text: /* ssl/s3_clnt.c */
  /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
   * All rights reserved.
   *
   * This package is an SSL implementation written
   * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
   * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
   *
   * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
   * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
   * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
   * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
   * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
   * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
   *
   * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
   * the code are not to be removed.
   * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
   * as the author of the parts of the library used.
   * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
   * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
   *
   * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
   * are met:
   * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
   * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
   *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
   * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
   *    must display the following acknowledgement:
   *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
   *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
   *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
   *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
   * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
   *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
   *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
   *
   * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
   * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
   * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
   * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
   * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
   * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
   * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
   * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
   * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
   * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
   * SUCH DAMAGE.
   *
   * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
   * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
   * copied and put under another distribution licence
   * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
   */
  /* ====================================================================
   * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
   *
   * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
   * are met:
   *
   * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
   *
   * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
   *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
   *    distribution.
   *
   * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
   *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
   *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
   *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
   *
   * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
   *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
   *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
   *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
   *
   * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
   *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
   *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
   *
   * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
   *    acknowledgment:
   *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
   *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
   *
   * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
   * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
   * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
   * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
   * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
   * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
   * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
   * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
   * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
   * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
   * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
   * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
   * ====================================================================
   *
   * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
   * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
   * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
   *
   */
  /* ====================================================================
   * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
   *
   * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
   * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
   *
   * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
   * license provided above.
   *
   * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
   * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
   *
   */
  /* ====================================================================
   * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
   *
   * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
   * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
   * license.
   *
   * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
   * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
   * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
   *
   * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
   * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
   * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
   *
   * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
   * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
   * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
   * to make use of the Contribution.
   *
   * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
   * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
   * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
   * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
   * OTHERWISE.
   */
  
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include "ssl_locl.h"
  #include "kssl_lcl.h"
  #include <openssl/buffer.h>
  #include <openssl/rand.h>
  #include <openssl/objects.h>
  #include <openssl/evp.h>
  #include <openssl/md5.h>
  #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
  # include <openssl/fips.h>
  #endif
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
  # include <openssl/dh.h>
  #endif
  #include <openssl/bn.h>
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
  # include <openssl/engine.h>
  #endif
  
  static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
  static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
  #endif
  
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
  static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
  {
      if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
          return (SSLv3_client_method());
      else
          return (NULL);
  }
  
  IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
                           ssl_undefined_function,
                           ssl3_connect, ssl3_get_client_method)
  #endif
  int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
  {
      BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
      unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
      void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
      int ret = -1;
      int new_state, state, skip = 0;
  
      RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
      ERR_clear_error();
      clear_sys_error();
  
      if (s->info_callback != NULL)
          cb = s->info_callback;
      else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
          cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
  
      s->in_handshake++;
      if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
          SSL_clear(s);
  
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
      /*
       * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
       * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
       * handshakes anyway.
       */
      if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
          s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
          s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
      }
  #endif
  
      for (;;) {
          state = s->state;
  
          switch (s->state) {
          case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
              s->renegotiate = 1;
              s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
              s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
              /* break */
          case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
          case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
          case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
          case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
  
              s->server = 0;
              if (cb != NULL)
                  cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
  
              if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                  s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                  ret = -1;
                  goto end;
              }
  
              /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
              s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
  
              if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
                  if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
                      ret = -1;
                      s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                      goto end;
                  }
                  if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
                      ret = -1;
                      s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                      goto end;
                  }
                  s->init_buf = buf;
                  buf = NULL;
              }
  
              if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
                  ret = -1;
                  goto end;
              }
  
              /* setup buffing BIO */
              if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
                  ret = -1;
                  s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                  goto end;
              }
  
              /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
  
              ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
  
              s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
              s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
              s->init_num = 0;
              s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
              /*
               * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
               */
              s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
              break;
  
          case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
          case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
  
              s->shutdown = 0;
              ret = ssl3_client_hello(s);
              if (ret <= 0)
                  goto end;
              s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
              s->init_num = 0;
  
              /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
              if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
                  s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
  
              break;
  
          case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
          case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
              ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
              if (ret <= 0)
                  goto end;
  
              if (s->hit) {
                  s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
                  if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
                      /* receive renewed session ticket */
                      s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
                  }
  #endif
              } else
                  s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
              s->init_num = 0;
              break;
  
          case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
          case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
              /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
              ret = ssl3_check_finished(s);
              if (ret < 0)
                  goto end;
              if (ret == 1) {
                  s->hit = 1;
                  s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
                  s->init_num = 0;
                  break;
              }
  #endif
              /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
              /* or PSK */
              if (!
                  (s->s3->tmp.
                   new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
                      && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
                  ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
                  if (ret <= 0)
                      goto end;
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
                  if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
                      s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
                  else
                      s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
              } else {
                  skip = 1;
                  s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
              }
  #else
              } else
                  skip = 1;
  
              s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
  #endif
              s->init_num = 0;
              break;
  
          case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
          case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
              ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
              if (ret <= 0)
                  goto end;
              s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
              s->init_num = 0;
  
              /*
               * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
               * the server
               */
              if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
                  ret = -1;
                  s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                  goto end;
              }
              break;
  
          case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
          case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
              ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
              if (ret <= 0)
                  goto end;
              s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
              s->init_num = 0;
              break;
  
          case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
          case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
              ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
              if (ret <= 0)
                  goto end;
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
              if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
                  if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
                      SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
                      ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                      s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                      goto end;
                  }
              }
  #endif
              if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
                  s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
              else
                  s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
              s->init_num = 0;
  
              break;
  
          case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
          case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
          case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
          case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
              ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
              if (ret <= 0)
                  goto end;
              s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
              s->init_num = 0;
              break;
  
          case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
          case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
              ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
              if (ret <= 0)
                  goto end;
              /*
               * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
               */
              /*
               * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
               * sent, but no verify packet is sent
               */
              /*
               * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
               * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
               * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
               * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
               */
              if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
                  s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
              } else {
                  s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
              }
              if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
                  s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
              }
  
              s->init_num = 0;
              break;
  
          case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
          case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
              ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
              if (ret <= 0)
                  goto end;
              s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
              s->init_num = 0;
              break;
  
          case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
          case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
              ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
                                                 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,
                                                 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
              if (ret <= 0)
                  goto end;
  
