text: /*
   * IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
   * Copyright (c) 2004-2019, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
   *
   * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
   * See README for more details.
   */
  
  #include "utils/includes.h"
  
  #include "utils/common.h"
  #include "utils/eloop.h"
  #include "utils/state_machine.h"
  #include "utils/bitfield.h"
  #include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
  #include "common/ocv.h"
  #include "common/dpp.h"
  #include "common/wpa_ctrl.h"
  #include "crypto/aes.h"
  #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
  #include "crypto/aes_siv.h"
  #include "crypto/crypto.h"
  #include "crypto/sha1.h"
  #include "crypto/sha256.h"
  #include "crypto/sha384.h"
  #include "crypto/random.h"
  #include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
  #include "drivers/driver.h"
  #include "ap_config.h"
  #include "ieee802_11.h"
  #include "wpa_auth.h"
  #include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
  #include "wpa_auth_i.h"
  #include "wpa_auth_ie.h"
  
  #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
  #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
  #define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr
  
  
  static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx);
  static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
  static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp, size_t pmk_len, struct wpa_ptk *PTK,
  			      u8 *data, size_t data_len);
  #ifdef CONFIG_FILS
  static int wpa_aead_decrypt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, struct wpa_ptk *ptk,
  			    u8 *buf, size_t buf_len, u16 *_key_data_len);
  static struct wpabuf * fils_prepare_plainbuf(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
  					     const struct wpabuf *hlp);
  #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
  static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx);
  static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			      struct wpa_group *group);
  static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
  static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			  struct wpa_group *group);
  static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  				       struct wpa_group *group);
  static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *snonce,
  			  const u8 *pmk, unsigned int pmk_len,
  			  struct wpa_ptk *ptk, int force_sha256);
  static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			   struct wpa_group *group);
  static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			  struct wpa_group *group);
  static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			  struct wpa_group *group);
  static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
  static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos);
  
  static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first = 1000; /* ms */
  static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq = 2000; /* ms */
  static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group = 1500; /* ms */
  static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_no_retrans = 4000; /* ms */
  
  /* TODO: make these configurable */
  static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime = 43200;
  static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold = 70;
  static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout = 60;
  
  
  static inline int wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
  	struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr)
  {
  	if (wpa_auth->cb->mic_failure_report)
  		return wpa_auth->cb->mic_failure_report(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr);
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  static inline void wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(
  	struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr)
  {
  	if (wpa_auth->cb->psk_failure_report)
  		wpa_auth->cb->psk_failure_report(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr);
  }
  
  
  static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  				      const u8 *addr, wpa_eapol_variable var,
  				      int value)
  {
  	if (wpa_auth->cb->set_eapol)
  		wpa_auth->cb->set_eapol(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, var, value);
  }
  
  
  static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  				     const u8 *addr, wpa_eapol_variable var)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth->cb->get_eapol)
  		return -1;
  	return wpa_auth->cb->get_eapol(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, var);
  }
  
  
  static inline const u8 * wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  					  const u8 *addr,
  					  const u8 *p2p_dev_addr,
  					  const u8 *prev_psk, size_t *psk_len,
  					  int *vlan_id)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth->cb->get_psk)
  		return NULL;
  	return wpa_auth->cb->get_psk(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, p2p_dev_addr,
  				     prev_psk, psk_len, vlan_id);
  }
  
  
  static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  				   const u8 *addr, u8 *msk, size_t *len)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth->cb->get_msk)
  		return -1;
  	return wpa_auth->cb->get_msk(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, msk, len);
  }
  
  
  static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  				   int vlan_id,
  				   enum wpa_alg alg, const u8 *addr, int idx,
  				   u8 *key, size_t key_len,
  				   enum key_flag key_flag)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth->cb->set_key)
  		return -1;
  	return wpa_auth->cb->set_key(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, vlan_id, alg, addr, idx,
  				     key, key_len, key_flag);
  }
  
  
  static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  				      const u8 *addr, int idx, u8 *seq)
  {
  	int res;
  
  	if (!wpa_auth->cb->get_seqnum)
  		return -1;
  	res = wpa_auth->cb->get_seqnum(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, idx, seq);
  #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
  	if (!addr && idx < 4 && wpa_auth->conf.gtk_rsc_override_set) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "TESTING: Override GTK RSC %016llx --> %016llx",
  			   (long long unsigned) WPA_GET_LE64(seq),
  			   (long long unsigned)
  			   WPA_GET_LE64(wpa_auth->conf.gtk_rsc_override));
  		os_memcpy(seq, wpa_auth->conf.gtk_rsc_override,
  			  WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
  	}
  	if (!addr && idx >= 4 && idx <= 5 &&
  	    wpa_auth->conf.igtk_rsc_override_set) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "TESTING: Override IGTK RSC %016llx --> %016llx",
  			   (long long unsigned) WPA_GET_LE64(seq),
  			   (long long unsigned)
  			   WPA_GET_LE64(wpa_auth->conf.igtk_rsc_override));
  		os_memcpy(seq, wpa_auth->conf.igtk_rsc_override,
  			  WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
  	return res;
  }
  
  
  static inline int
  wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
  		    const u8 *data, size_t data_len, int encrypt)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth->cb->send_eapol)
  		return -1;
  	return wpa_auth->cb->send_eapol(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, data, data_len,
  					encrypt);
  }
  
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_MESH
  static inline int wpa_auth_start_ampe(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  				      const u8 *addr)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth->cb->start_ampe)
  		return -1;
  	return wpa_auth->cb->start_ampe(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr);
  }
  #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
  
  
  int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			  int (*cb)(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx),
  			  void *cb_ctx)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth->cb->for_each_sta)
  		return 0;
  	return wpa_auth->cb->for_each_sta(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, cb, cb_ctx);
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			   int (*cb)(struct wpa_authenticator *a, void *ctx),
  			   void *cb_ctx)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth->cb->for_each_auth)
  		return 0;
  	return wpa_auth->cb->for_each_auth(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, cb, cb_ctx);
  }
  
  
  void wpa_auth_store_ptksa(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			  const u8 *addr, int cipher,
  			  u32 life_time, const struct wpa_ptk *ptk)
  {
  	if (wpa_auth->cb->store_ptksa)
  		wpa_auth->cb->store_ptksa(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, cipher,
  					  life_time, ptk);
  }
  
  
  void wpa_auth_remove_ptksa(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			   const u8 *addr, int cipher)
  {
  	if (wpa_auth->cb->clear_ptksa)
  		wpa_auth->cb->clear_ptksa(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, cipher);
  }
  
  void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
  		     logger_level level, const char *txt)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth->cb->logger)
  		return;
  	wpa_auth->cb->logger(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, level, txt);
  }
  
  
  void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
  		      logger_level level, const char *fmt, ...)
  {
  	char *format;
  	int maxlen;
  	va_list ap;
  
  	if (!wpa_auth->cb->logger)
  		return;
  
  	maxlen = os_strlen(fmt) + 100;
  	format = os_malloc(maxlen);
  	if (!format)
  		return;
  
  	va_start(ap, fmt);
  	vsnprintf(format, maxlen, fmt, ap);
  	va_end(ap);
  
  	wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, addr, level, format);
  
  	os_free(format);
  }
  
  
  static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			       const u8 *addr, u16 reason)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth->cb->disconnect)
  		return;
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR " (reason %u)",
  		   MAC2STR(addr), reason);
  	wpa_auth->cb->disconnect(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, reason);
  }
  
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_OCV
  static int wpa_channel_info(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			    struct wpa_channel_info *ci)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth->cb->channel_info)
  		return -1;
  	return wpa_auth->cb->channel_info(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, ci);
  }
  #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
  
  
  static int wpa_auth_update_vlan(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  				const u8 *addr, int vlan_id)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth->cb->update_vlan)
  		return -1;
  	return wpa_auth->cb->update_vlan(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, vlan_id);
  }
  
  
  static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
  {
  	struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
  
  	if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth->group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN)) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
  			   "Failed to get random data for WPA initialization.");
  	} else {
  		wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, NULL, LOGGER_DEBUG, "GMK rekeyd");
  		wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GMK",
  				wpa_auth->group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN);
  	}
  
  	if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey) {
  		eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey, 0,
  				       wpa_rekey_gmk, wpa_auth, NULL);
  	}
  }
  
  
  static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
  {
  	struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
  	struct wpa_group *group, *next;
  
  	wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, NULL, LOGGER_DEBUG, "rekeying GTK");
  	group = wpa_auth->group;
  	while (group) {
  		wpa_group_get(wpa_auth, group);
  
  		group->GTKReKey = true;
  		do {
  			group->changed = false;
  			wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
  		} while (group->changed);
  
  		next = group->next;
  		wpa_group_put(wpa_auth, group);
  		group = next;
  	}
  
  	if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey) {
  		eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey,
  				       0, wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
  	}
  }
  
  
  static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
  {
  	struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
  	struct wpa_state_machine *sm = timeout_ctx;
  
  	wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, "rekeying PTK");
  	wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
  	wpa_sm_step(sm);
  }
  
  
  void wpa_auth_set_ptk_rekey_timer(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	if (sm && sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_ptk_rekey) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Start PTK rekeying timer for "
  			   MACSTR " (%d seconds)", MAC2STR(sm->addr),
  			   sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_ptk_rekey);
  		eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
  		eloop_register_timeout(sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_ptk_rekey, 0,
  				       wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
  	}
  }
  
  
  static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx)
  {
  	if (sm->pmksa == ctx)
  		sm->pmksa = NULL;
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry,
  				   void *ctx)
  {
  	struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = ctx;
  	wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb, entry);
  }
  
  
  static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  					  struct wpa_group *group)
  {
  	u8 buf[ETH_ALEN + 8 + sizeof(unsigned long)];
  	u8 rkey[32];
  	unsigned long ptr;
  
  	if (random_get_bytes(group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN) < 0)
  		return -1;
  	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GMK", group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN);
  
  	/*
  	 * Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
  	 *                   Local MAC Address || Time)
  	 */
  	os_memcpy(buf, wpa_auth->addr, ETH_ALEN);
  	wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf + ETH_ALEN);
  	ptr = (unsigned long) group;
  	os_memcpy(buf + ETH_ALEN + 8, &ptr, sizeof(ptr));
  #ifdef TEST_FUZZ
  	os_memset(buf + ETH_ALEN, 0xab, 8);
  	os_memset(buf + ETH_ALEN + 8, 0xcd, sizeof(ptr));
  #endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
  	if (random_get_bytes(rkey, sizeof(rkey)) < 0)
  		return -1;
  
  	if (sha1_prf(rkey, sizeof(rkey), "Init Counter", buf, sizeof(buf),
  		     group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN) < 0)
  		return -1;
  	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Key Counter",
  			group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
  
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  static struct wpa_group * wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  					 int vlan_id, int delay_init)
  {
  	struct wpa_group *group;
  
  	group = os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group));
  	if (!group)
  		return NULL;
  
  	group->GTKAuthenticator = true;
  	group->vlan_id = vlan_id;
  	group->GTK_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group);
  
  	if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
  			   "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool for secure operations - update keys later when the first station connects");
  	}
  
  	/*
  	 * Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
  	 * used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
  	 * connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
  	 * on embedded devices.
  	 */
  	if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth, group) < 0) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
  			   "Failed to get random data for WPA initialization.");
  		os_free(group);
  		return NULL;
  	}
  
  	group->GInit = true;
  	if (delay_init) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "WPA: Delay group state machine start until Beacon frames have been configured");
  		/* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
  	} else {
  		wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
  		group->GInit = false;
  		wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
  	}
  
  	return group;
  }
  
  
  /**
   * wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
   * @addr: Authenticator address
   * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
   * @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
   * Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
   */
  struct wpa_authenticator * wpa_init(const u8 *addr,
  				    struct wpa_auth_config *conf,
  				    const struct wpa_auth_callbacks *cb,
  				    void *cb_ctx)
  {
  	struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth;
  
  	wpa_auth = os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator));
  	if (!wpa_auth)
  		return NULL;
  	os_memcpy(wpa_auth->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
  	os_memcpy(&wpa_auth->conf, conf, sizeof(*conf));
  	wpa_auth->cb = cb;
  	wpa_auth->cb_ctx = cb_ctx;
  
  	if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth)) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
  		os_free(wpa_auth);
  		return NULL;
  	}
  
  	wpa_auth->group = wpa_group_init(wpa_auth, 0, 1);
  	if (!wpa_auth->group) {
  		os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
  		os_free(wpa_auth);
  		return NULL;
  	}
  
  	wpa_auth->pmksa = pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb,
  						wpa_auth);
  	if (!wpa_auth->pmksa) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PMKSA cache initialization failed.");
  		os_free(wpa_auth->group);
  		os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
  		os_free(wpa_auth);
  		return NULL;
  	}
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  	wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache = wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
  	if (!wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
  		os_free(wpa_auth->group);
  		os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
  		pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth->pmksa);
  		os_free(wpa_auth);
  		return NULL;
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  
  	if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey) {
  		eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey, 0,
  				       wpa_rekey_gmk, wpa_auth, NULL);
  	}
  
  	if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey) {
  		eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey, 0,
  				       wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
  	}
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_P2P
  	if (WPA_GET_BE32(conf->ip_addr_start)) {
  		int count = WPA_GET_BE32(conf->ip_addr_end) -
  			WPA_GET_BE32(conf->ip_addr_start) + 1;
  		if (count > 1000)
  			count = 1000;
  		if (count > 0)
  			wpa_auth->ip_pool = bitfield_alloc(count);
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
  
  	return wpa_auth;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
  {
  	struct wpa_group *group = wpa_auth->group;
  
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  		   "WPA: Start group state machine to set initial keys");
  	wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
  	group->GInit = false;
  	wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
  	if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE)
  		return -1;
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  /**
   * wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator
   * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
   */
  void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
  {
  	struct wpa_group *group, *prev;
  
  	eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk, wpa_auth, NULL);
  	eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
  
  	pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth->pmksa);
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  	wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache);
  	wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache = NULL;
  	wpa_ft_deinit(wpa_auth);
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_P2P
  	bitfield_free(wpa_auth->ip_pool);
  #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
  
  
  	os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
  
  	group = wpa_auth->group;
  	while (group) {
  		prev = group;
  		group = group->next;
  		os_free(prev);
  	}
  
  	os_free(wpa_auth);
  }
  
  
  /**
   * wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration
   * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
   * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
   */
  int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  		 struct wpa_auth_config *conf)
  {
  	struct wpa_group *group;
  
  	if (!wpa_auth)
  		return 0;
  
  	os_memcpy(&wpa_auth->conf, conf, sizeof(*conf));
  	if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth)) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	/*
  	 * Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new
  	 * configuration.
  	 */
  	group = wpa_auth->group;
  	group->GTK_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group);
  	group->GInit = true;
  	wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
  	group->GInit = false;
  	wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
  
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  struct wpa_state_machine *
  wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
  		  const u8 *p2p_dev_addr)
  {
  	struct wpa_state_machine *sm;
  
  	if (wpa_auth->group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE)
  		return NULL;
  
  	sm = os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine));
  	if (!sm)
  		return NULL;
  	os_memcpy(sm->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
  	if (p2p_dev_addr)
  		os_memcpy(sm->p2p_dev_addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN);
  
  	sm->wpa_auth = wpa_auth;
  	sm->group = wpa_auth->group;
  	wpa_group_get(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
  
  	return sm;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			    struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth || !wpa_auth->conf.wpa || !sm)
  		return -1;
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  	if (sm->ft_completed) {
  		wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  				"FT authentication already completed - do not start 4-way handshake");
  		/* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
  		sm->wpa_ptk_state = WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE;
  		sm->Pair = true;
  		return 0;
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_FILS
  	if (sm->fils_completed) {
  		wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  				"FILS authentication already completed - do not start 4-way handshake");
  		/* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
  		sm->wpa_ptk_state = WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE;
  		sm->Pair = true;
  		return 0;
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
  
  	if (sm->started) {
  		os_memset(&sm->key_replay, 0, sizeof(sm->key_replay));
  		sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = true;
  		return wpa_sm_step(sm);
  	}
  
  	wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  			"start authentication");
  	sm->started = 1;
  
  	sm->Init = true;
  	if (wpa_sm_step(sm) == 1)
  		return 1; /* should not really happen */
  	sm->Init = false;
  	sm->AuthenticationRequest = true;
  	return wpa_sm_step(sm);
  }
  
  
  void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	/* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
  	 * reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
  	 * STA has not yet been removed. */
  	if (!sm)
  		return;
  
  	sm->wpa_key_mgmt = 0;
  }
  
  
  static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  #ifdef CONFIG_P2P
  	if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr)) {
  		u32 start;
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "P2P: Free assigned IP address %u.%u.%u.%u from "
  			   MACSTR,
  			   sm->ip_addr[0], sm->ip_addr[1],
  			   sm->ip_addr[2], sm->ip_addr[3],
  			   MAC2STR(sm->addr));
  		start = WPA_GET_BE32(sm->wpa_auth->conf.ip_addr_start);
  		bitfield_clear(sm->wpa_auth->ip_pool,
  			       WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr) - start);
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
  	if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) {
  		sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
  		sm->GUpdateStationKeys = false;
  	}
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  	os_free(sm->assoc_resp_ftie);
  	wpabuf_free(sm->ft_pending_req_ies);
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  	os_free(sm->last_rx_eapol_key);
  	os_free(sm->wpa_ie);
  	os_free(sm->rsnxe);
  	wpa_group_put(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
  #ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
  	wpabuf_clear_free(sm->dpp_z);
  #endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
  	bin_clear_free(sm, sizeof(*sm));
  }
  
  
  void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth;
  
  	if (!sm)
  		return;
  
  	wpa_auth = sm->wpa_auth;
  	if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_strict_rekey && sm->has_GTK) {
  		wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  				"strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA is leaving");
  		if (eloop_deplete_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk,
  					  wpa_auth, NULL) == -1)
  			eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk,
  					       wpa_auth, NULL);
  	}
  
  	eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
  	sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
  	eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step, sm, NULL);
  	eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, wpa_auth, sm);
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  	wpa_ft_sta_deinit(sm);
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  	if (sm->in_step_loop) {
  		/* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
  		 * Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "WPA: Registering pending STA state machine deinit for "
  			   MACSTR, MAC2STR(sm->addr));
  		sm->pending_deinit = 1;
  	} else
  		wpa_free_sta_sm(sm);
  }
  
  
  static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	if (!sm)
  		return;
  
  	if (!sm->use_ext_key_id && sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_deny_ptk0_rekey) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
  			   "WPA: PTK0 rekey not allowed, disconnect " MACSTR,
  			   MAC2STR(sm->addr));
  		sm->Disconnect = true;
  		/* Try to encourage the STA to reconnect */
  		sm->disconnect_reason =
  			WLAN_REASON_CLASS3_FRAME_FROM_NONASSOC_STA;
  	} else {
  		if (sm->use_ext_key_id)
  			sm->keyidx_active ^= 1; /* flip Key ID */
  		sm->PTKRequest = true;
  		sm->PTK_valid = 0;
  	}
  }
  
  
  static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter *ctr,
  				    const u8 *replay_counter)
  {
  	int i;
  	for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) {
  		if (!ctr[i].valid)
  			break;
  		if (os_memcmp(replay_counter, ctr[i].counter,
  			      WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) == 0)
  			return 1;
  	}
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter *ctr,
  					    const u8 *replay_counter)
  {
  	int i;
  	for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) {
  		if (ctr[i].valid &&
  		    (!replay_counter ||
  		     os_memcmp(replay_counter, ctr[i].counter,
  			       WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) == 0))
  			ctr[i].valid = false;
  	}
  }
  
