
  			}
  			if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
  				clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  				    ERR_R_EC_LIB);
  				goto err;
  			}
  			/*
  			 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
  			 * currently, so set it to the start.
  			 */
  			p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
  		}
  
  		/* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
  		field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
  		if (field_size <= 0) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  			    ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
  			goto err;
  		}
  		i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7)/8, clnt_ecpoint,
  		    srvr_ecdh, NULL);
  		if (i <= 0) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  			    ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
  			goto err;
  		}
  
  		EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
  		EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
  		EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
  		BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
  		EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
  		s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
  
  
  		/* Compute the master secret */
  		s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
  		    generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
  
  		OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
  		return (ret);
  	} else
  	if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
  		int ret = 0;
  		EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
  		EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
  		unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
  		size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
  		unsigned long alg_a;
  		int Ttag, Tclass;
  		long Tlen;
  
  		/* Get our certificate private key*/
  		alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
  		if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
  			pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
  
  		pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
  		EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
  		/*
  		 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type,
  		 * maybe use it for key exchange.
  		 * Don't mind errors from EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because
  		 * it is completely valid to use a client certificate for
  		 * authorization only.
  		 */
  		client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
  		if (client_pub_pkey) {
  			if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,
  			    client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
  				ERR_clear_error();
  		}
  		if (2 > n)
  			goto truncated;
  		/* Decrypt session key */
  		if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag,
  		    &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
  		    Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  			    SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
  			goto gerr;
  		}
  		start = p;
  		inlen = Tlen;
  		if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen,
  		    start, inlen) <=0) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  			    SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
  			goto gerr;
  		}
  		/* Generate master secret */
  		s->session->master_key_length =
  		    s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(
  		    s, s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, 32);
  		/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
  		if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1,
  		    EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
  			ret = 2;
  		else
  			ret = 1;
  gerr:
  		EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
  		EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
  		if (ret)
  			return (ret);
  		else
  			goto err;
  	} else {
  		al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
  		    SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
  		goto f_err;
  	}
  
  	return (1);
  truncated:
  	al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
  	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
  f_err:
  	ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
  err:
  	EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
  	EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
  	EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
  	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
  	return (-1);
  }
  
  int
  ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
  {
  	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
  	unsigned char *p;
  	int al, ok, ret = 0;
  	long n;
  	int type = 0, i, j;
  	X509 *peer;
  	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
  	EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
  	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
  
  	n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
  	    SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
  	if (!ok)
  		return ((int)n);
  
  	if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
  		peer = s->session->peer;
  		pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
  		type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
  	} else {
  		peer = NULL;
  		pkey = NULL;
  	}
  
  	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
  		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
  		if (peer != NULL) {
  			al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
  			    SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  		ret = 1;
  		goto end;
  	}
  
  	if (peer == NULL) {
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
  		    SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
  		al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
  		goto f_err;
  	}
  
  	if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
  		    SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
  		al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
  		goto f_err;
  	}
  
  	if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
  		    SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
  		al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
  		goto f_err;
  	}
  
  	/* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
  	p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
  	/*
  	 * Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites.
  	 *
  	 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is a bare
  	 * signature without length field.
  	 */
  	if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
  	    pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) {
  		i = 64;
  	} else {
  		if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
  			int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
  			/* Should never happen */
  			if (sigalg == -1) {
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
  				    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  				al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
  				goto f_err;
  			}
  			if (2 > n)
  				goto truncated;
  			/* Check key type is consistent with signature */
  			if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
  				    SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
  				al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
  				goto f_err;
  			}
  			md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
  			if (md == NULL) {
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
  				    SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
  				al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
  				goto f_err;
  			}
  			p += 2;
  			n -= 2;
  		}
  		if (2 > n)
  			goto truncated;
  		n2s(p, i);
  		n -= 2;
  		if (i > n)
  			goto truncated;
  	}
  	j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
  	if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
  		    SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
  		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
  		goto f_err;
  	}
  