  #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
              s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
  #else
              if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
                  s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
              else
                  s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
  #endif
              s->init_num = 0;
  
              s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
  #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
              s->session->compress_meth = 0;
  #else
              if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
                  s->session->compress_meth = 0;
              else
                  s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
  #endif
              if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
                  ret = -1;
                  s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                  goto end;
              }
  
              if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
                                                            SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
              {
                  ret = -1;
                  s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                  goto end;
              }
  
              break;
  
  #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
          case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
          case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
              ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
              if (ret <= 0)
                  goto end;
              s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
              break;
  #endif
  
          case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
          case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
              ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
                                       SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
                                       SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
                                       s->method->
                                       ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
                                       s->method->
                                       ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
              if (ret <= 0)
                  goto end;
              s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
  
              /* clear flags */
              s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
              if (s->hit) {
                  s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
                  if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
                      s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
                      s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
                      s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
                  }
              } else {
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
                  /*
                   * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
                   */
                  if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
                      s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
                  else
  #endif
  
                      s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
              }
              s->init_num = 0;
              break;
  
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
          case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
          case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
              ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
              if (ret <= 0)
                  goto end;
              s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
              s->init_num = 0;
              break;
  
          case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
          case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
              ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
              if (ret <= 0)
                  goto end;
              s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
              s->init_num = 0;
              break;
  #endif
  
          case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
          case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
              if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
                  s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
              ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
                                      SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
              if (ret <= 0)
                  goto end;
  
              if (s->hit)
                  s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
              else
                  s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
              s->init_num = 0;
              break;
  
          case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
              s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
              if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
                  ret = -1;
                  goto end;
              }
              s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
              s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
              break;
  
          case SSL_ST_OK:
              /* clean a few things up */
              ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
  
              if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
                  BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
                  s->init_buf = NULL;
              }
  
              /*
               * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
               * buffering now
               */
              if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
                  ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
              /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
  
              s->init_num = 0;
              s->renegotiate = 0;
              s->new_session = 0;
  
              ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
              if (s->hit)
                  s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
  
              ret = 1;
              /* s->server=0; */
              s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
              s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
  
              if (cb != NULL)
                  cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
  
              goto end;
              /* break; */
  
          case SSL_ST_ERR:
          default:
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
              ret = -1;
              goto end;
              /* break; */
          }
  
          /* did we do anything */
          if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
              if (s->debug) {
                  if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
                      goto end;
              }
  
              if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
                  new_state = s->state;
                  s->state = state;
                  cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
                  s->state = new_state;
              }
          }
          skip = 0;
      }
   end:
      s->in_handshake--;
      if (buf != NULL)
          BUF_MEM_free(buf);
      if (cb != NULL)
          cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
      return (ret);
  }
  
  int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
  {
      unsigned char *buf;
      unsigned char *p, *d;
      int i;
      unsigned long l;
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
      int j;
      SSL_COMP *comp;
  #endif
  
      buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
      if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
          SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
          if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
  #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
              !sess->session_id_length ||
  #else
              /*
               * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
               * "ticket" without a session ID.
               */
              (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
  #endif
              (sess->not_resumable)) {
              if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
                  goto err;
          }
          /* else use the pre-loaded session */
  
          p = s->s3->client_random;
  
          if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
              goto err;
  
          /* Do the message type and length last */
          d = p = &(buf[4]);
  
          /*-
           * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
           * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
           * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
           * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
           * choke if we initially report a higher version then
           * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
           * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
           * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
           * 1.0.
           *
           * Possible scenario with previous logic:
           *      1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
           *      2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
           *      3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
           *      4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
           *      5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
           *      6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
           *         know that is maximum server supports.
           *      7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
           *         containing version 1.0.
           *
           * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
           * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
           * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
           * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
           * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
           * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
           * the negotiated version.
           */
  #if 0
          *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
          *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
          s->client_version = s->version;
  #else
          *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
          *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
  #endif
  
          /* Random stuff */
          memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
          p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
  
          /* Session ID */
          if (s->new_session)
              i = 0;
          else
              i = s->session->session_id_length;
          *(p++) = i;
          if (i != 0) {
              if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                  goto err;
              }
              memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
              p += i;
          }
  
          /* Ciphers supported */
          i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0);
          if (i == 0) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
              goto err;
          }
  #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
          /*
           * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
           * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
           * use TLS v1.2
           */
          if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
              && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
              i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
  #endif
          s2n(i, p);
          p += i;
  
          /* COMPRESSION */
  #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
          *(p++) = 1;
  #else
  
          if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
              || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
              j = 0;
          else
              j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
          *(p++) = 1 + j;
          for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
              comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
              *(p++) = comp->id;
          }
  #endif
          *(p++) = 0;             /* Add the NULL method */
  
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
          /* TLS extensions */
          if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
              goto err;
          }
          if ((p =
               ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p,
                                          buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
              NULL) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
              goto err;
          }
  #endif
  
          l = (p - d);
          d = buf;
          *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
          l2n3(l, d);
  
          s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
          /* number of bytes to write */
          s->init_num = p - buf;
          s->init_off = 0;
      }
  
      /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
      return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
   err:
      s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
      return (-1);
  }
  
  int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
  {
      STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
      const SSL_CIPHER *c;
      unsigned char *p, *d;
      int i, al, ok;
      unsigned int j;
      long n;
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
      SSL_COMP *comp;
  #endif
  
      n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
                                     SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
                                     SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, &ok);
  
      if (!ok)
          return ((int)n);
  
      if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
          if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
              if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) {
                  s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
                  return 1;
              } else {            /* already sent a cookie */
  
                  al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
                  goto f_err;
              }
          }
      }
  
      if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
          al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
          goto f_err;
      }
  
      d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
  
      if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
          s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1];
          al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
          goto f_err;
      }
      p += 2;
  