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			       struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
  			       struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *kde)
  {
  	struct wpa_ie_data ie;
  	struct rsn_mdie *mdie;
  
  	if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde->rsn_ie, kde->rsn_ie_len, &ie) < 0 ||
  	    ie.num_pmkid != 1 || !ie.pmkid) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "FT: No PMKR1Name in FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	os_memcpy(sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, ie.pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
  	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
  		    sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, PMKID_LEN);
  
  	if (!kde->mdie || !kde->ftie) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake message 2/4",
  			   kde->mdie ? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	mdie = (struct rsn_mdie *) (kde->mdie + 2);
  	if (kde->mdie[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) ||
  	    os_memcmp(wpa_auth->conf.mobility_domain, mdie->mobility_domain,
  		      MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN) != 0) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	if (sm->assoc_resp_ftie &&
  	    (kde->ftie[1] != sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1] ||
  	     os_memcmp(kde->ftie, sm->assoc_resp_ftie,
  		       2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]) != 0)) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
  		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
  			    kde->ftie, kde->ftie_len);
  		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
  			    sm->assoc_resp_ftie, 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]);
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	return 0;
  }
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  
  
  static int wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  				    struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int group)
  {
  	/* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */
  	wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  			 "received EAPOL-Key Error Request (STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))",
  			 group);
  
  	if (group && wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
  		wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  				"ignore Michael MIC failure report since group cipher is not TKIP");
  	} else if (!group && sm->pairwise != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
  		wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  				"ignore Michael MIC failure report since pairwise cipher is not TKIP");
  	} else {
  		if (wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth, sm->addr) > 0)
  			return 1; /* STA entry was removed */
  		sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures++;
  		wpa_auth->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures++;
  	}
  
  	/*
  	 * Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
  	 * Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
  	 */
  	wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  static int wpa_try_alt_snonce(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *data,
  			      size_t data_len)
  {
  	struct wpa_ptk PTK;
  	int ok = 0;
  	const u8 *pmk = NULL;
  	size_t pmk_len;
  	int vlan_id = 0;
  
  	os_memset(&PTK, 0, sizeof(PTK));
  	for (;;) {
  		if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
  		    !wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
  			pmk = wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
  					       sm->p2p_dev_addr, pmk, &pmk_len,
  					       &vlan_id);
  			if (!pmk)
  				break;
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  			if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
  				os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, pmk, pmk_len);
  				sm->xxkey_len = pmk_len;
  			}
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  		} else {
  			pmk = sm->PMK;
  			pmk_len = sm->pmk_len;
  		}
  
  		if (wpa_derive_ptk(sm, sm->alt_SNonce, pmk, pmk_len, &PTK, 0) <
  		    0)
  			break;
  
  		if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, pmk_len, &PTK,
  				       data, data_len) == 0) {
  			if (sm->PMK != pmk) {
  				os_memcpy(sm->PMK, pmk, pmk_len);
  				sm->pmk_len = pmk_len;
  			}
  			ok = 1;
  			break;
  		}
  
  		if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) ||
  		    wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
  			break;
  	}
  
  	if (!ok) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "WPA: Earlier SNonce did not result in matching MIC");
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  		   "WPA: Earlier SNonce resulted in matching MIC");
  	sm->alt_snonce_valid = 0;
  
  	if (vlan_id && wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
  	    wpa_auth_update_vlan(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, vlan_id) < 0)
  		return -1;
  
  	os_memcpy(sm->SNonce, sm->alt_SNonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
  	os_memcpy(&sm->PTK, &PTK, sizeof(PTK));
  	forced_memzero(&PTK, sizeof(PTK));
  	sm->PTK_valid = true;
  
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  static bool wpa_auth_gtk_rekey_in_process(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
  {
  	struct wpa_group *group;
  
  	for (group = wpa_auth->group; group; group = group->next) {
  		if (group->GKeyDoneStations)
  			return true;
  	}
  	return false;
  }
  
  
  void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  		 struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
  		 u8 *data, size_t data_len)
  {
  	struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
  	struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
  	u16 key_info, key_data_length;
  	enum { PAIRWISE_2, PAIRWISE_4, GROUP_2, REQUEST } msg;
  	char *msgtxt;
  	struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde;
  	const u8 *key_data;
  	size_t keyhdrlen, mic_len;
  	u8 *mic;
  
  	if (!wpa_auth || !wpa_auth->conf.wpa || !sm)
  		return;
  	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "WPA: RX EAPOL data", data, data_len);
  
  	mic_len = wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len);
  	keyhdrlen = sizeof(*key) + mic_len + 2;
  
  	if (data_len < sizeof(*hdr) + keyhdrlen) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Ignore too short EAPOL-Key frame");
  		return;
  	}
  
  	hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) data;
  	key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
  	mic = (u8 *) (key + 1);
  	key_info = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_info);
  	key_data = mic + mic_len + 2;
  	key_data_length = WPA_GET_BE16(mic + mic_len);
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
  		   " key_info=0x%x type=%u mic_len=%zu key_data_length=%u",
  		   MAC2STR(sm->addr), key_info, key->type,
  		   mic_len, key_data_length);
  	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP,
  		    "WPA: EAPOL-Key header (ending before Key MIC)",
  		    (u8 *)key, sizeof(*key));
  	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "WPA: EAPOL-Key Key MIC",
  		    mic, mic_len);
  	if (key_data_length > data_len - sizeof(*hdr) - keyhdrlen) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
  			   "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - key_data overflow (%d > %zu)",
  			   key_data_length,
  			   data_len - sizeof(*hdr) - keyhdrlen);
  		return;
  	}
  
  	if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
  		if (key->type == EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA) {
  			/*
  			 * Some deployed station implementations seem to send
  			 * msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
  			 */
  			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  				   "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode");
  		} else if (key->type != EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN) {
  			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  				   "Ignore EAPOL-Key with unexpected type %d in RSN mode",
  				   key->type);
  			return;
  		}
  	} else {
  		if (key->type != EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA) {
  			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  				   "Ignore EAPOL-Key with unexpected type %d in WPA mode",
  				   key->type);
  			return;
  		}
  	}
  
  	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key->key_nonce,
  		    WPA_NONCE_LEN);
  	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
  		    key->replay_counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
  
  	/* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
  	 * are set */
  
  	if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Ignore SMK message");
  		return;
  	}
  
  	if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
  		msg = REQUEST;
  		msgtxt = "Request";
  	} else if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE)) {
  		msg = GROUP_2;
  		msgtxt = "2/2 Group";
  	} else if (key_data_length == 0 ||
  		   (mic_len == 0 && (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA) &&
  		    key_data_length == AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
  		msg = PAIRWISE_4;
  		msgtxt = "4/4 Pairwise";
  	} else {
  		msg = PAIRWISE_2;
  		msgtxt = "2/4 Pairwise";
  	}
  
  	if (msg == REQUEST || msg == PAIRWISE_2 || msg == PAIRWISE_4 ||
  	    msg == GROUP_2) {
  		u16 ver = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK;
  		if (sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP ||
  		    sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) {
  			if (wpa_use_cmac(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
  			    !wpa_use_akm_defined(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
  			    ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) {
  				wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
  						LOGGER_WARNING,
  						"advertised support for AES-128-CMAC, but did not use it");
  				return;
  			}
  
  			if (!wpa_use_cmac(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
  			    !wpa_use_akm_defined(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
  			    ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES) {
  				wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
  						LOGGER_WARNING,
  						"did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES with CCMP/GCMP");
  				return;
  			}
  		}
  
  		if (wpa_use_akm_defined(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
  		    ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED) {
  			wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_WARNING,
  					"did not use EAPOL-Key descriptor version 0 as required for AKM-defined cases");
  			return;
  		}
  	}
  
  	if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
  		if (sm->req_replay_counter_used &&
  		    os_memcmp(key->replay_counter, sm->req_replay_counter,
  			      WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) <= 0) {
  			wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_WARNING,
  					"received EAPOL-Key request with replayed counter");
  			return;
  		}
  	}
  
  	if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) &&
  	    !wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->key_replay, key->replay_counter)) {
  		int i;
  
  		if (msg == PAIRWISE_2 &&
  		    wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->prev_key_replay,
  					     key->replay_counter) &&
  		    sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING &&
  		    os_memcmp(sm->SNonce, key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0)
  		{
  			/*
  			 * Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
  			 * WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
  			 * breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
  			 * pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
  			 * even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
  			 */
  			wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  					 "Process SNonce update from STA based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key 1/4");
  			sm->update_snonce = 1;
  			os_memcpy(sm->alt_SNonce, sm->SNonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
  			sm->alt_snonce_valid = true;
  			os_memcpy(sm->alt_replay_counter,
  				  sm->key_replay[0].counter,
  				  WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
  			goto continue_processing;
  		}
  
  		if (msg == PAIRWISE_4 && sm->alt_snonce_valid &&
  		    sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING &&
  		    os_memcmp(key->replay_counter, sm->alt_replay_counter,
  			      WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) == 0) {
  			/*
  			 * Supplicant may still be using the old SNonce since
  			 * there was two EAPOL-Key 2/4 messages and they had
  			 * different SNonce values.
  			 */
  			wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  					 "Try to process received EAPOL-Key 4/4 based on old Replay Counter and SNonce from an earlier EAPOL-Key 1/4");
  			goto continue_processing;
  		}
  
  		if (msg == PAIRWISE_2 &&
  		    wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->prev_key_replay,
  					     key->replay_counter) &&
  		    sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING) {
  			wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  					 "ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - SNonce did not change",
  					 msgtxt);
  		} else {
  			wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  					 "received EAPOL-Key %s with unexpected replay counter",
  					 msgtxt);
  		}
  		for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) {
  			if (!sm->key_replay[i].valid)
  				break;
  			wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "pending replay counter",
  				    sm->key_replay[i].counter,
  				    WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
  		}
  		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "received replay counter",
  			    key->replay_counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
  		return;
  	}
  
  continue_processing:
  #ifdef CONFIG_FILS
  	if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 && mic_len == 0 &&
  	    !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) {
  		wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  				 "WPA: Encr Key Data bit not set even though AEAD cipher is supposed to be used - drop frame");
  		return;
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
  
  	switch (msg) {
  	case PAIRWISE_2:
  		if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKSTART &&
  		    sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING &&
  		    (!sm->update_snonce ||
  		     sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING)) {
  			wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  					 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in invalid state (%d) - dropped",
  					 sm->wpa_ptk_state);
  			return;
  		}
  		random_add_randomness(key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
  		if (sm->group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy) {
  			/*
  			 * The system did not have enough entropy to generate
  			 * strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
  			 * handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
  			 * information from it. Once enough entropy is
  			 * available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
  			 * Counter update and the station will be allowed to
  			 * continue.
  			 */
  			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  				   "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to collect more entropy for random number generation");
  			random_mark_pool_ready();
  			wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
  					   WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
  			return;
  		}
  		break;
  	case PAIRWISE_4:
  		if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING ||
  		    !sm->PTK_valid) {
  			wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  					 "received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in invalid state (%d) - dropped",
  					 sm->wpa_ptk_state);
  			return;
  		}
  		break;
  	case GROUP_2:
  		if (sm->wpa_ptk_group_state != WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
  		    || !sm->PTK_valid) {
  			wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  					 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in invalid state (%d) - dropped",
  					 sm->wpa_ptk_group_state);
  			return;
  		}
  		break;
  	case REQUEST:
  		break;
  	}
  
  	wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  			 "received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt);
  
  	if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK) {
  		wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  				"received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set");
  		return;
  	}
  
  	if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
  	    !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
  		wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  				"received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set");
  		return;
  	}
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_FILS
  	if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
  	    (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
  		wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  				"received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC set");
  		return;
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
  
  	sm->MICVerified = false;
  	if (sm->PTK_valid && !sm->update_snonce) {
  		if (mic_len &&
  		    wpa_verify_key_mic(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len, &sm->PTK,
  				       data, data_len) &&
  		    (msg != PAIRWISE_4 || !sm->alt_snonce_valid ||
  		     wpa_try_alt_snonce(sm, data, data_len))) {
  			wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  					"received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
  #ifdef TEST_FUZZ
  			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
  				   "TEST: Ignore Key MIC failure for fuzz testing");
  			goto continue_fuzz;
  #endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
  			return;
  		}
  #ifdef CONFIG_FILS
  		if (!mic_len &&
  		    wpa_aead_decrypt(sm, &sm->PTK, data, data_len,
  				     &key_data_length) < 0) {
  			wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  					"received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
  #ifdef TEST_FUZZ
  			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
  				   "TEST: Ignore Key MIC failure for fuzz testing");
  			goto continue_fuzz;
  #endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
  			return;
  		}
  #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
  #ifdef TEST_FUZZ
  	continue_fuzz:
  #endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
  		sm->MICVerified = true;
  		eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
  		sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
  	}
  
  	if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
  		if (sm->MICVerified) {
  			sm->req_replay_counter_used = 1;
  			os_memcpy(sm->req_replay_counter, key->replay_counter,
  				  WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
  		} else {
  			wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  					"received EAPOL-Key request with invalid MIC");
  			return;
  		}
  
  		/*
  		 * TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used;
  		 * even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted,
  		 * supplicant is allowed to encrypt it.
  		 */
  		if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR) {
  			if (wpa_receive_error_report(
  				    wpa_auth, sm,
  				    !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE)) > 0)
  				return; /* STA entry was removed */
  		} else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE) {
  			wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  					"received EAPOL-Key Request for new 4-Way Handshake");
  			wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
  		} else if (key_data_length > 0 &&
  			   wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data, key_data_length,
  					     &kde) == 0 &&
  			   kde.mac_addr) {
  		} else {
  			wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  					"received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK rekeying");
  			eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
  			if (wpa_auth_gtk_rekey_in_process(wpa_auth))
  				wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, NULL, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  						"skip new GTK rekey - already in process");
  			else
  				wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth, NULL);
  		}
  	} else {
  		/* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
  		wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm->key_replay,
  						key->replay_counter);
  
  		if (msg == PAIRWISE_2) {
  			/*
  			 * Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
  			 * case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
  			 * needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
  			 * pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
  			 * unexpected supplicant behavior.
  			 */
  			os_memcpy(sm->prev_key_replay, sm->key_replay,
  				  sizeof(sm->key_replay));
  		} else {
  			os_memset(sm->prev_key_replay, 0,
  				  sizeof(sm->prev_key_replay));
  		}
  
  		/*
  		 * Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
  		 * do not get copied again.
  		 */
  		wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm->key_replay, NULL);
  	}
  
  	os_free(sm->last_rx_eapol_key);
  	sm->last_rx_eapol_key = os_memdup(data, data_len);
  	if (!sm->last_rx_eapol_key)
  		return;
  	sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len = data_len;
  
  	sm->rx_eapol_key_secure = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE);
  	sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = true;
  	sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE);
  	sm->EAPOLKeyRequest = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST);
  	os_memcpy(sm->SNonce, key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
  	wpa_sm_step(sm);
  }
  
  
  static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8 *gmk, const char *label, const u8 *addr,
  			  const u8 *gnonce, u8 *gtk, size_t gtk_len)
  {
  	u8 data[ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN + 8 + WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
  	u8 *pos;
  	int ret = 0;
  
  	/* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
  	 *	AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
  	 * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
  	 * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
  	 * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
  	 * exactly same.
  	 */
  	os_memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
  	os_memcpy(data, addr, ETH_ALEN);
  	os_memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, gnonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
  	pos = data + ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN;
  	wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos);
  #ifdef TEST_FUZZ
  	os_memset(pos, 0xef, 8);
  #endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
  	pos += 8;
  	if (random_get_bytes(pos, gtk_len) < 0)
  		ret = -1;
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_SHA384
  	if (sha384_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, label, data, sizeof(data),
  		       gtk, gtk_len) < 0)
  		ret = -1;
  #else /* CONFIG_SHA384 */
  #ifdef CONFIG_SHA256
  	if (sha256_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, label, data, sizeof(data),
  		       gtk, gtk_len) < 0)
  		ret = -1;
  #else /* CONFIG_SHA256 */
  	if (sha1_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, label, data, sizeof(data),
  		     gtk, gtk_len) < 0)
  		ret = -1;
  #endif /* CONFIG_SHA256 */
  #endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */
  
  	forced_memzero(data, sizeof(data));
  
  	return ret;
  }
  
  
  static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
  {
  	struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
  	struct wpa_state_machine *sm = timeout_ctx;
  
  	sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
  	wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, "EAPOL-Key timeout");
  	sm->TimeoutEvt = true;
  	wpa_sm_step(sm);
  }
  
  
  void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  		      struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int key_info,
  		      const u8 *key_rsc, const u8 *nonce,
  		      const u8 *kde, size_t kde_len,
  		      int keyidx, int encr, int force_version)
  {
  	struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &wpa_auth->conf;
  	struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
  	struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
  	size_t len, mic_len, keyhdrlen;
  	int alg;
  	int key_data_len, pad_len = 0;
  	u8 *buf, *pos;
  	int version, pairwise;
  	int i;
  	u8 *key_mic, *key_data;
  
  	mic_len = wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len);
  	keyhdrlen = sizeof(*key) + mic_len + 2;
  
  	len = sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr) + keyhdrlen;
  
  	if (force_version)
  		version = force_version;
  	else if (wpa_use_akm_defined(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
  		version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED;
  	else if (wpa_use_cmac(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
  		version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC;
  	else if (sm->pairwise != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP)
  		version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES;
  	else
  		version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4;
  
  	pairwise = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE);
  
