text: /* ssl/s3_both.c */
  /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
   * All rights reserved.
   *
   * This package is an SSL implementation written
   * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
   * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
   * 
   * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
   * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
   * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
   * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
   * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
   * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
   * 
   * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
   * the code are not to be removed.
   * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
   * as the author of the parts of the library used.
   * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
   * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
   * 
   * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
   * are met:
   * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
   * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
   *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
   * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
   *    must display the following acknowledgement:
   *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
   *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
   *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
   *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
   * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
   *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
   *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
   * 
   * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
   * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
   * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
   * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
   * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
   * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
   * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
   * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
   * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
   * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
   * SUCH DAMAGE.
   * 
   * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
   * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
   * copied and put under another distribution licence
   * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
   */
  /* ====================================================================
   * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
   *
   * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
   * are met:
   *
   * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
   *
   * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
   *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
   *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
   *    distribution.
   *
   * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
   *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
   *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
   *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
   *
   * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
   *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
   *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
   *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
   *
   * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
   *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
   *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
   *
   * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
   *    acknowledgment:
   *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
   *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
   *
   * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
   * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
   * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
   * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
   * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
   * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
   * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
   * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
   * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
   * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
   * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
   * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
   * ====================================================================
   *
   * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
   * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
   * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
   *
   */
  /* ====================================================================
   * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
   * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
   * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
   */
  
  #include <limits.h>
  #include <string.h>
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include "ssl_locl.h"
  #include <openssl/buffer.h>
  #include <openssl/rand.h>
  #include <openssl/objects.h>
  #include <openssl/evp.h>
  #include <openssl/x509.h>
  
  /* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
  int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
  	{
  	int ret;
  
  	ret=ssl3_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
  	                     s->init_num);
  	if (ret < 0) return(-1);
  	if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
  		/* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
  		 * we'll ignore the result anyway */
  		ssl3_finish_mac(s,(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],ret);
  	
  	if (ret == s->init_num)
  		{
  		if (s->msg_callback)
  			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg);
  		return(1);
  		}
  	s->init_off+=ret;
  	s->init_num-=ret;
  	return(0);
  	}
  
  int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
  	{
  	unsigned char *p,*d;
  	int i;
  	unsigned long l;
  
  	if (s->state == a)
  		{
  		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
  		p= &(d[4]);
  
  		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
  			sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
  		if (i == 0)
  			return 0;
  		s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
  		memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
  		p+=i;
  		l=i;
  
                  /* Copy the finished so we can use it for
                     renegotiation checks */
                  if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
                          {
                           OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
                           memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, 
                               s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
                           s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i;
                          }
                  else
                          {
                          OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
                          memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, 
                              s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
                          s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i;
                          }
  
  #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
  		/* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless
  		 * I do this.
  		 */
  		l&=0xffff;
  #endif
  
  		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
  		l2n3(l,d);
  		s->init_num=(int)l+4;
  		s->init_off=0;
  
  		s->state=b;
  		}
  
  	/* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
  	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
  	}
  
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
  /* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen to far. */
  static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
  	{
  	const char *sender;
  	int slen;
  	/* If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will
  	 * set the appropriate error.
  	 */
  	if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
  		return;
  	if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
  		{
  		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
  		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
  		}
  	else
  		{
  		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
  		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
  		}
  
  	s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
  		sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
  	}
  #endif
  
  int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b)
  	{
  	int al,i,ok;
  	long n;
  	unsigned char *p;
  
  #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
  	/* the mac has already been generated when we received the
  	 * change cipher spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md.
  	 */ 
  #endif
  
  	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
  		a,
  		b,
  		SSL3_MT_FINISHED,
  		64, /* should actually be 36+4 :-) */
  		&ok);
  
  	if (!ok) return((int)n);
  
  	/* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
  	if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
  		{
  		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
  		goto f_err;
  		}
  	s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
  
  	p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
  	i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
  
  	if (i != n)
  		{
  		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
  		goto f_err;
  		}
  
  	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0)
  		{
  		al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
  		goto f_err;
  		}
  
          /* Copy the finished so we can use it for
             renegotiation checks */
          if(s->type == SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
                  {
                  OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
                  memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, 
                      s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
                  s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i;
                  }
          else
                  {
                  OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
                  memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, 
                      s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
                  s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i;
                  }
  
  	return(1);
  f_err:
  	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
  	return(0);
  	}
  
  /* for these 2 messages, we need to
   * ssl->enc_read_ctx			re-init
   * ssl->s3->read_sequence		zero
   * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret		re-init
   * ssl->session->read_sym_enc		assign
   * ssl->session->read_compression	assign
   * ssl->session->read_hash		assign
   */
  int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
  	{ 
  	unsigned char *p;
  
  	if (s->state == a)
  		{
  		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
  		*p=SSL3_MT_CCS;
  		s->init_num=1;
  		s->init_off=0;
  
  		s->state=b;
  		}
  
  	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
  	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
  	}
  
  static int ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
  	{
  	int n;
  	unsigned char *p;
  
  	n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
  	if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3)))
  		{
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
  		return(-1);
  		}
  	p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
  	l2n3(n,p);
  	i2d_X509(x,&p);
  	*l+=n+3;
  
  	return(0);
  	}
  
  unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
  	{
  	unsigned char *p;
  	int i;
  	unsigned long l=7;
  	BUF_MEM *buf;
  	int no_chain;
  
  	if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || s->ctx->extra_certs)
  		no_chain = 1;
  	else
  		no_chain = 0;
  