      /* load the server hello data */
      /* load the server random */
      memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
      p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
  
      s->hit = 0;
  
      /* get the session-id */
      j = *(p++);
  
      if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
          al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
          goto f_err;
      }
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
      /*
       * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
       * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
       * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
       * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
       * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
       * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
       * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
       * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
       * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
       * server wants to resume.
       */
      if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
          s->session->tlsext_tick) {
          SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
          s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
          if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
                                       &s->session->master_key_length,
                                       NULL, &pref_cipher,
                                       s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
              s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
                  pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
          } else {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
              al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
              goto f_err;
          }
      }
  #endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
  
      if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
          && memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
          if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
              || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
              /* actually a client application bug */
              al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
                     SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
              goto f_err;
          }
          s->hit = 1;
      } else {
          /*
           * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
           * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
           * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
           * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
           * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
           */
          if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
              if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
                  al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
                  goto f_err;
              }
          }
          s->session->session_id_length = j;
          memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */
      }
      p += j;
      c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
      if (c == NULL) {
          /* unknown cipher */
          al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
          goto f_err;
      }
      /* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later */
      if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
          (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)) {
          al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
          goto f_err;
      }
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
      if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
          !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
          al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
          goto f_err;
      }
  #endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
      p += ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
  
      sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
      i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
      if (i < 0) {
          /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
          al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
          goto f_err;
      }
  
      /*
       * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
       * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
       * set and use it for comparison.
       */
      if (s->session->cipher)
          s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
      if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
  /* Workaround is now obsolete */
  #if 0
          if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
  #endif
          {
              al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
                     SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
              goto f_err;
          }
      }
      s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
      /*
       * Don't digest cached records if TLS v1.2: we may need them for client
       * authentication.
       */
      if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION
          && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
          al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
          goto f_err;
      }
      /* lets get the compression algorithm */
      /* COMPRESSION */
  #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
      if (*(p++) != 0) {
          al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
                 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
          goto f_err;
      }
      /*
       * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
       * using compression.
       */
      if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
          al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
          goto f_err;
      }
  #else
      j = *(p++);
      if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) {
          al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
                 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
          goto f_err;
      }
      if (j == 0)
          comp = NULL;
      else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
          al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
          goto f_err;
      } else
          comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, j);
  
      if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) {
          al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
                 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
          goto f_err;
      } else {
          s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
      }
  #endif
  
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
      /* TLS extensions */
      if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
          if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) {
              /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
              goto f_err;
          }
          if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
              goto err;
          }
      }
  #endif
  
      if (p != (d + n)) {
          /* wrong packet length */
          al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
          goto f_err;
      }
  
      return (1);
   f_err:
      ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
   err:
      s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
      return (-1);
  }
  
  int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
  {
      int al, i, ok, ret = -1;
      unsigned long n, nc, llen, l;
      X509 *x = NULL;
      const unsigned char *q, *p;
      unsigned char *d;
      STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
      SESS_CERT *sc;
      EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
      int need_cert = 1;          /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
                                   * KRB5 */
  
      n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
                                     SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
                                     SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
                                     -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
  
      if (!ok)
          return ((int)n);
  
      if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
          ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
           (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) {
          s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
          return (1);
      }
  
      if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
          al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
          goto f_err;
      }
      p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
  
      if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
          goto err;
      }
  
      n2l3(p, llen);
      if (llen + 3 != n) {
          al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
          goto f_err;
      }
      for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
          n2l3(p, l);
          if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
              al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
                     SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
              goto f_err;
          }
  
          q = p;
          x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, l);
          if (x == NULL) {
              al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
              goto f_err;
          }
          if (q != (p + l)) {
              al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
                     SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
              goto f_err;
          }
          if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
              goto err;
          }
          x = NULL;
          nc += l + 3;
          p = q;
      }
  
      i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
      if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
          && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
               (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
  #endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
          ) {
          al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
                 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
          goto f_err;
      }
      ERR_clear_error();          /* but we keep s->verify_result */
  
      sc = ssl_sess_cert_new();
      if (sc == NULL)
          goto err;
  
      if (s->session->sess_cert)
          ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
      s->session->sess_cert = sc;
  
      sc->cert_chain = sk;
      /*
       * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
       * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
       */
      x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
      sk = NULL;
      /*
       * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
       */
  
      pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
  
      /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
      need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
                   (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
          ? 0 : 1;
  
  #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
      fprintf(stderr, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey, x);
      fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x, pkey));
      fprintf(stderr, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
              s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
              s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
              s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
  #endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
  
      if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) {
          x = NULL;
          al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
                 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
          goto f_err;
      }
  
      i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
      if (need_cert && i < 0) {
          x = NULL;
          al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
                 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
          goto f_err;
      }
  
      if (need_cert) {
          sc->peer_cert_type = i;
          CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
          /*
           * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
           * of lines ago.
           */
          if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
              X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
          sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
          sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
  
          if (s->session->peer != NULL)
              X509_free(s->session->peer);
          CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
          s->session->peer = x;
      } else {
          sc->peer_cert_type = i;
          sc->peer_key = NULL;
  
          if (s->session->peer != NULL)
              X509_free(s->session->peer);
          s->session->peer = NULL;
      }
      s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
  
      x = NULL;
      ret = 1;
  
      if (0) {
   f_err:
          ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
   err:
          s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
      }
  
      EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
      X509_free(x);
      sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
      return (ret);
  }
  
  int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
  {
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
      unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
  #endif
      EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
      unsigned char *param, *p;
      int al, j, ok;
      long i, param_len, n, alg_k, alg_a;
      EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
      const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
      RSA *rsa = NULL;
  #endif
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
      DH *dh = NULL;
  #endif
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
      EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
      BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
      EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
      int curve_nid = 0;
      int encoded_pt_len = 0;
  #endif
  
      EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
  
      /*
       * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
       * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
       */
      n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
                                     SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
                                     SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
                                     -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
      if (!ok)
          return ((int)n);
  
      alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
  
      if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
          /*
           * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
           * ciphersuite.
           */
          if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
              al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
              goto f_err;
          }
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
          /*
           * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
           * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
           * problems later.
           */
          if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
              s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
              if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
                  OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
              s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
          }
  #endif
          s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
          return (1);
      }
  
      param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
      if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
          if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) {
              RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
              s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
          }
  #endif
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
          if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) {
              DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
              s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
          }
  #endif
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
          if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) {
              EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
              s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
          }
  #endif
      } else {
          s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
      }
  
      /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
      param_len = 0;
  
      alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
  
      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
  
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
      if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
          param_len = 2;
          if (param_len > n) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
              goto f_err;
          }
          n2s(p, i);
  
          /*
           * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
           * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange.  Assume that the maximum length of
           * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
           * identity.
           */
          if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
              al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
              goto f_err;
          }
          if (i > n - param_len) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                     SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
              goto f_err;
          }
          param_len += i;
  
          s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
          if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
              al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
              goto f_err;
          }
  
          p += i;
          n -= param_len;
      } else
  #endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
      if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
          param_len = 2;
          if (param_len > n) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
              goto f_err;
          }
          n2s(p, i);
  
          if (i > n - param_len) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
              goto f_err;
          }
          param_len += i;
  
          if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
              goto err;
          }
          p += i;
  
          if (2 > n - param_len) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
              goto f_err;
          }
          param_len += 2;
  
          n2s(p, i);
  
          if (i > n - param_len) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
              goto f_err;
          }
          param_len += i;
  
          if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
              goto err;
          }
          p += i;
  
          if (1 > n - param_len) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
              goto f_err;
          }
          param_len += 1;
  
          i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
          p++;
  
          if (i > n - param_len) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
              goto f_err;
          }
          param_len += i;
  
          if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
              goto err;
          }
          p += i;
  
          if (2 > n - param_len) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
              goto f_err;
          }
          param_len += 2;
  
          n2s(p, i);
  
          if (i > n - param_len) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
              goto f_err;
          }
          param_len += i;
  
          if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
              goto err;
          }
          p += i;
          n -= param_len;
  
          if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
              goto f_err;
          }
  
  /* We must check if there is a certificate */
  # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
          if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
              pkey =
                  X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
                                  sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
  # else
          if (0) ;
  # endif
  # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
          else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
              pkey =
                  X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
                                  sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
                                  x509);
  # endif
      } else
  #endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
      if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
          /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
          if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
              al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
              goto f_err;
          }
          if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
              goto err;
          }
  
          param_len = 2;
          if (param_len > n) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
              goto f_err;
          }
          n2s(p, i);
  
          if (i > n - param_len) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
              goto f_err;
          }
          param_len += i;
  
          if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n))) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
              goto err;
          }
          p += i;
  
          if (2 > n - param_len) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
              goto f_err;
          }
          param_len += 2;
  
          n2s(p, i);
  
          if (i > n - param_len) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
              goto f_err;
          }
          param_len += i;
  
          if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e))) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
              goto err;
          }
          p += i;
          n -= param_len;
  
          /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
          if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
              pkey =
                  X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
                                  sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
          else {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
              goto err;
          }
  
          if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey) <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
              al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
              goto f_err;
          }
  
          s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
          rsa = NULL;
      }
  #else                           /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
      if (0) ;
  #endif
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
      else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
          if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
              goto err;
          }
  
          param_len = 2;
          if (param_len > n) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
              goto f_err;
          }
          n2s(p, i);
  
          if (i > n - param_len) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
              goto f_err;
          }
          param_len += i;
  
          if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
              goto err;
          }
          p += i;
  
          if (2 > n - param_len) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
              goto f_err;
          }
          param_len += 2;
  
          n2s(p, i);
  
          if (i > n - param_len) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
              goto f_err;
          }
          param_len += i;
  
          if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
              goto err;
          }
          p += i;
  
          if (2 > n - param_len) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
              goto f_err;
          }
          param_len += 2;
  
          n2s(p, i);
  
          if (i > n - param_len) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
              goto f_err;
          }
          param_len += i;
  
          if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
              goto err;
          }
          p += i;
          n -= param_len;
  
  # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
          if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
              pkey =
                  X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
                                  sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
  # else
          if (0) ;
  # endif
  # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
          else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
              pkey =
                  X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
                                  sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
                                  x509);
  # endif
          /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
  
          s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
          dh = NULL;
      } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) {
          al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                 SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
          goto f_err;
      }
  #endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
  
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
      else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
          EC_GROUP *ngroup;
          const EC_GROUP *group;
  
          if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
              goto err;
          }
  
          /*
           * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
           * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
           * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
           */
  
          /*
           * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
           * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
           * byte for the length of the encoded point
           */
          param_len = 4;
          if (param_len > n) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
              goto f_err;
          }
  
          if ((*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
              ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)) {
              al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                     SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
              goto f_err;
          }
  
          ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
          if (ngroup == NULL) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
              goto err;
          }
          if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
              goto err;
          }
          EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
  
          group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
  
          if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
              (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
              al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                     SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
              goto f_err;
          }
  
          p += 3;
  
          /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
          if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
              ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
              goto err;
          }
  
          encoded_pt_len = *p;    /* length of encoded point */
          p += 1;
  
          if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
              (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
                                  p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
              goto f_err;
          }
          param_len += encoded_pt_len;
  
          n -= param_len;
          p += encoded_pt_len;
  
          /*
           * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
           * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
           * and ECDSA.
           */
          if (0) ;
  # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
          else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
              pkey =
                  X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
                                  sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
  # endif
  # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
          else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
              pkey =
                  X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
                                  sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
  # endif
          /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
          EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
          s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
          ecdh = NULL;
          BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
          bn_ctx = NULL;
          EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
          srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
      } else if (alg_k) {
          al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
          goto f_err;
      }
  #endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
  