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  		   "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%zu keyidx=%d encr=%d)",
  		   version,
  		   (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE) ? 1 : 0,
  		   (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC) ? 1 : 0,
  		   (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK) ? 1 : 0,
  		   (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL) ? 1 : 0,
  		   pairwise, kde_len, keyidx, encr);
  
  	key_data_len = kde_len;
  
  	if ((version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES ||
  	     wpa_use_aes_key_wrap(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) ||
  	     version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) && encr) {
  		pad_len = key_data_len % 8;
  		if (pad_len)
  			pad_len = 8 - pad_len;
  		key_data_len += pad_len + 8;
  	}
  
  	len += key_data_len;
  	if (!mic_len && encr)
  		len += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
  
  	hdr = os_zalloc(len);
  	if (!hdr)
  		return;
  	hdr->version = conf->eapol_version;
  	hdr->type = IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY;
  	hdr->length = host_to_be16(len  - sizeof(*hdr));
  	key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
  	key_mic = (u8 *) (key + 1);
  	key_data = ((u8 *) (hdr + 1)) + keyhdrlen;
  
  	key->type = sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 ?
  		EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN : EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA;
  	key_info |= version;
  	if (encr && sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2)
  		key_info |= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA;
  	if (sm->wpa != WPA_VERSION_WPA2)
  		key_info |= keyidx << WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT;
  	WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_info, key_info);
  
  	alg = pairwise ? sm->pairwise : conf->wpa_group;
  	if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 && !pairwise)
  		WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_length, 0);
  	else
  		WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_length, wpa_cipher_key_len(alg));
  
  	for (i = RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES - 1; i > 0; i--) {
  		sm->key_replay[i].valid = sm->key_replay[i - 1].valid;
  		os_memcpy(sm->key_replay[i].counter,
  			  sm->key_replay[i - 1].counter,
  			  WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
  	}
  	inc_byte_array(sm->key_replay[0].counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
  	os_memcpy(key->replay_counter, sm->key_replay[0].counter,
  		  WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
  	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Replay Counter",
  		    key->replay_counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
  	sm->key_replay[0].valid = true;
  
  	if (nonce)
  		os_memcpy(key->key_nonce, nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
  
  	if (key_rsc)
  		os_memcpy(key->key_rsc, key_rsc, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
  
  	if (kde && !encr) {
  		os_memcpy(key_data, kde, kde_len);
  		WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic + mic_len, kde_len);
  #ifdef CONFIG_FILS
  	} else if (!mic_len && kde) {
  		const u8 *aad[1];
  		size_t aad_len[1];
  
  		WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic, AES_BLOCK_SIZE + kde_len);
  		wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
  				kde, kde_len);
  
  		wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: KEK",
  				sm->PTK.kek, sm->PTK.kek_len);
  		/* AES-SIV AAD from EAPOL protocol version field (inclusive) to
  		 * to Key Data (exclusive). */
  		aad[0] = (u8 *) hdr;
  		aad_len[0] = key_mic + 2 - (u8 *) hdr;
  		if (aes_siv_encrypt(sm->PTK.kek, sm->PTK.kek_len, kde, kde_len,
  				    1, aad, aad_len, key_mic + 2) < 0) {
  			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: AES-SIV encryption failed");
  			return;
  		}
  
  		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Encrypted Key Data from SIV",
  			    key_mic + 2, AES_BLOCK_SIZE + kde_len);
  #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
  	} else if (encr && kde) {
  		buf = os_zalloc(key_data_len);
  		if (!buf) {
  			os_free(hdr);
  			return;
  		}
  		pos = buf;
  		os_memcpy(pos, kde, kde_len);
  		pos += kde_len;
  
  		if (pad_len)
  			*pos++ = 0xdd;
  
  		wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
  				buf, key_data_len);
  		if (version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES ||
  		    wpa_use_aes_key_wrap(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) ||
  		    version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) {
  			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  				   "WPA: Encrypt Key Data using AES-WRAP (KEK length %zu)",
  				   sm->PTK.kek_len);
  			if (aes_wrap(sm->PTK.kek, sm->PTK.kek_len,
  				     (key_data_len - 8) / 8, buf, key_data)) {
  				os_free(hdr);
  				os_free(buf);
  				return;
  			}
  			WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic + mic_len, key_data_len);
  #ifndef CONFIG_NO_RC4
  		} else if (sm->PTK.kek_len == 16) {
  			u8 ek[32];
  
  			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  				   "WPA: Encrypt Key Data using RC4");
  			os_memcpy(key->key_iv,
  				  sm->group->Counter + WPA_NONCE_LEN - 16, 16);
  			inc_byte_array(sm->group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
  			os_memcpy(ek, key->key_iv, 16);
  			os_memcpy(ek + 16, sm->PTK.kek, sm->PTK.kek_len);
  			os_memcpy(key_data, buf, key_data_len);
  			rc4_skip(ek, 32, 256, key_data, key_data_len);
  			WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic + mic_len, key_data_len);
  #endif /* CONFIG_NO_RC4 */
  		} else {
  			os_free(hdr);
  			os_free(buf);
  			return;
  		}
  		os_free(buf);
  	}
  
  	if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC) {
  		if (!sm->PTK_valid || !mic_len) {
  			wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  					"PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key frame");
  			os_free(hdr);
  			return;
  		}
  
  		if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->PTK.kck, sm->PTK.kck_len,
  				      sm->wpa_key_mgmt, version,
  				      (u8 *) hdr, len, key_mic) < 0) {
  			os_free(hdr);
  			return;
  		}
  #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
  		if (!pairwise &&
  		    conf->corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability > 0.0 &&
  		    drand48() < conf->corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability) {
  			wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  					"Corrupting group EAPOL-Key Key MIC");
  			key_mic[0]++;
  		}
  #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
  	}
  
  	wpa_auth_set_eapol(wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx, 1);
  	wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth, sm->addr, (u8 *) hdr, len,
  			    sm->pairwise_set);
  	os_free(hdr);
  }
  
  
  static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			   struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int key_info,
  			   const u8 *key_rsc, const u8 *nonce,
  			   const u8 *kde, size_t kde_len,
  			   int keyidx, int encr)
  {
  	int timeout_ms;
  	int pairwise = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE;
  	u32 ctr;
  
  	if (!sm)
  		return;
  
  	__wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth, sm, key_info, key_rsc, nonce, kde, kde_len,
  			 keyidx, encr, 0);
  
  	ctr = pairwise ? sm->TimeoutCtr : sm->GTimeoutCtr;
  	if (ctr == 1 && wpa_auth->conf.tx_status)
  		timeout_ms = pairwise ? eapol_key_timeout_first :
  			eapol_key_timeout_first_group;
  	else
  		timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_subseq;
  	if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
  	    (!pairwise || (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)))
  		timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_no_retrans;
  	if (pairwise && ctr == 1 && !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC))
  		sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 1;
  #ifdef TEST_FUZZ
  	timeout_ms = 1;
  #endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  		   "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry counter %u)",
  		   timeout_ms, ctr);
  	eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms / 1000, (timeout_ms % 1000) * 1000,
  			       wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
  }
  
  
  static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp, size_t pmk_len, struct wpa_ptk *PTK,
  			      u8 *data, size_t data_len)
  {
  	struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
  	struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
  	u16 key_info;
  	int ret = 0;
  	u8 mic[WPA_EAPOL_KEY_MIC_MAX_LEN], *mic_pos;
  	size_t mic_len = wpa_mic_len(akmp, pmk_len);
  
  	if (data_len < sizeof(*hdr) + sizeof(*key))
  		return -1;
  
  	hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) data;
  	key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
  	mic_pos = (u8 *) (key + 1);
  	key_info = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_info);
  	os_memcpy(mic, mic_pos, mic_len);
  	os_memset(mic_pos, 0, mic_len);
  	if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK->kck, PTK->kck_len, akmp,
  			      key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK,
  			      data, data_len, mic_pos) ||
  	    os_memcmp_const(mic, mic_pos, mic_len) != 0)
  		ret = -1;
  	os_memcpy(mic_pos, mic, mic_len);
  	return ret;
  }
  
  
  void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	sm->PTK_valid = false;
  	os_memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK));
  
  	wpa_auth_remove_ptksa(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, sm->pairwise);
  
  	if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE, sm->addr, 0, NULL,
  			     0, KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE))
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "RSN: PTK removal from the driver failed");
  	if (sm->use_ext_key_id &&
  	    wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE, sm->addr, 1, NULL,
  			     0, KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE))
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "RSN: PTK Key ID 1 removal from the driver failed");
  	sm->pairwise_set = false;
  	eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event)
  {
  	int remove_ptk = 1;
  
  	if (!sm)
  		return -1;
  
  	wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  			 "event %d notification", event);
  
  	switch (event) {
  	case WPA_AUTH:
  #ifdef CONFIG_MESH
  		/* PTKs are derived through AMPE */
  		if (wpa_auth_start_ampe(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr)) {
  			/* not mesh */
  			break;
  		}
  		return 0;
  #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
  	case WPA_ASSOC:
  		break;
  	case WPA_DEAUTH:
  	case WPA_DISASSOC:
  		sm->DeauthenticationRequest = true;
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  		os_memset(sm->PMK, 0, sizeof(sm->PMK));
  		sm->pmk_len = 0;
  		os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
  		sm->xxkey_len = 0;
  		os_memset(sm->pmk_r1, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r1));
  		sm->pmk_r1_len = 0;
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  		break;
  	case WPA_REAUTH:
  	case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL:
  		if (!sm->started) {
  			/*
  			 * When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
  			 * manages to re-associate without the previous STA
  			 * entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
  			 * sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
  			 * properly at this point.
  			 */
  			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  				   "WPA state machine had not been started - initialize now");
  			sm->started = 1;
  			sm->Init = true;
  			if (wpa_sm_step(sm) == 1)
  				return 1; /* should not really happen */
  			sm->Init = false;
  			sm->AuthenticationRequest = true;
  			break;
  		}
  
  		if (!sm->use_ext_key_id &&
  		    sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_deny_ptk0_rekey) {
  			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
  				   "WPA: PTK0 rekey not allowed, disconnect "
  				   MACSTR, MAC2STR(sm->addr));
  			sm->Disconnect = true;
  			/* Try to encourage the STA to reconnect */
  			sm->disconnect_reason =
  				WLAN_REASON_CLASS3_FRAME_FROM_NONASSOC_STA;
  			break;
  		}
  
  		if (sm->use_ext_key_id)
  			sm->keyidx_active ^= 1; /* flip Key ID */
  
  		if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) {
  			/*
  			 * Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
  			 * update for this STA.
  			 */
  			sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
  			sm->GUpdateStationKeys = false;
  			sm->PtkGroupInit = true;
  		}
  		sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = true;
  		break;
  	case WPA_ASSOC_FT:
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "FT: Retry PTK configuration after association");
  		wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm, 1);
  
  		/* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
  		sm->ft_completed = 1;
  		wpa_auth_set_ptk_rekey_timer(sm);
  		return 0;
  #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  		break;
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  	case WPA_ASSOC_FILS:
  #ifdef CONFIG_FILS
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "FILS: TK configuration after association");
  		fils_set_tk(sm);
  		sm->fils_completed = 1;
  		return 0;
  #else /* CONFIG_FILS */
  		break;
  #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
  	case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
  		sm->tk_already_set = false;
  		return 0;
  	}
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  	sm->ft_completed = 0;
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  
  	if (sm->mgmt_frame_prot && event == WPA_AUTH)
  		remove_ptk = 0;
  #ifdef CONFIG_FILS
  	if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
  	    (event == WPA_AUTH || event == WPA_ASSOC))
  		remove_ptk = 0;
  #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
  
  	if (remove_ptk) {
  		sm->PTK_valid = false;
  		os_memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK));
  
  		if (event != WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL)
  			wpa_remove_ptk(sm);
  	}
  
  	if (sm->in_step_loop) {
  		/*
  		 * wpa_sm_step() is already running - avoid recursive call to
  		 * it by making the existing loop process the new update.
  		 */
  		sm->changed = true;
  		return 0;
  	}
  	return wpa_sm_step(sm);
  }
  
  
  SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE)
  {
  	SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE, wpa_ptk);
  	if (sm->Init) {
  		/* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
  		 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
  		sm->changed = false;
  	}
  
  	sm->keycount = 0;
  	if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys)
  		sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
  	sm->GUpdateStationKeys = false;
  	if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA)
  		sm->PInitAKeys = false;
  	if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
  	       * Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
  		sm->Pair = true;
  	}
  	wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled, 0);
  	wpa_remove_ptk(sm);
  	wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portValid, 0);
  	sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
  	if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) ||
  	    sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP ||
  	    sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE) {
  		wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
  				   WPA_EAPOL_authorized, 0);
  	}
  }
  
  
  SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT)
  {
  	u16 reason = sm->disconnect_reason;
  
  	SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT, wpa_ptk);
  	sm->Disconnect = false;
  	sm->disconnect_reason = 0;
  	if (!reason)
  		reason = WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID;
  	wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, reason);
  }
  
  
  SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED)
  {
  	SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED, wpa_ptk);
  	sm->DeauthenticationRequest = false;
  }
  
  
  SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION)
  {
  	SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION, wpa_ptk);
  	os_memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK));
  	sm->PTK_valid = false;
  	wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto,
  			   1);
  	wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled, 1);
  	sm->AuthenticationRequest = false;
  }
  
  
  static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  				  struct wpa_group *group)
  {
  	if (group->first_sta_seen)
  		return;
  	/*
  	 * System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
  	 * potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
  	 * of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
  	 * GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
  	 * enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
  	 */
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  		   "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first station");
  	if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
  			   "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
  		group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = true;
  	} else {
  		group->first_sta_seen = true;
  		group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = false;
  	}
  
  	if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth, group) < 0 ||
  	    wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group) < 0 ||
  	    wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group) < 0) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPA: GMK/GTK setup failed");
  		group->first_sta_seen = false;
  		group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = true;
  	}
  }
  
  
  SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
  {
  	SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2, wpa_ptk);
  
  	wpa_group_ensure_init(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
  	sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = false;
  
  	/*
  	 * Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
  	 * ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
  	 * incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
  	 * analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
  	 * help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
  	 * machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
  	 * stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
  	 */
  	if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
  			   "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce.");
  		sm->Disconnect = true;
  		return;
  	}
  	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm->ANonce,
  		    WPA_NONCE_LEN);
  	/* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
  	 * logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
  	 * re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
  	 * INITIALIZE. */
  	sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
  }
  
  
  static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
  			   "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
  		sm->Disconnect = true;
  		return -1;
  	}
  	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
  		    WPA_NONCE_LEN);
  	sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
  {
  	u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
  	size_t len = 2 * PMK_LEN;
  
  	SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITPMK, wpa_ptk);
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  	sm->xxkey_len = 0;
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  	if (sm->pmksa) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache");
  		os_memcpy(sm->PMK, sm->pmksa->pmk, sm->pmksa->pmk_len);
  		sm->pmk_len = sm->pmksa->pmk_len;
  #ifdef CONFIG_DPP
  	} else if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "DPP: No PMKSA cache entry for STA - reject connection");
  		sm->Disconnect = true;
  		sm->disconnect_reason = WLAN_REASON_INVALID_PMKID;
  		return;
  #endif /* CONFIG_DPP */
  	} else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, msk, &len) == 0) {
  		unsigned int pmk_len;
  
  		if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
  			pmk_len = PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192;
  		else
  			pmk_len = PMK_LEN;
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine (MSK len=%zu PMK len=%u)",
  			   len, pmk_len);
  		if (len < pmk_len) {
  			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  				   "WPA: MSK not long enough (%zu) to create PMK (%u)",
  				   len, pmk_len);
  			sm->Disconnect = true;
  			return;
  		}
  		os_memcpy(sm->PMK, msk, pmk_len);
  		sm->pmk_len = pmk_len;
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  		if (len >= 2 * PMK_LEN) {
  			if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
  				os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, msk, SHA384_MAC_LEN);
  				sm->xxkey_len = SHA384_MAC_LEN;
  			} else {
  				os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, msk + PMK_LEN, PMK_LEN);
  				sm->xxkey_len = PMK_LEN;
  			}
  		}
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  	} else {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Could not get PMK, get_msk: %p",
  			   sm->wpa_auth->cb->get_msk);
  		sm->Disconnect = true;
  		return;
  	}
  	forced_memzero(msk, sizeof(msk));
  
  	sm->req_replay_counter_used = 0;
  	/* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to false, but not doing this
  	 * will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
  	 * get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
  	 * machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
  	 * state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
  	 * eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
  	 * derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = false here seems to
  	 * be good workaround for this issue. */
  	wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun, false);
  }
  
  
  SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPSK)
  {
  	const u8 *psk;
  	size_t psk_len;
  
  	SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITPSK, wpa_ptk);
  	psk = wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, sm->p2p_dev_addr, NULL,
  			       &psk_len, NULL);
  	if (psk) {
  		os_memcpy(sm->PMK, psk, psk_len);
  		sm->pmk_len = psk_len;
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  		os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, psk, PMK_LEN);
  		sm->xxkey_len = PMK_LEN;
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  	}
  #ifdef CONFIG_SAE
  	if (wpa_auth_uses_sae(sm) && sm->pmksa) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PMK from PMKSA cache");
  		os_memcpy(sm->PMK, sm->pmksa->pmk, sm->pmksa->pmk_len);
  		sm->pmk_len = sm->pmksa->pmk_len;
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  		os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, sm->pmksa->pmk, sm->pmksa->pmk_len);
  		sm->xxkey_len = sm->pmksa->pmk_len;
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_SAE */
  	sm->req_replay_counter_used = 0;
  }
  
  
  SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART)
  {
  	u8 buf[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN], *pmkid = NULL;
  	size_t pmkid_len = 0;
  
