text: /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
  /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
   * All rights reserved.
   *
   * This package is an SSL implementation written
   * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
   * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
   * 
   * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
   * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
   * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
   * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
   * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
   * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
   * 
   * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
   * the code are not to be removed.
   * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
   * as the author of the parts of the library used.
   * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
   * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
   * 
   * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
   * are met:
   * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
   * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
   *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
   * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
   *    must display the following acknowledgement:
   *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
   *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
   *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
   *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
   * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
   *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
   *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
   * 
   * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
   * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
   * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
   * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
   * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
   * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
   * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
   * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
   * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
   * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
   * SUCH DAMAGE.
   * 
   * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
   * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
   * copied and put under another distribution licence
   * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
   */
  /* ====================================================================
   * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
   *
   * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
   * are met:
   *
   * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
   *
   * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
   *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
   *    distribution.
   *
   * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
   *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
   *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
   *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
   *
   * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
   *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
   *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
   *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
   *
   * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
   *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
   *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
   *
   * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
   *    acknowledgment:
   *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
   *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
   *
   * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
   * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
   * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
   * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
   * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
   * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
   * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
   * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
   * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
   * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
   * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
   * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
   * ====================================================================
   *
   * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
   * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
   * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
   *
   */
  
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <errno.h>
  #define USE_SOCKETS
  #include "ssl_locl.h"
  #include <openssl/evp.h>
  #include <openssl/buffer.h>
  
  static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
  			 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
  static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
  
  int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
  	{
  	/* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
  	 * packet by another n bytes.
  	 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
  	 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
  	 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
  	 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
  	 */
  	int i,off,newb;
  
  	if (!extend)
  		{
  		/* start with empty packet ... */
  		if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
  			s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
  		s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf + s->s3->rbuf.offset;
  		s->packet_length = 0;
  		/* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
  		}
  
  	/* extend reads should not span multiple packets for DTLS */
  	if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION &&
  		extend)
  		{
  		if ( s->s3->rbuf.left > 0 && n > s->s3->rbuf.left)
  			n = s->s3->rbuf.left;
  		}
  
  	/* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
  	if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n)
  		{
  		s->packet_length+=n;
  		s->s3->rbuf.left-=n;
  		s->s3->rbuf.offset+=n;
  		return(n);
  		}
  
  	/* else we need to read more data */
  	if (!s->read_ahead)
  		max=n;
  
  	{
  		/* avoid buffer overflow */
  		int max_max = s->s3->rbuf.len - s->packet_length;
  		if (max > max_max)
  			max = max_max;
  	}
  	if (n > max) /* does not happen */
  		{
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  		return -1;
  		}
  
  	off = s->packet_length;
  	newb = s->s3->rbuf.left;
  	/* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
  	 * 'off' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
  	 * 'newb' extra ones at the end */
  	if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf)
  		{
  		/*  off > 0 */
  		memmove(s->s3->rbuf.buf, s->packet, off+newb);
  		s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
  		}
  
  	while (newb < n)
  		{
  		/* Now we have off+newb bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and need
  		 * to read in more until we have off+n (up to off+max if possible) */
  
  		clear_sys_error();
  		if (s->rbio != NULL)
  			{
  			s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
  			i=BIO_read(s->rbio,	&(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off+newb]), max-newb);
  			}
  		else
  			{
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
  			i = -1;
  			}
  
  		if (i <= 0)
  			{
  			s->s3->rbuf.left = newb;
  			return(i);
  			}
  		newb+=i;
  		}
  
  	/* done reading, now the book-keeping */
  	s->s3->rbuf.offset = off + n;
  	s->s3->rbuf.left = newb - n;
  	s->packet_length += n;
  	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
  	return(n);
  	}
  
  /* Call this to get a new input record.
   * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
   * or non-blocking IO.
   * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
   * ssl->s3->rrec.type    - is the type of record
   * ssl->s3->rrec.data, 	 - data
   * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
   */
  /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
  static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
  	{
  	int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
  	int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
  	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
  	SSL_SESSION *sess;
  	unsigned char *p;
  	unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
  	short version;
  	unsigned int mac_size;
  	int clear=0;
  	size_t extra;
  	int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
  	unsigned char *mac = NULL;
  