  	if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
  		long hdatalen = 0;
  		void *hdata;
  		hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
  		if (hdatalen <= 0) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
  			    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  		if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) ||
  		    !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
  			    ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
  			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  
  		if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
  			al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
  			    SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  	} else
  	if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
  		i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
  		    MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
  		    pkey->pkey.rsa);
  		if (i < 0) {
  			al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
  			    SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  		if (i == 0) {
  			al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
  			    SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  	} else
  	if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
  		j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
  		    &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
  		    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
  		if (j <= 0) {
  			/* bad signature */
  			al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
  			    SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  	} else
  	if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
  		j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
  		    &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
  		    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
  		if (j <= 0) {
  			/* bad signature */
  			al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
  			    SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  	} else
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
  	if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
  	    pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
  		long hdatalen = 0;
  		void *hdata;
  		unsigned char signature[128];
  		unsigned int siglen = sizeof(signature);
  		int nid;
  		EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
  
  		hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
  		if (hdatalen <= 0) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
  			    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  		if (!EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &nid) ||
  				!(md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
  					ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
  			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  		pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
  		if (!pctx) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
  			    ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
  			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  		if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) ||
  		    !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) ||
  		    !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, signature, &siglen) ||
  		    (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) ||
  		    (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) <= 0) ||
  		    (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY,
  				       EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT,
  				       GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE,
  				       NULL) <= 0)) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
  			    ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
  			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
  			EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  
  		if (EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, p, i, signature, siglen) <= 0) {
  			al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
  			    SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
  			EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  
  		EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
  	} else
  #endif
  	{
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
  		    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  		al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
  		goto f_err;
  	}
  
  
  	ret = 1;
  	if (0) {
  truncated:
  		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
  f_err:
  		ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
  	}
  end:
  	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
  		BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
  		s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
  		s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
  	}
  	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
  	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
  	return (ret);
  }
  
  int
  ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
  {
  	int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
  	X509 *x = NULL;
  	unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
  	const unsigned char *p, *q;
  	STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
  
  	n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
  	    -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
  
  	if (!ok)
  		return ((int)n);
  
  	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
  		if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
  		    (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
  		    	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
  			    SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
  			al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  		/*
  		 * If tls asked for a client cert,
  		 * the client must return a 0 list.
  		 */
  		if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
  			    SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
  			    );
  			al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
  		return (1);
  	}
  
  	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
  		al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
  		    SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
  		goto f_err;
  	}
  	p = (const unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
  
  	if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
  		    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
  		goto err;
  	}
  
  	if (3 > n)
  		goto truncated;
  	n2l3(p, llen);
  	if (llen + 3 != n)
  		goto truncated;
  	for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
  		n2l3(p, l);
  		if (l + nc + 3 > llen) {
  			al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
  			    SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  
  		q = p;
  		x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
  		if (x == NULL) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
  			    ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
  			goto err;
  		}
  		if (p != (q + l)) {
  			al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
  			    SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  		if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
  			    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
  			goto err;
  		}
  		x = NULL;
  		nc += l + 3;
  	}
  
  	if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
  		/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
  		if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
  			al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
  			    SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  		/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
  		else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
  		    (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
  			    SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
  			al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  		/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
  		if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
  			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  	} else {
  		i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
  		if (i <= 0) {
  			al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
  			    SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
  			goto f_err;
  		}
  	}
  
  	if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
  		X509_free(s->session->peer);
  	s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
  	s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
  
  	/*
  	 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
  	 * when we arrive here
  	 */
  	if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
  		s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
  		if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
  			    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
  			goto err;
  		}
  	}
  	if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
  		sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
  	s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
  
  	/*
  	 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
  	 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
  	 */
  
  	sk = NULL;
  
  	ret = 1;
  	if (0) {
  truncated:
  		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
  		    SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
  f_err:
  		ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
  	}
  err:
  	if (x != NULL)
  		X509_free(x);
  	if (sk != NULL)
  		sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
  	return (ret);
  }
  
  int
  ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
  {
  	unsigned long l;
  	X509 *x;
  
  	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
  		x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
  		if (x == NULL) {
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
  			    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  			return (0);
  		}
  
  		l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, x);
  		s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
  		s->init_num = (int)l;
  		s->init_off = 0;
  	}
  