  	SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART, wpa_ptk);
  	sm->PTKRequest = false;
  	sm->TimeoutEvt = false;
  	sm->alt_snonce_valid = false;
  
  	sm->TimeoutCtr++;
  	if (sm->TimeoutCtr > sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count) {
  		/* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
  		 * immediately following this. */
  		return;
  	}
  
  	wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  			"sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
  	/*
  	 * For infrastructure BSS cases, it is better for the AP not to include
  	 * the PMKID KDE in EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 since it could be used to initiate
  	 * offline search for the passphrase/PSK without having to be able to
  	 * capture a 4-way handshake from a STA that has access to the network.
  	 *
  	 * For IBSS cases, addition of PMKID KDE could be considered even with
  	 * WPA2-PSK cases that use multiple PSKs, but only if there is a single
  	 * possible PSK for this STA. However, this should not be done unless
  	 * there is support for using that information on the supplicant side.
  	 * The concern about exposing PMKID unnecessarily in infrastructure BSS
  	 * cases would also apply here, but at least in the IBSS case, this
  	 * would cover a potential real use case.
  	 */
  	if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 &&
  	    (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) ||
  	     (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE && sm->pmksa) ||
  	     wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) &&
  	    sm->wpa_key_mgmt != WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
  		pmkid = buf;
  		pmkid_len = 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN;
  		pmkid[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
  		pmkid[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN;
  		RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID);
  		if (sm->pmksa) {
  			wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG,
  				    "RSN: Message 1/4 PMKID from PMKSA entry",
  				    sm->pmksa->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
  			os_memcpy(&pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN],
  				  sm->pmksa->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
  		} else if (wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
  			/* No KCK available to derive PMKID */
  			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  				   "RSN: No KCK available to derive PMKID for message 1/4");
  			pmkid = NULL;
  #ifdef CONFIG_FILS
  		} else if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
  			if (sm->pmkid_set) {
  				wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG,
  					    "RSN: Message 1/4 PMKID from FILS/ERP",
  					    sm->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
  				os_memcpy(&pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN],
  					  sm->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
  			} else {
  				/* No PMKID available */
  				wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  					   "RSN: No FILS/ERP PMKID available for message 1/4");
  				pmkid = NULL;
  			}
  #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  		} else if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
  			   sm->ft_completed) {
  			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  				   "FT: No PMKID in message 1/4 when using FT protocol");
  			pmkid = NULL;
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  #ifdef CONFIG_SAE
  		} else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
  			if (sm->pmkid_set) {
  				wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG,
  					    "RSN: Message 1/4 PMKID from SAE",
  					    sm->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
  				os_memcpy(&pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN],
  					  sm->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
  			} else {
  				/* No PMKID available */
  				wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  					   "RSN: No SAE PMKID available for message 1/4");
  				pmkid = NULL;
  			}
  #endif /* CONFIG_SAE */
  		} else {
  			/*
  			 * Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
  			 * available with pre-calculated PMKID.
  			 */
  			rsn_pmkid(sm->PMK, sm->pmk_len, sm->wpa_auth->addr,
  				  sm->addr, &pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN],
  				  sm->wpa_key_mgmt);
  			wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG,
  				    "RSN: Message 1/4 PMKID derived from PMK",
  				    &pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN], PMKID_LEN);
  		}
  	}
  	if (!pmkid)
  		pmkid_len = 0;
  	int key_info = WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK | WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE;
  #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
  	if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.corrupt_eapol_1_of_4 > 0.0 && drand48() < sm->wpa_auth->conf.corrupt_eapol_1_of_4){
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAPOL MSG 1/4 Adding Corruption : %p len: %i %x", sm->ANonce,key_info,
  				*(sm->ANonce));
  		key_info = 1;
  	}
  #endif /*CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS*/
  
  	wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
  		       key_info, NULL, sm->ANonce,
  		       pmkid, pmkid_len, 0, 0);
  }
  
  
  static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *snonce,
  			  const u8 *pmk, unsigned int pmk_len,
  			  struct wpa_ptk *ptk, int force_sha256)
  {
  	const u8 *z = NULL;
  	size_t z_len = 0, kdk_len;
  	int akmp;
  
  	if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.force_kdk_derivation ||
  	    (sm->wpa_auth->conf.secure_ltf &&
  	     ieee802_11_rsnx_capab(sm->rsnxe, WLAN_RSNX_CAPAB_SECURE_LTF)))
  		kdk_len = WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN;
  	else
  		kdk_len = 0;
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  	if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
  		if (sm->ft_completed) {
  			u8 ptk_name[WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN];
  
  			return wpa_pmk_r1_to_ptk(sm->pmk_r1, sm->pmk_r1_len,
  						 sm->SNonce, sm->ANonce,
  						 sm->addr, sm->wpa_auth->addr,
  						 sm->pmk_r1_name,
  						 ptk, ptk_name,
  						 sm->wpa_key_mgmt,
  						 sm->pairwise,
  						 kdk_len);
  		}
  		return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm, ptk);
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
  	if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP && sm->dpp_z) {
  		z = wpabuf_head(sm->dpp_z);
  		z_len = wpabuf_len(sm->dpp_z);
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
  
  	akmp = sm->wpa_key_mgmt;
  	if (force_sha256)
  		akmp |= WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256;
  	return wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk, pmk_len, "Pairwise key expansion",
  			      sm->wpa_auth->addr, sm->addr, sm->ANonce, snonce,
  			      ptk, akmp, sm->pairwise, z, z_len, kdk_len);
  }
  
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_FILS
  
  int fils_auth_pmk_to_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *pmk,
  			 size_t pmk_len, const u8 *snonce, const u8 *anonce,
  			 const u8 *dhss, size_t dhss_len,
  			 struct wpabuf *g_sta, struct wpabuf *g_ap)
  {
  	u8 ick[FILS_ICK_MAX_LEN];
  	size_t ick_len;
  	int res;
  	u8 fils_ft[FILS_FT_MAX_LEN];
  	size_t fils_ft_len = 0, kdk_len;
  
  	if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.force_kdk_derivation ||
  	    (sm->wpa_auth->conf.secure_ltf &&
  	     ieee802_11_rsnx_capab(sm->rsnxe, WLAN_RSNX_CAPAB_SECURE_LTF)))
  		kdk_len = WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN;
  	else
  		kdk_len = 0;
  
  	res = fils_pmk_to_ptk(pmk, pmk_len, sm->addr, sm->wpa_auth->addr,
  			      snonce, anonce, dhss, dhss_len,
  			      &sm->PTK, ick, &ick_len,
  			      sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pairwise,
  			      fils_ft, &fils_ft_len, kdk_len);
  	if (res < 0)
  		return res;
  	sm->PTK_valid = true;
  	sm->tk_already_set = false;
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  	if (fils_ft_len) {
  		struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = sm->wpa_auth;
  		struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &wpa_auth->conf;
  		u8 pmk_r0[PMK_LEN_MAX], pmk_r0_name[WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN];
  		int use_sha384 = wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm->wpa_key_mgmt);
  
  		if (wpa_derive_pmk_r0(fils_ft, fils_ft_len,
  				      conf->ssid, conf->ssid_len,
  				      conf->mobility_domain,
  				      conf->r0_key_holder,
  				      conf->r0_key_holder_len,
  				      sm->addr, pmk_r0, pmk_r0_name,
  				      use_sha384) < 0)
  			return -1;
  
  		wpa_ft_store_pmk_fils(sm, pmk_r0, pmk_r0_name);
  		forced_memzero(fils_ft, sizeof(fils_ft));
  
  		res = wpa_derive_pmk_r1_name(pmk_r0_name, conf->r1_key_holder,
  					     sm->addr, sm->pmk_r1_name,
  					     use_sha384);
  		forced_memzero(pmk_r0, PMK_LEN_MAX);
  		if (res < 0)
  			return -1;
  		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS+FT: PMKR1Name", sm->pmk_r1_name,
  			    WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN);
  		sm->pmk_r1_name_valid = 1;
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  
  	res = fils_key_auth_sk(ick, ick_len, snonce, anonce,
  			       sm->addr, sm->wpa_auth->addr,
  			       g_sta ? wpabuf_head(g_sta) : NULL,
  			       g_sta ? wpabuf_len(g_sta) : 0,
  			       g_ap ? wpabuf_head(g_ap) : NULL,
  			       g_ap ? wpabuf_len(g_ap) : 0,
  			       sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->fils_key_auth_sta,
  			       sm->fils_key_auth_ap,
  			       &sm->fils_key_auth_len);
  	forced_memzero(ick, sizeof(ick));
  
  	/* Store nonces for (Re)Association Request/Response frame processing */
  	os_memcpy(sm->SNonce, snonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN);
  	os_memcpy(sm->ANonce, anonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN);
  
  	return res;
  }
  
  
  static int wpa_aead_decrypt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, struct wpa_ptk *ptk,
  			    u8 *buf, size_t buf_len, u16 *_key_data_len)
  {
  	struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
  	struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
  	u8 *pos;
  	u16 key_data_len;
  	u8 *tmp;
  	const u8 *aad[1];
  	size_t aad_len[1];
  
  	hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) buf;
  	key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
  	pos = (u8 *) (key + 1);
  	key_data_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
  	if (key_data_len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE ||
  	    key_data_len > buf_len - sizeof(*hdr) - sizeof(*key) - 2) {
  		wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  				"No room for AES-SIV data in the frame");
  		return -1;
  	}
  	pos += 2; /* Pointing at the Encrypted Key Data field */
  
  	tmp = os_malloc(key_data_len);
  	if (!tmp)
  		return -1;
  
  	/* AES-SIV AAD from EAPOL protocol version field (inclusive) to
  	 * to Key Data (exclusive). */
  	aad[0] = buf;
  	aad_len[0] = pos - buf;
  	if (aes_siv_decrypt(ptk->kek, ptk->kek_len, pos, key_data_len,
  			    1, aad, aad_len, tmp) < 0) {
  		wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  				"Invalid AES-SIV data in the frame");
  		bin_clear_free(tmp, key_data_len);
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	/* AEAD decryption and validation completed successfully */
  	key_data_len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
  	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Decrypted Key Data",
  			tmp, key_data_len);
  
  	/* Replace Key Data field with the decrypted version */
  	os_memcpy(pos, tmp, key_data_len);
  	pos -= 2; /* Key Data Length field */
  	WPA_PUT_BE16(pos, key_data_len);
  	bin_clear_free(tmp, key_data_len);
  	if (_key_data_len)
  		*_key_data_len = key_data_len;
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  const u8 * wpa_fils_validate_fils_session(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
  					  const u8 *ies, size_t ies_len,
  					  const u8 *fils_session)
  {
  	const u8 *ie, *end;
  	const u8 *session = NULL;
  
  	if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "FILS: Not a FILS AKM - reject association");
  		return NULL;
  	}
  
  	/* Verify Session element */
  	ie = ies;
  	end = ((const u8 *) ie) + ies_len;
  	while (ie + 1 < end) {
  		if (ie + 2 + ie[1] > end)
  			break;
  		if (ie[0] == WLAN_EID_EXTENSION &&
  		    ie[1] >= 1 + FILS_SESSION_LEN &&
  		    ie[2] == WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_SESSION) {
  			session = ie;
  			break;
  		}
  		ie += 2 + ie[1];
  	}
  
  	if (!session) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "FILS: %s: Could not find FILS Session element in Assoc Req - reject",
  			   __func__);
  		return NULL;
  	}
  
  	if (!fils_session) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "FILS: %s: Could not find FILS Session element in STA entry - reject",
  			   __func__);
  		return NULL;
  	}
  
  	if (os_memcmp(fils_session, session + 3, FILS_SESSION_LEN) != 0) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Session mismatch");
  		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Expected FILS Session",
  			    fils_session, FILS_SESSION_LEN);
  		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Received FILS Session",
  			    session + 3, FILS_SESSION_LEN);
  		return NULL;
  	}
  	return session;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_fils_validate_key_confirm(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *ies,
  				  size_t ies_len)
  {
  	struct ieee802_11_elems elems;
  
  	if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(ies, ies_len, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "FILS: Failed to parse decrypted elements");
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	if (!elems.fils_session) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: No FILS Session element");
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	if (!elems.fils_key_confirm) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: No FILS Key Confirm element");
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	if (elems.fils_key_confirm_len != sm->fils_key_auth_len) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "FILS: Unexpected Key-Auth length %d (expected %zu)",
  			   elems.fils_key_confirm_len,
  			   sm->fils_key_auth_len);
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	if (os_memcmp(elems.fils_key_confirm, sm->fils_key_auth_sta,
  		      sm->fils_key_auth_len) != 0) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Key-Auth mismatch");
  		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Received Key-Auth",
  			    elems.fils_key_confirm, elems.fils_key_confirm_len);
  		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Expected Key-Auth",
  			    sm->fils_key_auth_sta, sm->fils_key_auth_len);
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  int fils_decrypt_assoc(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *fils_session,
  		       const struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt, size_t frame_len,
  		       u8 *pos, size_t left)
  {
  	u16 fc, stype;
  	const u8 *end, *ie_start, *ie, *session, *crypt;
  	const u8 *aad[5];
  	size_t aad_len[5];
  
  	if (!sm || !sm->PTK_valid) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "FILS: No KEK to decrypt Assocication Request frame");
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "FILS: Not a FILS AKM - reject association");
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	end = ((const u8 *) mgmt) + frame_len;
  	fc = le_to_host16(mgmt->frame_control);
  	stype = WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc);
  	if (stype == WLAN_FC_STYPE_REASSOC_REQ)
  		ie_start = mgmt->u.reassoc_req.variable;
  	else
  		ie_start = mgmt->u.assoc_req.variable;
  	ie = ie_start;
  
  	/*
  	 * Find FILS Session element which is the last unencrypted element in
  	 * the frame.
  	 */
  	session = wpa_fils_validate_fils_session(sm, ie, end - ie,
  						 fils_session);
  	if (!session) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Session validation failed");
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	crypt = session + 2 + session[1];
  
  	if (end - crypt < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "FILS: Too short frame to include AES-SIV data");
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	/* AES-SIV AAD vectors */
  
  	/* The STA's MAC address */
  	aad[0] = mgmt->sa;
  	aad_len[0] = ETH_ALEN;
  	/* The AP's BSSID */
  	aad[1] = mgmt->da;
  	aad_len[1] = ETH_ALEN;
  	/* The STA's nonce */
  	aad[2] = sm->SNonce;
  	aad_len[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN;
  	/* The AP's nonce */
  	aad[3] = sm->ANonce;
  	aad_len[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN;
  	/*
  	 * The (Re)Association Request frame from the Capability Information
  	 * field to the FILS Session element (both inclusive).
  	 */
  	aad[4] = (const u8 *) &mgmt->u.assoc_req.capab_info;
  	aad_len[4] = crypt - aad[4];
  
  	if (aes_siv_decrypt(sm->PTK.kek, sm->PTK.kek_len, crypt, end - crypt,
  			    5, aad, aad_len, pos + (crypt - ie_start)) < 0) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "FILS: Invalid AES-SIV data in the frame");
  		return -1;
  	}
  	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Decrypted Association Request elements",
  		    pos, left - AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
  
  	if (wpa_fils_validate_key_confirm(sm, pos, left - AES_BLOCK_SIZE) < 0) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Key Confirm validation failed");
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	return left - AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
  }
  
  
  int fils_encrypt_assoc(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *buf,
  		       size_t current_len, size_t max_len,
  		       const struct wpabuf *hlp)
  {
  	u8 *end = buf + max_len;
  	u8 *pos = buf + current_len;
  	struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt;
  	struct wpabuf *plain;
  	const u8 *aad[5];
  	size_t aad_len[5];
  
  	if (!sm || !sm->PTK_valid)
  		return -1;
  
  	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG,
  		    "FILS: Association Response frame before FILS processing",
  		    buf, current_len);
  
  	mgmt = (struct ieee80211_mgmt *) buf;
  
  	/* AES-SIV AAD vectors */
  
  	/* The AP's BSSID */
  	aad[0] = mgmt->sa;
  	aad_len[0] = ETH_ALEN;
  	/* The STA's MAC address */
  	aad[1] = mgmt->da;
  	aad_len[1] = ETH_ALEN;
  	/* The AP's nonce */
  	aad[2] = sm->ANonce;
  	aad_len[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN;
  	/* The STA's nonce */
  	aad[3] = sm->SNonce;
  	aad_len[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN;
  	/*
  	 * The (Re)Association Response frame from the Capability Information
  	 * field (the same offset in both Association and Reassociation
  	 * Response frames) to the FILS Session element (both inclusive).
  	 */
  	aad[4] = (const u8 *) &mgmt->u.assoc_resp.capab_info;
  	aad_len[4] = pos - aad[4];
  
  	/* The following elements will be encrypted with AES-SIV */
  	plain = fils_prepare_plainbuf(sm, hlp);
  	if (!plain) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Plain buffer prep failed");
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	if (pos + wpabuf_len(plain) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE > end) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "FILS: Not enough room for FILS elements");
  		wpabuf_clear_free(plain);
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	wpa_hexdump_buf_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Association Response plaintext",
  			    plain);
  
  	if (aes_siv_encrypt(sm->PTK.kek, sm->PTK.kek_len,
  			    wpabuf_head(plain), wpabuf_len(plain),
  			    5, aad, aad_len, pos) < 0) {
  		wpabuf_clear_free(plain);
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG,
  		    "FILS: Encrypted Association Response elements",
  		    pos, AES_BLOCK_SIZE + wpabuf_len(plain));
  	current_len += wpabuf_len(plain) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
  	wpabuf_clear_free(plain);
  
  	sm->fils_completed = 1;
  
  	return current_len;
  }
  
  
  static struct wpabuf * fils_prepare_plainbuf(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
  					     const struct wpabuf *hlp)
  {
  	struct wpabuf *plain;
  	u8 *len, *tmp, *tmp2;
  	u8 hdr[2];
  	u8 *gtk, stub_gtk[32];
  	size_t gtk_len;
  	struct wpa_group *gsm;
  	size_t plain_len;
  	struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
  
  	plain_len = 1000 + ieee80211w_kde_len(sm);
  	if (conf->transition_disable)
  		plain_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 1;
  	plain = wpabuf_alloc(plain_len);
  	if (!plain)
  		return NULL;
  
  	/* TODO: FILS Public Key */
  
  	/* FILS Key Confirmation */
  	wpabuf_put_u8(plain, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION); /* Element ID */
  	wpabuf_put_u8(plain, 1 + sm->fils_key_auth_len); /* Length */
  	/* Element ID Extension */
  	wpabuf_put_u8(plain, WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_KEY_CONFIRM);
  	wpabuf_put_data(plain, sm->fils_key_auth_ap, sm->fils_key_auth_len);
  
  	/* FILS HLP Container */
  	if (hlp)
  		wpabuf_put_buf(plain, hlp);
  
  	/* TODO: FILS IP Address Assignment */
  
  	/* Key Delivery */
  	gsm = sm->group;
  	wpabuf_put_u8(plain, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION); /* Element ID */
  	len = wpabuf_put(plain, 1);
  	wpabuf_put_u8(plain, WLAN_EID_EXT_KEY_DELIVERY);
  	wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN,
  			    wpabuf_put(plain, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN));
  	/* GTK KDE */
  	gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
  	gtk_len = gsm->GTK_len;
  	if (conf->disable_gtk || sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
  		/*
  		 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
  		 * of GTK in the BSS.
  		 */
  		if (random_get_bytes(stub_gtk, gtk_len) < 0) {
  			wpabuf_clear_free(plain);
  			return NULL;
  		}
  		gtk = stub_gtk;
  	}
  	hdr[0] = gsm->GN & 0x03;
  	hdr[1] = 0;
  	tmp = wpabuf_put(plain, 0);
  	tmp2 = wpa_add_kde(tmp, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2,
  			   gtk, gtk_len);
  	wpabuf_put(plain, tmp2 - tmp);
  