  	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
  	sess=s->session;
  
  	if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
  		extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
  	else
  		extra=0;
  	if (extra != s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
  		{
  		/* actually likely an application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
  		 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  		return -1;
  		}
  
  again:
  	/* check if we have the header */
  	if (	(s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
  		(s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) 
  		{
  		n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
  		if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
  		s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
  
  		p=s->packet;
  
  		/* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
  		rr->type= *(p++);
  		ssl_major= *(p++);
  		ssl_minor= *(p++);
  		version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
  		n2s(p,rr->length);
  
  		/* Lets check version */
  		if (!s->first_packet)
  			{
  			if (version != s->version)
  				{
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
  				/* Send back error using their
  				 * version number :-) */
  				s->version=version;
  				al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
  				goto f_err;
  				}
  			}
  
  		if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
  			{
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
  			goto err;
  			}
  
  		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
  			{
  			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
  			goto f_err;
  			}
  
  		/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
  		}
  
  	/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
  
  	if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
  		{
  		/* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
  		i=rr->length;
  		n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
  		if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
  		/* now n == rr->length,
  		 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
  		}
  
  	s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
  
  	/* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
  	 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
  	 */
  	rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
  
  	/* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
  	 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
  	 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
  	 * the decryption or by the decompression
  	 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
  	 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ 
  
  	/* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
  	 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
  
  	/* check is not needed I believe */
  	if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
  		{
  		al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
  		goto f_err;
  		}
  
  	/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
  	rr->data=rr->input;
  
  	enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
  	if (enc_err <= 0)
  		{
  		if (enc_err == 0)
  			/* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
  			goto err;
  
  		/* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
  		 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
  		 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
  		 * the MAC computation anyway. */
  		decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
  		}
  
  #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
  printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
  { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
  printf("\n");
  #endif
  
  	/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
  	if (	(sess == NULL) ||
  		(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
  		(s->read_hash == NULL))
  		clear=1;
  
  	if (!clear)
  		{
  		mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
  
  		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
  			{
  #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
  			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
  			goto f_err;
  #else
  			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
  #endif			
  			}
  		/* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
  		if (rr->length >= mac_size)
  			{
  			rr->length -= mac_size;
  			mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
  			}
  		else
  			{
  			/* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
  #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
  			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
  			goto f_err;
  #else
  			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
  			rr->length = 0;
  #endif
  			}
  		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
  		if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
  			{
  			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
  			}
  		}
  
  	if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
  		{
  		/* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
  		 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'.  But unless a decryption
  		 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
  		 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
  		 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
  		al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
  		goto f_err;
  		}
  
  	/* r->length is now just compressed */
  	if (s->expand != NULL)
  		{
  		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
  			{
  			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
  			goto f_err;
  			}
  		if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
  			{
  			al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
  			goto f_err;
  			}
  		}
  
  	if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
  		{
  		al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
  		goto f_err;
  		}
  
  	rr->off=0;
  	/* So at this point the following is true
  	 * ssl->s3->rrec.type 	is the type of record
  	 * ssl->s3->rrec.length	== number of bytes in record
  	 * ssl->s3->rrec.off	== offset to first valid byte
  	 * ssl->s3->rrec.data	== where to take bytes from, increment
  	 *			   after use :-).
  	 */
  
  	/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
  	s->packet_length=0;
  
  	/* just read a 0 length packet */
  	if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
  
  	return(1);
  
  f_err:
  	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
  err:
  	return(ret);
  	}
  
  int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
  	{
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
  	int i;
  	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
  
  	rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
  	i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
  		SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
  	if (i < 0)
  		return(0);
  	else
  		rr->length=i;
  	rr->data=rr->comp;
  #endif
  	return(1);
  	}
  
  int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
  	{
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
  	int i;
  	SSL3_RECORD *wr;
  
  	wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
  	i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
  		SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
  		wr->input,(int)wr->length);
  	if (i < 0)
  		return(0);
  	else
  		wr->length=i;
  
  	wr->input=wr->data;
  #endif
  	return(1);
  	}
  
  /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
   * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
   */
  int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
  	{
  	const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
  	unsigned int tot,n,nw;
  	int i;
  
