Secret military space programs can be a little less secret
Secret military space programs can be a little less secret, Pentagon says

            
  
  
  
    

    

    
      Many defense officials argue that less secrecy will lead to better security.
    

    

    

    
  



  

  
      
    
    
                      
                      
          
Late last year, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks signed a memo to overhaul a decades-old policy on how the Pentagon keeps sensitive military space programs secret. However, don't expect defense officials to openly discuss everything they're doing to counter China and Russia in orbit.
John Plumb, assistant secretary of defense for space policy, revealed the policy change in a roundtable with reporters on January 17. For many years, across multiple administrations, Pentagon officials have lamented their inability to share information with other countries and commercial partners. Inherently, they argued, this stranglehold on information limits the military's capacity to connect with allies, deter adversaries, and respond to threats in space.
In his statement last week, Plumb said this new policy "removes legacy classification barriers that have inhibited our ability to collaborate across the US government and also with allies on issues related to space."
But Plumb was careful to point out that the memo from Hicks calls for "declassification, not unclassification" of military space programs. "So think of it as reducing classification." Effectively, this means the Pentagon can make sensitive information available to people with lower security clearances. More eyes on a problem usually mean better solutions.
New policy for a new century
Some of the Pentagon's most secret space technologies are part of Special Access Programs (SAPs), where information is highly compartmentalized, and only a few officials know all facets of the program. With SAPs, it's difficult or impossible to share information with allies and partners, and sometimes officials run into roadblocks even discussing the programs with different parts of the Defense Department.

          
                      
                  
                    
        
          
    
    
          
          
"Overall, the department does overclassify," Hicks told reporters in November.
Generally, it's easier to assign a classification level to a document or program than it is to change the classification level. "The originator of a document, usually a foreign policy or national security staff member, decides if it needs to be classified," wrote Bruce Riedel, a 30-year veteran of the CIA and a former adviser to four presidents. "In almost all cases this is a simple decision. Has its predecessor's been classified? If so, classify."
The government has periodic reviews to determine whether something still needs to be classified, but most of the time, secret documents take decades to be reviewed. If they are released at all, they generally have value only as part of the historical record.
The declassification memo signed by Hicks is, itself, classified, Plumb said. Hicks signed it at the end of last year.
"What the classification memo does generally is it ... really completely rewrites a legacy document that had its roots 20 years ago," Plumb said. "And it's just no longer applicable to the current environment that involves national security space."
The Pentagon has identified China as the paramount national security threat to the United States. Much of what the Pentagon is doing in space is geared toward maintaining the US military's competitive advantage against China or responding to China in cases where Chinese capabilities may threaten US assets in orbit.
This overarching focus on China touches on all military space programs and the NRO's fleet of spy satellites. The military is launching new constellations of satellites designed to detect and track hypersonic missiles, demonstrating their ability to quickly get a satellite into orbit, and is interested in using commercial space capabilities from US industry, ranging from in-space refueling to broadband communications.

          
                  
                    
        
          
    
    
          
          
"Our network of allies and partners is an asymmetric advantage and a force multiplier that neither China nor Russia could ever hope to match," Plumb said.
Officials have said the threat environment requires the military to be more agile. It's more vital to collaborate with allies and commercial partners.


    
              
                
              
                Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks arrives to a classified all-Senate briefing on artificial intelligence at the US Capitol Building on July 11, 2023.
                                  
                              
            
                  
          
    
    
      Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks arrives to a classified all-Senate briefing on artificial intelligence at the US Capitol Building on July 11, 2023.

              
          Credit:

                      
          
          Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images

                      
                  
          
  
        
            

"So anything we can bring from a SAP level to a top-secret level, for example, (brings) massive value to the warfighter, massive value to the department," Plumb said. "And frankly, my hope is over time it will also allow us to share more information with allies and partners (who we might not) be able to share that information with at the SAP level."
Plumb said the Pentagon's leadership is assigning "minimum classifications" to certain programs, then allowing the military service to examine their own programs and determine whether they should remain Special Access Programs.
"The general point that I have made clear is policy is not a reason, is not the only reason, to hide something in a SAP program," Plumb said. "There have to be technical aspects to it."
The military has traditionally held space programs at a higher classification level, but the Space Force's leaders have encouraged their teams to think more tactically about space operations. This means the Space Force needs to entrust more real-time operational decisions to junior officers who may not hold a top-level security clearance.
The new classification policy apparently doesn't open the door to releasing more information to the public. The military and intelligence agencies, such as the National Reconnaissance Office, have in recent years disclosed previously classified information about some of their secret surveillance satellites that operated from the 1950s into the 1990s.

          
                  
                    
        
          
    
    

        
        
          
          
The Space Force and the NRO still closely guard details about the satellites they currently have in orbit. From the perspective of those outside the military or the defense industry, that's not likely to change.
"That is not actually a thing I'm all that concerned about," Plumb said. "I'm concerned about... reducing the classification of things where they are overclassified to the point that it hampers our ability to get work done or hamper the ability of the warfighter to do their mission."
The Space Force and the NRO have a growing number of contracts with companies operating satellites for commercial remote sensing, maritime surveillance, and radio frequency detection. The data supplied by these companies are unclassified, so military officials can share their products more widely than they could disseminate imagery from a government spy satellite.
Recent conflicts in Israel and Ukraine have amplified the importance of commercial satellite data to the military.
"The issue with Israel and Hamas, and with Ukraine, the ability to provide threat information to them from our commercial providers... allows them to make their operations better," said Lt. Gen. Doug Schiess, a senior commander at US Space Command, in remarks last month.
There's also value to information-sharing in deterrence, he said.
In 2021, the trade publication Breaking Defense reported the Pentagon was close to revealing information about a super-secret space weapon and providing a real-world demonstration of its capabilities to potential adversaries like China and Russia. But the report of an impending information dump never materialized.
Nevertheless, Schiess said last month that commercial space reconnaissance capabilities contracted by the military provide their own measure of deterrence.
"The fact that we can take information that comes out (from commercial satellites) and show that we've seen something that's happened on orbit, and that we don't have to go through the classification levels to be able do it, is incredibly powerful."


          
                  

                  
          


  




  
  
          
  

  
    

    
      Stephen Clark is a space reporter at Ars Technica, covering private space companies and the world’s space agencies. Stephen writes about the nexus of technology, science, policy, and business on and off the planet.
    
  



  
    
    
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