  	/* IGTK KDE and BIGTK KDE */
  	tmp = wpabuf_put(plain, 0);
  	tmp2 = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, tmp);
  	wpabuf_put(plain, tmp2 - tmp);
  
  	if (conf->transition_disable) {
  		tmp = wpabuf_put(plain, 0);
  		tmp2 = wpa_add_kde(tmp, WFA_KEY_DATA_TRANSITION_DISABLE,
  				   &conf->transition_disable, 1, NULL, 0);
  		wpabuf_put(plain, tmp2 - tmp);
  	}
  
  	*len = (u8 *) wpabuf_put(plain, 0) - len - 1;
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_OCV
  	if (wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm)) {
  		struct wpa_channel_info ci;
  		u8 *pos;
  
  		if (wpa_channel_info(sm->wpa_auth, &ci) != 0) {
  			wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING,
  				   "FILS: Failed to get channel info for OCI element");
  			wpabuf_clear_free(plain);
  			return NULL;
  		}
  #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
  		if (conf->oci_freq_override_fils_assoc) {
  			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
  				   "TEST: Override OCI frequency %d -> %u MHz",
  				   ci.frequency,
  				   conf->oci_freq_override_fils_assoc);
  			ci.frequency = conf->oci_freq_override_fils_assoc;
  		}
  #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
  
  		pos = wpabuf_put(plain, OCV_OCI_EXTENDED_LEN);
  		if (ocv_insert_extended_oci(&ci, pos) < 0) {
  			wpabuf_clear_free(plain);
  			return NULL;
  		}
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
  
  	return plain;
  }
  
  
  int fils_set_tk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	enum wpa_alg alg;
  	int klen;
  
  	if (!sm || !sm->PTK_valid) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: No valid PTK available to set TK");
  		return -1;
  	}
  	if (sm->tk_already_set) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: TK already set to the driver");
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise);
  	klen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise);
  
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Configure TK to the driver");
  	if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, alg, sm->addr, 0,
  			     sm->PTK.tk, klen, KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX)) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Failed to set TK to the driver");
  		return -1;
  	}
  	sm->tk_already_set = true;
  
  	wpa_auth_store_ptksa(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, sm->pairwise,
  			     dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime, &sm->PTK);
  
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  u8 * hostapd_eid_assoc_fils_session(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *buf,
  				    const u8 *fils_session, struct wpabuf *hlp)
  {
  	struct wpabuf *plain;
  	u8 *pos = buf;
  
  	/* FILS Session */
  	*pos++ = WLAN_EID_EXTENSION; /* Element ID */
  	*pos++ = 1 + FILS_SESSION_LEN; /* Length */
  	*pos++ = WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_SESSION; /* Element ID Extension */
  	os_memcpy(pos, fils_session, FILS_SESSION_LEN);
  	pos += FILS_SESSION_LEN;
  
  	plain = fils_prepare_plainbuf(sm, hlp);
  	if (!plain) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Plain buffer prep failed");
  		return NULL;
  	}
  
  	os_memcpy(pos, wpabuf_head(plain), wpabuf_len(plain));
  	pos += wpabuf_len(plain);
  
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: plain buf_len: %zu", __func__,
  		   wpabuf_len(plain));
  	wpabuf_clear_free(plain);
  	sm->fils_completed = 1;
  	return pos;
  }
  
  #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
  
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_OCV
  int get_sta_tx_parameters(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int ap_max_chanwidth,
  			  int ap_seg1_idx, int *bandwidth, int *seg1_idx)
  {
  	struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = sm->wpa_auth;
  
  	if (!wpa_auth->cb->get_sta_tx_params)
  		return -1;
  	return wpa_auth->cb->get_sta_tx_params(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, sm->addr,
  					       ap_max_chanwidth, ap_seg1_idx,
  					       bandwidth, seg1_idx);
  }
  #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
  
  
  SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING)
  {
  	struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = sm->wpa_auth;
  	struct wpa_ptk PTK;
  	int ok = 0, psk_found = 0;
  	const u8 *pmk = NULL;
  	size_t pmk_len;
  	int ft;
  	const u8 *eapol_key_ie, *key_data, *mic;
  	u16 key_data_length;
  	size_t mic_len, eapol_key_ie_len;
  	struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
  	struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
  	struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde;
  	int vlan_id = 0;
  	int owe_ptk_workaround = !!wpa_auth->conf.owe_ptk_workaround;
  
  	SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk);
  	sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = false;
  	sm->update_snonce = false;
  	os_memset(&PTK, 0, sizeof(PTK));
  
  	mic_len = wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len);
  
  	/* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
  	 * WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
  	 * the packet */
  	for (;;) {
  		if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
  		    !wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
  			pmk = wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
  					       sm->p2p_dev_addr, pmk, &pmk_len,
  					       &vlan_id);
  			if (!pmk)
  				break;
  			psk_found = 1;
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  			if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
  				os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, pmk, pmk_len);
  				sm->xxkey_len = pmk_len;
  			}
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  		} else {
  			pmk = sm->PMK;
  			pmk_len = sm->pmk_len;
  		}
  
  		if ((!pmk || !pmk_len) && sm->pmksa) {
  			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Use PMK from PMKSA cache");
  			pmk = sm->pmksa->pmk;
  			pmk_len = sm->pmksa->pmk_len;
  		}
  
  		if (wpa_derive_ptk(sm, sm->SNonce, pmk, pmk_len, &PTK,
  				   owe_ptk_workaround == 2) < 0)
  			break;
  
  		if (mic_len &&
  		    wpa_verify_key_mic(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, pmk_len, &PTK,
  				       sm->last_rx_eapol_key,
  				       sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len) == 0) {
  			if (sm->PMK != pmk) {
  				os_memcpy(sm->PMK, pmk, pmk_len);
  				sm->pmk_len = pmk_len;
  			}
  			ok = 1;
  			break;
  		}
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_FILS
  		if (!mic_len &&
  		    wpa_aead_decrypt(sm, &PTK, sm->last_rx_eapol_key,
  				     sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len, NULL) == 0) {
  			ok = 1;
  			break;
  		}
  #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_OWE
  		if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE && pmk_len > 32 &&
  		    owe_ptk_workaround == 1) {
  			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  				   "OWE: Try PTK derivation workaround with SHA256");
  			owe_ptk_workaround = 2;
  			continue;
  		}
  #endif /* CONFIG_OWE */
  
  		if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) ||
  		    wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
  			break;
  	}
  
  	if (!ok) {
  		wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  				"invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake");
  		if (psk_found)
  			wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr);
  		return;
  	}
  
  	/*
  	 * Note: last_rx_eapol_key length fields have already been validated in
  	 * wpa_receive().
  	 */
  	hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) sm->last_rx_eapol_key;
  	key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
  	mic = (u8 *) (key + 1);
  	key_data = mic + mic_len + 2;
  	key_data_length = WPA_GET_BE16(mic + mic_len);
  	if (key_data_length > sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len - sizeof(*hdr) -
  	    sizeof(*key) - mic_len - 2)
  		return;
  
  	if (wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data, key_data_length, &kde) < 0) {
  		wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  				 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with invalid Key Data contents");
  		return;
  	}
  	if (kde.rsn_ie) {
  		eapol_key_ie = kde.rsn_ie;
  		eapol_key_ie_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
  	} else if (kde.osen) {
  		eapol_key_ie = kde.osen;
  		eapol_key_ie_len = kde.osen_len;
  	} else {
  		eapol_key_ie = kde.wpa_ie;
  		eapol_key_ie_len = kde.wpa_ie_len;
  	}
  	ft = sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 && wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt);
  	if (!sm->wpa_ie ||
  	    wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft, sm->wpa_ie, sm->wpa_ie_len,
  			       eapol_key_ie, eapol_key_ie_len)) {
  		wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  				"WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not match with msg 2/4");
  		if (sm->wpa_ie) {
  			wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
  				    sm->wpa_ie, sm->wpa_ie_len);
  		}
  		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
  			    eapol_key_ie, eapol_key_ie_len);
  		/* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
  		wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
  				   WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
  		return;
  	}
  	if ((!sm->rsnxe && kde.rsnxe) ||
  	    (sm->rsnxe && !kde.rsnxe) ||
  	    (sm->rsnxe && kde.rsnxe &&
  	     (sm->rsnxe_len != kde.rsnxe_len ||
  	      os_memcmp(sm->rsnxe, kde.rsnxe, sm->rsnxe_len) != 0))) {
  		wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  				"RSNXE from (Re)AssocReq did not match the one in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4");
  		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "RSNXE in AssocReq",
  			    sm->rsnxe, sm->rsnxe_len);
  		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "RSNXE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
  			    kde.rsnxe, kde.rsnxe_len);
  		/* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
  		wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
  				   WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
  		return;
  	}
  #ifdef CONFIG_OCV
  	if (wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm)) {
  		struct wpa_channel_info ci;
  		int tx_chanwidth;
  		int tx_seg1_idx;
  		enum oci_verify_result res;
  
  		if (wpa_channel_info(wpa_auth, &ci) != 0) {
  			wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  					"Failed to get channel info to validate received OCI in EAPOL-Key 2/4");
  			return;
  		}
  
  		if (get_sta_tx_parameters(sm,
  					  channel_width_to_int(ci.chanwidth),
  					  ci.seg1_idx, &tx_chanwidth,
  					  &tx_seg1_idx) < 0)
  			return;
  
  		res = ocv_verify_tx_params(kde.oci, kde.oci_len, &ci,
  					   tx_chanwidth, tx_seg1_idx);
  		if (wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm) == 2 && res == OCI_NOT_FOUND) {
  			/* Work around misbehaving STAs */
  			wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  					 "Disable OCV with a STA that does not send OCI");
  			wpa_auth_set_ocv(sm, 0);
  		} else if (res != OCI_SUCCESS) {
  			wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  					 "OCV failed: %s", ocv_errorstr);
  			if (wpa_auth->conf.msg_ctx)
  				wpa_msg(wpa_auth->conf.msg_ctx, MSG_INFO,
  					OCV_FAILURE "addr=" MACSTR
  					" frame=eapol-key-m2 error=%s",
  					MAC2STR(sm->addr), ocv_errorstr);
  			return;
  		}
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  	if (ft && ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth, sm, &kde) < 0) {
  		wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
  				   WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
  		return;
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  #ifdef CONFIG_P2P
  	if (kde.ip_addr_req && kde.ip_addr_req[0] &&
  	    wpa_auth->ip_pool && WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr) == 0) {
  		int idx;
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "P2P: IP address requested in EAPOL-Key exchange");
  		idx = bitfield_get_first_zero(wpa_auth->ip_pool);
  		if (idx >= 0) {
  			u32 start = WPA_GET_BE32(wpa_auth->conf.ip_addr_start);
  			bitfield_set_local(wpa_auth->ip_pool, idx);
  			WPA_PUT_BE32(sm->ip_addr, start + idx);
  			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  				   "P2P: Assigned IP address %u.%u.%u.%u to "
  				   MACSTR, sm->ip_addr[0], sm->ip_addr[1],
  				   sm->ip_addr[2], sm->ip_addr[3],
  				   MAC2STR(sm->addr));
  		}
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
  	if (DPP_VERSION > 1 && kde.dpp_kde) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "DPP: peer Protocol Version %u Flags 0x%x",
  			   kde.dpp_kde[0], kde.dpp_kde[1]);
  		if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP &&
  		    wpa_auth->conf.dpp_pfs != 2 &&
  		    (kde.dpp_kde[1] & DPP_KDE_PFS_ALLOWED) &&
  		    !sm->dpp_z) {
  			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
  				   "DPP: Peer indicated it supports PFS and local configuration allows this, but PFS was not negotiated for the association");
  			wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
  					   WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
  			return;
  		}
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  	if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 && wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
  		/*
  		 * Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches
  		 * with the value we derived.
  		 */
  		if (os_memcmp_const(sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, sm->pmk_r1_name,
  				    WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN) != 0) {
  			wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  					"PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way handshake");
  			wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG,
  				    "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
  				    sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN);
  			wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
  				    sm->pmk_r1_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN);
  			return;
  		}
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  
  	if (vlan_id && wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
  	    wpa_auth_update_vlan(wpa_auth, sm->addr, vlan_id) < 0) {
  		wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
  				   WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
  		return;
  	}
  
  	sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
  	eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
  
  	if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) && sm->PMK != pmk) {
  		/* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
  		 * state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
  		 */
  		os_memcpy(sm->PMK, pmk, PMK_LEN);
  		sm->pmk_len = PMK_LEN;
  	}
  
  	sm->MICVerified = true;
  
  	os_memcpy(&sm->PTK, &PTK, sizeof(PTK));
  	forced_memzero(&PTK, sizeof(PTK));
  	sm->PTK_valid = true;
  }
  
  
  SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2)
  {
  	SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2, wpa_ptk);
  	sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
  }
  
  
  static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	size_t len = 0;
  
  	if (sm->mgmt_frame_prot) {
  		len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN;
  		len += wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
  	}
  	if (sm->mgmt_frame_prot && sm->wpa_auth->conf.beacon_prot) {
  		len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + WPA_BIGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN;
  		len += wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
  	}
  
  	return len;
  }
  
  
  static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
  {
  	struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk;
  	struct wpa_bigtk_kde bigtk;
  	struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
  	u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN];
  	struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
  	size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(conf->group_mgmt_cipher);
  
  	if (!sm->mgmt_frame_prot)
  		return pos;
  
  	igtk.keyid[0] = gsm->GN_igtk;
  	igtk.keyid[1] = 0;
  	if (gsm->wpa_group_state != WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE ||
  	    wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN_igtk, rsc) < 0)
  		os_memset(igtk.pn, 0, sizeof(igtk.pn));
  	else
  		os_memcpy(igtk.pn, rsc, sizeof(igtk.pn));
  	os_memcpy(igtk.igtk, gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], len);
  	if (conf->disable_gtk || sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
  		/*
  		 * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
  		 * IGTK in the BSS.
  		 */
  		if (random_get_bytes(igtk.igtk, len) < 0)
  			return pos;
  	}
  	pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK,
  			  (const u8 *) &igtk, WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len,
  			  NULL, 0);
  
  	if (!conf->beacon_prot)
  		return pos;
  
  	bigtk.keyid[0] = gsm->GN_bigtk;
  	bigtk.keyid[1] = 0;
  	if (gsm->wpa_group_state != WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE ||
  	    wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN_bigtk, rsc) < 0)
  		os_memset(bigtk.pn, 0, sizeof(bigtk.pn));
  	else
  		os_memcpy(bigtk.pn, rsc, sizeof(bigtk.pn));
  	os_memcpy(bigtk.bigtk, gsm->BIGTK[gsm->GN_bigtk - 6], len);
  	if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
  		/*
  		 * Provide unique random BIGTK to each OSEN STA to prevent use
  		 * of BIGTK in the BSS.
  		 */
  		if (random_get_bytes(bigtk.bigtk, len) < 0)
  			return pos;
  	}
  	pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_BIGTK,
  			  (const u8 *) &bigtk, WPA_BIGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len,
  			  NULL, 0);
  
  	return pos;
  }
  
  
  static int ocv_oci_len(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  #ifdef CONFIG_OCV
  	if (wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm))
  		return OCV_OCI_KDE_LEN;
  #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  static int ocv_oci_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 **argpos,
  		       unsigned int freq)
  {
  #ifdef CONFIG_OCV
  	struct wpa_channel_info ci;
  
  	if (!wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm))
  		return 0;
  
  	if (wpa_channel_info(sm->wpa_auth, &ci) != 0) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING,
  			   "Failed to get channel info for OCI element");
  		return -1;
  	}
  #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
  	if (freq) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
  			   "TEST: Override OCI KDE frequency %d -> %u MHz",
  			   ci.frequency, freq);
  		ci.frequency = freq;
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
  
  	return ocv_insert_oci_kde(&ci, argpos);
  #else /* CONFIG_OCV */
  	return 0;
  #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
  }
  
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
  static u8 * replace_ie(const char *name, const u8 *old_buf, size_t *len, u8 eid,
  		       const u8 *ie, size_t ie_len)
  {
  	const u8 *elem;
  	u8 *buf;
  
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TESTING: %s EAPOL override", name);
  	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TESTING: wpa_ie before override",
  		    old_buf, *len);
  	buf = os_malloc(*len + ie_len);
  	if (!buf)
  		return NULL;
  	os_memcpy(buf, old_buf, *len);
  	elem = get_ie(buf, *len, eid);
  	if (elem) {
  		u8 elem_len = 2 + elem[1];
  
  		os_memmove((void *) elem, elem + elem_len,
  			   *len - (elem - buf) - elem_len);
  		*len -= elem_len;
  	}
  	os_memcpy(buf + *len, ie, ie_len);
  	*len += ie_len;
  	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TESTING: wpa_ie after EAPOL override",
  		    buf, *len);
  
  	return buf;
  }
  #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
  
  
  SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING)
  {
  	u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN], *_rsc, *gtk, *kde = NULL, *pos, stub_gtk[32];
  	size_t gtk_len, kde_len, wpa_ie_len;
  	struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
  	u8 *wpa_ie;
  	int secure, gtkidx, encr = 0;
  	u8 *wpa_ie_buf = NULL, *wpa_ie_buf2 = NULL;
  	u8 hdr[2];
  	struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
  
  	SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk);
  	sm->TimeoutEvt = false;
  
  	sm->TimeoutCtr++;
  	if (conf->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries && sm->TimeoutCtr > 1) {
  		/* Do not allow retransmission of EAPOL-Key msg 3/4 */
  		return;
  	}
  	if (sm->TimeoutCtr > conf->wpa_pairwise_update_count) {
  		/* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
  		 * immediately following this. */
  		return;
  	}
  