      /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
  
      /* if it was signed, check the signature */
      if (pkey != NULL) {
          if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
              int sigalg;
              if (2 > n) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
                  goto f_err;
              }
  
              sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
              /* Should never happen */
              if (sigalg == -1) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                  goto err;
              }
              /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
              if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
                  al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                  goto f_err;
              }
              md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
              if (md == NULL) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
                  goto f_err;
              }
  #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
              fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
  #endif
              p += 2;
              n -= 2;
          } else
              md = EVP_sha1();
  
          if (2 > n) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
              goto f_err;
          }
          n2s(p, i);
          n -= 2;
          j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
  
          /*
           * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
           */
          if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
              /* wrong packet length */
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
              goto f_err;
          }
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
          if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
              && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
              int num;
              unsigned int size;
  
              j = 0;
              q = md_buf;
              for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
                  EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
                  EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
                                    ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
                  EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
                                   SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
                  EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
                                   SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
                  EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
                  EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size);
                  q += size;
                  j += size;
              }
              i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa);
              if (i < 0) {
                  al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
                  goto f_err;
              }
              if (i == 0) {
                  /* bad signature */
                  al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
                  goto f_err;
              }
          } else
  #endif
          {
              EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
              EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
                               SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
              EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
                               SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
              EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
              if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
                  /* bad signature */
                  al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
                  goto f_err;
              }
          }
      } else {
          /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
          if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
              goto err;
          }
          /* still data left over */
          if (n != 0) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
              goto f_err;
          }
      }
      EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
      EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
      return (1);
   f_err:
      ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
   err:
      EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
      if (rsa != NULL)
          RSA_free(rsa);
  #endif
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
      if (dh != NULL)
          DH_free(dh);
  #endif
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
      BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
      EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
      if (ecdh != NULL)
          EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
  #endif
      EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
      s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
      return (-1);
  }
  
  int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
  {
      int ok, ret = 0;
      unsigned long n, nc, l;
      unsigned int llen, ctype_num, i;
      X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
      const unsigned char *p, *q;
      unsigned char *d;
      STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
  
      n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
                                     SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
                                     SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
                                     -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
  
      if (!ok)
          return ((int)n);
  
      s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
  
      if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
          s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
          /*
           * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
           * wont be doing client auth.
           */
          if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
              if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
                  goto err;
          }
          return (1);
      }
  
      if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
          ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
          goto err;
      }
  
      /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
      if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
          if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
              ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
                     SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
              goto err;
          }
      }
  
      p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
  
      if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
          goto err;
      }
  
      /* get the certificate types */
      ctype_num = *(p++);
      if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER)
          ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
      for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
          s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = p[i];
      p += ctype_num;
      if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
          n2s(p, llen);
          /*
           * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
           * length value.
           */
          if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) {
              ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
                     SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
              goto err;
          }
          if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_process_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
              ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
                     SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
              goto err;
          }
          p += llen;
      }
  
      /* get the CA RDNs */
      n2s(p, llen);
  #if 0
      {
          FILE *out;
          out = fopen("/tmp/vsign.der", "w");
          fwrite(p, 1, llen, out);
          fclose(out);
      }
  #endif
  
      if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
          ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
          goto err;
      }
  
      for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
          n2s(p, l);
          if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
              if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
                  goto cont;      /* netscape bugs */
              ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
              goto err;
          }
  
          q = p;
  
          if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
              /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
              if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
                  goto cont;
              else {
                  ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
                  goto err;
              }
          }
  
          if (q != (p + l)) {
              ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
                     SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
              goto err;
          }
          if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
              goto err;
          }
  
          p += l;
          nc += l + 2;
      }
  
      if (0) {
   cont:
          ERR_clear_error();
      }
  
      /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
      s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
      s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
      if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
          sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
      s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
      ca_sk = NULL;
  
      ret = 1;
      goto done;
   err:
      s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
   done:
      if (ca_sk != NULL)
          sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
      return (ret);
  }
  
  static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
  {
      return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
  }
  
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
  int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
  {
      int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen;
      long n;
      const unsigned char *p;
      unsigned char *d;
  
      n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
                                     SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
                                     SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
                                     SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok);
  
      if (!ok)
          return ((int)n);
  
      if (n < 6) {
          /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
          al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
          goto f_err;
      }
  
      p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
  
      if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
          int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
          SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
          /*
           * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
           * one
           */
          if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
              /*
               * Remove the old session from the cache
               */
              if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
                  if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
                      s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
                                                        s->session);
              } else {
                  /* We carry on if this fails */
                  SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
              }
          }
  
          if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
              al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
              goto f_err;
          }
  
          SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
          s->session = new_sess;
      }
  
      n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
      n2s(p, ticklen);
      /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
      if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
          al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
          goto f_err;
      }
      if (s->session->tlsext_tick) {
          OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
          s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
      }
      s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
      if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
          goto err;
      }
      memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
      s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
      /*
       * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
       * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
       * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
       * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
       * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
       * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
       * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
       * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
       * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
       */
      EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
                 s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
  # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
                 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
  # else
                 EVP_sha1(), NULL);
  # endif
      ret = 1;
      return (ret);
   f_err:
      ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
   err:
      s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
      return (-1);
  }
  
  int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
  {
      int ok, al;
      unsigned long resplen, n;
      const unsigned char *p;
  
      n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
                                     SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
                                     SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
                                     SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok);
  
      if (!ok)
          return ((int)n);
      if (n < 4) {
          /* need at least status type + length */
          al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
          goto f_err;
      }
      p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
      if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
          al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
          goto f_err;
      }
      n2l3(p, resplen);
      if (resplen + 4 != n) {
          al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
          goto f_err;
      }
      if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
          OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
      s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
      if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
          al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
          goto f_err;
      }
      s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
      if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
          int ret;
          ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
          if (ret == 0) {
              al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
              goto f_err;
          }
          if (ret < 0) {
              al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
              goto f_err;
          }
      }
      return 1;
   f_err:
      ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
      s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
      return (-1);
  }
  #endif
  
  int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
  {
      int ok, ret = 0;
      long n;
  