  	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
  	tot=s->s3->wnum;
  	s->s3->wnum=0;
  
  	if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
  		{
  		i=s->handshake_func(s);
  		if (i < 0) return(i);
  		if (i == 0)
  			{
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
  			return -1;
  			}
  		}
  
  	n=(len-tot);
  	for (;;)
  		{
  		if (n > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
  			nw=SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
  		else
  			nw=n;
  
  		i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
  		if (i <= 0)
  			{
  			s->s3->wnum=tot;
  			return i;
  			}
  
  		if ((i == (int)n) ||
  			(type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
  			 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
  			{
  			/* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
  			 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
  			s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
  			
  			return tot+i;
  			}
  
  		n-=i;
  		tot+=i;
  		}
  	}
  
  static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
  			 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
  	{
  	unsigned char *p,*plen;
  	int i,mac_size,clear=0;
  	int prefix_len = 0;
  	SSL3_RECORD *wr;
  	SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
  	SSL_SESSION *sess;
  
  	/* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
  	 * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */
  	if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
  		return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
  
  	/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
  	if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
  		{
  		i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
  		if (i <= 0)
  			return(i);
  		/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
  		}
  
  	if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
  		return 0;
  
  	wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
  	wb= &(s->s3->wbuf);
  	sess=s->session;
  
  	if (	(sess == NULL) ||
  		(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
  		(s->write_hash == NULL))
  		clear=1;
  
  	if (clear)
  		mac_size=0;
  	else
  		mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
  
  	/* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
  	if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
  		{
  		/* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
  		 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
  
  		if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
  			{
  			/* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
  			 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
  			 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
  			 * together with the actual payload) */
  			prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
  			if (prefix_len <= 0)
  				goto err;
  
  			if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
  				{
  				/* insufficient space */
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  				goto err;
  				}
  			}
  		
  		s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
  		}
  
  	p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
  
  	/* write the header */
  
  	*(p++)=type&0xff;
  	wr->type=type;
  
  	*(p++)=(s->version>>8);
  	*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
  
  	/* field where we are to write out packet length */
  	plen=p; 
  	p+=2;
  
  	/* lets setup the record stuff. */
  	wr->data=p;
  	wr->length=(int)len;
  	wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
  
  	/* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
  	 * wr->data */
  
  	/* first we compress */
  	if (s->compress != NULL)
  		{
  		if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
  			{
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
  			goto err;
  			}
  		}
  	else
  		{
  		memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
  		wr->input=wr->data;
  		}
  
  	/* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
  	 * from wr->input.  Length should be wr->length.
  	 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
  
  	if (mac_size != 0)
  		{
  		s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1);
  		wr->length+=mac_size;
  		wr->input=p;
  		wr->data=p;
  		}
  
  	/* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
  	s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
  
  	/* record length after mac and block padding */
  	s2n(wr->length,plen);
  
  	/* we should now have
  	 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
  	 * wr->length long */
  	wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
  	wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
  
  	if (create_empty_fragment)
  		{
  		/* we are in a recursive call;
  		 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
  		 */
  		return wr->length;
  		}
  
  	/* now let's set up wb */
  	wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
  	wb->offset = 0;
  
  	/* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
  	s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
  	s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
  	s->s3->wpend_type=type;
  	s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
  
  	/* we now just need to write the buffer */
  	return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
  err:
  	return -1;
  	}
  
  /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
  int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
  	unsigned int len)
  	{
  	int i;
  
  /* XXXX */
  	if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
  		|| ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
  			!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
  		|| (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
  		{
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
  		return(-1);
  		}
  
  	for (;;)
  		{
  		clear_sys_error();
  		if (s->wbio != NULL)
  			{
  			s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
  			i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
  				(char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]),
  				(unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left);
  			}
  		else
  			{
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
  			i= -1;
  			}
  		if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left)
  			{
  			s->s3->wbuf.left=0;
  			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
  			return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
  			}
  		else if (i <= 0)
  			return(i);
  		s->s3->wbuf.offset+=i;
  		s->s3->wbuf.left-=i;
  		}
  	}
  