  	/* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
  	   GTK[GN], IGTK, [BIGTK], [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
  	 */
  	os_memset(rsc, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
  	wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, rsc);
  	/* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
  	wpa_ie = sm->wpa_auth->wpa_ie;
  	wpa_ie_len = sm->wpa_auth->wpa_ie_len;
  	if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA && (conf->wpa & WPA_PROTO_RSN) &&
  	    wpa_ie_len > wpa_ie[1] + 2U && wpa_ie[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN) {
  		/* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE and possible MDIE */
  		wpa_ie = wpa_ie + wpa_ie[1] + 2;
  		if (wpa_ie[0] == WLAN_EID_RSNX)
  			wpa_ie = wpa_ie + wpa_ie[1] + 2;
  		if (wpa_ie[0] == WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN)
  			wpa_ie = wpa_ie + wpa_ie[1] + 2;
  		wpa_ie_len = wpa_ie[1] + 2;
  	}
  #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
  	if (conf->rsne_override_eapol_set) {
  		wpa_ie_buf2 = replace_ie(
  			"RSNE", wpa_ie, &wpa_ie_len, WLAN_EID_RSN,
  			conf->rsne_override_eapol,
  			conf->rsne_override_eapol_len);
  		if (!wpa_ie_buf2)
  			goto done;
  		wpa_ie = wpa_ie_buf2;
  	}
  	if (conf->rsnxe_override_eapol_set) {
  		wpa_ie_buf = replace_ie(
  			"RSNXE", wpa_ie, &wpa_ie_len, WLAN_EID_RSNX,
  			conf->rsnxe_override_eapol,
  			conf->rsnxe_override_eapol_len);
  		if (!wpa_ie_buf)
  			goto done;
  		wpa_ie = wpa_ie_buf;
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
  	wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  			"sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
  	if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
  		if (sm->use_ext_key_id && sm->TimeoutCtr == 1 &&
  		    wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0,
  				     wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise),
  				     sm->addr,
  				     sm->keyidx_active, sm->PTK.tk,
  				     wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise),
  				     KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX)) {
  			wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
  					   WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
  			return;
  		}
  
  		/* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
  		secure = 1;
  		gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
  		gtk_len = gsm->GTK_len;
  		if (conf->disable_gtk ||
  		    sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
  			/*
  			 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
  			 * of GTK in the BSS.
  			 */
  			if (random_get_bytes(stub_gtk, gtk_len) < 0)
  				goto done;
  			gtk = stub_gtk;
  		}
  		gtkidx = gsm->GN;
  		_rsc = rsc;
  		encr = 1;
  	} else {
  		/* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
  		secure = 0;
  		gtk = NULL;
  		gtk_len = 0;
  		_rsc = NULL;
  		if (sm->rx_eapol_key_secure) {
  			/*
  			 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
  			 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
  			 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
  			 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
  			 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
  			 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
  			 */
  			wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  					"STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
  			secure = 1;
  		}
  	}
  
  	kde_len = wpa_ie_len + ieee80211w_kde_len(sm) + ocv_oci_len(sm);
  
  	if (sm->use_ext_key_id)
  		kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2;
  
  	if (gtk)
  		kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + gtk_len;
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  	if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
  		kde_len += 2 + PMKID_LEN; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
  		kde_len += 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  #ifdef CONFIG_P2P
  	if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr) > 0)
  		kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 3 * 4;
  #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
  
  	if (conf->transition_disable)
  		kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 1;
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
  	if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP)
  		kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2;
  #endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
  
  	kde = os_malloc(kde_len);
  	if (!kde)
  		goto done;
  
  	pos = kde;
  	os_memcpy(pos, wpa_ie, wpa_ie_len);
  	pos += wpa_ie_len;
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  	if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
  		int res;
  		size_t elen;
  
  		elen = pos - kde;
  		res = wpa_insert_pmkid(kde, &elen, sm->pmk_r1_name);
  		if (res < 0) {
  			wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
  				   "FT: Failed to insert PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
  			goto done;
  		}
  		pos -= wpa_ie_len;
  		pos += elen;
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  	hdr[1] = 0;
  
  	if (sm->use_ext_key_id) {
  		hdr[0] = sm->keyidx_active & 0x01;
  		pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_KEYID, hdr, 2, NULL, 0);
  	}
  
  	if (gtk) {
  		hdr[0] = gtkidx & 0x03;
  		pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2,
  				  gtk, gtk_len);
  	}
  	pos = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, pos);
  	if (ocv_oci_add(sm, &pos, conf->oci_freq_override_eapol_m3) < 0)
  		goto done;
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  	if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
  		int res;
  
  		if (sm->assoc_resp_ftie &&
  		    kde + kde_len - pos >= 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]) {
  			os_memcpy(pos, sm->assoc_resp_ftie,
  				  2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]);
  			res = 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1];
  		} else {
  			int use_sha384 = wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm->wpa_key_mgmt);
  
  			res = wpa_write_ftie(conf, use_sha384,
  					     conf->r0_key_holder,
  					     conf->r0_key_holder_len,
  					     NULL, NULL, pos,
  					     kde + kde_len - pos,
  					     NULL, 0, 0);
  		}
  		if (res < 0) {
  			wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
  				   "FT: Failed to insert FTIE into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
  			goto done;
  		}
  		pos += res;
  
  		/* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
  		*pos++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL;
  		*pos++ = 5;
  		*pos++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE;
  		WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, conf->reassociation_deadline);
  		pos += 4;
  
  		/* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
  		*pos++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL;
  		*pos++ = 5;
  		*pos++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME;
  		WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, conf->r0_key_lifetime);
  		pos += 4;
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  #ifdef CONFIG_P2P
  	if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr) > 0) {
  		u8 addr[3 * 4];
  		os_memcpy(addr, sm->ip_addr, 4);
  		os_memcpy(addr + 4, conf->ip_addr_mask, 4);
  		os_memcpy(addr + 8, conf->ip_addr_go, 4);
  		pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, WFA_KEY_DATA_IP_ADDR_ALLOC,
  				  addr, sizeof(addr), NULL, 0);
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
  
  	if (conf->transition_disable)
  		pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, WFA_KEY_DATA_TRANSITION_DISABLE,
  				  &conf->transition_disable, 1, NULL, 0);
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
  	if (DPP_VERSION > 1 && sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP) {
  		u8 payload[2];
  
  		payload[0] = DPP_VERSION; /* Protocol Version */
  		payload[1] = 0; /* Flags */
  		if (conf->dpp_pfs == 0)
  			payload[1] |= DPP_KDE_PFS_ALLOWED;
  		else if (conf->dpp_pfs == 1)
  			payload[1] |= DPP_KDE_PFS_ALLOWED |
  				DPP_KDE_PFS_REQUIRED;
  		pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, WFA_KEY_DATA_DPP,
  				  payload, sizeof(payload), NULL, 0);
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
  	int idx = os_random() % kde_len;
  	if (conf->corrupt_eapol_3_of_4 > 0.0 && drand48() < conf->corrupt_eapol_3_of_4){
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAPOL MSG 3/4 Adding Corruption : %p len: %i %x", kde, (int) kde_len, *kde);
  		kde[idx]++;
  	}
  #endif /*CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS*/
  
  	wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
  		       (secure ? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE : 0) |
  		       (wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len) ?
  			WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC : 0) |
  		       WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK | WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL |
  		       WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE,
  		       _rsc, sm->ANonce, kde, pos - kde, 0, encr);
  done:
  	os_free(kde);
  	os_free(wpa_ie_buf);
  	os_free(wpa_ie_buf2);
  }
  
  
  SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE)
  {
  	SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE, wpa_ptk);
  	sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = false;
  	if (sm->Pair) {
  		enum wpa_alg alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise);
  		int klen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise);
  		int res;
  
  		if (sm->use_ext_key_id)
  			res = wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, 0, sm->addr,
  					       sm->keyidx_active, NULL, 0,
  					       KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX_MODIFY);
  		else
  			res = wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, alg, sm->addr,
  					       0, sm->PTK.tk, klen,
  					       KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX);
  		if (res) {
  			wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
  					   WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
  			return;
  		}
  		/* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
  		sm->pairwise_set = true;
  
  		wpa_auth_set_ptk_rekey_timer(sm);
  		wpa_auth_store_ptksa(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, sm->pairwise,
  				     dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime, &sm->PTK);
  
  		if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) ||
  		    sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP ||
  		    sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE) {
  			wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
  					   WPA_EAPOL_authorized, 1);
  		}
  	}
  
  	if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
  		sm->keycount++;
  		if (sm->keycount == 2) {
  			wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
  					   WPA_EAPOL_portValid, 1);
  		}
  	} else {
  		wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portValid,
  				   1);
  	}
  	wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable,
  			   false);
  	wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone, true);
  	if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA)
  		sm->PInitAKeys = true;
  	else
  		sm->has_GTK = true;
  	wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  			 "pairwise key handshake completed (%s)",
  			 sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA ? "WPA" : "RSN");
  	wpa_msg(sm->wpa_auth->conf.msg_ctx, MSG_INFO, "EAPOL-4WAY-HS-COMPLETED "
  		MACSTR, MAC2STR(sm->addr));
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  	wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr);
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  }
  
  
  SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
  {
  	struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = sm->wpa_auth;
  	struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &wpa_auth->conf;
  
  	if (sm->Init)
  		SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE);
  	else if (sm->Disconnect
  		 /* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
  		wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  				"WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect");
  		SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
  	}
  	else if (sm->DeauthenticationRequest)
  		SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
  	else if (sm->AuthenticationRequest)
  		SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
  	else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
  		SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
  	else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
  		if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
  		else
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
  	} else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
  	case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
  		break;
  	case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
  		SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
  		break;
  	case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED:
  		SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE);
  		break;
  	case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION:
  		SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
  		break;
  	case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2:
  		if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
  		    wpa_auth_get_eapol(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
  				       WPA_EAPOL_keyRun))
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITPMK);
  		else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) ||
  			 sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
  			 /* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITPSK);
  		else if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP)
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITPMK);
  		break;
  	case WPA_PTK_INITPMK:
  		if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
  				       WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable)) {
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
  #ifdef CONFIG_DPP
  		} else if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP && sm->pmksa) {
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
  #endif /* CONFIG_DPP */
  		} else {
  			wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
  			wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  					"INITPMK - keyAvailable = false");
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
  		}
  		break;
  	case WPA_PTK_INITPSK:
  		if (wpa_auth_get_psk(wpa_auth, sm->addr, sm->p2p_dev_addr,
  				     NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
  #ifdef CONFIG_SAE
  		} else if (wpa_auth_uses_sae(sm) && sm->pmksa) {
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
  #endif /* CONFIG_SAE */
  		} else {
  			wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  					"no PSK configured for the STA");
  			wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
  		}
  		break;
  	case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART:
  		if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
  		    sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise)
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
  		else if (sm->TimeoutCtr > conf->wpa_pairwise_update_count) {
  			wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
  			wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  					 "PTKSTART: Retry limit %u reached",
  					 conf->wpa_pairwise_update_count);
  			sm->disconnect_reason =
  				WLAN_REASON_4WAY_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT;
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
  		} else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
  		break;
  	case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING:
  		if (sm->MICVerified)
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2);
  		else if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
  			 sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise)
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
  		else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
  		break;
  	case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2:
  		SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING);
  		break;
  	case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING:
  		if (sm->update_snonce)
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
  		else if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
  			 sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE);
  		else if (sm->TimeoutCtr >
  			 conf->wpa_pairwise_update_count ||
  			 (conf->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
  			  sm->TimeoutCtr > 1)) {
  			wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
  			wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  					 "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %u reached",
  					 conf->wpa_pairwise_update_count);
  			sm->disconnect_reason =
  				WLAN_REASON_4WAY_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT;
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
  		} else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING);
  		break;
  	case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE:
  		break;
  	}
  }
  
  
  SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE)
  {
  	SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE, wpa_ptk_group);
  	if (sm->Init) {
  		/* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
  		 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
  		sm->changed = false;
  	}
  	sm->GTimeoutCtr = 0;
  }
  
  
  SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING)
  {
  	u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN];
  	struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
  	const u8 *kde;
  	u8 *kde_buf = NULL, *pos, hdr[2];
  	size_t kde_len;
  	u8 *gtk, stub_gtk[32];
  	struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
  
  	SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk_group);
  
  	sm->GTimeoutCtr++;
  	if (conf->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries && sm->GTimeoutCtr > 1) {
  		/* Do not allow retransmission of EAPOL-Key group msg 1/2 */
  		return;
  	}
  	if (sm->GTimeoutCtr > conf->wpa_group_update_count) {
  		/* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
  		 * immediately following this. */
  		return;
  	}
  
  	if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA)
  		sm->PInitAKeys = false;
  	sm->TimeoutEvt = false;
  	/* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
  	os_memset(rsc, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
  	if (gsm->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE)
  		wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, rsc);
  	wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  			"sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake");
  
  	gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
  	if (conf->disable_gtk || sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
  		/*
  		 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
  		 * of GTK in the BSS.
  		 */
  		if (random_get_bytes(stub_gtk, gsm->GTK_len) < 0)
  			return;
  		gtk = stub_gtk;
  	}
  	if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
  		kde_len = 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + gsm->GTK_len +
  			ieee80211w_kde_len(sm) + ocv_oci_len(sm);
  		kde_buf = os_malloc(kde_len);
  		if (!kde_buf)
  			return;
  
  		kde = pos = kde_buf;
  		hdr[0] = gsm->GN & 0x03;
  		hdr[1] = 0;
  		pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2,
  				  gtk, gsm->GTK_len);
  		pos = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, pos);
  		if (ocv_oci_add(sm, &pos,
  				conf->oci_freq_override_eapol_g1) < 0) {
  			os_free(kde_buf);
  			return;
  		}
  		kde_len = pos - kde;
  	} else {
  		kde = gtk;
  		kde_len = gsm->GTK_len;
  	}
  
  	wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
  		       WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE |
  		       (wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len) ?
  			WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC : 0) |
  		       WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK |
  		       (!sm->Pair ? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL : 0),
  		       rsc, NULL, kde, kde_len, gsm->GN, 1);
  
  	os_free(kde_buf);
  }
  
  
  SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED)
  {
  	struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = sm->wpa_auth;
  #ifdef CONFIG_OCV
  	const u8 *key_data, *mic;
  	struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
  	struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
  	struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde;
  	size_t mic_len;
  	u16 key_data_length;
  #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
  
  	SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED, wpa_ptk_group);
  	sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = false;
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_OCV
  	mic_len = wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len);
  
  	/*
  	 * Note: last_rx_eapol_key length fields have already been validated in
  	 * wpa_receive().
  	 */
  	hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) sm->last_rx_eapol_key;
  	key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
  	mic = (u8 *) (key + 1);
  	key_data = mic + mic_len + 2;
  	key_data_length = WPA_GET_BE16(mic + mic_len);
  	if (key_data_length > sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len - sizeof(*hdr) -
  	    sizeof(*key) - mic_len - 2)
  		return;
  
  	if (wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data, key_data_length, &kde) < 0) {
  		wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  				 "received EAPOL-Key group msg 2/2 with invalid Key Data contents");
  		return;
  	}
  
  	if (wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm)) {
  		struct wpa_channel_info ci;
  		int tx_chanwidth;
  		int tx_seg1_idx;
  
  		if (wpa_channel_info(wpa_auth, &ci) != 0) {
  			wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  					"Failed to get channel info to validate received OCI in EAPOL-Key group 2/2");
  			return;
  		}
  
  		if (get_sta_tx_parameters(sm,
  					  channel_width_to_int(ci.chanwidth),
  					  ci.seg1_idx, &tx_chanwidth,
  					  &tx_seg1_idx) < 0)
  			return;
  
  		if (ocv_verify_tx_params(kde.oci, kde.oci_len, &ci,
  					 tx_chanwidth, tx_seg1_idx) !=
  		    OCI_SUCCESS) {
  			wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  					 "OCV failed: %s", ocv_errorstr);
  			if (wpa_auth->conf.msg_ctx)
  				wpa_msg(wpa_auth->conf.msg_ctx, MSG_INFO,
  					OCV_FAILURE "addr=" MACSTR
  					" frame=eapol-key-g2 error=%s",
  					MAC2STR(sm->addr), ocv_errorstr);
  			return;
  		}
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
  
  	if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys)
  		sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
  	sm->GUpdateStationKeys = false;
  	sm->GTimeoutCtr = 0;
  	/* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
  	wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  			 "group key handshake completed (%s)",
  			 sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA ? "WPA" : "RSN");
  	sm->has_GTK = true;
  }
  
  
  SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR)
  {
  	SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR, wpa_ptk_group);
  	if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys)
  		sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
  	sm->GUpdateStationKeys = false;
  	sm->Disconnect = true;
  	sm->disconnect_reason = WLAN_REASON_GROUP_KEY_UPDATE_TIMEOUT;
  	wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
  			 "group key handshake failed (%s) after %u tries",
  			 sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA ? "WPA" : "RSN",
  			 sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count);
  }
  
  
  SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP)
  {
  	if (sm->Init || sm->PtkGroupInit) {
  		SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE);
  		sm->PtkGroupInit = false;
  	} else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_group_state) {
  	case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE:
  		if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys ||
  		    (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA && sm->PInitAKeys))
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING);
  		break;
  	case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING:
  		if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
  		    !sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED);
  		else if (sm->GTimeoutCtr >
  			 sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count ||
  			 (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
  			  sm->GTimeoutCtr > 1))
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR);
  		else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
  			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING);
  		break;
  	case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR:
  		SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE);
  		break;
  	case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED:
  		SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE);
  		break;
  	}
  }
  
  
  static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			  struct wpa_group *group)
  {
  	struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &wpa_auth->conf;
  	int ret = 0;
  	size_t len;
  
  	os_memcpy(group->GNonce, group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
  	inc_byte_array(group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
  	if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group->GMK, "Group key expansion",
  			   wpa_auth->addr, group->GNonce,
  			   group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len) < 0)
  		ret = -1;
  	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GTK",
  			group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len);
  
  	if (conf->ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION) {
  		len = wpa_cipher_key_len(conf->group_mgmt_cipher);
  		os_memcpy(group->GNonce, group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
  		inc_byte_array(group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
  		if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group->GMK, "IGTK key expansion",
  				   wpa_auth->addr, group->GNonce,
  				   group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4], len) < 0)
  			ret = -1;
  		wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "IGTK",
  				group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4], len);
  	}
  
  	if (conf->ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION &&
  	    conf->beacon_prot) {
  		len = wpa_cipher_key_len(conf->group_mgmt_cipher);
  		os_memcpy(group->GNonce, group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
  		inc_byte_array(group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
  		if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group->GMK, "BIGTK key expansion",
  				   wpa_auth->addr, group->GNonce,
  				   group->BIGTK[group->GN_bigtk - 6], len) < 0)
  			ret = -1;
  		wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "BIGTK",
  				group->BIGTK[group->GN_bigtk - 6], len);
  	}
  
  	return ret;
  }
  
  
  static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			       struct wpa_group *group)
  {
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  		   "WPA: group state machine entering state GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)",
  		   group->vlan_id);
  	group->changed = false; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
  	group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT;
  