  	/* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
  	buf=s->init_buf;
  	if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10))
  		{
  		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
  		return(0);
  		}
  	if (x != NULL)
  		{
  		if (no_chain)
  			{
  			if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
  				return(0);
  			}
  		else
  			{
  			X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
  
  			if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,NULL))
  				{
  				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
  				return(0);
  				}
  			X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
  			/* Don't leave errors in the queue */
  			ERR_clear_error();
  			for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++)
  				{
  				x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
  
  				if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
  					{
  					X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
  					return 0;
  					}
  				}
  			X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
  			}
  		}
  	/* Thawte special :-) */
  	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++)
  		{
  		x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i);
  		if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
  			return(0);
  		}
  
  	l-=7;
  	p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
  	l2n3(l,p);
  	l+=3;
  	p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]);
  	*(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
  	l2n3(l,p);
  	l+=4;
  	return(l);
  	}
  
  /* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
   * maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
   * The first four bytes (msg_type and length) are read in state 'st1',
   * the body is read in state 'stn'.
   */
  long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
  	{
  	unsigned char *p;
  	unsigned long l;
  	long n;
  	int i,al;
  
  	if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message)
  		{
  		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0;
  		if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt))
  			{
  			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
  			goto f_err;
  			}
  		*ok=1;
  		s->state = stn;
  		s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4;
  		s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
  		return s->init_num;
  		}
  
  	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
  
  	if (s->state == st1) /* s->init_num < 4 */
  		{
  		int skip_message;
  
  		do
  			{
  			while (s->init_num < 4)
  				{
  				i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
  					&p[s->init_num],4 - s->init_num, 0);
  				if (i <= 0)
  					{
  					s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
  					*ok = 0;
  					return i;
  					}
  				s->init_num+=i;
  				}
  			
  			skip_message = 0;
  			if (!s->server)
  				if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
  					/* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
  					 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
  					 * if their format is correct. Does not count for
  					 * 'Finished' MAC. */
  					if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 &&p[3] == 0)
  						{
  						s->init_num = 0;
  						skip_message = 1;
  
  						if (s->msg_callback)
  							s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
  						}
  			}
  		while (skip_message);
  
  		/* s->init_num == 4 */
  
  		if ((mt >= 0) && (*p != mt))
  			{
  			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
  			goto f_err;
  			}
  		if ((mt < 0) && (*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
  					(st1 == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A) &&
  					(stn == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B))
  			{
  			/* At this point we have got an MS SGC second client
  			 * hello (maybe we should always allow the client to
  			 * start a new handshake?). We need to restart the mac.
  			 * Don't increment {num,total}_renegotiations because
  			 * we have not completed the handshake. */
  			ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
  			}
  
  		s->s3->tmp.message_type= *(p++);
  
  		n2l3(p,l);
  		if (l > (unsigned long)max)
  			{
  			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
  			goto f_err;
  			}
  		if (l > (INT_MAX-4)) /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
  			{
  			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
  			goto f_err;
  			}
  		if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,(int)l+4))
  			{
  			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
  			goto err;
  			}
  		s->s3->tmp.message_size=l;
  		s->state=stn;
  
  		s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4;
  		s->init_num = 0;
  		}
  
  	/* next state (stn) */
  	p = s->init_msg;
  	n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
  	while (n > 0)
  		{
  		i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,&p[s->init_num],n,0);
  		if (i <= 0)
  			{
  			s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
  			*ok = 0;
  			return i;
  			}
  		s->init_num += i;
  		n -= i;
  		}
  
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
  	/* If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
  	 * Finished verification. */
  	if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
  		ssl3_take_mac(s);
  #endif
  
  	/* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
  	ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
  	if (s->msg_callback)
  		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
  	*ok=1;
  	return s->init_num;
  f_err:
  	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
  err:
  	*ok=0;
  	return(-1);
  	}
  
  int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
  	{
  	EVP_PKEY *pk;
  	int ret= -1,i;
  
  	if (pkey == NULL)
  		pk=X509_get_pubkey(x);
  	else
  		pk=pkey;
  	if (pk == NULL) goto err;
  
  	i=pk->type;
  	if (i == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
  		{
  		ret=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
  		}
  	else if (i == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
  		{
  		ret=SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
  		}
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
  	else if (i == EVP_PKEY_EC)
  		{
  		ret = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
  		}	
  #endif
  	else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || i == NID_id_GostR3410_94_cc) 
  		{
  		ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST94;
  		}
  	else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 || i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001_cc) 
  		{
  		ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
  		}
  err:
  	if(!pkey) EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
  	return(ret);
  	}
  
  int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
  	{
  	int al;
  
  	switch(type)
  		{
  	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
  	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
  	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
  		al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
  		break;
  	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
  	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
  	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
  	case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
  	case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
  	case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
  	case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
  	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
  	case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
  	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
  	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
  		al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
  		break;
  	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
  	case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
  		al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
  		break;
  	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
  	case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
  		al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
  		break;
  	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
  		al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
  		break;
  	case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
  		al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
  		break;
  	case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
  	case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
  	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
  	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
  	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
  	case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
  	case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
  		al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
  		break;
  	case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
  		al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
  		break;
  	case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
  		al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
  		break;
  	default:
  		al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
  		break;
  		}
  	return(al);
  	}
  