      /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
      n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
                                     SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
                                     SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
                                     SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, &ok);
  
      if (!ok)
          return ((int)n);
      if (n > 0) {
          /* should contain no data */
          ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
          s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
          return -1;
      }
      ret = 1;
      return (ret);
  }
  
  int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
  {
      unsigned char *p, *d;
      int n;
      unsigned long alg_k;
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
      unsigned char *q;
      EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
  #endif
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
      KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
  #endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
      EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
      const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
      EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
      unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
      int encoded_pt_len = 0;
      BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
  #endif
  
      if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
          d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
          p = &(d[4]);
  
          alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
  
          /* Fool emacs indentation */
          if (0) {
          }
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
          else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
              RSA *rsa;
              unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
  
              if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
                  /*
                   * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
                   */
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                  goto err;
              }
  
              if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
                  rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
              else {
                  pkey =
                      X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
                                      sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].
                                      x509);
                  if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
                      || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
                      SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                             ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                      goto err;
                  }
                  rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
                  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
              }
  
              tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
              tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
              if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
                  goto err;
  
              s->session->master_key_length = sizeof tmp_buf;
  
              q = p;
              /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
              if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
                  p += 2;
              n = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
                                     tmp_buf, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
  # ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
              if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
                  p[1]++;
              if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
                  tmp_buf[0] = 0x70;
  # endif
              if (n <= 0) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
                  goto err;
              }
  
              /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
              if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
                  s2n(n, q);
                  n += 2;
              }
  
              s->session->master_key_length =
                  s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
                                                              s->
                                                              session->master_key,
                                                              tmp_buf,
                                                              sizeof tmp_buf);
              OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
          }
  #endif
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
          else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
              krb5_error_code krb5rc;
              KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
              /*  krb5_data   krb5_ap_req;  */
              krb5_data *enc_ticket;
              krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
              EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
              const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
              unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
              unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
              unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
              int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
  
              EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
  
  # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
              fprintf(stderr, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
                      alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
  # endif                         /* KSSL_DEBUG */
  
              authp = NULL;
  # ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
              if (KRB5SENDAUTH)
                  authp = &authenticator;
  # endif                         /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
  
              krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err);
              enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
              if (enc == NULL)
                  goto err;
  # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
              {
                  fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
                  if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
                      fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
                              kssl_err.text);
              }
  # endif                         /* KSSL_DEBUG */
  
              if (krb5rc) {
                  ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
                  goto err;
              }
  
              /*-
               * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
               * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
               *
               * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
               * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
               * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
               * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
               *   kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
               *
               * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
               * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
               * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
               * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
               * Example:
               * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
               * Where "xx xx" = length bytes.  Shown here with
               * optional authenticator omitted.
               */
  
              /*  KerberosWrapper.Ticket              */
              s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
              memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
              p += enc_ticket->length;
              n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
  
              /*  KerberosWrapper.Authenticator       */
              if (authp && authp->length) {
                  s2n(authp->length, p);
                  memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
                  p += authp->length;
                  n += authp->length + 2;
  
                  free(authp->data);
                  authp->data = NULL;
                  authp->length = 0;
              } else {
                  s2n(0, p);      /* null authenticator length */
                  n += 2;
              }
  
              tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
              tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
              if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
                  goto err;
  
              /*-
               * 20010420 VRS.  Tried it this way; failed.
               *      EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
               *      EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
               *                              kssl_ctx->length);
               *      EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
               */
  
              memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
              EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
              EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf,
                                sizeof tmp_buf);
              EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
              outl += padl;
              if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                  goto err;
              }
              EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
  
              /*  KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret    */
              s2n(outl, p);
              memcpy(p, epms, outl);
              p += outl;
              n += outl + 2;
  
              s->session->master_key_length =
                  s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
                                                              s->
                                                              session->master_key,
                                                              tmp_buf,
                                                              sizeof tmp_buf);
  
              OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
              OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
          }
  #endif
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
          else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
              DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
  
              if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
                  ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
                  goto err;
              }
  
              if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
                  dh_srvr = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
              else {
                  /* we get them from the cert */
                  ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
                  goto err;
              }
  
              /* generate a new random key */
              if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
                  goto err;
              }
              if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
                  DH_free(dh_clnt);
                  goto err;
              }
  
              /*
               * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
               * clear it out afterwards
               */
  
              n = DH_compute_key(p, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
  
              if (n <= 0) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
                  DH_free(dh_clnt);
                  goto err;
              }
  
              /* generate master key from the result */
              s->session->master_key_length =
                  s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
                                                              s->
                                                              session->master_key,
                                                              p, n);
              /* clean up */
              memset(p, 0, n);
  
              /* send off the data */
              n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
              s2n(n, p);
              BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
              n += 2;
  
              DH_free(dh_clnt);
          }
  #endif
  
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
          else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
              const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
              EC_KEY *tkey;
              int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
              int field_size = 0;
  
              if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
                  ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
                  goto err;
              }
  