  	/* GTK[0..N] = 0 */
  	os_memset(group->GTK, 0, sizeof(group->GTK));
  	group->GN = 1;
  	group->GM = 2;
  	group->GN_igtk = 4;
  	group->GM_igtk = 5;
  	group->GN_bigtk = 6;
  	group->GM_bigtk = 7;
  	/* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
  	wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
  }
  
  
  static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx)
  {
  	if (ctx != NULL && ctx != sm->group)
  		return 0;
  
  	if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE) {
  		wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  				"Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update");
  		sm->GUpdateStationKeys = false;
  		return 0;
  	}
  	if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) {
  		/*
  		 * This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
  		 * Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
  		 * station needs to be counted here anyway.
  		 */
  		wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  				"GUpdateStationKeys was already set when marking station for GTK rekeying");
  	}
  
  	/* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in WNM-Sleep Mode */
  	if (sm->is_wnmsleep)
  		return 0;
  
  	sm->group->GKeyDoneStations++;
  	sm->GUpdateStationKeys = true;
  
  	wpa_sm_step(sm);
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_WNM_AP
  /* update GTK when exiting WNM-Sleep Mode */
  void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	if (!sm || sm->is_wnmsleep)
  		return;
  
  	wpa_group_update_sta(sm, NULL);
  }
  
  
  void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int flag)
  {
  	if (sm)
  		sm->is_wnmsleep = !!flag;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
  {
  	struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
  	struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
  	u8 *start = pos;
  
  	/*
  	 * GTK subelement:
  	 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
  	 * Key[5..32]
  	 */
  	*pos++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK;
  	*pos++ = 11 + gsm->GTK_len;
  	/* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */
  	WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, gsm->GN & 0x03);
  	pos += 2;
  	*pos++ = gsm->GTK_len;
  	if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, pos) != 0)
  		return 0;
  	pos += 8;
  	os_memcpy(pos, gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1], gsm->GTK_len);
  	if (conf->disable_gtk || sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
  		/*
  		 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
  		 * of GTK in the BSS.
  		 */
  		if (random_get_bytes(pos, gsm->GTK_len) < 0)
  			return 0;
  	}
  	pos += gsm->GTK_len;
  
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: GTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
  		   gsm->GN);
  	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: GTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
  			gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1], gsm->GTK_len);
  
  	return pos - start;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
  {
  	struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
  	struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
  	u8 *start = pos;
  	size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
  
  	/*
  	 * IGTK subelement:
  	 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] | Key[16]
  	 */
  	*pos++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK;
  	*pos++ = 2 + 6 + len;
  	WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, gsm->GN_igtk);
  	pos += 2;
  	if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN_igtk, pos) != 0)
  		return 0;
  	pos += 6;
  
  	os_memcpy(pos, gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], len);
  	if (conf->disable_gtk || sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
  		/*
  		 * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use
  		 * of IGTK in the BSS.
  		 */
  		if (random_get_bytes(pos, len) < 0)
  			return 0;
  	}
  	pos += len;
  
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: IGTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
  		   gsm->GN_igtk);
  	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: IGTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
  			gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], len);
  
  	return pos - start;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_wnmsleep_bigtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
  {
  	struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
  	u8 *start = pos;
  	size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
  
  	/*
  	 * BIGTK subelement:
  	 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] | Key[16]
  	 */
  	*pos++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_BIGTK;
  	*pos++ = 2 + 6 + len;
  	WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, gsm->GN_bigtk);
  	pos += 2;
  	if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN_bigtk, pos) != 0)
  		return 0;
  	pos += 6;
  
  	os_memcpy(pos, gsm->BIGTK[gsm->GN_bigtk - 6], len);
  	if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
  		/*
  		 * Provide unique random BIGTK to each STA to prevent use
  		 * of BIGTK in the BSS.
  		 */
  		if (random_get_bytes(pos, len) < 0)
  			return 0;
  	}
  	pos += len;
  
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: BIGTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
  		   gsm->GN_bigtk);
  	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: BIGTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
  			gsm->BIGTK[gsm->GN_bigtk - 6], len);
  
  	return pos - start;
  }
  
  #endif /* CONFIG_WNM_AP */
  
  
  static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			      struct wpa_group *group)
  {
  	int tmp;
  
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  		   "WPA: group state machine entering state SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)",
  		   group->vlan_id);
  	group->changed = true;
  	group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS;
  	group->GTKReKey = false;
  	tmp = group->GM;
  	group->GM = group->GN;
  	group->GN = tmp;
  	tmp = group->GM_igtk;
  	group->GM_igtk = group->GN_igtk;
  	group->GN_igtk = tmp;
  	tmp = group->GM_bigtk;
  	group->GM_bigtk = group->GN_bigtk;
  	group->GN_bigtk = tmp;
  	/* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
  	 * counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
  	 * including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
  	wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
  
  	if (group->GKeyDoneStations) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
  			   group->GKeyDoneStations);
  		group->GKeyDoneStations = 0;
  	}
  	wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth, wpa_group_update_sta, group);
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
  		   group->GKeyDoneStations);
  }
  
  
  static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  				       struct wpa_group *group)
  {
  	struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &wpa_auth->conf;
  	int ret = 0;
  
  	if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth, group->vlan_id,
  			     wpa_cipher_to_alg(conf->wpa_group),
  			     broadcast_ether_addr, group->GN,
  			     group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len,
  			     KEY_FLAG_GROUP_TX_DEFAULT) < 0)
  		ret = -1;
  
  	if (conf->ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION) {
  		enum wpa_alg alg;
  		size_t len;
  
  		alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(conf->group_mgmt_cipher);
  		len = wpa_cipher_key_len(conf->group_mgmt_cipher);
  
  		if (ret == 0 &&
  		    wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth, group->vlan_id, alg,
  				     broadcast_ether_addr, group->GN_igtk,
  				     group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4], len,
  				     KEY_FLAG_GROUP_TX_DEFAULT) < 0)
  			ret = -1;
  
  		if (ret == 0 && conf->beacon_prot &&
  		    wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth, group->vlan_id, alg,
  				     broadcast_ether_addr, group->GN_bigtk,
  				     group->BIGTK[group->GN_bigtk - 6], len,
  				     KEY_FLAG_GROUP_TX_DEFAULT) < 0)
  			ret = -1;
  	}
  
  	return ret;
  }
  
  
  static int wpa_group_disconnect_cb(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx)
  {
  	if (sm->group == ctx) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Mark STA " MACSTR
  			   " for disconnection due to fatal failure",
  			   MAC2STR(sm->addr));
  		sm->Disconnect = true;
  	}
  
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  static void wpa_group_fatal_failure(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  				    struct wpa_group *group)
  {
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  		   "WPA: group state machine entering state FATAL_FAILURE");
  	group->changed = true;
  	group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE;
  	wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth, wpa_group_disconnect_cb, group);
  }
  
  
  static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  				 struct wpa_group *group)
  {
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  		   "WPA: group state machine entering state SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)",
  		   group->vlan_id);
  	group->changed = true;
  	group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE;
  
  	if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group) < 0) {
  		wpa_group_fatal_failure(wpa_auth, group);
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			      struct wpa_group *group)
  {
  	if (group->GInit) {
  		wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth, group);
  	} else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE) {
  		/* Do not allow group operations */
  	} else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT &&
  		   group->GTKAuthenticator) {
  		wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth, group);
  	} else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE &&
  		   group->GTKReKey) {
  		wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth, group);
  	} else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS) {
  		if (group->GKeyDoneStations == 0)
  			wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth, group);
  		else if (group->GTKReKey)
  			wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth, group);
  	}
  }
  
  
  static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	if (!sm)
  		return 0;
  
  	if (sm->in_step_loop) {
  		/* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
  		 * end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
  		 * recursive call. */
  		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
  		return 0;
  	}
  
  	sm->in_step_loop = 1;
  	do {
  		if (sm->pending_deinit)
  			break;
  
  		sm->changed = false;
  		sm->wpa_auth->group->changed = false;
  
  		SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK);
  		if (sm->pending_deinit)
  			break;
  		SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP);
  		if (sm->pending_deinit)
  			break;
  		wpa_group_sm_step(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
  	} while (sm->changed || sm->wpa_auth->group->changed);
  	sm->in_step_loop = 0;
  
  	if (sm->pending_deinit) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "WPA: Completing pending STA state machine deinit for "
  			   MACSTR, MAC2STR(sm->addr));
  		wpa_free_sta_sm(sm);
  		return 1;
  	}
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
  {
  	struct wpa_state_machine *sm = eloop_ctx;
  	wpa_sm_step(sm);
  }
  
  
  void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	if (!sm)
  		return;
  	eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step, sm, NULL);
  }
  
  
  void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
  {
  	int tmp, i;
  	struct wpa_group *group;
  
  	if (!wpa_auth)
  		return;
  
  	group = wpa_auth->group;
  
  	for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
  		tmp = group->GM;
  		group->GM = group->GN;
  		group->GN = tmp;
  		tmp = group->GM_igtk;
  		group->GM_igtk = group->GN_igtk;
  		group->GN_igtk = tmp;
  		tmp = group->GM_bigtk;
  		group->GM_bigtk = group->GN_bigtk;
  		group->GN_bigtk = tmp;
  		wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
  		wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group);
  	}
  }
  
  
  static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int val)
  {
  	return val ? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
  }
  
  
  #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
  #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
  ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
  
  int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, char *buf, size_t buflen)
  {
  	struct wpa_auth_config *conf;
  	int len = 0, ret;
  	char pmkid_txt[PMKID_LEN * 2 + 1];
  #ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH
  	const int preauth = 1;
  #else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
  	const int preauth = 0;
  #endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
  
  	if (!wpa_auth)
  		return len;
  	conf = &wpa_auth->conf;
  
  	ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len,
  			  "dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n"
  			  "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n"
  			  "dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n"
  			  "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n",
  			  wpa_bool_txt(preauth),
  			  wpa_bool_txt(conf->wpa & WPA_PROTO_RSN),
  			  wpa_bool_txt(conf->rsn_preauth));
  	if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
  		return len;
  	len += ret;
  
  	wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt, sizeof(pmkid_txt),
  			 wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed, PMKID_LEN);
  
  	ret = os_snprintf(
  		buf + len, buflen - len,
  		"dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n"
  		"dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n"
  		/* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */
  		/* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */
  		/* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */
  		/* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */
  		"dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n"
  		"dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n"
  		"dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n"
  		"dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n"
  		"dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n"
  		"dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n"
  		"dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n"
  		"dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n"
  		"dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
  		"dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
  		"dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
  		"dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n"
  		"dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
  		"dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
  		"dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
  		"dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n"
  		"dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n"
  		"dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
  		RSN_VERSION,
  		!!conf->wpa_strict_rekey,
  		conf->wpa_group_update_count,
  		conf->wpa_pairwise_update_count,
  		wpa_cipher_key_len(conf->wpa_group) * 8,
  		dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime,
  		dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold,
  		dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout,
  		RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected),
  		RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected),
  		RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected),
  		pmkid_txt,
  		RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested),
  		RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested),
  		RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested),
  		wpa_auth->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked,
  		wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures);
  	if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
  		return len;
  	len += ret;
  
  	/* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */
  	/* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */
  
  	/* Private MIB */
  	ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n",
  			  wpa_auth->group->wpa_group_state);
  	if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
  		return len;
  	len += ret;
  
  	return len;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, char *buf, size_t buflen)
  {
  	int len = 0, ret;
  	u32 pairwise = 0;
  
  	if (!sm)
  		return 0;
  
  	/* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */
  
  	/* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */
  
  	pairwise = wpa_cipher_to_suite(sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 ?
  				       WPA_PROTO_RSN : WPA_PROTO_WPA,
  				       sm->pairwise);
  	if (pairwise == 0)
  		return 0;
  
  	ret = os_snprintf(
  		buf + len, buflen - len,
  		/* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */
  		"dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR "\n"
  		"dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n"
  		"dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
  		/* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */
  		"dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n"
  		"dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n"
  		/* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
  		/* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */
  		/* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */,
  		MAC2STR(sm->addr),
  		RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise),
  		sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures,
  		sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures);
  	if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
  		return len;
  	len += ret;
  
  	/* Private MIB */
  	ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len,
  			  "wpa=%d\n"
  			  "AKMSuiteSelector=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
  			  "hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n"
  			  "hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n",
  			  sm->wpa,
  			  RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_akm_to_suite(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)),
  			  sm->wpa_ptk_state,
  			  sm->wpa_ptk_group_state);
  	if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
  		return len;
  	len += ret;
  
  	return len;
  }
  
  
  void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
  {
  	if (wpa_auth)
  		wpa_auth->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked++;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	return sm && sm->pairwise_set;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	return sm->pairwise;
  }
  
  
  const u8 * wpa_auth_get_pmk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int *len)
  {
  	if (!sm)
  		return NULL;
  	*len = sm->pmk_len;
  	return sm->PMK;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	if (!sm)
  		return -1;
  	return sm->wpa_key_mgmt;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	if (!sm)
  		return 0;
  	return sm->wpa;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
  		return 0;
  	return sm->tk_already_set;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_sta_fils_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
  		return 0;
  	return sm->tk_already_set;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
  			     struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
  {
  	if (!sm || sm->pmksa != entry)
  		return -1;
  	sm->pmksa = NULL;
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
  wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	return sm ? sm->pmksa : NULL;
  }
  
  
  void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	if (sm)
  		sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures++;
  }
  
  
  const u8 * wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, size_t *len)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth)
  		return NULL;
  	*len = wpa_auth->wpa_ie_len;
  	return wpa_auth->wpa_ie;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *pmk,
  		       unsigned int pmk_len,
  		       int session_timeout, struct eapol_state_machine *eapol)
  {
  	if (!sm || sm->wpa != WPA_VERSION_WPA2 ||
  	    sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_pmksa_caching)
  		return -1;
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  	if (pmk_len >= 2 * PMK_LEN && wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
  	    wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
  	    !wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
  		/* Cache MPMK/XXKey instead of initial part from MSK */
  		pmk = pmk + PMK_LEN;
  		pmk_len = PMK_LEN;
  	} else
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  	if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
  		if (pmk_len > PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192)
  			pmk_len = PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192;
  	} else if (pmk_len > PMK_LEN) {
  		pmk_len = PMK_LEN;
  	}
  
  	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: Cache PMK", pmk, pmk_len);
  	if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm->wpa_auth->pmksa, pmk, pmk_len, NULL,
  				 sm->PTK.kck, sm->PTK.kck_len,
  				 sm->wpa_auth->addr, sm->addr, session_timeout,
  				 eapol, sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
  		return 0;
  
  	return -1;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			       const u8 *pmk, size_t len, const u8 *sta_addr,
  			       int session_timeout,
  			       struct eapol_state_machine *eapol)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth)
  		return -1;
  
  	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: Cache PMK from preauth", pmk, len);
  	if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth->pmksa, pmk, len, NULL,
  				 NULL, 0,
  				 wpa_auth->addr,
  				 sta_addr, session_timeout, eapol,
  				 WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X))
  		return 0;
  
  	return -1;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_sae(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
  			   const u8 *pmk, const u8 *pmkid)
  {
  	if (wpa_auth->conf.disable_pmksa_caching)
  		return -1;
  
  	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: Cache PMK from SAE", pmk, PMK_LEN);
  	if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth->pmksa, pmk, PMK_LEN, pmkid,
  				 NULL, 0,
  				 wpa_auth->addr, addr, 0, NULL,
  				 WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE))
  		return 0;
  
  	return -1;
  }
  
  
  void wpa_auth_add_sae_pmkid(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *pmkid)
  {
  	os_memcpy(sm->pmkid, pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
  	sm->pmkid_set = 1;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_pmksa_add2(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
  			const u8 *pmk, size_t pmk_len, const u8 *pmkid,
  			int session_timeout, int akmp)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth || wpa_auth->conf.disable_pmksa_caching)
  		return -1;
  
  	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: Cache PMK (2)", pmk, PMK_LEN);
  	if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth->pmksa, pmk, pmk_len, pmkid,
  				 NULL, 0, wpa_auth->addr, addr, session_timeout,
  				 NULL, akmp))
  		return 0;
  
  	return -1;
  }
  
  
  void wpa_auth_pmksa_remove(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			   const u8 *sta_addr)
  {
  	struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *pmksa;
  
  	if (!wpa_auth || !wpa_auth->pmksa)
  		return;
  	pmksa = pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth->pmksa, sta_addr, NULL);
  	if (pmksa) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Remove PMKSA cache entry for "
  			   MACSTR " based on request", MAC2STR(sta_addr));
  		pmksa_cache_free_entry(wpa_auth->pmksa, pmksa);
  	}
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_pmksa_list(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, char *buf,
  			size_t len)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth || !wpa_auth->pmksa)
  		return 0;
  	return pmksa_cache_auth_list(wpa_auth->pmksa, buf, len);
  }
  
  
  void wpa_auth_pmksa_flush(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
  {
  	if (wpa_auth && wpa_auth->pmksa)
  		pmksa_cache_auth_flush(wpa_auth->pmksa);
  }
  
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL
  #ifdef CONFIG_MESH
  
  int wpa_auth_pmksa_list_mesh(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
  			     char *buf, size_t len)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth || !wpa_auth->pmksa)
  		return 0;
  
  	return pmksa_cache_auth_list_mesh(wpa_auth->pmksa, addr, buf, len);
  }
  
  
  struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
  wpa_auth_pmksa_create_entry(const u8 *aa, const u8 *spa, const u8 *pmk,
  			    const u8 *pmkid, int expiration)
  {
  	struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry;
  	struct os_reltime now;
  
  	entry = pmksa_cache_auth_create_entry(pmk, PMK_LEN, pmkid, NULL, 0, aa,
  					      spa, 0, NULL, WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE);
  	if (!entry)
  		return NULL;
  
  	os_get_reltime(&now);
  	entry->expiration = now.sec + expiration;
  	return entry;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_entry(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			     struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
  {
  	int ret;
  
  	if (!wpa_auth || !wpa_auth->pmksa)
  		return -1;
  
  	ret = pmksa_cache_auth_add_entry(wpa_auth->pmksa, entry);
  	if (ret < 0)
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "RSN: Failed to store external PMKSA cache for "
  			   MACSTR, MAC2STR(entry->spa));
  
  	return ret;
  }
  
  #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
  #endif /* CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL */
  
  
  struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
  wpa_auth_pmksa_get(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *sta_addr,
  		   const u8 *pmkid)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth || !wpa_auth->pmksa)
  		return NULL;
  	return pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth->pmksa, sta_addr, pmkid);
  }
  
  
  void wpa_auth_pmksa_set_to_sm(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *pmksa,
  			      struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
  			      struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			      u8 *pmkid, u8 *pmk)
  {
  	if (!sm)
  		return;
  
  	sm->pmksa = pmksa;
  	os_memcpy(pmk, pmksa->pmk, PMK_LEN);
  	os_memcpy(pmkid, pmksa->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
  	os_memcpy(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed, pmksa->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
  }
  