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
  /* On some platforms, malloc() performance is bad enough that you can't just
   * free() and malloc() buffers all the time, so we need to use freelists from
   * unused buffers.  Currently, each freelist holds memory chunks of only a
   * given size (list->chunklen); other sized chunks are freed and malloced.
   * This doesn't help much if you're using many different SSL option settings
   * with a given context.  (The options affecting buffer size are
   * max_send_fragment, read buffer vs write buffer,
   * SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_WRITE_BUFFER, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION, and
   * SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS.)  Using a separate freelist for every
   * possible size is not an option, since max_send_fragment can take on many
   * different values.
   *
   * If you are on a platform with a slow malloc(), and you're using SSL
   * connections with many different settings for these options, and you need to
   * use the SSL_MOD_RELEASE_BUFFERS feature, you have a few options:
   *    - Link against a faster malloc implementation.
   *    - Use a separate SSL_CTX for each option set.
   *    - Improve this code.
   */
  static void *
  freelist_extract(SSL_CTX *ctx, int for_read, int sz)
  	{
  	SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list;
  	SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent = NULL;
  	void *result = NULL;
  
  	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
  	list = for_read ? ctx->rbuf_freelist : ctx->wbuf_freelist;
  	if (list != NULL && sz == (int)list->chunklen)
  		ent = list->head;
  	if (ent != NULL)
  		{
  		list->head = ent->next;
  		result = ent;
  		if (--list->len == 0)
  			list->chunklen = 0;
  		}
  	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
  	if (!result)
  		result = OPENSSL_malloc(sz);
  	return result;
  }
  
  static void
  freelist_insert(SSL_CTX *ctx, int for_read, size_t sz, void *mem)
  	{
  	SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list;
  	SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent;
  
  	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
  	list = for_read ? ctx->rbuf_freelist : ctx->wbuf_freelist;
  	if (list != NULL &&
  	    (sz == list->chunklen || list->chunklen == 0) &&
  	    list->len < ctx->freelist_max_len &&
  	    sz >= sizeof(*ent))
  		{
  		list->chunklen = sz;
  		ent = mem;
  		ent->next = list->head;
  		list->head = ent;
  		++list->len;
  		mem = NULL;
  		}
  
  	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
  	if (mem)
  		OPENSSL_free(mem);
  	}
  #else
  #define freelist_extract(c,fr,sz) OPENSSL_malloc(sz)
  #define freelist_insert(c,fr,sz,m) OPENSSL_free(m)
  #endif
  
  int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s)
  	{
  	unsigned char *p;
  	size_t len,align=0,headerlen;
  	
  	if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
  		headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
  	else
  		headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
  
  #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
  	align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
  #endif
  
  	if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
  		{
  		len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
  			+ SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
  			+ headerlen + align;
  		if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
  			{
  			s->s3->init_extra = 1;
  			len += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
  			}
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
  		if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION))
  			len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
  #endif
  		if ((p=freelist_extract(s->ctx, 1, len)) == NULL)
  			goto err;
  		s->s3->rbuf.buf = p;
  		s->s3->rbuf.len = len;
  		}
  
  	s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
  	return 1;
  
  err:
  	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
  	return 0;
  	}
  
  int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s)
  	{
  	unsigned char *p;
  	size_t len,align=0,headerlen;
  
  	if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
  		headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1;
  	else
  		headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
  
  #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
  	align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
  #endif
  
  	if (s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL)
  		{
  		len = s->max_send_fragment
  			+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
  			+ headerlen + align;
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
  		if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION))
  			len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
  #endif
  		if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
  			len += headerlen + align
  				+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD;
  
  		if ((p=freelist_extract(s->ctx, 0, len)) == NULL)
  			goto err;
  		s->s3->wbuf.buf = p;
  		s->s3->wbuf.len = len;
  		}
  
  	return 1;
  
  err:
  	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
  	return 0;
  	}
  
  
  int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s)
  	{
  	if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
  		return 0;
  	if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
  		return 0;
  	return 1;
  	}
  
  int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s)
  	{
  	if (s->s3->wbuf.buf != NULL)
  		{
  		freelist_insert(s->ctx, 0, s->s3->wbuf.len, s->s3->wbuf.buf);
  		s->s3->wbuf.buf = NULL;
  		}
  	return 1;
  	}
  
  int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s)
  	{
  	if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
  		{
  		freelist_insert(s->ctx, 1, s->s3->rbuf.len, s->s3->rbuf.buf);
  		s->s3->rbuf.buf = NULL;
  		}
  	return 1;
  	}
  
  