  	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
  	return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
  }
  
  /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
  int
  ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
  {
  	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
  		unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
  		const unsigned char *const_p;
  		int len, slen_full, slen;
  		SSL_SESSION *sess;
  		unsigned int hlen;
  		EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
  		HMAC_CTX hctx;
  		SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
  		unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
  		unsigned char key_name[16];
  
  		/* get session encoding length */
  		slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
  		/*
  		 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
   		 * too long
   		 */
  		if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
  			return (-1);
  		senc = malloc(slen_full);
  		if (!senc)
  			return (-1);
  		p = senc;
  		i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
  
  		/*
  		 * Create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to
  		 * clean up
  		 */
  		const_p = senc;
  		sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
  		if (sess == NULL) {
  			free(senc);
  			return (-1);
  		}
  
  		/* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
  		sess->session_id_length = 0;
  
  		slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
  		if (slen > slen_full) {
  			/* shouldn't ever happen */
  			free(senc);
  			return (-1);
  		}
  		p = senc;
  		i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
  		SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
  
  		/*
  		 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
   		 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
   		 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
   		 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
   		 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
   		 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
   		 */
  		if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
  		    26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
  		    EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) {
  			free(senc);
  			return (-1);
  		}
  
  		p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
  		/* do the header */
  		*(p++) = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
  		/* Skip message length for now */
  		p += 3;
  		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
  		HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
  		/*
  		 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
  		 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
  		 * from parent ctx.
  		 */
  		if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
  			if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
  			    &hctx, 1) < 0) {
  				free(senc);
  				return (-1);
  			}
  		} else {
  			arc4random_buf(iv, 16);
  			EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
  			    tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
  			HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
  			    tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
  			memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
  		}
  
  		/*
  		 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
  		 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session
  		 * (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new
  		 * sessions will live as long as their sessions.
  		 */
  		l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
  
  		/* Skip ticket length for now */
  		p += 2;
  		/* Output key name */
  		macstart = p;
  		memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
  		p += 16;
  		/* output IV */
  		memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
  		p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
  		/* Encrypt session data */
  		EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
  		p += len;
  		EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
  		p += len;
  		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
  
  		HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
  		HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
  		HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
  
  		p += hlen;
  		/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
  		/* Total length */
  		len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
  		p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
  		l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
  		p += 4;
  		s2n(len - 10, p);
  		/* Ticket length */
  
  		/* number of bytes to write */
  		s->init_num = len;
  		s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
  		s->init_off = 0;
  		free(senc);
  	}
  
  	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
  	return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
  }
  
  int
  ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
  {
  	unsigned char *p;
  
  	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
  		/*
  		 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
   		 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
   		 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
   		 * + (ocsp response)
   		 */
  		if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 4 +
  		    s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
  			return (-1);
  
  		p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS);
  
  		*(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
  		l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
  		memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
  
  		ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4);
  
  		s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
  	}
  
  	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
  	return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
  }
  
  /*
   * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
   * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
   */
  int
  ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
  {
  	int ok;
  	int proto_len, padding_len;
  	long n;
  	const unsigned char *p;
  
  	/*
  	 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
  	 * extension in their ClientHello
  	 */
  	if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
  		    SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
  		return (-1);
  	}
  
  	/* 514 maxlen is enough for the payload format below */
  	n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
  	    SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
  	if (!ok)
  		return ((int)n);
  
  	/*
  	 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
  	 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
  	 * by ssl3_get_finished).
  	 */
  	if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
  		    SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
  		return (-1);
  	}
  
  	if (n < 2)
  		return (0);
  	/* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
  
  	p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
  
  	/*
  	 * The payload looks like:
  	 *   uint8 proto_len;
  	 *   uint8 proto[proto_len];
  	 *   uint8 padding_len;
  	 *   uint8 padding[padding_len];
  	 */
  	proto_len = p[0];
  	if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
  		return (0);
  	padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
  	if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
  		return (0);
  
  	s->next_proto_negotiated = malloc(proto_len);
  	if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
  		    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
  		return (0);
  	}
  	memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
  	s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
  
  	return (1);
  }
  