  
  /*
   * Remove and free the group from wpa_authenticator. This is triggered by a
   * callback to make sure nobody is currently iterating the group list while it
   * gets modified.
   */
  static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			   struct wpa_group *group)
  {
  	struct wpa_group *prev = wpa_auth->group;
  
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Remove group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
  		   group->vlan_id);
  
  	while (prev) {
  		if (prev->next == group) {
  			/* This never frees the special first group as needed */
  			prev->next = group->next;
  			os_free(group);
  			break;
  		}
  		prev = prev->next;
  	}
  
  }
  
  
  /* Increase the reference counter for group */
  static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			  struct wpa_group *group)
  {
  	/* Skip the special first group */
  	if (wpa_auth->group == group)
  		return;
  
  	group->references++;
  }
  
  
  /* Decrease the reference counter and maybe free the group */
  static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  			  struct wpa_group *group)
  {
  	/* Skip the special first group */
  	if (wpa_auth->group == group)
  		return;
  
  	group->references--;
  	if (group->references)
  		return;
  	wpa_group_free(wpa_auth, group);
  }
  
  
  /*
   * Add a group that has its references counter set to zero. Caller needs to
   * call wpa_group_get() on the return value to mark the entry in use.
   */
  static struct wpa_group *
  wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, int vlan_id)
  {
  	struct wpa_group *group;
  
  	if (!wpa_auth || !wpa_auth->group)
  		return NULL;
  
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
  		   vlan_id);
  	group = wpa_group_init(wpa_auth, vlan_id, 0);
  	if (!group)
  		return NULL;
  
  	group->next = wpa_auth->group->next;
  	wpa_auth->group->next = group;
  
  	return group;
  }
  
  
  /*
   * Enforce that the group state machine for the VLAN is running, increase
   * reference counter as interface is up. References might have been increased
   * even if a negative value is returned.
   * Returns: -1 on error (group missing, group already failed); otherwise, 0
   */
  int wpa_auth_ensure_group(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, int vlan_id)
  {
  	struct wpa_group *group;
  
  	if (!wpa_auth)
  		return 0;
  
  	group = wpa_auth->group;
  	while (group) {
  		if (group->vlan_id == vlan_id)
  			break;
  		group = group->next;
  	}
  
  	if (!group) {
  		group = wpa_auth_add_group(wpa_auth, vlan_id);
  		if (!group)
  			return -1;
  	}
  
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  		   "WPA: Ensure group state machine running for VLAN ID %d",
  		   vlan_id);
  
  	wpa_group_get(wpa_auth, group);
  	group->num_setup_iface++;
  
  	if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE)
  		return -1;
  
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  /*
   * Decrease reference counter, expected to be zero afterwards.
   * returns: -1 on error (group not found, group in fail state)
   *          -2 if wpa_group is still referenced
   *           0 else
   */
  int wpa_auth_release_group(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, int vlan_id)
  {
  	struct wpa_group *group;
  	int ret = 0;
  
  	if (!wpa_auth)
  		return 0;
  
  	group = wpa_auth->group;
  	while (group) {
  		if (group->vlan_id == vlan_id)
  			break;
  		group = group->next;
  	}
  
  	if (!group)
  		return -1;
  
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  		   "WPA: Try stopping group state machine for VLAN ID %d",
  		   vlan_id);
  
  	if (group->num_setup_iface <= 0) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
  			   "WPA: wpa_auth_release_group called more often than wpa_auth_ensure_group for VLAN ID %d, skipping.",
  			   vlan_id);
  		return -1;
  	}
  	group->num_setup_iface--;
  
  	if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE)
  		ret = -1;
  
  	if (group->references > 1) {
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "WPA: Cannot stop group state machine for VLAN ID %d as references are still hold",
  			   vlan_id);
  		ret = -2;
  	}
  
  	wpa_group_put(wpa_auth, group);
  
  	return ret;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int vlan_id)
  {
  	struct wpa_group *group;
  
  	if (!sm || !sm->wpa_auth)
  		return 0;
  
  	group = sm->wpa_auth->group;
  	while (group) {
  		if (group->vlan_id == vlan_id)
  			break;
  		group = group->next;
  	}
  
  	if (!group) {
  		group = wpa_auth_add_group(sm->wpa_auth, vlan_id);
  		if (!group)
  			return -1;
  	}
  
  	if (sm->group == group)
  		return 0;
  
  	if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE)
  		return -1;
  
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR
  		   " to use group state machine for VLAN ID %d",
  		   MAC2STR(sm->addr), vlan_id);
  
  	wpa_group_get(sm->wpa_auth, group);
  	wpa_group_put(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
  	sm->group = group;
  
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  				  struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int ack)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth || !sm)
  		return;
  	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR
  		   " ack=%d", MAC2STR(sm->addr), ack);
  	if (sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout && ack) {
  		/*
  		 * Some deployed supplicant implementations update their SNonce
  		 * for each EAPOL-Key 2/4 message even within the same 4-way
  		 * handshake and then fail to use the first SNonce when
  		 * deriving the PTK. This results in unsuccessful 4-way
  		 * handshake whenever the relatively short initial timeout is
  		 * reached and EAPOL-Key 1/4 is retransmitted. Try to work
  		 * around this by increasing the timeout now that we know that
  		 * the station has received the frame.
  		 */
  		int timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_subseq;
  		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
  			   "WPA: Increase initial EAPOL-Key 1/4 timeout by %u ms because of acknowledged frame",
  			   timeout_ms);
  		eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
  		eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms / 1000,
  				       (timeout_ms % 1000) * 1000,
  				       wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
  	}
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
  	if (sm->eapol_status_cb) {
  		sm->eapol_status_cb(sm->eapol_status_cb_ctx1,
  				    sm->eapol_status_cb_ctx2);
  		sm->eapol_status_cb = NULL;
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_uses_sae(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	if (!sm)
  		return 0;
  	return wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm->wpa_key_mgmt);
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_uses_ft_sae(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	if (!sm)
  		return 0;
  	return sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE;
  }
  
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_P2P
  int wpa_auth_get_ip_addr(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *addr)
  {
  	if (!sm || WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr) == 0)
  		return -1;
  	os_memcpy(addr, sm->ip_addr, 4);
  	return 0;
  }
  #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
  
  
  int wpa_auth_radius_das_disconnect_pmksa(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  					 struct radius_das_attrs *attr)
  {
  	return pmksa_cache_auth_radius_das_disconnect(wpa_auth->pmksa, attr);
  }
  
  
  void wpa_auth_reconfig_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
  {
  	struct wpa_group *group;
  
  	if (!wpa_auth)
  		return;
  	for (group = wpa_auth->group; group; group = group->next)
  		wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group);
  }
  
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_FILS
  
  struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data {
  	struct wpa_authenticator *auth;
  	const u8 *cache_id;
  	struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *pmksa;
  	const u8 *spa;
  	const u8 *pmkid;
  };
  
  
  static int wpa_auth_fils_iter(struct wpa_authenticator *a, void *ctx)
  {
  	struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data *data = ctx;
  
  	if (a == data->auth || !a->conf.fils_cache_id_set ||
  	    os_memcmp(a->conf.fils_cache_id, data->cache_id,
  		      FILS_CACHE_ID_LEN) != 0)
  		return 0;
  	data->pmksa = pmksa_cache_auth_get(a->pmksa, data->spa, data->pmkid);
  	return data->pmksa != NULL;
  }
  
  
  struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
  wpa_auth_pmksa_get_fils_cache_id(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  				 const u8 *sta_addr, const u8 *pmkid)
  {
  	struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data idata;
  
  	if (!wpa_auth->conf.fils_cache_id_set)
  		return NULL;
  	idata.auth = wpa_auth;
  	idata.cache_id = wpa_auth->conf.fils_cache_id;
  	idata.pmksa = NULL;
  	idata.spa = sta_addr;
  	idata.pmkid = pmkid;
  	wpa_auth_for_each_auth(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_fils_iter, &idata);
  	return idata.pmksa;
  }
  
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  int wpa_auth_write_fte(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, int use_sha384,
  		       u8 *buf, size_t len)
  {
  	struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &wpa_auth->conf;
  
  	return wpa_write_ftie(conf, use_sha384, conf->r0_key_holder,
  			      conf->r0_key_holder_len,
  			      NULL, NULL, buf, len, NULL, 0, 0);
  }
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  
  
  void wpa_auth_get_fils_aead_params(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
  				   u8 *fils_anonce, u8 *fils_snonce,
  				   u8 *fils_kek, size_t *fils_kek_len)
  {
  	os_memcpy(fils_anonce, sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
  	os_memcpy(fils_snonce, sm->SNonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
  	os_memcpy(fils_kek, sm->PTK.kek, WPA_KEK_MAX_LEN);
  	*fils_kek_len = sm->PTK.kek_len;
  }
  
  
  void wpa_auth_add_fils_pmk_pmkid(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *pmk,
  				 size_t pmk_len, const u8 *pmkid)
  {
  	os_memcpy(sm->PMK, pmk, pmk_len);
  	sm->pmk_len = pmk_len;
  	os_memcpy(sm->pmkid, pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
  	sm->pmkid_set = 1;
  }
  
  #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
  
  
  void wpa_auth_set_auth_alg(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u16 auth_alg)
  {
  	if (sm)
  		sm->auth_alg = auth_alg;
  }
  
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
  void wpa_auth_set_dpp_z(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const struct wpabuf *z)
  {
  	if (sm) {
  		wpabuf_clear_free(sm->dpp_z);
  		sm->dpp_z = z ? wpabuf_dup(z) : NULL;
  	}
  }
  #endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
  
  
  void wpa_auth_set_transition_disable(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  				     u8 val)
  {
  	if (wpa_auth)
  		wpa_auth->conf.transition_disable = val;
  }
  
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
  
  int wpa_auth_resend_m1(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int change_anonce,
  		       void (*cb)(void *ctx1, void *ctx2),
  		       void *ctx1, void *ctx2)
  {
  	const u8 *anonce = sm->ANonce;
  	u8 anonce_buf[WPA_NONCE_LEN];
  
  	if (change_anonce) {
  		if (random_get_bytes(anonce_buf, WPA_NONCE_LEN))
  			return -1;
  		anonce = anonce_buf;
  	}
  
  	wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  			"sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake (TESTING)");
  	wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
  		       WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK | WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE, NULL,
  		       anonce, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_resend_m3(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
  		       void (*cb)(void *ctx1, void *ctx2),
  		       void *ctx1, void *ctx2)
  {
  	u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN], *_rsc, *gtk, *kde, *pos;
  	u8 *opos;
  	size_t gtk_len, kde_len;
  	struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
  	struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
  	u8 *wpa_ie;
  	int wpa_ie_len, secure, gtkidx, encr = 0;
  	u8 hdr[2];
  
  	/* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
  	   GTK[GN], IGTK, [BIGTK], [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
  	 */
  
  	/* Use 0 RSC */
  	os_memset(rsc, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
  	/* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
  	wpa_ie = sm->wpa_auth->wpa_ie;
  	wpa_ie_len = sm->wpa_auth->wpa_ie_len;
  	if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA &&
  	    (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa & WPA_PROTO_RSN) &&
  	    wpa_ie_len > wpa_ie[1] + 2 && wpa_ie[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN) {
  		/* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE and possible MDIE */
  		wpa_ie = wpa_ie + wpa_ie[1] + 2;
  		if (wpa_ie[0] == WLAN_EID_RSNX)
  			wpa_ie = wpa_ie + wpa_ie[1] + 2;
  		if (wpa_ie[0] == WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN)
  			wpa_ie = wpa_ie + wpa_ie[1] + 2;
  		wpa_ie_len = wpa_ie[1] + 2;
  	}
  	wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  			"sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake (TESTING)");
  	if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
  		/* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
  		secure = 1;
  		gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
  		gtk_len = gsm->GTK_len;
  		gtkidx = gsm->GN;
  		_rsc = rsc;
  		encr = 1;
  	} else {
  		/* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
  		secure = 0;
  		gtk = NULL;
  		gtk_len = 0;
  		_rsc = NULL;
  		if (sm->rx_eapol_key_secure) {
  			/*
  			 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
  			 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
  			 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
  			 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
  			 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
  			 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
  			 */
  			wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  					"STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
  			secure = 1;
  		}
  	}
  
  	kde_len = wpa_ie_len + ieee80211w_kde_len(sm) + ocv_oci_len(sm);
  
  	if (sm->use_ext_key_id)
  		kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2;
  
  	if (gtk)
  		kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + gtk_len;
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  	if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
  		kde_len += 2 + PMKID_LEN; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
  		kde_len += 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  	kde = os_malloc(kde_len);
  	if (!kde)
  		return -1;
  
  	pos = kde;
  	os_memcpy(pos, wpa_ie, wpa_ie_len);
  	pos += wpa_ie_len;
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  	if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
  		int res;
  		size_t elen;
  
  		elen = pos - kde;
  		res = wpa_insert_pmkid(kde, &elen, sm->pmk_r1_name);
  		if (res < 0) {
  			wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
  				   "FT: Failed to insert PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
  			os_free(kde);
  			return -1;
  		}
  		pos -= wpa_ie_len;
  		pos += elen;
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  	hdr[1] = 0;
  
  	if (sm->use_ext_key_id) {
  		hdr[0] = sm->keyidx_active & 0x01;
  		pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_KEYID, hdr, 2, NULL, 0);
  	}
  
  	if (gtk) {
  		hdr[0] = gtkidx & 0x03;
  		pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2,
  				  gtk, gtk_len);
  	}
  	opos = pos;
  	pos = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, pos);
  	if (pos - opos >= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN) {
  		/* skip KDE header and keyid */
  		opos += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2;
  		os_memset(opos, 0, 6); /* clear PN */
  	}
  	if (ocv_oci_add(sm, &pos, conf->oci_freq_override_eapol_m3) < 0) {
  		os_free(kde);
  		return -1;
  	}
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
  	if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
  		int res;
  
  		if (sm->assoc_resp_ftie &&
  		    kde + kde_len - pos >= 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]) {
  			os_memcpy(pos, sm->assoc_resp_ftie,
  				  2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]);
  			res = 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1];
  		} else {
  			int use_sha384 = wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm->wpa_key_mgmt);
  
  			res = wpa_write_ftie(conf, use_sha384,
  					     conf->r0_key_holder,
  					     conf->r0_key_holder_len,
  					     NULL, NULL, pos,
  					     kde + kde_len - pos,
  					     NULL, 0, 0);
  		}
  		if (res < 0) {
  			wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
  				   "FT: Failed to insert FTIE into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
  			os_free(kde);
  			return -1;
  		}
  		pos += res;
  
  		/* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
  		*pos++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL;
  		*pos++ = 5;
  		*pos++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE;
  		WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, conf->reassociation_deadline);
  		pos += 4;
  
  		/* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
  		*pos++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL;
  		*pos++ = 5;
  		*pos++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME;
  		WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, conf->r0_key_lifetime);
  		pos += 4;
  	}
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
  
  	wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
  		       (secure ? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE : 0) |
  		       (wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len) ?
  			WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC : 0) |
  		       WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK | WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL |
  		       WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE,
  		       _rsc, sm->ANonce, kde, pos - kde, 0, encr);
  	os_free(kde);
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_resend_group_m1(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
  			     void (*cb)(void *ctx1, void *ctx2),
  			     void *ctx1, void *ctx2)
  {
  	u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN];
  	struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
  	struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
  	const u8 *kde;
  	u8 *kde_buf = NULL, *pos, hdr[2];
  	u8 *opos;
  	size_t kde_len;
  	u8 *gtk;
  
  	/* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
  	os_memset(rsc, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
  	/* Use 0 RSC */
  	wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
  			"sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake (TESTING)");
  
  	gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
  	if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
  		kde_len = 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + gsm->GTK_len +
  			ieee80211w_kde_len(sm) + ocv_oci_len(sm);
  		kde_buf = os_malloc(kde_len);
  		if (!kde_buf)
  			return -1;
  
  		kde = pos = kde_buf;
  		hdr[0] = gsm->GN & 0x03;
  		hdr[1] = 0;
  		pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2,
  				  gtk, gsm->GTK_len);
  		opos = pos;
  		pos = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, pos);
  		if (pos - opos >=
  		    2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN) {
  			/* skip KDE header and keyid */
  			opos += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2;
  			os_memset(opos, 0, 6); /* clear PN */
  		}
  		if (ocv_oci_add(sm, &pos,
  				conf->oci_freq_override_eapol_g1) < 0) {
  			os_free(kde_buf);
  			return -1;
  		}
  		kde_len = pos - kde;
  	} else {
  		kde = gtk;
  		kde_len = gsm->GTK_len;
  	}
  
  	sm->eapol_status_cb = cb;
  	sm->eapol_status_cb_ctx1 = ctx1;
  	sm->eapol_status_cb_ctx2 = ctx2;
  
  	wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
  		       WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE |
  		       (wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len) ?
  			WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC : 0) |
  		       WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK |
  		       (!sm->Pair ? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL : 0),
  		       rsc, NULL, kde, kde_len, gsm->GN, 1);
  
  	os_free(kde_buf);
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth)
  		return -1;
  	eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
  	return eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
  }
  
  
  int wpa_auth_rekey_ptk(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  		       struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth || !sm)
  		return -1;
  	wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, "rekeying PTK");
  	wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
  	wpa_sm_step(sm);
  	return 0;
  }
  
  
  void wpa_auth_set_ft_rsnxe_used(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, int val)
  {
  	if (wpa_auth)
  		wpa_auth->conf.ft_rsnxe_used = val;
  }
  
  
  void wpa_auth_set_ocv_override_freq(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
  				    enum wpa_auth_ocv_override_frame frame,
  				    unsigned int freq)
  {
  	if (!wpa_auth)
  		return;
  	switch (frame) {
  	case WPA_AUTH_OCV_OVERRIDE_EAPOL_M3:
  		wpa_auth->conf.oci_freq_override_eapol_m3 = freq;
  		break;
  	case WPA_AUTH_OCV_OVERRIDE_EAPOL_G1:
  		wpa_auth->conf.oci_freq_override_eapol_g1 = freq;
  		break;
  	case WPA_AUTH_OCV_OVERRIDE_FT_ASSOC:
  		wpa_auth->conf.oci_freq_override_ft_assoc = freq;
  		break;
  	case WPA_AUTH_OCV_OVERRIDE_FILS_ASSOC:
  		wpa_auth->conf.oci_freq_override_fils_assoc = freq;
  		break;
  	}
  }
  
  #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
  