[Eliot Spitzer, Cnn Anchor:] Good evening, I'm Eliot Spitzer. Welcome to the program. I'm joined by regulars E.D. Hill and Will Cain. E.D., what have you got for us tonight?
[E.d. Hill, Cnn Contributor:] You know I'm going to look at "the huh" factor. Are we coordinating with the Libyan opposition or not? Are we working under NATO command and they're taking control or not? A A lot of questions. We're going to try to get the answers.
[Spitzer:] All right. Will?
[Will Cain, Cnn Contributor:] Brand-new numbers out today from a Pew Hispanic study and it says, guess what? The Hispanic population is booming. But the interesting note, where it's booming. I'm going to tell you.
[Spitzer:] All right. Look forward to it. But first breaking news on Libya. For days the White House has talked about handing off control of the operation in Libya to NATO, but now that it's happening, the question of NATO's exact role is still up in the air. Just hours ago, NATO's Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen told CNN that America will relinquish military command within in days. But Rasmussen made clear that NATO will only enforce the no-fly zone. NATO will not take leadership of the most critical aspect of the campaign, those elements relating to the protection of civilians which have been the basis for the assault on Moammar Gadhafi's forces that halted their momentum against the rebels. Listen to this.
[Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General, Nato:] We have not decided yet whether we will take on the broader responsibility. This means that right at this moment, you will have two operations. We have taken on responsibility for the no-fly zone while the coalition still continues its activities. But as I told you, we are considering whether we should take on that broader responsibility. However, that decision has not been made yet.
[Spitzer:] In the military, there's nothing more important than clear command and control. This sounds like command and confusion. Is this any way to run a war? General Wesley Clark served as supreme allied commander of the successful NATO intervention in Kosovo and has an insider's perspective on why an international intervention of this type can be such a complicated diplomatic dance. General Clark, welcome, and thank you for joining us.
[Wesley Clark, Former Nato Supreme Allied Commander:] Thanks, Eliot. Well, it is confusing. And especially when you hear it like this, it's probably less confusing for the pilots because basically they're going to be given a mission order, they're going to be given the intelligence, they're going to be told to go out and do something. They'll be given a frequency. There'll be a controller who tells them what to do and they'll be de-conflicted from other aircraft. But yes, it does sound confusing and I think it's temporary because I think within three or four days, NATO will decide to take the whole thing.
[Spitzer:] Well, it seems to me, General, and I may be wrong about this, but it seems to me that the reason for this delay is that there is uncertainty about what the scope of that U.N. authorization really is. What does the U.N. mandate mean when it says protect, use any and all measures necessary to protect civilians? And so let me frame it for you this way. If you were now the supreme allied commander, as you were for many years, and you looked at that U.N. resolution, and the opposition forces were beginning to go on the offense they were beginning to march from Benghazi toward Tripoli would we be able to provide air cover for them in that offensive operation?
[Clark:] Well, you might not exactly provide air cover for them, but if the Libyan tanks were around the cities and still shelling and so forth, you would be probably able to take out the tanks. Eliot, this gets addressed by lawyers. There's
[Spitzer:] Then you've heard me.
[Clark:] Actually there are lawyers in the State Department and in the Pentagon who will look at this in great detail. They'll use the best guidance they can get to the commanders. I think, you know, the confusion for NATO is rather that Turkey, in particular, they have guest workers in Libya. They're very sensitive in terms of their regional role. There is a Muslim member of NATO. And they want to see how the operation unfolds. It will take a few days to get accustomed to it. And once it's clear that it's not using excessive force and not killing civilians, I think Turkey will sign on.
[Spitzer:] Well, where we seem to be right now, and obviously we watched and talked to folks over in Libya all day long, it seems that the massive bombing, clearly the no-fly zone was established, the massing bombing has created some element of momentum for the opposition forces, but the question is, will this be sufficient to actually turn the tide so they can march forward to Tripoli and actually unseat Moammar Gadhafi. What is your take on the military balance of power right now?
[Clark:] The military balance of power is probably still with Gadhafi. But there are that's a material balance of power. If you look at the moral balance, the morale and the sense of inevitability, I think increasingly Gadhafi's forces will fine that inevitably they're going to be run out of town. There are other nonmilitary factors at work here. The International Criminal Supreme Court considering Gadhafi, considering charging him. Once he becomes a war criminal, that further diminishes things. A diplomatic effort to encircle and isolate Gadhafi is gaining momentum. The training of the Libyan opposition forces, their familiarity with the weapons and so forth, that they're doing themselves is gaining. And inevitably they will become more adept at sharing information with
[Nato. Spitzer:] But in an odd way, you're while you are absolutely correct that it seems inevitable that Moammar Gadhafi will end up on the wrong side of a criminal prosecution by the International Court, does that not create certainly for him an incentive to fight to the end? So where is that pivotal moment? When because he has no place to go. He's going to be tracked down and prosecuted, and who knows what the remedy would be. So doesn't that mean we need to tip not just the moral balance that you talk about that's so important but also the military balance and how do we do that given what the constraints are right now on what NATO or the allies can do?