  /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
   * 'type' is one of the following:
   *
   *   -  SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
   *   -  SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
   *   -  0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
   *
   * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
   * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
   *
   * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
   * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
   * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
   * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
   * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
   * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
   *     Change cipher spec protocol
   *             just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
   *     Alert protocol
   *             2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
   *     Handshake protocol
   *             4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
   *             to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
   *             here, anything else is handled by higher layers
   *     Application data protocol
   *             none of our business
   */
  int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
  	{
  	int al,i,j,ret;
  	unsigned int n;
  	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
  	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
  
  	if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
  		if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
  			return(-1);
  
  	if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
  	    (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
  		{
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  		return -1;
  		}
  
  	if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
  		/* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
  		{
  		unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
  		unsigned char *dst = buf;
  		unsigned int k;
  
  		/* peek == 0 */
  		n = 0;
  		while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
  			{
  			*dst++ = *src++;
  			len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
  			n++;
  			}
  		/* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
  		for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
  			s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
  		return n;
  	}
  
  	/* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
  
  	if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
  		{
  		/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
  		i=s->handshake_func(s);
  		if (i < 0) return(i);
  		if (i == 0)
  			{
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
  			return(-1);
  			}
  		}
  start:
  	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
  
  	/* s->s3->rrec.type	    - is the type of record
  	 * s->s3->rrec.data,    - data
  	 * s->s3->rrec.off,     - offset into 'data' for next read
  	 * s->s3->rrec.length,  - number of bytes. */
  	rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
  
  	/* get new packet if necessary */
  	if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
  		{
  		ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
  		if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
  		}
  
  	/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
  
  	if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
  	                               * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
  		&& (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
  		{
  		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
  		goto f_err;
  		}
  
  	/* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
  	 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
  	if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
  		{
  		rr->length=0;
  		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
  		return(0);
  		}
  
  
  	if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
  		{
  		/* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
  		 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
  		if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
  			(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
  			{
  			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
  			goto f_err;
  			}
  
  		if (len <= 0) return(len);
  
  		if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
  			n = rr->length;
  		else
  			n = (unsigned int)len;
  
  		memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
  		if (!peek)
  			{
  			rr->length-=n;
  			rr->off+=n;
  			if (rr->length == 0)
  				{
  				s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
  				rr->off=0;
  				}
  			}
  		return(n);
  		}
  
  
  	/* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
  	 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
  
  	/* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
  	 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
  	 */
  		{
  		unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
  		unsigned char *dest = NULL;
  		unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
  
  		if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
  			{
  			dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
  			dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
  			dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
  			}
  		else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
  			{
  			dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
  			dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
  			dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
  			}
  
  		if (dest_maxlen > 0)
  			{
  			n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
  			if (rr->length < n)
  				n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
  
  			/* now move 'n' bytes: */
  			while (n-- > 0)
  				{
  				dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
  				rr->length--;
  				}
  
  			if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
  				goto start; /* fragment was too small */
  			}
  		}
  
  	/* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
  	 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2      iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
  	 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
  
  	/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
  	if ((!s->server) &&
  		(s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
  		(s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
  		(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
  		{
  		s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
  
  		if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
  			(s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
  			(s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
  			{
  			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
  			goto f_err;
  			}
  
  		if (s->msg_callback)
  			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
  
  		if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
  			!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
  			!s->s3->renegotiate)
  			{
  			ssl3_renegotiate(s);
  			if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
  				{
  				i=s->handshake_func(s);
  				if (i < 0) return(i);
  				if (i == 0)
  					{
  					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
  					return(-1);
  					}
  
  				if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
  					{
  					if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
  						{
  						BIO *bio;
  						/* In the case where we try to read application data,
  						 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
  						 * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
  						 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
  						s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
  						bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
  						BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
  						BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
  						return(-1);
  						}
  					}
  				}
  			}
  		/* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
  		 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
  		goto start;
  		}
  
  	if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
  		{
  		int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
  		int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
  
  		s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
  
  		if (s->msg_callback)
  			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
  
  		if (s->info_callback != NULL)
  			cb=s->info_callback;
  		else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
  			cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
  
  		if (cb != NULL)
  			{
  			j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
  			cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
  			}
  
  		if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
  			{
  			s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
  			if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
  				{
  				s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
  				return(0);
  				}
  			}
  		else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
  			{
  			char tmp[16];
  
