Removing the Linux /dev/random blocking pool
Removing the Linux /dev/random blocking pool [LWN.net]


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The random-number generation facilities in the kernel have been reworked
some over the past few months—but problems in that subsystem have been
addressed over an even longer time frame.  The most 
recent changes were made to stop the getrandom() system call from
blocking for long periods of time at system boot, but the underlying cause
was the behavior of the blocking random pool.  A recent patch set would
remove that pool and it would seem to be headed for the mainline kernel.



Andy Lutomirski posted
version 3 of the patch set toward the end of December.  It makes
"two major semantic changes to Linux's random APIs".  It adds
a new GRND_INSECURE flag to the getrandom()
system call (though Lutomirski refers to it as getentropy(), which
is implemented in glibc using getrandom() with fixed flags); that
flag would cause the call to always return the amount of 
data requested, but with no guarantee that the data is random.  The kernel
would just make its best effort to give the best random data it has at that
point in time.  "Calling it 'INSECURE' is
probably the best we can do to discourage using this API for things
that need security."



The patches also remove the blocking pool.  The kernel currently maintains
two pools of random data, one that corresponds to /dev/random and
another for /dev/urandom, as described in this 2015 article.  The blocking pool is the one
for /dev/random; reads to that device will block (thus the name)
until "enough" entropy has been gathered from the system to satisfy the
request.
Further reads from that file will also block if there is
insufficient entropy in the pool.



Removing the blocking pool means that reads from /dev/random behave
like getrandom() with a flags value of zero (and turns
the GRND_RANDOM flag into a noop).  Once the cryptographic
random-number generator (CRNG) has been initialized, reads from
/dev/random and calls to getrandom(..., 0) will not
block and will return the requested amount of random data.  Lutomirski said:

I believe that Linux's blocking pool has outlived its usefulness.
Linux's CRNG generates output that is good enough to use even for
key generation.  The blocking pool is not stronger in any material
way, and keeping it around requires a lot of infrastructure of
dubious value.




The changes were made with an eye toward ensuring that existing programs
are not really affected; in fact, the problems with long waits for things
like generating GnuPG keys will get better.

This series should not break any existing programs.  /dev/urandom is
unchanged.  /dev/random will still block just after booting, but it
will block less than it used to.  getentropy() with existing flags
will return output that is, for practical purposes, just as strong
as before.




Lutomirski noted that there is still the open question of whether the
kernel should provide so-called "true random numbers", which is, to a
certain extent, what the blocking pool was meant to do.  He can only see
one reason to do so: "compliance with government standards".
He suggested that if the kernel were to provide that, it should be done
through an entirely different interface—or be punted to user space by
providing a way for it to extract raw event samples that could be used to create
such a blocking pool.



Stephan Müller suggested
that his Linux random-number generator (LRNG) patch
set (now up to version 26) might be a way to provide true random
numbers for applications that need them.  The LRNG is "fully
compliant to SP800-90B
requirements", which makes it a solution to the
governmental-standards problem.
Matthew Garrett objected
to the term "true random data", noting that the devices being sampled
could, in principle, be modeled accurately enough to make them predictable:
"We're not sampling  
quantum events here."  Müller said that
the term comes from the German AIS 31 standard to describe a
random-number generator that only produces output "at an equal rate as the underlying 
noise source produces entropy".



Beyond the terminology, though, having a blocking pool as is proposed by
the LRNG patches will just lead to various problems, at
least if it is available without privilege, Lutomirski said:

This doesn’t solve the problem. If two different users run stupid programs
like gnupg, they will starve each other. 

As I see it, there are two major problems with /dev/random right now: it’s
prone to DoS (i.e. starvation, malicious or otherwise), and, because no
privilege is required, it’s prone to misuse. Gnupg is misuse, full stop. If
we add a new unprivileged interface, gnupg and similar programs will use
it, and we lose all over again.




Müller noted that
the addition of getrandom() will now allow GnuPG to use that
interface since it will provide the needed guarantee that the pool
has been initialized.  From discussions with GnuPG maintainer Werner Koch,
Müller believes that guarantee is the only reason GnuPG currently reads directly from
/dev/random.  But if there is an unprivileged interface that is
subject to denial of service (like /dev/random today), it will be
misused by some applications, Lutomirski asserted. 



Theodore Y. Ts'o, who is the maintainer of the Linux random-number
subsystem, appears to have changed his mind along the way about the
need for a blocking pool.  He said that
removing that pool would effectively get rid of the idea that Linux has a
true random-number generator (TRNG), which "is not
insane; this is what the *BSD's have always done".  He, too, is concerned that
providing a TRNG mechanism will just serve as an attractant for application
developers.  He also thinks that it is not really possible to
guarantee a TRNG in the kernel, given all of the different types of
hardware supported by Linux.
Even making the facility only available to root will not solve the problem:

 Application programmers
would give instructions requiring that their application be installed
as root to be more secure, "because that way you can get access the
_really_ good random numbers".




Müller asked if
Ts'o was giving up on the blocking pool implementation that he had added long
ago.  Ts'o agreed that he
was; he is planning to take the patches from Lutomirski and is pretty
strongly opposed to adding a blocking interface back into the kernel.

The kernel can't offer up any guarantees about whether
or not the noise source has been appropriately characterized.  All
say, a GPG or OpenSSL developer can do is get the vague sense that
TRUERANDOM is "better" and of course, they want the best security, so
of *course* they are going to try to use it.  At which point it will
block, and when some other clever user (maybe a distro release
engineer) puts it into an init script, then systems will stop working
and users will complain to Linus.




For cryptographers and others who really need a TRNG, Ts'o is also
in favor of providing them a way to collect their own entropy in user space
to use as they see fit.  Entropy collection is not something that the
kernel can reliably do on all of the different hardware that it supports,
nor can it estimate the amount of entropy provided by the different
sources, he said.

The kernel shouldn't be mixing various noise sources together, and it
certainly shouldn't be trying to claim that it knows how many bits of
entropy that it gets when [it] is trying to play some jitter entropy game
on a stupid-simple CPU architecture for IOT/Embedded user cases where
everything is synchronized off of a single master oscillator, and
there is no CPU instruction reordering or register renaming, etc.,
etc.

You can talk about providing tools that try to make these estimations
--- but these sorts of things would have to be done on each user's
hardware, and for most distro users, it's just not practical.

So if it's just for cryptographers, then let it all be done in
userspace, and let's not make it easy for GPG, OpenSSL, etc., to all
say, "We want TrueRandom(tm); we won't settle for less".  We can talk
about how do we provide the interfaces so that those cryptographers
can get the information they need so they can get access to the raw
noise sources, separated out and named, and with possibly some way
that the noise source can authenticate itself to the Cryptographer's
userspace library/application.




There was a bit of discussion about how that interface might look; there
may be security implications for some of the events, for example. Ts'o noted that the
keyboard scan codes (i.e. the keys pressed) are mixed into the pool as
part of the entropy collection. "Exposing this to userspace, even if
it is via a privileged system 
call, would be... unwise."  It does seem possible that other event
timings could provide some kind of side-channel information leak as well.



So it would seem that a longtime feature of the Linux random-number
subsystem is on its way out.
Given the changes that the random-number subsystem have undergone recently,
it effectively was only causing denial-of-service problems when it was
used; there are now better ways to get the best random numbers that the
kernel can provide.
If a TRNG is still desired for Linux, that lack will need to be
addressed in the future, but likely will not be done within the kernel itself.

           Index entries for this article
           KernelRandom numbers
            

            