[Clark:] Gadhafi is unpredictable. And we really don't know exactly what the tipping point is. But it's also possible. His people are reaching out, they're trying to figure out what's going on. It's also possible he may decide he wants to cut a deal before he gets indicted in an effort to avoid the worst possible consequences. He's got plenty of money. He may be searching right now, probably is, for a way to get that money out of there. Looking at which government's going to give him protection. And then he may decide to cut the best deal he can. These people don't go down a single course of action. They're not fools. They're very smart candy operators. That's the reason he's remained in power. So he's ruthless, he's saying he'll never give in and so forth. But there's a part of Gadhafi which is certainly working to say what's my next move and what's my best means for survival. We can't really know from his perspective everything about it. But I think it's a it's a mistake to think that the only thing that can dislodge him is boots on the ground and military force. There are other elements at play here, that there's no there's no guarantee of this as there would be if you put in a sizable invasion force. You would definitely run Gadhafi out. But it's possible that we may get rid of him without that.
[Spitzer:] All right. General Clark, I certainly hope you're right because the sooner he is gone, fewer lives will be lost and the better it is for humankind everywhere in this world. All right. General Clark, thanks so very much for your insight. Joining me now is a uniquely independent voice as one of the most senior advisers of the George W. Bush State Department. He disagreed with the decision to invade Iraq and he believes our current policy in Afghanistan is a mistake. Richard Haass is the president of the Council on Foreign Relations. His book, "War of Necessity, War of Choice" is a must- read. I think we should be in Libya. Richard thinks we shouldn't be. Richard, explain why I'm wrong. And you know I don't like to be told I'm wrong. But I have such faith in you. Explain it to me.
[Richard Haass, President, Council On Foreign Relations:] It's a fair question, as always. I'll speak for myself rather than for the Council on Foreign Relations. I don't think U.S. interests are vital here. The economic interests are significant but modest still. Two percent of the world's oil output. But I don't think the humanitarian crisis was automatic or as acute as people thought. I think other issues in the Middle East are more important, more deserving of U.S. focus, Egypt, Bahrain, conceivably Syria, certainly Iran and Iraq, not to mention Afghanistan,
[Spitzer:] Look, I agree with the second half of your statement, we haven't thought this through properly, and we need to do that very rapidly and very clearly. Let me challenge your premise, though.
[Haass:] Sure.
[Spitzer:] You may be correct, Libya is not one of the vital strategic interests. But is aren't you answering the wrong question? Isn't the right question, if we had not gone into Libya, would we not have undercut the entirety of the revolution for freedom throughout North Africa and the Middle East?
[Haass:] Not at all. Not at all.
[Spitzer:] All right. Tell me why I'm wrong on that one.
[Haass:] The fact that you got the Arab League to support this resolution in the U.N. should tell you something. What was the last time the Arab League endorsed an intervention against one of their own? Answer, never. Why is that? Because Gadhafi is a pariah even in the Arab world. He doesn't have a lot of he doesn't have a lot of resonance. Each situation, what's going to happen in Egypt, it's not going to be based on this. Do you think what the Saudis are going to do in Bahrain is going to be fundamentally based on what happens with Moammar Gadhafi? Essentially each boat on its own bottom.
[Spitzer:] Well, if you're correct, each boat on its own bottom, and in fact each nation will be analyzed separately, then you're correct. No vital interest, we shouldn't perhaps be here. But if you believe, as I do, that if we had failed to go in and sent the message throughout the Arab world that when you're as tough as nails and shoot at your own civilians as Gadhafi is willing to, you survive. But we push out a Mubarak and arguably in Yemen, as well. That sends the wrong message and would have had consequences, I think.
[Haass:] Eliot. Eliot, if the next crisis is in Syria, are you going sit here on your show and recommend that the United States do a no-fly zone and more than it should?
[Spitzer:] Then you assess whether it's possible and here we'll see the possibilities and the realty of success will vindicate this decision
[Haass:] Or in Bahrain? Would you take on the sorties in Bahrain?
[Spitzer:] That is the next choice well.
[Haass:] The answer is you wouldn't. So again you've got to take
[Spitzer:] Not necessarily. All right. But anyway, Richard Richard, your arguments are always persuasive. I want you to explain prospectively
[Haass:] Sure.
[Spitzer:] Look, retrospective question, fascinating, but we've gone beyond it. Prospectively what do we now do? How do we take this to a victorious outcome since we're in?
[Haass:] There's four potential ways this goes at the risk of making it too complicated. One is the cease-fire happens. Highly unlikely. Second is a prolonged
[Spitzer:] Stop. Can I stop if there's a cease-fire, does he then survive and maintain, and that's a loss for us?