  			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
  			s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
  			BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
  			ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
  			s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
  			SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
  			return(0);
  			}
  		else
  			{
  			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
  			goto f_err;
  			}
  
  		goto start;
  		}
  
  	if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
  		{
  		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
  		rr->length=0;
  		return(0);
  		}
  
  	if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
  		{
  		/* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
  		 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
  		if (	(rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
  			(rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
  			{
  			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
  			goto f_err;
  			}
  
  		/* Check we have a cipher to change to */
  		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
  			{
  			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
  			goto f_err;
  			}
  
  		rr->length=0;
  
  		if (s->msg_callback)
  			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
  
  		s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
  		if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
  			goto err;
  		else
  			goto start;
  		}
  
  	/* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
  	if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&	!s->in_handshake)
  		{
  		if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
  			!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
  			{
  #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
         * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
         * protocol violations): */
  			s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
  				?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
  				:SSL_ST_CONNECT;
  #else
  			s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
  #endif
  			s->new_session=1;
  			}
  		i=s->handshake_func(s);
  		if (i < 0) return(i);
  		if (i == 0)
  			{
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
  			return(-1);
  			}
  
  		if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
  			{
  			if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
  				{
  				BIO *bio;
  				/* In the case where we try to read application data,
  				 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
  				 * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
  				 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
  				s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
  				bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
  				BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
  				BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
  				return(-1);
  				}
  			}
  		goto start;
  		}
  
  	switch (rr->type)
  		{
  	default:
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
  		/* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
  		if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
  			{
  			rr->length = 0;
  			goto start;
  			}
  #endif
  		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
  		goto f_err;
  	case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
  	case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
  	case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
  		/* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
  		 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
  		 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
  		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  		goto f_err;
  	case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
  		/* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
  		 * but have application data.  If the library was
  		 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
  		 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
  		 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
  		 * we will indulge it.
  		 */
  		if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
  			(s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
  			((
  				(s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
  				(s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
  				(s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
  				) || (
  					(s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
  					(s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
  					(s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
  					)
  				))
  			{
  			s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
  			return(-1);
  			}
  		else
  			{
  			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
  			goto f_err;
  			}
  		}
  	/* not reached */
  
  f_err:
  	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
  err:
  	return(-1);
  	}
  
  int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
  	{
  	int i;
  	const char *sender;
  	int slen;
  
  	if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
  		i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
  	else
  		i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
  
  	if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
  		{
  		s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
  		if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
  		}
  
  	if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
  		return(0);
  
  	/* we have to record the message digest at
  	 * this point so we can get it before we read
  	 * the finished message */
  	if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
  		{
  		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
  		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
  		}
  	else
  		{
  		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
  		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
  		}
  
  	s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
  		&(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
  		&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
  		sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
  
  	return(1);
  	}
  
  void ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
  	{
  	/* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
  	desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
  	if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
  		desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
  	if (desc < 0) return;
  	/* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
  	if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
  		SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
  
  	s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
  	s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
  	s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
  	if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
  		s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
  	/* else data is still being written out, we will get written
  	 * some time in the future */
  	}
  
  int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
  	{
  	int i,j;
  	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
  
  	s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
  	i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
  	if (i <= 0)
  		{
  		s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
  		}
  	else
  		{
  		/* Alert sent to BIO.  If it is important, flush it now.
  		 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
  		 * we will not worry too much. */
  		if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
  			(void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
  
  		if (s->msg_callback)
  			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
  
  		if (s->info_callback != NULL)
  			cb=s->info_callback;
  		else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
  			cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
  
  		if (cb != NULL)
  			{
  			j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
  			cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
  			}
  		}
  	return(i);
  	}
  