              /*
               * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
               * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
               * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
               */
              if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
                  /*-
                   * XXX: For now, we do not support client
                   * authentication using ECDH certificates.
                   * To add such support, one needs to add
                   * code that checks for appropriate
                   * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
                   * For example, the cert have an ECC
                   * key on the same curve as the server's
                   * and the key should be authorized for
                   * key agreement.
                   *
                   * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
                   * to skip sending the certificate verify
                   * message.
                   *
                   * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
                   *     (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
                   *      EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
                   * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
                   */
              }
  
              if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
                  tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
              } else {
                  /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
                  srvr_pub_pkey =
                      X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
                                      sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
                  if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
                      || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
                      || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
                      SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                             ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                      goto err;
                  }
  
                  tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
              }
  
              srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
              srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
  
              if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                  goto err;
              }
  
              if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                  goto err;
              }
  
              if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
                  goto err;
              }
              if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
                  /*
                   * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
                   * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
                   */
                  const BIGNUM *priv_key;
                  tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
                  priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
                  if (priv_key == NULL) {
                      SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                             ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                      goto err;
                  }
                  if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
                      SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
                      goto err;
                  }
              } else {
                  /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
                  if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
                      SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                             ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
                      goto err;
                  }
              }
  
              /*
               * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
               * clear it out afterwards
               */
  
              field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
              if (field_size <= 0) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
                  goto err;
              }
              n = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, srvr_ecpoint,
                                   clnt_ecdh, NULL);
              if (n <= 0) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
                  goto err;
              }
  
              /* generate master key from the result */
              s->session->master_key_length =
                  s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
                                                              s->
                                                              session->master_key,
                                                              p, n);
  
              memset(p, 0, n);    /* clean up */
  
              if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
                  /* Send empty client key exch message */
                  n = 0;
              } else {
                  /*
                   * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
                   * accordingly.
                   */
                  encoded_pt_len =
                      EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
                                         EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
                                         POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
                                         NULL, 0, NULL);
  
                  encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
                      OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
                  bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
                  if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
                      SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                             ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                      goto err;
                  }
  
                  /* Encode the public key */
                  n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
                                         EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
                                         POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
                                         encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
  
                  *p = n;         /* length of encoded point */
                  /* Encoded point will be copied here */
                  p += 1;
                  /* copy the point */
                  memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
                  /* increment n to account for length field */
                  n += 1;
              }
  
              /* Free allocated memory */
              BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
              if (encodedPoint != NULL)
                  OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
              if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
                  EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
              EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
          }
  #endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
          else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
              /* GOST key exchange message creation */
              EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
              X509 *peer_cert;
              size_t msglen;
              unsigned int md_len;
              int keytype;
              unsigned char premaster_secret[32], shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
              EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
              EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
  
              /*
               * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
               */
              peer_cert =
                  s->session->
                  sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
              if (!peer_cert)
                  peer_cert =
                      s->session->
                      sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
              if (!peer_cert) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
                  goto err;
              }
  
              pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
                                          X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
              /*
               * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
               *
               * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
               * certificate key for key exchange
               */
  
              /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
  
              EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
              /* Generate session key */
              if (RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) {
                  EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
                  goto err;
              }
              /*
               * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
               */
              if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
                  if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
                      (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
                      /*
                       * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
                       * * would be used
                       */
                      ERR_clear_error();
                  }
              }
              /*
               * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
               * data
               */
              ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
              EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
                             EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
              EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
                               SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
              EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
                               SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
              EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
              EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
              if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
                  (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
                   shared_ukm) < 0) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
                  goto err;
              }
              /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
              /*
               * Encapsulate it into sequence
               */
              *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
              msglen = 255;
              if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret, 32)
                  < 0) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
                  goto err;
              }
              if (msglen >= 0x80) {
                  *(p++) = 0x81;
                  *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
                  n = msglen + 3;
              } else {
                  *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
                  n = msglen + 2;
              }
              memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
              /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
              if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
                  (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
                  /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
                  s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
              }
              EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
              s->session->master_key_length =
                  s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
                                                              s->
                                                              session->master_key,
                                                              premaster_secret,
                                                              32);
              EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
  
          }
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
          else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
              if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
                  /* send off the data */
                  n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
                  s2n(n, p);
                  BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
                  n += 2;
              } else {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                  goto err;
              }
              if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
                  OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
              s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
              if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                  goto err;
              }
  
              if ((s->session->master_key_length =
                   SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
                                                     s->session->master_key)) <
                  0) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                  goto err;
              }
          }
  #endif
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
          else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
              /*
               * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
               * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
               * strnlen.
               */
              char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
              size_t identity_len;
              unsigned char *t = NULL;
              unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
              unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
              int psk_err = 1;
  
              n = 0;
              if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
                  goto err;
              }
  
              memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
              psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
                                               identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
                                               psk_or_pre_ms,
                                               sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
              if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                  goto psk_err;
              } else if (psk_len == 0) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
                  goto psk_err;
              }
              identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
              identity_len = strlen(identity);
              if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                  goto psk_err;
              }
              /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
              pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
              t = psk_or_pre_ms;
              memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
              s2n(psk_len, t);
              memset(t, 0, psk_len);
              t += psk_len;
              s2n(psk_len, t);
  
              if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
                  OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
              s->session->psk_identity_hint =
                  BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
              if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL
                  && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                  goto psk_err;
              }
  
              if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
                  OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
              s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
              if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                  goto psk_err;
              }
  
              s->session->master_key_length =
                  s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
                                                              s->
                                                              session->master_key,
                                                              psk_or_pre_ms,
                                                              pre_ms_len);
              s2n(identity_len, p);
              memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
              n = 2 + identity_len;
              psk_err = 0;
   psk_err:
              OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
              OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
              if (psk_err != 0) {
                  ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
                  goto err;
              }
          }
  #endif
          else {
              ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
              goto err;
          }
  
          *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
          l2n3(n, d);
  
          s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
          /* number of bytes to write */
          s->init_num = n + 4;
          s->init_off = 0;
      }
  
      /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
      return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
   err:
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
      BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
      if (encodedPoint != NULL)
          OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
      if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
          EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
      EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
  #endif
      s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
      return (-1);
  }
  
  int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
  {
      unsigned char *p, *d;
      unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
      EVP_PKEY *pkey;
      EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
      EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
      unsigned u = 0;
      unsigned long n;
      int j;
  
      EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
  
      if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
          d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
          p = &(d[4]);
          pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
  /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
          pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
          EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
          if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
              if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
                  s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
                                                       NID_sha1,
                                                       &(data
                                                         [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
          } else {
              ERR_clear_error();
          }
          /*
           * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
           * digest and cached handshake records.
           */
          if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
              long hdatalen = 0;
              void *hdata;
              const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
              hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
              if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                  goto err;
              }
              p += 2;
  #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
              fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
                      EVP_MD_name(md));
  #endif
              if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
                  || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
                  || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
                  goto err;
              }
              s2n(u, p);
              n = u + 4;
              if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
                  goto err;
          } else
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
          if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
              s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
              if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
                           MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
                           &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
                  goto err;
              }
              s2n(u, p);
              n = u + 2;
          } else
  #endif
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
          if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
              if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
                            &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
                            SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
                            (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
                  goto err;
              }
              s2n(j, p);
              n = j + 2;
          } else
  #endif
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
          if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
              if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
                              &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
                              SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
                              (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
                  goto err;
              }
              s2n(j, p);
              n = j + 2;
          } else
  #endif
          if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
                  || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
              unsigned char signbuf[64];
              int i;
              size_t sigsize = 64;
              s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
                                                   NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
              if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                  goto err;
              }
              for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
                  p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
              }
              s2n(j, p);
              n = j + 2;
          } else {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
              goto err;
          }
          *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
          l2n3(n, d);
  
          s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
          s->init_num = (int)n + 4;
          s->init_off = 0;
      }
      EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
      EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
      return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
   err:
      EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
      EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
      s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
      return (-1);
  }
  
  int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
  {
      X509 *x509 = NULL;
      EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
      int i;
      unsigned long l;
  
      if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
          if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
              (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
              (s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
              s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
          else
              s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
      }
  
      /* We need to get a client cert */
      if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
          /*
           * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
           * return(-1); We then get retied later
           */
          i = 0;
          i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
          if (i < 0) {
              s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
              return (-1);
          }
          s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
          if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
              s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
              if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
                  i = 0;
          } else if (i == 1) {
              i = 0;
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
                     SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
          }
  
          if (x509 != NULL)
              X509_free(x509);
          if (pkey != NULL)
              EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
          if (i == 0) {
              if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
                  s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
                  ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
                  return (1);
              } else {
                  s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
              }
          }
  
          /* Ok, we have a cert */
          s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
      }
  
      if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
          s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
          l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
                                     (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
                                      2) ? NULL : s->cert->key->x509);
          if (!l) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
              ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
              s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
              return 0;
          }
          s->init_num = (int)l;
          s->init_off = 0;
      }
      /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
      return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
  }
  
  #define has_bits(i,m)   (((i)&(m)) == (m))
  
  int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
  {
      int i, idx;
      long alg_k, alg_a;
      EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
      int pkey_bits;
      SESS_CERT *sc;
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
      RSA *rsa;
  #endif
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
      DH *dh;
  #endif
      int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
  
      alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
      alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
  
      /* we don't have a certificate */
      if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH | SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
          return (1);
  
      sc = s->session->sess_cert;
      if (sc == NULL) {
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
          goto err;
      }
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
      rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
  #endif
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
      dh = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
  #endif
  
      /* This is the passed certificate */
  
      idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
      if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
          if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
              /* check failed */
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
              goto f_err;
          } else {
              return 1;
          }
      }
  #endif
      pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
      pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
      i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
      EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
  
      /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
      if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
                 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
          goto f_err;
      }
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
      else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
                 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
          goto f_err;
      }
  #endif
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
      if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
          if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
              !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
                     SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
              goto f_err;
          } else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
              if (pkey_bits <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
                  if (!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
                      SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
                             SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
                      goto f_err;
                  }
                  if (rsa != NULL) {
                      /* server key exchange is not allowed. */
                      al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
                      SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                      goto f_err;
                  }
              }
          }
      }
  #endif
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
      if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && dh == NULL) {
          al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
          goto f_err;
      }
      if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
                 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
          goto f_err;
      }
  # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
      if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
                 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
          goto f_err;
      }
  # endif
  
      /* Check DHE only: static DH not implemented. */
      if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
          int dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
          if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 768)
              || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512)) {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
              goto f_err;
          }
      }
  #endif  /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
  
      if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
          pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
          if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
              if (rsa == NULL) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
                         SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
                  goto f_err;
              } else if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) >
                  SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
                  /* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */
                  al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
                         SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
                  goto f_err;
              }
          } else
  #endif
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
          if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
              if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) >
                  SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
                  /* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */
                  al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
                         SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
                  goto f_err;
              }
          } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
              /* The cert should have had an export DH key. */
              al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
                     SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
                  goto f_err;
          } else
  #endif
          {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
                     SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
              goto f_err;
          }
      }
      return (1);
   f_err:
      ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
   err:
      return (0);
  }
  
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
  /*
   * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
   * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
   * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
   * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
   * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
   * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
   * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
   */
  static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
  {
      int ok = 0;
  
      if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION || !s->tls_session_secret_cb ||
          !s->session->tlsext_tick)
          return 0;
  
      /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
      s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
      /*
       * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
       * so permit appropriate message length.
       * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
       * and not its length.
       */
      s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
                                 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
                                 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
                                 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
      s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
  
      if (!ok)
          return -1;
  
      s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
  
      if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
          return 1;
  
      /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
      if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
          SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
          ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
          return -1;
      }
  
      return 0;
  }
  
  # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
  int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
  {
      unsigned int len, padding_len;
      unsigned char *d;
  
      if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) {
          len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
          padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
          d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
          d[4] = len;
          memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
          d[5 + len] = padding_len;
          memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
          *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
          l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
          s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
          s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
          s->init_off = 0;
      }
  
      return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
  }
  #endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
  #endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
  
  int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
  {
      int i = 0;
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
      if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
          i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
                                          SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
                                          px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
          if (i != 0)
              return i;
      }
  #endif
      if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
          i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
      return i;
  }
  