[Haass:] Well, again, the question is what then happens? I don't think it's sustainable. Civil wars tend not to stop. It's not like a basketball game with the halftime. I think it's very tough. You could have a prolonged civil war, though, in which there's carnage on both sides as civil wars are. Or you can have either side prevail. You could have the opposition prevail over Gadhafi. He could implode, they could do better without outside help, or just the opposite. Gadhafi could prevail against a disorganized opposition. So this could still go in lots of ways.
[Spitzer:] How do you assess not likelihood but whether we should or not since we're in? You can't go in with a toe, because now an outcome would we agree that if Gadhafi is there six months from now that is a significant defeat for the United States?
[Haass:] It is bad for the United States. The United States has specifically called for his ouster. The best at least on the surface outcome for the United States if he's gone. But then we have to think about some other things. What is the nature of the opposition, how did they how did they orient themselves. Also, can they maintain order? It's quite possible that the ouster of Gadhafi could actually lead to circumstances where NATO or the Arab League or both would be pressured to think about introducing some kind of peacekeeping force. There could be boots on the ground.
[Spitzer:] Because of the fear that mayhem would be the other alternative. But if we want the best outcome there is a judgment tell me if I'm wrong the best of the outcomes is the opposition prevails over Gadhafi in a reasonably short time frame. Is that likely to happen without our giving them more military assistance than they're getting right now?
[Haass:] No. They're going to need a lot more military assistance from the outside. And again, it's only a desirable political outcome if they not only have capacity at the end of the day to run their country, but if they have an orientation. And again, my concern is I don't think you, me, or anyone else can speak with confidence about exactly what the opposition would do if it were to come to power. We don't even know what the opposition would be because indeed once they got rid of Gadhafi, there might be an awful lot of infighting. The pattern of revolutions is once they get rid of the old regime, they tend to then start fighting amongst themselves.
[Spitzer:] Dissent breaks out immediately. That will be next week's crisis if we, in fact, get there. But this is then where the mission creep comes from because no-fly zone was easy to state, in fact, reasonably easy to implement. But now we're bombing we're beginning to intervene in a more aggressive military way.
[Haass:] Exactly. We're already beyond a no-fly zone. This is already a so-called no-fly zone plus, and if that isn't enough, then the question is do you simply level the playing fields so fighting can go on forever? That doesn't seem moral or very humanitarian. So you've got to decide then, are you going to let Gadhafi prevail? Probably not. So I think then NATO is then on the hook to essentially try to tilt the playing field in favor of the opposition that will require a lot more use of air power and conceivably ground forces.
[Spitzer:] Right. Look, we're not there just to be referees and neutral arbiters, we're there to get an outcome. And that's what the president has said. I want to switch geography just a little bit.
[Haass:] Sure.
[Spitzer:] You raised Syria and very powerfully said, look, do you go to Syria next, which is obviously much more problematic, much more difficult. But it Syria the next hot spot where we're finally seeing after the Assad family has ruled for decades, again this organic rising up of opposition?
[Haass:] I would hope so, as the Arabs would say, inshallah. It would be a very good thing to see. It's another minority-run country. The Alawites who run Syria are maybe 10 percent plus or minus of the country. We should be thinking, what can we say, what can we do behind the scenes that might weaken the government there or strengthen the opposition. We should do it there. We should do it in Iran. We don't always want to be on the defensive in the Middle East, where essentially it's our friends coming under power. Under sway, rather. We want to look for ways to weaken the countries that are the most problematic beginning with Iran but also Syria.
[Spitzer:] OK. You are the person who wrote the memos to the president saying here's what we can do. If you were writing the memo right now to President Obama about Syria, what would we do? What could we do? What leverage do we have?
[Haass:] Well, I would be looking now to raise the rhetoric, find ways if the opposition needs help, whether it's with technology, whether it's with cash. That's why you have the CIA. It's also why essentially you want to communicate with these people so they can get messages. The government wants to control the flow of information. They don't want oppositions to coalesce. If we can help in places like Iran or Syria with different types of software technology and the social media, we should be open to that.
[Spitzer:] I hate to go back to Libya, but you did your mention of the reference of the CIA. And your articles on this, which are fascinating, you said why didn't we use covert means. You said we could have used covert means. Would that have been successful? Do we have the capacity? Could we actually have ended Gadhafi's reign that way?
[Haass:] The honest answer is I don't know. But going forward we may have to think about it. If we don't want to have a heavy military presence and the president has also ruled out boots on the ground, and if Gadhafi hangs in there for a while, we're going to have to look at ways of ratcheting up the sanctions, ways of perhaps helping but also shaping the opposition.
[Spitzer:] Right.
[Haass:] And ways of weakening the regime and covert means are one of them. You don't want to deny yourself any of the instruments of national security here.
[Spitzer:] All right. Richard, thank you for coming in. You speak with the wisdom of experience, and that's why I hate to disagree with you. Thanks so much for coming in.
[Haass:] Thanks, Eliot.
[Spitzer:] All right. Coalition air strikes launched perhaps its fiercest attacks yet against Gadhafi. CNN's Nic Robertson is on the ground and close enough to hear the heavy bombardment. We'll talk with him coming up next.